Golden Doves With Silver Dots: Semiotics and Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition (Jewish Literature and Culture) [1 ed.] 0253326001, 9780253326003

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Semiotics and Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition ~

JOSE FAUR 7

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INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS • BLOOMINGTON

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To the blessed memory of my grandfather Joseph Faur, who taught me the meaning of Kabod (Honor-Respect); and David Faur, my wife's grandfather, who helped me find it.

This book was brought to publication with the assistance of a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Copyright © 1986 by Jose Faur All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any infor1nation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses' Resolution on Per,nissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition. Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Faur, Jose Golden doves with silver dots. (Jewish literature and culture) Bibliography: p . Includes indexes. 1. Rabbinical literature History and criticism. 2. Bible. 0.T.-Criticism, interpretation, etc., Jewish. 3. Tradition (Judaism) I. Title. II. Series. BM496.5.F38 1985 296.1'2o6 84-47967 ISBN o-253-326oo-1 t 2 3 4 5 90 8g 88 87 86

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CONTENTS ••

HEBREW TRANSLITERATION TABLE

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PREFACE

1X •

INTRODUCTION

XI

Chapter I. Writing and Graffiti

1

Chapter II. Semiology and Metaphysics 1. Nieto and the Autonomy of Nature 2. The Ontological and Semiological Views of the Universe 3. Semiology and Interpretation 4. Visual and Auditory Thinking 5. Spatial and Successive Organization: Thought and Experience 6. Calling upon the Name of God 7. Speech and Subjectivity 8. Expressive Actions: Encoding and Decoding

49

Chapter III. Freedom, Language, and Negativity Introduction 1. Freedom and Creation 2. Language and Ma~na 3. Negation: Semiotics and Semantics

59 59 66 69 76

Chapter N. Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition Introduction 1. Halakha and Haggada 2. The Formulation of the Oral Law 3. ''Written'' and ''Oral'' Texts 4. Formulation and Publication

84 84

18 18 23 27 29 32

37 41

89 97 100

108

Chapter V. Golden Doves with Silver Dots Introduction 1. Semiotic and Semantic Reading 2. Derasha and Mesira

114 114 118 123

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Paniml,AJJ,or Written and Oral Law Cosmology and the Tora: Semiological Systems Authentication of Tradition Transmission and Change

131 135 138 142

146

NOTES

1 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY

202

INDEX OF REFERENCES

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

214 214 217

INDEX OF NAMES

222

RABBINIC SOURCES

224

INDEX OF TERMS

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PREFACE

Just as in a Cubist painting the same object is viewed from different angles, in this book the tension between ideality and articulation is examined from different perspectives. Significantly, the rabbis compared God's revelation at Sinai to ''a multifaceted mirror which could reflect a subject from every side'' (Pesiqta Rabbati, ed. M. Friedman [Vienna, 188o], 100b). In the same fashion, the rabbis compared Judah's speech to a revolving sphere that reflected the subject from every angle. Referring to Prov 25:11, the rabbis said: ''Just as a [revolving] sphere reflects a subject from every side, likewise, when Judah spoke to Joseph, his words could be seen from all sides'' (Bereshit Rabba, ed. Theodor and Albeck Uerusalem: Wahrman Books, 1g65}, XCIII, 3, p. 1152). This book was possible thanks to a fellowship by the ''Comite Conjunto Hispano Norteamericano para Asuntos Educativos y Culturales, '' in Madrid, Spain, for the project ''Hebraismo hispanico: Legado hist6rico literario de los judios espafioles, '' which I shared with my colleagues Dr. Angel Saenz-Badillos, from the University of Granada, and Dr. Carlos Carrete Parrondo, from the Pontifical University of Salamanca. Part of the third chapter grew out of a study previously completed under a grant from the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia. The first chapter, too, grew out of an initial study made under a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. The publication of this book was aided by a grant from the Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Unless otherwise noted, all the translations are my own.

J.F .

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INTRODUCTION Intelligence cannot generate wisdom without interpretation [midrash]. Anonymous Yemenite scholar

Rabbinic tradition is the most idiosyncratic element in Judaism. Whereas Hebrew Scripture was eventually incorporated into Western tradition, rabbinic thinking seemed esoteric and remained outside the cultural code of the West. This book focuses on some of the most significant aspects of rabbinic thinking in ter1ns of linguistic theory and contemporary critical analysis. In this way we hope to penetrate the hermeneutic code of the rabbis and gain a glimpse into their mode of thinking and literary concepts. The aim is twofold: to introduce the student and specialist in critical theory to some of the seminal ideas of the rabbis, and to expose the student and specialist in Rabbinics to some of the methodology and intellectual horizons peculiar to structural and post-structural analysis. As will be seen, both these fields benefit by learning from each other's endeavors. Like many studies on Judaism, this work, too, must be interdisciplinary. Because our academic divisions do not always fit the Jewish subject at hand, the Jewish scholar may have to cross the boundaries assigned to those disciplines in Western scholarship. Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907), a leading Jewish scholar of modem times, recognized the interdisciplinary character peculiar to Jewish studies. When presenting his views, Salo Baron wrote: ''the understanding of the Jewish past required arduous study of the various disciplines and countries. ''1 In the present work the converging of linguistics, critical theory, and rabbinics also involves a shift in perception and a change in perspective and methodology. Some justification is warranted for such a change. Ever since 1819, Jewish scholarship has been dominated by the movement known as Wissenschaft des Judentums or the ''Scientific Study of Judaism.'' The basic premise of this school was the belief in the objective study of the humanities. Following German historiography, it was maintained that there are universal categories determining the institutions and cultural development of man. The facts that fit these categories pertain to the essential aspects of society; all other facts must be considered peripheral and unessential. Likewise, •

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societies failing to exhibit these institutions and development must be classified as underdeveloped and unrepresentative of the true spirit of Judaism. Essential to this outlook is the belief that Jewish history reflects a gradual progress (to be understood in Hegelian terms) of the national or religious spirit peculiar to Judaism. It was also maintained that scholars could be totally free from all valuejudgments and personal convictions and discover the objective truth, much as scientists observe ''pure empirical facts. ''2 Actually, this notion of Jewish scholarship entailed much more than the mere description of facts. Salo Baron has already noticed how ''the theocratic view of history'' dominating ancient and medieval authors was also present among modern historians: ''with all the variations, from Krochmal and Zuns to Geiger, Graetz and Giidemann, the underlying concept, nurtured from the overpowering forces of Hegelianism and the German philosophy in general, was in more than one respect but a continuation of the old doctrine.'' 3 Contemporary studies in the fields of linguistics and critical theory hardly permit the belief in a ''value-free judgment'' or an ''innocent reading'' whereby the reader is capable of '' objectively'' grasping ''the mind of the author'' in all of its pristine purity. The intimate relationship between a people's Weltanschauung or ''comprehensive view of the world'' and its specific innere sprachform or ''inner linguistic form'' was already established by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835): The intellectual peculiarity and the linguistic conforination of a people are related by such an intimate fusion that, given the one, the other could be entirely derived from it. For intellectuality and language permit and promote only mutually agreeable formations. Language is, as it were, the external manifestation of the minds of the peoples. Their language is their soul, and their soul is their language. 4

Similarly, Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923) observed that if Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Dakotan, his logic and rational categories would have been different. 5 In the same fashion Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) wrote: ''For all the concepts of theoretical knowledge constitute merely an upper stratum of logic which is founded upon a lower stratum, that of the logic of language. ''6 In this country, Edward Sapir (1884-1936) pointed up the close relationship between a particular language and its culture. 7 As the pioneer investigation of Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) has shown, ''no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free.'' 8 The close relationship between language and sensory perception is particularly evident at the auditory level. Ro-

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man Jakobson (1896-1982) has pointed out that minute and extremely subtle phonemic differences, which are sometimes difficult to detect even with modern instruments, can be accurately distinguished by the human ear ''on condition that ... they are rigorously and intimately conjoined with specific meanings'': The minutest phonic differences, to the extent that they perfor1n a discriminative role in a given language, are accurately perceived by all the native speakers of that language, without exception, whereas a foreigner, even a trained observer, or even a professional linguist, often has great difficulty in perceiving these differences if they do not perfortn this discriminative function in his native language. 9

Modern linguistics directly contributed to the formation of contemporary literary theory. Concerning the ''new union of literature and linguistics," Roland Barthes (1915-1g8o) observed: A second principle, particularly important in regard to literature, is that language cannot be considered as a simple instrument, whether utilitarian or decorative, of thought. Man does not exist prior to language, either as a species or as an individual. We never find a state where man is separated from language, which he then creates in order to ''express'' what is taking place within him: it is language which teaches the definition of man, not the reverse. 10

Modern critical theory has disclosed the polysemic structures inherent in literary texts and the possibility of multiple readings and interpretations. (As has been said in the field of scientific observation, ''There is no such thing as an ~maculate perception.'' 11 ) This involves a rejection of such notions as '' objective text'' and purely ''innocent'' reading capable of discovering the ''empirical facts'' and of rendering a ''neutral'' criticism. Concerning the polysemic character of the Tora, the rabbis taught: A single verse may unfold into many senses, but a single sense may not unfold from two verses. [Someone] from the school of R. Ismael transmitted: ''[Is not my word like fire, said the Lord] and like a hammer that shatters the rock?" (Jer 23:29). Just as each blow of a hammer strikes forth many sparks, so a single verse unfolds into many senses. 12

This view implies a deeper appreciation for the role of the reader. ''The aesthetic fact,'' writes Borges, ''necessitates the conjunction of the reader and the text, and only then it exists.'' 13 Ultimately, the sense of a text is conditioned by the her1neneutic code and particular view of the reader. The mahloqet 'controversy,' crisscrossing the entire corpus of rabbinic literature and traditional Jewish commentar-

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ies, underlies this point. Concerning the parity of conflicting opinions, the rabbis declared: ''These and these, are [i.e., they represent] the words of the living God.'' 14 The preceding is especially pertinent for the scholar examining something as complex as rabbinic literature, belonging to a different historical period and produced in a linguistic and cultural environment presupposing a cultural and hermeneutical code radically different from those of the modem investigator.

Linguistics is particularly significant for the proper understanding of the axes present in rabbinic tradition. Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), the father of modem linguistics, observed that all sciences concerned with a system of values (for example, economics, linguistics) can be studied either diachronically or synchronically. In linguistics, diachrony corresponds to the vertical axis of language. It is concerned with the evolution and development of individual elements as they unfold successively through time. Synchrony corresponds to the horizontal axis of language. It is concerned with the static aspect of language at any one time all those logical and psychological factors ''that bind together coexisting terxns and form a system in the collective mind of the speaker. '' 15 Each of these axes is absolutely independent of the other: ''A diachronic fact is an independent event; the particular synchronic consequences that may stem from it are wholly unrelated to it. '' 16 Consider, for example, the French negation pas; the fact that it is historically identical to the substantive ''step'' is in no way relevant to its current use and application. 17 One need not know the history of ''garage," ''automobile," and ''mechanic'' to use these terms properly. (In the same manner one does not need to know the history of economics to be a competent stock analyst, investment broker, or banker.) ''We do not learn about synchronic states by studying . .. diachronic events, any more than we learn about geometric projections by studying, even carefully, the different types of bodies. ''18 There is a radical, absolute opposition between these two axes: ''One consequence of the radical antinomy between the evolutionary and the static fact is that all notions associated with one or the other are to the same extent mutually irreducible. '' 19 Accordingly, when considering a subject from one of its axes, we must suppress the notions associated with the other: The first thing that strikes us when we study the facts of language is that their succession in time does not exist insofar as the speaker is concerned. He is confronted with a state. That is why the linguist

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who wishes to understand a state must discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony. He can enter the mind of the speakers only by completely suppressing the past. The intervention of history can only falsify his judgment.la [italics added]

The application of values and notions from one axis to the other may result in faulty methodology and confusion. Comparative philology, as initiated in Germany by Franz Bopp (1791-1867), was faulty precisely because it did not come to grips with the fundamental opposition of these axes. In this regard, traditional grammars, concerned with the static aspect of language and its synchronic axis, were better defined and more free from ambiguity and confusion: Classical grammar has been criticized as unscientific; still, its basis is less open to criticism and its data are better defined than are those of the linguistics started by Bopp. The latter, occupying ill-defined ground, has no clear-cut objective. It straddles two areas because it is unable to make a sharp distinction between states and successions. 21

Rabbinic authority comprises three fundamental institutions: (1) transmission of the Tora; (2) derasha 'interpretation' of Scriptures; and (3) hora'a 'judicial application' of the Tora and the promulgation 22 of new legislation. The first institution involves the process of qabbalalmesira 'reception/surrendering,' whereby one generation receives the legacy of the preceding generation and then passes it to the next. Here are operative the two basic perspectives of the diachronic axis: the upward view towards the past and the downward view towards the future. The second institution concerns the synchronic study and application of the Tora. The purpose of derasha is not to interpret Scripture on the basis of objective, verifiable data, but rather to generate meaning from the text of the Scripture on the basis of the linguistic, cultural, and psychological factors binding the coexisting terms of Judaism. From the perspective of this axis the Tora has a wholly valid existence apart from its specific history or diachronic axis. The rabbis saw themselves and the Jewish people as ''the linguistic community'' who ''spoke'' and actually ''lived'' the Tora. This perspective must exclude all diachronic notions. ''There is neither before nor after to the Tora,''23 declared the rabbis; chronological considerations are not to be interpolated into this axis. Likewise, concerning scriptural verses appearing in different places, the rabbis declared that ''they were uttered in a single statement," 24 meaning that they must be explained synchronically, as if constituting a single conceptual unit. As noted by R. Nissim Ga'on (ca. 9901o62), this serves as one of the foundations of rabbinic exegesis. 25 As in all value-systems, one may not apply to one axis the values of

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another. ''You only have the judge of your own generation, ''26 declared the rabbis. Thus one may not refer to ''the earlier days,'' but rather must accept the contemporary authorities. 17 The object of the third institution is ''to build a fence around the Tora," to safeguard and promote the Tora in terms of new historical circumstances.l! This institution functions as a bridge between the horizontal and the vertical axes. Wissenschaft des Judentums and much of subsequent Jewish scholarship are concerned with the origin and evolution of Judaism, that is, its diachronic axis. Much of the reproof of rabbinic institutions and literature, as well as of the traditional Jewish commentaries, stem precisely from the inability of the modem investigator to distinguish between his own exclusive diachronic axis and the synchronic axis of the rabbis. The diachronic axis is essential to understanding the context and circumstances of rabbinic institutions and literature: it is about Judaism. The synchronic axis involves understanding the factors giving cohesion to the system of values of the rabbis: it pertains to Judaism itself, not to its circumstances. Both these axes are necessary for a total view of Judaism. Although highly sensitive to historical considerations, the major thrust of this study is the synchronic axis of the rabbis. Five closely related areas are examined here. The focus of this work is a rabbinic passage examined in the final chapter-distinguishing between the idea as originally conceived in the mind of the first person, and the idea as processed into language and communicated to the second person. In its pristine stage the idea is designated here ''ideality''-in the sense of a totally unambiguous thought, prior to articulation-in contradistinction to the thought as grasped by the second person, after and through articulation. Using the verse ''Golden doves with silver dots'' (Songs 1:11) as a metaphor, the rabbis identified ''golden doves'' with the divine oraculum prior to articulation, and '' silver dots'' with the oraculum as processed into language and communicated to the people of Israel. As with gold and silver, ideality and articulation could be equivalent, but ultimately they are not reducible to one another: silver lacks the absolute density of value represented by gold. (For the rabbis lucidity and linguistic density are correlative: diffusion is a function of confusion). 19 There is a perennial residue the specific appurtenance of the ''golden doves''-that will always elude the system of value of the ''silver dots." Between ideality and articulation lies the concept of iteration or repetibility. Here, iteration involves the transformation of the original into a system of values: •

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without transformation, repetition is impossible. The repetition, however, is never identical to the original. The preceding bears directly upQJJ the relationship between the written and the oral Law. For Judaism there are two Toras: the written Law, or Hebrew Scriptures, and the oral Law, which includes all the legal teachings, lore, and commentaries transmitted by the rabbis. It will be seen that a semiological relationship prevails between the written and the oral Law, in which the oral Law is the interpreter system and the written Law is the interpreted system. This type of relationship cannot be inverted: the interpreter system cannot be interpreted by any other system. Accordingly, Spanishspeaking Sephardim designate the oral Law Ley Mental 'Mental Law'-since it is representative of the cultural and hermeneutical codes of the Jewish people. The oral Law is 'the interpretation' of Scripture. 30 ''It cannot be equivalent to the true [i.e., original] Tora," 31 declared R. Joseph ibn Megas (1077-1141), one of the foremost rabbinic figures of the Iberian Peninsula. The most authoritative collection of the oral Law is the Mishna (ca. 189), compiled by R. Judah the Prince (ca. 16o-220). Mishna means 'text,' 'formulation.' This term is connected with the biblical obligation 'to transmit' (veshinnantam) the words of God to the children (Deut 6:7). Accordingly, it is not an intransitive verb denoting a reflexive action. Mishna derives from the root ShaNaH, meaning both 'change' and 'transmission': articulation or forxnulation is a transitive action effected through a change which makes transmission possible. 32 Transformation is a basic linguistic process, affecting both the common language and the language of dreams. Arabic-speaking Jews distinguish two levels of language which are transformable (but not reducible) to one another. Shara~ 'meaning' represents the lexical sense of a term. Marna 'significance' represents the semantic sense of the sentence. The marna originates in the mind of the first person, and then is processed into words and distributed in the sentence. In tum, the second person (or reader) processes the words and synthesizes them into marna. Obviously, the sense of the marna is conditioned by the herxneneutical and cultural code of the second person (or reader). Aaron ben Moses (first half of the tenth century), one of the most authoritative biblical masoretes, alluded to the fundamental changes present in speech when describing the psychophysiological chain involved in the reading process. The idea (in the mind of the reader) moves the lungs and then the lungs send air to the vocal organs, ''and the lips and mouth express the sense of writing, and writing is contained in words and words in letters and letters in script . .. and the lexical meaning is comprised in the [semantic] sense, and the sense is in the synthesis of the mind.''33

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R. Baltye ibn Paquda (eleventh century) described the speech process as a kind of writing or translation: ''Speech is the pen of the heart, the translator of the soul, and the emissary of the thoughts. ''34 A similar process is also present in the language of dreams. The dream that one recalls is a transformation of an original dream, never remembered exactly except in prophetic vision. R. Isaac Caro (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) suggested this principle when discussing Pharaoh's dreams. Although R. Caro was discussing prophetic dreams in particular, the principle of transformation applies to dreams in general: ''when one dreams a prophetic dream, one sees the truth itself. Pharaoh had actually seen seven years of plenty and seven years of famine, but his imagination had transformed them into seven cows and seven stalks, since they resemble plenty and famine. '' 35 Iteration of the '' golden doves'' results in countless '' silver dots'' variations. Since ideality and articulation are not reducible to one another, there is a constant tension between the ''golden doves'' and the '' silver dots'' which is resolved in an infinite series of variations. (''Infinite'' is exclusive and should not be confused with ''total.'' There is an infinity of numbers whose factor is 3, but 1, 2, 4, and 5 are not among them.) The derasha serves to express these variations. To begin with, the derasha implies a denial of a supreme reading, of a supreme synthesis capable of concentrating all shades of emotion and meaning. Derasha is the earmark of scholarship and creative thinking. According to the rabbis there are four classes of educated men: the sage, the disciple of the sages, one who is in the habit of reading, and one who can only follow the reading of others. The difference between a 'sage' (}µlkham) and an advanced student or 'disciple of the sages' (talmid }µlkhamim) is that the former is able to produce his own derasha, whereas the latter is only able to follow a derasha. ''If he is a sage [}µlkham]," declared the rabbis, ''he will expound [doresh] the Scripture himself, but if he is an advanced student [talmid }µlkhamim] others will expound [dorshin] before him." A less erudite individual is one ''who is in the habit of reading,'' but he cannot follow a derasha. At the bottom of the educational scale is the individual who cannot read himself, but he can follow when others read for him. 36 The object of derasha is liberation from conventional reading, and dissemination of knowledge; more precisely, it is dissemination of knowledge through liberation from conventional reading. As did Jacques Derrida, the rabbis sought ''a freeplay,'' amounting to a ''methodical craziness'' whose purpose is the ''dissemination'' of texts; this craziness, though ''endless and treacherous and terrifying, liberates us to an errance joyeuse. '' 37 The specific function of derasha could be best understood in terms

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of Saussure's distinction between signifier and signified. The signifier is the sound-image of a word, for example, the spoken word ''tree''; the signified is the concept structurally connected to the sound-image·. Together, the signifier and signified constitute the linguistic sign. 38 The term of the derasha appears as a signifier, not as a signified; meaning is not present, it is generated. 39 Another fundamental distinction introduced by Saussure will help explain how derasha generates meaning: Saussure distinguished between the linguistic concept of the sign (the signified}--which is the counterpart of the sound-image and the linguistic value resulting from the association or opposition of a term to other terms of the linguistic system.40 (This distinction corresponds, approximately, to the distinction between sharab and ma~na.)41 In a derasha, the linguistic concept (= sharab) is either suspended or modified. In this fashion, it is possible to relate a term with another term of the system, and generate new meaning (= ma~na). One illustration of each case will suffice. The rabbis taught: '' A disciple of the sages [talmid bakhamim] who is not hard as iron is not a [genuine] disciple of the sages, as it is written: 'A land [i.e., the Holy Land] whose stones ['abaneha] are iron' '' '(Deut 8:9). 42 Here, the linguistic concept structurally connected with 'abaneha 'its stones' is suspended. Therefore, 'abaneha can now function solely as a signifier and be associated with the homonym baneha 'her sons.' Applying the same method, the rabbis associated baneha with bone 'builder,' in the sense of a scholar who ''builds'' the spiritual legacy of Israel with his contributions. 43 Accordingly, the verse is interpreted: ''A land whose scholars ('abaneha-+baneha-+boneha] are hard as iron.'' The following illustrates how a derasha modifies the signified. Referring to Jacob's wrestling with the angel (Gen 32:25), R. Joshua ben Levi (third century) declared: ''It teaches [melammed] that they raised dust with their feet until it reached the Divine Throne."44 To begin with, melammed 'it teaches' is a technical term used to introduce an explanation that does not correspond to the literal sense of the term (= the signified). 45 Here, the term vayye'abeq 'and wrestled' is associated with 'abaq 'dust'; accordingly, it was explained: ''and they [wrestled] raising dust with their feet." Both of these terms derive from the root 'ABaQ 'dust' (''wrestling'' is related to ''dust'' in the sense that a wrestler is ''dusty'' from the fight.) Although etymologically related, ''dust'' and ''wrestling'' are semantically unrelated. By associating these two terms, R. Joshua ben Levi was modifying the usual sense of vayye'abeq 'wrestling.' Accordingly, the verse was interpreted: ''And they raised dust with their feet until it reached the heavens'' an allusion to the long and painful journey of exile peculiar to Jacob and his children. 46

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The relations effected by derasha parallel the linguistic associations and oppositions established by the speaking community. Historically, the derasha emerges at the time of Hillel (died ca. 20 B.C.E.), 47 when Hebrew was being displaced by Aramaic and Greek both in the Holy Land and among the Diaspora, becoming only 'the holy language' (leshon ha-qodesh), that is, lishana de-be qudsha 'the language [spoken] at the Temple,' and later 'the language of the sages' (leshon lµzkhamim). 48 Without derasha, Hebrew, more precisely the language of the Scripture, would have ceased to function as a ''living language.'' In a speaking community, however, the linguistic relationships ftrst occur in speech and then are projected into the literature. Derasha first establishes the linguistic associations and oppositions in the language of the Tora, and from there they are projected into the speaking community. The first chapter examines the constituents of the book (sefer) and its relation to the people. The author 'st1 rrenders' (moser) his work to a public, entrusting the people with the herineneutical and cultural codes needed to process the text. In this fashion, a covenantal relationship between author and public is established. Outside such a relationship, delineating the semiotic and semantic possibilities of the text, writing is graffiti-not a book. For the Hebrews, the bo~k is their national symbol: it is the Book. Thus, the Hebrews themselves become the symbol of the Bcok. This total, absolute identification creates the Book. ''Book/people'' results in a reciprocal relationship: the people affect the Book and the Book affects the people. Thus the Book is not merely a book----a literary instance; rather, it is a literary genre a mode conditioning the reader's attitude towards the text. Borges noted in another context, literary genres depend perhaps less on the texts than on the mode in which they are read. The aesthetic fact necessitates the conjunction of the reader and the text; and only then does it exist. It is absurd to suppose that a volume is much more than a volume. It begins to exist when a reader opens it. Then the aesthetic phenomenon exists; it is similar to the moment in which the book was conceived. 49

The special ''Book/people'' relationship is manifest in the rabbinic institution for the 'public reading' (qeri'a be-~ibbur) of the Tora. On the one hand, public reading is concerned with the accepted sense of the text (peshat); at this level, the reader must comply with the conventions of the audience: errors or deviations are not tolerated. 50 On the other hand, public reading must be accompanied by the Targum (pl. Targumim) or 'Aramaic version,' the version in the colloquial

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language of the Jews in rabbinic times. The Targumim, particularly those that were recited in the Holy Land, are not plain translations of the text. Rather, they are punctuated by numerous passages and terms reflecting the lore, exegesis, and legal views current at the time. (Therefore in the Holy Land it took three years to finish reading the Tora, instead of the one year customary in the Diaspora.) The recitation of the Targum an institution preserved in the Yemenite Synagogue to the present day-functions as a reader-response on the part of the audience. The meturgeman 'translator' stands by the reader (qore') and recites the Aramaic version after every verse read from the Hebrew text. The meturgeman is thus expressing the feelings and understanding of the public. Here, again, errors are not tolerated. 51 Departures and deviations from the conventional, however, are allowed in private reading. The expression 'al tiqre 'do not read it,' that is, in the customary form, introduces a deliberate departure from th~ established reading. Alluding to this level of reading, R. Joshua (first and second centuries) asked his younger colleague R. Ismael (second century): ''How do you read'' a passage in the Song of Songs? 52 The derasha pertains to reading, but it is not reading. ''Reading'' the derasha in the text will come later, when the master of the derasha had created a public who had assimilated the derasha and now ''reads it'' in the text at hand. 53 Occasionally, as is evident from the Targumim used in the Holy Land, the derasha is assimilated into the ''public reading'' and finds expression in the reader-response of the audience, thus producing new tensions and generating new perceptions and meaning. Derasha is grounded on the special ''Book/people'' relationship; it is not simply the effect of a ''sacred'' text, written in a ''divine language." It will be seen that the derasha is methodologically akin to some of the hern1eneutical rules applied in antiquity to the interpretation of dreams and literary texts. Moreover, the rabbis taught that ''the Tora expresses itself in the language of man."54 Since derasha must express the cultural and hermeneutical codes of the author and the people, a doresh be-haggadot shel dofi 'expounding faltering interpretations'-violating the hermeneutical code55-or an alien derasha:violating the cultural code56-constitutes a betrayal of the convenantal ''author/people'' relationship and renders the derasha illegal. The Book and derasha include Creation. In the mind of the Hebrews the Universe is represented as the writing or active speech of God. Whereas Heidegger (1889-1976) conceived of the poet as a Maker, 57 the Hebrews conceived of the Maker as a poet. According

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to R. Levi ben Gereshom (1288-1344) the biblical expression ''the book which You [God] have written'' (Exod 33:32) refers to the world: Behold, the book that God wrote is everything that exists. . . . That which exists is compared to a book because just as a book points up the ideality from which it was, in the same manner the sensible world points up the Law of the intelligible Universe which is in [the ideality of] God, from which the sensible world is. s8

As a poet and this is the perennial problem of writing-God must hide his omnipresence. ''The poet is each one of the people of his fictitious world,'' says Borges; ''he is every breath and every detail. One of his tasks, certainly not the easiest, is to hide or dissimulate that omnipresence. ''59 In the case of Dante (1265-1321), this dissimulation was accomplished by including himself as one of the figures of the Com media. Similarly, from the perspective of Hebrew monotheism, concepts such as ''Satan'' and ''evil'' must be understood rhetorically, as means of hiding divine omnipresence. 60 The second chapter examines the major differences between the metaphysical and the semiological views of the universe. In the Greek mind ''the world is eternal. It can have no goal; it can only be."61 Therefore, physical phenomena cannot signify. According to this perception, the most important thing is simply to be: ''In a general way, what is important for the Greek is neither to become nor to own, neither to be able nor to will; it is to be. ''62 The semiological view of the universe conceives of physical phenomena (and historical and personal events) as significant indexes that are to be interpreted and decoded as speech and writing. Therefore the Hebrews reject the rigid ''nature/history'' opposition. As with the Book, there is a constant tension between the universe as God's ideality (''the golden doves'') and the actual creation (''silver dots''). This tension is resolved in infinite variation: the initial act of creation is repeated in endless variations. Divine Providence is to creation what derasha is to the Book. One of the implications of this view is the negation of the absolute autonomy of nature. Man does not passively ''dis-cover'' the truth; truth is the effect of dynamic interpretation: it is man's interaction with the world that determines the value and significance of the world. As with reading, sense and value is determined through man's active participation. Through man's interaction, the world is transformed and becomes accessible to man. This perception of man and the universe bears upon the ''nature/artificiality'' issue. The rab-

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bis reported a series of disputes between R. 'Aqiba (50-135) and Tumus Rufus (Tinneius Rufus, the Roman governor of Judea), concerning the validity of what may be described as ''the state of nature.'' Reflecting pagan idealization of nature, Tumus Rufus argued that many biblical commandments, such as rest on the Sabbath, 63 charity, 64 and circumcision, 65 run contrary to ''the acts of God'' (that is, nature). R. 'Aqiba replied that ''the acts of man'' (that is artificiality) were superior, cleverly asking his opponent whether he did not prefer a baked cake over plain wheat. 66 Through a process of transforination, nature becomes artificial and thus accessible to man. With Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), this posits that we can have true knowledge only of what we ourselves have instituted or created: ''Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since man had made it, men could come to know. 67 Isaiah Berlin explains this fundamental concept as follows: Men could know ''from the inside'' only what they had made themselves and nothing else. The greater the man-made element in any object of knowledge, the more transparent to human vision it will be; the greater the ingredient of external nature, the more opaque and impenetrable to human understanding. There was an impassable gulf between the man-made and the natural: the constructed and the given. All provinces of knowledge could be classified along this scale of relative intelligibility. 68

Modern scientific thought further corroborates this point. The application of mathematics an artificial system created by man-to the interpretation of physical phenomena indicates that nature cannot be adequately known unless it is transformed into a man-made system. Commenting upon a verse in Habakuk (3:6) describing the laws of nature as ''the ways [halikhot] of the world," the rabbis declared: ''Do not read ['al tiqre] halikhot, but halakhot69 ['laws,' legal or precise 'formulations']. " 70 At the ontic-ontological level, there are no ''natural laws''-whether scientific or philosophical-that man could ''read.'' Man's relation to nature is conditioned by a fundamental process of 'al tiqre whereby the halikhot are transformed to halakhot. 71 This negates the possibility of mimesis or ''imitation'' of nature: at the literary level, too, nature must be artificially transformed in order to be meaningful. In this connection, it is worth noting that from the point of view of Semitics, what is peculiarly human in language is not the emission of vowels, as Rousseau

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(1712-1778) maintained, but the articulation of consonants: pre-

cisely those sounds which are not to be found in the state of nature. It will be seen that unlike the Greeks who thought mainly in terms of natural space (simultaneous synthesis), the Hebrews thought principally in temporal terms (successive synthesis). This type of thinking involves the application of hierarchical and therefore artificial-structures. 72 According to the mystics, these artificial structures are the garments that will clothe the soul in the world to come. Reflecting this belief, R. Moses Albelda (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) declared: ''The pious construct the time.'' After discussing this point, he added ''And this fits well with what was inculcated in us by the mystic sages, of blessed memory, that the days themselves [lived by an individual] are made into the garments of the soul in Paradise. ''iJ

The third chapter examines some basic linguistic concepts in rabbinic and post-rabbinic traditions. Since meaning is derived from a linguistic structure, according to Saussure meaning must be conceived in terms of the differences and differentiations established by the linguistic system. 74 For the Hebrews, too, bina 'intelligence' is conceptually connected with 'difference,' 'differentiation.' It derives from the root BYN, from which also comes the preposition ben 'between.' This preposition serves to indicate not only spatial (Gen 13:3) and temporal (Exod 12:6, Neh 5:18) separation, but also 'differentiation' involving 'discernment' (2 Sam 19:36), 'teaching' (Lev 10:10), 'understanding' (1 Kings 3:9), and 'judgment' (Gen 16:5). More to the point, in the first blessing of the weekday ~Amida 'Silent Prayer,' which is a request for wisdom and intelligence, the following supplement is to be recited at the conclusion of the Sabbath: this supplement is called habdala 'differentiation': ''You [God] have spoken, in order to distinguish between the sacred and the profane, between light and darkness, between Israel and the nations, between the seventh day and the six days of Creation. . . . Blessed are You who graciously bestow Knowledge.'' 'You have spoken, in order to' ('amarta le-) clearly indicates that the basis of these distinctions is linguistic. The intimate relationship between difference and meaning is best expressed by the Hebrew term 'ot 'sign,' 'letter.' Jacques Derrida indicated the need to find the 'dreamt of' word capable of designating both ''difference and articulation."75 Long ago, the Hebrews located such a word. As a 'sign' and 'letter' 'ot serves to articulate meaning. Unlike a symbol, which is significant in itself, 'ot as a letter is significant only in syntagmatic opposition: according to the rabbis,

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a single letter does not constitute writing. As a letter, 'ot is that which may be related to another letter and generate meaning. At the same time, 'ot means 'different,' 'absolutely unique.' With this meaning in mind, the rabbis designate God as the ultimate 'ot: God functions as the final difference that escapes articulation and identification. 76 Signs, even in a purely relational system indicating differences, do in fact convey a positive sense linguistic signs, even in isolation, necessarily convey a linguistic concept. Therefore, there is identity and similarity among the signs. Absolute difference is realized only when in syntagmatic opposition-when standing ''face to face''-with God (Exod 33:11). Hence the scriptural ''fear of God'' serving as the ground of wisdom and knowledge (Ps 111:10, Prov 1:7). Because the divine pertains to the ''golden doves," esoteric subjects elude proper articulation. Such subjects, as Maimonides (1135-1204) taught, must be apprehended by 'the teaching of oneself' (talqin nafsahu) and remain unarticulated, leaving only a 'trace in the soul': ''there are some significances which are traced in the soul of the perfect individual which, if articulated linguistically or expressed in metaphors, would turn coarse and elude one's design. 77 The fourth chapter examines some of the textuological concepts of the rabbis. 'Written' and 'oral' correspond to the legal status of contracts. Certain contractual obligations are considered 'written' whether they are actually written or not, and others are considered 'oral' even when they are put down in writing. The principal difference between 'written' and 'oral' documents pertains to the institution of derasha. It will be seen that the right of the rabbis to apply derasha to the Tora corresponds to the right of the court to interpret 'secular documents' (shitre hedyotot) surrendered to them by their legal holders. Only a text that was 'written' and published as a 'book' (sefer) can be the subject of derasha. The authority to apply derasha is predicated on the surrendering of the work by the author. In tum, each generation must surrender the text and pass it on to the next, thereby enabling the new generation to make its own derasha. Vertical transmission makes (synchronic) derasha possible; this transmission must exclude the imposition of horizontal interpretation on the next generation. As noted by Saussure, ''continuity necessarily implies change, varying degrees of shifts in the relationship between the signified and the signifier." 78 Just as language comprises two levels (sharal} and ma~na), which function somewhat as a pair of mirrors reflecting one another, oral literature too comprises two distinct genres. Haggada (like derasha) is concerned with the dissemination of the idea; halakha is concerned with the articulation of the idea and its

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transmission in precise for1nulas. Again, haggada involves reflexive knowledge. The Mishna, which is the authoritative body of halakha, involves repetition and transmission to others. Because the Tora is self-referential and free from any extraneous elements that either limit or condition it, the rabbis considered the Tora to be a shira 'song,' 'poem': like a poem, the Tora is complete in itself and accounts for itself. 79 It will be seen that this self-referentiality is not an extension of the text itself, the Tora she-bikhtab 'Written Law,' but of the Tora she-beral pe 'Oral Law.' As it were, the curvature of the Scroll allowing for self-referentiality is the 'Mental Law' determining the methodological horizon and textual logic of the text.

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Contemporary critical theory represents a radical shift in Western thought, resulting in new perspectives and methodology. This shift now allows for a better understanding of rabbinic semiotics and textuality. In the West ''philosophy'' stood in hierarchical opposition to ''rhetoric.'' This opposition further generated a whole series of hierarchical oppositions, for example, ''inner/outer,'' ''content/context,'' ''thought/language, ''speech/writing. In this sense, . ''philosophy'' (as well as ''rhetoric'') are specifically Greek. So Rabbinic tradition is the only intellectual and cultural movement to have continued developing since antiquity without a primaeval rupture an inaugural split-resulting in an endless series of hierarchical oppositions. 81 The comparison of knowledge to 'a tree of life' (Prov 3:18) underlies the organic connection and interdependence of all cognitive subjects. As Maimonides puts it, ''everything which exists is as one single individual''; 82 that is, the whole universe is organically connected and interdependent. 83 To the Hebrew mind, there are no autonomous, abstractly disconnected subjects or concepts that can only be examined in pristine intellectual isolation. The ''philosophy/rhetoric'' split, already evident in the clash between Gorgias and Socrates, 84 constitutes a pivotal moment in the intellectual history of the West. In mythological thinking, ''logos means both word and idea. ''85 Knowledge includes both meaning and the articulation of meaning: meaning and literature were therefore inseparable and indistinguishable from one another. The division of knowledge established by the ''philosophy/rhetoric'' opposition and the subsequent victory of the former over the latter posited a new 86 conception of meaning and language. Meaning is determined by (universal) categories of thought, independent of any (particular) language. 87 Language is merely the means by which meaning is conveyed; ideally, language ought to be absolutely innocent and un11

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obtrusive. The exclusion of writing from philosophy by Plato, and the supremacy of the spoken word over the written script, is intimately connected with this conception of meaning and language. 88 Because the Greeks confused the categories of (a particular) language with the categories of (universal) thought, 89 oral communication gave the illusion of conveying ''pure'' meaning. 90 Thus the ''presence/absence'' opposition. ''Presence'' is only possible in oral communication, whereas writing is the effect of ''absence,'' or the disappearance of ''real'' presence. The preeminence of speech over writing also posits the impossibility of reading. Ideally, the reader ought to be able to incorporate the mind of the author and fully understand the text. Since this is hardly possible, every reading may be in fact construed as ''misreading. ''91 From this point of view, writing could be only conceived as a ''supplement'' to speech, or as the ''outer'' expression of meaning, in opposition to the ''inner," ''natural'' sense. 92 Therefore, ''philosophy'' could not be ''read." Conversely, ''literature'' involves deviation from the original sense of the text and from the truth. For the Hebrews meaning, signification, etc., are inseparable from text. Judaism does not recognize an a-textual problem: meaning is a function of text. The ultimate object of reading is not to discover the mind of the author, but to generate meaning. Referring to Sefer Ye~ira, ''The Book of Creation'' (a work whose core dates from the second century), Jorge Luis Borges remarked: ''I know that these books were not written for the purpose of being understood; they were made to be interpreted, they are goads so that the reader would follow the thought. ''93 As will be seen, this applies to all texts read at the semantic level, where words are treated as signifiers (in contradistinction to the semiotic level, where words are treated as signified). Accordingly, meaning is not a given, it is not present; rather, it is the product of reading. One of the functions of derasha is to negate the ''inside/outside'' opposition. In Western tradition, some elements of the text are to be considered ''essential'' and ''intrinsic,'' whereas others are ''circumstantial'' and only pertain to the parergon 'ornamentation,' 'accessory' of the text. Concerning the analytic of aesthetic judgment, Immanuel Kant (1724-18o4) describes parergon as ''what is only an adjunct. ''94 It is what enables one to frame an art object and to distinguish between the ''inside/outside," ''intrinsidextrinsic," ''essential/circumstantial,'' etc. Derrida explains it as follows: . . . every analytic of aesthetic judgment presupposes that we can rigorously distinguish between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. Aes-

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thetic judgment must concern intrinsic beauty, and not the around and about. It is therefore necessary to know-this is the fundamental presupposition, the foundation-how to define the intrinsic, the framed, and what to exclude as frame and beyond the frame .95

Like the supplement, the parergon inscribes something extra, exterior to the specific field ... but whose transcendent exteriority touches, plays with, brushes, rubs, or presses against the limit and intervenes internally only insofar as the inside is missing. ''96 In the analytic of judgment, this frame ''is what allows us to define the procedure of formality, the opposition of the for1nal and the material, the pure and the impure, the proper and the improper, the inside and the outside. ''97 The same may apply to literary theory whereby some elements are classified as ''extrinsic," ''circumstantial,'' etc., and whose sole function is the framing of the text. In a derasha-text no parergon is tolerated. More precisely, even the parergon of the text or calligraphic ornamentations (tagim) may generate meaning: the ''outside'' is thus the ''inside.'' One of the peculiarities of R. ~Aqiba and his schoolthe most influential movement in the rabbinic period-was the application of derasha to all the elements of the text, including syntactical particles98 and calligraphic ornamentations. 99 By generating meaning from elements devoid of lexical sense, and therefore ''external'' or ''circumstantial," the rabbis were in fact denying any ground for a logic of supplementarity, or of a distinction between ''inside'' and ''outside." Unlike the book in Western tradition, the Scroll of the Hebrews is unbounded and unframed. The Tora may not be written on the verso of the Scroll. Therefore, it can be rolled inwardly, towards the recto, the verso serving as its boundary. Because the book is written on the verso and cannot be rolled in, it requires an outside element, the frame: as does an art object, every book requires a parergon. The inward movement of the Scroll indicates that the text is thoroughly cross-referential and therefore self-referential. It is noteworthy that on the holiday of Sim/µlt Tora, celebrating the completion of the Tora-reading, the beginning of the Tora is read immediately after the end. 100 In this fashion, the total circularity of the text is ascertained. The rabbinic principle, ''There is neither before nor after to the Tora," posits the absolute synchronicity of the Tora: its cross-referentiality may not be limited by chronological considerations. 101 11

Because rabbinic tradition did not recognize the inaugural ''philosophy/rhetoric'' split and insisted upon applying to the text cate-

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gories that were excluded from traditional Western literary analysis, it could not be grasped in terms of the hierarchical oppositions peculiar to Western thinking. This situation is now changing rapidly. Contemporary critical theo~ is now challenging many of the premises and categories separating Western from rabbinic literary theory. Structural and post-structural criticism no longer recognizes the traditional disciplinary boundaries; linguistics, psychology, anthropology, etc., are now applied to literary analysis. The boundaries between critical theory and philosophy are no longer clear. To be more precise, critical theory seems to include ''philosophy'' and in many quarters it is actually displacing the educational and intellectual activities traditionally associated with philosophy. This change has resulted in a common ground sufficient to permit exploring some of the fundamental principles underlying rabbinic interpretive and literary theory in terms of contemporary critical analysis. Although dealing with a central issue (the tension between ideality and articulation) and conceptually interrelated, each of the five chapters of this work stands on its own and may be read separately. Also, depending on the intellectual background of the reader, these chapters may be read in a different sequence. For the modem reader concerned with critical theory the first and second chapters may serve as an introduction to the subtleties of Jewish ideality. For the reader involved with rabbinic literature, the starting point should be the fourth and fifth chapters. The third chapter will introduce the medievalist (or one who thinks in terms of medieval categories) to the peculiarities of classical Jewish thought. Then, depending on his intellectual inclination, the reader may proceed to penetrate either the field of Jewish textuality or that of Jewish ideality. Obviously, as the attentive reader already knows, different arrangements will bear upon the perspective and perception of the issue at hand. Therefore, some may want to pursue more than one course of reading. Finally, in spite of numerous references to and analysis of talmudic passages, we have refrained from examining the Talmud as an independent topic. The Talmud (ca. 499), which was the traditional earmark of rabbinic elitist thought and ideality, is currently the least known of all Jewish subjects. Another possible chapter, ''Rhetoric: Transmission and Tradition,'' if adequately developed, would produce a lopsided effect. Therefore, as it were, the inner orbit of ''the silver dots'' will not be studied here. It would be best to explore it in a separate work.

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WRITING

FFITI

The Jew remains alone with the holy text. He is continuously confronting that text. It seems to me that therein lies the great distance with that which would be Christian. ity. Therein originate the freedom of choice, the audacity, which bestow on the Jew the right to approach God directly in each word, the appeal of his capacity to understand, the tolerance also that flows and which accepts error providing that it proceeds from a sincere approach, authentic to the text. Everything proceeds as if tradition trusts man; the momentary fault is never but a tolerated stage toward the true understanding. Perhaps it is even an anticipated stage. The apparent disrespect that the Jew exhibits towards the holy text is the very sign of his attachment to the Word of God. Edmond Jabes

Writing and graffiti may be best grasped in terms of the distinction of Emile Benveniste (1902-1976) between semantics and semiotics. Briefly stated, the unit of a semiotic system is the sign. In semiology, the sign has a precise value in isolation, known by convention and immediately recognized. Because each sign has a definite value in isolation, ambiguity constitutes a violation of the code and the breaking down of the system. At the semantic level we have the sentence, which contains the sign (the word), but it is not merely the sum of signs: a sentence constitutes a whole which is not reducible to the value of the sum of its parts. The sense of a sentence is ''conceived globally, and then realized and divided into individual 'signs,' which are words." Semantically, the value of a sign is determined by the context. Thus, whereas at the semiotic level a sign is known conventionally, and its precise value determined through 1

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paradigmatic relation to an ideal model, at the semantic level the sign is known through interpretation, and its sense is established through syntagmatic opposition to the other signs in the sentence. 1 The uniqueness of language stems from the fact that it alone comprises the semantic and the semiotic, using the same sign (the word) to accomplish both of these systems. 2 It will be seen that the two levels of language known among Arabic-speaking Jews as sharah 'meaning' and marna 'significance' correspond respectively to semiotics and semantics. 3 Philo also recognized two aspects in language. Concerning human speech (logos), Philo declared that it ''has two aspects, one resembling a spring, the other its outflow.'' Conceptually, '' 'logos' in the understanding re_sembles a spring, and is called 'reason.' '' The actual articulation, or ''utterance by mouth and tongue," may be compared to a spring's ''outflow, and is called 'speech.' ''4 At the semiotic level the ''word/meaning'' grid is absolute and inviolable. Ambiguity is categorically excluded. There is only one c~rrect meaning possible, either recognized as such or not. Language functions as a kind of ''conductor'' transmitting the ''mind'' of the speaker. At this level the linkage between a text and the author is both formal and irrevocable. Ultimately, the task of the reader is to ''recognize'' the ''correct'' meaning of the text, the intended sense as it originated in the mind of the author. At the semantic level the ''word/meaning author/text'' grid is non-operative. The significance of a semantic entity is the effect of interpretation. Prior to interpretation the text appears in polysemic structures, which have more than one meaning; at this stage ambiguity (or 'perplexity' in the vocabulary of Maimonides) is of the essence. This ambiguity involves the reader in a creative choice. Through ''interpretation'' he must process the significance of the text. Along with Roland Barthes, we may say that at the semantic level the reader is actually an ecrivain. He determines his own contextual connections, thus creating the ''message'' and the ''text." In this sense, ''A book must go further than the author's intention."5 There are two classes of reading; semiotic reading is passive and serves to discover and decode the meaning of the text as intended by the author, as in Borges's ''Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote." In semantic reading, every interpretation of a text is like a volume of Borges' s ''The Library of Babel. ''6 Reading, therefore, involves a crisis of choice and is the process that transforms the multiple meanings into a single significant text. 7 Graffiti, whether pictorial or linguistic, pertains to semiotics: meaning is ''recognized'' and known by convention. Graffiti is un-

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ambiguous, excludes interpretation, and is perceived identically by all who are familiar with it. In graffiti the whole sentence functions as a sign, that is, semiotically: meaning is the effect of recognition, not of interpretation. It may be recognized even by those who do not know the language in which it is written, as is ''Yankee go home'' in a non-English-speaking country. 8 Like signs in animal communication, graffiti, once recognized, will elicit an immediate and unequivocal response. ''Graffiti'' includes the slogan, whether political or commercial, which has a pure semiotic function. The key symbols which the slogan contains (''love," ''savings," ''aggression," ''environment," etc.) identify the issue. 9 Because the slogan and key symbols function semiotically, they exclude differences in interpretation. We may now understand why one obvious function perfor111ed by the key symbol is that of providing a common experience for everyone_in the state, ranging from the most powerful boss to the humblest layman or philosopher. Indeed, one of the few experiences that bind human beings together, irrespective of race, region, occupation, party or religion, is exposure to the same set of key words. 10

''There is some fascination,'' remarked Harold Laswell, ''in the thought of how many human beings are bound together by a thread no more substantial than the resonance of a name or the clang of a 11 slogan. '' Whereas human thought and feeling vary greatly in regard to a particular thing or event, ''the key symbol enters directly into the focus of all men and provides an element of common experience. '' 12 One of the most significant aspects of graffiti is the imposition of what may be properly described as ''horizontal reading'' (synchronic reading). This class of reading rejects interpretation and thereby vertical (diachronic) transmission to a public unwilling or unable to partake in the ''common experience'' elicited by the key symbols. 13 Graffiti-reading is best understood in terrns of Elias Ca• netti' s Crowds and Power. Graffiti must be unifortnly accepted by the members of the crowd; those rejecting it belong to the hostile crowd. This sense of absolute conformity gives rise to the overwhelming feeling of equality present in a crowd. Concerning this feeling, Canetti wrote: Within the crowd there is equality. This is absolute and indisputable and never questioned by the crowd itself. It is of fundamental

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importance and one might even define a crowd as a state of absolute equality. A head is a head, an arm is an arm, and differences between individual heads and arms are irrelevant. It is for the sake of this equality that people become a crowd and they tend to overlook anything which might detract from it. All demands for justice and all theories of equality ultimately derive their energy from the actual experience of equality familiar to anyone who has been part of a crowd. 14

There are also ''national crowd symbols'' whose object is to foster national unity and identity: ''Every member of a nation always sees himself, or his picture of himself, in a fixed relationship to the particular symbol which has become the most important for his nation. . . . A nation's consciousness of itself changes when, and only when, its symbol changes. ''15 The national symbol of the Hebrews is the Book. This idea was expressed by Se~adya Ga'on (882-942) when he declared ''that our Nation, the children of Israel, is a Nation by virtue of her laws [bi-shara'ina]." 16 By 'laws' (shara'ina), the Tora itself was meant. However, since the Book demands ''interpretation'' and ''reading,'' this symbol implies selfness and diversity. ''The extent of variation between Jews, both in their nature and their appearance, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena there is,'' observed Canetti. ''Jews are different from other people, but, in reality, they are most different from each other. ''17 The '' crowd'' of the Book is unlike any other crowd. Canetti describes it as a ''naked crowd.'' 18 In Hebrew thought, Book and Desert are contingent upon one another. When God revealed Himself to Moses and charged him with the task of freeing the Hebrews, terms such as ''freedom'' and ''liberty'' were not used. The idea of emancipation from bondage is expressed as '' going on a three days' journey into the desert, to sacrifice to God our Lord'' (Exod 3:19; 5:3), as if God could not be apprehended without this initial journey into the desert. Characteristically, Moses rejects Pharaoh's offer to worship God ''in the land'' (Exod 8:21-24). The Desert, like the ''blank space'' of the rabbis, is an essential element of writing. ''That space, that white interval,'' wrote Jabes, ''far from separating one word from the other, unites them." 19 In fact, Desert is the very condition of speech: ''The word cannot dwell except in the silence of other words. To speak is, accordingly, to lean on a metaphor of the desert, a space of dust or ashes, where the triumphant word is offered in her unrestricted nudity. '' 20

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Revelation, which is speech in its absolute nudity and transparency, must take place in the Desert: ''It is only in the desert, in the dust of our words, that the holy word could be revealed. Nudity, the transparence of a word, it is necessary to regain every time we hope to speak. Wandering created the desert. ''21 The relation of this to the idea of silence and negativity is evident; 22 the Desert is that negation, peculiar to the writer, which, as Blanchot tells us, the writer seeks ''as the no that is not no to this, to that, to everything, but the pure and simple no. '' 23 Like the Desert itself (Deut 1:19; 8:15), this type of negation involves a particular type of ''dread'': Dread does not allow the recluse to be alone. It deprives him of the means by which he could have some relation to another, making him more alien to his reality as a man than if he had suddenly been changed into some sort of ver1r1in; but once he has been stripped in this way, and is about to bury himself in his monstrous particularity, dread throws him back out of himself and, in a new torment that he experiences as a suffocating irradiation, it confounds him with what he is not, turning his solitude into an expression of his communication and this communication into the meaning assumed by his solitude and drawing from this synonymy a new reason to be dread added to dread.~

This is why the Desert, like the negativity that it represents, is not sterile, a mere vacuum or absence of things; rather it is fertile, and elicits a dynamic creativity: 25 ~aira 'perplexity' is the product of the Desert. 26 Because the Desert is the absolute condition of the Book, and because the Book does in fact imply the Desert (without the former the latter vanishes), one may say, along with Canetti, that the Desert, too, is the national symbol of the Hebrews: The image of this multitude moving year after year through the desert has become the crowd symbol of the Jews. It has remained to this day as distinct and comprehensible as it was then. The people see themselves together before they settled and then dispersed; they see themselves on their migration. In this state of density they received their law. If ever a crowd had a goal, they had. They had many adventures and these were common to all of them. The crowd they forrned was a naked crowd; of all the many things which normally enmesh men in their separate lives scarcely any existed in these surroundings. Around them was nothing but sand, the barest of all crowds; nothing is more likely than the image of sand to emphasize the feeling of being alone with itself which this wandering procession must have had .... The duration of their wandering is of

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particular importance. What this crowd sustained for forty years can later be stretched to cover any period of time. 27

It is highly significant that outside the Holy Land, in the Arabian Peninsula-,a country dominated by the desert, the Hebrews discovered their identity as Ahlu-1-Kitabu 'the people of the Book.' Because they projected themselves as ''the people of the Book," even the jahili 'unlettered,' 'ignorant' pre-Islamic Arab recognized them as such. 28 However, the identification ''Book-people of the Book,'' was already present in the Holy Land in Roman times. The habit of burning the Jew together with his Book29 indicates the close association of these two items in the mind of the Romans, an association of later times as well. Referring to the identification of the Hebrews with the Talmud during the Middle Ages, Rafael Cansinos-Assens (1883-1964), remarked that ''Never was there seen such a close association between a people and her book.'' Then he added: In the days of medieval persecutions people and book share the same nefarious destiny and burn in the same blaze of the same pyre and they are wounded by the same pyre and they are wounded by the same keen swords, and one communicates to the other the same fate for suffering, the same innocent cause for torture. Sometimes the pyres are kindled for the culprits for having put their eyes and soul on the nefarious book; at other times the very book is wounded and burned, as [if it were} a living creature, as a sorcerer accused of evil doing .. . . Thus, on more than one occasion the abominable book was burned by order of the bishops, with the same sumptuous cruelty [and] in the same fashion as they were burned, crowned with the coroza ["hat used as a mark of infamy"] and dressed with infamous garments, the sad creatures guilty of having read it. 30

Outside the perimeter of ''Book-people of the Book,'' reading is categorically excluded: writing becomes graffiti and the bookman replaces the man of the Book. In Auto da Fe, Elias Canetti examines the nature of books and the bookman in Western tradition. Kien, the principal character of Auto da Fe, typifies the bookman. ''For that was how I saw him,'' said Canetti; '' as a bookman, and so intensely that his connection to books was far more important than himself." 31 These books were written in a language foreign to Kien, these were books that he never read, that he could not read, whose very content was alien, inconsequential, and inaccessible to him and to the world in which he lived. The ''books'' were objects to be possessed and protected, not to be read. The books provoke a crisis: Kein (''pine wood'' in German) has ''combustibility."32 As a true bookman, he resolves the crisis through cremation: he ends up cremating himself and his books. 33 Unlike the Desert of the Book, cremation is

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not a ''metaphor ... a space of dust or ashes'' where speech is displayed in total nudity. 34 It is destruction, simple and unabashed, an act in which books and all they represent become the instrument and object of devastation. It is through Kien that Canetti comes to a personal realization of the Desert, a Desert that for Canetti, as for Jabes, is self-created. Reflecting on Kien' s end he remarked: and I felt my own books drawn into that fate in some incomprehensible way. It may have been guilt for permitting Kien to lay hands on books; it may have been justice in having to sacrifice my own books for his; but whatever it was, they denied themselves to me and I found myself burnt empty and blind in my self-created desert. 35

The type of ''reading'' characteristic of the bookman reflects the essential monolingualism peculiar to the ancient Greeks and their refusal to become involved in foreign cultures. Arnaldo Momigliano has shown that unlike the Hebrews and Romans who learned Greek, the Greeks never had the curiosity to learn any foreign language. Monolingualism appears as an essential trait of the Greek mind: This is only one of the manifestations of what we may well call the nortnal attitude of the Greeks to foreign civilizations as we know it from the time of Homer onwards. Whether Homer was right or wrong in taking the Trojans as Greek speakers is beside the point. What matters is that his very humane understanding of conflicts presupposes monolingualism. 36

''The dialogue with the Greeks happened," writes Momigliano, ''because the Romans and the Jews wanted it. '' 37 When the Greeks were confronted with a foreign culture, ''silence or escapism was perhaps the usual reaction. '' 38 This escapism is particularly evident in their literary accounts of the Oriental world and its wisdom: On the other hand, the old disinclination of the Greeks to learn foreign languages is only too plainly confir11,ed by these products. Hardly anyone had the linguistic knowledge to recognize the swindles. True enough, after Plato Oriental wise men became real to the Greeks .... But what passed for their thoughts was to a great extent Greek fabrication .... An unreal Oriental world was created to satisfy the craving for revealed and mysterious wisdom. 39

Monolingualism finds philosophical expression in Greek metaphysics and Aristotelian logic, but Greek linguistic peculiarities are confused with universal categories of human thought. As Benveniste demonstrated, ''Aristotle, reasoning in the absolute, is simply

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identifying certain fundamental categories of the language in which he thought. ''.f'J This bears directly on the notion of ''being'' (and therefore the whole of Greek metaphysics) \\'hich is not grounded on universal canons of human thought, but on a specific quality of the Greek language: Let us emphasize this, because it is in a linguistic situation thus characterized that the whole Greek metaphysics of ''being" was able to come into existence and develop.... The language did not, of course, give direction to the metaphysical definition of ''being''each Greek thinker has his own-but it made it possible to set up ''being'' as an objectifiable notion which philosophical thought could handle, anaJyze, and define just as any other concept. 41

Monolingualism is predicated upon a one-dimensional concept of language: speech and thought are thoroughly reducible to each other. Therefore, the semiotic and the semantic are basically identical and must be governed by the same principles. This corresponds with the Platonic view of speech (logos) as apophansis, that is, 'showing' or 'revealing' (in contradistinction with the Philonic logos). 42 Accordingly, knowledge of the semiotic involves knowledge of the semantic. In this respect, all knowledge is reducible to what Maimonides designates as sharalJ al »ism, or linguistic analysis. 43 Other languages and civilizations, by the very fact that they employ another semiotic system, must be regarded as faulty. This view of language and knowledge serves as the basis for the Greeks' preference for oral tradition and their distrust of the written word. Wisdom can only be imparted orally, never in writing. To the Greeks, the sacredness of the book is an alien concept. Concerning the status of the scribes among the Greeks, David Nunes Carvalho (1848-1926) noted: ''These individuals were not always held in the highest esteem. Among the Hebrews it was considered an honorable vocation, while the Greeks for a long time treated its practitioners as outcasts.,,,... Eventually, monolingualism resolves itself into a peculiar for1n of circular reasoning: Western thought alone is truly ''philosophical," that is, it may evaluate all other systems but it cannot be evaluated by any other system. 45 Similarly, scholarly criticism may be best applied to other systems, never to our own. As noted by Momigliano: it is perhaps characteristic of our time that we have so many discussions of the religious ideas of underdeveloped countries, but so little analysis of our own religious beliefs with the simple purpose of ascertaining their credibility. During recent years in Italy more scholarly books have appeared on heretical sects than on modem Catholicism. The men who would be able to illuminate the contemporary

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scene by talking about truth in its historical context have not yet found their public. 46

The identification of the semantic with the semiotic leads directly into the concept of the ''Total Library'' that Borges examined so masterfully; basically, this idea presupposes that the fortuitous combination of words or universal orthographic symbols, recombined in all possible variations, would eventually include ''everything it is possible to express: in all languages." All knowledge, past and future, would somehow be included: ''Everything: the detailed history of the future. . . . the Gnostic preachings of Basilides, the song the sirens sang, the accurate catalog of the library, the proof that the catalog is fallacious.'' The Library would be ''The Library of Babel,'' where meaning is impossible: for every reasonable line ''there would be millions of mad cacophonies, of verbal farragoes and incoherances.'' The real function of such a Library is the categoric exclusion of knowledge; in conclusion, Borges writes: One of the mind's habits is the invention of horrible fancies. It has invented Hell, predestination, being predestined to Hell, the Platonic ideas, the chimera, the sphinx, the abnorn1al transfinite numbers (where the parts are no less abundant than the whole), masks, mirrors, operas, the monstrous Trinity: the Father, the Son, and the unresolvable Ghost, all articulated in one single organism. . . . I have tried to save from oblivion a minor horror: the vast, contradictory library, whose vertical deserts of books run the incessant risk of metamorphosis, which affirm everything, deny everything, and confuse everything-like a raving god. 47

The ''vertical deserts of books'' and the Desert of the Book both arise at the moment of ''crisis''-the former when man's understanding of himself and the world breaks down, the latter upon realizing the silence of words. They differ in their direction. The Desert of the Book extends horizontally, that is, synchronically. It comes about when the man of the Book experiences the silence of books, of the ''self-created desert'' of Jabes and Canetti. Eventually, this can lead into writing and a new creation, perceived as an ''interpretation'' of the Book. The ''vertical deserts of the books'' extend diachronically from one generation to the other. Because these deserts owe their existence to the very books making up the ''Total Library," as with Kien, the crisis is resolved in cremation. Meanwhile, what pass from one generation to the next are ''the vertiginous shelves the shelves which obliterate daylight and in which chaos resides''-which are the very essence of the Total Library.

