Globalizing Cities: A Brief Introduction 113874395X, 9781138743953

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Globalizing Cities: A Brief Introduction
 113874395X, 9781138743953

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Globalization has been built upon, and maintained by, major urban centers. As the interconnections among these cities grow, more cities become involved as important global nodes, and globalization has an extremely strong influence upon the forms and functions of cities everywhere. This new textbook examines modern cities worldwide through two lenses: as the major nodes in the global economy, and as primary propagators of cultural ideas across the world. Exploring the ramifications of the continuing penetration of global forces into smaller urban areas, this book clearly distinguishes economic, cultural, and political processes to demonstrate how global attachments are shaping many of the basic features of modern cities. Specifically, this book examines the way cities accommodate huge global flows of people, including migrants, tourists, and the managers of multi-national firms, and the effects this has upon the cultural, economic, and political forces associated with globalization in cities. The main features of this book include: • a balanced emphasis upon how economic, technological, and c­ ultural forces shape both urban and global developments; • a highly interdisciplinary focus, incorporating major works and ideas from urban scholars writing in sociology, geography, a­ nthropology, and politics; • detailed case studies of events and activities within specific cities and regions that illuminate major trends; and • end of chapter reading lists of corresponding chapters in The ­Globalizing Cities Reader, second edition, edited by Xuefei Ren and Roger Keil and published by Routledge in 2018. Written in a clear and accessible style, Globalizing Cities: A Brief I­ ntroduction will appeal to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students in both urban and globalization courses within sociology, geography, and urban studies. Mark Abrahamson is Professor of Sociology (Emeritus) at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, U.S. He is the author of more than 20 books and monographs as well as dozens of research articles in major social science ­journals. Among his more recent book publications are Global Cities (2004), Urban Enclaves: Identity and Place in the World (2006), Classical Theory and Modern Studies (2010), Urban ­Sociology: A Global Introduction (2014), and Studying Cities and City Life: An ­Introduction to Methods of Research (2017).


Mark Abrahamson

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Mark Abrahamson The right of Mark Abrahamson to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Abrahamson, Mark, author. Title: Globalizing cities: a brief introduction / Mark Abrahamson. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019027208 (print) | LCCN 2019027209 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138743946 (hbk) | ISBN 9781138743953 (pbk) | ISBN 9781315181332 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Urbanization. | Globalization. Classification: LCC HT111 .A47 2020 (print) | LCC HT111 (ebook) | DDC 307.76—dc23 LC record available at LC ebook record available at ISBN: 978-1-138-74394-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-74395-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-18133-2 (ebk) Typeset in Garamond by codeMantra


List of tables List of boxes Preface

vii viii ix

1 The history of globalization 1 Dimensions of globalization 2 Early economic globalization 5 Early modern globalization: 1860–1913 6 The disrupted era: 1913–1945 10 Globalization resumes: 1945–1999 12 Globalization continues: 2000–2017 23 A preview 28 Glossary 29 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 29 2 Global city-regions 34 The units of analysis 34 Global city-regions 37 Global cities and the global economy 40 Global economic rankings 47 Global cities and global culture 53 The cultural industries 56 The economic and the cultural 64 Glossary 65 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 66 3 Inequality 71 Globalization and world cities 72 Measuring inequality 75 Inequality within nations 80 Inequality within cities 83 Glossary 92 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 92 v

Content s

4 Global emigres 97 Migrants and their routes 97 Undocumented migrants 100 Global city migrant streams 106 Human trafficking 109 Immigrants’ contributions: perceptions and reality  111 Assimilation: social integration and acculturation  114 Remittances 120 Return migration 121 Citizenship issues 123 Glossary 124 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 125 5 Ghettos, enclaves, and ethnoburbs 130 Ghettos 130 Enclaves 140 Ethnoburbs 147 Glossary 155 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 155 6 Paradigms of growth and shrinkage 159 The Chicago School 160 Political economy 164 From Chicago to Los Angeles 170 New York as the model 176 Conclusions 177 Shrinking cities 178 Glossary 183 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader  183 7 Gentrification 187 The pace of gentrification 188 Residential gentrification 189 Pioneers or space “domesticators” 195 Retail gentrification 200 Suburban gentrification 203 Conclusion 205 Glossary 205 Corresponding readings in The Globalizing Cities Reader 206





1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1

Nations’ globalization rankings 4 Leading global television series in 2016 27 World’s largest urban concentrations 37 Most attractive cities 43 Rankings of global cities 51 Leading tours, 2016–2017 59 Major entertainment companies 62 Leading global advertising agencies 64 Comparing Gini index and percentile shares 78 U.S. Gini index, household income 81 Household wealth in the United States 81 Residential changes in U.S. cities 85 International migrants in major cities 98



1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4


Lisbon: a 16th century global city 5 Gross domestic product 8 Explaining the proliferation of nation-states 16 A hydropower dam for Uganda 19 Promoting development in the Ivory Coast 21 Governance in the Accra (Ghana) city-region 39 Where is home to transnational corporations? 50 Choosing a bicycle in Amsterdam 54 Re-wearing discarded clothing 74 Playdates in New York City 87 Public transportation in a Gwinnet County 90 Migrants in Paris tent camps 101 Who to save? 104 Emigres in Beardstown 105 Assimilation and resurgent ethnicity 119 Maintaining segregation in Detroit 134 An enclave becomes a ghetto 141 Korean communities in Auckland 154 Montreal’s 19th century suburbs 162 Hong Kong’s former police headquarters 169 Right-sizing in Youngstown, OH 182 Gentrifying the center of Istanbul 190 Art-driven gentrification in Hackney, London 198 Strip club conflicts in Toronto 201 Defining boundaries in Southwest Philadelphia 202


During the last decades of the 20th century, a great deal of urban research and theory focused upon a small group of cities in which the headquarters of major international firms were so concentrated that activities within these cities were described as managing and directing centers of the global economy. The initial focus was primarily upon purely economic activity and the way certain cities were also centers of global culture was initially disregarded. Similar attention to global culture soon followed, though, and analysts tried explicitly to compare how the global patterns of each were both alike and different. One of my earlier books (Global Cities, Oxford University Press, 2004) was part of this genre. Two additional perspectives were added and emphasized in the 21st century. The first focused upon the way global cities had expanded ­geographically and functionally to become global city-regions. The second perspective focused upon how both the global economy and global culture had reached widely into many cities and city-regions in addition to the small group of historically leading cities. Exploring the ramifications of the continuing penetration of global forces into smaller urban areas that previously were largely unaffected by global influences is a major focus of this book, as its title implies. The empirical and theoretical literature I have tried to integrate and summarize is largely from urban sociology and urban geography, but it also includes numerous insights from urban economics and history, and urban planning. While this is a self-contained book that can be used in a variety of courses, it also fits very well with The Globalizing Cities Reader, edited by Xuefei Ren and Roger Keil, and published by Routledge (second edition, 2018). Both books cross multiple disciplines in examining globalization and urban change, and can well be used together in a variety of courses. At the end of each chapter, I have indicated the chapters that correspond most closely in the Ren-Keil anthology.



Writing this book has been challenging, at times frustrating, but stimulating and ultimately satisfying. I hope that readers of this book will undergo a similar experience. Mark Abrahamson South Windsor, CT April 2019



The history of globalization This first chapter focuses upon the historical development of globalization from a number of perspectives, with particular attention to its economic, social-cultural, and governmental-political dimensions. The next chapter turns to a historical examination of cities, focusing upon how they have grown in size and complexity. Special consideration will be given to how their growth has been accompanied by increased outreach eventually leading to linkages with counterpart cities in other nations. To some degree, we will note, the current forms and functions of almost all cities that are being influenced by their connections to the global system. Globalization entails the degree to which nations are inter-­dependent; in other words, the extent to which there are explicit connections, such as political or military activities jointly undertaken by nations; or the degree to which events that occur in one nation have substantial ­repercussions in others. This variable amount of inter-connectedness conventionally involves nations rather than regions, cities, or any other entity. However, as we shall describe in later chapters of this book, it is the major cities within nations that are the primary places in managing the flows of people, capital, goods, firms, and ideas that are at the heart of globalization. 1


DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION Globalization obviously involves not only the production and distribution of diverse commodities, but also the dissemination of values and ideas as well as forms of organization. To be more specific, in recent years, analyses of globalization have tended to distinguish among three primary dimensions: economic, political, and cultural. Each can be briefly described as follows: 1. Economic, entailing the international flow of capital, goods and ­services as well as forms of business and commercial organization (e.g. transnational organizations). It is typically measured by a variety of statistics relating to imports, exports, and investments. 2. Social-cultural, which involves a diffusion of values, ideas, and images that shape people’s identities and the types of relationships and recreational forms they favor. Relevant indicators often include tourism and international media flows, broadly defined to include movies, newspapers, recorded music, etc. 3. Governmental-political, entailing the degree to which agreements, treaties, and shared rules control the flow of people and goods across national boundaries, and define the locus of citizenship. ­Measurement frequently includes the number of signed treaties and embassies and immigration rules. While theorists have often found it useful to distinguish among these three dimensions and to analyze each separately, it can sometimes be difficult to place a component into one and only one dimension. Their constituent parts are often shared. To cite just one example, the music industry is ordinarily considered an element of the social-cultural realm, but it obviously involves the import and export of goods (e.g. recorded music) and services (e.g. concert management) as well, and these components can also be viewed as part of the economic dimension. Whether the three dimensions should be separated or combined is, at least in large part, an empirical question to be answered by the degree of correlation among them. If they overlap almost perfectly— the correlations among the dimensions would then be very high—that would make a strong case for combining them into a single measure of globalization. By contrast, the more nations’ scores on each dimension are independent of their scores on other dimensions—the correlations among them would then be very low—the more it would make sense to view the three as separate dimensions. We will examine the data with these questions in mind.




There are a number of centers and institutes that rank the nations of the world on globalization indexes. Because they employ different criteria, the rankings differ a little from each other, but only a little. One of the most useful set of indexes for our purposes is prepared annually by the Swiss Economic Institute and is titled the KOF Index of Globalization.1 (KOF is the abbreviation of the institute’s name.) It rates a large sample of 207 nations on the three dimensions of globalization that we have been discussing. Each dimension is expressed as a composite of a number of specific indicators, as described below. The three indexes are also combined into a fourth, which can be regarded as a general measure of globalization. In sum, the KOF Indexes provide both an overall measure of ­globalization and separate rankings of each nation’s economic, governmental, and social-cultural scores. The main components of each of the four indexes are as follows: 1. Globalization: An overall measure that combines the economic, governmental, and social-cultural indexes, as described below. 2. Economic, which combines two sub-dimensions: 2a. E  conomic flows: a nation’s imports, exports, and foreign investments. 2b. R  estrictions on trade, involving tariff rates and hidden import barriers. 3. Governmental-political: Embassies located in a nation, the nations’ number of memberships in international organizations and number of treaties signed with other nations. 4. Social-cultural, which has three sub-dimensions: 4a. T  ransnational personal contacts involving telecommunications and mailed letters. 4b. P  otential flow of ideas and images, indicated by the number of internet users, households with television sets and Internet and international newspapers. 4c. P  enetration of transnational beliefs and values, indicated by such variables as the number of imported and exported books and the number of McDonald’s restaurants.2 KOF calculated index scores for all the 207 nations, then based upon those scores the nations were ranked, relative to each other, from 1 to 207 on each of the four indexes. Presented in Table 1.1 is a 10% ­systematic sample (that is, every 10th nation) from the KOF listing.



Table 1.1  Nations’ globalization rankings


Globalization (Composite)




The Netherlands Finland Australia Qatar Ukraine Brunei Darussalam South Africa Mexico Tunisia Kyrgyz Republic Grenada Samoa Cote d’Ivoire Burkina Faco Yemen Cameroon Iraq Ethiopia Afghanistan Eritrea Monaco

1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131 141 151 161 171 181 191 201

4 17 43 29 54 25 60 69 105 74 177 195 129 142 125 150 179 159 152 173 189

5 17 18 25 67 59 107 95 121 123 84 89 149 160 170 169 153 198 197 178 77

9 21 26 80 41 136 37 82 40 97 139 146 73 68 101 83 129 53 145 177 173

The figures shown for each of the 21 nations in this sample are its ranking among the 207 nations rated by KOF. To illustrate, based upon economic globalization, the Netherlands was the fourth highest scoring nation among the 207. (The only ranks shown in Table 1.1 are for the 21 nations included in our sub-sample.) Inspection of the sample of nations included in Table 1.1 shows a general tendency for the three primary dimensions to co-vary with each other, that is, for nations to rank similarly on all of the dimensions. The Netherlands is a particularly good example, ranking in the top 10 on all four dimensions. However, the relationships among the three dimensions are far from perfect. For example, there are nations—such as Qatar—that are globally well connected economically and culturally, but lag well behind on the government dimension. On the other hand, there are nations—such as Ethiopia—that rank much higher on the government dimension than they do on either the economic or cultural dimensions. As the above examples would lead us to anticipate, a statistical analysis indicates that the three dimensions and the composite are all positively inter-related, and the relationships among them (varying between about 0.50 and 0.80) are statistically significant. At the same time, these inter-relationships are clearly imperfect. The conclusion that follows is that it is prudent to dissect globalization into its three primary dimensions, 4


but the dimensions are sufficiently related to each other to make it also reasonable to refer to globalization as a composite phenomenon. In the following chapters, we will emphasize the composite or specific dimensions according to which better fits the issue at hand. The remainder of this chapter traces the history of globalization with weight given to recent time periods. Within each time period, the three primary dimensions of globalization will be discussed separately, but their inter-connections will also be noted.

EARLY ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION In some form, there has been a degree of economic globalization for thousands of years. As early as the 8th century BCE, gold and bronze figures were being traded between China and parts of Central Europe. This trade eventually bourgeoned and the route was later termed “the silk road” because of the initial importance of transactions involving silk material; but by the end of the 14th century, it included everything from gunpowder to carpets.3 During the Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), there was extensive trade across many parts of the world. The busiest trade routes linked Western Europe (Spain and Portugal, in particular) and Asia (China and India, in particular). As early as the 16th century, the principal cities in the nations most involved in global trade had become major nodes in the global economy of the day. Lisbon and Portugal, in the mid-16th century, were an especially notable example. It is described in Box 1.1.

BOX 1.1  LISBON: A 16TH CENTURY GLOBAL CITY During the 15th and 16th centuries, Lisbon became one of the world’s most important port cities. It was home to extensive ship building and manufacturing of naval instruments, permitting Portuguese trading ships to acquire merchandise from China, West Africa, Sri Lanka, etc. Some of the cargoes most sought by these traders could be described as “curiosities” and luxury goods. Included here were carvings, ivory caskets, elephants, jewelry, and precious stones. At various times, some of these items were provided almost exclusively to royalty, but Lisbon also contained a bustling international market in which both luxury and everyday goods were sold to a very diverse set of buyers.



The principal commercial and financial street in Lisbon was Rua Nova dos Mercedores. It was, during this era, one of the wealthiest streets in the world; the 16th century equivalent of Bond Street or Fifth Avenue. The specialized shops along this avenue offered Asian textiles, Ming porcelain, jewelry, animal byproducts, and so on. The shoppers were ethnically and economically diverse, described at the time as rich and poor, slaves and knights, and they included both domestic shoppers and international traders.4 Adding to Lisbon’s importance as a port city, many of the items that arrived at its waterfront were sold to international merchants who, in turn, shipped them across Europe. Thus, the Rua Nova and surrounding area were simultaneously both a major market serving a Portuguese clientele and a hub from which merchandise from around the world was shipped across Europe. Unfortunately, Rua Nova was completely destroyed by an earthquake and tsunami in 1755, so the best descriptions of this important marketplace are gleaned from several paintings that managed to survive.

Global trade increased over the following two centuries, slowly encompassing more nations and more commodities, though increases were not uninterrupted. A variety of disruptions, from natural disasters to wars, depressions, and revolutions almost invariably led to decreases in global trade that sometimes lasted for long periods of time. It was in the latter half of the 19th century that global trade and commerce rapidly expanded and their growth was associated both with government actions that promoted trade and with the cross-national dissemination of cultural values. This period, lasting from roughly 1860 to the onset of World War I (in 1913), can be seen as the early modern era with respect to globalization.


Many of the basic features of the modern world economy emerged with the Industrial Revolution early in the 19th century. Advances in transportation (e.g. steamships) and communication (e.g. telegraphs) permitted a large expansion of international trade, and led to what was later termed the “first age” of globalization.5 Building upon these initial developments, canals were constructed in Panama, Egypt, and many other nations that permitted steamships to reach further points. For 6


example, the Panama Canal—by creating a new Atlantic to Pacific Ocean route—reduced by over 3,500 miles the distance between parts of Asia and Europe. At the same time, the expansion of railroads brought more goods to ports to be loaded upon these trans-oceanic steamships. Throughout the 19th and into the early 20th century, there were striking increases in global trade, resting largely upon continuous improvements in transportation and communication which dramatically cut the costs of trans-national trade. Hand-in-hand with this increase in global trade, there was an increase in the division of labor among nations. In much of the Northern ­Hemisphere—and notably in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and North America—industrialization was rapidly increasing. According to world systems theory (WST), these industrializing nations were becoming the “core” of the global economic system that was emerging. By contrast, most of the nations in the Global South, including much of Latin and Central America, Asia and Africa provided raw materials, exporting agricultural and mining products. However, WST argued that the trade-related returns to the industrializing nations always far exceeded the returns to the raw material providing nations, contributing to what was to become an enduring wealth gap. The less industrial nations, in terms of the global economic system, were termed the “periphery,” and as the exploitive relationship between them and the core nations continued, the differences in wealth between the two groups of nations grew larger over time. As the global economy matured, WST viewed an intermediate group of nations referred to as the “semi-periphery.”6 The leading industrial nation in the late 19th century, Britain, also dominated global economic trade. By 1860, its level of industrialization, as measured by its percentage of the world’s manufacturing p­ roduction, was more than double that of the next highest scoring nations in the more industrialized core (France, Russia, and the United States). Its gross domestic product (the monetary value of all goods and services produced in the nation, abbreviated as GDP) was over nine times larger than the average nation in the periphery.7 Britain’s government policies also played a central role in enhancing the increase in global trade. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

During the 19th century, government actions affecting trade primarily took a bilateral form in which one nation signed a trade agreement with one other nation. These arrangements reduced tariffs on each other’s exports, and frequently included offering most favored nation (MFN) designations. Included with MFN status were clauses in which 7


the parties agreed to match any tariff reductions given by either to a third nation. (The largest agreement of this type was concluded between ­England and France.) Of probably the greatest significance in terms of its impact upon global trade was adoption of the gold standard. Its basic provision was a government’s guarantee that its bank notes would be fully backed by gold. A nation’s currency was much more readily accepted in trans-­national exchanges when recipients knew they could convert the money to a gold equivalent. Britain was the first to adopt a gold standard to back Bank of England notes, and the British pound became the dominant currency in international transactions. Other nations followed, and by the end of the 19th century most of Europe, the United States and several nations in other parts of the world similarly backed their currencies with gold. The effect was to create a fixed rate of exchange among a wide range of currencies, with gold as the common denominator, and thereby eliminating what had been a sizeable barrier to international trade.8 The government actions described above helped to promote increasing levels of global trade between the mid-19th and early 20th century. The most exact picture of global trade during this early modern era is provided by a data set compiled by Angus Maddison. His figures show a large increase in the value of world exports between 1870 and 1913 (the start of World War I). Across this time period, Maddison shows that the value of world exports grew about 60% faster than the value of world GDP, the sum of the monetary value of goods and services produced by all nations. (For additional explanation of the GDP see Box 1.2.) However, the relative political stability that underpinned the 19th and early

BOX 1.2  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT The gross domestic product (GDP) was developed by mid-20th century economists who wanted to quantify the total output of a nation or nations by measured the total value of the goods and services produced. Only those goods and services that are bought and sold count toward total value, so for example, a housewife’s unpaid contributions to her household would not be counted. By examining yearly changes in GDP, analysts believed they had a precise measure of economic growth in a nation or group of nations. The GDP was also touted as a measure of national or world well-being. An increasing GDP implied that people were becoming better off. However, recent criticism of the measure has been increasing. Some object to an inherent bias in the measure because it excludes important activities that do not fetch



a price. Others contend that GDP leaves out too many important criteria in judging well-being; for example, the amount of inequality within or among nations, the amount of irreplaceable resources that are being used, and so on. Because proposed economic policies are frequently judged on the basis of their ­potential impact upon GDP, it reinforces a narrow view of nations’ interests.9 Despite the above criticisms, the GDP continues to be relied upon extensively because it is the most widely available measure of economic output both for longitudinal and cross-national research.

20th century increases in global trade was terminated by the outbreak of World War I, which began in Europe in 1913, and later involved New Zealand, the United States, and numerous other nations. SOCIAL-CULTURAL FORCES

When a nation plays a dominant role in international commerce, aspects of that nation’s culture will typically be very influential globally as well. Its values, customs and ideal ways of life tend to be exported along with its commercial goods. With respect to the early modern era, Britain’s economic standing was without peer, and its economic reach across the globe was reinforced, and symbolized, by its naval power. As would be expected, therefore, British culture was the most emulated in the world. Its values and lifestyles were imitated in the colonies that comprised the British Empire, such as Egypt, Australia, and India, but that nation’s cultural influence also extended well beyond its colonies. Following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, the cross-national influence of values and ideals is frequently referred to as “cultural hegemony.” He was an Italian Marxist who was jailed in the 1920s because his writings were considered too radical to be tolerated by the Italian government. Gramsci theorized that an ideology, which he regarded as an important component of any culture, typically accompanied and justified political and economic institutions.10 If one nation dominated another economically—as epitomized by, but not limited to, colonial arrangements—people in the subordinate nation would be more accepting of the economic arrangement if they adopted the values and outlooks of the dominant nation. Such acceptance would make the subordinate nation’s population less likely to view the other nation as an oppressor. To apply Gramsci’s perspective, we can note that Britain’s cultural hegemony was reflected by the way people in other nations admired 9


British customs and tried to emulate British clothing, sports, religion, food, language, etc. With respect to sports, for example, cricket, rugby, and soccer all diffused from England to the colonies, and beyond. Even the word “sport” originated in England.11 Imitating the manners, customs and dress of people in an economically dominant nation enables the dominant nation to impose political and economic regulations without having to resort to as much overt force as might otherwise be necessary. In part, therefore, Gramsci offered a theory of political stability. On the other hand, however, such emulation also alienates people from their native culture, according to Gramsci, and tends eventually to promote counter-hegemonic forces, resulting in resistance and struggle. Active opposition of this type characterized the revolutions of British colonies, and later of Latin American nations trying to disgorge the cultural dominance of the United States. Thus, the same cultural hegemony that at one time can make subordination possible with little overt force also, at another time, triggers resistance, including armed revolutions. SUMMARY

Britain played a central role in the growth of trade among nations in the 19th and early 20th century. Bank of England notes, backed by gold, were the dominant currency in the world and British ships carried the most exports. Correspondingly, with respect to international trade, the actions of the British government were more consequential than those of any other nation. Britain’s cultural hegemony was also unequalled. In sum, congruent and powerful economic, political and cultural influences emanated out of Britain.12 The late 19th century also saw the beginnings of a bifurcated world division of labor. Rapidly industrializing nations grew wealthier and comprised the world system core while less industrial nations, dependent upon exporting minerals and agricultural products, were consigned to the periphery, and lagged behind economically.

THE DISRUPTED ERA: 1913–1945 World War I sets back globalization expectations. Prior to its outbreak, many analysts believed the nations of the world had become interdependent enough to prevent serious conflicts, and that i­nternational cooperation and global trade would necessarily continue uninterrupted. However, as the war intensified, the gold standard collapsed 10


and warring nations enacted trade restrictions in place of MFN accords. As the global economic system virtually disintegrated, there were widespread shortages of food and raw materials in the core nations, and much of the world experienced economic deprivation.13 After the war, nations’ interest in economic cooperation took a back seat to protectionist policies. Britain did not fully resume its economic leadership, and no other nation immediately stepped into the void. ­Limitations on international trade hampered everyone’s post-war ­economic recovery, and when the New York stock market crashed in 1929 it ushered in a deep worldwide depression that lasted until after the end of World War II (1945). Maddison’s figures (which cover 1913–1950) show that domestic economies shrank, as reflected by declines in world GDP. However, during this period, global exports declined even faster and further than nations’ GDPs. The most notable political accomplishment during the post-World War I era was the creation of the League of Nations. Established after the war, its objectives were to promote world peace and provide a body to resolve international territorial disputes. It had very limited success, however, and at its peak had only 58 nations as members.14 The League dissolved in 1946, but it morphed into the United Nations whose agencies later played a major role in promoting economic development and international trade. Although economies struggled and exports declined, it was during the early to middle decades of the 20th century that the United States began to emerge as a dominant economic and cultural center. Henry Ford’s Model T automobile was an especially notable step. It dramatically illustrated the power of industrialization to produce more products, at cheaper prices, than anyone had imagined. And while the United States (and Detroit in particular) was Ford’s home and center of production, his Model T was also assembled in Canada, England, Germany, Argentina, etc. It became the first global car, and in the 1920s, it comprised well over one-half of the world’s total automobile production.15 No matter where it was produced, the Model T came to symbolize the industrial strength of America, and the lifestyles and values associated with it: individualism, materialism, hedonism, consumerism, and so on. American popular culture, especially movies, also became globally dominant, shaping the dreams and ideals of people across the world. ­ merica The spread of baseball—“America’s pastime”—into Latin A and parts of Asia was another aspect of the widespread diffusion of the “American way of life.” It ushered in what would later be termed the American century.16 The growth of globalization was again disrupted by war, this time by World War II that began in Europe in 1939, and directly involved the 11


United States and other nations beginning in 1941. Hostilities overwhelmed trade and negotiations; and external cultural influences were submerged by the nationalism that typically accompanies warfare.


After World War II, improvements in transportation and communication were again the stimuli for increased international trade. Especially notable were advances in shipping technology that permitted cargo vessels to carry more commodities over longer distances. Following war-driven developments in aviation, aircraft manufacturers designed cargo aircraft that also become major carriers in global trade. And especially in core nations, improved railroads, highways and trucks were bringing more and more merchandise to ports and air terminals for global export. Findlay and O’Rourke described this post-war period as entailing “re-globalization” and they noted that the world economy grew faster between 1950 and 1973 than it had in the decades prior to 1913.17 ­Maddison provides some precise figures, showing that world GDP was increasing almost 3% annually in this post-war period, but that did not match the dramatic increase in world trade, which was growing by nearly 8%.18 Later in the 20th century, analyses of trade emphasized manufactured goods. Prior to mid-century, agricultural products had dominated world trade, but after that their importance steadily declined. On the other hand, manufactured goods, and their components, continued to grow in importance and by the end of the 20th century they comprised over three-quarters of world trade.19 Because of the dominant place of manufactured goods, it can be more instructive to compare changes in trade to fluctuations in goods production than to overall GDP changes. Relevant figures show that the 1950s were a decade of rapid growth in both. After 1960, the rate of growth of both continued to be robust, but the rate of increase of both manufactured goods and trade declined gradually until 1980. There was a widespread recession during the 1980s, and a decade long decline in the growth of both manufactured goods and exports. During the last decade of the century, both rates rebounded.20 With respect to manufacturing and the global economy, several other trends that occurred during this period—and have continued to the



p­ resent—are important to note. Manufacturing employment declined in the highly industrial (i.e., core) nations while reduced barriers to entry and lower wage costs, in particular, led to increased manufacturing activity in many of the formerly non-industrialized nations of the Global South. There has been a good deal of debate around the consequences of these relative changes in the manufacturing sector. Of special note has been the question of whether manufacturing employment has continued to have a sizeable impact upon economic growth, and whether that impact is the same for nations of all types. Roshan Pandian has addressed this question with data from 24 highly industrial nations and 99 formerly less industrial nations of the Global South. He measured economic growth by the percent change of per capita GDP over five-year intervals between 1970 and 2010. He correlated these changes with the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing.21 Pandian found that after controlling for school enrollment, population growth and other potentially relevant variables, that economic growth and manufacturing employment were positively related: more of one was associated with more of the other. And perhaps surprisingly, he found that while the positive effect of manufacturing employment remained steady in core nations between 1970 and 2010, it declined in nations of the South; the positive effect did not disappear, it simply decreased in magnitude. It is difficult to say why the relative decline occurred in the South, and only in the South, but there is some reason to believe it was due to manufacturing costs (including wages) being kept down in peripheral nations by competition among the links in the global supply chains that were established during the latter half of the 20th century. GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS

A supply chain entails a network of suppliers and distributors who are involved in the production of the component parts of a company’s product and its eventual sale to a retail customer. Cost is the criterion that determines where each step in the chain will occur. During the latter half of the 20th century, many of these supply chains became global, meaning that multiple nations were involved in production and/or distribution. The relative advantage possessed by the peripheral nations was cheap labor that could be employed in some of the manufacturing processes. This pitted peripheral nations against each other in “bidding” for manufacturing jobs, and that may be why the return on manufacturing employment in these nations was declining relative to the return in core nations.



Automobile production proves clear illustrations of how complex global supply chains operate. For example, cars identified (and marketed) as American, such as a Ford Focus, are comprised of some parts made in Mexico (including plastic bumpers and seat covers), other parts made in Canada (such as components of engines), and other parts made in the United States (transmissions, for example). The production of a more complex component might entail crossing national borders three or four times as different parts are added. Similarly, automobiles identified as German, such as Volkswagens, are assembled from parts that are produced in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere, and similarly c­ risscross national borders. In sum, manufacturing became dependent upon supply networks in which goods traversed national borders a number of times as part of the complex pipeline by which the components of an automobile (or airplane or computer) became parts of a finished product.22 Having a global supply chain in place can also insulate a company from the “shocks” that can accompany fluctuations in inter-nation exchange rates. To illustrate, prior to 2012, the British pound traded at $1.50. The sale of a product in the United States at a cost of $15,000 yielded 10,000 pounds for the British firm (15,000 divided by 1.50). The value of a pound relative to a dollar declined after 2012, and by 2017 had reached $1.27. The same sale by the British firm then yielded 11,811 pounds, an increase of 1,811 pounds. Of course, the pound and the dollar could also move in an opposite direction in which case the company would have less to show for each U.S. sale. And such changes in exchange rates can become the single most important variable affecting a company’s balance sheet. One answer to the risk of sudden swings in currency exchanges is for a company to set up sales offices in the same nations in which components of its product are being manufactured or assembled. Then, if a currency change adversely impacts a company’s yield at the point of sale, that same currency change will operate to the company’s benefit where some of the product was manufactured. For example, in the 1990s, BMW outsourced a small portion of its automobile production to China. As its sale in China increased, the company also increased production in China by 2012, producing almost all of the components for one-half of the BMWs sold in China. This had the advantage of shortening BMW’s supply chain as well as providing a cushion against fluctuations in the pound to yuan rate. Happy with the result, BMW then began to implement the same strategy in India, Mexico, and Russia.23 For global supply chains to operate smoothly, there must be a wide range of international regulatory agreements. For example, if the nations are adjoining, they must share the same maximum truck size



requirements for vehicles to cross borders. Regardless of the nations’ locations, it is also very important to eliminate or reduce restrictive customs and security requirements.24 The umbrella agreements that enabled supply chains to traverse national boarders are discussed in the following section. MULTINATIONAL FIRMS (MNFS)

Also associated with the intensifying of global economic interdependence was the growth of firms that operated in more than one nation, usually through affiliated firms or subsidiaries. They are typically referred to as transnational corporations (TNCs), multinational firms (MNFs), or global corporations. There is no consensus on which is the best term, though Harrod makes a persuasive argument for MNFs. He argues that multinational simply notes that a company operates in several nations. Transnational, by contrast, implies that firms operate over and above national boundaries, but they are in fact highly dependent upon nations’ tax codes, labor forces, etc. And finally, global implies a worldwide reach, but many MNFs operate in only a few nations and often concentrate upon a single national market.25 Therefore, following Harrod, we will typically refer to them as MNFs, even though MNFs and TNCs are typically employed interchangeably in the literature. Most of the larger MNFs also have multinational employees, especially at the higher levels of the firm. They tend to move their professional, technical, and upper management personnel into and out of the cities in which their firms are located. This movement of staff has been a recurring feature of MNFs, and it has had an extremely important impact upon contemporary cities. It is a consequence of globalization that will be further discussed in the chapters that follow. These MNFs grew rapidly in the last quarter of the 20th century and assumed a major place in international trade.26 They grew by expanding their base of operation outside of the nation in which they began, and by investing in companies outside of their initial national boundaries. The latter usually involves foreign direct investment (FDI). To illustrate, when a company that manufactures automobiles in Germany or the United States purchases all or part of the equity of a facility in Poland or Mexico it entails FDI. Therefore, the growth of MNCs and FDI has been highly correlated. By 1999, FDI exceeded $350 billion, and this entailed a seven-fold increase over the last quarter of the 20th century.27 Given the typically highly dispersed ownership of large companies, 10% is typically a sufficient stake to provide one investor with the



single largest percent of the firm’s equity, and as a result, a large degree of control over operations of a firm. For this reason, the widely used measure of FDI requires a cross-nation investment of 10% or more in the corporation. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

In the years immediately following the end of World War II, there was a great increase in the number of nation-states. In fact, they become a dominant institutional form of government, and the attention of much of the world turned to questions about the kinds of political bridges that could be erected to connect them. These were partially separate developments that to some degree ran counter to each other because an integral attribution of nation-states is that their claim to internal autonomy and external independence is accepted as legitimate by other nation-states. So, if the nation-states regard each other as autonomous and independent, effectively linking them can be problematic. Let us begin by examining the growth of the nation-state model that occurred after World War II. At the time (i.e., 1945), there were fewer than 50 nation-sates. Their rate of growth was especially dramatic during the first years after the war when their number doubled. Their rate of growth slowed later in the century, but continued to be robust, and the number of nation-states reached 150 by the year 2000. Thus, over the last half of the 20th century, the number of nation-states tripled.28 Exactly why this increased occurred has been explained in two somewhat different ways associated with different theoretical traditions. Each is described in Box 1.3.

BOX 1.3  EXPLAINING THE PROLIFERATION OF NATION-STATES There is some disagreement among analysts concerning how best to account for the rapid proliferation of nation-states, but the differences are largely a matter of emphasis. Some stress the diffusion of the nation-state model. They argue that its spread was due to its relative strengths resulting from a unique set of exchanges between government and the governed. To be specific, nation-states offer their citizens opportunities for political participation (e.g. voting) in return for military service and public goods, such as welfare benefits, in return for paying taxes. The first nation-states—Great Britain, France and the United States—impressed ambitious leaders throughout the world with their ability both to raise taxes and to mobilize large armies,



and most significantly, to do both without encountering great resistance. These nation-states appeared to have economic power, political legitimacy and ­military effectiveness that far surpassed that of other alternatives: federations, monarchies, empires, city-states, etc. These perceived advantages, according to historic institutional theorists, accounted for why non-nationstate regimes were most likely to be replaced by nation-states.29 An alternative explanation, referred to as world polity theory, focuses upon the proliferation of inter-government and international non-­government organizations that rapidly proliferated in the post-war period. These agencies and organizations, such as the United Nations, stressed the legitimacy of the nation-state model and actively promoted it. To receive the full recognition of these global organizations required that countries adopt the nationstate form of government. The organization’s success in advocating for this model built upon itself because as the number of nation-states increased, the capacity of any polity to establish relationships with others depended upon its adoption of the nation-state model.30 The two explanations offered here for the rise of the nation-state model are associated with two different theoretical traditions. It is not necessary for the reader to choose one over the other, though. It seems perfectly reasonable to assume that the set of forces each stressed operated conjointly.

In the immediate post-war period, as the nation-state was becoming ascendant, representatives of the nation-states also focused upon building connections among them. Especially notable was the conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, of 44 nations led by the United States and the United Kingdom. Over a two-year period, they negotiated a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (known as GATT).31 It established reciprocal import–export rules and a forum in which related disputes could be resolved. The over-reaching objective of GATT was to promote international trade by eliminating the tariffs that had exacerbated by Great Depression and contributed to the outbreak of World War II. Over the next 50 years, there were one-half dozen more rounds of negotiations with over 100 nations becoming signatories to the agreement. Most of the included nations were from the world system core, and most of the exports that were protected from antidiscrimination tariffs were products exported from core nations. (Agricultural products were notably excluded.) The era of GATT regulations technically ended in 1995 with its incorporation into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Bretton Woods conference also led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the WTO and IMF were designed to operate parallel to each other. The IMF was viewed as operating like a 17


bank in that member nations had to deposit set fees and the Fund would lend money to nations experiencing economic difficulties in order to spur their economic growth. The IMF was also charged with addressing global financial problems, such as across-nation income inequality.32 At roughly the same time that the Bretton Woods conference was occurring, a group of nations also officially founded the United Nations to replace, and expand upon, the League of Nations. Two agencies closely associated with the UN are especially significant with respect monitoring and promoting global trade: the World Bank (TWB) and the IMF, as introduced above.33 THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

TWB usually refers to what is more formally known as the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is actually one of several banks that comprise the World Bank Group; by itself, however, it is typically referred to as TWB. Along with IMF, TWB is one of more than one dozen specialized, self-governing agencies associated with the UN. Member nations support and oversee these agencies on a voluntary basis that is separate from their membership in the UN. Each of these agencies has a separate board that represents member nations, and each board appoints a director who manages day-to-day operations of the agency. The primary missions of the IMF are to facilitate international trade and assist member nations when they face short-term balance of payment problems. In addition to helping with cash flow issues, IMF provides technical support and advice. That is also true of TWB in conjunction with its primary objective of furthering economic development. Their favorite diagnosis for why nations—often in the periphery of the world system—face economic difficulties is that they are not yet fully integrated into the global economy. The underlying assumption has been that globalization will reduce the economic problems of all nations as long as they are adequately connected to the world system. For people who think that global economic interdependence has gone too far, and is destroying trade unions, promoting sweatshops, degrading the environment and promoting greater inequality among and within nations, these agencies, along with WTO, are the most visible culprits. As a result, when directors of these agencies have met in recent years, there has frequently been some type of large-scale demonstration. In October 2015, for example, directors of the IMF and TWB convened their annual meeting in Lima, Peru. An estimated 5,000 demonstrators marched to the meeting place where they were stopped by a national police force more than double their size.34 18


The standoffs between police and demonstrators that typically occur at these annual meetings can be seen as a microscopic reflection of a north–south division of the world. Working closely with TWB and IMF has been the G7, an affiliation of the wealthiest nations that are also the major supporters of these agencies.35 (The G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.) It periodically expands to a larger group of leading nations that comprise the G20. The finance ministers of the G7 and G20 affiliations meet regularly to analyze the world’s economic situation, from their viewpoint, and to review how well the agencies are promoting economic development. When the G7 or G20 group meet, there are typically demonstrations much like those that are organized to protest IMF and WTO. When the G20 met in Hamburg, Germany, in July 2017, for example, crowds estimated at 20,000 people set automobiles on fire in order to block access by the delegates to Hamburg’s downtown convention center where the leaders were scheduled to meet. City police needed the assistance of hundreds of officers from outside Hamburg in order to clear the roads. Protests aside, it is difficult to assess the overall success of IMF and TWB. In some cases, investments from these agencies (they often work in conjunction with each other) have led to economic growth within nations that has benefitted much of the population. In other instances, the gains have been highly selective, with only one segment of the population benefitting. And in still other cases, the funded project has turned out to be a widespread disaster in which hardly anyone benefitted. The following case studies, presented in Boxes 1.4 and 1.5, are illustrative.

BOX 1.4  A HYDROPOWER DAM FOR UGANDA In the late 1990s, the government of Uganda, with help from TWB and others, began construction of a hydropower dam at Bujagali Falls, near the source of the Nile River. The nation had been experiencing an extreme shortage of electricity, which had resulted in daily power shortages in businesses, hospitals, schools, etc. From the standpoint of TWB (and the Uganda business community), these power shortages were stunting Uganda’s e­ conomic growth. The dam at the Bujagali waterfall was projected to cost $800 million and to provide the nation with abundant and less expensive energy. The increased access to electricity was expected to generate industrial investment, leading to increased employment and, therefore, less poverty.36 In order to construct the dam, however, thousands of people living in the area had to be resettled, against their will. This included a large number of indigenous people for whom the area was their historic home. A graduate



student, Karianne Heien, decided to study the effects of the involuntary relocation for her master’s thesis and moved into the area while the dam was being constructed. She conducted lengthy interviews with people in families that had been resettled and was able to document how adversely their lives, especially those of children, had been affected. Conducting the research turned out to be more difficult than expected because she found that families had been pressured by local officials to make statements that were favorable to the formally authorized aims and goals of the project. Therefore, she relied upon open-ended interviews in “natural” settings because they more closely resembled normal conversations, and her respondents felt less like subjects of an experiment, and she felt that they would respond to her questions more candidly and spontaneously.37 Heien found that before they were involuntarily moved, local inhabitants had been promised electricity, medical facilities and schools in their new settlement. However, after they were relocated, they could not afford the electricity, and the schools were too far away for children who could not walk long distances to attend. Furthermore, the compensation given to most families also turned out to be so insufficient that they were unable to pay the required fees for their children to attend school. In fact, many families were so impoverished after resettlement that they often lacked sufficient food. And when children, or adults, became ill they found that, despite earlier promises to the contrary, they had very limited access to healthcare facilities. Looking beyond the people who had to be uprooted, the picture is still not very bright. By the time the dam was completed in 2012, its total cost had risen to $1.3 billion, and the average cost of electricity actually increased, to levels most Ugandans could not afford. In addition, there were a host of other adverse consequences. The cascading Bujagali Falls—that had been considered a national treasure—were degraded and the dam led to the submerging of a place with great spiritual importance to indigenous people who had lived in the area for generations. Local environmentalists fear the costly dam also lessened the opportunity for Uganda to pursue more sustainable energy alternatives.

Representing the Southern Hemisphere and attempting to counter the G7 and G20 are the Group of 77. It began with 77 nations (hence its name) in 1964, but by 2016 it had grown to include 134 nations, mostly in Africa, Central, and Latin America. This group complains that funds they have received from IMF and WTO have locked them into cycles of debt and poverty from which they cannot escape. Further aid from these agencies requires that debtor nations adhere to policies dictated by the rich nations that control the agencies and they almost always demand 20


BOX 1.5  PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE IVORY COAST The Ivory Coast (also known as Cote d’Voire) received its independence from France in 1958, and for two decades following it seemed to flourish economically, especially in comparison to its West African neighbors. When its agricultural export economy was hurt by the global recessions of the 1980s, however, living standards fell, and many of its wealthiest and best educated people migrated to Europe or the United States. There was political turmoil in addition to growing poverty, and the nation’s downward cycle peaked in several bloody civil wars.38 IMF and TWB provided substantial assistance to the Ivory Coast in the latter decades of the 20th century, but were disappointed in the results, and periodically halted funding entirely because of government instability and fiscal mismanagement. Between 2002 and 2016, however, these agencies redoubled their efforts and made new investments totaling several hundred million dollars. In return, they demanded that the Ivory Coast accept the usual requirements the agencies imposed upon borrowing nations: public finance reform, including the improved administration of tax codes; more supervision of the nation’s banks; balanced government budgets, requiring reduced w ­ elfare payments; and more open markets, based upon supply and demand.39 Between 2003 and 2016, GDP per capita increased from about $2,200 to about $3,600. The nation’s GDP increased ten-fold, and the Ivory Coast’s economic growth became among the fastest in the world. Its principal city, Abidjan, with a population of nearly five million, became a commercial hub for all of West Africa, attracting large amounts of foreign investment. Many of the elite who previous left the country returned, and prospered in the new environment. However, the benefits of the Ivory Coast’s impressive economic development that were realized by the elite have not been widely shared. The wealth has been slow to trickle down to the nation’s poorer areas. Unskilled workers in Abidjan and farm workers in rural areas of the nation, for example, have seen little or no improvement. Income inequality within the Ivory Coast has substantially increased, and as a result, one Abidjan journalist’s view of his nation’s social situation is that, ‘We are sitting on a bomb.’40

budgetary austerity. In effect, that means fewer benefits for the working class and others who are in marginal economic positions. Thus, while representatives of the G7 and G20 generally condemn protestors for trying to disrupt TWB and IMF meetings, spokespeople for the G77 frequently praise demonstrators for calling attention to the deleterious policies of the agencies.41 21



The latter half of the 20th century could fairly be described as the American half-century with respect to cultural influence. America’s sway that had begun in the early decades of the century, increased exponentially as technological developments made the cultural industries—recorded music, television, motion pictures, etc.—more exportable. The impact of television was especially notable because of its global penetration; people everywhere increasingly had access to its content. And television series, in particular, have always been an especially good medium for conveying cultural images because their length enables them to present detailed, if idealized, pictures of the place in which they are set, and to do so over a long period of time. When television initially began to expand, in the 1950s, the exporting of programs was very limited because most programs were broadcast live. Technical limitations and time differences largely confined their showing to domestic and border audiences. The advent of videotape in the late 1950s expanded opportunities for exporting programs because a videotaped show could be shown at the same hour despite time zone differences. They could also be more easily dubbed in order to transcend language differences. The export of made in U.S. television shows soared as a result, and by the 1960s, they had become important parts of the local television schedule in many parts of the world. Satellite technology in the 1970s made distance irrelevant, and importantly, made it more difficult for a nation that wanted to remain closed to prevent the United States from beaming its television signals across national boundaries. By the 1970s, a UNESCO study concluded that the relationship of the United States to the rest of the world, with respect to exporting television programs, resembled a “one-way street.”42 An especially notable example of the U.S. influence was the television series, Dallas. It was a series about a successful Texas oilman that began in the late 1970s and was the first television show produced anywhere that had a large transnational audience. From Algeria to Romania, people were watching the same episodes of Dallas. It was, however, only the first of many American-made, internationally popular series. At the same time, audiences were going to theaters showing ­American-made ­ merican movies, and young people were listening to music recorded by A performers, and all of the exported cultural industries conveyed a romanticized image of America life that very many people across the world wanted to emulate. In sum, by the final decades of the 20th century, the United States held a pre-eminent global position with respect to finance and cultural



hegemony. And the major governmental institutions that were shaped during this period and charged with monitoring and regulating global trade of all sorts—such as the UN (in New York), the IMF and TWB (in Washington, DC),—were located, not by accident, in the United States.


