Globalizing Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline [1 ed.] 9783737006903, 9783847106906

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Global East Asia

Volume 6

Edited by Chun-chieh Huang

Advisory Board: Roger Ames (Hawai‘i), Don Baker (Columbia), Carl Becker (Kyoto), Michael Friedrich (Hamburg), David Jones (Kennesaw), Bent Nielsen (Copenhagen), Jörn Rüsen (Essen), Kirill O. Thompson (Taipei), John Tucker (Carolina), Ann Waltner (Minnesota) The volumes of this series are peer-reviewed.

Ching-yuen Cheung / Wing-keung Lam (eds.)

Globalizing Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline

With 6 figures

V&R unipress National Taiwan University Press

This book series is subsidized in part by, and published in cooperation with, the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISSN 2365-7871 ISBN 978-3-7370-0690-3 You can find alternative editions of this book and additional material on our website: www.v-r.de © 2017, V&R unipress GmbH, Robert-Bosch-Breite 6, 37079 Goettingen, Germany / www.v-r.de (Asian version published by National Taiwan University Press) All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Cover image: © Lam Wing-keung

Contents

Preface

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Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline: An Introduction . . . . .

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Part I: Japanese Philosophy: Teaching and Research in a Global World James W. Heisig (Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture) Japanese Philosophy and its New Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Jacynthe Tremblay (Hokkaido University) Teaching and research on contemporary Japanese philosophy in Belgium, Canada and France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Raquel Bouso (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Broadening philosophy: learning experiences from Japanese thought . . .

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Alfonso Falero (Salamanca University) The Meaning of Japanese Philosophy. A Spanish Perspective

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Curtis Rigsby (University of Guam) Constructing a Course in Japanese Philosophy

Satofumi Kawamura (University of Tokyo) Japanese Philosophy in Japan: Research, Teaching and Politics . . . . . . 115

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Contents

Part II: Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline Mayuko Uehara (Kyoto University) The Philosophy of Nishi Amane – Toward the Creation of New Knowledge through Translational Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Michiko Yusa (Western Washington University) Exploring the “Logic” of Topos with Sun Wukong

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Katsuhito Inoue (Kansai University) The Topic of Environmental Issues and The Japanese Philosophy . . . . . 167 Liao Chin-ping (Sun Yat-sen University, China) On the Cultural Discourses of Nishida Kitaro¯ and Suzuki Daisetsu

. . . . 173

Lam Wing-keung (University of Tokyo) Nishida Kitaro¯ and Confucian ethics: with a focus on “cheng” . . . . . . . 181 Wong Yiu-hong (Chinese University of Hong Kong) The Structure of iki and Hermeneutic Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . 193 ¯ tani University, Japan) Yosuke Takehana (O The Logic of the Transcendence of Life. Tanabe’s Theory of “World Schema” and Miki’s “Logic of the Imagination” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Taguchi Shigeru (Hokkaido University) Reality as it is. Nishida and Tanabe on appearance and mediation

. . . . 229

Gereon Kopf (Luther College) “Nishida, Tanabe, and Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism: A Blueprint for a Critical Philosophy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Yasuo Kobayashi (Aoyama Gakuin University) About Professor Megumi Sakabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Notes on Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 Index of Names

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Preface

I am delighted to include this book, co-edited by Cheung Ching-yuen and Lam Wing-keung, in the series of Global East Asia which is a major book series coordinated by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (IHS), National Taiwan University (NTU). As this volume on Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline is the first one of the series, I would like to make some remarks. First of all, the IHS of NTU was conceived in 2005 and established in 2006 as the first “Institute of Advanced Studies” to be established not just in Taiwan but in the greater Chinese language academic area. The main purpose of establishing IHS is to identify research topics in the humanities and social sciences in which National Taiwan University faculties are strong and to build research teams that could make breakthrough developments, while exploring cross-disciplinary topics and studying various cultures. It should be noted that history has blessed Taiwan by enriching her society and culture with relative peace and stability across the centuries, as well as a rich variety of influences, including the impact of Dutch and Portuguese explorers in the 16th and early 17th centuries. The Chinese came in waves, from Zheng Chenggong’s (Koxinga’s) Ming loyalists in the early 17th century to settlers from Fujian in the 18th-19th centuries. Taiwan society received the stamp of Chinese culture that survived its absorption into the Japanese empire from 1895–1945 which strove to modernize Taiwan as a center for East Asia cooperation and trade. Taiwan was restored to the Republic of China (ROC) government in 1945 and hosted by the ROC from 1949. Thus, through the turbulent twentieth century, Taiwan was protected from that military violence, political and cultural upheavals in mainland China. Taiwan experienced smooth economic and educational development under the Japanese; then during the Postwar period, under the coldwar order, Taiwan nurtured her political and educational institutions. In this relatively ideal cultural environment, scholars in Taiwan were able to continue age-old traditions of studying, reflecting on and developing the best of Chinese

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Preface

culture, primarily the Confucian classics, but other manifestations, as well, such as Buddhism and Daoism. Because Taiwanese scholars enjoyed a secure, stable environment for so many decades, they effectively developed the traditions of scholarship in Chinese culture, the Confucian classics, in particular. That is why today at National Taiwan University, for example, so many colleagues are so adept at reading and interpreting the original texts of the Confucian Classics; this empowers them also to be able to read the commentaries, not only by the traditional dynastic Chinese scholars, but those by early Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese scholars, as well, who also wrote commentaries in Classical Chinese, which modern scholars in those countries have difficulty in reading. Thus, it was, in view of this special asset of NTU faculty, IHS planned and instituted its Program on East Asian Confucianisms. By similar reflection on fields in the social sciences, IHS planned and nurtured five other large-scale research programs, including Democratic Studies in East Asia, Courts and Legal Transplants in East Asian Countries, Psychological Study of Chinese Self in East Asian, etc. To support, coordinate and analyze the fruits of these research programs, IHS also set up three integrated platforms on digital Humanities, environment humanities and Health and the humanities. The six research programs at IHS have led to the publication of over 196 volumes in eleven series of books in Chinese and English. The series on Global East Asia publishes books authored by Principal investigators or generated from the conferences that IHS sponsored. Books included in this series, in a varying degree, aim at thinking from East Asia. The expression “East Asia” covers “East Asia as a political system” and “East Asia as a cultural contact zone”. Either way, in the past several millennia, the intercourse and relationships among these East Asian countries and regions exhibited extreme asymmetries of power and culture that inevitably led to political leviathans and cultural hegemony. In the 20th century, many East Asian scholars of the humanities and social scientists were influenced by academic paradigms borrowed from America or Europe. They extrapolated ideas from humanities and social science theories that were based on Euro-American experiences and applied them uncritically to their East Asian studies, cutting and trimming the data to fit inappropriately imported paradigms. Because “the West” stood as the “Significant Other in Absentia” in the back of these scholars’ minds as they engaged in their research, only East Asian phenomena that were similar to or comparable with European or American experiences were treated seriously by them. For this reason, “Thinking from East Asia” is an issue that warrants the serious attention of East Asian scholars today. However, the “Thinking from East Asia” that we advocate in this book series is not another form of Reflexive Orientalism, but instead seeks to compare and contrast the cultures and intellectual traditions of the countries and regions of

Preface

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East Asia. Only by understanding these similarities and differences can we grasp their deeper traditional commonalities and divergences, so that future scholars may avoid the pitfalls of cultural ethnocentrism and political solipsism. In “thinking from East Asia,” our Program of “East Asian Confucianisms” stands out a major point of departure. The field of “East Asian Confucianisms” embraces a pluralistic outlook and a comparative methodological stance. Although “East Asian Confucianisms” embraces the Confucian traditions of China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, it is by no means merely a synthetic concept embracing them all as a unity. At the same time, the development of “East Asian Confucianisms” manifests “continuity of development” and “similarity of intellectual framework.” We should not only study the similarities among the “East Asian Confucianisms” of each part of East Asia; but we should also carefully analyze their different trends and tendencies. By pioneering in the field of East Asian Confucianisms, on the one hand, we transcend the constraints of the traditional methodology of Sinology while casting off the state-centric bias that plagues the traditional scholars. By “retrospect,” we see that the East Asian approach is “forward looking” and encompasses “future” and “past.” In this age of globalization of the 21st century, if we endeavor to explore the field of East Asia as a cultural field, taking the Confucian classics as its core and culture as our research context, we may broadly engage in East-West cultural exchange and focus on the cultural interactions among the different parts of East Asia. In this way, we may discuss the changes and development of the classical Confucian concepts and values in the cultural-historical context of each part of East Asia, and thereby pioneer a colorful, enticing new realm of Confucian studies for the 21st century. Now, we are in a better position to appreciate the reasons for including the Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in our series. The move from tradition to modernity in Japan since the middle of 19th century was very drastic. As the 19th-century intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901) had pointed out vividly, the intellectuals of Meiji Japan had two bodies in one life, namely, the upper “body of Chinese studies” and the lower “body of Western studies.” Among the various disciplines of traditional Sinological studies, Confucianism was of paramount importance. After the Meiji Restoration, the importance of Confucianism had been quickly replaced by European philosophy, predominantly the German idealism. Therefore, Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline has been developed since the latter half of 19th century. However, in contrast with Confucianism that is a time-honored tradition of thought, the modern Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline for teaching and research requires justification. In other words, Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline needs a discourse for its raison d’être. All the 17 articles in this volume review the current status of the teaching and research of Japanese

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philosophy in the global context, and discuss a variety of issues involved in Japanese philosophy as a new field of study. In conclusion, we publish this volume in the hope that it will be proven to open a new vista for the teaching and research of Japanese philosophy in the 21st century. Chun-chieh Huang NTU, Taipei April 17, 2016

Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline: An Introduction

The essays collected in this book are some of the papers presented in the International Conference: Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline, a conference organized by the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in December 2011. The book is divided into two parts, namely, “Japanese Philosophy: Teaching and Research in a Global World;” and “Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline.” In the first part, there are reports of the situation of teaching and research of Japanese philosophy. The areas discussed are Japan, Canada, France, Spain and English-speaking regions. 2011 is the year of the publication of Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook. James Heisig, one of the editors of Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, gives us a general introduction of the sourcebook project, and its promise as an important teaching resource about Japanese philosophy. In the second part, there will be papers on varies topics on Japanese philosophy, such as papers on Nishida Kitaro, Kuki Shuzo, Tanabe Hajime to contemporary thinker such as Sakabe Megumi. These papers not only show the topics on Japanese philosophical debates, but also are the potential of Japanese philosophical thoughts. Back in August 2010, there was a workshop organized by University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP) titled “The Possibility of Making Japanese Philosophy an Academic Discipline.” Nakajima Takahiro, the organizer of this conference, suggests that “[W]e are now trying to understand Japanese Philosophy as a challenge to think of our world differently. We don’t want to stabilize Japanese Philosophy in an established department, but to use it as a tool to intervene and shake the academic apparatus as it exists in the modern university system.” Nakajima and the editors of this book, as well as many other colleagues, later applied for a grant titled “Japan Studies Based on International Collaboration,” a competitive grant by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). According to JSPS, “the promotion of internationalization is an important aspect of humanities and social science research in Japan, particularly those with a focus

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on subjects related to Japan (Japan Studies).” “Furthermore, Japan Studies is losing its special status overseas, on its way to being relegated to merely one area of Asian Studies.” “Therefore, it is important to promote Japan Studies abroad through international collaboration, by providing support for existing Japan Studies with the aim of securing an international demographic that possesses a deeper understanding of Japan.” We proposed a project called “Constructing an International Research Ground for Japanese Philosophy.” Taking Chinese philosophy as an example, we notice that it is well-recognized as a branch of philosophy, and there are many scholars and students working on Chinese philosophy. However, the situation is quite different in Japanese philosophy. On the level of research, there are prestigious academic journals for Chinese philosophy, but there is not a single peerreviewed academic journal for Japanese philosophy at the time of our application. In order to make Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline, we believed that it is important to seek for the possibilities of establishing an international journal, an international association and perhaps a research center. The project was an attempt to realize these possibilities. We proceeded to the final round of hearing, but the grant application failed. “Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline” became an unfinished project. Although we failed to get the grant, we managed to establish the Journal of Japanese Philosophy (SUNY) in 2013, International Association of Japanese Philosophy in 2014, and the book series called Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy (Springer) in 2015. These ongoing projects would not be realized without the supports of all our colleagues and friends. We strongly believe that Japanese philosophy should be an open platform for all readers. We are trying to demonstrate the potential of Japanese Philosophy, but not to limit Japanese philosophy to a single philosophical tradition or school. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to Prof. Huang Chun-chieh, who has been supportive to the idea of making Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline. It has been a privilege for us to have the full support from Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (IHS), National Taiwan University. We would like to thank Amy Chin and Linda Yu for their editorial support to the publication of this book. Cheung Ching-yuen and Lam Wing-keung Winter 2016

Part I: Japanese Philosophy: Teaching and Research in a Global World

James W. Heisig (Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture)

Japanese Philosophy and its New Students

Young students East and West opting for a specialization in philosophy today stand at a crossroads with a choice that few of their teachers ever faced, and fewer still have ever had to face: either they open up their studies to a world of philosophy wider than the traditional curriculum, with all the confusion and uncertainty that entails, or they turn their backs on it. For some years now, this has been a live and momentous option. Not too long from now, if I am not being overly optimistic, it may also be a forced option, so that we may say with William James: not to choose is to choose. For departments of philosophy, this concern with nonwestern philosophy runs immediately into obstacles from customs prevailing in the academy. I shall restrict my remarks to East Asia, but similar circumstances exist in other parts of the world. Basically, these obstacles are of two kinds. The first obstacle is resistance to the idea that there can even be any system of thought outside western intellectual history that merits the name “philosophy” in the strict sense of the word. The arguments in favor of this position are on shaky ground from the start inasmuch as they offend the spirit of philosophy as the critical search for wisdom wherever it is to be found. The assumption has been that the particular variety of philosophies acknowledged in the academies of the West should be allowed to define the field for the rest of the world. Reliance on that assumption has been eroded in the past fifty years and is now on its last legs. No culture, no religion, no philosophy can any longer presume to speak for the whole of humanity. In defense of those who exclude philosophies other than the western, it must be said that, by and large, the countries of East Asia have not clearly defined their own philosophical traditions as such. The definition of philosophy that clings to the word invented by the Japanese Nishi Amane in 1874 and has been taken over by the neighboring countries of China and Korea has remained bound hand and foot to western philosophy. There have been three approaches to challenge that habit of thought.

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The first approach is to locate the term philosophia in a broader class of intellectual enterprises, none of which can stand as a defining paradigm for the others. Raimon Panikkar’s “homeomorpic equivalents” (roughly the equivalent of Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances”) comes to mind. A generation ago he listed over 30 Sanskrit names and notions that could qualify as philosophy. Perhaps his criticism was made too early; perhaps the range of knowledge required to take over his suggestion was too great. In any case, the impact on western philosophers has been minimal. A second way to challenge the western definition of philosophy has been to maintain the term, in a very general sense, and show that there similar traditions not rooted in the cultures of the Mediterranean basin. This has been the approach taken in Japan in recent years, although the Japanese themselves are divided on whether to consider the connection with western philosophy an essential ingredient in the definition. A third approach is that taken by John Maraldo, Thomas Kasulis, and me in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook. Our idea was to identify in Japanese intellectual history resources comparable to those that have informed and continue to inform western philosophy. This includes much that would not meet today’s academic standards but without which the philosophical tradition would be greatly impoverished. It is doubtful that the likes of Heraclitus, Epictetus, Plotinus, and perhaps even Plato, Erasmus, Voltaire, and Nietzsche would survive peer review in today’s philosophical journals, but it is hard to imagine western philosophy without them. The same may be said of the massive body of “philosophical” thought from premodern Japan. At least one has to admit that its merits as a philosophical resource deserve serious consideration. Now a second and more reasonable obstacle to the embrace of nonwestern philosophies is that, simply put, professors are at a loss how to direct students in philosophies in which they have not been trained or even know how to begin training themselves. In the case of East Asia, the number and quality of translations from Korean, Japanese, and Chinese into European languages do not make matters any easier. True, over the past fifty years a wealth of material on a whole range of Asian philosophies has led to a revision of recent encyclopedias of philosophy, not to mention the respectable array of doctoral dissertations and monographs on particular thinkers. But the results are fragmentary and the audience small. In general, it is hard not to sympathize with teachers of philosophy who deal with the problem by encouraging their students to first gain a solid background in western thought and defer their study of Asian philosophies for future study under competent teachers. The solution is not satisfactory, if for no other reason than that it begs the question. To answer a student’s question by substituting it with other questions that the teacher is qualified to answer is not the right lesson to teach at any point

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in education, and certainly not in a field of study that prizes self-critical thought. What is more, such a response overlooks the fact that the basic linguistic skills needed to work seriously with nonwestern philosophy are less likely to be gained the longer they are postponed. Before suggesting a way out of this dilemma, we may first try to consider it from a different point of view. No doubt, the inclusion of alternate paths to contemporary philosophy raises important questions about the accuracy of textual interpretations grounded in cultures and modes of thought foreign to those that produced those texts. Still, a closer look at just how this took place in Japan may help teachers reassess their uneasiness over the lack of linguistic and historical expertise for directing students interested in Asian philosophies. To begin with, the great majority of Japanese engaged in western philosophy do not consciously incorporate Japanese premodern resources into their writings, despite the abiding influence of those resources on their own intellectual development. The fact is, without the Buddhist and Confucian canons and the varieties of intellectual currents they produced, without the Taoist classics and Shinto mythology, the nuances and tacit assumptions of Japanese logic and language would fall flat. Conversely, for the West, there is a vast body of religious, literary, and esoteric thought that has served as a valuable resource and, given its philosophical language, a depth of connotation hidden from the surface of the texts. The Bible, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, Cervantes, and Proust, as well as the corpus of mystical, hermetic, alchemical, and proto-scientific thought have had a far greater influence on philosophical thought than academic philosophy ordinarily pays tribute to. There are of course exceptions on both sides, but these only serve to heighten awareness of what is lost in the carriage of philosophy across traditions. In addition to the linguistic and textual problems of embracing radically different modes of thought, there is always a performative aspect to philosophical reasoning that makes it more like music than like literary criticism in the sense that it is only accessible through the praxis of interpretation. Simply to read the texts is to be tone-deaf, to focus on the lyrics and miss the melody. Where the tuning and the scales are unfamiliar, as they are in much of Japanese philosophy, the temptation to block them out is all the greater. We seem to have strayed to the opposite corner of the argument for broadening the study of philosophy beyond the western heritage, but philosophy must find a way through this skepsis if it is to maintain its foundational commitment to think as critically, comprehensively, and intensively as possible. The only way to do this is to do it. Detention by methodological doubt is no longer enough of a reason not to engage. Had the acceptance of western philosophy in East Asia been stymied by the same apprehensions, we would not have the body of twentiethcentury Japanese thought that has begun to capture the imagination of philos-

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ophers in the West. Philosophers best honor those specialists in East Asian thought and literature who have acquired the linguistic skills and level of historical understanding to make a considerable body of work available in translation not by retreating from its “otherness” but by returning to the very naivete of apprenticeship that their education has shielded them from. Dialogue with the philosophies of the East needs to be approached as a voyage of discovery, not as an archaeological dig. Its primary virtue is not the prudence of the classifier but the daring of the adventurer—something that the great turning points in the history of western philosophy attest to again and again. Post-colonial contemporary philosophy has labored for the past fifty years and more to deconstruct the hubris and Eurocentricism of “philosophy” and to disenchant us of its claims to universality. But there is a growing sense that the project has been idling and unproductive, that something more needs to be tried. Once the idols have been toppled, examining the pieces is just not that satisfying, as more and more of those standing at the frontiers of western philosophy have begun to feel intuitively. To judge from the many young students whom we met in the course of workshops and conferences organized in preparation for the Sourcebook, the enthusiasm for the philosophies of Japan and its East Asian neighbors is a sign that the time is ripe for giving different philosophies and different rationalities recognition at the curricular level. As we wait for a generation to be trained and take on positions in the academy that allow for institutional reform, there is much that teachers and students, as many as feel the urge, can undertake together to prepare the way. The suggestion is not as foolhardy as it sounds. In fact, one might say that unless change begins from the bottom up, in the self-conscious naivete of adventure, no changes imposed at the organizational level are likely to take root. What is more, apprehensions about the cultural and linguistic differences, as important as they seem in the confrontation of European and Asian philosophies, are regularly transgressed on one’s home ground. The mooring of history and language to geographical stability easily creates the illusion of a primordial “sameness” that allows philosophical thought to jump from one age to another as easily as a frog hops across lily pads on the surface of a pond. The movement to understand ideas by clarifying the epistemic circumstances of their birth has introduced a certain suspicion towards appeals to a philosophia perennis, but in practice the philosopher who is not self-consciously engaged in clarifying one or the other aspect of the history of philosophy, regularly overlooks the epoch specificity of texts and authors cited. This makes it possible for the past to serve as a “resource” and inspiration for the present without constantly having to apologize for the fact that the past is in large part a foreign country. Despite the cautions mentioned earlier, not all of Japanese philosophy, and perhaps none of it always, needs to be fenced off as “foreign” and “other.” There

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are ideas of mind, body, temporality, and even interpersonal communication to be found in medieval Japanese thought will appear more accessible to the contemporary western mind than their counterparts in medieval scholasticism—and vice-versa for Japan. The geographic and cultural boundaries of Japan and of Europe are not sufficient to provide their respective traditions of thought with a stability that justifies keeping them at arm’s length one from the other. Language and social institutions are always too fluid, too much alive not to overflow their current identities in the attempt to understand what is radically “other.” If there is one thing we learned through the preparation of the Sourcebook it is that descriptions of particularly “Japanese” aspects of language, art, and logic gain nothing important from attempts to prove that these elements are lacking in other cultures. Most of the time—perhaps all of the time—these arguments show a crippled understanding of non-Japanese philosophies, logics, and arts. There has to be a more acceptable way of making comparisons. It is one thing to say, “We cannot say X in other languages; our idea of Y is nowhere to be found in other cultures and this makes it valuable”; and quite another to say, “I simply do not know how to say X or how to find Y in any other intellectual tradition than my own. But if I could, or if someone could show me, then X and Y would be all the more valuable for it.” These questions all carry over into the definition of philosophy. From the standpoint of modern Japan, at least four distinct senses of the word tetsugaku have been debated. John Maraldo has studied this in depth and his results woven into the Framework with which the Sourcebook opens. All four senses were stimulated by the encounter with non-Japanese traditions, both western and Asian. I summarize them here. First is the study of western philosophy as it was received from abroad—not only its content but also its method of study. Nothing else was classified as “philosophy.” This is not the place to assess the results, but the fact that no major Japanese philosopher has ever been universally accepted in the West as part of that tradition is enough to suggest that the ideal was both misguided and selfdeceiving. In the second place, for the same reasons but at the other extreme of the spectrum, there are those who hold that only pre-modern Japanese thought and its East Asian sources can count as genuinely Japanese philosophy. Although the Sourcebook devoted considerable space to these resources, their relevance today cannot be isolated from advances made in philosophies of the West. A third sense builds on an assumption that gained currency in Meiji Japan: wakon yo¯gaku 和魂洋学, Western learning with a Japanese soul. Often used as a defense mechanism, the truth is, it takes a practiced hand to identify the philosophical import of premodern writing and engage them in the light of modern philosophical terms and methods. Moreover, the venture always teeters on the

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edge of a narrow precipice, one side falling into protectionism, the other into a headlong but unconscious appropriation of western thought. Those who have the skills to keep their balance and not lose touch with the fundamental philosophical vocation to critical thinking have been given a prominent place in the Sourcebook. A fourth and final sense of tetsugaku is distinctively Japanese in construction but not in audience. Its markedly Japanese character is put at the service of a vision that rejects both colonial and counter-colonial forms of orientalism. Whatever singularity Japanese philosophy represents, it does not necessarily entail a slide into the vainglory of national pride. And yet, a critical awareness of the historical, cultural, and linguistic conditions that shape its thinking are a necessary condition for identifying original or creative contributions to philosophical thinking. This fourth sense is most clearly, but not exclusively, represented by the Kyoto school. At its best and at its worst, the writings of Nishida and his successors highlight the task, and are therefore given a large section of their own in the Sourcebook. While respecting this description of what philosophy has meant, the editors hold out hope for a new definition that will allow Japanese philosophy to be a resource for the West as well. This is a task that only the new students of philosophy, in Japan, in its neighboring countries, and in the West, can bring to reality. We look ahead to the day when contributions to what we have no choice today but to call “Japanese philosophy” can transcend the land of their birth and be judged on their own merits—the day when the Sourcebook will be seen as a relic in the history of philosophy. Meantime, scholars East and West specializing in Japanese philosophy need to broaden their view of the resources of the tradition as a whole. Those working with late twentieth-century thought, for example, may feel no immediate pressure to study neo-Confucian thought, but familiarity with the important changes that took place there during the Tokugawa era should alert them to aspects of current thought that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. It was with these considerations in mind that the idea of producing a Sourcebook was born. In a word, we wanted to show the breath and length, the front and back of Japanese philosophy from its beginnings to the present day. We had no wish to interfere with the self-image Japan has of the way its own history of philosophy developed, or to tarnish its own image of that development. We wished only to gather resources into a single volume for readers who, from a different standpoint, want to learn from many examples of creative thinking in that history. Obviously learning philosophically is not the same as learning about the facts of the history of philosophy. It is not just a matter of satisfying intellectual curiosity or expanding one’s range of knowledge. Philosophy’s way of learning is

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to grope around beneath the text for assumptions, to compare, to appropriate, to carry the lamp of Diogenes between the lines into questions dark and impenetrable. The more we advanced, the more we realized that the image of Japanese philosophy in much of the West as “traditionalist” and “following the lead of precedence” is a groundless anachronism. If a Kant or a Hegel or a Heidegger were able to change the way we did philosophy, then so might a Do¯gen, a Sorai, or a Nishida—if given a chance. I repeat: this is not to devalue the “otherness” of the history of Japanese philosophy. As is the case with most of our own past, it must be allowed to retain its strangeness. This is all the more so when there are major differences of expression and construction involved in treating a language as different from Japanese as English is. We need texts that sound natural to the English ear, but never at the expense of allowing the challenge of otherness to shine through. I do not mean that translation is merely a tolerable alternative to contact with the original texts. The fact is, Japanese philosophy must be translated if it is to interact fully with other philosophies, including those of the West. But translation is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it implies that the classical traditions of European and American philosophy can learn from Japan’s native philosophical tradition. On the other, it implies that Japanese philosophy can be used, and even have creative contributions made to it, by those not conversant in the original language. This is a harder pill to swallow, but once again the history of western philosophy bears it out: it is not the border lines between traditions that are primary, but the borderlands in whose overlap they become secondary. People can sit in Madrid or Paris comfortable with the claim that Catalan is a hybrid of French and Spanish, and the reason is: they have no idea what Catalan is. You have to see it in its living form to know how wrong the categorization is. It is in the borderlands that Japanese philosophy comes to light. As Tom Kasulis is fond of saying, imagine if only those who could read Danish or Russian were qualified to comment on the thought of Kierkegaard or Dostoyevsky and advance ideas that remained undeveloped in their thought. Then, too, there are important studies done on William James or Henri Bergson by people outside the cultural-linguistic frames within which they wrote who have at best a dim appreciation of their use of language. Crudely put, western philosophy would be much the poorer if we applied the same criteria to it that have kept the development of Japanese philosophy locked into its own language and culture. If there is much lost in even the best translation, the gains are often more than compensation. It might seem that referring to our anthology of Japanese philosophy as a “sourcebook” evades the problem of defining philosophy. It is and it is not. The editors are of one mind that the right to define what is philosophy and what is not does not rest with any one tradition, any more than the right to define what is

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rational can be claimed by any particular culture and imposed on any other. But just what makes one work philosophical and another not is another question. We have assumed a rather generous approach, in light of the great variety of the western philosophical tradition, not confining ourselves to the stricter parameters of modern academized philosophy. But it is entirely possible that the range of our inclusion may help question the dismissal of some elements in the western tradition as “unphilosophical.” This is a problem I have not thought through well myself, odd as that may seem for an editor of a philosophical collection for a western audience. In any event, the apparent irony of not being able to define the central concept of our collection may be a sign of a new era in philosophy. When the Sourcebook was published this past June, we heaved a collective sigh of relief. A project of more than half a million words and over 100 collaborators is exhausting. But in another sense, as editors, it has left us full of expectations. Not because of its reception; not because I think it will change anything in the world of philosophy. By its nature, the volume points beyond itself, a door to another reality. For a few months more we may forget the moon and fixate on the finger, but in our hearts we know that eventually, when people realize what that other reality is, they will find themselves unhappy with our resumes and selections. Our expectations are of another sort. They focus not so much on the pages of this one book but on the process that led up to it and stands behind it. The Sourcebook is only one more symbol of important changes taking place in the history of philosophy. Those of us involved in the preparation of the book stepped into a stream already flowing and tried to pen a few words on the surface of the flowing water. To that larger history, even 1,360 pages is no more than a footnote. If collaborators in other Asian countries, of whom there are several representatives here today, can open a door to philosophy, and if our efforts and the efforts of all our collaborators can keep a foot in that door, then the philosophical heritages of the West and of East Asia will be better off for the intrusion. For a century and more, western scholars who have made a home in Japan and Japanese scholars who have spent great parts of their lives in the West have ¯ gai called “two-legged scholars.” The clamored for the education of what Mori O curricula of our philosophical academies hobble along on crutches, unable to open their eyes to the self-evidence of what those voices are saying.

Bibliography Heisig, James W., Kasulis, Thomas P., Maraldo, John C. Maraldo (eds). Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture). Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011.

Jacynthe Tremblay (Hokkaido University)

Teaching and research on contemporary Japanese philosophy in Belgium, Canada and France

Introduction This paper deals with the teaching and research conducted from 2004 to 2011 on Japanese philosophy in Belgium, Canada and France. In 2004, Bernard Stevens, Frederic Girard and I overviewed research about Nishida’s philosophy in the French-speaking regions (Heisig 2004). I will take up this subject, adding other Japanese philosophers, research in English Canada, as well as university education in this field.

1

Teaching of Japanese philosophy

In the francophone countries of Europe, there is currently only one course on contemporary Japanese philosophy. It is a course about Japan’s history of ideas given by Asari Makoto at University of Bordeaux 3. Asari is known for his comparison between thought and Japanese language. He discusses the concept of aida (the “between”), in particular through four thinkers: Watsuji, Hiromatsu Wataru, Kimura Bin, and Nishida. He links this theme to the topic of the overcoming of modernity, and to some examples of philosophically significant nihonjinron (speech on the specificity of Japanese culture). He also addresses the topic of tenko¯ (change of ideological direction) through a few books of Tsurumi Shunsuke, Fujita Sho¯zo, Yoshimoto Takaaki, Maruyama Masao, and Karatani Ko¯jin. Across English Canada, there was only one course on Japanese philosophy until recently. Robert Carter, now retired and known for his translation of a section of Watsuji’s Ethics (Watsuji 1996), gave a course at Trent University about East Asian philosophy that included Do¯gen, Suzuki, and Nishida. At McGill University (Montreal), Victor Hori occasionally gives a course on Japanese Buddhist philosophy. He discusses its most important figures, namely Nishida, Tanabe and Nishitani, focusing on the double origin of this kind of

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philosophy, that is to say modern European philosophy (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger), and Buddhism Mahayana (Zen and Pure Land Buddhism). In March 2008, Hori has organized a symposium at McGill University about “The Kyoto School: Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations”. Among the topics, one can find Kuki’s methodology and concept of contingency, Nishida’s treatment of temporality, Miki Kiyoshi’s concept of the subject of history, Watsuji’s concept of the transcendence of the state, comparisons with the Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan, and so on. All the papers were published in the second book of the collection Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy (Hori and Curley 2008). In 2009, I had the opportunity to teach contemporary Japanese philosophy at University of Montreal. On this occasion, I discussed the introduction of Western philosophy in Japan at the beginning of the Meiji era, the formation of Japanese philosophical vocabulary, and the interdisciplinary aspects implied in Japanese philosophy. The course focused on Kuki, Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Watsuji. Most students’ interests, however, were not philosophy but Asian studies in general. For this reason, little attention was paid to that kind of academic field and the course was discontinued. For a few years, a course is offered at the Faculty of Philosophy at Laval University (Quebec City). It is an introductory course in environmental ethics, given by Marie-Hélène Parizeau, who is trained both in biology and in philosophy. She deals with Western and Japanese contemporary environmental philosophies and ethics. She focuses on ethical theories that aim to overcome the subject/object dichotomy induced by Western modernity, such as Imamichi Tomonobu’s eco-ethica and Watsuji’s ethics. In 2011, I gave a course at Laval University on contemporary Asian philosophy with particular emphasis on Japanese philosophy. This course focused on the introduction of Western philosophy in Japan, China and Korea. It made students pay attention to the types of logic involved in the comparison between contemporary Asian philosophy and Western philosophy. Two main trends have caught my attention, namely the Kyoto school and Watsuji on one hand, and the contemporary Neo-Confucianism on the other, especially through Mou Zongsan. While surprised by the difficulties of Japanese philosophy, students of Laval University developed a great interest in Nishida and Watsuji. In order to promote studies in contemporary Japanese philosophy in Canada, Parizeau and I have asked in fall 2011 for a grant from the Japan Foundation for the preparation of a symposium to be held in October 2012 at Laval University. That project, entitled “Nature and Technology: Issues in Contemporary Japanese Thought and Philosophy”, had three objectives. The first was to bring together researchers and students from multidisciplinary horizons whose interests converge towards contemporary Japanese philosophy and thought. The second was to offer Francophone researchers (including Japanese colleagues) an opportunity

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to meet, discuss ideas, and publish the results of their work on contemporary Japanese philosophy and thought. The last objective was to stimulate an interest for Japanese philosophy in French Canada through the publication of a collective book including a series of texts with highest scientific quality (Tremblay and Parizeau 2014). At present, the studies conducted in Canada on environmental ethics are largely inspired by Watsuji. This is why a large part of the symposium’s second sub-theme (see below) was dedicated to Watsuji’s comprehension of ethics, insisting on the issues emerging from the relation between humanity and its environment (the milieu), whether this environment should be “natural” or technical. In order to better analyze this topic, other Japanese philosophers were also covered in the second and third sub-themes of the symposium, notably Nishida, Tanabe, Nishitani, as well as Imamichi. Nature and technology were thus be transversal themes throughout this symposium, which was articulated around three sub-themes. 1) The first presented a multidisciplinary perspective on the relation to nature and technology in Japanese pop-culture. This interdisciplinary perspective did not necessarily cover typical Japanese philosophical literature; it was conceived as an introduction to Japanese thought and culture. 2) The second sub-theme compiled the various research and issues related to environmental ethics, from the perspective of contemporary Japanese philosophy, in relation to the topic of modern technology. It was properly philosophical and focused directly on environmental ethics and the introduction of contemporary Japanese philosophical concepts such as the “milieu” (Watsuji) or the “eco-ethic” (Imamichi). This section also featured presentations on the general relation of humanity to nature and technology, in the perspective of a dialogue between Japan and the Western modern world. 3) The last sub-theme addressed contemporary Japanese philosophy’s theoretical and cultural influential paradigms. Its central issue was to precise the philosophical paradigms conditioning our relation to nature, and show how the concepts found in contemporary Japanese philosophy would enable us to conceive a new and in a more creative way of our relation to nature.

2

Research in Japanese philosophy in Belgium and France

With regard to the research in Japanese philosophy, a well-known researcher in Belgium is Bernard Stevens. His publications in recent years have focused as before on the Kyoto school in general, and more recently on Karatani (Stevens 2010). In 2005 he published a small book entitled Invitation à la philosophie japonaise (Invitation to Japanese philosophy) (Stevens 2005). In addition, Stevens, Sylvain Isaac and I have realized the French translation of Heisig’s book

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Philosophers of Nothingness (Heisig 2008). Stevens personal interest is now oriented to Buddhism, especially the Triratna, the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO). Relief in Belgium is now taken by Sylvain Isaac, who is already a recognized scholar and translator of Nishitani (Nishitani 2008). Both through fundamental research and translations, he strives to make the philosophy of Nishitani accessible to the French-speaking readers. His interest has focused on issues such as otherness, nihilism, ontology, god, and non-duality (Isaac 2010). In parallel, Isaac took an interest in the reception of Western philosophy in Japan and the meaning of “Japanese philosophy”. In addition to a comprehensive bibliography on Nishitani (Japanese and Western languages), Isaac is currently completing the French translation of Nishitani’s book Nihilism (1949). In France, research on Japanese philosophy is represented mainly by two already well known individuals, namely Augustin Berque and Michel Dalissier. Until recently, Berque continued his original and creative research on Watsuji. This research culminated with the publication of the French translation of Fu¯do, in collaboration with Pauline Couteau and Kuroda Akinobu (Watsuji 2011). Now retired, Berque is working to expand and deepen mesology or fu¯doron in two directions. The first goes towards the living world. It compares Watsuji to Uexküll, and human history to evolution, particularly by returning to the issue of subjectivity in Imanishi Kinji. The second direction is towards logic, or more exactly the tetralemma. Using the original theories he developed, Berque tries to follow a trail opened in 1974 by Yamanouchi Tokuryu¯ with “Logos and Lemma”. As for Michel Dalissier, he currently lives in Kyoto and continues to work on Nishida, and also in recent years on Merleau-Ponty. He published in 2009 his doctoral thesis on Nishida entitled Anfractuosité et unification (crevice and unification) (Dalissier 2009). His recent research has focused on the topics of unification, nothingness, and logic of place. He compares Nishida to Do¯gen and Bergson, and to Chinese philosophy. He is also known as a translator of some Nishida’s essays (Dalissier 2010). Finally, in collaboration with Nagai Shin and Sugimura Yasuhiko, Dalissier published a collective book entitled Philosophie japonaise ( japanese Philosophy) (Dalissier 2013). This book includes the French translation of some essays of Do¯gen, Ogyu Sorai, Motoori Norinaga, Nishi Amane, Nakae Chomin, Nishida Kitaro¯, Tanabe Hajime, Tosaka Jun, Izutsu ¯ mori Sho¯zo¯. Toshihiko, and O With regard to research groups, one can find in Paris an active center in Japanese philosophy, with the “Research Group on philosophy in modern Japan”. This group is focused on history of ideas. Directed by Saito¯ Takako, Kuroda Akinobu and Simon Ebersolt, it is related to the Center of Japanese Studies of INALCO. About once a month, one of the participants presents his/her recent research. The group first spent four years studying mainly Nishida. From

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2005, it focused on “Social space and individual freedom” in the thought of Japanese intellectuals. That new orientation allowed an opening to sociology and ethics. The implicit goal of this group is to offer, for PhD students and young researchers, training in the history of Japanese philosophy, since this type of course does not exist in France. Two seminars have surrounded the activities of the “Research Group on philosophy in modern Japan”. In March 28 and 29, 2004, was held in Colmar a study session at the Center for Japanese Studies in Alsace, under the scientific responsibility of Asari Makoto (INALCO). Most of the papers were about Nishida. The second seminar was held in Paris in October 13, 2011 on the theme of “Philosophy in Japan today: Issues and philosophical context”. It focused on a triple relationship, that is to say French philosophy and Japan, Heidegger and Japan, and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Mahayana Buddhism1. The proceedings of this seminar, led by Saito¯ Takako, a professor at the University du Havre, were published in the journal Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger (Saito¯ 2011).

3

Research in Japanese philosophy in Canada

In Canada, research in Japanese philosophy is currently scattered in three cities, that is to say Ottawa, Quebec City and Montreal. It focuses above all on Nishida and Watsuji. The research on Watsuji is essentially multidisciplinary. The most important representative of this approach is Erin McCarthy. Ottawa native, she currently teaches at St. Lawrence University (U.S.A.). Also a specialist of feminist theory, she is currently using Asian philosophy, especially Watsuji, to rethink the idea of motherhood and to implement an “ethics of care”. She also participates in the new edition of Do¯gen’s Shusho¯gi. In her book Ethics Embodied (McCarthy 2010), she explains how Japanese philosophy includes the body as an integral part of selfhood and ethics, and shows, through a comparative feminist approach, how it provides an alternative and challenge to the Western philosophical view of self and ethics. Also from Ottawa is Graham Mayeda, who conducts research in both philosophy and law. His interests in philosophy focus on East Asian ethics and twentieth-century European philosophy, with a particular emphasis on the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas. In 2006, Mayeda published his doctoral thesis on Time, Space, and Ethics in the Thought of Martin 1 http://www.fabula.org/actualites/philosopher-au-japon-aujourd-hui_46639.php.

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Heidegger, Watsuji Tetsuro¯, and Kuki Shu¯zo¯ (Mayeda 2006). In addition, he used phenomenology, including Watsuji’s phenomenology, to discuss the fact that human being has cosmopolitan responsibilities at the level of international law towards people of distant countries. Mayeda’s current research concerns global justice in East Asian philosophy. Watsuji was also the subject of several articles about Japanese imperial power written by anthropologist Bernard Bernier, at University of Montreal. In recent years, he has examined the relationship between Watsuji’s ethics on one hand, and Japanese imperial power and state on the other. He also contributed to the project “Japanese philosopher in the twentieth century” (which I will discuss below) with an article on the transcendence in Watsuji (Bernier 2010), and the translation of a small section of Ethics (Watsuji 2008). Another interpretation of Watsuji, but also of Nishida and Tanabe, has been developed by Thomas Lamarre, at McGill University. Lamarre has a double training in oceanology, and in literature and East Asian languages. He does not approach Watsuji directly but through several topics from Japanese literature. For example, he compared Tanizaki Jun-ichiro¯ and Watsuji about the Platonic concept of the image and the status of technology (Lamarre 2005). In addition, he analyzed Nishida’s concept of pure experience, as well as relations between Natsume So¯seki and Nishida. Finally, he addressed the problem of species and evolution in Tanabe. Lamarre’s current research turns more directly on Japanese philosophers, principally Nishida and Imamichi. As for myself, I focus, as always, on Nishida Kitaro¯, following three different aspects. Since 2004, I have been particularly interested in the relationship between self-awareness and temporality in Nishida. After publishing an Introduction à la philosophie de Nishida (introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida) (Tremblay 2007 [1]), I tried to show, in a second book called Auto-éveil et temporalité (self-awareness and temporality) (Tremblay 2007 [2]), how Nishida took again, especially from Augustine, the ancient theme of temporality and reinterpreted it in the context of his logic and his concept of self-awareness. This led Nishida to establish a new conception of the present and the self. Continuing in the same direction, I showed, in a third book called L’être-soi et l’être-ensemble (being-oneself and being-together) (2007 [3]), that self-awareness is a response to the seeking for a new kind of subjectivity. Nishida carried out this search about awareness through a dialogue with Augustine, once again, but also with Descartes. He also insisted on the topic of mutual relationship. Based on these presuppositions, I have shown, in the previous books and elsewhere, that all Nishida’s philosophy and logic has a relational character. The second research theme on which I worked these recent years is the connection between Nishida’s logic and his written style. My research has helped to establish the fact that Nishida’s logic has an encompassing character (Tremblay

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2007). Moreover, it emphasized that this encompassing aspect is rooted directly in the syntactic structures of the Japanese language (Tremblay 2009 [1], 2009 [2], 2011). Henceforth, my intention is to try to show how Nishida used all available resources of the Japanese language in order to stress the encompassing character of his logic. In a book in preparation that would be entitled La Flexibilité de la langue philosophique de Nishida (the flexibility of Nishida’s philosophical language), I am conducting a thorough and technical analysis of Nishida’s encompassing language and its consequences for a correct understanding of his logic. My third research theme is a continuation of the comparison I made in the past between Nishida and the German theologian Karl Rahner. In this context, I have prepared, in collaboration with the journal Théologiques (University of Montreal), a special issue that focused on the relationship between Christian theology and the Kyo¯to school philosophers (Tremblay 2012). The purpose of this issue was not to focus on the relationship between Buddhism and Christianity to which the thought of these philosophers has often led, but on how they took up again some topics from Protestant and Catholic theology, and reinterpreted them within their own philosophical systems. This issue of the journal Théologiques looked for a new theological paradigm based on the Japanese philosophers of the twentieth century. In other words, it examined how the reinterpretation, by these philosophers, of Christian theological themes can provide theology a new conceptual framework. In addition, this issue considered how Japanese philosophers read through again and assimilated Western mystical traditions. This interpretation of mystical currents by Japanese philosophers could provide rich material to renew the understanding of spiritual experience. In addition, I carried through the complete French translation of the Nishida’s book entitled “De ce qui agit à ce qui voit” (from the Acting to the Seeing) (Nishida 2015). This book is the fourth volume of the 1965 edition of Nishida’s complete works. It will be offered for the first time in a full translation. Gathering nine essays written between 1923 and 1927, the work marks the transition to the original philosophy characterizing Nishida. It is deemed for its extreme difficulty and complexity. But simultaneously, it is fascinating because of the deepness of its analysis, and not only for the well-known concept of “place” that is explicitly developed in that book for the first time.

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Jacynthe Tremblay

The French-speaking project “Philosophers of Japan in the twentieth century”

In addition to my personal research, much of my time has been occupied since 2004 and during the three following years, by an important international research project for French-speaking people. The project, entitled “Philosophers of Japan in the twentieth century”, consisted in bringing together for the first time, in the frame of an international project, most of the French-speaking researchers and translators in the field of Japanese philosophy. Twenty-three of them around the world, including seven Japanese, have responded enthusiastically to the invitation to participate in this project. The main goal of the project was to produce a broad range of articles about Japanese philosophy (since the Meiji period), as well as French translations of texts by major Japanese philosophers. The other objectives of the project were to offer to French-speaking researchers (including Japanese ones) around the world an opportunity to publish their works on Japanese philosophers, and to raise in French-speaking regions a lasting interest in Japanese philosophers by means of a properly philosophical and highly scientific work concerning these philosophers. The need for such a project was obvious. Since two decades, research in French-speaking regions about Japanese philosophy of the twentieth century has been more and more numerous. However, despite this significant development, research was still hampered by a major problem, that of the isolation of researchers. Until 2004, indeed, research and translations were carried out under the responsibility of individuals who, because of their remoteness, had few opportunities to meet and to share ideas. Local and international symposia were extremely rare, as well as opportunities for joint publication. It was therefore important and necessary to implement concrete ways to change this situation, in particular by promoting a French-speaking collaborative venture gathering researchers and translators working in the field of contemporary Japanese philosophy. That is the reason why several events surrounding the project were organized in autumn 2005 and summer 2006, which considerably made the project progress forward. First, I arranged in September 2005 two workshops about contemporary Japanese philosophy within the context of the second congress of the Réseau Asie2. The purpose of these workshops was to bring together the European members of the project. The topic of the first was “Modern Japanese philosophy: an interdisciplinary field”. As for the second workshop, the theme was “Self, subjectivity, and society in Japan: the philosophical standpoint”. For the North2 http://www.reseau-asie.com/cgi-bin/prog/pform.cgi?langue=fr&Mcenter=colloque&TypeLis te=showdoc&email=&password=&ID_document=267.

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America participants of the project and some Japanese participants, a symposium entitled “Modern Japanese Philosophy” has been held in October 2005 at the University of Montreal. Finally, for participants who resided at that time in Japan (Japanese and Western), discussions were organized during the summer of 2006 in Kyo¯to, Nagoya, and To¯kyo¯. These various events surrounding the project “Philosophers of Japan in the twentieth century” came up to all expectations. Most papers produced in the framework of these events were published in 2010 in a collective work under my direction and entitled Philosophes japonais contemporains (contemporary Japanese philosophers) (Tremblay 2010). As for the planned translations, they were published in 2008 in a special issue of the journal Laval Théologique et Philosophique, under the title Philosophie japonaise du XXe siècle ( japanese philosophy of the twentieth century) (Tremblay 2008). Let us describe briefly the content of these two publications. With regard to the book Contemporary Japanese philosophers, it has not been seemed appropriate to try to cover all of the Japanese philosophy from the seventh century. The main reason is that the number of French-speaking researchers in this field is still very small. Rather than providing an encyclopaedic presentation, the aim in this work was to deal with specific philosophical problems which were those of the contributors themselves, and which also have directly to do with the concerns of contemporary philosophy. In this sense, this project was an accurate reflection of the research in this field in the Frenchspeaking world. This collective work makes clear the importance of contemporary Japanese philosophy, and identifies its specific issues in relation to other human sciences. Indeed, current research in this area is fundamentally interdisciplinary, as one can see by taking a look at the five sections of the book: 1) Japanese philosophy as dialogal philosophy; 2) the spatiotemporal nature of the human being; 3) the search for a different kind of subjectivity; 4) the modes of the interpersonal encounter; 5) the relationship between individual, society and state. The various chapters of these five sections deal with Kuki, Nishida, Tanabe, Nishitani, Tosaka Jun, Watsuji, Karatani Ko¯jin and Kimura Bin. As for the special issue of the journal Laval Théologique et Philosophique, it met the second objective of the project “Philosophers of Japan in the twentieth century”, that is to say, to offer the French translation of several important Japanese philosophers’ essays. The number of French-speaking people (both in Japan and in the West) able to translate a Japanese philosophical text into French is very limited. Because of this lack of resources, we were not able to provide translations representative of all Japanese philosophers since the Meiji period. The project was rather an effort to offer western philosophers a wide range of

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important texts of this period. The texts have been selected by translators themselves, according to their fields of research and interest. Despite of this contextual limitation, this collective work helped to expand the knowledge of already recognized philosophers, as Nishida, Nishitani, and Watsuji. It also took into account Tosaka Jun, a representative of the prewar Marxism. In addition, a place has been given to interdisciplinary research in comparative philosophy, with the translation of one essay of the psychiatrist Kimura Bin, and another of the literary critic Karatani Ko¯jin. At the end of that special issue of the journal Laval Théologique et Philosophique a bibliography has been added in all languages other than Japanese, and as complete as possible, in the field of Japanese philosophy (since Meiji until 2007). On a final note, I should add that outside the project “Philosophers of Japan in the twentieth century”, I organized in 2007, as a part of the Third Congress of the Réseau Asie, two new workshops. While those of 2005 related only to Japanese philosophy, those of 2007 were open to China and Korea. The topic of the first workshop was “Contemporary philosophy in China, Japan and Korea: towards the development of a pan-asianism”. The second workshop was entitled “Philosophy and aesthetics in China and Japan.”3. Following on from these workshops, a seminar was held in June 2008 in Paris (Maison des sciences de l’homme). The proceedings of that seminar were published under the title La Modernité philosophique en Asie (philosophical Modernity in Asia) (Alexandre Journeau 2009).

Bibliography Alexandre Journeau Véronique (ed.), 2009 La Modernité philosophique en Asie, Réseau Asie/Anagrammes, Paris, France, 268 p. Bernier Bernard, 2010 “La transcendance chez Watsuji”, in Jacynthe Tremblay (ed.), Philosophes japonais contemporains, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 492 p.; p. 446–482. Dalissier Michel, 2009 Anfractuosité et unification. La Philosophie de Nishida Kitaro¯, Genève, Droz, 638 p. Dalissier M., Nagai S., and Sugimura Y. (ed.), 2013 Philosophie japonaise. Le Néant, le monde et le corps, Paris, Vrin, 471 p. Heisig James W., 2008 Les Philosophes du néant, Paris, Cerf (translated by Jacynthe Tremblay, Sylvain Isaac, Bernard Stevens). 3 http://www.reseau-asie.com/cgi-bin/prog/pform.cgi?langue=fr&Mcenter=colloque&TypeLi ste=showdoc&email=&password=&ID_document=411; http://www.reseau-asie.com/cgi-bin/ prog/pform.cgi?langue=fr&Mcenter=colloque&TypeListe=showdoc&email=&password=& ID_document=410.

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Hori Victor and Curley Melissa Anne-Marie (ed.), 2008 Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 2. Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 261 p. Isaac Sylvain, 2010 “Existence et saisie de l’être chez Nishitani Keiji”, in Jacynthe Tremblay (ed.), Philosophes japonais contemporains, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 492 p.; p. 290–314. Lamarre Thomas, 2005 Shadows on the Screen: Tanizaki Jun’ichirô on Cinema and “Oriental” Aesthetics, Center for Japanese Studies Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 408 p. Mayeda Graham, 2006 Time, Space, and Ethics in the Thought of Martin Heidegger, Watsuji Tetsuro¯, and Kuki Shu¯zo¯, New York, Routledge, 274 p. McCarthy Erin, 2010 Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese and Feminist Philosophies, Lexington, 134 p. Nishida Kitaro¯, 2010 La Science expérimentale suivie de Explications schématiques, Paris, L’Harmattan, 401 p. (translated by Michel Dalissier and D. Ibaragi). –, 2015 De ce qui agit à ce qui voit, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 364 p. (translated by Jacynthe Tremblay) Nishitani Keiji, 2008 “Le problème de l’être et la question ontologique”, in Jacynthe Tremblay (ed.), Laval Théologique et Philosophique. Philosophie japonaise du XXe siècle, 64 (no. 2) 305–325 (translated by Sylvain Isaac and Takada Tadanori). Saitô Takako (ed.), 2011 Philosopher au Japon aujourd’hui. Enjeux et contexte philosophique, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 160 (no. 3) 160 p. Stevens Bernard, 2005 Invitation à la philosophie japonaise. Autour de Nishida, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 233 p. –, 2010 “L’herméneutique archéologique de Karatani Ko¯jin”, in Jacynthe Tremblay (ed.), Philosophes japonais contemporains, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 492 p.; p. 315–318. Tremblay Jacynthe, 2007 [1] Introduction à la philosophie de Nishida, Paris, L’Harmattan, 141 p. –, 2007 [2] Auto-éveil et temporalité. Les Défis posés par la philosophie de Nishida, Paris, L’Harmattan, 229 p. –, 2007 [3] L’Être-soi et l’être-ensemble. L’Auto-éveil comme méthode philosophique chez Nishida, Paris, L’Harmattan, 194 p. –, 2009 [1] “Nishida Kitaro¯’s language and structure of thought in the “logic of basho””, in Raquel Bouso Garcia and James W. Heisig (ed.), Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6. Confluences and Cross-Currents, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 383 p.; p. 254–72. –, 2009 [2] “The Potential of Nishida’s “encompassing” language”, in Lam Wing-keung and Cheung Ching-yuen (ed.), Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4. Facing the 21st Century, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 304 p.; p. 127–134. –, 2012 “La flexibilidad de la lengua filosófica de Nishida. Verbos envolventes y locuciones de lugar en la lógica del basho”, in Agustin Jacinto-Zavala (ed.), Alternativas Filosoficas: Investigaciones recientes sobre la filosofia de Nishida Kitaro, fundador de la Escuala de Kioto, El Colegio de Michoacán / Morevallado Editores, 365 p.; p. 159–202. Tremblay Jacynthe (ed.), 2008 Laval Théologique et Philosophique. Philosophie japonaise du XXe siècle, 64 (no. 2) 233–573.

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–, 2010 Philosophes japonais contemporains, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 492 p. –, 2012 Théologiques. Les Philosophes de l’École de Kyo¯to et la théologie 12 (no. 1–2) 3–383. Tremblay Jacynthe and PARIZEAU Marie-Hélène (ed.), 2014 Milieux modernes et reflets japonais. Chemins philosophiques, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 269 p. Watsuji Tetsuro¯, 1996 Watsuji Tetsuro¯’s Rinrigaku. Ethics in Japan, Albany, SUNY Press, 381 p. (translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter). –, 2008 “L’État”, in Jacynthe Tremblay (ed.), Laval Théologique et Philosophique. Philosophie japonaise du XXe siècle, 64 (no. 2) 345–357 (translated by Bernard Bernier and Michel Richard). –, 2011 Fûdo. Le milieu humain, Paris, CNRS, 330 p. (translated by Augustin Berque).

Raquel Bouso (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Broadening philosophy: learning experiences from Japanese thought

I.

Introduction

Like the editors of the recently published volume Japanese Philosophy. A Sourcebook, James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, our underlying assumption here is that a focus on Japanese philosophy “can broaden and deepen not only our understanding of philosophy, but also of Japan”1. Certainly, on the one hand, the philosophical tradition in the West can be enriched with the various ways of thinking arising from different cultures such as the Japanese. On the other, the Western scholarly approach to Japan seems to have been relying only upon its history, politics, literature, and arts, while its philosophy has received far less attention. Hence, I couldn’t agree with them more when they say that to obtain a more comprehensive picture of Japan clearly we need to include certain knowledge of all fundamental aspects of the mind of the Japanese people, even the philosophical ones. Thus, our aim here is to reflect on some pedagogical strategies which may help to consolidate Japanese philosophy as an academic discipline. It is based on my experience in teaching East Asian thought and religion at the Faculty of Humanities in the University Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona (Spain). The ideas presented here are the result of several years devoted to research and teaching in the field of Japanese studies, in particular concerned with gaining understanding of the philosophy developed by the Kyoto School thinkers. In this regard, the main idea I would like to introduce is that the work of the Kyoto school founder Nishida Kitaro¯ (1875–1945) has proved to constitute a good starting point for introducing Japanese thought and culture to undergraduate students in Humanities and an excellent means to make them reflect critically upon the images of cultures and the danger of their degeneration into stereotypes.

1 Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, edited by James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2011, p. 1.

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In order to understand the extent of this enterprise, it may be useful to say something about the state of affairs in this field of studies in Spain. Like the Spanish historian of religions Francisco Díez de Velasco has shown, before the sixteenth century, Spain was a territory of boundaries between different cultural models based on different religions that had become related in antagonistic as well as non-violent ways2. Then, the governing regime in the Iberian Peninsula established, from the end of the fifteenth century, a model of ideological standardization which used religion as an axis and generated a notable degree of violence. Catholicism provided a strong sense of identity. It was defended by the Inquisition, institution whose disappearance took place in Spain as late as 1834. Even after, the identification between Catholicism and Spanish national identity could not fail to generate violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It reached its peak in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) which was understood as a crusade for National-Catholicism, the official ideology of Franco’s system3. The official ideological model, based on an anti-modern convergence of politics and religion, was established by means of the persecution of those who thought differently. The Catholic Church had strong control over education, courses in the Catholic religion being obligatory at all educational levels, including the university. Thus, this model, with its fluctuations, lasted until such a recent date as 1967, when the first law guaranteeing religious freedom was adopted, and since then it has been abandoned rapidly. Today, the former type of frontier situation is becoming more and more evident and leads us to think about the dynamic between globalization and local cultures, between migrations and identities and about the role that religion can fulfil as a vehicle for differences. Unlike the twentieth century tendency in other Western countries, the rise of religious studies in North American and European colleges and universities,4 which created spaces in the academy for the study of non-Christian religions, is still not a widespread reality in Spain. In the specific 2 Francisco Díez de Velasco, “Theoretical Reflections on Violence and Religion: Identity, Power, Privilege and Difference (With Reference to the Hispanic World)”, Numen, vol. 52, num. 1, 2005, pp. 87–115. 3 On the ideologues of the religious grounds of Franco’s regime, cf. Lluís Duch, “Excursus: lo teológico-político en España, especialmente la recepción de Carl Schmitt”, in Religión y política, Barcelona, Fragmenta, 2014, pp. 465–502. 4 With regard to Asian studies, note, for instance, that at Columbia University the thought of including Asia in the core curriculum in Humanistic studies arose in the 1930’s “well before either World War II, the postwar boom in Asian studies, or the rise of the third-world politics in the sixties” and not under political or ethnic pressures but rooted in “fundamental human concerns and visionary as to future trends”. William Theodore de Bary, “Asia in the Core Curriculum” in Approaches to the Asian Classics, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990 (updated edition of Approaches to the Oriental classics, 1959), p. 16. At the time of the decision, language and area studies (Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic studies) were already offered at Columbia.

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field of philosophy, the academic study of non-European philosophical traditions is still exceptional. Regarding Asian traditions in particular, although it is possible to follow some courses on Asian histories, languages or arts in some Degrees in Humanistic Studies, it is still rare to find a course on Indian, Chinese and even Japanese Philosophy5 despite the efforts made by some scholars to maintain the legacy of the pioneers and leading intellectual figures in Asian scholarship such as Raimon Panikkar (1918–2010), who was able to build bridges in the forums of inter-religious and intra-religious dialogue6. It was not until 2003, due to the political commitment by the Spanish government in 2000 to promote the cooperation between Spain and the Asia-Pacific area that started the first Degrees in East Asian Studies in Barcelona and Madrid. Even so, a serious investment in the creation, maintenance, and promotion of teaching and research facilities is needed. Certainly there are many recent initiatives and as a result the number of publications and doctoral dissertations in the field increases. Still, it may be said that in Spanish academia, the Eurocentric prejudices are difficult to eradicate. Nowadays, this is one of the most important challenges for scholars devoted to the study of philosophy and religion from an intercultural perspective.

II.

Introducing Intercultural philosophy through Kyoto School

In that context, why Kyoto school could be a good starting point for introducing Intercultural philosophy to undergraduate students in Humanities? Traditionally, the academic study of the particular form of knowledge that we call philosophy begins with Greek thinkers, the so-called Pre-Socratics. Then one can proceed to learn from the canonical works and authors found in the histories of philosophy, divided in periods for pedagogical purposes. It may be the case that a few of these histories of philosophy mention China and India as other birthplaces 5 Regarding the studies of Japanese philosophy in Spain, see: Alfonso J. Falero, “Japanese Philosophy in Salamanca. A Historical Survey”, in Séptimo centenario de los estudios orientales en Salamanca, coordinated by Ana Agud Aparicio, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2012, pp. 705–714; and Raquel Bouso, “La filosofía japonesa en España”, in Japanese Philosophy Abroad, edited by James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2004, pp. 98–113. 6 Panikkar settled in Catalonia, Spain, only after becoming Professor Emeritus of the University of California, Santa Barbara, where held a Chair in Religious Studies (Comparative Philosophy of Religion and History of Religions). Nevertheless, through his published work and as a guest lecturer in several universities and intellectual circles, his thought exerted certain influence into Spanish academic philosophy. Currently Panikkar’s Opera Omnia is being published into Catalan language first and into Spanish language subsequently and so an increasing reception of his ideas can be expected.

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of philosophy. When dealing with Kyoto School philosophy, one of the first questions arisen is why Nishida is considered the first original modern Japanese philosopher7. Even if this claim may sound exaggerate, from it derives that Nishida’s thought somehow marks a new beginning of philosophy, a start in a different time and a different place. Therefore, when analysing the claim more closely, one may ask whether there was previously in Japan an intellectual activity, rational and critical, that we can identify as philosophical. Faced with the query about when philosophy as an academic discipline started in Japan, and what sort of intellectual and spiritual traditions there were before, the question of what “philosophy” names and means can be posited. Historiographical, methodological, and metaphilosophical issues as such can lead us to reflect on the relation between philosophy and culture, and thus to intercultural philosophy. As Ram Adhar Mall wrote: The meeting of different cultures, philosophies, and religions – which we have less aspired to than have happen to us in the wake of modernity, with all its global technological formations – calls for an intensive and reciprocal dialogue involved all concerned. The general concept of philosophy possesses a universal connotation over and above its particular, adjectival qualifications, such as Chinese, Indian, European, and so on. This connotation gives us the right to speak of interculturality. Every philosophy must tie on to another and form part of a larger whole, making every philosophy a crosscultural phenomenon8.

If philosophy is by nature intercultural, as the same Mall recognises, “intercultural philosophy” may be a sort of tautology. However the expression intercultural philosophy allows acknowledging the philosophical aspiration towards universality while being at the same time always and already conditioned historically and culturally. Similarly, in an excellent essay on comparative philosophy, Giangiorgio Pasqualotto points out the fact that the philosophical task itself always entails making comparisons9. Moreover, Pasqualotto argues that the comparative activity lies in the same roots of the act of thinking. Thus, instead of comparative philosophy, as an erudite discipline in which the comparing subject is external and indifferent to the compared terms, he proposes philosophy as 7 Nishimura Takuo summarizes the novelty of “the intellectual network” formed around Nishida known as Kyoto School as follows: “It is said the only philosophy in the history of modern Japanese thought that is peculiar to Japan and not just an import from Western thought”. Nishimura Takuo, “The Kyoto School and the Theory of Aesthetic Human Transformation. Examining Motomori Kimura’s Interpretation of Friedrich Schiller”, in Education and the Kyoto School of Philosophy. Pedagogy for Human Transformation, edited by Standish, Paul and Naoko Saito, Dordrecht et al., Springer, 2012, p. 65. 8 Ram Adhar Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, Lanham, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000, p. 1. 9 Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, “Oltre la filosofia comparata: filosofia come comparazione”, in East and West. Identità e dialogo interculturale, Venezia, Marsilio, 2003, p. 48.

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comparison, as a dynamic practice in which the subject and the compared objects are mutually conditioned. In this sense, as K. Ludwig Pfeiffer has noticed that even the viewpoint of the observer possess some epistemological plausibility, distracts from the question “to what extent cultures should be seen not only as objects of established descriptive or observational habits, but as loosely organized spaces for the negotiation of behaviour and, by extension, of ranges of cognitive and affective orientation”10. Instead of structures of meaning, Pfeiffer proposes semipermanent, semitransitory patterns which are potentials for meaning. In order to avoid any essentialist claim about Japanese uniqueness, Thomas P. Kasulis also speaks of “functional patterns” to identify heuristically and pragmatically general tendencies in Japanese philosophical thinking11. Consequently, before being exposed to new ideas and experiences, the students are conducted to reflect upon how philosophy can be understood and practiced, and so to critically review their common assumptions. Hence, when reflecting upon one’s own cultural perspective, the specific form of ethnocentrism that is “orientalism” come to the fore. In this specific context, the notion of orientalism often takes the form of a division between two ways of approaching the truth, on the one hand, the logical-discursive-rational, and on the other, the meditative-mystical way, and the association of the former to the West and the latter to the East. The same applies to the so-called “reversed orientalism” on the side of Japanese philosophers, as Maja Milcˇinski warns, insofar as their adoration for “Western Reason” deprives the West of its non-logical traditions and at the same time traps the East into the exclusively intuitive dimension12. In his discussion on this issue, Bret W. Davis in a splendid essay refers to the Kyoto School’s attempts “to navigate a passage through the pendulum swing within modern Japan between deferential Eurocentrism and reactionary Japanism”13. 10 K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, “The Black Hole of Culture: Japan, Radical Otherness, and the Disappearance of Difference (or “In Japan everything normal”)”, in The Translatability of Cultures. Figurations of the Space Between, edited by Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 202. 11 Thomas P. Kasulis, “Helping Western Readers Understand Japanese Philosophy”, in Confluences and Cross-Currents. Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6, edited by Raquel Bouso and James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2009, pp. 218–219. 12 Maja Milcˇinski, “The ‘Orientalization’ of Japanese Philosophy”, Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies 1994, IV. International Research Center for Japanese Studies/ The Japan Foundation, vol. 3, num. 25, 1996, p. 18. Bernard Faure linked “reverse Orientalism” and Nishida’s philosophy in “The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism” in Japan and Postmodern Perspectives, edited by Charles Wei-Hsun and Steven Heine, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 245–280. 13 Bret W. Davis, “Dialogue and Appropriation: The Kyoto School as Cross-Cultural Philosophy”, in Japanese and Continental Philosophy. Conversations with the Kyoto School, edited by Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2011, p. 33.

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And in light of this, it can be said that Kyoto School comes to be a privileged area of study where examine both the tension between cultural appropriation and creative synthesis, as well as the dialogue and respect for irreducible cultural differences, not to mention the problematical ethical and political issues involved14. In fact, it was by virtue of extraphilosophical factors, such as imperial, colonialistic, and politic forces that, according to Mall, the Greco-Eurocentric concept of philosophy succeeded in absolutizing itself 15. Now, given the plurality of traditions and that there have been multiple views of the nature of philosophy, if we still want to apply this notion to other cultures we should justify the extrapolation or show that is a cultural universal, as Panikkar wrote16. The denomination itself entails a cross-cultural problem. In addition, philosophical ideas have been exchanged among Western and non-Western traditions for thousand years but, as Elizabeth Schiltz notes, very few of its practitioners have undertaken the sustained study of any of the rich and varied traditions of nonWestern philosophy17. On the contrary, from the non-Western counterpart, the dialogue with Western philosophy undertaken by Nishida and his followers can be seen as a very fruitful intercultural exercise which has stimulated many others. Thus, the students may encounter in the philosophy of the Kyoto School not only ideas from non-Western traditions that broaden their philosophical knowledge but an opportunity to rethink the conceptual schemes underlying their own tradition18. From this encounter may follow a deeper understanding of 14 Among the literature on this topic, see: James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 1994; Arisaka Yo¯ko¯, “Beyond East and West: Nishida’s Universalism and a Postcolonial Critique”, The Review of Politics, vol. 59, num. 3, 1997, pp. 541–560; Christopher S. Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity, London, Routledge, 2005; ID. ed., Re-politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2007; Graham Parkes, “Heidegger and Japanese Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection”, in Confluences and Cross-Currents. Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6, edited by Raquel Bouso and James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2009, pp. 347–372. 15 Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, p. 2. 16 Raimon Panikkar, “S´atapathaprajña¯: Should we speak of philosophy in classical India? A case of homeomorphic equivalents”, in Contemporary philosophy. A New Survey, edited by Guttorm Fløistad, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, p. 14. 17 Elizabeth Schiltz, “How to Teach Comparative Philosophy”, Teaching Philosophy, vol. 37, num. 2, June 2014, p. 215. 18 In the same vein, Elizabeth Schiltz asserts that a seemingly counterintuitive goal of teaching a course in comparative philosophy is to help students better understand Western philosophical traditions, the parameters, methods, and goals of the way we understand the philosophical project itself, since it helps them to identify and rigorously analyze their own presuppositions. And by so doing, a third goal may be achieved: “the transition from simply studying philosophy to truly doing philosophy”, see: Schiltz, “How to Teach Comparative Philosophy”, pp. 217–218.

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the rejection by intercultural philosophical thinking of any absolutistic and exclusive claim of philosophical tradition to be in sole possession of the one philosophical truth. Still, even admitted the philosophical value of non-Western intellectual traditions as such of Japan, the same designation “Japanese philosophy” remains problematic. Nevertheless, it is not only a matter of defining “philosophy” or “Japanese philosophy” because, as Uehara Mayuko acutely notices in her Introduction to the first number of The Journal of Japanese Philosophy, “the definition of this discipline needs to be reconsidered all the time”19.

III.

Understanding Japanese cultural and intellectual traditions through Kyoto School

The experience of exchanging in the classroom the mentioned issues about broadening philosophy to include many world philosophical traditions has proved to be very positive. Confronted with these challenging questions and ideas, the students successfully think for themselves and freely express their views in group discussions. Nevertheless, the most difficult part of teaching undergraduate students to understand a cultural tradition alien from their own is to facilitate an access to the sources and a proper knowledge of their contexts. For the most part, the undergraduate students in Humanities at the University Pompeu Fabra possess certain knowledge about Japanese history and popular contemporary culture but are not familiar with either Japanese language or Japanese intellectual history. For these reasons, it would seem helpful to start with a thinker who shares with them a Western philosophical background and this was the case with Nishida. Nishida came of age in the days of the Meiji Restoration, when Japan was looking to the West for ideas to help to modernize. Somehow he sought to fuse Japanese traditional ways of thinking with European philosophical legacy. Thus, his fresh approach to the traditional problems of Western philosophy in conversation with the foremost thinkers allows the students to engage in the critical study of their own intellectual framework. Interestingly, some students find that Nishida’s philosophy is “too different” from the philosophy they are familiar with, while others think that is “too Westerner” in comparison with what they are expecting. In either case, by adopting Nishida as the axis of the course, some learning strategies have been developed aiming at supporting the introduction into the world of Asian religions and thought, and specifically Japanese traditions. These strategies can be summarized in three 19 Uehara Mayuko, “Introduction”, The Journal of Japanese Philosophy, vol. 1, 2013, p. 1.

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aspects: first, exploring Nishida’s Eastern sources; second, discussing the role of meditation and intellection in Nishida’s experience of thinking and in Buddhism; and third, starting by Nishida’s works of calligraphy and poetry, approaching to arts as a different way of expression. Nishida’s Eastern background included a deep knowledge of Confucian, Buddhist, and Shinto resources. By reading Nishida’s Zen no kenkyu¯ (1911) 20 or Bashoteki no ronri to shu¯kyo¯teki sekkaikan (1945) 21, both writings translated into Spanish, and Nishida’s successors’ works like Nishitani Keiji’s Shu¯kyo¯ to wa nani ka (1961), also translated22, the students discover scattered references to notions such as “absolute nothingness” and “emptiness”, or terms like sama¯dhi, nirva¯na or samsa¯ra. This fact proves that even if the course is focused on modern Japanese philosophy, its premodern Japanese heritage cannot be neglected. This may be a disappointment to those who come to the subject bad versed in Asian traditions. However, the training of students in modern Japanese developments of Asian thought and culture has generated new interest in their chronological beginnings in India in order to clarify how later migrated into China and then were reinterpreted by the rest of East Asia. At the beginning, this terminology appears to cause difficulties of understanding but later students learn to take seriously the study of non-Western traditions on their own terms. Frequently, after becoming familiar with Nishida’s philosophical notions such as “pure experience” and the “self-identity of absolute contradiction” or Nishitani’s “double exposure”, the students realize the important role played by the paradox, contradiction, and negation in the line of reasoning found in some classical Asian texts, in particular belonging to Buddhism, Vedanta advaita or Daoism. In this respect, certain courses have been designed to explore alternative views and approaches to major topics rather than to introduce into any specific discipline, a common-set of readings are proposed. For instance, to deal with the key issue of non-dualism23, as a reading requirement the famous passage of the Heart Sutra about the five aggregates which are empty of inherent existence is included: 20 Ensayo sobre el bien, translated by A. Mataix and J. M. de Vera, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1963; translated by Alberto Luis Bixio, Indagacion del bien, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1995; and partially translated as “La experiencia pura” by Agustín Jacinto ZavaIa, in Textos de la filosofía japonesa moderna, Michoacán, EI Colegio de Michoacán, 1995, pp. 67–74. 21 “La lógica del lugar de la Nada y la cosmovisión religiosa” in Pensar desde la nada: ensayos de filosofía oriental, translated by Juan Masiá Clavel and Juan Haidar, Salamanca, Ediciones Sígueme, 2006, pp. 23–118; and Agustín Jacinto Zavala, “Lógica del topos y cosmovisión religiosa” in Textos de la filosofía japonesa moderna, Michoacán, EI Colegio de Michoacán, 1995, pp. 153–233. 22 Nishitani Keiji, La religion y la nada, translated by Raquel Bouso, Madrid, Siruela, 1999. 23 On Nishida and non-dualism, see: Gereon Kopf, “The Absolute Contradictory What: On How to Read the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro¯”, in Asian Texts – Asian Contexts. Encounters with Asian Philosophies and Religions, edited by David Jones and E. R. Klein, Albany, New York, State of New York University Press, 2010, pp. 143–158.

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They should correctly perceive the five aggregates also as empty of inherent existence. Form is emptiness; emptiness is form. Emptiness is not other than form; form is not other than emptiness. In the same way, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousness are empty. S´ariputra, in that way, all phenomena are empty, without characteristics, unproduced, unceasing, undefiled, not undefiled, not decreasing, not increasing24.

Or the Upanishadic assertion “That is you” (tat tvam asi) viewed by exponents of nondualist Veda¯nta as a statement of the nondifference of a¯tman and Brahman, the Absolute and the individual: ¯ tman and Brahman by declaring The scriptures establish the absolute identity of A repeatedly: “That is you”. The terms “Brahman” and “Atman”, in their true meaning, refer to “That” and “you” respectively. In their literal and superficial meaning, ¯ tman” have opposite attributes, like the sun and the glow-worm, the “Brahman” and “A king and the servant, the ocean and the well, or Mount Meru and the atom. Their identity is established only when they are understood in their true significance, and not in a superficial sense. […] The scriptures repudiate any idea of a duality in Brahman. […] See the reality in both, and you will find that there is one. […] Just as a clay jar or vessel is understood to be nothing but clay, so this whole universe, born of Brahman, essentially Brahman, is Brahman only – for there is nothing else but Brahman, nothing ¯ tman. Therefore, “That is you” – pure, beyond That. That is the reality. That is our A blissful, supreme Brahman, the one without second25.