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Implicit in the idea of ''people of the Book'' is the belief that for the Hebrews the Book is the only book. Arabic-speaking Jews designate the Tora ii sifr 'the book,' just as Hellenistic Jews had called it biblion 'book,' pl. biblia; hence our 'Bible.' From this perspective, ''writing'' does not precede the Book. Rather, it is a by-product of the Book. Eupolemus (second century B.C.E.), one of the earliest Jewish historians, ascertained that through the Tora writing was first introduced to mankind by Moses and the Hebrews. 48 In rabbinic literature, ''written'' means that which is contained in the Book. ''Reading," too, can only apply to Scripture. Therefore, it is also designated miqra 'the reading,' that is, 'that which is read or which can be read.' (Its semantic equivalent, qur'an, introduced by Jews to the Arabian Peninsula, eventually came to designate the Moslem Scripture.)49 The ''readability'' of the Tora distinguishes it from other written compositions and makes it a book, and therefore the Book. Other writings are not read as books (either because the readers do not ''read'' or because the writings are graffiti and thereby exclude ''reading''). The rabbis distinguished between ''[formal] reading," in which the text is chanted according to the rules of biblical prosody, and ''reading as one reads a letter," that is, infortnally. 50 The first class of reading is reserved exclusively for canonical literature. All other writings, even those as venerated as the book of Ecclesiasticus, must be ''read as one reads a letter." 51 Indeed, the rabbis declared ''that if one has read [ha-qore] extra-canonical books''-that is, chanted the text in accordance with biblical prosody-''he has forfeited his portion in the World-to-Come." 52 There is a fundamental aspect of Hebrew ''reading'' which is essential for the proper understanding of ''writing'' and the Book. The text of the Hebrew Scriptures contains only consonants. Vocalization (written-in vowels) renders the scroll ritually invalid. In a work attributed to R. Judah ibn Barzilai al-Bargeloni (late eleventh century), 53 the rules concerning the vocalization and punctuation of the scroll of the Tora were formulated: It is forbidden to vocalize a scroll of the Tora and a vocalized scroll is ritually invalid. As we were taught concerning the scrolls: "A vocalized scroll cannot be read from; even if one erases the vowels, it may not be read from." R. Yehudai Ga"on (8th century), of blessed memory, said: ''One may not put a colon (used in Hebrew as a period] at the end of the verse and if one did, he should erase it." R. Ha'ayye Ga'on (939-1038) sent a responsum in Arabic to the Academy of R. Nissim of blessed memory, as follows: "Concerning a scroll of the Tora which has been vocalized ... we have written on this matter in The Laws of Scribes: 'A vocalized scroll of the Tora may not be read in

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public; even if the vowels were erased'. If it was taken out (to be read in public) it should be returned and another scroll must be taken out in its place. It should not be retained with this blemish as it has forfeited the status of 'scroll of the Tora'. " 54

Furthermore, ''Only the consonantal text [ha-masoret] may be written, but the vocal text [ha-miqra] cannot be written. '' 55 The significance of this rule is particularly evident in the words known as Qere wu-khtib 'Read it A, but write it B.' 56 According to this rule, if one were to ''read'' any of these words as they are written, the liturgical lesson is to be declared invalid. Likewise, if one were to write the text according to the vocal tradition, the scroll is ritually invalid. 57 The Tora embodies two textual levels: at the written level, the text consists only of consonants, therefore it is categorically unreadable; the vocalized text must be transmitted orally and may not be put down in writing, making it (legally) unwritable. Thus, writing and vocalization are two mutually exclusive levels. 'Reading' (qeri,a) is the point of contact between these two levels. The reader must mentally supply the vowels to the consonantal text, and ''recreate, on his own, the word. '' 58 ''Reading'' involves interaction between ~ _the reader and the text, whereby the reader joins the author in creating meaning. 59 Only in this way does the consonantal text acquire sense and significance. The Hebrew qeri,a 'reading' is also a 'summons' and a 'calling up' for signification. The venerable R. David ibn Abi Zimra (1479-1573), whose synagogue in Cairo was under the trusteeship of the Jabes family and 60 where Edmond Jabes himself served as an officer, explained the function of these levels and their mutual relationship. ''There are two [classes of] readings,'' he declared, '' one spiritual and another corporeal." At the consonantal level there is ''a different, spiritual reading of the Tora without the articulation of words,'' in contradistinction to the ''corporeal reading, in the mode of the articulation of words.'' The corporeal reading pertains ''to the things of man'' and 61 serves as the basis for the legal dimension of the Law. Similarly, on the basis of Scripture and rabbinic tradition, Maimonides ascertained that in its pristine state the divine voice heard by the Hebrews at the foot of Mount Sinai was inarticulate: initially ''they heard that awesome voice without the articulation of words." This voice, a voice that according to rabbinic tradition constituted the basis for the first two commandments of the decalogue, was processed into words by Moses for the children of Israel. 62 ''It was Moses," says Maimonides, ''who made them hear this [i.e., the two first commandments] with his own words, in the articulation of audible letters. ''63 The vocal text which the children of Israel heard from Moses is the

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basis of their convenantal relationship with God. In Hebrew 'hearing' (shema1 is intimately.@ssociated with 'comprehension' and 'conception,' as well as 'acceptance' and 'commitment.' 04 Thus, once ''heard'' by the children of Israel and processed in their minds, the vocal text is in fact the oral Law: the commentary (pirush) of the original scriptural text. As previously noted, Spanish-speaking Sephardim designate the oral Law Ley Mental 'Mental Law.' This 'Mental Law,' however, is not passive; it processes the vocal text and ''reads it into the script." 65 Like the oral Law, the vocalization of Scripture is in fact a pirush 'commentary.' It, too, is to be transmitted orally. 66 The mystics ascertain that in its pristine state (tora qeduma), the Tora included what later on became known as the written and oral Law. The division of ''written'' and ''oral'' came about after the articulation of the Law. 67 Concerning this doctrine, R. Elie Benamozegh (1822-1900) writes that these two laws, the written law and the oral law, [known in mysticism as] the Word and the Kingdom, are intermixed and united at a higher scale of the emanations in this superior Wisdom which is simply designated the Law, the eternal Law: Tora qedu,na, and the Word and the Kingdom, the written law and the oral law, constitute but the two halves after its division. 68

From the preceding it follows that reading is not, cannot be, the initial contact between the reader and a text. There is no ''innocent reading''; ''words are never innocent. ''69 First, one ''hears'' the word and ''understands'' it and finally ''reads'' it in the text. Concerning the Tora, Maimonides taught that knowledge of reading came after writing, at the end of the educational process. A poet of the Jewish tribe of Nadir, in Medina, when enumerating the essentials of the Jewish scholars, similarly designated reading as the final stage. 70 According to the rabbis, Scripture is expressive at both the semiotic and the semantic level. The first level corresponds to peshat, usually translated 'the literal,' but actually meaning 'the generally accepted' sense of Scripture. 71 The other level corresponds to derasha, the rabbinic methodology of Scriptural exegesis. Arabic-speaking Jews associated derasha with ta'wil 'exposition' (commonly translated allegory, but actually meaning a non-literal, that is, semantic, interpretation). 72 The purpose of peshat is to expound the mind of the author as expressed in the text. The derasha interprets the text independently of the intention of the author. The elements of the text do not convey the meaning which they had at the semiotic level; derasha is not the sum of each of its components in

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isolation. As in all semantic compositions, the elements of derasha acquire value through syntagmatic opposition. At the semantic level there is no objective meaning. Derasha is a creative composition of the reader functioning as an ecrivain. 73 The specific bond between a people and a book can only be effected through the process of derasha-ta'wil. Although the ta'wilmethodology is generally used by many people in the analysis of literature and other disciplines, it can be properly applied, first, only to the Book and, second, only by the people of the Book. Outside the perimeter of ''Book-people of the Book,'' ta'wil is illegitimate. This will become clear upon considering that the function of derasha-ta'wil is not the semiotic or 'evident' (Arabic ~har); it pertains rather to the semantic which is 'concealed' (Arabic batn) and processed by the reader acting as an ecrivain. 74 Following in the footsteps of Judah ha-Levi (ca. 1075-1141), 75 Maimonides insisted that only the Tora has a genuine batn. 76 Why? This question is related to the view expressed by R. Nissim Ga'on that only a Jew may apply ta'wil to the Tora. In a responsum he dismissed a ta'wil contradicting Jewish tradition, on the basis that this methodology is the exclusive prerogative of the Jewish people. 77 Likewise, Maimonides dismissed the criticism of sectarians78 and non-Jews79 based on ta'wil of Scripture, implying that since these critics do not belong to the Jewish people, their ta'wil is illegitimate. Why? The same point was emphasized by R. Samuel de Uceda (sixteenth century). Commenting on the Mishna 'Abot III, 18, he noted: The intention [of the Mishna] is that to the sages and to Israel was given [the authority] to interpret it [the Tora] and to explain it ... and that interpretation also constitutes "my Tora." ... Only to Israel it [the Tora] was given as a gift .... This may have been the intention of the members of the Great Assembly who instituted ''the blessing of the Tora" and instituted the saying of '' ... Who has chosen us from among all the nations and gave us [italics added] the Tora ... ," meaning that is was given to us as an unconditional gift-to explain and interpret as we wish. It was given to us alone.--not to any other nation!Bo

In the Hebrew mind the ''text/author, word/meaning'' grid ceases to be operative only when, first, the author formally presents the text, and, second, it is formally accepted by the people. In rabbinic tradition the theophany at Sinai is designated matan Tora 'the (formal) presentation of the Tora,' by God, and qabbalat ha-Tora 'the (formal) acceptance of the Tora,' by Israel. 81 Thereupon, ''the Tora is 82 no longer in the Heavens," declared R. Joshua. ''What did he mean to say?'' asked the rabbis. R. Jeremiah (third century) explained

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots ''that since it was [for111ally] presented at Sinai, we no longer heed [even] a celestial voice'' (attempting to explain in the name of God the sense of the Tora). 83 Maimonides declared that one who defended his own interpretation of the Tora on the basis of divine inspiration or prophecy could be charged with the crime of false prophecy. 84 Intimately connected with the foregoing is the technical term mesira, indicating the 'surrendering' of a document to the Court by its legal holder, empowering the Court thereby to apply derasha to the interpretation of the document. 85 Mesira is one of the three deterrnining elements constituting the Scriptures. Concerning this fundamental principle, Se~adya wrote: The constituents of the prophetic Writings are three. One of them is that it should include some mention of prophecy, e.g., "And God said," or ''Thus said the Lord,'' as is found in the rest of the Books; or [that it should include] the teaching of some unknown matter [indicating thus divine inspiration], as in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and Esther. The second [element] is proof that the author of such a book is indeed a prophet .... And the third [element] is that the Nation would accept that book in the collection of the Sacred Books, and collectively transmit it. 86 If these three [conditions] are not met, but only one [or two] of these, that book is not a prophetic book. 87

The act of mesira from one generation to the next is what authorizes the people of the Book to apply derasha to the Book. The rabbis taught that after Moses had formally received (qibbel) the Tora at Sinai, he 'surrendered' (masar) it to Joshua, who in turn surrendered 88 it to the elders, etc. . Hence the right of the rabbinic court to apply derasha to Scripture. Conceptually, mesira involves the presentingreceiving process whereby the Tora is transmitted from one generation to the next. Juridically, it is what makes the people of the Book the legal custodian of the Book. 89 This is why, although all may study Tora, ''Whoever studies Tora,'' said R. Me'ir (second century), ''even if he is a gentile ... must be considered as holy as a High Priest'';90 the rabbis warned ''not to surrender [mosrin] the words of t~e Tora to a gentile." 91 An alien may be able to penetrate into a culture and master its peshat level. However, participation at the semantic level, in which the reader acts as an ecrivain, presupposes the kind of commitment to the text which excludes the alien. More precisely, without mesira, interpretation is an act of violence perpetrated both against the people entrusted with the transmission of the Book and against the author. Indeed, R. Yo}:lanan (ca. 18o-ca. 279) compared an alien who is ''intensely pursuing the study [~oseq] of Tora'' to an individual who is usurping the inheritance of someone

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else (the people to whom the Book was entrusted), or raping the bride of another man (the author of the Book). 92 As with Kien, this type of ''reading'' is violent; the function of ''interpretation'' is to possess the books synchronically. Eventually, cremation becomes the order of the day; books will be thoroughly consumed by the most devastating fire ever devised. Through ''interpretation'' Kien deposits the books in the ''vertiginous shelves'' of the ''Total Library'': affirming everything, denying everything-like a raving god. The rabbis taught that God refused the request of Moses to put down in writing the Mishna (oral Law), in order that the nations of the world not be able to usurp it and declare themselves to be Israel. ''The Mishna is the mysterion of God, and God will not reveal his mysterion except to the righteous. "93 Without tradition it is impossible to penetrate a text at the semantic level; therefore this type of reader could never hope to be the Verus Israel. Since this type of interpretation involves violence, the morality of such reading is essential. From the point of view of the people of the book, the moral factor alone suffices to exclude a reader from partaking in ''the mysterion of God.'' Let us consider some of the major points mentioned above. The special bond between a people and a book is grounded upon an act of trust whereby the author presents his work to the people, entrusting them with the semantic interpretation of the text. Thus they may interpret the text independently of the author's intention. The ''author/text'' grid is thus shattered. In the words of the rabbis: ''The Tora is no longer in the heavens." By accepting the Book, the people become the custodians of the Book and take upon themselves the responsibility of ''surrendering'' the Book to each succeeding generation. ''Surrendering'' the Book is also an act of trust whereby one generation, acting as the receivers of the Book, presents it to the next, entrusting them in turn with their own semantic reading. In this sense, the vertical (diachronic) transmission of a text excludes horizontal (synchronic) imposition of its interpretation. 94 Although no authority may revoke a decree enacted by a preceding authority unless the succeeding authority is of higher rank, each generation has the right to dismiss a decree based upon a derasha of previous times. R. Meir Abul~afia (ca. 1170-1244), a prestigious rabbinic figure of Castille, taught this crucial point in the name of Ha,ayye Ga'on. 95 R. David ibn Abi Zimra concluded independently that Maimonides held the same view. 96 This position is the ground of the Oriental and Sephardic traditions ascertaining that derasha is not binding even

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when transmitted by the most authoritative sources of the oral Law, the Talmud. 97 Unlike legislation that may be promulgated on the basis of authority, derasha, like all semantic interpretations, must be subjective: its value is always a matter of acceptability. Vertical transmission excludes horizontal imposition. Therefore, ta'wil cannot be imposed. As a matter of fact, one of the characteristics of the people of the Book is rejection of those trying to impose their ta'wil on others. 98 Vertical transmission may be best appreciated when examining it with regard to translations of the Book. According to Islam the Koran is untranslatable; it must be read and transmitted in the original alone. 99 Diachronic transmission, in the sense of '' surrendering'' the text to a succeeding and therefore essentially different generation, is unacceptable. The movement must always be upwards: from the people to the Book, not the other way around. The term taqlid 'imitation' best describes the devotional attitude expected from later generations in carrying on the traditions of their predecessors. Christianity admits translation of the Scriptures but does not recognize an original text in reference to which translations are accountable. Judaism alone recognizes both the original text of the Book as well as translations of the Book. 100 Vertical transmission of the Book implies the impossibility of writing books. Because semantic reading of the Book is inexhaustible, every book is a mere variant of the original Book: it implies the 101 Book; without it, it is meaningless. Because a book is nothing more than one variant among countless 102 possibilities, writing may be described as ''the insane game. '' The Hebrews became the ''people of the Book'' by accepting the full implications of the Book: they abstained from writing books. (Or, to put it differently: their book is the Book because they abstained from writing books.) Rather than play ''the insane game of writing,'' they heeded the advice of King Solomon-the traditional author of Ecclesiastes ''that of making many books there is no end'' (Eccles 12:12). The canonization of Scripture (ca. 100) is the formal acknowledgment of this advice. Henceforth, writing would be a surrogate for the spoken word and would belong to the ''oral Law," which is a ''commentary'' on the written Law. 103 In order to safeguard the reader from being trapped by ''the insane game of writing,'' a '' commentary'' cannot be per1nitted to become a ''book'': the oral Law is not to be read semantically. The rabbis explicitly excluded the application of derasha to the oral Law. 104 Since the oral Law is to be understood semiotically and its terms must be grasped according to their original sense, special instruction is required. Arabic-speaking Jews designate with the term talqin the instruction

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Writing and Graffiti required for understanding this type of text. The instructor of talqin must supply the student with the linguistic and intellectual apparatus by which the text can be grasped in its original sense. It is important to note that in order to be effective, talqin must be delivered personally, by oral communication. 105 Graffiti is the purest form of semiotic reading, in which the ''mind'' of the author is immediately and unambiguously recognized. As with ancient hieroglyphics, this type of inscription is not concerned with diachronic transmission. The ephemeral character of the graffiti-medium clearly indicates indifference to vertical reading. Even inscriptions made in a more per1nanent script are not designed for vertical transmission. They cannot reach the reader; rather the reader must tum and approach them. 1°" Indeed, this situation affects all compositions in which the author, as an ecrivain, fails to ''surrender'' his work to a public authorized to interpret it semantically. The situation is made more difficult by the vocal character of Western literature and its encouragement of the production of the ''readerly'' text, discussed so brilliantly by Barthes. 107 Moreover, even when producing an absolutely ''un-readerly'' text (such as the Hebrew Scriptures consisting solely of consonants), special measures must be taken lest the reader cease to be an ecrivain and succumb to the trappings of the ''insane game of writing,'' a la Mallarme, io8 or even worse, be transformed into a Pierre Menard ''rewriting'' Don Quixote, a la Paul Valery. 109 In this sense, as noted by Borges, Jews alone produced grandchildren. Unlike the Hebrews, ''The nights of Alexandria, Babylon, Carthage, Memphis have never succeeded in engendering a single grandfather. " 110 In Jabes this relationship is explicit: The Jews' fatherland is a sacred text amid the commentaries it has given rise to. Hence, every Jew is in the Law. Hence, every Jew makes the Law. Hence, the Law is Jewish. 1 1 1

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II.

SEMIOLOGY D METAPHYSICS There isn't a bird in the air, or a tree in the forest, or a flower in the meadow, or an animal in the mountain, a fish in the waters, an herb in the field, that tacitly as a working clock is not indicating the hand that made them and the wisdom that designed them. Isaac Cardoso

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Nieto and the Autonomy of Nature

The rise of modem secularism is intimately connected with the perception of the Universe as a self-contained, autonomous entity governed by the laws of Nature. The Clock became the symbol of a Universe moved by an inner mechanism, following well-defined and mathematically predictable motions: But while they were gargantuan toys, such clocks were far more than toys: they were symbols related to the inmost, and often unverbalized, tendencies of that age. By 1319-20 a novel theory of impetus was emerging, transitional between that of Aristotle and Newton's inertial motion: Under the older concept, nothing moved unless it was constantly pushed by an outside force. Under the new physical theory, things keep moving by means of forces originally imprinted upon them, by vis impressa. Moreover, regularity, mathematically predictable relationships, facts quantitatively measurable, were looming larger in men's picture of the universe. And the great clock, partly because its inexorability was so playfully masked, its mechanism so humanized by its whimsicalities, furnished the picture. It is in the works of the great ecclesiastic and mathematician Nicholas Oresmus, who died in 1382 as Bishop of Lisieux, that we first find the metaphor of the universe as a vast mechanical clock created and set running by God so that 'all the wheels move as harmoniously as

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possible'. It was a notion with a future: eventually the metaphor became a metaphysics. 1

Later, Robert Boyle (1627-1691) conceived of God as a divine clockmaker creating a Universe that, once started, continues on its own mechanical course. 2 Similarly, the Deists flourishing in England at the same time believed Nature to be a fully autonomous entity designed by God and governed by its own internal laws rather than by Divine intervention. 3 This conception of Nature found its ultimate expression in the publication of Isaac Newton's Principia (1687) according to which the Universe is conceived of as a law-abiding and fully autonomous machine, rigidly determined by precise mathematical formulae. Eventually, the theological and philosophical ''explanations'' associated with the design and function of Nature appeared to be extraneous, obtrusive, and bizarre. The result was a ''value-free'' perception of the Universe. Scientifically, the mechanistic view of the Universe was overthrown by Albert Einstein (1879-1955). The concepts of quantum mechanics begun by Max Planck (1858-1947) and further developed by Werner Heisenberg (b. 1901) totally demolished the geometric structure of space-time lingering from classical mechanics. Ideologically, this structure had already been opposed by R. David Nieto (1654-1728), the spiritual leader of the Sephardic community in London. Although he himself was an accomplished scientist-probably the only Jew of his time who could understand the Principiahe did not concern himself with the scientific aspects of this view. 4 His singular concern was with the spiritual implications contained in the mechanistic view of Nature as maintained by the Deists. In a sermon delivered on November 20, 1703, at the Sephardic Synagogue in London, Sharar ha-Shamayim, David Nieto declared that the notion of a Universal Nature in the sense of an autonomous entity governing the physical world-is contrary to basic Jewish belief. Indeed, he had recently taught this doctrine at the Yeshiba (Rabbinical Academy) in reaction to the Deist's position ''that there is only one God, but that He does not trouble Himself with the government of the world ... and that Nature directs and governs everything in its way." 5 Nieto insisted that the very notion of ''Nature'' is foreign to Jewish thinking, since tebar, the Hebrew term for it, was first introduced 6 during the Middle Ages under Arabic influence. All the phenomena attributed to Nature in pagan thinking are attributed by Scripture (cf. Ps 36, 102-104, 136, 141, etc.) and by the rabbis directly to God: God blows the wind and pours the rain, He takes bread out of the earth and gives sustenance to all. 7 Even biological abnormalities are

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directly attributed to Him. The rabbis prescribe that upon observation of some biological mutation one must pronounce the forinula ''Blessed art Thou ... who changes [i.e., deforms] His creatures.'' In opposition to those who argued that God only created ''the species'' (which are only segments of the universal Nature), Nieto pointed out that ''freaks'' do not constitute any specific species. Rather, they are abnorinal individuals. Therefore, the blessing could not allude to a primaeval species of freaks established during Creation. 8 The same applies to other blessings, such as '' ... He who takes the bread out of the earth,'' ''. . . He who creates the fruit of the land,'' ''. . . He who creates the fruit of the tree,'' etc. The participial form used in this type of blessing clearly indicates that the concrete morsel of bread or fruit now about to be eaten is intended. 9 Citing such classical Jewish thinkers as Rabbis Judah ha-Levi, Nissim Gerondi (?1310-1375), Judah Moscato (1530-1593), Isaac ~Arama (1420-1494), and Jacob Abendana (1630-1685), Nieto declared that in Jewish thought ''God is Nature, '' 10 meaning that what is conceived in pagan thinking as the function of a universal Nature is viewed by Judaism as the exclusive province of God. He summarized his position as follows: I want to teach the people and alert them not to confuse the works of God with the works of the Particular Nature. The people say that Nature makes rain and dew but King David and our Rabbis of blessed memory say that God is the one who makes all these things. Therefore, when I say that Nature is God, it means that He provides and makes all these things. Men, however, capriciously invented the idea that it is Nature which makes all these. 11

Before examining Nieto' s position it is worth considering that he belonged to a venerable tradition of Hebrew religious humanists which counted among its ranks such monumental figures as Judah ha-Levi and Maimonides before him, and Rabbis Israel Moses l:fazzan (1807-1863) and Elie Benamozegh after him. His opposition to the concept of Universal Nature must be understood within the context of the tradition that he represented. Nieto (himself an accomplished physician and astronomer, and the most distinguished Jewish scientist of his time) admitted the particular nature of things: ''I distinguish: That there is a Particular Nature I admit. That there 12 is a Universal Nature created [by God]-1 reject.'' His opposition to the notion of ''Universal Nature'' stems from two closely related ideas which are implicit in that view: first, Nature is conceived as an autonomous entity; and second, it is thoroughly opaque. As an autonomous entity, Nature is perceived as ''an absolute, independent power, that gives to all, without having the necessity of receiv-

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ing [anything] from anyone." 13 The view that Nature functions autonomously is contrary to Scripture and the rabbis. 14 Furthern1ore, the most frequently employed analogy of the universe as a Cosmic Clock is based upon a superficial understanding of mechanics. Although Nieto never addressed himself directly to the Cosmic Clock metaphor, his views on this issue are quite clear. In a different context he wrote: Imagine a rustic, who never saw a watch, seeing a clock-dial without knowing that there is an artifact of wheels and weights [under the dial). He would assume and ascertain that the actual metal of the dial has the inner power to show time. Whoever knows the truth would not deny this effect, but would insist that the wheels move the hands on the dial. He who understands better would say that the weights make it work. All speak correctly, with the following differences. He who says that the dial shows time, speaks the truth, when one considers only the effects but not the causes. He who says the wheels is considering the proximate causes. He who says the weight, [is considering] the more principal [cause] which functions as the soul of the wheels. 15

If the Universe is to be conceived in ter1ns of a Cosmic Clock, 16 then it must be clearly understood that it cannot operate as an autonomous entity. Just as are the weights and counterweights in a real clock, ''God is the principal cause and soul 't hat gives life and everything'' to the Universe. 17 Nieto seems to be saying that the dials and wheels of a clock cannot function in an absolute vacuum; a mechanism, any mechanism, is predicated upon a system that transcends it, and therefore it cannot be understood solely in terms of itself. Nieto' s other objection to the mechanistic view of the Universe is on semiological grounds. Nature is thoroughly opaque and precludes any perception of God. I have mentioned that David says that ,God covers the skies with clouds, etc; that God brings down the dew, etc. [I have also mentioned that] the sages of the Talmud teach that it is God who blows the wind, etc. In those happy days and pious centuries, no one doubted, as they do nowadays, whether the faculty of Nature to function independently is God-given. Everything, both mediate and immediate acts, was attributed to God. In the centuries closer to our own, what the Ancients designated as God, has more recently been designated as Hashga}J.a 'Providence.' Later, it further continued to degenerate until it became [totally] corrupted and changed into Teba' 'Nature.' With the passing of time this name gained daily recognition, forining in the mind of the people an image or idol, which

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots seriously affected their mind and soul .... [Thus l the Idol of Nature was for111ed, to which if the knees of the body did not bend, those of the intellect did. Considering it Wise and Prudent, Mighty and Shrewd, Vigilant and Active, Beneficent and Provident ... they applied to it the attributes which [according to Hebrew thought] are applicable only to God. Finally, they all fell and succumbed to the belief expressed by the idolatrous at the time of Ezekiel, who declared ''The Lord has abandoned the earth, the Lord no longer sees.'' (Ezek 9:9) 18

The major objection to ''Nature'' was on semantic grounds: In itself, the term "Nature" is neither bad nor repugnant to the Holy Law of Moses providing that he who utters it would understand its true meaning. However, since not all who utter it understand it, they first for1n false ideas and from them afterwards very har1nful propositions which are contrary to the truth professed by Israel; [a truth that Israel is prepared] to uphold by risking property, children, and life. From these [false} propositions, later on, the Idol Nature was for1ned. 19

According to Nieto, the Hebrews conceived of Universal Providence, in which God continuously repeats the first act of Creation, rather than Nature, which implies a totally passive God. The Scriptures declare that at the end of Creation, the Lord ''rested from all his works which God created to do'' (Gen 2:3). Nieto noted that the nominative agent of the sentence is God. Therefore, the literal sense of this passage is ''that God created, so that He Himself should do; that is, repeat. '' 20 Some objected that to attribute to God the function of Universal Nature smacked of gross pantheism. 21 Therefore, the opinion of R. Zevi Ashkenazi (1660-1718), the foremost Ashkenazic authority of his time, was consulted. In a formal legal decision (pesaq) he concluded that Nieto's position represented basic Jewish dogma. In addition to the book De La Divina Providencia (London, 5464"1704; 2nd ed. 5476/1716), Nieto also issued a legal decision (pesaq) defining the above-mentioned doctrine. He published it together with the Spanish version of R. Zevi Ashkenazi's reply, as well as with statements by the Parnasim 'lay authorities,' in his work Decision (London, 5465/1705). 22 Neither of these legal decisions was subsequently challenged by any rabbinic authority. Accordingly, they represent basic doctrine to both Ashkenazim and Sephardim, the two principal branches of Judaism. The significance of this doctrine will become clearer upon considering the semiological and metaphysical views of the Universe.

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The Ontological and Semiological Views of the Universe

In contradistinction to the Greek thinkers who conceived of the Universe in metaphysical terrns, the Hebrews viewed it as a semiological system. For the Hebrews, not only was Creation realized through speech;1 it actually is the speech of God. 2 It must be noted that in Hebrew, God's 'word' (dabar, 'imra) is a dynamic, creative force. The dabar of the Lord ''is as a fire ... and like a hammer that smashes a rock'' (Jer 23:29). The Universe was effected by His word. With His dabar ''the Heavens were made'' (Ps 33:6). The blessing before consuming non-vegetal foods states ''that everything was with His dabar." Similarly, in the blessing on the occasion of the New Moon, it is said ''that with His speech [ma'amaro] He created the firmaments, and with the spirit of His mouth everything that they contain.'' In the first blessings before the evening Shema~, it is said ''that with His dabar, [He] brings on the evening with wisdom, opens the [heavenly] gates with understanding, alters the moments and int.erchanges the times, and arranges the stars in the firmament according to His will." His 'imra ''drops like dew'' (Deut 33:2), meaning that ''just as the rain and snow come down from heaven, and would not return there, but would water the earth and impregnate it and make it fruitful. . . . so it is with My dabar which comes forth from My mouth: it shall not come back to me unfulfilled, but will do that which I want, and will consummate that for which I dispatched it'' (Isa 55:10-11). God's 'imra gives life (Ps 119:50) and protection (Ps 119:67, 133) to man. All phenomena are affected by it, ''He dispatches His 'imra to the earth: with utmost speed [~ad-mehera] His dabar moves'' (Ps 147:15). The expression ~ad-mehera alludes to the absolute simultaneity between His speech and Creation. Emphatically, the Psalmist declares: ''For He spoke and it was; He commanded and it stood forth'' (Ps 33:9). The same idea is expressed in the morning blessing to be pronounced before reciting the liturgical Psalms (Pesuqe de-Zimra): ''Blessed [be He] who spoke and [it] was." The verb ve-haya 'and-was' expresses the absolute simultaneity between God's speech and its effect. The atemporal Hebrew participle used in the same blessing, ''Blessed [is He] who says and makes; Blessed [is He] who decrees and executes; Blessed [is He] who makes Creation," serves to indicate the simultaneity of God's speech and action. 3 In a different context the rabbis declared that the speech of God is His performance. 4 The simultaneity of speech and action is best expressed by the teramim 'prosodic signs' of the two verses describing the first act of Creation. In the Hebrew text God utters two words: yehi 'let-it-be' 'or 'light' (Gen 1:3). The

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots prosodic marks clearly indicate that they must be pronounced as two separate words. The makkaf 'hyphen' in the following verse (describing the actualization of God's speech) indicates that these two words are to be read as one: Vayhi:tJr 'and-it-was' -'light.' Accordingly, the Targumic Memra 'Word' is a semiological, rather than a metaphysical entity. Me,nra does not function according to some preestablished order: it establishes the order. 5 More precisely, it is the actual manifestation of God. 6 Although it occasionally stands for the intellectual aspects of an utterance, 7 Memra expresses speech as a dynamic, active force manifesting God's activities in the realm of both spiritual8 and natural phenomena. 9 Like its Aramaic equivalent, the Philonic Logos is semiological. In Platonic thought the Logos is metaphysical; it 'gathers,' it synthesizes and organizes according to a pre-established order. It is fundamentally static. In the words of Plato the Logos says ''how a being is." 10 On the other hand, the Philonic Logos is not determined by a pre-established order; it is the ultimate structure containing the totality of ideas. 11 It, like Memra, is 12 the instrument by which God created the world: ''His Word [Logos] which He made use of like an instrument and so made the world.'' 13 Elsewhere, commenting upon the expression ''the House of God'' (Gen 28:17), Philo wrote: Who, then, can that House be, save the Word (Logos) who is antecedent to all that has come into existence? the Word (Logos), which the Helmsman of the Universe grasps as a rudder to guide all things on their course? Even as, when He was fashioning the World, He employed it as His instrument, that the fabric of His handiwork might be without reproach. 14

Since the Logos functions as the laws of nature, 15 it is very close to the Greek ''mind. " 16 Philo's preference for Logos, rather than for a term such as the ''soul'' or ''mind'' of the world as used by the Sophists, 17 clearly indicates that he wanted a term semantically equivalent to the biblical dabar and 'imra. There are no a priori grounds to determine whether the Universe is to be apprehended as a metaphysical or a semiological system; it is a matter of '' choice'' which will determine the validity of one system over the other. Here a metaphor may be helpful. Suppose that an object exhibiting some marks reaches this planet-it could be examined ontologically or semiologically. The marks may be considered fortuitous, like astrological configurations, the lines on the palm of the hand, or the stripes of a tiger. In this case these marks would be void of any signification. Any message that one may ''decode'' must be considered as pure fabrication. The only way to understand it would be through scientific analysis. Conversely, the marks may be

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perceived as signs, such as writing or mathematics. In this case, the scientific analysis is irrelevant to the message, just as the material on which a letter was inscribed and the ink and the instrument with which it was written are not relevant to decoding its meaning. The most important difference between a semiological and a metaphysical entity is that the for111er signifies, whereas the latter is. An ontological entity, like the Universe of classical mechanics, must be value-free: the ''explanations'' are mere interpolations which actually interfere with the primary presence of an ontic-ontological being. For the people of the Book, however, physical phenomena are significant: ''writing'' is intrinsic to nature. Maimonides observed that the tablets containing the ten commandments were written with ''the finger of God''-.a code-term designating the creation of the physical world and natural phenomena. Similarly, the expression ''the doing of the Lord,'' describing how the tablets were made, is a code-term for natural creation. '' And the tablets were the doing of the Lord" (Exod 32:17). This means that their existence is natural, not artificial, as in fact all natural phenomena are designated ''the doings of the Lord," [e.g.]: ''they witness the doings of the Lord'' (Ps 107:24). And after mentioning all types of natural phenomena, such as vegetation, animals, winds and rain, it was said: "How great are your doings, Oh Lord!" (Ps 104:24) ... Similarly, when it says "the writing of the Lord" (Exod 31:18; Deut 9:10), it was explained how [this writing] is related to God, and it was said "written with the finger of the Lord" (ibid.). The expression "with the finger of the Lord'' is similar to what was said concerning the heavens ''the doing of your fingers" (Ps 8:4); [elsewhere] it was explained that they were made with speech, ''With the word of the Lord the heavens were made'' (Ps 33:6). You know, already, that in order to designate the creation of things Scripture borrows [the ter1n] 'speech' and 'word'; and that the very thing which it was [described] as made with speech is [also] [described) as made with the finger [of God]. Likewise, the expression "written with the finger of God'' is equivalent to the expression ''with the word of God." And if it had said 'with the word of God', then it would have been equivalent to having said 'written with the volition of God', i.e., with his intention and will. 18

In opposition to the skeptics who think that a ''natural'' script is too wonderful to accept, Maimonides writes: Would you perhaps consider the existence of [such a) script in the tablets more wondrous than the existence of the stars in their spheres? Just as they came to exist through His first [i.e., unmotivated] intention, and were not made with an instrument, so it was with that script which was written with His first intention, not with

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots an instrument. You already know the text of the Mishna ('Abot V,6) about the ten things that were made at the twilight (of Creation]. Among these are "writing and the script," thus indicating that among the masses it was generally accepted that the writing of the tablets was (genetically] similar to all the acts of Creation, as we already explained in our Commentary to the Mishna. 19

The idea of Creation as the (active) speech or writing of God posits first of all that the Universe is essentially intelligible. In fact, this is the very ground for Einstein's recognition that ''the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility.'' Furthermore, once ''Nature'' is no longer perceived in metaphysical terms, but as the dabar or 'imra of God, God's relation to Nature cannot possibly involve pantheistic notions. The basis of pantheism is metaphysical. For the Hebrews, the relation of God to ''Nature'' is semiological, not metaphysical. There were those who were quick to argue that Nieto was actually advocating a pantheistic theology since by denying the autonomy of Nature he was positing that God acts directly in Nature. 20 David Nieto dismissed these charges. His principal argument was grammatical. He indicated that a ''rudimentary knowledge of Hebrew grammar'' is sufficient to distinguish between active and passive nouns and transitive and intransitive verbs. 21 In Psalm 147 examined in his sermon, ''the nominative agents or active nouns refer to God, whereas the passive nouns are the heavens, rain, and mountains. '' 22 God's action on them is expressed with the transitive verbs ''to cover, ''to prepare, and ''to make grow.'' 11

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Thus we have here three distinct and separate names. One is the Po~el or (nominative] Agent, which "covers'' [the Heavens]. The second is the Pa~ul or [nominative] Passive, which are the Heavens, that bear the action of having been covered. The third, finally, is the thing [expressed in the transitive verb] with which God covers, these are the Clouds. Likewise, using the same method, it applies respectively to the Rain and the Grass . . . There were named here (Ps 147) three distinct and separate subjects, namely: God [who is the nominal] Agent, Heavens [which are the nominal] Passive, and the Clouds that are the Instrument or Means; how could it be [alleged) that in the Sermon the Passive [noun] was mistaken for the Agent? how could one be changed into the other? how could it be [imputed of me] to have said that God is the Cloud, that God is the Rain, that God is the Grass? and therefore that God is Water, Fire, Earth, Sun, Moon, and the Stars? that being a convertible proposition: the creatures are God and [therefore] God is his Creatures?23

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The immediacy of God to his Creation ought to be understood in semiological rather than metaphysical ter111s. For if the Universe is the active ''speech'' of the Lord and therefore His ''book," proximity to Him is a function of ''hearing'' or ''reading,'' of establishing a semiological relationship. The meaning of this relationship will become clearer upon considering the character of the sign and of semiological knowledge. The irreducible distinctness of God and His creatures is grammatically explicit in the distinctness of the nominal and passive agents. The transitive verb expressing the relation between the nominal and passive agents prohibits the identification of one with the other or the belief of an inner, intrinsic connection between them. According to Nieto, pantheism presupposes a total disregard for basic grammatical principles. 3. Semiology and Interpretation Semiological knowledge is interpretive and subjective. 'Emet, the Hebrew ter1n for 'truth,' implies 'trust,' 'faith' (as does its English equivalent). It is context-bound. 'Emet cannot be grasped in the abstract. Outside a specific context it is meaningless. R. Isaac 'Arama, commenting on the verse '' and your truth [extends] until the firmaments'' (Ps 57:11; 1o8:5), noted that 'emet is valid only within the context of the created Universe: outside the real world it is not 1 significant. A semiological entity must be thoroughly transparent. A condition of semiology is that, ultimately, significance must permeate the sign. Once the value of a sign is determined and the message decoded, the sign vanishes. From the point of view of semiology, the opacity of any given entity is a state prior to interpretation, not an absolute condition. Before being decoded an entity is opaque. ''Reading," which is the decoding of an encoded message, means that significance has thoroughly permeated the script and rendered it transparent. Therefore, ''opacity'' is synonymous with ''undecoded." In this connection, it is worth remembering that the elements of the alphabet, unlike hieroglyphics and pictorial representation, bear no similarity to the message. The alphabetically-written word does not indicate that ''real thing'': it is a pure linguistic symbol. ''Whereas, what truly denotes a writing to be hieroglyphic is, that its marks are signs for things," noted Bishop William Warburton (1698-1779), ''what denotes a writing not to be hieroglyphic is that its marks are signs for words. "2 The individual letters (which are visual marks) stand for

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phonetic sounds (which are auditory). The individual shape of the letters is absolutely '' arbitrary'' and totally unrelated to the actual sound. 3 Since letters are not icons, their significance is not intrinsic. Letters become significant only through opposition to each other. Accordingly, a letter by itself is in-significant. Concerning the desecration of the Sabbath, the rabbis declared that ''writing'' must comprise at least two letters. 4 Since all semiological entities are significant only through opposition, they are context-bound. -Significance is the function of interpretation. The Hebrew term for interpretation, peter (pitaron)lpesher, implies the notion of compromise. Interpretation involves the integration of various elements. In Hebrew, it also means ''lukewar111." In a sense, ''interpretation'' may be conceived as blending different elements, as when mixing hot and cold water. Thus ''to interpret'' is to integrate two or more signs and make a '' compromise'' which contains them all but is identical with none of them, just as lukewarm water is neither hot nor cold. Particularly after Plato, the Greek aletheia is 'truth' in itself; 5 it is context-free, and therefore universally valid; it ''un-veils'' and ''discovers'' the evident. This truth is static and absolute: like Euclidean geometry it transcends all contexts. Ideally, this type of knowledge ought to be thoroughly descriptive and objective. Therefore the truth is essentially tautological. The fo11nula A = A' expresses the ultimate goal of this type of knowledge. Opacity is a condition of ontology. Ontology demands total opacity and absolute autonomy. At the instant in which opacity or autonomy are penetrated, the ontic-ontological object vanishes. ''Beingness'' and ''presence," which are intrinsic to ontic-ontological reality, cannot be per1neated. In order to be perceived as such, ''being'' must be absolutely dense and impregnable: it cannot point to something outside itself. Ideally, it must function as a gravitational field at maximum density does; no ray of attention of the perceiving subject could possibly escape. (''Objectivity'' is the total absorption of the subject by the object.) To be apprehended as such, a being must be perceived as a totally autonomous entity. An ontic-ontological object must be ''context-free." Like figures in Euclidean thinking, ontic-ontological entities are rigid, with points at invariant distances from each other. Perspective, orientation, and distance are invariable. No object could be perceived as dependent on another. To conceive of an object as dependent upon another is to deny its ontological reality. The distinction between ''context-bound'' and ''context-free'' types of truth may be best understood in light of the two-process 6 mechanism of the brain described by Karl Pribram. On the basis of

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neurological considerations, Pribram distinguished two classes of communicative acts. One is ''context-free." Its meaning is not predicated upon any context. '' A rose is a rose is a rose regardless of whether it appears in a garden, on a dinner table, or in the garbage pail. ''7 Another class of communicative acts ''derive their meaning from their past use and from the current state of the organism using 8 them." Their meaning is predicated upon the specific context in which they appear. Within the limits of our purpose it is important to note that ''context-free'' meaning is a function of abstraction. They '' derive meaning by selective attention to aspects of the Image they signify." 9 Their concern is the ''objective," ''real'' world. Invariably, ''they intend some part of the World-Out-There." 10 The ''context-bound'' meaning is the effect of a subjective operation. More specifically, they ''derive meaning by establishing a context within which interest and feeling become organized. '' 11 In contrast to the other class which is concerned with the spatial, concrete world, the ''context-bound'' refers ''to occurrences in the domain of the organism's World-Within." 12 This type of process is both internal and subjective. The ''context-bound'' serves to express ''what the organism has registered from its experience and its valuation of that experience what he is interested in, what he cares about. Caring largely consists of being sensitive and responsive to changes occurring in the communicative context. " 13 The opposition of ''context-free'' and ''context-bound'' types of truth results in two different models for the organization of thought and human experience. An opaque object, perceived as context-free in the World-Out-There, must be grasped visually. Opacity not only establishes the ground for ontological reality but it also determines the means by which such a reality can be apprehended: opacity is the function of visual thinking and spatial organization. The contextbound type of t~th perceived in the World-Within is grasped either syntagmatically,--by relating it to the context at hand, or paradigmatically,~y relating it to an ideal model. The processing of such data is best modeled in terms of temporal organization and successive synthesis. The Greeks and Hebrews developed their respective cultures and way of thinking in terms of each of these models.

4. Visual and Auditory Thinking The Hebrew and Greek types of truth correspond to two different levels of reality. The Greek truth is visual.1 Therefore it is related to the spatial World-Out-There. For the Hebrews the highest form &f truth is perceived at the auditory level. In Hebrew, shemat 'to hear'

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means also 'to understand' and 'to acknowledge.' In the rabbinic expressions mai mashmar 'how do we hear this?,' shemar minnah '[you] hear from this!,' ta shemar 'come and hear,' etc., 'to hear' means 'to learn.' In Greek thought the highest expression of reality is in the realm of the visual. Greek civilization (art, religion, etc.) emphasizes the outer aspect of reality. Literature projects a world viewed in the 2 third person, easily visualized. The Hebrews were concerned with the auditory aspect of reality, specifically speech. The highest expression of reality is found in communicative speech. The outer aspect of things is unimportant. Neither Scripture nor the rabbis gave visual descriptions of things or people. 3 The few allusions to outer reality found in classical Hebrew Literature are vague and subjective, and serve to clarify a further development in the story: for example, that Sarah (Gen 12:11, 14) and Joseph (Gen 39:6) were beautiful. The more ''objective'' descriptions found in the Song of Songs, such as ''your eyes are [like] well-designed pools'' (Song 7:5), and ''your eyes are like pigeons by a stream of water'' (Song 5:12), intend to convey pathos rather than visual sensation, much like impressionist paintings. 4 (Without knowing it, the Pizarro brothers, Modigliano, and Pascin were projecting a visual modality peculiar to their own tradition). 5 The Hebrew aversion to iconic representation reflects concern with the visual level of expression rather than mere opposition to representational art. 6 Verbal representation of God, even in anthropomorphic terms, is common both to Scripture and to the rabbis. What was offensive to the Hebrew was to ''see'' God (cf. Isa 6:5; Exod 33:18, 23); that is, to express His reality at the visual level. 7 These two levels of expression correspond to two fundamental processes governing language and human perception, known as simultaneous and successive synthesis. 8 Simultaneous synthesis is genetically related to visual perception and spatial organization. It is the ability to integrate the stimuli arriving at the brain into ''simultaneous, and primarily spatial, groups. ''9 This for1n of synthesis is essential to the visual process as well as to other sensory perceptions (smell, taste, touch) experienced as a continuum. (This type of synthesis also affects some auditory perceptions, in the interpretation of certain sounds and chords into a simultaneous structure and in the association of sound with specific points in space.) Successive synthesis is genetically connected with the auditory process and temporal organization; it is the ability to arrange the stimuli arriving at the brain ''into temporally organized, successive series. " This for1n of synthesis is essential to the perception of discrete signs and their organization into a serial, successive structure. It has been shown that 10

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disturbances in this activity arising from lesions in the brain affect not only sensory perception but also the mental and verbal 12 processes. Although the patient retains the ability for spatial analysis and the analysis of logico-grammatical relationships based on simultaneous synthesis, he will exhibit ''considerable disturbances in successive synthesis. '' 13 For example, some patients could not repeat a melody or rhythm. Those who previously had known the Morse Code could no longer use it.14 At the speech level, some patients repeated ''words such as house-cat-bell . . . as house-bell-and something else, or as cat-bell ... , or as house-bell-cat. " 15 After repeating a series of three words several times, one patient constantly changed their order ''and the series a-b-c was repeated successively as a-b-c ... a-b-c ... a-c-b ... b-a-c and so on. " 16 Roman Jakobson examined the nature of auditory and visual signs in relation to the two types of synthesis mentioned above. He observed that although visual and auditory signs occur in time and space, ''the spatial dimension takes priority for visual signs and the temporal one for the auditory signs. '' 17 The spatial and temporary dimensions affect, respectively, the very structure of visual and auditory signs: ''A complex visual sign involves a series of simultaneous constituents, while a complex auditory sign consists, as a rule, 18 of serial successive constituents. '' Whereas the components of the visual image produce a continuous and enduring structure, processed as an integrated spatial unit, the components of auditory sensation produce a serial and discrete structure processed as an artificial and temporal unit. 19 These structures are the function of simultaneous and successive synthesis: When the observer arrives at the simultaneous synthesis of a contemplated painting, the painting as a whole remains before his eyes, it is still present; but when the listener reaches a synthesis of what he has heard, the phonemes have in fact already vanished. They survive as mere afterimages, somewhat abridged reminiscences, and this creates an essential difference between the two types of perception and percepts. 20

The hierarchical structure characteristic of verbal organization is necessitated by the ephemeral nature of its components. The ''artificial'' organization of language is in fact an essential condition of successive integration. For this reason, unlike the components of visual perception which appear in a ''natural'' (that is, spatial) and unorganized state, the components of auditory perception need to be organized into artificial and highly stratified structures. 21 As mentioned before, auditory perception also involves simultaneous synthesis. 22 There are auditory components, such as chords and po-

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lyphony in music, desi~ned to express simultaneity. 23 Accordingly, there are two axes to a·J ditory perception: a principal axis involving successive synthesis, and a secondary axis involving simultaneous synthesis. Jakobson' s view concerning the visual and auditory proces~"s ,nay be summarized as follows: Within the systems of auditory signs, never space, but only time acts as a st'1Jctural factor, namely, time in its two axes, sequence and simultaneity; the structuration of visual signatia necessarily involves space and can either be abstracted from time, as in immobile painting and sculpture, or superinduce the time factor, as in the motion picture. 14

Greek thinking is organized in terms of simultaneous synthesis and visual experience. Hebrew thought is mainly auditory and therefore organized in terrns of successive synthesis.

5. Spatial and Successive Organization: Thought and Experience Ever since Parmenides, in all metaphysics ''to think'' is ''to see.'' 1 Reality is that which is present to the eye. Thought and experience are organized in terms of simultaneous synthesis. The art of memory in Western tradition provides a striking example of visual thinking. This art was founded by Simonides of Ceos (ca. 556-468 B.C.E.) and recorded in classical sources. It was further developed by Giordano Bruno (1548-16oo) and was part of European tradition until comparatively modem times. 2 Essentially, it consisted in first imprinting a building and images in the memory, and then proceeding to associate the words of a speech that one wanted to remember with the already-memorized building and images. Only through the recollection of spatial and visual images could words be adequately remembered. Frances A. Yates (1899-1981), who examined this very basic aspect of Western tradition, writes: We have to think of the ancient orator as moving in imagination through his memory building whilst he is making his speech, drawing from memorised places the images he has placed on them. The method ensures that the points are remembered in the right order, since the order is fixed by the sequence of places in the building. 3

The reason for this cumbersome method-it would appear more simple and efficient to memorize the words themselves rather than associate them with a building and other images is the inability to organize thought in non-visual terms: ''We have to try to imagine the memory of a trained orator of that period as architecturally built

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up with orders of memorised places stocked with images in a manner to us inconceivable. ''4 Because auditory experiences were ephemeral and difficult to organize, it was imperative to associate them with sight and space. The theoretical basis of this method was ''the discovery that the sense of sight is the strongest of all senses. '' 5 The belief in the supremacy of the visual experience affected their literary conceptions and creations. Simonides equated poetry with painting. ''It is significant," noted Yates, ''that the comparison of poetry with painting is fathered on Simonides, for this has a common denominator with the invention of the art of memory.'' This equation ''also rests on the supremacy of the visual sense; the poet and the painter both think in visual images which one expresses in poetry the other in pictures. ''6 The geometrical method best illustrates what may properly be designated as ''visual thinking,'' the categorization of mental activity in terms correlating to visual experience. Things appear to be context-free, as ''absolute motion," in classical mechanics. In Euclidean thinking, objects are rigid, with points at invariant distances from one another. This type of geometry does not allow one to place an object precisely in a frame of reference. Shape as well as relationships involving perspective, orientation, and distance are invariable. Things are atemporal and static. Except under external influence, ''Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line." An ontological object is similarly governed by the laws of inertia: it is absolutely dense and absolutely static. 7 It, too, is simultaneously present. Mathematics other than geometry deals with quantitative relations and functions on the basis of successive analysis and synthesis. The structure of mathematics, like that of language, is ''artificial." Similarly, mathematical terms need to be organized into highly hierarchical and stratified structures, as do the components of auditory perception. Therefore, to understand the place of successive analysis in these cultures, it would be particularly significant to examine the different approaches to geometry and algebra in Babylonian and Greek mathematics. ''However incomplete our present knowledge of Babylonian mathematics may be, so much is established beyond any doubt, wrote Professor Neugebauer; ''We are dealing with a level of mathematical development which can in many aspects be compared with the mathematics, say, of the early Renaissance. " 8 The principal concern of Babylonian mathematics was algebraic relations (successive synthesis). Another distinguishetl historian of mathematics concluded ''that Babylonians, during 2000 years before the Christian era laid the foundations of real algebra. " 9 In Babylonian mathematics geo11

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metrical concepts (simultaneous synthesis) were of secondary interest. Babylon never produced a ''geometrical algebra." There was no concern, as there was in Greek and Hellenistic mathematics, to formulate arithmetical and algebraic knowledge in geometrical language. Problems that we are used to treating geometrically were solved by the Babylonians algebraically. Professor Archibald writes: Even where the foundation is apparently geometric the essence is usually strongly algebraic; illustrated by the fact that frequently operations occur which do not admit of a geometric interpretation, like the addition of areas and lengths, or multiplications of areas. The predominant problem consists in the deter111ination of unknown quantities subject to given conditions. Of course a certain number of geometric relations were well known. Numerical calculations are everywhere carried out with the greatest facility and skill. 10

Greek mathematics is essentially geometrical. Numbers appear to represent magnitudes rather than quantitative relations; there was a notable concern to for1nulate even simple arithmetic and algebraic knowledge in geometrical language. This concern resulted in the development of ''geometrical algebra. " 11 Since geometry is nothing more than the application of mathematics to the measurement of two- and three-dimensional figures, the inclusion of geometry in mathematics would make as much sense to a Babylonian mathematician (or to many modem ones) as would the inclusion of accounting and astronomy in that same discipline. In the following remarks Neugebauer addressed himself to this issue: Compared with the algebraic and numerical component in Babylonian mathematics the role of ''geometry" is rather insignificant. This is, in itself, not at all surprising. The central problem in the early development of mathematics lies in the numerical deter1nination of the solution which satisfies certain conditions. At this level there is no essential difference between the division of a sum of money according to certain rules and the division of a field of given size into, say, parts of equal area. In all cases exterior conditions have to be observed, in one case the conditions of the inheritance, in another case the rules for the determination of an area, or the relations between measures or the customs concerning wages. The mathematical importance of a problem lies in its arithmetical solution; "geometry" is only one among many subjects of practical life to which the arithmetical procedures may be applied. 12

The inclusion of geometry in mathematics and the for1nulation of mathematical knowledge in geometrical language and concepts among the Greeks indicates a preference for visual thinking and

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simultaneous synthesis and analysis. Indeed, the fact that it is nearly impossible to conceive of modem mathematics without geometry is further evidence of the place of visual thinking in Western culture. This basic point was noted by Professor Wilder. Concerning the controversy between Diens, Veblen, and Whitehead about whether to include geometry in mathematics, he wrote: That some people think visually and others not has been widely observed; and granting the distinction, perhaps the case is that Diens was one who did not think visually, so that geometric patterns were of little value to him, whereas Veblen and Whitehead, both of whom made notable contributions to geometry and its derivatives (such as topology), are to be numbered among those who thought visually. The author has long had a feeling that he could classify the algebraists with whom he has been intimately associated into the two groups, visual thinkers and nonvisual thinkers; partly because, being a ''visual thinker'' himself, he seemed to understand the former much more easily and partly because the manner in which they present their concepts reveals an underlying geometric pattern. 13

Thought and experience may also be organized in terms of successive synthesis and auditory perception. Reality is sequential. There is a fundamental ''timeness'' permeating the entire gamut of physical and intellectual phenomena. In its incipient, primeval state, Creation is excited and dynamic. Chaos is the ground of reality. 14 The stability and order present in the Universe are the effect of direct intervention. As David Nieto would have put it, ''Every body is in a state of erratic motion, unless compelled to persevere in a state of rest or of uniform motion by forces impressed thereon." Thus, the Hebrews did not cease to wonder at the ordinary. The order and stability present in the Universe were wonderful and bewildering. ''I will praise you,'' said the Psalmist, ''because I [am/was] frightfully bewildered: your acts are bewildering and [that] my soul knows well'' (Ps 139:14). Something as ordinary as rain is in fact more bewildering than the greatest of wonders. R. Abhu (ca. 300) taught: ''The day of rain is greater than the day of resurrection. " 15 The ~Amida 'Silent Prayer' includes the statement that God ''blows the wind and pours the rain'' in the section about the resurrection of the dead! The ordinary is nothing other than a constant act of creativity. ''[He] who renews every day continuously the act of Creation," is declared daily at the end of the first blessing preceding the morning Shema~. The same belief was expressed by Nehemiah, who declared: ''You have made the heavens, the heavens of the heavens and all that they contain; the earth and all that is therein. You give life [meQQyye] to them all; and the host of heaven bow to You'' (Neh

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots 9:10-11). The active participle form mel}ayye 'to give life' expresses

the constant act of bestowing life by God on His Creation. 16 Maimonides, similarly using the active participle for1n, declared at the beginning of the Mishne Tora that '' 'to acknowledge that He gives existence [mam~i'] to all that which exists' is the most fundamental of all axioms and the pillar of all sciences. " 17 Like all serial data, reality may be variously processed into certain well-defined artificial structures involving hierarchical and syntactical organization. Serial data allow for various connections. Therefore, to be significant, physical and intellectual phenomena must be context-bound. The understanding of 'physical phenomena' ('umur at-tabi~iye), according to Maimonides, is one of the 'great mysteries' (as-sodot al~ aqima) of the universe.1 8 This is what the rabbis refer to as Ma~ase Bereshit 'The Procedure of Creation,' ranking second only to the mystery of the Merkaba 'Chariot.' 19 Obviously, Maimonides was not referring here to the studies of nature current in Greek and Arabic ·scientific and philosophical traditions. Rather, he was referring to the semiological ''reading'' and ''interpretation'' of nature implicit in the belief that Creation is the ''word'' and ''writing'' of God. Maimonides compared the deciphering of the significance of physical phenomena to a person in pitch darkness trying to glimpse his surroundings during a flash of lightning. Like a flash of lightning, truth is necessarily temporal. It cannot appear as a continuum, but only successively. Even when one seems to be in continuous light, one is in fact only catching glimpses of rapid lightning flashes one after the other: He would be illuminated by flashes of lightning rapidly succeeding each other, and therefore he would appear to be in continuous light, with no interruption. For him the night is like daytime.... To another the lightning flashes only once during his [whole] night. There are also others, who, from one lightning flash to another, [experience] long or short intervals. There is also another who did not come up to the level of having his night illuminated by lightning, but, rather, by some radiant body or some type of rock which is radiant by night. 20

The truth is successive; discontinuity or interruption is essential to its very structure. When mentioning the light emitted by radiant bodies, Maimonides remarked: ''Even that little light also, which is shining upon us, does not emanate as a continuum, but it emanates and then it is concealed as if it were 'the flame of the revolving sword' [guarding the road to Eden] (Gen 3:24)."21 The temporality of truth is also epistemological. Physiological and

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psychological factors prevent us from retaining the flash as a continuum. ''Sometimes the truth shines upon us, and we suppose it to be [as clear as] in daylight, and behold it is then concealed by body and habits!''22 The same factors affect the manner in which the truth could be formulated and transmitted. Know that when a worthy person, in accordance with the level of his perfection, wishes to express something of what he had understood about these secrets, either orally or in writing, he would not be able to explain even the measure that he apprehended-thoroughly and orderly as it is done in the other Sciences commonly studied. But, he would experience, when teaching others, the same situation in which he found himself when he learned it. Namely, that the subject will surface, and emit and then be concealed; as if the -nature of this subject would remain unchanged, whether [apprehending] little or much of it. 23

The successive emanation and concealment of this type of truth does not mean that it is faint or inaccessible. Quite the contrary. What is really amazing is that many people continue in darkness, evading the radiant brilliance. Referring to the unlearned populace, Maimonides wrote: and the truth in its totality is concealed from them, notwithstanding the potency of its radiance, as it was said concerning them: "And now they have not seen the light, shining brightly in the firmaments'' (Job 37:21). These are the common unlearned. We shall not refer to them in this treatise. 24

Maimonides' metaphor of lightning piercing the thickness of the night involves several fundamental ideas. One of these is the successive character of the Hebraic truth. 6. Calling upon the Name of God Magic presupposes a metaphysical system through which physical and spiritual phenomena are manipulated. Without such a system magic is inoperative. The ''name'' is the linguistic nexus between a thing and its ''essence'' or metaphysical dimensions. More precisely, the name is identical to the essence. 1 Knowledge of the name gives unlimited power over the thing bearing the name. Even the gods are powerless to disobey those who possess their names. 2 The lndoEuropean verb ''to be'' (particularly the copula ''is'') serves to express the essential identity between the name (or other verbal attributes) and the thing. Concerning the copula Cassirer observed:

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots The "is'' of the copula almost unfailingly goes back to a sensuously concrete original meaning; instead of conveying mere existence or a general state of being, it originally denoted a particular kind and form of appearance; especially being in a certain place, at a specific point in space.3

The ''presence'' peculiar to ontic-ontological objects is an extension of tne ''essence'' implicit in the verb ''to be." By calling the name, the thing is ''summoned'' and it ''appears." Whereas in magic the name totally controls the thing, at the ontological level the presence summoned by the name also implies the spatial absence of the thing. Kockelmans expressed this notion as follows: Saying thus calls and brings what is called closer. However, this bringing closer does not bring what is called nearer in the sense of putting it down in the domain of the immediate. Although this calling calls hither what is called, what is called remains at a distance where it remains as absent. Saying therefore calls nearer what is called, but it does not withdraw it from the distance where it was and remains. Saying calls something, as it were, back and forth, calling it to become present and nevertheless summoning it to remain absent at the same time. 4

Semiology excludes metaphysics. In a semiological system a name is arbitrary and void of magical powers. A semiological element has no ''essence''; it is not a ''being''; there can be no intrinsic relation between name and essence. The name of a thing only establishes that it is semiologically significant. The act of naming does not imply power over the thing named. According to the rabbis, Adam named not only the animals, but also God. 5 Likewise, ''calling upon the name'' of someone does not involve any power over him, but simply indicates the will to establish intersubjective communication. The function of the name is to summon the hearer to respond to the invitation. Scripture teaches that God has a name. This means that God is semiologically accessible. When God charged Moses to tell the children of Israel that He had spoken to him, Moses replied: '' And they will ask me 'What is His name?'-what shall I tell them?'' (Exod 3:13). As Maimonides noted, the name in question could not possibly be a special designation that would prove that God had indeed spoken to Moses. If this special designation was already known to the Israelites, the fact that Moses also knew it would not constitute a proof that God had spoken to him. On the other hand, if this name was unknown to them, they could not corroborate whether, in fact, 6 it was revealed by God to Moses or was a fabrication. Moses' question and God's response become intelligible upon considering the

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function of a name in a semiological system. Moses was charged to come before the Hebrews and announce that God had heard their cries. Surely they would ask ''What is His name?'' that is, ''How can we address Him directly and receive a response from Him?'' God's answer was twofold. First, He clarified ''I shall be that which I shall be'' (Exod 3:14). In magical theology, knowledge of the deity's name constitutes power over the deity and the ability to manipulate it. The assertion ''I shall be that which I shall be'' negates magical theology; knowledge of His name does not constitute power over Him. In addition, if the children of Israel wished to speak directly to Him they were to address Him as ''the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; this shall be My name for ever and that will be My designation from generation to generation'' (Exod 3:15). This is the manner in which God is traditionally addressed. The Hebrew ~Amida 'Silent prayer' begins with the for1nula ''. . . our God and the God of our Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.'' Rather than magical theology, knowledge of God's name involves the possibility of addressing Him and receiving a response, that is, to pray to God. Indeed, the biblical expression ''to call upon the name of God'' is synonymous with prayer. The Aramaic translations render ''and there Abram called upon the name of God'' (Gen 13:4) as ''and there Abram prayed to God."7 To ''call upon'' God's name implies receiving a response. ''Moses and Aaron, among His priests,'' said the Psalmist, '' and Samuel among them that call upon His name; they called upon the Lord and He answered them'' (Ps 99:6). For the Hebrews, the ultimate test of a religious system is whether or not prayers are answered. Elijah challenged the priests of the Baal, '' And you shall call upon the name of your gods, and I shall call upon the name of the Lord: and the God that answers by fire, He is the God'' (1 Kings 18:24). Pointedly, Elijah addressed God using the traditional formula: ''Lord, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Israel'' (1 Kings 18:36), ''Israel'' being another name for ''Jacob.'' ''Calling upon'' the name of God does not produce an automatic response. First of all, the devotion of the individual addressing God is a factor. The Psalmist emphasizes this point: ''God is close to all those who call up to Him: to all those who call up to Him in truth'' (Ps 145:12). More important, God's response is not the result of some magical coercion effected by the utterance of His name. God's reply is an act of pure volition: it was God Himself who first '' called upon'' His own name in prayer, teaching thereby how to pray. According to rabbinic tradition, it was God-not Moses who ''called upon the name of God'' and said: ''the Lord, the Lord, God

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots compassionate and gracious'' (Exod 34:6).8 In order to further emphasize that God's response is volitional, R. Yobanan described God's ''calling of the name'' as follows: It teaches [metaphorically] that God wrapped Himself [in the prayer mantle], as a minister officiating at the liturgical services, and showed to Moses the liturgical order. He told him: whenever Israel sin let them do before me as in this order and I shall forgive them. 9

R. Yobanan expressed the same idea by declaring that ''God prays, '' 10 that is, that it was God who had established how to speak and plead with Him. The Selil}ot 'Supplication Services' contain the following statement: You, God, have taught us to say the thirteen attributes of mercy . . . as it is written in your Tora: ''... and [Moses] called upon the name of God" (Exod 34:5). And there it was [further] said: ''And the Lord passed before Moses and called: The Lord, the Lord, God compassionate and gracious.'' (Exod 34:6)

Finally, to further dispel the notion that there may be any element of coercion, the Scripture states that only because God Himself had (previously) called upon His name, invoking His name brings a response: ''In all places where I shall mention My name, I shall come to you and shall bless you'' (Exod 20:24). Characteristically, the Aramaic translations render it: ''In every place that you will mention My 11 name in prayer, I shall come and bless you. " Through God the whole Universe is semiologically connected. God maintains a semiological relation not only with man, but with all of Creation. At the end of each of the first three days of Creation, God ''calls'' what He had created (Gen 1:5, 8, 10). This ''calling'' is a ''summons'' implying total submission of what was created. As the creator, God ''calls'' His creatures and summons them to execute His orders. This idea was used by Isaiah to explain the special '' calling'' of God to Israel. When exhorting Israel to follow God's summons, Isaiah pointed out how the rest of the Universe ''stands up," in readiness and volition, to obey Him. ''Listen to me, Oh Jacob, and Israel the one that I called: I am He, I am the first, I also am the last. My hand also had laid the foundations of the earth, and my right hand spanned the heavens: I call to them; they stand up together'' (Isa 48:12-13). Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508) commented on the last verse: ''It means that, since I made them ex nihilo, I could do with them as I will, and at the instant that I call upon them to execute My will, they stand up before Me [ready to obey] like servants. '' 12 R. Abraham Laniado (d. 1585) observed that 'to call'

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(qore) is the atemporal participle, implying thereby a continuous act of ''calling upon." Reflecting a position similar to that of David Nieto, Laniado interpreted ''standing up'' as the effect of God's continuous calling: things ''stand up," in the sense that they are what they are, because God calls upon them continuously. 13 Similarly, his grandson, R. Levi Laniado (seventeenth century) noted that ''together'' (yal}dav) means not only ''conjointly'' but also ''simultaneously.'' Thus, the sense of the verse is: simultaneously, at God's calling, the whole of Creation ''stands up," it becomes what it is. Isaiah wanted to convey to the people of Israel the following idea: ''Look up and see how heavens and earth and all that which they contain do not hesitate in executing my word and fulfilling it, but they hasten to execute the word of God. And you, why don't you listen to me likewise to do my will?'' 14 Within the cosmic semiological system, man stands alone not only in his power to refuse to respond to God's call, but also in his faculty to '' call upon the name of God,'' that is, to initiate a dialogue with God. As we shall see, this involves man's ability for intersubjective communication. 7. Speech and Subjectivity Speech is the most significant aspect of successive synthesis. The Targum pointedly renders ''and God made man into a living soul'' (Gen 2:7) as ''and God made man into a speaking soul. " 1 The ''living/ speaking'' identity reflects the dynamic dimension of speech. To the Hebrew, to live forever meant ''to praise God from now into eternity'' (Ps 115:18). The living aspect of speech, is best understood in light of Emile Benveniste' s concept of person and linguistic subjectivity. The ground of subjectivity is linguistic. What enables man to conceive himself in terms of I is the act of speaking: ''It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept of 'ego' in reality, in its reality which is that of the being. '' 2 Linguistic subjectivity is not merely the feeling which everyone experiences of being himself. Linguistic subjectivity is the very ground for the category of person. The "subjectivity" we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as "subject." It is defined not by the feeling which everyone experiences of being himself (this feeling, to the degree that it can be taken note of, is only a reflection) but as the psychic unity that transcends the totality of the actual experiences it

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots assembles and that makes the permanence of the consciousness. Now we hold that "subjectivity," whether it is placed in phenomenology or in psychology, as one may wish, is only the emergence in the being of a fundamental property of language. "Ego" is he who says "ego." That is where we see the foundation of "subjectivity," which is deter111ined by the linguistic status of "person. " 3

Language and language alone is the basis of subjectivity, for it enables man to proclaim himself the subject and declare himself as an /. Linguistic subjectivity ''creates the category of person-both in language and also, we believe, outside of it as well. ''4 Before examining the particulars of the ''category of person'' it will be helpful to touch upon the syntagmatic character of language. Ferdinand de Saussure described language ''as a system based entirely on the opposition of its concrete units. '' 5 A linguistic sign in isolation is void of signification. Language must be conceived as ''a type of algebra consisting solely of complex terms.,,& Linguistic signs do not function ''through their intrinsic value but through their relative position. '' 7 Employing a most apt metaphor, Saussure compared language to a chess game in which the ''value of the pieces depends on their position on the chess-board just like each linguistic term derives its value from its opposition to all other terms. ''8 ''Consciousness of self,'' writes Benveniste, ''is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. " 9 Linguistic subjectivity is the effect of a special relationship between I and you. 1

10

I use J only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as /. Here we see a principle whose consequences are to spread out in all directions. Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself up as a subject by referring to himself as I in his discourse. Because of this, I posits another person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to "me,'' becomes my echo to whom I say you and who says you to me.11

Accordingly, we must distinguish between speech and communication. Although speech involves communication, it is not reducible to it. In this fundamental aspect human language is different from animal communication. The message of a bee announcing the discovery of a source of food ''lacks the dialogue which is distinctive of 12 human speech. '' Therefore, it is fundamentally wrong to characterize speech either as a social or as an individual act. ''Person'' is a dialectical category which can neither be derived from ''society'' nor · be reduced to ''individual.''

