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Global surveillance and policing : borders, security, identity
 9781843921608, 184392160X, 9781843921615, 1843921618, 9781843926139, 184392613X

Table of contents :
Content: Global surveillance and policing : borders, security, identity--
introduction / Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter --
Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance / Gary T. Marx --
At the threshold of security : a theory of international borders / Mark B. Salter --
Borders, migration and economic integration : towards a new political economy of borders / Hélène Pellerin --
Border is everywhere : ID cards, surveillance and the other / David Lyon --
Borders, bodies and biometrics : towards identity management / Benjamin J. Muller --
Expanding surveillance : connecting biometric information systems to international police cooperation / Nancy Lewis --
What happens when you book an airline ticket? : the collection and processing of passenger data post-9/11 / Colin J. Bennett --
Potential threats and potential criminals : data collection in the national security entry-exit registration system / Jonathan Finn --
Imperial embrace? : identification and contraints on mobility in a hegemonic empire / John Torpey --
Fencing the line : analysis of the recent rise in security measures along disputed and undisputed boundaries / John W. Donaldson --
'Getting ahead of the game' : border technologies and the changing space of governance / Katja Franko Aas --
Immigration controls and citizenship in the political rhetoric of New Labour / Don Flynn --
Freedom of movement inside 'fortress Europe' / Willem Maas.

Citation preview

Global Surveillance and Policing Borders, security, identity

Edited by

WILLAN PUBLISHING

Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter

G lo b a l S u rv e illa n c e and P olicin g

G lo b a l S u r v e illa n c e a nd P o lic in g Borders, security, identity

e d ite d by E lia Z u r e ik a nd M a r k B. S a lt e r

0 WILLAN PU BLIS H IN G

Published by Willan Publishing Culmcott House Mill Street, Uffculme Cullompton, Devon EX15 3AT, UK Tel: +44(0)1884 840337 Fax: +44(0)1884 840251 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.willanpublishing.co.uk Published simultaneously in the USA and Canada by Willan Publishing c / o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Ave, Suite 300, Portland, Oregon 97213-3786, USA Tel: +001(0)503 287 3093 Fax: +001(0)503 280 8832 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.isbs.com

© Editors and contributors 2005 All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Publishers or a licence permitting copying in the UK issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE. First published 2005 ISBN 1-84392-160-X paperback ISBN 1-84392-161-8 hardback British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Project managed by Deer Park Productions, Tavistock, Devon Typeset by GCS, Leighton Buzzard, Beds. Printed and bound by T.J. International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

C o n te n ts

A ckn ow ledgem en ts N otes on con tribu tors 1

2

3

4

5

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G lo b a l su rv e illa n c e and p o lic in g : b o rd e rs, secu rity , id e n tity - In tro d u c tio n E lia Z u reik and M ark B. Salter

vii ix

1

S o m e c o n ce p tu a l iss u e s in th e stu d y o f b o rd e rs and su rv e illa n c e G ary T. M arx

11

A t the th re sh o ld o f secu rity : a th eo ry o f in te rn a tio n a l b o rd e rs M ark B. Salter

36

B o rd ers, m ig ra tio n and e co n o m ic in te g ra tio n : to w ard s a n ew p o litic a l eco n o m y o f b o rd e rs H elen e P ellerin

51

T h e b o rd e r is e v ery w h ere: ID card s, s u rv e illa n c e and th e o th e r D avid Lyon

66

B o rd ers, b o d ie s and b io m e tric s : to w ard s id e n tity m anagem ent B enjam in J. M u ller

83

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7

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E x p an d in g su rv e illa n c e : c o n n e ctin g b io m e tric in fo rm a tio n sy ste m s to in te rn a tio n a l p o lice co o p era tio n N an cy Lew is W h at h a p p en s w h e n yo u b o o k an a irlin e tick e t? T h e c o lle c tio n and p ro c e ssin g o f p a sse n g e r d ata post-9/11 C olin J. B enn ett

113

P o te n tia l th re a ts and p o te n tia l c rim in a ls: d ata c o lle ctio n in the n a tio n a l secu rity e n try -e x it re g is tra tio n sy stem Jon athan Finn

139

Im p e ria l em b race ? Id e n tifica tio n and c o n stra in ts on m o b ility in a h e g em o n ic e m p ire John Torpey

157

F e n cin g th e lin e : a n a ly sis o f the re ce n t rise in secu rity m easu res a lo n g d isp u ted and u n d isp u te d b o u n d a rie s John W. D onaldson

173

'G e ttin g ahead o f the g a m e ': b o rd e r te c h n o lo g ie s and th e ch a n g in g sp ace o f g o v ern an ce K atja F ran ko A as

194

Im m ig ra tio n c o n tro ls and c itiz e n s h ip in th e p o litic a l rh eto ric o f N ew L ab o u r D on Flynn

215

F reed o m o f m o v e m e n t in s id e 'fo rtre s s E u ro p e ' W illem M aas

Index

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233

247

A ck n o w le d g e m en ts

We would like to thank the Social Sciences and H um anities Research Council of Canada for m aking this collaboration possible, through the generous funding of the Globalization of Data Project, of w hich this is a part. In particular, w e w ish to thank David Lyon and Yolande Chan for their support of this project. We value their friendship, encouragem ent, and thoughtful input, as well as that of other colleagues and collaborators in the project. We would also like to thank Joan Sharpe, w hose superlative logistical, organizational, and personal skills have been invaluable in organizing the w orkshop and in seeing to it that the m anuscript for this book stayed on track. We also acknow ledge with gratitude the organizational and intellectual input of graduate students throughout this project. We thank A nna Dekker for her skillful editing of the m anuscript and her punctuality w hich made the task of working with her a joy. Elia Zureik and M ark B. Salter Kingston and Ottawa, Ontario

N o te s on co n trib u to rs

K atja Franko Aas is senior researcher at the Institute of Crim inology and Sociology of Law, U niversity of Oslo. She has w ritten extensively on the use of inform ation and com m unication technologies in contem porary penal system s, including Sentencing in the A ge o f Inform ation: from Faust to M acintosh (C avend ish/G lasshouse Press 2005). She is currently com pleting a book for SA G E Publications entitled G lobalization and Crime. C olin J. B en n ett received his B ach elor's and M aster's degrees from the U niversity of W ales, and his PhD from the U niversity of Illinois at U rbana-C ham paign. Since 1986 he has taught in the Departm ent of Political Science at the U niversity of Victoria (British Colum bia, Canada), w here he is now Professor. H is research has focused on the com parative analysis of inform ation privacy protection policies at the dom estic and international levels, published in three books: Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Police in Europe and the United States (Cornell U niversity Press 1992); Visions o f Privacy: Policy Choices fo r the Digital A ge (U niversity of Toronto Press 1999, with Rebecca Grant); and The G overnance o f Privacy: Policy Instrum ents in the Digital Age (Ashgate Press 2003, w ith Charles Raab).

Global Surveillance and Policing

Jo h n W. D onald son is a research associate at the International Boundaries Research U nit (IBRU) in the D epartm ent of G eography at the U niversity o f D urham (United Kingdom ). IBRU w orks to enhance the resources available for the peaceful resolution of problem s associated w ith international boundaries on land and at sea, including their delim itation, dem arcation and m anagem ent. At IBRU M r Donaldson has authored boundary reports for the U S governm ent's N ational G eospatial-Intelligence A gency (form erly N IM A) and has assisted in research for several current international boundary arbitrations. His articles have appeared in Geopolitics and Jane's Intelligence Review, and he has presented papers on a variety of boundary-related issues to several international conferences. Currently pursuing a PhD at the U niversity of Durham , M r D onaldson holds a BA degree from Southern M ethodist U niversity (USA) and a M A degree in International Boundaries from the U niversity o f Durham . Jon ath an Finn is A ssistant Professor in the D epartm ent of C om m unication Studies at W ilfrid Laurier University. H is research focuses on the intersections of visual and scientific practices w ith particular em phasis on the use of visual representation in forensic science and surveillance system s. D on Flynn is the policy officer for the Joint Council for the Welfare of Im m igrants, an independent U K im m igration rights group. He has worked in the field of im m igration law and policy for the past 25 years, covering developm ents in both the U K and the w ider European Union. He has w ritten extensively on N ew L ab ou r's approach to im m igration policy and is currently w orking on the situation of m igrant w orkers in the U K and the European U nion under 'm anaged m igration' policies. N ancy Lew is is an A ssistant Professor of Sociology and Crim inal Justice at State U niversity of N ew York, at Potsdam. H er areas o f interest include fem inist crim inology and w om en in policing. H er interest in police use of surveillance as social control is related to a sem inar she leads for senior undergraduate students at Potsdam College. H er w ork has appeared in the journals Women Studies Quarterly, Violence A gainst Women and in an edited collection on policing in Canada by D ennis P. Forcese (ed.), Police: Selected Issues in Canadian Lazo Enforcement. D avid Lyon is D irector of the Surveillance Project and Professor of Sociology at Q ueen's U niversity in Kingston, O ntario, Canada. H e is the author o f several books on surveillance, the m ost recent o f w hich is Surveillance after Septem ber 11 (Polity Press 2003).

Notes on contributors

W illem M aas has a PhD in Political Science from Yale U niversity and is A ssistant Professor of Politics and European Studies at New York University. In his research, Dr M aas focuses on citizenship, European integration, m igration, sovereignty, federalism , and dem ocratic theory and elections. At NYU, he teaches the graduate and undergraduate research sem inars in European Studies and graduate courses on European citizenship, com parative European politics and the European Union. G ary T. M arx is a lapsed sociologist, Professor Em eritus MIT, and an electronic (garym arx.net) - and occasionally itinerant - scholar. He is the author of Protest and Prejudice and Undercover: Police Surveillance in A m erica, and of articles in all the usual, and som e unusual, places. He is the founder of the Bainbridge Island and Scottsdale Bike and Kayak Club. B en jam in J. M u ller recently com pleted his PhD at Q ueen's U niversity Belfast. H is research focuses broadly on the p ost-9/11 securitization of citizenship and m igration, hom eland security strategies, biom etric technologies, biopolitics and theories of international relations. He has published in various academ ic journals, and since Septem ber 2003 has taught International Security and European Studies in the Departm ent of Political Science at the U niversity of Victoria, Canada. H elene P ellerin is A ssociate Professor in the School of Political Studies, U niversity of Ottawa. H er research interests involve the m anagem ent of m igration flows at regional and international levels and the current GATS negotiations around m igration. She has published several articles on these issues. The m ost recent of these are 'Econom ic integration and security', Choices, 10(6), July 2004; and 'Borders and M igration controls in the European U nion' in J. D eBardeleben (ed.), Soft or Hard Borders? M anaging the D ivide in an Enlarged Europe (A shgate 2005). M ark B. S alter teaches globalization, security and global m obility in the School of Politics at the U niversity of Ottawa. He is author of Barbarians and Civilizations in International Relations, and Rights o f Passage: the passport in international relations, and several articles and chapters on border security and identity docum ents. Jo h n Torpey is Professor o f Sociology at the City U niversity of New York Graduate Center. He is the author o f The Invention o f the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cam bridge U niversity Press 2000; translated into Portuguese with a Japanese translation in process); and editor (with Jane Caplan) of D ocumenting Individual Identity: The xi

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Development o f State Practices in the M odern World (Princeton U niversity Press 2001); of Politics and the Past: On Repairing H istorical Injustices (Row m an & Littlefield 2003); and (with Daniel Levy and Max Pensky) of Old Europe, N ew Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War (Verso 2005). H is book M aking W hole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparations Politics will be published by H arvard U niversity Press in late 2005. E lia Z u reik is a Professor o f Sociology at Q ueen's U niversity in Kingston, O ntario, Canada. H is published w ork focuses on privacy, surveillance in the w orkplace and biom etrics. Recently he has been researching inform ation technology and nation-building in Palestine.

C h a p te r I

Global surveillance and policing: borders, security, identity Introduction Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter

There is no doubt that the m obility of people, data and goods is em erging as a defining feature of life in late modernity. The talk about globalization and the disappearance of space notw ithstanding, borders in their geo­ graphical, spatial and virtual form s have becom e increasingly central for understanding the life chances of people. If for M arx the capitalist state exercised m onopoly over the m eans of production, and for Weber the state exercised m onopoly over the organized m eans of violence, for John Torpey (2000) the m odern state exercises m onopoly over the m eans of m ovem ent. If there was a m ove towards a borderless w orld, the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem ber 2001 have m anaged to dash any such hopes. Since the 9 /1 1 attacks in N orth A m erica and the accession of the Schengen Accord in Europe, students, scholars, politicians and pundits have been increasingly concerned w ith the passages of people, goods and inform ation across borders. In response, states have fundam entally changed the w ays that they police and m onitor this m obile population and personal data. In this highly topical anthology we assem ble a num ber of prom inent scholars from disciplines across the social sciences, all working on the com m on problem of policing and surveillance at physical and virtual borders. Global Surveillance and Policing com bines theoretical discussions of how w e think of policing and surveillance at borders with em pirical case studies. G athering at a w orkshop held at Q ueen's U niversity (Kingston, O ntario, Canada) under the aegis of the G lobalization of Personal Data I

Global Surveillance and Policing

Project funded by the Social Sciences and H um anities Research Council of Canada, scholars, researchers and activists discussed the w ays in w hich the m odern state attem pts to control its m obile population and data flows. This collection offers both a theoretical fram e and em pirical cases for the study of borders and the flow of personal inform ation which are accessible to students and scholars in sociology, political science, geography and public adm inistration who are concerned with state power, bureaucracies, borders and border m anagem ent, and hom eland security in an age o f terror. O ne of the great strengths of this collection is that there is no other anthology on this subject w hich exam ines the study o f physical and virtual borders sim ultaneously. Furtherm ore, sim ilar w orks on this topic do not address a p ost-9/11 w orld, which has fundam entally changed the global m obility regim e and the w ay that states police their borders. The them es of the papers in this volum e capture various dim ensions of borders, and indeed they highlight the relevance of G ary M arx's rephrasing in this volum e of General Douglas M acA rth ur's often quoted words: 'old borders never die, they ju st get rearranged'. But in noting the flexibility of borders, one should also note that in the process people and their identities are deconstructed and rearranged as well. Contributors to this volum e com e from a variety of disciplines and theoretical traditions. O ur m utual concern with various form s, processes and institutions of surveillance provides the im petus for this collection. We m ight point to Foucault's w ritings on the topic of surveillance as a broad grounding for this analysis. Foucault exam ined the concom itant evolution of industrial and institutional techniques of m odern governance through an investigation of how productive, healthy, m oral bodies were constructed, schooled, policed and harnessed for labour and public order. H is investigation of how the penal system in particular led to the evolution o f a disciplinary society provides a m odel for this study in w hich we exam ine how m obile bodies are produced and policed (1977). Foucault w as also instrum ental in elaborating how a disciplinary society m ight evolve that used surveillance as a prim ary m achine for the construction of docile citizens. W hile Lyon, am ong others, argues that the panopticon m odel is am biguous and, on its own, inadequate as the basis of surveillance theory, he also acknow ledges that it rem ains a pow erful rem inder that pow er is not solely repressive, but also constitutive. In exam ining the institutions of surveillance, Bigo has presented a m odification of Foucault's panopticon as the 'banopticon' in w hich, rather than the crim inal being encircled and institutionalized, m odern societies encircle and institutionalize the 'norm al' and exclude the 'abnorm al' (Bigo 2002). Lyon puts forward the argum ent that the

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effect of a generalized surv eillance is a 'so cial sortin g' that has only intensified after the terror attacks o f 9 /1 1 (2001, 2002, 2003). In analysing how the state and priv ate auth orities m on itor and police p opu lations, several d ifferent avenues o f research present them selves. H aggerty and E ricson d iscu ss how the governm ental m od ality of surv eillance has becom e oriented around the idea o f 'risk ' and 'risk m an agem en t'. In particular, they argue that a new form o f 'su rv eillan t assem blage' functions to 'ab stract [...] hum an bod ies from their territorial settings, and sep arate them into a series o f discrete flow s. T h ese flow s are then reassem bled in d ifferent locations as d iscrete and virtual "d ata d o u b le s '" (2000: 605). It is this prom pting, am on g others, that has led us in this collection to exam in e the sim ultaneous flow s o f data and persons across borders to understand better the relationship betw een the m obile body and its data shadow . In ad dition to abstract data, we also exam in e the d ocu m ents o f identity w hich provide the grounding for surveillance. Torpey's w ork w as sem inal in his inv estigation o f the history o f the p assp ort (2000), later supplem ented by S a lte r's account of the evolu tion o f international coop eration surrou nd in g the global m obility regim e o f passports and v isas (2003). This collection extend s this research w ith chapters by Lyon, M uller, Torpey and Salter w hich push this agenda forw ard. In exam in in g the o bject o f surveillance, Z u reik and others have explored the im portan ce o f biom etrics - the con version of the b od y into d ata (Z ureik 2004). M u ller situ ates biom etric tech nology w ithin a political fram ew ork in the cu rren t volu m e and in a forthcom ing w ork. M uller high ligh ts the role o f the biom etrics ind ustry in fram ing the d ebate around security, identity and borders. N ancy Lew is argues in this v olu m e that in respond ing to p olitical and cultural pressures, the p olice have resorted to using the latest in surv eillance technologies such as biom etrics and D N A testing in a d ragn et fashion, and in the process have expanded p olicing functions to inclu de non-crim inal activities at a cost to hum an rights. The current collection brings together a nu m ber o f these threads of investigation to w eave a com plex story abou t the current p ractices of surv eillance and their im plications for policy and policy study. O u r shared concern abou t surv eillance has also led us to the border. Let us set out som e com m only accepted precepts: Borders are im portant and un derstudied. W hile all bord ers are im portant, som e bord ers are m ore im portan t than others. Inter-state bord ers - o f various significance - are central to the global m obility regim e, the international system in both p olitical and econ om ic spheres, and to national identity. Inter-state frontiers alw ays reflect the over-determ in ation of econom ic, m ilitary and cultural boundaries. T h at said, the m etaph or o f the bord er is over-used

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to the extent that our thinking about borders is often clouded - although M arx goes a long w ay to providing a typology of borders in the current volum e. M arx rem inds us that borders are the subject of a variety of disciplinary investigations, in addition to a few inter-disciplinary forays. Crossing the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political science and hum an geography w ithin this collection, the border itself is opened up as an extrem ely productive site o f study. The presum ed isom orphism am ong sovereignty, nationality and territory has been undone by transportation, com m unications and population flows com m only called 'globalization'. Airports, for instance, deterritorialize the border, while im m igration databases virtualize it. N evertheless, the border of a state is central to its definition; as A nderson suggests, 'the frontier is the basic political institution' (1996:1). To draw an analytical distinction betw een the policing of population and the policing of territory (although in practice the two functions are often carried out in concert and are certainly m utually reinforcing), we m ight separate the frontier and the boundary of a state. Thus we can understand the policing of hum an m ovem ent across borders as a boundary-m aintenance procedure and the policing of territorial rights across borders as a frontierm aintenance procedure. O ne sees the difference clearly in the kinds of institutions w hich arise to structure each of these different governm ental roles. This analytical division is especially salient now, w hen m any POEs (Ports of Entry) and checkpoints or security nodes - border policing - occur outside the territory of the state - or inside the territory of the state (in addition to being at the frontier). A lbert and Brock have described this as a 'debordering' process because border functions are increasingly distant from territorial frontiers (1996: 62-3). For the most part, this collection focuses on the border and the control and policing of population rather than territory, although D onaldson's w ork provides an interesting counterpoint by detailing both kinds of lines. It is our contention that as the policing function of the border is underm ined or interrupted, a more general policing of the population m ust take place, as Lyon and Salter have suggested. The im age of a controlled border allow s for the construction of the national space as sm ooth space, safe space and dom estic space. In the m acro-politics of the in sid e/o u tsid e dynam ic, the anxiety of the internal other m ay be generalized into policing as the external other is contained by the army and the international border. As these two forces and threats intertwine, Bigo suggests, w e see the forces of arm y and police coordinate to 'low er [...] the level of acceptability of the oth er' (2001: 111). To our m ind, this is a reconfiguration of the national sense of 'safe' space - a vital part of national territoriality. W ithin a globalized, p o st-9/11 w orld, revolutions

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in transportation, technology, and policing m ake the border an essential site o f study. O u r core argum en t in this volum e is fourfold: 1) T h at the new d ynam ics of global p olicing and surveillance should be a central con cern o f m od ern p olicy m akers and policy stud ies; 2) T h at this project to understand the processes, institutions and experiences o f control - such as identity cards, cen su ses, passports, etc. - requ ires a m u lti-d isciplinary effort; 3) T h at the bord er itself is an under-stud ied and under-theorized im portan t site o f p olitics; and 4) T h at w e m u st exam in e the paths, p rocesses and institutions o f the m ov em ent o f d ata and inform ation ju st as m u ch as w e exam ine the paths, p rocesses and institutions o f the m ovem ent of persons. In an age o f globalization, how do w orld gov ernm ents, and often private corp oration s, attem p t to m itigate the inheren t u n certainty o f increasingly m obile p opu lations? H ow m igh t w e account for the ease o f som e persons jettin g around the w orld w ith little con cern other than the choice o f an aisle or w ind ow seat alongsid e the tyranny of the local in w hich the m ajority o f the w o rld 's p op u lation is tied to the natal hom e? Sim ilarly, how m ight w e explain the m ov em ent o f ou r personal data, often w ithou t ou r exp licit know led ge? We w ould su gg est that there are three d im ensions w hich illustrate the d ynam ics o f state p olicing, surveillance and the differential m obilities o f d ata and persons. We m igh t gau ge the freed om o f m obility (of data and p ersons) as bein g con ditioned b y state cap acity for su rveillance, state inclination d em onstrated b y policing environm en t, and the ch aracteristics o f the d ifferent m obile (bodily or inform ational) popu lations. This three-d im ensional space allow s us to con cep tu alize the v arying degrees o f control and con stitu tion o f states and ind iv id u als as they cross international borders. State surv eillance capacity is d eterm ined by the resources available, inclu d ing not only the budgetary, m aterial or geographic restraints, but also p olitical w ill. D istinct from the ability o f the state to control its border, w e m u st also exam in e the d egree to w hich the state p olices its citizens and its borders. Finally, as Salter has argued elsew here, the characteristics of the m obile subject are crucial in d eterm ining the perm eability of an international border, d eterm ined by class, natio n ality and other social scripts (Salter 2003, 2004). T hu s, w e can characterize the freed om o f m o bility o f p articu lar indi­ v id uals or inform ation p ackets across d ifferent ju risd iction s - allow ing 5

Global Surveillance and Policing

Figure 1.1

Dimensions of Control at the Border

for different perm eabilities in different governm ent jurisdictions. The various authors exam ine questions of technology, biom etrics, identity, police cooperation, private surveillance, data and inform ation sharing, airports and territorial borders. O ur collection is organized into four broad them es. M arx, Salter and Pellerin discuss typologies and theories of borders and border m aintenance. Lyon, M uller and Lew is analyse the intersection of biom etric and surveillance technologies through both em pirical and theoretical lenses. Bennett, Finn and Torpey investigate the N orth A m erican context - although Bennett exam ines private data tracks w hile Finn and Torpey trace governm ental program s. Aas and Donaldson look at the persistence and even reprioritization of borders to states from a theoretical and em pirical stance. Flynn and M aas investigate the European case through assessm ents of British and a potential European citizenship. From sociology, crim inology, political science, com m unications, border studies and activist groups, these authors represent an im portant m ulti­ disciplinary effort to parse the effects of state policing and surveillance at the border. M arx offers a theoretical investigation into the 'operating principle' of a social barrier through exploring how risk, com m unications and surveillance technologies condition, alter and underm ine different kinds of borders. By draw ing upon the notion o f system s in sociological theory, M arx points out that 'form s of surveillance can be usefully view ed as techniques of boundary m aintenance'. Through his typology, w e see that borders are m anifest in spatial, institutional, tem poral and bodily w ays. Salter exam ines the over-determ ined politics o f the state border

6

Global surveillance and policing

through an exam ination of the various legal, econom ic, cultural and social functions it fulfils, in terms of the policing of a m obile population and the construction of a particular m obile citizen /su bject. The airport is taken as an exem plar of the international border through the application of anthropological m odels of 'rites of passage'. Pellerin elaborates the political econom y aspect of the international border in the context of state securitization, focusing on the way in w hich the regulation of border perm eability is conditioned by labour m arkets, econom ic forces and continental integration. In adding econom ic inform ation as data which travel, Pellerin productively expands the inform ational context in which states m ake decisions regarding freedom of movem ent. She argues that despite suggestions of trends towards deterritorialization as a result of econom ic globalization, w e are in fact w itnessing a reterritorialization of econom ic space. The precise intersection of personal and data m obility is found in the national identity card, and the transm ission of biom etric inform ation betw een governm ents and governm ent agencies. Lyon's com parative approach to the national identity card issue illustrates the degree to w hich political will and political culture affect the adoption of widescale schem es. Taking into account the technological capacity of states, he suggests that w ith the increased ability to gather and use personal data, the border - both personal and virtual - is potentially everywhere. M uller also exam ines the technological capacity of states to 'know ' their population, but uses the fram e of security to ask, 'W hat is the political space of biom etrics?' He argues that the construction of biom etrics as an inevitable evolution of policing has displaced som e crucial political debates about the value and possible abuses o f such inform ation. Bennett exam ines this dynam ic o f p riv acy /su rv eillance through a study of his own data trail generated from an airline ticket. This innovative project plots the trajectory of Bennett's data as he physically crosses the country, generating an em pirically grounded view of the actual dangers of surveillance. Bennett concludes by cautioning against the use of 'totalizing m etaphors' in discussing surveillance. Surveillance is a contingent thing. In his detailed description of w hat happens to the inform ation collected about him as an air traveller com ing to the w orkshop that generated the chapters of this volum e, Bennett show s that it is not beyond reach to deconstruct one's digital persona as it is assem bled at crossing points such as an airport. Lewis continues this em pirical investigation in the realm of police cooperation, w hich she argues holds for inform ationsharing across borders am ong different agencies - a thesis supported also by the 9 /1 1 Com m ission Report and the A uditor-G eneral's report on Canadian anti-terror policies. For both Bennett and Lewis, the as-yet-

7

Global Surveillance and Policing

untapped potential for data-sharing has not m anifested itself or led to the kind of total surveillance warned by others. Finn also evaluates the collection of data in the N orth A m erican context through the new N ational Security Entry-Exit Registration System that has recently been upgraded through the U S-V ISIT program to require the fingerprinting and photographing of every foreign entrant to Am erica (except Canadians). He argues that the selective application of these program s to som e m obile bodies and not to others suggests the construction or description of benign or potentially crim inal travellers, w hich has im plications in terms of rights and freedom s as well as the creation of Am erican and foreign identities. Torpey m akes the point that European em pires used the colonies to experim ent w ith m ethods of social control before they im ported these to the m other country, as G erm any did in Southw est Africa and its subsequent extension of sim ilar m ethods o f population control in dealing with the Jew ish population in Germany. A pertinent exam ple is the point m ade by Tim othy M itchell (1988), who notes that Jerem y Bentham 's visit to Egypt in the nineteenth century was prom pted by his desire to assist the Turkish ruler of Egypt at the time to instill obedience and discipline in the Egyptian population through surveillance techniques. Thus, Bentham 's 'panoptic principle w as devised on Europe's colonial frontiers with the British em pire, and exam ples of the panopticon were built for the m ost part not in N orthern Europe, but in places like colonial India' (Zureik 2001: 211). In contrast to European em pires, though, the 'A m erican hegem onic em pire' practised extralegal m ethods of surveillance in the 'penal colonies' by engaging in both outlaw ed practices in the m other country and at the sam e time by exporting other illegal m ethods of social control which were introduced in US prisons, as occurred in the prisons of G uantanam o Bay and Abu Ghraib. From the point of view of the incarcerated, border and citizenship do not seem to m atter w hether the prisoner is inside the US or outside it. With an increase in the privatization of the military, Torpey asks if it is still the case that the m odern state has a m onopoly over the use of legitim ate m eans of violence. The confluence of liberal dem ocracy and penal colonies prom pted Torpey to argue that a more apt description of the United States would be to call it an 'im perial republic'. Several authors take the question of borders them selves seriously in exam ining the broader context of globalization. Donaldson provides som e im portant and new em pirical surveys of the territorial borders in such diverse cases as In d ia/P akistan , Israel/P alestin e, Bangladesh /In d ia, B otsw ana/Z im babw e, M alaysia/T hailand and Saudi A rabia/Y em en. From a firm foundation he argues that border defence and security m easures are not decreasing - especially in zones of conflict or dispute. Aas exam ines the changing notions o f territoriality w ithin the context 8

G lobal surveillance and policing

of a p otential 'sp ace o f flow s' evid enced by globalization and the 'era of sp ace' typified by the sovereign state. She avoid s over-sim plification and argues that con flicting p o litical, econom ic and social trends reinforce the sym bolic need for state borders. A as points out that state borders can be elsew here, beyond the state. She show s how Britain, for exam ple, is stationing its police au th ority in continental E uropean cities to forestall the entry o f w h at it consid ers to be unw anted subjects, and how N orw ay, in the nam e of security, is ad op tin g strin gent m easures to curtail the entry o f asylum seekers. Flynn question s this sym bolic d im ension of borders and the national id entities they secure through a stud y of British im m igration policy, w hich regulates the p erm eability o f the U K border to foreigners. In the un even history o f British citizenship , Flynn asserts a bureaucratic rationale behind a 'fu zzy ' notion o f citizenship w hich w ill challenge con tem porary theories o f citizenship as a legal status w hich fixes the un certainty of popu lations in flux. M aas is m ore sangu in e about the EU experim ent, and analyses the m ove tow ards com m on citizenship in Europe and the rem oval o f bord ers in the con text of various tensions am ong the EU states. W hile Europe m ay not be a 'fo rtress' for Europeans, it rem ains so for non-E u ropeans w ho set their sights on entering Europe. The collection o f p ap ers in this volu m e clearly show s that social sortin g w ill rem ain a central feature o f con tem porary society. It will be increasingly applied along borders o f all kinds: social, ind ividu al, geographic and virtual. T he d ev elop m ent o f su rv eillance technologies w ill be used to strengthen the p o w er o f the nation state. T he bord ers of the state need no longer be confined to traditional points o f entry w hich travellers, citizens, im m igrants and other transient groups are accustom ed to pass through - legally or illegally. Borders now exist elsew here, so to speak, in p laces that trad itionally belonged to sovereign states, but now have been transform ed to enable governm ents to check across their geographic borders personal identity and m onitor the m ov em ent of people before such m ov em ent actu ally takes place. In the age o f 'w ar on terro rism ', v u lnerable groups, m inorities and oppositional groups w ill be at the receiving end o f this process o f social sortin g and profiling, w hich is bound to extract a toll in term s o f hum an rights.

R eferences

Albert, M. and Brock, L. (1996) 'Debordering the World of States: new spaces in international relations', Nezv Political Science, 35:1, pp. 69-106. Anderson, M. (1996) Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press). 9

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

Bigo, D. (2001) 'The M oibus Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)', in M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid (eds) Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of M innesota Press), pp. 91-116. Bigo, D. (2002) 'Security and Immigration: toward a critique of the governm entality of unease', A lternatives, 27, pp. 63-92. Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, A. Sheridan (trans) (New York: Vintage). Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V. (2000) 'The Surveillant Assem blage', British journal o f Sociology, 51:4, pp. 605-22. Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: M onitoring Everyday Life (Philadelphia: Open U niversity Press). Lyon D. (ed.) (2002) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (London: Routledge). Lyon, D. (2003) Surveillance after Septem ber 11th (Oxford: Blackwell). M itchell, T. (1988) Colonizing Egypt (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press). Muller, B.J. (forthcoming) '(Dis)Qualified Bodies: securitization, citizenship and "Identity M anagem ent"', Citizenship Studies, 8:3. Salter, M.B. (2003) Rights o f Passage: The Passport in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Salter, M.B. (2004) 'And Yet It Moves: the global mobility regim e', in L. Assassi, D. Wigan and K. van der Pijl (eds) Global Regulation: M anaging Crises after the Imperial Turn (London: Palgrave), pp. 177-90. Torpey, J. (2000) The Invention o f the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (New York: Cam bridge University Press). Zureik, E. with K. H indle (2004) 'Governance, Security, Technology: the case of biom etrics', Studies in Political Economy, 73: Spring-Summer, pp. 113-37. Zureik, E. (2001) 'Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices', British Journal o f M iddle Eastern Studies, 28:2, pp. 205-27.

10

C h a p te r 2

Some conceptual issues in the study o f borders and surveillance Gary T. Marx

We are at any m om ent those who separate the connected or connect the separate. G eorg Sim m el A question w ell put is h a lf answ ered. W illiam Jam es B ecause you're m ine I w alk the line. Jo h n n y C ash The C an ad ian sociologist Everett H ughes ad vised that the stud y o f society should begin at hom e.* In fact it should begin (and continue) w herever the observer is. In that regard the conference at w hich the papers in this volu m e w ere d elivered can illustrate som e b ord er issues. O ne that stands out is the com m on form o f a tem poral process of linked bord er crossings. H ere the initial crossings o f various personal bord ers are a prerequ isite for som e kind o f perm issiv e or restrictive action on the part o f bord er guards (as broad ly defined). This perm its the su bsequ en t crossing o f organizational bord ers (w hich can, bu t need not, b e linked w ith geographical bord ers) in the form o f exitin g and then entering. T h e se reflections expand on earlier work available at www.garymarx.net, in par­ ticular Marx 1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2002,2003.

Global Surveillance and Policing

Consider those of us who passed through one or more international borders in com ing to Canada. We were perm itted to cross into the physical and organizational C anadian border, but only under the prior condition of perm itting a variety of our personal borders to be crossed - first by the country that w e w ere perm itted to exit, perhaps were in transit through, and then the country w e entered.1 These personal border crossings included 'non-public' inform ation (both that personally know n by the subject but not im m ediately m anifest to strangers, and inform ation not even necessarily known by the subject). Take, for exam ple, the biographical and biom etric identity inform ation encoded into a passport or visa and offered to (or 'taken ' by)2 an agent, and the disparate and disaggregated details of prior transactions and behaviour w hich are accessed, com bined, cross-checked and com pared against watch and risk profile lists. This checking in turn can rend asunder know ledge inhibitors stem m ing from the logistical borders of fragm entation, incom patible form ats and time. Consider the resurrection for decisional consum ption of events long past (which in an earlier age could be easily concealed and were often beyond hum an m em ory) or in w idely dispersed records and those in varied non-com binable form ats. N ote also how inspectors go beyond direct searches and through x-rays, electronic, chem ical, canine and other scans pierce the protective border coverings of the unaided senses offered by our bodies, clothes, backpacks and suitcases. For som e travellers the transversing of the body is a transgression.3 In these border crossings we see several central characteristics of contem porary surveillance - the breaking through previously protected inform ation b arriers/bord ers o f the person often in a low -visibility or invisible fashion; the use and integration of m ultiple kinds of data (no border is an island); and the use of acontextual, non-local and abstract categories to construct profiles of, and decisions about, the individual. As with video cam eras applied equally to guards and prisoners or w orkers and m anagers, w e see the reproduction or generalizability of these m eans as they are also applied to those licensed to cross the personal borders of travellers. Consider the use of drug tests, background investigations, biom etric identification and video - including a recent proposal for cam eras in airline cockpits, as applied to those in the transportation industry. The articles in this volum e em phasize the juridical and geographical national border. This form w hich can be so vital with respect to issues of citizenship, identity, econom ics, security and culture can be located w ithin a broader conceptual space w hich perm its com parisons across kinds of borders, and an em phasis on the links betw een borders.

12

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

At the broadest level border issues are central to the idea of any system , w hether physical, cultural, social or psychological. Thinking about society as a system is, of course, fundam ental to m odern social theory (Park and Burgess 1921; Parsons 1956). Any notion of society involving a system of interdependent parts im plies the ideas of internal and external borders and m eans of defining and regulating them. The parts are differentiated from each other, even as there are points of connection and exchange betw een them. M any form s of surveillance can be usefully viewed as techniques of boundary m aintenance. Surveillance serves to sustain borders through defining the grounds for exclusion and inclusion - w hether to physical places, opportunities or m oral categories. Differential treatm ent based on surveillance results is central to m any forms. Surveillants (w hether at an airport, a w elfare office, a credit card company, a highway, a mall or in a fam ily) serve as gatekeepers, com pliance inspectors, sod a 1-essence definers and guardians, assessing aspects of individuals to determ ine who they are, w hat categories they fit into and how they are to be treated.4 Conversely, w hile it usually generates less attention as a policy issue (because it can more easily be fram ed as legally and often ethically wrong), surveillance is also a tool for underm ining borders. At a very general level there are likely som e universal border structures or form s, regardless o f specific content, that serve to define and protect organism s as well as groups. Borders that serve one group's interest (and are functional for it) m ay o f course be challenged by those w hose interests are not served and for whom the border is dysfunctional. The topic involves a fundam ental natural and social process of border differentiation and creation/re-creation that has accelerated under m odernization. We see a kind of boundary m usical chairs, as actors and organizations strategically pursue their ends in ever-changing environm ents. Changes in life conditions, social organization, cultural values and technology rearrange borders, generating various com binations of the new and the old. Borders m ay becom e ever more inclusive and generalized and sim ultaneously (in other form s) ever less inclusive and more specialized / as well as becom ing more perm eable for som e elem ents and less for others.6 Depending on the point of view and the analytic com ponent, surveillance m ay serve to m aintain or underm ine borders. Beyond its broad usefulness in thinking about social behaviour and organization in any context, the concept of borders offers an organizing perspective for considering contem porary surveillance issues. W hen

13

Global Surveillance and Policing

these are sociologically and socially significant and newsworthy, it is often because defining, crossing or failing to cross a border of som e form is at issue. I hypothesize that when individuals feel their personal borders are wrongly invaded (their privacy is violated) one or more of four conditions are present (M arx 1999): 1) A natural sense border protecting inform ation is crossed (e.g. the presence of secret video or audio transm ission devices); 2) A social border assum ed to be protective o f inform ation is breached (e.g. violations of confidentiality); 3) The tem poral and spatial borders separating various periods or aspects of one's life are violated (the m atching and m ining o f diverse com puter data sets); 4) The assum ption that unless notice is given, interaction and com m unication are ephem eral and transitory like a river, and not to be recorded and shared with others for future use. From the early stirrings of surveillance studies in the 1970s through to the end of the twentieth century, em pirical research and moral concerns focused on the use of new com puter technologies to break through personal borders, as well as their potential for bringing greater organizational accountability. Those concerned with privacy and civil liberties argued for tightening the new ly vulnerable borders around personal inform ation, and they m et with som e success. At the same time, fallout from the 1960s and Watergate led to increased pressure for greater organizational openness and transparency (e.g. the Freedom of Inform ation Act). The technological and social changes related to econom ic globalization also m eant the w eakening of several form s of organizational borders, resulting in the freer flow of goods, inform ation and persons. Yet after 9 /1 1 in som e w ays the above w as reversed. We see less public concern over the invasion of privacy and less support for governm ental and organizational openness. Pressures to cross personal borders in order to protect organizational and national borders have greatly increased. M any in governm ent argue that the privacy and openness of recent decades, and the unrestricted use of new technologies such as encryption and the web, underm ine national security. Contrary to the trend of recent decades, m any social borders are now m ore difficult to cross - w hether entering another country, a neighbourhood or a building, seeking im m igrant or asylum status, or accessing inform ation - while som e individual borders are easier to cross as a result of new laws such as the Patriot Act. This can confuse the righteously indignant researcher on the side of the angels. Is the social problem the difficulty of crossing the borders of the individual and the ease of crossing organizational borders, or the

14

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

reverse? O f course there is not one social problem , and m uch depends on the context. But how ever view ed, we need to attend to enduring as well as changing aspects. To this end I first suggest a fram ew ork and questions for analysing and seeing the connections (w hether theoretical or literal) betw een various border structures and processes. I next offer exam ples of how recent developm ents in com m unications, surveillance and related technologies underm ine and alter som e of the physical, geographical, spatial, juridical and tem poral borders that have traditionally defined the self, the body, the hum an, hom e, w ork and other institutions, com m unities, cities, regions and nation states as entities. U nderstanding these changes in borders ought to be a central project for social science.

Classifying borders

In dictionary terms a border is a boundary or an edge that separates elem ents w ithin from those beyond it. I use the term border to encom pass a family o f overlapping concepts and meanings. I em phasize personal and social borders as they affect, and are affected by, new com m unication and surveillance technologies. The border dem arcation m ay be m etaphorical, sym bolic and largely definitional, as with the borders betw een good and evil, loyalty and disloyalty or art and kitsch. O r it m ay be more literal, m aterial and tangible, as with the borders of a printed page, the walls of a prison or an expressionless face. I am interested in the norm s and phy sical/technical conditions involved in the discovery or p rotection/concealm ent of inform ation, particularly as this involves the borders of the individual in relation to other individuals, as well as to organizations.7 The area can also be analyzed by considering organizational borders and inter-organizational relations. The topic m ay be usefully approached by studying the interplay of the cultural and the p h y sical/m aterial as both border barriers and border breakers. Border barriers are intended to serve as blockages in defining edges, and border breakers are intended to overcom e these. Borders as barriers can be understood as literal containers or excluders of persons, objects and inform ation (e.g. as in a prison, a purse or an encrypted com m unication). Som e of this is done using 'hard' physical factors8 (e.g. closed doors, clothes, locked display cases, arm our) and som e using 'soft' norm ative factors ('d on 't ask, d on't tell' rules, 'you can look, but d on't touch', 'stop on red') and very often both (e.g. doors on

15

Global Surveillance and Policing

restroom s and the expectation that 'ladies' and 'gentlem en' signage will be appropriately directive).9 Border breakers m ay also involve physical (e.g. explosives, night vision or decryption technology) or cultural factors (e.g. search warrants, self­ disclosure and notice rules), as well as com binations (e.g. the voluntary10 offering of inform ation on custom s declarations form s and electronic and chem ical searches of persons and luggage at international borders). A fundam ental question is how agents and subjects of surveillance create borders around them selves a n d /o r their opposition and, in gam e­ like fashion, seek to transcend or underm ine their opponent's borders. To pursue this we need a com parative and dynam ic fram ew ork for thinking about types of barrier borders and barrier breakers and the questions they raise. K now ledge advances through identifying variation in outcomes. Below I suggest som e of the m ain form s of border variation. A next step is to analyse their causes, correlates and consequences. For ease of presentation these variables are discussed in e ith e r/o r terms, although m any are best seen as continua. Table 2.1 com bines the dim ensions of the presence or absence of physical and cultural factors in the determ ination of borders. This yields four types helpful in considering the sociology of inform ation. Cells 3 and 4, involving barriers to border crossings, are m ost applicable to technological surveillance issues. The cases in Cell 1 (absence of cultural or physical barriers) are likely characterized by greater trust, equality,

Table 2.1

Borders physical barrier to crossing

cultural (normative) barrier to crossing

no (soft)

yes (hard)

no (open)

1. looking at a person speaking to you, city borders

2. sense limitations (darkness, distance)

yes (closed)

3. staring, backstage regions, privacy and confidentiality expectations,12 religious and sacred areas13

4. convent, military base11

16

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

resource abun d an ce and coop erative group and ind ividu al relations, and lessened hierarchy than bord ers w ith barriers. T hat pattern holds for the sin gle barriers o f C ells 2 and 3 relative to the cases in C ell 4, w here we see both cultural and physical barriers. K ey issues here are the exten t to w hich a bord er is n atu rally 'read ab le' and 'cro ssable' w ith o u t special disclosure rules or tech nological m eans of access, or in con trast serves as a barrier. The barrier m ay be natural as w ith lim its o f the unaided sen ses o r becau se a bord er (w hether to m ov em ent or p ercep tio n /co m p reh en sio n ) has been created. The com pulsion o f d isclosure norm s and the frequently involu ntary (for the subject) character o f surv eillance technology represent m ajor social m arkers for un derstand ing and evalu atin g the ethical and public p olicy aspects o f personal inform ation collection. In the sam e fashion the use o f bord ers to restrict access and inform ation (som etim es as a result o f initial personal bord er crossings to d eterm ine eligibility) are relevant to u n derstand ing current questions around the priv atization o f pu blic space and access and new restrictive cop yrigh t rules. The latter block access to w hat, in their absence, w ould be otherw ise av ailable (e.g. the righ t to physically be in a given place, to access inform ation w ithout restrictions o r to reverse engin eer and m od ify softw are). C on trast a bank visitor w ith a H allow een m ask bearing a threatening note and a cu stom er w ithou t a m ask also m akin g a w ithd raw al; calling from an unlisted (or listed) telephone nu m ber to phone nu m bers w ith and w ithout C aller ID; a su p erv isor seeing or sm elling em ployees sm oking d ope as again st inferring dope sm oking from a drug urine test; o bserving p olice b ehaviou r on a pu blic sid ew alk versu s in the back areas of a p olice station; or d riving w ithin, as against beyond, bord erless EC countries. M y d iscu ssion w ill focus on the border barrier cells (i.e. C ells 2, 3 and 4). In 'T h e M end in g W all' R obert Frost (1975) w rites: Before I built a w all, I'd ask to know W h at I w as w alling in or w alling out, A nd to w h o m I w as likely to give offence. S om ething there is that d o esn 't love a w all, T hat w ants it dow n. Im plicit in the poem are som e m ajor questions abou t borders. In classifying bord er barrier phen om ena and processes, I su gg est asking a series o f questions. W hat is the p u rpose or im m ed iate goal o f the barrier from the stan d p oin t o f its o w n e r/c o n tro lle r/re sp o n sib le agent? By d efinition a 17

Global Surveillance and Policing

border d em arcates. But beyond its d en otative function, a barrier can be intended to keep in, keep out or do both sim ultaneously and differentially, d ep en ding on the category. A fence around an electrical pow er facility is intended to exclu d e persons. Physical borders - w hether high m ountains, island s or lim itations of the sen ses - also serve to exclu d e, as do sealed or confid ential records. C ou ntries that deny resid ents the righ t to travel freely (w hether w ithin or beyond their national territory) use bord ers to keep the popu lation w ithin. T h e w alls o f a prison are intended to keep prisoners w ithin, and a som etim es w rathful public out. W hether the p u rp ose is to w all in or to w all out, w e can ask w hat is in c lu d e d /h e ld w ithin or e x clu d ed /b lo ck ed ? W hat is a bord er in ten d ed 14 to be open or closed to? A m obility m etaph or is often approp riate w ith any con sid eration o f the idea o f a border. The qu estion being, w hat elem ents (under w hat conditions) are kept in or out, or p e rm itte d /a b le to pass through, and how often and in w hat d irection? M ajor form s here are persons, v alu ables, inform ation, com m u nication, anim als, insects, germ s, h eat and cold, and chem icals. G iven the richness o f physical and social reality, all barrier bord ers are partial and lim ited w ith respect to w hat they can inclu de and exclude. A m ap pin g o f even the m ost basic elem ents that can be contained w ithin the catchm ent areas o f a border and those that m ay cross in one or both d irections is far from sim ple. Thu s cyclone fences inhibit the m ovem ent o f persons across them , but n o t sights and sou nd s (or m ov em ent over or un der them ). A broad castin g booth protected by a w ind ow perm its lig h t15 and the visual to go back and forth, w hile internal sound is kept w ithin and external sound w ithout. As a Los A ngeles teenager, I recall w atching film s I w as unable to hear w hile parked beyond the fenced G riffith Park D rive-in T heater.16 C onversely, I recall hearing, but not seeing, con certs outsid e the Berkeley G reek T heater (rather than d oing both from insid e w ith an ad m ission ticket). A cattle grate keeps bovines from going from one territory to another, w hile perm itting persons and vehicles to go both w ays at will. H ow ever, it has no im pact on seeing, hearing o r sm elling w hat is h app en in g on opposing sides. W hat is the b a rrie r's operative principle? W hat is it based on? H ow does it keep out and in? W hat is it that m u st be cro sse d /b ro k e n through in order to enter or leave or be w ithin or beyond ? T he d istin ction betw een the cultural and the physical applies. C u ltu ral restrictions involve barrier norm s - m anners, d ip lom acy and secrecy, p riv acy and confid entiality rules. Physical barriers that restrict or block m ay be inanim ate as w ith cliffs, w alls, safes or cloth es.17 Solid d oors - w ith and w ithout locks - w ind ow s w ith 'b lin d s' or curtains, d raw ers and secret com partm en ts are related exam ples. 18

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

M ore perm eable borders m ay be 'voluntarily' m aintained out of habit or to avoid sanctioning for w rongful crossing (e.g. fear o f electric shock, land m ines or setting off an alarm and other deterrents). M ore gentle form s such as a mall store that keeps teenagers aw ay by playing classical m usic can also be noted. An arm ed guard, guard dogs, geese trained to quack at intruders, and alligators in a m oat (who threaten to eat unauthorized entrants) offer exam ples of sustaining borders through anim ate m eans. Skin can be the functional equivalent of a wall in preventing access to body conditions. The face can be a potential m ask of inner feelings and attitudes. Anim als m ark territory with their scent, and skunks and squid use their resources to deter predators in creating a defensive perimeter. We can also note borders o f an ecological or logistical nature in which there is a sep aration /com p artm entalization/segm entation of activities, or the dispersal and disaggregation o f inform ation. Thus the absence of a national ID card or universal identifier m eans that personal inform ation in distinct databases cannot be im m ediately joined. There m ay be cognitive borders to com m unication, as with incom prehensible languages and incom patible codes. Time is a distinctive form of inform ation barrier. H ere the physical and cultural m ay be com bined, as w hen rules provide that records kept in a locked vault m ay not be released for a fixed period o f time. Time m ay also protect inform ation as a result of m em ory loss or record disappearance or degradation. Time shares w ith the senses the idea of a border betw een the known and the unknown. To the extent that the past has been experienced or known, it stands in the sam e relation to an unknow n future as does the unseen lying beyond the pow er of the naked eye.

T h e senses

A final operative principle for borders beyond the physical, cultural, logistic, ecological and tem poral lies in the zones w ithin and beyond w hich the unaided senses w ork, and fail to work. Erving Goffm an (1959: 106) im plies this lim itation in his definition of front and back stage regions as applied to group interaction. In suggesting that 'a [border] region m ay be defined as any place that is bounded to som e degree by barriers to perception', he identifies a central way that borders can vary and is discussing the senses. I w ould broaden this definition to 'any place bounded to som e degree by barriers to the senses'. This avoids narrow ing the topic to ju st the sense of vision as im plied by 'perception'.

19

Global Surveillance and Policing

For borders and su rv eillance a key elem ent is access or inaccess as these involve the variou s senses. The senses stand in special relation to other bord er factors sin ce p ersons m ay be the ob ject o f a border (w hether having things taken from or im posed upon them , or b ein g kept in or out). P ersons m ay be the carriers o f a border as w ith those w earing location m on itoring transm itters (e.g. child ren, p aro les),ls the boy encapsu lated in a plastic bubble for m edical pu rposes, or high and low caste H in d u s.1’ Persons are also o f cou rse the vehicles for com prehen ding borders through their senses. M any form s of surv eillance as bord er crossing tools and border en han cem en t tools rely on extend ing or con strictin g the sen ses (w hether o f the agents or subjects o f surveillance and in v arying com binatio n s).20 Border barriers and breakers often aim at lim iting or strengthening sense data. The form er thus can involve the con struction o f barriers that block or lim it the norm al range o f the unaid ed senses (sou nd proof room s, encryp tion, m asks, blindfolds, con cu ssion grenades),21 as w ell as im peded hum an physical m obility and access. Border breakers m ay seek to extend that range by m ag nifying the sen se in question, or by offering new form s o f data and m eans o f transcen ding physical lim itations. The senses, w hile inv ariably connected to perception and cognition, can also be seen as a d istin ct border form . T he senses o f cou rse are not a border that one can p hy sically cross as w hen going betw een cou ntries or places. Sense borders are d ifferent from those that block the m obility of persons or objects. N or are they a con ceptu al bord er involving opposites as betw een the sacred and the profane or hot and cold. The sen ses involve cognitive or experiential bord ers betw een the kn ow n and the u nknow n, or the experienced and w hat can only be im agined. The ignorance associated w ith the 'b ey o n d ' o f a sense bord er also differs from lim its to cognition that stem from bein g unable to give m eaning to data becau se they are n o t un derstood, or are unknow n as a result of d isaggregation or being hidden. Borders o f the sen ses occur natu rally w hen their thresholds are reached. T h u s the horizo n 's bord er offers a barrier to sight, as does darkness. The borders beyond w hich w e cannot hear (or sm ell, or touch and taste) are logically equivalen t, if involving m uch shorter d istances than sight. The latter tw o even require im m ed iate p roxim ity to the stim ulus. T he territory included in our unaid ed sen ses is m iniscu le relative to w hat there is to be sensed. A sking w hat is on the other sid e of a border or a fram e is a related question .22 H ow does w hat is w ithin the bord er d iffer from w hat is beyond it? W ith the con ceptu al border, there is a logical o pposition (if n ot alw ays opposite) based on w hat is included or exclu d ed from the

20

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

category. Physical bord ers m ay sep arate places w ith d ifferent social d efinitions (e.g. a river as the m arker betw een cou ntries) or sim ply d ifferent physical attributes (e.g. a v alley and m ountains). The elem ents d istingu ished by a border m ay be basically equiv alen t (other than for their d ifferentiating factor) as w ith the river banks separated by flow ing w a te r/1 a national or state bord er defined by latitude, or the tw o halves o f a basketball court. Such sym m etrical borders con trast w ith asym m etrical borders that sep arate fun dam entally d ifferent elem ents (w hether beyond , below or above). C on sid er w h at lies beyond the edge o f a cliff, below the w ire o f a tight-rope w alker, surrou nd s a subm erged subm arin e, or the in- and out-of-boun d s lines o f an athletic field. O r con sid er b uildings w ith a concierge, or gated com m u nities and w hat lies beyond them , or the jag ged and shifting lines o f police using fire hoses aim ed at crow ds. The finite crossing o f a physical border, such as opening a sealed envelope or in hid ing a video cam era in a w all, creates transparency - the act of border crossing reveals w h at is on the other side. But sense bord ers stand in a d ifferent relation to their o ther side. Sense borders m ay be extend ed through tech nology (e.g. binocu lars, telescopes, m icroscopes and sound transm itters).24 H ow ever, those extensions sim ply p u sh the opaqu e threshold beyond w hich one can no longer receive sense stim uli. The ratio o f w h at is know n to unknow n is altered as the bord er is extend ed, but it is not obliterated. We m ay also ask about d irection ality and frequency o f border crossings. W here border crossings are perm itted w e m ay ask if they are uni- or bi-directional. M ann, N olan and W ellm an's (2000) w o rk in trying to take pictu res o f surveillance agents (in the trad ition o f G arfin kle's [1967] breaching experim ents) illustrates the one-w ay natu re o f m uch surveillance and the question o f how, and by w hom , a social bord er is created. A related factor is w hether the transition across borders is sud den or gradual. T h e border change m ay be im m ed iate and d iscon tin uous, as w ith the edge o f a cliff or a tow n w all. O r the border m ay be slow and con tin uous (even as a qualitative difference ev en tu ally appears), as w ith day and nigh t and ecological regions that fade into each other. G rad u al transitions m ay be m arked by in-betw een areas and interm ed iate buffer zones trad itionally kn ow n in geopolitical contexts as 'n o -m an 's-lan d ' (w hich did not m ake them w o m an 's lands). C o n trast the d irect division betw een entities as w hen leaving the U S and entering Canada or M exico w ith the d em ilitarized zone sep aratin g N orth and South Korea and equiv alen t contested areas. Such interstitial bord er areas (w hile partly d esigned as conflict-

21

Global Surveillance and Policing

m inim ization m eans) are particu larly likely to be con tentiou s, as those on opposing sid es claim the interstitial area as their ow n, or one they are entitled to control and use to pu rsu e their ow n ends. A s w e will note, this con tention goes far beyond traditional issues o f geography to the location and m ean in g o f borders betw een the person and others un der the stim u lu s o f new surv eillance technologies. We m ay ask if the bord er is relatively fixed in volving geo-coordinates and stationary barriers, or sh iftin g and fluid. Consider, for exam ple, the relatively fixed borders o f an inland hom e as against a property line d eterm ined by tide levels or a bluff con stan tly eroded by w ind, rain and w aves. D iplom atic im m u nity and international planes and ships involve borders that m ove w ith the d iplom at and vehicle, as do m obile hom es. W hile Fou cau lt noted how scientific m easurem ent led to lines around presum ed norm alcy, m an y d evices are fluid and their cut-off points specific to the situ ation and issue (e.g. the ad visory note attached to credit score reports that there is no passing or failing grade). W hen Frost w rites 'so m eth in g there is that d o esn 't love a w all' he im plies both natural processes o f erosion and the m ore pu rposiv e activity o f insects, anim als and hu nters in un derm ining borders. B arrier borders are alw ays partial and, to v arying degrees, leaky. M any surveillance tech nologies rely on border seepage.25 T he logistical and econom ic lim its on total m on itoring (or p erfect borders), the interpretive and contextual nature of m any hum an situ ations, system com p lexity and inter-con nected ness, and the v u lnerability o f those engaged in border w o rk to be com prom ised frequ ently provide room fo r the inapprop riate border crossings (w hether inv olv ing legal or m erely social violations). In ad dition, new su rv eillance technologies give a m om entous boost to crossing several form s of traditional borders. They call attention to con tentiou s interstitial areas w hose m eaning is defined through political struggle. They also help create new types o f border.

B o rd e r changes

O ld borders never die. They ju st g et re-arranged. G eneral D ouglas M cD ialectic In one form o f intact border w e see rearrangem en t in the ind ividu als w ho pass through them . W ith role transitions, persons con tin u ally cross social and cultural borders. T he norm ative borders rem ain around categories, but role occup ants m ove on. T h e gam e is rou ghly the sam e, but the

22

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

p layers are different. C on sid er the m ove in child hood from being a non­ sw im m er restricted to the shallow end, to being able to cross the line into the d eep w ater reserved for sw im m ers, not to m ention the transitions from child hood to ad ulthood and beyond (and the gradations there at ages 18, 21, 25, 65, etc.), and the bord er crossings o f im m igrants, m igrants and tourists.2'’ There is also variation in the ind ividu als passing through ticket-controlled p erim eters on d ifferent d ays (e.g. sportin g and m usical events). C on sider too, the less com m on transitions in role and identity entran ces and exits - w hether entering or leaving a school, m arriage or religious order, or undergoing a sex-ch ange operation. A nother kind o f change involves the bord ers them selves. C loser to con tem porary question s w e see the link betw een surveillance and borders and how technology m ay change borders. C entral topics here are how the agents and subjects o f surv eillance create, apply, sustain, challenge and change borders un der con d itions o f the new surveillance. G eorg Sim m el (1994: 5) has w ritten that 'th e brid ge sym bolizes the extension of our volition al sphere into sp ace'. In the sam e w ay new bord er-creating and -breaking tech nologies extend ou r volition al sphere into areas far beyond sp ace, in clu ding the senses, bod ies, selv es and tim e.27 R ecent d ev elopm ents in com m u nications, surveillance and related technologies in som e w ays u n derm ine and alter traditional physical, geographical, spatial, ju rid ical and tem poral borders, m aking them m ore vulnerable to crossing, and, partly in response, new borders appear. N ew form s and borders w hose m ean in g is un clear or contested are appearing at an accelerated rate. N ew tech nologies that overflow and change the m ean in g o f traditional bord ers m ay create d isputed interstitial areas.2* C on sid er changes involving the borders o f the person and personal inform ation.29 In the past, w alls, d arkness, distance, tim e and skin w ere boun daries that protected personal inform ation and helped define the self. Inform ation about the self resided w ith the individual and those w ho knew him or her. T he nu m ber of records on an ind ividu al w as lim ited. But now, w ith so m any new w ays o f collecting personal data and the grow th o f data banks, w e see the rise o f a shad ow self based on im ages in d istant, often netw orked, com puters. N ew w ays o f d efining the self have greatly expanded . We becom e not only the sum o f ou r ow n biograph ies, but p art o f broad er social types believed to have the potential to behave in certain w ays. Individu als are defined relative to quan titative scales generated from enorm ous am ounts o f data. Traditional borders blocked inform ation about the self from flow ing

23

Global Surveillance and Policing

too freely to others w ithout the individual's know ledge or will. This lim itation enhanced the value of personal inform ation to the individual, who could use it as a resource, doling it out as was appropriate. The boundaries o f the b o d y /se lf also served to keep out unw anted influences and information. But with recent technical developm ents, the self m ay be less protected from covert intrusions and m anipulations. Technologies being developed that seek to infer m eaning from personal involuntary em anations such as brain w aves and scents suggest the question of w ho such data belong to. Consider the case of a California m an with a rare blood disease w hose virus w as cloned in an effort to help treat others. His claim that he had a property interest in the cell line that was subsequently developed was rejected by the Court. Determ ining identity from DNA 'prin ts' left on a drinking glass or by how a person w alks can also be noted. W here does the person stop once elem ents associated with the person are expressed? With visual im age, especially if it is used for com m ercial purposes, the individual has a property right. Should that apply to other forms? Related exam ples can be seen w hen previously unavailable inform ation protected by lim itations of the senses are accessed and given m eaning through technological supports. N ight-vision technology takes w hat had been existentially private (regardless of w hether it is in a legally protected private or public place) and m akes it visible. Urine, hair and sw eat analyses are used to infer drug-use patterns. The effort to read subtle facial expressions, voice trem ors, handw riting and heat patterns around the eyes as clues to the person also seek to profit from porous borders. Various form s of electronic and chem ical scan are used to infer the presence of contraband by 'seeing' through closed objects such as a suitcase or clothes. C onsider also unseen cam eras with zoom lenses that look beyond their location in a private mall to a 'public' street, or a 'public' street cam era that reveals the interior of a 'private' shop or hom e. A nice exam ple of how heretofore m eaningless personal data associated with a legally private place com es to a public place and is suddenly given meaning through a new technology can be seen in therm al imaging. Here heat from inside a house can be picked up by a device 'outside', revealing the outline of interior areas. In crossing borders the above efforts take from the person a n d /o r their possessions. But technological border crossings m ay also im pose upon the person and, in so doing, often create contentious m arginal zones in search of legal and social definition. Consider a bakery pum ping its sm ells onto the street, a factory pum ping scents through its heating system , a departm ent store spraying

24

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

its 'perfum e of the day', or the intrusive cellphone talking in a public place. These exam ples create and call attention to buffer areas traditionally free of such stim uli. Telem arketing and spam fit here. A uditory and visual sublim inal m essages m ay involuntarily and subtly cross personal borders of perception, ju st as tear gas, light or acoustic m icrow ave crowd control m eans m ay not so subtly cross personal borders.’" A related border blurring involves the line betw een the hum an and the non-hum an, and the living and the machine. We are increasingly seeing hum ans with artificial parts, and research is well underw ay on artificial skin and blood. Com puter chips have reportedly been im planted in chim panzees, and a variety of im plants have been proposed for humans. Cyborgs are not ju st science fiction. We see robots designed to behave as hum ans and efforts to have hum ans becom e m ore efficient by m odelling their actions after machines. The ease with which w e divided the human from the non-hum an and the organic from the inorganic is challenged.

Changes in institutional, organizational and place borders

The personal border changes noted above are a strand o f a broader tapestry of blurred borders that also involve organizations. The lesser clarity regarding the separation of individuals and groups from each other, and from their environm ents, has counterparts w ithin institutions and organizations. New com m unications and surveillance technologies (along with new crises, threats and opportunities) are also blurring and rearranging organizational structures and goals.” In som e w ays it becom es more difficult to draw clean clear lines separating the centre from the periphery, the rural from the urban, the national from the international, and the private from the public (w hether involving material or intellectual property). In the case of form al social control organizations, for exam ple, we see if not outright merging, at least fogging up of the traditional lines betw een national and international authority, foreign and dom estic police, m ilitary and police, and intelligence gathering and crim inal prosecution. With increased internationalization and globalization of crim e, terror and social control (M cDonald 1997; Deflem 2002; Sheptycki 2003), the m eaning of national borders and foreign and dom estic actions is less clear. The links now m ade betw een dealing in contraband (drugs, weapons) and terror w eakens the traditional distinction between crim e and political activities. The previous separation of the m ilitary from dom estic police, and intelligence from operational units, is also w eakened by new legislation and new form s o f cooperation.’2 The em phasis on prevention

25

Global Surveillance and Policing

blurs the line betw een intelligence and crim e-fighting activities, freedom of speech and association and crim e, and w eakens the tradition of a predicate before invasive surveillance is undertaken. Consider also the boundaries of hom e and work. For an increasing num ber of people the traditional boundaries betw een w ork and hom e are blurred (in one way they are even restored to aspects of the pre­ industrial age). With telecom m uting, we see an increase in the num ber of people working at hom e. As w ell, fast-track em ployees with beepers, cellular phones, com puters with m odem s, and fax m achines are expected to be constantly available for w ork no m atter w here they are. In addition, com pany rules such as those against sm oking or using drugs are applied to off-duty, as w ell as on-duty, behaviour. The w orkplace becom es everyw here the w orker is. At the same time, with childcare facilities, health centres, lounges and recreational and com m issary facilities, w orkplaces becom e more like hom es. The use of electronic m onitoring to incarcerate people in their hom es breaks and creates borders in another form. Since the developm ent of m odern rights, the hom e has represented a sanctuary and a refuge, relatively inviolate in defining one of the lines betw een the public and the private. But with electronic m onitoring, the hom e can becom e de­ privatized for both offenders and m em bers of their families. The latter m ay also be seen and overheard on the video and audio m eans that frequently accom pany hom e-confinem ent program s.” We also see the w eakening of selective borders of dom esticity with respect to an increase in the hard and rem ote w iring and sensoring (and potentially censoring as well) of the hom e. Here the m em branes that bring inputs into the hom e for entertainm ent, telephone and com puter com m unication, electric pow er and heat, as well as various security sensors, send back records of internal activity to distant centres. D evelopm ents in com m unication and surveillance tools over the last several centuries (and m arkedly accelerated in recent decades) fundam entally alter tem poral lines. The ephem eral past is not w hat it used to be. With m odern technologies, elem ents o f the past can be preserved and offered up for visual and auditory consum ption. Tem porally bounded events m ove from a flow ing river to a stagnant pool. This goes beyond film ing of a birth, a w edding or a battle, to surfacing and preserving elem ents o f the past that were previously unavailable, such as im ages of a grow ing em bryo or a brain w ave pattern in response to a given stim ulus. The grow th of com puter records offers a different type of preservation

26

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

and access. In extend ing ou r ability to know the future (particularly on a probable basis), w e see the w eaken ing or even breaking o f yet another border. Traditionally, m an y elem ents o f the future w ere open-end ed. This supported A m erican op tim ism and a belief that w ith hard w ork or good luck things m igh t get better. DN A analysis or expert system s that yield p red ictive profiles based on the analysis of large n u m bers o f cases claim to offer w ind ow s into a d eterm ined future. A nother w eaken ed tem poral border involves the lag betw een the occurrence o f an ev en t and com m u nication about it. Such tim e fram es have been greatly shortened as the im m ed iate p ast and the present alm ost m erge and the tem poral buffer offered by slow er, m ore restricted m eans o f com m u nication is reduced. T here is less tim e for ju d g em en t and greater pressu re for instan t action in ou r 24-hou r globally connected inform ational w orld. For people w ho are 'o n call' regardless o f the tim e or w here they are, the borders betw een action and inaction, on- and off-duty, and pu blic and priv ate that w ere av ailable w ith the 'n atu ral' rhythm s o f day and night, w eekend s and holid ays and d istance are shattered .14

Resistance and efforts to create new borders

O f cou rse these efforts to change traditional bord ers occur in a dynam ic environm ent. In W estern liberal dem ocracies the ad van tages of technological bord er-breaking d evelopm ents are often short-lived and con tain ironic vulnerabilities. Border creation and border crossing involve a d ynam ic ad versarial social d ance o f strategic m oves and cou nter-m oves and should be studied as a con flict interaction process. E lsew here (M arx 2003) I identify eleven behaviou ral tech niques in­ tended to su bv ert the collection o f inform ation based on crossing personal borders. W hile m y em ph asis is on crossing personal borders, m any of these tactics are relevant to other form s o f bord er as w ell. H ere I note several form s particu larly relevan t to the topic at hand. For d iscovery m oves (know n as surveillance d etection in the intelligence trade), the goal is to find o ut if surv eillance is in operation and w here it is. Exam ples o f d iscovery m oves inclu de locating a hidden bord er-breaking device through the use o f bug, tape and vid eo cam era d etection devices. A voidance m oves m ay follow the d iscovery that surveillance is present and involve self-regulation. T h e su bject's behaviou r v aries d ep ending

27

Global Surveillance and Policing

on w hether or not surveillance has been found to be in operation. For exam ple, drivers slow down w hen their anti-radar 'fuzz b u ster' warns them that police radar is in use. W ith piggyback m oves the surveillance is directly faced rather than avoided. A border control is evaded, or inform ation protected, by accom panying or being attached to a legitim ate subject or object. For exam ple, system s requiring an access card can som etim es be thwarted by w alking or, in the case of a parking structure, driving quickly, behind a person w ith legitim ate access.’5 Blocking and m asking call explicit attention to the com m unicative aspects of surveillance. Surveillors desire to read the signals given off by their subjects. With blocking, subjects seek to physically block access to the com m unication or, if they are unable or unw illing to do that, to render it (or aspects of it such as the identity, appearance or location of the com m unicator) unusable. The Faraday cage, w hich encapsulates space in metal or a m etallic net, blocks electronic transm issions. A sim pler version is the shoplifter w ho uses a large shopping bag with a fam iliar logo within w hich is concealed a second bag lined with alum inium or duct tape. W earing a H allow een m ask and w riting in invisible ink are fam iliar children's gam es with adult counterparts. A 'photo flash d eflector' fluid w hich blocks the photographing of a licence plate becam e available soon after system s for m onitoring red-light runners appeared. Som e 'fuzz busters' send w hite noise back to a police radar gun, producing a blank reading. The encryption of com m unications is another exam ple. Electronic surveillance m ay easily intercept a message, but it is m eaningless absent decryption. M asking involves blocking in that the original inform ation is shielded, but it goes beyond it to involve deception36 with respect to the identity, status a n d /o r location/locatability of the person or m aterial of surveillance interest. Such actions include efforts to disguise identity, w hether involving wigs, dyed hair, elevator shoes, padded clothing, plastic surgery or fake docum ents. Rem ote com puter entries, w hether taking or sending inform ation, by using an other's identification and passw ord are a nice exam ple of masking. The goal of breaking m oves is to render the surveillance device inoperable, often by stopping a border-breaking or -defining device. For exam ple, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips can be fried in a m icrow ave, and a video m onitor im m obilized by spray painting the lens or aim ing a laser pointer at it. A m ale guard dog may be neutralized with a tranquillizer dart, mace, poisoned food or a female dog in heat.

28

Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance

T erm in u s

In con clusion, I have suggested question s and con cepts that may, con sisten t w ith the opening epigrap h from Sim m el, help con nect the sep arate and sep arate the connected w ith respect to bord er p henom ena. T h e p rism o f the b ord er offers a w ay to ord er and reflect up on question s of su rveillance, com m u nication, privacy, accou n tability and social change. It is tem pting to see a linear p attern w ith the kn ow led ge o f science and tech nology lead ing to the break in g o f ever m ore bord ers that seem ed im passable and im m u table to previous generations.37 Yet w e are hardly at the age of the end o f bord ers. The p u sh in g back o f bord ers and frontiers does not m ean they d isap p ear given their functionality, social and cu ltural supports and the richness and com p lexity o f an onion-skinned universe. It is ju st as reasonable to note the d iscovery and invention o f new bord ers and the pu shing further back (or ahead) of o lder ones in a con tin u ing process. We see con tin uity in the progressive erosion o f bord ers, b u t also in the creation o f new bord ers. W hat changes is con tent, not form . D evelopm ents in com m u nications and surv eillance create new form s and destroy, rearrange and alter som e of the p hysical, geographical, spatial, ju rid ical and tem poral bord ers that have trad itionally defined and protected the integrity o f ind iv id u als and groups. W hen surv eillance topics are con troversial it is often becau se defining, creating, crossing or failing to cross a bord er o f som e form is at issue. P olicy issues in a w id e array o f con texts often revolve around the approp riaten ess o f crossing, or failing to cross, personal and organizational bord ers and the w ise and unw ise use o f bord er barriers. C on cepts such as those offered above can identify question s and variations. A n ext step is to stud y correlates, con sequ ences and causes o f this. Studies o f the structures and d ynam ics throu gh w hich agents and subjects of surveillance strategically create b ord er barriers and bord er breakers around them selves a n d /o r their opposition ought to be a central topic for social inquiry. N o te s

1

Note also borders between and within countries. Being inside a country once a plane or train arrives need not ensure leaving the controlled confines of a disembarkation centre. Consider the film Terminal in which an arriving visitor is told, 'Welcome (almost) to the US international travel lounge which you are free to be in.' He is not, however, 'free' to be out of it.