And finally, the following excerpt from the Zhuangzi on the mutually correspondence of the opposites: Everything has its “that”, everything has its “this”. From the point of view of “that” you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, “that” comes out of “this” and “this” depends on “that” – which is to say that “this” and “that” give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where there is unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. […] He [the sage] recognizes a “this”, but a “this” which is also “that”, a “that” which is also “this”. His “that” has both a right and a wrong in it. […] A state in which “this” and “that” no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly26.

Although at a first sight these viewpoints sound profoundly different from typically Western ones, through the reading of Nishida students encounter some 24 Prajñaparamita-hrdaya-sutra, translated by John Powers in Scriptures of the World’s Religions, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2011, p. 108. 25 Viveka-cudamani, from Sankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, translated by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, Hollywood, Vedanta Press, 1975, pp. 72–74. 26 Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Inner chapters, II, translated by Burton Watson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 39–40.

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characteristic topics and approaches from Asian philosophies and religions. To avoid the risk of focusing only in the differences, it is useful to remember that other schools of thought in each of these traditions have defended diverse and even opposite views. Also Heraclitus’ use of paradoxes and Hegelian dialectics may serve as a bridge with Western philosophical tradition. Of course a great effort is needed to penetrate the barriers of the different languages and backgrounds and enter deeply into other cultural traditions. It must be taken into account the risk of misunderstanding and superficiality in the interpretations. As a counterpart, the possibility of expanding one’s own intellectual horizon is promising. To show how the fundamental ideas that we can read in Nishida’s works belong to a particular cultural context and that they are deliberately concerned with it, needs from the teacher to elaborate creative practical guides. Teaching materials, handbooks, source readings, translations of major texts, study guides, glossaries, and so on are necessary. In particular, the use of philosophical texts combined with literary sources and images of Asian art and architecture can be helpful in order to outline the interconnection between ideas and actions, ideals and attitudes in everyday life. These ideas are not only articulated with words but by using other means and materials. Sometimes the ideas behind the artistic works as a part of people’s life are more easily grasped. Since art is something that is open and available to everyone and has a more direct impact, particularly taking into account the above-mentioned linguistic and cultural barriers. It may seem to be the opposite given the current continual saturation of images in which we are immersed. However, dealing with visual arts from diverse cultures demands a deeper reflection on the role and meaning of the images and the adequate instruments for interpreting them. To illustrate Nishida’s philosophical proposals – especially those concerning to the world of action and creativity – by using samples of Nishida’s own poetry and calligraphy his ideas can be a fruitful pedagogical technique. It can be complemented with an introduction to the number of arts that have been cultivated in Japan as an alternative to the stricter training going on in monastic practices, particularly since the twelfth century in Zen monasteries. It can be said that calligraphy, painting, flower arrangement, the art of archery, tea-ceremony, landscape gardening, etc. as practical disciplines embody certain spiritual principles. And this brings us to the last strategy, the introduction of meditative techniques. Similarly to “Japanese Philosophy”, “Contemplative studies” is a recent discipline seeking its place in the academic context. The need for this type of studies is grounded in a practical and not only theoretical notion of knowledge:

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Thinkers such as Pierre Hadot (…) and Michel Foucault (…) have noted the convergence and divergence of contemplative and academic traditions in the past (…) While contemplative practices have been foundational to wisdom traditions throughout various cultural periods, more recently these practices are being reexamined across different context(s) of learning (…). Many scholars are finding it increasingly necessary to incorporate the rigors of contemplative practice within academic contexts, discovering that contemplative process and method is well equipped to enhance, deepen, and broaden academic thought and praxis across disciplines.27

An argument to introduce the so-called contemplative practices in the classroom is that can be undertaken to expand mind and body awareness as well as to introduce the students to “a number of important and long-standing ways of knowing self and world”28. Particularly, to make contact with these types of praxis may allow grasping the significance of the practice and the concrete in the traditional Japanese way of learning. According to it is by using both the body and the mind as a whole that knowledge is achieved. It is in this sense that Kyoto School has been considered a philosophy of experience, of human becoming, and of transformation29. For instance, taking Nishida’s experience with zazen meditation and teaching the essentials of this practice to the students have proved to be an interesting experiment. The initiation to the Zen practice together with the reading of Ueda Shizuteru writing “The Practice of Zen”30 and excerpts from Zen literature has consented the students to figure out the meaning of the nishidean notion of koteiki chokkan or “action-intuition”, the practical and poetical expression of the creative force that springs up from the inactive state of meditation, very well illustrated in Japanese traditional arts. In this respect, even if Nishida himself did not try explicitly to elaborate a philosophy of Zen Buddhism, to give more careful consideration of meditation allows us to take a step forward the way of experiencing the things themselves “as such”, an assumption which lies behind his philosophical project. The principles behind the techniques of meditation transmitted in several types of Asian religious life through cosmologies and ritualized forms have made cultural sense to Asian peoples inspiring them and taking them deeply into practice. These techniques may be adapted to help Western students learn to 27 Olen Gunnlaugson, Edward W. Sarath, Charles Scott, and Heesoon Bai (eds.), “An Introduction to Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines”, in Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2014, p. 1. 28 Andrew O. Fort, “Contemplative Studies and the Liberal Arts”, in Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 33, 2013, p. 31. 29 Cf. Nishimura, “The Kyoto School and the Theory of Aesthetic Human Transformation”, op. cit. 30 Ueda Shizuteru, “The Practice of Zen”, The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 27, num. 1, 1994; translated into Spanish and included in Zen y filosofía, edited by Raquel Bouso, Barcelona, Herder, 2005.

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discern qualities of wisdom and compassion. In this regard, the Kyoto School understanding of the “subject” in theoretical terms as a process and the place for action and interrelation perhaps can be made clearer in such a practice. Let me quote to conclude a beautiful image taken from the Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh which has made easier for students to realize the meaning of notions like nonself, impermanence or interrelatedness: If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper. If we look even more deeply, we can see the sunshine, the logger who cut the tree, the wheat that became his bread, and the logger’s father and mother. Without all of these things, this sheet of paper cannot exist… Everything co-exists with this sheet of paper. So we can say that the cloud and the paper “inter-are”. We cannot just be by ourselves alone; we have to inter-be with every other thing31.

To realize this view can also wake us up to reality more fully over time by interrupting our surface thinking and liberating our underlying capacity to know and respond from a deeper place and thus be capable to empathize with others in their suffering. Consequently, philosophy can truly become a way of life.

IV.

Conclusions

In brief, by means of the mentioned initiatives, the students of Humanities are introduced through the Kyoto School to Japanese philosophy. By studying Nishida’s texts they are able to get in touch with a reinterpretation of Asian traditions within a Western philosophical framework. Therefore, in Nishida’s philosophy we learn not only some basic presuppositions of Asian classical thought, we also find a critical and modern reading of them. To introduce in the course references to Japanese arts and meditative practices as part of traditional culture may help to grasp significant aspects of Nishida’s background. Nishida is a leading intellectual figure in the midst of two worlds, Japan and the West, and at the same time, he belongs to the end of an epoch, that is, the Japanese tradition (pre-Meiji) and the beginning of a new one, Japan modernity. To take his philosophical task seriously entails dealing with the intricate process of appropriation of foreign ideas influenced by indigenous beliefs that distinguish the modernization of Japan. For retracing this historical path, Nishida’s work has particular interest to students due to its “bordering” condition.

31 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the PrajNaparamita Heart Sutra, Berkeley, Parallax Press, 1988, p. 3.

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Moreover, Nishida’s struggle to develop a new conceptual language helps to set up hermeneutical problems arisen in intercultural philosophy. On the one hand, one must recognize that there are aspects of expression and understanding that are peculiar to a given culture. But to emphasize the differences between Western and Japanese philosophies, such as the prevalence of concepts over emotions, reason over experience, logos over silence, and so on, leads to a marked contrast and oversimplification. On the other, to apply one’s categories of understanding to another culture can constitute a form of domination and the emphasis on the similarities can lead to the ever-increasing sameness among cultures. Thus, the awareness of one’s own prejudices and the necessarily limited knowing of the other that can be achieved as well as the recognition of the mutual conditioning of cultural positions are aspects involved in the ethical dimension of the cross-cultural discourse. In the case of the readers of Nishida, they are impelled to become painfully engaged with different views on standard issues. At the same time, they are asked to set apart their exotic bias. Finally, the readers are required to review their own assumptions and deep-rooted beliefs confronted with an alien discourse in hope of creating spaces for mutual understanding.

Bibliography Arisaka, Yo¯ko¯, “Beyond East and West: Nishida’s Universalism and a Postcolonial Critique”, The Review of Politics, vol. 59, num. 3, 1997, pp. 541–560. Bouso, Raquel, “La filosofía japonesa en España”, in Japanese Philosophy Abroad, edited by James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2004, pp. 98– 113. Davis, Bret W., “Dialogue and Appropriation: The Kyoto School as Cross-Cultural Philosophy”, in Japanese and Continental Philosophy. Conversations with the Kyoto School, edited by Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2011, pp. 33–51. De Bary, William Theodore, “Asia in the Core Curriculum” in Approaches to the Asian Classics, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990 (updated edition of Approaches to the Oriental classics, 1959); pp. 3–21. Díez de Velasco, Francisco, “Theoretical Reflections on Violence and Religion: Identity, Power, Privilege and Difference (With Reference to the Hispanic World)”, Numen, vol. 52, num. 1, 2005, pp. 87–115. Duch, Lluís, “Excursus: lo teológico-político en España, especialmente la recepción de Carl Schmitt”, in Religión y política, Barcelona, Fragmenta, 2014, pp. 465–502. Falero, Alfonso J. “Japanese Philosophy in Salamanca. A Historical Survey”, in Séptimo centenario de los estudios orientales en Salamanca, coordinated by Ana Agud Aparicio, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2012, pp. 705–714.

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Faure, Bernard, “The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism” in Japan and Postmodern Perspectives, edited by Charles Wei-Hsun and Steven Heine, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 245–280. Fort, Andrew O., “Contemplative Studies and the Liberal Arts”, in Buddhist-Christian Studies, vol. 33, 2013, pp. 23–32. Goto-Jones, Christopher S., Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity, London, Routledge, 2005. Goto-Jones, Christopher S., ed., Re-politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2007. Gunnlaugson, Olen, Edward W. Sarath, Charles Scott, and Heesoon Bai (eds.), “An Introduction to Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines”, in Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2014, pp. 1–12. Heisig, James W., Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, eds., Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2011. Heisig, James W. and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism, Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 1994. Kasulis, Thomas P. “Helping Western Readers Understand Japanese Philosophy”, in Confluences and Cross-Currents. Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6, edited by Raquel Bouso and James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2009, pp. 215–233. Kopf, Gereon, “The Absolute Contradictory What: On How to Read the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro¯”, in Asian Texts – Asian Contexts. Encounters with Asian Philosophies and Religions, edited by David Jones and E. R. Klein, Albany, New York, State of New York University Press, 2010, pp. 143–158. Mall, Ram Adhar, Intercultural Philosophy, Lanham, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000. Milcˇinski, Maja, “The ‘Orientalization’ of Japanese Philosophy”, Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies 1994, IV. International Research Center for Japanese Studies/ The Japan Foundation, vol. 3, num. 25, 1996, pp. 12–21. Nhat Hanh, Thich, The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the PrajNaparamita Heart Sutra, Berkeley, Parallax Press, 1988. Nishimura, Takuo, “The Kyoto School and the Theory of Aesthetic Human Transformation. Examining Motomori Kimura’s Interpretation of Friedrich Schiller”, in Education and the Kyoto School of Philosophy. Pedagogy for Human Transformation, edited by Standish, Paul and Naoko Saito, Dordrecht et. al., Springer, 2012, pp. 64–76. Nishida, Kitaro¯, Ensayo sobre el bien, translated by A. Mataix and J. M. de Vera, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1963. –, Indagacion del bien, translated by Alberto Luis Bixio, Barcelona, Gedisa 1995. –, “La experiencia pura”, in Textos de la filosofía japonesa moderna, translated and edited by Agustín Jacinto ZavaIa, Michoacán, EI Colegio de Michoacán, 1995, pp. 67–74. –, “La lógica del lugar de la Nada y la cosmovisión religiosa”, in Pensar desde la nada: ensayos de filosofía oriental, translated by Juan Masiá Clavel and Juan Haidar, Salamanca, Ediciones Sígueme, 2006, pp. 23–118.

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–, “Lógica del topos y cosmovisión religiosa”, in Textos de la filosofía japonesa moderna, translated and edited by Agustín Jacinto Zavala, Michoacán, EI Colegio de Michoacán 1995, pp. 153–233. Nishitani, Keiji, La religion y la nada, translated by Raquel Bouso, Madrid, Siruela, 1999. Panikkar, Raimon, “S´atapathaprajña¯: Should we speak of philosophy in classical India? A case of homeomorphic equivalents”, in Contemporary philosophy. A New Survey, edited by Guttorm Fløistad, Dordrecht, Boston, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 11–67. Parkes, Graham, “Heidegger and Japanese Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection”, in Confluences and Cross-Currents. Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6, edited by Raquel Bouso and James W. Heisig, Nagoya, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2009, pp. 347–372. Pasqualotto, Giangiorgio, “Oltre la filosofía comparata: filosofía come comparazione”, in East and West. Identità e dialogo interculturale, Venezia, Marsilio, 2003, pp. 39–61. Pfeiffer, K. Ludwig, “The Black Hole of Culture: Japan, Radical Otherness, and the Disappearance of Difference (or “In Japan everything normal”)”, in The Translatability of Cultures. Figurations of the Space Between, edited by Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 186–203. Prajñaparamita-hrdaya-sutra, translated by John Powers, in Scriptures of the World’s Religions, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2011. Sankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, translated by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, Hollywood, Vedanta Press, 1975, pp. 72–74. Schiltz, Elizabeth, “How to Teach Comparative Philosophy”, Teaching Philosophy, vol. 37, num. 2, June 2014, pp. 215–231. Ueda, Shizuteru, “The Practice of Zen”, The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 27, num. 1, 1994. –, Zen y filosofía, edited by Raquel Bouso, translated by Raquel Bouso and Illana Giner, Barcelona, Herder, 2005. Uehara, Mayuko, “Introduction”, The Journal of Japanese Philosophy, vol. 1, 2013, pp. 1– 3. Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Inner chapters, II, translated by Burton Watson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

Alfonso Falero (Salamanca University)

The Meaning of Japanese Philosophy. A Spanish Perspective1

1. Teachers and researchers of Japanese philosophy do their practice worldwide. Although the object of this study is very concise, and limited to boundaries that are always debatable, the range of discussion is global. I. e. “Japanese philosophy” must be practised with a holistic view in mind, as a signifier which points to something broader, from which it derives its possible meaning. This has to do not just with the fact that particular instances in the history of thought in Japan cannot be understood unless we relate them with occurrences in the history of Chinese, Indian or European thought, but also the issues under discussion are never strictly speaking Japanese, on the contrary they are part of broader, even global discussions. (The term “global” used in this context does not allude to the recent phenomenon of globalization, but is synonymous with “worldwide” or “holistic”). If this is the case, then we have in our hands an object of research which reveals a basic character of interrelatedness, to begin with. From this moment, we become aware of the inadequacy of trying to keep the limits of Japanese philosophy within Japan. We are not just pointing at the fact that the history of thought in Japan is much indebted to foreign schools of philosophy. For, beyond that, this reflection makes itself extensive to any pretension of defining “Japanese philosophy” as an epistemological or heuristic category. It is, then, not just a problem belonging to the general history of philosophy, and how far we can grasp the depth of the many intellectual debts which occur within it, but the reckoning of an epistemological problem attached to the very category of “Japanese philosophy” itself. The question of what is Japanese and what is not Japanese does never get to a satisfactory conclusion, not due to the difficulty of the issue itself, but rather because the term to be defined is somehow inconsistent. This is why we have the impression that the many attempts to deal with 1 This essay is part of the research Project “Textos y temas fundamentales del pensamiento japonés,” financed by MINECO (ref. FFI2012–36210).

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this subject, which we have been witnessing since the beginnings of the twentieth century up to the present, always leave something out. It is like trying to depict with precision a visual object seen through blurred lenses. We must take notice that the issue of Japanese philosophy does not hold properly before the Meiji era. As a matter of fact, medieval monks were dealing with philosophical problems as universal issues, never taking into account the Japanese difference, and not seeing themselves as Japanese interpreters. The Japanese difference was first raised as an issue by the Kokugaku school, but they decided that philosophy, i. e. the quest of reason (li), was un-Japanese. As a consequence the emergent issue of a “Japanese philosophy” was excluded from the roots. Then, the issue about Japanese philosophy has no roots in the Japanese tradition. The first proposals about a native way of thinking only come out after a period when the idea of philosophy itself is assimilated into Japanese soil. It is not just the problem of the difference between the Euroamerican philosophical tradition called philosophia and the Japanese intellectual tradition conceived as the practice of ri (li) and do¯, which configure the combination do¯ri meaning a way of pursuing the requirements of reason, and also a way of pursuing the truth. After all it is something quite akin to the aspirations of “philosophy”. But the option for shiso¯ as an alternative to philosophy, putting emphasis on the cognitive side, as a mental activity independent of any prerequisite on the part of the object, and devoid of any epistemological commitment, effects a desemantization of the space traditionally occupied by terms like ri or do¯. Through this strategy a whole field of thought is displaced to avoid a collision with philosophy, identifying the latter as foreign and shiso¯ as native. In this way shiso¯ and philosophy stop pertaining to the same terrain. They do not oppose as contraries, or different modes of reasoning, but they oppose as “heterologues” (hetero-logos) or heterogeneous domains of thought. They cannot meet, they just stand in front of each other as ever parallel dimensions. In this way, the possibility of a dialogical relation is excluded, and the Japanese difference is construed as a virginal space unspoiled by the fuss and frets of logical argumentation or rational discourse. It becomes apparent that this kind of strategy carried out in the period of transition between Meiji and Taisho Japan, as a response to the challenge posed by the emergence of Euroamerican philosophy, reproduces the same strategy of preserving the native purity from pollution by foreign cultural invasion in Kokugaku thinking. “Philosophy” is then quarantined and lodged in special pavilions reserved for research on foreign strains, i. e. academic departments. Philosophy as the practice of logical reasoning and rational argumentation is excluded from infesting discourses outside the academia. The Japanese difference is attested in the emotional, the aesthetical, the inherited perception, the communal sense of belonging, the institutional uniqueness and the linguistic untranslatability. “Philosophy” is consequently deprived of emotions, charged with a foreign sense

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of the aesthetical, rooted in an alien world-perception, felt as an exterior, conceived as a practice proper to Western schools and institutions, awkward to the Japanese language. Doing philosophy means speaking bad, ugly Japanese. Moreover it means making an impure use of the language. This is what, for instance, Kobayashi Hideo (1902–1983) objected to Japanese intellectuals contaminated by philosophy.2 In all, philosophy is defined as a field of meaning strictly limited to a few cerebral functions, like a simplistic logic, a dry rationality, an impersonal objectivity, or abstract ideas. On the other side Japanese style shiso¯ is defined in an extremely vague manner, more like a comfortable field of diffuse self-recognition than the old domain of the Edo style rationality of ri or selfcultivation of do¯. The problem with the notion of do¯ is that it becomes pervasive in the Edo period. Practically all schools of thought and all intellectual expressions are interpreted or else translated into the omnipresent category of do¯ practice. Then, it evolves into a multiplicity of different practices and an encyclopaedic archive of Edo knowledge, both intellectual and performative. It sustains self-formative practices of all kinds, both philosophical in nature as well as non-philosophical, i. e. non argumentative practices which spring from or else pursue some kind of wisdom. Seen from the point of view of the above dichotomy, viz. philosophy vs. shiso¯, established in the late Meiji period, we can recognize that the Edo tradition of do¯ is behind both of them. We have seen in the first lines of this essay how the notions of do¯ and ri coalesced in the compound do¯ri, demonstrating that the practice of ri rationality was also understood as an epistemological procedure rooted in the larger gnoseological category of do¯. But at the same time, philosophers of the Asian difference, like Yuasa Yasuo (1925–2005) have understood that the shugyo¯ practice is the key to understand the central sapiential tradition of embodied wisdom in Japan.3 In this way, the notion of a sapiential do¯ practice underlies the deployment of a kind of wisdom that opposes philosophy as such, and in a way transcends it. For if philosophy is limited to an extremely intellectualized activity of a purely speculative nature, then from there ensues the Cartesian dichotomy of spirit and matter, interpreted as rationalism vs. embodied wisdom. Philosophers of the embodied wisdom in Japan have persistently identified the Cartesian dichotomy as the ultimate cause of the differential equation which divides East and West, but the fact is that they have first conceived the very dichotomous split they criticize. I mean, the Cartesian philosophy of mind and matter is under discussion in the area of European criticism of the 2 The objections presented by Kobayashi against the philosophical, un-Japanese style of writers like Nishida at the Overcoming Modernity debates of 1942 are well known. See Gendai Nihon shiso¯ taikei, 1963–1965 (35 Vols.), Tokio: Chikuma Shobo¯, Vol. 32 Hankindai no shiso¯. 3 See Yuasa, Yasuo (1986/1991) The Body, Self-Cultivation, and Ki-Energy, State University of New York Press 1993.

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history of philosophy, but this kind of philosophical endeavour is different to the dichotomous interpretation currently made in Japanese circles. I have the impression that the East-West frame of reference underlies and explains this kind of dichotomy, and this discursive space should not be easily confused with the field of Cartesian criticism in Europe and America. This is so, even though cognitive philosophies of bodily knowledge and philosophies of the brain have celebrated the appearance of this kind of embodied wisdom in Japanese philosophical proposals. The Edo philosophies of do¯ cover a wide range of philosophical attitudes, but since Meiji they acquire a nationalistic imprint. Western philosophy is not incorporated as do¯ but as science or technique. The problem is that the notion of do¯ is reinterpreted as paradigmatic, and is initially discarded to represent modernity. Together with li, qi and similar terms which represented genuine philosophical knowledge before Meiji, the notion of do¯ is initially relegated to the field of pre-modern Japan and -gaku is readily substituted for it as the new paradigm of modern knowledge. The result is that the philosophical sciences are rendered as -gaku, including the different kagaku and tetsugaku. In this way philosophy is ascribed to the modern paradigm and is disconnected from the philosophical notions pertaining to the old one. Li is incorporated through redefinition of its scope, basically decontextualized from historical sources, just as a loan word to translate Western ideas of rationality. Of course, the notion of -gaku as an epistemic descriptor of the various fields of knowledge is well established in the Edo period, but it describes mainly the diverse schools of learning. In this sense it incorporates more than mere knowledge, for it includes the traditions inherent to every one of the schools. This applies to inner and outer knowledge, the ways of transmission of this knowledge, a set of criteria to discern the orthodox and the spurious, a way of life, i. e. an ethics, and a developed theory of criticism towards other schools. In the Meiji period this is decontextualized and recontextualized. Two main changes are attached to this categorial term. First, it stops describing schools of learning and changes towards depicting the diverse fields of the only one realm of knowledge associated to the modern paradigm. Second, as a development of the Kokugaku innovation of discerning between the native and the foreign, the idea of nihongaku and its variants, like kokubungaku, ho¯gaku, wagaku, etc., points to the notion of “national studies”. This is reinforced by the incorporation to the Japanese academic world of the disciplines that take the several nation-states which configure the world order as objects of study. Above all, the ancient notion of daigaku is reinterpreted as the general academic frame under which national variants must be studied. Together with wagaku, kangaku is also offered a place as well as eigaku or futsubungaku, or else jikugaku. In this way, the line initiated in rangaku gets its sequel in the yo¯gaku, and this is later countered upon by to¯yo¯-

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gaku. At Tokyo University, departmental studies of kokugogaku and kanbungaku are ranked side by side. But at the same time, the epistemic notion of -gaku is also applied on a universal basis beyond national discrimination. The first reference of this is found in the Hyakugaku renkan of 1870, the Encyclopaedia by Nishi Amane (1829–1897).4 It is just seven years later that Tokyo University is founded (1877), by reorganizing the College of Letters or Bungakubu, under a holistic frame of reference. In this way, -gaku comes to represent both the universal knowledge of the sciences, and the particular knowledge of the national traditions supported by linguistic difference. It is in this context that the first Tetsugakka makes its appearance within the frame of Tokyo University in 1881. But now, philosophy is defined as a Western discipline, belonging to the general field of the sciences, at the same time lacking an applicability to the Eastern traditions. So, while philosophers at these Departments try to attain universal truth through the acquisition of a new language, the traditional schools of Asian philosophies are displaced out of this frame. But this ambiguity between Western and universal in the categorization of philosophy is not reproduced in the case of literary studies, which from the beginning are divided in their proper national departments. In 1886 Tokyo University founded Bungakka for both English and German literature respectively. Three years later, in 1889 French literature was added. Finally, following the studies of Suzuki Sadami and Shirane Haruo, it was since 1890 that nativism in literature was definitely established.5 Here the term “literature” (bungaku) was redefined as fictional writing. In this year, Kokubungaku tokuhon (Readings of National Literature) was published by Tachibana Senzaburo¯, and Nihon bungakushi (A History of Japanese Literature), by Mikami S./Takatsu S., Bungaku ippan (General Introduction to Literature), by Uchida Roan (1868–1929), and Wabungakushi (A History of Japanese Literature), by ¯ wada Tateki were released.6 In 1893 Tokyo University founded a general DiviO sion for the Humanities with the name Bunka Daigaku, and from 1895 to 1917, Japanese literature was referred to as Teikoku bungaku (Imperial Literature). During this period, in 1907 the seminal essay “Bungakuron” (A Theory of Literature), by Natsume So¯seki (1867–1916) appeared, trying to fill the gap between world literature and Japanese sensitivity.7 Finally, let us quote two events which are quite illuminating. In 1919 the curricula at Tokyo Imperial University were rearranged following the principles of national learning, establishing academic 4 See Gendai Nihon shiso¯ taikei, 1963–1965 (35 Vols.), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, Vol. 1 Kindai shiso¯ no ho¯ga. 5 Shirane, H./Suzuki, T. (eds. 2000) Inventing the Classics: Modernity, National Identity, and Japanese Literature, Palo Alto (CA): Stanford University Press. 6 Suzuki, Sadami (1994) Nihon no “bungaku” o kangaeru, Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten. 7 See Ueda, Makoto (1976) Modern Japanese Writers and the Nature of Literature: An Introduction, Palo Alto (CA): Stanford University Press.

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divisions between Japanese Literature, Japanese History, Chinese Philosophy, Chinese Literature, Oriental History, Occidental History, Philosophy, and Indian Philosophy, among others. In this way, the ambiguity between the universal = philosophy, and the particular = Chinese and Indian philosophies was reinstated. Finally in 1923, the quest for Japaneseness produced the essay “Kokubungaku no hassei” (Origin of Our National Literature), written by ethnologist Orikuchi Shinobu (1887–1953).8 From the above paragraph we can conclude that there is a difference between the assimilation of the Western notions of literature and philosophy. As concerns literature, Japanese men and women of letters had been conscious and proud of having a tradition of their own since antiquity, although in academic circles Chinese literature was considered to be exemplary, and then was positioned in a higher rank than the Japanese. The term “literature” included philosophic and theoretical texts, and in this sense it was all-embracing. But after the impact of the Western notion of “literature”, in the precise period of transition of the 1890s decade, philosophical texts belonging to tradition fell out of the literary umbrella, as this was redefined and its range of meaning became narrowed down. But then philosophical texts created in Japan fell in a sort of limbo. For there was no consciousness of a Japanese philosophical tradition to match philosophical texts as found in China or India. Buddhist texts were appreciated mainly as literature, as it happens with Kamo no Cho¯mei, Do¯gen, Myo¯e, or Ikkyu¯, and we still find these authors classified as literary classics rather than as philosophers, although, with the exception of their poetry, they did not write fiction. On their part, Confucian schools in Japan were deemed subsidiaries of their Chinese counterparts, and later were included within Asianist traditional philosophies, i. e. shiso¯. The result is that, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, Tokyo Imperial University acknowledged in its curriculum of the Faculty of Letters the subjects of Chinese and Indian philosophies, and also universal “philosophy” at the same time, but there was no room for a Japanese philosophy. There was Japanese Literature but not Philosophy. From this fact we can understand the difficulty among Meiji academic designers and intellectuals, like the well known objection of Nakae Cho¯min (1847– 1901) to consider the existence of a Japanese philosophy.9 True, other thinkers like Inoue Tetsujiro¯ (1855–1944) and Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) strove to adapt Confucianism and Buddhism to the new philosophical parameter, but their efforts remained somehow isolated, while the main academic trend was to negate 8 Orikuchi Shinobu zenshu¯ (31 Vols.) Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ronsha 1976, Vol. 1 Kodai kenkyu¯ (Kokubungakuhen). 9 See W. Lam, The making of “Japanese Philosophy”: Nishi Amane, Nakae Cho¯min and Nishida Kitaro¯, in Nakajima, Takahiro (ed. 2011) Whither Japanese Philosophy? III: Reflections through Other Eyes, The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 69–80.

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the philosophical status of the Japanese tradition.10 This situation favoured that Japanese philosophical texts and authors remained associated to Japanese aesthetics and sensitivity. Key terms like seishin, kokoro, mono no aware, shiso¯, and the like served to protect Japanese philosophical tradition from getting intermingled with foreign philosophies. And in this way it remained in a situation of quarantine, ready to surge together with the new trends of national culturalism, to shape an answer to philosophy from the ground of Japanese shiso¯ bunka. To give an example, in the present day academic curriculum of the Faculty of Letters of Tokyo University, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, the specialization in Japanese culture refers to “ideas and sentiments based on language” (kotoba ni yoru shiso¯ ya shinjo¯). It is a rather traditionalistic way of expression, but it shows two things. First, the legacy of the dualism “philosophy” vs. shiso¯ extends to the present. And second, in consequence the term “philosophy” has remained very much restricted to academic research following Western methods of discussion and argumentation, while shiso¯ has expanded its scope to refer to many sorts of philosophical thinking, including postmodern discourse in Europe and America. While the present day journal Tetsugaku deals mainly with issues in the history of Western philosophy, the Meiji journal Tetsugaku zasshi originally included Japanese issues like morals, Confucianism, and Buddhism, together with imported issues like phenomenological reduction, or neo-Kantianism. This shows that for a period, the term tetsugaku did not exclude Japanese major lines of intellectual discourse. The result is that we have inherited a rather ambiguous legacy. While we still find nowadays dualistic discourse of the type East/Japanese shiso¯ vs. Western philosophy, it is not rare to encounter a synonymous use of the terms shiso¯ and tetsugaku, lacking the dualistic tension. How can we define “philosophy”? Let us accord that originally it means a “quest for universal truth through the mediation of argumentative, reflexive and interpretive discourse”. I think this is how Europeans, since the ancient Greeks up to the present, understand it. If we agree with the above definition it turns out that in this discipline there is an original tension between the aspiration to universality and the instruments to pursue it, which are mainly language and culture. For argumentation, reflection and interpretation are all linguistic tools. At the same time, our hermeneutic awareness makes us conscious of the mediation of the culturally impregnated historical conditions of the philosophical enterprise. When philosophia arrived in Meiji Japan, this discipline was passing through a period of adaptation to the new global political conditions created by the emergence of nation-states in Europe. This process would eventually lead to 10 See Shimomura Torataro¯ (ed.) Tetsugaku shiso¯, Gendai Nihon Shiso¯ Taikei 24, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯ 1965; Heisig, J. H./Kasulis, Th. P./Maraldo, J. C. (eds. 2011) Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, Honolulu: Hawaii University Press.

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the departmentalization of a universal discipline into national categories, making it possible to speak of a German philosophy as something different from French philosophy. Still the aspiration to universality made great thinkers of the early twentieth century, like E. Husserl (1859–1938), fight for the maintenance of rationality as a universal common ground, able to grasp some truth beyond all cultural and linguistic differences.11 However, soon his disciple M. Heidegger (1889–1976) would invert the balance, and present language and culture as the ultimate limitations to any grasping of truth, giving culturalism and its associate philosophical nationalism the highest status.12 This is what he tried to transmit in his edited conversation with the Japanese inquisitor. I. e. according to Heidegger, doing philosophy in Japan is nothing other than exploring the conceptual possibilities of the Japanese language. However obvious this may seem at a first glance, this proposition conceals the fact that the history of philosophy in Europe has been a process of permanent translation of ideas from the exterior to the core of every system of thought. If Descartes and Leibniz had ever been hyper-conscious of the linguistic limits of their own thought systems, then there would not have been a history of philosophy in Europe. Descartes, Locke and Leibniz, even Kant and Hegel, still believed that the language of philosophy was common to all of them, based in ancient Greek, Latin, French, and German at the same time. Leibniz wrote in Latin, French, and German. And believed to be always speaking the same language: the language of rationality (not necessarily rationalism). These philosophers believed in translation as a basic tool of the language of philosophy, and had not yet conceived the idea of any mother tongue as the condition of possibility for philosophical discourse. It is the collapse of rationality in the beginnings of the twentieth century (as well as the collapse of the European empires) that opens the door to cultural nationalisms of all sorts. As a result, the conception of philosophy as the universal language of truth is replaced by the emergence of scientific truth as a universal paradigm, and on the other hand by the national philosophies as expression of Geist = seishin. Kulturgeschichte gets divorced from rationality, and deepens its roots in life, i. e. the irrational ground of sentiment. In sum, the history of philosophy in the twentieth century starts from the Babel of languages and the Babel of nations, all isolated in their own pristine gardens of irretrievable meaning, unintelligible and then untranslatable.

11 See the essay on the relationship between Husserl and Nishida by B. Stevens “Husserl, Nishida et la ‘crise’: Hier et aujourd’hui”, in Heisig, J./Uehara, M. (eds. 2008) Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 3: Origins and Possibilities, Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 173–192. 12 So it can be inferred from the interview with T. Tezuka in 1953, included in Unterwegs zur Sprache 1959, Gesamtausgabe Volume 12.

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Summing up our discussion so far, we can state the following points. First, the situation of philosophy in Japan before the Meiji period presents quite a different landscape. Different philosophies are not recognised through their ascribing to any national tradition, but to a particular school of thought. Most schools are trans-national, while some are even local or centred upon a given locality. But very few of them develop a national consciousness. In Japan, only the Kokugaku and the Mito fall under this last category. The situation is quite similar to what we have ascertained in the case of the European history of philosophy. Second, the irruption of Western philosophy in Meiji witnesses a different state of affairs. Japan is modernising and has become a nation-state. As a part of this process, the status of philosophy becomes very ambiguous in Meiji Japan. The emergence of modernity cancels the previous paradigm of knowledge. As a consequence, the previous schools of thought either are relegated to the past or else they have to start a process of renegotiation to obtain a new status. In this situation, a new discipline enters the scene, with a pretension of hegemony over the field of intellectual discourse. This is philosophy, a new term (tetsugaku) which designates the “queen of sciences”, as the language of positive knowledge. It is as such that Nishi Amane incorporates philosophy to the new canon. If this is so, all intellectual discourse should be absorbed by the new discipline, except religion, literary criticism, and literary essay. In fact, old schools of thought in Japan try to renegotiate their status under these conditions. Some will try to demonstrate that they are prepared to respond to the requirements of philosophy, as they are able to develop a comprehensive worldview consistent with modern science. Others will choose to resituate themselves within the non-philosophic, free space of shiso¯. For philosophy is after all a Western category, not easily applicable to the Japanese intellectual tradition. From these two facts springs the ambiguity of the positioning of philosophy within the Japanese context. Third, within the tension between universalism and particularism, in late Meiji philosophy of culture acquires prominence. As examples, the cases of Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913) and Nitobe Inazo¯ (1862–1933) show two paradigmatic models of the aspiration to universalize the particular.13 Both attempt to translate the unique into the common language or koiné. If Japanese translators up till then had strained to create new terms in their native language, Okakura coins the English term teaism, in order to translate the Japanese particularity into the universal language of Western culture. Fourth, we have confirmed that as late as 1919, university curricula had incorporated national philosophies, but with two 13 On Okakura see K. Karatani (1994) “Japan as Art Museum: Okakura Tenshin and Fenollosa,” in Marra, Michael F. (ed. 2001) A History of Modern Japanese Aesthetics, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 43–52. On Nitobe, Martí Oroval, Bernat (2007) “Orientalismo, japonismo y occidentalismo: Nitobe Inazo¯ y el bushido¯,” Boletín de la Asociación Española de Orientalistas Año XLIII-2007, 329–343.

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peculiarities. Among the national philosophies, Japan is excluded, and then Japanese theoretical discourse is relegated to the area of culture studies. And Western philosophy is incorporated to just “Philosophy” with no attribution whatsoever, evidencing our contention of the ambiguous status of philosophy in Japan, circumscribed between universalism and particularism. Fifth, Japanese thought, unable to attain the status of philosophy, turns to the preservation of tradition. If Okakura and Nitobe attempted to preserve Japanism, with the notion of fu¯do Watsuji Tetsuro¯ (1889–1960) tried in 1935 to build a type of Asianism able to compete with Western philosophy.14 But at the same time, academics like Nishida Kitaro¯ (1870–1945) and Kuki Shu¯zo¯ (1888–1941) demonstrate how the project of a Japanese philosophy is possible in two different ways.15 Nishida decides on the translatability of basho = “place” or topos, to erect the philosophical system of an Asian universalism, on the opposite side of Watsuji’s Asian particularism. And Kuki takes Watsuji’s particularism even further, by finding an untranslatable kernel of Japanism in the aesthetic category of iki, deriving from there a full-fledged Heideggerian cultural ontology. All through the exposition above I have tried to argue that the general history of the debates on whether there is something called Japanese philosophy or not, an issue that springs from Meiji, lacks a sufficient self-awareness concerning to what extent this long-held debate is dependent on the strategic negotiations of the old schools of thought and their re-positioning in a new arena where there appear national consciousness side by side with the pretensions of universality of Western philosophy, the rise of Asianism as a response, and the attempts at hybridisation in the quest of a new global Asian-Western universalism. This approach reveals obvious deficiencies of understanding in two frequently held positions. First, traditionalism ignores the historical problem, and assumes uncritically the existence of a sustained line of transmission of the old philosophical wisdom into present day Japan. It ignores the point of rupture described in the paragraphs above, and the fact that all representatives of Edo schools and intellectual circles had to reinvent themselves to be able to survive. This process implied new line-ups, a self-consciousness absent previously, a Western-global projection that takes the place of the Asian focus, and a reconfigured awareness of Asia and Japan as collective destinies. In this way, all previous transmissions are reinterpreted and relocated within the new philosophical mapping. The second position that must be submitted to criticism corresponds to any idea of a 14 See N. Sakai “Return to the West/Return to the East: Watsuji Tetsuro¯’s Anthropology and Discussions of Authenticity,” in Miyoshi, M./Harootunian, H. D. (eds. 1993) Japan in the World, Durham: Duke University Press, 237–270. 15 Nishida’s definitive essay on basho is Bashoteki ronri to shu¯kyo¯teki sekaikan (1945), included in Nishida Kitaro¯ shu¯ (1974) Kindai Nihon Shiso¯ Taikei 11, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯. On Kuki, see Y. Wong, “Hermeneutics and Kuki’s Conception of iki”, in this volume.

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national philosophy, presented as a set of ideas and values which are the patrimonial property of Japanese society, linked to the associated notions of Japanese culture and Japanese identity. Cultural and philosophical nationalism ignore the fact exposed in this essay that the notion of a national philosophy is incongruent before the rise of Japan as a nation-state in Meiji. We take the position that the historical practice of philosophy in Japan must be understood under the same principles and with the same methodological tools as in China or Europe. If we accept the definition of philosophy as the universal quest for truth, cultural particularisms are included in this enterprise. What we call truth in philosophy is by itself comparable to scientific truth in that it must be applicable universally. A philosophical discovery must have the same status as a scientific one, independently of where this discovery is made. The proposition of the notion of basho by Nishida is not intended to be a truth pertaining to Japanese culture, but to universal philosophy. It must be discussed not in the history books of Japanese philosophy, but in philosophical circles along the world where radical ontology is the issue. Unfortunately, the reception of Japanese philosophers out of Japan has been very limited, due in part because their propositions have been understood as peripheral. But the point is where is the philosophical centre located? Is there a philosophical centre? Can there ever be such a thing? During the twentieth century Japanese thought has been submitted to a scrutiny through which it has been de-philosophised to a great extent. This has happened in Japan, as we have seen above, but has also been carried out in the European philosophical centres. The most flagrant case has been the legacy of Heidegger’s hermeneutics in the twentieth century. For although Heidegger turned to be probably the first European philosopher with a global hearing, his legacy has been fragmented between his European disciples, his mediated reception in America, his limited Chinese following, and above all the considerable number of his Japanese inheritors. We wonder why heideggerianism or hermeneutical ontology, a universal discovery for the languages of philosophy, did not integrate thinkers in a global community of interests, but on the contrary it has lost the battle against cultural particularisms. I interpret that to a great extent, the failure of philosophers all along the world in building that community, unable to win over the nationalistic pride associated to their various millennial traditions, is responsible for the discredit of philosophy in the twenty first century. In front of the integrating power of scientific language, philosophy has seen itself gradually enmeshed in the Babel of languages, as we have argued. Then, to approach Japanese philosophy in the twenty first century, first we must be conscious of the fatal dilemma which confronts philosophy versus nonphilosophical thought, or tetsugaku vs. shiso¯ bunka, as has been lived in the previous century in Japan, where tetsugaku as applied to Japan is restricted to the Confucian philosophy, the Kyoto school, and the philosophy of science. Sec-

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ondly, we must recover rationality, understood as a basic philosophical and linguistic tool, common to all cultures and languages, using different ways of expression, and liberate in this way Japanese philosophy from the tinge of irrationality to which it has been condemned inside and outside Japan; inside Japan, by the defendants of the Japanese difference, and outside by the proponents of Japanese exoticism. For comparing it with science, this is rational and universal, and it is no different in Japan. Nor is Japanese science exotic in any sense. The way ahead is in the blending of the practice of tetsugaku and shiso¯, as they are being carried out in academic and intellectual circles in present day Japan. I. e., it means to open the scope of tetsugaku-type research and discourse, so as to include the practice of other discourses of the shiso¯ type, and at the same time to raise the shiso¯ discourses to the level of tetsugaku style philosophical rigour. The presupposition here is that there cannot be a different type of rationality in Japan, for rationality, understood as the power of reasoning, cannot be different according to national cultures, it is a universal endowment of mankind. The dividing line between philosophical and non-philosophical ways of thinking is historically conditioned, but the context has changed. It cannot be kept any longer, for it makes no meaning nowadays. The academic “philosophical” research carried out in Japan is obsolete inasmuch as it differentiates itself from other more loose intellectual discourses, but the opposite holds true just as much. The genre of the intellectual essay, with a very long history in Japan, must be interpreted as genuine philosophical discourse, in the same way as the European tradition of essayism that extends from Montaigne to Rousseau, from Benjamin to Zˇizˇek or Byung-Chul Han (b. 1959).16 It should reckon more logically-bound and argumentatively tight discourse as part of its own intellectual space. In the post-nationalist era, cultural or religious differences have lost momentum. It is time to build a meta-cultural, meta-religious genuinely universal language of philosophy, or else philosophy will become nothing beyond the discourses of cultural identities. But this is not what most of the Greeks, the Indians, the Chinese of antiquity, or the Japanese thinkers before Meiji had intended in devising their thought systems.

2. The starting point for Japanese philosophy in Spain was the publication in 1909 of Bushido: The Soul of Japan, initiating a long period with just a few translations, without proper philosophical responses on the part of Spanish intellectuals. The 16 Han is reinvigorating recently the genre, with short, incisive and very readable essays, being the latest Im Schwarm: Ansichten des Digitalen, Berlin: Matthes & Seitz 2013.

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publication follows unmistakably the line of Japanistic interest promoted from Meiji Japan, readily assimilated by exoticistic America and Europe. It became a best-seller, and as such arrived in the shelves of Spanish snobs as well as academicians. In this way it appealed to those interested in serious cultural anthropology, offering instead a substitutive discourse on Japaneseness. It was in 1941 that the Bushido was reedited, this time addressed to a different public, made of young trainees in the Spanish military. Curiously enough, the ideal of the bushi had resulted in an exportable model for countries like Franco’s Spain. It had attained a sort of unintended universality. The image of martial Japanese culture had definitely taken roots in Spain, mainly dissociated from its own intellectual roots in Japan. A significant case is the appearance in 1954 of El rapto de Europa, an ambitious essay on the history of civilizations written by the Spanish political scientist and philosopher disciple of Ortega y Gasset, L. Díez del Corral (1911–1998), where the author presents his thesis on the decadence of the European civilization from the point of view of the related rise of postwar Japan.17 The foundational myth of the rape of Europe has originally an oriental connection, and Díez del Corral offers an extremely imaginative reinterpretation of the myth based on an Orientalist reading of the text as applies to the case of contemporary Japan. By reinterpreting European cultural history the author discloses his interpretation of Japanese civilization as the place where all civilizations of Asia have converged, and as how in a last manoeuvre of civilizational absorption, Japan has revealed itself as the kidnapper of Europe in the mythical tale. In this way, the range of the old myth closes its circle in the contemporary world, and its meaning acquires full realization. The originality of this kind of hermeneutics of civilization in the fifties soon called attention worldwide, and so the English translation, The Rape of Europe (London), and the German Der Raub der Europa (Munich) saw the light in 1959. The essay was also the object of enthusiastic praise by Mishima Yukio (1925–1970), raising attention in Japan.18 The translation appeared in 1962 under the title Europa no ryakudatsu: Gendai no rekishiteki kaimei (Tokyo 1962/1980), first in a series of Japanese translations by philosopher Kojima Takehiko (1903–1996).19 The publication was accompanied by a trip of the author to Japan, and interviews with Mishima, Takeyama Michio (1903– 17 In the Prologue to the 1974 edition of this work, Díez del Corral updates and summarizes his views on the matter. It has been published in Spanish by Alianza Ed. 18 Díez del Corral kept an epistolary relation with Mishima, that lasted for some years. 19 It was published by Miraisha. The same year Kanki Keizo¯ translated an article named “Spain between Europe and the World” for issue no. 11 of the journal Sophia, published by Sophia University, and one year later Niwa Mitsuo included an article titled “Díez del Corral y la historia del mundo” in the Journal of the Asociación Japonesa de Hispanistas, Hispánica no. 8.

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1984), Karaki Junzo¯, and a few other historians.20 A selection of his lectures and interviews were subsequently published in Japan, starting with “Rekishi no unmei to shinpo” (Tokyo 1962). He made a great impact in Japanese academic circles, and one year later on his return to Spain published the notebook of reflections on his Asian itinerary, with the title Del nuevo al viejo mundo (Madrid 1963). This diary of notes was again translated into German as Asiatische Reise (Munich 1967), and Japanese as Asia no tabi: Fu¯kei to bunka (Tokyo 1967/1980). A second visit to Japan ensued in 1968, confirming his popularity among Japanese intellectuals of the day. He would visit Japan two more times. The result of these trips was the publication of “Kako to genzai” (Tokyo 1969), and “Jiyu¯shugi no kako to mirai” (Tokyo 1980). Summarily, the case of Díez del Corral stands alone in a period when there were no other intellectual exchanges between Spain and Japan. However, this one author made an impact among intellectuals of many sorts, including writers, historians and theoreticians of culture. As an example of the latter, we can mention the reception of his impressions on the Japanese world of sanctuaries in the work of the phenomenologist of religion Sonoda Minoru (b. 1936).21 Nishida’s Zen no kenkyu¯ was first translated in 1963, thanks to the interest in Japanese philosophy by the Jesuits at Sophia University, and the further response by the Spanish philosophical journal Revista de Occidente, an isolated case among intellectual journals in publishing Japanese philosophy in Spain, in that decade. This date signals a real start in the encounter with Japanese philosophy. In 1965, the first presentation of Zen philosophy and practice, under the simple title Zen, was released, initiating the second line of interest in Japanese intellectual culture, which will continue uninterrupted to this day. The author of the essay was A. Blay (1924–1985), a Catalan psychologist specialised in yoga techniques, who understood Zen as an expression of dhyana, and had no particular knowledge of the history of Japanese Zen.22 As a consequence, the first transmission of Zen philosophy in Spain was related to psychic Orientalism, and not to the intellectual challenge of Zen to Western philosophers. There were yet no translations of the Zen tradition to counter this approach. On the previous line, it was four years later that the first book on the history of Japanese thought was published in Spanish, a translation of the Jesuit father G. Piovesana’s Pensamiento del Japón contemporáneo (1967). This edition was intended to appeal mainly to theologians, for the interest in Japanese philosophy during the sixties 20 Takeyama’s Harp of Burma (1948) has been translated into Spanish in 1989, while Karaki has not yet been translated. 21 Sonoda refers to Díez del Corral’s report on his visit to a Shinto shrine in Matsuri no gensho¯gaku (1990) Tokyo: Ko¯bundo¯, 338. 22 See a summary view on Zen by A. Blai in http://www.oshogulaab.com/BLAY/TEXTOS/BLAYZEN1.htm (Spanish).

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was represented mainly by missionaries and their audiences. Although the essay deals with lay philosophers, and not only religious thought, the personal adscription of translators and authors in the sixties made Japanese philosophy to be generally interpreted under the category of mysticism. Among the missionaries we must finally add the regular publishing activity of the Dominican priest J. González Valles (1929–2007) in this period, but practically limited to the theological journal of the Order.23 The seventies represent a turning point in the knowledge and interest in Japanese philosophy. On the one hand, Spanish Orientalism keeps appropriating the privilege of introducing Zen philosophy and practice. On the other, the Jesuit fathers at Sophia University keep their distinctive but very limited task of translation and introduction of Japanese thought in the Spanish world, but it scarcely has an effect in the academia. And finally, students of philosophy at Spanish universities encounter the thought of philosophical Orientalism and Japanism through translations. Common to them all is the presence of Zen in the adapted version of Zenism. These three factors converge in accentuating the hallo of mystic esotericism under which Japanese philosophy is interpreted in general at Spanish academic institutions. In the first row, yoga master R. Calle (b. 1943) follows on the legacy of Blay, although not being his disciple, since 1968, but particularly his essay of 1970 Introducción al zen y al lamaísmo evidences one of the general characteristics of the introduction of Zen in Spain as we have sustained, i. e. its association to esotericism.24 In the same line, we find an interest in Zen microbiotics since 1973, and Zen as applied to business since 1978. As to religious and theological interest in Zen, we must highlight the pioneering but reduced work of the Jesuit R. López Silonis, who as early as 1971/1972 is credited as one of the introducers of the Kyoto school philosophy in Spain, particularly the religious thinking of Nishida. Only, his status as theologian prevented him to tackle other types of philosophical analysis. Due to this factor, his contributions have been disregarded out of theological circles. He wrote articles on the “Religion in Nishida Kitaro¯” (1971), and “God in the Religious Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro¯” (1972). A different reception was given to the collection of essays published in 1968 by Th. Merton (1915–1968), including a dialogue with D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), under the title Zen and the Birds of Appetite, which was translated into Spanish in 1972.25 Therein students of the Departments of Philosophy at Spanish universities had the first chance to encounter directly Nishida and Su23 González Valles was a missionary in Japan during 1955–1976, residing in Matsuyama, Nagoya and Tokyo. A pioneer in publishing in Spain articles on Japanese religion, culture and philosophy since the sixties. 24 Calle has published a children’s tale in English, Yoga in the Jungle, Madrid: Cuento de Luz 2013. 25 Spanish title El zen y los pájaros del deseo, published originally in 1972.

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zuki. The next Zen master to be introduced in this period was Deshimaru Taisen (1914–1982).26 The collection of essays Zazen: The Practice of Zen was first translated and published in 1976, and then again in 1979, including the presentation of sacred texts of the tradition, like the “Hannya Shingyo”, or the translation of Ho¯kyo¯ zanmai by monk Tozan (807–869).27 In this way was the classic literature of the Zen tradition first introduced to Spanish students of philosophy. To this, the figure of Thich Nhat Hanh (b. 1926) was added in 1978 with the translation of Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice.28 Eventually, the prominent apostle of Zenism D. T. Suzuki was reintroduced to Spanish readers since 1979 with the translation of Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalisis, the joint edition of Suzuki and E. Fromm (1900–1980), which had a certain impact among young students.29 And the apostle of Orientalism A. Watts (1915–1973), who had been well covered by Spanish publishers since 1971, was added to the Zenist library with the translation of The Way of Zen in 1984.30 In all, we can ascertain the general frame under which the Buddhist Zen literature was interpreted by Spanish publishers and masters of oriental techniques in the seventies. This genre was interpreted as belonging to Orientalism, esotericism, and was according to some even close to occultism. This misinterpretation was the reason behind the lack of initiatives within Departments of Philosophy of Spanish universities, to include Zen Buddhism in their syllabi or their lessons, and consequently the absence of academic dissertations on Japanese philosophy in general during this period. Another consequence has been the misinterpretation that all there is to Japanese philosophy is Zen. Both misunderstandings are behind the present day appreciation of Japanese philosophy as a marginal world, inaccessible to European thinkers. On the opposite side, the world of Zen aesthetics has had a great impact in artists, designers, poets, artisans, chefs, painters, musicians, and intellectuals at large. In sum, the legacy of the seventies’ concentration in Zenism has been double: the marginalization of Zen ontology as part of esoteric religiousness, out of the Philosophy Departments, and the assimilation of Zen aesthetics. But at the same time, the scholarly interest in mysticism with a long tradition in the Iberian peninsula gave as a result the appearance of transnational per26 La práctica del zen has become a classic, being reissued recurrently. The latest edition is of 2013. Among other recent works in translation, El tesoro del zen (Barcelona: Oniro) has been released in 2011. 27 The essay on Tosan by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi (1889–1980) has been translated and published in 2011 (Barcelona: Herder). 28 Nhat Han owns 95 references in the database of publications hosted by the Spanish Ministry of Education. His latest work in press is Un canto de amor a la tierra (Barcelona: Kairós 2014). 29 Published as Budismo zen y psicoanálisis by Fondo de Cultura Económica de España, Madrid. 30 Published as El camino del zen by Eddhasa, Barcelona.

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sonalities, like that of the celebrated Roman catholic priest R. Panikkar (1918– 2010), one of the founders of modern studies in comparative mysticism, based both in academic work and personal experience.31 The span of influence of the charisma and work of Panikkar extends from the early seventies to this day. Born to an Indian father and a Catalan mother, already in 1971 he released his first important work on comparative mysticism, Misterio y revelación. Hinduismo y cristianismo: Encuentro de dos culturas. Although he never wrote about Japanese mysticism, his personality and work have been the foundation of a Catalan school of academics related to universities in the area of Barcelona, who following his legacy have approached with acumen the world of Japanese mysticism and religions, also from the viewpoint of the philosophy of religion and culture. Needless stressing that this study of mysticism is mostly scholarly, far away from the interest in Orientalistic practices described in the previous paragraph. This Catalan centre of studies in Japanese mysticism, inspired in Panikker, attached to several different institutions, and conducted mainly in the Spanish language, has probably become the most important place for religious exchange and study in all the Iberian territory. Panikker was also a pioneer in religious dialogue. The seventies have been a decade in which the platform for a regular religious dialogue among scholars was set. To this, Spanish scholars have contributed not only from Spain, but also from Japan. A singular case is that of the Jesuit father A. Mataix (b. 1928), who took part in 1973 in the edition of Shu¯kyo¯ no taiwa: Kristokyo¯ to Nihon no shoshu¯kyo¯, based on an encounter at Sophia University between Catholicism and Japanese popular cults, Shinto, and Buddhism.32 Unfortunately, this effort on the side of the Jesuit fathers at Sophia University had no echo within the Iberian territory, and was isolated from the intellectual networks. A different fate had another Jesuit, the German father, H. Enomiya-Lassalle (1898–1990), a pioneer in what we call today bi-religion, with an important following in Spanish religious and lay Catholics.33 In 1980 Spanish publishers started releasing books authored by Enomiya-Lassalle, the first of which was El zen entre cristianos. Thanks to initiatives of scholars linked mainly to the legacy of Enomiya-Lassalle, Zen philosophy and practice have found other lines of expansion in Spanish religious and academic circles. Also, another group of originally Jesuit fathers turned laymen has contributed most to expand the nihonjinron-type theses among young students since the eighties, when they started returning to Spain, one by one. Pioneer among them all was the initiative taken by J. López (1926–2011), who 31 One of his latest works has been Pluralisme I Interculturalitat, Barcelona: Fragmenta 2010. 32 Coeditors were Kadowaki Kakichi (b. 1926) and Inoue Hideharu (b. 1930). It was published by So¯bunsha, Tokyo. 33 His latest publication on Zen has been Zen: Un camino hacia la propia identidad, in Eds. Mensajero, Bizkaia 2007.

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promoted interest in Japanese culture and philosophy in southern Spain, being decisive in the institution of the Japanese studies program at Granada University.34 He was inspiring to a number of young scholars who later pursued their aims in Shinto and Buddhist academic studies linked to the Department of Philosophy at this University. He was the first foreign student at the Department of Buddhist Studies at To¯dai, and eventually recruited Nakamura Hajime (1912– 1999) to his intercultural project.35 Beside the Jesuits trained in Sophia University, we must also add the importance that another institution, Nanzan University at Nagoya, has had in fostering interreligious dialogue and the study of Japanese philosophy in Spain. In 1984, the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture hosted an academic encounter between Catholicism and Shinto, published with the title Shinto¯ to kristokyo¯: Shu¯kyo¯ ni okeru fuhen to tokushu. This Institute, under the leadership of J. Heisig (b. 1947), established links with the Department of Philosophy of the University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, and Heisig himself has made a reputation as a direct heir of the legacy of R. Panikkar, and at the same time as an expert introducer of the Kyoto school philosophy in Spain.36 In this way another seed of young Spanish scholars has been since then linked to both institutions. A different line of connection with the philosophies of Asia and Japan in particular is represented by the publication of translations and original accounts of the Asian history of philosophy by Spanish scholars. In 1847 Dr. J. Balmes (1810–1848), a theologian from Barcelona, issued an Historia de la filosofía where he covers India, together with classical Confucianism and Daoism in China.37 His interest reflects the French tradition in theology of confronting Chinese religious thought with Catholic orthodoxy. There is no mention of Japan. But this is rather an isolated case. We will have to wait for more than a century to find some success enjoyed by a period of translations, initiated by the Histoire de la philosophie de 1969–1974 of Éditions Gallimard, published in the Spanish language by Siglo XXI in 11 volumes between 1972 and 1981. Therein, Volume 1 is dedicated to “Prephilosophical and Eastern thought”, covering again India and China up to Neoconfucianism, and the conclusive Volume 11 is titled “Philosophy in the East”, meaning Islam, India and China up to 1968. But again there is no mention of 34 A son of López, Nobuo Ignacio, a linguist, is today the head of the Japanese Studies program at Granada University. 35 Nakamura eventually visited Granada on invitation by López, and one of the disciples of this has been the translator of Ways of Thinking into Spanish. See an excerpt in Heisig, J. H./ Kasulis, Th. P./Maraldo, J. C./Bouso, R. (eds. 2016) La filosofía japonesa en sus textos, Barcelona: Herder. 36 Heisig has gathered a group of Spanish translators of philosophy to undertake translations of the Kyoto school philosophers, starting with Nishitani’s Shu¯kyo¯ to wa nanika in 2003. 37 Balmes became a reputed writer on politics and philosophy during his lifetime. His most acclaimed works dealt with fundamental philosophy.

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Japan. The figure of the Spanish philosopher Jesús Mosterín (b. 1941) presents an interesting case, being not linked to the world of religious studies.38 He comes from logic and philosophy of science, from where he develops a global view on philosophy as a universal phenomenon, as it happens with science and culture. From there springs the first project about writing a universal history of philosophy by a Spanish philosopher. The execution of this project, in the part related to Asian philosophies, starts with a volume on Indian thought in 1982, adding later a further volume on the history of Chinese thought. In 1983, he releases his account of an “Ancient philosophy in the East”, where he includes India and China up to Zhuangzi, but without reference to Japan. And again in 2007 his project of a universal history of philosophy sees the release of the volume dedicated to China, extending up to the Ming dynasty. In this volume we now find numerous references to Kamakura Buddhism, and particularly Zen Buddhism. Another aspect which connects this author with Japanese philosophy is his participation as a member of the international research group founded by Imamichi Tomonobu (1922–2012), to develop the project of the eco-ethica at the International Institute of Philosophy of the National University of Mexico since 1994, together with philosophers like M. Dufrenne (1910–1995), P. Ricoeur (1913–2005), and J. Simon (1914–1996).39 Mosterín participated actively in a number of academic activities and symposia, invited by Imamichi, between 1996–2003. A part of Mosterín’s contributions have been published in the Institute’s journal Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae. Among them “Levels of Moral Consciousness” (Vol. 15, 1997), “What is Culture and How Does it Evolve?” (Vol. 17, 1999), and “A World without Nation States” (Vol. 23, 2005). A more occasional relationship with Japanese philosophy is presented by the case of writer L. Racionero (b. 1940), with an interest in Orientalism, derived from his Catalan cultural identity.40 The first fruit of this orientation came out with the edition in 1983 of a collection of translated texts from Daoist aesthetics, ranging from the Daodejing up to the Book of Tea. The collection was titled Textos de estética taoísta. And in 1993 there came up a sequel in the shape of East-West philosophical comparison, Oriente y Occidente: Filosofía oriental y dilemas occidentales. The author has been invited to Japan to represent Spanish intellectuals linked to Japanism, together with peers of the like of conservative 38 Mosterín has covered a wide spectrum of philosophical interests, and has been an active collaborator with colleagues beyond the Atlantic, especially in Mexico, through which connection he was recruited by Imamichi. See below. 39 Imamichi has contributed to collective volumes in Mexico and Spain. See his contribution to La Ortiga in 2010 “Eco-ética en el siglo XXI: Cosmopolitismo y urbanica”, 63–72. See below. 40 Racionero is an intellectual with a following in Spain, representative of typical Catalan dilettantism and sophistication. His analyses use to be smart and shrewd. He has been a friend of Catalan journalist J. Pla (1897–1981) and artist S. Dalí (1904–1989).

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writer F. Sánchez Dragó (b. 1936).41 We still do not find a proper work on Japanese philosophy during the nineties. We have to be contented with entries in dictionaries, like the Diccionario de escuelas de pensamiento o ismos, released in 1997 by M. Arroyo, wherein we can find a selection of entries related to Eastern religions and philosophies, like “Daoism”, “Confucianism”, “Tibetan Buddhism”, and “Zen Buddhism” including a reference to “Shintoism”. Or also, beside Orientalism, global accounts of contemporary philosophical trends oscillate between Euro-Americocentrism and the aspiration to a universal history of philosophy. Example of the former is the apparition in 1997 of a volume covering “Philosophy today” (J. Muguerza/P. Cerezo eds.), where Asian contributions to the matter are absent. On the other pole, we must refer to the project of an Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, conceived in 1992 by the Institute of Philosophy of the Spanish National Research Council as a global Spanish language contribution to the universal history of philosophy. Therein Vol. 19, published in 1999 is dedicated to the Filosofías no occidentales, and it includes chapters on Chinese philosophy, Indian Veddha and Indian Buddhism, but not on Japan. There is just one single allusion to Zen. The situation as relates to Japanese philosophy changes drastically in 2000 thanks to the scholarly work of father J. González Valles, O. P., whom we have already met above. He is the latest link in a long Spanish Dominican tradition of study of the Japanese language and classics, initiated by historical figures like that of father D. Collado (d. 1638), a missionary educated in the Salamanca Seminary.42 González Valles published that year his Historia de la filosofía japonesa, first and only one of the kind written by a Spaniard. Here, after some elucidation, the author decided to use the term “philosophy” boldly, as a straight proposition running counter to the general trend in Spanish professors of philosophy not to recognize Eastern thought under such category. In its stead the dominant tendency has been to call it “thought” or “thinking” (pensamiento), or “philosophical thought” at most, but never just “philosophy.” A similar case to the reluctance in Japan to using the term tetsugaku as applied to Japanese thinkers. Since this point in time, we may state that new contributors are striving to raise the point of view on Japanese authors as philosophical proponents on a same scale with their Western counterparts. Without much academic support, González kept studying in his own cell, to release his swan song in 2007, a few 41 Dragó has been hired by Kyoto University of Foreign Studies for more than a decade. A media-friendly outspoken pseudo-intellectual, he conducts conservative TV programs in Spain. 42 Collado has made the first contributions to a Latin/Spanish grammar and dictionary of Japanese by a Spaniard. Among his works stand Ars grammaticae Iaponicae linguae (in Latin, 1632), and a history of Christianity in Japan, written with Dominican J. Orfanel in Spanish in 1633.

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months after his decease, under the title Filosofía de las artes japonesas. Still, Euro-Americocentric accounts of present day philosophy keep recurring by the hands of professors like L. Sáez in 2001, J. Muñoz and M. Cruz in 2002, and J. M. Navarro (ed.) in 2004. On the other hand, the universalistic tendency will produce works like El legado filosófico y científico del siglo XX (M. Garrido/L. M. Valdés/ L. Arenas eds. 2005/2009), where we find a section dedicated to “Eastern Philosophical Thought in the XX Century”. Inside it we discover a chapter on “Japanese Thought” written by J. González Valles. The year 2007 a translation of Iki no ko¯zo¯ and “Fu¯ryu¯ ni kan suru ichiko¯satsu” (1941) introduced the figure of aesthetician and philosopher Kuki Shu¯zo¯ to Spanish readers, as a result of the recently founded Japanese studies curriculum at the University of Salamanca. Here too symposia and group research on Fukuzawa Yukichi (1865–1901) and Orikuchi Shinobu are still to be published.43 During this period, the Catalan front receives the impulse of the publication of the Spanish edition of Philosophers of Nothingness (2002) by J. Heisig, following which the nucleus of research on Japanese philosophy is reactivated. Due to this stimulus, the Catalan project linked to the legacy of Panikkar would see the publication in 2003 of the Spanish translation of Nishitani’s Shu¯kyo¯ to wa nanika (1961), and a selection of essays by Ueda Shizuteru in 2005. Simultaneously, A. Martín Morillas (b. 1959), heir both of J. López and Nakamura Hajime at the Faculty of Philosophy of Granada University, reads a doctoral dissertation on the concept of nothingness in Heidegger and its Eastern connection in 2003, releasing an Aproximación al budismo zen in 2012.44 We may also quote the monograph on Japanese contemporary cultural anthropologists released by the Catalan language Revista d’Etnologia No. 29 (2006), which includes a selection of texts by H. Befu, T. Funabiki, Y. Sugimoto, K. Yoshino, N. Koyasu, E. Oguma, St. Tanaka, N. Sakai, and T. Aoki, as a result of the parallel research activity on Japan conducted at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. And finally we should mention the universal history of philosophy project carried out by a team of Spanish historians which for the first time includes chapters on Japan, one on the modern period, and another on the contemporary scene. It was released in 2007, under the general title of Historia universal del pensamiento filosófico, in 6 volumes, edited by A. Segura (b. 1938), a historian of philosophy at Granada University.45 In sum, the first decade of the twenty first century witnesses what we should call the maturity of research and translation on Japanese philosophy in Spain. We have discerned three lines of research and diffusion. First, Japanese thought finally enters the space of the 43 The symposia were held as events of inauguration of Japanese studies at Salamanca University in 1999 and 2001 respectively. 44 Martín Morillas presently teaches philosophy at the Faculty of Theology. 45 Segura is well known among Spanish interpreters of Althusser, Marx, Aquinas, Heidegger, Vattimo, Kant, Spinoza, and more recently in the field of neuro-philosophy.

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histories of philosophy, contributing to break the hegemony of Euro-Americocentrism. Second, translation and study of twentieth century Japanese authors compensates for the previous focus on premodern, classical referents, adding new materials to a field previously dominated by Zenism. And third, the interest in Japanese religious thinking keeps alive and productive as one of the most important Spanish contributions to the field of interreligious dialogue. The present decade will open by extending what we have summed up in the previous paragraph. In 2010 the Journal on Art, Literature and Thought La Ortiga released a monograph on issue No. 102–104, dedicated to Far Eastern philosophy. Herein we will find essays by authors already acquainted with, like late Dominican J. González Valles discussing on Nishida, and newly incorporated researchers, like M. Crespín (b. 1976) on Karatani Ko¯jin (b. 1941), or invited Japanese authors like philosopher of the global Imamichi Tomonobu, and historian of Greek philosophy Notomi Noboru.46 On a different perspective, religious comparatism is seeing the rise of a new centre of discussion, adding the Jacobean interreligious and transphilosophical project of the Department of Philosophy of Santiago de Compostela University to the panorama. These academic encounters start from 1993, but the edition of 2007 is held under the heading “Galicia and Japan”. Counting with panellists like Indian philosophy scholar Sawai Yoshitsugu (b. 1951), since that occasion every two years up to the present, on each edition there is a permanent panel dedicated to Japan.47 The key issue has been a comparative analysis of the pilgrimages to Santiago and to celebrated places in Japan, from the philosophical perspective of the notions of “way” (caminho) or do¯. The same Department has seen the release of its first doctoral dissertation on Japanese philosophy in 2013, discussing on two authors already introduced in Spain, i. e. Nishitani and Izutsu Toshihiko (1914–1993).48 Of the latter, a translation from French of Le Koan zen (1978), a collection of essays on Zen Buddhism, was available to Spanish readers already since 1980. Later on, Izutsu has been paid attention again by Spanish publishers in the new century. Recently, a new generation of young scholars is presenting doctoral dissertations on Japanese philosophers. We may quote studies on Yuasa in 2012, and on Kiyozawa and Nishida in 2013. So the prospect of recent trends in Spanish universities is showing the following tendencies. First, the interest in Japanese philosophical authors is slanting towards twentieth century referents, instead of relying on religious traditions, and mixed Sino-Japanese sources. These authors are being studied in their original language, and the mediation of translations 46 M. Crespín has presented a doctoral dissertation on Nishida in 2013 at the University of Barcelona. 47 The reference is Agís, M./Baliñas, C./Ríos, J. (eds.) Galicia y Japón: Del sol naciente al sol poniente (2007), Universidade da Coruña 2008. 48 The title was Esencia y vacío en la obra de T. Izutsu y K. Nishitani.

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from a third language has ceased being the rule. Second, the interest in Japanese philosophers of the religious, especially Zen Buddhism, is not diminishing however, on the contrary, thanks to the activity of two centres of study, situated around Barcelona and Santiago de Compostela, this tendency is being ever more focused towards the interreligious and transcultural. And third, new Departments of Philosophy are joining the field, like the ones at Valencia University, Ramon Llull University, and Barcelona University, where some of the new research is being conducted. At some of them, regular courses on “Eastern philosophy” make part of the curricula in their Philosophy degrees. This is connected to Asian Studies programs at Departments of Literature and Translation, where courses on Chinese and Japanese philosophy are being carried out. So the future prospect for Japanese studies in philosophy permits some confidence on keeping a regular productivity in the area of research, in the hands of the “third generation” of young scholars and their second generation supervisors. The regular issuance of new translations, studies and handbooks, like Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Heisig, J. H./Kasulis, Th. P./Maraldo, J. C. eds. 2011), just released in the Spanish edition in 2016, will greatly contribute to their training. Finally, we should add the necessity to foster cooperative transcontinental research between institutions on both sides of the Atlantic, for example with El Colegio de Mexico.49 Still there is a lot to be done. The celebration of newly founded Area studies at Spanish Universities in the beginnings of this century, where Japanese programs were inserted has turned rather deceptive in what refers to the field of philosophy. As we have seen, there is a tendency to incorporate Japanese philosophy to universal histories in a separate chapter, as if it were unrelated to the rest. In this way, the old Orientalist prejudice to segregate the Eastern from the Western keeps active. The same pattern reproduces at conferences and congresses. While scholars of philosophy attend their own philosophical conferences, scholars in Japanese philosophy attend Area studies conventions. In the same line, the Departments of Philosophy and the Area Studies programs are totally disconnected. This is not a particular feature of the Spanish institutions, on the contrary this is a situation produced by the institutionalization of Area studies at large, being the Spanish case a late version of the same pattern. Japanese philosophy is taught in the program on Japanese Studies at several universities like the Madrid Autonomous University, and at Salamanca University Japanese Intellectual History is being taught since 1998. In the new M. A. on Japanese Studies at Granada University, Japanese philosophy is also present. But these curricula are unrelated to any of the corresponding Departments of Philosophy. This absurd dichotomy 49 We should make mention here of the invaluable research work on Nishida in Spanish carried out for years by Dr. Agustín Jacinto at the Colegio de Michoacán.

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will keep reversing the efforts to integrate Japanese philosophers in their proper place, i. e. a universal history of philosophy model wherein they will be part of the discussion, in phenomenology, hermeneutics, the problem of transcendence, philosophies of the mind and body, epistemology, and aesthetics, to mention the most obvious. This is yet to be written, but the young generation is conscious of these conditions and will no doubt contribute to redirect this general tendency.