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And so the old antinomies of "I" and "the other," of the individual and society, fall. It is a duality which is illegitimate and erroneous to reduce to a single primordial term, whether this unique ter11, be the ''I,'' which must be established in the individual's own consciousness in order to become accessible to that of the fellow human being, or whether it be, on the contrary, society, which as a totality would preexist the individual and from which the individual could be disengaged gradually, in proportion to acquisition of self-consciousness. !t is in a dialectic reality that will incorporate the two ter11,s and define them by mutual relationship that the linguistic basis of subjectivity is discovered. 13 .

There is another aspect worth considering of Benveniste' s category of person. ''Person'' is real only ''in the act of ~peech'' or in ''discourse." 14 In fact, the category of person is the ground upon which ''language is ~med into instances of discourse." 15 A few remarks on Saussure's distinction between language [langue] and speech [parole] will clarify this point. Language ''is the whole set of linguistic habits which allow an individual to understand and be : understood. '' 16 It has a social context, the community of speakers, and ''it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community." 17 As such, language transcends the individual and the community of speakers. It is possible to penetrate a 18 dead language and properly assimilate its linguistic facts. Speech is the individual act of speaking; ''speaking is thus not a collective instrument; its manifestations are individual and momentary. '' 19 Linguistic subjectivity is the function of speech. Language is impersonal and it excludes the category of person. Now a language [langue] is a socialized structure which the act of speaking [parole] subjects to individual and intersubjective ends, thus adding to it a new and strictly personal design. Langue is a system common to everyone; discourse is both the bearer of a message and the instrument of action. 20

The function of the personal pronoun is to transform language into speech. Unlike other linguistic signs, .the personal pronoun 21 does ''not refer to a concept or to an individual. " We are in the presence of a class of words, the "personal pronouns," that escape the status of all the other signs of language. Then, what does I refer to? To something very peculiar which is exclusively linguistic: I refers to the act of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the speaker. It is a term that cannot be identified except in what we . have called elsewhere an instance of discourse and that has only momentary reference. The

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reality to which it refers is the reality of the discourse. It is in the instance of discourse in which I designates the speaker that the speaker proclaims himself as the "subject." And so it is literally true 22 that the basis of subjectivity is the exercise of language.

We may summarize the foregoing as follows: (a) linguistic subjectivity establishes (b) person as a dialectical category, (c) transforming thereby language into speech, and (d) establishing linguistic subjectivity through the personal pronoun, and thus closing the circle. I and you alone participate in the act of speech and express subjectivity. The third person is excluded from the act of speech. It only expresses impersonal language. The dialectic basis of ''person'' is explicit in the Arabic and Sephardic nomenclature of the personal pronouns. The first person is designated 'the speaker' (al-mutakallirnu = medabber), the second person 'the addressee' (al-mukhatabu = ,zokeal}.) and the third person 'the absent' (al-ghaibu = nistar). 23 Benveniste showed that the symmetry among the three persons found in ''normal'' Indo-European languages, ''far from representing a fixed and necessary type, is an anomaly at the very center of languages. " 24 The third person states a predicate about something or someone, but it is not a person: ''the 'third person' is not a 'person'; it is really the verbal form whose function is to express the non-person. ''25 The third person will be best understood as the ''absence'' of ''person'' and of linguistic subjectivity. In Semitics the absolute personal pronoun of the first two persons contain the particle 'an, a demonstrative denoting time-space. In most Semitic languages, the third personal pronoun does not contain the particle 'an. As in many other languages, hu 'he,' the Hebrew for the third person, was originally a deictic pronoun. 26 The '' absence'' indicated by the third person is particularly evident in the Semitic perfect verb. In Semitics the person is marked in the perfect verb by a pronominal suffix. The third person masculine singular has a zero pronominal sign. In the words of R. Jonah ibn Jannab (eleventh century), ''the personal suffix of the third person masculine singular is concealed in the verb and it is not marked. ''27 The third person is only 'implicit' (fi-an-niyat) but never actually present in the verb. 28 According to him, the suffix in the third person feminine is not the sign of the person, but of the feminine gender. Likewise, the suffix of the third-person plural is the mark of the plural, not of the person. 29 Similarly, the prefixes of the imperfect verb do not indicate the person, but only the tense. This is why the prefix ti appears in both the second person masculine and the third person feminine. 30

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There is another aspect of the Hebrew verb bearing on the character of the third person. Semitists have noted the similarity between the third person masculine singular of the perfect verb and the nominal fo11ns. This is particularly evident in the Hebrew nominal verbs of the qatel for111, in which the third person and the noun are morphologically and notionally identical. 31 The coincidence of the nominal for111 with the conjugation of the third person is a widespread linguistic phenomenon and not exclusive to Hebrew. 32 In Hebrew, ''I'' as an absolute pure ego is designated by the suffix Ii. It appears connected with prepositions such as Iii 'to me,' bli 'in me,' rimli 'with me.' It also appears with the noun, functioning as genitive; for example, shorli [= ox/me] 'my ox.' The independent personal pronoun 'ani 'I' also contains this suffix [ = 'anli]. Hebrew distinguishes between the ego as perceived from the perspective of the first person (/ti) and the ego as perceived externally ('an,). Symmetry between the persons is found only when the ego is exposed objectively, that is, in terms that can be perceived ''externally'' from the perspective of the second person and are not circumscribed to the ''interior'' perspective of the speaking subject. In this case, intersubjectivity is the relation of two subjects at an objective and therefore external level. 'Ani and its derivative lni express ''I'' as an object. When the speaking subject posits himself as the object of someone else's action, he must necessarily present himself externally. Hence the function of lni to indicate the object of the verb. 'Atta 'you' and /ta serve an equivalent function. The function of 'ani and 'atta will become clearer upon considering their components. The first component is 'an, a demonstrative particle denoting place and time. 33 The original forin of 'atta was 'anta as preserved in biblical Aramaic and Arabic. In other Semitic languages, such as Assyrian and Hebrew, the consonant n of the particle 'an was assimilated into the t. 34 The second component is Ii and !ta. Accordingly, 'ani and 'atta are an actual inflection of 'an, a timespace container. 35 Objectivization, whether of the ego or of the second person, is the expression of person within the context of a time-space indicator. The subject of the verb is the function of pronominal suffixes. In the perfect, the first two persons as subject of the verb are indicated by the suffixes !ti and !ta. For instance, haragti 'I killed' and haragta 'you killed' comprise the verbal stem harag 'killed' and the pronominal suffixes !ti and !ta, resulting in 'killed/I' and 'killed/you.' The object of the verb is the function of lni (first person) and /kha (second person). The verbs haragtikha 'I killed you' and haragtani 'you killed me' comprise three elements: the verbal stem harag, the subjects of the verb !ti and !ta, and the objects of the verb lni and /kha, resulting

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots in ''killed/I/you'' and ''killed/you/I [me)." The Ii and lkha are suffixes to nouns and convey the sense of the genitive. For instance, qoli 'my voice' and qolekha 'your voice' comprise the noun qol 'voice' and the suffixes Ii and lkha, resulting in ''voice/me'' and ''voice/you.'' The following is a chart of the pronouns just discussed.

1st person 2nd person

Subject of the verb

Possessive subject

ti ta

•

l

kha

Independent pronoun

. anz 'atta

Object of the verb

,

•

nz kha

Thus there is a fundamental asymmetry between the subject of the verb of the first and the second person. The subject of the second person is just a shorter form of the independent pronoun 'atta, whereas /ti is not related to 'ani. It is the object of the verb lni-not the subject, as in the second person-that is related to the independent pronoun. Therefore, the pronominal subject of the second person is correlative to the pronominal object of the first person: relation between the persons is that of a subject to an object. The second person does not have an equivalent to the first person !ti. It expresses subjectivity by using lta-,a derivative of a pronoun expressing objectivity! The asymmetry between /ti and !ta reflects the absolute distinction between the perspectives of the first and second person. Whereas different individuals may perceive a given object from the perspective of the first person, no one may perceive another person as an ''I." To the subjective ego /ti, all other persons except himself are viewed as the second or the third person. /Ti not only excludes all other persons from perceiving it as an ''l''-that is, from the perspective of the first person-but also excludes itself from perceiving others as !ti. This twofold exclusion is intrinsic to the perspective of the first person and the grounds for the feeling of ''interiority." It is also the grounds for the fundamental isolation of the !ti. Linguistic subjectivity expresses this exclusive perspective. When the speaker :-osits himself as ''subject," he is excluding all others from his perspective and himself from the perspective of others. The ''addressee'' must be perceived ''externally," as someone whose interiority can never be penetrated by the speaking subject. Accordingly, the second person appears as an object. It is objective because it is absolutely opaque. More precisely, absolute opaqueness is the very ground of linguistic objectivity. Intersubjectivity, or the relation between two subjective I's, is possible when one ''I'' silences his !ti and becomes !ta. The asymmetry of !ti and !ta expresses the funda-

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mental relation between the first-person subject and the second-person object. In Hebrew the expression of the subjective ego is the exclusive function of !ti. It means that, at least for the Hebrew mind, this level of subjectivity cannot be expressed by an independent word. Only when connected to a perfect verb does the subjective ego find identity. Within the context of our purpose it will suffice to point out that the concept of subjective identity reflects the Semitic idea of a verb as a po('al, an '' action-process. '' 36 !Ti and !ta are not simultaneously possible. Silence, in the sense of active listening, transforms (the actual or potential) !ti into /ta. Conversely, speech transforms !ta into !ti. Thus /ti and /ta, speech and silence, are two correlative ter1ns expressing the dialectic reality of person and subjectivity. Interruption signifies the distinctness and the possibility of transforn1ation of these terms: /ti can be said only to a person who could in tum address the speaker as lta. 37 In this sense, interruption represents the ultimate ground of speech and subjectivity. Referring to this basic concept, Blanchot wrote: The power to speak is interrupted, and this interruption plays a seemingly subordinate role, that, precisely, of subordinated alternation. A role, however, so mysterious that it can be interpreted as carrying the mystery of language itself: pause between phrases, pause from one speaker to the other, and pause of attention, of understanding, which doubles the power of expression. 38

Interruption is excluded in simultaneous analysis. It is both necessary and possible within the realm of successive analysis. For, if reality is to be apprehended serially, then ''the gap makes becoming possible'' 39; like lightning puncturing the night, ''discontinuity assures continuity of understanding. ''40 We shall now review some of the points discussed before. Speech is both the grounds of isolation and the means by which isolation is resolved. The perception of ''I'' from the perspective of the first person is the effect of speech-when the speaking subject posits himself as an ''I." This perception is ''internal'' and therefore hermetically closed in a twofold direction to the ''outside." On the other hand, subjectivity is the condition of perceiving the ''other'' as an object. As students of Husserl recognize, ''subjectivity is contemporaneous with objectivity, ''41 and therefore with intersubjectivity, which is the very basis of linguistic communication. Unlike sight which is perceived as in the ''world-out-there'' and the purely internal feelings that are experienced in the ''worldwithin, '' hearing is an auditory phenomenon in the ''world-outthere'' experienced in the ''world-within. '' 42 Hearing functions as the

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots nexus between human interiority and exteriority. The self is not only totally vulnerable to sound, but through auditory speech, reflexive experience is realized. Upon hearing oneself talk, the interiority/ exteriority of the ''I'' is simultaneously experienced. Presence is thus realized. Speech and language can now be understood in terms of their respective functions. The function of speech is presence. The function of language is representation. Presence and representation are mutually exclusive. Presence is experienced in the dialectic reality of person. It is experienced in the act of speech when the ego establishes subjectivity. The interiority of the speaking subject excludes representation. ''Representation'' here does not imply a distinction between effective and fictitious language, a ''re-presenting'' or ''reproducing'' of presence in the Husserlian sense; 43 rather, it is meant as the articulation of that which is absent (from the act of speech). Accordingly, the very idea of the Universe as the dynamic speech of God excludes the possibility of God's representation. Presence and the two-directional function of speech are best illustrated by the Shemar, the most important prayer in Jewish liturgy. It consists of three sections from the Pentateuch (Deut 6:4-9, Deut 11:13-21, and Num 15:37-41). There are several features unique to this prayer. To begin with, it is the only liturgy consisting of biblical passages whose daily recitation is Scripturally required by Jewish Law. The purpose of the first section is ''that one should accept upon himself the yoke of Heaven'' (Mishna Berakhot 11,2); that is, the acceptance of God's authority. The second section is ''that one should accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments'' (ibid.); that is, the recognition of the authority of biblical law. The third section is to commemorate the Exodus from Egypt. 44 There is a difference of opinion concerning how the Shemar must be recited (Mishna Berakhot 11,3). Commenting upon the word Shemar, the old law declared: ''Have your ears hear that which your lips utter. " 45 Therefore, the Shemar must be audible to the person reciting it. This law fell into disuse during religious persecution, when many recited the Shemar silently in order to escape detection. 46 Reflecting upon this situation, the rabbis established that if one recited the Shemar silently he had fulfilled his obligation. Moreover, they maintained that the Shemar could be recited in the language of the reader and not necessarily in Hebrew. 47 Judah the Prince, the leading rabbinic authority of his time, disagreed. Upholding the old law, he declared that the Shemar must be recited out loud and in the original Hebrew. 48 According to the Talmud these two points are mutually dependent: the acceptance or rejection of one of them necessitates the acceptance or rejection of the other. 49 A remarkable aspect of the Shemar will be evident upon con-

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sidering its content. The first two sections (which are the most important) 50 are an address in which God, speaking in the imperative, orders the basic principles of Jewish faith. Shema' is the Hebrew word with which the first verse of this call begins (''Hear, oh Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One''). It is worth noting that whereas in all other prayers man addresses God, in the Shema' God addresses man. c Reflectively, the reader is the linguistic representative of God to himself. The simultaneity of speaker and hearer peculiar to this liturgy ' corresponds to the interior and exterior aspects intrinsic to a reflexive linguistic experience. From this last consideration we can now gain a better insight into the position of Judah the Prince. The Shema' is ''the act of speech'' in which God is linguistically present; therefore, it must be uttered in the original Hebrew. Furthermore, in order to be apprehended linguistically it also must be audible. The conflict between the rabbis and Judah the Prince concerns a situation in which the dual direction of speech is not possible, when the reader does not understand Hebrew. In such a case the reader can ''speak," recite the original Hebrew, but he cannot ''hear," understand the address that he is reflexively reciting to himself. Judah the Prince considered ''the act of speech'' as the primary object of the Shema'. Understanding, as in all early linguistic experiences, is not necessarily present. Speech engenders understanding but it is not restricted to it. 51 By upholding the old law, Judah the Prince ascertained the linguistic character intrinsic to a reflexive experiehce. And yet all Jewish codifiers, following standard legal procedure, registered the position of the majority opinion. According to Jewish law, the Shema' may be recited in the language of the reader, and silent recitation fulfills the obligation. 52 It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that universal practice follows the position of Judah the Prince. The Shema' is recited in Hebrew and out loud! 53 If God is present in ''discourse'' and if Scripture is God's ''act of speech,'' then the whole Tora-.a nd not only the Shema'-must be read reflexively. Therefore it is particularly significant that whereas Se'adya Ga'on classified teaching Tora and studying Tora as two different obligations, 54 for Maimonides they constitute a single commandment: 55 ''teaching/studying'' are the essentials of apprehending God's presence reflectively, that is, linguistically.

0

8. Expressive Actions: Encoding and Decoding A culture any culture is distinguished not only by its language and civilization but particularly by the system it employs to encode its values and collective experiences (whether ''historical'' or ''myth-

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ological'') and transmit them to future generations. In this fashion, every culture has its own particular ''historiography'' and system to decode the past and encode messages for posterity. Ritual, too, can best be understood in terms of the encoding and decoding function. Ultimately, it serves to encode and communicate the hereditary mnemonic trace of a people. 1 As stated earlier, linguistic proficiency alone (at the lexical and grammatical levels) does not allow the alien to penetrate a culture. (It is not difficult to imagine a foreign genius, highly proficient in our language, incapable of making heads or tails of a comic book that any child would find thoroughly intelligible and enjoyable.) Such an alien is either ''stealing'' the culture in the sense of trying to appropriate for himself something which does not belong to him-or else he is ''violating'' it-in the sense of imposing his will on it and wrenching it out of its original shape. 2 The only way to penetrate a culture is by mastering its peculiar process of encoding and decoding. Then and then alone would it be possible to participate in ''the act of speech'' of a culture, rather than passively perceiving it from the perspective of the third person. The encoding and decoding system of the Hebrews is connected with the idea of repetition. In a successive system, no event can be frozen. One may catch a glimpse of the Divinity only as it passes, vay-ya~abor, a term involving the notion of successiveness, as in the projection of sound. 3 The object of repetition, therefore, is both to record and to transmit. The peculiar for1n in which the collective mnemonic trace of the Hebrews was recorded and transmitted may be better understood if we consider their attitude toward translation. It is a uniquely Jewish concept and it correlates with the idea of text. As outlined in the preceding chapter, the Koran is not to be translated. It must be read and transmitted only in the original. Transmission tolerates no change. Taqlid 'imitation' stipulates that the movement must always be one-directional, from the people to the Koran, and not the other way around. 4 Christianity allows translation of the Scriptures. However, it does not recognize an original text to which the translation is organically connected and ultimately accountable. Christianity does not have an officially recognized Hebrew version of the Old Testament. More significantly, Christianity did not preserve the original Aramaic of the words of Jesus and early New Testament writings. ''Translation," here, involves the suppression of the original mnemonic trace. On the one hand, Judaism recognizes an original text of the Scriptures. The Masora is a rigidly controlled system whereby every word is accountable at the orthographic level. On the other hand, Judaism officially recognizes ''translations'' of the Tora. The dictum of R. Judah (second century), ''He who translates a verse in its [exact] form is an impostor, and he

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who adds to it is a blasphemer," clearly defines the two poles of a translation. 5 The rabbinic statement ''The [second] Tablets and the pieces of the [original] Tablets were [together] deposited in the Ark'' 6 applies, within a successive system, to the transmission of all texts. Thus a text cannot signify the erasure of the trace. Rather than suppression of the trace, through repetition, the text-like the Ark of yore must contain both the trace and its transformation. Repetition directly concerns the concepts of Creation, transmission of the Law, and ritual. In a simultaneous system, repetition is impossible. Metaphysics is, therefore excluding repetition. Since absence and negation cannot be tolerated in the realm of the ontological, there can only be re-presentation, in a tautological sense. Repetition and negation are functions ,:-, exclusive to successive analysis, and therefore intrinsic to semiotics. At the cosmological level, too, nature is conceived as the repetition of Creation. A brief consideration of the scriptural Sabbath will be helpful in understanding this concept. Benamozegh examined the following problem. According to Scripture, rest on the seventh day celebrates Creation. The association of the Sabbath-the day when there·was no Crea~on-with Creation is unsettling. From a metaphysical point of view, one would have expected Creation to be celebrated either on the first day (when it began) or on the sixth day (when it was completed), rather than on the seventh day when it was absent. The answer to this problem concerns the very concept of Creation. Benamozegh noted that the essential and idiosyncratic point of the biblical idea of Creation is not merely that God creates, but, rather, that the God who creates can abstain from creating. Interruption of Creation signifies Creation as pure volition. It also expresses the paradox that the supreme power is the power to limit-that is, to express in limited terms that which is infinite: It seems to me that the seventh day was deliberately chosen in order to reject the opinion held by the heretics that God created the world out of necessity and compulsion. The Interruption of Creation is evidence that He created with His absolute will, when He wished it. There is an additional reason, that in regards to His infinite power, He would have had to continuously create infinite worlds and there is some truth to this. 7 Nonetheless, Interruption actually demonstrates His power more than continuous [creative] activity, since there is no greater power than to [be able to] put an end and a limit to an infinite power. In truth, the infinite power is God's ability to limit Himself in proper space and time. Further111ore, without God's ability to restrain His infinite power, it would not have been possible to create an intelligent animal with an autonomous spirit and individ-

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ual personality, the Universe would then have been purposeless. The Sabbath was thus instituted to testify to that. 8

,,

Similarly, the rabbis taught that God had declared ''I am He who said to the world 'Stop!' For if I had not said 'Stop!' to the heavens and 'Stop!' to the earth, they would have continued to expand until this very moment. '' 9 That God may in fact abstain from creating means that repetition is possible. Precisely because there was interruption and God ''abstained from all the work that He had done'' (Gen 2:2), Nature, as Nieto taught, is to be conceived as repetition of Creation. Interruption also posits the irreducible and absolute distance between God's omnipotence and the finitude of Creation, as contrasted by the Psalmist: God ''counts the numbers of the stars," but ''to His intelligence there is no number'' (Ps 147:4-5). Repetition here does not imply an identical reproduction of an original thing or event. Rather, it involves change and transformation and therefore encoding and decoding. Specifically, repetition involves encoding the original event. Thus the original is always changed: the encoded message is not identical with the original. The object of a decoding process is to transform the encoded message, thereby conceptually recovering the original. A few remarks concerning the Hebrew root SHaNaH will help define this concept. Primarily, this root means 'to repeat.' 1° Connected with the idea of repetition, shana also means 'year,' in the sense of the recurrence or repetition of a cycle. In the form sheni it means 'second' and shene 'two.' The same root means also 'to repeat' 11 and 'to change.' 12 Likewise, the nominative for1n miSHNeH means 'double,' 13 implying identity with the original, and 'second to,' 14 implying difference. Both senses coalesce in the expression Mishne Iam-Melekh 'Second to the King' 15 : on the one hand the Mishne is not identical to the King; 16 on the other hand, since he is the royal representative, he is not actually different from the King. 17 Like the Mishne, the encoded message ''represents'' the original but is not identical to it. Repetition implies change and difference from the original. The root SHaNaH conveys both alterity and identity simultaneously: repetition and change mutually imply each other. In rabbinic tradition, a text is a composition designed for transmission and therefore it involves repetition. Indeed, the Mishna (from the root SHaNaH 'to repeat') designates the authoritative formulation of the oral Law. The same term, in the masculine form Mishne, is found twice in the Scriptures (2 Kings 22:14; 2 Chr 34:22) in passages that according to the Aramaic translation and traditional commentators mean 'House of Study.' Before considering the ''repeti-

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tion/text/study'' association, we must examine the expression Mishne Tora 'Second to the Tora' found twice in the Scriptures (Deut 17:18; Josh 8:32). Traditional commentators were divided as to the exact sense of this expression. On the basis of the verse in Deuteronomy, some maintained that it means the Book of Deuteronomy. 18 The verse in question, referring to the King, states: ''When he is seated on his royal throne he shall write for himself a Mishne of this Tora ('et Mishne hat-Tora haz-zot] in a book, from before the Levitical priests.'' The identification of Mishne Tora with the Book of Deuteronomy takes ''Mishne of this Tora'' to mean ''this Mishne Tora," whereas the pronoun ''this'' serves to indicate the Book of Deuteronomy. There are two serious difficulties with this interpretation. To begin with, the Hebrew text uses the feminine pronoun zot 'this'; therefore it must refer to Tora which is feminine, rather than to Mishne which is masculine. Moreover, in the passage in Joshua it is said that upon entering the Holy Land the Israelites wrote ''the Mishne of the Tora of Moses'' on stones. As many commentators observed, it is highly improbable that they would have written on stone a composition of the length of Deuteronomy. 19 Accordingly, Se~adya Ga~on explained that the Israelites only inscribed a summary of the principal laws. 20 Both views agree that Mishne is a summary. The controversy only concerns whether the summary is of the Book of Deuteronomy or of some other composition. 21 The precise meaning of this term will be obvious upon noting that it is parallel to the expression Mishne lamMelekh, implying thereby identity/alterity with the original. On the one hand, a summary of the original is not identical to it; on the other hand, since it contains the principal laws, it can effectively represent the authority of the Tora. The sense of the passage in Deuteronomy is that the King should order a summary of the Tora to be written for him, under the supervision of the Levitical priests. The Book of Deuteronomy itself, since it contains the principle laws of the Pentateuch, is a Mishne Tora, but it is not the only such Mishne. As Se~adya Ga~on and other commentators noted, the Mishne Tora written by the Israelites on stone was not the Book of Deuteronomy. There may have been other authoritative Mishne Tora. One such Mishne Tora, coming from priestly circles for the benefit of a future King, is the Temple Scroll from the Dead Sea. 22 R. David Qim}.'li (ca. 116o-1235) observed that a Mishne-text is conceptually related to the duty 'to repeat' (ve-shinnantam) the Tora to the younger generation ''and to speak'' about it (Deut 6:7), a duty involving ''repetition of the Tora and its explanation in a general way." 23 According to this prescription, the Tora must be communicated not by reciting the original, but through ''repetition,'' by changing the original into a text that may be adequately repeated (and thus grasped) by the

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younger generation. ''If the intention [of this commandment] was the verbatim recitation of Scripture, without any additions or omissions, using the same expressions and vocabulary, it could not possibly have said 'and you shall repeat them and speak of them [vesl1innantam ve-dibbartam],' '' observed Benamozegh; ''this is not called 'repetition' and 'speech' but reading! Speech [dibbur) is that which people communicate orally, not in writing!'' 24 Forn1ally, the oral Law is the ''explanation'' of the written Law. 25 This ''explanation'' is effected through the verb shana, that is, repetition/change. The Mishna/Misl1ne is the ''text'' of an original: the original is ''textualized'' into a formula which can be grasped by the student and which helps him to recover the sense of the original message. It is important to remember that the oral Law is also designated Ley Mental 'Mental Law.' The ''mental'' aspect of the Law does not refer to the text itself, but, rather, to the original sense of the message that the text helps to recover. 26 The change/explanation association is particularly evident in the Neophyti and other Palestinian Targumi,r·, where the ''translation'' of the Scriptures is actually expanded and paraphrased. Rabbinic tradition connects the recitation of the Targum in the Synagogue with a passage in Nehemiah (8:8), saying that the Scripture was read and ''explained. " 27 Accordingly, the Targumim are classified as oral Law. 28 Repetition is thus the source of the oral Law and the explanation of the written Law. In this sense, since Deuterono,ny is the ''Repetition of the Tora," it constitutes the beginning of the oral Law and the explanation of the written Law. Again quoting Benamozegh: In our opinion the commandment "and you shall repeat them to your children and you shall speak about them" (Deut 6:8), alludes to the explanation of the Tora which is the oral Law. The explanation is designated "repetition. This is why the Book of Deutero,10111.11 is designated "Mish11e Tora, since concerning it it was said: "And Moses began explaining this Tora'' (Deut 1:5). Upon reflection you will realize that the Book of Deuteronomy is the end of the written Law and the beginning of the oral Law: It is the thread joining them both. Accordingly, the oral Law is called Mishna. 29 11

••• 11

The encoding and decoding processes are apparent in some rituals. An event is ''encoded''; the execution of the ritual ''decodes'' the message, expressing thereby the original trace of the event. Let us examine, for the sake of illustration, some of the rituals connected with the Exodus. During their enslavement in Egypt the Hebrews could not prepare leavened bread since they would have had to remain idle for about thirty minutes, waiting for the dough to rise. Therefore, the ma~~a

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'unleavened bread' was designated ''the bread of affliction'' (Deut 16:3), commemorating, in the words of the Passover Haggada, ''the bread of poverty that our forebears ate in the Land of Egypt.'' The Scripture states that on the morning of the Exodus, when the moment of freedom was imminent, dough was kneaded in preparation for the journey ahead (Exod 12:39). Suddenly, while eagerly waiting for the dough to rise and to savor their first leavened bread, the Presence of the Lord was revealed to the people announcing their freedom and the beginning of the Exodus. Therefore, ''the people took their dough before it was leavened'' (Exod 12:34). Refen,ng to the verse '' And they baked unleavened wafers of the dough that they brought out from Egypt'' (Exod 12:39), the rabbis explained: And they baked . . . the dough: it teaches that they kneaded the dough, but that they had no time to make it leavened, until they were saved. '' 30 In this fashion the ma~~ was transforn1ed from a ''bread of affliction'' into a symbol of freedom, because of the presence of the Lord urging the Israelites to depart from Egypt and to begin the journey to the Promised Land. This explanation appears in the Passover Haggada: 11

This ma~~a that we eat, what does it signify? It is because the dough of our forebears could not yet leaven until God revealed Himself to them and saved them. As it is written'' And they baked unleavened wafers of the dough which they brought out from Egypt." (Exod 12:39)

The tension between the ma~~a in the pre-Exodus context (''bread of affliction'') and as an encoded message symbolizing redemption and freedom is evident in the laws concerning the Passover ritual. The ma~~ is not to be kneaded with wine, honey, or any similar ingredient, since this would make it into 'a bread of the wealthy' (pat ~ashira): 31 ma~~a must be the ''bread of affliction," that is, ''of poverty. "32 On the other hand, it is not to be consumed in the same manner as before the Exodus: the law declares that it must be consumed while one is reclining on a couch 'in the manner of freedom' (derekh J,erut). 33 We meet a similar situation with the Paschal lamb that was consumed on the night of Passover at the time of the Temple, commemorating the Paschal meal in Egypt the night before the Exodus. Unlike the Samaritans who eat it in the same manner in which it was eaten in Egypt, ''with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in your hand ... in haste'' (Exod 12:11), transformation is of the essence in Jewish law. The rabbis were careful to stipulate the difference ''between the Paschal celebration in Egypt and the Paschal celebration of [future] generations'' (Mishna Pesa/Jim IX, 5). The relationship between the celebration of a ritual and the origi-

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots nal event which it represents is more subtle and complex when the original event itself was also a ritual. In such a case transformation affects the event itself and not merely the manner in which it is to be celebrated. Consider the Mezuz.a, a scroll containing two portions of Deuteronomy (6:4-6 and 11:13-21). In fulfillment of the commandment to write God's words ''on the door-post(s) of your house and your gates'' (Deut 6:9, 11:21), it is to be put on the door-post of the house. Hence its name Mezuz.a 'door-post.' It is intimately related to the Paschal sacrifice celebrated by the Hebrews before the Exodus. In Egypt the Israelites had to smear the ''two door-posts and the lintel of the house'' with the blood of the Paschal lamb (Exod 12:7). The blood on the door-posts was a ''sign'' securing ''protection'' from the destruction affecting Egypt (Exod 12:13). '' And the Lord will pass to smite the Egyptians," said Moses to the Hebrews, ''and when He will see the blood on the lintel and on the two door-posts, and the Lord shall protect the door, and He will not permit the destroyer to come to your house to injure'' (Exod 12:24). In Jewish tradition, the object of the Mezuz.a is also the ''protection'' of the house from any impending harrn. 34 The point of reference for this belief is the blood on the door-posts in Egypt: And the Lord shall protect the door, and He will not permit [the destroyer to injure] (Exod 12:24). One may [present] an a fortiori argument from these words: If the Paschal sacrifice in Egypt, which is light-that it is [only] momentarily [binding], [and] that it did not obligate during day and night [but only at night], and that it was not binding on [all future] generations it was said about it ''and He would not pern1it the destroyer''; the Mezuza which is weighty-that it contains ten times the Tetragrammaton, that it obligates during the day and during the night, and that it is binding on [all future] generations how much more that ''He would not perntit the destroyer." 35

An analysis of the rule governing the application of the Mezuz.a and the blood ceremony will help us grasp their intimate relation. Rabbinic tradition maintained that the door-posts in Egypt served as a substitute altar. The smearing of blood corresponded to a general procedure whereby the blood of the sacrifice is smeared on the altar. 36 The function of this ceremony becomes quite clear in terms of the sacramental rite. It is not clear, however, why the rabbis declared that it had been perforrned not only on the doors of the room in which the Paschal lamb was (slaughtered and) consumed, but also on the chambers in which they slept. 37 According to the rabbis, only rooms used for non-residential purposes, such as a barn or a stable, were not smeared with blood. 38 The reason lies in the fact that the same rule also applies to the Mezuz.a. 39 The sense is now clear: since the rabbis

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conceived of the Paschal blood on the door-posts as the model for the Mezuza, they also applied the laws governing the latter to the for1ner. Thus, whereas in the ma~~' the substance of the original event is preserved (unleavened wafers), changing only the mode in which it is to be consumed (''in the way of freedom''), in the case of the Mezuza the mode of the original was preserved; the substance, however, was radically changed: from Paschal blood into two portions of the Scriptures. The blood )Scriptures change is in itself noteworthy, indicating the belief that the ultimate bond between God and man must be found in the Law, rather than in sacramental blood. Furthermore, the selection of two scriptural passages containing the Tetragrammaton ten times is, as noted by the rabbis, a highly significant fact: the ''protection'' effected by God upon seeing the ''sign'' of the blood is the culmination of the special regard for Israel during the ten plagues. Occasionally, the change distinguishing the new from the old ritual has no basis whatsoever in Scripture, but solely in tradition. For the sake of illustration, let us examine the ritual of circumcision. Jewish law determined that circumcision includes two procedures, one that involves mila 'incision,' a vertical cut made along the foreskin; and the other peri"a 'uncovering,' folding out the foreskin, unveiling thereby the corona. 4~ Both procedures are absolutely necessary. Categorically, the law declares that without peri"a the circumcision is invalid. 41 In Scripture, circumcision is first connected with Abraham (Gen 17). Neither of these operations is mentioned. And yet rabbinic tradition maintains that Abraham did not make peri"a, but only mila. '' Abraham," taught the rabbis, ''was commanded [to make] mila, but not peri"a. "42 It follows therefore, that the prescribed ritual involves a transformation of the original circumcision p·racticed by Abraham. As with the Mezuza, the object of the prescribed ritual is identical to that of the original. Explicitly, the traditional blessing accompanying circumcision declares that its purpose is ''to have him [the child] partake in the covenant of our Patriarch Abraham." 43 Again (as with the Mezuza), the range of applicability of circumcision coincides with the original ritual, namely all male children and household members. Only the element of peri"a, as an absolute condition, distinguishes the prescribed ritual from the original model. By declaring first that Abraham did not practice peri"a, and second that circumcision is invalid without peri"a, the rabbis were obliquely ascertaining the irreversibility of a transformational process: the original event cannot be substituted for the prescribed ritual. The position of Maimonides that the circumcision is only binding be~ause of Mosaic legislation, and not because of God's commandment to Abraham, recognizes this fundamental principle. 44 The best illustration of the change involved in the process of trans-

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots mission is the theophany at Sinai. It is the most important event in the history of Israel. Indeed, Maimonides considers it the supreme instant in human history: the collective experience of God's speech by an entire nation. 45 How was this experience transmitted? It was transmitted through the radical Sinai-to-Temple transformation: the 46 theophany at Sinai is ever-present at the Sanctuary in Jerusalem. In Jewish tradition, Mount Sinai is totally devoid of sanctity. 47 The ''original'' Mount Sinai and the momentous event taking place in its midst were ''transferred'' to the Tabernacle and then to the Temple at Jerusalem, 48 just as Bet-'El-the Sanctuary consecrated by the Patriarch Jacob-was ''transferred'' to the Temple at Jerusalem. More precisely, using the metaphor of the rabbis, Mount Moriah-the future place of the Temple at Jerusalem-''jumped'' to meet Jacob at Bet-'El, before the Patriarch had consecrated it: 49 transforn1ation is not effected by reaching into the past from the perspective of the present, but rather by having the future anticipate the past and transforrn it before it becomes real. 50 The preceding may be summarized as follows. At the cosmological level, repetition encodes the first trace of Creation and the everchanging acts of Providence. The created Universe expresses the tension between the infinite power of the Creator and the finite terrns in which Creation is realized. This, somehow, parallels the tension between language as the oraculum or ''golden doves'' apprehended from the perspective of the first person, and articulation or ''silver dots'' as perceived from the perspective of the second person. 51 As will be seen in the following chapter, at the linguistic level too we find ma~na 'significance' representing the unprocessed thought in the mind of the speaker, and sharalJ, 'articulation,' which is apprehended by ''the addressee." The aim of communication is for ''the addressee'' to transform sharalJ, into ma~na. At the conceptual level, repetition is the ground for the idea of text and textuality, the subject of the fourth chapter. Both these levels coalesce when considered semiologically.

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III

FREEDOM, L GUAGE, AND NEGATIVITY Because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently. Jacques Derrida

Introduction

The most peculiar aspect of the medieval thinker is that he developed his ideas around a text and expressed them as a commentary. The text could be sacred, such as the Bible or the Koran, or authoritative, such as the works of Plato and Aristotle. The truth, by sheer definition, was contained in a book: already ''written,'' it could only be discovered by means of interpretation. This concept of truth affected his perception of nature: the medieval man read natural phenomena; he interpreted them as semiological indexes rather than as objective facts. The underlying assumption implicit in this approach to nature is present in the rabbinic view concerning ''the letters with which the heavens and earth were created'' (Berakhot 55a). This view is further developed in Sefer Ye~ira 'The Book of Creation,' in which Creation is conceived in terms of letters and ciphers. Judah ha-Levi indicated that these letters and ciphers are the ''thirty-two paths of wisdom'' (the principal premise of the Sefer Ye~ira) and that they correspond to the twenty-two letters of the alphabet and the ten basic numbers of the decimal system. The created universe is, accordingly, significant in that all of Creation may be grasped in terms of speech and numbers. More precisely, in terms of a metalanguage (''the thirty-two paths of wisdom''), Creation includes both language and mathematics. Reflecting on this view, he commented ''that the writings of God are his creations, and 1 the words of God are his writings. '' The argument presented by R. Ba})ye ibn Paquda in favor of Creation projects this idea quite well:

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It is known that things that are void of intentionality cannot constitute a sign [indicating] wisdom and capability. Don't you see that if suddenly one spilled an inkwell on a blank piece of paper, it could never result in orderly writing and readable lines, such as result from a pen? If someone presented to us some orderly writing-which could never have been made without using a pen-and pretended that it was inscribed when ·the ink spilled over the paper fornting the writing, we would hasten to contradict him, as this would be impossible without intentionality. Since according to our perception this cannot be possible with the inscription of letters, which are valid by convention ['i~pla}:l] 2 then how can one maintain the possibility that things which for us are of a more complex constitution [than letters] and of infinitely more wisdom, came to be without intentionality; wisdom, and capability? This [argument] is sufficient in order to demonstrate the existence of a Creator, blessed be He, on the basis of signs, to whomever understands in earnest. Likewise, this would be an adequate answer and reply to the dahriya, who are those who profess that the world is eternal. Understand [this well]! 3

Because the medieval man considered interpretation the highest form of intellectual activity and viewed the whole gamut of reality as a semiological system, it is difficult to exaggerate his deep involvement with semiology and semantic theory. ''I must confess,'' wrote Roman Jakobson, referring to medieval linguists, ''that the more one is plunged into their writings, the stronger is the impression of an unsurpassed skill in the arduous tasks of semantic theory. ''4 The preceding applies all the more to the Jewish thinker. Jewish involvement with ''the Book'' dates from remote antiquity. With the loss of national territory and political autonomy the Jewish people became more and more dependent on ''the Book'': survival was an act of interpretation. As the bureaucracies indispensable for the government of a people were coming to an end, the Jews had to fill the vacuum with their books (which are books) about ''the Book. '' 5 The entire basis of the rabbinic movement, and the subsequent survival of Judaism as we know it, rests on interpretation. Without interpretation, the entire edifice of Judaism would have vanished into naught: the political, juridical, and religious institutions, the justification for their own peculiar history and destiny, the hopes for the future, the system of values, etc., are the effect of interpretation. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) sensed the peculiar situation of the Jews when he wrote: ''The political misfortune of the nation taught them to appreciate the only possession they had retained, their written records, at its true value . . . . From now on, it was the Holy Book, and the 6 study of it, that kept the scattered people together. '' This last statement is accurate only if interpretation is meant by ''study.''

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In Moslem lands, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula, the Jew responded to the new interest in philology and grammatical theory prompted by Arabic culture, and applied it to the language of the Scripture. The dawn of what later would be known as the Golden Age of Judaism began with the grammatical works of Menal).em ibn Saruq (tenth century). His disciple R. Judah ibn ~ayyuj (ca. 9451000) discovered the most important principle governing Semitic languages: all words derive from a triliteral root. This discovery revolutionized the study of language in general and grammatical theory in particular. Dunnash ibn Labrat (tenth century), a brilliant grammarian who had sat at the feet of Sefadya Ga~on in the East, settled in Spain, bringing to the West the invaluable knowledge of his teacher, the most outstanding mind in medieval Jewry prior to ·· Maimonides. Thus was initiated a period of linguistic research unparalleled in Jewish history, culminating in the works of R. Samuel ha-Nagid (933-1055), R. Moses ibn Chiqatilla (eleventh century), R. Judah ibn Balafam (eleventh century), R. Abraham ibn fEzra (1o8g1164), and above all, the great master of grammatical theory, R. Jonah ibn }annal). Maimonides, certainly the most important figure in medieval Jewry and one whose values and works constitute the very basis of modern Judaism, must be perceived in light of this linguistic tradition. His Guide for the Perplexed is concerned with religious language and symbolism rather than with philosophy; he explicitly wrote that the object of his work was ''to elucidate the uncertainties of religion and to bring to light the truths that lay in her interior which are above the comprehension of the masses. ''7 Likewise, he disclaimed any interest or preeminence in physics and theology: ''The works written about these are sufficient," he remarked, ''and if they are wanting in some of their aspects, whatever I would have to say about that particular subject would not be better than what has already been said. " 8 The twenty-five points concerning physics, which he needed in order to develop his proof of the existence of God, were listed in the introduction to Part II, set apart and excluded from the body of the work. In the Guide, philosophical themes are not examined for their own sake but simply to expound points concerning religion: '' do not suspect or entertain in your mind that somehow I intend only to expound that philosophical theme, since such themes were already discussed in many books .... Rather I only intend to mention what could elucidate some of the uncertainties of religion. ''9 In an epistle addressed to the sages of Lunel, Maimonides emphatically declared that philosophical studies should be carried out simply in order to serve as a ''handmaid to the Scripture. ''10

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots Maimonides' perception of his work as something apart from philosophy reflects a profound awareness of two different types of truth. The philosopher approaches the truth as if it lies beyond the perimeter of a text and a context; truth is absolute, transcendental, and all-embracing. For Maimonides there is no truth outside a text and a context. A text any text-demands an a priori commitment to its significance as the sine qua non for the possibility of interpretation; that text is a book, a particular book, ''the Book.'' Maimonides leaves himself open to the kind of criticism that no modem philosopher can withstand: ''If we must 'believe' in order to 'understand,' '' wrote Paul Ricoeur, ''then there is no difference between a priori understanding and mere projection of our prejudices. ''11 Hence the profound concern of Maimonides with the semiological system of ''the Book'' and the justification of his interpretation in light of philosophy. We will now examine three closely-related areas pertaining to semiology, significantly treated by Maimonides. As we shall see, freedom pertains to one level of language. Conversely, all semiological systems, language included, are grounded on ''arbitrariness," a concept correlative to freedom. Rather than restrict this discussion to the strict boundaries of medieval studies, we will examine these areas in the light of some correlative issues of contemporary interest. \

Freedom, in the sense of a totally unmotivated act transcending the realm of causality, is basic to Judaism at both the ethical (freedom of choice) and cosmological (creation ex nihilo) levels; similarly, freedom is the ground of semiology. Saussure delineated the arbitrary character of the sign; 12 unmotivated, it has no natural connection with the signified. This ''arbitrariness'' makes signification possible. Signs ''carry signification'' through their differences, and ''arbitrary and differential are two correlative qualities.'' Only through the conscious opposition and relative position to one another can signs acquire value and signification. 13 Accordingly, there is a tension between semiology and ''being'' as an ontic-ontological entity determined by absolute metaphysical (or natural) necessity. Sign and ontology are mutually exclusive. The latter is; in order to signify, a thing must lose its necessary character. 14 Before a thing becomes a sign and signifies, it must shed its ontological dimension. Creation ex nihilo implies not only design but also intentionality (in its semiological sense, rather than intention, in the teleological sense, which is metaphysical). Creation, or the eternity of the world, depends solely on how one wishes to relate to this world and to perceive it. If one wishes to perceive the world in ontic-ontological ter11ts, there is

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Freedom, Language, and Negativity little need to postulate Creation. Conversely, Creation is postulated when one wishes to relate to the world as a semiological system. Language may be conceived of as an instrument allowing for deception and the manipulation of emotions. It may also be conceived of as a rational instrument operating on logical categories. In ancient Greece, Gorgias and Plato initiated a debate concerning the character of language which has persisted to this day. Gorgias maintained that speech affects the psyche of the hearer like magic and witchcraft: it functions as an emotional catalyst: casting a spell upon the audience, it char1ns and binds, producing illusion and deception. The object of rhetoric is to master the techniques of arousing and controlling these emotions. Rather than to sophia 'wisdom' rhetoric pertains to metis 'cunning intelligence.' 15 The rhetor, as an experienced magician, knows how to exploit the psyche, and masters the techniques by which this aim is reached. Gorgias, noted Charles P. Segal, ''does not regard such persuasion and its concomitant enchantments as immoral, but rather as a necessary and practical corollary to his conception of the human psyche.'' As an instrument for the irrational, ''the logos demands the complete suspension of 'rational' belief . . . it works via magic and enchantment rather than via the objective factuality of aletheia [truth]." 16 According to this view, rhetoric is essential for the proper directing of human conduct: What is significant, however, is the rational principle involved, that the manipulation of the formal aspect of the logos can produce a desired emotional effect on the audience; and hence the linguistic techne of rhetoric becomes also a technique for directing human motivation. 17

Plato condemned the irrational aspect of speech. Rhetoric is wrong; its aim is illusion and deception. 18 However, he also recognized the magical quality of rhetoric and speech. As with magic, rhetoric is an instrument empowering the orator to manipulate his audience. Rhetoric may be defined as ''a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments. '' 19 The main objective of Plato in Phaedrus is the subordination of rhetoric to philosophy. The orator should implant in his audience ''the conviction [he] desire[s] by the right application of words and training. '' 20 Because of its manipulative and magical powers, rhetoric must be used as an instrument in the service of truth, that is, of philosophy. Accordingly, a genuine orator must be first and foremost a true philosopher: Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls they are so many and of such nature ... ; he will next divide speeches ,

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots into their different classes: 'Such and such persons,' he will say, 'are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way' . . . he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech . . . then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art. 21

The development of formal logic (as well as of Aristotelian rhetoric) is grounded on the belief in the hierarchical superiority of philosophy and the need to subordinate speech and rhetoric to rational principles. 22 Usually, in discussions concerning the character of language, the rhetorical and logical views are treated as mutually exclusive. For Maimonides, however, both the rational and the irrational aspects of speech, far from being mutually exclusive, are essential for an adequate understanding of language. At one level (the semiotic aspect of speech), language is rhetorical. At a deeper level (semantics), language is rational. These two levels are closely intertwined and together constitute the texture of language. To view speech as the exclusive apparatus for either rhetoric or reason is to ignore profoundly what language is all about. Maimonides' treatment of language bears directly upon his concept of freedom. Negativity, remarked Hegel (1770-1831), ''is the energy of thought, of pure ego.'' The ''life of the mind'' becomes ''this power by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. ''23 Freedom is intrinsic to ''absolute negativity," Werner Marx explained this as follows: The spirit attests its power of again finding itseH in this contradiction, in this division, in the negative it has posited, and thus of again negating the latter. As such a power of ''absolute negativity," the substance of spirit is ''freedom," i.e., non-dependence on another, and seH-relation to itseH. In this way the spirit engenders its own freedom, liberates itseH from all forms of its being which do not correspond to its concept of spirit. 24

In a different context, Freud also relates negation to freedom: The study of judgment affords us, perhaps for the first time, an insight into the origin of an intellectual function from the interplay of the primary instinctual impulses. Judging is a continuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process by which the ego took things into itseH or expelled them from itseH, according to the pleasure principle. The polarity of judgment appears to correspond to the opposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist. Affirmation as a substitute for uniting-belongs to Eros; nega-

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Freedom, Language, and Negativity tion-the successor to expulsion-belongs to the instinct of destruction .... But the performance of the function of judgment is not made possible until the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a just measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle. 25

~

Maimonides approaches negativity from a radically different perspective that of the Philonic tradition concerning the unknowability of God. 26 Since God cannot be known, all His attributes are to be interpreted negatively. On this point, Maimonides coincides with the position of some of the Church Fathers and Moslem theologians. 27 We must note, at the very outset, that negativity here does not merely ''deny the predicate of existence to God .... in order to recognize Him as a superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. '' 28 ''Superior'' presupposes a common ground for comparison, something unacceptable to Maimonides; whatever the sense of ''recognition'' in conjunction with ''inconceivable'' may be, it has nothing to do with either t~e basis or the objectives of negativity. ''Negative theology'' is not grounded on some ontological principle. Like Bergson, Maimonides rejects the notion of negation in nature. 29 Negativity here is related to language. Kenneth Burke wrote: The paradox of the negative is simply this: Quite as the word 'tree' is verbal and the thing tree is non-verbal, so all words for the nonverbal must, by the very nature of the case, discuss the realm of the non-verbal in terms of what it is not . ... Hence, to use words properly, we must spontaneously have a feeling for the principle of the negative. 30

.- Negativity is intrinsic to the very essence of language: 31 ''in languages there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive

terms. '' 32 This is why the difficulty of expressing certain ideas in positive terms is not restricted to medieval thinkers and the advocates of negative theology. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) observed that although Dasein is used in what appears to be a positive sense, Heidegger actually uses it negatively: Now the characteristic of Heidegger's philosophy is to describe Dasein using positive terms which hide the implicit negations. Dasein is ''outside of itself, in the world''; it is "a being of distances"; it is care; it is ''its own possibilites, '' etc. All this amounts to saying that Dasein "is not'' in itself, that it ''is not'' in immediate proximity to itself, and

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that it "surpasses'' the world inasmuch as it posits itself as not being in itself and as not being in the world. In this sense Hegel is right rather than Heidegger when he states that Mind is the negative. 33

In Hegel negativity pertains to the very structure of the mind, and in Heidegger to the original structure of human reality. To both, Sartre addresses a question that would be particularly significant in our investigation of Maimonides: Actually we can put to each of them the same question, phrased slightly differently. We should say to Hegel: ''It is not sufficient to posit mind as mediation and the negative; it is necessary to demonstrate negativity as the structure of being of mind. What must mind be in order to be able to constitute itself as negative?" And we can ask the same question of Heidegger in these words: ''If negation is the original structure of transcendence, what must be the original structure of 'human reality' in order for it to be able to transcend the world?'' In both cases we are shown a negating activity and there is no concern to ground this activity upon a negative being. 34

The relation of language to negativity is essential for a proper understanding of these concepts in Maimonides. In turn, both of these concepts are related to freedom.

1.

Freedom and Creation Why were the prayers of the righteous compared to a doe? To teach us: just as with a doe, whenever her horns grow they bifurcate, the same is with the righteous, whenever they increase their prayers, their prayers are heard.

-Yoma 29a

There are two aspects to freedom, one metaphysical and the other linguistic. With the exception of the Epicureans, the pagan world believed the Cosmos to be governed by necessary and uniform laws. Man is part of the Cosmos and is determined by absolute laws. Therefore, at the metaphysical level, man cannot be totally free. Even Plato and Aristotle, in speaking of man's ''voluntary actions," do not mean ''voluntary'' in the sense of absolute freedom. They mean it rather in the sense that man is free from external compulsion and that he acts knowingly. Internally, however, even when acting ''voluntarily,'' man is determined by his own mechanism. 1

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Freedom, Language, and Negativity Absolute freedom is an illusion, a concept particularly significant for Hegel. 2 Ernst Cassirer explained Hegel's position as follows: Indeed, according to Hegel, the ''ultimate subtlety of reason'' consists in the very fact that it forever appears in the form of independence to the individual, completely seducing him with this deception, but without the least guarantee of actual independence. 3

The same idea was expressed by Borges in the ''Chess'': They do not know it is the player's hand That dominates and guides their destiny They do not know an adamantine fate Controls their will and lays the battle plan •

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God moves the player, he in tum the piece But what god beyond God begins the round Of dust and time and sleep and agonies?4

Only the Epicureans, who denied causality and maintained that the world is the result of chance, could believe that man's actions were free and undetermined. 5 Freedom as an absolute category in spite of ·causality was first introduced to western thought by Philo. 6 This is a basic biblical doctrine (Deut 30:15, 19), particularly essential to Judaism, that teaches the absolute responsibility of man. Man is free in a double sense: his activities are not determined by a fate external to him; and his activities are not the effect of his own internal mechanism. Man's freedom is perfect. He is free even when facing God. Cain lied to God (Gen 4:9). Moses did not feel compelled to listen to God's plea to save the people from Egypt (Exod 3:11; 4:10, 13). Jonah refused to obey God's command to preach to the Ninevites (Jon 1:1 ff.). Neither wisdom, nor piety, nor sanctity can alter man's freedom. King Solomon was very wise and yet he sinned (1 Kings 11:1; cf. 3:13; 5:9-14). King David, the traditional biblical symbol of piety, was responsible for the sins of adultery and murder (2 Sam 12:1-10). Even Moses, ''the servant of the Lord'' (Deut 34:5) who ''spoke mouth to mouth with the Lord'' (Num 12:8), sinned (Num 20:12), implying thereby that he was free. Freedom of choice is connected with the biblical idea of Creation ex nihilo. Biblical Creation is an act of pure volition. Accordingly, causality is the effect, not the ground, of Creation. The physical laws governing the universe are not an extension of the first act of Creation; they were superimposed on an erratic and chaotic world, whose existence defies conceptualization. A mighty wind blew, interfused, shuffled, and coalesced these elements: darkness permeated the whole of Creation. And then there was light. In this

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pristine realm of existence the basic laws of contradiction were not yet in effect: light and darkness were not mutually exclusive; they bypassed each other without crossing. Light did not shrink darkness and darkness did not dim light (Gen 1:1-3). Only at a later stage ''God separated between light and darkness'' (Gen 1:4). 7 Likewise, the rest of the physical laws were established by God (Job 26:7-14, 38:4-38; Ps 148:6; Jer 10:12 ff., 31:35). Miracles bear witness that God, author of the physical laws, may change them at His will. At the metaphysical level, creation ex nihilo means that there is no ontological relation between God and His creation. ''Creation'' is spontaneous. It pertains to the structural, not to the causal. Freedom of choice postulates that man is capable of pure volition. Although man is limited in his physical life, there is a realm-that of the spiritual and ethical-in which he is not subjected to the prin.c iple of causality. Some commentators associate this power with the belief that man was created in the image of God (Gen 1:26). This image is the source of man's freedom. Its essence is choice, not necessity. It belongs to the pristine realm of existence, free and undetermined. Because the ''image of God'' in man involves absolute individuality, it is traditionally associated with the idea of absolute freedom. On this basic idea, so eloquently expressed by R. Emanuel Aboab (ca. 15551628), the whole system of Hebrew morality rests: God, the Omnipotent, having created the entire celestial and elemental machine: the Planets and the Stars in the Ethereal part; the herbs, plants and animals in the inferior part, at the end created man, as the completion of all his works, whose substance He made out of the earth, and as a for111 He blew into him an intellective soul: subjecting everything under his dominion, the fishes of the sea, the birds of the air, the plants and the animals on earth: bestowing upon him (among many other things) that supreme benefit and prerogative, which is freedom of choice and an autonomous and absolute will, by which he could dispose of his actions according to his wishes, without internal coercion or [external] influence by any cause that could force him to act against his own wishes. In this aspect, man is divine and he imitates his Creator who, (Blessed be his holy name), everything that He does, He does by his will and immense goodness, but not as an effect of necessity ... Every element has its particular quality: and finally, no celestial or terrestrial creature could pass the limited and natural order that the supreme artificer has imposed on it. Only man may dispose with absolute dominion and autonomous will his actions and thoughts.... And because man is free, and the absolute master of his will, we see that God pleads with his people to incline towards the side of virtue, and to apply its freedom to his holy service. . . . And because man is a subject who can sin or deserve [merit], God admonishes him in his

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holy Law, and by mouth of his servants the Prophets, to pursue [what is] good, and emphatically exhorting him to the veneration and love of the divine, in order to deserve thus the eternal beatitude for which he was created.8

Each time the spirit of man blows it is a new and spontaneous act. In the words of George Santayana (1863-1952): ''There can be no spirit without wind to impel it; but wind may also blow spirit out. It is each time a new song of the wind, joyful while it blows free and unreturning. ,,9 Freedom of choice rejects the belief in a strict causality underlying all activities and phenomena. Thus, there is a basic duality in the universe, a disunity between the realm of physics and the realm of ethics. Spinoza (1632-1677) rejected this disunity. By applying the geometrical method to ethics, he was in fact ascertaining the basic unity and uniformity of human activities and of physical phenomena·. Schelling (1759-18o5), as he himself declared, was the ''completion of what Spinoza had set forth in an initial and bold sketch.'' For him, rejection of duality was an affirmation ''that the absolute Identity (the Infinite) cannot alienate itself. '' 10 Maimonides refers to freedom of choice as ''the most important doctrine.'' 11 This freedom is ''categoric'' and universally agreed upon by all Jews. Maimonides did not concern himself with the basic duality that this doctrine posits. It is possible that Maimonides did not perceive duality as a valid philosophical problem, or else, the problem did not even arise since he did not believe in absolute determinism even in the physical realm. For instance, he maintained that animal movements are the effect of volition, in the sense that they are not determined. 12 At the cosmological level, too, he considered the uneven distribution of matter in the universe 13 and the different orbital directions of the stars as evidence against absolute determinism.14 Although Maimonides upholds causality, causality is not transsystemic. It is operative only within a specific context and structure which integrates it. Therefore, there is no real dichotomy between the physical and the ethical. In Maimonides the problem of ·) freedom arises in conjunction with his theory of language.