Following the severe and widespread recession of the 1980s, global trade, world GDP, and other indices of economic activity increased somewhat during the 1990s, but the upward trend was not sustained. Looking back, it appears that the 1990s were the unusual decade, and that slowdowns in the rate with which global trade increased—­including some declines in its absolute volume—was actually most typical after the 1970s. For example, between 2012 and 2016, the volume of world trade grew only by about 3% per year. That was less than one-half of the usual rate of expansion during the preceding quarter century. Another way to view the slowdown: between 2012 and 2016 world trade and world GDP increased at the same rate, but during the preceding quarter ­century world trade had grown twice as fast as world GDP.43 A number of theories have been offered to explain why the rate of growth of global trade declined during the first decades of the 21st century. We can begin by noting that there were no major transportation or communication innovations that could have stimulated trade by driving down costs. There was also an increase in some nations’ protectionist policies, especially involving trade barriers imposed upon each other by two of the world’s largest traders, China and the United States. An ­illustrative summary of some of these changes is provided by the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index. It provides a yearly tabulation of regulatory restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. The relevant figures show that openness increased substantially, especially in the most industrial nations, between 1970 and 2000, and then remained flat through the end of 2014.44 Of perhaps greatest consequence was the slump experienced by most of the major industrialized nations. Looking specifically at the G7 nations, they had experienced robust economic growth—defined by an increase of 4% or more in GDP—in about 75% of the years between 1981 and 2000. However, between 2001 and 2016, only one of the G7 nations (Japan) ever had an increase in GDP of 4% or more and Japan’s large increase occurred only once in this 15-year period.45



The relative economic slump of the 21st century depressed global demand and manufacturing output. To appreciate the impact, we note that manufactured goods, over the previous 40 years, or so, had dominated trade. By 2015, they comprised 80% of world trade. Economic downturns, such as those widely experienced by the leading industrial nations in the first decades of the 21st century, typically resulted in manufacturing cutbacks. Therefore, as the correlation between the volumes of manufactured goods and global trade increase, economic downturns that suppressed manufacturing had increasingly profound effects upon global trade.46 Other indices of global economic activity, especially among G7 nations, also declined during the early part of the 21st century. Between 2006 and 2016, for example, FDI in these economies decreased by 40%, and an additional 10%–15% was projected into 2017 as this was being written. International bank lending also declined by nearly 10% during this ten-year period.47 A broader measure of this type of activity is provided by the sum of all types of cross-border capital flows. They grew from one-half trillion dollars in 1980 to about $12 trillion just before the recession began in 2007. There was a corresponding increase in the percentage of global GDP that capital flows comprised: from 4% to 20% of world GDP. After 2007, cross-border flows dropped dramatically, and by 2013 had not recovered. Specifically, by then they amounted to only $4.6 trillion, and comprised only 6% of global GDP.48 THE FUTURE

There are a number of analysts who predict that the rate with which global trade increases in the future will probably decline, and that it may even decline in an absolute, rather than relative, sense. One culprit they note is the ageing of populations around the world. Almost every one of the G7 and G20 nations’ population are aging, meaning older work forces that may be less productive. Aging populations also mean larger proportions of people that are retired, hence dependent upon smaller productive labor forces. These aging trends are likely to continue to increase.49 The intensity of the global economic ties that have developed may also, perhaps paradoxically, introduce the possibility of cascading risks that reduce trade in the future. To explain, Miguel Centeno and his colleagues contend that the global economy should be viewed as a constituting a system, that is, comprised of densely interconnected and interdependent components (mainly nations). All such highly integrated systems, they continue, are intrinsically at risk of disruptions that emanate in one particular nation or region, but then spread widely



across the highly interconnected system. These ripples multiply the effect of the initial disruption.50 To illustrate how a problem at one place can be contagious, they point out that 80% of global trade now passes through only a couple of shipping lanes. Piracy, extreme weather, or other events that disrupted these core shipping lanes would have adverse consequences that would reverberate around the world. To illustrate further, the interconnectedness of the global financial system means that there are always going to be tipping points in which a local banking problem surges into system-wide failures because the “local” bank holds funds from other nations’ retirement accounts, mutual funds, etc. In sum, the economic interdependence that increased over the decades may have produced a system in which the components are so tightly interconnected that risks are magnified. As routinely occurring local disturbances become system disruptions, the effect may be to suppress the economies of many nations and, thereby, global trade. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

One of the most significant global developments of the first decade of the 21st century was the growth of the European Union (EU), designed to provide a single market and free movement of people and goods across member states. The EU actually became a legal entity in 1993, growing out of the European Economic Community that formed in the late 1950s, but the impressive growth and impact of the EU occurred after the turn of this century. Especially notable was the introduction of the euro, in 2002, which replaced 12 national currencies. Between 2002 and 2015, the EU’s member nations more than doubled in size, and it consolidated power in the office of a President of the European Council.51 However, from a high point in 2012—when membership peaked and the EU was awarded a Nobel Prize—problems emerged as some nations began to wonder if their national interest was being served by the EU membership. Open borders requiring that nations take migrants who entered any other member nation was a major issue; but the problems went much deeper. People in many nations began to push back against globalism, per se. They started to challenge the idea that globalization was inherently good and that global governance should naturally expand while national sovereignty contracted.52 It is generally assumed that any nation-state requires a degree of its citizens’ cognitive and affective commitment. Under routine conditions, this commitment results from people’s sense that they occupy a unique geographical space and share a feeling of belonging



to a distinctive collectivity. Their attachment is routinely expressed in ­taken-for-granted shared rituals, such as observing commemorative holidays, flying and waving flags, and so on. Analysts recognized that a variety of events and circumstances could periodically arise to increase the salience of national identity: terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and so on.53 However, these spikes in nationalism were regarded as shortterm responses to immediate events that would soon dissipate. By the second decade of the 21st century, popular political movements challenged the belief that only a minimal degree of nationalism would exist under ordinary conditions. Stronger than expected identification with the nation and a highly limited definition of who were its “real” citizens was combined with fear of economic competition and it led to a desire to restrict immigration and to scale back the nation’s supranational involvements. Working classes, through unions and political parties, began to question whether globalization was in their economic interest. Immigration sometimes seemed to be out of control, and the same classes feared job competition and too much blurring of their national-ethnic-religious identities. At the same time, national governments, from Poland to Canada, were investing in public relations advisors and communication specialists to help them to articulate coherent identities for their nations. The techniques they employed, and they goals they tried to attain, were very similar to those involved in crystallizing the identity of a commercial product, such as soap, or a fast food restaurant. The over-riding objective was to raise the salience of the nation, and make it a “brand” that could command citizen loyalty in a world in which national boundaries were becoming vague.54 The first overt political action in response to changing sentiments about globalization was Britain’s vote, in 2016, to exit from the EU (“Brexit.”). Details of the withdrawal, and the nature of the continuing relationship between Britain and the EU remained unclear months later (as this is written in early 2019). For example, might there be tariffs on trade between Britain and the EU? Nevertheless, the Brexit vote clearly signified a reversal of the trend toward increasing trans-national governance in Europe. Simultaneously to Brexit, the National Front in France—a political party that was nationalistic and anti-euro—made gains in French elections. And then ­Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, running on a highly nationalistic platform, vowing to enact tax policies and tariffs that would benefit the United States regardless of their consequences for global trade. There is ample reason to question whether national governments will be as supportive of global trade in the future as they have been in the past. 26


However, it is not clear to what extent increasing nationalism will be able to push back the trans-national arrangements that solidified the global economic interdependence that developed over the preceding century. CULTURAL HEGEMONY

In recent decades, the cultural hegemony of the United States has declined, but not eliminated, by media streams from across the world. By the first decades of the 21st century, it was a more level global playing field than it had been in the latter part of the 20th century. On the one hand, television programmes produced in the United States continued to be the most watched in the world. In 2016, for example, not an atypical year, the United States produced programs dominated the global top ten.55 The single most watched television series in the world was the U.S.-produced Game of Thrones, which was shown on an A ­ merican network (HBO). However, that same program also illustrated the global nature of television content. While identified as an American program, the primary filming for the series was at a studio in Belfast, Norther Ireland, and its external locations included: Canada, Iceland, Morocco, Spain, etc.56 Numerous television series produced outside the United States also had a global impact. Shows produced in England by the BBC became very popular in the United States, and in other parts of the English-speaking world. There were also a number of non-British television programs produced outside of the United States that were broadcast, or shown on Netflix, in many parts of the world, including the United States. In other words, the United States, like many other nations, became both an importer and exporter of culturally laden television series, though as we have noted, the United States was still the dominant exporter. A few of the notable examples of the series watched in 2016 by large audiences across much of the world are briefly described in Table 1.2. Table 1.2  Leading global television series in 2016

Series Title


Produced in

Some Other Nations Showing

Cinderella and Four Knights Shtisel

South Korea


Poor, but ambitious young Korean woman Orthodox Jewish community in Jerusalem Fashion empire in 1950s Spain



Troubled lawyer in


Philippines, China, United Kingdom, Spain United States, Canada, France, Sweden France, Lithuania, Greece, United States United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, United States




Other media forms followed a similar pattern in which the United States remained the most important production site, but less so than in previous decades. With respect to motion pictures, for example, while U.S. production companies have continued to consistently dominate the top 50 movies in world box office grossing, China became a more serious rival. For China, the success in 2008 of U.S.-made Kung Fu Panda was a turning point. The film’s enormous success in China led government officials to question how a U.S. company could understand Chinese culture well enough to make a movie that required so much understanding of Chinese culture. Motion pictures, along with other popular forms of art and literature, became viewed by Chinese political leaders as a major way to influence the domestic population—and via export, to extend Chinese cultural influence.57 Along with increasing investments in film production, China added movie screens at a prolific rate, and by 2017 surpassed the United States in the total number of movie screens. This made China an important market for imported movies, and Chinese investors have been actively involved in joint productions with studios in the United States and elsewhere, producing films for both domestic audiences and export. For example, the global top 50 movies list for 2016 included six films ­produced in China/Hong Kong, and several others that were jointly produced by companies in China and the United States.58

A PREVIEW In Chapter 2, the focus turns to cities, and their historical development, most recently resulting in city-regions that are the major nodes of the modern global system. Then the remaining chapters are devoted to a discussion of the ways that globalization has impacted life in diverse cities. We can note that many of these effects would be difficult to reverse, even if some aspects of globalization were to be reduced in the coming decades. To be specific, the significant attributes of globalization that will be examined in relation to their urban consequences include: 1. Increased inequality both within and across nations that is associated with increased stratification in cities, the topic of Chapter 3. 2. The diffusion of ideas and values that produce global culture(s), and lead to increased tourism and an emphasis upon an experience economy within cities, discussed in Chapter 4. 3. MNFs are associated with flows of corporate personnel across national boundaries, resulting in large numbers of young people with distinctive urban lifestyles, the topic of Chapter 5. 28


4. Relatively open national boundaries and very large inter-nation opportunity differences that stimulate migration, leading to the formation of urban enclaves, discussed in Chapter 6. 5. Challenges to national boundaries and citizenship, raising questions about the autonomy of city-regions, described in Chapter 7.

GLOSSARY Cultural Hegemony: The external influence of a nation’s values and customs. European Union (EU): A supra-national entity created by European member nations that established a single market with free movement of people and goods. G7: An affiliation involving the world’s wealthiest nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Global Supply Chains: Production and distribution of component parts of a product in multiple nations. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The monetary value of all the goods and services produced (usually by a nation). International Monetary Fund (IMF): An agency associated with the UN, charged with promoting international trade and economic growth. Multinational Firms (MNF): Corporations with major operations in more than one nation (also referred to as transnational corporations). The World Bank (TWB): One of several banks associated with the UN, its mission is to promote nations’ economic development by increasing their connectivity to the global economy. World Systems Theory: Views exploitive exchanges between nations in the core and periphery as leading to wealth inequality.

CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER [In many instances, a chapter in the Reader corresponds with more than one chapter in this book, and can therefore appear more than one time.] 2. Divisions of space and time in Europe Fernand Braudel 5. Urban specialization in the world system: an investigation of historical cases Nestor P. Rodriguez, Joe R. Feagin 29


6. Accumulation and comparative urban systems John Walton 7. The world-system perspective and urbanization Michael Timberlake 18. Fourth world cities in the global economy: the case of Phnom Penh, Cambodia Gavin Shatkin 19. Medellín and Bogotá: the global cities of the other globalization Eduardo Mendieta 20. Prologue: “Specification of the world city network” Peter J. Taylor 30. Prologue: “The global city as world order” Warren Magnusson 31. Globalization and the rise of city-regions Allen J. Scott 32. Global cities, “glocal states”: global city formation and state territorial restructuring in contemporary Europe Neil Brenner 36. Between world history and state formation: new perspectives on Africa’s cities Laurent Fourchard 52. The transnational capitalist class and contemporary architecture in globalizing cities Leslie Sklair 68. The urban revolution Henri Lefebvre

NOTES 1 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2016 KOF Index of Globalization, www.kof. 2 The ubiquitousness of McDonald’s combined with its reflection of American fast food culture make it an often used indicator of specifically American cultural penetration. 3 Liu Xinru, The Silk Road in World History. Oxford University Press, 2010. The same term—silk road—is again in use to describe Beijing’s expanding land and sea routes across Asia and parts of Africa and Europe. 4 For further description of Rua Nova, see the essays in, Annemarie J. Gschwend and K.J. Lowe (Eds), The Global City. Paul Holberton, 2016. 5 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan. Princeton University Press, 2011. 6 Immanuel Wallerstein, World System Analysis. Duke University Press, 2004. See also, Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Globalization.” Journal of World Systems Research, 5, 1999.



7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24

25 26 27 28 29

30 31

Angus Maddison, The World Economy. OECD, 2006. See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report, 2013. For further discussion, see Diane Coyle, GDP. Princeton University, 2015. Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol. 1. Columbia University Press, 1992. For further discussion of the relationship between culture and sports, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Meaning of Sports. PublicAffairs, 2004. For a thorough overview, see Raymond E. Dumett, Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. Routledge, 2016. World Trade Organization, op.cit. For additional history of the League, see Ruth Henry, The League of Nations. Haus Publishing, 2010. See David Reynolds, America, Empire of Liberty. Basic Books, 2011. See the essays in, David Slater and Peter J. Taylor (Eds), The American Century. Wiley-Blackwell, 1999. Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty. Princeton University, 2007. Maddison, op.cit. World Trade Report, 2013, op.cit. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report, 2014. Roshan K. Pandian, “Does Manufacturing Matter for Economic Growth in the era of Globalization.” Social Forces, 95, 2017. The American automobile’s production chain is described by, Dudley Althaus and Christina Rogers, “Global Car Industry Runs on NAFTA.” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2016, p. A12. Xu Bin and Liu Ying, “The Case Study: How BMW Dealt with Exchange Rate Risk.” Financial Times, October 29, 2012. The World Bank has compiled a logistic performance index rating nations on their supply chain capabilities. See Bernard Hoekman, “A 21st Century Trade Agenda.” Global Supply Chains and Logistics Services article 5, World Trade Organization, 2017. J.W.J. Harrod, “Multinational Corporations.” In Sohail T. Inayatullah (Ed), Global Transformations and World Futures. UNESCO-EOLSS, 2009. For further discussion of these firms, see Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy. SAGE, 2011. For further discussion of FDI and MNFs, see Mark Abrahamson, Global Cities. Oxford, 2004. Figures presented by Xue Li and Alexander Hicks, “World Polity Matters.” American Sociological Review, 81, 2016. Two articles by Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein are especially relevant: “The Rise of the Nation-State Across the World.” American Sociological Review, 75, 2010; and “Still No Robust Evidence for World Polity Theory.” American Sociological Review, 81, 2016. Li and Hicks, op.cit. For background, see also John W. Meyer, et al., “World Society and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology, 103, 1997. For the history of GATT, see Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT. Cambridge University, 2008.



32 For an analysis of how IMF has operated, and detailed case studies, see Mark S. Copelovitch, The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy. Cambridge University, 2010. 33 The origins and missions of The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization are analyzed in, Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity. Zed Books, 2009. 34 North American Congress on Latin America, NACLA Report on the Americas, 47, 2015. 35 The G-7 includes: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. These nations hold almost two-thirds of the net global wealth. Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Databook 2015. 36 A variety of official documents are available in: 37 Karianne H. Heien, Local Livelihoods and the Bujagali Hydro-Power Dam, Uganda. VDM Verlag, 2009. 38 Further historical background is provided in, Abou B. Bamba, African Miracle, African Mirage. Ohio University, 2016. 39 Much of the funding and associated requirements are noted in IMF Press Releases for Cote D’L Voire. See: 09/96, 08/241 and 07/176. 40 Quoted in, Joe Parkinson, “Ivory Coast Grows Into Powerhouse.” The Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2016, p. A8. 41 For more information, see the website of the G-77 at: 42 Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, Television Traffic. UNESCO (Paris), 1974. 43 Aqib Aslam, et al., “Global Trade.” Chapter 2 in, World Economic Outlook, IMF, October, 2016. 44 Hiro Ito and Menzie Chinn, Notes on the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index, 2014 update, June 30, 2016. 45 Figures from IMF, reported in Gerald F. Seib, “The Elusive Solution to Discontent.” The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2017, p. R3. 46 Douglas A. Irwin, “World Trade and Production.” In Bernard Hoekman (Ed), The Global Trade Slowdown. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2015. 47 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, October 16, 2016. 48 McKinney Global Institute, Financial Globalization, 2013. 49 This will be one of the major disruptive trends in the future according to ­Richard Dobbs, James Manyika and Jonathan Woetzel, “No Ordinary Disruption.” Public Affairs, 2015. 50 Miguel A. Centeno, et al., “The Emergence of Global Systemic Risk.” Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 2015. 51 For a historical overview of the development of the EU, see Alasdair Blair, The European Union. Oneworld Publications, 2012. 52 See Greg Ip, “We Are Not the World.” Wall Street Journal, January 7–8, 2017, p. C1. 53 For a review of nationalism in settled and unsettled times, see Bart Bonikowski, “Nationalism in Settled Times.” Annual Review of Sociology, 42, 2016.



54 The position that nations explicitly try to promote themselves as brands is presented by, Melissa Aronczyk, Branding the Nation. Oxford University Press, 2013. 55 Gus Lubin, “Data Reveals (sic) the 20 Most Popular TV Shows of 2016.” Business Insider, December 30, 2016. 56 Bryan Cogman, “Inside HBO’s Game of Thrones.” Orion, November 6, 2014. 57 Erich Schwartzel, “Hollywood Doesn’t Work Without China.” Wall Street ­Journal, April 19, 2017, p. A1. 58 Data from Nash Information Services. www.the-numbers/com. Retrieved on February 14, 2017.



Global city-regions THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS This chapter begins with an examination of three basic social and demographic units: (1) cities, (2) metropolitan areas, and (3) extended urban areas with global reach that are variously referred to as city-regions, mega- or global-city regions, or megalopolises. These three primary units can be arranged in a hierarchy that is characterized by systematic differences in the size of their populations, their geographical expansion, and the distance over which activities occurring in the entity have an impact upon other urban areas. Cities are at the base of the hierarchy, and global city-regions are at the apex; and variations in the size, expansion, and reach of each tend to be highly correlated. After introducing and defining these social-demographic units, this chapter will focus upon the global city regions, and describe the economic and cultural dimensions along which they can be ordered. CITIES

Cities are generally defined as large and dense settlements with a heterogeneous population (that is, specialized nonfarming occupations). In determining which settlements are considered cities, demographers have sometimes imposed a uniform size criteria along with a requirement 34

Globa l cit y- regions

that the local area in question is relatively self-sufficient with respect to providing for the population’s political, economic, and religious needs. In addition, a city must ordinarily be recognized as an incorporated entity with jurisdiction over a local area.1 While the above criteria are conventionally employed in urban studies, in almost every nation there is a government or quasi-­government agency–such as a census bureau or national statistics bureau–that is responsible for stipulating what officially constitutes a city in that nation. The figures produced by that agency are frequently used by urban analysts in compiling world publications. In some nations, official designating agencies take note of urban lifestyle characteristics; however, population size is almost always emphasized, often to the exclusion of any other consideration. Hence, across the world, a city is most often defined as an incorporated place containing some minimum population size. A strong, or even exclusive, reliance on population size as the criterion can be justified by the fact that it is objective hence more easily measured and, in addition, it is typical to find high correlations between population size and all of the other indicators that might be used to distinguish cities (i.e., density, occupational specialization, etc). Thus, if one had to choose a single variable to measure cities, that one variable would be population size. Precisely how large the population of a place must be for it to be considered a city varies among nations. In Mexico, for example, the minimum population for a city is 100,000 people, whereas in New Zealand it is 50,000. Population minimums between 50,000 and 100,000 persons are typical, but as a result of these variations in definitions one must be cautious in comparing urbanization in different nations, or even cities within the same nation because there are sometimes regional differences in how settlements are classified within the same nation. METROPOLITAN AREAS

By the middle of the 20th century, in most of the Western world, the geographical areas surrounding the cities (i.e., suburbs) built up and became more urban (less rural) in character. The outer areas of a city became less dependent upon farming, and more residents commuted to work in the city and the city also housed the newspapers and television stations, major recreational facilities (e.g., stadiums and concert halls), and transportation hubs that served population of both the city and the suburban area. By all of these indicators, cities and their surrounding suburbs were becoming more integrated. 35

Globa l cit y- regions

At the same time, many metropolitan areas continued to expand, engulfing more and more formerly separate communities. For example, once developers built tract housing in a former farming community outside of a city, adjacent areas would slowly be exposed to the same suburbanization pressures. This process of expansion often led to the overlap of the peripheries of nearby (and once separate) urban areas, creating extremely large unified areas. Sometimes this entailed areas previously connected to two separate metropolitan areas, such as Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, DC. In other instances–such as Shanghai, China, and Sao Paulo, Brazil–one major urban center greatly expanded by engulfing numerous smaller cities. While the hinterland surrounding cities was growing with respect to the size of its residential population, the importance of the retail and commercial activities it contained was also increasing. Many suburbs were no longer just bedroom communities, although a few of them had always been more than that. To illustrate, many of the largest corporations moved to the suburbs of major cities rather than to the city or its central business district, and many firms that provided technical and staff support to these corporations followed. The corporate headquarters of McDonald’s and Allstate Insurance, for example, anchor commercial complexes in northern suburbs of Chicago. To study urban life in a meaningful way, it became increasingly necessary to develop formal definitions to refer to the more inclusive area that encompassed both a city and its suburbs. The same government agencies that define cities in any nation usually define these areas as well. Historically, these definitions were sometimes imprecise, such as referring to the “built-up area” around a city. They soon became more precise, however. In many nations, this newly defined territorial unit was referred to as the metropolitan area, or standard metropolitan area, or in the contemporary United States, a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). To illustrate further, in France, an urban unit refers to a city and its contiguous suburbs; an urban area also includes the less immediate suburbs, which can still be viewed as part of a coherent economic unit.2 Because cities are politically incorporated areas, their boundaries are usually unambiguous so it is almost always possible to state with precision the geographical area a city encompasses. Metropolitan areas, by contrast, are not typically incorporated. The cities, towns, and surrounding areas are functionally interdependent, and they may formally cooperate in limited ways, as with regional transportation authorities or metropolitan police departments. However, the parts of a metropolitan area, unlike the parts of a city (i.e., neighborhoods), are not usually under the jurisdiction of a single government. Thus, in most instances, 36

Globa l cit y- regions

despite being meaningful entities sociologically and economically, metropolitan areas do not have legal-administrative control over the areas they encompass.3 Furthermore, changes in political boundaries also occur much more frequently in metropolitan areas than in cities. Their borders are more fluid, often expanding and engulfing formerly separate rural hinterlands or small towns.

GLOBAL CITY-REGIONS The continued expansion of metropolitan areas, often in conjunction with large amounts of in-migration and sometimes also in conjunction with high birth rates, have produced the largest urban concentrations that ever existed. Many of them are located in Asia, as Table 2.1 indicates. Included in this table are the ten largest concentrations, as of 2018. This listing attempts to make the urban concentrations in different nations as comparable as possible by, in each case, focusing upon the built-up metropolitan area around a central city.4 At the same time that they were gaining population and expanding geographically, these sprawling urban areas were extending their scope of influence, reaching across both regional and national boundaries. It is not a coincidence that city-regions were developing at the same time that trade and commerce were becoming increasingly international in scope. According to urban geographer, Allan J. Scott, city-regions were a response to economic globalization because to compete effectively in an international arena, a local firm cannot go it alone. Each must cooperate with other firms, and the larger the urban area in which they are located, the greater the opportunities for each to establish relationships with other firms. To be specific, when firms are located in the same market, every one of them is provided with access to others with whom to share information about new technologies and new markets, to buy and Table 2.1  World’s largest urban concentrations



Population (in Million)

Tokyo-Yokohama Greater Jakarta Delhi Capital Region Metro Manila Seoul Capital Area Shanghai-Suzhou Mumbai Urban Area New York MSA Beijing Sao Paulo-Guarulhos

Japan Indonesia India Philippines South Korea China India United States China Brazil

38.1 32.3 27.3 24.7 24.2 24.1 23.3 21.6 21.3 21.1


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sell products, and to share a labor pool because transportation improvements create a single labor market across the disparate areas within the city-region. Accruing these advantages favors the development of urban areas in which scale and scope surpass anything previously seen. Because of the impact of international markets on the growth of these areas, Scott refers to them as global city-regions.5 As previously noted, there is a lack of uniformity in the terms employed by analysts to describe these far-reaching urban concentrations. In addition to global city-regions, some refer to them as megalopolises6 and some refer to them as megaregions.7 Regardless of the terminology employed, however, all agree that a distinguishing feature of these concentrations, in addition to their size, is their ­trans-metropolitan and trans-national scope. No one should be surprised by the increasingly international involvements of cities, according to Saskia Sassen, who has written extensively about global cities. She notes that there are now more cross-national border transactions of all types, for example: people emigrating and returning, movies and music diffusing around the world, social movements (e.g., women’s rights, ecology) beginning and spreading across nations, and so on.8 GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION

It was social and economic, rather than political, benefits that led to the formation of global city-regions, and they have generally been politically fragmented as a result, involving multiple jurisdictional levels, each of which tend to be autonomous. The lack of any overriding governmental organization has made coordination difficult. For example, many of these agglomerations have focused on the development of regional transportation systems. To illustrate, Luxembourg City has a large service and financial center to which thousands of employees commute daily from bordering nations: Belgium, France, and Germany. They travel by buses and trains that are tied to these other nations, but partially or wholly funded by Luxembourg. Coordinating schedules across different modes of transportation and across nations presents continuous problems and requires constant negotiations in the absence of any governance structure that transcends regional transportation.9 Further complicating governance in some city-regions is the fact that as these agglomerations formed and expanded, they paid little heed either to state, district, or provincial boundaries. In consequence, a number of city-regions have cut across the geographical lines demarcating different political jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, Philadelphia’s extended metropolitan area includes parts of four 38

Globa l cit y- regions

different states: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland10; and in the United States, the jurisdiction of most government agencies ends at state lines. The following case study describes how this jurisdictional problem arose in Accra, Ghana. As cross-nation entities, global city-regions confront not only the problems of fragmented multilevel governance common to most metropolitan areas, but also numerous other political impediments because of national differences in currencies, taxes, and social security systems, and so on. However, the economic advantages of such regions have often won out, and they have found innovative ways to surmount the obstacles and, in some instances, have managed to create new jurisdictional forms. The bridge and tunnel between Copenhagen, Denmark, and Malmo, Sweden, was for some years hailed as the beginnings of a model for the future integration of city-regions, but as years progressed doubts have arisen.

BOX 2.1  GOVERNANCE IN THE ACCRA (GHANA) CITY-REGION Ghana, like a number of other regional African nations, experienced rapid urban growth after its independence (in 1957). This was especially true of its capital and major urban center, Accra. By 2018, the city and its surrounding area, included a population of approximately two and one-half million people. They resided in the central core or one of the other 19 administrative districts that comprised the 87 square mile metropolitan area. Between 1993 and 2016, a period of Accra’s rapid growth, Ghana passed several Local Governance Acts, which were intended to assure decentralized governance, but at the same time provide a degree of integration across the metropolitan area’s 20 administrative districts. Specifically, the 2016 act provided for four regional assemblies, each of which was given administrative authority over the districts in its sector of the metropolitan area. However, the authority of each was confined to its region. The problem in Accra’s case is that the built-up area around the city is located in all four regions. So, even when there are continuous built-up lands, there is no governance unit to foster coordination among the districts when they fall into different governance regions. In short, according to a group of analysts who have studied the region, urban expansion in Accra has outstripped the spatial governance structure.11 The mismatch that has arisen between governance and space is due to the fact that while urban areas around Accra were growing and expanding, the governance system was essentially static. As in many other contemporary city-regions, urban and regional planners in Ghana did not anticipate how rapidly the Accra region was going to grow and expand, let alone develop an appropriate governance system.


Globa l cit y- regions

Copenhagen is located on the western edge of the Oresund Strait that separates Denmark and Sweden. It is Denmark’s largest city with a metropolitan population of about two million. Malmo, on the other side of the Strait, in Sweden, has a metropolitan population of about 650,000. In 2000, a bridge and tunnel were constructed connecting the two metropolitan areas. The transit includes private automobiles, buses, and a rail line. By 2010, nearly 25,000 vehicles crossed the bridge daily, most carrying people commuting to work. Over time, more people also moved from one metropolitan area to the other in order to be closer to work. The economic integration of the two metropolitan areas was further enhanced when they merged their formerly separate port facilities into one jointly owned entity. Finally, despite remaining parts of different nations, the two global city-regions created an encompassing political body (the Oresund Committee) to oversee and coordinate many of the shared activities. For many urban analysts, Copenhagen and Malmo provided a picture of what the future might hold for the political integration of cross-nation global city-regions.12 After 2010, however, there was little additional progress, and, in fact, some back pedaling. For example, the number of daily cross-border commuters declined after 2010, apparently because of problems of distance and cost.13

GLOBAL CITIES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Saskia Sassen acknowledges that the global economy is often thought of as operating without reference to particular places—that is, as though a global system was a thing apart, separate from human actions, that did not require any specific activities in concrete locales to sustain it. In fact, she argues the global economy is embedded in a number of places, and its continued operation is vitally dependent on activities that are performed in these places. The most important of them, Sassen concludes, is cities and their surrounding areas.14 The failure to appreciate the importance of cities in the global economy is a result of a historic emphasis on how nation-states and the global system stood in a zerosum relationship to each other. It was assumed, in other words, that either could gain only at the other’s expense; however, as we saw at the end of Chapter 1, increases in globalization have not led to the demise of nation-states. However, the relationship between globalization and the status of the nation-state is not the critical issue, according to Sassen, and it deflects attention away from the really important question which concerns how the global economy is maintained by geographical units


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smaller than nations, namely, global cities. They are the places where the work of globalization gets done. Since the pioneering work of John Friedmann, during the 1980s, described global cities as the core areas of the world’s economy, these cities have been viewed as “command and control” centers.15 However, over the ensuing years, the nature of their control has been debated. To begin, control has sometimes been regarded as implying only top-down domination, but other, more subtle modes of influence—such as manipulation or inducement—are probably involved as well. In addition, regardless of how control emanating from cities is expressed, its limitations have also been recognized. The global economic system is volatile and prone to crises, hence not totally controllable by any entities.16 CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS, PRODUCER SERVICES FIRMS, AND CREATIVE CITIES

One very important set of activities critical to the maintenance of the world economy is performed in the corporate headquarters that tend to be highly concentrated in global city-regions. Decisions made in these headquarters quickly move around the world and affect everyone. However, despite the power of these large transnational organizations, Sassen notes, they could not, on their own, maintain a world economy. For them to operate effectively, they require highly specialized services from firms that are also concentrated in the major global cities. The organizations that corporate headquarters rely on for expertise are termed producer, or professional, services firms. The producer services firms offer a wide range of specialized assistance in such areas as accounting, law, management consulting, engineering design, software development, executive recruiting, financial services, and so on. All of these firms are knowledge-intensive organizations that employ formally trained professionals with particular expertise.17 The staffs of these specialized firms are mostly highly trained professionals. Their expertise cuts across many conventional academic disciplines, but what they tend to share in common is work that emphasizes originality and inventiveness. They are a major component of what geographer Richard Florida calls, “the creative class,” and they are concentrated in “creative cities.” He has operationally defined creative cities as those that rank highly on innovation (measured by the number of patents issued to people in the city) and also have a great deal of high-tech employment. These two variables, as expected, were highly correlated with each other, and Florida combined them


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to produce a list of the leading creative city-regions in the United States. He wondered what about cities would make them appeal to creative people. The presence of other people like themselves would be important in sustaining creative cities because talented and creative people like, and benefit from, having many other people like themselves with whom to interact on a regular basis. But Florida wanted to know how the most creative cities—which included Boston, San Francisco, Seattle, and others—came initially to attract large numbers of creative people. He guessed that they might be drawn to cities that were diverse and tolerant, with tolerance the key because such places are, by definition, open to new ideas and accepting of the eccentricities often associated with creative people. In addition, because the high-tech labor force often moves among the world’s leading cities, a welcoming environment without barriers would be important so that they could integrate quickly.18 In global cities, Warf noted, people are forced to interact, on a daily basis, with people who are different from themselves: ethnically, linguistically, politically, and in religion, sexual orientation, etc. These experiences encourage the development of a tolerant outlook, accepting of people’s differences.19 Florida next turned to the question of how best to measure tolerance. At the same time, Gary Gates happened to be plotting the geographical distribution of the gay and lesbian population in U.S. cities. The two researchers in collaboration discovered that cities with the largest hightech concentrations also had the largest gay populations, and that made sense to Florida given his assumption about the importance of tolerance. (More tolerant cities would presumably have larger gay populations.) Looking at the most tolerant cities, he found they were the ones that had undergone the most complete transition to high-tech, creative labor forces. The Institute for Urban Strategies has developed a more elaborate measure of what it terms the “magnetism” of cities, their ability to attract creative individuals and enterprises. It is an index which includes a number of specific measures placed into six categories. The categories and some of the main variables measured in each include: 1. The size of a city’s economy (its GDP, total employment, etc.) 2. Research, involving the size and awards of the local research community. 3. Cultural resources, such as museums and historical sites. 4. Livability, as reflected in housing costs, the variety of restaurants, etc. 5. Environment, indicated by the amount of renewable energy, recycled waste, etc. 6. Accessibility, involving international flights, public transportation, etc. 42

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Table 2.2  Most attractive cities


Magnetism Score

London New York Tokyo Paris Singapore

1512 1385 1339 1290 1197

Each of the cities in their sample received a tally on each of the variables in each of the six categories. A perfect score, which no city attained, was 1,800. The top five cities, and their scores, are listed in Table 2.2.20 (These are the 2016 rankings, but from year to year the fluctuations among cities have typically been very small.) A familiar group of cities are again at the top of the list, but note that London not only ranks the highest, but the difference in total scores between it and the next city, New York, is very substantial. By these measures, London is unambiguously first in ability to attract creative people. There is also a sizeable difference in magnetism scores between Paris (fourth) and Singapore (fifth). Trailing behind Singapore are one half dozen cities with highly similar scores. Even if the headquarters of a transnational firm is not located in one of the leading city-regions, and some are not, the headquarters will still require access to the services of the producer services firms that are concentrated in the global centers. As evidence of the importance of the services housed in global cities for the world economy, Sassen notes how international financial activity, despite enormous increases in volume, has continued to become more and more concentrated. Within nations this has entailed agglomerations in a very limited number of ­city-regions that have thereby become world financial centers. To illustrate, over the past few decades, Paris attracted a larger share of leading investment banks than other French cities, and its stock exchange (Euronext Paris) gained foreign listings, whereas markets in the two other leading French centers, Lyon and Marseilles, became more provincial. Similarly, Frankfurt increased its share of most financial sectors relative to other German cities: Berlin and Hamburg, for instance. The same process occurred with respect to financial activities in the United States with New York’s concentration increasing relative to all other cities in the nation. Even though Chicago and Los Angeles also increased the amount of international financial activity they housed, they did so to a lesser extent than New York.21 The high concentration of corporate headquarters and producer services firms is by-products of national and international developments. 43

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The transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies, especially in a global setting, led to an increased clustering of transnational corporations and the firms that service them in the center of cities, historically the location of financial districts. Demand for space in the established centers of these cities increased, leading to rising costs for space, which encouraged firms to seek alternate locations while remaining near to the center of major cities. Over time, as the high-rise offices in the financial district aged it also became more difficult and expensive to upgrade their facilities, and this too encouraged firms to seek office towers in newer locations. In sum, cost, crowding, and aging buildings all led firms to spillover locations, though access to the original financial district was usually an important consideration.22 This type of development of secondary financial centers has been most pronounced in New York and London. In New York, the most significant movement of financial and producer services firms has been from the Wall Street area in lower Manhattan, the original concentration, to Midtown, further uptown. The most expensive area in Midtown is between 42nd and 59th (to the north and south) streets and between 3rd Avenue and 7th Avenue (to the east and west). This one-half square mile is the largest entertainment and media center in the United States. It also contains a large number of corporate headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. Between 2000 and 2010 construction created an increase in office space in Midtown that was greater than anywhere else in Manhattan. Its newer facilities combined with access to transportation hubs around Columbus Circle made the area attractive and it competed, to some degree, with Wall Street for financial services firms. Still more recently a huge complex, Hudson Yards, is being constructed in the Chelsea neighborhood, on the west side of Manhattan. This commercial, retail, and residential complex is still in progress, as this is written at the end of 2018. However, a large number of financial services firms, currently located both in Wall Street and Midtown, have already committed to relocating to Hudson Yards.23 The movement of financial services firms in London has paralleled that of New York. London’s leading financial hub historically has been The City, one square mile in the center of London that geographically corresponds closely with the walled-in portion of Medieval London. In part because of the area’s historical significance, it has retained a degree of political autonomy within the larger city-region. As it was in Roman times, it remains very crowded, and while there has been new construction, many of its buildings are old and lack modern amenities. As a result, many major financial services firms migrated out for the same reasons their counterparts left Wall Street. Initially, the largest new destination was in Canary Wharf, a former port area off the Thames 44

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River where land values had deteriorated with the decline in shipping, making real estate available for redevelopment. More recently, there has also been some movement to the south and east, to the Thames Gateway. This massive (40 mile long) mixed use area offers new facilities and new modes of transportation to make both The City and London’s major airport, Heathrow, accessible; and, via a high-speed channel tunnel rail link, to improved connections to Paris and the rest of Europe.24 However, like Wall Street is to New York, The City is likely to remain London’s most significant financial and producer services center. PERSONNEL FLOWS

The international flow of executives and officials between and among the transnational firms housed in the leading global cities is an important way in which these cities are linked. A large percentage of the senior officials in transnational firms are in continuous circulation between their firms’ parent and subsidiary headquarters, and this often means crossing national borders. In addition, because contemporary global cities have a large agglomeration of financial and related professional services firms, they attract large numbers of people with high aspirations from all around the world. Major cities, in every historical period, have tended to draw talented young people like a beacon. They are the best places to be if one is interested in unequaled access to anything that matters. That is why people everywhere in France headed to Paris, Argentinians to Buenos Aires and Koreans to Seoul. That has continued, but what changed in recent years is the size of the international flow among major city-regions as more people sought opportunities outside of the nation in which they were raised. Global recruiting has joined national and local recruiting to provide the professional employees needed by the leading cities’ banking, advertising, law, and other producer services firms. In the headquarters of large transnational firms, complex decisions with far-reaching consequences are being made, and they require a lot of expertise; consider legal specialists, for example. To be effective in working with complicated global ventures, lawyers must have a great deal of pertinent experience. A private practice attorney able to make a standard will for a person can be found in any small town, but the largest in scale and most sophisticated legal work is usually performed by groups of attorneys in firms located in only a few major world cities. William Henderson and Arthur Alderson found that the higher the global standing of a city, the more graduates of law schools in the city had interview opportunities for high-end corporate practices, and the 45

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more income these graduates eventually earned. Recognizing this relationship, the brightest young wannabe lawyers from within a nation and from around the world seek to enter law schools in the leading global cities. The higher the global standing of a city, therefore, the greater the demand for admission to the law schools in the city, and the higher the LSAT scores of admitted students. A specific example of how firms in a global city can draw talent was provided by the experience of New York between 1993 and 2003. During this period, the city’s financial service firms substantially expanded. Correspondingly, New York led the United States by a very large amount in the number of high-end law offices opened and the number of new lawyers hired. In addition, the law schools located in the city received more applications, and a larger percentage of the applications they received came from the best students, as described earlier.25 Similar processes are likely to occur in other fields that produce professionals with skills that are especially relevant to global headquarters: finance, marketing, accounting, design, and so on. On the other hand, when a global city is adversely affected by economic trends, mechanisms are in place to quickly funnel people out of the city-region, and the spigot that pours international students into the city is also re-directed. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom lagged behind many Asian nations in emerging from the recession of 2008–2009. Therefore, transnational recruiting firms, which place commodity traders, programmers, investment analysts, and corporate lawyers wherever in the world there is demand, increased their placements of people into firms located in Singapore and Hong Kong. Many of their clients were young professionals who, five years earlier, would have been channeled into firms in London or New York.26 In anticipation of shifts in demand, many global recruiting firms are continuously monitoring the world economy, seeking to enter new markets by mergers, acquisitions, and alliances. They are also continuously building personnel files. Because of the competition, many of these global firms are forced to specialize rather narrowly, and they try to establish contacts with highly distinctive groups. Coleman and Company, for example, sponsors happy hours in London and New York bars to locate Western-trained professionals and managers who speak Russian. Their clients are companies headquartered in Moscow that maintain offices throughout the world. The personnel firm can quickly identify appropriate people to send anywhere in the world when companies headquartered in Moscow suddenly need more people with their skills at a subsidiary office.27 The operations of these specialized recruitment firms provide another important example of how the infrastructure that maintains the world economy is located in global cities. 46

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GLOBAL ECONOMIC RANKINGS Almost regardless of how global economic activity has been measured, the same small group of city-regions turns up at the top of the hierarchy: London, New York, Tokyo, and, most of the time, Paris. These four are consistently found to be the world’s leading economic centers. Beneath them is a larger group of cities that also tend to score highly on diverse measures of economic activity but still tend to place consistently below the top group. This second category typically includes Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Seoul, and about one dozen other cities. Following behind the second category is a much larger group of city-regions whose inclusion in any global ranking is variable and dependent upon which specific criteria are employed to determine the ranking. The nature of the variations among cities has led many analysts to utilize categories in describing the “global-ness” of cities. At the same time, it is important to recognize that, on the basis of their scores on various indexes, cities can also be viewed as more or less global—that is, as continuously distributed. This latter view is suggested by the fact that city-regions in the second of the groupings described above sometimes have scores that are very close to those in the top group. For example, Hong Kong’s business activity index places it as close to the average of the top city-regions as to the average of the city-regions in the second category. The same intermediate quality of some cities’ rankings also occurs with respect to categories two and three. Thus, it is important in analyzing the economic ranking of cities to recognize that this variable often follows both a continuous distribution, unmarked by categories, and a clustered distribution in which categories are pronounced. In the following pages, we examine the two major ways that global city economic rankings and categories have been measured. The first focuses on the links among cities, and views the world economy as a network of cities, with the ranking of any city dependent upon what flows through it (in terms of people, money, information, etc.) and how that flow connects to other cities. The ranking of any city reflects its place and role in a global urban network. The second approach creates a hierarchy of cities by examining the types and magnitude of economic activity (including the headquarters of transnational firms, global government centers, etc.) that are located within each city-region. The more relevant activity is located in a city-region the higher its ranking. Although the theoretical assumptions underlying each of these approaches are different, and their results are not identical, the rankings they produce are usually similar. 47

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As employed in the following pages, both are examples of what has been termed a “top-down” approach to world city rankings. Methodologically, it most closely follows the writings of Friedmann and Sassen, both of whom were previously introduced. It is utilized more frequently than a “bottom-up” approach because it provides data and measures that are more comparable across city-regions and national boundaries.28 PLACE IN THE WORLD CITY NETWORK

Simultaneous to the growth of global city-regions, the links among them, and among the firms they housed, both multiplied and strengthened. It was the previously introduced Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC) that pioneered the study of these linkages and this line of research has had enormous influence on contemporary global city research across the social sciences. One of the key assumptions of the GaWC theorists is that the position of major cities is “produced by that which flows through them… rather than what is fixed within them.”29 Some GaWC-inspired investigations attempt to focus directly on an intercity network as reflected by telecommunication and transportation links. For example, one group of researchers began by tabulating the total number of enplaned passengers in all U.S. cities. They found New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, in that order, to score highest. Some researchers who did not share GaWC’s emphasis on networks might stop at this point and simply view the city’s number of passengers as indicating the place of the city in the nation’s hierarchy. For GaWC researchers, however, this was only the first step. They then examined the domestic intercity flights with the greatest number of passengers and found that New York–Los Angeles and New York–Chicago were at the top—that is, were the most strongly linked cities. A hierarchical view would stress the New York, Los Angeles, Chicago ranking, whereas a network view would emphasize the strength of the New York–Los Angeles and New York–Chicago links. Moving to international connections, the investigators found that the strongest link involving a U.S. city was between New York and London. No surprise there. In addition, they found that many of the airports in other major U.S. cities also offered direct connections to London among their top dozen linkages, showing the global significance of London in the world city network.30 Other studies, focusing upon plane traffic across the world, also identified the major cities in Europe and North America as the most centrally connected.31 Those leading cities would, of course, include New York and London. 48

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A second type of network approach focuses on interconnections not directly between cities but between and among activities or organizations that are located within cities. An interesting example is provided by Zachery Neal’s examination of the producer services firms that have the greatest degrees of global connectivity because of their branch networks. He found that the types of firms with the highest connectivity were accounting firms including KPMG, Pricewaterhouse, and HLB; banks including Deutsche Bank, Citibank, and Barclays; and advertising firms including McCann Erikson, BBDO, and J. Walter Thomson. Neal examined the locations of these firms and their branch offices and then calculated the degree to which each of the leading cities had firms that offered direct access to branches in every other global city. He termed this closeness centrality, and he found that London and New York far exceeded any others in this regard and that the differences among other leading cities were relatively small. More specifically, firms in both London and New York were found to offer direct access to about 94% of the 118 major cities in the global network. They were, therefore, the most central cities in the network in terms of closeness. The next group of leading cities had firms that provided access to between 67% and 71% of the entire global network. They too had central positions in the network, but much less so than London and New York.32 Included in this grouping, in order of branch access, were Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Chicago, Los Angeles, Milan, Amsterdam, Madrid, Sydney, Toronto, Brussels, and Frankfurt. While it is usually possible to identify the location of a firm’s headquarters, that is not always the case, and it can be problematic to equate a transnational firm’s headquarters with its “home.” In fact, for many of the firms with offices around the world, the very notion of a home can be challenging. For further discussion, see Box 2.2. Despite the advantages of being located in a city-region that is in a central position in the global network, some firms are nevertheless in locations that are out of the loop, unlikely places from a network perspective. They cannot locally provide all the required global services and connections, so they must rely upon firms in more connected cities who, in turn, will sometimes be required to work through corporate offices located in the most central cities. This pattern illustrates the role of global cities as intermediaries-that is, as brokers or gatekeepers of the global network. Neal reports that with respect to global cities’ roles as intermediaries, London and New York are again in a class by themselves. They each serve as brokers in about one-third of intercity connections between global cities. No other cities serve an intermediary role for more than about 2% of all such connections. Thus, the 49

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BOX 2.2  WHERE IS HOME TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS? Many firms have so many locations across the world that it can be very difficult to identify their “home.” By home, most people mean where the corporation has its central headquarters; and sometimes that location is easy to identify and sometimes it is not. However, even a headquarters location does not necessarily answer the home question. Consider, for example, what happened when Annhauser-Busch (AB) purchased SAB Miller. AB announced its registration, which identifies it as a taxable legal entity, would remain in Brussels; but its shareholders’ meetings would still occur in two other Belgian towns where AB began; but the top management, including the chief executive, would be housed in Midtown Manhattan; but AB would still call St. Louis, where it brews Budweiser, its official U.S. headquarters.33 So, where is the brewer’s home? Similarly, consider what transpired after Fiat automobiles purchased Chrysler. The company remained registered in Amsterdam, but the company identified London as its tax domicile; its chief executive worked out of the firm’s two operational headquarters, located in Milan and Detroit; and its stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange.34 Even when there is a single headquarters, as in the case of McDonald’s (in suburban Chicago), identifying a single corporate home can still be tricky. The first McDonald’s in Russia opened near the Kremlin in 1990, and the number of Russian franchises increased over the years, but it continued to be viewed as an American company. Correspondingly, when there were periodic tensions between the United States and Russia, Russian authorities permanently closed dozens of the fast food restaurants and temporarily closed hundreds of others with unannounced health inspections. ­McDonald’s responded by trying to become perceived more as a Russian company, for example, buying as much of its raw materials as possible from Russian producers, and emphasizing this fact. By 2018, the company estimated that 98% of the products it sold in Russia were produced from local Russian suppliers. It painted a large “98%” on its delivery trucks and its commercials on Russian television urged people to buy McDonald’s because its products are, “close and native.”35

distribution of cities’ centrality scores, and their scores as intermediaries (which Neal refers to as “betweenness”) are very similar, attesting to the importance of both London and New York in the global city economic network. Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong are the next highest scoring cities, on both measures, but a substantial distance behind the two leaders. 50

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There are a number of rankings of global cities based on the volume and types of economic activity that occur within their regions. The higher a city’s score, the more it is regarded as a global leader. Fortune 500 types of rankings are a familiar example. These studies differ from those previously discussed in that they do not explicitly analyze cities from a network perspective. Hierarchical relations among interconnected cities are implied by, and sometimes inferred from, differences in their economic concentrations, but these linkage implications are not formally analyzed. Some of the rankings are narrowly focused, examining cities in relation to one particular type of transaction or the size of one economic indicator, such as the value of shares in foreign companies traded on a stock exchange located in the city. Other rankings are quite broad in scope, adding such considerations as how the nation’s political and legal framework support global economic activity, the quality of life in the city, and so on. These different rankings tend to correlate somewhat with each other; cities that are high or low on any measure tend, to some extent, to score congruently on other measures. This is especially true at the top of the different rankings, which tend to involve the same small group of leading cities. Overall, the correlations among different rankings are far from perfect, however. To illustrate how the rankings vary, Table 2.3 shows the relative standings of leading cities based (1) solely upon their economy (GDP, total employment, etc.) and (2) a more diverse set of indicators including cities’ cultural attractions, livability, and other considerations in addition to their economy. Table 2.3  Rankings of global cities


Economic Only Rank

Diverse Criteria Rank

Tokyo London New York Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Shanghai Zurich Seoul Sydney Geneva Stockholm Copenhagen Paris San Francisco

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

3 1 2 17 7 5 12 16 6 14 30 15 19 4 24


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Regardless of how the rankings are produced, Tokyo, London, and New York remain at the top, though their rankings relative to each other are not the same as with their network scores. Especially when the economic focus is narrow (the first column), Tokyo is the highest. Paris is also in a familiar place with this top group when the economic focus is narrow, but when a more diverse measure is employed, Paris slides to 14th. ILLEGAL GLOBAL COMMERCE

The rankings of leading global cities are always based on legally counted sales of commodities, documented international travel, and so on. It is important to recognize that there are also not officially counted, illegal flows of people and products among the world’s leading cities, although there is not sufficient data to enable a detailed ranking of cities in these respects. The same technological improvements in transportation and communication that enabled cities and city-regions across the world to link and form an above ground global urban system are also used for many illegal activities, such as laundering money, betting on sports, smuggling tobacco, illegally transporting people across national borders, and so on. If it were possible to rank cities as underground or illegal global centers, the rankings would probably be very similar to those presented for (legal) economic activities. The overlap between the legal and illegal has occurred because the creation of a global urban system was accompanied by increases in diverse forms of deviant and/or illegal activities that relied on the system’s transportation and communication advances. Thus, the Internet, which facilitates global communication above ground, has also improved access to and increased the availability of illegal products and services, from child pornography to drugs and money scams. Similarly, the establishment of the global urban system that permits merchandise produced anywhere in the world to be efficiently exported also enables cigarettes to be smuggled around the world. Along the same path, figuratively if not literally, the international flow of executives and officials among the headquarters of transnational firms has its counterpart in the millions of people who are smuggled or who sneak across national lines every year. However, the underground movement typically involves people with fewer resources, and after they arrive many of them are coerced into working in sweatshop factories or held in virtual bondage to pay off debts, or are coerced or tricked into prostitution or other forms of sexual work. (For further discussion, see Chapter 4.) 52

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GLOBAL CITIES AND GLOBAL CULTURE Beginning in the 1970s, almost all of the first sustained writings on global cities strongly emphasized the economic ties among them and the economic basis of their global ordering. In various articles and books, analysts argued that the number and kinds of financial and commercial activities that occurred in any city determined where it stood among the leading cities of the world. More emphasis was later placed on relationships among cities rather than on what each contained, but it was still economic relationships that continued to receive the most attention. As previously described, some noneconomic variables are now routinely added to the mix of measures, but the cultural attractions found in a city—historical sites, museums, and symphony orchestras—are usually as close as most of the rating come to focusing upon the cultural dimension. The cultural dimension, as the concept is being employed here, refers to more than museums and symphonies; it denotes ideas, values, symbols, and identities, and the ways in which they are transmitted via movies and television, books and magazines, recorded music, the Internet, and so on. Collectively, they are the products and by-products of the cultural industries and the rankings of cities can, as with economic rankings, be based upon the concentration of these industries in the city-region or upon how the ideas, values, and symbols that emanate from these industries spread among interconnected cities. TRADITIONAL AND GLOBAL CULTURE

Within the social sciences, culture has historically been largely equated with a society’s indigenous way of life, organized around symbolic classifications. Symbols, such as a crucifix or a skull and crossbones, divided the world into categories, such as sacred–profane or edible–inedible, and provided norms that guided people’s actions by defining what behavior was appropriate within a category. The symbols were viewed as more or less fitting together so a culture provided a reasonably integrated whole. Seen in this way, a culture offered a clear road map that people could follow in their daily lives without much reflection.36 This traditional view of culture was developed in studies of small and relatively isolated preindustrial societies in which change occurred infrequently, and it probably best fit societies of that type. By contrast, in most contemporary societies, there are rapid changes as globalization continuously exposes everyone to a wide range of alternatives. This has prompted a more recent view of culture as offering a pastiche of information, values, and identities. Presenting this view, anthropologist Gordon Mathews 53

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describes culture in contemporary societies undergoing profound changes because of globalization as resembling a “supermarket”: providing a wide array of possible choices concerning the values people will live by and the identities they wish to cultivate.37 People still rely on cultural standards to decide which rituals and beliefs and objects continue to be relevant to their lives and which objectives remain worth pursuing; however, now they must explicitly make choices. Because there are so many legitimate alternatives to choose from, people within any society take many different paths; however, they continue to be guided by cultural values and ideas. Choosing among different bicycles in the Netherlands presents a concrete example of how cultural ideas and values influence people’s choices. See Box 2.3.