3. I think that there is an academic bipolarity in dealing with problems referring to Japanese cultural, historical, and political issues. We can appreciate this when dealing with sensitive issues like the problem of Yasukuni, or conditions of women in present day Japan. Discussions of these issues tend to polarize between a neo-conservative view sustained by a number of Japanese authors, and a progressive outlook, supported by a wide international consensus. But typically this kind of issues is rarely seen in a broader context, including state cult ceremonies in the United States or Europe in the case of Yasukuni, and the diversity of state and societal responses to the challenges of post-industrial capitalism in a global context, in the case of genre analysis. In the case of appraising Japanese philosophers, it is the international academic world that shows the tendency to isolate them as “Japanese”, i. e. different than “world” philosophers. This is why it is rare to see Japanese authors standing on their own within panels dealing with international issues, and we see them more frequently gathered around panels named “Japanese philosophy”, “Japanese ethics”, “Japanese religions”, or the like. This is what I mean by an academic bipolarity when dealing with Japanese issues. This bipolarity in fact reproduces the political tension “Japan” – “the world”, wherein problems of the Japanese uniqueness and the need for internationalization are no more than the expression of the inability on both sides to break the political dividing line that persistently disconnects Japan from the international community and reinforces the global perception that Japan is an isolated state and a heterogeneous culture. I must contend that this view itself is problematic. The opposition “Japan” – “the world” in fact has always been a political fiction. For in what relates to Japan, the Japanese state has always been a part of the political world, even when it has taken isolationist positions in history. This applies just as well to Japanese material as to intellectual culture. The Japanese difference has always been relative, i. e. world-relational. So that present day Japanese historiography assumes transcultural contextualization as the first step in its procedure. If this is so, then Japanese philosophers of all periods must be reinterpreted as world philosophers. And secondly, the world has never been a

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unit equivalent to Japan. There is a kind of petitio principii in the dichotomy, which reveals its artificiality. The world has always been nothing else than a conglomerate of other states, each one with particular interests or indifference towards Japan. So that when analyzing problems related to Japan, the tendency to focalize views through an opposing binary formula usually does nothing more than reproduce the political pattern analyzed above. Then our task must be to dissolve this pattern into its real components. Try to find a third view, not just A or B, i. e. Japan or the rest. For this purpose the introduction of multi-level analysis should make a difference. In terms of its application to historical issues or to the interpretation of philosophical debates, it means that marginal countries in Japanese studies like the ones out of the rim of the Anglo-Saxon academic institutions might provide perspectives that fall out of the dichotomous tendency, by applying historical experiences dissimilar to the ones sanctioned in the dominant field. Breaking the dichotomy means gaining in complexity, and getting rid of simplistic analyses. I am persuaded that peripheral countries in Japanese studies might contribute to the dismantling of the category “Japanese”, but to develop this capability first they must overcome their own habits that prevent these potentialities to effloresce. I basically discern two types of handicaps. First, the legacy of Orientalism. Countries like Spain maintain their own history in building a certain type of Orientalism, mainly seeing Japan as the other to a Roman Catholic model of civilization, and later in history sharing Orientalistic stereotypes with other European neighbours. The enormous amount of literature trying to explain “Japan” reinforces the stereotype that understanding Japan requires of concealed clues, unnecessary when explaining other countries, and that dealing with Japan requires of exotic, unusual patterns of negotiation. And second, the aspiration to incorporate the Spanish academic institutions, and their methods of tuition, to the dominant Anglo-Saxon academic world. This false perception of dependency is a real handicap in the training of young scholars, who most often assume as dogmas general theories found in the prevailing literature in English, without any capacity for criticism. In this way I find quite often in my seminars that students reproduce anti-Japanese discourse as a natural way of criticising nihonjinron theses. This without realising that radical criticism towards Japan is nothing else than an inversion of the typical Japanistic discourse of the nihonjinron type. For the result is still another type of Japanism. The only way out is again contextualizing in ampler circles of analysis and acquiring complexity. The expected result will be reintroducing Japan or Japanese authors into a resemanticized global space of discussion. Some Japanese authors have been pointing this way already for a few decades. Among them, Imamichi, Karatani, Nishitani Osamu (b. 1950), or Asada

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Akira (b. 1957), to quote a few examples.50 Let us conclude by giving an example of how to apply our proposal. Let us take the question about the pair rational – irrational as has been applied to Japanese intellectual history. One of the longest discussions and less fertile ones has developed in trying to understand Japanese intellectual stance for irrationality as a kind of feature of its national character, in front of a pseudo-definition of Western rationality as a kind of fixated construction of the world. This stereotype probably originated in the reinterpretation of intentionality or kokoro-mind as equal to aware-consciousness in a bid to find a differentiation in contrast to a li-rationality, as typically formulated by philosophers like Motoori Norinaga (1730–8101).51 An aware which is subtly connected to the femininity of jo¯-passion in the plays of Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1725).52 Many nationalist as well as postmodern authors have celebrated this difference, axiologically oriented towards a judgment of value that enhances the former. As a consequence all the history of Japanese philosophy has been reinterpreted to fit this scheme. In the early period of modernization around Meiji Restoration, however this kind of discourse concealed itself because of the pressure to compete with a new type of rationality, accompanying the arrival of Western civilization. Traditional religions, including Shinto, strove to demonstrate their rationalistic world-views in front of the Christian pretensions for hegemony. But after religious toleration became the rule and the Japanese state took its stance as a candidate for dominion over Asia, a number of Japanese intellectuals started constructing a national character or seishin, as we have explained in the first section of this essay, and then the pair rational – irrational became the basis for a series of self-reproductions, among them the difference between philosophy-tetsugaku and thought-shiso¯, which was again sanctioned. The prewar bid towards overcoming the West only served to give this bipolarity a political meaning. Since then up to the present, there has been an endless series of discussions as to how to interpret this dichotomy, being a feature corresponding to a Japanese type of consciousness-mind. Only after the period of kokusaika in the late eighties of last century, Japanese and foreign scholars have started denouncing this dichotomy as forgery. A new history of Japanese philosophy has started being written, out of the presumption of the tendency towards emotionality. In this line, for the classical period the study of Gr. Paul (1993) has 50 Nishitani has published recently a significant work on the issue, under the title Risei no tankyu¯, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 2009, which reunites essays of the period between 2004 and 2009. Asada’s position can be inferred from the presentation made by Nakamasa Masaki (2006) Nihon no gendai shiso¯ : Postmodern to wa nan datta no ka, Tokyo : NHK Books 2009. 51 See a recent article by T.-h. Kim in Lam, W.-k./Cheung, Ch.-y. (eds. 2009) Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4: Facing the 21st Century, Nagoya: Nanzan University Press. 52 See for instance the opening paragraph of “The Love Suicides at Amijima”, in Four Major Plays of Chikamatsu, Tr./Preface by D. Keene, New York: Columbia University Press 1998.

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become a must.53 At this juncture there can be little doubt about what this kind of dichotomous construct represents. Contrary to the dynamism proper of true bipolarities, like in yin-yang philosophies, dialectical thinking, dialogical analysis, or theories of complexity, the dichotomies of the type rational – irrational reveal their inanity in their irreconcilable character. An irrational Japan is a futile construct just as a rationalistic Europe or West is an extremely simplistic pseudoconcept. The truth is that there is nothing like a Western rationality inasmuch as the rational faculty is inherent to the human species, and historical differences in the use of this faculty can never become substantiated as to give shape to any sort of essence or substance. The history of Western philosophy has been associated to the emergence of Western science, but if scientific discoveries are valid worldwide, philosophical discoveries are so too. The Babel of interpretations has resulted in a diaspora of cultural meanings, and reconciliability seems far away. Perhaps the only way open to build a true universal philosophy will be to refound rationality in the Kantian sense of a universal faculty of understanding, by way of a dialogical intersection of the different experiences of rational thinking in the various kernels of cultures and traditions. I. e. to build a hybrid, complex, relative, organic, and dynamic new model of rationality. By hybrid I mean a model that must be the result of the fusion of different rationalities as are found in history, learning from all experiences, as I have just maintained. By complex I mean a rationality that does not exclude the irrational, but on the contrary, that interacts with it. For the solution to the dichotomous dualism rational – irrational can never be on one of the poles of the equation, but on how they relate. The simple affirmation of rationality over the irrational has turned societies into some type of fanaticism and intellectual slavery, but the unilateral refuge in the irrational has only served to lose all ground on the administration of the real. Empires have developed rational administrative bodies to subjugate the spontaneity of different languages and cultures, but the nationalistic reaction of modern nation-states has only substituted for it an emotional, local sense of identity and exclusion of otherness. A combination of both poles of the rational plus the irrational is the only way to deal with problems of international law and understanding at a different level than the local application of traditions and religious cults. By relative I propose a type of rationality self-conscious of its own limits, and in this way self-protected from the fanaticism of a fixated construction (architecture in terms of Karatani) which ignores and excludes the irrational and the meta-rational. For rationality has its own roots in the magma of the unconscious mind, from where it gets its nutrition and organic 53 The reference is Paul, Gregor (1993) Philosophie in Japan: Von den Anfängen bis zur HeianZeit, eine kritische Untersuchung, München: Iudicium Verlag.

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flexibility, and at the same time reckons that there is another dimension, beyond its conceptual and linguistic conditions, where the intuitive faculties of the mind have access to the realm of the dao, silence, nothingness and an unfathomable ineffability. There are no concepts, no words to measure this infinite. Rationality cannot be devoid of life, being just a cold, abstract artefact of the mind. Rationality must be organic in the sense that it is a live function of our biological brain, and serves a vital need of human beings to respond intelligently and creatively to their environment. Finally, dynamic means a fluid, not solidified, unfinished, open, never complete use of reason. If rationality is a part of the exchange between human beings and the world, and the world is the realm of the ever-changing, rationality is a function that must keep in a constant flux. Contrary to the historical misuse of reason, the aim of rationality is not to build the world, but to respond to it. Not the domination of nature, including human nature, but interaction with it, in the service of a naturalized human species. Renouncing rationality as a result of a harsh criticism towards Western rationalism has been, on the contrary to what was intended, rather a weak point in many Japanese authors of the twentieth century. It continues today for instance in debates on bioethics, where an excess of affirmation of an alleged dependency on the part of Japanese towards certain beliefs, which run counter to scientific knowledge and violate individual rights, has been quite often the rule. But this kind of beliefs is just some type of superstition, one which Japanese citizens are able to overcome. On the contrary, intellectuals are wrongly contributing to protect this superstitious behaviour, confusing anachronistic irrationality with a Japanese legitimate tradition, in a similar way as Jehova witnesses and other cults interfere with medicine in the West. This is an example where rationality is needed to overcome the subjugation to atavistic rules. Another example has been the confrontation with Western rationalism in the “overcoming the West” debates of last century. Rejecting Western rationalism in cultural and intellectual matters did never mean renouncing Western science, generating a forged dualism between spiritual culture and material techne. The fact is that the type of rationality that shaped modern science has also shaped modern philosophy. In fact, many other authors had understood this since Meiji times, and they contributed to the movement “Western science, Japanese spirit”, forging another one of the dichotomous dualisms we have encountered, with the purpose of rejecting modern rationality. This is culturalism. Culturalism is, I argue, the main objection that the proposal I have presented in this essay may find from Japanese intellectuals. For culturalism will always deny that rationality can be universal, and will always claim particularity as the limit for discussion. At times even uniqueness. Some Japanese authors are reluctant to lose the patrimonial sense of property of their cultural heritage, and are not ready to accept that the faculty of reason is in their minds as anywhere else, and it functions just the same. All I can

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do to answer culturalism is to propose an inclusive model of rationality, valid for Japanese as for Spaniards as for any other philosopher in this planet, in the line I have described above. It is a long time ago that rationality stopped being ontological and turned epistemic. This turn has a meaning beyond the borders of the geographical place where it happened.

Bibliography Deshimaru, Taisen (1974/1975/1977) La práctica del zen, Barcelona: Kairós, 1979. Díez del Corral, Luis (1974) Perspectivas de una Europa raptada, Madrid: Seminarios y Ediciones. – (1963) Del nuevo al viejo mundo, Madrid: Revista de Occidente. – (1954, 1974) El rapto de Europa: Una interpretación histórica de nuestro tiempo, Madrid: Alianza Editorial 1979. Garrido, M./Valdés, L. M./Arenas, L. (eds. 2005/2009) El legado filosófico y científico del siglo XX, Madrid: Cátedra. González Valles, Jesús (2007) Filosofía de las artes japonesas: Artes de guerra y caminos de paz, Madrid: Verbum 2009. – (2000) Historia de la filosofía japonesa, Madrid: Tecnos. Heisig, James W. (ed. 2004) Japanese Philosophy Abroad, Nagoya: Nanzan University Press. – (2002) Filósofos de la nada, Barcelona: Herder. Karatani Ko¯jin (2012) Tetsugaku no kigen, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 2013. Maillard, Chantal (1998) La razón estética, Barcelona: Laertes 2001. Mataix, A./Kadowaki, K./Inoue E. (eds. 1973) Shu¯kyo¯ no taiwa, Tokyo: So¯bunsha. Merton, Thomas (1968) El zen y los pájaros del deseo, Barcelona: Kairós 1972. Montesino, M., Sierra, C. H., Hernando, S. S. (eds.) Revista d’Etnologia de Catalunya, No. 29, Desembre 2006. Mosterín, Jesús (2007) China: Historia del pensamiento, Madrid: Alianza. Nishida, Kitaro¯ (1911) Ensayo sobre el bien, tr. A. Mataix/J. M. de Vera, Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1963. Nishitani Osamu (2004–09) Risei no tankyu¯, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 2009. Nitobe, Inazo¯ (1899) El bushido, tr. J. Millán-Astray, Madrid: Artes Gráficas Ibarra 1941. – Bushido: El alma de Japón, tr. G. Jiménez de la Espada, Madrid: Ed. D. Jorro 1909. Paul, Gregor (1993) Philosophie in Japan: Von den Anfängen bis zur Heian-Zeit, eine kritische Untersuchung, München: Iudicium Verlag. Piovesana, Gino K. (1965) Pensamiento del Japón contemporáneo, Madrid: Razón y Fe 1967. La Ortiga: Revista Cuatrimestral de Arte, Literatura y Pensamiento, 2010 No. 102–104: Habitar la Terra Incognita: Experiencias, Miradas, Pensamientos sobre Extremo Oriente. Segura, Armando (ed. 2007) Historia universal del pensamiento filosófico, 6 vols., Bizkaia: Liber Distribuciones Educativas. Watsuji, Tetsuro¯ (1935) El hombre y su ambiente, tr. A. Mataix/J. Masiá, Teruel: M. Castellote 1973.

Curtis Rigsby (University of Guam)

Constructing a Course in Japanese Philosophy

Japanese philosophy does not commonly belong to the widely recognized set of those philosophical traditions – such as Greek, German, French, or AngloAmerican – which are considered to constitute the history of philosophy or to contribute to the general project of philosophy proper. Therefore the burden of proof falls upon Japanese philosophy and its advocates to demonstrate its existence and philosophical validity to the mainstream Academy. This essay constitutes a prolegomena toward such a demonstration, pursuing the theme of “constructing a course in Japanese philosophy.” This master theme trades on the ambiguity of the English word “course” as either a content of study or an evaluative direction for inquiry, so as to examine two interrelated sub-themes: first, constructing a course in Japanese philosophy as a historiography or academic curriculum, and second, constructing a course in Japanese philosophy as a genuine approach to the project of philosophy. Simply stated, this essay thus asks: (1) What is Japanese philosophy and (2) what is its relevance?

(1)

What is Japanese Philosophy?

The first main question considered in this study – what is Japanese philosophy? – aims “to construct a course in Japanese philosophy” as a historiography or academic curriculum. The primary method of inquiry and analysis here is exegesis, approaching Japanese philosophy as history and a socio-cultural phenomenon. Of course, to the extent that the content of Japanese philosophy exhibits a rational and universal character, it can be considered philosophically as well as historically. Whether by socio-cultural interrelationships or by ideological coherence, the intellectual heritages of Japan must exhibit sufficient unity and uniqueness in order to merit the defining title “Japanese philosophy,” whereby its thinkers, movements, and ideas can be considered together and distinguished from those of other traditions.

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However, in regards to determining such specific nature, scope, and content, arch-historian of modern Japanese thought Gino K. Piovesana warns against the error of “generalization-itis.”1 Faced with the daunting task of determining the defining character of Japanese philosophy, Piovesana cautions that copious anomalies – Pitirim Sorokin’s “cultural congeries” or Georges Gurvitch’s “heterogeneity”2 – mitigate against any purported homogeneity or uniqueness whereby Japanese philosophy can be consistently and meaningfully defined. Indeed, Peter Dale provocatively claims that the alleged homogeneity and uniqueness of Japanese culture is a mere fictitious myth.3 Although Piovesana emphasizes extreme caution in any attempt to propose a homogenous, internally consistent, unique generalization of Japanese philosophy, he notably recognizes degrees of asymptotic success toward this end. He most strongly criticizes the “hasty generalizations” of the Orientalists and early Japanologists who labeled Japanese thought as “artistic” or “emotional,” or as completely lacking in speculative power. Correspondingly, Piovesana condemns the claims of Yamazaki Ken and Paul Lüth that Japanese philosophy is invariably idealistic and conservative.4 Piovesana submits as a better but still seriously problematic alternative, the “holistic generalization” of Saigusa Hiroto, whereby Japanese thought has been shaped by a divine origin theory, an authoritarian Confucianism, an aestheticizing way of the arts, and a fatalism inspired by EastAsian conceptions of nature as “what is so of itself” (shizen 自然). Finally, Piovesana proposes as an even better alternative to Saigusa’s semi-successful “holistic generalization,” the “systematic generalization” of Kuwada Kumataro¯ and Nakamura Hajime, whereby Japanese thought exemplifies a certain “irrationality” and dialectical tendency, an emphasis on feelings and sociality, and a synthetic, holistic approach to various traditions. However, according to Piovesana, despite their systematic and content-rich character, even the generalizations of Kuwada and Nakamura are flawed, presumptuously connecting motifs widely separated from each other by cultural space and historical time.5 H. Gene Blocker and Christopher I. Starling have more recently submitted their own set of generalizations regarding the character of Japanese philosophy, whereby it exemplifies an emphasis on the here-and-now, a sensible aestheticism, anti-transcendentalism, ritualized ceremonialism, a “symmetrical identity” between the absolute infinite and the relative finite, a sense of divinely 1 Piovesana, Gino K., S. J.. Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 1862–1996. Japan Library (Curzon Press Ltd): Richmond, 1997. p. 233. 2 Piovesana, p. 238. 3 Peter Dale. 1986. The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. New York: St. Martin’s Press. introduction. quoted in Blocker and St p. 160. 4 Piovesana p. 234–235, 243; italicization my own. 5 Piovesana p. 234–239; italicization my own.

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instituted national destiny, and a willingness to borrow from various foreign sources due to the internal political or cultural expediency of Japanese interests rather than any foreign-imposed constraint.6 Finally, the father of modern Japanese philosophy, Nishida Kitaro¯ famously proposed that Japan exhibits a “culture of Nothingness” (mu 無). Thus Nishida and the Kyoto School which formed around the trajectory of the Nishida Philosophy formulated various philosophies of Nothingness, thereby exemplifying what many have considered to be a broadly representative ideological heritage of Japan.7 The following issues serve to clarify further what Japanese philosophy is: (1.1) the proposed homogeneity and uniqueness of Japanese philosophy (1.2) ideological [X] developments, [Y] traditions, and [Z] themes (1.3) broad & narrow definitions of Japanese philosophy (1.4) the best way to explicate Japanese philosophy?

(1.1) the proposed homogeneity and uniqueness of Japanese philosophy Each of the aforementioned proposals – the Orientalists and early Japanologists, Yamazaki and Lüth, Saigusa, Kuwada and Nakamura, Blocker and Starling, and Nishida and his legacy – purports to express central or essential characteristics of Japanese thought. Building on this trajectory, the following table lists eleven proposals (1)–(11) which might be appealed to in order to delineate what is homogenous and unique about Japanese philosophy.8 Corresponding to each proposal is a prima facie anomalous difficulty for its effectiveness in delineating the essence of Japanese thought. Thus Japanese counterexamples to any claim of homogeneity are listed, as are non-Japanese analogues threatening to negate any claim of Japanese uniqueness. The task of constructing a course in Japanese philosophy should include a substantial redress of each of the Japanese counterexamples and non-Japanese analogues in this list.

6 Blocker and St, p. 28, 30–31, 34–35, 38–39, 41, 48, 61, 70–71, 121. 7 NKZ 9:53 The Problem of Japanese Culture chpt 6. Note also that James Heisig calls the Kyoto School philosophers “philosophers of Nothingness,” as evidenced in the title of his book, Heisig, James W. Philosophers of Nothingness. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2001. For details on the meaning of Nothingness in East-Asian and especially Japanese philosophical sources, see my: “Three Strands of Nothingness in the Kyoto School & Chinese Philosophy: A Summary & Evaluation”: Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, volume 13, no. 4, October 15, 2014. 8 I have cobbled together this list of eleven characteristics of Japanese philosophy directly from Piovesana and from Blocker and Starling, but the same characteristics are widely apparent throughout the relevant literature.

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proposals for the essence of Japanese thought and attendant anomalies analogue with (EuroAmerican) non-Japanese thought, mitigating against uniqueness *critics of society and tra*tradition affirmation dition from Nichiren to *strong social cohesion ex¯ shio Heihachiro¯; willing- emplified in the Three EsO ness to go against the status tates, serfdom, etc quo *divine right of kings + scala naturae theory

proposed (homogeneityand uniqueness-guaranteeing?) essential character of Japanese thought (1) *conservative *authoritative Confucianism *sociality; Mutai Risaku notes social implications of Nishida’s topos (basho 場 所) theory; Watsuji Tetsuro¯’s ethics based on social betweenness (ma 間, aidagara 間柄, ningen 人間) (2) *idealistic; Funayama Shin’ichi’s charge of Feuerbachian Spiritualismus (唯心 論) in need of materialistic critique *focus on the heart (kokoro 心) *Ishida Baigan’s heart-mind study ([sekimon] shingaku [石門]心學) *personalism (人格主義) and subjectivity (主体性); existentialist *Nishida Kitaro¯’s panentheism (万有在神論)

counterexamples within Japanese thought, mitigating against homogeneity

(3) *emphasis on feelings (ninjo¯ 人情), emotional; Nishida Kitaro¯’s “feelingsbased culture” ( jo¯teki bunka 情的文化) *Takeo Doi’s theory of dependence (amae 甘え) (4) *aestheticizing way of the arts (geido¯ 芸道) / artistic / sensible aestheticism *ritualized ceremonialism

*Shukigaku subordination *Romantic Movement of ki [氣] and its emotional *Transcendentalism manifestations to ri [理] *aesthetic Mysticism *Buddhist asceticism

*Kogaku / Old Confucian criticism of transcendently oriented speculation *post-sakoku / postwar popularity of Positivism, Materialism, and Marxism

*Zen iconoclasm

*German Idealism itself is often the inspiration for modern Japanese idealism

*Romantic Movement *operas, plays, visual art, etc *Renaissance *chivalric or ecclesiastical pageantry *Impressionism & Expressionism

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proposals for the essence of Japanese thought and attendant anomalies (Continued) proposed (homogeneityand uniqueness-guaranteeing?) essential character of Japanese thought (5) *the here-and-now *anti-transcendentalism *“symmetrical identity” between the absolute infinite and the relative finite

counterexamples within Japanese thought, mitigating against homogeneity

*Dainichi and numerous boddhisattvas of Mikkyo¯ ecstatic experience *Amida and Western Paradise of Pure Land, arguably the largest Buddhist movement in Japanese history (6) *Buddhist demythologiza*lacking in speculative tion and “logic” (kotowari power 理) / “logic of the Way” (do¯ri *“irrationality” (hir道理), ex. Do¯gen onrishugi 非論理主義) *the “Grave Doubts” (大疑 *Buddhist union of oppo録) of Kaibara Ekken or the sites (soku 即) type logic in “logic of things” ( jo¯ri 条理) the Heart Sutra pursued by Miura Baien ¯ nishi Hajime (7) *Christian (O *divine origin theory / sense & Uchimura Kanzo¯) and of divinely instituted naMarxist (Tosaka Jun & Miki tional destiny (ex. Kokuga- Kiyoshi) critics ku / Motoori Norinaga) (8) *discriminate borrowing *unrestricted willingness to and reformulation: Shinran, borrow indiscriminately Do¯gen, Kaibara Ekken, without any external conMiura Baien, Nishida Kistraint taro¯, etc *lacking in originality *synchretistic tendency *political and cultural expediency based on borrowing (9) *indiscriminate dialectical tendency (bensho¯ho¯ 弁証 法)

*hierarchical Buddhist ranking systems (kyo¯han 教 判) *Nichiren’s exclusivist reading of Buddhism *Kokugaku’s radical criticism of Buddhism, hanhonjuisuijaku

analogue with (EuroAmerican) non-Japanese thought, mitigating against uniqueness *Romantic Movement

*Romantic Movement *Mysticism *coincidentia oppositorum of Nicholas Cusanus

*divine right of kings + scala naturae theory *ecclesiastical apostolic succession *early stages of European rediscovery of Classical learning *Orientalism, faddish dabbling in Asian culture

*Heraclitus *Protagoras *Hegel, Marx *Nietzsche

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proposals for the essence of Japanese thought and attendant anomalies (Continued) proposed (homogeneityand uniqueness-guaranteeing?) essential character of Japanese thought (10) *fatalism inspired by EastAsian conceptions of nature as what is so of itself (shizen 自然, onozukara shikaru 自 ずから然る)

counterexamples within Japanese thought, mitigating against homogeneity

*in the Kojiki, the independent and singular (hitorikami 独神) creative three deities (zo¯kasanshin 造化三神 / mihashira 三柱) – the Lord in the Center of Heaven (amenominakanushi 天之御中主) and the two producing deities (musuhi 産霊) – by whom the rest of the kami were created *Takahashi Satomi claims (11) *Buddhist “Emptiness” (ku¯ all-encompassing “Noth空) ingness” is really Being *Kyoto School “Nothing*Critical Buddhism contra ness” (mu 無) and Japan as a all-encompassing topo“culture of Nothingness” logical Buddh (mu no bunka 無の文化)

analogue with (EuroAmerican) non-Japanese thought, mitigating against uniqueness *Spinoza’s deterministic pantheism / deus sive natura / natura naturatis

*Meister Eckhart’s Gottheit *Aquinas’ foundational subsistence (substistentia) of Divine Being versus the existence (existentia) of creatures

Any proposal of a homogeneity-confirming genus and uniqueness-confirming species purporting to constitute a definition of Japanese philosophy can be expressed in various degrees of strength and weakness. On the one hand, a proposal purporting a strongly systematic or ideological definition of Japanese philosophy presumes that the internal coherence of the ideas of Japanese philosophy itself guide its development and define its parameters. That is, it is the ideas themselves which function both as the genesis and the end product of Japanese philosophy. On such an account, ideas enjoy a marked independence from pragmatic or particular cultural concerns and exhibit a marked internal consistency whereby the identity of Japanese philosophy might be formulated. Thus an especially “strong” definition of Japanese philosophy might be enabled.9 On the other hand, a proposal purporting an arbitrary or incidental definition of Japanese philosophy presumes that it is not so much the ideas of Japanese philosophy which guide its development and identity, but rather contingent events and non-ideological concerns related to economic or political goals, or to 9 If the Japanese language itself may be conceived as entailing a philosophical worldview, then the strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis whereby language strictly constrains thought may be conceived of as a justification or explanation for a consolidated or essential definiens of Japanese philosophy. See Angus Graham’s discussion of the “guidance and constraint hypothesis” in Appendix 2, Disputers of the Tao. New York: Open Court, 1989.

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geographical restrictions. That is, whereas ideas may appear prima facie to strictly define Japanese philosophy, their appearance and arrangement will upon closer inspection prove to be haphazard and coincidental, the end product of expedience. Blocker and Starling call those espousing such a view “control theorists,” who, “inspired by Foucault…, attribute Japan’s alleged high degree of homogeneity not to innate characteristics but to power relations.”10 Thus on this view, the purported unity or meaningfulness of Japanese philosophy is due more to pragmatically motivated circumstances such as Japan’s self-imposed national isolation (sakoku 鎖国) than to internally consistent or systematic ideology. Thus only a weaker or less obviously philosophical definition of Japanese philosophy would seem to be possible. A maximally arbitrary or incidental account of Japanese philosophy along these lines mitigates against identifying the systematic or explanatory potential whereby any so called “Japanese philosophy” might function as genuine philosophy. Conversely, a maximally systematic or ideological account of Japanese philosophy mitigates against recognizing the contingent, localized cultural and historical context whereby any so called “Japanese philosophy” might qualify as genuinely Japanese. Neither extreme is preferable. Rather, in order for Japanese philosophy to count as both philosophical and Japanese, another important task in constructing a course for it is to pursue an account which engages both logical and pragmatic concerns and recognizes both systematizable and capricious phenomena. Wilhelm Dilthey’s interpretive method of “meaningful understanding” – Verstehen – suggests an auspicious middle ground. In contrast to the method of “explanation” – Erklären – whereby precise mathematical entailments and thoroughly predictable cause-effect relationships of the natural sciences or Naturwissenschaften are expounded, Dilthey’s method of Verstehen apprehends the often pragmatically driven and less certainly determined multiform phenomena of the historically and culturally embedded Humanities or Geisteswissenschaften. Of course, the semi-structured historically or culturally embedded geistliche relationships between motives and intentions or amid free choices and human responses may be analogous to the causes and effects of the natural sciences. However, in contrast to their more mechanistic trajectory, the geistliche character of human philosophical traditions such as Japanese philosophy require a more flexible and open hermeneutic. Dilthey’s Verstehen suggests a heuristic toward that end.

10 Blocker, Gene H. and Christopher I. Starling. Japanese Philosophy. State University of New York Press: Albany, 2001. p. 160.

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(1.2) ideological [X] developments, [Y] traditions, and [Z] themes Although this essay proposes no precise definition clarifying the homogeneity or uniqueness of Japanese philosophy, it does propose a provisional account of components aiming collectively to constitute Japanese philosophy. Just as several characteristics along the lines of the previous eleven (1)–(11) have been proposed to delineate the essence of Japanese thought, I also propose that Japanese philosophy can be – as with any historically and culturally embedded ideological tradition – considered in terms of three aspects: ideological developments, traditions, and themes. Hereafter, I symbolize these three aspects as, respectively, [X], [Y], and [Z], and propose that their recognition constitutes an especially important step in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy. [X&Y] Ideological developments and traditions are necessarily embedded historically and culturally, whereas ideological [Z] themes can be more thoroughly abstracted from their original historical-cultural context. Consequently, ideological [X] developments and [Y] traditions are naturally and often considered in religious studies or the history of ideas, whereas ideological [Z] themes are more likely considered in studies of philosophy proper. However, even [X] and [Y] can each be considered in relative abstraction from their original concrete contexts. Indeed, some degree of such abstraction is necessary for Japanese philosophy – as with any other historically-culturally embedded tradition – to be understood by or to contribute to the general philosophical project outside the boundaries of Japanese thought. Further, [X] and [Y] are not only manifest as commentary on previously established ideological convention, but can also manifest critique, or innovation, or – as is especially the case with Japan – a discriminating synthetic systematization of a multitude of traditions. Finally, [X] and [Y] function as the concrete vehicles or signs whereby the more easily universalizable and abstracted ideological [Z] themes are expressed. [X] Ideological developments are ideas traceable to particular events, people, or artifacts at a point in time. Identifying them requires an abstraction isolating a unique voice in cultural space at a particular time. Ideological [X] developments are thus strongly dependent upon a local idiosyncratic context, but they are nevertheless independent enough from surrounding historical-cultural currents in order to stand out among other voices synchronically considered. Cases of [X] are manifest in ideological innovators, but often emerge out of well-established ideological [Y] traditions, as critics, or as commentators, apologists, or revitalizers, or even as discriminating synthesizers or systematizers of various traditions. In the history of Japanese philosophy, cases of [X] appear in roughly three broad eras: [X1] the ancient pre-Asuka era (till the 500s CE), [X2] the medieval era stretching from the Asuka to the Edo periods (500s–1800s CE), and [X3] the modern post-Edo era (1800s–present).

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[Y] Ideological traditions are constituted by a collectively considered and systematized diachronic stream of particular ideas. Identifying them requires an abstraction isolating a unique ideological trajectory enduring through historical time. Ideological [Y] traditions are thus strongly dependent upon a background ideological current, but they are conversely independent enough from any given idiosyncratic context in order to be considered diachronically. Analogous with the particular cases of ideological [X] developments, the collectively constituted [Y] traditions can appear as innovative, critical, commentorial, or synthetic and architectonic. In the constituting of Japanese culture, instances of [Y] appear in roughly three sources of inspiration: [Y1] “native” Shinto¯, [Y2] Chinese Buddhist and Confucian ideas adopted in purported agreement with the original Japanese spirit (wakonkansai 和魂洋才), and [Y3] various Western ideas also adopted in purported agreement with the original Japanese spirit (wakon’yo¯sai 和魂洋才). [Z] Ideological themes are general claims regarding the nature of the world, methods for interpreting it, and directives for how to act properly within it. Identifying them requires a supreme abstraction isolating a general truth- / coherence-aimed method of inquiry or idea which can be considered with minimal reference to the cultural or historical circumstances within which it may have emerged. Ideological [Z] themes are thus maximally independent from their emergence in historical time or cultural space. Hereby occasions of [Z] are the most likely candidates for philosophy proper. In the fabric of Japanese philosophy, occasions of [Z] appear in roughly three tiers of complexity or methodological stances: [Z1] “proto-philosophy” as might be manifest in a historicallyculturally embedded worldview (sekaikan 世界観; Grn: die Weltanschauung), [Z2] scholastic philosophy or “thought” (shiso¯ 思想), and [Z3] academic philosophy (tetsugaku 哲学). Specific themes considered in Japanese philosophy – and likely to be considered in any philosophical heritage – include [Z*1] ontological, [Z*2] practical-ethical, and [Z*3] hermeneutical-epistemological themes, and various others of the like. (1.2a) summary of the three aspects of Japanese philosophy or of any historical-cultural intellectual tradition [X] DEVELOPMENTS ideas traceable to particular events, people, or artifacts at a point in time; often emerge out of [Y] traditions either criticizing or affirming them ⇒

[Y] TRADITIONS are constituted by a collectively considered and systematized diachronic stream of particular ideas, i. e. [X] developments ⇐

[Z] THEMES general claims regarding the nature of the world, methods for interpreting it, and directives for how to act properly within it

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(Continued) [X] DEVELOPMENTS 1 abstraction: isolating a unique voice in cultural space at a particular time * dependent upon local, idiosyncratic context but independent enough from the surrounding current to stand out among other voices synchronically considered

[Z] THEMES 3 abstraction: isolating a general truth- / coherence-aimed method of inquiry or idea which can be considered with minimal reference to the cultural or historical circumstances within which it may have emerged * maximal independence from both [X] cultural context and [Y] historical background heritage *necessarily embedded historically and culturally the most likely candidates *naturally considered in religious studies or the history of for philosophy proper ideas st

[Y] TRADITIONS 2 abstraction: isolating a unique ideological trajectory enduring through historical time * dependent upon a background ideological current but independent enough from the idiosyncratic context in order to be considered diachronically nd

rd

(1.2b) three stages in the unfolding of Japanese philosophy [X] development

stage 1 ancient (pre-Asuka)

[Y] tradition

NATIVE / ¯ SHINTO

[Z] theme

stage 2 medieval (Asuka-Edo)

stage 3 modern (post-Edo)

CHINESE / WESTERN BUDDHIST & Confucian praxis & scholarship wakonkansai [和魂漢才] wakonyo¯sai [和魂洋才] proto-philosophy scholastic philosophy academic philosophy sekaikan [世界観] shiso¯ [思想] tetsugaku [哲学]

(1.3) broad & narrow definitions of Japanese philosophy It is a common worldwide assumption that philosophy first emerged in 6th century Greece and perhaps in India and China at roughly the same time – an ideological turning point made famous by Karl Jasper’s appellation “the Axial Age” (die Achsenzeit, 枢軸時代). There is also a tendency to identify the most appropriate professional application of the term “philosophy” with the postEnlightenment academic discipline bearing the name, a tendency highlighted especially in Japan where the Sino-Japanese term for “philosophy” – tetsugaku (哲学) – is, when indigenously applied, often reserved for Japanese ideological developments which have been heavily influenced by post-Enlightenment Western philosophical traditions. In marked contrast, in Japan, pre-Western-

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contact Japanese intellectual developments and traditions are often labeled mere “thought” – shiso¯ 思想. Pre-Buddhist Japanese ideological dimensions may not even attain to the status of shiso¯, but rather might be further relegated to mere unreflective “worldview” (sekaikan 世界観, Grn: die Weltanschauung). Thus, in the wake of the Auguste Comte inspired Nishi Amane’s original 1873 coining of the term tetsugaku, the Rousseau inspired Nakae Cho¯min stated in 1901 that “from antiquity to the present day, there has never been any philosophy [i. e. tetsugaku] in Japan.”11 In the second half of the 20th century, the Japanologist Edward Seidensticker expressed an analogous sentiment in his purported anecdote that “Japanese philosophy is one of the ‘two great oxymorons’ of East Asian culture, along with Chinese music.”12 On the other hand, Liáng Shùmíng’s (1893–1988) application of the same Sino-Japanese term 哲学 – pronounced zhéxué in Mandarin – to Confucian and Buddhist traditions, indicates that Chinese scholars have been more generous than their Japanese counterparts in applying the term to ancient and nonWestern developments in such civilizations as China and India. Correspondingly, Blocker and Starling go so far as to submit what they call a “postmodern challenge” to the prevailing “logocentric” conception of philosophy whereby only modern and Western conceptions of philosophy count as philosophy. Thus they distinguish a “restricted” or “narrow” sense of philosophy – which identifies the modern, professional, academic and often Western conception – from an “extended” or “broad” sense of philosophy whereby the intellectual trajectories of pre-Western-contact Japan can also rightly be called “philosophy.”13 In the following chart, I follow Blocker and Starling by proposing a maximally broad account of Japanese philosophy whereby even the ideological [X] developments and [Y] traditions of pre-Western-contact Japan are recognized. Although this [X1&2] pre-Western ideological material is often relegated to the status of mere “thought” or shiso¯ whereas the status of genuine “philosophy” or tetsugaku is often reserved for [X3] post-Western contact material, I am proposing that the boundaries of philosophy in Japan might be considered more broadly so that, for example, even Shinto¯ mythology or the aesthetic sensibilities of the arts (geido¯ 芸道) or Japan’s warrior code (bushido¯ 武士道) might be considered as philosophical expressions. Thus, in addition to the [Z3] professional, academic, and [X3] modern developments strongly facilitated by [Y3] Western contact, philosophical status in the following chart is also conferred

11 ibid, p. 1. 12 Thomas Kasulis, “Japanese Philosophy in the English-Speaking World” (Japanese Philosophy Abroad, ed. James W. Heisig, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2004), p. 64. 13 Blocker and Starling, p. 8–12.

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upon [Z1] an “implicit” or “proto-philosophy” of ostensibly [Y1] indigenous14 and [X1] ancient, pre-Buddhist origins, and also upon [Z2] scholastic, practical, and religious philosophies largely [Y2] inspired by Chinese models in [X2] Japan’s medieval periods. (1.3a) maximally broad account of Japanese Philosophy [X1&2] pre-Meiji / pre-modern; [X2&3] literate / historical [X1] implicit (“native”-d.) Vedic? Siberian?

[X2] scholastic, practical, & religious (Chinese-dominant; wakonkansai)

[X3] academic (Western-d.; wakonyo¯sai)

[X2.1] Buddhist [X2.2] Confucian [X2.11] [X2.12] modern institutional aristocratic popular [Y1] “NATIVE” honjisuijaku→ →honjisuijaku hanhonjisuijaku [Y1.3] Kyoto yamatodamashii School, etc ¯ Kojiki, Nihon- Watarai & [Y1.1] SHINTO Kokugaku Nationalism kotodama shoki Yoshida Shinto¯ ¯ WAKA: wabi-sabi, ukiyoe, kabuki, Natsume So¯seki, [Y1.2] GEIDO Noh, sado¯ Hagakure etc Jo¯mon & Yayoi Man’yo¯shu¯, pottery Tale of Genji pre-Buddhist

14 I say “ostensibly indigenous” here only because the historical records do not provide precise information as to the origins of ancient Japanese thought, such as expressed in Shinto¯ mythology. Ancient Japan’s extensive contact with Korea and probable contact with Siberia and the surrounding world of the Pacific Rim strongly suggest that even those characteristics of ancient Japan considered to be most indigenously “Japanese” are most likely borrowed from or inspired by surrounding cultures. Perhaps the pre-Japanese origins of the supposedly indigenous “Japanese” culture can be excavated through comparative thematic analyses of Siberian shamanism, or perhaps even of the Vedas, which through Pacific trade relations made a considerable impact on many of the cultures and ideologies of the Pacific Rim. Indeed, these considerations strongly mitigate against calling anything in Japanese culture ultimately “indigenous.”

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[X1&2] pre-Meiji / pre-modern; [X2&3] literate / historical (Continued) [X1] implicit (“native”-d.) Vedic? Siberian? pre-Buddhist

[X2] scholastic, practical, & religious (Chinese-dominant; wakonkansai) [X2.1] Buddhist [X2.2] Confucian [X2.11] [X2.12] institutional aristocratic popular [Y2] CHINESE ←Vairocana & increasing naSho¯toku Con- Amida from tional conCentral Asia? fidence stitution [Y2.1] BUD→Kegon Buddhism supDHIST 1. Pure Land pressed 1. Nara, 2. 2. Zen Heian: Tendai 3. Nichiren & Shingon [Y2.2] CONNeo-ConFUCIAN fucianism via harmony (wa) Zen monk Yı¯sha¯ng Yı¯níng

[X3] academic (Western-d.; wakonyo¯sai) modern turn away from Chinese influence 1. Pure Land 2. Zen 3. Critical Buddhism, etc

Shukigaku, Yo¯- kokumindo¯toku, meigaku, Koga- kyo¯iku chokugo ku

[Y3] WESTERN

[Y3.2+n] Rangaku

[Y3.1] Kirishitan

Kakure-kirishitan

“TETSUGAKU” / academic philosophy Protestant dominant

The aforementioned contrast between shiso¯ and tetsugaku may suggest that the maximally broad account of Japanese philosophy which I have just presented in chart form (1.3a) might be unacceptable to orthodox commentators on Japanese ideological developments and traditions. However, Nishida Kitaro¯’s consideration of the existentially rich, historically and culturally shaped, pre-Western but logically reflective “thinking” or shisaku (思索) of the Japanese people suggests an auspicious broader notion which might encompass the conventional meanings of both shiso¯ and tetsugaku. Piovesana hints at this point in pondering the meaning of “philosophy,” and thus hints again in considering the supremely literal translation of the Greek philo-sophia into Japanese – aichi (愛知 = love of wisdom) – as such a term may also enable a philosophical appraisal of the indigenous ideological trajectories of Japan. However, Piovesana notes that both aichi and its more indigenous counterpart shisaku, are probably impracticable because of their current lack of use.15 Piovesana further suggests that the modern meaning of tetsugaku is prefigured in pre-modern Japanese philosophical developments, such as “the logic of things” ( jo¯ri 条理) posited by Miura Baien (1723–1789) and the “general learning” (gakushi 學師) posited by Takano Cho¯ei 15 Piovesana p. 249, 255.

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(1804–1850).16 The following chart summarizes major Japanese terms which can stand as candidates for translating “philosophy.” (1.3b) Japanese terms for philosophy NISHI AMANE’S TERMS FOR PHILOSOPHY sympathy with Compte and Mill; scorn for metaphysics, which he termed the abstract / empty theory (ku¯riron [空 理論]) pre-tetsugaku evolution of tetsugaku Neo-Confucianesque Western-esque (3) words based on tetsu (1) general terms (1) rigaku [理學] study of [哲], wisdom (1.1) shisaku [思索] general principles, preferred by word for “thinking” subMiyake Yu¯jiro¯ (1860–1945) (3.31) kikyu¯tetsuchigaku (1.1) kyu¯rigaku [窮理學] mitted by Nishida Kitaro¯ [希求哲智學] science of ultimate study (1.2) aichi [愛智] love of the love of wisdom, abbre(1.2) seirigaku [性理學] wisdom; literal for philoviated as… study of the principles of sophia (3.32) kitetsugaku [希哲學] things further abbreviated as… (2) pre-Meiji terms Nishi abandons the previous (3.33) tetsugaku [哲学] (2.1) jo¯ri [条理] logic of terms upon discovering that 1873–1874 things, for Shu¯rigaku [修理 Western philosophy includes philosophical psy學], Study of the Natural chology, “mental philosoOrder, by Miura Baien phy,” and moral philosophy, (1723–1789) (2.2) gakushi [學師] general but he maintains a Con/ most important learning, fucian outlook in… (2) tendo¯jindo¯ [天道人道], by Takano Cho¯ei (1804– the Way of Heaven & 1850) Human Beings, even used to characterize “tetsugaku” OTHER TERMS FOR PHILOSOPHY

On the one hand, I have just proposed a maximally broad account of Japanese philosophy so as to affirm the philosophical dimensions of the ancient indigenous and medieval Chinese trajectories constituting the history of Japanese thought. On the other hand, there is also good reason for the orthodox commentators of this history to restrict application of the term tetsugaku to modern academic, largely Western models. I join Piovesana in his agreement with cultural anthropologist Alfred Lois Kroeber,17 that what philosophy in its narrow sense has come to mean – namely, the strongly disciplined and self-consciously reflective and holistic critical method of general inquiry as well as the complex systematic claims and imperatives which arise from this method – is rare throughout the stretch of historical time and the expanse of cultural space. Liáng 16 Piovesana p. 4. 17 Piovesana p. 239–240.

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Shùmíng may very well be right that mature philosophy has only emerged originally in China, India, and the West, perhaps including also Persian and Semitic elements if Jaspers’version of Axial Age theory is taken into account. It is certainly hard to doubt that since the Enlightenment, professional academic and Western-originated philosophy has come to dominate the scholarly Academy worldwide. I offer the following chart as a rough summary of how this trajectory – that is, philosophy in its narrow sense – has emerged in Japan.

(1.3c) narrow account of Japanese Philosophy [X3] academic (Western-dominant) / modern [X3.1] modernization

[X3.2] self-assertion 1920s–1945

[Y1] NATIVE bunka-tetsugaku→

Tsuchida Kyo¯son (bunkashugi) Ikegami Kenzo¯ Watsuji Tetsujiro¯

[Y1.1] NATIONALISM Inoue Tetsujiro¯ ¯ Natsume So¯seki [Y1.2] GEIDO

State Shinto¯; kokutai; Ko¯saka Masaaki, Ko¯yama Iwao Kuki Shu¯zo¯

[Y1.3] MOVEMENTS zaiya culture focus

KYOTO SCHOOL Nishida, Tanabe

[Y2] CHINESE→

→Japan as “culmination”

[X3.3] adaptation post 1945 Nakamura Hajime Yuasa Yasuo Jan Van Bragt & James Heisig nihonjinron; Mishima Yukio Kamei Katsuhiro¯ KYOTO THINKERS Nishitani China not highlighted Critical Buddhism

[Y2.1] BUDDHIST, “Topological” (bashoteki~)

nationalism

[Y2.11] ZEN Soyen Shaku

D. T. Suzuki Hisamatsu Shin’ichi

[Y2.12] PURE LAND Inoue Enryo¯

Mutai Risaku

[Y2.2] CONFUCIAN background of modernizers; (anti-) antiquarianism; bushido¯

nationalistic; ethical training / mere historical artishu¯shin-rinri, kokumindo¯fact or stigma of toku, kyo¯ikuchokugo nationalism

[Y3] WESTERN English… [Y3.1] CHRISTIANITY ¯ nishi Hajime, Uchimura Kanzo¯, O Nitobe Inazo¯ [Y3.2] TETSUGAKU Meirokusha; junsui-tetsugaku vs. zaiya-tetsugaku

German trend

Abe Masao Akizuki Ryo¯min Ueda Shizuteru Takeuchi Yoshinori

Hatano Seiichi Ariga Tetsutaro¯ Kagawa Toyohiko

German→English trend Takizawa Katsumi Yagi Seiichi Kitamori Kazoh

Kuwaki Gen’yoku

Ikegami Kenzo¯

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[X3] academic (Western-dominant) / modern (Continued) [X3.1] modernization

[X3.2] self-assertion 1920s–1945

[X3.3] adaptation post 1945

[Y3.21] Socialism / Marxism / Modernism / Materialism Katayama Sen; Ko¯toku Shu¯sui (Denjiro¯); Kato¯ Hiroyuki

Miki Kiyoshi Tosaka Jun

[Y3.22] Existentialism

various Kyoto School

[Y3.23] “Humanism” shutaisei Takayama Chogyu¯ (Rinjiro¯) [Y3.24] Phenomenology [Y3.25] Analytic Philosophy

Abe Jiro¯

“the New Left” Saigusa Hiroto Yanagida Kenju¯ro¯ Funayama Shin’ichi Maruyama Masao ¯ shima Yasumasa O Ko¯yama Iwao Mutai Risaku

Takahashi Satomi Miyake Go¯ichi

Yamauchi Tokuryu¯ Ueda Seiji

[Y3.26] “Postmodernism”

explicitly postmodern Tokiyuki Nobuhara Tanaka Yutaka Steve Odin

[Y3.27] Process Philosophy

Recovery from the trauma of Japan’s defeat in World War II accompanied significant philosophical developments which crystalized in the 1970s. This turning point may reflect the spirit of concomitant major events such as: (1) Japan’s economic rebirth fueled by Japan’s collaboration with US interests and heralded by the 1960 Security Treaty (anpo 安保) of the 1960s which among other things tied Japan to America’s military venture in Vietnam, (2) the 1969 Yasukuni Shrine Bill to officially honor Japan’s war heroes, (3) “Expo ’70” or the 1970 World’s Fair in Osaka, (4) the 1971–1972 reversion of Okinawa back to Japan, which occurred on the condition of a continued US military presence, and (5) the 1972 Winter Olympics in Hokkaido. The accompanying philosophical shifts of this period may be called a “postmodern” phase of Japanese thought.18 Some of its characteristics are presented in the following chart:

18 A “postmodern” phase in Japanese thought is suggested by Blocker and Starling, in their “Beyond Modernity” chapter 5 and the “Conclusion,” and in Yasuo Furuya’s A History of Japanese Theology, in chapter 4, “Theology After 1970.” This phase is also hinted at in Naoshi Yamakawa’s Appendix to Piovesana’s history, especially in the “Post-60’s Developments” section, which describes a shift from existentialism and marxism to phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and so on (p. 279ff).

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(1.3d) philosophical shifts of the 1970s [X3.3] “postmodern” phase [X3.31] resignation [X3.32] self-re-affirmation pre 1970s post 1970s rd th [Y3.1] “Barthian Captivity” “3 gen- “Meontology” “4 generation” of Christian eration” of Christian Theology Theology [Y3.2] “modernism” “post-modernism” (arguably begun with the 1942 Kyoto School Overcoming Modernity symposium) [Y3.21&2] Marx, Sartre, MerleauFoucault, Lacan, Levi-Strauss Ponty

(1.4) the best way to explicate Japanese philosophy Facing the exegetical task of determining methods and content whereby a proper account of Japanese philosophy can be given, I have considered the difficulties of formulating a homogeneity- and uniqueness-affirming definition, and I have posited three aspects – ideological [X] developments, [Y] traditions, and [Z] themes – which provisionally reveal the structure and interrelationships of the whole of Japanese philosophy across historical time and cultural space. I have also examined how broad and narrow accounts of the meaning of philosophy determine the scope of what is considered Japanese philosophy. Especially in the charts which I have provided in this study, I have introduced copious material which collectively constitutes what might be considered the content of Japanese philosophy, and to this extent, my study is empirical. At the same time, this present study has emphasized meta-empirical issues – considering the problematics of interpreting, arranging, or systematically expanding or limiting the content of Japanese philosophy. Although I cannot accomplish in this present study an exhaustive detailed exposition of the copious content of Japanese philosophy, I have ambitiously endeavored to provided a prolegomena toward this end, and I can at least stress here the necessity of empirically grounded exposition. Therefore, yet another major task in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy is to ensure that the interpretive explanation of Japanese philosophy remains solidly grounded in empirical content – namely, the details of the historically and culturally shaped, idiosyncratic ideological context. Grounding meta-empirical interpretive explanation in empirical content prevents misrepresentation and distortion. In her study of the Japanese Buddhist thinkers Ku¯kai and Do¯gen, Pamela Winfield stresses this point which indeed could be applied to any historically and culturally embedded ideological tra-

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jectory. She criticizes phenomenological and Jungian expositions of Japanese philosophy, warning that they “graft completely foreign Western European conceptual constructs onto [the ideas of Ku¯kai and Do¯gen].” Winfield rather aims that her study “looks internally to within the Buddhist tradition itself to elucidate [the original East-Asian ideas which] most influenced [Ku¯kai and Do¯gen].”19 David Hall and Roger Ames have similarly warned of the “provincialism” of “Western ethnocentrism” which by promoting itself as “a universal norm for assessing the value of cultural activity everywhere” – even in an “evangelical” manner – misrepresents and distorts the Chinese ideological heritage.20 Winfield, and Hall and Ames, rightly urge that interpretive remainingation of a given historically and culturally embedded ideological trajectory should be solidly grounded within the empirical content of that trajectory’s original emergence. That is to say, accurate exposition of Japanese philosophy requires utilization of the terms and frameworks of the original Japanese ideological heritage. However, accurate exposition of a philosophical trajectory does not yet realize the full philosophical potential of that trajectory. For example, I can come to correctly understand what someone means when he or she says that “the earth is flat,” but that does not make the claim itself correct. Further, I can also rightly understand that one interpretation of “Buddhahood in this very body” (sokushin jo¯butsu 即身成仏) was self-mummification, but my right understanding here does not mean this practice is actually right for anyone. For “Japanese philosophy” to become genuine philosophy, its study must break free from mere exegesis and extend to proposing and testing truth- and efficacy-aimed theses. Rather than remaining just a matter of historical or cultural interest or a mere set of traditional doctrines, the claims of Japanese philosophy must demonstrate their explanatory power and its imperatives must demonstrate practical or moral worth – even outside of the uniquely Japanese context. To achieve these goals within the global philosophical community, Japanese philosophy must indeed be translated into or at least understandable within the terms and frameworks of other philosophical communities, and the currently reigning community is Western. Therefore, phenomenological and Jungian expositions of or conversations with Japanese philosophy should in the end be a warmly welcomed step in introducing its insights to the world, assuming of course that these insights are also first correctly understood and interpreted.

19 Pamela Winfield, Icons and Iconoclasm…, p. 2. 20 Hall and Ames, Anticipating China, XXX p. xiv–xvi.

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What is the Significance of Japanese Philosophy?

The second main question considered in this study is – what is the significance of Japanese philosophy? More specifically, how can Japanese philosophy function as genuine philosophy? This second question highlights the most explicitly philosophical meaning of the master theme of constructing a course in Japanese philosophy. Whereas the first question – what is Japanese philosophy? – is clarified by the exegesis of historically and culturally embedded phenomena, the current question is clarified by careful consideration of the method and content of philosophy itself. The task at hand here is also necessarily comparative and hermeneutical, because hereby the more globally known Western mainstream and the lesser known Japanese heritage must make sense of each other. This dialectical encounter can be expressed in the Hegelianesque thesis-antithesissynthesis motif 21 as follows: 1. THESIS: my philosophical heritage (= Western) considered alone 2. ANTITHESIS: another heritage (= Japanese) which I aim to understand {method is increasingly EXEGESIS} 2.1 utilizing the terms & frameworks of my heritage alone in order to make sense of another heritage 2.2 utilizing the terms & frameworks of the other heritage in order to make sense of it 3. SYNTHESIS {method is increasingly PHILOSOPHY} 3.1 genuinely translating the terms & frameworks of each heritage in terms of the other 3.2 clarifying and critiquing the terms & frameworks of each heritage in terms of the other 3.3 utilizing the best elements gleaned from the terms & frameworks of both heritages in order to achieve greater explanatory power and practical benefits This dialectical mutual translation and eventual transformation of both Japanese and Western philosophical heritages is arguably the most all-encompassing and important task of constructing a course in Japanese philosophy. Two goals are hereby achieved, the first being exegetical, namely, the determination of what Japanese philosophy is, and the second being philosophical, namely, the demonstration of the explanatory power and practical benefits enabled by Japanese 21 The Hegelianesque thesis-antithesis-synthesis motif is arguably embodied in Zen master Qı¯ngyuán Wéixìn’s (960–1279 CE) account of enlightenment as “mountains provisionally are, and yet are not, and finally indeed are mountains.”

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philosophy. The following questions serve to clarify further how Japanese philosophy is genuinely philosophical: (2.1) Is Japanese philosophy genuine philosophy? (2.2) How can the current philosophical mainstream contribute to the emergence of Japanese philosophy as genuine philosophy? (2.3) What can Japanese philosophy contribute to the world?

(2.1) Is Japanese philosophy genuine philosophy? The task of defining philosophy itself – let alone the task of defining Japanese philosophy – is a daunting undertaking which is not always straightforward. However, clarification of the basic method and content of philosophy as generally conceived, can function as an important step in determining whether and how Japanese philosophy is indeed genuine philosophy. (2.1.1) the method of genuine philosophy A classical account of the method whereby genuine philosophy emerges is the Socratic ability to think for oneself. Socratic questioning seeks justification – apologia – for belief. Classically, this means a praxis-guiding, lived apologia because in the words of Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living.” Socratic questioning also prioritizes autonomy, because the genuine practice of philosophy cannot be directly conferred from outside of oneself. Correspondingly the Socratic goal is to “know oneself” – epitomized by its Platonic interpretation as a self-confirming remembrance (anamne¯sis) – and Socratic teaching is in the manner of the midwife who can facilitate but cannot confer the actual life of insight gained through the self-driven birth of knowledge in philosophy. Philosophical method is thus easily characterized as individualistic to the extent that “thinking for oneself” and not as coerced by others means “thinking as an individual.” On the other hand, naïve accounts of the philosophical method as justification and autonomy have themselves been criticized by philosophers. For instance, Karl Marx condemned modern academic philosophy’s tendency toward merely theoretical justification, complaining that: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world…the point is to change it.”22 Marxists and their Hegelian forbearers have correspondingly criticized merely individualistic autonomy – as 22 Karl Marx first wrote this in “Theses on Feuerbach” in Spring 1845, but his colleague Frederick Engels first published it as a supplement in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 1886.

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suggested in the most individualistic strains of existentialism – and have rather promoted the communitarian values of communism. Furthermore, current proposals of epistemological “externalism,” such as formulated in Alvin Plantinga’s account of knowledge as warranted belief,23 challenge traditional “internalist” proposals of knowledge according to which knowers have epistemic access to all factors which justify belief. That is, according to epistemological internalism, knowers must in principle know precisely why they know, and this in turn has historically highlighted the knower’s duty to justify his or her beliefs to others in the manner of apologia. On the other hand, epistemological externalism proposes that belief is justified – or “warranted” à la Plantinga – via factors which are not epistemically accessible to the knower. Thus with epistemological externalism, the possibility is opened up that the knower may not be able to justify his or her beliefs, and consequently the task of philosophy itself may arguably be less clearly defined by a duty of apologia. If these shallow characterizations of the philosophical method as entailing merely theoretical and individualistic autonomy, or as synonymous with the justification whereby knowledge is constituted, indeed represent the general Western trajectory, then the philosophical method would seem not to apply within many of the East-Asian heritages given their praxis-oriented and communitarian tendencies. Such East-Asian tendencies are manifest in the ancient Confucian promotion of benevolent attitude toward others (rén 仁) and social ritual (lıˇ 禮), and a focus on human interrelationships epitomized by Watsuji Tetsuro¯’s more recent characterization of human beings (人間) as “betweenness”-exemplifying (aidagara 間柄) persons (hito 人) who exist “between” (aida 間) each other. On the other hand, even East-Asian trajectories arguably entail the theoretical and individualistically autonomous dimensions suggested by the classical Socratic account of the philosophical method. The early Confucian “integration of the intentions” (chéng yì 誠意) signifying an ontological “integrity” or personal “sincerity” (chéng 誠) whereby one “does not deceive oneself” and one’s words (yán 言) can be actualized (chéng 成), suggests a theoretical or coherence- and meaning-conferring foundation for action.24 Further, Confucius himself suggests the importance of self-driven, autonomous “thought” (sì 思) as opposed to mere “learning” (xué 學) and adaptation to socially conferred norms, when he states: Learning without thought is labor lost; thought without learning is perilous (學而不思 則罔，思而不學則殆) (Analects 2/15) 23 see Alving Plantinga’s Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 24 A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao p 133. Graham considers here Great Learning (大學) 3, “What is meant by integrating the intentions’ is refusing to deceive oneself” (所謂誠其意 者，毋自欺也) (Graham’s translation).

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Buddhist affirmations of theoretical and autonomous methods are more numerous than their Confucian counterparts. As brief examples, I refer to the more systematic and elaborately justified claims of Buddhism, as well as to the privileging of the self-enlightened pratyeka Buddha (縁覚) over the ´sra¯vaka or “voice-hearing” (声聞) Buddha whose enlightenment was guided by others. The foundational role played by both Confucianism and Buddhism for centuries in the Japanese ideological heritage has ensured that the theoretical and autonomous methods propounded by each of these two traditions would have been available to the trajectory of Japanese philosophy at least from its medieval scholastic stage onwards. At the same time, a purportedly central characteristic of Japanese philosophy – that it is a product of extensive pragmatic borrowing – would seem to mitigate against a Japanese exemplification of philosophical method as self-justification and autonomy. However, as the appraisals by Piovesana and Blocker and Starling regarding Japanese borrowing suggest, borrowing in itself does not necessitate the elimination of philosophical method. To the extent that borrowing is critical and selective and not indiscriminate or mindless, even borrowing can express the practice of self-justification and autonomy. For instance, Piovesana appeals to Adam Ferguson’s account of the “acculturation of culture” whereby people critically adopt the ideas and practices of those around them. Hereby every greater explanatory power and efficiency are achieved – a philosophically significant achievement requiring creativity and intellectual acumen. Thus, even though so much of Nishida Kitaro¯’s philosophy, for example, is built from ideas adopted from many different cultures, Piovesana identifies a “creativity and novel approach” in him that constitutes a remarkable “seed” of Japanese philosophy – a seed planted in the fertile East-Asian “soil” of Buddhism, and brought to fruition by the “rain” of Western civilization.25 Finally, although the many strands of the Japanese ideological heritage will in various degrees exemplify theoretical justification and individual-affirming autonomy, consideration of other more praxis- or community-oriented criteria for philosophical method might extend even further the parameters for what counts as genuinely philosophical Japanese philosophy. The following chart summarizes intellectual attitudes whereby a potentially philosophical thesis might be formulated, highlighting especially attitudes toward native and foreign traditions. I propose that those methods and attitudes which I label “critical-creative” are candidates for what is genuinely philosophical, whereas those which I label “uncritical-uncreative” are not. These appellations are inspired by Piovesana’s characterization of the philosophical method as

25 Piovesana p. 241–245.

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“creative and novel,”26 and Nishida’s assessment of proper thinking, in his statement: academia in Japan lacks a critical spirit (hihyo¯ seishin 批評精神); activating it will depend upon the earnest awakening of the young people.27 candidates for genuinely philosophical method, whereby new ideas can be generated, or a tradition or traditions can be addressed [XY] ⇘

[–Z] uncritical-uncreative = pre-philosophical

[+Z] critical-creative = genuine philosophy

1. new ideas

superficial dabbler

innovator

2. a tradition

unreflective sentiment pro or against

arguments pro or against

2.1 pro-tradition, School 2.11 [Y1] “native”

dogmatist

commentator, apologist, revitalizer han-honjisuijaku Kyoto School

2.12 alien

exoticism fad, “Westernism” like Orientalism; mere imitation Nara Buddhism stagnation of Shukigaku

~~[Y2] Chinese

~~[Y3] Western

pre-Nara Shinto¯?

mere imitators of West → explicators / historians of the West 2.2 anti-tradition merely destructive rebel or xenophobia 2.21 vs [Y1] “native” 2.22 vs alien ~[Y2] Chinese ~[Y3] Western 3. many traditions

critical evaluation Ku¯kai, Kamakura Buddhism Yo¯meigaku reform proposals most modern Japanese philosophy critic

Buddhism contra naïve Shinto¯ Kokugaku contra all Chinese thought *Heian contra Nara Buddhism, *Kamakura contra Heian Buddhism, *Neo-Confucianism contra Buddhism, *Kogaku contra Shukigaku, *Kokugaku contra all Chinese thought * sonno¯jo¯i, *“overcoming modernity” symposium indiscriminate synchretism discriminating systematization

It would seem that, especially in the case of pre-modern Japanese philosophy, the contrast between [–Z] uncritical-uncreative and [+Z] critical-creative is harder to determine, so that the relationship between them may be more of a spectrum than a discontinuity. Further, because [–Z] is clearly less philosophically ad26 italics my own; Piovesana, ibid. 27 italics and translation my own; personal letter to Takizawa Katsumi, dated 1941 April 23 (NKZ 19:160; #1570).

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vanced than [+Z], it is natural to recognize an evolutionary movement from the former to the latter. One possible account of the evolutionary development of philosophical method is the aforementioned methodological movement of increasing complexity from [Z1] “proto-philosophy” through [Z2] scholastic philosophy to [Z3] academic philosophy – manifest sequentially in Japanese philosophical history as the movement from [X1] the ancient through [X2] the medieval to [X3] the modern. Japanese scholarly terminology, it would seem, roughly expresses each of these three stages as [Z1] “worldview” (sekaikan 世界 観; Grn: die Weltanschauung), [Z2] “thought” (shiso¯ 思想), and [Z3] “philosophy” (tetsugaku 哲学). So another important task in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy might be to explicate how philosophical methodology is manifest in [Z1] the implicit philosophy of ancient Shinto¯ and in [Z2] medieval Japanese Buddhism as well as in [Z3] modern philosophical movements of Japan. While recognizing the evolutionary movement from [Z1] to [Z2] to [Z3] and their essential differences, I propose that it is also worth asking: what are the methodological continuities, or discontinuities, relating these three ostensibly evolutionary movements? (2.1.2) the content of genuine Japanese philosophy The basic content of philosophy is evidently clearer than its method. Uncontraversial candidates for philosophical content will include such fields as the following three: ontology, evaluation of practical imperatives and ethics, and hermeneutics and epistemology. Following the symbolization I have posited for ideological [Z] themes, I symbolize these three, respectively, as: [Z*1] ontological [Z*2] practical-ethical [Z*3] hermeneutical-epistemological In the following chart, I list candidates from the Japanese ideological heritage, for these three themes in the emergence of: [X1Z1] ancient implicit proto-philosophy [X2Z2] medieval scholastic, practical, and religious philosophy [X3Z3] modern academic philosophy Determining if and how my list of candidates do indeed count as the content of genuine philosophy is yet another important task in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy.

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candidates for genuinely philosophical content, emerging from increasingly critical-innovative methods [X1] ancient [Z1] IMPLICIT [Z*1] zo¯kasanshin, (u)musubi [Z*2] makoto [Z*3] magokoro [Y1] ⇑“NATIVE”⇗ [Y2] CHINESE⇒

[X2] medieval [Z2] SCHOLASTIC, practical, & religious [Z*1] Amenominakanushi or Amaterasu; honjisuijaku / ryo¯bushinto¯ → hanhonjisuijaku

[Z*1] Emptiness, jijimuge interpenetration, emptiness is form; Principle [Z*2] Do¯gen’s oneness of practice & enlightenment (shusho¯itto¯); Neo-Confucian loyalty [Z*3] seeing the self directly

KEY: [Z*1] onto[Y3] WESTERN⇒ logical [Z*2] practicalethical [Z*3] hermeneutical-epistemological

[X3] modern [Z3] ACADEMIC [Z*1] Kyoto School Mu [Z*2] Watsuji’s rinri [Z*3] Kyoto School jikaku

[Z*1] soku logic as exemplified in the postures of Inoue Enryo¯, Inoue Tetsujiro¯, Nishida Kitaro¯, etc

[Z*1] Geist, the person, zettai [Z*2] shutai, Marxism… [Z*3] scientific method

(2.2) How can the current philosophical mainstream contribute to the emergence of Japanese philosophy as genuine philosophy? The methods and contents of the Western philosophical heritages are both impressively developed and widely influential. Indeed, modern Japanese philosophy is itself largely constituted by originally Western models: first positivist, then especially German idealist, then also Marxist and existential. Continental European influence remains strong in Japan, as with the postmodern currents which have emerged since the 1970s. However, other originally Western voices such as Pragmatism, Process, and Analytic philosophy are also pronounced. Thus the current global philosophical mainstream, which is markedly Western in origin and character, has contributed to the emergence and sophistication of recent Japanese philosophy and will likely continue to do so, imparting its idiosyncratic Euro-American methods, terminologies, systematic claims and imperatives, problems, and proposed solutions. But in addition to internally facilitating the development of Japanese philosophy within its unique historically

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and culturally embedded context, the introduction of Western philosophies into this context also provides Japanese philosophers with a widely understood vocabulary and methodology whereby they might more clearly and quickly communicate their own insights externally with the global philosophical community, which is more familiar with the conventional motifs of Western philosophical discourse than their Japanese counterparts. Thus it would seem that in the early stages of introducing Japanese philosophy to the global philosophical community, Japanese thinkers should utilize Western terminologies and models in order to eventually demonstrate the explanatory power and practical worth of their own heritage.

(2.3) What can Japanese philosophy contribute to the world? Correspondingly, the ultimate task of constructing a course in Japanese philosophy is to contribute significantly to the current philosophical mainstream by rationally and persuasively demonstrating the explanatory power of its claims and the practical worth of its imperatives. This task is clarified by questions such as: What does Japanese philosophy do particularly well, or what can it offer to the largely Western philosophical mainstream that the latter has not yet considered? What indeed can Japanese philosophy contribute to the world?

(2.3.1) Japanese reformulations superior to Western originals? First, the critical adroitness whereby Japanese thinkers have adopted Western ideas and terminologies is impressive. Indeed, the Japanese translations of Western philosophical vocabulary are arguably superior to the originals in clarity and precision. Because the Buddhist and Neo-Confucian terminologies available to Japan before its Westernization did not facilitate a smooth exposition of Western ideas, the early modern Japanese philosophers had to develop a new terminology to express the newly encountered complex distinctions of Western philosophical traditions. These early pioneers took full advantage of the opportunity to start from scratch and explicate a product which Western philosophers had already brought to a sophisticated level of development. Building upon what was given to them, the Japanese translators streamlined the newly acquired terminology and made its explanatory power more explicit. Drawing upon a previously established Chinese convention of generating new terms by combining atomic morphemes, the Japanese arguably improved upon the Western philosophical terminology by developing numerous neologisms which are often far more precise and intuitively compelling than their Western counterparts.

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For instance, while characterizing “matter” as a kind of “stuff” (shitsu 質), modern Japanese terminology goes further by explicitly distinguishing Aristotelean “matter” (= shitsuryo¯ 質料, i. e. “content stuff”) from the “matter” (= busshitsu 物質, i. e. “physical stuff”) of physicalistic materialism – “physicalistic materialism” itself being literally translated in Japanese as “doctrine of everything-reduced-to physical-objects” (= yui-butsu ron 唯物論). By contrast, English expresses these significantly different ideas with the same word, “matter.” Further, while introducing a mental component (観・念・心・想) to unite the various nuances of “idealism,” modern Japanese terminology goes on to make explicit these radically different nuances covered by the single English term “idealism”. Thus Japanese terminology distinguishes: an idealism (kan’nenshugi 観念主義) which opposes realism, an idealism (riso¯shugi 理想主義) which opposes pessimism, and a German idealism (kannenron 観念論) which has been opposed by dialectical materialism. Finally, the fine distinctions made explicit by Japanese translations of “subject” and “object” highlight the strong ambiguity entailed in the English counterparts. Indeed, the specific nuances of the English terms “subject” and “object” (or “matter” or “idealism”) must be clarified through context, which is a less reliable vehicle for meaning clarification than the intrinsic precision entailed in the more specifically defined, counterpart Japanese terms. Consider the following chart explicating Japanese translations of “subject” and “object”:

existential-activity ≈ ~tai (体) epistemological ≈ ~kan (観) grammatical ≈ ~go (語) discourse

“subject” ≈ shu~ (主) shutai (主体) autonomous actor, active subject shukan (主観) first person perspective, merely subjective shugo (主語) grammatical subject shudai (主題) subject matter

“object” ≈ kyak(u)~ (客), etc kyakutai (客体) merely following the status quo, a manipulated object kyakkan (客観) third person perspective, objectively available for anyone to assess jutsugo (述語) predicate, “what is spoken” (述) taisho¯ (対象) a determinate object for consideration, an object standing against me, “what opposes” (対)

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(2.3.2) Japanese language as a heuristic for philosophy In addition to the philosophical clarity enabled by such intentionally created terminology, the philosophical implications of Japanese grammar and preWesternized vocabulary are also noteworthy. The single English verb “to be” and correlative gerund “being” – just as the Greek verb “einai” and noun “ousia” – can express meanings of existence, predication, and identity. But whereas English and Indo-European languages rely on context to distinguish these meanings, these meanings are expressed explicitly in different Japanese words: aru / iru (and u有) for existence, dearu (and shikaru 然) for predication, and (at least in some Classical contexts) ze (是) and / or soku (即) for identity. The Western appreciation of these differences took time to emerge, arguably first appearing in Medieval elaborations on essence and existence, and only appearing recently in logical analysis and symbolization: $x, Qx, x=x. Japanese grammar itself hampers the emergence of the existential fallacy whereby existence is derived from mere predication, because the expressions “x is thus” and “x is (= exists)” appear as different grammatical structures in Japanese, respectively: “x ha Q dearu” and “x ga aru / iru.” Thus the force of Kant’s dictum that “existence is not a predicate” and its fatal implications against the ontological argument for God’s existence28 is more clearly and naturally manifest in the Japanese language. Developing such philosophical commentary on the Japanese language itself could well be a facet in the process of constructing a course in Japanese philosophy. Certainly, the Kyoto School of modern Japanese philosophy has already famously formulated various accounts of continuous and discontinuous identity in difference entailed within the often Buddhistically nuanced word “soku,” which itself appears in the Heart Sutra’s famous line: “form is emptiness” (shiki soku-ze ku¯ 色即是空). It is highly unlikely that philosophers who are not Japan specialists will ever be able to learn the Japanese language. However, they do not need to do so in order to appreciate the philosophical insights encoded within it, whether encoded in its original structure or by way of its conscious and philosophically motivated manipulation. It is enough to note that both natural and technical Japanese language confirms or even expresses more clearly the hard-won philosophical insights of the philosophical mainstream. Further, should philosophical investigations proceed in a direction à la symbolic logic or the technical languages of the sciences toward a maximally precise Esperanto-esque universal language of philosophy or a maximally comprehensive “meta-language,” then the Japanese grammar and philosophical terminology might be appealed to as a heuristic.

28 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Bk.2 Ch.3 §IV, ¶55.

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(2.3.3) giving a sophisticated voice to the voiceless The philosophical potential of Japanese philosophy is not limited to the theoretical building blocks of language. The very existence of Japanese philosophy is rich with practical suggestiveness. The Japanese are unique among non-Western peoples for avoiding colonization by the West and also for successfully meeting the West on Western terms. Whereas the labor and resources of lands such as Africa, India, China, the Americas, and the islands of the Pacific have been exploited inequitably by the West, Japan has largely escaped such geo-political and economic colonization, and even embarked on its own analogous colonization program, famously annexing many of its neighbors from the late 1800s to the mid 1900s. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) dramatically signaled Japan’s path toward international self-assertion, entailing imperialist ambition, but also economic and technological advances rivaling the West. Most significantly from a philosophical angle, Japan has also escaped to a remarkable degree what might be called a cultural and ideological colonization by the West. That is to say, while Japan has adopted Western ideas, it has done so largely on its own terms and arguably in ways that affirm rather than discard Japan’s own ideological and cultural heritage. Political and cultural theorists in Japan have referred to this drive toward autonomous self-definition and selfdetermination as “subjectivity” (shutaisei 主体性), which is to say, the ability to function as an active subject and to avoid manipulation as a passive object. This ideal of subjectivity or autonomy has spread across East-Asia, and is notably a prominent doctrine of North Korea. Indeed, the latter’s development of the idea has passed into English as “juche” – the Korean pronunciation of the original Chinese characters 主体 – and has been promoted by non-Korean, non-Japanese revolutionary movements such as the Black Panthers in America.29 Although the Western academy may not be readily disposed to consider Japanese philosophical contributions, and although Japanese thinkers themselves have not always communicated their ideological heritage successfully to circles outside Japan, Japan at least does have a sophisticated and autonomous philosophical voice whereby to converse with the non-Japanese intellectual world. Other non-Western cultures committed to maintaining their own heritages or to expressing themselves autonomously in the face of unavoidable Western influence, may discern hints for their own self-expression and selfdetermination from the Japanese model – not just in political, economic, or technological terms, but also in cultural and ideological terms. Thus another task in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy may very well be the empowering 29 see the Eldridge Cleaver Papers.