2.

Language and Matna In princely estates, a garden is sometimes so laid out that a man easily loses his way in it. The purpose of such an arrangement is to afford entertainment. The trees are set in rows through which there runs a network of

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots paths that resemble one another. All paths lead seemingly to a central colonnade; but in fact some lead away from the colonnade, and some toward it. A man who walks in the garden cannot tell whether he is on the right path or not, because all seem alike. Only one who has frequented the garden and has learned how to reach the colonnade can distinguish one path from another. But the man who stands on top of the colonnade commands a view of all paths, and can tell which is the right one and which the wrong one. He therefore can point out to those who walk in the garden which path to take. Those who trust him arrive at their destination; but those who do not trust him and prefer to rely on their own judgment are bound to go astray, and fail to reach their goal. R. Moses f:{ayyim Luzzato

According to Philonic tradition, language is conventional, not natural.' Judah ha-Levi also maintained that language is not natural but conventional.2 Maimonides accepted this tradition. 3 We can now proceed to ask a fundamental question concerning the concept of human heedom. What can the meaning of human freedom be when language, the apparatus of human expression, is a conventional system imposed on the individual from without? Maimonides did not forn1ulate this question. However, from his treatment of language a clear understanding of the problem emerges. To begin with, language is not totally arbitrary. In a medical work, Maimonides stated that the phonological system of a language is determined by physiological and climatic factors. 4 Moreover, ~i;;tala}}iya and mu~tala}}, the Arabic ter111s used to describe the character of language, usually translated 'conventional,' actually mean 'artificial' in opposition to 'natural. ' 5 R. Isaac Profiat Duran (died ca. 1414), commenting on the meaning of haskan,a, the Hebrew equivalent of these Arabic ter111s, pointed out that although it usually implies "human choice,'' in our case choice must be excluded "since neither }rourself nor any other speaking individual has the choice of language. Follov.'ing Philonic and rabbinic tradition, 7 Duran ascertained that language was instituted by God who taught it to Adam. s The principal meaning of haska,,,a. in this context, is that it is not natural in a t,,·ofold sense: nature is not reflected in language and language is not the product l)f nature.~ In other words, language does not contain the values that ,-t,

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shed light on real objective things, and no natural process can account for the phenomena of language: However, in this definition it was said that language is the result of haskama, because we are following the correct opinion that languages are conventional, not natural, unlike [the view] held by some of the ancients, who believed that languages are natural. The meaning of their view could either be that languages by their own nature infor111 us about the nature of real things, or that we, the members of the human race, have language in our own nature .... The falsehood of this view is evident to everyone familiar with the truth: languages do not inform us about real things, 10 and the human race does not have it [language] by nature, but by haskama. 11

Language is ''conventional'' in the sense that all hierarchical systems and organizations are necessarily artificial and therefore admit 12 an alternative system. There is, on the one hand, a necessary and absolute relationship between a word and what it represents. Maimonides considered the verse ''and whatever man called it that was its name'' (Gen 2:19) a proof that according to Scripture language is conventional. 13 We must point out that Maimonides accepted the tradition that God taught speech to man. 14 However, he distinguished between the general faculty of speech, which is God-given, 15 and the actual languages themselves with their respective linguistic systems, which are artificial. 16 Maimonides' proof from Scripture is predicated upon three closely-related interpretations. First, it was Adam and not God who instituted language. This point is fundamental to the artificial aspect of speech. Second, the expression ''and whatever man called it'' is taken as indicative of the arbitrariness of the word itself. Finally, the second half of the verse, ''and that was its name," is understood to mean ''and that became its name''; positing thus a basic linguistic property whereby a sign is necessarily associated with what it represents. On the other hand, this necessary relationship is effective only within a given linguistic system. Any word can be replaced by a linguistic equivalent from another language. Thus the validity of a linguistic sign is necessary within a given linguistic system, but conventional from the point of view of the totality of linguistic systems. The analogy of the ''conventional'' or ''artificial'' view of language with Saussure's theory concerning the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is obvious. 17 However, the term ''conventional'' (or ''artificial'') avoids the pitfalls connected with the choice of the term '' arbitrariness'' (''so grossly misnamed," in the words of Derrida). 18 The finer points of this theory of language, and the specific relationship be-

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tween the linguistic sign and what it represents, will be best understood upon an analysis of the two levels of language. As mentioned earlier, there are two levels of language: sharal} and marna. Sharai} 'meaning'19 is the lexical sense of a term; it is intrinsic to every word and it is immediately recognized by all the members of the speaking community. It corresponds to the ~har 'obvious' sense of the term. Marna 'significance' is the conceptual sense of a term;20 it corresponds to the batn 'inner' sense. 21 It is not immediately recognized by all the members of the speaking community and it requires ta'wil 'interpretation' to be properly decoded. 22 Marna (pl. marani) is expressed through language: ''The words concerning it [what is conceived] are either to teach it to others or to elucidate to himself what he had [already] conceived. '' 23 Superior beings communicate ma'na without language. 24 The need to articulate marna and communicate it linguistically is exclusively human: ''We can neither understand nor perceive the communication of marani from the soul of one individual to the soul of another individual except through speech, which is the sound articulated by the lips, tongue, and other speech instruments. ''25 Only man possesses this ability: ''Man is singular in his ability to [use] speech in order to signal and express to others what he had conceived in his mind.'':1.6 Se'adya Ga'on, commenting upon a key passage in Sefer Ye~ira, remarked: The ma'na cannot be apprehended without three elements: phonetic sound, word, and association. The phonetic sound is what is not meaningful [in isolation], as when one utters "Aa'' and other phonetic sounds. A word occurs when one says, ''man." Here, too, no ma'na can be discerned. However, in association with other words ma'na is accomplished, as, e.g., when one says "a man found me," or "I saw a man'' ... ''phonetic sound'' is what cannot be understood, ''utterances" are isolated words, and ''sentence" is the association of two or three [or more] words, as .w e have illustrated. 27

Secadya's first point ascertains the glossematic principle: the phonic expression is not intrinsic to the linguistic sign. This is essential for a proper understanding of the conventional (or arbitrary) character of the· linguistic sign. 28 Maimonides did not formulate this principle. From his reference to non-phonetic speech, however, it is clear that for him too the phonic expression is marginal to the linguistic sign. 29 Secadya's third point will be considered in the next section. His second point will be understood upon examining Maimonides' treatment of 'ism. One must distinguish between the 'ism 'name,' the linguistic sign

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(which includes the shara~), and the matna that the sign indicates. 30 Even in one language the same 'ism could stand for more than one matna 31 and some matna require more than one 'ism, 32 and there are some 'ism totally devoid of matna. 33 Conversely, there is matna too subtle to be indicated ''in common language, which is the major cause of error. '' 34 Although language can convey matna, matna is not totally reducible to language. Language only conveys generalities. 35 Accordingly, there is a matna residue transcending the linguistic sign, 36 ''since we are unable to find an 'ism that really corresponds to the truth of a matna. '' 37 The object of metaphor is to give linguistic expression to this type of matna. 38 Matna is both epistemologically and ontologically valid. 39 On the one hand, it originates in the taql 'intellect' and can only be grasped by it. 40 More precisely, ''the taql is nothing but the matna when actually understood. ''41 On the other hand, the referent of niatna is objective reality, which is not a linguistic category. Matna is related to the $Ura 'inner forn1' of things: the $Ura ''is the matna through which a thing becomes and is what it is."42 Unlike the shara~, which is defined in linguistic terms alone, the matna refers to, and is defined by, objective reality. Therefore they cannot be equally apprehended. It is imperative ''to grasp the matani according to their truth, [that is] they ought to be understood through intellectual perception. [They] must be abstracted [from language] and should not [be understood] according to the generalities indicated by language. ''43 To illustrate: if one wants to establish the matna associated with the different activities of fire on the basis of language, one would have to arrive at a much larger number of matani than if ''fire'' were grasped intellectually: For instance, fire can melt some objects and solidify others. It can cook, burn, whiten, and blacken. . . . Now, whoever does not understand the nature of fire would wrongly think that it has six different matani. One matna that blackens, another that whitens, a third matna that cooks, a fourth matna that burns, a fifth matna that melts, and a sixth matna that solidifies. All these activities [when perceived linguistically] are contradictory: the matna of one activity does not coincide with the matna of the other. However, one who knows the nature of fire will concur that all these activities are the effects of one single quality, which is heat. 44

Although shara~ and matna occasionally coincide, 45 and each can be analyzed in terms of the other, 46 they are two distinct and irreducible levels. The shara~ is a linguistic category and can be known through the lexical analysis of the 'ism. 47 The matna, as indicated by Setadya, depends on context; 48 therefore, it cannot be derived from '' the ab-

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stract name. ''49 This is the basis for Maimonides' criticism of those who believe ''that knowledge of the sharaQ of words constitutes [ultimate] understanding, '' 50 and his dissatisfaction with the knowledge acquired through sharaQ al-'ism 'analysis of the name,' the linguistic sign. 51 For Maimonides, God communicates with man by transmitting to him matna without language, 52 making it thereby absolutely free from ambiguity. 53 It seems that the task of the recipient of a divine message is to articulate it into language, and thus make it accessible to other human beings. 54 One must apprehend not only the text of Scripture at the matna level, but also the rituals. 55 A principal objective of Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed is to teach the matna of Scriptures'> and the methodology required for its proper interpretation and decoding. 57 Freedom, although limited linguistically at the sharaQ level, is categoric at the conceptual matna level. Prior to sin, Adam inhabited the realm of the taql and matna. Only truth and falsehood are operative at this level. The consequence of sin was the passing to the realm of the conventional where good and evil are operative. By succumbing to the conventional, man lost his absolute, pristine freedom. To recover his freedom man must retrogress to the universe of truth and falsehood, that is, of matna and taql. 58 The view that language is conventional comes from Aristot.Je. 59 Matna too seems to correspond to ''the mental affections'' of Aristot60 le that ''are the same for the whole of mankind." Paraphrasing Aristotle, Se'adya Ga'on wrote ''that languages vary and writings vary, and yet although they vary the matani do not change."61 Actually, in Aristotle the ''mental affections'' pertain to the sense of words in isolation. 62 The special sense of words in association is that of ''truth and falsity," 63 which is restricted to propositions and is not characteristic of all sentences. 64 Moreover, since the ''mental affections are the same for the whole of mankind,'' they pertain to thought rather than to language. According to this view, ''speech sounds'' are the signs of a non-linguistic category. 65 Be that as it may, for Maimonides (and Se'adya) speech sound only expresses sharaQ. The ma'na is indicated by the ''association'' of words, that is, the sentence. It is important to note that the 'ism is never a sign expressing ma'na: ma'na cannot be expressed by a sign. Rather, it is indicated by a dalala, commonly translated ''guide," but actually meaning a gesture pointing to a thing or to a direction: a 'signal,' 'sign-post,' 'indicator,' or 'indication.'66 Ultimately, whether a term is just a sign or a dalala depends on the level of analysis. Unlike the dalala, the sign first expresses an intentional sense; the signified is immanent to it and is necessarily associated with it. The sign has no sense of its ''own'' transcending the signified. The dalala (as the notion of 'sign-post' implies) has its own sense, independently of

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whatever it indicates. Its signification is ''extensional," that is, it transcends its own particular sense; therefore, the signification indicated by the dalala is not necessarily connected with it (otherwise it would be a sign) and it requires ta"wil. This is why every dalala is a ''riddle'' :67 it appears as multi-dimensional, and more than one solution seems possible. 68 Accordingly, /µlira 'perplexity' is intrinsic to metaphor and to all terms capable of more than one marna. The student of such a term is /µl"iran 'perplexed,' facing a crisis involving the choice of one interpretation over another. 69 This crisis is aggravated by the fact that there are two classes of metaphor: one in which the marna is indicated by its global sense and another in which each individual terin (in opposition to the other terms making up the entire metaphor) stands for a specific matna. Therefore, there is always the danger of interpreting each term of the metaphor as conveying an individual marna when in fact there is only one single matna indicated by the global sense of the metaphor, or of interpreting the metaphor globally when in fact it was intended to be interpreted by each of the terms. 70 The title of Maimonides' work Dalalat al-}Ja"irin ('Guide for the Perplexed') is composed of the two terms just discussed. The frrst term, which should be translated as 'Sign-post' or 'Index' (rather than 'Guide'), is the construct for111 of dalala. The second tern1 expresses the crisis of choice ·in passing from the level of sharalJ to the level of matna.71 With the absence of signs at the marna level, not only freedom but also /µl'ira 'perplexity' comes into play. }Ja'iran 'perplexed,' which translates the biblical term nabukh, refers to someone who has lost his way and is now ''trapped by the Desert.''72 }Ja'ira is the specific function of the Desert. Referring to Israel's journey into the Desert, Maimonides writes that God ''perplexed (1}ayyar) them away from the right path, '' 73 in the sense that they were led away from the road leading into the Holy Land, and made to wander in the Desert. This ''perplexity'' was the effect of divine lutf 'guidance with cunning benevolence' :74 God guided them with cunning benevolence throughout their perplexities in the Desert until their soul became bold, as it is known that dwelling in the desert and austerity of the body engenders boldness, whereas its opposite engenders timidity; and thus was born a people who knew no abasement or slavery. And all this was by God's commands through Moses: "At the commandment of God they encamped and at the commandment of God they departed, the ordinance of God they obeyed, at the commandment of God by the hand of Moses'' (Num 9:23). 75

Because there are no fixed points in the Desert, it is not possible to get one's bearings. The Desert ''envelopes'' the traveler; he becomes

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots disoriented and l}a'iran. The Desert entraps; because of the rapid topological and climatic shifts, the old and trusted pathways may now lead to death and destruction (cf. Job 6:14-20). Thus, in order to survive, the l}a'iran must learn how to disregard the ''sign-posts'' and trust his own judgment: he is to overcome the ''imaginary''76 as well as ''error'' and ''ignorance. "77 In a different context, the rabbis taught about a situation where survival requires the charting of a new path: ''The Tora is analogous to two paths, one [leading] to fire and the other to snow. Anyone bearing towards this one will perish by fire. Anyone bearing towards that one will perish by snow. What is he to do? Let him walk in the middle!''78 The crisis facing the l}a'iran is a crisis of choice (of pure choice, since this level excludes signs by which riddles can be resolved). The dalala, a mere gesture pointing out a direction, can never express immanent meaning. Dalala is the ground both for direction and for bifurcation (l}aira). ''Pointing out'' gives direction and branches the path into two: direction and bifurcation are simultaneous. Thus l}aira is to dalala what meaning is to the sign (the signified to the signifier). The crisis of l}aira is resolved by an act of choice: this leads to another dalala branching the path into two, and so on; an endless labyrinth. In the words of Borges: ''Hope not that the straightness of your path/ that stubbornly branches off in two, and/ stubbornly branches off in two, will have an end.... ''79

3. Negation: Semiotics and Semantics Negation is an abrupt break in continuity which can not in any case result from prior affirmations; it is an original and irreducible event. Sartre

The specific sense of matna and shara~ can best be apprehended in light of Emile Benveniste's fundamental distinction between semiotics and semantics. 1 As we shall see, shara~ pertains to semiotics and matna to semantics. The unit of a semiotic system is the sign. An essential quality of the sign is that it has a specific sense in isolation. This sense is conventional and perceived equally by all familiar with the sign. The sense expressed by signs in association is the effect of the sum of their individual senses in isolation. ''Syntax'' applies to the rules governing this type of association. Signs cannot participate in a

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semantic composition; the semantic unit is not the sign. In a semantic composition, such as music or painting, the basic elements (sound or color) do not have any specific sense. The signification that these elements have within a given composition arises from the opposition that the artist establishes between the elements. The particular sense present in the individual elements of an artistic composition is the creation of the artist; the artist creates his own individual semiotics: Thus the artist creates his own semiotics: he establishes his oppositions by means that he himself makes significant in their arrangement. Accordingly, he neither receives a series of signs, recognized as such, nor establishes one. Color, a material thing, comprises limitless nuances of shades, none of which is an equivalent to a linguistic sign. 2

In contradistinction to the sense of the semiotic unit (''the sign''), which is conventional and therefore cannot be changed by anyone, the sense of the semantic unit is always particular and established ad hoc by the author: Accordingly, one can distinguish between systems in which significance is impressed by the author in his work and systems where significance is previously expressed by the elements in isolation, independently of the relationships in which they could be interlaced. 3

Benveniste had shown that the uniqueness of language and its preeminence as a semiological system stems from the fact that it alone comprises both the semantic and semiotic. 4 It is particularly significant that language, in combining both of these systems, uses the very same elements. At the semiotic level, we have ''the word'' functioning as a sign (''the linguistic sign''): As previously mentioned, the sign is defined as the semiotic unit; it is received as possessing signification by the community of those who use the same language, and the totality of these signs form the totality of the language. . . . In semiology there is no need to define what a sign signifies. For a sign to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that it should be received and that it should be related somehow to other signs. Does the entity in question signify? The answer must be either yes or no. If it is yes, everything was said, and it is registered; if it is no, it is rejected, and also everything was said. "Feasible"* does it exist?-Yes. "Feature''*?-Yes. ''Feafuge''*?-No. 5

At the semantic level we have the sentence; ''the sentence contains signs but is not itself a sign. ''6 The sentence is realized in words, but the words are not simply segments of it. A sentence

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots constitutes a whole, which is not reducible to the sum of its parts; the meaning inherent in the whole is distributed over the ensemble of its constituents. The word is a constituent of a sentence; it brings out signification; but it does not necessarily appear in the sentence with the meaning which it has as an autonomous unit. 7 Within the context of our purpose there are six major points distinguishing semiotics and semantics: (1) The sense of the semiotic is conventional; therefore, it expresses the general. 8 The sense of the semantic is particular;9 therefore it expresses the specific and the circumstantial. 10 (2) Consequently, the semiotic expresses only relations with other signs. 11 The semantic expresses concrete, real situations. 12 (3) At the semiotic level there is no initial global sense. The sense is the sum of the individual value of each of its particular signs. 13 At the semantic level ''the sense (the 'intended') [is] conceived globally, and then realized and divided into individual 'signs,' which are words. ''14 (4) In semantics, the sense ''is expressed in a specific forn1, which is the syntagma, in contradistinction with the semiotic, which is defined by a paradigmatic relation. ''15 This last point is of the essence. Precisely because ma~na is not immanent to the sign, but rather indicated by a dalala, it cannot acquire any sense in isolation on the basis of a paradigmatic relation with other signs. It can acquire specific sense only through concrete syntagmatic opposition. (5) The semiotic implies recognition; the semantic, interpretation;16 demanding, respectively, successive and simultaneous forms of analysis. 17 (6) The dialectical nature of negation implies a semiotic system. This becomes evident when one realizes the binary character of semiotics: ''Binary, it seems to me, is the semiological characteristic par excellence, first in language, and then in all other behavioral systems born in the midst of social life and participating 18 in a semiological analysis.'' Because of its syntagmatic character, in a semiotic situation negation is differential. This will be clearer upon our analysis of the concept of negativity in Maimonides. We can now proceed to examine a basic principle concerning Maimonides' linguistic theory. According to Maimonides all attributes referring to God himself must be interpreted in negative tern1s. For instance, attributes such as ''One,'' ''Eternal,'' and ''Living'' are to be interpreted as ''Not-multiple,'' ''Not-created,'' and ''Not-dead.'' The same applies to all other personal attributes such as ''Almighty,'' ''Omniscient,'' and ''Merciful. '' 19 God can only be perceived negatively, as what He is not, but never as what He is. Negativity, in this case, follows from two closely related premises. First, there is the categoric difference between God and his creatures: ''Absolutely, there is no likeness between Him and his crea-

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hires in anything. His existence is not like their existence, his life is not like the life of those who live, and his knowledge is not like the knowledge of those who know. ''20 Since this concept of Creation rejects any ontological relationship between God and his creatures, there is a categoric and unbridgeable abyss separating God from the Cosmos that he created. 21 This difference is both ontological and epistemological. 22 The second premise is that, as a consequence of the above, there is no common marna between God and his creatures: Conceming,whether there can be any relation between them [God and his creatures], it may appear that such a relationship exists. However, this is not the case, since it is impossible [for example] to conceive of any relation between ''reason'' and ''color" although, in our minds, both of them are perceived as belonging to the same class of existence. How then would it be possible to conceive of a relation with one [God] who has no ma'na in common with others?23

Whatever positive likeness may be drawn between God and his creatures rests on the basis of semiotics, not marna: Those attributes applying to Him, there is nothing in common between their ma'na and the ma'na which is known to us. In no manner is there any [ontological] association at all, in any way [epistemological]. Their association, however, is only in the 'ism. 24

Knowledge of God is attained through negation of a marna wrongly thought to apply to Him. 25 Thus whereas negation of ma'na results in a positive knowledge of God, a positive assertion of divine attributes results in bewilderment. 26 Negation of marna must be conceptual. It requires ''proof,'' and cannot be effected at the verbal level: ''By negating the 'ism of an accident as an attribute of God one does not negate its marna. '' 27 Negation must be accomplished at the conceptual level: In light of this explanation you will know that someone who does not know the proof for the negation of a ma'na is more deficient in his perception of God and farther away from knowing Him, than another to whom it was proven that [such a ma'na] is inapplicable to Him. Therefore, the fewer the negations, the greater the deficiency in perception, as was explained at the beginning of this chapter. However, whoever applies to Him a positive attribute, knows nothing (of Him) except the name in abstract. Likewise, the thing that he imagines as the referent of this 'ism is a non-existent ma'na, fictitious and false. It is as if he had applied that 'ism to a non-existent ma'na since in reality there is no such thing. 28

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Negation of a ma"na common to God and man ought not to be interpreted as meaning that He is void of ma"na. Indeed, God has ma"na29 and therefore He understands Himself. 30 The Tetragrammaton is the 'ism of this ma"na. 31 Since He is One, in the sense of being absolutely unique and absolutely incomposite, 32 His ma"na is also absolutely unique33 and therefore inaccessible to anyone but Himself. 34 There is a twofold objective in the negation of ma"na: first, to ascertain God's oneness and uniqueness, and secondly, in the function of the syntagmatic character of ma"na. As a semantic entity, ma"na acquires significance through opposition and contrast. Although God's ma"na is inaccessible in positive terms, man can grasp his quiddity ('anniyyatahu). 35 The meaning of this will be clearer upon considering the dialectical nature of ''person.'' Benveniste showed that subjectivity is a linguistic function. It is only in the act of speech, when the speaker says ''I,'' that subjectivity is established. ''I," however, can only be said to ''you'': Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his tum designates himself as I• •.. Language is possible only because each speaker sets himself up as subject by referring to himself as I in his discourse. Because of this, I posits another person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to ''me," becomes my echo to whom I say you and who says you to me.J6

Thus understood, ''person'' is a dialectical category. ''I'' and ''you'' imply each other. They are defined by mutual contrast and have a syntagmatic relation. In biblical thought this type of syntagmatic relation applies to God and man. In accordance with his position on negative attributes, Maimonides insisted that the similarity implicit in the belief that man was created ''in the image of God'' (Gen 1:26) must be understood negatively: they are similar because they are unlike others (as well as unlike each other). 37 Being ''in the image of God'' means, precisely, that man and God are defined by mutual contrast, that is, by a syntagmatic relation. Because God's ma"na is not reducible to man's (and vice versa), a syntagmatic relation is established where each one is defined in terms of opposition to the other. Negativity is the ground for this type of relation. Negativity is not a logical proposition. Its function is differential, not predicative: ''Likewise, these negations neither function nor apply to Him, except in a manner in which, as you know, a negative [proposition] in which a predicate is inappropriately applied to a subject, as when one says about a wall that it does not see." 38

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Negativity expresses the irreducible difference separating man and God. After indicating the difficulties involved in trying to describe the substance of the stars in common language, and how one is compelled to use language negatively, Maimonides added: How then would the situation of our mind be when it [our mind] intends to perceive what is absolutely separate from their [the stars'] substance? One Who is categorically incomposite, of necessary existence, without any cause, and to whose Nature, in addition to his perfect essence, no matna would be relevant. As mentioned before, the intent of this ''perfection'' is to deny to Him any imperfection. One about whom nothing could be perceived except his quiddity ['anniyyatahu] alone, and that [quiddity] is an Existent with whom none of the existent [things] to which He gave existence can be compared. None of them [his creatures] can partake with Him in any matna whatsoever. There is no plurality in Him, and no impediment to giving existence to others. His relation to the Universe is that of a captain to his boat-but this, too, is not a real relation nor a true comparison! It merely intends to give some direction to our thoughts, [and teach us] that He the Almighty leads all that is, meaning that He gives them extension and guards their order adequately. 39

As differential, negativity expresses a fundamental semiological principle. Saussure showed that ''by itself the sign would have no signification. ''40 Differentiation and opposition are required for the acquisition of value. A ter111 derives its value from ''its opposition to all other terms.'' Thus negativity is simultaneous with difference and value: '' concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not. ''41 The negative sense of a term appears only at the semantic (matna) level in which signification is the effect of a syntagmatic relation with the whole of the sentence. At the semiotic level meaning is immanent in the sign even in isolation. In fact, Saussure distinguished between the signified and signifier: when considered separately from each other, they are negative, when considered together as a sign, they are positive: Although both the signified and the signifier are purely differential and negative when considered separately, their combination is a positive fact; it is even the sole type of fact that language has, because maintaining the parallelism between the two classes of differences is the distinctive function of the linguistic institution. 42

Before examining negativity within the context of man's relation with God, it should be noted that the semiotic and the semantic are

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not always present in language. Fonnal logic, for instance, functions only at the semiotic level. In surrealist poetry and certain forms of myth we find semantics without semiotics. This is the specific situation of the language of dreams: the language of dreams is a pure semantic composition which does not tolerate any semiotic elements.43 This is why, as Freud noted, ''the word 'No' does not seem to exist for a dream. "44 Likewise, Freud stressed ''the fact that in analysis we never discover a 'No' in the unconscious. ''45 Within a semantic composition, negation, as mentioned earlier, is differential. Without semiotics there is no ''logic.'' Hence the freedom of association characteristic of dreams. Precisely because dreams are a pure semantic composition excluding syntax, the relation of words to things is inverted: things stand for words (rather than words for things). Therefore, as the Talmud observes, the signification of things in a dream varies according to the language of the dreamer. 46 Only imprecisely can one speak of either the '' syntax'' or ''logic'' of the language of dreams. Outside the realm of semiotics, language knows rhetoric rather than logic. Concerning man's relationship with God, negativity serves a twofold objective: first, it rejects a religion based on omnipotence of thought and hyperbolic anthropomorphism, implicit in the rhetoric of positive attributes; second, man acquires ultimate signification when relating to God as the ultimate difference. Whereas the difference between man and other creatures is relative, the difference between man and God is absolute: in relation to his creatures God is the total and unqualified difference. 47 Maurice Blanchot refers to this ''interrelational space'' as ''an interruption of being." All other modes of relationships tend towards the unity of the ''I'': ''the ''I'' wants to annex the other (identify him with myself) by making him my object or by studying him like an object; or I want to find another ''I'' in the other, be it through free recognition or immediate union of hearts. ''48 ''Interruption of being," however, is grounded on the irreducible distance between the speakers. The ''strangeness'' of the other can never be punctured: There remains another modality (without mode). This time, there is no unifying effort. I no longer try to recognize in the other the person or the thing which a common measure (belonging to the same space) still keeps in a continuous or uniting relation to me. Now, what is at stake is the strangeness between us, and not only that obscure part which escapes our mutual knowledge and is nothing but the obscurity of being within the I-the singularity of the singular I-a strangeness which is still relative (an I is always close to another I, even in difference, competition, desire, and need). What is at stake now and has to

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Freedom, Language, and Negativity be accounted for is all that separates me from the other, that is to say, the other insofar as I am infinitely separate from him: separation, cleft, gap which leaves him infinitely outside me, but also claims to found my relation with him on this very interruption which is an interruption-of being-otherness through which he is, I must repeat, for me neither I, nor another existence, nor a modality or moment of universal existence, nor a super-existence (god or non-god), but the unknown in its infinite distance. 49

Maimonides' doctrine of negativity expresses this unique type of relationship, possible only between God and his creations. 50 Indeed, rabbinic tradition is explicit on this point. Before considering the source in question we must examine the Hebrew term 'ot 'letter.' 'Ot designates both difference and articulation. 51 Bishop William Warburton, on the basis of Exod 4:8, rightly observed that 'ot has a ''voice'';52 that is, it articulates meaning. Its primary sense is something with immanent meaning, a ''sign'' (Gen 9:12, 17; Exod 13:9, 16; 31:17); a ''portentous sign'' (Exod 4:8; Deut 13:3); a ''distinctive mark'' (Gen 4:15; Num 2:2). Hence its most common sense is ''letter'' (of the alphabet}--the most basic element of articulation. It also means ''different," ''absolutely distinct." This meaning is preserved in a passage of the Talmud, ljagiga 16a, in which the peculiar relation of God to His creatures is described: God ''is an 'ot [even] among His myriads [of heavenly angels].'' Commenting on a similar passage in Sefer Ye~ira, Setadya Ga'on explained the meaning of 'ot in this passage: ''nothing is like Him nor is He like anything, even the angels. ''53 As an 'ot God is the absolute and unbounded difference. Better still, in the words of Derrida, ''Whether He is Being or the master of beings, God himself is, and appears as what He is, within difference, that is to say, as difference and within dissimulation. '' 54

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IV.

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omoN ''Textuality'' designates that which pertains to the structural an_d functional aspects of a text, regardless of whether th~ for1n~t _is written or oral. ''Text'' is somewhat more difficult to define. Within the limits of this work it will be defined as ''a composition designed for transmission.'' As we shall see, transmission is essential to the very notion of text. The central theme of this chapter is the concept of text among the rabbis (sections 1 and 2), and its constitutive elements and functions (sections 3 and 4) as reflected in Talmudic tradition. The focus of analysis will be the formative period of rabbinic tradition, from after the destruction of the Temple (70), more precisely the destruction of Bethar (135), until the fonnulation of the Mishna (ca. 189) by Judah the Prince. The underlying thesis of this study may be summarized as follows. Under the leadership of R. ~Aqiba and his school, the rabbis undertook a project of momentous importance: the collection and official formulation of Jewish tradition (a project without parallel until about half a millenium later, when Moslem scholars collected and edited the }µidith, excepting, perhaps, the formulation of Roman law). This project was a catalyst for new ''textuological'' concepts. To begin with, it became imperative to distinguish between ''written'' and ''oral'' texts. This difference was postulated on the basis that only the Scripture possesses a ''written'' text, that is, a ''Masora'' or duly registered text, that could be expounded at the orthographic level, independently of its linguistic sense. Hence a profound concern developed with written aspects of the Scriptures: the orthography of words, defective and full spelling, and calligraphic ornan:1entations. These became ''significant''; they could acquire mearung through canonical exegesis. The perception of the past was also affecte_d by this concern. For example, the title for the sages of the preceding generations, safer ''scribe," was interpreted to mean ''~e who counted every letter of the Tora'' (Sanhedrin 106b). Gnosticism served to endow the written aspects of the text with intellectual

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Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition and religious significance. Books such as Sefer Ye~ira ('The Book of Creation') and 'Otiyot de-Ribbi ~Aqiba (The Alphabet of R. tAqiba'), in which Creation is conceived in terms of letters, illustrate the textuological function of Gnosticism. Not all ''written'' texts had attained the same textuological level. Some rabbis believed that there were texts ''to be read,'' but ''not to be written'' or ''expounded.'' It should be remembered that the Hagiographa contained the books that ''could not be read," that is, in the liturgical services. 1 (The Hebrew designation Ketubbim 'the Writings,' may thus be understood in a restrictive sense: books that unlike the Tora and the Prophets are only to be written, but not to be read.) The ''oral'' tradition had only a vocal (not a written) text. But, unlike the paradosis and deuterosis which was a tradition that the deuterote transmitted in his own words, 2 the tanna 'formulator,' 'transmitter' had to transmit a rigidly controlled text. 3 As the Hebrew term ~i~nim 'outsiders' designates the books that do not belong to the Scriptures, 4 the Aramaic equivalent, barraita, stands for those traditions that do not belong to the official collection of for111ulations. 5 Similarly, there were different levels of textuality. Terms such as tana, tanu rabbanan, etc., serve to indicate the different levels of the oral tradition. 6 Other traditions were never fol'1nulated and were handed down with no regard to the text. One of the fundamental premises of this study is the view of Sherira Ga'on (ca. 9()6-1oo6). Following Geonic historiography, he viewed the destruction of Bethar as a turning point for the Jewish people and as the beginning of the rabbinic movement leading to the foundations of the Mishna and the Talmud. The principal figure in this movement was R. tAqiba. He was the spokesman of a new ideology: the official formulation of the oral tradition. The full ramifications of this ideology are too numerous, and its impact upon the Jewish people too great, to be adequately examined here. Educationally, it meant that the teachers had to transmit the traditions of the rabbis not in their own words, but according to the official formulas. This type of teaching required the establishment of a new institution in the person of the tanna whose task was the authoritative transmission of the official formulations. 7 Semantically, it meant that the teachings of the rabbis must be grasped first verbally rather than conceptually. Politically, it was an acknowledgment-made tragically clear by the defeat of Bar Kokhba and his followers that the Jews were not about to restore the old seats of power and authority. Ironically, there is an intimate relationship between R. tAqiba's support of Bar Kokhba's messianic revolution and the situation that made acceptance of Aqiba' s ideology imperative for national survival. As a result of that uprising, thout

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sands were slaughtered, and there remained very few who knew the old traditions. The rabbis taught: If one has heard an authoritative tradition from the lowliest Israelite, he must consider it as if he had actually heard it from a great sage . . . and he should consider it not only as if he heard it from a single sage, but as if he had actually heard it from all the sages ... and not only as if he heard it from all the sages, but as if he had actually heard it from the Sanhedrin . . . and not only as if he heard it from the Sanhedrin, but as if he had actually heard it from Moses, the shepherd . . . and not only as if he heard it from Moses the shepherd, but as if he had actually heard it from the mouth of God, Blessed be He. (Sifre #41, p. 86)

In order to salvage a modicum of Jewish autonomy, political necessity required the collecting and authoritative transmission of the pronouncements of the rabbis in precise tertninology. Indeed, a rabbinic tradition reports that ''all the exiles would not be gathered in, if not for the merit of the mishnayot. ''8 This ideology was finally realized with the for111ulation of the Mishna by Judah the Prince. This realization also eclipsed our knowledge of other forms of rabbinic tradition. Most of what is known about the rabbis, including those of the period before R. 'Aqiba, comes from his school. There are almost no independent sources about other schools and traditions. The controversies recorded in rabbinic literature between R. 'Aqiba and his contemporaries, such as that with R. Ismael, are minor, and but slight variations of what, in effect, represents the ideologies associated with R. 'Aqiba. Only a few hints radically critical of R. 'Aqiba have been preserved. The following, among others, are indicative: the puzzling remark that the tanna ''withers the world'' (Sota 22a)-an allusion to the establishment of official transmitters which the for1nulation of oral tradition required;9 the humorous, odd story_ that when Moses (in a vision) attended a class given by R. 'Aqiba, he could not understand a word (Menabot 29b); the statement that R. 'Aqiba was flagellated several times by the Jewish court; 10 the incident with the venerable R. Nel'tunya ben ha-Qana, in which R. 'Aqiba had to climb to the top of a palm tree in order to escape the wrath of the guards (Megilla 28a); Rabban Gamli'el's vehement protest to R. 'Aqiba, ''How could your heart have dared to transgress the words of your colleagues?''; 11 his clash with R. Yose ben Qisma ending with the sharp comment, '''Aqiba, I would be surprised if they [the Romans] do not burn you together with the scroll of the Tora'' ('Aboda Zara 18a); the bitter remark made by R. Eli'ezer be Horqanos (branded a ''Shammaite'' and excommunicated) at his deathbed announcing to R. 'Aqiba that he and his

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Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition · associates will suffer a horrible death: ''Your [death] will be more horrendous than theirs;'' also his complaint that he was seldom asked to teach his traditions (Sanhedrin 68a). The conspicuous absence of any halakhic teaching by such saintly figures as }:Ioni haMetaggel (first century B.C.E.), R. J:Ianina ben Dosa (first century), and Na):lum of Gimzo (first and second centuries}--one of R. Aqiba' s earlier teachers-may be because their halakhic views and traditions were not acceptable to this school. The same may have been the case with R. Eltazar ben tArakh (frrst century), the most 12 prestigious disciple of Rabban Yotianan ben Zakkai (frrst century), and R. Netiunya ben ha-Qana (see above), also a pupil of Rabban Yo):lanan ben Zakkai. The Geonic view concerning the activities of R. t Aqiba and his school will be presented in the second section. Intimately connected with the idea of for1nulating the oral tradition are the concepts of halakha (pl. halakhot; Aramaic, hilkheta) and haggada (pl. haggadot, or aggada and aggadot). For111ally, halakha designates the traditions that had received precise and authoritative formulations, whereas haggada designates the teachings that were not the object of authoritative formulations. Therefore, there was not much concern with the actual text of the haggada. For instance, it has been noted that Nissim Ga'on did not consider it necessary to transmit the haggadot according to the talmudic text. Thus, more variations are found in haggada than in halakha. 13 Halakha requires perfect memorization and oral transmission. While reciting a tradition in the name of another person, it was required for psychological effect to picture that person standing before him (PT Sheqalim II, 7, 47a). For this reason, in bidding farewell to a friend, one should transmit to him a halakha in order to be remembered (Berakhot 31a). (Although qerita 'tearing one's garment in mourning' for a friend is required only for those present at the burial or death [beshatat ~immum ], rabbis, always citing their colleagues' shematta 'lesson,' must practice qerita upon hearing of a colleague's death, just as if they were present [Mored Qatan 24a].) In this narrow, technical sense, halakha is a late concept, and one that acquired significance with the diminishing of Jewish authority. The rabbinic saying, ''With the destruction of the Temple, God has nothing in this world except for the four cubits of halakha'' (Beralchot Sa), underlines this point. (The ''four cubits'' refers to the minimum space that a student needs to sit undisturbed and memorize the for1nulated text.) The most authoritative formulation of halakha is the Mishna. Some peculiarities of the Mishna become intelligible in light of this function. This view is discussed in the frrst section. The last two sections examine the distinction between ''written'' t

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and ''oral'' Law. It will be seen that this distinction is a direct function of the official formulation of the halakha. Once the oral tradition was formulated, it became imperative to distinguish between it and Scripture. ''Written'' and ''oral'' represent textual status rather than actual writing or oral recitation. For the sake of illustration, it would do well to consider the function of parallel terms in rabbinic legislation. Some obligations, such as debts, may be acquired either orally or by a written document. Some liabilities, such as torts, marriage contracts, and fmes involving robbery, although not written, are considered ''written in a document." Therefore, in case of default, .the debt is recovered even from mortgaged property (Tosefta Ketubbot II, 2). Likewise, the rabbis established the principle that normally, a for1nal acquisition (qinyan) may be put into writing (Baba Batra 40a), giving it the status of a written contract. There are also obligations that can be acquired only orally. In this case, even when a written document is drawn up and duly registered, it has the status of an oral contract. 14 Conversely, the words uttered in testament at deathbed are ''as if written and registered'' (ki-khtubim wu-msurim, Gitfin 13a), regardless of whether an actual document was written. The last term, mesurim 'registered,' is particularly significant for an understanding of the function of a written text. It refers to the act of mesira 'delivery,' in the sense of '' surrendering and committing a document to the legal holder and proprietor. '' 15 The term Masora relating to the text of 16 Scripture refers thus to a ''duly registered text. '' One of the implications of having a ''written'' document, duly registered with the court, is that it may be the object of derasha midrash 'canonical exegesis,' just as the Ketubba 'Marriage Contract' is. 17 By classifying rabbinic tradition as ''oral'' and denying it the status of a ''written'' text, halakha was formally excluded from the kind of canonical exegesis usually applied 18 to Scripture. Obviously, all this touches upon the wider issue of biblical canonicity, a highly complex problem for both Jews and Christians. A comparative study of this issue in the history of the early synagogue and church could yield very valuable results. Within the limits of our study, it is important to indicate that, in the church, books are classified as a) fit for liturgical usage, b) fit for private usage, but not for liturgical services, c) totally banned from all types of usage. This classification was also present in rabbinic literature. Finally, another central theme of this chapter, too, is the relationship between the text and the concept that it articulates. Following Sherira Ga~ on' s reference to the fa tam 'sense,' in contradistinction to the lishana or matnita 'text,' we shall examine how this issue touches upon the formulation of oral law. R. Samuel Sidillo (d. ca. 1530) pointed out, in the introduction to his work Kelale Shemu' el (printed

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Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition in Tummat Yesharim [Venice, 5382/1622]), how important this issue is for the understanding of rabbinic rhetoric.

1.

Halakha and Haggada

Rabbinic literature distinguishes between halakha and haggada. Traditionally this distinction is conceived of in terms of content alone: halakha designates legal material, whereas haggada designates narrative, legendary, exegetical, and all other non-legal elements. In most cases both halakha and haggada do, in fact, contain legal and nonlegal materials. There are some cases in which halakha has nothing to do with legal matters. Consider, for instance, the statement ''[By] halakha it is known that Esau hates Jacob. '' 1 The expression ''He overlooked the halakha'' is used in connection with the Flood cover2 ing Mt. Gerizzim. Similarly, the notion that sexual indulgence increases concupiscence whereas restriction helps control lust, and also the instructions concerning the magical creation of living things, are designated as halakha. 3 Conversely, the derashot 'exegesis,' 'homilies' are explicitly dissociated from haggada. 4 On the other hand, one finds that the Noachide laws were contained in Sifra de-Aggadta 'A Book of Aggadot. ' 5 Halakha and haggada pertain to two distinct modes of oral transmission. A statement, explanation, or story could be transmitted either verbally or conceptually. In the first case, the transmission is handed down verbatim, repeating the exact words in the precise order in which they were originally received. In the second case, the principal objective is to communicate the idea. Therefore, handing down the precise wording of the original statement is not required. The transmitter could hand down the tradition using his own words. It will be seen that halakha designates the first type of tradition and haggada the second. Cicero, too, distinguishes two classes of memory: me,noria rerum 'memory of things' and memoria verborum 'memory of words.'6 This distinction corresponds, more or less, to our distinction between haggada and halakha. Frances A. Yates defines rerum and verborum as follows: '' 'Things' are thus the subject matter of the speech; 'words' are the language in which the subject matter is clothed. ''7 Halakha requires perfect memorization. The student is expected to repeat faithfully the original statement even when this involves faulty pronunciation. Hillel faithfully mispronounced a Hebrew term in the transmission of a halakha as conveyed to him by his proselyte teacher, ''because a disciple is obligated to say it in the same language [i.e., as it was pronounced] by his Master'' (Mishna ~Eduyot I,

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots 3). 8 Some of the disputes between the rabbis do not concern the substance of the issue in question, but rather the linguistic for1nulation of that tradition. Thus the Tosefta remarked, ''They did not argue about the substance of the halakha, but, rather, about the language'' (Para XI, 8). 9 Since halakha required perfect repetition and transmission of the oral text, girsa (memorization drills) was essential to the study of halakha. 10 ''Whoever studies and forgets," said a rabbi, ''is like a woman who bears sons and then buries them." 11 The importance of perfect memorization is evident in the statement, ''Whoever forgets [even] a single word from his studies deserves death. ''12 Mistakes are inexcusable; ''A blunder must be considered intentional. ''13 A rabbinic scholar was expected to review his studies constantly. To insure absolute accuracy he would recite the oral text periodically under the supervision of an authority. 14 The rabbis warned of the rapid and devastating effect of laxity. Elishat ben Abuya (early second century) showed how two years of neglect could waste ten years of study: Without reviewing one may forget in two years the studies of ten years. How? After six months of sitting idle and not reviewing, he would confuse "pure'' with ''impure." Twelve months without reviewing, he would confuse the names of the authorities. Eighteen months without reviewing, he would forget the headings of the tractates. By the twenty-fourth month without reviewing he would already have forgotten the headings of the chapters. 15

This explains why, '' one who studies [only] two orders [of Mishnayot] and is fluent in them is preferable to another who studies [all] halakhot and is not fluent in them. '' 16 Ideally, a rabbinic scholar had to be completely fluent and capable of responding with absolute accuracy to whatever inquiries were made of him. Referring to the oral text, the rabbis said: ''They must be pointed on your tongue, so that when one asks you something, you do not hesitate, but say it to him instantly. ''17 When asked a question, the rabbinic scholar answers by citing a traditional formula. One of the characteristics of the rabbinic scholar is that he responds in accordance with the halakha (Mishna 'Abot V, 6), that is, by quoting a traditional text. 18 The language, vocabulary, and style of halakha reflect concern for verbatim memorization and transmission. Because halakha had to be memorized, it required a most extreme form of linguistic condensation. In the for1nulation of halakha, a teacher was expected to be succinct. ''One should always teach his students in a concise way, ''19 advised the rabbis. For the sake of illustration, let us consider the case where the Talmud (Baba Batra 107a) discusses the procedure to

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be followed when the three experts designated by the court to assess the estate of orphans fail to reach an agreement: Our rabbis taught: [in the case in which] three [experts] went down [to the estate of male orphans] to assess it ... [If] one values [the estate] at a mane [ = one hundred dinarim], one at twenty [sela'im, each sela' = 4 dinarim] and one at thirty [sela'im], it is to be judged at a mane. R. El'azar b. R. Sadoq said: It is to be adjudged at ninety [dinarim].

The traditional explanation of this passage is that the first number mane 'one hundred' refers to the coin dinar, whereas the other two numbers refer to the coin sela', which is worth four dinarim. The opinion favoring a settlement at one hundred dinarim ( = 25 sela'im) is a compromise between the other two opinions of twenty and thirty sela'im. The same applies to the opinion favoring a settlement at ninety dinarim ( = 22½ sela'im). Although the talmudic discussion is perfectly clear at the conceptual level, it presents a serious linguistic difficulty. What is the rationale for expressing the sums in two different coinages (dinarimlsela'im)? The problem was examined by R. Samuel Sidillo: If you ask: Why did the tanna [for1nulator of tannaitic literature] begin with dinarim and continue with sela'im? He should either have expressed the values in sela'im, and said that the first is assessing it at twenty-five sela'im, the second at twenty sela'im, and third at thirty sela'im; or he should have expressed the sums in dinarim and say eighty, [one hundred,] and one hundred and twenty! The answer to this is that the tanna opts to use the shorter expression. If he had used sela'im, he would have had to say 'esrim va-/µlmisha [''twenty and-five"] which is two words. However, by referring to dinarim he could use a single word mane ["one hundred''). If he had continued referring to dinarim, then he would have had to express the last sum in two words (me'a ve-'esrim ["one-hundred and-twenty"), whereas by referring to sela'im he could use one single word, sheloshim (''thirty''). This .will teach you the great desire of the tanna to express himself concisely, to the point that he would rather use a single ter1n, although the idea would not be [perfectly] clear, than to use two words and thus make the idea clear. This may serve as a paradigm for the need (and function] of commentaries [to assist] in the proper understanding of the ideas [expressed in talmudic literature]. 20

Economy affects the vocabulary of halakha to the point of impre21 cision. In order to facilitate memorization, the variation of vocabulary is minimized. If a term already used could be used again with approximation, it was preferred over a term that could express the

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same thought with precision. To illustrate this point, let us examine the Mishna Pesa~im II, 2. It comprises two statements. In the first statement, it declares that one is forbidden to draw any benefit (hana'a) from the }Jame~ 'leavened bread' of a Jew after Passover. In the second statement, it declares that one may draw benefit (hana'a) from the }Jame~ of a gentile, rather than simply stating: ''it may be eaten." It would appear, therefore, that the leavened bread of a gentile may not be eaten after the holiday. The Talmud, however, rejects such an inference and declares that one may actually eat the bread and not merely ''draw benefit'' from it (buy it or sell it). The Talmud explains that although the term ''benefit'' was used, ''eaten'' was intended. The reason that the Mishna did not actually say ''eaten'' is that in the first statement the term 'benefit' (hana'a) was used, and the same term was employed in the second statement (although ''it is permitted to be eaten'' would have been more accurate). 22 The technical term 'ayde serves to indicate this type of linguistic formulation. 23 Likewise, different cases containing similar expressions may be grouped together, although the sense of these expressions varies. The expression left ~eshbon 'according to the counting' in the Mishna Teruma V, 6, means 'proportionally' in the first two cases but, in the last case, 'according to the number' (of vessels used for that purpose).24 Occasionally, for the sake of harmony as well as for mnemonics, a term appearing in one section also appears in the other, although it is superfluous or already implicit in the sentence. The expression kede nesaba serves to indicate this type of superfluity. 25 Economy is also evident in the employment of a single term to designate simultaneously two distinct notions. In the Mishna Sanhedrin I, 3 we find the term semikha 'laying on of the hand(s).' This expression could mean either the ceremony of laying the hands on the head of the expiatory sacrifice or the ceremony of ordination. In his commentary to the Mishna, R. eObadya of Bertinoro (ca. 14501516) ascertained that both of these were meant. R. Moses Zacuto (1620-1697) explained that ''since either of these explanations is plausible, both were intended.'' 26 This is also the position of Maimonides, who included both interpretations in his Commentary to the Mishna27 and in the Mishne Tora. 28 The Talmud also sustains this double interpretation of the Mishna. 29 The style of the Mishna is affected by the fact that it depended on memorization. Within the limits of our study, it will be sufficient to examine a single instance concerning the revision and correction of an original version of the Mishna. R. Emanuel l:fai Ricchi (16881743), one of the most perceptive talmudists of his time, pointed out

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the difficulty of amending an oral text. He noted that unlike a written text, which could be corrected in a later, more authoritative version, an oral text memorized from early youth and constantly repeated in the schools was much more difficult to discard in favor of a revised version. He observed that memorization of the revised version would not solve the problem since it would only be a matter of time before conflict arose as to which version was faulty and which one was revised. Instead, the 'original version' (mishna rishona) was left unchanged, and an explanation was made to circulate concerning the validity of that version. Gradually, the original version would be weakened and eventually supplanted by the revised version. 30 Traces of this type of emendation and their effect on· style are evident in the Mishna; for example, Baba Me~ita IV, 1: ''Gold [coins can] acquire silver [coins, but] silver [coins] cannot acquire gold [coins]. Copper [coins can] acquire silver [coins, but] silver [coins] cannot acquire copper [coins].'' The Palestinian and Babylonian Talmud31 report that the original version taught by Judah the Prince read: ''Silver [coins can] acquire gold [coins, but] gold [coins] cannot acquire silver [coins], etc.'' The Palestinian Talmud recounts that when Judah the Prince reported the revised version to his son Simeon (second and third centuries), his son rejected it, replying: ''I won't change my [version], since when you had your strength, you had taught me 'Silver [coins can] acquire gold [coins].' '' The text of the Mishna of the printed edition of the Palestinian Talmud corresponds to the original version. In the printed editions and manuscripts of the Babylonian Talmud the Mishna corresponds to the revised version. 32 There is no evidence, however, that the revised version had in fact displaced the original version in talmudic times. Two Babylonian scholars, R. l::liyya (second century) and R. Ashe (335-427/8), defended the original version. 33 Finally, as indicated by Ricchi, a careful analysis of the revised version will reveal that it does not fit with the rest of the Mishna. The revised version makes no sense in listing gold and copper coins separately. It should have read ''Gold and copper [coins can] acquire silver [coins]," rather than ''Gold [coins can] acquire silver [coins] .... copper [coins can] acquire silver [coins].'' The present separation of gold and copper coins into two clauses is absolutely necessary according to the original version (''Silver [coins can] acquire gold [coins, but] gold [coins] cannot acquire silver [coins]. Copper [coins can] acquire silver [coins, but] silver [coins] cannot acquire copper [coins]''). In the original version, '' silver'' in the first clause is the instrument of acquisition, whereas in the second clause it is the object of acquisition. It is therefore evident that the revised version of Judah the Prince was

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never edited into the text of the Mishna. 34 This illustrates resistance of the oral text to revision even when attempted by the original editor himself! Haggada (from the root NGO 'to tell,' 'to narrate,' 'to declare') designates an utterance in which the speaker uses his own words, rather than the words of another or a formulated text. 35 It usually relates to a visual36 or auditory37 experience, J8 conveying thereby the notion of ''showing'' and ''letting hear. "39 Whereas 'amar 'to say' introduces a direct quotation or reproduces an exact for1nula, higgid is a report or description of an event or utterance. 40 To indicate the precise wording of an haggada-utterance, lemor 'saying' 41 or a similar term42 is appended. Higgid also designates a pronouncement made by an authority that stands on its own (and does not need to refer to the authority of another). 43 Nagid 'prince,' 'ruler' conveys this notion of authority. 44 Likewise, neged, usually meaning 'in front of,' can also convey the notion of authority and therefore may mean ''under the authority or supervision of. " 45 The sense of both ''telling in one's own words'' and ''pronouncement of authority'' converge to constitute the meaning of ''authoritative or genuine interpretation. "46 All of these nuances, plus the sense of ''testimony," coincide in the commandment 'to tell' (vehiggadta) one's children about the Exodus from Egypt (Exod 13:8). This verse means ''to tell authoritatively," as witnesses who experienced the Exodus, in a manner that would be understood by one's children (that is, ''to interpret''). 47 Hence, the Haggada is to be narrated on the first night of Passover. 48 This is to be understood in contradistinction to the commandment of teaching the children by 'repeating the text' (ve-shinnantam; Deut 6:7). Semantically, higgid parallels the Latin verb dicere which means 'to pronounce' and 'showing verbally' the right, authoritative way. 49 Unlike halakha, haggada is concerned with the transmission of an idea, not a verbal formula. It may be expressed in the narrator's own words, and he ''may add [his own] words and explanations [midrashot].''So Therefore, haggada does not require verbal memorization. Unlike the biblical elder or the rabbinic scribe of yore the narrator was not invested with authority; he was simply expressing ''his own words,'' and therefore haggada came to signify ''personal, nonauthoritative opinion.'' Indeed, the expert on haggada is referred to as one who ''neither prohibits nor permits; declares something to be neither impure nor pure. ''51 Conversely, since halakha only repeats the words of the rabbinic authority, it came to signify an authoritative pronouncement: ''If [what you have stated] is halakha," says a rabbinic expression, ''we shall accept it. But if it is a din [judgment, that is, an opinion based on juridical reasoning], it is debatable. '' 52 The primary difference between halakha and haggada is for1nal. It

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pertains to the mode of transmission. Haggada is concerned with communicating the sense. The fact that the narrator could use his own words, and thus effectively communicate with the public, made haggada the best vehicle for the narration of stories aimed at exposing the public to the teaching of Scripture and rabbinic lore. 53 The object of halakha is to hand down the text, not the sense of the text. One who is gamir 'fluent in the text of halakha' may not necessarily be sabir 'fluent in the concept of halakha,' and vice versa. 54 Some scholars were recognized as experts in one area but not in the other. 55 Sometimes the transmitter himself did not know the sense of the text that he was handing down. 56 Ideally, a tradition should be learned in large groups. ''When are the words of the Tora correctly said?'' asked the rabbis; ''when their transmitter received them in an assembly. ''57 Accordingly, the study of halakha (formal rabbinic education) comprised three distinct levels. The most elementary was girsa 'memorization of the text.' 58 Girsa involved arduous and perpetual exercise. Students and teachers were fully absorbed by it59- :some were even overcome by this task and had to engage in a more relaxing activity until regaining their strength.6o It was common to find some students sleeping (to regain their strength) while others were engaged 61 in girsa. To facilitate this task, some advised the students to engage in girsa by a river. 62 They studied girsa in their gardens, 63 under a palm tree, 64 in their homes, 65 synagogues, 66 and schools. 67 Although one could study girsa alone, it was usually done in association with others. 68 The reason given by the rabbis was to avoid the possibility of error: •

[When two] sit and engage in the study of Tora, if one of them makes an error, in [the recitation of an] halakha, or of a chapter, or in saying "pure'' instead of ''impure" or ''impure" instead of ''pure''; or [in saying] ''permissible'' instead of "forbidden" or "forbidden'' instead of ''permissible,'' his companion would correct him. 69

Night was considered an excellent time for study. 70 It was advised to engage in girsa at night, particularly when the moon was out, and to take advantage of its light for an occasional glance at the text: ''The moon was created only for girsa," said the rabbis. 71 Because rabbinic students got up before dawn for girsa, it was not uncommon to see them drowse during the morning. We are told that if one were to enter a tavern by the fourth hour of the morning and see a young rabbinic student drowsing while drinking wine, ''this was because he had arisen early for his girsa. '' 72 The highest virtue was to perpetually engage irt girsa. 73 Neither the Angel of Death74 nor the evil impulse75 could touch a person engaged in girsa. Special commercial

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots privileges were accorded to young rabbinic scholars ''in order that they should not be disturbed from their girsa. 76 This level of study did not involve understanding of the text. 71 It was important, however, to say the text out loud in order to facilitate memorization78 and to recite it according to traditional Jewish prosody (tet:amim). 79 R. Isaac Profiat Duran reports copies of the Mishna with cantillation marks. So Obviously, not all who mastered girsa would advance to the next level. There were those whose sole concern was girsa and not the understanding of the text. Some rabbis were disturbed by this, and complained ''about these generations that proceed in their studies of Tora as blind ... all read, but do not know what they read; all recite Mishna, but do not know what they recite. ''81 The professional tanna memorized four collections of oral Law: (1) hilkheta, which is the Mishna; 82 (2) Sifra; (3) Sifre; and (4) Tosefta.83 The second level, gamir, was to be approached only after mastering girsa. 84 Parents were advised to introduce their children to this level in order to promote their interest in girsa. 85 The gamir level was applied to the shemat:ta 'lesson' that the masters of the Talmud offered to the ~urba me-rabbanan 'young rabbinic scholar. ' 86 The shemat:ta probably included the type of ''textual analysis'' known as diyyuq, diyyuqa. 87 Accordingly, the ''lesson'' required intense preparation. There were some who reviewed the Mishna (mesadder matnita) forty times before each session, others twenty-four times. 88 It was also necessary to review the daily lesson afterwards. 89 Some were in the habit of mehadder 'repeating,' 'reexamining' their studies once every thirty days. 91> Even the Angel of Death had to honor this practice and had to allow his subject the opportunity to review his studies before being taken to face his Maker. 91 It is not clear whether t:iyyun 'analysis' applied exclusively to this level or to the next, or to both. 92 The third and last level, sabir, presupposed full mastery of the preceding levels, 93 and involved intense preparation. To illustrate, R. Yo):lanan, the most distinguished rabbinic scholar of his time, was able to master the first and second levels of the Sifra in three days, but he needed three months to attain sabir. 94 Knowledge at the gamir level did not imply knowledge at the sabir level. 95 Some could learn gamir from one teacher but had to study sabir from another. 96 The fact that halakha generally transmits legal and haggada narrative and exegetical material is the effect (not the cause) of their formal difference. The relationship between their content and their for1nal difference will become clear upon considering the theory of oral Law expounded by Sherira Ga'on.

