Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement 0199333432, 9780199333431

Table of contents :
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-1
Title Pages
Roel Meijer
Title Pages
(p.i) Global Salafism (p.ii) (p.iii) Global Salafism
Title Pages
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-5
(p.vii) Acknowlegements
Roel Meijer
(p.vii) Acknowlegements
(p.vii) Acknowlegements
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-6
(p.viii) Glossary
Roel Meijer
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
(p.viii) Glossary
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-7
(p.xvii) Abbreviations
Roel Meijer
(p.xvii) Abbreviations
(p.xvii) Abbreviations
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-8
(p.xix) Transliteration
Roel Meijer
(p.xix) Transliteration
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-1
Introduction
Roel Meijer
Introduction
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
Doctrine
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Identity and Empowerment
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Politics
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Jihadi-Salafism
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
The Local and the Global
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Notes:
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-2
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
Roel Meijer
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
Bernard Haykel
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction: What is In a Term?
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
(p.38) The Importance of Theology: tawhid, tawhid and More tawhid
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
The Importance of Law: to Be Or Not to Be a mujtahid
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
Enlightened Salafism: Where Many Have Got It Wrong
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
The Question of manhaj, Or the Way to Be a Salafi in the World
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
Conclusion
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
Notes:
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-3
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Roel Meijer
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism
Stéphane Lacroix
Abstract and Keywords
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
(p.59) Three Distinct Religious Traditions
Muslim Reformism
Wahhabism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Ahl-e Hadith
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
The Birth of Salafism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Al-Albani In Syria
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Al-Albani and Saudi Arabia
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
From Al-Albani to the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Specific and Practices of the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
The Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith'S Early Bases In Saudi Arabia
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Al-Albani'S Heirs
Juhayman Al-‘Utaybi and the Rejectionists
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Al-Madkhali and the Jamis
The Exportation of the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Conclusion: the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith Today
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Some Writings and Tapes by Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani
Notes:
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
Between Revolution and Apoliticism
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-4
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Roel Meijer
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi
Joas Wagemakers
Abstract and Keywords
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Origins of al-wala’ Wa-l-bara’
Pre-Islamic Arabia
Early Heterodox Islamic Sects
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
From Bid‘A to Basis: Sunni Views of al-Wala’ Wa-l-Bara’
Bid‘A
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Basis
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Al-Maqdisi and al-wala’ Wa-l-bara’: Continuity and Change
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Continuity
Change
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Justifying takfir
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Levels of Faith
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Debate On Kufr
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Conclusion
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Selection of the Writings of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
Notes:
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
The Transformation of a Radical Concept
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-5
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Roel Meijer
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-Shi‘ism
Guido Steinberg
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Anti-Shi‘Ism and the War In Iraq
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
The Wahhabiyya and Anti-Shi‘Ism
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhab
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
The Later Wahhabiyya
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
The Role of the Saudi State
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Anti-Shi‘Ism In Syria and the Iranian Revolution
(p.117) The Intellectual Roots of Anti-Shi‘Ism In Syria
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
The Iranian Revolution and the Emergence of Syrian Anti-Shi‘Ism
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Salafi anti-Shi‘Ism Among Syrians
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Notes:
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-6
Salafism In Pakistan
Roel Meijer
Salafism In Pakistan
The Ahl-e Hadith Movement
Mariam Abou Zahab
Abstract and Keywords
The Historical Context
Salafism In Pakistan
Doctrines and Principles
Salafism In Pakistan
The Arab Connection
Salafism In Pakistan
The Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (MJAH)
Salafism In Pakistan
The Madrasa Network
Salafism In Pakistan
The Markaz Da‘Wa Wal Irshad (MDI)27
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
The Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT)36
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
The LeT After the Ban of 12 January 2002
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
Notes:
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
Salafism In Pakistan
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-7
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Roel Meijer
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Doctrine, Difference and the Problem of Islamic Political Action in Contemporary Sudan
Noah Salomon
Abstract and Keywords
University of Chicago1
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Purification of Doctrine: a Salafi theory of Political Action
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Khartoum, Sudan, Summer 2007: a Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Pious Individuals/pious States
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Prophet In Mecca and the Politics of da‘Wa
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Conclusion: Complicating “The Political” In “Muslim Politics”
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
Notes:
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
The Salafi critique of Islamism
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-8
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Roel Meijer
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Noorhaidi Hasan
Abstract and Keywords
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Anti-hizbiyya
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
The Sururiyya Issue
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Salafi haraki Versus Salafi Yamani
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Jihadist Activism
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
(p.187) Conclusion
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Notes:
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-9
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Roel Meijer
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya
Abstract and Keywords
The Jama‘A Al-Islamiyya As a Social Movement
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
The Early Years
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
A Separate Organisation
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Merger With Tanzim Al-Jihad
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
The Second Generation
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
The Life of an Activist In the 1980s
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
The Salafi-Islamist Revolution
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
About-turn: the Initiative to End Violence
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Revisionism
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Conclusion
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS OF THE JAMA‘A AL-ISLAMIYYA (until 2003)
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Notes:
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-10
Salafi formations In Palestine
Roel Meijer
Salafi formations In Palestine
The Limits of a de-Palestinised Milieu
Khaled Hroub
Abstract and Keywords
Salafi formations In Palestine
Islamist Formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Rising Behind the Back of Legitimacy
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafis In the West Bank and Jerusalem
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafism In the Gaza Strip
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Jihadi-Salafis
Salafi formations In Palestine
Promoting Religious and Social Conservatism
Salafi formations In Palestine
The Lure of Politics
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafis and the Fighting Between Fatah and Hamas
Salafi formations In Palestine
A De-Palestinised Salafi discourse
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Uncertain Future: is Al-Qaeda/Palestine Inevitable?
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Notes:
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
Salafi formations In Palestine
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-11
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Roel Meijer
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism
Thomas Hegghammer
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Theology-based Terms
Jihadism
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Takfirism
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Salafism
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafism
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Preference-based Terms
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Concluding Remarks
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Notes:
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-12
Debates Within the Family
Roel Meijer
Debates Within the Family
Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, Takfir, Extremism, Suicide Bombings, and the Sense of the Apocalypse
Reuven Paz
Abstract and Keywords
Debates Among the Jihadi-Salafis
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Towards a Jihadi-Salafi pluralism?
Debates Within the Family
Internet Jihadi Scholars
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Dr Nasir Al-‘Umar'S fatwa
Debates Within the Family
The Response of Abu Yahya Al-Libi
Debates Within the Family
Conclusion
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Debates Within the Family
Notes:
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-13
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Roel Meijer
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current
Brynjar Lia
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
The ‘Destructive Role’ of Salafi clerics
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Salafism As a Source of Internal Discord and Conflicts
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Al-Suri and Abu Qutada In London, 1993–6
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Al-Suri'S Description of Abu Qutada'S Rise to Prominence is Revealing:
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
The Controversy Over the Taliban'S (lack Of) Islamic Legitimacy
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Concluding Remarks
List of Selected Works By Abu Mus‘Ab Al-Suri
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Books and Booklets
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Articles, CommuniquéS, Audiotapes.
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
Notes:
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
‘Destructive Doctrinarians’
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-14
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Roel Meijer
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Madawi Al-Rasheed
Abstract and Keywords
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Contesting the Local State
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Local and Global Identities
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Tension Between the Local and the Global
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Tension In the Practice of jihad
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
Notes:
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-15
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Roel Meijer
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Laurent Bonnefoy
Abstract and Keywords
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Overview of the Salafi movement In Yemen
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Manifestations of Transnationalism
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Flows of Audiotapes, Books and People
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Transnational Sponsors
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
‘Saudisation’ Versus Transnationalisation
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
The Limits to Transnationalisation
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Selection of the Writings and Conferences of Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
Notes:
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-16
Growth and Fragmentation
Roel Meijer
Growth and Fragmentation
The Salafi Movement in Bale, Ethiopia
Terje Østebø
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
Growth and Fragmentation
Questions Objectified and Answered
Growth and Fragmentation
Islam In Ethiopia
Growth and Fragmentation
The Emergence of Salafism In Bale
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Salafism In Post-Derg Ethiopia
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Religious Conflict, Fragmentation and Objectification
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Salafism and Ethnic Objectification
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Concluding Remarks: the Limbo of Objectification
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Notes:
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
Growth and Fragmentation
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-17
Salafism In France
Roel Meijer
Salafism In France
Ideology, Practices and Contradictions
Mohamed-Ali Adraoui
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France: a Sect?
Attraction of the Gulf
Salafism In France
Politics
Salafism In France
Culture
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Economics
Salafism In France
Crisis of Authority, Individualism, Postmodernism and Post-Islamism
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism and Post-Islamism
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Notes:
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
Salafism In France
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-18
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Roel Meijer
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Salafism and British Muslim Youth
Sadek Hamid
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Rise of British Salafism
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Guardians of Orthodoxy: Salafism'S Appeal
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Tribal Religion: Islamic Groups As Football Teams
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Evolution and Fissure: Emergence of the ‘Super Salafis’
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Counter-attack of ‘Traditional Islam’
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Effect of Terrorism
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Conclusion
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
Notes:
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam
acprof-9780199333431-chapter-19
Changing World Views and Friendship
Roel Meijer
Changing World Views and Friendship
An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafis in the Netherlands
Martijn de Koning
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction1
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Emergence of Salafi movements In the Netherlands
Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth and the Search for a ‘Pure’ Islam
Changing World Views and Friendship
Globalisation, Secularisation and Security: the Rise of the Dutch Salafi movements
Changing World Views and Friendship
Snapshots of the Lives of Two Women
Changing World Views and Friendship
Umm Salamah: Who Am I?
Changing World Views and Friendship
Umm Salamah:24
Umm Salamah:
Changing World Views and Friendship
Sudden Realization (Excerpt)
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Aicha: Faith(Less) Through Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Aicha:33
Changing World Views and Friendship
Aicha:
Aicha:
Aicha:
Changing World Views and Friendship
From Born-again Muslims to Salafis
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Notes:
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
Changing World Views and Friendship
acprof-9780199333431-indexList-1
(p.448) Index
Roel Meijer
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
(p.448) Index
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-9
(p.424) About the Contributors
Roel Meijer
(p.424) About the Contributors
(p.424) About the Contributors
(p.424) About the Contributors
(p.424) About the Contributors
(p.424) About the Contributors
(p.424) About the Contributors
acprof-9780199333431-miscMatter-10
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Roel Meijer
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792)
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Muqbil Ibn Hadi Al-Wadi‘I Founder of Salafism In Yemen
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Shaykh Muhammad Hashim Al-Hadiyya (1910–2007): a Spiritual Biography
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Shaykh Saleem Shurrab: the First Palestinian Salafi(1926–1986) Khan Younes—Gaza Strip
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Muhammad Surur Zayn Al-‘Abidin
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Shaykh Abubakr Muhammed
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Abu Mus‘Ab Al-Zarqawi (1966–2006)
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Ja‘Far ‘Umar Thalib
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Shaykh Yusuf Al-‘Uyairi: a Model of Jihadi-SalafiScholar, Webmaster and Commander
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
‘Abdallah ‘Azzam
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Abdullaah Abu Bakr Al-Maghrebie
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders
Abdur-Raheem Green, the Life of a British Convert to Salafism
C., the Life of a French Salafi
(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders

Citation preview

Title Pages

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Title Pages (p.i) Global Salafism (p.ii) (p.iii) Global Salafism

(p.iv) Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2013 Roel Meijer and the Contributors Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc

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Title Pages 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Published in the United Kingdom in 2013 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Global salafism : islam's new religious movement / [edited by] Roel Meijer. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–19–933343–1 (pbk.) 1. Salafiyah. 2. Islamic fundamentalism. I. Meijer, Roel. BP195.S18G46 2013 297.8’1—dc23 2013025751 135798642 Printed in India on Acid-Free Paper

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Acknowlegements

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.vii) Acknowlegements This book is based on a three day conference “Salafism as a Transnational Movement”, which was held between 27 and 30 September 2007 in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. I would like to thank the following institutions for their generous grants to enable this event to take place: the Department of Arabic and Islam of the Radboud University, the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden, the Dutch Foreign Office, and the Institute for Historical, Literary and Cultural Studies (HLCS) of the Radboud University. I am grateful for the indirect subsidy the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) gave by covering the travel expenses and accommodation of its two members. I would especially like to express my gratitude to the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam for the subsidy to translate one of the chapters of the book from French to English. As part of the project, Salafism: Production, Distribution, Consumption and Transformation of a Transnational Ideology in the Middle East and Europe, funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), I would like to thank professors Harald Motzki and Martin van Bruinessen, as well as my research colleagues Joas Wagemakers, Carmen Becker and Martijn de Koning for their support during and after the conference. Professor Bernard Haykel's keen interest in the book and his copy editing of several of the chapters and the introduction is appreciated, as well as Professor Motzki's nasa‘ih (friendly admonitions) regarding the more technical details of Salafism. I especially would like to thank all the participants of the conference (and those that joined later in contributing to the book) and Michael Dwyer of Hurst & Co. Publishers for their cooperation in this collective effort to produce this book. Without their enthusiasm this book would not have seen the light of day.

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Acknowlegements

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Glossary

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.viii) Glossary Note: words in italics are Arab words, those in normal script are anglicised Arabic words. The long vowels are represented by a double vowel. A long ‘a’ is ‘aa’ and a long ‘u’ is ‘ou’, pronounced as in you. The long ‘i’ is represented by double ‘ee’. The ’ is a hamza or a glottal stop, whereas the ‘ is an ayn. ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a (ahl as-sunna wal-jamaa‘a) ‘alim/‘ulama (aalim/ulamaa) followers of the normative usage of the Prophet and of the community religious scholar, mostly someone who specializes in the Shafi‘i, Hanbali, Hanafiand Maliki schools of jurisprudence commanding good and forbidding wrong (also called hisba) al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (al-amr bil-marouf wannahee an al-munkar) anashid (anaasheed) songs without instrumental accompaniment (which is forbidden) ‘aqida (aqeeda) creed, which in Salafism is concentrated on tawhid ‘aql (aql) ratio. Salafis reject rationalism (‘aqliyya). Muslims, they argue, should only be guided by following the hadith and the Qur’an literally bay‘a (baya) pronouncement of allegiance to a ruler bid‘a/bida‘ (bida/bida) illegimate or reprehensible innovation Dar al-Islam (daar al-Islaam) abode of Islam Dar al-harb (daar al-harb) abode of war (p.ix) Dar al-sulh (daar al-sulh) Page 1 of 7

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Glossary abode of peace da‘wa (dawa) call, spreading of the faith fatwa (fatwaa) juridical advice or response by an ‘alim concerning a question regarding human behaviour fitna/fitan (fitna/fitan) dissension, internal strife, condemned as the main threat to the unity of the umma. Used by conservative Salafis against political Salafis, whose political activism leads to dissension, and against JihadiSalafis, who believe resistance and jihad should prevail over the conservatives’ fear for fitna. Associated with hizbiyya and haraka fiqh (fiqh) Islamic jurisprudence. Based on the five schools of jurisprudence (Shafi‘i, Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and the Shi‘i Ja‘fari canonical schools) al-firqa al-najiya (al-firqa an-naajiya) the saved sect. Salafis believe they belong to the saved sect, a belief that is based on the hadith that states “[T]his Umma will be divided into seventy-three sects all of which except one will go to Hell and they are those who are upon what I and my Companions are upon” (used interchangeably with al-ta’ifa al-mansura) hadith/ahadith (hadeeth/ahaadeeth) tradition or saying of the prophet Muhammad. The hadith make up the Sunna hakimiyya (haakimeeya) see tawhid hakimiyya. Term coined by Sayyid Qutb to denote the sovereignty of God and the rejection of the concept of the sovereignty of the people. The Qutbian concept is however rejected by Salafis as non-Qur’anic haraka (haraka) movement, or activism. A term used by the pietistic, apolitical or political conservative Salafis to denounce activist, (p.x) political Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, or more politically inclined Salafis, whose members are unfavourably called harakiyyun (members of a political movement) hisba (hisba) see al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an almunkar hizbiyya (hizbeeya) party politics. Almost always used in a derogatory manner, with the meaning of “partyism”, which leads to allegiance to others than God and therefore infringes upon the principle of tawhid, the Oneness of God, and is regarded as the main source of dissension (fitna) and the splitting of the unified community of Muslims Page 2 of 7

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Glossary ijaza (ijaaza) licence provided by an ‘alim to his student declaring that he is competent in a certain discipline ijtihad (ijtihaad) individual interpretation of the two sources of Islamic law, Qur’an and hadith, as opposed to taqlid, the imitation or following of one of the five canonical schools of jurisprudence ijma‘ (ijmaa) the consensus of the scholars of one or more schools of jurisprudence. In Salafism it applies to the consensus of the salaf, the pious forefathers iman (eemaan) faith. It is the opposite of kufr, or unbelief jihad (jihaad) struggle or religious war. Divided into lesser and greater jihad, the former referring to the defensive or offensive war against the dar alkufr, the latter, jihad al-nafs (jihaad an-nafs), to self-improvement Jihadi-Salafism current within Salafism that regards jihad as the only way to selffulfilment. Rejected by apolitical or conservative Salafis for its activism, and by the political (p.xi) Salafis for its violence leading to fitna jizya (jizya) poll tax imposed on non-Muslims khadim al-haramayn (khaadim al-haramein) protector of the two holy places of Islam, Mecca and Medina. Title the Saudi monarchy has adopted for itself khariji/khawarij (khaarijee/khawaarij) In English known as Kharijites. Sect that developed during the dissension after the assassination of the third caliph ‘Uthman in 656. It demanded that all rule should belong to God and that anyone could become a caliph as long as he was just. Always used as a curse against opponents by Salafis khuruj (khurouj) revolt against the ruler. This is not recognised as legitimate by purist Salafis unless the ruler openly renounces Islam kafir/kuffar (kaafir/kuffaar) unbeliever. Divided into kafir i‘tiqadi (kaafir itiqaadee), lit. infidel in matters of belief. This is considered a major sin because one has left the basic creed behind. The other form is kafir ‘amali (kaafir amalee), lit. a infidel in matters of religious practice, but not in belief by means of lesser sins, such as drinking alcohol kufr (kufr)

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Glossary unbelief. Divided into two forms: kufr akbar (kufr akbar), or major unbelief, is based on a conscious decision to do wrong despite knowing what is right, which means the person becomes an apostate. Kufr asghar (kufr asrar), or minor unbelief, which only includes sins caused by mistakes, which are correctable and which do not lead to expulsion from Islam madhhab/madhahib (mathhab/mathaahib) school of jurisprudence. Most Salafis reject taqlid, the following of a (p.xii) madhhab, in theory, but follow mostly the Hanbali madhhab manhaj/manahij (manhaj/manaahij) method, praxis, way of life. It is the practical performance of ‘aqida. It can also mean a programme to interact with life expert on hadith muhaddith/muhaddithun (muhaddith/muhaddithoun) person who exerts hisba. Traditionally a title for the overseer of the market place, who was appointed by the ruler to control prices and to keep the peace. Nowadays, a person who exerts hisba or al-amr bi-lma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar to uphold proper morals muhtasib/muhtasibun (muhtasib/muhtasiboun) an honorary title, meaning the renewer or reformer of Islam. Based on the tradition that every age will witness a “renewer” or reformer of Islam mujaddid/mujaddidun (mujaddid/mujaddidoun) fighter in religious war. Regarded by Jihadi-Salafism as the vanguard and highest form of activism and self-realisation. According to this current al-firqa al-najiya (the saved sect) is restricted to the mujahidun mujahid/mujahidun (mujaahid/mujaahidoun) apostate. Someone who has left Islam by committing major sin or denying the sources of Islam murtadd/murtaddun (murtadd/murtaddoun) someone who commits shirk or gives associates to God, worships more than one God and denies tawhid (Oneness of God). They are regarded as idolaters and polytheists. In Salafism the term is also used against other Muslims who do not follow the strict Salafi creed (‘aqida) and method (manhaj) mushrik/mushrikun (mushrik/mushrikoun) religious police in Saudi Arabia, which mutawwa‘/mutawwa‘un (mutawwa/mutawwaoun) enforces hisba (see hisba) niqab (niqaab) veil covering the face (p.xiii) niyya (neeya) correct religious intention. Salafism concentrates heavily on having the correct intention. Religious acts, such as prayer, fasting, but also Page 4 of 7

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Glossary waging jihad, are only valid if they are executed with the right intention Pesantran qiyas (qiyaas) religious boarding school in Indonesia analogical reasoning in Islamic law. Very rarely used in Wahhabism rafida/rawafid (raafida/rawaafid) rejectionists. Derogatory term used by followers of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab and Salafis of Shi‘ites. Refers to the Shi‘ite rejection of the first three caliphs (and many of the hadiths of the sahaba) and their acceptance of only ‘Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, as his successor sahaba (sahaaba) Companions of the Prophet, the first followers of the Prophet Sahwa (sahwa) Islamic revival. Used in general for the revival of Islam from the 1960s onward. More specifically, the term is used for the Saudi reform movement that emerged in the 1980s al-salaf al-salih (as-salaf as-saalih) the first three generations of Muslims who are regarded as the most pure and knowledgeable about the Muslim creed (‘aqida) and Islamic method (manhaj) because they had direct or very close experience of its origins. They include the companions of the Prophet (sahaba), the last of whom died around 690, the second generation (tabi‘un), the last of whom died around 750, and the third generation, the followers of the followers (atba‘ al-tabi‘in), the last of whom died around 810 Salafiyya (Salafism) refers to the movement that believes that Muslims should emulate the first three generations of Islam referred to as (p.xiv) the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih) as much as possible in all areas of life shahada (shahaada) pronounciation of the words “There is no god than God, and Muhammad is his Prophet”. This is the basis of tawhid, monotheism shahid (shaheed) shari‘a (shareea) martyr, someone who dies in jihad Islamic law. According to Salafis all political systems should be based exclusively on Islamic law Shi‘a (Sheea) literally the followers, but meant are the followers of ‘Ali the son-inlaw of the Prophet Muhammad, now the second largest current in Islam. The Shi‘a has been totally opposed by Wahhabism, Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism shirk (shirk) idolatry, polytheism, the veneration of idols and many gods as opposed to the veneration of one God, tawhid. To associate others Page 5 of 7

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Glossary with God, in the form of idols, or according to the Salafis to seek objects of veneration (tombs of saints, holy trees, creatures, soothsayers, astrology) or humans as intermediaries who intercede with God Sunna the exemplary, perfect habits and ways of the Prophet, transmitted from him in the ahadith (see hadith) al-ta’ifa al-mansura (at-taaifa al-mansoura) has the same meaning as al-firqa al-najiya Tabligh (tableer) school of thought which originated in Pakistan. The word is synonymous with da‘wa tafsir (tafseer) Qur’an exegesis taghut (taarout) has different meanings. Originally means idol and is condemned on the principle of tawhid as shirk, but the term has also acquired the political meaning of an (p.xv) oppressive or unjust ruler who does not rule according to revelation takfir (takfeer) pronouncement of someone as unbeliever (excommunication) and placing him/her outside the community of believers taqlid (taqleed) imitation of one of the schools of jurisprudence tasfiya (tasfiya) purification of Islam of everything that is foreign to it and corrupts it tawhid (tauheed) oneness of God. Doctrine that does not allow any associates to God (shirk). Tawhid is divided into three divisions: tawhid rububiyya, tawhid uluhiyya, tawhid asma’ wa-l-sifat a) tawhid rububiyya (tauheed ruboubeeya) unity of lordship and the affirmation of God's unique qualities and powers; reference to God's possession of absolute power over heaven and earth, life and death b) tawhid al-asma’ wa-l-sifat (tauheed al-asmaa wa-ssifaat) affirmation of the unity of his names and his attributes. Assigning God's characteristics to human beings even if they are kings, is forbidden and constitutes a violation of God's uniqueness c) tawhid uluhiyya (tauheed ulouheeya) oneness of divinity, the oneness of the object of worship, total submission to God alone. Usually seen as personal submission to God and the rule that all forms of worship are meant for God alone. The above three forms of tawhid form the basis of Wahhabism d) tawhid hakimiyya (tauheed haakimeeya) Page 6 of 7

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Glossary sovereignty of God. Usually regarded as a political (p.xvi) concept of the complete application of the shari‘a. Directed against rulers, it implies that rulers who do not apply the shari‘a commit a grave sin and should be regarded are kafirun. The concept that has been evolved by Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, is not Qur’anic, and is rejected as innovation (bid‘a) by Salafis, such as al-Albani and other purist or quietist Salafis tazkiya pronouncement of someone's integrity or credibility, attestation of (a witness) honourable record religious scholars ‘ulama’ (ulamaa) religious scholars Wahhabiyya (Wahhabism) reform movement characterised by a return the Qur’an and the Sunna. Concentrates on ‘aqida and less on fiqh (jurisprudence). All religious pronouncements must be based directly on the Qur’an and the Sunna and not on fiqh. It rejects qiyas and ra’y, reasoning al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (al-walaa wal-baraa) loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims alone and disavowal of other religions and non-Muslims. An important principle in Salafism the legitimate political ruler. In principle purist Salafism wali al-amr (walee al-amr) recognizes the legitimacy of any ruler even if the ruler is unjust, unless the ruler admonishes the believers to act contrary to the shari‘a. It rejects the right to rise up in revolt (khuruj) and believes that Muslims must concentrate on following the path of al-salaf alsalih

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Abbreviations

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.xvii) Abbreviations ABTP Association of the Book and Tradition of the Prophet (Palestine) ADSS Al Da‘wa System of Schools (Pakistan) CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan) EPRDF Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front FKAWJ Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunna wal-Jama‘ah (Indonesia) GIA Group Islamique Armée (Algeria) GIMF Global Islamic Media Front GSPC al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Qital (Groupes Salafistes pour la Prédication et le Combat) (Algeria) HISAM Harakat Islah al-Shabab al-Muslimin (Movement of Reform of Muslim Youth) HT Hizb ut-Tahrir ISI Islamic State in Iraq JIMAS Jamiyyah Ihya Minhaj as Sunnah (Britain) JSM al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (Saudi Arabia) Page 1 of 2

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Abbreviations JUD Jamaat ul Da‘wa Pakistan (Pakistan) JUI Jamiat Ulema-i Islami (Pakistan) LeT Lashkar-e Taiba (Pakistan) LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group MAB Muslim Association of Britain MJAH Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (Pakistan) MMA Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (Pakistan) MDI Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad (Pakistan) NIF National Islamic Front NII Negara Islam Indonesia (p.xviii) OASIS Organisation of Ahl al Sunna Islamic Societies OLF Oromo Liberation Front PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party SCSMP Scientific Council for the Salafi Mission in Palestine SPLM Sudan People's Liberation Movement YM Young Muslims YMO Young Muslim Organisation

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Transliteration

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.xix) Transliteration I have used in this book a simplified form of Arabic transcription. I have used ‘ for ayn, and ’ for hamza. It is normal to include them in the middle and at the end of words and not use them for Arabic names. I have, however, used the ‘ayn also at the beginning of words and names, as in ‘Ali, but I have not included the ’ alif at the end of words in for example ‘ulama ’, which is rendered as ‘ulama. I have not included the long vowels, but in the glossary it is indicated how to pronounce the most important words in Salafism, by doubling them, as for instance “aa” for the long “a” in jihaad or ijtihaad (normally spelt as jihad and ijtihad in the subsequent chapters) and “ou” for the long second “u” in khurouj (subsequently spelt as khuruj), or “ee” for the long “i” in aqeeda or eeman (subsequently spelt as ‘aqida and iman). I have distinguished between the article (al-), which is written in lower case and joined to the word it determines, and the word for “Al” for family, pronounced with as a long “aa”, as in the Al al-Sa‘ud or the Sa‘ud family. I have consistently changed “bin”, the Arabic for “son of ”, sometimes indicated by “b.”, into “ibn”. So the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad bin, or b., ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and perhaps more commonly Bin Baz, the former mufti of Saudi Arabia, becomes Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Baz. But in those cases in which the name becomes incomprehensible, as in Usama bin Laden, I have retained “bin”. Also other standard names, as al-Qaeda and Saudi, have been retained instead spelt consistently according the Arabic transcription rules as al-Qa‘ida and Sa‘udi. Only in the note and bibliography the Arabic transcription is maintained. (p.xx)

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Introduction

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Introduction Roel Meijer DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords This Introduction offers an exposé of the main characteristics of Salafist history and doctrine, and the main debates that have centered on the movement. The introduction explains quietist, political and jihadi Salafism and especially focuses on the relation between Salafism and politics. Keywords:   Salafism, history, doctrine, jihadi Salafism, Salafism and politics

Salafism had not attracted much attention before 9/11, except for the classical period1 or early modern period.2 In academia, “fundamentalism” had been a topic of research and interest since the assassination of Sadat in 1981, but very few scholars studied Salafism,3 let alone as a global phenomenon, with the exception of Gilles Kepel or Reinhard Schulze.4 Others who have studied modern Islam on a global scale, such as Olivier Roy, have analysed it as part of neofundamentalism, lumping it together with other movements such as Hizb utTahrir.5 Salafism or Wahhabism was studied mostly in Saudi Arabia as part of its history.6 The same can be said of Pakistan, where the Ahl-e Hadith and (p.2) Deoband are active.7 When Salafism spread to Europe in the 1990s, it attracted some academic attention, but research on Salafism has been very localised or very general in scope and was mostly related to radicalisation.8 Much of the research was carried out by anthropologists, and the relations with the global movement remained unclear. This changed after 9/11. A lot has been said and written about Salafism and Wahhabism, but much of this has been through the prism of “security studies”9 or books that play on the popular view that equates

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Introduction Wahhabism with violence. More neutral academic studies have only more recently challenged the major assumptions about Salafism.10 This volume intends to contribute to the debate on Salafism by addressing some of the salient questions that have emerged concerning this phenomenon: (p.3) what are the basic tenets of its doctrine, why does it have such an appeal, and what is its relationship with politics and violence? What makes Salafism so difficult to define is its ambiguity and fragmentation. Although it is a movement with clearly defined characteristics, it is not a homogeneous movement but— especially in the modern era—has become a movement with mixed, and recently even contradictory tendencies which have sprung up in different regions. Part 1 of this book addresses the doctrine of Salafism and its major themes, and the transformation it has been subjected to as a result of doctrinal reforms and new applications in the modern era. Although reformism has emerged in different regions of the world, this volumes concentrates mainly on the form it has adopted in Saudi Arabia as Wahhabism and the way it has influenced the dissemination of Salafism elsewhere in the world. Part 2 takes up the complex issue of the relations of Salafism with politics and tries to answer such questions as: is Salafism really apolitical and quietist, and if not, how and when does it become activist and exert political influence, and in what way has it been influenced by other more politically oriented Islamist currents such as the Muslim Brotherhood? Part 3 addresses the issue of socalled “Jihadi-Salafism” and its relationship with mainstream Salafism and especially its modern and even modernist character. Part 4 focuses on the transnational character of Salafism and the relationship between its local and global manifestations and the diversity of organisations and networks. Part 5, finally, investigates its appeal and its strong identity-building capacity among youth in different parts of the world. To cover the complexity of Salafism this book has brought together specialists in the field from different disciplines, including political scientists, historians, Islam specialists, anthropologists and researchers involved in security studies.

Doctrine Salafism derives from the term the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih), the first three generations of Muslims who had first-hand experience of the rise of Islam and are regarded as exemplary for the correct way to live for future Muslims.11 The golden period is considered to be restricted to the first (p.4) generation of Muslims or even to the period of the four rightly guided Caliphs (632–661). As Bernard Haykel shows in chapter 1, the name Salafism goes back to the Ahl alHadith during the Abbasid caliphate, who concentrated on the study of the hadith as a means to purge Islam of non-Muslim accretions. As the means to return to the pristine purity of Islam, Salafism preaches a return to the study of the basic sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the hadith, and rejects taqlid, or the “blind” following of the four canonical law schools (madhhab/madhahab) and Page 2 of 31

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Introduction therefore accepts ijtihad, or individual interpretation, albeit along strict lines. In Islam the Qur’an is regarded as the direct word of God, whereas the life of the Prophet Muhammad is seen as the perfect living out of the teachings and values of the Qur’an. Salafism was therefore not only scripturalist but also literalist. Muslims had to behave exactly like the pious forefathers whose deeds and thoughts were found in the sources of the Islam. Although its doctrinal appeal lies in its clarity and its claim to purity, there are many tensions in Salafism. They are reflected in the doctrines of the important figures who contributed to the formation of Salafism as doctrine, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855) and Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), and re-emerge in Wahhabism, the eighteenth-century reform movement in the Najd, in central Arabia. The basic tension derives from the contradiction between expounding a rigorous doctrine of complete submission to God, represented in the doctrine of the Oneness of God (tawhid), and the demands this makes on the believer to adhere to this creed. In part this is a political issue. Can the believer implement this fundamental injunction by accepting political power, even if the ruler does not adhere to Islamic law, the shari‘a, and should the believer in that case concentrate on tarbiya (education) and da‘wa (spreading the faith) in order to create a purified Muslim society? Or should the true believer correct the deviant ruler by verbally upbraiding him or even rising up against him? In other words, is Salafism primarily quietist or activist, and to what degree should it be one of these alternatives? This was a dilemma which the Salafist revivalist and reformist movement has encountered throughout the ages and which would reoccur in Wahhabism, a premodern movement founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab tried to skirt the dilemma by first concentrating on reforming society. Like his predecessors, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab believed that Muslims had become ignorant of their religion and lived in a barbaric state of ignorance (jahiliyya), which was at the root of Islam's spiritual and political decline since the golden age. The only way to achieve salvation (p.5) and retrieve past glory was the re-assertion of absolute monotheism and the belief in the Oneness of God (tawhid) as the basis of the Islamic creed (‘aqida) and a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna. In order to achieve this pristine purity, he condemned the acceptance of intermediaries between man and God, such as the veneration of the tombs of saints, holy trees, astrology and soothsayers. Following classic Salafism, he regarded these practices as giving associates to God (shirk), or idolatry and polytheism, the form of religion that prevailed in Mecca before Muhammad started to preach Islam (jahiliyya). They were condemned as reprehensible innovations (bid‘a/bida‘). As the creed (‘aqida) was the central focus of Wahhabism, the faith, or niyya, behind a practice or ritual is essential and the act in itself without the proper intention of worshipping God alone (tawhid) is regarded as a sin. Only when intention and practice are in agreement can one be regarded as belonging to the saved group (al-firqa al-najiya) or the Page 3 of 31

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Introduction victorious sect (al-ta’ifa al-mansura) that can enter paradise. In contrast to the quietist Ibn Hanbal, but following the more activist Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab was willing to call all those who did not adhere to the doctrine of tawhid unbelievers (kafir/kuffar) or apostates (murtaddun), who can be excommunicated (takfir), which was a precondition for waging jihad against them. A recent study regards combating superstitions and calling to reform (da‘wa) as the essence of the Wahhabi mission.12 Wahhabism was not the only revivalist movement of this period that drew its energy from classic Salafi doctrines.13 In Yemen Muhammad ibn ‘Ali alShawkani (d. 1834) was a reformer, who radically reorienting the sources of law by a direct use of Qur’an and hadith, insisting on ijtihad, as well as developing a method to implement these reforms.14 In India, a contemporary of Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762), launched a comparable reform programme that rejected taqlid and popular custom and concentrated on the study of hadith and the Qur’an.15 The Deobandi School, opening in 1867, near Delhi, also taught mainly hadith and opposed the rational studies of law, logic and philosophy since they were based on deficient human reasoning.16 In contrast, however, to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, most of the Indian reform (p.6) movements were more conciliatory towards Islamic mysticism, or Sufism. Shah Wali Allah was himself a Sufiand tried to reconcile Sufism and even Shi‘ism with a more orthodox, Salafi Islam. Deobandis regarded themselves as both intellectual and spiritual teachers and therefore combined the Law and the Path, although they advocated a responsible Sufism that was shorn of its excesses.17 The same goes for the Tablighi Jama‘at in India, a split-off of the Deobandi school founded by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) in 1934. This transnational movement, was, in contrast to Wahhabism, geared to spreading tolerance and forbearance and rejected the use of force as in jihad.18 However, on most other issues the Arab and Indian reform movements shared the same programme with Wahhabism. Both emphasised tawhid and condemned as bid‘a local customs, such as the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the playing of music as a means to reach ecstasy, or elaborate weddings or funerals, or worse, the inclusion of Hindu and Shi‘i rituals into Sunni practices. They also discouraged social and business contacts with Shi‘is and Hindus. In addition, both limited their reforms in regard to the law schools and practiced taqlid in regard to Hanbalism (Wahhabism) or Hanafism (Deobandis), thus limiting the reach of ijtihad as a means of directly finding solution to problems by studying the sources of Islam, especially the hadith. In this respect, as Mariam Abou Zahab in chapter 5 makes clear, another contemporary reform movement, the Ahl-e Hadith, founded by Shah Isma‘il Shahid (d. 1831), basing himself on the medieval Ahl al-Hadith, went a step further by rejecting taqlid completely. The modern Ahl-e Hadith even accuse the Tablighis of shirk for following a law school,19 an accusation levelled later, albeit in milder form, against Wahhabism by Nasir al-Din al-Albani. Page 4 of 31

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Introduction (p.7) If Wahhabism differed from many other early modern movements in form and degree, it differed in content from the late nineteenth-century Salafi reformist movement in the Arab Middle East led by such thinkers as the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), the Persian Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) and the Syrian Rashid Rida (1865–1935). The basic difference between these two movements is that the first emerged as a response to the Western cultural, political and economic threat but regarded the West as a model for emulation, whereas Wahhabism emerged as a purely revivalist movement directed to the purification of doctrine and later, in the twentieth century, when it was brought into contact with the West, rejected all Western models and even, for a while, Western technology.20 Although they were scripturalist, the late nineteenth-century reformers were not literalist, trying to find all answers to life in the hadith, as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had done. With the exception of Rashid Rida, who later became an admirer of Wahhabism, they believed that a return to the sources of Islam did not contradict the acceptance of Western models of emulation, Western education, or learning English or French.21 They resembled the Indian reform movements in their more restricted political ambitions, both regions having been incorporated into the British Empire. Quietism, would however, not be a permanent feature of some of these movements. For instance, a modern Deobandi movement, such as the Jamiat Ulema-i Islami (JUI) is highly political, protesting against Pakistan's support for the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.22 Many of the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan are even associated with the activism of the Taliban.23 In contrast, the Tablighi Jama‘at have remained adherents of the primal quietist and pious Salafi creed, stating that “the true solution lies in strengthening your faith and in returning to God”.24 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was able to evade the choice between quietist submission and activist confrontation by making a deal with political power. In fact, Wahhabism would have remained an isolated sect if he had not made a political alliance with the tribal chief, amir Muhammad ibn al-Sa‘ud in 1744. (p.8) Through this pact Ibn Sa‘ud could harness the religious fervour of a revivalist movement to the political ambitions of his family. The territory that was liberated was purged of ‘ulama who opposed the mission, while the population was forced to adhere to the new creed and a new class of ‘ulama was trained to enforce it. The descendants of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab established a religious dynasty, called the Al al-Shaykh (family of the shaykh), who gained power over the new religious establishment, while the Al Sa‘ud (Sa‘ud family) provided the political elite of the new state. Two states were founded by this coalition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries before amir ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud (d. 1953) eventually founded the Saudi state in 1932. In order to survive, he realised that he had to curtail the zealotry of his religious fighters, the ikhwan, and establish the primacy of political power. He thereby established the present division of labour and laid the foundation for a return of the main contradiction of Page 5 of 31

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Introduction Wahhabism/Salafism between its quietist presence and activist past. At present the political and bureaucratic elite rule the Saudi state and determine its economic and foreign policy without regard for the shari‘a in these spheres, while the religious establishment has been given control over society, enforcing a strict Wahhabi morality in exchange for political subservience.25 Partly this division had been sanctioned by the Wahhabis in the doctrine of wali al-amr, the duty of obedience to the ruler, but its inner tensions could not be so easily laid to rest and would be revived by more activist Salafis who could use it to challenge the political legitimacy of the Saudi rulers. The tensions in Salafism would emerge with the growing importance of the Saudi state. Having been founded in relative isolation in a backwater of the Islamic world in the deserts of Arabia, Wahhabism was rudely confronted by modernity once Saudi Arabia became a powerful oil-producing state in the 1950s and especially after the oil crisis in 1973. From a sectarian, excluded, localised, parochial, and marginal movement, Wahhabism was pulled into the modern world by more sophisticated, ideologically and culturally diverse independent thinkers and groups who transformed it to confront the modern world. They brought into the equation their own doctrines, interests and issues and backgrounds to create a multifaceted Salafism that is reflected in a diversity of strains, ranging from apolitical, quietist currents, including lifestyle and identity movements, to political activist movements and violent Jihadi networks. These currents trace their origins to Salafism and share basic doctrines and terms with Wahhabism, but have their own genealogies, (p.9) developing their own particular interpretation of Salafism based on specific local circumstances and global developments. As several contributions to this volume demonstrate, modern Salafism has brought out the tensions in Wahhabism. In the last part of this section I will analyse four elements of its doctrine that have been radicalised after having escaped the control of the state and the religious establishment. The first tension lies in Wahhabism's programme of returning to the sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the hadith, while in fact it followed (taqlid) the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Although this issue deals with doctrine, it had political important implications. The reformer Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–99), one of the most important influences on modern Salafism, was the first to point out this contradiction in Wahhabism, as Stéphane Lacroix shows in chapter 2. AlAlbani was influenced by the liberal Salafi reformers of the end of the nineteenth century, who rejected the veneration of tombs of shaykhs and taqlid and promoted ijtihad (individual reasoning). But he was also more radical than these reformers in the sense that he made the study of hadith the central point of his reformist movement, turning it into a science. When he was asked to teach in Saudi Arabia, al-Albani's method was contentious not for rejecting Wahhabism, but, as Lacroix points out, for outdoing Wahhabism on its own terms and therefore posing a threat to the vested interests of the ‘ulama whose power was Page 6 of 31

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Introduction based on upholding Hanbalism. Proclaiming that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was not a hadith specialist and indeed was not a Salafi because he followed the Hanbali madhhab, was a revolutionary position to adopt in Saudi Arabia. Al-Albani transformed Wahhabism in another way as well. With his accusation that the Muslim Brotherhood paid more attention to politics than ‘ilm, religious knowledge, al-Albani laid the basis of the present day friction between Salafism and the Brotherhood and integrated Salafism into modern Islamic discourse. A third legacy of al-Albani is his organisational form of transmitting knowledge. Like the Abbasid Hanbalis,26 it is based on the informal teacher-scholar relationship.27 This relationship constitutes one of the basic forms of the organisational genealogy for the dissemination of Salafism. Although quietist, it can be contentious for escaping the control of the state. (p.10) The second source of tension that has resurfaced and has been given a much more activist interpretation is the doctrine that regulates the relationship between the community of believers and outsiders/non-believers. Wahhabism's contribution to Salafism lay in its strengthening of a xenophobic attitude towards foreigners and its sectarianism towards non-Wahhabi Muslims. On the basis of the principle of loyalty and disavowal (wala’ wa-lbara’) Muslims were called upon to distance themselves from Muslims who did not adhere to Wahhabism. A true believer could only express his belief and the sincerity of his faith by demonstrating open enmity towards “idolators”.28 Already in the nineteenth century tracts existed condemning travelling to the land of idolators (bilad al-mushrikin) and befriending them and becoming “corrupted” and offering loyalty to them. Muslims were explicitly urged “to sever ties with them, to wage jihad against them and grow closer to God by hating them.”29 Accordingly, the struggle with the Ottoman Empire was framed as a struggle between believers and non-believers. This doctrine would re-emerge in the first quarter of the twentieth century when Wahhabi zealots such as the ikhwan tried to spread Wahhabism to Iraq, while in the second half of the twentieth century a figure as important as the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz, ordered Muslims to withhold their greetings to nonbelievers and cultivate hatred for them.30 As in the case of hadith studies by al-Albani and ijtihad, the concept of wala’ wal-bara’ has been radicalised by modern thinkers, as Joas Wagemakers demonstrates in his analysis of the reinterpretation of this concept by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959) in chapter 3. Wagemakers traces the genealogy of its transformation from the writings of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), to a grandson of the founder of Wahhabism, Sulayman ibn ‘Abdallah Al al-Shaykh (1786–1818), who urged believers to “cut the loyalty (al-muwala) between the believers and them (non-Muslims)”, to such modern Saudi scholars as Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan (b. 1935), who argued that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should emigrate to the Islamic world because “settling in the countries of the unbelievers will lead to forming loyalty [to them]”. In the last stages of the genealogy of the concept of wala’ wa-lbara’, activists such as Juhayman Page 7 of 31

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Introduction al-‘Utaybi (d. 1980), who led the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, directed it against the Saudi rulers, arguing that Muslims should also disavow the rulers who ally themselves with (p.11) the polytheists, not just distance themselves from foreigners.31 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi would finally take the concept to its radical activist conclusion by excommunicating (takfir) the Saudi state for its close relations with the West, thus for the first time legitimising jihad against rulers purely on the basis of Wahhabi/Salafi reasoning. The third example of a Wahhabi theme that has influenced Salafism and has become radicalised, is the condemnation of Shi‘ism as a heresy. Wahhabism condemned Shi‘ism for two doctrinal reasons. The first was that Shi‘is venerated the imams who were regarded as infallible. Secondly, Shi‘is denied the legitimacy of three of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (who ruled from 632–661) and therefore also the Companions of the Prophet and the authenticity of the hadith, the very basis of Wahhabism/Salafism. Guido Steinberg in chapter 4, however, not only traces the genealogy of anti-Shi‘ism to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's writings on the “rejectionists” (rawafid) (of the Rightly Guided Caliphs), but also to the writings of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which adopted the same antiShi‘a attitude for political reasons after the support of Iran for the Alawite regime of Hafez al-Asad in 1980. Developed by the Syrian Brotherhood leader Sa‘id Hawwa (1935–1989), and later provided with a Salafistamp of approval by the intermediary figure Muhammad Surur Zain al-‘Abidin (b. 1938), it finally became an ideological weapon in the hands of the Jihadi-Salafi Abu Mus‘ab alZarqawi (d. 2006) who was to use the doctrine with devastating effect in Iraq, where the Shi‘is’ doctrinal and historical “perfidy” in always collaborating with the enemies of Islam was confirmed by their political alliance with the United States against the true Sunni believers. The fourth and final example in this volume of the ambiguities Wahhabism has bequeathed to modern Salafism lies in the practice of hisba, or commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar).32 Although this practice goes a long way back and had existed during the time of the Abbasids (750–1258) and was regarded by Ibn Taymiyya as the ultimate form of jihad,33 it was revived by Wahhabism as a means to impose its (p.12) strict moral rectitude on the population and correct deviations such as smoking tobacco, worshipping at shrines, and other forms of engaging in shirk. In the 1920s the practice of hisba was institutionalised by the religious police (mutawwa‘/matawi‘a) to enforce public morality and the punctual observance of prayers. In the 1950s, the Committee for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong was also used as a political tool to counter the secular opposition.34 As with al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ and anti-Shi‘ism, hisba has its own particular genealogy, being transformed from a socially conservative principle to ensure political subservience in Saudi Arabia into an instrument for social activism and even revolution with the Egyptian Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, as Roel Meijer Page 8 of 31

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Introduction demonstrates in chapter 8. In the case of anti-Shi‘ism non-Wahhabi/Salafi influences were crucial in this transformation. In the case of the Jama‘a alIslamiyya, it was the inspiration of medieval thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya in combination with the revolutionary thought of the radical Egyptian Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) that probably explains the specific form it acquired as well as the way it was used to ensure internal discipline, expand “Islamic space”, intimidate opponents, challenge the state's authority and eventually legitimise revolt against the ruler in the 1970s and 1980s. That such a classical concept had become a flexible modern tool that could be reinterpreted and adapted to new circumstances has more recently been confirmed when it was transformed for a second time in the books the leadership of the Jama‘at issued in 2002 in which it constitutes the basis of an Islamic doctrine of responsible citizenship. Another aspect related to the inner contradictions of the doctrine of Wahhabism/ Salafism that is emphasised in this volume is its tendency to fragment. It stands to reason that the strong emphasis on doctrinal purity and the literalist bent that Salafism has inherited from Wahhabism inevitably leads to internal disputes, splits and fragmentation. Whether they belong to the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt (chapter 8), or the group around Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib in Indonesia (chapter 7), or in Bale, Ethiopia (chapter 15), or are active in Great Britain (chapter 17), Salafis spend a considerable amount of time and energy on doctrinal disputes. Although Salafism claims that its doctrine is transparent, its quietist and activist interpretations lead to endless interpretations. Moreover, the organisational form of the informal network enhances splits, a tendency that is highly accentuated by new media forms such as the internet and manifestations of modernisation such as increasing individualisation. (p.13) Typically, a political activist such as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, who was not concerned with doctrinal niceties, was exasperated by the damage doctrinal bickering caused to the Jihadist cause in Afghanistan and elsewhere, as Brynjar Lia makes clear in chapter 12.

Identity and Empowerment Despite doctrinal disputes “Salafi clarity” has been an important reason for its appeal. Although Salafism is mostly associated with repression of women and acute social control, in this volume, its capacity to empower and change identities. In a contentious age, Salafism transforms the humiliated, the downtrodden, disgruntled young people, the discriminated migrant, or the politically repressed into a chosen sect (al-firqa al-najiya) that immediately gains privileged access to the Truth. Salafis are therefore able to contest the hegemonic power of their opponents: parents, the elite, the state, or dominant cultural and economic values of the global capitalist system as well as the total identification with an alien nation which nation-states in Europe impose. Because its emphasis is on doctrinal purity and not politics, Salafism, more than the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut-Tahrir, has been able to empower individuals Page 9 of 31

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Introduction by providing a universal alternative model of truth and social action (even in its passive form of rejecting existing religious, cultural and political systems). As Roy has pointed out, due to its universal quality and its de-territorialised, deculturised character it has become a highly powerful model of identification and is eminently suitable for the creation of new virtual communities.35 But the real power of Salafism's mobilisational capacity, as Haykel stresses in this volume, lies in its ability to morally upstage the opponent. As Mohamed- Ali Adraoui states in chapter 16 on Salafism in France, the basic power of Salafism lies in its capacity to say “we are better than you”. This sense of superiority has six dimensions. First, it is not explicitly revolutionary, i.e. it does not directly challenge the status quo by claiming to overthrow it by a foreign ideology, such as Marxism. Rather it claims to build a superior moral order by purifying existing structures on the level of the individual, the family or the community. Like so many other reformist movements it is iconoclastic in the name of conservatism. Second, its empowerment derives from its claim to intellectual superiority of religious knowledge (‘ilm). Few competitors are as thorough, or so demanding in the knowledge of the (p.14) sources of Islam as Salafism, and joining the “saved sect” means not only obtaining the moral high ground but also acquiring a superior knowledge of Islam that every Muslim should have. Moreover, direct access to the text enables one to challenge the religious establishment, which is mostly based on fiqh of the four jurisprudential schools as well as on “folk Islam”, both of which are associated with the dominant power structure or prevalent culture. Third, Salafism provides its followers with a strong identity. Salafis are conspicuous for being different in appearance. As Roy has pointed out, neo-fundamentalists are obsessed with boundaries.36 Fourth, it allows its followers to identify much more easily with the larger umma, which enhances its universal pretensions, in contrast to the much more nation-oriented Brotherhood. Fifth, it is activist while being (mostly) quietist. It empowers the follower by urging him/ her to actively participate in the Salafi mission and the spread of the call (da‘wa). It therefore has an immediate social function of not only showing one's superiority but also of exerting it in the public and private domain by means of wala wa-l-bara’ and hisba, or in even stronger terms by taking part in jihad. Sixth, as all religious movements, and in contrast to political ideologies, it has the tremendous advantage of ambiguity and flexibility. Although it claims to be clear and rigid in its doctrine and in its striving for purity, as has been explained above, in practice it is malleable. Its ambiguity allows the adherent to be politically supportive of regimes as well as reject them. Perhaps the most conspicuous forms of empowerment and transformation of the individual have occurred in those parts of the world where Salafism is a recent phenomenon, where the influence of local culture and folk Islam is rapidly being eroded, such as Indonesia (chapter 7), or Upper Egypt (chapter 8), where social Page 10 of 31

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Introduction and educational changes are rapid and were the youth is in search of new means of empowerment without being able to reject their background completely. In Europe, Salafism has especially led to a kind of “conversion” of Muslims who have adopted a new identity that is based neither on that of their parents nor on that of the dominant culture of the nation-state they live in. Adraoui in chapter 16 and Martijn de Koning in chapter 18 show how Salafism has transformed second-generation migrants from humiliated and despised marginal citizens to superior human beings who have access to the Truth. “The appeal of Salafi puritanism lies in its ability to provide a way of not only opting out of society but creating an alternative, superior community based on the unity of God (tawhid).” It is the absolute character of Salafism that attracts. Instead of being passive followers, Salafis become active (p.15) role models. Adraoui regards Salafism as a strong “product” because it succeeds in convincing the customers of the religious market in believing it is the real Islam, provides an explanation why their lives have gone awry and how to become a true believer by living in accordance with correct Islamic rules in line with the Salafi practice (manhaj). The economic success of some members confirms the correctness of the Salafi‘aqida and their belonging to the “saved sect”. It has also expanded their identity by allowing them to identify with the Arab Gulf countries, where some have emigrated. The same politics of identity occur in the Netherlands. De Koning shows in his analysis of two Dutch Moroccan Salafi women in chapter 18 that Salafism's strength lies in “a merging of the idea of the authentic self with the idea of a pure Islam as revealed by Allah”. Salafism in Europe reflects a transformation in society that enhances self-fulfilment, individual choice and assertiveness. It furthermore has the advantage that it allows for individual self-study of the sources of Islam to find out “what Islam really says”. Moreover, in the midst of turmoil it provides “peace, a direction in life, the right answers”. Salafism's empowerment as a way of solving modern identity crises is also evident in Bale, Ethiopia, among the new generation of Salafis who grew up during the Marxist Derg regime, which fell in 1991. Terje Østebø points out in chapter 15 that “when the red stars and the statues of Lenin were removed, this generation harboured a profound sense of disorientation and found itself in a psychological and ideological vacuum.” As a result, “the propagandists of the Ahl al-Sunna (a Salafi group) found fertile ground in a generation disenchanted with the past and burdened by an uncertainty regarding the future.” Speaking the same language as the young generation, addressing issues directly related to their daily lives, the message of the Ahl al-Sunna found a welcome reception among the youngsters. As part of the generational conflict Salafism provided them with the tools to attack local customs, outbidding the older generation, who were accused of being “corrupt” and “lax”.

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Introduction Even in the heartland of Salafism, Saudi Arabia, where Salafism is a state religion and is used to control society and enforce a strict conservative morality, a new generation of Salafi thinkers and ideologues have succeeded in using the contentious potential of Wahhabism and turning it against the political and religious authorities, cutting down boundaries, and criticising the notion of a Saudi state as totally opposed to the basic notions of tawhid. Always regarded as a rigid doctrine that allows no room for interpretation and in fact does its best to rule out human individual reason (ray’), Madawi Al-Rasheed (p.16) shows in chapter 13 the astonishing capacity of Salafism to empower a diversity of groups and individuals and challenge foreign and internal opponents without having recourse to Western concepts. In all cases, the new identity of Salafi converts has been conspicuously marked by outward forms, clothing and beards, to stress the difference between “us” and “them”, based on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ and hisba. First of all it is directed towards themselves. Salafis distinguish themselves from the rest of society (Muslim and non-Muslim) by their special rituals and attire. In France and the rest of Europe, male Salafis are conspicuous for the qamis, the long robe and the short gallaba, revealing the calves, the women for the niqab, the veil that covers the face. In Saudi Arabia, the neo-Ahl al-Hadith have given rise to protests for staying shod during prayers and forbidding women to wear the niqab. In addition they reject common practices wherever they live. In France they refuse certain occupations and avoid “contamination” of their purity by mingling with non-believers (kuffar). This sense of separateness is also expressed in their time management that revolves around the obligatory five daily prayers. In Egypt, Westernised forms of culture or social codes were attacked by breaking up mixed meetings of men and women, music festivals, setting fire to video shops and cinemas, while traditional folk practices were disturbed during the celebration of mawlids of saints or the Prophet, or traditional pagan holidays such as Sham al-Nassim. In Yemen, Salafis were conspicuous for banning the chewing of qat and traditional music, whereas in Saudi Arabia the followers of Nasir al-Din al-Albani became famous for the critique of the ‘iqal, the headband and the traditional headdress, which were considered un-Islamic. In its battle to purify Islam in Bale, a number of local Oromo customs and practices, particularly rituals connected to weddings and funerals, were denounced and labelled as both backward and irreconcilable with the life of a true Muslim. Salafism has also been conspicuous for claiming and expanding purified Islamic space. In France, Salafis dominate certain city neighbourhoods while other neighbourhoods are avoided because they are dominated by the “unbelievers”. Whereas in Egypt, the semi-Salafi al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya tried to take over secondary schools, universities, mosques, or even whole villages and neighbourhoods in Cairo.

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Introduction Despite the “traditional” outward appearances, the identity issue stresses the paradox of Salafism. Both de Koning and Østebø, following Eickelman and Piscatori,37 point out, that Salafism is par excellence a modern phenomenon (p. 17) and the result of the objectification of religion and the conscious answer to questions such as: what is my religion? Why is it important to my life? How do my beliefs guide my conduct? According to Adraoui, Salafism is even a postmodern phenomenon: “The uprooted, postmodern French Salafi is a globalised individual who is no longer interested in his own cultural roots and the land of his parents, preferring instead the non-cultural dynamics of the Gulf, such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi.” It is ironic, however, that in spite of themselves, they are more integrated into French society than they would concede. For although Salafism, based on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, rejects contacts with the nonbelievers, it does allow for economic relations, “as long as loyalty remains to one's own community”. It is through this loophole that they become imbued with the materialistic culture of the modern consumerist society.

Politics Undoubtedly the link with politics is one of the most puzzling, slippery and fascinating aspects of Salafism.38 As has been stated earlier, this forms the central dilemma in Salafism. Traditionally, politics in Wahhabism has adopted the form of discrete advice (nasiha) given by the ‘ulama to the ruler behind the scenes. This still is the official political code of behaviour in Saudi Arabia, despite some minor changes. The central problem of modern Salafism is how to act non-politically in a political world, where media attention is crucial, Islamism has become a mass movement, and the Western public has become highly suspicious of a current that is often associated with intolerance and terrorism. What makes this all the more difficult is the empowerment of the Salafi creed, the sense of mission it provides to its followers and the energy and activism it generates with its strong identity. With the help of Saudi educational institutions (charity organisations, and universities), supported by the Saudi state, this sense of mission has gained a transnational dimension. Salafism's political dimension adopts three forms: quietist and discrete (with behind the scenes advice to rulers), covert (professing quietism, but acting politically while condemning open political involvement as hizbiyya, leading to fitna or factionalism) and openly activist by calling for political reform. When Salafist groups openly propagate politics, they shade off into the Islamism (political Islam) of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is the case with the Saudi Sahwa movement or the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. But although (p.18) this happens more often, Salafism's appeal is based on the purist rejection of the world and one of its weakest aspects is the underdeveloped nature of its political vocabulary. Transcending politics, its overt political activism takes the form of violence and jihad. Salafism does, however, provide certain concepts and practices that can be transformed into political tools, such as the principles of loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wa-l-bara’) and commanding good and forbidding Page 13 of 31

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Introduction wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar) (see chapters 3 and 8). These principles allow for active interference in the public sphere and can be expanded from a quietist, minimalist to an active, maximalist political and even violent stance. Therefore the division should not be regarded as rigid but as a sliding scale. In contrast to what normally is assumed, the violent form can be reached through a quietist trajectory if hisba and wala’ wa-l-bara’ are radicalised as has been seen in the examples of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt and the Jihadi-Salafi thinker Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in chapters 8 and 3. In its minimalist form someone as politically reticent as Nasir al-Din al- Albani acknowledges the need for an Islamic state but disagrees with the method to reach that stage. For Salafism politics for its own sake is not important, but rather it is doctrinal purity that is the basis for political involvement. In practice, the focus is on da‘wa, which according to al-Albani consists of al-tasfiya wa-ltarbiya (purification of the creed and education). As Lacroix shows, this principle, logically pursued, leads to astonishing results, of which the most famous is al-Albani's fatwa in which he calls on the Palestinians to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they cannot perform their religion correctly under Israeli occupation. Given a choice between protecting the creed (‘aqida) and the land, it is the creed, according to al-Albani, that has priority. Similarly, as Laurent Bonnefoy points out in chapter 14, the founder of Salafism in Yemen and follower of al-Albani, Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i, stated that the independence of South Yemen from British rule in 1967 was worse than colonialism since it brought to power a socialist government and led to the death of fellow Muslims. For the same reason, as Noorhaidi shows, the Indonesian version of apolitical Salafism regretted the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998. This prioritarisation of ‘aqida above politics, has led to a severe critique of Salafism by the more politically inclined Muslim Brotherhood. Already as early as the 1930s, the Brotherhood in Egypt blamed the local Salafis, the Jam‘iyya alShar‘iyya, for being more interested in rituals and doctrine than in liberating the country from the British occupation.39 The same (p.19) accusation was also made against the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Egypt by the Left in the 1970s.40 By far the largest Salafi movement in present-day Egypt, the al-Jama‘iyya al-Shari‘yya and others groups like the Shubban al-Muslimin are quietist and apolitical and are therefore supported by the Mubarak regime. Khaled Hroub shows in chapter 9 that Hamas can easily portray Salafism as a collaborator with the Israeli government because its leaders shy away from politics and thus can be framed as supporting the occupation. In practice, however, it has been hard for Salafism to completely ignore politics. Partly this has been the result of the fact that religion and politics have been so enmeshed that religious doctrines become political, as was apparent in the challenge of al-Albani's hadith study to the authority of the Saudi religious establishment. But the main source of tension between religion and politics derives from the doctrine of the Oneness of God (tawhid) itself, as we have Page 14 of 31

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Introduction explained. The duty to worship only God (tawhid) and recognise God as the only authority challenges the allegiance and duty of obedience of the subject/citizen to the ruler. Even if Qutb's hakimiyya (usually regarded as the legitimacy to rebel against established political authority (khuruj ‘ala alhakim) is rejected as an innovation (bid‘a) by Salafism because the term does not occur in the Qur’an,41 the tension between total political subservience to the ruler, even if he is corrupt (the original doctrine of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab) and the complete worship of God forces adherents of “apolitical” Salafism to take a position. In fact, as Noorhaidi in chapter 7 explains, the more a group emphasises the purity of belief and concentrates on religious knowledge (‘ilm), the greater the tensions with reality and the greater the pressure to adopt a political stance and criticise the political establishment as deviant, corrupt and un-Islamic. Political takfir is a monster that mainstream Salafism desperately tries to keep in its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it escape. Al-Albani himself set the first step in this direction by regarding the Al Sa‘ud as illegitimate rulers because the family does not descend from the tribe of Quraysh. As we have seen, a group of his followers, organised as al-Jama‘a alSalafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM), led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, took this reasoning one step further, condemning the close ties of the Al Sa‘ud with the West (p.20) and the corruption of its members, while Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, took the final step of excommunicating (takfir) the rulers. That the Saudi authorities were aware of the contentious and political potential of al-Albani's doctrines is apparent from the fact that al-Albani was temporarily banished from the kingdom after the occupation of the Grand Mosque. Even the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz, was not completely exonerated as he was closely connected with JSM and was loath to disavow ‘Utaybi's ideas. Another famous, so-called quietist Salafist religious leader, Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i, who also was a member of JSM and would later establish Salafism in Yemen, was arrested and later sent back to his home country. On the other hand, it was equally possible for other followers of al-Albani to wholeheartedly support the regime, as happened with his neo-Ahl al-Hadith disciples Rabi‘ ibn Hadi Madkhali and Muhammad Aman al-Jami, who supported the Saudi invitation to American troops in 1990.42 They were allowed to gain control over such important institutions as the Islamic University in Medina in exchange for purging them of the Sahwist and Muslim Brotherhood critics of the regime. Whereas the “political” genealogy leads to Afghanistan and Jihadi-Salafism, the “apolitical” trend can be traced to Europe, as many foreign students who studied at institutions such as Medina's Islamic University, or other Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, brought the Madhkali trend back to countries like France and the Netherlands. As Adraoui shows, it is this form of “apolitical”, quietist Salafism that has inspired French Salafis to take the step of rejecting the legitimacy of the French state, Republicanism and the rights they have as citizens, such as taking part in elections. As an

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Introduction alternative, Salafism provides them with a new identification with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. How difficult it has been to keep the lid on the central Wahhabi paradox is clear from the effects of the fallout of the decision to allow Americans to station troops on holy soil in 1990.43 Whereas the Saudi state promoted Salafism worldwide with the intention of using it against Shi‘ism in the 1980s and increasing its influence44 through the expansion of student stipends and the (p.21) global media, this process has been hard to control, and the Gulf War in 1990–1991 has shown how its transnationalisation can backfire. As a result, the decision of the Saudi government to welcome American troops did not only damage Saudi Arabia itself, shattering its self-righteousness and provoking internal opposition in the form of the Sahwa movement,45 it also had a devastating effect on the countries where Salafism had taken root, as several contributors to this volume make clear. Exposing its contradictions, international Salafism had to adopt a position in favour or against this decision and everywhere the battles raging inside Saudi Arabia were replayed elsewhere. Noorhaidi has analysed how in Indonesia the struggle between da‘wa salafiyya and the da‘wa hizbiyya turned into a vicious struggle between the so-called “Sururis ” (the followers of Muhammad ibn Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, who was critical of the American presence on holy soil) and the “non-Sururis ”.46 In chapter 17, Sadek Hamid analyses how in Great Britain the JIMAS split into different groups, one, supporting the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, vilified by its detractors as “Harakeyoon” “Kharijites”, or “Qutbists”, while the more pure, “unadulterated” Salafis supporting the Saudi government, were derogatorily labelled the “Super Salafis” for their self-righteousness. These examples make clear how politics has fragmented the Salafist movement. It even had effect in Bale in the internal power struggle between the generations, as Østebø makes clear. Crucial for the emergence of the political dimension of Salafism and the heightened tension within the movement, has been the problematic relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood on account of its more flexible, pragmatic, and political approach, which is also much more attuned to local cultural traits (usually reflected in its acceptance of Sufism) and nationalist causes. The rule of thumb is that where nationalist causes are dominant, such as in Palestine, or ethnic strife is strong, as is the case in Bale in Ethiopia, or politics has been more evolved, such as Egypt, the Brotherhood will be dominant, whereas Salafism, for its deterritorialised, deculturised, and apolitical character will be prevalent in an environment where these issues are non-existent, have not evolved or have failed, and where the population is devastated and radicalised (p.22) as in Algeria in the 1990s,47 Chechnya during the second war,48 or Iraq after the American invasion.49 In these last three cases, Jihadi-Salafism transplanted political Salafism. This shows that where politics has evolved as a form of contention, as in Egypt, Salafism is also not very strong. In these circumstances the Muslim Brotherhood has better cards. For while the Page 16 of 31

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Introduction Brotherhood (and its offshoots like Hamas) has been looked down upon as shallow, misguided, and deviant (munharif) by Salafism for its emphasis on politics at the expense of ‘aqida and religious knowledge (‘ilm), it is worldwide a more powerful force than Salafism. As a result the relationship between the two is highly complex. Not only is the Brotherhood regarded as an external enemy, but it is also feared as a direct challenge that brings out the tensions and paradoxes within the Salafi movement itself in its attitude towards politics. In many cases, the simple fact that the Muslim Brotherhood exists and is highly active and as such is a competitor for people, resources and influence, forces the Salafis, despite themselves, to take sides and formulate political views. The relations are all the more tense as Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood formed coalitions in the past to oppose their common enemy. In Saudi Arabia, in the 1950s and 1960s, they found each other in opposing Nasser; in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s they shouldered the opposition against the New Order of Suharto, organising shared study groups under the term “Salafi‘aqida, Brotherhood manhaj ”; in the Sudan, Noah Salomon shows in chapter 6, the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood have in recent times joined a common front despite their significant doctrinal differences. Some thinkers such as (p.23) Muhammad ibn Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, or ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq in Kuwait took this opportunity to try to build bridges between the two movements and combine Brotherhood activism with the Salafi emphasis on doctrine. Bernard Haykel mentions this influence as the source of hybridity of Salafism. But it is clear from the vehement attacks on thinkers who have tried to combine the two that it has evoked tremendous opposition. The manner in which Salafism has coped with politics also depends on the quality of its leaders. In Yemen, as Laurent Bonnefoy shows, the Salafi establishment Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i founded was careful to maintain good relations with the state and led to a typical situation where he claimed to be neutral and apolitical, but in fact supported the state by, for instance, not taking part in elections, working with the state against common enemies, such as the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood or militant Zaydi groups. At the same time, Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i was clever enough to express his political views when they were called for, such as condemning Ibn Baz for issuing the fatwa in 1990 as a means to protect Salafism from the political fallout, while at the same time, condemning the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia for its overt political involvement, or hizbiyya. Not all Salafi movements have been so adept in combining covert and overt politics and defusing the inherent tension in Salafism. The most spectacular example of the tension between the ideal of spreading da‘wa and the temptation of politics is Indonesia, where Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib had for a long time proclaimed to lead a pious, apolitical movement that condemned other currents for their da‘wa hizbiyya. This stance backfired once the Suharto regime fell and the movement was forced to manifest itself in competition with other movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Page 17 of 31

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Introduction organise mass meetings. It was heavily discredited when it became involved in jihad. In Palestine, Salafism has fared even worse, as Hroub shows in chapter 8. By staying close to the original doctrine and concentrating on da‘wa, the Salafi movement was unable to ensconce itself within the dominant struggle for national liberation and acquire a position in the competition between Fatah and the religious-nationalist Hamas movement (in fact a transformed Muslim Brotherhood). On the other hand, as Bernard Rougier shows for the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, where the nationalist struggle has failed, de-territorialised Salafism, with its stress on the ummah, can be successful if it is linked to a transnational struggle.50 In the Sudan the Ansar al-Sunna (p.24) alMuhammadiyya adopted a halfway position as a way out of the basic dilemma of remaining apolitical in a contentious world. In fact, it seems to have cleverly taken advantage of the denouement of the NIF, not rejecting politics completely, as the other wing of the Ansar al-Sunna had done, but rather, under influence of Salafi/Brotherhood thinkers such as ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, tried to incorporate politics and subsume it under its activities of da‘wa. In this way the Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya has given the non-political doctrinal terms such as the purification (tasfiya) of society by first purifying (tazkiya) doctrines, as al-Albani advocated, a political connotation. Thus, like the Muslim Brotherhood, it strives for the Islamic state, but, unlike its competitor, it regards the acceptance of the correct creed (‘aqida sahiha) as a precondition for its establishment. The semi-Salafi Jama‘a al-Islamiyya was able to adjust itself as well to changing circumstances, revising its previous rejectionist interpretation of hisba to a more accommodating form after it had been defeated by the state.

Jihadi-Salafism The problematic interaction of Salafism with the real world and politics has been compounded by its relationship with violence. Logically, violence stems from the same rejection of reality as corrupt and corrupting because it leads to compromises in doctrine (‘aqida) and practice (manhaj) that lie at the basis of apolitical Salafism. Ironically, Jihadi-Salafism, usually regarded as its most retrograde form, is Salafism's most modern manifestation, as we have seen above in the reinterpretation of Wahhabism by ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. The main difference with mainstream Salafism is that, Jihadi-Salafism is primarily concerned with the analysis of reality (waqi‘) and changing that reality. In contrast to mainstream Salafism, whose creed (‘aqida) is based on the basic principles of Wahhabism (tawhid, shirk, etc), and whose practice and method (manhaj) is largely related to avoiding reality and separating oneself from that reality and avoiding politics, Jihadi-Salafism concentrates on the analysis of political reality, devising strategies and practices for how to change it, and applying them (tatbiq) to different situations and circumstances. In return, also, its ‘aqida is transformed into being fully geared to jihad.51 Jihadi-Salafism probably found its original (p. 25) inspiration from Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), whose ideas on pre-Islamic society Page 18 of 31

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Introduction (jahiliyya) and sovereignty of God (hakimiyya), coincide with those of Salafism, but are much more highly politicised.52 Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, is a good example of a contemporary jihadi who combined the Salafi terminology of tawhid, purification (tazkiya), and pure intention (niyya), with a sharp and ruthless analysis of reality, geared to the implementation (tatbiq) of a jihadi strategy, thus producing a Salafist activist concept of praxis that is comparable to Leninism. Revolutionaries, like Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, seemed to realise this necessary ideological contribution of Salafism, despite his irritation with its tendency towards doctrinal bickering, as Brynjar Lia explains in chapter 12. In genealogical terms, al-Suri branches off from ideologues like al-Uyairi or alMaqdisi, who legitimise jihad as an ideology within the boundaries of Wahhabism, into a secularised, political jihad without the religious paraphernalia, geared to fighting the enemy by the most efficient means. Needless to say, if Salafism empowers individuals with feelings of superiority, Jihadi-Salafism empowers them even more as it makes greater demands on its adherents. Because in its popular, non-intellectual forms its propaganda is widely available in sound bites, video clips and translated texts on the internet, and its importance is proportionally exaggerated by Western politicians and intelligence agencies, it can feed the frustrations of youth in the West and the East, focus them and allow them to become heroes as mujahidin and martyrs.53 How modern this type of Salafism is and how far it is removed from the cautious, pietistic Salafism of Nasir al-Din al-Albani and Muqbil Hadi al- Wadi‘i—although we have seen there are links—is clear from Al-Rasheed's analysis of the jihadis in chapter 13. She argues that Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general. In her words it is “a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the (p.26) twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity”. She argues that it is precisely the mimicry of the West which the Jihadis want simultaneously to become part of and reject that accounts for their violence. Like any other modern identity it can be adopted and shed and people have reinvented themselves from pietistic Salafis to Jihadis and vice versa. They are transnational like modern capitalist markets, and promote a Western idea of changing the world by action, and like the West they promote a subjective experience of the world and a privatisation of pleasure and pain, loss and gain, and wealth and poverty, to improve life, spread prosperity, and dominate as a world system. Saudi intellectuals such as Lewis ‘Atiyat Allah have given oldfashioned anti-imperialism wings to Salafism by linking the rejection of the West with the notion of purity and sacredness of the land of the two holy shrines (bilad al-haramayn). The modernist embrace of chaos and dissent, so abhorrent to al-Albani and others, but characteristic as an expression of transition and rebirth, is taken for granted and even welcomed as a means of cleansing and creating a tabula rasa. Al Rasheed warns, however, against overemphasising the Page 19 of 31

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Introduction importance of these ideologies as a source of violence. Circumstances must explain the appeal Jihadism has in a certain place and time. Recruitment is carried out through friends and connections and not just by reading the internet, which can also be cathartic. The modern character of Jihadism is also stressed by Paz in chapter 11 in its form of organisation. While the classic organisation of Salafism from medieval times is the informal scholar-student relationship and the regional network of scholars, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and al-‘Uyairi use the internet to create what Paz calls “the Open University for Jihad Studies”, creating a “virtual community” of brothers devoted to global jihad. The use of the internet also has consequences for the content of their message. Living in a virtual and paranoid world, Jihadis plunder the Salafi terminological toolkit of intolerance, xenophobia, sectarianism, and violence, turning them into a terminology supporting total war against apostate governments and unbelieving forces of global oppression with which Islam is locked in a apocalyptic clash of civilisations. However, Paz at the same time points out the paradoxes of Jihadism. Whereas public debates in the Arab world are suppressed or highly controlled, the open character of the Jihadi sites has led to a pluralism that is rare in the region. But if Salafism can harbour such extremes, the question which Hegghammer poses in chapter 10 is more than justified. What is the use of the term (p.27) Salafism if it can harbour such quietist tendencies as those of Nasir al-Din alAlbani and Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i on the one hand, and radical activists such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, or terrorists like Abu Yahya al-Libi, on the other hand? Hegghammer raises additional questions to make the link even more problematic. Can the term Jihadi-Salafism apply to all these diverse groups? For instance, what is the term takfiri worth as an analytical tool if it is a label and not a self-appellation? And what is the use of Salafism when it is often only used to denote the authenticity of the ideology propounded or the person active in jihad? The major problem, as Hegghammer points out, is that “the term Salafism […] is a theological, not a political category.” As such, he quite rightly argues that “it says very little about the political preferences of the actors described as Salafis”. The problem is compounded when Salafism is related to jihad in JihadiSalafism. Hegghammer proposes a new model based on analytical categories to end the present confusion and at least acquire some insight into the political distinctions between the different groups as far as their political programme is concerned. The main religious category he uses is Islamism, doing away with the term Salafism. In a sense this is the ultimate answer to solving the riddle of the relationship between Salafism and violence. He argues that Salafism is so diverse and so mixed up with other currents and elements that it is not useful for understanding the sources of violence. On the other hand, he gives up the search for the genealogy of the different currents in Salafism and how they have managed to put together their own doctrine and practices. For instance, in Page 20 of 31

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Introduction Hegghammer's useful model of categorisation of political activity, Salafism, due to its puritanical imprint and piety, has more affinity with the last three categories: umma-oriented (Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi), morality-oriented (the semi-Salafi Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya) and sectarian (Abu Mus‘ab alZarqawi) than with the more politically developed and nationalistic orientations focused on the state and the nation, which are more easily claimed by the Muslim Brotherhood or movements associated with it, such as Hamas (chapter 9), or influenced by it, such as the Sahwa in Saudi Arabia, as has already been pointed out above.