29

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

2

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9

30

N on-citizens face additional m onitoring and lim itations, if within a floating, materially invisible norm ative border (e.g. prohibitions on working or on free movement). W hat is 'given' and 'taken' corresponds broadly to voluntary (consensual) as against coercive m eans, however difficult drawing this line often is (e.g. 'an offer that can't be refused'). N ote the controversy over the 'pat dow ns' of female air travellers. On my last trip to a Canadian conference in Vancouver, after I left the train for the controlled place of the station, the man in front of me attracted the attention of a custom s dog and w as quietly taken inside for further questioning and a more intensive possession, and likely body cavity search. This excludes m uch of the surveillance work of intelligence agents, voyeurs, paparazzi, blackm ailers, docum entarians, strategic planners and researchers in w hich the surveillance is its own end or is used for publicity. In Marx (forthcom ing A) I discuss a num ber of surveillance roles and goals. The goals of the above actors stand in contrast to the social sorting and categorization exam ples found in Lyon (2003) and Gandy (1993). Thus we see new global and regional political, econom ic and cultural units such as the European Union and the North Am erican Free Trade Agreement. Yet we also see a dialectical m ove towards smaller, less inclusive units as in Eastern Europe, the form er Soviet Union and parts of Africa. Note also Great Britain where Scottish, Irish, Welsh and Kentish identities are in some ways more prom inent, or moves to split Italy and California into southern and northern units. Consider also new hybrid units such as those based on Kurdish identity crossing several countries, as well as the gradual emergence in the geographical and cultural borderlands betw een the United States and M exico as a third way. The further w eakening of the historical connection betw een physical proximity, tem porality and social relations made possible by cyberspace breaks and creates new borders as well. Andreas (2000), for exam ple, notes how the United States-M exico border has becom e form ally m uch more perm eable for the flow of goods but less perm eable for the flow of undocum ented immigrants and drugs. I suggest that inform ation about persons be seen as involving a series of concentric circles moving from the outerm ost, w hich includes individual inform ation, to private information to sensitive/intim ate information to unique identification to core identification. I identify ten broad types of descriptive inform ation and 18 analytic dim ensions that can be used to characterize them (M arx forthcom ing B). These of course vary in their degree of strength from hardened steel barriers to m inor restraints (e.g. m ost railroad crossings or ropes guiding custom ers in a line). Such arrangem ents of course seek to sim plify the social and physical world and ignore the issue of persons with a mixed m ale-fem ale id en tity/ physiology. One sensitive drug-testing agency asked such a person whether they wanted to be observed in sam ple production by a male or female and was told 'it doesn't m atter'. Small children of course often cross such borders at will, as may those experiencing great urgency.

S om e co ncep tual issues in th e study o f b o rd e rs and su rveillance

10

11 12 13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

Voluntary refers to w hether or not the individual chooses to fully reveal. Legally there is no choice, even if there is practically (absent being singled out for an intensive search). Here the border to be crossed involves both the physical passage and who can becom e a member. The border here involves the confines of the confidential relationship within w hich the shared information is kept. A British General said the shrine in Fallujah, Iraq is protected by 'an invisible shield'. In the case of natural physical borders w e need to ask about consequences rather than intentions. However, intention may be considered when hum ans fail to take altering action such as building a bridge or moving a mountain. There are of course kinds of light. Sun screens and expensive dark glasses prom ise to let in one kind of light and not another. One-way mirrors perm it seeing out but not in. After the ticket booth closed for the last m idnight show ing it was possible to back in the exit and steal the sound as well. A few years later that could be done only at the cost of destroying one's tyres, given the developm ent of slanted spikes in the ground that permitted exiting but not entering. The latter mechanism, along with turnstiles that go one or both ways, is a nice illustration of directional flow built into a border-control mechanism. Clothes may hide scars, tattoos and appearance-altering devices. There is great variation in the goals and context for using these and related forms. Contrast the moving border associated with those under court injunction to stay away from a particular person such as a form er spouse, to those sentenced to house arrest, to cellphones that indicate location when 911 is dialled. The borders determ ining issues of ritual pollution such as being in another's shadow, touching higher status persons and their objects, or looking directly at the ruler might usefully be contrasted with those involving literal pollution or contam ination (the isolation of those with contagious diseases or the sanitary zones of a hospital or m anufacturing facility). These tools in turn fit within broader efforts to engineer social control by affecting the actions of controllers, targets, potential victim s and their environm ents (Marx 1995). Note also more perm anent actions such as the reported blinding of some of the builders of the Pyram ids and the m edieval cutting out of tongues of non-literate persons as a m eans of ensuring their silence. We see the opposite with sense-enhancem ent m eans which, when voluntarily used, cross (via extending) the sense borders of the user. However, when sense data are imposed upon the person (e.g. smells, sound or images) a border of a different sort is crossed. Technologies that strengthen the senses may in turn be used to cross the personal borders of another person against his or her will. The concept of borders, particularly when we consider persons in

31

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

22

23

24

25

26

32

interaction, is expansive and illusive and dependent on the com ponent in question and whose, or which, perspective is adopted (the sender or receiver of stim uli, the controller or the controlled, potential victim or perpetrator). Borders are hopelessly interwoven and reciprocal, like the parts of an Escher drawing. This speaks to the topic's ironic and paradoxical qualities. However, conceptual unpacking perm its som e disentanglem ent, at least for purposes of analysis. Consider also the m ysterious and magical phenomena that mythology suggests lie beyond the borders - barbarians and the uncivilized, dangerous creatures, temptation, dam nation and pollution, and less often, salvation, angels, heavenly delights and utopia. Apart from the inchoate 'beyond', note the sense of foreboding and uncertainty associated with interstitial borderlands. Being beyond the formal control of the established order within the border, these are in m any ways often messier and more dangerous, if more dynam ic and energized. M ore generally this is also the case for regions of cultural conflict where diverse peoples meet - w hether at crossroads, frontiers, ports or borderlands. Tolerance may be greater and rule-violating behaviour more com mon because of the weakness of a central authority and lesser consensus on the rules. Such places may also be incubators of social change given lesser traditionalism and the sparks of cultural confrontation. As Rosaldo (1993) observes, understanding border regions can offer insight into broader cultures. Here, as sources of insight, border areas share som ething with the cracks and ruptures in the social order appearing with natural and social disasters. O f course, in conjunction with other borders these can m atter enorm ously - consider the two sides of the Ohio River w hich for slaves m eant the difference betw een slavery and freedom, depending if they were on the Kentucky or Ohio side. The thresholds of the senses are som ew hat individual, varying from those who in varying degrees are blind or deaf to those with acute senses (e.g. the astounding vision of baseball great Ted Williams or the greater hearing ability of m any of those w ho are blind, as with Ray Charles). A dog need not enter a vehicle to search it for explosives since the scent escapes from the metal walls of the vehicle. Speech from inside a room creates vibrations on windows w hich can be remotely 'read' by outsiders. Consider the related difficulties in border definition and control seen with pollution, w hether airborne pollutants from smokestacks, industrial waste emptied into a river going downstream , or w hen sew age pumped into the ocean from Victoria, Canada or Tijuana, M exico m akes its way to the western waters of the USA. Surfing in Coronado, California, a few miles from the M exican border, som etim es has its drawbacks. W hile it is of a different order, a life cycle model of various form s of birth, m aturity and death can also be applied to organizations - from empires to

S om e co ncep tual issues in th e study o f b o rd e rs and su rveillance

27

28

29 30

31

32

scholarly and artistic fields to family units. Both entropy and innovation are factors here. However, these may be one-way or bi-directional bridges. W ho the 'our volitional sphere' refers to and w hat interests are served should always be analysed. This is also the case with new land use patterns such as shopping malls, entertainm ent worlds and large apartm ent, university, hospital and corporate com plexes that blur lines that had been clearer as betw een the public and the private. W hile privately owned, they are dependent on steady flows of people in and out. The ratio of public to private spaces has been altered so that the amount of public physical space, as traditionally defined, appears to be declining. In addition, what had form erly been public, or at least ignored, space (such as em pty lots) is increasingly built upon and the rapid growth of gated com m unities and access-controlled buildings further alters conventional borders. This draws from and expands on M arx (1997b). Since the 1970s Russian experim enters have claimed to have techniques to control rioters and dissidents, dem oralize or disable opponents and enhance perform ance through w hat is termed 'acoustic psycho-correction'. This is done with com puterized acoustic devices said to be capable of implanting thoughts in people's minds w hich are intended to alter behaviour, without their awareness of the source. Here come the M anchurian candidates. We also see border blurring among distinct objects such as telephones, com puters and televisions w hich are merging, as w ell as the m erging of w hat had been distinct form ats and types such as sound, image, print and data. Issues of sim ulation and the blurring of lines between copies and originals also fit here. Beyond empirical changes that need to be culturally fram ed, som e of the blurring involves lack of definitional singularity. For exam ple, note the various dim ensions (e.g. property, access, inform ation) that may be present w hen the terms 'public' and 'private' are used (Marx 2001). Understanding the range of empirical and causal connections between physical borders and social and cultural conceptualization of borders is vital for understanding. N ippert-Eng (1995) creatively explores aspects of this in studying boundary negotiations between hom e and work. The physical and the cultural borders are also joined in language with expressions such as 'over the top', 'out of bounds', 'o ff base' and 'beyond the pale'. In the latter case, a pale is part of a fence. The expression, however, refers to social distance from a norm ative standard, not physical distance from the fence. O f course, more is going on here than the im pact of technology. In som e cases blurred borders are clearly a functional means to get around organizational restrictions. Note the US federal governm ent turning to the use of data gathered and analysed by private agencies as a means of avoiding privacy and related legislation (O'H arrow 2005).

33

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

33

34

35

36

37

In another poem, T h e Hired Hand', Robert Frost writes, 'H om e is the place that w hen you have to go there, they have to take you in'. The proliferation of electronic borders may require us to update this, at least for som e persons, to 'H om e is the place that when you w ant to leave, they have to keep you in'. It took many days for news of N apoleon's defeat to reach France, and some battles were fought after the Civil War was ended because com batants had not heard the news. An im portant context for this form is entrance and exit controls. The fact that the door or gate must remain open long enough to perm it legitim ate entry may offer a window for illegitim ate entry. W hile not quite the leakage noted elsewhere, this nicely illustrates the ironic vulnerability of control systems in w hich there is exchange across borders. The need to open creates the possibility for illegitim ate as well as legitim ate entrance and egress. Deception offers challenges to border conceptualization. The border here involves m anipulating perceptions to make it appear that an illusory border is literal (e.g. the Potem kin village, the seem ing firm ground above an animal trap, signs w'arning that video surveillance is present when it isn't). Deception may also be used to misinform with respect to w hat it is that is on the other side of a border - note cans of 'shaving cream ' and other consumer goods sold as containers for valuables or a picture hung over a wall safe. The 'honey traps' (sexual lures) of covert police w ork and flypaper seek to draw their subjects in via temptation, in the form er case to break through informational borders of the suspect and in the latter to create a border with no exit. Consider Copernicus and Galileo for breaking the conventional border between earth and heaven, and Darwin for that between the human and animal, as well as technologies that blur the line betw een the human and the m achine and those overcom ing traditional physical lim itations perm itting space travel, microscopic and telescopic data, and new sense-extending means of com munication.

R e fe re n c e s

Andreas, P. (2000) Border Games (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Deflem, M. (2002) Policing World Society (New York: Oxford University Press). Frost, R. (1975) The Poetry o f Robert Frost (New York: H. Holt and Co.). Gandy, O. (1993) The Panoptic Sort (Boulder, CO: Westview). Garfinkle, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity). Goffm an, E. (1959) The Presentation o f S elf in Everyday Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday). Lyon, D. (2003) Surveillance as Social Sorting (London: Routledge).

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S om e co ncep tual issues in th e study o f b o rd e rs and su rveillance

Mann, S., Nolan, J. and Wellman, B. (2000) 'Sousvcillancc: inventing and using wearable com puting devices for data collection in surveillance environm ents', Surveillance and Society, 3, pp. 321-55. M arx, G. (1995) 'The Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet', in J. H agan and R. Peterson (eds) Crime and Inequality (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 245-56. M arx, G. (1997a) 'The Declining Significance of Traditional Borders and the Appearance of New Borders in an Age of High Technology', in P. Droege (ed.) Intelligent Environments (North-Holland: Elsevier Science), pp. 484-94. M arx, G. (1997b) 'Social Control Across Borders', in W. M cDonald (ed.) Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village (Cincinnati: A nderson Publishing), pp. 23-39. M arx, G. (1999) 'Ethics for the New Surveillance', in C. Bennett and R. Grant (eds) Visions o f Privacy: Policy Choices fo r the Digital A ge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), pp. 39-67. M arx, G. (2001) 'M urky Conceptual Waters: the public and the private', Ethics and Information Technology, 3:3, pp. 157-69. M arx, G. (2003) 'A Tack in the Shoe: neutralizing and resisting the new surveillance', Journal o f Social Issues, 59, pp. 369-90. M arx, G. (Forthcom ing A) W indows into the Soul: Surveillance and Society in an A ge o f High Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). M arx, G. (Forthcom ing B) 'Varieties of Personal Inform ation as Influences on Attitudes Toward Surveillance', in R. Ericson and K. Haggerty (eds) The New Politics o f Surveillance and Visibility (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). M cDonald, W. (ed.) (1997) Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing). N ippert-Eng, C. (1995) H ome and Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). O'Harrow, R. (2005) No Place to H ide (New York: Free Press). Park, R. and Burgess, E. (1921) Introduction to the Science o f Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Parsons, T. (1956) The Social System (Glencoe: Free Press). Rosaldo, R. (1993) Culture and Truth: The Remaking o f Social Analysis (Boston: Beacon Press). Sheptycki, J. (2003) In Search o f Transnational Policing (Aldershot: Dartm outh Publishing). Sim mel, G. (1994) Bridge and Door: Theory, Culture, and Society (Thousand Oaks: Sage).

35

C h a p te r 3

A t the threshold o f security: a th e o ry o f international borders Mark B. Salter

T his chap ter questions the foun dations for a gen eral theory of bord ers, w hich could be categorized in term s o f perm eability accord ing to state capacity, state intentions and the character o f the m obile subject. Rather than use m acro-theories o f m igration, this m odel arises from a concern w ith the m icro-politics o f bord er control, illustrated by an ind ividu alistic focus. Startin g from the site o f the airport, the anth ropological m od el of the 'rite o f p assag e' is applied to m od ern bord ers - sep aratin g crossings into p re-lim inal, lim inal, and p o st-lim inal rites - w hich are shaped by architectu re, the con fession ary com plex and hyper-d ocum entation . T he interface betw een state p olicies and d iscou rses o f b ord er secu rity and the practise o r capacity o f state policing is m u ch u n der-th eorized and understudied. These question s have taken on an accelerated salience since 9 /1 1 . I w ould argue that there h as b een no d eep-stru ctu ral change to the p rocess o f crossing bord ers sin ce the terror attacks. But, the am ou nt o f public attention and p olicy scru tin y has increased. Borders are alw ays contested b y social p ractices and in som e sense arb itrary in their evolu tion and p olicing. A central aim o f m o st national bord er n arrativ es is to obscure the arbitrary and con tin gent nature of bord ers and to fix the p lay o f m eanings o f the com m u nity boun ded by these incom plete and unstable boun daries. B alibar (2 0 0 2 :7 8 -9 ) contributes an extrem ely useful series of con cepts to illustrate the con tem porary m ean in gs o f borders. H e d escribes bord ers as o v er-determ in ed , p olysem ic and heterogenous. The p olitical b ord er alw ays coincid es w ith other kinds 36

A t the threshold of security: a theory o f international borders

of borders, be they cultural, econom ic, linguistic, historical and so on. Borders are alw ays experienced differently by different social classes, as Dalby expresses: T h e crucial point, however, is that boundaries play very different roles for people and for im ages, com m odities and financial flows, dependent on w hich larger fram ew ork is invoked as the overarching spatial architectural of politics' (1999:135). And borders are never hom ogenous in their materiality, effects or functionality across the space of them. We m ight point to a num ber of functions of the border: both to repress (police powers) and to constitute (constructive). Table 3.1

W h at d oes the B order C ontrol?

L egal

S o v ereig n

E co n o m ic

L an g u ag e

Id en tity

C itizenship

Territory

C urren cy

Of interrogation

U s /th e m

Space

Law

Int'l law

C u s to m s /

Of g ov ern m en t

In sid e /

Time

B u reau cracy

taxes

outside

R egulations

N ationalism

C u ltu re

These dual operations constitute insiders and outsiders. In the case of international borders, the territorial separation of state jurisdictions is constitutive of the world system . In addition to historical studies of the evolution of state borders, a num ber of scholars investigate the degree to w hich state border functions persist in the globalized world. We can point to a large num ber of studies that analyse European borders, fewer that exam ine A m erican borders, and very few that go beyond the core of the w orld economy. W ithin international relations, only Zacher (2001) has looked at the persistence of borders - though not border functions - on a global scale. I have suggested elsew here that the perm issive or discrim inatory function of borders varies considerably by m obile population and state capacity. In particular, anthropological studies of thresholds and rites of passage can contribute to our analysis of the international border. The border exam ination is a rite of passage for international travellers. Follow ing from anthropologist van G ennep, the territorial passage is divided into three specific rites: pre-lim inal rites (the rites of separation from a previous world); lim inal or threshold rites (rites of transition); and post-lim inal rites (rites and cerem onies of incorporation into the new world) (1960: 21). In classical or pre-m odem civilizations, com m unities often had neutral space betw een them, on w hich to hold negotiations, conduct battles, or hold m arkets - the 'original' inter-national, interstitial space of world politics. Borders them selves are over-determ ined by social, 37

Global Surveillance and Policing

p olitical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic barriers. T he transition betw een spaces, w hich van G ennep d escribes as taking p lace w ithin the neutral zone, is now m ore often a m atter o f policing than exclusion. W hen one p etitions to enter a state, the traveller abd icates all rights (except basic hu m an rights, I w ould argue). The application o f sovereign p o w er at the bord er is absolu te; travellers possess only basic hu m an rights gu aranteed by international con v en tions and d ram atically circu m scribed nationally derived rights. T he bord er represents the lim it o f the p olitical com m u nity - the territorial incarnation o f the in sid e /o u tsid e boun dary (W alker 1993: 127). 'U ntil that threshold is crossed, the person is outsid e the covenant w ith its priv ileges and benefits; but w hen it is crossed, or p assed , the person is a partak er o f all that is w ith in ' (Trum bull 1896: 266). This circu m scribed position as p etitioner is w ell-illu strated by anthropological theory. G irard d iscu sses the individual 'in p assag e' - in the transitory state betw een one space and another. The passenger 'is regarded in the sam e light as a crim inal or as a victim o f an epidem ic: his m ere physical presence increases the risk o f v io len ce' (Girard 1977: 281). H e con tin u es to d escribe the com m u n ity 's reaction to the in d ividu al in transition: 'isolate the victim ... forbid all con tact betw een him and the healthy m em bers of the com m u nity; he m u st be placed in quaran tin e' (282). To the d egree that m od ern p olitics, com m erce and society depend on the easy m ov em ent of ind ividu als, the state m u st clearly balance this u n pred ictability and thus insecurity w ith freedom and mobility.

Liminal Border examination

Figure 3.1

Border as Rite of Passage

R ites o f territorial p assag e are rites o f social p assage. T h ey attem pt to provide som e stability and p red ictability to a fun d am entally disru ptive change (such as ad o le sce n t/a d u lt, sin g le /m a rrie d , ch ild le ss/ch ild , fa m ilia r/stra n g e , etc). The entry o f a stranger into the com m u nity is plainly a d angerous and u n pred ictable act. H ow ever, as G irard (1977) illustrates, 'w ith regular repetition and a p attern o f success, these rites are gradu ally transform ed into sim ple tests or trials, becom e increasingly "sy m b o lic" and form alistic' (284). The w orld has faced a radical rem ind ing o f the 38

A t the threshold of security: a theory o f international borders

unpredictability w hich the border rites of passage were m eant to contain. Faced with the radical undecideability and subsequent risk of the 'alien' or 'foreign er', governm ent agents are struggling to introduce new rites of passage that will som ehow contain the contagious violence inherent in the terror threat. Yet, we should not under-estim ate the im portance of the rituals of obedience, confession and discretion that are em bodied at the border post. We proffer our passport - that request by our sovereign to another - that w e m ay enter. By responding to the inspector's questions, w e recognize the validity of the sovereign to dem and of us truth, w hich we provide. The sovereign bids us enter, and with it an im plicit prom ise to abide by that sovereign authority. W ithout the im plicit confessionary com plex, that psychic rite of passage w herein w e disclose our intentions to the agent of the sovereign, the border cannot fulfill its discretionary function -e x clu d in g the dangerous and adm itting the safe. However, that discretionary function itself relies on individual acts of discretion as each state agent stands in for the sovereign. Contem porary rites of passage involve not ju st exam ination and confession, but also inform ation and risk m anagem ent - the truth of the confession is double-checked by the exam iner and the technology available. This crucial m om ent of decision sets up this project.

Bodies, biopow er and borders

Conventional political accounts o f m igration focus on m asses of m oving populations - broad dem ographic and social trends - or the public policy process by w hich those populations are constrained or enabled. This account turns traditional analysis on its head and asks: W hat if w e were to put the individual at the centre of our analysis? This is not to adopt a method w herein the life-experience of an individual stands in for any representative social group. It is im portant not to fill the position of the individual in this analysis as a universal, white, property-ow ning, male citizen (or any other figure). Rather, our aim is to put an em pty m arker in the place of the individual and track how different force fields em pow er or lim it the individual's progress through the global m obility regime. In this m odel, we point to a num ber of factors affecting the mobile individual: construction of the traveller through social scripts; material body characteristics, w hich often suggest particular scripts and are a subject of biom etrics and docum entation; linguistic ability and the im plicit com pliance with the confessionary exam ination at the border; the facilities or constraints im bued by class position; adm ission or exclusion at the border w ithin a fram ew ork of international rights and responsibilities,

39

Global Surveillance and Policing

w hich is dependent on technologies of risk assessm ent and the application of discretion under the shadow o f failure and catastrophe; state capacity for intelligence gathering, inform ation m anagem ent and risk assessm ent; state policing pow ers; and finally, surveillance of the individual before, d uring and after the border mom ent. In a typical journey, an individual will face several points of decision or discretion: legal, social and financial ability to leave hom e (passport, agency, ticket); financial and bureaucratic ability to travel internationally (visa, ticket); linguistic and social ability to enter the target country (exam ination, confession, discretion); and finally, the ability to leave that country again. Traditional narratives of m igration describe the m acro-process in terms of 'pu sh ' and 'p u ll' factors that induce or deter populations from m oving. Scholars discuss econom ic, political and hum anitarian m otives for international m ovem ent (hope for a better future, fear of harm , etc.) (Brettell and H ollifield 2000). The abstraction of the 'p u sh /p u ll' model of m igration or the policy-oriented analysis of specific border cases helps dow nplay the role of social scripts and agency in migration. However, this m odel o f m igration dow nplays the crucial role that state policies and state agents have in facilitating or restricting mobility. G overnm ents are key players in this narrative, by establishing barriers and inducem ents to specific kinds of m ovem ents - harsh refugee adjudication procedures, fast tracks for entrepreneurial investors, and so on. By placing the individual - the body of the individual - in the centre o f the analysis, w e see that both m acro- and m icro-politics of pow er structure the perm eability of state borders. This analysis in no w ay detracts from the ability of the state to repress or to exclude, but puts forward the idea that the state's ability to construct and to include should play an equal role in study. As Foucault suggests, w e m ust be attendant not only to the pow er to prohibit or to regulate, but also to the pow er to create and to norm alize. In addition to the ability of the state to adm it or exclude travellers, state agents - such as visa, passport and im m igration officials, not to m ention police and intelligence officers - have the capacity and responsibility to define travellers as desirable or undesirable, safe or risky, healthy or diseased, etc., definitions which have profound effects on the freedom of those individuals. In doing this, w e m ust be m indful that the ability to construct and to repress are not dem ocratic, and involve the application of pow er (both repressive and constructive) w hich m ay take the form of know ledge, m aterial or class position, as well as physical violence. This contrapuntal position draws on the tension betw een em piricism and constructivism : w orking from the m aterial circum stances of global mobility, but adm itting that these circum stances are the result of political

40

A t the threshold of security: a theory o f international borders

discourses that are not reducible to physical factors. Follow ing Bigo's criticism o f post-structural theory, follow ing the w ork of Said and others, this prom pts us to include the category of experience - w ithout m aking this category foundational or irreducible - in our analysis of global m obility regim e (Bigo 2002). The focus on m icro-politics, rather than m acro-politics, illustrates the im portance of the politics of scale. As Adey suggests, 'little research has been com pleted on the m icroscale m ovem ents that occur in border zones and airports. This lack of enquiry is som ew hat paradoxical given that the control of international m obilities that cross through airports and border zones are effectively m anaged, filtered and screened within these sites' (2004b: 1365). This individualistic orientation is prom pted by three concerns: norm ative, theoretical and em pirical. W hile policy analysis provides an im portant em pirical superstructure for this project, w e have invested in an em pathetic project in w hich w e keep firmly in our view that these restrictions and regulations are im portant and fundam ental in structuring the possible lives of m illions o f travellers. Rather than discuss the lack of international agreem ent on a TRIPS visa (which would allow all professionals with particular skills the ability to travel w ithout restriction), this kind o f analysis will investigate the ways in w hich the m obility gradient changes with skill level, not in a bilateral sense but within a much w ider ambit. This individualist orientation refocuses our attention on the m icro-politics of border control. W hile state policy represents a prim us inter pares of sources, we are m ind­ ful of the role of discretion by individual policers in enforcing the abstract restrictions o f policy. The research in public adm inistration of front-line officials confirm s and elaborates anecdotal evidence that general policies are alw ays subject to interpretation - indeed, that front-line flexibility is necessary for any large-scale exclusion system to function (Bouchard and Carroll 2002). The Office of the Inspector General investigations also illustrated the im portance o f individual confession and exam ination in crossing borders. This is not to privilege the terrorist as the m ost im portant of travellers, but rather to suggest that the age of terror has reoriented the anxieties of state officials. To supplem ent the diplom atic history of foreign policy im plem entation, w e need a technocratic or governm ental history of border policy and policing (Salter 2003). We can classify the axes of free m ovem ent in four categories: legal, econom ic, social and bureaucratic. Global transportation grids have displaced points of entry (POE) from the border to w ithin the heart of the country. Dom estic, national space is understood as unevenly vulnerable - in contrast to the unvariegated safe space of m odern geopolitics. W hile this sm ooth safety w as undone by the

41

Global Surveillance and Policing

Table 3.2 Legal

Economic

Social

Bureaucratic

Citizenship Passport Visa

Travel Ticket Visa/guarantee

Agency Desirability Risk

Examination Confession Discretion

Inter-Continental Ballistic M issile and the trium ph of speed over distance, the end of the Cold War resurrected the nineteenth-century mood of com placent invulnerability. From the m acro-politics of in sid e/o u tsid e, we see the em ergence of a m icro-politics of surveillance nets and vulnerable nodes. Thus, we have seen a sea change in our notion of territoriality, w herein the anxiety w hich w as previously centred on the border has been projected onto a set of internal security m easures (such as airport security and mall surveillance). W hile these international border functions exist at all POEs, the international airport best illustrates the organization of state repressive and constructive pow er to discrim inate betw een safe and undesirable travellers and thus to facilitate or hinder international mobility.

A irp o rts as transient institutions

The traditional tools of Foucauldian institutional analysis illustrate the distinction betw een 'com plete' and 'transitory' institutions. Foucault discusses the school, the workhouse, the psychiatric clinic and the prison as com plete institutions, in that they attem pt to fix and control the inhabitants of those institutions through incarceration, enclosure and discipline (1977). The architecture, rules and structuring of behaviour are designed either to harness the biopow er inherent in those labouring bodies or to regulate the pathological body into norm al conduct. Foucault analyses the architecture, rules and operating procedures, the inter­ relationships betw een know ledge and power, and how these p o w e r/ know ledge netw orks both create subjects and repress behaviours. Each of these institutions is designed for staticity - the regulation of lim ited m ovem ent through repetition. The airport is designed for m ovem ent - the regulation of m ass m ovem ent and the discrim ination of desirable and undesirable travellers. A t the airport, the border is collapsed spatially - there is no 'foreign' airport space, only the interstitial space of the gate area - beyond exit control, not yet in transit, and before entry control. The crucial threshold betw een inside and outside is the displaced 42

A t the threshold of security: a th eo ry o f international borders

international border, the arrivals hall. U sing van G en n ep 's m od el of the threshold rite, w e can parse the airp ort into three d istin ct spheres: p relim inal rites, lim inal rites, p ost-lim inal rites. I w ould high ligh t three aspects o f the airp o rt's control m atrix: prelim inal rites are structured by airport architecture, lim inal rites are d ep en den t on the con fession ary com plex; p ost-lim inal rites, or the re-integration o f the su b ject into the new space, are d ep en d en t on hyper-d ocum entation. A rchitecture, confession and h yper-d ocum entation are all m u tually reinforcing m echanism s of control - shoring and supporting the sovereign p o w er o f the state to com pel subjects to d ocility and obedience. P relim in a l - a rchitecture

S im ilar kinds o f social institutions are d esigned for transitory control through spatio-know led ge m anagem ent: freew ays, shopping m alls, em ergency room s. In each case, the m aintenan ce o f safe and efficient flow s is central to the use of the space. Freew ays, m alls and hosp itals fail if agents do n o t m ove throu gh the space. A irports are com plex institutions w hich striate m o bility and access. From the ground -level control of baggage, technical and su p p o rt staff, to the sep arate levels o f arrival and d eparture and the d istin ction betw een d om estic and international flights, airports are d esigned to survey, d iscrim in ate and control m obile bodies. A key tech nology o f control is surv eillance - b y w hich passengers are kn ow in gly m onitored b y secu rity personnel. A d ey goes as far as to argue that 'th e airp ort is now a su rv eillance m achine - an assem blage w here w ebs o f tech nolog y and inform ation com bin e' (2004b: 1375). B uild ing on his excellent w ork, I hope to introd uce som e kind o f spatial analysis to b ear on the structure of airport spaces. In this, I follow the w ork o f sociologists and hu m an geog rap hers in charting the pow er im bu ed to social spaces. Lyon pow erfu lly argues that cu rren t m eth od s o f su rv eillance and social organization have led to an increase in 'so cial sortin g ' in w hich h ierarchies o f class, social p osition and race are increasingly instan tiated in m od ern spaces. H e argues 'th e leading trend, in m o st sectors, is tow ards classificatory, p re-em p tive surveillance, w hich tries to sim ulate and anticipate likely b eh av iors' (2 001:104). R ites of p assage are a form o f social sortin g - they regulate w ho m ay be adm itted into the com m unity, and u n d er w h at conditions. The space betw een the gate and the arrivals hall is a gen uine interstitial space o f politics: you are physically in a cou n try w hich has n o t yet ad m itted you, not yet claim ed sovereign ty over you, and n o t yet accepted you r obedience. A nd con sequ ently anom alies arise, such as M erhan K arim i N asseri w ho w as 'stu ck ' in C h arles de G au lle airport for over ten years becau se his papers w ere n o t in order, or a fam ily that lived at Cairo 43

Global Surveillance and Policing

International A irport for several w eeks.1 Prelim inal rites are preparatory - they declare the past, and the intention to enter another space. In m odern times, one m ay point to the application and receipt of a visa, the ordering of the passport and the com pletion of an arrival card (custom s, im m igration, arrival declaration) as prelim inal rites, which m ust be concluded before arrival at the lim inal space (CBSA 2003a). The Canadian Custom s D eclaration card, w hich is to be filled out on the plane before landing, 'w as designed, in part, to replace certain questions custom s officers ask travellers at the prim ary inspection line' (CBSA 2003b). By com pleting this form , travellers are already disclosing inform ation in preparation for the actual exam ination. The prelim inal rite of param ount im portance is the transport from airplane to arrivals hall - in w hich travellers selforganize into citizens, foreigners, refugees. To w ait in the w rong line is to present one's self dishonestly before the exam iner in the first instance - or to proclaim ignorance of the language of interrogation (Derrida 2000). In the arrivals hall itself, the fundam ental question of adm ission - 'do you belong' - is answ ered by a trav eller's organization of h im /h e rse lf in space. Travellers sort them selves into categories of belonging: citizens who claim the right to return to their country (Article 13 [2], Universal Declaration of H um an Rights [UDHR]); refugees who claim the right of asylum (Article 14, UDHR); or foreigners (who m ay claim no right to enter a foreign country under the U DH R - there is a right to freedom o f m ovem ent and a right to exit, but no corresponding right of entry). This self-sorting also takes place with regard to privileged travellers, such as the A m erican INSPASS program w hich exchanges an extensive background check and extended biom etric data-gathering w ith a shortened exam ination and wait. O thers also m onitor w hether travellers 'belong' to a particular space (Curry 2004). For the m ost part, however, the prelim inal rite at the border is one o f self­ sorting. Lim inal - confessionary com plex

Foucault is extrem ely useful in exam ining the w ays in w hich the individual com es to police h im /h e rse lf as part of the m achinery of airport security. He discusses the grow th of the confessionary com plex, by w hich state pow er is used not only to restrict certain actions, but also to im pel individuals to disclose the truth about them selves - even w hen that truth is dam ning (1994:81). The confessionary com plex is at the heart of the airport's security regim e. W hen a traveller petitions to enter a state, h e /s h e abdicates all national rights (except basic hum an rights, I w ould argue); the application of sovereign pow er at the border is absolute. The first act of obedience before the law is self-disclosing the truth of our intentions (Derrida 2000:27). Even the space of exam ination is established like a confessional: the border agent 44

A t the threshold of security: a theory o f international borders

behind the glass asks of your past, your future intentions, exam ines your passport, and then grants absolution or further investigation. In Foucault's terms, the m odern subject is controlled not sim ply through repression of certain desires, but through a structure in w hich 'unconditional obedience, uninterrupted exam ination, and exhaustive confession form an ensem ble [which] appears as an indispensable com ponent of the governm ent of men by each o th er' (1994: 84). Institutions such as the courts of law, m edicine, the psychiatric clinic or the classroom are imbued w ith a structure by w hich the subjects of those institutions are conditioned to confess their deeds, thoughts and capabilities to those in authority according to an externally defined norm of innocent, sane or attentive. In contrast to torture, confinem ent or the violent m anipulation of individuals found in other system s, m odern institutions function through discipline: the creation of obedient and self-policing subjects (Foucault 1977: 193). Even in the transit space of the airport, m obile individuals are trained to obey an underlying logic of control. The confessionary dynam ic is illustrated by the ubiquitous 'no joking' rule w hich is posted at m ost airports. In the words of the Canadian Air Transport Security A uthority 'you should never joke or m ake "sm all talk'' about bom bs, firearm s or other w eapons w hile going through pre-board screening' (CATSA 2004). Sm all talk and jokes are dangerous because they express untruths for effect - either am usem ent or a sense of easing social tension. But airport exam iners rely on the anxiety of the passenger and them selves to effect the dynam ic of obedience and confession in the airport. Like doctors, judges, teachers and other authority figures, we m ust all tell the truth to airport security personnel - not ju st the truth from a certain point o f view, but the whole, entire, self-policing truth. It is ironic that these exam iners of our bags, our docum ents, and our intentions w hose chief responsibility is discerning serious threats from safe travellers - are portrayed as being unable to take or interpret a joke or sm all talk. Though their pow er is limited to policing, these regulations against joking and sm all talk train travellers to self-police their speech and behaviour to present a low -risk profile towards the authority figure. In particular, the confessionary com plex depends on the self-policing of individuals: the 'aim of the exam ination is perform ed with the help of a ... mechanism of sham e that m akes one blush at expressing any bad thought' (Foucault 1994: 84). Just as the architecture and concom itant surveillance lead to the social sorting of safe and risky travellers, so too do airport exam ination polices train docile travellers. The ability of a border official to read the intentions of any particular traveller is severely lim ited. Initial or prim ary inspections take between 30 and 120 seconds. In that time, officials m ust verify the authenticity of

45

Global Surveillance and Policing

the docum ent, input the data from the passport and visa, and gauge the intention of the traveller (Gilboy 1991: 578-80). Im m igration inspectors face enorm ous bureaucratic pressure to handle an im m ense caseload, and are often sanctioned if they refer too m any travellers to secondary exam ination (though this norm m ay have changed since 9 /1 1 ). Border officers rely on profiles that allow them to sort passengers into 'those who are safe, those about w hom m ore needs to be know n, and those w ho are not to be trusted' (Curry 2004: 477). Curry and Gilboy both investigate how profiles - w hich are socially constructed stereotypes - share an arm 's length relationship to data. The method adopted in this construction of profiles is risk m anagem ent: the allocation of resources to the probable target, and the quick approval of the vast m ajority of cases which are predicted to be unproblem atic. As I have argued elsew here, there is a structural problem with this type of risk m anagem ent (Salter 2004). Bouchard and Carroll's study of discretion provides us w ith a conceptual fram ew ork for distinguishing betw een the policy as w ritten and the policy as enforced (2002: 239-57). They argue that agent discretion provides vital flexibility and interpretation in the im m igration system , while sim ultaneously underm ining the integrity of that system . A dm inistrative justice sim ultaneously requires discretion to allow for special circum stances and is underm ined by discretion which prevents equal treatment. The assessm ent of risk requires discretion because not all necessary inform ation can be know n - the crux of risk is ignorance. But risk itself is also increased by the m aking of uninform ed decisions. This fundam ental uncertainty at the m om ent of policing renders m obility a constant and irreducible danger. As with any regim e that rests on obedience, there rem ains the opportunity for resistance and secret intentions. As is illustrated by the 9 /1 1 terrorists, som e individuals place them selves in a state of w ar with the state and do not feel the im pulsion towards confession. Even in the face of sustained inquisition, a state m ay not be able to determ ine a terrorist's intentions. Richard Reid was interrogated by French police on two consecutive days for nearly seven hours but still boarded a United A irlines flight with explosives in his shoe. W hile there has been greater allow ance m ade after 9 /1 1 for inspection, the underlying structure rem ains the same: only The Shadow knows w hat evil lurks in the heart of men. Part of the target's resistance against the target is lying to the agents of state. The confessional com plex is undone and reversed. Each act of resistance is a victory. A system that depends on confession cannot com prehend, police or control anti-system ic, revolutionary individuals (H offm an 2003). I would also argue that the sm ooth operation of discretion relies on the confessional com plex w hich is an essential supplem ent to the surveillance state. The necessary cynicism of the border official is twinned with the necessary

46

A t the threshold of security: a th eo ry o f international borders

anxiety o f the traveller to create a space o f interrogation and confession w hich creates the likeness o f control w ith o u t actual coercion (or covert coercion). As in the arrivals hall, the m om ent o f exam in ation is coupled by an exam in ation of our papers. Po st-lim in al - h y p er-d o cu m en ta tio n

L in king the m obile bod y to stable or reliable inform ation is a crucial technique o f risk m anagem ent. The m obile bod y o f the traveller m ust be linked to inform ation w hich reveals intentions - risk factors - w hich the in d ividu al h im /h e rs e lf w ill n o t reveal. There is a kind o f hyper­ d ocu m entation at w o rk here, by w hich I m ean that each piece o f data is linked to other data, and ultim ately to a risk profile: bod y-biom etricsfile-profile. The notion of hy p er-d ocu m entation also ind icates the speed of com m u nication b y w hich inform ation is abstracted into data and then com pared to a risk profile. A d ey suggests that biom etrics abstract m obile ind iv id u als into objects w hich can be tracked and sorted (2004a: 507). A s B en nett (2005) and K oslow ski (2004) have con tended , a key factor to this social sortin g is the exchange o f inform ation b etw een agencies. G iving you r passport to the im m ig ratio n officer - hav ing that inform atio n checked against d atabases - effectively signals your integration into the m achinery o f the m od ern state. You becom e data - an instan ce of a profile, a case, a file num ber. W ithout d oubt, this m ay b e an acceptable price to pay for ad m ission into the territory of that state. M y po in t here is solely that the su b m ission o f on e's self in term s o f inform ation is still a p olitical act o f o bedience - the data trail of you r entry w ill rem ain etched in the m em ory o f the state long after you have b een forgotten. We m igh t p oint to three d ynam ics o f this bord er control m echanism : the w eakn esses o f biom etrics, the reliance on tech nological fixes to an inheren tly psycho-gov ernm ental problem , and the failure o f risk m an agem en t as a strategy for security. In short, states are faced w ith a d ilem m a in the p o s t -9 / I I w orld: a totalitarian strategy to increase their surveillance of d om estic (and international) p opu lations so that they m igh t 'k n o w ' m ore; or the bifu rcation o f w orld regions and w orld popu lations into safe and d angerou s in a w ay that com p letely replicates the n in eteenth-centu ry im p erial m od el o f the colonial w orld and reverses any m od ern m ovem ent tow ards freed om o f m obility. B orders in eith er case becom e m echanism s of state control - for eith er those on the insid e o r those on the outside. T his d escrip tion o f airport architectu re, the con fession ary com plex and hy p er-d ocu m entation ind icate the exten t to w hich state capacity, state p olicy and the characteristics o f the m obile subject m ay rad ically change the perm eability of a state border. 47

Global Surveillance and Policing

State capacity: the e m p e r o r ’s new b o rd e r policy

We are fam iliar w ith the fable of the e m p e ror's new clothes. A n em peror is convinced b y his tailors that they p ossess a fabric w hich is so refined that only the brilliant and v irtu ou s m ay ev en see it. A t enorm ous cost, th ey fashion a suit for the em peror, w ho p ro u d ly w ears it d uring a parade. C itizens, cou rtiers and the em peror all d iscu ss the absent clo th in order to prove that they are brillian t and virtuous - until a child (seem ingly innocent o f guile or insecurity) laughs at the e m p e ro r's nakedness. M uch con tem p orary analysis of bord er secu rity am ou nts to a tally in g o f the e m p e ro r's accounts. A crucial p art o f the d iscu ssion o f bord er secu rity m u st be state capacity. C an any state - o r any p articu lar in d ividu al or group o f states - gu arantee bord er security? I w ould su gg est there are three areas of state capacity w hich h igh ligh t the question o f security: inform ation and intelligence, exam in ation and con fession , and policing. C an state actors gather, gu arantee and d iffuse intelligence abou t all potential travellers? C an the state exam ine travellers w ith an expectation o f exh ortin g a true confession? C an the state effectively p olice its bord ers and its POE? In ad dition to pointing to som e articles (Bigo 2002; W alters 2002; Salter 2004) that do investigate this question seriou sly in the E uropean context and som e w o rk (A ndreas 2003; Flyn n 2004) on A m erican bord ers, there is a real pau city o f research on bord er p olicing capacity. T he interface betw een state p olicies and d iscou rses o f bord er secu rity and the p ractise or cap acity o f state policing is m u ch u n der-th eorized and under-stud ied. I w ould argue that there has been no d eep-stru ctu ral change to the process o f crossing bord ers since the terror attacks of 9 /1 1 , bu t the am ou nt of pu blic attention and p olicy scru tiny has increased.

T h e o rie s o f borders

To establish a m odel - or substructure - o f m od ern rites o f bord er p assage, the three d im ensions o f state capacity, state p olicy and the characteristics o f the m obile subject are determ inative. Sym bolically, bord ers fun ction in a sim ilar w ay to d em arcate the bou n d aries o f com m u nity and authority. H ow ever, the life-w orld s o f international bord ers d iffer rad ically based on superstru cture, structure and agent. In the past, these d im ensions have been exam in ed in the aggregate. T his chap ter has suggested that: a) w e need to (re)place analytical focus on the in d ividu al; b) such an ind ivid ­ ualist m eth od ology yield s d ifferent and interesting results from m acro­ analysis o f m igration or pu blic policy; and c) greater research need s to be done into the interface betw een state cap acity and state policy. 48

A t th e th re sh o ld o f security: a th e o ry o f interna tion al b o rd e rs

N o te s

1 The Hollywood version of this story, The Terminal, starring Tom Hanks, is far less tragic than the reality.

R e fe re n c e s

Adey, P. (2004a) 'Secured and Sorted M obilities: exam ples from the airport', Surveillance and Society, 1:4, pp. 500-19. Adey, P. (2004b) 'Surveillance at the Airport: surveilling m obility/m obilizing surveillance', Environment and Planning A , 36, pp. 1365-80. Andreas, P. (2003) 'Redraw ing the Line: borders and security in the twenty-first century', International Security, 28:2, pp. 78-111. Balibar, E. (2002) 'W hat is a Border?', in Politics and the Other Scene (New York: Verso), pp. 75-86. Bennett, C.J. (2005) 'W hat Happens W hen You Book an Airline Ticket (Revisited): The Com puter A ssisted Passenger Profiling System and the Globalization of Personal Data' in E. Zureik and M.B. Salter (eds) Global Policing and Surveillance: Borders, Identity, Security (Cullompton: Willan). Bigo, D. (2001) 'The M oibus Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)', in M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid (eds) Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 91-116. Bigo, D. (2002) 'Security and Immigration: toward a critique of the governm entality of unease', Alternatives, 27, pp. 63-92. Bouchard, G. and Carroll, B.W. (2002) 'Policy-M aking and Adm inistrative Discretion: the case of im m igration in Canada', Canadian Public Administration, 45:1, pp. 239-57. Brettell,C.B. and Hollifield,J.F. (2000) 'M igration Theory: talking across disciplines', inC .B . BrettellandJ.F. Hollifield (eds) M igration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines (New York: Routledge), pp. 1-26. Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) (2004) 'Frequently Asked Q uestions'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .catsa-acsta.g c.ca/en g lish /h elp _aid e/ faq.htm (accessed on 19 July 2004). Canadian Border Services A gency (2003a) 'E311 (03) Custom s Declaration Card'. Available at: h ttp ://w w v v .cb sa-asfc.g c.ca/E /p b g /cf/e311 /R EA D M E, html (accessed on 19 July 2004). Canadian Border Sendees A gency (2003b) 'M em orandum D-2-5-7: E311 Customs Declaration Card and M ultilingual Leaflet CE311, Translation of the Customs Declaration Card'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .cb sa -a sfc .g c.ca /E /p u b /cm /d 2 -5 7/d 2-5-7-e.htm l (accessed on 19 July 2004). Curry, M.R. (2004) 'The Profiler's Q uestion and the Treacherous Traveler: Narratives of Belonging in Com m ercial Aviation', Surveillance and Society, 1:4, pp. 475-99. Dalby, S. (1999) 'Globilisation or Global Apartheid? Boundaries and Knowledge in Postm odern Tim es', in D. Newm an (ed.) Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, (Portland: Frank Cass), pp. 132-50.

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

Derrida, J. (2000) 'Foreign Q uestion', in J. Derrida and A. Dufoumantelle (eds) O f Hospitality, translated by R. Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 3-73. Flynn, S.E. (2004) Am erica the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins). Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage). Foucault, M. (1994) 'O n the Governm ent of the Living,' in P. Rabinow (ed.) Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works o f Foucault 1954-1984 (New York: New Press), pp. 81-5. Gilboy, J.A. (1991) 'Deciding Who Gets In: decisionm aking by immigration inspectors', Law and Society Review, 25, pp. 578-80. Girard, R. (1977) Violence and the Sacred, translated by P. Gregory (Baltimore: Johns H opkins Press). Hoffman, B. (2003) 'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism', The Atlantic M onthly, 291:5, pp. 40^17. Koslowski, R. (2004) 'International Cooperation on Electronic Advanced Passenger Information Transfer and Passport Biom etrics', presented at the International Studies A ssociation M eeting, Montreal, 17-20 March 2004. Langewiesche, W. (2004) The Outlaw Sea: A World o f Freedom, Chaos, and Crime (New York: North Point Press). Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: M onitoring Everyday Life (Philadelphia: Open University Press). Salter, M.B. (2003) Rights o f Passage: The passport in international relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Salter, M.B. (2004) 'Passports, Security, Mobility: how sm art can the border be?', International Studies Perspectives, 5:1, pp. 71-91. Trumbull, H.C. (1896) The Threshold Covenant or the Beginning o f Religious Rights (Edinburgh: T&T Clark). van Gennep, A. (1960) The Rites o f Passage, translated by M.B. Vizedom and G.L. Caffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Walker, R.B.J. (1993) Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press). Walters, W. (2002) 'Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens' Citizenship Studies, 6, pp. 265-92. Zacher, M ark (2001) 'The Territorial Integrity Norm: international boundaries and the use of force' International Organizations, 55:2, pp. 215-50.

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C h a p te r 4

Borders, migration and economic integration: towards a new political economy o f borders Helene Pellerin

Borders have received renew ed scholarly attention in recent years. This certain ly show s that changes b rou ght abou t by globalization did not elim in ate bord ers, con trary to w hat m an y analysts have suggested in the early 1990s (O hm ae 1993; O 'B rien 1992). Borders seem to becom e a priv ileged place of regulation, as w e follow the assessm en ts o f intelligence sen d ees, police and som e politicians. In the scholarly texts, bord ers and secu rity are increasingly linked together, in an attem p t to d em ystify their social con stru ction (W aever et al. 1993; H uysm ans 2000; A nd erson 1997; B alibar 2004). T hese analyses often neg lect the econ om ic d im ension of bord ers, perhaps su rprisingly sin ce the increasing tightening of bord ers occurs in large part in regions w here econom ic integration is m ov ing ahead, notably in N orth A m erica and the E uropean U nion. The relation ship betw een the bord er o f econ om ic integration and the bord er of security n eed s to be addressed. The argum en t pursu ed here w ill argue that these tw o analytical logics are linked into w h at can be called a reterritorialization o f econ om ic space, in the con text o f globalization. A p olitical econ om y analysis, d raw ing also from social and critical geography, w ill be used to explore this link, focu sing on the restructuring of the econom ic space, as w ell as on p o w er relations involved in the p ractices o f bord ers. T h e first section w ill present recent d evelopm ents in N orth A m erica and the E uropean U nion, ind icatin g that bord ers becom e cen tral for im plem enting reform s. N ext w ill be an analysis o f bord ers as places and processes o f recording and expressin g p ow er relations. 51

Global Surveillance and Policing

I.T h e cen trality o f bo rders in N o rth A m e r ic a and the European U n io n

In the tw o regions, bord er policies had b een ad opted already in the 1990s, in the con text o f econ om ic integration on the one hand, and the search for greater secu rity and control m easures on the other. W ith the 1997 A m sterdam Treaty, the E uropean U nion prom oted the creation o f a space o f freedom , security and ju stice, also called the Sch en gen space.' T he con stitution o f this space w as d esigned to prom ote econom ic liberalization, p articu larly the greater m obility o f capital and labour w ithin the confines o f the Sch en gen A greem en t, b y elim in ating border controls am on g m em ber states. A t the sam e tim e, external controls, betw een Sch en genland and the p eripheries, w ere to be reinforced, notably through the h arm onization o f controls, coord ination o f in telligence and p olice forces. T he secu rity controls constituted the cou n terp art o f the liberalization o f internal frontiers. In N orth A m erica, bord ers have also seen a sustained , if n o t an increasing, interest in recent years. Betw een C anada and the U nited States, the b ord er is first seen as a p lace o f exchang e for trade. The W orld Trade C en ter attacks revealed the con tin u ity o f m easures already started in the 1990s, but this tim e on enhan ced secu rity m easures. T he fear of terrorist threats and econom ic pressu res from bu sinesses on both sid es of the bord er focu sed on the need to link secu rity con cern s w ith econom ic liberalization. The M exican -A m erican bord er received histo rically a very different kind o f attention. Since the m id -tw entieth century, the border betw een the U nited States and M exico w as the focu s o f efforts to lim it the flow o f M exican m igrants to the A m erican south. L ater on, the w ar on drugs added another perception o f risk to the U nited States, com ing from its sou thern bord ers. The even ts o f 11 S ep tem ber 2001 im peded the d evelopm ent o f a n ew d ialogu e about the A m erican -M ex ican border.

2. Interpreting b o rd e r policies

Borders have not been theorized extensively in the social sciences. T his can be explained , in large part, b y the 'territorial trap ' (A gnew 1994) that ch aracterizes at least the d iscipline o f international relations. N ational territory is a fixed, p erm anent and ahistorical feature o f w orld order accord ing to m any theories. C onsequently, the national space and bord ers have becom e fundam ental features o f the state. Borders are conceived as one instan ce o f the affirm ation o f the state's sovereign ty on society and in relation to the inter-state system . From such a persp ectiv e, the strength en in g o f b ord er controls is interpreted as the rational reaction to 52

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grow ing threats represented by a 'leaking' or perforated border (Rudolph

2002 ). Traditional M arxist analyses have also considered the borders as a natural feature of the capitalist state, used to control and divide the w orld labour force. The border, in that sense, contributes to creating w hat the natural factor endow m ent could not provide, that is differences in the supply and in the quality of the factors of production. By im posing restrictions on the access, on the judicial status and on the m ovem ent of people, border controls make more vulnerable som e categories of workers. The precarious status of m igrants has generally negative consequences on their negotiating power, and m ight even have a deleterious effect on the labour m arket as a whole, a sort o f reserve arm y o f labour constantly renewed and m ade precarious by new restrictions (Fortes and Walton 1981; Burawoy 1976). The renewal in the study of borders of recent years questioned its im m utable character, partially thanks to changes in the spatial con­ figuration of pow er and econom ic activities in the globalization context, and partially thanks to critical thinking about institutions. These new studies look at borders as the construction of a space or as the exercise of power. From one of these perspectives, a constructivist one, borders represent an act of authority, real or sym bolic, which serves to consolidate the state's pow er in dom ains w here its capacities are questioned, but w here they can be re-actualized (Bigo 2002; Crepeau and C arlier 1999; Andreas 2000; Foucher 1998). Such analyses allow a look at borders as instrum ents of state power, particularly over people (N evins 2001), but often by assum ing a single and unified state logic. This is not unlike m any studies in hum an geography, w here borders are constructions not ju st o f states, but also of com m unities (Gottm an 1952). Borders are im agined divisions, constructed over time with physical or sym bolic signs. The im age of borders as being constructed through myths, historical narratives and experiences is becom ing a central feature of m any citizenship studies (Balibar 2004). In political science, however, borders' functions are not solely sym bolic. Bigo, for instance, showed the num ber of bureaucratic agencies involved in constructing borders and border policies (Bigo 2003). These analyses identified som e of the im portant processes and m odalities of control that are grow ing in num bers, as well as the social processes w hereby sym bolic borderlines shift, change or stay the sam e in hum an history. But the com plexity stops short of addressing the econom ic dynam ics that are partly constitutive of borders and border functions. In econom ic analyses, space as distance, rather than borders, has been an explanatory factor of internal and international dynam ics (Schwartz

53

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1994). Borders led to the possibility of an international division of labour on a global scale, that is, a specialization based on the relative abundance and scarcity of goods, capital and people. Borders cam e to be seen as a node to be used as a regulatory tool, in the global circulation of production factors. Both neoclassical and M arxist econom ists have rested their analyses on this conception of borders as a characteristic of a fragm ented world economy. For neoclassical econom ists, such a feature o f the world econom y is a given and constitutes the dynam ics of econom ic growth; unequal opportunities are the engine of innovation and expansion. For M arxists, and neo-M arxists, borders are used deliberately by the capitalist state to m aintain or to exacerbate unequal treatm ents of the international proletariat. A lthough inequality exists and states have often used - and still use - restrictive policies in order to m ake precarious a particular group of foreigners (Portes and Walton 1981; Buraw oy 1976), these analyses take the form s and functions o f borders for granted, w ithout probing into their transform ation throughout history. The border is thus conceived as a line of dem arcation, protecting the internal from the external environm ent. Secondly, borders are seen m ostly in their function of exclusion and of restrictions of people. W hile this explanation w as convincing in an econom ic context w here labour-intensive industries were the engine of growth in the industrialized world, w ith a potency to m arginalize the status of a large num ber of w orkers, it is less central today. A political econom y analysis of borders should take the border as a constructed space, that is, a space w here different social forces, each with specific econom ic and political interests, m eet and interact. The border should be seen as sim ultaneously dividing and connecting the internal and the external realms of politics and econom ic activities. As a social construction therefore, the border is a political process reflecting the power relations present in specific regions and historical periods (Anderson 1997). In the context of globalization and the spatial restructuring of the economy, borders becom e im portant nexus w here new flows and forms of cooperation are designed and im plem ented. A starting point is to recognise that borders can play a variety of functions, sim ilar to w hat Raffestin had identified: differentiation, connection, regulation and translation of a political will (O 'D ow d and W ilson 1996). The second step is to recognize that borders are processes w ith specific pow er relations; a border, like m any other places, is a social space (M assey 1992; H arvey 1989; Lefebvre 1974). Conceiving the border as a social space problem atizes the autom atic link with the state or with som e econom ic sectors, and opens up the realm of social actors and forces involved in the practice of borders. As a social space, borders produce pow er relations; at the sam e time, they are the site of pow er relations. 54

Borders, migration and econom ic integration

B orrow ing from A llen (1999), three theoretical propositions can be form ulated to analyse borders as social processes fulfilling several functions. First, the bord er can be conceived as m arking a difference, w hich is then translated by p ractices o f inclu sion and o f exclu sion. The second form of pow er is the ability to create space w ith som e coherence and m eaning. This is the differentiation w hich has long been explored in scholarly w ork. The second proposition sees the border as creating a space, not only by d elineating w hat is inside, but also by em ph asizing w hat deserves to be differentiated from the outside. Finally, the border is also an actor, con stitu ting pow er. It becom es n o t only a place, but also a specific w ay o f exerting pow er. T hrou gh borders, specific techniques are used that define processes o f control and new p o w er relations that em erge. T hese propositions w ill be explored through the d escription o f European and N orth A m erican bord er p ractices of recent years.

3. B o rd e r issues in Eu ro p e and in N o rth A m e r ic a A ) B o rd e r as d iffe ren tiation

The fun ction o f d ifferentiation is im p ortan t w hen analysing bord ers, not only becau se it accoun ts for m ajor w orld in equalities and exclu sions, bu t also for the op p ortu nities that it thus creates for business. Borders are also a space for the exchange o f products, and spaces o f circu lation for p olicy m ak in g and bu sin ess strategies. C h arles-A lbert M ichalet show ed v ery clearly in the 1970s the im portan ce of d ifferentiation for bu siness exp an sion internationally, bo th in term s o f trad e and in term s o f p rod uction strategies (M ichalet 1976). Borders are legal posts that d em arcate w age differentials, taxation, social and environm en tal policies, as w ell as interest rates. T h ese d ifferences becom e in stitutionalized w ith borders. In order to p lay this role, bord ers have to be bo th restrictive and perm issiv e, they h av e to be places of con nections and places o f exchange and o f regulations. The b ord er is used to d ifferentiate betw een legal and social system s, and the p ractice o f d ifferentiation carries w ith it v arious form s of exclusion. 'F ortress E u rop e' has often been used, since the M aastricht Treaty o f 1992, to refer to the policies o f the E uropean U nion tow ards foreigners, p articu larly non-E U nationals. E xclu sion targets curren tly tw o categories o f foreigners: asylum claim ants and illegal m igrants. The D u blin C on vention o f 1990 w as m ean t to address the first group. By forbid d ing the p ossibility o f m akin g m u ltiple asylum claim s, by ad optin g an inform ation exchange system am ong m em ber cou ntries, and b y id entifying one state responsible to stud y the claim , the C on vention 55

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sought to lim it the num ber o f asylum claim ants w ho would stay in Europe prior to their hearing. Regarding the undocum ented m igrants, the European U nion has upgraded police cooperation, notably through the Schengen Inform ation System s I and II. With these m easures, m any controls are taking place at the border or destined to be used at the border: the issuing and checking of visas; sanctions by airline com panies; and the use of surveillance technologies such as infrared cam eras, m ovem ent or heat detectors. Restrictions towards foreigners have had the effect of levelling com m unity policies and m em ber states' policies towards foreigners in the European space. To that effect, a program m e for adm inistrative cooperation for external frontiers, visas, asylum and im m igration (ARGO) was put in place in 2002, accom panied by a program m e for police and judicial cooperation (AGIS). To this one should add the Schengen Inform ation System , w hich has existed since 1995 and facilitates intelligence cooperation am ong police forces of the m em ber states. This facilitated the crim inalization of m igrants, w hile it also led to a partial shift of the costs o f controlling illegal m igration to countries of origin and of transit. A ccess to European U nion labour m arkets becam e m ore selective, geared towards attracting the m ost qualified w orkers. Borders are an im portant instrum ent for this selection process; they constitute a regulator of labour markets. Through the issuing of tem porary labour contracts, reinstated in the 1990s in Europe, after 20 years of restrictions, greater selection of foreigners into the European U nion space w as possible. The exclusivist tendency of the European U nion also applies to regions, and the function of differentiation is very im portant, especially at the outskirts of the EU, at its hard borders w hich separate the European Union from East European countries, Turkey and the M ahgreb. The cooperation agreem ents betw een the EU and these countries contain clauses selecting and restricting trade in goods, and the m ovem ent of people. For instance, there were attem pts to com bat organized crim e and increased controls on m igrants from third countries. Security m easures at the borders involved the adoption of converging policies regarding asylum , visas and police and judicial fram ew orks. For the ten countries that becam e m em bers of the EU on 1 M ay 2004, m any lim its will rem ain, from no access for som e agricultural products, to restrictions on the m obility of people that can vary from four to seven years in som e cases. The borders in N orth Am erica also reflect a trend towards restriction and differentiation, but with very different realities depending on w hether it refers to the northern or southern border of the United States. The southern border, betw een the United States and M exico,

56

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has long been the ob ject o f police surveillance, serving to control both un docum ented m igrants and drugs. The N orth A m erican Free Trade A greem en t (N AFTA) did n ot change that situ ation, n o t only because international m igration w as n o t p art o f the agreem ent, but also becau se it m aintained w age and social d ifferentials that w ere the o riginal conditions for econ om ic integration in the first place. N A FTA institutionalized , in som e w ays, the econ om ic and social inequalities betw een the U nited States and M exico. A bilateral com m ission on m igration questions w as created that served to facilitate police coop eration in the fight against illegal m igration (M iller 2000), thus con solidating the border as a place of controls, w ith lim itations on the m obility o f nationals from M exico. In the 1990s, the U nited States m ad e a m ajor offensive, w ith m easures of great visibility such as the con struction o f a w all betw een San Diego and Tijuana (A ndreas 2003). M exico also initiated a series o f m easures in the early 2000s for reinforcing its bord er con trols at the frontier w ith G u atem ala (Flynn 2002), in an attem p t to raise the perim eter d ividing N orth from C entral A m erica. The bord er betw een C anada and the U nited S tates know s a different d ynam ic o f differentiation. In the p ast at least, it w as not so m uch exclu sion that characterized border practices, but rather collaboration and the creation o f bord er zones: ind ustrial bord er zones for agricultural prod ucts on the w est coast, and ind ustrial products in the cen tre-east of the border. T h e C an ad ian -A m erican bord er thus served for a long tim e m ore as a po in t for trade and tourism . The N EX U S program m e (for fast track) and E X PR E S (rapid and safe exped ition) w ere p u t in p lace in the 1990s to facilitate and ev en accelerate the m ov em en t o f good s and people am ong tw o of the three trad e-agreem en t partners. T he Border A ccord of 1995 sou gh t to prom ote international trade, facilitate the m ovem ent of people, red uce costs for governm ents and users, and increase protection against drug trafficking and illegal m igration (C oalition 2001; Pellerin 2004). But since the m id -1990s, border coop eration increasingly focused on securin g the border, in response to both terrorist threats and econom ic strategies to m ake the border m ore efficient. This coop eration resulted in the Sm art Border A ccord betw een C anada and the U nited States. It favoured the coordination o f intelligence services and the rapp roch em ent of asylum policies. G reater coop eration betw een the tw o cou ntries in com batin g illegal m igration w as also underlined in a 2001 D eclaration, w hich led to an agreem ent on safe third cou ntry statu s in D ecem ber 2002. T he Sep tem ber 2001 attacks in the U nited States prom pted m ore direct talks o f a com m on Secu rity Perim eter, p articularly betw een C anada and the U nited States. There em erged m ore coordination of border m an agem en ts, w ith regard to security m easures in particular;

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a list o f safe third cou ntries for rejected asylum claim s w as produced; jo in t team s of custom officials w ere constituted in som e ports; and there w ere initiatives for the jo in t exercise o f fighting terrorism (G overnm ent o f C anada 2003). A ll o f these m easures concurred in m akin g the border tighter, and m aking the N orth A m erican region m ore d istin ct from the rest. The border as m arker o f d ifferences seem s to have both d istin ct and sim ilar features in N orth A m erica and in the E uropean Union. In N orth A m erica, internal borders rem ain an im p ortan t feature o f econom ic expan sion and integration, w hich is less the case for the European U nion. The reason for this difference stem s from the m odel o f econom ic integration that is pursu ed. T h e N orth A m erican m odel seeks to exploit econom ic d ifferentials built in a fragm ented political fram ew ork, but in an integrated m arket netw ork, w hereas in the E uropean U nion one im portan t objective has been, sin ce the Single M arket, to create a com m on econom ic space, backed by institutions and legislations. Yet, the events of the last 20 years have seen a rapp roch em ent betw een the tw o regions. They have increasingly em ph asized the im portan ce o f strong, hard, extern al borders, both for secu rity and for com petitiv e reasons. B) B orders as regu lators a n d organizers o f the in te rn a l space

H um an factors are im p ortan t in u n derstand ing p olitical geography, and in shaping space. A nd if bord ers are p olitical processes, this m eans that th ey do n o t only operate on existing or given d istin ctiven ess, they can also create them . B orders are a point of com parison , or points that m ark the in from the out. B y d oing this, bord ers are both a d em arcatin g line and a d efining instru m en t o f w hat is inclu ded and w hat is exclu d ed . In other w ords, bord ers define as m u ch the line as the con tent o f the space bein g dem arcated. D efining the inclu siv e space translates into a d ebate over the natu re of place, o f various m od els of spatial organizations. Two m od els seem to be opposed: the territorial m od el and the global or n etw ork m od el o f firm s (Cox 1996; A m in and T hrift 1997; P alan 2003). In this context, it com es as no surprise that bord er regulations are at the centre o f im p ortan t debates betw een m ore o u tw ardly and m ore inw ard ly social forces, notably around regulations of m igration , tax hav ens and trade in services. Yet the opposition betw een global and territorial logics is m ore con ceptu al than real. A s H arv ey pu t it, global does not m ean non-territorial, as places o f fixity territorially located still exist and are required for econom ic exp an sion to unfold (H arvey 1989). W ith econom ic integration, the regional space b ecom es a place o f fixity for cap ital accum ulation. T his often requires the sm oothing o ut o f som e d ifferences w ithin the 58

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region. A nd borders con stitute an im portan t instrum en t for d oing so. Border is a central legal object, as it is often the p o in t of d eparture of legislations having internal and external im plications. The d elim itation of a space through the erection or con solid ation of borders is a process that is as im portan t as the con ten t of regulations being d eveloped and im plem ented . The exercise o f m arking is thus n o t ju st a technical matter. In fact, the d elim itation of borders directly con tributes to d efining the content, insofar as it m u st im pose the param eters o f regulation. Border regulations tend to im pact p hysically m u ch m ore beyond the bord erline, becau se bord er regulations are expan sionist. They tend to involve m ore dom ains than transbord er phenom ena. An exam ple o f this is the European area o f freedom , security and ju stice, being created by Ju stice and H om e A ffairs o f the European Union. The project w as to create a space w here secu rity and ju stice w ould be d eveloped to accom p any and to foster the econ om ic space already in place. A s one observer signalled , it w as not security as such that w as the objective, but rather a space o f security; in other w ord s, the ability to con stitute a coop erative fram ew ork that w ould cov er the w hole sp ace o f the European U nion (C hevallier-G overs 2003). The natu re o f border regulations is extensive also becau se the m arking o f the bord er betw een the internal and the external requires the progressive h arm onization o f those units that are now com bined. In the E uropean U nion and N orth A m erica, the progressive harm onization proceeds in a con text w here the p aram ou nt objective is econom ic liberalization and com petition. Yet som e d ifferences rem ain that are perhaps o f d egree rather than substantive. T h e ju d icial fram ew ork prod uced by Ju stice and H om e A ffairs aim ed to d evelop a European ju stice system that could superv ise police and surveillance activities. Such d evelopm ent is gen erally acclaim ed, w ith good reason, since it should provide cou nterbalance m echanism s to the pow ers o f police and other security agencies. But the ju d icial fram ew ork p u t in place also serves to regulate the econ om ic and social activities at the European level. From pension system s to labour m arkets, to edu cation system s, a w hole series o f d om ains is now affected, in ord er to create a m ore coh erent internal ju d icial order. It should be em ph asized, how ever, that such harm onization did n o t lead to com p lete con vergence o f legal orders, historical and political reasons forbid, only to the reduction of p olitical and ju d icial insecurities w hich gen erate transaction costs and un certainty betw een m em ber states (Riem en 2001). Som e com m entators have seen in this d ynam ic the successfu l attem p t to assert the d om ination of liberal econom ic objectives, by restructuring and elim in ating barriers to econ om ic grow th such as union p articipation in d ecision m akin g and other social obligations (Panitch and G ind in 2004). 59

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The focus on bord er regulations did not bring abou t so m uch convergence in N orth A m erica. M any d ifferences had been diluted over years o f integrating p rod uction activities am ong the three countries. N AFTA added econ om ic rules for trade and inv estm en t facilitation am ong the three m em ber countries. And the reinforcem ent o f police controls around the borders in the 1980s and 1990s has added som e legal thickness to the regional space being created. C anada and the U nited States signed several agreem ents on legal coop eration to d eal w ith transbord er crim es and police investigations. The C a n a d ia n -U S forum on the fight against trafficking, telem arketing and m on ey laund ering, instituted in 1997, is also a good exam ple o f the significance of borders in creating incentives to coop erate, and to d evelop a m ore coh erent legal and p olice space (Solicitor G eneral o f Canada 2002; U S D epartm ent of Ju stice 1995). A nd the d om ains covered spill over strictly transbord er phen om ena and activities. As the C om m ission er o f the R C M P w as suggesting, a com m on m an agem en t o f bord ers im plies a com m on vision, w ith shared p riorities and objectives, not sim ply the ad option o f sim ilar tactics (Zaccardelli 2002). The con tent o f the com m on legal order being created in N orth A m erica, sim ilar to w h at happ ens in the European U nion, is shaped by trade liberalization and com petition. The com m on border betw een C an ad a and the U nited States has becom e a sm art border, w hich m eans that it com bines secu rity and com m ercial interests o f firms. Secu rity and econom ic efficiency and com petition becom e ind ivisible (C oalition 2001). The influence o f business interests is no stranger to this d evelopm ent. Follow ing the attacks in the U nited States in 2001, a coalition o f the m ain C an adian businesses (C anadian C h am ber of C om m erce, Business C ou ncil for N ational Issues, C an adian Federation of Ind epen d ent B usinesses, and the C an ad ian -A m erican A lliance for Trade Border) have prod uced a report su ggesting a solu tion that w ould provide for a secure and prosperous econom ic space (C oalition 2001). Such a plan involved d ecentralizin g border m an agem en t, and m u ltiplying points of control and surv eillance throu gh ou t already existing trade corridors. In spatial term s, this involves the d isp lacem en t of borders, inw ard as w ell as outw ard, to places w here controls can be d one m ore efficiently. H ence the C an adian C ou ncil o f C h ief E xecu tives proposed the reinvention of borders. From this p erspective, borders in N orth A m erica should be zones o f coop eration over the continent, w ith greater surv eillance on the p erim eter o f N orth A m erica (C C C E 2003). T he sam e cannot be said of the sou thern border betw een the U nited States and M exico, at least for the im portan t border points betw een San D iego and Tijuana, or betw een El Paso and C iud ad Juarez. It is sligh tly d ifferent betw een Laredo and N uevo Laredo, w here m ore trade occurs. T hese specificities m igh t change if the p roject o f P uebla-P anam a finally takes off. 60

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C) B order as a space o f pow er

Pow er is not sim ply the attribute of an actor or the im position of one's will onto another; it is also constitutive. Power, in other words, is acquired through action. This Foucauldian view o f power, transplanted into a spatial fram ew ork, gives a social dim ension to space, w hich can no longer be seen as sim ply the environm ent in which social relations unfold. Pow er is acquired through its exercise at the border or in relationship to borders. Border regulations often rely on old and traditional m echanism s of authority - the arm y and treaties - but also on new m eans - police and private agencies to which som e regulating functions or product have been assigned. These new agents benefit from border regulations (private com panies and services, and security officials). These three facets of pow er in space will be explored m ore em pirically in tw o case studies. Police services, for one, are central in the new border m anagem ent, w hat Didier Bigo calls the archipelagos of security professionals (Bigo 2003). M ilitaries, custom s officers, police forces and intelligence services have all increased their functions since the m id-1990s, both in Europe and in North Am erica. Their areas o f expertise have been w idening to include not only drug offences but also white collar crim es, anti-trust practices and migration. The grow ing pow er of police forces in the European Union, together with the grow ing influence of the M inistry o f Justice and Interior, has often led to the withdraw al of m inistries of health, labour and social affairs (Bigo 2003). In North Am erica too one can find this tendency, although in a less acute form. The United States centralized its security service on the creation of the D epartm ent of H om eland Security, com bining w hat was, until then, the services of eight large departm ents. Although it is too early to tell, this centralization m ight give greater pow er to security services in im plem enting a strategy for internal protection. In Canada, resistance is stronger, but recent reform s and new policies adopted in the afterm ath of the 11 Septem ber 2001 attacks, notably an anti-terrorist bill and a law on public security, have strengthened the pow er of police and intelligence forces (G ouvem em ent du Canada 2002). A t least tw o other forces are involved at borders: private agencies now responsible for the security and surveillance that states delegated to them, and organized crim inal groups. Regarding the first category, there are two types of agents involved: com panies directly involved in the transborder activities, such as airline com panies or travel agencies, and high technology enterprises that offer surveillance and control products, such as infrared technologies. Airline com panies have seen their functions of border controls increased over the last ten years, yet it is not clear 61

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how m u ch p o w er they m anaged to gain from these activities. H igh technology enterprises did not have pow er over border activities five years ago. But recently, these com panies have been able to gain pow er over the processes o f control at the border, and w ere ev en involved in the d esign o f a secu rity p erim eter around N orth A m erica, w hich w ould not only control people and good s, but also the protection of d ata and system s (Purdy 2002). C rim inal organizations have increased their pow er, parad oxically perhaps, in the con text o f greater transbord er surv eillance and regulations. T h e coyotes at the A m erican -M ex ican bord er for instance, increased their influence and power. T he logic goes as follow s: the use of sm ugglers increases as the d ifficu lties arise for crossing the bord er illegally. A nd the m ore they are used, the m ore influence they gain, if not in relation to states, at least to potential m igrants (A ndreas 2000). Furtherm ore, since risks are high for these organizations, they tend to d iversify their sm uggling activities: people, and v arious kinds of illicit m erchandises. Both N orth A m erica and the European U nion are im p ortan t sites for the activities o f transbord er crim inal organizations. T his m akes the border a p otentially very lucrative p lace, and thus it represents an im p ortan t stake for these organizations, as m uch as for states. A nd these agencies are not there sim ply to challenge the state, even less the existen ce o f borders. It is the existen ce o f bord ers that m akes them pow erfu l. T heir pow er stem s from their ability to capitalize on restrictions and d ifferences at the border, a p o w er that they can exercise against states, but also to seek profits.