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The Formulation of the Oral Law

According to Geonic tradition, the pivotal question concerning oral Law and the formulation of the Mishna is the relationship of the text (lashon, pe, mishna, etc.) to the taram (pl. teramim; Aramaic tarame 1 'sense,' 'meaning'). Prior to the destruction of the Temple, there was no uniform, authoritative text of the oral Law. The sages knew the teramim of the Tora, but each would formulate them to his disciples in his own words: Prior to the destruction of the Temple, the ancients had no need for this [formulation of the Mishna], since it is the oral Law, and the ta'am was not yet expressed in a definite for1nula, as [was the case] with the written Law. 2 But they knew and learned the ta'ame in their hearts [i.e., conceptually]. Each and every one would teach [them] to his disciples as if he was narrating to his friend, with any words that he chose .... The ta'ame of the Tora were comprehended as if they had been halakha received from Moses at Sinai. There were no variations or disputes among them. 3

During that period the most common method of study was the judicial exegesis of Scripture. The object of this method was to show how a particular law was remiza 'hinted,' 'suggested' in the Tora. 4 This was accomplished by applying the canons of exegesis current in rabbinic rhetoric to the text of the Scriptures. 5 Since the oral Law was not yet formulated it had the status of pirushe 'commentaries,' 'explanations,' ''as those that we explain today to our disciples, who all studied, but each wrote differently. ''6 This does not mean that at this time there was no Mishna. In fact, there were ancient texts of the oral Law even before the destruction of the Temple. 7 However, these texts were not uniform in either language, scope, or methodology: No individual among the ancients ever wrote [i.e., published] anything [concerning the oral Law] until the end of the days of Judah the Prince. Also there was no single [text] that all studied, with the same words and language. They only knew the ta'ame and they conformed with each other in regard to their understanding. Therefore, the [different] texts did not imply any actual controversy. [Moreover,] they knew which case was universally agreed upon and which was the majority opinion. However, they did not possess an edited composition and a for1nulated text which all recited with the same words and language. Because all the sages were in agreement with each other concerning the te'amim and traditions, each would formulate them to his respective disciples in the language and methodology of his choice. Some chose a concise method.... Others chose to teach

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots general principles while others chose specific cases. There were those who were prolix and included [in the treatment of a subject] analogies and further analogies of the [first] analogies. Every rabbi would recite [i.e., study] the for1nula that his master had taught him. One would put one subject first and another would put it last; one would be concise and the other wordy. 8

Prior to the destruction of the Temple, there were very few controversies among the rabbis, as they knew that the different formulations which they studied and transmitted did not imply any difference in substance. The situation changed radically with the destruction of the Temple, and later on with the destruction of the academy at Bethar. Scholars were scattered and the students could no longer mature at the feet of their masters, hoping to grasp fully the substance of the for1nulas which they had learned: ''When the number of disciples who did not minister to [follow, learn from] their masters increased sufficiently," taught the rabbis, ''controversy proliferated in Israel. "9 Upon the destruction of the Temple they went to Bethar. Bethar was also destroyed. The rabbis were scattered in every direction. Because of the convulsions, persecutions, and general confusion prevalent at the time, disciples could not minister sufficiently, and controversies increased. 10 ·

The principal figure behind the entire project of redacting the Mishna was R. tAqiba and his school. As a matter of fact, one finds that the very concept of ''Mishna, '' the methods to accomplish this goal, the style in which such a text must be formulated, and the apparatus required for its transmission all stem from R. 'Aqiba and his disciples. 11 The concept of ''Mishna," in the sense of an official for1nulation of the oral Law accepted by all schools and teachers, 12 was first discussed by R. tAqiba's students. To realize this goal, R. Aqiba collected, verified, classified, and forn1ulated the oral Law, as it was taught in various schools by different teachers .

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To what might R. 'Aqiba be likened? To a laborer who took his basket and went forth. When he found wheat, he put some in the basket; when he found barley, he put that in; spelt, he put that in; lentils, he put them in. Upon returning home he sorted out the wheat by itself, the barley by itself, the beans by themselves, the lentils by themselves. This is how R. 'Aqiba acted, and he minted the whole Tora as coins. 13

''Coins'' must be understood here in the sense of ''formulations." These for1nulations were precise and concise, and included both

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general principles and specific cases. 14 Finally, the term tanna, in the sense of an official reciter and transmitter of Mishna-the essential agent of oral tradition---,appea_rs for the first time among his disciples. 15 This project was brought to a successful completion several generations later by Judah the Prince, who adopted R. cAqiba's methodology as it was developed by his greatest student, R. Me'ir. 16 His work was known as ''the Mishna.'' It was immediately accepted by all the sages living in the Holy Land as the most authoritative formulation of the oral Law relegating to the status of barraita ('nonauthoritative' for1nulas) all other formulations. 17 A more or .less similar process took place later on with the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud. 18 Contrary to common opinion, the object of Judah the Prince was not to produce a legal code. Prior to the for1nulation of the Mishna, there were halakhot considered to be ''corrupt." 19 His object was to produce a text ''that the rabbis could recite [uniformly] in the same words and composition, rather than each one reciting a different composition. ''20 His aim was pedagogical: an authoritative and uniform redaction of the oral Law that could be effectively taught by teachers and memorized by students. 21 The Mishna is the most authoritative depository of the halakha (Aramaic hilkheta). Thus Mishna and halakha became synonyms: ''Hilkheta is our Mishna, formulated by our holy teacher Uudah the Prince]." He ''instituted [i.e., fixed the text authoritatively] the Hilkheta and its Mishna. ''22 The text therefore is not subject to revision. One can neither delete from it nor make further additions: ''We have definitely seen, that the six orders of the Mishna were edited by our holy teacher Uudah the Prince], as it is recited [by the rabbis], one hilkheta after the other. One can neither add nor remove [anything from it]. '' 23 Because the Mishna was authoritatively formulated it falls into the category of halakha, although it contains much material which has been classified as ''haggadic'' (for example, The Chapters of the Fathers). It is worth noting that in the manuscripts of the Spanish version of The Epistle of Sherira Ga'on, the Mishna includes only halakhot and (unlike the printed edition) no haggadot. 24 Hence, the term ''Mishna'' was occasionally used in the sense of ''an authoritative text," as in the expression 'ena mishna 'this is not a mishna,' designating a corrupt barraita. 25 The terms tanu rabbanan, tanya, tana, etc., heading the tannaitic material quoted in the Talmud, serve to indicate the status of the circle which formulated and accepted that tradition. 26 Not all tannaitic traditions were authoritatively for1nulated; some were never formulated. 27 Others received authoritative for1nulation only in amoraitic times. These are the tannaitic traditions transmitted

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under the title 'itmar a term that designates amoraitic provenance. 28 There were still others, such as Hilkhot Derekh 'Ere~, which, although actually for1nulated, were not perceived as authoritative, and therefore fall into the category of haggadot. 29 There is a passage in the Palestinian Talmud, discussing the per1nissibility of reading extracanonical books, bearing directly upon this subject. The correct version was preserved by R. Simeon b. $emall Duran (1361-1444): [Concerning] all the rest of the books that were written from now on, whoever reads them is as one who reads aggadot. Why? [Because it is written "of making many books there is no end," and] ''much study is weariness of the flesh'' (Eccles 12:12): For reading they were given, but for toil [i.e., study] they were not given! 30

The sense of this passage is obvious. Haggadot may be ''read.'' However, since they were not subject to official redaction and publication, they should not be studied and analyzed with the intensity suitable for other writings. This is the reason, as we shall see, why some rabbinic authorities did not find fault with, and even recommended, the study of written copies of haggadot. There was little danger that people would attribute to copies of ''unformulated texts'' the status of ''written books.'' The specific intention of this passage will be particularly clear upon examining the concepts of ''written'' and ''oral'' Law. 3. ''Written'' and ''Oral'' Texts

Rabbinic Judaism recognizes the authority of two Laws: the Scriptures and oral tradition. According to the popular view, this implies that it is forbidden to write down the oral Law: '' As for the rabbinic sources themselves, they state clearly that the oral Law is not to be put down in writing. '' 1 In point of fact, in no place in rabbinic literature is there an injunction against writing the oral Law. What the rabbis say is that the oral Law may not be recited, that is, authoritatively transmitted, from a written document. The Ge,onim and most rabbinic authorities in Spain maintained that the difference between ''written'' and ''oral'' pertains only to the manner in which authoritative transmission is effected. The text of Scriptures is handed down on the basis of authoritative manuscripts, whereas the oral text is handed down by the masters and official reciters (tanna'im) . The well known rabbinic rule, ''Oral words may not be said in writing and written words are not to be recited orally,'' refers to the way in which these texts are to be transmitted, not to the way in which they should be recorded. The entire chain of transmission must

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be oral. One cannot refer to a written document as the source of a tradition or as a link in the chain of transmission. For this reason, an objection was raised against a rabbi in the Holy Land who wanted to send a letter to a colleague in Babylonia with the correct version of some tannaitic material: the rabbis asked, how could the rabbi in Babylonia transmit a tradition based upon a written authority? According to the popular view that it is forbidden to write the oral Law, then it should also follow that it is forbidden to recite Scripture from memory. Hence, one would have to assume that when the rabbis quoted the Bible, it was from scrolls that they were carrying containing the twenty-four books of the Hebrew Scriptures! The French commentators attempted to avoid this problem by declaring that this injunction does not apply to quotations made when studying, but only ''when one is officiating for others so that they may fulfill their religious obligation. '' 3 This position cannot be accepted on several grounds. To begin with, the symmetric construction of the statement demands that the same principle also apply to the first part of the statement. No such ''religious obligation'' concerning the recitation of oral tradition may be found. Furthermore, and contrary to common opinion, the public recitation of the weekly portion of the Pentateuch does not involve a ''religious obligation'' to hear the Tora, as does the reading of the scroll of Esther on the holiday of Purim. The fact that a minor, who cannot officiate on behalf of others, can officiate as one of the seven principal readers of the Tora clearly shows that there is no basis to assume such a ''duty.''4 Moreover, in the Maramadot services and on the Day of Atonement at the Temple, the Tora was publicly recited from memory. 5 Finally, the Shemar, which must be recited twice daily, consists of two sections from Deuteronomy (6:4-9, 11:13-21) and one from Numbers (15:137141). Yet it is not necessary to read it from a duly copied scroll of the Law, either when discharging this duty personally or when officiating on behalf of the community. Elsewhere, the rabbis themselves made it clear that the abovementioned rule concerns the liturgical recitation of the Hebrew text of the Tora and its Aramaic translation (Targum) in the synagogue. The Targum cannot be recited from a written scroll (''Oral words may not be said in writing''), and the Tora cannot be recited by heart (''Written words may not be said orally''). 6 A similar tradition was preserved by a Spanish scholar who taught that this rule referred to the qere wu-khtib. There are words in the Scriptures that may not be read in public according to the written text (ketib); rather, they must be read according to another version (qere). 7 The object of the rabbis was to prohibit writing down the qere in place of the written version (''Oral words'' that is, the oral version, ''you may not say in writ2

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ing''-you cannot put them in writing and read them aloud from the written text). Conversely, it is forbidden to recite the written text (ketib) and disregard the oral version (''Written words,'' that is, the ketib, ''you cannot say orally''-in place of the oral version). This tradition was accepted by Maimonides. It is important to note that in no place did Maimonides codify an injunction against writing the oral Law. However, he codified the prohibition of reading the ketib in place of the qere, or writing the qere in place of the ketib. Since he was not in the habit of codifying laws that are not found in the Talmud, we must conclude that he accepted the above-mentioned tradition. 8 In order to gain an understanding of this subject, it would help to examine the concept of ''written'' in rabbinic tradition. R. Israel Moses I:Iazzan, in an as yet unsurpassed study of this subject, has pointed out the significance of two tern1s essential for the correct understanding of this concept. In reference to Megillat Taranit 'The Fast Scroll,' the rabbis ascertained that it was ketiba wu-manlµl 'written and publicly placed.' ''It is obvious from this," l:fazzan observed, ''that there were other works that were written but not 'publicly placed.' ''9 His analysis of this term bears directly upon the editing procedures current in the ancient world: What does "and publicly placed'' mean? According to the Spanish scholars this expresses a very subtle idea, since truly, the entire oral Law was to be found in writing in the possession of individuals. However, it was not ''publicly placed'' [''available to all''], but, rather, ''written'' and genuza ['withdrawn,' 'inaccessible to the general public'] in the private possession of the Sanhedrin authorities. The uniqueness of Megillat Ta~anit did not inhere in the fact that it was actually written, as the rest of the oral Law was, but in that it was ''publicly placed'' and thus accessible to all. Whoever wanted could come and take from it. It is almost certain that this means that they could expound [authoritatively] from the text. 10 Incidently, from the preceding, it seems that there are no longer any grounds for the criticism [made by R. Jacob 1:Iajez, 1620-1674) in [his] ~Es 1:layyim, objecting to the view of the Spanish scholars [regarding the per1nissibility of writing the oral Law] on the basis that never was it stated that the Mishna was ''written and publicly placed." After begging his pardon, [let me say that] he did not consider the matter sufficiently. Only Megillat Ta~anit was written and publicly placed in the hands of all. The Mishnayot, Barraitot and Talmud found in every generation [during the rabbinic period] were written but they were only in the possession of the teachers, who were scrupulous in reciting them by heart. However, they were not ''publicly placed'' in the hands of all. 11

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The other ter1n examined by l:lazzan is 'eno nittan le-hikkateb 'it was not consigned for writing.' J:lazzan noted that when referring to writing down unauthorized material, the rabbis never used the technical term 'asur 'it is forbidden' or 'eno rashshai 'he is not authorized' to write down the oral Law or to recite the Scriptures orally. At least in one place, the rabbis applied to this case the expressions 'eno nittan le-hikkateb. 12 (According to R. l:lazzan, the expressions used elsewhere by the rabbis in conjunction with the oral recitation of the Scripture, and the writing of the oral Law, are the semantic equivalent of 'eno nittan le-hikkateb, not of 'asur or 'eno rashshai.) This is a legal term. In order to understand its precise sense we must remember that rabbinic legislation distinguishes between two classes of loans (or debts), one which is beralpe 'orally,' that is, contracted verbally, and another which is bishtar 'documented,' that is, contracted in a written document. J:lazzan analyzed a passage in the Babylonian Talmud (Baba Me~ira 72b) discussing the liability of an individual who sold a property that he had previously transferred to his son. The issue debated by the rabbis concerns the liability of the seller. According to some, this is to be considered a ''documented'' debt. The bill of sale that he had written documents his liability. The final conclusion is that, since the bill that he had written 'eno nittan le-hikkateb, it does not have the force of a ''written document," and it must be considered an ''oral contract." J:lazzan points out another passage (Ketubbot 19b) in which this term appears in a similar context. 13 For the sake of illustration, it would help to examine a passage in Ketubbot 102b concerning the liability of parents who promised financial help to their children before their wedding ceremony. The Talmud concludes that this type of liability 'eno nittan le-hikkateb. Therefore, Maimonides declared that even if a written document was drawn up at the time of the wedding registering the parents' promise, the contract must be considered '' oral. ''14 Thus, it becomes clear that this term does not indicate whether the actual writing of the document is permitted, but rather, the status of such a document. In the case of the parents' promise discussed above, there is no objection against the actual drawing up of such a document. The sole concern is the status of a document containing something which was not authorized for registration in writing. We can now proceed to examine two key passages, the exact sense of which eluded the Talmudic commentaries. The Talmud quotes an opinion that Purim is the last (recorded) miracle of Israel's history. This is contrasted with the miracle of ]:lanukka, which, although occurring at a later date, was not (officially) recorded. The Talmud remarks: ''This is correct according to the view that [the scroll of]

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Esther was consigned for writing [nittena le-hikkateb]. But according to the view that [the scroll of] Esther was not consigned for writing [lo nittena-le-hikkateb], how can this [view] be maintained?''15 This passage is connected with a statement made in the name of Samuel (second and third centuries): [The scroll of] Esther does not defile the hands [i.e., it is not canonical]. Shall we then assume that Samuel believes that [the scroll of] Esther was not pronounced by the Holy Spirit (i.e., divinely inspired]? But Samuel has said: "(the scroll of] Esther was pronounced by the Holy Spirit!''-It was pronounced only for reading, but it was not pronounced for writing (ne'emara liqrot ve-lo ne'emara le-hikkateb). 16

Following the popular view that the oral Law cannot be committed to writing and that Scripture cannot be recited by heart, the usual explanation is that Samuel intended to say that the scroll of Esther may not be put down in writing and therefore must be recited orally. This view, as noted in the commentaries, is in flagrant contradiction with the Mishna in Megilla (II, 1) which states that, if one recites the scroll of Esther by heart, he has not discharged his obligation. 17 Furthermore, Samuel himself stated that if one reads the scroll of Esther from a scroll containing the (entire) Hagiographa, he has not fulfilled his duties. 18 This view presupposes that one cannot discharge his obligation by reciting this text from memory, but only from a duly copied scroll. 19 The issue of whether the scroll of Esther was consigned for writing or only for reading pertains to the status of the scroll. Samuel maintained that it was not consigned for writing. Therefore, although it must be read, the scroll does not have the status of a written document (ne'e,nara liqrot ve-lo ne'emara le-hikkateb). His view is particularly significant in light of the fact that Philo and the Dead Sea sects did not include this book in the Scriptures. Samuel's position may be a compromise between the normative view (including this scroll in the canon) and the sectarians and Hellenistic Jews who discarded altogether the practice of reading it. Samuel's view was accepted by Levi b. Samuel (third century) and R. Hunna b. l:fiyya (third century), who did not believe that it was necessary to use a handkerchief to handle the scroll of Esther, as rabbinic legislation 20 requires for scrolls containing canonical writings. Over and above laws of purity and ritual, the question of whether the scroll of Esther was consigned for writing bears on whether or not it could be the subject of canonical exegesis. This is the most significant issue involving the concept of ''writing.'' ''Writing'' involves three intimately connected points: (1) whether the text was ''consigned'' for writing, (2) the ritual status of the canon-scroll, and (3) the canonic-

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ity of exegesis. These points are neatly connected in the following passage from the Palestinian Talmud: From this it is evident that the scroll of Esther was consigned [nittena] to be expounded [le-hiddaresh]. R. l:{alabo, R. Yesa in the name of R. Eleazar: "About this it was said, 'Words of peace and truth' (Est 9:30). Elsewhere [concerning the Tora] it was said 'Acquire truth and do not sell it' (Prov 23:23). [This means that] it is like the very truth of the Tora! Just as one (the scroll of the Tora] requires lines, also the other [the scroll of Esther] requires lines. Just as o~e [the Tora] was consigned to be expounded [nittena le-hiddaresh], also the other [the scroll of Esther] was consigned to be expounded [nittena le-hiddaresh]." R. Jeremiah said in the name of R. Samuel b. Isaac: '' Also the scroll that Samuel committed to David (1 Chron 28:19) was consigned to be expounded [nittena le-hiddaresh)." What is the proof?-''all in writing''-this is the written text!-"from the hand of the Lord''-this is the Holy Spirit [i.e., divine inspiration]!-''to be understood''-this is evidence that it was consigned to be expounded [nittena le-hiddaresh)! 21

Before examining the sense of this passage, some remarks about its structure are of the essence. This is what I designate as sugya 22 kefula 'a folded pericope.' The passage consists of two parallel sections (I and II), each beginning with the heading (h) ''it was consigned to be expounded,'' introduced by one rabbi in the name of another, and ending with a similar conclusion (en), which is included in (c). Section II contains points (a), (b), and (c). In section I only (b) and (c) are explicit; (a) is only implicit, as (b) and (c) obliquely prove (a). It is worth noting that section I introduces (b) with the expression ''from this it is evident'' (zot 'omeret), an expression often used polemically, to score a point. 23 Evidently, this indicates a lacuna. The lacuna may be the effect of faulty transmission or, more likely, it may be part of the editing strategy. This becomes evident when considering the different functions of I and II. The function of I is rhetorical. It demonstrates (c) on the basis of (b). The function of II is conceptual. It points out the relationship among (a), (b), and (c). Thus, although (a), (b), and (c) are parallel in I and II, they are not identical. At the rhetorical level, (a) is unnecessary to demonstrate (c), since (c) is demonstrated on the basis of (b) alone. Conceptually, however, (c) cannot be understood without (a). I (h) [it] ''was consigned to be expounded'' (a) [the scroll of Esther was consigned for writing]

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(b) Just as one requires lines, so also the other requires lines (c) Just as one was consigned to be expounded, so also the other (en) was consigned to be expounded

(b) ''by the hand of the Lord''this is the Holy Spirit (c) ''to be understood''-this is evidence that (en) it was consigned to be expounded

Section II cites a verse from Chronicles (which according to tradition involves a scroll that the prophet Samuel committed to David) as the framework for the concept of a ''written text. '' 24 For this purpose the verse is divided into three parts, corresponding to (a), (b), and (c). The key term of the first part is bikhtab 'in writing,' which is explained as applying to ha-masoret 'the Masora' of the text. Here we have the first element of a ''written text'': a Masora, or absolute control, at the orthographic level. The significance of this will soon become evident. At this juncture, it will be sufficient to note that committing the scroll to David is designated by the technical term masar, which actually means 'delivering a text with a Masora.' Transporting this to I, (a) (whether the scroll of Esther was consigned for writing), involves an issue of fundamental importance. This issue is whether or not the scroll of Esther has a Masora-text, that is, whether or not there is an absolute control of the text at the orthographic level. The key term of the second part is beyad hashem 'with the hand of the Lord.' Thus in section II, (b) explains the symbolism of (b) in section I: why ''written'' texts must be copied on parchment with traced lines (shirtut). The shirtut lines, made with a blunt instrument on the parchment, symbolize the invisible trace of the Holy Spirit (''the l1and of the Lord''), without which writing is impossible. Human writing must be preceded by a divine trace. The intimate relationship between the ritual defilement of the hands and writing by the Holy Spirit becomes evident upon considering that since such a text was written ''by the hand of the Lord'' it may not be touched by human hands. 25 Conversely, since such a text does not represent ''the mind'' or ''wisdom'' of its human author, it may be the object of canonical exegesis (derash). 26 Hence the astonishment of the rabbis upon learning the opinion of Samuel that the scroll of Esther was divinely inspired, but it does not defile the hands. Samuel's position may be expressed as follows: although all canon-scrolls are divinely inspired, not all divinely inspired texts are to be copied in canonscrolls (le-qeri'a ne'mara ve-lo likhtiba). The notion of a text written by the Holy Spirit is predicated upon a text being ''accepted," ''certified'' by the people. It is highly significant that both Samuel and Rab (second and third centuries)-the

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two highest authorities of the Babylonian Talmud-maintained that the scroll of Esther was written by the Holy Spirit because the Jews had ''received'' [qibbel[u]]and certified [ve-qiyyemu] it'' (Est 9:27). According to Samuel it was received by the people, in the sense of being accepted, and thereby it was certified in the Heavens: ''They certified above [i.e., in the Heavens] what was accepted below [i.e., by the people]."27 According to Rab, first the people certified the scroll and thereupon it was 'approved' (hiskim) by God. 28 Pointing out the defective spelling of qibbel(u), implying the singular, Rab remarked: ''it is written ve-qibbel [i.e., in the singular]-it was the Lord of the Jews [i.e., God] who received it!''29 It should be noted that according to Rab, ''certification'' must be understood in the technical sense of a legal document presented to the court and certified by the legal authorities (qiyyum shetarot). 30 Since for Samuel the scroll of Esther ''was not consigned for writing'' he could not expound the defective spelling of ve-qibbel(u). 31 Moreover, since it lacks a ''written'' text, it could not be ''certified.'' Remarkably, both these views coincide in that ''written by the Holy Spirit'' is a textuological dimension stemming from the acceptability-of the-text by-the people. 32 Other Babylonian authorities expressed similar views. 33 In essence, (b) explains not only the rationale for the rituals attached to canon-scrolls, but it also serves as the bridge between (a) and (c). The function of (b) is to explain why the orthographic level of the text is significant, and why such a text can be ''expounded'' in a sense totally independent of its linguistic content. The key term of the third part, hiskil 'for understanding,' is related to the institution of derash or canonical exegesis, the method used by the rabbis to express authoritative opinion by applying exegetical canons to the Tora. That ''it was consigned to be expounded'' means, as explained by R. Samuel Yafe Ashkenazy (d. late sixteenth century), ''that exegesis may be applicable to the [orthographic] text." 34 In conclusion, ''written," rather than actual writing, expresses a legal status. To begin with, it involves an element of intentionality: whether or not the text was consigned for writing. Once a formal pronouncement was made, with the purpose of being legally registered, the text acquires the status of being ''written,'' regardless of whether the document was actually written. It could then be quoted in court, interpreted, analyzed, and implemented by the proper authorities. Conversely, a certain class of statements which the law considers as ''not to be consigned for writing'' will retain the status of ''oral'' although an actual document was registered to this effect. The distinction of ''written'' and ''oral'' Law follows similar lines. The Scriptures 'were consigned to be written' (nittena le-hikkateb). As a duly registered document, which was 'committed' (nimsar) to the

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court, the Scriptures have a Masora, that is, ''a registered orthographic text.'' When put into writing, the canon-scrolls are subject to ritual laws, such as the defilement of the hands and the requirement of a handkerchief for handling. Lines (shirt ut) must be marked on the parchment to indicate the divine trace, that is, that the text was pronounced with or by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, unlike unwritten texts, the writing contained in canon-scrolls is ''consigned to be expounded''; authoritative teaching could be expressed by applying canonical exegesis to the text. Since this class of writing has a Masora-text, canonical exegesis applies to both the verbal and the orthographic levels of the text. Exegesis could be applied to the letters, fragments, and words of the text regardless of their lexical sense. This is why a ''written'' text cannot be orally transmitted (authoritatively). Oral transmission excludes the possibility of textual exegesis. This point was expressed tersely by R. Samuel Sidillo. Commenting on the reason why ''written words'' are not to be transmitted orally, he wrote: The reason for this is that in a written composition many things are expounded on the basis of the orthographic text, e.g., defective or full spelling, the oral version in contradistinction to the written version, etc. If oral transmission were authorized, this would have to be excluded. 35

4. Formulation and Publication

The technical term for publication of a written text is ''publicly placed.'' Texts such as ''the Scroll of Fast'' and ''the Scroll of Esther'' were thus published. 1 However, a published text is not yet a 'book' (sefer). A ''publicly placed'' text is merely a text accessible to all, in contradistinction to a privately held or unpublished text (see below). A ''book'' is a text that was accepted by the people and certified by the authorities as a legal document; only such a text may become the object of canonical exegesis (derash). Thus, in order to acquire the status of a 'book' (sefer), a text not only requires ''publication'' but it also must be accepted. According to the rabbis, prior to its canonization the scroll of Esther was already ''publicly placed'' (man/µl) in the royal archives of Persia and Media, 3 but it was not a ''book.'' Speaking on behalf of Esther, the rabbis formulated the official request for canonization as 'write me on a sefer' (ketabuni ral sefer), 4 that is, as a book. R. Joshua, who opposed the canonization of the scroll of Esther, argued that it was only a zikkaron 'memorandum'-not a sefer!5 This view is the basis for Samuel's position that it ''was consigned for reading, but it was not consigned for writing. ''6 In other 2

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Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition words, it may be read from a written text, but the text itself is only a ''memorandum,'' not a ''book.'' The prevalent view, accepting the canonization of the scroll of Esther, argued that in the Pentateuch, Prophets, and Hagiographa, references may be found suggesting that it is (or may become) a sefer. 7 Canonization is the for111al acceptance or certification of a book (sefer); thus it is '' consigned to be expounded. ''8 Without this official act, a text cannot be ''expounded." For1nal acceptance is connected to mesira, indicating the ''surrendering'' of a document to the court by its legal holder, 9 thereby empowering the court to apply derasha to the interpretation of the document. Therefore, mesira is one of the three constitutive elements defining canonization of the Scriptures. Concerning this fundamental principle, Se~adya Ga'on wrote: The constituents of prophetic Writings are three. One of them is that it should include some mention of prophecy, for example, And God said . . . , '' or the teaching of some unknown matter [indicating thus divine inspiration], as in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Esther. The second [element] is proof that the author of that book is indeed a prophet. . . . And the third [element] is that the Nation accept that book [in the collection of] the Sacred Books, and collectively transmit it. 10 If these three [conditions] are not met, but only one [or two], that book is not a prophetic book. 11 11

An unpublished text is designated by the term megillat setarim 'concealed [i.e., unpublished] scroll,' 12 or 'non-book.' There were two terms to indicate that a previously published book was removed from circulation. Referring to ''the Scroll of Fast," the rabbis declared that it was batla 'annulled.' 13 This term implies ''abrogation'' (of the law), and it actually alludes to abrogation of the laws contained in this scroll regulating the days when fasting is forbidden. These laws were automatically abrogated once the scroll was removed from circulation. 14 A more common term is ganzu 'they withdraw,' as applied to the Book of Ecclesiasticus. 15 This term refers also to texts that were never published. Neither of these terms necessarily implies censure or condemnation. As a matter of fact, both of these works were quoted by the rabbis. It is worth noting that according to the rabbis, prior to the theophany at Sinai, the Tora itself was genuza 'withdrawn,' 16 just as the primaeval light was ''withdrawn'' by God from this world to be revealed by Him to the pious in the world to come. 17 A ''withdrawn'' text is affected in two ways. First, in the case of fire it cannot be saved on the Sabbath. 18 Second, it cannot be ''expounded.'' This is evident from a statement by R. Joseph (d. 333). Referring to the Book of Ecclesiasticus, he declared: ''Were it not for the fact that the rabbis had withdrawn [ganzuha]

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that book, I would have expounded those excellent utterances which it contains. ''19 Accordingly, we may distinguish three classes of writing. (1) A book (sefer) that was published and formally accepted or canonized. This class is divided into two. (a) The Scripture, which contain books that were ''publicly placed'' and canonized, and, therefore, can be ''expounded.'' These books have a _Masora-text, were pronounced by the Holy Spirit, must be inscribed on scrolls with traced lines (shirfut), defile the hands, and may be saved on the Sabbath in case of fire. (b) Translations of the Scriptures. According to some, translations may be used for the liturgical readings of the Tora (nittenu liqrot bahem). Others maintain that translations ''were not consigned for reading'' (lo nittenu liqrot bahem), that is, liturgically, in the 20 public service of reading the Tora. Even among those who maintained that translations were ''not consigned for reading," there were some who believed that they must be saved on the Sabbath in 21 order not to promote ''irreverence towards the holy books. '' (2) Writings that were not canonized (either ''published'' or ''withdrawn''), but containing no objectionable passages. Although one may not 'read' (liqro') them, that is, use them in liturgical services, or ''expound'' them authoritatively, one may read them casually. (3) 22 Heretical works that are absolutely forbidden from use. As indicated by l:lazzan, the most significant aspect of the publication of the Mishna was that, unlike Scripture, it was not ''publicly placed'' but only ''orally'' formulated. 23 We may now proceed to ask a fundamental question: what was the purpose of having a text ''orally'' edited rather than being ''publicly placed''? This problem cannot be solved merely by pointing to the validity of oral tradition among the Greeks or to the publishing habits current in the Hellenistic world. At best, this may help us understand the options available to the rabbis, but it cannot elucidate the specific functions associated with one model as opposed to the other. At worst, it could be misleading. What we designate as ''oral'' in one tradition may have a different content and function in the other. 24 Likewise, no significant insight concerning the formulation or the editing of the Mishna can be gained by dealing in general with the publishing methods in antiquity, without considering their specific character and function. The problem is more complex when one considers the enormous difficulties connected with setting up the kind of organization needed to insure the oral transmission of a text throughout the generations. Moreover, when examining this problem, a very important fact was overlooked. Not all elements of rabbinic tradition were to be transmitted ''orally." The rabbis emphasized that only ''those who write [that is, professionally] 25 halakha, are like those who bum

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the Tora." The same was said of those who wrote the 'blessings' 26 (berakhot), that is, the liturgy. The reference to ''burning'' alludes to the law prohibiting saving this type of writing in case of fire on the Sabbath. It was noted, however, that, since only halakha and blessings were mentioned, haggada must be excluded. 27 Two opposing tendencies concerning haggada did develop among the rabbis. On the one hand, some recommended the study of haggada from a written text. ''He who studies aggada from a book will not forget [it] 28 rapidly." Actually, R. Yo}.lanan and Rish Laqqish (ca. 250-290) studied haggada from written copies. 29 On the other hand, R. Joshua b. Levi (third century) declared: ''Whoever writes aggada has no portion in the world to come. Whoever comments upon it will chum [in Hell). Whoever hears it [recited from a written copy] will receive no reward. ''30 Why are these two extreme positions (recommendation of study from written copies or total condemnation) associated only with the study of haggada and not with halakha? No investigation of the place of the oral Law in rabbinic tradition could hope to arrive at a satisfactory solution without coming to grips with this problem. The tension between ''written'' and ''oral'' is intrinsic to, and thus coeval with, R. ~Aqiba's ideology of the formulation of the oral Law. This ideology became official with the formulation of the Mishna. Prior to the formulation of the Mishna, Scripture and oral tradition were distinguished by the fact that only the former had a formulated text. The Ge' onic and Sephardic traditions designated the oral Law in its pristine form, the pirush 'exposition' of the written Law. 31 Without attempting to present a full analysis of this concept, it will suffice to point out that the most significant aspect of pirush is that it has no text. It lacks textuological dimensions and formal articulation. Because it deals with the sense of the text, the pirush itself cannot have a text. As noted earlier, Arabic-speaking Jews designate with the term talqin the specific type of instruction that pirush imparts to a text. 32 For example: suppose one wishes to explain a map to another. He could not do this by drawing another map. A second map could expand or correct the first map but not explain it. The same applies to a musical composition, a painting, or a chemical formula: the explanation of one semiological system must be made in terms of another semiological system. This basic principle was brilliantly examined by Emile Benveniste. 33 Benveniste observed that semiological systems may enjoy a ''semiotic relationship."34 In this type of relationship, one system is the interpreter and the other is the interpreted. The interpreted system is contained, and finds ultimate meaning, in the system of the interpreter: ''The semiotic relationship between systems is designated as the relationship between a System

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which Interprets and a System which is Interpreted. ''35 This type of relationship is classified as ''the relation of interpretation''; for instance, the Morse and Braille systems are interpreted in terins of the alphabet. Unlike algebraic equations, this type of relationship cannot be reversed: the interpreter system cannot be interpreted in terms of the interpreted system. Applying this to our illustration, it means that the alphabet cannot be interpreted in terms of either the Morse or the Braille systems. 36 The uniqueness of language as a semiological system stems from two closely related facts: language alone can be interpreted in terms of itself and it is the ultimate system in terms of which all other systems are interpreted: The third relationship between semiotic systems we will designate Relation of Interpretation. In this way we designate what is instituted between a system that interprets and a system that is interpreted. From the point of view of language, the fundamental relationship is one which separates the systems into systems which articulate themselves, because they manifest their own semiotics, and into systems which are articulated and whose semiotics appear only through the network of another system. Thus we may introduce and justify the principle that language is the interpreter of all other semiotic systems. No other system has a ''language'' by means of which it can categorize and interpret itself according to semiotic distinctions, whereas language can, in principle, categorize and interpret everything, including itself. 37

From the foregoing, it is evident that in rabbinic tradition, a semiotic relationship prevails between the written and the oral Law, in which the latter is the interpreter and the former the interpreted system. As the (ultimate) pirush of Scripture, the oral Law must function as ''language.'' It must manifest its own values according to which it can categorize itself as well as Scriptures. To formulate a pirush and give it textuological dimensions is to transform it from an interpreter to an interpreted system. This is why Sherira Ga,on emphasized that originally the oral Law had no text but was a pirush in which each teacher could express the meaning of the Scriptures in his own words. 38 A ''pirush'' that does not function as language is no longer a pirush but an interpreted system: thus the irreducible tension between text (the interpreted system) and pirush (the interpreter system). 39 The formulation of the Mishna appeared to threaten the most fundamental distinction between written and oral Law. In addition to historical considerations, such as the traditional division of two Toras and the final canonization of Scripture, the publication of the Mishna raised a more pragmatic problem. The object of the oral Law

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was to transmit the (authoritative) teachings of the rabbis. With the downfall of Bethar and the destruction of the seats of learning, following the disastrous consequences of Bar Kokhba' s revolution, the oral Law remained the only source of authority. Since the Mishna was officially ''accepted,'' if it had been ''publicly placed'' it would have become ''consigned to be expounded,'' and thereby the object of canonical exegesis like the rest of the Scriptures. Thus, the Mishna would have become a text, the object of rhetorical manipulation, rather than the source of authority. We can now appreciate the strategy of editing an ''oral for1nulation," rather than ''publicly placing'' a ''written text.'' By denying textuological dimension to the Mishna, the pirush character of the oral Law was determined and the possibility of canonical exegesis prevented. 40 The rabbis' preoccupation with written texts of the oral Law stems from the fact that once the oral Law had acquired an official formulation it could become indistinguishable from the written Law. By insisting on oral transmission and memorization, this possibility was in fact eliminated. This is why the rabbis censured only those who wrote halakhot and berakhot (professionally) as these items alone have an official formulation. 41 Since haggada does not have a fixed for1nulation, most rabbis did not believe there were grounds for concern that people would eventually attribute to the haggada the status of a written text. 42 Moreover, since the principal objective of the haggada is conceptual communication, some believed that this type of literature is better studied from written texts rather than memorized. R. Joshua b. Levi's condemnation of written haggada reflects concern for having writings without precise formulation circulating freely in private hands. His concern is more comprehensible when one considers that the haggada was known to contain esoteric material. 43 Finally, there were others who considered haggada useless; since it lacks text, it should not, it could not, be the subject of study. 44

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V.

GOLDEN DOVES WITH SILVER DOTS Golden doves we shall make for you with silver dots (Cant 1:11). . . . Another explanation: 'Golden doves we shall make for you'that is the Tora that the oraculum 1 taught in the mind of the Almighty. 'With silver dots'-R. Abba bar Kahana said: These are the letters.' R. Al;la said: 'These are the words.' Another explanation: 'Golden doves we shall make for you'-this is writing. 'With silver dots'-these are the lines.

-Shir ha-Shirim Rabba I,

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Introduction

King Solomon, to whom ancient tradition attributed unbounded wisdom and the authorship of the Song of Songs, challenged us with a double riddle: golden doves with silver dots. To begin with, there is a technical problem: silver could not be welded into gold. Therefore, how could ''golden doves with silver dots'' be made? A clue to this problem is found in a verse in Proverbs another book that ancient tradition attributed to King Solomon: ''Golden apples in a silver mesh, this is a word spoken on its two circles'' ('ofnav 'faces,' 2 that is, fitly; Prov 25:11). The golden doves must have been cast into a silver mesh. 3 Solving the technological problem presents us with an even more difficult challenge. It would appear wiser to cover a less valuable material with a more valuable one. Why, then, would one want to cast golden doves into a silver mesh? A solution to this problem is offered by the rabbis. King Solomon was referring to speech and communication. Using the Latin oraculum in the sense of an absolutely unambiguous non-verbal communication, the rabbis designated with it thought as it originates in the mind of the first person, prior to its being processed into speech. This unprocessed, 114 Digitized by

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original thought is ''the golden doves'' that cannot be expressed unless cast into a mesh of ''silver dots." Depending on our view concerning the ultimate components of speech, the dots must be conceived of either as words or as letters. Again, just like dots, these components cannot be subject to further division. In themselves, they are not significant; like the silver mesh encasing the golden doves, they could not be ''welded'' into the original oraculum: the notion of a word/meaning grid must be dismissed unequivocally. Rather than ''welded'' together, the word/meaning relationship is to be conceived of as a mesh revolving around the oraculum (which in itself is in motion). Because of the orbital position of the mesh, different views of the oraculum can be obtained. It is worth noting that the Hebrew 'ofnav 'its circles or faces,' in the plural, indicates that more than one orbit is possible. Concerning the ''golden apples,'' Maimonides wrote: The wise man had said: ''Golden apples in a silver mesh, this is a word spoken on its circles [faces]." Hear, now, the significance of what he said. Maskiyot is a chiseled net, containing places with very finely pierced perforations, as in jewelry work. . . . Solomon was saying that a word spoken on its two orbits is like a golden apple in a silver mesh with very fine eyelets. Note how wonderfully this statement describes a meaningful metaphor. He was saying that in an utterance with two faces, i.e., with an outer and an inner one, the outer [face] must be as valuable as silver. However, the inner [face] must be more precious than the outer one, so that the inner [face] in relation to the outer [face] would be as gold is to silver. Moreover, the outer [face] must contain some indication pointing out to the observer the contents of the inner face. In the same fashion a golden _ apple covered by a silver mesh with very fine eyelets when seen from a distance or carelessly appears to be a silver apple; but on closer examination, to one with sharp sight, its content will be discernible, and he would know that it is of gold. 4 •

The tension between the ''inner'' and the ''outer'' levels corresponds to the tension between the oraculum as initially conceived by the first person, and the processing or articulation into terms that can be apprehended by the second or third person. The double function of the mesh, that of simultaneously concealing and displaying, is reminiscent of the ''dynamic call'' peculiar to sexuality discussed by D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930). 5 Roland Barthes, better than anyone else in our days, pointed out the ''erotic'' excitement involved in ''every unveiling of truth'' and ''the pleasure of the text."6 The second solution (''another explanation," cited above) is more precise. The processed oraculum is conceived of as writing-a kind of

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pristine trace which precedes speech and communication. The ''silver dots'' allude to the white parchment and the lines (traced on the parchment with a blunt object) that make writing possible. According to rabbinic tradition, only when written on such a ''traced'' parchment is the scroll of the Tora valid: shirtut 'tracing the lines' on the parchment is intrinsic to the concept of sefer 'book. ' 7 The ''golden doves'' are the script itself; the ''silver dots'' are the structured blank space surrounding each letter. This type of spacing is an essential condition of writing. Even the heavenly Tora is written with ''black fire on a white fire. ''8 According to rabbinic tradition, spacing between the letters is not merely to insure that each letter will not impinge upon another: the blank spaces between the letters in the sense of unused ''writable'' space is essential for writing. Consider the following law: if even one single letter of the Tora is written around a punctured parchment, so that the letter either surrounds the perforation or the perforation is contained within the space between two letters (in neither case does the perforation impinge upon the script itself), the scroll of the Tora is invalid and unfit for liturgical purposes. Blank-spacing is essential only to the initial act of writing; once written, script no longer requires this type of spacing. Therefore, if a properly written scroll is punctured within an individual letter or in the soace between two letters (in a manner not .. affecting the script itself), the status of the scroll is unaffected. 9 Similarly, R. I:Iananya ben Teradyon (second century), while burning at the stake together with the scroll of the Tora, declared that he ''saw [only] the pa_rchment burning, while the letters were flying away [unharmed]."10 Jorge Luis Borges also includes blank ''space'' in his definition of writing. 11 The whiteness of the parchment between the letters is what contains (and in effect gives expression to) the ''golden doves'' or writing. With Derrida, this concurs with the essential '' deferring process'' which writing involves. But this deferral is not simply a denial of absolute presence. Rather, it is the structuring of presence in successive terms. 12 Simultaneous knowledge excludes the possibility of an unending progress of knowledge. Because ''presence'' is never simultaneously but always successively structured, ''knowledge,'' ''truth," etc., can never be ''totally'' grasped. Rather, there is an unending (that is, successive) process, involving the possibility of continuous progress. The notion of intellectual humility permeating the Hebrew Scriptures and rabbinic tradition reflects the belief that knowledge can never be ultimate, that ''eternity'' ought not to be conceived in simultaneous terms. 13 It is worth noting that ''silence'' (or ''interruption'') is both possible and necessary only within the realm of successivity. 14 It is the peculiar trait of the Hebrew God not

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only to speak, but also to be ''silent.'' This idea was expressed quite eloquently by Judah ha-Levi, who wrote: ''I reveal and [then] hide Me, I anger [in the biblical sense of 'interruption') and [then] respond.'' 15 The same applies to the Hebrew people. As the participants in the divine dialogue, not only did they ''sing the wonders of the Lord,'' but they also had the faculty of keeping their peace, of remaining speechless. Whereas other people claiming to be the recipients of prophecy kept speaking continuously, unable to hold their peace, Israel alone is capable of silence. It is precisely this speechlessness which-like blank spacing in writing-contains and gives expression to speech. Indeed, the Zohar (a work which tradition associates with R. Simon bar Yol)ai [second century] and which modem scholars attribute to Moses de Le6n [ca. 1250-1306)) declared in the name of R. El~azar: My silence built a Sanctuary above and a Sanctuary below. Truly (it is commonly said) ''If a word is worth one coin, then silence is worth two. ''16 ''A word is worth one coin''-this is what I spoke and what I inspired; ''then silence is worth two''-this [applies to] my silence, by which were created and built two worlds at once. 17

As mentioned earlier, successive analysis is genetically connected with the ear and the hearing process. 18 Moharal)u (R. 1:fayyim Vital, 1542-1620), the foremost Lurianic mystic, declared that ''the ear is the mystery of intelligence [bina] ... and it is the mystery [sod) of the soul [neshama]." 19 The soul is ''made out of the ether in the ear. ''20 The human mind, ''even with the help of metaphor could only reach up to the ear, but not beyond it. '' 21 It is no coincidence that the oraculum is depicted as '' doves. '' 22 First, the Hebrew tore 'doves' is phonetically close to ''Tora." But more importantly, the doves indicate the volatile character of a successive experience. The second '' dove'' (identical to the first, but not actually the first) is grasped by the second person, initially in terms of the '' silver dots'' and then as a ''golden dove.'' Similarly, the rabbis taught that '' At the beginning [the Tora] is called in the name of the Lord, but in the end it will be called in his [the student's] name''; that is, the student will eventually view the Tora from the perspective of the first person. 23 The two doves are the two poles essential to every linguistic experience: ''I'' could only be said to a ''you."24 Similarly, the written Law is the original oraculum as perceived ad intra. But initially, the Israelites received it as the oral Law. Only after forty years of wandering, before entering into the Promised Land, did Moses deliver to them the written Law. From the perspective of the people, the oral Lav, antecedes the written Law. 25 Therefore, as Elie Benamo-

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zegh indicated, the written Law must always function as a mnemonic sign for the oral Law. 26 It seems that the inspiration for the ''golden doves'' came to Solomon from his father, King David. In a Psalm traditionally associated with the theophany at Sinai, 27 the people are compared to ''the wings of a dove inlaid with silver, and her feathers with yellow gold'' (Ps 68:14). The silver-gold combination probably implies a technique similar to that used for the manufacturing of the '' golden doves'' and ''golden apples." In the solution of these riddles, too, lies the significance of a dove with ''silver'' wings and feathers of ''yellow gold.''

1.

Semiotic and Semantic Reading

The rabbis cited at the head of this chapter taught that in the theophany at Sinai, the Israelites were privileged to bypass speech and have the oraculum transmit directl~ to them the thought in the mind of God: at Sinai each Israelite apprehended the ''golden doves'' without the ''silver dots." Later generations, however, needed the ''silver dots.'' According to Jewish tradition, the collective experience of the people at Sinai, the miracles in Egypt, and the wandering in the desert are intuitively known to their posterity. 1 There is no need to ''prove'' or ''demonstrate'' the validity of this experience to any of their descendants. R. David Nieto, explaining that the purpose of miracles is not to promote some article of faith, noted ''neither they [those who witnessed the miracles] nor we have the need for miracles to demonstrate a truth which is rooted among us without any hesitation or doubt, a truth which is fixed in the most intimate place of our hearts.'' Maimonides (and others) considered this intuitive knowledge a phylogenic trait of the Jewish people. Concerning the experience at Sinai, Maimonides wrote ''Therefore, let it be known that whoever departs from the faith that was given at that awesome testimony [the theophany at Sinai]-his ancestors have not stood at the foot of Mount Sinai!'' 3 The function of studying the Tora and acquiring wisdom-so fundamental in Jewish tradition-is to articulate (the ''silver dots'') the intuitive knowledge accumulated by the people of Israel. The plural ''we'' in ''golden doves we shall make for you with silver dots'' includes not only God (the originator of the oraculum) but also the people (who received it), implying thereby an active participation of the people in the manufacturing of the ''golden doves'' and ''silver dots.'' 2

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How was the divine message communicated to the people at Sinai? Rabbinic tradition has preserved two opposing views. R. Yol)anan, the highest rabbinic authority of his time, maintained that a mal'akh 'angel,' 'representative' of God, explained the divine message to every Israelite. This view presupposes that the author communicates through the text. The text is a mere instrument, a kind of linguistic conductor, transmitting the mind of the author. The linkage with the author is both for1nal and irrevocable. Grasping a text may be compared to having a mal'akh or representative of the author explaining the original idea behind it. This view was rejected by his colleagues. The second opinion, transmitted in the name of the rabbis, ascertains that the oraculum itself spoke to the people, not a mal'akh:4 But the rabbis say: It was the uttterance itself that would tum to every Israelite and ask him: 'Do you accept me? Such and such commandments are contained in me. Such and such laws are contained in me. Such and such decrees, such and such ordinances, such and such a fortiori [reasonings] are in me. Such and such a reward there is in me.' And he would respond: 'Yes and yes!' Thereupon, the utterance would kiss him on the mouth. It was the oraculum teaching him the Tora. 5

According to this opinion, a text is independent of the author; it uses the author, rather than the other way around. This view seems to be corroborated by the talmudic principle, ''the Tora is not in the Heavens'' ;6 that is, the Heavens have no authority in the interpretation of the Tora: God may not explain his own words. 7 Obviously, the view of R. Yol)anan's colleagues here, and the view that the oraculum communicated to the people the Tora in the mind of God, are the same. The idea that an oraculum communicates the mind of the first person is a rejection of phonocentrism. Traditionally, Jewish commentators explained the verse ''and all the people saw the voices'' (Exod 20:15) to mean that God's speech was perceived ''visually," that is, in a non-auditory way: the Israelites read the voices. The fact that the scroll of the Hebrew Scriptures contains only consonants (a vocalized scroll is ritually invalid)8-,an unpronounceable text9-implies a glossematic view of language. 10 The two levels of language symbolized by '' golden doves with silver dots'' parallel the semiotic and semantic, that is, sharal) and ma~na. The essential disconnection between these two levels (which as gold and silver could not be welded) leads to one of the most important insights into the nature of language. Unlike the semiotic, where each sign has a definite value in isolation, the components of a semantic unit, like color in painting or sound in a musical composi11

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tion, are significant only in association, not in isolation. 12 The significance of a semantic composition is the effect of interpretation. Prior to interpretation, there is ambiguity (or ''perplexity''). This ambiguity involves the reader in a creative process: he must choose one of several alternatives. Concerning Scripture, it was taught that ''there are seventy faces to the Tora, '' 13 that is, the Tora could be interpreted in seventy ways. These ''seventy ways'' correspond to ''the seventy nations'' 14 or ''seventy languages''15 which, according to the 16 rabbis, make up the totality of mankind. More significantly, even within a single ''face'' there are as many variables as there are individuals making up that nation. In fact, the mystics taught that there are six hundred thousand faces to the Tora: equal to the number of Israelites standing at the foot of Mount Sinai. 17 With Barthes, we may say that at the semantic level the reader is actually ''a producer 18 of the text'': he determines his own contextual connections, thus creating the ''message'' and the ''text. " 19 Accordingly, there are two classes of reading. Semiotic reading is passive and serves to unveil the meaning of the text as intended by the author. In Borges's ''Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," the reader is expected to penetrate thoroughly the mind and language of the author-.as the mal'akh teaching the Israelites, according to R. Yo}.tanan. Somehow, the reader must become the author and rewrite the text he is reading-with all the ensuing paradoxes that Borges so subtly insinuated. In semantic reading, every text is like a volume of Borges' s ''The Library of Babel.'' The ''Library'' includes all possible books in all possible languages. A volume, any volume, represents a single variant out of all the possible variants of any possible text. Reading, therefore, involves a crisis of choice. The choice must be exclusive. Interpretation must process the multiple meanings and transform them into a single significant text. Therefore, semantic reading excludes intertextuality. A book, any book, must be like the Book. As mentioned earlier, Eupolemus maintained that the Bible was the first book ever written. In fact, he believed that writing was first introduced by Moses and the Hebrews: ''Moses was the first wise man and the first that handed down the tradition of writing to the Jews. It was from the Jews that the Phoenicians received it, and the Greeks from the Phoenicians. Also, Moses was the first who wrote down Laws [the Tora] for the Jews."21 The Tora is the first book not simply because the writings of other people were not designed for transmission (and therefore are not ''books''), but because any book worth reading must be the first book, that is, it must be free from all other books. More precisely, like the Tora itself, it must 22 antecede Creation. In contradistinction to the Western tradition, for Judaism the book does not reflect the Universe: the Universe must 20

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reflect the Book. (Western literature, through appropriation of the Hebrew Scriptures and by using them as the mirror of the Universe, appears trapped in a Borgesian gallery of distorting mirrors, mirrors reflecting other mirrors.) In Judaism, books on the Book are classified as ''oral Law," that is, they are mere surrogates for the phonetic word. R. Joseph ibn Megas clearly defined the formal grounds of the distinction between the Book and Talmud (oral Law). The latter is a ''commentary'' and therefore is never identical to ''the true Tora." The fact that the Talmud may be copied in a parchment without lines and that, unlike Scripture, it does not ritually deftle the hands, proves that its status is not the same as that of the Tora: The Talmud, however, is the explanation (bi~ur] and commentary [pirush] of the Tora, not the true Tora. Don't you see that it does not require lines as does the true Tora? It is evident, therefore, that its holiness is inferior to that of the Tora itself. It does not come even to . the holiness of the other Holy Writings ... which defile the hands. 23

By excluding the vowels from the text of Scripture, Hebrew tradition was in fact excluding semiotic reading. It was also excluding parasitic exegesis, the type of static reading peculiar to the ''readerly'' text discussed so brilliantly by Barthes. 24 It is hardly possible to conceive a more ''unreadable'' text than one made exclusively of consonants! The same distinction applies to the ''commentaries'' on the Book. A commentary may be anaesthetic; its object is to make the text ''readable''; therefore, it presupposes literary innocence on the part of the reader. The ''explanations'' are designed to act as a soporific whereby the reader surrenders his own· criteria to that of the author and becomes totally passive. The ''unreadable'' type of commentary presupposes total alertness. Its object is to point out hitherto unforeseen possibilities in the text, to for1nulate new alternatives by further perforating the original, and thus to raise the level of perplexity. This type of commentary bears no resemblance whatsoever to the original. It requires superior erudition and scholarly sophistication merely to note in what way it is actually expounding the original. Consider, for example, the Mishna and the Talmud, the most authoritative compilations of the oral Law. Traditionally, they were co_n sidered the official pirush 'commentary' of the Tora. 25 It is a remarkable fact that they bear absolutely no resemblance at all to the Tora, in either structure, language, or style. The semiotic and the semantic are two ''disconnected,'' that is, autonomous, systems. In the arts, such as painting and music, there is only semantics but no semiotics (hence the presence of ''ambiguity''). In animal communication and artificial languages, such as the Morse Code or symbolic logic, there is only semiotics but no seman-

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tics (hence ambiguity is excluded). The uniqueness of language stems from the fact that it alone comprises both the semantic and 26 the semiotic. It uses the same sign (the word) to accomplish both these systems. Hence, although conceptually disconnected, by partaking of the same symbol, these two systems are semiologically linked. Pointedly, Se~adya Ga'on and Maimonides took 'ofnaiv (Prov 25:11) to be a dual, not a plural. 2 7 The perception of language as a semiological apparatus organizing two distinct systems is intimately related to the perception of the Book and its ''commentaries.'' In rabbinic tradition, Scripture is expressive at both the semiotic and the semantic levels. The first level corresponds to peshat, the 'literal' or 'generally accepted' sense of Scripture. 28 The other level corresponds to derasha 'interpretation'-the rabbinic method of Scriptural exegesis. Arabic-speaking Jews associate derasha with ta'wil 'exposition,' (nonliteral interpretation). 29 The purpose of peshat is to expound the mind of the author as expressed in the text. The derasha interprets the text independently of the intention of the author. At this level, the elements of the text do not convey the meaning which they had at the semiotic level; the sense of the derasha is not the sum of the value of each of its components in isolation. As in all semantic compositions, the elements of the derasha acquire significance only through syntagmatic opposition, and is context-bound. ''Every exposition (midrash wu-midrash) is context-bound,'' taught the rabbis. 30 As with the oraculum, it is the text itself speaking to the reader. At this level there is no objective meaning: ''One may not raise objections against an aggada [derasha ], '' said the rabbis. 31 Interpretation is subjective: it is the creative composition of the reader functioning as an author. The derasha is not exclusive to Scripture. It pertains to all semantic compositions. Consider the interpretation of dreams. The language of dreams is exclusively semantic. Accordingly, it is context-bound. Concerning dreams, Sigmund Freud observed that ''the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it occurs in various people or in various contexts'' 32-a fundamental idea also noted in the Talmud. 33 To be significant, a dream must be ''inserted into the psychical chain that has to be traced backwards in the memory from a pathological idea''34-it cannot be analyzed in isolation. Since the language of dreams excludes semiotics, the feeling of interiority is absent: dreams are ''speechless." We can now understand the fact, noted by Freud, that when in a state of sleep one lacks ''the criterion which alone makes it possible to distinguish between sense-perception arising from without and that from within.''35 Since dreams are semantic compositions, the derasha-methodology is particularly suited to their interpretation. The close relationship be-

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tween the derasha and the interpretation of dreams in antiquity-so poorly understood 36-is not haphazard. It stems from the fact that both these methodologies concern the interpretation of a semantic composition. By intuitively applying the derasha methodology to the interpretation of dreams, Freud was obliquely acknowledging this point. The privileged position of art in the Western tradition may be understood best in ter1ns of its function. As a semantic composition, art is the only possibility of derasha available to Western man. In order genuinely to appreciate a work of art, one must for1nulate his own derasha, becoming, thereby, a co-author of that artistic creation. Art seduces. By stripping the semiotic components, some modern schools lay bare the semantic character of their productions, raising the temptation for derasha. The appeal of the Hebrew Scriptures is connected with the enor1nous possibilities of derasha offered to both the learned and the masses. Tora fulfilled the need for derasha. Hence the absence of art in Judaism.

2.