The Local and the Global As we have seen above, Salafism is certainly not a unified movement. We can speak of genealogies of different currents within Salafism, each with its own historical trajectory and combination of local and transnational networks. In this volume the most conspicuous transnational network is the one that starts (p.28) out with Nasir al-Din al-Albani and Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i, is institutionalised by the Madkhalis in Saudi Arabia, and in one remove to Yemen by Muqbil al-Wadi‘i. Later it branches out to the groups of Salafis around Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib in Indonesia in one direction, Bale in Ethiopia in another direction and French Salafis in a third direction. Official institutions such as the Islamic University in Medina and Muqbil's institute in Yemen play a role, but also networks of scholars and, in Indonesia, pesantren (religious school/madrasa). Not all of these networks flow in one direction. Abou Zahab shows that the Ahl-e Hadith has influenced the Salafi movement. Another network is that of the Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. Although this movement is only analysed by Salomon in chapter 6, it pops up in Egyptian history in the 1930s, in Saudi Arabia in relation to Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, and then finally in the Sudan. Such genealogies can also be made for the Ahl-e Hadith as well as all the violent networks dealt with in this volume. It is important to trace the manner in which these networks change over time, how they adapt to their circumstances and what influences they exert on their environment. The extent to which Salafism has become a global affair and can be seen as a global movement is clear by the early 1990s after the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz, issued his fatwa condoning the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990–1991. Not only did the shock-waves of the ensuing crisis reverberate throughout the Salafi transnational networks—in all their different forms (from the Ahl al-Sunna in Bale, to the Ahl-e Hadith in Pakistan, to the Salafis organised in JIMES in Great Britain, and those in Indonesia); but it is clear that underneath these broad transnational developments, Salafism has also had to cope with local circumstances, adapting to them— and sometimes succumbing to them. Adraoui shows in chapter 16 that in France Salafism has adopted a postmodern attitude towards capitalism, individualism, marketing and the acceptance of material success. De Koning in chapter 18 shows how in the Netherlands Salafi women try to find a modern identity that is neither Dutch nor Page 21 of 31

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Introduction traditional Moroccan. In Yemen, where there exists a rivalry with Saudi Arabia, Bonnefoy shows how the success of Muqbil al-Wadi‘i was linked to his capability of remaining independent from Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya was able to successfully harness a Salafi principle such as hisba to its activist social revolutionary programme. And in Iraq, Zarqawi was able successfully to mobilise the sectarian dimension of Salafism and play on the sectarian divides to widen the gulf between Sunnis and Shi‘as in the special circumstances of the American invasion and the ensuing civil war. (p.29) Local circumstances have also clearly hampered the development of some movements. Hroub has shown that in the West Bank and Gaza Salafism has not been able to make any inroads on the dominant position of Hamas. In Bale, ethno-national or religio-nationalist forces have prevented the younger generation of Salafis from prevailing. In Afghanistan, as Lia has shown, the rigidity of Salafism greatly damaged its prospects in a traditional environment. It appears that where either the population is still strongly embedded in local practices and individualisation has not evolved sufficiently, or where an ethnicnationalist struggle is prominent, transnational Salafism is unable to take root. It can only succeed in making inroads when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed and the national struggle can be linked with a larger global struggle, or it fits into the politics of identity in Western Europe. The contributions in this volume make clear that the more global Salafism becomes, the more diverse, contradictory, ambivalent, and fragmented it appears to be in its local variations. It is abundantly clear that neither states, nor in fact Salafist schools themselves, are able to control the general flow of people, goods and information, and even the different currents of Salafism— due to the diversity of books, videos, tapes, let alone what television has to offer in the form of shows. Ideologically, it may mix with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood or not. In Egypt, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya blended Qutbism with Salafism, while in Saudi Arabia Muhammad Surur blended Salafism with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq Zarqawi has gone his own way and the Association of Muslim Scholars has been able to devise an ideology that blends Arab nationalism, political and Jihadi-Salafism. In parts of the world where the authority of figures and institutions that try to maintain an “orthodox” view is weak, such as Great Britain, as Sadek Hamid demonstrates, some have recently even tried to combine Salafism with its arch-enemy, Sufism, very much in the way many of the Indian reformist currents have done. In this sense Salafism's strong points, such as clarity, empowerment, quietism, activism, and universalism are undermined by its countervailing forces: rigidity, fragmentation, political dissolution and localism. As it is being reduced to a toolbox, it will increasingly be hijacked by other issues, such as the politics of

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Introduction identity in Europe, the anti-imperialist movement in the Middle East and Asia and sectarianism in countries like Iraq and Lebanon. (p.30) Bibliography Bibliography references: Abdalla, Ahmed, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, London: Al Saqi Books, 1985. Amghar, Samir, ‘Les salafistes français: une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse’, Maghreb- Machrek, no. 185 (2005), pp. 13–31. ———, ‘Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims’, in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, Michael Emerson (eds) European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 38–51. Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Birt, Jonathan, ‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and Reactions’, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.) Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Hurst, 2005, pp. 168–84. Bonney, Richard, Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden, Foreword by Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004. Brown, Daniel, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Buijs, Frank et. al ., Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratusche moslims in Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006 Commins, David, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B.Tauris, 2006. Cook, Michael, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. de Koning, Martijn, Zoeken naar een zuivere islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008. Delong-Bas, Natana J., Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London: I.B.Tauris, 2004.

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Introduction Eickelman, Dale F ., and Piscatori, James, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Ephrat, Daphne, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni ‘Ulama’ of Eleventh- Century Baghdad, SUNY Press, Albany NY, 2000. Euben, Roxanne L., Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limit of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Fandi, Mamoun, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 2001. Hafez, Muhammad, ‘From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 37–60. Haykal, Bernard, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hegghammer, Thomas, ‘Global Jihadism after the Iraq War’, Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 1 (2006), pp. 11–32. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Lacroix, Stéphane, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited’, The International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007), pp. 97–116. (p.31) Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in a Liberal Age, 1798–1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002. ———, The War for the Muslim Mind: Islam and the West, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Lacroix, Stéphane, and Hegghammer, Thomas, Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?, International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 31, 12 September 2004. Laouste, Henri, Le traité de droit public d’ibn Taimiyya: Traduction annotée de la Siyasa Shar‘iyya, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1948. ———, Le profession du foi d’ibn Taymiyya: Texte, traduction et commentaire de la wasatiyya, Paris: Geuthner, 1986. Lia, Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998. Page 24 of 31

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Introduction ———, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus‘ab alSuri, London: Hurst, 2007. Martinez, Luis, ‘The Distinctive Development of Islamist Violence in Algeria’, in Amélie Blom, et.al, The Enigma of Islamist Violence, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 121–35. Masud, Muhammad Khalid, ‘The Growth and Development of the Tablighi Jama‘at in India,’ in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama‘at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 3–43. ———, ‘Ideology and Legitimacy’, in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama‘at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 79–118. Meijer, Roel, ‘Muslim Politics under Occupation: The Association of Muslim Scholars and the Politics of Resistance in Iraq’, Arab Studies Journal, vols. 13 and 14, nos. 2 and 1 (Fall 2005–Spring 2006), pp. 92–112. ———, ‘Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis’, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 47, nos. 3–4 (2007), pp. 422–59, ———, ‘Yusuf al-Uyairi and the Transnationalisation of Saudi Jihadism’, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.) Kingdom without Borders, Hurst & Co, 2008, pp. 221– 43. Metcalf, Barbara Daly, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002, 2nd edition. Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New- Order Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ———, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Rougier, Bernard, Every Day Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst & Co, 2002.

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Introduction Schulze, Reinhard, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20 Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischer Weltliga, Leiden: Brill, 1990. (p.32) Steinberg, Guido, Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902–1953, Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002. Teitelbaum, Joshua, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. Voll, John, ‘Foundations for Renewal and Reform’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 509–47. Wictorowicz, Quintan, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001. ———, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. Notes:

(1) See for example, Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Henri Laouste, Le traité de droit public d’ibn Taimiyya: Traduction annotée de la Siyasa Shar‘iyya, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1948; and his, Le profession du foi d’ibn Taymiyya: Texte, traduction et commentaire de la wasatiyya, Paris: Geuthner, 1986. (2) See for instance, John Voll, ‘Foundations for Renewal and Reform’, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 509–47; and Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (3) Bernard Haykal, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. (4) Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002; Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20 Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischer Weltliga, Leiden: Brill, 1990. (5) Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst & Co, 2002. (6) Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten, 1902–1953, Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B.Tauris, 2006; Madawi AlRasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Mamoun Fandi, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Page 26 of 31

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Introduction Opposition, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000; Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London: I.B.Tauris, 2004. (7) Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002, 2nd edition; for the modern, radicalized Deobandis see: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. (8) For France see, Samir Amghar, ‘Les salafistes français: une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse’, Maghreb-Machrek, no. 185 (2005), pp. 13–31; for Great Britain, see for instance, Jonathan Birt, ‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and Reactions’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.) Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Hurst, 2005, pp. 168–84; for the Netherlands, Frank Buijs, et. al., Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, and Martijn de Koning, Zoeken naar een zuivere islam. Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007; for Europe, see Samir Amghar, ‘Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims’, in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, Michael Emerson (eds) European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 38–51; for Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New-Order Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006. (9) For good analyses of the global jihad, see Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Global Jihadism after the Iraq War’, Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 1 (2006), pp. 11– 32, and Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, London: Hurst, 2007. (10) See Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Quintan Wictorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39; and Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?, International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 31, 12 September 2004. (11) Most of the companions of the Prophet had died by 690 CE, most of the second generation, the followers (tabi‘un) who had obtained their knowledge directly from the first generation, around 750 CE, and the third generation, the followers of the followers (atba‘ al-tabi‘in) around 810 CE. Personal communication with professor Harald Motzki. (12) David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, pp. 14–17.

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Introduction (13) For a general analysis of the emergence of revivalist thinkers and movement in the early modern period, see John Voll, “Foundations for Renewal and Reform”, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 509–47. (14) Haykal, Revival and Reform in Islam, pp. 76–108. (15) Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp. 35–45. (16) Ibid., pp. 100–1. (17) Ibid., p. 139. (18) Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘The Growth and Development of the Tablighi Jama‘at in India’, in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama‘at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, Leiden: Brill, date, pp. 22–3. The main difference between the Tablighi Jama‘at and Wahhabsim is the former's tolerance. While Wahhabism is strident and stresses the punishment of deviation, Tablighis seek communalities, or in Mawlana Ilyas’ words: “You should make sure that our movement and Islamic tabligh do not allow hurting someone's feelings. Nor do we want to hear the words fitna and fasad (disturbance). You have called some people bid‘ati (heretics). You should avoid such words in future that incite disturbance”. Quotation from Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘Ideology and Legitimacy’, in Travellers in Faith, p. 95. (19) For a brief but illuminating overview of the different groups in South Asia and the tensions between quietism and activism, see Barbara Metcalf, “Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, www.ssrc.org/ sept11/essays/metcalf_text_only.htm (20) Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 130–43. (21) See Albert Hourani for an analysis of the modernist Salafi thinkers Jamal alDin al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, in his Arabic Thought in a Liberal Age, 1798–1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 103–60. (22) Metcalf, ‘Preface to the Paperback Edition’, in Islamic Revival, p. xviii. (23) See Rashid, Taliban, pp. 89–94. (24) Quote from the second leader of the Tablighi Jama‘at, Muhammad Yusuf Kandhalawi, at a rally in Pakistan in 1947 during the partition. Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘The Growth and Development of the Tablighi Jama‘at in India’, in Travellers in Faith, p.16. (25) Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, pp. 10–11. Page 28 of 31

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Introduction (26) See Daphne Ephrat, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni ‘Ulama’ of Eleventh-Century Baghdad, SUNY Press, Albany NY, 2000. (27) See especially Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001, pp. 133–44. (28) Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 34–5. (29) Ibid., p. 63. (30) Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 36. (31) Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited’, The International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007), pp. 97–116. (32) For the most extensive account of this principle see Cook, Commanding Right. (33) For more on the relation between jihad and hisba see Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden. Foreword by Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004, pp.111–26. (34) Cook, Commanding Right, pp. 180–91, and Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 109. (35) Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam. (36) Ibid., p. 36. (37) Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. (38) Wiktorowicz's article ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, has undoubtedly been the most comprehensive analysis on the issue of the division of ‘purists’, ‘politicos’ and ‘jihadi ’ Salafis. (39) Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998, p. 59–60. (40) Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, London: Al Saqi Books, 1985, pp. 227–8. (41) Hakimiyya as such does not appear in the Qur’an but hukm Allah does, and as such is considered Qur’anic in derivation if not in inspiration. Information provided by Bernard Haykel.

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Introduction (42) See also Wiktorowicz for the diversity of trends leading from al-Albani, even leading to violent forms of Salafism as propounded by Abu Qatada. ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, p. 213. (43) See for the analysis of this event and the effect it has had on the rise of religious opposition: Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists? International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 31, Amman/Riyadh/ Brussels, 21 September 2004. (44) Gilles Kepel, The War for the Muslim Mind: Islam and the West, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 152–96. (45) See for more on the Sahwa movement: Mamoun Fandi, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 2001; and the way Saudi Arabia got caught up in the problems of its making, Gilles Kepel ; The War for the Muslim Mind: Islam and the West. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 152–96. (46) For more on Muhammad ibn Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, see the section on Salafi biographies at the end of the book. (47) See on the transformation of Algeria into “a land of the infidels” and the sanction of large scale massacres among the population, based on an utopian, non-political terminology derived from Salafism: Luis Martinez, ‘The Distinctive Development of Islamist Violence in Algeria’, in Amélie Blom, et.al, The Enigma of Islamist Violence, London: Hurst & Company, pp. 121–35, and Muhammad M. Hafez, ‘From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 37–60. (48) Jihadi-Salafism only gained ground in Chechnya after the devastation of the first war from 1994 to 1996, see James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. (49) In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 59, 15 February 2006; Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. Some groups with a more political inclination combined a Salafi ideology with nationalism and even Baathism, see Roel Meijer, ‘Muslim Politics under Occupation: The Association of Muslim Scholars and the Politics of Resistance in Iraq’, Arab Studies Journal, vol. 13 and 14, nos. 2 and 1 (Fall 2005–Spring 2006), pp. 92–112.

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Introduction (50) Bernard Rougier, Every Day Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, (translated by Pascale Ghazaleh), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. (51) See Roel Meijer, ‘Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis’, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 47, nos. 3–4 (2007), pp. 422–59, and ‘Yusuf alUyairi and the Transnationalisation of Saudi Jihadism’, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.) Kingdom without Borders, Hurst & Co, 2008, pp. 221–43. (52) See for more on Sayyid Qutb, Leonard Binder, ‘The Religious Aesthetics of Sayyid Qutb: A Non-Scriptural Fundamentalism’, in his Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 170–205; and Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limit of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. (53) See for an excellent analysis of Salafism and radicalisation in Europe: Samir Amghar, ‘Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims ’, in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, Michael Emerson (eds) European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 38–51.

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 Bernard Haykel

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords This chapter gives a detailed background of the doctrine of Salafism since its origins. It explains the meaning of the term tawhid and the central place it has in the doctrine of Salafism. It explains the central position of sharia law and other terms that are essential in Salafism, such as aqida (creed), manhaj (program), ijtihad (individual interpretation) and shirk (giving associates to God). The chapter ends with an analysis of al-Qaeda’s creed. Keywords:   tawhid, sharia, aqida, manhaj, ijtihad, shirk

Introduction: What is In a Term? The term Salafi, and those it designates, remains ill-defined and often misunderstood in the literature on this movement, and in studies on Islamism more generally.2 It is nonetheless well-established that the Salafis claim to be engaged in a process of purifying Muslim society in accordance with their teachings, and that the designation Salafi is prestigious among Muslims, because it denotes the earliest and therefore authentic version of Islam—the Islam of the “pious ancestors”, generally understood to refer to the first three (p.34) generations of Muslims. There is, among Sunnis, a strongly held view that temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam, and this is encapsulated in the oft-quoted hadith about the best three-generations of Muslims being the first three and which can be found in Bukhari's Sahih: “The best of my community [i.e., Muslims] are my generation, then those who come after them and then those who follow them.” It is also known that Salafis claim to be members of the only victorious group that will be saved in the Hereafter (al-ta’ifa al-mansura and al-firqa al-najiya), again basing Page 1 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 themselves on a famous hadith. But beyond these facts it would be useful to know why the term Salafi, which in the late nineteenth century referred to modernising and reason-minded Muslim reformist scholars, has come to be identified with the Wahhabis for whom reason-based (‘aqli) arguments are anathema. What is the difference, if any, between a Salafi and a Wahhabi? How old is the term Salafi as a designation for a particular group or movement among Muslims? Much of the secondary literature on Salafism focuses entirely on the political aspects of the movement's different—and differing—groups, and in so doing misses, or even dismisses, its ideational, theological and legal underpinnings.3 Some writers would have us believe that the Salafis are not much different from fascists, and that Salafism is a totalitarian ideology.4 And because contemporary Salafis are divided among themselves on matters of politics— with Jihadi-Salafis on one end of the spectrum and politically submissive Salafis (e.g., Jamis and Madkhalis) on the other—the term Salafi is often considered of little or no analytical value. Such an argument, however, misses the mark because it is unduly restrictive in its conception of politics, and because Salafis represent a social and religious movement whose activities have longterm political effects that are not obvious at first glance. Most Salafis are not political actors in the strict or formal sense of politics, by which I mean that they are not exclusively intent on capturing the state and its levers of power either through non-violent means or through direct action. They also eschew formal political and most civic forms of organisation (e.g., political parties, clubs, associations). Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers who are engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms (p.35) of authority and identity, both personal and communal. Indeed, Salafis are determined to create a distinct Muslim subjectivity, one with profound social and political implications. It is important to understand Salafis as constituting a group that defines its reformist project first and foremost through credal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important, though secondary, for their self-definition are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics. I hope to show in this study that Salafism is a term that is heuristically useful because it is a marker of a distinctive form of engagement with the world, and one that is identifiable as such to many Muslims. A Salafi is immediately recognisable to others through distinctive dress, social and religious habits, prayer postures, and the content and form of his speech. The importance of the Arabic language cannot be overstated for the members of this movement because they emphasise the study and constant referencing of revealed texts, the Qur’an and hadith. And because of this, Arabs—and those with native fluency in classical Arabic—have and will continue to dominate this movement, and non-Arabs will continue to invest great

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 effort and energy in learning this difficult language, and take pride in its mastery.5 Salafi teachings and ideas have become pervasive in recent decades so that many modern Muslims—even ones who do not identify formally as being Salafi— are attracted to certain aspects of Salafism, namely its exclusive emphasis on textual forms of authority, its theology that attacks Ash‘ari voluntarism, its pared down version of legal interpretation and its call for reform of Muslim belief and practice by, among other things, returning to the model of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.6 And because of their adherence to (p.36) a particular form of textual interpretation—one that emphasises a direct interface with the texts of revelation—Salafis enjoy a relatively shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authorities. Most Salafis—though not all—are unlike traditional, and pre-modern, Muslims in that they do not subscribe to a developed and layered scholastic tradition of religious interpretation, which otherwise constrains and regulates, in rigorous fashion, the output of opinions. As such, it is striking how relatively easy it is to become an authority figure among the Salafis. In fact, as an interpretive community Salafis are, in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning, relatively open, even democratic. This article will shed light on what Salafism is and who the Salafis are. It will also attempt to explain why some Muslims find this movement's ideas appealing. In this regard, I will argue that the attraction to Salafism lies in the form of authority that it promotes, and reproduces, as well as the particular hermeneutics it advocates. It is not Salafism's so-called “de-territorialised” and “fundamentalist” qualities, nor the “globalised” condition of modern life, that make Salafism particularly attractive. Rather, it is Salafism's claims to religious certainty that explain a good deal of its appeal, and its seemingly limitless ability to cite scripture to back these up. A typical Salafi argument is that Salafis, unlike other Muslims, rely exclusively on sound proof-texts from revelation as the basis for their views, and they adduce the relevant verses or traditions every time they issue a judgment or opinion. In support of this is cited the claim that these texts, in particular the hadiths, are unconditionally authoritative when it comes to the elaboration of teachings and opinions, a suggestion that is hotly debated and even denied by other schools of Islamic theology and law. The claims to greater certainty of God's law through a hyper-textual methodology are a trademark of the Salafis. Implicit in this claim is that to deny Salafi views is to deny the probative value of the texts of revelation, especially the canonical hadiths, a position that represents a quick and slippery slope to exclusion from the community of believers and to damnation. Some scholars, such as Olivier Roy, have argued that Salafism's popularity lies in the de-territorialised and globalised condition of contemporary Muslims. But the question still remains as to why Salafism is so well-rooted in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, even in parts of India and Nepal among other places, Page 3 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 where indigenous Salafis do not suffer from a sense of being de-territorialised. Another related question is: what explains the active (p.37) presence of Salafis for many centuries before our own globalised era? Many studies on this movement convey the sense that Salafism is a purely modern manifestation— since the late nineteenth century—and in so doing their authors betray considerable ignorance of Islamic religious history. I hope to provide here some sense of the pre-modern history of this movement and that its origins lie in theological and legal debates that preceded our modern age. Furthermore, Salafism is not the only form of “fundamentalism” prevalent today, and as such it is only one of a number of alternative Islamic religious movements that Muslims can choose to adhere to. For example, other doctrinally robust movements or tendencies are: Hizb al-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama‘at al-Tabligh, certain Sufibrotherhoods, strict Hanafism, the Deobandis, the Barelwis, etc. What makes a Muslim choose Salafism over these alternatives? The answer, in addition to the aforementioned matter of religious certainty, can be found in Salafism's promotion of a specific Muslim identity, which is infused with claims to authenticity. This includes a muscular discourse that is directed at reforming other non-Salafi Muslims, and which amounts to an activist worldview in which one sees oneself as pure and the other as in need of purification in both belief and practice. There is in this movement what some have labelled in reference to other contexts a “hostile othering” of non-Salafi Muslims. Finally, it has often been asserted that Saudi Arabia's funding and promotion of this movement explains Salafism's spread and wide appeal.7 This argument is too simplistic since Salafis existed before Saudi Arabia's creation and many are not recipients of Saudi largesse. Moreover, non-Salafis have received this kind of patronage, such as the Nadwat al- ‘Ulama’ seminary in Lucknow, India, without adhering to this movement's teachings, as have the Deobandis in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, a good number of Salafis are antagonistic to the kingdom's government and policies to the point of stripping it of all legitimacy, and some even condemn the persistence of so-called tribal values in Saudi society and politics. In this regard, the most that can be claimed is that Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of Salafism has helped spread the movement's ideas, in good part through Salafi publishing activities, but that this help is neither a necessary nor sufficient explanation for Salafism's presence and entrenchment in Muslim life around the world.8

(p.38) The Importance of Theology: tawhid, tawhid and More tawhid The word Salafi as a proper noun and an adjective is of pre-modern vintage— not a neologism of the late nineteenth century—and refers to a distinctive theological group that is identified with the Ahl al-Hadith.9 We find the term, for example, in a number of Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 1328) works as well as those of other pre-modern authors (e.g., al-Sam‘ani, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Dhahabi).10 In his alFatawa al-kubra, Ibn Taymiyya writes the following:

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 As for the Salafiyya it is as [Hamd ibn Muhammad] al-Khattabi and Abu Bakr al- Khatib [al-Baghdadi] and others have stated: The way of the Salaf is to interpret literally the Qur’anic verses and hadiths that relate to the Divine attributes (ijra‘ ayat al-sifat wa ahadith al-sifat ‘ala zahiriha), and without indicating modality and without attributing to Him anthropomorphic qualities (ma‘ nafy al-kayfiyya wa-l-tashbih). So that one is not to state that the meaning of “hand” is power or that of “hearing” is knowledge.11 This definition is not simply about physical aspects of God; more crucially it is about how to approach the texts of revelation and who is to be considered a true believer in Islam.12 Therefore, denying an attribute of God or interpreting this metaphorically, might amount to unbelief. Similarly, attributing to someone other than God—a saint or the Prophet—a quality or power that belongs to God alone might well qualify a person as an unbeliever. Bolstering this theology of the Salafis are certain claims that involve among other things: 1) a return to the authentic beliefs and practices of the first three “generations” of Muslims—the Salaf al-Salih (“pious ancestors”)—a period which is understood to have started with the revelation of the Prophet (p.39) Muhammad (ca. 610) and to have ended around the time of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's death (855);13 2) an emphasis on a particular understanding of tawhid (God's oneness), which Salafis divide into at least three categories of belief and action: the Oneness of Lordship (tawhid al-rububiyya), the Oneness of Godship (tawhid al-uluhiyya) and the Oneness of the Names and Attributes (tawhid al-asma’ wa-lsifat);14 3) Making certain that unbelief is fought, especially all forms of associating other beings or things with God (shirk); 4) claiming that the only valid sources of authority are the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (the latter is equated with the canonical Sunni hadith collections) and the consensus of the Prophet's companions; 5) ridding Muslims of the reprehensible innovations (bida‘, sing. bid‘a) in belief and practice that they have wittingly, or unwittingly, adopted; 6) arguing that a strict constructionist interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna is sufficient to guide Muslims for all time and through all contingencies, and that these sources are perspicuous.15 Ibn Taymiyya's writings focus intensely and extensively on theological questions, and his oeuvre should be understood as a monumental effort to purge (p.40) Islamic belief of what he considers to be accumulated heresies and to refute these in a systematic manner. He was a master theologian who engaged other groups in disputation and debate in an effort to defend his version of orthodoxy, in other words Salafism. Ibn Taymiyya's followers, to this day, consider his written works to constitute the definitive word on the theological polemics that raged in classical Islam, and to have sealed the fate of the opponents of the Salafis, such groups as the Ash‘aris, Jahmis, Murji’is, Shi‘is and the philosophers among others. And because of this many modern Salafis no longer consider it Page 5 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 necessary to engage other Muslims in detailed theological debate, this having been won by Ibn Taymiyya.16 Instead, Salafis today continue the effort of purging the Sunni tradition of non-Salafi traces and influences as well as repeating, in abridged form, the arguments made by Ibn Taymiyya.17 They remain alert for the reappearance of these ever-seductive heresies in modern incarnations. Salafis believe that true belief in Islam is constituted by both inner faith and manifest action, and that this can increase as well as diminish, depending on these two variables. The Murji’is are accused by Salafis of confining belief to inner faith alone and as such of being tolerant of flagrant acts of impiety, such as the non-performance of the five obligatory daily prayers. On this basis of what constitutes belief, Salafis are willing to engage in excommunication (takfir) of Muslims who do not perform the obligatory acts required of the faith.18 This more activist conception of the faith has led some Salafis to engage in political criticism, even anathematisation, of any self-proclaimed Muslim regime that does not rule by, and therefore apply, Islamic law. Those who legitimise or who tolerate such regimes are labelled Murji’is.19 Contemporary Ash‘aris and Maturidis complain of being attacked by Salafis for engaging in allegorical or metaphorical interpretation of texts pertaining (p.41) to the Divine attributes.20 They accuse the Salafis of being latter-day Kharijis, who are intolerant and extremist heretics seeking to sow dissent and division (fitna) among Muslims by engaging in the reprehensible practice of anathematisation or excommunication of fellow Muslims. Some of these antagonists also go on to condemn the Salafis for advocating anthropomorphism and reserve for them certain terms of abuse such as hashwiyya.21 Salafis are also constantly inveighing against Shi‘is, whom they consider to be infidels. They also attack Sufism and Sufis and all those who visit graves and engage in ritual practices that are deemed to be contrary to Islam's creed, such as celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (mawlid) and seeking to make the dead a means to God (tawassul), or a means for assistance (istighatha) or an object of intercession with God (tashaffu‘).22 Salafis refer to such people as Quburiyyun (grave worshippers), whereas they label Shi‘is as the rafidi, the “rejectionists” of the first three caliphs of Islam. Shi‘is, in turn, refer to the Salafis as nasibis, the “hateful enemies” of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and the Prophet's family (Ahl al-Bayt). Insults abound, and these are rooted in theological beliefs about which any difference of opinion is not permissible. One might conceive of the effort that Salafis are engaged in to be one of continuous boundary defence: the delimitation of the community of pure believers, as opposed to those outside it who are in one or more ways theologically corrupted and in error.

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 The focus on theological differences, as opposed to legal ones, is important because theology in Islam does not entertain a tolerance for a multiplicity of equally valid, but obviously different, beliefs—only one view is correct, and on this basis it becomes possible to exclude and excommunicate the adherents (p. 42) of other views. The legal realm operates differently in that on most issues differences of opinion are tolerated because the proof-texts upon which these are based are of probable (zanni) quality, and therefore it is uncertain whether any given opinion coincides exactly with God's will. This is why theological claims trump other kinds of argument—they are an effective conversationstopper. It is also why Salafis are perceived to be intolerant by other Muslims. Often this takes the form of Salafis distinguishing and defining themselves in opposition to the unbelief of others, a form of negative selfdefinition: “We are the true Muslims, not like the misguided ones and the people of innovation, such as the Ash‘aris, the Sufis and the Kharijis, who believe in x and y heresy.” This form of self-definition represents a long-standing tradition in Islam, which is nicely illustrated by Ridwan al-Sayyid in his study on the concept of the “group” (jama‘a) and its political implications.23

The Importance of Law: to Be Or Not to Be a mujtahid Another important aspect of Salafiself-definition lies in the movement's approach to law, and in particular the position Salafis adopt vis-à-vis the four established Sunni schools (madhahib, sing. madhhab). Here the Salafis are divided among themselves, unlike their unity on questions of what constitutes orthodox theology. The main difference pertains to the degree to which they follow, or reject, the teachings of one of the orthodox schools of law (madhhab), or put differently, how important they consider ijtihad (independent reasoning) to be in legal matters. The Wahhabis, for instance, tend to be followers of the Hanbali school, whereas other Salafis completely reject taqlid (“imitation”) of any madhhab, preferring instead to interface directly with the sources of revelation (al-‘amal bi-l-dalil) every time they want to obtain an Islamic judgment or opinion. As such, a principal definitional distinction between the traditional Wahhabis and the ijtihad-minded Salafis has to do with the former group's adherence to the views of the Hanbali school of law, and the extent to which ijtihad is not stressed in the formulation of legal opinions. Muhammad Nasir alDin al-Albani (d. 1999), a major authority in the modern Salafiyya movement, criticises Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), the founder of the Wahhabi movement, on this very point, even though he praises him for spreading the true version of tawhid and of ridding the people of Najd and the Hijaz of the reprehensible innovations (bid‘a) they had (p.43) adopted. Al-Albani is correct because in Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's main works, Kitab al-tawhid and Kashf al-shubuhat, he makes no mention of the importance of ijtihad. Instead, the content of these works is theological and constitutes a thorough critique of those who deviate from the Salafi understanding of tawhid as well as laying the ground upon which these deviators can be excommunicated. Furthermore, in the Page 7 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 famous treatise entitled Fasl al-khitab, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's brother and opponent, Sulayman ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, offers a detailed critique of Wahhabi theological teachings and criticises Muhammad for not understanding the principles of ijtihad.24 The confusion over the importance of independent reasoning in law outside the madhahib goes back at least to Ibn Taymiyya's time. Though Ibn Taymiyya was a mujtahid, his principal concern was theology. In his biography of Ibn Taymiyya, al-Dhahabi writes the following: He was well-informed of the legal views of the [Prophet's] companions and their followers, and he rarely engaged an issue without mentioning the four schools. He did, however, contradict the four schools in well-known matters and about which he has written and has argued from the Qur’an and the Sunna… For several years now, he does not issue fatwas in accordance with the opinions of a specific school, rather he bases these on the proof that he has ascertained [himself ]. He has made victorious the pure Sunna and the Salafiyya way.25 Nowhere in Ibn Taymiyya's writings could I find him arguing that an ordinary Muslim could not practice taqlid of the four established schools or that taqlid was improper or unacceptable for the common man. The case was different for an absolute mujtahid such as himself; such a person was expected to follow his own independent judgment and not practice “imitation”—indeed ijtihad in this case was considered an obligation. In contrast with Ibn Taymiyya's position, his student and devoted follower, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), not only stressed the importance of ijtihad for a qualified scholar, (p.44) but also argued that ordinary Muslims should be liberated from the taqlid of the four schools of law.26 It appears that it is from Ibn al-Qayyim's teachings that Salafis adopted the anti-schools’ position, what is referred to in Arabic as la-madhhabiyya. This position was taken up most forcefully, and eloquently, by an eighteenth-century member of the Salafi movement, the Yemeni scholar Muhammad al-Shawkani (d. 1834).27 Shawkani's basic position is that any Muslim has ready access to scholars of Islamic law and as such should inquire about the proof (dalil) for an opinion he or she has obtained from the scholar before accepting that opinion. By having the proof for the ruling, the lay Muslim is not engaging in taqlid, but rather a practice Salafis label ittiba‘ (“following”). And as such everyone is freed from the yoke of taqlid and is being faithful to the true teachings of the first generations of Islam.28 The opponents of the Salafis ridicule this argument by insisting that an unschooled Muslim is on account of his ignorance incapable of understanding the proof, and therefore ask rhetorically what use is it to him if he obtains it by asking the scholar. They also add that the system that the Salafis are proposing is highly idealised in that it pre-supposes the existence of mujtahids around every corner, an impossible scenario given the difficulty in attaining this exalted rank of scholarship. Finally, a system that is anchored in an Page 8 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 endless number of living mujtahids assumes that the great learning embodied in the established schools of law, which is after all the legacy of the eponymous founders of the schools, is worthless, or even worse a source of misguidance.29 (p.45) The Salafis assert apodictically that it is not an insuperable matter to produce a sufficient number of mujtahids to accommodate the needs of all Muslims. And this claim again coincides well with their hyper-textual approach in which citing a relevant proof-text often constitutes sufficient argument for the validity for an opinion. As to the worth of the schools of law, the Salafis state that the opinions of the madhahib have become hallowed by being accepted uncritically and without reference to the proof-texts from revelation. Because of this the madhahib have in fact become a barrier between the believer and God's revelation, and as such constitute a reprehensible innovation. Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a faithful adherent of Shawkani's views on this matter, makes the interesting point that before purchasing an item in the market any consumer would educate himself about the product by among other things shopping around for the best price and asking questions about quality. He then asks rhetorically if religious concerns are any less important than a consumer product such that people cannot be troubled to inquire about the soundest ruling that can be obtained. In al-Albani's answer lie several important kernels that explain Salafism's appeal to modern believers: religious knowledge can be acquired easily; to become a scholar is not an impossible feat; and Muslims are endowed with agency, and indeed are duty bound, to acquire this knowledge for themselves through a personal effort.30 Acquisition of religious knowledge is a personally empowering and salvific process for every legally competent Muslim.

Enlightened Salafism: Where Many Have Got It Wrong This legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, and his use of the term Salafi, should not be conflated or confused with the Salafi ideas associated with the late nineteenthcentury reformist scholars Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) and the early views of ‘Abduh's disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935). This group's Salafism, which in some writings is referred to as al-Salafiyya al-tanwiriyya (Enlightened Salafism), did not partake of the antirationalist and literalist theological teachings of Ibn Taymiyya on the nature of God or His oneness (tawhid).31 By contrast, however, the Afghani and (p.46) ‘Abduh school was in matters of legal interpretation similar to Ibn al-Qayyim's position on the importance of independent derivation of legal rulings (ijtihad) and the return to the textual sources of revelation. The Enlightened Salafis were not literalists, however, and they did not argue that the hadiths were unconditionally authoritative. So in this respect they were also unlike the traditional Salafis on questions of legal theory and interpretive methodology. Their project was more about finding the resources, in terms of philosophical values, for generating a renaissance of Muslim society that would lift it out of the lethargy they felt it had fallen into. The Enlightened Salafis were interested in confronting the West, but also in learning from it and adopting Page 9 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 some of its traits and skills, namely in the sciences. The reform of Muslim society was not to be pursued by condemning other Muslims for their theological heresies, although the condemnation of reprehensible innovations, especially those involving superstitions, was a particular concern to these reformers. Put differently, the Enlightened Salafis were not obsessed with delineating the boundary that separated the true Muslims from the false ones; rather their vision was more inclusive, even ecumenical, and was concerned with uplifting Islamic civilisation and all its members. After the death of Muhammad ‘Abduh, his disciple Rashid Rida drew closer to the traditional Salafi teachings as described in the first two sections above. He became seriously involved in the editing and publication of the works of Ibn Taymiyya and like-minded scholars. His writings, whether in his famous journal al-Manar or elsewhere, also expressed traditional Salafi theological and legal positions, without ever fully adopting these unconditionally. Rida appears to have wavered or hedged about his full affiliation to the Salafism of Ibn Taymiyya's school, though he certainly veered in this direction in the last decade or so of his life. Some contemporary Salafis claim that this move towards a more traditional Salafism was due to the influence of such men as Shaykh Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi, the founder of the Jama‘at Ansar al- Sunna al-Muhammadiyya in Egypt, who drew Rida closer to the scholars of Saudi Arabia and away from the rationalism of ‘Abduh.32 Some Saudi scholars in conversation with me have claimed that it was not al-Fiqqi but Muhammad Husayn Nasif (d. 1971), the famous Salafi, Hijazi merchant and ally of King (p.47) on the nature of Salafi thought ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, who influenced Rida's views.33 Surprisingly, the etiology of Rida's Salafism has yet to be uncovered and is likely to remain contested for some time to come. What is notable, however, is that contemporary Salafis have engaged with this question with varying degrees of success, and have tried to rehabilitate Rida, claiming him to be a true Salafi in the Taymiyyan and Wahhabi traditions.34

The Question of manhaj, Or the Way to Be a Salafi in the World The last element that plays an important role in understanding Salafism is the concept of manhaj, by which Salafis mean the path or method they live and implement their beliefs and “call” (da‘wa). It is mainly in relation to this concept that questions about Salafis and politics arise. The use of the term manhaj in this way is a modern development and is most likely associated with the teachings of Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who developed it on the basis of the Qur’anic verse in the chapter al-Ma’ida 5:48: “To each of you we prescribed a law and a way.” AlAlbani's view on the correct manhaj for Muslims to adopt was to shun all affiliation and participation with any formal group, be it a political party (hizb) or civic association (jam‘iyya) and therefore to eschew, on principle, all organised forms of political life. The main reason for this, according to al-Albani, is that such groupings lead to division arising among Muslims (furqa), which is condemned because it breaks the unity of the community (shaqq saff al-umma), Page 10 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 not to mention that such forms of political and civic engagement are in and of themselves deemed to be reprehensible innovations (bida‘). This view, however, has not been universally accepted by Salafis. Some of these have argued that alAlbani's teachings on this matter are inconsistent with the values and norms of the Salafi way, which oblige Muslims to resist all forms of associationism that are prevalent in a given age. In recent times, the greatest form of associationism pertains to the fact that governance and rule are not based on God's laws (shirk al-hakimiyya).35 As such, engaging (p.48) in political reform is an essential requirement, to make sure that God's rule prevails. Clearly, profound differences exist in what the manhaj entails for Salafis. In terms of political engagement Salafi groups broadly fall into three distinct categories. The first, and most notorious, are the Salafi Jihadis who call for violent action against the existing political order and for the establishment of a unitary state in the form of the caliphate. Al-Qaeda is today the quintessential example of such a group and you can find in the appendix to this article a translation of this movement's “creed and path”, which outlines its theological and political commitments. You will note from this that takfir plays an important role in al-Qaeda's ideology and that many of the theological points outlined above are central to its self-definition. Al-Qaeda, like other Islamist movements in the world, has been heavily influenced by the thought of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), one of the Muslim Brotherhood's principal ideologues, who elaborated on the twin concepts of hakimiyya (God's sovereignty) and jahiliyya (idolatrous condition) to condemn the existing regimes in the Arab world and to sanction violent rebellion against them. Point five (and nineteen) of the creed illustrates this influence rather well: We believe that all rule and legislation belong to God alone, and that His rule constitutes absolute justice and all that opposes it constitutes oppression that must be rejected. [We also believe] that one of the foundations of faith and conditions for its validity is to refer matters to God's rule and legislation, and that all who refer matters to other than God's rule and legislation, and who do not rule on the basis of God's revelation, have adhered to an arbitrary legislation, which God has not permitted. And because of this, such a person(s) is an infidel who has abandoned the Muslim community and has followed the rule of the age of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya). Unlike the Jihadis, the second group of Salafis advocates non-violent political activism in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. These are often referred to as activists (haraki s), and they have adopted some of the teachings as well as the political consciousness of the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking to effect political reform and in aspiring to power. Their presence is felt in Saudi Arabia, where they are labelled Sahwis (“The Awakening Ones”) and Sururis, but also in Yemen and in Kuwait among other places. In Kuwait, their leading ideologue is ‘Abd alPage 11 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, an Egyptian who graduated from the Islamic University in Medina and who is identified with the work of the Association for Reviving the Islamic Heritage (Jam ‘iyyat Ihya’al-Turath al- Islami). ‘Abd al-Khaliq's version of the manhaj is often referred to as “organised Salafism” (al-Salafiyya altanzimiyya) because he advocates that Salafis organise for purposes of attaining political power and influence. (p.49) The third group of Salafis is identified with Nasir al-Din al-Albani's teachings and also with the officially recognised scholars in Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Jamis and Madkhalis, who are associated with the scholars Muhammad Aman al-Jami and Rabi‘ al-Madkhali, respectively. It adopts a quietist posture and a more traditional outlook, arguing that all forms of overt political organisation and action, let alone violence, are forbidden because this can lead to civil strife (fitna) between Muslims, and moreover obedience to Muslim rulers —even unjust ones—is religiously mandated. This group or tendency is sometimes referred to as “Scholastic Salafism” (al-Salafiyya al- ‘ilmiyya), and is derided by its detractors for being obsessed with questions of ritual purity, such as menstruation, while missing the more important matter that Muslims and Islam are being trampled and weakened by the religion's enemies.36 Members of this quietist group focus on educating individuals about the teachings of Salafism and correcting those who veer away from them. Little or no thought is given to immediate issues of political concern, especially international ones. The view that is often expressed by the quietists is that Islam can only re-emerge as a dominant force on the world stage after a painstaking and long process of “purification and education” (tasfiya wa-ltarbiya) is undertaken, whereby Muslims are brought back to the true teachings of Islam as embodied by Salafism. Often the literature on the quietists incorrectly describes them as pacifists because they generally adopt an apolitical posture, one that is associated with total obedience to the regimes in power such as the ones in Riyadh, Sanaa or Amman. They are not pacifists, however, but rather obedienceminded people who would not hesitate to engage in armed warfare if given the order to do so by the ruler (wali al-amr). They have in fact done so on several occasions, perhaps the most notable being when they fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the socialists of south Yemen during the 1994 civil war, and at present they are engaged again in warfare against the Zaydis in the region of Sa‘da in north Yemen. Salafis are seriously divided on questions of political engagement even though they all agree on credal principles and often on questions of legal interpretation. They all believe that for God's sake they must show loyalty and provide succour to fellow Muslims and evince hatred and enmity towards non-Muslims—this doctrine is referred to as al-wala’ wa-l-bara’. They are divided, however, as to whether this doctrine can form the basis for violent (p.50) engagement with non-Muslims, as al-Qaeda's ideologues have argued. Furthermore, depending on context and circumstance, Salafis have been willing to engage in the practice of Page 12 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 takfir of fellow Muslims, but whether they can use it against Muslim rulers or not has been a source of great strife among members of the movement. The salient point about takfir is that it legitimises the use of violence against the person or entity that is deemed to be non-Muslim, and one consequence of this is that armed rebellion—often termed jihad — against a nominally Muslim-led state (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt) is considered not only legitimate, but a religious duty incumbent upon the individual believer. A number of activist Salafi as well as Jihadi-Salafi groups—the Sahwis and Sururis mentioned above as well as al-Qaeda—have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's organisational teachings and political concepts, especially those of Sayyid Qutb. Here the two most important ideas are Qutb's hakimiyya (God's sovereignty, which he adopted from the writings of the Indo-Pakistani intellectual Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979)) and jahiliyya (idolatrous condition). These Salafis, for instance, have added a new credal principle to their theology, that of tawhid al-hakimiyya (the oneness of God's sovereignty, which is often subsumed under tawhid al-uluhiyya). These activist Salafis use these principles to excoriate modern governments and the existing socio-political order, whether locally, regionally or internationally. Any government that does not make God's rulings supreme and bases its rule on idolatrous foundations (e.g., nationalism) is deemed to be un-Islamic and a legitimate target of attack. The conceptual framework, vocabulary and political consciousness of such groups are drawn from the Muslim Brotherhood, and these enable them to analyse the predicaments of the Muslims world and to offer solutions. Under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, this path now includes forms of organised activism such as extra-curricular activities for school and university students as well as the establishment of formal ranks and hierarchies of authority within the group, including sometimes the formation of a vanguard (tali‘a) to lead the effort. Because of this, these Salafi groups subscribe to a hybrid ideology–with varying emphases depending on the particular group–that combines elements of the traditional Salafism of Ibn Taymiyya with those from the Muslim Brotherhood's teachings.

Conclusion Salafism, I have argued, can be understood by looking at three constitutive elements of the movement: theology, which is encapsulated by the concept of (p. 51) on tawhid; law, which is centred on the question of ijtihad and whether one should adhere to the teachings of a particular school of law; and politics, which is determined by the particular manhaj or way Salafis choose to engage in the world. On matters of theology the movement's members appear to be in unanimous agreement on the credal tenets that define Salafism. On questions of legal theory and practice, the consensus frays somewhat, though most Salafis are of the view that ijtihad is a requirement, and that taqlid should be avoided, even by the unschooled Muslim. The divisions within the movement are most prominent, as is to be expected perhaps, on how to make Salafi teachings Page 13 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 pertinent to political life and questions of power. This last issue is no doubt important, but it does not lie at the core of what makes a Salafi a Salafi, and to focus on it unduly—as many have done—obscures so much of what makes Salafism appealing, even compelling, to many a believer. translated by Bernard Haykel In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Our Creed and Our Path: 1. We believe that God is One, that He has no associate and that He is the only one deified and worshipped and no other than Him can be rightly worshipped. 2. We believe that God—may He be exalted—is the active creator, possessor, and organiser of all creation and command. 3. We believe that God—may He be exalted—possesses lofty names and attributes, which we affirm as they have been mentioned in the Qur’an and the authentic Sunna. We do this without resorting to anthropomorphism, nor asking why, nor comparing Him with something else, nor interpreting or denying the names and attributes. (p.52) 4. We believe that only God is the object of obedience and love, and that all obedience and love to other than Him is only for Him and through Him. 5. We believe that all rule and legislation belong to God alone, and that His rule constitutes absolute justice and all that opposes it constitutes oppression that must be rejected. [We also believe] that one of the foundations of faith and conditions for its validity is to refer matters to God's rule and legislation, and that all who refer matters to other than God's rule and legislation, and who do not rule on the basis of God's revelation, have adhered to an arbitrary legislation, which God has not permitted. And because of this, such a person(s) is an infidel who has abandoned the Muslim community and has followed the rule of the age of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya). 6. We believe that Muhammad—God's peace and blessing be upon him—is God's messenger to all creation, men and jinn. It is obligatory to follow and obey him in all that he has commanded and to attest to his truthfulness and to the validity of all that he has reported. [We believe] this to be a basis for the soundness of a man's faith. Obedience to him involves referring to his judgment and to his tradition (Sunna). He who rejects the Prophet's judgment rejects God's judgment, and he who rejects God's judgment is an infidel. 7. We believe that faith involves statements and action: the statements of the heart [i.e., unexpressed belief or intention] and the tongue [i.e., word of mouth] and the actions of the heart and limbs, and that these four are the pillars of faith without which a person's faith is contradicted and vanishes. Page 14 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 8. We believe that abandoning the category of the actions of the limbs [in matters of faith] constitutes unbelief and is the gravest way of falling outside the Muslim community. 9. We believe that excommunication (takfir) is a legal act that is based on the Qur’an and the Sunna of his Messenger—God's peace and blessings be upon him—as well as on the consensus of the Muslim community. 10. We believe that no Muslim is to be excommunicated for a sin that falls short of associationism (shirk) as long as he does not consider this sin to be licit. (p.53) 11. We believe that anyone who performs a statement or an act of unbelief is an unbeliever because of this [statement or act] even if he did not intend unbelief by this. 12. We believe that unbelief can be produced in the heart, the tongue and in action. 13. We believe that unbelief, whether of acts or faith, consists of two categories, the greater and the smaller. 14. We believe that the most common unbelief among people is obstinate refusal and the turning away from [Truth]. This is the unbelief that the Messenger of God fought against among the people. 15. We recognise to be a Muslim he who manifests to us his Islam and we accord him the treatment of Muslims; and we declare to be an infidel, both in his external manifestations and in his most interior being, the one who shows us unbelief without a legitimate and widely recognised legal impediment, and we accord him the treatment of the infidels. 16. We believe that the one who abandons prayer is an unbeliever whose act of unbelief is the gravest way of falling outside the Muslim community. 17. We believe that he who accomplishes an aspect of worship, such as an act of obedience, love, fear, beseeching, seeking aid, invocation, asking for succour, involving other than God, such a person is incontestably an infidel whose act of unbelief is the gravest way of falling outside the Muslim community. 18. We believe that he who supports the associationists (mushrikun) against the Muslims, in whatever form this support takes, such a person is incontestably guilty of the gravest form of unbelief. 19. We believe that the ruler who does not rule in accordance with God's revelation, as well as his supporters, who substitute the shari‘a [with some other law], are infidel apostates. Armed and violent rebellion against them is an individual duty on every Muslim. 20. We believe that secularism (‘ilmaniyya)—in all its forms, appellations and political parties—constitutes flagrant unbelief leading one to fall outside the community of believers. He who believes in secularism, calls to it, supports it or rules by it is an infidel associationist regardless of whether he claims adhesion to Islam or pretends to be a Muslim. Page 15 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 21. We believe that democracy is the tribulation of this age. It consecrates the divinity of man and his sovereignty as well as confers upon man the quality of ruler and legislator, and neglects God completely. Democracy is an unbelief, which constitutes the gravest way of falling outside the Muslim community. He who believes in the concept of democracy, or who calls to it or supports it or rules by it, is an apostate regardless of his affiliation to Islam or his claim to being a Muslim. (p.54) 22. We believe that any faction that agrees upon a principle other than Islam constitutes a faction of apostasy and unbelief, and this includes the pannationalist, nationalist, communist, Baathist and socialist parties. 23. We believe that the rejectionist Shi‘a (al-rawafid al-shi‘a) are a group of unbelievers and apostates, and that they consist of the most evil beings under the celestial dome. 24. We believe that a mental disability that cannot be cured is a legally recognised excuse, which halts absolute divine retribution against the person concerned. 25. We believe that the excommunication of a specific person depends upon the fulfillment of the conditions of excommunication with respect to him and the suspension of the obstacles to its application against him. 26. We believe that Muslim lands that are ruled by the laws of infidelity have a composite status, combining on the one hand the attributes of the Abode of Infidelity with respect to the applied laws, and on the other the attributes of the Abode of Islam with regard to their populations. Each person in these lands is valued according to his personal merit: the Muslim is considered to be a Muslim and the infidel an infidel. The presupposed status of these populations is Islam regardless of whether their circumstances are known or unknown. 27. We believe that this world is an abode of laws whose abandonment is not permissible if one is able to perform these. To neglect these [deliberately] constitutes associationism, to abandon them is a grave sin and to disrespect them constitutes atheism (zandaqa). 28. We believe that the Islamic groups who participate in elections and legislative assemblies are groups of reprehensible innovators (ahl bid‘a). We are innocent of their sinful acts before God. 29. We believe that the statement “Establish the Islamic state in your hearts and it will be established on your land” is understood by its claimants in a deterministic (jabri) and Murji’i fashion. 30. We are innocent before God of the errors of the wicked Jahmis and Murji’is who form the coterie around the apostate idols [the rulers of the Muslim countries] and are the guard dogs that provide them with safety and security. We warn against their misguided, corrupting and misleading ways.

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 31. We are innocent before God of the errors of the Kharijis and their extremism and of the abusers of the practice of excommunication who follow in their footsteps in this era. We warn against them, of frequenting them as well as of their corruption and misleading ways. (p.55) 32. We believe that the divine promises that are in the Qur’an and the Sunna of God's Messenger are positive commands for Muslims to obtain the means to these as well as to endeavour in their attainment. 33. We believe that the victorious faction is a faction of knowledge and jihad. 34. We believe that jihad will last until judgment day, between the just and the unjust, in every time and place, with the presence of a supreme leader or without one. This jihad is accomplished by a single individual or by more, and will not be stopped by the tyranny of the oppressors or the defeatist talk of the demoralisers. 35. We believe that jihad in the path of God is the sound legal avenue that empowers the Muslim community to resume an Islamic way of life and to establish a rightly-guided caliphate on the prophetic model. 36. We believe in the truth of the Mysteries that were mentioned by the Messenger of God such as heaven, hellfire, the divine chair and throne, the Straight Path, and the Scale. 37. In matters of fate, we believe in the middle way between the Jabris and the Qadaris. Our actions and our will are created, and man is an agent endowed with choice, possessing desire and will, and he is truly the agent of his actions. 38. We believe in all of God's prophets and His messengers and do not distinguish between any of His messengers. [We believe] in all His books, which were revealed to His messengers. [We believe] in His angels. [We believe] that none of them are insubordinate to God in that which He commands, and that they perform all that they have been commanded. 39. We seek God's blessing for all the companions of the Prophet (may God's prayers and blessings be upon him) whether they be the supporters of Medina (al-Ansar) or the immigrants from Mecca (al-Muhajirun) as well as for those who became Muslim after the Conquest. We express our communion with them and with those who expressed the same to them and showed them love. We express our enmity to those who showed them enmity and hatred. We curse and excommunicate those who excommunicated them. They all have probity (‘adala) and they are the best of creation after the prophets and the messengers. 40. We believe that the best people in terms of good deeds after the century of the Prophet and his companions in are the Followers (altabi‘in) of the second and third centuries. After this lying will spread and loyalty will weaken. (p.56) 41. We respect and honour our scholars and we acknowledge their merit and their due. We do not believe in their infallibility, nor do we Page 17 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 fanatically cling to them or to their opinions when in contradiction with the Truth, nor do we follow them in their errors since it is worthier to follow the Truth. And the Truth is what we value above all else. Al-Faruq Bibliography Bibliography references: Ahmad, Muhammad Sayyid, and al-‘Alawi, ‘Abduh Ahmad, Muhammad Nasif hayatuhu wa atharuhu, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1415/1994. Amin, Kamaruddin, ‘Nasiruddin al-Albani on Muslim's Sahih: a Critical Study of his Method’, Islamic Law and Society, vol. 11, no. 2 (2004), pp. 149–76. al-‘As‘as, Ibrahim, al-Salaf wa-l-salafiyyun: Ru’ya min al-dakhil, Amman, n.p., 1994. Berman, Paul, Terror and Liberalism, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. Blanchard, Christopher M., ‘The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya’, Congressional Research Service, RS21695, January 25, 2006. al-Buti, Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan, al-Salafiyya marhala zamaniyya mubaraka la madhhab islami,Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1988. Crawford, Michael, ‘Wahhabi ‘Ulama’ and the Law 1745–1932 AD’, M.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1980. al-Dimashqi, Ibn Nasir al-Din, al-Radd al-wafir, ed. Zuhayr al-Shawish, Beirut, 1393. al-Fawzan, Salih ibn Fawzan, al-Irshad ila sahih al-i‘tiqad wa-l-radd ‘ala ahl alshirk wa-lilhad,Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1990. Gold, Dore, Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2003. Haddad, Gibril Fouad, Albani & his Friends: a Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement, n.p.: Aqsa Publications, 2004. Haykel, Bernard, Revival and Reform in Islam: the Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Holmes Katz, Marion, The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad: Devotional Piety in Sunni Islam, New York: Routledge, 2007.

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqi al-Din, al-Fatawa al-kubra, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Haditha, 1966. al-Kathiri, Muhammad, al-Salafiyya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya, Beirut: alGhadir, 1997. Mutawalli, Tamir, Manhaj al-shaykh Muhammad Rashid Rida fial-‘aqida, Jeddah:Dar Majid ‘Asiri, 2004. Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst & Co, 2002. al-Salman, Muhammad, Rashid Rida wa da‘wat al-shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Kuwait: Maktabat al-Mu‘alla, 1988. (p.57) Schacht, Joseph, ‘ahl al-hadith’, The Encyclopaedia of Islam,2nd edition, Leiden: Brill. al-Qawsi, Mufarrih ibn Sulayman, al-Mawqif al-mu‘asir min al-manhaj al-Salafi fial-bilad al-‘Arabiyya, Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2002. Steinberg, Guido, Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten 1902–1953, Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002. ‘Umar, Ahmad Muhammad Tahir, Jama‘at ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya: nash’atuha, ahdafuha, manhajuha, juhuduha, Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. Notes:

(1) I would like to thank Aron Zysow, Saud al-Sarhan and Eng Seng Ho for their assistance with this article. All mistakes are, of course, my own. (2) For example, Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst & Co, 2002, does not even provide a definition of the term. (3) Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya’, Congressional Research Service, RS21695, January 25, 2006; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. (4) See Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. (5) This point about the importance of the Arabic language for Salafis cannot be stressed enough. I have encountered Salafis in India, and elsewhere outside the Arab world, for whom the ability to speak fluently in classical Arabic is a major marker of being a true Salafi. Following in the footsteps of the “pious ancestors” Page 19 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 is therefore not only about adhering to their religious and legal teachings, but also about being like them in a live quotidian fashion. The Salafi imagination reconstructs the early Muslims’ sartorial, linguistic, cultural and ethical habits and insists on being exactly like them. Some have even argued that ideally all Muslims should speak Arabic as a mother tongue. This is not an easy feat to accomplish and its realisation is a mark of distinction and high status among the members of the movement. (6) On the topic of voluntarism, Ash‘aris argue that there is no justice or wisdom other than what God determines these to be—for them there is no measure for ethics other than revelation. Salafis, by contrast, argue that there is a standard for right and wrong independent of revelation, and that all of God's actions manifest perfect justice, even though we may not know how they are just. In so far as Salafis hold to this view, they are more similar to the Mu‘tazila, a group they otherwise vilify, than they are to the Ash‘aris. (7) The classic of this genre is Dore Gold Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia supports the new global terrorism, Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2003. (8) One might argue, for example, that the widespread use and adoption of Ibn al-Kathir's commentary on the Qur’an, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘azim, has to do with Saudi Arabia's promotion of this text at subsidised prices. Certainly, this is also true for the works of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim and, more recently, Muhammad al-Shawkani. (9) Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), the eponym of the Hanbali school of law and whose name is also associated with a theological school, is alleged to have said: “It has been transmitted from more than one of our ancestors (Salafi na) that they said ‘the Quran is the speech of God and is uncreated’, and this is what I endorse. I do not engage in speculative theology and I hold that there is nothing to be said other than what is in God's Book (Qur’an), the traditions of His messenger or those of his companions and their followers—may God have mercy on them. It is not praiseworthy to engage in theological discussion in matters not contained therein.” For the Ahl al-Hadith see The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2ndedition, s.v. “ahl al-hadith” (J. Schacht). (10) ‘Abd al-Karim al-Sam‘ani (d. 1166) in his Kitab al-ansab writes: “al-Salafi…is an attribution to the ancestors (al-salaf) and the adoption of their creed” (vol. 4, p. 104). (11) Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa al-kubra, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Haditha, 1966, vol. 5, p. 152. (12) The term that Salafis use for interpreting such problematic texts of the Quran is imrar or tamrir, literally to allow them to pass by without engaging in interpretation of any kind, such as metaphor or allegory for example. Page 20 of 24

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 (13) The term generation (jil) must be understood as being longer than a mere twenty years, but something approximating eighty years. The three-generation model, for Hanbalis at least, consists of a period of around two hundred and fifty years, and as such the overlapping periods between generations are not significant. (14) By Oneness of Lordship, Salafis intend that God has certain powers as the Lord of Creation and to attribute any of these to other than Him constitutes unbelief. The Oneness of Godship implies that all forms of worship must be directed exclusively towards God and no one else, and to worship other than God constitutes unbelief. Finally, the Oneness of the Names and Attributes involves believing in the depiction of God as it is presented in the texts of revelation without inquiring about modality or metaphorical interpretation. The terms tawhid al-rububiyya and tawhid al-uluhiyya appear to have been coined in Ibn Taymiyya's time. Tawhid al-uluhiyya has been a particularly useful concept for the enforcement of Salafi views because it is most connected to the acts of worship and therefore matters that pertain to actual practice. (15) The Salafi belief that the proof-texts of revelation are obvious to find and easy to understand is greatly ridiculed by their opponents. One of these, the Saudi scholar Hasan al- Maliki, related to me a story of a Salafi who was so enamoured of computer technology and its possibilities for easy searches of the Islamic textual sources that he often asked his nine year old son to search these databases for the “proof ” (dalil) of a given issue that he was investigating. While this account is most likely an exaggeration, it nonetheless underscores the fact that the computer, and the Islamic software programmes that have been developed for it, appear to have strongly favoured the Salafi method of textual interpretation and citation. The canon is literally at one's fingertips, and therefore what need is there to engage in the long and arduous task of studying for years with various teachers, often in distant locations? (16) See for instance Mufarrih ibn Sulayman al-Qawsi, al-Mawqif al-mu‘asir min al-manhaj al-Salafi fial-bilad al-‘Arabiyya, Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2002; and Salih ibn Fawzan al- Fawzan, al-Irshad ila sahih al-i‘tiqad wa-l-radd ‘ala ahl al-shirk wa-l-ilhad, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1990. (17) Even the canonical Sunni collections of hadiths have been scrutinised by Salafis, who have argued that these need to be sanitised of weak and unsound traditions. See Kamaruddin Amin, ‘Nasiruddin al-Albani on Muslim's Sahih: a Critical Study of his Method’, in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 11, no. 2 (2004), pp. 149–76. (18) In contrast with the Salafi position, the dominant view among Sunnis has been that only those who knowingly and openly reject the obligatory nature of

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 these religious duties (e.g., prayer) can be excommunicated. Their nonperformance of these, in and of itself, does not constitute grounds for takfir. (19) The writings of the Saudi scholar Safar al-Hawali are a locus classicus of this modern Salafi position. (20) See for instance Gibril Fouad Haddad, Albani & his Friends: a Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement, n.p.: Aqsa Publications, 2004. A number of anti-Salafi authors deserve mentioning and the most prominent are: Muhammad Zahid alKawthari, Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti, Hasan ‘Ali al-Saqqaf. Al-Buti's most noted work against the Salafis is al-Salafiyya marhala zamaniyya mubaraka la madhhab islami, Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1988. (21) The Hashwis are literally those who stuff things (e.g., pillows or margins of texts), and it is a pejorative term that is used against the Ahl al-Hadith and the Salafis by their enemies to imply that they are anthropomorphists and essentially stupid and misguided. The late Sayyid Majd al-Din al-Mu’ayyidi, one of the most prominent Zaydi scholars of his generation, referred to Salafis in this way during an interview I conducted with him in 1994. (22) On the topic of attacks against the mawlid see Marion Holmes Katz, The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad: Devotional Piety in Sunni Islam, New York: Routledge, 2007. (23) Ridwan al-Sayyid, al-Jama‘a wa-l-mujtama‘ wa-l-dawla, Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, pp. 231–68. (24) Later Wahhabi scholars did mention the importance of ijtihad and assert that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was a mujtahid, but this is not an accurate depiction of the teachings of the founder, but rather a retrojection of later concerns on the period of the first Saudi state. See Michael Crawford, ‘Wahhabi ‘Ulama’ and the Law 1745–1932 AD’, M.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1980; Guido Steinberg, Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitischen Gelehrten 1902–1953, Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002, pp. 301–41. (25) Ibn Nasir al-Din al-Dimashqi, al-Radd al-wafir, ed. Zuhayr al-Shawish, Beirut, 1393, p. 34. Also see Caterina Bori, ‘A New Source for the Biography of Ibn Taymiyya’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 67, no. 3 (2004), p. 333. (26) See Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lam al-muwaqqi‘in ‘an rabb al-‘alamin, 7 vols., Dammam: Dar Ibn al-Jawzi, 1423/2002, vol. 2, pp. 470–4 and vol. 3, pp. 5–36. (27) For a more detailed presentation of Shawkani's views see Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: the Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani, Cambridge, 2003. It should be noted that other scholars preceded Shawkani in this view,

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1 most notably the Yemenis Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Wazir (d. 1436), and Muhammad ibn Isma‘il al-Amir (d. 1769), among others. (28) It should be noted that nowhere in this Salafi argument in favour of ijtihad is this concept associated in any way with notions of rationality, progress, or the adaptability of Islam to new circumstances in novel and creative ways. Such associations with ijtihad emerge from modernist and modernising Muslim intellectuals and Western scholars, many of whom have no training in Islamic law, and who have injected unprecedented meaning into this legal principle, something which is not shared by Salafis. (29) Some of the most heated debates about this matter take place between Hanafis and Salafis. A prime example of this can be found in the writings of Muhammad Zahid al- Kawthari, a Hanafiwho vilified the Salafis for their compounded ignorance of many things Islamic. (30) Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Haqiqat al-da‘wa al-salafiyya, http:// salafway.maktoobblog.com (accessed May 9, 2008). (31) Enlightened Salafism is a term used by Muhammad al-Kathiri in his booked titled al- Salafiyya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya, Beirut: al-Ghadir, 1997. The author is a Moroccan scholar who is pro-Shi‘a and a determined opponent of the Ibn Taymiyyainspired Salafis. (32) Ahmad Muhammad Tahir ‘Umar, Jama‘at ansar al-sunna al-muhammadiyya: nash’atuha, ahdafuha, manhajuha, juhuduha, Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004, p. 145. I would like to thank Noah Salomon for directing me to this text. (33) For a panegyric book on Muhammad Nasif, see Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad and ‘Abduh Ahmad al-‘Alawi, Muhammad Nasif hayatuhu wa atharuhu, Beirut: alMaktab al-Islami, 1415/1994. (34) See Muhammad al-Salman, Rashid Rida wa da‘wat al-shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab, Kuwait: Maktabat al-Mu‘alla, 1988, and Tamir Mutawalli, Manhaj al-shaykh Muhammad Rashid Rida fial-‘aqida, Jeddah: Dar Majid ‘Asiri, 2004. Mutawalli's study is the more serious of the two cited here and he admits that Rida was in a number of respects not a true Salafi. (35) For an attack on al-Albani's views see Ibrahim al-‘As‘as, al-Salaf wa-lsalafiyyun: ru’ya min al-dakhil, Amman, n.p., 1994. (36) The opponents of this tendency derisively refer to its scholars as “the scholars of menstruation and puerperium” (‘ulama al-hayd wa-l-nifas). (37) Appeared on Minbar al-Faruq al-Ikhbari (http://members.lycos.co.uk/alfaroq/ html/Goals.htm; accessed 3 December 2003.

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On the Nature of Salafi thought and Action1

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Between Revolution and Apoliticism Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism Stéphane Lacroix

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords This chapter deals with one of the founders of modern Salafism, Nasir al-Din alAlbani (died 1999). It is partly a biography of al-Albani and it traces his life from Albania to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It shows how his doctrine, while quietist, was at the same time radical and revolutionary and influenced both apolitical Salafis, who remained far from politics, as well as radicals, such as Juhayman al-Utaybi, who occupied the Central Mosque in Mecca in 1979. As such, the chapter deals with one of the most central aspects of Salafism. Keywords:   al-Albani, Saudi Arabia, politics, quietist, Juhayman al-Utaybi

When on 1 October 1999 shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din (a.k.a. Nasir al- Din) al-Albani died at the venerable age of 85, virtually everyone in the world of Salafi Islam was in mourning. In the eyes of many, he was the third great contemporary figure of Salafism, after ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, the mufti of Saudi Arabia, deceased a few months earlier, and his second-in-command within the Saudi religious establishment, Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaymin. Salafi newspapers, magazines and websites celebrated the memory of this son of an Albanian watchmaker who had become the “traditionist1 of the era” (muhaddith al- ‘asr),2 recognised by all as the greatest hadith scholar of his generation. By confining al-Albani to the role of a brilliant technician of hadith, the apparent consensus that took shape on this occasion concealed the deeply multiform nature of a controversial figure who, at least as much by the stands he took as Page 1 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism through his religious expertise, contributed greatly to the structuring of Salafism since the 1960s. It is our intention here to restore the complexity of alAlbani's role by expounding on his career, his positions, and those of both his legitimate and illegitimate heirs.

(p.59) Three Distinct Religious Traditions In order to grasp the originality of al-Albani's thought, we first need to present the three religious traditions with which it is to various extents related, although in a complex and conflictual way. Muslim Reformism

The first of these traditions is “Muslim Reformism”. This term we shall take to mean the body of ideas developed from the end of the nineteenth century by a small number of Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals with a view to ending the decadence of the Muslim world through a renewal of Islam. Calling upon the Muslim world to throw off the fetters of servile imitation (taqlid) of precedent through a renewed interpretation (ijtihad), they were also distinguished by their defence of a certain Sunnite orthodoxy following directly from the writings of the medieval jurist and theologian Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263– 1328), characterised by a definite hostility to the practices of popular Islam and of Sufism. In this sense they shared certain ideas with the second religious tradition that here concerns us, i.e. Wahhabism, a doctrine of which, according to Henri Laoust, they professed a “watered-down”3 version. Wahhabism

The Wahhabi religious tradition derives from the intellectual heritage of the preacher Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who was himself a fervent reader of Ibn Taymiyya and “cofounder” with Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud of the first Saudi state in 1744. This tradition subsequently gave birth to the Saudi religious establishment, which considers itself its guardian. The grand principles set forth by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab reflect his concern above all with theological questions and aim to purify the Islamic creed (‘aqida), which for him must be nothing but pure tawhid (divine Oneness). He held that the faith of his contemporaries had so far deviated from the orthodoxy of their pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih)4 that the society in which he was living had fallen into a period of ignorance (jahiliyya) similar to the situation that prevailed before the advent of Islam. For it is not enough to (p.60) proclaim tawhid, affirms Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, in order to be a true Muslim; one must also adhere to it in religious practice. Herein lies all the difference that he established between, on the one hand, tawhid al-rububiyya (the affirmation that God is One) and tawhid al-asma’ wa-l-sifat (the affirmation of the oneness of His names and His attributes) and, on the other hand, tawhid aluluhiyya (the oneness of the object of worship).5 The latter principle was at variance with different widespread religious practices in the Arabian peninsula of his time, such as the Page 2 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism cult of saints (based on tawassul, or intercession) and Shi‘ism, which Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab denounced as forms of polytheist associationism (shirk).6 It was essentially to counter these that Wahhabism was conceived. However, while the theological positions of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab are clear, his legal positions (on fiqh, i.e. law)7 are much less so, first and foremost because they are much less central to his doctrine.8 His basic principle is that the only sources upon which a valid religious judgment can be based are the Qur’an, the Sunna9 and the ijma‘ (consensus) of the pious ancestors. Theoretically, that comes down to a rejection of the taqlid (imitation) of the four canonical legal schools, and to the establishment of ijtihad (interpretation) as the pillar of the law. In practice, nevertheless, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab continued to adhere to the rules of exegesis of Hanbalism, which imply a very literal reading of the sacred texts. This is what he emphasised in his letter to the ‘ulama of Medina10 in which, probably also seeking to prove thereby the orthodoxy of his da‘wa (preaching), he went so far as to declare himself a “non-innovating proponent” (muttabi‘ ghayr mubtadi‘) of the Hanbali school of law. In fact, it has been established that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab never delivered a novel legal opinion, usually restricting himself to a relative ijtihad within the (p.61) compass of the Hanbali school. As is shown by Frank Vogel,11 this paradox between a declared ijtihad ideal and a legal practice grounded largely in the Hanbali school has been a constant of Wahhabism right up to our time. This paradox, as we shall see, will be one of the principal motors driving the conflict opposing the Saudi religious establishment, guardian of the Wahhabi tradition, to Muhammad Nasir al-Din alAlbani. Ahl-e Hadith

The third religious tradition that concerns us here is that of the Ahl-e Hadith (Partisans of Hadith) of the Indian subcontinent. This movement took form in the 1860s around two religious personalities, Nazir Husayn in Delhi, and Siddiq Hasan Khan in Bhopal. The ideas of these two men show strong similarities to the Wahhabi tradition. Like the heirs of Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, they were fiercely opposed to Shi‘ism and Sufism, which they considered dangerous innovations. Also like them, they read the sacred texts very literally, having recourse to qiyas (reasoning by analogy) only in extremely limited circumstances. Finally, they were also fervent readers of the work of Ibn Taymiyya.12 The two groups discovered how close their thinking was when their paths crossed during the pilgrimage to Mecca. Subsequently, some Wahhabi ‘ulama went to Bhopal and Delhi to study with their Indian colleagues.13 But while the tradition of the Ahl-e Hadith has certain important points in common with Wahhabism,14 it also differs radically in its methodology. Indeed, as opposed to the Wahhabis, the primary concern of the Ahl-e Hadith is with law (fiqh) rather than with creed (‘aqida). Their intellectual starting point is a Page 3 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism complete rejection of taqlid (imitation), particularly of the four canonical schools of jurisprudence, and a call to base all religious rulings exclusively on the Qur’an and the Sunna with no intermediary involved. This implies a special interest in the hadith, which, alone, may provide answers to all legal questions for which the schools (especially the Shafi‘i, the Maliki and the Hanafi) relied on the ra’y (the opinion) of their founders and their disciples.15 This had long before been the position of the Ahl al-Hadith ( (p.62) proponents of tradition) in the Middle Ages in the dispute that opposed them to the Ahl al-Ra’y (partisans of opinion), and the Indian movement sought to identify itself with them through their choice of name. One of the consequences of this alienation from the schools is a particular way of reading the sacred texts that entails a physical appearance and an outward way of praying that distinguishes the Ahl-e Hadith from other Muslims. The earliest vector of the impact of the Ahl-e Hadith on the Saudi religious sphere was made up of those Wahhabi ‘ulama who at the end of the nineteenth century studied with the Indian shaykhs. The most emblematic of them is Sa‘d ibn ‘Atiq (1850–1930), sent to India in 1881 by his father, the famous Wahhabi ‘alim, Hamad ibn ‘Atiq, who maintained a correspondence with Siddiq Hasan Khan. Sa‘d, who spent nine years with the Ahl-e Hadith, was afterwards to become a major religious figure of the third Saudi state, appointed by Ibn Sa’ud to be the judge (qadi) of Riyadh and the imam of the city's Grand Mosque,16 an office that gave him great influence over the education of the young generation of Wahhabi ‘ulama. Among his students figured the young ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, who was to be marked very early by the teachings of the Ahl-e Hadith. The effect of this Ahl-e Hadith influence was above all to highlight the abovementioned paradox in the attitude of Wahhabism toward the legal schools. Intruding through the breach opened by the theoretical teaching of the rejection of taqlid, their doctrine would lead to the emergence of Wahhabi ‘ulama openly at odds with Hanbali fiqh, among whom Ibn Baz figured prominently. It was they who opened the way for Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who would become active in the kingdom from the 1960s on.