BOX 2.3  CHOOSING A BICYCLE IN AMSTERDAM In large part because it is a relatively flat city, Amsterdam probably has the highest use of bicycles, both for commuting to work and leisure, in the world. For many of the Dutch residents, cycling is both a weekend leisure pursuit and a major means of commuting to work. The city’s streets are always full of cyclists sharing the roads with automobiles and pedestrians. Prior to the 1980s, almost all of the bicycles purchased by people in Amsterdam were conventional, domestic products. A Taiwanese firm then tried to introduce mountain or all-terrain bikes (ATBs) and initially had little success. City residents saw little need for a bike that would be good for going down steep hills or handling rough terrain off-roads. Over time, however, by appealing to people’s sense of adventure and desire to be different, a marketing campaign was able to convince increasing numbers of Dutch consumers to buy the ATB alternative. The successful innovation of the ATBs was possible because while people saw the ATBs as different, they were not so different that they no longer looked like bikes.38 Also beginning during the 1980s, other firms were producing recumbent bicycles and trying to induce the Dutch to purchase them. Being able to recline while pedaling has ergonomic advantages and, on Amsterdam’s flat roads, people would actually be able to attain higher speeds with them than with conventional bikes. Despite how well-suited the recumbent bicycle appeared to be to the Netherland’s terrain, people continued to choose conventional bikes or ATBs, but not the laid back, recumbent type. The reason, according to an expert who studies innovation, is that the recumbent bicycle did not look enough like a bike for people to consider it a bike. So, in people’s minds, it did not become a legitimate alternative to purchase. In other words, because the new product was culturally further from people’s perception of what the product should look like, they were more resistant to innovate.39


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In Chapter 1, we considered the degree to which international trade was moving the entire world toward price integration: the same commodities being sold in markets everywhere, at roughly the same price. The cultural counterpart to price integration entails cultural homogenization: the convergence of ideas and values across the world, or across large parts of it. In the same way that the world was becoming a single marketplace for commodities, societies became increasingly alike with respect to people’s language and artifacts, the overt expressions of culture. All around the world, but especially in global cities, the same advertising slogans made their way into everyday speech, the same songs and movies were the most popular, and people everywhere wore similar articles of clothing, from designer jeans to baseball caps. The visible signs of cultural homogenization, such as baseball caps and slogans, are only the manifest components of more fundamental cultural changes in people’s basic value systems. In Korea, for example, people traditionally regarded short stature as desirable because they associated it with perseverance and ambition. They believed that short people had to be very determined, perhaps to compensate for their height, and that was a quality they admired. However, the actors and pop idols in Western television shows and movies who became popular in Korea were tall, making tallness seem desirable. In response, in Seoul in particular, hundreds of very expensive growth clinics opened, offering everything from hormone shots to tonics made of deer antlers to parents who were willing to pay thousands of dollars in hopes of adding a few inches to their children’s height.40 The spread of a new idea, practice, product, or value is termed diffusion, and these innovations typically spread across the world in a series of stages. At the macrolevel, it is the nature of the connection between cities or societies that is most important. For example, for more than 100 years, Paris has been home to a concentrated number of artists and designers whose ideas and products were marketed to shape the international fashion industry. People’s ideas of what to wear and when to wear it and what looked nice and what did not were strongly influenced by the Paris fashion designers and marketers. Their innovations continuously led to new fashion trends, which were initially adopted in other major cities, such as New York and London, that were most closely connected to Paris. Styles then spread to other cities that were less strongly connected to Paris, New York, or London.41 At the microlevel, the typical pattern is for some people to adopt the new fashion or idea right away, and then for a lag to occur before 55

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it is widely accepted. People differ in their degrees of responsiveness to social influence. Some people might wear a new kind of jean as soon as they saw someone else wearing them, but others might not follow until it became a widespread fashion. However, the higher the prestige or status of those who initially adopt, the briefer the typical delay in others following. If the rate of diffusion is viewed over time, it is usually shown to increase exponentially, as more people come into contact with more people who have already adopted the fashion, practice, or belief.42 The spread of rumors provides a familiar example. We have noted a number of instances in which values or ways of behaving diffused, via mass media, across many societies. It is a frequently observed pattern. However, it would be oversimplified to assert that broadcast messages are more or less automatically absorbed because, even among societies that may be receptive to external communications, and where the media are not censored, there are factors that help maintain local cultures. These are “firewalls,” according to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, and poverty is one of the most significant of these firewalls. The West African nation of Mali, for example, has open to broadcast media from around the world; however, access to the media has been limited to a small, urban, middle class. Recently, only one in seven households in the nation owned a television set. However, even if most people in a nation such as Mali were somehow exposed to the global media-watching television at a neighbor’s house, for example, they would typically lack the financial resources necessary to adopt the practices or products they saw.43 In addition to wealth-related issues, low status can also impose limitations on the adaptation of an innovation. To illustrate, consider a woman in a lower (scheduled) caste in a rural village in India. The level of technology available in her village greatly limits her and everyone else’s exposure to outside ideas and values, and her subordinated status restricts her access to those limited items even more. Furthermore, even if she managed to see Western images of the modern woman whose relations with her husband and extended family were more egalitarian than hers, she would lack both the social space in which to explore alternatives and significant others who she could approach for assistance.44 That makes innovation very difficult.

THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES The cultural industries include mass media as broadly defined (newspapers, magazines, television, etc.), the Internet, as well as other cultural products, such as record albums or iPods, and cultural services (varying 56

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from museum preservation to the arrangement of live concerts). The distinction between cultural goods and cultural services has historical significance to global commerce because many international trade accords have treated them differently. However, technological changes have made it difficult to distinguish clearly between them. Should online books, for example, be classified as (virtual) goods—or services? Fortunately, for our purposes, distinguishing between them is not critical because we are focusing on the way cultural goods and services combine to portray ideas and standards for people to utilize in deciding what should be valued and what meanings should be assigned to everyday events and relationships.45 PLACE IN PRODUCT

While the ideas and values transmitted by the cultural industries pervade the entire world, these industries are highly concentrated, making the cities where they are housed the centers of world ideas and values. Trends are set in these cities, and it is important to recognize that location is not irrelevant to the messages that emanate from them. Where the major cultural industries are headquartered matters because, as Harvey Molotch contends, products of all types usually bear the stamp of the places in which they were produced. Had San Francisco rather than Detroit been the center of U.S. automobile production, for example, it would almost surely have altered the product. Or, suppose that early on, the United Kingdom had surpassed the United States in automobile production. Cars would, in all likelihood, have been smaller, capable of lower top speeds, and so on. Or, if motion picture production in the United States had remained concentrated in New York rather than move to Los Angeles, how would movies have been different?46 To illustrate further, consider an apparently mundane product such as an ordinary household toilet. In Japan, by contrast to many other places in the world, a sink and (clean water) spigot are frequently installed on the top of the back of the toilet. With a single flush, water is drawn down into the tank from one pipe to carry away the waste, and potable water from another pipe simultaneously comes out of the spigot on top. The designers of toilets in Japan, reflecting their society’s extremely strong concerns with sanitation, created a system that would enable people using the toilet to wash their hands before they touched anything else in the room.47 The link between place and product is clear. Even though the same goods and services are frequently available in numerous places around 57

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the world and are also sometimes produced in multiple sites, they nevertheless often continue to contain traces of their origins. Thus, people can buy Amani suits in dozens of cities throughout the world; however, had they originally been designed in Toledo, Ohio, instead of Milan, Italy, they almost certainly would not be the same suits. The term “glocalization” is sometimes employed to refer to the interpenetration of the local and the global—for example, a suit tailored for world tastes that also expresses one particular place. Some theorists contend that glocalization is very widespread and utilize the concept to describe varying phenomenon; local place in a global product; transnational travelers who are culturally cosmopolitan, but simultaneously embedded in a particular place; social movements, such as human rights or ecology that are cross-national, but also expressed in relation to local conditions.48 The production or design of cultural goods and services may be especially impacted by the cultural environment in which they are located because, as Scott defines these goods and services, their subjective meaning is high relative to their utilitarian purpose. Practical considerations—how efficiently will the car run or the toilet flush?— remain relevant but exert less constraint on the design process when the objective of the product or service is to amuse or inform.49 Thus, painters, authors, musicians, and their agents and gallery owners, and the executives who manage studios and broadcast networks may be strongly influenced by local perceptions of taste as they shape the cultural goods and services that are widely disseminated and utilized by people everywhere. Whether or not a product will diffuse from its place of origin and remain essentially the same or be modified, or initially spread but then be rejected, depends in large measure on the cultural congruence between the places of origination and destination. Will Americans be too repulsed by Japanese toilets to use them? Will Japanese consumers be willing to buy large American automobiles? Many studies have ignored the role of values in these processes because they have focused on how diffusion occurs. Addressing the question of how usually leads to an emphasis on contact—that is, how ideas or products spread as a function of degrees and types of contact between societies, cities, and groups of people. In examining how diffusion occurs, the studies have tended to overlook questions pertaining to what; in other words, what practices, products, or ideas are likely to diffuse, and once they do initially spread, which ones will persist in a new setting? Answering the “what” question, of course, more likely requires taking cultural meanings into account in the explanation.


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In the first part of this chapter, we examined how the world economy was maintained by a concentration of firms and activities in the major global cities and by intercity linkages among the firms and the transnational producer services. There are parallels in the cultural realm, as we have noted, and this section introduces the analysis of cultural industries by focusing on music, specifically on live concerts and recorded albums. To begin, consider the concerts of the world’s leading singers and musicians. At any given time there is an elite group of rock, pop, and country artists who performs across the world. Their concerts obviously have economic significance, and could therefore be regarded as part of the global economy, but these are also important cultural performances whose lyrics and style transmit ideas and values about what kind of clothing is best to wear, how to interact with friends, what people ought to desire from marriage, and so on. Analyzing these activities in this section is warranted by their cultural significance. The typical pattern is for leading performers to put together a named show that can be presented, with minimal changes, across the world. Such a show can run from a few months to more than one year, and typically cover a large part of the world, with the longest tours returning multiple times to the same cities. In 2016–2017, according to Billboard, there were five tours that were attended by more than one million people. They are presented in Table 2.4, arranged in order of total attendance.50 Promoters that operate globally—the two largest are Live Nation Global Touring and AEG Worldwide—book each tour into different cities across the world. One determinant of where tours are booked involves connections between each of the two dominant global promoters and a number of large venues. For example, Live Nation’s ties to The Forum in Los Angeles and Madison Square Garden in New York has led the agency to require that tours appear at The Forum, rather than Los Angeles’ other main venue, The Staples Center, if the performers want desirable dates at Madison Square Garden.51 Table 2.4  Leading tours, 2016–2017


Tour Name

Number of Shows

Coldplay Guns N Roses Bruce Springsteen Justin Bieber Beyonce

A Head Full of Dreams Not in this Lifetime The River Tour 2016 Purpose World Tour The Formation World Tour

114 125 89 149 49


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The two largest indoor venues—02 Arena in London and Madison Square Garden in New York—typically attract more than two million persons per year to their concerts, but there are also a sizable number of large arenas across the world. Three of the ten largest indoor venues are located in metropolitan New York enabling that city consistently to be the world’s attendance leader. Greater London and metropolitan Los Angeles typically rank immediately behind New York. Many of the other cities that typically score highly are in English-speaking nations: in the United States (Dallas, Las Vegas, and Tampa); the largest cities in Canada (Toronto and Montreal); Australia (Sydney and Melbourne); and Ireland (Dublin). In non-English-speaking nations, the cities with the highest annual attendance usually include Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Antwerp, and Paris. In examining the global tours of live concerts and the venues which host them, the rankings of cities was necessarily based more upon the activities housed in cities than upon the interconnections among them. With respect to recorded music, however, data are available to permit analysts to focus both upon both activities and intercity connections. These analyses are possible because producing albums for the contemporary recorded music industry involves temporarily bringing together a team of musicians, studio engineers, and producers. Any specific group of this type may be assembled one time for one album, or members of the same group may often work together. In addition, some of the albums are entirely produced at one time in one studio, but many are produced in multiple sites. It is not uncommon for parts of a single album to be produced in as many as six studios, each one located in a different city. When finished, the product is distributed to cities across the world. The production and distribution processes provided British geographer Allan Watson with the requisite data for an analysis of city hierarchies on the basis of the recording activities they housed and their connectedness to other global cities.52 Watson examined the b­ est-selling iTunes, in 2011, in the three largest Anglophone digital music markets: United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. He found that studios based in London were involved in the production (wholly or jointly with studios in other cities) in about half of the top-ranked albums in the United Kingdom. This positioned London in first place. Los Angeles and New York were virtually tied for second and were the only other cities with studios that produced substantial numbers of leading albums for the U.K. market. Several other U.K. cities (including Cardiff and Bristol) made the bottom of this list, but were far behind Los Angeles and New York. The studios in London, New York, and Los Angeles were also the most strongly interconnected, and they were also the most connected to studios in other cities, no matter where these cities ranked. 60

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The same triad of cities dominated production of leading albums in the United States, but the order was different: Los Angeles was first, New York was a close second, and London a distant third. Other U.S. cities, notably Nashville, also housed studios that contributed to leading albums, but the numbers they produced were far below those of the top three. In the U.S. market, studios in Los Angeles and New York were again found to be the most connected to each other and to studios in other cities that produced top ranked albums. In Australia, studios in New York, Los Angeles, and London were once more tightly bunched at the top of the hierarchy, both in terms of being the leading album producers and their degree of connectivity to other cities. Australia’s two major cities (Melbourne and Sydney) were also involved, but both the amount of recorded music they produced and their degrees of intercity connectivity were well below the three global leaders. In sum, New York, London, and Los Angeles housed the studios that were the world’s leading producers of the top digital albums for the ­English-speaking market; and they housed the studios with the strongest connections to other major studios located across the Anglophone world (and beyond). There were a few other cities of secondary importance in each nation, but their import was largely confined to their nation. New York, London, and Los Angeles were (in varying order) always the top three in every nation. GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT CONGLOMERATES

Most of the major forms of popular entertainment in the world— recorded music, theme parks, video games, print publications, television, and movies—are owned or controlled by one of only a small number of corporations. Therefore, a very large percentage of all the world’s forms of entertainment are produced and owned by one of these eight. These companies are listed in alphabetical order in Table 2.5. It is also important to recognize that the operations of these conglomerates are not totally independent of each other because at any given time they engage in numerous joint ventures. Particularly when trying to innovate a costly new product—such as a new type of movie or television series—the companies are motivated to create joint ventures in order to reduce everyone’s financial risk. With respect to profitability or earnings, which companies are at the very top of this list, and how they rank relative to each other, changes a bit over time as they buy and sell controlling interest in their various holdings. This same group of companies tends to remain the world’s 61

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Table 2.5  Major entertainment companies


Primary Headquarters

Secondary Headquarters

Media, Movies, Publishing, Sports, Theme Parks, etc.


Gutersloh (Ger)

RTL (radio-TV), BMG Music, Penguin Random House



New York Beijing, Berlin, Sao Paulo, New Delhi

News Corp

New York

London, Sydney

Sony Corp


Time Warner

New York

New York, Los Angeles


New York



Walt Disney

Los Angeles

Cable and Internet, NBC stations, Dreamworks, Flyers (NHL) Fox broadcast and films, Wall Street Journal, The Times (UK), HarperCollins Sony Pictures, Playstation, Columbia & RCA records Turner Broadcasting, HBO, Warner Bros studio and stores Paramount Pictures & Theme Parks, MTV, BET Networks, Nickelodeon Canal+film & TV, Universal music, Havas advertising, video games ABC & ESPN networks, Disney films & theme parks, Anaheim Angels (MLB)

leaders, however, because when these companies purchase or spin off various subsidiaries, the exchange frequently involves another of the leading global enterprises. For example, when in 2011, Vivendi decided to sell the NBC Universal division, the buyer was Comcast. When in 2012 Comcast decided to sell parts of NBC Universal, the principal buyer was the Disney Corporation.53 From the headquarters listing in Table 2.5, it is apparent that New York, followed by Los Angeles, and then several other cities that have frequently been at the top of global rankings house the most significant facilities in producing popular entertainment. Some activity often occurs at a distance from the headquarters of these companies, but the headquarters are where decisions are made concerning which cultural goods and services will be produced or offered, how they will be funded, marketed, distributed, and so on. These decisions are the ones that exert the greatest global influence and make the cities from which they emanate the most important nodes in the global hierarchy. To further clarify the distinction between activity and ­decision-making, consider Nashville’s Music Row. A great deal of recording activity occurs 62

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there, particularly involving country music. The recordings made in Nashville’s studios are played throughout the world, and the singers and musicians made famous by these recordings are the stars of global tours. However, most of those recordings are on labels whose corporate headquarters are in New York, London, or Los Angeles, rather than Nashville. Major decisions, such as whether to sign a new artist to a single or full-album deal, or whether to invest in tours to promote an artist or recording are likely to be made in corporate headquarters. Furthermore, even when decisions are made by executives located in Nashville, they are typically made in accordance with guidelines and criteria that emanate from the home office.54 In sum, with respect to the recorded music industry, a city like Nashville would be considered important, but less so than New York, London, or Los Angeles because the latter house the corporate headquarters that, across the world, exert the most influence. The conglomerates are striving, almost continuously, to extend their geographical reach into new markets. For example, Nashville and Belfast, Northern Ireland arrange an annual Belfast Nashville Songwriters Festival; Disney has opened theme parks outside of the United States, in Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Part of Disney’s objective is to create worldwide demand for Disney films and other products placed in the theme parks. The expansion of conglomerates puts pressure on firms that provide the necessary supportive ­services—such as advertising, marketing, and public relations—to grow correspondingly. RELATED SERVICES: ADVERTISING–PUBLIC RELATIONS–MARKETING

The entertainment conglomerates have increasingly demanded that the firms which service them create advertising campaigns in diverse media, and offer public relations and marketing expertise across the many different nations in which they are operating. In response, the agencies have followed an acquisitions–merger strategy that mirrors the entertainment conglomerates they serve. The Omnicom Group, for example, a global marketing communications firm that serves clients in over 100 countries, was created by mergers and acquisitions among seven once separately owned agencies. There are five global conglomerates that typically generate the most revenue, and though their year to year rankings relative to each other sometimes change, these five have invariably been the world’s revenue leaders. These five agencies and their headquarters locations are presented in Table 2.6.55 63

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Table 2.6  Leading global advertising agencies


Headquarters Location

WPP Omnicom Publicis Groupe Interpublic Group Dentsu Inc.

London New York Paris New York Tokyo

Among the next 20 firms in revenues, 4 were located in L­ ondon, and New York and Tokyo each had 2, further reinforcing the position of these cities as home to the world’s leading m ­ arketing-advertising agencies. In addition, regardless of where the headquarters of any agency was located, the agencies also had principal offices in the other leading cities noted in Table 2.5. Thus, New York, followed by London, is again at the apex, and they are followed by agencies in Tokyo and Paris. Finding a concentration of culture and media producers in a few large metropolitan areas is very consistent with the results reported by ­Stefan Kratke, and he views it as another example of the local agglomeration of a specialized form of activity. Kratke’s analysis—based upon the ­networks of the largest global media firms identified New York, ­London, Los Angeles, and Paris as the most prominent centers of the global cultural industries by virtue of housing the greatest number of media firms. However, he also placed Amsterdam, Berlin, and Munich in the top category and placed Tokyo in a second (lower) category.56 While the similarities in the two sets of findings far exceed the differences, it may be instructive to ask why the differences occurred. A likely explanation lies in the fact that in ranking cities Kratke placed less weight on whether they contained headquarters, and more weight on the presence of branch offices. In addition, the data presented here were from 2016 while most of Kratke’s data were 15 years older. Perhaps the tendency toward concentration within the media industry, noted earlier by Kratke, led to a smaller group of major global centers by 2016.

THE ECONOMIC AND THE CULTURAL Measures of both economic activity and the cultural industries showed a marked tendency toward concentration in a small number of cities (i.e., city-regions). Regardless of the special focus of any measure, London and New York emerged at the top of the rankings. Paris and Tokyo also scored highly on both. Thus, there was a great deal of overlap near the apex of both rankings. The most notable differences between the two 64

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hierarchies involved Hong Kong’s consistently high economic, but not cultural ranking and Los Angeles’ consistently high cultural, but not economic, ranking. New York, Paris, and many other Western global cities have a long history of investing in both their economic and cultural infrastructure. One clear, highly visual illustration is provided by the way cultural icons, such as museums, have been placed in the centers of global financial concentrations, such as the City of London and Wall Street in New York. Other cities that did not become important economic centers until well into the 20th century typically turned to their cultural infrastructure years after they had attained economic significance, and have tried hard to catch up in this realm. This latter pattern is illustrated by Hong Kong, Singapore, and other Asian cities that only more recently focused on creating significant cultural enterprises to match their globally important economic activities. There is an emphasis among contemporary city leaders on developing both the economic and cultural standing of their cities because global significance has increasingly come to depend on a city’s stature both realms.

GLOSSARY Cities: Incorporated places with a minimum populations size determined by a government agency. Creative Cities: Have highly innovative populations and a great deal of high-tech employment. Cultural Homogenization: The diffusion of the same values and lifestyles across the world. Cultural Industries: Include the mass media broadly defined, the Internet, and cultural products and services. Diffusion: The spread of an artifact either within or across societies. GaWC: The globalization and world cities study group that has been studying the linkages among major cities. Global Cities: Major cities that exert great influence and support the world economy. Global City-Regions: Sprawling metropolitan areas with global connectivity. Glocalization: The interpenetration of the global and the local. Metropolitan Areas: A city and the builtup suburbs surrounding it. Producer Services Firms: Offer specialized services—law, finance, design, etc.—to large organizations. Traditional Culture: A set of integrated symbols, rituals and values most strongly associated with preindustrial societies. 65

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CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER [Almost every chapter in the Reader could be placed here because almost all involve global city-regions to some degree; therefore, the only chapters shown here are those which can only be placed here because they are not strongly associated with any other chapter in this book.] 1. Prologue: “The metropolitan explosion” Peter Hall 3. World city formation: an agenda for research and action John Friedmann, Goetz Wolff 4. Locating cities on global circuits Saskia Sassen 9. Global and world cities: a view from off the map Jennifer Robinson 16. From “state-owned” to “City Inc.”: the re-territorialization of the state in Shanghai Fulong Wu 22. Comparing London and Frankfurt as world cities: a relational study of contemporary urban change Jonathan V. Beaverstock, Michael Hoyler, Kathryn Pain, Peter J. Taylor 23. Global grids of glass: on global cities, telecommunications and planetary urban networks Stephen Graham 24. Global cities and the spread of infectious disease: the case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada S. Harris Ali, Roger Keil 25. Flying high (in the competitive sky): conceptualizing the role of airports in global city-regions through ‘aero-regionalism’ Jean-Paul Addie 26. One package at a time: the distributive world city Cynthia Negrey, Jeffery L. Osgood, Frank Goetzke 27. Global cities between biopolitics and necropolitics: (in)security and circuits of knowledge in the global city network David Murakami-Wood 32. Global cities, “glocal states”: global city formation and state territorial restructuring in contemporary Europe Neil Brenner 33. Global cities and developmental states: Tokyo and Seoul Richard Child Hill, June Woo Kim


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36. Between world history and state formation: new perspectives on Africa’s cities Laurent Fourchard 40. Local actors in global politics Saskia Sassen 50. “Global media cities”: major nodes of globalising culture and media industries Stefan Krätke 51. Willing the global city: Berlin’s cultural strategies of interurban competition after 1989 Ute Lehrer 55. Spaces and networks of musical creativity in the city Allan Watson, Michael Hoyler, Christoph Mager 59. External urban relational processes: introducing central flow theory to complement central place theory Peter J. Taylor, Michael Hoyler, Raf Verbruggen 60. Beyond the global city concept and the myth of “command and control” Richard G. Smith 61. World cities under conditions of financialized globalization: towards an augmented world city hypothesis David Bassens, Michiel van Meeteren 62. Can the straw man speak? An engagement with postcolonial critiques of “global cities research” Michiel van Meeteren, Ben Derudder, David Bassens 65. Planetary urbanization Neil Brenner, Christian Schmid

NOTES 1 For further discussion, see Joel Kotkin, The City. Modern Library, 2006. 2 See definitions and methods in, Institut National de la statistique et des etudes economique, October 2016. 3 For further discussion of U.S. cities, see David K. Hamilton, Governing Metropolitan Areas. Routledge, 2014. 4 Demographia’s World Urban Areas, 14th Annual Edition, April 2018. 5 An influential early description of global city-regions was provided by Allen J. Scott, et al., “Global City-Regions.” In Scott (Ed), Global City Regions. Oxford, 2002. Some critics have contended that the global city-region over-bounds urban areas and includes fringe areas that should be viewed as laying outside of it. See, for example, John Harrison and Hesse Heley, “Governing beyond the Metropolis.” Urban Studies, 52, 2015.


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6 See the analysis by Blanca A. Ramos and Josep Roca, “Megalopolis.” Paper presented at the 55th Congress of the European Regional Science Association, Lisbon, 2015. 7 See the papers in, John Harrisson and Michael Hoyler (Eds), Megaregions. Edward Elger, 2017. 8 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy. Sage, 2018. 9 Sabine Dorry and Antoine Decoville, “Governance and Transportation Policy Networks in the Cross-border Metropolitan Region of Luxembourg.” European Urban and Regional Studies, 23, 2016. 10 For a listing of metropolitan areas, by states, see U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2017. 11 Felix S. Agyemang, Kofi K. Amedrzo, and Elisabete Silva, “The Emergence of City-regions and their Implications for Contemporary Spatial Governance.” Cities, 71, 2017. 12 For further discussion, see Gerard Gilbert, Trail of the Unexpected. Independent, April 20, 2012. 13 David Fichberg, “A Bridge Alone Can’t Unify Hong Kong with China.” Bloomberg Opinion, October 23, 2018. 14 Sassen, op. cit. 15 John Friedmann, “The World City Hypothesis.” Development and Change, 17, 1986. 16 See the discussion of control in, D. Bassens and M. van Meeteren, “World Cities Under Conditions of Financialized Globalization.” Progress in Human Geography, 39, 2015. 17 Sassen, op.cit. 18 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class. Basic Books, 2014. 19 Barney Warf, “Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Geographies of Tolerance.” Urban Geography, 36, 2015. 20 Institute for Urban Strategies, Global Power City Index 2016. 21 The concentration of banking is discussed in several chapters in, Youssef Cossis, Richard S. Grossman, and Catherine R. Schenk, The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History. Oxford University, 2016. 22 Neil Brenner and Roger Keil, “From Global Cities to Globalized Urbanization.” Glocalism, 3, 2014. 23 Rob Urban, David M. Levitt and Christopher Cannon, “Wall Street is Moving.” Bloomberg, May 14, 2018. 24 See the essays in part one in, Philip Cohen and Michael J. Rustin (Eds), London’s Turning. Routledge, 2016. 25 William D. Henderson, “More on Global Cities and Labor Market for Lawyers.” Empirical Legal Studies, August 18, 2006; and William D. Henderson and Arthur S. Alderson, “The Changing Economic Geography of U.S. Law Firms.” Journal of Economic Geography, 1235, 2016. 26 Louise Story, “As Wall Street Crumbles…” New York Times, August 12, 2008, p. B1. 27 “Global Personnel Files.” New York Times, April 16, 2009, p. A16.


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28 Stefan Luthi, Alain Thierstein and Michael Hoyler, “The World City Network.” Cities, 72, 2018. 29 For an excellent introduction to GaWC, see the chapters in, Ben Derudder, et  al. (Eds), International Handbook of Globalization and World Cities. Edward Elgar, 2015. 30 Ben Deruder, Frank Wilcox and Peter J. Taylor, “U.S. Cities in the World City Network.” Urban Geography, 28, 2007. 31 Matthew C. Mahutga, et al., “Economic Globalization and the Structure of the World City System.” Urban Studies, 47, 2010. 32 Zachary P. Neal, “The Duality of World Cities and Firms.” Global Networks, 8, 2008. 33 Saabira Chaudhuri and Tripp Mickle, “Where Should a New Beer Giant Call Home?” The Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2015, p. B1. 34 Ibid. 35 Thomas Grove, “McDonald’s Goes Local in Russia.” The Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2018, p. B1. 36 For a concise introduction to this traditional view of culture, see Serena Nanda and Richard L. Warms, Culture Counts. Cenage Learning, 2017. 37 Gordon Mathews, Global Culture/Individual Identity. Routledge, 2000. For a detailed case study of globalization’s cultural effects, see Gordon Mathews, The World in Guangzhou. University of Chicago, 2017. 38 Dany Jacobs, The Cultural Side of Innovation. Routledge, 2014. 39 Ibid. For further discussion of congruence and conflict among cultural assumptions, see Erin Meyer, The Culture Map. Public Affairs, 2014. 40 Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Stretches Standards for Success.” New York Times, December 24, 2009, p. A6. 41 See the discussion of the geography of centers and margins in Sassen, op.cit. 42 The classic text on this topic, currently in its fifth edition, is Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation. Free Press, 2010. For a number of essays critiquing and modifying Roger’s view, see Ann Vishwanath and George A. Barnett (Eds), The Diffusion of Innovation. Peter Lang, 2011. 43 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cosmopolitan Communications. Cambridge University, 2009. 44 This issue is explored in a number of different contexts by the essays in, Bandana Purkayastha and Mangala Subramaniam (Eds), The Power of Women’s Informal Networks. Lexington Books, 2004. 45 See Richard Campbell, Christopher R. Martin and Bettina Fabos, Media and Culture. Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016. 46 Allen J. Scott, On Hollywood. Princeton University, 2018. 47 Harvey Molotch, Where Stuff Comes From. Routledge, 2005. See also, Harvey Molotch and Laura Noren (Eds), Toilet. New York University, 2010. 48 Victor Roudometof, Globalization. Routledge, 2016. 49 Allen J. Scott, “Cultural-Products Industries and Urban Economic Development.” Urban Affairs Review, 39, 2004. 50 David Brooks, “2017’s Highest-Grossing Tours.” Billboard, July 27, 2017.


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51 The manager of Live Nation said that playing in The Forum, “makes you a friend of the company.” Ibid. 52 Allan Watson, “The World According to iTunes.” Global Networks, 12, 2012. 53 It is also important to recognize that the operations of these firms are not totally separate because at any given time they engage in numerous joint ventures with each other. Particularly when trying to innovate costly new products, the firms are motivated to form joint ventures to reduce everyone’s financial risk. 54 For further discussion, see Don Cusic, Discovering Country Music. Praeger, 2008. 55 Additional information about each of these agencies is available in Wikipedia. 56 Stefan Kratke, “Global Media Cities in a Worldwide Urban Network.” ­European Planning Studies, 11, 2003.



Inequality One of the most distinctive attributes associated with globalization, as noted in Chapter 1, is increased inequality. It could entail differences among people in a wide range of potential attributes, including income and wealth, educational opportunities, health and longevity, etc. And there have been studies focusing upon each of these attributes, but income—or income-related features—have been the most ­studied. That is probably why this line of inquiry is frequently referred to as income inequality, but some discuss the issue under the term, class polarization, and still others focus upon residential segregation as a spatial manifestation of income inequality and refer to cities impacted by globalization-induced inequality as “dual cities.”1 All the analysts were responding to essentially the same phenomenon, however. After several decades of substantial middle-class growth in the cities of most economically advanced nations, somewhere after about 1970, it was the highest and lowest classes that began to expand. As a result, urban observers hypothesized that the overall distribution of wealth was taking the shape of an hourglass; wider at the top and bottom, pinched in the middle. Friedmann and Wolff, in one of the early landmark analyses of cities impacted by globalization, used the metaphors of the citadel and the ghetto to describe the expanding classes at the top and bottom.2 They selected these terms because they characterized not only different strata within a socioeconomic hierarchy, but also groupings that were spatially segregated from each other as well. 71

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There is, of course, nowhere other than in a socialist utopia that everyone has an identical amount of whatever it is that people value. Some differences in income or wealth, and in everything else, are ubiquitous. And a number of studies have similarly found that people in most societies do not object to all forms of inequality and may even sometimes prefer it, as long as the differences (in income, for example) are justly determined; that is, so long as everyone is perceived as having a fair chance of obtaining whatever is valued.3 It is a very high degree of inequality in a city or nation that is associated with multiple and diverse social and political problems. In several large cities in Latin America, for example, studies have reported a correlation between the degree of inequality and the amount of kidnapping that occurs.4 Because the kidnappers are usually poor and their victims rich, the transfer of money in a ransom payment becomes, in effect, a Robin Hood way of redistributing income. Other analyses suggest that the greater the degree of income inequality in a nation, the greater the differences in how much overall satisfaction people express when they are asked how they feel about “their lives as a whole these days.”5 Some studies even contend that excessive inequality, as a by-product of globalization, reduces social solidarity and feelings of trust and produces political instability.6 Therefore, if extreme degrees of inequality are an essential feature of cities and nations in a globalized world, that may portend serious and widespread social problems.

GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD CITIES One of the most influential perspectives that both predicted increased inequality as a by-product of globalization and provided an explanation for that increase has come out of the Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) previously discussed in Chapter 2. It can be helpful to introduce GaWC in relation to the perspective of world systems theory (WST). The latter contends that nations can be place into three categories—core, semi-periphery, and periphery— based upon the nature of their transnational connections. The more industrialized nations in the core are dominant and benefit from their place in the world economic order by maintaining exploitive relations with nations in the periphery, obtaining their labor (and raw ­materials) cheaply. As a result of this relationship, there is a global elite in the core nations that is highly skilled and very well paid and a large, unskilled and very poor class in the peripheral nations.7 The semi-­periphery is intermediate. 72

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One of the ways in which the unequal relations among nations impacts income inequality within nations is via the globalization of production. To maximize profit, firms try to move production to wherever the costs of labor are cheapest, which means peripheral nations. This tends to reduce the demand for unskilled labor in core nations; but in order to complete the production process, skilled laborers and other high value-adding specialists are usually required. They tend to be located in the core, increasing the demand for higher salaried people in the core. These differences in the demand for high- and low-skilled personnel increase inequality within the working class in core nations. In addition, the abundance of relatively cheap labor in the periphery tends to reduce the overall bargaining power of labor in both the core and periphery, resulting in increased inequality between those closest to capital and those with only their labor to sell. Therefore, studies report that as global production networks expand, income inequality, especially in core nations, usually increases.8 Some of WST’s emphasis upon inequality as a function of nations’ external relationships is retained by the GaWC paradigm, but its central focus is upon how the major activities and processes that sustain the global system are located in a small group of cities. To review briefly, the international accounting, law, advertising, banking, and finance occupations (referred to as “advanced producer services”) that are housed in select cities (which tend to be in core nations) support and maintain the global system. Cities and city-regions can be correspondingly ranked in categories based upon the type and volume of the international producer services functions that they contain.9 To tie GaWC and WST together, we can note that almost all of the leading global cities (such as New York, London, and Paris) are located in core nations. One of the more conspicuous differences between wealthy people in the leading global cities in core nations and poor people in peripheral nations lies in the clothing they wear. Many of the shirts and jeans initially purchased in expensive retail stores that are soon discarded in New York, London, or Stockholm end up recycled and worn again in East Africa or Central America or western India. The global network by which used clothing is reutilized is described in Box 3.1. Associated with the concentration of advanced producer services in global cities is a technical and managerial elite that also tends to be highly paid. However, high-status residents also generate demands for a less skilled, less well paid labor force whose functions complement those of the technical-managerial elite. For example, the counterparts to the elite include cooks, nannies, gardeners, janitors, mail sorters, and so on. This service-oriented labor force is dominated by racial-ethnic minorities and immigrants who are attracted by the opportunities they 73

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BOX 3.1 RE-WEARING DISCARDED CLOTHING Large clothing recyclers operate in many leading cities in core nations. The tons of clothing which people in these wealthy nations continuously discard because they consider it too worn or out of fashion, initially ends up in garbage or recycle bins, at Goodwill Industries (or other used clothing outlets) or collected by global retailers, such as H&M. Collecting used clothing for export to peripheral nations is encouraged by the re-sale profits that firms can realize, but there are also environmental concerns. It is not easy to dispose of used clothing. The chemicals in discarded clothing can leach into groundwater and burning textiles in incinerators can release chemical toxins into the air. Municipalities also find that getting rid of trashed clothing is very expensive. New York City, for example, spends over $20 million annually to ship textiles to landfills and incinerators, and then the environmental ­degradation follows.10 Every month heaps of castoff clothing arrives at ports in peripheral nations. People working in the textile reprocessing centers sort the clothes according to its resale value: old Levi’s, for example, tend to be worth the most, so they are kept separate. Badly torn shirts, on the other hand, are worth very little so they are cut into rags. From some of the centers the used clothing is re-sold to local customers while other centers re-package and re-export the clothing further down the “fashion chain.” The recipients of the discarded clothing find it hard to explain why anyone would throw away pants and shirts which they consider to be still highly wearable. They are puzzled by the behavior of these people in other countries who they assume must be very wealthy. They offer a number of interesting explanations for the readiness of the wealthy to discard perfectly good clothing. Some recipients speculate that the discarders don’t have time to wash the clothes once they get dirty, or that water must be so expensive in their countries that it is cheaper to replace the clothes than to wash them. Others who inherit the used clothing believe that those who disposed of the clothing wore it once or twice, and then got bored, or perhaps the castoffs were owned by people who died.11 The sheer difference in wealth between them and the people who discarded the clothing is difficult for them to comprehend.

see associated with the wealth of globally well-connected cities. Thus, ­inequalities within cities (or nations) are also a function of internal forces, according to GaWC.12 The more globally important a city, the more its labor force is likely to be dichotomized into two segments, one offering high-paying, stable 74

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employment and the other providing low-paying and precarious work. These cities are, as a result, often described as having dual labor markets or, for short, as dual cities. Built into the occupational structure of these dichotomized cities is a high degree of income and wealth inequality, and all that is related to such differences.

MEASURING INEQUALITY Any review of inequality research begins with a variety of t­ heoretical and methodological decisions. Through what theoretical perspective will inequality be examined and what measures of inequality will be emphasized?13 The first decision to be made concerns the specific ­variable to be examined. There are three major possibilities that can be selected, individually or in combination: 1. Income: Usually measured on an annual basis, either directly or by proxy indicators, such as people’s occupational status and/or level of education. 2. Wealth: The net value of people’s assets, such as homes and investments, minus their debts. Unlike income, which is tabulated at one point in time, wealth is cumulative, reflecting prior years’ activities. 3. Residential segregation: Focuses upon the physical separation of groups of people who differ in income or wealth. Income segregation is most often used to measure inequality in cities. (Racial or ethnic differences are frequently involved as well, but are usually analyzed separately.) All three of the above ways of measuring inequality produce results that correlate with each other; the higher one is the higher the others tend to be. However, the relationships are only moderately high so that which one is selected can be very consequential for a study’s findings. Further, while there is a correlation between yearly earnings and total wealth, the magnitude of the differences in wealth tends to be much more pronounced. Specifically, the wealth differences between different groups of individuals, such as men and women, or between socioeconomic groups or racial categories all tend to far exceed the yearly differences in their average incomes because historical differences in inheritance patterns, in their ability to buy homes, and so on, cumulate to increase differences in wealth. In the United States, for example, women’s recent yearly earnings were about 78% as much as men’s, but they only possessed about 36% as much wealth.14 75

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A second decision concerns the appropriate unit of analysis, and the major possibilities include individuals, families, or households. To focus on variations in wealth or income among individual earners will usually lead to understating overall degrees of inequality in a city or nation because it ignores the number of people each person is supporting. If seven people live on an annual income of $30,000, they are a lot worse off than two people living on the same amount. This size affect becomes e­ specially pertinent to inequality assessments because of socioeconomic differences in family size. Specifically, lower-standing families tend to have more dependent children, meaning even less income or wealth on a per capita basis than smaller, higher standing families. In comparing studies, it is important therefore to know whether wealth or income differences are being examined among individuals or among households or families. Because funds are typically spent on a household or family basis, either of them may be more appropriate to examine than individuals– but which? Although the two units are often identical, they can diverge. In the United States, for example, individuals living together must be related to be considered, in census reports, to be a family. Other individuals living together that do not share a kinship tie, such as roommates, are excluded from the family category. Further, people of the same sex could almost always constitute a household, but there are governmental differences, across time and among societies, in whether they could officially be considered to be a married couple, hence family. Selecting households versus families as the unit of analysis can be consequential because income inequality among households often exceeds inequality among families.15 With respect to inequality among families, still further complexities are introduced if type of family, or the different life stages of families, are also considered. With the identical income, for example, a retired couple with government health insurance and a paid-for home is likely to be much better off than a young, newly married couple. The age composition of a city or nation is, therefore, pertinent, and so is the distribution of family types, given the growing differences in income between dual-earner families and a variety of other types of families in which only a single adult is working.16 The third and final decision concerns the metric to be employed. Whichever of the above variables are selected for study by a researcher, how is inequality to be measured, and its values expressed? The two most widely used measures are percentile shares and the Gini index. The amount of residential segregation, based upon income or wealth, is another way to measure inequality. It is not as widely utilized as ­percentile shares or Gini indexes, but it is often used in studies of cities or metropolitan areas. Each is described below. 76

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The percentile shares approach notes how much of an entire nation’s or city’s income or wealth is associated with various percentages of the population, such as deciles (tenths) or quintiles (fifths). This actual share is then compared to the amount that would be expected if wealth or income was evenly distributed across the entire entity. To illustrate, suppose households in a city are divided into deciles based on wealth. If there were no inequality, each decile’s share of total wealth would be exactly 10%. The actual distribution of wealth is then compared to this hypothetical (complete equality) value, and the more it deviates, the greater the degree of income inequality. The logic behind the examination of percentile shares is straightforward, but comparisons utilizing it can be very cumbersome. Using deciles, for example, one would have to examine ten deciles in each city/nation to obtain a complete picture of its inequality. For that reason, studies often compare places utilizing only the top and bottom deciles (or quintiles). This simplification is justified by the fact that deviations from equality are likely to be most pronounced at the very top and very bottom of any population. One might also want to know how much income, in absolute rather than relative terms, the various strata received. To see the difference, think of the income of a nation or city as though it were a pie, and imagine the slices of the pie as representing shares. If the pie is cut into ten equal-in-size pieces, then each decile slice represents an i­dentical share, equal in size to every other slice of the pie. However, the a­ bsolute amount income of places varies, so to pursue the metaphor, recognize that the circumference of the different pies would not be identical. A one-tenth slice from some pies would be larger than a one-tenth slice from others. Thus, the lowest decile in a rich nation is likely to have more income, in an absolute sense, than the lowest decile in a poor nation, even though each has 10% of their nation’s income. GINI INDEX

Another statistic used to measure inequality is the Gini index, or Gini ­coefficient. It is probably the single most widely used measure of ­inequality in many social science disciplines. Its advantage is that it ­summarizes the entire income distribution in any population with a s­ ingle figure. To calculate that figure, one sums the cumulative d­ iscrepancy between an actual income distribution and the ­(hypothetical) distribution that would be expected if there were complete equality. In the latter case, each person or household would have an identical share of the income of 77

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a city or nation. The sum of the discrepancies between the actual and the hypothetical values would in this instance result in a Gini coefficient of zero. No discrepancy. In fact, however, a Gini index less than .20 almost never occurs; .20 is about as close to 0 as actual places ever get. At the opposite pole, complete inequality would be reflected by a score of 1.0, which would indicate that one person or one household possessed all of the income; therefore, none of the others had any. A maximum inequality score (i.e., 1.0) is hypothetically possible, but scores higher than .70 are very rare, in fact. As with percentile shares, one can focus upon either relative or absolute Gini values. To illustrate this, suppose that in 2010 one person earned $10 per day and another earned $100; and in 2015 the earnings of the first person increased to $80 per day and the second increased to $800. The relative difference between the two would be unchanged. The second continued to earn ten times more than the first. However, the absolute difference between them has increased from $90 per day to $720. For this reason, the relative Gini and absolute Gini coefficients will often differ from each other.17 The fact that it is a single figure, whether expressed in absolute or relative terms, summarizes an entire distribution makes the Gini less cumbersome to use than separate income shares; however, that is also its disadvantage because it does not indicate where in the income hierarchy the greatest inequality is found. A nation or city could have a high Gini index primarily as a result of a relative absence of income in the lowest strata whereas in another place it could be more a result of an excessive concentration of income in the upper strata. There is no way to infer which from a Gini index. Although many studies only report one or the other, it would be highly desirable to have both a Gini index and percentile shares for the same place at the same time. To illustrate, Table 3.1 compares households in Brazil and South Africa, in 2014, with respect both to Gini indexes and top and bottom percentile shares.18 From the value of Gini indexes in Table 3.1, it is apparent that there is greater income inequality among South African households (65.0) than Brazilian households (52.7). In fact, South Africa is consistently among the nations with the highest inequality. The percentile share Table 3.1  Comparing Gini index and percentile shares

Brazil South Africa


Gini Index

Bottom 10% Share

Top 10% Share

52.7 65.0

1.0 1.1

41.7 53.8

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figures enable one to round out the comparison. The bottom 10% in each nation had a very similar share of its nation’s income, but it was in the top 10% that there were marked differences. From these figures, we can infer that the high degree of inequality indicated by South Africa’s Gini index is primarily due to the great share (53.8%) of the nation’s income that is held by households in the top 10%. As we will note later in this chapter, increased income inequality in a nation or a city has, in recent decades, often been due to greater wealth or income accruing to the top percentile in a population. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

The final measure of inequality to be considered is residential segregation based upon wealth or income, and as previously noted, it is a widely employed measure in studies of cities. When the focus is upon how groups that are geographically separated from each other differ in terms of income or wealth, then segregation can be regarded as a spatial representation of inequality because these economic differences are almost invariably associated with multiple differences in opportunities, or life chances. It is often difficult for analyses to remove the effects of non-economic variables that also affect both residential segregation and opportunities. The racial-ethnic composition of a city or nation is obviously such a variable. Nevertheless, income and wealth inequality have been found to be the major correlates of the extent of socioeconomic residential segregation. In the United States, for example, size of the Gini index, by itself, has been found to explain over one-half of all the variation in residential income segregation among metropolitan areas.19 The most widely utilized measure of segregation is probably the index of dissimilarity. It expresses the degree to which any two groups are similarly distributed across the neighborhoods or census tracts that comprise the larger geographical area, usually a city or metropolitan area. It calculates the percentage of people in one group who would have to change locations for the two groups being compared to be identically distributed. To illustrate with respect to high- and low-socioeconomic groups: a dissimilarity index of .39 would indicate that 39% of the people or households in the low-socioeconomic group would have to move to a high-socioeconomic group neighborhood for the two income groups to share the same spatial distribution.20 The possible values of the index range from 0 (no movement necessary because the two groups are totally integrated) to 100 (indicating that they are totally separated). Neither of these extremes scores have been empirically obtained, though. Every place that has been examined has scored somewhere between 0 and 100. 79

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Another set of measures of income segregation entails placing neighborhoods or census tracts into socioeconomic categories (e.g., high, medium, and low) based upon the average wealth or income of the ­residents in relation to the midpoint of the city or metropolitan area. The larger the proportion of residents living either in the high (i.e., affluent) or low (i.e., poor) communities, the higher the inferred degree of income segregation in the city. At one hypothetical extreme, everyone in a city would live in either a very wealthy or very poor neighborhood, and there would be no middle-class areas.