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of marginalized voices in general – voices which might be currently overpowered or facing assimilation by a dominant, often Western mainstream. But despite Foucauldian suggestions that philosophy is merely an ethical imperative that the margin should have a voice in relation to the majority in the global net of power relations, the theoretically-oriented philosophical question will persist: what indeed makes Japanese philosophy a “sophisticated” voice? (2.3.4) elucidating the relationship between culture and philosophy One important feature of Japanese philosophical sophistication is arguably Japan’s keen awareness of the relationship between culture and ideas, particularly in regards to the cultural expression of ideas. From the time that Buddhism was first introduced to Japan, the Japanese have often been self-conscious of their “native” cultural heritage vis-à-vis originally foreign ideas, even in the process of assimilating them. Indeed, the general relationship between culture and ideas – initially as an influential force and eventually as a philosophical topic – has featured very prominently in the development of Japanese philosophy. The very etymology of the name “Japan” – a name meaning “the sun’s – origin” (ni-hon 日 本) – highlights Japan’s framing of itself in an advantageous position vis-à-vis its culturally sophisticated neighbor to the West, namely China. Whereas the Chinese originally designated Japan with a character wa (倭) meaning “physically or authoritatively diminutive,” Japan conversely sought to bolster its own cultural advantage by replacing the old character with a homophone wa (和) meaning “harmony.” This latter term has become a catchword for anything Japanese, and strongly suggests the assimilative harmonizing whereby Japan has adopted and synthetically systematized originally foreign ideas. Thus, the so-called “Japanese spirit” (yamatodamashii 大和魂) is literally the “spirit of great harmonization” (yamato 大和), and it is this very spirit of Japanese culture (wakon 和魂) that Japan has typically sought to maintain as it has embraced ideas from abroad.30

30 The Japanese have famously expressed this policy of cultural continuity via two slogans corresponding to the two major phases of Japanese borrowing from its sophisticated neighbors: first in embracing “Chinese learning” wakonkansai (和魂漢才), and second in embracing “Western learning” wakon’yo¯sai (和魂洋才). Nonetheless, usually, when foreign ideas were first introduced to Japan, Japanese “native” counterparts initially receded to a subordinate position in the face of foreign dominance, such as with the Buddhist reinterpretation of Shinto deities (honjisuijaku 本地垂迹) or with the faddish, uncritical adoption of all things Western in the beginning of the Meiji era in the late 1860s. However, after a time, a resurgent Japanese spirit often reversed this asymmetry by subordinating foreign ideas to a self-consciously “native” approach, such as with the Shinto critical reinterpretation of Buddhism (hanhonjisuijaku 反本地垂迹) or the Kyoto School’s formulation of a philosophy of “Nothingness” (mu 無) ostensibly opposing a Western “Being” (u 有).

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In sum, the themes of cultural identity and the relationship between culture and ideas have played an important role in the development of Japanese thought, even to the present day. This preoccupation which even Japanese philosophers have often had with Japanese culture is not always naively ethnocentric, but can be rigorously self-critical. Whether Japanese thinkers affirm or criticize their cultural heritage, it is noteworthy that they have often conspicuously treated markedly cultural themes, with all of their historically determined locality and yet concrete manifestations of universal motifs. As recently as 1997, Naoshi Yamawaki wrote: At the present time, on the one hand, there is a defense of Japanese society understood in the manner of [Tetsuro¯] Watsuji’s ethics, and, on the other, a specific criticism of Japanese society from the modernist viewpoint like [Masao] Maruyama’s thought. And these seem to cancel each other out. But both a nationalistic defense and a Eurocentric critique of Japanese society are rather one-sided and misleading, since this theme [of “combining the economic formation of Japan with its culture and thought”] needs a kind of dialectical thinking which takes the complementarity of the particularity of culture and the universality of ethics or religions into consideration… [This sort of dialectical thinking] is the most important and urgent task for the philosophers of Japan, as they face the 21st century, to contribute to international society by dealing with this theme [of particularity and universality].31

Yamawaki’s appeal to the particularity of culture aside, the very nature of philosophy as an exhaustive critique or systematization of all inquiry – or as the explanation or evaluation of everything – turns the field of philosophy in a decidedly universal direction. But this poses an unavoidable dilemma for any philosopher. While thus turning toward universality, he or she must experience, live, and communicate within particularity. Yet from the legacy of SocraticPlatonic definition which eliminates particular contingencies, to the increasing specialization of the modern age wherein philosophers happily allot empirical inquiries to other fields such as chemistry or anthropology, philosophers typically minimize or ignore particular empirical phenomena such as culture. This tendency is arguably strongest in the Analytic philosophical trajectory. However, the current dominance of Western philosophy in academic discourse poses the danger of confusing the universal and the particular. There is indeed the danger that the contingent, cultural idiosyncrasies of Western philosophical discourse may be hastily equated with all genuine philosophy. Hereby, not just philosophical terminology, but also the determination of what counts as a valid philosophical problem or an effective method of inquiry, is dictated by idiosyncratically Western models. Thus the all-inclusiveness of universality faces the threat of being tyrannically hidden behind a restrictive Western particularity. 31 in Piovesana, see Naoshi Yamawaki’s additional chapter, p. 287.

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Such Westernization has even happened in Japan. For example, Nakae Cho¯min’s famous anecdote that “there has never been any philosophy [i. e. tetsugaku] in Japan,”32 seems to entail an equation of the ideas of Comte and Rousseau and a small constellation of related Western philosophies with the entire philosophical enterprise. Arguably, the equation of all genuine philosophy with the idiosyncrasies of Western philosophical discourse occurs just as rampantly if not more so in the Western Academy itself. The achievements and study of Japanese philosophy suggest solutions to this problem of conflating universality with particularity. The very existence of indigenously pursued Japanese philosophy – arguably even in its pre-Western manifestations – provides a foil demonstrating the cultural peculiarities of Western philosophical traditions and also the possibility of other philosophical directions not highlighted in the West. Furthermore, the themes of cultural identity vis-à-vis other cultural traditions, and the very relationship between culture and ideas, have long played especially important roles in Japanese philosophy itself. Such considerations suggest that a further task in constructing a course in Japanese philosophy is to clarify: 1. the nature of the cultural dimension of philosophy – that is to say, the culture of academic discourse, 2. how this particularity comes to terms with the universal, and 3. how one particular academic discourse should come to terms with other analogous particular discourses. It would seem that Japanese philosophy shows special promise toward this end of elucidating the relationship between culture and philosophy. (2.3.5) forging a comparative and discriminating synthetic method across traditions Indeed, it is in the relationship between culture and philosophy that Japanese philosophy may make its greatest contribution to the world. However, merely considering the culture-philosophy relationship as an object of philosophical reflection is just one of many philosophical endeavors. It would seem that the power and scope of Japanese philosophy’s contribution to the world would be greatly enhanced if this same strength of Japanese philosophy would be considered as a vehicle applicable to any object of philosophical reflection. That is to say, the culture-philosophy relationship as a mere object or content of investigation presents just one field of philosophical inquiry which most philosophers may never touch upon. However, treating the culture-philosophy relationship as a vehicle or method of investigation allows any conceivable philosophical content, object, or problem to be pursued by way of this method. Given the presumption that the cultural content informing this method is intercultural, this 32 Blocker and Starling, p. 1.

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method is sometimes called “comparative philosophy,” and consists of critically utilizing insights across philosophical traditions in order to arrive at synthetically achieved conclusions. The presumption of such an approach is that: 1. A single, independent philosophical tradition will tend to be detrimentally limited in its scope of attention and resources for explanation. 2. The scope of any philosophical tradition is broadened and its resources are enriched, and its own potential shortcomings are highlighted by learning from other traditions. To use the symbolizations posited in the “what is Japanese philosophy” section of this essay, the “cultural” aspects of philosophy as applied to Japan are its ideological [X] developments in the cultural space delineated by Japan, and its [Y] traditions enduring through time, namely, Shinto¯, Buddhism, Confucianism, Western hybrids, and so on. The comparative trajectory pursued so far by Japanese philosophy includes [X] developments in Germany, France, America, Rome, Greece, and so on, and [Y] traditions such as Platonism, Dialectical Materialism, Existentialism, Christianity, Process Philosophy, and so on. It is from these various [X] developments and [Y] traditions both inside and outside of Japan that Japanese philosophy came to focus on various evidently universal philosophical [Z] themes expressed therein. So although these [Z] themes are the most obvious philosophical aspect of Japanese philosophy, they are ostensibly discovered only within the cultural phenomena of [X] and [Y]. Therefore, it would appear that the cultural dimension of the culture-philosophy relationship is indispensable for doing philosophy. Intercultural investigation of philosophical developments and traditions is not unique to Japan. Some Western thinkers have also been hopeful that a global investigation of the great ideas of peoples around the world will yield more powerful explanations and methods than those formulatable within only one group. This recognition in principle of all competent voices everywhere evokes the “community of inquiry” appealed to by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey as a safeguard against Cartesianesque solipsism. The content achieved through the intercultural investigation of such a global community has – from the Renaissance to Aldous Huxley – been called the the “philosophia perennis” or perennial philosophy. Japanese philosophy scholar Gino K. Piovesana remained skeptical that the realization of such a high goal could ever be achieved, and concluded: Whether a “philosophia perennis” will be worked out or has been already found is a question which depends so heavily on what fundamental experience is chosen as a point of departure that no definite answer can be given… More conciliatory thinkers are more

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hopeful, but it must be said clearly that the theoretical ground has not yet been formulated for what is emphatically only a hope.33

Nevertheless, Piovesana did suggest the nobility of the idea, and did recognize the important role that this ambitious idea played in the emergence of modern Japanese philosophy. Perhaps then, a new vision of philosophia perennis – at least as a regulative ideal if not as a precise scientific account – is the greatest possible contribution that Japanese philosophy can make to the world. Perhaps also then, this is the ultimate task in constructing a course in Japanese Philosophy.

33 Piovesana, p. 282.

Satofumi Kawamura (University of Tokyo)

Japanese Philosophy in Japan: Research, Teaching and Politics

1.

What is “Japanese Philosophy”?

What is “Japanese philosophy”? To answer this question, we have to consider how “philosophy” (tetsugaku) was introduced in Japan during its modernization, but we must also examine how the notion of “Japan” was formed. In the historical context of modern Japan, these two problems converged in the modern institution of the “university” (daigaku), in particular the “Imperial Universities” (teikoku-daigaku), which were initially founded in Tokyo and subsequently in Kyoto, Tohoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido, Keijo¯ (Seoul), Taihoku (Taipei), Osaka and Nagoya. As is typical of the backward modern nation-state, the first official modern Japanese university, called “the Imperial University of Japan” (Teikokudaigaku), was founded not as an institution supported spontaneously by individual academics, but rather as a national institution created by a government decision. Although there had been both private and national institutions which aimed to provide tertiary education, such as Keio¯-gijuku, the Law School of the Ministry of Law (Shiho¯-sho¯ ho¯-gakko¯) and so forth, the Imperial University of Japan was founded in 1886 at Tokyo as the only institution the government officially recognized as a university. The aims of the Imperial University were to study the advanced knowledge of the West, and thereby to build up the national elites, particularly technocrats, who would become the key decision-makers of the country. In this sense, the foundation of the Imperial University was precisely political, as it was needed by a government eager to build the nation-state – a state underpinned by the people’s imagination of the unity of the nation. For the government, the university was an institution to study the systems and ideologies which constituted the modern nation-state. Therefore, the most important school of the Imperial University was the law school (ho¯ka-daigaku), and the aims of the school were the study and education of the German style of “Cameralism” (Kameralwissenschaft, or kanbo¯-gaku) or “the state science” (Staatswissenschaften, or kokka-gaku). The students of the Imperial University were

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primarily expected to study the techniques of how to govern and conduct the people as a nation in order to maintain the unity and development of the country. At this early stage of the Meiji era, the notion of the “Japanese nation” as a cultural and ethnic/racial substance was not prevalent, and the ground which could sustain the concept of a Japanese nation was perceived to be still very weak. Hence, one of the missions of the elites educated in the Imperial University was to invent measures by which to inculcate the people to become members of the nation, and to make them loyal to the country. In other words, they had to mold “Japan” as the nation-state. Philosophy as a subject taught in the Imperial University was also pursued to achieve a national end. Philosophy was studied in order to elucidate the spiritual, cultural, or civilizational backdrop on which western ideas were born. In this context, it was assumed that the emergence of the nation-state was an outcome of the natural development of civilization, and that all human communities would eventually reach the form of the nation-state. In this sense, Japanese intellectuals understood the formation of the nation-state as a universal phenomenon. Nishi Amane, the original inventor of the translation of the word “philosophy” into the Chinese characters “哲学”, argued in his representative work Hyaku-itsu shinron (The New Theory of the Unity of Hundreds of Sciences) 1 that philosophy was the “unifying science” (to¯itsu-kagaku) which worked as the basis on which modern sciences would be integrated. For Nsihi, the integration of the modern sciences was needed to realize an ideal community whose unity was maintained by the integrated sciences, and such a community was thought to be underpinned by independent and autonomous individuals. Nishi argued that in advanced counties such as France and England, people were aware of their rights and freedom, and the European rule of law that was the principle of their unity was far from the law according to which the Asian (Chinese) monarchs treated their subjects, that is, as if they were his/her slaves. Thus, Nishi had the progressivist idea that as a community advanced its members came to be aware of their rights and freedom, and he thought that modern nation-state which adopted the rule of law consisted of independent and free individuals. For Nishi, philosophy was precisely the principle by which (Japanese) people would learn and become enlightened individuals, and this was the best way to establish Japan as a nationstate. As we can see from Nishi’s position, there was a political intention behind the introduction of philosophy into Japan, and philosophy was understood as the knowledge to reach a universal truth. In other words, the study of philosophy in modern Japan has already been understood as a universalistic attempt, and the 1 Nishi Amane, Hyaku-itsu shinron, in Nishi Amane Zenshu¯ I (Tokyo: Munetaka shobo, 1960), 232–289.

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Kyoto School’s philosophy is no exception. Today, the Kyoto School philosophers, such as Nishida Kitaro¯, Tanabe Hajime, Miki Kiyoshi, Nishitani Keiji, Ko¯saka Masaaki and so forth, are regarded as the founders or pioneers of “Japanese Philosophy”, but their “Kyoto philosophy” was never envisaged as a philosophy whose kernel was essentially Japanese. Rather, as Naoki Sakai points out, “one may talk about Kyoto School philosophy as a part of Japanese philosophy, but Japanese philosophy in this context should imply no more than the discipline of philosophy instituted in the national education system of Japan. Moreover, we cannot pretend to be ignorant of the historical condition that the ‘Japanese’ philosophy (of which the Kyoto School of philosophy was part) was instituted as Western philosophy.”2 However, it can equally be said that the study of philosophy in modern Japanese universities contributed to crafting the hypostatized concept of “Japan”, in so far as the “West” was regarded as the equivalent of the universal. In tandem with Sakai again,3 we can argue that the concept of Japan is produced through a comparison with the West. In the moment we posit “Japan” or “Japanese-ness”, we adopt the comparative framework Sakai calls “the schema of configuration”, and define it as a particular in comparison with the West as the universal. This operation is imaginary, because the universality of the West is not defined on a substantive ground prior to the operation: rather, the definition of both the particularity and universality come to be produced through this operation. As Sakai argues, the “desire to identify either with Japan or the West is, therefore, invariably a mimetic one, so that the insistence on Japan’s originality, for instance, would have to be mediated by the mimetic desire for the West”.4 In sum, philosophy worked as the frame of reference according to which the definitions of Japan and the “West”, and the “particular” and “universal” were decided. However, because this dichotomic relationship was imaginary and mimetic, it was always reversible: the universal would easily slide into the particular, and vice versa. Therefore, this frame of reference has been mobilized to orchestrate the project of building Japan as the modern nation-state-empire. At the beginning of the modernization of Japan, this schema was utilized to legitimate the introduction of western universal knowledge and technology in order to establish the Japanese nation-state fulfilling the universalist condition. However, in the late stage of the regime of the Meiji constitution, the schema was employed to criticize western universalism as a pseudo-universalism, and thus 2 Naoki Sakai, “Resistance to Conclusion: the Kyoto School Philosophy under the Pax Americana”, in Re-politicizing the Kyoto School as Philosophy, ed. Christopher Goto-Jones (London: Routledge, 2008), 189. 3 Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 51–52. 4 Ibid., 52.

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Japan or Japanese-ness was posited as the principle to realize the true universality through which both the West and the East could be mediated and integrated. This is precisely the trajectory by which the concept of universality is developed in the modern Japanese context, and this trajectory is underpinned by the study of philosophy in modern Japan. In this sense, if we try to argue the originality of “Japanese” philosophy as a principle that competes with western philosophy, we have to be cautious about whether such an argument might be a repetition. In this essay, I would like to consider how the study of “Japanese” philosophy was produced in the Japanese university system, that is to say, who founded it and how it was institutionalized through courses to study Japanese Philosophy, or what was more often called Japanese Thought (Nihon shiso¯). As we shall see, the philosophical speculation on “Japan” was not conducted only in the department of “philosophy”, but it was more commonly discussed as a theme in departments of history or politics. Through this examination, we will elucidate the trajectory of how an understanding of the Japanese principle has changed, i. e., from the particular to the universal. To put it more concretely, I shall look at the arguments of Inoue Tetsujiro¯, Hiraizumi Kiyoshi, Muraoka Tsunetsugu, and Tsuda So¯kichi, all of them are professors at the Imperial Universities, or working as scholars who gave lectures there. Following this line of inquiry, I would like to clarify the relationship between Japanese philosophy and politics, and the risks entailed in the glorification of Japanese philosophy. I think this is an important task that may provide a proper appreciation of the meaning or possibility of research and teaching of Japanese philosophy in today’s context.

2.

Fanaticism or Rationalism toward National History? Inoue Tetsujiro¯ and Hiraizumi Kiyoshi

In 1890, one year after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyo¯iku ni kansuru chokugo or Kyo¯iku-chokugo) was proclaimed by the Emperor. As it is widely known, the Imperial Rescript worked to canonize the legitimacy of the Emperor-centered regime on the basis of Confucian ethics. In particular, it was the first text in which the concept of the “national polity” (kokutai) was officially mentioned. Although it was difficult to define the national polity clearly, this concept was underpinned by the belief that there was the unbroken line (Bansei-ikkei) of ancestry from the goddess Amaterasu to the present Emperor. We could say that with this proclamation, the national polity became a sort of “floating signifier” whose signified was never defined clearly and whose ambiguity was subsequently utilized to denounce and suppress anybody who might be regarded as opposed to it. As Maruyama Masao

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points out, the Japanese government and the right-wing ideologues exploited the concept of the national polity to attack individuals or groups who contested their power, by labeling the disobedients as advocates of rebellion against the national polity.5 In other words, the national polity was a discourse utilized to establish a boundary between friends and enemies. Following the proclamation, the government intended to publish an official commentary on the Imperial Rescript, and Inoue Tetsujiro¯ was appointed as the author of a commentary called Chokugo-engi. Inoue was the first “Japanese” professor of philosophy at the Imperial University and, of course, his position was to teach and research philosophy as “western” philosophy. However, he was expected to play the role of an ideologue to philosophically craft a Japanese principle – such as the national polity – to be the kernel of the Japanese nationstate-empire. In this sense, the philosophy professor of the Imperial University occupied a position subject to political and national intent. Inoue was a typical figure in the elite of modern Japan. In 1855, he was born in Dazaifu, Hakata. His father was a doctor, and as such his family’s attachment to the intellectual class could afford Inoue an opportunity for a better education. Almost from the cradle, he studied privately with a Confucian teacher, an opportunity that would forge the basis of his thought. In 1871, he came to Nagasaki to study English at a national school named Ko¯unkan, and in 1875, he moved to Tokyo to study at Kaisei gakko¯, which was one of the precursors of the old Tokyo daigaku (University of Tokyo). The old Tokyo daigaku was founded in 1877 by integrating several schools, and Inoue became an inaugural student in the University’s Department of Philosophy. There, Inoue worked with an American scholar Ernest Fenollosa, and studied the ideas of Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Hegel and so forth. Thus, Inoue primarily acquired knowledge of the Anglo-American tradition. After graduating in 1880, he committed himself to editing the Dictionary of Philosophy (Tetsugaku jii) and launched the To¯yo¯ gakugei zassi (the Magazine of the Eastern Arts and Letters) with friends. In 1882, Inoue assumed the position of associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the old Tokyo daigaku, and was ordered by the government to study abroad in 1884. His destination was Germany, for he was expected to become a Germanist. While he was initially granted a three-year stay, he begged the government to extend it and stayed in Germany for six years altogether. The old Tokyo daigaku became the Imperial University of Japan (Teikoku Daigaku) in 1886, so when Inoue returned to Japan in 1890, he was appointed professor of the Philosophy department of the School of Letters, at the Imperial University of Japan (Teikoku daigaku bunka daigaku). Inoue became the first Japanese professor to teach German philosophy. 5 Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso¯ (Tokyo: Iawanami shoten, 1961), 33.

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For Inoue, the Japanese principle was the philosophical matter. Utilizing his knowledge about “philosophy”, that is western philosophy, he tried to formulate the ideas which would contribute to the integration of the populace as the Japanese nation. In this sense, his speculation on the Japanese principle was that of a pioneer of “Japanese philosophy”. As well as writing Chokugo engi, published in 1891, Inoue composed Waga kokutai to kokumin do¯toku (Our National Polity and National Morality) in 1925. In these works, he tried to give an interpretation of the national polity, and thereby created a logic according to which the Imperial Rescript could be authorized as the text that reveals the “national morality” (kokumin do¯toku). Inoue argued that the national polity was based on loyalty to the Emperor, and this loyalty was comparable to the domestic relationship between father and son. Just as it was natural for a son to obey an order from his father in the domestic relationship, so too obedience to the Emperor was natural for the Japanese people. Positing the Emperor as a benevolent father who looks after the wellbeing of his children, Inoue argued that it was both natural and a duty for people to repay such an infinite debt to the Emperor. Thus, Inoue asserted that “obedience [to the Emperor] is the virtue of Imperial subjects”.6 Although Inoue’s argument was obviously based on feudalistic ideas, he believed that his view on national morality would be vindicated because the necessity of morals was a universal phenomenon. In other words, he thought that people everywhere needed morals, and therefore the ideal morality should be the same for all people. For Inoue, despite its particularity, his notional morality was precisely the ideal morality born in Japan. In addition to Inoue, there was a major scholar who argued the importance of the national polity as the Japanese principle: Hiraizumi Kiyoshi. Hiraizumi was the first professor of the course of the “History of Japanese Thought” (Nihonshiso¯shi ko¯za) in Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo teikoku daigaku). At the request of the Ministry of Education, this was created in 1938 as the course to discuss “the national polity” and, against this backdrop, the socio-political trends of the moment were a strident militarism and nationalism. In this context, this university course was precisely political, though it is worth mentioning that Hiraizumi’s former position as the professor of the second course of the National History of Japan (kokushigaku daini ko¯za) was also political, because “national history” (kokushi) and “morals” (shu¯shin) were the elementary school subjects regarded as essential for the purpose of inculcating the sacredness of the national polity in young students. The “moral” was the subject to learn the significance of the Imperial Rescript and, needless to say, Inoue’s commentary was taken as its authorized interpretation. 6 Inoue Tetsujiro¯, Chokugo engi, in Kindai nihon shiso¯ taikei: Meiji siso¯shu¯ II, ed. Matsumoto San’nosuke (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo¯, 1977), 112.

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Hiraizumi was born in 1895. His father was the priest of Heisenji Hakusanjinja shrine. Located in Heisenji village, Fukui prefecture, this shrine was established by the Buddhist monk Master Taicho¯ (Taicho¯ daishi) in 717. The fact that Hiraizumi had such a noble ancestry might have contributed to a sense that the pursuit of a Japanese principle was his calling. After graduating Fukui pre¯ no Junior High School (Kenritsu O ¯ no chu¯gakko¯), he attended the fectural O Fourth National High School (Dai-yon ko¯to¯gakko¯) at Kanazawa in 1912. Then, in 1915, he entered the School of Letters, Tokyo Imperial University and graduated from with a first-class honors degree in 1918. His major was Japanese national history, particularly the medieval era, and he pursued the research in the graduate school of Tokyo Imperial University. In 1923, Hiraizumi was appointed a lecturer of Japanese national history at Tokyo Imperial University and, receiving a doctoral degree in 1926, he was promoted to the position of associate professor. As his reputation as a pro-Imperial historian grew, he had became increasingly familiar with figures from the Imperial families and military personnel, and enjoyed more opportunities to lecture in the Imperial Palace and military academies. By 1935, when Hiraizumi was promoted to professor, he was well known as a major ideologue of the national polity. Thus, Hiraizumi had been trained and took the post as a historian, but for him, history should be understood as a ground to vindicate the divinity of the Emperor and the national polity. In this sense, it could be argued that Hiraizumi’s discussion was philosophical or even theological. For him, the absoluteness of the Emperor whose ancestry originated in the goddess Amaterasu was unquestionable, and he considered the historical study of Imperial Japan to be the verification of the means by which their divine powers were exercised. The purpose of Hiraizumi’s study was to pursue the principle that had been latent in the development of Japan. He believed this principle was particular to Japan and therefore incomparable to other countries. Hiraizumi argued: Because of revolutions or falls, the histories of countries will be lost. Because of reformations or restoration, the histories of countries will revive constantly and freshly. Because it has seen neither revolutions nor falls, Japanese Imperial history as the unbroken development of the foundational spirit is the one and only best.7

Hiraizumi’s attempt to pursue the principle underlying Japanese history had a strong effect on other scholars, evoking both affinity and aversion. In this sense, it was not as a philosopher, but rather as a historian of Japanese thought, that his influence on the study of Japanese philosophy would prove ineluctable.

7 Hiraizumi Kiyoshi “Kokushigaku no kotsuzui” in Kokushigaku no kotsuzui (Tokyo: Shibundo¯, 1932), 13.

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Satofumi Kawamura

Ideology of the Empirical: Muraoka Tsunetsugu and Tsuda So¯kichi

Once the modern educational system was established in Japan, with the university at the apex of its structure, the notion of “science” (kagaku or gakumon) was also introduced as the spiritual ground of the university. This spirit of “science” had to be rational and objective, and these characteristics would guarantee its truthfulness. However, how could these characteristics be assured? In the humanities, it was often argued that empirical studies like philology (bunkengaku) were one of the disciplines most likely to fit this demand. Muraoka Tsunetsugu, the first professor of the course of the History of Japanese Thought (nihon shiso¯-shi) at Tohoku Imperial University (Tohoku teikoku daigaku), was also typical of the scholars who respected philology as the means of “science”. Muraoka was born in Tokyo in 1884. From early childhood, he was exposed to Japanese nativist classics, such as Kojiki (the Ancient Chronicles) and a poem anthology Manyo¯shu¯ (A Collection of a Myriad Leaves). In 1895, he entered Kaisei Junior High School (Kaisei jinjo¯ chugakko¯) and in 1901, he enrolled in the Advanced Preparatory Course (ko¯to¯ yoka) of Tokyo Senmon Gakko¯ (the school which was the predecessor of Waseda University). Then, in 1902, he entered Waseda University (Waseda daigaku) – notably, he was not an alumnus of the Imperial University System – and majored in western philosophy under the supervision of the religious philosopher Hatano Seiichi. In 1906, he graduated University, and subsequently enrolled in the Seminary of German Protestantism (Doitsu shinkyo¯ singakko), from which he graduated the following year. In 1908, married Yanagishita Kika, and joined the news firm Nichi-doku yu¯ho¯sha, where he translated the German newspaper Deutsche-Japan Post. While working at this company, he pursued his research independently and, in 1911, he published his first book Motoori Norinaga. In 1914, he quit the company and accepted a lectureship at Waseda University the following year. Although he left Waseda in 1917, he assumed the post of professor at Hiroshima Advanced Normal School (Hiroshima Ko¯to¯ Shihan-gakko¯) in 1920. In 1922, he received an official offer of a professorship at Tohoku Imperial University, but before assuming this post, he was ordered to study abroad in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Returning from his study abroad in 1924, Muraoka became the first professor of the History of Japanese Thought at Tohoku Imperial University. While he held this post until 1944, in 1940, as the successor of Tsuda So¯kichi, he assumed the post of adjunct lecturer of the History of Oriental Political Thought (To¯yo¯ seiji shiso¯shi) at Tokyo Imperial University. In “Concerning the Research Method of the History of Japanese Thought” (“Nihon shiso¯-shi no kenkyu¯ho¯ ni tsuite”), Muraoka tried to clarify what the

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history of Japanese thought was. First of all, he argued that the history of thought (shiso¯-shi) was a part of cultural history (bunka-shi). On his account, while cultural history was often thought to be different from political history, the study of national history was likely to focus on political history. However, in order to pursue an immanent speculation on political history, it would be necessary to consider the cultural principle that governed political phenomena. In other words, religious, epistemological, aesthetic, or ethical instances worked at deeper levels of history that seemed to develop because of political or military struggles. A culturalism (bunka-shugi) of historical study was the approach which would respect these spiritual and inner elements as the core of the development of history, and Muraoka adopted this approach. He argued that from this approach, a history of religion, of ethics, or of art became possible, and a history of national culture (kokumin bunka-shi) would subsume these cultural histories. He thought that each nation (kokka) was the subject or agency (shutai) which united each particular culture (tokushu no bunka). According to Muraoka, then, philosophy was the advanced thought of cultural phenomena, and a religious philosophy, moral philosophy, or philosophy of art would emerge as religious, ethical, or aesthetic thought developed. Thus, the history of thought was the prehistory of cultural phenomena which would develop into philosophy, and Muraoka argued that the history of Japanese thought was the study of how cultural phenomena developed in Japan. Interestingly, Muraoka stated that a historical approach to Japanese thought was more suitable for studying Japan than the West, because, in Japan, cultural phenomena had not developed so much prior to the Meiji era such that people had not been conscious of the difference between religion, morals and art. In other words, Muraoka thought that the history of Japanese thought was the best approach to study the development of Japanese culture as a whole. From this perspective on Japanese culture, Muraoka argued that one of the best ways to examine the history of thought was philology. On his account, philology was an empirical approach established in Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the representative scholar of this approach was August Boeckh, who argued that the purpose of philology was “the recognition of the recognized” (Das Erkennen des Erkannten). In the recognition of the recognized, he argued, philology aimed to make the recognition have objective validity, and in this sense, it was a science. Muraoka thought despite the fact that philology was developed in Germany, a similar approach had been established in Japan: that is, the National Learning (Kokugaku), particularly that of Motoori Norinaga. Muraoka appreciated Motoori’s study of the Ancient Chronicles (Kojiki) as a philological study of a Japanese historical document established in the seventh century. In other words, Muraoka understood Motoori’s study as an attempt to clarify Japanese thought in the ancient period. He argued: “now it becomes clear that the National Learning as philology was the study that is the

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closest to and the basis of the history of Japanese thought, and how the attempt of this study must be completed in the history of Japanese thought.”8 However, what was Japanese thought for Muraoka? How it was possible for him to define Japan as the subject that unites or subsumes cultural phenomena? To understand this point, the essay “Discussing the Japanese Spirit: the Reason for the Defeat” (“Nihon-seishin wo ronzu: haisen no gen’in”) should be considered. In this essay, Muraoka tried to define the core of Japanese thought, or Japanese spirit, and argued that the national polity was precisely the core. According to his definition, the national polity was the (fundamental) characteristic of the nation-state (kuni-gara). Muraoka thought that just as each person had particular characteristics, each nation-state also had particular characteristics as a form (kata) which penetrated the development of its national history. Arguing that this form was both the realized ideal and the idealized reality, he emphasized that “our Japanese national polity, or the characteristic of our Japanese nationstate, is nothing but the Emperor-centered family like country, which the Japanese nation comes to realize, defend and accomplish by respecting the Imperial House as its apex.”9 Muraoka believed that, in this thought or spirit of the national polity, there were both universal and particular aspects. According to Muraoka, the universal aspect of the national polity was that it had been learning foreign cultures, and thereby becoming the spirit of absorbing the world culture (sekai-bunka sesshu no seishin). Muraoka put it: Here we should pay attention to the point that this Japanese spirit has both universality as the moral principle and particularity, or a sort of unique feature, as a national moral principle, which has been seen in various dimensions such as the social, geographical or historical, and caused both the virtues and the vices of the Japanese.10

Muraoka was critical of the utilization of the national polity as an ideological concept for legitimating the war waged by Japan, but he was not critical of the concept itself. For him, one of the reasons for the defeat of the Japanese Empire was a misuse of the national polity as the dogmatic concept, and a correct grasp of the concept was needed to build the new Japan in the aftermath of the war. In this context, we should also consider Tsuda So¯kichi, the major scholar of the history of Japanese thought who competes with Muraoka. Tsuda is wellknown for his heroic struggle during 1930s and 40s against denouncements by Ultranationalists and members of the extreme right wing such as Minoda Muneki. This conflict, known as the Tsuda Incident (Tsuda jiken), occurred because 8 Muraoka Tsunetsugu, “Nihon shiso¯-shi no kenkyu¯ho¯ ni tsuite” in Shin-pen Nihon shiso¯-shi kenkyu¯: Muraoka Tsunetsugu ronbun-sen (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 2004), 17. 9 Muraoka Tsunetsugu “Nihon-seishin wo ronzu: haisen no gen’in” in Shin-pen Nihon shiso¯-shi kenkyu¯: Muraoka Tsunetsugu ronbun-sen (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 2004), 387. 10 Ibid., 403.

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Tsuda assumed the first lecturer post of the course of the History of Oriental Political Thought at Tokyo Imperial University. At the request of the government, this course was established in 1939 to teach the significance or greatness of the national polity and Japanese spirit, and it was the Law department’s counterpart to the course on the History of Japanese Thought given by Hiraizumi in the Department of Letters. Contrary to the expected role of his post, Tsuda’s lectures were critical of the fanatical and mystical interpretation of the national polity, which was strongly promoted by Ultranationalists and the government. In 1873, Tsuda was born in Tochii village (Tochii-mura), Gifu prefecture. After graduating Bunmei elementary school (Bunmei sho¯gakko¯), he entered the Department of Politics in Japanese, Tokyo senmon gakko¯ (Tokyo senmon gakko¯ ho¯go seiji-gakka) in 1890. In the next year, he graduated the gakko¯, and then worked in several junior high schools in the Kanto area until 1908. In 1908, he joined the research staff of the Investigation Department of the History and Geography of Manchuria and Korea, the South Manchuria Railway (Minamimanshu¯ tetsudo¯ man-sen rekishi chiri cho¯sabu). The chief of this department was Shiratori Kurakichi, a prominent historian and professor of Tokyo Imperial University. At this time, Tsuda began his research on Japanese and East Asian history and, in 1916, he published the first volume of Bungaku ni araware-wataru waga kokumin-shiso¯ no kenkyu¯ (The Study of Our National Thought as Seen in Japanese Literature). In 1918, Tsuda assumed the post of lecturer in history at Waseda University, and in 1919, he published Kojiki oyobi Nihonshoki no Shinkenkyu¯ (A New Study of the Ancient Chronicle and the Chronicle of Japan). In 1920, Tsuda was promoted to professor at Waseda, and, in 1922, received a doctoral degree in literature for a thesis entitled: “Jo¯dai shina-jin no shu¯kyo¯shiso¯” (Religious Thought of the Ancient Chinese). Tsuda was the historian of Japanese national thought (kokumin-shiso¯), but widely known as the scholar who held an anti-Ultranationalist ideology. In 1939, when Tsuda took the post of lecturer on Oriental Political Thought, he was attacked by Ultranationalists like Minoda Muneki for his claim that thirteen emperors described in the Ancient Chronicle were fictional. In 1940, the government banned his major works, and he was forced to quit the university. In the same year, Tsuda was accused of tarnishing the dignity of the Imperial House, but finally dismissed. After the defeat, though, he was welcomed by the post-war academic circles for his critical attitude. Tsuda criticized irrational or unsubstantiated arguments on the national polity or Japanese spirit as a mystical principle. He often argued for the importance of a scientific attitude which respected an empirical approach, because otherwise historians were likely to project their ideology onto their interpretation of history. Tsuda critically argued that “the Japanese have a tendency to discuss something as the truth by avoiding the steps to ensure whether it is fact or not and by resorting to their own dogmatic

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ideas”.11 For Tsuda, the Ultranationalist argument for the Japanese spirit was typical of this tendency. As he stated, “those who emphasize the promotion of the Japanese sprit are more likely to ignore the relationship between the world and Japanese ethnic life, the life of Japanese as a worldly people, and to understand the Japanese as an ethnic group who have only a particular characteristics different from the rest of the world, with Japan opposing and countering the world.”12 Tsuda thought that the Ultranationalist argument for the Japanese spirit did not understand the real conditions in which Japan was situated. However, Tsuda never denied the hypostatized concept of the Japanese nation: furthermore, he never criticized the Emperor. For Tsuda, it was an unquestionable fact that there had been a Japanese nation since ancient times, and it was the unique and ideal tradition of peaceful and harmonious relations between the Emperor and the Japanese nation. Tsuda put it: The Imperial Family had never challenged local ruling families with military power, and there are no remains of the domestic battles [between the Imperial Family and local ruling families]. In this sense, ancient Japan was tremendously peaceful, and this is because there was the fundamental fact that the Japanese nation was the one ethnos.13

Thus, Tsuda believed that the essence of the Japanese sprit or thought would never disappear – even if it changed as time passed – as long as the Japanese nation was present. Rather, as the principle for recovery in the postwar period, Tsuda thought that the Japanese spirit and the Emperor-centered regime had to be reformed as a principle that would be compatible with the universal ideal: that is, democracy. Arguing that “the Emperor is our emperor”, Tsuda stated that “to love the Imperial House in this way is simultaneously to show precisely the humanist spirit which leads to the universal”.14 In this section, we have thus far examined the life and thought of Muraoka and Tsuda, and how they developed the concept of Japanese thought. Although both of them shared a critique of the national polity as Ultranationalist ideology or an ideology to legitimate the Meiji oligarchy, they were never critical of the concept of the national polity itself, or the tradition of Japanese thought. They thought that there was a “Japan” as a substantial notion, and even believed that Japanese spirit would be the principle leading to the universal. Their empiricism or sci-

11 Tsuda So¯kichi, “Chingen to¯go” in Tsuda So¯kichi rekishi-ronshu¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 89. 12 Tsuda So¯kichi, “Nihon-seishin ni tsuite” in Tsuda So¯kichi rekishi-ronshu¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 173. 13 Tsuda So¯kichi, “Kenkoku no jijo¯ to bansei-ikkei no shiso¯” in Tsuda So¯kichi rekishi-ronshu¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 294. 14 Ibid., 322.

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entific attitude was used to vindicate such a belief. In other words, their antiideological approach worked strongly to legitimate an ideology.

4.

Conclusion

During the 1930s and 1940s, in keeping with the socio-political situation of the period, the philosophers who discussed the national polity and Japanese spirit, or the Imperial Way (Ko¯do¯) were more likely to be those who were not specialists of Japanese thought. For example, Nishida Kitaro¯ also discussed the national polity in The Problem of Japanese Culture (Nihon-bunka no mondai), “The Problem of Reason of the State” (Kokka-riyu¯ no mondai), and “The Principle of the World New Order” (Sekai-shinchitsujo no genri). Although there has been harsh controversy about how to understand Nishida’s discussion of the wartime ideology, there is no doubt that he tried to interpret the national polity and the Imperial Way from the angle of his universalistic philosophy. This politico-philosophical tendency has often been regarded as precisely the “trend” in a particular period. However, as we have examined in this chapter, the national polity has always preceded the discussion of Japanese thought or spirit. In other words, the philosophers who discussed Japanese thought or spirit could not avoid struggling with the problem of the national polity. This is because the notion of the Japanese nation is a modern invention, and the national polity is likewise invented to vindicate it. Then, the concept of Japanese thought or spirit is envisaged as the backdrop against which the national polity emerged, and the existence of such a backdrop is assumed in comparison with the West. In this sense, Japanese thought or spirit was, much like the national polity, political. Therefore, even if the philosophers’ speculation on Japanese thought or spirit – which could perhaps be “Japanese philosophy” in a true sense – seems to have been different from the concerns of the historians, they shared a fundamental problem: the problem of the national polity. To make matters worse, because they knew more about philosophy as a western principle, the problem became more complicated: the philosophers tried to find in Japanese spirit a national but universal principle which would overcome the problem of the West. As an example of this point, we may consider Watsuji Tetsuro¯. After graduating Tokyo Imperial University in 1912, Watusji assumed the post of the lecturer on ethics (rinri-gaku) at Kyoto Imperial University in 1925, and was promoted to professor in 1931. In 1934, he moved to Tokyo Imperial University, where he assumed the professorship of the course of ethics. A professor who taught ethics in the Imperial Universities was expected to teach the national morality. In other words, Watsuij was expected to lecture on the significance of the national polity and Japanese spirit, and was therefore motivated to study

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them. Watsuji thought that Japanese sprit would work as the principle that overcame the limitations of the modern civilization of the West. This was the civilization of modern capitalism, the emergence of Gesellschaft society, and colonialism. The pervasive principle of this civilization was an individualism that pursued merely the maximization of individual interest, which Watsuji called “bourgeois spirit” (burujowa seishin). Consequently, this form of civilization was marked by labor disputes and severe economic crises. To overcome these crises, Watsuji argued, it would be necessary to build a “national cooperative society” (kokumin kyo¯do¯ shakai), and Japanese spirit would become the principle of this society, because the Japanese tradition was one in which the people were harmoniously united through their respect for the Emperor as the center of the nation. Watsuji argued: During the warring states period, the Emperor was not the actual ruler of the Japanese nation. However, as the subject expressing the totality of the Japanese nation, the Emperor obviously held a strong authority that would prevail against any military power. Therefore, the Japanese were later aware of their totalized unity as a nation mediated by the subject of expression. Rather we should argue that the nation as a political constitution is underpinned by the living totality of the integrated nation.15

Thus, Watsuji discussed the Japanese spirit as the principle which could overcome the universal problem of the modern world, and this means that, according to Watsuji’s logic, the national polity was the universal and philosophical principle which could enable the creation of a “national cooperative society”. In other words, Watsuji also contributed to the philosophical glorification of the national polity as both a national and universal principle. Here, we can understand of the real “political” problem of Japanese philosophy: that is, how can we problematize the national polity? If we wish to envisage the possibility of Japanese thought or philosophy, we would have to take this problem seriously.

15 Watsuji Tetsuro¯, “Kokumin-do¯toku-ron” in Watsuji Tetsuro¯ Zenhu¯ XXIII (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1991), 101.

Part II: Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline

Mayuko Uehara (Kyoto University)

The Philosophy of Nishi Amane – Toward the Creation of New Knowledge through Translational Inquiry

The Japanese assimilation of Western civilization in the modern era was conducted through the translation of writings in a broad and comprehensive range of disciplines, including, among others, law, science and technology, military affairs, geography, and history. Concentrated in a thirty to forty-year period around the start of the Meiji Restoration, a vast number of translations were carried out not only by the government but also in the private sector1. Translation lay in the background of Japan’s modernization and facilitated its progress. The academic domain of philosophy, too, was introduced under these circumstances, and philosophical inquiry began to be undertaken in Japan. For a roughly tenyear period beginning at the end of the 1860s interest was focused on Mill’s utilitarianism and Comte’s positivism, which were considered bourgeois philosophy, but from 1890 onward, in conjunction with the formation of academic institutions in Japan, the main emphasis began to be placed on the introduction of German philosophy2. Kantian, Neo-Kantian, Romantic, and Marxist philosophies then became the mainstream of philosophical thought within the academe. Nishi Amane arrived on this scene early, departing for the Netherlands in 1862, and pioneered the assimilation of Western philosophy after studying for two years at Leiden University. In particular, he is highly regarded for his contribution to the construction of the foundations of philosophical inquiry in Japan through the translation of philosophical terms and the names of various scholarly fields, including “tetsugaku” 哲学 (philosophy), “shinrigaku” 心理学

1 Kato¯ Shu¯ichi, Nihonkindaishiso¯ taikei Honyaku no shiso¯ 日本近代思想大系 翻訳の思想 (Japanese Modern Thought Surveys : Thought of Translation) 15, Iwanami shoten, pp. 342–343. 2 “Nihon no kindai tetsugaku” (Japanese Modern Philosophy), Tetsugaku jiten 哲学事典 (Dictionary of Philosophy), Heibon sha, 1993, p. 1055; Shimomura Torataro¯ and Furuta Hikaru, “Kaisetsu: Nihon no tetsugaku” (Commentary: Japanese philosophy), Gendainihonshiso¯ taikei Tetsugaku shiso¯ 現代日本思想大系 哲学思想 (Contemporary Japanese Thought Surveys: Philosophical Thought) 24, Chikuma shobo¯, 1965, pp. 31–33.

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(psychology) and “butsurigaku” 物理学 (physics) 3. Often described as a “philosopher”, Nishi was a preeminent trailblazer who took up the task of exploring, sifting through and assimilating the vast accumulation of Western knowledge. But can he truly be considered a “philosopher” in today’s sense of the term? Is not the sense in which he was a “philosopher” indeed limited to one corresponding to the incipient stage of philosophy in which he was engaged? According to Shimomura Torataro¯, “philosophy”, at the time a new field of academic inquiry, was, in the Meiji period, “limited to translation, introduction, and the survey of discourses throughout the entire half-century, not yet having gone beyond the preparatory stage”. And it was not until the end of the Meiji period and beginfirsning of the Taisho period that at last Japanese philosophy “exited the territory of literary review and developed into a thorough investigation and historical understanding of philosophical questions through the sound study of each of the classical thinkers”4. It is safe to say that this is a very commonly held view of philosophy in the Meiji period. Shimomura, needless to say, “could not help being surprised by [Nishi’s] insight and his clear vision that was far ahead of his time”5 and held him up as Japan’s first “philosopher”. He praises this view of Nishi with regard to his achievements, including Hyakugakurenkan 百学連環 (Encyclopedia), an attempt to compile encyclopedic knowledge that had not existed in Japan before the modern era. In this sense, Shimomura considers Nishi as the first philosopher in Japan. So what was Nishi Amane like as a translator? How is he positioned today in the history of Japanese philosophy that can now be discerned with a certain degree of clarity? Much has been said about his translations, including his having come up with original translations of technical terms such as “shukan” 主観 (subjectivity) and “risei” 理性 (reason), and his translation of Mill’s Utilitarianism into classical Chinese (kanbun) under the title Rigaku 利學 (lit. benefitstudy), but the question of how he translated or what he thought about the act of translation itself has not been a focus of much interest. If one attempts to assess Nishi even a little more closely as a “translator”, it becomes apparent that this is something that has been acknowledged only in the vaguest of terms.

3 Not many of these translations of terms for scholarly fields remain in use today. See Seiseihatsuun 生性發蘊 (Nishi Amane zenshu¯ 西周全集 (Complete Works of Nishi Amane) 1, Munetaka shobo¯, 1981). Nishi Amane zenshu¯ is hereafter abbreviated as “NAZ”. 4 Shimomura Torataro¯, “Daisanbu: Nihonkindai no kagaku shu¯kyo¯ tetsugaku” 第三部 日本 近代の科学・宗教・哲学 (Part 3: The Science, Religion, and Philosophy of Japanese Modernity), Kyoto tetsugaku sensho: Seishinshi no naka no nihonkindai 京都哲学撰書 精神史の 中の日本近代 (Kyoto Philosophy Selected Writings: Japanese Modernity within Intellectual History) 4, To¯ei sha, 2000, p. 276. 5 Ibid., p. 278.

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Nishi was a philosopher, and at the same time he was also a translator of philosophy. In this essay, I will argue that he was a pioneer of modern knowledge in Japan in this dual sense. What was the nature of his philosophical thought? Japan could not have appropriated philosophy and this discipline could not have advanced and matured in this country without the systematic translation of works written in Western languages. The following reflections will aim at reevaluating Nishi Amane, translator-philosopher, by examining how translation and philosophy were interwoven within his thinking.

1

Nishi Amane as a Translator

In the first year of the Meiji era, Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Seiyo¯jijyo¯ – Gaihen 西洋事 情外篇 (Western Matters – Extra Edition), which can be described as a kind of translation, Tsuda Mamichi’s translation Taiseikokuho¯ ron 泰西国法論 (On the Laws of Nations in the West), and Nishi’s translation Bankoku ko¯ho¯ 万国公法 (International Law) marked the beginning of the history of Japanese philosophy. Here is a list of Nishi’s translations of which records remain6: Bankokuko¯ho¯ 萬國公法 (International Law; Records of lectures on international law given by Simon Vissering) Seirigaku zanketsu 生理學殘缺 (Physiology – Abridged; An abridged translation of a text dealing with physiology by Auguste Comte) Seibutsujôkigaku 生物鑷氣學 (Biomagnetism; Translation of a section on magnetism in a physics textbook by W.A. Zimmerman) Shinrigaku 心理學 (Psychology; Joseph Haven, Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will, 1857) Kenriso¯to¯ron 權利爭闘論 (The Struggle for Right; Rudolf von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht, 1872) Rigaku 利學 (Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, 1863, classical Chinese translation)

His selection of texts for translation seems to have extended to different fields and not been limited to the discipline of philosophy, which again reveals his intention to pursue an encyclopedic systematization of knowledge. What sorts of things did Nishi consider through his own practice of translation? Let me quote a passage that may provide us with insight on this matter. In our country, up to now there are very few who have translated books on European reason 理性. Hence it goes without saying that there are no suitable terms available for 6 “Nishi Amane arawasu tokorono shomoku” 西周所著書目 (Catalogue of Writings by Nishi Amane), NAZ 3, 1981, pp. 109–114.

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use in translation. At the same time, when compared to the explanations of Chinese Confucians, the layers of mental nature 心性 are classified all the more minutely [in the West]. Furthermore, what the Confucian sinographs designate has itself other meanings [differing from the Western terms I am translating], and selecting characters and creating new terms are therefore unavoidable. For this reason, while 知覺 (perception), 記 性 (memory), 意識 (consciousness) and 想像 (imagination), for instance, are existing terms, I adopt as translations, 理性 (reason), 感性 (sensibility), 覺性 (sense), […] as well as the technical terms of logicians such as 觀念 (idea), […] 主觀 (subjective view), 客觀 (objective view), 歸納 (induction), 演繹 (deduction), 總合 (synthesis), and 分解 (analysis). The reader might have difficulty understanding their meaning because they are for the most part neologisms. (“Explanatory Notes” Psychology (op. cit), NAZ 1, pp. 8–9) Translation is an exceedingly difficult task, […] even if there are no serious errors, there are distinctions between [the variety of] deep and superficial readings even when we fully apprehend the meaning [of the original]. In addition, there are different ways that threads of the original text are emphasized [in a given translation depending on the translator]. Needless to say, these are unavoidable problems. (“Explanatory Notes” International Law (op. cit), NAZ 2, p. 7) The original terms for tetsugaku 哲學, such as philosophy in English and philosophie in French, were derived from Greek, in which philo means love and sophos means wisdom. It is the study of the discourse of “the lovers of wisdom”, that is “philosophy” which corresponds to Zhou Dunyi’s 周茂叔 expression “the master who desires wisdom” 士希 賢. [“Philosophy”] designates the study probing “ri” 理, according to the usage in subsequent generations. Even if we literally translate it as rigakuriron 理學理論, it is often confused with the other [forms of Confucianism]. Therefore, I decided to translate it as tetsugaku and thus distinguish it from the Confucianism of East Asia. (Seiseihatsuun 生性發蘊 (1873), NAZ 1, p. 31)

As we have seen above, he asserts that “it goes without saying that there are no suitable Chinese terms available for use in translation”. This reveals the “unavoidable problems” of translation: it is an uncertain and extremely difficult “task” to aim for perfection. This is quite understandable if we consider the circumstances at the time, in which serious attempts to assimilate Western languages were just beginning and these languages were being learnt through a form of “translation” similar to the kanbun reading analysis that had been used in the past to decipher Chinese texts, a process in which the order of words is changed according to relatively established patterns to make the meaning comprehensible in Japanese7. Even when Nishi translated texts or their constituent terms, it is 7 Yanabu Akira, “Nihon niokeru honyaku－rekishiteki zentei” 日本における翻訳—歴史的前 提 (Translation in Japan-Historical Assumptions), Nihon no honyakuron－ansorojı¯ to kaidai 日本の翻訳論 アンソロジーと解題 (Translation Discourse in Japan－Anthology and Commentary), Yanabu Akira, Mizuno Akira, Naganuma Mikako (eds.), Hosei University Press, 2010, pp. 2–11.

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doubtful that he fully expressed what he grasped of their meaning. He agonized over the degree of depth to which the meaning of words and phrases could be communicated, and “there are different ways that threads of the original text are emphasized [in a given translation depending on the translator]”. Regarding the translation of “philosophy”, his writings provide numerous accounts of his ruminations before arriving at a decision as how to translate a given term or passage. In the statements quoted above it is asserted that he avoided “literal translation” and created terms intended to be distinguished from the expressive forms of knowledge found in Confucianism and that can compete with them. Nishi’s translations reflect his way of thinking. At the same time, however, we can also say that these translations are the results of investigations concerning how “philosophy” is to be assimilated, conducted by Nishi Amane the philosopher. Nishi’s discourse on translation is inserted into all of his philosophical writings, including Hyakugakurenkan (Encyclopedia), permeating every corner of these texts. As an attempt to understand Western concepts and theories, philosophical reflection is itself transformed into an act of translation. In accordance with Jean-René Ladmiral, I will call this affinity between philosophy and translation, the “philosophy of translation”. Incidentally, in today’s West the movement to elevate translation to a distinct domain of academic inquiry is flourishing. “Philosophy of translation” requires at least some explanation, and to this end I would like to begin by examining the meaning, or significance, of translation. Translation means “the communication of a message from speakers of a source language to speakers of a target language”. It is also the “text in the target language” that is “the practice of translation, or the act of the translator and its result”. Additionally, there is also in translation, “a metaphorical sense, excessively enlarged of expression, that is representation and interpretation”. This is the explanation given by French translation studies scholar Ladmiral, and in this manner translation is a multifaceted “dynamic” act as well as a “static” product8. This dynamism of translation is premised on the question of how to translate. But this is a question without an answer. There is a tendency to try to differentiate between approaches using the technical terms “free translation” and “literal translation”, but in European and American translation studies, the norms of “source language” and “target language” have been established. The former is a way of thinking that emphasizes the language of the author of the original text, while the latter emphasizes the language of the reader of the translated text. A translation’s dynamism illustrates the reflective essence of the act of translating. This can indeed be viewed as identical to philosophical reflection. Without stopping to look for equivalence in the dimension of concepts in another 8 Jean-René Ladmiral, Traduire : théorèmes pour la traduction, Paris, Tel, Gallimard, 1994, p. 11.

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language, even things for which equivalence cannot immediately be found are finally conceptualized through a deepening of psychological reflection. “Conceptual reflection” is accompanied by “psychological reflection”, and this is the act of the translator. Ladmiral emphasizes this reflection that occurs in translation as something belonging to the philosophical dimension, and calls it “philosophy of translation.”9 With this “philosophy of translation” in mind, I attach great importance to the aspect of translation in philosophy conceived from the perspective of philosophers. Philosophers read and sometimes may publish translations of philosophical texts written in languages other than their mother tongue, and even when this is not the case, they may adopt some technical terms and expressions and express them in their native language. The latter sort of case, too, can be considered as a kind of translation. Terms in the target language have the potential, through misunderstanding or reconceptualization, to eventually move away from the concepts in the source language. Can we not, however, say that this is the birth of a new concept? In the translation undertaken by modern Japanese thinkers, too, it should be possible to recognize a philosophy of translation in the sense of translation from the perspective of thinkers.

2

Translation and Philosophy – A Reinterpretation of “Ri” 理10

In 1862, as the Edo period was nearing its end, Nishi Amane and Tsuda Mamichi went abroad to study at Leiden University in the Netherlands. They had been working as auxiliary teachers at the “Institute for Western Learning” (Bansho Shirabesho), but were sent overseas as students by the shogunate using official funds. This was not something they had been ordered to do but rather was an undertaking pursued on their own initiative11. All of the bearers of knowledge of this era, including Nishi and Tsuda, attempted to absorb the academic discipline of “philosophy” due more to the “freshness of its approach to thinking and the sharpness of its approach to rational and analytic thought rather than because of their refinement and gravity of its thought itself”. They displayed an “unusual interest…in ‘philosophy’” because of “an impression of freshness and sharpness, and not so much in regard to the philosophical content itself, but rather to the approach to thinking found within it”. They “assumed that ‘philosophy’ pos9 Ladmiral, ibid., pp. XVII–XXI. 10 理 (“Ri”) is a key term, and the complex concepts it refers to are analyzed in this section. As these concepts cannot be expressed with a single term in English, I use this term’s phonetic transcription “ri” except when presenting Nishi’s translations of it. 11 Shimomura Torataro¯, “Tsuda Mamichi” 津田真道, Kyoto tetsugaku sensho (Kyoto Philosophy Selected Writings) 4, op. cit., pp. 160–161.

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sessed a distinct theoretical nature and rationality that differs from the religious, meditative doctrines of Buddhism and the practical, ethical doctrines of Confucianism”12. Their demand for a rational and analytic method of thought reflected the spirit of the times. Nishi and Tsuda’s discovery and assimilation of “philosophy”, too, was undoubtedly carried out against the background of this requirement of the era with the intention of satisfying it in mind. In what manner, then, did Nishi understand and assimilate Western philosophy? His interest in Western philosophy lay in the question of “how Japanese society should be remodeled and reorganized”. His idea was “administrative” rather than “scholarly”13. When Nishi and Tsuda studied under Simon Vissering, a professor at Leiden University, their purpose had been to receive lectures in disciplines such as politics and economics. At the same time, this mentor who had adopted the perspective of Anglo-French positivism introduced them to the philosophy of Comte and Mill. Other thinkers active in Europe at the time included Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spencer. Opzoomer, an influential figure in the world of Dutch philosophy, also adopted the stance of Comte and Mill. Nishi and Tsuda had studied the history of philosophy in general while still in Japan, and ended up choosing the positivism that was popular in the Netherlands14. While they likely also appreciated Kantian philosophy15, they absorbed the thought of Comte and Mill in particular. The entirety of Nishi’s major work, Seiseihatsuun 生性發蘊 (1873) 16, is an explanation of Comte’s positivism, and at the same time it is also a work that asserts the standpoint on which Nishi’s own thought is based. Considering this point, we can see the importance of Mill in Nishi’s thought. This text was in fact based on two books by George Henry Lewes, one a popular history of philosophy and the other an explanation of Comte’s philosophy17. The Seiseihatsuun is partially composed of translations of sections from these books. According to ¯ kubo Toshiaki, editor of Nishi Amane zenshu¯ 西周全集 (Complete Works of O Nishi Amane), “Nishi’s knowledge of Comte was not based on Comte’s original 12 Gendainihonshiso¯ taikei (Contemporary Japanese Thought Surveys) 24, op. cit., p. 21. 13 Ibid., p. 32. 14 Kitano Hiroyuki, “‘Tetsugaku’ tono deai – Nishi Amane” 「哲学」との出会い—西周 (Encounters with ‘Philosophy’ – Nishi Amane), Nihonkindaishiso¯ o manabu hito no tameni 日本近代思想を学ぶ人のために (For Those Studying Modern Japanese Thought), Fujita Masakatsu (ed.), Sekaishiso¯ sha, 1997, pp. 9–10. 15 In his Nishi Amane den 西周伝 (Biography of Nishi Amane), Tsuda Mamichi writes, “he [Nishi Amane] enjoyed the philosophy of the Kantian school, and I preferred the philosophy of Comte”. Kyoto tetsugaku sensho 4, op. cit., p. 161. 16 NAZ 1, pp. 29–129. 17 George Henry Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece down to present day, 1875 ; Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences ; being an Exposition of the Principles of the Cours de Philosophie Positive of Auguste Comte, Part I. Fundamental sciences, section XVI–XX.

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writings”18. There is no evidence of his having translated Comte’s French originals, nor is there any record of his having owned copies of them19. As for Mill, however, Nishi published a kanbun translation of his Utilitarianism entitled Rigaku in 1877. Today “ko¯rishugi” 功利主義 has become the standard translation for “utilitarianism”. Both Comte and Mill, on whom Comte had a large influence, can be seen as positivists20, but it is Nishi’s introduction of Comte that I will consider here. “Jissho¯shugi” 実証主義 (lit. evidence/proof-ism) and “jissho¯tetsugaku” 実証 哲学 (lit. evidence/proof philosophy) have become the established Japanese translations of Comte’s “positivism”. However, Nishi translates it as “jitsuri” 實 理 (lit. actual/true-ri). “Jitsuri gaku” 實理學 (lit. actual/true-ri-study) was a new philosophy that attains a “unified view”, thought to be necessary in different academic disciplines, on the basis of positive evidence through the study of the physical sciences. The following three-stage process was recognized in the progress of the world of human beings and intellectual development: “theology” (神理學 teoroji), “metaphysics” (超理學 metafishikku), and “positivism” (實理 學 poshichı¯u) 21. Comte’s method seems to have been the origin of the conception of a systematic classification of scholarship Nishi pursued in Hyakugakurenkan (a record of lectures given at his private school, Ikueisha, inaugurated around 1870). In Sho¯hakuto¯ki 尚白剳記 (1882) 22, Nishi succinctly presents his own perspective on the assimilation of Western philosophy. “Encyclopedic scholarship” is not limited to the systematization of scholarship, but extended to the welfare of the state through the arrangement of the “social order”. This practical view of scholarship that Nishi conceived may have been inspired by the political aspect of Comte’s philosophy aiming at social improvement23. Nishi considered “riho¯” 理 18 NAZ 1, p. 621. 19 In “Nishi Amane shozo¯ yo¯sho mokuroku” 西周所蔵洋書目録 (Catalogue of Western Writings Belonging to Nishi Amane) owned by the library of the University of Tokyo, regarding Comte’s writings, an English translation, A general view of positivism (1865) is the only text recorded. See Sugawara Hikaru, Nishi Amane no seijishiso¯ 西周の政治思想 (The Political Thought of Nishi Amane), Perikan sha, 2009, p. 264. 20 Kuki Shu¯zo¯’s Lectures on Contemporary French Philosophy 現代フランス哲學講義 shows the magnitude of the significance of Comte’s philosophy at the time. Mill published Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). Brentano, also under the influence of Comte, “brought the concept of so-called phénomène into psychology”. Husserl, one of his disciples, “established Phänomenologie as the study of the essence of Phänomen. In this sense phenomenology can be said to flow from Comte.” See Kuki Shu¯zo¯ zenshu¯ 九鬼周造全集 (Complete Works of Kuki Shu¯zo¯, KSZ) 8, Iwanami shoten, 1991, pp. 128–129. 21 Seiseihatsuun 生性發蘊, NAZ 1, pp. 47–48. 22 The writing seems to have begun around 1872 (NAZ 1, pp. 627–628). This essay references Sho¯haku to¯ki 尚白剳記, included in Gendai nihon shiso¯ taikei 24, op.cit. 23 KSZ 8, op. cit., p. 129.

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法, or “nachuraru rou” ナチュラル・ラウ(natural law), which was applied to Comte’s classification of five fundamental branches of scholarship , as problematic. Today this is normally translated as “shizenho¯” 自然法 (lit. nature-law). From the opening passages of Sho¯hakuto¯ki, it is clear that Nishi has immediately addressed interlingual questions concerning “ri” and “riho¯”. These are precisely the questions of translation studies I mentioned in section 1. The interrelationship between “seiri” 生理 (lit. life-ri) and “seiri” 性理 (lit. nature-ri) 24”, essential elements of the Comtean classification, was something Nishi struggled to understand. “Seirigaku” 生理學 and “seiri” 性理 were Nishi’s translations of “physiology” and “psychology”, respectively. He himself classified “ri”, which appears in both of these words, in terms of “shinri” 心理 (lit. mind/heart-ri) and “butsuri” 物理 (lit. thing-ri) and explained the relationship between these classifications. It is important to note, however, that here “shinri( jo¯no上ノ)” is used as translation of “moral” or “intellectual” and “butsuri( jo¯no上ノ)” “physical” 25. Nishi introduces “shinrigaku” 心理學26 (psychology) as a neologism in the “Explanatory Notes”27to his translation of Joseph Haven’s Mental Philosophy. Nishi’s interest turns to the question of the definition and essence of the term “ri” 理 that constitutes a fundamental element in these terms. “Ri” connotes diverse Confucian meanings and was a crucial concept in Song-dynasty NeoConfucianism. Over time its semantic breadth was expanded until it was also utilized in the concept of “do¯ri” 道理 (reason/logic). In Japanese, in addition to its native reading of “kotowari” 理, there are also the words, “hazu” (should/ ought to) and “wake” ([the] reason [for something]) which mean 理, though the derivation differs. Moreover, while there was no suitable translation of “ri” in Western languages, Nishi wondered if the concept itself might exist in the West. He rejected the Edo period Confucian assertion that “Westerners have never known ri”, and looked for and compared equivalent terms in English, French, German and Dutch. The main points of his argumentation are as follows. To begin with, Nishi’s comparative investigations lead to a major discovery. If we look at the equivalent to “ri” in European languages, we can detect a distinction between “re¯zun” レーズン (reason) and “rau・obu・nechu¯ru”ラウ・ 24 “Seiri” 性理 is a general term for putting in another way important Confucian concepts of the Song and Ming eras such as “shinsei” 心性, “seimei” 性命, “do¯ri” 道理 and “riki” 理気. The study of Zhu xi, also referred to as “seirigaku” 性理学, was considered fundamental for the scholarship in Ming era. “Seirigaku”, or briefly “rigaku” 理学, was also called “girigaku” 義理 学 and “kyu¯rigaku” 窮理学. Nishi found a conceptual similarity between “seiri” 性理 and “psychology” and hit upon this translation. He might have reinterpreted “seiri” according to dualist way of thinking. 25 NAZ 1, p. 630. NAZ 4, p. 111. 26 Here I apply the older form of sinograph 學 that appears in NAZ, but I use also the new form of the same character 学 in a passage below. 27 NAZ 1, p. 8.

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オブ・ネチュール (laws of nature). “Reason” in a broad sense is translated into Japanese as “do¯ri” (道理) and in a narrow sense as “risei” 理性 (Nishi’s neologism). “Do¯ri” 道理 does not refer to “that which is stipulated in the human mind”. “Nachuraru rou” (natural law), on the other hand, Nishi describes as “unconnected to human affairs” and “that which belongs to [the side of] objectivity”. He also considers “principle” and “idea” as concepts close to “ri”. He translates “principle” in the sense of “origin” as “genri” 元理 and in the sense of “basis” as “shugi” 主義. The fundamental meaning of “idea” is “that which resides in the mind as an impression of an object”, and to translate this Nishi proposed the neologism “kannen” 観念. Applying the above-mentioned linguistic/conceptual comparison, Nishi actually criticizes Zhu Xi’s school of Neo-Confucian thought. In European thought, various concepts that can be expressed with “ri” in Japanese are differentiated with greater precision than in the Confucian thought of the Song-dynasty. In Neo-Confucianism, all matters from natural phenomena to human affairs obey the “tenri” 天理 (heavenly principles). As a conclusion of these inquiries, Nishi offers his own explanation of what “ri” is in its essence. There is a tendency to postulate a “ri outside of ri” (理外の理). We believe that there is a “ri” that ought to be a certain way and that there are things that do not accord with this “ri”. However, these presuppositions are a result of conceiving of “ri” as a certain kind of thing. Whenever a certain phenomenon occurs or action is taken, a “ri” inevitably arises from it, and it can never be the case that this “ri” has no cause. Moreover, if what is supposed to be a “ri” of this kind does not match the facts, this is because we have not been able to discover a “ri” precise enough to fit the facts in question. This is how Nishi understood “ri”. I have given a fairly long overview of Sho¯hakuto¯ki in order to present the analysis of the translator-philosopher Nishi Amane as a whole. In this essay in which we can observe him addressing the problem of translation, “ri” is actually reinterpreted and reconceptualized. This can indeed be called a philosophical act. Nishi’s response to the problem of clarifying the relation between “seiri” 生 理 and “seiri” 性理 in Comte, or the relation between “shinri” and “butsuri” provides consequently the foundation for Nishi’s assignment of a new concept to “ri”. Nishi’s approach to philosophy introduced in Sho¯hakuto¯ki is very interesting from the standpoint of translation studies. Intertwining comparison and interpretation, it goes beyond the differences in form between the source and target languages and pursues the essence of that which a translation attempts to verbalize. This is the stance of Nishi’s “philosophy of translation” that departs from Comte’s positivistic approach. Sho¯hakuto¯ki can be read as a valuable text concerning the philosophy of translation. It is a detailed record of Nishi’s thought as he compares concepts and

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terms and reflects deeply on expressions that are considered untranslatable, or, in other words, source language/texts that cannot be immediately verbalized or translated. Here we find what might be described as a site of the process of translation and experiments of interpretation. It was Nishi’s reflective stance as a philosopher and translator that constituted the practical implementation of the philosophy of translation. I would like to focus on the fact that it was Nishi’s true understanding of “ri”, above all, that directed the development of his new philosophy. This is made evident in Sho¯hakuto¯ki, a text he wrote late in his life. Nishi did not, however, live long enough to see this development through to its end. Inoue Atsushi, too, thinks highly of Nishi’s “innovative interpretation of “ri””, and has examined in detail the concept of “ri” that runs across the entirety of his thought28. Drawing on the major elements of this research, let us now consider the question of why Nishi’s thought was novel. Nishi understood the concept of “psychology”, which scholars at the start of the Meiji period found difficult to grasp, as a synthesis of “tamashı¯” 魂 (soul/ spirit), “kokoro” 心 (mind/heart), and “sei” 性, and he translated this term as “seirigaku” 性理学. Thinkers of the Zhu Xi school assume that ““rei” 霊 (spirit/ soul) is essentially “kokoro””, and ““sei” is the do¯ri 道理 of kokoro, and kokoro controls the body””. Tsuda, however, read this differently, and distinguished reilike “sei” from a controlling “tamashı¯”. Nishi seems to have been influenced by this when he assigned the rei-like term “sei” 性 to “psychology”29. Nishi defined this discipline, which would later come to be known in Japan as “shinrigaku” 心理学, and described it as follows. Western philosophy discusses “reikon no tai” 霊魂ノ体 (lit. substance of the spirit/soul), while in East Asia, the “shinsei no yo¯” 心性ノ用 (lit. the function of mental nature) is the focus of consideration. In spite of this difference, the two approaches are quite similar. He thus uses “seiri” 性理 to translate “psychology”. According to Inoue, Nishi explained the difference between “reikon” and “sei” with the “substance-functiontheory”(体用論) 30. There is no explanation of this theory in Inoue’s article, but Saigusa Hiroto elucidates this point as follows. Nishi understood psychology to be “the study of something called kokoro こころ or tamashı¯ たましい (psyche)” . But “he realized that this was not the case in the East, where, while the workings of the kokoro 心 or tamashı¯ 魂 were discussed, nothing whatsoever was said about 28 Inoue Atsushi, “Nishi Amane to jukyo¯shiso¯－‘ri’ no kaishaku o megutte” 西周と儒教思想— 「理」の解釈をめぐって (Nishi Amane and Confucian Thought－Concerning the Interpretation of ‘Ri’), Nishi Amane to nihon no kindai 西周と日本の近代 (Nishi Amane and Japanese Modernity), The University of Shimane Nishi Amane Research Association (ed.), Perikan sha, 2005, pp. 146–182. 29 Ibid., pp. 162–163. 30 Ibid., p. 166.

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its tai 体”. It is likely that because he had educated himself in the teachings of the Zhu Xi school, Nishi came to utilize the notion of “seiri” to describe Western psychology. When looking for an East Asian equivalent of the Western notion of psyche, in other words, what is referred to as “kokoro” or “tamashı¯”, it would correspond to the workings of the “kokoro” or “tamashı¯”. Nishi seems to have supposed that the East Asian conceptual framework would not take account of the notion of “tai” or “substance”31. According to Inoue, Nishi then further clarified the difference between “reikon” and “seiri” by applying the concepts of “shukan” 主観 (subjectivity) and “kyakkan” 客観 (objectivity). In his 1873 work, Seiseihatsuun, however, he was still translating “subjectivity” and “objectivity” as “shikan” 此観 (lit. here-view) and “hikan” 彼観 (lit. over there-view). “Through the perspective of hikan, humanity discovered “the control of the universe”, and through the perspective of shikan, discovered “seiri 性理 that governs the mind (kokoro)””. In Inoue’s analysis, Nishi had come to “distinguish between reikon and seiri” by introducing these two perspectives. He had thus “verified again that a theory of seiri was the most important theme in both Eastern and Western philosophies”32. In both the East and the West, human beings are considered to be endowed with the same “sei” 性, and the ultimate goal of scholarship resides in the investigation of “seiri”. The question is what method is to be used in this endeavor, and Nishi chose an “experimental” method of inquiry learned from Comte. As I have already surveyed, in his Sho¯hakuto¯ki and Seiseihatsuun he re-examined the concept of “ri”. The originality of Nishi’s interpretation lies in the “structural relevance” of “ri”. It is this point, Inoue asserts, that is Nishi’s original conceptualization of “ri”. The “ri” of the Zhu Xi school is “law”, and possesses a “substantial character” seen in moral virtues. But according to Nishi, “ri” “emerges between the subject and the object that are related”. This is something that is demonstrated in Nishi’s explanation of “chichigaku” 致知学 (logic), and, as Inoue convincingly argues, it is an innovative definition of “ri”. Nishi regarded Western logic (chichigaku) as shikan (subjectivity) and Eastern kakubutsuchichi 格物致知 as hikan (objectivity). Western logic is “a scholarship that attains knowledge through considering the relations between things,” while kakubutsuchichi is “a mechanism of thought” that “attains knowledge at the end of” “physical investigation”. “Ri” corresponds to “contemplating in the light of

31 Nihontetsugakushiso¯ zensho 日本哲學思想全書 (Complete Writings of Japanese Philosophical Thought) 2, Heibon sha, 1955, pp. 135–136. 32 Inoue (2005), op. cit., p. 166.

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shikan (subjectivity), but not “[objectively] dealing with a thing””. It is “the thinking itself of “what ri is” in “language”33. Consulting the work of Inoue yields convincing evidence that Nishi’s conceptualization of “ri” concerns a reinterpretation brought about by means of his own original approach. This overlaps with the concise manifestation of the idea of “ri outside of ri” (理外の理) found in Sho¯hakuto¯ki. By further clarifying the meaning Nishi imparted to “ri outside of ri”, it may well be possible to recast our assessment of Nishi Amane as a philosopher.

3

Nishi Amane and Inoue Tetsujiro¯, Meiji Philosophers

After returning from the Netherlands, Nishi Amane assumed a post as a public official, opened his own private school on the side where he taught Western studies, the Ikueisha, and commenced giving the lectures that would go on to form his masterpiece, Hyakugakurenkan. When his scholarly research began in earnest, as a member of the Meirokusha 明六社, he vigorously published articles in the Journal of Meiroku. The Meirokusha was an intellectual society founded in the sixth year of the Meiji era by Mori Arinori, and its aim was to allow its members to deepen each other’s knowledge and to enlighten the general public with the progressive, liberal thought in which they themselves believed. It was an autonomous group of cultured individuals who, under the banner of “civilization and enlightenment”, had taken up the mission of educating, from a place beyond political standpoints, the people who were to live in this independent, modern nation and would form its foundation. Up until the founding of the University of Tokyo, it also played the role of a scholarly association, introducing and conducting research on mainly British-French philosophy concerning socio-political questions34. Here, in order to more clearly show that Nishi’s method of inquiry implies the philosophy of translation, I will compare it with Inoue Tetsujiro¯’s method of assimilating Western philosophy. To begin with, we will turn our attention to the 33 Ibid., pp. 167–169. 34 Gendainihonshiso¯ taikei 24, op. cit., p. 31. Matsumoto Sannosuke also comments on this as follows.“Under the Meiji nation, it was not necessarily easy for intellectuals to develop their intellectual activities from a free perspective distinct from the activities of the government or political parties and political organizations, nor was it easy for them to become aware of the unique social significance of this [kind of activities] ”. See Matsumoto, “Atarashii gakumon no keisei to chishikijin” 新しい学問の形成と知識人 (The Formation of a New Scholarship and the Intellectual), Nihon kindai shiso¯ taikei Gakumon to chishikijin 日本近代思想大系 学 問と知識人 (Japanese Modern Thought Surveys: Scholarship and the Intellectual) 10, Iwanami shoten, 2000, p. 462.