The Birth of Salafism “Salafism” is here used to denote all the intellectual hybrids that sprouted from the Wahhabi substrate in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and thereafter. In the climate of the policy of “Islamic solidarity” put into effect by King Faysal to fight against Nasser and his “progressive” allies, the kingdom at that time became a veritable religious melting pot where all those who were being persecuted for their Islamic activism could find refuge. Among those who did were, first of all, a large number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The hybrid that took shape when the political and cultural aspects of their (p.63) ideology encountered the religious concepts of Wahhabism is called al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Awakening), shortened simply to the Sahwa. It is the politicised Page 4 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism form of Salafism represented by the Sahwa, which is strongly anchored in the educational system, that has dominated the politico-religious sphere up to our time. Besides the Brotherhood, however, dozens of independent Islamic personalities, sometimes coming from a “Muslim Reformist” background, found refuge in Saudi Arabia at that time. Some of them, like Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, whose career we are about to trace, were to wield decisive influence over how the Saudi politico-religious sphere would be structured.

Al-Albani In Syria Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani was born in Albania in 1914 of a Hanafi‘alim (religious scholar) father. In 1923 just after a secular takeover of the country on the heels of independence from the Ottoman Empire, his father decided to leave the country and settle with his family in Damascus in Syria. The young Nasir alDin first learned Arabic and then the profession of watchmaker, while his father taught him the rudiments of religion in the purest tradition of Hanafifiqh. His education might have stopped there had he not from adolescence been immoderately fond of reading. Thus, in his spare time, he spent many hours in the Maktaba Zahiriyya,17 the first public library in Syria, founded in the early 1880s by one of the precursors of Muslim Reformism in the region, Tahir alJaza’iri.18 In this way he became a self-taught expert on Islam, learning from the books rather than from the ‘ulama. One of his biographers even states that alAlbani was distinguished in religious circles by how few ijazat (certificates19 ) he possessed.20 As a result of his reading of the journal al-Manar, the major vehicle for the spread of Muslim Reformist ideas, (p.64) and of his attendance21 at the majlis of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, a student of Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, the father of Muslim Reformism in Syria, al-Albani, at the age of twenty, adhered to the Reformist tradition that was so fashionable among the “peripheral ‘ulama ” of Damascus.22 From this school he inherited his hostility to Sufism and popular Islam, even though that hostility, which he theorised as early as in his first work,23 entitled A Warning to Those Who Kneel Down not to Mistake Tombs for Mosques (tahdhir al-sajid min ittikhadh al-qubur masajid),24 would in his hands take on more radical forms than in Muslim Reformism. From this source also came his refusal of taqlid (imitation), which he was to emphasise in rejecting the madhahib (the four canonical legal schools) themselves, and its counterpart of calling for a renewal of ijtihad. To enable this renewal, the Muslim Reformists— headed by Rashid Rida, the chief editor of al-Manar —had underlined the importance of a critical re-evaluation of the hadith, but without making this a central point of their doctrine.25 They had in fact continued to let reason and independent opinion play a relatively important legal role; thus even their criticism of the hadith was intended to be both a “technical” review of the sanad (the hadith 's chain of transmission) and a more “rational” critique of the matn (the content of the hadith).26 Here al-Albani's approach differs radically from his teachers’; for al-Albani, who claims to follow, like the Indian Ahl-e Hadith, in the steps of the medieval school of the Ahl al-Hadith, the use of reason must at all Page 5 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism costs be banned from the legal process. To that end the hadith,27 which provides answers to problems with no solution in the Qur’an without calling on human reason, must be placed at the heart of the process. Here al-Albani is once again greatly in tune with the Indian Ahl-e Hadith. He therefore sets the “science of hadith ” (‘ilm al-hadith) at the apex of the religious disciplines, eclipsing fiqh, (p. 65) which in his eyes is no longer anything more than a mere appendix to it (which he calls fiqh al-hadith28 ). However, the science of hadith must itself be sheltered from reason; thus the critique of the matn must be strictly formal, i.e. linguistic or grammatical. Only the sanad may be truly called into question, and it is therefore by studying the sanad that the authenticity of a hadith can be determined. For al-Albani the most important discipline within the science of hadith becomes the “science of men” (‘ilm al-rijal), which essentially appraises the morality, and thereby the reliability of the transmitters; this discipline is also known as the “science of critical study and just appraisal” (‘ilm al-jarh wa-l-ta‘dil). Another serious divergence from his reformist teachers is al-Albani's extension of the range of criticism to the whole corpus, which Rida, for example had been reluctant to do, considering a hadith mutawatir (a hadith transmitted through multiple chains), handed down from generation to generation, to be beyond criticism.29 Thus did al-Albani not hesitate to characterise as weak (da‘if)30 certain hadith taken from the two canonical collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim.

Al-Albani and Saudi Arabia It was in the early 1950s that al-Albani became famous in Syria for his knowledge of hadith, which he taught weekly from 1954 in an informal circle (majlis).31 In 1960 his popularity began to worry the government, who put him under surveillance even though he steered clear of taking any political stand.32 He was therefore happy to accept the teaching post that the recently founded University of Medina offered him. His name was proposed by shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, the vice-president of the university, who had close personal and intellectual ties to al-Albani. As emphasised above, Ibn Baz was strongly influenced in his student days by the teaching of Sa‘d ibn ‘Atiq, himself converted to the ideas of the Ahl-e Hadith during his long stay in India, and he strongly shared al-Albani's interest in a renewal of hadith.33 The battle (p.66) was, nevertheless, far from being won; from the moment of his arrival, the presence of al-Albani stirred up sharp controversy within the Wahhabi community, which was still under the sway of unacknowledged partisans of the Hanbali madhhab (school of law), led by the mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al alShaykh (1893–1969). For Al al-Shaykh, al-Albani's call for an ijtihad outside the framework of the established schools of law compromised the authority of the Wahhabi ‘ulama. But at the same time Wahhabism's original paradox, opposing a stated ideal of ijtihad to a legal practice stemming largely from the Hanbali school, made these ‘ulama particularly ill-armed to defend themselves on the intellectual level, and all the more so as al-Albani's creed (‘aqida) was Page 6 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism irreproachably Wahhabi. On several occasions fatwas handed down by al-Albani outraged the religious institution. The mufti, who refused to lower himself to reply to a person he still considered a young, second-tier ‘alim, delegated the task of refuting the Syrian shaykh to one of his chief assistants, Isma‘il alAnsari.34 But al-Albani was growing ever more popular, and to get rid of him they would have to wait until he committed a serious mistake. The opportunity arose when, after reassessing the authenticity of certain hadith accepted by the Hanbali school, al-Albani pleaded in a work entitled The Muslim Woman's Veil (Hijab al-mar’a al-muslima) for women to be allowed not to cover their faces. Such a stand appeared unacceptable to all Saudi religious groups of whatever persuasion. Thus, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim had no trouble justifying the refusal to renew al-Albani's contract at the university, forcing him to leave the kingdom in 1963.35 In May 1967, al-Albani was arrested in Syria and spent a month in prison before being freed with all other political prisoners in June.36 This event probably motivated the offer he received the following year—after pressure on the Saudi authorities from his protector ibn Baz—to head the department of higher studies in the shari’a (p.67) faculty in Mecca.37 But the manoeuvre failed “due to the opposition of the authorities,”38 which demonstrates how keen the controversy surrounding al- Albani still remained. He was to be jailed again a few years later in Syria for eight months,39 before leaving the country for Jordan in 1979.40 As for Saudi Arabia, it finally granted him symbolic rehabilitation in 1975, making him a member of the High Council (al-Majlis al-A‘li) of the Islamic University of Medina.41 But even though al-Albani taught for only a relatively short time in Saudi Arabia—not counting his numerous invitations to conferences and his visits on the occasion of the pilgrimage—his ideas had a very strong impact there.42 Overall, he encouraged a vast revival of interest in studying the hadith and its authenticity, which affected all the religious currents. As a former member of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith explained, “The hadith had become a virtual dictatorship. When in a sermon or a conference an‘alim cited a hadith, he could be interrupted at any moment by one of his students asking him: “Has that hadith been authenticated? Has al-Albani authenticated it? That could hardly fail to reinforce the mistrust felt by the ‘ulama belonging to the religious institution toward al-Albani.”43 It was through this same means that al- Albani, indirectly and perhaps despite his own wishes, exerted influence on the main Saudi Salafi movement, the Sahwa, for whom his calls to revive ijtihad were above all a way to legitimise political stands that diverged from the official line. Al-Albani, nevertheless, would always play a relatively secondary role in the Sahwi corpus, and for good reason: those who made him their absolute reference are the Sahwa 's sworn enemies. (p.68)

From Al-Albani to the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith These self-proclaimed disciples of al-Albani took the name “Ahl al-Hadith”, in reference to the medieval school from which he himself claimed to proceed. To distinguish them from their predecessors in the Middle Ages we shall in this Page 7 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism article call them the “neo-Ahl al-Hadith”. They adopt a stance that is critical both of the traditional Wahhabi religious institution and of the Sahwa, justifying this double opposition through certain of al-Albani's stands. Al-Albani, as we have seen, denounced the Wahhabis’ attachment to the Hanbali school, going so far as to say that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was salafi (that is faithful to the pious ancestors) in creed (‘aqida), but not in law (fiqh). Moreover, in al-Albani's view ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not know the hadith well, as is shown by the fact that one of his epistles contains a notoriously weak hadith.44 Al-Albani thus plays here with the original inconsistency within Wahhabism which we already pointed out, assigning himself not so much the role of Wahhabism's opponent as that of an advocate of a regenerated Wahhabism purified of its elements contrary to the doctrine of the pious ancestors. In taking up these ideas, the neo-Ahl al-Hadith are therefore attacking not the spirit of Wahhabism, which they claim to defend, but rather the legitimacy of the institution that has set itself up as the depository of that spirit. It should be pointed out moreover that this challenge to the legal methodology of Wahhabism in no way involves a broader criticism of its social positions—on the ban on photography, music, or tobacco, for instance— which the neo-Ahl al-Hadith mostly share. Al-Albani's opposition to wearing the niqab (the veil that covers up women's faces) should not give the impression that the neo-Ahl al-Hadith are much more socially liberal than the Wahhabis. However, more than the Wahhabi religious establishment, with whom relations remained fairly cordial thanks to the presence of Ibn Baz, the neo-Ahl al-Hadith's main adversary was the Sahwa, outsiders like them in the Saudi religious field, but enjoying a strong tailwind since the early 1970s. As before, they would justify this opposition by referring to al-Albani and his stands on the Muslim Brotherhood—amalgamated by the neo-Ahl al-Hadith with the Sahwa —and to his position on political activism. It should be recalled here that at a time when all the Islamic currents, even the Wahhabi religious community with Ibn Baz at the forefront,45 paid (p.69) homage to the “martyred” radical Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966 on Nasser's order, al-Albani was one of the first shaykhs to openly risk criticism of him. His main problem with Qutb was with his creed (‘aqida), as set forth in his Qur’anic commentary, In the Shadow of the Qur’an. In particular, al-Albani thought he detected in it signs of the loathed doctrine of the “unity of being” (wahdat al-wujud), defined by the Andalusian mystic Ibn ‘Arabi in his time and assimilated with Sufism.46 In addition, al-Albani took issue with Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, denouncing his “stands contrary to the Sunna”, and insisting on the fact that al-Banna was not a “religious scholar” (‘alim).47

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism These attacks were directly linked to the other main fault for which he reproached the Brotherhood (and by extension their Sahwa emulators), i.e. being more interested in politics than in religious science (‘ilm) and creed (‘aqida). AlAlbani insisted, for his part, that his priorities were the opposite. Thus did he keep on repeating this now famous sentence: “in the present circumstances, the good policy is to stay away from politics” (min al-siyasa tark al-siyasa).48 Indeed, as he explained at a lecture delivered in Medina in 1977 through an indirect allusion to the Muslim Brotherhood: “All Muslims agree on the need to establish an Islamic state, but they differ on the method to be employed to attain that goal. [For me] only by the Muslims’ adhering to tawhid can the causes of their dissensions be removed, so that they may march toward their objective in closed ranks.”49 It was in this spirit that he developed his theory of da‘wa (preaching), which he calls al-tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya (purification and education) and explains as follows: “By tasfiya I mean the purification of Islam of everything that is foreign to it and corrupts it. To that end the Sunna must be purged of all the forged (mawdu‘) and weak (da‘if) hadith that (p.70) it contains, so that the Qur’an may be interpreted (tafsir) in light of this authenticated Sunna and the notions and concepts passed down from our pious ancestors.” As for the tarbiya, “it consists in instilling into our youth this authentic Islamic creed (‘aqida) drawn from the Qur’an and the Sunna.” The radical difference between this approach, which places creed (‘aqida) before politics and the individual before the state, and the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood is spectacularly illustrated by al-Albani's famous fatwa in which he calls on the Palestinians to leave the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank since they could, according to him, no longer practice their religion correctly there. Given a choice between protecting the creed (‘aqida) and the land, he adds, it is the creed that must receive priority.50 These stands taken by al-Albani were to be enshrined by the neo-Ahl al- Hadith in a veritable ideological paradigm and were to engender a much more systematic argumentation against the Muslim Brotherhood and by extension the Sahwa. Thence, in one of his pamphlets deemed the most representative of this faction's ideas, entitled al-Makhraj min al-fitna (How to Escape from Internal Dissension), dated 1982, the Yemeni shaykh Muqbil al-Wadi‘i, who spent the 1970s at the Islamic University of Medina and belonged to the group al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM), to which we shall be returning in detail a bit further on, established a distinction between five “Islamic groups”: first, those he calls ashab al-Hadith (or Ahl al-Hadith), whom he describes as “the group that God has designated to preserve His religion”51 and, identifying them with the early traditionists (muhaddithun), as “those whose counsel is best after the prophets and companions, for God, His messenger, His book, His leaders, and ordinary Muslims”;52 then in the middle, three groups to whom he addresses scathing criticism while still recognising their virtues: the Egyptians of Ansar alSunna al-Muhammadiyya53 (whom he reproaches for their lack of interest in the Page 9 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism hadith, while singling out the importance of their calls for tawhid),54 the Jama‘at al-Takfir—the “takfiris ”— whose enthusiasm and insistence on dalil (proof drawn from the sacred texts) he praises while lambasting their tendency to abuse the practice of takfir (p.71) (excommunication),55 and the Tabligh, praised for the efficacy of their teaching, but reproached for their neglect of ‘aqida and ‘ilm and for their attachment to the madhhab —in this case the Hanafischool; and finally, the Muslim Brotherhood at whom, after a brief introduction in which he underlines the initial good intentions of Hasan al-Banna, he directs his harshest and most virulent criticism. He blames them for not having ‘ulama in their ranks, for “forbidding their members to attend the ‘ulama 's classes”, for simply “not liking [the ‘ulama]”, for being consequently ignorant in the disciplines of religious knowledge,56 and also for “preferring positions of power to the Sunna”.57 At a moment when the Muslim Brotherhood was at the apex of its influence, alAlbani's stands—and the use to which they were put by his neo-Ahl al-Hadith disciples—caused a great deal of turmoil. They resulted, in the 1970s, in the Brotherhood's “boycotting [al-Albani's] lessons and everything connected with his da‘wa ” and publishing several attacks against him in its journal al-Mujtama ‘.58 This was an untenable position for someone who was already seeking to be recognised as one of the most highly respected religious authorities in the Muslim world. As a consequence, from the 1980s al-Albani was to try ever harder to keep out of the disputes, even if that sometimes meant having to disown his most enthusiastic disciples. This is why al-Albani, visibly surprised by the devastating effects of his stands on Sayyid Qutb, and probably fearing to alienate a whole sector of the Islamic sphere, would himself seek to soften his statements by declaring: “Yes, [Sayyid Qutb] must be refuted, but with composure, and dispassionately…Yes, he must be refuted, it is a duty…(…) But that does not mean that we must show him hostility, or forget that he has certain merits. The important thing is that he is a Muslim and an Islamic writer—within the bounds of his own understanding of Islam, as I have already said—who was killed for the sake of da‘wa, and that those who killed him are the enemies of God.”59 However, such attempts proved to be useless; however hard al-Albani tried to appear as a consensual figure, it was already too late, as his disciples had (p.72) already, partly despite his own wishes, set him up as the spiritual father of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith current.

Specific and Practices of the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith Beyond this ideology, which conferred on the neo-Ahl al-Hadith a particular identity in the religious sphere, they also developed a number of practices that made them stand out in the social sphere. Most of these were grounded in some Page 10 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism of al-Albani's fatwas that were in disagreement with the Hanbali-Wahhabi consensus. On the subject of prayer, for instance, the neo-Ahl al-Hadith tend to follow al-Albani's injunctions collected in a little book—which caused a great scandal when it came out—entitled The Characteristics of the Prophet's Prayer (Sifat salat al-nabi). In it al-Albani advocates, for example, adding “wa barakatuhu ” (and His blessings) to the ritual “al-salam ‘alaykum wa rahmatullah ” as well as holding one's hands during prayer in a way that significantly differs from the prescriptions of Hanbali-Wahhabi fiqh. Also, he approves of remaining shod while praying within the mosque. The conspicuous nature of these ritual differences explains why the emergence of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith aroused quarrels and arguments in the mosques of Medina and other cities where their movement had taken root, driving al-Albani's disciples to gather in mosques under their own control. These mosques have no mihrab (a nook oriented toward Mecca inside the mosque), as the neo-Ahl al-Hadith consider it a bid‘a (a blameworthy innovation).60 Insofar as their attire is concerned, the neo-Ahl alHadith, like the Sahwis but with even greater intransigence, stress the ban on wearing the ‘iqal, (a circlet used to fasten the shmagh or the ghutra, the headcloths worn by the Saudis). As for the thawb (the Saudi robe), they demand that it should come up to half-calf (“four fingers under the knee”), mostly to distinguish themselves from the Sahwis, who wear it down to their ankles. As a former member of this group humorously puts it, “The aim is to show that the duty to present oneself humbly before God is stronger than the fear of ridicule”.61 Finally, some neo-Ahl al-Hadith tend to push imitation of the Prophet to the point of wearing their hair long, again setting them apart from the Sahwis, who feel that in the interest of da‘wa one must be well-groomed.62 (p.73)

The Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith'S Early Bases In Saudi Arabia It was in the 1960s that the neo-Ahl al-Hadith faction began to take shape at the Islamic University of Medina, and especially at Dar al-Hadith, a religious institute attached to the university. The history of this institute eloquently illustrates how the influence of the Indian Ahl-e Hadith prepared the way for the neo-Ahl al-Hadith. Dar al-Hadith was actually founded in 1931 by an Indian Ahl-e Hadith shaykh who was living in Medina, Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Dahlawi,63 concerned with encouraging the study of hadith in the Hijaz and thereby disseminating the ideas of his movement there. At his death in 1955 the institute passed under the control of a Malian shaykh, a “traditional” specialist of hadith whose name was ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Ifriqi, and then in 1957, after al-Ifriqi's demise, under shaykh ‘Umar Falata64 also of West African origin. In 1964 the institute was attached to the Islamic University of Medina,65 where it functioned as the de facto department of hadith until 1976, when such a department was officially set up.66 In the 1960s al-Albani visited Dar al-Hadith frequently to give lectures, and some of his students, such as ‘Ali al-Mazru‘i, taught there. There were sharp disputes between al-Albani's disciples, already perceived as hadith revolutionaries, and the partisans of a more traditional concept of hadith study, Page 11 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism like Hammad al-Ansari and ‘Umar Falata, the institute's director. The 1970s saw the influence of the al-Albani faction gain ground at the institute, a development that would lead, as we shall be seeing shortly, to the powerful rise of al-Jama’a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM). Rapidly, however, al-Albani's influence reached the other main place where the hadith was taught in the Hijaz, which had stayed up to that time under the thumb of ‘ulama who favoured a more traditional approach. This was the Dar al-Hadith al-Khayriyya in Mecca, an institute founded in 1933 by ‘Abd al-Zahir Abu al-Samh,67 an Egyptian member of Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya who had become imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca a few years before.68 From the 1970s onwards, the number of neo-Ahl alHadith there grew significantly. Finally, in Riyadh and in Burayda, there appeared (p.74) small groups linked to the neo-Ahl al-Hadith, generally led by a charismatic individual, often the imam of a mosque.

Al-Albani'S Heirs Together with a sharp increase in the numbers of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith, the 1970s saw al-Albani's disciples split—despite their official claims of shunning politics—over the attitude to adopt toward the regime. Two main positions emerged during that period: the first, which advocates an active rejection of the state and its institutions, crystallised in the form of a “rejectionist” current, whose first manifestation was the storming of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by a radicalised faction of al-Jama’a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba. The second position, which is characterised by unconditional support for the ruler, first manifested itself in the wake of the Gulf war with the “Jami” current (in reference to shaykh Muhammad Aman al-Jami, one of its leading figures). Juhayman Al-‘Utaybi and the Rejectionists

Recent research69 has shown that the group led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, which occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca for two weeks in November and December 1979, was a radicalised fraction of a larger pietistic movement, al- Jama‘a alSalafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM), literally “the Salafi group that promotes virtue and prevents vice”. The JSM was founded in Medina in the middle of the 1960s by disciples of al-Albani who were unhappy with the growing social influence of new religious actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the nascent Sahwa and the Tabligh. The JSM was characterised socially by its adhesion to most of the distinctive practices in attire and prayer preached by al-Albani. It was able to develop under the protection of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, who had become head of the Saudi religious establishment after the death of mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahm Al al-Shaykh 1969, and had even agreed to be named the movement's supreme guide. Al-Albani often visited the JSM, mainly during the pilgrimage, giving lectures at Bayt al- Ikhwan, the headquarters of the movement located in a suburb of Medina

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism One of the characteristic features of the JSM was its attitude toward politics and power; its members renounced any interest in politics, which they thought (p. 75) distracted the true believer from religious knowledge (‘ilm) and from the rigour of creed (‘aqida). As a consequence they—like al-Albani—made the Muslim Brotherhood the prime target of their criticism. Thus, when JSM members proclaim that the Saudi regime, like many other governments in the Muslim world, is illegitimate, they are not, a priori, proceeding from political motives, but rather on the simple principle that those wielding power do not come from the Prophet's tribe, Quraysh, the sine qua non condition for ruling the community stated by most of the classical jurists and taken up by al-Albani. Consequently, the oath of allegiance (bay‘a) that links the Saudi regime to its subjects is, according to them, null and void (batila). This in no way means, however, that the individual members of the Saudi royal family should be excommunicated (takfir). Nonetheless, for some of the JSM, drawn against their will toward the politicisation they continued to reject formally, a number of precise grievances against the royal family, perceived as being too close to the West and to a large extent corrupt, were increasingly melded with this principle. This rising protest within the JSM would considerably contribute to the rifts that tore it apart in 1977 and ended by a small hard core splitting off around Juhayman al-‘Utaybi. Still it should be noted that however radical they were, al-‘Utaybi and his companions never crossed the red line of takfir and continued to cling formally to the stands of JSM and al-Albani as to the attitude to take toward the regime. How then can the rise of these revolutionary urges within the radicalised fraction of the JSM be conciliated with a legal position that rejects using takfir against the rulers, without which it is illegitimate to oppose them with armed force? The solution was found, if one dares to say so, in a divine intervention. At the end of 1978 Juhayman al-‘Utaybi announced to the members of his group that the arrival of the Muslim messiah (mahdi) expected at the end of time to establish prosperity and justice over the earth, was imminent, and a few months later that he was none other than Muhammad al- Qahtani, a longtime companion of al-‘Utaybi's in the JSM. For the prophecy to be fulfilled, tradition ordains that the mahdi has to be consecrated in the heart of the Grand Mosque in Mecca between one of the corners of the Ka‘ba (al-rukn) and Abraham's prayer station (al-maqam). The date chosen was the first day of the year of the Hijra 1400, which corresponds to 20 November 1979. It is therefore in this messianic line of reasoning that one must seek the reasons behind the storming of the Grand Mosque of Mecca—which had nothing to do with any clear political strategy. The attack ended in fiasco, with al-‘Utaybi and his companions killed or arrested. Not long after, al-Albani was (p.76) accused of intellectual responsibility for the creation of the JSM and so, indirectly, for the 1979 crisis. He was then forbidden to set foot in Saudi Arabia for a number of years, but the ban was soon lifted, as always, at the behest of Ibn Baz.70 Page 13 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism Al-Madkhali and the Jamis

The episode at the Grand Mosque of Mecca was a hard blow for the rejectionist neo-Ahl al-Hadith and led within the wider neo-Ahl al-Hadith movement, as if to compensate, to an ostentatiously exacerbated frenzy of loyalism toward the Saudi royal family. This gave rise in the 1980s to a loyalist neo-Ahl al- Hadith faction, under the banner of two illustrious individuals, shaykh Muhammad Aman al-Jami, from whose name this current came to be known as Jami, and shaykh Rabi‘ al-Madkhali, both of them professors of hadith at the Islamic University of Medina. In doctrine the Jamis largely continue to follow the injunctions of al-Albani, questioning only his principle denying the legitimacy of a non-Qurayshite ruler, as the Saudi state is in their eyes a pure Islamic state. While they were relatively marginal at the end of the 1980s, they found themselves thrust to the forefront by the Gulf War. King Fahd's appeal to the American troops to protect the kingdom five days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 stirred up quite of bit of turmoil in Saudi Arabia. It was after this event that the Sahwa, acting here as proponent of a politicised version of Salafism, took the reins of an uncompromising Islamist opposition aimed against the Saudi regime, of which it demanded both the departure of the Americans and a substantial reform of the political system. Against this wave of protest the Jamis, who had gained considerable experience in attacking the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sahwa since the 1960s, appeared to the regime as first-rate allies. In no time they were granted considerable resources to lead a major counter-offensive against the Islamist opposition. Al-Jami, al- Madkhali and others were offered official tribunes for their sermons, in which they would put to good use the well-tried rhetoric of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith against their Sahwi adversaries. They claimed that Sahwi opposition to the Saudi regime was nothing but a predictable consequence of the Sahwis ’ indifference toward genuine ‘ilm and of their opportunism. Thus did the Jamis counter the Sahwa 's politicised Salafism with an assertive and militant (p.77) apolitical stance, complemented by unconditional loyalism toward the royal family.71

The Exportation of the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith Even though the dynamics that initially gave birth to the neo-Ahl al-Hadith are to be understood within the Saudi context, the movement was rapidly exported out of Arabia, so that it today constitutes an unavoidable element of Salafi Islam in many Muslim and Western countries. The vehicles of its exportation were of two kinds. The first kind of vehicle was personal. It was above all Nasir al-Din al-Albani himself who, in every country where he stayed, trained students who would endeavour to perpetuate his teaching, as in Syria, where he resided until 1979, and Jordan, where he emigrated afterwards and settled until his death. The leeway he enjoyed in the Hashemite kingdom partly explains the strong implantation of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith community in that country.72 Another Page 14 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism sizable conveyor of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith doctrine was the Yemeni Muqbil alWadi‘i, one of al-Albani's students and a member of the JSM in the 1970s before his expulsion in 1978 to his native Yemen, where he emerged locally as the founding father of Salafism. The social and religious clout acquired by al- Wadi‘i in Yemen explains the central role played by the neo-Ahl al-Hadith in the makeup of Yemeni Salafism. The second type of vehicle for the export of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith was institutional. While the neo-Ahl al-Hadith filled a relatively small slot up to the end of the 1980s in the Islamic institutions of the kingdom, the rise of Jamism in 1991–1992 was such that its proponents were granted control of several of those institutions, certain of which were linked to the export of Saudi Islam. The most important of these institutions was the Islamic University of Medina, taken over by al-Jami and al-Madkhali, who managed to get most of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sahwis who taught there dismissed. The stakes were high; a significant proportion of the university's students are foreigners, destined to go home to their countries once their education is completed. Therefore, transforming it into a Jami stronghold from 1992–1993 had a strong impact on the nature of the Salafism that would thereafter be exported from Saudi Arabia. The fact that Salafism was implanted in France (p.78) in large part by graduates of this university, such as imam Abdelkader Bouziane (expelled to Algeria in 2004),73 who had come back from Medina in the mid-1990s, goes far to explain why Jamism, and to a greater extent the neo- Ahl al-Hadith current of thought, hold such a preponderantly dominant position within Salafi Islam in France.

Conclusion: the Neo-Ahl Al-Hadith Today Through the originality of his legal positions and his dogged opposition to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sahwa in the Saudi religious sphere and beyond, Nasir al-Din al-Albani provided the doctrinal corpus necessary for the emergence of a powerful neo-Ahl al-Hadith current, infused with the revolutionary desire to regenerate Wahhabism through hadith while simultaneously stressing a militant stand against any involvement in politics. This current is today dominant within Salafism in several countries, such as France and Yemen. It is strongly present in other countries—such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Algeria—whose regimes have long learned how to use it to counterbalance the rise of a politicised form of Salafism that poses an often unprecedented challenge to their authority. This could prove a risky bet: as the example of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi has shown, violent activism need not be the direct result of politicization and may derive from other factors, like messianism. It is true, however, that the neo-Ahl al-Hadith have, since 1979, kept to their tradition of political quietism, even going so far as to develop a strong sense of loyalty to established regimes, as in the case of the Jamis. For this very reason, in the post-9/11 world, these regimes see it as more

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism indispensable than ever. This is in part why it will continue, in the years to come, to represent one of the main components of Salafi Islam. Bibliography Bibliography references: Nubdha mukhtasara ‘an al-sira al-dhatiyya li-fadilat al-shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din ibn al-Hajj Nuh al-Albani rahamahu Allah[Short Abstract of the Biography of the Venerable Sheikh Muhammad Nasir al-Din ibn Nuh al-Albani, May God Have Mercy Upon Him], http://saaid.net/Warathah/1/albani.htm. al-‘Ali, Ibrahim Muhammad, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani—muhaddith al-‘asr wa nasir al-Sunna, Damascus : Dar al-Qal‘a, 2001. (p.79) Amghar, Samir, ‘Les Salafistes français: une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse?’, Maghreb- Machrek, no. 183 (Spring 2005), pp. 13–31. al-Ansari, Isma‘il, Ibahat al-tahalli bi-l-dhahab al-muhallaq li-l-nisa’ wa al-radd ‘ala al-Albani fitahrimihi, no date, no place. al-Bassam, ‘Abdallah, ‘Ulama Najd khilal thamaniyat qurun, Riyadh: Dar al-‘Asima, 1398 Hijra, vol. 2. Brown, Daniel, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Commins, David, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. ———, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. al-Fahad, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, ‘From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism’, New York University Law Review, vol. 79, no. 2 (May 2004), pp. 485–519. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Lacroix, Stéphane, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited’, The International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007), pp. 97–116. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, al-Rasa’il al-shakhsiyya li-l-shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, n.p., n.d.. Laoust, Henri, Pluralismes dans l’Islam, Paris: Geuthner, 1983. al-Majdhub, Muhammad, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum—al-juz’ al-awwal, Cairo: Dar al-I‘tisam, 1986.

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism Metcalf, Barbara, D., Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Schulze, Reinhard, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert, Leiden: Brill, 1990. al-Shamrani, ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad, Thabatu mu’allafat al-muhaddith al-kabir al-imam Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, www.dorar.net. Vogel, Frank E., Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden: Brill, 2000. al-Wadi‘i, Muqbil Hadi, al-Makhraj min al-fitna, Sana‘a, 1982. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, New York: SUNY Press, 2001. Zayn al-‘Abidin, Muhammad Surur, ‘Shaykh muhaddithi al-‘asr fidhimmat allah’, Majallat al-sunna, Birmingham: Centre for Islamic Studies, no. 90, Rajab 1420 [October 1999]. Zeghal, Malika, Gardiens de l’Islam, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996. Some Writings and Tapes by Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani

• Mafahim yajib ’an tusahhah [Conceptions that need to be corrected]: • (Salah al-zahir wa-l-batin (1)) [External and internal piety (1)] • Tahdhir al-sajid min ittikhadh al-qubur masajid [A Warning to Those Who Kneel Down not to Mistake Tombs for Mosques]. 4th éd. Beirut: al-Maktab alIslami, 1983. (p.80) • Silsilat al-ahadith al-da‘ifa [The Series of Weak and Forged Hadiths], Beirut, al-Maktab al-Islami, 1972. • Silsilat al-ahadith al-sahiha [The Series of Authentic Hadiths], Beirut: alMaktab al-Islami, 1985. • Hijab al-mar‘a al-muslima [The Veil of the Muslim Woman]. 8th éd. Beirut: almaktab al-islami, 1987. • Sifat salat al-nabi min al-takbir ila-l-taslim ka’annaka taraha [The Characteristics of the Prophet's Prayer from the Beginning to the End as if you saw it]. 14th éd. Beirut: al-maktab al-islāmī, 1987. Notes:

(1) Traditionists are ‘ulama specialized in hadith. (2) According to a saying attributed to shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz.

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism (3) Henri Laoust, ‘Le réformisme orthodoxe des “salafiya” et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle,’ in Henri Laoust, Pluralismes dans l’Islam, Paris: Geuthner, 1983, p. 182. (4) In Wahhabi writings this term generally refers to the three first Muslim generations. (5) For more on doctrine, see the introduction by Roel Meijer and the first chapter by Bernard Haykel. (6) On Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's doctrine, see book David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London : I.B. Tauris, 2006, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Fahad, ‘From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism’, New York University Law Review, vol. 79, no. 2 (May 2004), pp. 485–519. (7) The term fiqh is sometimes translated as “jurisprudence”. However, because al-Albani's doctrine precisely rejects the principle of jurisprudence, it is better translated here as “law”. (8) Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 12. (9) The Sunna designates the Prophet's tradition, as transmitted through the hadith. (10) al-Rasa’il al-shakhsiyya li-l-shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab [The personal letters of shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab], n.p., n.d., p. 39. (11) Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 74–76. (12) Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 270–278. (13) Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 145. (14) For this reason, the Ahl-e Hadith are sometimes dubbed “Wahhabis” in India. (15) Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp. 275–277. (16) ‘Abdallah al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd khilal thamaniyat qurun [The Wahhabi Ulama Across Eight Centuries], Riyadh: Dar al-‘Asima, 1398, vol. 2, p. 223. (17) Ibrahim Muhammad al-‘Ali, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani—muhaddith al-‘asr wa nasir al-Sunna [Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani—Traditionist of the Era and Champion of the Sunna], Damascus: Dar al-Qal‘a, 2001, pp. 11–17.

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism (18) David Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 42. (19) An ijaza is a certificate delivered by a religious scholar to a student of his whom he considers able to transmit part or all of his teachings. (20) ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad al-Shamrani, Thabatu mu’allafat al-muhaddith alkabir alimam Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani [Index of the Writings of the Great Traditionist Imam Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani], www.dorar.net,p. 17. (21) Nubdha mukhtasara ‘an al-sira al-dhatiyya li-fadilat al-shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din ibn al-Hajj Nuh al-Albani rahamahu Allah [Short Abstract of the Biography of the Venerable Sheikh Muhammad Nasir al-Din ibn Nuh al-Albani, May God Have Mercy Upon Him], http://saaid.net/Warathah/1/albani.htm. (22) See Commins, Islamic Reform. For the term “peripheral ulama”, see Malika Zeghal, Gardiens de l’Islam, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996. p. 21. (23) al-Shamrani, Thabatu mu’allafat al-muhaddith al-kabir, p. 40. (24) Muhammad al-Majdhub, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum—al-juz’ alawwal [Ulama and Thinkers I Have Met—First Volume], Cairo: Dar al-I‘tisam, 1986, p. 290. (25) Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 40–41. (26) Ibid., pp. 113–117. (27) al-Majdhub, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum, p. 291. (28) al-Shamrani, Thabatu mu’allafat al-muhaddith al-kabir, pp. 109–110. (29) Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought, p. 41. (30) A hadith is said to be “weak” (da‘if) when there are strong reasons to doubt its authenticity. (31) al-‘Ali, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, p. 30. (32) Biographical elements about Nasir al-Din al-Albani, http:// www.islamway.com/bindex.php?section=scholarinfo&scholar_id=47. (33) Interview with Sa‘ud al-Sarhan, Riyadh, April 2005. (34) The first refutation is called “Authorizing women to wear golden rings or bracelets and refuting al-Albani's prohibition” (Ibahat al-tahalli bi-l-dhahab almuhallaq li-l-nisa wa al-radd ‘ala al-Albani fitahrimihi). See al-Shamrani, Thabatu Page 19 of 22

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism mu’allafat al-muhaddith al-kabir, p. 161. The second refutation, which came as a reaction to al-Albani's claims that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was ignorant in hadith, is entitled “Defending shaykh of Islam Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab by refuting alAlbani's errors” (al-intisar li-shaykh al-islam Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab bi-lradd ‘ala mujanabat al-Albani li-l-sawab), see al- Shamrani, Thabatu mu’allafat al-muhaddith al-kabir, p. 164. Al-Shamrani's list contains the titles of three other refutations on pp. 165–176. (35) Interview with a former disciple of al-Albani, Riyadh, December 2005. (36) http://www.islamway.com/bindex.php?section=scholarinfo&scholar_id=47. (37) Al-‘Ali, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, p. 31. (38) Muhammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, ‘Shaykh muhaddithi al-‘asr fidhimmat allah’ [The shaykh of the Traditionists of the Age under the Protection of God], Majallat al-Sunna [Revue al-Sunna], Birmingham: Centre for Islamic Studies, no. 90, Rajab 1420 [October 1999]. (39) http://www.islamway.com/bindex.php?section=scholarinfo&scholar_id=47. (40) Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, New York: State University of New York Press, 2001, p. 120. (41) Al-‘Ali, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, p. 31. (42) This explains why Frank Vogel noted that in the 1980s “Saudi ulama seem more disposed to claim mujtahid status than were their Wahhabi forefathers. Today, one can notice reticence to admit any school affiliation at all” See Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, p. 78. (43) Interview with a former member of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith, Jeddah, April 2005. (44) Recordings are available at: http://www.albrhan.org/fetan/b1.ram. (45) The Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Majdhub recounts that, the day Sayyid Qutb was sentenced to death, Ibn Baz asked him to write a telegram of protest to be sent to the Nasserite regime. Al-Majdhub, shocked by the announcement of Qutb's imminent death, wrote the telegram using a totally uncompromising style. When he read it to Ibn Baz, convinced that the latter would ask him to moderate his language, he was surprised to see the blind shaykh approve of every word the telegram contained and ask for it to be sent immediately. This telegram was—according to al-Majdhub—the only such act of protest originating

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism from the Muslim world that Nasser received on the occasion, see al- Majdhub, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum, p. 91. (46) See al-Albani's tape entitled “Conceptions that need to be corrected” (Mafahim yajib ’an tusahhah). (47) The recording is available at: http://www.albrhan.org/fetan/a18.ram. (48) See al-Albani's tape entitled “External and internal piety (1)” (Salah al-zahir wa-l-batin (1)) (49) al-Majdhub, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum, p. 302. (50) For this fatwa, see for instance Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, p. 169, note 76. (51) Muqbil al-Wadi‘i, al-Makhraj min al-fitna [How to overcome discord], Sana‘a, 1982, p. 90. (52) Ibid ., p. 96. (53) “The proponents of the prophetic tradition” (Ansar al-Sunna alMuhammadiyya), a pro- Wahhabi Egyptian association founded in Cairo in 1926. (54) Al-Wadi‘i, al-Makhraj min al-fitna, pp. 99–100. (55) Ibid. , p. 101–102. (56) Ibid., pp. 106–114. (57) Ibid., p. 123. (58) Al-Albani, “Conceptions that need to be corrected”. (59) The recording can be found at: http://www.islamgold.com/rmdata/ 139_Albani_qotob_part3.rm. (60) Interview with former JSM member Nasir al-Huzaymi, Riyadh, March 2005. (61) Interview with a former member of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith, Jeddah, April 2005. (62) Idem. (63) Annual Index of the Islamic University of Medina, 1978, pp. 209–210. (64) Al-Majdhub, ‘Ulama’ wa mufakkirun ‘araftuhum, pp. 151–175. (65) Annual Index, p.209.

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Between Revolution and Apoliticism (66) Ibid., p. 113. (67) Ibid., p. 225. (68) Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert, Leiden: Brill, 1990, p. 142. (69) Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, The International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, (2007) pp. 97–116. (70) For more on the JSM and Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, see Hegghammer, Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia”. (71) This presentation of the Jamis is the result of field observation and interviews conducted in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2006. (72) Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, pp. 110–146. (73) Samir Amghar, ‘Les Salafistes français: une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse?’, Maghreb- Machrek, no. 183 (Spring 2005), p. 15.

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

The Transformation of a Radical Concept al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi Joas Wagemakers

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0004

Abstract and Keywords The doctrine of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) is perhaps one of the most influential and controversial doctrines in Salafism. It says that Muslims should remain loyal exclusively to Muslims and must distance themselves from all other religions and actively hate their followers. The contemporary Jordanian Salafi thinker Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has become famous for making the doctrine of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ the foundation for his doctrine of jihad. His work is the basis of what has become known as Jihadi Salafism. Keywords:   Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Al-wala’, Jordan, Jihadi Salafism

The Salafi concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, roughly translatable as “loyalty and disavowal,”1 has come to be considered by some as a recipe for extremism. Adherents to the idea that all Muslims should show loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims and that everything else should be disavowed are deemed inherently radical by some observers.2 It is certainly true that al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ divides (p. 82) the world into two separate spheres of which one is good and one is evil. This can result in strong bonds of loyalty and brotherhood among Muslims on the one hand as well as extreme forms of piety through the disavowal of everything and everyone considered un-Islamic on the other. Adherents to the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ can therefore use it to set up boundaries between groups and create divisions and possibly even sectarianism. In a Western context, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ can be used as a bulwark against successful

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept integration into society. A certain amount of radicalism thus seems to be inseparably connected with the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’. In spite of the inherent radical nature of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, however, there are considerable differences in the way Salafis interpret this concept. This chapter intends to show these diverse interpretations by tracing the history of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ from its pre-Islamic beginnings and its place in heterodox forms of early Islam, when some Sunnis still dismissed it as a religious innovation (bid‘a), to its prominence in present-day Salafi discourse, where it is frequently described as part of the basis of Islam (asl al-din). The emphasis in this article will be on the ideas of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), a PalestinianJordanian Jihadi-Salafi ideologue. He not only contributed to the development of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ but also turned this concept into the core of his ideology and connected it with concepts that had existed before but were re-reasoned by him.3

The Origins of al-wala’ Wa-l-bara’ Pre-Islamic Arabia

The origins of the term bara’ in the meaning given above can be found in the tribal culture of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula. While members of the same tribe were bound to each other by strong ties4 , relations between different tribes were not always very peaceful. They were often at war with one (p.83) another but could also enter into an alliance (hilf or tahaluf) sometimes. Since these alliances frequently came into existence for pragmatic reasons, such as having common enemies, they could also be dissolved. This act of breaking up an alliance was referred to as khal‘ (separation).5 The same term, however, could also refer to the expulsion by a tribe of one of its members. Although tribes were responsible for the protection of their members against attacks from outsiders, they sometimes decided to expel one of their own so as not to jeopardise relations with another tribe they were allied with. Such a person was referred to as a khali‘ (outcast) and the act of expulsion was, apart from khal‘, also called tabarru’. The latter term is linguistically related to bara’ and denotes that a particular tribe declares itself innocent (bari’) of the fate of its former member.6 Early Heterodox Islamic Sects

The concept of disavowal that existed in pre-Islamic times was not changed significantly with the advent of Islam. This evolved into a situation where tabarru’ came to be used by Muslims to break alliances with non-Muslims that they had entered into before Islam came about. This way, a tribal concept was adopted by Muslims but modified in such a way that it fitted their new needs.7 The Qur’an also mentions both wala’ and bara’, albeit in slightly different forms. Sura 5: 51, for example, tells us that Jews and Christians “are friends (awliya’, plural of wali) of each other”8 and sura 9: 1 starts with the word “disavowal” (bara’a). Although the exact translation of the latter word is somewhat controversial, most authors seem to agree on its general meaning as Page 2 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept having something to do with “being innocent of ”, “disavowal”, “denunciation” or similar, semantically related phrases.9 (p.84) The first Islamic group to use al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as part of its doctrine was apparently the sect known as the Kharijites. They became a distinct group after they had refused to accept the mediation between the fourth caliph ‘Ali (r. 656–661), whom they had initially supported, and his opponent Mu‘awiya (r. 661–680). The Kharijites incorporated al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ into their beliefs, showing great loyalty to other members of their group while disavowing outsiders. The same reasoning was applied to things, actions and beliefs, so that every aspect of life became either worthy of the Kharijites’ loyalty or their disavowal. As such, they framed the world around them in black and white terms.10 A group that split from the “mainstream” Kharijites were the Ibadites, whose ideas were slightly more moderate. Concerning al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, they believed that a separate category of people and things between the two extremes was also possible, calling it wuquf or tawaqquf (wavering, suspension of judgement). The creation of a middle category reflected the fact that not every creature's nature (either good or evil) was entirely clear.11 Interestingly, the Ibadites also used the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, as the “mainstream” Kharijites had done before them, to distinguish insiders from outsiders. At the time, Ibadites were (and in fact still are) a relatively small group of heterodox Muslims in a sea of orthodox Sunnis. This not only necessitated retaining close ties within Ibadite circles (loyalty) but, to keep their beliefs free from Sunni influences, also distance from others (disavowal).12 Far and away the largest and most important branch of Islam to adopt alwala’ wa-l-bara’ as part of its doctrine is the Shi‘a. Shi‘a Muslims had always revered ‘Ali, Hasan, Husayn and their successors as their divinely-inspired imams and had, consequently, taken a negative view of the first three caliphs, who had preceded ‘Ali and were deemed his opponents but were (and are), however, considered by Sunni Muslims to be rightly guided (rashidun).13 This (p.85) attitude was later given doctrinal form through the concept of al-wala’ wa-lbara’. The love and affection for the Shi‘a imams developed into wala’ while bara’ came to signify the negative attitude towards the first three caliphs and their successors as well as idols (tawaghit) and their worshippers. This way, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ became a significant part of Shi‘a doctrine's theological underpinnings.14

From Bid‘A to Basis: Sunni Views of al-Wala’ Wa-l-Bara’ Bid‘A

The adoption of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ by heterodox Muslims was not emulated by Sunni Islam.15 In fact, the very few Sunni reactions to al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ I have found were entirely negative. One such a reaction can be found in the writings of Page 3 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept the “founder” of the Hanbali school of Islamic law, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), as treated by the Hanbali scholar Ibn Abi Ya‘la (1059– 1131). He declares that “loyalty (al-walaya) is a religious innovation (bid‘a) and disavowal (al-bara’a) is a religious innovation. […] This doctrine (hadha l-qawl) is a religious innovation”, before adding “so be careful with it”.16 It is not entirely clear whether the author rejects al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ on doctrinal grounds or simply because he associates it with the Shi‘a, since he also states that Shi‘as (al-rafida) “disavow (yatabarra’una) the companions of Muhammad […], curse them and degrade them. […] The Shi‘a are in no way part of Islam.”17 Similar condemnations of alwala’ wa-l-bara’ are found in the writings of another Hanbali scholar, Ibn Batta (d. 997). He also dismisses both walaya and bara’a as bida‘ (plural of bid‘a) but, interestingly enough, without explicitly linking them to any form of heterodox Islam.18 After several centuries of relative silence on the topic of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, the concept was dealt with extensively by the famous Hanbali scholar Ibn (p.86) Taymiyya (1263–1328). Although he never uses the actual phrase “al-wala’ wa-lbara’ ”, it is clear that Ibn Taymiyya is familiar with the idea behind it. He writes that after centuries of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya), Islam came to show people “the straight path” (al-sirat al-mustaqim), which Muslims must not deviate from. Jewish and Christian influences, however, have sullied the pure truth that Islam represented, Ibn Taymiyya writes, so Muslims must once again cling to the straight path.19 The author is especially concerned about the influence of Jewish and Christian religious festivals and stresses that Muslims must avoid these if they want to remain true to Islam.20 Otherwise, Muslims might start showing loyalty (muwala) and friendship (mawadda) to them, leading themselves away from the straight path. Although Ibn Taymiyya quotes extensively from the Sunna and the Qur’an, one verse more or less sums up his argument, namely sura 5: 51, which states: O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends (awliya’); they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friends is one of them. God guides not the people of the evildoers. Ibn Taymiyya sees verses like this one as indicative of how Muslims should deal with Jews and Christians, interpreting them as a condemnation of close contact with these people.21 Examples of supposedly un-Islamic practices that Ibn Taymiyya mentions include looking like Jews and Christians in greeting others, particular types of clothing and allowing Jews to participate in Islamic prayers (salat).22 These examples of “loyalty” are, according to Ibn Taymiyya, still not as bad as following non-Muslims in their particular types of worship or incorporating popular religious rituals into Islam, which he believes shows an even greater loyalty to “infidels” (kuffar) and their religion. It is this aspect of loyalty that he criticises most, for instance calling on Muslims to refrain from

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept visiting graves, turning burial sites into mosques or praying at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.23 Basis

It is interesting to see that instead of following his Hanbali predecessors by condemning al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as a bid‘a, Ibn Taymiyya in effect uses the (p.87) concept as a means to fight bida‘. By turning al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ into a tool that keeps Muslims away from un-Islamic practices, he applies it against religious innovations instead of seeing the concept itself as such.24 This positive view of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ was reinforced by later writings on this topic by eighteenthand nineteenth-century scholars, especially the descendants of the influential Hanbali reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). One of the most important of these was his grandson, Sulayman ibn ‘Abdallah Al alShaykh (1786–1818).25 Sulayman takes the development of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ a step further by using it not just as a means to fight bid‘a but as a tool against kufr (unbelief). Since a religious innovation does not necessarily place the person guilty of such a thing outside Islam, but being an unbeliever (kafir) does, this means that Sulayman increases the value of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’. In Ibn Taymiyya's writings, loyalty and disavowal could still be seen as traits of pious Muslims only. Sulayman, on the other hand, portrays al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as a litmus test of true belief for all Muslims. He states that “the firmest of ties of the faith (awthaq ‘ura al-iman) are love in God (al-hubb fillah) and hatred in God (albaghda’ fillah)” and commands believers to “cut the loyalty (al-muwala) between the believers and them (nonMuslims)”.26 Sulayman further mentions that love, hatred, enmity and loyalty— which can all be seen as synonyms of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ —are indispensable parts of the religion and that Muslims must give their exclusive loyalty to God or have no part in Islam.27 If they do give their loyalty to someone or something else, they are considered kuffar. There are no exceptions to this rule, according to Sulayman, except for those who were forced to commit an act of unbelief (kufr).28 One Hanbali scholar who takes Sulayman's ideas even further is Hamd ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Atiq (d. 1883). He explicitly connects al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ with the (p.88) concept that can be seen as the very basis of Islam, the unity of God (tawhid). Ibn ‘Atiq states that one is not a Muslim if one does not oppose non-Muslims and if one does not show them one's enmity and disavowal. This amounts to declaring your belief in tawhid and Islam to people, according to Ibn ‘Atiq, which does not happen “until one disavows the people of unbelief (ahl al-kufr) […] and declares to them that they are unbelievers and that one is their enemy. If that does not happen, one has not declared the religion.”29

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Apart from this more specific connection to tawhid, Ibn ‘Atiq's work also shows a move away from simply condemning misplaced wala’, which earlier writers had mostly concentrated on,30 towards the necessity of showing bara’. This can be seen in the quote given above but also in Ibn ‘Atiq's use of Qur’anic verses. One of these, sura 60: 4, is dealt with relatively thoroughly in Ibn ‘Atiq's explanation of his point of view.31 It states that: You have had a good example in Abraham, and those with him, when they said to their people, ‘We are quit of you and that you serve (inna bura’a’u minkum wa-mimma ta‘buduna), apart from God. We disbelieve in you (kafarna bikum), and between us and you enmity (al-‘adawa) has shown itself, and hatred (al-baghda’) for ever, until you believe in God alone.’ By tying al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ to the basis of Islam and increasing the importance of sura 60: 4, Ibn ‘Atiq confirmed a trend that continued into the twentieth century; both aspects were incorporated into the ideas of modern-day Salafischolars. On the basis of their views on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, these can be divided into two different branches: the first consists of the Saudi stateemployed religious scholars (‘ulama) and their ideological followers; the second branch started with Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the leader of a group of rebels who occupied the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.32 The ‘ulama employed by the Saudi state treat the subject of al-wala’ wa-lbara’ in a way that is rooted in the tradition of this concept on the one hand but cannot be seen outside of the Saudi political context on the other. As the (p.89) religious scholars know they cannot overstep the boundaries the state has set for them, they practice a form of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ that is politically friendly to the regime while being very strict in social matters at the same time. This means that in matters such as the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, they apply a stringent form of bara’ but are willing to overlook their political leaders’ faults by being lenient with them and showing them their support.33 This attitude manifests itself in condemnations of any feasts apart from ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha so as not to look like non-Muslims,34 warnings not to resemble the “infidels” in clothes, words or names35 or the stated inadmissibility to greet nonMuslims with a hand gesture.36 Although many Salafi‘ulama both inside and outside Saudi Arabia refrain from referring to any political issue,37 some of them do deal with politics in their writings. Because of the relations between Saudi scholars and their political rulers mentioned above, however, it is not surprising to see that this basically amounts to support for the regime, even though this seems to fly in the face of other rulings these same scholars have issued. Former Saudi mufti ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999), for example, states that one should be hostile to Jews since they “and the polytheists are greatest in enmity to believers” and cites “Jewish aggression against the Arabs” as well as suras 60: 4 and 5: 51 to support his Page 6 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept case.38 In spite of this, he does not condemn reconciliation (sulh) with Israel as a form of un-Islamic wala’ but states that security co-operation, trade and the exchange of ambassadors are allowed with the Jewish state since these do not require friendship and loyalty.39 Another example is the prominent Saudi scholar Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan (b. 1935), who believes that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should emigrate to the Islamic world (p.90) because “settling in the countries of the unbelievers will lead to loyalty [to them]”, contends that Muslims should not adopt the Christian calendar and further states that one should hate non-Muslims.40 In spite of all this, al-Fawzan contends that this does not entail that it is forbidden to deal with kuffar with the purpose of selling or buying goods but that it simply means that Muslims should distance themselves from other religions.41 While the apolitical or pro-regime rulings of many Saudi ‘ulama seem a natural consequence of the situation in which they came about, resistance against this phenomenon was also to be expected. The first to formulate his ideas on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ in a political way and apply them to the Saudi regime was Juhayman al-‘Utaybi (d. 1980). In his writings, Juhayman deals with the concept in general and, incidentally, is the first who uses the actual phrase “al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ ”.42 He states that God has given Muslims the example of “the religion of Abraham” (millat Ibrahim), which is based on loyalty to the worship of God alone and disavowal of polytheism (shirk) and polytheists (mushrikun) and “showing enmity to them” (izhar al-‘adawa lahum). This, Juhayman believes, separates the true believers from the false ones.43 To make sure that the millat Ibrahim is followed through, Juhayman distinguishes three phases one must go through and that can be summarised as follows: disavowal of shirk and its followers; leaving one's house and emigration (hijra) to a safe place where one can gather; and fighting (qital).44 Judging from al-‘Utaybi's experiences, it seems that he did indeed pass through these three stages, with his attempt to occupy the Great Mosque of Mecca in 1979 being the third phase.45 Interestingly though, despite believing that the Saudi leadership was unfit to rule, he explicitly did not call them unbelievers since he was not convinced they had committed any sin that expelled them from Islam.46 This is (p.91) the main difference with the man who would be greatly influenced by him, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.47

Al-Maqdisi and al-wala’ Wa-l-bara’: Continuity and Change The Palestinian-Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi ideologue ‘Isam ibn Muhammad ibn Tahir al-Barqawi, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, made a significant ideological contribution to al-wala’ wa-l-bara’. Although he is mostly known to the public for being the spiritual father and later critic of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi,48 who wreaked havoc in Iraq with suicide bombing operations, al-Maqdisi had been an important ideologue long before al-Zarqawi became famous. In his writings, al-Maqdisi greatly emphasises al-wala’ wa-l-

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept bara’, a concept whose tenets he both continues from their earlier descriptions but also changes significantly. Continuity

In his writings, al-Maqdisi continues to rely on two aspects of al-wala’ wa-lbara’ that became increasingly significant throughout the history of the concept, namely its connection to the basis of Islam (tawhid) and the importance of sura 60: 4. Like Juhayman al-‘Utaybi had done before him, al-Maqdisi adopts the Qur’anic concept of millat Ibrahim as the basis of his ideas. Also, like Juhayman he states that this means disavowal of shirk and its followers on the one hand and loyalty (ikhlas) to the worship of God alone on the other.49 For al-Maqdisi, the connection between al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as embodied by millat Ibrahim and the basis of Islam is of paramount importance, formulating his ideas on this issue even more explicitly than his ideological predecessors. (p.92) He states that “the Religion of Abraham” is “the foundation of Islam and the meaning of ‘there is no god but God’”. This way, al-Maqdisi turns al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ into a natural and necessary confirmation of the Islamic profession of faith (shahada), which forms the first pillar of Islam and is incumbent upon every Muslim.50 The book in which al-Maqdisi described his ideas on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ for the first time is so heavily influenced by the notion of millat Ibrahim that he even used that phrase as its title. Unlike Juhayman however, who derived the term from Qur’anic verses like sura 16: 123 and 6: 161,51 al-Maqdisi adopts sura 60: 4 as the basis of millat Ibrahim. He quotes it extensively and by doing so, shows that he continues the tendency to ascribe great value to this verse and to focus more on bara’ against shirk, kufr and kuffar than on supposedly un-Islamic forms of wala’.52 Change

Despite the fact that al-Maqdisi's ideas on al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ are strongly rooted in the writings of his predecessors, there is also a strong element of change visà-vis earlier Salafischolars’ treatment of the concept. This change consists of two elements that cannot be seen separately: politics and excommunication (takfir). The first had already been incorporated into al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi but without connecting it to takfir. Al- Maqdisi does make this connection and does so by expanding the concept of millat Ibrahim so as to include in its definition the necessity to worship God “in every meaning that the word worship encompasses” (bi-kull ma tahwihi kalimat al-‘ibada min ma‘anin).53 The impact of adding these words to Juhayman's definition of millat Ibrahim is enormous as it opens up wala’ to interpretations that do not strictly fall into the religious sphere. In other words, al-Maqdisi's new definition of millat Ibrahim may forbid forms of “worship” that have nothing to do with concepts (p.93) usually associated with that word, such as political obedience and a willingness Page 8 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept to abide by a country's laws. This way, al-Maqdisi not only radically changes wala’, but by equating the application of and adherence to man-made laws with un-Islamic worship he also accuses present-day Muslim politicians and leaders of shirk and therefore of being kuffar. He legitimises this equation by referring to sura 9: 31, which states that Jews and Christians took their spiritual leaders, whose rulings and laws they adhered to, “as lords apart from God” (arbaban min dun Allah). To al-Maqdisi, this means that obeying certain people or adhering to their laws amounts to seeing them as “lords” and thus as other gods, even if one does not actually pray to them or bow down for them.54 Because al-Maqdisi equates adherence to un-Islamic laws and obedience to the rulers who apply them with shirk and kufr, he believes that people who abide by their country's man-made rules and follow their politicians and are in effect misdirecting their wala’. In al-Maqdisi's view, God (and Islam in general) should be the only recipient of people's loyalty and any attempts to redirect this wala’ to another person or thing basically amounts to taking another god. This is why alMaqdisi believes that the people and laws that are “worshipped” should be seen as idols (tawaghit). Al-Maqdisi sees idolatry all over the Muslim world and spends hundreds of pages denouncing supposedly un-Islamic leaders and their loyalty to man-made laws. He criticises Kuwait, for instance, for not having God as the sole legislator but having “the trinity (thaluth) of the emir and the people's council based on the constitution” as “the legislating god” (al-ilaha almusharri‘).55 He also states that in Kuwait's constitution, Islamic law (shari‘a) is a prominent source of legislation (alshari‘a masdar ra’isi li-l-tashri‘) instead of what al-Maqdisi believes it should be, namely the only source of legislation. This, al-Maqdisi says, is like testifying that “God is one of the important gods” (Allah ilaha min al-aliha al-ra’isa) and should therefore be seen as shirk and kufr.56 Jordan, the country where al-Maqdisi has lived since the early 1990s, receives scathing criticism for similar reasons but also for its levying of non-Islamic taxes, freedom of the press, equality and freedom of speech.57 (p.94) Al-Maqdisi's severest criticism, however, is reserved for Saudi Arabia. He scolds the country for not applying the shari‘a in full, even though it pretends to do this. Its large number of man-made laws makes a mockery of “the tawhid state” (dawlat al-tawhid) that Saudi Arabia claims to be. Since the country takes away the sole sovereignty of God in legislation, it systematically tries to destroy tawhid, according to al-Maqdisi.58 He states that the true tawhid of God […] exists through disbelieving the idols, all the idols, and disavowal of their people (al-bara’a min ahliha), not just the idols made of stone and wood that the shaykh s of Saudi Arabia keep murmuring about (yudandinu hawlaha mashayikh al-Sa‘udiyya dawman) […] On the contrary, all idols, including the idols of ruling according to something else than what God has revealed (tawaghit al-hukm bi-ghayr ma anzala Allah)

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept […] the idols of the law… and not just locally. On the contrary, in the Gulf, in the Arab world and all over the world.59 For almost ninety pages, al-Maqdisi condemns what he sees as Saudi Arabia's reliance on international man-made laws and its ties with the rest of the world, moving from the country's support for the charter of the United Nations to its ties with other Gulf countries and the military help it gets from America.60 The alternative al-Maqdisi offers to all of this faulty loyalty to modern-day tawaghit is, of course, its exact opposite: bara’. Because of his political interpretation of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, al-Maqdisi insists that Muslims need to disavow their “unbelieving” rulers. Since al-Maqdisi connects loyalty and disavowal to the shahada and tawhid, he effectively turns denunciation of political leaders in the Muslim world into an obligation that true believers cannot possibly avoid. Instead of giving them their loyalty, al-Maqdisi insists that Muslims are obliged by the very basis of their faith to disavow un-Islamic rulers.61 According to al-Maqdisi, there are several ways to show your disavowal of kufr and kuffar. Quoting a tradition (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad, he states that Muslims must try to correct wrongfulness with their hand, their tongue or their heart, with the latter being the weakest form of faith (p.95) (iman). The least Muslims must do, therefore, is to disavow the tawaghit in their hearts.62 According to al-Maqdisi, the best way to show one's disavowal of these kuffar who have turned themselves and their laws into tawaghit, however, is jihad, which he sees as a natural consequence of bara’.63 He refers to jihad against the kuffar to restore tawhid in legislation as “the highest rank of showing enmity and hatred to the enemies of God (a‘la al-maratib izhar al- ‘adawa wa-lbaghda’ li-a‘da’ Allah)”.64 He even speaks directly to his readers on this topic, as he often does, stating that It is compulsory for you (fa-l-wajib ‘alayka)—if you want Paradise—to disbelieve in him (the modern-day taghut), disavow him and his servants and his friends (awliya’ihi) and to hate them (tubghiduhum) and to make them detestable (tubaghghiduhum) for your children and your family, to work and wage jihad (tujahidu) all of your life for his destruction and his annulment (min ajl hadmihi wa-ibtalihi) and that you do not give up, [that you will not] be satisfied or happy unless [there is] the rule of God the Most High and his legislation alone. Otherwise there is hell. Hell!65 Thus, al-Maqdisi moves from condemning wrongful wala’ to compelling Muslims to apply bara’, which he feels should primarily be directed at the “unbelieving” rulers of the Muslim world and their supposedly un-Islamic laws. This means that al-Maqdisi basically changes al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ from a tool to increase religious strictness and piety into a revolutionary ideology that is incumbent upon every Muslim.

Justifying takfir Page 10 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Al-Maqdisi's arguments given above explain how he equates adhering to unIslamic laws with worship, why he sees this as sinful wala’, why this should be countered with bara’ and why the rulers of the Muslim world—and not just idols such as trees and effigies—should be the target of this disavowal. What they do not explain, however, is how he justifies calling the alleged sins and transgressions of political rulers kufr instead of just fisq (sinfulness) or zulm (injustice). He could have accused them of being only sinners who deviated from God's will instead of going so far as to call them tawaghit and kuffar. (p.96) Given the seriousness of un-Islamic rule in al-Maqdisi's eyes—a violation of tawhid and wrongful wala’ —it may seem obvious for him to equate it with downright unbelief, thereby justifying his verdict of takfir. This conclusion, however, is by no means uncontroversial. It should be pointed out that al-Maqdisi's ideas on tawaghit, kufr and takfir are not new. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), for example, a radical Egyptian ideologue from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, formulated similar ideas in Egypt in the 1960s. In his famous book Milestones (Ma‘alim fil-tariq), he states that all societies live in a situation comparable to the pre-Islamic age of ignorance (jahiliyya) because they are based on wrong beliefs and because their institutions and laws are not derived from the shari‘a. In Qutb's view, by turning themselves into legislators, political leaders usurp the legislative sovereignty (hakimiyya) that should be God's alone. They should therefore be seen as tawaghit, an equation he justifies by quoting sura 9: 31, just like al- Maqdisi does.66 A more or less similar argument to Qutb's is found in the manifesto al- Farida algha’iba (the Absent Duty), written by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954– 1982), one of the ideological leaders of the Islamic Jihad Group that was responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. The author of this pamphlet bases his arguments on two religious rulings (fatwas) given by Ibn Taymiyya during the reign of the Mongols, stating that if Muslims outwardly profess to be believers but rule through un-Islamic laws, they should be considered kuffar. This, Faraj contends, is also the case with modernday Egyptian rulers and he therefore extrapolates Ibn Taymiyya's rulings to the situation in Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s. The “Absent Duty” that Faraj refers to is the jihad that Muslims should wage against their rulers to overthrow them in order to make God the sole legislator again.67 Although the arguments of Qutb and Faraj sound very similar to al- Maqdisi's, there are two major differences between their reasoning and his. The first can be found in the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, which neither of the two Egyptian authors refers to.68 The second difference lies in the arguments (p.97) they use to justify the application of kufr and takfir. Both Qutb69 and Faraj70 refer to sura 5: 44, which states that “whoso judges not (wa-man lam yahkum)71 according to what God has sent down—they are the unbelievers (al-kafirun)”, but fail to go Page 11 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept beyond a very basic explanation of what this means. Al-Maqdisi, however, not only goes into great detail to explain his justification of takfir of the rulers on the basis of this verse but he also adopts arguments that are largely shared by some other Salafis who are diametrically opposed to his conclusion. Levels of Faith

Al-Maqdisi explains his justification of takfir by quoting sura 5: 44 mentioned above.72 The problem with this reasoning is that in the next two verses, the same words are repeated only this time the verdict on people who do not judge according to God's revelation is that they are “evildoers” (zalimun) and “the ungodly” (al-fasiqun). Since these three labels are applied to the same group of people in the Qur’an, the difference in their meaning is not immediately clear. Moreover, as al-Maqdisi knows only kufr is serious enough to expel Muslims from Islam, he needs some way to explain his decision to apply this term—and not zulm or fisq —to “infidel” rulers to justify his use of takfir against them. This explanation can be found in the three different levels of faith al-Maqdisi distinguishes. The three levels of iman that al-Maqdisi separates are the level of sihhat al-din (the soundness of the religion), wajib al-din (the compulsory of the religion) and kamal al-din (the perfection of religion). The first refers to the (p.98) tenets of Islam that are so basic that they form its foundation (asl). Subsequently, any disbelief in them immediately changes the person guilty of such a sin into an unbeliever and thus expels him or her from Islam. This category includes the beliefs that there is only one god and that he is the Creator and Lord of all creatures. The second level of faith refers to things that are certainly part of Islam but whose violation is simply sinfulness (fisq) or disobedience (ma‘siya), which does not expel its perpetrator from the religion. Examples of this include drinking wine or eating pork. The third category includes beliefs and actions that are commendable (mustahabb) and violation of any of them is therefore not even a sin. Adhering to this level increases one's iman but ignoring it does not diminish one's faith. For the determination of someone's true belief, only the first two categories are important.73 Al-Maqdisi argues that any sin from the second level of faith, although not necessarily a form of kufr, can be equated with downright unbelief. This happens if such a sin is supported by the conviction (i‘tiqad) of the perpetrator that he or she did the right thing, despite knowing Islam forbids it; permission (istihlal) given by the perpetrator to him- or herself by rendering something that is forbidden (haram) permissible (halal); or negation (jahd or juhud) of the truth of Islam. If any of these three conditions apply, the sinner is not just a fasiq (someone guilty of sin) but also a kafir because his or her conscious decision to do wrong despite knowing what is right elevates the wrongful act from the category of wajib al-din to the category of sihhat al-din.74 If, however, a sinful act is committed because one was forced to, believed it to be correct or made a Page 12 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept wrong interpretation of certain texts, it is not a form of kufr and therefore does not justify takfir.75 The reasoning given above is not very controversial among Salafis. Many of them have written similar things, arguing that sins in the category of sihhat aldin are always kufr, whether i‘tiqad, istihlal or jahd are present or not. Transgressions at the level of wajib al-din, however, must be accompanied by (p. 99) some sort of proof of unbelief in a person's heart to be able to pronounce takfir.76 The controversy among Salafis starts, however, when al-Maqdisi divides all sins into two categories of unbelief and applies them to politics. He distinguishes major unbelief (kufr akbar) and minor unbelief (kufr asghar). The first includes the sins at the level of sihhat al-din and those sins at the level of wajib al-din that are supported by i‘tiqad, istihlal or jahd. These turn their perpetrator into a kafir and thus expel him or her from Islam. Minor unbelief, on the other hand, only includes sins that were caused by mistake, wrong interpretations etcetera and thus do not expel a person from Islam. Applying the above to politics, al-Maqdisi does not necessarily include ruling according to something else than God's revelation in the category of major unbelief. He even states explicitly that if a political leader follows un-Islamic laws frequently but does so as a result of a mistake, a misinterpretation or something similar, he or she is not a kafir.77 If, however, a ruler makes a habit of applying un-Islamic laws, adopts a constitution that becomes the basis of any legislative process or substitutes the shari‘a for an entirely different system of laws (tabdil), al-Maqdisi no longer considers these actions as mere sins for which proof of actual unbelief is needed to justify takfir, but he immediately puts them in the category of sihhat al-din. This means that al-Maqdisi sees such sins as forms of major unbelief, making any evidence of i‘tiqad, istihlal or jahd entirely unnecessary to justify takfir and expulsion from Islam. In other words, the gravity of such un-Islamic rule in al-Maqdisi's eyes elevates its sinfulness from the level of wajib al-din to the level of sihhat al-din.78 Debate On Kufr

Many Salafis, even though they acknowledge the same levels of faith that alMaqdisi distinguishes, use the same categories of kufr and quote the same verses from the Qur’an, disagree with his reasoning given above and refuse to label un-Islamic rule or even systematic un-Islamic rule a form of major unbelief. This is because they believe that even in the case of consistent un-Islamic rule, i‘tiqad, istihlal or jahd are necessary preconditions for takfir. This issue is possibly the main bone of contention with regard to kufr between apolitical (p. 100) Salafis and their militant counterparts of Salafism's jihadi branch. Although there is an enormous number of articles that can be found on this topic,79 one example will suffice to explain the differences of opinion that exist among Salafis. This example is a discussion between al-Maqdisi and the

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept prominent Salafischolar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) on the meaning of sura 5: 44, the verse that forms the basis of many of these debates.80 Al-Albani states that sura 5: 44 was originally revealed with regard to Jews. They not only failed to adhere to Islamic rules but, precisely because they were Jewish, also did so out of conviction since they followed their own religion. AlAlbani sees their conviction as the distinguishing factor in any comparison with modern-day rulers. Whereas the Jews could be said to adhere consciously and knowingly to a different system of religious laws, the same cannot possibly be said of Islamic politicians in our day and age, who are at least nominally Muslims and have thus not chosen a different religion. Al-Albani therefore considers ruling by something else than what God has revealed a form of minor unbelief— or kufr of action, as he calls it—that only becomes a form of major unbelief if it is accompanied by conviction, permission or negation in the heart, as is the case with the Jews in sura 5.81 (p.101) Al-Maqdisi agrees with al-Albani that sura 5: 44 was originally revealed with regard to Jews; he also agrees that their unbelief was a form of kufr akbar. AlMaqdisi contends, however, that systematic un-Islamic rule is major unbelief anyway, regardless of whether or not it is supported by i‘tiqad, istihlal or jahd. He refutes al-Albani's argument by stating that none of the verses of this sura mention that the Jews actually disbelieved Islam in their hearts. In other words, he contends that there is no explicit reference to any overt conviction, permission or negation. If that means that such an explicit declaration is not necessary to justify takfir, then why should it not be permissible to apply this verse (and takfir) to politicians, who also do not give any explicit statement of unbelief ? If, however, the absence of any clear indication of the Jews’ true unbelief means that their kufr akbar can be assumed from their actions, then why not also assume it with present-day rulers of the Muslim world, whose manmade laws certainly justify such a conclusion? This way, al-Maqdisi means to show that whichever way you interpret sura 5: 44, it always leads to the conclusion that both the verse and takfir can be applied to modern-day politicians.82 Al-Maqdisi's ideology thus uses the Salafi concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as the basis of his arguments, gives it a political meaning and connects it with takfir. Moreover, by re-reasoning the justification for calling modern-day politicians kuffar and even tawaghit by using Salafi arguments that go much further than the relatively shallow explanation of Qutb and Faraj, he presents himself as someone who is well-versed in Salafi discourse. By doing so, al-Maqdisi shows that his interpretation of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ is both entirely Salafi in nature but nevertheless every bit as radical and far-reaching as the ideas of other thinkers intent on overthrowing the regimes in the Islamic world.