INEQUALITY WITHIN NATIONS This section begins with a brief review of income and wealth ­inequality trends within nations. Most of the relevant research on income and wealth focuses upon nations rather than cities. Studies of inequality within cities are much more likely to examine residential segregation based upon economic groupings, and we will turn to these studies after reviewing the data on nations. Apart from data availability, it is reasonable to assess nations first because fiscal policies which impact inequality, usually enacted by nations, obviously affect the nation’s cities as well. Since roughly 1980, the degree of income inequality has steadily increased in most nations of the world, sometimes dramatically. The international Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that Gini coefficients increased by an average annual rate of .3 between 1985 and 2008 across a wide range of nations.21 ­Coefficients did actually decline in a handful of nations (including Chile, Greece, Ireland, and others), but they were the exceptions.22 Illustrative of the dominant trend toward increased inequality in rich nations, the Gini index in the United Kingdom increased between the mid-1980s and late 2000s from .26 to .41. By the end of this period, households in the highest one-tenth of the United Kingdom’s income distribution possessed nearly one-third of the nation’s total income, while the poorest one-tenth had only about one-hundredth of the total income.23 In most of the formerly socialist nations in C ­ entral and Eastern Europe, despite historically low levels of income inequality, there was a similar increase during this period. Gini indexes in ­Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere in the region became almost identical to the United Kingdom’s.24 Inequality in the United States was h­ istorically higher than in the United Kingdom, and it remained higher, but the rate of increase in the United States was nevertheless very similar during this period. 80

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To be specific, between 1947 and 1980, the U.S. Gini coefficient for household income hardly varied, fluctuating only between about .36 and .38. Then it began to increase, as shown in Table 3.2. Family income inequality followed the same trend as that of the household.25 There have been fewer studies of wealth inequality because fewer surveys have asked respondents about their total economic assets and debts. However, those studies that have focused upon the wealth accumulated by families or households show a similar trend toward increasing inequality. Figures for the United States are presented in Table 3.3. The Gini coefficient at the bottom of the table provides an overall measure, and comparing it to Gini coefficients for household income (presented in Table 3.2) shows the degree to which wealth inequality has increased compared to increases in income inequality. The percentile figures on wealth shares, in the top rows of the table, show the degree to which the wealthiest have gotten wealthier while those who began the period with the least wealth later acquired even less of the nation’s wealth.26 In Asia, there has been a good deal of variation among nations in their historical degrees of inequality, but regardless of where they began, in recent decades most have experienced increases comparable to those that occurred elsewhere.27 For example, according to recent studies, China’s household income Gini index (.47) was virtually identical to that of the United States, even though China began the period with less inequality than the United States. There was also some variation among nations in Central and Latin America, though most of the nations in the region experienced very large increases in inequality over the past several decades, resulting in Gini indexes that made Latin America the most unequal region in the world. A large percentage of the increase in the region was due to the increasing wealth of Latin America’s billionaires.28 Table 3.2  U.S. Gini index, household income










Table 3.3  Household wealth in the United States

Share of Household Wealth Owned By:






Top 1% Top 10% Bottom 50% Gini coefficient [ ]—household wealth

29.9 34.8 32.1 33.6 35.5 67.0 67.9 69.6 71.4 75.0 3.0 3.6 2.8 2.5 1.1 [.79] [.79] [.81] [.82] [.85]


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The growth of inequality in recent decades is even more notable given the fact that it has occurred even in those places that had traditions emphasizing the importance of minimizing income and wealth differentials. In the formerly socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, for example, their political and economic ideology stressed the desirability of curtailing inequality; and those nations (including Hungary, Poland, and others) generally had extremely low levels of inequality as late as 1989. That was the year in which the Soviet Union collapsed, and nations formerly under Soviet control slowly opened their borders to outside investment and moved to become more integrated with the global economy. Within 10–15 years, income inequality in many of these nations increased to levels characteristic of nations that had a long history of global connectivity and inequality, such as the United Kingdom.29 To illustrate further, most of the Scandinavian nations have long shared cultural values that stress the importance to society of minimal income differentials, and these values were historically reflected in relatively small income differences. For example, in order to diminish inequality, Sweden has historically enacted a variety of government policies such as a tax system, which had the effect of redistributing wealth from the richest to the poorest segments, and prohibitions against layoffs or hiring temporary workers (who are typically less well paid), under normal circumstances. Until about 1990, the efficacy of these policies was reflected in the fact income inequality in Sweden gradually declined while the same measures of inequality were increasing in most of the world. After 1990, however, large multinational corporations in Stockholm, in particular, pressured the Swedish government to permit them to be more flexible in hiring, promoting, firing, etc. The threat was that these corporations would cut back on hiring in Sweden and expand in locations outside the country, meaning less tax revenue for Sweden. The government responded by approving a number of accommodations, and a large segment of the labor force changed from secure, full-time, relatively high-wage employment to precarious, temporary, low-wage employment. In consequence, as in many global cities, Stockholm moved toward a dual labor market. The relative income share of the working class declined even further because at the same time that they were losing ground, salaries and bonuses were increasing for senior executives and professionals in finance, law, and related fields.30 In sum, steep increments in income inequality within nations were widespread during the latter decades of the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century. Differences among people in wealth tended to be larger than differences in income, and the relative gains of households and families at the high ends of their societies were especially pronounced. 82

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INEQUALITY WITHIN CITIES Within most of the major cities, the rate of increase in income i­nequality was even more pronounced than it was in the remainder of their nations during the decades before and after the turn of the 21st century. By 2011, for example, Inner London contained a greater proportion of both extremely high- and extremely low-income households (i.e., top and ­bottom 10% of the income distribution) than anywhere else in the United Kingdom.31 To illustrate further, during this same period Tokyo experienced a greater increase in income inequality than any other city, town, or village in Japan.32 And in the United States, income gaps in New York City in 2010 far exceeded those of any other major city in the nation. In that city, and particularly in its center (i.e., Manhattan), the rich continued to get richer while the poor were getting poorer—and both trends were occurring at an accelerated rate.33 As previously noted, studies of inequality in cities have tended to focus upon the residential segregation of income groups, and these ­studies of segregation have usually reported results consistent with those that have focused upon income or wealth. That is to be expected: All else equal, cities with great income or wealth inequality will have greater residential segregation.34 Following is a brief review of major recent studies of residential income segregation in cities in various nations: 1. China: Prior to the 1980s, most large cities in China had some clusters of wealthy households in the center and poor migrants in the outskirts. However, most neighborhoods contained a mix of socioeconomically different groups. After 1980, with increased exposure to the global economy and rapid urbanization, the amount of income inequality—as reflected by levels of residential segregation among different socioeconomic groups—dramatically increased, reaching levels higher than in most U.S. cities, despite being ruled by a government that designates socialism as its official economic policy and ideology. And it was in the largest and most globally connected cities in China that the degree of residential wealth segregation became most pronounced.35 2. Twelve Major European Cities (including London, Madrid, ­Athens, etc.): Socioeconomic segregation consistently increased in almost all of these cities, to varying degrees. It sometimes entailed greater separation between the highest groups and the rest of the city; it sometimes entailed the greater separation of the bottom group; and it sometimes entailed both the top and bottom groups’ greater separation.36 In Stockholm, for example, wealthy groups became more likely to live in one of the city’s exclusive postcodes 83

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(i.e.,  neighborhoods) characterized by homogeneously wealthy households while the poorest segments were similarly concentrated in separated ghettos.37 While the overall level of segregation was lower in Stockholm than in some other major European cities, it nevertheless had increased more than in the less globally connected cities in Sweden. And London, the most globalized city (i.e., the city with the highest global connectivity) in the larger European sample was also the city with the highest amount of socioeconomic residential segregation. 3. United States: In both large and moderate sized cities, after 1970, the share of the population living in the poorest and most affluent neighborhoods more than doubled while the share of families living in middle income neighborhoods—once the nation’s most prevalent type—declined from 65% to 44%.38 And the greatest degrees of residential segregation, as previously noted, tended to occur in the nation’s leading global cities (New York, Chicago, and others, as noted in Chapter 2). INEQUALITY AND GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS

The correlation between the global connectedness (GC) of a city and its degree of income inequality or income-based residential segregation is, as we have noted, modified by several other variables. The most important of these extrinsic factors include the city’s racial-­ethnic composition, its tax structure, and housing programs. As a result, the overall or cross-national correlation between inequality in a city and its GC that is obtained by studies is far less than perfect. The reported relationships have been in the expected direction (i.e., more of one associated with more of the other) and statistically significant, but not robust. From an examination of the studies, it appears that very high degrees of GC are consistently associated with very high degrees of inequality or segregation; however, in cities with moderate to low degrees of GC, inequality does not follow a consistent pattern. To illustrate, in a study of 12 capital cities in Europe, the city with the highest degree of GC (London) was found also be the city with the highest degree of income inequality. Among cities that were lower in GC, Gini indexes only sometimes varied consistently.39 Similarly in the United States, cities with very high GC (e.g., New York and Chicago) also scored very highly on measures of income inequality or residential segregation; but more-or-less direct correspondence between GC and inequality did not occur lower in the hierarchy.40 84

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Increasing inequality within nations and cities has resulted in economic stratification taking more and more of an hourglass shape: expanding at the top and bottom while the middle has constricted. With respect to residential segregation within cities, the effect has been to reduce both the size and the relative affluence of middle-class neighborhoods at the same time that upper status neighborhoods were increasing in affluence and lower status neighborhoods were becoming both larger and poorer. In the United States, for example, in almost every medium- and largesized metropolitan area, the proportion of the population living either in areas of affluence or poverty increased while those in the ­middle declined in relative size. Specific figures are presented in Table 3.4.41 Note that the percentage living in affluent neighborhoods doubled and the percentage living in neighborhoods of overwhelming poverty more than doubled. And while middle class residential areas were still a majority, they were declining in number. Examinations of residential areas in London have indicated similar patterns. In an interesting study, two urban geographers, Mark ­Davidson and Elvin Wyly, developed a list of 50 variables that could describe ­characteristics of London’s residents: their type of employment, level of education, ethnicity, and so on. Then they analyzed these variables to find out which clustered together. The results of this analysis produced bundles of inter-related variables, which they used to describe a number of distinct types of neighborhoods. Then they examined the ­geographical distribution of these neighborhoods. Of most relevance to us were 1. a number of East End neighborhoods in which residents had limited education, high unemployment, large families, and high welfare dependence. They also tended to be comprised largely of ­ethnic-racial minority groups. And 2. a number of West End neighborhoods, which contained a large number of professionals, often employed in finance, predominantly white, university educated, and frequently unmarried. Overlap of the two extreme groups within any of London’s neighborhoods was minimal.42 Table 3.4  Residential changes in U.S. cities

Residential Area

% in 1970

% in 2009

Affluent Middle or Mixed Poverty

 7 85  8

14 67 19


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As inequality has led to residential segregation in cities around the world, more affluent families have frequently reinforced their separation from less affluent segments by installing gates and guard houses, hiring private security firms, and so on. Consider, as an example, the city of Beijing where stratification during the 1990s began to take on the familiar hourglass shape. These changes in wealth (and associated ethnic diversity) led to dramatic increases in proprietary communities with gardens, club houses, and sporting facilities whose cost limited them to well-to-do residents. Most of these amenity-rich residential developments were large, high-rise, privately managed, and gated communities with visible security guards. Two-thirds of the proprietary communities built in Beijing after 2000 did not allow free passage to nonresidents.43 In addition to gates and guards to maintain the separation of their neighborhoods, the affluent have frequently sought to minimize interclass contact away from their homes by dining in restricted clubs, sending their children to private schools, and flying in helicopters above crowded highways. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, over one million people live in gated communities with electrified fences and very large, private security forces. Many of the most well-off executives, with offices in the city, rely on helicopters to avoid contact not only for commuting to their high-rise offices, but also for traveling to their beach homes and even to religious services. At any time of the day, the wealthy elite are in hundreds of privately owned helicopters flying above beggars and street gangs and the buses and cars filled with Sao Paulo’s low-income residents that jam the city’s expressways. Those who do not own their own helicopter can hail one for a ride, like Uber or a conventional taxi.44 The physical separation of different income groups is only part of the story, though. In addition, based upon observational studies, there also appears to have been a widespread decline in interactions between persons from different income group in cities’ shared public spaces, such as parks. Dissimilar income groups are described as carving out their own spaces in different sections of these parks.45 Further, even when people from varying income groups lived in the same neighborhood, there was a tendency for them to further separate themselves from others who they viewed as being lower in socioeconomic status. In gentrified neighborhoods in New York City, status differentiation occurs in a variety of often subtle ways. Within neighborhood associations, such as food cooperatives, higher status members seek out others whose behavior signifies their commensurate high status.46 They also


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forge informal associations in order to maintain social distance from others who they perceive as lower in status. An interesting illustration of how upper status parents control the social circles of their young children is presented in Box 3.2.

BOX 3.2 PLAYDATES IN NEW YORK CITY In New York City, as in London and Tokyo and many other large, densely populated cities, there is a substantial degree of residential segregation, based upon income and wealth. A certain amount of “lumping together” also tends to occur because of wide-spread gentrification: run-down areas are redeveloped, and often become home to very wealthy residents, but some vestiges of the former, less advantaged population remain. In addition, in cities like New York, areas immediately adjacent to each other can be socioeconomically extremely different from each other resulting in specific streets that house economically very diverse families and individuals. Within these small diverse spaces, or sub-areas, differentiation based upon income and wealth tends to occur so there is further segregation within cities that are already highly segregated. In other words, there is both macro and micro level segregation. One micro process that produces economic differentiation and exclusion within small areas is the “playdate.” As described by sociologist Tamara Mose, the playdate is found in several of New York City’s wealthiest areas.47 It involves a parent, usually a mother, arranging a get-together for her pre-school child and one to three other similarly aged children. These dates require a lot of preparation, beginning with the selection of a site. Desirable alternatives include specialized (and very expensive) play facilities, highly fashionable restaurants, and private residences (that have to be made presentable for the occasion). Unlike spontaneous play among neighborhood children, the playdate is formally arranged by a parent and if a participating parent feels another child is an “appropriate” playmate, a follow-up may be arranged by an exchange of “contact cards” (resembling adults business cards) between three- or fouryear old children. Parental decisions about which children are appropriate playmates for their child are largely based, according to Mose, on characteristics related to socioeconomic class. (Race is also involved, as playdates tend to occur only among white children.) Parents rely upon lots of status clues, such as where the other parent selects as a place to meet. A fast food restaurant, for


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example, would convey that the family was not the right sort. How the other child is dressed is also important. Parents are sure to notice whether the child’s sneakers are the latest style. What kind of snacks the mother brings for her child is an important consideration; a health food product is best. The type of toys a child brings to play with is also evaluated; for example, wooden toys are considered better than plastic. As a result of these multiple evaluations, some children will be judged to be from the “right” families, and they will be popular with the wealthy parents in an area. Other children, whose status clues suggested they were from the “wrong” families, will be largely left out. In sum, even within neighborhoods that appear from the outside to be highly diverse, sorting processes are occurring. Families that consider themselves to be of higher status than their neighbors often use the playdate to carve out an exclusive clique for their children that does not depend upon economic segregation within the neighborhood.


Areas of concentrated poverty are found in almost every city in the world. In such areas, it is commonplace for most of the residents also to share a distinctive race, ethnicity, or religion that sets their community apart. Areas of this type, typically referred to as ghettos or enclaves, are discussed in Chapter 5. At this time, we will focus upon the inequality and physical and social separation of residents who live in a place where people share a uniformly low income, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or religion. While low-income and minority status of residents often go together, the isolation and disadvantages associated with low-income neighborhoods can be largely the same even when minority status is not an issue. For example, Stockbridge Village, a community outside of Liverpool, UK, is largely comprised of native whites, but it is uniformly poor and as isolated and beset by essentially the same set of problems that are associated with minority enclaves.48 These poor neighborhoods have historically been located near the center of cities that formerly were highly industrial. As factory work became automated and as production moved to nations where labor costs were cheaper, factories in these once highly industrial cities (such as ­London, Chicago, Paris, and so on) closed. Work opportunities for nearby residents who had been employed in the factories largely disappeared and the neighborhoods deteriorated: a lack of resources forced 88

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community centers to close, stores were shuttered, public spaces became dangerous, and people who could leave, did. Those who remained were uniformly poor. In cities in many nations, there has been an increase in income-based segregation over the past couple of decades. In U.S. cities, for example, high-poverty neighborhoods—typically defined by at least 40% of the residents being below poverty level—fluctuated during the 20th century, but increased substantially after 2000. The result: more neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty in metropolitan areas in the United States.49 Overall, European cities tend to be less segregated by income than U.S. cities, but studies report the same trend toward increasing geographical separation of poor neighborhoods in a number of major European cities.50 Another major change involved the increasing number of low-­ income areas in suburbs rather than in central cities. In some places, industries had been massed in suburban areas, but when the factories closed, it slowly resulted in neighborhood deterioration. To illustrate, several of the suburbs of Paris (“banlieues”), which lost the manufacturing jobs that had provided their economic core are now characterized by concentrated poverty and the same problems associated with such neighborhoods as when they are located in central cities.51 In particular, they tend to be cut off from jobs and amenities in other parts of the city. Despite the city-region’s extensive subway system, the closest commuter train into the center of Paris is typically at least a 20-minute bus ride away for residents of these areas. The highway encircling the city of Paris is known as “the Peripherique.” To enter or leave the suburbs is often described as, “crossing the Peripherique,” as though it were a frontier, and residents of the banlieues often joke that going into Paris requires a visa.52 In other places, as inner-city suburbs aged and more affluent residents moved out, property values began a long decline and the area attracted large numbers of economically marginal residents. Suburban neighborhoods marked by concentrated poverty have recently been increasing in many metropolitan areas of the United States.53 Similarly, in the largest British cities—which includes London, Glasgow, Manchester, and others—Bailey and Minton reported that between 2004 and 2016 lower income households were increasingly found in suburban areas where such concentrations had not previously existed. This demographic shift is often a result of displacement from gentrifying inner city areas (as discussed in Chapter 6). The implications for the people who are moving, the investigators note, can be difficult to ascertain. Will a suburban area with a growing community of low-income residents offer the same combination of social 89

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problems and poor public services historically associated with innercity locations? Or will the suburbs offer better quality schools and less air pollution?54 Associated with the growth of poor neighborhoods, regardless of where they are located, is separation from the larger city. They are geographically isolated by their own limited resources and by government programs and policies that separate them, either intentionally or as unintended consequences. A majority of people in many of these neighborhoods do not own their own automobiles so they are dependent upon those who do, or upon public transportation. However, the public transportation that could connect people in poor neighborhoods to other parts of the city—where jobs might be more plentiful and other ­amenities might be more available—tend to be very limited; and if available, often too expensive. The poor residents find themselves stranded as illustrated in Box 3.3.

BOX 3.3 PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN A GWINNET COUNTY The Background: Gwinnett County is a large, inner suburb of Atlanta. Although it is socially and economically integrated with the Atlanta metropolitan area, it is governed by its own board of commissioners and operates its own schools, transportation systems, police, etc. The neighborhoods in the county are very diverse, both racially and economically. While some are relatively affluent, there is concentrated poverty in others. For example, in some schools over 90% of the children qualify for free or reduced cost lunches. In these areas, many families live in public housing (which has long wait lists) or in extended stay motels (which are also home to drug dealers and prostitutes) or homeless shelters, or on the street. Places to work or shop are limited. The strip malls, which once housed grocery stores and hair solons, now have only pawn shops and check-cashing services. The above background provides the context in which to understand the presentation of Harriett Bradley to the Gwinnet County Board of Commissioners. She lived in one of the many extended stay motels that house people of limited means in the county and had no car. A Reverend, it took her up to three hours to get to church by bus, and because the public transportation did not operate on weekends, she had to depend upon friends who could drive her. She even had to rely upon a friend to pick her up after the Board meeting because the buses did not run that late.55


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Right before the Bond Commissioners’ board meeting ended, Reverend Bradley was granted a few minutes to speak. She wanted to explain that people in her neighborhood could not get jobs at the closest mall or local warehouses or the city’s airport because the bus schedules could not accommodate a work schedule. (The buses were often 45 minutes, or more, late.) Even to attend this meeting, she explained, they would have to take two long bus rides to get there, but could not take buses back home because the buses did not run late enough. She pleaded with the commissioners to increase funding so people could, at least, get to jobs. But she felt largely ignored, which she attributed to their lack of interest because the commissioners did not have to rely upon public transportation.

Many of the inequalities of opportunity faced by residents of poor areas involve institutional access—to high-quality education, health care, and so on—and these have been well documented, but they tell only part of the story. Another type of unequal access entails infrastructural exclusion. As defined by Deener, it refers to the spatial and material organization by which resources are differentially provided to the population that is reliant upon them.56 Obvious examples involve water and electricity. In addition, as modern, chain grocery stores were forced to close in poor urban neighborhoods, or as they avoided moving into newer low-income areas, it led to another type of unequal access in cities in China, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere. Looking at Philadelphia, beginning in the 1930s, for example, Deener writes that grocery chains took advantage of highway development, larger warehouses, and improved trucking and found that suburban locations were more profitable. Slowly, inner city supermarkets in formerly industrial and now impoverished neighborhoods were closed, turning the areas into “food deserts.” In the economically most advanced nations, public subsidies and regulations have assured that pipes and plumbing, roads and highways, and electrical power plants are accessible throughout a region or nation; but even though food distribution is as essential to human life as these other goods, it has not been part of a public infrastructure system. Left to the profit motive of private firms, access to groceries in inner cities, such as Philadelphia, became another form of urban inequality. In the Global South, in nations such as India and cities such as Delhi, the absence of grocery stores is hardly the poor residents’ major concern. In one slum with about 5,000 occupants in a dense settlement of one room dwellings, there is no access to toilets. Water and electricity


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are available only infrequently. Slums like this one in India are considered “zones of exception,” which permits the government to deny basic facilities to the residents, demolish housing virtually at will, and continuously scrutinize the lives of residents who are excluded from opportunities for middle class life in the city.57

GLOSSARY Dual Labor Market: A dichotomized labor force with one group of jobs offering large salaries and stability and a second group providing low wages and precarious employment. Gini Index: Measures the discrepancy between the actual income or wealth distribution and that which would be expected if there were no inequality. Index of Dissimilarity: Measures the percentage of people in one group who would have to move for the two groups being compared to have the same residential distributions. Percentile Share: The actual share of any entity’s income or wealth held by a specific percentage of the population. Wealth: The net value of people’s assets minus debts; it is cumulative as opposed to income, which is usually measured yearly. World Systems Theory: Divides nations into categories based upon their inter-relationships; a dominant set of core nations is viewed as exploiting peripheral nations.

CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER 18. Fourth world cities in the global economy: the case of Phnom Penh, Cambodia Gavin Shatkin Introduction to part four 34. World city formation on the Asia Pacific Rim: poverty, ‘everyday’ forms of civil society and environmental management Mike Douglass 37. The “right to the city”: institutional imperatives of a developmental state Susan Parnell, Edgar Pieterse 38. Global Cities vs. “global cities”: rethinking contemporary urbanism as public ecology Timothy W. Luke 92

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39. Prologue: “From Tahrir Square to Emaar Square: Cairo’s private road to a private city” Mohamed Elshahed 41. The right to the city David Harvey 42. Urban social movements in an era of globalization Margit Mayer 43. São Paulo: the city and its protest Teresa Caldeira 46. World cities and union renewal Steven Tufts 47. Blockupy fights back: global city formation in Frankfurt am Main after the financial crisis Sebastian Schipper, Lucas Pohl, Tino Petzold, Daniel Mullis, Bernd Belina 54. Graffiti or street art? Negotiating the moral geographies of the creative city Cameron McAuliffe 57. Prologue: “World city” Doreen Massey 64. What is urban about critical urban theory? Ananya Roy

NOTES 1 During the past 40 years, Manuel Castells has written a number of important papers describing this aspect of contemporary cities. See, especially, ­Chapters  4 and 7 in Ida Susser (Ed), The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory. Wiley-Blackwell, 2002. 2 John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff, “World City Formation.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 6, 1982. 3 For a review of these studies, see Christina Starmans, Mark Sheskin and Paul Bloom, “Why People Prefer Unequal Societies.” Nature Human Behavior, 1, 2017. 4 For a review and analysis, see Magaly Sanchez R., “Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 635, May 2011. 5 The relationship between satisfaction and inequality has been debated in the literature, and findings depend on how deviations within the distributions are measured. The recent finding that inequality leads to decreased satisfaction has strong methodological support and seems intuitively compelling. See Jan Delhy and Ulrich Kohler, “Is Happiness Inequality Immune to Income ­Inequality?” Social Science Research, 40, 2011. 6 David W. Brady, “Globalization and Political Instability.” The American Interest, March 8, 2016.


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 7 A collection of world systems research on inequality is presented in, Immanuel Wallerstein, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Christian Slater (Eds), Overcoming Global Inequalities. Paradigm Publishers, 2015.  8 Matthew C. Mahutga, Anthony Roberts and Ronald Kwon, “The Globalization of Production and Income Inequality in Rich Democracies.” Social Forces, 96, 2017. This study focuses upon the Global North and South, which are not identical to the core and periphery, but there is substantial overlap.  9 See “The World According to GaWC 2016.” Loughborough University, March 31, 2017. 10 Alden Wicker, “Fast Fashion is Creating an Environmental Crisis.” Newsweek, September 9, 2016. 11 Eric Bellman, “Fashion Feeds a Recycling Network.” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2016, p. B1. 12 For further discussion, see Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy. Sage, 2011. (Sassen was one of the founders of GaWC.) 13 An overview of the theories and methods associated with different disciplines in the study of inequality is provided by David B. Grusky and Jasmine Hill, Inequality in the 21st Century. Westview Press, 2017. 14 Mariko Lin Chang, Shortchanged. Oxford University Press, 2010. 15 See, for example, Michael T. Owyang and Hannah Shell, “Measuring Trends in Income Inequality.” The Regional Economist, April, 2016. 16 See Gosta Esping-Andersen, “Sociological Explanations of Changing Income Distributions.” American Behavioral Scientist, 50, 2007, and Peter Gottschalk, Bjorn A. Gustaffson and Edward E. Palmer (Eds), Changing Patterns in the Distribution of Economic Welfare. Cambridge University Press, 2010. 17 See, for example, United Nations, Human Development Reports, 2016. 18 Data for 2014 from, CIA World Factbook, 2015. 19 See Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, “Income Inequality and Income Segregation.” American Journal of Sociology, 116, 2011. However, methodologically, isolating the effects of specific variables upon spatial segregation is complex and difficult. See the essays in, Christopher D. Lloyd, Ian Shuttleworth and David K. Wong, Social-Spatial Segregation. Policy Press, 2015. 20 The dissimilarity index was first presented in the 1950s, and in ensuing years there have been a number of modifications resulting in other Indexes that while distinct, are closely related to the original. For further discussion, see Chris Taylor, Stephen Gorard, and John Fitz, “A Re-examination of Segregation ­Indices.” Social Research Update, Autumn, 2000. 21 OECD, “Income Inequality.” OECD, Paris, 2011. 22 See “LAC Equity Lab.” The World Bank, 2016, lac-equity-lab1. 23 Comparative data on inequality are presented in Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa and Elsa Orgiazzi, “Factor Components of Inequality.” Halshs, 2, 2013. 24 See Nina Bandelj and Matthew Mahutga, “How Socio-Economic Change Shapes Income Inequality.” Social Forces, 88, 2010. 25 Owyang and Shell, op.cit. 26 Alexandra Killewald, Fabian T. Pfeffer and Jared N. Schachner, “Wealth ­Inequality and Accumulation.” Annual Review of Sociology, 43, 2017. 94

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27 See papers on the specific nations included in, Ravi Kanbur, Changyong Rhee, and Juzhong Zhuang (Eds), Inequality in Asia and the Pacific. Routledge, 2014. 28 Alicia Barcena and Winnie Byanyiuma, “Latin America is the World’s Most Unequal Region.” World Economic Forum, Davos, January, 2017. 29 For an analysis of formerly socialist nations, see Nina Bandelj and Matthew C. Mahutga, “How Socio-Economic Change Shapes Income Inequality in Post-­ Socialist Europe.” Social Forces, 88, 2010. 30 For a comparison of the transformation in Sweden to that of other economically advanced, democratic nations, see Gregg M. Olson, Power and Inequality. Oxford University Press, 2010. 31 Figures from Guy Palmer, The Poverty Site, April 22, 2011. 32 For further discussion of Japan, see Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality. Harvard University Press, 2015. 33 Sam Roberts, “Income Data Shows (sic) Widening Gap.” The New York Times, May 21, 2012, p. A19. 34 This finding has been reported in studies that compared U.S. cities, and studies that have compared cities in the United States to cities in France. Lincoln Quillian and Hugues Lagrange, “Socio-Economic Segregation in Large Cities in France and the United States.” Demography, 53, 2016. 35 For a review of increasing socioeconomic segregation in China’s 20 largest cities, see Paavo Monkonen, Andre Comandon, and Jiren Zhu, “Economic Segregation in Transition China.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016. 36 Sako Musterd, et al., “Socioeconomic Segregation in European Capital Cities.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016. 37 Roger Anderson and Lina Hedman, “Economic Decline and Residential Segregation.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016, and Tiit Tammaru, et al., “Relations between Residential and Workplace Segregation.” Cities, 59, 2016. 38 Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, “Income Inequality and Income Segregation.” American Journal of Sociology, 116, 2011. 39 Musterd, et al., op.cit. 40 For further data on U.S. cities, see Alan Berube, “All Cities Are Not Created Unequal.” Brookings, February 20, 2014. 41 Data from, Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, “Growth in the Residential Segregation of Families by Income, 1970 to 2009.” U.S. 2010 Project Report, November 2011. 42 Mark Davidson and Elvin Wyly, “Class-ifying London.” City, 16, 2012. 43 Luigi Tomba, “Gating Urban Spaces in China.” In Samer Bagaeen and Ola Uduku (Eds), Gated Communities. EarthScan, 2010. For an analysis of gated communities in many other cities throughout the world, see the ­chapters  in  Samer Bagaeen and Ola Uduku, Beyond Gated Communities. ­Routledge, 2015. 44 Paula Ramon, “Want to Escape Sao Paulo’s Traffic?” PhysOrg, July 19, 2017. 45 Alexander J. Reichi, “The High Line and the Ideal of Democratic Public Space.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016. 46 Lidia K.C. Manzo, “Naked Elites.” Urban Geography, 38, 2017. 47 Tamara Mose, The Playdate. New York University, 2016. 95

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48 “A New Kind of Ghetto.” The Economist, November 9, 2013. 49 See the review in, John Iceland and Erik Hernandez, “Understanding Trends in Concentrated Poverty.” Social Science Research, 62, 2017. 50 See, for example, Musterd, et al., op.cit. 51 See, for example, Loic Wacquant, Urban Outcasts. Polity, 2007. 52 George Packer, “The Other France.” The New Yorker, August 31, 2015. 53 Elizabeth Kneebone and Alan Berube, Confronting Suburban Poverty in America. Brookings Institute, 2014. 54 Nick Bailey and Jon Minton, “The Suburbanization of Poverty in British ­Cities, 2004–2016.” Urban Geography, 38, 2017. 55 This description is taken from, “Suburbs and the New American Poverty.” The Atlantic, January 7, 2015. 56 Andre Deener, “The Origins of the Food Desert.” Social Forces, 95, 2017. 57 For further discussion of how life in such a slum removes opportunities for f­amily intimacy and encourages violence, see Ayona Datta, “The Intimate City.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016.



Global emigres In addition to a worldwide flow of capital, organizations, ideas, and values, one distinguishing feature of globalization involves the extensive movement of people—temporarily as tourists, students, and guest workers, and more permanently as resettling migrants. It is a world in motion, and the movement of people to and among the major world cities is especially pronounced, despite the risks that many face in traveling and the hostile receptions they may face after their arrival. This chapter will focus in detail on the patterns of movement that are characteristics of migrants, and the way many of them tend to assimilate partially and selectively rather than in totality, as previously implied by the once popular melting pot theory. The chapter that follows explores the types of communities into which migrants settle in the destination nations.

MIGRANTS AND THEIR ROUTES By 2015, almost 250 million people were living in a nation other than the one into which they were born and had been residing in the new nation for more than one year—fitting the definition frequently used of an international migrant. The United States has been the destination of the single largest number of migrants, followed in order by Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom. In terms of origins, Asia has been the 97


Table 4.1  International migrants in major cities


International Migrants As % of Population

Miami (United States) London (United Kingdom) Los Angeles (United States) New York (United States) Munich (Germany) Paris (France)

39 37 35 31 27 25

leading region followed by Europe. The migrants were 52% male and their median age was 39 years.1 For most of the past 100 years, or so, a distinguishing characteristic of international migrants has been their preference for relocating to major urban areas, regardless of the type of area in which they lived before moving. As a result, these international migrants now comprise a substantial percentage of the population of the major cities in the destination nations. To illustrate, Table 4.1 displays their share of the population in major cities in some of the leading destination nations.2 From interviews with migrants, Nina Glick Schiller has concluded that they share a multidimensional ranking of cities. The migrants’ rankings placed some emphasis upon a city’s economic opportunities, but it was only one of the criteria they typically considered. This social anthropologist, who has extensively studied migrants, contends that their families and friends shared a hierarchy that rated cities according to their cultural diversity and openness, and the likelihood of migrants encountering political surveillance—in addition to the cities’ economic reputations.3 These cities have been described as providing ­multiculturalism as a “lived reality.” The dynamic institutions of these cities are open to diversity and are highly accommodating. While many of the people in certain racial or ethnic groups live in relatively homogeneous settlements, their communities are not closed to mainstream culture or to each other. At the top of the migrants’ ratings, according to Schiller, were the leading (Western) global cities: London, New York, Paris, and Toronto. They were followed by a number of other Western cities that migrants also believed rated highly on the economic, political, and cultural criteria. Included here were Dallas, Frankfurt, and other cities that were generally included in the second and third tiers of global cities in the rankings presented in Chapter 2. It is interesting to note how global city rankings based upon objective indicators, such as headquarters of multinational corporations (MNCs), and the subjective rankings, based upon cities’ reputations among immigrants, closely reproduce each other. 98


A number of Asian nations, and the major cities in those nations, have been the major exceptions to the overall migration trends. Their difference in this regard is largely a reflection of xenophobia, the tendency to dislike foreigners. Japan is a primary example. For years that nation has made it difficult for outsiders to enter the country, and multiple forms of discrimination have discouraged potential emigrants. However, Japan has an aged native population and a low birth rate; and as a result of this demographic combination, the nation has periodically felt forced to accept migrants as a solution to labor shortages. These have usually been short-term exceptions and subject to reversal. Between 2003 and 2006, for example, Japan recruited thousands of persons of Japanese descent who had been living in Brazil to fill positions in the nation’s manufacturing sector, which was then experiencing severe labor shortages. A few years later, though, there was a global recession leading to a decline in the demand for Japanese products. The labor shortage largely disappeared, and the industrial sector began to lay off workers. Japan then completely reversed its previous actions and in 2008 extended a different offer to the hundreds of thousands of former Brazilians: the government agreed to pay the full costs for them to go back in return for their agreement never to reapply for a work visa in Japan. It would not make sense, a government official explained, to pay them thousands of dollars to induce them to leave only to have them later try to come back.4 In 2012, with an improved economy, Japan faced a new labor shortage and again reversed course. Correspondingly, between 2012 and 2016 Japan admitted 400,000 migrants to its labor force, almost doubling the percentage of the labor force that was foreign born. A large percentage of the migrants took jobs in Tokyo, working at low-end service and retail positions: restaurant kitchen workers, convenience store clerks, etc. Although post-2016 Japan continued to make it difficult for foreign workers to remain permanently in the country, Japanese firms in need of workers continued to recruit migrants, mostly from other Asian nations.5 As we have described, major cities have historically been the leading destination for international migrants, and that continues; but in the past couple of decades, there has also been an increase in migration into smaller cities and towns. In most respects, the composition of the migrant streams are similar, despite the different destinations. For further description of migration into small towns, see Box 4.3, later in this chapter. With respect to the composition of international migrants, the percentage of women has remained fairly constant at slightly lower than 50%. Some of them have left native countries to escape various forms of gender-based oppression, and some were part of a large illegal trafficking in women, discussed later in this chapter. However, the percentage 99


of women who were secondary migrants—that is, who moved following a male migrant to reunify their family—has dramatically declined. In recent years, a growing percentage of women have been primary migrants, initiating a family move and their husbands (and other family members) later followed them.6 Similar to their male counterparts, work opportunities provided a major impetus to the women’s decisions to initiate a family relocation. An interesting illustration is provided by a large group of female nurses from Kerala, India, who moved to the United States, found jobs, and were subsequently joined by their husbands and other family members. This reversal of traditional gender roles in migration was accompanied by numerous changes in men’s household roles after the families were reunited. Specifically, the men were more involved in childcare, cooking, and other tasks traditionally considered in India to be in the woman’s domain.7

UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS The persons who either enter or remain in nations illegally are referred to as undocumented, or unauthorized, because they lack the legal paperwork. What different nations mean by undocumented foreigners varies greatly, however. In Germany, for example, many persons designated as undocumented initially entered the country legally, as temporary guest workers or tourists from Eastern Europe. They subsequently found work in agriculture, construction, or personal services, and remained in Germany to work, but without appropriate authorization. Spain, to illustrate further, has readily provided nine-month work visas to people wishing to emigrate from North Africa; but these visas could only be renewed 12 months after they were initially issued. In consequence, there was a three-month in-between period in which thousands of migrants slipped into undocumented status.8 Changes in nations’ laws governing migration have also trapped thousands of people in a limbo status within a nation that was not their ultimately desired location. During 2015 and 2016, for example, over 60,000 refugees fled war torn Syria and Iraq, and made it to Greece or Turkey. Other European nations, which were the migrants’ planned destinations, had pledged to take in many of them, but then these nations (Austria, Denmark, and others) changed their minds. As a result, tens of thousands of migrants remained trapped for years in what were meant to be temporary refugee camps.9 Because of cross-national variations in immigration laws and visa policies, it is very difficult to compare nations and not very ­meaningful to combine different nations into a world total. Figures for the United States 100


are relatively reliable, however, and may provide a basis for generalizing to other favored immigrant destinations. Data for the United States have been obtained by subtracting the number of foreign-born people in the population who were documented (i.e., legal residents) from the total foreign born included in the U.S. Census. This technique, developed by demographer Jeffrey Passel, has led to estimates of between 11 and 12 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States around 2010, comprising about 30% of the total foreign-born population.10 Many would-be immigrants are also apprehended, either en route or when they arrive at their destination. This usually entails being held in prisonlike conditions. In the Australian outback, for example, there are several camps used to detain and eventually deport thousands of refugees who continuously try, unsuccessfully, to enter the country. One such center had been shut down in 2002 because its facilities were very inadequate and it was accused of neglecting and abusing detainees. However, it was reopened in 2010 to help accommodate a new surge of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and P ­ akistan trying to enter the country by boat, even though the Australian government imposed a moratorium on even processing applications. Designed to hold a maximum of 300 people, by 2011 it held more than 1,500 p­ eople in huts and tents, surrounded by an electrified fence. One guard at the center described the compound as resembling “a ­free-range chicken farm.”11 The situation of thousands of migrants who had hoped to reach France and finally did, but did not find the conditions they expected, is described in Box 4.1.

BOX 4.1  MIGRANTS IN PARIS TENT CAMPS One very extensive migrant stream landed in France after leaving ­Afghanistan and a number of North African countries. Another stream initially landed in Italy or Spain and then arrived in France. Between 2015 and 2016, a large ­percentage of all of these migrants were initially housed in the ­Mediterranean port city of Calais. It was meant to be a small, temporary encampment, with portable toilets, but thousands of migrants were packed into the camp whose primitive and crowded living conditions led to it being known as, “the jungle.” French officials routinely tried to evict some of the thousands of migrants in the encampment, and others snuck out, trying to escape from the ­jungle, hoping to find better living conditions and opportunities elsewhere. On some



days, as many as 600 migrants were estimated to have left Calais, and about 100 of them typically made their way into Paris. After they reached the city they hoped, without much basis in fact, to find meaningful work and eventually obtain asylum. And if that did not work out, from Paris they thought they would be able to cross the channel into the United Kingdom. The migrant stream that initially felt fortunate to reach Paris, found few accommodations waiting for them. It was not until the end of 2016, about one year after the movement out of Calais began, that the city opened the first shelter for migrants. It only provided about 400 beds, though. To find some shelter, the migrants bunched under subway overpasses or put up pup tents on the sidewalks alongside of Paris boulevards. The native Parisians mostly tried just to ignore the forlorn looking people living on the sidewalks, hurrying by and “holding their noses against the reek of urine.”12 In response to complaints or reports of criminal activities, riot police regularly cleared the migrants, arresting or expelling a few of them but many, with nowhere else to go, soon returned.

A large percentage of the undocumented migrants leave economically depressed nations where there are high rates of poverty and unemployment (as well as illiteracy and malnutrition). These countries are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. The most attractive destinations for them are the leading global cities in the ­economically most advanced nations in Europe, Australia, and North America. However, in many instances, these would-be economic refugees face serious obstacles. The economically advanced nations often offer very few work visas, especially relative to the demand for them. This means that many would-be immigrants cannot just pack their belongings and buy a plane ticket. They have to sneak across borders or put themselves in the hands of traffickers who promise to resettle them, albeit illegally. Such travel is almost always difficult and dangerous and almost every day there are news accounts of immigrants drowning when their boats sink, suffocating in the back of unventilated rail cars, and so on. A continuing stream of migrants from the village of Senya Beraku in Ghana, West Africa, to the outskirts of Naples, Italy, illustrates the ­serious risks that desperate migrants are willing to take. Because of its proximity to many economically depressed nations in Southern Europe and North Africa, Italy receives thousands of immigrants, some of whom find a permanent home in Italy and others who regard Italy as an initial stop, and then hope to work their way westward, eventually reaching larger Western European cities, such as Paris, Berlin, and London. 102


Fishing in small boats and then selling their catch locally was the means by which most people in the village traditionally supported themselves. It was not a wealthy village, but people got by. Then, around 2000, Spain and several other European nations acquired fishing rights off the Ghana coast. Their industrial trawlers were much more efficient than anything the villagers had, and as they scooped up large catches the fish began to disappear. The villagers became desperate, and finally began to think they might have to go somewhere with better opportunities. The declining fish population was typical of the type of environmental factors that can lead to migration. In other places and other times, the precipitating “push” variable has been sustained draughts, natural disasters, such as floods, and so on. There is usually some interaction between environmental changes and personal and household characteristics that lead some of the affected people to migrate and some to stay.13 In this case, it was the younger adults who initially decided to leave. Everyone in Senya Beraku had heard stories about former villagers who had been able to secure good jobs around Naples, Italy, and that became their destination. There was a migrating chain from the village to Naples that e­ ventually involved hundreds of people. They risked an ­extraordinarily dangerous two-part journey. The first entailed crossing the Sahara Desert, and avoiding the Libyan police and others who preyed on the migrants. Those who were successful in the first part, then had to find a trafficker who would take them across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. For most this meant attempting a crossing in makeshift boats that were packed well beyond their capacity.14 At the port in Tripoli, Libya, at any given time in 2016 and 2017, there were thousands of migrants from across Africa hoping to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. People from Senya Beraku were just one small part of the total. As a result, the sea was full of small vessels that were trying to smuggle people into Italy. This crossing became the world’s deadliest migration route. The sea was patrolled by the Italian Coast Guard and international aid agencies, such as Doctors Without Borders, and they were credited with saving hundreds of thousands of migrants who would otherwise have died in the crossing. They were typically overwhelmed, though. In a single day, rescue vessels pulled more than 1,400 would-be migrants from the Mediterranean. In the typical boat carrying migrants, there may have been more than 400 p­ eople stuffed into a rickety 40-foot wooden boat. The choppy seas would have made the crossing difficult in a boat that was far less over-stuffed and in better condition. However, their chances were better than those migrants who tried to cross in a rubber raft. The crews trying to rescue them were kept very busy, as described in Box 4.2. 103


BOX 4.2  WHO TO SAVE? Before dawn on a typical day, volunteers assigned to a vessel from a nonprofit rescue organization are awakened by screams for help. The lead paramedic shouts an alert, and a crew that is tired from all-night rescues scrambles to the deck. They pull frightened, cold, and often ill migrants up a collapsible ladder into the rescue ship and evaluate their medical needs. Once all are on-board the crew sets fire to the wooden boat or slashes the rubber raft so that a smuggler will not be able to use it again. Smugglers entice desperate people to make the crossing for a fee of €3,000–4,000 (about $3,500). They play down the risk, sometimes claiming that the lights visible from the Libyan shore are from the European mainland. It makes the trip look short and easy, but the lights are actually from offshore oil facilities. Some of the trafficked crossings are successful, but many of the boats and rafts sink and those migrants not fortunate enough to be rescued drown even when these rickety boats and rafts do not sink, the migrants are stuffed into such crowded conditions along with their vomit, urine, and feces, that they often become deadly ill.15 Overwhelmed rescuers routinely face difficult decisions. One typical day, the physician on a rescue vessel received a call from the Italian Coast Guard, informing him that they were aware of a deflating rubber dinghy, packed with migrants, and slowly sinking. They sent the dinghy’s coordinates. However, at almost exactly the same time, the rescuers were told that a lone West African man had been pulled out of the sea by a passing vessel; but the man was unconscious, experiencing convulsions, and would likely die without immediate aid. Given that the emergencies were in different directions, the rescuers had to make a choice. After some anguish, they concluded that the sick man would surely die if they did not help him and—perhaps—another passing ship would save those on the sinking dinghy. They raced to where the man was near death and gave him immediate attention, but he was unresponsive. With some difficulty, they arranged for his evacuation to a mainland hospital, but shortly afterward learned that he died in the ambulance. A couple of days later, the rescuers got back to where the dinghy had been sinking and found only an empty rubber boat poking above the surface. The personnel on the rescue ship stared in silence.16

As a post-script, we note that the migrants from Ghana and elsewhere who do make it to Naples, or other parts of Italy, very often fare no better than the migrants from Calais to Paris, described in Box 4.1. The Italians living nearby have frequently treated them with overt hostility, 104


throwing rocks and eggs at them. Because they are undocumented, the migrants have usually been reluctant to report incidents, and when they have, government officials have usually been unresponsive.17 CHANGING ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS

While migration from poor nations to the major cities of wealthy nations remains a very significant pattern, in recent years there has also been a growing migrant stream emigrating from economically ­middle-level nations, such as India and Mexico. Further, within these origin nations it is frequently persons of relatively higher status who have been the first to migrate; and they have been the ones who benefit the most.18 This general tendency for those who start out with the most to wind up gaining the most—in any situation or context—has been termed “the Matthew effect.” Sociologist Robert K. Merton initially coined the phrase, following the biblical verse in the Gospel of Matthew.19 In recent years, there have also been two other trends that have become more notable. The first entails a growing tendency for the same economically middle-level nations that have more frequently become places of origin to also be more sizable places of migrant destination. For example, this dual role recently characterizes such nations as Brazil and India. The second trend involves a growing tendency for smaller cities and towns in destination nations to become the places in which migrants settle. The major cities, as previously noted, remain the ­dominant ­destinations, but smaller cities and towns have been ­attracting a growing number of emigres. This pattern has recently been occurring in both Europe and the United States, and is illustrated by the case study in Box 4.3.

BOX 4.3  EMIGRES IN BEARDSTOWN Beardstown is a town with about 6,000 residents, located in a rural area of Illinois. During the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was home to a number of factories that provided blue-collar employment for the town’s almost all white, native born population. Among the largest industries was meatpacking, and it earned the town the nickname, “Porkopolis.” By the middle of the 20th century, however, many of the factories began to close, laid off people migrated out of the deteriorating town and many private homes, the town’s movie theater and bowling alley were all boarded up.



In 1987, Cargill, a large transnational processor of beef and pork, r­ eopened what had been a shuttered Oscar Mayer plant. The jobs on the factory floor at Cargill’s were dirty and extremely difficult and because of ­frequent ­accidents, very dangerous. Unable to attract natives to fill these undesirable positions, Cargill turned to Mexico and to a lesser extent, West Africa. The newcomers totally changed the face of Beardstown. Prior to 1990, it had only 32 black or Hispanic families. By 2010, the number exceeded 1,000. The aggressiveness of Cargill’s transnational recruitment was i­llustrated by the company’s efforts to recruit workers from a group of M ­ exican towns. The company placed signs advertising the availability of jobs in Beardstown and sent nurses into Mexico to conduct physical examinations. The n ­ ewcomers— from Mexico, but also Puerto Rico, West Africa, and elsewhere—did not receive warm receptions. They were ignored in stores and churches and physically threatened on the streets. However, they stayed because their former towns had nothing to offer, and their word of mouth led their relatives and friends to follow them. Many of the later migrants relied upon social networks to transition to new lives, and the migrants maintained these networks to access services that Cargill did not provide: returning home for medical treatment, sending young children back to ­family members for childcare, etc.20

GLOBAL CITY MIGRANT STREAMS Previous chapters have described how the labor force of global cities resembles an hourglass shape: wide at the top and bottom, pinched in at the middle. The flows of international migrants to these cities both reflect and reinforce the same globalization-related forces. One international flow involves professionals and executives moving into high-level positions in corporate service firms or offices of MNCs. What this group shares in common is a high level of formal education, with credentials that are universally recognized. They are specialized attorneys, finance and IT experts, etc. By moving across nations to offices of their MNCs, their career mobility is enhanced, and that is the primary motivation for their moves.21 However, a group of researchers contend that the above descriptions of the high-status migrants are based almost entirely upon their ­experience in major Western cities. Chinese megacities, namely B ­ eijing and Shanghai, have also attracted large numbers of highly educated migrants, but their overall living conditions have not been consistently desirable because in China access to many types of services and 106


opportunities is tied to a household registration (“hukou”) system. Some high-status migrants are excluded from this system, which tends to marginalize them and forces them into very crowded urban settlements described as “YiZu,” resembling a tribe of ants.22 Among the professionals who move to global cities, a substantial number fit the definition of exiles: persons who leave their nations of birth primarily for political or religious purposes.23 Many of these people were physicians, lawyers, architects, and the like in their homelands and remain strongly attached to their homelands culturally; however, they were forced to flee, or felt that an impending loss of freedoms made it impossible to stay. Such exiles often regard themselves as in diaspora, hold the culture of their new land at arm’s length, and retain a commitment to return home. By contrast, traditional immigrants usually consider a large degree of assimilation to be necessary because they could not earn comparable wages in their former homelands; hence they tend to regard their move as more permanent. A second global flow includes less skilled migrants seeking jobs in the low-end service sector. Within the origin nations, however, this does not typically involve the poorest segment because they tend to lack the requisite resources. Rather, it is people a step up from the bottom, who have experienced downward mobility. In studies of Brazil, for example, researchers report that emigres are from the “impoverished middle class”: people whose socioeconomic status declined, generating feelings of relative deprivation. Between roughly 1980 and 2010, when B ­ razil experienced an economic downturn that particularly impacted the lower middle class, nearly four million Brazilians became international migrants, moving to places that promised better opportunities. Some cleaned office buildings, and some worked as convenience store clerks. One very large migrant network involved Brazilian women moving to Boston where they cleaned the homes of affluent suburbanites, with earnings that exceeded what they could have made in Brazil, especially after the economic downturn.24 Particularly for women, dislocation often enmeshes them in a ­Southern-to-Northern Hemisphere and rural-to-global city migration into low-wage positions as nannies, maids, and so on. It is the proliferation of the high-end service sector that generates the demand for lowend service workers in private households. The professional work force, concentrated in global cities, commands large salaries; however, these professionals are also required to work long hours. A typical household contains two working professionals in an egalitarian relationship who are always at the brink in managing domestic chores. Sassen has described them as “the professional household without a ‘wife’” and notes, with a hint of irony, that the traditional wife as household manager is missing just when she would be needed most.25 The gap is filled by immigrant 107


women who comprise the serving class; cooking meals, doing laundry, and cleaning homes. Despite their importance, the low value placed on their work, and the abundant potential supply of both legal and illegal immigrants to fill these positions, has kept salaries low, making a large, economically marginal class of low-end service workers a defining characteristic of most global cities. CUMULATIVE CAUSATION

Although difference in wages between people’s place of origin and intended place of destination drives a great deal of international migration, there is also substantial evidence of cumulative causation: a tendency for international migration flows to sustain themselves.26 The first phase tends to involve migrants who are relatively better off people with more information. The second group of migrants tend to be less well-off, but they benefit from the knowledge and assistance of the first flow, reducing the costs of migration. Within a community of origin, information about a destination grows as more people emigrate. This information shapes the plans of people thinking about leaving and, over time, increases the likelihood that there will be additional emigration from this origin to the new destination. To illustrate, an analysis of ­villages in Fujian Province, China, found that the past prevalence of emigration to New York City from any village remained the best predictor of whether an individual would leave that village and relocate to New York City in the future—despite enormous efforts by the governments of both China and the United States to stop them.27 The flows can be self-perpetuating because, once established, migrant networks share information about jobs and housing, and there may be influential individuals in the migrant chain who offer counseling about immigration laws and provide financial assistance to those otherwise ready to move.28 An interesting example is provided by the large migratory chain from Governador Valadares, Brazil, to Boston. It began when a large group of pioneering women migrated and established home cleaning services. They later helped other women from the same town to make travel arrangements and then helped them to find jobs by introducing them as trusted friends to other suburban Boston homemakers with whom they had established relationships.29 Because of the efficacy of these migrant networks, some of those left behind can continue to be induced to join those who have already migrated, even if the income advantages that previously led people to move have disappeared. It is not yet clear, however, just where the upper limit to the effects of cumulative causation lies. A growing number of 108


immigrants from a specific nation or region to a specific city in another nation can eventually saturate the local job market, lead to increased rents, and generate a backlash against the newcomers. All of these effects make the city a less inviting destination for later migrants. As a case in point, Ivan Light has argued that around the turn of this century, Los Angeles reached a saturation point for immigrants from Mexico and Central America, making it more difficult for later arrivals to find jobs and housing and exposing them to local resentment of the growing number of poor Latinos. The self-perpetuating movement of Latinos to Los Angeles slowed and was redirected to other U.S. cities that had not previously attracted such immigrants.30 Because Light’s analysis focused solely on Los Angeles and involved only one particular migrant stream, however, it is not yet clear whether cumulative causation might typically be expected to run into an upper limit, or exactly where that upper limit might be found. When, for example, will the Naples area lose its attraction to desperate migrants from Ghana?