Derasha and Mesira

In rabbinic tradition, the derasha is a legal institution pertaining to all written documents. This institution is connected with the expression leshon hedyot 'the language of a commoner' (in opposition to leshon ha-qodesh, 'sacred language,' used to describe the Hebrew Scriptures). In rabbinic literature, leshon hedyot appears in the sense of a binding text which is not scriptural. The text may have been established by the rabbinic court, such as the Ketubba 'Marriage Contract' or contracts in vogue within the business community. The rabbis declared: dorshin leshon hedyot ''the language of a commoner [as it appears in the contract] may be interpreted by the court. '' 1 The precise meaning of this expression was given by Ha,ayye Ga,on. Referring to the authorities who applied this principle to the interpretation of contracts, he wrote: All those authorities that were mentioned ... examined the language of the commoner that they used in their contracts, and they interpreted [dorshin] them as if they were analyzing the text of the Tora. They interpret [dorshin ], not in accordance with the literal sense [ki-fshutan], but in accordance with other interpretations. 2 (italics added)

The court's right to apply derasha to a document and interpret it in a non-literal sense is the effect of mesira ('surrendering' the contract to the court by its legal holder); 3 most rabbinic legal authorities

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maintain that when the intention of the contract is doubtful, the court has the right to determine its sense even when contradicted by the text. 4 Moreover, if a term or expression appears to be superfluous (yitur lashon), it is the right of the court to expound it as it sees fit. 5 Likewise, the rabbis declared that Moses 'surrendered' (masar) the Tora to Joshua, and he to the elders, etc. 6 Hence the right of the rabbinic court to apply derasha to Scripture. 7 Conversely, although all may study Tora (''Whoever studies Tora, even if he is a gentile ... must be considered as holy as a High Priest''), 8 the rabbis warned ''not to surrender [mosrin] the words of the Tora to a gentile."9 An alien may be able to penetrate into a culture and master its peshat level. However, participation at the semantic level, in which the reader acts as an author, presupposes the kind of relationship with 10 the text which is not possible for the alien. More precisely, without the act of mesira of the text to the reader, derasha is illegitimate. Reflecting this idea, R. Nissim Ga'on dismissed a ta'wil contradicting Jewish tradition on the basis that ta'wil is the exclusive prerogative of the Jewish people: No one has the right to for11tulate a ta'wil of the Tora against us contrary to our consensus, because we are the authorities of its language, the transmitters of its text, and the proclaimers of its veracity. We have received it from the Prophets verbally [i.e., directly], as well as its meaning and ta'wil. 11

R. Joseph ibn ~Aqnin (ca. 1150-1220) reports that the most prestigious authorities in the Orient and in the Iberian Peninsula would consistently consult with Christian scholars on the meaning of Scripture. For instance, Ha'ayye Ga'on, the most illustrious authority of his time, would consult with the head of the Syrian Church on scriptural matters. It is noteworthy that these consultations concerned only the sharab (peshat), never the ta'wil. 12 The court's right to apply derasha to the text of contracts and the right to apply it to the Tora are intimately connected with each other. This may be seen in the fact that, according to rabbinic tradition, Hillel, the first to apply derasha to Scripture, 13 was also the first authority to apply derasha to leshon hedyot . 14 Characteristically, leshon hedyot may be subject to derasha even when, in effect, it was not put down in writing. ''Writing'' is not merely the actual inscription of a text, but a legal status: ''The leshon hedyot are considered as institutions of the court," said Ha'ayye Ga'on; ''therefore, even if they \AJere not put down in writing, they must be considered as written. ''15 The same applies to Scripture, which, whether written or not, retains the status of ''written'' Law. 16

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The oral Law pertains to semiotics. It may not be ''interpreted'': derasha is explicitly excluded. 17 Because it is a purely semiotic composition, the text of the oral Law excludes its own frame of reference and the elements by which it can be internally expounded. Accordingly, it is categorically impossible to discover the meaning of this literature from the text itself. As noted earlier, the sense of the oral Law is known through talqin 'instruction. ' 18 Therefore, the exposition of oral Law does not follow standard literary canons. Referring to the talmudic explanations of the Mishna, Maimonides wrote: The Talmud expounds the Mishna in a way that no one can ever arrive at through common logic. Sometimes it [the Talmud] applies to it [the Mishna] principles not implicitly contained in the text and ascertains that a particular Mishna was for1nulated on the basis of this or that aspect. Or that a particular Mishna has omitted words, and the meaning [of the omissions] is so and so. Or that a particular Mishna stems from Rabbi X and he believes so and so. Further111ore, in the course of its exposition it [the Talmud] adds to its [the Mishna's] text, subtracts from it, and explains its causes. 19

Classical Qabbala 'mystical literature' such as the Zohar (Cremona, 5318/1558), Shemona Shec:arim (Jerusalem, 5623-5638/1863-1878), and Rel}obot ha-Nahar (Salonika, 5566/18o6), is principally significant at the semantic level. From the point of view of Qabbala the ultimate sense of a text is only semiotically connected with the script. The letters are only ''metaphors'' pointing to a significance transcending the realm of words. Anticipating Charles Peirce (1839-1914), the Qabbala conceives of words (and letters) as symbols that make thinking possible. (Just as the number four cannot be thought of without ''4'' or some other symbol, the sense of the Tora cannot be apprehended without adequate symbolism.) Moharashash (R. Shalom Shar~abi, 1720-1777), the most outstanding Lurianic mystic after MoharaQ.u, explained that the Qabbala deals with two types of symbolism: one from man and the other from language. Reflecting the view that the ''silver dots'' (or the ultimate components of language) are letters, the Qabbala maintains that letters function as metaphors for the sublime. The sublime is a montage ''written'' in an alphabet of ''lights'' of different colors: Although it is obvious that there is nothing up There [in the realm of the spirit] except sublime lights, so totally spiritual that it cannot be apprehended directly at all, as the Scripture says ''Because you have not seen any for111'' [Deut 4:15] ... there is, however, another method by which one can symbolize and grasp these subtle matters. It [this method] concerns the writing of the script of the letters,

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because every letter indicates a particular sublime light. Obviously, even this type of imagery cannot be applicable to the divine, since up There there are neither consonants nor vowels. This [method], too, is a metaphor and [an aid] to conceptualize, to soothe the ear, as mentioned before. And these two types of conceptualization, conceptualiz.ation through man and conceptualization through letters, are both necessary for the understanding of the significance of the subtle lights. As you can see, the books of the Zohar are built upon these two types of conceptualization. 20

It is noteworthy that derasha and mesira are the key terms used by the rabbis to describe the instruction of Matase Bereshit 'the Procedure of Genesis' and Matase Merkaba 'the Procedure of the Chariot'the two pillars of Sitre Tora 'the Mysteries of the Tora.' 21 The teacher 'surrenders' (mosrin) to the pupil the ''heads of chapters," or basic axioms," and then the student ''must understand in his own mind,'' that is, he must formulate his own derasha. 23 Maimonides uses the term ta'wil (derasha) to describe the understanding of classical Jewish mysticism. 24 The idea of language comprising hvo autonomous yet semiologically connected systems leads directly to the nature of metaphor. Language is essentially metaphoric because the same element (the word) functions at two different levels: the semiotic and the semantic. 25 By virtue of using the same semiological system, these levels act like Borgesian mirrors reflecting (thereby distorting and deflecting) the intention of each other. Metaphor, then, is the intention at one level as perceived from the perspective of the other. Because language includes two independent systems, it is selfexpressive and reflective. It can be expressive about itself precisely because it comprises two distinct structures acting as mirrors reflecting one another. The notion of an endless movement from one structure to another is superfluous when noting this mirror-like quality of language. The problem raised by Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Russell (1872-1970), concerning the impossibility of language expressing its own structure, misses this cardinal point. Maurice Blanchot referred to this problem as follows: Every language has a structure about which one can say nothing in that language, but ... there must be another language dealing with the structure of the first and possessing a new structure about which one cannot say anything except in the third language and so forth. 26

The mirror-like relationship present in (any) two systems semiologically connected forestalls the notion that every language must

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appear as the Other (system) and imply an Other (system), without which it is itself inconsequential. Again quoting Blanchot: Now, ever since Mallarme, we have felt that the Other of language is always posed by the language itself as that in which it looks for a way out, in order to disappear into it, or for an Outside, in which to be reflected. Which means not simply that the Other is already part of this language, but that as soon as this language turns around to respond to its Other, it is turning towards another language, and we must be aware that this other language is Other, and also that it, too, has its Other. 2 1

Rather, one may say that language is essentially reflective. The ''distorting'' quality of language is what makes knowledge possible. W. B. Yeats (1865-1939) expressed this seminal point: '' ... Empty eyeballs knew/ That knowledge increases unreality, that/ Mirror on mirror mirrored is all the show. '' 28 Borgesian mirrors distort. They function as the ''Library of Babel,'' producing through progressive reflections endless variations. These variations entrap. They make up the ''labyrinths'' enclosing the Minotaur, as in ''The House of Asterion."29 What begins in ''Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis, Tertius'' 30 as a fabrication of ''a false country'' 31 eventually displaces the whole of civilization. ''Contact with Tlon and the ways of Tlon have disintegrated this world. ''32 In the course of time, English, French, and other languages will disappear. ''The world will be Tlon, '' Borges declares. 33 At the very outset of the story, we are told that the initial discovery of Uqbar and Tlon resulted from ''the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia."34 Paradoxically, when there is absolute fidelity, as with Pierrre Menard ''rewriting'' two passages from Don Quixote, the result is not only meaningless: it is also unrelated to the original; it becomes an un-book, an unreadable text. The rabbis, too, conceived of the human mind as a kind of mirror. In order to explain to a Samaritan how God could have revealed himself to Moses in the narrow area between the two staves of the Holy Ark, R. Me'ir said: ''Bring me a large mirror." He brought him one. He told him: ''Look at your reflection." He saw it large. "Bring me a small mirror." He brought him one. He told him: ''Look at your reflection." He saw it small. He said to him: ''If you who are of flesh and blood can change yourself as you wish, the Creator of the Universe, how much more so!''35

As noted by R. Joseph Sarfati (sixteenth century), R. Me'ir intended to demonstrate how God's presence and reflection vary ac•

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cording to the mind of the individual, just as images will vary depending on the kind of mirror in which they are reflected. J6 Interestingly, our ''speculation,'' in its reflective and conjectural sense, is related to the Latin speculum 'lookiing-glass,' 'mirror.' The same term appears as a loan-word in rabbinic literature in the for1n speclaria (with the meaning 'looking glass,' 'mirror'). It is significant that the rabbis used this term to explain the difference between the prophetic vision of Moses and that of all other prophets. Moses beheld the Divine Presence from ''a brilliant speclaria'' whereas all other prophets beheld it from ''a speclaria which was not brilliant. ''37 In a different passage, two traditions are registered concerning the meaning of a ''brilliant'' and ''not brilliant'' speclaria. The rabbis maintained that ''brilliant'' means a well-polished mirror whereas ''not brilliant'' is a stained mirror. However, R. Judah bar Iltai (second century) maintained that, whereas other prophets beheld the Divine Presence reflected in the ninth mirror, Moses beheld it reflected in the first mirror.JS Ha'ayye Ga'on remarked that the brilliance of the Divine Presence is ''a piercing radiation''-somehow reminiscent of the ''iridescent sphere of almost unbearable brilliance'' of Borges's Aleph39-which, if directly perceived, will result in instant death. 40 R. l:fanan'el (d. 1055/6) further elaborated this point: All the prophets who perceived His Glory from a speclaria which is not brilliant, [perceived] it as a dim light; they imagined that they had perceived a vision, as when an elderly person whose eyesight is weak sees that which is short as if it were tall, and one as if it were two, and as in other such cases, although this is not so [in reality]. 41

There is another aspect to the Latin speculum and the rabbinic speclaria worth considering. In the aforementioned passages, the rabbis used speclaria to expound the sense of temuna 'form,' 'image' in the verse declaring that Moses would behold the temuna of God (Num 12:8). The rabbis taught that Moses could not possibly look directly at God; the temuna is not the '' shape'' of God, rather it is His reflection as projected onto the speclaria. But on what basis did the rabbis identify te,nuna with speculumlspeclaria? Benamozegh examined this problem. He indicated that speculum is related to species (both these terms stem from the Sanskrit spaf 'to look'; hence speculum 'looking-glass,' 'mirror' and species 'a sight,' and, therefore, that which appears as outwardly familiar). Likewise, Hebrew lexicographers noted that the root of temuna is MUN from min 'class,' 'species.' Thus, temuna is the outer form exhibiting the inner characteristics of the species. 42 Similarly, Philo remarked: ''For the primary species are in the genus to begin with, and reveal themselves as in a mirror to

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those who have the faculty of keen vision. ''43 In fact, Maimonides noted that temuna can refer to the outer shape of a thing, to the impression that a thing leaves on the imagination (speclaria which is not brilliant), and ''to· the true semantic significance [ma~na) which the intellect beholds.'' Furthermore, Maimonides remarked: ''It is in regard to this third sense that it was said 'and the temuna of God he [Moses] would behold' (Num 12:8). ''44 By associating temuna with speculum, the rabbis taught, frrst of all, that in this context temuna does not refer to shape or contour, but, rather, to the spectrum 'image,' 'appearance' reflected in the speculum. More significantly, this association suggests that the mirror-like quality is present in all things: every teniuna is a reflection of an inner for1n (or every inner for1n projects an outer temuna). This concept also pertains to God. Alluding to the verse ''you will see my back, but my face will not [i.e., cannot] be seen'' (Exod 33:23), Ha'ayye Ga'on commented that what Moses beheld from the brilliant speclaria was ''the back ['a~or) of the Divine Presence''; however, ''the face [panim] of the Divine Presence he beheld in the same manner as all other prophets, and [all] other prophets beheld the Divine Presence from a speclaria which is not brilliant.''45 In other words, the temuna reflected in the speclaria is the back, never the face, of the Divine Presence. Maimonides explained that the 'back' ('a~or) here refers to the Divine activity by which His Presence is made manifest. 46 Unlike Western thought, in which ''face'' is associated with ''exteriority'' and is therefore visually exposed, in Hebrew panim 'face' means ''interiority." The ''face'' is perceived through the (inner) psychological expressions such as anger and sadness; it is dynamic and subject to constant change. In order to perceive the ''face,'' one requires active interpretation rather than passive ''looking.''47 The face/back (panim/'a~r), forming the totality of the individual, is expressed in two radically different ways. The ''back'' reflects the temuna in the speculum; therefore, it is associated with ''sight'' and ''vision." The ''face'' can actually be perceived through 'speech' (qol) alone. To apprehend it, one must ''hear'' it. There is no possibility of ''seeing'' God's face. Thus, teniunalqol are respectively incompatible with panim/'a~r. This pertains to our earlier discussion of simultaneous and successive syntheses. 48 Following traditional philological exegesis, Maimonides translated the Hebrew panim 'el panim 'face to face' as'' 'presentness' to 'presentness.' '' This ''presentness'' is apprehended through speech, but not necessarily through phonetic words. 49 Reflecting the rabbinic tradition that the oraculum at Sinai was directly apprehended without ''the silver dots,'' or words, Maimonides stated that panim 'el panim, describing God's speech to the children of Israel (Deut 14:12) and to Moses (Exod 33:11), means that there was ''no intermediary." Again, reflecting

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concern about the idea that the sense of a text may be transmitted by an angel or messenger, Maimonides remarked in the same paragraph that the speech was apprehended ''without the mediation of an angel'': 11

With regard to this specific sense, it was said; And God spoke to Moses face to face'' [panim 'el panim] (Exod 33:11), meaning: presentness to presentness without an inter11tediary. The same applies to the passage... : ''Face to face [panim 'el panim], God has spoken to you'' (Deut 5:4). In another passage, this expression was further explained: ''You are hearing the sound of words, but you are perceiving no for1n [temuna], only a voice'' (Deut 14:12}-this is an allusion to what was referred to before as: ''Face to face'' [panim 'el panim]. Similarly, concerning the passage: And God spoke to Moses face to face'' [panim 'el panim], the type of speech that Moses heard was described elsewhere as: And he heard the voice itself speaking to him'' (Num 7:Sg). From this it should be clear to you that to hear speech without the mediation of an angel is designated by the expression "face to face'' [panim 'el panim]. In the same fashion we must understand: "And my face will not be seen'' (Exod 33:23) to mean: my 'presentness' as it is [i.e., ad intra] will not be perceived. 50 11

11

The oraculum and the speculum relate to panim and 'abor. The speculum, as related to temuna, reflects the general, that which belongs to the species. Concerning God, Maimonides explained that temunal 'abor means to know Him through His creations. 51 When applied to man at the psychological level, the speculum concerns collective thinking, that which enables an individual to for1n part of a crowd and belong to a definite archetype. The panim concerns the unique, that which cannot be reduced to the general; it is absolutely ''internal'' because it is absolutely unique. It cannot be grasped in terms of anything else. 52 ''I am that which I am'' (Exod 3:14; translated equally well by ''I will be that which I will be,'' implying, therefore, both tenses) 53 is a precise definition of the individual and unique. Since it cannot be known in terms of anything else, panim cannot be ''seen." It is the oraculum or speech which makes ''presentness to presentness'' possible. It involves a syntagmatic relation in which individuals can be known through opposition, by that which is not rather than by that which is. 54 Man, as a creature made ''in the image of God'' (Gen 1:26) contains both these aspects: he reflects a temuna and has absolute individuality. According to Moharattu the two principal names of God, 'Elohim and YHWY, correspond, respectively, to the outer and inner 'image' (~lem) in man. Scripture teaches that God created man ''in His image, in the image of God ['Elohim] created He him'' (Gen 1:26). ''His image'' indicates the inner aspect of God, symbolized by

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YHWH. 55 (Note that unlike ''the image of ,Elohim," which is explicitly mentioned, there is no mention of ''the image of YHWH''-it is only inferred through the syntagmatic opposition of ''His image'' and '' the image of ,Elohim'').

3. Paniml'Ahor The function of paniml'aQor is best understood in light of Arabic 1 and Sephardic grammatical theory. Panim 'el panim involves a dialogue between the ''speaker'' (first person) and the ''addressee'' (second person). Accordingly, there is presence and linguistic subjectivity. It also implies successive synthesis. 'AQor stands for the third person or the ''absent." It excludes linguistic subjectivity. The function of the third person is objectivity; the temuna 'image' is apprehended through simultaneous synthesis. From this perspective, language is impersonal: there is no presence. The original of the temuna must be absent: the temuna is to be apprehended in the speculum, never directly. 'AQor is not 1nere absence in a purely static and negative sense. It involves a 'passing away,' a 'crossing over' (vayya"abor). 3 In contradistinction to ''covering the face," which is absence in a missing and inattentive sense, 4 the 'aQor-absence is dynamic; it is a continuous movement away, which finds ultimate (and dynamic) expression in the temuna: '' After the object comes the image. 'After' means that first the thing must move away in order to allow itself to be grasped again,'' noted Blanchot. 5 The 'aQor-motion results in a dynamic tension, which effects the ''distancing'' necessary to apprehend the temuna. One must also say that the temuna displaces the original; distancing is the effect of the speculum: 2

The thing was there . . . and once it has become an image it instantly becomes ungraspable, non-contemporary, impassive, not the same thing, distanced, but that this as distancing, the present thing in its absence, the thing graspable becomes ungraspable, appearing as something that has disappeared, the return of what does not come back, the strange heart of the distance as the life and unique heart of the thing. 6

Both the panim and 'aQor systems involve an irreducible tension between the original and the articulation or reflection. The basic disconnection between the '' silver dots'' and the '' golden doves'' forestalls any idea of ultimate compatibility between the original oraculum and articulation: they are mutually irreducible. Probably with this metaphor at the back of his mind, R. l:lanina (third and fourth centuries) censured someone who added ''Have you exhausted all the

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praises of your Lord?'' to the traditional doxology, in the belief that in this fashion the service would be more propitious. R. l:{anina asked him, '' 'Have you exhausted all the praises of your Lord?' To what may this be compared? To a king who had a million gold coins, and then he was praised because he had silver [coins]. In regard to him, isn't this an affront?'' 7 He indicated thereby the unbridgeable gap separating what is articulated as ''praise'' from what actually pertains to God. ''The point of this metaphor,'' remarked Maimonides, ''lies in [the phrase] ... 'gold coins and he was praised because he had silver [coins],' a metaphor indicating that what for us is perfection-nothing of this sort could actually apply to Him. ''8 Precisely because the original oraculum cannot be reduced to articulation and can never be exhausted, it may be expressed in countless variations. Eternity of the Tora a fundamental premise in Hebrew thought-thus takes on a dynamic aspect: fresh and hitherto unknown significations may always be discovered. Referring to the words of the Tora, the rabbis said: ''Every day, they should be in your eyes like new."9 Only Moses (who received the entire Tora panim 'el panim and grasped all of it as the original oraculum) was able to perceive it in its infinite possibilities: ''Even what a diligent student will one day expound at the feet of his teacher was already told to Moses at Sinai. ''10 Therefore, a book, any book (such as a volume in ''The Library of Babel'') is a mere variant of the original Book: it implies the Book; without it, it is meaningless. In the words of Blanchot: The book begins with the Bible, in which the logos is inscribed as law. . . . The Bible not only offers us the highest model of a book, the specimen that will never be superceded; the Bible also encompasses all books, no matter how alien they are to biblical revelation, knowledge, poetry, prophecy, proverbs, because it contains the spirit of the book; the books that follow it are always contemporaneous with the Bible: the Bible certainly grows, expands with itself in an infinite growth that leaves it identical per111anently sanctioned by the relationship of Unity, just as the ten Laws set forth and contain the monologos, the One Law, the law of Unity that cannot be transgressed and never can be denied by negation alone. 11 \

Because a book is nothing more than a variant out of countless possibilities, writing may be described as ''the insane game.'' (Accordingly, ''writing'' and the ''people of the Book'' are mutually exclusive.)12 The Hebrews became ''the people of the Book'' (Ahlu-lKitabu) by accepting the full implications of the Book. Rather than play ''the insane game of writing,'' they heeded the advice of King Solomon-the traditional author of Ecclesiastes ''that of making 1

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many books there is no end'' (Eccles 12:12). The canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures (ca. 100) is the for1nal acknowledgement of this advice. 13 Henceforth, writing would. be a surrogate for the spoken word. It would belong to the ''oral Law," which is the ''commentary'' of the written Law. The oral Law is grounded on the irreducible tension between the oraculum and articulation. Rather than suppress that tension, or pursue the insane game in search of the ''absent book'' (which eventually could reduce the oraculum to articulation), the oral Law accepts the tension (and the absence of the book) as a constant. Its object is to formulate the tension and explain the absence; that is, to be a commentary (pirush). Applying a legal category whereby certain classes of obligations cannot be contracted in a written document, the rabbis declared that the oral Law is ''unwritable'' (lo nittena le-hikkateb). 14 This does not mean that putting it into writing is forbidden. Rather, it means that even when reduced to writing, it has the status of an oral formula. Concerning this type of ''written'' documentation, the Talmud explicitly declared that it is to be considered 'speech' ('amira). 15 We have seen that certain types of obligations have the status of ''written'' because they are 'writable' (nittena le-hikkateb)-although they were not actually written; other types of obligations are to be treated as ''oral'' although they were contracted in a written document. 16 A semiotic relationship, whereby the oral is the interpreter and the written the interpreted system, prevails between the written and the oral Law. 17 This type of relationship cannot be reversed: the interpreter cannot be interpreted in terms of the interpreted system. Language alone, because of its mirror-like quality, 18 can be interpreted in terms of itself. The ''oral'' character of the ''commentary'' of Scripture means, first of all, that it is 'unwritable' (lo nittena le-hikkateb); therefore it cannot be interpreted in terms of biblical exegesis. (Derasha cannot be applied to the oral Law.) 19 Secondly, and as a result of the preceding, like language, the ''commentary'' must be explained in terms of itself. There is a symmetrical relationship between the written and the oral Law. This can best be understood by considering their respective levels of textuality. On the one hand, the written Law has a purely consonantal text which defies enunciation; and has scriptural value; on the other hand, the oral Law has a vocal text which is unwritable, and therefore has no scriptural value. There is writing without the possibility of enunciation, and enunciation without the possibility of writing. The point of contact between these mutually exclusive levels is the vocal version transmitted by the oral tradition of 'reading' (qeri'a) the Scripture, the written Law. In ''reading'' the reader mentally supplies the vowels to the consonantal text; reading

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involves interaction between the reader and the text. In this fashion, the consonantal text acquires meaning. The term for 'reading' (qeri'a) 20 is also a ''summons'' and a ''calling upon'' for signification. The scriptural and vocal aspects of the Law stem from Moses. The scriptural text was contained in the scrolls that he delivered to the children of Israel at the end of his mission, before they crossed into the Holy Land. Initially, however, throughout the forty years of wandering in the desert, Moses delivered the text of the Tora 21 vocally. Maimonides states that upon receiving the commandments orally from Moses the people, on their own, ''would write the text on scrolls.'' It is important to note that knowledge of reading came at the end of the educational process. Maimonides further remarked that after copying the text on scrolls, the teachers would ''go out to teach and instruct in order that they should grasp that text and 22 know how to read it. '' A similar view appears in a poem written by Sammak (sixth and seventh centuries) of the Jewish tribe of Na9ir, in Medina. The poet Qa~b ibn al-~Ashraf, who was associated with the same tribe, had been treacherously murdered (on high orders) for writing poems critical of Mohammed. Sammak replied to this outrage. Part of his poem concerns the function of tradition. In four lines he explained why Mohammed was unacceptable (the sages of the tribe had unanimously discarded him) and enumerated the essentials of the Jewish scholar. These are, first, knowledge of tradition: the expression ~ilmun khabiru 'traditional knowledge' is related to khabar '(unformulated) tradition.' The second is command of the derasha-methodology; darisina is actually an arabization of the Hebrew derasha, one of the many technical terms introduced by Jews into the Arabian peninsula. The third essential is mastery (and authority) in the proper enunciation of the Tora. The word zuburu, usually associated with the Psalms, actually means 'writings'-an exact translation of Ketubbim (Hagiographa). Knowledge of enunciation is not the basis for the right to apply derasha and transmit tradition. Rather the opposite is the case; because one is the recipient of tradition and has mastered the derasha methodology, he possesses the knowledge to enunciate Scripture. The following is a transliteration and translation of these lines: 'ara-1-'a}Jabra tunkiruhu jami'an I see the scholars unanimously rejecting him wa-kulluhum lahu 'ilmun khabiru all of whom are the depository of traditional knowledge wa-kanu ad-darisina likulli 'ilmin they were the instructors of all knowledge bihi at-tauratu tant iqu wa-z-zuburu through them the Tora is enunciated, and the Writings. 23

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4. Written and Oral Law

Let us consider these two aspects of the written Law. One is written (but unreadable), the other is vocal (but unwritable). These aspects are not equivalent. The Talmud for1nulated the principle: ''Words that are in writing [debarim shebikhtab]-you may not say them vocally, and vocal words [debarim sheberal pe]-you may not say 1 them in writing. '' The common view is that debarim shebikhtab and debarim sheberal pe stand for ''written'' and ''oral'' Law. This vie~ is incorrect. ''Written'' and ''oral'' Law are designated as Tora ''shebikhtab'' and ''sheberal pe''-not as debarim! The correct interpretation of this passage was given in a work attributed to R. Judah ibn Barzelai al-Bargeloni, 2 and followed by Maimonides. 3 It concerns the written and vocal texts of the Law. The liturgical lesson of the Tora cannot be enunciated according to the written text (disregarding the vocal tradition of reading) and it is prohibited to write the text according to the vocal tradition (disregarding the scriptural tradition). The significance of this rule is particularly evident in the words known as Qere wu-khtib 'read it [A], but write it [BJ,' in which the scriptural and vocal texts do not coincide. Thus, neither can the vocal lesson be enunciated according to the ''written words'' (that is, another reading of the consonantal text), nor can the scriptural text be written according to the vocal text (that is, with a different spelling). 4 Each aspect of the Law finds expression in a different commandment. The commandment to study Tora, in its most basic sense, is the obligation of a father to teach his son ''until he can read [i.e., recite the unvocalized text according to the vocal tradition] the entire Scripture.''5 The commandment to write the Tora consists of copying the scriptural text of the Law. 6 Although these commandments are conceptually related, they are formally independent of each other: one may discharge the obligation to study Tora by reading from a scroll that is liturgically invalid (pasul). 7 The basic units of each of these aspects are radically different. The minimum unit of the written text is the letter. A single letter which is improperly inscribed or at variance with the traditional version renders the scroll liturgically invalid (pasul). 8 The minimum unit of the vocal text is the word. Concerning the duty to recite the scriptural lesson from the written text itself and not from memory, Maimonides declared that it is prohibited to recite by heart ''even a single word. ''9 It has been noted that according to this position, if less than a word was recited by heart (a Hebrew letter is one syllable), no transgression is incurred.10 Likewise, Maimonides stated that one who rejects the divinity ''even of a single word'' of the Tora is a heretic. 11 Clearly, one questioning the divinity of less than a word (that is, of letters) is not to be included in this cate-

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gory. Significantly, in the same section of the Talmud mentioned above, R. Yollanan declared that the covenant between God and Israel was established on the basis of the vocal text (debarim shebe~al pe), not on the basis of the written text (debarim shebikhtab). Since the covenant involved the vocal text, Maimonides must have concluded that the minimum unit of faith in the Tora is the word, not the letter. Like the oraculum itself, the unreadable consonantal text was processed into the vocal text that Moses enunciated to the children of Israel. As with the first tablets, Moses ''breaks'' the consonantal text, thereby giving it articulation and meaning. ''There are two [classes] of readings," said R. David ibn Abi Zimra, ''one spiritual and another corporeal; so that whoever can understand [either of these levels] will be able to understand." At the consonantal level there is ''a different, spiritual reading of the Tora without the articulation of words," in contradistinction to the ''corporeal reading, in the mode of the articulation of words.'' The corporeal reading pertains ''to the things of man'' and serves as the basis for the legal dimension of the Law: ''impurity and purity, prohibition and permission, innocence and guilt, as well as all the other laws of the Tora." 12 The vocal text, which the children of Israel heard, is the basis of their covenantal relationship with God. In Hebrew 'hearing' (shemaj is intimately associated with 'comprehension,' 'conception.' Thus, once ''heard'' by the children of Israel and processed in their minds, the vocal text is in fact the oral Law: the commentary (pirush) of the original scriptural text. From the point of view of the second grammatical person, this pirush is the revelation of Scripture. Again, from the point of view of the second person, the oral Law is not the ''exteriority'' of Scripture; on the contrary, the unprocessed script itself becomes the ''exteriority'' of the texttotally inaccessible and totally inexhaustible. This Ley Mental, or ''Mental Law,'' however, is projected into the script. From the perspective of both the first and the second persons, the vocal text is the point of contact between the ''Mental Law'' and the unprocessed script. The close relationship between the vocal text and the oral Law was excellently explained by R. ibn Abi Zimra. Like the oral Law, the vocalization of Scripture is in fact a pirush 'commentary';13 both of them, too, are transmitted orally: The vocalization and prosody-marks [of Scripture] were transmitted orally, like the rest of the oral Law, which is a pirush [commentary] to the written Law. In the same fashion, the vocalization and prosodymarks are a pirush (commentary] to the written Law. It is known that without vocalization the consonantal text has many (possible] senses, different combinations, and opposite readings. 14

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At the consonantal level (''spiritual reading''), the Tora comprehends all possible senses. Accordingly, a vocalized scroll is ritually invalid: The scroll of the Tora is not vocalized, because it includes all the senses and all the profound paths. All of these may be expounded in each letter: faces within faces and secrets within secrets. No limits are known to us on this. . .. If the scroll of the Tora had been vocalized, then it would have had a limit and a magnitude . . . . It could not have been expounded except in accordance with the specific vocalization of the word. However, since the scroll of the Tora is a compound of [all possible] perfections . . . it was not vocalized in order that all these types of perfections could be expounded .... This is why our sages declared: "There are seventy faces to the Tora." 15 Understand [this well]! 16

Regarding this fundamental concept, Blanchot wrote: It is very striking that within a certain tradition of the book . . . what is called the ''written Torah'' preceded the "oral Torah," the latter then giving rise to the edited version that alone constitutes the Book. Here, thought is confronted with an enigmatic proposition: Nothing precedes writing. Yet the writing on the first tablets does not become readable until after they are broken and because they are brokenafter and because of the resumption of the oral decision, which brings us to the second writing, the one we know, rich in meaning, capable of issuing commandments, always equal to the law it transmits. 17

In its function as Mental Law, the object of the oral Law is to give meaning to the tension between the script and articulation: Let us try to examine this surprising proposition by relating it to what might be a future experiment of writing. There are two kinds of writing, one white, the other black; one makes the invisibility of a colorless flame invisible, the other is made accessible in the for1n of letters, characters, and articulations by the power of the black fire. Between the two there is orality, which, however, is not independent, but always involved within the second kind of writing, because it is the black fire itself, the measured darkness that limits, defines all light, makes all light visible. Thus, what we call oral is designation in a temporal present and a presence of space, but also, at first, development or mediation as it is guaranteed by a discourse that explains, welcomes and defines the neutrality of the initial inarticulation. The ''oral Torah'' is therefore no less written, but is called oral in the sense that as discourse it alone allows there to be communication, otherwise known as commentary, speech that both teaches and declares, authorizes and justifies: as though language (discourse) were

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5. Cosmology and the Tora: Semiological Systems

The tension described above is also present at the cosmological level. The two principal subjects of Jewish mysticism, Marase Bereshit 'the Procedure of Genesis' and Marase Merkaba 'the Procedure of the Chariot,' bear directly upon this issue. Marase Bereshit concerns the created Cosmos, which is the manifestation of the power of the Lord. Marase Merkaba concerns the pre-processed 'Glory' (Kabod) of the Lord. In essence, both the scriptural and the cosmological express the tension between God's boundless power and the finite mode in which His power is manifest. Ultimately, at both these levels, the infinite finds expression in the finite successively, in endless variations of the oraculum. If derasha-whether deliberate or unintentional articulates the infinite variations of the Book, then Providence articulates the infinite variations of the first act of Creation (Marase Bereshit). As David Nieto taught, the verse ''which [God] created [bara1 to be made [/arasot]'' (Gen 2:3), means that what was '' created'' at the original act of Genesis will be continually ''made'' through the specificity of Providence. 1 In the mind of the rabbis, the scriptural and cosmological levels articulate the Book (one in terms of panim and the other in terms of 'abor). Referring to Creation, the rabbis declared: It is the way of the world that when a mortal king [wishes] to build a palace, he will not build it according to his own designs, but from the design of an artisan. [In tum] the artisan will not build it according to his own design, but he would have charts and boards [to consult] and know how he would build the chambers. . . . In the same fashion God looks at the Tora and creates the Universe. 2

In this connection it is important to note that in the Aramaic versions of Scripture and rabbinic literature the Tora is designated Oraita. Since this term is associated with Tora, it is commonly thought to be the Aramaic form of the Hebrew hora'a, from yara 'to teach' (from which the word Tora stems). This view is incorrect. The Aramaic translation of yara is 'alaf. A literal translation of Tora into Aramaic would be 'ulfana or yalfana-not Oraita! Furthermore, Oraita does not appear in any other Semitic language. Oraita is both semantically and linguistically connected to arta (Latin ars, artus, ritus)----a key Indo-European term implying the notion of ''the religious, legal and technical aspects of 'order.' '' 3 The term arta belongs to an an-

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dent lndo-Iranian stratum and it occurs in numerous lexical forms and dialectical variations. The Jews could have borrowed it from the Iranian environment in Mesopotamia in a colloquial for1n arita, or it may have evolved into arita through a process of phonetic semitization. The present form Orita ► Oraita is the effect of the popular association of arta ►arita with the Semitic hora,a, yara. Benveniste's description of arta fits perfectly with the meaning of Oraita in rabbinic tradition: . We have here one of the cardinal notions of the legal world of the Indo-European to say nothing of their religious and moral ideas: this is the concept of 'Order' which governs also the orderliness of the universe, the movement of the stars, the regularity of the seasons and the years; and further, the relations of gods and men, and finally the relations of men to one another. Nothing which concerns man or the world, falls outside the realm of 'Order.' It is thus the foundation, both religious and moral, of every society. Without this principle everything would revert to chaos. 4

Since the Tora and the Universe manifest a tension which is resolved in endless variations, the ''Order'' of Oraita cannot be conceived in static terms, as in Indo-European thought. For the Hebrew the ''Order'' is Providence: an exquisite system of relations establishing a dynamic balance between things. This means, first of all, that ''Nature'' is purely structural. It denotes a system of relations and balances, rather than content or ''things'' (in an ontic-ontological sense). It also means that the Universe, as the spectrum of the Book, is to be conceived as a semiological system rather than in metaphysical terms. David Nieto noted that tebar, the Hebrew term for ''Nature,'' was first coined in the Middle Ages as a direct influence of Arabic philosophical thought. 5 Nonetheless, a similar term, the nominal form mafbear, is common in rabbinic literature. A semantic analysis of this term will contribute to a proper understanding of the Hebrew concept of ''Nature,'' and show how matbea(' involves structural systems and relations, rather than ''things'' or ''content." This term means first, 'coinage'; specifically, the standard denomination against which other coins fluctuate. This standard is the criterion whereby other 6 coins and currencies are measured. Its own value, however, is purely semiological, not material. A second meaning is the liturgical formula established by the rabbis. 7 The 'formula' concerns the relation between different elements of the liturgy, not the content or ~pecific wording. Thus, if one preserved the structure of the liturgical formula, but changed the content or wording (for example, beginning the blessing of the morning Shema(' with the for1nula of the evening

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Shemar, or vice versa), one has fulfilled one's duty. However, if one preserved the content of the liturgy, but changed the structure (for example, introducing the for1nat of a ''long'' blessing to what is prescribed as a ''short'' for1nat, or vice versa), one has not discharged one's obligation. 8 A third meaning is 'Signet,' 'seal.' It derives from tabar 'sunken,' 'dipped' an allusion to the act of dipping the signet in the process of stamping. This is the principal meaning of mafbear. A ''coin'' is currency by virtue of the ''stamp'' it bears. Therefore, its value is semiological, not material. Accordingly, the rabbis designated an unminted coin asimon. The reknowned philologian, R. Benjamin Musafia (16o6-1675), observed that this term is a loan-word from the Greek a-semeion 'without a sign.'9 By analogy, the liturgical formulas established by the rabbis bear the ''seal'' of authority and have ''currency'' and ''acceptability.'' The rabbis and Philo applied the notions of ''seal'' and ''coinage'' to help explain their own perception of the Universe. Unlike the Platonic paradigms or the Stoic 'recognizable presentation' (kataleptike phan10 tasia), the mafbear is subject to fluctuation and multiformity. Alluding to the ''image of God'' serving as the original mafbear with which God ''stamped'' Adam's soul, the rabbis taught: ''A man could impress one hundred stamps with a single signet and all would be identical. God, the King of Kings, the Holy One Blessed Be He, stamps every man with Adam's signet. Yet no one resembles another." 11 12 Philo, too, described the soul as the ''seal'' of God. Elsewhere, referring to Bezalel, the chief craftsman of the Tabernacle, he comments ''that here too we have a form which God has stamped on the soul as on a tested coin. '' 13 Because the human soul is not conceived of in ontological terms, but rather as a semiological entity bearing the imprint of the supreme authority, forgery is possible. Indeed, the rabbis described the progenitors of an illegitimate child as forgerers who had adulterated a coin; moreover, ''they had forced me to stamp my own signature against my will,'' declared God. 14 If someone took dies from the authorities to mint his own money, the coin would not be legal currency, even though the stamp is genuine. Philo, too, described evil nature as a ''counterfeit'' coin, in contradistinction to a legitimate coin: Seeing then that we have found two natures created, undergoing molding, and chiselled into a full relief by God's hands, the one essentially hurtful, blameworthy, and accursed, the other beneficial, and praiseworthy . . . stamped the one with a counterfeit, the other with a genuine impression. 15

The idea that the ''image of God'' functions as currency means that man's relation to God is semiological; similarly, the stamp in

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots legal currency represents the political authority semiologically, not iconically. Referring to the ''image of God'' in man, Philo remarked ''that the Image had been made such as representing God, but that the man was made after the image when it had acquired the force of a pattern. " 16 By ''the force of a pattern," the force of legal currengr is meant. 17 Man is not the only being bearing the stamp of the Lord. The entire Universe bears the seal of God: ''the whole creation, this entire world perceived by our senses, is a copy of the Divine image, it is manifest that the archetypal seal also ... would be the very Word of God." 18 Benamozegh has shown that ''coinage'' and ''stamp'' is a basic Jewish metaphor describing Creation and its relation to God: The discerning reader could hardly have overlooked the fact that the metaphor which we are analyzing as well as other similar [metaphors] based on coinage are grounded on a most subtle idea, found on the lips of the sages in the Talmud, and this idea is that all creatures-swhether intelligent or [purely] material-were stamped by the signet of God, just as monarchs engrave their images on pieces of silver or gold, giving them thereby proper value and worth. Concerning this they declared: ''The seal of the Lord is the truth." . .. Therefore, it was suitable and proper that when our sages spoke about the perception of the essence of beings whether intelligent or spiritual and about the definition and quality of the knowledge concerning them and their natures, they use metaphors connected with currency and banking. 19

Finally, it is worth remembering that the relation of the unprocessed oraculum in the mind of the speaker to speech is like an unminted coin to a coin. In the words of Philo: ''For it is indeed a fact that speech meeting the mind's conceptions, and wedding the parts of speech to them, mints them like uncoined gold, and gives the stamp of expression to what was unstamped and unexpressed before. ,,w Let us review the principal points concerning matbear: it is an artificially established standard; used as a criterion or measure; its value is purely semiological, not material. Therefore, like coinage, it admits of variants and fluctuations. Man, who bears the ''stamp'' of the Lord, is a living testimony that God's mafbear does not result in uniformity. We have shown that the Hebrews conceived of ''Nature'' as the ''Writing of the Lord," that is, as a semiological system. From this point of view, Creation is merely a different semiological 21 system from the Tora, serving to express the Book. Thus, whereas metaphysical theology posits that God is fundamentally illiteratet--

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots things are, but they cannot possibly signify-for literal theology (or the theology of the Book) the Cosmos is the successive manifestation of the writing of the Lord. 6. Authentication of Tradition

One of the meanings of mafbear is ''formulation.'' In this sense, the term was applied not only to the liturgy, but, more specifically, to the authoritative formulation of the oral Law. Benamozegh has shown that a key banking term le-har~t, hir$l 'to submit for verification and evaluation,' that is, to submit (money) for inspection to a banker, was used by the rabbis to indicate that a tradition was submitted to the proper authorities for certification. 1 R. 'Aqiba lamented the death of one of his teachers, saying: ''I have many coins, but I 12 have no banker to submit them to for inspection [le-har~tan)' meaning that he could no longer find the proper authority to verify the traditions that he had collected. Regarding R. 'Aqiba's collection and transmission of oral tradition, the rabbis declared that he ''made the whole Tora into tabberot, tabberot. "3 The usual translation of tabbe'ot 'rings,' is grammatically possible, but it does not convey the sense of the sentence. Although it is known from other sources that R. 'Aqiba was involved in the formulation of some general principles, there are no semantic grounds for identifying ''rings'' with ''abstract general rules.'' In fact, no such ''abstract general rules'' covering ''the whole Tora'' are known to have been formulated. 4 Finally, it is worth considering that the principal meaning of tabba'at is 'signet,' 'seal'; it may also mean ''ring'' because rings were commonly used as seals. The report of the rabbis about R. 'Aqiba's activities becomes clear when we consider that, as indicated by R. Benjamin Musafia, tabba'at (pl. tabberotltabbe'im) is the Aramaic equivalent of mafbea' and is used in the Mishna as 'coin.' 5 Moreover, there are well-attested versions of the above-mentioned passage which have preserved the reading matbe'ot instead of tabbe'ot. 6 At the beginning of his career, P.. 'Aqiba had studied with many teachers and his traditions were in disarray: he was compared to a ''disorderly storage-house."7 But ''when he became a great sage [IJakham ], he minted the whole Tora 8 into different types of coins (tabberot tabbe'ot or matbe'ot mafbe'ot]. '' This refers to the great collections of the oral Law, such as the Mishna, Sifre, and Torat-Kohanim, which are traditionally associated with R. 'Aqiba and his school. 9 By converting the entire oral Law into different types of coins universally accepted as legal currency, R. 'Aqiba freed the student of

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the need to search for authorities to authenticate and evaluate the traditions that he had received and studied. Let us remember that a sage (/Jakham) was defined as ''he who could uphold [leqayyem] his 10 studies'' ; leqayyem is a legal term meaning 'the certification of the signatures in a legal document.' 11 Without this ability, one may at best be 'intelligent' (nabon), like 'an impoverished banker' (shulQani rani) who requires the backing and certification of others; and unlike a 'wealthy banker' (shulQani rashir) who is independent. 12 The rabbis illustrated a similar situation by recourse to the following metaphor: Suppose that two strangers come to a city; ''one has unminted pieces of gold and the other has copper coins; the one who has unminted pieces of gold would not be able to make purchases [i.e., to convert the gold] and subsist, but the one with the copper coins would be able to make purchases and subsist.'' Likewise, a 'master of the Talmud' (baral gemara) could find himself in a place where there are no sages to authenticate his knowledge, whereas a 'master of Aggada' or popular preacher would easily find a public which recognizes his knowledge. 13 Elsewhere, this type of preacher is designated ''publicly wealthy,'' that is, one who has ready money and, therefore, gives the appearance of being rich. 14 The Ge'onim (who were the heirs of the Talmudic academies and the undisputed masters of rabbinic tradition) reported that at first the oral Law was not officially formulated. Each teacher had the right to teach it in his own words and to develop his own system. The effort officially to formulate the oral Law began in the period when Scripture was canonized. This effort was associated with R. ~Aqiba: ''All the oral Law,'' wrote the famous scientist and chro..; nologist R. Abraham Zaccuto (1452-1515), ''came to us from his hands." 15 R. ~Aqiba's efforts and that of his school culminated several generations later in the Mishna, the most authoritative forinulation of the oral Law. In a profound sense, whereas the Book is the source and beginning of knowledge a testimony to our limitlessness the Mishna is the end of knowledge a testimony to our own finitude. Hence, the Mishna registers maQloqet 'division,' 'controversy' among the various schools and authorities the very boundaries of human understanding. Mishna 'formulation' is also connected with the idea of 'repetition' and 'change,' 16 therefore subtly implying 'death' and 'burial.' ''The Mishna, '' the Zohar remarked, ''is the handmaid of the Shekhina [Divine Presence].'' ''This is why,'' it further added, ''Moses was buried outside the Holy Land; his sepulchre is the Mishna which dominated the Mistress [the Tora], which is the original reception from Moses." 17 Elsewhere, the Zohar subtly connects Mishna with shina 'sleepiness'an allusion to this bodily life. The following speech is put into the

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mouth of Moses, who is designated Ratya Mehemna 'the Faithful Shepherd': Masters of the Mishna! Your souls, spirits, and breaths, awake you all now! Remove sleepiness from you, which for sure is the method of peshaf [ = conventional sense] of this World. I am awakening you with the subtle secrets of the World to come in which you [now dwell], [about which it was said:] ''behold, neither slumbers nor sleeps'' (Ps 121:3). 18

As the canoniz.ation of the Hebrew Scriptures marked the end of

writing and the full acceptance of the Book, the official fo1n1ulation of the oral Law marked the end of speech and the full acceptance of silence (death). Traumatic events-resulting in the lack of trustworthy bankers and the circulation of counterfeit currency-brought about the realization that ''speech'' was no longer possible. Whereas in the field of economics, new events may warrant the revision and change of the monetary system, the sage was no longer in the position to mint new values. Henceforth, silence became the earmark of the Jewish sage. A dramatic story in the Talmud illustrates the options available to the sage. 19 The story concerns Roman persecution in Judea at the time of the emperor Hadrian (117-138). The event unfolds at the rabbinic academy. Three of the protagonists are distinguished pupils of R. rAqiba. R. Judah (bar Ilrai), who was chairing the meeting, introduced the topic for discussion. It alluded to the Roman conquest and the ''benefits'' of ''civilization'' that it brought: ''How comely are the activities of this Nation. They have set up markets, they have set up bridges, they have set up bath houses!'' This statement, depending on the way it was enunciated, could have been interpreted as praise or sarcasm. Elsewhere, R. Judah is described as ''a sage (~kham] when he chooses,"20 implying thereby that he was shrewd. He probably enunciated the statement in a tone that could have been interpreted either way. His position as chairman of the meeting would have warranted impartiality. The Romans interpreted (or chose to interpret) it as praise. R. Judah was rewarded and appointed as ''chief spokesman for all occasions.'' R. Yose (ben 1:Ialafta, mid-second century) shataq 'kept silent.' This was not a withdrawal. Renowned for 21 his oratorical skills, R. Yose' s refusal to speak constituted a most eloquent outcry protesting the impossibility of speech. The Romans understood this quite well. He was sentenced and banished to Galilee. R. Simon bar Yobai responded: ''Everything they have set up, they have set up for their own needs.'' The ''benefits'' are part of their warfare strategy to further crush the people: ''They have set up mar-

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kets to put in them whores; bath houses for their own pleasures; bridges to impose on them [and through them] taxes!'' The real purpose behind the economic boom was the establishment of whorehouses to further undermine the people. He had cleverly switched ''bath houses'' (R. Judah's third item) to the second place. The bath houses, which the Romans ''dangled'' as the highest prize their system of values could offer, were not accessible to all. The purpose of the last item, bridges (second in R. Judah's statement), is not the improvement of transportation, but to help the army tighten its grip on the people and to collect taxes. These taxes made it difficult· for those who wished to evade the system and to trade in their villages. The new economic boom forced the farn1er and the villager to trade in the market centers. Eventually, the farmer and the villager would be exposed to the whorehouses and all they represented. The ''bridges'' thus tightened the system of the Romans and considerably reduced the possibilities of avoiding the ''benefits'' of ''civilization." The Romans sentenced R. Simon bar Yo):lai to death. He escaped and hid in the mountains for thirteen years. A fourth participant, Judah ben Gerim (second century), collaborated with the enemy and brought the whole matter to the attention of the Roman authorities. He was the only one to meet with a tragic end. One day in the market he casually met R. Simon bar Yo~ai at whose feet he had once studied. R. Simon bar Yo~ai looked at him and he turned into a pile of bones. This story excellently portrays the typologies of the sage. He has only four options. They are: (1) diplomacy (cunning); (2) silence; (3) confrontation; and (4) collaboration with the adversary. Judaism rejects the fourth totally and categorically. It is important to note that the third option, unless processed into political (and possibly military) terms (which essentially transcend the sage and could distort his views), may also end in silence. Probably due to the solitude he had to face in his long flight from the enemy, R. Simon bar Yo~ai became a mystic. Jewish mysticism is silence at its best. Therefore, in essence, his position coincided with that of R. Yose. Diplomacy, too, is a kind of silence. Although there may be some merits in diplomacy, silence is the ideal typology of the Jewish sage. 22 But this silence is not merely the absence of speech. It is manifested through a complex system of transmission involving repetition and change. Specifically, silence is realized first by repeating the words of others (the Mishna), and second by studying (that is, commenting upon) the commentaries of others (Talmud). Accordingly, silence may be defined as speech on a speech (effected either by repetition or by comment).

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Golden Doves with Silver Dots 7. Transmission and Change

The dynamics of tradition were clearly understood by Igor Stravinsky (1882-1971), who wrote: Tradition is entirely different from habit, even from an excellent habit, for habit is by definition an unconscious acquisition and tends to become mechanical, whereas tradition results from a conscious and deliberate acceptance. A real tradition is not the relic of a past irretrievably gone, it is a living force that animates and informs the present.1

This concept of tradition implies an unfolding concept of History whereby transmission and change are synonymous as in shana, the Hebrew root of Mishna. Again quoting Stravinsky: ''Far from implying the repetition of what has been, tradition presupposes the reality of what endures. It appears as an heirloom, a heritage that one receives on condition of making it bear fruit before passing it on to one's descendants. '' 3 Understood in this way, tradition (''the accumulation of wisdom throughout the ages'') presents a perennial challenge for excellence to future generations. From this challenge, historical progress follows: 2

Brahms was born sixty years after Beethoven. From the one to the other, and from every aspect, the distance is great; they do not dress the same way, but Brahms follows the tradition of Beethoven without borrowing one of his habiliments. For the borrowing of a method has nothing to do with observing a tradition. A method is replaced: a tradition is carried forward in order to produce something new.'' Tradition thus assures the continuity of creation.4 11

This peculiar notion of tradition, and the type of response that it demands, is essential for a proper understanding of Judaism. The continuity of Israel, the uninterrupted chain of transmission from the Patriarchs to Moses and from Moses through countless ages to the present, our own struggle to transmit to unborn generations a message we have yet to articulate and which we can never hope fully to comprehend-all this can be meaningful only when the dynamics of tradition are fully grasped. The rabbis understood this quite well. Contrary to popular opinion, continuous progress as a specific responsibility to the challenge of the past-is essential to rabbinic tradition: ''Scripture had faulted the honor of a dead righteous man, for the sake of a living righteous man,'' said the rabbis, implying thereby that the latter was more deserving than the former. 5 Comparing Aaron the priest-one of the most glorious figures of the Jewish past-with two priests of later generations, the rabbis re-

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marked that ''if Aaron had been present'' in their time, each of them ''in his generation, would have been greater than'' Aaron. 6 The tension between reverence for the past and commitment to further progress is resolved in the following illustration cited by R. Isaac Leon ibn Sur (sixteenth century), one of the leading talmudists of his time, in the name of his contemporary, the renowned Jewish humanist R. Solomon Almoli (before 1485-after 1542); Almoli took it from the famous writer R. Abraham, the son of R. $idqiya ~Anav (1225-1291); he in tum quoted it in the name of the venerated jurist R. Isaiah di Trani (ca. 1200-126o), and he heard it · ''from gentile sages.'' A giant, by virtue of his height, commands a better range of view than a dwarf. If the dwarf, however, climbed onto the giant's shoulders, he would be able to command a better view than the latter: ''In the same fashion we are like dwarves standing on giants' shoulders, since we have learned from their knowledge. We, who have investigated further [than our predecessors], have gained this knowledge thanks to their knowledge, and thus we now know whatever we know. ''7

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NOTES

Introduction The· introductory quotation is &om TelJillat Pirush Shir ha-Shirin1, ed. M. Friedlander, Festschrift zum . . . Mortiz Steinschneider {Leipzig: Otto Hanassowitz, 1896), Heb. section, p. 53 1.

History and Jewish Historians (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication So-

ciety, 1964), p. 279. 2. See my Rabbi Moshe Yisrael f.laz1An. [Heb.], (Haifa: Academic Publishers, 1978), pp. 113-115. 3. History and Jewish Historians, p. ']6. 4. Linguistic Varialn1ity and Intellectual Development, trans. George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 24. 5. Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache, vol. 3 (Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1902), p. 4. 6. l.Anguage and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), p. 28. He further developed this subject in u-rhe Influence of I .anguage upon the Development of Scientific Thought,'' The Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): 309-327. On the different senses of logic and their application to linguistics, see Robert M. W. Dixon, Linguistic Science and Logic (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963), pp. 59 ff. For a summary review of the different views on this matter, see Eugenio Coseriu, Teoria del Lenguaje y Lingufstica General (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1962), pp. 235-26o. 7. See Culture, Language and Personality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 78 ff. On this topic, see Barbara B. Lloyd, Perception and Cognition (New York: Penguin Books, 1973). 8. ''Science and Linguistics," in uznguage, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1956), p. 214. 9. Roman Jakobson, Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, trans. John Mepham (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I. T. Press, 1978), pp. 74-75. 10. ''To Write: An Intransitive Verb?'' in The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 135. 11. Gted by Jeremy Campbell, Grammatical Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1982), p. 49· 12. Sanhedrin J4cl· See below, p. 120. 13. Borges, Oral (Buenos Aires: Emece Editores, 1979), p. 66. 14. 'Erubin 13b; d. f.lagiga 3b. 15. Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1966), pp. 99-100. 16. Ibid., p. 84. 17. Ibid., p. 91. 18. Ibid., p. 87. 19. Ibid., p. 91; d p. 83. 20. Ibid., p. 81.

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Notes to Pages xvii-xxi 21. Ibid., p. 82. 22. Maimonides, Mishne Tora, Mamrim, I, 1-2. 23. Pesal)im 6b; PT Sheqalim VI, 1, 4gd; Rosh ha-Shana I, 1, 56b; Megilla I, 7, 700; Qohelet Rabba I, 12 in Midrash Rabba (Venice, 5364'16o4), 6gb-c; cf Sanhedrin 49b. This principle applies even in a single sentence; cf. Se'adya Ga'on's Commentary to the Pentateuch, ed. Joseph Derenbourg, Version arabe du Pentateuque (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894), on Lev 9:22, and Megilla 18a. See also R. Yom Tob as-Sibili, J:Iiddushe ha-Ritba (New York: Otzar Hasefarim, 1959), on Makkot 18b, s.v. Mai; cf. R. Joshua Solomon Mercado Ardip, 1:Iinna ve-1:Iisda, vol. 1 (Izmir, 5624'1864), 134d. 24. Sifre, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1969), #333, pp. 265-266. For parallel sources, see ibid., note 13. 25. Sefer ha-MaftealJ,, ed. J. Goldenthal (Vienna, 1847), 5oa-b. 26. Tosefta Rosh ha-Shana I, 17 ad fine . 27. Rosh ha-Shana 25b; cf. Sifre #153, pp. 2o6-207. 28. Cf. 'Abot de-R. Natan [henceforth: AdRN], ed. Salomon Schechter (Vienna, 5647/1887), chap. II, pp. 8-14 (all quotations and references are from version ''A''). 29. See Mishne Tora, De'ot, II, 4. 30. See below, pp. 111-112. 31. She'elot wu-Tshubot Ribbi Yosef ibn Megas (Salonika, 5546/1786), #92, 13a. 32. See below, pp. 51-55. 33. Aaron ben Moses ben 'Asher, Diqduqe ha-Te'amim, ed. S. Baer and H. L. Strack (Jerusalem, 1970), #5, .p . 6. 34. Al-Hidaya ila Fara'i4 al-Qulub, ed. A. S. Yahuda (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1912), II, 5, p .113 (11. 11-12). 35. Toledot Yi~l)aq (Riva di Trento, 5318/1558), 55a. 36. Mishna Yoma I, 6. The sta11dard editions are faulty. The correct text was preserved by Maimonides, Pirush ha-Mishnayot le-ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. R. Joseph Qafitt (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1967), 7 vols.; vol. 2, p. 240. On the distinction between reading and derasha, see PT Berakhot II, 3, 4d: ''You know how to read, but you don't know how to interpret

(lidrosh)!" 37. Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 216. 38. Course in General Linguistics, pp. 65-67. 39. This reflects the position of Maimonides and some of the Geonic authorities who do not give to derasha the status of a biblical precept (de-'oraita); see my Studies in the Mishne Tora [Heb.], (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1978), pp. 25 ff. 40. Course in General Linguistics, pp. 114-117. 41. See below, pp. 72-75. The present analysis reflects the criticism by Jakobson of Saussure, in Jakobson, Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, pp. 61-67. 42. Ta'anit 4a. 43. See ibid. and Berakhot 64a. Accordingly, the term banna'im 'builders' in Mishna Miqva'ot IX, 6 was interpreted by R. Yottanan, Shabbat 114a, to mean ''scholars who apply themselves all their lives in building the world.'' Occasionally, a rabbi is given the honorific title ''builder of the Tora''; see PT Yoma III, 5, 4oc; Gittin VII, 3, 48d. In Shir ha-Shirim Rabba I, 5 in Midrash

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Rabba (Venice, 5364"1604), 6c, benot 'the daughters' is associated with binot 'the expounders.' On the relation of philosophy to building, see Martin Heidegger, ''Building Dwelling Thinking," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 145-161. On the analogy of philosophy to architecture, see Jacques Derrida, ''The Parergon," trans. Craig Owens, October 9 (1979): 15-16. On the relation of memory to architecture in European tradition, see below, pp. 32-33. 44. ljolin 91a. 45. See Rabbi Yisrael Moshe ljazzan, pp. 137-138. 46. See R. Solomon ibn Adret, ljiddushe ha-Rishba ~al Aggadot ha-Shas (Jerusalem, 5726/1966), pp. 114-119. 47. See below, p. 124. 48. See Samuel David Luzzatto, Philoxenus ('Oheb Ger] (Cracow, 1895), p. v. For the history of Hebrew at that period, see the masterly article of E. Y. Kutsher, ''Hebrew Language,'' Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol. 16, cols. 1590-16o7. 49. Borges, Oral, p. 66. 50. See PT Megilla IV, 5, 75b and Mishne Tora, Tefilla XII, 6. 51. See PT Megilla IV, 1, 74d and my ''Targumim and Halakha," Jewish Quarterly Review 66 (1976): 23-26; cf. the valuable comment of R. Natan 'Ab ha-Yeshiba, Pirush Shishsha Sidre Mishna (Jerusalem: ~El ha-Meqorot, 5716/ 1956), Megilla IV, 7a and note 5. 52. Mishna ~Aboda Zara II, 5. On the background of this passage, see Saul Lieber1nan, ''Mishnat Shir ha-Shirim," in Gershom G. Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1965), pp. 125-126. Because the distinction between public and private reading was no longer properly inferred, the sense of this passage eluded the commentators; see R. Isaac bar Sheshet, Teshubot ha-Ribash (Constantinople, 5307/1547), #284. It should be noted that the Masoretic text has preserved two different sets of prosodic marks (te~amim) and vocalization for the ten commandments, one for public reading and the other for private reading. For an analysis of these variants, see R. Menatiem de Lonzano, 'Or Tora (Amsterdam, 5419/1659), 1oa-b. Cf. the responsum of R. Moses ben l:fabib, Qol Gadol (Jerusalem, 5667/1907), #33, 17a, in which this basic distinction is overlooked, concluding thereby that by reading a single verse (which, according to the prosodic marks used for private reading, is read as three verses, but according to the prosodic marks used for public reading must be read as a single verse), the minimum requirement of reading three verses in public has been fulfilled. The Samaritans have a different set of cantillations for public reading; see Johanna Spector, ''The Significance of Samaritan Neumes and Contemporary Practice,'' Studia Musicologica VII (1965): 143-144. In some Sephardic communities in the Near East two different styles for the cantillation of the Pentateuch have been preserved, one for private reading and another for public reading. In Egypt and Tunisia a different style of cantillation is used for the public reading of the Prophets (haftara). 53. Thus, the derasha precedes reading; see below, p. 134. 54. Berakhot 31b, Qiddushin 17a and parallels. For other sources see R. Isaac Lampronti, Pa}Jad Yi$}Jaq, vol. 2 (Venice, 5513/1753), 78a-b. Some Talmudic authorities opposed this principle; see Nedarim 3a. However, the consensus of opinion was behind it; see Makkot 12a. It should be noted that this conflict did not pertain to the validity of the principle itself, but only to

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Notes to Pages xxiii-xxvii its applicability. Following the controversy between the school of R. Ismael and R. 'Aqiba (see below, notes g8, 99) there were those who argued that since the Tora speaks in the language of man, derasha may not be applied to the elements void of lexical sense such as syntactical particles and idiomatic expressions. For R. 'Aqiba and his school, although the Tora speaks in the language of man, derasha is still applicable to these ter1ns; see Sanhedrin gob; Qiddushin 17a, etc. This principle was upheld by R. Menaltem ben Saruq, Ma~beret Menal}em, ed. Herschell Filipowski (Edinburgh, 1854), 54a, and Maimonides, Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 4, p. 211; Mishne Tora, Yesode ha-Tora, I, 9; Dalat al-J:Ia'irin (henceforth: Guide), ed. Joel and Munk (Jerusalem, 1931), I, 26, p. 27 (1. 20); 33, p. 48 (11. 9-10); 46, p. 68 (l. 1). 55. Sanhedrin 99b. Some, ibid., connected this with one who "unveils in the Tora directions contrary to the law'' (mega/le panim ba-Tora she-lo ka-halakha). 56. See below, pp. 13-15. 57. '' ... Poetically Man Dwells ... " in Poetry, lAnguage, Thought, p. 214. 58. Pirush 'al ha-Tora, (Venice, 5307/1547), 113b-c; cf. Toledot Y~l}aq, 64b; and below, pp. 59-6o. 59. Jorge Luis Borges, Nueve ensayos dantescos (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1g82), pp. 93-94. 6o. See my ''Job and Situational Morality," Judaism 19 (1970): 219-225. 61. Kostas Papaioannou, ''Nature and History in the Greek Conception of the Cosmos," Diogenes 25 (1959): 9. 62. Ibid., p. 5. 63. Sanhedrin 65b. 64. Baba Batra 1oa. 65. Midrash Tan~uma, ed. Salomon Buber, 2 vols. (Vilna, 5645/1885); Tazria' VII, vol. 2, p. 18. 66. Ibid. Rule applies to medicine, see Midrash Shemu'el, ed. Salomon Buber (Cracow, 5653/1893), IV, 7, p. 54; and to study of the Tora, see R. Manasseh Ben Israel, The Conciliator, trans. E. H. Lindo (London, 56o2/1842), 2, pp. iii-iv. 67. Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), 311, p. 96. On this basic issue, see Rodolofo Mondolfo, II "verum factum'' prima Vico (Naples: Guida, 1969). 68. ''The Divorce between the Sciences and the Humanities," Salmagundi 27 (1974): 24; see idem, Vico and Herder (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), pp. 99-103. 69. Megilla 28b; cf. PT Megilla I, 7, 70d. 70. Cf. below, pp. 89-90. 71 . Since the positive attributes are the effect of the process of transformation, God must be apprehended negatively, as what He is not; see below, pp. 78-81. 72. See below, pp. 29-32. 73. R. Moses Albelda, 'Olat Tamid (Venice, 536o/16oo), 103b. 74. See below, p. 42. 75. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 65. 76. See below, pp. 82-83. This leads into the idea of the holy as "the 'wholly other,' ... that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar." (Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey [New York: Oxford University Press, 1958], p. 26). Similarly,

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Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1959), p. 11: ''Man becomes aware of the sacred because it manifests itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane." However, for the Hebrews, this awareness should not end in stupor but must serve as the basis for wisdom and articulation. 77. Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 2, p. 337.

78.