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Conclusion This chapter has shown that the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, while always strict and radical in nature, has changed significantly throughout its history. Starting as a tribal concept adopted by early Islam, it rose to prominence among heterodox Islamic groups while being dismissed as a bid‘a by Sunnis. The works of Ibn Taymiyya changed this when he wrote about al-wala’ wa-l (p.102) bara’ as a means to counter religious innovations. His ideas were perpetuated by several eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hanbali scholars, the most important of which were Sulayman ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh and Hamd ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Atiq, who both reformulated the concept as a distinguishing feature of Islam that was derived naturally from tawhid and was therefore compulsory for every Muslim. The twentieth century saw the development of two different branches concerning al-wala’ wa-l-bara’: one was embodied by mostly Saudi scholars and their followers, who applied strict forms of bara’ in society but were lenient to their rulers and conscious of the political boundaries within which they had to work; another was started by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, a radical thinker who applied bara’ to the Saudi regime and subsequently tried to overthrow it in 1979. It is this second branch that influenced the prominent Jihadi-Salafischolar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi most of all. The main contribution al-Maqdisi has made to al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ was the connection he established between this concept on the one hand and politics and takfir on the other, turning it into a theory that promoted jihad against the rulers of the Islamic world, whose politics and laws he criticised meticulously. Moreover, he reformulated existing ideas on takfir by using arguments that were much closer to Salafi discourse than the thoughts of others before him. Furthermore, by adopting the connection with tawhid that earlier scholars had established, he translated his anti-governmental and violent version of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ into a natural consequence of the basic beliefs of Islam. This way, alMaqdisi turned al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, which until that time had mostly been used in the religious sphere only, into the basis of his own radical ideology that he considered incumbent upon every Muslim. Al-Maqdisi's strong roots in Salafi discourse, both with regard to al-wala’ wa-lbara’ and his re-reasoning of takfir, the importance he ascribes to the former concept through its connection with tawhid, as well as his detailed knowledge of the political systems of several Islamic countries make it highly likely that his prominence among Salafi activists will live on for some time to come. Bibliography Bibliography references:

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Abu ‘Iyad, ‘Kufr can occur without Istihlaal or Juhood’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. al-Albani, Muhammad Nasir al-Din, ‘Concerning those who do not Rule by what Allaah SWT has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com,n.d. (p.103) Arberry, A.J., The Koran Interpreted, New York: Touchstone, 1996 (1955). al-Ba‘li al-Hanbali, ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Yunayni, al-Manhaj al-qawim fiikhtisar iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim. www.saaid.net, n.d. Bell, Richard, ‘Muhammad's Pilgrimage Proclamation’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1937), pp. 233–243. Boukhars, Anouar, ‘The Challenge of Terrorism and Religious Extremism in Jordan’, Strategic Insights ( www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Apr/ boukharsApr06.asp), 2006, vol. 5, no. 4. Brooke, Steven, ‘The Preacher and the Jihadi’, in: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani & Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, Vol. III, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2006, pp. 52–66. Brunschvig, R., ‘Bara’a’, in: H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E. Lévi-Provençal, J. Schacht, B. Lewis & Ch. Pellat (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. I, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960, pp. 1026–27. Buhl, Frants, ‘Zur Kuranexegese’, Acta Orientalia, vol. 3 (1924), pp. 97–108. al-Burjis, ‘Abd al-Salam, ‘A Treatise on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. Cook, David, Understanding Jihad. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. ‘The Creed of Imaam al-Albani on the Issues of Takfir and Riddah’, www.Salafi publications. com, n.d. Della Vida, G. Levi, ‘Kharidjites’, in: E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat & C.E. Bosworth (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. IV, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978, pp. 1074–75. van Ess, Josef, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, vol. II, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992 Gardet, L., ‘Iman’, in: B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, Ch. Pellat & J. Schacht (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, Vol. III, Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, 1971, pp. 1170–4 Page 16 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad, Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din, Vol. I, Book II, Cairo: ‘Uthman Khalifa, 1933 Goldziher, Ignaz, Muhammedanische Studien, vol. I, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1888 Grimme, Hubert, Mohammed, Münster: Aschendorff, 1892 al-Halabi, ‘Ali ibn Hasan & Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Shaikh Alee Hasan and Imaam al-Albani on Kufr, the conditions of takfir, and Istihlaal’, www.allaahuakbar. in., n.d. Hegghammer, Thomas & Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no 1, 2007, pp. 103–22 Ibn ‘Abd al-Khaliq, Abu ‘Abdallah ‘Abd al-Rahman, al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’, www.salafi.net/ books/book46.html, 1986. Ibn ‘Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman, Awthaq ‘ara al-Iman, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. ———, al-Dala’il fihukm muwalat ahl al-ishrak, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. Ibn Abi Ya‘la, Abu l-Husayn Muhammad, Tabaqat al-Hanabila, Cairo, 1952 Ibn ‘Atiq, Hamd ibn ‘Ali, Sabil al-naja wa-l-fikak min muwalat al-murtaddin wa-lAtrak, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. 103 (p.104) Ibn Baz, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Hukm al-salam bi-l-ishara bi-l-yad, www.binbaz.org.sa, n.d. ———, ‘Imaam Ibn Baz on Imaan, Kufr, Irjaa’ and the Murji’ah’, www.Salafi publications. com, n.d. ———, al-Sulh ma‘a l-Yahud aw ghayrihim min al-kafara la yalzimu minhu muwaddatahum wa-la muwalatahum, www.binbaz.org.sa, n.d. ———, Wujub ‘adawat al-Yahud wa-l-mushrikin wa ghayrihim min al-kuffar, www.binbaz. org.sa, n.d. Ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, Salih, ‘al-Bara’ min din al-kuffar wa-laysa bi-tark alta‘amul ma‘ahum’, ‘Ukaz, 21 December 2003. ———, ‘Shaikh Salih al-Fawzan Explains his Words in Kitaab ut-Tawheed on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. ———, al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ fil-islam, www.saaid.net, n.d. Ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad, Hukm al-ihtifal bi-l-‘Id al-watani, www.tawhed. ws, 1965. Page 17 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Ibn Taymiyya, [Taqi al-Din Ahmad], Iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim mukhalafat ashab al-jahim, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. Izutsu, Toshihiko, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966. Jansen, Johannes J.G., The Neglected Duty—The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1986. Kazimi, Nibras,, in: ‘A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi’ Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani & Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. II, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005, pp. 59–73. Kohlberg, Etan, ‘Some Zaydi Views on the Companions of the Prophet’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 1976, pp. 91–8. ———, ‘Bara’a in Shi‘i Doctrine’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 7 (1986), pp. 139–175. ———, ‘Some Imami Shi‘i Views on the Sahaba’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 5 (1994), pp. 145–75. Lane, Edward W., ‘Bara’’, in: Edward W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. I, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society Trust, 1984, pp. 178–9. ———, ‘Wala”, in: Edward W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. I, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society Trust, 1984, pp. 3060–1. Laoust, Henri, La Profession de Foi d’Ibn Batta,Damascus: Institute Français de Damas, 1958. al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, Millat Ibrahim wa-da‘wat al-anbiya’ wa-l-mursalin, www.tawhed.ws, 1984. ———, Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab, www.tawhed.ws, 1986 ———, Mukhtasar ‘Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab’—al-Dustur al-Urduni, www.tahwed.ws, 1996. ———, Tabsir al-‘uqala’ bi-talbisat ahl al-tajahhum wa-l-irja’, www.tawhed.ws, 1996. ———, Imta‘ al-nazr fikashf shubhat murji’at al-‘asr, www.tawhed.ws, 1999/2000 (2nd ed.). ———, al-Kawashif al-jaliyya fikufr al-dawla al-Sa‘udiyya, www.tawhed.ws, 2000/2001 (2nd ed.).

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (p.105) ———, Bara’at al-muwahhidin min ‘uhud al-tawaghit wa-amaninim li-lmuharibin, www.tawhed.ws, 2002. ———, al-Dimuqratiyya din, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. Munisa, Abu Khalid Walid, Mukhtasar iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim, www.tawhed.ws, 1994. Najib, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim, al-Bara’a min al-bida’ wa-ahlihi min usul ahl alsunna wa-l- Jama‘a, www.saaid.net, n.d. Pedersen, J., Der Eid bei den Semiten, Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1914. ———, ‘Kasam’, in: H.A.R. Gibb & J.H. Kramers (eds), Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961, pp. 224–26. al-Qasim, ‘Abd al-Malik, al-Wala’ wa-l-bar a’, www.saaid.net, n.d. Qutb, Sayyid, Milestones, New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2005 (1964). ———, Fi zilal al-Qur’an, vol. VI, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980/1981. al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State—Islamic Voices from a New Generation,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Rubin, Uri, ‘Bara’a: A Study of Some Quranic Passages’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 5 (1984), pp. 13–32. al-Sarhan, Sa‘ud ibn Salih, ‘al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ … al-idiyulujiyya al-jadida li-lharakat al-islamiyya’, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 January 2004. ‘Sayings of the Ulamaa’ Regarding Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed and the two Types of Kufr’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. Schwartz, Werner, Die Anfänge der Ibaditen in Nordafrika, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983. ‘Shaikh Ibn Uthaimeen on Ibn Baz and Albani's Position on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. Sirriyeh, Elizabeth, ‘Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism’, Bulletin (British Society of Middle Eastern Studies), vol. 16, no. 2, 1989, pp. 123–132. al-‘Utaybi, Juhayman ibn Sayf, Awthaq ‘ura al-iman; al-hubb fillah wa-l-bughd fillah, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. ———, Raf ‘ al-iltibas ‘an milla min ja‘lihi llah imaman li-l-nas, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. Page 19 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept ———, Risalat al-imara wa-l-bay‘a wa-l-ta‘a wa-hukm talbis al-hukkam ‘ala talaba, www.tawhed.ws, n.d. al-‘Uthaymin, Muhammad ibn Salih, ‘Shaikh ibn ‘Uthaymeen on al-Hukmu bighayri maa Anzallallaah’, www.Salafi publications.com, n.d. Walker, P.E., ‘Wilaya’, in: Th. Branquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel & W.P. Heinrichs (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. XI, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002, pp. 208–9. Wansbrough, John, Quranic Studies. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1977. Selection of the Writings of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi

al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, Millat Ibrahim wa-da‘wat al-anbiya’ wa-l-mursalin [The religion of Abraham and the call of the prophets and the messengers], www.tawhed.ws, 1984. ———, Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab [Lifting the veil from the law of the jungle], www.tawhed.ws, 1986. (p.106) ———, I‘dad al-qada al-fawaris bi-hajr fasad al-madaris [The preparation of the chivalrous leaders to leave the corruption of the schools], www.tawhed.ws, 1987. ———, Mukhtasar ‘Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab’—al-Dustur al-Urduni [The summary of ‘Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab’ —the Jordanian constitution], www.tahwed. ws, 1996. ———, Tabsir al-‘uqala’ bi-talbisat ahl al-tajahhum wa-l-irja’ [Enlightening the minds by exposing the people of Jahmiyya and postponement], www.tawhed.ws, 1996. ———, Al-Risala al-Thalathiniyya fiTahdhir min al-Ghuluw fil-Takfir [The thirtypart letter on warning against extremism in excommunication], www.tawhed.ws, 1998/1999. ———, Imta‘ al-nazr fikashf shubhat murji’at al-‘asr [The enjoyment of looking at revealing the falsehoods of modern-day postponers], www.tawhed.ws, 1999/2000 (2nd ed.). ———, al-Kawashif al-jaliyya fikufr al-dawla al-Sa‘udiyya [The shameful revelations on the unbelief of the Saudi state], www.tawhed.ws, 2000/2001 (2nd ed.). ———, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna [This is our creed], www.tawhed.ws, 2003. ———, al-Dimuqratiyya din [Democracy is a religion], www.tawhed.ws, n.d.

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept Notes:

(1) For a comprehensive description of the different meanings of both terms (in general as well as in Islam), see (for wala’) Edward W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. I, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society Trust, 1984, pp. 3060–1; P.E. Walker, ‘Wilaya’, in: Th. Branquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel & W.P. Heinrichs (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. XI, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002, pp. 208–9; (for bara’) Lane, vol. I, pp. 178–9; R. Brunschvig, ‘Bara’a’, in: H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E. Lévi-Provençal, J. Schacht, B. Lewis & Ch. Pellat (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. I, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960, pp. 1026–27; J. Pedersen, Der Eid bei den Semiten, Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1914, pp. 174, 209; Ibid., ‘Kasam’, in: H.A.R. Gibb & J.H. Kramers (eds), Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961, pp. 224–5; Etan Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a in Shi‘i Doctrine’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 7 (1986), pp. 170–2. (2) David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,2005, pp.141–2; Sa‘ud ibn Salih al-Sarhan, ‘al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ al-idiyulujiyya aljadida li-l-harakat al-islamiyya’, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 January 2004. (3) Many of the texts used in this paper have been downloaded from the internet and some of these were only available to me in html-format. This means that referring to specific pages is difficult. I have tried to solve this problem by citing both the name or number of the chapter and the page numbers in the footnotes. (4) One could describe these strong ties as a form of loyalty. I have not found any sources that refer to the intra-tribal solidarity as wala’, however. (5) Ignaz Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, vol. I, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1888, pp. 63–9. (6) Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966, p. 56; Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a in Shi‘i Doctrine’, pp. 139–140. (7) Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a in Shi‘i Doctrine’, pp. 140–1. (8) This quotation from the Qur’an and subsequent others are taken from A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, New York: Touchstone, 1996 (1955). (9) See Hubert Grimme, Mohammed, Münster: Aschendorff, 1892, pp. 128–9; Richard Bell, ‘Muhammad's Pilgrimage Proclamation’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1937), pp. 234, 238, 242; Uri Rubin, ‘Bara’a: A Study of Some Quranic Passages’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 5 (1984), pp. 14– 17; Frants Buhl, ‘Zur Kuranexegese’, Acta Orientalia, vol. 3 (1924), pp. 97–100; John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 11–12. Page 21 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (10) Della Vida, G. Levi, 1978, ‘Kharidjites’, in E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat & C.E. Bosworth (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, vol. IV, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 1074–75; Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a ’, pp. 142–4. (11) Werner Schwartz, Die Anfänge der Ibaditen in Nordafrika, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983, pp. 57–8; Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a in Shi‘i Doctrine’, pp. 143–4; Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, vol. II, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992, p. 225. (12) Schwartz, Die Anfänge der Ibaditen in Nordafrika, p. 62. (13) Kohlberg, ‘Some Zaydi Views on the Companions of the Prophet’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 1976, pp. 93–8; Ibid., ‘Some Imami Shi‘i Views on the Sahaba’, Jerusalem Studies of Arabic and Islam, vol. 5 (1994), pp. 145–75. (14) Kohlberg, ‘Bara’a ’, pp. 144–51. (15) It is interesting to see that the massive work on early Islamic theology by Josef van Ess makes virtually no mention of the concepts of al-wala’ and al-bara’ outside of a heterodox context. For his treatment of this topic in Khariji and Ibadi Islam, see Van Ess, vol. II, pp. 195, 224–31. (16) Abu l-Husayn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Ya‘la, Tabaqat al-Hanabila, Cairo, 1952, p. 35. (17) Ibid., p. 33. (18) Henri Laoust, La Profession de Foi d’Ibn Batta, Damascus: Institute Français de Damas, 1958, p. 162. (19) [Taqi al-Din Ahmad] ibn Taymiyya, Iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim mukhalafat ashab aljahim, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., pp. 3–9. (20) Ibid ., pp. 136–60. (21) Ibid ., pp. 36–7. (22) Ibid. , pp. 64–67. (23) Ibid. , pp. 156–303. (24) Ibn Taymiyya's book on this topic proved to be a source of subsequent studies. See ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Yunayni al-Ba‘li al-Hanbali, alManhaj al-qawim fiikhtisar iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim. www.saaid.net,n.d.; Abu Khalid Walid Munisa, Mukhtasar iqtida’ al-sirat al-mustaqim, www.tawhed.ws, 1994.

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (25) For a discussion of related concepts such as kufr (unbelief) and nifaq (hypocrisy) amongst Wahhabi scholars in this period, see Elizabeth Sirriyeh, ‘Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism’, Bulletin (British Society of Middle Eastern Studies), vol. 16, no. 2, 1989, pp. 123–32. (26) Sulayman ibn ‘Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, Awthaq ‘ara al-Iman, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., ‘Muqaddima’, p. 1. (27) Ibid. , pp. 2 and 4. (28) Ibid ., al-Dala’il fihukm muwalat ahl al-ishrak, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., p. 1. (29) Hamd ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Atiq, Sabil al-naja wa-l-fikak min muwalat al-murtaddin wa-l-Atrak, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., ‘Mas’ala izhar al-din’, pp. 1–2. (30) These included not only Ibn Taymiyya and Sulayman ibn ‘Abdallah Al alShaykh but also other nineteenth-century scholars such as ‘Abd al-Latif ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh (d. 1876) and ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abd al-Bari al-Ahdal (d. 1854 or 1855). (31) Ibn ‘Atiq, ‘Fasl; wa hadha awan al-shuru‘ fil-maqsuq’, pp. 4–6. (32) For the most recent interpretation of the developments surrounding the actions of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, see Thomas Hegghammer & Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, no 1, 2007, pp. 103–22. (33) Madawi Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State—Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 36–7. (34) Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, Hukm al-ihtifal bi-l-‘Id al-watani, www.tawhed.ws, 1965, pp. 1, 7. (35) Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ fil-islam, www.saaid.net,n.d., pp. 4, 8. (36) ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, Hukm al-salam bi-l-ishara bi-l-yad, www.binbaz.org.sa,n.d. (37) Examples of these include Abu ‘Abdallah ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’, www.salafi.net/books/book46.html,1986; ‘Abd al-Malik alQasim, al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’, www.saaid.net,n.d.; Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim Najib, alBara’a min al-bida’ waahlihi min usul ahl al-sunna wa-l-Jama‘a, www.saaid.net,n.d. (38) Ibn Baz, Wujub ‘adawat al-Yahud wa-l-mushrikin wa-ghayrihim min al-kuffar, www.binbaz.org.sa, n.d., p. 1. Page 23 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (39) Ibn Baz, al-Sulh ma‘a l-Yahud aw ghayrihim min al-kafara la yalzimu minhu muwaddatahum wa-la muwalatahum, www.binbaz.org.sa,n.d., p. 1. (40) al-Fawzan, al-Wala’, pp. 4, 7 and 15. (41) al-Fawzan, ‘al-Bara’ min din al-kuffar wa laysa bi-tark al-ta‘amul ma‘ahum’, ‘Ukaz, 21 December 2003. (42) Juhayman ibn Sayf al-‘Utaybi, Awthaq ‘ura al-iman; al-hubb fillah wa-l-bughd fillah, www.tawhed.ws, n.d., ‘Bab; fifasl al-hubb fillah wa-l-bughd fillah’, p. 1. (43) al-‘Utaybi, Raf ‘ al-iltibas ‘an milla min ja‘lihi llah imaman li-l-nas, www.tawhed.ws, n.d., ‘Muqaddima’, pp. 1–2, ‘Fasl; fibayan millat Ibrahim’, p. 1. (44) Ibid ., ‘Minhaj nasr al-din yatalakhkhasu fithalathat umur’, p. 1. (45) See Hegghammer & Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 106–13. (46) al-‘Utaybi, Risalat al-imara wa-l-bay‘a wa-l-ta‘a wa-hukm talbis al-hukkam ‘ala talaba, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., ‘Fasl; al-Khilafa al-lati ‘ala minhaj al-nubuwwa wa-l-mulk al-Jabri’, p. 2, ‘Fasl; Fi shurut al-khilafa wa-l-imam al-ladhi tajibu bibay‘atihi wa ta‘atihi’, pp. 1–3. (47) For more on how al-Maqdisi became acquainted with Juhayman al-‘Utaybi's ideas and followers, see Hegghammer & Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 115–16. (48) For more information on this issue, see Nibras Kazimi, ‘A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi’, in: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani & Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. II, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005, pp. 59–73; Steven Brooke, ‘The Preacher and the Jihadi’, in: Fradkin, Haqqani & Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, Vol. III, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2006, pp. 52–66; Anouar Boukhars, ‘The Challenge of Terrorism and Religious Extremism in Jordan’, Strategic Insights ( www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Apr/boukharsApr06.asp), 2006, vol. 5, no. 4. (49) Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim wa-da‘wat al-anbiya’ wa-lmursalin, www.tawhed.ws, 1984, ‘al-Fasl al-awwal: Fi bayan millat Ibrahim’, p. 1. (50) Ibid ., p. 3; see also al-Maqdisi, Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab, www.tawhed.ws, 1986, ‘Wa-fial-tariq mukhdhilun wa-murjifun’, p. 6; and his Imta‘ al-nazr fikashf shubhat murji’at al-‘asr, www.tawhed.ws, 1999/2000 (2nded.), pp. 95–6 and 114. (51) al-‘Utaybi, Raf ‘, ‘Fasl; Fi bayan millat Ibrahim’, p. 1. He also uses sura 60: 4 but less prominently than al-Maqdisi does. Page 24 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (52) See for instance al-Maqdisi, Millat, ‘Bara’a’, p. 1, ‘Muqaddima’, pp. 1, 3, ‘alFasl al-awwal: Fi bayan millat Ibrahim’, pp. 3, 6, ‘al-Fasl al-thalith’, pp. 3, 9, besides functioning as the starting point of al-Maqdisi's entire argument in this book. (53) Ibid ., ‘al-Fasl al-awwal: Fi bayan millat Ibrahim’, p. 1. (54) al-Maqdisi, al-Dimuqratiyya din, www.tawhed.ws,n.d., ‘Fasl: Fi bayan asl alusul…’, pp. 1–2, and his Mukhtasar ‘Kashf al-niqab ‘an shari‘at al-ghab’—alDustur al-Urduni, www.tahwed.ws, 1996, p. 5. (55) al-Maqdisi, Kashf, ‘Amthila kufriyya min al-dustur; (1) Man al-ilaha almusharri‘ fidusturihim?’, p. 3. (56) Ibid ., p. 3. (57) al-Maqdisi., Mukhtasar, pp. 6–11. (58) al-Maqdisi, al-Kawashif al-jaliyya fikufr al-dawla al-Sa‘udiyya, www.tawhed.ws, 2000/2001 (2nded.), pp. 15–17. (59) Ibid., p. 58. (60) Ibid., pp. 58–142. (61) al-Maqdisi, Imta‘, pp. 95–6, 114, and his other works: Kawashif, pp. 58, 143; Kashf, ‘(3) Al-Bara’a min kull shar‘…’, p. 1, ‘(5) al-Ta‘a fil-tashri…‘’, p. 1, ‘al-Kufr bi-l-dustur…’, p. 1, ‘(7) Min ashna‘ tawaghit al-‘asr…’, p. 2; Bara’at almuwahhidin min ‘uhud al-tawaghit wa-amaninim li-l-muharibin, www.tawhed.ws, 2002, p. 9; Millat, ‘al-Fasl al-awwal: Fi bayan millat Ibrahim’, pp. 5–6. (62) al-Maqdisi, Kashf, ‘Man ‘ajaza ‘an al-sad‘’, p. 1. (63) al-Maqdisi, Tabsir al-‘uqala’ bi-talbisat ahl al-tajahhum wa-l-irja’, www.tawhed.ws,1996, p. 143. (64) al-Maqdisi, Millat, ‘al-Fasl al-thalith’, p. 4; similar phrases to describe jihad can be found in his, Kawashif, pp. 114, 143; Kashf, ‘al-Da‘wa ila dhalika…’, p. 1. (65) al-Maqdisi, Kashf, ‘(7) Min ashna‘ tawaghit al-‘asr’, p. 2. (66) Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2005 (1964), pp. 58 and 80–4; for a version of this document in the original Arabic, see www.tawhed.ws. (67) Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty—The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 167–76. Page 25 of 27

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (68) One can find references to words like wala’ or bara’ in Qutb's book but the former only rarely refers to the concept of loyalty and even then only in a general sense (see Qutb, Milestones, pp. 46 and 48). The word bara’ is treated only in the context of sura 9, sometimes called surat bara’a (see Ibid. , p. 54). The concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as a whole, however, is entirely absent in Qutb's book. The same can be said about his massive exegetical work on the Qur’an, Fi zilal al-Qur’an, where Qutb does not come up with a single argument to interpret sura 60: 4 (or the rest of the sura for that matter) in a political way. See Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur’an, vol. VI, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980/1981, pp. 3535– 48. (69) Qutb, Milestones, p. 83. (70) Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 167. (71) These words can also be translated as ‘whoso rules not’ or even ‘whoso governs not’. These interpretations, particularly the latter one, are relevant because they give the verse a more political meaning, as opposed to its more obvious, legal meaning. Since the distinction is not relevant for al-Maqdisi's argument, however, I will not go into this any further here. (72) al-Maqdisi, Imta‘, pp. 116–22. (73) Ibid. , pp. 89–92; this question revolves around questions such as ‘What constitutes faith?’ and ‘Can faith increase and decrease?’ For an overview of these questions and various answers given by Muslim scholars throughout history, see L. Gardet, ‘Iman’, in B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, Ch. Pellat & J. Schacht (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam—New Edition, Vol. III, Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, 1971, pp. 1170–4, particularly pp. 1170–1. For a treatment by an earlier Muslim scholar who wrote extensively on iman, see Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din, Vol. I, Book II, Cairo: ‘Uthman Khalifa, 1933, pp. 79–111, particularly pp. 96–8. (74) al-Maqdisi, Imta‘, pp. 8, 10, 46, 49–52 and his Tabsir, pp. 22–4, 44–8, 113– 14. (75) al-Maqdisi, Tabsir, p. 44. (76) See for example Abu ‘Iyad, ‘Kufr can occur without Istihlaal or Juhood’, www.Salafi publications.com; ‘Ali b. Hasan al-Halabi & Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Shaikh Alee Hasan and Imaam al-Albani on Kufr, the conditions of takfir, and Istihlaal’, www.allaahuakbar.in. (77) al-Maqdisi, Imta‘, pp. 46, 49. (78) Ibid. , pp. 46, 49–52, and al-Maqdisi, Tabsir, pp. 45–6, 114.

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The Transformation of a Radical Concept (79) See for example ‘Sayings of the Ulamaa’ Regarding Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed and the two Types of Kufr’; ‘Shaikh Ibn Uthaimeen on Ibn Baz and Albani's Position on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’; ‘Abd al-Salam al-Burjis, ‘A Treatise on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’; Muhammad b. Salih al- ‘Uthaymin, ‘Shaikh b. ‘Uthaymeen on alHukmu bi-ghayri maa Anzallallaah’; all these articles can be found on the proSaudi, mostly apolitical website www.Salafi publications.com. (80) The discussion—meaning al-Maqdisi's reactions to quotes from al-Albani— can be found in al-Maqdisi's book Tabsir al-‘uqala’ bi-talbisat ahl al-tajahhum wal-irja’, www.tawhed.ws, 1996, pp. 104–72. (81) Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Concerning those who do not Rule by what Allaah SWT has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com,pp. 1–2; although al-Maqdisi basically quotes al-Albani correctly in his book, the latter goes into greater detail in this article, which is why I use this instead of al-Maqdisi's book when citing al-Albani. Incidentally, it should be mentioned that there is no consensus on al-Albani's views on this issue even among apolitical Salafis. They all seem to agree that ruling incidentally by man-made laws is a form of minor unbelief but the differences of opinion start when habitual or systematic unIslamic rule is discussed. See for example al-Fawzan, ‘Shaikh Salih al- Fawzan Explains his Words in Kitaab ut-Tawheed on Ruling by other than what Allaah has Revealed’, www.Salafi publications.com.Al-Fawzan states that applying a constitution is a form of major unbelief, even if there is no explicit conviction, permission or negation. See also ‘The Creed of Imaam al-Albani on the Issues of Takfir and Riddah’, www.Salafi publications.com,p. 8, footnote 9, for more examples of dissenting views; and Ibn Baz, who basically agrees with al-Albani, ‘Imaam Ibn Baz on Imaan, Kufr, Irjaa’ and the Murji’ah’, www.Salafi publications.com,pp. 2–3. (82) Al-Maqdisi, Tabsir, pp. 109–11.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-Shi‘ism Guido Steinberg

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0005

Abstract and Keywords The chapter traces the introduction of anti-Shi’ism into the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood through Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhibb al-Din Khatib and other thinkers of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. It ends by considering the important Syrian thinker Sa’id Hawwa and the sectarian condemnation of Alawi dominance of the Ba’th party in Syria. Anti-Shi’ism found its way eventually, through Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi, into the civil war in Iraq, where it has been used to justify attacks on Shi’i civilians. Keywords:   al-Zarqawi, Sa’id Hawwa, Muslim Brotherhood, Alawi, Anti-Shi’i, Ba’th, Syria, Iraq

Introduction When in 2006, the international public realised that the conflict in Iraq had developed into an all-out civil war between Sunnis and Shi‘is, a debate ensued about whether these events were the expression of an essentially religious conflict between two confessional blocs which had existed for more than a thousand years, or rather the outcome of current political or even socioeconomic conflicts between and within Middle Eastern states, drawing on religion and confession as legitimising and mobilising tools. The argument here is that animosities between the confessions have played a role in Muslim history since the eighth and ninth centuries, but that in most cases it was not large confessional groups, but rather relatively small radical Sunni groups that proved to be the standard-bearers of anti-Shi‘ism and were primarily responsible for conflicts between the two confessions. While during the eighth and ninth Page 1 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is centuries the Hanbalis of Baghdad led the fight against the Shi‘a in the Abbasid capital, the Arabian Wahhabis adopted their anti-Shi‘ism in the eighteenth century. Today, modern Salafis dominate anti-Shi‘a discourse in (p.108) the Arab world and their most radical offspring, the Jihadi-Salafis, have been responsible for the main anti-Shi‘a violence especially in Iraq. Religion is an important factor in these events, but they are not determined by religion. Rather, confessional violence only breaks out when several factors concur: firstly, in most historical cases of anti-Shi‘i violence, radical Sunni groups or individuals believe that true Islam is in danger—mostly because of a threat posed by a foreign power—and that Shi‘is form a part of this threat. Often, Iran and Shi‘ism are identified by Sunnis so that any military threat emanating from Iran might trigger strong anti-Shi‘a sentiments among Sunnis especially in Iraq and its neighbouring countries. Secondly, these radical groups need able and ruthless leaders as well as the opportunity to build an infrastructure in order to become a force to be reckoned with. Thirdly, for major conflicts to break out, Shi‘i militant actors have to retaliate. As these conditions were rarely met, major conflicts between Shi‘is and Sunnis have been relatively rare in the history of the Arab world. However, all these conditions were met in Iraq after the American invasion of spring 2003: Firstly, many Sunnis believed that Islam was in danger because the US had invaded a core country of the Arab world and the ancient capital of the caliphate. In the course of the following years, though, the rise to power of Shi‘is with strong ties to Iran prompted the Sunni insurgents—especially the Salafi Jihadis among them —to increasingly target the Shi‘a population of Iraq. In their eyes, Iraqi Shi‘is were a fifth column of the regime in Tehran and were frequently simply labelled as “Persians”. Secondly, the ongoing violence in Iraq gave the most radical antiShi‘a organisations the opportunity to build their infrastructure and gain support from sympathisers in the rich Gulf states. Under changing names, first Monotheism and Jihad Group (Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad), then al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al-Qa‘ida fiBilad al-Rafidayn), the Jordanian Abu Mus‘ab alZarqawi (1966–2006) built an organisation which followed a strategy which aimed at provoking a civil war between Sunnis and Shi‘is. By deliberately targeting Shi‘i religious leaders, politicians, civil servants and civilians, he hoped to trigger a Shi‘i retaliation against the Sunni population, thereby securing a battlefield on which Jihadist groups would have a chance to continue operating in the long term. The third condition was met from 2005, when Shi‘a militia eventually fought back and a civil war erupted between Sunnis and Shi‘is.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is My aim here will be to examine the intellectual roots the Jihadi-Salafis draw their inspiration from. These roots might be found in a review of religious and (p.109) intellectual trends in the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq. More analytically, there are two distinguishable lines of tradition: • First and foremost, the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi movement has been the main source of Salafi anti-Shi‘ism today. • Secondly, Wahhabi and Salafi thought have influenced a more politically minded tradition where Syrian Islamists have developed their own, slightly distinct brand of anti-Shi‘ism. While the Wahhabiyya and its allies outside of its home country Saudi Arabia have laid the intellectual foundations of anti-Shi‘ism in the Arab world, the Iranian revolution and its repercussions have made these foundations increasingly relevant for politics in the region. In Syria from 1980, Islamist rebels not only targeted the allegedly Alawi regime of president Hafiz al-Asad, but resented the alliance between their home country and Iran, which they targeted as an alliance of Shi‘i infidels intent on destroying Islam. Both intellectual trends have converged in the anti-Shi‘a thinking of Abu Mus‘ab alZarqawi and other Salafi Jihadis.

Anti-Shi‘Ism and the War In Iraq It is not at all clear how exactly Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi developed his deep hatred of the Shi‘is. Most likely, he was influenced by his erstwhile spiritual mentor Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who on his part was heavily influenced by radical trends in Wahhabi thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. Zarqawi had become a leading personality among Jordanian militants during the 1990s, when he was jailed in Amman. After his release in 1999, he returned to Afghanistan, where he had spent some time in the late 1980s. He did not play a prominent role among the Arabs there, because Osama bin Laden and his Egyptian allies dominated the scene. However, he established himself as the leader of a group of Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians and founded a training camp in Herat, close to the Iranian border and far from al-Qaeda's headquarters in Qandahar. He managed to evade al-Qaeda's efforts to lure him into the larger organisation. In late 2001, after the American invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi and most of his followers managed to escape to Iran and hence to Northern Iraq. There, he reorganised his small group and from early 2003 redirected it to fight the Americans and their allies in Iraq. He was sub sequently responsible for the majority of the most devastating bombings to hit the country. From as early as 2003, Zarqawi put into practice an anti-Shi‘i strategy. In January 2004 the US military published a letter American troops had found (p. 110) in Iraq. In it, Zarqawi addressed Bin Laden and his deputy, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, and quite strikingly described the difficulties of warfare against the Americans in Iraq and elaborated a strategy according to which only Page 3 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is the provocation of a civil war between Shi‘is and Sunnis in the country would create an environment in which Jihadist groups would have a chance to continue operating in the long term. “Zero hour” for a broad attack on the Shi‘is in order to provoke their retaliation against the Sunnis would be the day four months before the transfer of power from the American-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to an Iraqi Interim Government. Since the scheduled date for this transfer was 30 June, 1 March was the zero hour for spectacular attacks on the Shi‘is.1 According to the Muslim calendar, 1 March was the ‘Ashura-holiday, when Shi‘is all over the world commemorate Prophet Muhammad's grandson Imam Husain's martyrdom in passion plays. In spite of massive security measures, in the morning hours of 2 March, suicide bombers managed to detonate several bombs close to the shrines of the Shi‘i Imams Husayn and Musa al-Kazim in Karbala and Baghdad, respectively.2 More than 180 people died in one of the most devastating attacks of the Iraqi insurgency. The attackers had clearly targeted Shi‘a civilians who had gathered around the shrines of their imams to celebrate ‘Ashura. By perpetrating the large-scale attack that he had announced in his strategy letter, Zarqawi proved his commitment to an anti-Shi‘a strategy.3 However, Zarqawi frequently made clear that his anti-Shi‘ism was not only a strategic choice in a political conflict, but rather a decision resting on religious convictions: “History's message is validated by the testimony of the current situation, which informs most clearly that Shi‘ism is a religion that has nothing in common with Islam except in the way that Jews have something in common with Christians under the banner of the People of the Book. From patent polytheism, worshipping at graves, and circumambulating shrines, to calling the Companions [of the Prophet] infidels and insulting the mothers of the believers and the elite of this [Islamic] nation, [they] arrive at distorting the Qur’an as a product of logic to defame those who know it well, in addition to speaking of the infallibility of the [Islamic] nation, the centrality of (p.111) believing in them, affirming that revelation came down to them, and other forms of infidelity and manifestations of atheism with which their authorised books and original sources—which they continue to print, distribute, and publish—overflow. The dreamers who think that a Shi‘i can forget [his] historical legacy and [his] old black hatred of the Nawasib4 as they fancifully call them, are like someone who calls on the Christians to renounce the idea of the crucifixion of the Messiah. Would a sensible person do this? These are a people who added to their infidelity and augmented their atheism with political cunning and a feverish effort to seize upon the crisis of governance and the balance of power in the state, whose features they are trying to draw and whose new

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is lines they are trying to establish through their political banners and organisations in cooperation with their hidden allies the Americans.” In this last sentence, Zarqawi broadens his argument and includes the political situation in Iraq. According to him, the Shi‘is have allied with the Americans in order to battle against true, i.e. Sunni, Islam and have to be fought mercilessly. In this and other texts, Zarqawi compares their modern alliance with the US with the alleged alliance between the Shi‘is and the Mongols in the thirteenth century. This narrative draws heavily on the writings of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), a prominent Hanbali theologian who serves as one of the main intellectual points of reference of current-day Jihadis. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the Shi‘is had conspired with the Mongols, thereby assisting them in bringing down the Abbasid caliphate. Most importantly, the Shi‘i Abbasid vizier Ibn al-‘Alqami is alleged to have assisted the Mongols in taking Baghdad in 1258.5 Zarqawi, just as other modern anti-Shi‘a authors, reiterated these claims as a striking historical parallel to the events in Iraq after 2003. Although other Jihadist factions challenged his strategy, Zarqawi further escalated anti-Shi‘a violence in Iraq. In September 2005, he declared a “total war” on the Shi‘is of Iraq. Even when Zarqawi died, his followers stuck to his strategy. In 2006 and 2007, it became clear that anti-Shi‘ism—Zarqawi style—had become a standard feature of Jihadi-Salafi discourse.

The Wahhabiyya and Anti-Shi‘Ism Zarqawi's and other Jihadis’ anti-Shi‘ism is hardly distinguishable from the antiShi‘ism which was developed by the Wahhabiyya. Many of their concepts (p. 112) are drawn from the writings of the religious scholars of this movement, most notably its eponymous founder, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhab

Wahhabi anti-Shi‘i teachings go back to the founder of the movement, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), who developed a profound hatred of the Shi‘is. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was an adherent of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780– 855), the famous founder of the Hanbali school of law. However, Ibn Hanbal was rather a traditionist (= hadith scholar) and theologian than a lawyer and doesn’t seem to have intended to found a school of law at all. As a traditionist, his main interest was in collecting, criticising and categorising hadith material, i.e. reports about the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. On the basis of the Qur’an and collections of trustworthy hadiths, Ibn Hanbal and fellow traditionists established what they regarded as true Islamic doctrine. These reports, however, had been transmitted by the companions of the prophet (sahaba), many of whom are not regarded as reliable by the Shi‘is because of their roles in the conflict over the rightful successors to the Prophet—the most important point of contention between Sunnis and Shi‘is. As a result of this conflict, the Shi‘is regarded many of these companions not only as untrustworthy, but claimed that they had in fact strayed from the true path of Page 5 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Islam. By the very nature of his occupation, Ibn Hanbal had to develop a robust anti-Shi‘ism. Many Hanbalis followed suit. Whenever later Hanbali scholars tried to reform their societies, they referred to Ibn Hanbal's hadith-based approach and thereby adopted his negative view of the Shi‘is as well. The Hanbali Ibn Taymiyya, who was a known traditionist as well, was a case in point, as well as Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab: He was mainly motivated by the fore-mentioned doctrinal aspects. Although it is possible that other influences played a role, this has not been established yet. He must have encountered Shi‘is during his travels before 1740, when he spent time in Mecca, Medina, Basra, and in al-Ahsa. In Medina, he studied with the Indian scholar Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi and seems to have adopted his focus on hadith studies from him.6 Most likely, he came into contact with Shi‘is and other anti-Shi‘a scholars during these years. These might have played a role in the development of his thought on the Shi‘is. (p.113) Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab summarized his thoughts about the Shi‘is in a short treatise called The Refutation of the Rejectionists (al-rafida).7 The term “rejectionists” (rawafid or rafida, Sg. rafidi) had already been used by Ibn Hanbal and refers to all those who deny the legitimacy of even the first two rightlyguided caliphs Abu Bakr (632–634) and ‘Umar (634–644), while defending ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib's right of succession to the prophet. It includes the so-called Twelver Shi‘is, who form the overwhelming majority of Shi‘is today. In the line of thought of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali critics of Shi‘i doctrine and practice, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab focused on the common topics radical Sunni thinkers have cited in order to prove that the Shi‘is are in fact heretics. While he cites numerous topics like the Shi‘is’ claim that the Prophet Muhammad had designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali as his heir apparent, the Shi‘is’ denial of the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and the practice of dissimulation (taqiya), his main point is a critique of the Shi‘is’ position towards the prophet's companions. Claiming that important companions have in fact strayed from the true path of Islam to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab means destroying the foundations of true Islam: “This is the destruction of the basis of religion, because its base is the Qur’an and the hadith ”.8 Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab not only aimed at a general return to the faith of the pious ancestors, but he wanted Muslim scholars to return to the sources, namely the Qur’an and—even more importantly—the Sunna. Criticising, or even reviling the first three rightly guided caliphs and other companions, who are among the most important guarantors of the authenticity of hadith material, means attacking the core of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's reform, arguably even the core of Sunnism. Shi‘a teachings simply ran counter to this goal. As a result, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not consider the Shi‘is to be Muslims but unbelievers (kuffar). To him, they were even more dangerous than Christians and even Jews because they claimed to be Muslims and thereby threatened to corrupt the true religion from within.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is The Later Wahhabiyya During Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's lifetime, relations with the Shi‘is were not a pressing topic for the young Saudi state. However, from shortly after his death until today, the subsequent Saudi states (1744/5–1818/1824–1891/1901– (p.114) present) had to cope with the question of how to deal with the Shi‘i infidels. Considerable Shi‘i populations lived in the Eastern oases of al-Ahsa (or al- Hasa) and in the cities of the Hijaz in the West. The question of how to deal with them on the territory of the Saudi-Wahhabi state became a constant source of tensions between the religious and the political elites of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi scholars stuck to the teachings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and reiterated his arguments in a number of anti-Shi‘a treatises. In some cases, their argumentation was more violent than Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's himself, but by and large, they did not differ. Anti-Shi‘ism became a standard feature of the Wahhabi lore and it seems to have been shared by the Saudi rulers as well. However, the Saudi rulers gave priority to pragmatic political deliberations when it came to the question of how to deal with the Shi‘is. In order to avoid major disturbances, the rulers rejected Wahhabi demands to force all Shi‘is to “convert to Islam” or exile or even kill all those who would not comply. Economic reasons must have played a role as well, as the Shi‘is lived in the most fertile region of Saudi Arabia and the state budget until the 1940s depended on the taxes from the Eastern province. Only once, in 1927, the Wahhabi ‘ulama came close to influencing Saudi religious policy up to the point where their vision of a policy towards the Shi‘is was fulfilled. It was a unique situation as the Wahhabi ‘ulama allied with the radical Wahhabi ikhwan movement. These were former bedouin who had been settled by the Saudi state from 1911 and had undergone Wahhabi religious indoctrination for years. As a result, they combined the military prowess of the Arabian camelherders with the fanaticism of the more radical trends in Wahhabism. When they revolted against the Saudi state in 1926 and 1927, the ruler Ibn Saud invited the Wahhabi scholars to act as arbitrators. In the fatwa that the leading scholars agreed upon in February 1927, they walked a fine line between their desire not to weaken the Saudi state and their ideological convictions. So while on the one hand they confirmed the ruler's prerogative to declare a holy war (jihad) against neighbouring countries, they supported the Ikhwan's demands for a more radical anti-Shi‘i policy: “As to the Shi‘i renegades (al-rafida) we have told the imam that our religious ruling is that they must be obliged to become true Muslims, and should not be allowed to perform the rites of their misguided religion publicly. It is incumbent on the imam to order his governor in Hasa to summon the Shi‘is to Shaykh Ibn Bishr [i.e. the Wahhabi judge of the oasis], before whom they should swear to follow the religion of God and his Page 7 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Prophet, to cease all prayers to the saintly members of the Prophet's house or (p.115) jihadi-salafism and the shi‘is others, to cease their heretical innovations (bid‘a) such as the commemoration rites performed on the anniversaries of members of the house of the Prophet and all other such rites of their misguided creed, and they should cease to visit their so-called sacred cities Karbala and Najaf. They must also be forced to attend the five prayers in the Mosques, along with the rest of the congregation. …. Any Shi‘is who refuse to keep with these rules must be exiled from Muslim territory. With regard to the Shi‘is of Qatif [a town nearly exclusively inhabited by Shi‘is] the imam should compel Shaykh Ibn Bishr to go and see personally that all the above-mentioned requirements are carried out. We have advised the imam to send missionaries and teachers to certain districts and villages which have only recently come under the rule of the Muslims, and to order his governors and other officials to bring these people back to Islam and forbid sinful behaviour.”9 The measures demanded in this fatwa were partly implemented in the following year, but abolished after the Ikhwan rebellion was subdued by Ibn Saud. If we consider that this was a fatwa in which the authors still exercised some restraint, the extent of the Wahhabi establishment's hatred of the Shi‘is becomes obvious. More radical scholars and their students held even more radical views. These are mirrored by famous fatwa s by leading scholars like ‘Abdallah ibn Jibrin, who in 1991 labelled the Shi‘is “polytheists” who might be lawfully killed by Muslims.

The Role of the Saudi State The Saudi state remained ambivalent about the treatment of the Shi‘is: It never allowed the Wahhabi radicals’ demands to be put into practice, but Shi‘is in Saudi Arabia suffered from a wide range of political, socio-economic and religious discriminations. Governmental arbitrariness intensified after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Shi‘i groups were increasingly seen as a threat to the internal stability of Saudi Arabia, but subsided somewhat after an agreement between the Shi‘i opposition-in-exile and the government in 1993. At the same time, however, the Wahhabi ‘ulama retained a monopoly on the public display of religiosity and religious policy in Saudi Arabia and were not only allowed but given the financial means and institutional basis by which they might spread their ideology abroad. From the early 1960s, the (p.116) Muslim World League and affiliated organisations began to spread Wahhabi ideology worldwide. With rising oil income after 1973, these institutions’ activities gained momentum. The decision to establish these organisations might be interpreted as compensation for the Wahhabi ‘ulama who were increasingly sidelined in Saudi politics by the ruling family. However, from the 1970s, and especially after 1979, the Muslim World League and its affiliates gained strategic political importance for the Saudi state. Their financing of Sunni educational institutions and other infrastructure and support of Islamist movements of different Page 8 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is orientations served the Saudi state in its bid to contain revolutionary Iran, especially in Pakistan, but also in Afghanistan and the Arab World. The Saudi government, semi-governmental institutions like the World League and private donors joined hands in the financing of anti-Iranian and anti-Shi‘i militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Educational and missionary efforts supported this policy. Confessionalism became a weapon used by the Saudi Arabian regime in order to counter the Iranian threat all over the region. The results were not only an upsurge in anti-Shi‘i violence in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s and heightened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also a protracted war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988). Without generous support by the Arab Gulf states, Saddam Hussein would have lost the war years before it actually ended. Domestic considerations played an important role in shaping this policy, as Shi‘is had revolted against the Saudi state in late 1979 and again in early 1980. By containing Iran, the Saudi government hoped to reduce the threat to the stability of Eastern province. On an ideological level, it seems as if the Saudi state gave Wahhabi scholars the green light for a religious propaganda campaign against Iran and the Shi‘is. This was an especially serious development because Saudi Arabia was no longer the regional backwater that it had been until the 1940s. The country's oil wealth and the various geopolitical changes meant that it became a leading Arab state from the 1960s, and its conflict with Iran an issue of world politics. As a consequence, from 1979, the Persian Gulf became an epicentre of global instability.

Anti-Shi‘Ism In Syria and the Iranian Revolution From the 1980s, an increasing number of Syrian Islamists and Salafis developed their own, slightly different brand of anti-Shi‘ism. It was influenced by Wahhabi and Salafi thought, but was more concerned with the current political situation and especially the alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria's allegedly Alawite regime. (p.117) The Intellectual Roots of Anti-Shi‘Ism In Syria

Until the early twentieth century, Sunni anti-Shi‘ism was especially strong in the traditional centres of the Hanbali school of law (and theology), namely in Najd, Baghdad, and Damascus. However, it was a phenomenon that spread over the boundaries of these centres after a political and intellectual shift within the “classical” salafiyya. While its founding fathers, Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and even Rashid Rida (1865–1935), in the earlier years of his career, had not adopted anti- Shi‘ism, this changed in the 1920s. Rida and others came under the influence of the Wahhabism and the Saudi state and became increasingly hostile towards Shi‘ism. This emerging “right wing” (Werner Ende) of the classical Salafi movement adopted Wahhabi anti-Shi‘ism.10 Scholars and intellectuals like the Iraqi Hanbali Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857–1924) in Baghdad and the Syrian Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1886–

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is 1969) in Damascus and Cairo became the leading proponents of Salafi antiShi‘ism in the first half of the twentieth century. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib became famous as an editor of classical Arabic literature, a publisher of magazines, a journalist, and the owner of the Matba‘a al-Salafiyya printing press in Cairo.11 He authored articles and fore- and afterwords to the books he printed. Based on his reception of Ibn Taymiyya's writings and close relations to the Wahhabiyya, he developed an intense antiShi‘ism. In his major work in this context, Guidelines to the Foundations on which the Religion of the Twelver Shi‘a is based,12 he flatly denied that Shi‘is were indeed Muslims. First published in 1960/61, it has become standard reading for Salafis anti-Shi‘is today. Although he spent many years in Cairo, Khatib not only contributed to the spread of anti-Shi‘ism over the Arab world, but also in his home country Syria. Due to the increasing influence of the (p. 118) Salafi movement's right wing, anti-Shi‘ism gained wider acceptance among Muslims in the Arab East. However, until the 1970s the Salafis’ antiShi‘ism still remained an intellectual phenomenon. Even the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged in the 1930s and which was partly influenced by Khatib and Rida, at first didn’t develop any pronounced anti-Shi‘ism. It was the combination of ideological influence of the likes of Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib and a special political situation which led anti-Shi‘ism to become an important factor among Syrian Islamists and Salafis after 1979. The Iranian Revolution and the Emergence of Syrian Anti-Shi‘Ism

After the coup d’état in 1963, the new Baath party government quickly outlawed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. As a consequence, sporadic conflicts erupted between the Islamists and the Syrian government in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1976 and 1982, they culminated in a bloody civil war in which both sides fought with utmost brutality. It effectively ended in 1982, when Syrian troops quelled an open rebellion in the city of Hama. During the 1960s, conflicts between the Brotherhood and the Syrian state didn’t have any confessional dimension: Sunni Islamists rather protested against the policies of the leftist Baath regime. However, after the Alawi Hafiz al-Asad took power in 1970, the confessional dimension grew in importance: the Alawis are a minority that— mainly for political reasons—claims to be an offshoot of Twelver Shi‘ism.13 In their propaganda, the Muslim Brotherhood and other militant groups increasingly targeted the regime's alleged sectarian character and openly labelled the Alawis “unbelievers” (kuffar).14 This was consistent with the widespread view among Sunnis in Syria that the Alawis were heretics rather than Shi‘i Muslims. From the mid-1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly played the sectarian card and Islamist insurgents targeted not only Alawi members of the regime but also members of their community as such. However, the relations between the Alawis and the Twelver Shi‘is only became a topic after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is At first, the Syrian Islamists seem to have hesitated about possible consequences of the events in Iran for their project. On the one hand, Ayatollah (p.119) Khomeini and his followers had proven that an Islamist movement was able to topple the regime of one of the most important states of the region. Some Islamists even hoped that the Iranian revolutionaries might support likeminded Sunni movements. As a consequence, Sa‘id Hawwa, the leading ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, is said to have proposed to Ayatollah Khomeini an alliance which the latter rejected, however. On the other hand, the Syrian regime had entertained good relations with Khomeini during the 1970s already. This short flirtation finally ended in September 1980 when Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Iran, with Syria being the only Arab country to side with Iran. This alliance influenced the relations between the Syrian Islamists and the Iranian revolutionaries as well. The Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamists from 1980 bitterly attacked Iran and broadened their anti-Alawi propaganda to an allout attack on Shi‘ism. Instead, Baathist Iraq became an important source of support for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Syrian authors connected to the Muslim Brotherhood authored an especially high number of anti-Shi‘i publications after 1979.15 The most important protagonist of the Muslim Brotherhood's anti-Shi‘ism was Sa‘id Hawwa (1935–1989), the leading ideologue of the Syrian Brotherhood in the 1970s and 80s.16 In 1987, he published a booklet under the title Khomeini, Deviation in Doctrines, Deviation in Positions.17 It contains a short critique of Twelver Shi‘ism in general and Khomeini's ideology in particular. The text in its first part contains passages quite similar to standard Hanbali anti-Shi‘i polemics: For instance, Hawwa criticises the Shi‘is’ excessive veneration of the imams, the alleged Shi‘i belief that the Qur’anic text had been tampered with, and their rejection of the prophet's companions. In a second part, Hawwa focuses his argumentation on political aspects of Shi‘i-Sunni rivalry. In the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya, he cites several examples of prominent Shi‘is who allegedly allied themselves with the “unbelievers” against the “Muslims”: One of the persons he names is the famous medieval theologian Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201–1274), whom he blames for having convinced the Mongol Khan Hülegü to end the Abbasid caliphate. Hawwa further cites the (p.120) Abbasid vizier Ibn al-‘Alqami who allegedly assisted the Mongols in taking Baghdad in 1258 before addressing current conflicts between Shi‘is and Sunnis. According to Hawwa, Khomeini's revolution is just another episode in this history of Shi‘i betrayals of Islam and their collaboration with the infidels. By its quest for regional hegemony, the revolution has weakened the Muslim community (umma) and threatens to spread and take over all the territories inhabited by Shi‘is in Iraq and the Gulf region. In fact, the picture painted by Hawwa closely resembles that presented by anti-Shi‘i treatises after 2003. While Hawwa was obviously motivated by his hatred for what he considered to be an Alawi regime in Syria, he tries to convince his audience that there is a wider cooperation between the Page 11 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Shi‘is and “the enemies of Islam” like the regime of Hafiz al-Asad and the state of Israel. His treatise has influenced anti-Shi‘i writers and activists in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq ever since. Salafi anti-Shi‘Ism Among Syrians

Sa‘id Hawwa cannot be considered a Salafi, and although he draws on some ideas prevalent in Salafi anti-Shi‘ism, he stands rather for the more politically motivated anti-Shi‘ism of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. From the 1980s, other Syrians went further: one of the most influential anti-Shi‘i books of the 1980s was written by the Syrian Muhammad Surur Zain al-‘Abidin (b. 1938).18 His Then Came the Turn of the Fire-Worshippers, which he published under the pseudonym ‘Abdallah Muhammad al-Gharib in 1981 or 1983, became one of the most influential anti-Shi‘a treatises during the 1980s and 1990s.19 Surur had been a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood since the 1960s, when he studied in Damascus. In the late 1960s, he moved to Saudi Arabia and thence to Kuwait, where he seems to have written the book. In 1984, he settled in Britain and became known as the head of a Salafi trend called the “Sururiyya ”—a term rejected by the Sururis themselves. In his teachings, Surur combines Salafi thought and practice in the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya—including a pronounced anti-Shi‘ism—with the revolutionary (p.121) concepts of the Muslim Brotherhood as worked out by Sayyid Qutb.20 As a consequence, they have been criticised as overly politicised by more purist, non-political Salafis. The Jihadists, for their part, criticise the Sururis for cooperating with apostate regimes in the Arab world because they have proved to be more moderate in outlook than al-Qaeda and similar organisations. Then Came the Turn of the Fire-Worshippers, is typical for a Syrian anti-Shi‘a author insofar as he equates all Shi‘a groups past and present, ignoring the differences between the Twelver Shi‘is and different sects like the Nusayris and Alawis.21 More comprehensive than Hawwa, Surur focuses on the Iranians (“fire-worshippers” or “majus ” in his derogatory terminology) and introduces a long list of Shi‘i sects as proof of “Persian conspiracies” against Islam. He then specifies aspects of Khomeini's ideology and the Iranians’ alleged designs for hegemony in the Arab East and the Persian Gulf region. Notwithstanding the ideological distance between the Jihadis and the Sururiyya, Surur's anti-Shi‘i book has had, as has been shown by Nibras Kazimi, a decisive influence on the content of Zarqawi's anti-Shi‘i speeches.22 Possibly, Zarqawi came into contact with Surur's thought and works through Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi, who had lived in Kuwait until 1991 and—although he is critical of Surur and his teachings—is very likely to have come into personal contact with Surur and his followers there.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is The main influences on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's anti-Shi‘ism seem to have been the Wahhabiyya and some trends in Syrian Islamism. It is no coincidence that most foreign fighters in Iraq over the years since 2003 have been Saudis and Syrians, who have been attracted not only by the opportunity to fight the US in the heart of the Arab world and by al-Qaeda's call to join the jihad there, but also by Zarqawi's pronounced anti-Shi‘i strategy.23 Furthermore, Iraqis represented an important part of Zarqawi's organisation: while the (p.122) leadership seems to have been dominated by foreigners, most recruits were Iraqis. For them, too, Zarqawi's strategic blueprint proved to be extremely attractive. Since the nineteenth century, anti-Shi‘ism had been popular among Hanbali and Hanbaliinspired scholars and intellectuals in Baghdad, who entertained relations with the Wahhabis in Central Arabia. Members of the Alusi family had already developed a pronounced anti-Shi‘ism during the nineteenth century. But it was Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi who became most influential with his abbreviation of the Indian scholar Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al- Dihlawi's anti-Shi‘i treatise The Twelver Shi‘a Gift24 which was later published by Khatib in Cairo in 1953/4.25 In the course of the twentieth century, anti- Shi‘ism remained strong among the Sunnis of Iraq, but its consequences were controlled by the different regimes. Saddam Hussein used it as a tool in mobilising the Sunnis against Iran during the 1990s, but relied more on nationalist argumentations focusing on the age-old struggle between Arabs and Persians. When his regime fell, Sunnis quickly developed a profound anti-Shi‘ism, focusing on the leading roles Shi‘is played in the new Iraq and Iran's alleged influence on the Iraqi Shi‘is. The Jihadi-Salafis were only the most radical among these groups and attracted a large following of several thousand Iraqis. Anti-Shi‘ism proved to be an ideal ideology to muster the support of Iraqis. However, other Jihadists rejected Zarqawi's strategy. Most importantly, the alQaeda leadership protested the indiscriminate killings of Muslims in Iraq. Although bin Laden and his organisation have been heavily influenced by antiShi‘i thinking, al-Qaeda had long chosen not to alienate Shi‘is. Al-Qaeda did not want to lose its focus on the fight against authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world and against the West, the United States in particular. In a letter dated July 2005, bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri addressed Zarqawi and criticised his strategy, albeit very cautiously.26 Stressing the importance of popular support in order for the Jihadists to win the struggle against their enemies, he presents his criticism of Zarqawi's strategy in the form of leading questions: “Indeed, questions will circulate among mujahedeen circles and their opinion makers about the correctness of this conflict with the Shi‘a at this time. Is it something that is (p.123) unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put off until the force of the mujahed movement in Iraq gets stronger? And if some of the operations were necessary for self-defence, were all of the operations necessary? Or, were there some operations that weren’t called for? And is the opening of another front now in addition to the front Page 13 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is against the Americans and the government a wise decision? Or, does this conflict with the Shi‘a lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shi‘a, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar? And if the attacks on Shi’a leaders were necessary to put a stop to their plans, then why were there attacks on ordinary Shi‘is? Won’t this lead to reinforcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent on us to preach the call of Islam to them and explain and communicate to guide them to the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all of the Shi‘a in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shi‘a considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance?27 And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shi‘a? And do the brothers forget that we have more than one hundred prisoners—many of whom are from the leadership who are wanted in their countries—in the custody of the Iranians? And even if we attack the Shi‘a out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures? And do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?” The cautious tone doesn’t hide the unease with which the al-Qaeda leadership followed the events in Iraq. The letter and the following events made clear that al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia remained an independent organisation: rather than heeding Zawahiri's advice, Zarqawi intensified his propaganda war by calling for a “total war” on the Shi‘is in September 2005. Bin Laden and Zawahiri were not only unable to influence Zarqawi, but were rather forced to accept his anti-Shi‘a strategy. From 2005, anti-Shi‘a contents played an increasing role in al-Qaeda's public declarations.28 Nevertheless, Zawahiri in his letter made clear that he and al-Qaeda shared the fundamental belief that the Shi‘is were in fact dangerous heretics intent on allying themselves with the enemies of Islam: “People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the Twelver school of Shi‘ism. It is a religious school based on excess and falsehood whose function is to accuse the companions of Muhammad of heresy in a campaign against Islam, …. Their prior history in cooperating with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the Crusaders.” (p.124) Zawahiri concludes that “The collision between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shi‘a is a matter that will happen sooner or later. This is the judgement of history, and these are the fruits to be expected from the rejectionist Shi‘a sect and their opinion of the Sunnis.” By stating that he didn’t disagree with Zarqawi's anti-Shi‘ism as such, but rather with its practical implementation in the framework of an anti-Shi‘a strategy in Iraq after 2003, Page 14 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Zawahiri made clear that he shared Zarqawi's view of the Shi‘is as unbelievers. Rather, Zawahiri proposed a different strategy, whereby the United States and the West should be targeted first, while the fight against the Shi‘as would follow after the emergence of a true Islamic state. Although Zawahiri represents a more moderate trend among Jihadists than Zarqawi, his view still mirrors the extreme hatred prevalent among JihadiSalafis which they have inherited from the Wahhabiyya. Thus, even if Jihadist anti-Shi‘ism will lose some of its appeal after the end of the conflict in Iraq, it will remain an important factor as long as Jihadist movements play a role in world and regional politics. However, the overall consequences of the events in Iraq for relations between Sunnis and Shi‘as are not perfectly clear yet. As Jihadists and non-violent Salafis (who are, after all, linked by their anti-Shi‘a attitudes) will remain a force for the foreseeable future and as Iran is probably on its way to a stronger political position in the Gulf region and the Arab East, the confessional dimension of regional conflicts will remain in force. If Iran continues its quest for regional hegemony, many Sunni Arab governments will be tempted to play the sectarian card, just like Saudi Arabia did after 1979. If that should be the case, the Sunni-Shi‘a divide will rapidly grow in importance in the future. Bibliography Bibliography references: al-Alusi, al-Sayyid Mahmud Shukri, Mukhtasar al-tuhfa al-Ithna ‘Ashariya, allafa aslahu bi-l-lugha al-farisiya Allamat al-Hind Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ghulam Hakim alDihlawi, Cairo 1953/4. ———, Ghara’ib fiqhiya ‘inda al-Shi‘a al-Imamiya, ed. by Majid al-Khalifa, n.p. 1984, Ende, Werner, Arabische Nation und islamische Geschichte: Die Umayyaden im Urteil arabischer Autoren des 20. Jahrhunderts, Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1977. ———, ‘Ehe auf Zeit (mut‘a) in der innerislamischen Diskussion der Gegenwart’, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 20, no. 1/2 (1980), pp. 1–43. ———, ‘Sunni Polemical Writings on the Shi‘a and the Iranian Revolution’, in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Boulder: Westview, 1999. (p.125) al-Khatib, Muhibb al-Din, al-Khutut al-‘arida li-l-usus allati qama ‘alayha din al-Shi‘a al- Imamiya al-Ithna ‘Ashariyya, Cairo 1968.

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Kramer, Martin, ‘Syria's Alawis and Shiism’, in Martin Kramer, (ed.), Shiism, Resistance and Revolution, Boulder: Westview, 1987. Steinberg, Guido, The Iraqi Insurgency: Actors, Strategies, and Structures, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2006 (SWP-Research Paper 13/06). ———, ‘Wahhabi ‘Ulama and the State in Saudi Arabia 1927’ (incl. the text of ‘The Wahhabi ‘Ulama's Fatwa Concerning the Demands of the Ikhwan, 11 February 1927)’, in Camron Michael Amin (et al.) (eds), The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 57– 61. Voll, John, ‘Muhammad Hayya as-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth Century Medina’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 38, no. 1 (1975), pp. 32–9. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn,al-Radd ‘ala al-rafida, n.p., n.d., http:// tawhed.ws/r?i=1381. Weismann, Itzchak, ‘Sa’id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba‘thist Syria’, Studia Islamica, vol. 85 (1997), pp. 131–54. al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus‘ab, ‘Text of Al-Zarqawi Message Threatening More Attacks’, in: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/zarqawi040604.html. Notes:

(1) The letter was published on the website of the Coalition Provisional Authority, http://cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html. (2) New York Times, 3 March 2004 (“At Least 143 Die in Attacks at Two Sacred Sites in Iraq”). (3) There are widespread doubts—not shared by the author of this article—as to the authenticity of the January letter. Zarqawi reiterated his statements in an audio-tape published in early April 2004. See ‘Text of Al-Zarqawi Message Threatening More Attacks’, in: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ zarqawi040604.html, accessed July 5, 2004. (4) nasibi/nawasib is a derogatory term used by Shi‘as to name Sunnis, especially radicals among them, who hate the Shi‘as and—allegedly—the family of the Prophet. The term is often used for Wahhabis, Salafis and Jihadists. (5) His most comprehensive treatment of the subject is a speech that was recorded shortly before his death, Hal ataka hadith al-afida? [Has Word of the

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is Rejectionists Reached You?], http://tawhed.ws/r?i=4048,accessed January 28, 2008. (6) John Voll, ‘Muhammad Hayya as-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth Century Medina’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 38, no. 1 (1975), pp. 32–9. (7) Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, al-Radd ‘ala al-rafida, n.p., n.d., http:// tawhed.ws/r?i=1381, accessed on January 29, 2008. (8) Ibid ., p. 6. (9) The full text of the fatwa can be found in Guido Steinberg : ‘Wahhabi ‘Ulama and the State in Saudi Arabia 1927 (incl. the text of ‘The Wahhabi ‘Ulama's Fatwa Concerning the Demands of the Ikhwan, 11 February 1927)’, in Camron Michael Amin (et al.) (eds), The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 57–61. (10) Werner Ende, ‘Ehe auf Zeit (mut‘a) in der innerislamischen Diskussion der Gegenwart’, Die Welt des Islams vol. 20, no. 1/2 (1980), pp. 1–43 (p. 32f.). Regarding the ‘right wing of the Salafiya’ see Werner Ende, Arabische Nation und islamische Geschichte: Die Umayyaden im Urteil arabischer Autoren des 20. Jahrhunderts, Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1977, p. 92. (11) On his biography see Ende, Arabische Nation, pp. 91ff. (12) Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, al-Khutut al-‘arida li-l-usus allati qama ‘alayha din al-Shi‘a al-Imamiya al-Ithna ‘Ashariyya, Cairo 1968. The book was first published in Arabic in Jedda 1960/1. According to Werner Ende there was an earlier edition in Urdu. See his ‘Sunni Polemical Writings on the Shi‘a and the Iranian Revolution’, in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Boulder: Westview, 1999, p. 231, footnote 50. (13) At the instigation of Hafiz al-Asad, the Lebanese Shi‘a cleric Musa as-Sadr (1928–1978) in 1973 certified that the Alawites are indeed part of the Twelver Shi‘a. See Martin Kramer, “Syria's Alawis and Shiism”, in Martin Kramer, (ed.), Shiism, Resistance and Revolution, Boulder: Westview, 1987, pp. 246–9. (14) Hans Günter Lobmeyer, Islamismus und sozialer Konflikt in Syrien, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch 1990, pp. 44ff. (15) Ende, “Sunni Polemical Writings”, p. 226. (16) On Hawwa's life and thought cp. Itzchak Weismann, ‘Sa’id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria’, Middle Eastern Studies

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is vol. 29 (October 1993), pp. 601–23; Itzchak Weismann, ‘Sa’id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba‘thist Syria’, Studia Islamica, vol. 85 (1997), pp. 131–54. (17) Sa‘id Hawwa, Khomeini: Shudhudh fi-l-aqa’id, shudhudh fi-l-mawaqif, Amman 1407/1987. From 1978, Hawwa lived in exile in Amman, where he died in 1989. (18) For a brief biography of Muhammad Surur Zain al-‘Abidin, see the section on biographies of Salafis at the end of this volume; for other references to Surur, see chapter 2 and chapter 7. (19) ‘Abdallah Muhammad al-Gharib: Wa-ja’a dawr al-majus: al-Ab‘ad al-tarikhiya wa-l- ‘aqa’idiya wa-l-siyasiyya li-l-thawra al-Iraniya, n.p., n.d. The Arabic and Persian word “Majus” originally means Zoroastrian and gained a derogatory meaning only after 1979, when it was used to describe Iranians as non-Muslim fire-worshippers. (20) al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 28 October 2004 (Muhammad Surur left Syria after the disaster of the Ikhwan). (21) Ende, ‘Sunni Polemical Writings’, p. 226. (22) Nibras Kazimi, ‘Zarqawi's Anti-Shia Legacy: Original or Borrowed?’, in Hillel Fradkin (et al.), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 4, Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2006, pp. 53–71 (p. 55f.). (23) On the nationalities of foreign fighters in Iraq see, Guido Steinberg, The Iraqi Insurgency: Actors, Strategies, and Structures, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2006 (SWP-Research Paper 13/06), p. 25f. (24) al-Sayyid Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, Mukhtasar al-tuhfa al-Ithna ‘Ashariya, allafa aslahu bi-l-lugha al-farisiya Allamat al-Hind Shah Abdalaziz Ghulam Hakim al-Dihlawi, Cairo 1953/4. Alusi had finished the text in 1883/84. (25) He also wrote a work entitled Juridical Peculiarities of the Imamite Shi‘is (Ghara’ib fiqhiya ‘inda al-Shi‘a al-Imamiya), ed. by Majid al-Khalifa, n.p. 1984. (26) http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahirizarqawiletter_9jul2005.htm,accessed January 25, 2008. (27) The widespread view among Sunni legal specialists is that ordinary Shi‘is should not be punished for their heretical views because they had not been taught true Islam. (28) Michael Scheuer, “Abu Yahya al-Libi: Al-Qaeda's Theological Enforcer, Part 2 ”, Terrorism Focus vol. 4, no. 27 (14 August 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/ terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373619, accessed January 26, 2008. Page 18 of 19

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Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi‘Is

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Salafism In Pakistan

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Salafism In Pakistan The Ahl-e Hadith Movement Mariam Abou Zahab

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0006

Abstract and Keywords This chapter gives an analysis of the different Salafi currents in Pakistan, such as the Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith, Markaz Da’wa wal Irshad, Lashkar-e Taiba, and several other movements. It traces the development of the madrasa system and the influence it has on Pakistani society. Keywords:   Pakistan, wal Irshad, Ahl-e Hadith, madrasa

Salafis are known as Ahl-e Hadith in South Asia and have relatively few followers in Pakistan, where they have been active since the nineteenth century. They have maintained close ties with the Saudi religious establishment since the 1960s, ties which were reinforced when thousands of Arabs came to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although there has been some convergence of Salafi theology and Deobandi sectarian political ideology in recent years, along with an overlapping of personnel in organisations belonging to different schools of thought, the focus of this paper is on the Ahl-e Hadith movement and its jihadi expression in Kashmir.

The Historical Context The Jama‘at Ahl-e Hadith, an elitist politico-religious movement aimed at islah (reform), has its origins in the early 1870s. Like other Sunni reform movements, it claims to continue the tradition of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi (1703–1762) whom it regards as the first modern Ahl-e Hadith member and draws on ideas of Syed Ahmed Barelvi (Ahmed Shaheed) (1786–1831), follower of Shah Abdul Aziz Page 1 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan (1746–1824), the son of Shah Waliullah, and the Yemenite qadi Mohammad ibn Ali al Shawkani (1775–1839).1 In the late (p.127) nineteenth century, the princely state of Bhopal became a centre for the Ahl-e Hadith around Siddique Hasan Khan (1832–1890) and Maulana Syed Nazir Hussain (1805–1902). The former belonged to a prominent Shi‘a2 family from Awadh State; his father had converted to Sunnism under the influence of Shah Abdul Aziz who taught the religious sciences, particularly hadith, in Delhi with his three brothers. Maulana Nazir Hussain, the first ideologue of the Ahl-e Hadith, had studied under Shah Muhammad Ishaq (1782–1846), the grandson of Shah Waliullah and his khalifa. Thus they constructed a spiritual-cum-genealogical “Ahl-e Hadith family tree”.3 The leadership of the movement belonged to socially eminent families,4 descendants of the Mughals and Awadh aristocracy, many of them sayyid. But most of these families had fallen on poor times after the British colonisation of India; they had a sense of social dislocation and were disturbed by what they felt to be the decadence of the Muslim community. In order to unite the Muslims and to revive and strengthen their faith, they insisted on a return to the original sources of the faith, the Qur’an and the hadith,5 “they drew on them as their major marker of identity”6 to restore Islam from what they perceived as bida‘ (innovations), deviations and superstitions.

Doctrines and Principles The Ahl-e Hadith recognise only the Qur’an and the hadith as legal sources— with qiyas (analogy) and ijma‘ (consensus). They claim not to follow any specific school of jurisprudence and proudly call themselves ghayr muqallid (nonconformists). For them, following a madhhab (school of jurisprudence) is tantamount to the personality worship of its founder.7 In addition, they advocate ijtihad (independent reasoning), making it “the focal point of their identity”,8 but confining it to the sufficiently qualified. (p.128) Puritanical in matters of faith and practices, they criticise Sufism as being a wrongful innovation and are hostile to the syncretic practices of most South Asian Muslims, particularly the Barelwis, who are regarded as bida‘-akin to shirk (associationism). They want to purge the religion of “unislamic” Hindu borrowings and of all customs that could be criticised by non-Muslims. They accuse Sufis of including non-Muslim traditions in their practice and of compromising the shari‘a. As for the Barelwis, who place emphasis on Sufisaints as intermediaries, have cults centred on shrines and holy relics, and venerate the Prophet as being made of light (nur) and having supernatural powers, Ahl-e Hadith consider them as ignorant, shrine-worshippers, even heretics. According to the Ahl-e Hadith, the major problem in South Asia is not irregularity in prayers, but shirk9 which is why such efforts are being made towards installing the concept of tawhid. The Ahl-e Hadith condemn the invoking of the Prophet or of a saint in prayer, as this is considered to be shirk. Other Page 2 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan customs they condemn are: supplication at graves, including the grave of the Prophet; the celebration of the death anniversary (urs) of a saint (qawwali), including the giyarwin sharif of Abdul Qadir Gilani;10 the wearing of taawiz (amulets) and the belief in their healing power; the practice of magic; the fast on particular days dedicated to saints; the distribution of food for marriages, funerals and religious festivals; the recitation of durud (praise of the Prophet) in mosques; the celebration of Milad un-Nabi (birth of the Prophet) and of Hindu festivals, and Shi‘a customs. They also introduced a new, highly visible, style of namaz (prayer) that makes them distinct from the Hanafis. The Ahl-e Hadith say amin out loud (amin bil jahr), lift their hands as they bow (rafa‘ al yadayn), fold their hands above the navel and repeat the Fatiha out loud along with the imam, claiming that Shah Waliullah prayed that way.11 As a result, they have faced regular opposition and expulsion from Hanafimosques. They oppose all those whose beliefs differ from theirs, including the Deobandis, convinced that they alone embody the authentic faith. Both the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis are the product of the colonial context. (p.129) And although they share a reliance on Shah Waliullah with the Deobandis, the Ahl-e Hadith do not recognise the Hanafischool of law, on which the Deobandi doctrine is based.12 The Deobandis place the hadith at the centre of their education but unlike the Ahl-e Hadith, they accept Sufism. The Ahl-e Hadith accuse Deobandis of fabricating hadiths and do not accept the interpretative tradition of Hanafis. The Ahl-e Hadith target Deobandis as mushrikin, worshipping graves (quburiyin) for their practice of offering fateha13 on shrines and their veneration of the Prophets. To justify themselves, they have, from the outset, engaged in big public debates against the reformist Hindus of the Arya Samaj and the Christian missionaries and have been very active in preaching and publishing pamphlets in Urdu, Arabic and Persian.

The Arab Connection Due to certain similarities with the Wahhabis, questions were asked of their connections as, like them, the Ahl-e Hadith greatly valued Ibn Taymiyya and translated his writings into Urdu. Furthermore they met Wahhabis during the pilgrimage, read their books and associated with the Arab ‘ulama who had migrated to India and settled in Bhopal. However the influence of the Arab Wahhabis was denied and it was pointed out that as the Wahhabis were Hanbali they were not real Salafis, instead they emphasised their links to Shah Waliullah. This was mainly to avoid being suspected by the British of political activism and of following the jihadi tradition of Syed Ahmed Barelvi, the socalled “Wahhabi movement”. But, “at the same time, they retained connections to the local networks of the Indian ‘Wahhabis’, suppressed by the British in 1863 and Page 3 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan sentenced in the so-called Wahhabi trials between 1868 and 1871”.14 Nazir Husain was even suspected of links with the mujahidin and imprisoned. The Ahle Hadith eventually persuaded the British colonial administration to drop the word Wahhabi from official correspondence. Until about 1910, they actively engaged in religious reform and professed loyalty to British rule. Gradually, they grew into a sectarian movement and by holding all-India conferences became more visible.15 (p.130) “From the 1920s onwards, accelerating after the 1970s [the Ahl-e Hadith] developed international connections with the Salafiya and the Wahhabiyya in Arabia, building on old networks of personal contacts with the Hijaz.”16 One of the prominent Ahl-e Hadith scholars was Sheikh Abdul Ghaffar Hassan (1913–2007). Born in Umarpur, near Delhi, he migrated to Pakistan after partition in 1947. Interestingly, he was associated with the Jamaat-e Islami from 1941 to 1957 and left due to differences with Maududi about the way to establish an Islamic state, through elections or by educating the masses. Abdul Ghaffar Hassan was in favour of education. He then established a school in Faisalabad. In 1964 a delegation from Saudi Arabia came to Pakistan and he was selected, together with Hafiz Mohammad Gondalavi, the father-in-law of Ehsan Ellahi Zaheer, to teach at the Islamic University in Medina. He replaced Sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani and taught hadith for sixteen years in Medina; he was very close to Ibn Baz and among his most famous students were Safar al-Hawali and Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi‘i. Back in Pakistan he was engaged in da‘wa activities till his death. Since the 1980s, this elitist group with an urban following has made inroads into Pakistani society as migrant workers and alumni of Medina University have introduced Salafi ideas from Saudi Arabia. The appeal of literalist Islam is due to the Afghan jihad, sponsorship by the state and the expansion of madrasas financed by Saudis. After the Gulf War in 1991, Saudi Arabia shifted its patronage from the Jamaat-e Islami17 to Ahl-e Hadith and created Salafi establishments in Pakistan. The Ahl-e Hadith received millions of dollars and developed a publishing empire with worldwide distribution.

The Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (MJAH) There are 17 Ahl-e Hadith organisations in Pakistan, six of them taking part in politics and three engaging in jihad, the others focus on da’wa and the establishment of a network of madrasas.18 The Ahl-e Hadith suffer from significant fragmentation and there is intense internal strife over differences in ritual and strategy; much time is spent refuting other groups. Some reject the political system as batil (false) and do not take part in politics while others participate in elections. There are also differences over jihad, some advocating (p.131) jihad bi-l-nafs (effort to better oneself) and others jihad bi-l-sayf (violent Page 4 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan jihad), some considering jihad as a fardh-e ain (individual duty) and others as a fardh kifaya (collective duty). The Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (MJAH) is the main Salafi organisation in Pakistan. It traces its origins to the All India Ahl-e Hadith Conference which took place in Arah (Bihar) in 1906. This organisation came to the forefront in 1986 in Lahore under the leadership of Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer,19 who transformed the Jamiat into a political party closely associated with the Pakistan Muslim League. The MJAH is part of the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA), the alliance of religious parties, where it is represented by its chairman, Professor Sajid Mir. The MJAH has several subsidiary organisations, one of which is the Ahl-e Hadith Youth Force, a group with a great ability to mobilise the youth, they take part in sectarian disputes against Shi‘is and Barelwis and take over Barelwi mosques. The other important subsidiary is Tehrik-e Mujahidin, a jihadi outfit that emerged in 1989 in Indian-held Kashmir and sent its recruits to Afghanistan for training.20 Linked to the MJAH since 2000 (the MJAH absorbed Tehrik-e Mujahidin in response to objections that it was not militant and was only interested in politics), it has a training camp near Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir). Apart from fighting the kuffar, Tehrik-e Mujahidin, which is funded by the Haramayn Foundation, strives to defend the pure ‘aqida (faith) in Indian-held Kashmir where it has converted many Barelwi mosques into Ahl-e Hadith mosques. The contact with Saudi Arabia was established when (p.132) the Ahle Hadith started the Tahaffuz-e Haramain-e Sharifain Movement in 1985 after Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca during the Hajj.

The Madrasa Network The greatest asset of the MJAH is the Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya, which controls Salafimadrasas all over Pakistan21 . According to the Ministry of Interior, there were some 20,000 madrasas in Pakistan in 2000. In 1947 there were only 245 madrasas in West Pakistan. Although it is generally taken for granted that the mushroom growth of seminaries was linked to the Afghan jihad, their number increased considerably between 1988 and 2000 and the proliferation of madrasas during General Musharraf 's rule, notably in Islamabad.22 The largest number of madrasas are Deobandi (65 per cent) with only 6 per cent Ahl-e Hadith, but the increase in the number of Ahl-e Hadith seminaries has been phenomenal, going up from 134 in 1988 to 310 in 2000 (131 per cent). According to some sources, they now number 500 of whom about 300 are affiliated to the Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya and the Islamic University of Medina. In 2006, according to the Pakistani government, 34,000 students23 were studying in Ahl-e Hadith madrasas compared to 18,800 in 1996.

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Salafism In Pakistan Interestingly this massive increase coincides with a similar growth of Shi‘a madrasas since 2000 as if there was renewed competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran on Pakistani soil. The Ahl-e Hadith madrasas teach the dars-e nizami — the curriculum developed in the eighteenth century by Mulla Nizamuddin and which is taught in Pakistani madrasas, including Shi‘a madrasas —but with an emphasis on Qur’an and hadith.24 Contrary to madrasas affiliated to other schools of thought, the Ahl-e Hadith madrasas merge Islamic education with a modern curriculum and have been teaching Pakistan studies, English,25 mathematics and science for a long time. Many madrasas (p.133) have a high school that follows the national curriculum and prepares students for matriculation (secondary school certificate) and B.A. exams. The main Ahl-e Hadith madrasa26 is Jamaa Salafiya in Faisalabad, whose director is Sajid Mir, and which is also the headquarter of Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya. It is a centre of tablighi (missionary work, preaching) and jihadi activities and of the Ahl-e Hadith Youth Force that is involved in sectarian activities. The Jamaa Salafiya in Islamabad is affiliated to the Medina and Umm al-Qura universities. The madrasa of Mamun Kanjan, in Faisalabad district, founded in 1921, has the biggest religious library in Pakistan. Jamaa Dirasat ul Salafiya in Swat, founded in 1994, has become a centre of Tehrik-e Mujahidin and the administration of the Mansehra training camp has been shifted to the madrasa after the crackdown on jihadi groups in 2002. The Ahl-e Hadith madrasa of Quetta (Baluchistan), founded in 1978, is closely linked to the Islamic University of Medina, all the teachers graduated in Saudi Arabia and courses are taught in Arabic. It controls 25 madrasas in the province. In Peshawar, Jamaa Asaria, built in 2006, is considered among the best Salafimadrasas in Pakistan. The fees are very low for the 1,200 students, thanks to the generosity of donors in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.

The Markaz Da‘Wa Wal Irshad (MDI)27 The MDI (Centre for Preaching and Guidance) was set up in 1986 by three Pakistani university professors belonging to the department of Islamic studies of Lahore Engineering University—Hafiz Mohammad Saeed,28 Dr Zafar Iqbal (nom de guerre Abu Hamza), and Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki (Hafiz Mohammad Saeed's nephew), all linked to Saudi ‘ulama and to Medina Islamic University— and to Sheikh Abdullah ‘Azzam. The Markaz's headquarters are located in Muridke, 30 kilometres from Lahore. It is a big complex of 200 acres, allegedly donated by the government (p.134) of Zia ul Haq, with schools, a farm and factories, and is meant to be a pure city (Medina al Taiba) in a purely Islamic environment. In the beginning, the Markaz received considerable Arab funds, including some from Osama bin Laden, who also sent telephone messages from Sudan and later Afghanistan for several of their general meetings. It is also funded by the large Pakistani diaspora in

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Salafism In Pakistan Europe—mostly in Britain, France and the Netherlands—and in the Middle East, it also collects donations in Pakistan.29 The Da‘wa wal Irshad movement can be described as ‘Salafi-jihadi ’, in that it has two proclaimed aims: da‘wa and jihad, which have a symbiotic relationship and cannot be separated, and to which it gives equal importance. Hafiz Saeed sees jihad and education as complementing each other. The characteristic of the Markaz is to integrate da’wa with jihad and to advocate that modern education is not in conflict with religious education. But without military training, education is meaningless because “when the Muslims gave up jihad, science and technology also went into the hands of others”.30 For Hafiz Saeed, the main problem facing Muslims as a whole is their subjugation to the West; jihad is thus a means of challenging oppression and establishing the rule of Islam. Contrary to the other Ahl-e Hadith movements of Pakistan, who consider jihad as fardh kifaya, Da‘wa wal Irshad considers jihad as a fardh-e ain in the prevailing situation.31 Da‘wa wal Irshad affirms that many organisations are engaged in da‘wa, but that they have forgotten jihad. This criticism is aimed directly at the Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith whom Hafiz Saeed reproaches for its inertia with regard to jihad. For the movement, the current situation where Muslims are perceived as oppressed throughout the world demands from Muslims that they engage in jihad against Hindus who are the worst of polytheists and against Jews who are their allies, with the aim of first Islamising India and then conquering the whole world. Jihad is also presented as essential in preserving the Islamic identity of Pakistan and as the only solution to the evils that plague Pakistani society, notably sectarianism (the Sunni-Shia conflict), which is seen as another conspiracy to divert Muslims from waging jihad against the infidels. (p.135) Besides, jihad is also justified in terms of ‘izzat (honour) to take revenge for the “rape of sisters and mothers”.32 Apart from jihad, Da‘wa wal Irshad wants to purify Pakistani society in particular and Muslim societies in general and purge South Asian Islam of Hindu influences. According to Hafiz Saeed, “the majority of Pakistanis have been unable to pull themselves away from Hindu customs and traditions”. He quotes as examples the popularity of the Basant kite-flying festival and the Jashn-e Baharan (spring festival) in the Punjab, adding: “It is shameful that our rulers are wasting the money of Muslims to celebrate this Hindu festival, and they should fear Allah's wrath for doing so.”33 Their success in “converting” Muslims from different schools of thought to the Ahl-e Hadith has indeed, been phenomenal. They have set up a huge network of over 2,000 recruitment centres across Pakistan and have, since 1994, been developing a network of Al Da‘wa model schools under the leadership of Dr Zafar Iqbal, where children receive Islamic and modern education, with an Page 7 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan emphasis on Arabic, English and computer science. The aim is to utilise modern technology to spread the message of jihad and prepare children from a young age to become mujahidin. Textbooks insist on jihad and train young children to focus on the spirit of sacrifice (qurbani): Urdu readers for second year children contain the wills (wasiatnamah) of martyrs and exhort children (both boys and girls) to prepare to give their life for the great nuclear power that Pakistan has become. In 2002, Da‘wa wal Irshad claimed to have 200 primary schools and 20,000 students, including 5,000 girls.34 The following advertisement for Al Da‘wa schools appeared in Ghazwa, a magazine published by the MDI: “Do you want your children to grow up to become a doctor, engineer, economist, officer, businessman or leader? But do you also want that they should not become ‘slaves’ of the English people? Then you should put your children in the Al Da‘wa System of Schools (ADSS). At ADSS, they will become guardians of Islam and Qur’an. They will (p.136) become leaders of the Muslim world besides becoming a professional in medicine, engineering, law, business, etc. At Da‘wa's school, we also prepare your children for jihad. We offer classes of martial arts. Please call [phone numbers in Lahore].”35

The Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT)36 The Laskhar-e Taiba, which is the military wing of the Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad, is the jihadi expression of the Ahl-e Hadith movement and the largest private jihadi army in South Asia. The LeT was established in early 1990 to train young Pakistanis willing to fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. In 1987, the MDI had set up a training centre known as Muaskar-e Taiba in Jaji (Paktia province, Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan), and a second one known as Muaskar-e Aqsa in the Kunar province in Afghanistan.37 It claims that some 1,600 of its trainees participated in the Afghan jihad but that only five were martyred. It shifted its focus to Kashmir after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as it did not want to involve itself in factional fighting within Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, the LeT decided to “take a leaf from the book of the Afghans […] and lit the torch of the jihad movement.” Although the LeT claims that the mujahidin are recruited from all social classes, most of them belong to the lower middle class and come from the towns and cities of central and south Punjab and from semi-urban neighbouring villages whose populations grew exponentially in the 1980s through ruralurban migration. In their late teens or early twenties, mostly between 18 and 25 years of age, the recruits tend on the whole to be more educated than the average Pakistani and certainly more so than members of Deobandi jihadi groups, such the Sipah-e Sahaba or Jaish-e Mohammad. The majority of them have completed secondary school with high grades and quite a few have (p.137) studied for BA Page 8 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan or BSc at college, and have come into contact with the LeT through da’wa programmes which have in turn led them to attend the big annual congregations organised every year in Muridke by the MDI. The proportion of madrasa-educated boys is minimal (about 10 per cent), but includes boys who studied in a madrasa after studying in an Urdu medium school. It is difficult for the LeT to recruit in Ahl-e Hadith madrasas due to its differences, notably on the concept of jihad, with the MJAH, which controls the great majority of Ahl-e Hadith madrasas.38 The MJAH considers that jihad is fardh kifaya while the LeT considers it to be fardh-e ain. The MJAH considers that the Tehrik-e Mujahidin fulfills the conditions to wage jihad. It also condemns the behaviour of some of the LeT recruits who loot banks, make money out of jihad and embezzle huge sums of money collected under the name of jihad39 . Apart from the madrasa in Muridke, the LeT controls a dozen madrasas, the two main ones are located in Karachi—Jamia Abu Bakr which follows the same curriculum as the Islamic University of Medina40 and Jamaa Dirasat ul Islamia where half of the 500 students come from South East Asia. The LeT prefers to recruit educated boys as they are more motivated and well aware of what they are doing. With its call to erase centuries of superstitions, the Ahl-e Hadith school of thought appeals to the educated youth who have become dissatisfied with traditional Islam but who also reject Western ideas. Belonging to this highly structured movement gives a substitute identity and a feeling of moral superiority to young men who feel despised by the Westernised elite of their country and marginalised in a society which they consider impure and corrupt and where they do not see any opportunity for upward social mobility. Two teenagers caught after running away from their boarding school to join the LeT made the following statement: “The jihadi man who brought us to Muridke told us we would become great by fighting jihad. We knew we could never become great if we stayed in Buner. I wanted to become great. […] We were told to fight against Israel, America and non-Muslims. We are so unhappy with our lives here. We have nothing. We wanted to go to the Muridke madrasa so we would have a better life in the hereafter.”41 (p.138) Recruits are not sent to Kashmir immediately, but after a long period of training.42 Most of them are Hanafis, they often do not know which maslak (rule of conduct) they belong to and it is only during religious training that they find out that they are Deobandi or Barelwi. First they attend an ordinary course (daura–e amma) that lasts 21 days and focuses on religious education and more precisely on the principles of the Ahl-e Hadith school of thought; two weeks are devoted to religious education and one week to practical da‘wa and tabligh. They are then sent back home to resume their former activities, and to engage in da‘wa work in their neighbourhood, with the particular task of recruiting their friends. They remain under the scrutiny of the local LeT leaders who only agree to send them for the three-month special course (daura-e khassa) after assessing their level of motivation. The aim of this course is to demonstrate the superiority Page 9 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan of the Ahl-e Hadith to the other schools of thought and to prepare the recruits for tabligh.

The LeT After the Ban of 12 January 2002 As a result of pressure from India and the USA, President Musharraf banned the LeT, in his landmark speech of 12 January 2002. However, in anticipation of this declaration, Hafiz Saeed reshaped the MDI on 25 December 2001 into a missionary (tablighi) organisation named Jamaat ul Da‘wa Pakistan (JUD), an organisation that was completely separate from the LeT, and in doing so announced that he would devote himself to education and social welfare activities with the aim of reforming Pakistani society. Yahya Mujahid, spokesman for the Jamaat ul Da‘wa, was reported as saying: “We handed Lashkar-e- Taiba over to the Kashmiris in December 2001. Now we have no contact with any jihadi organisation. We, the Jamaat ul Da‘wa, are only preachers.”43 The Jamaat ul Da‘wa is building a support base across the entire country. Meanwhile the Idara Khidmat-e Khalq (Service of the People), a front for LeT, has become highly visible, setting up Taiba hospitals in Muridke and Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir), 51 dispensaries plus mobile medical camps for patients in poor areas and in the Afghan and Kashmiri refugee camps: “We are a welfare organisation and are working on various projects in health, education, provision of clean drinking water, advancing financial help to (p.139) orphans and families of those martyred in jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan.”44 They provided relief after the tsunami of December 2004 and were the first group to offer aid after the earthquake in October 2005 with a stated policy “to win hearts and minds of people”.45 The earthquake was described by Hafiz Saeed as the wrath of God: “The earthquake is the result of the rulers’ sinful policies. They wanted the women to abandon hijab […] at Bush's behest, they wanted to purge our school books from verses on jihad, befriend India and recognise Israel. They banned all the jihadi groups and abandoned jihad […] thus they invited the wrath of God.”46 As their training camps were near the epicentre of the earthquake, they were the first to reach the affected people and to offer aid. They were praised by the Pakistani government, and even by some Western NGOs, for their efficiency and these legitimate relief activities boosted their position locally. Al Da‘wa Medical Mission, which had previously focused on the urban poor, has now extended its activities to the least privileged areas of Sindh (Tharparkar) and Baluchistan (Makran belt) with the double aim of countering the activities of the NGOs and of fulfilling a religious duty. According to Hafiz Saeed, NGOs have hidden agendas that aim to weaken faith in God and the spirit of jihad. “These NGOs are working on an anti-Islamic agenda and after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and European countries, their agendas have been exposed.”47 Nonetheless, Jamaat ul Da‘wa uses the same techniques as Page 10 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan NGOs and Christian missionaries, with doctors extending da‘wa to patients while they treat them48 . After keeping a low profile for a short time, the LeT became active again, this time under the name Pasban Ahl-e Hadith (Guardians of Ahl-e Hadith), though is still known as LeT. Its offices had been closed or turned into Jamaat ul Da‘wa offices—who meanwhile continued to recruit mujahidin for the LeT—but remained operational in Azad Kashmir under the pretext that the ban was not enforceable there. The Jamaat ul Da‘wa is targeting not only the youth but is giving equal importance to “converting” women, as without (p.140) them it cannot realise the dream of establishing the kind of society it wants to create in Pakistan and elsewhere. Despite divisions in the leadership due to personality clashes, accusations of nepotism49 and unfair distribution of funds, Hafiz Saeed has expanded the membership of the JUD. After the beginning of the rapprochement between India and Pakistan, the LeTmujahidin were compelled by the Inter-Services Intelligence, (ISI, the intelligence services of Pakistan) to keep a low profile, but it was at this time that their international links became clear and a process of deterritorialisation was started. The arrest in March 2002 of the Arab militant Abu Zubaidah in a LeT safehouse in Faisalabad, a Pakistani Islamist hub, put the spotlight on the connections between the LeT and Arab militants linked to al-Qaeda. Similarly, in September 2003, Indonesian and Malaysian students linked to the Jemaah Islamiyyah were arrested in Karachi from the Jamaat ul Dirasat ul Islamiya, a madrasa that is affiliated to the Jamaat ul Da‘wa. It was also reported that students arrested in the Philippines in October 2003 had received training in LeT camps. Western converts and people of Pakistani origin settled in the United States and Australia, who had been trained in LeT camps in Azad Kashmir, were also detained in 2003. In the beginning, they supported the clerics of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad because they wanted to enforce shari‘a,50 but when the situation turned nasty, they distanced themselves claiming that “the people of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa belong to a different school of thought” (Deobandi Hanafi)51 and that no group had the legal, constitutional or religious right to forcibly implement shari‘a in the country. The ambiguity of the LeT is plain for all to see: it looks beyond Kashmir, at least in its rhetoric, and promotes transnational activities in the name of jihad against infidels anywhere in the world where Muslims are perceived to be oppressed, and aims at creating a new deterritorialised identity based on Islam (i.e. the ummah). Hafiz Saeed reiterated in August 2007 its call for jihad: “It is obligatory that every Muslim rise for the defence of oppressed Muslims regardless of which part of the world they are in, whether they are in (p.141) Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, or in any other part of the world.”52 The LeT pays great Page 11 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan attention to the links between global and local scenarios and its publications focus on developments in other countries and in the USA that are seen as a threat to the Muslims. But as is the case with every jihadi movement in Pakistan or elsewhere in the region (Afghanistan, Central and South East Asia), local considerations always prevail over global ones. The jihadi movements have to some extent Islamised a nationalist struggle but, notwithstanding the presence of foreign delegates in the congregations and the rhetoric about the oppressed Muslims in every part of the world, the main objective of the LeT recruits waging the Kashmiri jihad is to complete the unachieved partition of 1947 and integrate Kashmir into Pakistan. Recruitment is still driven by the dynamics of the India-Pakistan conflict and strategic interests in Afghanistan rather than by global events. The mujahidin are more concerned with liberating Kashmir from Indian occupation and through martyrdom gaining a place for themselves and their family in Paradise, than waging jihad in distant lands. The Ahl-e Hadith have limited appeal beyond certain urban commercial and professional middle classes. Although they have gained strength since the 1990s and are more organised than the other groups, they remain a tiny minority, a puritanical group in matters of faith and practice, and an elitist group that worships in separate mosques, many of them refusing to pray behind imams belonging to other Sunni sects. The Ahl-e Hadith madrasas are located in the cities of Northern Punjab that have a large Muhajir population such as Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sheikhupura, Kasur. Their unique approach, merging Islamic education with modern curricula, is attractive for the lower middle classes who cannot afford private English-medium schools. These hybrid madrasas boast excellent exam results, which in turn encourages parents to send their children to these schools. The Ahl-e Hadith devote considerable energy to combating Sufism and other socalled “Hindu practices”, particularly on the internet. This is the reason why the Ahl-e Hadith is particularly appealing to young people from the diaspora who want to break away from the South Asian Islam of their parents which they often consider as superstition. The emphasis on individual scholarship and the rejection of “blind taqlid ” is attractive to young people, which explains the success of Zakir Naik (an Indian medical doctor by training who has become a religious preacher inspired by Sheikh Ahmed Deedat) in Pakistan and in the diaspora. (p.142) Bibliography Bibliography references: Abou Zahab, Mariam & Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, Hurst, London, 2004 Page 12 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan Abou Zahab, Mariam, ‘“I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise”: the Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)’, in The Practice of War: The Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, Aparna Rao, Monika Böck, Michael Bolling (eds) Oxford/NewYork: Berghahn Books (forthcoming). Benjamin, Daniel, and Weimann, Gabriel, ‘What the Terrorists Have in Mind’, The New York Times, 27 October 2004. Edwards, David, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad,University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002. Hamza, Maulana Amir, Qafilat da‘wat-o jihad, Dar ul Andalus, Lahore, 2004. Hamza, Amir, and Jamal, Arif, ‘Invitation of Another Kind’, The News, 2005. Haykel, Bernard, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Jamal, Arif, ‘The Message Spreads’, The News, 10 August 2003. Khan, Abdul Sattar, ‘88 seminaries teaching more than 16,000 students’, The News, 6 July 2007. Metcalf, Barbara D., Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982/ Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1989. Rana, Muhammad Amir, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan: Jihadi Tanzimon aur Mazhabi Jamaaton ka ek Jaiza, Lahore: Mashaal Books, 2002. ———, ‘Jammatud Dawa has no Global Network or Ambitions: Mujahid’, The Daily Times, 25 May 2004 Reetz, Dietrich, Islam in the Public Sphere: Religious Groups in India 1900– 1947, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. Sikand, Yoginder, ‘Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: the Case of Lashkar-i Tayyeba’, Qalandar, webmagazine October 2005, www.islaminterfaith.org. Swami, Praveen, ‘From Faith to Hate’, Frontline, 14–27 July 2007. Notes:

(1) Bernard Haykel . Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. (2) The family was originally Sunni and converted to Shi‘ism like many at the Awadh court. Page 13 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan (3) Dietrich Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere: Religious Groups in India 1900– 1947, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 88. (4) For details on the Ahl-e Hadith, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982/ Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1989, pp. 268–96. (5) See Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere, Appendix 1 ‘Articles of Faith of the Ahle Hadith’, pp. 323–6. (6) Ibid ., p. 92. (7) Ibid ., See also Yoginder Sikand, ‘Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: the Case of Lashkar-i Tayyeba’, Qalandar, webmagazine October 2005, www.islaminterfaith.org. (8) Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere, p. 100. (9) Some of them call Pakistan Shirkistan! (10) ‘Abdul Qadir Gilani is commemorated on 11thRabi‘ al-Thani and food is prepared in his name. Giyarwin sharif literally means the acred 11th[of the lunar month], the celebration of the urs (death anniversary) of ‘Abdul Qadir Gilani on the 11th Rabi’ul Thani. In Punjab it is celebrated not only once a year but food is distributed in Abdul Qadir's name on the eleventh of every month. (11) Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, p. 275. (12) Reetz, Islam in the Public Spher e, p. 92. (13) The first sura of the Qur’an recited at every religious occasion and particularly for the benefit of a deceased person. (14) Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere, p. 73. (15) Ibid. (16) Ibid., p. 74. (17) The Jamaat-e Islami supported Saddam Hussain. (18) Khaled Ahmed, ‘The power of the Ahl-e Hadith’, The Friday Times, Lahore. 12–18 July 2002. (19) Born in 1945 in Sialkot in the Sheikh Sethi trading community, Ehsan Elahi Zaheer studied in Salafimadrasas in Gujranwala and Faisalabad before leaving to study from 1963 to 1965 at the University of Medina. After graduating, he returned to Pakistan and received MAs in Arabic, Islamic studies, Urdu and Persian. While in Saudi Arabia, he was taught by Shaykh al-Albani and Shaykh Page 14 of 17

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Salafism In Pakistan Ibn Baz, among others. He travelled extensively around the world for da‘wa purposes and wrote many books, most of them refutations of Shi‘is, Sufis, Barelwis, Ahmadis, Isma‘ilis and Baha‘is. In 1980 he wrote a book entitled Shias and Shiism, which denounces Shi‘a Islam as heresy and accuses the Shi‘is of being Zionist agents in Islamic countries. This book, translated into Arabic and English, was widely distributed by the Saudi Government. Ehsan Elahi Zaheer died in March 1987 after a bomb explosion inside a mosque in Lahore perpetrated by Shi‘a militants. Wounded, he was taken to Saudi Arabia on the order of King Fahd, who sent his private plane. He died in Medina and Shaykh Ibn Baz led his funeral prayers. The assassination of Ehsan Elahi Zaheer marked the start of sectarian violence in Pakistan. (20) For details, see Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan: Jihadi Tanzimon aur Mazhabi Jamaaton ka ek Jaiza, Lahore: Mashaal Books, 2002, pp. 222–31. (21) The Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith UK, whose headquarters is at the Green Lane mosque in Birmingham, has been a registered charity since 1976. It controls 41 mosques and madrasas in the UK. (22) Abdul Sattar Khan, ‘88 seminaries teaching more than 16,000 students’, The News, 6 July 2007. In 2007, Islamabad had two Ahl-e Hadith madrasas with about 200 students. (23) The number of students in Deobandi madrasas is estimated at 200,000; around 190,000 students are studying in Barelwi madrasas. (24) They share this emphasis on Hadith with the Deobandi madrasas. (25) For the Ahl-e Hadith, there is no harm in learning English as long as one does not adopt Western culture and decadence. (26) See Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan, pp. 213–68. (27) For details, see Mariam Abou Zahab ‘“I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise”: the Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)’, in The Practice of War: The Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence. Aparna Rao, Monika Böck, Michael Bolling (eds) Oxford/ NewYork: Berghahn Books (forthcoming). See also Mariam Abou Zahab & Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan- Pakistan Connection, Hurst, London, 2004, pp. 32–46. (28) Hafiz Saeed, who migrated with his family to Pakistani Punjab in 1947, studied at the King Saud University in Saudi Arabia from 1978 to 1980. After returning from Saudi Arabia, he joined the Abdul Rasul Sayyaf Salafi group and participated in the Afghan jihad.

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Salafism In Pakistan (29) See Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan, pp. 235–58. (30) Hafiz Saeed . Interview in Takbir (Karachi), 12 August 1999, pp. 37 ff. (31) ‘Today is the era of jihad […] Only jihad can teach a lesson to kufr,’ is a sermon of Amir Hamza in Masjid al Aqsa, Rawalpindi, given on 11 August 2006. “The best way to protect the honour of the Holy Prophet is jihad […] If the Muslims did not wage jihad against the West today, they will regret it tomorrow” is a quote from a speech of Hafiz Saeed addressing a rally in Rawalpindi, Ghazwa, 29 June 2006. (32) This is a recurrent theme in Lashkar-e Taiba literature and in the martyrs’ testaments. The Lashkar-e Taiba justified jihad against the Americans in Iraq because Iraqi Muslim women were raped in Abu Ghraib, adding “the Americans are dishonouring our mothers and sisters. Therefore, jihad against them has now become mandatory”. Quoted by Daniel Benjamin and Gabriel Weimann ‘What the Terrorists Have in Mind’. The New York Times, 27 October 2004. (33) Sermon in Masjid-e Qudsia, Lahore, quoted by Praveen Swami, ‘From Faith to Hate’, Frontline, 14–27 July 2007. (34) See Muhammad Amir Rana, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan, p. 242. (35) Ghazwa, 7 April 2005. (36) For details, see Abou Zahab, “‘I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise’: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)”. (37) The Kunar province of Afghanistan, bordering the Bajaur Agency in Pakistan, had for a long time been a stronghold of the Ahl-e Hadith school of thought. In 1985 Maulana Jamil ul Rahman, educated in the Panjpir madrasa in Swabi, formed a strict Salafi party, the Jamaat ul Da‘wa ilal Quran wa Ahl-e Hadith, and increasing numbers of Arabs came to fight in its ranks. See Maulana Amir Hamza, Qafilat da‘wat-o jihad. Dar ul Andalus, Lahore, 2004; David Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002, pp. 153–6. (38) The LeT considers that the MJAH is no more Salafi because it associates with non- Salafis. (39) See Mohammad Amir Rana, Jihad-e Kashmir-o-Afghanistan, pp. 214–16. (40) All courses are taught in Arabic and about ten students get admission in Medina every year. (41) NBC News, September 2007.

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Salafism In Pakistan (42) For details on the training, see Abou Zahab, “‘I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise”: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)’. (43) Mohammad Amir Rana . ‘Jammatud Dawa has no Global Network or Ambitions: Mujahid’, The Daily Times, 25 May 2004. (44) Mian Muhammad ‘Asif, in charge of public relations for the Jamaat ul Da‘wa Peshawar zone, in The Daily Times, 18 November 2003. (45) “It helps to negate the negative propaganda against us”, Amir Hamza, Arif Jamal, ‘Invitation of Another Kind’, The News, 2005 (exact date unknown). (46) Interview with Hafiz Saeed, 24 October 2005. http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/ oct/24inter1.htm. (47) ‘Foreign NGOs Weakening People's Faith: Hafiz Saeed’, Daily Times, 2 May 2004. (48) Arif Jamal, ‘The Message Spreads’, The News, 10 August 2003. (49) Zafar Iqbal, an Arain, accused Hafiz Saeed, a Gujjar, of promoting Gujjars. It is ironic to see a Salafi organisation succumb to the virus of the Hindu caste system! In July 2004 Zafar Iqbal created Khair un Nas, a breakaway faction for which he tried to get support from Saudi ‘ulama. (50) ‘The Lal Masjid talks about Shari‘a, therefore we support it’, in a sermon of Hafiz Saeed, Rawalpindi, 27 April 2007. (51) ‘Dawa Distances Itself from Lal Masjid Management’, Dawn, 17 July 2007. (52) Sermon in Masjid-e Qudsia, Lahore, 17 August 2007.

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The Salafi critique of Islamism

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

The Salafi critique of Islamism Doctrine, Difference and the Problem of Islamic Political Action in Contemporary Sudan Noah Salomon

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0007

Abstract and Keywords This chapter deals with the Sudanese group Ansar al-Sunna and its particular interpretation of politics and its belief in the purification of the community as a precondition for establishing the Islamic state. It deals extensively with the ideas of this particular group and its differences with Islamist movements in Sudan. The key idea is that pious states can only be founded by pious individuals. Keywords:   Sudan, Ansar al-Sunna, pious, Islamic state

University of Chicago1 (p.144) [The Prophet Said]: My people will split into seventy-three sects. All of them are dammed to hellfire except one. (sataftariq ummati ‘ala thalatha wa saba‘in firqa. kulluha fi-l-nar ila wahida) Commonly Quoted Hadith (existing in many formulations, see e.g. Sunan Ibn Majah, al-Fitan 17)2 Hold fast to the rope of God and do not break apart. Page 1 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism (i‘tasimu bi-habl allah jami‘an wa la tafarraqu.) The Qur’an, Surat Al ‘Imran: 103 In June 1989, General ‘Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and his backers in the National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in Sudan in a bloodless coup and inaugurated what is widely recognised to be the first Sunni-majority Islamist republic.3 While many states throughout history have derived their political theory from Islamic sources, Sudan is the first state in which the modern Islamist movement (al-haraka al-islamiyya),4 which has served in opposition (p. 145) to governments across the Islamic world, took the full reins of power. The National Salvation Revolution (thawrat al-inqadh al-watani), as the NIF called their coup, and the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan which led to its formation, has been the subject of much research on contemporary Sudan.5 Here, Sudan has served as a case study to test the relative applicability of the theories of Islamist groups, devised in the cauldron of opposition, to function when such groups actually seize power—particularly in the context of a religiously diverse nation like Sudan. Yet, while the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist offshoots such as the NIF have dominated the literature on the intersection of Islam and politics in Sudan, many other Muslim organisations are also debating the role that political work (al-‘amal al-siyasi) should play in their overall programmes and are in need of scholarly attention. In the years in which I conducted fieldwork in Sudan (2005–7), the failure of the Islamist vanguard to maintain control of the programme of social and religious reform it initiated, coupled with the relative degree of political freedom afforded by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005,6 brought the political criticism of many actors to the fore. (p.146) While the critique of the Islamist project waged by Muslim liberals and secularists was to be expected, one of the more nuanced and interesting voices of opposition was that of Salafi organisations. Though they supported in principle the implementation of shari‘a law and the other accoutrements of the Islamic state which were the rallying cry of the Islamists (to the extent that certain factions even joined the Islamist government), Salafis remained highly critical of both the method and the content of Islamist political activism. Even those who joined with the government, such as the Shaykh al-Hadiyya7 wing of the Ansar al-Sunna alMuhammadiyya group with whom I worked,8 saw themselves (using the classical idiom of nasiha, or advice) in the role of reforming a regime not yet fully in line with the principles of what Salafis understood to be correct doctrine (al-‘aqida al-sahiha). Due to present geopolitical concerns, the question of the relationship of Salafism to politics has focused primarily on radical, reactionary, and violent sects within the movement. While violent and radical movements (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya) do indeed exist within the rubric of modern Salafism, a far more widespread Page 2 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism phenomenon in the Islamic world is Salafi groups known as al- (p.147) salafiyya al-da‘wiyya (“the evangelising Salafis”)9 whose primary goal is calling Muslims to good and steering them away from error (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-lnahy ‘an almunkar).10 For Ansar al-Sunna, such evangelising does not require a withdrawal (‘itizal) from current affairs, nor should it be understood as quietest or apolitical. In fact, the opposite is true: their shaykhs have argued that one must use all means at one's disposal (be it political parties, student unions, or trade associations) to further the goal of da‘wa (calling individuals to the “true” Islam).11 Though party-based and state politics and the (p.148) implementation of shari‘a are important for groups like Ansar al-Sunna, it must be understood that they are seen as wholly secondary to the work of da‘wa, and even when undertaken seen only as a means to its end. Yet, such an understanding remains in tension with the idea often expressed in their writings that political power (alhukm) is a necessary goal for Muslims, who, in their view, should promote the rule of God on earth as well as in the heavens. Indeed any support of a leader who does not implement an Islamic programme they refer to as a kind of shirk (giving to others powers due to God), a term most often associated with instances of purported idolatry (such as extreme reverence for religious leaders like Sufishaykhs) but also mobilised by Salafis to speak of political associationism. That said, as the following essay will show, Salafis like Ansar alSunna are extremely sceptical of politics as a cure-all, as a means towards creating an Islamic society. We can juxtapose this Salafi approach in Sudan with that of the Islamist NIF, which when it took power instituted what it called “The Civilising Project”.12 The Civilising Project sought to conform public morality to Islamic norms through state coercion, such as the instillation of Islamic law, the imposition of an Islamic curriculum in schools and universities and the Islamisation of state-run media. While Ansar al-Sunna supports the idea of an Islamic state, it is quite pessimistic that an Islamic government can create an Islamic society. Rather its leaders argue that it is only out of the groundwork of an Islamic society that the true Islamic state can emerge. Since the second half of the 1990s the al-Hadiyya wing of Ansar al-Sunna with which I did my research has been extremely accommodating with the NIF and the current ruling National Congress Party [NCP] into which the NIF developed.13 Such accommodation is due in great part to the benefits to the proselytizing mission that Ansar al-Sunna has reaped through government (p. 149) positions and ease of permissions for building mosques and the like.14 Yet, despite this cooperation, Ansar al-Sunna activists constantly challenge the ideas which underlie the Islamist programme.15 While this criticism of Islamism is buried just beneath the surface in the sources read by members of Ansar alSunna, such as the books of the Egyptian-born Kuwaiti Salafi thinker ‘Abd alRahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, it has risen to the surface in the “post-peace” period in Sudan, in which some Ansar al-Sunna shaykhs have begun openly to criticise the Islamist philosophy. One should note that Salafis rarely criticise individual living Page 3 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Islamists by name, the one exception being NIF founder Hasan al-Turabi who, after his falling out with the government in the late 1990s, is no longer protected and has become the favorite whipping-boy for everyone from Sufis to Salafis for the failures of Islamism both past and present. (p.150) Through an analysis of some of the writings, lesson-circles and lectures of contemporary Ansar al-Sunna shaykhs, as well as an extended foray into some of the literature that informs their work, this chapter will explore how contemporary Salafis in Sudan construct a political philosophy that is at great odds with that of the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamists. In particular, I will examine the disagreement between Salafis and Islamists on the problem of intraIslamic religious difference and how standardisation of matters of doctrine (‘aqida) among political cadres is seen, respectively, as a necessary or contingent element in the construction of the Islamic state. My essay will reveal that although Islamism and Salafism often appear similar in their calls for Islamic government, in reality we see two adamantly opposed political philosophies at work. The Islamists’ notion that the creation of a Muslim society is the responsibility of the socially-engineering state (e.g. endeavours such as the “Civilising Project”) stands in stark contrast to Ansar al-Sunna's contention that it is only as a result of a reverent and doctrinally pure society that a true Islamic state can emerge.

The Purification of Doctrine: a Salafi theory of Political Action The intersection of personal piety and politics has often been studied for the ways in which the state has encroached on the individual's ability to practice (or not practice) his or her religion freely. This chapter will examine what is perhaps the reverse phenomenon: a group that argues that an impious society impedes the realisation of an Islamic state. Both in the millennial sense that it is God who will install a Muslim leader in a society only when it is truly virtuous and in the mundane sense that a good Islamic state must be made up of good Muslim citizens, Ansar al-Sunna argues that the precondition for creating the Islamic state is the purification of the doctrinal commitments and practices of individuals.16 It must be understood that for Salafis the task of (p.151) enjoining the good and forbidding vice (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an almunkar)17 does not merely consist in calling Muslims to worship correctly and to live their lives under certain moral codes, but it is (perhaps characteristically of the Salafis) undertaken also for the rectification and correction of doctrine (tashih al-‘aqida). The concept of tawhid (what I might term, for the way in which Salafis use it as a tool in their polemic, the “monotheification” of doctrine and practice), which all Salafi groups understand themselves as promoting, is intimately linked to the notion that a Muslim's work should first and foremost be a kind of doctrinal iconoclasm, a destruction of all beliefs lingering within Islam that deny the complete dominion of God, and God alone, over all aspects of the world and the hereafter (such “heretical” beliefs are known as shirkiyyat,

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The Salafi critique of Islamism “associationisms,” for the way in which they associate the powers of God with others). This purification of doctrine (tazkiyat al-‘aqida) is understood by the Salafis with whom I worked to be fundamentally political work. Thus any study of Salafi political theory forces us to expand the category of “Muslim politics” beyond the sphere of debates about sovereignty and the implementation of Islamic law (on which most studies of the category have focused) to include the kind of political work undertaken in transforming the social body to assent to certain key matters of belief. Promoting doctrinal reform in the arena of Islamic theology is key to the Salafi agenda and is thus different from the da‘wa work of other evangelist groups which primarily concern themselves with promoting pious practice, moral integrity and the like. It is important to note that the main object of critique of the Salafis with whom I worked is not the laxness of contemporary secularising society18 but rather the compromised and faulty doctrines of pious Muslims (whether Sufis, Islamists or the unaffiliated), the “innovation” (bida‘) they have inserted into the pure faith of the (p.152) foundational community of Muslims (al-salaf), and their lack of consistent application of religious dictums found in the Qur’an and Sunna.19 Any study of Salafi political activism must then pay careful attention to Salafi attempts to standardise doctrine among Muslims. Further, it must be pointed out that it is by raising tazkiyat al-‘aqida as the main goal of their da‘wa (lit. “call,” or proselytisation) that Salafis launch a virtual war on the classical Islamic principle of al-ikhtilaf, the differing of religious opinion in which several solutions may be valid.20 The Salafi critique of Islamism is complex and multifaceted and there is not enough space in the present chapter to discuss the critique in all its details. (p. 153) Instead, here I will focus on one key issue which I believe underlies the polemic: that is, how Salafis see themselves as differing from Islamists on the question of intra-Islamic religious difference (al-ikhtilaf) itself.21 The guiding principle of Islamist political organisation in Sudan has been the idea of the “front,” al-jabha, a gathering of various Islamically-oriented political or religious parties, irrespective ideological and doctrinal commitments, for a common purpose (here the implementation of shari‘a and the Islamic state). Due to the Salafi focus on tazkiyat al-‘aqida as preceding calls for Islamic political sovereignty, the notion of the front is seen as anathema, for it is understood as suspending the command to enjoin religious truth for temporary political gain. As we will see below, the Salafis with whom I worked often mobilised both the Qur’anic verse (aya) and the hadith that serve as the epigraph to this chapter as evidence to support their theses on religious difference within the Muslim community. Of course, one could read the two pieces of scripture as contradictory: the aya (“and do not break apart…”) calls for Muslim unity, while the hadith contends that only one part of the Muslim community is correct and will be saved. Yet, for Ansar al-Sunna they pose no such contradiction. Rather, Page 5 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism the hadith is seen as tempering, or explaining the aya: Muslim unity is important but only unity around a singular truth, for all sects are dammed to the fires of hell except one.

Khartoum, Sudan, Summer 2007: a Salafi critique of Islamism As the last rays of the sun dipped behind the horizon and the evening call to prayer resounded out over the loudspeakers of the small Ansar al-Sunna (p. 154) mosque in the densely-packed mud-filled streets of Daym al-Juzuli,22 an outlying neighbourhood in the ever-sprawling Sudanese capital of Khartoum, a friend and I shuffled into the mosque. Some months prior I had begun attending Ansar al-Sunna lectures and lesson circles quite regularly. Ansar al-Sunna often held these lectures in the far corners of Khartoum and its suburbs, bringing the Salafi message to the masses through direct interaction. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups which relied on a vanguard made up of universityeducated elite,23 leadership in Ansar al-Sunna required no such pedigree, and in their activism Ansar al-Sunna shaykhs often explicitly tried to transcend both the class and ethnic divisions that plague Sudan by including Muslims from a variety of backgrounds.24 Speaking that night was a wellknown Salafi preacher, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Raziq.25 Ahmad ‘Abd al-Raziq26 is an Ansar al-Sunna shaykh most often associated with the Salafi polemic against Sufism and I had been collecting his writings and attending his lesson circles for the work I was doing for my dissertation on the debates between Sufis and Salafis.27 It was somewhat to my surprise, therefore, when he began this lecture (p.155) with a theme very different from that which preoccupies his published writings. After some rather standard commentary on the exclusive grasp on the truth that the Salafi understanding of Islam holds, he said the following: “The group (firqa) most dangerously in error in the Islamic world is the Muslim Brotherhood! Understand well what I am saying [and interpret] it as you like. The most dangerous group and the most corrupt group and the most deviant (munharif) programme of thought (manhaj) is that of Hasan al-Banna the Egyptian, the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood, which calls for the acceptance of truth and error together (al-jam‘ bayn al-haqq wa-l-batil).” While I had heard him speak critically of the Muslim Brotherhood the previous month in a lecture he gave as part of a week-long training course for Salafi missionaries (du‘at) I attended, this was the first time I had heard him speak in such uncompromising terms. This shaykh who had spent his entire career in Ansar al-Sunna attacking Sufis seemed now, at this historical juncture in Sudan where criticism of the ruling Islamists was much more possible, to have a new target of attack. And his ominous “Understand well what I am saying [and interpret] it as you like,” left no doubt to his listeners as to whom he was referring: the Islamic movement which underlies the ruling cadre of leaders in Sudan. In addition to the fact that the target of his attack surprised me, the theme of the lecture itself, which promised to be a reading of Surat Al ‘Imran 103 (which I quoted in the epigraph above), was unique. While this verse had, time and again, Page 6 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism been invoked to foster Muslim unity (wahda, or wihda in the Sudanese pronunciation) and the tolerance of doctrinal and political difference in the face of external challenges,28 Shaykh Ahmad had an opposite reading of it. Shaykh Ahmad understood the verse as arguing for the separating out of what he saw as true Muslims from those with antinomian leanings. Returning the first word of the aya (i‘tasimu) to its root, ‘isma (impeccability), Shaykh Ahmad argued that the intention of the word “i‘tasimu” was two-fold: it was a command not only to gather together and unify, but to unify around something free of error and indisputable (ma‘sum). For Shaykh Ahmad, the only indisputable and error-free sources of knowledge are the word of God (the Qur’an) and the Sunna of the Prophet, and thus he understood that imbedded in the verse was a call to gather around Qur’an and Sunna. But this (p.156) gathering was not to be one around the general spirit of the book and the life of the Prophet, but rather around one interpretation thereof. To understand Salafi theories of Muslim unity (and dissolution) it must be recognised that for Salafis Qur’an and Sunna are not open to multiple interpretations but rather are understood to be to a great degree transparent. Salafi literature is replete with attacks against the idea of interpretation (ta’wil).29 While of course their approach is as interpretive as any other, their lack of recognition of the situatedness of their hermeneutics coupled with their argument for a strict constructionist reading of Qur’an and Sunna (part of the process they refer to as taysir fahm al-islam, “simplification of the understanding of Islam”)30 leads to a rejection of the possibility of doctrinal difference (except in the most narrow of circumstances). Thus the assertion is often made by Salafishaykhs that if we simply all followed Qur’an and Sunna, we would all arrive at the same truth, there would be no difference among us. While Shaykh Ahmad agrees with most interpreters that Al ‘Imran 103 is about Muslim unity, his idea of unity radically differs from theirs, for it is a unity not in spite of difference, but rather one which is only possible through the destruction of difference. In order to understand the Salafi reading of “wihda ” (unity) and the problems they see in the Islamist understanding of it, I will quote at length from (p.157) the speech Shaykh Ahmad gave to the course for Salafi missionaries I mentioned above.31 Speaking of the critique that Islamists wage against Ansar al- Sunna shaykhs in which Islamists contend that they should not criticise other Muslims lest they create fissures in the umma, Shaykh Ahmad argued: “And then there are groups in Sudan who [do not like our method of critique] and come to us [saying, no, don’t talk like this] ‘because we want to gain these people for our cause (naksibhum).” You want to gain them?!? Have you opened a store?!? You should gain them through truth!!!… And there are people who say about each path (sabil) which Muslims take that all of us [Muslims] are one, and all of us are one nation of Muslims (ummat al-islam) and [they speak about] unity (wihda)…Extremely dangerous Muslim activists (du‘at) come [to us]—and indeed [I am talking about] the Page 7 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Muslim Brotherhood group here—and say [to us], before [we] have revealed the truth about these [deviant] groups, that our use of hadith [which show the Prophet revealing deviant (munharifa) groups in his time] as a [rhetorical tool] against [present-day] groups and sects represents a lack of wisdom [on our part]. For example, you see their leader Hasan alBanna who founded this theory and this way of doing da‘wa, saying that all of us should pardon one another (kullana yanbaghi an na‘dhir ba‘dana ‘an b‘ad) around the things about which we differ and that we should just do [together] those things about which we all agree… [they say] ridiculous words [kalam farigh] like this… Such pardoning has rules (ahkam)! … And there is the hadith of Bani Qurayza32 [on (p.158) this subject]. And there are people who interpret it in a corrupt manner. And in following what their leader [Hasan al-Banna] said…they repeat it like parrots who just imitate one another… But the hadith of Bani Qurayza is not something that can be used as evidence for the idea that we should all forgive one another in a situation where there are deviant groups (firaq munharifa)…or that there is no need for discord (fitan) …And every Muslim Brother has memorised the hadith of Bani Qurayza. But it has no relationship with the idea that we should ignore our differences. Why? Because the hadith of Bani Qurayza was talking about people who subscribe to one approach (manhaj)…The approach is one: the Qur’an and Sunna on the understanding of the righteous forefathers (al-kitab wa-l-sunna ‘ala fahm al-salaf al-salih). … The [Islamists] are alleging that they are Salafis and denying that you can criticise the different sects (firaq). They make friends (yuwalun) with people with heretical practices and ideas (ahl al-bida‘)… So the announcement of war [between us and them] is coming (warda) because the uncovering of the deviant groups is something the Prophet did and he announced against them war and jihad … There is the hadith: ‘My community will split into seventy-three sects, all of them are dammed to hellfire except one.’ And these are words that stop all other words. The judgment said all of them are in the fire. So really you say that we should excuse the wrong opinions of others?!? You say that those are all people who confess that there is no God but God [i.e. people whom we should accept as Muslims]?!?… He said all of them are in the fire!!! You want to say ‘no’ to this, that you are more merciful than the Prophet?” Here we see Shaykh Ahmad contending that it is precisely the Islamist practice of ignoring questions of doctrine in order to gather Muslims around a similar political goal that puts them in grave error, for in doing so they risk not only the health of the polity in which they live but the soundness of religion itself. The acceptance of doctrinal difference by the Islamists in order to establish an Islamic state represents a key point of contention for Ansar al- Sunna, as they see the foundation of the command on every Muslim to enjoin the good and

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The Salafi critique of Islamism forbid wrong to be very much opposed to the idea of bracketing doctrinal difference for a supposed greater good. In the same speech, Shaykh Ahmad argues this very point using evidence from a hadith which speaks of God not answering the supplications of a man married to a morally corrupt woman, saying that the hadith proves that “if you do not separate, you are in rebellion against God (idha ma faraqta takun ‘asi).” Thus the husband's acceptance of the errant wife for the greater good of marriage is an action in error: he is guilty by association, for his first duty should (p.159) be to correct her error before joining into union with her. Shaykh Ahmad is arguing that the same is true of the Islamists’ acceptance of deviant Muslim sects into their political coalition. Quoting Surat al-An‘am: 159—“those who have broken up their religion and have become schismatics (shiya‘an), do not have anything to do with them”—he adds the gloss, “So really you can’t say I have no problem with people as long as they say ‘there is no god except God,’ for here it clearly warns against befriending them…So while the aya [Al ‘Imran 103] says ‘gather’ (i‘tasimu), it has to be around a real rope of God. And even if you asked these people to come to it, they wouldn’t. They’d say ‘I, become a Wahhabi?!!?’33 But I never asked them to become Wahhabi, I ask them to follow Qur’an and Sunna.” For Ansar al-Sunna, while unity is important, it should never be undertaken through a sacrifice of correct doctrine or the Muslim's duty to fix doctrinal error whenever he or she sees it. Shaykh Ahmad concludes: “[The Islamists] say [to us], ‘we don’t want any division. You, Ansar alSunna, come to us, join with us.’ With who, man?!? … The basic thing is that you want to allow difference (tahlil al-khilaf) so that you can say ‘all of us should become one. And between us should be love.’ So we should lose religion so that you [Islamists] can sit in a seat [of power]? We should lose our religion because of you?” While Salafis like Shaykh Ahmad support the idea of an Islamic state, which is the rallying cry of the Islamists, they are clear that the “Islamic” part of it must be much more than a slogan. Thus, it is only when Muslims have got their ‘aqida correct—and never prior to that point—that a truly Islamic state can emerge. To allow otherwise, as they contend the Islamists do by welcoming errant Islamic sects into their coalition before fixing their doctrinal errors (as well as before correcting the errors of their own beliefs), risks destroying Islam itself. Salafis question the very possibility of an Islamic state built on this coalition model, rather than on the foundations of unified and correct (p.160) doctrine. Salafis like those of Ansar al-Sunna contend that calling for Islamic governance (alhukm al-islami) indeed should be part of a larger programme of da‘wa, but in doing so we cannot sacrifice other tenets of doctrine.

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The Salafi critique of Islamism This idea that the purification of doctrine (tazkiyat al-‘aqida) is of greater importance than more commonly mentioned political issues of the contemporary Muslim umma, such as Palestine and Iraq, was made during the speech Shaykh Ahmad gave at the course for Salafi missionaries. Here he was speaking about the group which claims to be a balance between Salafis and Islamists, the sururiyyun (whom I described in footnote 10), whom Ansar al-Sunna considers to be merely Islamists pretending to be Salafis. He argues: “And additionally, among their other sicknesses is that in their speeches they repeat over and over ‘those who do not rule on the basis of what God revealed, they are unbelievers (Surat al-Ma’ida: 44).’ And then they start shouting: ‘Palestiiiiiine!!!’ The problems here [in Sudan] are bigger than the problems in Palestine! So come here to die [i.e. meaning that by being a martyr here, you will get more reward from God]. [The problems] that are happening here are bigger than there. Palestine! What is so important about it?!? Solve our problems here: this one wears hijbat [amulets, which are forbidden in the Salafi reading of Islam], this one has a [Sufi] doctrine, this one takes dirt in his pocket [from a Sufishaykh's tomb because he believes it to be holy]. So what about Palestine?!? Because of his obsession [with political issues like Palestine], he is not able to talk about tawhid and this is a sickness.” For Ansar al-Sunna, the doctrine which focuses exclusively on political concerns is necessarily a partial doctrine (‘aqida juz’iyya). Promoting correct doctrine and getting rid of “superstitious” shirkiyyat, such as those mentioned in the above passage, are the essential grounds on which any righteous political community must be built. For Ansar al-Sunna, if the base is not strong, if Islam is not clean, then an Islamic polity will surely fall, for it has no foundation. Or, as another contemporary Ansar al-Sunna shaykh has written, “Ansar al-Sunna believes that there is a major error in the philosophy of the Muslim Brothers which is the focus on the gathering of the people regardless of the differences in their schools of thought and the contradictions in their ideas in order to reach power with them and [only] then to apply the law of God. In this way there is negligence of what is the most important thing in religion: the call to the correct doctrine (da‘wa ila al-‘aqida al-sahiha). [For if doctrine] is fixed and made righteous then all matters will be made righteous, and through the righteousness of society the state is made righteous.”34 Thus for Ansar al-Sunna (p.161) the socially engineering state of the early NIF and their “civilising project” is turned on its head: the Islamic state cannot make citizens righteous, rather it is only righteous citizens who can make the state Islamic.

Pious Individuals/pious States This political theory that it is an impious society that impedes the realisation of the Islamic state is most clearly asserted in the writings of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, a contemporary Salafi activist who is perhaps the most influential Page 10 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism author in the thought of Ansar al-Sunna alive today. ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd alKhaliq is an Egyptian shaykh living in Kuwait, a prolific author, and the founder of the Organisation for the Revival of Islamic Tradition (Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami) and the website: www.salafi.net.Though actual copies of his books were hard to find except among the more scholarly members of Ansar al-Sunna, his characteristic formulation of ideas often trickled into Ansar al-Sunna discourse and he was cited often as a major influence. In particular his formulation of Salafida‘wa as focusing on tawhid, ittiba‘ (the following of the Prophet), and tazkiya (purification, of the self and of doctrine), found its way into many Ansar al-Sunna lectures and sermons, as well as everyday speech. Ansar al-Sunna's short-lived magazine al-Istijaba (“The Heeding of the Call”) held a two part interview with Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman beginning in its second issue published in the Autumn of 1985.35 Coming (p.162) only two years after the Islamists had scored a major success in Sudan with President Ja‘far Nimayri's implementation of shari‘a law in September 1983,36 the article reveals that Ansar al-Sunna shaykhs were eager to show their continued relevance. One might ask, they feared, that if the Salafis were not leading the “Islamic Movement” sweeping the Islamic world calling for the immediate implementation of shari‘a and the establishment of an Islamic state, what exactly were they doing? Such a defensive posture is evidenced by the very first question Ansar al-Sunna's interviewers pose to Shaykh ‘Abd al- Rahman. They ask, “Salafis are accused of being uninterested in what goes on around them and also … in the challenges which Muslims face like the danger of the communists in Afghanistan and the Zionist colonisation of Palestine. [It is said that] ‘He who is not interested in a matter [which concerns] the Muslims is not one of them (man lam yahtamm bi-amr al-muslimin fa-laysa minhum).’37 What is your response to these people?” Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman's reply is definitive here and for that reason it serves as a good framework through which we can understand Ansar al-Sunna's scepticism towards the Islamist project. After arguing that Salafis have indeed been active in politics but that they do not particularly enjoy talking about it, unlike “those others who sing about jihad,” he puts forth a political philosophy which he views as being at great odds with his Islamist opponents. Shaykh ‘Abd al- Rahman stresses that Salafis’ “first interest is cleansing (tazqiya) Islamic doctrine and the Islamic cadres (al-saff al-islami) from shirk and those who engage in it because the umma has got all mixed up (ikhtalata habiluha binabiliha) and the difference between true Islam and fabricated Islam is not appreciated.” His first and primary example of Muslims whose doctrine is not yet cleansed (and with whom the Islamists, at least in Sudan, have traditionally allied) are contemporary Sufis about whom he says (constructing a caricature of actual Sufibeliefs), “How do we call someone a Muslim when he believes that the Prophet Muhammad (sl‘m)38 is the one who brought down the Qur’an and it (p. 163) is he who is reclining on God's throne? And how does someone like that Page 11 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism stand in the line of Muslims?… How could the Muslims be victorious [in jihad or politically] when among them are people who hold such beliefs?… I believe that the unification and the gathering of these different sects [for political purposes] is an action in error which will lead to the delusion of the umma and lead it astray from the true religion…Before commencing with a jihad with the sword… let us delineate the nature of Islam which we want, the nature of Islam which God revealed.” For Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman it is not just jihad which is suspended by this logic but the implementation of shari‘a itself. He argues that so many who call for the implementation of shari‘a have no idea what true shari‘a is: “There is no doubt that many people call for Islamic shari‘a, but when we ask these people what is the shari‘a that they want, we find that their shari‘a is sometimes different, unfortunately, from the complete shari‘a.” He understands the reason for this to be that Muslims today rely on juridical schools of thought (madhahib) rather than the sources of Islam themselves, the Qur’an and Sunna. It is for this reason that he argues, “Before we address the call for the application of shari‘a it is necessary to make people understand what Islamic shari‘a is. How could we apply shari‘a …if Muslims differ over two opinions?… Salafi groups in the present time have an educational duty (dawran ‘ilmiyyan)…Salafis must redouble their efforts to make firm this informed (‘ilmi) understanding [of Islam] first before becoming involved in war against these and those [outsiders].” Thus for Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman, before creating an Islamic state, we must delineate what kind of Islam we want. A government like that of Ja‘far Nimayri, which puts into place shari‘a without clarifying what this shari‘a is, will create a shari‘a which is a slogan (shi‘ar) but leave the task of imposing true shari‘a unfulfilled. In his book The Fundamentals of Knowledge for Salafi Proselytisation,39 a kind of practical handbook which outlines the basic principles of Salafi activism and that has been very important to Ansar al-Sunna, Shaykh ‘Abd al- Rahman expands on this critique of the Islamists.40 He writes, “Regarding (p.164) those who are bragging of Islamic rule and alleging that they are calling for it: one does not find in their morals and their works and their behaviour and actions what would qualify them to be individuals in this [Islamic] society let alone to be responsible for establishing it.”41 He explains such scepticism towards the Islamists in the following: They do not believe in shirk except when it comes to worshipping Christ or idols… [and as for other forms of associationism committed by Muslims, such as Sufireverance for their shaykhs] they don’t criticise them, but rather they bless them and agree with their perpetrators. And if it occurred that some of them do criticise, [their critique] will be like the critique of a trivial innovation which does not harm religion. But the fact of the matter is that [such shirk] is a fundamental of the fundamentals of tawhid and letting it pass is a rebuke to correct doctrine and Islam… Page 12 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Salafida‘wa … is not da‘wa of social reform (da‘wa islahiyya ijtima‘iyya) nor is it a political, party-based, da‘wa (da‘wa siyasiyya hizbiyya), it is a da‘wa to Islam, Islam with all that this word means.42 The idea that Islam cannot be followed partially, that all of God's commands must be implemented—from the most mundane to those on the most pressing matters of life—and that anything less than that amounts to shirk, to following an authority other than God, is a key characteristic of Salafi thought. Yet such a focus on even the most (seemingly) minor details of doctrine as being equally important to them as “the Islamic State” has earned Ansar al- Sunna in Sudan the derisive nickname among some members of the Islamist Movement “‘ulama’ al-hayd wa-l-nifas,” “the scholars who are concerned with women's menstruation and issues of childbirth.” In labelling them thus, these Islamists are arguing that Ansar al-Sunna concerns itself with minor details of ritual purity, while the large matters of importance to the umma, such as its political status, are left ignored.

The Prophet In Mecca and the Politics of da‘Wa Salafis like those of Ansar al-Sunna understand that a key difference between their political agenda and that of the Islamists centres on defining the nature of “the political.” In his al-Muslimun wa-l-‘amal al-siyasi, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd alKhaliq puts forward a very different definition of politics than that which focuses on establishing an Islamic state or the implementation of shari‘a. Indeed, he argues that the very act of spreading Islamic truth is inherently political, no matter the means used to do so. In distinction to the quietest (p.165) Salafi groups that argue against any involvement in party-based politics (both because it forces the individual to associate with non-believers and to organise in a way that has no precedent in the Prophet's life), he contends that there is no avoiding this aspect of the political, and that party-based politics should thus be seen as one means among many for effective da‘wa.43 Yet, ‘Abd al- Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq is trying to steer a middle course. He argues that party activism can be a useful tool for da‘wa and that it should not be understood as a forbidden innovation (as the quietist Salafis argue) nor as the centre of Islamic life (as the Islamists argue). He writes that it is “incumbent on any Islamic group that they practice da‘wa in all its dimensions, and we have learned that the political dimension is indeed one of the dimensions of da‘wa to God, and on top of this we have learned that doing the work of da‘wa in its foundation and in its consequences is political work.”44 For Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan as well, da‘wa in the service of doctrinal purity is political in that it stands in the face of the monopolisation that they understand Sufis and their Islamist allies as having over the religious sphere. It is political also because at stake is the polity: as we have seen above, for these Salafis it is only out of a doctrinally pure society that the Islamic state can emerge. The Muslim umma and the very possibility of deriving an Islamic state out of that umma is dependent on the success of this da‘wa.

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The Salafi critique of Islamism In Islamic political theory, political work is often linked to the model of the life of the prophet Muhammad. Interestingly, while most Islamic political theory uses the Medinan period of the Prophet's life (when he founded an Islamic polity) as its source, for Salafis political theory emerges first and foremost from the Meccan period (in which the Prophet's role was primarily proselytisation). As ‘Abd al-Rahmaan ‘Abd al-Khaliq argues in al-‘Amal al- Siyasi, “The idea that the Prophet (sl‘m) did not practice politics until after the migration [to Medina] when he established a state is a grievous error. For [the concept of ] ‘political work’ (al-‘amal al-siyasi) is broader than just the idea of ‘sovereignty’ (hukm). The prophet (sl‘m), from the first day that he began his call, called to a belief different from the prevailing belief, and he gathered people around [true] doctrine, and this is in reality political work according to contemporary understandings of the term.”45 The proselytization of the (p.166) Prophet and the tortures his community faced on its account are thus held up as examples of both the political stakes one risks in spreading truth against “prevailing belief,” as well as of the necessity of conducting da‘wa as a precondition to political sovereignty. Islamic politics, as he argues later in the same book, is about the rearing (tarbiya) of individuals out of the darkness of unbelief (kufr) and into the light of true faith (iman), and about establishing the ascendancy of “the group that saves” the individual from damnation (al-firqa al-najiyya) over all other claimants to religious truth.46 Thus the life of the Prophet shows us that political work is not limited to the struggle for the Islamic state but must also include a serious focus on the kind of tarbiya and doctrinal reform that the Prophet's life in Mecca exemplifies.

Conclusion: Complicating “The Political” In “Muslim Politics” Contemporary studies of Muslim politics have paid insignificant attention to the complexity of the political horizons towards which Islamic movements aspire. By limiting studies of political Islam to attempts by Islamic movements to grab hold of the modern state—rather than exploring the way in which Islamic movements are engaging the more diffuse constellations of modern state power as it trickles into the once religiously controlled domains of education, law, birth, marriage and death47 —scholars have consequently limited our understanding of the scope of “the political” in which Islamic groups see themselves as being involved. As we saw above, Salafis like Ansar al-Sunna understand the very work of da‘wa to be fundamentally political work as it challenges prevailing notions of ethics and truth promoted both by the state and rival movements within modern Islam. As the above analysis has shown, those Islamic movements which argue for a reawakening of the fundamentals of Islam as the source of political action (as both Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamists do) cannot be lumped into a unified category. While the work of scholars who have downplayed the “Islamic threat” (insisting that Muslim politics has similar agendas to Western secular politics but in Islamic idiom)48 has been helpful in opening up the (p. Page 14 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism 167) topic of Islamic politics to serious study, it has also downplayed important differences between varieties of Islamic political theory and regnant western models. The above analysis has shown that the Salafi political philosophy of Ansar al-Sunna is not merely unique in regards to other political theories because of the Islamic symbolic retinue it mobilises to express otherwise universal political processes, as Eickelman and Piscatori have suggested of Islamic political theory in their otherwise helpful volume,49 but rather in that it argues for a political philosophy which is in itself unique. Ansar al-Sunna's notion that a virtuous state is only possible as the result of a virtuous society, and that this virtue depends not only on moral rectitude but on doctrinal purity, raises a series of interesting challenges to existing theories of religion and politics that have yet to be fully examined. It is my hope that, if nothing else, the present essay encourages scholars to reexamine Islamic politics (its internal fissures, its resonances and dissonances with political solutions offered in the West) and in so doing to begin to construct a much more textured picture of the variety of Islamic political solutions being offered to address the problems of our age. Bibliography Bibliography references: ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Usul al-‘ilmiyya li-l-da‘wa al-salafiyya: Tawhid, ittiba‘, tazkiya, Alexandria: Dar al-Iman, no date. ———, al-Muslimun wa-l-‘amal al-siyasi, no publisher, no date. ‘Abd Allah Ahmad al-Tihami and ‘Umar al-Shaykh, al-Istijaba tuhawir al-shaykh ‘Abd al- Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq hawl qadaya al-sa‘a’, in al-Istijaba, vol. 1, no. 2 (Safar 1406/ October/November 1985), pp. 10–12. Abu-Rabi‘a, Ibrahim, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Ahmad Muhammad al-Tahir, Jama ‘at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya: Nash’atuha, manhajuha, ahdafuha, Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi‘, 2004. Ahmed, Einas, ‘Political Islam in Sudan: Islamists and the Challenge of State Power (1989– 2004)’, in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, Benjamin Soares and Rene Otayek (eds), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 189–210. Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Qur’an, Trowbridge, Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1984. Brown, Jonathan C ., The Canonization of al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni Hadith Canon. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Page 15 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Collins, Robert O., and Burr, J. Millard, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State 1989–2000, Leiden: Brill, 2003. (p.168) Cook, Michael, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Eickelman, Dale F., and Piscatori, James, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. El-Affendi, Abdelwahab, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, London: Grey Seal, 1991. Euben, Roxanne, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Gallab, Abdullahi, The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in Sudan, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008. Haydar Ibrahim ‘Ali, Suqut al-mashru‘ al-hadari. al-Juz’ al-awal: al-Siyasa wa-liqtisad, Khartoum: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Sudaniyya, 2004. Hirschkind, Charles, ‘What is Political Islam?’ MERIP vol. 27, no. 4 (2007), pp. 12–15. Layish, Aharon, and Warburg, Gabriel, The Reinstatement of Islamic law in Sudan under Numayri: An Evaluation of a Legal Experiment in the Light of its Historical Context, Methodology, and Repercussions, Leiden: Brill, 2002. Mitchell, Richard P ., The Society of the Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford University Press, 1969. Salomon, Noah, Toiling in the Shadows of Salvation: Sufis and Salafis in the Age of Late Islamism in Contemporary Sudan, PhD (forthcoming). Seesemann, Rüdiger, ‘Between Sufism and Islamism’, in Paul L. Heck (ed.), Sufism and Politics, New York: Markus Wiener Press, 2007, pp. 23–57. Shepard, William E., (ed.), Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1996. Sidahmed, Abdel Salam, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Simone, T. Abdou Maliqalim, In whose Image?: Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Notes:

(1) The research for this essay was generously funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Fulbright-Hays Commission of the United States Department of Education and by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. I thank Dalil Muhammad Dalil for his patient and diligent research assistance with helping me to analyse and contextualise many of the texts and speeches to which I refer below. I also thank Muhammad Khalifa Siddiq for acquiring for me many of the texts I discuss in the following and for going to such great ends to help answer my many, many questions. I thank Talal Asad, Bernard Haykel, Jeremy Walton, and Malika Zeghal for their helpful comments on this essay. Despite the valiant efforts of all of the above, any mistakes I have made in the following are mine, and mine alone. (2) All Arabic translations are my own. With Qur’anic verse I also made reference to the translation of Muhammad Asad in The Message of the Qur’an, Trowbridge, Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1984. (3) See Abdullahi Gallab, The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in Sudan, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008; Robert O. Collins and J. Millard Burr, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State 1989–2000, Leiden: Brill, 2003. (4) While the term “Islamist” has been used by the press and scholars alike quite liberally to denote any Islamic organisation with a political agenda (including Salafi groups), in this chapter when I discuss “Islamists” I do so using the much narrower sense of the term utilised in Islamic world: groups whose primary goal has been an Islamisation of the state and its institutions (through either jihad or participation in the democratic process) and which have often organised themselves into political parties in order to do so. In Sudan, such groups are known collectively as “al-haraka al-islamiyya” or “islam al-haraka,” the Islamic Movement, and its adherents are referred to as “islamiyyun” (Islamists), or sometimes more poetically as “al-kayzan ” (“the cups,” sing. kuz, after NIF founder Hasan al- Turabi's famous alleged statement, “al-islam huwwa al-bahr wa nihna al-kayzan,” roughly translating into “Islam is a wide river and we [the Islamist vanguard] are the cups [who deliver the water to the people]”). In Sudan, like elsewhere in the Islamic world, Islamist groups trace their intellectual genealogies through the Muslim Brotherhood movement and are distinguished both historically and ideologically from Salafi organisations as will become clear in the following. As this chapter shows, while Sudanese Salafis and Islamists share an agenda of the revival (ihya’) of Islam in public life, Salafis are extremely sceptical of the Islamist notion that this can be done through the mechanism of the state and its institutions. (Note also that while what I say here is true of the trend of Salafism I studied [al-salafiyya al-da‘awiyya, see below for an explanation of this term], Jihadist Salafi groups, which are the subject of Part Page 17 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Three of the present volume but do not have an open presence in Sudan, have a different relationship to the state, evidence of the diversity of political theories held under the rubric of Salafism). (5) In addition to the above-mentioned titles, see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, London: Grey Seal, 1991; Aharon Layish, and Gabriel Warburg, The Reinstatement of Islamic law in Sudan under Numayri: An Evaluation of a Legal Experiment in the Light of its Historical Context, Methodology, and Repercussions, Leiden: Brill, 2002; Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996; T. Abdou Maliqalim Simone, In whose Image?: Political Islam and Urban Practices in Sudan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Einas Ahmed, ‘Political Islam in Sudan: Islamists and the Challenge of State Power (1989–2004)’, in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, Benjamin Soares and Rene Otayek (eds), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 189–210. (6) The CPA was signed between the government in the North and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) based in Southern Sudan and brought an end to more than twenty years of civil war between these two parties. Further, the CPA lifted the military-enforced state of emergency across the country, inaugurated a new constitution and (at least on paper) extended wide range of rights to marginalized individuals and groups. Though there has been much backtracking since 2005, particularly in the areas of freedom of press and political expression, in the months following the signing of the CPA a new mood of political freedom pervaded Sudan and people began openly to express political opinions that only shortly before had been severely criminalized. (7) Shaykh Muhammad Hashim al-Hadiyya was the president of Ansar al-Sunna from 1952 until his death on 19 September 2007. I have profiled him in the biographies section of the present volume. In the late 1990s, Ansar al-Sunna split into two major wings (that of al-Hadiyya and Abu Zayd Muhammad Hamza), over several administrative and internal political issues, with the al-Hadiyya wing maintaining control over the vast majority of mosques, institutes of study and administrative centres. My research focuses only on the al-Hadiyya wing of the movement. (8) Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya is a Sudanese organization founded in 1939 in Umdurman by, among others, postal worker Ahmad Hasun and educator al-Fadil al-Taqlawi. The organization traces its roots back to a periodic lesson circle held around 1917 in the western city of al-Nahud led by Algerian scholar ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Hajar and attended by Ahmad Hasun, Tijani SufiShaykh Yusuf Abo, and judge ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Diqn, whom some consider the forefathers of modern Salafism in Sudan. (Note that after being expelled from Sudan by the British for anti-colonial activity, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Hajar eventually made his way to the Hijaz where the Saudi King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Page 18 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism appointed him president of the Organization of al-Amr bi-l-Ma‘ruf wa-l-Nahy ‘an al- Munkar in Jedda). Though Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan was heavily influenced and inspired by the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna (founded by Azhari ‘Alim Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi in 1926), it has always remained independent of the Egyptian organization. For more details on the founding of Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan, see Ahmad Muhammad al-Tahir, Jama‘at Ansar al-Sunna alMuhammadiyya: Nash’atuha, manhajuha, ahdafuha [The Ansar al- Sunna Group: Its Development, its Philosophy, its Goals], Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila li-l-Nashr wa-lTawzi‘, 2004, pp. 107–9. (9) It should be noted that these groups have tended to eschew violence as a means to political ends and speak openly against the activities of groups like alQaeda for doing a disservice to the reputation of Muslims worldwide (and hence becoming an obstacle to their proselytising work), by killing innocents which is forbidden in Islam, and by performing violent jihad without the permission of a jointly recognised and manifest Islamic leader (amir mu‘lan). (10) I thank the Sudanese journalist and commentator on Islamic affairs, Makki al-Maghribi, for his helpful model (personal interview, August 2007) that schematised Salafi groups into these categories. Additionally, he added the categories of: “al-salafiyya al-‘ilmiyya,” characterised by scholars such as Nasir al-Din al-Albani (see Jonathan C. Brown's excellent analysis of him in The Canonization of al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni Hadith Canon, Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp. 321–4 and Stéphane Lacroix's chapter in this volume) and devoted to a re-examination of the foundational texts of Islam and in particular the hadith canon; “al-salafiyya al-sufiyya,” (also called al-sufiyya al-islahiyya), referring to a very small movement in Sudan spearheaded by the sons of some important Sufifamilies who attempted to retain their Sufiaffiliations while performing the task of ta‘sil (i.e. putting their Sufism in line with a Salafi interpretation of the sources of Islam); al-salafiyya alharakiyya, movements which understand themselves as a hybrid of Salafism and Islamism (such as that led by University of Khartoum professor and shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy Yusuf) and are referred to often as al-Sururiyyin since they are influenced by the thought of the Syrian activist Muhammad Surur Zayn al‘Abidin (see www.surour.net, and the short biography of Muhammad Surur at the end of this volume); and, al-salafiyya al-takfiriyya, which are groups that advocate a withdrawal (hijra) from contemporary society since, they contend, its members, though allegedly Muslims, are in fact, by virtue of their distance from proper doctrine, unbelievers (kuffar), and that therefore any association with them (including praying behind them in the mosque) is forbidden (the allegation of the disbelief of other Muslims is known as takfir, hence the name altakfiriyya).