HUMAN TRAFFICKING Human trafficking involves the recruitment and transfer of people that entails coercion or deception, and in which the objective is to exploit the person being moved. Central to the definition is forced movement because all forms of forced labor do not entail trafficking. However, where flows of trafficking have been detected they have very frequently overlapped with key migration routes. An estimated 60% of trafficking victims are moved across national boundaries.31 Human trafficking subsumes a number of different types of victims and varying forms by which the migrants are exploited. There are, however, two principal types: 1. Forced labor in which after being moved, people are coerced into working for a legitimate business or a private residence. The victim may have been initially forced into employment, or entered ­voluntarily without realizing the conditions of employment or the fact that they would not be free to terminate the employment. If the victims of forced labor are paid at all, the wages are meager, there will be no benefits and they are coerced into continued servile employment. 2. Sex trafficking involves coercing the migrants into performing commercial sex acts (for live performances, adult videos, or the like) or engaging in prostitution. In most of these instances, the activities themselves are intrinsically illegal, but they otherwise resemble other forms of forced labor because of the coercive element.32 109


As previously noted, only a small percentage of people eager to migrate are able to obtain visas or afford the cost of relocating. But many people with few resources—from farmers in Mexico to fishermen in Ghana—face desperate situations. As a result, they are ready marks for traffickers looking for clients. The traffickers are known by different names in different parts of the world: as “snakeheads” to Chinese, as “coyotes” to Mexicans, and so on. Would-be migrants become the victims of these modern pirates when they enter into a “debt contract.” The smuggler makes the arrangements and the migrants agree to work off the debt when they arrive at the destination country. However, they are paid so little, if at all, that they cannot ever earn their freedom. Control over the people who are in debt bondage is maintained in a number of ways. Sometimes “escorts” oversee their activities 24 hours a day and resort to violence, when necessary. Keeping close tabs on victims is facilitated by the fact that they may not speak the local language, may have limited knowledge of their rights, and fear bringing themselves to the attention of authorities. In other cases, or in addition, the relocated victims fear that they or their families back home will be harmed if they try to escape. The threat can be overt, or take a variety of more subtle forms. For example, Nigerian women who are trafficked into Italy must leave samples of their hair or fingernails. These personal effects are mixed, by a voodoo woman, into a powder that is then subject to a ritual. The trafficked women believe they will be seized by madness or sudden death if they try to back out of their commitment.33 Some traffickers provide a package of services for would-be immigrants, including fake papers and expertise in eluding capture as well as basic transportation. These have been termed exporting schemes, and they are characterized by the fact that services end on the immigrants’ arrival at the agreed-on destination. The export smugglers tend to be freelance operators who move people temporarily and on a part-time basis. When the demand for passage out of a nation increases, the owners of boats or planes, mountain guides, and so on may be enticed into smuggling by the lure of quick money. To illustrate, one route from Southern Europe to Italy is via Vlore, Albania, and across the Ionian Sea. When economic conditions in Southern Europe deteriorate, the demand to migrate to Western Europe, via Italy, increases. Would-be immigrants go to Vlore and induce people who own speedboats normally used for fishing or for tourists to smuggle them across the sea. The migrants moved out in such exporting schemes typically have some financial resources, or they would not be able to pay the fees. Importing operations, by contrast, tend to involve very specialized criminal organizations with permanent, full-time staff, and they tend to have understandings with corrupt officials in the destination nations. 110


Even when governments are willing to get involved, criminal actions against traffickers are often difficult because of differences in laws between nations. Smuggling women from Albania to work as prostitutes in Copenhagen or Amsterdam, for example, is difficult to prosecute in Albania because, although prostitution is illegal in Albania, it is legal (however, controlled) in Denmark and the Netherlands.34 In further contrast to export smugglers, the importers’ clientele ­typically comes from the lowest socioeconomic strata, and their emigration often has a constrained element: they may be kidnaped, tricked, or coerced into leaving. One woman, who had been working as a prostitute in London, explained that her plight began in an Albanian village when she accepted an engagement ring from a man. It was only after he sealed her mouth with electrical tape and threatened to kill her family that she realized the man she thought was going to marry her was a trafficker. Similar to thousands of other women, she was thrown into a speedboat on the coast of Albania and taken to Italy by night, then moved across Europe to London. The prevalence of human trafficking is open to debate. On the one hand, there are global law enforcement data that suggest the problem is pervasive and growing. Between 2010 and 2016, the number of convictions for trafficking, worldwide, almost tripled to over 9,000, with over 65,000 victims identified.35 (While global migrants are a large percentage of the victims, these figures including all trafficking convictions.) While the number of convictions indicates that human trafficking is a serious social problem, they do not support the most strident claims, which have estimated the number of victims in the millions. In addition, surveys that have been conducted in a number of countries, asking respondents if any member of their family has been a victim, also lead to calculations of the prevalence of trafficking that are much lower than the millions estimated by some officials.36

IMMIGRANTS’ CONTRIBUTIONS: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY Across times and places, the reaction to immigrants, especially those from poorer nations, has typically been hostile, because of varying combinations of xenophobia and fear of competition for jobs or housing. Regardless of whether immigrants have crossed borders legally or illegally, many have been regarded negatively, viewed as outsiders, both at work and in the community, and subjected to verbal and physical abuse. Despite the widespread resentment of immigrants, the reality is that they routinely fill niches left vacant by natives. Across Spain, Portugal, 111


Italy, and Greece, migrant workers have been found to take positions that nonmigrants consider unacceptable because the jobs are degrading, dead end, dirty, difficult, or dangerous.37 In several of New York City’s neighborhoods, Caribbean immigrants drove cabs around the clock, providing transportation in communities that previously had none at night. They went where natives did not want to go and did work that natives did not want to do.38 In Japan, as previously noted, the nation’s aging population and low birth rates have made it difficult to fill many positions with natives. In response, Japan has established a foreign trainee program for which they have brought thousands of apprentices to Japanese cities every year. Most come from rural China or the Philippines, where there are few opportunities, and they are attracted by the potential for high salaries the program advertises for those who complete the apprenticeship. However, most continue for years to work long hours for little pay, and when they complain about the discrepancy between the advertisements that lured them and the reality of their situations, their supervisors tell them to quit complaining or go home. One worker from Manila recalled her Japanese manager telling her just to follow orders or “Swim back to the Philippines.”39 The niche-filling role of immigrants is further illustrated by thousands of laborers from sub-Saharan Africa who have been employed in leather tanneries in central Italy and steel mills in northern Italy. These industries, which have been of vital importance to Italy’s economy, have relied on an immigrant work force to fill almost all of the particularly unpleasant jobs because these positions are shunned by natives. Nevertheless, public hostility has marginalized these groups, and they have been condemned by government officials in the media. Some of these immigrants entered Italy legally, others did not, but that has made ­little difference, as all tend to see themselves as little more than socially excluded cheap labor.40 Immigrants typically have neither the legal protections nor political access available to natives. As a result, it is often impossible for them to translate the importance of the positions they fill into higher wages or better working conditions. In the San Francisco Bay area, for example, Zlolniski notes that Mexican immigrants, working as subcontracted janitors, have been indispensable to high-tech firms in the Silicon Valley because these jobs cannot be outsourced and natives have refused to take them. However, timidity due to fear of being deported and the steady stream of immigrants willing to take the jobs have combined to make it very difficult for them to improve their situation by bargaining with their employers.41



Not only does a nation’s economy benefit from the work that immigrant groups are prepared to do, but also their communities benefit as well as they make a life for themselves. They often move into areas that had been deserted or were in decline prior to their arrival—as ­illustrated by the Naples settlement of the people from Senya Beraku. Further illustration of the latter is provided by Millman’s analysis of how immigrants from Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana affected New York City neighborhoods. Prior to their arrival in the 1970s and 1980s, housing stock in several communities had deteriorated and commercial activities practically vanished. These immigrants renovated blighted housing and opened small businesses, and their children, striving to be successful, helped invigorate public schools in the city. It was not a coincidence, Millman wrote, that the period in which the United States had its most restrictive immigration policies—between 1945 and 1965— corresponded with the decades in which neighborhoods in its major cities most seriously deteriorated.42 Despite widespread evidence that indicates immigrants tend to move into vacated employment niches and deserted or deteriorated neighborhoods, natives tend to perceive that they are in competition with immigrants over employment and housing. In effect, they resent the newcomers taking jobs and dwellings, even if there are jobs and ­dwellings that no one else seemed to want before the immigrants arrived. When there are also racial differences between immigrants and natives, the mix can be especially volatile. In her study of large-scale incidents involving immigrant confrontations with natives or police in boroughs of London, Dancygier reported that hostile events were especially likely to be recorded when nonwhites moved into predominantly white areas that were economically deteriorated and offered limited housing and jobs.43 In many Western cities, these were former blue-collar, factory towns that were economically depressed after the factories closed. The final issue to be considered here focuses not on neighborhoods, but on the economic impact of immigrants on the entire nation into which they move. Does a large immigrant population adversely impact nations by requiring additional support, or does this group promote economic growth? One of the best assessments of this question was provided by sociologist Matthew Sanderson who examined the effects of cumulative in-migration on 122 nations’ living standards, as measured by GDP per capita. Overall, in this global sample, he found that it had a positive effect. Average income per person rose in response to in-­migration: the more, the better. He also found, however, that immigration’s effects did not seem to be uniformly beneficial. It had a small, negative effect on a group of nations in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Further



analysis disclosed that this negative effect was primarily the result of the high birth rates in this region. It was by contributing to this high fertility rate that in-migration further dissipated per-capita earnings in the region. However, this negative effect was regionally limited, and more importantly, it was conditional because when fertility rates were held constant, the negative effect of in-migration on per capita income disappeared.44 Other studies have also reported some negative consequences of in-migration for host countries, but the adverse reports again have tended to be small in magnitude and limited. In the United Kingdom, for example, some analyses have suggested that in-migration can have a negative effect upon the nation’s wages, but only in the short run. Similarly, research in the United States, focusing upon government budgets, has reported that first-generation migrants are more costly than natives, but by the second generation and beyond, immigrants’ economic ­contributions have a positive effect upon government budgets.45

ASSIMILATION: SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND ACCULTURATION Most studies of assimilation emphasize either changes in the social standing of members of a group—social integration—or their adaptation of a new way of life—acculturation. To be more specific, measures of social integration typically involve changes in socioeconomic status (notably, educational and occupational attainments) and/or changes in residential segregation. Acculturation is usually indicated by the degree to which the second (or a later) generation of the immigrant group speaks the language of the new nation, the rate with which they intermarry, and/ or whether they continue to maintain various group traditions, such as observing their holiday customs.46 However, the acculturation dimension of assimilation has been problematic at a conceptual level. It is often regarded, theoretically, as entailing newcomers’ adoption of the values, customs, language, and lifestyle of the societal mainstream. That conception is not very useful, though, because it implies that the mainstream is characterized by a single way of life; but in fact, most nations with large migrant populations have multiple, coexisting ways of life. Thus, it makes little sense to think about all new arrivals being channeled into a single, narrow mold. In the United States, for example, many groups (such as Baptists in Alabama or Jews in New York) have historically distinguished themselves from the mainstream while remaining “recognizably American.”47 It is important, therefore, to view the mainstream of most modern societies broadly rather than narrowly. 114


What is included in the mainstream is also continuously changing as it incorporates customs associated with new arrivals. To illustrate, in Mexico, Day of the Dead (El Dia de los Muertos) has a long tradition as a national holiday designed to give people a time to remember deceased loved ones. Mexican immigrants brought this custom with them, and the paintings of Chicano artists helped to popularize the holiday. From its Aztec roots in Mexico, Day of the Dead festivities diffused first to non-Mexican Latinos and then non-Latinos and across Central and North America. As the holiday spread geographically, it evolved into a different type of celebration, both culturally and commercially. While retaining some aspects of remembering the dead, the rituals became mainly a celebration of Latino identity and Latino pride.48 In late October or early November, the modern version of the holiday is now celebrated as part of everyone’s cultural calendar in cities across North America, from New Orleans to Toronto. There is, in other words, a two-way flow between the mainstream of a society and its constituent migrant groups. Most groups slowly adopt many of the practices of the host society, but at the same time that society is continuously changing as it incorporates customs originally linked to the migrant groups. Consider as further illustration the fact that bagels, pizza, tandoori chicken, and egg rolls now considered staples in the diets of people in Europe and North America were at an earlier time largely confined to the diet of one particular immigrant group. SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION

Immigrants and their offspring confront pluralistic and fragmented societies. It is almost certain that the second generation will assimilate, at least partially; however, to what segment of the host society? Almost all of the children of Cuban immigrants in the Miami area, for example, learned to speak English and selectively adopted A ­ merican customs, such as rooting for the Miami Dolphins football team on ­Sundays. Some move in this direction as they aspire to become part of the ­middle-class mainstream. For them, social integration and acculturation run on parallel tracks. However, others seek upward mobility within their ethnic group; for example, some Cubans go into local business in Miami’s ­Little Havana. Still others in the second generation are drawn, or pulled, into a poor, multiracial ghetto in the inner city. All become more ­Americanized than their immigrant parents, but what that entails varies according to the segment of the society into which they assimilate, hence the term segmented assimilation.49 115


The non-mainstream segments into which the assimilation of s­ econd-generation immigrants occurs is very often comprised of panethnics: people of different national origins, but typically from the same region, who become grouped together mostly as a result of the mainstream responding similarly to them. The shared feature leading to a common response can be their skin color, mode of dress, religion, or a combination of similar features. Their shared experiences in the destination society often lead them to minimize important historical differences among themselves, mirroring the mainstream view. The molding of people from different nationalities into a panethnic identity is widespread. For example, despite enormous cultural differences among Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, many of the second generation from all of these nations in the United States have adopted the mainstream’s view of them as Asians, or Asian Americans.50 ­Similarly, migrants of Middle Eastern descent have experienced stereotyping and discrimination whether they were from Iraq or Lebanon or whether they were Muslim or Christian. In Montreal, they have all been ­similarly responded to by the dominant French Canadians. As a consequence, most of Montreal’s second-generation emigres from anywhere in the Middle East have come to self-identify with the panethnic term, “Arab.”51 The children of West Indian migrants in New York City, to illustrate further, have sometimes joined youth gangs comprised of other ­African ­Americans (i.e., segmented assimilation) because they shared common experiences of discrimination as people who were simply black in the eyes of whites. Mary C. Waters noted that this led to a common ­identity and sharing of an adversarial stance toward white society that t­ ranscended differences in their specific countries of origin.52 It can be very difficult to isolate the characteristic that separates migrants from the mainstream and provides a common bond among them because there is often a confluence of potential differences: race, ethnicity, language, religion, etc. The simultaneous existence of these multiple differences makes it difficult to estimate the degree to which any one of them is the primary basis for discrimination, and hence serves to tie otherwise different migrants together. Some relevant data come from an ambitious, comparative study in which Alba and Foner tried to identify whether nations differed in which characteristic of immigrants was most salient.53 The investigators looked at a wide range of indicators of a group’s social integration, focusing upon residential segregation, socioeconomic attainments, and inter-marriage rates. They analyzed a range of data from the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In each of these nations, they focused upon the integration or separation of immigrants who differed in multiple respects from the 116


mainstream in their destination nations; for example, North Africans in France and Mexicans in the United States. From their analysis, Alba and Foner concluded that historical and political circumstances that differed among the studied nations were associated with variations in what immigrant characteristics seemed to matter most. In the United States, race—especially the black–white divide—appeared to continue to provide the barrier that most separated newcomers from the mainstream. By contrast, in the European nations studied—and in Canada, to some degree—religion appeared to present the most significant barrier, though much of the recent effect of religion was specifically associated with Muslim immigrants. The investigators pointed out that their findings have to be generalized across time and place with a great deal of caution because changing circumstances could be expected to alter the effects of any of the ­characteristics they studied. Further, it should also be noted that the views of immigrant groups, themselves, may not necessarily agree with the results of statistical analyses, such as those of Alba and Foner. For example, relying upon interviews with North African immigrants in France, Bass concluded that, in their view, the primary barrier to their integration into French society was “having black skin” more than ­religious differences.54 GENERATIONAL CHANGES

Many studies of acculturation/assimilation have focused on the second generation—that is, the offspring of the people who moved to a new nation. The assumption was that the immigrants themselves, the first generation, are less likely to adopt the new ways than their children. By the third generation—that is, the grandchildren of the immigrants—it was widely assumed that assimilation was complete; in other words, the third generation would share virtually none of their immigrant grandparents’ traditions. This assumption was part of the melting pot theory that was thought to describe the offspring of the millions of European immigrants who came to the United States in the early decades of the 20th century. It provided a prototype of assimilation, which was also expected to describe later immigrants to the United States and other nations as well. The melting pot notion sometimes provides a useful marker against which to examine actual group experiences, but it almost always exaggerates the degree to which various groups typically assimilate. It is also flawed conceptually because it fails to recognize the pluralism characteristic of societies with immigrant populations as well as the tendency 117


for cultural influence to flow in both directions between the mainstream and immigrant groups.55 The melting pot model also regarded assimilation as involving the total replacement of commitment to the culture of one’s country of origin with complete absorption by the culture of one’s host country. One became American, Dutch, or Canadian by ­ceasing to be Turkish, Indian, or Iranian. However, many second-­generation (and later) young people tend to adapt aspects of a new culture selectively while retaining—again selectively—some of their parents’ homeland traditions, and they minimize conflict between the two cultures by emphasizing one or the other at different times and places.56 One inter-generational change that seems widespread concerns the degree to which the offspring of immigrants continue to be engaged in organizations that are tied to the governments of their countries of origin. These transnational organizations vary in their focus from a concentration on immigrant-related issues to diverse and large-scale financial interests. From case studies of highly varied ethnic groups (including Chinese, Mexican, Vietnamese, etc.) conducted in several Western ­European countries and the United States, one of the clearest generalizations to emerge was that there was a marked decline in involvement in transnational organizations between the first and second generations. In fact, with few exceptions, the second generation was rarely involved.57 RESURGENT ETHNICITY

Following a melting pot model would lead one to assume that the reported differences between first and second generations was merely the start of an intergenerational trend in which the third generation would be still less involved, the fourth even less so, and so on. However, while there are not extensive data on this issue, a progressive decline among ensuing generations appears to not typically occur. A study of Japanese Americans, by Takeyuki Tsuda, is one of very few to extend the inter-generational lens. He found that the fourth generation Japanese Americans, who grew up in the 1980s and 1990s, actually maintained stronger transnational ties than the third generation that grew up in the 1950s. People in the fourth generation developed their own ethnic heritage through academically offered Japanese Studies Programs, not as available to the earlier generations, and by travelling to Japan in order to further their heritage education.58 This increase in later generation’s attachment to patterns of behavior and symbols associated with an immigrant groups’ culture is typically referred to as resurgent ethnicity. Over the long run, all of the indicators of social integration and acculturation will ordinarily correlate with each other, although 118


certainly not perfectly because each tends to change at a different pace. For example, among second-generation South Asian immigrants to ­London, rates of intermarriage have typically lagged behind the group’s upward socioeconomic mobility. Even well-to-do offspring continue the tradition of selecting a spouse from within their group. Similarly, sociologist ­Bandana Purkayastha describes second-generation South Asian ­Americans as indistinguishable from their native white counterparts with respect to education and occupation. In our terms, they are socially integrated. At the same time, many have retained transnational ethnic ties, and the food and clothing they often choose displays their attachment to their heritage. Social integration could appear to exceed acculturation, but their food, clothing, and ritual choices are flexible. As previously noted, assimilation tends to be selective. Thus, they selectively emphasize aspects of either their Asian or American identity depending on time, place, and circumstances. When with South Asian friends on Saturday night, they may emphasize their common traditions in the way they dress, the food they eat, and so on; however, these traditions are ignored when they go with non-Asian friends for a drink after work. Thus, rather than being a fixed attribute, their ethnicity is something that they are able to situationally negotiate.59 Other studies of Asian Americans also report selective assimilation, with measures of social integration and acculturation correlating with each other, but less than perfectly; and with increases in measures of assimilation being offset by evidence of resurgent ethnicity. The relevant research of Emily Walton is described in Box 4.4.

BOX 4.4  ASSIMILATION AND RESURGENT ETHNICITY Emily Walton examined several different groups of Asian immigrants of varying generations in California, the state that is home of almost one-third of all Asian immigrants in the United States. She focused upon the relationship between two indicators of groups’ integration: socioeconomic status and residential segregation. Her primary interest was in the degree of correlation between the two indicators in the years 2000 and 2010.60 From their relationship across time, she wanted to ascertain specifically whether improvements in a group’s socioeconomic status correlated with decreased levels of residential segregation. The lower the correlation, the more evidence of segmented assimilation, that is, some attributes of immigrants changed while others did not. To the degree that socioeconomic mobility did not result in less segregation, resurgent ethnicity would be implied because people



were showing a preference to remain in an ethnic neighborhood despite an increased ability to move out. Among the diverse Asian American groups living in California, Watson found different patterns. For example, among Filipinos, as immigration to California increased between 2000 and 2010, the dominant trend was for their ethnic neighborhoods either to become more densely concentrated, or for its boundaries to expand geographically. There was little movement out of the community even when socioeconomic mobility would have permitted movement to higher status, less segregated, neighborhoods. Resurgent ethnicity was therefore indicated. Among Chinese Americans, however, there was a lot of variation associated with their initial place of settlement. In many areas, socioeconomic mobility was clearly associated with leaving the ethnic community—congruent assimilation; but in some Chinese American communities socioeconomic mobility did not lead to geographical mobility, suggesting resurgent ethnicity was involved. Still other patterns characterized other Asian Americans. In sum, no one pattern characterized even similar groups living in similar areas with respect to assimilation and resurgent ethnicity.

REMITTANCES Many people who emigrate send money back to their country of origin. Anticipating the ability to send such funds, termed remittances, can often be an important part of the decision to migrate. The total amount sent globally fluctuates somewhat with economic conditions in the destination countries, but for the past 20 years, or so, the trend has been clearly upward. By the end of 2017, global remittances sent formally—through Western Union, for example—were projected to reach about $600 ­billion.61 (Additional funds, sent informally, are very difficult to estimate.) The growth in the flow of remittances over the past couple of decades has been associated with the changing trend of emigration from lower to middle income nations. Correspondingly, the proportion of remittances directed back to middle-income nations, such as India and Mexico, now exceeds 70% of the total. In 2017, for example, there were an estimated one million people from Poland living and working in the United ­Kingdom. During that year they sent home more than one billion dollars. Similar amounts were remitted from migrants from France and Germany working in the United Kingdom.62 However, as one would expect, the impact of remittances upon nations’ economies is greater in poorer nations, such as Haiti and Liberia. 120


To be specific, these funds have an important impact upon poverty reduction in low-income nations, accounting for 8% of their GDP compared to only 2% in middle-income nations.63 Most remittances are directed to family members in the country of origin, but some of the funds are also sent to organizations dedicated to “hometown development.” These contributions are used to provide public goods for local residents, support for future migrants, and so on. Some research suggests that an important spillover effect of these funds is an increase in local democratic governance. Citizen groups are mobilized and able to demand more responsiveness from local governments which might otherwise be less accountable.64 Often overlooked in research on remittances are what have been termed, “reverse remittances.” These are funds that move from families or organizations in the country of origin to assist migrants with the costs of moving and settling in a new country. With respect to Asia, in particular, it may be that the funds flowing out of the region, much of it comprising investments in people, for education, for example, exceeds the amount of the traditional remittances.65

RETURN MIGRATION Among those persons who migrate and then later return to their countries of origin, a relatively small percentage are forced to return. They may be stopped and held at a border crossing or migrant camp, then offered incentives to return. Or they may be admitted with documents that are later invalidated, and they then fear staying so their decision to return involves a coercive element. Or they may be forcibly deported. Studies suggest that the forced returnees who subsequently remain in their original home country face difficulties in re-integrating, and many want to go back to the place they were forced to leave, and some eventually migrate again.66 A relatively larger group of returnees would be able to remain in the destination country, but they choose to go back. Given the hostility they often face, it is not surprising that some aspire to return. Especially, if they are exiles who hastily emigrated in the face of political or religious persecution, they may hope for a change in the conditions that initially led them to move. Some do eventually return, but usually not in large numbers, and some returnees make a U-turn and re-migrate. Much relevant data are missing, but some of the return sentiments can be described, at least broadly. For many immigrants, expressing a desire to return home is probably a way of showing solidarity with compatriots. It is meaningful 121


symbolically but may not be indicative of a genuine intent. For example, part of the ritual in the observance of Passover by American Jews is a prayer that ends, “Next year in Israel,” meant to imply a permanent move from Diaspora. However, few Jews in the United States who utter those words plan to emigrate. A common toast among Cubans in Miami expresses the same sentiment: “Next year in Havana.” It conveys the hope that the political and economic situation in Cuba will change, making the country more like the pre-Castro nation the older emigres have romantically passed on. One Cuban American who insisted that, following such changes, he would be on the next plane back to Cuba was asked if he was really sure of that. “Well,” he smiled, “Who can tell?”67 There is a clear pattern that emerges involving an increase in the numbers who return to their former countries if they can, at least temporarily, when their current country of residence experiences an economic downturn. That is not surprising given that, as we have noted, economic opportunities provide a major motive for emigration. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, for example, the economy of New York and other major U.S. cities was seriously disrupted. Everyone suffered, but the people most adversely affected by the downturn were lower-end service workers, from nannies and gardeners to food preparation workers and taxi drivers. Mexican immigrants were in many of these positions, and within two months following the attack, an estimated 350,000 Mexicans who had been working in the United States returned home. In the following decade, over two million Mexicans returned home from the United States. For many of the migrants, their work in the United States enabled them to acquire skills that created new opportunities for entrepreneurship after they returned, and among the returnees there was a high rate of self-­employment and upward mobility.68 As the U.S. economy slowly improved in subsequent years, many of the former Mexican migrants did return to the United States, but the precise number who left and eventually returned is not known. Unfortunately, few large-scale, statistical migration studies track the same people over an extended period of time. One of the few long-term pictures of return migration is provided by the movements of Spaniards and their descendants between Spain and Argentina. Spain has conferred citizenship on children of S­ paniards, regardless of their place of birth, and Spain and Argentina have a dual citizenship agreement. So, movement back and forth between the two nations is relatively easy and well monitored. From roughly 1875 to 1975, slightly more than three million Spaniards emigrated to ­Argentina. About half of that total remained. Returning to Spain was, in Argentina, widely regarded as being like a homecoming; however, 122


many of those who did return found that their skills poorly matched those required by high-level jobs in Madrid and other Spanish cities, and they considered entry-level jobs beneath them. The natives in Spain thought the South Americans unrealistic and arrogant. Many of those who went back to Spain were disappointed in their treatment and their opportunities and returned to Argentina.69 A similar result has been reported in a study of Iraqi women who had emigrated to Copenhagen, Denmark, but remained in touch with family and friends who remained in Baghdad. Many said they hoped to return after Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, was deposed. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, and the dictator was killed, the hoped for conditions seemed to be presenting themselves; however, the women’s short-term return visits were typically disappointing and led most to think they should stay in Copenhagen where they had made new lives for themselves. For example, they had grown accustomed to Western-style dress. They were surprised to find that, in Iraq, many of their former friends and relatives were now wearing veils. So, despite their continued feeling of attachment to Iraq, the visits led them to believe they no longer belonged in Iraq.70 It is common for immigrants who return to a former home to discover that Thomas Wolfe’s famous book was right: “You can’t go home again.”71 Migrants’ remembrances of their home countries often exaggerate and glamorize the positive while minimizing the negative. Panethnic identities can also make it difficult for emigres to return to their native countries because such identities (e.g., Hispanic, Asian, Arab, etc.) do not correspond with any actual nation. They are meaningful only in the place the immigrant now resides. In other words, it is an ethnic self-conception that has been Americanized, Canadianized, or the like. This panethnic identity ties them to their host country, even if the label has pejorative connotations. This can place them in a marginal position in which they do not feel that they really belong anywhere.

CITIZENSHIP ISSUES Millions of people, as we have seen, are living and working in a nation to which they emigrated. Their citizenship rights in the nation in which they were born are often called into question. For example, they may formally retain their citizenship, but their political participation opportunities (e.g., voting) may be limited once they leave their home nation. At the same time, the political rights granted to migrants in their destination nation are often very limited. When they move from a less to a 123


more democratic nation, the migrants may be afforded more protections, but typically much fewer than those provided to citizens.72 There are often substantial roadblocks placed before migrants wanting to become citizens. Historically, nations have granted citizenship only to people born to parents who were citizens or who were born on the nation’s soil. For example, Germany has in the past given citizenship to any child born to at least one German parent, regardless of where the child was born. The United States, to illustrate further, historically granted citizenship to almost any child born on ­American soil, regardless of the parents’ nationality. However, neither of these options fits very well in an era of mass migration and globalized workplaces.73 To make matters worse for the migrants, many destination nations have, in response to mass migration, raised the citizenship bar. In ­Denmark, for example, to be sponsored as the spouse of a citizen used to provide a clear and relatively easy path to legal entry and citizenship. However, sponsors now face more difficult hurdles. They must demonstrate that they have a strong attachment to Denmark and prove that they have the financial means to support the foreign spouse.74 On the other hand, a number of nations have made it easier for ­people who migrate to continue to exercise citizenship rights. For example, after 2006, Mexico issued emigrant identity cards to make it easier for Mexican citizens working outside the nation to register to vote in ­Mexican elections. Also in 2006, India enacted an Overseas Citizenship law. It provides citizenship-like rights to Indians living abroad, defining as Indians persons of Indian origin, even if the biological tie is distant, for example, through great-grandparents. Under this law, people considered to be Indian have rights normally associated with citizenship: ability to travel to India without a visa, buy and sell property in India, etc. In these nations, the desire for remittances has been a factor in liberalizing the citizenship rights of migrants.75

GLOSSARY Acculturation: The adoption, by migrants, of the new nation’s traditions and values. Cumulative Causation: The tendency for a flow of international migrants to be self-sustaining. Exiles: People who emigrate primarily for religious or political rather than economic motives, and often hope to return to their homeland. Export Schemes: Freelance operators arrange only the transportation of voluntary, undocumented migrants. 124


Human Trafficking: Migrants are illegally taken across national borders and coerced into non-voluntary employment. Importing Operations: Criminal organizations smuggle poor, undocumented people across national boundaries and often coerce them into employment to repay the smugglers. Melting Pot Theory: Assumed that with each generation the offspring of immigrants would be more completely assimilated. Panethnics: People from different nations, but the same region, become grouped together. Remittances: Funds sent by migrants back to family and organizations in their nation of origin. Resurgent Ethnicity: When later generations become more attached to an immigrant group’s culture. Segmented Assimilation: When migrant groups integrate into a one specific sub-culture of the society. Social Integration: The movement of migrants into the economic or residential mainstream of a society. Undocumented Migrants: People who are living in a nation without legal paperwork.

CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER 10. Space in the globalizing city Peter Marcuse 14. The stimulus of a little confusion: a contemporary comparison of Amsterdam and Los Angeles Edward W. Soja Introduction to Part Five 43. São Paulo: the city and its protest Teresa Caldeira 45. Between ghetto and globe: remaking urban life in Africa AbdouMaliq Simone 47. Blockupy fights back: global city formation in Frankfurt am Main after the financial crisis Sebastian Schipper, Lucas Pohl, Tino Petzold, Daniel Mullis, Bernd Belina 48. Prologue: “High culture and hard labor” Andrew Ross 49. World cities: Global? Postcolonial? Postimperial? Or just the result of happenstance? Some cultural comments Anthony D. King 125


53. Shanghai nightscapes and ethnosexual contact zones James Farrer, Andrew Field 56. Provincializing the global city: from Bombay to Mumbai Rashimi Varma

NOTES   1 Population Division, United Nations, Trends in International Migrant Stock: 2015 Revision.   2 McKinsey Global Institute, Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity, ­November 2016.   3 For further discussion, see Nina Glick Schiller, “A Comparative Relative Perspective on the Relationships between Migrants and Cities.” Urban Geography, 33, 2012.   4 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Goodbye Honored Guest.” New York Times, April 23, 2009, p. B1.   5 Yoko Kubota, “Japan’s Rising Foreign Workforce Hits Wages.” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2017, p. A6.   6 European Women’s Lobby, Gender and Migration, February 2010.   7 In response to what many of the men experienced as a status loss in the household, they became actively involved in the Christian Church and created new positions that were reserved for men. See Sheba M. George, When Women Came First. University of California Press, 2005.   8 For further discussion, see Katherine M. Donato and Amada Armenta, “What We Know about Unauthorized Migration.” Annual Review of Sociology, 37, 2011.   9 Aryn Baker, “When the Call Comes.” Time, February 20, 2017. For further discussion, see Time’s on-going, Finding Home Project. 10 Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized Immigrant Population.” Pew Research Hispanic Center, February 2011. 11 Nina Bernstein, “Getting Tough on Immigrants to Turn a Profit.” New York Times, September 29, 2011, p. A11. 12 Adam Nossiter, “Evicted from Calais, Migrants Trickle into Paris Camps.” The New York Times, November 4, 2016, p. A13. 13 For an extensive review of relevant literature, see Lori M. Hunter, Jessie K. Luna and Rachel M. Norton, “Environmental Dimensions of Migration.” Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 2015. 14 This description is based primarily on Hans Lucht, Darkness before Daybreak. University of California Press, 2011. 15 Jason Pohl, “24 Hours of Chaos.” USA Today, December 29, 2016, p. 1. 16 Drew Hinshaw, “A Doctor’s Hard Decision.” The Wall Street Journal, September 16–17, 2017, p. 1. 17 Lucht, op.cit. 18 Reviews of a number of studies are reported in, World Economic Forum, Migration and its Impact on Cities, October, 2017. 126


19 Robert K. Merton, On Social Structure and Science. University of Chicago, 1996. 20 This discussion of Beardstown is based upon, Faranak Miraftab, Global ­Heartland. Indiana University, 2016. Miraftab also reported that while ­Cargill advertised itself as promoting diversity, the company systematically tried to block efforts by the newcomers to forge alliances across racial-­ethnic lines. 21 See the chapters in, Lars Meier (Ed), Professionals in the City. Taylor and Francis, 2015. 22 Hao Wang, Wei Li and Yu Deng, “Precarcity among Highly Educated Migrants.” Urban Geography, 38, 2017. 23 For further discussion of immigrants and exiles, especially among Cuban migrants to the United States, see Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America. University of California Press, 2006. 24 For further discussion of Brazilian emigration, see Jan Brzozowski, “­ International Migration and Socioeconomic Development.” Estudos Avancados, 76, 2012. 25 Saskia Sassen, “Two Stops in Today’s New Global Geographies.” American Behavioral Scientist, 52, 2008; and Cities in a World Economy. Sage, 2011. 26 Douglas S. Massey et al., Worlds in Motion. Oxford University Press, 2005. 27 Zia Liang et al., “Cumulative Causation, Market Transition, and Emigration from China.” American Journal of Sociology, 114, 2008. For a Latin American example, see Elizabeth Fussell, “The Cumulative Causation of International Migration in Latin America.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 630, 2010. 28 The choice to remain or leave the West Indies, for example, was found by Bashi to be determined less by individuals’ own plans than by decisions made by small groups of influential West Indians who selected people they thought they would fit well in Londop or New York, See Vilna F. Bashi, Survival of the Knitted. Stanford University Press, 2007. 29 Jan Brzozoski, op.cit. 30 Ivan Light, Deflecting Immigration. Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. 31 Orlando Patterson and Xiaolin Zhuo, “Modern Trafficking, Slavery and Other Forms of Servitude.” Annual Review of Sociology, 44, 2018. 32 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2017. 33 Ronald Weitzer, “Human Trafficking and Contemporary Slavery.” Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 2015. See also Debarashmi Mitra and Mangala ­Subramanlam, “Trafficking in Women as Gender-based Violence.” International Journal of ­Contemporary Sociology, 46, 2009. 34 The distinction between importing and exporting schemes is presented by David Kyle and John Dale, “Smuggling the State Back In,” in David Kyle and Rey Koslowski (Eds), Global Human Smugling. Johns Hopkins University, 2011. 35 U.S. Department of State, op.cit. 36 Weitzer, op.cit. 37 Emilio Reyneri, “lllegallmmigration and the Underground Economy” National Europe Centre Paper No. 66, 2003, and Emilio Reyneri and Giovanna FuHin, “Ethnic Penalties in the Transition to and from Unemployment.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 52, 2011. 38 Joel Millman, The Other Americans. Penguin Books, 1998. 127


39 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Training Opportunity in Japan Turns Sour.” International Herald Tribune, July 21, 2010, p. 13. 40 For a description of unskilled immigrant groups in Italy and in Spain, see Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 41 Christian Zlolniski, Janitors, Street Vendors, and Activists. University of C ­ alifornia Press, 2006. 42 Millman, op.cit. 43 Rafaela M. Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2010. 44 Matthew R. Sanderson, “Does Immigration Promote Long-Term Economic Development?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39, 2013. 45 See World Economic Forum, op.cit. 46 These dimensions of assimilation are discussed by Mary C. Waters and Tomas R. Jimenez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation.” Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 2005. 47 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream. Harvard ­University Press, 2005, p. 13. 48 For a discussion of how this celebration was transformed in the United States, see Regina M. Marchi, Day of the Dead in the U.S. Rutgers University Press, 2009. 49 For further discussion, see Alejandro Portes, Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and ­William Haller, “Segmented Assimilation on the Ground.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, 2005. 50 Dina G. Okamoto, “On Panethnicity.” American Sociological Review, 68, 2003. 51 Paul Eld, Being Arab. McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008. 52 See the “Introduction” to, Philip Kasinitz, et al., Inheriting the City. Russell Sage, 2010. 53 Richard Alba and Nancy Foner, Strangers No More. Princeton University, 2015. 54 Loretta E. Bass, African Immigrant Families in Another France. Palgrave ­Macmillan, 2014. 55 See Tomas R. Jiminez, The Other Side of Assimilation. University of California, 2017. 56 For further discussion, see Ruben G. Rumbaut, “The Melting and the Pot,” in Peter Kivisto (Ed), Incorporating Diversity. Paradigm Publishers, 2005. 57 Alejandro Portes and Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (Eds), The State and the G ­ rassroots. Berghahn Books, 2015. 58 Takeyuki Tsuda, Japanese American Ethnicity. New York University Press, 2015. 59 Bandana Purkayastha, Negotiating Ethnicity. Rutgers University Press, 2005. See also, Peter Fink, Variations on Uzbek Identity. Berghahn Books, 2014. Dual identities are also sometimes used to describe this situation. 60 Emily Watson, “Spatial Assimilation and its Discontents.” Urban Geography, 38, 2017. 61 World Bank Group, Migration and Development Brief 28, October 2017. 62 Allison McCann, et al., “Where a No-Deal Brexit Would Hurt Europe.” New York Times, February 8, 2019, p. A8. 63 Phillip Connor, D’Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzales-Barrera, Changing Patterns of Global Migration and Remittances. PEW Research Center, December 2013. 128


64 For the case of remittances to Mexico, see Lauren Duquette-Rury, “Migrant Transnational Participation.” American Sociological Review, 81, 2016. 65 Thomas Faist, “Cross-Border Migration and Social Inequalities.” Annual Review of Sociology, 42, 2016. 66 For further discussion of forced returns, see World Bank Group, op.cit., and A.M. David, “Back to Square One.” International Migration Review, 51, 2017. 67 David Rieff, The Exile. Simon & Shuster, 1993, p. 45. By the same author, see also, In Praise of Forgetting. Yale, 2017. 68 Joshua T. Wassink and Jaqueline M. Hagan, “A Dynamic Model of Self-­ Employment and Socioeconomic Mobility among Return Migrants.” Social Forces, 96, 2018. 69 See Takeyuki Tsuda, “Why Does the Diaspora Return Home?” and David Cook-Martin and Anahi Viladrich, “Imagined Homecomings,” in Takeyuki Tsuda (Ed), Diasporic Homecomings. Stanford University, 2009. 70 Marianne Holm Pedersen, “Revisiting Iraq.” Anthropologica, 53, 2011. 71 That is the often quoted title of a book first published by Thomas Wolfe in 1940. 72 Roger Waldinger, The Cross-Border Connection. Harvard University, 2015. 73 Aneesh Aneesh, “Global Citizenship.” Presented in Santa Fe, New Mexico, October 13, 2016. 74 Nicole Stokes-DuPass, Immigration and New Limits on Citizenship Rights. ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 75 Daniel Naujoks, Migration, Citizenship and Development. Oxford, 2013. For further discussion of how various nations define citizenship, see the papers in, Nicole Stokes-DuPass and Ramona Freeja (Eds), Citizenship, Belonging and Nation Nation-State in the Twenty-First Century. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.



Ghettos, enclaves, and ethnoburbs Groups of migrants have historically settled in close proximity to each other when they arrive at their new destination. Chain migration is typically responsible for bringing together substantial numbers of people who, prior to migrating, were related by kinship or else either knew each other or at least shared some significant commonalities, such as coming from the same town or village. The types of settlements formed by migrants all tend to share some features in common, but they also differ from each in the nature of their geographical locations, the socioeconomic status of people in the community, the types of local institutions they provide, or fail to provide, and so on. In this chapter, we will examine three principal types of migrant settlements—ghettos, enclaves, and ethnoburbs—and the defining characteristics of each of them.

GHETTOS In the social sciences, much of the research and writing about ghettos traces its beginnings to the ideas of Louis Wirth. He was a University-of-­Chicagotrained sociologist and an influential part of the early Chicago School. His 130

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dissertation, which was published in book form in 1928, was titled, The Ghetto.1 Wirth focused upon Jewish ghettos, in Europe and the United States, but he also noted similarities between them and those of other racial and ethnic groups. Of most importance, Wirth laid out some basic features of ghettos that provided starting points for later analysts and researchers. WIRTH’S VIEW

In the first part of his book, Wirth traced Jewish ghettos back to European towns in the Middle Ages. They formed, in his view, mostly by the desires of people who shared religious precepts and rituals to be together so they could support communal institutions. At the same time, Wirth noted that Jewish populations were sometimes ordered into ghettos by people in power and that even when Jews “voluntarily” formed ghettos it was sometimes because they feared non-Jews and physically separated themselves in order to escape hostilities. By virtue of their separation, regardless of how voluntary it was, relations between Jews and non-Jews historically tended to be limited, formal, and impersonal. Within the ghetto, by contrast, relationships tended to be extensive and highly personal. In fact, intimate relationships, such as marriage, were strictly confined to the in-group as demanded by religious teaching and social norms. When a person from the community nevertheless selected a spouse from outside the community, the married couple was ordinarily banished, that is, forced to live outside of the community’s boundaries. Thus, in every respect, the historical ghetto was a closed community. Wirth noted that when, through education or commerce, external contacts increased, more universal values tended to replace the ghetto’s traditional values, and intermarriage increased. The eventual result of such assimilation, he concluded, could be the end of the ghetto, and of the Jewish “race.” In the early 20th century, Wirth thought there were some Jewish communities close to disappearing in this manner, and he pointed specifically to Frankfurt, Germany. In the United States, and Chicago, in particular, Wirth described the largely voluntary formation of Jewish ghettos that both resembled and differed from their European counterparts. One big difference was in their proximity to other similarly segregated groups. The Jews were one of several immigrant groups that succeeded each other in forming dense settlements in the inner city. The immigrant waves began with Germans and Irish, and they were displaced by Jews who, in turn were displaced by Poles and Italians, and they were later displaced by African A ­ mericans. One could observe the transformation on an almost daily basis as Lutheran churches became synagogues and the African M.E. Churches. 131

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At many points during the process that eventually led to displacement, different ethnic and racial groups lived side by side. The boundaries among them were maintained, according to Wirth, by the fact that they generally detested and distrusted each other. What they all shared in common was poverty status, but this common economic position did not create an over-arching bond among them. When Jews (or others) attained a degree of economic success their outlooks on life typically change, and they wanted to escape from their inner city ghettos. Moving up meant moving out. In an essay that preceded publication of the book, Wirth wrote that if you wanted to know a lot about a Jewish man, ask him whether he lives in the ghetto. …no single factor indicates as much about the character of the Jew as the area in which he lives. It is an index not only to his economic status, his occupation…, but to his politics and his outlook on life, and the stage in the assimilative process that he has reached.2 (Writing in the 1920s, when Wirth meant “people” he tended to describe them as “males.”) With a degree of irony, Wirth noted that when Jews were upwardly mobile they moved out from inner city ghettos; however, other Jews tended to soon follow the initial migrants into newer areas and because non-Jews in these areas wanted to avoid contact with the newcomers, the non-Jews left. In effect, then, the Jews wound up re-creating ghettos in new areas further out from the center city, the main differences between the old and new ghettos being their locations and the higher socioeconomic status of residents. For a couple of decades after the publication of Wirth’s book, the Jewish settlement—and especially the one in the inner city—was the prototype of the ghetto in much of the scholarly literature of the then dominant Chicago School. At the same time, however, the scholars in this group also studied the ghettos being formed by immigrant Italians, Poles, and others. They examined each of the separate communities in detail and also described how they were geographically distributed across the city. Robert Park, a senior colleague of Wirth’s, depicted the constellation of ghettos in Chicago during this period as resembling, “a mosaic of little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate.”3 In sum, for roughly the first half of the 20th century, the key defining features of a ghetto included: 1. The relative ethnic or racial homogeneity of the place 2. Its separateness, meaning limited interactions between people living inside the ghetto and those living outside 132

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3. The distinctive institutions and facilities it offered to residents, such as places of worship, restaurants, and food stores 4. An emphasis upon the attractive pull of the ghetto, leading to the inference that decisions to live within it were largely (though not exclusively) voluntary. The last of the above features was of particular significance in Mitchell Duneier’s historical analysis of the concept of a ghetto. Many of the Chicago School pioneers and their followers, Duneier noted, viewed the northern urban ghettos merely as “way stations” for newcomers who would assimilate to modern urban life and move up. These segregated areas were the result of voluntary and natural forces and served as useful and temporary places of residence. It was not necessary, therefore, to formulate policies to eliminate ghettos.4 LATER DEVELOPMENTS

During the second half of the 20th century, there was a dramatic change in the way the social sciences viewed ghettos. The first change was in whose settlements were considered the prototype of ghettos, and in this respect non-whites replaced Jews. One reason for this substitution was the Nazi’s enforced encampment of Jews in Germany, Poland, and elsewhere in occupied Europe. Hitler justified these actions by arguing that he was just putting Jews back in the ghettos where they had been for centuries. However, these were prisons more than ghettos, and they lacked any of the attractions that had characterized Jewish communities in the past. No one would have voluntarily chosen to live in them. Further, they usually turned out to be stops not on the way to upward mobility but to death camps. Therefore, even after World War II ended, and the few remaining Jews who survived the Holocaust were liberated from the camps, the connotations of Jewish ghettos remained permanently altered.5 At the same time that Hitler changed the meaning of Jewish ghettos, there were large migrations of non-white populations, moving largely from South to North, within nations (e.g., African Americans from the rural south to the industrial north in the United States) and among nations (e.g., from the Caribbean to the United Kingdom). Many of these migrants had limited formal educations and were relatively unskilled; but, the growing number of factory jobs that were becoming available in industrializing cities offered comparatively good wages for workers who entered factories without skills. They were one of very few places of employment where a man or woman without much formal education or 133

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skills could make a decent wage. The result, in the middle of the 20th century, was that the non-white migrant population contained a large number of stable working class families. These industrializing cities tended to be highly segregated, though, so that as they added migrants the population in the growing non-white communities became increasingly dense. In many respects, the city of Detroit provides an exemplar of migration into an industrial city in which active and overt discrimination led to inner-city racial concentrations. These processes are described in Box 5.1.