Course in General Linguistics, p. 78. 79. Sanhedrin 21b. As the term carmina indicates, the ancient Romans too identified ''law'' with ''song''; see New Science 1036-1037, p . 390; cf. ibid.,

p. 386 (the Corollary); 46g, p. 157. For a comparison of the Hebrew and Roman traditions on this point, see R. Elie Benamozegh, 'Em la-Miqra, 5 vols. (Leghorn, 1862-1863), vol. 5, 12oa-121b. Bo. See below, pp. 7-8. 81. In modem times this split has led into what Jose Ortega y Gasset calls ''The Barbarism of 'Specialisation,' '' the ''real disarticulation of knowledge'' (The Revolt of the Masses, trans. anonymous [New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1957), p. 111). The specialist is defined as follows: He is one who, out of all that has to be known in order to be a man of judgment, is only acquainted with one science, and even of that one only knows the small comer in which he is an active investigator. He even proclaims it as a virtue that he takes no co~isance otwhat lies outside the narrow territory s}'ecially cultivated by himself, and gives the name of ''dilettantism' to any curiosity for the general scheme of knowledge. (ibid., p. 110) One of the most significant aspects of the specialist is the ''state of 'not listening' '' (ibid., p. 113): ''By specialising him, civilization has made him herrr,etic and self-satisfied with his limitations; but this very inner feeling of dominance and worth will induce him to wish to predominate outside his specialty'' (ibid., p . 112). 82. Guide, I, 72, p. 127 (1. 10). 83. And yet each thing has its own individual purpose, independently of the rest of Creation; see ibid., III, 13. The dual purpose corresponds to the lexical sense of a word in isolation and the semantic sense that it acquires as part of a context; see below, pp. 76-78. Concerning man's unawareness of his cosmic purpose, see Borges's "The Chess'' cited below, p . 67. 84. See below, pp. 63-64. 85. The New Science 401, p. 127. For other notions of logos see below, p. 24. 86. See Newton Garver, ''The Philosophy of Jacques Derrida," The Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 667-668. 87. See below, pp. 7-8 and chapter III, section 2, note 65. 88. See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 61-171. Bg. See Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 57. Cf. below, chapter III, section 2, note 65. 90. See Of Grammatology, p. 20. 91. On the different types of misreadings, see Critical Understanding, pp. 277-339. 92. Of Grammatology, pp. 144-157. 93. Borges, Oral, p. 16.

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1 54

94. The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Claredon Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 68. 95. ''The Parergon, '' p. 26. g6. Ibid., p. 21. 97. Ibid., p. 33; cf. p. 37, note 20. gB. Pesal)im 22b and parallels; Sanhedrin 51b. 99. Menal)ot 29b. 100. Currently, the standard custom at the Synagogue is to have two different readers: one reads the end of the Tora and another the beginning. This custom is based on a faulty version of the Mishne Tora, Tefilla, XII, 23; see the valuable note of R. Joseph Qafil), Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 2, p. 359, note 5. Originally, one reader read both sections of the Tora, as is customary in the Libyan Synagogue; see R. Abraham Adadi, Vayyiqra 'Abraham (Leghorn, 5625/1865), 123b. (This is also the custom at the Yemenite Synagogue.) In order to stress the circular interconnection of the Tora, it was customary at the Sephardic Synagogue for the rabbi to deliver a homily linking the end with the beginning of the Tora; see, for example, R. l:{ayyim Palaggi, ljayyim Tel)illa (Salonika, 556o/18oo). 101. See above, pp. xvii-xviii.

I: Writing and Graffiti The introductory quotation is from Du Desert au livre (Paris: Pierre Belford, 198), p. 1o8. 1. See below, pp. 76-78. 2. See below, pp. 77-78. 3. See below, p. 76. 4. Philo, The Migration of Abraham, XII, 71, (Loeb Classical Library), vol 4., p. 173; a similar view is expressed in his On the Life of Moses, II, xxv, 127, (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 6, p. 511; cf. ibid., 129. For the Philonic logos, see below, pp. 23-24. 5. Borges, Oral, p. 18; cf. his La Cifra (Buenos Aires: Emece, 1981), p. 44, in fine. See below, pp. 118-122. 6. See below, p. 120. 7. See below, p. 78 and pp. 72-73, 120, 122. 8. Cf. Du Desert Au Livre, p. 67; also his The Book of Questions, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976), pp. 25-26, 52; and ibid., p. 35. 9. On this basic concept, see Harold D. Laswell, "The Language of Power," in Language of Politics, ed. Harold D. Laswell and Nathan Leites (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 10-14. 10. Ibid., p. 13. 11. "Why Be Quantitative?'' ibid., p. 51. 12. Ibid., p. 52. 13. Regarding the specific problem that this type of culture presents to the Jew and the strategy developed by the Sephardim, see my ''Introducing the Materials of Sephardic Culture to Contemporary Jewish Studies,'' American Jewish Historical Quarterly, 63 (1974): 340-345. 14. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, trans. Carol Stewart (Harn1ondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 32. 15. Ibid., p. 199.

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16. Se•adya Ga'on, Al-'Amanat wal-'Irtiqadat, ed. and trans. R. Joseph Qafi]:l (Jerusalem, 5730/1970), p. 132. 17. Crowds and Power, p. 208. 18. Ibid., p. 209. 19. Du Desert au Livre, p. 131; cf. pp. 142, 145, 146. 20. Ibid., p. 101. 21. Ibid. 22. See below, pp. 82, 116-117. 23. ''From Dread to Language," in The Gaze of Orpheus, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill Press, 1981), p. 5. 24. Ibid., p. 15. 25. See ibid., pp. 7 ff. 26. See below, chapter III, Section 2. 27. Crowds and Power, p. 209. On the "Desert'' in rabbinic thought, see Midrash TanlJ,uma, Shemot, XII, vol. 2, p. 7; cf. rOlat Tamid 58d. 28. This epithet was occasionally applied to Christians. Pre-Islamic Arabs, like modem Buddhists in Asia, found it difficult to distinguish between Judaism and Christianity. 29. See rAboda Zara 17a, etc. . 30. R. Cansinos-Assens, Bellezas del Talmud (Buenos Aires, 1945), pp. 1819. 31. Elias Canetti, ''The First Book: Auto-da-Fe," in The Conscience of Words, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 203. 32. See ibid., p. 213; cf. p. 203. 33. ''Gerg Buchner," in The Conscience of Words, p. 193. 34. See above, p. 4. 35. The Conscience of Words, p. 193. 36. Arnaldo Momigliano, ''The Fault of the Greeks," in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, (Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), p. 17. Cf. Rabbi Yisrael Moshe I:Iazzan, p. 38, note 7. 37. Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, p. 13. 38. Ibid., p. 18. 39. Ibid., pp. 20-21. A similar conclusion was reached by Emile Benveniste, The Persian Religion (Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Guenther, 1929), p. 118: "But it does not follow that the Greeks knew a single form of Persian religion." And on p. 119: ''The great service that the Greek historians render is to help us to imagine [our italics] the religious activity, the variety and complexity of the innovations where we should be inclined to see only dogmatic uniforxnity and lifeless tradition.'' 40. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 57. 41. Ibid., pp. 61-62; cf. below, chapter III, section 2, note 65. 42. Cf. below, chapter II, section 2, note 10. 43. See below, pp. 73-74. 44. Forty Centuries of Ink (New York: Banks Law Publishing, 1904), p. 19. See Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 304. From this it is obvious why no significant study of the place of oral tradition among the Greeks and the Hebrews as well as the publication procedures of their texts could be undertaken without first coming to grips with this fundamental difference. Cf. below, pp. 11of. 45. This posture is evident even among some of the most lucid thinkers of our time. See Edmund Husserl, ''Philosophy and the Crisis of the Euro-

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8-10

pean Man,'' in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 171, where he stated that in other cultures knowledge of the world ''is and remains mythico-practical in its logical connections, and it is a mistake for someone brought up in the scientific modes of thought initiated in Greece and progressively developed in modem times to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy'' (see translator's note). He similarly dismissed the view that ''the science of the Greeks, is not, after all, distinctive of them.... Today we possess all sorts of studies on Indian, Chinese, and other philosophies, studies that place these philosophies on the same level with Greek philosophy. . . . Still, one must not allow intentional depths to be covered over by what is merely morphological common and be blind to the most essential differences of principle'' (p. 164). Whereas other cultures try (in vain, one presumes) ''constantly fo Europeanize themselves . . . if we understand ourselves properly, we will never, for example, Indianize ourselves" (p. 157). We are told that ''The spiritual telos of European Man ... lies in infinity ... " (p. 158). At the same time, Husserl recognized that ''the European nations''-who are the exclusive possessors of "Philosophy''-happen to be ''sick; Europe itself, they say, is in critical condition'' (p. 150). Pathetically, the ''cure'' which he prescribed-''to elevate mankind [read: the European man] through universal scientific reason," etc., ''and thus transforrn it into a radically new humanity [probably: non-Indianized, etc.]" (p. 16g)-stems from monolingualism: the very sources that produced the ''crisis'' in the first place. 46. '' A Piedmontese View of the History of Ideas,'' in Essays in Andent and Modern Historiography, p. 7. 47. ''The Total Library," in Borges: A Reader, ed. Emir Rodriguez Monegal and Alastair Reid (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1g81), p. g6; cf. Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, p. 20. 48. See below, p. 120. For some background on this historian, see Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, trans .. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 92-95. 49. See Elie Benamozegh, Morale Juive et Morale Chretienne (Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1867), p. 339. On this type of terminology, introduced by Jews to the Arabian Peninsula, see the valuable study of A. S. Yahuda, ''A Contribution to Qur'an and 1:Iadith Interpretation,'' Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1948), pp. 28o-3o8. 50. PT Sanhedrin X, 1, 28a. Concerning the cantillation of Scripture, see Du Desert au Livre, pp. 41, 131-132. Popular opinion notwithstanding, it has nothing to do with music: see ibid., pp. 41-42; or singing: see Sanhedrin 101a, where the singing of Scripture is explicitly prohibited. 51. See below, chapter N, section 2, note 30. 52. Mishna Sanhedrin X (XI), 1. Se'adya Ga'on was severely criticized for appending te·amim 'cantillation-marks' to some of his compositions; see Sefer ha-Galui, ed. Abraham E. Harkavi, in Zikhron la-Rishonim, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1892), pp. 150-153, 162-163; he dismissed this criticism on the basis of some technicality. 53. There is a difference of opinion concerning the authorship of this work. E. N. Adler attributes it to R. Judah ibn Barzilai al-Bargeloni. However, other scholars differ with this view; see The Maimonides Book of Tarbiz [Heb.] (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1935), ed. note, pp. 185-187. The matter requires further investigation. At any rate, it is not later than the eleventh or twelfth century.

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11-15

54. An Eleventh Century Introduction to the Hebrew Bible [Heb.], ed. Elkan Adler (Oxford, 1897), p. 38; see below, chapter V, section 1, note 8. 55. This responsum by Ha,ayye Ga,on is printed in Toratan shel Rishonim, ed. Chaim M. Horowitz (Frankfurt a. M.: Slobotzky, 1881), second part, p. 40. 56. See below, p. 135. 57. See below, pp. 136-137. 58. Du Desert au Livre, p. 118. 59. See ibid., p . 18; cf. pp. 54, 6g, 75, 118, 134, 153. 6o. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 61 . See below, p. 136. 62. Guide, II, 33, p. 256 (I. 13). 63. Ibid., p. 257 (II. 3-4). 64. On the threefold sense of the term shema', see R. Joshua ibn Shu'eb, Derashot 'al ha-Tora, (Constantinople, 5283/1523), [7a] . Cf. below, pp. 14, 5657. 65. See below, p. 136. 66. For further details, see below, pp. 136-138. 67. Cf. below, pp. 136-138. 68. Morale Juive et Morale Chretienne, p. 342. 6g. See Du Desert au Livre, p . 118. 70. See below, pp. 133-134. 71 . See below, chapter V, section 1, note 28. 72. See below, chapter V, section 1, note 29. 73. See Du Desert au Livre, p. 64; cf. ibid., pp. 18, 54, 6g, 75, 1o6, 122, 135. 74. See below, pp. 123-124. 75 . Kitab al-Radd Wa'l-Dalil fi'l-Din al Dhalil [Kuzari] , ed. H . Baneth (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1977), II, 32, p. 64; cf. ibid., III, 9 ff. 76. lggeret Teman, ed. A. S. Halkin (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1952), pp. 14 ff.; cf. Guide, Introduction, p . 7 (I. 10). 77. See below, pp. 123-124. 78. Pirush ha-Mishnayot, ,Abot I, 3, vol. 4, p. 410. 79. 'lggeret Teman, p. 12. So. R. Samuel de Uceda, Midrash Shemu'el (Amsterdam: 5472/1712), 6ob. 81. Mishna Ta'anit IV, 5; Nega'im VII, 1. 82. Mishna 'Abot I, 1; Shabbat 86a. 83. Baba Me~i'a 59b. 84. Mishne Tora, Yesode ha-Tora, IX, 4. 85. See below, pp. 123-124. 86. In the Hebrew translation, p. 161 (I. 15): ve-timserennu be-qabbala. 87. Sefer ha-Galui, p. 163. 88. Mishna 'Abot I, 1. Sg. See below, pp. 123-124. go. Sanhedrin 5ga. Cf. Sifra (New York: Om Publishing, 1946), 'Alµzre Mot, XIII, 86b. 91. ljagiga 13a. For the precise sense of this passage, see the learned discussion of R. l:fayyim Palaggi, Re'e ljayyim, vol. 2 (Izmir, 5624/1864), 85b ff. 92. Sanhedrin 59a; see below, p . 50. 93. TanJ.iuma, Vayyera VII, vol. 1, p. 88. For the parallel sources of this passage as well as for some valuable insights, see Jakob J. Petuchowski, ''Judaism as 'Mystery'-the Hidden Agenda?'' Hebrew Union College Annual 52 (1g81): 151.

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Notes to Pages 15-19 94. Cf. above, pp. 3-4. 95. Quoted in his commentary on Sanhedrin 32a. g6. Mishne Tora, Mamrim, II, 1 and the commentary of R. ibn Abi Zirnra, ad loc. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 31-32. 97. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 183-193. The same principle applies to the interpretation of the Talmud and other legal sources: it cannot be imposed vertically. In the Introduction to the Mishne Tora, Maimonides declared: In the same fashion, if one of the Ge'onim [i.e., a rabbinic authority] has taught that the course of the law is in this way, but to another court established at a later time it appears that this [was not the intention] of the law for11--iulated in the lalmud, they may not adopt (the view] of the earlier authority. Rather, [they must follow tne view] which seems most reasonable, whether it belongs to an earlier or to a later [authority]. g8. See above, p. 13.

99. See Anwar G. Chejne, ''Arabic: Its Significance and Place in the Arab Muslim Society," The Middle Eastern Journal 19 (1965): 447-470. 100. See below, pp. 50-51. 101. See ''The Absence of the Book," in The Gaze of Orpheus, p. 151; cf. below, p. 120. 102. See ibid., pp. 145, 147; and below, p. 132. 103. See below, pp. 111, 132-133. 104. See below, chapter IV, introduction, note 18. 105. See ''Some General Observations on the Character of Classical Jewish Literature,'' p. 36. 1o6. This idea is beautifully symbolized in the inscription guarding an ancient library, in which the Muses say, referring to the books: ''We guard them here; but let him who truly loves us come to us: We will crown him with ivy.'' (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, p. 3o6). 107. See below, chapter V, section 1, note 24. 1o8. Cf. Du Desert au Livre, p. 120; and above, pp. 10-11. 109. See Paul de Man, ''A Modem Master," The New York Review of Books 3 (19 November 1g64): 8-10. 110. ''I, a Jew,'' in Borges: A Reader, p. 65. 111. The Book of Questions, p. 101; cf. Jabes, ''Judaisme et Ecriture, " L'Ecrit du Temps 5(1g84): 5-16. II: Semiology and Metaphysics

The introductory quotation is from Las Excelencias y Calumnias de Los Hebreos (Amsterdam, 1679), 317a-b. Section

1:

Nieto and the Autonomy of Nature

Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 125. On the impact of the clock on medieval thinking, see Jean Gimpel, The Medieval Machine (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 147-170; and Carlo M. Cipolla, Clocks and Culture (New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978). 1.

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2. See Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), pp. 40-41. 3. See below, note 5. 4. On Nieto, see the monograph by Jakob J. Petuchowski, The Theology of Haham David Nieto (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970). For Nieto, a theory explaining a scientific principle or physical phenomenon is scientifically meaningless. Its purpose is solely pedagogical, to help conceptualize a scientific law, but it does not-it cannot exhaust a physical phenomenon or verbalize a scientific law. (It is as if human language were totally irrelevant to physical phenomena and therefore necessarily metaphoric.) In his view, a theory may be used pedagogically even if it is not consistent with objective reality. Thus he defended the cosmography of the rabbis, since it helped conceptualize the astronomical principles relevant to Jewish law, although it was objectively faulty; see his Matte Dan (London, 5474'1714), V, 13 ff., 182a. This is why although he believed that Copernicus's description of the solar system was essentially correct (see ibid., V, 4, 181a ff.), he was not ready to accept it when contradicting Jewish tradition; see ibid., IV, 130 ff., 12ga; cf. however, The Theology of Haham David Nieto, pp. 59-63. 5. De la Divina Providencia (London, 5476/1716), p. 16. 6. Ibid., pp. 19-20; cf. Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 166, note 3, and p. 216, note 4. 7. De la Divina Providencia, pp. 20-21, 35, 40, 111-115, 137, 165-166, 171. 8. Ibid., pp. 166-167. 9. Ibid., pp. 87-92. 10. Ibid., pp. 23-28. For the source of this concept of nature, see Guide, II, 48. 11. Respuesta, p. 5, printed together with his Decision (London, 5465/1705). 12. De la Divina Providencia, p. 33; cf. p. 56. 13. Ibid., p. 137; cf. p. 16. 14. Ibid., pp. 76, 77, Bo, 81, 83. 15. Ibid., pp. 104-105. 16. See ibid., p. 129. 17. Ibid., p. 105. 18. Ibid., pp. 171-174. 19. Ibid., p. 174. 20. See ibid., pp. 169-171. For the source of this explanation, see R. Joseph Yatbe~, Pirush le-Sefer Tehillim (Salonika, 5331/1571), XIX, s.v. Yom (21b). 21. Cf. De la Divina Providencia, p. 11. See below, pp. 25-26. 22. On this incident, see The Theology of Haham David Nieto, pp. 15-17; Leon Roth, ''The Eighteenth of the Published Responsa of Hacham Zevi," Dissertatio ex Chronici Spinozani 1 (1921): 278-282.

Section

2:

The Ontological and Semiological Views of the Universe

1. See Mishna 'Abot, V, 6; 'Otiyyot de-Ribbi #Aqiba (Korzec, 5545/1785), 4a, 16a-17a. 2. See below, p. 26. 3. Cf. below, section 6, note 14. 4. Cf. below, p. 59. 5. Neophyti 1, ed. Alejandro Diez Macho, vols. 1-6 (Madrid and Barcelona: Consejo de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1968-1979); Deut 33:27h.

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t6o

Notes to Pages 24-28

6. See ibid., Gen 1:1, 16, 25, 27; 2:2, etc.; 12:7a; 17:7; 18:1; Exod 19:9; Lev 9:4; Num 22:9; Deut 32:15, 18, 39. 7. See Onqelos Lev 8:35; 18:3ob. 8. See Neophyti Gen 19:24, 38:10; Deut 26:18; 32:25, 36, 38, 39", 40, etc. 9. See ibid., Deut 32:30. On Memra in the Targumim, see the excellent monograph by Domingo Munoz Le6n, Dios-Palabra (Granada: Santa Rita, 1974). 10. Cratylus, 387b; in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), 2 vols., vol. 1, p. 177; cf. Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970), pp. 67-69. On the logos as apophansi, that is, as letting things be seen as they are, see Joseph J. Kockelmans, ''Language, Meaning and Ek-sistence, '' in On Heidegger and Language, ed. and trans. Joseph H. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 17-25. For a dynamic definition of man's logos, see Philo, The Migration of Abraham, XIII, 71, p. 173; cited above, p. 2. 11. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 236. 12. See On the Creation, V-IX, 20-31 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1, pp. 1725; cf. J. Freudenthal, Hellenistische Studien, vol. 1 (Breslau, 1874), pp. 73 f. 13. Allegorical Interpretation, m, 31, g6 (Loeb Classical Library) vol 1, p. 365. 14. The Migration of Abraham, I, 6, p. 135. Similarly Philo, The Decalogue (Loeb Classical Library), vol 7, XI, 47, p. 31, remarked that ''whatever God says is not words but deeds''; and On the Life of Moses, I, XLIX, 283, p. 423: ''for His word is His deed.'' 15. See Philo, vol. 1, p. 326. 16. Cf. ibid., p. 230. 17. Cf. ibid., p. 253. 18. Guide, I, 66, p. 110. 19. Ibid., pp. 110-111. 20. See above, section 1, note 21. 21. De la Divina Providencia, pp. 21-22. 22. Ibid., p. 22. 23. Ibid., pp. 22-23. Section 3: Semiology and Interpretation

1. J:Iazut Qasha (Sabioneta, 5312/1552), 16a. 2. The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, vol. 3 (London, 1765), p. 94. 3. On the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, see below, chapter III, introduction, notes 12-14; and section 3, notes 40-42. 4. See Mishna Shabbat XII, 3. 5. Cf. Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, pp. 201-202. Particularly among theologians, the differences between the Hebrew and Greek modes of thinking and perception have been overstated and exaggerated; see, for instance, R. Bulmann, in Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1933), s.v. Ginosko, pp. 689-714. For some sobering and very illuminating remarks on this subject, see Arnaldo D. Momigliano, ''Time in Ancient Historiography," in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, pp. 179-204. 6. Cf. Karl Pribram, Languages of the Brain, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 305.

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Notes to Pages 29-32 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

p. p. p. p.

161

3o8. 332. 350. 351.

Section 4: Visual and Auditory Thinking

1. See Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, pp. 113-122. 2. See ibid., pp. 200 ff. 3. See my ''Some Observations on the Character of Classical Jewish Literature," Journal of Jewish Studies 33 (1977): 32. 4. See Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, pp. 76-84. 5. Cf. ibid., p. 87. 6. See Heinrich Graetz, The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays, ed. Ismar Schorsch (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1975), pp. 68-6g. 7. However, see Midrash Tehillim, ed. Salomon Buber (New York: Om Publishing, 1947), LXIX, 161a; CXLIX, 270a, where ''seeing God" seems to stand for ''experiencing God'' in a positive sense. 8. See my ''The Hebrew Personal Pronouns," Perspectives on Jews and Judaism, ed. Arthur A. Chiel (New York: The Rabbinical Assembly, 1978), p. 48. 9. A. A. Luria, Human Brain and Psychological Process, trans. Basil Haigh (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 74. 10. Ibid., p. 75. 11. Ibid., p. 74. 12. See ibid., pp. 103-115. 13. Ibid., p. 105. 14. See ibid., pp. 110-111. 15. Ibid., p. 112. 16. Ibid., p. 119. 17. "Visual and Auditory Signs," Selected Writings, vol. 2 (The HagueParis: Mouton, 1971), p. 336; and ''On the Relation of Visual and Auditory Signs," ibid., p. 340. On this subject, see Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, pp. 97-105. 18. Selected Writings, vol. 2, p. 336. 19. Ibid., p. 337. 20. Ibid., p. 344. 21. Ibid., pp. 336, 341; cf. 243 ff., 351 ff. 22. See above, note 10. 23. Selected Writings, vol. 2, p. 336; cf. Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, pp. 109-116. 24. Selected Writings, vol. 2, p. 701. Section 5: Spatial and Successive Organization: Thought and Experience

1. See Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, pp. 113-122. The Greek ter1n horos 'concept,' for instance, stems from the root hor from which we have the verb horao 'to see.' 2. On this subject, see the very important work of Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1g66).

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Notes to Pages 32-40 3. Ibid., p. 3. 4. Ibid., p. 43. 5. Ibid., p. 4. 6. Ibid., p. 28. 7. On static thinking, see ibid., pp. 51-54. 8. 0 . Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 48. 9. Raymond Clare Archibald, ''Outline of the History of Mathematics,'' supplement to American Mathematical Monthly 56 (January, 1949): 13. Significantly, Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 4, I, 168, p. 83, credits the Babylonians with knowledge of arithmetic and astronomy, which passed through Abraham "into Egypt, whence they passed to the Greeks"; Abraham was credited with introducing this knowledge to Egypt. See J. Freudenthal, Hellenistische Studien, vol. 2 (Breslau, 1875), pp. 224-225. 10. ''Outline of the History of Mathematics," p. 13. 11. Cf. The Exact Sciences in Antiquity, pp. 147, 149-151. 12. Ibid., pp. 44-45. 13. Raymond L. Wilder, Evolution of Mathematical Concepts (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 1o8-109; d. pp. 82-88. 14. Cf. below, pp. 40-41. 15. Ta'anit 7a. For the Hebrews, Creation is a higher manifestation of God than the miraculous. This point has been brilliantly developed by R. David Nieto, 'Esh Dat (London, 5475/1715), II, 184-192, 34b-35a. Hence the Jewish doctrine of miracles; see below, p. 118. 16. See De la Divina Providencia, pp. 97-100, 109-111. 17. Cf Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 159. 18. Guide, Introduction, p. 3 (11. 16-24). 19. Cf. ibid. (U. 7-10, 19). 20. Ibid., p. 3 (l. 27)-p. 4 (l. 5). Maimonides is here alluding to Moses; see R. Joel ibn Shu'eb, 'Olat Shabbat (Venice, 5337/1577), 39c. 21. Guide, Introduction, p . 4 (U. 5-7). 22. Ibid., p. 3 (U. 25-26). 23. Ibid., p. 4 (ll. 12-17). 24. Ibid. (U. 9-12).

Section 6: Calling upon the Name of God 1. See Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (Dover Publications, 1946), pp. 3, 46, 49-57. 2. Cf. ibid., pp. 20 f. , 46, 48. 3. Ibid., p . 75. 4. "Language, Meaning, and Ek-sistence, '' p . 26. 5. Bereshit Rabba XVII, 4, p. 156. 6. Guide, I, 63, p. 105. 7. See Targum Neophyti and Onqelos ad loc.; the Septuagint gives a literal translation. 8. Rosh ha-Shana 17b; Targum Neophyti, Onqelos, and Septuagint ad loc. See Num 14:17. 9. Rosh ha-Shana 17b. For the Geonic traditions on this point see Rabbi Yisrael Moshe l:lazzan, p. 129 ff. 10. Berakhot 7a.

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Notes to Pages 40-45

163

11. See Targum Neophyti and Onqelos, ad loc. The Septuagint gives a literal translation. 12. From his commentary on Isaiah, ad loc. 13. R. Samuel Laniado, Keli Faz (Venice, 5417/1657), 188b. 14. Ibid., 188c.

Section 7: Speech and Subjectivity 1. In the Aramaic translations of the Scripture, memra 'word,' 'speech' is sometimes used as a synonym for 'self'; see Neophyti on Gen 9:17 and the Targum on Job 7:8. 2. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 224. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., p. 227. 5. Course in General Linguistics, p . 107; cf. pp. 117-120. 6. Ibid., p . 122. 7. Ibid., p. 118; the same is true of phonemes; cf. ibid., p. 118. 8. Ibid., p . 88; cf. p . 110. 9. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 224. 10. Ibid., p. 225. 11. Ibid., pp. 224-225. 12. Ibid., p. 53. This fundamental point was overlooked in the treatment of human and animal communication by J. Bronowski, '' Human and Animal Languages,'' To Honor Roman Jakobson, vol. 1 (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1967), pp. 374-394. 13. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 225. 14. Ibid., p. 220. 15. Ibid., p. 226. 16. Course in General Linguistics, p. 77; cf. p. 19. 17. Ibid., p. 14; cf. pp. 9, 10, 13, 15, 77. 18. Ibid., p. 13; cf. p. 14. 19. Ibid., p. 10. 20. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 67. 21 . Ibid., p. 226. 22. Ibid. 23. For a thorough discussion on this subject, see my "The Third Person in Semitic Grammatical Theory and General Linguistics,'' Linguistica Biblica Bonn 46 (1979): 106-113. 24. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 199; cf. pp. 197-204, 221-222. 25. Ibid., pp. 197-198. 26. See ''The Third Person in Semitic Grammatical Theory and General Linguistics,'' p . 1o8. 27. Kitab al-Luma', ed. Joseph Derenbourg (Paris: Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1886), p. 188 (11. 14-15). 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., p. 191. 30. See S. R. Driver, Hebrew Tenses (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 18g2), p. 9. 31. Ibid., pp. 6-12. 32. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 135. 33. The particle 'an, and with a final vowel 'ana, usually appears as an interrogative adverb of place (I Sam 10:14; Deut 1:28); when preceded by the conjunction 'ad 'until' (used to introduce the adverb clause), it appears as an

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Notes to Pages 45-49 interrogative adverb of time (Job 8:2; Num 14:11). In the form 'ane it is used as an adverb of place, 'here' and 'there' (1 Kings 2:36, 42; 5:25). The term 'ana used in supplications (the final vowel could be represented either by the matres lectionis he or by 'ale/), where senses of time and space merge, results in 'here-now.' The expressions 'anu 'they shall lament' (Isa 3:26, 19:8) and ta'aniyya and 'aniyya (cf. the Arabic 'annat wa-'ahat) 'supplication,' 'lamentation' (Lam 2:5), are connected with the act of supplication conveyed in 'ana; see R. Abu Brahim Yi~,baq ben Barun, Kitab al-Mu'azana, in Paul Kokovstov, Novye Materialy, vol. 1 (St Petersburg: Tipographia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 18g3), p. 38. The particle na, an apocope of 'ana, in Num 12:13, etc., is generally explained as 'now'; see R. David Qim,bi, Sefer Ha-Shorashim, ed. Jo. H. Biesenthal and F. Lebrech (Berlin, 1847), col. 42, s. v. 'An. 34. All Sephardic lexicographers entered the personal pronoun 'ani under the entry of the particle 'an; R. Jonah ibn Janna.I), Sefer Ha-Shorashim, ed. Wilhelm Bacher (Berlin: Mekize Nirdamim, 18g6), p. 39; R. Judah ibn Bala'am, in Paul Kokovstov, Novye Materialy, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: Tipographia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1916), pp. 113-114; R. David Qim,bi, Sefer Ha-Shorashim, col. 42; R. Solomon ibn Far,bon, Ma~beret he-'Arukh, ed. Solomon Gottlieb Stern (Pressburg, 1844), p. 5. etc. 35. See R. Abraham ibn 'Ezra, Safa Berura, ed. Michael Wilensky, Debir, 2 (1923), p. 287; and his commentary to Gen 12:13. 36. On the Semitic verb, see Henry Fleisch, Traite de Philologie Arab, vol. 1 (Beirut: L'Institut de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, 1961), pp. 263-264 and the note on pp. 525-527. 37. Cf. above, note 11. 38. Maurice Blanchot, "On Jabes," trans. Waldrop and Auster, Montemora 6 (1979): 72. 39· Ibid., 72-73. 40. Ibid., 73. See above, pp. 4-5. 41. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 59; cf. pp. 130-131; and Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 7 ff. 42. See above, section 3. 43. See Speech and Phenomena, pp. 48-59. 44. See Mishna Berakhot I, 5; Mishne Tora, Qeri'at Shema', II, 3; and Kesef Mishne, ad loc. 45. Berakhot 13a; cf. Sifre #31, p. 53, and the editor's note. 46. See editor's note on the Sifre, ibid. 47. Berakhot 13a. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. See R. l;ezqiya de Silva, Peri ljadash ['Ora~ l:Iayyim, part I) (Amsterdam, 5490/1730), #67, 1, 10b; cf. Saul Liber1nan, Tosefta Kifshuta, Zera'im, vol. 1 (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1955), p. 12. 51. Kavvana, an essential element of the liturgy, means "direction," implying thereby ''intentionality'' rather than "understanding." 52. See Mishne Tora, Qeri'at Shema·, II, 8, 10. 53. In the Spanish Prayer Book, prepared for the forced converts to Christianity who were returning to Judaism, the first verse of the Shema• is a transliteration of the Hebrew; see Orden de las Bendiciones (Amsterdam, 5421/1661), Sb.

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Notes to Pages 49-53 54. See R. Yerultam Fischel Perla, Sefer ha-M~vot, vol. 1 (New York: E. Grossman's Publishing House, 57221'1962), 117d ff. 55. Maimonides, Sefer ha-Mi~vot, ed. R. Joseph Qafil;t (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1971), positive commandment #11, p. 65. Section 8: Expressive Actions: Encoding and Decoding 1. Hence Maimonides' concern with the ta'ame 'sense' of the commandments; see Guide, III, chaps. 29 ff. 2. Sanhedrin 59a; see below, pp. 124-125, and above, pp. 13-15. 3. See below, p. 131. 4. See above, pp. 15-16. 5. Tosefta Megilla III (IV), 41; Qiddushin 49a. 6. Berakhot 8b. 7. Cf. below, pp. 58, 138-139. 8. 'Em la-Miqra, vol. 2, 56b. A similar idea was expressed by Philo, On the Life of Moses, I, XXXVII, 2o6, p. 383, that the Sabbath celebrates "the birthday of the world,'' in the sense that only absence of Creation permits celebration of Creation. Cf. below, pp. 67-6g. 9. Bereshit Rabba V, 10, p. 37. 10. See Gen 41:32; 1 Sam 26:8; 2 Sam 20:10; 1 Kings 18:34. 11. See Mal 3:6; Ps Sg:35; Lam 4:1. 12. See Est 1:7, 2:9, 3:8. 13. See Gen 43:15; Exod 16:5, 22; Deut 15:8; Job 42:10. 14. See 2 Kings 23:4; Jer 52:24. 15. See Est 10:13; cf. Gen 41:43. 16. See 1 Chr 5:12. 17. Cf. Gen 44:18. 18. Mentioned in the Commentary of Don Isaac Abarbanel on Josh 8:32. 19. See the Commentary of R. David Qimttl on Josh 8:32, and Abarbanel, etc. 20. Cited by R. Abraham ibn 'Ezra, in his Commentary on Deut 27:3; see Rav Saadya Gaon's Translation of the Torah, ed. Dr. Moses Zucker (New York: Philipp Feldheim, Inc., 1959), pp. 254-255. The objection raised by Aaron ibn Sargado Ga'on (tenth century), cited ibid., that since the Scriptures specified ''all the words of this Tora'' (Deut 27:3) it cannot be a summary, misses the representative character of the Mishne. Similarly, the objection of R. Samuel Laniado, Keli Yaqar (Venice, 5363/16o3), 30a that Joshua could not have written such a summary since the Scripture says ''that ['asher] Moses wrote before the children of Israel'' (Josh 8:32), is mistaken. The relative pronoun 'asher determines the tern1 Tora, not Mishne! Therefore, the correct translation is ''the Mishne, of the Tora that Moses wrote before all Israel." 21. E.g., the ''Ten Commandments''; see Abarbanel's Commentary on Josh 8:32. 22. Ed. Yigael Yadin, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: The Israel Exploration Society, 1977). The principal difference between this Mishne Tora and the Book of Deuteronomy is that the latter excludes the laws of purity, sacrifices, and other rituals connected with the Temple; these laws were the concern of the Priest, not the King. Finally, it should be pointed out that according to the rabbis (Sanhedrin 21b) Mishne Tora in Deut 17:18 must be explained as ''double Tora" (cf. above, note 13), in the sense that the King must have two copies of the Tora. 23. In his Commentary on Josh 8:32.

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Notes to Pages 54-58

166

24. 'Em la-Miqra, vol. 5, JOcl· This point becomes clear upon considering that in Hebrew such a recitation should be designated qore be'al pe 'reading from memory.' 25. See Bamidbar Rabba, Naso XIV, 4 (173d); d. below, p. 121. 26. See below, p. 136. 27. Megilla Ja. 28. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 179, note 28. 29. 'Em la-Miqra, vol. 5, 30b. See Sifre, #16o, p. 211. JO. Mekhilta de-R. Yishma'el, ed. H. S. Horovitz and J. A. Rabin (Jerusalem: Wahrman, 1970), p. 49; d. Mishna Pesal)im X, 5. 31. Pesal}im J8b. 32. Ibid., 36a; cf. Mishne Tora, l;la~ wu-Ma$$11, VI, 5. 33. PesalJ,im 1o8a; PT Pesa,,im X, 1, 37b; J:la~ wu-Ma$$11, VII, 7. 34. See Mena}µ,t 33b; cf. 'Aboda ZAra 11a; PT Pe'a I, 1, 15d. 35. Mekhilta de-R. Yishma'el, p. 39. 36. See ibid., p. 18. The same tradition is reported in Philo: Supplement (Loeb Oassical Library), vol. 2, p. 21. 37. Mekhilta de-R. Yishma'el, p. 18, and p. 24; Mekhilta de-R. Shim'on bar Yolµzi, ed. Y. N. Epstein and E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1965), p. 12. 38. See R. Moses Najara, Leqal} Tob (Constantinople, 5335/1575), 17a. 39. Yoma 11a. 40. See PT Shabbat XIX, 1, 17a; Mishne Tora, Mila, Il, 2. 41. Mishna Shabbat XIX, 6; cf. Mila, Il, 3. 42. Yebamot 71b. 43. Shabbat 137b. 44. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 149-150. In the same fashion, R. •Aqiba maintained that the original 'huts' (sukkot) used by the Israelites in the Desert were not the regular huts prescribed for the holiday of Sukkot (commemorating the ''huts'' in the Desert), but ''clouds of [the Divine] glory." See Sifra, 'Emor, XVII, 103a; Sukkot 11b. Likewise, the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve (Gen 32:33), commemorating Jacob's wrestling with the angel, applies only to animals that are ritually permitted for consumption; see Mishne Tora, Ma'akhalot 'Asurot, VIII, 1. Contrary to the opinion of R. Solomon ibn Adret, She'elot wu-Tshubot ha-Rishba, [vol.1] (Bologna, 5299!1539), #364, 61d, it does not-it could not apply to the sciatic nerve of man. 45. See Guide, II, 34. 46. Cf. Maimonides, Bet ha-BelJ,ira, VI, 15. This point was further developed by Isaac Cardoso, Las Excelencias de los Hebreos, p. 129: Mount Sinai represented what later would be the Sanctuary, or Holy Temple. The people of Israel were secluded; then Moses brought them to the foot of the mountain to meet the Divini~; later on came Aaron and the seventy elders to the mountain by divine commandment; and finally Moses went up alone to the most sublime. Likewise at the Temple the people of Israel were in the court in the 'Azara 'assembly-hall' of the Israelites; the Priests were in the second camp [representing] the 'Azara 'assembly-hall' of the Priests; and only the higb Priest could enter the Holy of Holies, the Qodesh ha-Qodashim. 47. Ta'anit 21b. 48. Cf. ZebalJ,im 116b-117a; Bet ha-Be~ira, VII, 11.

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Notes to Pages 58-60 49. I:Iolin 91b. 50. Similarly, according to the rabbis, Mount Sinai was originally a part of Mount Moriah and it was ''removed'' from there and brought to the desert; see Midrash Tehillim LXVIII, 9, p. 318. Cf. R. Isaiah di Trani, Sefer ha-Makhria~ (Leghorn, 5539'1779), j'Sa. 51. See below, chapter V. III: Freedom, Language, and Negativity

The introductory quotation is from Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 87. Introduction

1. Judah ha-Levi, Kitab al-Radd, [Kuzari], IV, 25, 174 (11. 9-10). The source for the idea that the Universe is God's writing may be biblical; see above, p. xx. It is found in the Midrash Tehillim CVII, 3, 462; cf. R. Abraham ibn ·Ezra on Ps 19:5. This idea goes back to Ancient Babylonia; cf. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, pp. 304, 307. Ha-Levi's interpretation of the sefirot as numerical ciphers was confirmed by Samuel David Luzzatto, Vikkua~ •al ha-Qabbala in Me}J,qare Yahdut, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 5673/1913), pp. 124-127. This idea is implicit in the Psalmist's notion that the Universe was created "with the speech of the Lord'' (Ps 33:6). Accordingly, the Philonic logos and the Targumic memra reflect this fundamental semiological principle which is biblical-rather than the Greek logos which is metaphysical; see above, p. 24. 2. On the meaning of this term, see below, section 2, note 5. 3. Al-Hidaya 'ila Fara'iq al-Qulub, I, 6, pp. 49-50. Cf R. Nissim Gerondi, Derashot (Constantinople, 5290/1530), p. 27, and below, chapter V, section 5, note 2. This idea first appears in Cicero, De Natura Deorum (Loeb Classical Library), Il, 93, XXXVII, p. 213. It was brilliantly developed by Borges in ''The Total Library," Borges: A Reader, pp. 94-96. See above, chapter I. For a general survey of the ''book'' in Western literary tradition, see European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, pp. 302-347. For the notion of "the book of Nature," see ibid., pp. 319-326. This study is faulty in two fundamental areas. First, it never defines the precise meaning and function of the ''book," ''writing," ''letter," etc. Therefore, there is no actual understanding of the sense of these symbols. Obviously, one cannot lump together Galileo's remark that the Universe ''is written in mathematical language'' (p. 324) with the poet's remark that ''a beauty's blond hair drew an l on the white page of her cheek'' (p. 342). Secondly, Jewish tradition, whether in Hellenistic times or in the European Middle Ages, is systematically ignored. This is particularly awkward in the treatment of Luis de Granada, G6ngora, Fray Luis de Le6n, and other distinguished figures of the Spanish "siglo de oro'' (see ibid., pp. 541 ff., 547 ff.), who were the descendants of forced converts and maintained strong spiritual and literary connections with the tradition of their forefathers. 4. Roman Jakobson, ''Glosses on the Me~eval Insight into the Science of Language,'' M~langes Linguistiques offerts a Emile Benveniste (Paris: Editions Peeters, 1975), p. 297; cf. Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, p. 63. 5. See ''Some General Observations on the Character of Classical Jewish Literature," pp. 30 ff.; cf. Borges, Oral, p. 19.

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Notes to Pages 60-64

168

6. Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage Books 1955), p. 147. 7. Guide, II, 2, p. 176 (11. 9-10). 8. Ibid. (U. 6-8). 9. Ibid. (11. 13-16). 10. Qobe~ Teshubot ha-Rambam (Leipzig, 561g/1859), part I, 12c; cf. Guide, II, 2, p. 176 (11. 17 ff). 11. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth, Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 94. 12. Course in General Linguistics, pp. 67-70. 13. Ibid., p. 118; see also p. 112. 14. Ibid., p. 117. Contrary to the view of David Funt, "Roland Barthes and the Nouvelle Critique," Journal of Aesthetics and Criticism 26 (1g68): 328 ff., there can be no ''process" by which an object becomes a sign or vice versa. 15. On this basic and highly complex subject see the masterful work by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning-Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. Janet Lloyd (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1978). It is most significant that Philo, The Worse is Wont to Attack the Better, XI, 38, (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 2, p. 227, identified the magicians in Egypt with the sophists, and sophistry with magic. Likewise, Balaam the magician is depicted as a master of eloquence and sophistry; ibid., XX, 71, p. 251. 16. Charles P. Segal, ''Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos,'' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 (1962): 112. 17. Ibid.; 128. On the linguistic theory of Gorgias, see Pierre Aubinque, Le Probleme de l'etre chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 100-1o6.

18. On this fundamental controversy, see Jacqueline de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975). 19. Phaedrus, [261), (Jowett ed., vol. 1, p. 264). 20. Ibid., [270) (Jowett ed. vol. 1, p. 273); cf. [276], (Jowett ed., vol. 1, p. 28o).

21. Ibid., [271), (Jowett ed., vol. 1, p. 275). 22. The following quE>tation from Aristotle's Rhetoric, III, i, 1404a (Loeb Classical Library), p. 347 is a good example of his attitude towards this subject: Rhetoric is to influence opinion; we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but as being necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting eain or pleasure. For justice should consist of fighting the case witn the facts alone, so that everything else that is otner tnan demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. On the other hand, Strabo, Geography, I, 2, 5 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 1, p. 61, declared that ''rhetoric is, to be sure, wisdom applied to discourse." 23. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 93. 24. Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Peter Heath (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 59.

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25. Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, vol. 5 (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 185. 26. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 94-164. 27. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, '' Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," Haroard Theological Review 45 (1952): 115-130; his "Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides," ibid. 50 (1957): 145156; and his The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 218-234. 28. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 134. 29. Guide, II, 28, p. 234 (11. 19 ff.). 30. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), p. 18. 31. Course in General Linguistics, p. 120. 32. The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 22. Burke, ibid., refers to ''the spirit of negative theology'' present in Spinoza. It should be noted, however, that on

this point Spinoza was merely following standard medieval Jewish philosophy; see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934), vol. 1, pp. 137-138. 33. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1g66), p. 52. 34. Ibid., pp. 52-53. Section

1:

Freedom and Creation

1. See Philo, vol. 2, p. 234.

On this point see the valuable article of Richard L. Schacht, "Hegel on Freedom,'' Hegel, ed. Alastair MacIntyre (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame, 1974), pp. 289-328. 3. Ernst Cassirer, The Logic of the Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 18-19. 4. Jorge Luis Borges: Selected Poems, 1923-1967, ed. Norman Thomas di Giovanni (New York: A Delta Book, 1971), pp. 121-122. Cf. La Cifra, p. 49. 5. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, Religious Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1g61), pp. 196-198. 6. See Philo, vol. 1, pp. 424-456. 7. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 175, note 70. 8. Nomologia (Amsterdam, 5389/1629), pp. 9-11. See the Commentaries of R. Eliyahu Mizratli and Don Isaac Abarbanel, ad loc.; and below, pp. 130131. 9. As quoted in The Logic of the Humanities, p. 5. 10. ''The Wind and the Spirit," in Animal Faith and Spiritual Life (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 18. 11. Mishne Tora, Teshuba, V, 3. 12. Guide, III, 17, p. 338 (11. 24-30); cf. ibid., p. 337 (l. 6); I, 51, p. 75 (1. 27). Maimonides recognizes that man's freedom is affected by biological and educational factors; see ibid., II, 23, p. 224 (ll. 23-28); III, 8, p. 310 (11. 13 ff.). Likewise, man can eventually lose his freedom totally; see Mishne Tora, Teshuba, VI, 3. 13. Ibid., II, 19, p. 216 (11. 4-7). 14. Ibid. (1. 24). Significantly, Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, vol. 4, I, 155156, pp. 77-79, considered the irregularities in celestial phenomena as evidence of Creation. 2.

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Notes to Pages 70-72 Section 2: Language and Ma' na

The introductory quotation is from The Path of the Upright, trans. Mordecai M. Kaplan {Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1926), pp. 26-27. 1. See Religious Philosophy, pp. 224-228. 2. Kitab Al-Radd [Kuzari], I, 54-56, pp. 15-16; cf. Religious Philosophy, pp. 230-235. 3. Guide, II, 30, p. 251 (11. 17-19). 4. 'Jggerot ha-Rambam, ed. R. Joseph Qafi}:,. (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1972), p. 149. 5. Cf. Religious Philosophy, p. 231, note 79. 6. Ma'ase 'Efod, ed. Dr. Jonathan Friedlander and Jakob Kohn (Vienna, 1865), p. 28. 7. See Religious Philosophy, pp. 226-229. --8. Ma'ase 'Efod, p. 28. This tradition already appears in Kitab al-Luma', p. 1; Jacob ben El'azar, Kitab al-Kami/, ed. Ne}:,.emya Alloni (Jerusalem: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1977), p. 22. 9. This view anticipates the rupture between the humanities and the sciences discussed by C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 10. Cf. below, note 44. 11. Ma'ase 'Efod, pp. 28-29. 12. See Roman Jakobson: Selected Writings, vol. 3 (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1971), pp. 336, 341; cf. 243 ff. and 351 ff. 13. Guide, II, 30, p. 251 (11. 17-19). 14. See above, note 7. 15. Guide, III, 8, p. 313 (11. 11-14). 16. Maimonides was careful to distinguish between 'languages' (lugat), which are conventional {see above, note 13), and '[the power of] expression through speech' {lisan) (see above, note 15), which was given to man by God. Maimonides, Guide, III, 8, p. 313 (II. 22 ff.) went out of his way to give what appears to be a very unsubstantial reason as to why Hebrew is designated the "holy language" (cf. commentaries ad loc.). R. Shem Tob ibn Shem Tob, ad loc., indicates that the real purpose of Maimonides was to dispel the notion that God speaks to his prophets in Hebrew; cf. above, chapter I, note 63. He probably also wanted to dispel the belief that God taught this language to Adam (see Kitab Al-Radd [Kuzari], IV, 25, p. 175), and the intrinsic superiority of Hebrew (see Ma})beret Mena})em, p. ta; cf. ibid., p. 39a)-a belief that penetrated Judaism via Islam, see article cited above, chapter I, note 99. For a comprehensive review of the origin of language in Islamic thought, see the valuable study of Henri Loucel, "L'Origine du Langage d'apres les Grammairiens Arabes," Arabica 10 (1963): 188-208, 253-281; 11 (1964): 57-72, 151-187. On the original connotation of the designation ''holy language'' to Hebrew, see above, Introduction, note 48. 17. For an in-depth analysis of the meaning of this theory, see Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 43-48. Jakobson, Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, pp. 109-116, rejected Saussure's view concerning the (absolute) arbitrariness of the sign. See also his ''Retrospect,'' Selected Writings 1 {The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962), pp. 653-654. 18. Of Grammatology, p. 44. 19. Lit. 'dissection'; hence 'analysis' and 'meaning.'

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Notes to Page 72 20. In the writings of the Kalam, ma•na is used in the sense of 'thing,' 'nature'; see The Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 114-118. It was first used in this sense by Wa~il b. 'Ata' {d. 748; see ibid., p. 118) and developed by Mu'ammar as the basis for the doctrine of the divine attributes; see ibid., pp. 147-167. Maimonides {as anti-Kalam and anti-attributist) used this ter1n in its literal sense, 'significance.' 21. On the terms batn and ~har, see Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 94, 183, 186. 22. Ta'wil, wrongly translated 'allegory,' actually means 'exegesis,' which is an interpretation that is not based on the lexical analysis of the ter111. Allegory can be ta'wil, but not all ta'wil is allegory; see Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 18 ff. On the relation of this ter1n to batn and ~har, see ibid., p. 75, note 14. 23. Guide, II, 5, p. 180 {I. 25). 24. Ibid., I, 46, p. 66 {II. 25-29); cf. 55, p . 109 (11. 4-15); II, 12, p. 195 (11. 14-19). 25. Ibid., I, 46, p. 66 {ll. 22-24). 26. Ibid., 64, p. 1o8 (11. 6-7). 27. Pirush R. Se'adya Ga'on le-Sefer Ye~ira, ed. and trans. R. Joseph Qafi}:l {Jerusalem: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1972), p. 53. Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation {Loeb Classical Library), I, 16a, 10-19, pp. 115117. For a similar division of language, see R. Joel ibn Shu'eb, Nora Tehillot {Salonika, 5329/1569), 41a. 28. See Of Grammatology, pp. 44-65. 29. Guide, II, 5, p. 18o; cf. I, 29. Like Se'adya, Maimonides in II, 5 bases his view on Ps 19:2; cf. lbn 'Ezra's commentary ad loc. R. Abraham {11861237), the son of Maimonides, was explicit on this point. In a passage of his Arabic work Pirush, ed. R. Suleman Sassoon {London, 5718/1958), p. 33, commenting on the Aramaic translation of Gen 2:7 by Onqelos, he remarked: How learned is the explanation given by Anqelos [Onqelos], of blessed memory, ''and Adam became a speaking soul''; since human speech, when externalized as language, articufates phonetically, in letters and words that are intelligible to those who bear them, the internal speech which is the intellectual rerception related to the speaking for1n. Therefore, speech is mans specific appurtenance. Understand this! In Hebrew, qol means not only 'voice,' 'speech' but also 'sound.' Therefore, the phonic expressions must be marginal to language. In Hebrew "speech" is connected with ''writing,'' as evident in the expression found in Sefer Ye~ira, sippur and sefer, to designate, respectively, speech and writing; see Judah ha-Levi, Kitab Al-Radd [Kuzari], IV, 25, p. 174; and Se'adya Ga'on, Pirush le Sefer Ye~ira, p. 49; both these terms are connected with sefer 'book.' More significant is the view of R. }:Ianan'el, R. Judah al-Bargeloni, and others who explained the terms ha-ketab ve-ha-mikhtab, in 'Abot, V, 5, 'writing and speech'; see R. Israel Moses }:Iazzan, 'Iyye ha-Yam {Leghorn, 5629/1869), 113a. The intimate relationship between speech and writing was made explicit by Sherira Ga'on in Teshubot ha-Ge'onim, ed. Abraham E. Harkavi {Berlin, 1887), #29, p. 11: ''God had created in man the faculty to express his words in letters and signs, which constitute writing, and [thus was man] capable of instituting all signs and all letters." Interestingly, R. Ba}:lye ibn

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Notes to Pages 72-74 Paquda declared that ''speech is the pen of the heart," see above, p. xx. Finally, in Hebrew li-qro, 'to read' means also 'to call,' 'to designate,' 'to name,' and 'to summon.' This tertn applies both to the reading and to the recitation by heart of a written text. 30. Guide, I, 56, p. 8g (11. 17-25); cf. 51, p. ']6 (11. 9, 12, 14); 52, p. 72 (l. 22). 31. Ibid., Il, 43, pp. 278 (1. 11)-279 (1. 14). Cf. Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, I, 165a, 12. 32. Guide, I, 62, pp. 103 (I. 29)-104 (1. 2). 33. Guide, 6o, p. 99 (11. 25 ff.). 34. Ibid., 57, p. go (l. 20). 35. Ibid., p. 91 (1. 3). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book ''2" 15, 1040a, 1-9. 36. Cf. Guide, I, 58, p. 93 (11. 23-25); see below, note 38. 37. Ibid., Il, 12, p. 195 (11. 6-7). 38. Ibid., Introduction, p. 4 (11. 12-28); cf. pp. 3 (11. 1-7), 4 (11. 12 ff.); Ill, 51, p. 459 (11. 8-9). 39. Cf. ibid., I, 51, p. ']6 (11, 21-24); 50, p. 73 (11. 5-6). Cf. Khalil Georr, Les Categories d' Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes (Beirut: Institut Fran~ais de Damas, 1948), pp. 234-235. 40. Guide, I, 65, p. 109 (11, 5-6). 41. Ibid., 68, p. 113 (11. 3-4). 42. Ibid., 1, p. 14 (11. 20-21). 43. Ibid., 57, p. 91 (II. 2-3). 44. Ibid., 53, p. 81 (11. 18-26). 45. Ibid., 65, p. 109 (1. 10). 46. Cf. ibid., 48, p. 71 (l. 18); II, 43, p. 277 (11. 15 ff.); 44, p. 280 (1. 20); 45, p. 287 (1. 15); Ill, 53, p. 465 (1. 8); p. 466 (1. 10). 47. Cf. below, note 51. 48. See above, note 27. The same idea was stated by Se'adya in his Sefer ha-Galui, p. 157 (11. 5-8). Cf. Guide, I, 54, p. 84 (1. 23); 59, p . g6 (11. 3 ff.). · 49. Guide, I, 6o, pp. g8 (1. 12), 99 (1. 26); cf. 63, p. 105 (1. 13); 64, p. 107 (I. 18). 50. Ibid., II, 29, p. 243 (11. 26-27). 51. Cf. ibid., I, 51, p. ']6 (11. 9, 12, 14); 52, p. 77 (1. 22). 52. Ibid., 65; cf. 46, p. 67 (11. 18-19); 6g, p. 116 (11. 22-23); Il, 12, p. 194 (11. 22 ff.); 36. 53. Cf. ibid., Ill, 24, p. 364 (11. 9-20). This is why, in a prophetic vision, "everything that one perceives is a metaphor for some ma'na." Ibid., 9, p. 315 (11. 3-4); cf. above, pp. 11-12. 54. Maimonides is not explicit on this point. Cf., however, Guide, II, 29, p. 235 (II. 24-25); Introduction, p. 6 (11. 20-24); I, 46, pp. 6g (1. 20)-70 (I. 2). 55. Ibid., Ill, 51, p. 458 (1. 9). Hence Maimonides' preoccupation with finding the ''reasons,'' i.e., the signification, of biblical ritual. 56. Ibid., Introduction, p. 2 (1. 6); cf. p. 3 (11. 3-4). 57. See above, note 22. This method consists of interpreting the individual terms (Guide, Introduction, p. 6 [l. 21]) in relation to the ma'na; cf. ibid., I, 27, p. 38 (1. 26). 58. See Guide, I, 2. 59. On Interpretation, II, 16a, 21, 30; 17a, IV, 2. For an analysis of Aristotle's view on language see Aubenque, Le Probleme de 1'2tre chez Aristote, pp. 106-134. 6o. On Interpretation, I, 16a, 8-11. 61. Pirush le-Sefer Ye$ira, p. 53. On Interpretation was translated into Arabic

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by 'lsbaq ibn l:fonain (d. ca. 910) and published by Isidor Pollak, Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Ubersetzung des Is}µzk Ibn l:Ionein, in Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XIII Band, no. 1 (Leipzig, 1913). In that text, p. 1 (I. 3), "mental affections'' is rendered ''the impressions of the soul," an expression approaching the sense of ''trace''; cf. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 199 ff. In the Arabic version, p. 1 (II. 7-8), we read: ''And the things on which the soul has impressed their likeness are the ma'ani." 62. On Interpretation, I, 16a, 4-8. 63. Ibid., 9-18. 64. Ibid., IV, 17a, 1-5. 65. Whether Aristotle's categories are a projection of Greek language and grammar, and are therefore linguistic (rather than philosophical), or whether they represent canons of human thought, and are therefore universally valid, was the subject of a debate between a Christian Arab and a Moslem in the year 320 (A.H., = 932). See D.S. Margaliouth, "The Discussion Between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi on the Merits of Logic and Grammar," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1905): 77-129; and the study of Muhsin Mahdi, ''Language and Logic in Classical Islam," in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. E. von Gruebaumm (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1970), pp. 51-84. For a more modem discussion of this point, see Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 55-64; and Jacques Derrida, ''The Supplement of the Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics," The Georgia Review 30 (1976): 527-571. See above, pp. 7-8. 66. Cf. Guide, I, p. 23 (I. 12); 46, p. 67 (ll 12, 20-22, 27); it is the same with the verbal forrn; see ibid., 20, p. 32 (1. 5); 27, p. 39 (1. 3). Because of its extensional character, this term is used in the sense of 'significance'; see ibid., 61, p. 100 (I. 23); p. 101 (1. 12). Likewise, 'istidlal, a derivative of this ter111, is used in the sense of 'inductive proof'; see ibid., 5, p. 19 (I. 13); II, 15, p. 202 (I. 5). This term serves to translate the Greek semeion and symbolon; see Pollak's Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Ubersetzung, p. 41; and also semantikos; see Georr's Les categories d'Aristote dans leurs versions syroarabes, p. 219. 67. Aristotle, in Rhetoric, II, 12 (1405b), p .. 359, observed that "a metaphor is a kind of enigma." 68. Guide, Introduction, p. 3 (I. 21), 4 (11. 19, 27, 28), 5 (I. 11), 6 (I. 22). On the precise meaning of "riddle,'' see Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 193. 6g. Guide, Introduction, p. 6 (11. 10-13); cf. 2 (II. 18-19, 23, 27, 29). 70. Ibid., pp. 8 (I. 3)-9 (1. 25). 71. For some interesting remarks concerning the translation of this title, see Solomon Munk, Le Guide des Egares (Paris: Editions G-P Maisonneuve, 196o), vol. 2, p. 379. 72. See Exod 14:3 and Se'adya's translation Version arabe du Pentateuque, p. 101. 73. Ibid., III, 32, p. 385 (1. 23). Instead of Jµzyyar, Qafib's in More ha-Nebukhim, vol. 3, p. 576, hasJµzyyad'tomakeonedigress,"tomakeonedeviate.'This reading is not supported by older manuscripts. Moreover Jµzyyad implies 'violence' and the harboring of 'ill-feelings'; among Jews it translates the biblical le-satan (Nu 22:22, 32), see Se'adya, Version arabe du Pentateuque, p. 229..-therefore it could not possibly be applied to God and the wandering of the Hebrews in the Desert. Probably it is an "emendation" by someone who felt uncomfortable with the idea that God himself could bring about perplexity.

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Notes to Pages 75-80 74. This is a fundamental concept in Jewish historiography and philosophy. For further references, see Guide, Ill, 33, p. 38g (l. 16); 54, p. 466 (U. 2225). 75. Ibid., III, 32, p. 386 (II. 4-9). 76. Ibid., III, 25, p. 367 (I. 25). 77. Ibid., p. 368 (l. 2). 78. PT ]:fagiga II, 1, 77a. 79. Jorge Luis Borges, In Praise of Darkness, tr. Nor1nan Di Giovanni (New York: Dutton, 1974); ''Labyrinth," p. 39. This is the central theme of his collection of stories Labyrintl1s, ed. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby (New York: A New Directions Book, 1964). It was further developed in his later poems; see La Cifra, pp. 23, 63, 8g, 91, 101.

Section 3: Negation: Semiotics and Semantics 1. Benveniste developed this theme in three articles: ''The Levels of Linguistic Analysis," Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 101-112; ''Semiologie de la langue," Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2 (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1974), pp. 43-66; "La Forn,e et le sens dans le langage," ibid., pp. 215-240. 2. Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 58. Accordingly, it would be wrong to apply the ter1n "alphabet" to the units of a semantic composition; cf. Interpretation Theory, pp. 40, 41. 3. Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 59. 4. Ibid., pp. 63-66. 5. Ibid., p. 222. 6. Problems in General Linguistics, p. 109. 7. Ibid., p. 105. See Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, pp. 223-225. 8. Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 223. 9. See ibid., pp. 58-6o. 10. Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 110-111; Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, pp. 64-65, 223-225. 11. See Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 223. 12. See ibid., pp. 225-226. 13. See above, note 3. 14. Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 64. 15. Ibid., p. 225. 16. See ibid., pp. 64, 222. 17. On these two for1ns of analysis see Roman Jakobson: Selected Writings, vol. 2, pp. 334-344. 18. Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. 2, p. 223. 19. Guide, I, 51-6o. 20. Ibid., 35, p. 54 (II. 8-10). 21. Ibid., 72, p. 134 (II. 1-2). 22. Ibid., 51, p. 76 (II. 20-24). 23. Ibid., 52, p. 79 (II. 24-27). 24. Ibid., 56, p. 8g (II. 24-25). 25. Ibid, 59. 26. Ibid., 6o. 27. Ibid., 51, p. 76 (II. 17-18); cf. 50 and 53, p. 82 (II. 14-15). 28. Ibid., 6o, p. 99 (II. 22-28); cf. 55, p. 88 (II. 9-11). 29. Ibid., 51, p. 76 (II. 20-24); cf. below, note 33. 30. Ibid., 68.