C o n clu sio n

C on tem porary issues o f borders have surfaced in the ind ustrialized w orld, in the con text o f globalization and o f increasing m igration flow s, xen op hobic reactions and p op u lar d issatisfactions tow ards political institutions. It is im portant, in this context, to exam in e carefully w hat is at stake around borders. Too often, stud ies o f borders focus on only one d im ension o f the issue, eith er on social reactions, on the p olitical pow er o f the state, or on the econom ic gains o f business. T h e analysis offered here suggests that these v arious issues involve a series o f agencies, but also a series o f processes o f p o w er relations that need to be looked at carefully. In N orth A m erica and in Europe, thanks to the strength o f neo-liberalism , issues o f borders are h eavily influenced by the pow er o f business to create a specific regulatory space that often

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c o n tra d ic ts th a t o f sta te s , o r p e rh a p s th a t o f c o m m u n itie s . In th is co n te x t, th e re s tric tiv e a s p e c t o f b o rd e rs is o n ly p a rt o f th e p ro b le m , th e o th e r issu e s b e in g th e o p e n in g o f b o rd e rs, an d th e sh a p in g o f th e re g io n a l s p a c e a c co rd in g to b u s in e ss p rio ritie s. R e a c tio n s to b o rd e r iss u e s in th is c o n te x t in v o lv e b o th a m o v e to w a rd s re s tric tiv e m e a s u re s , su g g e ste d b y c o n se rv a tiv e fo rce s, an d a d iffe re n t k in d o f o p e n n e s s in th e c re a tio n o f re g io n a l p la c e s th a t are b o th s o c ia lly g ro u n d e d an d re s p e ctfu l o f d iv ersity . E u ro p e an d N o rth A m e rica m ig h t h a v e d iffe re n t m o d e ls to p ro p o se , b u t th e c h a lle n g e fo r p ro g re ss iv e fo rce s is to fo ste r g re a te r th in k in g an d a c tio n in m a k in g th is p o s sib le .

N o te

1

Follow ing the Schengen Agreement, w hich cam e into force in 1999. It includes 13 m em ber states of the European Union; Ireland and the UK decided to exclude them selves from it, as well as two other European states, not mem bers of the EU (Iceland and Norway).

R e fe re n c e s

Agnew, J. (1994) T h e Territorial Trap: the geographical assum ptions of international relations theory', Reviezv o f International Political Economy, 1:1. Allen, J. (1999) 'Spatial Assem blages of Power: From Domination to Em powerm ent', in D. Massey, J. Allen and P. Sarre (eds) Human Geography Today (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 194-218. Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1997) 'Globalization, Socio-econom ic, Territoriality', in R. Lee and J. Wills (eds) Geographies o f Economics (London: Arnold), pp. 14757. Anderson, M. (1997) 'Les frontieres: un debat contem porain', Cultures & Conflits, 26-27: Fall. Andreas, P. (2003) 'Controles frontaliers en Amerique du Nord a la suite du 11 septem bre 2001', in M. Fortmann, A. M acleod and S. Roussel (eds) Vers des Perim'etres de Securite? La Gestion des Espaces Continentaux en Am erique du Nord et en Europe (M ontreal: Athena). Andreas, P. (2000) Border Games: Policing the U .S.-M exico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Balibar, E. (2004) "We, the People o f Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Bigo, D. (2003) 'Les archipels des professionnels de l'(in)securite', in M. Fortmann, A. M acleod and S. Roussel (eds) Vers des Perimetres de Securite? La Gestion des Espaces Continentaux en Am erique du Nord et en Europe (M ontreal: Athena). Bigo, D. (2002) 'Security and Immigration: toward a critique o f the governm entality of unease', Alternatives, 17: Supplem ent, pp. 63-92. 63

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Burawoy, M. (1976) 'The Functions and Reproduction of M igrant Labor: com parative m aterial from Southern Africa and the United States', American Journal o f Sociology, 81:5, pp. 1050-87. CCCE (2003) 'Security and prosperity. Toward a new Canadian US partnership in North America. Profile of the N orth Am erican Security and Prosperity Initiative.' Available at: http://w w w .ceocou ncil.ca (last accessed M ay 2003). Chevallier-Govers, C. (2003) 'Le concept de securite interieure et l'U nion europeenne', in J.-C. Froment, J.J. Gleizal and M. Kaluszynski (eds) Les Etats ii I'Epreuve de la Securite (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble). Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders (2001) Rethinking our Borders: A Plan fo r Actions (Ottawa: Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders). Cox, R.W. (1996) 'Production and Security', in R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (eds) Approaches to World Order (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press), pp. 276-95. Crepeau, F. (2003) 'Controles migratoires aux frontiers europeennes: l'acceleration securitaire', in M. Fortmann, A. Macleod and S. Roussel (eds) Vers des Perimetres de Securite? La Gestion des Espaces continentaux en A m erique du N ord et en Europe (Montreal: Athena). Crepeau, F. and Carlier, J.-Y. (1999) 'Integration regionale et politique migratoire: Le m odele europeen entre cooperation et com unautarisation', Journal du Droit International, 4, pp. 261-85. Flynn, M. (2002) 'Donde Esta La Frontera?', Bulletin o f the Atom ic Scientists, 58:4, pp. 24-35. Foucher, M. (1998) 'The Geopolitics of European Frontiers', in M. Anderson and E. Bort (eds) The Frontiers o f Europe (London: Pinter), pp. 235-50. Gottm an, J. (1952) La Politique des Etats et leur Geographic (Paris: Armand Colin). G overnm ent of Canada, Departm ent of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2003) 'Declaration on safe and sm art border'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .d faitm aeci.qc.ca (last accessed M arch 2003). Gouvernem ent du Canada, M inistere du Transport (2002) 'N ews release. Public safety A ct 2002'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .tc.c.ea/m ed iaro o m /releases/ n at/20 0 2 /0 2 _ g c0 0 1 e .l (last accessed April 2002). Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition o f Postmodernity (Cambridge: Blackwell). H uysm ans, J. (2000) 'The European Union and the Securitization of M igration', Journal o f Common M arket Studies, 38:5, pp. 751-77. Lefebvre, H. (1974) La Production de YEspace (Paris: Editions Anthropos). Miller, M.J. (2000) 'International M igration in Post-Cold War International Relations', in B. Ghosh (ed.) M anaging M igration: Time fo r a New International Regime? (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 27-47. N evins, J. (2001) 'Searching for Security: boundary and im m igration enforcement in an age of intensifying globalization', Social Justice, 28:2, pp. 132-48. O 'D ow d, L. and Wilson, T.M. (eds) (1996) Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers o f Sovereignty in the New Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate). Ohm ae, K. (1993) 'The Rise of the Region State', Foreign Affairs, Spring, pp. 7887. O 'Brien, R. (1992) Global Financial Integration: The End o f Geography (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).

B o rd e rs, m igration and e c o n o m ic integration

Palan, R. (2003) The Offshore World: Sovereign M arkets, Virtual Places, and Nomad M illionaires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Panitch, L. and Gindin, S. (2004) 'A m erican Im perialism and Eurocapitalism: the m aking of neoliberal globalization', Studies in Political Economy, 7\ /72, pp. 7-38. Pellerin, H. (2004) 'Integration econom ique et securite: Nouveaux facteurs determinants de la gestion de la migration intem ationale', Choix, 10:3, pp. 1-30. Portes, A. and Walton, J. (1981) Labor, Class and the International System (New York: A cadem ic Press). Purdy, J. (2002) Presentation at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, Ottawa, Septem ber 2002. Riemen, O. (2001) 'European private international law, the European Com munity and its emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', Common M arket Law Revieiv, 38, pp. 53-86. Rudolph, C. (2002) 'Security and the political econom y of international migration'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .cio n et.o rg /ep s/ru c02.p d f (last accessed Novem ber 2002 ). Schwartz, H.M. (1994) States Versus M arkets: History, Geography, and the Development o f the International Political Economy (New' York: St M artin's Press). Solicitor General of Canada (2002) 'Cross border crim e and security: C an ad aUnited States cooperation. Frequently Asked Q uestions'. Available at: h t t p :// www.sgc.gc.ca (last accessed April 2002). US Departm ent of Justice (1995) 'N ew Antitrust Cooperation Agreem ent Signed Betw een United States and Canada', August 1995. Available at: h ttp ://w w w . u sd oj.g o v /o p a/p r/rie_90/A u g u st95/428.txt.h tm l (last accessed April 2002). Waever, O., Buzan, B. and Kelstrup, M. (1993) Identity, M igration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (New York: St M artin's Press). Zaccardelli, J. (2002) 'Intelligence, security and the integration of law enforcem ent', keynote speech of the annual Conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, Ottawa, Septem ber 2002.

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C h a p te r 5

The border is everywhere: ID cards, surveillance and the other David Lyon

Introduction

'T h e bord er is ev eryw h ere' is a p hrase som etim es used to express the experience of racialized 'o th ers' w ithin the territory o f a giv en nation state. You d o n 't have to be trying to cross throu gh a physical bord er check p oin t to sense that yo u are an alien, a n on-citizen, som eone w ho does n ot belong. But there is another sen se in w hich the b ord er is everyw here. A lth ou gh national ID card system s have m an y pu rposes, one of them is to enable auth orities to d istin gu ish, clearly and autom atically, betw een those w ho do and those w ho do not b elon g as full m em bers o f the nation state. T his p ap er is m ainly abou t this second sense in w hich the 'bord er is ev eryw h ere' - it is bo th portable (the plastic card) and v irtual (the database). In term s o f m em bersh ip w ith the m ajority w ithin the border, the card system helps to sort insid ers from outsiders. N o d oubt ID cards also exacerbate the sense o f b ein g 'o th e r', b u t that is n ot the m ain focus o f this chapter. N ational ID card schem es are b ein g d ebated in sev eral cou ntries around the w orld - thou gh in C anada the d ebate w as stillborn - and in som e p laces they are already b ein g im plem ented . Su ch ID cards, that keep track o f citizens m ainly insid e the bord ers o f the natio n state, m ark a m ajor step forw ard in the surveillance capacities o f any natio n state. From paper-based id entification records w ith lim ited personal details used for extraord inary p u rposes (such as p olicing), the new proposed 66

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ID is 'sm art' in that it is linked w ith netw orked searchable databases (both public and private), uses biom etrics, and is likely to be used for a range o f activities well beyond any policing or adm inistrative function for w hich such cards are currently used. From time to tim e the gradual evolution of socio-technical system s experiences a sudden spurt, and the establishm ent of a national ID in the UK (or anywhere) is a case in point. As well as outlining the w ays in w hich the proposed ID represents a quantum leap in 'scientific' identification processes, this paper also looks critically at several issues. O ne is the lim itations of such system s, particularly their dependence on dubious biom etric technologies. A nother is the issue of 'function creep' in w hich subsequent novel uses are devised for existing technical system s, w hich are added to the original panoply of functions. A third is to consider the experiences of other countries that have cards or are introducing them - H ong Kong, M alaysia, Japan, China - along with countries that have yet to m ake clear decisions about national ID card system s or have thus far resisted them - such as A ustralia, Canada, South Korea and the USA. Different cultural and political situations m ean that each nation has different reasons for establishing ID cards, reasons that relate to who is defined as 'o th er' for purposes of im m igration control. Im portant questions of privacy and civil liberties such as freedom of m ovem ent are raised, but it is also im portant to see such significant shifts in surveillance (in this case ID cards) as augm enting the ability of nation states to engage more directly in 'social sorting'. That is to say, in the tw enty-first century, as nation states find them selves w ith dim inishing pow er over som e entities (such as corporations), they tend to reinforce their interest in 'law and o rd er' and 'social safety' in w hich surveillance features prominently. W hat appears to be a system that augm ents the capacity of nation states to identify citizens for adm inistrative and policing purposes turns out also to facilitate extensive social, econom ic and political categorization w ithin em erging processes of control and governance. Those who are defined as 'o th er' within such system s are m ost likely to experience negative discrim ination as a result. The m ain argum ent of this paper is that the current establishm ent of sm art ID cards is highly significant for surveillance. W hereas earlier form s of state surveillance relied to an extent on both identification and, in som e countries, actual ID cards, this still did not spell a tight and highly inform ed adm inistrative relation between citizen and state. The earlier phases of rationalization that applied bureaucratic form s of governance that helped constitute m odern nation states as such were subject to both legal and technical lim its that m ilitated against the

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totalitarian tend encies bu ilt into any such advances. Even though they w ere claim ing a m on op oly o f m eans o f id entification - ov er fam ilial practices or religious organizations, for exam ple - the effect w as m itigated by restricted capacity. Today's database and biom etric ID card system s ratchet up the surveillance capacities of ID cards in several respects. T h ey are being introduced in an international clim ate o f m ed ia-am plified fear and suspicion; they adopt a m eans o f autom ated classification that rem oves this process further from d iscretion and com passion; they introduce a further level to the v irtual border of the nation state, in w hich decisions m ad e abou t 'citizen s' and 'o th e rs' are rem ote and rem oved from geographical borders; and they d epend on personal data gleaned not only from ad m inistrative and law -enforcem ent sources but also from coop eration w ith priv ate databases. A com p arativ e look at 'o th er n ations' (in this case nations other than the UK) show s that the 'n atio n 's others' are, as has too often been the case, m o st at risk.

M o d ern h o rro rs co m e h om e: ID cards for the U K

A n ID card proposal, introd ucing a national registry and a m u lti-pu rpose card for all citizens by 2013, began its passag e through the U K P arliam ent from N ovem ber 2004, but its progress w as delayed by the M ay 2005 election. W hat Jon A gar (2001) en tertainingly describes as a 'm odern h o rro r' - identity cards in Britain - is proposed for a cou ntry that has resisted their introd uction for a long tim e. W hile m u ch m edia rhetoric surrou nd s the cards them selves - 'D o you w ant to have p o lice officers d em and in g to see you r card ?' - it is im p ortan t to note that there are tw o issues: the cards and the national registry. C ards are m arkers o f m em bersh ip and d istingu ish those eligible for the benefits o f being British. But the surv eillance issue, the w ay the state scru tin izes society as a m ean s o f gov ernan ce, is n ot so m u ch the m u lti­ p u rpose cards as the national registry. The u n iqu e identifiers on the cards act as the 'p h o n e n u m b er' or the google keyw ord that connects the card-h old er w ith the stored record. Search able d atabases are the key item in any tw enty-first-centu ry surv eillance system , w here surveillance is un derstood as focu sed attention to personal d ata for the pu rpose o f influence, m an agem en t or control, and w here this is facilitated by electronic infrastructures. The U K system is intended to achieve three ends: im m igration control, fraud control and anti-terrorism . A s an 'en titlem en t' system it is an outcom e o f 'e-go v ern m en t' initiatives, giving citizens autom ated

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access to pu blic services. A s a 'g o v ern an ce' system it is designed to keep track o f the d aily lives o f citizens, ch eckin g eligibility for sen d ees and benefits and enabling m ore efficien t policing. E ither way, it represents a m ajor m ov em ent in secu rin g a m on op oly o f the m eans o f identification. H ow ever, its pu blic acceptability d ep ends on n either o f these b u t rather on the 'an ti-te rro r' function w hich, ironically, is the one b enefit it cannot deliver. Interestingly, the 'm od ern h o rro r' for the British included a largely fictitiou s character - the bigam ist - that earlier schem es w ould alleged ly root out. Is tod ay 's equiv alen t the 'terro rist'?

U n dersta n d in g identity cards: ration alizatio n and the m o d e rn state

Identity cards are a prod uct of m o d ern ity M ore specifically, they em erged as a m eans o f rationalization w ithin the nation states that invented them selves d uring the n ineteenth century, starting in Europe. O ne aspect of this rationalization w as the effort to d eterm ine w ho w as and w ho w as not a m em b er o f a given nation state. In order to con nect som eone w ith a bureaucratic record o f m em bership, som e form o f d ocu m ent w as need ed , and tw o specific ones began to appear, first in France: the p assp ort and the identity card. The p assport, as Jo h n Torpey has clearly show n, becam e a prim ary m eans of 'reg u latin g the m eans o f m ov em ent' and o f d istin gu ishing betw een 'n atio n als' and 'fo reign ers', particu larly at border points (Torpey 2000). Identity cards, on the other hand, straddle tw o dom ains. T hey relate to m ov em ent but also to entitlem ent. They are as m u ch abou t the 'm ean s o f id entification' as the 'm ean s o f m ovem ent'. In this section identity cards are explored , briefly, as prod ucts o f the m odern nation state's quest for rational organization and ad m inistration. Before d iscu ssing this, a link w ith the n ext section is w orth rem arking. From earliest days, the attem p t to establish identity card system s w as frequently associated w ith the desire to be 'scien tific' in the classification of 'in sid ers' and 'o u tsid ers'. This m ay be seen, again, in the case of France, w here 'B ertillo n age' - an th ropom etric scales for m easurin g bod y d im ensions - w as legally introd uced for internal passes in 1912 (K aluszynski 2001; see also P iazza 2004). T hese also related to 'racial' ch aracteristics, designed to m aintain the pu rity o f French nationality, and w ere used esp ecially for crim inals and m arginal groups, notably 'g yp sies'. Two points m ay be m ad e here. O ne, rationalization often has recourse to science and technology, and in the later tw entieth century, w ith the prom ise offered by com puterization, this tendency took on a new lease of life w hich w ould be realized in the 'sm art' ID cards currently being rolled

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out or debated. Two, the m eans o f classification touches m ost heavily on the areas of m arginality or m ov em ent - w hen the m em bersh ip of certain persons is m o ot or w hen they m ove around accord ing to a logic o f their ow n. But h ow ev er 'scien tific' the m eans, it m u st be recalled that standardization , cen tralization and the im position o f national identity w as alw ays associated w ith the desire for cultural h om og eneity (C alhoun 1997). T hese are them es to w hich w e return below. W hat are identity cards? T his d eceptively sim ple question raises a host o f com plex issues and the best answ ers begin historically. Identity cards appeared as v isible m arkers o f m em bersh ip w ithin the early nation states of the n ineteenth and tw entieth centuries. But as Torpey rightly observes, they also im m ed iately 'confront us w ith a docu m entary "g ra y z o n e " ' (Torpey 2000: 165) becau se their rem it lies betw een the regulation o f m o v em en t (like passports) and the entitlem en t to benefits o f m em bersh ip (such as healthcare, v otin g rights or w elfare). If p assports deal p rim arily w ith m ov em ent in and out o f the territory governed by the nation state, ID cards refer above all to activities carried out w ithin the nation state's boundaries. Passports are a rem ind er o f the territorial aspect o f the nation state, w hile ID cards poin t tow ards the m em bership aspect (even though these are far from exclu sive distinctions). Sociologically, ID cards m ay be considered in relation to tw o inter­ related processes; the w ays in w hich the n ation state is constituted as such, and the w ays that 'id en tities' are established . Each m u st be understood in term s o f p o w er relations. As Torpey argues, the 'm ono p olization of the m eans of m ov em ent' represented esp ecially by p assports indicates the state's d rive to develop the 'cap acity to "e m b ra ce " their ow n citizens in order to extract from them the resources they need to reproduce them selves ov er tim e' (2000: 2). T his is in fact one o f the key w ays in w hich nation states, beginn ing after the French R evolu tion, becam e such, and, by extension , continue to be such. T his affirm s the state's control over territories w here it has ju risd ictio n , and thus ov er those considered its citizens. T he ID card establish es the identity o f citizens (and in som e cases w ould -be citizens), d istin gu ishing them from others; assists ad m inistrative efficien cy; and ensures that benefits are received by those w ho bear the card. B ecause the 'establish m en t o f iden tity' involves a classification w hich im poses 'id en tity ', this process alw ays involves interpretation and som etim es struggle or conflict. As Ian H acking notes, the classification of ind ividu als is central to m od ern b ureaucratic and rationalized strategies o f gov ernm ent and control (H acking 1990) and thus m ay be su b ject to resistance. A fter all, says Torpey, ID cards are intrinsically illiberal in the sense that they p resum e the bearers' gu ilt w hen called upon to identify

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them selves. The state seem s to assum e that people will lie about who they are and that therefore durable identities are needed to guarantee the ongoing political, econom ic and adm inistrative aim s of that state. Thus '...d o cu m e n ts authorizing m ovem ent and establishing identity discourage people from choosing identities inconsistent with those validated by the state' (Torpey 2000: 166). As Richard Jenkins helpfully puts it: 'Identification is som ething over w hich struggles take place and ivith w hich stratagem s are advanced - it is m eans and ends in politics and at stake is the classification of populations as well as the classification of individuals' (Jenkins 2004: 23). The struggles and stratagem s of identification system s have been evident throughout their history, starting in France (see Piazza 2004a) and - often in an attem pt to rem ain distinct from that country! - continuing in the UK (see Lyon 1993). As we shall see below, such struggles and stratagem s occur in different ways in different countries, depending on their cultural distinctions and political histories. But the sim ple paperbased docum ents relating to m anual file storage and retrieval that characterized the establishm ent of stable identities from early m odern times (see H iggs 2001) are now rapidly giving way to quite different system s. A lthough the drive towards finding a 'scientific' basis for securing identities has also been evident from the start, rationalization is now seen in the technological m eans sought. Such schem es take the m onopolization o f the m eans of identity to another level altogether.

S m a rt ID cards: surveillance society and safety state

In the tw enty-first century, proposals are proliferating to set up new sm art ID system s, or to upgrade old ones. It would be a m istake to see this upsurge m erely in terms of the current international obsession with 'anti-terrorist' techniques, although the afterm ath of 9 /1 1 certainly has had a pow erful effect in galvanizing and catalysing such developm ents (Lyon 2003a). N ational identification schem es have been used or proposed for som e time, m ainly for handling routine adm inistrative transactions betw een governm ent agencies and citizens, w ith the rationale of cost savings, convenience and to reduce fraud. But the p o st-9/11 security drive has helped to provide a previously absent urgency to the search for viable ID system s, and m om entum appears to be picking up, internationally. First, though, it m ust be rem arked that new ID system s relate to already existing processes that are discussed here: bureaucratic rationalization and

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com puterization, m ost recently expressed in 'e-governm ent' initiatives; growing m obility rates w hich mean that m ore people are on the m ove and m arginal groups are harder to trace; and the changing role o f the state in the w ake of deregulation of trade and the w ithdraw al from econom ic m anagem ent, w hich m agnifies its 'law, order and security' function. ID cards are also intended as an 'anti-cybercrim e' measure, w here 'identity theft' has been cited as a m ajor growth area for dom estic offences. One could argue that each of these factors points towards the possibility of reinforcing identification regim es, and that 9 /1 1 offers the rationale for accelerated im plem entation. If one takes the British ID card case as an exam ple, each of these factors is evident. The initial 2004 press release from the Hom e O ffice included statem ents by David Blunkett, H om e Secretary, w hich indicate this clearly (the follow ing quotations are taken from this docum ent; H om e Office 2004). The idea that governm ent is re-tooling itself for the tw enty-first century is plainly stated. Citizens will be enabled to 'play a full role in our increasingly global and technologically com plex w orld', and the schem e will 'place the U K at the forefront of a w orld-w ide drive by industrialized nations to produce biom etric identity and travel docum ents'. People will be able to 'live their everyday lives more easily, giving them a w atertight proof of identity for use in daily transactions and travel'. A ccess to governm ent services will be facilitated, it is said, and along w ith this, better w ays of preventing access to those w ith no entitlem ent. This is part of a long-term UK goal of m oving towards e-governm ent, and it also reflects grow ing m obility rates and ease of travel, especially betw een EU countries. The 'challenges of the tw enty-first century' w hich ID cards address are equally clearly of the 'law, order and security' variety: 'ID cards will help tackle the type of serious and organized crim e w hich depend on being able to use false identities - terrorism , drug trafficking, m oney laundering, fraud through ID theft, and illegal working and im m igration.' The docum ent m akes much of the threat of 'recent events' - a dark hint at 9 /1 1 presum ably - and of ID fraud w hich apparently costs the U K £1.3 billion per year. These challenges are best m et, it is claim ed, by biom etrics devices built into the card system . Referring again to a w orld-w ide 'drive to increase docum ent security w ith biom etrics', the UK press release acknow ledges the shift now taking place. 'Taking people at face value' and 'trusting them to be w ho they say they are' is taken for granted in a free and open society, says Blunkett, but now the opportunity m ust be taken to 'm ove beyond this' to 'new biom etric technology w hich allows for a com pletely new level of verifying identity'. M uch has been m ade in recent decades of the rise of 'risk' as a central social and political phenom enon. W hile the first m ajor risks were 72

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thou ght o f as environm ental, stem m ing from irresponsible industrial p ractices (Beck 1992), the category o f risk has sin ce been extended to cov er a v ariety o f situ ations and processes including, notoriously, 'terrorism '. Sin ce 9 /1 1 especially, 'secu rity ' has becom e a p red om inant p olitical preoccu pation, d om inatin g the 2004 U S p resid ential election and m u ch else besides. W hile this notion o f 'secu rity ' has m uch to do w ith the 'terrorist' threat, it is im p ortan t to note the con tin uity w ith w hat w as already em erging w ithin the so-called risk society. A s Ericson and H aggerty p u t it neatly, 'In risk society, governan ce is directed at the prov ision of secu rity ' (1997: 85). O f course, by 'g o v ern an ce' they refer to other agencies as w ell as the state, bu t the state still plays a very sig nificant role in governance. The nation state is now centrally concerned w ith the provision o f security (w hich has in turn becom e an econ om ic category as w ell - the 'secu rity ind ustry'). ID cards fall fully into this kind o f risk society analysis. As E ricson and H aggerty also observe, the 'y earn in g for secu rity drives the insatiable quest for m ore and better kn ow led ge o f risk ' (1997: 85). This is w here surveillance com es into the picture. Ericson and H aggerty w rite prim arily about p olice surveillance but the analysis they engage m ay be extend ed elsew here w ith profit. R isk kn ow led ge is gleaned through surv eillance practices, w hich today m eans, above all, the use of inform ation technologies. To m eet the dem and for enhanced security, surv eillance m easures o f the m ost ad vanced kinds are called for. In the present case, a national d atabase and biom etric m easures offer the m eans to su pport a national ID card. A nd this is n o t w ithout its ow n attend ant risks, as Z u reik and H indle (2004) show. T heir argum en t leads to the con clusion that biom etrics is likely to increase p op u lation 'm anagem en t and con tro l' and to pu t p articular pressu re on 'poor, m arginal, and v u lnerable p eo p le' (2004: 134). We look at this further below. For the present, the m essage o f the British gov ernm ent is clear: security is at risk on several levels, and the role o f the state is to ratchet up security m easures to m eet the challenge. L ead ership in new technology is vital, to provide citizens w ith the latest, best and w orld -travel com p atible m eans of identification, w hich sim u ltaneou sly allow s access to governm ent services and d enies it to pretenders. ID cards w ith biom etrics is the key, w hich n ecessitates a new national database. Thu s the surv eillance society and the safety state (Raab 2005) go hand in hand.

ID cards: including and excluding the state’s citizens

M odern states have su ccessfu lly m on op olized the 'legitim ate m eans of m o v em en t' (Torpey 2000) using d ocu m ents such as p assports and ID 73

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cards to distinguish between citizens - 'nationals' - and others, and to regulate their m ovem ents. This is in part w hat constitutes states as they em brace their own citizens so that they can extract from them resources needed to reproduce them selves. W hat began in W estern Europe and the USA has been extended to cover all m odern states, although this has been intensified at particular times, such as during war. The so-called w ar on terror consequent on 9 /1 1 is having sim ilar effects, even though the 'w a r' is of a different character from previous ones that generated interest in ID cards. People have becom e dependent on states for an 'identity' - or, rather, identification - w hich both enables and inhibits m ovem ent w ithin a given territory and across borders. The 'identity' that includes also excludes those w ho do not m eet the criteria of citizenship. In an era of networked databases, pressure exists to find m ultiple-purpose cards that com bine, for exam ple, national IDs with passports. N ational com m unities may be im agined (A nderson 1991) but they are also dependent on codified ID docum ents. Cultural identities should not be confused w ith national identifications, even though they relate to each other in varying degrees of tension (see Jenkins 2004). Several factors m ake current projects som ew hat different from earlier ones. O ne is that they are dependent on electronic inform ation infrastructures that support a variety of functions through access to networked databases. Secondly, this takes further the already existing integration of state with com m ercial data and connects conventional national interests in personal identity with consum er ones. Thirdly, not only are state and econom y linked by m eans of the new system s, but so are internal-external issues of m ovem ent regulation. Indeed, the introduction o f 'internal' IDs is likely to be closely tied to the 'external' IDs of passports. In the UK case, the new ID card is associated in the first instance w ith passport and d river's licence renew als.1 The consequent globalization of personal data takes further the challenge to conventional political distinctions between d om estic/in ternation al, territorial/non-territorial and in sid e / outside. The fact that contem porary surveillance is heavily dependent on netw orked searchable databases means that an autom ated system is perm itted to do the w ork of categorizing populations, distinguishing betw een 'insid ers' and 'outsiders'. In the case of ID cards, as I have suggested, it is the database that is likely to have the largest long-term im pact even though the cards them selves are the lightning rod for the em otional and political charge. This is because the database perm its 'pre­ em ptive' surveillance, a fact that was first underscored by Gary M arx (1988) in his use of the phrase 'categorical suspicion'. Such anticipatory

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activity m ay already be seen in the crim inal investigation sphere, but m ay easily be transposed to an anti-terror key. As M alcolm Feely and Jonathan Sim on say, the approach seeks 'techniques for identifying, classifying, and m anaging groups sorted by levels of dangerousness' (Feely and Sim on 1994). In the case of ID cards, 'levels of dangerousness' is only one issue to be confronted. Cards are intended to sort for likelihood o f com m itting fraud, both financial and in self-representation, as well as for entitlem ent to benefits and services. The difficulty here is that for the purpose - anti­ terrorism - that gives the ID cards debate its timing and its apparent acceptability, the efficacy of sm art cards is m oot to say the least. Even the m ost advanced biom etrics depends on having a clear threat profile, and even w ith this, the cards can still be tampered with by determ ined people. Equally, advanced biom etric cards still have to be based on som e other docum entary identification in the first place, pushing upstream to the hum ble birth certificate, which in m ost cases is far from forgery proof (see Stalder and Lyon 2003). If the aim of introducing ID card system s is to counter terror - and in the USA the debate is alm ost exclusively couched in these terms - then distinguishing betw een those w ho m ay pose a threat and those w ho do not is param ount. A m itai Etzioni has recently begun to prom ote the cause of ID cards, or of strengthening de facto IDs such as drivers' licences (Etzioni 2004). He has found him self opposing the 'privacy lobby' w hich, he claim s, often pushes the m ost em otional buttons it can find. He says that privacy advocates are wrong to suggest that ID cards w ould lull citizens into a false sense of (technology-dependent) security, that privacy would be violated more with ID cards, and, most im portantly for our purposes, that m inorities w ould be discrim inated against m ore readily. Space forbids a full treatm ent of these argum ents, but a central objection to each of them is that they ignore the broader context. First, high technology surveillance is being prom oted by high technology com panies and governm ents (often working in collusion, see ACLU 2004), to the virtual exclusion of low-tech, labour-intensive alternatives. The balance is tilting decisively towards reliance on algorithm ic methods. Second, it is hard to believe that supposedly m ore reliable m ethods of identification would reduce privacy violations, given that any sm art ID system is dependent on an array of databases, public and private, and that data-m ining is a key m eans of discovering personal data associated w ith a given identity. Third, the idea that consistent ID docum ents would reduce racial and other m inority discrim ination is very doubtful indeed in a w orld w here m edia-am plified fear and suspicion are com m onplace

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and w here the con sequ ent need for 'secu rity ' has becom e a prim ary political goal. N ew ID cards, touted as a key m eans o f ensuring a reliable m eans o f identifying the bona fid e citizens o f a given state, are both less than ideal o f this stated pu rpose and are likely to have o ther attend ant effects w hich are socially retrograde. This differs from place to place, o f course, and it is instructive to d iscov er w h at d ifference culture and history m ake in the ad option o f ID card system s. M any E uropeans have had paperbased ID system s for a long tim e, and cou ntries in East and South East A sia have adopted electronic database ID system s m ore recently. Each experience is d ifferent and prod uces v arying effects.

T h e experien ce o f others I: o th e r nations

W henever a nation state initiates a process leading to the ad option of a new ID card system it tends to be seen as an internal ev en t that seeks p recedent or p ast exp erience as a guide. Yet w ith increasingly sim ilar m eans of identification being sought, and for sim ilar pu rposes, it seem s approp riate to exam in e the exp erience o f several d ifferent nation states. In ad dition, certain nations or federations - such as the U SA o r EU - put pressu re on others to conform to standards, w hich again suggests that u n derstand ing both sim ilarity and difference of approaches w ould be advisable. It is n o t only the m on op olization of the m eans o f violence (G id dens 1985, 1990) that has given m od ern states their ch ief raison d'etre and is now challenged in globalizing situations. Ju st as national security in a m ilitary sense now dep ends on m u lti-lateral coop eration (H eld 2004: 9), so too in the realm of m ov em ent across borders, inclu ding the securin g o f stable identities, coop eration is also required as nev er before. T h e m eans o f m ov em ent and o f authorized id entification are central to this. O ver the p ast tw o d ecad es several m u lti-p u rp ose sm art card ID s have been proposed, trialled, rejected or im plem ented . T hose in operation tend to be in fairly au th oritarian states such as M alaysia and T hailand, and perh aps a little less so, H ong Kong. Each o f these uses a national database and includes biom etrics (thum b prints) in the card. Those bein g im plem ented , in India or C hina, are also fairly auth oritarian by the standards for W estern Europe and N orth A m erica, but n o t enough is know n about the d etails o f their prototyp e system s to m ake com m ent. In cou ntries that w ent through earlier phases o f m od ernization Jap an, South K orea - there have been m ajor con troversies abou t their em ergence. The K oreans rejected a card; the Jap an ese experienced a huge

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w av e o f (ongoing) civil d isobed ience ov er theirs (see Lyon and Wood forthcom ing). It should be rem em bered that although m any European cou ntries - inclu d ing Italy and Finland - alread y have ID cards, few have im plem ented up grad es that w ould turn them into fully fledged sm art card system s. If the British plan goes ahead, it will be by far the m o st advanced. In the U SA and C anada no official national ID card system has ever been establish ed but this is n o t for w ant o f trying. Several proposals have been m ad e and in 2005 it appears that the U SA m ay initiate at least a de fa c to card before C anada does. The Intelligence Reform Bill, passed by the Senate in D ecem ber 2004 (A non 2004) calls for an overhaul o f the d riv e r's licence system that w ould be tantam ou nt to m akin g a national ID. But in C anada, w hat appeared to be building tow ards a serious proposal in 2003 cam e to nothing. A D epartm ent o f Im m igration report, based in part, interestingly, on a fact-find ing v isit to several E uropean cou ntries, led to its d ism issal before the 'n ational d ebate' initiated by the m inister responsible, D enis C oderre, had ever begu n in earnest (M cC lintock 2004). True, an upgrad ed im m igration docu m ent, the P erm anent R esid ent Card, w as established in 2003, but this has a very specific pu rpose and is a very sm all change com pared w ith a national ID. In the U SA there has been m u ch talk about ID cards since 9 /1 1 but no official plan has finally been announced. A fter the flurry o f interest follow ing the offer by O racle's Larry Ellison to provide 'free' softw are for a proposed national ID, the pu blic d iscu ssion o f the issue has been fairly quiet. A s the m ost com m on de fa c to ID in the U SA is the d riv e r's licence, how ever, it is likely that an upgrad ed version o f that d ocu m ent m ay well becom e the cen trepiece o f an ID system , or som ething closely resem bling one. T h e plan, d uring 2 0 0 2 -0 3 , w as to create a federal system linking all the existing state system s and to inclu de a biom etric identifier in the new card. T he A m erican A ssociation of M otor Vehicle A dm inistrators is w orkin g w ith H om eland Secu rity to this end. Each state w ould still run its licence system but using standardized data and secu rity features (O 'H arrow 2001). A t the tim e o f w riting this enhan ced d riv e r's licence p roposal is still the m ost likely scenario for a de fa c to ID card.

T h e exp erien ce of others II: nation s’ others

The com p arativ e study o f ID card system s suggests that the key question relates to w ho are the 'o th ers' that the nation state in question w ould like to exclu d e or regulate. It is the entry o f 'o th ers' into the territory of the nation state w ith w hich p assports deal, and their p resence w ithin

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the borders o f that territory, in the long or sh o rt term , for w hich ID cards are sought. For m any cou ntries, the im plicit agen da is how to d em onstrate that they are prepared for p otential 'terro rist' attacks. In this case, the experience of the U SA , w here, as the official report on 9 /1 1 show s, several o f the attackers used false d ocu m ents, is the exam ple to avoid. H ow far other cou ntries are also keen to avoid the civil-rights abuses that have follow ed in the w ake o f the A m erican d evelopm ent o f a culture o f suspicion is un clear (see Lyon 2003). But the longer-term agenda behind the establish m ent o f ID cards m u st n o t be forgotten, and although this varies from cou ntry to country, a con stan t factor is im m igration control. The use o f passports, it seem s, is insufficient. A m eans is sought, p articularly for regulating resid ence and access to go v ernm ent services and benefits, o f v erifying identities in term s o f citizenship. Im m igration control is an exp licit aim o f the British ID card proposal. A lthou gh one key com p lain t o f both the U K Inform ation C om m ission er and the H ouse of C om m ons H om e A ffairs C om m ittee is the lack of clarity of p u rpose about the proposed ID card system , it is clear that preventing illegal im m igration and illegal w o rkin g is am on g the top governm ent priorities (H ouse o f C om m ons 2004: 25). A lth ou gh the C om m ission for Racial E quality has accepted that the use o f ID cards could ensure fairer treatm ent o f asylum seekers and other new im m igrants, it is also argued that this w ill only be the case if p rop er controls are exerted over w ider factors such as the hiring policies and p ractices o f firms. O ther cou ntries w ith ID card system s also have strong incentives to sort betw een legitim ate and illegitim ate w orkers and residents. H ong K ong w ish es to lim it C hinese m ainland ers; M alaysia has long tried to regulate Indonesian m igration; G erm any has am b iv alen t attitu d es tow ards g astarbeiters, esp ecially those from the form er Yugoslavia and from Turkey; the U SA m akes ev er m ore strenuou s efforts to keep illegal w ork-seeking M exicans from crossing the border; Jap an is concerned abou t K orean w orkers in its m idst; and so on. In a w orld w here m any obstacles have been rem oved to free m ovem ent and to w orking in foreign contexts - esp ecially in the EU - it is interesting to note that p articular groups are still proscribed , for a variety of reasons. A nother issue, w hich m ay help to reveal negative d im ensions of new ID card system s, is the use o f biom etrics. Such p ractices are not them selves new, o f course. Earlier in the tw entieth cen tury the A m erican ad m inistration attem pted to use fingerp rinting on C h in ese im m igrants, w hich m u st cou nt as one o f the first attem pts to use 'bio m etrics' on a m inority popu lation for ID pu rposes (C ole 2001). But it is interesting to note w hich cou ntries actually use som e kind o f biom etrics w ithin their existing ID card system s. They inclu de C am bodia, Egypt, Israel, 78

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M alaysia, N igeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Spain and Thailand (PI 2004). If the UK were to succeed in im plem enting its proposed card, it would be joining a list of nations, none o f w hich is taken to be exem plary in its pursuit of racial and ethnic equality. However, lacking studies of the consequences of biom etric IDs for m inority groups in those countries, it is im possible to judge w hether or not this is a significant factor. To return, finally, to the events that have given ID card proposals a new lease of life in the early tw enty-first century - 9 /1 1 and its afterm ath - it is clear that, even w ithout ID cards, m uch injustice has been experienced by certain m inority groups through w idespread processes of 'racial profiling'. The stated effort to exclude such profiling from anti­ terrorist activity m ay actually be betrayed by reliance on 'silver bullet' technology in the p o s t-9 /11 era. Biom etrics, as Clive N orris has argued (Norris and A rm strong 1999) and as Jeffrey Rosen rem inds us, though it m ay have originated with Bertillon, was cham pioned by Francis Galton, the father of eugenics (Rosen 2004: 125). Rosen argues that, as with G alton's w ork, technologies of hierarchy m asquerade as technologies of equality. W hile crude racial profiling m ay ostensibly be avoided, 'instead of elim inating the evils of stereotyping and discrim ination, the technologies of classification extend them across Am erican society as a w hole' (Rosen 2004: 126).

Conclusion

It m ay be that the advent of sm art ID cards m akes affected populations vulnerable to increased 'invasions of privacy' or a snooping 'Big Brother'. Equally, those m ay be justified who fear gratuitous restrictions on the free m ovem ent of citizens follow ing the introduction of new ID cards. But neither of these necessarily takes into account the w orking of the national registry database that facilitates digital discrim ination and social sorting. It is this, along with the use of biom etrics, w hich is exposed and debated in this paper. I have suggested that in ratcheting up the technological elem ents of the state's m onopoly over the m eans of identification, not only are the opportunities for m isuse and abuse m ultiplied - routine use is also questionable. As national ID card system s are adopted, the nation state's im plicit definition of the 'o th e r' will be built into an autom ated system for determ ining who is and who is not a member, thus reducing dependence on face-to-face accounts of individual identity. So the border will increasingly be everyw here, in at least two senses. First, the sm art ID card is a portable m eans of identification - surveillance is literally borne by those who are its subjects - and yet the identity revealed there may 79

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well be doubted or disputed by the bearer. This is because it originates in the netw orked databases to which the card is virtually connected, w hose categories m ay be clear, but m ay also be opaque or, w orse, stereotypical. Identity and identification are - especially for m inorities - in a kind of dialectical relation of struggle and com prom ise. W hich brings us to the second sense of cards serving to bring the border everyw here - the experience of otherness becom es steadily more ubiquitous, no longer lim ited to physical borders. The question of w hether or not a society accepts the m ajor step up to a sm art ID system relates to how far that society w ishes to go in effectively rejecting or at least suspecting personal narratives in favour of the database of identification. That database, com posed as it is by m yriad sm all personal details, concatenated through data-m ining and other advanced techniques, extends processes used com m ercially to constitute consum ers, to constitute bona fid e citizens. And it thus raises questions about the paradox of cosm opolitanism , w here nation states are in com plex and intricate institutional relationships, depending on netw orked new technologies, but w here citizens still find their loyalties and com m itm ents in relation to tradition, locality, ethnicity and, in som e circum stances, nation. This also raises large questions about the politics of inform ation. W ho decides on the categories o f suspicion and of opportunity? How far are citizens involved in this process, and at w hat level? W hat ethical scrutiny is there of these categories? And lastly, how accountable are the m anagers of these m assive new system s on w hich the life-chances of so m any are dependent? W hen the border is everyw here, answ ers to these questions are the more urgently needed.

N ote 1

This is interesting because it ties in with a further feature of ID card history the incentives offered for acceptance. In the UK case, the Second World War ID was required for food rationing (see Agar 2001). Today, the new IDs are tied to other 'necessary' functions - driving and foreign travel.

References ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) (2004) The Surveillance Industrial Complex August 2004. Available at: http://w w w .aclu.org/Safeand Free/SafeandFree. cfm?ID=16224& c=207

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Agar, J. (2001) 'M odern Horrors: British Identity and Identity Cards', in J. Caplan and J. Torpey (eds) D ocumenting Individual Identity: The Development o f State Practices in the M odern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 10120 . A nderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread o f 'Nationalism (London and New York: Verso). Anon (2004) 'Senate OKs intelligence overhaul bill' CNN.cont, Friday 10 Decem ber 2004. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .cn n .c o m /2 0 0 4 /A L L P O L IT IC S /1 2 /0 8 / intelligence.bill/ Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society (London: Sage). Calhoun, C. (1997) Nationalism (Buckingham: Open University Press). Cole, S. (2001) Suspect Identities: A History o f Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press). Ericson, R. and Haggerty, K. (1997) Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Etzioni, A. (2004) 'It's not just a d river's license anymore: It's a de facto national ID. We should make it secure', The Washington Post, Sunday 16 M ay 2004, B3. Feely, M. and Sim on, J. (1994) 'Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law ', in D. N elken (ed.) The Futures o f Criminology (London: Sage), pp. 173201 . Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences o f M odernity (Cam bridge: Polity Press). Giddens, A. (1985) The Nation State and Violence (Cam bridge: Polity Press). Hacking, I. (1990) The Taming o f Chance (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press). Held, D. (2004) 'Becom ing Cosmopolitan: The Dim ensions and Challenges of G lobalization', in Peter Heslam (ed.) Globalization and the Good (London: SPCK), pp. 3-15. Higgs, E. (2001) 'The Rise of the Information State: the developm ent of central state surveillance of the citizen in England 1500-2000', Journal o f Historical Sociology, 14:2, pp. 175-97. Home Office (2004) 'David Blunkett: National ID card schem e is the key to the U K 's future', 26 April 2004. Available at: w w w .hom eoffice.gov.uk/n_story. asp?item _id=918 House of Com m ons (Home Affairs Com mittee) (2004) Identity Cards Volume 1, 20 July 2004. Available at: http ://w w w .p u blication s.p arliam en t.u k /p a/ cm 200304/cm select/cm h aff /130/13002.h tm Jenkins, R. (2004) Social Identity (London and New' York: Routledge). Kaluszynski, M. (2001) 'Republican Identity: Bertillonage as Governm ent Technique', in J. Caplan and J. Torpey (eds) (2001) Documenting Individual Identity: The Development o f State Practices in the M odern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 123-38. Lyon, D. and Wood, D. (forthcoming) 'Surveillance in Japan, before and after Septem ber 11', under submission to Urban Studies. Lyon, D. (ed.) (2003) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (London and N ew York: Routledge).

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Lyon, D. (2003a) Surveillance after Septem ber 11 (Cam bridge UK and M alden MA: Polity Press). Lyon, D. (1993) 'British Identity Cards: "th e unpalatable logic" of European integration?' The Political Quarterly, 62:3, pp. 377-85. M arx, G. (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in Am erica (Berkeley: University of California Press). M cClintock, M. (2004) 'ID card plan fails grade', Calgary Sun, Friday 9 April 2004. Norris, C. and Armstrong, G. (1999) Towards the M aximum Surveillance Society: The Rise o f CCTV (Oxford: Berg). O'Harrow, R. (2001) 'States devising plan for high tech national identification cards', The Washington Post, Saturday 3 N ovem ber 2001, A10. PI (Privacy International) (2004) M istaken Identity: Exploring the Relationship Between National Identity Cards and the Prevention o f Terrorism. Available at: www .privacyinternational.org/ Piazza, P. (2004) 'Septem bre 1921: la prem iere "carte d'id entite" de franijais', Geneses, M arch, pp. 76-89. Piazza, P. (2004a) Histoire de la Carte Nationale d'identite (Paris: O dile Jacob). Raab, C. (2005) 'Towards the safety state?' Inaugural lecture at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Rosen, J. (2004) The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious A ge (New York: Random House). Stalder, F. and Lyon, D. (2003) 'Electronic Identity Cards and Social Classification', in D. Lyon (ed.) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 77-93. Torpey, J. (2000) The Invention o f the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cam bridge and New York: Cam bridge University Press). Zureik, E. and H indle, K. (2004) 'G overnance, Security and Technology: the case of biom etrics', Studies in Political Economy, 73, Spring-Sum m er, pp. 113-37. This paper w as originally prepared for a sem inar at the Institute for Advanced Study in the H um anities, University of Edinburgh, Scotland during a visiting fellowship there in 2004. This revised version w as prepared for the Surveillance Project research workshop on Borders and State Surveillance, at Q ueen's University, August 2004.

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C h a p te r 6

Borders, bodies and biometrics: towards identity management Benjamin J. Muller

‘B ord ers’ of engagement: security, liberty, identity

Borders have alw ays been integral to discourses of international security and world politics. Predictions of a borderless world and a dustbin of history overflow ing with the stalw arts of m odernity were quickly recognized to be little m ore than the over-zealous Zeitgeist born of a post1989 hangover (see O hm ae 1999; Fukuyam a 1992; Friedm an 1999; Beilharz et al. 1992; Salter 2002). The state and indeed international frontiers have proven to be far more resilient than such com m entaries predicted. As the process of European integration once again found its feet, the rhetoric of freer m ovem ent and the eradication of borders only vaguely cloaked dom inant preoccupations with constructing a 'Fortress Europe' (Walters 2002; Donnan and W ilson 1999; Bornem an 1998; Pieterse 1991). In fact, even before the events of 11 Septem ber 2001, som e analysts argued for the critical im portance of 'identities, borders, orders' as an integral triad in contem porary international relations theory (A lbert et al. 2001; W ilson and Donnan 1998). The politics of identities, borders and orders has nonetheless changed. Notably, the hours and days im m ediately follow ing the horrific events of Septem ber 11 rem inded us that sacrificing the unfettered m ovem ent of capital, goods and services at the altar of security was no option; a long-term solution for 'm anaging' identities, borders and orders w as essential (Carr 2002; A ndreas and Biersteker 2003). As if it w ere privy to

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som e prophecy, the biom etrics industry seem ed im m ediately ubiquitous, claim ing to provide all the right answ ers for the 'new ' challenges of the global security environm ent. Focusing on physical (or physiological) characteristics, or 'the body', as the unique identifier/v erifier o f individuals, biom etric technologies provide a m eans for 'm easurem ent'. As the body becom es password (Davis 1997), one's retina or iris, or even the angle of one's nose, is converted through algorithm s into a binary code, for the purpose of verification or identification (M uller 2004; Zureik 2004). N ot unlike debates surrounding the ever burgeoning field(s) of biotechnology, even the m ost ardent advocates of biom etrics concede the need for public consultation and debate. However, w hat is the nature o f this debate? In m any cases, the field of biotechnology has w itnessed som e rather contrived discussions that have done little to grapple with deeply ethical and political concerns, and focused instead on questions of m arket m anagem ent and the ro le / rights of the consum er.1 In m any instances, deeper cultural and political considerations are only entertained in the 'consum er space', lest one is forced to take on the uncom fortable m antle of late-m odern Luddism , and all its unsavoury consequences (Leiss 2004). M oreover, the production of political space by discourses of biotechnology, or in this case, biom etrics, has im portant consequences for political en g agem ent/resistan ce, and the contem porary politics o f security and identity. W hat then is the political space of biom etrics? W hat are the lim its/ possibilities of political and ethical engagem ent with the (im pending) introduction of biom etric technologies? W hat is the relationship between security, liberty and identity in the context of 'biom etric security'? M ore to the point, how does one actually define 'biom etric security'? In hopes of com ing to terms with the politics of biom etrics, I reflect on a num ber of these questions here. Focusing on various texts, or w hat could be described as 'im plem entation m anuals', as well as the report on the biom etrics forum hosted by Citizenship and Im m igration Canada in O ctober 2 0 0 3 ,1 consider how the political space of biom etrics is framed. Closer scrutiny of m any of the aforem entioned questions begins to paint a picture of the politics of biom etrics that has very little to do with the politics of borders and bodies, and m uch more with the m anagem ent of the database. In fact, m uch o f the debate over the relationship (and sacrifices) am ong security, liberty and identity are fram ed in the context of the dataset. As a result, I reflect on the political space of biom etrics as the space of the database, and consider the resulting im plications for the politics of security and identity. Persistently revisiting the relationship am ong notions of security,

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liberty and identity as the dom inant 'borders' of engagem ent, I reflect on the ways in w hich the politics of biom etrics are (re)presented w ithin the 'bod y' of biom etrics literature. Focusing on 'im plem entation m anuals', I expose the extent to w hich these texts 'produce' a politics of biom etrics, overtly fram in g/lim itin g the space o f political and ethical engagem ent. Then, focusing on the report on the forum hosted by Citizenship and Im m igration Canada on 'Biom etrics: Im plications and Applications for Citizenship and Im m igration', I engage the possible (ab)uses of biom etrics and the im portance o f w hat I call the 'inevitability crisis' to the politics of biom etrics. The paper concludes with som e reflections on 'biom etric security', and its im plications on w ider notions of (international) security.

‘Bodies’ of literature

W hat is initially striking about the 'biom etrics literature' - and here I am referring to w hat are best described as 'm anuals' produced by industry analysts - is an incredible lack of irony. The challenges o f post-Septem ber 11 global (in)security and the unshakeable problem of identity th eft/frau d are forwarded as challenges or rather problem s that biom etrics is only too capable of 'resolving'. The titles of these m anuals are telling in and of them selves: Biometrics: Identity Assurance in the Inform ation A ge (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003); A rm y Biom etric A pplications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns (Woodward Jr. et al. 2001); Biom etrics: Facing Up to Terrorism (W oodward Jr. 2001); Im plem enting Biom etric Security, w ith the by-line 'timely, practical, reliable' (Chirillo and Blaul 2003). Biom etrics are certainly timely. The am algam ation of public and private concerns over 'securing identity' - and here one m ight also consider the increasing reliance on 'm ilitary contractors' for security, w hich I discuss later (see Singer 2003; Davis 2000; Silverstein 2000) - has served to reinforce the 'need ' for the sorts of solutions the biom etrics industry believes it can provide. If timely, then the question of practicality would appear moot, leaving questions of reliability as the singular site o f debate and contestation; hence, Charles M ann's preoccupation w ith 'sm art failure' (M ann 2002). I return to this point of 'tim eliness' m ore explicitly when discussing the Citizenship and Im m igration Canada biom etrics forum, under the heading of the 'inevitability crisis'. At this point, it is w orthw hile interrogating the extent to w hich the biom etrics literature produces the political space of biometrics.

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Discourse and the p o litica l space o f biom etrics

A ccording to Jim George, 'a discourse m akes "re a l" that which it prescribes as m eaningful' (George 1994:30). I wish to avoid a long retracted discussion on the m erits, relevance and challenge o f 'd iscourse', as this is adequately addressed elsew here (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996; George 1994; H ow arth et al. 2000). Furtherm ore, as the role of discourse(s) in social science literature is far from revolutionary in the early tw enty-first century, one would expect to hear few reservations, directed only at the m ost 'post­ post' form s of discourse analysis from the m ost positivistic corners of the discipline; as a result, I fail to see the need to engage in any sort of subdisciplinary jousting here. M uch like the constructivist point that m aintains 'reality' is socially constructed, the suggestion that discourse is im portant in producing realities elicits little more than yaw ning acceptance except in the darkest recesses o f the peculiar discipline o f international relations (on constitutive role of theory see also Booth 1997; Smith 2004). T h em o st im portant articulation of discourse for the discussion presented here is, as Bradley Klein puts it: 'A discourse, then, is not a w ay of learning "ab o u t" som ething out there in the "real w orld "; it is rather, a way of producing that som ething as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, m eaningful' (Klein quoted in George 1994: 30; see Klein 1994). In this way, I exam ine the m anuals on biom etrics, and later the forum report, reflecting on how a 'politics of biom etrics' is produced. W hat is the political space of biom etrics? And, w hat are the constitutive limits of political and ethical engagem ent in this political space? This 'production of political space' by the biom etrics literature is done rather un-ironically, m erely signifying the depth (or lack thereof) o f its own reflexivity and com m itm ent to the pow er of discourse. The way in which the lim its of the politics of biom etrics are produced is m ost obvious in practice, such as the biom etrics forum held by Citizenship and Im m igration Canada. However, the industry-produced literature is influential, and as such deserves attention. Biom etrics literature

W hile arguably timely, practical and reliable, the three basic factors influencing the adoption o f biom etrics according to the industry itself are: security, convenience and cost (W oodward Jr. et al. 2003: xxiv). In the w ake of the events of 11 Septem ber 2001 and the subsequent 'war(s) on terro r', the overw helm ing preoccupation w ith 'secu rity' has reduced other considerations; this point is further highlighted in the context of the biom etrics forum. O ne of the im portant considerations here is the ongoing erosion of the separation betw een public and private. W hile

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relevant to changing notions of privacy in m odern surveillance societies (Bennett and G rant 1999; Lyon 2001,2003), the blurred distinction between public and private is particularly essential in terms of the (in)security of identities and spaces, or 'borders and bodies'. The current Iraq War is the exem plar here, as 'private m ilitary contractors' are now the second-largest contributor to coalition forces after the US (Wilson 2004). This private arm y of 'bodyguards' is charged w ith protecting contractors and industrialists involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, as well as certain locations of the Coalition Provisional A uthority (W ilson 2004). O ther than highlighting the increasing reliance on the privatized m ilitary industry for contem porary w arfare and security, this exam ple dem onstrates the changing nature of 'security' itself. As the m otivation for the war in Iraq rem ains mired in controversy, the significance of resource w ealth is never far off the radar, and the im m ediate actions of coalition forces and the International M onetary Fu nd /W orld Bank towards the M inistry of Oil in Iraq has done little to quell such controversies (see A li 2002). To suggest then that Iraq (in)security is both a public and private concern is not necessarily surprising, but the involvem ent of private contractors in 'securing' Iraq m ight create interesting nuances. Similarly, in the field o f biom etrics the (in)security of identity is both a public and private preoccupation. The rising problem of identity th eft/frau d coupled with the obsession over 'securing the inside' vis-a-vis varying constructions of 'hom eland security', speaks to the joint p u blic-p rivate interest in 'securing identity' for the security of both the state space and the consum er space. These brief reflections on the relationship betw een the erosion of distinct public and private spaces, and their increasingly shared interests, in terms of the (in)security of identity and sp ace/p lace, is an im portant first step in com ing to terms w ith the politics of biom etrics. To understand and subsequently engage in the politics of biom etrics is to com e to terms w ith w hat the Iraq exam ple dem onstrates: the increasing unfeasibility of separating public interests from private interests. As a private industry, a secure consum er space and state space - dependent of course on the perceived insecurity of these spaces and the bodies w ithin them - is in the best interests of the biom etrics industry. In terms of counterterrorism , Lon Troyer refers to this phenom enon in the follow ing manner: A sim ulacral reenactm ent and coordination o f public, corporate, and private spaces, the field of observation is translated into the space of integrated databases and searched for figures, m om ents, and acts that stand out from the hom ogeneous surface noise of hum an tra ffic... To stand out is to be at risk; to becom e undifferentiated from the m ass of other lives translated into the binary language of electronic encoding

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becom es the goal in the age of Total Inform ation Awareness. (Troyer 2003: 271) M uch like the role of private m ilitary contractors in Iraq, the eroding separation betw een public and private and the close connection between security and insecurity playing out in the space of the database are constitutive characteristics of the politics of biom etrics, which the industry literature unsurprisingly fails to point out. However, it periodically alludes to this political space of the database, (un)consciously lim iting the politics of resistance to the m aligned spaces of the physical body. In A rm y Biom etric A pplications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns, John D. Woodward Jr. and others point out that as surprising as it m ay seem , biom etrics has its critics. The authors begin their discussion on the sociocultural concerns associated with biom etrics, exam ining how they differ from other identification m ethods, focusing on questions of inform ational privacy, physical privacy and religious objections (Wood ward Jr. et al. 200 1 :2 1 -2 ). Texts or m anuals on biom etrics do not, however, always explicitly address w hat they see to be im portant sociocultural or political concerns. For exam ple, in Im plem enting Biom etric Security, although Chirillo and Blaul's very first sentence of the text is: 'A s unfortunate as it may be, the events of Septem ber 11, 2001, forever changed our lives' (Chirillo and Blaul 2003: vii), the authors spend no time dealing explicitly with the 'political' aspects of biom etrics. In contrast, the Woodward Jr., O rlans and H iggins text, Biom etrics: Identity Assurance in the Inform ation Age, also takes the events of 11 Septem ber 2001 as a critical point of departure (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003: xxiv), but devotes a substantial portion to exam ining 'Privacy, Policy, and Legal Concerns Raised by Biom etrics' (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003: 195-279). The W oodward Jr. et al. collection A rm y Biom etric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns represents w hat is arguably the m ost overt preoccupation w ith such m atters, and the clearest exam ple of the effective role of the text in producing a politics o f biometrics. According to Woodward Jr. et al., the key sociocultural concerns associated with biom etrics fall into three m ain categories: 1) inform ational privacy; 2) physical privacy; 3) religious objections (Woodward Jr. et al. 2001: 23). In their other text, Biom etrics: Identity Assurance in the Inform ation Age, W oodward Jr. et al. raise a sim ilar set of concerns, focusing on privacy, policy and legality (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003: 195-279). A lthough the texts willingly entertain a specific and rather narrow set of concerns with biom etrics, predictably the authors argue in favour of biom etrics, highlighting the way in w hich it is legal and privacy-enhancing and dem onstrates hum an diversity and individuality in practice, rather than a sacrifice of individuality for (securing) the state (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003: 198,209-10). In another testam ent to the un-ironic tone, Woodward Jr. et al. 88

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point out, 'biom etrics could refocus the way A m ericans look at the brave new w orld o f personal inform ation' (2003: 198). This new w ay of looking at personal inform ation is to look at the political space of biom etrics as the space of the dataset. In the case of privacy, legality and broader sociocultural concerns, the site of contestation is the database itself, preoccupied with m aintaining the integrity of the binary code, not the 'integrity' of the body. As a result, the sorts of issues that arise all assum e the tim eliness and practicality of biom etrics, and indeed the way in which identity, security and liberty are already altered. N otably the argum ent regarding privacy - or liberty - suggests, 'biom etrics is privacy's friend because, for exam ple, it can be used to help protect inform ation integrity and deter identity theft' (Woodward Jr. et al. 2003: 199). Consequently, biom etrics quickly resolves the seem ing rivalry betw een liberty and security: it is in fact securing the database that facilitates liberty/privacy. Specifically, the database is protected from m isu se/ab u se of inform ation; the problem o f 'functional creep', where inform ation is later used for purposes other than those originally intended; and tracking, or the 'Big Brother' fear, w here anonym ity and autonom y can no longer be m aintained (Woodward Jr. et al. 2001: 23-6). These concerns fall into the category of 'inform ational privacy', w here the (in)security of the database is directly related to, and not divergent from, the concerns of liberty/privacy. The effort devoted to inform ational p riv acy /secu rity in all texts on biom etrics, com pared with the m inim al (or even nonexistent) reflections devoted to issues of 'physical privacy', hints at the extent to w hich the space of the database is congruous with the political space of biom etrics.2 In the only exam ination of 'physical privacy' found in the consulted texts, Woodward Jr. etal. list three core characteristics: stigm atization, actual harm and hygiene (Woodward Jr. et al. 2 0 01:23-6). Stigm atization is quickly m aligned by linking it directly w ith w ider sociocultural norm s (which can of course be changed in the 'brave new world of personal inform ation'). A m ost interesting aspect of physical privacy, how ever brief, is the issue of 'actual harm '. The biom etrics industry and its advocates w ho urge citizens unfam iliar with biom etric technologies to consult Hollyw ood films for a better grasp of these technologies, seem unaw are of the centrality of 'actual harm ' in both popular culture's representations of biom etrics and the lived experiences of those engaging in resistance against biometrics. In an attem pt to fam iliarize readers with biom etric technologies, Chirillo and Blaul suggest: If you've ever w atched high-tech spy m ovies, you've m ost likely seen biom etric technology. Several m ovies have depicted biom etric technologies based on one or m ore of the follow ing unique identifiers: 89

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face, fingerp rint, handprint, iris, retina, signature, and voice. (2003: 1) Som e ad vocates o f biom etrics have ind icated that such strategies are problem atic, ind icatin g an aw areness o f the central role o f 'actu al h arm ' in m ost H ollyw ood representations o f biom etrics. A s A u stralia's Im m igration M inister A m anda V anstone confessed in 2004, 'I d o n 't think I have ever heard o f a m ovie being m ad e that's d em onstrated w here biom etrics have in fact saved peop le from im p rop er persecu tio n ' (H erald Sun 2004). The (ab)use o f biom etrics in film s often involves 'actual harm ', such as Tom C ru ise's character in M in ority Report, w ho is forced to carry his ow n eyeball in a plastic bag after a clan d estine botched m ed ical procedure. A s the body is passw ord, the append age - in this instance, the eye - is required for authorization. W oodw ard Jr. et al. seem concerned w ith 'actu al harm ' only insofar as it m igh t lead to d eceiving biom etric system s: 'O thers m ay be concerned that a dism em bered lim b could be stolen and used to " fo o l" a system ' (2001: 27). Such com m ents only serve to reinforce the ind u stry's representation o f the p olitical sp ace o f biom etrics as the space o f the database, rather than the space of the body. P hysical harm , h ygiene and stigm atization are sum m arily dism issed as little m ore than peripheral reservations w ith biom etrics. O ne m igh t con sid er to w hat exten t this m ove pu shes the p olitics o f resistance to these m aligned spaces, as resistance becom es futile in the high ly restricted space of the dataset. I reflect briefly on this later in the p ap er (see M uller 2004). The body o f biom etrics literatu re to w hich I refer goes to great lengths to present both the possibilities (and risks, how ever m inim al) of biom etric technologies. In d oing so, this literature serves to con stru ct the political space o f biom etrics. N ot overtly stating w h at is or is n ot 'p o litical' about biom etrics, the literature raises w hat it says are the sociocu ltu ral, policy and legal concerns associated w ith these technologies. The (in)security of the d atabase is forw ard ed as the sp ace o f biom etrics p olitics: here p riv a cy / liberty are 'secu red ', but this is prem ised on a rather narrow accoun t of liberty and privacy. A gain, this m ove is n o t lost on the biom etrics literature. R ather than engaging p riv acy or liberty in the abstract or general sense, privacy is broken dow n to inform ational p riv acy and physical privacy. Clearly, in the p hysical sen se there is little privacy and m inim al liberty, yet the space o f the d atabase rem ains secured. Q uestion s of p hysical p riv a c y / liberty are rapid ly d ism issed , yet w ould appear to be the precise space o f resistance, but this is another matter. R eflecting on w hat a politics of biom etrics m igh t look like, the texts o f biom etrics them selves appear to begin 'a fte r' the body, w here liberty, identity and (in)security are enter­ tained in the space o f the database rather than in the space o f the physical

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body. This production of a particular political space of biom etrics in which there is little room for resistance was exposed further in the Citizenship and Im m igration Canada forum on biom etrics held in O ctober 2003.

Biom etrics: (ab)use and the ‘inevitability crisis’

At the very outset of the report on the Citizenship and Im m igration Canada forum on biom etrics, the com m on need for biom etrics by both public and private sectors is raised as a critical starting point (CIC 2003:2). In the introduction to the report, a num ber of key points and conclusions are raised, notably echoing the fram ing o f the political space of biom etrics found in the literature. In particular, the dichotom y betw een security and privacy is deem ed false. Reinforcing the extent to w hich the politics of biom etrics is congruent w ith the space of the dataset, the report notes that: By the end of the Forum, m any if not m ost participants and presenters agreed that although there m ay be challenges with the use of biom etrics in som e contexts, there is nothing either inherently privacy-enhancing or privacy-lim iting about the use of biometrics. Biom etrics m ust therefore be looked at in the context of specific applications and their related data management environm ent. (CIC 2003: 5; em phasis added) The report's introduction goes on to stress the im portance of m anaging data in order to ensure accuracy and avoid abuse (CIC 2003: 6). Finally, the introduction plainly states that 'the status quo is not sustainable', hinting at the inevitable use of biom etric technologies w hich is expressed more explicitly later in the report and recurs throughout (CIC 2003: 5). Denis Coderre, the then M inister of Citizenship and Im m igration, focuses on the inevitability of biom etrics, suggesting that 'the biom etrics train has left the station' (CIC 2003: 11). A lthough M r Coderre highlights the am algam ation of public and private needs, notably identity th eft/frau d and security, freedom and privacy, an 'inevitability crisis' seem s persistent throughout the report. Echoing the com m itm ent in the biom etrics literature to fram ing the political space of biom etrics as the space of the database, the biom etrics forum report focuses on questions of inform ation managem ent. In the context of public policy analysis, the report cautions of a problem in the introduction, but nonetheless falls prey to it: 'It is im portant to make sure that policy im peratives are driving the developm ent of technology and not technology driving policy' (CIC 2003: 5). As the space of the

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database is produced as the political space of biom etrics, it would seem that questions associated with policy im plem entation precede considerations over agenda setting and problem definition. From both public and private perspectives, the general issue is 'terrorism ' and addressing the (in)security of borders and identities. However, these are general issues, and depending on subsequent problem definition, the appropriateness of biom etrics as a sufficient (re)solution is not altogether clear. M uch like the oft-cited exam ple of 'hom elessness', if the problem is defined as a lack of housing, rather than insufficient em ploym ent, or substance abuse, the sort of policy solution will be quite incapable of coping w ith other associated problem s. In the case of terrorism , if the problem is a lack of sufficient inform ation, rather than overt state-sponsored stigm atization of particular individuals, or the preservation of certain rights and privileges to specific individuals and the subsequent exclusion of others from these sets of rights and privileges, the appropriate policy response would again be m arkedly different. As the title of the forum report suggests, the preoccupation is with the im plications and applications of biom etrics questions of im plem entation - w hile prior questions of problem definition are assum ed, further reinforcing the inevitability crisis of biom etrics. As one of the forum participants, Gerry Van Kessel, notes: 'The question is not w hether to adopt biom etrics as it is too late to turn back the tide of biom etric technology; rather the issue now is how to m anage its applications' (CIC 2003: 21). The second point to the inevitability crisis w hich characterizes the biom etrics forum report is the preoccupation w ith the space of the database, echoing the biom etrics literature itself. Throughout the biom etrics forum report, m any of the invited experts and it should be noted that the question of 'invitations' was a controversial point in and of itself3 - focus on the space of the database. The keynote speaker, Dr Colin Soutar, focuses on issues of m anagem ent, security (encryption) and identification/verification. W hen asked about the role of biom etric technology in the war on terror, Dr Soutar is quick to once again return to the space of the database, suggesting that aside from deterrence and prevention of identity fraud, in the space of the database privileges and access can be revoked quickly to those considered to be threats or risks to security (and identity) (CIC 2003: 16). W hen considered in the international context, M artin Giles from the UK H om e O ffice speaks of the very concept of identity, suggesting that territoriality is an insufficient aspect o f identity since it is not unique. In contrast, the physical characteristics of the hum an body converted to binary codes produce a unique and distinctive identity (CIC 2003:17). Citing stream lined security clearance, fraud reduction and the prevention of 'm ultiple identities', Giles extols the virtues of biom etrics in m aintaining and 'secu ring' identity. The question of biom etrics politics and the space of the database reaches it 92

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zenith in the European Com m ission Directorate General Gillian Russell's discussion of EURO D AC, the European U nion-w ide biom etric database for tracking asylum requests (CIC 2003: 19). Russell notes the im portance of privacy and security, but again, such concerns are fram ed in the space of the database. Finally, Gerry Van Kessel - who, as the earlier quoted passage dem ­ onstrates, expresses the inevitability crisis as starkly as Denis C oderre's m etaphor of the biom etrics train already having left the station (CIC 2003: 21) - was also asked to consider the abuse of biom etrics. In particular, Van Kessel was asked to consider the history of the (ab)use of technologies that 'exacerbate inequalities' (CIC 2003: 24; also see M uller 2004). Again rem aining close to the space of the database, the response suggested that securing access (to inform ation, sp aces/p laces, etc.) to 'legitim ate people' and m inim izing abuse is the underlying principle of biom etrics in the first place.