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historical background that caused Inoue to become involved in issues of thenation. Initially, the political establishment in Japan was divided into British and German factions, and in the end the German faction that hoped to create a national structure similar to Germany won out. Japan looked toward Germany, which was more conservative than Britain or France and whose government was based more firmly on the royal family. The establishment changed its policies. The purpose of this change was to instill a conservative mentality and as a result suppress the movement for “Civic Rights and Freedom”. In the establishment’s eyes, this movement grounded in British and French philosophy threatened to give rise to anti-government influences. In the academe sapping the strength of philosophy considered to be the wellspring of Japanese progressive thought was a matter of great urgency. Inoue was an inaugural student in the philosophy department at the University of Tokyo’s Faculty of Letters, graduated in 1880, and was sent to Germany as a student by the Ministry of Education in 1884. He returned to Japan in 1890, and became the first Japanese appointed as a professor specializing in philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University. Over the next thirty years, he exerted a powerful influence within the discipline of philosophy in Japan. Inoue’s support was a driving force behind the research of German philosophy in the academe. It can be seen from Inoue Tetsujiro¯ jiden 井上哲次郎自伝 (Autobiography of Inoue Tetsujiro¯, 1942) 35 that Inoue was a figure who played a pioneering role in various aspects of the study of the humanities. His many undertakings included, among others, giving the “To¯yo¯tetsugakushi” 東洋哲学史 (History of Eastern philosophy) lectures, editing Tetsugakujii 哲学字彙 (Dictionary of Philosophical Terms), publishing Rinri shinsetsu 倫理新説 (A New Theory of Ethics), publishing Seiyo¯tetsugaku ko¯gi 西洋哲学講義 (Lectures on Western philosophy) which deals with ancient Greek philosophy, introducing German philosophy and Schopenhauer in particular, giving lectures on Kant and Indian philosophy, publishing Shakamuni den 釈迦牟尼伝 (Life of S´akyamuni), Nihon yo¯meigakuha no tetsugaku 日本陽明学派之哲学 (Philosophy of the Japanese Yángmíng School), Nihonkogakuha no tetsugaku 日本古学派之哲学 (Philosophy of the Japanese Classical School), and Nihonshushigakuha no tetsugaku 日本朱子学派 之哲学 (Philosophy of the Japanese Zhu Xi School), conducting research on Chinese philosophy, and establishing a course on Shinto¯ 神道 at Tokyo Imperial University. Here, then, let us examine Inoue’s engagement with translation. In 1880, he translated writings by Fenollosa and published them as Setaikaishin ron 世態開 35 Inoue Tetsujiro¯ shu¯ 井上哲次郎集 (Collection of Works by Inoue Tetsujiro¯, ITS) 8, Kuresu shuppan, 2003, pp. 1–69.

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進論 (Theory of Social Evolution). This work is a consideration of “setaigaku” 世 態学, or sociology (today translated in Japanese as “shakaigaku” 社会学). In the first edition (1881) and expanded and revised edition (1884) of Tetsugakujii, “setaigaku” appears as the translation of “sociology”. Inoue, who is also known as a pioneer of “new-style poetry”, said, “my first new-style poems were translations of Longfellow’s poetry”36. At a time when what we would today call “translation” was considered equivalent to the “adaptation”, his view of translation that takes one’s translation of another person’s poems as one’s own poetry was not unusual. On the contrary, this view on adaptation may well have been the impetus behind the creation of new-style poetry. Another of Inoue’s translations I refer to here is Baiin shi shinrishinsetsu 倍因 氏心理新説 (Bain’s New Theory of the Mind) published in 1882, an abridged translation of Alexander Bain’s Mental Science. Inoue mentions it in his Autobiography of Inoue Tetsujiro¯ (Inoue Tetsujiro¯ jiden 井上哲次郎自伝) 37 and in Reminiscences of the Meiji Philosophical Academe (Meiji tetsugakukai no kaiko 明治哲学界の回顧) 38, noting in the latter that “as for writings on psychology, this [was] second only to Nishi Amane’s [translation of] Mental philosophy by Haven.” In the “Foreword” of this translation39, he explains that while numerous books on psychology had been existed in the West, he selected the original 1875 text for translation because “nobody is as clear and meticulous as Bain.” According to Inoue, this abridged translation consists of an outline, and its composition is altered with the aim of allowing it to serve as an introduction to psychology for philosophical inquiry in Japan. Bain’s New Theory of the Mind is presented as a translation, but in light of today’s criteria of what constitutes a translation, we might define it as adaptation rather than an “abridged translation”. In the first half of the Meiji period, multiple Japanese translations would appear for a single foreign word, and the terms used in translation were in a state of confusion. Tetsugakujii, the first Japanese dictionary of philosophical terms40, was created in response to the practical needs of the era and contributed to the consolidation and spread of philosophical terms in Japanese. According to Inoue, when he was a student composing philosophical discourse in Japanese 36 37 38 39

Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 12. Gendainihonshiso¯ taikei 24, op. cit., p. 60. See the first of four volumes published in a Japanese-style binding of Inoue Tetsujiro¯ (ab¯ tsuki Fumihito (revision), Baiin shi shinri shinsetsu 倍因氏 心理新 ridged translation) and O 説 (Bain’s New Theory of the Mind), Aoki Sukekiyo shuppan, 1882. 40 The first edition simply gives Japanese translations of philosophical terms in English without any explanations of concepts or other additional content. Besides the expanded and revised edition (1884), a third edition including equivalent terms in French and German was published in 1912.

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required extreme effort, and he had to use a large number of foreign terms. He thus became keenly aware of the need to obtain fixed philosophical terms in Japanese, but to devise neologisms from scratch was not easily accomplished41. Tetsugaku jii includes almost no sources or notes concerning its translations. In his other writings, too, Inoue does not record anything regarding to the translation process, as Nishi does of his own translation process in notes appended to his texts. He does not seem to have had any particular interest in the philosophical problem of translation. This is perhaps suggested by the following passage from the “Preface” to Tetsugaku to shu¯kyo¯ 哲學と宗教 (Philosophy and Religion, 1915) 42. Even if we cannot say that the work of translation is of no benefit to society, it in fact concerns merely high-level interpretations. Thus while [translation] is relevant to philosophy, nevertheless it completely differs from philosophy itself.

The idea that translation “completely differs from philosophy itself” is irreconcilable with the philosophy of translation on which this essay relies. Is not the translation of philosophy indeed impossible without recognizing and practicing the act of philosophical reflection as I have described? In Nishi Amane’s reflection, the process of translation and the method of philosophy were unified as one. Seeing that both source language words and target language translations of technical terms are described and included in his works as a rule, readers are able to naturally grasp the high level of Nishi’s awareness of the question of terms and concepts. They must then inevitably pay constant attention to the question of translation. The passage quoted above, however, conveys the impression that Inoue did not apprehend the philosophical essence of translation, and its most difficult but most interesting significance. To put it another way, he seems to have been indifferent to what is in today’s sense its minimum foundation, that is, the attitude of interpreting the source text while attempting to be faithful to it within the process of translation. For instance, his treatment of the above-mentioned Bain’s New Theory of the Mind was a reworked, abridged translation. Given that in the early days of the Meiji period free translation in the manner of adaptation was the mainstream, his attitude toward translation cannot be seen as peculiar. In the “Preface” to Philosophy and Religion, Inoue asserts that rather than following current trends in philosophy and introducing one new thing after another, an “independent, grounded attitude of thinking and criticizing oneself” is required in philosophical inquiry. He himself attempted to adopt an attitude of discussing and comparing philosophy broadly, without making a distinction 41 ITS 8, pp. 33–34. Rinrigaku 倫理学 (ethics), bigaku 美学 (aesthetics), gengogaku 言語学 (linguistics), and zettai 絶対 (absolute) are all examples of translations Inoue came up with himself that are still in use today. 42 ITS 5, 2003, p. 2.

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between East and West, and devising an all-encompassing study of philosophy43. This was an approach, however, that involved reading Western philosophy by drawing it from a far distance towards the side of Eastern philosophy. While Inoue held Kant in high regard, he criticized him for lacking any knowledge of Buddhism. Schopenhauer had great respect for this religion, but Kant, being ignorant of it, wrote a book on the philosophy of religion without mentioning it. Inoue saw this as a flaw in Kant’s philosophy of religion44. But Inoue does not appear to have delved deeply into Kant’s philosophy itself. Nowhere in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ shu¯ 井上哲次郎集 (Collection of Works by Inoue Tetsujiro¯) do I see evidence of him having engaged in the process of singling out a concept of Kant or any other individual philosopher and investigating it rigorously. Inoue’s belief that translation “completely differs from philosophy itself” is also reflected in his approach to philosophy. This likely was a stance necessitated by an era that prioritized the establishment of a modern nation that could rank with those of the West. We may say that when it comes to solidifying the foundations of philosophical inquiry within the academe, Inoue did indeed fulfill his mission.

43 ITS 8, pp. 59, 61. According to Inoue Katsuhito, from the start of his career Inoue Tetsujiro¯’s reading of German idealist philosophy was undertaken through its connection to Eastern metaphysics (Nishida Kitaro¯ to Meiji no seishin 西田幾多郎と明治の精神 (Nishida Kitaro¯ and the Spirit of the Meiji Era), Kansai University Press, 2011, p. 157). 44 ITS 8, op. cit., pp. 43–44.

Michiko Yusa (Western Washington University)

Exploring the “Logic” of Topos with Sun Wukong

The year 2011 marked the centennial of the publication of Nishida Kitaro¯’s Zen no kenkyu¯ (An Inquiry into the Good). As a final celebration, in early December Dr. Chingyuen Cheung at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) organized an International Conference on “Japanese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline.” The paper I originally prepared for the conference was little more than a loose draft of random thoughts. The truth of the matter is that at that time I was musing with the image of Peng 鵬 in The Zhuangzi, soaring high in the sky. I gathered parts of my Hong Kong paper into an independent essay that was subsequently published.1 On arrival at the campus of CUHK, I was pleased to discover that the expansiveness of spirit I had imagined was reconfirmed by the setting. Standing on the magnificent “Pavilion of Harmony” (合一亭) overlooking Tolo Harbor, one can see the islands reflected on the pond in such a way that the sky, the harbor, and the trees merge with whoever is standing there to capture the harmony of nature and humanity envisioned by the University’s founder. The night of the full moon further enhanced the exquisite charm of the place. Artists often speak of creating their work in situ. Why not we intellectuals? For me the power of the “location” – in this case, Hong Kong – was far from coincidental. It gave a certain feel and hue to my thought. This was not my first time to visit Hong Kong. I had visited it briefly a quarter century earlier. In anticipation of returning, exotic images of all sorts formed inside me, tapping deeply into my psyche. My childhood fantasy of flying in the air like a Daoist adept resurfaced in consciousness. Among the many images that had left an impression on me was the story of Sun Wukong (孫悟空, Jp. Son Goku¯) recounted in the popular Ming-period novel, the Journey to the West (Xı¯youjı¯ 西遊記, Jp. Saiyu¯ki). I decided to take a scene from this novel to introduce my PowerPoint presentation on Nishida’s “logic of topos” (basho no 1 M. Yusa, “Parsing the Topos and Dusting the Mirror: A Radical Internalization of ‘BashoTopos,’” Journal of Japanese Philosophy 2 (2014), forthcoming.

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ronri 場所の論理) and the “dialectical world” (bensho¯ho¯teki sekai 弁証法的世 界). Expecting that the audience would be familiar with the Xiyouji, I chose it to anchor my presentation. Whatever my personal motivations, this way of reasoning also reflects the “topological” nature of our existence by means of which we create and share common horizons of intelligibility.

Association as a Topological Activity I am using the term topological here to refer to Nishida’s idea of topos (basho 場 所) and “logic of topos” (bashoteki ronri 場所的論理). It refers to the nature and dynamism of the topos, understood here to include both the concrete beings located in the field of self-consciousness as well as the operations of consciousness itself. To have employed the word topical would not have conveyed Nishida’s intentions of grounding a comprehensive logic on the idea of topos. What is more, topological better conveys the self-determination of the topos as it gives rise to various horizons or “worlds.” In this paper I will attempt to interpret the unfolding of mental associations (renso¯ 連想) in a topological way. My hypothesis is that I who make these associations function as a topos to connect various threads of ideas into a single, coherent whole. Viewing the process of intellectual association in this light

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captures the way in which our thoughts not only arise in a specific space-time continuum but also enclose within the present moment an infinite past and an infinite future – what Nishida referred to as the “self-determination of the absolute present.” Associations unfold through traversing spatial and temporal extensions. I begin by summarizing certain features of Nishida’s logic of topos and the dialectical world that may help clarify where my hypothesis is going. I will then expand on my initial conference presentation to give free rein to my own mental associations.

Textual Exposition The Logic of Topos Nishida understood “logic” (ronri 論理) in a rather broad sense, more in keeping with the rich and pliable connotations the word Logos carried for ancient and medieval Western philosophers and theologians. As Nishida used the term, logic may be described in simple terms as “the way in which one views and understands the world systematically,”2 to distinguish it from the narrower sense of “analytic” or “formal” logic. In Nishida’s own words: Logic is not something divorced from the historical world, but is the very form of the expressive self-formation of historical life. Take Aristotle’s logic, for instance. It was not something merely formal, but it represented the Greek historical and social logic, which had Plato’s philosophy in the background. It was inseparably connected with its metaphysics. Concerning Kant’s logic, the same can be said. I do not mean to say that logic is merely a product of each particular historical period, nor do I deny the existence of objective universality. Rather, what I want to say is that various historical periods have their own ways of seeing and thinking about things, as each historical period is a unique development of concrete historical life. As such, various developments of logic can be considered particular forms of concrete logic (gutaiteki ronri). The form of concrete logic must be sought in how historical life comes to be established.3 2 In non-technical Japanese, I would put it: ikkan shita taikeiteki na mono no mikata (一貫した 体系的な物の見方). This is even more so the case when we turn to D. T. Suzuki’s “logic of soku-hi.” 3 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Jo” [Preface] to Tetsugaku Ronbunshu¯ [A Collection of Philosophical Papers], vol. 3 (1939), NKZ 9.6. 「論理は歴史的世界から離れたものでなく、歴史的生命の表現的 自己形成の形式でなければならない。アリストテレスの論理と云うものも、単に形 式的ではなく、プラトンの哲学を背景としたギリシャの歴史的・社会的論理であっ た。その形而上学と不可分離の関係を有ったものである。カントの論理についても 同様のことが云い得るであろう。斯く云うのは、論理が唯その時代のものだと云う のではない、客観的一般性と云うものがないなどと云うのではない。種々なる時代 と云うのは、具体的な歴史的生命の種々なる発展として、種々なる物の見方考え方

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The above passage implies that different eras and different cultural spaces each shape their own kind of concrete historical life, and hence each have a “logic” that is particular to them. Nishida’s logic of topos is a development of just such a notion of concrete logic. At this point I would like to register a suspicion that Nishida’s use of “subject S,” and the “predicate P” to explain his topology may have been more confusing than helpful. The root of the confusion lies in the fact that the “subject S,” which refers to the conceptualized object as the “subject term” of intellectual judgment, turns into a non-objectivized “subjectivity” in the logic of topos. This is because the logic of topos deals with individuals imbued with subjective awareness (or self-consciousness). The “I” qua the real self (i. e., authentic subjectivity) takes this “subject term” in its moment of self-objectification. But in the moment in which the self forgets its objectivized image and is utterly absorbed in what it is doing, this subject S turns into a “subjectivity” that merges with the predicate P. This movement of “emerging and (sub)merging,” in which my awareness of myself as an objectivized individual disappears and merges into P (the field of consciousness) and then reemerges at the moment of objectification is how reflective self-consciousness works. This feature of self-consciousness – as giving rise to both objectivity and subjective awareness – has been described variously in the Zen tradition. Objectivity is constructed in subjectivity, and subjectivity in objectivity.4 The conceptualized, objectivized view of the “self” diminishes to the point of nothing the more one “sinks into” the source of one’s subjectivity and utterly lets go of the sense of self. This is something we are all familiar from daily experience as we concentrate “single-mindedly” on what we are doing.5 In any case, we need to distinguish two modes of the self assumes in self-consciousness: the self ’s を有つのである。それは具体的論理の特殊形と云うことができる。具体的論理の形 式は、歴史的生命の成立に於いて求められなければならない。」 NB: All references to Nishida Kitaro¯’s writings are based on the edition of Nishida Kitaro¯ zenshu¯, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1978–1980), and abbreviated as NKZ. 4 For instance, Case 12 of the Mumonkan 『無門関』is about Master Ruiyan Shiyan (瑞巌師彦, Zuigan Shigen), who talked to himself as “you the protagonist,” and habitually carried on a conversation with himself. Master Rinzai’s “four moments” (shiryo¯ken, 四料簡) also speak of this same reality (Rinzairoku『臨済録』). 5 A good example, if you are a Harry Potter fan, is the reason why Harry’s best friend Ron is inept at the game of Quidditch (something similar to soccer) as long as he is conscious of the spectators watching him: he is overly self-conscious about his objectivized image of himself. Ron’s elder brother Fred comments: “Well, he can do it if he doesn’t think anyone’s watching him. … So all we have to do is ask the crowd to turn their backs and talk among themselves every time the Quaffle goes up his end …” “Quaffle” is a flying object (an equivalent of a ball) that gets hit into the goal by the opponent team to score points, and Ron’s job is that of the goalkeeper. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, (New York: Scholastic Press, 2003), 574.

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conceptualized notion of itself and the actual living and breathing self itself.6 In his later writings Nishida used the subject term S primarily to indicate the mental operation of reifying concepts. Despite my suspicions, I will retain Nishida’s terminology of S and P here. I would only note that more critical attention needs to be given to this terminology in order to render Nishida’s intentions into more natural English without compromising its complexity.

The Formation of the Notion of Topos In my original Hong Kong paper I focused on the development of Nishida’s thought from the initial phase of “pure experience” to the later notion of topos. Nishida first directed his attention to the nature and functions of “self-consciousness” ( jikaku 自覚) – the reflective consciousness embodied by each individual and giving each its own unique subjectivity – and how reflections arise from momentary intuitions. This line of inquiry led him to recognize that the known is always “enclosed” in the knower. “For a thing to be is for it to be in something.”7 With that, the notion of topos (basho) was born. He expressed himself variously on this point in various works previous to 1929: Arising of my self-awareness ( jikaku) means that the topos determines itself within itself. It means that the topos and what is at the topos are “one.” That which knows is “one” with that which is known. This kind of “oneness” is not mere identity of two things, or the identity of the active agent and the thing acted on in their reciprocal operation. Such identity only points to the identity of externally objectivized things and does not clarify the meaning of the “oneness” of the knower and the known. … That which is selfidentical is thinkable in the self becoming its own predicate, but in what way is such identity thinkable? … If we start out with the standpoint that upholds judgment to be established by the selfdetermination of the universal, we can think of that which is self-identical in terms of the “subject aspect” (S) infinitely approximating the “predicate aspect” (P) and at last merging into P and becoming one with it.8 6 See Nishida Kitaro¯, “Bashoteki ronri to shu¯kyo¯teki sekaikan” [The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview], (1945), NKZ 11.421: “When we attach ourselves to what is intellectually conceived as really existing ( jitsuzai), we err.” 7 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Basho” [Topos], (1926), NKZ 4.208. 「有るものは何かに於いてなければ ならぬ。」 8 Nishida Kitaro¯, “So¯setsu” [Summary], (1929), NKZ 5.423–425. 「自覚ということは場所が 自己自身の中に自己を限定するということである、場所と之に於いてあるものとが 一であるということを意味するのである。知るものが知られものに同一であるとい うことは、単に或物が或物自身に同一ということではない。又働くものが働かれる ものと一であるという様に、連続的作用として一であるというのでもない。かかる 意味に於いて同一ということは皆対象的なるものの同一を意味するのである。知る

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To draw particular attention to the “locative” aspect of self-consciousness, Nishida described the workings of self-consciousness as “I see myself in myself” (or “Ich sehe mich in mir,” as he originally phrased it in German, 自己が自己に 於いて自己を見る).9 The formulation is helpful for understanding Nishida’s approach. He went on: The self-determination of the topos means that which is at the topos becomes that which self-determines, i. e., it becomes that which is self-conscious ( jikaku suru). This determination is considered an intuitive determination. As I mentioned earlier, “in myself” becomes the “I” [as in “I see myself in myself”]. For the self to determine itself in this manner means that the self recognizes its own nothingness (mu), and the objectivized sense of the self disappears. Even the noetic determination is no longer there. At the terminus of this determination, the only thing we can say is that the topos determines the topos itself. Only the “noematic determination” of the awareness that is absolutely nothing is present there. We cannot even “look at” the content of the noetic determination, because it is none other than interior vital life (naiteki seimei). For this reason, the operation of the topos determining itself is thought of as the self-determination of this deep interior life, and likewise the “topos of the universal” can be likened to a mirror in which vital life reflects itself.10

What is known is always located within a knower. Noesis envelops noema.11 At the same time, self-consciousness arises by through the enticement of external stimuli.

ものが知るもの自身に同一という同一の意味を明らかにするものではない。．．． 自己同一なるものは自己が自己の述語となると考えられるが、如何にしてかかるも のが考えられるか。… 判断が一般者の自己限定によって成立するという立場から云 えば、．．．主語的なるものが無限に述語的なるものに近づき、遂に之に合一する ことによって、自己同一なるものが考えられると云わねばならぬ。」Emphasis added. 9 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Ippansha no jiko gentei” [The self-determination of the universal], (1929), NKZ 5.353, et passim. 10 Nishida Kitaro¯, “So¯setsu” [Summary], (1929), NKZ 5.440.「場所が場所自身を限定すると いうことは、之に於いてあるものが自己自身を限定するものとなることでなければ ならぬ、即ち自覚するものとなるのでなければならない。かかる限定が直覚的限定 と考えられるものである。上に云った如く『自己に於いて』が『自己が』となるこ とである。かかる意味に於いて、自己が自己を限定するということは、自己が自己 の無を見ることであって、見られる自己がなくなることである。ノエシス的限定も 見られなくなることである。かかる限定の極限に於いては、唯、場所が場所自身を 限定するというの外はない、絶対無の自覚のノエマ面的限定という如きもののみ残 されるのである。そのノエシス的限定は唯我々の深い内的生命として之を見るとい うこともできない。故に、場所が場所自身を限定するというのは、我々の深い内的 生命の自己限定と考えられるものであり、一般者の場所というのは生命が自己自身 の姿を映す鏡ということができる。」Emphasis added. 11 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Watakushi to sekai” [I and the world], (1933), NKZ 7.144.

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The Paradigm Shift from the Individual Self to the World Beginning around 1930, Nishida began to shift his focus of inquiry in response to challenges raised by the Marxist dialectical thought in vogue at the time. Gradually he turned away from his earlier position centered on individual self-consciousness to one centered on the world that embraces self-conscious beings. As a result, he set out to re-structure his thought up to that point. On this point, he had the following to say: Hitherto philosophy has considered reality ( jitsuzai) only in the objectivized direction, i. e., it has focused on the direction of the “subject term.” In that sense, we can say that it has privileged intellectualism. But from such a perspective, we cannot reach real socialhistorical beings. Social-historical beings are not something we think about by standing outside of it; rather, we look at it while we are actually in it. To know is already a socialhistorical fact.12

To carry out a philosophical investigation from within the socio-historical world requires that he expand the scope of his topology: What is considered the topological determination has to have the significance of sociohistorical determination. The world that arises out of topological determination is not linear but spherical. Thus, we have the objective world.13

In formulating a version of the dialectical world that is neither Marxist nor Hegelian, Nishida paid close attention to the actual world (shin no jitsuzaikai 真 の実在界) where individuals interrelate and interact and where individuals and the environment determine each other. In the self-determination of the truly dialectical universal, the medium (baikaisha) must have the significance of determining what actually exists, the individuals – that is, it has to have the significance of topological determination. At the bottom of the selfdetermination of the dialectical universal, we have to have that which is “one qua many, and many qua one.” Otherwise, dialectics cannot be considered ontological.14 12 Nishida Kitaro¯, “So¯setsu” [Summary], (1933), NKZ 7.181. 「従来の哲学は実在というもの を唯対象的方向に考えて来た、即ち主語的方向にのみ考えて来た、そういう意味に 於いてはそれは何処までも主知主義的であった。併し私はそういう立場に於いては 真に社会的・歴史的実在というものは考えられないのではないかと思う。社会的・ 歴史的実在というのは我々はその外に立って之を見るのではなくして、我々はその 内にあって之を見るのである。知るということそのことが既に社会的・歴史的事実 である。」Emphasis added. 13 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Watakushi to sekai,” NKZ 7.164: 「場所的限定と考えられるものは、 固、社会的・歴史的限定の意味を有ったものでなければならない。かかる意味の於 ける場所的限定の世界というのは、直線的ではなくして円環的と考えられるもので なければならない。我々は客観的世界を有つのである。」By “enkanteki” (“circular”), Nishida meant something dynamic and not just two-dimensional. Therefore, I translated it as “spherical.” 14 Cf. Nishida Kitaro¯, “Watakushi to Sekai,” NKZ 7.107–108: 「真の弁証法的一般者の自己限

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Each of us is at once the “many” that constitute the world and yet is a unique “one” with a singular subjectivity. Moreover, we individuals represent a “many” relating to the “one” world, while at the same time each of us retains the uniqueness of a singular “one.” This is the source of the tension and existential dilemma between freedom and necessity, singularity and totality, etc., which characterize the dialectical nature of human existence. For individual things that mutually determine and co-exist in this world there must be present a “medium” that makes topological determination possible: We therefore consider this world to self-determine itself by virtue of the mutual codetermination of individual things – a thing and a thing mutually interact. At the same time, from the reverse perspective, that the world self-determines itself means that a thing and a thing interact. As I mentioned above, it is thanks to the mutual determination of the individual things that we can think of the determination of the universal that objectively determines individual things.15

This idea of irreducible individuals interacting with the world was the ontological ground of Nishida’s dialectical world. It was also his metaphysical safeguard against totalitarian thinking. Consciousness, for Nishida, can be seen as an “expressive (hyo¯genteki) selfdetermination of the world.”16 He turned to expression (hyo¯gen 表現) as a way to describe the mediation of absolutely discrete topological individuals.17 Expression, be it linguistic, artistic, or bodily, carries with it a sense of meaning and interpretation. As such it is the driving force behind the activity of shaping a culture. Further detail on this question would take us too far afield, but I trust that what I have to say in the second half of this paper will shed further light on 定に於いては、媒介作用が実在的なるものを限定する意味を有っていなければなら ない、個物的なるものを限定する意味を有っていなければならない、即ちそれは場 所的限定の意義を有っていなければならない。弁証法的一般者の自己限定の底に は、一即多、多即一というものが考えられねばならない所以である。然らざれば、 弁証法は実在論的と云うことはできない。」 15 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Watakushi to sekai” (1933), NKZ 7.109 「個物と個物との相互限定という ことを媒介作用と考えるならば、そこには場所的限定の意義が含まれていなければ ならぬ。故に我々は物と物とが相限定する、物と物とが相働くということによっ て、此世界が自己自身を限定して行くと考えると共に、逆に此世界が自己自身を限 定して行くということが物と物とが相働くと考えるのである。上に云った如く、個 物と個物との相互限定から、客観的にどこまでも個物を限定する一般者の限定とい うものが考えられるのである。」 Also see, “So¯setsu,” (1933), NKZ 7.190: “An individual thing is considered from the perspective of the universal as the ultimate point of its self-determination, as well as it is an individual thing by having the significance of determine the universal. An individual thing is an individual thing only by facing another individual thing, and individuals are determined by topological determination (bashoteki gentei).” 16 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Watakushi to sekai,” NKZ 7.119. 17 Nishida Kitaro¯, “So¯setsu,” (1933), op. cit., NKZ 7.187, et passim.

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the role of linguistic and artistic “expression” in creating a variety of colorful worlds and in lending meaning to life. The shift of perspective from the individual self to the world did not take place overnight. Nishida grappled with it for some time before declaring himself in the Preface to the second volume of his Fundamental Problem of Philosophy (1934): I attempted to clarify further the fundamental form of my thinking in the second essay contained in this volume, “The World as the Dialectical Universal,” and to reorganize and rearrange my thought concerning various issues. The medium M (baikaisha 媒介 者) between individual entities (kobutsu 個物) is what I call the topos (basho) or the “dialectical universal,” and the self-determination of the topos is considered the selfdetermination of the world. In my essay, “I and the World” [1933], compiled in the previous volume [of my philosophical essays], I still could not shed completely the standpoint of looking at the world through the perspective of the individual self. Hence, I was unable to clarify what the objective determination was. Our individual self is something conceivable at all along the self-determination of the world into individuals.18

This paradigm shift of emphasis from the individual self to the world itself gave rise to Nishida’s idea of a dialectical world with two focal points as it was, a world with a “twofold significance” (niju¯ no imi 二重の意味):19 We can think of the world of subject terms on the one hand and that of the predicate terms on the other; we can think of the objective world on the one hand and the subjective world on the other. We can think of the material world (mono no sekai) on the one hand and the mental or spiritual world (kokoro no sekai) on the other.20

Nishida devoted the last decade of his life to developing and clarifying a philosophy of the topological dialectical world. The shape of this world, he insisted, is determined by the individual selves that make it up, and takes place through action imbued with intuition (ko¯iteki chokkan 行為的直観). That is, individuals are not only determined by the world in which they find themselves, but they also

18 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Jo” 序 [Preface], (1934), NKZ 7.203. 「私は此書の第二編『弁証法的一般 者としての世界』に於いて、更に私の考の根本的形式を明にし、それによって種々 なる問題に対する私の考を綜合統一しようと努めた。個物と個物との媒介者Mとい うものが場所とか弁証法的一般者とかいうものであり、その自己限定が世界が世界 自身を限定すると考えられるのである。前書の『私と世界』に於いては尚自己から 世界を見るという立場が主となっていたと思う。従って客観的限定というものを明 にするのが不十分であった。我々の個人的自己というものは自己自身を限定する世 界の個物的限定に即して考えられるものに過ぎない。」Emphasis added. 19 An astute reader will notice here an echo of Ueda Shizuteru’s interpretation of Nishida’s world as the “twofold world.” See J. Heisig, T. Kasulis & J. Maraldo, ed., Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 766–784. 20 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Genjitsu no sekai no ronriteki ko¯zo¯” [The logical structure of the actual world], (1934), NKZ 7.242.

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influence the shape the world takes. Ultimately, self and the world are mutually determining and co-creative. At this point I would like to return to my CUHK presentation, hoping to illustrate various aspects of Nishida’s philosophy of topos and his idea of a dialectical world in a more concrete and graphic manner.

An Excursion The Ontological Horizon: The Wager between Sun Wukong and the Buddha The Journey to the West begins by introducing an unruly character, the Monkey King Sun Wukong. One day Wukong encounters Sha¯kyamuni Buddha, the Tatha¯gata. The Buddha makes a wager with him: if Wukong can fly out of the palm of his hand, he would be granted the supreme throne of the Heavenly Emperor. Should he lose, he would have to return to the human world below and be incarcerated for hundreds of years until the Tatha¯gata would once again engage him again in a competition of their supernatural powers. Wukong takes the wager and jumps onto the Buddha’s palm, which he finds to be no larger than a lotus leaf. He summons his magic “jet” cloud, and flies off with lightning speed. Presently Wukong notices ahead of him mountain peaks soaring high into the skies. “They must mark the end of the earth,” he thinks to himself. Cunning creature that he is, he decides to leave proof of his having been there. He dips his brush in the ink and pens on one of the peaks the words, “The Great Sage Equal to Heaven (Qitian Dasheng 齊天大聖) Has Been Here.” Further coaxed by his nature, Wukong leaves another, cruder proof in a gorge between the peaks. He returns to the Buddha and recounts the journey he had made to the ends of the earth. The Buddha opens his palm and Wukong sees his calligraphy inscribed on the middle finger of the Buddha’s hand. From somewhere between the Buddha’s fingers he detects the odor of urine. Wukong was certain he had flown out of the Buddha’s palm and was surprised to find he had not. “Blimey, was I in the palm of the Buddha the whole time?” The episode reminds me that we are radically and ontologically embraced by something that transcends us and enables us to be. It is the Ur-topos or the “Mu no basho” – absolutely undetermined and undeterminable topos – symbolically depicted in the fantasy tale by the Buddha’s palm.

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The Existential Horizon: Wukong Is Saved by Xuanzang Why is the Buddha’s palm so much larger than Sun Wukong’s world? Because the Buddha’s awareness is so much more expansive and deeper than Wukong’s. The Buddha totally understands Wukong, sees through him, and embraces him. The Buddha’s palm that embraces Wukong represents the sense in which topos constitutes the “field of consciousness.” Wukong having lost the wager, the Buddha locks him into a narrow opening between the rocks on Mount Wuxin (“Five Elements”). Many years elapse before a traveling Buddhist monk Xuanzang (玄奘, Jp. Genjo¯) passes through the mountain on his white horse and hears the commotion being made by Wukong. Xuanzang takes pity on the monkey and releases him from captivity. Xuanzang was on his way to India to get copies of the Buddhist scriptures. (Thus he is sometimes addressed with respect as the “Tripitaka,” Sanzang 三蔵, Jp. Sanzo¯.) In exchange for his newly gained freedom, Wukong takes Xuanzang as his master, serves him as a bodyguard, and eventually becomes his indispensable travel companion, transforming himself into a protector of the Buddhist dharma. The novel unfolds as one fantastic event after the other befalls the pair of travelers. Soon thereafter Xuanzang takes on two more attendants, the Pigsy, Zhu Bajie (猪八戒, Jp. Cho Hakkai) and the River monster, Sha Wujing (沙悟浄, Jp. Sa Gojo¯), both of whom have been condemned to their present state because of dishonorable deeds in their former life. Together the traveling party collaborates to protect Xuanzang as their journey takes them through deserts, steep mountains, and deep valleys with swift rivers. Harsh natural conditions are depicted as aggressive demons and unearthly creatures that threaten them and make their journey through unfamiliar terrain treacherous. Occasionally, however, they encounter a benevolent king or an innocent maiden in distress who needs their help. The Xiyouji can of course be read as a Daoist fantasy full of supernatural happenings. But as each of Xuanzang’s traveling companion gradually come to self-discovery and undergoes spiritual transformation, we also understand it as a

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record of the deep-seated yearning for spiritual emancipation that all of us carry within us.21 The compassion personified in the Bodhisattva Guan’yin (観音, Jp. Kan’non) begins to permeate the atmosphere of the Xiyouji when as the Bodhisattva is asked by the Buddha to assure a safe trip to and from India for Xuanzang. Deeply immersed in this topos of compassion, Wukong is transformed and begins to realize that his real self is more valuable than his boastful ego. This self-transformation takes place within the existential horizon of topos. It helps us appreciate which Nishida alluded to a “theology of topology” (bashoteki ronriteki shingaku 場所的論理的神学), which he described as “neither theism nor Deism; it is neither spiritual nor natural, but it is historical.”22 Through numerous trials and hardships, Sun Wukong and his comrades are awakened to the Buddhist teaching of infinite compassion and the selflessness of all things. By the end of the story, Wukong has fully embodied the true meaning of his name, “the awakening” (悟 wu, Jp. satori, or “go”) “emptiness” (空 kong, Jp. sora, kara, or “ku¯”). In Episode 100, with which the novel end, Wukong is anointed by the Tatha¯gata Buddha as the “Victorious Warrior Buddha” (闘戦勝仏).23 As topological awareness deepens in reflective self-consciousness, Wukong is able to undergo spiritual transformation. This inner spiritual journey (or the transformation of the self) is an integral part of the “logic of topos.” The topos, as the field of consciousness, defines the “locus” where “I am.” Its reach expands the more one’s egocentric frame of mind is left aside. The fundamental topological view of the self is that it is never fixed but always elastic and dynamic, always capable of transformation. As Nishida was fond of saying, Mono to natte kangae, mono to natte okonau 物となって考え、物となって行う – “Becoming a thing, I think; becoming a thing, I act.” I understand “becoming a thing” to mean that “I” merge into a topos where I lose my objectivized sense of myself and wholly embody my action. In becoming a “thing,” I acknowledge my topological presence pure and simple.24

21 C. T. Hsia, The Classic Chinese Novel: A Critical Introduction, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 20, recounts that by Yuan and Ming times, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism had long enjoyed governmental support and popular reverence as the “three teachings” (sanjiao); their doctrinal distinctions had become blurred, and popular Buddhism and Daoism preached the same type of teaching and observed similar forms of ritual. 22 Nishida Kitaro¯, “Bashoteki ronri to shu¯kyo¯teki sekaikan,” NKZ 11.406. 「場所的論理的神学 はテースムスでもなく、デースムスでもない。精神的でもなく、自然的でもない、 歴史的である。」 ¯ ta Tatsuo 太田辰夫 & Torii Hisayasu 鳥居久靖, trans. into modern Japanese, Saiyu¯ki『西 23 O 遊記』, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1971), vol. 2, 463. 24 In terms of the example given earlier in note 4, above, from the Harry Potter, it would mean for Ron truly to execute his role as a goalkeeper.

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The Social Horizon A brief digression is in order here. At the moment of self-discovery, I also discover not only that there are other people but also that they constitute an integral part of my existence. From the perspective of the world, there are innumerable beings and each human person represents a subjectivity par excellence and radically irreducible. The world is made up of all these individuals imbued with subjective self-consciousness. The topological nature of the person according to which each person functions as a “medium” (baikai 媒介) explains this copresence of the vast multitude of persons. I am one and the many at the same time. Nishida called this recognition “dialectical.” Dialectical recognition is not only a realization of one’s own uniqueness but also a realization of the uniqueness of every other person as a single, integrated reality. The degree of my awareness as one of the many is reflected in the “density” of my ego – the more selfish I am, the more blind I am to the existence and needs of others. The more altruistic I am, the clearer is my awareness of the presence and needs of others. The socialization this entails would not be possible if we were not topological. In addition, the ethical implications of topology come into play here in virtue of the nature of human existence as a “contradictory self-identity.” Developing one’s potential is the other side of socialization. Each of us needs to find a “mission” in order to live a happy and fulfilled life. Finding the right balance between inner freedom and outer obligations is a constant challenge and confirms the “contradictorily self-identical” nature of human beings. In classical terms, it is the bind we are put in by “giri” 義理 (principled duty) and “ninjo¯” 人 情 (concern for others). Reflecting on the conflict that Meiji intellectuals were caught up in, with modern Western rationality on the one hand and traditional Japanese sentiment on the other, the celebrated writer Natsume So¯seki 夏目漱石 (1867–1916) opened his novel Kusamakura (1906) with these oft-quoted lines: While climbing a hilly path, I thought to myself. If I’m too rational, it creates conflicts among people. If I put down the rowing pole in human emotions, I’m swept away by the current. If I overly assert my needs, I feel I have no room to wiggle. This world of human beings is not really easy to negotiate.25

We find that we are ever at the crossing points of reason and irrationality.

25 Natsume So¯seki 夏目漱石, Kusamakura『草枕』[On a journey], the Japanese text downloaded from Aozora bunko: http://www.aozora.gr.jp/cards/000148/files/776_14941.html「山 路を登りながら、こう考えた。智に働けば角が立つ。情に棹させば流される。意地 を通せば窮屈だ。とかくに人の世は住みにくい。」

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Intellectual and Cultural Horizons: The Interaction of History and Stories (“Histoires”) Let us now return to the Xiyouji. Topological determination also gives rise to an intellectual horizon in which we can give free play to mental associations, hopping from one point to the next. In fact, this was how the Xiyouji came to be written in the first place. By the Ming period, novels had became a popular literary genre in China. The author of this novel, a minor scholar and official, Wu Cheng’en 呉承恩, managed to add the flavor of popular Ming culture to the realities of the social milieu current around 1570.26 The long tradition of poetry, martial arts, the Daoist search for longevity, local legends, Confucian customs, the legalistic philosophy of reward and punishment – all these elements and more were woven into the rich tapestry of Wu Cheng’en adventure story. At the same time, the novel could not have been written were it not for the historical journey of the Buddhist monk Xuanzang from 629 to 645, during the early years of the founding of the Tang Dynasty in China. Xuanzang’s long, arduous, and courageous journey must have been legendary by the Ming period.

Xuanzang Sanzang (602–664), a young and exceptionally bright student of Buddhism, raised questions about what seemed to him the arbitrary reading of Buddhist scriptures. He longed to read the original texts and study with an Indian master deeply familiar with them. Given the highly volatile nature of the military and political situation at the time, the Chinese were forbidden to cross the border to travel, but Xuanzang left China secretly and followed the trade route into Central Asia – the route known today as the “Silk Road” – as far as Samarkand. ¯ ta & Torii, Saiyu¯ki, op. cit., “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], vol. 1, 431. 26 O

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After a brief visit to Bukhara, he headed south and crossed the Hindu Kush mountain range into Gandhara. Once arrived in India, he first visited Kapilavastu and other sites related to the Buddha’s life, before settling in at Nalanda, the largest Buddhist intellectual center of the time. For his teacher he sought out the abbot, S´¯ılabhadra (Jp. Kaiken Ho¯shi 戒賢法師), who was versed in the Yoga¯caa¯rabhu¯mi S´a¯stra and other texts that required specialized knowledge.27 After several years of studies, he journeyed further into southern and western India, visiting Buddhist holy sites until at last he began his return journey to China. When Xuanzang reached Chang’an on 7 January 645, he met with a hero’s welcome. It is said that it took twenty-two horses to transport the sutras, scriptures, and Buddhist statues he had brought back with him from India. Prior to his arrival at the capital city of Chang’an, he had requested, and was granted, the emperor’s permission to reenter. Within several months of his return, Xuanzang assembled his translation team and began work on translating Sanskrit Buddhist texts into Chinese. By the end of his life, he not only translated new texts but also retranslated a number of major texts of which existing translations were not sufficiently accurate.28 The founding emperor of the Tang Dynasty Taizong 太宗 was eager to consolidate his territory and, if possible, expand it. To this end he ordered Xuanzang to compile a report of the peoples and lands that lay beyond China, all of which was virtually unknown to the Chinese. Within eighteen months Xuanzang had completed his work, The Great Tang Records on the Western Regions (Datang xiyuji, 大唐西域記, Jp. Daito¯ saiikiki), which he presented to the emperor in 646.29 The pages are filled with firsthand observations of local geography, physical appearance of peoples, languages both written and spoken, agricultural products, religious practices, ancient monuments and folk tales associated with such monuments, and so forth. For the accuracy of his observations, Xuanzang is hailed to this day as a gifted, scientifically trained cultural anthropologist.

27 Nagasawa Kazuyoshi 長澤和俊, Genjo¯ Sanzo¯ by Eryu¯ & Genso¯『慧立・彦悰 玄奘三蔵』 [Xuanzang Sanzang by Huili & Yanzong], (Tokyo: Ko¯dansha, 1998), 150, 156–57. This is a translation into modern Japanese of the first five volumes of the ten-volume Chinese biography by Xuanzang’s disciples. 28 Nagasawa Kazuyoshi 長澤和俊, “Genjo¯ Sanzo¯ no sho¯gai to gyo¯seki” [Life and work of Xuanzang Sanzang], Commentary accompanying his translation of Xuanzang’s biography, Genjo¯ Sanzo¯ by Eryu¯ & Genso¯, op. cit., 307–308. Xuanzang translated 74 su¯tras and s´a¯stras (commentaries on the su¯tras), totaling 1,338 volumes, including the Yoga¯ca¯rabhu¯mi-s´a¯stra 瑜伽師地論 in 100 volumes and Maha¯prajña¯pa¯ramita¯-su¯tra 大般若波羅蜜多経 in 600 volumes. 29 The Tang Records on the Western Regions has been translated into modern Japanese by Mizutani Shinjo¯ with copious notes. Mizutani Shinjo¯ 水谷真成, Daito¯ saiiki『大唐西域 記』, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1983–84).

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Efforts to compile an official biography of Xuanzang began during his lifetime under the initiative of his disciple Huili (慧立, Jp. Eryu¯). The work was then expanded by another disciple Yanzong (彦悰, Jp.Genso¯) before being completed in 688 under the title Biography of Master Sanzang of Daci’en Temple (Daci’ensi Sanzang fashi zhuan 大慈恩寺三蔵法師伝, Jp. Daijionji Sanzo¯ Ho¯shi-den).30 Here we have one more demonstration of how the past is remembered in our intellectual world, often being recreated and recast into new stories and new expressions. Today in Japan, a manga (comic) version of the great master’s travel to India is available. It touches on selected but major events that occurred along the journey and serves as an excellent introduction to those eager to know more of Xuanzang’s travels and his contribution to Chinese Buddhism.31 (A page from that book is included below. As one can see the three attendants, Sun Wukong, Zhu Bajie, and Sha Wujing – the characters of the Xiyouji – help play the role of narrating Xuanzang’s life achievement, further mixing history and stories, or “histoires.”).

While I was investigating Xuanzang’s journey to India and tracing the route he took, I came across a book by the Japanese painter, the late Hirayama Ikuo (1930– 30 Nagasawa Kazutoshi, op. cit. 31 Hiro Sachiya ひろさちや & Abe Takaaki 阿部高明, Genjo¯ Sanzo¯: Indo e no tabi 『玄奘三 蔵・インドへの旅』 [Xuanzang Sanzang: A Journey to India], (“Buddhism Comics Series,” no. 60), (Tokyo: Suzuki Shuppan, 1996).

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2009), entitled Genjo¯ Sanzo¯: Inori no tabi and bearing the subtitle, Pilgrimage on the Silk Road.32 Born in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1930, Hirayama was actually in the city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and exposed to the explosion of the atomic bomb dropped by parachute from a B29.33 In 1959 he took ill as a result of the radiation he had been exposed to as a young man. For some time, he had also been struggling to find his own painting style. In his darkest moment, a lone Buddhist monk wandered into one of his dreams. “Who could he be?” Hirayama wondered. He discovered that it was none other than Xuanzang and with that threw himself in reading about the life and travels of the celebrated Chinese monk. This resulted in a painting that Hirayama entitled Bukkyo¯ denrai 仏教伝 来 – The Transmission of Buddhism (1959) – in which he finally succeeded in drawing up from his innermost being an authentic painting style all his own. In it, Xuanzang is depicted on a white horse, accompanied by a fellow monk on a black horse, on the return from India to China. Miraculously, Hirayama’s health began to improve around this time34 and he went on to produce a series of paintings based on the life of the Buddha and inspired by Xuanzang.

In the context of this paper, we might say that the lives of the Buddha and Xuanzang came to form a “topological connection” in Hirayama’s life, culminating in the painting of a commemorative mural for the Yakushi Temple 薬師寺 in Nara. Hirayama offered his work as a personal gift, a bodhisattva act of “da¯na” or giving. Yakushi Temple belongs to the Hosso¯ 法相 school whose doctrine is based on Xuanzang’s interpretation of Yogacara Buddhism. In preparation for the work, Hirayama and his wife made numerous visits to sites along the Silk Road that Xuanzang had visited and made copious sketches. They also traced 32 Hirayama Ikuo 平山郁夫, Genjo¯ Sanzo¯: Inori no tabi, Shirukuro¯do junrei 『玄奘三蔵、祈り の旅 – シルクロード巡礼』 [Xuanzang Sanzang: A Journey of Prayer – Pilgrimage on the Silk Road], (Tokyo: NHK Publishing, 2001). 33 The moment of its explosion left him an indelible memory in his mind and soul, so much so that he could not turn to the scene to paint it in any way; the only painting he was able to complete was the Hiroshima Seihenzu 広島生変図 [The Living Transformation of Hiroshima] in 1979 – and that was 34 years after the experience. Hirayama, op. cit., 15–16, 18–20. 34 Hirayama Ikuo, op. cit., 45–53.

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Xuanzang’s trail to the foot of the Himalayas and various parts of India, as well as to the Chinese mainland. The Yakushi Temple mural begins with the great tower of Daci’en Temple 大慈恩寺 in Chang’an (today’s Xi’an). It includes a scene of the Bamiyan Valley and the austere peaks of the Himalayas and ends with a night scene of Nalanda, a full moon shining on the remnants of the once magnificent Buddhist study center. Hirayama added a faint figure on the path in the foreground. Was it Xuanzang? Or was it the artist himself ? Or is it any of us who exercises our imagination to be there? Hirayama left the interpretation deliberately open.

***

In conclusion, I would reiterate the topological openness, the porous nature of each of us as topos that allows us to make intellectual associations freely. Every intellectual interest gives rise to a different self-determination of the topos unique to the person in search of an answer. It creates a specific “context” for the search and its answer. Is this not how we actually engage in scholarly work and carry it out? My excursion with Sun Wukong “picked up” in our “vehicle” Xuanzang and Hirayama along the way. This open connectedness (in the manner of the “continuation of the discontinuous,” hirenzoku no renzoku 非連続の連続) reflects another aspect of the topological nature of intellectual activity. In my own case, what I discovered in pursuit of my original hypothesis about mental associations turned out to be an enriching and satisfying experiment, opening up to the lives and the works of Xuanzang and Hirayama in ways I had never expected. I am still amazed at how far my vague hope to express Nishida’s logic of topos in concrete imagery has brought me. Not only do “I see myself in myself,” but also “I see the content of what I imagine in my expressive self in the socio-historical world in which I find myself.”

Katsuhito Inoue (Kansai University)

The Topic of Environmental Issues and The Japanese Philosophy

I Indeed our daily life has become rich and convenient by the development of technology and industry, but the air in cities is heavily polluted by vehicle emissions, and the water is contaminated by industrial waste from chemical plants. So the global ecosystem is now facing a crisis of global warming or the desertification caused by excessive deforestation. The cause of this environmental pollution is Western modernization. On the one hand, the advanced, industrialized nation feels a sense of crisis concerning this problem. On the other hand, developed nations regard modernization as a progressive process, and push ahead with it. Under the pretense of civilization, they turn nature into industrial cities. In this critical situation, environmental ethics is grappling with serious issues in order to overcome the global crisis. The main maxims of environmental ethics can be given as follows: 1. All living things on earth have equal rights to life. 2. The present generation has a duty to provide a comfortable life and security for future generations. 3. The present generation should not completely consume the current natural resources. In spite of these proposed maxims, our lifestyles and home environments do not change. The cause of this situation is our deep-seated beliefs that science and technology are almighty, and that profit-seeking is to be highly regarded. In this situation, what can the philosopher do? I would argue that we need not only environmental ethics, but also eco-philosophy. At this juncture, let me introduce Arne Naess (1912–2009), a philosopher from Norway. He advanced a philosophy called deep ecology. In his book Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (translated and edited by David Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, 1989), he classified environmental protection into two types of eco-activities, that is, shallow ecology and deep ecology. The former is a

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campaign to fight against the pollution and exhaustion of natural resources. Its ultimate goal is the health and wealth of advanced, industrialized nations. The environmental policy of governments, or the international congress on environmental development suggest this basic attitude. What should be noted is that shallow ecology believes in the progress of technology and insists that continuous economic growth can be compatible with environmental preservation. In contrast with this, deep ecology supports the image of a relational, holistic field, and regards all beings in the world as being within an organic union. This ecology replaces anthropocentricism, which see the environment only from the viewpoint of human beings, and tries instead to see the natural environment as it is in and of itself. The attitude of deep ecology pays respect to all life as irreplaceable and precious being. Beyond a utilitarian view of things, it has a sense of “reverence for life itself.”

II There are, however, two objections to this kind of ecology in Japan. First, is an objection against the popular opinion that expresses sharp criticism of the Western modernization which resulted in the spread of environmental pollution, and advocates instead a return to Oriental naturalism. This opinion seems objectionable since, from the standpoint of environmental ecology, the mysterious, and meditative Eastern thought will not help with concrete solutions to environmental problems. Second, there is a more severe objection to consider. It claims that deep ecology is a romantic ideology that tries to keep up appearances under superficial slogans. For, while deep ecology professes “reverence for life itself,” it does not show an awareness of the fact that it is life itself that causes the boundless desire to live comfortably and conveniently. This ecology does not go beyond the insistence that western thought is one of confrontation and rule, whereas eastern thought about life and nature holds harmony and symbiosis in high esteem. Though it advocates overcoming the dualism at the heart of Western modernization, and also a sense of unity with all natural beings, such slogans are, in the final analysis, too shallow. For these reasons, the topic of environmental philosophy must take up the many contradictions, compromises, troubles, bad, and good, that lurk within the depths of the dark side of life. Hence, environmental philosophy should consider to what extent the expected representative of Japanese philosophy, the Kyoto School, is suitable in this respect, or not. Wherein lies the particular nature and meaning of the much spoken of Eastern traditional ethic of the Kyoto School’s philosophy? Especially when we think of environmental issues, where must the topic of Japanese philosophy be taken up?

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III The standpoint at the basis of the Kyoto school has an extremely strong religious color, especially in relation to Buddhism, and it is here that one consistent commonality can be seen. That commonality is its truly Eastern form of thought, i. e. ‘holistic monism (本体的一元論),’ which is of a different nature than the Western form, especially with regards to the dualism characteristic of the Latin Western tradition. This monism describes a transcendentally single principle which, while preserving to the end its transcendence, develops itself by arising within itself, is a logic which transforms all things from within, and is a whole from which all origination of development is derived. In other words, we can say that this principle is a logic of ‘substance (体 tı˘) and function (用 yòng). It should also be noted, however, that the ‘transcendent unity (超越的一)’ of this holistic monism, while we can say that it is transcendent, is not something externally transcendent. In this sense it can be contrasted to that which is featured by the Latin tradition of Western thought in its assumption of an external, personal, singular, divinity which stands outside of that which it transcends. The Eastern transcendent unity of which I speak is, to the utmost, an ‘internal transcendence (内在的超越).’ Hence, the view of nature which can be seen here, as opposed to a creation made from nothing by a creator god, is, rather, an organic perspective in which something realizes its own end, so to speak, insofar as it has nature from within itself. In this perspective, individual things, while relating to one another, preserve harmony, and nature is the existence of individual independent things as they are in and of themselves. This is, therefore, is a pantheistic view of nature which sees it as a living whole. In these ways, holistic monism differs from the technological view of nature forming the basis of modern ‘analytic thought,’ which approaches things as objects external to the knowing subject. Nishida Kitaro¯ (西田幾多郎, 1870–1945) often uses the phrase “mono-to natte-mi, mono-to natte-hataraku (物となって見、物となって考える)”, which could be translated as, “Look/see by becoming the thing, work/do by becoming the thing.” This phrase means to see from within the thing by going within the thing, and it is here that Nishida sought the marrow of scientific spirit. That is to say, in distinction from the West’s objectively logical thought, Nishida sought at the root of Eastern thought a thinking that becomes the ‘thing’ completely. In other words, to transcend the self, whilst standing in the existential world which envelops this self, and to stand on the realized plane wherein things come to appear to the extent that the self is made nothing. In this sense, Nishida’s standpoint is related to what is called “ko-wu, chih-chie” (格物致知) in Ta-hsüeh (『大學』). That is to say, it may be called a ‘thoroughgoing objectivism (徹底的 客観主義).’ Hence, with regards to Nishida’s philosophy, we can see that it

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cannot be thought in terms of a self and world, subject and environment, oppositionally constituted dualism. Rather, both terms are taken to be none other than contradictory, dialectical, and relational (so¯soku-teki 相即的), and are determined ‘topologically’ ( basho-teki 場所的). This means that, as opposed to the modern western way of looking at the world from the side of the self, Nishida’s philosophy tries to look at the self from the side of the world, i. e. from the side of things. If we now re-think environmental ethics, by taking up a position like Nishida’s, let us try to find a point that closely resembles the standpoint of deep ecology discussed above. Insofar as we speak of turning away from anthropocentrism (人間中心主義), and towards the self-realization of a position which recognizes the value of all things in and of themselves in organic and living nature, through the process introduced above of negating the self to look from the side of things in a topological thinking, there may be many points of correspondence. If that is the case, then perhaps there is nothing to save Nishida’s philosophy from also being rejected as mere romanticism. However, Nishida’s philosophy has inexhaustible depths to offer. We can see this depth in his notion of “oppositional correspondence (gyaku-taio¯ 逆対応)” emphasized in his later years.

IV What Nishida tried to teach via his logic of oppositional correspondence is that “the self is itself insofar as it transcends itself.” To put this in other words, we can say that the self which turns its back to God is, just as it is, enveloped within God’s love, or that the self full of desires which cannot cleanse itself of its sin, is, just as it is, receiving the salvation of divine mercy. The paradoxical situation which Nishida describes is that while the individual self is separate in relation to the absolute self, that individual self remains, at the same time and just as it is, unified with the absolute self in deep reality. In short, Nishida’s logic is none other than a “logic of immanence and transcendence (内在的超越の論理).” While transcendence remains utterly within the absolute Other, it is precisely there that the relative existent being is something utterly finite. While there is an absolute division between these two, in the depths they are unified. The finite relative self, in the depths of itself, finds ‘transcendence,’ and it is here that such a kind of perspective opens towards the absolute Other. This problem of the ‘transcendental other (超越的他者)’ at the root of the relation between self and self constitutes the centre of Nishida’s thought. Hence, this is not an ethics based on the everyday relatively mediated lateral relations of ‘I and thou,’ ‘self and society,’ and ‘self and environment.’ It is, rather, an ethics which takes as its basis

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the vertically linear relation between the subjective self and the absolute Other (絶 対他者). Therefore, even if Nishida were to think of environmental ethics, it seems it would be placed within the productive ‘vertical relation’ of the absolute self, which is the source of that between self and self. That is to say, not an ethic which advocates a feeling of unity with fertile living nature by liberation from anthropocentrism, but rather a perspective used to become aware of the ‘desires (欲 望・執着)’ and ‘bad karma (業・煩悩)’ hidden at the base of ‘life’ which urge humans on towards the destruction of the environment.

V I would now like to try and grasp this perspective towards the transcendent ‘absolute Other’ based on the ethics of the Kyoto-school, that is to say, the ethics of the ‘oppositional correspondence’ as a kind of ‘trans-descendance.’ This term, is viewed as having been creatively carried on by the Kyoto School member Takeuchi Yoshinori’s (武内義範, 1913–2002)philosophy, which is at the base of his philosophy of religion. Through an exploration of this term, the thoroughgoing awareness of the self ’s finitude can be taken up as a weighty problem. According to Takeuchi, finite human beings cannot move to approach the absolute Other, this is, rather, cut off and left far behind. Without seeing infinity, it becomes covered over and hidden, unable to be seen. It is there that we have the failure of harmony and human misery. It is there that the human being with the tendency to fall into infinite despair in its depths is grasped. If we speak from this basis, without running away from the ‘desires’ which have destroyed the environment, without relation to the tension of the environmental danger in the sphere of our lifestyle, but instead we will be made conscious of the loss of the given ‘suffering’ of the self which cannot reform its present lifestyle from the ground up. What comes to be seen here is not a transcendental upwardly directed transcendence, it is, rather, a downwardly directed degradation that seems to be the opposite of transcendence, or what we may call a ‘trans-descendance.’ Such an awareness of finitude becomes the thorough-going form of no-self brought to shine forth and become endless repentance by the infinite Other which sunk to the depths of the self. In this sense, Takeuchi’s religious philosophy becomes a ‘logic of awakening’ and a ‘logic of conversion.’ That is to say that this philosophy has for its aim a perspective which has overcome the self ’s sinful nature by focusing on it, and going over its origins. That is the way of being of transcendence as trans-descendance.

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Moreover, this kind of going to the depths within a consciousness of the self ’s finite nature is not simply a despairing sinking down. Quite the opposite, since the directionality of descending meets here a kind of leaping up in the opposing direction, or a ‘sublimating direction’ which cannot help but be awakened. Within the awareness of finite nature, there is an encounter with the ‘infinite Other,’ and by this encounter, negation is turned into affirmation. That kind of transcendent way of being is what Takeuchi tries to show with the concept of trans-descendance. Taken as this kind of thing, trans-descendance is ‘that which constitutes the place of encounter with the other.’ Therefore, if the perspective which would take up the crisis of environmental destruction would deal sincerely with the human beings driven into this situation by modernization, and bring them to endless repentance, then what is most necessary is an ethics based on a twinge of conscience. This means to see the look of the transcendental ‘absolute Other’ within the natural environment in peril of destruction, and to there hear the call of the ‘infinite Other.’ That is, the subjective and existential awareness of ethical responsibility pierced through with the sensitivity of ‘indebtedness (痛み・負い目).’

Liao Chin-ping (Sun Yat-sen University, China)

On the Cultural Discourses of Nishida Kitaro¯ and Suzuki Daisetsu1

Introduction Through the contacts with Western countries in modern time, Japan in the Meiji period synthesized Eastern and Western cultures, producing its own unique modern civilization. However, as a result of the formation of such a civilization, Japan’s spiritual conditions were rather unstable. While confronting the contradictions between the East and the West, conservatism and progress, tradition and modernity, new and old, and self and others, the Japanese had to tackle these contradictory issues and attempted to integrate the paradoxes as well. Therefore, what is Japan? What is Japan’s unique culture? Such a question which provokes debates on self-identity or subjectivity thus becomes the foremost issue that the Japanese had to face at that time. When the Japanese realize the question of its “unique culture,” they express the following views or positions on self-cultural identity: 1. self-awakening under the interactions and integration with different cultures; 2. self-persistence under the contradictory paradoxes against different cultures, and 3. the transcending, realistic self-produced in the fusion of aufheben (abandoning) self and other cultures. These three viewpoints have contemporary implications for people living in globalization and capitalism. As we cannot live for being separated from others and other cultures, the issues of what self and others are, how to live within one’s self, and how the culture is being created form self and others sustains or developed have become an important lesson in modern time. A modern Japanese philosopher, Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945), and a religious philosopher, Suzuki Daisetsu (1870–1966), confronted the issues of self-identity and cultural discourses with their respective philosophical thinking. While Nishida Kitaro explicated the patterns of cultural development with his unique 1 This research has received the financial support of the Research Program Fund “Introduction of the Western Learning and the 21rst Century Guangzhou Maritime Silk Road” and granted by “Three Big Constructions” of Sun Yatsen University.

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metaphysical and artistic insight, Suzuki Daisetsu advocated cultural forms of religious subjectivity from a spiritual perspective. Through the analysis on the cultural discourses of the above thinkers, this paper attempts to interpret how the Japanese construct their own cultural subjectivity and the significance in the pursuit of culture in the context of cultural collisions between the East and the West.

I.

Cultural Forms of Religious Subjectivity

Suzuki Daisetsu lived in the USA for twelve years. He studied Buddhism when he was teaching in university, and disseminated Buddhist philosophy while traveling in Japan, Europe and the US. His cultural discourses were established on the comparisons between the Eastern and the Western cultures. He believed Japanese culture was an intuitive eternity, which meant a constant pursuit of eternity. However, Western culture was rooted in analysis, theory and binary contrast (see S 19, 33). This showed that Japanese culture was more mystic, but the culture of the West was more of a rational and sensible nature. About the differences between Japanese and Western cultures, Suzuki presented the unbalanced beauty of tableware as an example to illustrate the future development of Japanese culture. He stated that Japanese tableware was full of changes, mostly unbalanced in shape, or its symmetric beauty was purposely diminished. On the contrary, Western tableware had only two or three shapes with a focus on symmetry and regularity (see S 19, 51) 2. Suzuki compared Japanese culture with Western culture, and pointed out the contrasts between all kinds of concepts such as asymmetry vs. symmetry, incompleteness vs. completeness, changeability vs. unchangedness, uneasiness vs. easiness, destruction vs. safety, simplicity vs. complexity, softness vs. solidity, mufunbetsu (non-distinction) vs. funbetsu (distinction), non-theory vs. theory, submission to nature vs. domination over nature, impermanence vs. constancy, etc. These differences revealed the Zen spirit (ku¯mu) hidden in Japanese culture and the substance or essence spirit (existence and eternity) embodied in Western culture. It should be noted that Suzuki’s cultural discourses consist of metaphysics which includes ontology. The substance theory derived from Zen Buddhism and Greek philosophy is clearly sketched in his principles.

2 The quotes from Nishidakitarozensyu¯ (Complete Works of Nishida Kitaro) (Iwanami Shoten, 3rd print), and Suzukidaisetsuzensyu¯ (Complete Works of Suzuki Daisetsu) (Iwanami Shoten, 2nd print) in this paper are marked in (N volume number, pages) and (S volume number, pages) respectively.

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In addition, Suzuki’s cultural discourses were established in epistemology of the East, i.e. intuitive epistemology. Knowledge initiated in the West often begins with experience, and through the deliberate, dialectic activities of philosophers and thinkers, concludes in experience, choice, judgment or pragmatics. Nevertheless, none of these concepts can be excluded from the reflections or deliberations on experience. Generally speaking, epistemology in the West exists within rationality and sensibility; by contrast, unlike the theoretical epistemology of the West, the fundamental doctrines of Zen are “to realize outside the written text, to teach supplementary Buddhism, to refer to the will of people, and to see the nature straight to achieve Buddhahood.” It means that to obtain satori (enlightenment) and to seek the ultimate truth, neither conceptual knowledge nor system is needed. As Suzuki stated, “it is believed that the truths of life and things can be grasped only with intuition rather than with concepts. The intuitive knowledge is not only a philosophy but also the foundation of all other cultural activities. It is these ideas that Japanese Zen contributes to art appreciation and cultivation” (S 11, 117–118). It can be inferred that Suzuki’s cultural discourses are endowed with Eastern, Japanese (or Zen) metaphysics and epistemology. As a result, when Suzuki discussed Japanese cultural forms such as art, samurai, kendo¯, Confucianism, sado¯ (tea ceremony), haiku, no¯, etc., he had to also investigate the connections between these cultural issues and Zen Buddhism (see Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture,1938, Japanese translation as Zen To Nihonbunka). Yet, what should be further looked into is the question of Japanese subjectivity (spirituality) as opposed to Western subjectivity (sensibility) which is the backbone of the culture in the West. In Suzuki’s Nihontekireisei (Japanese Spirituality) (1994), he used a religious term – spirituality – not spirit, not soul, to display Japanese subjectivity. Spirituality transcends religious awareness (see S 8, 17–22). From this perspective, Suzuki’s cultural discourses referred to the remarks of the Japanese beyond religious awareness on self lifestyle or historic characteristics home and abroad. Nonetheless, the so-called religious subjectivity – spirituality – was not a product from the Nara period or the Heian period, which did not take root in aristocracy nor in common people. The idea was rooted in the people of a lower class during the Kamakura period. Such religious subjectivity was spread from the Muromachi period to the Edo period, and to modern time through the realization of Japanese living. A more widespread religion for Japan’s lower classes or the general public was Zen, suitable for samurai life, and Jo¯do-shu¯, popular among farmers or uneducated people (see S 8, 26–31). Zen and Jo¯do-shu¯, though originated from foreign countries, are deeply seated on Japanese soil, the land for samurais and farmers. While non-attachment and mufunbetsu of Zen bring about a global view of relief and satori (enlightenment),

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and influence the samurais residing locally, redemption and benefits which represent Buddhist salvation by faith of Jo¯do-shu¯ have a large impact on most farmers and uneducated people. Therefore, “religion, land, and people” are closely related, a direct result of the development of Zen and Jo¯do-shu¯ in Japan. The two religions which had been instilled into the life and the land of the Japanese, to Suzuki, were not foreign; instead, they were produced from deep inside the minds of the Japanese themselves (see S 8, 61–79). In his opinion, Japanese culture was a product of the Japanese lifestyle with a local religious ideology.

II.

The Cultural Form of “Zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” (Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity)

Contrary to the religious subjectivity culture proposed by Suzuki, Nishida interpreted the development of Japanese culture along a different path. After the 1930s, as the world situation changed, Japan turned from comprehensive Westernization to partial Westernization, and even alienation from or resistance against Westernization. In the 1930s, a wave of “Japanese spirit” and “return to Japan” set off in Japan’s educational and academic circles; it was an era of “Japanism.” However, Nishida maintained a distance from this zeal and adopted a detached attitude in his philosophy on Japanese culture. Nishida repeatedly emphasized in Nihonbunkanomondai (The Problems of Japanese Culture) (1940) that he did not take a stand of inferiority or superiority or egoism in his cultural discourses; instead, he said that in historic reality, Japanese culture today should embrace Western characteristics (scientific spirit) and progress toward a more open cultural pattern. Nishida meant Japanese culture had to be dynamic as part of the world culture. The basis of this concept was derived from his unique Eastern metaphysics – Eastern ontology which is constructed by “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu (absolute contradictory self-identity).” What is “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu?” Chapter two of Nishida’s Nihonbunkanomondai begins with this question. “The so-called world is a collection of innumerable things, which is a synthetic form determined by many things. However, the so-called real world is always a world for things to associate and interact with each other. The only way to determine the form of the real world is the mutual limitation between innumerable things since the infinite past, that is, interaction” (N 12, 290–291). Nishida believed the world was established with its constituent materials, but the constituent materials existed in paradoxes, mutual denial, and associations with each other. The formation of the world must be

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founded on the relationship of mutual denial and interactions between innumerable things. He further explained, “One is one, and many is many no matter where they are. The contradictions between one and many and selfidentity are the so-called real world” (N 12, 292), which is the ontological recycle of “itsusokuta, tasokuitsu (One is many; many is one).” “Zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” can be said to be the constant evolvement of the world and all things into the “relationship of generation.” (Nishida called it the “performance relationship” to distinguish between artistic creation or historical events, and the position on birth and death of all things.) In Chapter one of Nihonbunkanomondai, the idea of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” is Nishida’s theoretical base for his criticism on European centrism. He stated that Europeans today should no longer hold the thoughts that other cultures were inferior or not recognized a culture at all, and that European culture should be evolved into the European pattern. He proposed this concept because he believed the European pattern was not the only cultural stereotype (see N 12, 284). In his opinion, culture is of a temporary nature and formed by countless cultures’ mutual conflicts and interactions (contradictions and integration). In other words, culture cannot remain in any fixed form. Then, what is the link between culture and “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” which represents ontology? Nishida stressed that the world where human beings lived was definitely a realistic world with history and culture. The formation of such a realistic world was not resulted from mechanism or teleology initiated from the West, but from creationism of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” (N 12, 377). Consequently, the self “performance relationship” between the world and human beings was that of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu,” which certainly included the creation of history and culture. In regard to the relations between “world, humans, and production (creation),” Nishida said, “The real world in history is not only the world where we are born and where we will die, or the world where we produce things and where we are produced through production” (N 12, 296). It is therefore inferred that the “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” relations between the world and human beings are catalyzed by art, cultural creation and historic activities. Hence we see a metaphysical concept set up in Nishida’s philosophy – the cultural form of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu,” which is further illustrated in the following quote: “Subject limits environment; environment limits subject. Being the mujuntekijikodo¯itsu of a single many and a whole one, the world shifts into a creation from a created thing, and forms a conceptual self …. Culture exists within the mujuntekijikodo¯itsu between the two (Author’s note: subject and environment)” (N 12, 345). Although Nishida’s cultural discourses are based on his own philosophical theory, the core still lies in “self-limitation of zettaimu (absolute nothingness).” Nishida believed that numberless cultures eventually

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had to be numberless cultures formed by a historic, real world; in contrast, a historic, real world also had to be a world constructed by numberless cultures. Therefore, what was between the world and culture (one and many) was a relationship of infinite interactions. Either the former or the latter only emerged in a temporary form of existence, not a fixed form. Nishida called this phenomenon “limitation of the unlimited,” and “self-limitation of zettaimu” (N 12, 295).

III.

Mu (nothingness) of Subjectivity and Its Culture

To sum up Suzuki’s and Nishida’s cultural discourses, several similarities and differences can be drawn. Suzuki on one hand confirmed Japanese religious subjectivity with Japanese spirituality; on the other hand, he used the various cultural forms created by the Japanese with Zen experience to identify Japanese culture. By comparison, Nishida analyzed cultural development from a philosophical viewpoint, focusing on the various forms of existence, activity, and culture which were constructed by “the world, humans, and creation” together. Even though the two philosophers researched cultural issues from a different perspective, the Japanese spirit behind, that is, the Zen spirit, makes their cultural discourses share something in common. Suzuki said in Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture, “The Zen doctrines lie in transcending form and grasping spirit, but do not forget that they remind us of the fact that the world we live in is a world of various special forms, and spirit can only be presented by way of forms. Therefore, Zen signifies lawcontradictory principles as well as discipline principles” (S 11, 99–100). Zen originally disseminates relief and satori (enlightenment) coming from non-attachment and mufunbetsu (non-distinction), but as quoted above, it does not propose to discard everything in the real world merely. On the contrary, the heart of Zen is to illustrate non-attachment through a certain form. If so, the principles of Zen emphasize paradoxical matters such as formless form, u (existence) within ku¯ (emptiness), and funbetsu of mufunbetsu. These paradoxical forms represent the Zen spirit, and Suzuki believed such a spirit can be found in various forms of Japanese culture. In other words, what makes Japanese culture Japanese culture is the attainment of the Zen spirit. By contrast, Nishida’s cultural theory is not so much to stress philosophy as to show the zettaimu (absolute nothingness) spirit via philosophical discourses. As for the comparisons between cultural forms of the East and the West, Nishida stated, “I once analyzed ancient cultural forms of the East and the West from the metaphysical angle, and distinguished between the root of ‘u (being) is existence’ and the root of ‘mu (nothingness) is existence;’ that is, both form and formlessness are recognized as existence. The real world of self-limitation and ko¯i-

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tekichokkan (intuitive behavior) is mujuntekijikodo¯itsu, and the existence of time and space. Probing into the foundation of the world in space-limitation is the thought of u, while studying the foundation of the world in time-limitation is the thought of mu” (N 12, 351–353). Nishida believed that Japanese culture was founded on the bedrock of “mu is existence,” that is, the position of formlessness as existence, and moreover, it would display a time-based, dynamic form along with the “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu” relationship between “the world, humans, and creation.” When facing the problems of the Japanese imperial family living in a historic, real world, Nishida did not treat the problems with exclusive imperial centrism, but instead he expressed that the imperial family which symbolized the Japanese spirit “was always an existence within mu, and mujuntekijikodo¯itsu” (N 12, 336). The Japanese imperial family here is merely self-limitation of mu, that is, a temporary, mobile being; therefore, Nishida believed it was an existence of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu.” It seems that though by different approaches, Suzuki’s and Nishida’s cultural discourses have reached the same goal. Suzuki talked about a lot of specific cultural forms, attempting to seek the funbetsu (distinction) of mufunbetsu (non-distinction), that is, the Zen spirit, a symbol of u within mu or ku¯u (emptiness in existence). Compared with this, when Nishida talked about the future direction of Japanese culture or of the world culture, he was trying not only to integrate contradictory Eastern and Western cultures, or all cultures in conflict with each other, but also to blend these cultural forms of development into the creation theory of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu.” Furthermore, hidden behind this creation theory is the Zen spirit – a symbol of u within mu or ku¯u because the various forms of existence, activity and culture brought about by “the world, humans, and creation” together are nothing but “self-limitation of zettaimu.” If so, how do we look at the two philosophers’ theory of mu of subjectivity and the cultural forms embodied in it? Suzuki and Nishida are not pursuing the culture of eternality or absolute value. For both of them, all cultural forms are only temporary in nature. From the standpoints of ku¯ (emptiness) or mu (nothingness), any cultural forms are by themselves a state of self-limitation, that is, a state of self-denial. From the perspective of cultural creators, any form of culture is just a form of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu.” Therefore, no cultures can be said to possess eternal, static subjectivity, i.e. mu of cultural subjectivity. The phenomenon also applies in the relationship between cultural creators and the world. In other words, there will not be a presence of everlasting people and world. We must ponder: What do the ku¯u cultural forms brought about by “the world, humans, and creation” signify in contemporary society?