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The Salafi critique of Islamism (11) For a detailed defence of such a position on da‘wa see ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Muslimun wa-l-‘amal al-siyasi [Muslims and Political Work], no publisher, no date (I will refer to this book subsequently as al-‘Amal al-siyasi) which I discuss below. This book, along with many of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman's other works, circulated in electronic copies among the more computer-savvy sector of Ansar al-Sunna in Khartoum. Many of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq's books can be found on his website: www.salafi.net.I will discuss ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq in more detail below. (12) The title of the endeavour in Arabic is al-mashru‘ al-hadari which can literally be translated as “The Civilisational Project.” Yet, as the intent of the project was to reform state and society to be in line with Islamic norms, I believe the sense of the phrase is closer to “The Civilising Project,” and thus I translate this phrase as such in the following. For a discussion of this project, see Gallab 2008 (p. 11 and elsewhere) and Haydar Ibrahim ‘Ali, Suqut al-mashru‘ al-hadari. al-Juz’ al-awal: al-Siyasa wa-l-iqtisad [The Collapse of the Civilizing Project, Volume One: Politics and Economics], Khartoum: Markaz al-Dirasat alSudaniyya, 2004. (13) The NCP was founded in 1998 as a result of a split in the NIF ranks and is populated by many key former NIF officials who maintain an Islamist ideology. The generic-sounding name of the party was most likely created to appease international and local anxieties about Islamist governance. (14) Shaykh Muhammad Hashim al-Hadiyya, personal interview, January 2007. Shaykh al- Hadiyya contended that his organization's accommodation with the NIF/NCP was greatly facilitated by Vice President and former Minister of Social Planning (and former protégé of NIF founder Hasan al-Turabi) ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha. ‘Ali ‘Uthman was successful in integrating a diverse segment of religious groups into his fold including the al-Hadiyya wing and many Sufiorganisations (the latter through the establishment of the National Council for Mindfulness of God and Those who are Mindful [al-Majlis al-Qawmi li-l-Dhikr wa-l-Dhakirin]. See: Rüdiger Seesemann, ‘Between Sufism and Islamism’, in Paul L. Heck (ed.), Sufism and Politics, New York: Markus Wiener Press, 2007, pp. 23–57 for a study of Sufi-Islamist accommadationism), and to this day a diverse sector of Islamic movements consider him a friend. (15) In her sophisticated and nuanced portrayal of the challenges state power has posed to Sudanese Islamists since their rise to power in 1989 until the signing of the CPA, Einas Ahmed (2007) analyzes the accommodation that Ansar al-Suna made with the NIF/ NCP as evidence that the “boundaries between fundamentalists, Salafis and Islamists have softened (p. 200).” While the détente between the government and Ansar al-Sunna is significant—not least for the contrast it poses to da‘wa ist Salafi groups in many other Muslim countries that refuse involvement in the state—I disagree with Einas Ahmed that this Page 20 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism represents any sort of new ideological softening on the part of Ansar al-Sunna as an organization. Even its involvement in state politics is nothing new, as Ansar al- Sunna was, for example, part of the various coalitions supporting an Islamic constitution following independence. Ansar al-Sunna shaykhs with whom I spoke stressed the pragmatic benefit in their alliance with the present government in the kinds of material power (opening of mosques, access to media) they gained which furthers their da‘wa, in their ability to advise and reform the government to be more in line with correct Islamic doctrine, and to the degree that certain of their goals overlap. At the same time, such shaykhs remained vocally and often publically critical of the Islamist ideology that underlies the NIF/NCP political agenda and frequently stressed their independence. (16) Indeed it was due to this position that the Salafis with whom I worked tended to be extremely sceptical of calls for Islamic revolution (such as that which took place in Sudan in 1989) or violent jihad as a means of securing an Islamic state. They argue that Islamisation cannot happen overnight and cannot simply be imposed from above, but rather can only come as a result of successful proselytisation of society. Thus, there is little patience for leaders who have come to power heralding an Islamic revolution but who do not practice Islam in the proper manner (‘ala fahm al-salaf al-salih) themselves. ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, a major influence on Ansar al-Sunna whom we will discuss in more detail below, argues “The leaders of the reform programmes and Islamic missions do not appreciate the enormity of the real burden in the road to establishing an Islamic society. They imagine that its establishment could happen overnight (bayn ‘ishaha wa duhaha) and through the efforts of 100 or 200 or 1000 or 2000 people. And they don’t bear in mind that the matter has become greater than this and needs a long struggle and a lot of patience and long years of moral rearing and education (tarbiya wa ta‘lim).” ‘Abd al- Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Usul al-‘ilmiyya li-l-da‘wa al-salafiyya: Tawhid, ittiba‘, tazkiya [The Fundamentals of Knowledge for Salafi Proselytisation: The Promotion of Monotheism, Following (the Prophet), Purification (of Doctrine and the Self)], Alexandria: Dar al-Iman, no date, pp. 42–3 (NB: I will subsequently refer to this book as al-Usul). (17) For an explanation of this principle see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. (18) See Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘a, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 92– 165. (19) It is also interesting to note that for Ansar al-Sunna the main religious opponent they feel they are up against is errant Muslims, and not non-Muslims (though they do certainly understand non-Muslims as being in deep error and in Page 21 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism need of conversion). Shaykh al-Hadiyya described to me his meeting with the late socialist (and Christian) leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), John Garang, in order to illustrate this point (interview, January 2007). Al-Hadiyya had been invited to Naivasha, Kenya during the peace negotiations between the SPLM (which represents a largely non- Muslim constituency whose origins are in the southern part of the country) and the northern dominated Government of Sudan as part of an ad-hoc council of Islamic scholars who were meant to give their opinions (or perhaps just blessings) to the emerging peace agreement. Shaykh al-Hadiyya recounted, “I said to him, ‘John Garang, there is no religious enmity between you and me. Completely. Not for a day did you rebel against Islam. It is the Muslims who attacked Islam, those who are with me here [in this council of scholars or perhaps he means the government representatives]. And our religion is very tolerant (mutasahil) regarding this matter. And I will present you a verse from the Qur’an: [And God said:] Ask [oh prophet Muhammad] of those who have received previous scripture and those who have no scripture [al-ummiyyiin], ‘have you surrendered yourself to God [in light of the new revelations revealed, i.e. to becoming Muslim)]?’ And if they thus surrender, they are rightly guided, and if they turn away, your duty is only to deliver to them the message [with which you have been entrusted] for it is [only] God who can see [the true convictions] of [His] believers [Al ‘Imran: 20]). So nowhere does it say cause strife with [non-Muslims], or attack them, or create problems with them.’” For Shaykh al-Hadiyya, it is primarily misguided Muslims who pose the biggest threat to the Salafi vision of Islam. Alliance with such “errant” Muslims could corrupt proper doctrine, whereas non-Muslims, who make no claims to correct interpretation of Islamic doctrine, pose little threat in this regard. (20) Note that while classical discussions of al-ikhtilaf generally concern matters of difference between the four major schools of Islamic legal thought (almadhahib), and are discussed within the realm of jurisprudence (fiqh), Salafis use the term as well to refer to difference on central matters of theology or doctrine as well. I use the term throughout this essay under this latter understanding of its reference. (21) Note that I will restrict myself in this chapter to discussing the political philosophy of the Islamists as perceived by Ansar al-Sunna. Indeed, this portrayal is often a caricature of the actual positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in Sudan. Nevertheless, my interest in this paper is less in a comparative study of the two groups and more in the type of political positionality that Salafis put forth using the Muslim Brotherhood as a foil. Those who are interested in the political philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood itself should look to Richard P. Mitchell's classic work The Society of the Muslim Page 22 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism Brothers, London: Oxford University Press, 1969; Roxanne Euben's Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; and to one of the many edited volumes of Sayid Qutb's work, such as Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam, William E. Shepard (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1996. (22) I have rendered the name of the neighbourhood an alias due to the political sensitivity of the topic of discussion. (23) See Gallab 2008, esp. pp. 51–3. Though the members of the leadership of Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups in Sudan characteristically have elite standing (commonly university educated, often in the west or Egypt), the balance between the elite and the masses was a constant topic of debate within these movements and is more complex than I have room to explicate here. See el-Affendi 1991, e.g. pp. 86–8, 158–9 for more details. (24) For example, in a week-long course for Salafidu‘at (missionaries) which I attended in suburban Khartoum in the Summer of 2007, an overwhelming majority of the participants came from the traditionally marginalised areas of Western Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. (25) I am using an alias for the shaykh due to the political sensitivity of the topic of discussion. (26) Note that since Arabic names are patronymic and there is therefore no traditional equivalent to the English surname, I will refer to Islamic religious figures by their most common appellations. In the case of some, it means referring to their nisba (attributive) names (e.g. for Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “al-Qaradawi”), while for others it means using their first name preceded by their title “shaykh” (e.g. for Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, “Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman”). Other Shaykhs are referred to by a nickname (e.g. al-Bura‘i for the famous Sudanese SufiShaykh ‘Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Waqi‘ Allah) or a unique sounding name within the chain of their names (e.g. for Shaykh Muhammad Hashim al-Hadiyya, “Shaykh al-Hadiyya”). (27) See my forthcoming dissertation entitled: Toiling in the Shadows of Salvation: Sufis and Salafis in the Age of Late Islamism in Contemporary Sudan, expected for submission in 2009. (28) Take, for example, the short-lived Sufipolitical movement that arose in 2005 called harakat al-i‘tisam al-watani (the Movement for National Solidarity) which used this verse as their motto and argued that, in the period leading up to national elections in four years’ time, Muslims need to gather together as one in

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The Salafi critique of Islamism order to maintain the Muslim identity of Sudan in the face of attacks from secularists and non-Muslim southerners. (29) The following quote from ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq's al-Usul in which he critiques modernist readings of the Qur’an is instructive for understanding Salafi hermeneutics: “When these interpreters (al-mu’awwilin) approach the verses on the attributes of God (ayat al-sifat), they distort them (yuharrifunaha), alleging that this is a kind of interpretation (ta’wil). So they interpret the coming of God on the Day of Resurrection as the coming of his command [i.e. not his literal coming] and his reclining on his throne as his possession over it, and his hand as his ability, and his face as his essence, and since they can’t believe in an essence on a throne, then they say that therefore there is no throne, and that the throne is God's supreme authority (mulk), and that God has no place, and therefore he is in no place, but rather they say that he has no place in a thing of this world, and even [no place] outside it. And therefore they argue that it is not permitted for a believer to say: my Lord is in the sky. If someone says so, they accuse him of innovation (yabaddi‘unahu) and they call him a heretic. And they come to hadith that mention in them a quality of God, like ‘God descends to the sky of this world every night’, and insult he who believes that [literally] with the ugliest of insults. They say rather that it is his mercy (rahmatu) that descends. …But the Salafi believes in the qualities of God and his names as they came in His book and on the tongue of the Prophet, salla allahu ‘alayhi wa sallam [a common invocation pronounced after the name of the Prophet Muhammad meaning “May God grant him grace and peace”. From here on I will use the common abbreviation (sl‘m) to refer to it.], pp.15–16. (30) See ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Usul, p. 67. (31) It should be noted that the idea of “wihda ” has a special salience in today's Sudan and is a term which is being debated by Sudanese intellectuals in conversations about the solidarity of the nation and the Muslim community. The prevalence of this term in public debate is due to the fact that the overwhelmingly non-Muslim southern part of the country is scheduled to vote on secession in 2011. Thus at stake at the present historical juncture is both the unity/territorial integrity of the Sudanese state (i.e. due to the threat of the south seceding) and the unity/integrity of the Muslim community (i.e. due to the opposite threat of the South being integrated in the federal government as an equal partner, with the legal recognition of the multi-religious and multicultural nature of Sudan as its condition, and thus threatening the Muslim hegemony over the character of the state). (32) The hadith of Bani Qurayza (Bukhari 5:59:445) is an important source which contemporary Muslims use to discuss the problem of difference (al-ikhtilaf) in their midst. The telling goes that a regiment of the Prophet's army was on its way to battle in the place of the tribe of Bani Qurayza. The Prophet told the Page 24 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism group on their departure, “do not pray the afternoon prayer until you reach the place of Bani Qurayza.” When the normal time for the afternoon prayer came, there was some dissent in the group of Muslims. On the one hand, there were those who argued that the Prophet had always appointed specific times for prayer and thus, despite his seeming to command otherwise, they could not delay the prayer. On the other hand, there were those who took the Prophet's words literally and indeed delayed their prayers until the regiment arrived at the place of Bani Qurayza. Later, when the story was related to the Prophet, he did not scold either group suggesting that both interpretations were correct. This hadith has subsequently been used by Muslims to support the idea that difference of opinion should be accepted in the Muslim community, i.e. that there are cases in which two interpretations are equally valid. It is such an interpretation that Shaykh Ahmad accuses Hasan al-Banna of upholding and against which he positions his speech. (33) The term Wahhabi is used derogatorily by non-Salafi Muslims to describe Salafi groups in Sudan in order to imply that the latter are a Saudi import. The Salafis, while they clearly see Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as one of their forebears, do not understand themselves as his intellectual heirs, but rather argue that both he and they are representatives of an “Islam based on the understanding of the righteous Salaf.” The argument is that both Wahhabi s and Ansar al-Sunna are Salafis, rather than that Ansar al-Sunna are ascribing to the philosophy of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahab (an idea which would be anathema to a group which prides itself on following the sources of Islam and not any individual). The question of the actual historical connections between what is known as Salafism in Sudan and the movement of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab in Arabia are in reality far more complex than the Salafis let on, but there is not sufficient space to allow me to discuss it in this chapter. (34) Ahmad Muhammad al-Tahir, Jama‘at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, p. 152, my emphasis. Though due to space restrictions I cannot discuss the breadth of Ansar al-Sunna's views on Islamism and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, I want to stress that Shaykh Ahmad is not unique in his point of view. In the above-quoted book, Dr. Ahmad Muhammad al-Tahir, president of Ansar al-Sunna in Eastern Sudan, discusses the differences between Ansar al-Sunna (in Egypt as well as Sudan) and the Muslim Brotherhood. Distinguishing between Salafism and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Ahmad argues that “The general principle which these two groups gather around is the revival of the Muslim nation (umma) and its awakening (iqazuha) so that it takes its place among nations. Such a goal cannot be achieved except by grabbing onto the true Islam. But they have a difference in philosophy and style: Should [this awakening] be by the way of da‘wa and moral rearing (tarbiya)? Or should it be the style of striving for rule and power? (p. 151).” The former opinion is associated with the Salafis, of course, and the latter with the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr. Ahmad argues that both groups have the goal of “the Page 25 of 27

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The Salafi critique of Islamism renaissance (nahda) of Islam” but while the Muslim Brotherhood wants to effect such a renaissance through political power, Salafis want to realise this goal through “fixing corrupted doctrines (islah al-‘aqa’id al-fasida) (p. 152).” (35) ‘Abd Allah Ahmad al-Tihami and ‘Umar al-Shaykh, ‘al-Istijaba’ tuhawir alshaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq hawl qadaya al-sa‘a ’, [‘al-Istijaba ’ Discusses with Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq the Issues of the Hour], in al-Istijaba [The Heeding of theCall], year one, issue two, Safar 1406 (October/ November 1985), pp. 10–12. All quotes in the following section are from this interview, unless otherwise indicated. (36) Gallab (2008) argues (p.73), following the work of Sudanese political historian and politician Mansour Khalid, that Nimayri instituted shari‘a in order to “preempt the Islamists’ project,” but that its institution was not actually driven by the Islamists themselves. That said, the success of shari‘a in Sudan was seen by all as a result of Islamist activism, whether driven by them or to preempt them. See also el-Affendi 1991: pgs. 121–3. (37) Commonly quoted hadith. (38) See footnote 29. (39) See footnote 16. (40) Note that while most often Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman leaves the targets of his criticism nameless, from the descriptions he gives it is always clear about whom he is writing (particularly when one compares his writings to the more explicit words of the Sudanese Salafishaykhs to which I refer in this essay). Nevertheless, the term “Islamists” (al-islamiyyun) does arise in his books as well to describe the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups he reviles (see, e.g. al-‘Amal al-siyasi, p. 26). (41) al-Usul, 43. (42) Ibid., pp. 22 & 39. (43) And here he argues, “those who decree today the non-permissibility of Islamic political parties perform a great service to the enemies of Islam which they do not even comprehend, for they restrict Islam within the scope of weak means (al-Usul, p. 20).” (44) al-‘amal al-siyasi, p. 31, my emphasis. (45) Ibid., p. 4. (46) Ibid., p. 36.

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The Salafi critique of Islamism (47) For a similar call to question the common assumption that it is Islam which has expanded into politics, and to explore instead how Islam has engaged the expansion of the modern state into traditionally religious domains, see: Charles Hirschkind's ‘What is Political Islam?’ MERIP vol. 27, no. 4 (2007), pp. 12–15. (48) See, for example, Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. (49) Ibid., p. 20.

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Noorhaidi Hasan

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0008

Abstract and Keywords This chapter deals with the complicated relationship between Salafism and politics by analyzing the Indonesian Salafi group Laskar Jihad, led by Ja’far Abu Thalib. It shows how the movement turned to jihad by rejecting politics as hizbiyya (partyism). The chapter also deals with internal debates on the so-called Sourouris, who mixed the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood with Salafism. It also deals with the links between Salafis in Indonesia and the Yemeni Salafi Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i. Keywords:   Indonesia, hizbiyya, Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Abu Thalib, jihad, Hadi al-Wadi’i

Despite its rapid proliferation and success in establishing an exclusivist current of Islamic activism in Indonesia, the contemporary Salafi movement has been vulnerable to tensions and conflicts among its protagonists. In fact, the movement is neither unified nor solid, but rather fragmented, and this fragmentation has very much to do with the stiff competition among the Salafis for the position as the movement's legitimate representative. Debates and controversies frequently erupt out of this competition especially over the prerogatives to define boundaries, and interpret religious symbols and doctrines which are integral to the identity and aspiration of the movement, and support of their organised claim and counterclaim. The competition involves the struggle not only for authority and legitimacy, but also for membership and strategic links. More than simply a competition over religious symbols and the institutions that produce and sustain them—the main feature that informs the dynamics of Page 1 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Muslim politics across the world—it is a public negotiation over the rules, discourses and networks that morally bind the movement's community together.1 Fragmentation in the Salafi movement seems rooted in the ideological and political ambivalence of the Saudi Arabian regime, itself the main sponsor (p. 170) of the movement. On the one hand, the regime wants to reinforce its geostrategic position as both the guardian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (khadim al-haramayn) and the centre of the Muslim world by portraying itself as the only true defender of the Islamic shari‘a, thus questioning the format of other governances. But on the other hand, it needs to maintain its legitimacy in the face of growing opposition, both at home and abroad, by developing a doctrine of obedience to existing rulers. This ambivalence has confused the movement's protagonists especially when they are faced with complex and extensive global realities. As part of their commitment to obeying existing rulers, they have developed a non-political pietistic model of Islamic activism marked by a disdain for politics. But this stance of apolitical quietism often produces paradoxes, especially when dealing with different political and social contexts. As I have argued elsewhere, the development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia is inexorably related to the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in the global politics of the Muslim world.2 Following the fading influence of Arab socialist nationalism associated with the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser (d. 1970), and the skyrocketing of oil prices in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia promoted the spread of Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world as a major plank in its foreign policy.3Nevertheless, the kingdom's role in global politics faced a serious challenge when the Iranian Revolution erupted in 1979 and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. It was haunted by the speculation that a similar revolution could wipe out its own newly acquired hegemony. This anxiety was to some extent justified by the rise of a revolutionary Islamic group within the borders of the kingdom. Led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the group seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979.4The challenge (p.171) posed by the Iranian Revolution became more apparent when Saudi Arabia witnessed a series of Shi‘i demonstrations and Khomeini proposed that Mecca and Medina be granted international status.5Saudi Arabia tried hard to limit the devastating effects of the revolution. At the domestic level it sought to prove its commitment to Islam by imposing a stricter enforcement of religious laws, while at the international level it intensified the export of Wahhabism, whose doctrines contain not only anti-Shi‘a sentiments, but also anti-revolutionary Islamic ideas.6 While doing this, Saudi Arabia tried hard to broaden its legitimacy and image as the only truly Islamic state committed to the comprehensive implementation of the shari‘a. Because of the pejorative meaning of the term Wahhabi among Muslims across the world, the kingdom has preferred the term Salafi as the banner of its campaign.

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Anti-hizbiyya Despite their emphasis on the need for a return to the Qur’an and the Sunna in accordance with the understanding and example set by the pious ancestors (alsalaf al-salih) the Salafis strongly reject what they call da‘wa hizbiyya, literally the call to participate in local politics.7 This was defined by them as the political call for fanatical adherence to a particular group and was believed by them to prevent the believer from the complete adherence to the Salafi method (manhaj).8 From the Salafis’ point of view the da‘wa hizbiyya is opposed to the da‘wa salafiyya for the following reasons: 1) it deviates from the way of faithful Muslims (sabil al-mu’minin); 2) its leaders come perilously close to the sins of bid‘a (innovation); 3) its members are committed to the doctrine of loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wa-l-bara’) on the basis of their allegiance to a particular leader rather than to the Qur’an and Sunna; and 4) it teaches fanaticism by devotion to a profane cause.9 They claim that the da‘wa salafiyya is the (p.172) only legitimate Islamic da‘wa based on the Qur’an and Sunna, and in doing so, they reject all da‘wa activities carried out by other Islamic groups. The Salafis argue that the main error committed by the hizbiyya groups stems from their loyalty to the followers of innovation (bid‘a). This mistake is believed to have caused division among Muslims because it teaches fanaticism to each separate group, prompting members to renounce any truths that might belong to the others. In the Salafis’ opinion, members of such groups become trapped in a tunnel of narrow thinking, as they become exclusively focused on attempts to seize political power.10 They direct their main criticism against the Muslim Brotherhood, whose spirit is deemed tantamount to the pagan spirit of the preIslamic jahiliyya period.11 Adherence to the da‘wa hizbiyya is even claimed to be one of the distinctive characteristics of polytheists (mushrikin). This is because those who support it use Islam as a weapon to create fanatical groups for their own political interests, with the result that Muslims become fragmented and weak.12 Paradoxically, however, the Salafis accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of being enmeshed in the sins of bid‘a especially because of its ambition to unite the Muslim umma. They are convinced that the Muslim Brotherhood has a tendency to direct the loyalty of its followers unreservedly to certain leaders at the expense of the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the example of the al-salaf al-salih. To underline their critique, they quote a number of fatwas from ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999), Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, and Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, which prohibit Salafis from showing any sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood and similar Islamist movements.13 They therefore condemn Muslims sympathetic to the messages propagated by the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar groups, whom Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, one important ideologue among Indonesian Salafis, identifies as “agitators of religion” (kaum pengacau agama).14 Another allegedly false goal pursued by the Muslim Brotherhood, Page 3 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia according to their Salafi critics, is the attempt to re-establish the Islamic caliphate. The Salafis claim that this ambition is political in nature and (p.173) threatens the purity of Islamic da‘wa, and that this ambition has encouraged the members of the Muslim Brotherhood to support the Iranian Revolution without paying heed to “all the forms of infidelity of this revolution and the hostility of its proponents to the principle of the ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a ”.15 In line with this non-revolutionary approach, the Salafis have developed a moderate stance towards existing rulers. They refer to prominent Salafi’ulama, including Ibn Baz and Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, who maintained that criticising a legitimate ruler might bring about anarchy (fitna) and that such an act is an absolute deviation from the Salafimanhaj.16 Nevertheless, the Salafis’ stance does not guarantee their immunity from politics, since some elements in their ideology suffer from ambiguity. They maintain, for instance, that Muslims must obey their legitimate rulers, whether just or unjust, on the condition that they are not commanded to commit any sin. This clause is important because within a certain context it makes it possible for the Salafis to withdraw from their initial loyalty. The same holds true for their opinion on the concept of hakimiyya (sovereignty). This is a key concept developed by Sayyid Qutb and Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi, whose writings teach that in Islam, governance belongs only to God.17 In both Qutb's interpretations and those of Mawdudi, hakimiyya is understood to be one of the main components of tawhid, which means to accept and believe in the oneness of God and His absolute authority. The Salafis reject the so-called tawhid hakimiyya, conceptualising hakimiyya as an independent branch of tawhid.18 They support this position by referring to a number of fatwa s issued by the Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia who maintain that the tawhid hakimiyya is a form of bid‘a exploited as a political weapon by hizbiyya groups.19 They argue that this understanding requires one to embrace the takfir doctrine, which has been used by hizbiyya groups as a means of legitimising their revolts against legitimate Muslim rulers.20 This doctrine teaches that the rulers—or even a (p.174) society as a whole—who do not follow the shari‘a are considered unbelievers (kuffar) and consequently should be resisted and replaced by true Islamic leaders through the use of violence, if necessary. Their explicit opposition to the takfir doctrine notwithstanding, the Salafis advocate a strict application of the shari‘a, in effect making a political claim and vitiating their criticism of hizbiyya groups. Submission to the shari‘a is considered compulsory because it is God's law. The Salafis emphasise that Muslims’ acceptance of the shari‘a as their only binding law constitutes one of the pillars of Islam. But they maintain that this is part of the tawhid al-uluhiyya, which decrees that all forms of worship are meant for God alone. According to their interpretation, to believe that those who do not apply the shari‘a stray necessarily into infidelity (takfir), as implied by the tawhid hakimiyya, is a mistake.21 Interestingly, the Salafis cannot avoid using the doctrine of takfir in Page 4 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia their analyses of the legal consequences for rulers who fail to honour the shari‘a. But their rejection of these rulers falls short of declaring them all unbelievers. They distinguish between two categories of unbelievers: kafir i‘tiqadi (infidel at the level of belief) and kafir ‘amali (infidel at the level of practice). While the first is no longer considered a faithful Muslim, the second is still regarded a Muslim, albeit a Muslim who commits sinful acts. Here we see the political nuances of the Salafis’ ideology. It is apparent that the necessity to submit to the shari‘a as a manifestation of tawhid has an inevitable consequence in their assertion that faithful Muslims should obey this law. Although they seem cautious about the impact of this doctrine, as indicated by their creation of the category of kafir ‘amali, the Salafis have asserted that the shari‘a is the only legitimate law and that it should be followed by Muslims. It can be inferred therefore that the boundary between the Salafis and members of other Islamist groups in terms of ideology is, in fact, very narrow. Their major difference is simply that the Salafis hold the view that submission to the shari‘a does not require the establishment of an Islamic state. They do not regard an Islamic state as a priority. It can be achieved gradually, provided that Muslims walk on the straight path in a consistent manner. In other words, its realisation constitutes the promise of God to faithful Muslims.

The Sururiyya Issue These ideological ambivalences have contributed a great deal to the competition and conflict erupting among the protagonists of the Salafida‘wa movement (p. 175) in Indonesia. Keeping pace with the rapid proliferation of the movement, competition emerged among them for the position as the movement's legitimate leader. All claimed to be authentic Salafis committed to the movement's main goal of purity. One contender, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib (for his biography see the section on biographies of Salafi thinkers and activists at the end of this volume), accused his rivals, who are generally graduates of Saudi Arabian universities, including Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz ‘Asif al-Din and Yusuf Baysa, of being affiliated with Muhammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin,22 one of the main Saudi Arabian critics who had fiercely criticised the Saudi Arabian government and its religious establishment over the presence of American troops on Saudi soil in 1990. The implication was that the accused were potentially violent jihadis who did not accept the existing government as legitimate. Fragmentation and conflict among the Salafis became inevitable. They split into two main currents: the so-called Sururis and the non-Sururis. Referring to the Saudi Arabian case, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib warned Indonesian Salafis to be aware of the danger of the so-called Sururiyya fitna (discord) and to remain consistent with the Salafida‘wa. He believed that such consistency was needed to deal with the enemies of the Salafida‘wa, his own rivals, whom he accused of pretending to be Salafis while in reality they believed in applying takfir. This doctrine considers that a regime is apostate if it does not follow the Page 5 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia shari‘a and that violence can be used to topple such a regime and replace it with a true Islamic state. According to Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, the dissemination of this doctrine was extremely dangerous, since it could instill a revolutionary spirit in Muslims, as was demonstrated by the case of the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad— responsible for the assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib sought to support this claim by pointing out that the name As-Sunnah, the title of the periodical published by Muhammad Surur in London, had been adopted by Abu Nida as the name of his own publication. In addition to this, he highlighted the link between the Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath (Society for the Revival of the Islamic Heritage) in Kuwait, Abu Nida's main donor, and ‘Abd alRahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, another principal critic of the mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz who had condoned the presence of American troops on Saudi soil to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation.23 (p.176) In 1996, the Jam‘iyya Ihya’ al-Turath had sent ‘Abd al-Khaliq to Indonesia. He was assigned the task of resolving the conflicts that had disrupted the Salafi community in Indonesia. In his speech, he sought to defend the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologues by exposing the fallibility of their detractors. This manoeuvre was crucial for answering Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's criticism of the so-called Sururis who were accused of being Ikhwani infiltrators bent on destroying the Salafida‘wa by promoting the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In reply, Shaleh Suaidi, one of the most important of Abu Nida's cadres, posed a question about the hukm (ruling) that cautions those who criticise well-known Salafi authorities and their followers in a rigid, uncompromising manner to be more temperate. ‘Abd al-Khaliq said he regretted the existence of such people and asked them to repent immediately.24 This event enraged Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, who felt that Suaidi's question was directed at him, and was part of a plot to discredit him in front of ‘Abd al-Khaliq. Following this event, he grew more persistent in attacking Abu Nida and other Salafi proponents, and he set Yusuf Baysa, who had served as the host of the meeting, clearly in his sights. He could no longer hide his anger and frustration with Yusuf Baysa, whom he remembered as the traitor who had replaced him in his position as the director of the Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) al-Irsyad Tengaran in 1990. Without any hesitation, he condemned Yusuf Baysa as one of the most dangerous Sururis in Indonesia. Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's persistence in criticising and condemning Yusuf Baysa drew an irritated reaction from Muhammad Sharif Fu’ad Haza, an Egyptian on the teaching staff at the Pesantren Al-Irsyad Tengaran, sent there by the Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath of Kuwait. In a pamphlet, he challenged Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib to stage a mubahala, a term derived from its Arabic root b-h-l, which literally means “cursing each other.” A mubahala is a sort of prayer challenge in which the disagreeing parties meet and appeal to God to render a verdict by placing his curse on the liars among the participants. To Haza, this was the only way of curbing Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's manoeuvre, which had created such a deep Page 6 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia split among Indonesian Salafis. A heated debate ensued among Salafis, news of which reached Indonesian students at the Islamic University of Medina, particularly pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran graduates who still maintained contact with their former teachers. Both Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and Yusuf Baysa felt that the students’ position on this issue was highly important. Student allies could be used to mobilise support from certain Salafi authorities in (p.177) Saudi Arabia. Yusuf Baysa sent them a letter explaining his opinions of Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's manoeuver.25 In reaction to this letter, the students split into two opposing groups. Some supporting Yusuf Baysa, others siding with Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib. Under the leadership of Usamah Faisal Mahri, Abu Munzir Zul Akmal, Ainur Rafiq, and Agus Rudianto, the pro-Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib group approached mentors at the Islamic University of Medina, such as Zayd Muhammad al-Madkhali, Rabi‘ alMadkhali, and ‘Abd al-Razzaq ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-‘Abbad, all known for their resolute opposition to Muhammad Surur. The result of their discussions appeared in the form of a small book entitled Nasehat dan Peringatan Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa’ (Advice and Warning about Sharif Fu’ad Haza).26 In his proJa‘far ‘Umar Thalib response, Zayd Muhammad al-Madkhali asserted that mubahala was the da‘wa method used by the Haddadiyyin (followers of Mahmud al-Haddad al-Misri, a Muslim Brotherhood activist advocating the use of the doctrine of takfir) and was unacceptable. Adopting the same tone, Rabi‘ alMadkhali clarified that such a method was incorrect and warned “Indonesian Salafis to be aware of the danger posed by people like Muhammad Sharif Fu’ad Haza”. ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-‘Abbad was of the opinion that recourse to “mubahala is forbidden unless a person has been utterly persistent in his deviations and that it is the last remaining option.”27 The commotion did not stop there. The Sururiyya issue raised by Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib generated tension and conflict between the Salafis and the activists of other Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the home-grown NII (Negara Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic State)—a movement which had itself emerged in the 1970s and actively campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, re-echoing the battle cry of the rebellious Darul Islam movement that had erupted in West Java in 1949. Considering themselves Salafis in terms of doctrine, the proponents of these movements could not accept Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's condemnation of Qutb, whose ideas inspired their mode of activism, and his claim that the movements they followed fell ignominiously into the hizbiyya category. To them, there were no grounds for Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and like-minded people—who considered da‘wa as the only acceptable form of politics—to denigrade the hizbiyya, with the meaning of participation in (p.178) practical politics, as a form of bid‘a (unwholesome innovation) and shirk (polytheism), which would mean that they were acting in opposition to Islam. Clashes occurred when Muslim Brotherhood activists refused to allow Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's followers to conduct their Page 7 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia activities in several Indonesian mosques, such as Mardiyah Mosque, near the Medical Faculty of the Gadjah Mada University. In response, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's followers adopted a far more aggressive stance and sought to take control of the mosque. They even extended this effort by trying to replace the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in the Shalahuddin Community of the Gadjah Mada University.28 Since then, clear-cut distinctions have been drawn between the Salafis and members of other Islamist organisations. University students engaged in Islamic activism began to recognise the differences between the circle (halqa) of the Muslim Brotherhood and the workshop (dawra) of the Salafis, which had previously been conflated as halqa tarbiya (a forum for the study of Islamic sciences) or dawra tarbiya (a type of workshop on Islamic teachings). The followers of each movement began to compete to attract new followers. As a consequence, shifts in membership from one movement to another became common. Many members of the NII movement, disillusioned with their clandestine activism, decided to move to the Salafi movement. The new strength provided by their involvement in Salafism was a much more significant reason for their joining this movement than their defiance of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, let alone the Tablighi Jama‘at. These students even established a new umbrella organisation called the Rabitat al- Shari‘a (The Shari‘a League).29 What should be emphasised here is the transnational and financial dimensions of the conflict. By instigating the Sururiyya issue, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib apparently sought to reinforce his relationships with prominent Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. This effort was particularly important to bolster his claim that he was the main authority among Indonesian Salafis who were concerned with Saudi Arabia's campaign to expel the Salafi activists who had resisted its policy to invite the American troops in 1990. At the same time, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib hoped that he would gain considerable support for disseminating Salafi messages from philanthropic foundations operating in the kingdom. People like Zayd Muhammad al-Madkhali, Rabi‘ al-Madkhali, and ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-‘Abbad were indeed important (p.179) figures who, because of their influence in the Salafi movement, could help channel support from Saudi Arabian foundations for Salafida‘wa activities in Indonesia.

Salafi haraki Versus Salafi Yamani The Sururiyya issue demonstrates how vulnerable the Salafis are to the fragmentation and conflict that can derive from theological nuances and personal manoeuvers. They find themselves in an ambivalent situation between the need to show their obedience to the powers that be and the ambition to underline their image as the most committed defenders of the shari‘a. For the early proponents of the Indonesian Salafida‘wa movement these two interests immediately collided with Realpolitik during the regime of the New Order led by Page 8 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Suharto. He was known as an authoritarian leader who systematically attempted to marginalise expressions of political Islam in the Indonesian public sphere, by, among other instruments, the fusion of Islamic parties and the implementation of the asas tunggal (sole foundation) policy, which required all mass organisations and political parties to accept the Pancasila (Five Principles, the ideology of the state) as the sole foundation of their ideology and activities, thus forbidding Islam from being used as the basis of any organisation. In this context, he steadfastly suppressed all kinds of Islamist opposition that erupted in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Consequently, early Indonesian Salafis did not hesitate to work hand-in-glove with Muslim Brothers as well as Hizb utTahrir and the NII activists in their attempts to resist Suharto's repression. In fact, during its formative years in the second half of the 1980s, the Salafi movement often co-organised halqas (Islamic study forum) and dawras (workshop on Islamic teachings) with activists of other Islamist organisations. Under the slogan “‘aqidah salafi, manhaj ikhwani,” meaning “Salafi creed, Brethren practice,” they broadened their influence and attracted a new generation into their circle. The closeness of the early proponents of the Salafi movement and activists of other Islamist organisations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, was also the target of Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's criticism when he raised the Sururiyya issue. In early 1990 he returned home after completing his jihad adventure in the Afghan war. He volunteered to join several factions of the Afghan mujahidin, having studied at the Mawdudi Islamic Institute, in Lahore, Pakistan for less than a year. This was not surprising, as many other students from Indonesia were also volunteering. First, he reported to the al-Khayriyya military training (p.180) camp in Peshawar, which became the headquarters of volunteer fighters from Syria.30 It is of interest to note that the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (The World Muslim League) and other Arab Islamist organisations responsible for recruiting volunteer fighters worldwide frequently covered up their true purpose by claiming that these recruits were taking religious courses at different educational institutions in Pakistan. Once there, however, it is alleged that the volunteers were diverted to regional camps where they received intensive instruction in the techniques of unconventional warfare.31 In 1987, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib began his engagement in the Afghan War. He claims to have initially joined the Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, before being sent to assist the Jami‘at-i Islami led by ‘Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. It was common for volunteer fighters to rotate from one faction to another in assisting Afghan mujahidin.32 He claims to have shared a tent with Sayyaf and to have had contact with Osama bin Laden. For ideological reasons, however, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib eventually preferred to support the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahli Hadith (The Society for Call to the Qur’an and the People of the Hadith), a strict Salafi faction and Saudi Arabian “principality” led by Jamil al-Rahman. This faction had special relations with the Pakistani Ahl-e Hadith, a reformist Page 9 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia movement founded in India in the nineteenth century that shares many similarities with Wahhabism, particularly in terms of its repudiation of traditional practices, such as visiting the Prophet's grave.33 Upon his return to Indonesia, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib was given the assignment to introduce changes to a reformist Muslim school in Central Java, Pesantren AlIrsyad Tangeran, so that the school's teachings would conform more closely with Wahhabi doctrines. In addition to teaching activities, he took part in disseminating Wahhabi ideas among university students, under the banner of the Salafida‘wa movement. This mission ultimately became his main concern, to the extent that he finally gave up teaching at the pesantren. He was active in (p. 181) responding to the invitations from the early proponents of the Salafi movement to deliver religious lectures and sermons in different cities, including Yogyakarta, Solo, and Semarang. It is likely that they did not want to be left behind in the campaign to spread Wahhabi doctrines. But a conflict erupted among the school's teachers and this encouraged Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib to quit. Having decided to quit the pesantren in 1990, he went to Yemen, allegedly using the connections he had built during his engagement in the Afghan War. His journey to Yemen had a specific aim, namely to deepen his insights into Wahhabi teachings with a Yemeni teacher, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i,34 known as a Salafi ideologue par excellence, bearing the honorific title of “muhaddith al-Yaman ” (the specialist in the Prophetic Traditions, hadith, in Yemen). Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i (d. 1999) gained recognition as a Salafi authority during his lifetime, and his influence had been growing since the early 1980s. His knowledge of Wahhabism was forged by two decades of study in Saudi Arabia. Initially, he studied in the Salafi teaching centre developed by Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin in Najran, before enrolling at the Medina Islamic University.35 His relations with Saudi Arabia seem to have been complicated but dynamic. He was imprisoned in 1979 for several months after being accused of having been involved in the Juhayman-led attack on the Meccan sanctuary. This experience was a nightmare that must have left an ineradicable imprint on the memories of the prisoner. It is said that al-Wadi‘i often launched harsh criticism of the Saudi royal family and once even declared this regime to be trapped in infidelity (takfir). Despite such hindrances, widespread official interest in spreading Wahhabism brought him close to the religious elite of Saudi Arabia. The Holy Mosque Establishment, a charitable organisation sponsored by the Saudi Arabian government, officially supported all institutions of learning associated with him in Yemen, including the al- Khayr mosque and Islamic teaching centres in Dammaj, Ma‘abir, Ma‘rib, and alHudaida.36 In many cases, al-Wadi‘i adopted a position that favoured Saudi Arabia. He was persistent, for instance, in his criticism of the Iranian Revolution, (p.182) about which he wrote a book entitled al-Ilhad al-Khomeini fiard alharamayn (Impudence of Khomeini in the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries). Similarly, during the Yemeni civil war in 1994, he encouraged his followers to be Page 10 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia active on the battlefronts against the Marxist-Leninist powers. He even inveighed against Muhammad Surur, whom he accused of committing takfir. This effort allied him with the defenders of Ibn Baz, including Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Rabi‘ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, and Zayd Muhammad ibn Hadi alMadkhali. Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's decision to study with Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i enabled him to establish a network of religious authority between the Indonesian and Yemeni Salafis. His primary success was to initiate the cooperation that facilitated the dispatch of hundreds of Indonesian youths to study at the Islamic teaching centres associated with Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i. In so doing, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib created an alternative channel for Indonesian Salafis who wished to enrich their religious insights abroad. As the southern gate of the campaign for the dissemination of Wahhabism across the world, the position of Northern Yemen, with excellent religious institutions linked to Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, was crucial. To establish contact with that region, therefore, meant to create a strategic link with Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the presence of such an alternative link did not necessarily attract the funding from Saudi Arabian foundations. In fact, the money from the foundations continued to flow exclusively into the accounts of those who had been accused by Ja’far ‘Umar Thalib of being Sururi proponents and who had direct access to important figures in the management of the foundations and their associates. His manoeuvre to use the Sururiyya issue as a tool against his opponents backfired by denying him access to these foundations. The executives working in the foundations were apparently unhappy with the people who had sparked this inflammatory issue, which had caused a serious fragmentation among Indonesian Salafis. As far as they were concerned, this fragmentation could become a barrier to the Salafi movement's attempts to realise its da‘wa goals and become a prominent movement. At the same time, conflict between Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and activists of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and NII movements continued to intensify when the latter consolidated themselves to counter the challenges posed by the Salafis. If Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib so readily labelled his Salafi rivals as Sururis, he accused his rivals from the other Islamist movements of being Salafi haraki (Salafi political activists) or neo-khariji (modern heterodox Muslims). Because of this conflict, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and his cohort (p.183) became increasingly labeled as SalafiYamani, which was meant as a derogatory term denoting their obsession with trivial issues such as wearing the right clothing—the jalabiyya, or the beard (lihya), the headband (isbal), and veil (niqab). For his “haraki ” rivals, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib was a representative of the old-fashioned Yemeni tradition which contributed nothing significant to the development of the Islamic

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia movement in Indonesia. They claimed that this limitation was rooted in the ambivalence of the necessity to enforce the shari‘a.

Jihadist Activism In the aftermath of the fall of Suharto in May 1998, which stimulated the growth of a free political space, and enabled a variety of groups, identities, and interests to emerge and compete for the newly liberated public sphere, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib's “haraki ” rivals emerged into the limelight to proclaim their existence. They set up, among other organisations, the Front Pembela Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Majelis Mujahidin, and took to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari‘a and the revival of the Islamic caliphate. They were also active in conducting raids on discotheques, casinos, brothels and other dens of vice scattered in big cities of Indonesia as part of their hisba (commanding good and forbidding wrong)37 campaign. The anti-hizbiyya doctrine Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and his cohort had developed certainly emerged as a barrier that prevented them from resorting to such political activism and mobilisation. Amid the fast growing current of political change that began to gain momentum at that time, however, they did not want to be left behind and eventually became involved in responding to a variety of political issues. They organised gatherings in which they expressed their profound concern about the direction of the ongoing reformatory process. In a gathering held in Yogyakarta in mid-1998, for instance, they voiced explicit regret about political reform, which, from their point of view, had resulted in the collapse of Indonesia's socio-political system and disrupted the growing alliance with Islamic forces so recently encouraged by the state.38 During similar gatherings organised later on their participation in the political discourse of the state became increasingly visible. (p.184) The enormous impact of Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib’s appearance in the Indonesian public sphere was demonstrated when his members flooded the Kridosono Sport Stadium in Yogyakarta at the beginning of January 2000. While waving banners and shouting slogans, voicing their concern about the communal conflicts in the Moluccas and other trouble spots in Indonesia, they proclaimed a resolution, called “Resolusi Jihad” (Jihad Resolution), demanding that all elements of Indonesian Muslim society be prepared for a jihad against the enemies of Islam. Proponents claimed that this war had become necessary when the so-called “three pillars of the state,” namely Muslims, the armed forces, and the president, had been toppled in the face of ethnic and inter-religious violence provoked by foreign powers. They then announced the establishment of FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama‘ah, Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet), which was intended to serve as an umbrella organisation for Laskar Jihad, and conisted of volunteer fighting units. Without approval from the then President Abdurahman Wahid, a legitimate ruler from whom permission should be requested before jihad can be conducted Page 12 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia according to the Salafi doctrine, Salafi jihad volunteers enlisted themselves to fight jihad in the Moluccas. The determination to fight jihad in the Moluccas required the Salafis, as part of the transnational da‘wa community, to request fatwas from a number of prominent religious authorities in the Middle East, all of whom were linked to Ibn Baz, the former head of the Saudi Arabian Council of Senior ‘Ulama. These included ‘Abd al-Razzaq ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-‘Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Rabi‘ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, Salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya ibn Muhammad alNajm, and Wahid al-Jabiri. Once issued by the prominent Salafi authorities, these fatwas legitimised the call for jihad in the Moluccas by the Indonesian Salafis associated with Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib. This legitimacy was crucial for the Salafis to achieve an internal consensus, and it provided a solid foundation that allowed them to cross the boundary set by their fundamental doctrinal position, which required adherents to follow a consistently nonpolitical da‘wa strategy. The need for this legitimacy was demonstrated when some elements among the Indonesian Salafis themselves voiced opposition to the call for jihad. Those associated with Abu Nida, for instance, strongly criticised this call by reminding their fellows that Salafi da‘wa was their original cause. They circulated opinions underlining the illegitimacy of Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib’s call for jihad, while declaring that the fatwas supporting the call were forgeries.39 (p.185) Ja’far ‘Umar Thalib's decision to fight jihad in the Moluccas aggravated his conflict with the other Salafi protagonists. His rivals had enough reason to accuse Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib of everything he had condemned previously: being a Sururi trapped in haraki activism. His lieutenants, who were initially supportive of his decision, as they understood the jihad in the Moluccas to be a defensive mechanism for assisting their Muslim brothers in repelling the attacks of Christians, began doubting his sincerity. Political manoeuvres made by Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib when he met with a number of the political elite, plus his appearance on television screens, served as a catalyst for their withdrawal from his line. Following the arrest of Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib in April 2002, such voices were increasingly heard ending up with a national meeting in Makassar. During this meeting they sent a petition to Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib to disband Laskar Jihad, claiming that by involving them in the jihad operation in the Moluccas they had become victims of political manipulation. After its dissolution in October 2002, they abandoned Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and requested a fatwa from Rabi‘ alMadkhali confirming that Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib could no longer be considered a true Salafi. Their opposition to Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib has developed into a network with Muhammad ‘Umar as-Sewed and Qamar Suaidi as its central personalities. Without Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib the Yemeni network has since then remained vocal in its criticism of the so-called hizbiyya groups or the Salafiharaki. It is particularly concerned with those activists identified as the members of the Jama‘ah Islamiyya, a clandestine Islamic organisation believed to have Page 13 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia perpetrated terrorism in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, including the Bali bombing in October 2002. One of the main protagonists in the bombing was Imam Samudra, who was arrested and has recently published a book entitled Aku Melawan Teroris (I Am Against Terrorists).40 In this book he claims to be the only Salafi truly committed to defending Islam from the attacks of what he calls “the real international terrorist, America” and its perpetration of terror against Muslims across the world. By implication, he accuses the other Salafis, including veterans of the Laskar Jihad, of only pretending to be Salafis. He also explicitly places prominent Salafi authorities, such as Ibn Baz, al-Albani, al-‘Uthaymin, al-Wadi‘i, and al-Madkhali, in the same group as those identified by Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and his cohorts as the main protagonists of Sururi groups, including Salman al-‘Awdah, Safar al- Hawali, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Mullah (p.186) ‘Umar. In response to this book, the Yemeni network published a dozen pamphlets and books. Abu Hamzah Yusuf, for instance, has written a pamphlet Membongkar Pemikiran Sang Begawan Teroris (Uncover the Thoughts of the Terrorist Mastermind), in which he criticised Imam Samudra for having dishonoured the truly Salafi authorities and idolised dubious figures, such as Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.41 The last two names are the founder and co-founder of the Jama’ah Islamiyyah (JI) respectively. Lukman Ba‘abduh, the vice-commander of Laskar Jihad during its operation in the Moluccas, took a step further by publishing a book entitled Mereka Adalah Terroris (They Are Indeed Terrorists).42 In this book he condemns Osama bin Laden as a khariji who destroyed Islam by spreading the doctrine of takfir and perpetrating terror. He also criticises Imam Samudra and his cohort as deviant Muslims who too easily applied the takfir doctrine to legitimate rulers and even to Muslims with whom they differ, resulting not only in widespread animosity against non-Muslims and Muslims alike, but also violence and terror in the name of jihad. He strongly condemns Imam Samudra's claim to be a grand hero fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mullah ‘Umar against the “greatest terrorist”, America. In his opinion, they are all fake mujahidin who have deviated from the Salafi method (manhaj). Conflicts among the Salafiharaki and the SalafiYamani have recently evolved into an open clash. On the occasion when the Yamanis organised a gathering in Surakarta to criticise Risalah Mujahidin, the mouthpiece of the Majelis Mujahidin, an organisation linked to the Jama’ah Islamiyyah, the SalafiHaraki attacked the SalafiYamani for having blamed the so-called harakis of being infiltrated by Jews and also questioned the consistency of their spiritual leader (amir), Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. This attack encouraged Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib to write an article in a national magazine, Gatra, in support his former followers, continued struggle against the hizbiyya libel.43 The spokesperson of the Majelis Mujahidin, Fauzan al-Anshari, reacted to this article by questioning Ja‘far ‘Umar

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Thalib's claim to be the only legitimate representative of the Salafis as well as his decision to wage jihad in the Moluccas.44

(p.187) Conclusion I have demonstrated how Salafism is prone to fragmentation and conflict. Although there are elements of personal intrigue and interest in the claim and counterclaim to be the most authoritative representatives of the movement, ideological and political ambivalences imported from Saudi Arabia as the main sponsor of the Salafi movement certainly played a great role in the dynamics of the conflict. The regime's ambivalence stems from its need to maintain its legitimacy at home and an interest in strengthening its central role in global Muslim politics. In a different context, doctrines of obedience provided by Wahhabism often collide with Realpolitik, which should be measured, according to the Salafis, through the commitment to the shari‘a. As a way to get rid of this situation, the Salafis promoted the slogan “‘aqida salafi, manhaj ikhwani,” but this solution appears vulnerable to debate and conflict too, especially because the former aims to domesticate revolutionary Islamism, while the latter is in essence political activism aimed at gaining power. This conflict is apparently a reflection of the Saudi regime itself, which, from day to day, needs to adjust itself to global changes, but at the same time, has to maintain the legitimacy of the corruption of Islam of its ruling regime. Bibliography Bibliography references: Abou Zahab, Mariam, and Roy, Olivier, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, London: Hurst & Company, 2002. al-Anshari, Fauzan, ‘Siapa Salafi?’ Gatra, no. 34, 5 July 2007. al-Atsary, Ibnu Syarif al-Bengkului as-Salafy, ‘Semangat Hizbiyyah, Semangat Jahiliyyah’, Salafy, no. 9 (1996), pp. 45–64. Ba’abduh, Lukman, Sebuah Tinjauan Syari’at Mereka Adalah Teroris, Bantahan terhadap Buku “Aku Melawan Teroris” , Malang: Pustaka Qaulan Sadida, 2005. Chalk, Peter, ‘Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippine’, in Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities, ed. Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 187–222. Eickelman, Dale F., and Piscatori, James, Muslim Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Fraser, Cary, ‘In Defense of Allah's Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy’, in Transnational Religion and Fading States, ed. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997, pp, 212–42. Page 15 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia Hegghammer, Thomas and Lacroix, Stéphane, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 39 no. 1 (2007), pp. 103–22. (p.188) Jasman, Armen Halim, ‘Rekayasa Fatwa?’ As-Sunnah, vol. 5, no. 1 (2001), pp. 5–7. Kechichian, Joseph A., ‘Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al- ‘Utaybi's Letters to the Saudi People’, The Muslim World, vol. 80, no. 1 (1990), pp. 1–16. Kepel, Gilles, The Trail of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002. Mahri, Usamah, . et al, Nasehat dan Peringatan [Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa’], Malang: Yayasan Waladun Shaleh, 1996. Metcalf, Barbara D ., ‘Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, ISIM Papers, Leiden, 2002. Moussalli, Ahmad S., Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992. Mu’thi, Abdul, ‘Memerangi Dakwah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy, no. 9 (1996), pp. 10–23. Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, vol. 27, no. 1 (2007), pp. 83–94. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and Great Game in Central Asia, London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Samudra, Imam, Aku Melawan Teroris, Solo: Jazera, 2004. Schulze, Reinhard, Islamischer Internationalismus in 20. Jahrhundert, Leiden: Brill, 1990. Schwartz, Stephen, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa‘ud from Tradition to Terror, New York, NY: Doubleday, 2002. Thalib, Ja‘far ‘Umar, ‘Perjalanan dari Luar Negeri’, Salafy, no. 28 (1996), pp. 62– 7.

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia ———, ‘Akhlaqul Muwahhidin dan Akhlaqul Musyrikin’, Salafy, no. 16 (1997), pp. 3–12. ———, ‘Salafi Mesti Berani’, Ghatra, no. 31, 14 June 2007. ———, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah Merupakan Perjuangan Reformasi Rakyat’, Salafy, no. 28 (1998), pp. 10–15. al-‘Uthaymin, Muhammad ibn Salih, Aqidah Ahlussunnah Wal Jama‘ah, Jakarta: Yayasan al-Sofwa, 1995. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, Middle East Policy, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2001), pp. 18–38. Yusuf, Abu Hamzah, ‘Membongkar Pemikiran Sang Begawan Teroris’, www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=878. Notes:

(1) On the definition of Muslim politics, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 5– 11. (2) Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, vol. 27, no. 1 (2007), pp. 83–94. (3) Cary Fraser, ‘In Defense of Allah's Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy’, in Transnational Religion and Fading States, ed. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997, pp, 212–42; Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus in 20. Jahrhundert, Leiden: Brill, 1990; and Gilles Kepel, The Trail of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002. (4) Among the works that analyse this event are Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 144–6; Joseph A. Kechichian, ‘Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-‘Utaybi's Letters to the Saudi People’, The Muslim World vol. 80, no. 1 (1990), pp. 1–16; Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa‘ud from Tradition to Terror, New York, NY: Doubleday, 2002; and Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 39 no. 1 (2007), pp. 103–22. (5) On the contestation between Iran and Saudi in post-Khomeini revolution, see Fraser ‘In Defense of Allah's Realm’, pp. 226–34. (6) Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p. 151. Page 17 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia (7) According to Salafis, hizbiyya (political activism) has a broad meaning, ranging from taking part in the parliamentary system to overthrowing the government. (8) Abdul Mu’thi, ‘Memerangi Dakwah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy, no. 9 (1996), p. 16. (9) Ibid., pp. 16–19. (10) Interview with Muhammad ‘Umar as-Sewed, Yogyakarta, December 2002. (11) Ibnu Syarif al-Bengkului as-Salafy al-Atsary, ‘Semangat Hizbiyyah, Semangat Jahiliyyah’, Salafy, no. 9 (1996), pp. 51–4. (12) Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, ‘Akhlaqul Muwahhidin dan Akhlaqul Musyrikin’, Salafy, no. 16 (1997), p. 12. (13) See ‘Fatwa-Fatwa Ulama tentang Larangan Membentuk Jama‘ah-Jama‘ah Hizbiyyah’, Salafy, no. 9 (1996), pp. 24–8. (14) Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, ‘Perjalanan dari Luar Negeri’, Salafy, no. 5 (1996), pp. 62–3. (15) Interview with Muhammad ‘Umar as-Sewed, Yogyakarta, December 2002. (16) Ibid., p. 49. (17) Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992, p. 151. (18) ‘Tauhid Hakimiyah antara Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq dan Abdullah as-Sabt’, Salafy, no. 21 (1997), p. 142. (19) ‘Fatwa Hai’ah Kibaril Ulama Saudi Arabia: Istilah Tauhid Hakimiyah adalah Perkara yang Baru’, and ‘Fatwa Nasr al-Din al-Albani, Penggunaan Kata Hakimiyya Termasuk Pelengkap Dakwah Politik’, Salafy, no. 21 (1997), pp. 17– 18. (20) Interview with Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib and Muhammad ‘Umar as-Sewed, Yogyakarta, December 2002. (21) ‘Jargon Baru, Slogan Lama’, Salafy, no. 21 (1997), p. 1. (22) For more on Muhammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, see the section on Salafi biographies at the end of this volume. (23) Interviews with Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, December 2002, and with Muhammad Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, December 2002.

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia (24) Interview with Yusuf Usman Baisa, Cirebon, February 2003. (25) Interview with Azhar Cholid Sef, Jakarta, January 2003. (26) Usamah Mahri. et al, Nasehat dan Peringatan (Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa’), Malang: Yayasan Waladun Shaleh, 1996. (27) Ibid., pp. 1–10. (28) Interview with Abu Mas‘ab, December 2002. (29) Interview with Faqih Edi Susilo, Semarang, February 2003. (30) See ‘Putra Malang Alumnus Perang Afghanistan’, Gatra, 5 August 2001. (31) See Peter Chalk, ‘Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippine’, in Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities, ed. Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein, p. 198. (32) For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. See also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and Great Game in Central Asia, London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. (33) Concerning the Ahl-e Hadith, see Barbara D. Metcalf, ‘Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, ISIM Papers, Leiden, 2002, p. 6. See also Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The AfghanPakistan Connection, London: Hurst & Company, 2002, pp. 20–1. See also chapter 5 in this volume. (34) For more on Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, see the biographies of Salafis at the end of this volume and chapter 14. (35) One of the most important works of al-‘Uthaymin is ‘Aqidat Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a, which is translated into Indonesian to become Aqidah Ahlussunnah Wal Jama‘ah, Jakarta: Yayasan al-Sofwa, 1995. (36) See Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, Middle East Policy vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2001), p. 32. (37) For more on the concept of hisba, see chapter 8. (38) Concerning this gathering see Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, ‘Dakwah Salafiyah Merupakan Perjuangan Reformasi Rakyat’, Salafy, no. 28 (1998), pp. 10–15. (39) See Armen Halim Jasman, ‘Rekayasa Fatwa?’ As-Sunnah vol. 5, no. 1 (2001), pp. 5–7. (40) Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, Solo: Jazera, 2004. Page 19 of 20

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Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts In the Salafi movement In Indonesia (41) Abu Hamzah Yusuf, ‘Membongkar Pemikiran Sang Begawan Teroris’, www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=878. (42) Lukman Ba’abduh, Sebuah Tinjauan Syari’at Mereka Adalah Teroris, Bantahan terhadap Buku ‘Aku Melawan Teroris ’, Malang: Pustaka Qaulan Sadida, 2005. (43) Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, ‘Salafi Mesti Berani’, Gatra, no. 31, 14 June 2007. (44) Fauzan al-Anshari, ‘Siapa Salafi?’, Gatra, no. 34, 5 July 2007.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya Roel Meijer DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0009

Abstract and Keywords One of the most important Islamic doctrines of action is the doctrine of al-amr bima’ruf wa nahi ‘an al-munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong). For Salafis it has become an important means of civil action, together with al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (dealt with in chapter 3). This chapter analyzes the use that the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya has made of this concept and practice in expanding its power in Upper Egypt, and, later, to the poor neighbourhoods of Cairo. It shows how the doctrine was turned into the lynchpin of social and political activities and how it evolved into a major political doctrine, which first legitimated violence but, after the Jama’a had rejected violence (muraja’at), became a principle of civil responsibility. Keywords:   Egypt, Jama’a al-Islamiyya, muraja’at, violence

The Jama‘A Al-Islamiyya As a Social Movement Undoubtedly the Egyptian Jama‘a al-Islamiyya is one of the most important Islamic movements in Egypt. Most of the attention has been focused previously on exotic groups such as the Takfir wa-l-Hijra, or minor groups such as the Military Academy Group,1 or more recently, since 9/11, on the Jihad Organisation and its relationship through Ayman al-Zawahiri with bin Laden.2 By contrast, the Jama‘a has largely been neglected in Western sources, or, worse, put into the same bracket as the Jihad Organisation. Only at the end of the 1990s, when it revised its ideology, did it attract significant attention.3 (p.190) Page 1 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Unlike its neglect in Western research, the Jama‘a has been the focus of many Egyptian researchers, but a definitive study has yet to be written.4 What makes the Jama‘a interesting is that it is a social movement.5 As opposed to the Jihad Organisation, the Jama‘a has always pursued the line of obtaining a large following and mobilising the masses and as such can be regarded as a social movement rather than a conspiratorial group or a sect. It was involved in all aspects of a contentious action: building an organisation, resource mobilisation, identity formation, framing, taking advantage of opportunity structures and choosing from a repertoire of contention.6 Moreover, the Jama‘a is especially interesting for its relationship with violence and the dangers it poses for a movement that was basically not geared to taking over power from the state. In its history the Jama‘a resembles in many ways the student movements in Europe of the 1960s, going through the same stages of development from an apolitical movement, acquiring political awareness, radicalising and in some (p.191) cases coming into violent conflict with the state. Not only does the Jama‘a differ from these movements on account of its religious character,7 but it is also a semi-Salafi movement and as such provides insight into one of the recurring characteristics of Salafism, hisba. This chapter deals with the history of the Jama‘a and its different tactics as a social movement. It will focus especially on the concept of hisba (al-amr bi-lma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar), or commanding right and forbidding wrong. The most important verses in the Qur’an concerning this issue state: “Let there be one community of you, calling to good, and commanding right and forbidding wrong: those are the prosperers” (3:104), and “You are the best community (ummah) ever brought forth to men, commanding right, forbidding wrong, and believing in God” (3:110). The most important hadith on hisba states that “whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand (bi-l-yad), let him do so; if he cannot then with his tongue (bi-l-lisan); if he cannot then with his heart (bi-l-qalb). That is the bare minimum of faith.”8 Hisba is traditionally a conservative principle. According to the classical doctrine of Muslim scholars, putting things right (taghyir) with the hand is the prerogative of political authorities, with the tongue of scholars and in (or with) the heart for the common people. This elitist interpretation confirms the state's monopoly of force and the “natural” hierarchical structure of society.9 The originality of the Jama‘a lies in turning this conservative concept into an activist programme or manhaj.

The Early Years Originally, in the 1970s, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya should be read in the plural as Jama‘at, or religious societies (al-jama‘at al-diniyya). They were concentrated in universities, operated independently from each other and, had no ties to (p. 192) other organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood. Most of them were informally organised as “families” (usar). Like the Muslim Brotherhood whose members were released from prison in this period, they were supported by the state as a counterbalance to the left.10 In Asyut and Aswan they were even Page 2 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action subsidised by the local governor.11 The organisational backbone of the Jama‘at was established by study “circles” (halaqat). One of the important activities they organised were summer camps, where students not only were taught fiqh (law) and tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) but also engaged in physical training and selfdefence, as the Brotherhood had done in the 1940s and 1950s. The Jama‘at gained adherents by not concentrating so much on politics as on providing services for students, such as free transport, copies of lectures, and organising markets for cheap food, books and clothing.12 Through their networks and their ideology of purity the Jama‘at had a potential to become a political opposition. Especially in Upper Egypt, where next to Asyut University new universities had been built in Sohag, Qina, and Minya, the Jama‘at grew into a contentious movement during the second half of the 1970s. One person stood out as particularly influential in the ideological development of the Jama‘at: ‘Abdallah al-Samawi. After having been imprisoned at the age of sixteen for his activities in the Brotherhood he had become alienated from the organisation at the end of the 1960s. Al-Samawi was able to create an independent network and devote himself completely to preaching and organising study circles. His Jama‘a expanded between 1974 and 1978 to several thousand members who supported him with donations.13 Another important figure is ‘Umar ‘Abd al- Rahman (b. 1938), who became the “spiritual father” of the Jama‘a when it became a separate organisation.14 Like ‘Abdallah al-Samawi, he had been in conflict with the state since the 1960s.15 (p.193) Ideologically, the Jama‘at were “immature” in the first half of the 1970s.16 The movement had neither a clear policy nor a clearly defined project.17 Most members were simply pious and endeavoured to follow a “traditional Salafism”,18 which had been founded in the 1920s. The movement was conservative, ritualistic, based on peaceful hisba and agitated especially against Sufism. In the 1970s it re-established its relations with Saudi Arabia and became oriented towards the Saudi Salafi establishment.19 In contrast, most (p. 194) Jama‘at members found their way “without directions” and read on their own the classic Salafi texts of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Kathir. With the exception of al-Samawi,20 or ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, “we were our own shaykhs”, Muntasar al-Zayyat (b. 1956), the later-to-become lawyer of the Jama‘a, states in his memoirs.21 For some students it was an opportunity to emerge as ideologues in their own right, such as ‘Isam Darbala, one of the later student leaders of the Upper Egyptian movement, who was admired by his peers as a “theoretician” and “a man of culture” for his knowledge of Salafi theology and jurisprudence.22 However, by the mid 1970s the Jama‘at had adopted such potentially revolutionary concepts as jahiliyya (period of ignorance) and hakimiyya (sovereignty of God as opposed to the sovereignty of man) from Sayyid Qutb.23 His Milestones was a key text in cadre training courses in 1980 and many members knew whole sections of it by heart.24 Sayyid Qutb, however, had little to say on hisba, and it is from Ibn Taymiyya that they derived the Page 3 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action characteristic repertoire of contention of “changing the forbidden/ reprehensible” (taghyir al-munkar).25 He argued that in extreme cases it was the right of every subject to exert hisba and to use force without the sanction of the state.26 By linking hisba with the concept of tawhid al-rububiyya, the necessity to completely submit to God's sovereignty, it was developed into an activist “programme of changing evil by force” (manhaj taghyir al-munkar bi-l-quwwa).27 Tal‘at Fu’ad Qasim, at the time a student leader in Minya, stated that they had to “rid themselves of the despots (tawaghit, (p.195) literally: idols) after reading the Salafi‘ulama and modern ‘ulama [sic] such as Sayyid Qutb”.28 Despite their growing antagonism towards the state, the actions of the Jama‘at were mainly directed against the community. The struggle against moral corruption (al-fasad al-akhlaqi) adopted the form of disrupting music performances, intervening in the showing of Western films, as well as preventing other forms of corruption: liquor stores, video shops and mixed gender trips of students.29 Smashing Christian liquor stores in Aswan with clubs was one way of expressing their religious zeal,30 preventing the building of cinemas was another method.31 But it is clear that hisba represented a multi-faceted repertoire of contention that was also used to encroach upon the prerogatives of the authorities. The clash with the authorities led to a cycle of contention.32 Demonstrations, sit-ins, prayer sessions on the streets (when mosques they controlled were closed down), and intimidation, followed by negotiations with and concessions by the authorities, led to a further expansion of their horizon, higher demands, and a new phase of contention, ending in violence.33 During this cycle the Jama‘at increasingly became involved in public clashes with the state, such as the “food riots” of 18 and 19 January 197734 and the demonstrations against the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel during the following year. By the end of the 1970s, the state regarded the Jama‘at in Upper Egypt as a threat and student leaders were suspended from attending university.35

A Separate Organisation The turning point came in 1977 when the Jama‘at were able to translate their numbers into power by electing their leaders to student unions. Some of them (p.196) became both an amir of a local Jama‘a and the chairman of a student union,36 increasing their power and outreach.37 In this period also the competition with the Muslim Brotherhood grew as the Brotherhood tried to recruit a new generation to its ranks.38 The main difference between the Jama‘at in Upper and those in Lower Egypt was the specific interpretation of hisba by the Upper Egyptian Jama‘at and the acceptance of violence.39 The Upper Egyptian Jama‘at condemned the Brotherhood for its weak manhaj and its refusal to “change evil by force”.40 But the differences went deeper. They claimed that they differed in their creed (‘aqida al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a), condemning the Brotherhood for its rejection of Page 4 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action the Qutbian concept of hakimiyya, which made it imperative to rise up in revolt against the ruler who does not rule in accordance with the revelation.41 For its part, the Brotherhood started to detach itself from the student societies of Upper Egypt after they had declared Sadat an unbeliever.42 Their relations reached a breaking point when these Jama‘at laid claim to the term Salafism,43 regarding themselves as living “according to the Salafi understanding” (nahwa fahm salafi).44 The organisational split occurred within the Jama‘at in 1978 when many student leaders in Lower Egypt proclaimed their adherence to the (p. 197) Brotherhood, to the outrage of their Upper Egyptian colleagues.45 In March of that year a conference was organised in Asyut during which the Upper Egyptian Jama‘a was established as a separate organisation with its own leader, Najih Ibrahim.46 Characteristically it established vigilante groups “to change the wrong” (taghyir al-munkar) in the form of forbidding the drinking of alcohol and the mixing of sexes. It also started to print pamphlets in its own name.47 Its activities expanded to include harassing Copts and the imposition of a head tax (jizya) on them.48 Religious leaders such as ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, legalised (istihalla) the appropriation of the money of the Copts, and robberies took place in such places as Shubra al-Khayma in Lower Egypt and Nag‘ al-Hamadi in Upper Egypt, during which several Coptic goldsmiths were killed.49 In addition to clashes with Copts during the national/pagan holiday of Shamm al-Nasim, it also attacked Sufis, and fights occurred during the celebration of saints’ days, mawlid s.50

Merger With Tanzim Al-Jihad The merger with the Jihad Organisation in 1979–1980 has been extensively analysed and needs no elaboration here except for a few points that illustrate the influence of Tanzim al-Jihad on the Jama‘a.51 First, the unification marked a merger of two different tactics of overthrowing the regime by means of a coup d’état by the Tanzim,52 supported by a “popular revolution” (thawra sha‘biyya) led by the Jama‘a.53 Second, for the first time an attempt was made (p.198) to draw up a strategy for achieving this goal.54 Regarding revolution as a method that could lead to formation of a “special praxis”,55 the new organisation closely studied the Iranian revolution that erupted in 1979.56 Third, as a result of this merger members of the Jama‘a for the first time received military training in the mountains along the Nile Valley in Upper Egypt.57 The plan was to take over power after a period of three years.58 Notwithstanding the merger, the basic differences could not be overcome between the two parts of the organisation. The main issue was the role of hisba.59 Whereas the Jihad Organisation was a secret conspiratorial organisation that concentrated on al-munkar al-akbar (the greatest evil, i.e., of the state) and believed that the state could only be brought down by a tight knit vanguard that was capable of penetrating the military and staging a coup d’état, the Jama‘a focused on open activism.60 Characteristically, the Jihad Organisation condemned hisba because it attracted the attention of the police.61 Eventually Page 5 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action these differences would crystallise into the two main strategies of the 1980s laid down in the Mithaq al-‘amal al-islami (The Charter of Islamic Action) of the Jama‘a and the Manhaj al-haraki li-Jama‘at al-Jihad (The Activism Programme of the Jihad Group) of the Jihad Organisation.62

The Second Generation The assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981 and the uprising in Asyut two days later, and the massive arrests which followed, did not mean a break with (p.199) the past. The split that had existed before with the Muslim Brotherhood became even greater when it started to focus on civil society and gained seats in parliament in 1984 and 1987, while the Jihad Organisation and the Jama‘a continued their strategies. Of the two, the Jama‘a was by far the most successful. Ninety per cent of the actions and publications against the state in the 1980s and 1990s were from the Jama‘a.63 Three developments were crucial in this period. First, the first generation of leaders (born in the second half of the 1950s) would remain in prison (until 2003–2006), but would acquire prestige as the “historical leadership” (al-qada al-tarikhiyyun) and try to exert influence on events outside the prison through their extensive writings and communiqués. Second, a new leadership arose out of the second generation of students, who had been trained in the prisons and instructed on how to build a new infrastructure,64 enabling them to take over daily operations of the Jama‘a once they were released. The torture they had undergone in prison had radicalised them.65 Third, the Jama‘a diversified geographically, extending its influence, importantly, to the marginal suburbs in Cairo.66 Fourth, a significant change took place in ideological writings. These became not only much more extensive, rigorous and systematic than the previous period, promoting violence via hisba and jihad, they also became much more political, promoting the establishment of an Islamic state, and therefore becoming more Islamist. In contrast to the rather abstruse The Hidden Duty of ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideologue of the Jihad Organisation, these writings were very direct.67 Fifth, the Jama‘a became a much more disciplined organisation after its members were released in 1984. Divided into different sections based on ideology and the paramilitary training of cadres, it was transformed into “an army” geared to the execution of hisba, the main element they retained from Salafism.68 (p.200) When the second generation leaders were released from prison in 1984, they took up the familiar practice of “changing wrong” by breaking up mixed parties, music festivals, theatre performances. As before, they were able to take advantage of the weakness of the central authority and terrorise the universities, especially Asyut University, where they used knives and chains to intimidate students and professors. To a much greater degree than in the 1970s they were able to expand “Islamic space” to neighbourhoods in cities and villages in Upper Egypt. Their main venue was the mosque, especially the Page 6 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action smaller mosques. They acquired popularity by providing social, educational and health services, distributing free health care, medicine and food, besides acting as intermediaries and power-brokers in neighbourhood conflicts, establishing a kind of militia for this purpose.69 By the end of the 1980s, the Jama‘a succeeded in gaining control over entire regions, such as the district of Dayrut, where it dominated fifty-two villages.70 Its hegemony was not total, however. By the mid-1980s a group of independent Jama‘at emerged that rejected violence.71 After the appointment of Zaki Badr as Minister of Interior in 1987, the relations with the state deteriorated, and the police started forbidding lectures, preaching in mosques,72 and opening fire on demonstrating students.73 The major assassination attacks on officials in this period were not the work of the Jama‘a but of other groups, such as the Najun min al-Nar (Saved from the Fire) and the followers of a shaykh in Fayyum, called the Shawqiyyun.74

The Life of an Activist In the 1980s An interesting insight into the activism of the Jama‘a in the 1980s on the individual level can be gleaned from the autobiography of Khalid al-Birri.75 (p. 201) Born in 1972 in Asyut he became member of the Jama‘a in 1986 at the age of fourteen while he was in secondary school. His autobiography confirms many of the notions on the process of radicalisation, of empowerment and alienation that are part of the “spiral of encapsulation”.76 In the neighbourhood where Khalid al-Birri lived, he was impressed by the combination of courage, even brutality, and the piety that the members of the Jama‘a demonstrated. It was their capacity for “action”, “bravery”, sense of “honour” and “solidarity”, mixed with their commitment to their religion (iltizam bi-dinihim) that made them attractive as role models for a young man in search of an identity.77 Everything in his memoirs revolves around the practice of hisba as an internal, individual as well as an external, collective, disciplining principle. He recounts how he loved listening to music and was a great fan of football but erased the music from his cassettes, recorded Qur’an citations instead, and stopped watching TV under influence of a Salafishaykh.78 He also started to practice another important principle in Salafism, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, avoiding contact with “all those who do not believe in God”, especially his Coptic neighbours and friends.79 During the next phase of empowerment—and alienation from his environment—he started practising hisba himself in his neighbourhood and at school. As he became aware of the “injustice of the unbeliever”, embodied by the state, his “political consciousness” was raised.80 The main reason for his transformation eventually, however, was an intellectual one. In the summer of 1987 he read The Inevitable Confrontation,81 one of the more virulent tracts of the Jama‘a that was peddled on the streets. For him it was a revelation, and he was immediately convinced of the necessity of (p.202) armed resistance against the state. His ardour for martyrdom and self-sacrifice was reinforced by documentaries on the jihad in Afghanistan and songs, anashid, Page 7 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action and gradually his personality was subsumed into that of the collective of the Jama‘a. He equated “submission” and “total obedience” to God with obedience to the Jama‘a and the excommunication (takfir) of “those who do not rule in accordance to what God has revealed”.82 Typically, for his and the previous generation, he acquired an understanding of the nature of activism and the “relationship between theory (nazariyya) and application (tatbiq)” by reading Sayyid Qutb, who provided him with a “complete cognitive model”.83 The sense that they were “distinguished” and “different” from the rest of society was translated in the minute details of eating and clothing and behaviour, and found its expression in the belief that they formed the vanguard of society. All attempts by the school to undermine the influence of these ideas, finally leading to his expulsion from school, only confirmed the just nature of the struggle against an “unbelieving system” (nizam kafir).84 Al-Birri also makes clear in his autobiography that the Jama‘a leadership were shrewd and constantly adapted their repertoire of contention according to circumstances. At a certain point, for instance, it was convinced that the strategy of hisba as an activist method was too aggressive for secondary schools, and that it could only be practised in the more open and less controlled environment of the university or the neighbourhoods of towns. Toned down, propaganda was limited to “personal da‘wa ”, the approach of individual pupils instead of formally organised meetings and indoctrination sessions in “study circles”.85

