God and the Burden of Proof: Plantinga, Swinburne, and the Analytic Defense of Theism 1615925953, 9781615925957

Citation preview

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

■

42

properly basic whenever I am in the circumstance of experiencing certain characteristic abdominal pangs. On the other hand, I might note that I do not accept 'My stomach is empty' as properly basic whenever I happen to notice that it is an hour after my usual time for taking lunch. I might have had an unusually large breakfast so that my stomach is not empty by my usual lunch time. From a large number of such examples I might eventually formulate the following criterion: "Accept beliefs about your internal bodily stateS as properly basic only when you experience certain characteristic feelings." Once such criteria have been formulated, they can be tested against concrete cases. That is, such criteria will be confirmed if each time we discover a new, obviously properly basic belief it conforms to those criteria. For instance, the above criterion is confirmed if, after formulating it, 1 notice th,at I accept belicfs about my heart rate as properly basic only wben I feel my pulse thumping in a characteristic way. On the other hand, such criteria would be disconfirmed if an instance of obvious proper basicality were found to run against them. For instance, a doctor might discover that she is pregnant by performing an ultrasound lest on herself. She makes this discovery by looking at an image on a screen rather than by having a characteristic feeling. Nevertbclcss, her belief that she is pregnant seems 10 be a basic belief; she just sees the developing embryo (seeing with an instrument is a form of seeing). Further, that belief seems 10 be properly basic.. \Ve have, thercfore, an apparenl counterexample to the criterion th.at beliefs about internal bodily states are properly basic only when certain characteristic feelings are experienced. By such a prooess of hypothesis formation aod testing, Planlinga believes that adequate sets of criteria can eventually be formulated. Further, he sees no reason to suggest that such critcria would have to permit greatpumpkinism as properly basic just because they allow theism to have that status. How, then, can theists be sure of having criteria that permit them 10 regard belief ,n God as properly basic? Simply by making belief in God ooe of their ex.amples of obvious proper basicality." That is, if we regard the ex.istence of God as obviously properly basic i n given circumstances, then the criteria we eventually formulate will, of course, reflect that initial assessment. In oth.er words, since our criteria in large pan will derive from what we initially take as obviously properly basic, lhose criteria will naturally permit the taking of such beliefs as properly basic! This may strike the reader as a case of pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps, but it is a perfectly legitimate procedure. The statement '1 + 1 = 2' is obviously a properly basic belief. lt tberefore constitutcs one of the paradigms of proper basicality from which l will endeavor to formulate my criteria. Those criteria,

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

öl

EI Kindle para PC de Adolfo - God and the Burden of Proof (Frontiers of Philosophy)

Archivo Ver Ir Herramientas Ayuda Biblioteca

< Atras

-- -.

lr a v

Aa

□

[D

Ocultar Bloc de notas 57

Notas y puntos destacados

Swinburne and the Cosmological Argument

r□

Filtrar por

+ Tarjetas

de estudio

Exportar

Todo el contenido �

At the end o f chapter I the conclusion was reached that if theistic belief is to be made credible to atheists, theists must agree to cooperate in hammering out shared conceptions of rationality. If this process had 10 start from scratch, there would not be much hope for the philosophy of religion. Fortunately, though, much common ground already e)(iSts. lndeed, since philosophers (or at least those in the analytic tradition) share much the same background, education, language, and, in general, participate in a common intellectual milieu, it would be surprising if they did not share many of the same intuitions about rationality. One of the deepest and most widely shared convictions about rationality is that the methods and practices of the natural sciences constitute a paradigm of reasoned inquiry. Respect for the natural sciences as a model of objectivity and progress in the acquisition of knowledge is still very widespread-if not quite as universal as it once was. Hence, a belief commands much respect if it legitimately claims to be supported by the canons and methods of scientific inquiry. The proliferation of pseudoscientific doctrines and practices shows how strongly people covet the "scientific" label for their own beliefs. lt comes as no surprise that theistic philosophers have often attempted to support theism with arguments at least similar to the ones employed in the natural sciences. If it could be shown that belief in God is supported by the same types of methods, logic, and evidence that undergird the best scientific theories, this should give the quietus to atheists (who are usually vociferous in their support of science). Unfortunately for theists, the road toward scientific theism has proven a bumpy one. Attempts to justify theism in this manner often succeed only in making a mockery of scientilic reasoning. The preposterously misnamed doctrine of "scientific creationism" is the latest of such distortions. 1 Equally notorious have been the many "God of the gaps" arguments. These arguments place God in the ever-shrinking gaps in the domain of the scientilically explicable. Thus, if there are domains that science has yet to explain adequately, such

39%

,P Escribe aquf para buscar

X

Posici6n 704 de 1863

L. Afiadir subrayados y notas

►

Para hacer un subrayado, selecciona el texto en tu libro y elige un color. Afiade notas haciendo clic en Afiadir nota en el menü de subrayado o en tu Notebook. Consejo: Para crear un subrayado räpidamente, pulsa Ctrl mientras arrastras el puntero sobre el texto.

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138