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Conclusion When Japanism was prevailing in Japan and abroad, Nishida and Suzuki did not go with the flow in their cultural discourses. Both philosophers took culture and its future forms of development seriously on a more disinterested position. Suzuki believed that Japanese culture and its creators had to display the spirits of non-attachment and mufunbetsu through a certain realistic form. This represents “the transcendence of mu and the reality of u” of both. On the other hand, Nishida argued that only the transcending, realistic self produced in the fusion of aufheben (abandoning) self and other cultures can play the role of the world culture creator. This also exemplifies the ku¯u of self-subjectivity and cultural subjectivity. Undoubtedly, both philosophers advocate a traditional, innovative and open cultural form. In their cultural imaginations, there is no end to it or a fixed form. Culture to them is just funbetsu of mufunbetsu, i.e. ku¯u. The ku¯u culture seems paradoxical, but they both believe it is the only way to allow the greatest cultural development because in ku¯u, there is no self-persistence, but instead, it is full of tolerance and openness. In that case, what are the implications brought about by the ku¯u culture to people in modern time? Although today is heralded as the era of globalization, there will never be other time which stresses self-awareness or identity more than today. It is also true for self cultural identity that the fewer boundaries between nations there are today, the more important role it plays. That is to say, today’s culture must be globalized (generalization) as well as localized (specialization). Then what is a globalized and localized culture? If we borrow the language of Nishida’s philosophy, that culture is a culture of “one is many, and many is one” because only under the circumstances of paradoxes and interactions can global countless cultures (many) constitute a world culture (one) in historic reality. This is also Nishida’s cultural form of “zettaimujuntekijikodo¯itsu,” a temporary cultural form composed by mu of cultural subjectivity. If we want to pursue a culture of transcendence and reality (both general and local), need we not also place culture in the state of ku¯u and further add colors to it?

Lam Wing-keung (University of Tokyo)

Nishida Kitaro¯ and Confucian ethics: with a focus on “cheng”1 “Sincerity is the good not because of the results arising from it, but because it is good in itself … the internal necessity of personality – that is, sincerity – is a demand based on the union of knowledge, feeling and volition.”2

Nishida Kitaro¯ and Confucianism: an undeniable connection Nishida Kitaro¯ 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945) is recognized as one of the foremost Japanese philosophers, whose project is to establish a “new” philosophical system.3 In doing so, he has received as well as confronted with various philosophical traditions. Among the nearly uncountable scholarships on Nishida,4 the interchanges with “Western” philosophy and Zen Buddhism are overwhelming. This paper, however, attempts to unveil an undeniable connection of Nishida philosophy with Confucianism. It is without doubt that a number of works can be found on this area, especially the relationship between Nishida and Wang Yangming.5 This paper focuses on one single but indeed far-reaching important 1 This paper was a revised manuscript presented at the conference of “East Asian Ethics: Lessons from Japanese Confucianism” at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, on 20–21 August 2015. 2 西田幾多郎 (Nishida Kitaro¯) 『善の研究』 (Zen no Kenkyu¯), 新版『西田幾多郎全集』 (New Version of the Collected Work of Nishida Kitaro¯) (hereinafter, NKZ)、東京：岩波書 店、2003 年、p. 123。The English translation is taken from Abe Masao and Christopher Ives. An inquiry into the good. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 133–134. 3 So¯da Kichiro左右田喜一郎 is the first scholar who used “Nishida philosophy” to prescribe the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro¯, advocating that it has attained an original realm which embraces a system covering the knowledge in the past and present, and East and West (「西田哲学」は 「一個の体系を備えたといい得べき境地に（中略）学古今を貫き、識東西にわたる （中略）一個独自の境地に進み入られた」), 「西田哲学の方法についてー西田博士の 教えを乞うー」 (About the Methodology of Nishida Philosophy: Seeking the Teaching of Dr. Nishida) 藤田正勝（Fujita Masakatsu）ed. 『西田哲学選集』(Selected Works of Nishida Philosophy), , 別巻二 (Supplementary Volume 2),『西田哲学研究の歴史』 (History of the Studies on Nishida Philosophy). Kyoto: To¯eisha, 1998, p. 44. 4 For example, see the bibliography compiled in the book edited by Fujita Masakatsu, ibid., pp. 542–592. 5 For examples, see 吳光輝 Wu Guanghui〈西田哲学の東洋的性格—陽明学受容の問題を 中心に〉(The Eastern Character of Nishida Kitaro¯: With a Focus on the Reception of Wang

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concept, cheng 誠 (Jap: makoto) in classical Confucianism, believing that it is one of the key philosophical resources for Nishida, particularly his moral philosophy. To fulfill the above purpose, an extensive and critical study of the quotation in the beginning of this essay must be conducted. In this very short but difficult passage, Nishida summarized the meanings and significance of cheng for ethics or his morality philosophy. First, Nishida stated clearly that cheng is “the good itself” rather than “the results rising from it,” second, cheng is the “internal necessity of personality,” which is “a demand based on the union of knowledge, feeling and volition.” Concerns of this paper include, therefore, first, why and how Nishida employed a Confucian concept, “cheng,” to illustrate “the good,” second, why “cheng” should be perceived as “the good itself” but not “the results arising from it?,” third, why “cheng” is seen as the “internal necessity of personality?,” fourth, why and how “cheng” is “a demand based on the union of knowledge, feeling and volition?” Again, this passage does not only indicate Nishida’s interest of Confucianism, but also postulates how Confucianism helps articulate Nishida’s moral philosophy. Regarding these underdeveloped issues of the connection between Nishida philosophy and Confucianism, and Nishida morality philosophy itself, it is unquestionably that “cheng” plays an indispensable role. To be more precise, this paper will divide into three parts, first, an overview of the concept “cheng” in Confucianism as well as the interpretations given by Nishida, second, why and how Nishida employed “cheng” to illustrate his moral philosophy; third, what promises and problems do “cheng” convey to Nishida’s morality philosophy, Confucianism and ethics itself.

Cheng: Nishida and its Confucian connection Nishida indeed had a lifelong interest in kangaku 漢学.6 In his masterpiece, Zen no kenkyu¯ (An inquiry into the Good), which was published in 1911, Nishida mentioned about Confucius 孔子, Zisi 子思, Wang Yang Ming 王陽明, Zhongyong 《中庸》and so on. Even though Confucianism is not explicitly mentioned in later Nishida, its influence remains unchanged. Particular to Nishida’s ethics, Confucianism is believed to be an undeniable subject, in which “cheng” is one of the key concepts. Having influenced by Nakajima Rikijo¯ 中島力造 (1858–1918), Nishida followed closely with British moral philosophy, especially Thomas Hill Yangming)《日本の哲学》(Japanese Philosophy), Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 76–89 and 小坂国継 Kosaka Kunitsugu〈『善の研究』と陽明学〉(Zen no Kenkyu¯ and Yangming Studies)《場 所》(Basho), Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 17–34. 6 Nishida read four to five boxes of books collected by this grandfather which are written in Chinese (kanbun 漢文) when he was young. See NKZ 10:399.

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Green (1836–1882).7 By borrowing Green’s concept of actualization of self (Jap. jiko no jitsugen 自己の実現), Nishida advocated the actualization of personality ( jinkaku no jitsugen 人格の実現), which signifies “the greatest demand of self – that is, the demands of personality – are the fundamental unifying power of consciousness (Jap. ishiki no konponteki to¯itsuryo¯ku 意識の根本的統一力).” Instead of focusing on the “self,” Nishida stressed the idea of “personality,” which is “the fundamental unifying power of consciousness.” While the notion of personality will be thoroughly discussed later in this essay, it is somewhat derived from the notion of cheng. [P]ersonality is the voice of a type of internal demand that emerges from the depths of the mind and that gradually envelops the mind as a whole. Conduct that takes personality itself as its goal is conduct that accords with this demand. If we go against it, we negate our own personality. Another condition necessary for good conduct is sincerity.8

By advocating “sincerity” (the original passage in Japanese is 至誠 shisei, Chinese: zhicheng; English: complete sincerity) as a necessary condition for good conduct,9 it does not only echo Nishida’s definition of personality as a “voice of a type of internal demand,” but also unveils its connection with Confucianism or Confucian ethics. As is well known, cheng or zhicheng can be found in the Warring States period, the Book of Rites for instance.10 It seems, however, that the

7 Nishida studied Thomas Hill Green with Nakajima Rikijo¯ 中島力造 at The Imperial University of Tokyo during his undergraduate studies. See 行安茂 Yukiyasu Shigeru《近代日本 の思想家とイギリス理想主義》 (Contemporary Japanese Thinkers and English Idealism). Tokyo: Hokuju Shu¯pan, 2007, p. 108. Nishida also mentioned that his thoughts basically echo Green’s epistemological metaphysics addressed in Prolegomena to Ethics. See竹內良知 Takeuchi Yoshitomo《西田幾多郎》(Nishida Kitaro¯). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983, pp. 112–114. 8 An inquiry into the good, p. 133. 9 The original passage in Japanese is 至誠とは善行に欠くべからざる要件である, which indeed does not embrace the meaning of “another.” 10 See 佐藤將之 (Sato Masayuki’s) works on the concept of cheng, 〈戰國時代「誠」概念的形 成與意義：以《孟子》、《莊子》、《呂氏春秋》為中心〉 (The Evoluationary Change of the Concept of Cheng in Mencius, Zhuangzi and Lüshi chunqiu and the Formation of the Idea of “Non-verbal Rule”)，《清華學報》 (Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies), Vol. 35, No. 2 (Dec 2005): 215–244,〈荀子哲學研究之解構與建構：以中日學者之嘗試與「誠」 概念之探討為線索〉 (Deconstruction and Reconstuction of the Xun Zi Research: Analysis of the Concept of Cheng (trustfulness) with a Review)，《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》 (National Taiwan University Philosophical Review), Vol. 34 (Oct 2007): 87–128,〈掌握變化的道 德－《荀子》「誠」概念的結構〉 (The Virtue of Mastering Chang: the Concept of Sincerity in the Xunzi), 《漢學研究》 (Chinese Studies), Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec 2009): 35–60 and 〈戰國早期的「非語言」統治思想以及其與「誠」概念之結合〉 (The Idea of “Nonverbal Rule in Early Warrior States Political Thought and its Incorporation into the Concept of Cheng), 《政治科學論叢》 (Taiwanese Journal of Political Science), Vol. 43 (Mar 2010): 53–82 and so on.

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word, cheng, does not carry ethical connotation until Mencius.11 In “Li Lou I” of Mencius, Mencius said, “When those occupying inferior situations do not obtain the confidence of the sovereign, they cannot succeed in governing the people. There is a way to obtain the confidence of the sovereign: if one is not trusted by his friends, he will not obtain the confidence of his sovereign. There is a way of being trusted by one’s friends: if one do not serve his parents so as to make them pleased, he will not be trusted by his friends. There is a way to make one’s parents pleased: if one, on turning his thoughts inwards, finds a want of sincerity, he will not give pleasure to his parents. There is a way to the attainment of sincerity in one’s self: if a man do not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. Therefore, sincerity is the way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the way of man. Never has there been one possessed of complete sincerity, who did not move others. Never has there been one who had not sincerity who was able to move others.”12

There seems to have at least four messages that Mencius would like to offer for the concept, cheng (sincerity) here. First, cheng is embedded in one’s “thoughts inwards,” second, cheng is attained by understanding what is good, third, “sincerity (cheng) is the way of Heaven,” fourth, complete sincerity (zhicheng) can only be possessed by moving others. In fact, similar elements or connotation of cheng can be found in Nishida’s writings, especially the first and the fourth point. For Nishida, sincerity refers to an actualization of personality, in which personality is a “voice of internal demand.” This may be found in Mencius’ portray of cheng as one’s “thoughts inwards.” Although the notions of “internal demand” and “thoughts inwards” should be examined comprehensively, it is not exaggerating to say that this indicates an undeniable connection between Nishida’s morality philosophy and Confucianism or Confucian ethics as postulated in the concept of cheng. In case of self-others relationship, Nishida also implicitly referred to Mencius’ morality philosophy. While Nishida claimed that “to actualize the true personality of the self – does not mean to establish subjectivity in opposition to objectivity, … however selfish one might be, if one has any degree of sympathy, the greatest 11 Even though Sato Masayuki argues that cheng in Mencius does not embrace Confucian ethical concepts, ren 仁, yi 義, ri 禮, zhi 智 and so on, he does admit that the concept of cheng appears in the context of ethical needs of human relationships. Further, it is important to advocate the concept shan 善 methodologically in order to attain the realm of cheng. See “The Evoluationary Change of the Concept of Cheng in Mencius, Zhangzi and Lüshi chunqiu and the Formation of the Idea of ‘Non-verbal Rule’,” pp. 229–230. 12 See http://ctext.org, browsed on 7 August 2015. This passage in Chinese is as follows: 孟子 曰：「居下位而不獲於上，民不可得而治也。獲於上有道：不信於友，弗獲於上矣； 信於友有道：事親弗悅，弗信於友矣；悅親有道：反身不誠，不悅於親矣；誠身有 道：不明乎善，不誠其身矣。是故誠者，天之道也；思誠者，人之道也。至誠而不動 者，未之有也；不誠，未有能動者也。」

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demand is certainly to give satisfaction to others after securing one’s own satisfaction,”13 Mencius argues that cheng “never has there been one who had not sincerity who was able to move others.” Again, a close study of what, why and how Nishida and Mencius perceive the self and others should be conducted, it should be no surprise to claim that an intimate relationship between Nishida and Mencius in line with the concept of cheng. Last but not least, the parity between Nishida and Confucianism or Mencius can also be found in the relationship between cheng and the good. While Mencius claims that “if a man do not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself,” Nishida denoted that “Sincerity is the good not because of the results arising from it, but because it is good in itself.” Even though Nishida did not seem to take the good as a prerequisite for attaining cheng, one should not overlook the inseparable relationship between the good and cheng. Another important passage of cheng in Mencius can be seen in “Jin Xin I”: Mencius said, “All things are already complete in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-examination. If one acts with a vigorous effort at the law of reciprocity, when he seeks for the realization of perfect virtue, nothing can be closer than his approximation to it.”14

According to Sato Masayuki, the words, cheng 誠 and xing 行 in the above passage signify a key method for the attaining le 樂 and ren 仁, but somewhat does not have any direct relationship with ren. Besides, cheng and ren are two axiological concepts in their respective contexts.15 Furthermore, it seems also difficult to understand why “All things are already complete in us” and cheng coexist. Questions are, however, that first, even if cheng and ren do not uphold a “direct relationship” and carry different axiological meaning, it does not mean that the two are completely unrelated. Second, saying that “There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity (cheng) on self-examination,” one may associate sincerity with self-examination and the concept of us in “All things are already complete in us.” Third, why Sato can say that cheng (sincerity) and xing 行 exemplify a key method for the attainment of le and ren on the one hand, but conclude that there is no direct relationship between cheng and ren. Why does cheng on the one hand serve as a key method for attaining ren but does not have a direct relationship between the two? It seems true to say that cheng and ren in a way or the other are related (even though it may be indirectly). More importantly, even if cheng and ren carry different axiological meanings in different contexts, 13 An inquiry into the good, p. 134. 14 See http://ctext.org, browsed on 7 August 2015. This passage in Chinese is: 孟子曰：「萬物 皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。強恕而行，求仁莫近焉。」 15 See Sato Masayuki, “The Evoluationary Change of the Concept of Cheng in Mencius, Zhangzi and Lüshi chunqiu and the Formation of the Idea of ‘Non-verbal Rule’,” p. 228.

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cheng is an axiological concept, and therefore should be seriously examined in both Mencius’ and Nishida’s moral philosophy. Up to now, we have only picked up two passages from Mencius in respect of cheng and its Confucian coloring in Nishida’s moral philosophy. Clearly, as Sato indicates, we may have to study closely on other Confucian texts, especially Zhongyong 《中庸》. It seems convincing enough to make an initial conclusion that not only we can discover the undeniable connection between Nishida’s and Mencius’ portray of cheng, but we also can aware of the parities and disparities between the two. In the following lines, more extensive and critical discussions to the above and other Confucian texts relating cheng will be conducted, especially their philosophical significance to Nishida’s ethics.

Cheng: Nishida and Confucian ethics In the last chapter of Part III (The Good 善) of the book, An inquiry into the good, that is, “Perfect good conduct,” Nishida summaried his ideas on the good or ethics, which in fact is closely related to the concept of cheng. The good is the actualization of personality. Viewed internally, this actualization is the satisfaction of a solemn demand – that is, the unification of consciousness – and its ultimate form is achieved in the mutual forget of self and other and the merging of subject and object.16

By reiterating the good or ethics as “the actualization of personality,” which refers to “the unification of consciousness,” Nishida again employed Confucian ethical concept, at least in the Mencius sense, cheng, to solicit his ethical discourse. [W]hen the motive is good but the actual conduct is not necessarily good – people often say that individual sincerity and the supreme good of all humankind sometimes conflict. I believe, however, that those who say this lack a correct understanding of sincerity – what such people say is not true if we use “sincerity” in the sense of the truly deepest demands of spirit as a whole. Our true demands are not artificially created by us; they are the facts of nature.17

With regard to the conflict between good motive and the actual conduct, Nishida argued that this implies a misunderstanding of sincerity (the Japanese expression here is shisei 至誠), as (complete) sincerity should be the “truly deepest demands of spirit as a whole,” which are not “artificially created by us,” but rather “the facts of nature 自然の事実.” In other words, cheng or zhicheng is not something 16 An inquiry into the good, p. 142. 17 Ibid., p. 144.

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“external”, but rather “internal” to ourselves. It is also indeed not artificial, but the fact of nature. Accordingly, Nishida’s interpretation of cheng or zhicheng is similar to or even borrowed from what Mencius has said. First, if cheng or zhicheng is something “internal,” then it matches what Mencius said, “All things are already complete in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-examination.” That is to say, cheng or zhicheng is “already complete in us,” of which its self-examination is undergoing. Second, if cheng or zhicheng signifies “the truly deepest demands of spirit as a whole,” it somewhat echoes Mencius’ idea of cheng as a “self-examination.” Third, if (complete) sincerity (zhicheng) is our true demand that are the facts of nature and are not artificially created by us, then it may sound similar to what Mencius said, “sincerity (cheng) is the way of Heaven.” Of course, one should not overlook the differences between the concepts of nature and Heaven.18 Another significant parity between Nishida and Confucian ethics on Nishida’s prescription of cheng as “knowledge, feeling and volition,” of which they are the foundation of “internal necessity of personality – that is, sincerely (cheng).” In the first of chapter of Part III, An inquiry into the Good, “Conduct,” Nishida writes, [A]s in Wang Yang-ming’s emphasis on the identity of knowledge and action, true knowledge is always accompanied by the performance of the will. To think in a certain way but not to desire in the same way means that one does not yet truly know.19

By referring to Wang Yangming’s identity of knowledge and action, Nishida also emphasizes “knowledge” for conduct. Despite the possible difference, that is, the will for “true knowledge,” Nishida basically followed and agreed with the ethical discourse postulated by Wang Yangming. In doing so, not only did Nishida share his moral concern with Confucianism, particularly Mencius and Wang Yangming, but also attempted to establish his own moral philosophy through the confrontation with “Western” ethics, including intuitive and heteronomous ethical discourse. Among the thirteen chapters of Part III, the Good, of An inquiry into the Good, a relatively rare and systematic analysis on ethics among the abundant and difficult writings,20 after giving an overview of his understanding of the good (ethics) in the first four chapters, Nishida spends six chapters on reviewing the 18 Examinations on the nature, the Heaven and their relationships will be conducted in a different paper. 19 An inquiry into the good, pp. 90–91. 20 As is well known, Part III originally was Nishida’s lecture notes at the Fourth High School, it should be no surprise that its structure and content, therefore, are well organized comparing with other writings.

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ethical discourse up to his contemporary time, basically on “Western” ethics. According to Christopher S. Goto-Jones, Nishida summaried (Western) ethics into three categories, namely, intuitive (Jap. chokkakusetu 直覚説), heteronomous (Jap. taritsuteki ronri gakusetsu 他律的論理学説) and autonomous (Jap. jiritsuteki ronri gakusetsu 自律論的論理学説), upon which he developed an ethical notion, that is, the actualization of personality (Jap. jinkaku jitsugensetsu 人格實現說). For Nishida, in line with Goto-Jones’ expressions, “intuitive theories indulge individual and heteronomous theories indulge nation.”21 By emphasizing the good as an actualization of personality, in which personality is an “internal demand,” it should be no surprise that Nishida was in favor of autonomous theories. More importantly, such preference is not only based on the criticisms of intuitive and heteronomous theories, but also founded on Nishida’s reliance and support to Confucian ethics, especially the concept of cheng or zhicheng. As quoted in the beginning of this essay, “Sincerity (zhicheng) is the good not because of the results arising from it, but because it is good in itself….the internal necessity of personality – that is, sincerity (zhicheng).” Since the content of actualization is “personality,” that which is “sincerity,” and “sincerity” is “the good in itself,” Nishida did not (only) refer to or promote Buddhism/Zen in his philosophical making, but also (heavily) relied on Confucianism. Concerning the contents of Confucianism in Nishida’s ethical discourse, they can be seen in “the union of knowledge, feeling and volition (知情意合一).” For Nishida, feeling plays a very important role for ethics. He does not, however, define feeling as merely a subjective emotion, but also an objective one. Nishida emphasized that feeling should be a subject-object unity. To fulfill the greatest demands of the self and to actualize the self is to actualize the objective ideas of the self – that is, to unite with objectivity. In this regard, good conduct is love. Love is the feeling of congruence between self and other, the feeling of the union of subject and object.22

Based on the “feeling of congruence between self and other, the feeling of the union of subject and object,” Nishida argued that such feeling should go one step father, that is, the subject and object, self and things should merge, so as to reach “the quintessence of good conduct.”23 Accordingly, considering that the good is an actualization of self, it is indeed not an individual matter, but rather relates to others, in which feeling is involved. Such feeling is, however, that neither a subjective nor objective matter, but rather 21 Christopher S. Goto-Jones, “Ethics and politics in early Nishida: reconsidering Zen no Kenkyu¯.” Philosophy East and West (Oct. 2003): 521. 22 An inquiry into the good, pp. 134–135. 23 Ibid., p. 135.

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a unity of both. This of course echoes the idea of pure experience that underlines Nishida philosophy, but particularly upholds an irreplaceable position in his ethics. Without feeling, one cannot fulfill the greatest demands of him/herself, and as a result, he/she cannot actualize his/her own self. To illustrate this position, Nishida borrowed what Confucius has portrayed in the Analects (Wei Zheng), “I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right.”24 In other words, our desire is not only a subjective one that overrides others, but rather follow what was (ethically) right. The subjective and objective “feeling” should merge and reach the “the quintessence of good conduct.” We indeed may also find the reference of feeling in Mencius and its relationship with Nishida’s ethics. As a well-known passage in the chapter of “Gong Sun Chou I”, Mencius writes, All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others….When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: even now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress.25

The importance of feeling for ethics can be clearly seen here, which does not only indicate a self-other relationship, but also postulates the “universality” of feeling (of alarm and distress) of men (and women). Even though the contents of feeling between Mencius and Nishida may be different, but their idea of “universality” of feeling makes them get closer. Furthermore, while emphasizing the unity of “knowledge, feeling, volition” for ethics, it also demonstrates a hidden link between Nishida and Mencius, especially the relationship between knowledge and feeling. As Lee Ming-huei argues, “for Mencius,…reason and emotion are unified.”26 The moral subject is not only rational but also emotional. The compassion, that is, the feeling of alarm and distress, as stated in the above passage, also embraces a discrimination of right and wrong. Last but not least, the concept of “volition” is without doubt an indispensable component for Nishida ethics. While defining the good as conduct, it is a “physical action that arises because of a conscious goal; it is a willed-action,… (which) mainly indicate internal phenomena of consciousness.”27 That is to say, the good as conduct is not a physical movement, but rather based on consciousness or will, which is not an external but internal phenomena. Although Nishida did not clearly indicate such idea in relation to Confucianism, it is not

24 See http://ctext.org, browsed on 7 August 2015. 25 Ibid. 26 See Lee Ming-huei, “Confucianism, Kant and Virtue ethics,” in Stephen C. Angle and Micheal A. Slote, eds., Virtue ethics and Confucianism. New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 54. 27 An inquiry into the good, p. 88.

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difficult to see its parallel with Mencius’ differentiation between animals and human beings. Mencius said, “That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while superior men preserve it. Shun clearly understood the multitude of things, and closely observed the relations of humanity. He walked along the path of benevolence and righteousness; he did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness.”28

While the connotations of animal may be different with Mencius, Nishida emphasized the fundamental distinction the conducts of animals and human beings in terms of consciousness, will or volition. I believe we can subsume the various phenomena of the practical human realm within the category of conduct,…and as seen in relatively higher animals, instinctive action that is goal-oriented and involves some conscious, but in which the goals are not clearly known.29

Nishida did not explain what exactly does “higher animals” mean, including its underlying difference with “lower animals.” It is unquestionably, however, that human beings do not belong to the categories of both higher and lower animals, since the conduct of human beings does not only involve consciousness, but also embrace clear goals. Similar to Mencius, the “small” difference between animals and human beings is that the latter do preserve benevolence and righteousness, which is not only matter of “will” but also a “clearly goal.” In brief, regarding the concept of cheng, the relationship between Nishida and Confucian ethics is twofold. First, Nishida somewhat found an ethical reference of his idea of actualization of personality with Confucianism, which both emphasize ethics an internal rather than an external demand. Second, by supporting the autonomous theories of ethics, Nishida attempted to criticize the “Western” ethical discourse, including intuitive and heteronomous theories, which to a certain extent share with Confucian ethics. The next step that this paper would like to or have to move on is, what kind of philosophical significance does the parities and disparities between Nishida and Confucian ethics have to ethics itself, especially in accordance with cheng.

28 “Li Lou II,” http://ctext.org, browsed on 7 August 2015. 29 An inquiry into the good, pp. 87–88.

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Cheng: Nishida, Confucianism and ethics Our discussions on the relationship between Nishida and Confucian ethics basically focus on early Nishida, especially the book, An inquiry into the good, classical Confucianism, particularly Mencius, and their support to autonomous ethical theories. Although the concept of cheng does not seem to be mentioned in the middle and later Nishida, it does connect with the two stages, including but not limited to moral and political philosophy. First, since cheng is interpreted as an actualization of personality, which is not only an individual matter, but also involves others, Nishida developed this selfothers relationship to an individual-social interconnection. It seems that Nishida would like to portray a dialectic relationship between self and others, as well as individuals and society, but society turns out to be more important than individuals. Similar to Confucian ethics, self-cultivation starts with an individual, which is followed by family, nation and the world, Nishida stressed the interests of society and nation. The development of social consciousness is not limited to the small group of the family….We individuals are entities that have developed as cells of one society. The essence of the nation is the expression of the communal consciousness that constitutes the foundation of our minds. In the context of the nation, we can accomplish a great development of personality; the nation is a unified personality, and the systems and laws of the nation are expressions of the will of this communal consciousness.30

This paper is neither intended to examine Nishida’s political philosophy nor philosophy of history, but it is clearly that Nishida has sowed some seeds for the above areas. The concept of cheng, therefore, does not limit to early Nishida or his moral philosophy, but also many other philosophical issues. Second, Nishida’s (re)configuration of cheng may offer some insights to Confucian ethics. By emphasizing cheng as a union of knowledge, feeling and volition, there are rooms for exploring how these three elements are interconnected in the context of Confucianism. It is definitely not an easy task to deal with it, but apart from the union of reason and emotion as Lee Ming-huei highlights, it may be interesting to study the issue of volition and its relationship with knowledge and feeling may need further examination. Third, the meaningfulness of Nishida’s (re)interpretation of cheng to ethics itself is another issue that should be examined. Although Nishida and Confucianism tend to support autonomous theories, the underlying concepts of and relationships between knowledge, feeling and volition, as well as their interconnections with various “Western” ethical theories have to be seriously studied. 30 Ibid., p. 140.

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Recent debates on using virtue ethics to (re) interpret Confucian ethics are extremely hot, which may also be an issue to explore for Nishida’s ethics.

Concluding remarks By taking a close study on the concept of cheng, it seems quite obvious that there is an undeniable relationship between Nishida’s and Confucian ethics, rather than Zen Buddhism that has long been overwhelmingly emphasized. In doing so, it does not mean that Nishida ethics is entirely relied on Confucianism and has nothing to do with Zen Buddhism. This paper attempts to open up a comparatively underdeveloped but very important field and subject for Nishida’s moral philosophy. Having explored some facts about the relationship between Nishida’s and Confucian ethics, it is expected to open up the philosophical potential embedded in the interconnection between the two in near future.

Wong Yiu-hong (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

The Structure of iki and Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Introduction Kuki Shuzo is one of the most prominent thinkers in modern Japanese philosophy. And among many of his great works in philosophy, The Structure of iki (Iki no kozo¯) 1 undoubtedly occupies a central place. The initial draft of this work had been largely composed during his overseas study in Europe from 1921 to 1928.2 To be sure, the studying on philosophy in Europe provided Kuki many fruitful inspirations for the formation of major conceptions. But Kuki’s encountering with Heidegger, first through studying a philosophical review article on young Heidegger’s philosophy, and by personal meeting with the thinker in Germany, determined ultimately the way of thinking underlining the study methodology to be executed in The Structure of iki. Mostly inspired by Heidegger’s innovative conception and hermeneutic phenomenology, Kuki intends to make a rigorous reconsideration of his general method of iki studying. The appropriation of Heidegger’s method not only arouses Kuki’s serious attention to the problem of philosophical method, but also makes him turn to a new direction different from the method supposed in the early planning in the draft of The Structure of iki. With a specific focus to the perspective of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, this paper aims at reconstructing Kuki’s study method taken in The Structure of iki and assessing the hidden connection between his applied method and hermeneutic phenomenology. For our definite understanding of herme1 In this paper, we have consulted several translations of Kuki’s work. Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara (Tokyo: Kodansha Intl., 2004). Reflections on Japanese Taste – The Structure of Iki, trans. by John Clark (Sydney: Power Publications, 1997). 《「粹」的構造》 (The Structure of iki), Chinese translation and commentaries by Wen-Hong Huang & Jin-Rong Huang, (Taiwan: Lingking Books, 2009). And this Chinese translation includes Fujita Masakatsu’s explanation and commentaries. 2 See Fujita Masakatsu’s explanation in The Structure of iki , Chinese translation, p. 128 and p. lvi–lvii.

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neutic phenomenology, we suggest a reading based on Heidegger’s thinking in his early Freiburg period, the formative period just before the publication of Being and Time. Furthermore, through tracing back to the genetic development of the thinking of young Heidegger, on the one hand, we can provide a more sufficient explanation to the idea formation of the entire programme in Being and Time. On the other hand, we can point out more precisely what is the hidden factor that motivates young Heidegger to pursue a new method ‘totally’ departed from his great mentor Husserl and Husserlian phenomenology. It is obviously that Heidegger takes a great debt from Husserl’s phenomenology, but a rising young philosopher has no intention to be a simple housekeeper. When Heidegger contends he has to find out his new way, it seems that a hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology and the concept of “formal indication” are the best alternatives that could be mostly relevant. In fact, “formal indication” has become the icon concept in the entire period of young Heidegger, and thus will be our major attention in the following discussion. We fully believe that under the indication of these Heidegger’s conceptions, we can more effectively explore the core feature of Kuki’s methodology, and review the reasoning that motivates his ultimate turn, from phenomenology of consciousness to hermeneutic phenomenology. As a result, such a reconstructive reading could be regarded as one of the hermeneutic practices, which is to open a different horizon for the possibilities of new dialogues.

1.

Method and the Way of Thinking

In the opening chapter of The Structure of iki, Kuki explicitly states that, this study intends to tackle two major problems. First, it is the question about the method of analysis, which method is the most appropriate for studying the phenomenon and experience of iki. This phenomenon is closely related, as Kuki will soon illustrate, to human consciousness, and is belonging to the category of cultural activity, it shares a meaningful structure of culture practice that is quite different from a physical object existed in the external world. In the very beginning section, Kuki strongly emphasizes this concern about method, “How is the phenomenon of iki structured? How can we make clear the structure of iki and grasp its being. … … If that is the case, what methodological approach should we take to treat this meaning”.3 Second, Kuki declares, strictly following the above section, the entire study aims at grasping the prominent features of the phenomenon of iki, but the process of exploration could not forgo the matter’s 3 Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara, p. 22.

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original condition, “to the thing itself”, must not deprive the “concreteness” and “existence” (existentia).4 Certainly the second question is closely related to the first question as to formatting into an organic integration for the whole study project. It seems that Kuki has not explained very clearly how he is going to analyze the phenomenon of iki, and not provided in detail what philosophical method he has determined to use. However, when we look more closely, he points out the problem explicitly under the footnotes. It has been argued that, during his overseas visit and study in Germany during 1920s, the school of phenomenology actually attracts Kuki very much attention. But why choosing the phenomenological method but not neo-Kantian ? The phenomenological method promises the thinker to approach the studied phenomenon as it is originally in itself, “To the things themselves”. In a similar vein, Kuki believes that, philosophy should be the discipline that achieves “comprehending the reality as it is”.5 As he claims that, “one must grasp the living form of it [phenomenon], as it is, without altering its actual concreteness.”6 From the past tradition, a major way of thinking in philosophy tends to grasp its studied object by abstraction and generalization, which is the process of elevation from particular experiences and phenomena to a concept or idea. However, Kuki gradually recognized that, facilitated by the phenomenological study in Husserl and Heidegger, the end product after theorization and idealization is being achieved at the cost of depriving the primordial condition of the “lived experience”, and totally neglecting the ontological context already embedded in the phenomenon. By theoretical abstraction to the level of the highest general level, as forming an ultimate definition or a metaphysical principle, whereas the essence of the studied object is being grasped successfully within the intellectual realm, but the experience has actually alienated from its original context which is supplying continuously the possibilities of meaning. As Kuki points out, the experience of iki could not be defined as a mathematical idea or be theorized to an ultimate definition, rather its intrinsic nature and structure shows that, Kuki has demonstrated fully, iki experience constitutes a very peculiar cultural phenomenon in the Asian tradition.

4 Ibid., p. 30. 5 Ibid., p. 18. 6 Ibid., p. 30.

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Culture and History – Phenomenon and Experience

It is no doubt that, Wilhelm Dilthey is the indispensable thinker for making the revolutionary breakthrough about studying culture and history.7 Preoccupied with a renewal inquiry on the peculiar nature of cultural and historical phenomenon, Dilthey keeps struggling for a different method for human science and then prepares a pathway towards how to study the living movement of human life.8 Even before the rising up of phenomenology, Dilthey has long stressed, historical phenomenon and experience could not be studied through natural scientific method. Scientific study attempts to generate the objective result by abstraction from different experiences. But the living movement of human life, constituting the peculiar structure, is deeply embedded within the life-world, and thus must be vaporized after the process of generalization. In this sense, although Kuki has made no explicit reference to Dilthey’s study on history, he would accept that iki as a cultural phenomenon is not the experience of physical properties or objects in the outside world. Of course, Kuki has finally chosen Heidegger and not Dilthey as his mentor in the exploration of iki, but we cannot ignore the fact that, Heidegger himself has inherited a great debt from Dilthey in forming his major ideas. The traces of influence have been obviously documented in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses, especially in 1920, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.9 In this lecture course, those Diltheys’ key concepts, such as “lived experience”, “life experience”, “nexus of influences”, “significance”, and “facticity”, have been incorporated effectively into Heidegger’s charismatic wording and thinking.10 The notions of “life experience”, “facticity” and “lived experience” are mostly relevant to our present discussion on Kuki’s study. We believe that Dilthey’s perspective would shed some lights on understanding Kuki’s intricate reception of Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy. Kuki may agree that, the experience of iki as a significant and complex cultural phenomenon is in fact constituted by the meaningful human practices within certain social – historical setting of the life world. In other words, this particular cultural phenomenon can help us disclose the most concrete “lived experience” in the world. Hence cultural and historical 7 Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 3–4. 8 Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, p. 93. 9 Heidegger, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.: theory of philosophical concept formation, trans. by Tracy Colony (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 2010). 10 Rudolf Makkreel, “The genesis of Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics and the rediscovered ‘Aristotle Introduction’ of 1922,” Man and World, 23, 1990. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. & revised by J.Weinsheimer and D.G.Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994).

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phenomenon actually reflects different modes of living (being) of human being with respect to his social actions. Moreover, all meaningful human actions involve a structure of experience that it is not regulated merely and explained sufficiently by the physical law, rather it must intrinsically possess a dimension of the movement of life. The living movement is, in Kuki’s word “the living form” or the “structure”, the defining characteristics of human life, and in this sense, it can disclose the fundamental structure for understanding human action. And such an understanding is, later called as hermeneutics, connected to the fact that, the human agent has already had a pre-reflective inner relationship with this primordial living movement. On the contrary, it has been argued to study the phenomenon of human life by the method of objectification, the subject matter (reality) being grasped can be only in a derivative sense, more or less departing from the primordial condition. This objectifying catching of the subject matter is obviously a ‘re-catching’, an understanding forming after objectifying intervention, and which can be obtained successfully under the presupposition of “subject and object” dichotomy. In this sense, Gadamer points out very precisely the complex of this problem, the concept of “facticity” that human life is characterized could not be assessed by a traditional philosophical method. Gadamer clearly states that, “Facticity is obviously that which cannot be clarified, that which resists any attempt to attain transparency of understanding. Thus it becomes clear that in every understanding there remains something unexplained.”11 In this regard, Heidegger has to develop a different method to investigate the facticity of human life, which is announced in one of his early Freiburg’s lectures, the hermeneutics approach.12 To be sure, Heidegger does not conceive Dilthey’s exploration has attained the faithful description of grasping “facticity” and “lived experience”. Since Dilthey had been continuously shifting his focus between pursuing the ideal of strict objective science and grasping the historicity of human life, he eventually provided no sufficient account of the structure of facticity and historicity.13 The inherent difficulty in Dilthey’s philosophy implies that, Heidegger should find himself a better way, and phenomenological method would be an available alternative. Hence, hermeneutics has to be transformed by phenomenology.14 Both the difficulty about the effective explanation and the reconsideration of an appropriate method contribute a significant background to reconstruct a full 11 Gadamer, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person, Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 33, 2000, p. 281. 12 Heidegger, Ontology – the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. by John van Buren, (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1999). 13 Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans. & revised by J.Weinsheimer and D.G.Marshall, p. 231. 14 Heidegger, Ontology – the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren, p. 53ff.

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picture of the development of young Heidegger’ thinking. With the help of clarification of this intellectual background about Heidegger, we may probably deduce that, Heidegger careful deliberation during this period has produced a great impact on Kuki’s final determination of method in his masterpiece. And, it is no exaggeration to state that, Heidegger’s early thinking implants an innovative spirit into the approach Kuki has chosen as the concluding voice. Indeed, Fujita Masakatsu has clearly indicated that how Heidegger enduring concern on method comes to be influential to the “turning” direction of Kuki’s methodology.15 Roughly speaking, it is reasonable to conceive Kuki’s analysis as a phenomenological attempt to disclose Japanese cultural phenomenon and to disclose the ethnic existence. In this sense, it must be conceded that this is one of the first “official” immigrations of the discipline of phenomenology into a nonEuropean country.

3.

Phenomenology: Why Heidegger than Husserl?

In concluding his overall investigation, Kuki explains to us, “Thus, the structure of iki cannot be understood merely in terms of its natural and artistic form. Contrarily, objective form can only come to life and be comprehended by transferring the meaning of iki obtained from individual or social experiences of meaning. We can only begin to understand the structure of iki by asking the quis ‘who’ question first. That is done through immersing oneself in the phenomenon of consciousness. That done, then we can ask the quid ‘what’ question when we come into contact with objective expression.”16 Scholar who is familiar with Heidegger’s concept would not neglect the true connotation behind Kuki’s such presentation, in which the typical Heideggerian style of questioning clearly indicates how the author is going to proceed his exploration.17 Why Heidegger’s thinking and formulation attracts Kuki so much? What does the method Heidegger choose to be? Why this method is a better way (‘who’ question)? What is the major concern in grasping the peculiar meaning by individual experience? How do these considerations influence on Kuki study of iki? Reviewing Heidegger’s major study in 1920s, we soon discover that, the tradition of philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie) has made a significant impact on his thinking. With its inspiration, Heidegger attempts to draw a tight connection between meaning of life and philosophical thinking. The ultimate concern of 15 See The Structure of iki (《「粹」的構造》), Chinese translation, pp. 134–137. 16 Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara, p. 190. 17 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh ( Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1996), §9, §12, §25.

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philosophy is to capture the reality (facticity) of life, rather than become the amusement to satisfy intellectual curiosity.18 As a result, Heidegger gradually finds that those conceptual generalization and analysis must have its limitation and cannot extend to be the appropriate method for studying ‘life’ phenomenon. Trained up with Husserl’s phenomenological analyses, Heidegger applies this penetrative method, phenomenological “seeing” something as it is originally as itself and without affected by any presupposition, to his newly chosen target, first to the movement of life (Dasein’s existence), then to the meaning of Being (the question of the meaning of being). However, Heidegger discerns before long that Husserl’s reflective method and his entire transcendental programme have failed to maintain the phenomenological motto, “zu die Sache selbst”. Even in this earlier stage, before publishing the monumental work, Being and Time, Heidegger has delivered severe critique on Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. But confronting Husserl by person, Heidegger seems to put all his firing under cover. From this intra-family debate with Husserl, it is not hard to see the real intention that, Heidegger is trying to formulate his own thinking by critically differentiating himself from his great master. Exactly in one of his early Freiburg’s lecture cources, dated 1919, Heidegger challenges the promise of the achievement of Husserl’s “reflection” and “reduction”, and convinces us that the intervention of “reflection” must transmute human lived experience into the form of “unliving” (Entleben) object.19 In Heidegger’s understanding, Dasein (human existence) cannot, as Husserl believes, direct its reflection and reduction so far as to arbitrarily make free choice, and to as freely execute the method of reflection to look at oneself to achieve selfunderstanding. Rather, the original lived experience of human factical life indicates that, Dasein has always already embedded into history and world, in which, Dasein can disclose its mode of existence of its ownmost being in the prereflective way. Hence, the concepts of “facticity” and “historicity” can more faithfully describe the original life movement, and exactly indicate the undeniable finite character of Dasein. However, these controversies between Heidegger and Husserl could not be settled in a simple way, it may require us to go through a short history of 18 It is the prior concern of Heidegger’s 1920 lecture. Heidegger, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.: theory of philosophical concept formation, trans. by Tracy Colony (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 2010), pp. 8–20. 19 Heidegger points out, “Thus, in reflection we are theoretically orientated. All theoretical comportment, we said, is de-vivifying (Entleben). This now shows itself in the case of lifeexperiences, for in reflection they are no longer lived but looked at. We set the experiences out before us out of the immediacy of experience. We intrude so to speak into the flowing steam of experiences and pull one or more of them out, which means that we ‘still the stream’ ”, The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview, trans. by Ted Sadler (London: Athlone Press, 2000), pp. 84–85.

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phenomenology. Scholars have argued recently that, though Heidegger chooses different terms than Husserl’s notion of “reflection” and “intuition” to elucidate his own method and also emphases its non-reflective character, his method, expressed as “hermeneutical understanding” or “hermeneutical intuition”, is still a certain form of reflection.20 Without affording to make an objective judgment about the debate, for our present concern, we intend to delineate how Heidegger’s change in method has given impact to Kuki’s reformulating his methodology. First and foremost, Heidegger’s dissidence towards Husserl almost reflects directly in the content and in the basic orientation of Kuki’s study. The opening chapter shows that the quarrel between German comrades undoubtedly lurks behind Kuki’s frame of mind, “Even if we were to engage in what is referred to as Ideation in the possible by freely making changes to a phenomenon, the being of which is ethnically and historically determined, we would only gain in the end abstract general concepts containing that phenomenon as a part. The important thing … is that one must grasp the living form of it, as it is, without altering its actual concreteness.”21 This evaluation shows, Kuki may adopt the reasoning Heidegger has used against Husserl’s method of “ideation” or “intuition”. And the footnote immediately follows this sentence clearly indicates that, Kuki regards Husserl’s approach as unsuccessful, which merely replaces the reality, “the living form”, with the abstract concepts at the cost of depriving the condition of concreteness. Obviously, Kuki has made no direct application of “facticity” and “historicity” in his exploration. He however emphasizes unceasingly the aspects of “concreteness” and “existence” of the experience of iki. And it is not difficult to discover there is a magnetic linkage between Kuki’s notions and Heidegger’s conception. Probably, Kuki tends to absorb Heidegger’s facticity (Faktizität) and historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) in a similar vein that, these two concepts can more faithfully describe the living form of iki, more precisely, its existential structure. In fact, this structure has closely embraced with the action of human agent, Kuki calls as “consciousness”, and thus cannot be grasped by “eidetic intuition”. This may explain why Kuki insists that, “we cannot attempt to ‘intuit the essence’ of iki, that is, treat it as a specific concept and attempt to discover abstract universals among general concepts that subsume iki,” and further important is, “before questioning the essential of iki, we should instead question first the existentia of iki.”22 20 Dan Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 96–98. Steven Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), pp. 137–139. 21 Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara, p. 30. 22 Ibid., p. 32.

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Heidegger’s Method – Formal Indication (formale Anzeige) as the ‘new way’ Assuming himself the duty of finding a way to avoid Husserl’s distraction from the original movement of life, Heidegger seeks for a different path to enter to the subject matter (die Sache). In his most creative young Freiburg year, Heidegger forms his revolutionary idea into one stunning concept, “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).23 And, by relying on this concept, he gradually finish the framework of his later programme, the presentation of Dasein’s analytic and the investigation of the question of the meaning of Being. As early as 1920, in the lecture course named as Introduction to the phenomenology of religion, Heidegger provides us the first lengthy illustration of the idea of “formal indication.”24 After continuous examinations of the problem of formation of “philosophical concept”, Heidegger is trying to determine the nature of philosophical thinking through one deed, the effort to clarify the demarcation between formalization and generalization.25 Heidegger explains that “formalization”, not “generalization” (genus, species), is the kind of thinking that could be incorporated to the discipline of phenomenology.26 By asking the nature of “phenomenology”, Heidegger relates the matter to “formal indication”. As he states, “What is phenomenology? What is phenomenon? Here this can be itself indicated only formally. Each experience – as experiencing, and what is experienced – can be taken in the phenomenon”, and “Why is it called “formal”? The formal is something relational (bezug).” Heidegger has27contended that, it is the important task for phenomenology not to conflate the relational sense (Bezugssinn) with the sense of the content (Gehaltssinn), and to analyse how the experience or object is being perceived. In other words, for phenomenology, 23 Many scholars have sufficiently noticed “formal indication” as a significant approach to assess the pre-reflective existence of human life, Dasein. Among them, several are of the most relevant to our present discussion. Otto Pöggeler, Heidegger Path of Thinking (NJ, Atlantic: Humanities Press, 1987), pp. 218–221. Rodolf Makkreel, The genesis of Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics and the rediscovered “Aristotle introduction” of 1922, Man and World, 23, 1990, pp. 308–317. Daniel Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical concepts as Formal indications, Review of metaphysics, 47, 1994, pp. 779–790. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 164–170. John van Buren, The Ethics of Formale Anzeige in Heidegger, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXIX, no.2, 1995, p. 158ff. Theodore Kisiel , The Genetic Difference in Reading Being and Time, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXIX, no.2, 1995, p. 173ff. Ryan Streeter, Heidegger’s formal indication: a question of method in Being and Time, Man and World, 30, 1997, p. 414ff. 24 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. by Matthias Fritsch & Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2004), p. 42. 25 Ibid., p. 39. 26 Ibid., p. 40. 27 Ibid., p. 43.

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“how does the object appear to the subject”, “how is the object being given” means to grasp the “relational sense” of the phenomenon. Concisely, while the relational sense is related to the question of “how”, that is, how one conceives that and how that is being experienced, the content sense is the cognitive knowledge first determined by the direction of the “how”. Later in his lecture course about Aristotle’s interpretation, while succinctly discerning the proper condition of philosophical thinking and analysis, Heidegger explicates once more the conception of “formal indication.” In his word, it is a radical and also fundamental task for philosopher in determining the “definition” of philosophy. Any true sense of definition of philosophy, under the perspective of phenomenological method, can only be “formally indicative”. Heidegger explains the initial character of “formally” that, “In order to grasp the sense fully, what is needed is a radical interpretation of the “formal” itself … the opposite is not the “material”, the accidental content. Nor is formal the same as the eidetic, and the use of that term, in the sense of universal generality, is altogether problematic in phenomenology. Formal refers to a way of “approach” toward actualizing the maturation of an original fulfilment of what is indicated.”28 In order to avoid confusing the sense of “formal” with the traditional understanding of universal and eidetic notion, including Husserl’s “ideation”, it is necessary to specify that, this “formal” sense is not derived from the concrete experiences or the material aspects through the process of theoretical abstraction. The simple example of “formalization” would be, “this something is an object”, the conception of object is not achieved by the process of generalization. As we have found in the tradition of western philosophy, the common practice of searching for a general definition across different objects and experiences under the guidance of the question of “what is X”.29 On the contrary, Heidegger points out two different ideas immediately related to “formal indication”. First, he claims that, “ “Indicated” here means that that which is said is of the character of the “formal”, and so is admittedly improper. Yet precisely in this “im-” there resides at the same time a positive reference. The empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides direction toward the actualization.”30 Second, almost the same period as the lecture course, Heidegger publishes a review article, in which except the comments on Karl Jasper’s Psychology of Worldview, he simultaneously exhibits many of his own developed conceptions. While reviewing Jasper’s book on psychology, Heidegger states that, “the object actually investigated in Jasper’s 28 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, p. 27. 29 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. by Matthias Fritsch & Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, p. 43. 30 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz, p. 26.

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work can be defined in formal indication as our existence.”31 In a later section, we will further explore these two vital conceptions. Before gleaning further from the details of Heidegger’s elaborations, it is helpful to outline a basic connection between the concept of “formal indication” and Kuki’s concern on method. The attempt to analyse the phenomenon and experience of human life can hardly be done with theoretical generalization, even including the application of Husserl’s method of ideation. Because the historical movement and the concreteness of human existence, the mode of human ‘being’ will be distorted by abstraction, and thus could only be assessed through the “formal indicative” way. And, this may be the most important idea Kuki closely follows Heidegger’s thinking and has adopted in his exploration of the experience and existence of the phenomenon of iki. It may argue that it is not the right historical moment Kuki comes under the direct influence of Heidegger. Historical evidence shows that, Kuki begins his phenomenological study under Heidegger not until 1927. But on the one hand, in fact, Kuki has already studied and deeply impressed by the early thought of Heidegger through the intensive review by another great Japanese thinker32, Tanabe Hajime.33 Tanabe Hajime has studied with Heidegger during 1922 to 1923, and has attended the lecture course, Ontology – hermeneutics of facticity. His published review article in 1924 indicates a highly acceptance and confirmation of young Heidegger’s hermeneutic philosophy.34 On the other hand, even it is true that, Kuki personally starts his study with Heidegger in the late 1927, and the fact that, the publication of Being and Time in the same year would have suggested a much stronger influence on his thinking during comprising the iki work than other works. However, we should hardly ignore that, there is a very close connection of the major theme of thinking, hermeneutics of Dasein and understanding of Being (Seinsverstandis), and a continuity of the peculiar method, holding between early Freiburg lecture’s courses and the final work of Being and Time. It is not unreasonable even to conclude that, Being and Time is an “indirect” but effective trial to show how “formal indication” could be employed to provide an explication of the existence (facticity) of human life.35

31 Heidegger, Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 9. 32 Thanks to Fujita Masakatsu detailed scholarship in noticing this impact of Tanabe Hajime’s review article on Kuki’s study of iki. See The Structure of iki, Chinese translation, pp. 133–36. 33 H. Gene Blocker, Christopher Starling, Japanese Philosophy (New York: State University of New York, 2001), pp. 147–149. 34 See Fujita Masakatsu’s commentaries in, The Structure of iki, Chinese translation, pp. 134–35. 35 Similar idea can be found in Otto Pöggeler, Heidegger Path of Thinking, p. 220; and Kisiel, The Genetic Difference in Reading Being and Time, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXIX, no.2, 1995, pp. 173–177.

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Resistance and Transform

Heidegger argues that, “The indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon – in the negative sense, however, the same as if to warn! … One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning is originally theoretical.”36 We may question why and what we have to prevent? “Formal indication” is the exact practice to prevent any attempt to direct our attention merely to the cognitive content of the phenomenon, and therefore neglect the more primordial dimension that constitutes the being of the object. This idea directly recalls the discussion about the reason for putting ‘the question of how’ before ‘the whatness’. The cognitive content of the object is acquired by the process of generalization. But its success must shed those concrete situations embedded with the object, and this tendency has once dominated the tradition of western thinking. Indeed, there is an unclarified presupposition that makes such concept formation and the acquisition of the cognitive content to be possible. From the phenomenological perspective, we may find immediately that, the generalized result or eidetic concept has been grounded on the separation, cutting the original connection about how a concrete experience is related to a particular “horizon” (Horizont), which embraces the way the subject perceives the object and simultaneously refers the object to the relevant explaining context. Furthermore, phenomenology shows us the picture that, the relationship between the object that appears to us and its referential context (the world) explicates the hidden reality of the phenomenon, in which a dynamic interplay of presence and absence has been constituting the meaning of its being. Though Kuki has hardly elaborated his idea with the abovementioned details, the similar line of thinking seems to determine his direction of study. Kuki points out that, “Because they first analysed objective expressions of iki and then sought general characteristics from this domain, they have failed to grasp the ethnic specificity of iki. Further, having once obtained an understanding of objective expression, they erroneously assumed as well that they had obtained a comprehension of the phenomenon of consciousness. Thus, the explanation of iki as a comprehension of consciousness has tended to be abstract and eidetic, and scholars have not been able to explain, concretely and hermeneutically its mode of being determined both ethnically and historically.”37 This continuous emphasis on the relative importance of the concreteness in understanding the phenomenon of iki has sufficiently indicated Kuki has a similar phenomenological awareness. And by putting his sense of concreteness into the phenom-

36 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. by Matthias Fritsch & Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, p. 44. 37 Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara, p. 32.

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enological elaboration, Kuki’s analysis could yield a more fruitful explanation to the phenomenon. Nevertheless, we find that Kuki’s understanding of phenomenology not only could be recognized in the initial conception in the preface, but also be discerned in his insisting on the un-reducibility of the correlation character between the consciousness and the phenomenon, which is to prevent the relational sense to be distorted. In the consideration of the intensional feature of the phenomenon of iki, Kuki discovers the coquetry (bitai) to be the most deterministic, and reminds that not to let the coquetry be disappeared by reducing the reciprocal dimension into a single side, “Let us say that coquetry is a dualistic attitude; that it puts a person of the opposite sex in opposition to the monistic self; and that it posits a possible relationship between that person and the self. … For that reason, the main concern of coquetry – and the essence of pleasure – is maintaining a dualistic relationship; that is to say, protecting the possibility as a possibility.”38 Then, the question is, how can one protect this dualistic relationship in the most effective way? Kuki further explains the vitality of “pride and honour” (ikiji) to the strength of “coquetry” that, “the second distinguishing characteristic, ikiji, represents the strong state of mind brought about by idealism. The state of mind brings increased tension and endurance to the dualistic possibility of coquetry; it also attempts to maintain the possibility as a possibility … ikiji reinforces the existentia of coquetry”.39 The operation of ikiji is to resist any one-sided assimilation by rejecting the complete taking over by the opposite sex. The agent concerned not only shows his/ her pride and honour, but also maintains the dialectical distance for the dualistic relationship not to be suppressed into a single domination. More importantly, Kuki’s analysis suggests to us that, bitai and ikiji are not just subjective attitudes, they exhibit a possible way of life, a way of existence, which concerns not ‘what the content’, but how we experience our life. In his careful demarcation between several related but different conditions about the constitution of iki, Kuki points out that “the living form” of iki and its existence could be vanished without noticing. People easily misunderstand and forget the intrinsic condition of the being of iki, and it is therefore highly difficult to maintain the middle ground, the space allowing the interplay between two opposite poles. Warning against becoming too close is a valuable method, and it can become in turn an indirect affirmation or protection of the living form (the life movement) of the existence of iki. Indeed, in this context of warning, Kuki’s several trials of clarifying between those related concepts revolving around the experi38 Ibid., p. 42. 39 Ibid., p. 50.

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ence of iki could be considered as a kind of historical destruction.40 As a whole, the different elements are combined organically to represent the peculiar form of being of human existence, and for this kind of existence, Kuki believes that constitutes the particular Japanese ethnic being. b)

Occasional Expression and Formal Indication

Experiencing a deeply attraction to Husserl’s Logical Investigations during the early Freiburg period, Heidegger undoubtedly concedes the work as a groundbreaking study in phenomenology. Heidegger has actually found one vital concept, the “occasional expression”,41 so much inspiring as to incorporating promptly into his reformulation of philosophical concept, by which the hermeneutics of Dasein could begin from the right track. “Occasional expression” is characterised as the expression that constitutes its meaning necessarily with reference to the articulator’s practical situation and using context. Rather than something that has been substantial and concrete, occasional expression is merely formal or indexical in the sense that, its meaning is being fulfilled with respect to different occasions. After contrasting with the non-occasional “objective expression”,42 Husserl introduced that, “we call an expression essential subjective and occasional, or, more briefly, essentially occasional, if it belongs to a conceptually unified group of possible meanings, in whose case it is essential to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation”.43 Occasional expression may include: indexical terms, “here”, “there”, “above”, “later”, “now”; demonstratives, “this”, “that”; personal pronoun, “you are”, “I am”, and etc.44 All these articulations show their incomplete and directional character, that they “formally” order the possible way of attaining their concrete meaning. They are fundamentally subjective, situational and temporal (historical) relative in which the receiver could only obtain a roughly or formally indicated message. In this sense, occasional expression simply delivers a content-empty intending

40 Ibid., p. 69. 41 Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, First Investigation: Meaning and Expression, §26–§27, translated by J.N.Findly (London: Routledge & Paul, 1970). 42 Husserl explains, “We shall call an expression objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one’s attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance. … … Among objective expressions we have, e.g., all expressions in theory, expressions out of which the principles and theorems, the proofs and theories of the ‘abstract’ science are made up.” Logical Investigations. Vol.1. translated by J.N.Findly, pp. 314–315. 43 Husserl, Logical Investigations. Vol. 1, p. 315ff. 44 Husserl, Logical Investigations. Vol. 1, pp. 315–318. Ryan Streeter (1997), pp. 422–423. Kisiel (1995), pp. 175–176. John van Buren (1995), p. 161.

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action, and the completion of meaning has to require the receiver’s action according to its relative occasions. Husserl further discussed one special form of occasional expression, which is more ambiguous or incomplete and formally in signalling its meaning. He pointed at some impersonal expressions, like “There is …”, “It is …”, and suggested that, “No one would understand the sentence ‘There are cakes’ as he understands the mathematical sentence ‘There are regular solids’. In the first case we do not mean that cakes exist absolutely and in general, but that there are cakes here and now – for coffee. ‘It is raining’, likewise, does not have the general meaning that rain is falling, but that it is doing so now, outside”.45 In such cases, it is more than obvious, that nothing intends to be generalized from the experience, we do not aim at grasping the object in general or the situation as such. Rather, the immediacy largely falls onto the indicated side, the ambiguity of its meaning could only be resolved until the action of the receiver. It is not difficult to understand why these elements in Logical Investigations Heidegger considers the most productive for his prior concern, finding a proper method of grasping the living form of human existence. From the background of Husserl’s elaboration of occasional expression, we can simply discover the underlying logic, the phenomenological reasoning to explain Heidegger’s various attempts to formulate “formal indicative” concepts.46 The meaning of this expression is constituted from both aspects of the ‘said’ (indicating) and of the ‘unsaid’ (indicated), but the latter part containing a variety of vague and incomplete possibilities which demands the receiver himself to fill up (vollziehen). That is, an important part of the meaning is never completely present at the very moment of indicating, that leaves a space for fulfilment (Vollzug). Moreover, in answering the question of “the who is Dasein”, Heidegger connects “formal indication” to the explication of human existence, “The “I” must be understood only in the sense of a noncommittal formal indication of something which perhaps reveals itself in the actual phenomenal context of being as that being’s “opposite.””47 The phenomenon and being of human life is, for Heidegger, characterised as ex-sistence, something that is ever reaching out, standing out of himself, and therefore can not be obtained in the objective expression. The being of life shows itself in a variety of ways with respect to different situations, and no one can exhaust all the possibilities by the actuality beforehand. After the whole elucidation of the phenomenon, Kuki explains, in the concluding chapter, his overall assessment of the validity of concepts, “… appreci45 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, §27, p. 319. 46 In the earlier stage, “fate”, “ruinance”, “caring”, and later in Being and Time, “conscience”, “death”, “care”. 47 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, p. 109.

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ation of iki must be based on a sens intime, an “intimate sense” in the truest sense of the word. The abstract conceptual moments reached through analysis merely point to several aspects of concrete iki. … Bitai (coquetry), ikiji (pride and honour), and akirame (resignation) are not parts of iki per se, they are no more than its conceptual moments …”48 Kuki reminds the reader those concepts can most probably “merely point to” the being of iki. This restriction does not reflect merely the limitation of the validity about applying concepts to the entire study, but illustrates a positive function of such “conceptual moments”. As Kuki himself believes, the conceptual analysis “can only be a simple causa occasionalis”, she/ he has to experience in an “intimate sense”. Under the logic of phenomenological interpretation, the concepts formally indicate some possible directions that must require the attention to the happening situation and invite receiver to fulfill (vollziehen) its concrete meaning. Hence, Bitai and ikiji do not signify a general concept or universal definition that has exhausted the concrete experience (the sense of existence) of iki. Rather they are to point out what possible way of one’s life to be realized, first in the relationship between two sexes, and in the wider context about subject and the world. Therefore, the sense of fulfillment (Vollzugssinn) of iki cannot be fully assessed by the form of objectification, resulted in the essences and universal concepts, the concreteness and its factical being request a pre-objectified approach, that is, “formal indication”. The experience of iki actually represents the being of one’s life corresponding with a particular occasion and situation (world), and that also signifies a factical relationship between one’s consciousness and the world. In other words, the conceptual moments of iki is a kind of occasional expression which could point to the inexplicit dimension embracing the relational sense of one’s existence, or at least has disclosed some vital aspects of the existential condition of life. The preceding discussion has shown that the formal indication or occasional expression can point out the possible practical direction. Yet the immediate problem is, how can the receiver be possible to follow the direction, if its meaning is always incomplete and vague in character. In fact, before the receiver takes any theoretical attitude, whether scientific or metaphysical, she/ he must have ‘always already’ (immer schon) known about her life (sense of being) and have engaged within the living situation. To use a fundamental idea in Being and Time, Heidegger notices that “care” (Sorge) formally indicates the mode of being of Dasein, in which there is the unthematic correlation already between subject and the world. Life is “care”, but care about what? Heidegger explains, whereas we tend to take care of this or that object for practical purpose, the care about oneself (being) is the most fundamental. Care is always a self-care, it is both the means and the end. In this existential condition, Dasein has already possessed a pre48 Kuki Shuzo, The Structure of iki, trans.by Hiroshi Nara, p. 186.

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understanding about one’s being, no matter whether it is under the authentic or the inauthentic moment. It is owning to this fore-having (Vorhaben/ Vorgegeben) construction of the being of one’s life, she/ he could more or less respond to the merely formal indicative direction, and be signified to fulfil (vollziehen) its concreteness with respect to different occasions. In other words, though the indicated direction of the expression is just a formal-empty way, the expression itself has actually recalled from one’s existence something already familiar to life, perhaps sometimes too close to us, in which, the receiver can appropriate for himself in a renewal action. For this discussion about the problem of self-explication, one Kuki’s passage should be taken seriously. Taking his work as a whole into consideration, the conception represented does not seem to suddenly happen to Kuki, rather, it must be a thoughtful deliberation. Contrarily, the conception could reflect an enduring influence of Heidegger hermeneutic phenomenology which has been continuously operating in Kuki’s frame of mind. At the closing section of the conclusion chapter, Kuki elaborates that, “Although iki as a meaningful experience exists in the uniqueness of the determinants of the ethnic being of the Japanese people, all too often we encounter mere ghosts of iki where it has decayed into the abstract, eidetic world of nothingness … But we must not be led astray by flatus vocis exchanged between ready-made general concepts. When we encounter these illusions, we must recall “what our soul once saw” in its concrete and factical being. This recollection is none other than the horizon that makes us recognize hermeneutically once more that iki is ours. … … not consigning our spiritual culture to oblivion.”49 It is truly a delicate and meaningful revision on his own work. And, the way to re-capture the factical being of iki is designated as “recollection”. If we have not already known the sense of one’s being in a certain way, and if we have not carried in ourselves the possibility of pre-understanding, nothing would be recollected to our awareness. It must be admitted that, we may understand nothing about iki even equipped with the concepts, if not “iki already lies at our disposal as an experience of meaning.”50 But it should be careful not to confuse Kuki’s idea as to identifying with that of “Platonic realist”. The recollection51 is not to awaken some a priori and determinate universal eidos, eidetic concepts, but to arouse our attention to the formal and indeterminate sense of being, our existential possibility (Seinkönnen). Putting into a phenomenological perspective, recollection is not just a theoretical activity, a contemplation (theoria), that calls up something in the mind. Instead, it is calling our 49 Ibid., p. 198. 50 Ibid., p. 186. 51 Ibid., p. 198.

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attention to something we have long forgotten, our possible ways of being of life, more precisely, how one lives his life, how one relates to others and to the world. In short, the task is to un-cover the original structure of the pre-understanding, as well as to re-vivfy the formally indicated possibility. In this regard, through recollection of Bitai (coquetry), ikiji (pride and honour), and akirame (resignation), one has got some significant but formal directions of the relational sense of being. The full meaning of one’s being is still not being achieved. Only if one actualize the possibilities in his occasion and situation, can the meaning of being bring forth sufficiently. Thus, it is not surprising that, Kuki has continuously remarked, one must acquire the true sense of being of iki by appropriating his “inner sense”, and to be sure, it is not being experienced in his mind but experienced in one’s life.52 As Kuki has highlighted, the recollection supports us with a horizon for understanding, and yet the recollection does not found itself arbitrarily, rather it is regulated already by “what our soul once saw”. Here, understanding does not belong to the category of epistemological activity, which makes general concept from theoretical ideation and objectification. Understanding is, in the strict sense, a repetitive action that aims to bring out anew what one’s already ‘having’ in being. Both Heidegger and Kuki contend that, hermeneutic understanding is a sole method (methodos) to reiterate (nach-vollziehen) or retrieve (widerholen) what something have always already been in one’s being. As is well known, hermeneutic action always runs its path in a circle, between backward and forward, something between familiar and strange.

52 Ibid., p. 188.

¯ tani University, Japan) Yosuke Takehana (O

The Logic of the Transcendence of Life. Tanabe’s Theory of “World Schema” and Miki’s “Logic of the Imagination”

The purpose of this paper is to consider Tanabe Hajime’s (田辺元 1885–1962) theory of “world schema” (世界図式) and Miki Kiyoshi’s (三木清 1897–1945) “logic of the imagination” (構想力の論理) as attempts to explore a connection between logic and life, namely as “logic of life”. It may seem strange to make a comparison between the philosophy of Tanabe and that of Miki given that it is not necessarily easy to find a direct link between them, and that their philosophical styles are quite different. Nevertheless, if we think of Tanabe as having investigated the possibility of mediating between irrational life and logic in his essays “logic of the species” (種の論理), and that the aim of Miki’s Logic of Imagination was to achieve a unification of pathos and logos, it is possible to describe the philosophies of both thinkers as attempts at a “logic of life”. Of course, the act of questioning into the connection between life and logic, which are commonly thought to be entirely different in nature from each other, is not something unique to these philosophers. In fact, this question could be regarded rather as a common motif shared by Japanese philosophers in the 1930s. For example, we can also understand Nishida’s later philosophy as a development of such a conception. It is well known that his philosophy is aimed at comprehending a logical structure of this concrete and real world we live in with unique concepts such as the “historical body” (歴史的身体) or “active intuition” (行為的直観). His interest is explicitly expressed in the title of his essay “Logic and Life” (「論理と生命」) in 1936. To be sure, the motif of unifying life and logic is continuous throughout his thought, as is clearly shown in the fact that he regards as “the necessity of contemporary philosophy”1 the unification of the Neo-Kantian standpoint of Heinrich Rickert and the Henri Bergson’s philosophy in the Preface of Thinking and Experience (「思索と体験」, 1914). What is characteristic here, though, is that this motif is the one problematized in a social and historical dimension. This shift mainly results from Tanabe’s criticism of 1 NISHIDA Kitaro, Complete Works of Nishida Kitaro『西田幾多郎全集』, vol. 1, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965, p. 203.

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Nishida for lacking the principle of history and Miki’s discussion about Karl Marx. Yet it is not only because Tanabe and Miki begin to deal with the problem of society or history prior to Nishida that we consider life and logic on a parallel between both philosophies. When the opposition between life and logic is investigated as the unification of a “logic of life,” there must be a reconsideration in some way about what is originally logical. In other words, as long as the “logic of life” is sought, its “logic” is no longer the rules of thinking, which are independent of as well as indifferent to reality itself, or the frames of concepts, which rationalize reality but at the same time leave life as the irrationalized rest beyond the rationalizing subject. The significance of the idea a “logic of life”, we believe, must be measured not only in how close the structure it presents can be to reality itself but also in how intensely it attempts to redefine the meaning of logic. Nishida, Tanabe and Miki’s logics are all remarkable in their intensiveness, and, among them, Tanabe and Miki are similar in the sense that both discover in Kant a clue as to how it is possible that logic and life are interrelated through Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik], 1929). This is a remarkable feature which we can never find in Nishida’s philosophy. Moreover, both attempts are also akin in understanding the way the logical manifests itself in life as the structure of the transcendence of life which human beings as active and embodied existences have. It is for these reasons that we attempt a comparison between both philosophies in thinking the problem of life and logic. How do the two philosophers reflect the logical in the transcendence of human existence, and what is the “logic of life” they think of ? Let us examine this in more detail below.

1.

Life as a Social Body

To begin with, it needs to be clarified what is meant by “life” when it is claimed that the philosophies of Tanabe and Miki can be described using the term “logic of life”. It means, of course, life as a philosophical concept used by the so-called philosophers of life (Leben) such as Dilthey, Bergson and Simmel. However, given that the “tradition” of Lebensphilosophie lacks the relative unity of approach found in phenomenology or neo-Kantianism, it is quite difficult to attach one definition to the concept of “life” these philosophers speak of, except something which is generally described as immediate, irrational, and fluid. Nevertheless, the notion of life in Tanabe and Miki has a common characteristic in that they attempt to understand it as “communal life”, so to speak, connected through the body rather than that of the individual experience or stream of consciousness.

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For Tanabe, the body with which he is concerned is not the body as physical object in space. Rather, it is that ground from which such a natural scientific understanding emerges to begin with. It is in this sense that Tanabe states: “Embodiment (身体性), in which the body becomes a true body, is first formed within the noetic body (ノエシス的の身体); that body which cannot simply be reduced to an exterior object of our consciousness (THZ 4/370).2 From this statement, we see clearly that his fundamental standpoint lies in regarding the essence of human beings not as the consciousness or the subject of cognition but as embodied existence. What is more important is that this “noetic body” is related to the problem of human sociality. This problem is considered by Tanabe from two sides; the sociality of the physical (body) and the physicality of the social. The former means that the body is not separated from a society but it has already included some social features. The latter expresses his thought that not only individual bodies but also various communities, in which we exist, provide the basis of human beings, as can be seen in the following quotation: “the philosophical meaning of the regional bond and the kinship regarded as the connection of community can be roughly understood if we admit that the whole of communities to which human beings belong such as family, tribe, nation and humankind commonly have a basis as a body which underlies them” (THZ 4/375).

It is impossible to separate these two sides completely. For Tanabe, “the noetic body” refers to a state prior to the individualization of this or that particular body. Therefore, we can say that the “socialization of the body” and the “embodiment of the social” are ways of expressing, from different perspectives, how the individual merges with the community. As is seen in his remark: “the continuous life is nothing but the ‘species’ (種)” (THZ 6/193), life is identified as “species”, which also has the above notion of body as its concrete meaning. Miki also discusses the issue of the body in his Philosophy of History (『歴史 哲学』, 1932) at about the same time that Tanabe begins to pay attention to its significance. He presents the concept of “history as fact” (事実としての歴史) in addition to that of “history as logos” （ロゴスとしての歴史） and “history as event” (出来事としての歴史). “History as fact” precedes the history of what has occurred objectively, known as “history as event”. Coming prior, it is considered by Miki to be the meaning of the origin of history. However it is not some socalled metaphysical principle separated from reality, but the act itself forming a history. According to Miki, the difference between “event” and “fact” lies in the point that the latter is the “subjective fact” (主体的事実) while the former the 2 『田辺元全集』[Complete works of Tanabe Hajime](Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963–1964), 15 vols., cited in the text as THZ, followed by volume and page. All italics and brackets are my own.

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“objective being” (客体的存在). It is because he claims “fact” is the unobjectifiable act itself in spite of bringing the history into the existence as the “objective being” that he uses the word: “subjective.” This unobjectifiable “subjectivity”, however, does not mean the subject as a consciousness or the ego. What he emphasizes is that the act as “fact” is closely connected with the body or sensibility. This essence of “fact” is expressed in the following sentence: “The act and the thing are united” (MKZ 6/34) 3 in the “fact.” He defines “fact” as Tat-sache in contrast with Fichte’s Tathandlung and says: “it is because of its characteristic as body or sensibility that the act [Tat] has the meaning of the thing [Sache]” (MKZ 6/33). What should be questioned here is the character of the body itself when it is claimed that the thing makes it possible to distinguish the act mentioned here from that of Fichte. In his “Philosophical Anthropology” (『哲学的人間学』), which is estimated to be written intermittently from 1933 to 1937, he says about this character: “the reason why the body is formed as body, that is, embodiment, consists in the unobjectifiable body in a subjective sense” (MKZ 18/149). In this remark, we see this “subjective” body is almost the same as “the noetic body” which Tanabe understands. Furthermore, Miki clarifies the property of the body in relation to the problem of sociality as Tanabe does. In The Philosophy of History, this property is clearly conceptualized as “the social body” (社会的身 体); which means “the necessary fact that human beings connect themselves with social existence in general” (MKZ 6/37). Miki does not refer to “the social body” itself as “life” explicitly. However, if we consider that the “history of fact” formed on the basis of embodiment is paraphrased as the concept of life (MKZ 6/37), and also that this embodiment exhibits the general property of the life which is thought to be not understandable by way of objectification, it is possible to see Miki’s “social body” as being characterized by a “communal life” or “shared life” in the same way as in Tanabe’s thought.

2.

Transcendence in the Body

What kind of logic is it which emerges from such a “communal life” or “social body”? Before entering this discussion, I would like to first clarify that the concept of body as understood in Tanabe and Miki is inseparably tied to another concept: transcendence. By considering the relation of transcendence to the body we will draw closer to an understanding of what the “logic of life” is. 3 『三木清全集』[Complete works of Miki Kiyoshi](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966–1968), 19 vols., cited in the text as MKZ, followed by volume and page. All italics and brackets are my own.