Reflections on security and identity

In the biom etrics literature referred to here, and the recent forum report on the im plications and applications of biom etrics, the space of the database is consistently reinforced as the space of biom etrics politics. In both instances, the separation betw een public and private erodes, if not altogether withers away, in the space of biom etrics. A post-Septem ber 11 obsession w ith 'securing identity' has, through the political space of biom etrics, helped produce identity as physical characteristics translated into binary codes. N ot only is the line betw een public and private eroded, but the interests of security and identity also becom e congruous. In this context, considerations of privacy, liberty and freedom fail to be juxtaposed to the concerns of '(in)secure identity', and are instead subsum ed as principle m otivation for this securitizing move. As a recent Canadian Press article suggests, secure identity is becom ing integral to a nation's status as a 'First World N ation' (Bronskill 2004). H ere the question of exclusion in the politics of biom etrics is fram ed m ore widely than the sim ple exclusion of particular rights, privileges and individuals, but also (in)secure identity as a criteria in the hierarchy of nations. The ram ifications of the particular (co)construction of the space o f the database as the political space of biom etrics not only conflates security and identity, but also ends up (re)producing identity in this space of the database. As such, (secure) identity becom es a physical characteristic translated into binary code. Q uestions of privacy, freedom and liberty are then also transposed to this space of the database, w here the m anagem ent

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and integrity of inform ation, and subsequent stream lined (freer) m ovem ent address these concerns in the secured space of the database. As noted in the biom etrics forum report, the perceived dichotom y betw een security and p riv acy /lib erty does in fact prove to be false, as the (secure) space of the database (read: biom etrics politics) reads the securing - and subsequent (re)production - of identity as the direct resolution of questions o f liberty, security and identity. The im plication of this m ove is to push the politics of resistance outside of the space of the database, w hich, as the political space of biom etrics, tends to m align questions of the physical body and force resistance to the space of bodily m anipulation (physical harm).

Acknow ledgem ents

I w ish to thank all the participants at the State Borders and Border Policing w orkshop at Q ueen's University, Kingston, ON, 20 -2 2 A ugust 2004, for their helpful com m ents on this paper, with special thanks to M ark Salter and Elia Zureik for their com m ents and their efforts as w orkshop organizers. Also, thanks to A ntje W iener and Serena Kataoka for their com m ents and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

N otes 1 In this case, consider particularly the way in which debates regarding genetically modified food are framed. Debates regularly focus on questions of product labelling, etc., and it is only in this 'consumer space' and framed as such that deeper questions regarding cultural norms, ethical and moral considerations are entertained. 2 O f all texts consulted, only the Woodward Jr. et al., Army Biometric Applications, devotes more than a paragraph to questions of 'physical privacy', and it only spends two pages. 3 In particular, the decision not to invite - and some argue exclude - Ontario's information and privacy commissioner Ann Cavoukian, who happens to be a world expert on the field but also a critic of the proposed Canadian national identity card, and invite American lawyer Alan Dershowitz who has been an outspoken advocate of biometrics since 11 September 2001, as well as controversially advocating torture as an interrogation technique, suggests the forum participants were chosen with specific intention. On Dershowitz and torture, see Buckley Jr. 2002.

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R e fe re n c e s

Albert, M., Jacobson, D. and Lapid, Y. (eds) (2001) Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of M innesota Press). Ali, T. (2002) The Clash o f Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and M odernity (New York: Verso). Andreas, P. and Biersteker, T.J. (eds) (2003) The Rebordering o f North America: Integration and Exclusion in a Neiv Security Context (New York: Routledge). Beilharz, P., Robinson, G. and Rundell, J. (eds) (1992) Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity (Cam bridge, MA: The M IT Press). Bennett, C. and Grant, R. (eds) (1999) Visions o f Privacy: Policy Choices fo r the Digital A ge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). 'Biom etrics to be used to identify illegal im m igrants', H erald Sun, 11 February 2004. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .herald su n .n ew s.com .au / (accessed 12 February 2004). Booth, K. (1997) 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in M.C. Williams and K. Krause (eds) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (M inneapolis: University of M innesota Press), pp. 83-120. Bom em an, J. (1998) Subversions o f International Order (New York: SUN Y Press). Bronskill, J. (2004) 'Canada to introduce biom etric passports despite privacy concerns', National Post, 18 July 2004. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .can ad a. c o m /n atio n al/n ation alp o st/n ew s/sto ry .h tm l?id =2e3e0fd 2-3d 23-45b 9-b 2c645df52bdbf86 (accessed 20 July 2004). Buckley, Jr., W.F. (2002) 'Tortured thought', National Review Online, 29 January 2002. Available at: http://w w w .nationalreview .com /bu ckley/buckley012902.shtm l (accessed 4 June 2004). Caldas-Coulthard, C.R. and Coulthard, M. (eds) (1996) Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical D iscourse Analysis (London: Routledge). Carr, D. (2002) 'The Futility of Homeland Defense', The Atlantic M onthly, January* pp. 53-5. Chirillo, J. and Blaul, S. (2003) Im plementing Biometric Security (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc.). Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (2003) Biometrics: Implications and Applications fo r Citizenship and Immigration, Forum Report, 7 -8 O ctober 2003, Ottawa, ON, Canada. Davis, A. (1997) 'The Body as Passw ord', Wired M agazine, 5:7 (July). A vailable at: h ttp ://w w w .w ir e d .c o m /w ir e d /a rc h iv e/5 .0 7 /b io m e trics.h tm l ?pg=2& topic=& topic_set= (accessed 4 M arch 2004). Davis, J.R. (2000) Fortunes Warriors: Private Arm ies and the Nezu World Order (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre). Donnan, H. and Wilson, T.M. (1999) Borders: Frontiers o f Identity, Nation, and State (Oxford: Berg Press). Friedman, T. (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux). Fukuyam a, F. (1992) The End o f H istory and the Last M an (New York: Free Press).

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George, J. (1994) Discourses o f Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Howarth, D., Norval, A.J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds) (2000) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (M anchester: M anchester University Press). Klein, B. (1994) Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press). Leiss, W. (2004) 'Cultural Politics of Bio-Genetics', sem inar at Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture, 12 February 2004, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada. Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: M onitoring Everyday Life (Buckingham: Open U niversity Press). Lyon, D. (2003) Surveillance After Septem ber 11 (London: Polity). M ann, C. (2002) 'H om eland Insecurity', The Atlantic M onthly, September. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .th e atlan tic.co m /d o c/p re m /200209/m an n (accessed 24 October 2002). Muller, B J. (2004) '(Dis)Qualified Bodies: securitization, citizenship, and "identity m an agem en t"', Citizenship Studies, 8:3, pp. 279-94. Ohm ae, K. (1999) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Business). Pieterse, J.N . (1991) 'Fictions of Europe', Race & Class, 32:3, pp. 3-10. Salter, M. (2002) Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations (London: Pluto Press). Silverstein, K. (2000) Private Warriors (New York: Verso). Singer, P.W. (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f the Privatized M ilitary Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Troyer, L. (2003) 'Counterterrorism : sovereignty, law, subjectivity', Critical Asian Studies, 35:2, pp. 259-76. Walters, W. (2002) 'M apping Schengenland: denaturalizing t h e b o r d e r ', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 20, pp. 561-80. Wilson, J. (2004) 'Private security firms call for more firepower in com bat zone', The Guardian, 17 April 2004. Wilson, T.M. and Donnan, H. (eds) (1998) Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press). Woodward, Jr., J.D. (2001) Biometrics: Facing Up to Terrorism (Arroyo Centre, RAND). Woodward, Jr., J.D., Orlans, N.M. and Higgins, PT. (2003) Biometrics: Identity Assurance in the Information Age (New York: M cGraw-Hill). Woodward, Jr., J.D ., Webb, K.W., N ewton, E.M ., Bradley, M. and Rubenson, D. (2001) Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns (Arroyo Centre, RAND). Zureik, E. with contribution from K. H indle (2004) 'Governance, Security and Technology: the case of biom etrics', Studies in Political Economy, 73 (Sp ring/ Sum mer), pp. 113-37.

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Expanding surveillance: connecting biom etric inform ation systems to international police cooperation Nancy Lewis

C an ad ian new s stories grabbin g head line attention in recent years inclu ded the d ep ortation o f C an ad ian citizen M aher A rar to Syria, and Toronto Police C h ief Fan tin o's suggestions that all arrested persons have their D N A tested. Fan tin o also proposed that fingerp rints collected from persons suspected o f crim inal behav iou r be kept on file, ev en after charges have b een dropped! A t first glance these new s stories have little in com m on, save the inv olv em ent o f law -enforcem ent agencies. But the con nection betw een these stories is the focu s o f this chapter: exploring the chang in g en vironm en t o f policing in this culture o f surveillance (Staples 1997) or surveillance society (Lyon 2001). First, I should provide the loose threads o f the new s stories ju st m entioned . M r M aher A rar is a C an ad ian citizen b orn in Syria, w ho w orked in O ttaw a, C an ad a as a telecom m unications engineer. R eturning from a fam ily vacation in Tunisia in S ep tem ber 2002, he w as detained by U S officials w hile on a sched uled stop ov er in N ew York. U S officials alleged M r A rar has links to A l Q aeda. H e w as dep orted to Syria, ev en thou gh he carried a C an ad ian passport. In an interview w ith A llison Sm ith o f the C an adian B roadcasting C orp oration , Tom R idge, D irector of H om eland Secu rity in the U nited States, said: First o f all, I think w e need to dispel the notion that this w as an arbitrary d ecision on the p art o f our governm ent. T here w as sufficient inform atio n w ithin the international in telligence com m u nity about 97

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this individual that we felt w arranted his deportation back to one of - he had dual citizenship - two countries. The decision was made, based on that inform ation available through the global international intelligence com m unity to effect that outcom e.1 As a result of his deportation to Syria, M r A rar spent one year in a Syrian jail w here he was tortured. The issue being debated in Canada relates to the inform ation Canadian police and security agencies shared with A m erican officials. It appears that inform ation collected in Canada by Canadian law -enforcem ent and security agencies about Mr Arar - w ho was never charged or convicted of a crim inal incident - was entered into a database referred to as SCIS (security crim inal intelligence system ). This inform ation was subsequently shared with the FBI. The second new s report regarding Toronto Police C hief Fantino's lobbying for the retention of fingerprint inform ation and the further collection of DNA inform ation from suspects charged with lesser crim inal offences is a m arked change from current practices in Canada. Currently, retaining biom etric inform ation such as fingerprints and photographs follow ing crim inal charges under the Identification of Crim inals Act (1985) is only lawful after conviction for an indictable offence or under the Security of Inform ation Act. C hief Fantino's request flies in the face of current Canadian law, w hich requires inform ation identifying a person to be stored only after they have been convicted. A lthough the collection and storage of biom etric inform ation appears unrelated to the case of M r Arar, it is not. Both are connected through an analysis of the changing nature of social control in this post-industrial or post-m odern society, and the corresponding changes in policing evoked. As Western industrialized countries have entered a new period of social, political and econom ic developm ent, it is m arked by the im position of new m ethods of form alized social control. Form alized social control within state borders is the m andate of national law -enforcem ent agencies. The m ajor prem ise of this chapter is that law enforcem ent does not happen in a vacuum , but instead is responsive to the changing social, cultural, econom ic and political environm ent. As a result of these changes, the law -enforcem ent com m unity has incorporated new surveillance technologies and capacities to facilitate its form al m andate of social control. The changing nature of social control has included developing and applying technologies to enhance surveillance, and has increased dem ands for improved cooperation w ithin the law -enforcem ent com m unity in W estern industrialized dem ocracies. Consequently, social control in a surveillance society rests on the expanded capabilities of

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police to collect, save, analyse and share inform ation about citizens across international borders and betw een other national agencies, w hether or not these agencies were traditionally connected to law enforcem ent. Increasingly, the collection o f inform ation relates to inform ation about the body, such as DN A, facial recognition and fingerprints, all exam ples of biom etric inform ation. Consequently, changes in the social, political and econom ic environm ent of W estern industrialized countries have precipitated changes in the way policing is accom plished. This chapter exam ines observable changes in the delivery of lawenforcem ent services as new surveillance technologies and partnerships are incorporated to respond to changing national and international environm ents. It is exploratory, raising issues of interest that require further analysis. It does not pretend to cover the entire breadth of changes in law enforcem ent, but instead to offer a sam pling of som e of the more obvious patterns occurring in W estern Europe and N orth America.

Part I: Four them es building on existing literature

I begin by draw ing on previous literature exam ining surveillance societies that analysed im portant concepts useful to the current discussion of expanded surveillance technologies applied in policing. For instance, the grow th in surveillance societies rests on creating the body as an objective source of inform ation. Surveillance capacities that focus on the body institute m icro-techniques of disciplinary pow er that self-regulate behaviour to be docile and conform ist. H owever, new surveillance societies m aintain the sam e old, tired social hierarchies that privilege som e and deny social benefit to others. Facilitating social hierarchies is a process of social sorting m ade efficient by the linking of once-discrete inform ation system s into netw orks of inform ation that can generate and analyse inform ation for purposes not even rem otely close to the original purpose of inform ation collection. These four them es are: the body as a site of struggle, m icro-techniques of disciplinary power, social sorting and classification into social hierarchies, and leaky containers and assem blages. Applying these them es to the expanded use o f surveillance technologies and the sharing of inform ation by the law -enforcem ent com m unity provides insight into the accom plishm ent of social control given the trem endous social, political and econom ic changes. The body as a site o f struggle

Staples observes that the individual's body has becom e a site of struggle in w hich the body has becom e a source of inform ation about the individual. 99

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The body is being used to test truth claim s, and to m easure possible deviations from the norm . A ccording to Staples (1997: 4) the body is 'to be w atched, assessed and m anipulated'. For Staples (1997), the more frequent collection of inform ation from the body, to serve an increasing num ber of p u b lic/p riv ate functions, dem onstrates the diffusion of pow er and technology to decentralized, daily, local know ledge-gathering activities. Police C hief Fantino's quest to keep fingerprint inform ation and DNA sam ples of people not yet convicted o f a crim inal offence is an exam ple of disciplinary pow er extending our gaze to an increasing num ber of citizens and, again, using the body to reveal secrets. Nelkin and A ndrew s (1999) refer to the gradual expansion of genetic testing for DN A identification as 'surveillance creep'. Increasing num bers of people have their DNA on file, and its collection is no longer limited to those individuals found crim inally responsible for the m ost serious crim inal offences. In the United States, m ilitary personnel subm it a DNA sam ple, w hich can be released to a law -enforcem ent officer investigating a possible crim inal m atter involving the service member. People w ho give their DNA in a dragnet have their genetic m arkers stored in a DNA data bank available for law -enforcem ent inquiry. Prisoners in m any states convicted of property crim es m ust give up their DNA too. M arx (1988) predicted increased efficiency and reduced cost of the technology will lead to increased use of surveillance technologies. This is exactly the case w ith the collection of DNA. DNA collection has gained popularity as the technology required for collection has becom e less com plex, less physically invasive and less costly, and requires less know ledge and skill to use. M icro-tech niq ues o f disciplinary pow er

M icro-techniques of disciplinary pow er evoke im ages of the panopticon. The architectural design of Bentham 's prison, the panopticon subjected the inm ate to continuous observation by the 'k eep er'. The pow er of the panopticon design is that the inm ates never know w hether they are being observed, but m ust assum e they are and adjust their behaviour to conform. In this way, inm ates w atch them selves, by internalizing the gaze of the keeper. It is the random ness of screening that creates the self-disciplining docile body. M icro-techniques of disciplinary pow er are exercised 'continuously, autom atically and anonym ously' (Staples 1997: 25). The principle of the panopticon has been incorporated in m any contem porary form s of surveillance, such as random drug tests. D isciplinary pow er is achieved as individuals conform their behaviour 100

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so that their body does not reveal their secrets. Because the screening cerem onies have becom e enm eshed in our daily routines, the need to give up our bodily fluids is infrequently questioned, continuing the dis­ ciplinary regim e that is autom atic and anonym ous. However, the 'gaze' has m oved far beyond those found guilty of crim inal offences. Prisoners or those legally defined as deviants are no longer the only group asked to offer up their bodily fluids. Discipline has diffused throughout society so that now countless groups and individuals fall into generalized surveillance regim es. M any m inim um w age, service sector jobs require a urine sam ple for the applicant as a condition of em ploym ent. M any high school athletes have to provide a urine sam ple, and teachers in New York state m ust subm it their fingerprints before em ploym ent. The 'k eep er' is no longer necessarily a public em ployee w hose purpose is to protect society. Instead, current surveillance technologies are used by a range of different public and private agencies to 'gaze' at an increasing num ber of societal m em bers, to create docile consum ers, students, em ployees, aid recipients and citizens. Consequently, disciplinary pow er transform s and im proves the body to becom e obedient. Disciplinary pow er effectively achieves social control by creating the body as docile, rendering the 'individual m anageable, subm issive, teachable ... and pliable' (Staples 1997: 27). So cia l sorting

The above exam ples suggest that disciplinary pow er has diffused throughout the community, w ith teachers, students and the working class equally subjected to its disciplinary gaze. But that is not the case as Staples (1997, 2000) and Lyon (2001, 2003) warn. Increased use of surveillance technologies raises im portant concerns about equality in its application of social control. Staples (1997: 6) m akes the im portant point that historically and cross-culturally, social control experienced by individuals and groups has varied depending on such characteristics as race, ethnicity, class and gender. H ier's (2003: 409) exam ination of poor, single w om en receiving social assistance confirm s that the application of new surveillance technologies contributes to the 'reinforcem ent of already existing social fractures'. A bstracted from Staples, and specifically evaluated in Hier, w e see that the new system s of surveillance developed from , and rem ain connected to, 'early m odern' system s of surveillance that w ere designed to 'coordinate and control populations' (H ier 2003: 403). The social need to control populations is a product of social and cultural forces. Sim ilarly, Lyon (2003) explains the problem s w ith increased surveillance 101

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relating to social processes o f hum an d ecision m aking. Su rveillance tech nologies are d esigned and im plem ented to d iscrim in ate betw een social groups, to collect, categorize and evaluate. Lyon (2003) refers to this process as social sorting. L yon's (2001: 4) con cep t o f social sorting describes the differential outcom es that result from categorizin g groups o f people, 'su rv eillan ce capacities are used to sort and sift popu lations, to categorize and to classify, to enhan ce the life chances o f som e and to retard those o f others'. A s a social process, the entire system o f surveillance - from the need to w atch, select, collect and cod e inform ation, to evalu atin g the inform ation and the p o w er im bued in the inform ation ou tp u t - reproduces social categories. Social categories of risk, and social hierarchies m easured against a m odel of the p rivileged , w hite, m id dle-aged , m id d le-class m ale allow ju d g em ents to be m ad e abou t ind ividu als and groups that include or exclu d e them from social, p olitical o r econ om ic benefits. Le ak y co n ta in ers a n d assem blages

R elated to his v ery im p ortan t observation con necting surv eillance to social sortin g and inequality, Lyon (2001) m ore fully d evelops Stap les' (1997) exam in ation o f the d iffu sion o f surv eillance practices and flow s of inform ation. Staples correctly d ism isses the 'B ig B ro th er' p hen om enon in that there is no cen tralized , hierarchical pow er w atching and recording ou r every action. H ow ever, Staples (1997) does n o t con tin ue in his analysis o f the d iffu sion o f pow er to arrive at the d ecentralized , local know led ge -gath erin g activities. L yon's (2001) analysis o f 'leaky con tain ers' picks up the d iscon nected pieces of apparen tly discrete pools o f inform ation and argues the trend in surveillance societies is to m ove inform ation m ore freely betw een once d iscrete inform ation d atabases held b y institutions. Inform ation collected for one p u rpose can be used for en tirely different purposes. Sim ilarly, H aggerty and E ricson (2000) use the con cept o f assem blages to recognize loose con nections betw een these p rev iously d iscrete inform ation- and d ata-gathering system s o f surveillance. T heir idea of the em ergent su rv eillant assem blage theorizes the need of surveillance to bring these once discrete com p onent parts into w ider, integrated system s. For H aggerty and E ricson (2000), it is not the b od y in its totality that is the focus o f surveillance tech nologies; rather, the bod y is dissected into various data flow s, assem blages. C onsequently, parts of the body, digitized in leaky con tain ers, w ill be reassem bled in a w id er netw orked system . Like Staples (1997) and Lyon (2001), H aggerty and E ricson (2000) em ph asize the d ecentralized nature o f surveillance. There is no 102

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centralized pow er directing, controlling or storing inform ation. Instead, inform ation system s are loosely connected and unstable. Surveillant assem blages connect once discrete system s, such as state agencies, with other public or private inform ation bases. For instance, H ier's (2003) w ork that exam ined w elfare services in O ntario dem onstrated the 'effectiveness' o f the surveillant assem blage as aid recipients' financial inform ation was verified through the use of incom e tax returns (from a federal database), student loans and other w elfare benefits (from various provincial databases). Social control does not require a centralized panopticon. Instead, social control creating self-regulating docile bodies can happen through a more localized netw orking of inform ation system s (social sorting). A ssem blages, connecting leaky containers, can have an effect sim ilar to that o f Bentham 's totally closed environm ent o f the panopticon prison.

Part 2: Policing and social change

The discussion in Part 2 of the article records observable changes in the techniques and delivery of policing services as a result of changes driven by surveillance societies. Law enforcem ent and the regulation of norm s do not happen in a vacuum or w ithin the sole discretion of the policing community. Instead, policing occurs w ithin an environm ent influenced by political, econom ic and social pressures, and these are increasingly global. Political pressures include the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 Septem ber 2001. Repeatedly, C anada's im m igration and law -enforcem ent policies have been identified as potential threats to Am erican security. For instance, as US A m bassador Paul Celucci prepared to leave his diplom atic post in Canada, he warned Canadians '" i t is inevitable terrorists will attem pt to use Canada as a base to strike the U nited States" and urged Canadians not to be com placent about the threat global terrorism poses to the continent ... [He further argued] "It is inevitable that terrorists would look to Canada as a potential launching pad to get into the U S " ' (Dawson and Fife 2005). Econom ic pressures affecting policing include the liberalization of trade. Increasing liberalization of m arkets has created new opportunities for crim e. Crim e and crim inals are no longer restricted to one geographic area. Instead, they transcend national borders, finding opportunity for crim e around the globe. The global m ovem ent of illegal im m igrants is a good exam ple of the ability of crim inals to forge alliances to com m it crim es in response to m arket pressures. For instance, a m arket exists in various

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industrialized countries for cheap, disposable labour (Bales 2004). Other countries have a surplus o f labour and the resulting wretched conditions for people with no ability to m ake an incom e. Supply meets dem and, and through a series o f m ovem ents, illegal im m igrants are transported around the globe. The adoption of surveillance technologies and the sharing of inform ation with outside agencies, som e of w hich are only rem otely involved in law enforcem ent, necessitate a cultural and operational change in policing. Police culture has generally reinforced an insular police agency, responding with suspicion to outside agencies' requests for cooperation and inform ation sharing. In a speech delivered at the Departm ent of N ational Defence conference on N etw ork Enabled O perations, Royal C anadian M ounted Police (RCM P) Com m issioner Zaccardelli (2004) noted the changing dem ands of policing have to overcom e the traditional police culture: Police culture - like m ilitary culture - overtly and deliberately creates a sense of higher calling. A bond betw een the m en and w om en who w ork the front line that is unique and pow erful. The trouble is, those sam e rom antic - although adm ittedly effective - notions d on't blend easily with this new idea that w e are in fact inter-dependent, inter­ connected and need to share power, resources and even operations w ith other organizations. Reiner (2000: 91) describes a core cultural characteristic of police culture as police suspicion, w hich operationally leads to stereotyping. The police cultural value of suspicion is closely linked to police racism. Through the developm ent of a classification system that allow s police officers to contrast the norm al with the exceptional, police officers hold very rigid stereotypical view s of the 'norm al' functioning of society. A ccording to Reiner (2000: 91), 'the particular categories inform ing [police suspiciousness and stereotyping] tend to be ones that reflect the structure of pow er in society'. C onsistent w ith surveillance practices such as social sorting, the police cultural characteristic of suspicion w orks to allow police in surveillance societies to categorize and classify populations and individuals by their perceived level of risk and suspicion. The grow ing culture of surveillance (Staples 1997) or surveillance societies (Lyon 2001) is a trend w atched closely by the police. Police budget spending on inform ation technology and inform ation m anagem ent (ITIM ) has grow n tremendously. The RCM P currently spends 12 per cent of its total budget ($3 billion) on ITIM. Police are lobbying for changes in law and policy that allow them to collect, store and share inform ation.

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Toronto P olice C h ief Fan tin o's p u rpose in speaking to the m edia about his requ est to retain in d iv id u als' biom etric inform ation is d esigned to ed u cate the voters about the police need for this inform ation, w hile also p lacing his requ est on the p olitical agenda in O ttaw a. E xam ining external p olice behaviou r allow s us to m ake assu m ptions and pred ictions about future d irections in the role o f police in securing social control. W hat d irection w ill social control by p olice take as they ad opt and apply new surv eillance technologies to respond to the grow ing internal and external pressures to reduce risk and enhan ce secu rity in their d om estic ju risd iction s? A review o f trends p u rsu ed by W estern ind ustrialized dem ocracies does not provide a clear picture, w ith som e trends ind icatin g a centralized , 'B ig B ro th er', panop ticon style o f social control, such as those pursued by European U nion nation states, w hile other trends ind icate p olice surv eillance w ill take on a m ore d ecentralized con figuration, such as theorized by H aggerty and Erikson (2000) and Lyon (2001). The assem blages linking leaky con tain ers w ill focus on n etw ork in g national public and priv ate data banks across v arious sectors beyond solely law -enforcem ent inform ation, characteristic o f the current N orth A m erican approach. T he rem aind er o f the d iscu ssion w ill focus analysis on the central issue o f im portance, p red icting the future direction of law enforcem ent in its pow erfu l role o f ad m inistering social control. C losely associated w ith this is the second con cern , to w hat exten t lawenforcem ent agencies w ill intervene in bodily integrity in their quest to collect biom etric inform ation. C e n tra lize d surveillance (p a n o p tico n )

The underlying assu m ption o f the cen tralized surv eillance ap proach is that the risks to d om estic secu rity com e from beyond the nation state's bord er and , as a result, cannot be ad dressed b y trad itional m ethod s of con trolling societal m em bers. Su ch an ap p roach recognizes the global m o v em en t o f bod ies and good s that is beyond the cap acity o f any one nation state to control. In fact, in a global econ om y the international m o v em en t o f good s and bod ies is a positive thing. R isks to dom estic secu rity identified b y those w ho favour a centralized ap proach to surveillance to achieve social control inclu de international terrorism and organized crim e. T he cen tralized approach to enhan ced surveillance has focused on d ifferent d im ensions in E urope than it has in N orth A m erica. In Europe a m ore centralized ap p roach has d om inated, given the form ation o f a com m on social, econom ic and p olitical id entity w ithin the E uropean U nion. T h e Treaty on E uropean P olitical and M onetary U nion (the Treaty of M aastricht) cam e into force on 1 N ovem ber 1993. T he Treaty ushered in

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a new set of challenges for policing and security am ong the European m em ber states. A ccording to the Treaty, 'every citizen is free to m ove and reside freely within the territory of the m em ber states' (Convey and Kupiszew ski 1995: 939). However, the challenge is to control the m ovem ent of the approxim ately eight m illion non-EU citizens m oving betw een m em ber states (Convey and Kupiszew ski 1995: 943). Two centralized surveillance system s were instituted by European Union m em bers in an attem pt to control im m igration from third countries and curtail the spread of crim e beyond individual states. The first centralized system of control is Europol, a system o f police inform ation exchange available to European Union m em ber states. It cam e into force on 1 O ctober 1998 and becam e operational on 1 July 1999 (European Report 2004: 408). A ctivities of interest to Europol include 'drugs-trafficking, hum antrafficking, child pornography, m oney-laundering, Euro-counterfeiting, cyber crim e, environm ental crim e, terrorism and racism ' (European Report 2004: 408-9). Schengen Inform ation System is the second centralized surveillance system used by the European U nion to control m obile bodies into and through its jurisdiction. In 1985, the leaders of the nine European C om m unity countries signing the Schengen Accord seeking a unified Europe sought not ju st 'free trade', but also the unim peded m ovem ent between m em ber states for the approxim ately 250 m illion residents (Evans 1994: 38). As a result, the Schengen Inform ation System (SIS) was created to facilitate police and custom s cooperation in a border-free Europe. SIS is defined 'as a databank for the purposes of tracing crim inals, suspects, aliens reported for non-adm ission, and others' (den Boer, quoted in W arren 1992: 28). In 2002 it was reported that 10 m illion people were listed in the SIS. M ost entries w ere related to forged or stolen passports or identity cards. As w ell, 1.3 m illion convicted and suspected crim inals are flagged on its alert system (European Report 2002: 481). The second-generation Schengen Inform ation System is under developm ent. On 26 O ctober 2004, a deal was signed with a m ulti­ national technology consortium to deliver the future Visa Inform ation System (VIS) and the next generation of SIS. It is anticipated that the second-generation SIS system will be in operation by M arch 2007, and the VIS by the end of 2006. It is notable that the new generation of SIS will be able to bank biom etric inform ation, m aking the job o f identifying individuals easier. Dr Frank Paul, Head of Unit, Large Scale IT System s, European Com m ission, Director General Justice and Hom e Affairs recom m ends that biom etric identifiers collected and stored should include a digitized facial im age and the m andatory printing of two fingers.2 A dopting standardized biom etric identifiers will verify that the

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visa docum ents belong to the person holding them. This represents an interesting trend in the developm ent of new generations of centralized surveillance technologies. A lthough there is a great deal of interest in these new inform ation system s from the perspective o f im m igration and m igration control, these new system s will not solve the law -enforcem ent challenges facing the European Union. These challenges stem from the rem oval of borders betw een the m em ber states, as well as the challenges faced by all nations from an increasing globalized m arket structure. The European countries have not been as successful in integrating and sharing law -enforcem ent inform ation as they been have in sharing im m igration-related inform ation. Currently, there is an interest am ong EU m em ber states to develop a structure to w ork m ore cooperatively w ith other EU police agencies. However, a num ber of obstacles were identified by police inform ation technology professionals representative of the various European police agencies that prevent inform ation sharing and cooperation.’ Issues include: • ow nership and control of inform ation • shared language (the EU recognizes 20 official languages) • lack of a structure to bring police inform ation technology groups together to discuss the issues • lack of political com m itm ent and lack of cooperation at various levels • lack of interest by industry vendors • lack of a standard system • lack of resources • culture of policing (unless the end u se r/p o lice officer is involved there is no buy-in and the end user needs to w ork with other partners to prioritize their needs) • difference in laws betw een countries Solutions recom m ended by conference participants provide a way forward for cooperation and inform ation sharing betw een police agencies w ithin the EU, but also indicate the infancy of structured cooperative relationships in law enforcem ent:4 • develop running • develop • produce contact)

a directory of national and international data services and applications a w eb-based com m unity to share inform ation an organizational contact list (form alized social netw orks for

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• •

develop a central help desk select a sp onsor group such as Europol or the Police C ooperative W orking G roup to hold form al m eetings to develop the n ext steps

N o rth A m e rica n assem blages

Sim ilar pressures for police coop eration beyond natio n al bord ers are bein g felt in N orth A m erica. The law -enforcem ent com m u nity in N orth A m erica is d riven to inform ation and in telligence sharing b y the shared assu m p tion that, 'Sch olars, m ilitary analysts and p o licy experts agree: it isn 't a m atter o f IF another large scale terrorist assau lt w ill occu r in N orth A m erica or Europe ... it is only a qu estion o f W H E N ' (Z accardelli 2004). Follow in g the terrorist attacks of 11 S ep tem ber 2001, pressures for integration and coop eration betw een C an ad ian and A m erican law enforcem ent intensified. A s R C M P C om m ission er G iu liano Z accard elli stated in a speech on 1 D ecem ber 2004, 'In a global secu rity environm ent, our con cern is no longer only the protection o f bord ers ... The lines of d istin ction betw een d om estic and international obligations have begu n to blur.' Further, o utgoin g U S A m bassad o r Paul C elucci w arned that 'Secu rity tru m ps trad e' (D aw son and Fife 2005). C an ad a has had to w ake up to the fact that 'w e sleep n ext to an elephant! O ur culture, ou r security, ou r econom y, even our identity, are un avoid ably affected b y A m erica's influ ence' (Z accardelli 2004). C onsequently, C an ad a and the U nited States are coop erating on a nu m ber of projects that increase info rm atio n flow betw een law enforcem ent and the in telligence com m unity. C om m ission er Z accard elli has m u sed that it is 'o n ly a m atter o f tim e until the global law enforcem ent com m u nity utilizes integrated D N A banks, b ord er secu rity system s, even shared crim inal reco rd s' (Z accard elli 2004). Currently, how ever, coop eration betw een the A m erican and C an adian law -enforcem ent com m u nities is less characteristic o f the E uropean U nion centralized approach and m ore reflective o f localized n etw orks partnered to respond to a particular need. A s the follow ing exam ples o f w o rkin g p artn ersh ips d em onstrate, there is a ran ge of assem blages sharing inform ation betw een C an ad ian and A m erican law enforcem ent. In a d dition , there are also assem blages linking inform ation betw een once d iscrete n ational agencies. E xam p les o f N orth A m erican police coop eratio n inclu de Integrated Border Enforcem ent Team s and p rotocols to share fingerp rint inform ation betw een A m erican and C an ad ian p olice agencies. A lth ou gh C a n a d a /U S Integrated Border E nforcem ent Team s (IBET) w ere originally d eveloped in 1996 to address cross-bord er crim es along the A m erican and C an adian w est coast, IBETs h ave increased in frequ ency 108

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and im portance. Currently there are fifteen geographical regions with IBETs operating. The IBET m odel is designed to create partnerships am ong A m erican and Canadian police agencies at the local, state, provincial and federal levels to respond to crim es that profit from cross-border relations, such as sm uggling of illegal drugs, w eapons, liquor, tobacco, m igrants and vehicles. IBETs facilitate the sharing of inform ation betw een Canadian and US police and law enforcem ent. Increased and sustained funding of IBETs is one of the m easures im plem ented by Canada to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem ber 2001. The RCM P received $135 m illion dollars dedicated to IBETs to continue partnerships with A m erican law enforcem ent through 2005-6.5 A second exam ple of increased structured inform ation sharing between Canadian and US law enforcem ent is the cooperation betw een the FBI and the RCM P to exchange inform ation related to 'persons of interest'. This is done through the exchange of biom etric inform ation from fingerprint identification. This exchange of inform ation protocol is currently limited to specified people w ithin each agency. That is, the officer on the street in Chicago, for exam ple, cannot query the Canadian Police Inform ation System directly, but m ust follow an established protocol that links his or her request through specific individuals w ithin the FBI and RCMP. In addition to program m es and projects to increase police cooperation beyond national borders, there is increasing interest and activity in the linking of leaky containers nationally, w ithin both Canada and the United States. The C anadian program m e of Integrated N ational Security Enforcem ent Teams (INSET)" is an exam ple of assem blages such as those H aggerty and Ericson (2000) and Lyon (2001) describe. The form alization or creation of a structure to share inform ation and analysis of intelligence am ong such leaky containers as the RCMP, Canada Border Services A gency (CBSA), Citizenship and Im m igration Canada (CIC), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and provincial and m unicipal police sendees is an exam ple of the pooling of inform ation. In addition, the RCMP, under the guidance o f the N ational Security Policy, is forging stronger alliances with the Departm ent of N ational Defence. The form ation of the US Custom s and Border Protection agency, centralizing the operations of US Custom s, US Im m igration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the US Border Patrol under the authority of the Departm ent of H om eland Security occurred as the result of the terrorist attacks of 9 /1 1 . The single, unified border agency is an exam ple of the form alization and securing of once discrete pools of inform ation. As a centralized agency, the US Custom s and Border Protection agency has access to vast am ounts of surveillance technology and inform ation from A dvance Passenger Inform ation System (APIS),

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to the Office of Intelligence and the N ational Targeting Center. The US Custom s and Border Protection agency is an exam ple of linking inform ation betw een once discrete agencies. However, in this case m ore than ju st inform ation was linked to create greater efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the agency's mandate. The exam ple of the US Custom s and Border Protection agency questions the notion of linking leaky containers and assem blages that are by their nature localized and decentralized. Perhaps centralization of public agencies with shared m andates, not ju st form alized agreem ents for inform ation sharing betw een decentralized or localized agencies, is the future direction of law enforcem ent.

Conclusions

This chapter applied concepts from the surveillance literature and found that policing in both the N orth Am erican context and W estern Europe is responding to the changing political, econom ic and social environm ent of the post-m odern society by developing protocols and program m es to link police inform ation beyond the level o f the individual agency, including to police agencies beyond national borders. There are trends operating in law enforcem ent predicted by the surveillance literature. For instance, the surveillance literature places great im portance on exam ining the body as a site of struggle. This chapter agrees that current law -enforcem ent practice and future trends indicate that the body is under siege. In fact, increasing collection and uses o f biom etric inform ation are being planned for future generations of inform ation system s. Surveillance creep is the reality, as surveillance technology becom es less com plex and less expensive, and continues to disperse into the community. The fact that there is no agreem ent am ong various national agencies regarding a standard biom etric indicator does not appear to be a stum bling block. Som e in the law -enforcem ent field predict we will have a m ulti-biom etric environm ent and develop ITIM to w ork in this environm ent. It rem ains to be seen w hether or not the increase in the use of biom etrics shared betw een once discrete agencies will have the effect of creating self­ regulating docile bodies. For that to occur, people would have to know the extent o f the networked inform ation about them, flow ing between agencies and across international borders. There is room here for further research to exam ine m icro-techniques of discipline across different populations, such as crim inal offenders who have their DNA stored, or consum ers who have their credit and financial inform ation profiled and widely available to other com m ercial enterprises. Will this shape their future decision m aking or behaviour?

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M ore research is needed to determ ine how the core cultural characteristic of police suspicion is used to sort and categorize individuals and groups. Even more im portant is the question o f w hether or not police agencies across international borders using the sam e inform ation will define characteristics o f suspicious persons similarly. A fter all, definitions and societal responses to deviance change over time, and betw een different societies. The chapter revealed m any instances in w hich law -enforcem ent agencies in N orth A m erica and W estern Europe have instituted protocols and program m es to collect and share inform ation from once discrete inform ation pools. However, the current review indicates that there is not one preferred netw orking or partnership arrangem ent. Instead, som e arrangem ents fit Lyon's (2001) m odel of social sorting characterized by loosely netw orked protocols, w hile others reveal a more centralized partnership such as the European experience or the creation of the US Custom s and Border Protection agency. Configurations of leaky containers or centralized surveillance system s will depend on a num ber of factors, including the legislative and political environm ent in the countries of inform ation origin and destination. The clear conclusion from a discussion of these law -enforcem ent inform ation-sharing program m es and protocols is that the changing social, political and econom ic environm ent has resulted in changes to traditional police operations. Traditional police culture characterized by the statem ent 'The way things get done around here' has been noticeably im pacted by the changing requirem ents of social control and the availability of surveillance technologies. Will there be a globalized DNA data bank in the future, one centralized police force for the European Union, or a totally integrated police system in N orth A m erica? We are not there yet, and given the challenges identified by leaders in police inform ation technology in Europe, w e are a long way off from such panoptic visions. However, given the lightning speed of inform ation technology developm ent, such possibilities m ay be available before the political and social environm ents have planned for it.

N otes 1 2

3

Source: Interview with Allison Smith, CBC, 3 October 2003. Available at: http: / / www.cbc.ca / new s/background / arar Presentation by Dr Frank Paul, AGIS Programme, 'Police Information Technology Co-Operation in an enlarged European Union', Wednesday 19 May 2004. Workshop on AGIS Programme, 'Police Information Technology Co-Operation in an enlarged European U nion', Friday 21 May 2004.

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4 5 6

Workshop on AGIS Programme, 'Police Information Technology Co-Operation in an enlarged European U nion', Friday 21 M ay 2004. Source: http://w w w .rcm p -grc.gc.ca/secu rity /ibets_e.htm Source: h ttp ://w w w .rcm p -g rc.ca/security/insets_e.htm

R e fe re n c e s

Bales, K. (2004) D isposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Los Angeles: University of California Press). Convey, A. and Kupiszewski, M. (1995) 'Keeping up with Schengen: m igration and policy in the European U nion', International M igration Review, 29:4, pp. 939-64. Dawson, A. and Fife, R. (2005) 'D on't Lose Fear of Terrorists, U.S. Envoy Cellucci W arns', The Ottawa Citizen, M onday 7 February 2005, p. A5. European Report (2002) 'Justice and H om e Affairs: Council M oves to Add Al-Qaeda M em bers to Schengen Information System ', 26 June 2002, p. 481. European Report (2004) 'Justice and Home Affairs: Data Exchanges with Europol Up by 39% in 2003', 7 July 2004, p. 408. Evans, D. (1994) 'Bordering on the Ridiculous (developm ent of Schengen Information System )', Computer Weekly, 24 March 1994, pp. 38-42. Haggerty, K. and Ericson, R. (2000) 'The Surveillant Assem blage', British Journal o f Sociology, 51:4, pp. 605-22. Hier, S.P. (2003) 'Probing the Surveillant Assemblage: on the dialectics of surveillance practices as processes or social control', Surveillance and Society, 1:3, pp. 399-411. Lyon, D. (2003) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination (New York: Routledge). Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: M onitoring Everyday Life (Buckingham: Open U niversity Press). M arx, G. (1988) 'D o M onitoring Technologies Threaten Em ployee Privacy Rights?' Editorial Research Reports, 2:12, p. 489. Nelkin, D. and Andrews, L. (1999) 'D N A Identification and Surveillance Creep', Sociology o f Health and Illness, 21:5, pp. 689-706. Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics o f the Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Staples, W.G. (2000) Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Postmodern Life (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield Publishers). Staples, W.G. (1997) The Culture o f Surveillance: Discipline and Social Control in the United States (New York: St M artin's Press). Warren, P. (1992) 'Continental Cop-out', Computer Weekly, 8 O ctober 1992, pp. 26-8. Zaccardelli, G. (2004) Speech-Cooperation and Coordination in the Nezu Security Environment, Departm ent of National Defence Netw ork Enabled Operations: Ottawa). Available at: h ttp ://w w w .rcm p -grc.gc.ca/sp eech es/sp _n ew _ security_e.htm

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C h a p te r 8

W hat happens when you book an airline ticket? The collection and processing of passenger data post-9/1 I Colin J. Bennett

In 1999 I w rote a paper with a sim ilar title (Bennett 1999) based on a series of case studies for the European Com m ission on the collection, processing and dissem ination of personal data by m ulti-national businesses, including the international airline industry (Raab et al. 1998). The paper traced the flows of data from the time of booking an airline ticket, through the check-in process, to the flight and the land ing.1 The case study exam ined the flow s of data through an increasingly com plex series of scenarios concerning the identity and tastes of the traveller, his 'frequent flyer status' and the nature of the ticketed route. The study allowed me to draw som e tentative generalizations about the practices of typical international air carriers w ith regard to the processing of personal inform ation, the characteristics of the larger surveillance netw ork and the prospects for international regulation. At the tim e of writing, little attention w as paid to personal data protection issues by the airline industry. It was then difficult to find interested or expert officials w ithin the m ajor airlines who could provide accurate descriptions of the personal inform ation processing practices of the industry. Few com panies had appointed C hief Privacy O fficers and few had explicit codes of practice. It was also difficult to find know ledgeable people from the com m unity of outside activists and regulators w ho had paid m uch attention to the issue. There has, however, been a dram atic increase in the attention paid to the personal

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data processing activities of the airline industry since 11 Septem ber 2001. P assenger N am e Record (PNR) data has been aggressively sought by US and international law -enforcem ent agencies as the basis o f pilot projects for passenger profiling system s. This has caused a m ajor transatlantic row betw een the Europeans and the US over the legality (under the EU 's 1995 Data Protection Directive) of transferring such data to the US for processing, given the presum ed 'inadequacy' of A m erican privacy protection standards. In addition, the construction of Advanced Passenger Inform ation (API) databases and the introduction of trusted traveller system s, often accom panied by biom etric identifiers, have brought the question of the processing of travel data sharply into profile. This paper attem pts to update the earlier 1999 version in light of developm ents since 9 /1 1 .2 Again, this paper eschew s abstraction in favour o f a very detailed em pirical description of 'w hat happens when you do indeed book an airline ticket'. It describes two scenarios, both based on recent personal experience. The first outlines the relatively sim ple trip that I took to attend the conference at w hich the first draft of this article was presented: a flight via one airline (Air Canada) within one country (Canada, from Victoria, British Colum bia to Toronto, Ontario, w ith onward flights to Kingston and O ttaw a, Ontario). It outlines the personal inform ation practices of the booking process, the check-in process, and the frequent flyer program m e. At each stage, I have tried to discover w hat inform ation about me is collected by whom , for how long it is retained, and who m ight have access to it. A second scenario takes the onward leg of m y journey to New York rather than to O ttaw a, and investigates how current and future changes in the rules of Canadian and US border control agencies have affected the flows of personal data about me. A lthough the paper concludes w ith som e reflections of a more theoretical nature, it is explicitly based on som e firm assum ptions about how w e should be studying the 'everyday' nature and im plications of personal surveillance system s (Lyon 2001). I am critical of som e of the literature on the surveillance (or privacy) im plications of inform ation and com m unications system s and networks. The analysis of social or individual risk is often based on exaggerated claim s about the potential for the linkage and com m unication o f personal data, on extrapolations about surveillance potential from highly abnorm al cases, and on hypotheses about w hat roles new technologies m ight perform in the abstract, with very little grounded analysis of its role in real, dysfunctional organizations w ithin which fallible but m ainly w ell-intentioned individuals m ake choices and decisions. 'O ur physical bodies are being shadow ed by an increasingly com prehensive data body', asserts Felix

W h a t happens when you b ook an airline ticket?

Stald er in his critiqu e o f p riv acy in the very first issues o f Surveillance and Society (Stald er 2002). Perhaps, but is it possible to observe this body of data? C an one find o n e's 'd ig ital perso n a' (C larke 1994)? The com m on assu m ptions in the literature are that o n e's 'd ata shad ow ' is becom in g m ore latent, com prehen sive, integrated , finely tuned, and thus m ore perniciou s. Throu gh this very narrow , and hardly generalizable, case stud y based on the 'p o litics o f personal exp erien ce' I w ish to raise som e searching question s abou t these and other assu m p tions w ithin the surv eillance literature.

V ic to ria -T o ro n to -K in g s to n -T o ro n to -O tta w a -T o ro n to -V ic to ria The reservation

A irline flights can be reserved in one o f fou r w ays: first, d irectly from the airlin e's ow n reservation system (by phone o r at its w ebsite); second , through a travel agen t w ho w ill have access to international com puterized reservation system s or global d istribution system s (G D S);3 third, if rew ard points are bein g used, through the toll-free nu m ber or w eb site associated w ith the airlin e's frequ en t flyer program m e; and fourth, ov er the Internet, through services such as w w w .travelocity.com , w w w .exped ia.com or w w w .trav elport.com . O n 24 Ju n e 2 0 0 4 ,1 follow ed the instruction s o f the conference organizers and reserved return flights from V ictoria to K ingston w ith onw ard con nections to O ttaw a through a local travel agen cy based in K ingston, O ntario. A ll C an adian travel agen cies are n o w covered by eith er federal or p rovincial p riv acy legislation, and should be d evelopin g their ow n p riv acy policies and ap p ointing p riv acy p rotection officers. It seem s, how ever, that only the larger agen cies, such as Thom as C ook, have taken these initiatives.4 The A ssociation o f C an ad ian Travel A gencies (ACTA) also provides gu idance con cern in g o blig ations under the new legislation, although the professional standards prom ulgated by A CTA have yet to incorporate p riv acy protection.5 T hu s, no agen cy should be revealing inform ation in m y custom er profile to any bod y else (w ithout m y consent) unless it is for the express pu rpose o f reserving travel arrangem en ts for m e / or is otherw ise required b y law. Like m any C an ad ian travel agents, this one used the G alileo reservation system to book m y flight and collected m y nam e, address, e-m ail, credit card nu m ber and A eroplan frequ en t flyer num ber. Travel agencies pay an annual fee to G alileo for access to this system , and for the presum ed convenience, speed and possible cost savings to their clients. G alileo International, Inc. is one of the leading global d istribution system s (GD S).

Global Surveillance and Policing

T heir services con n ect approxim ately 44,000 travel agency locations to 470 airlines, 24 car rental com panies, 56,000 hotel properties, 430 tour operators and all m ajor cruise lines throu gh ou t the w orld. Located in G reenw ood V illage, near Denver, C olorad o, G alileo 's Data C enter handles, on average, over 175 m illion requests for inform ation per day. A t peak tim es the com pany processes m ore than 2,915 m essages per second .7 G D Ss like G alileo are the central repository for vast am ou nts of inform ation related to an in d iv id u al's travel. They are the central hubs w hich link all providers o f travel services. T hey play a sim ilar role to that played by the credit bureaus in relation to the financial industry (H asbrou ck 2004). Thus, w hen a prospective traveller d iscloses air travel p lans to a travel agent, the agent enters the data into the G alileo system , eith er via an encryp ted Internet portal protected by SSL technology or by a direct com m u nication link. T he G alileo system then electronically contacts the airline(s) in question to ascertain w hether the requested flight is available. If it is, the travel agen t com pletes the reservation in the G alileo system . G alileo then transm its the reservation data to the travel suppliers involved in the booking - solely A ir C anada in this case. If the airline is hosted on a d ifferent G D S, inform ation about the flight(s) on that airlin e is sen t to the airlin e's host system . T he standards for inform ation sharing betw een airlines are governed by the A irline Interline M essage Procedures M anual (A IRIM P). I w as then e-m ailed an electronic ticket, issued by A ir C an ada, w hich includes a ticket num ber, the nam e and place o f the booking agent, the entire itinerary and the price for each leg (plus taxes). The electronic ticket inclu des the statem ent: 'C arriage and other services provided by the carrier are subject to con d itions o f carriage w hich are hereby incorporated by reference. T hese con ditions m ay be obtained from the issu ing carrier.'8 It also states that 'this receipt m ay be required at check­ in and m u st be presented to custom s and im m igration if requ ested.' M y itinerary and e-ticket could also be view ed online by typing in the reservation locator nu m ber and m y last nam e at w w w .view trip.com , a w ebsite operated by G alileo.9 A t this poin t in the process, the travel agen t's role is typically com plete. C ertain billing and sched u ling issues m ay be raised after the com pletion of travel. For exam ple, an airline m igh t con test the quoted price of a fare becau se certain booking con ditions w ere not met. A s the travel inform ation is no longer online (see below ), the agency w ould have to retrieve a hard copy from G alileo. W ith these exception s, the only records o f travel that m igh t be kept by an individual agen cy relate to the accoun tin g inform ation. T he d ata-reten tion p ractices o f travel agencies differ widely, how ever.

W h a t happens when you book an airline ticket?

The record - the P N R

W hen m y flight w as booked, a Passenger N am e Record (PNR) was created on G alileo's reservation system .10 It is probable that my PNR sim ply included the five m andatory fields of data: the Passenger's N am e, Itinerary or Routing Inform ation, Recipient (reservation booking personnel), Phone Contact and Ticket Number. There are two supplem entary categories contingent upon the construction of the PNR: a Special Service Request field and an Other Service Request field, into which inform ation m ight be entered depending on the special needs and preferences of the traveller (seat assignm ent, m eals, w heelchair needs and so on). Som e of the m aterials contained within these fields are available to other carriers through an inter-operability m echanism , while others are exclusive to the carrier itself. A General Rem arks Category is available to the operator as well. Som e carriers will also 'overlay' their checkpoint inform ation (seat num bers, baggage, frequent flyer) onto the PNR through their own system s at check-in. Som e carriers (typically chartered carriers) do not enter form al PNR inform ation, particularly where the carrier has an agreem ent with a 'Tour O p erator', but are provided with a basic 'm anifest' of passenger inform ation by the operator with whom they have a contract. A PNR m ay be am ended by different agencies through different channels at different times. For com plex travel arrangem ents, therefore, there m ay be several PN Rs created and stored on different GDSs. An exam ple of the possible com plexities is given by H asbrouck (2004): If, for exam ple, you m ake a reservation on United A irlines (which outsources the hosting of its reservations database to the Galileo C R S /G D S ) through the Internet travel agency Travelocity.com (which is a division of Sabre, and uses the Sabre C R S/G D S ), Travelocity.com creates a PNR in Sabre. Sabre sends a m essage derived from portions o f the Sabre PN R data to Galileo, using the A IRIM P (or another bilaterally-agreed format). G alileo in turn uses the data in the A IRIM P m essage to create a PNR in U nited's Galileo 'partition'. O nce a PNR is created, an audit trail logs each entry in the PNR history with the date, tim e, place, user ID and other inform ation of the travel agent, airline staff person, autom ated system or any other person (such as a com pany secretary) w ho requested the entry or change. Each entry in each PNR, even for a solo traveller, m ay thus contain personally identifiable inform ation on several people. In my case, the profile is not that interesting. But it could also include

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the credit card inform ation, alternative addresses, phone num bers and em ergency contacts. It may contain notes about tastes and preferences, as well as personal notes intended for the use of the travel agency." PNRs can therefore reveal an enorm ous am ount about our travel preferences, and therefore our tastes and behaviours. They show: where you w ent, w hen, w ith whom , for how long, and at w hose expense. Behind the closed doors of your hotel room , with a particular other person, they show w hether you asked for one bed or two. ... Through m eeting codes used for convention and other discounts, PNRs reveal affiliations - even with organizations w hose m em bership lists are closely-held secrets not required to be divulged to the governm ent. Through special service codes, they reveal details of travelers' physical and m edical conditions. Through special meal requests, they contain indications of travelers' religious practices - a category o f inform ation specially protected by m any countries. (H asbrouck 2004)12 Airlines also, of course, transport special categories of persons - deportees, unaccom panied m inors, refugees, and so on. The PN R created for m y travel w as collected in Canada, and is therefore subject to Canadian privacy legislation. A recently constructed privacy policy for G alileo Canada stipulates in greater detail how this inform ation is collected, stored and disclosed. G alileo Canada discloses personal inform ation to the extent necessary or related to successfully com pleting the reservation. Thus, personal inform ation is disclosed to the travel agency and travel suppliers selected by the traveler and others involved in the transaction, such as the traveler's credit card company, insurance company, and otherw ise as necessary on im portant public interest grounds or as required by law, court order, or as requested by a governm ental or law enforcem ent authority or in the good faith belief that disclosure is otherw ise necessary or advisable. Certain ticketing inform ation in the G alileo system is optionally available to the airlines. Personal inform ation m ay also be disclosed in any other m anner upon the consent of the traveller involved or to anyone who Galileo C anada reasonably believes is seeking the inform ation as the agent of the traveller. They also reserve the right to disclose personal inform ation in connection with the sale or transfer of all or substantially

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all of the assets of G alileo C anada or G alileo International, Inc. to a third party.13 The PNR data rem ains online for up to 72 hours after the com pletion of travel. A fter that it is archived for three years in the Galileo Data Center, after w hich it is destroyed. The G alileo Canada privacy policy applies only to personal inform ation collected in Canada. No general privacy protection policy appears on the parent site of G alileo.14 As a global distribution system , however, this policy is not significantly different from that applied throughout the entire global operations and which has been driven principally by European rules.15 A series of regulations on Com puterized Reservation System s (dating from 1989, 1993 and 1999) have governed the services between GD Ss and suppliers, to ensure fair com petition. These regulations also include bans on the transfer of personal data to third parties.16The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive reinforces these conditions. Thus, to all intents and purposes, the rules for personal data processing expressly defined under Canadian law would apply to G alileo's global operations. It is com m only assum ed that the PN R is a standard, while in fact they can vary in size and form at. In the 1970s, the International Air Transport A ssociation (IATA) tried to establish certain standards and inter-operability m echanism s. M ore recently, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has been considering the developm ent of an international standard to im plem ent uniform practices.17 The issue has really been brought to the fore by the request by the US Departm ent of H om eland Security (DHS) for the PNR data and Advance Passenger Inform ation (API) data from all international flights arriving in the US. This prom pted questions from the European Union about w hat PNR data m ight actually be included. The DH S then cam e up with a list of 39 separate data elem ents, subsequently reduced to 34.1S In June 2004, the US Departm ent of H om eland Security head Tom Ridge signed an agreem ent with the EU that would allow US Custom s and Border Protection (CBP) to collect airline PNR data from flights betw een the US and EU. O nce im plem ented, the agreem ent will be in effect for three and a half years, with re-negotiations to start w ithin one year of its expiry date. U nder the accord, data will be retained by CBP for three and a half years unless associated w ith an enforcem ent action. In addition, only the 34 PNR data elem ents will be accessed by CBP to the extent collected in the air carriers' reservation and departure control system s and CBP will filter and delete 'sensitive data' (on m edical conditions, m eal preferences, religious affiliations, etc.) as agreed by CBP and the European Com m ission. At writing, the entire agreem ent is under review by the European courts.

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The departure: the departure control system

Typically, 24 hours before departure, relevant fields from the PNR are transferred to the airline's D eparture Control System (DCS), and the check-in agents will 'ed it' the flight list to m ake sure there is the appropriate w eight distribution, to establish fuel requirem ents, to order m eals, and to ascertain that those with special needs have been properly accom m odated. W hen I check in for m y flight at Victoria International, A ir Canada check-in staff would enter m y last nam e (or the locator code) on the DCS, but they w ould not necessarily have access to the com plete PNR. They w ould add m y seat allocation (if necessary) as well as the inform ation on any checked baggage. Around five to ten m inutes before departure, a com plete list of passengers by seat num ber is printed (Passenger Inform ation List) and given to the in-charge flight attendant. The records for each flight are purged from the DCS within 24 hours after the flight has landed, and then archived in A ir Canada's headquarters in M ontreal.19 If there are special requests from third parties after the PNR has been archived, they would have to be m ade in w riting and considered at Air Canada headquarters. A ir C anada's databases are passw ord-protected for its own staff and check-in agents, with different levels of access depending on status in the organization. Em ployees, agents and contractors' staff needing access all have to com plete an application form which also serves to rem ind them about the need for confidentiality. To access the system , users have to input their ID and a self-selected passw ord (which has to be changed at regular intervals). The history of any changes to a PNR is recorded. There is an audit trail of all access to the DCS. If a passenger is taking an ongoing flight with a dom estic carrier, the onward flight appears as an A ir Canada coded flight on the passenger's ticket. The details transferred would only be the relevant stage booking, the im m ediately prior connecting flight and any special needs. 'Secon d' carriers do not have direct access to the com plete journey details, booking contacts or PNR history. A ir Canada em ployees in Canada will have been m ade aw are through training of the general policy about the disclosure of reservations inform ation. In general, em ployees are told not to disclose inform ation about a passenger, including via the telephone, unless the inform ation is given to: a colleagu e/an oth er airline or agent for the purpose of reservation booking or ticket issue; the passenger him self and you have taken the necessary steps to ensure that this person is the passenger; som e other person, and the passenger has clearly consented to this and there is a record of this in the PNR; an appropriate person or organization in an em ergency to prevent injury or dam age to som eone's health. Em ployees are also advised orally that requests from the police or 120

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law -enforcem ent bodies m ust be referred to the investigations unit, and those relating to legal proceedings to the legal departm ent. Airline personnel work, however, in a num ber of different settings that m ight guide the w ays in w hich these rules are interpreted. A greater variety of more urgent requests arise w ithin the airport context from local law -enforcem ent authorities (who have jurisdiction over m ost airports), from the federal Royal Canadian M ounted Police (RCM P), or from custom s and im m igration officials. W orking within a closer environm ent, personal contacts obviously develop betw een individuals from different authorities. A ir Canada staff are also, of course, frequently asked to check w hether M r or M rs X is on a particular flight. They should not give out such inform ation; anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that they often do.2" Responsibility for the process or pre-board screening is now the responsibility of the Canadian A ir Transport Safety A gency (CATSA), the m ain institutional response of the G overnm ent of Canada to the events of 11 Septem ber 2001. On 1 April 2002, CATSA assum ed financial responsibility for pre-board screening by reim bursing airlines for the cost of the service. At Victoria International, the pre-board passenger screening is contracted to a com pany called Aeroguard, the main organization responsible for pre-board screening in Canadian airports.21 On entering the screening area, I w as w elcom ed by the sign: 'Security m easures are being taken to observe and inspect passengers. No passengers are obliged to subject to a search of their persons and goods if they do not choose to board an aircraft.' There w ould, however, be very few circum stances under w hich Aeroguard personnel would seek passenger identification. Any attem pt to take surreptitiously a prohibited object onboard would alm ost certainly be a m atter for intervention by an official from Com m issionaires Canada, the com pany contracted to provide general security services at the airport, a n d /o r by the RCMP. The Victoria A irport A uthority (VAA) is obviously responsible for ensuring that security m easures are strictly enforced, but they do not now supervise the passenger or baggage screening process. There would be very few circum stances, therefore, w here the VAA would need to know any identifiable passenger inform ation. The one exception would be the video-surveillance system . W hen I boarded my flight at Victoria, m y im age w ould probably be captured on three sets of digital cam eras (at pre-boarding, the curb and the ramp). Those tapes would be retained by the VAA for a w eek before being destroyed.22 C o lle c tin g 'p oin ts’

I have been a m em ber of A ir Canada's A eroplan for about 15 years, 121

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and am now a 'Prestige' member. M y Aeroplan num ber appears on the PN R and on my boarding card. A eroplan is a division o f A ir Canada, though it has a separate privacy policy and C hief Privacy Officer. I have a profile w ith A eroplan w hich w ill have been collected over the years from me personally w hen I enrolled, from partners (hotels, credit card com panies, car rental com panies and other airlines) from whom I have earned m iles, and from other com panies who are not Aeroplan partners to whom I m ight have consented to the disclosure of m y inform ation. N one of these partners, however, should be disclosing any details about the various transactions, beyond the aggregate m iles accum ulation. A eroplan's Direct M arketing System Club Profile Database is located in Point-Claire, Quebec. Controversy erupted in July of 2001 when, in an attem pt to conform to the provisions of the Personal Inform ation Protection and Electronic D ocum ents A ct (PIPEDA ), Aeroplan released a brochure entitled 'All A bout Your Privacy', outlining the conditions under w hich Aeroplan collected, retained and disclosed the personal inform ation of its mem bers. The brochure was m ade available to approxim ately 60,000 of the nearly 6 m illion m em bers of the A eroplan program m e. It identified the m any situations in which Air Canada would disclose the personal inform ation of A eroplan m em bers, including sending m em bership lists to Aeroplan partners, who send 'inform ation of interest' to A eroplan's mem bers. M em bership inform ation was also disclosed to com panies outside of the A eroplan program m e for sim ilar purposes. Form er Canadian Privacy C om m issioner George Radw anski launched an investigation into the policies and practices o f Aeroplan, to ensure that they were conform ing with the provisions of PIPEDA. On 20 March 2002, Radw anski released his findings after a nine-m onth investigation and found that Aeroplan had 'n ot m et its obligations under Principles 4.2.4, 4.3, 4.3.1, and 4.5 of Schedule 1 of the A ct', concerning consent for the disclosure of personal inform ation. H e recom m ended that Air Canada should inform all Aeroplan m em bers as to the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal inform ation; explain to all A eroplan m em bers the purposes for the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal inform ation. This is not done adequately in the current version of the 'A ll about your privacy' brochure; seek positive (i.e., opt-in) consent from all A eroplan m em bers regarding all inform ationsharing situations outlined in the brochure; establish appropriate procedures for obtaining positive consent; and execute appropriate agreem ents with all the direct-m ailing houses it em ploys as agents

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to ensure that the personal inform ation of A eroplan m em bers is protected in accordance with the A ct.23 The Privacy C om m issioner also found that, prior to the distribution of the brochure in July of 2001, received by fewer than 1 per cent of Aeroplan custom ers, Air Canada had m ade no attem pt to obtain consent for the retention and disclosure of personal inform ation. Radwanski also determ ined that the 'opt out' portion of the brochure constituted a 'negative option', w herein m em bers were unw ittingly providing consent unless they negated the possibility by virtue of a check mark. The C om m issioner condem ned the practice by ruling that 'negative or opt-out consent is not sufficient for any o f the five situations described in the brochure'. A eroplan has subsequently am ended its Privacy Policy to include a recognition of the 'im portance of privacy for the A eroplan Program ', which includes a reference to the new ly appointed Aeroplan Privacy Officer. The am ended policy also addresses A eroplan's com m itm ent to privacy protection, w hich includes acceptance of responsibility for the personal inform ation collected; a statem ent of justification for the collection of personal inform ation; the lim itations upon the collection, use, retention and disclosure of personal inform ation; a statem ent concerning the im portance of consent and accuracy; and a statem ent ensuring security, transparency, and a m echanism for addressing com plaints.24 It still, however, relies on the opt-out procedures for securing consent. On the w ebsite, and on brochures periodically sent to subscribers, custom ers are allowed to check a num ber o f boxes if they do not w ant their personal inform ation shared with other airlines, hotels, car rental com panies, travel partners, financial partners, retail and entertainm ent services and telecom m unication partners.25

A dding a border T o ro n to -N ew York

At each leg of m y journey from w hich I take departing flights w ith A ir C anada (Victoria, Toronto, K ingston and O ttaw a) m y basic PN R is accessed and updated by A ir Canada personnel. A t each departing point, it is rem oved from the system w ithin 72 hours of the com pletion of that leg of m y travel. W ith this relatively sim ple trip w ithin Canada, data on m y flight arrangem ents obviously have appeared on the system s at these airports. But it is also held in Greenw ood Village, C olorado and in Point-Claire, Quebec. Let us now analyse an onward flight to N ew York 123

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rather than to O ttaw a, again with A ir Canada. Let us 'add a bord er' to the scenario and trace m y data shadow as I enter the United States and then return to Canada. Let us also say that I am attending a conference in New York, for w hich m y hosts are paying my travel expenses and a m odest honorarium .26 The North A m erican Free Trade A greem ent (NAFTA) allow s certain 'Professionals' in 63 approved categories to enter the U nited States to carry out professional activities pursuant to a contract or an offer of em ploym ent, under the TN Classification. The visitor is advised that 'in addition to your proof of Canadian citizenship a letter from your prospective employer, or a signed contract m ay assist in your inspection by United States Im m igration and N aturalization Service (USINS) officials.'27 The letter or contract should include: job title and detailed sum m ary of your duties; starting date and anticipated length of stay; arrangem ent for paym ent; proof that you have the necessary degree to w ork in the profession for w hich you are to be engaged; and professional-level qualifications (certified copies of your d ip lo m a/ alternative credentials). The TN Visa also serves as a w ork perm it and can be presented to the US Social Security A dm inistration to receive a Social Security Number. The TN classification is generally issued for one year (with a $50 fee) and is renew able as long as you can dem onstrate that your em ploym ent is temporary. If I w ere not perform ing any paid work, I w ould not require a visa and could travel betw een the US and Canada w ith one of the follow ing docum ents: a Canadian passport; a Canadian governm ent-issued birth certificate with governm ent-issued photo ID; a Canadian Certificate of N aturalization, C anadian Certificate of Citizenship (lam inated card) or Canadian d river's licence only when travelling from the US to Canada on the return portion of a roundtrip ticket.28 I would go through US Custom s and Im m igration Service (USCIS) at Toronto's Pearson International Airport. At that point, I would subm it this docum entation and fill in a U SCIS Form 1-94 (Arrival-Departure Record) w ith the VISA classification, the date I arrived in the United States and the 'A dm itted U ntil' date, the date when my authorized period of stay expires. The U SC IS inspector m ight ask me questions about the purpose of m y trip, how long I w ould be in the U nited States, and m y residence while in New York. The 1-94 would be surrendered w hen I leave the United States. There are, in fact, four separate inspections on entry to the United States: Public H ealth, Im m igration, Custom s and Agriculture. M ost people would talk to one Im m igration official, and one Custom s official. For Custom s purposes, I am also required to fill in a Custom s Declaration

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Form (Form 6059B) w hich requires: nam e; birth date; nu m ber o f fam ily m em bers travelling; U S address; p assp o rt nu m ber; cou ntry o f resid ence; cou ntries visited on the trip prior to US arrival; airline n u m ber; prim ary p u rpose o f trip; w hether I am bringing in fruits, plants, food, insects, m eats, anim als, a n im a l/w ild life products, d isease agents, cell cultures, snails, soil from a farm , ranch, o r pasture; w hether I have been in close proxim ity to livestock; w hether I am carrying m ore than $10,000 in currency or m on etary instrum en ts; w hether I have com m ercial m erchandise; and the total value o f all articles that w ill rem ain in the US. The sm all p rin t on the back o f the form states ironically that the auth ority for collection is the 1995 P aperw ork R ed uction A ct, that m y response is m an datory and that the 'av erage burden associated w ith this collection o f inform ation is 4 m inutes p er respond ent'. A ll the inform ation subm itted through this application process on Form s 1-94 and 6059B is theoretically protected by the US Privacy A ct of 1974. U SC IS cou ld, how ever, reveal that inform ation to an extensive list o f federal, state or local agencies for law enforcem ent, pu blic safety and other 'rou tin e uses'. A t this po in t in m y travel, therefore, the list of U S gov ernm ent agen cies to w hich this inform ation m ight potentially be revealed is extensive. Section 215 o f the U SA PATRIOT A ct also authorizes the FBI to requ est an order 'requ irin g the p rod uction o f any tangible things (including books, records, papers, d ocu m ents, and other item s)' relevant to an investigation o f international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, w ithout the traditional 'pro bab le cau se' test. This im m igration data may, therefore, be d isclosed , d issem in ated , m atched or profiled w ithin gov ernm ent w ith few restrictions. W ith the exception of the new U SA PATRIO T A ct requirem ents, this w as also the case before Sep tem b er 11. To w hom in the U nited States, how ever, m igh t the API or PN R data be revealed? Several schem es require d iscu ssion in this regard. The first is the U S /C a n a d a Sm art Border Initiative signed betw een the tw o countries in D ecem ber 2001. T h is con stitutes a large p ackage of security m easures, inclu ding agreem ents on inter-operable biom etric standards, p erm anent resid ent cards, refugee asylum claim s processing, and the N EXU S program m e to exp ed ite air, land and sea crossings for pre-app roved low risk travellers. C anada and the U nited States have also agreed to share A PI and PN R data on 'h ig h -risk ' travellers destined to either country. The autom ated C an ad a-U S A P I/P N R d ata-sharin g program w as due to be in place in Spring 2003. T h e tw o cou ntries have also agreed on the colocation o f custom s and im m igration officers in Jo in t P assenger A nalysis U nits to m ore intensively coop erate in id entifying potentially high-risk travellers.29

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Beyond these bilateral initiatives, the US has proposed three more general schem es for the collection and analysis o f airline passenger data. The first, and m ost controversial, was the Com puter A ssisted Passenger Profiling System (CA PPS), the second generation of an earlier m easure. The CA PPS II version was designed to receive PNR data from a new integrated database, cleanse and form at the data, perform a risk assessm ent and then assign a risk 'score' to individual passengers entering the United States. The second-generation system was to rely on experim ental data-m ining algorithm s to find patterns in the governm ent and com m ercial databases available on individuals. In January 2003, the Transportation Security A dm inistration (TSA) published a federal register notice announcing the creation of a new system of record called the Aviation Security Screening Records (ASSR) database. The notice described a system that would allow the governm ent access to unlim ited am ounts and kinds of data from other proprietary and public sources: Passenger N am e Records (PNRs) and associated data; reservation and m anifest inform ation of passenger carriers and, in the case of individuals who are deem ed to pose a possible risk to transportation security, record categories m ay include risk-assessm ent reports, financial and transactional data, public source inform ation, proprietary data, and inform ation from law -enforcem ent and intelligence sources.’0 As a result of an enorm ous volum e of criticism from Congress, civil liberties groups and other interests, Tom Ridge, the Secretary of H om eland Security, declared CA PPS II dead in July 2004, a statem ent that raised a series of further questions about w hat would happen to the m illions of records already collected. Secondly, and as a result of recom m endations of the United States N ational Com m ission on Terrorist A ttacks upon the United States (2004), a successor to the CA PPS system emerged in A ugust 2004. Secure Flight is intended to be confined sim ply to terrorist-related activities. U nder this proposal, airlines will still have to subm it passenger data to the agency, w hich will use an expanded, unified w atch list run by the Terrorist Screening Center to flag potential threats. H om eland Security officials hope law -enforcem ent and intelligence groups will add more data to the w atch list if they are assured the inform ation will not be provided to private com panies. That m atching process is currently being tested w ith m illions of passenger records, w hich the Transportation Security A dm inistration ordered airlines to turn over in N ovem ber 2004. The TSA further wants to test w hether the inform ation passengers provide to airlines can be verified using m assive com m ercial databases run by com panies such as LexisN exis and Acxiom. The governm ent has claim ed that this system is very different from its CA PPS predecessor because

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p riv acy con sid erations have been built in from the outset. C ivil liberties groups rem ain sceptical. T hey p oint to the fact that the w atch lists curren tly in use have already been show n to be inaccu rate, as exem plified by the high -profile exam ple o f Senator Ted K enned y repeated ly m isidentified as a suspected terrorist. It rem ains u n clear how ind ividu als w ho are im prop erly flagged w ill be protected. A third, and related, p roposal is the U S-V ISIT program m e. The program m e is a response to the Enhanced Border Secu rity A ct o f 2002, w herein C on gress directed the D H S to initiate controls on entry and exit points into the U nited States. P roposals w ere received in Janu ary 2004 and a con tract w as aw arded to A ccenture LLP on 28 M ay 2004. A ccord ing to DHS: U S-V ISIT is p art o f a continuu m o f security m easures that begins overseas, w hen a person applies for a visa to travel to the U nited States, and con tin ues on through entry and exit at U S air and seap orts and, eventually, at land bord er crossings. The U S-V ISIT program enhances the security o f US citizens and visitors by v erifying the identity o f visitors w ith visas. A t the sam e tim e, it facilitates legitim ate travel and trade by leveraging technology and the ev olv ing use o f b iom etrics to exped ite processing at ou r borders. U S-V ISIT is helping us d em onstrate that w e rem ain a w elcom ing nation and that w e can keep A m erica's d oors open and our nation secu re.11 A t the end of 2004, U S-V ISIT entry procedures w ere in place at 115 airports (including the m ajor C an adian airports) and 14 seaports. It is scheduled to be expanded to the 50 busiest land ports of entry and to all 165 land ports o f entry by 31 D ecem ber 2005. U S-V ISIT begins at the U S con su lar offices issuing visas, w here visitors' digital fingerscans and p h otographs are collected and checked against a d atabase o f know n crim inals and suspected terrorists. W hen the v isitor arrives at the po rt of entry, the sam e biom etrics are used to verify that the person at the po rt is the sam e person w ho received the visa. T his program m e does n o t apply to citizens o f 27 cou ntries that p articipate in the Visa W aiver Program , although such citizens will need to su bm it m achine-read able p assports (or a valid US Visa) as o f O ctober 2004. U S-V ISIT has also been subjected to con sid erable scru tiny from a privacy perspective. Inform ation gathered from U S-V ISIT m ay be shared w ith the usual list o f federal agencies plus 'ap p rop riate federal, state, local or foreign gov ernm ent agencies w hen needed by these organizations to carry o ut their law enforcem ent resp onsib ilities.'32 C an adian citizens are not yet subject to these rules,

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even though C anada is n ot a party to the Visa W aiver Program . Thus, at the m om ent, given m y C an adian citizenship , there w ould be nothing d ifferent about m y entry into the U nited States under the circu m stan ces outlined above, from w hat w ould have occurred p re -9 /1 1 . R eturning to C anada, how ever, w ould be a d ifferent story. N e w Y o rk-T oro n to

O n m y return to C an ada, I w ould , as traditionally, be required to fill in im m ig ration land in g cards, and w ould be required to provide the follow ing inform ation: nam e, p erm anent ad dress, date and place of birth, nationality, passport num ber, flight num ber, pu rpose o f visit and the value o f all goods bein g brou ght b ack to C anada. O n arrival, I w ould surren der this card to C an ad a C u stom s w hich, som e w eeks later, w ill be processed and entered into the C an ad a C u stom s info rm atio n system . A irline p ersonnel w ill not have access to the inform ation provided on these cards, althou g h it m ay be shared and m atched w ith data from other federal agencies.33 T h e collection and retention o f the personal info rm atio n o f airline passengers entering C an ad a is regulated b y the C ustom s A ct o f 1985. C an adian law also no w requires that all com m ercial carriers and charter carriers provide the new ly created C an ad ian Border Services A gency (CBSA ) w ith inform ation about all p assengers and crew d estined for C anada. T he legislative am en d m en ts necessary to im p lem ent this initiative w ere inclu ded in Bill C - l l , the Im m igration and R efugee P rotection A ct, w hich received R oyal A ssen t on 1 N ovem ber 2001, Section 269 o f w hich outlines the obligations o f the carriers:34 O n the requ est o f an officer, a com m ercial transporter m u st provide o n dep arture o f their com m ercial vehicle from the last point of em barkation before arriving in C anada the follow ing inform ation in w riting o n each person carried: (a) their surn am e, first nam e and initial or initials o f any m id dle nam es; (,b) their date o f birth; (c) the cou ntry that issued them a p assp ort or travel d ocu m ent or, if they do n ot have a passport or travel d ocum ent, their citizenship or nationality; (d ) their gender; (i?) their p assp ort nu m ber or, if they do n ot have a passport, the n u m ber on the travel d ocu m ent that identifies them ; and if) their reservation record locator or file num ber.