BOX 5.1  MAINTAINING SEGREGATION IN DETROIT During the first half of the 20th century, there was a steady stream of African American (and White) migration from the rural south of the country to Detroit, and other industrializing cities in the north. The blacks who moved to Detroit were almost totally relegated to one area in the near east side of the city. Whites outside of this area would not rent to blacks, and The Ku Klux Klan, complete with white hoods and burning torches, was always ready to step in if an African American family tried to move into a White area. As a result, despite increased migration, racial segregation remained intact. In the post-World War II, years the suburbs outside Detroit grew rapidly, but African Americans were largely excluded from them. The most violence tended to occur when African Americans tried to integrate ethnic, bluecollar suburbs such as Dearborn. In this suburb just west of the downtown near Ford’s River Rouge plant, there were a number of mob actions during the 1950s and 1960s. The regularly reelected mayor of Dearborn, Orville Hubbard, opposed integration on the grounds that it would lead to racial intermarriage and “mongrelization.”6 The Dearborn police made a house call to any African American family that moved into town and suggested they move out as quickly as possible. When they stayed and white mobs threw bottles and bricks, the Dearborn police failed to take any action. During the period of Detroit’s rapid suburban growth, roughly from 1950 to 1980, 50 incorporated communities were added to the metropolitan area. These villages and townships, which became the new suburbs, contained a total of nearly three-quarters of a million white people and fewer than 5,000 African Americans. Less than 1% of the population of the new suburbs were African American.7 When the growing size of the African American community forced geographical expansion, white neighbors were stampeded into selling their homes at reduced prices; and agents made off with the bargains. One


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block at a time, the African American ghetto slowly spread, on the heels of ­middle-class African Americans trying to move up and out. One long-term consequence was that among African Americans in Detroit, near the end of the 20th century, there was almost no correlation between their socioeconomic positions and the racial makeup of the neighborhoods in which they lived. To be specific, African Americans in Detroit making over $50,000 per year were about as separated from whites as those making less than $2,500; both lived in almost totally segregated areas.8

During the 1960s and 1970s, many of the industrialized cities in the United States and in Western Europe began to lose factory jobs. Detroit, for example, lost an average of about 7,000 factory jobs per year as factories automated, reducing their employment levels; or else moved to distant suburbs, to Southern and Western cities, and to industrializing nations in Asia and Latin America. A lot of the blue-collar jobs that were lost in these cities were eventually replaced by white-collar jobs in finance and technology, but these new jobs required substantially more formal education than that obtained by most inner-city residents in Detroit (or other industrial cities like Detroit). This mismatch between skills required for the new forms of employment and the skills people in the ghetto actually possessed has resulted in high levels of sustained unemployment in the inner cities of these formerly industrial cities. In the United States, for example, almost one-half of the large metropolitan areas that had relied upon manufacturing during the first two-thirds of the 20th century continued to lose jobs and had not recovered economically by the end of the first decade of the 21st century.9 The difficulty of finding employment in these cities has been especially pronounced for African American males without high-school diplomas. Many have no expectation of ever finding work. As a result, according to Wilson, they have little basis for resisting “street culture,” which encourages them to engage in reckless behavior that further jeopardizes their chances of being able to move up and out of the ghetto. Many of these young people do not believe their future has a chance of including stable employment and a stable marriage. Non-marital pregnancies, therefore, result in a large number of non-marital births to poor single mothers. Having a baby proves that they are desirable to men and confers upon them the status of grown woman, which is the most that many of these women can hope for. The poor, single mothers often lack the means to control their youngsters, and this leads to higher rates of school dropouts, drugs, gangs, and crime.10 135

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Danger so suffuses everyday ghetto life that it creates an oppressive climate of fear that, along with the poverty of the area, results in widespread institutional withdrawal. Hospitals and public health facilities minimize their community involvement or move out of the area; the police and courts are overwhelmed; public schools, libraries, and youth clubs lack facilities and limit their functions. So just when there was the most pronounced need for assistance—because of the large number of single-parent families living in poverty—that help and support was not available. Further, no one in the community has the funds to open stores or start newspapers or other activities that could lead residents to feel positive about their neighborhood. The demographic profile of these communities, marked by a large percentage of young, unmarried women with young children, is further exacerbated by the tendency of governments to rely upon incarceration of young adult black males who tend to be unemployed in order to prevent disorder in the communities in which they are concentrated. This trend is most pronounced, according to Loic Wacquant, in U.S. cities, followed by cities in France and then the United Kingdom.11 An emphasis upon what Wacquant terms “prisonfare” (as a replacement for “welfare”) is best indicated by the extraordinarily large number of people—and young black males, in particular—who are imprisoned in the United States. Approximately one-third of black males aged 20–34 who completed less than high-school education were incarcerated in 2010.12 That was the highest rate among industrial nations, and the figure does not include the extremely large number of people who, at any given time, are incarcerated awaiting trial or on parole, and therefore still subject to the criminal justice system. A combination of vigilant policing, authoritarian courts, and expanded prisons, according to Wacquant, is specifically designed to control, by “warehousing,” and to punish poor and marginalized groups. Another consequence of having many young black men out of the community is to create a sex imbalance so that even if a traditional marriage following pregnancy was supported by ghetto norms, there would be too few males available as long-term partners. During the 1960s and 1970s, analysts began to describe the African American ghetto as resembling a colony because of the high degree of external control over most aspects of daily life. The stores that remained in the neighborhood were typically owned either by individuals or chains not located within the ghetto. Apartments were mostly the properties of absentee owners. Members of the police forces that monitored and controlled everyday life were drawn from outside of the ghetto and answered external municipal authorities. In sum, the ghetto was like an historical colony except for the fact that it was located within the nation that supervised and administered it.13 136

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More recent analyses have continued to explore the external regulation of ghetto life in U.S. cities, but have also examined the modern-day equivalent of colonial taxation. According to Chris Hayes, ­neoliberal-era budget shortfalls have led municipal governments to trap ghetto residents in a complex of municipal fines and court fees. It is, Hayes wrote, an oppressive and confiscatory tax authority that in some ghettos generates a significant percentage of the local government budget. When the oppressive taxes placed upon residents or the questionable killings of black residents lead to demonstrations, they are like colonial revolts; and just as in historical colonies, a militarized force (of police or/and national guard units) quell the revolt.14 It is important to note that ghettos in the United States were not solely an historical phenomenon that occurred while cities were experiencing declines in factory employment. And while ghettos in U.S. cities have tended to be comprised of non-white populations, it has not always entailed African Americans. To illustrate both points, in 1986, a large groups of Cambodian refugees were resettled, en masse, in the Bronx section of New York City. It was initially envisioned as a temporary arrangement, but the assistance they were given was very l­imited. ­People who were accused of a crime or who had disputes with landlords or shopkeepers were offered little help in navigating the U.S. courts. Welfare assistance for the Bronx Cambodians was also very insufficient as were the housing programs. To survive, many of the women were forced to do piece work in their homes under highly exploitive conditions. For example, the woman who was the main subject in a detailed case study by Eric Tang sometimes assembled hair accessories in her Bronx home and sometimes sewed “Made in China” labels into ­Disney-branded products. Few of the immigrants were able to escape from the poverty and ­ ambodians crime that dominated the area. Decades later, many poor C remained in dilapidated housing, in an economically impoverished, blighted inn-city neighborhood. The poverty and violence that characterized the community along with its relatively homogeneous ­ethnic-racial makeup led Tang to label it a “hyperghetto.”15 GHETTOS DEFINED

From the preceding discussion, we can identify five principal characteristics that are typically associated with a ghetto. The prototype from which these characteristics are deduced is the African American ghetto found near the center of many U.S. cities between roughly the 1960s and the present.16 137

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1. They occupy a distinct geographical space that is recognized as such both by the occupants and by outsiders, and there are restraints that actively discourage, if not prohibit, efforts to leave. It also tends to be both physically and socially isolated from the rest of the city in which it is located. 2. The occupants share a distinctive attribute—race—that is held in low regard in the society (stigmatized) and subject to negative stereotyping. 3. The ownership or control over most retail establishments, housing and local institutions lies outside of the ghetto making it resemble an internal colony. 4. The relationship between ghetto residents and the external political system (municipal or state) is punitive and exploitive, maintaining the marginalized status of residents. 5. They tend to live in deteriorated, crowded neighborhoods, and have high rates of crime and violence while offering few amenities. People remain in such places not because of any attachment, but because they have nowhere else to go. GHETTOS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

There have been a number of studies of diverse groups conducted outside of the United States. The objective of these studies has been to ascertain the degree to which U.S.-style ghettos are, in fact, found in other nations. In England, we have previously described neighborhoods dominated both by white and non-white populations that largely possessed the characteristics associated with ghettos in the United States. In other nations, studies generally report other discrepancies from the U.S. prototype, making these neighborhoods approximate ghetto-like conditions, though the labeling is often very controversial. In the former industrial suburbs (banlieus) outside of Paris, for example, Wacquant described a number of ghetto-like conditions, including deteriorated housing, stigmatized minorities, high rates of poverty, and so on; but, he also argued that the French housing projects were less isolated than their American counterparts—and here he focused upon the south side of Chicago—and that they were less disadvantaged by policies of the larger political system. He also stated that the problems of crime and poverty were less pronounced in the areas outside of Paris than in the Chicago (or other United States) ghettos. Wacquant ­concluded that it was incorrect to equate the banlieus with American ghettos.17 However, some analysts have argued that both the p­ rototypical Chicago ghetto and the Paris banlieus have been changing, and growing more 138

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alike. Most notable, perhaps, has been the rising levels of unemployment, crime and social marginality in the French suburbs, making them increasingly like U.S. ghettos.18 Studies of Roma encampments in Rome have also tended to conclude that they strongly resemble U.S. ghettos, but are not identical. The Roma (also referred to as nomads and previously called gypsies) have been formally pushed by the state into formal camps in Rome where their behavior is monitored, making these camps resemble Jewish ghettos, in the earliest usage of the term when such areas were legally mandated. Other Roma are concentrated in informal encampments where they have more autonomy, but also live in crowded conditions and deteriorated housing. In the latter, a stigmatized group occupies a distinct space from which it is very difficult for them to move out, and they are exposed to punitive treatment by the state. In many respects, then, the informal Roma encampments resemble urban ghettos in the United States. On the other hand, the Roma do have some attachment to these communities because of the presence of widespread friendship and kinship networks, so there is a voluntary aspect to remaining in the encampments. In addition, they are self-employed more often than U.S. ghetto residents, operating flea markets, selling used automobiles, working as artisans, and so on, and much of this activity is conducted outside of the encampment. The overall combination of similarities and differences has sometimes led to them being designated neo-ghettos.19 According to some analysts, the imagery emanating from ghetto studies in U.S. cities has been so strong it has led some observers in other nations to believe that their cities also contained U.S.-style ghettos, when in fact they might not. In discussing Berlin, Germany, for example, Eksner wrote that despite U.S.–German differences in patterns of migration, “the concept and imagery of the African American ‘ghetto’ strongly influenced the framing of research and media discourse on emerging ‘ghettos’ in Germany’s urban centres.”20 In other words, the ghetto concept from U.S. studies has become so salient that it may be leading to project the concept onto neighborhoods in their cities that lack some or all of the qualities of a ghetto. The result may be self-fulfilling prophecies. To illustrate: if a neighborhood is labeled a ghetto, rightly or wrongly, its schools are correspondingly considered ghetto schools and assumed therefore to be inadequate. Degrees from those stigmatized schools are devalued with respect to qualifying graduates for further education or for positions in the job market. Thus, the upward mobility of migrants and minorities said to inhabit ghettos is blocked by the judgments of outsiders; but viewed from outside, the minorities or migrants’ lack of mobility is regarded as self-produced and self-perpetuating, justifying the stigma put upon them. 139

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ENCLAVES Analysts generally agree that one of the major distinctions between enclaves and ghettos lies in the basis for the segregation of a specific group. Both contain relatively isolated, homogenous populations. However, a ghetto entails, to a large degree, the forcible relegation of a specific group to a particular place. An enclave, by contrast, is based largely upon voluntary segregation, that is, people choosing to live in a particular place in order to be with others with whom they share some significant characteristic.21 Strongly associated with the segregation of a ghetto is the assumption of a negatively stereotyped population with nowhere else to go. The population in an enclave is less likely to be negatively stereotyped, but even if it is, it is typically less strongly stigmatized. Thus, both enclaves and ghettos are segregated places, but differ in the degree to which segregation is imposed versus selected and in the degree to which the segregated group is negatively viewed in the larger society.22 FROM GHETTO TO ENCLAVE

In many instances, the differences noted above are matters of degree rather than all or none; and an area that started as a ghetto due to external forces might over time develop specialized stores and institutions that are attractive to members of the group living elsewhere and thereby become more like an enclave. This can occur because it usually requires a concentrated population to generate the number of potential customers or clients necessary to support purveyors of various specialized goods and services. Access to them may serve as a magnet to members of the distinctive group.23 In cities with small Muslim populations, for example, for practicing Muslims living outside of Muslim communities, it is very difficult to follow traditional Muslim practices in arranging and negotiating marriages, observing communal religious rites, and the like to obtain the necessary assistance. To illustrate, consider how a death in the family is to be handled. The proper traditional response includes assembling mourners in a mosque for a prayer service to ensure the deceased’s passage to the next world, ritual washing of the corpse, burial in an exclusively Muslim graveyard, digging the grave exactly to the prescribed depth, and making certain the deceased faces Mecca. Outside of a Muslim community it is extremely difficult to find the technical skills and communal cooperation that are needed for such tasks. Thus, a community that is at one time a ghetto can evolve into an enclave, or at least develop enclave-like qualities. 140

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On the other hand, a segregated community that is initially an enclave can over time slide toward becoming a ghetto. Detroit, in Box 5.2, again provides an interesting example of how this change can occur. Box 5.1 described how segregation was maintained in Detroit after about 1950. Box 5.2 describes what happened to an African American community that, prior to the mid-20th century, had many enclave-like characteristics: locally owned barbershops that specialized in African American hair cutting and products, local newspapers, restaurants and night clubs, etc. The socioeconomic status of people in the community was also varied, including professionals, business owners, factory workers, and so on. However, the black community in the east side of Detroit moved from enclave-like to ghetto-like as a result of the decline in factory employment and government programs that had a deleterious effect. These changes are described in Box 5.2.

BOX 5.2  AN ENCLAVE BECOMES A GHETTO By the middle of the 20th century, parts of the inner cores of many industrial cities, including Detroit, were so old and deteriorated that their market values had steeply declined. The low value of inner-city parcels of land made redevelopment, or “slum clearance” attractive to entrepreneurs. City officials were often convinced to take the side of the entrepreneurs by the belief that redevelopment would lower crime or increase tax revenues. For these postwar redevelopment plans to be eligible for federal funds, though, the city had to provide other housing for the people who were displaced. Beginning around 1950, public housing projects were touted as the answer. In principle, they were cost-effective ways to address the housing shortage and meet federal requirements. In reality, however, they almost never fully replaced the lost housing and they produced some highly undesirable consequences that were not recognized at the time. The first and largest site selected for redevelopment was a deteriorating 129-acre site near the center of what had been the African American enclave. During the early 1950s, hundreds of families received official notification that they were required to vacate their dwellings immediately as demolition was to begin. It took a decade for the clearance projects to begin, and then one high rise public housing project after another was built. Higher status African Americans tended to leave the area when the dislocations began. Those with fewer resources were forced to leave their homes,


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and then move again when the projects were completed; but then the eastside community involved a concentrated population of poor African Americans. Even if middle class people wanted to remain in the public housing units, they would not have qualified because of income restrictions. Neighborhood life suffered because of the absence of higher status residents who could have served as role models, and the people who were pushed into high-density public housing projects felt unconnected to the neighborhood and disinclined to participate in community affairs. With the simultaneous decline of factory employment, poverty and unemployment increased, and a familiar cycle of social problems ensued: non-marital births, crime and gangs, and the end result was “psychic withdrawal” from community life. Further, no one in the community had the funds to open stores or start newspapers or other activities that could have led residents to feel positively about the neighborhood. Absent any enclavelike qualities, people remain in ghettos not because of any attachment, but because they have no alternative.24


As the preceding discussion implies, the income of residents is another variable that tends to differentiate between enclaves and ghettos. In the latter, people are homogeneously poor, for the most part, and the community lacks resources. By contrast, the residents of an enclave tend to be heterogeneous with respect to income, and the community usually contains locally supported educational, cultural, and other resources. The relative wealth of enclaves, relative to ghettos, has led some analysts to use other terms to designate these communities, such as citadels and ethnoburbs, but the distinction is the same regardless of the terms employed.25 Part of the relative material comfort of enclaves is often due to their tendency to become tourist attractions, creating employment opportunities for residents and support for local establishments. Enclaves are frequently interesting to outsiders because the people and places they contain look different than “mainstream” communities. The residents often look and dress differently and the commercial centers tend to be comprised of small, non-chain, family-owned stores, and restaurants. This sets them apart from typical communities dominated by the same big-box retailers (e.g., Walmart) and the same fast food restaurant chains.26 Building upon their uniqueness, cities actively market enclaves as exotic and authentic components of a tourist’s experiences in 142

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a city. Examples of such promotions include the Arab Quarter in Paris, the Gay Village in Manchester, England, and Chinatown in New York. There is, however, a downside to being promoted as a tourist attraction. One such consequence is that decisions of where to invest are likely to be selected according to their probability of generating a ­tourism-related return rather than according to their potential contribution to the daily lives of residents. Elementary schools currently in use, for example, are not typically included in visitors’ agendas, but historical theaters are usually included. As a result, theaters are more likely to attract investment than schools, though most residents would probably not share those priorities. Associated with tourism, of course, is a breaking down of a community’s separation from the rest of a metropolitan area. To promote tourism, a city may improve access roads connecting the enclave to the rest of the city or add mass transit stops convenient to an enclave. The boundaries of a community will then frequently be penetrated by tourists temporarily entering it. This lack of separation stands in marked contrast to the social and physical isolation of ghettos, which is one of their most distinguishing features.27 IDENTITIES

Another major distinction between enclaves and ghettos resolves around the identities of residents. Whenever a specifically identifiable group of people are associated with a particular place, the distinctive characteristic of the residents is typically attributed to the place, as well: it becomes known as, “Chinatown,” “Little Italy,” or the like. The link between a particular population and a place is often so strong that people who share the group’s distinctive characteristic, but live elsewhere are considered to be in diaspora. In the case of ghettos, the distinguishing characteristic that is emphasized, at least by outsiders, tends to be ascribed, namely race or a combination of race and religion; and that characteristic tends to be subjected to negative stereotyping. In the case of enclaves, the distinctive characteristic can also be ascribed, but it tends to be less subjected to negative stereotyping. To illustrate: about 200,000 Germans emigrated to southern states of Brazil during the late 19th century, and they formed a number of enclaves with their own churches and institutions that served the special secular needs of the group (schools, newspapers, rifle clubs, etc.). During the late 19th century, the industriousness of the people in these enclaves was widely recognized and often admired and there was relatively little negative stereotyping.28 143

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In the case of enclaves in comparison to ghettos, the distinctive characteristic is often tied more to lifestyle than to ascribed characteristics, though. The American and British writers, painters, musicians, and artists who formed the Montparnasse enclave in Paris’ Left Bank during the 1920s are illustrative. Their enclave was formed in support of a creative and hedonistic lifestyle rather than any ascribed characteristics. Similarly, people committed to gay and lesbian lifestyles formed a Castro district enclave in San Francisco with bars and bookstores and various celebrations that supported their lifestyle.29 In these instances, ascribed characteristics were generally subordinated to lifestyles at the core of the enclave. Thus, residents in each enclave tended to make few distinctions between writers and artists in Montparnasse who were British or American, or between gay men and women in the Castro district who were black or white. We have emphasized that enclaves are areas containing residents who share something significant and that this shared quality is salient to their identities. From a social-psychological perspective, the term identities refers to meanings and definitions attached to people’s selves both by the people themselves and by others.30 Because one’s sense of self tends to be linked to roles and relationships, a person typically has multiple identities. Accordingly, people think about themselves in their occupational and student roles, familial roles, gender and racial roles, and so on. Like roles, a built environment can attain very high salience in people’s identities because physical settings become associated with the bonding of people. That is an important part of people’s attachments to an enclave. The names of communities of this type, simultaneously conveying both physical and social space, can similarly attain very high salience in people’s identities. Saying that one is from the Castro district, for example, is a personal statement that acts as a calling card, providing others inside and outside the enclave with information about the person’s identity. Another way to differentiate among roles or places in terms of their salience for people’s identities is to note the emotional difficulty that people ordinarily experience when they go through the process of disengaging from them. The role exits that usually create the greatest turmoil for people—sex changes, giving up custody of children, or leaving a profession—are the ones associated with people’s most salient identities. Disruptions in the roles associated with people’s place attachments, due to natural disasters, for example, have similarly been found to have profoundly adverse effects.31 The more enclave qualities that communities have before a flood, landslide, or the like, the greater the longterm depression, sadness, and stress former residents report feeling after they are forced to move. Some go through a grieving process for the destroyed place similar to mourning for the dead. 144

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Some identities are highly situational for most people, and the subjective significance of the roles associated with them also tends to vary situationally. For example, suppose a person was markedly older than everyone else in one particular group. While in that group, in contrast with an older or mixed-age group, the one older person would likely see age as a more salient aspect of his or her identity. Similarly, people might take their city of residence for granted most of the time and attribute little significance to it for purposes of self-definition; but when they are traveling abroad and making international acquaintances, it would probably become subjectively more prominent in these new relationships.32 Other identities and their corresponding roles are less prone to situational change. They remain salient and central features of the self and are indicated when people employ the same role and stress the correspondingly identity in many different situations. For example, a hypothetical physician. Pat Smith, might make restaurant and hotel reservations as Dr. Smith, insist on being introduced as Dr. Smith in social settings, and so on. This cross-situational reliance upon the occupational title would likely signify that, for Pat Smith, the status of doctor had high-identity salience. When a particular status has exceptional significance for a person’s identity, essentially shaping the persons entire social experience, the term “master status” is frequently employed.33 That one status is often emphasized by others as well, and becomes the primary basis for their view of the person. The one status that is dominant or overwhelming in the eyes of those who do not share that status is often based upon deviance, for example, they may view a person solely as a pedophile or an ex-con. However, the master status can come from diverse realms, for example: race or ethnicity, physical condition (e.g., sightless), occupation (e.g., movie star), etc. When people with a potentially dominant status interact with others who do not share that status, the others may be overwhelmed by that one master status. As a result, the others may not respond to the person’s humor, intelligence, physical attributes, or other qualities. That leaves the person with only the single identity when interacting with others who are different. Because others tend to recognize only the one status, it is important for people with a potentially master status who are committed to multiple statuses to interact with others like themselves. Such others are often the only ones who can “validate” the full range of a person’s salient identities. If a woman is to continue to view herself as humorous, for example, it is necessary for people to laugh when she tells a joke. If a 145

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man is to continue to view himself as physically attractive, it is necessary for others to respond to him in an interested way. However, outsiders may not respond to the attempts at humor or the physical attractiveness of a person to whom they have attributed a master status. That leaves the person with only the single identity when interacting with others who are different. Thus, people with such dominant statuses often prefer each other’s company.34 The homogeneity of enclaves with respect to a potentially dominant status translates into opportunities for people to establish their other identities and provides one explanation for why many people are attached to life in an enclave. ENCLAVES VERSUS GHETTOS

In sum, we have identified a number of ways in which enclaves can be differentiated from ghettos. The major distinctions include the following: 1. Although both are segregated communities, the segregation of an enclave is based more upon its attractiveness to a particular group of people while the segregation of a ghetto is more involuntary (i.e. imposed). 2. Having an address in an enclave is usually a positive part of a resident’s identity while living in a ghetto tends to be a stigmatized feature of residents’ identities, though either can provide a place in which other identities can be actualized. 3. The income of residents in an enclave tends to be highly variable compared to the more homogeneously poor residents of a ghetto. 4. Enclaves often become tourist attractions while ghettos only rarely do. 5. Enclaves are usually well-connected to the city of which they are apart while ghettos tend to be socially and physically isolated. 6. Enclaves can be located anywhere in a metropolitan area. Ghettos are ordinarily found only in inner cities in the United States, but their location varies in non-U.S. cities. It is also important to recognize that the above noted differences are sometimes matters of degree rather than categorical; for example, some enclaves can be almost as isolated as a typical ghetto. Further, the distinction between these two types of communities is not necessarily fixed permanently. In some case, as previously discussed, a community can move from being more enclave-like to being more ghetto-like, and vice versa. 146

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ETHNOBURBS Ethnoburbs are the most recently developed classification for communities, initially indebted largely to a series of articles and books by Wei Li.35 The major model of an “ethnoburb” in her research was the concentration of ethnic Chinese in California’s San Gabriel Valley, and the city of Monterey Park, in particular. While most of the ethnoburb research has focused upon ethnic Chinese, other Asian groups as well as non-Asian groups have also been examined. And these studies have described ethnoburbs outside of U.S. cities in states other than California, and in the suburbs of cities in Canada, New Zealand, and elsewhere. One major limitation to where ethnoburbs can form lies in the nature of a city’s peripheral areas. To be suburban implies that the peripheral location consists of newer, higher status and low-density construction, and it is in such suburbs that ethnoburbs are situated. However, defined in that way, the areas outside of Beijing, for example, would not qualify as suburban.36 It would also not fit the banlieues outside of Paris, as previously described. Where such suburbs do not exist, neither, by definition, could ethnoburbs. The features that Li and others have emphasized in distinguishing an ethnoburb from other types of communities, in addition to their suburban location, include a significant concentration of one ethnic group, often Chinese, but also the presence of substantial numbers of other ethnic groups, and a transnational ethnic economy highly developed by the dominant ethnic group. In light of the way, Li’s research has influenced ensuing studies of ethnoburbs, we will focus upon the development of her prototype in Monterey Park. SAN GABRIEL AND MONTEREY PARK

The San Gabriel Valley is located just over eight miles east of the center of the city of Los Angeles. It covers 200 square miles and contains 31 cities and towns. According to the 2010 Census, the Valley had a total population of about one and one-half million persons. Just over 25% of the total were Asian Americans, dominated by Chinese and Taiwanese. The single largest racial-ethnic group was Latin Hispanic, with non-Hispanic whites in third place. However, the ethnic racial mix varies from city to city. Monterey Park in 2010 was a city of about 60,000 of whom about 65% were Asian (predominantly from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), 28% were Hispanic or Latino, and 7% were “other” (African American, non-Hispanic white, or mixed).37 147

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The Chinese population in the Los Angeles area was originally concentrated in an inner-city area known as “Chinatown.” Settlement in the community began in the late 19th century and it grew into the early 20th century. While the original Chinatown had some enclave-like features (for example, it offered a variety of specialized goods and services specifically for co-ethnics), it largely resembled a ghetto because people moved to the community mostly in reaction to the anti-Chinese hostility expressed by the larger white population and it was mostly comprised of relatively poor residents. The primary tie between the residents of Chinatown and their homelands involved correspondence with family and family-related travel. There were very few business connections. When a large part of the Chinese population in Los Angeles lived in Chinatown, the area that later became the City of Monterey Park (it was incorporated in 1916) was still a sparsely settled agricultural area. It grew slowly, initially viewed by its developers as a potentially high end community, partially because its hilly landscape resembled Beverly Hills, a wealthy suburb with high-end shopping located just east of the city of Los Angeles. By the end of World War II, however, it had become a typical, middle class suburban town, almost all white, with fewer than ten Chinese residents. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

During the 1950s and 1960s, there was some movement of people from Chinatown to the San Gabriel Valley, and to Monterey Park in particular, as part of the post war suburban movement, which involved much of the entire population. There were also pockets of Chinese residents outside of Chinatown, near South Central Los Angeles, a poor and racially diverse area. It was here that there were large-scale race riots in the 1960s, with widespread fires and looting. The destruction and violence associated with the riots provided an impetus for people who were able to leave to move, and many of the Chinese who left South Central selected Monterey Park. They viewed Chinatown, an obvious alternative, as too congested and commercial, and its residential rents had become very high—substantially higher than in Monterey Park. Some of the newcomers also had friends or relatives who had previously moved to Monterey Park, and they chose to follow in a familiar pattern of chain migration. By 1970, there were over 2,000 Chinese residents in Monterey Park, and they lived in a tight cluster or residences. However, at this time, it was necessary for the residents of Monterey Park to go to Chinatown if they wanted to shop at a Chinese grocery store or eat in an authentic 148

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Chinese restaurant. None opened in Monterey Park until after 1970. Thus, Monterey Park prior to this time was still a typical non-ethnic suburb, and the growing Chinese population it contained constituted neither an enclave nor an ethnoburb.38 During the 1970s and 1980s, the movement of Chinese from ­various parts of Los Angeles to Monterey Park increased, and there was a very large influx of international migrants, especially from Taiwan to the Los Angeles area, including Monterey Park. This led to one of the city’s nicknames “Little Taipei.” (Taipei is the capital of Taiwan.) During the 1970s, as relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were normalized, many wealthy families in Taiwan feared that their country would be reclaimed by the PRC. This fear prompted a capital and migrant outflow from Taiwan to the United States, with the Los Angeles area the favored destination of both capital and immigrants. They were joined by an exodus from PRC, and their combined presence had a dramatic effect upon Monterey Park as well as the greater Los Angeles area: airlines added numerous nonstop flights from Los Angeles to Taipei (Taiwan’s capital city) and Beijing; the PRC opened a consulate general office in Los Angeles to promote trade and cultural exchanges; the number of Chinese-owned banks proliferated; and greater Los Angeles became the U.S. metropolitan area with the largest concentration of Chinese-owned firms. Two of the hilly sections of Monterey Park were favored locations for all of the ethnically Chinese migrants, both from other parts of Los Angeles and abroad. This led to the city’s other nickname, “the Chinese Beverly Hills,” and that was one of the ways it became widely known, both in the Los Angeles area and abroad.39 Many of the international migrants, from Taiwan and from Hong Kong, were entrepreneurs who wanted to open businesses in Monterey Park, and they came with the resources to purchase homes and start local businesses. They bought local property, transforming a former bowling alley into a “Hong Kong Supermarket,” starting Chinese banks, TV and radio stations, opening recreational centers where elderly Chinese could play mahjong, etc. Most of these businesses catered to a distinctive Chinese market. For example, the Universal Chung Wah Funeral Home specialized in bringing the ashes of deceased family members from China to Monterey Park. (Keeping the remains close, according to Chinese tradition, makes it easier for the memory of the deceased to be revered.) By the 1980s, both sides of Monterey Park’s main commercial thoroughfare—Atlantic Boulevard—were dominated by retail stores and commercial offices with large, colorful Chinese-language signs. Even though journalist Timothy Fong was accustomed to seeing 149

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Chinese-language signs from visiting his grandparents in San ­Francisco’s Chinatown, his first trip down Atlantic Boulevard made his jaw drop. It felt like a foreign country, he later wrote.40 Just east of Atlantic Boulevard in the city’s original downtown area is Garvey Avenue. It was (and is) also lined with Chinese establishments: restaurants, bookstores, herb shops, and banks, and again, almost all of the signage was in Chinese. One notable establishment is the 99 Ranch Market, a Taiwanese American owned supermarket, which opened in the mid-1980s. It grew to 42 stores, mostly in California, and became the largest Asian supermarket chain in the United States.41 Its name was meant to blend traditional Chinese (99 stands for eternity In C ­ hinese numerology) and the American West (the reason ranch was added). In its-wide, brightly lit isles, young Asian families and singles found Gatorade and Skippy Peanut Butter as well as fungus buns, marinated pigs’ ears, white gourd juice, and tanks of live fish—not the iced headless fish that make these shoppers uncomfortable. Sho Kang, a 3­ 5-year-old electrical engineer, was looking over. Taiwanese entertainment magazines when a reporter asked him about where people he knew liked to shop. His answer summarized many of the differences in age, wealth, and lifestyle between residents of the city’s Chinatown and suburban Monterey Park. “Chinatown is for the old immigrant; 99 Ranch is for the new,” he answered.42 Using the capital they brought from China or could get from ­Chinese-owned banks in the Los Angeles area, new arrivals from ­Taiwan and Hong Kong established import–export business that tied their local community to the places the immigrants had left. They also built malls and condominiums and developed commercial strips. They converted the quiet downtown area into a busy commercial center. They took over many businesses, most of the restaurants, and all but two of the supermarket chains serving Monterey Park. One description of what was available in grocery stores stated: “Bok choy is more common than lettuce in produce departments, and dim sum … more readily available than a hamburger … in the restaurants.”43 HOSTILE REACTIONS AND COALITIONS

Long-term, non-Chinese residents in Monterey Park had a feeling of being overwhelmed by a foreign invasion. They had moved to the town when it was a more typical and homogeneously white suburban community. Many of these people reacted with anger to the influx of Chinese residents and businesses with their Chinese signs. One elderly white man complained about how things had changed: “Before, immigrants 150

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lived in their own neighborhoods and moved into ours after they learned English. Today, the Chinese come right in with their money and their ways. We are the aliens.”44 Another white man sold his home to a Chinese developer because he was disgusted with the changes that had occurred in his immediate neighborhood. When he had first moved into his house, the neighborhood had consisted of other individual family homes like his own. Tall condominium complexes on both sides of the street now were filled with large Chinese families living in cramped quarters and speaking little English. “What 1 might do,” he said, “is hang a little American flag on my truck and drive through town on my way out and wave goodbye to all my old friends.”45 In any community or nation, the growth of a distinctive racial or ethnic group could typically be expected to elicit similarly hostile reactions from residents who moved to the community before the influx. Outside of Melbourne, Australia, for example, an increase in the number of Chinese immigrants led old-timers to feel nostalgic for the “good old days” when all of the stores and restaurants were Australian, not Chinese.46 The rapid influx of the Chinese into Monterey Park and the subsequent proliferation of commercial and residential construction also created other changes that were upsetting to people who had previously moved to Monterey Park. Most notably, the Chinese residents and businesses caused traffic on its now-crowded streets to grind to a halt. The long-term residents of the city objected to the uncontrolled growth as well as to the feeling of being invaded, and during the 1980s sought to resist further growth and immigration. The city council, dominated during the 1970s and 1980s by whites, approved a master plan that greatly restricted further commercial development. Local governments do not generally tend to favor no-growth positions because continued growth fueled by land development enhances the fiscal situation of a local government.47 Nevertheless, the no-growth policy was endorsed by Monterey Park’s white-dominated city council, its intent clearly to inhibit further in-migration of the Chinese. If there was any doubt about the motive behind the no-growth policy, at the same time English was declared the official language of Monterey Park. One city council member, in particular, tried to organize xenophobic neighborhood parties to celebrate very traditional Fourth of July patriotic celebrations, but his efforts fizzled. In terms of constituencies, by the 1990s, Monterey Park consisted of three major groups: white Anglo, Hispanic, and Asian (predominantly Chinese). Decision-making power in the community had historically been in the hands of the Anglos, and the other two groups were slow to organize. However, when Anglo officeholders attempted to pass legislation that was designed to harm the interests of the other two groups, it helped the Hispanic and Asian communities to overcome their initial 151

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antagonisms toward each other and pushed them into a coalition that was large enough for them to block harmful legislation and to elect officials from their own groups. The council member who had organized the xenophobic ­neighborhood parties was voted out of office in 1990, receiving the fewest votes among the candidates from Anglos as well as from Chinese and Latino voters. ­ merican-born The mayoral election that year was won by Judy Chu, an A woman of Chinese descent. She spoke at length about separating ­ethnicity and xenophobia from growth policies. Her platform promised growth, but of a managed sort, and cultural diversity. Judy Chu’s election as mayor of Monterey Park in 1990 was dramatic in terms of the way it demonstrated not only the shift in power to members of an ethnic group, but also how the roles of Chinese women had changed. One hundred years earlier, Chinese women were brought to California to be sold as household servants or prostitutes. Judy Chu was later re-elected Mayor, then successfully ran for the U.S. Congress in 2009 when she became the first Chinese American woman to win such a seat. She was subsequently re-elected several times. When Monterey Park’s 102nd birthday was celebrated, in 2018, she was one of the principal speakers. Also featured was the current Mayor, other members of the city council, and the city clerk, almost all of whom were Asian Americans. The focal point of the city’s birthday was a parade, and the Grand Marshal of the parade, who was also president elect of the Monterey Park Women’s Club, was a bilingual Hispanic woman.48 THE TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

Historically, immigrants tended to settle in the center of cities, then with assimilation and economic attainment, many experienced social and geographical mobility, moving to suburban areas. Those who left Los Angeles’ Chinatown for Monterey Park fit this model. In many ethnoburbs, this historical type of migration has been combined with a new pattern that features trans-national movement directly to the suburban area. The Taiwanese migrants to Monterey Park followed this form, and these are the migrants that are primarily responsible for establishing economic ties to the homeland. These changes in the nature of emigration have been widespread, and are one of the main reasons for the increase in ethnoburbs. To illustrate further, in Chicago, Polish enclaves formed in the city since the turn of the 20th century. These neighborhoods predominantly comprised Poles, and these immigrants typically lacked much formal education and worked at low-paying, unskilled jobs. More recently, thousands of Poles 152

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have emigrated to suburban areas north of Chicago. Many of these emigres are entrepreneurs and professionals, with economic ties to Poland. And the new ethnoburbs into which they are moving contain a mix of other racial and ethnic groups, in addition to the Polish concentration.49 Prior to the late 1970s, as previously noted, Chinatown in Los Angeles was the center of Chinese cultural life in the Los Angeles area. As the number of ethnic Chinese moved into Monterey Park, it emerged as the ethnic service center. Some of the businesses were the typical ethnic enterprises of the past: Chinese restaurants, grocery stores, gift shops, etc. Slowly added were the professional offices of doctors and lawyers tending to the Chinese population, beauty salons and barber shops, etc. Then came travel agencies, which facilitated both immigration and visits home to see family, and branches of Chinese-owned banks that facilitated the entrepreneurial activity of the later immigrants.50 The recent popularity of Los Angeles as a destination for Chinese immigrants is a result of changes in the world system as well as changes in the nature of the immigrants. Most nations have increasingly become part of a world economy in which major decisions are made in the leading global cities. As described earlier, these are cities that house the headquarters of multinational corporations, are centers of finance, investment, and high-level legal and accounting services, contain the entertainment conglomerates, and are major links in global transportation and communication networks. The firms housed within these large and complex cities control and coordinate all kinds of commercial and cultural activities around the world. New York has historically been the preeminent global city in the United States and the nation’s principal link to the other leading world cities: London, Paris, and Tokyo.51 As the United States became more closely tied into the world system, more American cities joined New York as important links in the international network. Los Angeles is of particular note in this regard because Chinese immigration helped it to become one of the most important global cities in the United States and the world. ETHNOBURBS VERSUS ENCLAVES

There are a number of apparent similarities between ethnoburbs and enclaves. Living in either one tends to be based upon attraction more than external pressures, and living in either is usually a positive feature of residents’ identities, especially in comparison to ghettos. The income of residents tends to be highly variable in both and both also are typically connected to the urban area of which they are a part, again especially in relation to ghettos. 153

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On the other hand, while enclaves can be located anywhere, in a city or its periphery, ethnoburbs are confined to suburban areas and are less likely than enclaves to become tourist attractions. Ethnoburbs also tend to be found in less segregated, less homogeneous communities. However, the most important distinction—and one that provides the single best way to distinguish between an enclave and an ethnoburb— entails the amount of transnational economic activity. It is high in an ethnoburb and low in an enclave. The importance of such activity in deciding how to classify a community is illustrated in Box 5.3. In sum, in an ethnoburb, such as Monterey Park, one would expect to find a mix of businesses. Included would be stores serving co-­ethnics owned by local entrepreneurs, but also larger enterprises—import– export business, banks, and financial services firms—that link the immigrants’ current and former countries of residence.

BOX 5.3  KOREAN COMMUNITIES IN AUCKLAND In recent years, there has been a growing number of immigrants from Korea moving directly into some of the suburban areas outside of Auckland, New Zealand. They have tended to live in concentrated areas, but they typically comprise a small percentage of the larger community. Their size is relatively small compared to the native New Zealand population and other Asian groups, notably from China and India. Based upon these demographic considerations, the Korean community could appear to comprise an ethnobrub. There is also the expected socioeconomic variation within the community. However, according to Hong and Yoon, these Auckland suburbs should not be considered ethnoburbs because of one crucial ingredient that is missing: transnational economic activity. Their analysis of Korean businesses in suburban Auckland found that it fit the enclave more than the ethnoburb model. Specifically, they noted that about 85% of the businesses owned by Koreans were located within, or else very close to, the Korean residential cluster. And that location was due to the fact that the Korean-owned businesses were owned solely by local entrepreneurs and catered to local co-ethnics; and did not involve transnational ties. The most popular types of businesses were sit-in and take-out restaurants, pharmacies, grocery stores, and other specialized retail food services, and so on.52 The location and types of businesses owned by the Koreans in suburban Auckland imply a tradition enclave-like economy in which small businesses target the local co-ethnic market. Almost completely lacking are any homeland economic connections, that is, to Seoul. Primarily for that reason, Hong and Yoon considered this community to more closely resemble an enclave than an ethnoburb.


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When immigrants establish strong ties to their countries of origin, these ties are likely to expand their notion of “home,” according to Waldinger and Fitzgerald, to encompass both here (current place) and there (former place). The transmigrants’ bilocal conception of home may lead to their estrangement, though. Other people in their current place of residence (i.e., here) may find the immigrants’ foreign attachment disconcerting, particularly when the relationship between the two nations involved is strained by international events. At the same time, the immigrants’ movement sets them apart from their former cohorts who remained there. Having left a nation almost necessarily makes them different in some respects from the people they left behind.53 The bilocal residents of modern enclaves may therefore suffer a kind of marginality in which they do not fit anywhere, except with each other. This may, of course, increase their attachment to an ethnoburb.

GLOSSARY Enclaves: Places with relatively homogeneous populations that are attracted to the community’s distinctive institutions and stores, and for whom living in the enclave is part of their identity. Ethnoburbs: Racially or ethnically mixed suburban areas that are dominated by one of the ethnic groups that maintains transnational economic ties. Ghettos, Contemporary: Places with relatively homogenous minority populations with high unemployment, poverty, and crime that tend to be isolated from the rest of the city. Ghettos, Historical: A place occupied by a distinctive racial-ethnic group with its own institutions. Identity: The meanings attached to a person’s sense of self, both by the person and others. Master Status: Feature of the self that remains highly salient across situations, often submerging other potential statuses.

CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER 10. Space in the globalizing city Peter Marcuse 17. The dream of Delhi as a global city Veronique Dupont 155

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28. The virtual palimpsest of the global city network Mark Graham 41. The right to the city David Harvey 45. Between ghetto and globe: remaking urban life in Africa AbdouMaliq Simone 63. Global suburbanization Roger Keil 67. Governing the informal in globalizing cities: comparing China, India and Brazil Xuefei Ren

NOTES 1 Louis Wirth, The Ghetto. University of Chicago, 1928. 2 Louis Wirth, “The Ghetto.” American Journal of Sociology, 33, 1927, p. 68. 3 Robert E. Park, “The City.” In Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (Eds), The City. University of Chicago, 1984. First published in 1925. 4 Mitchell Duneier, The Ghetto. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 2016. 5 Ibid. 6 David L. Good, The Dictator of Dearborn. Wayne State University, 1989. 7 Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger and Harry J. Holzer, Detroit Divided. ­Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. 8 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid. Harvard University, 1993. 9 Harold Wolman, et al., Coping With Adversity. Cornell University, 2017. 10 William J. Wilson, When Work Disappears. Vantage, 1996. 11 Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor. Duke University, 2009. 12 Figures from Pew Research Center, July 18, 2014. 13 See, for example, William K. Tabb, The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto. W.W. Norton, 1970. 14 Chris Hayes, A Colony in a Nation. W.W. Norton, 2018. 15 Eric Tang, Unsettled. Temple University, 2015. 16 For further discussion of defining characteristics, and their inter-connections, see Dominique Raynoud, “Inside the Ghetto.” Bulletin de Methodologie Sociologique, 133, 2017. 17 Loic Wacquant, Urban Outcasts. Cambridge University, 2008. 18 For an English language review of several French studies, see the English translation of, Herve Marchal and Jean-Marc Stebe, “The New French Ghettos.” Metro, December 16, 2010. See also, John Agnew, “Slums, Ghettos and Urban Marginality.” Urban Geography, 31, 2010. 19 Isabella C. Marinaro, “The Informal Faces of the (neo-)ghetto.” International Sociology, 32, 2017.


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20 H. Julia Eksner, “Revisiting the ‘Ghetto’ in the New Berlin Republic.” Social Anthropology, 21, 2013. 21 See the essays in Part One of David P. Varady (Ed), Desegregating the City. State University of New York, 2005. 22 See Loic Wacquant, Urban Outcasts, op.cit; Loic Wacquant, “Seclusion in the ­Twenty-First Century.” Perspective: The Yale Architectural Journal, 43, 2010; and Dominique Raynaud, op.cit. 23 Raphael Susewind, “Muslims in Indian Cities.” Environment and Planning A, March 7, 2017. 24 For further discussion of the problems of inner-city Detroit, see Susan Welch, et al., Race and Place, Cambridge University, 2001; Kimberly Kinder, DIY Detroit, University of Minnesota, 2016. 25 See, for example, Peter Marcuse, “The Enclave, the Citadel and the Ghetto.” Urban Affairs Review, 33, 1997. 26 See Jan Lin, The Power of Urban Ethnic Places. Routledge, 2010. 27 See especially Wacquant, Urban Outcasts, op.cit. 28 That changed with international conflicts and World Wars in the 20th century. For further discussion of this enclave, see Mark Abrahamson, Urban Enclaves, Worth, 2006. 29 Ibid. 30 For further discussion of this perspective, see the essays on identity, its presentation and boundaries, in Jo Regan, et al. (Eds), Identity Work in Social Movements. University of Minnesota, 2008. 31 Melinda Milligan, “Displacement and Identity Continuity.” Symbolic Interaction, 26, 2003. 32 Situational effects on identity are examined in, Timothy J. Owens, Dawn T. Robinson and Lynn Smith-Lovin, “Three Faces of Identity.” Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 2010. 33 Stephen Hunt, “Master Status.” In George Ritzer (Ed), Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Wiley, 2007. 34 This discussion is based upon the ideas presented by, Erving Goffman, Stigma. Prentice-Hall, 1963. 35 Most notable is, Wei Li, Ethnoburbs. University of Hawaii, 2009. This book focuses primarily upon the San Gabriel valley. For studies of other communities in the U.S., Canada, New Zealand and elsewhere, see Wei Li (Ed), From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb. University of Hawaii, 2006. 36 See Xuefei Ren, “Lost in Translation.” In Richard Harris and Charlotte Vorms (Eds) What’s in a Name. University of Toronto, 2017. 37 U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Monterey Park City. Population estimates from July 1, 2017. 38 Li, op.cit. 39 Ibid. 40 Timothy P. Fong, The First Suburban Chinatown. Temple University, 1994. 41 Hank Pellissier, “99 Ranch Market.” The New York Times, May 21, 2011. 42 Quoted in, Patricia L. Brown, “In California Malls, New Chinatowns.” New York Times, March 25, 2003.


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43 Fong, op.cit., p. 62. 44 John Horton, “The Politics of Diversity in Monterey Park, California.” In ­Louise Lamphere (Ed), Structuring Diversity. University of Chicago, 1992. 45 Fong, op.cit., p. 65. 46 LinLing Gao-Miles, “Beyond the Ethnic Enclave.” City and Society, 29, 2017. 47 For further discussion, see John R. Logan and Harvey Molotch, Urban Fortunes. University of California, 2007. 48 Nancy Arcuri, “Happy 102th Birthday Monterey Park!” The Citizen’s Voice, June 19, 2018. 49 Jason Schneider, “From Urban Enclave to Ethnoburb.” Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies, 15, 2014. 50 See Li, op.cit. 51 For further discussion, see Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy. Sage, 2018. 52 Seong-Yun Hong and Hong-key Yoon, “Ethno-Economic Satellite.” Population, Space and Place, 20, 2014. 53 Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald, “Transnationalism in Question 1.” American Journal of Sociology, 5, 2004.



Paradigms of growth and shrinkage Within a city, some neighborhoods remain largely the same over long periods of time while others grow larger or smaller, richer or poorer. What will happen in a neighborhood depends, in part, upon where it began: its location in a metropolitan area, the physical quality of its housing stock, the racial composition of its population, and so on. However, local and metropolitan level variables contribute only part of the explanation for how neighborhoods change. In a world full of global linkages, what happens in one place often shapes events over large distances. For example, Newman pointed out, financial regulations enacted in the United Kingdom affect the cost and availability of capital in the United States, and this will impact local urban places in the United States.1 How cities and their metropolitan areas change is also affected by a mix of local and global variables. The global city literature, discussed in Chapter 2, emphasized the linkages among cities across the world, and the way cities changed as a result of these linkages. While a few major cities have become the command-and-control centers, Newman continued, neighborhoods everywhere are being impacted by the flow of global capital. The traditional banking systems that once linked local ­communities of savers and borrowers have been joined by, and sometimes 159

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replaced by, a world market. Global capital has drawn neighborhoods, “into the global economy house-by-house, apartment-by-apartment.”2 In addition to the flow of global capital is the flow of personnel employed by multinational corporations who are in motion, choosing certain local communities over others with consequences for all of them as well as for the metropolitan area of which they are a part. In this chapter, we will examine the processes by which cities and neighborhoods change, and grow smaller or larger, wealthier or poorer, age and deteriorate, or become gentrified.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL Through the first half of the 20th century, the dominant theory of how cities grew and changed was intimately connected with the Chicago School. Between roughly 1915 and 1935, the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago was, without question, the dominant sociology department in the United States, and probably in the world. Its faculty members presented the most influential theories and methods, it trained more PhD students in sociology than the rest of the world combined, and it published the leading sociology journal, American Journal of Sociology. The Chicago influence was particularly strong in urban sociology, but it was not confined to sociology. Chicago faculty in geography, anthropology, and economic and social psychology were also important parts of the Chicago School. The central figures in the Chicago School were Robert Park, a former newspaper reporter; his ex-student, Ernest Burgess; and their Chicago colleagues, Roderick McKenzie and Louis Wirth, in particular. In 1925, they published their major ideas in a book aptly entitled The City.3 In this book they contended that the human community should be studied analogously to a plant or animal community, utilizing the same concepts. For example, in botany, an invasion-succession cycle referred to the way a new type of plant species got a foothold in an area and then slowly overran the previously established plants. In the human community, they argued, it could refer to the way a newly arriving immigrant group infiltrated an area occupied by earlier arriving immigrant groups, and then forced out and replaced the previous occupants. Paralleling explanations in botany and biology, the Chicago urbanists developed human ecology as a theory that examined the spatial placement of elements within a community and focused on the effects of location within that community. To be specific, McKenzie defined their ecological analyses as examining “the effect of position, in time and space, upon human institutions and human behavior.”4 160

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The best-known representation of the Chicago School’s ecology of the human community was the concentric zone model. It placed Chicago’s downtown, or central business district (CBD), in the center, zone one, like the nucleus of a cell. The large banks, government offices, and corporate headquarters located in the CBD, locally referred to as “the loop,” were viewed as controlling growth everywhere in the community, also analogously to the role of the nucleus in a cell. The rest of the city extended out from the center in a series of concentric zones, resembling the cross sections of a tree. Also like the rings of a tree, the zones were thought to represent bands of growth. Because its central location provided maximum access to all parts of the community, the CBD was the most desirable location. That made it expensive. Only those activities that could most profit from such a central location could afford the high rents associated with the CBD. So, large hotels and department stores were typically situated downtown because they could greatly benefit from this location, whereas factories and single-family homes were not in the CBD because they could not profit sufficiently from the location to afford its high rents. A zone with mixed land uses, zone two, surrounded the CBD. Called the zone of transition, it was a hodgepodge of factories and shabby homes of new immigrant groups, each of which formed nearly self-contained ethnic communities with their own food stores, churches, and so on. Also found in this zone were rundown areas with prostitutes, homeless vagrants, and alcoholics. Moving further out from the center was zone three, a residential zone, containing earlier-arriving immigrant groups that had assimilated and “moved up” socially and moved out ­geographically. Zone four was middle class suburban and zone five (and sometimes six as well) were higher status suburban areas, reflecting the fact that ­commuting from an outer zone required wealth. The principle underlying the zones was the greater a residential area’s distance from the center, the later its development and the higher the status of its residents.5 The Chicago School researchers primarily studied Chicago as their “laboratory.” It seemed to provide the prototype of a modern industrial city with large factories surrounded by immigrants in working-class enclaves and a thriving downtown. In addition, the city was rapidly growing and expanding. The fact that much of this was occurring on the south side of Chicago, right outside the university’s doorstep, also made it very convenient. The Chicago sociologists assumed the zones that described Chicago would also fit many other modern cities, and to varying degrees they did. 161

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While the concentric zone model did approximate spatial configurations in Chicago and a number of other modern cities, and it did offer insights into how industrialization impacted the spatial form of many cities, some criticized it for providing an oversimplified representation of the modern city. Without rejecting it, they advocated modifications. For example, geographer Homer Hoyt noted that as intra-urban transportation improved, it often led to specialized corridors, extending outward along boulevards and rail lines. These areas were sometimes homogeneous with respect to residents’ characteristics (e.g., their country of origin) and sometimes with respect to land use (e.g., furniture manufacturers and textile and leather goods producers). Viewing the city from above, these corridors, called sectors, resembled the slices of a pie more than concentric zones.6 A number of urban ecologists later concluded that the modern city was a mix of zones and sectors. One major contention of the concentric zone model was that suburban development was a postscript, occurring years after the shape of modern cities was essentially formed, and that suburban industrial development in particular trailed decades behind the formation of industrial cities. This suburban lag thesis survived well after the general decline in interest in the concentric zone model that espoused it. In fact, it was not until shortly before the end of the 20th century that a spate of studies argued that the suburban lag had been seriously exaggerated. Although it is true that extensive suburban development did occur decades after the formation of industrial cities, some substantial fringe development actually occurred very early in the process. For example, by the early to mid-19th century, the physical deterioration of central Manchester, England had already made it an undesirable place to live. Those who could afford to move out of the city did so, into peripheral (i.e., suburban) areas. Manchester thus began a pattern of middle-class flight that later was to become an even more imposing characteristic of most industrial cities.7 Mid-19th century developments in suburban Montreal are described in Box 6.1.

BOX 6.1  MONTREAL’S 19TH CENTURY SUBURBS During the middle decades of the 19th century there was substantial growth in manufacturing in Montreal’s central city, leading to increased rents and increased competition for space. Both to the west and east of the city, manufacturing districts were rapidly growing because land at the fringe was cheaper making it especially desirable to companies that required large amounts of space for production or warehousing. In addition, labor unions


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were less well organized than they were in the city, another attraction of the suburbs to company owners. Residential development necessarily followed factory employment because the means of transportation in mid-19th century cities were so limited and expensive that most workers had to be able to walk to work. Multifamily units and small homes were constructed close to suburban Montreal’s breweries, steel and cotton mills, and so on. Grocers and other small retail establishments followed, many of them catering to the distinct ethnicities of local labor forces. All of the above expansions, which were occurring from the middle of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, mirrored developments that had previously begun in the city and were also continuing to occur in the city. Thus, in Montreal, as in many other places, city and suburban developments occurred parallel to each other, with only a small suburban lag.8

Later in the 20th century, the extensive expansion of areas outside of cities seemed particularly incongruous with the Chicago School’s contentions because suburbanization typically entailed more than just housing. To be specific, even in Chicago, as more of the finance, insurance, and real estate activities that shaped growth throughout the metropolitan area became housed in the suburbs as well as CBDs, the Chicago School’s single nucleus model (in zone one) was gradually replaced by a multiple nuclei model that recognized the significance of activities that were located in the suburban fringe (i.e., outer zones).9 In sum, through at least the first half of the 20th century, the concentric zone model, despite some criticisms, retained an important place in urban studies because it did, at least partly, seem to describe spatial arrangements in Chicago and in a number of cities. Another important factor that continued to prop up the concentric zone model was its emphasis on the ecological principles of separation, specialization, and external regulation. These features were highly congruent with images of the modern industrial city presented by architects, writers, planners, and artists. In the view that predominated, individual agency was accorded little significance given the coerciveness of ecological constraints on people’s thoughts and actions. During the last decades of the 20th century, however, interest in concentric zones declined because more studies produced research findings that were inconsistent with the model. Only a few analysts continue to find the model useful.10 Of most consequence for the decline of the Chicago School’s model, however, was the movement of urban studies toward a political and economic 163

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paradigm that did not emphasize the ecological variables. At the same time, numerous other universities came to rival or surpass Chicago as a center for urban studies, so the diminished aura of the Chicago School lent less credence to the concentric zone model that was so closely connected to it. As we will later describe, it also contributed to a declining emphasis on Chicago as the protypical city.