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1 75

31. Ibid., 61, p. 101 (II. 7-8); cf. 62, pp. 103 (I. 27)-104 (I. 2). 32. Ibid., 58, p,p. 92 (I. 6), 93 (II. 15-16). 33. Ibid., 20, p. 32 (U. 3-7). 34. See ibid., 50. 35. Ibid., 58, p. 92 (ll. 5-7); cf. p. 93 (I. 18). There are three ways to read this ter1n., The more prevalent way is as transcribed above. See Munk, Le Guide des Egares, vol. 1, p. 241, note 2; he connects it with the particle 'an or 'anna, and translates it 'son Que.' R. Dozy, Supplement aux Dictionnaires Arabes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), p. 39, registers the reading inniyyatun and connects it with the particle 'in. The translation 'quiddity' (following Munk) is supported by the fact that this term translates the Greek estin; see Georr's Les Categories d' Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes, p. 207. R. Joseph Qafi);l, the Hebrew translator of the Guide, More ha-Nebukhim (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1972), vol. 1, p. 141, note 16, read its 'anayyatahu and connects it with the personal pronoun 'ana 'I.' He translates it 'anokhiyuto 'his 1-ness.' This translation is particularly significant in light of the dialectical nature of person and linguistic subjectivity (see following note). This meaning is possible even if one reads this term as Munk did and connects it with the particle 'an. This particle is the basis of the personal pronoun 'I' both in Hebrew, see ''The Hebrew Personal Pronouns," pp. 57-58; and in Arabic, see Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. 'an. However, the fact that it was used to translate estin argues against R. Qafi);l's interpretation. 36. Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 224-225. 37. See Guide, I, 1, p. 15 (II. 14-19). 38. Ibid, 58, p. 93 (11. 14-19). 39. Ibid. (11. 14-23). 40. Course in General Linguistics, p. 130. 41. Ibid., 88. 42. Ibid., p. 117. 43. Following Berakhot 57b, Maimonides recognized dreams as of the same genus as prophecy; see Guide, II, 36, pp. 261 (I. 6)-262 (1. 2). In both, we have language without semiotics. 44. Sigmund Freud, ''The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words," in Character and Culture (New York: Collier Books, 1976), p. 44. 45. Collected Papers, vol. 5, p. 185. 46. See Berakhot 56b, where it was observed that the significance of a cat in a dream would vary according to the particular dialect of the dreamer. Dialectical variations of the name ''cat" would affect the word association, and hence the meaning of such a symbol. Because the language of dreams is only semantic, interpretation is of the essence. Therefore, a "dream that was not interpreted [i.e., decoded) is like a letter that was not read"; ibid., 55a and 55b. 47. This concept is grounded on the belief in Creation ex nihilo, where all and any ontological relationship between God and His Creation is rejected (cf. above). "Absolute difference" applies only to the semiological, never to the metaphysical. Precisely because biblical Creation does not recognize any similarity between God and His Creation (cf. Isa 40:25 and the Commentary of Don Isaac Abarbanel, ad loc. ), any relationship between Him and Creation must be semiological, i.e., it must be predicated on the unqualified difference between Him and what He created. 48. Maurice Blanchot, "On Jabes," 73. 49· Ibid., 73-74.

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Notes to Pages 83-86 50. See note 47 above. 51. See Of Grammatology, p. 65, for the convergence of these two mean• mgs. 52. See Bishop William Warburton, The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, vol. 3, p. 1o8. 53. Pirush le-Sefer Y~ira, p. 100; cf. Midrash TanlJ,uma, Yitro, XIV, vol. 2, 3ga. The same explanation is recorded in the Talmudic Lexicon (twelfth century) He-'Arukh, s.v. 'ot; cf. R. David Pardo, Sifre Debe Rab (Salonika, 5559"1799), 3o6c. The same ter111 serves to designate the name of God; see Berakhot 33a, Sanhedrin 92a. 54. Writing and Difference, p. 74.

IV: Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition Introduction 1. Shabbat 115a; see the commentary of R. l:{anan'el, ad loc. 2. Cf. J. Juster, Les Juifs dans l'Empire romain (Paris: P. Guenther, 1914), vol. 2, p. 376, note 6; E. N. Epstein, Mabo le-Nosal), ha-Mishna (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), pp. 697 ff.; N. R. M. de Lange, Origen and the Jews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 34-35. 3. See below, section 2. 4. Mishna Sanhedrin XI, 1; cf. Bamidbar Rabba, Naso XN, 4 (174b). 5. Teshubot ha-Ge'onim (Harkavy), p. 103; Geniza-Fragmente, ed. Dr. Max Weisz (Budapest, 1924) p. 32. See PT 'Erubin I, 6, 19b: "Any oral text that was not incorporated into [an authoritative] collection is not valid." A tannaitic text that was not contained in an official collection did not have the force of tannaitic tradition, and could not be construed as a metibe 'refutation' or 'challenge' of a talmudic authority; cf. R. Moses Nabmanides, MillJ,amot, in Talmud (Venice), on Baba Me~i'a, 22b. 6. See ibid., and below, section 2, note 26. 7. See below, p. 86. With regards to the transmission of the Mishna, the rabbis established that expert teachers (mashninim) should be available every day in the morning and evening; Shemot Rabba XLVII (102a). They were paid; see Pesiqta de-Rab Kahana, ed. Bernard Mandelbaum (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962), vol. 2, p. 402, and the parallels indicated by the editor. These teachers were considered the true watchers of the city, since ''they safeguard the Tora in the mornings and in the evenings''; 'Ekha Rabba, PetilJ,a, II, ed. Salomon Buber (Wilna, 1899), p. 2. For more advanced studies of the Mishna there were academies known as Bet Talmud; see ibid., pp. 12, 100; and PT Megilla N, 1, 73d. B. Vayyiqra Rabba, ed. M. Margulies (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1953), vol. 9, VII, 3, p. 155. 9. Cf. Mabo le-Nosal), ha-Mishna, pp. 673-674. This institution was first explicitly mentioned in connection with R. 'Aqiba's disciples; see ibid., p. 674. The view that the tanna'im were indicted because "they were in the habit of teaching the law authoritatively from their Mishna" (cf. Baba Batra 130b) is cited (Sota 22a) in the name of R. Joshua, who was both the mentor and major supporter of R. •Aqiba. The attempt to explain away this indictment, rather than merely to reject it or ignore it, is evidence of its authoritative origin. 10. 'Arakhin 16b. For a further discussion, see Louis Finkelstein, Akiba: Scholar, Saint, Martyr (New York: Covici Friede Publishers, 1936), p. 113. For

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other clashes with the rabbinic authority, see Mishna Rosh ha-Shana I, 6; and the vehement protest of R. •Aqiba' s disciples that he was not excommunicated, Rosh ha-Shana 2oa and PT Rosh ha-Shana I, 6, 57b. 11. Tosefta Demai V, 24; d. Tosefta Berakhot IV, 15 and Be~ Il, 12. This may explain the awkward omission of Rabban Gamli' el from the chain of transmitters, in Mishna 'Abot I, 17-18. As noted by R. Joseph Na};lmias, Pirush Pirqe 'Abot, ed. Moses Loeb Bamberger (Faks, 5667/1907), 7b, the ''Rabban Shim'on ben Gamli'el" mentioned in Mishna 18 is the son-not the fatherof our Rabban Gamli'el. R. 'Aqiba was active in the revolt against Rabban Gamli'el; his opposition subsided only when his mentor R. Joshua asked him to stop; see Berakhot 28b. It should be noted that in a similar situation that had taken place earlier, R. 'Aqiba persuaded R. Joshua to accept the authority of Rabban Gamli'el; see Mishna Rosh ha-Shana II, 9. In the Mishna l:falla n, 5, R. Joshua dismissed the opinion of an 'elder' (zaqen)-probably a member of the Sanhedrin who survived the destruction of the Templ~eindicating thereby the superiority of the 'sage' (}µzkham) over the legal authorities. It is noteworthy that the 'elder' is not mentioned by name. For a more grievous version of R. Joshua's remark, see PT l:falla II, 5, 58c. On the supremacy of the ''elder'' over the ''sage'' in early rabbinic tradition, see the Barraita quoted in Ta'anit 16a. The interpretation given to it by Abayye, ibid., is indicative of the displacement of the "elder" (in the original sense) in late rabbinic tradition. 12. There is an attempt to discredit him in late rabbinic sources, see Qohelet Rabba VII, 7 (Bob); AdRN, XIV, p. 30. According to a well-established tradition he founded a Synagogue in Damascus (AdRN, ibid.: dammasit should read dammaseq). This tradition is recorded in R. Simon bar Sema};l Duran, Magen 'Abot (Le~horn, 1762), 26b. 13. Cf. Rab Nissim Ga on (Heb.), ed. Shraga Abramson (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1965), pp. 394-395. 14. See below, pp. 103, 133. 15. It appears frequently in the sense of'surrendering a thing or a document to a proprietor'; see Pesabim 4a, etc.; also when surrendering a bride to her groom or his representative, Yebamot 29b. It could also apply to property that an individual transfers to the public, Sheqalim 4a, b; Baba Me~i'a 118a; or to documents that were surrendered to the court, Makkot 3b. The act of ''surrendering'' a document in the presence of witnesses constitutes a legal transaction; see Sanhedrin 28b, Yebamot 116a. Likewise, "surrendering'' a bill of divorce to the wife finalizes the divorce; see Giffin 9b. It is important to remember that in order to make the "surrendering" effective, the witnesses are required to read the text of the document; see Giffin 19b. Cf. below, pp. 123-124. 16. See below, pp. 105-107. 17. See Yebamot 117a; Ketubbot 81a; and especially Baba Me~i'a 104a; Tosefta Ketubbot IV, 9-13; PT Yebamot XV, 3, 14d; Ketubbot IV, 8, 28d-29a. Cf. below, pp. 123-124. 18. See Nazir 56b-57a; Pesabim 81b; Shabbat 132a, and Rashi on Shabbat, ibid., who correctly understood the principle "one cannot apply a fortiori reasoning to halakha" to mean that oral tradition cannot be subjected to rabbinic her1neneutics. Concerning this principle, R. Simson of Chinon (d. ca. 1350) reported in the name of a Geonic responsum: that the thirteen canons of [rabbinic] exegesis are a tradition from Sinai. However, when [they were] taught they were [intended] to be

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Notes to Pages 88-90 applied to Scripture [alone), but not to a halakha. From this it follows tfiat the thirteen canons of exegesis cannot be applied [even] to a halakha proceeding from Sinai. (S-efer Keritut, [Verona, 5407/1647], #1, p. 3.) The expression gezera shava 'an equal terrn' one of the thirteen canons of exegesis, appears in connection with a rabbinic law; see Mishna Be~ I, 6. However, it has already been noted that there it does not have its usual meaning; see Saul Lieberrnan, Tosefta Ki-Fshuta, vol. 5 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1g62), p. 931. Rashi's position was not accepted by all. Nabmanides, in his Hasagot le-Sefer ha-M~vot (Lvov, 5620/186), chapter 2, 27b), disagrees. Likewise, the fact that R. Simon bar Semab Duran, Yabin Shemuta (Leghorn, 5504"1744), 49b), did not refer to the view of Rashi is evidence that he did not consider it authoritative. The same appears to be the case with Tosafot Qiddushin 17a, s.v. ve-Nilaf; cf. the valuable remarks by R. Solomon Algazi, Gufe Halakhot (Izmir, 5435/1675), #14, 8a; and the sources indicated by R. l:fayyim Joseph David Azulai, Yatir 'Ozen (Leghorn, 5552/1792), "L," #26. This point was further analyzed by R. Joseph Zarqa, Parpera'ot la-l:fokhma (Tunis, 5664"1904), 4d-6c.

Section 1: Halakha and Haggada 1. Sifre (Bamidbar), ed. H. S. Horovitz (Jerusalem: Wahr1r1an Books, 1g66), #6g, p. 17. 2. Bereshit Rabba XXXII, 18, p. 2g6. 3. Sanhedrin 107a, 67b. 4. Tosefta Sanhedrin VII, 6; Sifre #48, p. 133; Nedarim 36b. This is contrary to the explanation given by Rashbam on Baba Batra 134a, s. v. Haggadot; cf. R. Gereshom, ibid. 5. Sanhedrin 57b; cf. Bereshit Rabba IX, 6, p. 325. Likewise, the text of Sefer Y~ira, commented on by Setadya Ga'on, is divided into halakhot, although it does not contain any legal material; see Pirush Rab Setadya Ga'on le-Sefer Y~ira. 6. De Oratore, II, LXXX, viii, 359 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 1, p. 471. 7. The Art of Memory, p. 9. For further references, see ibid., Index, "Memory for things and memory for words." 8. The correct interpretation was given by Maimonides, in his commentary to the Mishna, ad loc.; see Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 4, p. 284. For a further discussion see R. Joseph Butjel, Zarta de-Yosef (Leghorn, 56og/1849), #1, 1a-b. The compliments to the student who is faithful "even with the words that he has heard from his teacher" (PT Pe'a I, 1, 15b) intend to stress the duty to repeat the exact words of the teacher, even when they appear to be faulty or senseless. For an alternative explanation, see R. Israel Jacob Algazi, She'erit Yataqob (Leghorn, 5546/1786), 125c. The obligation to repeat faithfully the words of a teacher applied to halakha i.e., official for1nulas issued to the students. Obviously, it did not apply to the words used during a lesson or in a class discussion. Thus, the students of Hillel (PesalJ,im 3a) for1nulated in their own words a question raised by their teacher (Shabbat 17a), since he never had actually forn1ulated it as a halakha. 9. See Berakhot 47a; Shabbat 5b; PesalJ,im 37b; cf. Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 1, p. 376; Bekhorot 30b; l:folin 7a; cf. R. Jonah ibn Jannab, Sefer ha-Shorashim, p. 129. Maimonides applied this principle in his interpretation of talmudic literature; see his Teshubot, ed. and trans. J. Blau (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirda-

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mirn, 1957), vol. 2, p . 555; the remarks by Maran Joseph Caro, Kelale ha-Gemara, in Halikhot 'Olam (Warsaw, 564)11883), 67d and R. Mal'akhi ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'akhi, (New York: Keter Publishing, 57o8/1948), #663, 166a. R. ~ Aqiba' s request from his disciples not to report variant traditions unless they affect the fa'am 'sense' of the law was designed to discourage the proliferation of controversies on linguistic differences which are legally meaningless. The passage in question reads: "When R. 'Aqiba used to arrange the halakhot he would say: 'Whoever has heard [i.e., received) a ta'am against his colleague [i.e., contradicting the tradition reported by him) should come forward and speak' " (Tosefta Zabim I, 5). On this point, cf. below, pp. gS-99. The criticism against ''the disciples of Shammai and Hillel who did not minister to their masters sufficiently'' (Tosefta l:fagiga II, 4, Sanhedrin VII, 1) alludes to this type of controversy; see Maimonides, Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 1, pp. 20-21; cf. below, section 2, note 9. In order to avoid this type of pitfall, R. Me'ir advised studying from one single teacher; see AdRN, VIII, p. 36. 10. See below, pp. 95-g6. 11. Sanhedrin gga; AdRN, XXIII, p. 76. 12. Mishna 'Abot III, 10; cf. the commentary of R. David Maimonides, Pirqe 'Abot (Alexandria, 5661/1901) 4ga: "even a single word," and Menal;zot 99b. 13. Mishna 'Abot IV, 13; cf. Baba M~i·a 33b and ISG, pp. 50-51; Baba Batra 21a-b. 14. This is expressed with the Aramaic formula shekia}J qamme de- 'he was regularly in the presence of,' e.g., Shabbat 82a; Ta'anit ga-b. Another expression is mesadder matnita qamme de- 'he would order his Mishna in the presence of,' e.g., Megilla 27b; cf. below, note 88. 15. AdRN, XXIV, p. 78; cf. Sifre #48, pp. 107 ff.; #188, p. 227. Elsewhere, there was reported in his name ''the scholar who lost his mishna," i.e., who forgot the text as a consequence of neglect. He may still regain it by 'going back into it' (la-l;zazor 'aleha)-an expression implying repentance; see Rut Rabba VI, 4 (35b). For the difficulty or impossibility of regaining a "lost text," see the opinion of R. Me'ir, ibid.; cf. Yoma 2ga and ·o~r ha-Ge'onim, vol. 6, Yoma (Ha-Teshubot), #25, p. 15. 16. Vayyiqra Rabba III, 7, vol. 1, p. 54. On the specific duty to memorize the Mishna, see Sifre #58, p. 124, and #59, p. 125. 17. Sifre #34, p. 6o. 18. The usual explanation "in accordance with the Law'' renders the whole statement superfluous. Accordingly, we may distinguish between a reply that a student gives in the form of a quotation from an authoritative source, and hora'a 'authoritative reply' which is not a quotation and therefore requires semikha 'ordination'; see Sanhedrin 5b. 19. Pesa}J.im 3b; cf. Maimonides, Pirush ha-Mishnayot, Shabbat I, 1, vol. 2, p. 10. On this point see R. Emanuel l:{ai Ricchi, l:fosheb Mal;zashabot (Amsterdam, 5487/1727), 10b; idem, Hon 'Ashir (Amsterdam 5491/1731), 129c. He further observed that occasionally a word is chosen simply because it happens to be shorter than another; see Hon 'Ashir, 67d, 127c. Finally, we must note what is known as mishna l;zasera 'faulty' or 'wanting' Mishna, in which only the theme in general terms is mentioned without any definition of the laws concerning it; see Mishna Teruma X, 8, and the valuable remarks of R. Solomon ibn Adret, Teshubot ha-Rishba [vol. 1), #28o, 43d-44a; cf. ibid., #270, 42b-c and #281, 44a. 20. Kelale Shemuel, 1d-2a.

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21. Consider, for example, the Mishna Shabbat l, 3 using zablzaba instead of the more accurate zablnidda (since this prohibition applies not only to the period of the actual flow [zob damah], but to the whole period before her ritual purification [nidda)). The student who neglected to observe that prohibition after the flow (see SJ1al1l,at 13a-b) was misled by the ter1n zaba; cf. AdRN, II, pp. 8f. 22. Cf. PT Pesa~1im II, 2, 28d, which explains that "our Mishna is referring to those places where it is customary not to eat bread [baked by] Gentiles." 23. This type of analysis was also applied by the rabbis to the text of Scripture; see R. Jacob Israel Algazi, Ma'a11e Lashon, 11b ff., in Ne'ot Ya'aqob (Izmir, 5521/1761), for a brilliant exposition of this subject. 24. See Temura 12b; Maimonides, Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 1, p. 292, and the very illuminating comment by the translator, note 13, showing that in the first version Maimonides thought that in all cases this expression had the same sense; cf. Ke/ale SJ1emu'el, 16a. On this principle, see Yad Mal'akhi, #374; Ya'ir 'Ozen, ''L," #14-15. 25. For Maimonides this expression is related to 'ayde; see Maggid Mishne, Sl,abbat, XIX, 9; and R. Be$al'el Ashkenazi, 'Asifat Zeqenim, Ketubbot, vol. 1 (Constantinople, 5498/1738), 1, Sa. This point was further analyzed in l:finna ve-f:lisda, vol. 1, 1oc ff. A similar notion is that of ashigra de-lishana 'following the habitual expression,' whereby the Mishna uses a common for111ula or expression, although it does not exactly fit the specific context at hand; see R. Solomon 'Adani, Melekhet Shelomo, in Shishsha Sidre Mishna (Jerusalem: 'El ha-Meqorot, 5716/1956), f:lagiga I, 1, vol. 4, 3oc. 26. Qol lza-Remez (Amsterdam, 5479/1719), 131d; cf. ISG, pp. 19, 36, 44; cf. Baba Qamma 3a, etc. 27. See his Pirush ha-Mishnayot, vol. 4, p. 147, and vol. 5, p. 150. 28. Sanhedrin, IV, 3; Ma'ase ha-Qorbanot, II, 4. The position of Maimonides here, as well as the Talmudic sources on the Mishna, have been brilliantly analyzed by R. Isaac Navarro, Pene Mebin, vol. 1 (Salonika, 5576/1816), 39b-d. 29. Sanhedrin 13b-14a. This is what I designate as sugya meshulleshet 'a three-part pericope': (1) Tanu Rabbanan ... Rosh-Rosh Me-'ola; (2) Tana ... ve-Qibbelu; (3) Amar ... li-Shlam. (1,a) indicates the tannaitic source found in the Sifra (Vienna, 5707/ 1947), Vayyiqra VI, 1, 19b.....__bearing on Semikha, in the sense of a sacrificial ceremony. (b) is three rhetorical questions beginning with "ve-Ribbi Shim'on!?" bearing on the conflict between him and R. Judah, concerning the number of judges required for this ceremony. (2,a,i) indicates the tannaitic source found in the Tosefta Sanhedrin I, 1bearing on Semikl1a in the sense of ordination. This source does not indicate the number of judges required nor the substance of the ceremony; (ii) and (iii) supply, respectively, the infor1nation on these points. (b) is a challenge to the opinion requiring three judges, and a response to this challenge. (3) gives Amoraitic sources on: (a) the geographical limits of ordination; (b) the attitude of those receiving ordination; (c) some of the festivities associated with this ceremony. A brief note about the strategy of the sugya: Only after (1) has demonstrated that Semikhat Zeqenim refers to the sacrificial ceremony can (2) demonstrate through syntagmatic opposition that, to avoid tautology, the Tosefta (" Semikha wu-Semikhat Zeqenim") must refer to ordination.

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Notes to Pages 93-94 30. A similar view appears independently in Mabo le-Nosah ha-Mishna, p. 68o, and Saul Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1g62), p. 97. 31. PT Baba Me~i'a IV, 1, gc; Baba Me~i'a 44a-b. For the correct analysis of the passage in PT, see E. S. Rosenthal in his introduction to Yerushalmi Neziqin (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), p. 21. 32. See Mabo le-Nosah ha-Mishna, pp. 19-22. 33. Baba Me~i'a 44b. 34 .. See Hon 'Ashir, 117b-d. The resistance to change peculiar to oral texts is the background for some of the controversies among the rabbis; see Yad Mal'akhi, #663, 169a. In 'Erubin 2b, 11a and PT 'Erubin I, 1, 18d, Rab refused to accept a later version of the Mishna, probably made by Judah the Prince himself after Rab's departure to Babylonia. The view proposed by Epstein, Mabo le-Nosah ha-Mishna, p. 205, that Rab was not reporting the original text of the Mishna, but simply declaring that it was not according to the law (halakha), is unacceptable on several grounds. First, contrary to modem opinion, the rabbis never considered the Mishna to be a ''Code of Law''; see Baba Batra 130b and Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 33, note 2. Further1nore, Rab would not have chosen that particular occasion-the teaching of the Mishna to a child as a forum to present a legal opinion. Finally, as already indicated by R. Joshua Soncino, Nahala le-Yehoshua· (Constantinople, 5491/1731), notes on 'Erubin, 2a, the present text of our Mishna bears the clause "although it is wider than ten cubits," which is totally pointless according to the accepted version of the Mishna, and whose sole purpose is to reject emphatically the original version reported by Rab. It is worthy of note that according to the version of Rab our Mishna is divided into two parts (Resha!Sefa) each composed of exactly 11 words: Maboi shehu' gaboah me-'esrim 'amma yema'et, Ribbi Yehuda 'omer 'eno ~rikhl ve-harahab me-·eser 'ammot yema'et ve-'im yesh lo ~urat ha-petah ~rikh le-ma'et. 35. Lev 5:1; 1 Kings 21:13; 2 Kings 9:12. 36. Num 23:3; 1 Sam 19:3; 2 Sam 18:21. 37. Isa 21:10. 38. For both auditory and visual experiences, see Lev 5:1; Ezek 40:4. For a prophetic experience, see I Sam 3:15. 39. Isa 43:12, 44:8, 48:20; Jer 4:5, 46:14, 50:2. 40. Cf. Gen 45:9-11, where Joseph tells his brothers to deliver to their father a precise message (va-'amartem ... ko 'amar) and v. 13 where he is merely concerned with the gist of the message (ve-higgadtem). In v. 26 the brothers 'tell' (vayyaggidu) Jacob something which he refuses to accept, and in v. 27 they say to him (vaydabberu) the words of Joseph, which Jacob recognizes as genuine and therefore accepts. Consider Est 2:22 where Esther is 'told' (vayyagged) by Mordecai, and she 'says' it (vattomer) to the King in the name of Mordecai. Likewise, see Est 4:4, 7, 8, 9, 12, in contradistinction to vv. 13, 15. The explanation given by the rabbis to the verse "Thus you will say [tomar] to the house of Jacob and tell [i,etagged] the children of Israel'' (Exod 19:3), underscores the distinction between these two ter1ns: "Thus you will say. Thus in the Holy language; Thus, in this order; Thus, in this sense; Thus, that you should neither subtract nor add to it. And tell to the children of Israel, that you should be . meticulous with them and tell it to them'' (Mekhilta de-Ribbi Yishma'el, p. 207). This last point becomes evident when one considers that since vatagged pertains to the sense of the utterance,

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one must be ''meticulous'' and particular in the elaboration of details when "telling'' it to others. Cf. R. Moses }:lef~, Melekhet Malµishebet (Venice, 547o/1710), 45a-b. 41. Gen 45:26; Lev 14:35; 1 Sam 14:33; 2 Sam 15:31. Actually, it means ''the substance of the speech.'' .µ. 1 Sam 25:12; 2 Kings 18:37; Jer 38:27; Ps 52:2. 43. Deut 17:4, 10, 11; cf. Gen 41:25, 49:1; Deut 32:7; 1 Sam 9:8; Jer 42:21; Ruth 3:4. 44. 2 Sam 6:21, 7:8. Hence the talmudic expression nagdeh '[he] punished him' for the execution of chastisement by the rabbinic authority. 45. Gen 31:32, 37; Jos 8:33, 35; 1 Sam 12:3, 15:30, 16:6; Neh 8:3; Hab 1:3; Isa 59:12; Ps 88:2. Likewise, lifne 'in front of' may mean 'under the supervision of'; see ''The Targumim and Halakha," 23. 46. Gen 41:24; Jud 14:12-15, 17, 19; Ezek 24:19, 37:18; Dan 2:2, 10:21, 11:2. Hence the sense of the title of the Commentary to the Mishne Tora by R. Envidal de Toledo, Maggid Mishne (cf. Zech 1:12). 47. Mishna Pesal)im X, 4; cf. Maimonides, Ijam~ wu-Ma~~, VII, 2. 48. See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Mi~vot, positive commandment 157, p. 139, that the obligation is ''according to the eloquence of the narrator." 49. See Emile Benveniste, lndo-European Language and Society, trans. Elizabeth Palmer (Coral Gables, Fla.: University 'lf Miami Press, 1973), pp. 385 ff.; for other similar ter1ns, see ibid., pp. 409 ff. The Aramaic lµzvva 'to show,' which translates higgid in the Targum Onqelos, underlines the sense of 'showing' implicit in this ternt. In the Talmud we find mal)ve 'shows,' in the sense of pointing out with a motion something illustrating the case in question, e.g., Megilla 28b; Makkot 21a, b. On this ter1n, see Yad Mal'akhi, #428. In Job 13:7 'al)vati stands for 'my word,' 'my speech.' 50. Qehillat Shelomo, ed. R. Solomon Aaron Wertheimer (Jerusalem, 565g/1899), p. 26. 51. PT Horayot III, 8, 48c. 52. Yebamot 76b; cf. Studies in Mishne Tora, p. 24, note 35. 53. See Sota 4oa; Ijagiga 14a, and Sifre #317, p. 359; Baba Batra 145b with the comments in ISG, Appendix, p. vi; and below, p. 143. Haggada also designates the Sabbath's homily pronounced by the head of the Academy; see Tosefta Sofa VII, 6. The reason why the haggada "draws the heart of the audience'' like ''wine'' (Sifre, p. 359) or ''water" (Baba Batra 145b) may be related to the fact that, as indicated by Elias Levita, Meturgeman (Isny, 1541), 86b, this term in Aramaic translates the Hebrew moshekh 'to draw,' 'to pull'; see Targum to 1 Kings 22:34; Hos 7:5, etc. It also translates 'to drip,' 'to flow'; see Jud 5:4; Ps 78:16, 20; and 'to tilt,' 'to incline' favorably; Gen 39:21. 54. Horayot 2b. To merit appointment as a judge one had to be both gamir and sabir; see ibid. and Sanhedrin 3a, 5b, and 7a. For sabir, see Ta'anit 8a; Sanhedrin 36b. 55. See Horayot 2b, 14a; Berakhot 64a; 'Erubin 30a; Mo'ed Qafan 12a; Sanhedrin 42a; cf. 'Erubin 67a with the explanation in ISG, pp. 43-45, and in the Appendix, pp. vi-vii. 56. Mishna Para I, 1; Nidda I, 3; Baba Batra 121a; cf. Nedarim 78a. Even Judah the Prince had second thoughts about the meaning of a tradition that he himself had formulated; see Be~ 24b. Thus the expression hu tane lah ve-hu 'amar lah 'he transmitted the tannaitic source, and he explained it' ('Erubin 10b, etc.). Occasionally, the transmitter objected to the opinion that he himself had transmitted; see Shabbat 155b; 'Erubin 88a. R. Joseph, Ketubbot

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objected to the view that he transmitted in the name of Samuel, a point occasionally overlooked in the explanation of that passage. Accordingly there is no point to the emendation suggested by Tosafot of deleting ''Rab Yosef,'' contrary to well-established tradition; ibid., s.v. 'Ella. Moreover, even if one were to accept the reading of the Tosafot, it would still be wrong to attribute the suggestion of an alternative version ('Ella, 'i 'itmar, hakhi 'itmar) to R. Joseph, since syntax would demand 'Ella, 'amar Rab-Yosef, 'i 'itmar, hakhi 'itmar. R. l:fiyya, too, disagreed with a tradition that he transmitted; see PT Baba M~i'a IV, 1 in Yerushalmi Neziqin, p. 55, and Saul Lieberman, Introduction and Commentary, in Yerushalmi Neziqin, p. 145. It is noteworthy that R. l:fiyya also appears to disagree with a tradition that he transmitted in 'Erubin 9b. 57. Qohelet Rabba Xll, 11 (goa); cf. Makkot 10a; Bamidbar Rabba, Naso XIV, 4 (174d). 58. In Arabic this ter1n means 'to plant,' 'to fDC per1nanently.' In rabbinic idiom girsa also includes the traditional melody with which the text was chanted; see •~r ha-Ge'onim, vol. 6 (Yoma), Ha-Teshubot, #24, p. 14, and R. l:fanan'el ad loc. Cf. Aruch Completum, ed .. Alexander Kohut (Vienna, 1878), vol. 2, GRS [b], pp. 370--371, and below, pp. 95-96. On the relation of girsa to halakha, see ISG, pp. 7, 48, 62, 63. It also applies to the shema'ta-lesson offered by the rabbis to the students; see Mo'ed Qafan 16a; Berakhot 47b and the note by R. Nathan Coronel, Bet Natan (Vienna, 1854), 2ga. It seems that Rame b. l:fama did not consider knowledge of shema'ta at the girsa level to be meaningful. See below, note 86. 59. See 'Erubin 68a; Baba Me$i'a 75; Baba Batra 144a. 6o. See Berakhot 28a; 'Erubin 28b. 61. See Berakhot 25a. 62. Horayot 12a; Keritot 6a. Cf. A. Buchler, ''Leaming and Teaching in the Open Air in Palestine,'' Jewish Quarterly Review 4 (1913-1914): 475-491; and S. Krauss, "Outdoor Teaching in Talmudic Times,'' Journal of Jewish Studies 1 (1948-1949): 82-84. However, teaching in public places, such as a market, was prohibited; see Mo'ed Qafan 16a-b; cf. Sukkot 49b and the remarks of R. Nissim Gerondi, Derashot, p. 63. Twice a year (YarlJ,e Kalla), this prohibition was lifted; see R. l:fanan'el, Mo'ed Qafan 16b. 63. See Qiddushin 81b; cf. Baba Me$i'a 86a. 64. See Shabbat 156b. 65. See Berakhot Ba; Shabbat 30b; Megilla 2ga. 66. See Berakhot Ba, 30b; Shabbat 1oa; Megilla 2ga. 67. Giffin 6a; Makkot 10b. 68. Cf. Berakhot Ba; Shabbat 1oa; Ta'anit 21a; Mo'ed Qafan 16a. 6g. AdRN, VIII, p. 36; cf. Berakhot 63b; Megilla 5a; Qohelet Rabba IV, 10 (75d). 70. 'Aboda Z-ara 3b; cf. Sanhedrin 92a. 71. 'Erubin 65a; cf. AdRN, VI, p. XV, the need for light to study oral tradition (shone) at midnight. See below, pp. 1ooff. 72. Baba Me$i'a 83b. 73. Cf. Sanhedrin 88b; Shabbat 30b. 74. Shabbat 30b; Mo'ed Qafan 28a; Baba Me$i'a 86a; Makkot 10b. 75. Shabbat 156b; Qiddushin 81b; Cf. Bamidbar Rabba, Naso XIV, 4 (174d). ']6. Baba Batra 22a. 77. See 'Aboda Zara 1ga. 78. 'Erubin 53b-5~; cf. Berakhot 22a. 2a,

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Notes to Page 96 79. See above, note 58. Cf. Megilla 32a; Tosefta 'Ohalot XVI, 8; Para IV, 7; Shir ha-Shirim Rabba I, 10 (4b); Massekhet Soferim III, 13. Bo. Ma'ase 'Efod, p. 21. The Talmud Qiddushin printed in Sabioneta in 1552 contains te'amim ''cantillation marks" in the Mishna; for a description see R. N. N. Rabbinovicz, Ma'amar 'al-Hadpasat ha-Talmud (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 571.2/1952), pp. 55 ff. Likewise, many Geniza fragments of the Mishna and Talmud contain cantillation marks. This tradition was preserved by some Sephardic and Oriental communities until our own day. The proper cantillation' of the Mishna and the Talmud was entrusted to the memory of young students. Chanting the Mishna helped to establish its traditional sense, as in what I designate ''elliptical mishna." Consider, for example, Mishna Pesa}.rim II, 1 and the controversy Pesa}.rim 28a. As is apparent from R. Isaac Alfasi, ad loc., this mishna is elliptical; it ought to be read ''mefarer, vezore la-ruwalJ, wu-metil layyam," so that mefarer applies to the two clauses of the sentence, rather than "mefarer ve-zore la-ruwalJ,, wu-metil layyam," in which it can apply only to the first clause. Most likely the Tosefta was also chanted. The end of each paragraph of the Tosefta was probably signaled by a long concluding chant, as is customary with the Mishna. Occasionally the meaning of a passage or tet1n could be affected by whether it was recited as the end of one paragraph or as the beginning of the next (e.g., the controversy between R. Hunna and R. }:lisda, Shabbat 115a; the question concerning the position of R. Judah, l:folin 141a-b; etc.). In these cases the official tanna'im could be consulted in order to establish whether gabbe hadade tanya 'are these [passages or ter1ns] recited together,' i.e., as a single paragraph? For the dispute concerning the Tosefta Baba M~i'a III, 1, see Baba M~i'a 34c1. Conversely, the expression kerokh wu-tne 'connect [these ternis] and recite [them together]' (Berakhot 59a, etc.), serves to indicate that the ter111s in question, usually recited as two different passages, must be recited as one. There is some evidence that other tannaitic collections (Barraitot) were chanted, too. Consider, for instance, Ketubbot 11b, where a difficult Barraita is expounded on the basis of the type of explanation following a technical ter1n hakhi qa-'amar 'the following was meant.' Sometimes this explanation presupposes that there is a lacuna, in which case it is explicitly stated that the text is wanting (}µzsure malJ,sera). At other times this explanation is semantically implicit in the text and there is no need to presuppose that some words are wanting (}µzsure malJ,sera). Occasionally, however, a lengthy explanation is interpolated, as in Ketubbot 11b. And yet the text is not declared to be 'wanting' (}Jasure malJ,sera). Why? The solution to this problem is found in 'Asifat Zeqenim, Ketubbot, vol. 1, I, 63c, s.v. Hakhi qa-'amar, that it was known that the Barraita contained two disconnected statements. Accordingly, this Barraita is a kind of a riddle requiring decoding (rather than a single faulty statement, to be reconstructed by positing a hypothetically larger text from which the present statement originated). This is why the Talmud does not declare the Barraita to be }µzsure malJ,sera. But how could it be known whether the text contained a single (but faulty) statement or two complete (but disconnected) ones? If the Barraita was chanted (as was the Mishna in the Sephardic and Oriental traditions), they could not help knowing whether it contained one or two statements. This tradition was not known in France; had it been, there would have been no need to prove where a sentence in the Mishna ended because "in some copies there is a blank space'' after the word in question; see Tosafot l:fagiga 10b, s.v. Me'ilot. 81. Midrash Tehillim, CXLVI, 5, 268a; cf. Megilla 28b; Sota 22a.

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82. See ISG, pp. 7 (and note 5), 32 (note 1), 34, 35, 48-49, 50, etc.; Teshubot ha-Ge'onim (A. Harkavy), #262, p. 135. Some Medieval European Talmudists disagreed as to how many and which of the orders of the Mishna were supposed to be known by heart; see 'Asifat Zeqenim, Ketubbot, vol. 1, I, 36b. 83. See Qiddushin 49b; cf. Shabbat 63a; l:lagiga 3a, and the valuable note by R. Rabbinovicz on this passage in his Diqduqe Soferim, ad loc.; Shebu•ot 41b; ISG, p. 26. There were different opinions concerning what some of the collections contained. For example, the Geonic text (which is corrupt) published by Chaim H. Horowitz, Toratan shel Rishonim, part I, p. 43 includes Torat Kohanim with the Tosefta; in the fourth collection, under the title "Sifre'' (Sifra, there, is probably a scribal error), it includes four rabbinic Midrashim: (1) Genesis Rabba, (2) Mekhilta, (3) Sifre on Numbers, and (4) on Deuteronomy. The first ''four'' in the Talmudic riddle (''One may use [i.e., be served by] an individual who recites [tane] four, but one may not use an individual who teaches [matne] four'' [Megilla 28b]) alludes to the four collections of the oral Law that the tanna had to know by heart, whereas the second ''four" alludes to the four orders of the Mishna usually taught at the Talmudic Academies. The sense of the riddle is quite obvious: one may be served by a tanna (that is, one may treat him not as a scholar), although he knows by heart the entire four collections of the oral Law; but one cannot do the same with someone who teaches (i.e., who understands) only four orders of one of these collections (i.e., the Mishna); see Magen 'Abot 10b. Tane and matne refer to two different levels of study (cf. Nedarim Sa). Tane 'recounting,' 'chanting' (cf. above, note Bo) means plain 'oral recitation' regardless of whether it is tannaitic (cf. R. Isaac bar Sheshat, Teshubot ha-Ribash, #375) or not (cf. PT Megilla IV, 5, 75b; 'Ester Rabba II, 4, 4oa). According to some, this ter11, is biblical; see R. Se•adya Ga'on, Tehillim, ed. and trans. R. Joseph Qafilt (Jerusalem, 5726/1966), VIII, 2, p. 64; R. David Qim}:ti, Se/er ha-Shorashim, s.v. TNH. Matne 'to teach' (cf. Megilla 2ga and Maimonides 'Abelut, XIV, 11) refers to a more intensive level of study, dealing with the comprehension of the material, whether one is actually teaching it or not (cf. above, p. 95). Therefore, some identified it with shema•ta (cf. below, note 86); see R. l:fanan'el, Megilla 29a, and R. Isaac Alfasi ad loc. Since the sense of the riddle could be unravelled only by a talmudic scholar, it could not offend the sensibilities of the uninitiated. The Ge'onim have preserved this riddle in a different version, but the sense is the same. In a Geonic responsum (cited above, note 82), the following version is quoted: ''One may use an individual who teaches [matne] four, but one may not use an individual who recites [tane] four." As is evident from the responsum itself, this means that one who only knows how to recite (but does not understand) four orders of Mishna is preferable to one who actually 'teaches,' i.e., understands, four (unauthorized) collections of the oral Law. Epstein misunderstood the sense of this responsum, and therefore concluded that tane refers only to tannaitic material whereas for "talmudic" material only matne is used; see Mabo le-Nosa~ ha-Mishna, pp. 681-683. Actually, matne could apply to ''talmudic material," e.g., Ketubbot 6a, or a non-authorized work, e.g., ibid., 1o6a. Significantly, tanuye (the infinitive form of tane) implies familiarity with rabbinic literature in general, as in the expression qaraye ve-tanuye (Vayyiqra Rabba XXX, 1, vol. 4, p. 6go), designating knowledge of biblical and rabbinic literature; cf. l:linna ve-l:lisda, vol. 2 (Izmir, 5628/1868), Be, gc; and Ch. Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud [Heb.], (Tel

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Aviv: Dvir, 1969), pp. 26-27. It is used for the recitation of Midrashic literature; see Berakhot 11b (the correct version is cited and analyzed in Bet Natan, 5a). It is also used for the recitation of Talmud; see Sukkot 28b-2ga, Ms. Vat. Ebr. 134, reproduced in Manuscripts of the Babylonian Talmud (Jerusalem: Makor Publishing, 1972), vol. 2, p. 119, which reads: tanuye talmud bar mimmetaleta 'for the recitation of Talmud [it is pertnissible to be seated] outside the Sukka' (cf. Aruch Completum, vol. 8, p. 249). This reading is essential for an adequate understanding of this passage. The discussion centers around a tannaitic statement (st) that shinnun a ter1r, usually designating the recitation (and/or study) of the oral Law (cf. Megilla ~; PT Megilla Il, 3, 73b)--must be done inside the Sukka. (st) is questioned (q) on the basis of a statement by Raba (d. 352), distinguishing between the study of Scripture and Mishna (so in Vat. MS.) that must be inside the Sukka, and the recitation of the Talmud that belongs outside the Sukka. The answer (a) is predicated upon a distinction between two levels of study: one that must be done inside the Sukka and the other outside. There follows a corroboration (c) of the thesis that two levels apply to talmudic studies. The sense of (q) is that by excluding the Talmud from the Sukka, Raba was postulating that the (st) is not categoric. There is a difference of opinion concerning (a). According to R. }:ianan'el, ad loc., the reciting or study of either Scripture or Mishna, since they are qeba' 'fixed,' i.e., they have a fixed text and are part of the regular curriculum, must be done inside the Sukka. The only exception is tanuye talmud, an expression that for him is equivalent to merahate bi-gmara 'to speed through the gemara' or lesson given at the Academy. Since that lesson did not have a "fixed" version, it could be reviewed outside the Sukka. This seems to be the position of Se'adya Ga'on who stated categorically that "They are obligated to read and study . . . inside the Sukka''; see Siddur R. Se'adya ca·on (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1g63), p. 234; since by that time the text of the gemara (i.e., the Talmud) was already fixed, the above-mentioned rule was categoric. This seems also to be the position of R. Isaac ibn Ghiyyat, quoted by R. }:iayyim bar Shemu'el, $eror ha-1:Iayyim (Jerusalem, 5726/1g66), p. 99, who permits only ''the recitation of the text of the gemara outside the Sukka." According to this view, studying the gemara at the girsa level does not require ''seating'' (cf. Ta'anit 10b) and thus it is not included in the obligation to "inhabit'' the Sukka, whereas the other level of study ('iyyun 'analysis') requires "seating'' (cf. Megilla 28b, the episode with Raba), and therefore falls within the obligation to ''inhabit'' the Sukka. According to R. Isaac Alfasi (ad loc.) and Maimonides (Sukkot VI, 9), the only thing that matters is the level of study, regardless of the text. In their view, tanuye talmud is the equivalent of 'iyyun-not of merahate bi-gmara; cf. Ta'anit 24 a-b. Therefore, girsa, which requires no analysis, must be inside the Sukka, whereas 'iyyun (intensive study) must be excluded from the duty to "inhabit'' the Sukka (which pertains to more mundane activities). The object of (c) is to provide the semantic background for Raba's statement. The meaning of tanuye talmud is deter1nined by showing that Raba and his colleague would "speed together through the gemara, and afterwards analyze the theory [sebara]. '' For R. }:ianan'el, tanuye talmud is girsa of the gemara; for R. Alfasi and Maimonides it is the 'iyyun. According to both of them tanuye must refer to talmudic studies; otherwise neither (q) nor (a) nor (c) could make sense. If tanuye referred to some (less authoritative) tannaitic collection, it would not contradict (st) which explicitly points out "Mishna.'' There would be no reason to assume that a less authoritative literature would

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Notes to Pages 96-98 require the same type of attention as do Scripture and Mishna. Only by positing that Raba was referring to Talmud, which has a superior status (cf. Baba Me~i'a 33a-b), does (q) have sense. Otherwise, how would it be possible to relegate talmudic studies to a realm ''outside'' the Sukka?! Likewise, (a) and (c) would be pointless, injecting the question of different levels of talmudic studies. 84. Horayot 12; Keritot 6a; cf. Rab Nissim Ga'on, p. 134. For the usage of the terms gamir and girsa in Geonic literature, see Halakhot Pesuqot, ed. S. Sasoon (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1950), p. 38, and the Hebrew parallel in Hilkhot Re'u (Versailles, 1886), p. 11. 85. Berakhot 13b. 86. Cf. Berakhot 38b; Shabbat 21b; Be~ 27a; l:{olin 5oa. Students were totally engrossed in reviewing the shema'ta; cf. 'Erubin 43b. (For a striking illustration see Shabbat 88a.) Therefore students were not pe11nitted to review their lessons on the night before the Passover until they had searched their homes for leavened bread ''lest they become absorbed by their shema'ta and neglect their religious duty'' (PesalJ,im 4a). The shema'ta was only given to the rabbinic student; see above, note 58. Therefore, upon entering the Synagogue for a private errand, ''If one is a ~urba me-rabbanan, 'rabbinic student,' he must recite a shema'ta; if one is a tanna, he must recite a hilkheta" (Megilla 28b; the correct text is cited by R. l:fanan'el, ad loc.). It also applied to gemara; see l:{olin 45b; cf. Sukkot 2ga and the commentary of R. l:fanan'el, ad loc. 87. Cf. Berakhot 38b; PesalJ,im 52b; Mo'ed Qatan 16a; Baba Qamma 33b. On the different levels of shema'ta studies, see Makkot 11b. 88. Ta'anit Ba; cf. l:{agiga 9b. 89. See Baba Qamma 117a. 90. PesalJ,im 68b; l:{olin 86b; Keritot 27a. 91. See Mo'ed Qatan 28a; cf. Ginze Midrash, p. 249. 92. See Ta'anit 1oa and Sukkot 28b. From the commentary of R. l:fanan• el on Sukkot, it appears that it pertains only to sabir. This matter, however, requires further investigation. 93. See Shabbat 63a. 94. Yebamot 72b. The six-month period mentioned in PT Shabbat VII, 2, 9C, probably refers to this level of study. 95. Yoma 33a. See above, notes 54-55. 96. Sanhedrin 68a. For a more or less parallel division of Talmudic Studies in traditional Sephardic education, see my ''Hora'at ha-Talmud ba-Massoret ha-1:{innukhit ha-Sefaradit," Shebile ha-1:{innukh, 35 (1975), 189-192.

Section 2: The Formulation of the Oral Law 1. ISG, p. 18. Cf. Teshubot ha-Ge'onim (A. Harkavy), #334 in fine, p. 164. 2. The sense becomes clear upon considering that the oral Law, by definition, was not formulated, whereas the written Law, by definition, was forn1ulated; see the next section. 3. ISG, p. 22. 4. ISG, p. 39. This view was adopted by Maimonides; see Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 48 ff. 5. ISG, pp. 48-49. 6. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 7. Ibid., pp. 23-25; cf. pp. 8, 9, 10. 8. Ibid., pp. 18-19, cf. 58.

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9. Sanhedrin Bga. Accordingly, the rabbis warned against teaching the text of the oral Law ('al yishne) to an improper student (f,lolin 133a). Such a student could interrupt his studies before grasping the meaning of the formulas and explain them not in accordance with their original intention; cf. above, section 1, note 9. 10. ISG, pp. 10-11. 11. Ibid., pp. 5, 27-29. 12. Cf. Mabo le-Nosal) ha-Mishna, pp. 673-674. 13. AdRN, XVIII, p. xxxiv. 14. See below, pp. 142-143. Cf. Sheqalim V, 1, 14b; Gittin 67b; ISG, pp. 18-19; and Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, p. 95. 15. See Mabo le-Nosal) ha-Mishna, pp. 673-674. 16. ISG, pp. 26-29. 17. Ibid., p. 30; cf. p. 19. 18. Ibid., p. 47. 19. Cf. Mishna 'Ohalot XVI, 1. 20. ISG, pp. 21-22. 21. See Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 33. 22. ISG, p. 50. For the designation halakhot to the Mishna, see PT Horayot III, 7, 48c. 23. Ibid., p. 7. 24. Ibid., p. 36. Similarly, the Ge'onim had ''mishnayot" containing aggadic material; see ''Mishnat Shir ha-Shirim," p. 122, note 23. 25. Shabbat 1o6a. 26. See above, the introduction to this chapter, note 5; cf. Riban, Makkot 20b, s.v. hakhi garsenan. For instance, a tannaitic tradition transmitted under the heading tane (cf. above, section 1, note 83), was of little authority. Consider the dispute between Rish Laqqish and R. Yottanan, where the latter reports his view under the heading tane (Mak/cot 14b). Significantly, the Talmud states that Rish Laqqish appears to be correct (bishlama) in not considering the view of R. Yottanan; furthermore, it asks why R. Yottanan did not accept the view of Rish Laqqish. On the other hand, in the She'iltot de R. 'A}Jai, ed. R. Samuel Mirsky, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Sura Institute, 1959), p. 116, is found the term tanya heading an amoraitic tradition, probably in the sense of 'an authoritative statement.' Likewise, Baba Batra 107b (cf. Diqduqe Soferim, ad loc., note 30). For additional sources, see Louis Ginzberg, Ginze Schechter, vol. 2 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1929), pp. 148-149. 27. See R. }:Ianan'el on Shabbat 1o6a. 28. See 'lyye ha-Yam, 108a. 29. ISG, p. 47. Accordingly, there were some who permitted the ritually impure to recite it; see Berakhot 22a. Other tannaitic collections, such as those known as Massekhtot Qefannot, fall into this category. Cf. Tosafot, Shabbat 152b, s.v. 'Ad, in fine, that considers Massekhet SemaQot not authoritative. On the status and time of compilation of these collections, see 'En Zokher, ''S," #31; R. l;iayyim Benjamin Pontremoli, PetaQ ha-Debir, vol. 1 (Izmir, 5598/1838), 15c-d, and the sources cited in these works. However, in Qohelet Rabba V, 8 (77b), explicit mention was made of some of the tractates contained in these collections as ''given to Moses in Sinai"; cf. below, section 3, note 28. 30. Sanhedrin X, 1, 28a, in R. Duran Magen 'Abot (36b) as quoted in Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, p. 103, note 55. Lieberman, however, prefers the

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printed text be-'Iggeret ''in a letter." This is probably an emendation on the basis of TP Berakhot IV, 3, Sa. This expression means "to read it [with the intonation usually employed in reading] a letter'' (cf. above, chapter I, notes 50-52), something that makes little sense in the context of our quotation from Sanhedrin. Section 3: ''Written'' and ''Oral'' Texts 1. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, p.84. 2. Temura 14b; cf. Giffin 6ob. For such a correspondence between the Holy Land and Babylonia, see Lieberman, Introduction and Commentary, p. 1 47· 3. Tosafot Temura 14b, s.v. Debarim. This point was further analyzed by R. Joseph }:iazzan, f.liqre Leb, 'Ora/J, f.layyim (Salonika, 5547/1787), #12-14, 1ob-16d; #41, 71b-c; #56-57, 99b-102b. 4. Megilla 23a; cf. Maimonides, Tefilla XIII, 17. For a detailed analysis of this subject, see my ''Din 'Aliyat ha-Qatan Liqro ba-Tora,'' in Studies in Memory of the Rishon le-Zion R. Y. Nissim, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Yad Harab Nissim, 5745/1985), pp. 113-133. 5. Mishna Ta'anit IV, 3; Mishne Tora, Kele ha-Miqdash, VI, 4 and Mishna Yoma VII, 1. 6. See Midrash Tan/J,uma, Vayyera VI, pp. 87-88, and the parallels indicated by the editor. 7. For the traditional explanations of these terms, see R. Refael Encaoua, Qarne Re'em (Jerusalem, 5670/1910), #249, 23&-239C. 8. See below, p. 135; Maimonides, Tefilla, XII, 5; Sefer Tora, VII, 11; and Studies in the Mishne Tora, pp. 178-179. 9. 'Iyye ha-Yam 93b; see 'Erubin 62b, and cf. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, p. 86. 10. See below, pp. 1o8-110, where a text that was only ''published'' but not yet a ''book'' could be cited but not ''expounded." Cf. above, p. 100. 11. 'Iyee ha-Yam Boa. For a more or less similar view, see Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, pp. 83 ff. 12. Giffin 6oa; Massekhet Soferim XVII, 1. This expression does not appear in the printed text of Temura 14b. However, there is little doubt that there were other versions (cf. Studies in the Mishne Tora, p. 178, note 11), and that the text underwent scribal "corrections." The fact that this expression occurs in Shifta Mequbbe~t, ad loc., may be indicative of its presence in other • versions. 13. 'Iyye ha Yam, 111b-112b. The Talmud (Ketubbot 19b) distinguishes between a moda'a 'notification' which 'was consigned for writing' (nittan likateb [= lehikkateb]), and a shetar 'amana 'document [drawn] in trust' which 'was not consigned for writing' ('eno nittan likateb [= lehikkateb]). Concerning the latter, PT Ketubbot II, 3, 26b, reports in the name of Rab that witnesses may in fact sign a shefar 'amama; they cannot however validate their signature. According to this tradition there is no prohibition against writing a ''document in trust'' (cf. Mishna Baba Batra X, 4; Maimonides, Malve ve-love, XXIII, 5, in opposition to Tosafot Ketubbot 19a s. v. 'A-'Avla), but only against validating the signatures, as this would allow the holder to pass it for a genuine document. Ketubbot 19c1-b reports a different tradition in the name of Rab, namely, that the witnesses are actually forbidden even to sign such a document as this involves bearing false testimony; see Maimonides, 'Edut, III, 7. Concerning the reason why the witnesses are per1nittted to sign the bill of

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sale of a transaction executed under duress, Maimonides maiotains ('Edut m, 8; cf. Kesef Mishne, ad loc.) that since the notification (moda'a) issued by the proprietor [that he was selling under duress] is considered as written (nittan likateb), there is the legal possibility of invalidating the bill of sale and therefore the witnesses may sign it. Similarly, the Ge'onim maiotain that since the notification ''was consigned for writing'' it is considered as duly written and registered although in fact it was never written; see '0$ar ha-Ge'onim, vol. 8, Ketubbot (Ha-Teshubot), pp. 75, 77. Cf. above, pp. 87-88. 14. See Maimonides, Zekhiya wu-Mattana, VI, 17; and Yabin Shemu'a, 6obc. From Mo'ed Qatan 18b it is evident that, as Maimonides maintains, such documents were in effect written down; see Migdal 'Oz, ad loc. 15. Yoma 2ga. 16. Megilla 7a. 17. Tosafot, ibid., s.v. Ne'emara. The solution offered by the Tosafot is unclear; see however the comments of R. Jacob Berab in R. Solomon haKohen, She'elot wu-Tshubot Meharshakh, vol. 2 (Salonika, 5352/1592), #215; Me-Harere Nemerim (Venice, 5348/1588), 16b; and R. 1:Iiyya Rofe, Ma'ase l;liyya (Furth, 5487/1727), 11a-13c. 18. Megilla 1ga .. It should be noted that in Tosafot, Megilla 7a, s.v. Ne'emara and in Aggadat Ester, ed. Salomon Buber (Cracow 5657/1897), 40a, this view is quoted in the name of R. Yo~anan; see editor's note. 19. Rishba's Commentary, ad loc. 20. Sanhedrin 101a. Yemenites recite this scroll without chanting; see p. 10 above. 21. Megilla I, 1, 7oa. 22. Cf. above, section 1, note 29. 23. Cf. R. Emanuel l:fasin, in Me-Harere Nemerim, 5b. 24. See Midrash Shemu'el, chap. 15, p. 92, where on the basis of this verse it is declared that the act of mesira 'delivery' of a scroll must be executed 'standing up' (be-'amida). Surely this alludes to an official ceremony. PT Rosh ha-Shana I, 3, 57b recounts that a King would 'deliver' to his son precious objects during his coronation 'when his son stood up.' Similarly, sons 'stood up' when their father 'delivered' to them the tools of his profession, thus certifying that they were competent and in charge of the trade. 25. See Mishne Tora, Sefer Tora, X, 6, 8; for an analysis of this law, see R. David Pardo, l:fasde David, part IV, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 5730/1970). Cf. the valuable note of Ch. Albeck, Shishsha Sidre Mishna, vol. 6 (Jerusalem-Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute and Dvir Co., 1959), pp. 6o8-6og. 26. Cf. below, p. 119. 27. Megilla 7a. 28. Rut Rabba IV, 5 (33d). This view is connected with the view expressed there that the scroll of Esther ''was from Sinai," in the sense that when it became certified by the proper authorities, it acquired the status of a canonical text; cf. PT Megilla I, 7, 70d. 29. Rut Rabba IV, 5 (33d.) 30. See below, p. 143. 31. See below, notes 33-34. 32. This is implicit in the idea of a text as a legal document ''surrendered'' to the people; see below, pp. 122-124. 33. See Megilla 7a, the opinions of R. Joseph and R. Na~man bar Isaac (d. ca. 356) who proved that the scroll of Esther was written by the Holy Spirit on the basis of Est 9:28-that its memory will last among the Jewish people,

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that is, that they would transmit it. See above, p. 14, and Se'adya Ga'on, cited below, p. 109. 34. Yafe Mar'e (Berlin, 5485/1725), 123a. 35. Kelale Shemu'el, 5d. Section 4: Forn,ulation and Publication

1. See above, section 3, note 9; Aggadat Ester, p. Bo. The passage in Qiddushin 66a, in which a Sadoqite argued that the Tora is "rolled and deposited,'' may be an allusion to its publication; cf. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, pp. 86, 200-202. However, he carefully avoided mentioning that it is a 'book' (sefer). Why? This becomes clear when we consider that the status of "book" bears directly upon the issue of canonical exegesis (derash; see below, note 6)-a fundamental institution bitterly disputed by the Sadoqites. 2. See above, section 3, note 10. 3. See above, p. 102. 4. Megilla 7a; this is the manuscript version; see Diqduqe Soferim, ad loc.; the printed text is corrupt. 5. This is the manuscript version; see Diqduqe Soferim, ad loc.; the printed text is corrupt. 6. The printed text is corrupt. However, from the commentary of R. l;ianan'el, ad loc., it is obvious that we must read; ''Write this-(refers) to what is written here (in Exod 17:16) and in Deuteronomy (25:17-19); as a memorandum (zikkaronHrefers) to the scroll [of Esther]; in a book-(refers) to the Prophets (1 Sam 15:1-35); these are the words of R. Joshua." This version appears in Mekhilta de-Ribbi Shim'on bar Yolµii, pp. 123-124. However, what is reported in our Talmud in the name of R. Joshua is reported in the Mekhilta in the name of R. Eleazar ha-Moda'i, and vice versa. Accordingly, the ter1n ke-tanna'e ("the preceding is a controversy among tannaitic authorities'') appearing in our talmudic discussion, serves to introduce the opinion of R. Joshua that the scroll of Esther is only a zikkaron, in opposition to the preceding tannaitic source declaring that it is a sefer. Since this is the issue dividing the tannaitic authorities, R. }:ianan'el declared: "And the law is . . . that in a book refers to the scroll [of Esther]." 7. Megilla 7a. 8. Ibid.; see Rut Rabba, IV, 5 (33c). 9. See above, IV, introduction, note 15. 10. In the Hebrew translation, p. 161 (1. 15): ve-timserennu be-qabbala. 11. Sefer ha-Galui, p. 163. 12. Shabbat 6b, g6b; Baba Me~i'a gob. On the meaning of this ter1n, see 'Iyye ha-Yam, 113a-114b. 13. Rosh ha-Shana 18b, 1ga; cf. Ta'anit 10a, 17b. 14. On this issue, see the incisive analysis by R. Isaac de Mayo, Shorshe ha-Yam, vol. 1 (Salonika, 5567/1807), 164b ff. 15. See below, note 19. Cf. Berakhot 10b; Shabbat 30b, 112b, 115a; Pesa1,iim 62b; J:Iagiga 13a; Mena1,iot 45a. 16. Shabbat 88b, Bga; Zebal}im 116a. 17. l:lagiga 12a. 18. Shabbat 115a-b. 19. Sanhedrin 100b, as quoted by R. Me'ir Abul'afia, Yad Rama, ad loc. The printed text is corrupt. 20. Shabbat 115a-b; cf. Mishna Megilla I, 8, and Yadayyim IV, 6. For an

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analysis of this passage, see Mabo le-Nosaf}. ha-Mishna, pp. 648-649. The textuological status of translations in Judaism is a highly complex issue that ought to be treated separately. For the various talmudic views on Yadayyim IV, 6 see Megilla 8b-~. It is obvious, however, that Hellenistic Jews believed that the Greek translation of the Scriptures ''was consigned to be written'' and therefore ''consigned to be expounded." Accordingly, they expounded the Greek version as an independent text, i.e., independently of the sense of the Hebrew original. In rabbinic circles in the Holy Land and Babylonia, translations of Scripture were denied a ''written'' status. Although the Targum eventually developed a ''Masora,'' it was for pedagogical purposes; see my ''Ha-Mesora le-Targum Onqelos,'' Sinai 6o (1967): 17-27; and it never acquired the status of a ''written'' text. Therefore, although the Targum reflected authoritative traditions, it was never expounded as a source of halakha or authoritative teaching; see "The Targumim and Halakha," 19-26. 21. Shabbat 115a. 22. Cf. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, pp. 100 ff. 23. See above, pp. 102 ff. 24 See above, chapter 1, note 44. 25. 'lyye ha-Yam, 111a-b. 26. Shabbat 115b. 27. See the note of R. Z. H. Chajes, on Shabbat 115b. 28. PI Berakhot V, 1, ~29. Gittin 6oa; Temura 14b; cf. Berakhot 23b. It was common to lend copies of such books; see Shebu'ot 46b. 30. PI Shabbat XVI, 1, 15c. See ''Some General Observations on the Character of Classical Jewish Literature,'' p. 44. 31. Sefer ha-Mafteaf}., 2b; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Madda', ed. I