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P a s sen g er r e ser v a tio n in fo r m a tio n (2) At any time after a com m ercial transporter undertakes to carry a passenger to Canada, the com m ercial transporter m ust provide an officer access to its reservation system or, on the request of an officer, provide in w riting all reservation inform ation held by the com m ercial transporter on passengers to be carried to Canada. These regulations require that com m ercial carriers, charter operators, travel agents and ow n ers/op erators of a reservation system w ho under­ take to carry persons to Canada m ust, at the time o f departure, provide the M inister of Citizenship and Im m igration with access to specific inform ation on all passengers and crew m em bers en route to Canada. The API data is collected at check-in time, and is transm itted by the carrier or reservation system prior to the arrival of the conveyance. At present these regulations only apply to air travel. It is argued that obtaining passenger inform ation in advance of the arrival of a com m ercial conveyance will provide im m igration officials with additional time to assess the specific risk of individual passengers and focus their attention on the passengers who pose the highest risk before they arrive at the border. In order to receive the A P I/P N R data from the databases of the concerned third parties, Canada Custom s and Revenue A gency (CCRA) contracted with the Societe Internationale de Transportation A eronautique (SITA) to provide the technology to bring A P I/P N R to Canada. CCRA developed a new tool entitled PAXIS, which is the user-end application needed to access A P I/P N R data, and began collecting this inform ation in O ctober 2002.35 That inform ation is now stored in the new A dvance Passenger Inform ation/P assenger N am e Record (A P I/P N R ) database. In March 2003, the more precise PNR data from airlines' departure control system s cam e online, and more and more airlines are increasingly becom ing com pliant. To effectively carry out this initiative, Canada Custom s has established com bined C IC /C C R A passenger assessm ent units (PAUs) at the three main Canadian airports (Vancouver, Toronto and M ontreal). The prim ary role of the PAUs is to identify those travellers who, based on the inform ation obtained from A P I/P N R , should be referred for an im m igration 'exam ination'. The construction of this database w as the subject of a very high-profile conflict betw een the Canadian governm ent and the form er Privacy Com m issioner, George Radw anski, the result of which were certain constraints on how this inform ation m ight be used. Advance Passenger Inform ation (API) - which consists only of passport inform ation such as nam e and date of birth and does not include any specific travel inform ation - will continue to be stored for six years and can be widely

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shared under Section 107 of the Custom s Act. The m uch more detailed P assenger N am e Record (PNR) will im m ediately be purged by the CCRA of all m eal and health information. PN R data will still be held for six years, but use and access will vary by length of retention. For the first 72 hours, it will be used by custom s and im m igration officers to assess risk. From 72 hours to two years, the inform ation will be depersonalized and used, w ithout nam es attached, only by intelligence officers and analysts. The inform ation can be re­ identified with the traveller's nam e only w hen necessary for custom s purposes. During this tw o-year period, inform ation w ill only be shared w ith other agencies or departm ents for non-custom s purposes if a w arrant has been obtained, including for tax-evasion purposes. From two years to six years, the inform ation can only be used to fulfill the CCRA 's m andate regarding the security of Canada, rather than all custom s purposes. It w ill be used on a depersonalized basis unless the C om m issioner of the CCRA personally approves re-personalizing it based on reason to suspect that the nam e or other identifying elem ents are necessary to deal with a high-risk person. During this final period, inform ation can only be shared w ith agencies that have a national security m andate, w here there are reasonable grounds to believe that the inform ation relates to a real or apprehended threat. C om m issioner Radw anski hailed this com prom ise as a great victory for the privacy rights of C anadians.36 O thers were more sceptical.37

Conclusions

The literature on privacy, surveillance and all the attendant issues surrounding the processing of personal inform ation is replete with im ages and m etaphors about how each individual has a 'data shadow ' (Stalder 2002) or perhaps a 'digital persona' (Clarke 1994). The new netw orked society (Castells 1996) produces a proliferation of rem otely captured and stored personal data that m ay or m ay not correspond w ith an individual's actual personality or behaviour. These fragm ents of personal data supposedly exist in a non-transparent, m ystical and com plex world over which the individual has little know ledge and no control. In the theoretical literature of post-m odernity, this condition supports wider argum ents about the dissolution of the 'subject' and of traditional borders betw een individual and society, public and private, self and other, and so on (e.g. Poster 1990). W hether in its m ore sophisticated and theoretical version, or its more rhetorical or polem ical variant, this them e is rarely supported by detailed

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em pirical investigation into the nature of databases and the flows of inform ation betw een them. We are left with a range of often insightful conclusions about the nature of the surveillance society, none of which have been, or indeed can be, subjected to rigorous em pirical scrutiny. That em piricism is necessary if analysts and advocates are to understand the fundam entally contingent or 'Janus-faced' nature of contem porary surveillance practices (Lyon 2001), and also to com prehend how their w orst effects m ight be remedied. Certainly the endeavour of tracing m y data shadow with respect to the flights described in this paper resonates with som e im portant them es in the contem porary literature. The collection of personal inform ation is largely characterized by a process of autom atic 'data capture' (Agre 1994), rather than visual m onitoring. Unawares, I left behind a 'data trail' (Cavoukian and Tapscott 1997). M ost of these transactions have taken place at a distance, reinforcing Lyon's point about 'disappearing bodies' (2001: 16-27). To the extent that 'm y' data, even concerning a sim ple flight within Canada, have ended up in the United States, supports larger points about globalization and especially about the 'de-localized' border (Lyon 2003:110); I did not have to cross a geographical or national border for 'm y' data to do so. If one confines the analysis for the m om ent to the travel zvithin Canada, certain conclusions can be reached about m y abilities as a data subject to access my inform ation and to control its circulation. The follow ing organizations have had access to the basic inform ation about m y flight plans: the local travel agency, Galileo, A ir Canada and Aeroplan. The Victoria and Toronto A irport A uthorities w ould also have access to my im ages captured at various stages in both airports. Each of these institutions is regulated by federal privacy protection legislation and should therefore be abiding by the standard fair inform ation practices.18 With the exception of the travel agent, each institution has developed a tailored code of practice for the benefit of consum ers and employees. From my brief interview s with representatives from these organizations, I becam e convinced that the protection of the personal inform ation of travellers was som ething that each took very seriously. There are of course im portant differences betw een rules and practices, and I have already noted how inform al netw orks develop in an airport environm ent w hich can facilitate the unw arranted sharing of personal inform ation. Thus, for anyone with a little time and energy, it is possible to discover who has w hat inform ation, when about a particular flight itinerary. These institutions rarely receive requests for personal inform ation, but they are all obligated to provide it - even G alileo Canada, w hich claim s that it is not. The prevailing assum ption in m uch of the literature that surveillance

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is rem oved, invisible, non-transparent, m ystical, com plex and so on, is therefore overdrawn. It is difficult to trace o ne's 'digital persona', but it is not im possible. W hile it is com m on in the surveillance literature to critique the concept and policies of privacy protection, it is also true that those very policies oblige organizations to be far m ore forthcom ing about w hat data they collect and store. Transparency of 'system s of records' is one of the unrecognized values of inform ation privacy and data protection policy. Privacy is not the antidote to surveillance (Stalder 2002), but it is the only conceptual and legal fram ew ork available to achieve som e organizational accountability and transparency. H ave I been the subject of surveillance or, m ore precisely, 'dataveillance' (Clarke 1989)? Again, the literature would suggest that any capture of personal inform ation (how ever benign) constitutes a surveillance process. Surveillance, Lyon contends, is 'any collection and processing of personal data, w hether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or m anaging those w hose data have been garnered.' It is sim ply the outcom e o f the 'com plex w ays in w hich we structure our political and econom ic relationships' (2001: 2). M arx (1988) has also argued that there is a 'new surveillance' - routine, everyday, invisible and pre-em ptive. Linked to this broad definition is the pow er of classification and sorting. It is a pow erful m eans of creating and reinforcing social identities and divisions (Gandy 1993; Lyon 2003). W ithout dissenting from these judgem ents, two insights suggest them selves as a result of the case studies above. First, m y personal data (so far as I know) has not been processed for any purpose beyond that of ensuring that I am a valid passenger on the days and flights reserved. It has not been analysed, subjected to any investigation, m anipulated or used to m ake any judgem ent about me. No doubt, a certain am ount of data m ining of de-identified inform ation occurs w ithin the industry to analyse general travel patterns and dem ands. No doubt, had I not opted out under the Aeroplan privacy policy, my data m ight have ended up w ith a variety of A eroplan's partners, and I m ight have received related, and unrelated, prom otional m aterials. It seem s, however, that there is a fundam ental difference betw een the routine capture, collection and storage of this kind of personal inform ation, and any subsequent analysis of that inform ation from w hich decisions (benign or otherwise) m ight be m ade about me. The new process for A P I/P N R analysis serves to highlight the distinction. As a passenger, w hen I return to Canada, that inform ation is autom atically transferred ahead of m y arrival to the CC RA 's Passenger A ssessm ent Unit at the Canadian airport, and it is system atically analysed. Anybody w ithin a 'high-risk' category is then subject to further investigation. The crucial

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process, therefore, is not the capture and transm ission of the inform ation, but the prior procedures, and the assum ptions that underpin them, about w ho is or is not a high-risk traveller. Surveillance m ight be 'any collection and processing of personal data, w hether identifiable or not.' If w e are to use such a broad definition, however, we need to find another concept to describe the active intervention of hum an agents w ho then m onitor that data to m ake decisions about individuals. 'Surveillance' conflates a num ber of distinct processes. To describe w hat has happened to me as surveillance perhaps serves to trivialize the real surveillance to which som e individuals, perhaps with 'risky' surnam es and m eal preferences, can be subjected during air travel. Surveillance is, therefore, highly contingent. If social scientists are to get beyond totalizing m etaphors and broad abstractions, it is absolutely necessary to understand these contingencies. Social and individual risk is governed by a com plicated set of organizational, cultural, technological, political and legal factors. The crucial questions are therefore distributional ones: W hy do som e people get more 'surveillance' than others (Bennett and Raab 1997, 2003)? But to address those questions, it is crucial to conduct the kind of finely tuned em pirical studies such as the one attem pted above. These case studies have revealed som ething about the inform ation flows w hen a fairly typical traveller books an airline ticket. In this context, the nature and extent of the surveillance, and thus of individual risk, is highly dependent on m ethods of booking, on local practices, on legal rules, on netw orks and interfaces, and on the behaviours and preferences of the individual. Students of surveillance have a responsibility to study these processes in far greater detail. We m ust try to trace the inform ation flows, and thus interrogate C astells' m ajor hypothesis about the 'space of flow s' w ithin the netw ork society, in w hich 'dom inant functions are organised in netw orks pertaining to a space of flows that links them up around the w orld, w hile fragm enting subordinate functions, and people in the m ultiple space of places, m ade of locales increasingly segregated from one an other' (Castells 1996: 476). 'W hat happens w hen you book an airline ticket' is a com plex question, but it is not unfathom able. My tentative answ ers certainly reveal a dom inant netw ork, represented by G alileo and other global distribution system s, as well as a num ber of segregated locales, at w hich localized data capture, but hardly pernicious surveillance, has occurred.

N otes 1 Available at: http://w eb.uvic.ca/polisci/benn ett/ind ex.h tm #on lin e

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2 My thanks to Dean M urdock for the diligent and careful research assistance upon w hich this paper is based. 3 The travel industry is served by four main 'reservation system ' service providers - 'Global Distribution System s'. Two com panies have emerged as giants of the industry. Sabre, the larger of the two com panies and pioneer of the service, and Galileo offer com puterized reservation system s to airlines, travel agencies, rental com panies and hotel chains. The others are Worldspan and Amadeus. 4 h ttp ://w w w .tho m ascoo k .ca/A bout/PrivacySecurityO nline.aspx My custom er profile includes the following: nam e, designation, contact inform ation, preferred language, nationality, date of birth, mem bership numbers (for frequent flyer points), credit card numbers, passport number, e-mail address, my flying preferences (seat, m eals, etc.) and my beneficiary (for insurance purposes). 5 Source: http://w w w .acta.ca 6 Typical pressures arise when a travel agent is asked w hether a third party is on a particular flight; when client profiles are transferred from one agency to another; and when client data have to be com m unicated in cases of emergency. 7 Source: h ttp://w w w .galileo.com 8 N othing in the Air Canada conditions of carriage statem ents (that appear on the reverse of paper tickets) m entions the collection and disclosure of personal information. Air C anada's privacy policy is available at: h t t p :// w w w .aircanada.com /e n /a b o u t/le g a l/p r iv a c y /policy.html 9 See the critique of the security of these web portals by Edward Hasbrouck, 'W ho's Watching you W hile you Travel?' Available at: h ttp ://w w w . hasbrouck.org/articles/w atching.htm l 10 There are no indications on the Galileo system that a passenger can access his or her PN R from Galileo. Indeed, the Galileo Canada website expressly indicates that 'as a processor of data, Galileo Canada does not conduct business directly with individual travelers. Upon request, individual travelers may have access to their own data held by the Galileo system by contacting the travel agent involved in the booking' (Source: h ttp ://w w w . galileo ca n ad a.ca/p riv acy /2/). I asked the travel agency for m y PN R and was told that it was not their practice to disclose this inform ation as they were only accessing the rem ote network. Although I did not press the issue, the travel agency would legally be responsible for providing access. 11 Hasbrouck (2004) suggests the following: 'prefers king bed', 'prefers room on low floor in hotels', 'always requests halal m eal', 'w on't fly on the Jewish sabbath', 'uses wheelchair, can't control bowels and bladd er', 'prefers not to fly Delta A irlines'. Travel agents might add information like 'difficult custom er - always changing his mind'. 12 Air Canada provides the following meal choices: Asian vegetarian, b lan d / ulcer, child, diabetic, fruit platter, gluten-free, Hindu non-vegetarian, kosher, low calorie, low cholesterol, low salt, M uslim vegetarian, non-lactose, oriental, regular, vegetarian (lacto-ovo), and vegetarian. It provides the

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13 14 15 16

17

18

19 20

21 22 23

24

following Spccial Needs options: assistance clim bing steps, assistance when on plane, blind, hearing impaired, wheelchair in terminal. Galileo Canada Privacy Policy available at http://w w w .galileocanada.ca (my emphasis). There is ju st a policy that applies to the collection of information through the w ebsite itself. Telephone conversation with Thom as de May, Chief Privacy Officer, Galileo, 5 August 2004. See: European Parliam ent, Directorate General for Research, W orking Paper on The Rights o f A irline Passengers (1999). Available at: http: / / www.europarl. eu .in t/w o rk in g p ap ers/tran /105/d efau l t_en.htm F A L /12-W P /74, 153/04, 'A irline Reservation System and Passenger Name Record Access by States'. ICA O Facilitation Division - Twelfth Session, Cairo, Egypt, 22 M arch to 2 April 2004. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .icao .in t/ ic a o /e n /a tb /fa l/fa ll2 /d o c u m e n ta tio n /fall2w p074_en.pdf PNR Data Elem ents Required from Air Carriers and Global Distribution System s (GDS) Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 131 /Friday, July 9, 2004. 1) The PNR record locator code. 2) Date of reservation. 3) Date(s) of intended travel. 4) Name. 5) Other nam es on PNR. 6) Address. 7) All forms of paym ent information. 8) Billing address. 9) Contact telephone numbers. 10) All travel itinerary for specific PNR. 11) Frequent flyer information. 12) Travel agency. 13) Travel agent. 14) Code share PN R information. 15) Travel status of passenger. 16) Sp lit/D ivid ed PNR information. 17) E-mail address. 18) Ticketing field information. 19) General remarks. 20) Ticket number. 21) Seat number. 22) Date of ticket issuance. 23) No show history. 24) Bag tag numbers. 25) Go show information. 26) OSI information. 27) S S I/S S R information. 28) Received from information. 29) All historical changes to the PNR. 30) N um ber of travelers on PNR. 31) Seat information. 32) One-way tickets. 33) Any collected APIS information. 34) ATFQ fields. Telephone interview with Gail Paul, Air Canada manager, Victoria International Airport. I am indebted on this point to a paper written by a form er student, who had worked as a custom s agent at Vancouver International Airport. Khushwant Dhillon, 'Profiling by Canada Custom s at Vancouver International Airport'. (Admn 548, April 2002). Source: http:/ / w w w .aeroguard.ca/index.htm l Interview with Bruce M acRae, Victoria International A irport Authority, 3 August 2004. News Release on 20 March 2002, from the Office of the Privacy Com missioner of Canada. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .p riv co m .g c.ca/m ed ia/n r-c/02_05_b _ 020320_e.asp Aeroplan 'Privacy Policy'. Source: h ttp s://w w w .ae ro p lan .co m /e n /ab o u t/ privacy.jsp The new policy reads: 1.

We will only collect the personal inform ation necessary to administer the Aeroplan Loyalty Program and to offer our mem bers rewards, benefits, products, goods and services under the Program. 135

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2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

25 26 27 28

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We do not collect, use or disclose personal inform ation about a mem ber w ithout the consent of the member, except where required by law. From time to time we may transfer personal information to our agents for processing in order to determine which mem bers may be most interested in rewards, benefits, products, goods and services offered by Aeroplan or its Partners. We use contractual and other means to protect your inform ation while it is being processed by our agents. To increase opportunities for mem bers to accum ulate miles under the Program, to facilitate the redemption of miles under the Program, or to obtain special benefits for mem bers, Aeroplan® may tem porarily share personal inform ation with a Partner. Use by the Partner for any purpose other than the Aeroplan Loyalty Program is strictly prohibited. We will provide our mem bers with a detailed explanation, when they enroll and periodically thereafter, of how they can have their nam e deleted from the lists we share with our Partners. Our mem bers may contact us at any time at the address below to have their nam es deleted from the lists. We maintain the security and confidentiality of the inform ation furnished by our mem bers according to the strictest standards. Com pliance with these standards is constantly verified and revised as needed. In the adm inistration of the Aeroplan Loyalty Program , if we com m unicate inform ation to our Partners, agents, or representatives, we assum e the responsibility arising from these com m unications and take actions to ensure that the com m itm ents and rules set forth in this Policy are observed by our Partners, agents, or representatives. We require every organization that provides us with adm inistrative or information processing support services to com ply with this Policy and with the privacy protection rules it contains. Our mem bers are entitled to exam ine the information we hold regarding them, subject to the restrictions provided by law, and may request rectification of inaccurate or incom plete information. If applicable, w e will disclose this inform ation to the person concerned or rectify it promptly.

Source: h ttp s://w w w .aero p lan .co m /en /ab o u t/rem o v al.p d fA ero p lan 'OptOut request form '. I have 'opted-out'. M any of the relevant rules have been derived from the website: h t t p :// www.foreignborn.com Source: http ://w w w .d fait-m aeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/tem p_entry-en.asp Canadian perm anent residents and landed immigrants now require governm ent-issued photo ID (The M aple Leaf card) when travelling to the United States. Departm ent of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Sm art Border Action Plan Status Report. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .d fait-m aeci.g c.ca/can -am / m en u-en.asp?act=v& m id =l& cat=l& did =2465 Federal Register: 15 January, 2003 (Volume 68, N um ber 10)][Notices] [Page

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31 32 33

34 35

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2101-2103] at: h ttp ://a 2 5 7 .g .a k a m a itcch .n e t/7 /2 5 7 /2 4 2 2 /1 4 m a r2 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 / edocket. access, g p o.gov /2003/03-827.htm Source: h ttp ://w w w .d h s.g o v /d h sp u b lic /in te ra p p /c o n te n t_ m u lti_ im a g e/ content_m ulti_im age_0006.xm l Source: http://w w w .d h s.gov /in terw eb/assetlibrary /U SV ISITP riv acy P olicy. pdf In 1999, the Federal Privacy Com m issioner challenged the constitutionality under the search and seizure provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of a data m atching arrangem ent between Canada Customs and Human Resources Developm ent Canada (HRDC) for the com parison of these custom s data with unem ploym ent insurance records. At issue is H RDC's practice of collecting data from the Custom s declarations of every returning traveller to identify em ploym ent insurance claim ants (supposedly available for work) who were out of the country while receiving benefits. The Public Safety A ct also regulates access to A P I/P N R data. See: h t t p :// w w w .tc.gc.ca/m ed iaroom /releases/n at/2002/02_gc004e.h tm Custom s Act, Section 107 (1) reads: 'The M inister may, under prescribed circum stances and conditions, require any prescribed person or prescribed class of persons to provide, or provide access to, prescribed information about any person on board a conveyance in advance of the arrival of the conveyance in Canada or within a reasonable time after that arrival.' Source: h ttp ://w w w .p riv c o m .g c .c a /m e d ia /n r-c /2 0 0 3 /0 2 _ 0 5 _ b _ 0 3 0 4 0 8 _ e.asp See, for exam ple, the analysis of the Canadian Civil Liberties A ssociation at: http://w w w .ccla.o rg /p rivacy/ap i-p n r.sh tm l Ironically, the only institution that bears no legal responsibility for data protection is Q ueen's University; O ntario universities still are not regulated under O ntario's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

R e fe re n c e s

Agre, P. (1994) 'Surveillance and Capture: two m odels of privacy', The Information Society, 10, pp. 101-27. Bennett, C. (1999) 'W hat Happens W hen you Buy an A irline Ticket? Surveillance, globalization and the regulation of international com m unications netw orks', paper presented to annual meeting of Canadian Political Science Association, Sherbrooke, Q uebec, at: h ttp ://w e b .u v ic .c a /~ p o lis c i/b e n n e tt/in d e x .h tm # online Bennett, C. and Raab, C. (1997) 'The Distribution of Privacy Risks: who needs protection?', The Information Society, 14, pp. 263-74. Bennett, C. and Raab, C. (2003) The Governance o f Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press). Castells, M. (1996) The Rise o f the Network Society Vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwells Press).

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Cavoukian, A. and Tapscott, D. (1997) Who Knows? Safeguarding your Privacy in a Networked World (New York: M cGraw-Hill). Clarke, R. (1989) 'Inform ation Technology and Dataveillance', Communications o f the ACM , 31, pp. 498-512. Clarke, R. (1994) 'The Digital Persona and its Application to Data Surveillance', The Information Society, 10 (2); also at: h ttp ://w w w .an u .ed u .au /p eo p le/R o g er. C larke/D V /D igP erson a.htm l European Union (1995) Directive 95/46/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council on the Protection o f Individuals with regard to the Processing o f Personal Data and on the Free M ovement o f Such Data (Brussels: OJ No. L281, 24 October 1995). Gandy, O. (1993) The Panoptic Sort (Boulder: Westview Press). Hasbrouck, E. (2004) 'Travel Privacy', in Privacy and Human Rights Yearbook 2004 (Washington, DC: Electronic Privacy Information Center). Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: M onitoring Everyday Life (Buckingham: Open University Press). Lyon, D. (ed.) (2003) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy Risk and Digital Discrimination (London: Routledge). M arx, G. (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (Berkeley: University of California Press). Poster, M. (1990) The M ode o f Information (New York: Polity Press). Raab, C., Bennett, C., Gellm an, R. and Waters, N. (1998) Application o f a M ethodology Designed to Assess the Adequacy o f the Level o f Protection o f Individuals with Regard to Processing Personal Data: Test o f the M ethod on Several Categories o f Transfer (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Com m ission, at: h ttp ://e u ro p a .e u .in t/co m m /in te rn a l_ m a rk e t/e n /m e d ia /d a ta p ro t/stu d ie s/ adequat.htm). Stalder, F. (2002) 'Privacy is not the Antidote to Surveillance', Surveillance and Society, 1:1, at: h ttp://w w w .su rveillance-an d -society.org/jou rnalvlil.htm United States National Com m ission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report (New' York: Norton).

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C h a p te r 9

Potential threats and potential criminals: data collection in the national security entry-exit registration system1 Jonathan Finn

On 5 June 2002 United States A ttorney General John A shcroft announced the N ational Security Entry-Exit Registration System (N SEERS). The initiative captures and archives biographic data and im ages o f the faces and fingerprints o f select foreign nationals visiting or residing in the United States on tem porary visas. Because all of the 19 individuals involved in the 11 Septem ber 2001 hijackings entered the United States on valid tem porary visas, N SEERS w as prom oted as a program to prevent future terrorist attacks and enhance border security through rigorous docum enting and m onitoring of visitors to the United States. The registration system is based in a 1996 Congressional m andate, entitled the Illegal Im m igration and Im m igrant Responsibility Act, that the United States develop a com prehensive entry-exit registration system to record nearly all of the country's 35,000,000 annual visitors. On 5 January 2004 the United States Visitor and Im m igrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT) was im plem ented to fulfill this m andate and to succeed N SEERS. Both program s collect detailed biographic inform ation along w ith fingerprint scans and full-face, frontal photographs (hereafter referred to as photographs) from persons entering the United States. In over a year of operation, N SEERS had com piled data on 177,260 individuals (U SDH S 2003). By com parison, in just three m onths of operation, U S-V ISIT had processed 3,002,872 individuals (USDH S 2004).

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The trem endous difference in the data collected w ithin these registration system s points to a prim ary feature of N SEERS and form s the basis of this paper. Both program s are based in the 1996 Congressional m andate for an entry-exit registration system . Both utilize sim ilar technology and collect sim ilar data. However, w here U S-V ISIT records nearly all foreign nationals entering the United States, registration in N SEERS was selectively applied alm ost exclusively to Arab and M uslim men. This overtly discrim inatory practice was justified under the rubric of a 'w ar on terrorism ' and as a necessary response to a national security threat described as invisible and om nipresent. This paper exam ines the collection of personal identification data in the N ational Security Entry-Exit Registration System. The developm ent and im plem entation of N SEERS is exam ined to foreground discussion of data collection and its im pact on persons subject to registration. I argue that the construction and im plem entation of N SEERS was not a necessary response to the events of 11 Septem ber 2001 but that it w as reactionary and retaliatory. Data collection in N SEERS functioned less to enhance border security, than to code, categorize and display certain bodies as potentially threatening and as w arranting continued surveillance. This in turn had im m ediate and far-reaching effects on the identities, rights and freedom s of individuals subject to registration.

Background and im plem entation

The original proposal for the N ational Security Entry-Exit Registration System was published in the 13 June 2002 Federal Register (67 FR 40581).2 The proposal was drafted by Larry D. Thom pson, then acting A ttorney General, and called for w ritten responses and com m entary to be received by 15 July. The docum ent, 'Registration and M onitoring of Certain N on-im m igrants,' am ended Parts 214 (N on-im m igrant Classes) and 264 (Registration and Fingerprinting of A liens in the United States) of the Code of Federal Regulations, the codification of rules published in the Federal Register. A lthough N SEERS announced new and far-reaching pow ers to the presiding governm ent agencies and officials, the program was based in earlier efforts to form ally docum ent visitors to the country. The authority to register individuals in the United States dates to a 1952 section of the Im m igration and N ationality A ct (Kobach 2003). The form al application of this provision reached a peak during the 1990s, during w hich the authority to register non-im m igrants w as sporadically exercised. In 1991 a final rule published in the Federal Register called for the registration

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and fingerprinting of non-im m igrants from Iraq and K uw ait entering the United States (56 FR 1566). This w as in response to Iraq's then recent invasion o f Kuwait, and the United States' subsequent involvem ent in that conflict. Two years later, the A ttorney General published a notice in the Federal Register calling for the fingerprinting and registration of non­ im m igrants from Iraq and Sudan (58 FR 68157). On 5 Septem ber 1996 a Federal Register notice called for the fingerprinting and registration of non-im m igrants from Iran and Libya (61 FR 46829). Finally, on 21 July 1998 A ttorney General Janet Reno published a docum ent to consolidate and am end all previous registration requirem ents. A ttorney General Reno's notice called for the registration, fingerprinting and photographing of non-im m igrant aliens from Iran, Libya, Iraq and Sudan (63 FR 39109). A lthough A ttorney General R eno's 1998 notice established the basis for a registration system , the registration requirem ents w ere routinely waived for the vast m ajority of non-im m igrants entering the country. Prior to the im plem entation of N SEERS, the m ajority of persons entering the United States w ere only required to com plete an 1-94 form , detailing their plans w hile in the United States and providing contact information. Thus, one goal of N SEERS was to enforce the 'general registration' requirem ents (the collection of biographic inform ation, fingerprints and photographs) outlined under A ttorney General Reno's 1998 notice. However, in addition to the enforcem ent of 'general registration', N SEERS also announced distinctly new capabilities for law -enforcem ent and border security program s and personnel. New 'special registration' requirem ents were developed for a new class of non-im m igrants, loosely defined as 'certain non-im m igrant aliens', that w ere believed to require closer scrutiny. The 2002 proposal included a vague justification for the 'special registration' of these individuals, w hich sim ply stated: 'the U nited States frequently acquires inform ation that indicates that a specific alien's or class of aliens' activities w ithin the United States should be more closely m onitored' (67 FR 40582). In addition to the general registration requirem ents, those subject to 'special registration' would have to provide m ore detailed biographic inform ation and w ould be required to report to INS offices upon arrival to the U nited States, again 30 days after arrival and annually for re-registration. Further, those subjected to special registration had to report any change of address, school or em ploym ent w ithin ten days of the change and had to report to an INS office at their time of departure from the U nited States. In conjunction with the new special registration requirem ents, the N SEERS proposal also enabled the A ttorney General to call on 'certain non-im m igrant aliens' residing in the United States to report to INS

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for registration. This is a particularly problem atic feature of N SEERS and one that clearly distinguishes it from other registration programs. W here past registration procedures docum ented only persons entering the country, N SEERS allow ed for the collection of identification data retroactively from persons already residing in the country. Thus, the collection of personal identification data in the N ational Security EntryExit Registration System functioned in tw o ways: at ports of entry (POE registration) and through 'call-in' registration. In the former, individuals entering the country through any of the 317 air, land or sea ports of entry are registered directly on-site. In the latter, individuals residing in the United States can be called to register at a specified office or location through a notice published in the Federal Register. Significant penalties resulted for failing to com ply with any of the registration requirem ents. As outlined in the proposed rule, 'because failure to com plete registration is an unlaw ful activity, the alien shall thereafter be presum ed to be inadm issible to the United States' (67 FR 40584). In addition, failure to register or m aking a false statem ent during registration carries a m axim um $1000 fine or six m onths in prison; failure to provide change of address or other inform ation carries a m axim um $200 fine or im prisonm ent for 30 days; and failure to com ply with any of the registration procedures renders the alien 'rem ovable' from the country and 'inadm issible' in the future. The N SEERS proposal w as published as final rule in the 12 A ugust 2002 Federal Register (67 FR 52584). Fourteen com m ents on the proposal w ere received within the m onth-long period allowed for by the A ttorney General. Concerns ranged from the legal basis for such a program and the potential for discrim ination and violation of due process rights to the trem endous pow er afforded to the A ttorney General. Despite these concerns, the 12 A ugust publication notes 'this final rule adopts the proposed rule w ithout substantial change' (67 FR 52584). In fact, the single set of changes m ade to the docum ent was clearer indication that the registration system would be paperless, that the data w ould be collected electronically. In an overtly sym bolic m ove, the new registration system w ould take effect at select ports of entry a year to the day after the terrorist attacks, on 11 Septem ber 2002. The system was operable at all ports of entry on 1 O ctober 2002. The general registration requirem ents of A ttorney General Reno's 1998 publication to docum ent individuals entering the country from Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan w ere m et through the initial im plem entation of N SEERS. However, shortly after publication of the final rule in August of 2002, A ttorney General A shcroft greatly expanded the list of nations w hose residents would be subject to special registration. This is most

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clearly exem plified in the four published notices for call-in registration. A ll four calls focused on m en, 16 years o f age or older, w ho w ere adm itted to the U nited States on or before 30 S ep tem ber 2002, the date port of entry registration began. T he first call, on 6 N ovem ber 2002, required citizens and nationals o f Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sud an and Syria to report for registration (67 FR 67766). The second call, on 22 N ovem ber 2002, w as d irected at citizens and nationals of A fghanistan, A lgeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, M orocco, N orth Korea, O m an, Q atar, Som alia, Tunisia, U nited A rab E m irates and Yem en (67 FR 70526). T he third call, on 16 D ecem ber 2002, targeted citizens and nationals o f Pakistan and Saudi A rabia.’ The fourth and final call for registration w as pu blished on 16 Jan u ary 2003 and added nationals and citizens o f Banglad esh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jo rd an and K uw ait to the list. By the end o f the call-in registration period, 25 cou ntries had been

Table 9.1

The four 'call-in' registration periods in NSEERS

Date of Call

C ountries Listed

6 Novem ber 2002

Iran Iraq Libya Sudan Syria Afghanistan Algeria Bahrain Eritrea Lebanon M orocco N orth Korea Om an Qatar Som alia Tunisia U nited A rab Em irates Yemen Pakistan Saudi Arabia Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Jordan Kuwait

22 Novem ber 2002

16 Decem ber 2002 16 January 2003

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identified as w arranting special registration and close m onitoring. The presentation of these call-in periods in Table 1 em phasizes the extent to w hich the registration system focused extensively on Arab and M uslim men, foreign nationals of N orth Korea being the prim ary exception. Together with POE registration, these call-in registrations produced significant am ounts of personal identification data. By 30 Septem ber 2003 N SEERS had processed 177,260 individuals. O f these 93,741 individuals w ere registered at ports of entry and 83,519 w ere registered through the call-in notices (U SDH S 2003). Both the proposal and eventual application of N SEERS drew significant protest from professional and lay audiences. Com m ents on the 13 June proposal identified concerns and fears that were later taken up in protests throughout the country by concerned residents and by civil and human rights groups, including the A m erican Civil Liberties Union, A m nesty International and the A m erican-A rab A nti-D iscrim ination Com m ittee (Buchanan 2003; Garvey, Groves and W einstein 2002; M cG ann 2003; Redd 2003). The central area of concern was the selective application of N SEERS and the seem ingly unlim ited authority of the A ttorney General to call on bodies for registration. The am endm ent to Part 264 (Registration and Fingerprinting of A liens in the United States) of the Code of Federal Regulations detailed the three w ays in w hich individuals could be subject to special registration: 1.

N on-im m igrant aliens who are nationals or citizens of a country designated by the A ttorney G eneral, in consultation with the Secretary of State, by a notice in the Federal Register.

2.

N on-im m igrant aliens w ho [sfc] a consular officer or an inspecting officer has reason to believe are nationals or citizens of a country designated by the A ttorney General ...

3.

N on-im m igrant aliens who m eet pre-existing criteria, or who [s/c] a consular officer or the inspecting officer has reason to believe m eet pre-existing criteria, determ ined by the A ttorney General or the Secretary of State to indicate that such an aliens' presence in the United States w arrants m onitoring in the national security interests. (67 FR 52592)

As outlined above, the task of deciding which individuals or groups should be subject to special registration w as the responsibility o f the offices of the A ttorney General and Secretary of State. Vague term inology such as 'certain non-im m igrant aliens', 'pre-existing criteria' and 'intelligence-based criteria' provided the legal basis for the selective

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application o f N SEERS registration. N ot only can the A ttorney General require m em bers of entire nations to register sim ply by citing the country in the Federal Register, but consular officers and inspecting officers throughout the w orld can im pose sim ilar requirem ents on individuals and groups based on their 'belief' that the persons in question w arrant registration. In response to concerns surrounding the seem ingly arbitrary criteria for data collection, the final rule of N SEERS included the following statem ent, w hich is equally vague if not dism issive: 'The criteria by w hich an alien m ay be required to m ake a special registration cannot be m ade public w ithout defeating the national security and lawenforcem ent effectiveness of the criteria' (67 FR 52588). The selective and discrim inatory application of N SEERS at the discretion of the A ttorney General was shielded by a rhetoric of national security. In her analysis of N SEERS, Kathryn Lohm eyer (2003), J.D. Candidate at the W hittier Law School, argues that by exploiting this rhetoric, A ttorney General A shcroft was able to supercede the constitutional rights of registrants to due process and equal protection. She further argues that N SEERS em ployed the 'plenary p ow er' doctrine, a provision of the US Constitution that gives Congress com plete control over im m igration policy and allows for differential treatm ent of citizens and non-citizens. This effectively precluded any judicial or federal review of the program . Lohm eyer rightly concludes that the selective application of special registration was not ju st discrim inatory but that it w as antithetical to international laws governing the fair and equal treatm ent of individuals. The H om eland Security Act of 2002 officially abolished m any of the federal agencies involved in N SEERS, am algam ating them with num erous other agencies under the Departm ent of H om eland Security. Similarly, the efforts of A ttorney General John A shcroft to oversee N SEERS w ere transferred to Secretary of H om eland Security, Tom Ridge. This transform ation of pow er and the conglom eration of previously disparate federal departm ents and offices under the unified Departm ent of H om eland Security w as paralleled by the announcem ent of a new registration system , the United States Visitor and Im m igrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT). U S-VISIT accom plishes the sam e goals as N SEERS but is considerably larger in scope, ultim ately collecting fingerprints, photographs or other biom etric data from all aliens entering and leaving the country. The program was officially launched on 5 January 2004 and it is scheduled to be in full operation at all ports of entry by 31 D ecem ber 2005. At full im plem entation, the program will com pile data on each of the 35,000,000 individuals w ho visit the United States annually. The scope of US-

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VISIT - politically, econom ically and culturally - and the com pilation of an increasingly inclusive identification database dem and serious and continued critical attention. N onetheless, it is sufficient here to note that U S-VISIT developed as a com plete entry-exit registration system to succeed N SEERS and fulfill the 1996 Congressional m andate.4 The efficacy of N SEERS to enhance border security and prevent future terrorist attacks is difficult, if not im possible, to discern. The Departm ent o f Justice, Im m igration and N aturalization Service, and now the Departm ent of H om eland Security, cite statistics of detentions, arrests and deportations through N SEERS as proof of the program 's success. O f the 177,260 persons registered through 30 Septem ber 2003, 2,870 were detained and 143 identified as crim inals (U SDH S 2003). The m ajority of offences were violations of various im m igration laws, such as overstaying a visa or presenting fraudulent docum ents. To suggest that detaining or charging a person with a crim inal act for these offences aided in the prevention of a terrorist attack is speculative at best. W hat then is the purpose of special registration? In his extensive w ork on fingerprint identification, Sim on Cole (1998, 2001) show s that the technique's adoption into United States law -enforcem ent practices during the early twentieth century worked in concert with broadening crim inal laws to bring m ore bodies under police surveillance. In a sim ilar manner, the trem endous discretionary pow er of the A ttorney General under N SEERS increased the num ber of individuals m onitored by law -enforcem ent and im m igration departm ents. Yet, despite the heightened capabilities of digital technologies to collect and archive m asses of data (recall that U S-V ISIT processed over three million individuals in three m onths), the A ttorney General focused on the registration of Arab and M uslim men. This selective application of an entry-exit system suggests another function or purpose of NSEERS. The program was less a necessary or rational response to the events of 11 Septem ber 2001 than it was reactionary and retaliatory. Criteria for data collection were derived from 19 individual bodies and expanded to encom pass m illions of bodies and entire geographic areas. That is, because the 19 individuals involved in the hijackings were adult males from specific A rab and M uslim countries, then all adult m ales from all Arab and M uslim nations were categorically suspicious and therefore w arranted increased scrutiny and m onitoring. The developm ent of U S-V ISIT w ith its more com prehensive and dem ocratic collection of data is, in theory, a more realistic attem pt to address border security concerns. This is not to suggest that U S-VISIT is benign, but to highlight the extent to w hich N SEERS specifically targeted certain bodies. U nder the guise of national security, N SEERS

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was sped into application despite varied concerns and criticism . The program was proposed on 30 June 2002, adopted as rule on 12 A ugust and in operation by 11 September. N SEERS yielded blanket authority to the A ttorney General, w hich was subsequently exercised on certain bodies. True to David Lyon's description of surveillance in the w ake of Septem ber 11: 'hastily form ulated legislation cam e first', the technology and application followed (2003a: 20). W hile the efficacy of N SEERS to protect national security is uncertain, its im pact on the identities, rights and freedom s of those subject to registration is clear. In w hat follow s I w ant to address som e of the prim ary im pacts of data collection in the registration system . For purposes of clarity, the discussion is divided into two broad, but inter-related categories: direct im pact and public impact. The form er focuses on the im m ediate and future consequences of special registration on persons subject to that process. The latter exam ines the im pact of processes of data collection as they took place w ithin the public arena.

D irect im pact of data collection

The trem endous capabilities of digital technologies to collect, store, process and exchange data lay at the foundation of contem porary lawenforcem ent and surveillance practices. The seem ingly anonym ous and ubiquitous gaze of CC TV cam eras serves as the prem ier exam ple of a disem bodied surveillance apparatus that transcends traditional spatial and tem poral constraints. N SEERS relies on these enhanced capabilities for the rapid collection, exchange and use of biographic data, fingerprints and photographs of 'certain non-im m igrant aliens'. Importantly, data collection in N SEERS also functions at a much more rudim entary level: that of the body. The collection of identification data directly from individual bodies, and the future uses of that data, present both im m ediate and far-reaching consequences for bodily identity, with the rights and lim itations it affords. Special registration places severe lim itations on the m obility of individuals subject to the process. U nder the initial rule, individuals subject to special registration were forced to report in person to an INS office at arrival, 30 days after arrival, and again on an annual basis. On 2 D ecem ber 2003 a notice in the Federal Register suspended both the 30day and annual re-registration requirem ents (68 FR 67578). The notice also m arked the official transition in pow er from the Departm ent of Justice and Im m igration and N aturalization Services to the new Departm ent of H om eland Security (DHS) and the parallel transfer in authority over the

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registration system from A ttorney General John A shcroft to Secretary of H om eland Security Tom Ridge. In the notice, Secretary Ridge suggests that the suspension of re-registration requirem ents will ultim ately benefit those subject to registration by placing fewer restrictions on them and by reducing an estim ated 103,000 hours of w ork (45 m inutes per interview and 30 m inutes preparation by each alien m ultiplied by the 82,532 aliens that would be subject to re-registration over a six-m onth period). H owever, in practice the new procedures accom plish the sam e goals and, I argue, place stronger lim itations on the m obility of those subject to special registration. The new procedure is outlined in the notice: At the time of adm ission, DH S will advise all non-im m igrant aliens subject to special registration that they may be required to appear for additional registration interview s upon notice. DHS w ill separately notify those aliens selected to appear before DHS. (em phasis added) The procedure for notification is then outlined: N otification under these regulations m ay be given to the alien in a m anner reasonably calculated to reach the alien, w hich shall include, but is not lim ited to, notice by publication in the Federal Register, a letter sent via standard US postal mail to the last address provided by the alien to DH S using regular mail, an e-m ail to the address provided to DH S during a previous N SEERS registration interview, or in-person delivery. (68 FR 67580) U nder the new procedure, aliens have ten days to contact DHS from the date of publication or of post. Failure to contact DH S in a timely m anner constitutes a violation of the registration requirem ents and is grounds for deportation and future inadmissibility. The new procedure m ay free the individual from the requirem ents of re-registration but sim ply replaces them w ith others. The new requirem ents assum e that the individual will rem ain tied to a specific address and places undue burden on the individual to m onitor the Federal Register as they may be called on for further inform ation. An individual's capabilities to be m obile, w hich m ay well be a condition of em ploym ent or required for health or reasons of emergency, are greatly hindered by this process. In addition to restricting the m obility of individuals, N SEERS also places registrants under increased surveillance. Law -enforcem ent and im m igration databases house the 'data-im ages' (Laudon 1986) or 'datad oubles' (Lyon 2003b) of individuals subject to N SEERS registration. An

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in d iv id u al's ability to w o rk and live as a m em ber o f society are greatly influenced through the d ep loym ent o f such data (Lyon 1988, 1994). O nce collected , personal identification data can be accessed , interpreted and re­ interpreted based on m u table con ceptions o f w hat con stitutes crim inality, d eviance or threat. T he in d iv id u al's identity as a threat to national security, a crim inal, d ev iant or norm al body can change d ep en ding on the d ep loym ent o f data. To exem plify, the 'd ata-im ag e' o f a Pakistani m an w orkin g in the U nited States d uring the year 2000 m igh t attest to his pu rch asing habits, travel and em p lo ym en t history, his tem porary and p erm anent addresses, and other biograph ic inform ation. D uring the year 2000 this m an exists as a non-resid en t alien; as an individual w orking in the U nited States on a valid tem porary visa. T h e third notice o f call-in registration, on 16 D ecem ber 2002, requires this m an to report to a local IN S office for special registration. This process ad ds m ore detailed inform ation as w ell as fingerp rint scans and a photograph to his 'd ata-im age'. M ost im portantly, the m an 's identity as a valid non-residen t alien w orkin g in the U nited States on a tem porary visa is reconfigured into som eone w ho con stitu tes a potential threat to national secu rity and w arrants closer scru tin y and continued m onitoring. N othing abou t this living body has changed , yet his rights and freedom s and his ability to w ork and function in the U nited States are now contested and restricted. The im pact on ind ividu al identity through N SE E R S registration is also affected by the coop eration o f N SE E R S w ith other law -enforcem ent databases. Fingerprint scans taken d uring the registration process are checked against d atabases o f know n crim inals and terrorists as w ell as a large archive o f latent prints collected from 'k n o w n ' terrorist locations throughout the M idd le East by U nited States m ilitary. U tilization of this laten t archive is cause for particu lar concern, as w hat con stitutes a know n terrorist location is un clear but seem s to be equated w ith race. Fingerprint and other d ata collected through N SE E R S is also linked to the archives o f the N ational C rim e Inform ation C en ter (N C IC ), an im m ense law -enforcem ent inform ation archive con tain in g 17 cross-referenceable d atabases and u n iting 80,000 crim inal ju stice agencies throu gh ou t the U nited States, the US Virgin Islands, P uerto Rico and C anada (FBI 1999). Su p p ose the P akistani m an from the previous exam ple is question ed in relation to a local, m inor offence in w hich he w as sim ply present. Prior to his registration in N SE E R S, a search through N C IC d atabases m ay not be cause for con cern if the retrieved data sim ply attests to em ploym ent history and other biographic inform ation. H ow ever, after registration a search w ould identify the m an as an N SE E R S registrant. T he m an 's coop eration w ith the call-in no tice places him w ithin a category of

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suspicion, w hich follow s him and can have nu m erou s and varied im pacts on his identity.

Public im p a ct o f data collection

O n 24 M arch 2003, five days after the U nited States launched its prim ary m ilitary cam paign against Iraq, I w as travelling in the U nited States and w as at a stop -ov er in the A tlanta airport. The nu m erou s televisions in the term inal w ere tuned to C N N , w hich ran a con tin uous stream o f w ar cov erag e that w as eagerly m onitored by crow ds surrou nd in g the televisions. A m id this activity a m essage w as repeated ly broad cast over the PA system ann ou ncin g that the H om eland S ecu rity threat level w as curren tly at orange and that p assengers should report any suspicious activity to law -enforcem ent. The activity and ann ou ncem ent in the A tlanta airp ort po in t to the very public nature o f the 'w ar on terrorism '. W ithin this w ar the public is co-opted in surveillance p ractices and in the m aintenan ce o f national security. T he D epartm ent o f H om eland S ecu rity 's colour-cod ed 'C itizen G u idan ce on the H om eland S ecu rity A dvisory System ' asks that citizens be alert for and report suspicious activity to authorities. Sim ilarly, the m essage in A tlanta asked that w e, the patrons o f the airport, report any suspicious activities to law -enforcem ent. The m ove to co-opt the pu blic in the protection of national security and in the w ar on terrorism is based around a rhetoric that describes an enem y that is in visible and om nipresent. C on sid er the follow ing rem arks prepared for A ttorney G eneral A sh croft's pu blic ann ou ncem ent o f N SEERS: O n Sep tem b er 11, the A m erican d efinition o f national secu rity w as changed forever. A band o f m en entered our cou ntry un der false pretenses in order to plan and execute a m urderous act o f w ar ... In this new war, our en em y 's platoons infiltrate our borders, quietly blen ding in w ith v isitin g tourists, stud ents, and w orkers. T hey m ove unnoticed through ou r cities, neigh borhoods, and pu blic spaces. T hey w ear no uniform s. T heir cam ouflage is n o t forest green, but rather it is the color o f com m on street clothing. T heir tactics rely on evading recognition at the border and escap ing d etection w ithin the U nited States. T heir terrorist m ission is to d efeat A m erica, destroy our valu es and kill innocent people. (U SD O J 2002) T h e p assage above describes an enem y that is seem in gly undetectable.

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H e w ears the sam e clothes as w e do and w alks unnoticed am ong us. How then are we to locate or m ake this enem y visible in order to protect national security? To return to the Atlanta airport exam ple, w hat m ight count as suspicious and w arrant reporting? Throughout the trem endous m edia activity leading up to the war with Iraq the suspicious and potentially dangerous body had been coded in a specifically visual way. Race, represented by skin colour, becam e a central m eans of identification. A lthough the enemy, as outlined by A ttorney General A shcroft, m ay w ear the sam e clothes that we do and he may occupy the sam e roles that we do (as a tourist, student or worker), he is nonetheless visually distinguishable from 'u s'. W hy else w ould we be asked to keep w atch? N ew spapers, m agazines, television and Internet sources continually displayed the brow n-skinned faces of (alm ost exclusively male) Arab and M uslim persons as the focus of the war on terrorism. Racial profiling was em ployed at ports of entry to literally separate persons according to perceived levels of potential threat. The collection of identification data in N SEERS reflected a parallel em phasis on race and nationality as categories of suspicion. A t POE registration 'certain non-im m igrant aliens' are routed through separate lines and are subject to increased scrutiny and detention. Similarly, A ttorney General A shcroft called on individuals working, studying and travelling in the United States from Arab and M uslim countries to present them selves for registration at local INS offices. Fearing hum iliation, incarceration and potential deportation, large num bers of people waited until the last possible day to register. The snaking lines of Arab and M uslim m en outside registration offices w ere clear exam ples of the race-based categorical suspicion of N SEERS. These im ages w ere captured by the press and represented in new spapers across the country and internationally. For exam ple, a story in the 11 January 2003 edition of the Neiv York Times includes an im age displaying 'm en from m ostly Arab or M uslim countries' outside an INS office in Detroit in response to the second call-in registration period ('Facing a Registration D eadline' 2003). A more alarm ing scene is docum ented in the 11 January 2003 edition of the Globe and M ail (H oupt 2003). An im age beside the headline 'Thousands w ith US visas race to m eet INS deadline' depicts 'foreign-born m en' lined up outside a New York City IN S office, literally barricaded from the surrounding environm ent by a fence. The fence as barricade also appears in a 22 M arch 2003 story in the Neiv York Times (Cardwell 2003), with the title 'Pakistani and Saudi M en Find Long Lines for Registration'. A brief search of Am erican new spapers yields scenes sim ilar to those described above as w ell as others docum enting the registration process.

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An im age in the San Francisco Chronicle (H ubbell 2003) show s im m igrants leaving a local INS office follow ing registration. Im ages in the Los Angeles Times (M cdonnell and M ena 2003) and the Pittsburgh Post-G azette (Thom as 2003) show registrants being counselled by law yers and volunteers. An im age in the Orlando Sentinel (Brew ington 2003) displays an individual being fingerprinted at a Detroit INS office. An im age in Baltim ore's The Sun (Shane 2003) depicts a Pakistani family at the Pakistani Em bassy listening to a discussion of the registration rules. And a story in the Buffalo Neivs (Bonfatti 2003) contains an im age of a Pakistani family w aiting in a crowded refugee centre trying to cross into Canada before the registration deadline. The im ages depicted and referenced above are part of the trem endous sum s of im ages, m oving and still, w hich have docum ented, and been deployed in, the w ar on terrorism. Importantly, these im ages are not sim ply static docum ents. As part of a larger visual culture they are dynam ic sites w here m eaning, know ledge and identity are negotiated. They function as interactive screens or spaces through which social experience and know ledge are exercised, im posed and learned. The continued dissem ination and consum ption o f visual m aterials through a m ultiplicity of m edia channels aids in the transm ission of social codes and in the form ation of identities of self and other (M anning 1999). Understood as dynam ic rather than static objects, the deploym ent and circulation of im ages docum enting 'special registration' contribute to the construction and reinforcem ent of race-based categorical suspicion. An aggregate category - Arab and M uslim m en - was created and coded as a potential threat to national security. This process had two main consequences. First, it contributed to the developm ent of a rhetoric that justified the discrim inatory treatm ent of individual Arab and M uslim men. Second, the continued presentation and re-presentation of A rab and M uslim m en subject to the registration process gave a visual 'face' to this potential threat, enabling the public to participate in the w ar on terrorism (as in the reporting of suspicious activity and persons). The continued production and consum ption of visual m aterials - live, recorded, still and m oving - contributed to the form ation of false binaries of self and other, norm al and deviant, and A m erican and potential threat.

Conclusion: the public display of power

Initiatives such as N SEERS and U S-VISIT are indicative of a society and culture of surveillance.5 W ithin such a space, registration and m onitoring program s benefit from the trem endous capabilities of digital technology

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in the collection, storage and use of personal identification data. However, these program s do not sim ply increase the adm inistrative and com m unications capabilities of the state but also, as David Lyon (1994: 5 0-1) argues, constitute a reversal of the presum ption of innocence. W ithin the contem porary culture of surveillance the individual body is increasingly treated as a site of potential threat. The application of any surveillance technology or program necessarily reflects the interests, desires and m ission of its em ployers. In the abstract, a program such as U S-VISIT m ay enhance the security of the United States border through the docum entation and m onitoring of each of the country's visitors. In its potentially dem ocratic treatm ent of bodies, U S-V ISIT shares m any parallels with existing registration system s in Sw itzerland, the United Kingdom , Germany, Spain, France and the N etherlands (USDOJ 2002).6 It could be argued that having one's personal inform ation collected in this and other form ats is a necessary precondition for life in a surveillance society. However, the selective application of registration requirem ents in N SEERS is overtly discrim inatory and betrays any such rationale. The efficacy of N SEERS to enhance border security is highly debatable. W hat are clear are the num erous consequences and challenges the program poses to the identities and capabilities of individuals, groups and nations. The im plem entation and application of the N ational Security EntryExit Registration System was a reactionary and retaliatory response to the events of 11 Septem ber 2001. The program was sped into application w ithout sufficient review, and gave unyielding authority to the A ttorney General to collect aggregates o f personal identification data not ju st from persons entering the country, but retroactively from persons residing in the United States. Far from the m undane collection of data through daily transactions, activities and through the ubiquitous gaze of CCTV that is the hallm ark of a contem porary culture of surveillance, the net effect of data collection in N SEERS w as to code, categorize and display 'certain' bodies as potentially threatening and potentially crim inal. The collection of data in N SEERS m arks a curious aberration from the subtle and diffuse 'm icro-physics of p ow er' (Foucault 1979) characteristic of the m odern state. In contrast to the anonym ous, all-seeing gaze of the contem porary surveillance apparatus, the selective application of registration requirem ents in N SEERS represents an overt and public display o f state power. This pow er is targeted at specific persons and is exercised directly on the body. Individuals registered at ports of entry are processed through separate lines and are fingerprinted and photographed w hile non-registrants pass by. Those subject to call-in registration stand behind fences in lines snaking out of INS offices. W hat w e see throughout

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th e se e v e n ts an d in th e m e d ia re p re s e n ta tio n s o f th e m are A ra b an d M u s lim m e n p u t o n d isp lay , c o d e d an d id e n tifie d as p o te n tia l th re ats to n a tio n a l secu rity . T h e p ro d u c tio n an d c o n su m p tio n o f th e se s ce n e s b y n o n -re g istra n ts re in fo rc e s th is id en tity , s im u lta n e o u s ly v a lid a tin g th e v ie w e r 's o w n ro le as a p a rtic ip a n t in th e w a r o n te rro rism an d as a d e fe n d e r o f n a tio n a l secu rity . T h e o v e rtly d is c r im in a to ry c o lle c tio n o f d a ta in th e N a tio n a l S e c u rity E n try -E x it R e g is tra tio n S y s te m p ro m u lg a te s a fa lse d ic h o to m y o f 'u s ' an d 'th e m ', o f 'A m e ric a n ' a n d 'p o te n tia l th re a t' th a t h a s h ad an d w ill c o n tin u e to h a v e la stin g im p a c ts o n th e id e n titie s an d a b ilitie s o f in d iv id u a ls , g ro u p s an d n a tio n s.

N o te s

1 The author gratefully acknowledges that financial support for this research w as received from an Initiatory Research Grant through Wilfrid Laurier University. 2 The federal register is 'the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules and notices of Federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other presidential docum ents'. The citation form at [67 FR 40581] refers to [Volume 67, Federal Register, p. 40581]. This form at is used throughout governm ent docum ents and is used in this paper as well. The Federal Register from 1994 to the present can be accessed and searched through the United States G overnm ent Printing O ffice's website. Available at: < h ttp ://w w w . g p oaccess.g ov /fr/in d ex.h tm l> 3 Armenia was mistakenly included in this call, but was removed from the list two days after the initial publication [67 FR 77642]. 4 Although U S-VISIT is the successor to N SEERS it did not com pletely replace the program. Individuals can still be subject to special registration under N SEERS at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. 5 O n the developm ent of a society or culture of surveillance, see Lyon (1994), M arx (1985, 1988) and Staples (1997). 6 The announcem ent of N SEERS included a com parison of the program with the registration system s of the countries cited.

R e fe re n c e s

Bonfatti, J.F. (2003) 'Between Two Worlds; Pakistanis pack a refugee center in Buffalo', Buffalo News, 7 M arch, p. A l. Brewington, K. (2003) 'Im m igrants Sign Up in INS Antiterror Push', Orlando Sentinel, 11 January, p. A L Buchanan, W. (2003) 'H undreds Protest INS Registration: Men from 13 countries sign in', San Francisco Chronicle, 11 January. Cardwell, D. (2003) 'Pakistani and Saudi Men Find Long Lines for Registration', 154

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N ew York Times, 22 March, p. D2. Cole, S. (1998) 'M anufacturing Identity: A History of Crim inal Identification Techniques From Photography Through Fingerprinting', PhD diss, Cornell University. Cole, S. (2001) Suspect Identities: A History o f Criminal Identification and Fingerprinting (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 'Facing a Registration Deadline' (2003) Neiv York Times, 11 January, p. A9. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (1999) 'Inauguration of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IA FIS)', 10 August Press Release. Available at: < h ttp ://w w w .fb i.g o v /p ressrel/p ressrel99/iafis.h tm > (accessed Novem ber 2002). Foucault, M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, Alan Sheridan (trans) (New York: Vintage Books). Garvey, M., Groves, M. and Weinstein, H. (2002) 'H undreds Are Detained After Visits to INS; Thousands protest arrests of M ideast boys and men who complied with order to register', Los Angeles Times, 19 December, p. A l. Houpt, S. (2003) 'Thousands with US visas race to meet INS deadline', Globe and M ail, 11 January, p. A13. H ubbell, J.M . (2003) 'Im m igrants register before final deadline', San Francisco Chronicle, 26 April, p. A17. Kobach, K. (2003) 'N ational Security Entry-Exit Registration System ', 17 January Foreign Press Center Briefing. Available at: < h ttp ://fp c.state.g o v /16739p f. htm > (accessed 6 July 2004). Laudon, K. (1986) The Dossier Society: Value Choices in the Design o f National Information Systems (New York: Colum bia University Press). Lohmeyer, K. (2003) 'The Pitfalls of Plenary Power: a call for m eaningful review of N SEERS "Special R egistration "', Whittier Law Review, 25:1, pp. 139-79. Lyon, D. (1988) The Information Society: Issues and Illusions (Cambridge: Polity). Lyon, D. (1994) The Electronic Eye: The Rise o f Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of M innesota Press). Lyon, D. (2003a) Surveillance after September 11 (Cambridge: Polity). Lyon, D. (2003b) 'Surveillance as Social Sorting: Com puter Codes and Mobile Bodies', in D. Lyon (ed.) Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination (New York: Routledge), pp. 13-30. M anning, PK . (1999) 'Reflections: The Visual as a Mode of Social Control', in J. Ferrell and N. Websdale (eds) M aking Trouble: Cultural Constructions o f Crime, D eviance and Control, Social Problems and Social Issues Series, J. Best (ed) (New York: Aldine De Gruyter), pp. 255-75. M arx, G. (1985) 'The Surveillance Society: the threat of 1984-style techniques', The Futurist, June, pp. 21-6. M arx, G. (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (Berkeley: University of California Press). M cdonnell, P. and Mena, J. (2003) 'Round 2 of INS Sign-ups Goes Well', Los A ngeles Times, 11 January, p. B l. M cGann, C. (2003) 'Protestors Accuse INS of "Very U n-A m erican" Registration; Hundreds Rally in Seattle; M any Fear Tracking Will be Used to "Target and

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P ro file "', Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 14 January, p. B l. Redd, C.K. (2003) 'Protestors Rally Against INS Rules Effort Decried as Racial Profiling', Boston Globe, 21 February, p. B3. Shane, S. (2003) 'Registration rules puzzle, anger Pakistanis in U S', The Sun (Baltimore), 5 January, p. 3A. Staples, W.G. (1997) The Culture o f Surveillance: Discipline and Social Control in the United States, Contem porary Social Issues, George Ritzer (ed) (New York: St M artin's Press). Thom as, L. (2003) 'Register or Risk D eportation', Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 16 M arch, p. C l. United States Departm ent of Homeland Security (USDHS) (2003) 'Fact Sheet: Changes to National Security E n try /E x it Registration System ', 1 Decem ber Press Release. Available at: < h ttp ://w w w .d h s.g o v /d h sp u b lic/ display?content=3020> (accessed 22 June 2004). United States Departm ent of Homeland Security (USDHS) (2004) 'US-VISTT Statistics'. Available at: < h ttp ://w w w .d h s.g o v /d h sp u b lic/in te rap p /e d ito rial/ editorial_0437.xm l> (accessed 9 July 2004). United States Departm ent of Justice (USDOJ) (2002) 'Attorney General Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System '. Available at: < h ttp ://w w w .u sd o j.go v /ag/sp eech es/2002/060502ag p rep ared rem arks. htm > (accessed 14 July 2004).

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Imperial embrace?: identification and constraints on m obility in a hegemonic empire John Torpey

I have previously argued that the ability to 'em b race' its m em bers effectively - to identify them ind ividu ally and to draw a boun dary around them collectively - is a key attribute o f m od ern nation states, a fact that m assiv ely prom oted the 'revolution identificatoire' that has characterized the d ev elop m ent of m od ern state bu reau cracy M eanw hile, E m m anuelle Saada has noted that 'the colonial setting played the role o f a laboratory for the "id en tify in g S ta te " ' (Saada 2003: 17). There is indeed good reason to think that this is the case; in G erm an S outhw est A frica, for exam ple, the G erm an gov ernm ent d eveloped in the cou rse o f its dom ination of colonial p opu lations a nu m ber o f the tech niques later applied against the Jew s. A gainst the backd rop o f recent d evelopm ents, how ever, one w ond ers w hether the nation state w asn 't, in turn, the 'lab o rato ry ' for em pire itself - a new kind o f em pire (if that is the correct term ) em bod ied by the p o st-C old W ar U nited States. T his chapter explores the q u estion o f w hether or not the U nited States is an 'em p ire' - w hich is o f cou rse in significant p art a m atter o f d efinition - and how the practices o f id entification and restrictions on m ovem ent associated w ith the 'iden tify in g State' relate to the qu estion o f em pire. I argue that, in con trast to the m od ern E uropean overseas em pires, and m u ch to the chagrin o f som e o f its con tem porary cheerlead ers, the U nited States is not and lacks even the desire to be an em pire in any very useful sense. H annah A rend t (1973: 1 2 5-34) detested E uropean im perialism for refu sing to extend the law s o f the m etropole to the subju gated territories, 157

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as the R om ans had done, and thus ru ling over their d om ains tyrannically; in con trast, the U nited States seem s to w ant to extend its law s to the territories it invades, but not actually to rule ov er them (directly, at least). H ence, for exam ple, G eorge Bush has said of the intervention in Iraq, 'I sent A m erican troops to Iraq to defend our security, n o t to stay as an occup ying power. I sen t A m erican troops to Iraq to m ake its people free, not to m ake them A m e rican .'1 For the tim e being, to be sure, any m ajor d ecisions about p olicy are m ad e in W ashington, n o t Baghdad, but the objective - on both sid es of the p olitical aisle - is to get o ut o f Iraq, not d eeper into it. T his is true in general o f A m erican d om inance, w hich is m ore 'so ft' than 'h ard '. To the exten t that it could be d escribed as an em pire at all, then, I suggest that w e m ight call it a 'h eg em onic em p ire', in w hich those dom inated by the U nited States often w elcom e the p ossibility o f sharing in w hat they take to be 'the A m erican d ream '. The usual im perial arrangem en t w hereby various groups are subordinated to a d om inant lineage and ethnic or religiou s group does not fit the case o f A m erican 'em p ire' very w ell, as the U nited States p opu lation itself is so diverse and m u lti-faceted , the p rod uct o f con stan t infusions from outside. D espite US m ilitary d om inance o f the w orld, its popu lation has com e to feel itself (and to som e exten t it really is) threatened in a novel m anner by enem ies w ho are not em bod ied in states bu t in loose n etw orks o f like-m ind ed w arriors externally (Al Q aeda) and in large nu m bers o f p red om inantly non-w hite m iscreants internally. In this context, the efforts to identify at a d istance those w ish in g to com e to the territory of the centre, and the incarceration o f both d om estic social castoffs and potential non-state attackers from outsid e, are p art of a far-flung policing-cu m -w ar m achinery that is intended to protect the inhabitants o f a cou ntry that exp eriences itself as threatened by those not enthu siastic about, or a part of, a m id dle-class, con su m ption-oriented populace. A ttem pts to em brace and con strain these elem ents are driven by a new kind o f 'fear fa cto r', one that has em erged from the post-C old W ar d eterioration o f trad itional class and ethical solidarities.