The Salafi-Islamist Revolution It might be an overstatement to present Khalid al-Birri as a typical Jama‘a member, but his activist experience, and especially the pamphlets he read, confirm the ideological developments of the Jama‘a in the 1980s.86 These writings (p.203) are imbued with a Manichean world view, with the world divided into the bad and the good. Basically the Jama‘a subscribed to a deductive method in its effort to combat the bad. Its reasoning is from principles to practice, from creed (‘aqida) to method (manhaj), to application (tatbiq).87 Their writings are geared to action and the Qur’an is regarded as a programme for “an activist method (manhajan harakiyyan) that taught us how to establish an Islamic state.”88 Also noteworthy in this worldview is that politics and religion are totally congruent. The worst political crime is not to err but to commit a sin (ma‘siya), and sinfulness (fisq) is associated with misrule.89 Politicians and westernised intellectuals are depicted not as having different political or cultural ideas but rather as being “mentally confused”.90 And acting politically correctly can only be achieved by one's commitment to religion (iltizam bi-dinihim).91 The writings of the Jama‘a stress the comprehensive nature of religion. Inverting the official totalitarian discourse of the times, Islam is depicted as an allencompassing, total system (shumuliyya) that regulates all aspects of life.92 The Charter states “our religion is complete, total and final”.93 In that sense the Page 8 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Jama‘a, like all the rest of the Islamist movements, stresses the central paradox of Islamist political thought in modernity: the liberation of man by his total submission to God. Revolt against God is the same as sin (ma‘siya), and as man by nature is the slave/servant (‘abd) of God the goal of the Jama‘a is “the subjection of man to God” (ta‘bid al-nas li-rabbihim)94 in accordance with Ibn Taymiyya's dictum that “Islam means obedience” (wa-l-din huwa al-ta‘a).95 (p.204) The political goal is the re-establishment of the caliphate.96 However, the contradictions of applying the classical political doctrine of the Jama‘a in a contentious age become apparent in the way an apolitical Salafism associated with pietism can snap and tip over into an activist, even revolutionary, movement at the crucial point when subservience is transformed into revolt. Although stressing the necessity of obedience (“obedience to the caliph is obedience to God”) and compliance (“all his commands must be completely executed”), even when the ruler is oppressive (zalim) or sinful (fasiq), the Jama‘a does allow for the ruler to be “uprooted” when the “heinous act” (mafsada) of deposing him is less grave than the “heinous act” of letting him remain in power. This leaves enough room for individual interpretation and forms the basis for a theory of revolt.97 Once this step has been taken, the Jama‘a leaves no doubt about the right to depose the ruler. The popular version of the Charter, entitled Who Are We and What Do We Want?, states: “No doubt that he who prefers man-made positive laws to the laws of God is a kafir […],” adding that “as it is not allowed for a kafir to rule over Muslims (la wilaya li-kafir ‘ala muslim) it is a duty to depose the rulers of our country.”98 It is stressed that this can only be done by violent means and the assassination of Sadat is regarded as having been a rightful act (sahih).99 Even in the 1990s, in a debate with Nasir al-Din al-Albani who condemns all political action, the right of revolt is justified if the ruler is an unbeliever (kafir).100 No less important is the repertoire of contention that the Jama‘a propagates. The Charter does not single out any means, but holds a flexible view of activist praxis, depending on the circumstances. It states that the manner in which the movement “interacts with reality around us” (ta‘amul ma‘a al-waqi‘ hawlana) and finds “means of changing it”, depends on the means that are presented by God.101 But as politics is condemned as part of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic period), and hizbiyya (participating in politics) is rejected,102 only three methods are (p.205) left. The first is da‘wa, which is regarded as essential in every period in order to prevent people from deviating towards jahiliyya.103 The second method, the most characteristic of the Jama‘a, is hisba.104 Typically almost no attention is spent on what should be changed, for on this issue “there is general agreement”. Instead, all attention is focused on the issue of the qualifications of the persons who can exert this task, the muhtasib. Although hisba is a fard kifaya (collective obligation), it is, in the view of the Jama‘a, also more demanding than da‘wa. Page 9 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Hisba is limited to those who are legally responsible (mukallaf) and capable (qadir) to implement it, and in this context this involves the cadre of the movement. This is confirmed in classical legal doctrine, according to the Charter. The classical scholar al-Nawawi, for instance, explicitly argues that hisba is not restricted to Islamic authority (al-sulta al-muslima) but that everyone has the right (sahib al-haqq) to exert hisba.105 The argument to usurp the right to exert hisba by force, by the hand (bi-l-yad), and the tongue (bi-llisan) from the state, is the tipping point where a conservative political doctrine is turned into an activist one: because the present authorities do not rule in accordance with the shari‘a and as such they have lost their legitimacy to exert this right themselves, or to give this right or to withhold it.106 Hisba thus becomes “one of the most important obligations of the Islamic movement,” and an instrument to “change reality” (taghyir al-waqi‘). In the present circumstances in which jahiliyya “is all around us”, the Charter states that “we can only oppose it by hisba ”.107 It is a means of bringing society “as close as possible to an Islamic society, and to realise one of our goals […]: to make man submit to his master (ta‘bid al-nas li-rabbihim) and later to establish a caliphate”.108 Or as it is stated in the Charter: “There is no contradiction between hisba and striving to establish a Muslim state; on the contrary hisba (p. 206) is for us a way of re-establishing the caliphate”.109 Hisba can be applied whether there is a ruling entity among the Muslims or not. In fact, it is the raison d’etre of the Jama‘a for “as long as this principle is applied the ummah will exist […].”110 The importance of hisba is also stressed in later works.111 The third method is that of jihad. Jihad is regarded as a permanent duty until Judgement Day. “We know that jihad is a historical inevitability” (hatmiyya tarikhiyya). The struggle between the believers and the unbelievers is eternal and the unbelievers will never rest until they have undermined Islam.112 History is seen as a zero-sum game.113 Jihad against the ruler is mentioned, but the Charter only states that removing the unbelieving ruler (al-hakim al-kafir) is a duty based on consensus, ijma‘.114 The popular version of the Charter is even more explicit,115 while other pamphlets are wholly devoted to this topic. Especially the pamphlet The Confrontation Is Inevitable calls for open revolt. It is proud of the assassination of Sadat. The revolution provided hope and “for the first time in years Muslims could lift up their head in pride, by the blessing of the revolt (khuruj) and jihad in the way of God.”116 It goes on to state that it is “a duty (wajib) of Muslims to oppose him [an unbelieving ruler] violently (muwajahatihi bi-quwwa) and to uproot him and appoint a Muslim imam who can execute the true shari‘a.”117 A totally new element in the ideology of the Jama‘a in the 1980s is its condemnation of the parliamentary system. Hizbiyya became much more reprehensible because at the time the relations with the state deteriorated again and a new cycle of contention arose when the Muslim Brotherhood participated Page 10 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action in elections.118 Democracy was rejected because those who (p.207) entered parliament “recognised the legitimacy of this secular system and agreed with its institutional practices (wasa’il ‘amalihi) […], believing that they have the right to legislate without God […].119 It was regarded as shirk (polytheism) to take part in the political system. This, and the stress on other Salafi principles such as tawhid, wala’ wa-l-bara’ and hisba demonstrate the Salafistrain in the Jama‘a's ideology. At the same time, some pamphlets make clear that the Jama‘a had political goals. It opposed the rise in land rents, political corruption, the extension of the state of emergency and infringement of human rights.120

About-turn: the Initiative to End Violence In the second half of the 1980s the Jama‘a increasingly came into conflict with the state. Its interpretation of hisba, especially the expansion of physical and moral space and the encroachment on the territory of the state, which the government regarded as illegitimate, enhanced the likelihood of this confrontation.121 When the Jama‘a attacked tourists, starting in 1992, the state clamped down on the movement, dismantling the Jama‘a's infrastructure in Upper and Lower Egypt.122 In the end, 1,500 people died in clashes and (p.208) 20,000 members, supporters, or simply family members of the Jama‘a's followers were imprisoned.123 Although the confrontation did not end until 1997, by 1995 it was apparent that the Jama‘a was losing the low-intensity war. At the same time authority within the movement was shifting from the external leadership, who had migrated to Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s,124 to the internal leadership. Two attempts were made to merge the two organisations, one in Afghanistan and the other in the Sudan, but in the end they failed for the same reasons as before.125 Moreover, by that time there was another issue that came to the fore. While the Jihad Organisation decided that due to the military defeat in Egypt it should turn against the “far enemy”, the Jama‘a always believed that the “near enemy” was more important: “It is more important to fight the groups of denial (al-tawa’if al-mumtani‘ah) in our country than to fight the Jews and the Communists in their lands.” […] “We can only fight the far enemy after we have purified ourselves of the near enemy.”126 This is also apparent in the Jama‘a's denial of any relationship with the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, when its “spiritual leader”, ‘Umar ‘Abd alRahman, was arrested.127 Nor did it react against the US when they arrested Tal‘at Fu’ad Qasim in 1995 and transported him to Cairo. Instead, the Jama‘a's historical leadership drew the conclusion that the confrontation with the state, always ambiguously stated, was counter-productive. In April 1996 the (p.209) first preliminary attempt to stop violence (mubadarat waqf al-‘unf) was launched by one of its leaders who called for a unilateral declaration to end the use of violence.128 More than a year later, on 5 July 1997, the historical leadership itself issued a communiqué announcing the unilateral and unconditional initiative to end violence.129 The initiative (mubadara) was supported by others, such as Salah Hashim, one of the students leaders of the 1970s, who issued his Page 11 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action own communiqué.130 But the initiative was not helped by the continuous low level warfare in Upper and Lower Egypt131 and the trials in which members of the Jama‘a were being sentenced to death.132 Above all, the Luxor massacre of fifty-eight tourists on 17 November 1997 and the claim that it had been a Jama‘a operation led by Ahmad Rifa‘i Taha,133 a member of the external leadership who is closely attached to bin Laden and who had earlier opposed the initiative,134 would setback the initiative for years.135 Despite these setbacks the supporters of the initiative gradually gained the upper hand during 1998. Immediately after the Luxor attack the lawyer, Muntasar (p.210) al-Zayyat, came out condemning it.136 Usama al-Rushdi, another member of the external leadership living in the Netherlands, issued a communiqué entitled The Luxor Attack, a Dead End, and later attacked Ahmad Rifa‘i Taha directly.137 Others followed suit. In April Mustafa al-Muqri’, a member of the external leadership living in Britain, issued a report in which he supported the initiative.138 The major change, however, occurred when ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman came out in support of the initiative on 22 October, in a statement issued from his prison in the United States.139 He called for the movement to concentrate on spreading the call (da‘wa) and a non-violent form of hisba.140 Finally, on 24 March 1999, on ‘Id al-Adha (the Feast of Immolation), the external and internal leadership issued a joint communiqué in which they fully endorsed the initiative.141 By then, the International Front Against Zionism under the leadership of bin Laden, supported by a former Egyptian leader of the Jama‘a, had issued its fatwa in 1998 after it had declared war on the Americans in 1996.

Revisionism After the issue of the common communiqué of the external and internal councils in 1999 it took another two years before the internal leadership took over completely and gained hegemony over both the external leadership and the members of the movement.142 With help from the state they visited nine prisons in which their members were interned, beginning from October 2001 (one month after 9/11). In January 2002 they started to publish their famous series of four books, which would constitute what they called “revisionism” (muraja‘a). The series consists of four books written or supervised by the six (p.211) historic leaders of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya.143 Their content is not Salafi, but falls back on classic thinkers such as Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) and modern thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi. One is a general introduction to the series,144 the other three treat in greater depth the topics that needed to be revised, such as takfir,145 jihad,146 and hisba.147 These were followed by two other books: one on their condemnation of the Saudi attacks in 2003,148 the other containing a general defence of revisionism.149 In the summer of 2002 the weekly al-Musawwar published a series of interviews with the historical leadership.150 In an impressive tour through the prisons the historical leadership propagated revisionism and demonstrated their power over their followers as Page 12 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action well as the internal discipline within the movement. They still regarded themselves as Salafis, but organisationally they claimed to “resemble a party”, willing to be accepted by the state as an NGO (jam‘iyya).151 (p.212) The authors start out with an analysis of the present crisis for which Muslim youth (shabab muslim) is held responsible. They claim these had strayed from the right path,152 and deviated from the middle of the road (wasatiyya), and that this led them to choose exaggeration in religion (ghuluw fi-l-din) and the transgression of boundaries (tajawuz al-hudud) and rules (ahkam).153 The youth in their enthusiasm had confused means (wasila) with goals (ghaya), and had substituted derived principles (far‘) for primary principles (asl).154 This confusion has in fact led to a situation that is even worse than the one before the confrontation with the state. Even if the Islamic youth acted in good faith and reacted to oppression and wanted to free prisoners, “they did not take into account an important truth, that through their actions injustice and oppression increased, the number of arrests grew in number, da‘wa was forbidden, families were threatened, corruption (mafasid) became more widespread, while the common good (masalih) was further impaired, and the Jews could take advantage of this opportunity to sow dissension.”155 The result was a vicious circle of terror and counter-terror, leading to the spilling of blood and “murderous internal strife” (qital al-fitna).156 The solution can only be found, they argue, by returning to the right path, correcting (tashih) [misguided] concepts (mafahim).157 One must focus again on general principles (asl) and the common good (maslaha). The good (maslaha) must always be weighed against the bad (mafsada).158 Following the classic scholar Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), the historic leadership holds the view that the common good is represented by protecting religion (din), the soul (nafs), reason (‘aql), offspring (nasl) and property (mal).159 Everything that endangers these five principles runs contrary to the general good (maslaha).160 In the same manner the correction of concepts pertains to giving priority to the principles (asl) instead of to the derivative matters (far‘). The goals of ta‘bid al-nas lirabbihim (submission of man to his master/creator) and guidance of mankind (hidayat al-khala’iq), or, in other words, the goal, the transition from sin (ma‘siya) to obedience (ta‘a), remains the same but (p.213) the means to achieve this end are different.161 They also believe that youth should recognise the authority of the ‘ulama and should not themselves issue fatwas.162 The reassertion of general principles, however, entails more than just a selfcritique and a revision of tactics. It also leads to a new epistemology and a fundamental redefinition of the Jama‘a's members relation to reality. Whereas in the Charter the Jama‘a argued that reality should be changed (taghyir) to adjust to religion, they now recognise a more complex relationship between reality and religion. “One of the obvious mistakes that has been made is to adopt opinions and create rules and issue fatwas that do not take reality (waqi‘) into account, Page 13 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action and neglect to investigate the facts and do not take these as the primary sources for formulating fatwas.”163 In fact, the general good should take priority over the text (nass), “because the text must accomplish the general good and is not a goal in itself.”164 The general norm is that “Islam is a practical religion” (al-islam din ‘amali).165 Even parts of the shari‘a can be deferred if circumstances require it.166 Moreover, for the first time they acknowledge that a knowledge of politics is crucial. “That is why a profound knowledge of the shari‘a, as well as a knowledge of reality (al-‘ilm bi-l-waqi‘), and a deep understanding of politics (alfahm al-siyasi al-‘amiq) are essential tools for tackling this subject.” “Otherwise,” they argue, “people will destroy themselves, spill their own blood and that of others and lose their homeland without justification, and without serving the common good and attaining their goal.”167 The inclusion of reality is called the jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqi‘).168 For the first time, as well, history is valued as a practical, lived experience from which one must learn.169 Such crucial concepts as hakimiyya, jahiliyya and taghut, derived from Sayyid Qutb, which had dominated the 1970s and the 1980s, are not directly condemned but are regarded as exaggerations that must be placed within a wider knowledge of fiqh and the way it works.170 (p.214) Adopting fatwas and opinions from a different time and applying them to completely different circumstances is recognised as one of the big mistakes the Jama‘a committed. For example, the emergence of the concepts of takfir and kufr are explained as the result of torture in Nasser's prisons, but are rejected as innovations.171 Muraja‘at is therefore a critique of their former claim to Truth (ashab al-haqq). No longer is Islam portrayed as a programme (manhaj) that is “complete, total and final” and that can simply be implemented if the ruler implements the shari‘a. Even the pious forefathers (al-salaf), the historical leadership argues, had stated that they did not hold a monopoly of the absolute truth.172 Their writings should be analysed in historical context.173 The historical leadership, in fact, acknowledges that life is complex and that the sources of Islam must be interpreted (ijtihad) and debated in order to adjust them according to constantly different places (makan), circumstances (ahwal) and times (zaman) in which Muslims live.174 It is this recognition of (historical) time and (geographical, political and cultural) circumstances that allows them to change their ideas and accept flexibility. Rather than holding the truth, they regard themselves now as part of an ongoing debate about the truth.175 In these continuing debates only the common good (maslaha) is eternal; the rest depends on circumstances.176 In this new-found self-confidence Islam is regarded as a strong religion that takes from other religions and allows Muslims to “interact with life positively”.177 Borrowing what is beneficial from the West is no longer rejected.178 What is condemned is loving the unbelievers and wishing them to be victorious over Muslims, a wholly different view from their previous writings, or those of contemporary Jihadi-Salafis such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’.179 For the same reason they are now willing to Page 14 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action accept the parliamentary system, although it might not be the ideal way to change society.180 (p.215) In their more lenient interpretation of Islam, the emphasis has moved to classical fiqh and the elaborate conditions and proofs that the traditional jurisprudence requires. Instead of the enthusiasm and moral outrage of the activist, legal procedures, and a totally different form of discipline, are upheld. One, for instance, should not pry into another's “secrets” (which is God's prerogative), to find out what he thinks. Instead one must seek to establish a society based on trust and accept at face value what people say and do (zahir).181 Politically, this classical doctrine undermines their former justification for revolt, for as long as the ruler states he is a Muslim, “even if he does not apply the whole shari‘a ”, rebellion against him is unjustified.182 But even if the ‘ulama condemn the ruler as an unbeliever, the disadvantages (mafasid) of a revolt must be weighed against the advantages (masalih) of accepting his rule.183 On the basis of classic fiqh, also the robbing of Copts is condemned as well as attacks on tourists, who are protected by the visas which are regarded as aman (assurance of protection). What does revisionism entail for jihad and hisba? In the new programme the Jama‘a leadership does not renounce jihad in principle, but its status and function is subordinated to the larger concerns of the general good (tahqiq maslaha), making Islam victorious (nusrat al-din), and the ending of civil strife/ dissension (izalat al-fitna).184 Jihad is only allowed if it is a means (wasila) towards achieving the general welfare, not a goal in itself.185 It must lead to the common goal of submission of men to God (ta‘bid al-nas li-llah) and not to the fragmentation (taftit) and weakening (id‘af) of the ummah.186 Moreover, in accordance with the classical theory, it must only be directed against a foreign invasion.187 In fact, the historical leadership argue, true Islam is not so much threatened by its enemies, but by Muslims who do not understand its rules, as is apparent from the suicide attacks in Riyadh in May 2003.188 In their view, violence in Saudi Arabia and Palestine189 strengthens the enemies of Islam and harms its reputation,190 as well as the interests of Muslims.191 (p.216) Like the book on jihad, the one on hisba is primarily meant to curb its excesses.192 The problem with the previous period is that hisba, like jihad, became a goal in itself and was not regarded “as a means to realise the general welfare of society”.193 Hisba is regarded as a legal and religious duty (farida, fard dini), like fasting, praying and other duties, but is a fard kifaya, a collective obligation not imposed on every individual Muslim. It is sufficient that some Muslims fulfil this obligation, for instance the representives of the government.194 Yet hisba is still regarded as the main instrument against the “internal enemy of the principles of the revelation”195 as well as the most important instrument of maintaining morality.196 The new interpretation of hisba by the historical leadership of the Jama‘a, as laid down already in the classical Page 15 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action fiqh, is based on virtue and moderateness.197 It has become an expression of social responsibility of the “normal individual” (al-fard al-‘adi), who shares this task with a special functionary, the muhtasib, who is a govermental officer and not a self-appointed activist.198 Their cooperation for the common good is an expression of the new relationship between the citizen and the state. For instance, if a citizen sees a deviation, he should not punish the culprit by force on his own volition, but rather should hand the person over to the authorities “in order that they fulfil their legal duties.”199 In fact, in its new form, hisba has become the cornerstone of a new Muslim civil society that is based on the obligations and rights of the citizen in a new contractual relationship with the state. Hisba is regarded as a social obligation (ijabiyya) of the citizen on whose diligence the state's prosperity and well-being depends. For in the view of the historical leadership, “the more the population positively works together with social institutions and understands its role and is encouraged to exert it— within the confines of the law—the more society enjoys rest and stability.”200 Conversely, “the less the citizen is involved, the more society will be the victim of ignorance (tajahul), negativeness (salbiyya), confusion (khalal), deviation (inhiraf), leading to collapse (inhiyar), disintegration (tafassukh) and corruption (p.217) (fasad)”.201 The precondition of the new renaissance of society is that hisba is exerted with respect for the sanctity (hurma) of other citizens and their rights.202

Conclusion The history of the past three decades of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya can be read as an experiment in Islamist activism with a strong Salafi bent in Egypt. The Jama‘a has twice gone through all the phases of the cycle of contestation. During the first cycle it started out as an apolitical, pious group of students that became politicised and activist during the second half of the 1970s and succumbed to violence with the assassination of Sadat. During the second cycle it learned little from its previous experience. When the second generation was released in 1984, the Jama‘a started out with a strident and activist stance and with a provocative level of violence, ending in a second round of contestation with the state in the 1990s in which an unprecedented number of people were killed. Although the state was to blame for much of the violence and the escalation, it is clear that the Salafi repertoire of contestation of “forbidding wrong by force” was highly provocative, delegitimised the state, sometimes even calling for its overthrow, and replacing it with a utopian rule in the form of a caliphate. But the problems ran deeper and were not limited to its tactics as a social movement. As is clear from the theoretical works of the Jama‘a in the 1980s and after the period of revisionism, its relationship with reality (waqi‘) is crucial to understanding the ideological developments. The major transition is one from a strong Salafi tendency, which completely depended on religious sources and advocated a change of reality (taghyir al-waqi‘) to fit the text, to a phase in which the Jama‘a were forced to give reality and the general good (maslaha) more room, Page 16 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action culminating in the development of a “jurisprudence of reality” (fiqh al-waqi‘). Although the historical leadership might not be as pragmatic as to denounce jihad and hisba completely, by means of a relativistic, historical, and circumstantial interpretation of the sources of Islam, they have provided the groundwork for a much more mature Islamic political theory that focuses on human agency and opens the way for an Islamic civil society based on an Islamic concept of civility and civic virtue that has left behind the rigorism and dogmatism of Salafism. (p.218) Bibliography Bibliography references: 'Abd al-Fattah, Nabil (ed.), Taqrir al-halat al-diniyya fiMisr, Cairo: Markaz alDirasat al- Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 1996. Abu al-‘Ala’, Muhammad Husayn, al-‘Unf al-dini fiMisr, Cairo: Kitab al-Mahrusa, 1998. Ahmad, Makram Muhammad, Mu’amara am muraja‘a: Hiwar qadat al-tatarruf fisijn al- ‘aqrab, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002. Ahmad, Rif ‘at Sayyid, al-Nabi al-Musallah, Vol. 1. al-Rafidun, Beirut: Riad ElRayyes, 1991. ———, al-Nabi al-Musallah, Vol. 2. al-Tha’irun, Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes, 1991. al-‘Ali, ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Mukhatara fisafqat al-hukuma wa-jama‘at al-‘unf, Cairo: Mirit li-l-Nashr wa-l-Ma‘lumat, 2000. ———, al-Muqamara al-kubra. Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf bayna rihan al-hukuma wa-l- Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrusah, 2002. ‘Awda, Jihad, ‘Ulama al-haraka al-islamiyya al-radikaliyya, al-Minya: Dar al-Huda li-l- Nashr wa-l-Tawzi‘, 2004. Bakr, Hasan, al-‘Unf al-siyasi fiMisr: Asyut bu’rat al-tawattur. al-Asbab wa-ldawafi‘ (1977–1993), Cairo: Kitab al-Mahrusa, 1996. Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. al-Birri, Khalid, al-Dunya ajmal min al-janna: Sirat usuli Misri, Beirut: Dar alNahhar, 2001. Commins, David, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Cook, Michael, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Fandy, Mamoun, ‘Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?’, Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (1994), pp. 607–25. Della Porta, Donatella, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Fawzi, Issam and Lübben, Ivesa, Die ägyptische Jama‘a al-islamiyya und die Revision der Gewaltstrategie. DOI-Focus, No. 15, July 2004. Fawzi, Mahmud, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, al-Shaykh al-Amriki al-Qadim!, No place, no date. Carmon, Y ., Felder, Y ., and Lav, D., Gama‘at al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal, MEMRI, No. 309, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi? Page=countries&Area=Egypt&ID=IA30906. Gerges, Fawaz, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Kepel, Gilles, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt. London: Al Saqi Books, 1985. Habib, Kamal al-Sa‘id, al-Haraka al-islamiyya min al-muwajaha ila al-muraja‘a, Cairo: Maktabat al-Madbuli, 2002. Haenni, Patrick, L’ordre des caïds: Conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire, Paris : Karthala, 2005. (p.219) Hafez, Mohammed M., and Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 61–88. Heikel, Muhammad Hassanein, The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, London: Deutsch, 1983. Jansen, Johannes J.G., The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986. Lia, Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Meijer, Roel, ‘Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis’, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 47, nos. 3–4 (2007), pp. 422–59. Mubarak, Hisham, al-Irhabiyyun qadimun: Dirasa muqarana bayna mawqif “alIkhwan al-Muslimin” wa-Jama‘at al-Jihad wa-qadiyat al-‘unf (1928–1994), Cairo: Kitab al- Mahrusa, 1995. Mustafa, Hala, al-Islam al-siyasi fiMisr min harakat al-islah ila jama‘at al-‘unf, Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 1992. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Salah, Muhammad, Waqa’i‘ sanawat al-jihad: Rihla al-Afghan al-‘Arab, Cairo: 2001. Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. al-Tawil, Camille, al-Qa‘ida wa-akhawatiha: Qissat al-Jihadiyyin al-‘Arab, London: Dar al-Saqi, 2007. Toth, James, ‘Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4 (2003), pp. 547–72. al-Wardani, Salih, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr: Waqi‘ al-thamaninat, Cairo: Markaz al- Hadara al-‘Arabiyya li-l-I‘lam wa-l-Nashr, 1991. ———, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr: al-Waqi‘ wa-l-tahaddiyat, Cairo: Dar Logos, 2000. al-Zayyat, Muntasar, Ayman al-Zawahiri kama ‘araftuhu, Cairo: Dar al-Mahrusa, 2002. ———, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya : Ru’ya min al-dakhil , Cairo: Dar Misr al-Mahrusa, 2005. DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS OF THE JAMA‘A AL-ISLAMIYYA (until 2003)

• Muhammad ‘Isam al-Darbala, ‘Asim ‘Abd al-Majid and Najih Ibrahim, Mithaq al-‘Amal al-Islami [The Islamic Action Charter], 1984. • ‘Muhakamat al-Nizam al-Siyasi al-Misri’ [The Trial of the Political System], published in the journal of the Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Kalimat al-Haqq, 1986. • Hatmiyyat al-muwajahah [The Confrontation is Inevitable], 1987.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action • ‘Abd al-Akhir Hamad, al-Adilla al-shar‘iyya fijawaz taghyir al-munkar bi-l-yad li-ahad al-ra‘iyya [Legal Proofs of Permitting the Forbidding of Wrong by the Hand as a Right for Every Citizen], no date, no place (1980s). • Mulakhkhas bahth al-ta’ifa [Extract of the Research of the Sect], no date, no place, (1980s). (p.220) • Nahnu wa-l-Ikhwan [We and the Muslim Brotherhood], no date, place (1980s). • Man nahnu wa madha nuridu? [Who Are We and What Do We Want?], No date, no place (1980s). • Muhammad ‘Isam al-Darbala, ‘Asim ‘Abd al-Majid and Najih Ibrahim, Hukm al-ta’ifa al-mumtani‘a [Verdict of the Forbidden Group] (1980s). • Usama Hafiz, al-Haraka al-islamiyya wa-l-‘amal al-hizbi [The Islamic Movement and Political Parties], no date, no place (1980s). • Mawqif al-haraka al-islamiyya min al-‘amal al-hizbi fiMisr [The Position of the Islamic Movement towards Party Politics in Egypt], no date no place (1980s). • Taqrir khatir [Important Communiqué], no place, no date (1990s). • Waqafat ma’al-shaykh al-Albani hawl sharit (min manhaj al-khawarij) [Exchange of Views with Shaykh al-Albani Concerning the Tape on the Programme of the Khawarij], 1996. • Communiqué of Khalid Ibrahim, 1996. • Salih Hashim, Mubadara Liman, Amal Jadid, 1996. • Usama Ibrahim, ‘Isam Ibrahim Hafiz and ‘Isam ‘Abd al-Majid Muhammad, Silsila tashih al-mafahim. Mubadara waqf al-‘unf. Ru’ya waqi‘iyya wa-nazra shari‘iyya [The Correction of Concepts Series. The Initiative to End Violence. From a Pragmatic and a Legal/Theoretical Viewpoint], Cairo: Maktabat alTurath al-Islami, 2002. • Hamdi ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Azim, Najih Ibrahim ‘Abdallah and ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif, Taslit al-adwa’ ‘ala ma waqa‘a fi-l-jihad wa-min akhta’ [The Exposure of Mistakes made during the Jihad], Cairo: Maktabat alTurath al- Islami, 2002. • Najih Ibrahim ‘Abdallah and ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif, Hurmat al-ghuluw fi-l-din wa-takfir al-muslimin [The Forbidding of Extremism in Religion and the Excommunication of Muslims], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002. • Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif and Usama Ibrahim Hafiz, al-Nash wa-l-Tabyin fitashih mafahim al-muhtasibin [Counseling in and Explanation of the Correct

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Concepts for the People who exert Hisba], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath alIslami, 2002. • Tafjirat al-Riyad: al-Ahkam wa-l-athar [Explosions in Riyad. Legal Verdicts and Practical Results], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003. Collective book written by the historical leadership. • Nahr al-Dhikrayat: al-Muraja‘a al-fiqhiyya li-l-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [The River of Memories. The Fiqh basis of the Revisionism of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003. Collective book written by the historical leadership. Notes:

(1) Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt. London: Al Saqi Books, 1985. (2) See for instance, Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. (3) An excellent analysis of their ideology and its revision that only belatedly was brought to my attention is Issam Fawzi and Ivesa Lübben, Die ägyptische Jama‘a al-islamiyya und die Revision der Gewaltstrategie. DOI-Focus, No. 15, July 2004. For a more anthropological analysis of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, see James Toth, ‘Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4 (2003), pp. 547–72. For a sociological and cultural explanation of the rise of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, see Mamoun Fandy, ‘Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?’ Middle East Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (1994), pp. 607–25. See also, Gama‘at al- Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal, Y. Carmon, Y. Felder, and D. Lav, MEMRI, No. 309, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi? Page=countries&Area=Egypt&ID=IA30906. (4) The best book in Arabic is Hisham Mubarak's, al-Irhabiyyun qadimun: Dirasa muqarana bayna mawqif “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin” wa-Jama‘at al-Jihad wa-qadiyat al-‘unf (1928– 1994) [The Terrorists Are Coming: A Comparative Study of the Concepts of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jihad Groups and the Issue of Violence, 1928–1994], Cairo: Kitab al-Mahrusa, 1995. Other books on the topic are Muhammad Husayn Abu al-‘Ala’, al-‘Unf al-dini fiMisr [Religious Violence in Egypt], Cairo: Kitab al-Mahrusa, 1998 and Hasan Bakr, al-‘Unf al-siyasi fiMisr: Asyut bu’rat al-tawattur. al-Asbab wa-l-dawafi‘ (1977–1993) [Religous Violence in Egypt: Asyut the Source of Strain. Reasons and Motives], Cairo: Kitab alMahrusa, 1996. Undoubtedly the best source for research on the Jama‘a alIslamiyya are the articles Muhammad Salah wrote on the development of its struggle with the state for the newspaper al-Hayat since the beginning of the 1990s.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (5) An excellent article that analyses the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya as a social movement, is Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 61–88. The authors, however, overstate the structuralist factors and downplay the ideational factors, such as hisba, that form the crux to understanding the repertoire of contention of the Jama‘a al- Islamiyya, as I argue in this article. (6) The best overview is Sidney Tarrow's, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (7) The major contribution to promoting the study of the Islamist movement as a social movement, is the anthology edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004. (8) Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 3–4, 11–12. (9) Ibid., p. 17. In contrast to Egypt, hisba has been used in Saudi Arabia as a means for the state and the ‘ulama, to assert control over society and impose its conservative moral order through the “religious police”, or matawi‘a as disciplining force. See David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006, pp. 82, 95, 113 and 169 and Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 49– 58. (10) See Muntasar al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya: Ru’ya min al-dakhil [The Jama‘at al-Islamiyya: A View from the Inside], Cairo: Dar Misr al-Mahrusa, 2005, p. 63. (11) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 158 and Muntasar al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at alislamiyya, p. 74 and Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh, p. 134. (12) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al islamiyya, p. 66; Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh, pp. 143–56; Kamal al-Sa‘id Habib, al-Haraka al-islamiyya min al-muwajaha ila almuraja‘a [The Islamic Movement from Opposition to Revisionism], Cairo: Maktabat al-Madbuli, 2002, p. 32. (13) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 50. (14) Although he was an Azharite, he was especially a follower of Ibn Taymiyya, who was not regarded as a central figure at the Azhar at the time. See, Salih alWardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr: Waqi‘ al-thamaninat [The Islamic

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Movement in Egypt: The Realities of the 1980s]. Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara al-‘Arabiyya li-l-I‘lam wa-l-Nashr, 1991, p. 14. (15) For an interesting, though partly absurd, biography of ‘Umar ‘Abd alRahman, because it is based on conspiracy theory that he was manipulated by the Americans, see Mahmud Fawzi, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, al-Shaykh al-Amriki al-Qadim! [Umar Abd al-Rahman, The Amerian Shaykh is Coming!], No place, no date. (16) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 73. This is the common theme of the present first generation of activists. See also Kamal al-Sa‘id Habib, al-Haraka alislamiyya, p. 31, who regards these years as “almost like a dream” that was filled with a spirituality, enthusiasm, and solidarity, but needed direction, organisation, and rules. In their interviews with the editor-in-chief of alMusawwar, Makram Muhammad Ahmad, the Jama‘a leadership also confirm their inexperience (“twenty years ago we were young men (shabab)”). Typically, they state that their religious, political and historical knowledge was inadequate. See Makram Muhammad Ahmad, Mu’amara am muraja‘a: Hiwar qadat altatarruf fisijn al-‘aqrab [Conspiracy or Revisionism. Debate with the Leaders of Extremism in the Scorpion Prison], Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002, p. 131. (17) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al islamiyya, p. 52. (18) The term “traditional Salafism”, with the connotation of pious, quietist Salafism is used by Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr: al-Waqi‘ wa-ltahaddiyat [The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Reality and Challenges], Cairo: Dar Logos, 2000, p.99. One of the main apolitical Salafi movements in Egypt is the Jama‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. (19) For more on Salafism in Egypt see Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr, p. 87 and 98. See also his chapter on Salafism, pp. 144–54. He argues that the Salafi discourse in Egypt was dominated by tawhid, shirk, and bida‘, was loyal to the ruler (wali al-amr) and rejected the right to revolt (khuruj ‘ala alhakim), which it associated with the Kharajites, jihad, and takfir, instead concentrating on ‘aqida and personal piety. Hisba, however, was an important practice of the Salafis, and it is this element that the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya adopted from them. See also Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya fiMisr: Waqi‘ althamaninat [The Islamic Movement in Egypt: The Reality of the 1980s], Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara al-‘Arabiyya li-l-I‘lam wa-l-Nashr, 1991, pp. 60–72. According to al-Wardani the ideas of ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and the Saudi mufti Ibn Baz were the same, except for the issue of revolt against the ruler. That is supposedly the reason why he was refused a visa to enter Saudi Arabia (p. 65). Another major difference was that the Jama‘at were self-taught, whereas the Salafis were oriented towards Saudi Arabia and its ‘ulama. The image of the more traditional Salafis as a rigid apolitical movement that was more interested Page 23 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action in ritual purity than in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and therefore clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood, is confirmed by Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998, pp. 59–60, 116. Habib remarks that traditional Salafis were only interested in morals (akhlaq) and purity (tazkiya) and did not show any interest in reality (waqi‘), alHaraka al-islamiyya, p. 34. (20) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 47. (21) Ibid., p. 73. (22) Ibid., p. 97. The mid-1970s are recognised as a phase of transition to greater political consciousness. See Habib, al-Haraka al-islamiyya, p. 52 and Hasan Bakr, al-‘Unf al-siyasi fiMisr, p. 90. (23) See for the excellent accounts of Sayyid Qutb, Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, chapter 5, ‘The Religious Aesthetic of Sayyid Qutb: A NonScriptural Fundamentalism’, pp. 170–205. (24) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 129 and p. 47. (25) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 215. See also al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyyah (2000), pp. 144–54. (26) Ibid., p. 215. (27) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 73 and p. 86. (28) See the interview with Tal‘at Fu’ad Qasim in Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 159. Most of the attention on the ideological background of the student movement in the 1970s has been focused on Sayyid Qutb (see especially Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh), but it seems that Ibn Taymiyya has been more influential and that instead of jihad, hisba was a crucial aspect of activism in this period The combination of Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Qutb is mentioned by others. See also Habib, al-Haraka al-islamiyya, p. 29. (29) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 159 and p. 164. (30) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 73. (31) Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), p. 51. (32) Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, pp. 141–60. (33) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 159. (34) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 70. Page 24 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (35) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 160–1. (36) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 61. (37) Ibid., p. 66. (38) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 135 and 137. (39) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 163. Much has been made of the difference in culture between Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt. See, for instance, al-Zayyat, alJama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 53. Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 138 and Mamoun Fandi, ‘Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?’ It is quite possible that tribal background of the Jama‘at was an issue as well as their tolerance for violence. Also it seems likely that the conservatism of Upper- Egyptian culture promoted the Salafi bent of the Jama‘at, as Habib in al-Haraka al-islamiyya, states (p. 32). But the main strategic difference was the violent form of hisba these Jama‘at used. (40) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 139. (41) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 90. (42) Ibid., p. 84. (43) Ibid., p. 96. See also Habib, al-Haraka al-islamiyya, pp. 17–18, and alWardani, al- Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), p. 52. According to al-Wardani the Jama‘a issued a pamphlet on their relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, called Nahnu wa-l-Ikhwan, in which they condemned the Brotherhood's programme for enticing its members to commit innovation (bid‘a) and sin (ma‘siya). (44) ‘Abd al-Rahim al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-kubra: Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf bayna rihan alhukuma wa-l-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [The Great Gamble: The Initiative to End Violence between the Wager of the Government and the Jama‘at alIslamiyya], Cairo: Markaz al- Mahrusah, 2002, p. 141. (45) Ibid., p. 141, and al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 67 and p. 82. (46) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 138. Its members were Karam Zuhdi, Najih Ibrahim, Salah Hashim, Usama Hafiz, Tal‘at Fu’ad Qasim, Isam ‘Abd al-Majid, Sabri al-Banna, ‘Ali al- Sharif, Hamdi ‘Abd al-Rahman, Rifa‘i Ahmad Taha. (47) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 139. (48) al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-kubra, p. 139–40, and 142, (49) Ibid., 142. al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, 165. (50) Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), pp. 47–8 and 102. Page 25 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (51) See for the merger, Muhammad Hassanein Heikel, The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, London: Deutsch, 1983. (52) Typically the basic ideological text of the Jihad Organisation, The Hidden Duty, by ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, is completely focused on jihad and does not mention hisba. See the translation in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986, pp. 159–234. (53) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 105. (54) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, pp. 165–7. (55) See for the analysis of this concept in a contemporary form and the interaction of theory (nazariyya), programme, (manhaj) and application (tatbiq), Roel Meijer ‘Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis’, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 47, nos. 3–4 (1997), pp. 422–59. (56) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 167 and for more on the military strategic role of ‘Abbud al-Zumur, pp. 180–1. (57) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 143–5. (58) Ibid., p. 167. (59) See also the pamphlet of the Jama‘a itself Taqrir khatir [An Important Communiqué] (no place, no date), where jihad is downplayed and da‘wa and alamr bi-l-ma‘ruf emphasised. Collection of Islamist pamphlets of the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (60) See also Taqrir al-halat al-diniyya fiMisr [The State of Religion in Egypt], Nabil ‘Abd al-Fattah (ed.), Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 1996, p. 186. (61) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 189. (62) Muhammad Salah, Waqa’i‘ sanawat al-jihad: Rihla al-Afghan al-‘Arab [Realities of the Years of Jihad: The Journey of the Afghan-Arabs], Cairo: 2001, pp. 65–7. (63) Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), p. 46. (64) al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-kubra, pp. 146–9. (65) All commentators agree on the disastrous effects of the torture in prison after the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. See for instance ‘Ali, alMuqamara al-kubra, pp. 144–5, Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), p. 18. The effect on Zawahiri is clear from Muntasar al-Zayyat, Ayman alPage 26 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action Zawahiri kama ‘araftuhu [Ayman al- Zawahiri as I Knew Him], Cairo: Dar alMahrusa, 2002. (66) See for an excellent analysis of the Jama‘a in Imbaba and other poor neighbourhoods in Cairo: Patrick Haenni, L’ordre des caïds: Conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire, Paris: Karthala, 2005. (67) See the translation in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty, pp. 159– 234. (68) al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-kubra, p. 148. (69) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, pp. 227–8. (70) Ibid., p. 226. (71) Salih al-Wardani, al-Haraka al-islamiyya (2000), p. 50. (72) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 242–4. (73) Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, p. 217. (74) al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-kubra, p. 149. See on this period also Hala Mustafa, al-Islam al-siyasi fiMisr min harakat al-islah ila jama‘at al-‘unf [Political Islam in Egypt from Reformist Movement to Violent Groups], Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat alSiyasiyya wa-l- Istratijiyya, 1992. (75) Khalid al-Birri, al-Dunya ajmal min al-janna: Sirat usuli Misri [The World is more Beautiful than Paradise: Life of an Egyptian Fundamentalist], Beirut: Dar al-Nahhar, 2001. These memoirs have been translated into French, as La terre est plus belle que le paradis, Paris: J.C. Lattès, 2002, and in Dutch, De Aarde is mooier dan het paradijs, Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2003. (76) The term is used by Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 12 and pp. 195–201. (77) Birri, al-Dunya ajmal, p. 11. He admires them elsewehere for their courage (shaja‘a), devotion (ikhlas) to the cause and the justice (‘adl), purity (naqa’) and equality (musawah), p. 18. (78) Ibid., pp. 13–14. (79) Ibid., p. 16. (80) Ibid., p. 18.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (81) Hatmiyyat al-muwajaha was issued in 1987. The pamphlet has been reproduced in ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Ali, al-Mukhatara fisafqat al-hukumah wa-jama‘at al-‘unf [The Danger in the Deal of the Government with the Violent Groups], Cairo: Mirit li-l-Nashr wa-l- Ma‘lumat, 2000, pp. 252–94. (82) Birri, al-Dunya ajmal, p. 21. Based on Sura 5: 44. (83) Ibid., p. 24. (84) Ibid., p. 32 (85) Ibid., p. 34. (86) It seems that the Jama‘a was mostly not so well organised as Khalid al-Birri makes it out to be. For him, as a smart pupil, the influence of texts was probably more intensive than for other members. See Patrick Haenni, L’ordre des caïds, who does not ascribe much influence to texts. (87) Birri, al-Dunya ajmal, p. 24. (88) Ibid., p. 24. (89) Hatmiyyat al-muwajahah, p. 256. (90) See the central ideological document of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya of the 1980s, Mithaq al-‘Amal al-Islami [The Islamic Action Charter], p. 69. It was written by three members of the “historical leadership”, Muhammad ‘Isam alDarbala, ‘Asim ‘Abd al-Majid and Najih Ibrahim. Photocopy of a handwritten version at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (91) Birri, al-Dunya ajmal, p. 11. (92) Shumuliyya is a recurrent concept in the writings of the Jama‘a. See for instance Mithaq, p. 96, Hatmiyyat al-muwajaha, p. 282. (93) Mithaq, p. 135. (94) Mithaq, pp. 62–7. (95) Hatmiyyat al-muwajaha, p. 277, See also the pamphlet Mulakhkhas bahth alta’ifa [Extract of the Research of the Sect] (no date, no place). Handwritten copy at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (96) Hatmiyyat al-muwajaha, pp. 282–4, and Mithaq, pp. 68–75. (97) Mithaq, p. 74. (98) Man nahnu wa madha nuridu?, p. 33. Photocopy of a handritten version at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. Page 28 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (99) Man nahnu, p. 34. (100) Waqafat ma‘a l-shaykh al-Albani hawl sharit (min manhaj al-khawarij) [Exchange of Views with Shaykh al-Albani Concerning the Tape on the Programme of the Khawarij], 1996, p. 10–11. Document at the International Institute of Social History. (101) Mithaq, p. 83. (102) Salafi movements generally reject politics as hizbiyya, except the Saudi Sahwa movement. (103) Mithaq, p. 92. (104) See for an extensive treatment of the subject Mithaq, pp. 100–14. The Qur’anic verses used to sustain this argument are: 3:104 and 9:67, 71 and the famous hadith on changing evil by the hand, orally or by the heart. (105) Mithaq, p. 107. (106) Mithaq, p. 106. One of the books written by one of the leaders in Asyut, ‘Abd al-Akhir Hamad, at the time was al-Adilla al-shar‘iyya fijawaz taghyir almunkar bi-l-yad li-ahad al-ra‘iyya [Legal Proofs for Permitting the Forbidding of Wrong by the Hand as a Right for Every Citizen]. See Hala Mustafa, al-Islam alsiyasi fiMisr: Min harakat al-islah ila jama‘at al-‘unf [Political Islam in Egypt. From a Reformist Movement to Violent Groups], Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat alSiyasiyya al-Istratijiyya, 1992. pp. 163–4 and 174. (107) Mithaq, p. 113. (108) Mithaq, p. 114. (109) Mithaq, p. 111. (110) Mithaq, p. 111. (111) Waqafat ma‘ al-shaykh al-Albani. (112) Mithaq, p. 127–8. Qur’an verses quoted in support are 2: 109 and 2: 217. (113) Mithaq, p. 129. (114) Mithaq, p. 124. (115) Man nahnu, p. 23. (116) Hatmiyyat, p. 259. (117) Hatmiyyat, p. 262. Page 29 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (118) See the pamphlet al-Haraka al-islamiyya wa-l-‘amal al-hizbi [The Islamic Movement and Political Parties], written according to Habib, in his al-Haraka alislamiyya, p. 43, by Usama Hafiz. See also the article “Muhakamat al-Nizam alSiyasi al-Misri” [The Trial of the Political System], published in the journal of the Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Kalimat al-Haqq, 1986. Republished in Rif ‘at Sayyid Ahmad, al-Nabi al-Musallah [The prophet Armed], Vol. 2. al-Tha’irun [The Revolutionaries], Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes, 1991, pp. 273–82. See also another pamphlet of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya against political system, Mawqif al-haraka al-islamiyya min al-‘amal al-hizbi fiMisr [The Position of the Islamic Movement concerning Party Politics in Egypt], partly reproduced by in Rif ‘at Sayyid Ahmad, al-Nabi al-Musallah [The Prophet Armed]. Vol. 1. al-Rafidun [The Rejectionists], Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes, 1991, pp. 150–78. (119) Man Nahnu, p. 43. (120) Taqrir khatir. The pamphlet is probably written in 1992, during the first negotiations with the government. (121) Hasan Bakr confirms that violent hisba was the main reason for conflict with the state, starting from 1986. See his al-‘Unf al-siyasi fiMisr, p. 112. Typically the assassination attempts on ministers and journalist Makram Muhammad Ahmad were made by other groups such as the Najun min al-Nar and Shawqiyyun, while the attacks on the anti- Islamist writer Faraj Fawda in 1992 and the novelist Naguib Mahfouz in 1994 were done by members of the Jama‘a. The escalation of violence was not started by the Jama‘a, but was the result of the murder of its spokesman, ‘Ala’ Muhyi al-Din, in September 1990. In retaliation they tried to assassinate the Minister of the Interior, killing the Speaker of Parliament instead. In that year clashes with the state doubled to thirty-five from a year before. (122) See for an analysis of this process of escalation, Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 61–88. (123) See for an overview of the events in 1995, Taqrir al-halat al-diniyya fiMisr [Report on the Religious Situation in Egypt], pp. 189–207. (124) See especially, Salah, Waqa’i‘ sanawat al-jihad and Jihad ‘Awda, ‘Ulama alharaka al-islamiyya al-radikaliyya [Globalisation of the Radical Islamic Movement], al-Minya: Dar al-Huda li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi‘, 2004. (125) See for the two failed attempts of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Jihad Organisation to merge, the first in Afghanistan and the second in the Sudan, Camille al-Tawil, al-Qa‘ida wa-akhawatiha: Qissat al-Jihadiyyin al-‘Arab [al-Qaeda

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action and its Sisters: The Story of the Arab Jihadis], London: Dar al-Saqi, 2007, pp. 179–83. (126) Mulakhkhas bahth al-ta’ifa, p. 8. (127) Salah, Waqa’i‘ sanawat al-jihad, pp. 95–6. Salah cites the communiqué “Ama anna lihadha al-hura’ an yantahi”. Only after ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman was sentenced to life imprisonment, the Jama‘a issued a communiqué on 19 January 1996 in which it threatened the US, declaring that “American interests and nationals are the legitimate goals of our justified jihad until they have released the shaykh al-mujahid, Dr. ‘Umar ‘Abd al- Rahman and his brethren from American prisons.” But the threat is related to a specific issue and condition. See Salah, Waqa’i‘ sanawat al-jihad, p. 98. The issue is controversial. Peter Bergen believes that a fatwa issued by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman from prison started the war against the United States. See Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know. An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader, New York: Free Press, 2006, 200–8. (128) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 278. Communiqué of Khalid Ibrahim, photocopy at the International Institute for Social History. (129) Karam Zuhdi, Najih Ibrahim, ‘Abbud al-Zumur, Fu’ad al-Dawalibi, Hamdi ‘Abd al- Rahman and ‘Ali Sharif. See also al-‘Ali, al-Muqamara al-Kubra. p. 15. (130) Mubadara Liman, Amal Jadid [The Initiative of Liman Prison. A New Hope]. Handwritten statement by Salah Hashim, Jama‘a documents of the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (131) For instance, on 21 June 1997 three members of the Jama‘a were killed in a clash with the police in the village of Shantur in Upper Egypt. In Minufiyya sixty members of a radical group were arrested after they threatened to burn a church (al-Hayat, 21 June 1997). On 15 November members of the Jama‘a assaulted a police station in the town of Tama in the governorate of Sohaj, during which one member died. Four days earlier a fight in Nag‘ Hamadi cost the lives of a police officer, two policemen, and one member of the Jama‘a (alHayat, 17 November 1997). (132) One of these, “the Bank trial”, was famous for the amount of money the Jama‘a had been able to rob from banks throughout Upper and Lower Egypt (alHayat, 5 November 1997). In another trial in the town of Tama two members of the Jama‘a were sentenced to death (al-Hayat, 4 November 1997). (133) The external leadership issued several communiqués reproduced in alHayat, 19 and 20 November 1997. (134) See for extensive quotes from the letter al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 300. Page 31 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (135) Usama Ibrahim, ‘Isam Ibrahim Hafiz and ‘Isam ‘Abd al-Majid Muhammad, Silsila tashih al-mafahim. Mubadara waqf al-‘unf: Ru’ya waqi‘iyya wa-nazra shari‘iyya [The Correction of Concepts Series. The Initiative to End Violence: From a Pragmatic and a Legal/Theoretical Viewpoint], Cairo : Maktabat alTurath al-Islami, 2002. Introduction, 5–6. (136) al-Hayat, 23 November 1997. (137) al-Hayat, 10 December 1997. (138) al-Hayat, 15 April 1998. He was Secretary General of al-Rabita al-Islamiyya li-l-‘Amilin bi-l-Kitab wa-l-Sunna [Islamic association of those who act according to the Qur’an and the Sunna], located in Great Britain, and imprisoned for seven years after the Jihad trial in 1981. (139) al-Zayyat, al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya, p. 304. (140) al-Hayat, 22 October 1998. Text has been reprinted by al-‘Ali in alMuqamara al-kubra, p. 16. (141) For part of the text, al-‘Ali in al-Muqamara al-kubra, p. 17–18. (142) The Jama‘a al-Islamiyya were not the only organisation that renounced violence. Kamal al-Sa‘id Habib, a former member of Jihad Organisation, presented in his al-Haraka alislamiyya an impressive analysis of the reorientation of the Islamist movement. (143) The series was called Silsilat tashih al-mafahim [The Correction of Concepts Series]. The authors are Karam Muhammad Zuhdi, Najih Ibrahim ‘Abdallah, Usama Hafiz, Fu’ad Mahmud al-Dawalibi, Hamdi ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-‘Azim, ‘Ali Muhammad al-Sharif, Muhammad ‘Isam al-Din Darbala, ‘Isam ‘Abd al-Majid Muhammad. (144) Usama Ibrahim, ‘Isam Ibrahim Hafiz and ‘Isam ‘Abd al-Majid Muhammad, Mubadara waqf al-‘unf: Ru’ya waqi‘iyya wa-nazra shari‘iyya [The Initiative to End Violence: From a Pragmatic and a Legal/Theoretical Viewpoint], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002. At the end of 2008 a total of twenty-six books and booklets have been published by the historical leadership. (145) Najih Ibrahim ‘Abdallah and ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif, Hurmat alghuluw fi-l-din wa-takfir al-muslimin [The Forbidding of Extremism in Religion and the Excommunication of Muslims], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002. (146) Hamdi ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Azim, Najih Ibrahim ‘Abdallah and ‘Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif, Taslit al-adwa’ ‘ala ma waqa‘a fi-l-jihad wa-min akhta’

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action [The Exposure of Mistakes made during the Jihad]. Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath alIslami, 2002. (147) Ali Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sharif and Usama Ibrahim Hafiz, al-Nash wa-l-Tabyin fitashih mafahim al-muhtasibin [Counseling in and Explanation of the Correct Concepts for the People Who Exert Hisba], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002. (148) Tafjirat al-Riyad: al-Ahkam wa-l-athar [Explosions in Riyad: Legal Verdicts and Practical Results], Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003. It is a collective book written by the historical leadership. (149) Nahr al-Dhikrayat. al-Muraja‘a al-fiqhiyya li-l-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [The River of Memories. The Fiqh basis of the Revisionism of the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya], Cairo: Maktabat al- Turath al-Islami, 2003. (150) They were later published in a book, Makram Muhammad Ahmad, Mu’amara am muraja‘a: Hiwar qadat al-tatarruf fisijn al-‘aqrab [Conspiracies or Revisionism? Debate with the Leaders of Extremism in the Scorpion Prison]. Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2002. (151) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 55. (152) Taslit, pp. 19–20. (153) Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf, pp. 52–3. (154) Taslit, pp. 3–4. (155) Taslit, p. 16, and Nahr, p. 10. (156) Taslit, p. 18. (157) Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf, pp. 51–2. (158) Tafjirat, p. 23. (159) Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf, p. 20. (160) Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf, pp. 22–26. (161) Nahr al-dhikrayat, p. 42. (162) Mu’amara am muraj‘ah, p. 132. (163) Mubadarat waqf al-‘unf, p. 39. (164) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 107–8.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (165) Ibid., p. 122. (166) Ibid., p. 130. (167) Taslit, p. 13. (168) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, pp. 117–18. This theme runs through this whole book. (169) Nahr al-dhikrayat, p. 44. (170) Ibid., pp. 168–70. (171) Ibid., p. 46 and Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 93. (172) Taslit, p. 29. (173) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 36. (174) Taslit, p. 38. (175) Nahr al-dhikrayyat, pp. 119–21. (176) Taslit, p. 41. (177) Ibid., p. 48. (178) Nahr al-dhikrayat, p. 45. (179) Ibid., p. 48. See for a comparison chapter 3 by Joas Wagemakers on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. (180) Nahr al-dhikrayat, p. 162. (181) Ibid., p. 47. (182) Mu’amara am muraja‘a, p. 35. (183) Ibid., p. 122. (184) Taslit, p. 15. See also Mu’amara, p. 35. (185) Taslit, p. 50. (186) Tafjirat, p. 40. See also Nahr al-dhikrayat, pp. 109–11. (187) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 55. (188) Tafjirat, p. 43. (189) Ibid., p. 50. Page 34 of 35

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action (190) Ibid., p. 12. (191) Ibid., p. 42. (192) In Nahr al-dhikrayat, da‘wa is even prefered above hisba, p. 51. See also the conditions for exerting hisba: Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, pp. 45–63. (193) al-Nash, p. 97. (194) The relevant suras are 3:104, 110; 9:71; and 5:78–9. (195) Mu’amara am al-muraja‘ah, p. 55. (196) Ibid., p. 77. (197) There are constant references to fiqh (jurisprudence), see for example, alNash, p. 79. (198) Mu’amara am muraja‘ah, p. 37. (199) Ibid., p. 38. (200) al-Nash, pp. 26–7. (201) Ibid., p. 27. (202) Ibid., p. 39.

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Salafi formations In Palestine

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Salafi formations In Palestine The Limits of a de-Palestinised Milieu Khaled Hroub

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0010

Abstract and Keywords Unlike Palestinian resistance movements, Salafism in Palestine is totally apolitical, rejecting any involvement in the resistance to the Israeli occupation. The author analyzes the history of this quietist Salafism in Palestine, describing its major thinkers and considering the contradictions Salafism finds itself in by adhering to a doctrine of purification in a highly political environment. Keywords:   Palestine, quietist Salafism, resistance, Israeli occupation

With the current “Islamist sphere” in Palestine (in this case the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) being dominated by the Hamas movement, little room has been left for other Islamist trends including Salafism. Constructing a strong popular “Islamist” identity and promoting it successfully among Palestinians, whether the promoter be the Salafis, Hamas, Hizb al-Tahrir, the Sufis or any other Islamist group, has largely been shaped by the stance adopted by each of these concerned groups towards the Israeli occupation. The “resistance” to this occupation and the conjectural means of this resistance has been the license toward attaining public and popular legitimacy for every group (Islamist or secular). The Salafischool of thought has been less concerned with attaining this kind of legitimacy, having—by embracing God's word—achieved its own sense of divine legitimacy. However, historically speaking, Salafi groups have registered little existence and influence among the Palestinians.

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Salafi formations In Palestine Since the 1970s, a stream of Saudi Salafi and Wahhabi influence has flowed through Palestinian students who have graduated from Saudi universities. Stricken by poverty and limited resources, these desperate students found welcome support from various Saudi grant-giving organisations. These students brought the Wahhabi school of thinking back home with them and (p.222) soon traces of Salafism took root on Palestinian campuses, as those students gradually became university teachers there themselves.1 This chapter attempts to map the Salafi territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, identifying the salient intellectual, religious and political underpinnings of the various formations that declare and promote a “Salafi” identity.2 Delving into their literature, and looking at their discursive concerns, the chapter examines its future potential, legitimacy and the “dePalestinianisation” of their discourse. The precarious relationship between the Salafis and Hamas, especially in the Gaza Strip before and after Hamas's rise to power in 2006–7, is also analysed. Special focus is given to any prospective links between the rise of a Jihadi branch of Salafism and threads to al-Qaeda.

Islamist Formations In Palestine Historically, Islam has been a crucial influence shaping the identity of the Arabs of Palestine and the root of their belonging to the ‘holy land’. As with Christianity and Judaism, Islam accords significant sacredness to Palestine. For Muslims, the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven from the spot where the al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest Muslim shrine on earth, now sits in Jerusalem. Jerusalem is mentioned in the Qur’an several times, granting it and the surrounding land special blessing. So are Bethlehem and Hebron, southwest of Jerusalem, where several prophets were born and buried and reverence to them is part of the Muslim faith. Palestine,3with Jerusalem at the heart of it, has been cherished by Arabs and Muslims who held this land from the seventh century until the demise of Ottoman Turkish rule in 1917. (p.223) There have been many formations with Islamist colouring in Palestine throughout the twentieth century. Within this diversity, well-known societies with varying degrees of “Islamism” include the Islamic National Association (1921), the Muslim Youth Association (1928), The Supreme Muslim Council, headed by Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1921–1931), ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam who led a group which fought the British and the Zionist organisations fiercely in the early 1930s,4 the first branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem, Nablus, Haifa and Gaza around the early 1940s, the Hizb al-Tahrir (1952), the Islamic Jihad Movement (1981) and Hamas (1987), which was a restructuring of the older Muslim Brotherhood movement.5 Sufiformations have also developed in Palestine, although neither concretely institutionalised nor imprinting any noticeable stamp on the wider political scene.6

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Salafi formations In Palestine Until the late 1970s and early 1980s traces of Salafi/Wahhabi influence in Palestine were certainly scarce, if found at all. Salafi imports into Palestine had started to flow from Saudi Arabia due to the latter's response to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. That was part of what Gerges and Madawi, in their separate works, accurately describe as “the transnationalistisaion of the Saudi religious discourse, fearing the rising rhetoric of revolutionary Iran.”7 Another (p.224) reaction to the Iranian revolution was the creation of the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip in 1979 and in the West Bank in the early 1980s. Islamic Jihad was the antithesis of the Saudi Salafi ideology and was a specific response to the ongoing Israeli occupation.8 Alarmed by the Iranian revolution and its ambitions to “export” its model and ideas to neighbouring countries and elsewhere—challenging the hitherto moral leadership of the Saudis in Muslim world—the Saudis mobilised a strong campaign to spread the Wahhabi school of thought as the intellectual Islamic bulwark against the new “revolution”. Iran's predominantly Shi‘i population provided the Saudi's with particularly useful ammunition. From a strict Wahhabi/ Salafi perspective the Shi‘a are heretics, having deviated by a large measure from Islam. A theological attack on the Shi‘a would, the then Saudi strategy hoped, defame revolutionary Iran in the eyes of Sunni-dominated Muslims and stop its ideology from spilling beyond Iranian borders.

Rising Behind the Back of Legitimacy In the Palestinian context, popularity and legitimacy has been normally endowed to parties according to their “patriotic stance and practice” against the Israeli occupation. Before the establishment of Israel, the same criterion had been applied; however the occupier then had been colonial Britain (from 1917 to 1948). After the first Palestine war in 1948, called “the catastrophe” by the Palestinians, and “the independence” by the Israelis, two disconnected parts of Palestine—the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which together totalled around one quarter of the land of historic Palestine—remained “unoccupied” by the Israelis, but were annexed soon after the war to Egypt and Jordan respectively. In both parts, Palestinian parties and movements from all shades of the political spectrum strove to capture the imagination of the Palestinians. None were remarkably successful until the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s when the Fatah movement (the National Palestinian Movement for the Liberation of Palestine) was founded both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, declaring its ultimate aim was to “liberate Palestine from the Zionist State using armed struggle”. Proving itself to be serious and truly nationalistic, the Fatah movement, led by Yasir Arafat, has ever since garnered collective Palestinian sentiment and support. Focusing on the clear objective to “liberate (p.225) Palestine” and employing an armed response, Fatah claimed great popularity and legitimacy.9

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Salafi formations In Palestine During the 1970s and 1980s, other Palestinian factions, leftist, pan-Arabist or proxies to some Arab regimes, failed to compete with Fatah, although some of them enjoyed a measure of popularity. The more a faction was seen to exercise armed confrontation against Israel, the more legitimacy and popularity it would attain. Restraint in confronting the Israeli occupation cost the Palestinian Islamists—mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir—great losses until the eruption of the first intifada (popular uprising) in 1987. By then, the Muslim Brotherhood had come to realise that the ticket to popular legitimacy was “confrontation with Israel”. Thus, they transformed themselves into Hamas. Hizb al-Tahrir, by contrast, remained anchored in its non-confrontation strategy, marginalising itself permanently. Although the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) predated Fatah by over two decades—it only began competing with Fatah when, as Hamas, it embraced a confrontational stance against Israel.10

Salafis In the West Bank and Jerusalem There are several centres of Salafi activism in the West Bank and Jerusalem; all could be seen as belonging to the general non-violent mainstream. Unlike the case in the Gaza Strip, there were no indications of groups of radical JihadiSalafis. Salafis function within associations and mosques, merging into each other sometimes, with their main activity being “purifying” Islam and Islamic practices from shirk and bid‘a (heresy). Similar to the principal intellectual underpinnings of their counterparts in the Gaza Strip, they express revulsion to all things political. One of the main Salafi centres in the Jerusalem suburb Beit Hanina, is the Association of Ahl al-Sunna, founded in 1999. According to it's founder, Shaykh Ibrahim Barakat, a West Bank/Jerusalemite Salafi figurehead, the association is not a political party as they avoid partisan organisations, but a “charitable and cultural society within the context of ahl al-Sunna, that is the understanding of al-Kitab (the Qur’an) and the Sunna (the Prophet's exemplary (p.226) life) as they used to be followed by the salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors)”. He explains that “our mission is to focus on spreading the true and pure Islam, which has been ignored by the majority of the people”. He complains that “in Palestine our mission was weak and had no roots, and in the beginning we were attacked by others, especially those who belonged to political parties”.11 Shaykh Barakat's association suffered various degrees of closure along with dozens of Islamist charities and organisations after 9/11, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) could not withstand American and Israeli pressures to crack down on those charities, particularly Hamas’ ones. To avoid the appearance of targeting only Hamas’ charities, the PA closed down many other organisations that belonged to other Islamists, including the Salafis. Shaykh Barakat and his colleagues have decided to change the association into “a company”, so that

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Salafi formations In Palestine future decisions regarding Islamist organisations will bear no consequences on their own. Thus, their society has been renamed The Company of Ahl al-Sunna.12 The activities of the “Company” include running a nearby mosque known as Masjid al-Da‘wa (The Mosque of Propagation), where the focus is on teaching Qur’an and the Sunna according to the salaf al-salih understanding. The Company also runs an elementary school (with 245 male and female pupils between year one and year three), and two nurseries for children (having in total 260 children). Occasionally, the Company provides financial help to the poor, either students or families. Shaykh Barakat says that they are in the process of organising a football team in the name of the Company. There is a great focus on the school and nurseries, because it is there that the building of the future generation according to the pure path of ahl al-Sunna can take place. For Shaykh Barakat the educational process in these three places “aims to preserve the purity of Islamic teaching”. “In other syllabi, the student is taught deviated ways of understanding Islam, tainted by Western ideas such as the similarities between religions, the truthfulness of other religions, or the separation between the state and religion”.13 “These are”, in the words of Shaykh Barakat, “atheist and blasphemous approaches”. The main publication of the Company is the magazine al-Kalima al-Tayyiba (The Kind Word). (p.227) Other Salafis in Jerusalem and the West Bank include small associations in the cities of Ramallah, Nablus and Tulkarm, but one of the main Salafi formations is The Association of Scientific Centre for Methodological Studies and Research, founded in 2003. Leading Salafi personalities and ‘ulama attached to this association include Shaykh Hashim al-‘Arif, Shaykh Usama alTibi and Shaykh Ashraf Sahlab. These names are found in most publications, activities, lectures, websites and Salafi-related functions. They tour Palestinian cities to propagate Salafism, and those who enjoy Jerusalemite identity cards are allowed to travel to Israel at ease, frequently making visits to Palestinian villages and towns there and giving talks. A Salafi presence among the “Arabs of Israel” has been noticeable in recent years, but investigation into that subject falls beyond the scope of this research.

Salafism In the Gaza Strip Salafi formations in the Gaza Strip exhibit a continuous state of overlap and fluidity, which makes it difficult to chart a map of their presence and diversity. Mutual suspicion between society and Salafi groups create forms of self-imposed isolation among segments of the Salafis. Additionally, smaller Salafi groups undergo continuous changes of loyalty, especially after 9/11 and the rise of alQaeda and bin Ladenism in the region. However, the situation in the Gaza Strip is fairly representative of Salafi presence in other countries. Salafis in Palestine, particularly in the Gaza Strip, are largely a non-violent, mainstream group known as the Da‘wa Salafiyya (The Salafi Propagation, or Mission) plus a

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Salafi formations In Palestine number of smaller more radically thinking, sometimes violent, groups. For our purposes, these smaller groups can be labelled as “Jihadi-Salafis”. The two main addresses of the mainstream (non-violent) Salafi formations in the Gaza Strip are the al-Majlis al-‘Ilmi li-l-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya fi-l-Filastin (The Scientific Council for the Salafi Mission in Palestine—SCSMP) which was founded in Gaza in 1994, and the Jam‘iyyat Dar al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna (The Association of the Book and Tradition of the Prophet—ABTP) which was founded in 1975 in Khan Younis. The dates of foundation for these two associations are not overly significant, having little relevance to the true “date of birth” of Salafism in the Strip. For the SCSMP, the year 1994 is merely the year when they were granted a license from the Palestinian Authority (PA), which had for its part been newly born that same year by virtue of the Oslo Agreements of 1993. Salafi activities long predate that year, as explained by (p.228) Shaykh Yasin al-Astal, the founder and chairman of the SCSMP, and one of the main Salafi figureheads in the Gaza Strip. Al-Astal was educated in Saudi universities, studying shari‘a law and religious subjects. He is proud to “have been taught at the hands of great ‘ulama such as shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘muhaddith (hadith-knower) of our era’, and shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, who is considered to be one of the great ‘ulama of the umma (Muslim nation)”. Al-Astal goes so far as to claim that the purity of his knowledge and ‘ilm (religious knowledge) is guarded by the fact that between himself and the purest source of knowledge, the Prophet Muhammed, there is a direct and an unbroken chain of only twentytwo ‘ulama.14 Al-Astal says that the Salafi trend in the Gaza Strip goes back to the 1970s when it was initially promoted by Shaykh Salim Sharab, the “first ‘alim (scholar) to bring Salafi thought from Saudi Arabia to the Strip”. Sharab, according to alAstal, is credited with connecting the Salafis of the Strip to their ‘ulama and teachers and the guardians of Salafi thought in Saudi Arabia.15 Sharab was also educated in Saudi Arabia and when he returned to the Gaza Strip he actively engaged in propagating Salafi ideas. He was active first in the al-Azhar Religious Institute in Gaza, then at the Islamic University of Gaza and the Islamic Compound—the latter two were and are still Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas institutions. The fact that Shaykh Sharab was comfortable working closely with MB-controlled organisations underlines the Salafi weakness at the time. It also reflects the then prevailing perception among the MB leadership that Salafi thought and activism was no rival to their own. Such an amicable relationship between the Salafis and the MB/Hamas belong to the past, given the present tension underlying the mutual mistrust of both parties in the Gaza Strip. The SCSMP publishes a magazine al-Istiqama (The Straightfulness) headed by Shaykh al-Astal, which seems to be published only intermittently, and reflects the views and priorities of the SCSMP. Reading through a number of issues, the titles of articles reveal the preoccupations and agenda of the Salafis behind it: Page 6 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine ‘Pure Islamic Creed’, ‘The Noble Qu’ran’, ‘Reviving Honoured Prophetic Tradition and Eradicating Absurd Human Heresy’, ‘The Arabic Language which is the Unifying Language of Islam and Muslims’, ‘Islamic Heritage and History’, ‘Modern Sciences’, ‘Ethics, Manners and Behaviour’, (p.229) ‘Destructive Ideologies, False Ideas and Deviated Groups’, ‘Family and Woman Issues’, and ‘General Affairs’.16 Issues such as the “liberation of Palestine” or the “jihad against Israel” are muted in Salafi literature. These are considered to be “tainted political issues” to be avoided. Salafi views on pressing Palestinian affairs are mostly extracted through interviews and by journalists who press for answers. Shaykh Muhammed Hillis, a well-known Salafiimam in Gaza, fields “difficult” questions about Salafi perceptions of the liberation of Palestine and armed resistance. He maintains that Salafism “believes in armed jihad and considers it as one of its duties”. But, although the present timing of jihad is valid (because of the occupation), the “men of jihad ” are lacking. The conditions and prerequisites of jihad are not fulfilled yet. These conditions include the availability of an army and an emir (leader), without which the fruit of jihad will not be achieved.17 Similarly, al-Astal admits “jihad is a matter that is not conducted by an individual, a party, a group of people, or even an individual country of the Muslim countries; all Muslims should meet together and decide to declare jihad after preparation”. Al-Astal prohibits conducting jihad unless following the directions of the imam (leader) of Muslims, indicating that “in the Palestinian case President Mahmoud Abbas is the supreme leader of the armies”. Thus “all Palestinian resistance movements, including the al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, the Islamic Jihad's Saraya al-Quds Brigades, or the Fatah's al-Aqsa Brigades should obey Abbas”.18

Jihadi-Salafis Over the past two years a number of previously unknown small radical groups have attracted attention in the Gaza Strip, claiming responsibility for violent attacks against internet cafés, video stores, male and female hairdressers, “mixed” school ceremonies and similar activities. Female television presenters have been threatened for appearing on screen in “un-Islamic dress”. Statements issued by these groups contain heavy Salafi rhetoric, although mainstream Salafis anxiously distance themselves from these violent practices. A series of (p. 230) statements were issued under the name of Suyuf al-Haqq (The Swords of Truth), which claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on civilian facilities because of their heretical practices, and warned that all these attacks were part of “the campaign of white land” aimed at “driving out the bad elements of society”. They threatened to “put an end to all corruption and moral decadence in the land of Palestine, by use of force”. The group denied any political affiliation with established Islamist organisations in the Strip. A similar group that has carried out attacks is the Kata’ib Jund Allah (The Brigades of God's

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Salafi formations In Palestine Soldiers). This group objected to the “un-Islamic” appearance of many women in the al-Rimal neighbourhood in Gaza, a relatively wealthy area of the city. The al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra (The Group of Excommunication and Migration) is, arguably, one of the oldest Salafi formations in the Gaza Strip. Its intellectual roots go back to Sayyid Qutb, the radical Egyptian ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. This Salafi-oriented group, headed by Shaykh Mahmud Judeh, the emir, is a visible community where all members and their families live together in an isolated area, between Khan- Younis city and Rafah in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. This group, numbering up to several thousands, is extremely radical in its views. Palestinian society at large is considered to be un-Islamic and a true Muslim should migrate and live only with true Muslims, hence the notional migration in their name. Their aim is to establish a “pure Muslim society”, interacting only among each other; buying and selling and getting married only within the group. They do not send their children to “heretic schools of society”, nor do they go to hospitals and clinics but use traditional and religious methods of medicine. They have never participated in any political activity, and the use of violence is ruled out by them because practicing jihad needs to have a “pure Muslim society” first. A violent Salafi name/group that has gained great media and political attention is Jaysh al-Islam (The Army of Islam), which claimed responsibility for several violent acts including the kidnapping of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston in the Gaza Strip in March 2007. Jaysh al-Islam issued several statements praising alQaeda and giving the impression that they are the “branch of al-Qaeda” in Palestine. They have criticised Hamas for relinquishing jihad and becoming more interested in gaining governmental posts. The group was headed by Mumtaz Dughmush, a dubious arms dealer known for his frequent changes of loyalties. There are doubts whether this group is genuine or merely orchestrated by some Fatah elements who want to make Hamas’ life in government difficult. Possibly, it was a temporary ‘ad hoc ’ formation galvanised (p.231) around certain events, mainly the Johnston kidnapping. After Hamas’ take over of Gaza in June 2007, this group adopted a low profile as did other radical formations of Salafi colouring.