POLITICAL ECONOMY Beginning in the 1970s, the theoretical perspective that came to rival and then surpass ecology in urban studies involved an emphasis on political economy (PE). This paradigm has its origins in the writings of several classical theorists, most notably Karl Marx. Thus, urban sociology reached back to the past to find theoretical concepts with which to describe a future that was unfolding. Ironically, perhaps, it was a theory that was initially formulated to explain the form of industrial societies as they were emerging that was revised in order to examine the transition away from industrial societies. MARX AND NEO-MARXISM

Although Marx inspired many of the core ideas and assumptions, the contemporary PE theories typically do not call for the type of revolutionary activity that Marx urged. They tend to be critical of capitalism, alarmed with how it has spread with globalization, and sympathetic to the interests of the working class. However, contemporary Marx-­ inspired views generally stop short of advocating revolution. In addition, these theories recognize that the contemporary labor force is very different from the one Marx analyzed, containing more white-collar and managerial workers, for example, and fewer factory laborers. These are important differences, and they make several of Marx’s ideas less applicable. Nevertheless, to reflect the continuing influence of his insights, many of these contemporary PE theories are often called neo-Marxist. One of the major ways in which neo-Marxist theories are faithful to the original is by placing an emphasis on class conflict. In capitalistic societies, Marx and his followers believed that there were fundamental cleavages separating those who owned capital, such as factories and land, from those who had only their labor to sell (as factory workers, farm hands, and the like). No matter the degree to which each of these groups recognized it, their interests would necessarily stand in opposition to each other. More wages for workers must, at some point, mean less profit for factory owners. There is also a power discrepancy between those who 164

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own capital and those who have only their labor to offer as a result of differences in their access to government officials in decision-making positions. In a capitalistic society, Marx believed, the state invariably reflected the interests of owners over workers. For example, who gains from police enforcement of property rights—owners or renters? Seeing how the support provided by political decision-makers to special interest groups affects the way cities grow and change is, therefore, an important issue to contemporary PE theories. This legacy leads urban analysts to examine such issues as the way real estate and other investors may have special access to the government and quasi-government agencies responsible for planning and zoning regulations, highway and mass transit construction, urban redevelopment, and so forth. In addition to an emphasis upon class differences in power, a central feature of PE follow Marx’s theory of commodities, defined as the basic objects capable of satisfying human needs. This is a broad category, containing everything from French fries to cellphones. Central to his analysis of commodities was a distinction between use value and exchange value.11 1. Use value is tied to consumption, and is determined by the physical properties of any commodity, such as an automobile or a can of soda, because these features determine how the commodity can be used. 2. Exchange value entails the worth of any commodity relative to others. It is typically expressed in monetary terms because money provides the common denominator in making such comparisons. To illustrate how class conflict and the different values of commodities can be employed together, consider an apartment building. Most tenants would be working-class people, employed in stores, factories, construction sites, and so on, and the apartment would have use-value to them for the shelter it provides. Consistent with use-value, it would be appreciated in relation to its actual properties, such as its size, location, and layout. However, to the absentee owner—a capitalist—the same apartment is a commodity that has exchange-value, reflecting the amount of rental income it generates. Congruent with its exchangevalue, that income, judged relative to the profit that investments in other buildings, or in stocks, CDs, or the like would yield, provides the owner’s criterion in evaluating the worth of the apartment. THE GROWTH MACHINE MODEL

Within the PE framework, it is possible to identify several theoretical perspectives that differ from each other in small ways. The bestknown and widely cited of these in contemporary urban studies is the 165

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growth machine model. It was initially presented in an essay by ­Harvey Molotch in 1976, and then expanded into a 1987 book by John Logan and Molotch. This book was revised by the same authors 20 years later.12 The following discussion is based primarily on their most recent book, although their theoretical positions have remained very similar throughout. Logan and Molotch began with the question, what is a place? Their answer was that it was a commodity, in the Marxian sense, with use and exchange values and that there was typically a struggle between those for whom it primarily had use value and those who were primarily concerned with its exchange value. Cities are the meeting ground for this struggle as people in each socioeconomic class try to mobilize resources that will enable them to attain their own place-related objectives. This fact makes the struggle among competing land uses in a human community fundamentally different from the competition for space that occurs among trees and plants in a nonhuman community. According to Logan and Molotch, places are not natural areas, as espoused by the ecologists, but are socially constructed. Most of the differences between places are therefore not inherent, but a result of the actions of an economic and political elite. With respect to residential areas, for example, those who control the most desirable areas (place entrepreneurs, real estate brokers, bankers, etc.) use the status of these places to maintain their locational privileges, often at the expense of less prestigious areas. With the help of local government agencies, they manipulate transportation routes to ensure that expressways and mass transit stops serve the area, without introducing unwanted features, and they secure desired zoning to keep out unwanted land uses and to exclude social groups they consider undesirable. In other words, beautiful residential areas located next to pristine lakes with new schools and playgrounds do not just happen. The creation of such an area requires that local government officials, real estate developers, and a high-status group work together. City politics, they continued, tend to be dominated by financial and real estate interests because they have the most to gain or lose from the decisions of city agencies. Their primary objective is for the city to grow larger: develop peripheral space, add jobs, and increase population. Growth is the best means by which they can all maximize their investments. However, expansion and/or population increase is usually viewed by other elements in the city as in their interest also, and they usually support it. For example, population growth will mean more business for everyone from banks to architectural, engineering, and construction firms and more supporters and donors for museums, sports events, and symphony orchestras. 166

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In contemporary Los Angeles, for example, Lin has described a “conspiracy of interests” committed to increasing cultural tourism, and their collective conclusion that the Chinatown area outside of Los Angeles’s downtown had marketing potential. The key players in this group included organizations representing Chinatown, such as the Chinese Heritage and Visitors Center and the Chinatown Business Council; city agencies, such as the redevelopment agency and the mass transit agency; and representatives of a nearby bohemian arts district. These “un-­natural” allies worked together because an increase in tourism in Chinatown would benefit everyone.13 When there are conflicts over where in a metropolitan area some type of growth should occur, a city’s major daily newspaper (such as the L.A. Times) often plays a major role in the decision. The newspaper can stand above the fray and influence all of the participants because it is unique among the pro-growth local institutions. It does not matter much to a newspaper where the growth occurs—its subscriber base will gain regardless, therefore it can be an “honest broker.” By contrast, other groups or firms benefit only from growth that occurs within their domain, so their obvious self-interest limits their ability to serve as an impartial mediator. Logan and Molotch viewed local entrepreneurs and local officials as either competing against, or coalescing with, each other. However, the major stakeholders and public officials can also represent metropolitan or global interests. For example, when IBM decided to locate a facility in an industrial park in a suburb of Lille, France, the public speeches proclaiming the local’s success as an “efficient economic machine” were given by representatives of the city, the metropolitan area, the nation, and a global corporation.14 Empirical studies conducted in cities in the United States as well as in the United Kingdom, China, Israel, and elsewhere have tended to provide a strong degree of support for the growth machine model in the sense that the types of coalitions it emphasized have often been of apparent importance in neighborhoods or cities that experienced growth, especially rapid growth. However, the support has not usually been unqualified— that is, it has typically been accompanied by provisos. To illustrate, the early development of Tyson’s Corner, in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC, seemed closely to follow the steps outlined by Logan and Molotch. Until the 1960s it was a rural crossroads, then federal and state governments made extensive road improvements while a group of investors acquired former farmland with the intention of developing it and working closely with the local chamber of commerce and town governments. Commercial and retail businesses, entertainment venues, and residential construction then turned Tyson’s Corner into a city, in itself, 167

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and property values skyrocketed. In recent years, however, many urban planners, local residents, and even people with business interests in the area have viewed growth in Tyson’s Corner as having gone too far. As a result, in recent years anti-growth interests have formed and managed to block several proposed developments in adjacent areas. Phelps speculates that urban areas may not be as malleable to growth machine interests in the future as they have been in the past.15 Partial and perhaps time-limited support for the growth machine model has also been provided by Keith Bassett’s analysis of Bristol and several other cities west of London. This British geographer contended that during the middle decades of the 20th century, Bristol (and other UK cities) experienced the familiar manufacturing to service occupations transition, but unlike the U.S. situation, Bassett saw little evidence of a pro-growth coalition in this transition. After about 1990, as globalization generated more intercity competition to attract i­nvestment— in high-tech facilities in particular—city officials and business leaders combined their efforts in pursuit of their shared interests in the city’s development. However, Bassett concluded that these strong pro-growth coalitions probably involved a degree of temporary expedience and were not likely to endure at the same level of intensity. Similarly, mixed results have been reported in tests of the growth machine thesis conducted in cities in China, Israel, and elsewhere. The less than perfect fits would probably not be surprising to Logan and Molotch because, when they originally presented the theory, they stated that they explicitly developed it with U.S. cities in mind. For the model to work best, they wrote, it is necessary to assume the strong operation of a profit motive. The current international global system is largely capitalistic; therefore, one would not expect to find many major cities in which the growth machine perspective entirely missed the mark; neither would it be expected to perfectly fit everywhere. Even in China, however, with its mix of socialism and capitalism, central control, and open markets, investigators have found the growth machine model of some use in explaining the growth of several Chinese cities.16 HISTORIC CONSERVATION AND THE GROWTH MACHINE

The designation of an area as a historic site could serve as a hindrance to the development plans of a growth machine coalition by putting limitations on the uses to which a property can be put. Thus, the potential exchange value of the site might be restrained and, if so, place entrepreneurs could be expected to try to prevent properties with high potential value from being designated for conservation. On the other hand, perhaps 168

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a heritage conservation classification might enhance the ability to market a place as a tourist destination, thereby increasing its exchange value. Hong Kong presents an interesting city in which to examine how historic conservation impacts the growth machine coalition because the city claims to advocate the value of preserving its historic sites. At the same time, however, the growth machine model clearly expresses the favored urban politics of the city because planning in Hong Kong has more or less officially emphasized the exchange value of land and tended to favor economic interests in many situations.17 How these forces played out is examined in the case study of the city’s former police headquarters, described in Box 6.2.

BOX 6.2  HONG KONG’S FORMER POLICE HEADQUARTERS The Marine Police Headquarters building (MPH) in Hong Kong was erected in 1884 and used as such for nearly 100 years. After the headquarters was relocated, the building and grounds sat vacant for about a decade. The former MPH’s location, on a hill with an imposing view of the harbor, very close to upscale hotels, restaurants, and shopping made it an obvious candidate for tourist-themed development. Yung and Chan noted that some local groups advocated for conserving the authenticity of the original building and grounds and keeping them from being overly commercialized. However, land developers and the Tourism Commission prevailed, and between 2003 and 2009, they were able to transform the former MPH into a boutique hotel and shopping venue. In 2011, the Hong Kong government officially designated the MPH and adjacent road as a “commercial development area with a tourism theme,” in order to promote additional investment.18 The typical practice in Hong Kong, despite some protestations to the contrary, has been to use a site’s heritage designation as cultural capital in order to attract investment that could lead to economic growth. When the exchange-value of a site can be increased by commercial revenue, there is very likely to be an alliance among government, entrepreneurs and the tourism industry in Hong Kong to promote economic development. The prime location of the MPH almost guaranteed its transformation. After it became a tourist location, land values increased as expected. So much for exchange value; what about use value? Yung and Chan note that the shops and restaurants built on the hill were high-class venues, priced out of the budget of the general public; but offering a drop of consolation, they note that at least the former MPH location remains a place where ordinary Hong Kong residents can still take photographs.


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To conclude, additional clarification of the growth machine model can be obtained by explicitly comparing it to the ecological perspective. David Smith has examined the underlying assumptions of ecological and PE theories, including the growth machine version, and contends that the differences between them have been exaggerated. It is often the case that advocates of a newer paradigm (such as PE) will deliberately emphasize the ways it differs from the perspective it hopes to replace (i.e., ecological). Any similarities the perspectives may share are correspondingly given scant notice. To provide a more balanced comparison. Smith dispassionately reassessed both theories. The Chicago School’s principal founders, he noted, actually wrote about a growing centralization of political and economic control and the way in which it reflected the connection of cities to the international system. In other words, they were not as oblivious to political and economic considerations as the PE theorists claimed when they were trying to sharpen the differences between the new and the old paradigms. On the other hand, many of the PE theories have acknowledged the importance of variables, such as population growth and technological developments, that were central to the earlier ecological theories. Perhaps, Smith concluded, the best urban theory might be a synthesis of the two, rather than a deliberately exaggerated version of either that tries to force everyone into choosing between them.19 Despite appeals such as Smith’s, most urban analysts did, in fact, make a choice, and it was a strong preference for PE (and other ­political-economic models) over ecological models. However, the city of Chicago and the Chicago School type of analysis associated with that city have continued to provide an important point of comparison for most of the newer paradigms. Perhaps because everyone remembers the dominance of the Chicago School, contemporary theorists looking forward and trying to envision the form of postmodern cities still tend to begin by contrasting their perspective with that of the Chicago School’s and to argue for a new exemplar city in contrast to Chicago.

FROM CHICAGO TO LOS ANGELES The city of Chicago was once the most important site for conducting research on neighborhoods, urban transportation, immigrants’ assimilation, city growth, and related issues. Particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, when it was considered the exemplar, or prototype, of the modern city, studies carried out in Chicago were immediately considered 170

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generalizable to other cities, even if they were case studies of only one specific neighborhood. Chicago was considered the singularly ideal place from which to generate urban knowledge. That city was a “truthspot,” in Thomas Gieryn’s terms, and as such it gave instant credibility to research conducted there.20 However, a number of inter-related changes mostly ended Chicago’s status as the unquestioned exemplar for urban research. The ecological perspective that was developed in, and applied to, Chicago emphasized a strong center, or CBD, that controlled growth throughout the city-­ region; but postmodern cities, by many accounts, are dispersed, fragmented, and polycentered. Urban analysts argued that neither the city of Chicago nor the ecological theory used to explain its growth fit very well with these postmodern attributes. The Chicago School—named both for the city it studied and the university that housed its founders— lost its preeminent position and receded into the background. For a number of urban analysts, the new exemplar became Los Angeles. A city-region shaped by freeways and lacking a downtown tradition, it epitomized a spread-out city without a strong center. Other rapidly growing U.S. city-regions, such as Miami and Las Vegas, and bourgeoning city-regions in Mexico and South America, such as Mexico City and Sao Paulo, seem to be developing in a similar manner, suggesting that Los Angeles may provide a glimpse of the future shape of many important postmodern cities. At the same time that Los Angeles was replacing Chicago as a favored research site, urban sociology, urban geography, urban studies, and urban planning departments in Los Angeles area ­universities—notably at UCLA and USC—became increasingly significant academic centers for the study of cities. LOS ANGELES AND THE LA SCHOOL

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present, a number of significant articles and books simultaneously explained and promoted Los Angeles’s place as a postmodern exemplar. Their thesis was that the societal transition from modern to postmodern made it necessary to focus on a city whose transformation, in this regard, was ahead of the curve, and they nominated Los Angeles as that leading-edge city. Of note were several edited volumes devoted to Los Angeles that brought together writings from many of the leading urban theorists in geography and sociology. Among the more significant was a volume edited by Michael Dear in which each chapter took some descriptions of life in Chicago as originally presented by members of the Chicago School and juxtaposed them to more current descriptions of the same activities 171

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in contemporary Los Angeles. The overriding theme was that neither Chicago nor the theories associated with it were as viable for the contemporary study of urban growth and form as Los Angeles.21 Another notable volume was edited by two UCLA professors, Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja. It included chapters written by leading urbanists, all of whom were then (not coincidentally) located at Los Angeles area institutions. Published by the University of California Press (note, the University of Chicago Press had published much of the Chicago School writings), the volume described various aspects of Los Angeles’s growth and the ways in which they were indicative of future urban trends.22 These publications, and others, helped establish a concrete identity for an L.A. School, not only in social science, but also in urban planning, architecture, and so forth.23 Proponents of the L.A. School regarded that city as best reflecting the progression of a number of postmodern trends and, therefore, as epitomizing postmodern urban form. One feature that is almost always stressed in this regard is Los Angeles’s multiple and dispersed clusters of economic and cultural activity. The city of Chicago, as described by the Chicago School, had a single center in which commerce and retail activities, employment, governmental units, and so on were all concentrated; it was the CBD. That pattern made Chicago monocentric. Los Angeles, as described by the L.A. School, by contrast, is polycentric: a city-region with a proliferation of centers. These include a number of areas resembling traditional CBDs and new town centers. Adherents to the L.A. School viewed these activities, located predominantly in the periphery of the city-region, as having influenced developments in the center of the city more than vice versa. FRAGMENTED AND POLYCENTRIC

The economic fragmentation of the L.A. city-region is clearly captured in Scott’s description of the region as comprised of numerous high-tech industrial districts. Each clustering includes a number of firms that came together seeking agglomeration advantages. For example, some districts involve aircraft assembly plants and the subcontractors that serve them. Each of these districts, according to Scott, tends to be discrete, with few connections to firms in other high-tech districts in the city-region.24 Extreme fragmentation has also described the Los Angeles city government. For example, in 2012, the city received a consultant’s evaluation of its strategy for, and organization with respect to, economic development. The report began by noting that Los Angeles’ 172

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development activities were housed in over one-half dozen different city and regional offices and departments as well as in a number of voluntary associations that sometimes work closely with government officials and agencies. While acknowledging that each of the entities had contributed to the city’s economy, the consultants concluded that, “this fragmented distribution of economic development functions … poses significant challenges.”25 According to Michael Connor, an urban historian, the groundwork for metropolitan Los Angeles’s polycentric form was laid in the 1950s. Even though some experts were advocating governmental consolidation of entire metropolitan areas, a public choice view became very influential in the Los Angeles area. It argued that politicians and government bureaucrats might have self-interests that were different from taxpayers; hence, in consolidating separate suburban entities, for example, government intervention might not benefit the targeted group. Following a public choice perspective, it made more sense to trust in the efficiency of market principles and to leave suburban areas free to choose their own futures. Suburban Los Angeles provided the model for local officials who benefited from de-centralization to advocate for more of it.26 Because Los Angeles was considered the exemplar, or prototype, of the postmodern city, analysts following the L.A. School expected to find polycentric patterns elsewhere. One direction this line of research followed involved examining for the presence of edge cities. These are suburban areas with extensive office and retail space, hence, employment centers, but also residential centers with multiple forms of entertainment, and they are located at the periphery, or edge, of metropolitan areas. According to Joel Garreau, their concentration of activities somewhat resembled those of traditional CBDs, except for their exurban location.27 Garreau claimed that edge cities could be found in many large U.S. cities, which would be consistent with a polycentric, or multiple nuclei, organization. A later assessment by Robert Lang and associates focused on office space concentrations in large U.S. metropolitan areas, and it produced findings that questioned the prevalence of a polycentric model. Specifically, they found some metropolitan areas that resembled the original ecological models of the early 20th century: the CBD contained the densest mix of office space and there was no rival. New York City fit this mold. In other metropolitan areas, office space was concentrated both in the CBD and in only a single-edge city, while still others had many edge cities. Further, a number of metropolitan areas, notably Miami, were edgeless: office space was more or less evenly distributed across its urban and suburban areas, lacking any cores. From this diversity, Lang 173

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concluded that the patterns were somewhat idiosyncratic, with metropolitan areas following a number of different forms.28 So, Los Angeles might be polycentric, and while that was not an uncommon pattern, it did not seem to predominate in most metropolitan areas. It is important to note that Lang and associates did not examine all of the attributes of edge cities, which, in addition to office space include retail, residential, and entertainment clusters. While office space concentrations are a necessary component of any edge city, such concentrations are not sufficient. It is highly likely, therefore, that there would have been fewer observed edge cities if the investigators had employed a more complete operational definition. Outside of the United States, studies of city-regions have also produced highly variable descriptions with respect to monocentric and polycentric patterns. In the Ranstad and Rhine Ruhr conurbation in Germany, for example, there are multiple centers, but Dublin and a number of other European cities seem primarily monocentric.29 An observational study in large Chinese studies suggested that edge cities were commonplace, not only in the largest metropolitan areas, such as Shanghai, but also in smaller cities, such as Xining.30 In sum, the polycentric form is more common than the Chicago School would have anticipated, but at the same time it is clear that city-regions follow multiple forms. Corresponding with the economic and cultural fragmentation of the postmodern city-region, exemplified by Los Angeles, is the expectation of a decentered pattern of growth. According to geographers Dear and Dahmann, a very important expression of decenteredness can be inferred from the causal sequence observed in the development of different locations within the city-region. Focusing primarily on Los Angeles’s experience, they conclude that a city center is not necessary, but if it does form, its expansion can occur later than in the peripheries of the region. In Los Angeles’s downtown, commercial and cultural development is recent, lagging decades behind the extensive growth of such complexes in the periphery. This sequence of development, they conclude, arises because the direction of causality is from periphery to center, an ­“outside-in” form. That necessarily means that the center city’s role in the region is dramatically different than in the “inside-out” model of modern industrial urbanism.31 An inside-out form, characteristic of Chicago during the modern period, is associated with centralized control, orderly development, and activities rigidly fixed in specific locations. By contrast, an outside-in form, characteristic of Los Angeles during the postmodern period, is associated with less control and greater flexibility, with more fragmentation as a by-product. 174

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The center of Los Angeles, as previously described, was not a historically important place for people in the metropolitan area, and activities housed in the center had minimal impact on development in the periphery. Downtown Chicago, by contrast, was significant in these respects. Therefore, if Los Angeles is the postmodern exemplar and Chicago the modern exemplar, then their downtowns could be expected to be declining in significance. However, the center of Los Angeles has materially expanded during the past 30 years, beginning with a Walt Disney Concert Hall, followed by a Grammy Museum, sports arenas, bars, restaurants, sleek lofts, high-rise office buildings, and a Ritz-Carlton Hotel with a Wolfgang Puck restaurant on the 24th floor. After 2014, foreign investment from Canada, China, and elsewhere, further stimulated a building boom in downtown office buildings and apartments. These facilities have made the downtown a place where people live, work, and come to be entertained. It is now less accurate to describe the Los Angeles city-region as a series of freeways lacking a center. At the same time, the L.A. School’s depiction of Chicago, relying heavily on some outdated descriptions of the city by the Chicago School, has both exaggerated the degree to which Chicago’s periphery was subordinated to its center and overlooked recent decentering of the Chicago city-region. Contemporary Chicago exhibits some of the same features thought to be distinctive of Los Angeles as the postmodern prototype. Of most relevance to our current discussion of the importance of the city center, the retail shopping dominance once enjoyed by Chicago’s Loop has morphed into a polycentric pattern with imposing shopping malls scattered among distant suburbs. In addition, theaters, sports arenas, and other entertainment venues, once concentrated in Chicago’s downtown, are now also found across the entire city-region. In addition, as described in Chapter 2, both metropolitan areas are important nodes in the global urban system and as a result of globalization both share still other features, such as large immigrant populations and a high degree of income inequality. Finally, there is the question of whether the patterns predicted by the Chicago School’s ecological model are applicable in post modern cities, such as Los Angeles. Relevant data are limited, but at least a modicum of applicability has been reported by Meyer and Esposito. They analyzed the relationship between distance from the city center and the socioeconomic status of residential areas, the latter based upon median household income. The Chicago School, it will be recalled, proposed that higher status zones would be further from the center because they ­developed later (with improved transportation) and because the center was generally regarded as less attractive than the less dense, ­amenity-rich fringe. 175

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The correlation between status and distance was found to be very strong in Los Angeles: Residential areas with her median incomes tended to be located further from the center. However, in Chicago, these two variables were not related. To reconcile these perhaps surprising results, Meyer and Esposito propose that spatial patterns in Chicago were shaped before advents in intra-urban transportation. The city’s earlier ­features— high-status inner-city neighborhoods, in particular—continue to influence its overall spatial patterns. Los Angeles developed with the a­ utomobile, by contrast, so its organization was less affected by earlier forms. The investigators conclude that the Chicago School model is today better at explaining urban patterns in contemporary, post modern cities.32 In summary, there are data showing the Chicago School model is still relevant in post modern cities, though these data pertain only to one aspect of the model (i.e., the relationship between distance and status). Other arguments, with limited data, contend that the differences between Chicago and Los Angeles and their suburban areas while real, may not be as substantial as some of Los Angeles’ advocates have claimed. In other words, the consequences of selecting one or the other as the exemplar may have been exaggerated.33 Further confounding a decision about which city to select as the postmodern exemplar is a third entrant: New York.

NEW YORK AS THE MODEL Its choice is recommended by the fact that the distinguishing characteristics of postmodern cities are attributed, in large part, to forces associated with globalization. New York might therefore be the best city to view as the prototype because it is the U.S. city that consistently scores highest on all global economic indicators. Although both Los Angeles and Chicago are also major global cities, in Chapter 2 we saw that New York consistently ranked well above them, particularly in the global significance of its financial markets, professional service firms, and so on. When examining New York as a possible exemplar what immediately comes to mind is the degree to which the city has historically had a strong center. Furthermore, Midtown Manhattan has remained an important place for people in the region to work, live, shop, and be entertained even as the distribution of many activities in the region has become more polycentric. New York and Chicago resemble each other in this respect, although we have seen that Los Angeles, while beginning from an opposite position, has been moving toward these other cities with regard to the significance of its CBD. 176

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Associated with the advocacy for New York is a methodological emphasis upon how the city’s specific places shape people’s experiences and outlooks, in effect, generating local cultures.34 Restaurants, art galleries, retail establishments, even neighborhood sidewalks are regarded as symbolizing aspects of the city and its residents. This emphasis upon specific places tends to involve a micro approach that focuses more upon people’s concrete social interactions than upon more macro considerations such as the interconnections among suburbs and cities. Illustrative of the way the New York approach ties social interactions to physical locations is an analysis of two of New York’s historically significant shopping streets: Orchard Street in Manhattan’s Lower East Side and Fulton Street in Brooklyn. On both of these streets analysts described how immigrant shopkeepers have traditionally interacted with long-term residents, and the nature of these relationships has given the streets identities, both locally and globally. However, as these streets have aged, similar processes of gentrification have been occurring in both neighborhoods “homogenizing” their distinctive local characteristics.35 While the focus upon micro interaction has been a distinctive feature of what has been termed the contemporary New York School, it should be noted that a similar approach co-existed with the ecological analyses of the Chicago School. For example, important members of that earlier school conducted detailed micro studies in deteriorated areas of the city. They specifically carried out field work with prostitutes, homeless men, etc. and examined their lives in relation to specific places, such as SRO hotels, dance halls, etc.36 Some research of this type has also been conducted in conjunction with the L.A. School.37

CONCLUSIONS In almost all of the ways we have described the features of each of the three schools’ paradigm cities we have noted that, in fact, while the three metropolitan areas differed from each other they also shared some significant commonalities. In other words, the consequences of selecting any one of them as the exemplar were exaggerated. As a result, Hunter proposed that it might be more fruitful to view them as three approaches rather than three schools.38 Labeling them as approaches would reduce the presumed boundaries among them, making it easier to identify hybrids which combine features. Hunter also states that it is important to move the discussion beyond its exclusive focus upon U.S. cities. Toward this end, he proposes that the paradigm city associated with each of the three approaches be paired 177

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with a non-U.S. city whose form and features it closely resembles. Based upon prior research, the pairings he proposes are New York and London; Chicago and Paris; Los Angeles and Brasilia. These pairings would then be utilized for their ability to articulate the future shapes of metropolitan areas.

SHRINKING CITIES We have noted there are many ways in which Chicago, Los A ­ ngeles, and New York both differ from, and resemble, each other. One important similarity we have not yet noted concerns the fact that each of their metropolitan areas—as well as those of their non-U.S. ­counterparts— has over the past 50 years or so: generally gained population across their metropolitan areas, added large numbers of high-level technical and professional positions, attracted investment and drawn large numbers of tourists. In addition, while sections of their central cities have declined, within each of the metropolitan areas a large number of commercial and residential areas have emerged following processes and events that can be explained, at least in part, by the growth machine model. For many other metropolitan areas, however, globalization has meant not only an absence of population and job growth and financial investments, but actual shrinkage, or counterurbanization. Both population and jobs have been lost, and few sectors have been able to attract investment of any type. Over the past 50 years, about 400 cities throughout the world that once had populations of at least 100,000 have lost at least 10% of that population; further, many cities in North America, Europe, and Asia are projecting even larger population decreases during the next few decades.39 Although the growth machine model may still explain some of the changes that are occurring in a few of the shrinking cities’ neighborhoods or sectors, a model that focuses upon growth presents imagery that seems utterly incompatible with the overall experience of shrinking cities. With the increasing number of cities and metropolitan areas that have grown smaller and poorer, a global research network has formed to study the phenomenon: the Shrinking Cities International Research Network. Their objective has been to examine the ways that globalization has led to various types of shrinkage, and the ways that cities can deal with it.40 In some cases, a city has shrunk primarily due to unique occurrences. For example, devastating natural disasters, such as hurricanes, have led large numbers of people to relocate, and many had not returned even 178

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after many years; New Orleans provides an example. To illustrate further, regime changes, such as the transition from a socialist to capitalist economy, negatively impacted the population of several formerly East German cities.41 However, the most common cause of shrinkage among contemporary cities has been de-industrialization. DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION’S EFFECTS

Beginning in the middle of the 20th century a great deal of manufacturing that had been in factories located in cities in North America and Western Europe was relegated, or outsourced, to nations in Asia and Latin America that had previously produced few of the world’s products. Cheap labor was a major attraction in these new production sites, and sometimes it was supplemented by companies’ desires for more direct access to the new nations’ raw materials. Technological developments, automation in particular, in most of Western Europe and North America also led to the displacement of many manufacturing positions, even when the employing firms did not outsource production. The net result, in what had been the leading industrial nations, was a process of de-industrialization, and it was very widespread. These technological innovations greatly increased productivity so that even in nations such as the United States, where there were steep declines in manufacturing employment, the output of the manufacturing sector continued to increase at about the same rate as the rest of the private sector.42 Thus, de-industrialization pertains more to declining employment in manufacturing than to decreased productivity in that sector. In other parts of the world, most notably in China and India, the manufacturing sector has increased in recent decades and is associated with the very rapid growth of a number of industrial cities. In many instances, however, there is a mismatch between the work that is available in these cities and the kinds of jobs in-migrants are seeking. Across China, for example, mass higher education has dramatically increased the number of college graduates, and they do not typically want to take jobs in factories, even though they pay relatively well and alternatives they would consider more appropriate are not readily available. As a result, among 21- to 25-year-olds, the higher their level of education, the higher their unemployment rate. College graduates in 2012 had an unemployment rate (16.4%) that was almost four times larger than people with no more than an elementary school education (4.2%), and in large Chinese cities, the unemployment differences are even greater.43 Meanwhile, as the factory jobs disappeared from many of the places in Western Europe and North America in which they formerly 179

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constituted about one-third of the labor force, they were slowly replaced by two distinct types of service positions: professional jobs for lawyers, accountants, design specialists, and so on; and less skilled jobs, for waiters, delivery people, domestic help, and so on. Service sector jobs have grown relative to manufacturing positions because in many instances they cannot be outsourced and because, in contrast to factory jobs, many of them have not been impacted by technological improvements. The labor force changes associated with de-industrialization produced a different type of mismatch in many Western European and North American cities. Most of the people displaced from jobs by the closing or downsizing of factories knew how to operate a lathe or assemble a doorframe, but these skills were no longer in demand. They also lacked the formal education required for the high-end service positions, as described. Almost permanent unemployment has been the result for some. Others have experienced chronic underemployment, working a shift taking orders at McDonald’s, working as part-time security guards, and the like. These labor force changes have had devastating consequences for many communities whose resident families were formerly dependent on employment in factories. Cities throughout Western Europe and North America were impacted by the decline in manufacturing, but many cities in the Northern United States were among the most affected because their factory jobs had been an important lure to both European immigrants and African ­Americans raised in the south. The in-migration of these two groups was largely responsible for the population growth in many cities that were industrializing during the late 19th and early to mid-20th centuries. Factory work was attractive because it required little formal education. Newcomers could go right to work, and these factory jobs offered relatively good pay and benefits. There was no other sector in which people with limited formal education could match the earnings possible in manufacturing. More or less similar processes occurred in cities and nations throughout the world. Among those cities that industrialized early, the decline in manufacturing employment occurred more or less simultaneously to the losses in the United States, and for the same set of reasons. In many cities that industrialized later, such as Tokyo and Seoul, the decline in manufacturing employment also occurred later; however, the consequences of the decline for urban neighborhoods that had been built around manufacturing facilities were similar, regardless of where they were located or the characteristics of residents. People in these communities are generally locked into a vicious cycle because of the absence of local resources. Their neighborhoods lack good public schools, community and recreational centers, even shopping venues. The face they present to the world is of dreary and forsaken 180

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commercial strips; buildings that have been boarded up and abandoned; vacant lots everywhere, littered with broken bottles and miscellaneous trash; dilapidated old homes that serve as prisons for older people afraid to venture into the neighborhood; and idle young people standing on street corners with nothing to do.44 Anyone able to move out of such a community does so, and no one moves in if they have any alternatives. Although the social problems exacerbated by de-industrialization are typically found in inner cities in the United States and elsewhere, it is not an invariant pattern. In the Paris city-region, for example, depressed communities of this type are located in the suburban ring that surrounds the city because the most concentrated post-World War II industrialization occurred in this suburban ring. As in U.S. cities, factory jobs in these Greater Paris communities initially helped attract large numbers of immigrants and migrants. The employment-fueled population growth was followed by de-industrialization, however, which lead to high unemployment, then neighborhood decline: boarded up buildings, idle youth on street corners, high rates of violent crime, and so on. Declining neighborhoods in some of these cities were later subject to gentrification (as discussed in the following chapter), but many continued for years to grow smaller and poorer. In fact, entire cities that had been built around manufacturing grew smaller and poorer. The imagery associated with the growth machine model seemed incongruous with the reality of these shrinking cities and neighborhoods. While the growth machine model, and others like it, did not seem to fit well with shrinking cities, a better theoretical model was not immediately apparent. Even the search for a new theoretical model was hindered by wide-spread reluctance to accept that shrinkage was not just a temporary, and aberrant, situation. For example, many urban planners initially viewed demolition as a way to regenerate neighborhoods from which people and jobs moved, leaving behind vacant factories and blighted housing. If these by-products of decline were simply removed, it was assumed that neighborhoods and cities would then automatically be renewed. However, all these plans seemed to do was to further eliminate housing without leading to any social or economic improvements.45 One view that eventually attracted a good deal of attention is the “right-sizing” or “smart-decline” paradigm. RIGHT-SIZING

Unlike previous perspectives that equated population decline with urban decay, right-sizing views urban shrinkage as containing the seeds for new forms of social and economic development. Shrinking cities or 181

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neighborhoods, in other words, while presenting problems also present opportunities for innovating new urban forms. It also recognizes that shrinkage rather than growth is the likely future of many cities and tries to identify creative and effective ways for these cities to grow smaller.46 One city in which right-sizing has explicitly been followed is Youngstown, Ohio. Through the middle of the 20th century, it was an important manufacturing center and one of the leading steel producers in the United States. During the 1980s, however, due to global reshuffling, the city lost nearly 30,000 manufacturing jobs and then thousands of additional losses continuing to about 2010. With the disappearance of jobs, people left the city and Youngstown experienced a net population decline of over 100,000 people, representing a loss of 60% of its residents. Among those who remained in the city there was high unemployment, crime, and concentrated poverty. The city’s response is described in Box 6.3.

BOX 6.3  RIGHT-SIZING IN YOUNGSTOWN, OH In 2010, the city formulated a new strategy for dealing with its poverty and de-population. The published plan was regarded as a very innovative document because it viewed Youngstown’s smaller size not as a liability, but as an opportunity to improve the quality of life in the city with regards to its economy, its environment and its infrastructure. The plan called for re-investment in the downtown core and, very selectively, in those neighborhoods which were deemed to be “transitional,” that is, with economic problems, but not yet at the point of no return so that strategic investment could still produce benefits. The city could not afford to invest in all of the declining neighborhoods so officials and planners targeted investments to those likely to produce the greatest impact on property values.47 The 2010 plan called for a reduction in the housing supply by demolition of vacant and blighted housing, but then an effort to help homeowners to acquire the adjacent properties. The objective was to right-size housing, that is, to better adjust supply to demand. Simultaneously, the city sought to stimulate demand for housing in these transitional neighborhoods by promoting their historic identities with new street signs, artists’ murals, parks, etc. Campaigns also began to involve local homeowners in actively marketing their neighborhoods. Finally, in order to alleviate poverty and encourage local economic development, loans were offered to local residents trying start small businesses that would increase the attractiveness of the neighborhood.


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Cities like Youngstown, and their transitional neighborhoods, have frequently been the targets of gentrification because of their low rental values. Unlike gentrification, however, the objective of right-sizing has been to improve conditions for low-income residents rather than focus upon attracting more affluent newcomers. In the following chapter, attention turns to gentrification.

GLOSSARY Chicago School: A very influential ecological theory of the spatial form of cities and how they grew, developed at the University of Chicago and focusing upon that city as the exemplar. Concentric Zone Theory: Placed the central business district in the center, viewed as analogous to the nucleus of a cell, with growth rings moving out from the center. Ecological Model: Views the human community as functioning like a plant community, with spatial location the major variable; associated with the Chicago School. Edge Cities: Distant suburban areas with employment, residential and entertainment center. Exchange-Value: The worth of a commodity as an investment relative to other alternatives. Growth Machine Model: Assumes a profit motive leads financial and real estate interests to pursue urban growth to attain their place-­ related objectives. L.A. School: Views the fragmented and polycentric organization of post modern Los Angeles as the urban prototype (in contrast to Chicago and the Chicago School). Political Economy: Theories inspired by Marx, critical of capitalism and stressing class conflict, but not revolution. Use Value: The worth of a commodity as an object to be used/consumed.

CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER 8. Global city formation in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles: an historical perspective Janet L. Abu-Lughod 10. Space in the globalizing city Peter Marcuse


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12. The city as a landscape of power: London and New York as global financial capitals Sharon Zukin 13. Detroit and Houston: two cities in global perspective Richard Child Hill, Joe Feagin 14. The stimulus of a little confusion: a contemporary comparison of Amsterdam and Los Angeles Edward W. Soja 15. Global city Zurich 21. Local and global 29. Relationality/territoriality: toward conceptualization of cities in the world Eugene McCann, Kevin Ward 30. Prologue: “The global city as world order” Warren Magnusson 31. Globalization and the rise of city-regions Allen J. Scott 35. New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy Neil Smith 44. Global city building in China and its discontents Xuefei Ren 63. Global suburbanization Roger Keil 66. New geographies of theorizing the urban: putting comparison to work for global urban studies Jennifer Robinson

NOTES 1 Kathe Newman, “Reclaiming Neighborhood from the Inside Out.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016. 2 Ibid, p. 690. 3 Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, The City. University of Chicago, 1984. (Originally published in 1925.) 4 Roderick D. McKenzie, “The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community.” In Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (Eds), The City. University of Chicago, 1984, p. 64. 5 For a summary and discussion of the zones, from a contemporary perspective, see Daniel Stokols, Social Ecology in the Digital Age. Academic Press, 2018. 6 Homer Hoyt, The Structure and Growth of Residential Areas. Federal Housing Administration, 1939. 7 Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias. Basic Books, 1989. See also, Robert Lewis (Ed), Manufacturing Suburbs. Temple University, 2004. 184

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8 The 19th-century city and suburban developments are discussed in a number of cities in, Robert Lewis (Ed), Manufacturing Suburbs. Temple University, 2004. For further discussion of Montreal, see Chapter 5. 9 Chauncy D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman, “The Nature of Cities.” American Academy of Political and Social Science, 242, 1945. 10 For example, Weinstein has argued that an invasion-succession model still perfectly fits as a description of racial and ethnic changes that occurred in Coney Island, New York, between about 1950 and 2000. See Raymond M. Weinstein, “Succession and Renewal in Urban Neighborhoods.” Sociation Today, 5, 2007. 11 Commodities are discussed at length in, Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1. International Publishers, 1967. 12 Harvey L. Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine.” American Journal of Sociology, 82, 1976; and John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes. University of California, [1987] 2007. 13 Jan Lin, The Power of Urban Ethnic Places. Routledge, 2011. 14 Christian Lamour, “The Growth Coalition in the (Post)-Fordist City.” Urban Affairs Review, 54, 2018. 15 Nicholas A. Phelps, “The Growth Machine Stops?” Urban Affairs Review, 48, 2012. 16 A number of these studies are included in, David Wilson and Andrew E. Jonas (Eds), The Urban Growth Machine. SUNY, 1999. 17 Hong Kong’s political and economic philosophy are described in a series of essays by, Jason Y. Ng, No City for Slow Men. Blacksmith Books, 2015. 18 Esther H.K. Yung and Edwin H.W. Chan, “Re-examining the Growth Machine Ideology of Cities.” Urban Affairs Review, 52, 2016. 19 David A. Smith, “The New Urban Sociology Meets the Old.” Urban Affairs Review, 30, 1995. 20 Thomas F. Gieryn, “City as Truth-Spot.” Social Studies of Science, 36, 2006. 21 Michael Dear, From Chicago to L.A. Sage, 2002. 22 Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja (Eds), The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century. University of California, 1996. 23 See Michael Dear, et al., “Critical Responses to the Los Angeles School of Urbanism.” Urban Geography, 30, 2009. 24 Allen J. Scott, “High-Technology Industrial Development.” In Allen J. Scott and Edward W. Soja (Eds), The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century. University of California, 1996. 25 The City of Los Angeles, Economic Development in Los Angeles. 2012. 26 Michael A. Connor, “Public Benefits from Public Choice.” Journal of Urban History, 39, 2013. 27 Joel Garreau, Edge City. Anchor, 1992. 28 Robert E. Lang, Thomas W. Sanchez, and Asli C. Oner, “Beyond Edge City.” Urban Geography, 30, 2009. 29 See Peter Hall and Kathy Pain, The Polycentric Metropolis. Routlege, 2009. 30 Wendell Cox, “Edge Cities in China.” Newgeography, October 26, 2018. 31 Michael Dear and Nicholas Dahmann, “Urban Politics and the Los Angeles School of Urbanism.” Urban Affairs Review, 44, 2008. 185

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32 William B. Meyer and Christopher R. Esposito, “Burgess and Hoyt in Los Angeles.” Urban Geography, 36, 2015. 33 See for example, John Mollenkopf, “School is Out.” Urban Affairs Review, 44, 2008. 34 This view is presented by, Marcus A. Hunter, “Ecologies, Post-Modern Urbanisms, and Symbolic Economies.” Comparative Sociology, 13, 2014. 35 Sharon Zukin, Philip Kasinitz and Xiangming Chen, Global Cities, Local Streets. Routledge, 2016. 36 See Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology. University of Chicago, 1986. 37 Many of these studies are noted in, Laura Barraclough and Wendy Cheng, A People’s Guide to Los Angeles. University of California, 2012. 38 Hunter, op.cit. 39 See Justin B. Hollander, et al., A Research Agenda for Shrinking Cities. Edward Elgar, 2018. 40 A number of analysts in this consortium presented studies of many different shrinking cities in the special issue of a journal. See Cristina Martinez-­ Fernandez, et al., “Shrinking Cities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27, 2012. 41 For further discussion of specific causes of shrinkage in a sample of cities, see Marco Bontje and Sako Musterd, Inventive City-Regions. Routledge, 2016. 42 Susan Houseman, “Offshoring Bias in U.S. Manufacturing.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 2011. 43 Figures taken from, Keith Bradsher, “With Diplomas, Chinese Reject Jobs in Factory.” The New York Times, January 25, 2013, p. A1. 44 For further discussion see Susan Clampet-Lundquist and Douglas Massey, “Neighborhood Effects on Self-Sufficiency.” American Journal of Sociology, 114, 2008. 45 Jason Hackworth, “Demolition as Urban Policy in the American Rust Belt.” Environment and Planning A, 34, 2016. 46 See Daniel J. Hummel, “Right-Sizing in the United States.” Journal of Urban Affairs, 37, 2014. 47 James Rhodes, “Revitalizing the Neighborhood.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016.



Gentrification Gentrification is usually defined as the process by which higher status residents replace lower status residents in a neighborhood, or other geographical area (such as a street, series of streets, census tract, etc.). To be more specific, analysts have viewed gentrification as a change in the social class composition of a place over time, compared to other places in the same area.1 Central city neighborhoods have been a major site for such changes, but the same types of transitions have also become increasingly common in the inner suburbs of many cities as well. The conventional definition of gentrification, presented above, emphasizes changes in the characteristics of residents, but it can also refer to changes in the retail composition of a geographical area in which art galleries, gourmet food shops, and clothing boutiques replace locally owned bakeries, barber shops, grocers, etc. The reinvestment of capital into the retail sector of a neighborhood typically follows residential gentrification, but the temporal relationship between them can be reversed. While as we will note there is some disagreement about the consequences of gentrification, there is little debate about its growing prevalence, especially in major (i.e., global) city-regions. Theoretically, Sharon Zukin has proposed two major explanations for why gentrification occurs, and why it is increasing.2 The first, consumption-side, notes the growing appeal of city versus suburban living to young professionals and executives and the advantages of living closer to work in downtown areas. Such lifestyle attractions are the basis of consumption-side explanations 187

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for gentrification, and why it frequently targets inner-city neighborhoods. The second explanation stresses how depressed land values invite investment. It is the spread between actual and potential land values that are the basis of production-side explanations, and they also focus upon deteriorated inner city neighborhoods that were formerly manufacturing centers as gentrification targets. (Production-side is also frequently referred to as the rent gap theory, initially associated with Neil Smith.3) Although production and consumption explanations stress different considerations, they can typically be used in conjunction with each other. The pace with which gentrification has occurred has almost surely increased in recent decades for both production and consumption reasons: (1) the deterioration of working-class neighborhoods, as a function of de-industrialization, has increased, and (2) the number of people potentially interested in a gentrifying community has increased as a result of the growth in what has been termed the postindustrial middle class: mobile young professionals, not committed to a family house in the suburbs.

THE PACE OF GENTRIFICATION The literature is filled with case studies of neighborhoods that completely gentrified, and this may give the impression that once the process begins it is likely to continue until the neighborhood is totally transformed. A group of sociologists at the Urban Sociology Laboratory in Lausanne, Switzerland, wondered how often gentrification might begin, but then be halted; and if it was halted, why? To provide answers to these questions, they studied six neighborhoods in the outskirts of Paris. All had deteriorated as a result of factory and warehouse closings, and by 2003 had begun to gentrify.4 The investigators studied the six neighborhoods over a five-year period and found that the process continued, to a large degree, in four of the neighborhoods. They were increasingly transformed into middleclass residential areas, with new cafes and shops and remodeled or new housing. In one of the communities, the process began but was completely thwarted, and in another community it was partially halted. The latter two neighborhoods differed from the first four, according to the sociologists, in terms of being perceived (by newcomers) as noisy and dirty and the presence of more low-income minorities that made the newcomers feel uncomfortable. It is not clear whether such neighborhoods will eventually revert to their former composition, meaning newcomers leave, or whether after a pause, gentrification will continue. On the other hand, once redevelopment begins, it often sets processes into motion that have cumulative effects, leading to rapid gentrification. In central Tokyo during the 1980s, for example, a few firms began 188

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to move into a run-down area where space was available and rents were cheap (production-side). Other firms followed, and the area attracted still more businesses that wanted to provide services to the firms that had already moved into the area. Then, to be close to work, people began to buy and remodel nearby housing (consumption side). The redeveloped area in Tokyo had been a stable community, providing modest housing for multiple generations of interconnected residents. The invasion by firms and subsequent residential gentrification dramatically raised property values, and the taxes associated with property assessments also increased. Many of the central Tokyo area’s former inhabitants were forced to move because they could not afford the higher taxes on their homes or the increased rents that were passed on to them. Facilities associated with the neighborhood’s former way of life were also affected. For example, because the newcomers were typically single and without children, declining enrollments forced elementary schools to close, and the neighborhood then became less attractive to the families with children (typical of those who previously lived there). Space for still more chains, and the effects multiplied.5 In a surprisingly short period of time, neighborhoods such as the one in central Tokyo can no longer exist. They remain objects of nostalgia within collective memory, however, and local people often continue to discuss them in the present tense—as though they could still be seen. Years later, foreign tourists in Tokyo have tried to visit the places described by natives, looking in vain for the traditional shops and neighborhoods that once existed. The former residents also had long-standing ties to the small momand-pop retail shops that had dominated the area. Lacking such ties, the newcomers preferred the lower prices of chain stores, and a diminished customer base pushed out the traditional local stores. Each closing opened up additional nostalgic view of the place as it once existed is also commonly held by long-term residents of a gentrifying neighborhood. For example, in New York City neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, Ocejo describes how long-standing residents gather in longstanding establishments, such as local bars, and eulogize the past in romantic terms. The newcomers, by contrast, tend to dismiss the neighborhood’s past, and see themselves as people who are making a community rather than the people who helped to destroy one.6

RESIDENTIAL GENTRIFICATION Since about 1980, residential gentrification has been occurring in the center of major global cities following the growth of high end employment in the urban cores. Specialists in finance, design, law, etc. are in 189

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demand following corporate investment in and near the center of these global cities. Many of the executives and professionals who are employed in the centrally located office buildings want to live as close to work as possible in order to minimize commuting times. This gives a locational advantage to inner-city areas even if the history of such areas would not seem to make them likely candidates for gentrification. In the center of Beijing, for example, there were once many hutongs: narrow lanes resembling alleyways, crowded with traditional one story dwellings. Neighbors, who were often family relations, left passageways between the courtyards of their small homes to facilitate communal gatherings. In recent years, executives and professionals from across the world who were recruited to Beijing’s central office buildings have been buying and remodeling these hutongs. They like the location of the area, and its tradition, but want larger homes with modern upgrades. Wealthy newcomers are slowly replacing the modest income locals who formerly dominated life in the hutong, and large modern housing is replacing small traditional housing.7 While gentrification can occur in any type of community, it has been especially common in areas that once contained active factories and warehouses and were home to blue-collar workers. With the decline in manufacturing, property values fell in the neighborhoods formerly dominated by factories. They became attractive sites for investment because of the possibility of speculative profits. At the same time, in cities in many parts of the world, rent controls, housing subsidies, and other protections for low-income residents were either reduced or eliminated. A pro-growth agenda of land entrepreneurs and public officials led to neighborhood redevelopment designed to attract the professionals and executives who were employed nearby. The new residents are almost invariably richer and, in most cases, also younger and include fewer minorities. A typical pattern is described in Box 7.1.