G e ttin g a grip on a h egem on ic em p ire

In the afterm ath of 9 /1 1 , only the second extern ally initiated attack on the U nited States since the W ar o f 1812, the cou ntry has m oved v igorously to enhan ce its capacity to track persons all over the w orld. T he U S-V ISIT program - u n d er the auspices o f the D epartm ent of H om eland Secu rity - 'seek s to supplant the natio n 's physical borders w ith w hat officials call virtual bord ers' and 'to track visitors long before they set foot' in the U nited States (L ichtblau and M ark off 2004). T his p roject goes far beyond the im portan t ad m inistrative innovation o f 'rem ote con tro l', a d evelopm ent 158

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that A ristide Zolberg (forthcom ing) has show n was a m ajor advance in nation states' efforts to forestall unw anted im m igration, beginning in the early twentieth century. At the sam e time, the United States has also moved to ensure its access to cannon fodder should it need m ore m ilitary recruits - a m ajor concern during the 2004 election cam paign with its accusations of the Bush adm inistration's deploym ent of a 'backdoor draft' and a m atter of continuing concern to the US military. Thus the D ecem ber 2001 'sm art bord er' declaration signed with Canada 'w ill prevent conscientious objectors (and cow ards) from finding sanctuary across the northern bord er' (Sutherland 2004). It has also given Border Patrol officers the pow er to exclude potential entrants at the C anadian and M exican borders (Swarns 2004b). In carrying out this intensified effort to keep terrorists out of A m erican territory, the Border Patrol has created checkpoints as much as 100 miles from the actual border that it calls 'Functional Equivalents of the B order', m oving the effective boundaries of the country far inland (Blum enthal 2004). Since 9 /1 1 , the United States governm ent has also m oved to require 27 industrialized countries w hose citizens do not currently require visas to enter the United States to provide them with tam per-proof m achinereadable passports. The program has hit m ajor obstacles, however, leading to requests for delays in im plem entation beyond the initial 26 October 2004 deadline ('Passport Deadline in Doubt' 2004; Sw arns 2004d). Before stepping dow n as the first Secretary of the D epartm ent of H om eland Security, Tom Ridge recom m ended that the US governm ent also begin to issue passports with a full set of the bearer's fingerprints, on the assum ption that 'the change would induce foreign governm ents to do the sam e on the passports they issue' (Wald 2005). In an effort 'to ensure that travelers do not vanish into the shadow s after their arrival in the country', the governm ent is also expanding its efforts to track the departures of those required to have a visa to enter the U nited States, taking fingerprints and digital photographs of them at eleven US airports ('Program Tracking Foreign Visitors' 2004; Sw arns 2004a). In addition, the governm ent is experim enting w'ith program s to allow 'frequent fliers' to undergo stream lined security checks at airports in exchange for giving the authorities more inform ation about them selves than does the average traveller. 'A m ong the areas in which the governm ent wants to gain experience [with these program s] is the issuing o f "biom etric" identification cards, incorporating data on fingerprints or iris scans, to thousands of people, and using them routinely in short transactions' (Wald 2004a; 'Program Enlists A bout 10,000 Frequent Fliers' 2004). A m ong these various options, the N ational Institute of Standards and Technology, the governm ent agency responsible for determ ining such m atters, has found that fingerprint system s 'perform ed better as a group 159

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than facial recognition system s', although it con tin ues to test such system s ('F in g erp rin t System s S u p e rio r' 2004). M eanw hile, largely poo r w ould -be entrants m u st run a 'g au n tlet of d eath ' at the U nited States' sou thern border, taking seriou s risks in p u rsu it o f the o pportu nity to earn con sid erably h igh er w ages than those available to them at hom e. Yet there are thou ght to be som e 10 m illion illegal m igrants insid e the territory of the U nited States, perh aps half o f w hom entered the cou ntry legally (and w ho shift into illegality sim ply by overstayin g their visas). T h ey p lay an im p ortan t role in the cou n try 's econom y, p articularly in p laces like C alifornia that receive a large nu m ber o f M exican im m igrants ('C rosses on B o rd er' 2004). From the po in t o f view o f citizenship , these persons m ay be U S citizens-in-w aiting w h o w ill ev en tu ally be granted or acquire A m erican citizenship , but in all events their U S-born children w ill do so autom atically by d in t of the U nited States' ju s soli ('law o f the soil') procedu re for a ttributing citizenship. O ne gen eration on, m em bers o f these groups will be full-fledged m em bers o f the nation state. W hile they exist in legal lim bo, how ever, one m igh t regard them as 'o u tsid ers w ithin'; they are the citizenship equivalen t of gh osts - there, but n o t really there from the poin t o f view of full, p olitical m em bership. In part as a result o f the p resence o f so m any 'u n d ocu m en ted ' residents (a m isnom er, really, as they m ay have all kinds o f d ocu m ents - ju st not auth entic papers attesting A m erican citizenship ), talk o f introd ucin g a national identity card has grow n louder; such d ocu m ents w ould help identify 'insid ers w ithin' - that is, those legitim ately inside the national territory and hence fully authorized to be and rem ain in the cou ntry and to enjoy access to the p olitical system ('A N ational ID ' 2004). O f course, such identity cards are only as good as the d ocu m ents used to acquire them , and cannot identify those w ho m ay w ish to do a people harm unless they have already fallen under the suspicion o f the auth orities in the first place. T h is shortcom in g explains the call for federal standards for the issuan ce o f d riv e r's licences and birth certificates now controlled at the state level, 'a problem highlighted by the ease w ith w hich the S ep tem ber 11 hijackers w ere able to obtain such d ocu m ents' (Sw arns 2004a). A s p art o f the legislation overhauling the U nited States' intelligence activities, the D epartm ent o f H om eland Secu rity will henceforth issue regulations on the d ocu m entation required before a state m ay grant a d riv e r's licence (Wald 2004d). Som e critics see this as a step on the road to a national ID card or, ind eed , 'a system o f internal p assp orts' (Wald 2004d). T hese con sid erations ad dress the efforts o f the w o rld 's leading pow er to regulate entry into and presence and m obility w ithin the cou n try 's territory. Yet in recent years the U nited States has also com e to ad m inister an 'extralegal penal em p ire' (Sontag 2004) in various parts o f the w orld,

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in w hich 'd etain ees' m ay be subjected to treatm ent w ithout the benefit of the protections accorded to prisoners u n d er various G en eva C onventions. This con fin em ent o peration involves the now -infam ou s A bu G hraib prison in Iraq, A fgh an istan 's Bagram A ir Base, G u antanam o Bay, and 'secret prisons now h olding the thou sand s w ho have been arrested and confined by A m erican and allied forces sin ce the attacks o f S ep tem ber 11' (D anner 2004). A ccord ing to a report by the International C om m ittee o f the Red C ross, 'b etw een 70 p er cen t and 90 p er cen t o f the p ersons dep rived o f their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by m istake' (D anner 2004). Strikingly, those detained m ay also d isappear into the carceral system w ithou t their fam ilies having any idea o f their w hereabou ts or how to find them . Som e of those w ho disappeared had d one so becau se Secretary o f D efense D onald Rum sfeld had ordered that they be seclud ed from the pryin g eyes of m on itoring groups (Schm itt and S hank er 2004). T his is hardly surprising, given the d iscovery of a m em o from 4 Jan u ary 2004 and w ritten by the top legal ad viser to the then-senior A m erican com m an d er in Iraq, Lt. G eneral Ricardo Sanchez, un abash ed ly laying out w hat the m em o 's title called a 'N ew Plan to R estrict Red C ross A ccess to A bu G h raib ' (Shanker and Elliott 2004). A t the sam e tim e, som e of those held in the penal archipelago have been detained 'as m u ch for w hat officials do not know about them as for w hat they d o' (G old en and Van N atta 2004); som etim es, the lack of inform ation begins w ith the very identity o f the person in question, as som e o f the prisoners have refused to give their nam es. T h e inform ation v alu e o f m any o f the prisoners held at G u antanam o Bay has been regarded by kn ow led geable experts - in clu ding analysts o f the C IA - to have been m u ch over-estim ated . Indeed, as o f Ju n e 2004 - n early tw o years after they w ere first incarcerated - 'inv estigators have been able to d eliver cases for m ilitary prosecu tion against only 15 o f the su sp ects" (G old en and Van N atta 2004). Then, in N ovem ber 2004, a federal ju d g e found that President Bush had over-stepped his con stitutional auth ority and im prop erly ignored the G eneva C on ventions by establish ing at G u antanam o Bay m ilitary com m issions d esigned to try d etainees as w ar crim inals (Lew is 2004). The abuse at A bu G hraib m ay yet be deem ed a w ar crim e, despite efforts by Bush ad m inistration law yers to interpret the statu tes on torture narrow ly w ith the objective o f circu m ventin g the relevant international and A m erican law (H oge 2004). A M arch 2003 m em o prepared for the ad m inistration con tain s a curious section in w hich the law yers argued that any torture com m itted at G u antanam o w ould n ot be a v io lation o f the anti-torture statu te becau se the base w as u n d er A m erican legal ju risd ictio n and

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the statu te con cern s only torture com m itted overseas. T h at view is in direct con flict w ith the position the ad m inistration has taken in the Suprem e C ou rt, w here it argued that p risoners at G u antanam o Bay are n o t entitled to con stitutional protections becau se the base is outsid e A m erican ju risd iction . (Lew is and Sch m itt 2004) T his w ould seem to be the legal equ iv alen t o f 'h av in g it both w ay s', and the Suprem e C ou rt w ould have none o f it. O n 28 Ju n e 2004 all of the ju stices save C larence Thom as ruled that 'enem y com b atan ts' both in the U nited States and in G u antanam o Bay m u st be given the opportu nity to challenge their d etention before a ju d g e or other 'n eu tral d ecisio n m ak er'. The C ou rt also ruled that federal ju d g es had ju risd iction to con sid er petitions for w rits o f habeas corpus from any o f the hund reds of non-citizens held at G u antanam o Bay w ho b elieve they are being detained illegally. C ontrary to the ad m in istratio n 's claim that G u antanam o Bay w as outsid e the US and hence outsid e those ju d g es' ju risd ictio n , the m ilitary base in C uba is in fact 'territo ry over w hich the U nited States exercises exclu siv e ju risd iction and con trol', accord ing to the C ou rt (G reenhouse 2004b). The Bush ad m inistration has appealed these rulings, but in Jan u ary 2005 a federal ju d g e held that the d etainees at G u antanam o Bay 'w ere clearly entitled to have federal cou rts exam ine w hether they have been law fully d etained ' (Lew is 2005). In all events, the av ailable evid ence ind icates that the abuse o f Iraqi prisoners is n o t 'th e isolated acts of a rogue nigh t sh ift', but system ic and p ervasive - d espite a directive by P resident Bush ord ering that all people detained by the U nited States as p art o f the w ar on terrorism be treated properly 'ev en if the U nited States consid ered them n o t to be protected by the G eneva C o n ventio ns'. The d ocu m ents relating to A bu G hraib that w ere released by the ad m inistration w ere p red ictably selective, and criticized as self-serving ly so by, am on g others, Senator P atrick Leahy and the editorial w riters o f the N ew York Times (Stevenson 2004; 'A b u G h raib, Stonew alled ' 2004). A gainst this background , one m igh t characterize those persons held in U S custod y abroad as 'ou tsid ers w itho u t' - v iolators o f w hat the U nited States m ilitary or gov ernm ent regard as the security concerns o f the US, and w ithou t protection eith er by US law or by international law s related to the treatm ent o f prisoners in w artim e. Surely the transgressions that took place in A bu G hraib w ere a function o f the extra-legal character of the A m erican m ilitary occup ation in Iraq (Fisher 2004; see also D anner 2004 and Tyler 2004). T hese m isdeed s are also a result o f the fact that the U nited States m ilitary 'is being sw iftly p rivatized before our ey es', and 'in an aston ishing lapse on the p art of A m erican legislators, the actions

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of the tens o f thou sand s of [m ilitary] con tractors in Iraq are n ot governed by any com prehen siv e body o f crim inal law ' (K eefe 2004). T he situ ation of those detained in overseas US prisons thus bears som e resem blance to w hat H annah A rendt once said abou t the stateless p opu lations o f Europe: 'their p lig h t is not that they are n ot equal before the law, bu t that no law exists for them ' (A rendt 1973). The kinds o f abuses that have been un covered in the overseas penal em pire, m ean w hile, are thou ght to be not u ncom m on in prisons in the U nited States them selves, 'w h ere a nu m ber o f guards at A bu G hraib w orked in their civilian liv es' (Z ernike and Rohde 2004). Indeed, the p reoccu pation w ith terrorism has led to at least one case o f a poor innocent d isappearing into the federal prisons for m onths on suspicion o f terrorism . A visa over­ stayer from N epal w ho w as arrested for p hotog rap hing - apparently unbeknow n to him - a building con tain in g an FBI office in N ew York City 'w as sw allow ed up in the g o v ern m en t's new m axim um secu rity system of secret d etention and secret hearings, and his only friend w as the sam e FBI agen t w ho had helped decide to p u t him there'. The p rison in Brooklyn w here the m an w as d etained has been cited by the D epartm ent o f Ju stice's inspector general for 'a p attern of physical and m ental m istreatm ent of post9 /1 1 d etain ees', in clu ding 'slam m in g d etainees into w alls, m ocking them d uring unnecessary strip -searches, and secretly taping their con versations w ith law yers'. A ccord in g to the m an 's Legal A id law yer, as a result o f the secret system operated by the Bush ad m inistration Ju stice D epartm ent, 'there is no w ay to kn ow ' w hether non-citizens continue to be treated in a m an ner sim ilar to that o f the u n fortu n ate N epalese m an (B ernstein 2004; see also Dow 2004). N ot surprisingly, perhaps, the d ev elop m ent o f the overseas penal em pire follow s the em ergence ov er the p ast tw o d ecad es of a m assiv e 'prisonind ustrial com p lex' in the U nited States itself, w hich has involved an enorm ous grow th o f penal institutions and prison p op u lations (Butterfield 2004b). This rem arkable expan sion o f the 'correctional p o p u latio n ' has occurred d espite d eclines in the rates o f crim es of property and violence from 1993 to 2002 to 30-year low s (Wald 2004b; Butterfield 2004a). In ad dition to the grow th in the nu m bers of those im prisoned, the average length o f sen tences grew from 23 m on ths in 1995 to 30 m onths in 2001 (Butterfield 2004c). Som e insist that the treatm ent o f foreign p risoners in such n otorious locales as Iraq 's A bu G hraib is only the overseas analogue of the treatm ent accorded p risoners in the U nited States itself (H erbert 2004). In con trast to the illegal im m ig rant p opu lation ('ou tsid ers w ith in '), these U S citizens are 'insid ers w ith o u t' - that is, insid e the territory bu t outside the society and often w ithou t access to its political system . T he p opu lation

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held in the US prison system is disproportionately non-w hite, especially black (A frican-A m erican); indeed, one in ten black m en aged 25 to 29 were in prison in 2003 (Butterfield 2004c). The system contains so m any poorly educated blacks that incarceration has com e to be view ed as 'a new stage in the life course of young, low-skill black m en' (Pettit and Western 2004). To a considerable extent, the rise in incarceration rates has been a result of the more vigorous prosecution of drug-related offences and longer and m andatory sentencing of those convicted. Often, the segregation from the larger society also entails exclusion from its political system due to the fact that m any states disenfranchise convicted felons, even after they leave prison (Staples 2004; Behrens, U ggen and M anza 2003). In the eyes of David Garland, a leading specialist on these m atters, the m assive expansion of carceral institutions and populations in recent years reflects a shift from the 'old regim e' of 'penal w elfarism ', in w hich the dom inant expectation was of reform and rehabilitation, to a regim e of 'punitive segregation' that aim s only 'to punish and exclude' (Garland 2002: 140). The em phasis on anticipatory action to forestall crim e in G arland's interpretation of the new regim e of crim e control eerily resonates with the Bush adm inistration's argum ents about the need for preventive strikes against w hat it deem s threatening countries. The shift in punishm ent regim es is tied to changes in the political econom y and, in the U nited States itself, to changes in the status of blacks in A m erican society as a result of the 'civil rights revolution'. Punitive segregation has been accom panied by a m assive m ovem ent of w hites out of the cities and into suburbs, increasingly including gated com m unities that offer privatized security arrangem ents for those who can afford such quarters. It seem s m ore than coincidental that the boom in such housing took off soon after the adoption of landm ark laws that sought to guarantee the legal equality of blacks in A m erican society (Blakely and Snyder 1997). O ne m ight argue that the inhabitants of the 'penal em pire', both dom estic and foreign, are forced m igrants of a sort - expelled by governm ent pow er for shorter or longer periods into zones from w hich they cannot return - but from w hich they will eventually return, like m ost forced m igrants, aggrieved and em bittered (if they return at all). O nce their freedom of m obility is restored to them, they are likely to have difficulty re-integrating into the society from w hich they cam e and resentm ent about w hat has happened to them. As one Arab com m entator put it with regard to the prisoners held in Cuba, 'G uantanam o is a huge problem for A m ericans. ... Even those w ho were not hard-core extrem ists have now been indoctrinated by the true believers. Like [in] any other prison, they have been taught to hate. If they let these people go, these people will m ake trouble' (Golden and Van Natta 2004). Indeed, upon release, several

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A fghan d etainees returned to the battlefield as com m an d ers or fighters for the Taliban. Sim ilarly, observers of the Spanish prisons have found the radical Islam ists regard the jails as prim e recruiting ground s as well (M cL ean 2004). To be sure, at least som e o f those caugh t up in the penal em pire are guilty o f crim es o f one sort or another, or m ay bear anim u s tow ards the U nited States and its w ay o f life and w ish to do A m ericans harm . But the crim es for w hich so m an y have been incarcerated d om estically are clearly o f an ephem eral nature, not the sort of thing that w ill rem ain on the books w hen ever the curren t w ave o f repression passes. Sim ilarly, if the 'w ar on terrorism ' w as being condu cted m ore clearly un der the auspices of international law, m any o f those held overseas w ould be freed; in m an y cases, how ever, the current U S go v ernm ent sim ply does n o t w ish to con form to the dictates of that law. W hether d om estic or foreign, those detained m ay spend the rem aind er o f their lives un der various kinds of surv eillance and restricted m obility, on the basis of the identities now stored in the m any d atabases linked together for secu rity and other pu rposes (Pear 2004). W hether citizens o f the U nited States or not, ind ividu als are increasingly su bject to one or another form o f 'em b race' by the A m erican state. C on trary to traditional con servative strictures against the grow th of go v ernm ent pow er, the U nited States in recent years has m oved energetically to m obilize the state w ith the aim o f protectin g the p opu lation and territory, and this has m ean t a significant effort to enhan ce its grip on persons w ithin and w ithou t (Sw arns 2004c; Brooks 2004). M eanw hile, priv ate p arties seek residential and other arrangem en ts that segregate them from groups regarded as d angerous, recalcitrant and deviant. A nd yet d espite this m ajor d rive tow ards an enhanced em brace o f both d om estic and external popu lations, the US Suprem e C ou rt has recently been forced to address the very basic question of w hether ind ividu als can be required to identify them selves to the auth orities or not. A N evad a m an w ho w as pulled over by the police refused (11 tim es!) to give his nam e to the arresting officer. T his refusal violated a N evada law requ iring people in suspicious circu m stan ces to tell police their nam es; 20 U S states and a nu m ber o f cities and tow ns had such law s on their books at the tim e of this incident. The m an, Larry D. H iibel, refused to identify him self on the ground that d oing so w ould violate his rights un der the Fourth A m end m ent (unreasonable search and seizu re) and the Fifth A m end m ent (avoiding self-incrim ination). U ltim ately, the Suprem e C ou rt upheld the m an 's con viction , arguing that the d ivulgen ce o f the m an 's nam e w as reasonably required un der existing statutes and did not entail a v iolation of the con stitutional rights he invoked. But the C ou rt w as sharply divided; the vote w as 5 - 4 to sustain the low er cou rts' ruling. In d issen ting opinions,

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several justices (the m ore liberal ones) argued that the requirem ent to identify oneself did overstep the authority of the law. Despite losing the particular cause at issue, M arc Rotenberg, the executive director of the Electronic Privacy Inform ation Center (EPIC), one of the leading groups w orking to defend privacy rights, noted that the C ourt's m ajority had raised constitutional doubts about w hether a dem and for identification docum ents, as opposed to merely the person's nam e, w ould be acceptable. Rotenberg stressed his concern about the relationship betw een a possible national ID card and the potential for tapping into the vast am ounts of inform ation stored in inter-linked databases. This case suggests that, despite w hat som e would argue is a drift towards (or indeed the fa it accom pli of) 'em p ire' (in the sense of a political system of unilateral arbitrariness, legal unaccountability and tyrannical rule over other populations), the United States still has m any of the legal safeguards that characterize liberal dem ocracies as opposed to authoritarian states. The law can't do m uch w ith people w hose identities are unknow n - other than incarcerate them, w hich is not a very good or defensible solution w hen the offence is minor. But there is clearly a significant division of opinion over w hether or not individuals m ay be com pelled to reveal to officials w ho they are, and the indications are that the issue will have to be revisited later (Greenhouse 2004a, 2004b). In the heart of the 'em pire', it m ay turn out that persons m ay legitim ately refuse to tell the authorities w ho (and hence to som e degree 'w hat') they are.

T h e question o f em pire

A gainst this background, w e m ay return to the question posed at the outset: Is the United States behaving in these various efforts like an em pire? There are perhaps four basic answ ers to this question: 1) Yes, the United States is an em pire, and that's a good thing (or would be if put properly into practice). Those w ho answ er in this fashion tend to be neo-conservatives and certain hum an-rights liberals. The form er endorse its intervention in Iraq; the latter w ant it to intervene in Darfur. Thus Sam antha Pow er has recently w ritten of the United States as an 'em pire of hum an rights' - if only it lived up to its com m itm ents in this regard (Pow er 2003).2 2) Yes, the U nited States is an em pire, and that's a bad thing. This is the response of the traditional anti-im perialist left, perhaps best represented by N oam Chomsky. Those in this cam p see the United States as enorm ously pow erful and w ith a habitual tendency to invade and oppress other countries, especially the sm aller and weaker.

Imperial embrace?

3) No, the United States is not an em pire, nor should it be. It should avoid foreign entanglem ents, as the Founding Fathers once recom m ended, and look after its own concerns. Pat Buchanan is a leading representative of this view. 4) No, the U nited States is not an em pire, and that's bad. T hat is, the U nited States has the pow er to intervene in parts of the w orld that need fixing, but it is too isolationist and too unwilling to engage w ith the rest of the w orld to assum e the obligations of em pire. This is the view of the British (and now H arvard) historian N iall Ferguson, w hich he has laid out in a num ber of his w ritings. Ferguson w ishes the U nited States and its citizens w ere less parochial and more w illing to assum e the mantle of the British empire. Yet these view s often seem to over-state the pow er of the U nited States and to m isrepresent its nature. One m easure of the 'em pire' is its w orldw ide m ilitary presence and capacity. These are undoubtedly great and, indeed, unm atched by any other country. W ith regard to the overall level of US m ilitary power, Paul K ennedy has recently stated, on the basis of Time m agazine's recent estim ate, that the U nited States has 368,000 people in its 'national service' stationed in 120 countries (K ennedy 2004). Still, as was noted earlier, the United States is m oving dram atically towards the privatization of its m ilitary forces. This is partially a m atter of trying to 'outsource' certain activities in order to reap supposed gains of efficiency and cost. It is also an effort to appear to be 'dow nsizing' the m ilitary at a tim e w hen A m ericans have little stom ach for large-scale m ilitary losses and w hen there is little doubt that a draft w ould provoke m ajor upheaval. W ith developm ents such as these taking place in the w orld 's leading power, w e m ay be w itnessing the end of the W estphalian period that Max W eber had used to define the m odern state as that entity w ith a m onopoly on the legitim ate use of violence (Keefe 2004; Ignatieff 2000). A t the sam e tim e that the U nited States has such unchallengeable resources for projecting force and intim idating potential opponents around the w orld, the Bush adm inistration is clearly m oving towards a rearrangem ent of A m erican m ilitary forces based on a rethinking of their uses. For exam ple, the Pentagon plans to replace two A rm y divisions (typically including three brigades and 20,000 m en) w ith a single brigade in Germany, and a 'w'ing' of F-16 fighters currently based there w ill be moved to Turkey. These plans com prise 'the m ost significant rearrangem ent of the A m erican m ilitary around the w orld since the beginning of the Cold War, according to A m erican and allied officials' (Gordon 2004). Similarly, plans are afoot to w ithdraw 12,500 A m erican troops from South Korea. A ccording to Defense Secretary Donald Rum sfeld, 'It is not num bers of things. ... It is capability to im pose lethal power, w here needed, w hen

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needed, w ith the greatest flexibility and with the greatest agility' (Brooke and Shanker 2004). W hat is striking, however, from the point of view of considering the nature of Am erican pow er is that significant elem ents in both regions regret this departure of A m erican power. Despite the recent contretemps betw een the U nited States and 'old Europe', anti-A m ericanism probably rem ains far stronger in South Korea. Yet in each of the above-m entioned zones from w hich Am erican troops are to be withdraw n, influential voices w ould prefer them to stay. These facts suggest that the United States is not the hated 'em pire' that m any claim it is; the elem ent of w hat Joseph N ye called 'soft p ow er' in contem porary A m erican dom inance cannot be gainsaid. To som e extent, the use of the term 'em pire' to describe the United States is sim ply a way of tarring it w ith a brush that is no longer defensible. In the post-colonial age of the nation state, em pires are not acceptable or legitim ate form s of political organization. They sm ack of heteronom y - 'subjection to an external law or p o w er', according to the Oxford English Dictionary - and lack of dem ocratic participation. Those w ho w ish to deride the U nited States by using the term 'em pire' to characterize it may have an inflated view of its capacities. There are signs of w eakness in the Am erican 'em pire' that suggest that the country is not as pow erful as is often claim ed - w hether by supporters or detractors. H ence Em m anuel Todd has argued that A m erican pow er has over-reached in the sense that it is becom ing increasingly dependent upon foreigners for its current consum ption and, as a result of grow ing deficits in trade and current accounts, dangerously vulnerable to changes in policy and behaviour by other countries - especially Japan and China, w hich hold a large per centage of A m erican debt. Similarly, m obilizing his 'IEM P' (ideological, econom ic, m ilitary and political) m odel of pow er to analyse contem porary developm ents, M ichael M ann argues that the U nited States has becom e increasingly w eak econom ically because of the size of its trade deficits and the extent of foreign ow nership of A m erican financial assets. Both of these com m entators see the US as a giant with clay feet, m ilitarily unchallengeable but econom ically rather shaky (Todd 2003; M ann 2003). There is, of course, debate am ong econom ic analysts over the long-term significance of these developm ents (U chitelle 2004). The point rem ains that, how ever predom inant in m ilitary terms at present, A m erican suprem acy is likely to be neither eternal nor long unim peachable.

Conclusion

Contem porary A m erican dom inance, if not 'em p ire', involves to a

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con sid erable extent efforts to strength en the state w ith the aim o f extend ing its em brace to those w hose m ovem ents it w ish es to con strain, w hether these are un desirables from w ithou t or from w ithin. T h e latter - 'insid ers w ith o u t' - are persons subject to a m ore strin gent degree o f con straint and control than had been sou gh t for persons sim ilarly situated in the previous regim e o f crim e control. In ad dition to the efforts to strengthen state control over such persons, recent d evelopm ents in crim e control have pu shed in the d irection o f greater priv ate efforts to p rev ent crim e and segregate stigm atized popu lations. The increased spread o f preventive strategies w ith regard to d om estic crim e resonates w ith new m ilitary and secu rity d octrines that p rom ulgate anticipatory interventions against rogue elem ents deem ed to represent an external threat; these m ay be held as 'ou tsid ers w ith o u t', beyond the reach o f eith er U S law or international law. T h e m ovem ents o f 'ou tsid ers w ith in ' are m ade m ore com plicated and subject to greater surveillance, but m ainly w ith the aim o f locating and appreh end ing terrorists. M any 'ou tsid ers w ith in ' - the 'illegal aliens', p red om inantly from Latin A m erica - rem ain a p op u lation vital to the w ellbeing o f the A m erican econom y, and hence a group that is 'w anted but not w elco m e' (Zolberg 1987). Perhaps m o st em blem atic o f the current con stellation, how ever, are the 'o u tsid ers w itho u t' - those detained by A m erican entities overseas and frequ ently d eprived o f the rights that w ould norm ally accru e to 'en em y com b atan ts' un der international law, or to b eneficiaries o f A m erican law under the constitution. D espite opposition from the Suprem e C ou rt (D w orkin 2004), the Bush ad m inistration has been inclined to ignore such d ocu m ents as the G eneva C on ventions and such organizations as the Red Cross. Its disregard for these bulw arks o f the international ord er has inflam ed w orld opinion and given rise to an increasing p roclivity to regard the U nited States as an em pire - or even a 'rog u e natio n ' (P restow itz 2003). Perhaps Raym ond A ron's notion o f the US as the p olitical equiv alen t o f a platypu s - as an 'im p erial rep u blic', that is - rem ains apt (A ron 2003). If the U nited S tates is an em pire, it is one that is curren tly d em onstratin g a trem endous interest in con trolling the m ovem ents o f persons w ithin and across its borders - n o t a characteristic typically associated w ith em pires.

N o te s 1 2

Speech on 24 M ay 2004. W illiam Shaw cross appears to straddle the divide betw een these two groups; see Shaw cross (2004) and Asm us (2004).

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R e fe re n c e s

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G reenhouse, L. (2004a) 'Sup rem e C ourt H ears C ase of M an W ho W ithheld ID ', N ew York Times national edition, 23 M arch, p. A14. G reenhouse, L. (2004b) 'Ju stices A ffirm Legal Rights o f "E n em y C o m b a ta n ts'", N ew York Times national edition, 29 Jun e, pp. A l, A14. H erbert, B. (2004) 'A m erica's A bu G h raibs', N ew York Times national edition, 31 May, p. A21. H oge, W. (2004) 'U N Rights C h ief Says Prison A buse M ay be W ar C rim e', Nezv York Times national edition, 5 Jun e, p. A5. Ignatieff, M. (2000) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (N ew York: M etropolitan Books). K eefe, P R . (2004) 'Iraq: A m erica's Private A rm ies', N ew York R eview o f Books, 12 A ugust, pp. 4 8 -9 . Kennedy, P. (2004) 'M ission Im possible?', N ew York R eview o f Books, 10 June, p. 18. L ew is, N .A. (2004) 'U S Ju d ge H alts W ar-Crim e Trial at G u antanam o', N ew York Times national edition, 9 N ovem ber, pp. A l, A14. Lew is, N .A. (2005) 'Ju dge Extends Legal Rights For G uantanam o D etainees', New York Times national edition, 1 February, pp. A12. Lew is, N .A . and Schm itt, E. (2004) 'L aw yers D ecided Bans on Torture D id n 't Bind B u sh ', Nezv York Times national edition, 8 Jun e, pp. A l, A10. Lichtblau, E. and M arkoff, J. (2004) 'U S N earing Deal on Way to Track Foreign V isitors', N ew York Times national edition, 24 May, pp. A l, A 18. M ann, M. (2003) Incoherent Em pire (N ew York: Verso). M cLean, R. (2004) 'Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for R adical Islam ', Ne~w York Times national edition, 31 O ctober, p. 8. 'P assport D eadline in D oubt' (2004) N ew York Times national edition, 15 June, p. A18. Pear, R. (2004) 'Survey Finds U S A gencies Engaged in "D ata M in in g "', New York Times national edition, 27 May, p. A24. Pettit, B. and W estern, B. (2004) 'M ass Im prisonm ent and the Life Course: race and class inequality in U S incarceration', A m erican Sociological Review , 69, pp. 151-69. Power, S. (2003) 'D as Em pire der M enschenrechte', in U. Speck and N. Sznaider (eds) E m pire A m erika: Perspektiven einer neuen W eltordnung (M unich: DVA), pp. 138-55. Prestow itz, C. (2003) Rogue N ation: A m erican U nilateralism and the Failure o f Good Intentions (N ew York: Basic Books). 'Program Enlists A bout 10,000 Frequent Fliers' (2004) New York Times national edition, 5 Septem ber, pp. 1 ,1 4 . 'Program Tracking Foreign Visitors to be E xpan ded ' (2004) N ew York Times national edition, 4 A ugust, p. A14. Saada, E. (2003) 'T he H istory o f Lessons: pow er and rule in im perial form ations', Item s & Issues, 4:4, p. 17. Schm itt, E. and Shanker, T. (2004) 'Rum sfeld Issued an O rder to H ide D etainee in Iraq', Nezv York Times national edition, 17 June, pp. A l, A8. Shanker, T. and Elliott, A. (2004) 'R u m sfeld A dm its H e Told Jailers to K eep D etainee

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in Iraq Out of Red Cross View', N ew York Times national edition, 18 June, p. A13. Shawcross, W. (2004) Allies: The US, Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs). Sontag, S. (2004) 'Regarding the Torture of O thers', New York Times M agazine, 23 May, p. 29. Staples, B. (2004) 'H ow Denying the Vote to Ex-Offenders Underm ines Dem ocracy', New York Times national edition, 17 September, editorial page. Stevenson, R.W. (2004) 'Orders by Bush A bout Prisoners Set H um ane Tone', New York Times national edition, 23 June, pp. A l, A10. Sutherland, R. (2004) 'Draft Dilem m a', The Guardian, 31 May. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .guardian.co.u k /g 2 /s to r y /0 ,3604,1228178,00.htm l Sw am s, R.L. (2004a) 'Som e Steps Put in Place to Aid Border Security', New York Times national edition, 26 July, p. A12. Sw am s, R.L. (2004b) 'U S to Give Border Patrol Agents the Pow er to Deport Illegal Aliens', New York Times national edition, 11 August, pp. A l, A ll. Sw am s, R.L. (2004c) 'G overnm ent to Take Over Watch-List Screening', New York Times national edition, 17 August, p. A14 Sw am s, R.L. (2004d) 'U S Acts to N otify Foreigners of Tougher Rules for Visits', New York Times national edition, 11 September, p. A16. Todd, E. (2003) The Breakdown o f the American Order (New York: Colum bia University Press). Tyler, P. (2004) 'UN Chief Ignites Firestorm by Calling Iraq War "Ille g a l"', Neiv York Times national edition, 17 September, p. A ll. Uchitelle, L. (2004) 'U S and Trade Partners M aintain Unhealthy Long-Term Relationship', New York Times national edition, 18 September, pp. B l, B4. Wald, M.L. (2004a) 'Program Would Ease Security a Bit for Frequent Fliers', New York Times national edition, 16 June, p. A15. Wald, M.L. (2004b) 'M ost Crim es of Violence and Property H over at 30-Year Low s', New York Times national edition, 13 September, p. A12 Wald, M.L. (2004c) 'Congress Close to Establishing Rules for D river's Licenses', New York Times national edition, 11 October, p. A21. Wald, M.L. (2004d) 'U S to Specify Documents Needed for D river's Licenses', New York Times national edition, 9 December, p. A27. Wald, M.L. (2005) 'Ridge Wants Fingerprints in Passports', Neiv York Times national edition, 13 January, p. A22. Zernike, K. and Rohde, D. (2004) 'Forced N udity of Iraqi Prisoners is Seen as a Pervasive Pattern, not Isolated Incidents', New York Times national edition, 8 June, p. A ll. Zolberg, A. (1987) 'Wanted But Not Welcome: alien labor in western developm ent', in W. Alonzo (ed.) Population in an Interacting World (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press), pp. 36-74. Zolberg, A. (forthcoming) A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning o f Am erica (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

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Fencing the line: analysis o f the recent rise in security measures along disputed and undisputed boundaries John W. Donaldson

I. Introduction 1.1 Images o f a borderless w orld

The tearing d ow n o f the B erlin W all and em ph asis on cross-border coo p eratio n w ithin a globalized w orld w as believ ed in the 1990s to have harkened in an age w h en the inclination w as to be tow ards new ideas and practices w hich sou gh t to distance the notion o f the international bou n d ary as a linear barrier (L aitinen 2003: 37). It is true that the con ditions of globalization in the m od ern w orld - in clu ding the flow o f inform ation across boun daries, the rise in international trade, the p roliferation o f corporation s w ith w orld w id e influence, the ease of international travel and, m o st significantly, the increase in the nu m ber of regional econom ic u nions - have affected the trad itional ch aracteristics of a b ou n d ary as a d istin ct line o f sep aratio n .’ These factors led to a notion that absolu te state sovereign ty over fixed parcels o f territory w as b ein g erod ed .2 This process w as su ccinctly defined as 'd e-territorialisatio n ' and w as described b y N ew m an as: T his notion o f absolu te form o f p olitical legitim acy that occurs w ithin a rigid ly defined state territory, d eterm ined by the course o f hu m an-m ad e b oun daries, is b ein g called into question. State sovereignty is, so it is argued, bein g brok en d ow n as boun daries 173

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have becom e m ore perm eable than in the p ast and no longer fulfil one o f their basic functions - to act as physical barriers to transboun dary m ovem ent. (Pratt and Brow n 2000: 20) Even in the m id st of presum ed 'd e-territorialisatio n ', m an y nation states and their p opu lations rem ained p assionate about territory.’ H ow ­ ever, the p erv ad in g sense o f global insecurity in the w ake o f the 11 S ep tem ber 2001 attacks has led m any m ore states to re-exam in e their territorial boundaries less as areas o f interaction w ith neighbou ring states, and m ore as areas that need to be m onitored and secured. 1.2 Bou ndaries, defence a n d te rrito ria l co n flict

H istorically, states v iew ed their bou n d aries from a d efen sive perspective, as the ram parts from w hich to d efend their territory. T he securin g o f a land bou n d ary along its entire length, over hills and m ou ntains, across stream s, rivers, etc. w as trad itionally intend ed to m eet an organized m ilitary threat from an opposing state, usually w ithin a d ispute over territory (i.e. fear o f conquest). Som e fam ou s historical exam ples of extensive, m an -m ad e bou n d ary d efences inclu d e the G reat W all of C hina, the R om an H ad rian 's W all, the French M aginot Line and, m ore recently, the Iron C u rtain betw een E ast and W est Germ any.4 C h anges in m ilitary tech nology through the tw entieth cen tu ry led to a decline in the bo u n d ary as a line o f d efence, as forces and tactics gained m obility and w eapons gained range. T hese d evelopm ents w ere ind icative o f w arfare betw een large organized m ilitary forces, able to qu ickly seize and hold territory. But states have identified n ew threats, outsid e the con text of com bat betw een n ational arm ies, w hich have prom pted a return to old d efensive m easures. T h at trad itional notion of a d efen siv ely secured bou n d ary con tin ues in long-ru nn ing territorial d isputes around the w orld such as in K orea, w here standard m ilitary forces stretch along a bou n d ary or line facing opposing m ilitary forces. It w as thou ght such m easures w ere b ecom in g increasingly anachron istic in a p ost-C old W ar w orld , w hich envisioned an end to the m acro-territorial conflict betw een opposing state m ilitary forces. N everth eless, recently tw o states w ithin prolonged territorial disputes, India and Israel, have begu n establish ing bou n d ary defence and secu rity m easures. The natu re of these recent m easures reflects the new threats to states, identified as sm all irregu lar forces (e.g. terro rists/ insurgents), illegal im m igration and sm uggling, rather than state-versusstate conflict. But w ithin the potential settlem en t o f these territorial disputes, bou n d ary secu rity m easures m ay have m u ch m ore effect on the legal and p olitical battles than on actual battlefield tactics. 174

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1.3 B ou nd ary security outside territorial disputes

The events of 11 Septem ber 2001 have re-aw akened the traditional sense of the international boundary as a line of defence for the state. In the period follow ing the terrorist attacks on the United States, m any countries around the world initially tightened security at airports, sea ports and m ajor crossing points along land boundaries, in an effort to thw art the m ovem ent of m ilitants and terrorists. Subsequently, popular dem and for protection from terrorists has expanded to include a call for governm ents to address other cross-boundary problem s, including w eapons and drugs sm uggling and illegal im m igration. U nder the influence of popular opinion clam ouring for increased security, and with attention already focused on the m ajor points of entry, m any governm ents have focused substantial security resources along their land boundaries. The increase in boundary security m easures in the post-Septem ber 11 environm ent has occurred along boundaries or through territories which are both in dispute and not in dispute betw een neighbouring states. Such m easures along agreed and undisputed boundaries are certainly nothing new, but the scale and num ber of the recent increases has occurred at a tim e when the separation betw een the territories of two states was hoped to be m ore cooperative and less definitive; m ore zonal and less than linear. U nder this argum ent, fixed boundary defences w ithin territorial disputes such as Korea could have been considered sim ply an exception, a relic of another tim e w here standard forces faced off over large tracts of territory. Concepts of 'de-territorialisation' envisioned less rigid definition of territory with no real need for boundary defences along agreed boundaries betw een seem ingly friendly neighbouring states. However, it now seem s apparent that the international com m unity is disapproving of states that have not im posed tight boundary security m easures. The popular concept seem s to be that states with insecure boundaries m ight be used as potential harbours for trans-national m ilitan ts/terrorists. This study hopes to give an overview of the exact nature of the new boundary security m easures introduced w ithin disputed territory and along several undisputed boundaries. From analysis of the case studies, it will be seen w hat influence the im position o f border security measures m ight have in term s of dispute settlem ent and perceptions about bilateral relations. 2

Boundary security measures in disputed areas

2 .1Territorial and boundary disputes

It is im portant, at the outset, to m ake the difficult distinction betw een territorial disputes and boundary disputes. With significant overlap 175

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and no clear distinction betw een the two types, m any disputes could easily be defined as relating to both territory and boundaries. Territorial disputes involve the disputed title to sovereignty usually over a large area of territory and its population. In som e cases a territorial dispute m ay not involve land boundaries, as in the case of disputed islands5 or in cases w here the extent of territory is clearly defined. However, a territorial dispute will often have a boundary elem ent, in terms of defining the exact extent of the disputed territory. Boundary disputes on land concern the precise definition of the course of an international boundary betw een two states. Sovereignty over territory is usually not the central focus of a boundary dispute, but rather the exact definition of territory. O bviously it can be argued that even in a boundary dispute w here the territory involved m ay be very sm all, that the dispute involves claim s to sovereignty, but the issues involved with boundary definition are more specific. In m any cases the boundary elem ent is an extrem ely im portant aspect of the territorial dispute and usually m anifests in the post-conflict settlem ent process. A lthough the scale of territory in dispute is usually m uch smaller, a boundary dispute can be ju st as volatile as a territorial dispute. So while territorial and boundary disputes can be distinguished very roughly as separate categories, a boundary dispute can very easily develop from a territorial dispute. As J.G . M errills (1999: 98) points out '... because establishing title and determ ining its extent are separate questions, deciding that a particular piece of territory belongs to a certain state m ay generate further disputes about boundaries.'

3 Recent boundary security measures in Kashm ir and the W est Bank

The territorial disputes betw een India and Pakistan over the province of Jam m u /K ashm ir, and betw een Israel and Palestine are perhaps the two highest-profile territorial disputes, as they involve disputed title over large areas of territory and population. In neither case does the dispute exclusively concern the actual position of an international boundary, although it will certainly need to be addressed in the settlem ent of the territorial dispute. M ost im portantly for this discussion, there have been recent, unilateral efforts to erect border security m easures, including fencing and w alls, betw een the opposing sides. These efforts have both been sharply criticized, particularly by the opposing parties, in relation to their influence in the potential settlem ent of these territorial disputes.

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3.1 India and Pakistan (Kashmir/Jammu - The Line o f C ontrol)

The dispute betw een India and Pakistan over the region of Jam m u and K ashm ir dates back to 1947 when the M aharajah of Kashm ir agreed to accede to the new ly independent state of India. Pakistan refuted this accession and fighting broke out in 1948. In 1949 a cease fire line was agreed by the tw o sides in the Karachi Agreem ent, but fighting broke out again in 1971 and several areas on either side of the cease fire line changed hands. The tw o sides signed another cease fire agreem ent in 1972 (the Sim la Agreem ent) which established the Line o f Control (LoC), generally follow ing the 1949 cease fire line with several m inor deviations. Current situation

The LoC essentially m arks the lim it of the respective forces as defined in the 1972 Sim la Agreement. No official buffer zone has ever officially been estab lish ed / but the forces are certainly separated at varying distances along the LoC by som ething akin to an inform al no-m an'sland. Scattered gunfire is frequently exchanged, although a current

J A M M U A N D K A S H M IR REFERENCE MAP International Boundaries • Cites (> 100.000 population) ------ De tocto. demarcated • Other selected towns ------De lacto. undemarcated Capaais are underlined (including ‘ Line of Control*) ........Claimed, but not de lacto 0 ^ 50 mi-

Figure 1. Kashmir and the LoC. Source: IBRU 177

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cease fire establish ed in 2003 appears to be holding. The extent o f the m ilitary fortifications along the LoC is u nknow n, but certain ly involves a large nu m b er o f static em placem ents originally intend ed to defend against m ilitary forces. T h e UN M ilitary O b server G roup In d ia /P a k ista n (U N M O G IP ) ostensibly con tin ues to observe the cease fire although it has v ery little influence over the opposing forces, p o ssessin g only 44 m ilitary observers.7 The LoC itself has never been m arked on the ground by fencing or other m eans." Fence a lon g the L o C

With opposing m ilitary forces in a d ead lock along the Line o f Control, India curren tly believes its m ost im m ed iate threat is from K ashm iri m ilitan ts w ho cross the LoC from P akistani-controlled areas and com m it terrorist attacks w ithin Indian-held Kashm ir. T hese are n o t regular Pakistani m ilitary forces, although Islam abad has in the p ast ad m itted to giving the m ilitan ts w hat it term ed 'm o ral su p p ort'. In the recent clim ate o f the 'w ar on te rro r', Pakistan has m ad e efforts to restrict the activities o f the K ashm iri m ilitants w ithin areas un der its control. N evertheless, in 2001 India began construction o f a 340 m ile-long fence (in som e places electrified ) along its side o f the LoC, inclu ding a v ariety o f m otion and therm al im aging sen sors to d etect cross-bou nd ary incursions. Tem porary m ud w alls reported ly w ere built in som e areas to protect those con stru cting the fence itself from P akistani shelling and snipers. There is no reason to believe that the boun dary fence is a strategic com p onent of In d ia's m ilitary defence against a fu ll-scale assau lt by P akistan 's m ilitary forces. Instead, it is clearly m eant to m onitor and d eter the m ov em ent of sm all groups a n d /o r ind ividu als across the LoC. Pakistan has reacted sharply to In d ia's actions, b elievin g that such fencin g is an effort by India to valid ate the LoC as an official boundary betw een the tw o states. This is d espite the fact that Ind ia's fencing does n ot directly follow the LoC and is actually w ell behind the line itself (up to several m iles in som e places). But in the con text o f the dispute, Pakistan con tin ues to claim the w hole province o f Ja m m u /K a sh m ir, and therefore any division o f the province m ight be perceived as a loss of territory. India also continues to claim title to the entire Ja m m u /K a sh m ir region, but the LoC places a substantial portion o f the region un der Indian control. T herefore, w ith the territorial u p per hand, it is clear that India is less eager to settle the status o f the region en m asse.9 W hether o r not India had any degree o f territorial aspirations in m ind w hen choosing to con stru ct the fencing, it is the sense o f p erm anence im plied by the fence that has prom pted such a strong retort from Pakistan, w hich view s the fencin g by India as a u n ilateral v alid ation o f the LoC as a perm anent division, a hardening o f the line into an international boundary. 178

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3.2 Israel and Palestine (West Bank)

The situation in the volatile region of Israel and the O ccupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestine) rem ains another long­ standing and intransigent territorial dispute. After the Second World War and Britain's withdraw al from its m andate in Palestine, the UN divided the m andate area into Jew ish and Arab states.10 Arab populations within Palestine and in neighbouring Arab states objected to the partition and Jew ish forces fought Arab forces to m aintain an independent Israel. Several arm istice agreem ents were signed in 1949 w hich established arm istice lines separating the areas held by opposing forces. In 1967, Israeli forces, pre-em pting an attack by the neighbouring Arab states, crossed the arm istice 1949 lines and occupied areas beyond the lines. Therefore, since 1967 the West Bank has been occupied by Israeli forces, with no organized state m ilitary force in opposition on the ground in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. With this in m ind, the Palestinians in the occupied territories have relied on irregular m ilitants to engage the occupying Israeli m ilitary force, resulting in terrorist activities on both sides. 1949 Arm istice:The ‘green lin e’

Because there is no form al m ilitary force opposing Israel's occupation of the West Bank, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that this w as once a territorial dispute with a separation of opposing m ilitary forces. On 3 April 1949, the arm istice line, or 'green line', was drawn in the West Bank, separating Jordanian and Jew ish forces.11 In m ost places it eventually constituted a single line12 but in Jerusalem and several other areas, two cease fire lines formed no-m an's-land areas. A UN contingent monitored the cease fire, but it gradually eroded from the arm istice line after 1949 and by 1967 there was little appreciable UN presence. The 'green line' has been the topic of much discussion in the myriad settlem ent plans proposed up to the present day, but it has certainly never held the status of an international boundary. As is the case in Kashmir, Korea and Cyprus, the 'green line' is sim ply a cease fire line indicating the position of m ilitary forces at the conclusion of hostilities. However, from 1949 until 1967 this line did serve as the de facto boundary betw een Israel and the A rab-controlled territories. Since 1967, with Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the 'green line' generally ceased to function as a de facto boundary.13 H owever, criticism o f this legally questionable occupation has kept m em ories of the 'green line' at the forefront of negotiations. In addition, Palestine continues to claim that the 1949 'green line' did gain a high degree of legal validity from the wording of A rticle l(i) o f the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 179

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242 w hich called for: 'W ithd raw al o f Israel arm ed forces from territories occupied in the recent con flict.' T h e reference to 'territo ries' is believed by m any to refer to those territories east o f the 'green line'. 2003: Israel-Palestine security b a rrie r a n d w all

In 2003 Israeli forces began construction o f a new security w all in an attem p t to restrict the m ov em ent of irregu lar m ilitan t forces accused o f con d u cting suicid e bom bings w ithin Israel. The Israeli governm ent officially refers to this as the 'secu rity b a rrie r', w hile the Palestinian A uthority (and m any outsid e observers) have used various other term s, in clu ding 'apartheid w all'. In som e m ore populated areas, particularly around E ast Jeru salem , the security w all con sists o f a m assive 18 to 20 foot-high concrete w all w ith frequent w atch tow ers.14 In less-densely popu lated areas the fortifications include a security fence, less-frequent w atch tow ers and a variety o f m otion sen sors, therm al im aging and sand ed -track to identify crossing p oints. It is even rum oured that rem otely controlled autom atic m achine gu ns w ill be installed in som e places along the barrier. M onitorin g is so ad vanced that the Israeli m ilitary claim s it can respond to an intru sion along the barrier w ithin six m inu tes in som e places (particularly around Jerusalem ). A s w ith In d ia's fence along the L oC , Israel's secu rity cordon is not designed to repel full-scale, organized m ilitary assault, such as the positions along the 'd e-m ilitarised zon e' betw een N orth and South Korea. O ne key difference is that Israel has built section s o f the barrier w ell beyond the 1949 arm istice line, w hile In d ia's fencing is entirely w ithin its side o f the LoC. M uch o f the controversial cou rse o f the Israeli security barrier does n o t follow the 1949 'green lin e'; instead it cuts a looping path w ell to the east, encircling a nu m ber o f large Jew ish settlem ents, and projected expan sions to settlem ents. T his has left m any Palestinian villages and tow ns cu t o ff from one another and, in m any cases, from the fields in w hich peo p le w ork, schools in w hich child ren stud y and m arkets w here they shop. Interru ptin g the norm al m ov em ent p atterns of resid ents in the areas, there is the potential for the popu lation p atterns to shift as P alestinians are left detached by the security barrier.

4

C o n clu sio n s on the recent boun dary security m easures

in disputes areas 4 . 1M e e tin g the th rea t

T h e secu rity m easures pu t in place by both India and Israel are m ore focu sed on surv eillance rather than on d irect m ilitary con frontatio n.15 180

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T hese m easures are reflexive o f the perceived threat w hich prom pted them to be pu t into p lace and the env ironm en t w ithin w hich they are p laced .16 T he threats being addressed are sm all groups or individual m ilitan ts a n d /o r arm s sm ugglers, w hich pose a secu rity risk in term s o f terrorist attacks on civ ilian p opu lation or m ilitary installations. H ow ever, such forces are unlikely to gain and actually hold territory. The fortifications, em placem ents and m ilitary presence along K orea's D M Z (one m igh t also inclu de the forces o f Eritrea and Ethiop ia along the U N -m onitored tem porary secu rity zone and, at one tim e, the form er em placem ents through Cyprus) w ere d esigned to m eet a large-scale opposin g m ilitary threat. T he threat in those situ ations w as that opposing forces had the capability to gain and hold territory, u n like the security threats in K ash m ir and Israel w hich have provoked the recent boundary security m easures. 4.2 B o u n d a ry dispute from te rrito ria l dispute

T hese tw o territorial disputes can be show n against the backd rop o f the E ritrea-E th io p ia bou n d ary d ispute, w hich exem plifies the d evelopm ent o f a bou n d ary d ispute from a territorial dispute. A fter E ritrea's 30-year conflict for sep aration from E thiop ia, E ritrea gained ind ep en d en ce in 1993. But at this settlem ent o f the territorial d ispute, the p osition o f the bou n d ary rem ained unclear. W ith sim m ering anim osity, a bou n d ary w ar ensued from 1998 to 2000. A t the con clu sion of these h ostilities a second settlem ent phase em erged w here the bou n d ary w as the key issue. A n arbitral tribunal, the E ritrea-E th io p ia B ou nd ary C om m ission (E EB C ), w as set up to d elim it the boundary. U nfortunately, as critics h av e argued, this second settlem ent process b etw een 2000 and 2002 w as som ew h at rushed as the EEBC w as given a hu rried sched ule for arbitration. T he d ecision o f the E EBC in 2002 has also b een criticized for n o t ad d ressing the m ore sensitive issu es involved in the bo u n d ary d ispute in a pragm atic rather than legalistic m anner, esp ecially con cern in g the p osition and significance o f the v illage of Badm e. C onsequently, tensions b etw een Eritrea and E thiop ia have again increased , still w ithin the con text o f a bou n d ary d ispute, w hich con tin u es to sou r relations and deter resolution. The E ritre a /E th io p ia exam ple clearly ind icates that if the boun dary is n ot properly ad dressed in the settlem ent o f a territorial d ispute, there is the d istin ct p ossibility o f further conflict. In the cases o f both Ja m m u / K ash m ir and the W est Bank, if a p erm anent and ad equ ate boun dary solu tion is n o t ad dressed in the settlem ent of the territorial d ispute, they could easily evolve into future bou n d ary disputes.

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Table 11.1

Evolution of the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary dispute

Tension

Territorial Dispute

Boundary Dispute

War

H igh Tension

M oderate Tension

Low Tension

Settlement Phase

(Boundary)

Perm anent Settlem ent

4.3 D e fa cto bou n d aries a n d acq uiescen ce

W ithin territorial d isputes, a de fa c to b ou n d ary can be establish ed w hen hostilities b etw een o p posin g forces cease. In the cases of b oth K orea and C yprus, the sep aration o f o pposin g forces in a territorial d ispute has em erged as the d e fa c to boun dary.17 Su ch de fa c to bo u n d aries cannot be assu m ed to then becom e the legal (d eju r e), definitive boundary, even if title to the territory in qu estion is unclear.18 N everth eless, w hen the bou n d ary is ad dressed in n egotiations d uring the settlem ent o f a territorial dispute, a de fa c to bo u n d ary such as a cease fire line m ay prove to b e the best startin g point for d elim itation o f a de ju re boundary, becau se it ind icates the respective extent o f control b y the parties. C ertainly m any issues w ill be influential in n egotiations before a de ju re bo u n d ary is d elim ited, but the d e fa c to line w ill alw ays b e the starting point unless there is significant good w ill betw een the p arties to choose an alternative. 182

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It is debateable w hether or not the increased boundary security m easures im plem ented by India and Israel actually constitute attem pts to gain territory. India has argued that its security fence in Kashm ir is located w ithin its side of the LoC, which Pakistan would then counter is not necessarily Indian territory. Israel has argued that the path of the security barrier is to protect Israeli settlem ents, w hich, as the logic goes, m ust then be considered territory of Israel. The Palestinian A uthority - and m any outside observers - would argue that the territory w as not Israeli to begin with. Both India and Israel have responded to criticism by em phasizing that in both cases the lines in question are sim ply cease fire or arm istice lines which legally cannot be construed as international boundaries. India has em phasized that the LoC is a cease fire line and not an international boundary, therefore there is nothing to fear from the fence and security m easures. Israel would give the sam e justification for ignoring the 1949 arm istice line in the West Bank; the security barrier does not have to follow the 'green line' since it is not an international boundary. In essence, the disparity betw een the two situations from a territorial perspective is that w hile India m ay be seeking to validate a de facto boundary (the LoC), Israel is seeking to create a new de facto boundary and invalidate w hat had been conceived by m any to have been the de facto boundary (and som e believe to have significant legal valid ity).19 Perhaps, as Palestine fears, by encircling its settlem ents Israel is hoping that the path of the security barrier will supplant the 1949 'green line' as the starting point in future negotiations, or at least shift populations to affect further the position of a future boundary.20 Likewise, in Ja m m u / Kashmir, the fencing along the LoC by India further erodes the notion that settlem ent will involve the region; it instead em phasizes the LoC as the logical starting point for negotiations. However, the true significance of cease fire or arm istice lines in boundary m aking may not ju st be as starting points for negotiation, but in their de fa cto influence on the resultant positioning of populations on the ground. Because a de facto boundary will have affected settlem ent patterns on the territorial landscape, their enorm ous political significance in negotiations will be very influential. Endow ing de fa cto lines w ith im plied perm anence, these boundary security m easures com plicate potential dispute resolution by reducing flexibility in negotiations and increasing the political significance of changes to such lines.21 W hile fences can be rem oved relatively easily, changes in settlem ent patterns on the territorial landscape are m uch m ore difficult to undo. There is a com plicated process in international law by which a de jure (or legal) boundary m ight be created due to acquiescence and estoppel.

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Briefly, this process entails the acquiescence o f state A to the know n presence o f state B 's sovereign activity w ithin state A 's territory. If state A does not protest the p resence of state B, or in som e w ay express its belief that state B does not have title to that territory, then state A m ay be said to have estopped its rights to that territory. H ence state B could gain legal title to that territory. Both P akistan and Palestine do not w ish to appear to acquiesce to the presence of Israel and India in territory they believe to be rightfully their ow n. This has also encouraged persisten t official and international criticism o f the boundary m easures im posed by India and Israel (m ore significantly), inclu ding the recent 2004 International C ou rt o f Ju stice A dvisory O pinion on the Israeli sep aration wall.

5

B ou n d a ry security m easures in undisputed b o un dary areas

T h e recent increase in boundary security m easures has n ot been confined to those areas o f territorial or boun dary disputes. Several nations around the w orld have d ram atically increased security p resence along boundaries w hich are not in d ispute w ith n eigh bou ring states. In each o f the follow ing cases, there is an agreed international boun dary in place and there are no significant territorial claim s or disputes along the boundary in the areas w here secu rity m easures have been increased. 5. 1 B o ts w a n a -Z im b a b w e

In 2003 B otsw ana began con stru ction o f a 300 m ile-long fence along its eastern bo u n d ary w ith Z im babw e, rou ghly betw een the tow n of Francistow n in B otsw ana and Tuli in Z im babw e. The fence is reported ly 2.4 m etres in h eigh t (although som e other reports d escribe it up to 4 m etres in height) and electrified (although it has also been reported that n ot all sections can be fully charged). B otsw ana officially claim s that this fencin g w as erected in an effort to p rev ent cattle from straying into B otsw ana from Z im babw e. L ivestock fencin g lies along the b ou n d aries o f sev eral sou thern A frican states, sin ce it is com m on w h en livestock d iseases (such as foot-and -m outh) break out in one state for foreign m arkets to refuse im ported livestock from n eigh bou ring states unless bo u n d ary fencin g is in place.22 H ow ever, Z im babw e b eliev es that B o tsw an a's b ou n d ary fencin g serves a v ery d ifferent purpose. M any com m u nities on B o tsw an a's sid e o f the bo u n d ary have recently com plain ed o f a seriou s crim e w av e w hich has been blam ed on an increase in the nu m b er o f refugees fleeing R obert M u g abe's regim e and the econ om ic con ditions in Z im babw e. W hether the increase in crim inal activ ity is a direct result o f these refu gees or not, 184

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it is true that such an influx o f refugees is likely to have som e kind o f d estabilizing effect, particularly in B o tsw ana's borderland populations. C ritics, p articularly from Z im babw e, have accused Botsw ana o f erecting the fence to p revent the m ov em ent o f people rather than livestock.23 W hile m any livestock boundary fences in sou thern A frica are electrified (e.g. som e o f the B otsw an a-N am ibia boundary fencing), the true nature o f B otsw ana's fencin g m ay be thinly v eiled , as liv estock fences do not gen erally reach 3 to 4 m etres in height. 5.2 Sa u d i A ra b ia -Y e m e n

A fter a protracted bo u n d ary d ispute, Saud i A rabia and Yem en finally d elim ited their land bou n d ary in Ju n e 2000 throu gh a treaty signed in Jedd ah. D em arcation of the bou n d ary w as un dertaken in 2001 and com pleted in 2003. In spite o f boun dary d em arcation, Saud i A rabia claim ed that illegal arm s trafficking from Yem en into Saud i A rabia continued through the v ast d esert sections of the bo u n d ary (the socalled 'E m p ty Q u arter'). In an effort to d eter sm ugglers, Saud i A rabia began erecting a b arrier along a 95 km stretch of the n ew ly dem arcated bou n d ary betw een tw o m ou ntains, w hich w as a kn ow n transit route for arm s sm uggling. The barrier consisted o f a 3 m etre-high, d isused above-groun d oil p ipeline filled w ith con crete stretching across the desert. Yem en quickly criticized the barrier, stating that such a barrier con travened the 2000 Jed d ah bo u n d ary agreem ent w hich establish ed a 20 km no-m an 's-lan d on eith er sid e o f the bo u n d ary as a jo in t grazin g area fo r the nom adic tribes in the region. The pow erfu l Sh i-ite W ayilah tribe in Yem en (w hich p ossesses its ow n priv ate arm y) strongly objected to the Saud i sep aration barrier, com p aring it w ith Israel's secu rity w all. The nom adic tribe also rejected the bou n d ary d elim ited by the 2000 Jed d ah A greem en t, stating in a com m u nique to the Yem eni governm ent: 'W e are renew ing our objection to the agreem ents that created a barrier betw een us and our land s and our property.' Saud i A rabia responded to Yem eni criticism by stating that it w as erecting the p ipeline w ithin its ow n territory as an effort to curb the illegal arm s sm uggling and that the barrier in no w ay resem bled Israel's sep aration fence. Som e unconfirm ed reports ind icated that the barrier w as located w ithin 100 m etres o f the bou n d ary in som e areas, b u t Saudi officials stated that the b arrier w as located n orth o f the 20 km buffer zone. H ow ever, in Febru ary 2004 Saud i A rabia halted con stru ction o f the barrier after 42 km , p resum ably in response to Y em en's objections and in p articular after significant pressu re from E gyp t and the U nited States. The Yem eni go v ernm ent released a statem ent in February 2004 stating 185

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that the differences had been settled and Saudi Arabia had agreed to dism antle the barrier.24 5.3 Bangladesh-lndia

In 2000 India drew up plans and began construction of boundary fencing along its 4096 km boundary w ith Bangladesh. A t the end of 2003 Phase I of the project was nearing com pletion, w ith 857 km of fencing having been erected. Phase II, w hich envisions fencing an additional 2429 km , is estim ated to be com plete by 2007, according to India's M inistry of H om e A ffairs, D epartm ent of Boundary M anagem ent.25 The position of the land boundary betw een Bangladesh and India is not in dispute; however, India claim s that m ilitants participating in a variety of insurgencies w ithin northeast India have been crossing the loosely m onitored boundary into Bangladesh to escape pursuit and to traffic w eapons. At least two of these groups are related to tribal insurgency m ovem ents in the Indian state of Tripura. They supposedly conduct hit-and-run-style attacks in India before fleeing back into Bangladesh. H owever, Bangladesh refutes the notion that the m ilitants are being harboured in its territory, stating that Bangladesh has been vigilant in com bating these m ilitants. N evertheless, India has increased its num ber of boundary troops and begun fencing along lengthy sections of the boundary believed to be frequently crossed by m ilitants, convinced that Bangladesh is not doing enough to stop the m ilitants. In addition, illegal m igration across this boundary from Bangladesh into India has increased and becom e problem atic. The security fence is reportedly a m ulti-layer barbed w ire fence (apparently not electrified) built w ithin Indian territory and set back from the boundary, providing a kind of no-m an's-land of unspecified w idth betw een the fence and boundary. The landscape in m any of the boundary areas is striated by num erous stream s and rivers. In such areas w here the boundary traverses rivers, India has erected floodlights to aid in m onitoring any illegal m ovem ents through the watercourses. India has also increased the num ber of boundary troops in the area and the am ount of surveillance and m onitoring equipm ent along the boundary. Som e Indian villages w ithin the path of the boundary fence have contested its construction and are pursuing action in the courts. Supposedly India is restricting residents from living in dw ellings w ithin 150 yards of the boundary w ith Bangladesh. W hile Bangladesh has reacted sharply to India's boundary security m easures, it has rejected calls from India for joint boundary operations and reserves m uch of its criticism for India's new river projects w hich could have a severe affect on the w ater supply to Bangladesh. In another sign of the times, the population of India's M anipur region ju st east of Bangladesh has apparently requested that the 186

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Figure 11.2 Bangladesh-India boundary and areas w here insurgents are active. Source: IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 9.3.

boundary betw een India and Burm a also be fenced and m onitored. The regional gov ernm ent believes that such m easures on the B u rm a-In d ia boundary, w hich is n ot in d ispute, w ould help restrict the m ov em ent of illegal w eapons and drugs. 5.4 M a la y s ia - T h a ila n d

In February 2004 Thailand ann ou nced plans to build a concrete fence along parts o f its 600 km boun dary w ith M alaysia, bu t con stru ction has yet to begin. The plans for the bou n d ary fence w ere ann ou nced after a string of attacks o n p olice and B ud dh ist m onks in the three sou theastern provinces of Thailand (Pattani, Yala and N arathiw at) near the land bou n d ary w ith M alaysia. W hile m ost o f T hailand is p red om inantly B ud dhist, these three sou thern m ost regions have m ajority M uslim p opu lations. O n 29 A pril 2004, a string o f attacks by Islam ic insurgents on police outposts in T h ailan d 's three sou thern m ost provinces w ere m et w ith a heav y-h and ed response b y Thai p olice and over 100 p eople w ere killed as a result. Since those attacks, M alaysia has poured troops into the areas along the Thai boundary, hoping to stem the flight o f the m ilitants. 187

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T hailand has long know n that Islam ic sep aratists w ere o perating in the sou theast region, but claim ed that the groups often sou gh t refuge in M alaysia across the loosely m onitored boundary. T hailand adm itted that insu rg ent groups w ere active w ithin its territory, but felt that the boundary fence w as necessary to p revent the sep aratists from seekin g refu ge in M alaysia. The M alaysian gov ernm ent w as quick to state that its territory had nev er been used to harbou r any insurgents and that it w ould not allow such m ilitan ts sanctu ary w ithin M alaysian territory. The boundary in the area is also a w ell-know n sm uggling route for drugs, and since the A pril 2004 attacks som e jo in t surveillance m easures have been undertaken by the tw o cou ntries, inclu ding jo in t patrols along the boundary. G en erally bilateral ties betw een M alaysia and T hailand are very good.26 In fact, it is likely that T hailand halted its plans to con stru ct boundary fencing w hen M alaysia increased its troop nu m bers in the b oun dary areas and voiced its com m itm ent to crack in g d ow n on m ilitan ts in the region. W hile the boundary fence is currently on hold, even against M alay sia's protests.27 5.5

Responses to the increase in b o u n d a ry security alon g

und isp uted boundaries

5.5. 1Addressing the problem s

E ach o f the above cases w here bou n d ary secu rity m easures have been recently increased h as a unique set of circu m stances. T he m easures bein g pu t into p lace do seem to reflect the natu re o f the perceived threat or problem . Saud i A rab ia's concrete-filled p ip eline barrier along its bou n d ary w ith Yem en w as an exam ple of secu rity m easures bein g un iqu ely ad apted to thw art the specific problem o f arm s sm ugglers crossing the v ast stretches o f desert. B otsw an a's electrified fence is liable to be a d eterrent for bo th illegal m igrants as w ell as stray cattle. Sim ilar m easures to deter illegal m igration exist along the M e x ico -U S bo u n d ary in C alifornia and the M o ro cco -S p ain bou n d ary at the enclave o f C eu ta, althou g h the fencin g and m on itoring is m ore sop histicated . T he surveillance m eth od s and fencin g b ein g im posed b y India along parts of its bo u n d ary w ith B anglad esh are clearly intend ed to m on itor and deter the bo u n d ary crossings o f sm all groups of m ilitants. A lth ou gh w ithin the con text o f territorial disputes, there are obvious p arallels w ith the m easures u n d ertaken by Israel and India d irected at sim ilar threats. Plans for T h ailan d 's secu rity fence and bou n d ary secu rity m easures along the bo u n d ary w ith M alaysia are likely to be sim ilar to In d ia's practices on the boun dary w ith Bangladesh.

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5.5.2 The neig h b o u r’s re to rt

T h e one con stan t in each scenario is the n eg ativ e response from the n eigh bou ring state. In each case the n eigh bou ring state has b een critical of the bo u n d ary fencin g or other secu rity m easures. This is d espite the lack of d ispute betw een the n eigh bou ring states either con cern in g territory or the position o f the boundary, in these sp ecific areas.28 In each case the criticism has been sligh tly different, but the clear consensu s is that the neigh b ou rin g state has felt that b ou n d ary secu rity m easures negatively affect the relation ship betw een the tw o states w hen no obvious dispute is felt to exist. Z im babw e has rejected B otsw an a's claim that its bou n d ary fence is for liv estock and has instead accu sed G aberone o f sealing off the boun dary and m istreating m igrants from Z im babw e. T h is argum en t essentially ignores the basis for the fencing, nam ely that there is an increase in m igration from Z im babw e. Instead o f ad d ressing the cause o f the problem , the reason for the increase in m igration (i.e. poo r econom ic con ditions), Z im babw e has d irected criticism tow ards the fence itself. Yem en m ay have had a sound legal argum en t for criticizing Saudi A rab ia's bou n d ary b arrier (if it w as placed less than 20 km from the boun dary) b ased on the no-m an 's-lan d regim e along their new ly d elim ited bou n d ary establish ed in the 2000 agreem ent. H ow ever, again it m igh t be im plied the root cause o f the problem (cross-bord er arm s sm uggling) w as not b ein g ad equ ately ad dressed by both states. Likew ise, Yem en w as critical o f Saud i A rabia's un ilateral m ethods. B anglad esh m ay have felt that In d ia's bou n d ary fencin g and surveillance w ere a direct com m ent on the ability o f B anglad esh to com bat sep aratists w ithin its ow n territory. P erhaps the im plication w as that India believed B anglad esh w as b ein g soft on or even offering safe harbou r to m ilitants. In a sim ilar fashion, T hailand m ay also have been posin g the sam e com m ent to M alaysia w hen it ann ou nced plans for bou n d ary fencing. M alaysia m ay then have felt it necessary to prove its com m itm ent to regional security. T his w ould then explain the con nection betw een the influx o f M alaysian troops into the bou n d ary region and the concu rrent shelving o f T h ailan d 's b ou n d ary fence plans. 5.6

C o n clu sio n s on recen t increases in b o u n d a ry security m easures alon g

u nd isp uted boundaries

W hile the practical expressions o f bou n d ary security on the ground are un iqu e to the terrain involved and to the threat or problem of the situ ation, the outw ard political expression as interpreted by the

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neighbouring state appears to be constant. The recent, unilateral boundary security escalations along undisputed boundaries tend to im ply that a neighbouring state has an internal problem that is not being adequately addressed domestically. In som e cases the original problem m ay not be the presence of m ilitants in a neighbouring state, but the attraction of sanctuary in that neighbouring state due perhaps to lack of control in a border area. This could result in w hat m ight be termed the 'Iron Curtain effect' w hereby security m easures turn inward to thw art m ovem ent out of the state rather than m ovem ent into the state from outside. In the current clim ate of states com bating m ilitants, insurgents and terrorists, no state w ants to be depicted as being w eak or unable to m aintain security w ithin its own boundaries. In addition, perhaps the increase in security m easures along undisputed boundaries conveys the sense of conflict w here none exists. In that sense, several neighbouring states have labelled the increase in boundary security a 'sealing' of the boundaries. But the threats (i.e. separatists or sm ugglers) or problem s (i.e. im m igration) that have prom pted the boundary security m easures are beyond the control of either state. In terms of territory, the threats overlap the two states. Therefore by im proving its boundary security, a state essentially is attem pting to take responsibility for problem s exclusively within its own territory. M any times such security m easures allow states to deal more effectively with dom estic threats or problem s. Such m easures along undisputed boundaries do not legally threaten the territorial integrity of a neighbouring state as long as they recognize the agreed international boundary. The unfortunate caveat is that the neighbouring state m ay feel slighted that the overlapping threat or problem could not be addressed cooperatively. Such a political clim ate is not conducive to cooperation. Hard boundaries such as those m arked by fences and walls discourage transborder cooperation which can have dram atic effects beyond the issue of security, such as im peding the econom ic developm ent of borderland areas and the m anagem ent of the transboundary environm ental resources. 5.7 Final thoughts

Throughout this chapter, the term 'boundary security' has been used in lieu of 'boundary defence'. The nuances in definitions betw een the terms 'd efence' and 'security' pose interesting questions for understanding the significance of this recent increase in boundary security m easures. The term 'security' conjures im ages of jails, fencing and m onitoring. O ften police are associated w ith security, as it seem s to be associated w ith a m icro-com m unity feeling secure. Defence has a more m ilitary connotation, w ith im ages such as fortifications and w alls springing to mind. Certainly 190

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there is a large d egree o f overlap betw een the tw o phrases, but w hen lookin g at all the security m easures described above, the question can be posed: Do they represent secu rity or d efen ce m easures? M any have been described in the m edia as bein g 'secu rity m easu res'. T his m ay underscore the sh ift in pu blic thinking from the days of fearing m acro-territorial conflicts w hen the d em and w as for 'd efen siv e' m easures, to the m ore localized threats posed by m ilita n ts/te rro rists w hich dem and 'secu rity ' m easures. Therefore it m igh t be said that the com p arison of boundary defence versu s boun dary secu rity m igh t be defined by the threats being addressed. In con clusion, let it suffice to say that the recent increases in boundary secu rity m easures along both disputed and un disputed boun daries reveal a true 'h ard en in g ' of territory around the w orld, a return to traditional notions o f boun daries being the sites o f separation. T his hardening not only com plicates the settlem ent o f bilateral territorial disputes, but could also affect norm al bilateral relations and inhibit w orthw hile transbord er coop eration. But w ithin a global clim ate o f fear, the sealing o f territorial boun daries is a natural reaction o f the nation state, and m ore exam ples of boundary security m easures will likely em erge throu ghou t the w orld in the near future.