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Because transcendence has diverse meanings it is necessary to understand in what sense Tanabe and Miki use this concept. As is well known, on the one hand this word is used to indicate the relation of objects to the subject observing them or the externality of the world to this subject and, on the other hand, it is used to point out a direction to the infinite that surpasses finite existence in a religious sense. In their philosophizing about the logic of human being’s social and historical existence, Tanabe and Miki do not deploy the concept of transcendence in this first sense. However, the latter sense is frequently used by both thinkers.4 With regard to the discussion about the “logic of life”, though, we need to focus attention on another meaning of transcendence altogether, namely an idea of transcendence as closely connected to the body or life. Tanabe proposes such an idea about transcendence in the form of a criticism of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in his essays “Synthesis and Transcendence” (「超越と綜合」, 1931) and “The Standpoint of Anthropology” (「人間学の立場」, 1931). In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger redefines the meaning of “transcendental” as the stance of exploring “not the beings [das Seiende] itself but the possibility of precursory understanding of being [das Sein]”5 It is in this sense which he asserts that: “transcendental knowledge concerns the exceeding (transcendence) of pure reason toward beings.”6 As can be seen from these passages, transcendence in Heidegger’s view means the “precursory understanding of Being” which makes it possible to manifest beings as beings or, simply put, the particular property or position of human existence (that Heidegger calls Dasein) among all the beings. The important point here is transcendence does not imply the relation of the subject to external things but it is rather the possibility itself of revealing the world not merely as an external objectivity but as an ordinary and concrete world. On the basis of this notion, Heidegger makes an apparently contradictory remark: “we … determine transcendence as being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] ”7 in the “On the Essence of Ground (Vom Wesen des Grundes).” However, Tanabe estimates that Heidegger’s transcendence is merely “ideal” and that he fails to consider transcendence to be not only “ideal” but also “real” (THZ 4/338–339). At first sight, his criticism seems to be made entirely within the 4 For example, the concept of “transcendent whole”(超越的全体), which Tanabe often refers to in his Hegel’s Philosophy and Dialektik (1932), can be said to have such a meaning. In Miki’s Study of Human Being in Pascal 『パスカルに於ける人間の研究』(1926), the “transcendent, which is thought to make the understanding of life (Leben) complete, is clearly expressed as “the religion which exists in much higher order than life (MKZ 1/190).” 5 Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 3, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, S. 16. 6 Ibid. 7 M. Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, S. 139.

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epistemological framework, but Tanabe does not refer to “real transcendence” (実在的超越) on the presupposition of an external world. When transcendence is described as “real”, this is to indicate that Heidegger disregards the significance of the body for human existence. According to Heidegger’s analysis of the worldhood (Weltlichkeit), all the beings appear to us primarily as something familiar to us or as something “ready to hand” (das Zuhandene) rather than something to be observed or analyzed. Tanabe admits that all beings primarily have the character of a tool, but he points out that the body, which should be considered as the nearest tool to us, nevertheless, “has another aspect in which the body cannot be interpreted as a tool that belongs to me” (THZ 4/371). This aspect of the body is, to borrow Tanabe’s phrase, “the transcendent opposition against the subject or the original negativity to this subject” (THZ 3/117). In other words, the body appears as something alienated from us or as the other opposed against us although it is the most fundamental possession of our own. It is this reality of the opposing negativity that Tanabe grasps as “real transcendence” in the body. The link between embodiment and transcendence in Miki is found in his discussion about pathos, the notion of which plays an extremely important role in his philosophy. Pathos originates from the Greek word “πάσχω” which means “suffer”, and it is commonly used to refer to an emotion of sadness and compassion. In the History of Philosophy, Miki defines pathos as a destiny in which necessity and passivity or contingency are united and holds that it belongs to the domain of “history as fact.” As has already been seen, this domain is considered as that ground itself from which “history as event” comes into existence and pathos is, therefore, not simply a passivity but activity at the same time. In his Philosophical Anthropology Miki expresses these two sides of pathos in the twin concepts of “situatedeness” (状態性) and “impulse”. Pathos is hence something characterized as transcendent, only not in the typical religious sense. Miki states in his “On Pathos” (「パトスについて」, 1933): “pathos cannot be merely passive, but subjective and active precisely because what determines pathos has the significance of embodiment and yet it is not the object or the being outside consciousness but the “subject” which is by no means regarded as an object on account of its transcending consciousness in the reverse direction” (MKZ 19/ 583).

The emphasis in this quotation is laid upon the active or “subjective” essence of pathos, but at the same time we see that Miki characterizes such “subjectivity” as transcendence. In other words, the body understood as the “subject” which does not belong to the realm of objective existence, has a relationship to consciousness which could be understood as the former transcending the latter. It could be said, in this sense, that he proposes a definition of the relation of body to human being

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differently from an ordinary realistic stance, namely not as the external transcendence to consciousness but as the transcendence to it in the inverse direction; in his words, as a “transcendence toward the interior” (内への超越) 8. Yet this “interior” does not indicate a mental state of isolated individuals. As is clearly seen from his assertion: “it is precisely because human beings are social as fact that they come to create some societies” (MKZ 6/236). The “interior” is rather the possibility of actual social relationships they form, that is, the “social body” mentioned above as the basis of their existence. It is noteworthy here that the meaning of transcendence Tanabe and Miki grasp is different in its direction although their conceptions of embodiment have a close similarity in the sense that they are considered as the basis of sociality. What does the difference mean? This question needs to be further examined in relation to the problem of their “logic of life.”

3.

“Logic of the Species” as the Theory of “World Schema”

In the “Logic of the Species and a World Schema” (「種の論理と世界図式」, 1935), Tanabe expresses the relation between logic and life in the following way: “logic is the logic of life and the self-awareness of life is that of logic” (THZ 6/180). We find here the unification of the two sides of his “logic of absolute mediation.” According to Tanabe, the essence of logic consists in “mediation” (媒介性). On one hand, there must be no immediacy left outside of the logic and therefore all beings must be considered logically mediated. The essence of logic is the ongoing and undetermined act of negating the immediacy. On the other hand, however, this means that the logic needs, as the possibility of the act of mediation, this immediacy itself, which should be regarded as that which stands in contrast to the nature of logic. This other is, he asserts, irrational and immediate life; namely “species”. From the latter viewpoint that logic requires something immediated, logic must maintain a connection with such irrationality instead of disregarding it. That is, logic must become the “logic of life.” This implies, at the same time, that life manifests itself as the place in which the ceaseless activity of mediation is performed. In short, the “self-awareness of life” means that logic reveals its own essence through the medium of life. However, it is not the case that Tanabe’s “logic of absolute mediation” gives a full expression to the relationship between life and logic (THZ 6/173). In order for 8 It needs to be noted that this notion of transcendence is connected with that of nothingness in Miki. But, this problem cannot be discussed here. For further details of the relation between pathos or the body and the nothingness, see Fujita Masakatsu, “Logos and Pathos: Miki Kiyoshi’s Logic of the Imagination”, Japanese and Continental Philosophy. ed. by Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M.Wirth, Inndiana University Press, 2011, pp. 314–315.

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this “logic of absolute mediation” to become an actual fleshed out “logic of life” and not simply an outline, it is necessary to more concretely clarify this relationship. This is the task taken up in the last chapters of his “Logic of the Species and a World Schema.” Tanabe refers to such an inseparable relationship between his “logic of absolute mediation” and his theory of “world schema” as follows: “In particular, I name the logic which makes the absolute mediation possible in relation to the theory of world schema …logic of the species” (THZ 6/263). He proposes this conception of “world schema” in his essay titled “From Schema-Time to Schema-World”（「図式『時間』から図式『世界』へ」） which was published for the first time in 1932. This idea is inseparably connected with his criticism of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. According to Kant, it is because of the passivity or receptivity of human intuition that human intellect necessarily assumes a finite character that is sharply distinguished from a divine intellect. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger poses a further question of what makes it possible to receive an object in the intuition. He argues that an object appears as something opposed or as Gegen-stand through “the basic ability, which can be described as a turning toward … … which lets something become an ob-ject” (das Grundvermögen einer entgegenstehenlassenden Zuwendung-zu …).9 This ability is characterized as an “ecstatic (ekstatisch) – horizontal” act in the sense that a “going-beyond” (Hinausgehen) as the “turning toward…” forms the field itself of the objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit).10 It is this self-formative act that Heidegger grasps as transcendence, where he attempts to recognize the nature of time. To put it simply, Tanabe’s criticism of such an interpretation centers on the lack of the principle of space. As is clearly seen, Heidegger’s interpretation is relevant to the question about the possibility of the opposition of an object. What makes it possible for something to be opposed is originally regarded as time, as is seen from the following quotation: “time is implicated in the internal possibility of … [the] act of objectification.”11 Tanabe claims, however, that the concrete aspect of opposition can be fully understood only if we take into account that principle of space which means the “external opposition of the other” (THZ 6/17). When the opposition is described as “external” here, it is to indicate the “real transcendence” in the body. For Tanabe, if the opposition is comprehended in the activity of embodied existence, it is revealed as the aspect that the body is opposed as the external other. In this sense, he points out that Heidegger’s transcendence still remains at the standpoint of “immanent transcendence” 9 M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, S. 71. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by James S. Churchill, Indiana University Press, 1962, p. 74. 10 M. Heidegger, Ibid., S. 119. 11 M. Heidegger, Ibid., S. 71. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by James S. Churchill, Indiana University Press, 1962, p. 195.

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which disregards the mediation of “external transcendence.” On the basis of this notion of transcendence, the characteristic of schema is interpreted in relation to space. In Kant, schema or schematism is considered as a medium of two heterogeneous elements of sensibility and understanding. By way of introducing this concept, Kant attempts to indicate how the understanding becomes sensible as the subsumption of intuition under categories and he characterizes the function of schema as “transcendental time determination (Zeitbesimmung)”12 in the sense that the imagination that produces schema itself is always related to time as inner sense in its act of synthesis. This function of schema, in Heidegger’s interpretation, is comprehended as the structure which the transcendence builds in the form of time. Tanabe argues, however, that if transcendence is thought of as “immanent” and “external” transcendence at the same time, the structure that such transcendence builds for itself is not simply time but is rather the unification of time and space, to use his term, “world.” In this sense, Tanabe claims that the schema should be interpreted “not merely as the regulation on the formation of ideal image (形象, Bild) through the medium of time but as the world that is the principle of expression including the significance of real object at the same time” (THZ 6/37). In his essay “From Schema-Time to Schema-World”, Tanabe discusses the issue of “external opposition” in the relation between the self and the other. Yet the other means thou here, “who exist together with me and at the same time oppositely outside me” (THZ 6/27–28). He says: “this external relation is no other than the primitive meaning of space” (THZ 6/28), but it is not the principle of space itself. In addition to the two elements, he introduces the concept of the nonself which is external to the self, and is regarded as the principle of space. He ascribes to the body named “the principle of negation” (Ibid.) the non-self, namely what is not the self. His aim here is to make clear the opposition between the self (I) and the other (thou) through the mediation of the body. Yet he emphasizes that this mediation must not be considered as a preceding determination of the body to the self and that the determined body as my body never exists before the activity of the self. This is expressed clearly when he says: “it is only through the determination by the self that the self ’s body become the body of its own and the body does not have the meaning of determination as the self ’s own body without such determination by the self” (THZ 6/28). It could be said that this character of the body is the same as “the noetic body”. This body, furthermore, can be thought of as a social body or as the foundation before the self appears as the definite self, judging from the fact that he says the non-self has “the meaning of, so to speak, the body of the ego as humankind” (THZ 6/31). We 12 Immanuel.Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B178.

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can infer, therefore, that the negative or real opposition in the body means that the non-self becomes apparent as the non-self or as the opposing other from communal existence into which the self itself is originally combined. The body or community, of course, continues to be the basis or ground for the self regardless of its activity. It is, however, precisely when the self recognizes its basis or ground is not self that such a foundation is revealed as the other to the self, and at the same time this manifestation enables the self to become the self itself precisely because the self exists only in relation to the other. What is important here is that Tanabe regards this structure of “world schema” as “the pure formation of historical and social reality” (THZ 6/48). We can see the significance of such “formation” in the very point that it attempts to find a solution to the question as to why the social appears to individuals as something negative and opposed without admitting a simple realistic preexistence of society. To be sure, the conception of “species” is proposed to grasp the real oppositions or conflicts in a society, but this does not mean that his “logic of the species” is a simple realism, which holds that the “species” subsists prior to all “individuals” (個). This stance is evident in his assertion that: “it is not separately but only in mutual relation that the species and the individual exist” (THZ 6/104). However, he does not agree with the idea that it is on the basis of the activity of the individual that the world appears as world, even though he does not consider the social as a substance that exists in itself. From “the standpoint of the individual”, which is thought to be typical of that of Heidegger, we cannot understand, he thinks, why social has the negative side of opposition at all. He considers that the contradiction between such reverse directions can be solved only from the “world schema”, according to which the “immanent transcendence” that makes it possible for society to appear as society and the “external transcendence” by way of which society reveals itself as something opposed to individuals are simultaneous and interrelated. From the above discussions, we can understand why Tanabe gives the “world schema” the function of “assimilating into itself the being-in-itself which is not mediated” (THZ 6/262). His firm insistence that immediacy should be mediated seems to be merely the “postulate” made from his logical point of view, but his aim in “Logic of the Species and a World Schema” is to describe as the “world schema” the concrete formation that immediacy is brought into the act of mediation. That immediacy is mediated, to put it another way, is the fact or reality itself that some community comes to represent a negative or opposing force to individuals, which means at the same time that the community ceases to be the immediate and fundamental communality into which the individuals are tightly tied. In this case, such a community can be thought to exist before and after individuals. As is already seen, Tanabe tries to understand the formation of such a contradictory reality as “world schema.” In view of the fact that he says: “the

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theory of world schema is the subjective side of logic in consciousness” (THZ 6/ 258), it could be said that his “world schema” is the structure of the two transcendences and the manifestation of logic seen from the viewpoint of the “individual.”

4.

The logic of the Imagination and Form

“The logic of life,” both in Tanabe and in Miki, is focused on clarifying the way the social manifests itself through the transcendence of life in the body. In Tanabe, it is in the theory of “World Schema” that one can find the concrete structure of this manifestation. What is required now is to show how such a structure can be found in Miki’s philosophy as well. Before discussing this problem, I would like to consider Miki’s concept of “double transcendence” （二重の超越） which was touched on above. In Miki’s thought, transcendence refers to the relation of the unobjectifiable social body to consciousness. The aim in his Philosophy of History was to understand individuals within history not as having already been determined from externally existent structures but only as determined in the social body or pathos from inside. In other words, as being formed in the fundamental experiences of history which Miki calls “history as fact.” In this book, however, it was not taken into sufficient consideration how the actual sides of history or society emerge from such original experiences of history. In relation to this, transcendence was regarded as internal, in his words, “the transcendence toward the interior,”which is sharply distinguished from external transcendence whose meaning is that there exists something outside the epistemic subjectivity. In his Philosophical Anthropology, where he repeatedly used the term “double transcendence,” his emphasis as to the nature of transcendence was mainly laid upon its interiority. This transcendence, that is, “transcendence toward the subjectivity,” says Miki in this book, “is the ground for transcendence toward the objectivity” (MKZ 18/ 167). From this sentence, we can clearly find the relationship between the two transcendences which seems to remain rather parallel in Philosophy of History. Here, to be sure, the “objective being” is based upon the “subjective fact” which transcends toward the interior. Nevertheless, it appears to be left unsaid that the latter is “the ground” for the former. What does “the ground” mean? That is a problem needing further clarification. If it is by “transcendence toward subjectivity” as “the ground” for “transcendence toward objectivity” that history itself is made possible, this exterior transcendence must mean more than the mere externality of an object toward the epistemic subject. That is to say, “transcendence toward objectivity” or “the exterior” needs to be discussed as something concerning social and historical reality.

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With regard to this problem, it is worthy of attention that Miki argues about the relation between human beings and their surroundings by using Helmuth Pressner’s famous concept of “eccentricity” (Exzentrität). According to Miki, human beings exist by relating the surroundings to themselves and thus are a “center” to the environment. In this sense, however, they are just the same as living things in general. In order that they can be something beyond such mere organizations, it is necessary that, says Miki, “human beings bear a separate relation toward the surroundings” (MKZ 18/255). That is, they need to be an “eccentric” existence which has already ceased to be “centric.” Miki understands this “eccentricity” as just the same concept that he means by “transcendence toward the subjectivity” or “transcendence toward the interior.” The surroundings which emerge through human beings’ distancing themselves from being a “center” belongs to a different sphere from the ones living things have. Miki characterizes this distinction using German as that between Umfeld (milieu, 場) and the “surrounding world” which is Umwelt (environment, 環境). The surroundings that appear to human beings who transcend toward the interior become a “world”, which surrounds human beings and simultaneously involves a certain distance or gap from them. From this point of view, he says that “it is on the basis of human beings’ transcendence toward the subjectivity that the surroundings become transcendent and a world to them” (MKZ 18/257). “The transcendence toward the exterior”, which has not been conceptualized concretely in his former works yet as we mentioned above, acquires here the meaning of the “world” as the surroundings includes some distance to the subject. Despite this concretion, the emphasis of the two transcendences still lies on the interior transcendence rather than on the exterior one. It could be said that such a viewpoint entails a danger of laying too much stress on indeterminable or irrational fundamentality which “the social body” or pathos has to society and history manifested as a fact. In a similar manner, Tanabe also considers the communality each body has as a basis for the social, but he does not approve of such a fundamental immediacy itself by any means. That irrationality is mediated and brought into a logical structure through his “theory of World Schema.” Indeed, in Miki’s thought, the problem of mediating this irrational immediacy is never ignored, but it is not until his Logic of the Imagination, as he writes clearly, that he finds a solution to the question how logic and pathos are connected in a concrete fashion. Regarding this problem of his placing too much emphasis on pathos, it is worth noting that he mentions in the Preface of this book (strictly, of the Logic of the Imagination Part One, 1939) the following: “when I wrote the first chapter Myth [of this book], I merely understood the imagination as an ability to synthesize logos and pathos, and was anxious that I fell into a sort

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of irrationalism or subjectivism” (MKZ 8/5), but “ … soon afterwards I began to investigate “institutions” and meanwhile it has gradually became clear that the logic of the imagination I have been designing is actually nothing but “the logic of the form (形 の論理)”. the logic of the imagination as a kind of subjective expression has found out the logic of the form as a kind of objective expression. By virtue of that, my thought has become stable for the time being” (MKZ 8/6).

In the previous passage of this, the pathetic is said to be “subjectivity, internality ” (MKZ 8/4), and taking into account the above words of his, it would be plausible to assume that a matter of falling into “irrationalism or subjectivism” is identified with the problem of too much emphasis on pathos. In order to understand the meaning of those sentences, let us examine further the problem of the institutions (制度) which Miki refers to above. According to Miki, the imagination is defined as an act of making certain pictures or images which unifies the subjective and the objective. Needless to say, this definition itself is based on Kant’s idea, yet what is characteristic of Miki’s thought is that the imagination is interpreted as a fundamental activity of producing history. Miki says that the act of imagination is related with “the subjective” (主観的なもの), which means that it is inseparably connected with something subjective (主体的なもの) in Miki’s sense, that is, pathos existing behind individuals, rather than that it has some relation to representations they generate within each consciousness. In this respect, Miki’s concept of the imagination is distinguished from Kant’s definition. The act of imagination closely connected with “the subjective”, speaking in a more concrete fashion, means that through giving a certain picture or image to the pathetic, which is irrational and simultaneously fundamental to individuals, the imagination objectifies such pathos as something indefinable and thus bring it to logos. What Miki refers to first as a product by such an act of imagination is myth. This is a certain image and at the same time has a realistic power. It is in this ambiguity or doubleness that he tries to find the place where the function of imagination exercises. The notion according to which history can be comprehended exclusively from the viewpoint of myth, he believes, has “a risk of making history subjective” (MKZ 8/98). In his opinion, history must be “the most realistic, the most objective,” on basis of which he thinks that “the logic of the imagination needs to be not the mere logic of image but rather that of form” (Ibid.). The institutions, which he attempts to research next, are nothing but forms. What is notable here is that he selects the word “form” in order distinctively to describe the objectivity of products the imagination makes. In this way, the logic of the imagination, which was called “the logic of the symbol” or “the logic of the image” so far, is formulated as the logic of the form.

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Then, what makes institution more objective than myth? It is the fact that institution, which he thinks includes language, convention, morality, law, art and so on, is a sort of fiction. This is clearly shown in the following quotation: “First of all, every institution bears a fictional characteristic. This enables us to recognize the distinction between mythical existences and institutional ones. … These [mythical existences] are not what must be called fictional, but something religious, something sacred” (MKZ 8/104).

This discussion naturally draws us to the following question: “Are the myths as fictional as the institutions, or are they in fact even more so?” Yet for Miki, the myths are merely something mystic, which are by no means thought to take on fictional properties. It is because for individuals living in a mythical world there is no distinction or only an identification, between a variety of worlds each myth forms and the real world. In this sense, he says: “Mythical worlds are supernatural to barbarians, but no gap or no barrier lies between this world and the real world” (MKZ 8/67). To borrow an expression in his Philosophical Anthropology, the worlds formed by the imagination become fictional only if there is a distance between the imagined worlds and the real world. Simply put, it is precisely because we realize the imagined worlds are not real that they are fictions. Nevertheless, the institutions are never non-real even if such imaginary constructions are free from being what actually exists and occurs. Human beings accept these various fictionalities as real and follow them although they are aware that the institutions are not raw reality itself. “If we consider to be real the tools with which to master nature, the institutions are fictional. Besides, that where the fictional is the real is the historical world” (MKZ 8/179). In this sense, “the actual society … cannot exist without fictions” (MKZ 8/100). This is Miki’s fundamental viewpoint. In addition to being fictional, secondly, all institutions have some conventional characteristic as the basic element in our following them. The conventions (慣習) or customs (習慣) are an actual and concrete shape or appearance of “communal life” as “social body”. Miki tries to grasp the principle of convention as imitation, “the condition of which is the sympathy, that is, sharing some feeling or emotion (sym-pathos)” (MKZ8/128). This sym-pathos is nothing but the essence of “social body”, which is clearly seen when we take into consideration the idea shown in his Philosophical Anthropology. In this book, Miki says: “Destiny is pathetic; the body originally has the meaning of destiny” (MKZ 18/ 154). He goes on to connect “destiny” with the sociality of the body in the following way: “It is because the body is originally destiny that the body as an [objective] organ can be thought of as such. If this is the case, the social body is what is named destiny in the most appropriate way since society can be considered to be a subject having individuals as

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objects. The social body can be regarded as a subjective “embodiment” having individuals as “organs””(MKZ 18/155–156).

Finally, Miki mentions normativeness as the third characteristic of institutions. But his discussion about this problem is so complicated that we cannot easily understand what he regards as the ground for the normativeness of institutions. Even so, it could be said that the normativeness or restrictiveness each institution has is based on the gap between raw reality or conventions themselves and institutions, judging from his statement that the institutions fastened and thus made conventional by the act of pathos are “the ones which lapse into ‘facts’” (MKZ 8/182) and that “facts can never restrict themselves commandingly even though they compel themselves in a necessary way” (MKZ 8/182). If institutions were to become conventional completely, they would cease to be institutions. Indeed they are conventional, yet they are so not completely but partly. In other words, there is some distance between institutions and the individuals following them, instead of both elements being united and fused just as each individual unconsciously uses its body in every daily life. It is exactly for that reason that a certain normative property is necessarily added to every institution. We could understand these characteristics of institutions as a concrete conceptualization of “transcendence toward the exterior” discussed above. In the second chapter Institutions, he says as follows; “That generally speaking, expressions, and, particularly speaking, institutions, have a commanding property is originally based on such a transcendence [the transcendence of pathos and logos or that of the subjective and the objective]. The transcendence in this sense is thought in the point where the transcendence toward the exterior and that toward the interior are united. … In the transcendence toward the interior we become exactly what is called subject and at the same time the object becomes opposed to us in exactly what is its objectivity, that is, the transcendence” (MKZ 8/155).

This passage clearly shows that Miki places the same weight on the two transcendences. Furthermore, in the third chapter Technology, he discusses “the transcendence toward the exterior” in relation to human beings’ activity of producing something outward as a form. “The transcendence of human existence is not in the least bit mystic. This lies in the obvious fact that what he produces freely is entirely objective. The imagination is never merely subjective. Conversely, by means of the free act of imagination, the subjective becomes a form and thus transcends being a subject” (MKZ 8/229).

From the consideration so far, it becomes clear, we could say, how the act of imagination is related to the problem of transcendence in Miki’s thought; the subjectivity of the imagination, whose meaning is pathos, is derived from the fundamental activity of “the social body”, which is understood as “the transcendence toward the interior”, whereas the objectivity of the imagination, which

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is referred to as logos, is based on “transcendence toward the exterior”, through which the hidden activity of subjective body gets manifested as a certain form. We can conclude, therefore, that the significance of Miki’s logic of the imagination, when we try to comprehend it as a “logic of life”, consists in clarifying the objectification of communal, that is, social and historical life as the activity of the imagination producing some form in “the double transcendence.” When compared with Tanabe’s thought, we find that the “logic of life” of Miki has the same significance; both “logics” explains the independent force the social has against the individuals, to borrow Émile Durkheim’s famous words, “the social fact [le fait social]” as “things [choses]” without rendering substrative the social relationships produced by diverse actions of human beings. It is looking to the structure of transcendence which human existence as embodied life has, that the question can be resolved as to why society, created by individuals, nevertheless emerges as an estranged power toward them. Miki’s idea acquires more concreteness in the sense that he tries to make clear such an aspect of the otherness every society always has to some extent as the problem of fictional institutions. At the same time, however, it is not necessarily obvious in his thought what is the meaning of the logic that is to be redefined in his “logic of life.” This is mainly because his unfinished Logic of the Imagination Part One and Two remains “phanomenological” (MKZ 8/3) and the meaning of logic itself, which he openly declared to be discussed later in this book, ended up unclarified. Tanabe gives a clear-cut definition of mediation to the logic, but Miki decidedly rejects this viewpoint, as is shown in the following passage; “The logic of the imagination is not merely the so-called logic of the mediation. The latter finally remains the logic of reflection and definitely cannot be the logic of action (行為の論理). In logic of the mediation, every mediation is made abstractive in the end, and this logic misses the most vital point of leaping where every mediation is concentrated into a form” (MKZ 8/3).

When he implicitly criticizes Tanabe’s logic as above, he is undoubtedly willing to follow Nishida’s notion of “active intuition”. It is Nishida who interprets the fundamental meaning of logic as a function of expressing or exhibiting something outward, bearing in mind that logos etymologically means “word”, and finds in an act of human beings’ producing forms the actual place where this function shows itself. Miki’s thought is evidently under the influence of Nishida’s, given that the “ur-logic (原始論理, Urlogik)” (MKZ 8/8) Miki mentions in the Preface includes Hegel’s dialectic and the formal logic precisely under the logic of the form (MKZ 8/230). The uniqueness to Miki’s thought consists in his insight to see the root of the formproducing act as lying in the imagination and furthermore, we could infer, trying to conceive as a logic the structure according to which the imagination produces a

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variety of forms. This structure is nothing but schema. With regard to this, in fact, he writes in the last chapter Experience as follows: “The logic of the imagination, which appears fundamentally as schematism, is intuitional. Rather, it is a fundamental constitution of concepts itself” (MKZ 8/507). For Kant, as is already mentioned above, the schema is the intellectual and at the same time sensible third, by means of which both two heterogeneous elements, that is, the universal concepts and the individual intuitions, are united. Kant illustrates this by showing the following example. We have the concept of number in general, in which, as a matter of course, all the numbers, e. g. the number 5 and 1000 as well are included. We can represent the number 5 as the image of five points, but it is quite impossible for us to represent the image of a thousand points as such. Nevertheless, we can think of the number 1000, which is precisely because we can represent the way the number 1000 can be thought of as or in an image. To use another example, the two entirely different elements, the triangle itself and the individual triangles or the dog itself and many actual dogs are by no means united without our knowing how to illustrate a triangle or a dog as its image. In this sense, Kant defines the schema as the “representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept”13 or “a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept”14. Miki highly evaluates this idea of the schema and regards it as the revolutionary insight which can negate the vulgar opinion that the concepts are acquired by an operation of abstracting the concrete (MKZ 8/382). The basis for the logical, Miki believes, must not be laid upon the given concepts but upon the method by which some image can be represented. We could infer that Miki’s “ur-logic (Urlogik)” is completed when the image is interpreted as the historical form in his sense, but it is quite difficult to grasp the whole picture of this idea from his texts. What is notable here, however, is that Miki, who tries to leave Tanabe’s abstract perspective of discovering the essence of logic in a mediation by following Nishida’s notion, finally pays attention to the problem of the schema as Tanabe does in investigating the meaning of the logic more deeply. Yet the points of view Tanabe and Miki have are not the same, of course. Tanabe finds the manifestation of the logical in the mediating function the schema carries out, while Miki lays emphasis on the act of imagination which produces this schema in creating images or forms. It must be clarified next what contribution such ideas of the schema can be made to the re-thinking of what is originally logic. Further consideration of this problem however, I will leave for discussion in another paper. 13 Immanuel.Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B179f. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, Revised Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 182. 14 Immanuel.Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B180. Ibid.

Taguchi Shigeru (Hokkaido University)

Reality as it is. Nishida and Tanabe on appearance and mediation

Introduction What is “reality”? This old question is still far from being answered. What is even worse, we tend to forget it, with the result that we often believe we know what reality is, saying that it is “obviously” known. By contrast, philosophers are inclined to think that such apparently “obvious” knowledge can be contrasted and replaced with “true” knowledge. “Obvious” knowledge is that which we naïvely believe we know but, in fact, do not know properly. Consequently – philosophers suppose – there must be “true” knowledge that provides a “proper” understanding of reality. In this way, one might separate “appearances” from “reality.” What is the consequence of this separation? One might be tempted to argue that “appearances” are deceptive and that “reality” is behind/beyond/beneath/the basis of “appearances,” but this type of thinking can provoke a strong reaction from those who claim that there is no true reality behind appearances, and that, instead, appearances are reality. Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime do not adopt either of these approaches, however. Almost at the same time as Husserl was struggling to overcome this dichotomy of appearance and reality, Nishida and Tanabe were also tackling this fundamental aspect of philosophical thinking, each in his own way. In my paper, I will point up several of the unique features of Nishida’s and Tanabe’s attempts. As space is limited, I will do this by accentuating the differences between these two philosophers, in particular by discussing Tanabe’s criticism of Nishida’s philosophy as a sort of “emanation theory” and Nishida’s response to this criticism.

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Emanation Theory: Tanabe’s Criticism of Nishida

It is well known that Tanabe critically characterizes Nishida’s philosophy up to the period of the thought of “basho” (place) as a kind of “emanation theory” (発 出論).1 According to Tanabe, it derives all individual facts and entities from that which is supposed to be the sole ultimate principle of reality. Tanabe claims that it would mean the end of philosophy if Nishida dogmatically assumes that there is an unknowable Universal such that every actual being can be interpreted as its “self-determination.” By contrast, Tanabe emphasizes that the ultimate dimension for philosophical thinking cannot be regarded as the Absolute that determines itself step by step without requiring anything other than itself. For Tanabe, there is no ultimate reality before it is determined and appears in a particular form. It is only through such concrete determinations that the ultimate appears as the ultimate in the midst of its particular states of appearances (T4.311). The “Absolute” that allegedly embraces all individuals would only appear as such through the mediation of individuals. This means that it is nothing other than the mediation itself that is truly absolute. Tanabe remarks, “The Absolute that appears as a moment [of reality] can only be a differential, and the Absolute in totality is merely postulated through the mediation of that differential” (T4.311). Is it appropriate to say that Tanabe identifies appearances with reality while Nishida claims that there is reality “behind” appearances? It would be too simplistic to understand their controversy in such a way. Tanabe does not deny that there is reality that does not come into appearance. Nishida does not underestimate the appearances we directly experience and indulge in abstract speculation about the transcendent Absolute. In what follows, I will begin by examining Nishida’s theory of “pure experience” to trace the path back to the source of their antagonism.

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Nishida’s Idea of “Pure Experience”

It might seem that Nishida’s thought presented in his first book, An Inquiry into the Good (『善の研究』1911), has the characteristics of an “emanation theory” in part. However, the keynote of the work is evidently far from the kind of metaphysical theory of emanation that derives all beings from the absolute reality that lies beyond experience. Rather, Nishida emphasizes that “reality as it is” factually manifests itself in our experience here and now. He titled a chapter in 1 The most famous document is the article “西田先生の教を仰ぐ” (“Asking Nishida-Sensei for Edification,” 1930, in Tanabe Hajime Zenshu, Vol. 4 (T4.305–328).

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Part II of the book “Phenomena of Consciousness Are the Sole Reality.” This does not mean that reality is identified with mind separated from matter. Nishida makes this clear: “The gist of my argument is that true reality is neither a phenomenon of consciousness nor a material phenomenon” (Nishida 1990/1950, 44–68). Nishida calls reality in this sense “pure experience.” By “pure,” he is “referring to the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination” (ibid., 3–13). Consequently, we “know” reality just as it is in our “pure experience,” but we cannot describe it as it is by our language of analytical thinking. If we describe it from a logical-analytical point of view, “pure experience” as the sole reality is already “adulterated with some sort of thought” (ibid.), in other words, contaminated with reflective thought. Therefore, pure experience is often described by suspending the validity of dichotomies such as “subject and object,” “individual and universal,” “spirit and nature,” and so on. Nishida explains: “When one directly experiences one’s own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or an object, and knowing and its object are completely unified” (ibid., 3–4/13). Thus, one should say that, according to Nishida, “reality” is not a sort of metaphysical substance beyond experience and appearances, but rather it is equivalent to phenomena as they are in our direct, pure experience. Nevertheless, we cannot describe it in our analytical language. Everything is “here and now,” but we cannot concretely explain what it is by our usual way of description. This is why Nishida is obliged to explain how pure experience as true reality is modified into the mode of reality in which manifold beings stand disjunctively. Thus, he notes, “Because various types of discriminative knowledge derive from reflection on this reality, let us consider the formative mode in which it establishes itself and clarify how various discriminations arise from it” (ibid., 51/79). This seems to be a natural task that is required by the fundamental claim of Nishida’s philosophy. However, it is precisely this task that leads to the description of reality that provokes Tanabe’s later criticism of Nishida’s position as an “emanation theory.” Indeed, Nishida employs an approach that may well suggest “emanation theory.” To give an example: “Independent true reality complete unto itself is established in the same mode in all things: the whole first appears implicitly, and from it the content develops through differentiation; when that development ends, the whole of the reality is actualized and completed – one entity has developed and completed itself” (ibid., 52/79–80). However, it should be noted that Nishida does not start from a metaphysical assumption of emanation. His starting point is “pure experience,” in which everything manifests itself “here and now.” However, he could not develop a convincing way of describing his fundamental standpoint in relation to our commonsense understanding of reality; this is the reason why he could not

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completely dispel the misunderstanding that he took the view of emanation theory.

3.

Tanabe’s Early Thinking: From Emanation to Contradiction

It should be noted that Tanabe himself once took a view that strongly evoked the idea of emanation. Famously, Tanabe started his career under the substantial influence of Nishida’s early philosophy. However, in the major works of his early period,2 Tanabe does not emphasize “pure experience” as the basis of his philosophy. Rather, he employs a systematic way of explaining the emergence of differences and relations on the basis of an all-encompassing “unity of intuition.” As a consequence, Tanabe’s early philosophy seems closer to an “emanation theory” than Nishida’s does. For instance, Tanabe writes in his early work Introduction to Science (1918) as follows: “Reality is originally neither mind nor matter. It directly manifests itself as trans-individual intuition, which is [reflectively] posed and systematized according to its immanent relations, so that individual minds and physical things come to appear as objects.”3 It is true that the basic ideas presupposed in this passage originated with Nishida, but they lack the impressive richness of Nishida’s description of pure experience; thus, Tanabe’s description comes closer to a theory of emanation. This suggests that Tanabe’s argument against emanation theory implied self-criticism, that is, criticism of the way of thinking that he had just overcome. Tanabe found a clue to a better understanding of appearance and reality in Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of infinity and continuity. Through the mediation of Cohen’s theory, Tanabe reached the idea of the differential present as an infinitesimal “generating point” (Erzeugungspunkt, 生産点) 4 and gradually found a way out of emanation theory. Each lived experience of the present is an infinitesimal realization of the infinite that, in itself, can only be postulated as ideal. The point of the present moment is only a small edge of reality, but nevertheless it represents, bears, and even generates the whole range of reality. Such a dynamic view of reality overlaps with Tanabe’s understanding of morality as a conflicting intensity of “dualistic contradiction” (二元矛盾).5 Even 2 Recent Natural Science (『最近の自然科学』1915), Introduction to Science (『科学概論』 1918), and Investigation into the Philosophy of Mathematics (『数理哲学研究』1925). 3 「実在は本来非心非物、超個人的なる直観として直接に自己を発現し、此が其内面 的の関係に由つて定立組織せられる結果、対象として個人精神、物体が現れるので ある。」（T2.254）. 4 See T2.466, 472–4 (『数理哲学研究』1925). 5 See two articles about moral freedom written in 1917 (「道徳的自由」、「再び道徳的自由 に就いて」T1. 121–129, 133–139).

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though we feel that we should do good deeds, we cannot always do them in reality. Were there such a person who could always do the right thing without difficulty, he or she would already be as free as a divinity, and moral obligation would be irrelevant. By contrast, if one has no sense of moral ought whatsoever (as is perhaps the case with wild animals), then it carries no special significance that one cannot do particular types of deeds that are supposed to be “good.” This means that morality only comes into being through conflict between “what we are” and “what we ought to be” (T1.136). This tension is understood by Tanabe through the same principle as the infinitesimal realization of reality (especially in his early work Teleology in Kant [『カントの目的論』], published in 1924). On the basis of this development, Tanabe began to struggle with Hegel’s dialectic. In his important work Hegel’s Philosophy and Dialectic (『ヘーゲル哲 学と弁証法』1932), he achieved a crucial breakthrough. He reached a standpoint from which actual appearances of the present fact are no longer explained on the basis of the reality behind or beyond them; rather, reality is nothing other than contradictory and conflicting intensity between the actual moment of facticity and the infinite totality of potential and ideal beings. The pivotal point of this contradiction is our body. It is nothing but bodily action that mediates subjectivity and objectivity, by disconnecting and combining them at the same time (T3.114). Through this breakthrough, Tanabe finally attained the viewpoint from which he discovered and criticized every type of “emanation theory,” even in Hegel’s philosophy itself, which had enabled him to achieve that very breakthrough. The criticism of Nishida’s philosophy is also based on these groundbreaking ideas.

4.

There is no unifying reality: Nishida’s Response to Tanabe?

In this short paper, I cannot describe in detail how Nishida responds to Tanabe’s criticism.6 Instead, to highlight the significant change in Nishida’s thinking after Tanabe’s criticism, I will point to the simple fact that in the later philosophy of Nishida, one old idea has completely disappeared. In the early work An Inquiry into the Good, he claimed the following: Like any organic entity, a system of consciousness manifests its wholeness through the orderly, differentiated development of a certain unifying reality [統一的或者]. (Nishida [1990/1950], 7/18; emphasis mine)

6 This question is more thoroughly investigated by recent studies, such as Itabashi [2008] and Miné [2012].

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The later Nishida no longer speaks of such a “unifying reality” that might give the impression that there was a unifying absolute substance behind all factual appearances. On the contrary, he clearly rejects such an idea. He writes in the preface of his later work Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, 2nd Volume (The Dialectical World) (『哲学の根本問題 続編（弁証法的世界）』1934) as follows: It is inconceivable that the real world that is truly subjective and objective, namely, the world of action-intuition, has a general unity in the direction of its general determination, but it is also inconceivable that it has an individual unity in the direction of its individual determination. At the bottom of this world, there cannot possibly be any unity or continuity in any sense. Such a world as just described can only be considered as a dialectical unity of absolute negation-qua-affirmation and affirmation-qua-negation. That is why I call it the world of continuity of discontinuity or of determination of absolute nothingness. One would already take a subjective standpoint if one, in any way, thought of something potential at the bottom of the world. (N7.206–207) 7

Nishida thus explicitly denies that there is always a unifying factor as the basis for reality. To think so would be to adopt a “subjective” or “psychological” standpoint, as he himself critically characterizes his own early work An Inquiry into the Good in its third preface, written in 1936 (Nishida 1990/1950, xxxi/6). This means that, according to the later Nishida, we cannot approach true reality by consistently seeking for an ultimately unifying factor. The unity of reality cannot be achieved by reducing all appearances to the unifying Absolute and by eliminating the contradiction between them. There is no unifying reality behind contradiction; rather, it is nothing other than contradiction that forms unity itself. Only in this contradiction-qua-unity can we find true reality. This idea is conceptualized as “absolute contradictory self-identity” (絶対矛盾的自己同一) in Nishida’s later philosophy.8 We can only speculate as to whether this change in Nishida’s thinking that I have just examined was in some way caused by Tanabe’s criticism. What is important is that the historical development of Nishida’s philosophy itself confirms the philosophical validity of Tanabe’s argument against “emanation 7 「真に主観的・客観的なる現実の世界、行為的直観の世界はその一般的限定の方向 に一般的統一を考へることもできなければ、その個物的限定の方向に個物的統一を 考へられるものでもない。その底に何等の意味に於ても統一とか連続とかいふもの を考へることはできない。唯絶対の否定即肯定、絶対の肯定即否定の弁証法的統一 としてかかる世界が考へられるのである。此故に私はかかる世界を非連続の連続の 世界とか絶対無の限定の世界とかいふのである。世界の底に何等かの意味に於て潜 在的なるものを考へるといふことは既に主観的立場に立つことである。」(N7.206– 207). 8 See the following remarks: “The world of contradictory self-identity” is that of “phenomena qua reality” (現象即実在) (N9.148). “We can neither think of the total One nor the individual many as substratum at the bottom of the world” (ibid.).

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theory.” It is true that our prime concern should be to try to understand the above-described development as a deepening of Nishida’s own self-understanding. However, we cannot deny that Tanabe’s criticism possibly inspired this process.

5.

Nishida and Tanabe on the Absolute that is Relative

What is more, it can be seen that Nishida’s and Tanabe’s philosophies seem to converge considerably on a position that emphatically repudiates any kind of explanation of actually experienced phenomena as derivatives of a background substratum.9 Tanabe criticizes the “logic of identity” that characterizes traditional philosophy, and advocates instead a “logic of absolute mediation.” The “logic of dialectic” in his understanding is “not the logic that expresses being in its identity, but the logic that is [in its turn] unified with being through absolute negation while it is negatively opposed to being” (T6.457). Tanabe seeks to clarify that the logical philosophical determination of reality can be a realization of reality itself. In this sense, “the Absolute realizes itself in the self-awareness of the relative that this relative has of its own necessary uniqueness (individuality)” (T3.398). Tanabe thus declares that, “the ultimate principle of philosophy is not to be sought outside of relative concepts, but rather deep inside them; such a principle should not be a transcendent one that would be a far-off end that could be approached but never be reached by concepts; instead, the ultimate principle of philosophy can be understood as the very heart of relative reality, which lies in the innermost core of this world and everywhere actualizes itself in the relative” (T3.399). Nishida also emphasizes that there is no such Absolute beyond the relative. This is what Nishida definitely shares with Tanabe, for all their controversies. He puts this point in his last published writing, “The Logic of the Place and the Religious Worldview” (「場所的論理と宗教的世界観」), in the following way: [T]he absolute does not transcend the relative. The true absolute must possess its own negation. Consequently the relative is not merely the abstract form of the absolute, but is the absolute’s own negation. There is always this contradictory identity of the many and the one. […] It is through this kind of self-negation that the world exists and moves through itself, and is absolutely real. (Nishida [1987], 117–8; N11.457f.) 10

In this way, the later Nishida rejects any kind of explanation of actual phenomena as a linear and hierarchical development of reality. The relative is not a derivative 9 Nishitani [1991] and Ueda [1991] suggest that Nishida and Tanabe tried to express the same comprehension of reality from different perspectives. 10 See also N11.447f.; N9.153.

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of the absolute but, in a sense, embodies the absolute itself through its selfnegation. The whole range of reality manifests itself at this present moment and place while differentiating and mediating itself to the relative. This thought is expressed through such well-known key terms in Nishida’s later philosophy as “absolute contradictory self-identity,” “inverse correlation” (逆対応), and “everyday depth” (平常底).

6.

Nishida against Tanabe on Mediation and Contradiction

Now, one might ask, did Nishida and Tanabe finally reach the same thought whose variations are their respective philosophies? The answer is definitely no. There are still fundamental differences between their ways of thinking. I will now point out only one such aspect. For Tanabe, what he calls the “dialectic” or “logic of mediation” offers a philosophical principle by which to attain a reality that is, by its nature, contradictory. He says, “Dialectic is the logic of reality” (T6.457, 510). Mediation does not abolish contradiction; rather, it is mediation that demonstrates that contradiction exists. If there were no mediation at all between things, they could not even be opposed to each other to form a contradiction, because they would then have no common background on which they could be juxtaposed, and if there were no multiplicity so that everything formed a complete unity, there would also be no mediation because nothing would be left to be mediated. Where there is mediation, there must be multiple moments that are opposed to each other. This means that there is also contradiction, which resists the formation of a complete unity. Thus, where there is mediation, there is also contradiction. This is why mediation provides a definitive clue to the philosophical comprehension of reality as it is, which is contradictory. If we start from any alleged immediacy (or non-mediate moment) to explain the variety of phenomenal reality as derivation, the whole richness of reality subsisting in contradiction would be cut down to a one-sided abstractness. By contrast, absolute mediation refers to the state of reality “in which even mediation itself is mediated so that nothing is immediately given and presupposed” (T6.473). Absolute mediation is not absolute in the sense that it can be applied everywhere as a fixed formal principle; rather, it is absolute in the sense that “absolute negation mediates itself negatively” (ibid.). Thus, Tanabe’s absolute mediation is a philosophical logic that never absolutizes itself but mediates itself to the transcendent reality that negates logic itself. For Nishida, by contrast, reality is also contradictory but, at the same time, beyond mediation. Let me examine a few passages from his article “Logic and Life” (『論理と生命』1936), in which he responds to Tanabe’s criticism. He

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says, “The world of historical reality is always self-contradictory” (N8.366). However, “the logic of historical life” is intrinsically different from “the logic of objective recognition” and “is not the logic of mediation that is instrumental” (N8.355). The “immediate” that is considered to be “that which negates logic” would mean “a thought construction” in the end (N8.381) and is not “the reality of action-intuition” or “the true immediacy of life” (ibid.). Rather, “reality only consists in touching the absolute step by step (or in being creative). There is no other way to speak of true mediation of absolute negation” (ibid.).11 The “intuition” to which Nishida appeals is not merely immediate in the sense that it is not mediated; rather, it is the creativity of reality, and nothing other than this makes mediation possible. He claims that, “to unite contradiction does not mean to eliminate it. On the contrary, the more self-contradictory, the more intuitive” (N8.358). He also states succinctly, “Intuition consists in being selfcontradictory” (ibid.). It is in such intuition that we are faced with “reality as it is,” which challenges us to fight for the sake of our own life (N9.180f, 188, 201). Where there is contradiction of reality, there is action-intuition in which we are confronted with the world that presses us for life (N9.181). “The world is always self-contradictory. Because of its self-contradiction, it is intuitive and real” (N8.378). Thus, according to Nishida, it is not by mediation that reality is contradictory. Rather, reality is what it is as contradiction even without any mediation. Such contradiction without mediation is what the later Nishida calls “absolute contradictory self-identity,” that is, unity and contradiction at the same time. He would claim that if one relies on the logic of mediation, one still remains to hold a discriminative view, which means that one has not yet attained to the view of “absolute contradictory self-identity.” Nishida emphasizes that, “In the world of absolute contradictory self-identity, subjectivity and objectivity are neither merely opposed to, nor mediated by each other; rather, they fight for life and death” (N9.201), which can be paraphrased as contradiction without mediation.

7.

Conclusion: Two Aspects of Philosophical Confrontation with Reality

In this paper, I do not intend to judge who, if anyone, is the winner in this controversy. Rather, I would claim that this controversy itself helps us to deliberate more fundamentally on the nature of reality. Nishida and Tanabe inspire us 11 This passage in the original edition, published in Shiso and clearly intended as a response to Tanabe’s criticism, was partly expurgated when integrated into the book edition. See: N 8.381.

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to find different approaches to reality that correspond to the diverse dimensions of the relation between reality and philosophical thinking. Both philosophers seek to find concrete reality through philosophy. However, Nishida is eager to give words to the concreteness of the reality that is prior to logic, while Tanabe pursues the concreteness of the logic itself for thinking and speaking about reality. Neither aspect of philosophical concreteness is to be underestimated. The intensity of contradictory philosophical expression, by which Nishida especially inspires us, drives us to consider reality more deeply because it confronts us with a non-conceptual reality that can never be absorbed into our thoughts. On the other hand, contradictory expressions can very easily lose their intensity when they are repeatedly used and become conventional. We are quite likely to use such phrases as if we had a proper intuition of their meaning without examining them. If we do not have the appropriate intuition, however, such expressions are meaningless. In order to maintain the intensity of such philosophical expressions, we need their mediation through logical-analytical thinking. Tanabe tries never to forget the concrete “I” who is thinking philosophically. He thus tries to discourse from the specific viewpoint of this “I,” even if its concreteness might prove to be a secondary effect of the creative life, for it is only in this way that we can realize that such a viewpoint is already mediated. Through such self-limiting self-negation, philosophical thinking must prove itself to be a mediation by which it can be a proof of absolute mediation qua reality. Might these ways of philosophical thinking about “reality” represent one of the most fundamental differentiations of philosophizing? This is too profound a question to answer in this paper. On the basis of the above discussion, we may at least conclude that the philosophical enterprises of Nishida and Tanabe help each other to shake us up and keep us awake to reality as it is. Such stimuli are needed, given our tendency to fall into “dogmatic slumbers,” which means that we are inclined to take it for granted that we are familiar with reality; in fact, we never are.

References Abbreviations N Nishida Kitaro Zenshu [The Complete Works of Nishida Kitaro], Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo, 1965–66 (N3.55 = Vol. 3, p. 55).

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T Tanabe Hajime Zenshu [The Complete Works of Tanabe Hajime], Chikuma Shobo: Tokyo, 1963–64 (T4.421 = Vol. 4, p. 421). All citations from Tanabe’s works are my translations.

Itabashi, Yujin [2008]. Rekishiteki Genjitsu to Nishida Tetsugaku. Tokyo: Houseidaigaku Shuppankyoku [板橋勇仁『歴史的現実と西田哲学──絶対的論理主義とは何か』 法政大学出版局]. Miné, Hideki [2012]: Nishida Tetsugaku to Tanabe Tetsugaku no Taiketsu, Kyoto: Minerva Shobo [嶺秀樹『西田哲学と田辺哲学の対決』ミネルヴァ書房]. Nishida Kitaro [1950]: Zen no Kenkyu, Tokyo: Iwanami-bunko (西田幾多郎『善の研究』 岩波文庫). Nishida Kitaro [1987]. Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview. Translated by D. A. Dilworth. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Nishida Kitaro [1990]: An Inquiry into the Good, trans. Abe Masao/Christopher Ives, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Nishitani, Keiji [1991]. “Nishida Tetsugaku to Tanabe Tetsugaku,” In Tanabe Tetsugaku toha, edited by Nishitani et al. Kyoto: Toueisha. [「西田哲学と田辺哲学」『田辺哲 学とは』西谷他編、灯影舎]. Ueda, Shizuteru [1991]: “Tanabe Tetsugaku to Nishida Tetsugaku,” in: Tanabe Hajime: Shiso to Kaiso, Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 238–278. [上田閑照「田辺哲学と西田哲学」 『田辺元 思想と回想』筑摩書房].

Gereon Kopf (Luther College)

“Nishida, Tanabe, and Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism: A Blueprint for a Critical Philosophy”

The idea of “place” (basho, 場所) is central to the thinking of Japan’s leading twentieth century philosopher NISHIDA Kitaro¯ 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945). His “logic of basho” (basho no ronri 場所の論理) is generally interpreted by critics and disciples alike as a way of locating human existence in the “place of absolute nothingness” (zettai mu no basho 絶対務の場所) or the “self-identity of the absolute contradictories” (mujunteki jiko do¯itsu 矛盾的自己同一). Nishida’s followers hail his philosophy as the solution to the most urgent epistemological dilemma (Robert Wargo 2005), as a philosophy that grounds human knowledge in the religious experience (NKC 9: 95–255, UEDA Shizuteru 1991, Michiko Yusa 2002), or as a philosophical elaboration of the Zen logic vis-à-vis Western philosophy (Masao Abe 2003, 59–97). His critics, on the contrary, accuse him of misleading word games (Nobechi 1997, THZ 6 & 9) and dialectical entanglement (TSZ 4: 183–220). In his book, Critical Buddhism (Hihan bukkyo¯ 批判仏教), HAKAMAYA Noriaki 袴谷憲昭 accused Nishida’s “logic of basho” of being topological, that is, monistic, quietistic, and supportive of the political status quo. The role of philosophy is, however, according to Hakamaya, to be critical and supportive of social activism. In this paper, I will suggest that a comparative reading of Nishida and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) reveals that a philosophy based on the notion of kho¯ra or Nishida’s basho is neither monistic nor quietistic, but rather fulfills the criteria for Hakamaya’s critical philosophy in the wider sense. Specifically, I will argue that a philosophy of basho or, what John D. Caputo calls an “ankho¯ral philosophy” (Caputo 1997, 154), subverts the traditional conceptual structures and rejects a substantativist metaphysics. The result is a philosophy that is highly critical of doctrinal metaphysics, dominant paradigms, and hegemonic political structures. I will argue that, polemic accusations to the contrary, a philosophy of basho or kho¯ra possesses an enormous potential for supporting social change in the sense of Hakamaya’s critical philosophy because it exposes the violence brought forth by the rigidity of substantialist metaphysics.

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the call for critical philosophy

In his 1990 Critical Buddhism, Hakamaya shocked the world of buddhology in Japan and abroad with his bold claim that Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism is not really “Buddhist”. In short, he claims that “the dominant Buddhism in Japan really amounts to little more than Daoist ‘topical Buddhism,’ nothing could be less Buddhist” (Hakamaya 1990, 74) and that Kyoto school philosophers tout “an indigenous East Asian ethos of original enlightenment tinged with German idealism” (ibid., 78). Hakamaya suggests that the corruption of most of East Asian Buddhism is threefold: it discards the original Buddhist principles of causality and critical thought for the notion of “original enlightenment” (tatha¯gatagarbha, hongaku 本覚), language and reason for poetry and intuition, and logical and ethical distinctions for an inclusiveness that fails to differentiate. In particular, he accuses the Kyoto school philosophers of a “neglect of words” (kotoba keishi 言葉軽視) (ibid., 49) and what he refers to as “Nietzsche’s idealism of a “rejection of answers” (kaito¯ kyozetsu 解答拒絶) as well as a “departure from philosophical thought” (tetsugakuteki shisaku o shirizokeru 哲学的 思索を斥ける) (ibid., 51). Hakayama uses Giambbatista Vicco’s (1668–1744) distinction between the critical philosophy of reason and the topological philosophy of the heart as heuristic device to differentiate between critical, that is, true, Buddhism that adheres to the principles of causality and reason and topological, that is, corrupt, Buddhism that is based on the notion of “original enlightenment” as the Buddhist adaptation of the “Dao.” Under critical philosophy, Hakamaya subsumes early Buddhism, the philosophy of the “literati” (rujia 儒家), also referred to as early Confucianism, Cartesian philosophy, modernism, and rationalism; under topological philosophy, Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism, Shinto¯ 神道, German romanticism as well as idealism, and postmodernism. Critical philosophy is rational and privileges the principle of difference while the latter embraces irrationality and the principle of identity. Hakamaya believes that topological philosophy has corrupted all forms of Buddhism that subscribe to the “doctrine of original enlightenment” (tatha¯gatagarbha-va¯da, hongaku shiso¯ 本覚思想), that is, most of East Asian Buddhism. Subsequently, Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism has lost its critical potential because the principle of inclusiveness makes it impossible for the adherents of topological Buddhism to criticize indigenous traditions, which, in the case of Japan, Hakamaya identifies with “emperor system” (tenno¯sei 天皇制), in particular and to commit to social justice in general. Consequently, so Hakayama’s argument, topological Buddhism did not provide the Buddhist thinkers of the early 20th century with the heuristic tools to denounce militarism and was co-opted by it during the first half of the 20th century.

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Hakamaya’s argument is, at the same time, intriguing and frustrating. It is intriguing because he identifies the principles of rationality and difference as necessary criteria for ethics as well as theories of social activism; in addition, he unmasks dangers of a theory of “original enlightenment,” especially if conceived of as substantialist metaphysics, and reveals the trap in which Japanese Buddhist thinkers such as D. T. Suzuki 鈴木大拙 (1870–1966) and NISHITANI Keiji 西谷 啓治 (1900–1990) fell when they justified the militaristic expansionism of Japan in the early 20th century. At the same time, however, Hakamaya’s methodology suffers four basic flaws: 1) It seems a little bit haphazard to assume that Daoism, Hinduism, Shinto¯, Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism, German idealism, and postmodernism share sufficient methodological and ethical characteristics that warrant the overarching category “topological philosophy,” distinguishing them uniformly from early Buddhism, classical Confucianism, modernism, and rationalism. 2) By the same token, it is not that obvious that all thinkers subsumed under the category of “topical philosophy” lack both a critical and rational methodology and any trace of ethics as Hakamaya assumes without advancing a “rational” or “critical” argument to that effect. 3) It is ironic that Hakamaya cites as a primary characteristic of the topology of the Kyoto school, which has to be rejected, that it proposes a “harmony of East and West,” when Hakamaya himself adopts a “Western” classification of philosophy, namely Vicco’s categories, to analyze various philosophical traditions indigenous to South and East Asia. 4) At least some of the philosophical traditions and movements he subsumes under “topological philosophy” such as Derrida’s deconstruction actually employ a topological principle, namely the notion of “kho¯ra,” to develop what Hakamaya would call a “critical philosophy.” If we take his insistence seriously that “critical philosophy” is “critical” of “indigenous” traditions in the sense that Siddhartha Gautama (6th/5th centuries BCE), known as the “Buddha,” and Confucius (6th/5th centuries BCE) questioned prevailing modes of thought and uncritically adopted presuppositions, then, it follows that “critical philosophy” is not necessarily rationalistic – rationalism itself accepts a set of assumptions as beyond critique – but rather a philosophy that challenges hegemonic thinking and mainstream paradigms. It also does not promote the principle of difference to the exclusion of the moment of universality if not identity since, as Jessica Benjamin has pointed out, unbridled belief in difference leads to discrimination (Benjamin 1977) while the very notion of human rights require some sense of universality. Rather, as Mutai Risaku 務䑓理作 (1890–1974) has suggested, humanism that values peace and liberty1 has to reconcile the principles of difference and identity. Such a 1 As I have suggested elsewhere, Mutai argues that “to abolish wars, the number one priority must be to embrace as a rule that it is indispensable to protect world peace and the independence of nations” (MRC 9:217, Kopf 2009a, 84).

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“critical philosophy” is not only not necessarily at odds with some of the thinkers Hakamaya classifies as “topological philosophy” but also is, as I do contend, exemplified by Nishida’s “logic of basho” and Derrida’s deconstruction.

2)

Nishida’s “basho”

When we discuss Nishida’s “logic of basho,” it is important to distinguish between an earlier version, which he introduced in his 1924 From Acting to Seeing (Hataraku mono kara miru mono he 働くものから見るものへ) (NKZ 4: 3–174) and a later version, which he presented in his 1945 The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview (Basho no ronri to shu¯kyo¯teki sekaikan 場所の論理と宗教 的世界観 ) (NKZ 11: 371–464). The former one is, to some degree, susceptible to Hakamaya’s criticism insofar as it can be interpreted as a form of idealism that essentializes the ground of all knowledge as the “place of absolute nothingness” (zettai mu no basho 絶対無の場所) (NKZ 5: 180). Underlying Nishida’s appropriation of Plato’s (5th/4th centuries BCE) “kho¯ra” is the dictum that every “thing that exists” (aru mono あるもの) (NKZ 4: 218) has to be located in a “place” (basho 場所). This implies both that “individual objects” (kobutsu 個物) are located in physical space, and that “to know things… is to assume a field of consciousness” (NKZ 4: 210). Language in general and interpersonal communication in particular presuppose the field of intersubjectivity that Nishida refers to as “I and Thou” (watakushi to nanji 私と汝). All human activity—and here Nishida draws particular attention to knowledge, art, and morality—is located in the “historical world” (rekishiteki sekai 歴史的世界). While Nishida’s investigation is driven by logical and epistemological concerns, comments such as “noema sinks into the noesis” (NKZ 5:162) characteristic of the earlier version of his “logic of basho” seem to give credence to Hakamaya’s critique that Nishida’s philosophy of basho degenerates into an irrational monism in which everything is included without differentiation. However, a close reading of Nishida’s “logic of basho” reveals a more sophisticated philosophical system than Hakamaya gives him credit for. A deeper reading reveals that the phrase “noema sinks into the noesis” indicates that the world of knowledge is not independent from but exists quite literally inside the knowing subject as the idea of the thinker. While this observation may sound counterintuitive on first sight, I think the observation that the world that I know is nothing other than the world I know is rather commonsensical. This absorption of the “noema” (noema ノエマ) in the “noesis” (noeshisuノエシス) Nishida, then, contrasts with the mutual opposition of both

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dimensions, that is, with the noematic aspect of the “historical world.”2 Concretely, the mutual opposition of subjectivism identified as the “noetic direction” (noeshisuteki ho¯ko¯ ノエシス的方向) and objectivism referred to as “noematic direction” (noemateki ho¯ko¯ ノエマ的方向) signifies that the knowing self cannot but encounter public knowledge – including scientific and forensic knowledge – about itself and the objectively given reality Heidegger calls the “factuality” (Faktualität) as something external to its own will and beyond its own power. Nishida’s dialectic does not, or course, stop with the relationship between noema and noesis as well as the noematic and noetic directions but rather discloses a deeper third-level discourse as well. In his essay “The Relationship Between that which Exists in the Universal of Self-Awareness as well as SelfAwareness itself and that which exists in its Back” (Jikakuteki ippansha ni oite arumono oyobi sore to sono haigo ni arumono to no kankei 自覚的一般者に於い てあるもの及それとその背後に於いてあるものとの関係) (NKZ 5: 262– 352), Nishida declares that, in the “self of self-love” ( jiaiteki jiko自愛的自己 ) as well as in “intellectual self-awareness” (chiteki jikaku 知的自覚 ), “the noematic dimension and the noetic dimension are one” (NKZ 5: 187). This is the obvious condition and criterion of self-love and self-awareness. However, and this is important in the context of our discussion here, if the “noematic dimension” (noemamen ノエマ面) maintains a balance between identity and difference and if the “noetic one” (noeshisumen ノエシス面) implies the priority of identity by postulating that difference dissolves in identity, Nishida’s system can be said to maintain both principles, the balance of identity and difference as well as their imbalance. Regardless of how long we pursue this dialectical process its central point remains the same: Nishida does not dissolve difference in identity, but, on the contrary, persistently asserts the necessity of both principles. Nishida calls the layer that includes the opposition and the unity of the noetic and the noematic dimensions “the basho of absolute nothingness” (zettai mu no basho 絶対無の場所) (NKZ 5: 180). It is thus distinguished from the “basho of relative nothingness” (so¯taiteki mu no basho 相対的無の場所; tairitsuteki mu no basho 対立的無の場所) (NKZ 4: 224, 231). In short, “absolute nothingness” possesses a “noematic” (noemateki gentei ノエマ的限定) and a “noetic determination” (noeshiteki gentei ノエシス的限定). Insofar as it maintains the simultaneous unity and opposition of the noetic and noematic dimensions, the principle of “absolute nothingness” allows Nishida to conceive of “self-awareness.” Nishida declares that “when our self touches the self-awareness of absolute nothingness, we can seek the deepest meaning of the noetic determination in 2 I have made this argument in considerable length in my “Between Foundationalism and Relativism – Locating Nishida’s ‘Logic of Basho’ on the ideological Landscape” (Kopf 2003, 34).

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action. Contrary to this action, expression is that which appears noematically” (NKS 5:395). Elsewhere, he explains that insofar the noetic determination is seen noematically in the determination of selfawareness of absolute nothingness, intellect is established. What we call the noematic determination of the self that sees its own nothingness must be something like intellectual intuition” (NKZ 5: 384).

Once Nishida suggests that his most central paradigm expressed in “absolute nothingness” reveals fundamentally the two dimensions of the noematic and the noetic, he in fact concedes that it also includes the aspects of difference and identity. It is thus possible to say that with the introduction of the Husserlian terminology of noesis and noema into his philosophical system,3 Nishida shifted the focus of his philosophy slowly from the epistemological problem of subjectivity and objectivity to the question of whether the underlying paradigm of philosophy should be the principle of identity or that of difference. This shift becomes even more apparent if one examines the foundational concepts Nishida develops later in his career. In his later work, Nishida frames his foundational principle to express this dialectic of the “noematic dimension” and the “noetic dimension” using neologisms such as the “affirmation-qua-negation” (hitei soku kotei 否定即肯定), and the “self-identity of the absolute contradictories” (zettai mujunteki jiko do¯itsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一) (NKZ 8: 506). These concepts seem to conceal Nishida’ thought rather than illuminate it. In fact, they make Nishida’ writings almost unintelligible and cause some readers to disqualify Nishida’s philosophy as mysticism at best and as nonsense at the worst. However, a closer look at these concepts reveals Nishida’s struggle to develop a philosophical paradigm that neither dissolves the noematic dimension in the noetic one completely, nor juxtaposes both dimensions as mutually exclusive opposites but emphasized both aspects. To illustrate the “self-determination of the actual world” (NKZ 8: 488), intersubjectivity, i. e., “the mutual determination among individuals” (NKZ 8: 524), “historical activity” (NKZ 8: 515), and “biological life” (NKZ 8: 469) Nishida introduces the concept “affirmation-yet-negation.” Using this phrase, Nishida seems to say that everything that determines, develops, and expresses itself “affirms itself while, at the same time, negating itself” (NKZ 8: 440). Similarly, Nishida describes the “historical world” as “self-identity of the absolute contradictories” and even as “self-identity of the absolute contradictories of the many and the one” (ta to itsu no zettai mujunteki jiko do¯itsu 多と 一の絶対矛盾的自己同一) to indicate that the world is, at the same time, 3 In his Ideas (Ideen), Edmund Husserl (1850–1959) introduced the terms noesis and noema in his attempt to give a phenomenological analysis of how consciousness works.

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“plural-yet-singular” (ta soku itsu 多即一) (NKZ 9: 95), “creative-yet-created,”4 and “spatial-yet-temporal” (ku¯kan soku jikan 空間即時間) (8: 134, 250).5 The key to these seemingly contradictory phrases, Nishida himself provides in his last essay, “The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview”: [I]t (the absolute) does not face something outside itself as an object, but what we call ‘facing absolute nothingness’ implies that it faces itself as self-contradiction. That which faces itself negates itself…. Insofar as it negates itself outside itself and opposes itself, it is not the absolute. The absolute contains its own absolute self-negation inside itself (NKZ 11: 397–98).

I believe that this passage provides the key to Nishida’s later philosophy: As I have argued elsewhere (Kopf 2014), Nishida does not reject the principle of difference but difference essentialized as dualism in the same way in which he eschews monism as the ideology that reified the principle of oneness. He thus suggests an internalized notion of difference qua “self-negation” ( jiko hitei 自己否定),6 or a “mutual inclusion”7 of opposites that allows him to maintain both principles of difference and identity not as essences in the sense of a Cartesian substance8 but as “mutually determined” (so¯go gentei 相互限定), to use Nishida’s term, opposites. Thus understood, Nishida’s notion of “mutual determination” echoes the de-substantializing tendency of the early Buddhist notion of “co-origination” (pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da). In this sense, the “self-identity of the absolute contradictories” (zettai mujunteki jiko do¯itsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一) can be paraphrased as the “identity of absolute difference” and “many in one, one in many” (tasokuitsu issokuta 多即一 一即多) as “plurality in oneness, oneness in plurality.”

3)

re-reading Nishida’s logic of basho

But how can we understand this “difference in identity” and “identity in difference”? Quite unsurprisingly, Nishida’s commentators and critics alike did not agree on this question. In my essay “Between Identity and Difference: Three Ways 4 Nishida uses the phrase “from the created to the creating” (tsukurareta mono kara tsukuru mono e 作られたものから作るものへ) to express the dynamicity of the historical process (NKZ 9: 152). 5 For Nishida’s larger argument see NKZ 9: 152. 6 Nishida suggests that “the self-determination of the self that sees nothingness must include its own self-negation to some degree” (NKZ 5: 390). 7 I borrow this term from Jin Y. Park (Park 2006, 11). 8 René Descartes (1596–1650) proposes that “[b]y substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” (Descartes 1985, 210).

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of Reading Nishida’s Non-Dualism,” I suggested that it is possible to identify three ways of reading Nishida’s “logic of basho.” As I already indicated in my introduction it is possible to interpret Nishida’s central paradigm as a rejection of logic, the privileging of the principle of identity, and as the foundation for a nondual philosophy. Among all of Nishida’s critics, TAKAHASHI Satomi 高橋里美 (1886–1964) is the least polemic and the most thorough one. Nishida himself attributed some of the revisions he made to his concepts, mostly his abandonment of the notion of “pure experience” ( junsui keiken 純粋経験) to Takahashi. In short, Takahashi suggests that the concept of “pure experience,” as introduced by Nishida in his Inquiry Into the Good (Zen no kenkyu¯ 善の研究), cannot be distinguished from its opposite, “impure experience” (hijunsui keiken 非純粋経験), and, consequently, is meaningless. Concretely, Takahashi argues that while Nishida defines “pure experience” as “unifying activity” (to¯itsu sayo¯ 統一作用) (NKZ 1: 14, 43, 69), if in the unity there necessarily exists an opposition that is to be unified and if in opposition there exists a unity that can be opposed, even the standpoint of opposition constitutes a pure experience and the consciousness of unity an impure experience (TSZ 4:168).

In other words, if unity includes opposition and vice versa, unity and opposition and, by extension, purity and impurity become interchangeable and their distinction meaningless. It is interesting that Nishida concedes in his response to Takahashi that “pure experience” and “impure experience” “have to be thought of as different views of one object” (NKZ 1: 300–1) and that “the difference between the pure experience and the impure experience, i. e., the difference between unity (to¯itsu 統一) and disunity (futo¯itsu 不統一) probably disappears” (NKZ 1: 309). UEDA Shizuteru 上田閑照, one of Nishida’ loyal supporters admits that [t]he difference between pure experience and impure experience must have the meaning of the unity and disunity of experience. In original experience, there is neither purity nor impurity, neither unity nor disunity. Strictly speaking experience constitutes a complete identity” (Ueda 1991, 75).

And this is wherein the problem lies: Any system that denies the distinction between purity and impurity as well as between unity and disunity not only justifies slogans such as “discrimination is equality, and equality is differentiation” (Suzuki as qtd. in Sato¯ 2008, 67), which, e. g., D. T. Suzuki used to justify Japanese imperialism during the Pacific War but also seem to supports Hakamaya’s assessment that Nishida’s philosophy constitutes a “neglect of words,” a “rejection of answers,” and a “departure from philosophical thought.”

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If it is impossible to distinguish between purity and impurity, moral and religious practices are meaningless and everything is permitted. Of course, Nishida’s supporters claim that the strength of Nishida’s position lies in the fact that it overcomes all dualisms including the one between the principles of identity and difference and thus between dualism and monism. The two foremost representatives of the group of philosophers who believe that Nishida’s philosophy has to be interpreted as a philosophy of self-identity are Nishitani and Mutai. Addressing the accusation that Nishida’s notion of “unity” falls into a contradiction and thus renders itself absurd directly, Nishitani suggests that “[u]nity and contradiction constitute two aspects of the same identity, because of unity there is contradiction, because of contradiction unity. Now, the difference between self and other as well as the opposition between subject and object constitute the most fundamental difference and opposition respectively from which all other distinctions and oppositions arise. However, the infinite unifying power transcends even these (NKC 9: 138).

Nishitani clearly presumes that the reason Nishida chose “pure experience” qua “unifying activity” as the first paradigm for his philosophy was his desire to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, self and other, unity and contradiction. However, this reconciliation between the two polarities of binary systems is only possible, Nishitani implies, if one’s philosophical is based on the notion of “unity.” Mutai, like Nishitani a second generation philosopher of the Kyoto school who studied under both Nishida and his successor, TANABE Hajime 田辺元 (1889– 1962), framed this position quite differently and proposes the notion of “selfidentity” ( jiko do¯itsu 自己同一) as the foundational paradigm of a philosophical system that succumbs to neither monism nor dualism. The advantage the principle of “self-identity” has over “unity” is that it implies reflexivity, negation, and even contradiction within itself as its basic characteristic. Since this passage is central to understanding Nishida’s “logic of basho,” I have cited it here in full length. That which is mediated by the moment of negation is, as I said before, mediated by the negation of negation. The negation of negation is not a simple negation (universal negation), it constitutes Insichsein. Insichsein is that which is identical to itself. However, it does not constitute a mere self-identity (in this case the movement could not be thought), but it comprises the difference between self and other and, after it has traversed this difference, returns to self-identity. It does not see the identity with itself in the other that is different from and opposed to the self; that is, it is not the self-identity that exists merely inside the self, but it does return to itself carrying the identity with the other that is opposed to the self. Therefore, the negation of negation is not simply the negating activity, neither does it pile two layers (of negation) on top of each other, but it

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is the self-identity that cannot be reached by subjective consciousness and indicates the fact that self and other while mutually and deeply different share, at the same time, the same self-identity. Logic clarifies this movement, but it implies the self-determination of that which is self-identical and, while containing a contradiction within itself, transcends this contradiction. At the same time it indicates the self-identity of that which sees itself at the bottom of the contradiction and which maintains its self-identity in that it sees itself (Mutai 1996, 50).