BOX 7.1  GENTRIFYING THE CENTER OF ISTANBUL Between roughly 1950 and 1980, industrialization rapidly increased in the center of Istanbul involving large and small factories that manufactured weapons, leather goods, textiles, etc. Thousands of rural residents from across Turkey migrated to the city, drawn by the prospect of factory employment. The migrants were initially housed in poorly constructed, single story dwellings in communities locally referred to as squatter settlements, and the higher status residents of Istanbul viewed them as “backward” because of the way they dressed and spoke. As the in-migration stream continued, new construction proceeded haphazardly, involving high rise apartment buildings


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that rarely complied with any building codes. The workers’ sections then involved a mix of squatter settlements and high-rise apartment buildings interspersed among warehouses and factories.8 Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, new global connections led to the closing or relocating of Istanbul’s factories and the government sought to develop a more modern economy. With the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, the renovation of inner city Istanbul began with the construction of high-rise office buildings, luxury hotels and shopping malls. New rental housing also replaced the old, but it was increasingly unaffordable to the unskilled factory workers who were the neighborhood’s previous residents. Those people who could find employment to replace the disappearing factory jobs mostly worked in low-end service positions as housekeepers, cooks, parking attendants, etc. Almost none of them could afford the new rents in their former neighborhoods.9


Data pertaining to the probability that low-income residents will be displaced if a neighborhood undergoes gentrification have generally concluded that gentrification increases the probability that low-income residents will leave an area.10 All studies have not come to this conclusion, though; in fact, a few studies have reported that low-income residents in gentrifying neighborhoods were less likely to move than low-income residents in non-gentrifying areas.11 There are at least two variables that may account for the differences in findings: the type of city involved and the mix of owned and rented housing. The first consideration entails the type of city and metropolitan area in which a neighborhood is gentrifying. Reviewing the literature, ­Florida has concluded that in “superstar” cities, both gentrification and displacement are accelerating because of the demand to live close to the new corporations and businesses being attracted to the central cities.12 Superstar cities, such as New York, London, and Beijing, would be the most globally connected, while in less globally connected cities gentrification is less extensive and may involve less displacement. A second consideration involves the degree to which displacement is direct, due to forced sales, evictions, and so on, or indirect due to high rents serving as a barrier to entry for low-income residents so when low-income residents move or die they are not replaced by other low-­ income residents. Overall, indirect displacement seems more prevalent than direct displacement, and direct displacement appears to be more 191

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prevalent in rental housing while indirect displacement is more prevalent in neighborhoods with more home ownership. How much direct displacement will occur in the rental sector depends upon how much renters have legal safeguards. In those places that have extensive tenant protections, direct displacement is limited. Cities (and nations) differ greatly in the kinds and amounts of protection that tenants receive. At a high end are Rotterdam and Amsterdam so there has not been much direct displacement; but the steep price increased that have affected non-protected housing have greatly limited the access of low-income people living outside of gentrifying communities.13 In an intermediate rung with respect to tenant protections is New York City. Rent control and stabilization policies limit how much a tenant’s rent can be increased. However, owners sometimes scrutinize rent stabilized tenants for any lease infractions in order to begin eviction proceedings, and if the property is improved, then substantial increases in rents are permitted. In some New York communities the improvements have actually been relatively minor: for example, adding a children’s playroom. So, despite some tenant protections, there is still a good deal of both direct and indirect displacement.14 In Beijing, where tenants have the least protection, the Chinese government has gentrified central areas of the city by mass evictions and demolition campaigns, directly pushing out the low-income residents.15 The ratio of indirect to direct displacement also appears to vary with how much of the housing stock is rented rather than owned. In a large U.S. sample, for example, increased property taxes in gentrifying neighborhoods triggered involuntary moves by people who were living in rental properties. Homeowners, however, were not more likely to leave gentrifying neighborhoods than those in non-gentrifying neighborhoods.16 What insulates homeowners was not explicitly studied, though. Owners do tend to be older than renters and more likely to be married with children, so perhaps they have stronger place attachments, which leads them to be willing to struggle more to remain in a community. Or perhaps they have more economic resources than renters to cushion the impact of cost increases. Gentrification can also be associated with a neighborhood’s increase in home ownership and a decrease in rentals. In inner London, for example, a number of neighborhoods close to the City (London’s main financial district) had large numbers of renters prior to gentrification that began in the 1980s and has continued to the present. The younger, higher status newcomers converted a lot of the rental properties into privately owned homes. While rental properties were declining, landlords in central London raised rents in an effort to force low-income residents to move so they could upgrade their housing units and rent them to new tenants at higher rates. When rent increases did not suffice, 192

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some offered direct payments to residents to induce them to move, others began eviction proceedings.17 In sum, residential gentrification involves the displacement of a lower income population with a higher income population. Indirect replacement, due to rising costs serving as a barrier to entry by low-income outsiders, is almost always involved. In some cases, displacement is also direct, due to eviction or to cost-related pressures that force vulnerable, low-income residents to move out of the gentrifying area. Many of these moves are involuntary due to steep price increases and evictions. In most instances, the social class transition associated with gentrification also entails changes in a neighborhood’s racial-ethnic composition. In Los Angeles neighborhoods that gentrified between 2000 and 2015, for example, Scott found that there were typically sizeable declines in the number of African Americans and Hispanics residing in areas after they gentrified.18 Similarly, in central London, gentrification has been associated with the gradual replacement of minorities—­ African-Caribbean and Asian, in particular—by predominantly white residents.19 There are also data to indicate that when low-income residents are displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods they are pushed into still poorer areas, with higher minority concentrations.20 For the residents who are displaced by gentrification, moving into a poorer area is sometimes the only alternative, and sometimes this entails leaving the metropolitan area entirely. In Flanders, Belgium, for example, a lot of people were forced into rural areas. Interviews have disclosed that they have very low residential satisfaction because they felt forced to leave urban neighborhoods. They would have preferred to remain in the metropolitan area, but rising dwelling prices due to gentrification forced them to move to rural areas as the only place they could find housing that fit their needs.21 The people most likely to be displaced are, as we have seen, poorer minority residents and in at least some instances they are elderly persons with chronic health problems. Their frailty, according to Atkinson, may have limited their ability to fight back when landlords wanted to push them out so they could upgrade their housing and increase rents. Most moved to housing in areas that offered fewer amenities, others were able to move in with friends or family members, but some became homeless, forced to live in the streets.22 HOMELESSNESS

The poorest people provide the pool from which the greatest number of homeless people is drawn so the first variable concerning the magnitude of homelessness concerns the size of the pool of poor people. 193

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It is relevant, therefore, to recall another important (and previously discussed) characteristic of postmodern cities: extreme income inequality. In many cities and nations, socioeconomic stratification has become increasingly bifurcated during the past half century or so. The middle class has shrunk, with most pushed downward into an expanded class of economically marginal people, and the magnitude of the difference between rich and poor has increased. Service economies associated with global, postmodern economies appear to have accelerated the trend by increasing the demand for workers at the extremes: high-status professional service positions, such as lawyers, computer programmers, and consultants, and low-status service positions, such as janitors, security guards, and restaurant workers. Among the latter, many have marginal incomes, few benefits and little job security. For the latter, finding a place to live that they can afford is difficult. In Los Angeles, as in many other major cities, gentrification has greatly exacerbated the problem, resulting in a sizeable shortfall of affordable housing. In 2017, it was estimated that over one-half million units of affordable housing would be required for Los Angeles County to meet the demands of its low-income renters. The problem has grown over the past two decades, according to a 2017 report, because median rent in Los Angeles county increased by 32% over this period while the median income of renters decreased by 3%. And well over one half of the residents of the county are renters.23 The result has been a “perfect storm,” making the city-region home to the largest number of homeless people in the United States, despite having an inhospitable reputation among those living on the streets. Although precise data are lacking, it also appears that a variety of factors combined to make exiting from homelessness relatively difficult in Los Angeles. Those who did exit from homelessness did so with the assistance of family and/or friends or the good fortune of finding a program that made subsidized single-resident occupancy (SRO) housing available—small units for occupancy by a single person. However, according to the analysis of Mathew Marr, those who did escape from the streets tended to remain off the streets because of the fact that local SRO housing residents received long-term subsidies.24 In Berlin, by comparison to Los Angeles, there is a greater investment in the city’s homeless, and more unified agency support, and yet Berlin does not appear to do appreciably better than Los Angeles does in moving people off the streets.25 The comparison is particularly relevant because Berlin and Los Angeles are the homeless capitals of their respective nations. The problem has been intractable in both cities because the homeless frequently carry stigmas and there are market barriers to finding and keeping suitable housing. 194

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In Tokyo, Marr followed the same approach he had followed in Los Angeles, namely observing and interviewing both homeless people and program officials. He felt that it was imperative to conduct a comparative study to identify the range of variables that operate to produce homelessness in global cities. Marr began from the premise that forces associated with globalization both produce and restrain exits from homelessness by reducing the number of jobs that provide a living wage and reducing the amount of affordable housing. His research question was: What other variables pertaining to cultural values, the homeless individuals themselves, local government housing programs, and so on affect the overall rate of homelessness in a city? In Tokyo by comparison to Los Angeles, Marr found that there was an even stronger stigma attached to homelessness, and it appeared to lessen the degree to which families, friends, and even the staff associated with government programs were inclined to offer assistance. Nevertheless, a higher rate of people appeared to exit from homelessness in Tokyo than in Los Angles because there were more low-wage jobs and inexpensive apartments available in Tokyo. However, the low-wage jobs that were more abundant in Tokyo were frequently informally arranged, offered only casual employment, and were very temporary. That made it difficult for people exiting from homelessness, without resources, to remain off of Tokyo’s streets for very long.

PIONEERS OR SPACE “DOMESTICATORS” Neil Smith, who was both a social activist and university professor, noted how an area in the process of gentrification is frequently described by newspapers and realtors as a “new frontier.” The wild, wild West is the metaphor, so the young professionals who are frequently the first to renovate or remodel the deteriorated housing are seen as courageous homesteaders. For example, a number of residential towers were constructed on the far west side of Manhattan between 2005 and 2010. It was an area where parking garages, boarded up factories, deteriorated housing and pubs had dominated. The New York Time’s “Real Estate” section identified the area as “way out west” and described it as “Frontier with a view,” and the new owners of the multimillion dollar condos were called “pioneers.”26 Some of the typical appropriation of frontier symbolism might seem innocent enough, Smith commented, except for the terribly negative image it conveys of the former residents who are being displaced. To continue the metaphor, they become modern counterparts to a mythical tribe of savages, thereby justifying extreme measures by the brave, outnumbered settlers to get them out of their neighborhood. 195

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For newcomers who are very concerned with their personal security and/or the safety of their property, moving the former residents out of the neighborhood is only the first step. The gentrifiers’ next step involves consolidating their gains, and this often entails the erection of physical and symbolic barriers to keep people like the former residents out of the area they are newly creating. As a result, efforts to consolidate and secure gentrified areas have contributed to the widespread elimination of public space. By definition it is difficult to keep anyone out of a public space, such as parks, playgrounds, beaches, and so on. As a result, communities that had such public spaces have frequently eliminated them, either by closing them up or turning them into a quasi-membership facility for local residents only. Those areas that must remain open to the public, or cannot be removed, closed, or turned into members-only facilities—such as underground subway stations or shopping malls—are usually given close monitoring to sharply limit access by undesirable types of people: certain minorities, beggars, the homeless, and so on.27 In Seattle, Washington, two University of Washington professors with an interest in law and social control recently presented a multiyear study of the ways police, courts, and prosecutors have worked together to banish people who appear to be homeless, a member of a minority group, or otherwise marginal people from public spaces, such as parks and libraries. Correspondingly, they closely enforced trespass laws and very broadly defined “areas of interest” to police because such designations gave officials more control over who could access an area. Some of the regulations are backed by court orders; others are simply enforced by police in the field. To illustrate, whole areas of Seattle can be designated as drug areas and, therefore, off limits to anyone the police consider likely to engage in illicit activities. With broad discretion, this enables police not only to arrest drug dealers, but also to prevent protest movements or to keep people whose looks they do not like from going into these areas to seek employment or visit family. The net effect of these laws and police orders is to keep many people, mostly poor, often homeless, out of public areas, even when they would have legitimate purposes in being there.28 In New York City, an urban specialist from Paris has noted how many limitations there are to access tourist sites, such as the Statue of Liberty, or icons, such as the New York Stock Exchange. Even highrise office and residential buildings demand some form of identification before people are permitted to enter, and cameras routinely record the faces of people entering and leaving. In addition, as in Seattle, the New York City police have broad powers to restrict anybody’s freedom of assembly for safety sake, and in commercially valuable locations, such 196

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as Times Square, or in neighborhoods in transition, the city encourages the hiring of private guards and the use of closed-circuit televisions to supplement the police presence.29 In a number of Australian cities, the marketability of communities that are homogeneous with respect to social class and lifestyle and that are also believed to be safe has led to the development of a growing number of master planned estates (MPEs). Large-in-scale planned communities such as these, with either gated entrances, guards, or symbolic barriers to deter outsiders, have a long history. The number of such communities now appearing across the urban landscape in Australia is increasing. MPEs have also become more common in the United States and elsewhere. All project a vision designed to appeal to sophisticated residence-shoppers by offering them exclusive entree to an “urban village” with cinemas, cafes, and ethnic-racial (but not social class) diversity. It is a place, according to brochures, where neighbors will be friends, and everyone will participate together in a vibrant “street life” such as that formerly found in inner cities, but there will also be safeguards to ensure that the community remains a sanctuary.30 Because of gentrification’s adverse impacts upon poor, vulnerable, minority populations, many urban analysts have viewed gentrification and gentrifiers in negative terms. They reject, as romantic, the description of the gentrifiers as pioneers whose vision leads to the redevelopment of blighted and neglected areas. To critics, such as Neil Smith, the pioneers who are responsible for driving up rents and pushing out the former tenants are often described callously as thoughtless and selfish people. A particularly negative view was presented by Sacco and colleagues who proposed an analogy between gentrification and domestication. Among plant and animal species, domestication entails the species’ forced adaptation to a captive environment. In the social sciences, domestication of public spaces involve transformation of the public into the private and favoring individual interest over communal interest. Viewed in this light, gentrification involves a group of individuals acting as a domesticating agent, pursuing its profit goals over the interests of a community. Specifically, Sacco and colleagues emphasize three typical features of gentrification that they believe parallel domestication31: 1. The domesticating agent has no commitment to the place. It merely represents a temporary opportunity that will be left behind as soon as a better opportunity elsewhere presents itself. The neighborhood “surrenders” to being re-engineered according to the desires of the domesticating agent. 197

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2. The domesticating agent pre-determines the rules of the relationship and its eventual outcome. People living in the gentrifying community may think they have opportunities for democratic participation, but the power of the domesticating agent to set the conditions under which negotiations occur guarantees the outcome. 3. The domesticating agent strives to redefine communal resources as individual entitlements. The community’s ability to arrive at collective decisions is undermined, and there is no effective community opposition to the goals and priorities of the domesticating agent. ARTS AS AGENTS

Artists seeking low-rent spaces have often been at the vanguard of gentrification. Their concentration in deteriorated neighborhoods can lead to studios, galleries, coffee shops, and so on as a result of attracting two types of visitors: residents of other parts of the metropolitan area and tourists from elsewhere. While outsiders are initially attracted by the “authenticity” of the area, its low rents can lead some visitors to relocate. A process of residential gentrification thus begins and low-income and minority residents are displaced, “with artists unknowingly turned into involuntary change agents.”32 An interesting example of art-driven space “domestication” is provided by gentrification of the Hackney borough of London, described in Box 7.2.

BOX 7.2  ART-DRIVEN GENTRIFICATION IN HACKNEY, LONDON Hackney was a former Victorian slum with aged housing and high rates of crime. Around 1990, a group of artists were attracted to the area because they could find cheap workspace in vacant warehouses that were only three miles from the center of London. When the artists’ works were subsequently shown in local galleries, the area was suddenly viewed as a center of contemporary art in London. With increasing visitors to the galleries, the area attracted cafes, restaurants, boutiques, and fashionable pubs. Its authenticity, its low rents, and its proximity to central London led to residential gentrification. By 2017, many apartments in former warehouses were being sold for over one million dollars.33 The pre-gentrification residents of Hackney largely consisted of the working poor and they were mostly in private housing, but as rents doubled and


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tripled more and more were directly displaced. Many found themselves with nowhere to go. The number of homeless families more than doubled just between 2010 and 2016, and the cost to the borough to provide temporary housing increased more than fourfold.34 Post-gentrification, the population of Hackney became strongly bifurcated with a large affluent group of newcomers and a smaller impoverished group whose size was kept down because the high cost of housing prevented other low-income people from moving into Hackney (i.e., indirect displacement).


While gentrification has been shown to have many adverse consequences for people of marginal economic means and for minorities, it does not follow that the gentrifiers are pursuing negative agendas. From a detailed analysis based on interviews with higher status newcomers conducted in two gentrifying Chicago neighborhoods, for example, the in-migrants appeared to be a more diverse group than critics of gentrification might have expected. Some of the pioneers, in fact, expressed concern that their presence not unduly alter the traditional neighborhood, and others expressed a reverence for their new community’s heritage and were committed to minimizing how much it changed.35 Other research, also conducted in Chicago, described a sizeable group of gentrifiers as differing from pioneers in that they were not seeking to “tame” the place they were moving into and, further, did not even want to live in a community that had been fully gentrified. These people, described as bohemians because of their unconventional lifestyles, were looking for a place on the edge. Their ideal neighborhood was likely to be located between an established yuppie community and a low-­income, high-crime area that had not been gentrified.36 Research conducted in a number of different areas has also shown a consistent difference between the first and second waves of gentrifiers. The first tends to be disproportionately comprised of young, single adults. (It is likely that most of the gentrifiers looking for “edge” neighborhoods were parts of a first wave.) The second wave of gentrifiers tends to contain a large number of middle-class families, married with children.37 The socio-demographic profile of the second wave residents would have been, in a previous generation, associated with a move to a more typical suburban area, further out from the city. Adding still more complexity, a group of investigators recently reported that the nature of the gentrifiers varies substantially according 199

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to where the process occurs; that is, in different metropolitan areas, gentrifiers have different motives and tastes. Further, in defense of both gentrification and gentrifiers, the investigators note that it is neighborhoods that have been in long-term decline that are most frequently the targets of gentrification. If a Whole Foods store comes into a neighborhood that has not been served by any supermarket, should it be viewed as space domestication or as reinvigoration?38

RETAIL GENTRIFICATION As previously noted, retail gentrification typically follows residential gentrification, and is at least in part a response to the lifestyle and consumption preferences of the newcomers. The transformation of the retail sector of a community also symbolizes the broad cultural transformation from production to consumption. For example, the Marais in central Paris was, until the mid-20th century, dominated by manufacturing (mainly textiles and jewelry). As globalized production slowly forced the workshops to close, poverty increased in the Marais and its housing stock deteriorated. Residential gentrification began in the 1960s with an inflow of upper middle-class managers and professionals and people connected to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) community. Almost simultaneously, retails gentrification began, moving slowly at first, involving new household goods stores, more upscale restaurants and cafes. Beginning in the 1990s, when residential gentrification in the Marais was at its peak, art galleries, antique shops, health and beauty shops opened in large numbers along with international high-fashion brand stores. By 2010, Paris publications touted the Marais as one of the city’s leading shopping meccas mirroring its transformation from a depressed production site to an upscale consumption site.39 A very similar process of retail and commercial gentrification in New York City neighborhoods has been described as the movement from saloons to cocktail bars.40 Like residential gentrification, retail commercial gentrification tends to move in fits and starts. For many of the newcomers to a community, it is important that retail-commercial development be congruent with their vision of the neighborhood. They want saloons replaced by cocktail bars. Consumption and identity are so strongly linked that the type of entertainment offered in the commercial sector is thought to be a reflection of a neighborhood’s values. An instructive example is provided by the fight over a strip club in a gentrifying Toronto neighborhood. It is presented in Box 7.3. 200

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BOX 7.3  STRIP CLUB CONFLICTS IN TORONTO New Toronto, a neighborhood in Southwest Toronto, had once been an active industrial area, but by the 1960s it was suffering from high unemployment and a lack of new investment. Declining property values encouraged residential gentrification beginning in the 1980s, but redevelopment of the commercial district lagged. It had previously contained a number of bars, pornographic, and sex-related enterprises, most of which had closed and had not been replaced. Upscale substitutions, more congruent with the consumption preferences of the new middle-class families were still scarce, leaving the main commercial boulevard with a lot of boarded-up store fronts. In 2008, a sign in the window of a former bar featured a provocative picture of a woman with an announcement that it was to be the future home of a Gentleman’s Strip Club. To the new arrivals, the club was not consistent with the family friendly neighborhood they envisioned. New community organizations formed and expressed the belief that the club would only be frequented by people who still lived in the old, non-gentrified section of town, and that its presence would discourage the type of retail development that they had anticipated for their neighborhood. According to researchers who interviewed New Toronto residents and examined neighborhood documents, the campaign to stop the strip club from opening reflected the connections among the gentrifiers’ values, consumption preferences and identities.41 The ultimate objective, they concluded, was to distinguish between themselves and lower class “others” and assert a claim on the neighborhood’s commercial and public space.

Within a neighborhood undergoing residential and commercial gentrification there are often conflicts between the long-term residents for whom the use value of their home likely exceeds its exchange value and the newcomers who may be as motivated by exchange value as use value. At stake are the questions of to whom does the neighborhood belong and what kind of neighborhood is it? Answers to questions of this type are, of course, strongly related. The conflict is particularly likely to involve public spaces, such as parks and sidewalks, and retail-­ commercial development. To impose its vision, gentrifiers have frequently formed community organizations in order to pressure local officials to enact rules and regulations favorable to their vision. In New Toronto, a newly organized group of gentrifiers initially sought help from the local business association, then turned to zoning officials, the city council, and so on, but at the conclusion 201

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of the study described above they had not been successful in blocking the strip club. As a by-product of their efforts, however, they created what has turned out to be a very successful annual shopping event in the local business district. Only “family-friendly” businesses have been permitted to participate. This annual event symbolically reaffirmed the gentrifiers’ view of New Toronto and helped to stimulate investment in the types of commercial development they envisioned for their neighborhood. It has also been common for gentrifiers to pressure city councils and local police forces to control commercial and public spaces in ways that will promote their view of who and what is supposed to be in the neighborhood. Thus in gentrifying New York City neighborhoods, Laniyonu found that police responded to citizen demands for strict enforcing of order maintenance regulations—such as no trespassing or loitering— and for proactive street stops of people who looked like they did not belong in the gentrifying neighborhood’s upscale locations.42 Exactly where the boundaries are between the old (poorer and often minority) and new (wealthier and fewer minorities) sections of gentrifying neighborhoods is usually subject to different interpretations. Ambiguities arise because the old and new are not typically separated by any official markers, though particular boulevards and commercial strips are sometimes strongly associated with the old or the new. Box 7.4 examines the marked differences between the views of these two groups of residents in a gentrifying neighborhood in the south central section of Philadelphia.

BOX 7.4  DEFINING BOUNDARIES IN SOUTHWEST PHILADELPHIA Like many areas undergoing gentrification, a neighborhood in Southwest Philadelphia was a formerly industrial area that experienced significant population losses and little investment during the last half of the 20th century. By 1990, it was a poor, predominantly African American community plagued by crime, served only by a few remaining business including an African hair braiding salon, laundromat and bar. In 1997, the city offered tax abatements for new or converted residential construction which, along with its proximity to the high-rise office buildings in the central business district, led to an inflow of middle- and upper-class newcomers. One decade later, one portion of the neighborhood contained high-priced, three-story townhouses, trendy bars, and coffee shops. Residents of this section were predominantly the mostly white, middle- and upper-class newcomers. Six blocks south was a generally poor and predominantly African American neighborhood consisting mostly of long-term residents. In contrast to the gentrified section, it


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consists largely of small homes, mostly in disrepair, interspersed with vacant lots and bordered up stores. Jackelyn Hwang sampled residents of both sections of the Southwest Philadelphia community, asking them to describe their neighborhood and to draw maps of it. She found that the long term, minority residents both described and drew their neighborhood in large, inclusive terms. They called it, “South Philly,” cited wide boundaries and noted its African American heritage. They recognized the changes that were occurring in some parts of the neighborhood and resented feeling excluded from it, but they did not divide the area into subsections. The white newcomers, by contrast, viewed their neighborhood as comprising a smaller geographical area and they used more local places in describing its boundaries. Their maps were also correspondingly more circumscribed. They emphasized the small area in which they interacted with neighbors who resembled themselves, and juxtaposed this area to those sections of South Philadelphia with lower socio-economic status residents and higher rates of crime.43

SUBURBAN GENTRIFICATION The inner suburbs of a number of cities—including Paris, Amsterdam, Montreal, and many others—had substantial numbers of factories by the early to middle 20th century. (Previously described New Toronto is also such an inner suburb.) As in central cities, limited modes of transportation required that factory workers live in proximity to their places of employment and when factory work later grew scarce, the blue collar concentrations in the suburbs suffered the same economic shocks as those in central cities. The declining property values in these de-industrialized suburban areas sometimes made them one of the few places in a metropolitan area that people displaced by central city gentrification could afford. So, despite their deterioration, they sometimes continued to attract additional low-income residents. By the turn of the 21st century many urban analysts were noting the growing amount of concentrated poverty in suburbs. In a study of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the United States, for example, Cooke and Denton found between 1990 and 2011 that poverty had increased in most of their suburban areas, particularly their inner suburbs.44 In Amsterdam, to illustrate further, Hochstenbach and Musterd tracked the origins and destinations of households that moved between 203

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2004 and 2013. They found that low-income households were much more likely to move from the central city to suburban areas than to move within the city. The suburbanization of poverty in Amsterdam was also increased by the indirect exclusion of low-income households, that is, prices in the central city prevented low-income suburban residents from moving into the central city. Specifically, during the decade in question, the number of low-income households that moved from the suburbs to the central city declined while movement to other suburban areas increased.45 As the population of inner suburbs was becoming comprised of less affluent residents, the depressed property values in some of these areas made them attractive to land speculators and entrepreneurs and gentrification began. The processes were highly similar regardless of whether the targeted area was a central city or a suburb. In the inner suburbs of Atlanta, for example, poor minority areas with low rents have been selected for gentrification, leading to large amounts of direct and indirect displacement. More specifically, Markley reported that the areas most frequently targeted were depressed neighborhoods that were close to suburban downtowns.46 By gentrifying residential areas that are near to attractive town centers, the retail development necessary to complete the neighborhood’s transformation is already in place. Urban theory, especially that influenced by the Chicago School (see Chapter 6), had assumed that social mobility involved moving up and out from the city center. As a result, suburbs were thought to comprise relatively homogeneous middle- and upper-middle-class residents. This picture overlooked the working class population, which we have seen to have long, had a suburban component. There were also pockets of poverty, typically comprised of the rural poor whose communities became absorbed by expanding metropolitan areas. Dislocation from gentrifying inner-city neighborhoods, as we have seen, has pushed more very low-income people out of cities and into suburbs. In addition, immigrants of limited means who previously settled initially in inner cities and later moved up and out, now increasingly move directly into suburban areas where co-ethnics are concentrated. For the poor who are displaced from cities or are new migrants, suburban features can make it difficult to escape from poverty. For example, there are jobs in the suburbs, more than in central cities, but the poor have difficulty getting to them because most poor suburban residents do not own automobiles and public transportation is extremely limited. The net result of all of these forces in the United States, for example, is that over one-half of the nation’s poor now live in suburbs rather than central cities.47


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CONCLUSION In reviewing the research literature on gentrification, Brown-Saracino emphasizes a dichotomy that we frequently encountered in this chapter. On the one hand are studies that view gentrification as a nearly “unstoppable force” that has had profound effects upon cities and city residents, exacerbating economic and racial inequalities. On the other hand are studies that regard gentrification as having had only most effects upon urban life.48 The different conclusions and emphases associated with these two positions, according to Brown-Saracino, is a result of their different approaches to the issue. The first camp—that attributes the most widespread effects—tends to follow micro-level analyses that focus qualitatively upon the experiences of the people most closely involved in gentrifying neighborhoods: their resistance and the personal consequences of displacement. The second camp relies more upon macro-level, quantitative analyses of overall changes in urban spatial arrangements. It tends to view gentrification as only one of several consequential processes that are impacting cities, noting how income inequality, suburbanization, racial and ethnic segregation are all impacting cities, both in conjunction with and independently of gentrification. The key question, with which Brown-Saracino concludes is, why does gentrification appear so different from up close and from afar? While she does not offer an answer, we might speculate that there is always going to be a difference between how people subjectively experience any phenomenon and the statistical trends that describe the phenomenon.

GLOSSARY Displacement, Direct: Former residents are forced out of a gentrifying neighborhood by rent increases or harassment or eviction. Displacement, Indirect: Increases in rents serve as a barrier to entry so when low-income residents leave an area they are not replaced by other low-income residents. Domesticating space: Agents of gentrification force changes in a neighborhood solely in pursuit of profit, with no commitment to the place. Gentrification: A process in which higher status residents replace lower status residents in a neighborhood.


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CORRESPONDING READINGS IN THE GLOBALIZING CITIES READER 12. The city as a landscape of power: London and New York as global financial capitals Sharon Zukin 13. Detroit and Houston: two cities in global perspective Richard Child Hill, Joe Feagin 35. New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy Neil Smith 41. The right to the city David Harvey 42. Urban social movements in an era of globalization Margit Mayer 44. Global city building in China and its discontents Xuefei Ren 67. Governing the informal in globalizing cities: comparing China, India and Brazil Xuefei Ren

NOTES 1 Many analysts follow Freeman’s operationalization of tract-level changes in cities. See Lance Freeman, “Displacement or Succession?” Urban Affairs Review, 40, 2005. For a broadening of Freeman’s focus to include suburban, and even rural, areas, see Appendix A in Isaac W. Martin and Kevin Beck, “Gentrification, Property Tax Limitation, and Displacement.” Urban Affairs Review, 54, 2018. 2 This dichotomy was presented by Sharon Zukin, “Gentrification.” Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 1987. 3 Neil Smith, “Gentrification and the Rent Gap.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 77, 1987. 4 Luca Pattaroni, Vincent Kaufmann and Marie-Paule Thomas, “The Dynamics of Multifaceted Gentrification.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 36, 2012. 5 Paul Waley, “Moving the Margins of Tokyo.” Urban Studies, 39, 2002. 6 Richard E. Ocejo, Upscaling Downtown. Princeton University, 2014. 7 See Xuefei Ren, Urban China. Polity, 2013; and Alyssa Abkowitz, “Luxury in the Back Alleys of Beijing.” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2016, p. M1. 8 Ozan Koraman, “Urban Pulse—(Re)Making Space for Globalization in Istanbul.” Urban Geography, 29, 2008.


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9 For further discussion, see Nil Uzun, “Transformation in Residential Areas.” In O. Burcu Ozdemir San, et al. (Eds), Urban and Regional Planning in Turkey. Springer, 2019. 10 For a review of studies, see Richard Florida, “This is What Happens after a Neighborhood Gets Gentrified.” CityLab, September 16, 2015. 11 See, for example, Freeman, op.cit. 12 Florida, op.cit. 13 Cody Hochstenbach and Sako Musterd, “Gentrification and the Suburbanization of Poverty.” Urban Geography, 39, 2017. 14 Rachel A. Woldoff, Lisa Morrison and Michael R. Glass, Priced Out. New York University, 2016. 15 Tom Phillips, “The Gentrification of Beijing.” The Guardian, December 7, 2017. 16 Martin and Beck, op.cit. 17 For further information about gentrification related changes in inner L­ ondon, see Rowland Atkinson, “Measuring Gentrification and Displacement in Greater London.” Urban Studies, 37, 2000; and Neal Hudson and Susan Emmett, “The Demographic Pressures of a Growing Population.” Savills World Research, ­January 2014. 18 Allen J. Scott, “Residential Adjustment and Gentrification in Los Angeles, 2000–1015.” Urban Geography, 40, 2018. 19 Atkinson, op.cit. 20 For a study of displacement in Philadelphia and a review of the literature, see Lei Ding, Jackelyn Hwang and Eileen Divingi, “Gentrification and Residential Mobility in Philadelphia.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 61, 2016. 21 Jonas De Vos, Veronique Van Acker and Frank Witlox, “Urban Sprawl.” Urban Geography, 37, 2016. 22 Atkinson, op.cit. 23 University of Southern California Price Center, Neighborhood Data for Social Change, August 3, 2018. 24 Mathew D. Marr, Better Must Come. University of California, 2007. 25 Jurgen von Mahs, Down and Out in Los Angeles and Berlin. Temple University, 2013. 26 Jake Mooney, “Frontier with a View.” The New York Times, August 29, 2010, p. RE1. 27 See the essays in Setha Low and Neil Smith (Eds), The Politics of Public Space. Routledge, 2005. 28 Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert, Banished. Oxford University, 2011. 29 Sophie Body-Gendrot, Globalization, Fear and Insecurity. Palgrave, 2012. 30 See Lynda Cheshire, Peter Walters and Rebecca Wickes, “Introduction.” Urban Policy and Research 28, 2010. 31 Pier L. Sacco, et al., “Gentrification as Space Domestication.” Urban Geography, 38, 2016. 32 Sacco et al., op.cit., p. 1. See also, Sharon Zukin, Naked City. Oxford University, 2011. 33 Ruth Bloomfield, “Artists were Key to Hackney’s Rise.” Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2017, p. M1.


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34 Emma Youle, “Hackney Council Pays 35 Million a Year to Keep the Homeless Homeless.” Hackney Gazette, January 19, 2017. 35 Japonica Brown-Saracino, A Neighborhood That Never Changes. University of Chicago, 2009. 36 Gordon C. Douglas, “The Edge of the Island.” Urban Studies, 49, 3012. 37 See for example, Brenna Keatinge and Deborah G. Martin, “A ‘Beford Falls’ Kind of Place.” Urban Studies, 53, 2016. 38 For a description of different types of gentrifiers, and a defense of the process, see John J. Schlichtman, Jason Patch and Marc L. Hill, Gentrifier. University of Toronto, 2017. 39 Anne-Cecile Mermet, “Global Retail Capital and the City.” Urban Geography, 38, 2016. 40 Ocejo, op.cit. 41 Keatinge and Martin, op.cit. 42 Ayobami Laniyonu, “Coffee Shops and Street Stops.” Urban Affairs Review, 54, 2017. 43 Jackelyn Hwang, “The Social Construction of a Gentrifying Neighborhood.” Urban Affairs Review, 52, 2016. 44 See Thomas J. Cooke and Curtis Denton, “The Suburbanization of Poverty?” Urban Geography, 36, 2015. The authors also note the ambiguities in identifying suburbs in the U.S. and how operational definitions of suburbs can alter research findings on poverty. 45 Hochstenbach and Musterd, op.cit. 46 Scott Markley, “Suburban Gentrification?” Urban Geography, 39, 2017. 47 For a review of studies, see Karyn Lacy, “The New Sociology of Suburbs.” Annual Review of Sociology, 42, 2016. 48 Japonica Brown-Saracino, “Explicating Divided Approaches to Gentrification and Growing Income Inequality.” Annual Review of Sociology, 43, 2017.



Abkowitz, A. 206n7 Abrahamson, M. 31n27, 157n28 Acculturation 114–9, 124 Agnew, J. 156n18 Agyemang, F.S. 68n11 Alba, R. 116–7, 128n47, 128n53 Alderson, A. 45, 68n25 Althaus, D. 31n22 Amedzro, K.K. 68n11 Anderson, R. 95n37 Aneesh, A. 129n73 Arcuri, N. 158n48 Armenta, A. 126n8 Aronczyk, M. 33n54 Aslam, A. 32n43 assimilation 114–20; segmented 115–6, 119, 125; selective 117–9 Atkinson, A.B. 95n32 Atkinson, R. 207n17, 207n19, 207n22 Bagaeen, S. 95n43 Bailey, N. 96n54 Baker, A. 126n9 Bamba, A.B. 32n38 Bandelj, N. 94n24, 95n29 Barcena, A. 95n28 Barnett, G.A. 69n42 Barraclough, L. 186n37 Bashi, V.F. 127n28 Bass, L.E. 117, 128n54 Bassens, D. 68n16 Beck, K. 206n1, 207n16

Beckett, K. 207n28 Bellman, E. 94n11 Bernstein, N. 126n11 Berube, A. 96n53 Bin, X. 31n23 Bischoff, K. 94n19, 95n41 Blair, A. 32n51 Bloom, P. 93n3 Bloomfield, R. 207n33 Body-Gendrot, S. 207n29 Bonikowski, B. 33n53 Bontje, M. 186n14 Bradsher, K. 186n43 Brady, D.W. 93n6 Brenner, N. 68n22 Brexit 26 Brooks, D. 69n50 Brown, P.L. 158n42 Brown-Sarancino 204, 208n35, 208n48 Bryanyiuma, W. 95n28 Brzozowski, J. 127n24, 127n29 Bulmer, M. 186n36 Burgess, E.W. 156n3, 160, 184n3, 184n4 Calavita, K. 128n40 Campbell, R. 69n45 canal construction 6–7 Cannon, C. 68n23 Cassis, Y. 68n21 Castells, M. 93n1



Centeno, M.A. 32n50 central business district (CBD) 161, 171, 173–6 Chan, E.H.W. 185n18 Chang, M.L. 94n14 Chase-Dunn, C. 30n6, 94n7 Chaudhuri, S. 69n33 Chen, X. 186n36 Cheng, W. 186n37 Cheshire, L. 207n30 Chicago and the Chicago School 160–4, 170–1, 174–6, 183 Chin-Ito Financial Openness Index 23 Chinn, M. 32n44 Chu, J. 152 cities, defined 34–5, 65 citizenship rights 123–4 Clamper-Lundquist, S. 186n44 Cogman, B. 33n56 Cohen, P. 68n24 Cohn, D. 126n10 Comandon, A. 95n35 commodities (Marx) 165 concentric zones 161–3, 175, 183 Connor, M.A. 185n26 Cooke, T.J. 203, 208n44 Copelovitch, M. 32n32 Cox, W. 185n30 Coyle, D. 31n9 creative cities 41–3, 65 cultural hegemony 9, 22, 27, 29 cultural homogenization 55, 65 cultural industries 56–7, 59–61, 65; conglomerates in 61–4; music 59–61 culture, global 2–4, 53–65; traditional 53–4, 65 cumulative causation 108–9, 124 Cusic, D. 70n54 Dahmann, N. 185n31 Dale, J. 127n43 Dancygier, R.M. 113, 128n43 Danziger, S. 156n7 210

Datta, A. 96n57 David, A.M. 129n66 Davidson, M. 35n42 Dear, M. 171, 185n23, 185n31 Decoville, A. 68n9 Deener, A. 91, 96n56 de-industrialization 179–81, 188, 190–1; see also manufacturing, decline of Delhy, J. 93n5 Deng, Y. 127n22 Denton, C. 203, 208n44 Denton, N.A. 156n8 Derudder, B. 69n29, 69n30 DeVos, J. 207n21 diffusion 55–6, 58, 65 Ding, L. 207n20 displacement 191–3, 205 Divingi, E. 207n20 Dobbs, R. 32n49 domesticating space 197–8, 205 Donato, K.M. 126n8 Dorry, S. 68n9 Douglas, G.C. 208n36 dual labor market 74–5, 91 Duner, M. 133, 156n4, 156n5 Duquette-Rury, L. 129n64 Durnett, R.E. 31n12 ecological model see human ecology economic rankings of global cities 2–4, 47–52; compared to cultural rankings 64–5 Edge cities 172–3, 183 Eksner, J.J. 139, 157n20 Eld, P. 128n51 Emmert, S. 207n17 enclaves 141–6, 155; compared to ghettos 141–6; compated to ethnoburbs 153–55; tourism in 142–3 Esping-Anderson, B. 94n16 Esposito, C. 175–6, 186n32


ethnoburbs 147–55; compared to enclaves 153–55; Monterey Park model 147–52 Ethnoburbs 147–55 European Union 25, 29 exchange value 165, 168, 183 exiles 107, 124 exporting schemes 110–11, 124 Fabos, B. 69n45 Faist, T. 129n65 Farley, R. 156n7 Feinstein, Y. 31n29 Fernandez-Kelly, P. 128n49, 128n57 Fichberg, D. 68n13 Findlay, R. 11, 31n17 Fink, P. 128n59 Fishman, R. 184n7 Fitz, J. 94n20 Fitzgerald, D. 155, 158n53 Florida, R. 41–2, 68, 18, 207n10, 207n12 Foner, N. 116–7, 128n53 Fong, T.P. 157n40, 158n43, 158n45 Ford, H. 10 foreign direct investment (FDI) 15–16 fragmentation, in Los Angeles 172–75 Freeja, R. 129n75 Freeman, L. 206n1, 207n11 Friedmann, J. 41, 48, 68n15 Fussel, E. 127n27 Futtin, G. 127n37 G20 nations 19–21 G7 nations 19–21, 29, 32n35 Gao-Miles, L. 158n46 Garcia-Penalosa, G. 94n23 Garreau, J. 185n27 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 17 gentrification: artistic 198–9; consumption side 187–8; in suburbs 203–4; production side

188; residential 189–93, 204; retail 200–02, 204; see also displacement gentrifiers 199–200 George, S.M. 126n7 ghettos, contemporary U.S.; as colonies 136–7; compared to enclaves 140–6; compared to non-U.S. 137–9; defining characteristics 137–8 ghettos, historical 131–33, 155 Gieryn, T. 171, 185n20 Gilbert, G. 68n12 Gini index 77–80, 92 Glass, M.R. 207n14 global city-regions 37–8, 65 Global connectedness (GC) 47–9, 84; see also network analysis global supply chains 13–15, 29 Globalization and world cities study group and network (GaWC) 48, 65, 72–4 globalization dimensions defined 2–4 glocalization 58, 65 Goffman, E. 157n34 gold standard 7 Gonzales-Barrera, A. 128n63 Good, D.L. 156n6 Gorard, S. 94n20 Gottschalk, P. 94n16 Gramsci, A. 9–10, 31n10 Gross domestic product (GDP) 7–9, 29 Grossman, R.S. 68n21 Group of 77 20–1 Grove, T. 69n35 Grusky, D.B. 94n13 Gschwend, A.J. 30n4 Gustaffson, B.A. 94n16 Hackworth, J. 186n45 Hagan, J.M. 129n68 Hall, P. 185n29 Haller, W. 128n49 Hamilton, D.K. 67n3 Harris, C. 185n9 211


Harris, R. 157n36 Harrison, J. 67n5, 68n7 Harrod, J.W.J., 31n25 Hayes, C. 137, 156n14 Hedman, L. 95n37 Heien, K.H. 32n37 Heley, H. 67n5 Henderson, W.D. 45, 68n25 Henry, R. 31n14 Herbert, S. 207n28 Hernandez, E. 96n47 Hicks, A. 31n28, 31n30 Hill, J. 94n13 Hill, M.L. 208n38 Hinshaw, D. 126n16 Hochstenbach, C. 203, 207n13, 208n45 Hoekman, B. 31n24, 32n46 Hollander, J.B. 186n39 Holzer, H.J. 156n7 Hong, S.Y. 154, 158n52 Horton, J. 158n44 Housemann, S. 186n42 Hoyler, M. 68n7, 69n28 Hoyt, H. 162, 184n6 Hudson, N. 207n17 Human ecology 160–62, 171, 183 human trafficking 109–11, 125 Hummel, D.J. 186n46 Hunt, S. 157n33 Hunter, M. 126n13 Hunter, M.A. 177, 186n34m 186n38 Hwang, J. 207n20, 208n43

75, 81, 83, 92; within cities 83–4; within nations 80–2 Inglehart, R. 56, 69n43 international migrants; characteristics of 98–100; defined 97; to global cities 106–7; undocumented 100–04, 125 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 17–21, 29 Ip, G. 32n52 Irwin, D.A. 31n31, 32n46 Ito, H. 32n44

Iceland, J. 96n47 identities 144–46, 155 Ikenberry, G.J. 30n5 immigrant contribution 11–13 importing schemes 110–11, 125 index of dissimilarity 79, 92, 94n20 inequality; income 71–2, 75–81; measurement of 75–80; residential segregation 75, 79–80, 85–92; wealth

Lacy, K. 208n47 Lamour, C. 185n14 Lamphere, L. 158n44 Lang, R.E. 173–4, 185n28 Laniyonu, A. 208n42 Larange, H. 95m34 Levitt, D.M. 68n23 Lewis, R. 185n8 Li, W. 146, 157n35, 157n38, 158n50


Jacobs, D. 69n38 Jiminez, T.R. 128n46, 128n55 Jonas, A.E. 185n16 Kabuta, Y. 126n5 Kanbur, R. 95n27 Kasinitz, P. 128n52, 186n35 Keatinge, B. 208n41, 208n37 Keil, R. 68n22 Killewald, A. 94n26 Kinder, K. 157n24 Kneebone, E. 96n53 KoF Index 3–4, 30n1 Kohler, U. 93n5 Koraman, O. 206n8 Kosolowski, R. 127n34 Kotkin, J. 67n1 Kovisto, P. 128n56 Kratke, S 64, 70n56 Kwon, R. 94n8 Kyle, D. 127n34


Li, X. 31n28, 31n30 Liang, Z. 127n27 Light, I. 109, 127n30 Lin, J. 157n26, 185n13 Lloyd, C.D. 94n19 Logan, J.R. 158n47, 166–8, 185n12 Los Angeles and the L.A. School 171–6, 183 Low, S. 207n27 Lowe, K.J. 30n4 Lubin, G. 33n55 Lucht, H. 126n14, 126n17 Luna, J.K. 126n13 Luthi, S. 69n28 Maddison, A. 8, 10, 11, 31n7, 31n18 “magnetism” of cities 42–3, 45 Mahutga, M.C. 69n31, 94n8, 94n24, 95n29 Mandelbaum, M. 31n11 manufacturing, decline of 12–13, 24, 133–35; see also de-industrialization Manyika, J. 32n49 Manzo, L.K.C. 95n46 Marchal, H. 156n18 Marchi, R.M. 128n48 Marcuse, P. 157n25 Marinaro, I.C. 156n19 Markley, S. 208n46 Marr, M.M. 194–5, 207n24 Martin, C.R. 69n45 Martin, D.G. 208n37, 208n41 Martin, I.W. 206n1, 207n16 Martinez-Fernandez, C. 186n40 Marx, K. 164–5, 185n11 Massey, D.S. 127n26, 156n8, 186n44 master status 145–6, 155 Mathews, G. 53, 69n37 Mavroidis, P.C. 31n31 McCann, A. 128n62 McKenzie, R. 160, 184n4 McKinney Global Institute 32n48 Meier, L. 127n21

melting pot theory 117–8, 125 Mermet, A-C 208n39 Merton, R.K. 127n19 metropolitan areas defined 35–7, 65 Meyer, E. 69n39 Meyer, J.W. 31.n30 Meyer, W.B. 175–6, 186n32 Mickle, T. 69n33 migrant chain 108, 130 Milligan, M. 157n31 Millman, J. 113, 127n38, 128n42 Minton, J. 96n54 Miraftab, F. 126n20 Mitra, D. 127n33 Mollenkopf, J. 186n33 Molotch, H. 57, 69n47, 158n47, 166–8, 185n12 Monkonen, P. 95n35 monocentric form 174–5 Monterey Park 147–52 Mooney, J. 207n26 Morrison, L. 207n14 Mose, T. 87, 95n47 most favored nation agreement (MFN) 7–8 multinational firms (MNFs) 15, 29, 106; see also transnational corporations and producer services; headquarters of 49–50, 57 Musterd, S. 95n36, 96n50, 186n41, 203, 208n45, 207n13, 208n45 Nanda, S. 69n36 nationalism 25–6 nation-states, growth of 16–7 Naujoks, D. 129n75 Neal, Z. 49–50, 69n32 Nee, V. 128n47 network analysis 47–9 New York and New York School 176–7 Newman, K. 159, 184n1, 184n2 Ng, J.Y. 185n17 Nordenstreng, K. 32n42 213


Norris, P. 56, 69n43 Norton, R.M. 126n13 Nossiter, A. 126n12 Ocejo, R.E. 189, 206n6, 208n40 Okamoto, D.G. 128n50 Olson, G.M. 95n30 Oner, A.C. 185n28 Orgiazza, E. 94n23 O’Rourke, K.H. 11, 31n17 Owens, T.J. 157n32 Owyang, M.T. 94n15 Packer, G. 96n52 Pain, K. 185n29 Palmer, E.E. 94n16 Palmer, G. 95n31 Pandian, R. 12, 31n21 panethnic identities 116, 123, 125 Park, R.E. 132, 156n3, 160, 184n3, 184n4 Parkinson, J. 32n40 Passel, J. 126n10 Patch, J. 208n38 Pattaroni, L. 206n4 Patterson, O. 127n31 Pedersen, M.H. 129n70 Peet, R. 32n33 Pellissier, H. 157n41 percentile shares 77–8, 82 Pfeffer, F.T. 94n26 Phillips, T. 207n15 Pohl, J. 126n15 political economy (PE) 164–5, 170, 183 polycentric form 172–5 Portes, A. 127n23, 128n49, 128n57 producer services firms 41, 43–3, 49, 65, 73 public space 196–8, 202 Purkayastha, B. 69n44, 118, 128n59 Quillian, L. 95n34 214

Ramon, P. 95n44 Ramos, B.A. 68n6 Raynoud, D. 156n16, 157n22 Reardon, S.F. 94n19, 95n41 Regan, J. 157n30 Reichi, A.L. 95n45 remittances 120–1, 125 Ren, X. 157n36, 206n7 resurgent ethnicity 118–20, 125 return migration 121–3 Reynari, E. 127n37 Reynolds, D. 31n15 Rhee, C. 95n27 Rhodes, J. 186n47 Rieff, D. 129n67 right-sizing 181–3 Ritzer, G. 15n33 Roberts, A. 94n8 Roberts, S. 95n33 Robinson, D.T. 157n32 Roca, J. 68n6 Rogers, C. 31n22 Roudometof, V. 69n48 Rumbaut, R.G. 127n23, 128n56 Rustin, M.J. 68n24 Sacco, P.L. 197, 207n31, 207n32 San, O.B.O. 207n9 Sanchez, R.M. 93n4 Sanchez, T.W. 185n28 Sanderson, M. 113, 128n44 Sang-Hun, C. 69n40 Sassen, S. 31n26, 38, 40, 48, 68n14, 68n17, 69n41, 94n12, 107, 127n25, 158n51 Schachner, J.N. 94n26 Schenk, C.R. 68n21 Schiller, N.G. 98, 126n3 Schlichtman, J.J. 208n38 Schneider, J. 158n49 Schwartzel, E. 33n57 Scott, A.J. 37, 58, 67n5, 69n46, 69n49, 172, 185n24, 207n18


Seib, G.F. 32n45 Shell, H. 94n15 Sheskin, M. 93n3 shrinking cities 178–83 Shuttleworth, I. 94n19 Silva, E. 68n11 single parent families 135–6 Slater, C. 94n7 Slater, D. 31n16 Smith, D.A. 170, 185n19 Smith, N. 188, 195, 197, 206n3, 207n27 Smith-Lovin, L. 157n32 Soja, E.W. 172, 185n24 Starmans, C. 93n3 Stebe, J.M. 156n18 Stokes-DuPass, N. 129n74, 129n75 Stokols, D. 184n5 Story, L. 68n26 Subramaniam, M. 69n44, 127n33 Susser, I. 93n1 Sykes, A.O. 31n13 Tabachi, H. 126n4, 128n39 Tabb, W.K. 156n13 Tamba, L. 95n43 Tammaru, T. 95n37 Tang, E. 137, 156n15 Taylor, C. 94n20 Taylor, P.J. 31n16, 69n30 The World Bank (TWB) 18–21, 29 Thierstein, A. 69n28 Thomas, M.P. 206n4 tolerance 42 transnational corporations (TNCs) 15; see also MNFs Tsuda, T. 118, 128n58, 129n69 Uduku, O. 95n43 Ullman, E.L. 185n9 Urban, R. 68n23 use Value 165, 183 Uzun, N. 207n9

Van Meeteren 68n16 VanAcker, J. 207n21 VanMahs, J. 207n25 Varis, T. 32n42 Varody, D.P. 157n21 Vishwanath, A. 69n42 Vorms, C. 157n36 Wacquant, L. 96n51, 136, 138, 156n11, 156n17, 157n22, 157n27 Waldinger, R. 129n72, 155, 158n53 Waley, P. 206n5 Wallerstein, I. 30n6, 94n7 Walters, P. 207n30 Wang, H. 127n22 Warf, B. 42, 68n19 Warns, R.L. 69n36 Wassink, J.T. 129n68 Waters, M.C. 116, 128n46 Watson, A. 70n52 Watson, E. 119, 128n60 Weinstein, R.M. 185n10 Weitzer, R. 127n33, 127n36 Welch, S. 157n24 Wicker, A. 94n10 Wickes, R. 207n30 Wilcox. F. 69n30 Wilson, D. 185n16 Wilson, W.J. 135, 156n10 Wimmer, A. 31n29 Wirth, L. 130–2, 156n1, 156n2 Witlox, F. 207n21 Woetzel, J. 32n49 Woldoff, R.A. 207n14 Wolfe, T. 123, 129n71 Wolff, G. 71, 93n2 Wolman, H. 156n9 Wong, D.K. 94n19 world systems theory (WST) 7, 29, 72–3, 92 World Trade Organization (WTO) 17–8, 31n8, 31n13, 31n20 Wyly, E. 95n42 215


Xinru, L. 30n3 Ying, L. 31n23 Yoon, H.K. 154, 158n52 Youle, E. 208n34 Yung, E.H.K. 158n18


Zhu, J. 95n35 Zhuang, J. 95n27 Zhuo, X. 127n31 Zolinsky, C. 112, 128n14 Zukin, S. 186n35, 206n2, 207n32