N o te s 1

2 3

4

5 6

7

Perhaps the best exam ples include the influence of environm ental regulation w hich has encouraged the recent increase in the num ber of transboundary conservation areas, the decline of the rule of capture in m ineral/hyd rocarbon extraction (particularly offshore) and cross-border ethnic identities. 'Sovereignty as a particular spatiality of pow er and authority seem s un­ suitable for an increasingly globalised w orld' (Hudson 1998: 102). Recall that Botswana and Nam ibia spent tens of m illions of dollars adjudicating their dispute over tiny K asikili/Sed ud u Island (which is m ostly subm erged six m onths of the year) before the International Court of Justice from 1996 to 1999. Natural features along boundaries have also served a defensive purpose, such as the Rhine River betw een France and Germany, and the H im alayas isolating Nepal from India. Island disputes will usually involve problem s w ith m aritim e boundaries. These will not be discussed as this w ork is concerned w ith land boundaries. The auspices of the 1949 Karachi Agreem ent stipulated that no forces could be located w ithin 500 yards of the cease fire line. This m ight be considered a form of buffer zone, but w as included in the 1972 agreement. United Nations, Peacekeeping and Peace and Security Section of the Departm ent of Public Inform ation figures as of 31 M arch 2004. India does

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8

9 10 11 12

13 14 15

16

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

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provide transport and supply to U N M OGIP but does not report violations of the cease fire and largely ignores its presence. 'Since the line was expected to last only until agreem ent had been reached over the perm anent disposition of Kashmir, it w as not physically demarcated at the time (1949)' (Wirsing 1998: 9). In fact, in its 2002-3 Annual Report, India's M inistry of Defence refers to the 'Line of Control' as the 'International Border'. UN General Assem bly Resolution 181 of 29 Novem ber 1947. The term 'green line' w as coined as a result of the line being marked in green on subsequent official Israeli maps. A lthough due to the fact that the line was drawn on a 1:250,000 scale map with a thick greased pencil, the line varied in w idth when applied on the ground, up to some 500 metres in places. Israel, however, has never form ally annexed the m ajority of territory in the West Bank. The size of the wall in these areas is justified by Israeli officials as necessary to deter sniper attacks. The massive section of Israel's security wall in the urban areas is slightly different from the m ajority of the fencing, as this section is designed to not only repel m ilitants, but also to protect areas from sniper fire. M uch of the surveillance and monitoring equipm ent installed by India along the LoC is of Israeli manufacture, including hand-held therm al imaging devices, ground-based surveillance radar and night vision equipment. Brig. Gurm eet Kanwal 'India-Israel Defence Cooperation: Chinks in the A rm our' Observer Research Foundation Strategic Trends, 2 :2 3 ,1 4 June 2004 (http: / / www. observerindia.eom /strategic/st040614.htm #2). In both Korea and Cyprus, the division is by buffer or de-m ilitarized zone areas. Clearly this would invalidate the international legal principle that title to territory cannot be acquired by force and would encourage states to gain as much territory as possible by force before reaching a cease fire. US president George Bush voiced support for Ariel Sharon's plan for Israeli withdrawals on 14 April 2004, stating: 'In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcom e of final status negotiations will be a full and com plete return to the arm istice lines of 1949.' W hite House Press Release, 14 April 2004 (w w w .w hiteh ou se.g ov/n ew s/releases/2004/04/200404144.htm l) This opinion was shared by few other world leaders. In addition, any Israeli settlem ent east of the 'green line' outside of a bilateral agreem ent invalidates the basis of m odem international law that territory cannot be legally gained through force. See especially the Annan Plan for settlem ent of the Cyprus dispute. The European Union, w hich is Botsw ana's biggest destination for exported beef, has in the past threatened to raise tariffs if fencing is not in place when livestock diseases occur in neighbouring states. Zim babwe has also condem ned Botsw ana's boundary police for being heavy handed in dealing with Zimbabwean migrants.

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24 25 26

27 28

There arc no reports confirm ing that Saudi Arabia has in fact dismantled the barrier. Figures can be seen at h ttp ://m h a.n ic.in /b m m ain .h tm The two states are mem bers of the Associate of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) w hich is working towards greater regional cooperation and integration. (See ASEAN Vision 2020.) During June 2004, Thailand w as in talks with Burma about possibly fencing their com m on boundary to prevent drug smuggling. There are disputes betw een these neighbouring countries that are irrelevant to the discussion at hand. For exam ple, Bangladesh and India dispute sovereignty over South Talpatty Island and their m aritim e boundary in the Bay of Bengal. However, these are unrelated to the land boundary.

R e fe re n c e s

Dahlitz, J. (ed.) (1999) Peaceful Resolution o f M ajor International Disputes (New York and Geneva: United Nations). Laitinen, K. (2003) 'G eopolitics of the Northern Dimension: a critical view on security borders', Geopolitics, 8:1, pp. 20-44. M errills, J.G. (1999) 'International Boundary Disputes in Theory and in Practice: Precedents Established', in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Peaceful Resolution o f M ajor International Disputes (New York and Geneva: United N ations), pp. 95-112. N ewman, D. (1995) 'Boundaries in Flux: The "G reen Line" Boundary between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future', Boundary and Territory Briefing, 1:7 (International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), University of Durham). Pratt, M. and Brown, J.A. (eds) (2000) Borderlands Under Stress (International Boundary Studies Series) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). W irsing, R.G. (1998) 'War or Peace on the Line o f Control? The India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashm ir turns Fifty', Boundary and Territory Briefing, 2:5 (International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), University of Durham).

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C h a p te r 12

‘Getting ahead of the game’: border technologies and the changing space of governance Katja Franko Aas’

In June 2004, a Danish hum anitarian agency put up an 8 metre-high wall at the site of a rock festival in Roskilde. The wall w as a copy of the wall put up by the Israeli governm ent on the West Bank, with a m essage 'm ake peace not w alls' written on it. The Roskilde wall was put up as a protest against its original in Israel, and not surprisingly, it elicited heated objections from the Israeli em bassy to the Danish governm ent. This m inor incident, and num erous other protests against the Israeli wall, can serve as a rem inder of the sym bolic pow er that w alls and borders still hold today. The fall of the Berlin Wall is probably one of the most potent im ages depicting, and finally confirm ing, the fall of com m unism . On the other hand, we are faced with a discourse about, and increasingly perceive ourselves as, living in a global and a 'borderless' world. The im agery of glossy in-flight m agazines portrays m odern travel as an effortless experience w here our im agination is the only limit. This chapter seeks to address the changing im agery and material m anifestations of borders and territoriality, taking the case of the European Union as a point of departure. The chapter explores a certain dichotom y betw een the political, econom ic and cultural im agery of a global, borderless world and, on the other hand, the persistent, even increasing, im portance o f borders for the European sense of security. I shall exam ine how the em erging term inology o f global flows, zones and netw orks could offer som e useful tools for conceptualizing the border today. The chapter contends that while the em erging global phenom ena 194

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in a num ber of w ays transform and transcend the traditional space of governance, characteristic of nation states, they also strengthen the salience of state borders, as well as introducing new types and logics of border governance. Rather than seeing borders and global flow s as two seem ingly dichotom ous phenom ena, the chapter proposes to see the 'zone' and the 'w all' as m utually supportive. The em erging zones and global inform ation flow s are essential in m aintaining the strength of the outer walls of contem porary 'fortress continents' (Klein 2003). A t the sam e time, the existence of border controls is vital in m anaging global flows and m aintaining the present, intensely stratified, global order.

T h e ‘Era of Space’

In 1972 O scar N ew m an published a book, D efensible Space, w hich received m uch attention in architectural and crim inological literature, and had a profound influence on town planning in subsequent years. In the book, N ew m an defined territoriality and surveillance as tw o categories contributing to the establishm ent of a 'defensible space'. N ew m an argued that, ju st as conditions of visibility and surveillance in a space reduce disorder and insecurity, so too clear definitions of borders, with the help of physical as well as sym bolic barriers, encourage people's ownership of space and therefore foster security. A lthough quite com m on sense, and bordering on the obvious, N ew m an's findings highlight the intrinsic connection am ong borders, territory and security. H owever, according to som e analysts, the connection betw een territory and security is not an ahistoric entity, intrinsic to any social organization, but rather a historically specific constellation, particularly characteristic of the nation state. Follow ing Castells (1996), Baum an (2002) describes the time w hen territory was prim ary guarantee of security as the 'era of space'. The border was then literally m eant as a wall around a territory, preventing penetration by the outsiders. Exem plified by the Chinese w all, H adrian's Wall, designs o f m edieval castles and cities, and, later, the Berlin Wall, the wall sym bolized the borders of the state and the ability of the state to defend itself. Similarly, M ary Douglas (1994) in Risk and Blam e persuasively show s how distinct borders are essential for a distinct sense of identity, and how com m unities and groups m aintain their sense of identity through the control of the perceived dangers at the borders. Baum an (1998, 2002) and a num ber o f other observers (H edetoft 1998) point to the vital im portance of territory as a m aterial as well as a sym bolic expression of the nation state's ordering capacity and national

Global Surveillance and Policing

identity: T h e physicality o f territory is of course a m aterial and econom ic precondition, but its real m eaning is sym bolic: as locus and raison d'etre for national "hom ogen eity" in the orders of m odernity' (H edetoft 1998: 153). The world of nation states is thus essentially a w orld of territorial states exercising their pow er through the im position of order on their territory. This is particularly evident, for exam ple, if one takes a look at a map of Africa, w here the clear borders draw n w ith alm ost m athem atical precision reflect the affinity for order of A frica's colonial rulers. Like the town planners m entioned above, also for nation states, transparency of borders represents a precondition of a m odernist order. Today, the m ateriality o f borders is revealed in a num ber of locations. The rise of so-called gated com m unities in a num ber of countries is a potent rem inder of the persistent belief that w alls and fences can bring at least som e kind of safety. Instead o f building w alls around cities, like in m edieval times, contem porary m em bers of gated com m unities seem to be afraid of the dangers that reside w ithin their community, thus dividing cities and suburbs into a num ber of sm aller areas which are put under surveillance. In their illum inating study, Fortress Am erica, Blakely and Snyder (1997) show that never before in US history has 'forting up' been so w idespread, not ju st am ong upper class, but also am ong m iddle and lower m iddle class A m ericans. Gated com m unities represent 'the notion of com m unity as an island' (Blakely and Snyder 1997: 3), an attem pt of their residents to run aw ay from the disorder and m essiness of com m unal life, and establish som e sense of control. On the other hand, the gated com m unity also exem plifies a phenom enon taking place on a larger scale, nam ely the em erging global patterns of inequality and social exclusion. Fortress Am erica is em erging also on a broader level, through the fortification of the Am erican border. America and Europe are today being described as 'fortress continents' (Klein 2003). A ccording to Klein (2003), fortress continents are blocs of nations, with fortified external borders, and easy internal access to cheap labour (for exam ple, M exican, Polish, H ungarian, etc.). W hile liberalizing their internal borders, fortress continents seal off their external borders, thus creating 'locked-out continents', w hose residents aren't needed even for their cheap labour (Klein 2003). Therefore, not only Israel is building a wall in an attem pt to strengthen its national security, but also Europe is extensively fortifying its borders. W hile to Europeans, and other W estern citizens, the world may increasingly appear 'borderless' and 'connected', the outer borders of Europe hold a sinister reality reflected in alm ost daily reports about deaths of im m igrants trying to enter the fortress Europe. For coast guard officials in Italy, Greece and Spain the sight of ruined boats and drowned

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bodies on the shores is becom ing a regular part of their work. On 2 O ctober 2004 a boat carrying 75 m igrants, on their way to the Italian island o f Lam pedusa, sank a few kilom etres off the Tunisian coast. O nly 11 people survived. However, total num bers of m igrant casualties are difficult to estim ate, as num erous other less-publicized deaths of m igrants go unregistered. Also, Turkey and other EU neighbours are becom ing affected by the grow ing flow of m igrants and the accom panying trafficking trade. In one day, BBC reports, Turkish authorities found bodies of 24 illegal m igrants, am ong them nine children, frozen to death. On the sam e day five Pakistanis were found drowned in another incident on the shores of Turkey's Aegean coast.2 In 2001, the EU countries had 380,000 applications for asylum , and only about 1 to 5 per cent were successful, although not everyone who failed actually got deported.’ It has been pointed out that the dangerous clandestine routes of entry into the EU, operated by various sm uggling netw orks, are partly created and sustained by the EU 's tough im m igration and asylum policy. The rise in the num bers of clandestine m igrants reportedly started after the EU countries in 1995 started introducing tighter visa requirem ents, thus forcing the third-world m igrants to choose other, more dangerous, routes to com e to Europe. The list of countries requiring a visa to enter the EU, the so-called 'black list', has expanded from 70 in 1985 to over 126 in 1995 (Bigo and Guild 2004). Reducing not only num bers of granted asylum s, but also of asylum applications, is increasingly becom ing a m ark for m easuring a governm ent's success. Thinking pre-emptively, the N orw egian govern­ ment, for exam ple, invested considerable resources not only in the fortification of its borders, but also in spreading the inform ation about it to possible m igrant populations, airing, for exam ple, inform ative advertisem ents about tough N orw egian asylum procedures on national televisions of various potential countries of asylum . A sim ilar 'overseas inform ation cam paign' was undertaken, am ong others, also by the Australian governm ent in order to discourage illegal im m igrant and asylum flows from its shores. The point here is that, although there is an undeniable 'w all-like' quality to the W estern borders, the strength of these borders also depends on a num ber of additional strategies, particularly on a netw ork of inform ation flows and fortified strategic points, w hich seem to diffuse the w all-like im pression. In w hat follows, I shall exam ine w hether the w ork of analysts arguing for the netw ork-like nature of contem porary social and pow er relations, and the term inology of the so-called zones and space of flows, can shed som e light on the current nature of borders and space of governance.

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G lob a l netw orks, zones and space o f flows

The events of S ep tem ber 11 tend to b e d escribed as 'g lo bal e v en ts', 'w h en the w hole w orld w atched the surreal and stranger-th an-H ollyw ood ev en t as planes w ith live p assengers flew into and d em olished tw o o f the largest bu ild ing s in the w o rld ' (U rry 2002: 57). N ew York seem s to be the epitom e of a global city, and the fallen tw in tow ers the suprem e sym bols o f its pow er. It is therefore no surprise that in the con tem porary im agination the events o f Septem ber 11 tend alm ost exclu siv ely to be talked about as the attacks on the tw in tow ers, rather than on the P en tagon and the P ennsylvania airplane. A ccord in g to Baum an (2002) the fallen M anhattan tow ers represent the m ost potent sym bolic rem ind er o f an end o f an era - the era o f space - the 'an n ih ilatio n o f the p rotective cap acity o f space'. T h e events o f 11 S ep tem ber m ade it obviou s that no one, h ow ever resourceful, d istant and aloof, can any longer cut them selves off from the rest o f the world. It has becom e clear that the ann ih ilation o f the protective capacity o f space is a d ouble-ed ged sw ord: no one can hid e from blow s, and now h ere is so far aw ay that blow s cannot be p lotted and delivered from that distance. P laces no longer protect, h ow ev er strongly they are arm ed and fortified. Strength and w eakness, threat and security have now b ecom e, essentially, extraterritorial (and diffuse) issues that evade territorial (and focused) solutions. (B aum an 2002: 88; italics original) N ew York can thus be seen as the prim e exam ple o f w h at C astells (1996) term s a global (m ega)city and the so-called netw o rk society. In the con text o f n etw o rk society, the global, tech nolog ically sustained netw orks o f inform ation, com m od ities and transportation becom e the p rim ary unit o f econ om ic o rganization and pow er. T h e nod es o f netw orks - global cities - thus becom e globally inter-con nected at an unpreced ented level, w hile the territories (and states) su rrou nd in g them corresp on dingly lose their im portance. C astells describes the new notion o f sp ace as a space o f flow s, w hich is p rim arily n ot a p lace, b u t a process: 'A process by w hich centers o f p rod uction and con su m p tion o f ad vanced services, and their ancillary local societies, are connected in a global netw ork, w hile sim u ltaneou sly d ow nplaying the linkages w ith their hinterland s, on the basis o f inform ation flow s' (C astells 1996: 386). G lobally connected and locally d iscon nected , argues C astells, global cities and n etw orks introduce a qu alitativ ely new and d ifferent exp erience o f space, as w ell as o f social organization and stratification. 198

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Global flows and netw orks thus fundam entally transform the role of the nation state and its control of the territory. The speed and distance of com m unication and m ovem ent m ake them both difficult to spacialize, and im possible to build a wall around. O ne of the traditional roles of the nation state - m aintenance of order on a certain territory - is thus put in question, forcing som e to talk o f the 'w ithering aw ay of nation states' (Baum an 1998: 57). It is perhaps unnecessary to repeat that the process has been deeply connected to insecurity. The events of Septem ber 11 therefore sim ply brought to our full attention 'the dark side of globalization' (Colin Pow ell in Urry 2002: 58; Lyon 2003: 109). However, insecurity had been m uch on our lips even before 9 /1 1 , evident in the proliferation of w riting about globalization and risk. Also, the environm entalist m ovem ent has long centred on the notion of global threats, yet it seem s as if the fallen twin towers and the subsequent 'w ar on terror' really brought the m essage into every single home. Therefore, contem porary governm ents seem to be caught betw een two contradicting im pulses: on the one hand, the urge towards increasing securitization o f borders, and on the other hand, the aw areness of the im portance of global flow s for sustaining the present world econom ic order. General M otors, for exam ple, claim s that 'for every m inute its fleet of trucks is delayed at the U S-C anad ian border, it loses about $650,000' (Klein 2003). The British W hite Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven clearly expresses the dichotomy. A ccording to W alters (2004), the W hite Paper is one of the governm ent's first docum ents clearly acknow ledging not only the need to control m igration, but also the beneficial potential of m igratory flows. The docum ent stresses the im portance of easing m ove­ ments o f certain groups of people, w hich would benefit the econom y by, for exam ple, introducing a so-called H ighly Skilled M igrant Program m e and Seasonal Agricultural W orkers' Schem e. The objective is therefore not to seal off the border but rather to m anage it efficiently; 'not to arrest m obility but to tame it; not to build walls, but system s capable of utilizing m obilities and in certain cases deploying them against the sedentary and ossified elem ents w ithin society' (Walters 2004: 248). Secure Borders, Safe Haven therefore clearly states the need not only for more efficient protection of the border, but also for speeding up procedures for 'genuine passengers', one of the m easures being the intensified use of biom etrics (H om e Office 2002: 18). The challenge here is to allow those who qualify for entry to pass through the controls as quickly as possible, m axim ising the time spent on identifying those w ho try to enter clandestinely or by presenting forged docum ents. [...] The less time the Im m igration

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Service needs to spend on clearing passengers, the more they can concentrate on those who seek to underm ine our laws. (Home O ffice 2002: 17) H ow to discern betw een 'good ' and 'bad ' global m obilities thus becom es a vital task of contem porary governance. A ccording to Walters (2004), this new task introduces a new im age of the state w hich departs from the traditional im age of a social security state. W hile the social security state was originally organized according to a static notion of class, now, on the other hand, the state is a globally situated entity organized according to a dynam ic notion of channelling potentially risky flows of people and goods. The pre-em inent task of governm ent is to attract and channel flows of resources, w hether investm ent, goods, services, and now flows of (the right kind of) people into one's territory. Gone, for the most part, is the im age w hich underpinned social security: the figure of a coherent national econom ic system linked in turn to a social order com prised of strata or classes. [...] In its place w e find a horizontal, or perhaps 'm ultilevel' space criss-crossed by m ovem ents, flows, and forces. (Walters 2004: 244) Global travel is an intensely stratified phenom enon and the task of governance is to im plem ent these stratifying m echanism s, rather than to control the m ovem ents of people as such; or to use Baum an's (1998: 88) words, to distinguish betw een those allow ed to be 'globally m obile' and those 'doom ed to be locally tied'. Today, w e seem to have a num ber of im ages and identities for describing the global traveller. Roughly speaking, they can be m erchants, follow ing M arco Polo's tradition, seeking to expand the scope of their trade; cosm opolitans m oving between various world capitals and hot spots, ceaselessly pursuing the best w eather and shopping conditions; and refugees, asylum seekers and w hat Featherstone (2002: 2) term s 'w orking-class cosm opolitan m igrants', with a potential of harbouring am ong them terrorists and religious fundam entalists. The term inology of com bating trans-national crim inal netw orks plays a crucial role in distinguishing betw een the flows of global 'good s' and 'bad s'. It has been argued, for exam ple, that m easures to com bat trafficking have been appropriated also as im m igration control measures, rather then having as their sole objective to help abused m igrant w om en.4 Building on Jonathan Sim on's (1997) concept of 'governing through crim e', W alters (2004: 247) argues that the Secure Borders W hite Paper

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clearly exem plifies the tendency to 'govern central aspects of global m igration by strategies of crim inalization and illegalization'. Building on the established im age of drug sm uggling global netw orks, the W hite Paper describes traffickers and sm ugglers as sophisticated, unscrupulous and brutal organized netw orks w hose 'aim has been to cash in on global increases in m igration flow s' (H om e Office 2002: 16). The governm ent's answ er seem s to be threefold: increasing penalties, taking advantage of new surveillance technologies, and international cooperation (Home O ffice 2002). The point here is that security is essentially connected to the globalizing processes and tam ing potentially risky m obilities and trans-national crim inal networks. Similarly, terrorist netw orks, epitom ized in Al Qaeida, seem to be defined by their ex-territoriality, defying the state-like nature of enem ies in the previous world orders. Al Q aeida has been described as the 'M cD onalds of terrorism ' (M urdoch 2004) - being a 'global brand', using the media to its advantage and assum ing a franchise form not unlike the ones used in the contem porary business world. The task of controlling the global flows seem s to be increasingly com plex, and essentially global. Borders, in a traditional sense of the word, becom e unable to capture the em erging trans-national and extraterritorial netw orks of possible threats, such as clandestine im m igration, drugs and people trafficking and, of course, terrorism. Speaking about the Chechen terrorist attacks, Russian defence m inister Ivanov sum m arized the thought: 'In essence, war has been declared on us, w here the enem y is unseen and there is no front.'5 The threat of terrorism is today presented as alw ays potentially hidden inside the state, like a 'fifth colum n', as well as trying to enter from the outside. The war on terror therefore seem s to be an exam ple of a 'stateless w ar' (Baum an 2002) w here both sides 'm ilitate against the im position of constraints on the new ly gained extraterritoriality of the skies or the freedom to ignore or push aside the "law s o f nations" w here such laws feel inconvenient for the purpose at hand' (Baum an 2002: 93). The trend is reflected in the creation of a kind of 'non-space,'6 or territory excluded from the territory, at Guantanam o, w here the usual rules of national and international law do not apply. The US governm ent, for exam ple, presented an argum ent that since Al Q aeida is an organization and not a state, the rules of the Geneva Convention do not apply to Al Qaeida com batants. The current war on terror also further reflects the 'w ithering of the nation state' thesis, as the boundaries betw een state and private attem pts to com bat terror and achieve security becom e increasingly blurred. O n the battlefields of Iraq and A fghanistan, soldiers and civilian contractors have becom e alm ost indistinguishable and interchangeable.

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Beyond the wall

O ne need s, therefore, to high ligh t the em ergence o f m yriad alternative strategies o f go v ernan ce w hich transcend the state itself, and its territory, as the fu n dam ental parad igm for prov id ing security. These strategies are m arked by the fact that they aim to take the fight against global threats beyond the bord ers of national territories as w ell as ind ucing the coop eration o f non-state agents in the task o f b ord er control. T he U K Secure B orders W hite P aper thus outlines a clear strategy o f averting potentially risky m igratory flow s before they reach national territory. The m easures em ployed are, am on g others: • C on tinu e to d ep loy our netw o rk o f A irline L iaison O fficers stationed overseas to help p rev ent im prop erly d ocu m ented p assengers travelling to the UK. • C on tinu e to use visa regim es for nationals o f cou ntries w here there is evid ence of the system atic abuse o f our controls. • C on tinu e to d ep loy im m igration officers abroad w here this is necessary to check p assengers before the)' travel to the UK. • M aintain our operational arrangem en ts for UK im m igration officers con d u cting p assp ort checks in France. • D evelop a new con cep t o f screening p assengers before they travel to the U K w hereby they are checked against IN D d atabases to confirm their eligibility to travel. • D evelop the use o f biom etric technology, fo r exam ple, iris or facial recognition and fingerprints, for use in exped iting the clearan ce of particu lar categories o f passenger, w hilst at the sam e tim e safeguarding these p assengers from identity abuse b y others. • U tilise x /g a m m a ray scanners and C C TV to help locate those seekin g to enter illegally, w hilst evalu atin g the latest tech nolog y using therm al im aging and acou stic sen sors to d etect those concealed in vehicles and containers. • U se m obile task forces as part o f an intelligence-led control. • W ork together w ith E uropean partn ers, cand id ate and other cou ntries to strengthen the E U 's com m on bord ers and enhan ce b ord er controls on transit routes.

(Home Office 2002: 92)

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U sing a w ide array o f technologies, these m easures are designed to act pre-em p tively and to av ert p otentially risky ind ividu als before they ever have a chance to enter the national territory. N etw orks of airline liaison officers, em ployed by a nu m ber o f cou ntries, thus w ork at international airports h elping airlines in preventing potentially inad m issible passengers from board ing airplanes. Sim ilarly, the pre­ clearan ce system s allow im m igration officials to carry o ut im m igration checks at airports abroad, thus effectively m oving the border outside national territory. D avid Lyon (2003: 1 2 3-4) points out that airports in them selves are exam ples o f 'v irtual borders, even though they are not alw ays at the geographical edge o f the territory con cern ed '. The objective o f airp ort controls is to check and identify travellers prior to the arrival at their destination. T he notion o f bord ers as in terv ention points outside the nation state territory is also reflected in the recent expan sion o f the British im m igration checks to certain Belgian, French and D utch cities and ports. British im m igration officials are now able to stop and check travellers before they board trains and lorries head in g for Britain. The p rim ary objective o f these m easures is to stop people from claim ing asylum . A ccord ing to British H om e Secretary D avid Blunkett: A ll o f this adds up to a further reinforcem ent o f the border controls, the restrictions, the ability to pick up people w ho sh o u ld n 't be com ing across the border at all. [...] T his is another ann ou ncem ent of w o rkin g w ith the French, the Belgians and in future the Dutch, so that w e can m ove our border controls on the European con tin ent and stop people claim ing asylu m .7 O r as the U K im m igration services director o f border control said: It is abou t gettin g ahead o f the gam e. We d o n 't w an t this to turn into a problem and by being there in Brussels it w o n 't turn into a problem . P eop le's behav iou r w ill change. We have to w atch w here the risks [of illegal im m igration] are and those risks do change, (italics added)* H ow ever, the rationale o f intercep ting potentially undesirable ind ividu als has been challenged by a recent ruling by the Law Lords, the high est appeal cou rt in the UK. In a case brou ght up by six Rom a p assengers w ho w ere denied entry to the U K, the cou rt ruled that p re-clearance m easures at the Pragu e airport w ere 'inheren tly and system atically d iscrim in atory and u n law fu l'. T h e m easures w ere introd uced in 2001 in ord er to av ert large nu m bers o f Rom a asylum

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seekers arriving in Britain. Consequently, several hundred passengers, alm ost all of them Rom a, were turned aw ay as 'not bona fide tourists'. The Rom a passengers w ere 400 times m ore likely to be rejected than non-Rom a passengers, prim arily on the basis of their appearance and skin colour.9 A sim ilar rationale of 'getting ahead of the gam e' and preventing risks before they reach national territory is also evident in the recent proposition to establish offshore asylum cam ps outside the EU territory. The British governm ent proposed in 2003 to create 'regional protection zones', w hich w ould be close to areas w itnessing m ajor flows of people, thus offering to them a 'safe haven' close to hom e.10 Britain further suggested the establishm ent of 'transit centres' on the fringes of the EU, close to the m ajor transit routes in countries such as Albania, Turkey, M orocco, U kraine and Som alia. Currently, the EU has not yet found consensus about these m easures; they were nevertheless favourably received by a num ber o f m em ber states, and pilot projects are already taking place in som e A frican countries. Italy, for exam ple, is m oving ahead with establishing three asylum cam ps in L ibya." Furtherm ore, the EU already exerts considerable pressure on its neighbours, such as Turkey, the Balkans states and ex-Soviet republics, to im plem ent better border controls and ease the EU 's refugee w orkload.12 A recent EU policy has been the establishm ent of a so-called 'circle of friends', a zone of neighbouring countries w hich, am ong other things, also cooperate in the fight against organized crim e, terrorism and m igration issues. By using aid and trade as financial incentives, the EU has also signed repatriation agreem ents with a num ber of third w orld countries, w hich w ill accept back illegal im m igrants com ing from or having lived in those countries. The objective of the above-m entioned strategies is clearly to shift the flows of asylum seekers to zones outside the EU. Unfortunately, these zones consist m ostly of countries w hich have considerably poorer resources and hum an rights records than the EU itself. M y objective so far has been to illustrate how global governance is transcending the nation state, w hich is particularly evident in the EU and its various institutions. The war on terror has prom pted a num ber of EU initiatives, although w ith varying success in their im plem entation. For exam ple: European Com m on A rrest Warrant; appointm ent of EU 'counter-terrorism czar'; EU solidarity clause on terrorism ; exchange of inform ation about persons, groups, w eapons and financial transactions, etc. The EU is also setting up an agency to help m anage its external borders. A lthough w ithout law -enforcem ent pow ers, the A gency for the M anagem ent of Operational C ooperation at the External Borders is to

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coordinate national border controls and to boost the fight against illegal im m igration (Guardian Weekly 2003). However, the British Secure Borders W hite Paper also brings to our attention another aspect of contem porary global governance. In addition to dispersing the border to third w orld countries, the docum ent clearly outlines a strategy of distributing the responsibility of com bating potential risks with other non-state actors. The UK and the EU, as well as a num ber of other countries, thus have legislation w hich penalizes carriers for transporting passengers w ithout the required docum ents. Guild (2004) argues that these carrier sanctions effectively transfer the task of carrying of border controls from state agents to com m ercial agents. A third world traveller encounters the border o f the EU already when trying to book an airplane ticket or contacting a travel agency. The state (and the EU) is still involved in the process, although only indirectly and at a distance, by providing carriers with necessary instructions for carrying out the controls.13 This m odel of 'policing at a distance' (Bigo and Guild 2004) effectively co-opts com m ercial agents and consulates into the task of carrying out EU border controls and identity checks inside third country territories. This distribution of responsibility responds to w hat has been elsew here described as 'responsibilization strategy' within contem porary social control (O 'M alley 1996; Garland 2001). It involves a way of thinking by w hich governm ents actively enlist participation by non-state actors and agencies and thus share the burden of controlling unwanted social phenom ena. The governance of borders is thus becom ing an increasingly com plex and un-transparent matter, com bining a num ber of actors on various levels and with varying objectives. It is not sim ply a task for state or state-like institutions, but also for private actors, ready to step in when states becom e unw illing or unable to control the m igration challenge. For exam ple, a director of the Tangier branch of a British logistics com pany recently reported: 'The situation is really getting w orse and w orse, it's desperate. W e're finding people hidden in our lorries every single w eek now.' The com pany therefore chooses to em ploy its ow n security staff to protect its drivers and lorries from m igrants, rather than putting its trust in the hands of M oroccan border police who appear to be unable and unw illing to deal w ith the problem s.14 Craw ford (2002: 47) suggests that: The new governance of safety across Europe involves not only the interconnections betw een different levels above and below nation­ state [...] but also sees a fusing of public and private interests as

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non-state actors (including the com m ercial sectors) are draw n into the netw orks of control. The territory of the policing of crim e and insecurity is sim ultaneously public and private as well as local, national and transnational. Consequently, w e need to m ove beyond the notion of a unity of law and crim e control tied to the nation­ state towards an understanding of a plurality o f legal orders and m odes of regulation ... However, it is im portant to note that the era of global risk m anagem ent started long before the present hype of the war on terror and preoccupation w ith illegal migration. The 'w ar on drugs' was and is a global war. The reasoning behind the war on drugs was the idea that one should prevent danger on the global level. Norway, for exam ple, has forged a num ber of international alliances w ithin the UN, EU, Interpol, World Custom s O rganisation, w ithin Schengen and in cooperation w ith other N ordic countries as well as various N G O s.15 Furtherm ore, the N orw egian police and custom s have their personnel deployed in a num ber of ports and strategically im portant cities in order to im prove cooperation, exchange of inform ation and prevent possible drug trafficking.16 The strategy to fight drugs thus defies the established notion of territoriality and borders as 'w alls around territories'. The police and custom s cooperation, rather, assum es the dispersed and netw ork-like shape of the flows of goods they are trying to control.17

Governing a technological society

Exam ining the transform ations of borders and the changing space of governance, one needs, however, to keep in mind the technologically m ediated nature o f these phenom ena. The space of flows, described by Castells (1996), is essentially transm itted through and supported by inform ation and com m unication technologies. C astells' netw ork society is a society w here '[b]oth space and tim e are being transform ed under the com bined effect of the inform ation technology paradigm ' (Castells 1996: 376). Thus, European border security essentially depends on a variety of trans-national inform ation flow s and technological zones, m ost notably the ones based on the Schengen A greem ent as well as the socalled Dublin Convention, dealing with asylum issues. For exam ple, in the period betw een January 2003 and M arch 2004, the N orw egian police had 2,242 positive hits in the Eurodac database. Eurodac is a database, established by the Dublin Convention, containing fingerprints of foreign nationals, prim arily asylum seekers. The m ain purpose of

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Eurodac is to prevent people from claim ing asylum in several European countries.18 Schengen Inform ation System (SIS) originates in the Schengen A greem ent and its objective is essentially to dism antle the EU 's internal borders w hile coordinating and strengthening its external borders, particularly through better police cooperation and exchange of inform ation. The SIS is a netw ork w hich allow s police and other agents from Schengen m em ber states to access and enter a variety of data on specific individuals, vehicles and objects. Hayes (2004) reports that by M arch 2003, the SIS created [rjecords on 877,655 people, a further 386,402 aliases, and more than 15 m illion objects. EU officials estim ate that there are 125,000 access term inals to the SIS. U nder finalised proposals, access to the SIS is to be extended to Europol, Eurojust, national prosecutors and vehicle licensing authorities, (italics original) Furtherm ore, a new ly established European visa inform ation system (VIS) will contain 'personal inform ation supplied by people from around the world in an estim ated 20 m illion visa applications to the EU m em ber states every y ear' (H ayes 2004). These system s, with their netw ork of nodes and tens of thousands of access points, thus fundam entally reshape the scope and nature of the European space of governance. Barry (2002: 2) argues for the need to acknow ledge the 'centrality of technology to the reconfiguration of w hat one can call the space of governm ent'. If geography and territorial boundaries w ere before central for defining the space of governm ent, now, on the other hand, governm ent operates 'in relation to zones form ed through the circulation of technical practices and devices' (Barry 2002: 3). Drawing on A rjun A ppadurai's (1990) concept of technoscapes, Barry defines technological zones as zones of circulation w here technical devices, practices and artefacts are highly connected and com patible. Loader (2004: 67) argues that when it com es to the field of European policing, this is 'an alm ost entirely inform ationalised activity - a practice oriented not on-the-ground delivery of visible police functions [...] but towards supporting such practices through the generation, storage and dissem ination of inform ation'. Loader argues that the argum ent about the inefficiency of European cross-border inform ation sharing thus overlooks and under-estim ates 'the im port of the activities that are actually taking place on a specifically European level' (Loader 2004: 67). New technologies thus seem both to transform the traditional space of governm ent and to disrupt territorial boundaries, as well as appearing to

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state and com m ercial organizations to be the m ost efficient solution for addressing the problem s of governance and security arising from these reconfigurations. Through various technologically supported strategies, such as airline liaison officers and the obligation of carriers to com m unicate passenger data to border authorities, contem porary governance is able constantly to expand the range o f actors w ho participate in global risk com m unication networks. However, as Ericson and H aggerty (1997: 4) point out, risk com ­ m unication system s are not sim ply neutral channels through which know ledge is transferred: 'Rather, they have their ow n logics and autonom ous processes. They govern institutional relations and circum scribe w hat individuals and their organisations are able to accom plish.' The contem porary technological paraphernalia therefore not only enables fortification of the border, it also reshapes the border according to its own logic. According to Lyon (2003), globalized surveillance results in 'delocalization o f the border'. [BJorders them selves becom e 'delocalized' as efforts are m ade to check travellers before they reach physical borders of ports of entry. Im ages and inform ation circulate through different departm ents, looping back and forth in com m ercial, policing, and governm ent networks. Surveillance records, once kept in fixed filing cabinets and dealing in data focused on persons in specific places, are now fluid, flow ing and global. These consequences are properly 'globalized' in the sense that they signal new patterns of social activity and novel social arrangem ents, w hich are less constrained by geography. The 'delocalized bord er' is a prim e exam ple of globalized surveillance. (Lyon 2003: 110) However, Lyon (2003) points out that technological surveillance, intensified in the afterm ath of Septem ber 11, should not be seen sim ply as a 'sudden change' connected to an extraordinary event. Rather, the grow ing surveillance practices are sym ptom atic of deeper shifts in the nature of social control and governance that have been present in Western societies for som e time. The inform ation flows m ay have intensified after Septem ber 11, but they have been also before, in som e form, part of most global control strategies. The ability of surveillance technologies to 'delocalize' the border m eans not only that the border can be moved outside of national territory in order to avert potential risks, but also that the border can be dispersed and moved inside the territory. Consequently, som e analysts point out

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that the Schengen lands are by no m eans a 'borderless zone' (Bigo and Guild 2004; H yden and Lundberg 2004; Walters 2004). W hile abolishing internal state borders, Schengen lands have intensified internal police activities and identity checks of potentially undesirable individuals, particularly in certain zones heavily populated by third country nationals (Bigo and Guild 2004). A sim ilar strategy is present in the establishm ent of the so-called 'm obile task forces' described in the British Secure Borders W hite Paper: A cting on im proved and more effective use of intelligence, these 'M obile Task Forces' will be sent to targeted locations anywhere in the United Kingdom. An integrated intelligence netw ork that supports the M obile Task Forces will enable the Im m igration Service to increase resources, for limited periods of time, on identified areas of greatest risk. As the risk changes, the M obile Task Forces will be redeployed to focus on the new areas of concern. (H om e Office 2002: 97) Biom etric identity cards should therefore also be understood in this context, creating, according to Lyon (in this volum e), a border which is 'everyw here'. The U K governm ent's plans for electronic tagging and satellite surveillance of asylum seekers m ight also have a sim ilar effect.19 Living in a technological society m eans, as Barry (2002: 2) points out, that various technologies dom inate the sense of problem s w hich need to be addressed as well as dom inating their solutions. The task of providing security and controlling borders is today constituted essentially as a technological task, including not only inform ation sharing but also a variety of other technologies, such as gam m a ray scanners, w hich give clear im ages of bodies hidden in vehicles, heartbeat sensors, advanced heat-seeking technology, etc. The groups m ost eager to resist the technological surveillance networks are the ones who daily try to penetrate the fortress-like borders o f the first world. Using global com m unication system s is a m atter of necessity for them also. M obile phones allow hum an traffickers to m aintain contact with their netw orks and potential clients across the world. A ccording to a recent BBC report 'one sm uggler sold his m obile phone containing the directory of his contacts to another sm uggler for $15,000'.20 'Staying ahead of the gam e' is therefore also very m uch on the m inds of those 'doom ed to be locally tied' (Baum an 1998), although the price of failure is often paid with their lives.

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C o nclusio n

The story o f con tem p orary bord ers and go v ernan ce brings up them es o f d elocalization , globalization, ex-territoriality and 'th e end o f era of sp ace'. H ow ever, as m u ch as these them es are cou pled w ith the im ages o f a bord erless w orld, th ey p arad oxically also m ean introd uction o f ever m ore efficien t bord er controls. B aum an (1998) points out the im portance o f u n derstand ing the m u tual reinforcem ent betw een globalization and m obility on the one hand, and, sim ultaneously, the renew ed em phasis on territoriality on the other hand. W hile globalizing and bord erless for som e, the con tem p orary con d ition is increasingly localizing for others (or, one cou ld say, for the largest p art o f the hu m an popu lation). [R Jather than hom ogen izing the hum an condition, the technological annu lm ent o f tem poral/spatial distances tends to polarize it. It em an cipates certain hu m ans from territorial con straints and renders certain com m u nity-gen eratin g m eanings exterritorial - w hile denud ing the territory, to w hich other people go on bein g confined, o f its m ean in g and its id entity-end ow ing capacity. (Baum an 1998: 18, italics original) R ather than talking about globalization, B aum an and other com m entators talk about g localization, thus em ph asizing g lobalization and territorializatio n /lo c a liz a tio n as tw o m u tu ally reinforcing processes. The need for bord ers - in a m aterial as w ell as sym bolic sen se - m ay be therefore greater today than in the past. Fortress Europe, fortress A m erica, fortress A ustralia and the surveillance surge in the afterm ath of S ep tem ber 11 (Lyon 2003) are w itness to the persisten t m ateriality o f the border, the threat o f trans-national crim e b ein g a useful ju stificatio n for the controls intend ed to keep the locals tied to their territory. Fu rtherm ore, the p olitical rhetoric in m o st W estern cou ntries today show s a potent sym bolic need for bord ers as a m eans of strength en in g a sense of secu rity and identity. The w av e o f n ationalism and xenop hobia in the EU, p articularly in trad itionally tolerant cou ntries such as D enm ark and The N eth erlan ds, represents a p o ten t rem ind er o f the sym bolic im portance o f te rrito ry A fter all, the m ost recent w ar in Europe w as a w ar about territory and its con tested natu re, particu larly the great sym bolic pow er that K osov o held and still holds fo r the Serbs. The existen ce o f b ord ers and the 'em b race' o f locality m ay be therefore not only a d estiny to w hich som e are 'd o o m ed ' (B aum an 1998), b u t also a choice, a form of escapism o f the affluent. T h e em erging strategies for d efen ding the bord er con stitu te, accord ing to W alters, a new type of

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g o v ern a n ce a n d p o litic s - 'a w ill to d o m e stica te th e fo rce s w h ich th re aten the sa n ctity o f h o m e ' (2004: 242). L ik e b e in g to u g h on crim e, d efen d in g the b o rd er a lso ca rrie s an en o rm o u s p o litica l an d sy m b o lic cap ital. A s B a u m a n (1998: 117) w rites: In a n e v e r m o re in secu re and u n ce rta in w o rld the w ith d ra w a l in to the sa fe h a v en o f territo ria lity is an in ten se tem p ta tio n ; an d so th e d e fen ce o f th e territo ry - th e 'sa fe h o m e ' - b e co m e s th e p a ss­ k ey to all d o o rs w h ich on e feels m u st be lo ck ed to stav e o ff the trip le th re a t to sp iritu a l an d m a teria l co m fo rt. [ ...] It is p erh a p s a h a p p y co in cid en ce fo r p o litica l o p era to rs an d h o p e fu ls th at the g e n u in e p ro b lem s o f in secu rity an d u n certa in ty h av e co n d en se d in to the a n x ie ty a b o u t sa fety ; p o litic ia n s can be su p p o sed to be d o in g so m e th in g a b o u t th e first tw o ju s t b e ca u se b e in g seen to be v o cifero u s and v ig o ro u s a b o u t th e third.

N otes

1 I would like to thank the participants at the Queen's University's (Kingston, Ontario, Canada) workshop on state borders and border policing, and the participants at the Oslo Institute of Criminology's seminar about crime control and technological culture, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 2

S o u rce : h t t p :/ / n e w s .b b c .c o .U k / l / h i / w o r l d / e u r o p e / 2 0 2 4 9 4 3 .s t m

3

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4 I am grateful to May-Len Skilbrei and Astrid Renland for bringing the issue to my attention. 5 Source: http:/ / www.msnbs.msn.com/id/5881958/print/1 /displaym ode/ 1098/ 6 The existence of 'non-spaces' has been described as a general trait of contemporary social space (Lash 2002) - exemplified by transit lounges at airports and airports themselves, or by certain territories (such as Ceuta in northern Morocco), which are experienced as transit areas where people simply wait to get somewhere else. 7 Source: BBC News at http ://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_politics/ 8 Source: Guardian Unlimited at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/ story/0,11026,1192350,OO.html 9 Source: h ttp ://w w w .g u a rd ia n .c o .u k /R e fu g e e s _ in _ B rita in /S to ry / 0,2763,1370816,OO.html 10 Source: BBC News at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/2994034.stm 11 Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/m ain.jhtm l?xm l=/news/2004 /10/02/wasy02.xm l&sSheet=/news/2004/10/02/ixworld.html

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12

19

A sim ilar exam ple is recent efforts by the United States in West Africa to strengthen the security forces and border controls of M auritania, Mali, Chad and Niger. The U S Pan-Sahel initiative will provide equipm ent and training to military units responsible for the control of the porous Saharan borders. The objective of this intervention in som e of the poorest countries in the world is, to borrow' the words of the U S spokesm an, to strengthen 'surveillance against cross-border terrorism '. Source: http:/ / www.guardian. co .u k /in tern atio n al/sto ry / 0 ,3604,1122505,00.html Guild (2004: 38) reports that at busy airports, airlines may also engage services of private agencies to carry out additional passenger checks for them, thus diffusing the responsibility even further. M oroccan society largely depends on money sent back hom e by the migrants from Spain, which may explain the lacking interest of M oroccan authorities in border control. Source: BBC News at h ttp :/ /new sv ote.bb c.co.u k /m p ap p s/ p a g e to o ls/p rin t/n e w s .b b c .c o .u k /l/h i/w o rld /a fric a / Source: h ttp ://o d in .d e p .n o /h d /n o r s k /p u b l/s tm e ld /0 3 0 0 0 5 -0 4 0 0 0 5 /v e d 008-bn.html. Norway has had its police and custom s officers placed in Pakistan (Islamabad and Karachi), Spain, Great Britain, The N etherlands, Russia and Austria. Norway also cooperates with other Nordic countries, and they have com mon personnel placed in, among others, Ankara, Bangkok, Lisbon, Rome, Tallinn, Nicosia, etc. Source: h ttp ://o d in .d e p .n o /h d /norsk/ publ/ stm eld/0 3 0 005-040005/indexved008-b-n-a.htm l. It is im portant to point out that the w ar on drugs continues, although the public focus seem s to be shifting som ew hat away from the drug trade as a m orally reprehensible activity in itself, to drug trade being a financial supply-line for terrorism. Only four countries (UK, Germany, France and Sweden) had more positive Eurodac hits than N orway in the sam e period. Source: h ttp ://w w w .k rip o s. no/ak t_tem a/eu rod ac.htm l Source: h ttp ://n e w s.b b c .co.u k /2/h i/u k _n ew 's/p o litics/3243530.stm

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13

14

15 16

17

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R e fe re n c e s

Appadurai, A. (1990) 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural econom y', Theory, Culture and Society, 7:2-3, pp. 295-375. Barry, A. (2002) Political M achines: Governing a Technological Society (London and New York: The Athlone Press). Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cam bridge, UK: Polity Press). Baum an, Z. (2002) Society under Siege (Cam bridge, UK: Polity Press). Bigo, D. and Guild, E. (2004) 'D istancering af de fremm ede - logikken i Schengen -v isu m m et', Tidskriftet Politikk, 3:7, pp. 23-33.

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Blakely, E.J. and Snyder, M.G. (1997) Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United Stales (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press). Castells, M. (1996) The Rise o f the N etwork Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers). Crawford, A. (2002) 'The Governance of Crime and Insecurity in an Anxious Age: the Trans-European and the Local' in A. Crawford (ed.) Crime and Insecurity: The Governance o f Safety in Europe (Cullompton: Willan Publishing), pp. 27-51. Douglas, M. (1994) Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London and New York: Routlege). Ericson, R. and Haggerty, K.H. (1997) Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). Featherstone, M. (2002) 'Cosm opolis: an introduction', Theory, Culture and Society, 19:1-2, pp. 1-16. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Guardian Weekly (2003) 'EU sets up agency to police its borders', 20-26 November. Guild, E. (2004) 'The Borders of the European Union Visas and carriers sanctions', Tidskriftet Politikk, 3:7, pp. 34-43. Hayes, B. (2004) 'From the Schengen Information System to SIS IIand the Visa Inform ation System (VIS): the proposals explained', Statewatch Analysis. Available at: w w w .statew atch .org/n ew s/2004/f e b /summ ary-sis.reprt.htm Hedetoft, U. (1998) 'Constructions of Europe: Territoriality, Sovereignty, Identity: Disaggregations of Cultural and Political Space', in S. Immerfall and J. Hagen (eds) Territoriality in the Globalizing Society: One Place or None? (Berlin: Springer), pp. 153-71. Home Office (2002) Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (London: The Stationery Office). Hyden, S. and Lundberg, A. (2004) Inre utlanningskontroll I polisarbete: mellan attsstatsideal och effektivitet i Schengens Sverige (M almo: IMER, M almo hogskola). Klein, N. (2003) 'Fortress continents: The US and Europe are both creating m ulti­ tiered regional strongholds', The Guardian, 16 January. Loader, I. (2004) 'Policing, Securisation and Democratisation in Europe', in T. Newburn and R. Sparks (eds) Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: National and International Dimensions o f Crime Control (Cullompton: Willan Publishing), pp. 49-79. Lyon, D. (2003) Surveillance after September 11 (Cam bridge, UK: Polity). Murdoch, G. (2004) 'Dem ocracy in Digital Tim es', paper given at The M ateriality of M ediated Com m unication Conference, 17-18 May, Bergen, Norway. N ewm an, O. (1972) Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City (London: Architectural Press). O'M alley, P. (1996) 'Post-Keynesian Policing', Economy and Society, 25:2, pp. 13755.

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Sim on, J. (1997) 'G overning through Crim e', in L. Friedm an and G. Fisher (eds) The Crime Conundrum: Essays in Criminal justice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 171-90. Urry, J. (2002) 'The Global Com plexities of Septem ber 11th', Theory, Culture & Society, 19:4, pp. 57-69. Walters, W. (2004) 'Secure Borders, Safe Haven, D om opolitics', Citizenship Studies, 8:3, pp. 237-60.

21 4

C h a p te r 13

Immigration controls and citizenship in the political rhetoric of New Labour Don Flynn

G overnm ent policy in the U nited Kingdom has moved very rapidly during the course of the past eight years in the direction of an active, interventionist state claim ing the authority to m onitor and direct aspects of life w hich had form erly been regarded as none of its concern. Laissez fa ire in the realm of civic and social affairs is being replaced with a doctrine that asserts the right of the state to know far more about citizens and residents then ever it did in the past, for reasons justified by appeals to social cohesion and integration. The prom otion of a new m echanism for state scrutiny in the form of the Identity Cards Bill proceeding through Parliam ent, at the tim e of w riting, is em blem atic of these developm ents. The N ew Labour governm ent responsible for this change of direction has offered a range of reasons for its policies. These extend from the need to define a new and stronger notion of citizenship capable of asserting itself against the socially fragm enting tendencies of globalization, countering the alienation of sections of society from civic affairs, through to the protection of society from the dangers of terrorism of the 11 Septem ber 2001 variety.1 But forem ost am ong the reasoning of N ew Labour thinkers has been its evaluation of the im pact of im m igration on British society, w hich it sees as being sim ultaneously a force aiding the m odernization and econom ic com petitiveness of the country, and a danger because of its potential to run out of control and threaten the security of settled com m unities. 215

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This chapter attem pts to review the recent history of im m igration policy in Britain, with a view to explaining the character of the frequent innovations that New Labour has been responsible for since its election in 1997, and also its im pact on the broader issues of citizenship and the em ergence of an active surveillance state.

W h a t went before

The follow ing argum ent attem pts a review of the recent history of British im m igration control policy prior to 1997. The inclination of this author is to concur in general terms with a num ber of scholars who have seen in this record the com m on need o f post-w ar European governm ents to m ake extensive use o f m igrant labour to achieve econom ic growth com bined with low inflation (Castles and K osack 1985; H ollifield 1992). UK governm ents differed from their counterparts on the continent in their w illingness to rely on laissez fa ire m echanism s o f m arket dem and to recruit this labour force (Deakin 1970; H arris 1987).2 The conventions of the dissolving em pire initially provided a m eans by w hich colonial and C om m onw ealth citizens could act on their own initiative to travel and seek em ploym ent in the UK. W hile this appeared to provide an efficient m eans for m eeting the dem and of British em ployers for m igrant w orkers throughout the 1950s, it also allowed a space for nationalist political currents to agitate against alleged excessive 'coloured' im m igration (H um phry and Ward 1974; Layton-H enry 1992; Brown 1999). These tensions m arked out the terrain for the im m igration debate in Britain during the course of the 1960s. The unrestricted rights of C om m onw ealth and colonial citizens to enter the UK were ended in 1962 with the first C om m onw ealth Im m igrants Act. In 1968 a second Act imposed control m easures on British citizens w ho had obtained that status through connections with form er British colonies: in the m ain, people of South Asian ethnicity. In the m eantim e, the Labour governm ent, under the prem iership of Harold Wilson, had attem pted to tackle the problem of grow ing anti-im m igrant racism with measures that laid the foundation for w hat w ould becom e 'race relations' policy. A dual approach strategy em erged, w hich w as predicated on the idea that strict im m igration controls were necessary to facilitate harm onious race relations (Deakin 1970: 106). The final stage in the construction of the post-w ar system of controls w as reached with the Im m igration A ct 1971. By the time the politicians had concluded that legislation in this form was needed, the ideological paradigm had finally settled on the notion that im m igration was of

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m arginal im portance to the U K and that the role of policy w as to 'severely restrict'1 the num bers com ing for settlem ent or work. Insofar as som e degree of m igration had to be perm itted, the legislation allow ed the H om e Secretary to produce a detailed set of im m igration rules directing officials in the processing of visa applications and dealing with new com ers at ports of entry. These rules w ere drafted in sufficiently broad terms to perm it a wide degree of discretion in their im plem entation, which allowed a m anagem ent culture to be created focusing attention on w hat were considered the m ost problem atic categories of aspiring entrants. Im m igration statistics suggest that these were citizens of A frican and Asian countries (CRE 1985). But policies aim ed at prom oting harm onious 'race relations' required that black and A sian settlers be able to m ake the transition from im m igrants to being ethnic m inorities (Castles, Booth and Wallace 1987). The am biguities of this transform ation saw the sense of being 'British' clash with the facts of widespread racial injustices throughout society. This encouraged the rising generation to em brace the idea of being 'B lack British' and to stretch cultural assum ptions of w hat was entailed by 'Britishness' in the first place. The insistence of this new constituency on the salience of their experiences as Black British, and the often total incom prehension of w hat was involved in this discourse by politicians in the m ainstream parties,4 dem onstrated that the historical linkage of am biguous nationality to im m igration status had given rise to disputes about the character of citizenship itself, and its capacity to be used in a flexible way to describe the aspirations of m arginalized sections of society.

T h e descent into disorder

The control regim e put in place by the 1971 Act proved rem arkably durable across the succeeding two decades. Resort to further legislation was rare, and only in w ays intended to supplem ent the basic form o f the A ct.5 O utw ardly at least the system continued to run on the tram lines laid down more than 15 years previously. Yet this appearance w as deceptive. Geared to the presum ption that m igration was a m arginal activity capable of being managed by officials controlling entry at the UK borders, the system in fact struggled to contain pressures as the sheer num bers of international travellers entering via UK ports rose through the 1980s and '90s at an average rate of 8 per cent per annum , to reach a total of 80 m illion people by 1998. Though only a m inority could be classed as im m igrants in the accepted sense

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of the term, each nevertheless w as subject to checks on identity and reasons for travel by officials at UK ports. In practice, the burden of stringent scrutiny fell on a relatively small group o f people travelling from black C om m onw ealth countries, identified by im m igration officers as being particularly problem atic in terms of their entry to the country. The pressure on airport-based im m igration staff w as partially relieved from 1985 onw ards with the introduction of com pulsory visas, the first for any group of Com m onw ealth citizens, for nationals of Bangladesh, Ghana, India, N igeria, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. But the crucial pressures on im m igration, w hich proved less easy to accom m odate w ith relatively m inor adjustm ents to operating procedures, cam e from two separate directions: the rise of refugee m ovem ents from the early 1990s onwards, and the re-em ergence of dem and for labour m igration at the sam e time. The bulk of the new refugee m ovem ents were associated with the key periods of the Balkans w ars w hich accom panied the break-up of Yugoslavia. These num bers w ere supplem ented with the arrival of asylum seekers from wars and civil turm oil further afield, with nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, A fghanistan, Som alia and Turkey being represented am ong the new com ers. Bound in principle by the 1951 Geneva C onvention on the Status of Refugees, European governm ents nevertheless had scope to act through the use of visa controls and m easures aim ed at the interdiction of travellers before entering EU territory. However, doing this with any degree of effectiveness required extraordinary levels of cooperation betw een various national authorities, w hich proved m uch harder to establish in practice than m ight have been anticipated. Conflicts of interest divided southern European states from northern, and those with differing traditions of hum an rights jurisprudence from each other. W ith regard to econom ic m igration, the reconstruction of econom ies around the principle of deregulation, particularly pronounced in the UK, and a lengthy period of sustained econom ic grow th during the 1990s, generated a dem and for unskilled w orkers in sem i-casual branches of em ploym ent in the service sector which could not be m et from the dom estic labour force (Jordan and Duvall 2002). In cities like London, Birm ingham and M anchester, these vacancies w ould increasingly be filled by overseas students, w orking holiday-m akers, asylum seekers aw aiting consideration of their applications, and irregular migrants. A t other levels of the skills spectrum , influential groups of em ployers pressed for an expansion of w ork perm it schem es to allow the recruitm ent of professionals, technicians and tradespeople of all kinds. The task of accom m odating this new dem and w ithin a system of im m igration that still presum ed that m igration was essentially a marginal activity becam e m ore challenging as the 1990s moved on. 218

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A ttem pts at prim ary legislation by the Conservative governm ent from 1993 onw ards were prim arily intended to provide deterrents w ithin the system against asylum seekers, w ho were identified as the chief threat to ordered im m igration controls. Believing that a high proportion of asylum seekers w ere concerned m ainly w ith the opportunity to obtain social and w elfare benefits, it constructed a harsher reception regim e which withheld all national-state social w elfare support from people lodging 'in-country' asylum claim s (as opposed to applications made im m ediately on arriving at a UK border). But as national governm ent evaded its responsibilities to assist asylum seekers, the courts stepped in to rule that local governm ent had to assist w hen they becam e destitute.6 This obligation unintentionally im posed on som e town hall authorities a trem endous strain and cost, and the presence of asylum seekers becam e an issue of intense controversy. Incidents of violence against refugee fam ilies were reported in the region of the Channel ports in the southeast, w hich heightened the sense of crisis over the issue.

En ter New Labour: the 1998 W h ite Paper

N ew Labour cam e to pow er w ith a strong sense of the problem s and grievances that the im m igration control system was generating. Settled com m unities felt the injustice of fam ily reunion policies which imposed bureaucratic obstacles on the adm ission of spouses and children. At the sam e time, the anxieties of w hite w orking-class com m unities in traditional Labour constituencies were there to be exploited by centre right parties and the new spapers which supported them. The new governm ent acted prom ptly to m ake a concession to its supporters am ong black and Asian com m unities by easing som e of the restrictions to family reunification, abolishing the 'prim ary purpose rule'7 in O ctober 1997. On the w ider issues, the new Hom e Secretary, Jack Straw, prom ised a w hite paper w ithin a year w hich would propose changes to other areas of im m igration law and policy. The m om entum for substantial reform o f the system was established during these early m onths. The m otif of 'm odernization' w as adopted by the governm ent as defining its approach to im m igration reform. The need for m odernization of policy arose, as was explained in the first of New L abou r's two white papers on im m igration, because 'piecem eal' attem pts at reform during the previous 20 years had created a system w hich w as 'too com plex and too slow ' (W hite Paper 1998). This had resulted in inefficiency and had opened the system to the possibility of 'abuse'. M odernization m eant updating procedures to deal with these problems.

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The significance o f econ om ic m igration, w hich this chap ter argues grew greatly d uring this period, w as d ealt w ith only briefly on this occasion. It w as noted that, T h e UK, along w ith the rest o f W estern Europe, the U SA , C anada and A ustralia has seen a substantial increase in the nu m ber o f econ om ic m igrants seek in g a better life for them selves and their fam ilies' (W hite P aper 1998: 1.3). It im plied that, in principle, there w as nothing w rong w ith this, but national auth orities w ere now required to be alert to the p ossibility o f abuse o f the system . T h e 1998 W hite P aper w as cen trally con cern ed w ith the v exed issue o f asylum . The rise in the nu m ber o f refu gees com ing to the cou ntries of the EU, and Britain specifically, had risen fourfold since the late 1980s, from 4,000 in 1988 to over 32,000 in 1997 (W hite P aper 1998: 1.9). The con viction o f the go v ernm ent w as that the m ajority o f these applications did not qualify for protection un der the G eneva C on vention, and in fact involved econ om ic m igrants looking for an opportu nity to get around the strict rules restricting labour m igration. But the d uty to evalu ate com plex claim s abou t incid ents o f im p risonm ent and torture had clogged up the ad m inistration o f the system to the point that large parts o f the IN D w ere effectively paralysed by backlogs o f w ork (W hite Paper 1998: 1.14). The new leadership at the H om e O ffice w as determ ined to tackle w hat it consid ered an abuse o f refugee rights by revising asylum reception procedu res to m ake them m u ch less attractive to unfounded claim ants. A sylum seekers w ere to be d ispersed to tow ns and regions outside the m ain areas o f im m igrant settlem ent, subjecting them to a strict regim e o f surveillance to ensure they rem ained there. Further, their su p p o rt w as to be provided through a system o f special vouchers instead o f cash paym ents, m aking their m o vem ents p articularly visible in local com m u nities. Trapped w ithin a system that insisted on their high v isibility at all tim es, asylum seekers could be processed and, for the m ajority, rem oved from the cou ntry m u ch m ore efficiently. The W hite P ap er w as also required to take into accoun t the im plications o f the H um an R ights A ct 1998 - the so-called 'B ill o f R igh ts' for the U nited K ingd om - w hich w as presented by the go v ernm ent as a cornerstone o f its legislative program m e (K lug 2000). U nd er these new provisions, ju d g es w ould for the first tim e be em pow ered to ad jud icate on w hether a p articular action by pu blic au th orities infringed rights gu aranteed by the European C on vention on H um an R ights (ECH R). This w ould im pact on legislators and policy m akers, in that they w ould be required to consid er w hether their activities involved m easures w hich could be ruled against as an infring em ent in the courts. A s far as im m igration policy w as con cern ed, the protection o f hum an rights w as consid ered to require the introd uction o f a right to form al legal

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appeal on hum an rights grounds to persons who believed that rights under the ECH R had been infringed by a negative decision of the authorities (W hite Paper 1998, Chapter 7). The 'asylum procedures' chapter offered more, setting out the fact that under a hum an rights regim e, asylum decisions w ould have to take explicit account of the responsibilities of the U K authorities to com ply w ith the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1984 UN Convention A gainst Torture and other Cruel, Inhum an or Degrading Treatm ent or Punishm ent, and the ECH R (W hite Paper 1998, Chapter 8). This new right of appeal on hum an rights grounds has had a m ajor im pact on the operation of im m igration and refugee policy (H enderson 2003). It is possible to see in the 1998 W hite Paper all the elem ents of the New Labour approach assem bled and put on the agenda - m odernization, a positive valuation of past m igration and current diversity, and the new dim ension of hum an rights - but placed in the lim ited context of a discussion about overcom ing the failings of a collapsing im m igration control system . As such, the reform s appeared largely as safeguards rather than radically form ulated new principles to steer m igration policy. A nother three years and a further w hite paper w ould pass before these considerations were lent any greater clarity.

T h e sharpening o f ideas: the 2002 W h ite Paper

The 1998 W hite Paper, and the legislation w hich follow ed,8 was not a significant success in terms of the developing im m igration situation. The theory that asylum seekers could be deterred by dispersal and vouchers was disproved by the significant grow th in refugee num bers over this period. O ver 71,000 fresh applicants arrived in 1999, and a further 80,000 in 2000, m ost com ing as a consequence of the w ars in the Balkans and civil conflicts in other regions. A ttem pts at the interdiction of refugee m ovem ents at the EU borders had produced the perverse effect of strengthening the role of agents and facilitators in obtaining entry to the territory of m em ber states. The UK had em erged as a favoured destination for these netw orks, resulting in the establishm ent of a Channel crossing staging post at the Red Cross-m anaged Sangatte refugee camp, near Calais (Cohen 2004). The highly publicized disruption caused to Channel Tunnel rail services during the period after the 1999 Act, and the continuing high volum e of new applicants, advertised the fact that New Labour had still not found the key to the orderly m anagem ent of migration.