In this admittedly lengthy passage from his Logic of Basho (Basho no ronrigaku 場所の論理学), Mutai insists that Nishida’s project requires that the principles of negation, otherness, and difference be not dissolved in unity and identity. He thus points out the fundamental concern of Nishida’s “logic of basho.” However, his terminology still prefers the principle of oneness and thus seems to preclude the dialectics of the balance between identity and difference and their imbalance. Thus, I would like to suggest a third possible interpretation of Nishida’s “logic of basho” as developed in the later part of his life. I believe that the clues for this third interpretation of Nishida’s philosophy can be found ironically in the work of some of his greatest critics, Takahashi and Tanabe. While Takahashi was fiercely opposed to Nishida’s early philosophy of “pure experience,” his own philosophy does not sound so different from Nishida’s later philosophy as discussed above and as expressed in concepts such as “affirmation-qua-negation.” Takahashi defines “absolute nothingness” as follows: “Absolute nothingness is not that which determines itself in being. That which is thought to determine itself in being is not absolute nothingness; after all, this would be a nothingness that opposes being in a relationship.” And, “absolute nothingness neither determines itself nor is determined by structural existence” (TSZ 1:238). While the claim that absolute nothingness opposes nothing sounds like Nishida himself, the comment that the absolute does not determine itself shows a remarkable difference to Nishida’s system. To Nishida, absolute nothingness determines itself in the “eternal now” (eien no ima 永遠の今) and the “eternal present” (eien no genzai 永遠の現在) (NKZ 6: 189) in the “historical world” (NKZ 7:231). In contrast, Takahashi suggest that “[e]ven if it seems suitable to say that the dialectics that envisions the totality-as-part and the partas-totality expresses the particular aspect of the relativity in the relationship of the totality and the part, the truth can not be revealed.” Ultimately, “finitude is always different from infinity; the finite can never become the infinite” (TSZ 5:9). And, elsewhere he concludes that “[t]he totality can be experienced completely only on the final step of the dialectical process” (TSZ 3: 287). In other words, Takahashi holds his infinitely deferred totality against Nishida’s absolute that determines itself in the phenomenal world now. The systems of these two thinkers could not be different and yet, ironically, they share two fundamental characteristics that provide the key to understanding Nishida’s philosophy: both

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affirm that difference is irreducible; both envision an infinite process: Even in Nishida’s system, “absolute nothingness” “negates itself infinitely” (NKZ 7: 331), “can be thought of as the world which comes into being through a process of infinite creation” (NKZ 7: 231), and “determines itself infinitely inside itself” (NKZ 6: 67). Both Takahashi and Nishida suggest in their own ways what Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) will later call “infinite deferral” (Derrida 1982, 13; Hobson 1998, 48). The second clue for such an interpretation of Nishida’s “logic of basho” can be found in the philosophy of TANABE Hajime. Incorporating Nishida’s non-dualistic paradigm and Takahashi’s sensitivity for the problems the postulate of a contradiction entails, Tanabe suggests a third solution, namely interpreting the non-dual paradigm Nishida developed as “absolute critique” (zettai hihan 絶対 批判). Tanabe introduces this concept in his Philosophy as Metanoetics9 (Zangedo¯ toshite no tetsugaku 懺悔道としての哲学) (THZ 9: 1–270). In this volume Tanabe argues that, as the title already implies, that the fundamental purpose of philosophy has to be found in the act of self-reflection and in a self-corrective philosophical method. I call this attitude that interrogates the self and its motivation “introvert critique” in order to juxtapose it to the criticism of others and external views, which I refer to as “extrovert critique.” Tanabe wrote this volume, which was published in late 1945, partly to come to terms with the fact that he and quite a few members of the Kyoto school had succumbed to varying degrees to the seductive rhetoric of Japanese imperialism and militarism at the beginning of the 20th century.10 As a critique of an uncritical acceptance of mainstream ideology as well as a call to humility, self-reflection, and conversion, this work already responded to Hakamaya’s call for a critical philosophy proactively forty five years before Hakamaya penned his Critical Buddhism. Be that as it may, Tanabe’s central contribution in his Philosophy as Metanoetics is the notion of “absolute critique,” which “forms the theoretical dimension of “embodied conversion” (metanoetics) (THZ 9: 46). Tanabe compares “absolute critique” to the notion of “great death” (daishi 大死) (THZ 9: 47) in Zen Buddhist thought. To Tanabe, “critical philosophy” (hihan tetsugaku 批判哲学) commences with a radical interrogation of the self and the method of inquiry it applies. Using phrases strangely reminiscent of Nishida’s definition of the “absolute” introduced above Tanabe explains that

9 I borrow the English rendition of the title from James W. Heisig’s translation of Zangedo¯ toshite no tetsugaku (Tanabe 1986). 10 A good introduction to the various kinds and degrees of ways in which Kyoto school philosophers were involved in the propaganda machine of imperial Japan can be found in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism edited by James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo and published by the University of Hawai’i Press in 1995.

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when reason criticizes reason, does the reason doing the criticizing stand outside of the critique as a criticizing subject, without becoming an object of criticism? If this is the case, the critique of reason cannot be a thorough critique of reason in its entirety” (THZ 9: 47; Tanabe 1986, 38).

In the same sense in which Nishida argues that what “negates itself outside itself and opposes itself … is not the absolute” and that “the absolute contains its own absolute self-negation inside itself,” Tanabe contends that a critique that critiques its object and even its own method from the outside does not qualify as “absolute critique.” Like the external criticism of philosophical positions, the extrovert critique performed by a self simply projects one’s own standpoint and presuppositions onto the object of its critique or even an interlocutor. Such a relative criticism only judges the other by one’s own standards but neither clarifies one’s own standpoint nor that of the other. A “critique of reason in its entirety,” so Tanabe, necessitates a great death, a “self-awareness” ( jikaku 自覚), which “break[s] through itself by awakening to a consciousness of nothingness, a “self-criticism” ( jikohihan 自己批判), which interrogates the “impassable antinomies of the one and the many, the whole and the individual, infinity and finitude, determinacy and spontaneity, necessity and freedom,” and a criticism “that has no alternative but to surrender itself to this crisis of self-disruption ( jiko bunretsu 自己分裂), and to overcome it by allowing itself to be shattered to pieces” (THZ 9: 48; Tanabe 1986, 38). Waking up to the destruction brought about by the self-delusional impulse that drove the imperialist project and the intellectuals that succumbed to its dream world, Tanabe fashions a heartfelt and impassioned rebuttal of any position that puts the self at the center11 of its universe including Kant’s transcendent subjectivism and what he seems to characterize as haphazard attempts at a critical philosophy. He demands nothing more than an absolute critique that radically questions the self, its standpoint, and even the self ’s method of inquiry itself. Criticism has to disrupt one’s intellectual slumber and unsettle what is comfortable. What is interesting about his stratification of the “absolute critique,” however, is that he advances his critical philosophy by using conceptual structures reminiscent of Nishida’s non-dualism if not “logic of basho.” Not only does his blueprint of the “absolute critique” cited above evoke Nishida’s definition of the “absolute,” he also describes the principle of “absolute negation” ( jiko hitei 自己 否定) – this term happens to be a key concept in the later Nishida as well – with expressions that echo the phrases Nishida utilizes to illustrate his “self-identity of absolute contradictories.” According to Tanabe, “the contradiction based on ri, or the contradiction between ri and ji, is transformed into absolute negation 11 Tanabe defines “absolute critique” as “critique without a criticizing subject” (THZ 9: 50, Tanabe 1986, 41).

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through practice in accordance with ji, and establishes action-faith that effects an interpenetration of ri and ji”12 (THZ 9: 50; Tanabe 1986, 40). He also coins the phrase “self-power-and-yet-other-power” ( jiriki soku tariki 自力即他力) (THZ 9:50) using the soku-phrase not unlike Nishida does to express the mutual determination of opposites. I take this similarity in phraseology to mean that, even though Tanabe clearly distinguishes his approach from Nishida’s and even though both thinkers engaged in different projects, Nishida’s notion of the “selfidentity of absolute contradictories” has the potential to similarly function as “absolute critique.” Since the “logic of basho” is defined in the dialectics of identity of difference, Hakamaya’s criticism of Nishida’s philosophy does not apply. To the contrary, if the moment of difference is included in the conception of “basho,” it is possible to argue that basho constitutes a self-corrective principle and functions as “absolute critique.” If this is the case, Nishida’s “logic of basho” qualifies as critical philosophy.

4)

Nishida’s logic of basho as critical philosophy

While Nishida does not use the term “absolute critique” to refer to his own philosophy or its ideal, I believe that this concept perfectly captures the intent of Nishida’s “logic of basho.” ITABASHI Yu¯jin 板橋勇仁 takes this thought a step further when he interprets Nishida’s “logic of basho” as “radical criticism” (tetteiteki hihan shugi 徹底的批判主義) – literally, “exhaustive” or “pervasive criticism” – based on an often overlooked side comment by Nishida himself.13 On the last page of his “The World of Intelligibility” (eichiteki sekai 叡智的世界) (NKZ 5: 123–185), Nishida pronounces that I attempt to illuminate the foundation of the formation of knowledge as well as the order and mutual relationship among the various forms of knowledge from the standpoint of radical criticism while identifying the role and standpoint of each of these layers of knowledge” (NKZ 5: 184).

Nishida claims here that his philosophy is not only critical but radically critical since it investigates the foundation as well as the structure of knowledge. Even though Nishida does not refer to his philosophy as “radical criticism” elsewhere, 12 Tanabe’s phrase “rijiso¯nyu¯” 理事相入 evokes the Huayan terminology of “rijimuge” 理事無 礙 (literally, the “non-obstruction of ri and ji”), which Nishida explicitly identifies as inspiration for his mature philosophy (NKZ 10: 414). “So¯nyu¯” is sometimes used interchangeably with “muge” in the Buddhist canon (Muller 2002) and phrases that relate “riji” to “so¯nyu¯” do occur in Huayan Buddhist texts. 13 In a separate volume, Itabashi identifies the philosophical method in Nishida’s later work as “absolute logic” (zettai ronri 絶対論理) (Itabashi 2008).

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Itabashi argues convincingly that this category provides an accurate description of Nishida’s “logic of basho” which surpasses “even Kant’s criticism” and discloses the “universal of intelligibility” (eichiteki ippansha 叡智的一般者) (Itabashi 2004, 167). While Nishida’s and Itabashi’s use of “hihan” 批判, which can be translated depending on the context as either “critical” or “critique” is certainly different from Hakamaya’s use and perhaps even Tanabe’s, it is worth exploring in what role this central term takes on in the system of these four thinkers. What does Nishida mean, when he refers to his standpoint as one of “radical criticism”? It is interesting that even though Nishida mentions this term only once in his complete works, Itabashi does think that it is of importance to Nishida’s system or at least helpful in elucidating Nishida’s project. What is “radical criticism”? Since this is crucial to my argument, I cite the complete section, in which Itabashi sets Nishida’s “radical criticism” against Kant’s “criticism” (hihan shugi 批判主 義), Aristotle’s logic, and the specific accusation that Nishida’s philosophy violates the laws of logic, in full. The context of this section is a larger discussion as to what place Nishida’s “logic of basho” inhabits in Nishida’s own philosophical system as well as in the philosophical discourse in general. Consequently, the point in Nishida’s development that Nishida decided his standpoint wherein the basho of absolute nothingness takes on the position of true consciousness in the light of the epistemology of subjectivism and idealism (“doctrine of consciousness”) which still carries over remnants of the subject-object dualism is irrelevant. The standpoint Nishida develops from the problem of consciousness constitutes a discourse on the internality of consciousness developed simply from the fact of consciousness and, at the same time, something that is completely different from such a subjectivism. In fact, in this logic of basho, important phenomena such as the other, the body, and history are not yet sufficiently addressed. But Nishida’s logic, which addresses the basho of absolute nothingness as true consciousness, rejects dogmatism and constitutes a theory of things internal to consciousness that succeeds in a self-aware methodological reflection and that grounds objective knowledge as well as the philosophical logic that clarifies it. Therein lies the significance of Nishida’s logic. Its positive meaning is not that it abandons Kantian critical philosophy or that it arrives at a place where it ceases to use philosophical logic as logic, but, to the contrary, that it constitutes a criticism in the true meaning of the word, a radical criticism (my emphasis). Rather, in this radical criticism, Nishida’s project to develop a logic of absolute nothingness has the purpose to confront Aristotle’s substance driven “logic of the grammatical subject” itself, which, according to Nishida himself, constitutes the traditional logic in the background of Western culture. Nishida’s thought absolutely denies the distinction between East and West and should be valued as an attempt that asks the question about the significance of logic in the most pure and basic fashion to test the tenability of philosophical systems (Itabashi 2004, 146).

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Here, Itabashi lists four basic characteristics of Nishida’s “radical criticism”: 1) it eschews the dogmatism of the traditional alternative of materialism and idealism; 2) engages in “self-aware methodological reflection”; 3) proposes a phenomenology of consciousness that provides an analysis of the assumptions underlying Aristotelian logic, Kant’s transcendental subjectivism, and Nishida’s own “logic of basho”; 4) abolishes all kinds of dualism including the “distinction between East and West.” Most of all, however, Itabashi states that Nishida provides a critical method to examine all philosophical systems including his own. Overall, Itabashi makes an interesting move. Not only does he think that Nishida’s philosophy eschews the pitfalls of logical contradiction and the “neglect of words” discussed above, the more, Itabashi claims that Nishida’s philosophy is “radically critical.” What does he mean by that? Itabashi does suggest that Nishida’s “logic of basho” not only investigates the structure and foundation of our knowledge but, moreover, itself as philosophical method. When Nishida talks about the “negating itself within oneself,” he does not only verbalize a paradigm to conceive of the historical formation of the world or self-awareness, respectively, he also suggests that any philosophical inquiry has to examine its own presuppositions. This is the significance of Tanabe’s “absolute criticism.” Takahashi similarly suggests that dialectics, if taken seriously,14 “must transform itself dialectically into anti-dialectics” (TSZ 3:292). Takahashi calls this philosophical method that negates itself “inclusive dialectics” (ho¯bensho¯ho¯ 包弁証法) (TSZ 3: 291). What makes Nishida’s “logic of basho” “radically critical” is that its foundational paradigm, “absolute nothingness,” contains its own “self-negation” ( jikohitei 自己否定) as corrective principle and thus is capable of facilitating an introvert as well as an extrovert critique. In other words, the “logic of basho,” Itabashi argues, provides a philosophical method to investigate not only our epistemological assumptions but our methodological ones as well. Contrary to Hakamaya’s suspicion, Nishida’s philosophy as expressed by neologisms such as “absolute nothingness” and “affirmation-qua-negation” does not constitute a “departure from philosophical thought” but rather what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) would call the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein 1953, 47).

14 In his Phänomenologie des Geistes, Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) suggests that a philosophical method is applied to itself to avoid that a priori assumptions undermine one’s method (Hegel 1970, 75).

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Nishida’s philosophy as subversive philosophy

In this paper, I have shown that Nishida’s conception of “affirmation-and-yetnegation” can be understood as an expression of “radical criticism,” that is, as a self-corrective principle that eschews essentialism and facilitates what I call “extrovert critique” and “introvert critique” alike. By the same token, Nishida’s philosophy can be understood as critical philosophy. But how can we conceive of Nishida’s later philosophy as critical philosophy? Elsewhere I have argued that Nishida’s later philosophy shares at least three similarities with Derrida’s deconstruction and thus should be understood as subversive philosophy. In “Language Games, Selflessness, and the Death of God; A/Theology in Contemporary Zen Philosophy and Deconstruction,” I have suggested that [h]owever, it is not only Nishida’s overall project to subvert the substantialist and dualistic paradigms that can be compared to Derridean deconstruction; in addition, his approach to the terminology of the philosophical traditions he inherits reveals some similarities with Derrida’s deconstructive method. Where Derrida uses the terminology of différance, Nishida employs phrases that incorporate the Japanese word “soku” (即). One of the most famous examples of this phraseology is his notion “affirmation-andyet-negation” (Kopf 2010, 162).

In short, I believe that one can identify four basic similarities between the philosophical approaches of Nishida and Derrida: 1) both critique substantialism in metaphysics as well as in political philosophy; 2) there are similarities between Nishida’s infinite process of self-negation and Derrida’s “infinite deferral”; they share 3) an interpretation of Plato’s khora as the ambiguous and irreducible tension between opposites 4) and a philosophy of language that destabilizes the notion of meaning and prevents even the thought of reifying concepts into a substantialist metaphysics. Since the former two similarities are not really controversial, I would like to focus on the latter two in this essay. As I have discussed in length above, Nishida refuses to dissolve differences in an elusive oneness as well as to reify them into a dualism. Instead, Nishida argues that to be able to conceive of the world in binaries as we do and to imagine a consciousness that does conceive of the world within a binary matrix, we need to postulate a “place of absolute nothingness” that constitutes an “affirmation-andyet-negation” as well as that which is “one-and-yet-many” (issokuta 一即多) and that, as “absolute,” “contains its own absolute self-negation inside itself.” Nishida defines “basho” as “the place that constitutes the self-identity of contradictories of one and the many” (NKZ 11: 344). Thus defined, the “basho” encompasses, simultaneously, the moments of affirmation and negation, of difference and identity, as well as of multiplicity and oneness. Nishida’s argument here is twofold: the binaries that structure and frame our worldview are

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irreducibly opposite, complementary, and “mutually determined” (so¯go gentei 相互限定); at the same time, they necessitate a “place” that includes both in potentiality and actuality. In his recent analysis of Nishida’s “mature philosophy,” John W. M. Krummel suggests Nishida’s dialectic involves the play between being and non-being, affirmation and negation, in other words, logical contradictories, which from a trans-logical perspective can be seen as bi-conditionals in that each implies the other and conditions as the contradictory that it is. We have seen how this involves a radical dialectic of mutual selfnegation ( jiko hitei 自己否定) precluding any conceptual synthetic resolution of the opposites (Krummel 2015, 192).

The polarities that maintain our binary systems are thus “mutually inclusive” rather than exclusive. However, these binary opposites constitute a contradiction only in a world that is conditioned, determined, and reified. As Krummel himself observes, “the self ’s affirmation requires its prior delimitation by environing conditions, a negation that can give shape to the affirmation” (Krummel 2015, 192). But this determination of the self vis-à-vis an other on the plane of consciousness and even in the historical world requires that, ultimately, the self does not oppose the other as external negation but as an internal one. As Krummel points out, “[i]ts affirmation is obtained only in self-negation, that is de-substantialization, to preclude any substantial inter-obstruction of others” (Krummel 2015, 192). Nishida’s terminology thus does not indicate a challenge to or violation of logic but rather a rejection of the substantialist worldview that presents a freeze-frame of reality rather than the vision of a dynamic history wherein individuals inter-act. As a criticism of substantialism, however, Nishida’s philosophy discloses more affinities with Derrida’s philosophical deconstruction than with an abrogation of rationality and logic, a flight into the mystical, or Hakamaya’s caricature of what he calls “topological philosophy.” Of course, Hakamaya would reject Derrida as topological philosophy as well, but, similar to his denunciation of Nishida’ s philosophy, a rejection of deconstruction would be based on misreading the notion of “place.” Like Nishida, Derrida utilizes Plato’s “khora” as his foundational paradigm. And like Nishida, Derrida uses the rhetorical inclusion of opposites to indicate the destabilizing effect khora and our awareness thereof has on our worldview. Derrida explains that [a]s it is neither this nor that (neither intelligible nor sensible), one may speak as if it were a joint participant in both. Neither/nor easily becomes both…and, both this and that…. Khora is nothing positive or negative. It is impassive, but it is neither passive nor active (Jacques Derrida 1992, 105 & 107).

Like Nishida’s “basho,” Derrida’s concept of “khora” discloses the ambiguities inherent in our worldviews. However, while Nishida uses his reading of Plato’s

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“khora” to discuss the “place” of consciousness and logic, Derrida is more interested in the internal working of language. Despite their differing agendas, both thinkers suggest that “khora” or “basho,” respectively, is limited to “neither Being nor Nothing, God nor Man, Nature nor History, Matter nor Spirit” (Caputo 1997, 156) and thus “constitute[] a third species” (Derrida 1992a, 104) or the “middle” (Mitte) (Taylor 1984, 116). Basho/khora functions as the third term, which, simultaneously, grounds and subverts the dichotomies that makes up the conscious, logical, and linguistic frameworks we use to interpret and organize our experience. This, admittedly quick, comparison to Derrida’s “khora” illustrates that Nishida’s “logic of basho” subverts essentialism, dualism, and the belief in a centered universe. Not unlike Derrida’s reading of “khora”, Nishida’s “absolute,” which “contains its own absolute self-negation inside itself” signifies a place that, simultaneously, affirms and negates, discloses and conceals the phenomena of human experience. Mark Taylor refers to such as “place” that signifies the “decentered whole,” wherein the “one” is expressed in each of the “many,” and the “untotalizable totality of negativity” (Taylor 1984, 111), which is, at the same time, absolute yet “infinitely deferred” (Bennington 1994, 41), and affirms itself through self-negation, as “divine milieu” (Taylor 1984, 112). Taylor explains that [t]his milieu marks a middle way that is thoroughly liminal. At this threshold opposites cross. The margin itself, however, is not reducible to the extremes whose mean it forms. The medium, in other words, can never be contained, captured, or caught by any fixed pair of terms. Consequently, the milieu is always para-doxical (Taylor 1984, 115).

As “divine milieu” basho/khora “mediates” (baikai 媒介) between the binary opposites that structure the fields of human experience as well as our linguistic interpretations thereof. It constitutes the center and the margin of our field of consciousness and requires a structure, which, when seen in light of our hermeneutical frameworks, be they logical, linguistic, or conscious, seems paradoxical or self-contradictory. Most of all, however, the “divine milieu” staked out by basho/khora constitutes a subversive force that destabilizes every attempt at constructing an essentialist if not foundationalist ideology.

6)

an attempt at a critical philosophy

In the remaining section of the paper, I would like to introduce two examples of how Nishida’s “logic of basho” can be interpreted as “critical philosophy.” In particular, I will demonstrate how the notion of “affirmation-and-yet-negation” is designed to destabilize our use of language as well as our conception of “self.” As I have indicated above and argued elsewhere (Kopf 2010), I believe that

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Nishida uses the phrase “soku” 即 in a sense not unlike Derrida’s “différance.” Derrida’s “différance” in that it constitutes the elusive ambiguity by means of which “performed language” (parole) discloses and conceals. Derrida explains that “‘différance,’ which is neither a word nor a concept, strategically seemed to me the most proper one to think, if to master … what is most irreducible in our ‘era’” (Derrida 1982, 7). He chooses the term “différance” because it captures the obvious ambiguity of the verb “différer”: We know that the verb différer (Latin verb differre) has two meanings which seem quite distinct … Différer in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse consciously and unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of ‘desire” or ‘will’ … The other sense of différer is the more common and identifiable one: to be not identical, to be other, discernible, etc (Derrida 1982, 7–8).

In short, the concept of “différance” indicates the difference and abyss between parole and langue (“language system”), “signifier” (signifiant) and “signified” (signifié), as well as intent and meaning, on the one side, and suggests that the disclosure of the meaning of a sign is eternally deferred, on the other. Derrida explains that “[e]very concept is inscribed in a system within which it refers to the other, other concepts, by means of a systematic play of differences” (Derrida 1982, 11). The meaning of words and characters is thus highly ambiguous. As I wrote elsewhere, [c]oncepts reveal first of all the intertextuality by which they are determined and the multiplicity of differences embodied by the sign; they, as Martin Heidegger pointed out, simultaneously disclose and conceal meaning. For this reason, the deconstructionist crosses out signs such as ‘is’ as well as “Being” and puts them ‘under erasure’15 to read ‘is’ and ‘Being’” (Kopf 2010, 161).

Derrida suggests to write concepts “under erasure” to indicate the inherent ambiguity of linguistic signs. Jin Y. Park suggests, that, “différance” functions in Derrida’s approach not unlike the way “emptiness” (s´u¯nyata¯) functions in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s: “Différance is a Derridean term for devoid-ness of the self-nature of being, when identity is understood as non-identity” (Park 2007, 202). “Différance” indicates an openness in which meaning is created but which can never be 15 Heidegger introduces the method of “crossing out” signs such as “is” and “Being” to indicate the inconceivability and primacy of “Being.” Derrida, in comparison, puts the trace under erasure to indicate the ambivalence of signs and to critique Heidegger for assigning “Being” a privileged position and thus suggesting a metaphysics of presence. When I write terms such as “god” and “absolute” under erasure in this essay, I do so in the Derridean sense of “crossing out” the sign as well as the erasure itself and denying the signifier any privileged position in the system of signs called metaphysics. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface,” Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatris C. Spivak (Balitmore: John Hopkins Press, 1974), ix– lxxxvii.

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bridged. Concepts disclose and conceal, affirm and negate, and thus should never be reified or absolutized. Such a philosophy makes it impossible to construct or maintain absolute ideologies; to the contrary, a philosophy of différance reminds us that all metaphysical and moral commitments have to be continuously deconstructed. Even though, it was developed in a different historical and discursive context, I believe that Nishida’s use of “soku” similarly functions to subvert conceptual and ideological commitments. Some interpreters of Nishida follow the lead of D. T. Suzuki and claim that what he calls the “logic of sokuhi” 即非 implies a collapse of logic and a retreat to direct experience over language (SDZ 5: 381). I respectfully disagree. Already the Diamond Su¯tra (Vajracchedika¯ prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ su¯tra) (T 8.235), which both Suzuki and Nishida identify as their source for the phrases “sokuhi” and “soku” (NKZ 11: 398), respectively, uses phrases that include the characters “sokuhi” 即非 to subvert language and destroy the myth of a one-toone relationship between signifier and signified. One example of a typical usage of the sokuhi-phrases in the Diamond Su¯tra is “what we call ‘all dharmas’ is not all dharmas; that’s why we call them ‘all dharmas’” (T 8.235.751). If we analyze this passage, we can see that the topic of discussion is not the external reality of but the conception of “all dharmas.” More specifically, this passage observes that the concept “all dharmas” is not identical to the reality referred as such and, thus, reveals the abyss between signifier and signified as well as the infinite deferral of meaning indicated by the concept “différance.” Nishida’s soku-phrases similarly evoke or, more appropriately, anticipate Derrida’s notion of “différance” insofar as they destabilize their own meaning in the interplay of “affirmation-and-yet-negation” (ko¯tei soku hitei 肯定即否定) as well as the ability of the larger linguistic structure to provide a meaning-bestowing framework. Not only does Nishida juxtapose opposites such as “affirmation” and “negation,” “one” and “many,” as well as “being” (yu¯ 有) and “nonbeing” (mu 無) in the form of a “third species” à la Derrida’s “khora” or Taylor’s “divine milieu,” moreover, he describes their relationship as a “self-identity of the absolute contradictories” (zettai mujunteki jiko ditsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一). It is for this reason that John C. Maraldo observes that “soku” indicates “not merely a juxtaposition …, not merely a relativity …, not a transformation .., not [a] in on respect … in another …. Rather a simultaneous co-habitation of a space … a place itself hidden by the terms and revealed by following their self-negation” (Maraldo 2003, 40). In other words, “‘[s]oku’ does not signify an equation of opposites; rather it indicates that a term cannot be conceived of independent of its opposite and, even stronger, that a concept obscures what it is supposed to signify and that the signified can be only illuminated in the light of the selfnegation of the signifier” (Kopf 2010, 162–3). In short, I believe that these sokuphrases constitute Nishida’s way of writing “under erasure.” The reason for

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Nishida’s use of these phrases is obvious: Nishida designed the phrases of the form “A-soku-not-A” to subvert all forms of dualism, essentialism, and ideology. These phrases are an indication that Nishida’s philosophy is subversive insofar as they are not a product of a “neglect of words” but rather designed to facilitate a “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” A second but equally persuasive illustration of how a philosophy based on the principles of “self-negation” and “affirmation-and-yet-negation” can function as subversive philosophy is his conception of the relationship between self and other.16 In short, Nishida conceives of the relationship between self and other as one of “mutual determination.” What does this expression mean concretely? Nishida argues that “the self denies itself and must possess the meaning of becoming the self by recognizing the other. This means that insofar as the self recognizes the other as other it becomes the self” (NKZ 7: 85–6). The formative moment for the self lies in its relationship to and recognition by the other. In the face of the other, the self becomes itself. I am who I am in the moment when I recognize that the other recognizes me. This moment of mutual recognition reveals not only that self and other determine each other dialectically but also that their existences are inextricably intertwined (NKZ 7: 267). The self cannot exist without the other and vice versa. We do not constitute independent substances, souls, or transcendental subjectivities but we are who we are only in the face of concrete others and in relationship with abstract alterity. Our individuality, selfhood, and personality is contingent on whom we encounter in person, in discourses, or in the public realm. We are, Nishida proposes in no uncertain words, “expressions” (hyo¯gen 表現) of the historical world (NKZ 7: 267). At the same time, this relationship of mutual recognition and determination functions as a basho/khora in the sense of a “third species” that “marks,” as Taylor proposes in the passage quoted above, “a middle way that is thoroughly liminal” where “opposites cross,” that “is not reducible to the extremes whose mean it forms” and that it “can never be contained, captured, or caught by any fixed pair of terms.” Nishida calls what Taylor named “divine milieu” the “absolute other.” Our relationships and, more deeply, our relationality, open/s up a space where the self is affirmed and negated at the same time in the dialectics of mutual determination. Nishida explains that “the self includes the absolute other inside itself; the self includes absolute negation inside itself” (NKZ 6: 381). As “absolute other” my relationship to another self shapes me and challenges me; it affirms and threatens my identity; it opens up infinite possibilities as well as bottomless despair. 16 For an engaging discussion of the similarities among and the differences between Nishida’s and Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) dialogical philosophy see James Heisig’s Much Ado About Nothingness (Heisig 2015: 85–130).

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How are we to understand this dialogic of mutual determination? How does it disclose a subversive if not critical philosophy? I believe the dialogical relationship of self and other described by Nishida has three direct application. 1) It gives us a language to conceive of the interaction between disciples and their teachers in the canonized texts of the Chan Buddhism. Investigating the in/famous encounter dialogue between Bodhidharma (~ 500), the so-called first and, most likely, mythical Chinese patriarch of Chan Buddhism and his four disciples, Do¯gen paraphrases the words of Bodhidharma as follows: “You should know that there is ‘you are attaining me,’ ‘I am attaining you,’ ‘attaining me and you,’ and ‘attaining you and me’” (DZZ 1: 333). Here, Do¯gen replaces the notion of individuality with that of inbetweenness and relationality and thus suggests that Bodhidharma and his disciples are not separate individuals but are existentially and inextricably intertwined. To become oneself, the student has to become the master and vice versa. Do¯gen repeats the same theme in his “Moutain and Water Su¯tra” (Sansuikyo¯ 山水経) (DZZ 1: 258–267) when he describes the first encounter between the Chan master Decheng and his disciple: “‘[T]he person sees Decheng’ means that there is Decheng, while ‘Decheng touches the person’ means that there is the person” (DZZ 1: 266). We become who we are in relationships. We are relational selves. The conception of a separate individual is an illusion. Nishida’s self and other need each other in the same way in which the masters and disciples of Do¯gen’s Zen imaginaire do. 2) This observation is, of course, not unique to the encounter dialogues of the Chan Buddhist tradition. Jessica Benjamin, a contemporary psychotherapist, coined the term “paradox of mutual recognition” to describe the relationship between parents and children. Critiquing Erik Erikson’s (1902–1994) ideal of individuality, Benjamin argues that the predicament of individuals and especially teenagers lies in the fact that one’s self-image of an individual and independent self paradoxically necessitates the recognition of specific others and society as a whole. In Benjamin’s words, “[t]he need of the self for the other is paradoxical, because the self is trying to establish himself (sic) as an absolute, an independent entity, yet he (sic) must recognize the other as like himself (sic) in order to be recognized by him (sic)” (Benjamin 1988, 32). Benjamin seems to agree with Nishida that the notion of individuality is abstract and illusory and provides the psychological evidence to corroborate Nishida’s dialogical approach.17 The search for identity, individuality, and selfhood necessitates a space that opens up the dialectics of affirmation-and-yet-negation. Such a space is provided by the self ’s relationship to an other. In this sense, Nishida’s notion of

17 Interestingly enough, in her Bonds of Love, Benjamin uses Hegels’ dialectic to provide a conceptual framework for her “paradox of mutual recognition.”

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“mutual determination” provides a philosophical basis as well as a conceptual framework for Benjamin’s theory of mutual recognition. 3) More importantly, however, Nishida’s “logic of basho” destabilizes and challenges the notion of selfhood at its core. Located in the basho where the self negates itself and the khora, wherein “[n]either/nor easily becomes both” and which “is nothing positive or negative,” the self is confronted with its own contingencies, with the inability to grasp itself, and with what Stephen Batchelor calls the “anarchy of gaps” (Batchelor 2004, 184). The openness of basho/khora is a double-edged sword: it bestows infinite possibilities as well as irrevocable obliteration and destruction. Having nothing to hold on, the self falls into despair. Faced with its own self-negation, with the challenge by the other, and with the bottomlessness of the absolute other manifested in its relationships to an other as well as to society as a whole, the self ’s very existence is fundamentally threatened. Faced with the absolute other I loose my sense of self: without essence there is no identity, without separation no boundaries, and without center there is no order. Trinh Minh-Ha formulates this destabilization of the self beautifully: A critical difference from myself means that I am not i. I/i can be I or i, you and me both involved. We sometimes include(s), other times exclude(s) me. You and I are close, we intertwine, you may stand on the one side of the hill once in a while but you may also be me. While remaining what you are and I am not. The differences made between entities comprehend as absolute presences–hence the notion of the pure origin and the true self–are an outgrowth of a dualistic system of thought … Not One, not two either. “I” is therefore not a unified subject, a fixed identity, or has the solid or that solid mass covered with layers or superficialities one has gradually to peel off to see its true face. “I” itself is infinite layers … Whether I accept it or not, the natures of I, I, you, s/he, We, we, they, and wo/man constantly overlap (Trinh 1989, 90–4).

Located in the basho/khora, the place of self-negation, the self encounters a difference within itself and a kinship with the other. In the liminal field of the divine milieu, even the ascriptions of identity and difference are thoroughly inverted and negated. In this place, the self experiences the relationship to the other in the dialectics of affirmation-and-yet-negation, which Nishida identifies as the condition of selfhood, as highly ambiguous, as disorienting, and as the loss of the self. What Taylor calls the “disappearance of the self” (Taylor 1984, 34) is not only a matter of existential Angst, more importantly for our topic, it constitutes the origin of critical philosophy. The relational space18 between self and other opens

18 Martin Buber introduced the term “inbetween” (Zwischen) as a dialogical principle. WATSUJI Testuro¯ 和辻哲郎 (1889–1960) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) have argued, albeit in decidedly different ways, that the place where ethics commences is the interpersonal and inter-subjective relationship.

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up the possibility of absolute critique at the same time as it closes the door on ideological dogmatism. As Taylor argues, the divine milieu of basho/khora “can never be contained, captured, or caught by any fixed pair of terms.” A philosophy that is rooted in the liminality of the absolute other challenges both the self and the other and prevents the solidification of ideological dogma and the “departure from philosophical thought.” A philosophy that is grounded in the ambiguity of “affirmation-and-yet-negation” has the critical potential as “radical criticism” to resist rather than to succumb to ideological dogmas and the violence they instigate. As Batchelor suggests [t]he anarchy of the gaps makes it impossible for any ideology or religion to take hold. For the very act of laying claim to that inbetween space would enclose it in boundaries and compromise its openness, thereby turning it into a closed space separated from other closed spaces, thus creating more gaps that are beyond one’s reach (Batchelor 2004, 184).

The ambiguity of the basho/khora is immune to ideology and dogma. On the contrary, it provides the dialectical structure necessary to facilitate an absolute critique” that entails an introvert and extrovert critique alike. Such a philosophy is well equipped to resist the cooption by violent and destructive ideologies and to provide a philosophical basis for the theory and practice of social justice. Nishida’s later “logic of basho” interpreted as “radical criticism” constitutes such a philosophy.

7)

conclusion

This examination has shown that despite of its usage of the term “basho” and its potential to be interpreted as idealism or monism, Nishida’s “logic of basho” has the potential to function as critical philosophy if this is understood as a coherent and rational subversion of hegemonic thought structures and mainstream paradigms. Nishida’s “logic of basho” is not dismissive of words and reason but rather critical if not subversive of rationalism and substantialist philosophies of language. A third term as envisioned by Nishida as basho and by Derrida as khora discloses a linguistic and interpersonal space wherein critical engagement is possible if not necessary. If one considers Derrida’s claim that substantialist conceptions and legalist usage of language engenders violence, which he outlines in “The Force of Law” (Derrida 1992b), Nishida’s “logic of basho” exhibits the critical potential Hakamaya was looking for and provides a philosophical paradigm that includes a self-corrective principle. The concretization of such a theory of social justice that is based on an ankhoral philosophy, however, has to wait for another paper.

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Works Cited Abbreviations DZZ Do¯gen zenji zenshu¯ 道元禅師全集 [Complete Works of Zen Master Do¯gen]. 2 vol¯ kubo (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1969–1970). umes. Ed. Do¯shu¯ O MRC Mutai risaku chosakushu¯ 務台理作著作集 [Collected Works of Mutai Risaku]. 9 volumes (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobo¯, 2000–2002). NKC Nishitani keiji chosakushu¯ 西谷啓治著作集 [Collected Works of Keiji Nishitani]. 26 volumes. (Tokyo: So¯bunsha, 1986–1995). NKZ Nishida kitaro¯ zenshu¯ 西田幾多郎全集 [Complete works of Kitaro¯ Nishida]. 20 volumes. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 20 vols. NZG Nihon zengoroku 日本禅語録 [Collected Zen Records of Japan]. 20 volumes (Tokyo: Ko¯dansha, 1977–1981). SDZ Suzuki daisetsu zenhu¯ 鈴木大拙全集 [Complete Works of Daisetsu Suzuki]. 32 volumes (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 1968–1971). T Taisho¯ daizo¯kyo¯ 大正大藏経 [The Taisho Edition of the Buddhist Canon], ed. by Junjiro¯ Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Taisho¯ Shinshu¯ Daizo¯kyo¯ Kanko¯kai. 1961). THZ Tanabe hajime zenshu¯ 田邊元全集 [The Complete Works Hajime Tanabe]. 15 volumes (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1963–4). TSZ Takahashi satomi zenshu¯ 高橋里美全集 [The Complete Works of Satomi Takahashi]. 7 volumes (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973). YYZ Yuasa yasuo zenshu¯ 湯浅泰雄全集 [Complete Works of Yasuo Yuasa]. 17 volumes (Tokyo: Hakua Shobo¯, 1999–2006).

Other Sources Abe, Masao. 2003. Zen and the Modern World: A Third Sequel to Zen and Western Thought. Ed.: Steven Heine. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Batchelor, Stephen, 2004. Living with the Devil (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group). Benjamin, Jessica. 1977. “The End of Internalization: Adorno’s Social Psychology.” Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought (Vol. 32), 42–64. –, 1988. The Bonds of Love (Toronto: Random House). Bennington, Geoffrey. 1994. Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (New York: Verso). Caputo, John D. 1997. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion: Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1982. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). –, 1992a. “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Harold Coward and D. Foshay. Eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press104.

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–, 1992b. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority.’” Transl. Mary Quaintance. Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. Eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge), 3–67. Descartes, René. 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. I. Transl. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hakamaya, Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. 1990. Hihan bukkyo¯ 批判仏教 [Critical Buddhism] (Tokyo: Daizo¯ Shuppansha). Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1970. Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch der Wissenschaft). Heisig, James. 2015. Much Ado About Nothingness: Essays on Nishida and Tanabe (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture). Hobson, Marian. 1998. Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (New York: Routledge). Itabashi, Yu¯jin 板橋勇仁. 2004. Nishida tetsugaku no ronri to ho¯ho¯: tetteiteki hihan shugi to wa nani ka? 西田哲学の論理と方法—徹底的批判主義都とは何か (Tokyo: Ho¯sei Daigaku Shuppankyoku). –, 2008. Rekisshiteki genjitsu to nishida kitaro¯ tetsugaku – zettaiteki ronri shugi wa nani ka 歴史的現実と西田幾多郎哲学：絶対的論理主義は何か [Historical Reality and Nishida Philosophy Nishida Philosophy: What is Radical Criticism?] (Tokyo: Ho¯sei Daigaku Shuppankyoku). Ives, Chrisopher. 2005. “What’s Compassion Got to do with it? Determinants of Zen Social Ethics in Japan.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics (Vol. 12), 36–61. Kopf, Gereon. 2003. “Between Foundationalism and Relativism – Locating Nishida’s ‘Logic of Basho’ on the ideological Landscape.” Nanzan Bulletin (Vol. 27), 24–45. –, 2004. “Between Identity and Difference: Three Ways of Reading Nishida’s Non-Dualism.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies (Vol. 31, No. 1), 73–104. –, 2009a. “Between the Global and the Local: Applying the Logic of the One and the Many to a Global Age.” Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4: Facing the 21st Century. Eds.: Wing-keung Lam and Ching-yuen Cheung (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture), 76–89. –, 2009b. “Nationalism, Globalism, and Cosmopolitanism: An Application of Kyoto School Philosophy.” Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6: Confluences and Cross-Currents. Eds.: Raquel Bouso and James Heisig (Nagoya; Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture), 170–189. –, 2010. “Language Games, Selflessness, and the Death of God; A/Theology in Contemporary Zen Philosophy and Deconstruction.” Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Comparative Approaches to the Kyoto School. Eds.: Bret Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason Wirth (Bloomington: Indian University Press), 160–178. –, 2104. “Philosophy as Expression: Towards a New Model of Global Philosophy.” Nishida tetsugakkai nenpo¯ (The Annual Review of the Nishida Philosophy Association, Vol. 11), 181–155. Krummel, John W. M. 2015. Nishida Kitaro¯’s Chiasmatic Chorology: Place of Dialectic – Dialectic of Place (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). Maraldo, John C. 1998. “Nishida Kitaro¯ (1870–1945).” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1998), 7: 13.

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–, 2003. “Rethinking God: Heidegger in the Light of Absolute Nothing, Nishida in the Shadow of Onto-Theology.” Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics. Ed. Jeffrey Bloechl (Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 2003), 31–49. Muller, Charles. 2002. “相入.” Digital Dictionary of Buddhism. Ed. Charles Muller. Access on May 4, 2016. http://buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=相入. Mutai, Risaku 務台理作. 1996. Basho no ronrigaku 場所の論理学 [Logic of Basho] (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobo¯). Nobechi, To¯yo¯ 野辺地東洋. 1997. Nishida tetsugaku hihan: takahashi satomi no taikei 西田 哲学批判 : 高橋里美の体系 [A Critique of Nishida Philosophy: The System of Takahashi Satomi] (Tokyo: Taimeido¯). Park, Jin Y. 2006. “Naming the Unnameable: Dependent Co-arising and Différance.” Buddhisms and Deconstructions. Ed. Jin Y. Park (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.), 7–20. –, 2007. “Transgression and Ethics of Tension: Wo˘nhyo and Derrida on Institutional Authrority.” Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought, ed. Youru Wang (London: Routledge). Sato¯, Kenmyo¯ Taira. 2008. “D. T. Suzuki and the Question of War.” Tansl. with Thomas Kirchner. Eastern Buddhist (Vol. 39, No. 1), 61–120. Tanabe, Hajime, 1986. Philosophy as Metanoetics. Transl. Yoshinori Takeuchi with Valdo Vigielmo and James W. Heisig and a forward by James W. Heisig (Los Angeles; University of California Press). Taylor, Mark. 1984. Erring – A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Trinh, T. Minh-Ha. 1989. Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University). Ueda, Shizuteru 上田閑照. 1991. Nishida kitaro¯ wo yomu 西田幾多郎を読む [Reading Nishida Kitaro¯] (Toyko: Iwanami Shoten). Wargo, Robert. 2005. The logic of Nothingness – A Study of Nishida Kitaro¯ (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press). Wittgenstein, Ludwig.1953. Philosophical Investigations. Transl. Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell). Yusa, Michiko. 2002. Zen and Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

Yasuo Kobayashi (Aoyama Gakuin University)

About Professor Megumi Sakabe

It was in 1986 that Professor Megumi Sakabe published a collection of works on 20th century philosophers [Niju-Seiki Shisouka Bunko]. He was born in 1936, so he must have been 50 years old at the time. Included is a book on Tetsuro Watsuji in which Sakabe, in his “conclusion,” cites Watsuji’s text released just after his death at age 71 in 1960 – in that sense, we can say it was Watsuji’s very last work – and although not lengthy, the extract is unabridged, which is not at all customary of Sakabe. The text was an essay titled “The Sound of the Wind in the Pine Trees.” [Shofu no Ne] Watsuji writes about the “sense of nostalgia” that is evoked by the “crisp sound” of the shorai (branches of the pine trees). Watsuji starts by explaining the difference between how this sound is different from the wind that blows through the branches of zelkova tree, for example, and then goes on to explain that, more than anything, “the flow of notions, or the images it evokes are completely different.” When he hears wind in the pine trees, he thinks of “the tap, tap of the stones against a go board.” The players of the game may be a temple priest and his landlord, says Watsuji. “But I do not know where this temple is. I do not know who this priest or this landlord is. I don’t now know since when, but whenever I think of the sound of the wind in the pine trees, this is what I picture. It seems as though the sound of stones against a go board, exemplify that which transcends the realm of our world [seken]. The wind in the pine trees is the accompanying tune to this existence.” Then, in the subsequent and final paragraph, Watsuji wistfully writes “there is no room in the world anymore for such transcendence.” He concludes the paragraph, writing “the world would do well to have this. It is one way you can enjoy what the ancient Greeks called skhole (or leisure)”. Sakabe, as if to say “there is not much more that I could possibly add,” simply added two sentences. When we look at it as a whole, we see that Watsuji’s studies and writing had an overall skhole to them, from which an almost unbelievably rich power of imagination stemmed. When the natural, environmental, and human conditions that allow for this skhole, become obsolete, I cannot help but feel concern for the immense loss that the Humanities may suffer.

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If I might be so brash as to complement what Sakabe preferred not to explain, seeing Watsuji’s capacity to savor the sound of the wind in the pine trees, he perceives the skhole in his way of being. Clearly understanding that such skhole is now lost to us, he laments this. Sakabe makes this clear in his postscript saying “I cannot help but feel that I’ve just inadvertantly written a requiem for Tetsuro Watsuji, and for that matter, perhaps also a requiem for twentieth-century Japan, on which the complexity and haste of modernization have been imposed. Need I emphasize this, but Sakabe writes “a requiem for Japan.” Being a true philosopher, I doubt this phrase was uttered lightly. And thus, in 1986, Sakabe writes a “requiem for Japan” together with Watsuji. And so the death bell tolls. I’d like to hypothesize that from that point on (or perhaps starting at a certain point earlier than that) Sakabe’s philosophy was encompassed by this requiem. But what I must immediately add is that in order to pay tribute to an already lost skhole with a requiem, you must be among those in the realm of skhole. The echo of the wind in the pine trees is long gone, yet, in Watsuji’s heart, those sounds – the sounds of the wind, and the sounds of the tap, tap of the stones against the go board are the very present. Whether reality or recollection, or even hallucination, that place in which the music rings – that is where the realm of skhole lies. So, we can say that a requiem is also, in a sense, a practice of skhole. Those who read Sakabe’s book from the beginning might notice that this postscript serves as a distant response to what might be perceived as the central passage in the book. I am referring to the 5th section of the 2nd chapter entitled “To be a Human” [Hito toshite Arukoto], which explores Watsuji’s “basic ontology” which Sakabe describes as a pivotal point in Watsuji’s philosophy. Sakabe’s criticisms of Watsuji’s work are also summarized. I shall not chase after the details of the logic here. But we must give notice to the fact that, in the midst of the argument pertaining to the fundamental concept of “ari” [being] – which, of course, forms the basis of “de aru” [is] and “ga aru” [there is] – Watsuji casually, as if by chance, mentions “wind.” The text that Sakabe cites from Watsuji’s Ethics as the Study of Man [Ningen no Gaku toshiteno Rinrigaku] is as follows: Therefore, the limitation of “ari” [being] is the limitation of man’s ownership, or grasp of objects or concepts. If we were to say “kaze ga aru” [there is wind] that would be to say “man owns [motsu] wind.” If we were to say “kaze ga shizuka de aru” [the wind is soft] that would be to say “man owns [motsu] the wind as something that is sensed as soft.” If we were to say “sasugani kaze wa kaze de aru” [wind is, after all, wind], that would be to say “man owns [motsu] the wind as something that can be starkly perceived as wind.” These diverse manners in owning [mochi kata] are none other than the essence of man’s existence. If we say this, we can also say the distinction between “ga aru” [there is] and “de aru” [it is] is a distinction made by man, or within the existence of man. Therefore, if we are to acknowledge that there is a fundamental root of ari [being] that stems into ga

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aru and de aru, then, that root is none other than the existence of man. But we can say ari defines existence [sonzai] only precisely in this context.

To this particular excerpt, Sakabe sums up as follows: “We see through these expressions as ‘there is wind,’ ‘the wind is soft,’ we see the existence of man in possession of the wind, and further, at the root of this, we see the ‘existence’ of man as one that possesses oneself,” but then he goes on to fervently refute such logic as being too rigid. Sakabe offers this criticism in Kitaro Nishida’s philosophical style, as follows. But here too, if we were to simply look at what is, and do away with a mindset that is a tad too rigid, and of exclusive and extensional logic which leans too heavily toward an anthropocentric mindset, we could say that the existence of man, or the possession of oneself, is revealed, or to borrow Nishida’s words, “proven,” or consciously perceived through the possession [motsu] of wind, or clouds, or mountains, or in other words, through the state in which wind is wind and clouds are clouds, etc. If I were to go on further and summarize my criticism towards Watsuji, it would be this… if we were to take the idea one step further, gleaning from Nishida’s and MerleauPonty’s philosophy, perhaps we do not have to define “there is man” [ningen ga aru] as an absolute irreversible limitation from which all “ga aru” and “de aru” stem, but as a reversible concept. In other words, not all de aru and ga aru have to stem from man’s existence, or “there is man” [ningen ga aru] but (as Watsuji mentioned in a certain text), from a non-limited “ari” [being]; and “there is man” [ningen ga aru] is merely a limited condition or derivation of this.

Although gleaning from Nishida’s philosophy and the philosophy of MerleauPonty in his later years, Sakabe’s criticism of Watsuji’s basic ontology only serves to articulate the basic ontology in Sakabe’s own philosophy. As a matter of fact, Sakabe goes on to define this primordial “ari” [being] as “the original predicate” of which man is but a limb, and which “follows, to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s phrase a ‘chiasmus’-like inclusive and analogical logic of the so called ‘weak structure’.” He thus formulates a primordial (weak) structure of: a flower there is/are me others

Of course, no philosophy suddenly begins from one specific or defined point – it is rather the result of long preparation and gestation – but still, if I were to hypothesize, I would say that it seems it is in the topos of Sakabe’s criticism of Watasuji, wherein the starting point of Sakabe’s philosophy lies. In other words, Sakabe uses this weaker ontological structure as a starting point to deconstruct Watsuji’s “study of man” [ningen gaku] into the philosophy of personal [ninshouteki] structure (i. e., concepts such as “speech” [katari], “behavior” [furumai], and “action” [furi],”) or, to borrow Sakabe’s words from the last part of

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this chapter, “to stretch ontology and the understanding of man to a realm where there is a mutual exchange between ‘hito toshite aru’ [to be as man] and ‘hito ga aru’ [there is man] and an ‘ari’ [being] which is without limitation or an ‘ari’ [being] that was before limitation.” – Perhaps that is where one trajectory of Sakabe’s philosophy was heading. Now, as one that came after Sakabe, I can in no way, at least at this point, offer a conceptual or structural “critique” of Sakabe’s philosophy, in the manner that he offered one of Watsuji. However, if I were to squeeze in perhaps a pointless accusation, it would be that Sakabe replaced what Watsuji used as an illustration of his argument, i. e., “wind” with the structure of the “flower.” Of course, had he not replaced “wind” with “flower, it would not have changed the structure. I, on the other hand, sense the formula of a flower there is/are me others

to be a bit of a stretch. The same sort of stretch I feel in Watsuji’s expression, “wind is, after all, wind.” In other words, I can say I do understand well the sense of replacing “flower” with “wind,” and that is also because I feel Watsuji’s persistence on the phrase “man owns [motsu] wind” to be a bit bizarre in the logic of Japanese. Perhaps this is because my senses tell me that “wind” is something that is impossible for “man” of all things to “own” [motsu]. Sakabe lists such expressions pertaining to the flower, such as “I gaze at a flower,” “the flower gazes at me”, “there is a flower”, “there is me,” “there my existence is cognized and proven as one that could have been a flower,” etc, etc. My sense is that the “wind” may be something that blows beyond the boundaries of a primordial symmetry called chiasmus. But perhaps not for Watsuji. As is expressed in his last essay, “The Sound of the Wind in the Pine Trees” [Shofu no Ne], perhaps Watsuji could, indeed, possess the wind. In other words, perhaps the very phrase, “wind is after all, wind” opens the possibility to personify what otherwise could never be personified and would endlessly slip through our fingers. It is not that I am trying to be picky about the fact that Sakabe replaced “wind” with “flower.” I would actually prefer to romanticize and think that this subtle switch somehow left an imprint in Sakabe’s unconscious, only to pull him back to the theme later. I pose this assumption because, in the final essay of the fifth and final volume of “The Works of Megumi Sakabe” [Sakabe Megumi Shu] (Iwanami shoten, March 2007), which is the culmination of his work, Sakabe comes back to the theme of “wind” in the concluding section. The essay entitled “The Trail of the Wind” [Kaze no Kayoi Michi] was published in 2003. This is more than a decade after his book “Watsuji Tetsuro” and,

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uncharacteristically of him, he starts by writing about a tobi bird he spotted “flying” above as he looked up at the sky in Chigasaki where his final dwelling was, which ultimately leads to the essence of “wind.” Under other circumstances, I would share with you the whole passage without offering explanation, just as Sakabe did with Watsuji’s work, but since that is not possible I will at least share with you the following passage. It is a description of a tobi flying gallantly in the sky as if it were a phoenix. It is a passage rich with skhole. The “phoenix” glides, drawing an arc in the sky. Further up, we see the spreading arc formed by the clouds in the sky. The dance of the winds, the arc of life. The dance, drawing archaic circles in the sky. The slow dance of the wind. The playful dance of the gods. The passionate dance of the oracles.

Wind, in this way, is referred to in relation with “dance” [mai] or a “(dance like) act [furi]” and “the realm in which they echo.” According to Sakabe, “the realm of the ‘furi’ in which these arcs cross, is a primitive sketch of what will eventually become ‘relations with others’ [fure-ai] or ‘behaviors’ [furu-mai]. So, in this sense, the wind ultimately leads us to “acts” [furi] or learning [manebi] and ultimately the more primordial experience of “to touch” [fureru]: Perhaps we can say we are “touching” [fure-ru] the wind through these various senses. When we listen closely and sense the breath of “life” in a wind so soft you don’t know whether it is there, what you see is an ever subtle, but ever stark “reverberation of ‘life’.” When the wind “touches” us, we “touch” the breath of life.

Here, Sakabe dutifully pays respect to the notion of sensus communis, but then he writes as follows: Such things as “climate and culture” [fudo] and “feng shui” [fu-sui] are an extension of our experience of the interpenetration of “life.” Watsuji’s instinct still holds true today. As the extension of the body [shintai], climate and culture [fudo] is the exchange of life between man, in its betweenness [aidagara], and the environmental world surrounding him.

– and thus praises Watsuji’s “wind.” But the point of this essay, as Sakabe himself clearly acknowledges, is to touch on wind not only as a “dance” [mai] or “(dance like) act” [furi] but also as a “voice” [koe] or “song” [uta]. Sakabe could have deepened his contemplation to the question of pneuma or verbum, in other words, “living words” but instead goes on to refer to Kozo Yoshimasu’s study of Nobuo Origuchi. This was only because he had mistakenly taken the title of Yoshimasu’s book as “Life as a Path through the Wind” [Shogai wa Kaze no Nakamichi] when it was actually “Life as a Path through a Dream” [Shogai wa Yume no Nakamichi]. But Sakabe nevertheless legitimizes his error, and goes on to point out that “life” [inochi] is derived from “amongst breath” [iki no uchi] (Daigenkai Dictionary) or “strength of breath” [iki no chi] (Iwanami Kogo

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Yasuo Kobayashi

Dictionary) and therefore is interconnected with “breath” [iki] – thus, he delves into the notion that “to live” [ikiru] is that path through “breath” [iki] or “wind” [kaze]. And then, just as Yoshimasu’s writing echoes Origuchi’s, so too Sakabe overlays his own writing onto Yoshimasu’s, when he writes as follows: “This strange sensation – it is not a deviation, but how shall one describe this… two overlapping streams of water – a fierce stream and a quiet one, together. Or, a high sky and a low one, overlapping…” A high sky and low sky, while proud of their respective currents and wind paths, still, at some point, “reflect” off of each other. It is a double flight in which we can no longer differentiate which is “shape” and which is “shadow.” The currents and the paths of these winds are multilayered and intertwined. Just like a flock of tobi birds taking off into the sky together.

Anyone can clearly perceive the “breath” [iki] in Sakabe’s stream of thought as it freely and grandly spirals up, up through the paths that carry the wind. These are words that are not mere words – they are the words that touch, are touched, and are reflected in “life” [inochi] and “breath” [iki]. Such grand skhole into which Sakabe’s philosophy is released! Furthermore, on this page, we find a photograph that Sakabe shot at his home as an accompaniment to his words, along with those of both Yoshimasu and Origuchi. It is a picture of a heavy, dense, spiral of clouds. Apart from a thin lightning rod jutting up straight into the sky from the water tower of an obscure building1*, all we see is the wind and the clouds. You can almost see the rod swaying and the roar of the whipping wind. Here, we do not sense the “crisp sound of the shorai.” An avid photographer, Sakabe also shows two photographs of the house where Watsuji was born, which he shot himself – although personally, I find the photos out of focus and not very good. There are what seem to be pine trees in the garden, but we do not hear the sound of the shorai. What we hear in place of the wind in the pine trees and the tap, tap of the stones against the go board, is the whipping wind blowing beneath a rough sea of spiraling clouds. And amidst the roaring wind, we see a single lightning rod, touched by, and swaying in the wind. That final photograph is the last gift Sakabe has left to us. Life, as a path through the wind – as Sakabe would repeatedly make mention of the words of Toshio Fujisawa, always with a sense of amusement, if, as Aristotle said, “to live” is in itself energeia, then life is a path through energeia as well. If energeia shows itself to us as a path we are to take, as life, then perhaps that is the very essence of the “being” [ari] of man. Sakabe-sensei, as you perceived skhole in Watsuji’s sense of nostalgia in the wind in the pine trees, so shall I perceive skhole in your sense of nostalgia towards the sound of the wind in the lightning rod you captured – a nostalgia that was

1 I heard later that this building was Sakabe’s condominium.

About Professor Megumi Sakabe

275

most probably a more cosmic, transcendent nostalgia, than Watsuji’s. Skhole, I imagine is to know to “wait.” When we think of “a high sky and a low sky” – the low sky, no matter how low it is, still has a path through which the wind will pass, which connects to the higher sky. Sakabe concludes his essay with the following passage: The path, leaks no sound In this silence, perhaps the subtlest of winds passed? Or, was the travelling poet, while quietly walking in the silent wind, “waiting” for its arrival?

I also see the philosophical poet, although a bit timidly, tenaciously awaiting a certain something, just like the lightning rod in the wind. July 20th, 2010

Notes on Contributors

Raquel BOUSO Garcia is an associate professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain, where she received her PhD with a thesis on the notion of emptiness in the thought of Nishitani Keiji. She has translated into Spanish works by Nishitani Keiji, Ueda Shizuteru, and Toshihiko Izutsu, along with other books on Japanese philosophy. Besides various articles, she published El zen (Catalan 2008, Spanish 2012), has co-edited Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy, Cross-currents and confluences (2009) with James W. Heisig, and La filosofía japonesa en sus textos with James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo (Herder 2016). CHEUNG Ching-yuen (張政遠) received his PhD degree in Tohoku University, Japan. He has taught philosophy for 7 years, and is currently lecturer at Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests are Japanese philosophy and Japanese literature. He is editor of Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy (Springer) and assistant editor of Journal of Japanese Philosophy (SUNY Press). He is author of Nishida Kitaro¯. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press (2017). Alfonso FALERO Folgoso is a professor of intellectual history at the University of Salamanca (Spain). He obtained his PhD on Shinto Studies at Kokugakuin University (Japan). He is engaged in the project of re-thinking Japanese intellectual history from a global perspective. He has translated Kuki Shu¯zo¯, Orikuchi Shinobu, and Ueno Chizuko into Spanish. See http://diarium.usal.es/ falero/ James W. HEISIG is a permanent research fellow (emeritus) at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture in Nagoya, Japan. His books, translations, and edited collections, which have appeared in 12 languages and currently number 78 volumes include Nothingness and Desire (2013) and Much Ado about Nothingness: Essays on Nishida and Tanabe (2015).

278

Notes on Contributors

INOUE Katsuhito (井上克人) is Professor at Kansai University. Field of research: Religious Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy of West and East, Japanese Philosophy, Philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism and Zen Buddhism. Recent publication: Time and Mirror , Philosophy of Transcendent Concealment—Thinking with Do¯gen, Nishida, Daisetsu and Heidegger (2015), Nishida Kitaro¯ and The Spirit of Meiji Era (2011), Manifestation and Concealment—From Phenomenology to Religious Philosophy (2003). KAWAMURA Satofumi (川村覚文) is Project Assistant Professor of the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy. He holds degrees from Waseda University, Goldsmiths University of London and the Australian National University. His research interests include modern Japanese philosophy, contemporary political and social thought and cultural and critical theory. His article “the National Polity and the formation of modern national subject in Japan” appeared in Japan Forum (2014), and he coedited Tasho-ron teki tenkai (『他者論的転回』Alterity Turn) (2016), a volume of essays on religion, politics, and public sphere. KOBAYASHI Yasuo (小林康夫) is Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (Graduate School of Cultural and Creative Studies) and Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. Fields of Research: Contemporary French Philosophy, Studies of Culture and Representation. Recent publications: Hyo¯sho¯bunkaronko¯gi: Kaiga-no Bo¯ken [『表象文化論講義——絵画の冒険』Lectures on the Culture and Representation: Adventures of Paintings] (2016); Opera Sengo Bunkaron1: Nikutai no Kuraki Unmei 1945–1970 [『オペラ戦後文化論１—— 肉体の暗き運命1945—1970』Opuses on the Post-war Culture 1: the Dark Destiny of Corpora 1945–1970” (2016); Kimi Jishin no Tetsugaku e [『君自身の哲学 へ』For Your Own Philosophy] (2015). Gereon KOPF received his Ph.D. from Temple University and is currently professor of East Asian religions and philosophy of religion at Luther College. As a research fellow of the Japan Foundation and the Japan Society for the Promotion ¯ birin University in of Science, he conducted research in 1993 and 1994 at O Machida, Japan, and at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture in Nagoya, Japan, from 2002 to 2004. In the academic year of 2008–2009, he taught at the Centre of Buddhist Studies at the University of Hong Kong. 2013–2014, he was a visiting lecturer at Saitama University and a Visiting researcher at To¯yo¯ University. He is the author of Beyond Personal Identity (2001), the co-editor of Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism (2009), and the editor of the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy. He is currently editing the Dao Companion of Japanese Buddhist Philosophy for Springer.

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279

LAM Wing-keung (林永強) is currently teaching at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at University of Tokyo. His research interest basically lies on Japanese philosophy, of which he has been involving in the editorial teams of the Journal of Japanese Philosophy (SUNY Press) and Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy (Springer). His publications include: Self and Person in East Asian Traditions and Modern Philosophy. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2015. (co-edited with Tsai Chen-feng and Cheung Ching-yuen, in Chinese), Japanese Philosophy in East Asian Perspectives: Tradition, Modern and Transformation. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2013, (co-edited with Cheung Ching-yuen, in Chinese) and Diversity of Japanese Philosophy: Striving for a New Dialogue in the Twenty-first Century. Kyoto: Sekaishiso¯shai, 2012. (coedited with Cheung Ching-yuen, in Japanese). LIAO Chin-ping (廖欽彬) is associate professor at Sun Yat-Sen University. He received his PhD. from Tsukuba University in 2009. He has published many papers on Tanabe Hajime, Japanese philosophy and transcultural philosophy. Recently, he is working in a research project on philosophy in Taiwan during the Japan-Governing period. Curtis RIGSBY is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and the Coordinator of East-Asian Studies at the University of Guam. He is a specialist in modern Japanese philosophy, especially Katsumi Takizawa. Dr. Rigsby is a co-launcher and the Book Review Editor of the Journal of Japanese Philosophy. He has also pursued scholarship in Indian and Chinese Philosophy. His approach is decidedly comparative and global. He has an M.A. in Theology and is competent in Western traditions. He is the Chair of the Japan Committee of the Society of Christian Philosophers and has enjoyed support from the John Templeton Foundation. TAGUCHI Shigeru (田口茂) is an Associate Professor at Hokkaido University, Japan. He obtained a PhD in philosophy from the University of Wuppertal in Germany in 2005. He has been working on phenomenology and Japanese philosophy (especially Nishida and Tanabe). He is the author of Das Problem des ‘UrIch’ bei Edmund Husserl (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006) and two Japanese books on phenomenology. His most recent publications includes: “Non-being Self as Mediator in Tanabe Hajime’s Philosophy,” in: Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol.12, No.1, 2015, 25–40; “Reduction to Evidence as a Liberation of Thinking,” in: Metodo, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, 1–11.

280

Notes on Contributors

TAKEHANA Yosuke (竹花 洋佑) ––– Part-time Lecturer at Otani University. Fields of research: Modern Japanese philosophy and German philosophy in 19th and 20th centuries. Recent Publications: “The Self-Negation of Species and the Concept of ‘Severing’”「種の自己否定性と『切断』の概念」: in Studies in Japanese Philosophy『日本哲学研究』, vol.15 (2015); “Life and Logic –– Nishida’s Criticism of Tanabe and the meaning of ‘Logic of Species’”「生と論理 －西田の田辺批判と『種の論理』の意味」: in Japanese Philosophy 『日本 の哲学』, vol.14 (2013). Jacynthe TREMBLAY is currently a visiting researcher at Hokkaido University and a specialist in contemporary Japanese philosophy, especially Nishida Kitaro¯. Her most important books about Nishida include Auto-éveil et temporalité (selfAwareness and temporality) (L’Harmattan, 2007) and Je suis un lieu (I am a place) (PUM, 2016). She has also published several French translation of Nishida, such as L’Éveil à soi (self-awareness) (CNRS, 2003) and De ce qui agit à ce qui voit (from the acting to the seeing) (PUM, 2015). Finally, she directed several collective books, including Philosophes japonais contemporains (contemporary Japanese philosophers) (PUM, 2010). UEHARA Mayuko (上原麻有子) has been professor of Japanese philosophy at Kyoto University since 2013, prior to which she held the post of Associate Professor at Meisei University in Tokyo for six years. She obtained her PhD from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. She currently serves as editor-in-chief of the Journal of Japanese Philosophy (suny Press). Her writings include “Naming and Contingency in Kuki Shu¯zo¯: From Philosophy to Literary Theory”(2009), “Japanese Aspects of Nishida’s Basho: Seeing the ‘Form without Form’”, “Philosophy in the Sho¯wa Period as Seen from the Viewpoint of Translation: Ecriture of the Kyoto School” (「翻訳から見る昭和の哲学—— 京都学派のエクリチュール」, 2013), “From Nishida Kitaro¯’s Theory of the Body to a Consideration of the Woman’s Face” (「西田幾多郎の身体論から女 性の顔についての考察へ」, 2013), “A Reinterpretation of Nishida’s Philosophy: Facial Expression Considered from The Viewpoint of Intuition-Action” (「西田哲学の再解釈」, 2015). WONG Yiu Hong (王耀航) is currently Lecturer at Philosophy Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong, where he also received his Ph.D. He has published articles, “Temporality, Death and History: a reflection after Heidegger” (in Chinese), collected in Phenomenology 2010 (volume 1) : Phenomenology in Dialogue with East Asian Tradition. Edited by YU Chung-Chi. Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2010 ; “Understanding, Historically Effected Consciousness, and Phenomenology in Gadamer”, in Phenomenology and Human Experience. Edited by

Notes on Contributors

281

Chung-chi Yu and Kwok-ying Lau. Nordhausen, Germany: Verlag Traugott Bautz GmbH, 2012. His area of interest include: phenomenology, hermeneutics, and comparative philosophy. Michiko YUSA (遊佐道子) – Professor of Japanese Thought and Intercultural Philosophy, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington, U.S.A.; Visiting Research Fellow, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Nagoya, Japan, 2016–17. Fields of research: Nishida Kitaro¯’s philosophy, Zen philosophy, Women philosophers, Matsuo Basho¯ and the philosophy of poetics, Christian mysticism, Life and thought of Raimon Panikkar. Recent publications: “Parsing the Topos and Dusting the Mirror: A Radical Internalization of ‘Basho-Topos,’” Journal of Japanese Philosophy 2 (November 2014), 7–32. “An Advaitic Matter: Pebbles Speak,” CIRPIT Review 3 (2012) 99–115. “‘Immanent Transcendence’ in Postmodern Culture,” in R. Elberfeld & Y. Arisaka, ed., Kitaro¯ Nishida in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhundrets, Mit Texten Nishidas in deutscher Übersetzung, (Freiburg & München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2014), 365–380. “Ecosophy and Saigu¯— The Sacred Office of Imperial Princess,” in Gerard Hall & Joan Hendriks, ed., Dreaming a New Earth: Raimon Panikkar & Indigenous Spiritualties, (Preston, Victoria: Mosaic Press, 2012), 93–113. “Overview, Japanese Women Philosophers,” “Yosano Akiko,” “Hiratsuka Raicho¯,” “Yamakawa Kikue,” in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, James Heisig, John Maraldo & Thomas Kasulis, ed., (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 1115–1126, 1138–1159.

Index of Names

Agud, Ana 37, 47 Arisaka Yo¯ko¯ 40, 47, 280 Asada Akira 75, 76 Bai Heesoon 45, 48 Balmes, Jaume 68 Bergson, Henri 21, 26, 211, 212 Blay, Andoni 64, 65 Blocker, H. Gene 82, 83, 87, 91, 96, 102, 112, 203 Bloom, Irene 36, 47 Calle, Ramiro 65 Cervantes, Miguel De 17 Chikamatsu Monzaemon 76 Collado, Diego 70 Comte, Auguste 91, 112, 133, 137, 138, 140, 142 Crespin, Montserrat 72 Dale, Peter 82 Dante 17 Davis, Bret W. 39, 47, 217, 266 De Bary, William Theodore 36, 47 Derrida, Jacques 241, 251, 256, 257, 258, 259, 264, 265, 266, 267 Deshimaru Taisen 66, 79 Díez De Velasco, Francisco 36, 47 Diez Del Corral, Luis 63, 64, 79 Dilthey, Wilhelm 196, 197, 212 Diogenes 21 Do¯gen 21, 23, 56, 85, 97, 98, 262, 265 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 21 Duch, Lluís 36, 47

Dufrenne, Marcel 69 Durkheim, Émile 226 Enomiya-Lassalle, Heinrich Epictetus 16 Erasmus 16

67

Falero, Alfonso 37, 47, 51 Fort, Andrew O. 45, 48 Fromm, Eric 66 Fujita Masakatsu 137, 181, 193, 198, 203, 217 Fukuzawa Yukichi 9, 71, 133 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 196, 197, 279 Genjo¯ Sanzo¯ See: Xuanzang Sanzang Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 17 Gonzalez Valles, Jesus 65, 71, 72, 79 Goto-Jones, Christopher S. 40, 48, 117, 188 Gunnlaugson, Olen 45, 48 Hakamaya Noriaki 24, 242, 243, 244, 251, 257, 264, 266 Han Byung-Chul 62 Hanh Thich Nhat 46, 48, 66 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 21, 24, 58, 85, 119, 255, 266 Heidegger, Martin 21, 24, 27, 28, 33, 40, 49, 58, 61, 71, 193–204, 206–210, 215, 216, 218, 220, 245, 259, 267 Heisig, James W. 11, 15, 22, 23, 25, 26, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 57, 58, 68, 71, 73, 79, 83, 91, 95, 157, 251, 261, 266, 267

284

Index of Names

Heraclitus 16, 44, 85 Hiraizumi Kiyoshi 118, 120, 121, 125 Hirayama Ikuo 164–166 Husserl, Edmund 58, 138, 194, 195, 198– 203, 206, 207, 229, 246 Imamichi Tomonobu 24, 25, 69, 72, 75 Inoue Tetsujiro¯ 56, 95, 105, 118–120, 143– 147 Itabashi Yu¯jin 233, 239, 253–255, 266 Izutsu Toshihiko 26, 72 Jacinto Zavala, Agustín Jones, David 42, 48

33, 42, 49

Kant, Immanuel 21, 57, 58, 71, 77, 108, 119, 144, 147, 151, 189, 212, 215, 218, 219, 227, 233 Karatani Ko¯jin 23, 25, 31–33, 59, 72, 75, 77, 79 Kasulis, Thomas K. 16, 22, 35, 39, 48, 57, 68, 73, 91, 157 Kierkegaard, Søren 21, 137 Kiyozawa Manshi 56, 72 Klein, E.R. 42, 28 Kobayashi Hideo 53 Kojima Takehiko 63 Kopf, Gereon 48 Kuki Shu¯zo¯ 11, 24, 28, 31, 33, 60, 71, 95, 138, 193–196, 198, 200, 203–210 Kuwada Kumataro¯ 82, 83 Liáng Shùmíng 91, 94 Lopez, Julian 67, 68, 71 Mall, Ram Adhar 38, 40, 48 Maraldo, John C. 16, 19, 22, 35, 40, 48, 57, 68, 73, 157, 251, 260, 266 Martin Morillas, Antonio 71 Maruyama Masao 23, 96, 118, 119 Marx, Karl 71, 85, 97, 100, 137, 212 Masiá, Juan 42, 48, 79 Mataix, Anselmo 42, 48, 67, 79 Merton, Thomas 65, 79

Miki Kiyoshi 24, 85, 96, 117, 211–217, 221– 227 Milcˇinski, Maja 39, 48 Mill, John Stuart 94, 119, 133, 137, 138 Miné Hideki 233, 239 Mishima Yukio 63, 95 Mosterin, Jesus 69, 79 Motoori Norinaga 26, 76, 85, 122, 123 Muraoka Tsunetsugu 118, 122–124, 126 Mutai Risaku 95, 96, 243, 249, 250, 265, 267 Nakae Cho¯min 26, 56, 91, 112 Nakamura Hajime 68, 71, 82, 83, 95 Natsume So¯seki 28, 55, 92, 95, 161 Nietzsche, Friedrich 16, 24, 85, 242 Nishi Amane 15, 26, 55, 56, 59, 91, 94, 116, 131–147 Nishida Kitaro¯ 11, 20, 21, 23–33, 35, 38, 40–48, 53, 56, 58, 60, 61, 65, 72, 73, 79, 83–85, 93–95, 102, 105, 117, 127, 147, 149, 151–157, 160, 161, 169–180, 181– 192, 211, 212, 226, 229–239, 241, 243–267 Nishimura Takuo 38, 48 Nishitani Keiji 23–26, 31–33, 42, 49, 72, 95, 117, 235, 239, 243, 249, 265 Nishitani Osamu 75, 76, 79 Nitobe Inazo¯ 59, 60, 79, 95 Ogyu¯ Sorai 21, 26 Okakura Tenshin 59, 60 Orikuchi Shinobu 56, 71 Panikkar, Raimon 37, 40, 49, 67, 68, 71 Parkes, Graham 40, 49 Pasqualotto, Giangiorgio 38, 49 Pfeiffer, K. Ludwig 39, 49 Piovesana, Gino K. 79, 82, 83, 93, 94, 102, 103, 111, 113, 114 Plato 16 Plotinus 16 Proust, Marcel 17 Racionero, Luis 69 Rickert, Heinrich 211 Ricoeur, Paul 69

285

Index of Names

Saigusa Hiroto 82, 83, 96, 141 Saito¯ Naoko 26, 27, 33, 38, 48 Sakabe Megumi 11, 269–275 Sakai Naoki 60, 71, 117 Sanchez Drago, Fernando 70 Sarath, Edward W. 45, 48 Sawai Yoshitsugu 72 Schiltz, Elizabeth 40, 49 Schroeder, Brian 39, 47, 217, 266 Scott, Charles 45, 48 Segura, Armando 71, 79 Shakespeare, William 17 Simon, J. 69 Sonoda Minoru 64 Standish, Paul 38, 48 Starling, Christopher I. 82, 83, 87, 91, 96, 102, 112, 203 Suzuki Daisetz T. 23, 55, 65, 66, 95, 151, 173–180 Takahashi Satomi 86, 96, 248, 250, 251, 255, 265, 267 Takeyama Michio 63, 64 Tanabe Hajime 11, 23–26, 28, 31, 95, 117, 203, 217–222, 226, 227, 229–239, 241,

243, 245, 247, 249–255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265–267 Thich Nhat Hanh 46, 48, 66 Tozan 66 Tsuda Mamichi 133, 136, 137, 141 Tsuda So¯kichi 118, 122, 124–126 Uchida Roan 55 Ueda Shizuteru 45, 49, 55, 71, 95, 96, 157, 235, 239, 241, 248, 267 Uehara Mayuko 41, 49, 58 Vicco, Giambbatista Voltaire 16

242

Watsuji Tetsuro¯ 23–28, 31–34, 60, 79, 84, 95, 101, 127, 128 Watts, Alan 66 Wirth, Jason M. 39, 47, 217, 266 Xuanzang Sanzang (Genjo¯ Sanzo¯) 160, 162–166 Yuasa Yasuo Zhuangzi

53, 72, 95, 265

43, 49, 69, 149, 183

159,