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Public opinion on the effects of the governm ent's policies was in the m ain hostile to the new com ers, but an im portant though sm aller group reacted in an opposing way. The voucher schem e com bined with com pulsory dispersal w as view ed by m any w ithin New L abou r's coalition of supporters as an outrage. The deliberate isolation of vulnerable people beyond the fringes of the cash econom y offended against values of decency and hospitality. A fter the m urder of a Kurdish asylum seeker, Firsat Dag, on the Sighthill estate in Glasgow in 2001 public attention w as focused on the conditions dispersed asylum seekers were being expected to endure.9 The Jam aican-born leader of the Transport and G eneral W orkers Union, Bill M orris, norm ally considered close to the New Labour governm ent, responded to the accounts of violence and discrim ination against asylum seekers by proposing to bring the entire issue onto the floor o f that year's Labour party conference, thereby threatening the governm ent w ith the prospect o f a m ajor breach with its supporters on asylum policy. The critics of governm ent policy effectively w on this round of the cam paign. A m inisterial re-shuffle in the sum m er had seen Jack Straw replaced with David Blunkett as H om e Secretary, a politician steeped in the traditions of northern English m unicipal socialism (Blunkett 2001). Blunkett im m ediately saw his task as im posing a more focused agenda on his departm ent, structured around notions of civil renewal and the strengthening of community. From this perspective the abstractions of hum an rights looked like the obsessions of the southern 'chattering classes', and as such stood in the way of policies w hich first and foremost w ould offer 'security' to ordinary citizens, and a space in a society which they were confident resembled the core values of their traditional local com m unities.10 He moved quickly to defuse the row over refugee dispersal. It was obvious that the voucher system for supporting asylum seekers would be abandoned to head off the threatened revolt at the party conference. However, when he rose to speak at that assem bly on 1 October 2001, the sm oke from the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon on 9 /11 was still very m uch in the air. The security elem ent of Blunkett's concerns w as pow erfully reinforced, and it w as clear that these would be prom inent in the im m igration debate thereafter. The im m ediate prom ise was for a second fundam ental review of policy, and a second w hite paper w as eventually published in February 2002. Safe Borders, Secure Haven differed from its predecessor in being uncluttered by the need to address the chaos caused by the failed policies o f the Tory epoch. It aimed at the onset for the integration of a sw eeping w orldview dealing w ith globalization and its consequences

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for local com m unities. The contexts of citizenship and social cohesion extended the range of discussion from m atters relating to the adm ission of im m igrants, through to the supervision of m igrant com m unities, and the circum stances in which their integration into w ider British society would be provided for. There w as a retraction from N ew L abou r's initial idealism about the potential of hum an rights in the W hite Paper's discussion of refugee and asylum issues. From the outset the W hite Paper posed the problem s of m igration w ithin the fram ew ork of citizenship and nationality. M igration is potentially unsettling because it leads to changes in national culture and identity. Tensions can be raised and long-established senses of belonging can be underm ined (W hite Paper 2002: 9). But a later reference to the civil disturbances w hich took place in the northern towns of Oldham , Burnley and Bradford in the sum m er of 2001 suggested a more fundam ental problem : even w ithout the tensions allegedly induced by m igration, the sense of culture and national identity w as already fragile in the UK: [...] globalisation of com m unication m edia and inform ation technology has opened up national cultures to diverse influences, and provided channels of mutual interaction betw een different parts of the w orld that literally know no boundaries. Social changes such as the decline of old certainties of class or place, and the em ergence of new political institutions alongside the nation state, have also contributed to these changes in identity and belonging. (W hite Paper 2002: 9 -10) The form ulation of new policies on citizenship, intended to prom ote this lost sense of belonging, are therefore required not only because of the experience of m igration, but because of developm ents arising from globalization. In fact, these efforts to focus interest on the form s m odern citizenship m ight take precede both white papers and go back to days before governm ent when Etzionian ideas of com m unitarianism were being investigated by N ew Labour theorists. The task of 're-m oralising' the nation, and the role which education m ight play in prom oting the core values of com m unity were strongly present in the adoption of citizenship studies in the school curriculum as a part of New L abour's education policy. In this form, however, they were criticized by Tory opponents as faddish and a m anifestation of the 'nanny state's' desire to interfere in m atters w hich were not its proper concern. The disturbances in the northern cities in 2001 changed the context and shifted citizenship from theoretical abstractions to som ething with m uch more grit. The fact that the protagonists during the riots had been

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groups of w hites and A sian you ths - the latter ov erw helm ingly o f British birth and edu cation - exoticized the d iscu ssion and associated it w ith the entry of foreign elem ents into settled British com m u nities. Rooted in these points, a con versation about equ ip p ing n ew com ers w ith the basic p rinciples o f how to live and behav e in British society injected new hope that the issues N ew L abou r w as trying to talk about m ight becom e m ore w id ely understood. A s the W hite P aper said, 'H istorically, the U K has had a relatively w eak sense o f w hat active citizenship should entail. O u r valu es o f individual freedom , the protection o f liberty and respect for difference, have not been accom p anied by a strong, shared un derstand ing o f the civic realm ' (W hite P aper 2002: 10-11). T h e b usiness o f integrating im m igrants w as seen as a w elcom e op p ortu nity to explore this long-n eglected social space. D oing it this w ay allow ed its authors to say categorically that a m odern civic culture w ould not be able to p rosp er on the basis o f a 'narrow and out-d ated view o f w h at it m eans to be "B ritish ". The governm ent w elcom es the richness o f the cu ltural d iversity w hich im m igrants have brou ght to the UK - our society is m u lti-cultural, and is shaped by its d iverse peoples. We w ant British citizenship p o sitively to em brace the d iversity o f background , culture and faiths that is one o f the hallm arks o f Britain in the 21st C en tu ry ' (W hite P aper 2002: 29). But if British citizenship w as n ot to be narrow , w hat w ould be the exten t o f its breadth? The H um an Rights A ct 1998 w as referred to as providing 'a source o f valu es that British citizens should share'. A t this point w e are given an ind ication o f w hat is likely to lie outsid e the scope o f these valu es, in p articu lar 'so m e cultural valu es w hich con flict [...] such as those w hich deny w om en the righ t to p articipate as equal citizens' (W hite Paper 2002: 30). A nd the ability to sp eak a 'co m m on langu age' w as raised as a reference point, so that people could particip ate as active citizens in econ om ic, social and p olitical life. By such hints the role o f im m igration p olicy in shaping citizenship gradu ally em erged. P eople w ould need to be 'prep ared for citizenship '. It should be a 'sig n ifican t life ev en t'. It w as a p o in t at w hich people com m itted them selves to bein g a p art o f British society. To g et there, applican ts should be ab le to d em onstrate a level o f kn ow led ge about British society w hich im plied acceptance o f its broad traditions. The go v ernm ent had m ad e it clear that this know led ge w ould be o f a general kind, rather than detailed insights into history or society. A w orking group set up un der the chairm an ship o f Professor Sir Bernard C rick w ould later set o ut its ad vice that it should con tain a broad sen se o f the d irection o f British history, together w ith ideas about how healthcare or edu cation and schools w orked, as w ell as a basic kn ow led ge o f key

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institutions, like Parliam ent and the monarchy. Language tests would sim ilarly be expected to dem onstrate a practical facility in English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic). O ther chapters explain why an active approach to citizenship and population form ation w as now being expressed. New Labour had accepted the case for econom ic m igration and believed that British em ployers needed to have access to global labour m arkets across all levels of the skills spectrum . The integration of new high technology sectors across the globe m eant that m any highly qualified people living in developing countries were m otivated to w ork for at least a part of their careers in the UK (Castles and M iller 2003). Beyond the dem and for the highly skilled, the grow th o f living standards in the cities of the UK had produced a new service sector catering to the lifestyles of the affluent m iddle classes. D eregulation of labour m arkets m eant that m any of these would be provided in conditions w hich had traditionally generated dem and for low -skilled m igrants (Harris 1995). The m odern im m igration policies w hich N ew Labour envisaged w ould m anage the adm ission of large num bers of m igrants also im posed on these w orkers conditions of residence w hich ensured their subservience to the often dem anding conditions of life in the '3D ' jobs (dirty, dem anding, dangerous) which w ere increasingly the norm. The W hite Paper chapter on 'w orking in the U K' set out the argum ents for a pro-active policy of m anaged econom ic m igration to m eet the needs of British em ployers. It envisaged a rigidly structured system , capable of differentiating betw een skilled w orkers in sectors with acknow ledged shortages (to be fast-tracked); em ployers unable to fill a specific vacancy from the dom estic labour m arket (standard w ork perm it procedures); and em ployers with seasonal needs for sizable w orkforces on a casual basis w ho were not able to m obilize sufficient num bers to fill vacancies on the short tim escales they operated on (seasonal and tem porary w ork schem es). The problem in tying m anaged m igration to this highly differentiated labour m arket is that the system of m anagem ent must m irror this com plexity and be sufficiently sophisticated to respond to all these needs in a flexible fashion. W hat em erged in practice was a highly stratified system , with over 22 schem es being officially acknow ledged as a part of m anaged m igration, with the potential for further layers being added as new situations were generated (M orris 2004). This system sought to allocate differential rights to m igrant w orkers, covering such issues as perm itted length of residence, the possibility of changing employer, access to w elfare benefits and services, family reunification, and eligibility to eventual rights of settlem ent. The pattern of allocation was itself a function of such factors as skill level, nationality

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and gender, w ith evidence that ethnicity was also a com ponent at an inform al level." A system of this sort could be expected to generate friction, with m any categories of m igrants being frustrated in am bitions and plans for their m igration. Policing the different categories o f m igrant w orkers im poses heavy costs on adm inistration. U nder N ew L abou r's schem e, the state authorities divest them selves o f som e of these by enrolling other parties to undertake tasks of m onitoring and surveillance. These include em ployers, social security agencies, education services (many casual w orkers are also students), healthcare services, local authorities, and potentially such private sector actors as banks and other financial service providers. This level of policing m ight be sufficient for the m ajority of m igrant w orkers, and m ost will rem ain in com pliance w ith w hatever conditions are im posed on them. But it is realistic to suppose that a significant fraction will experience difficulties from a range of sources, such as encountering exploitative em ployers, discovering that they have been unable to recover the costs of their m igration (particularly for those from distant countries, or w hose adm ittance into the system has been facilitated by expensive agents), or w hose life circum stances change and who need, or sim ply want, to rem ain longer than was originally perm itted. In the face of this the state has the need to be continually overhauling its capacity for surveillance and supervision, and ultim ately the pow er to intervene to deal w ith delinquent migrants. A gainst such contingencies the need for close supervision of m igrant com m unities can be understood. H om e Office statistics for the year 2002 suggest that 320,000 people were adm itted in eight managed m igration schem es during the previous 12 months. Blunkett m ade it clear that he did not favour the setting of governm ent-inspired caps on the num bers ad m itted .12 A 'm odern' im m igration policy therefore has to contem plate the m anagem ent and supervision of potentially large num bers of people w hose official designation as being outside the m ainstream of life will lead to widespread alienation from the values of the society on w hose periphery they tem porarily reside. The issue of the surveillance and control of m igrants figures prom inently in the W hite Paper. The starting point for the discussion is proposals for improved techniques aimed at keeping asylum seekers in the UK under close observation, through the use of induction centres, accom m odation centres, reporting centres, and a new asylum identity card, the biom etrical Asylum Registration Card (ARC). This latter item has been used to test out the technology needed for a general identity card schem e, w hich at the time of w riting is being piloted through Parliam ent in an Identity Card Bill. 226

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The m ain rationale advanced by the governm ent for a national identity card schem e has been precisely that of m anaging m igration, and to a lesser extent, fighting fraud.13 True to New L abou r's approach to the tasks of m odernization, the scope for using technology and m anagem ent techniques im ported from the private sector is seen as vast. The W hite Paper sets this out in a chapter dealing with the issue of 'frau d' (W hite Paper 2002, Chapter 5). It states that there would be more coordination betw een governm ent departm ents and other concerned parties; IT would be upgraded, and databases developed to track and record movem ents. Presented as a convenient way of dem onstrating entitlem ent to a range of state services for those w ho held them, the argum ent was spiced up in further discussions to include the assertion that people w ould be proud to possess such a card, because it would be a palpable badge confirm ing their m em bership of the community. Blunkett m ade a statem ent to the Com m ons on 11 N ovem ber 2003, saying that identity cards w ere 'about asserting our sense of identity and belonging, about our citizenship, and reinforcing the balance betw een rights and responsibilities'.14 They also appear to be about the establishm ent of a database containing specific personal identifiers for the entire population, with the potential for m onitoring the m ovem ent and transactions of m illions of people. To sum m arize, the significance o f the second W hite Paper lies in its assertion of a vision of a m odern im m igration policy, aim ing for the m anagem ent of new form s of m igration established under the impetus of globalization, and the benefits w hich the UK expected to derive from this in terms of econom ic growth and cultural diversity. The problem s anticipated with these developm ents were seen as an increase in anxiety due to a loss of the sense of belonging on the part o f established com m unities and the historical w eakness in the core values which were accepted as defining British society. Further, the ordered m anagem ent of the new m igrations would place huge dem ands on adm inistration which could only be m et by increased international cooperation, particularly at the level of the EU, and a m assive investm ent in organization and technology to ensure that flows were properly structured and adequately policed. The solutions to all the issues raised im plied a reconstruction not ju st of m igration m anagem ent techniques, but also of w ider conceptions of citizenship in order that the sense of belonging could acquire updated m eaning and be properly expressed w ithin the new system o f rights and responsibilities that w ould arise. In considering all these points it could be said that a paradigm w as being constructed w hich presum ed the type of society receiving m igration on the scale envisaged w ould be very different from that constructed by the laissez fa ire traditions of old Britain. 227

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N ew L a b o u r rh e to ric in effecting change

In this final section w e w ill tty to set out thoughts on the w ays in w hich the N ew L abou r m od e o f p olitical d iscou rse is facilitating the types o f changes need ed for the introd uction o f the m anaged m igration it envisions as a m ajor com p o nent o f its policies. We w ill also su gg est reasons w hy there are likely to be lim its to the progress w hich N ew L abou r can m ake in this d irection, and the im plications this w ill have for pu blic d ebate in the future. A lan Finlayson has argued for attention to be paid to the rhetorical form o f a political p arty 's 'p itch ' to the electorate on the grounds that, 'P o litics is con cern ed not only w ith d ep loyin g the force o f w ords in order to achieve som e d esired effect b u t in giving force to w ords so that their usage can com e to have such effects' (Finlayson 2003: 67). A political argum en t is rhetorical in that 'it functions to p ersu ad e and m otivate'. Finlayson uses the exam ple o f 'm od ern izatio n ' to m ake his point, but a term like 'citizen sh ip ' could equally be d esignated as an '" u p " w ord, that m akes things sou nd exciting, progressive and p o sitiv e'. But crucially it: [...] is also ideological in that this rhetorical usage helps generate an appearan ce o f structured and unified thinking beyond w hich is either nonsense or (by im plication) outd ated thinking. It helps to rend er 'n atu ral' and u n -contestable that w hich is n o t necessarily so. B ecause the sam e w ord is used to d escribe con stitu tional reform , changes to the police force, health service and ed u cational system , it seem s that som e sort o f coh erent approach is u n d erp in ning policy. A lon g w ith this un ify in g effect there is (as a necessary corollary) a sim ultaneous exclusion. T hat w hich is not m o d e m is not o f N ew L a b o u r's N ew Britain, and that w hich is not p art o f it cannot lay claim to be m od ernised . (Finlayson 2003: 67) T his p ap er has argued that N ew L ab o u r's approach to the reform of im m igration po licy in B ritain has been structured around the concept o f 'm o d ern izatio n ', w ith the p ivotal ideas b ein g ad aptation to the new realities o f globalization and the im portan ce o f diversity in m u ltiplying the com p lexity o f m arkets and the potential for trad e and h igh er levels o f econom ic grow th. The insistence on lin king m od ernization to m arketled grow th also assu m es a p articular style o f d iscipline b ein g exercised over flow s, w ith econom ic m igration bein g p rivileged ov er h u m anitarian and seco nd ary m ovem ents, and channelled p recisely into the sectors and niches in w hich the d em and from em ployers is greatest. This im plies a

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trem endous com plexity in the w ays in w hich m igration is organized, because the needs of em ployers, for w orkers of various skill levels, for em ploym ent on different types of contracts, for w orkers of particular national or cultural backgrounds, age groups, tolerance for particular types of work, etc., is itself very com plex. But while the need for this com plexity is challenging, the em ergence of new m anagem ent techniques and new technologies of supervision and control hold out the hope of a system of m anaged m igration w hich extends seamlessly, from the issuing of visas in countries of origin, to m aintaining the integrity of the channels and corrals in w hich m igrant labour is to be confined, through to the eventual integration of the chosen fractions deem ed w orthy of the grant of citizenship. It m ust be clear that a political form ation which is propounding these extensive program m es of reform is not sim ply m aintaining the racist and restrictive traditions of Britain's post-w ar im m igration control legislation. And yet racism and restriction rem ain present within the new techniques of m anagem ent, in the form of 'institutional racism '1’ and the cultural focus on the values of citizenship, w hich generate inevitable tensions betw een adm inistrators and those w hose cultural stance is considered problem atic. M anaged m igration will be restrictive because it will assert the right of the state to say no, but this time on a great deal more issues than the sim ple question of adm ission into the country. It will routinely refuse perm ission to m igrant w orkers to change em ploym ent when better pay or career prospects are in view. It will decide that six months, one year or two years is long enough for different groups of m igrant w orkers, w hether applications to assist w ith housing costs or deal with short-term unem ploym ent will be refused, and prim arily healthcare withheld from w orkers suffering from infections and injuries deem ed non-urgent. Fam ily re-unification will be contested by a state which has decided that it is not appropriate for w orkers w hose presence is required only for short-term , casual em ploym ent; and refugees will be informed that 'sustainable protections options' are available for them overseas, obviating their old rights to live and settle in a safe European country. New Labour has been assessed by a num ber of critical com m entators as a form ation which has its strengths in essentially sociological pre­ sum ptions about the nature of m odern society, and its w eaknesses in its poverty of appreciation of politics (Finlayson 2003; Leggett 2004; M arquand 2004). The review of the w hite papers attem pted here gives substance to this view point, in their presum ption that the case for reform can be m ade prim arily on grounds of econom ic efficiency and the contingencies of social cohesion. They assum e the resum ption of the type o f stability w hich proved possible after the Im m igration A ct of 1971,

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w hen im m igration pressu re w as regulated by low d om estic d em and and the relative isolation of im m igrant com m u nities seekin g to con test the basis o f control. Yet n either o f these con d itions applies at the present tim e, and w hat is m ore, N ew L abou r p olicy itself ju stifies its reform ist stance on the grounds that d em and , being rooted in the w orkin gs of the global econom y, w ill rem ain high, and that the cen trality of hum an rights, anti-racism and social coh esion w ill m ean an intense en gagem ent w ith the lives o f im m igrant and black and m inority ethnic com m unities. T h at this will require p erm an en t change and ad aptation is intrinsic to the N ew Labour vision o f m od ernization , w hich sees it im posin g on society the un end ing dem and con tin ually to change and transform . This has certain ly been the history of im m igration p olicy u n d er N ew Labour, w ith tw o m ajor W hite P apers and three m ajor A cts o f P arliam en t d uring the seven short years it has been in office. Yet the end is still not in sight and its core p rinciples seem as con tentiou s and d ifficu lt as ever. M aybe this turm oil w ill even tually take im m igration p olicy beyond the param eters o f N ew L abou r altogether, and in the direction of a global society its id eologues had never thou ght possible.

N o te s 1 2

3

4

5

230

For a presentation of the w ays in which these them es have been elaborated in New L abou r's thinking, see Blunkett (2001). The existence of a governm ent European Voluntary Workers schem e im m ediately after the war, w hich recruited and directed the w ork of 180,000 m ainly Polish and Ukrainian w orkers w as a significant exception to the general laissez faire approach of governm ent, albeit for a relatively short period of time. This form ulation w as used to explain the raison d'ttre of im m igration control policy in the m ission statem ent of the Im m igration and Nationality Directorate (IND) throughout the 1980s and up to its am endm ent by New Labour in 1998. A good exam ple o f this w as provided by the 'Labour says h e's black, w e say he's British' advertising cam paign w hich w as run by the Conservative party in the early 1990s. Em barked upon as an attem pt to dem onstrate the nonracial credentials o f the Conservatives, cam paign strategists w ere horrified by the negative reaction of alm ost all m inority ethnic com m unities, w ho typically responded by asserting the fact that they were both black and British. Carriers liability legislation w as brought onto the statute book in 1987, allow ing the im m igration authorities to im pose fines on air and sea lines carrying passengers w ho had not obtained the visas required under the provisions of the im m igration rules. The Im m igration Act 1988 tidied up a

Im m igration c o n tro ls and citizen ship in th e p o litical r h e to ric o f N e w Lab ou r

6 7

8 9

10 11

12 13 14 15

num ber of items w hich were perceived as loopholes in the main legislation, such as rem oving the obligation to facilitate the adm ission of fam ily members of a Com m onw ealth citizen who had resided in the UK at 1 January 1973 (the date when the 1971 A ct cam e into force), and a new prohibition on the adm ission of subsequent w ives in polygam ous marriage cases. R -v- LB Hammersmith, ex parte M , reported in The Times, 19 February 1997. The prim ary purpose rule required the spouses and fiance(e)s of people settled in the UK to dem onstrate they were not primarily motivated to marry because of the im m igration advantages which would be conferred. The obstructive im pact of the rule fell largely on people from the countries of the Indian subcontinent - see Sondhi (1982) and Sachdeva (1992). The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. See, for exam ple, the report on the health of asylum seekers published by the British M edical A ssociation and the M edical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture in O ctober 2001. See John K am pfor's interview with David Blunkett, New Statesman, 5 July 2004. For exam ple, Asian and African nurses are employed disproportionately in the private care sector, with fewer opportunities for career developm ent and hence less access to the greater privileges associated with higher status migrants. Blunkett: 'No UK immigration lim it', The Guardian, 13 N ovem ber 2003. See Legislation on Identity Cards: A Consultation, Secretary of State for the H ome Department, April 2004. Hansard, 11 N ovem ber 2003, Colum n 173. For the meaning and significance of the concept of institutional racism , see the M acpherson Report of the Inquiry into the Death of Stephen Lawrence, Home Office, February 1999.

R e fe re n c e s

Blunkett, D. (2001) Politics and Progress: Renewing Democracy and Civil Society (London: Demos). Brown, A.R. (1999) Political Languages o f Race and the Politics o f Exclusion (Aldershot: Ashgate). Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1985) Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Castles, S., Booth, H. and Wallace, T. (1987) Here fo r Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic M inorities (London: Pluto Press). Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2003) The Age o f M igration: International Populations M ovements in the M odern World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Cohen, N. (2004) 'The Sangatte legacy', The Observer, Sunday 13 June. CRE (1985) Immigration Control Procedures: A General Investigation (London: CRE). Deakin, N. (1970) Colour, Citizenship and British Society (London: Panther). 231

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Finlayson, A . (2003) Making Sense o f Neiv Labour (L on don: L aw ren ce & W ishart). H arris, C. (1987) 'B ritish C apitalism , M igration an d R elative S u rp lu s-P ro d u ction ', in Migration, Jan u ary 1987, Berlin. H arris, N . (1995) The Neiv Untouchables: Immigration and the Neiv World Worker (H arm o n d sw o rth : Pen gu in Books). H en d erson , M. (2003) Asylum and Human Rights Appeals (L on d o n : IL P A /R e fu g e e L egal G roup). Hollifield, J.F. (1992) Immigrants, Markets, and States: Political Economy o f Postwar Europe (H arv ard U n iversity Press). H um ph ry, D. an d W ard, M. (1974) Passports and Politics (H arm o n d sw o rth : Pen gu in Books). Jord an , B. and D uvall, F. (2002) Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas o f Transnational Mobility (C heltenham : E d w ard E lgar Publishers). K lu g, F. (2000) Values for a Godless Age: The History o f the Human Rights Act and Its Political and Legal Consequences (H arm o n d sw o rth : Penguin Books). L ayto n -H en ry , Z . (1992) The Politics o f Immigration (O xford: Blackw ell Pub­ lishers). L egg ett, W. (2004) 'N ew L a b o u r's Third W ay: F ro m "N e w T im es" to "N o C h o ic e "', in H ale, L egg ett and M artell (eds) The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures, Alternatives (M anchester: M an ch ester U n iversity Press). M arquan d, D. (2004) The Decline o f the Public (C am b rid ge: Polity Press). M orris, L. (2004) The Control o f Rights: The Rights o f Workers and Asylum Seekers Under Managed Migration (L on don: JC W I). W hite P ap er (1998) Fairer, Faster and Firmer - A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum (L on don: The Stationery Office). W hite P ap er (2002) Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (L on d o n : The Stationery Office).

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Freedom o f movement inside ‘fortress Europe’ Willem Maas

Introduction

M u ch attention has b een focu sed on those seeking to enter 'fortress E u rop e' - w hether the con cep t is understood to refer only to the EU Sch en gen cou ntries or to inclu de n on-E U Sch en gen cou ntries, the U nited K ingd om and Ireland, or the cou ntries w hich joined the U nion in M ay 2004. Yet internal m obility w ithin 'fortress E u rop e' is at least as w orthy of consid eration. The rise of freed om o f m ov em ent rights in Europe - now codified w ith the legal categ ory o f E uropean U nion citizenship - represents a startling reversal o f the historical trad ition o f state sovereignty. States have histo rically b een d efined in term s o f insid ers (citizens) and outsiders (foreigners). T h e new supran ation al rights supersede this traditional d istin ction b y red ucing or even rem ov ing the ability o f E uropean states to d iscrim in ate betw een their ow n citizens and those o f other EU m em ber states. B orders w ithin the E uropean U nion still m atter, bu t the rem aining b arriers to freed om o f m ov em ent w ithin 'fortress E u rop e' are practical rather than legal, and even th ey are rap id ly disappearing. E xcep tions to the E uropean free m ov em ent regim e still exist - such as the case of ind ividu als deem ed to pose a sig nificant threat to public health or pu blic security. But the rights o f free m ov em ent have now been extend ed to virtu ally all E uropean citizens, even thou gh there w ill be a

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phase-in period for w orkers from m ost of the new accession states. By c o n tra st third-country nationals - citizens neither of the host state (first country) nor of another EU M em ber State (second country) but of a nonEU state - continue to be denied freedom of m ovem ent rights within the Union, despite the efforts of the Com m ission and som e national governm ents to extend them the sam e rights as those enjoyed by EU citizens. Exceptions to Schengen also continue to exist, as with special events such as the European soccer cup, for w hich Portugal in 2004 (just as Belgium and the N etherlands in 2000) was granted a tem porary exem ption on the requirem ent to abstain from checking the identification of individuals crossing Portuguese borders. On the w hole, however, the picture that em erges for freedom o f m ovem ent w ithin Europe is one of a continent in which Europeans can m ove about freely, and in which state borders (though clearly not the borders betw een 'fortress Europe' and the rest of the w orld!) have lost m ost o f the significance they once possessed. This paper lays out the developm ent of the Schengen system and places it w ithin the context o f European U nion citizenship.

Signing Schengen

O n 14 June 1985, in the Luxem bourg town o f Schengen, representatives of Belgium , Germany, France, Luxem bourg and the N etherlands agreed to elim inate border controls betw een their countries. The agreem ent was signed on the sam e day that the new European C om m ission, headed by Jacques Delors, released its W hite Paper entitled Com pleting the Internal M arket, w hich laid out the single m arket program and inspired the Single European A ct and the M aastricht Treaty. The signing cerem ony occurred on a ship anchored on the M oselle River at the point w here the borders of West Germany, France and Luxem bourg meet. To add to the sym bolism , the boat sailed through the w aters of the three countries follow ing the signing. The Belgian secretary of state for European affairs affirm ed that the ultim ate goal of the agreem ent w as 'to abolish com pletely the physical borders betw een our countries' (United Press 1985). For Luxem bourg's m inister o f foreign affairs, the agreem ent m arked 'a m ajor step forward on the road toward European unity', directly benefiting the nationals of the signatory states, and 'm oving them a step closer to w hat is som etim es referred to as "European citizen sh ip '" (United Press 1985). Schengen was an exam ple o f the 'tw o-speed Europe' that som e regarded as the best way out of the institutional paralysis resulting from the Com m unity's expansion to ten m em bers. Faced w ith resistance on the part o f three of

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the new er M em ber States - Denm ark, the UK and Greece - five of the original six pushed ahead with plans to elim inate border controls. Italy was not invited to join because of fears of inadequate policing of the long Italian coastline, w hile Ireland opted not to join in order to stay in the C om m on Travel Area that it shared with the UK.' Follow ing lengthy preparations, the five Schengen states signed an im plem enting Convention on 19 June 1990, agreeing to rem ove internal border controls w hile coordinating control at external borders. Under the supervision of the Joint Supervisory Authority, an independent body established in Brussels and com posed of representatives of the national data protection authorities, this coordination was to be achieved largely through the use of the Schengen Inform ation System (SIS), a database shared by all Schengen states. SIS would contain inform ation on persons and on stolen or m issing vehicles and objects such as identity papers.2 As discussions on im plem entation continued, Italy signed the A greem ent on 27 N ovem ber 1990, w hile Spain and Portugal joined on 25 June 1991. W hereas Spain and Portugal were soon judged to have m et the conditions for effective border control, Italy w as not. M eanw hile, proposals to incorporate the Schengen policies into the M aastricht Treaty failed. Incorporation into the Treaty w ould have given the Com m unity institutions (Com m ission, Parliam ent, Court) roles in the Schengen acquis; w ithout incorporation, Schengen continued as an inter-govem m ental bargain. O riginally intended to be an interim arrangem ent leading to the com plete abolition of border controls w ithin the EU, the Schengen laws and regulations had continually expanded. Yet extending Schengen to all M em ber States was blocked by the diplom atic im passe betw een Spain and the United Kingdom over the status of Gibraltar (H andoll 1997). N evertheless, m ore states joined: Greece agreed to join on 6 N ovem ber 1992, follow ing its ratification of the M aastricht Treaty, while Austria signed the Schengen A greem ent on 28 April 1995. Full im plem entation of the Schengen Treaty began in July 1995 with the rem oval of internal border controls betw een six of seven Schengen states: Germany, the N etherlands, Belgium, Luxem bourg, Spain and Portugal. France invoked internal security and decided to use the safeguard clause of the Treaty, allow ing the tem porary continuation of passport controls on its borders w ith Belgium and Luxem bourg (but not with G erm any and Spain, w hich w ere opened). An im portant aim of these controls was to check the im portation of drugs, notably from the N etherlands.’ M eanw hile, Greece had not yet adapted its legislation, w hile Italy and Austria were judged to have not yet com pleted the physical preparations needed for secure controls at external borders. This judgem ent reflected the worry, especially on the part of Germany, that large num bers of

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m igrants w ere entering Europe illegally across the Italian and Austrian borders, and that the A ustrian and Italian authorities had not done enough to stop them. Before a settlem ent was reached in July 1997, A ustria threatened to block the A m sterdam Treaty if it continued to be excluded from Schengen (BBC News 1997). In order to com ply with Schengen external border control conditions, Austria deployed over 6,500 new personnel along the external border, bought new technical equipm ent, and laid dow n the SIS IT infrastructure (Karanja 2002).4 This satisfied G erm any and the other Schengen states, and Austria, together w ith Italy, fully joined Schengen on 1 April 1998 (European Report 1997). M eanw hile, Greece finalized the necessary legislation in 1997, but it took another two years to prepare all necessary procedures, and the full im plem entation of the Schengen acquis took place from 1 January 2000 for land and sea borders and 25 M arch 2000 for air borders (H ellenic Republic 2004). The Treaty of A m sterdam incorporated the Schengen arrangem ents into the acquis comm unautaire, the body of com m unity law, upon its entry into force on 1 M ay 1999. The Council replaced the Schengen Executive Com m ittee, the Schengen secretariat staff m oved to the C ouncil's general secretariat, and new Council w orking groups w ere established to deal w ith Schengen. Furtherm ore, the Council decided w hich of the Schengen rules w ould be incorporated into the acquis comm unautaire, and hence be susceptible to control by Com m unity institutions (Com m ission, Parliam ent, Court) and form part of the legal rules w hich countries seeking EU m em bership m ust adopt into their own national legislation. Denm ark, Finland and Sw eden signed the Schengen A greem ent on 19 D ecem ber 1996. A t the sam e time, the Schengen states signed a cooperation agreem ent with the non-EU m em bers of the N ordic Passport Union (N orway and Iceland) giving them observer status (though not voting rights) on the Schengen Executive Com m ittee. Though acts continue to be adopted by the EU M em ber States alone, they apply to Iceland and N orw ay as well, and their application is vetted by a com m ittee com posed of representatives from the Icelandic and N orw egian governm ents and m em bers of the European Council and the Com m ission (Com m ission 2004a). O n 1 Decem ber 2000, the Council decided on the application of the Schengen acquis in Denm ark, Finland and Sw eden, and in Iceland and Norway. The Council decided that, as of 25 M arch 2001, the Schengen arrangem ents w ould apply to these five countries of the N ordic Passport Union. The U nited Kingdom and Ireland rem ain outside Schengen. The UK requested in M arch 1999 to participate in police and legal cooperation in

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crim inal m atters, the fight against drugs, and the Sch en gen Inform ation System . T h e C o u n cil's approval w as achieved only on 29 M ay 2000 becau se the d ispute betw een Spain and the U nited K ingdom regarding G ibraltar delayed the process. Ireland also asked to p articipate in the Sch en gen Inform ation System on 16 Ju n e 2000 and on 1 N ovem ber 2001. O n 28 February 2002 the C ouncil adopted a d ecision on Irelan d 's request w hich took effect as o f 1 A pril 2002 (C om m ission 2004a). The Sch en gen states now inclu de A ustria, Belgium , D enm ark, Finland, France, G erm any, Iceland, Italy, G reece, Luxem bourg, the N etherlands, N orw ay, Portugal, Spain and Sw eden. O n 19 M ay 2004, the C om m ission agreed to allow Sw itzerland to jo in the Schengen treaty w ithin three years (G ov ernm ent o f Sw itzerland 2004). The Sch en gen system w ill ultim ately apply to all new M em ber States, but full p articipation in it will be based on a tw o-step process: T h e new M em ber States w ill first need to achieve a high level o f external border control up on accession w hereas the lifting o f internal bord er controls w ith cu rren t M em ber States w ill take place only at a later stage, subject to a sep arate d ecision by the C o u n cil' (C om m ission 2001).

Schengen m easures

S ch en g en 's key m easure is the rem oval o f checks at com m on borders, replacing them w ith external bord er checks. This m ain m easure has led to a nu m ber of related ones: • a com m on d efinition o f the rules for crossing external borders; • sep aration in air term inals and ports of people travelling w ithin the Sch en gen area from those arriving from cou ntries outw ith the area; • harm onisation o f the rules regarding con ditions o f entry and v isas for sh o rt stays; • coordination betw een ad m inistrations on surveillance o f borders (liaison officers, harm onisation o f instructions and staff training); • the d efinition of the role o f carriers in the fight again st illegal im m igration; • requ irem ent for all non-E U nationals m ov ing from one cou ntry to another to lodge a declaration; • the d raw ing up o f rules for asylum seekers (D ublin C onvention); • the introd uction o f rights o f surv eillance and h o t pu rsu it; • the strength en in g o f legal coop eration through a faster extrad ition system and faster d istribution o f inform ation abou t the im plem entation of crim inal ju d g m en ts; [and] • the creation o f the Schengen Inform ation System (SIS). (C om m ission 2004a) 237

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Each o f these deserves sep arate attention, though let m e sim ply note here the C o u n cil's form ulation: 'Free m ov em ent w ithin the territory of the Schengen States is a freedom w hich as a cou n terp art requires n ot only the strength en in g o f the com m on external bord ers and the ad m inistration o f third cou ntry nationals, but also enhanced co-operation betw een law enforcem ent auth orities o f Sch en gen states' (C ouncil 2003b). The C o m m ission 's resources for coord inating these m easures rem ain paltry: the Ju stice and H om e A ffairs DG has a un it devoted to citizenship, racism and xenop hobia, the C h arter of Fu nd am ental Rights, and the D aphne program (designed to com bat violence against child ren, young people and w om en), and another unit devoted to free m o v em en t o f persons, v isa policy, extern al borders and Sch en gen, along w ith other units. In 2002, the unit devoted to free m ov em ent o f persons, visa policy, external bord ers and Sch en gen had ju st seven officials, in ad dition to three bureaucrats seconded from M em ber States. C reated as a sep arate DG in 1999, the entire Ju stice and H om e A ffairs DG has ju st 180 o fficials.5 It has been grow ing fast, but its sm all size reflects the fact that coop eration on the Sch en gen acquis developed through in ter-governm ental coordination, first outsid e the C om m u nity altog ether and then, w ith the A m sterdam Treaty, w ithin the C ouncil.

C u sto m s coo p eration

The goal o f rem oving all barriers to the free m ov em ent of persons is accom p anied by the sam e goal w ith regard to the free m ov em ent of goods. Thus it is instructive to exam in e European custom s coop eration to draw parallels w ith the free m o v em en t o f persons. O n 11 February 2003, the E uropean P arliam en t and the C ou ncil ad opted an action program for custom s in the C om m unity, entitled C u stom s 2007 (C ou ncil 2003a). T he program is sched uled to run from Jan u ary 2003 to D ecem ber 2007 and is intended to ensure that the custom s ad m inistrations o f Sch en gen states: (a) carry out coordinated action to ensure that custom s activity m atches the need s o f the C o m m u n ity 's internal m a r k e t...; (b) interact and p erform their duties as efficien tly as though they w ere one ad m inistration and achieve equ iv alen t results at every po in t o f the C om m u nity custom s territory; (c) m eet the dem and s placed on them by globalisation and increasing v olu m es o f trade and con tribu te tow ards strength en in g the com petitiv e environm en t o f the E uropean U nion; (d) provide the necessary p rotection of the financial interests o f the European U nion and provide a secure and

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safe environm ent for its citizens; [and] (e) take the necessary steps to prepare for enlargem ent and to support the integration of new M em ber States. (Council 2003a) Furtherm ore, the com m on custom s policy 'shall continuously be adapted to new developm ents in partnership betw een the Com m ission and the M em ber States in the Custom s Policy Group, com posed of the heads of custom s adm inistrations from the Com m ission and the M em ber States or their representatives' (Council 2003a). This goes beyond the level of m utual aid specified in the Conventions on M utual A ssistance between Custom s A dm inistrations: N aples I of 1967 and N aples II of 1998.6 Thus the Com m ission and the M em ber State custom s adm inistrations have established regular interactions so that they m ay indeed w ork together as efficiently and effectively as a single adm inistration w hich achieves equivalent results throughout the Com m unity custom s territory, and m eet the other aim s specified by the Parliam ent and Council. In order to achieve these goals, the Com m ission and the Schengen states agree to ensure the sm ooth functioning of a num ber of com m unication and inform ation exchange system s: (a) the com m on com m unications n etw ork /com m on system s interface (C C N /C S I)...; (b) the data dissem ination system (DDS); (c) the new com puterised transit system (N C T S/N ST I); (d) the inform ation system on the integrated tariff of the Com m unity (TARIC); (e) the inform ation system for transfer of origin stam ps and the transm ission of transit stam ps (T C O /T C T ); (f) the European custom s inventory of chem ical substances (ECICS); (g) the European binding tariff inform ation system (E B T I/R T C E ); (h) the tariff quota surveillance m anagem ent system (TQS); (i) the inw ard-processing relief system (IPR); (j) the U nit values system ; (k) the Suspensions inform ation system ; [and] (1) other existing IT Com m unity system s in the custom s area to ensure their continuity.7 Each of these system s is necessary to m aintaining an efficient com m on custom s policy. For exam ple, the European Binding Tariff Inform ation (EBTI) system is a key instrum ent for im plem enting the Com m on Custom s Tariff and is intended to sim plify procedures for im porters and exporters to get the proper classification of the goods. Custom s

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auth orities o f the M em ber States issue im porters and exporters w ith B inding Tariff Inform ation in advance, so that they know the tariff classification o f the good s they intend to im port or export. Such BTI is introduced into a database run by the C om m ission and is legally valid in all M em ber States, regardless o f the M em ber State w hich issued it (C om m ission 2004b). O verall, the P arliam en t and C ou ncil allocated € 1 3 3 m illion to the C om m ission for the im plem entation o f the C u stom s 2007 program m e for the period 1 Jan u ary 2003 to 31 D ecem ber 2007 (C ouncil 2003a). T his is in ad dition to the funds that the M em ber S tates w ill d evote to carrying out their duties under the Sch en gen acquis. R ecognizing that w ithin 'th e fram ew ork o f the creation o f an area of freedom , security and ju stice, the free m ov em ent of goods, persons and capital leads to a reassessm ent o f control m easures w ithin the European U nion', the C ou ncil in O cto ber 2003 resolved, am on g other things, to define a strategy for custom s coop eration w ithin the fram ew ork o f the creation o f an area o f freedom , security and ju stice, based on the follow ing aim s: (a) to con sid er new form s o f coop eration, in clu ding the exam in ation o f the need for com m on analysis in the fight against cross-bord er organised crim e and to protect citizens and the econ om y and to con sid er a com m on approach to training am on g their custom s ad m in istratio n s...; (b) to take p ractical steps tow ards im plem enting these new form s of coop eration, such as to: im prove o perational coop eration; ensure an effective role at the external bord ers o f the E uropean U nion; con sid er the creation o f a p erm anent O p erational C oord ination U nit w hich w ill support the JC O ; ensure an institutional ap proach based on coop eration betw een custom s, p olice and other relevan t border agen cies; further develop Third P illar IT s y s te m s ...; (c) to im prove and m ake m ore flexible the existing coop eration process, m ainly by m eans o f new or im proved legal m echanism s and a structured and m easu rable approach to sharing good practice, so as to m eet the expectation o f an effective approach to seizing illicit goods and com batin g cross-bord er organised crim e throughout the European U nion; and (d) to enhan ce pu blic con fid ence in custom s, by d em onstratin g tangible results through custom s coop eration and ensuring an increased aw areness o f custom s role in relation to law enforcem ent.*

240

Freedom o f movem ent in sid e‘Fortress Europe’

K ey here is the d eterm ination to extend to all EU M em ber S tates the lessons learned from the Sch en gen acquis. O f cou rse, A rticles 29 and 30 o f the Treaty on European U nion (as am ended at A m sterdam ) already provide for closer coop eration am on g the custom s ad m inistrations of the M em ber States in ord er to con tribute to the creation o f an area of freedom , security and ju stice for U nion citizens. But this has yet to result in practical d evelopm ents, as the language o f the C ou ncil resolu tion cited above indicates.

C o o rd in a tio n on visas to third countries: the U n ite d States

A ll the pre-accession EU M em ber States excep t G reece (i.e. A ustria, Belgium , D enm ark, Finland, France, G erm any, Ireland, Italy, Luxem bourg, the N eth erlan ds, P ortugal, Sw eden, Sp ain and the UK) have a w aiver agreem ent w ith the U nited States. C onversely, only one o f the new m em ber states, Slovenia, has a w aiver agreem ent. T h e other nine new m em bers (i.e. C ypru s, the C zech Republic, Estonia, H ungary, Latvia, Lithuania, M alta, P oland and Slovakia) do not. The new M em ber States, p articularly Poland and the C zech R epublic, have suggested that they w ould invoke the solidarity clau se o f the Sch en gen C onvention. This could m ean that all Sch en gen states w ould be required to act uniform ly, requ iring visas from US citizens. Rather than seeing the solid arity clause invoked, the European C om m ission prefers to negotiate w ith the U S that all the new M em ber States can jo in the visa w aiver as a bloc w hen they jo in Sch en gen, expected in 2006 (EU O bserver 2004b). G reece has n ot invoked the clau se 'in order not to create m ajor trouble for other m em ber states', accord ing to Jon ath an Faull, D irector G eneral of the C o m m ission 's Ju stice and H om e A ffairs DG. H e also suggested that the reciprocity clau se w ould be am ended to 'introd u ce som e flexibility' (EU O bserver 2004a). This high ligh ts the con tin uing tension betw een M em ber States w hich face d ifferent requirem ents for persons and goods leaving for third states, yet m u st agree on com m on requ irem ents for persons and goods arriving from those third states.

Citizen sh ip

The free m ov em ent o f both p eople and good s can be conceptualized through the lens o f E uropean U nion citizenship. The key righ t o f EU citizenship , w hich w as form ally introduced in the M aastricht Treaty of 1992 (although its core precepts had characterized the d evelopm ent of

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European integration since the 1950s) is free m ovem ent of persons (M aas 2004). The developm ent of Schengen cam e about not m erely because of econom ic calculations - though the desire to reap the econom ic benefits of increased m obility no doubt played a role - but because of the political value to creating a borderless Europe in w hich European citizens can travel freely. Since the Schengen program can be situated w ithin the developm ent of EU citizenship, it can also draw criticism from those who disagree with the project of creating European citizens. The key source of opposition to the rights of EU citizens is found w ithin populist parties. Thus, in the 2002 election cam paign in the N etherlands, populist Pim Fortuyn cam paigned to re-introduce border controls w ithin the EU, a perspective shared by the French far-right party Front N ationale (Gollnisch 2002). Similarly, the A ustrian Freedom Party is opposed to freedom of m ovem ent for new EU citizens from the accession states, a perspective shared by the Danish People's Party.’ In addition to the positions of populist political parties, there also exist religious pressures to back out of the Schengen agreem ent, although they too rem ain marginal. Thus, for exam ple, the Greek O rthodox Church warned in its 1997 Easter encyclical, read out in all G reek O rthodox churches during Easter services, against the threat that the Schengen agreem ent poses to 'our O rthodoxy' (cited in Fokas 2000 ).

Conclusion

The project to abolish com pletely the physical borders between European states form ally com m enced with the signature of the Schengen A greem ent by representatives of Belgium , Germany, France, Luxem bourg and the N etherlands on 14 June 1985, the sam e day that the Com m ission released its W hite Paper entitled Completing the Internal M arket, w hich laid out the '1992 program '. O ver the past 19 years, the Schengen acquis has grow n to include alm ost every W estern European state, and plans are well underw ay to ensuring that the entire European continent will becom e borderless. This striking developm ent has not proceeded w ithout problem s, as the challenges to coordinating the custom s and im m igration regim es of 13 and more m em ber states are significant. Furtherm ore, there rem ain significant issues surrounding the free m ovem ent of thirdcountry nationals, individuals who are not citizens of EU M em ber States. For Europeans, however, the developm ent of rights of free m ovem ent has been rem arkable. This chapter charted the developm ent of the Schengen acquis and discussed som e of the rem aining issues and

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te n sio n s, b e fo re a rg u in g th a t th e p ro je c t o f e lim in a tin g b o rd e r c o n tro ls b e tw e e n th e E u ro p e a n s ta te s flo w s fro m th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f E u ro p e a n U n io n citiz e n sh ip .

N o te s

1 There are generally no passport controls within the Com m on Travel Area (which includes the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands in addition to Ireland and the UK), although Ireland has at times instituted controls on crossings from N orthern Ireland. Over two-thirds of journeys leaving Ireland have Britain as their destination, so the Irish governm ent calculated as too high the cost of leaving the Com m on Travel Area in order to join Schengen. 2 Article 94 of the Convention contains a detailed list of categories of data that can be stored in the system . Data on persons may include: (a) surname and forenames, any aliases possibly entered separately; (b) any specific objective physical characteristics not subject to change; (c) first letter of second forenam e; (d) date and place of birth; (e) sex; (f) nationality; (g) w hether the persons concerned are armed; (h) w hether the persons concerned are violent; (i) reason for the alert; (j) action to be taken. Sensitive information (e.g. concerning racial origin, political, religious or other beliefs, or information concerning a person's health and sexual activities) may not be entered. The purposes for w hich alerts may be entered are given in Articles 95 to 100. An alert for a person may be entered in the SIS for the following reasons: arrest for the purpose of extradition (Article 95); to determine the whereabouts of a m issing person, of minors or of persons whose detention has been ordered by the com petent authorities (Article 97); arrest for the purpose of appearing in court, either as a suspect or a witness, or at the request o f the judicial authorities in connection with a criminal investigation or for the purpose of serving a custodial sentence (Article 98); discreet surveillance and specific checks, conducted for the purpose of prosecution in connection with a crim inal offence, averting a threat to public safety or national security (Article 99); in the case of aliens, refusal of entry to the Schengen area pursuant to a decision taken by the com petent adm inistrative or judicial authority subject to national laws, a decision based on the danger posed to national security and public order or a decision based on the fact that the alien concerned has contravened national provisions governing entry and residence (Article 96). Data on objects may include: (a) m otor vehicles with a cylinder capacity exceeding 50 cc which have been stolen, m isappropriated or lost; (b) trailers and caravans with an unladen w eight exceeding 750 kg which have been stolen, m isappropriated or lost; (c) firearms which have been stolen, m isappropriated or lost; (d) blank official docum ents w hich have been stolen, m isappropriated or lost; (e) issued identity papers (passports, identity cards, driving licences) w hich have been stolen, m isappropriated or lost; (f) banknotes (suspect notes). (Joint Supervisory A uthority 2004)

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3

4

5 6 7 8 9

There continue to be regular news reports o f (mostly North American) students and tourists caught with marijuana on checks on the Amsterdam to Paris Thalys trains. The article m entions that the Austrian authorities claimed to have spent 3 billion Austrian Schillings preparing Austria for Schengen implementation. But this seems highly unlikely, since that corresponds to € 2 1 8 million. Source: h ttp :/ /e u r o p a .e u .in t/c o m m / d g s /ju s tic e _ h o m e / fre em o v em en t/ w ai/dg_freem ovem ent_en.htm (last accessed 3 M arch 2005). OJ C 24, 23 January 1998,1. The text of N aples II is also available at h ttp :// e u ro p a.eu .in t/scad p lu s/leg /en /lv b /133051.h tm (last accessed 3 March 2005) Ibid. Chapter II, Article 5 § 1. Council resolution of 2 October 2003 on a strategy for custom s cooperation, OJ C 247, 15 O ctober 2003, 0001-0003. In the 2001 elections, the Dansk Folkeparti, a populist party with an anti­ immigration platform, took out full-page newspaper advertisem ents with a caption reading 'D o you really w ant to open our borders to 40 million Poles?'

R e fe re n c e s

BBC News (1997) 'Background to Schengen A greem ent', 28 November. Available at: h ttp :/ /n e w s .b b c .c o .u k /1 /h i/s p e c ia l_ r e p o r t/1 9 9 7 /sch e n g e n / 13508.stm (last accessed 3 March 2005). Com m ission of the European Com m unities (2001) The Free M ovement o f Workers in the Context o f Enlargement, 5. Com m ission of the European Com m unities (2004a) 'The Schengen acquis and its integration into the Union'. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .eu ro p a.eu .in t/ scad p lu s/leg /en /lv b /133020.h tm (last accessed 3 March 2005). Com m ission of the European Com m unities (2004b) 'Binding Tarriff Information'. Available at: h ttp ://eu rop a.eu .in t/co m m /taxatio n _cu sto m s com m o n/ d atabases/ebti/ind ex_en.htm (last accessed 3 March 2005). Council of the European Union (2003a), Decision No 2 5 3 /2 0 0 3 /E C of the European Parliam ent and of the Council of 11 February 2003 adopting an action programm e for custom s in the Com munity (Customs 2007), O J L 036, 12 February 2003, 0001-0006 and OJ L 095, 11 April 2003, 0036-0037. Council of the European Union (2003b), EU Schengen Catalogue, Vol. 4 (June), p. 32. EU O bserver (2004a) 'EU and US in tussle over visa arrangem ents', 27 April. EU Observer (2004b) 'U S grants more time for new passports', 11 August. European Report (1997) 'Schengen: Germany, Austria and Italy agree to scrap border checks in A pril', 23 July. Fokas, E. (2000) 'Greek O rthodoxy and European Identity', in A. Mitsos and E. M ossialos (eds) Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate). Gollnisch, B. (2002) 'II faut instaurer un controle des frontieres en revenant sur

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les accords dc Schengen', Le M onde, 30 December. Governm ent of Switzerland, Integration Office D FA /D E A (2004) 'Bilateral Agreements II Switzerland - EU'. Available at: http ://w w w .eu rop a.ad m m . c h /n b v /o ff/e /in d e x .h tm (last accessed 3 March 2005). H andoll, J. (1997) 'The Free M ovem ent of Persons', in B. Tonra (ed.) Amsterdam: What the Treaty Means (Dublin: Institute of European Affairs), p. 134. H ellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) 'The Schengen Acquis'. A vailable at: h ttp ://w w w .m fa .g r/e n g lis h /fo re ig n _ p o lic y /e u /a c q u is .h tm l (last accessed 3 M arch 2005). Joint Supervisory A uthority (2004) 'The Schengen Inform ation System '. Available at: h ttp ://w w w .s c h e n g e n -js a .d a ta p ro te c tio n .o r g / (la st a ccessed 3 M arch 2005). Karanja, S. (2002) 'The Schengen Information System in Austria: an essential tool in day to day police and border control w ork?' The journal o f Information, Law and Technology, 1 M aas, W. (2004) 'Creating European C itizens', PhD Dissertation, Departm ent of Political Science, Yale University. United Press International (1985) 'Five EC M em bers Agree to Eliminate Border C hecks', 14 June.

245

In d e x

9/11 see Septem ber 11 Abu Ghraib, abuse at 161-2 access, borders to restrict 17 acquis comm unautaire 236, 242 active citizenship 224 actual harm, physical privacy 89-90 Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) 109-10 Advance Passenger Inform ation/ Passenger Name Record database (A P I/P N R ) 129-30 Aeroplan (Air Canada) 121-3 Agency for the M anagem ent of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 204-5 AGIS programm e 56 Air Canada A eroplan 121-3 disclosure of passenger data 120-1, 122 password protected databases 120 airline industry, personal data protection 113-14 A irline Interline M essage Procedures M anual (AIRIMP) 116

airports as transient institutions 42 -3 pre-liminal rites of passage 43 -4 lim inal rites of passage 4 4 -7 post-lim inal rites of passage 47 as virtual borders 203 Al Qaeida 201 All About Your Privacy (Aeroplan) 122, 123 Am sterdam Treaty 52, 236 anti-Am ericanism 168 anti-cybercrim e measure, ID cards as 72 anti-terrorism , ID cards 68, 75 anxiety, obedience effect through 45 Arar, M aher 97 -8 ARGO programm e 56 Armistice (1949) 179-80 Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns

88 arm y/p olice coordination 4 arrival cards, pre-liminal rites of passage 44

247

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

Arrival Departure Record (USCIS I94) 124, 125, 141 assem blages see surveillant assemblages Association of Canadian Travel Agencies (ACTA) 115 Asylum Registration Card (ARC) 226 asylum seekers exclusion 55 -6 governm ent success measured by reduced 197 offshore camps for 204 asymm etrical borders 21 audit trails, PNR histories 117-18 Aviation Security Screening Records (ASSR) 126 avoidance moves 27-8 Bangladesh, India boundary security m easures 186-7, 189 banopticon 2 barrier borders 15-16 lim iting or strengthening of sense data 20 partial nature of 22 purpose or goal 17-18 time as 19 behavioural techniques, to subvert personal border crossings 27 -8 Bertillonage 69 'Big Brother' phenom enon 102 biographical information 12 biom etric ID cards 67, 68, 69-70, 71-3, 7 6-7, 159, 209, 226 biom etric identifiers 106-7 biom etric information banking 106 personal border crossings 12 retaining following criminal charges 98 biom etric security 84 biom etric technologies body as unique identifier 84 in films 89-90 w ar on terror 92 Biometrics: Identity Assurance in the Information Age 88 248

biom etrics (ab)use 91-3 negative dim ensions of ID cards 78-9 politics of 84, 85-91 population 'm anagem ent and control' 73 security and identity 93 -4 tracking and sorting of individuals 47 Black British 217 blocking 28 Blunkett, David 203, 222, 226, 227 blurred borders 25 -6 body as a source of inform ation 99-100 as unique identifier 84 Border Accord (1955) 57 border controls discretion 46 dual operations 37 dynam ics of 47 elim ination, Europe 234-43 risk m anagem ent 46 strengthening of 52-3 border cooperation 56, 57, 60 border crossings 11-12 directionality and frequency 21 policy issues 29 transparency 21 see also organizational border crossings; personal border crossings; technological border crossings border differentiation 13 border exam inations 37 border m anagem ent business interests 60 police sendees 61 U S/C anad a 57-8 Border Patrol, U S/C anad a 159 border policies Europe and N orth America 52 interpreting 52 -5 border regulations 58-60, 61 border security 48, 51 border seepage 22

Index

borders changes 13, 22-5, 25 -7 classifying 15-19 delocalization of 208-9 as differentiation 55-8 dim ensions of control 6f of engagem ent 83 -5 functions of 54, 55 identity 195 inter-state 3 m ateriality 196 metaphor 3 -4 need for 210 new political economy of 51-63 policing function of 4 private actors in governance of 205-6 regulators and organizers of internal space 58-60 resistance and efforts to create new 27 -8 security 195 senses 19-22 as space of pow er 61-2 state 9, 37, 98 sym bolic pow er 194 territorial 8 -9 theory of international 36-48 virtual 158, 203 wall-like quality of Western 197 Botswana-Zim babw e, boundary security measures 184-5, 189 boundaries de facto 182-3 de jure 183-4 defensive 174 boundary disputes distinguished from territorial disputes 175-6 Eritrea-Ethiopia 181, 182t boundary maintenance 4, 6, 13 boundary security measures 173-91 in disputed areas 175-6 conclusions 180-4 India and Pakistan 176, 177-8, 183 Israel and Palestine 176, 179-80

man-made defences 174 outside territorial disputes 175 in undisputed areas 184—90 conclusions 190-1 breakers 16, 20 breaking moves 28 buffer zones 21 Bush adm inistration 169 business interests, border m anagement 60 call-in registration (NSEERS) 141-2, 143-4, 153-4 Canada Custom s inform ation system 128 Canada Custom s and Revenue A gency (CCRA) 129 Canadian Air Transport Safety A gency (CATSA) 121 Canadian Border Services A gency (CBSA) 128 Canadian Custom s Declaration Card 44 Canadian immigration policies, as threat to US security 103 Canadian-Am erican border 52, 57-8, 60 Canadian-U S forum 60 C anadian/A m erican police cooperation 108-9 carrier sanctions 205 'categorical suspicion' 74 centralized surveillance 105-8 circle of friends 204 Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System 150 citizenship European 234, 241-2 form ulation of new 223-5 ID cards as means of identifying 76 jus soli 160 Citizenship and Immigration Canada forum on biom etrics 91-3 classification, ID cards as means of 69, 70 codes of practice, passenger information 131 249

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

cognitive borders 20 colonialism , as laboratory for 'identifying state' 157 com mercial carriers, passenger inform ation 128-9 Com m onwealth Immigrants Acts 216 com m unication, w eakening of temporal borders 27 com plete institutions 42 Completing the Internal market 234 Com puter A ssisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) 126 com puter records 26 -7 conceptual borders 20-1 confessionary com plex 39, 4 4 -7 constructivism , study of borders 53 cooperation agreem ents 56, 57, 60 coyotes, M exican-Am erican border 62 Crick, Sir Bernard 224-5 crossable borders 17 cultural considerations, biom etrics 84 cultural dim ensions, determination of borders 16 Custom s 2007 238-41 custom s cooperation, Europe 238-41 information system , Canada 128 Custom s A ct (1985) 128 Custom s and Border Protection Agency (US) 109-10, 119 Custom s Declaration Card, Canada 44 Custom s Declaration Form (6059B) 124-5 dangerousness, ID cards for sorting levels o f 75 data capture, personal information 131 data doubles 3 data images, N SEERS 148-9 data m ining, passenger data 132 Data Protection Directive (1995) 114, 119 data shadows 130, 131 database, (in)security of the 89, 90

250

dataveillance 132 de facto boundaries 182-3 de jure boundaries 183-4 de-territorialisation 173-4, 175 debordering process 4 Defensible Space 195 defensive boundaries 174 'delocalization of the border' 208-9 dem arcation, borders as line of 54 Departm ent of Homeland Security (DHS) 61, 145, 147, 158 departure control system s 120-1 detainees, U S extralegal penal empire 161, 162, 164-5 detentions, through N SEERS 146 differentiation, borders as 55-8 'disappearing bodies' 131 disciplinary pow er 100-1 disciplinary society 2 disclosure, airline passenger data 118-19, 120-1, 122 discourse see political discourse discovery moves 27 discretion, im m igration system s 46 discrim ination, ID cards as a means of reducing 75-6 discrim inatory function, borders 37 DNA identification, genetic testing 100 domesticity, weakening of selective borders of 26 d river's licence renewals, ID cards 74 Dublin Convention (1990) 55-6 ecological borders 19 economic dimension of borders 51, 53-4 migratory flows 199 economic integration border policies 52 border regulation 58 -9 border security 51 US internal borders 58 economic liberalization change in policing 103-4 harm onization of border regulations 59, 60

Index

economic m igration New labour acceptance 225 significance of 220 electronic airline tickets 116 electronic m onitoring, blurred boundaries 26 Electronic Privacy Information Center 166 elem ents, distinguished by borders 21 encryption 28 engagement, borders of 83-5 Enhanced Border Security Act (2002) 127 'entitlem ent' system , ID cards as 68-9, 75 era of space 195-7, 198 Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary dispute 181, 182t EURODAC 93, 206-7 European area of freedom, security and justice 59 European Binding Tariff Information (EBTI) 239-40 European Union agreem ent with US to collect PNR data 119 border issues in 55-62 centrality of borders 52 Data Protection Directive (1995) 114, 119 Europol 106 exclusion asylum claimants and migrants 55-6 borders as function of 54 experiential borders 20 EXPRES 57 facial images, digitized 106 Fantino, Police Chief 97, 98, 100, 105 Faraday cage 28 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 109 films, biom etrics in 89-90 fingerprint information, request to keep 97, 98, 100

fingerprint system s 159-60 fingerprinting 78, 106, 146 finite crossings, physical borders 21 fixed borders 22 fluid borders 22 foreigners, EU policy towards 55 -6 form alized social control 98 Fortress America 196 fortress continents 196 fortress Europe exclusion of foreigners 55-6 freedom of movem ent within 233-43 migrant casualties 196-7 Fortuyn, Pim 242 fraud control, ID cards 68, 75 free m ovem ent 41-2 freedom o f m ovem ent, within fortress Europe 233-43 'function creep' 67, 89 future, weakening of temporal borders 27 Galileo Canada 118, 119, 131 Galileo Data Center 116, 119 Galileo International, Inc. 115-16 Galileo reservation system 115, 116, 118-19 gated com m unities 196 'gaze', panopticon 101 General M otors 199 General Remarks Category, PNR 117 genetic testing, DNA identification 100 Geneva Convention economic migrants 220 on the Status of Refugees (1951) 218 US inclination to ignore 161, 169,

201 global distribution system s 115-16 global governance 202-6 global netw orks/flow s 198-201 Global Surveillance and Policing 1 Globalization of Personal Data Project

1-2 governance

251

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

ID cards as a system of 69 m anagem ent of m igratory flows 199-200, 202-5 technological society 206-9 governm ents access to immigration data, U S 125 prom otion of surveillance technology 75 strategy for averting risky m igratory flows, UK 202 success measured by reducing granted asylum s 197 green line 179-80 Guantanam o Bay prisoners, information value 161 harm onization, border regulations 59 high-technology com panies, promotion of surveillance technology 75 H ighly Skilled M igrant Programme 199 Hiibel, Larry D. 165-6 hom e and work, blurred boundaries 26 Homeland Security A ct (2002) 145 hom elessness, appropriateness of biom etrics 92 housing boom , adoption of landm ark laws 164 Hum an Rights Act (1998) 220, 224 hum an rights groups, protest to NEERS proposal 144 hu m an/non-hum an, blurred borders 25 hyper-docum entation 47 ID cards 66-80 experience of nations' others 77-9 experience of other nations 76 -7 for frequent fliers 159 'function creep' 67 inclusion and exclusion of citizens 73-6 m anaging m igration 226-7 privacy and civil liberties 67 proposal, for the UK 68-9, 72, 74

252

rationalization and the m odem state 69-71 significance for surveillance 67-8 sm art 67, 68, 69-70, 71-3, 76-7, 159, 209, 226 social sorting 67 talk of introducing, US 160 Identification o f Crim inals Act (1985) 98 identification system s, struggles and stratagem s of 71 identity borders and 195 (in)security of 87 NSEERS impact on 149-50 reliance on states for 74 security and the space of the database 93 -4 Identity Cards Bill 215 identity theft 72 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility A ct 139 illegal migrants casualties, fortress Europe 196-7 EU exclusion of 56 information campaigns to discourage 197 transborder crim e 103-4 within the US 160, 169 Immigration A ct (1971) 216, 217, 229 im m igration controls, United Kingdom 215-30 prior to 1997 216-17 descent into disorder 217-19 ID cards 68, 78 New Labour 1998 W hite Paper 219-21 2002 W hite Paper 221-7 interventionist policy 215 rhetoric in effecting change 228-30 trafficking controls appropriated by

200 immigration data on entry to United States 124-5 on return to Canada 128-30

Index

Im m igration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) 128 immigration system s, discretion 46 implementation m anuals, politics of biom etrics 84, 85 Implementing Biometric Security 88 in-between areas 21 India-Bangladesh boundary security measures 186-7, 189 India-Pakistan, territorial dispute 176, 177-8, 183 individualistic orientation, of study 41 individuals body as a source of information about 99-100 borders in relation to 15 as carriers of borders 20 NSEERS im pact on identity 149-50 increased surveillance 148-9 restricted m obility 147-8 see also travellers inevitability crisis, of biometrics 91 -3 information body as a source of 99-100 borders to restrict 17 ID cards and politics of 80 streamlined security checks in exchange for 159 surveillant assem blages and movem ent of 102-3 see also biom etric information; hyper-docum entation; passenger data; personal information information barriers 19 inform ation campaigns, to discourage illegal migrants 197 information sharing, policing Canada-U S cooperation 98, 108-10 Europol 106 issues preventing 107 solutions for cooperation 107-8 information technology/ information, police spending 104 inform ation value, Guantanam o Bay prisoners 161

inform ational privacy 89 insecurity of the database 89, 90 of identity 87 insid e/outsid e dynam ic 4, 37, 42-3 'insiders w ithout', US prisoners as 163-4 INSPASS program 44 Integrated Border Enforcem ent Teams (IBETs) 108-9 Integrated National Security Enforcem ent Teams (INSET) 109 Intelligence Reform Bill (2004) 77 inter-state borders 3 internal borders, American 58 internal ID cards 74 internal space, borders as organizers of 58-60 International Air Transport Association (IATA) 119 international borders, a theory 36-48 international boundaries 175 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 119 international division of labour, through borders 53, 54 interstitial border areas 21 -2 airports 43-4 Iraq, Bush on intervention in 158 Iraq War abuse of prisoners 161-2 private military contractors 87 Israel-Palestine territorial dispute 176, 179-80, 183 Jam m u territorial dispute 176, 177-8, 183 judicial fram ew ork (EU) 59 jus soli 160 Kashmir, territorial dispute 176, 177-8, 183 labour markets, access to European 56 law enforcement changes in 98, 99-103

253

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

ID cards 72 PNR data sought by US agencies 114 requests for reservation information 121 see also policing liberty, biom etrics as securer of 89 lim inal rites of passage 37 at airports 4 4 -7 Line of Control, India/P akistan dispute 177-8, 183 logistical borders 19 M aastricht Treaty (1992) 55, 105-6, 241 machine-readable passports 159 M alaysia-Thailand boundary security m easures 187-8, 189 market dem and, m igrant labour 216 M arxist analyses, borders 53 masking 28 The M ending Wall 17 metaphor of the border 3 -4 M exican-Am erican border 52, 56-7, 62 m igrant labour m arket demand 216 W hite Paper on m anagem ent of 225-6, 229 migrants see illegal migrants migration citizenship and nationality 223 conventional political accounts 39 managed 199-200, 202-5, 226-7, 229 p u sh /p u ll model 40 m ilitary forces, privatization of US 162-3, 167 military power, US 167-8 M inority Report 90 m obile com m unication, betw een smugglers 209 m obile population perm issive/discrim inatory function of borders 37 restriction under N SEERS 147-8 state control 1, 2, 40 m obile task forces 209 mobility m etaphor 18

254

modernization, im m igration reform, UK 219 M orris, Bill 222 multi-purpose ID cards 74, 76-7 nation states global flows and networks 199 ID cards as means of rationalization 69-71 residents subject to U S special registration 142-4 national borders 52 National Institute o f Standards and Technology 159-60 national security, undermined by privacy 14 National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) 139-54 background and im plem entation 140-7 direct impact of data collection 147-50 public im pact of data collection 150-2 public display of power 152—4 national space 52 nationality, as category of suspicion 151 netw ork society 198, 206 New Labour, im m igration see immigration controls NEXUS programm e 57, 125 night-vision technology 24 'no joking' rule, at airports 45 North America see United States North American Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) 57, 60, 124 obedience effect, through anxiety 45 offshore asylum camps 204 organizational border crossings 11 organizational borders, blurred 25 -6 organized crime, ID cards as means of tackling 72 Other Service Request field, PNR 117

Index

others experience of ID cards 77-9 ID cards and im plicit definition of 79 'outsiders w ithin', US illegal migrants as 169 Pakistan-India territorial dispute 176, 177-8, 183 Palestine-Israel, territorial dispute 176, 179-80, 183 panopticon 100-1, 105-8 passenger assessment units (PAUs) 129 passenger data, processing 113-33 reservations 115-16 Passenger Name Record 117-19 departure control system s 120-1 collecting 'points' 121-3 onward flights 123-8 immigration information 128-30 conclusions 130-3 passenger inform ation lists 120 Passenger Name Record (PNR) 117-19 Aeroplan num ber on 122 data sought by U S law enforcement agencies 114 data transfer to departure control system s 120 duration of data held on A P I/P N R database 130 passports m achine-readable 159 m onopolization of means of movem ent 69, 70 pre-liminal rites of passage 44 renewals and ID cards 74 past, w eakening of temporal borders 2 6 -7 PAXIS 129 penal empire, US extralegal 160-5 penalties, failure to com ply with N SEERS 142 perfect borders 22 perm eable borders 19 perm issive function, borders 37

personal border crossings 11, 12 behavioural techniques to subvert 27-8 com puter technologies 14 of perception 25 wrongful 14 personal information autom atic 'data capture' 131 biom etrics as new way of looking at 89 border changes 23 protection, airline industry 113-14 risk through com m unication 114-15 tightening of borders around 14 see also passenger data Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents A ct (PIPEDA) 122 persons see individuals physical barriers 18 physical borders 18, 21 physical characteristics, as unique identifiers 84 physical dim ensions, determination of borders 16 physical privacy 89-90 piggyback moves 28 point collecting, airline 121-3 police and arm y coordination 4 border m anagem ent 61 culture, dem ands of policing 104 policing boundary maintenance 4 migrant labour 226 and social change 103-10 see also self-policing 'policing at a distance' 205 policy issues, border crossings 29 political borders 36 -7 political considerations, biom etrics 84 political discourse political space of biom etrics 86 UK immigration policy 228-30 political economy, of borders 51-63

255

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

politics of biom etrics, im plem entation m anuals 84, 85-91 politics of information 80 populist parties, opposition to rights of EU citizens 242 post-liminal rites of passage 37 at airports 47 power border as a space of 61-2 see also disciplinary power; military power; sovereign power; state power; sym bolic power pow er relations, border as producer and site of 54 pre-board screening, at airports 121 pre-liminal rites of passage 37 at airports 43 -4 prison population, US 163-4 prisoners, abuse of Iraqi 161-2 privacy biom etrics as friend of 89 and ID cards 75 less concern for after 9 /1 1 14 physical 89-90 Privacy Act (US 1974) 125 privacy policies Air Canada Aeroplan 123 Galileo system 118, 119 private actors, involved at borders 61-2 private agencies, border m anagement 205-6 private m ilitary contractors, Iraq War 87 priv ate/p u blic space, erosion of separation betw een 86-8 privatization, US military forces 162-3, 167 profiles, risk m anagem ent 46 public consultation, about biom etrics 84 public impact, data collection, N SEERS 150-2 public opinion, New Labour immigration policy 222

256

pu blic/p rivate space, erosion of separation betw een 86-8 punitive segregation 164 p u sh /p u ll model, migration 40 race, as a category of suspicion 151 race relations policy 216, 217 racial colour, as means of identification 151 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips 28 rationalization, ID cards as means of 69-71 readable borders 17 refugee movements attempts at interdiction at EU borders 221 rise of 218 refugees, rise in, UK 220 regulations com puterized reservation system s 119 see also border regulations rem ote control 158-9 repatriation agreem ents 204 reservations, passenger data processing 115-16 responsibilization strategy 205 revolution identificatoire 157 risk, personal data com m unication 114-15 Risk and Blame 195 risk com m unication system s 208 risk knowledge 73 risk m anagement immigration system s 46 passenger data 47 risk society, ID cards 72-3 rites of passage see territorial rites of passage Roskilde wall 194 safe space, national sense of 4 Saudi Arabia-Yemen, boundary security measures 185-6, 189

Index

scanning 24 Schengen Agreem ent 106, 23 4 -7 m easures 237-8 Schengen Information System s I and II 56, 106-7, 207 Schengen space 52 searchable databases 68 Seasonal Agricultural W orkers' Schem e 199 Secure Borders, Safe Haven 199-200, 200-1, 202, 205, 209, 221-7 Secure Flight 126 securing identity 92, 93 security blurring of public and private space

86-8 of the database 89, 90 of identity 87 identity and the space of the database 93-4 and territoriality 195-7 through ID cards 72-3 see also border security; boundary security m easures; national security security barrier, Israel-Palestine 180 Security Perimeter, CanadianAmerican border 57 self less protection from covert intrusions 24 new ways of defining 23 self-disciplining docile body 100-1 self-disclosure, at airports 44-5 self-policing, at airports 44 -7 self-sorting, by travellers 44 sense borders 14, 19-22 Septem ber 11 Canadian-US border m anagem ent 57 concerns about mobile population 1 dark side o f globalization 199 enhancem ent of U S tracking capacity 158-9 form ation of US Custom s and Border Protection A gency 109

less concern for invasion of privacy 14 M exican-US border 52 NSEERS as reaction to 153 processing passenger data after 113-33 re-awakening of international boundaries 175 urgency for and talk about ID cards 71, 77 shadow self 23 Simla Agreement (1972) 177 smart ID cards 67, 68, 69-70, 71-3, 76-7, 159, 209, 226 Sm arter Border Accord 57, 125, 159 smugglers 62, 209 social classes, experience of borders 37 social construction perspective, borders 54 social control by police 105 form alized 98 in a surveillance society 98-9 surveillance technologies and equality in 101-2 social control organizations, blurred borders 25 -6 social institutions, transitory control 43 social sorting 3, 43, 67, 101-2 society, as system s 13 sociocultural concerns, biometrics 88-91 sovereign power, at borders 38, 39 space of the database biom etrics politics 92 -3 identity and security 93 -4 space of flows 9, 198, 206 space of power, border as 61 -2 special registration (NSEERS) 141, 142-4, 147 Special Service Request field, PNR 117 standardization, PNR 119 state borders 9 form alized social control w ithin 98

257

G lo b a l Su rveillan ce and Policing

in globalized world 37 see also airports state capacity border security 48 surveillance 5 state control, mobile population 1, 2, 40 state power borders as instrum ent of 53 N SEERS as public display of 152-4 stigm atization 89 streamlined security checks, in exchange for more inform ation 159 surveillance border changes 23 as boundary maintenance 6, 13 centralized 105-8 contem porary 12 contingencies 133 decentralized nature of 102-3 disciplinary society 2 expanding 97-111 increased under N SEERS 148-9 of migrant workers 226 panopticon principle 100-1 risk knowledge 73 searchable databases 68 significance of ID cards 67-8 social sorting 101-2 state capacity 5 topics, controversiality of 29 surveillance creep 100 surveillance machines, airports as 43 Surveillance and Society 115 surveillance technologies blurred borders 25 border changes 23 delocalization of the border 208-9 equality in social control 101-2 law enforcem ent 98 prom otion of 75 reliance on border seepage 22 surveillant assemblages movem ent of information 3, 102-3 police cooperation, N orth America 108-10

258

surveillants 13 suspicion police culture of 104, 111 race and nationality as categories of 151 sustaining borders 19 sym bolic power, walls and borders ' 194 sym m etrical borders 21 technological border crossings 24-5 technological society, governance 206-9 technologies extension o f sense borders 21 less protection of the self 24 personal border crossings 14 see also biom etric technologies; surveillance technologies tem poral borders 19, 26 -7 territorial borders 8 -9 territorial disputes boundary security outside 175 distinguished from boundary disputes 175-6 Jamm u province 176, 177-8, 183 m an-made boundary defences 174 West Bank 176, 179-80, 183 territorial rites of passage 37, 38, 39 at airports see airports territorial trap 52 territoriality, and security 195-7 terrorist networks 201 Terrorist Screening Center 126 Thailand, M alaysia boundary security m easures 187-8, 189 thermal im aging 24 threshold rites see liminal rites thresholds, sense borders 20 ticketing inform ation, Galileo system 118-19 time see temporal borders time fram es, shortening of 27 TN Classification 124 tracking biom etrics 47

Index

enhancem ent of US capacity 158-9 transborder crimes legal cooperation 60 m ovem ent of illegal immigrants 103-4 transborder criminal organizations, pow er 62 transit centres, for asylum seekers 204 transitions across borders 21, 23 betw een spaces 38 transitory control, social institutions 43 transnational crim inal networks 200 transparency border crossings 21 system s of records 132 Transportation Security Adm inistration (TSA) 126 travel agents, passenger data processing 115-16 travel patterns, analysis of passenger data 132 travel preferences, PN R data 118 travellers at airports see airports construction of 39-40 images for identifying global 200 state control of 40 streamlined security checks for frequent 159 in transitory state between spaces 38 US efforts to track departures 159 see also passenger data United Kingdom ID card proposal 68-9, 72, 74 im m igration controls see immigration controls United States assem blages for police cooperation 108-10 border issues in 55-62 Canadian immigration policies as threat to 103

centrality of borders 52 contem porary dom inance 168-9 custom s forms 124-5 European visa coordination on 241 as hegem onic empire 157-69 inspections on entry to 124 passenger data collection and analysis of 126-7 on entry to 124-5 EU agreement on collection of 119 sought by law enforcement agencies 114 talk about ID cards 77 Visitor and Im m igrant Status Indicator Technology see US-VISIT United States/C an ad a Sm art Border Initiative 125 U S-VISIT 127, 139, 140, 145-6, 153, 158 USA PATRIOT Act 125 USCIS Form 1-94 124, 125, 141 Victoria Airport Authority (VAA) 121 virtual borders 158, 203 Visa Information System (VIS) 106-7, 207 visas European coordination on 241 pre-liminal rites of passage 44 w ar on drugs 206 war on terror 74, 92, 165, 201 West Bank territorial dispute 176, 179-80, 183 w ork and hom e, blurred boundaries betw een 26 Yemen, criticism of Saudi Arabia boundary 185-6, 189 Zim babwe, Botswana security measures 184-5, 189 zoom lenses 24

259