Promoting Religious and Social Conservatism Like other Salafi movements in the region and elsewhere, Salafis in Palestine—in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank—promote an ultra-conservative social milieu. Strict and uncompromising views are presented as the only pure Islamic way of life. A sample of published “propagation” pamphlets that have been collected by the author, varying in size between eight to twelve pages each, includes the following titles: Voluntary Fasting and Its Rewards; Ramadan and Ten Incentives to Make Use of It; A Call for Self-Accounting; The Doctrine of Sunni Muslims; Message to Muslim Sister (woman); Christmas and Muslims (where even the congratulating of Christians on that occasion was also declared haram Page 8 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine (forbidden in Islam)); The Three Fundamentals and Their Proofs for Shayk Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab.19 In addition to these multipage pamphlets, the Salafis used to publish and distribute a series of one or two-page commentaries, usually with a fatwa, concerning an urgent issue. For example, a one page statement of a series called Series Confronting Decadence is entitled The Hidden Dangers in Mobile Cameras! This pamphlet warns Muslims of the possibility of un-Islamic use of the cameras that are built into modern mobile phones. Being far less costly than, say, military or political activity, social conservatism is an ever-present, comfortably worn path waiting for Salafis, be they Palestinians or others, to plod along. The track of social action is satisfyingly easy to take refuge in when difficulties (or failure) block a political or military course of action.20 That is not to say that when Salafis are busy politically or militarily they are any less active (or more moderate) socially. On the contrary, when Salafi movements attain political or military “success” at any time, they exploit such success with the imposition of their social/religious codes on the (p.232) surrounding constituency.21 The case of Salafi and al-Qaeda formations in Iraq have shown that social conservatism and religious rigidity have been marching hand in hand with military strategies against the status quo.

The Lure of Politics The overarching attitude of Salafis in Palestine toward politics is unequivocally expressed: “We do not engage in politics, and we keep ourselves away from what is happening in political life because it is all lies and deceit. We only clarify the ‘religious ruling’ on political issues that concern people's daily life. In brief, political affairs pollute religion. Look at what happened in New York, what did we gain? Only wounds in Iraq and Afghanistan.’22 Yet, whether the Salafis of Palestine will continue to adhere to a strategy of distancing themselves from politics remains open. External factors have a say here.23 The volatile atmosphere emanating from the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians’ responses to it and their internal frictions, along with the rapid pace of regional developments such as the rise of Iran and Hezbollah, all could put pressure on the Salafis to speak about (and perhaps get involved with) politics if only in a small way. Disengagement remains possible as long as any group is satisfied with its marginal role in Palestinian society. However, once it becomes more influential and visible, the population pushes toward more immediate “political” issues, top among them, the Israeli occupation. Internal dynamics and the intellectual make-up of the Salafi formation also have a role to play. In theory, Salafi disengagement with politics stems from its rejection of the corrupt status quo, thus it is a temporarily pragmatic position not a principled one. It is plausible that if politics became “not corrupt” and could serve “clean” ends then it could be espoused by Salafis. In their literature the ultimate aspiration, bluntly promoted or tacitly endorsed, is to create a Salafi Islamic life at the individual and societal level. Therefore, at the heart of Page 9 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine this philosophy is a highly politicised world-view that is completely different (p. 233) from such apolitical approaches to religion as, say, Sufism, which is more about an individualistic salvational way of religiosity. Thus there must be conscious or unconscious Salafi thinking that engaging in politics is ultimately unavoidable as a future phase of an ideology. Such a phase is imperative if their final aim is the Islamisation of society. This “phased” thinking of eventual Islamisation of society is in fact not far from that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both follow a strategy of successive phases where the notion of “preparation and religiously educating the people” lies at its heart. While the version of Islam and Islamisation is different in both cases, the end aspiration is to have society Islamised in accordance with what they deem to be the righteous Islamic way. While this strategy is well-outlined in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is less well-elaborated in Salafi literature. The phaseto-phase pursuit of the ultimate end of an Islamised society, or the postponed pursuit of fighting Israel in the case of Palestinian Salafis, is somehow a replica of that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Against the backdrop of Fatah/Hamas fighting, a Salafistatement denounced those who “want to rush things (and go to fight the enemy) before becoming really ready”. The statement draws an analogy between healthy people versus ill people to compare the past glory of the Muslim umma with the current state of affairs marred by many illnesses. (The use of the term “Muslim umma”, here meant to remotely refer to the Palestinians, is but another hesitation in the Salafi discourse to use labels with a national implication). Those healthy people, as depicted by the statement, used to have fertile land, rich with divers mature crops, pure air and clean rivers and springs. Because they relied on the “purity” of their sources of life they were healthy and strong. Later on, however, they started dumping rubbish in their clean rivers and springs polluting their purity; used the polluted water to irrigate their land, which in turn started yielding corrupt crops that made them ill, and made their bodies and society weak. Their enemies were quick to exploit that weakness and invade them. To get rid of weakness and illness of bodies and society, the statement confirms; there is no point in trying to treat the symptoms. The wise and right way is to go back to the pure sources; drink and eat from them right away. Once health and strength are regained, fear will strike amongst enemies and victory will be achieved. The statement observes that: “during the period of weakness and illness various people suggest different proposals to exit the shameful state of affairs. Some would recommend, based on what they call ‘acknowledging reality’, that imitating the enemy, in all good and evil qualities, would (p.234) make us as strong as them. Others, however, would suggest opening hospitals and importing medicine to treat the ill people and eradicate illnesses, yet they forget that the root causes of the weakness remain there. A third group of people would dare Page 10 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine to suggest fighting the enemies despite the weakness and humiliation that they suffered. They would say death is much better than such a disgraceful life. But how could we achieve victory over our enemies while we are disunited and divided among ourselves?” After discounting the basis of all other proposals, the statement provides the only remaining solution and that is the return to the original and pure source of the river. Only then will “bodies be healthy and strong, and the enemy will be defeated”.24 If the size and influence of the Salafi movement continues to increase, and their self-confidence is ever further boosted, a combination of external concerns and internal readiness in Salafi thought would make it very hard for them to keep avoiding eventual engagement in politics. In fact, over the past few years the Salafis could not avoid expressing views on a number of political events. It is worth taking a closer look at three clear pronouncements issued by the Salafis in reaction to pressing events that occurred during 2006 and 2007. As usual, they are not dated but the first one is on the hanging of Saddam Hussein, on the event itself, the portrayal of the execution on TV and “the humiliation” that it brought to Muslims. It precedes the statement with “To Allah first … then to history” [meaning, we declare our position to absolve responsibility before God that we have spoken the truth, then for the history to register our word on this matter]. Denouncing the execution of Saddam, the three-page statement attacks the Shi‘is (of Iraq, Iran and Lebanon) more than any other thing or party including the Americans. The statement wonders “[…] is it to this degree that our manhood and dignity is killed that nobody condemns or objects [to the execution]. Is it to this degree of humiliation and disgrace that they have made us a scapegoat to please the Safawi Shi‘i Iran?” The use of “the Safawi Shi‘i state” is common and meant to mobilise Sunni Muslims against Iran. The statement spares no Shi‘a party in the region without levelling against them accusations of collaboration with the “crusades and infidels”. In Iraq the Shi‘a have facilitated the invasion of the country by the Americans. In Lebanon, the Shi‘a have collaborated with Israel against the Palestinians in the massacres of Sabra and Shatila (in 1982). The authors of the text wonder if those who complained about the oppression of (p.235) rulers could see the situation in Iraq after Saddam! Allah had been using Saddam to defend Ahl al-Sunna (the Sunnis) against the evils of those criminals who hated the Sunnis. At least, his oppression was that of one individual not of a sect or groups or military. There is only one single reference to Israel in the statement and it is meant as more of an attack against Iran, invoking the “Iran Gate” “… when those two Satans [Iran and Israel] agreed on a deal to supply Israel with oil in the 1980s during the rule of Khomeini”.25

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Salafi formations In Palestine The second example is a statement distancing the Salafi movement from a number of attacks that took place in the year 2006 targeting internet cafés, video shops and other places seen as spots of “moral decadence” in the Gaza Strip. Previously unknown groups claimed responsibility for these attacks, but speculations and accusations were directed at the Salafis. The language used in communiqués claiming responsibility for the attacks is reminiscent of Salafi phraseology. Feeling the heat of a political situation in which it had to clarify its position, the Salafi movement had to come forth and speak out to the public. The statement reiterates the “moderate” line of the Salafis in preaching their word, and denouncing the perpetrators of those attacks. It explains that the Salafi approach is a peaceful one where changing un-Islamic values is done through dialogue, propagation and persuasion. The statement attacks the media for directing the accusations towards the Salafis “while they know full well that the Salafi approach is completely innocent of such transgressions”. Furthermore, the statement launches an offence against those who spread rumours about the Salafis, asserting that “to keep accusing Salafism is merely an attempt to export their own internal problems”.26 It is unclear, though, to whom the pronoun “their” refers. A third example is the Salafis position vis-à-vis the fighting between Fatah and Hamas. In this case, the Salafis seemed to have been caught in the crossfire, and their way of dealing with the situation deserves a closer look.

Salafis and the Fighting Between Fatah and Hamas The fighting between Fatah and Hamas after the latter's victory in the January 2006 elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip put the Salafis in a really (p. 236) precarious situation. They found themselves facing what they had been trying to avoid for many years, namely speaking out about politics. The Salafis strove to position themselves on neutral ground between the two competing factions, however difficult that was. On the one hand the Salafis are supposedly religiously closer to Hamas as they both claim Islamist ideology. On the other hand, the Salafis, have amicable relations with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as many of them have been appointed over the years as religious guides and imams in the various PA-institutions. The PA looked upon them as harmless Islamists and moderate figures that could furnish some religious legitimacy to the “system” in an attempt to break what seemed to be the exclusive Hamas control of the Islamist discourse and milieu. The Salafistatements tried to avoid taking positions. They endorsed President Mahmud Abbas as the legitimate wali al-amr (the legitimate ruler that all should obey), but without directly criticising Hamas. They vaguely continued to place the blame on abstract notions such as al-fitna (the dispute), the non-adherence to the true path of al-Kitab wa al-Sunna and so forth.

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Salafi formations In Palestine After Hamas’ violent take over of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Salafi groups and mosques had to face the new reality and heat of Hamas's rule. At that time Hamas had enough enemies to deal with, and sought to keep the Salafis and other so-called harmless groups neutral. However, Hamas's Executive Force (the powerful security arm of Hamas's government in the Gaza Strip) insisted on asserting control over areas and mosques of the Strip, and imposed restrictions on some Salafi activities and movements. In late August and during September 2007 several cases of friction took place between Hamas's Force and Salafi individuals and imams. On 11 September, a statement in the name of the Salafis of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a threatened to declare jihad against Hamas, which was described as “the oppressing group”. The statement likened Hamas with khawarij, a rebellious group that revolted against Muslim rule back in the seventh and eighth centuries. The authenticity of this statement, however, could be questioned because of its harsh and unusual language. A more credible statement was issued in the same month by the Supreme Council for the Salafi Mission in Palestine (in Gaza), offering a reconciliation initiative between Fatah and Hamas on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan.27 In the statement, the head of the Supreme Council, shaykh Yasin alAstal, adopted mild and careful language calling upon Fatah and Hamas to (p. 237) “use the holy month of Ramadan to salvage what has remained of religious, kinship and neighbourhood relations between both of them”. He called the two fighting movements the “two contesting brothers” refraining from placing the blame on either side, and asked each of the two parties to revisit its own mistakes and redress them. However, al-Astal called upon the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas, in accordance with his capacity as wali al-amr (the legitimate Islamic ruler) to “open his arms for his sons”. This acknowledgement of Abbas as wali al-amr would of course infuriate Hamas as this would be the last thing that they would want Abbas to be considered.

A De-Palestinised Salafi discourse The term “Palestinian Salafism” is something of a self-contradictory construct. Palestine as a modern term denotes nationalist notions and/or aspirations for a political or liberationist agenda, and as such is simply lacking in the discourse of mainstream Salafis in Palestine. Equally, aspirations such as building an independent Palestinian state, with its prerequisite struggle against the Israeli occupation, enjoy no place in the literature of the Salafis. Consciously, Salafi thinking is not nationalist, but transnational. Embraced by Palestinian Salafis, transnationalism is seen as the timeless and transcendent thought that connects the chain of thinkers and ideas that constitute the corpus of the Salafischool of thought throughout history.28 In their books, speeches, series of lectures, mosque sermons, and website material, the term used to refer to the Palestinians is “Muslims”. “Oh, Muslims” is the common opening phrase for

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Salafi formations In Palestine virtually all statements, even if they are addressing a small neighbourhood about a very local issue. Even when addressing major issues of Palestinian concern, the Salafis insist on employing a very general discourse that hardly touches on the “hot” aspects of the issue at hand. They tend to reiterate their “standard diagnosis” that all problems and catastrophes facing “Muslims” (meaning Palestinians), are due to their deviation from the true path of Allah and his prophet Muhammed. The Salafi“standard panacea” for redressing all maladies facing the Palestinians, is the return to the Qur’an and the Sunna. The righteous way to undertake the journey of such a return is, naturally, to embrace the pure Sunni line of Islam, Salafism. Salafi discourse would restrict itself to making this sort of (p.238) high-pitched pronouncement, and to uttering abstract notions such as Muslim destinies, inevitable failures, continuous suffering and so forth, all because “Muslims” have become ignorant of Allah's path; there is no discussing specific occurrences. A striking example of this is the Salafi's statement on the fighting between Fatah and Hamas before and during the bloody takeover by Hamas of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, as discussed above. On this occasion, a Salafistatement that was distributed in the Gaza Strip talked about the fitna —dissent, or infighting. In the three-page statement there was not a single direct pronouncement or reference to Fatah, or Hamas, or Palestine, or the Palestinians, or even to Gaza. It is written in a completely generic language full of religious utterances that merely encourage being a good, true Muslim. The statement could be published and read by any Salafi group anywhere; in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or South Africa, under any circumstances and without the need to change a single phrase in it. All that it contained were Qur’anic verses, Prophet Muhammad's sayings, advice, and religious anecdotes showing how destructive internal struggle can be, and how the deviation from the true Salafi path becomes so damaging. The statement ends by approaching the actual Hamas/ Fatah situation as remotely as possible by calling upon “those who are wise and sensible from all institutions to show flexibility and patience, and to do the good deeds so that the ship will not sink; and [to remember that] the events of Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq are there [to learn from]”.29 Such a detached, dispassionate and de-Palestinised discourse is almost unique within the current Palestinian spectrum of political and even religious thinking. In fact, a de-Palestinised discourse that prioritises utopian religious abstractions as manifested in the Salafi literature and language could be seen as harmful for the Palestinian cause insofar as their national aspirations are not realised. Such a discourse actually plays against Palestinian ends, and enables many Israelis to reinvigorate an old claim that the Palestinians belong to the wider Arab and Muslim sphere and territories, where they could relocate, unlike the Israelis who “only have this disputed small piece of land to claim”. Negating “Palestinianism” Page 14 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine in the Salafi discourse contradicts the founding tenets of the contemporary Palestinian national identity; an identity that has metamorphosed over decades within and around the premises (p.239) of national liberation and independence as proclaimed by the PLO/Fatah (and later Hamas).30 However, any Salafi discourse that initially marginalises the immediacy of the Palestine cause could also nurture, over time, the possibilities of the rise of totally unexpected discourses or sub-discourses and practices. The case of the Muslim Brotherhood and their relatively recent internal transformation into Hamas is still a fresh example. During decades of almost complete resignation from any confrontational approach vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation, the Israelis, some Palestinian factions and perhaps other regional players were tacitly pleased with the course of (in)action adopted by the old Muslim Brotherhood. Yet what was proved in later stages, by the creation of Hamas in the late 1980s, was the intellectual and religious readiness to make a sharp detour in strategy. However, the differences in the intellectual and political formation and historical experiences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movements, especially the apolitical ones, remain considerable. These differences should make any attempt to draw confirmed parallels on the future paths prudently somewhat guarded. From a broader perspective, the issue of Palestine has only been a late-comer onto the Salafi agenda anywhere. Unlike many other formations of Islamism in the region, such as the Muslim Brotherhood first in Egypt then in most Arab countries, or Hizb al-Tahrir, the Salafi ideology has until recently avoided any involvement with the Palestinian cause even rhetorically. The Salafi mainstream adhered—and for a long period of time—to non-political ideology, resigned to the idea that politics is the business of the wali al-amr alone. When part of the Salafi movement was dragged into politics and militancy it was Afghanistan that captured the “jihadi imagination” of this newly developed dimension of Salafism. Of course, the development in that direction—and in particular in Afghanistan— was neither innocent nor spontaneous but encouraged by the Saudi state as it served its higher strategic ends. In line with the US policies there, the Saudis made available in Afghanistan financial, intelligence and religious capital to serve the “mujahidin ” in their war against the Soviets and their local regime in the late 1970s and 1980s. Under the close eye of the Saudi government, thousands of Saudi young people, deluded by the vehement religious encouragement of their Salafiimams in Saudi cities, were (p.240) to join their “Afghani brothers” in their war against the Soviet atheists, leaving their country in the pursuit of “jihad ” in Afghanistan.31 This strategy of exporting potential militant elements to Afghanistan in a bid to rid Saudi Arabia of them proved catastrophic. While this part of Salafi development is surely covered in detail in other parts of this book, it suffices to say here that any similar Salafi enthusiasm to send people to fight for the cause Page 15 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine of Palestine, say in South Lebanon when it was wide open to anyone who wanted to join the Palestinian fighters there and at exactly the same period of time as the Afghan jihad (late 1970s), was simply lacking. The standard justification put forward by Salafiimams for not fighting with the Palestinian factions was a reference to the “un-Islamic ideologies” and style of life of these Palestinians, which differed from the “Islamic life” of the pious Afghani mujahidin. In fact, sending people to fight Israel in South Lebanon would have been strongly rejected by the Saudi state in order to avoid any friction with the US in the region. Nonetheless, the pretext that the Palestinian struggle was not a jihad was widely accepted within the new militant factions within Salafi circles. Even when bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri became the figureheads of the international militant Salafi movement, al-Qaeda, the Palestine issue appeared only scantly in their discourse. Since the mid 1990s and after the establishment of the World Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders in 1998 (in Afghanistan), the focus of al-Qaeda has been the American troops in the region, not Palestine. Taking note of a rising criticism from various Arab and Muslim quarters because of their ignorance of Palestine, bin Laden and Zawahiri began in their post-9/11 statements to inject a higher “dose” of the centrality of the Palestinian issue and the need for Muslims to unite their efforts to liberate it. Practically, these pronouncements have remained little more than lip service, as bin Laden and al-Qaeda have never attacked Israeli targets. In later stages, alQaeda tried to outbid Hamas in showing “concern” for the plight of the Palestinians. When Hamas won the elections and formed a government in January and March 2006 respectively, Zawahiri was blunt in attacking the movement. He accused Hamas of selling out the cause of (p.241) Palestine and accepting secular notions such as elections and power-sharing with secular Palestinians.32 Non-militant Salafi movements in the region, mainly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf countries, display minimal interest in the Palestinian cause. Some of them have created a charitable branch of their own organisation to focus on fundraising (zakat, for instance) that is assigned to relieve the suffering of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Part of that money serves the declared ends by reaching the poor through local Palestinian charities. But the other part, perhaps the larger one, reaches nascent Salafi organisations, mosques, Qur’anic schools and other Salafi formations in order to strengthen the Salafi trend in Palestine. The resources, buildings, facilities and publications of the few Salafi organisations in Palestine, however, are not comparable with the size of their membership or visibility and influence in society.

Uncertain Future: is Al-Qaeda/Palestine Inevitable? Speculations on future courses of events in Middle East politics have always proved to be unreliable given the radical shift of realities on the ground. One could aspire to underline the possible impact of the major factors that could Page 16 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine shape the future of the Palestinian Salafis. Changes in the immediate surrounding countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran, would have a strong bearing on the development (or underdevelopment) of the Salafi movement in Palestine. This means that exogenous dynamics would have no less great an influence on the Salafi reality in Palestine than indigenous ones. The development that could take place within the Palestinian/Israeli conflict will contribute greatly to the context that would shape the Salafi future, among others. Internally, one of the main factors could be the future of Hamas in Palestinian politics, detailed below. If Hamas should fail, politically and militarily for instance, this could push many of its angry elements to look out for alternative Islamist organisations, and some of them could be attracted to the Salafi formation. Or, they themselves could create separate groups with a radical Salafi orientation. Depending upon regional and internal dynamics, the Salafis could develop in either of these two directions: they may retain their non-violent, nonpolitical (p. 242) mainstream, with small groups on the fringe, or the Salafi mainstream could become further radicalised and militant and split into various competing and violent groups. Whether a Palestinian branch of al-Qaeda is a possibility depends on emerging conditions. Central to these are the successes or failures of Hamas.33 While Palestinian Islamism is dominated by Hamas and to a lesser extent the Islamic Jihad Movement, Salafism remains a marginal phenomenon, at least so far. Palestinian Salafism was imported from Saudi Arabia, where the Palestinian founders and leading figures had been educated by Saudi Salafi‘ulama mainly at universities. Salafism in Palestine is, broadly speaking, represented by a nonviolent mainstream both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The social, cultural and political Salafi milieu of this mainstream, however, is very strict. It draws on an orthodox interpretation of Qur’an and hadith, compared to which other Islamist outlooks, such as the Muslim Brotherhood's, would look moderate, perhaps liberal. On the margins of the mainstream, particularly in the Gaza Strip, small splinter groups –Jihadi-Salafis—have appeared (and disappeared) in the past few years. Among these groups, a number have adopted a radical discourse drawn from alQaeda and Osama bin Laden's statements and experiences. Yet, lack of clarity, and the sudden emerging and vanishing of groups and subgroups makes it difficult to draw any concrete conclusion as to whether al- Qaeda has actually established its own branch in Palestine.34 Salafism in Palestine, be it non-violent or violent, is an intellectual movement that thrives on social and religious conservatism, and pushes society in that direction. The future of Salafism in Palestine is open to all alternatives, depending upon the changing political and social context, locally and regionally. Page 17 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine Salafism could gather momentum if the “right” conditions were to emerge. Its political indifference is temporary. Future Salafi engagement (p.243) against the Israeli occupation cannot be ruled out. If such engagement took place, Salafis could start to compete popularly with major Islamist movements such as Hamas. Salafism could capitalise on the failures of other Islamist movements and attract their angry and frustrated members. Al-Qaeda or similar Jihadi-Salafi formations could emerge, offering bin Laden al-bay‘a (allegiance), similar to what al-Zarqawi had done in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi regrouped with many angry elements, mostly with a Salafi background, and declared loyalty to bin Laden, offering themselves as the al-Qaeda branch in Iraq. If, however, structural conditions—mainly the Israeli occupation and that which emanates from it, which keeps breeding radicalism in Palestine— were to change, the chances of radicalising the Salafi movement would become fewer. Bibliography Bibliography references: Abu-Amr, Ziad, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad , Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994. El-Awaisi, ‘Abd Al-Fattah, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928– 1947, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998. Chehab, Zaki, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement, New York: Nation Books, 2007. Cooley, John K., Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London: Pluto Press, 2000. Gerges, Fawaz A., The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. al-Hout, Bayan Nuwaihedh, Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine 1917–1948, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986 [in Arabic]. Hroub, Khaled, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000. ———, ‘Cut Hamas Some Slack, to Contain Al-Qaeda’, Daily Star, 26 March 2007. Jaber, Hassan, ‘Salafis of Gaza: Common Vision and Various Societies’, al-Ayyam, May 2007. Milton-Edwards, Beverly, Islamic Politics in Palestine, London: New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999. Page 18 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Tamari, Saleem, The Mountain against the Sea: Studies in Palestinian Urban Culture & Social History [in Arabic], Ramallah: The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2005. Notes:

(1) Even the Islamic University of Gaza, founded in 1978 and considered to be one of the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas's greatest strongholds in the Gaza Strip, was influenced by Salafi academics during the 1980s. However, this influence would wane in contrast to Hamas’ gradual rise, according to its current president Dr Kamaleen Sha‘th in interview with the author, Gaza, March 2007. (2) The definition and connotations of the term “Salafi” are discussed elsewhere in this book, but I will use the term here interchangeably with Wahhabism as defined by Al-Rasheed: “Wahhabiyya is considered a fragmented but hegemonic religious discourse. It is distinguished from other Sunni Muslim religious discourses by its own specific interpretations and interpreters. Wahhabiyya is simply a religious worldview that can promote both consent and contestations, depending on the context in which its teaching and texts are interpreted”, Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 2. (3) Which was vaguely territorially defined, but rather integrally linked to a broader geography that constituted today's Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. (4) In the early 1990s Hamas named its military wing after shaykh ‘Izz ad-Din alQassam— Al-Qassam Brigades—to emphasise the continuity of the chain of Islamist movements and their fight against colonial occupiers. (5) For more on the history of ‘Islamist movements and Palestine’ see Bayan Nuwaihedh al- Hout, Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine 1917–1948, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986 [in Arabic]; ‘Abd Al-Fattah El-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928–1947, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998; Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, London: New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999, and Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000. (6) Writings about Sufism in Palestine are surprisingly scarce. Saleem Tamari's exciting book, The Mountain against the Sea: Studies in Palestinian Urban Culture & Social History [in Arabic], Ramallah: The Palestinian Institute for the Page 19 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine Study of Democracy, 2005, provides a vivid picture of Sufiand other religious folklore prior to the establishment of Israel. To the knowledge of this author, there is no single credible book covering this subject in Palestine in the second half of the twentieth century. (7) See See Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, especially chapters 2 and 3: ‘The Afghan War: Sowing the Seeds of Transnational Jihad’ and ‘The Rise of Transnationalist Jihadis and the Far Enemy’, respectively; and Madawi AlRasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, especially Chapter 3 ‘Struggling in the Way of God Abroad: From Localism to Transnationalism’. In this chapter, AlRasheed considers the year 1979, the year of the Iranian revolution, to be “a critical year” in the context of Saudi/Iranian rivalry. (8) On the emergence of Islamic Jihad see Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994, chapter 4. (9) For the genesis of the National Palestinian Movement and the central role of Fatah, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. (10) On this shift see Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000, Chapter 1. (11) Shaykh Ibrahim Barakat, interview with Faten Abu Aisha on behalf of the author, 15 August 2007. (12) Ibid. (13) Ibid. (14) Shaykh Yasin Al-Astal, as interviewed by Hassan Jaber in ‘Salafis of Gaza: Common Vision and Various Societies’, al-Ayyam, May 2007. (15) Ibid. (16) Al-Istiqama, issues 3 and 4, second year, Rabi’ Awal 1418 (dated using the Islamic calendar, which is equivalent to July 1997). (17) Interview with Muhammed Hillis, a Salafiimam and well-known figure in Gaza, Islam Online, 20 February 2007; http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/ Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1171891069019&pagename=Zone-ArabicDaawa%2FDWALayout (18) Al-Astal interview, al-Ayyam. Page 20 of 22

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Salafi formations In Palestine (19) I have to thank Dr ‘Atif Abu Sayf from Gaza who helped me to get access to these booklets. (20) A case in point in this regard is the example referred to by Madawi AlRasheed of the Sahwis (Salafi revivalists) in Saudi Arabia, a group of popular Salafis who started a loose movement of opposition to the regime in the 1990s. Their failure to bring about any tangible change was followed by a thrust in the direction of “rejecting and obstructing social change”. See Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, pp. 80–91. (21) In the cases of non-Salafi movements, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood organisation, the experience is mixed. Political (and sometimes military success) could lead to the regeneration of more moderate or radical social programmes, depending on the pressing circumstances. (22) Shaykh Khalil, pseudonym, prominent Salafi leader in Gaza, interview on behalf of the author, Gaza, 20 July 2007. (23) By way of an indicative comparison, it was accumulated external factors that pushed the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood into transforming themselves into Hamas in late 1987. See footnote 10 above. (24) Salafistatement, ‘From the Publications of the Salafi Mission: The Exit of the Mihna (Ordeal)’, Gaza, approximate date February 2007. (25) Salafistatement, ‘From the Publications of the Salafi Mission: To Allah First … then to History’, Gaza, approximate date January 2007. (26) Salafistatement, ‘From the Publications of the Salafi Mission: The Salafi Approach and its Followers are Repudiated from Ghuluw (extremism)’, Gaza, approximate date April 2007. (27) See the text of the statement on Maan News: http://www.maannews.net/ar/ index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=82887. (28) An interview on behalf of the author with Shaykh Abu ‘Umar (pseudonym), a Salafi leader in Gaza, August 2007. (29) Salafistatement, ‘From the Publications of the Salafi Mission: In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate and Merciful, No God but Allah: The Kind Word’, Gaza, approximate date July 2007. (30) The irony here is that as a counterweight to Hamas's rise in Palestine in recent years Fatah became supportive of the Salafis, mainly in the Gaza Strip, playing them off against Hamas.

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Salafi formations In Palestine (31) For more on the Saudi engagement in the war in Afghanistan, the Saudi support of the mujahidin, and sending Saudi men to fight there, see Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy, and John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London: Pluto Press, 2000, especially chapter ‘Donors, Bankers and Profiteers’, pp. 107–26. (32) See al-Zawahiri's statement (4 July 2007) attacking Hamas: http:// www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite? c=ArticleA_C&cid=1183483965145&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/ NWALayout. (33) Khaled Hroub, ‘Cut Hamas Some Slack, to Contain Al-Qaeda’, Daily Star, 26 March 2007. See also Chapter 8 ‘Fiction Precedes Fact: The Al-Qaeda Connection’ in Zaki Chehab's Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement, New York: Nation Books, 2007. (34) At the time of undertaking final revision of this chapter (January 2008), news was reported that Fatah al-Islam, a Lebanese-based al-Qaeda affiliated organisation, had announced “The Majlis al-Shura (the Consultation Council) of Fatah al-Islam has decided the appointment of Shaykh ‘Abd al Rahman alGhazzawi as the Emir of the group in Palestine”, al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 14 January 2008. Although this news may hold little significance, it still shows the continuous attempts of al-Qaeda and its sister organisations to get a foothold in Palestine.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism Thomas Hegghammer

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0011

Abstract and Keywords This chapter gives an analysis of the different forms of political activism and places Salafism within that spectrum. It argues that Salafist religious doctrines do not explain the political conduct of Salafism’s adherents. All the terms researchers have used only add to the confusion. Instead, it argues, one should look at the rationales or strategies of Salafism and other Islamic movements. Keywords:   Salafism, political activism, strategies

Introduction The question of how to conceptualise and label actors and currents within the Islamist movement has long haunted scholars studying the Middle East. When Islamism became a prominent force in Middle East politics in the 1970s, mainstream political science offered few tools to grasp this hybrid and nonWestern phenomenon. A dominant tendency in the scholarship on Islamism since the 1980s has therefore been to adopt Arabic descriptors found in the (p.245) discourse of the Islamist actors themselves. Today, terms such as “Jihadi ”, “Takfiri ”, “Salafi ” and “Jihadi-Salafi ” are widely used in the academic literature and have started to enter mainstream media. These terms are widely believed to offer a more nuanced and culturally more authentic set of tools with which to analyse the Islamist movement. However, at the same time, the academic literature suffers from a paucity of clear definitions of these terms, as well as inconsistencies in their application to specific groups and ideologues. There is notably considerable confusion about the precise political content of several of Page 1 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? these terms. For example, what characterises the political behaviour of JihadiSalafi groups? And what does the label Salafi tell us about the political preferences of actors described as such? The purpose of this chapter is to examine the origin and definitions of Arabic descriptors such as Jihadi, Salafi and Takfiri, and to assess their relationship with discrete patterns of political behaviour displayed by Islamist groups. The analysis will focus on the most easily observable form of political behaviour, namely violence. While the inquiry may initially resemble terminological nitpicking, it actually has deep implications for two important theoretical debates in the study of Islamism. First is the question of the relative importance of politics and religion in determining the behaviour of Islamist actors; second is the question of whether Islamism is essentially different from other religious and political phenomena. The chapter starts with a review of the Arabic terms that are most widely used in the academic discourse on radical Islamism. After showing why these theological terms are problematic in the analysis of political behaviour and political violence, I present an alternative approach to classifying Islamist actors based on revealed political preferences.2 Finally I shall discuss the implications and limitations of the latter approach, as well as the relative utility of the theology-based and preference-based typologies.

Theology-based Terms Jihadism

Among the most widely used terms in the contemporary academic and media discourse on radical Islamism is that of “Jihadism” and the associated adjective (p.246) “Jihadi ” or “Jihadist”, which derives from the Arabic and Islamic term jihad (struggle or holy war). “Jihadism” is a relatively new term that only gained currency in the academic discourse in the late 1990s.3 Since 9/11, it has made its way into mainstream discourse as a relatively useful term to distinguish violent actors from non-violent, democratic, or progressive Islamists. “Jihadi” has a meaning very close to that of “militant Islamist”, although it is practically never used to refer to Shi‘i militants such as Hezbollah or Palestinian groups such as Hamas. The term “Jihadism” is often met with scepticism by Muslims, because it is seen as wrongly associating the noble religious concept of jihad with illegitimate violence. While Western academics (and liberal Muslim writers) use the term descriptively, mostly as a synonym for “violent Islamist”, conservative Muslims see it as having normative implications that unfairly associate Islam with terrorism. This is one of the reasons why, when Muslim states speak of militant Islamists they consider illegitimate, they do not use the term Jihadist, but rather explicitly delegitimising terms such as “terrorists” [irhabiyyun], Kharijites

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? [khawarij], “deviants” [munharifun], or members of “the misled sect” [al-fi’a aldhalla]. Takfirism

It was a similar desire to delegitimise radical Islamist opposition groups which led Arab states to introduce the term “takfiri ”—derived from the Arabic for excommunication, takfir —in the public discourse in the 1970s.4 When members of the sect-like group Jama‘at al-Muslimin [The Group of Muslims] led by Shukri Mustafa went to trial in Egypt in the mid-1970s, they quickly became known as al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra [Excommunication and Exile], despite the fact that they had never used this name themselves; the name had in fact (p.247) been invented by the state-controlled press to ridicule and delegitimise the defendants.5 The delegitimising force of the term takfiri stems from the very controversial nature of the religious concept of takfir, which signifies the act of declaring a nominal Muslim an infidel. In classical Islamic jurisprudence, takfir is an extremely serious measure that can only be pronounced by qualified religious authorities under very specific circumstances. These restrictions are in place to prevent the privatisation and proliferation of the practice of excommunication among Muslims, which would lead to chaos or fitna (sedition). To the broader Muslim public, therefore, takfiri is a clearly pejorative term that connotes rebellion and extremism. In the modern political context, excommunication is essentially a theological or ideological manoeuvre to ostracise other Muslims. In practice, it is evoked in three main types of situations. The first is when an opposition group seeks to topple what they view as a politically illegitimate Muslim regime. By declaring the ruler infidel, they justify the use of violence against him. The second is when official or self-appointed representatives of a conservative majority seek to intimidate holders of minority views on religion, usually individual progressive intellectuals. The third main type of situation is when a small sect views Muslims around them as so morally corrupt that it considers them infidels and seeks to isolate itself from the rest of society. This is a rare an inward-looking use of takfir which most often produces withdrawal, not violence. It is very important to note that the adjective takfiri is a label, not a selfappellation. Islamist actors, however radical, virtually never call themselves takfiri, but get labelled as such by their enemies.6 Moreover, these enemies often leave considerable ambiguity on the precise type of takfir allegedly being exercised. When Arab state officials employ the term takfiri of a group of Islamists, they very rarely distinguish between actors who excommunicate individual politicians or intellectuals [takfir al-‘ayn], and those who excommunicate the whole society around them [takfir al-‘umum]. This distinction is not relevant for states because their purpose is to make the group in question (p.248) appear as crazy fanatics, not to explain the content of their ideology. Page 3 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? The Arab states’ use of the term “takfiri ” is thus very similar to the way in which Western states use the term “terrorist” to delegitimise their political opponents. The Arab regime discourse on “takfiri ” groups has led to the serious misunderstanding in certain circles that “takfirism” represents a distinct ideological doctrine or movement. Some have even suggested that there exists today an organisation or global network of activists operating under the name altakfir wa-l-hijra.7 Both views are extremely problematic. For a start, there are practically no actors who call themselves Takfiris. The alleged existence of an organisation named al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra is almost exclusively supported by unspecified intelligence sources. To this author's knowledge, no written statement or manifesto has ever been signed by a group using this name. Moreover, there is no corpus of texts that outline a “Takfiri ideology” in any meaningful way. Any such hypothesis would run into the problem of defining the precise political content of this alleged ideology: who exactly do they excommunicate, for what reason and for what purpose? As mentioned above, those who consider other Muslims as infidels do it to different extents (individuals, regimes or societies), for different reasons, (moral or political) and for different purposes (revolution, intimidation, or isolation). Salafism

Another very frequently used concept in the contemporary discourse on Islamism is that of “Salafism”.8 In the Islamist community, Salafi has the opposite connotation value of Takfiri, in the sense that nobody will admit to being Takfiri, while most will claim to be a Salafi. However, there is considerable debate and disagreement about what constitutes Salafism, primarily because Islamists often use it as a normative term, while observers understand it as a descriptive label. The question of the definition of Salafism is too complex to be treated here, so I shall focus on the question of how it relates to political behaviour. (p.249) Most definitions of Salafism in the academic literature emphasise that the term derives from the expression al-salaf al-salih (the pious ancestors) and that Salafis believe that the Qur’an and the hadith [Prophetic tradition] are the only legitimate sources of religious conduct and reasoning. There is also a general understanding that Salafism represents a more literalist and more puritan approach to Islamic doctrine and practice. When academics speak of “the Salafis” or “the Salafi movement,” they allude to a nebula of actors whose practice of Islam is more puritan and more rigorous than other Muslims. Salafi is often used as a self-descriptor by conservative Sunni Muslims and Islamist groups of different shades and orientations. Many Islamist groups and ideologues will readily declare themselves to be Salafis, and the word “Salafi” is also found in names of Islamist groups, such as the GSPC (al-Jama‘a al- Salafiyya li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Qital) in Algeria. The reason why the adjective “Salafi” is so Page 4 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? popular among Islamist actors is that it connotes doctrinal purity and therefore affords a degree of religious and political legitimacy to whoever describes himself as such. For this reason, the term “Salafi” is often better understood as a bid for legitimacy than an indication of a specific political programme. In many cases, the self-appellation “Salafi” is simply a synonym for “authentic”. This becomes more evident when we look at the specific political actors who have been labelled Salafi or declared themselves as such. The actors who tend to become subsumed in this category constitute a politically very heterogeneous group. It includes actors who between themselves have diametrically opposing views on crucial political issues. Alleged Salafis include bitter enemies of the Saudi regime like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi on the one hand and regime apologists like the official Saudi ‘ulama on the other.9 It includes overtly political Saudi dissidents like Sa‘d al-Faqih as well as staunch advocates of apolitical Islam such as Rabi‘ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali.10 It includes (p.250) apocalypticists like Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and pragmatists like Salman al- ‘Awda.11 The crucial problem with the term Salafism, therefore, is that it is a theological, not a political category. Used on its own, it says very little about the political preferences of the actors described as Salafis. At the same time, it is indeed possible to delineate, in broad terms, a certain Salafi intellectual posture or a set of Salafi intellectual traditions. One might speak of a common Salafi approach to scripture that may be characterised as literalist or anti-rationalist. One might speak of a Salafi preference for specific early theologians, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, or Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. One might also argue that Salafis tend to place particular emphasis on the observance of details of ritual practice and moral behaviour. Moreover, in well-defined geographical contexts, the term Salafi may connote more specific sets of political preferences. When talking about Kuwaiti Islamism, for example, it makes sense to speak of the Salafis because, in that specific political context, the term connotes distinct and coherent set of preferences which set the Salafis apart from other actors in the field (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood) and which explain their behaviour. Similarly, the “Salafis” in French suburbia represent an observable sociological phenomenon with behavioural patterns distinct from those of their “Tablighi” or “Ikhwani” neighbours.12 The same applies to other contexts such as Morocco, Syria, Yemen, or Pakistan.13 In these cases the category is operational because it is the slick (p.251) contextualised and defined in relation to competing actors in the local political field. However, it is very problematic to assume that all actors known as Salafis in their respective contexts can be analysed as parts of a single transnational Salafi movement.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? Jihadi-Salafism

What, then, about the Salafis who share a propensity for violent rebellion? “Jihadi-Salafism” is a term that has grown in popularity in recent years, but its precise origins remain unclear.14 It is often said that the Saudi-educated Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi articulated the doctrine of Jihadi- Salafism in the early 1990s and propagated it through his London-based disciple and countryman Abu Qatada al-Filastini.15 However, although alMaqdisi has used the term Jihadi-Salafi about himself and his ideas, he did not invent the term as such, for in a 2002 interview, he pointed out that “we did not give ourselves this name, but people have described us in this way.”16 According to another account, conveyed by Saudi intellectuals such as Yusuf al-Dayni, the doctrine of Jihadi-Salafism originated in Jamil al-Rahman's Wahhabi-oriented Jihadist community in Kunar in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s.17 While this is possible, there is little textual evidence to this effect. Adding to the confusion about the origin of the expression, the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi claimed in 2006 to have invented it in the early 1990s, although no written record confirms this.18 What the textual evidence does suggest is that the term first gained popularity in the Islamist community in London in the early 1990s. The first written reference—known to this author—to a “Jihadi-Salafi movement” [al-haraka aljihadiyya al-Salafiyya] appeared in an interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri published in the London-based Jihadist magazine al-Ansar in 1994.19 In the academic literature, the term was first used in 1998 in two (p.252) independent studies by Gilles Kepel and Kamil al-Tawil.20 This confirms the London origin of the term: Al-Tawil was a London-based reporter for al- Hayat newspaper, and Kepel explained that he first heard the expression from Abu Hamza al-Masri during an interview in London in February 1998.21 Newspaper searches show that “Jihadi-Salafism” is occasionally used in Arab media reporting from the British Islamist scene from 1999 onward, but it was only from 2003 onward that its use proliferated and entered Western discourse. Two specific factors seem to have contributed to this increase: one was the so called “Salafiyya Jihadiyya ” terrorism case in Morocco in 2003, which led the Arab press to use the term much more frequently than before.22 The other factor was the publication of the English version of Kepel's book Jihad, which made a deep impact on the Western academic discourse on militant Islamism. An important justification for the use of the term Jihadi-Salafi in academic circles is the fact that it has been employed by the Islamist actors themselves. However, if we examine the Jihadist literature more closely, the term is not nearly as widely used as a self-appellation as is often assumed. For a start, some of the actors most closely associated with the term have distanced themselves from it. One example is al-Maqdisi's disclaimer mentioned above. Similarly, the Moroccan militants tried in 2002 in the so-called “Salafiyya Jihadiyya ” case actually rejected this label themselves.23 More interesting is the fact that a Page 6 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? search in Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad —the largest online database that holds several thousands items of Jihadist literature—produces only thirty-nine hits for the expression “Jihadi-Salafi” and its variants.24 Admittedly, we do find (p.253) this term in certain prominent Jihadist texts and group names, but the vast majority of instances occur in 2003 or later.25 Despite the popularity of the term “Jihadi-Salafi” in the academic literature on radical Islamism in recent years, it is surprisingly difficult to find a politically substantial and specific definition of it. Most definitions, whether articulated by radical Islamists or outside observers, tend to be rather vague. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, for example, described Jihadi-Salafism as “a current which unites the call to monotheism in all its aspects with jihad for that purpose at the same time.”26 Wikipedia in Arabic states that “[ Jihadi-Salafism] calls for jihad to change what it considers wrong, outside of shari‘a and a deviation from religion. It considers jihad as an inescapable obligation on every Muslim and as the summit of Islam.”27 This definition is practically devoid of political content. Although no clear definition of Jihadi-Salafism has thus far been articulated, the existing academic literature on militant Islamism suggests that many, though not all, scholars understand Jihadi-Salafism as having three politically substantial characteristics. First, Jihadi-Salafi groups are perceived as more extremist and intransigent than other groups.28 Second, they are said to draw on Salafi or Wahhabi religious tradition and discourse as opposed to the more pragmatic ikhwani ideology and discourse of Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood.29 Finally they are seen as more internationalist and anti-Western (p.254) than other groups.30 While many scholars will nod approvingly at these three points, there are several problems with this proto-definition. First, it is very difficult to operationalise the notion of radicalism or intransigence. At which level of extremism does an actor start or cease to be a Jihadi- Salafi? If the level of violence is the measure, then we have to explain the fact that on several occasions, prominent scholars described as Jihadi-Salafi have criticised certain militant activists for their excessive use of violence.31 Moreover, intransigence is also found in groups not usually described as JihadiSalafi, such as the Egyptian militants of the 1970s and 1980s or Juhayman al‘Utaybi's rebels in 1979. As seen above, it is not at all clear that the “Salafi outlook” imputes actors with a particular propensity for violence. Second, it is not at all clear how operational the Salafi-ikhwani dichotomy is in the world of contemporary militant Islamism. Sayyid Qutb is still being cited by groups seen as Jihadi-Salafi.32 Activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood tradition such as Marwan Hadid and ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam are still being hailed as martyrs and legends by groups described as Jihadi-Salafi.33 Moreover, one might argue that the difference in the respective discourses of the early Egyptian militants and the Jihadi-Salafis of the 1990s is overstated. Qutb and Faraj cited Page 7 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? Ibn Taymiyya throughout their texts. Islamologist Rosalynd Gwynne has shown that the discursive and theological differences between Faraj's Absent Obligation and bin Laden's Declaration of War are negligible.34 So-called Qutbist expressions such as jahiliyya [age of ignorance] and (p.255) hukm bi-ghayr ma anzala allah [ruling according to ungodly principles] abound in texts by ideologues associated with Jihadi-Salafism. Admittedly, the concept of “al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ ” [loyalty and disavowal], frequently associated with Jihadi-Salafism, does not appear in Faraj's Absent Obligation or Qutb's Signposts, but it is not found in all alleged Jihadi-Salafi texts either. An additional problem arises from the fact that several academics do not include the Salafi-ikhwani dichotomy in their conception of Jihadi-Salafism. Some consider the Qutbist revolutionaries of 1970s Egypt and Syria as JihadiSalafis.35 Others consider that “the origins of Salafi Jihadism can be traced to the Muslim Brotherhood.”36 Yet others see Jihadi-Salafism as representing a mixture of Salafism and Qutbism.37 The third allegedly distinctive criterion of Jihadi-Salafism, namely its international and anti-Western character, is also problematic, because several of the key groups and thinkers known as Jihadi-Salafi have never actually focused their struggle on the West. Kepel, for example, first used the term Jihadi-Salafi in the context of the Algerian civil war to describe the GIA, which was fighting a revolutionary struggle against the local regime.38 More significant is the fact that Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who is considered as one of the most important ideologues of Jihadi-Salafism, has in fact been much more concerned with the struggle against the local Arab regimes than the confrontation with the West or with irredentist struggles in Palestine or Chechnya. Al- Maqdisi defines JihadiSalafism as “the current which seeks to implement monotheism through jihad against the tyrants.”39 In Islamist parlance, the word “tyrants” [tawaghit] connotes the local regimes. More significantly, in the 1990s, al-Maqdisi was actively discouraging Islamists from going to Bosnia and Chechnya on the grounds that it weakened the struggle against the near enemy.40 (p.256) Another problem is that some militants engage in international activism without committing either anti-Western or anti-regime violence. For example, the vast majority of foreign fighters who took part in guerrilla struggles in 1980s Afghanistan or 1990s Bosnia and Chechnya never ventured outside of the main theatre of operations and never explicitly targeted Westerners. Moreover, many of these fighters were from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and had not previously been involved in regime-critical activism at home.41 As a form of political behaviour, this was very different from the internal battle waged by the GIA or the transnational terrorism of bin Laden.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? What emerges, then, is a problem similar to the one posed by “Salafism”, namely that the political content of the term is so unclear that its application extends to actors with very different political preferences and behavioural patterns. The term Jihadi-Salafi notably conceals what is arguably the most significant political rift in the world of militant Islamism since the mid-1990s, namely the question of whether to focus the struggle on the near or the far enemy.42 It also conceals the distinction between those international fighters who wanted to confront nonMuslim armies in confined battle zones, like the Arabs in Bosnia and Chechnya, and those willing to employ interational terrorist tactics against Western civilians, such as al-Qaeda. These are not simply tactical disputes, but differences in political priorities that have shaped entire organisations and generated stable and consistent patterns of behaviour. As theological concepts, “Salafism” and “Jihadi-Salafism” thus have limitations when it comes to analysing Islamist militancy. Put simply, the adjective “Salafi” highlights a distinction that is secondary in informing political behaviour such as violence. When we say that a Jihadi has become Salafi(or viceversa), it tells us virtually nothing about whom he considers his main enemy (p.257) or where and how he is going to fight. In order to capture these differences, we may need to approach the phenomenon from a different angle.

Preference-based Terms An alternative approach consists of applying analytical categories based on the revealed political preferences and political behaviour of militant groups. This is not a new idea. Rudimentary preference-based typologies have been in use by academics for some time. Already in the early 1980s, Gilles Kepel distinguished between the gradualist Muslim Brotherhood, the isolationist Jama’at al-Muslimin and the “Bolshevik-style” revolutionaries of Egyptian Islamic Jihad.43 One of the first systematic attempts at creating a preference-based typology was carried out by R. Hrair Dekmejian, who in a 1985 book distinguished between “gradualist-pragmatic”, “revolutionary” and “messianic-puritanical” Islamist groups.44 More recently, Barry Rubin has distinguished between “revolutionary”, “national liberationist” and “reformist” Islamist actors, while Quintan Wiktorowicz has separated three types of Salafis: “purists”, “politicos” and “jihadis.”45 Another well-known typology of unclear origin separates between three types of militant groups: irredentists who fight locally for a particular territory (e.g. Hamas), revolutionaries who fight the so-called “near enemy” (e.g. Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and global jihadists who fight the “far enemy.” (e.g. alQaeda).46 However, all these typologies are problematic, either because they are inconsistent—mixing means (e.g violence/ engagement/separation) and objectives (e.g. national liberation/regime change/increased social conservatism) —or because they are incomplete— omitting prominent forms of Islamist militancy such as sectarian violence. In the following, I shall provide a more elaborate framework for conceptualising the political behaviour of Islamist actors. The ideas presented below do not (p.258) represent a fully developed Page 9 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? typology, but are intended as an example of the type of analytical categories that may emerge from the preferencebased approach. My hypothesis is that there are five main rationales for action that underlie most forms of Islamist activism. Under the term “rationale”, I subsume observed midterm political aims and strategy. These rationales—which may be termed “stateoriented”, “nation-oriented”, “Umma-oriented”, “moralityoriented” and “sectarian”—represent the most important reasons for which Islamists act. “State-oriented” Islamism is characterised by a desire to change the social and political organisation of the state. “Nation-oriented” Islamism is defined by a desire to establish sovereignty on a specific territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims. “Umma-oriented” Islamism is distinguished by a desire to protect the Islamic nation as a whole from external (non-Muslim) threats. “Morality-oriented” Islamism is characterised by a desire to change Muslims’ social conduct in a more conservative and literalist direction. “Sectarian” Islamism is defined by a desire to reduce the influence and power of the competing sect (Shi‘i or Sunni). Each rationale has a non-violent and a violent manifestation. The non-violent manifestation of state-oriented Islamism is reformism; its violent form is sociorevolutionary activism. Nation-oriented Islamism produces non-violent as well as violent irredentists. Umma-oriented Islamism may produce a “soft” form of panIslamism or extreme pan-Islamism, the latter of which comes in two main forms: classical Jihadism and global Jihadism. Moralityoriented Islamism mostly manifests itself in pietism, but its violent form is vigilantism (or hisba). Sectarian Islamism also comes in moderate and extreme manifestations. For violent Islamist groups, these rationales represent the five most important reasons for using violence or objectives for the struggle. Socio-revolutionaries fight for state power against a Muslim regime perceived as illegitimate. Nationalist-separatists fight for a specific territory against a local non-Muslim occupier. Extreme pan-Islamists fight to defend the entire Islamic nation and its territories from external aggression (classical Jihadists will fight conventionally on one local front at a time, while global Jihadists fight the West with all means in all places). Vigilantists use violence to correct the moral behaviour of fellow Muslims, while violent sectarians kill to intimidate and marginalise the competing sect. It is important to underline that these are rationales for action in the shortand mid-term, not long-term political aims. This distinction is important, (p.259) because the issue of determining the end goals of an actor is both difficult and of limited analytical significance. This is because most militant Islamist groups tend to have very vague, similar and utopian end goals that can be used to rationalise a vast range of political and military strategies. Just like the declared aim of “a better world” tells us little of the political preferences of Western Page 10 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? political parties, Islamist slogans such as “establishing the Caliphate” are too vague to tell us anything about the expected political behaviour of a group in the short and mid term. The typology can thus be illustrated by Table 1 , which distinguishes between rationales on the vertical axis and manifestations on the horizontal axis.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?

Table 1 : A Preference-Based Typology of Islamist Activism Rationale

Non-violent form

Violent Form

Manifestation

Examples

Manifestation

Examples

State oriented

Reformism

MB, Saudi Sahwa

Socio-revolutionary activism

GIA, GSPC, EIJ

Nation oriented

Nationalism

Violent irredentism

Hamas, LeT, Chechen mujahidin; Islamic Army (Iraq)

Umma oriented

Pan-Islamism

MWL

Classical jihadism Global jihadism

Arabs in Chechnya alQaeda, QAP

Morality oriented

Pietism

Tabligh, Madkhalis

Vigilantism

Unorganised hisba

Sectarian

Sectarianism

Violent sectarianism

Lashkar e Janghvi, Iraqi militias

Abbreviations: MB=Muslim Brotherhood; GIA=Groupe Islamique Armée; GSPC= Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat; EIJ=Egyptian Islamic Jihad; LeT= Lashkar-e-Tayyiba; MWL=Muslim World League; QAP=al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? These are of course overly schematic ideal-type categories. Most violent Islamist actors work to promote several or all of these agendas at the same time. However, I argue that at any given time, all actors have one rationale which is stronger than the four others. The dominant rationale shapes the strategy and priorities of the actor and usually determines the direction and form of its violence. For example, practically all militant Islamist groups are (p.260) explicitly hostile to the United States, supportive of the Palestinian cause and critical of secular Arab governments, but they disagree on immediate priorities, i.e. what represents the most urgent threat and what needs to be done first. It is also important to underline that the distinctions between these ideal types are gradual, and that the constellation of rationales underlying an actor's behaviour is dynamic. The ideology of a militant Islamist group or individual may change over time to become more or less socio-revolutionary or more or less pan-Islamist. Sometimes, though not very often, a group may change its dominant rationale and move, for example, from primarily socio-revolutionary to primarily global Jihadist activist, as was the case with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1990s. In other words, actors are fluid, but the categories themselves are discrete. Two main variables allow us to determine the relative importance of the different rationales in the ideology of an actor, namely behaviour and discourse. To each rationale there is an accompanying ideal pattern of behaviour that is logically connected to the political substance of the rationale. Sociorevolutionaries attack mostly government targets. Nationalist-separatists attack primarily the local occupier. Classical Jihadists also attack mainly the local occupier in the area they have chosen to fight, while global Jihadists usually attack Western (primarily US) targets in any location. Vigilantists tend to direct their violence against morally transgressing Muslims and symbols of moral corruption in society. Violent sectarians mainly attack members of the opposite sect. “Reading” an actor's behaviour is sometimes complicated by the fact that a particular target may have a double symbolic significance (for example, for militant Sunnis in Iraq, Shi‘is symbolise both the government and the Shi‘a community), and by the fact that an attack on a particular target may be an instrumental way of reaching another objective (cf. the attacks by al-Jama‘a alIslamiyya on Western tourists in 1990s Egypt as a form of economic warfare against the government). We therefore also need to look at what the actor is saying about his own struggle. Sometimes, radical Islamists articulate their immediate political priorities in concise and specific language, which makes it easy to identify the dominant rationale. More often, the discourse will be vague or ambiguous, citing general slogans (such as “establishing God's rule”) or denouncing more than one enemy. However, I argue that each rationale has an accompanying ideal-type discursive theme or “frame” which allow us to identify the dominant rationale even when it Page 13 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? is not explicitly stated. The socio-revolutionary discursive theme is the mismanagement of the Muslim ruler. The examples used to justify the (p.261) call for action are mainly tales of oppression, torture and corruption, as well as the secularism and hypocrisy displayed by the local regime. The irredentist discourse, on the other hand, focuses on territorial occupation. The call for action is supported by evidence of the Muslim right to the land and illustrations of the brutality and bloodthirstiness of the occupier. The extreme pan- Islamist discourse focuses on the external threat to the life and territories of all Muslims. Pan-Islamists usually support their call for action with long lists of examples of non-Muslim infringements on Muslim territory and symbols of Muslim suffering at non-Muslim hands. Texts by morality-oriented Islamists emphasise the moral corruption and deviance of contemporary Muslim society, while sectarian discourse is characterised by self-victimisation as well as demonisation of the other sect. There are at least three analytical advantages to preference-based typologies like the one presented here. First of all, while certainly not perfect or complete, it provides for descriptors which match the principal patterns of behaviour displayed by militant Islamist groups more closely than do theology-based terms. This improves our ability to explain and predict the actions and strategies of Jihadist groups. For example, a group with a clear global Jihadist discourse and past record of behaviour is much more likely to direct its future violence against a Western target than a government target. Similarly, an irredentist group is unlikely to resort to international operations, and groups engaged in moral policing will rarely resort to sectarian violence. There are admittedly cases of groups changing their pattern of behaviour—such as the socio-revolutionary Egyptian Islamic Jihad joining al-Qaeda's global Jihadist project or the global Jihadist Zarqawi network in Iraq going sectarian—but this is arguably the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, these terms make it easier to identify and analyse precisely such behavioural changes. A second advantage with preference-based categories is that they provide a basis for nuanced thinking about the causes of Islamist militancy. It notably allows us to consider the hypothesis that different ideal types of activism have different root causes. For example, it is reasonable to assume that sociorevolutionary Islamism thrives on socio-economic problems and violent state oppression, while irredentist Islamism tends to emerge in areas of territorial conflict between a Muslim and a non-Muslim population. Conversely, it would allow for more nuanced analysis of the effect of certain structural factors such as poverty on Islamist militancy. Rather than look for the effect of poverty on terrorism or Islamism in general, we may examine its effects on different types of Islamism. It may well be that socio-economic factors are (p.262) more strongly correlated with socio-revolutionary and vigilantist Islamism than with irredentist or pan-Islamist militancy. Similarly, a given political development might affect different types of groups in different ways. For example, a torture Page 14 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? scandal in the Egyptian prison system is likely to mobilise more sociorevolutionaries than pan-Islamists. Likewise, a symbol of Muslim suffering like Guantanamo Bay will be more readily seized upon by global Jihadists than by sectarian groups for propaganda purposes. A third advantage with categories rooted in political behaviour as opposed to theology is that they facilitate the study of Islamist militancy in a comparative perspective. By highlighting the political core of the activism of Islamist groups, it becomes much easier to spot similarities with other, non-Islamist, forms of political violence. This is not to say that Islamism can or should be reduced to its political core, only that there may be some similarities between certain aspects of Islamist activism and other political phenomena that are worth exploring. For example, it is possible that the analytical distinction between socio-revolutionary and ethno-nationalist ideologies, fruitfully applied to the analysis of secular militancy in 1970s Europe, may have relevance for the study of militant Islamism.47 Irredentist Islamist groups such as Hamas seem to be larger, more pragmatic and have a socio-economically more heterogeneous recruitment base than do socio-revolutionary Islamists such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, thus echoing key differences between ethnic-separatists (such as ETA and IRA) and leftist Extremists (such as Rote Armee Fraktion and Brigate Rosse) in Europe. There could in other words be certain generic structural differences in form, behaviour and recruitment patterns of militant groups that recur across religious and cultural boundaries. The rationale-based approach no doubt has important limitations, and it is likely to inspire three main lines of criticism. Some will argue that there is a danger of projecting Western analytical categories onto the complex and idiosyncratic phenomenon of Islamism. The underlying assumption of this argument is that Islamism is best understood through the terms and categories used by the Islamists themselves. This point is valid to some extent, because some Western commentators have indeed tended to ignore the study of Islamist discourse and make prejudiced assumptions about the motivations of Islamist actors. However, taken to its logical conclusion, this argument leads to essentialism and exempts militant Islamism from social scientific scrutiny. (p.263) The assumption that political actors can only be analysed using concepts employed by the actors themselves is a flawed one. Analytical categories in the social sciences are not made to please the actors, but to accurately represent observable and discrete phenomena so that one can construct theories with universal and predictive value. If the concepts and categories are clearly defined, rooted in observable behaviour and constructed with an acute awareness of relevant cultural specificities, then their Western origin is irrelevant. Another line of criticism would consist of arguing that the typology falls into the trap of excessive categorisation of an inherently fluid and dynamic phenomenon. While it is true that excessive labelling is a problem in contemporary Page 15 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? scholarship, no researcher can do without categories—they are a prerequisite for scientific analysis. Of course, all ideal type categories face the problem of accounting for gradualism and ambiguity, but the ideological fluidity and mobility of individual activists does not eliminate the need for discrete categories. We have already noted that most Islamists work to promote several or even all of the five main types of objectives at the same time, and that the relative importance of a given rationale for a group's behaviour may vary over time. The aforementioned categories should thus not be seen as isolated boxes but rather as overlapping spectrums. The third and most pertinent line of criticism would argue that an exclusively political approach does not sufficiently take into account the theological dimension of militant Islamist ideology or the social dynamics of violent behaviour. For a start, this typology leaves little room for dynamics of a religious or theological nature, such as the ikhwani- Salafi dichotomy. For example, this framework would describe both the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi Sahwa as reformist movements, thus glossing over the many important ideological—and behavioural—differences between them, notably on issues related to social conservatism. Moreover, this rationalist perspective may impute Jihadists with a higher degree of political awareness than is sometimes the case. In certain situations, the behaviour of militant groups is determined less by political considerations than by a concern for survival, vengeance motives or other idiosyncratic reasons. Similarly, individual militants may be driven more by social factors (such as the desire for companionship) than by an ideological programme, and may thus drift from one type of activism to another as their social relationships evolve. It is important to point out, however, that the preference-based approach to conceptualising actors must not be equated with a structural-functionalist view on the causes of Islamist violence. Saying that Islamist actors have discrete (p. 264) political preferences is not the same as saying that the causes of Islamist violence are exclusively political or socioeconomic. Clearly, ideology matters. However, ideology—even religious ideology—is not the same as theology. Islamist ideology has both theological and political dimensions and may be analysed from both perspectives. The preference-based approach simply highlights the politics, it does not necessarily ignore religion.

Concluding Remarks The relationship between politics and religion in the study of Islamism is undoubtedly a complex one, and no one perspective is in itself sufficient to understand this hybrid phenomenon. The choice of terminology in scientific studies must ultimately depend on the purpose of the analysis. Theology-based terms such as Salafi and Jihadi-Salafi, when clearly defined, are useful for the analysis of texts and discourse, because they refer to positive theological traditions and apparatuses and may help identify the intellectual origin of Page 16 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? particular texts, actors or ideological currents. The term Salafism may also be fruitfully applied to the study of political actors in particular national or regional contexts, when these actors’ political agendas are clearly defined and contextualised. However, when it comes to comparative analyses of political behaviour, especially violence, theological categories are less adequate as they are not associated with discrete sets of political preferences. The term Salafi, as we have seen, says very little about the expected political behaviour of actors labelled as such. We must therefore be particularly careful not to conflate theological orientations and social movements. A social movement, by definition, presupposes a set of political preferences.48 Theological categories, however, are usually vague and ambiguous in their political content. The notion of a global Salafi(or takfiri or Jihadi-Salafi) movement, while appealing as a collective noun, is in fact very problematic, because the actors subsumed in this category do not share political preferences. Salafis around the world work for different political agendas and thus pull in different directions. This is one of the main reasons why the Salafi movement has proved, and will remain, frustratingly difficult to analyse. (p.265) This analysis has shown that the study of a hybrid and non-Western phe nomenon such as Islamism does not necessarily require a unique vocabulary. On the contrary, culturally specific terminology, when used carelessly and excessively, may even be detrimental to scientific analysis. It may generate Durkheimian prénotions —terms that are taken for granted and encapsulate phenomena that are really distinct—and it may isolate an academic field from the impulses of the broader social sciences. Therefore, striking a balance between the search for the universal and sensitivity to the specific is as indis pensible as it is difficult. Bibliography Bibliography references: Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985. Fandy, Mamoun, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Gerges, Fawaz, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2005. Gwynne, Rosalynd, ‘Usama Bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad’, Religion vol. 36, no. 2 (2006), pp. 61–90.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? Hegghammer, Thomas, and Lacroix, Stéphane, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 39, no.1 (2007), pp. 103–22. Hegghammer, Thomas, Violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism.Paris: Sciences-Po (PhD thesis), 2007. International Crisis Group, La France face à ses musulmans: Emeutes, djihadisme et dépoliticisation (Europe Report no. 172), Brussels, 2006. International Crisis Group, Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History, Brussels:, 2004. Kenney, Jeffrey T., Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Kepel, Gilles ‘Les GIA à travers ses publications’, Pouvoirs, vol. 86 (1998), pp. 67–84. ———, Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme, Paris: Gallimard, 2000. ———, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. ———, The Roots of Radical Islam, 2nd English ed., London: Saqi Books, 2005. Krekar, Mulla, Med Egne Ord [In My Own Words], Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004. Lacroix, Stéphane, and Hegghammer, Thomas, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists? (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004). Livesey, Bruce, ‘The Salafist Movement’, Frontline (www.pbs.org), 25 January 2005. Makarenko, Tamara, ’Takfiri Presence Grows in Europe’, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (2005). McCarthy, John D., and Zald, Mayer N., ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology vol. 82, no. 6 (1977), pp. 1212–1242. (p.266) Mili, Hayder, ’Jihad, without Rules: The Evolution of Al-Takfir Wa AlHijra’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 4, no. 13 (2006). al-Munafisi, Usama, ‘al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya: bidayat wa malat, (Part 5 of 10)’,al-Inba’, 2005. Naji, Abu Bakr, al-khawana( www.tawhed.ws).

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? ———, idarat al-tawahhush, ( www.tawhed.ws). Pargeter, Alison, ‘The Islamist Movement in Morocco’,Jamestown Terrorism Monitor vol. 3, no. 10 (2005). Rubin, Barnett, ‘Arab Islamists in Afghanistan’, in John Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1997, pp. 179– 206. Rubin, Barry, ‘Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998), pp. 17– 24. al-Salim, Muhammad, ‘39 wasila li-khidmat al-jihad wa-l-musharaka fihi ’, Sawt al-Jihad Publications (2003). al-Tawil, Kamil, al-Haraka al-islamiyya al-musallaha fi-l-Jaza’ir, Beirut: Dar alNahar, 1998. Waldmann, Peter, ‘Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures’, in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organisations, edited by Donatella Della Porta, Greenwich: JAI, 1992, pp. 237– 57. Weissmann, Itzchak, ‘The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005), pp. 39–58. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. Wright, Lawrence, ‘The Master Plan’, New Yorker, 11 September 2006, pp. 48– 59. al-Zawahiri, Ayman, ‘Mawqifna min Iran—al-radd ‘ala tuhmat al-ta‘awun bayna al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-Salafiyya wa Iran al-rafidiyya ’, al-Ansar, no. 91 (1994). Notes:

(1) Thomas Hegghammer ([email protected]) is a Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School and a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The author thanks Stéphane Lacroix, Steffen Hertog, Brynjar Lia and Will McCants for useful comments on early drafts of the chapter. (2) In this article I use the term “theological” broadly as a synonym for “normatively religious”. I do not make the traditional Islamological distinction

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? between theology (the study of God) and jurisprudence (the interpretation of God's Laws). (3) A search in the New York Time s electronic archive, which goes back to 1851, reveals that these words were first used in 1999 and 2000 respectively. The Washington Post first used the term in 2002. (4) Although the word takfir had already been used by islamologists for some time, it was first used by mainstream media in 1977 in connection with the Shukri Mustafa case. Neither the New York Times nor the Washington Post used the word “takfir” between 1981 and 2000. The adjective “takfiri” was introduced in the media discourse later: the New York Times first used it in October 2001. For more on Arab state uses of religious terms to delegitimise opponents, see Jeffrey T. Kenney, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. (5) Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 70. (6) A rare possible exception was the case of a Sudanese group which reportedly called itself “al-Takfir wa-l Hijra” and carried out several attacks on a moderate Islamist group called Ansar al-Sunna between 1994 and 2000; see ‘Attack on a Mosque in Sudan by Fundamentalist Kills 20’, New York Times, 10 December 2000. (7) See for example Chris Hedges, ‘A Powerful Combattant in France's War on Terror’, New York Times, 24 November 2001; Tamara Makarenko, ‘Takfiri Presence Grows in Europe’, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (2005), and Hayder Mili, ‘Jihad without Rules: The Evolution of Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 4, no. 13 (2006). (8) “Salafism” has been used in Western scholarship on Islam since the early twentieth century. In the media discourse, on the other hand, it's a new term. The New York Times and the Washington Post did not use the term “Salafi” or “Salafist” until 2000. (9) Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi became an enemy of the Saudi regime after calling for the violent overthrow of the Al Saud in a 1989 book entitled alKawashif al-jaliyya fikufr al-dawla al-Sa‘udiyya [The Obvious Proofs of the Infidel Nature of the Saudi State]. (10) Sa‘d al-Faqih is a Saudi opposition activist who fled to London in the early 1990s at the height of the political confrontation between the Saudi regime and the reformist Sahwa movement, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Rabi‘ ibn Hadi alMadkhali (see Stephane Lacroix's chapter on Nasr al-Din al-Albani earlier in this Page 20 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? book) is a Saudi religious scholar associated with a stricly apolitical and pietist Salafism. In the early 1990s, the Saudi government promoted Madkhalism as an ideological counterweight to the popular Sahwa movement. Many of Englishlanguage internet sites promoting Salafism—notably www.Salafi publications.comand its affiliates ( www.rabee.co.uk, www.albani.co.uk, etc)—are in fact part of this Saudi government-sponsored effort to depoliticise Islamism. (11) Juhayman al-‘Utaybi led an apocalyptic sect which seized the Great Mosque in Mecca during the pilgrimage in Mecca in November 1979. See Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al- Utaybi Revisited’, International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 39, no.1 (2007), pp. 103–22. Salman al-‘Awda is a Saudi religious scholar who spearheaded the Sahwa movement in the early 1990s. Since his release from prison in 1999, al-‘Awda has taken a less confrontational stance against the government, promoted dialogue with the West and recognised nonWahhabi Islamic traditions in the Kingdom; see Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists? (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004). (12) La France face à ses musulmans: Emeutes, djihadisme et dépoliticisation, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006), pp. 13–16. (13) See for example Itzchak Weissmann, ‘The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005), 39–58. (14) This term was first used by the New York Times in 2005. It has been used by al-Sharq al-Awsat since at least 1999. (15) For more on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, see chapter 3 earlier in this book. (16) ‘hiwar ma‘ al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423 [Conversation with Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in 2002]’, ( www.tawhed.ws). (17) Interview with Yusuf al-Dayni, Jeddah, January 2007. For more on the Wahhabi community in Kunar, see Barnett Rubin, ‘Arab Islamists in Afghanistan’, in John Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1997, pp. 196–7. (18) See Lawrence Wright, ‘The Master Plan’, New Yorker, 11 September 2006, p. 50. (19) Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘mawqifna min Iran—al-radd ‘ala tuhmat al-ta‘awun bayna al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-Salafiyya wa Iran al-rafidiyya [Our Position on Iran—Response to the Allegations of Cooperation between the Jihadi-Salafi Movement and Rafidi Iran]’, al- Ansar, no. 91 (1994).

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? (20) Kamil al-Tawil, al-Haraka al-islamiyya al-musallaha fi-l-Jaza’ir [The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria],Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998, p. 60 and Gilles Kepel, ‘Le GIA à travers ses publications’, Pouvoirs vol. 86 (1998), pp. 70–1. (21) Gilles Kepel, Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme, Paris: Gallimard, 2000, p. 395. (22) A search in the electronic archives of al-Sharq al-Awsat (which go back to early 2001) shows that before mid-2002, ”Salafi jihadi” (and its variants) was only used in a handful of articles, mostly about Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada. In contrast, between July 2002 and May 2003, there were nearly a hundred articles containing this term, the vast majority of which were about the Moroccan investigation. (23) Alison Pargeter, ‘The Islamist Movement in Morocco’, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, vol. 3, no. 10 (2005). (24) The following are the results from a search conducted on www.tawhed.wson 21 January 2008: al-Jihadi al-salafi: 0 hits; al-Salafi al-jihadi: 14 hits; al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya: 22 hits 10 of which occur in texts by a certain Abu al-Fadhl al-Iraqi); al-Salafiyun al-jihadiyun: 1 hit; al-Salafiyyin al-jihadiyyin: 2 hits. (25) The term has notably been used by the ideologue Abu Bakr Naji, see Abu Bakr Naji, alkhawana [The Traitors] ( www.tawhed.ws),pp. 5–6 and Abu Bakr Naji, idarat al-tawahhush [The Management of Savagery], ( www.tawhed.ws), p. 3. It has also been used in group names, such as the GSPC and the short-lived Iraqi group al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Mujahida in 2003. In recent years, the term Jihadi-Salafi has also been used in postings on Jihadi discussion forums. (26) ‘hiwar ma‘ al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423 ’. (27) al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya ”, Wikipedia in Arabic ( http://ar.wikipedia.org; accessed 5 January 2007.) (28) See for example Kepel, Jihad, p. 255, andBrynjar Lia, ‘The Rise of SalafiJihadi Groups in Iraq: Some Preliminary Observations’, Lecture Manuscript, University of Oslo, 20 November, 2003, p.2. (29) See for example Gilles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, 2nd English ed., London: Saqi Books, 2005, p. 15; Kepel, Jihad, p. 404; Sa‘ud al-Sarhan, ‘al-Tayyar al-Salafi al-jihadi [the Salafi Jihadi Current]’, (manuscript, 2003); Sa‘ud alSarhan, ‘al-wala’ wa-l-bara’: al-idiulujiyya al-jadida li-l-harakat al-islamiyya [AlWala Wa-l-Bara: The New Ideology of the Islamist Movements]’, manuscript, 2003.

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? (30) See for example ‘Salafi’, Wikipedia in English, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Salafi (accessed 6 January 2006) or Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 3. (31) Such was the case of Abu Qutada and Abu Hamza in London who broke relations with the GIA in the mid-1990s over the issue of excessive violence. Similarly, in 2005, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi criticised Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq for his excessive use of suicide bombings. Sheikh Abu Basir al-Tartusi also criticised the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings. (32) See for example Muhammad al-Salim, 39 wasila li-khidmat al-jihad wa-lmusharaka fihi [39 Ways to Serve Jihad and Take Part in It], Sawt al-Jihad Publications (2003). (33) see‘Imam al-jihad al-mu’asir: Abdallah Azzam [the Imam of Contemporary Jihad: Abdallah Azzam]’, Sawt al-Jihad, no. 13 (2004) and ‘Marwan Hadid: alalam al-shahid [Marwan Hadid: The Martyred Luminary]’, Sawt al-Jihad, no. 11 (2004). (34) Gwynne shows that both rely extensively on Ibn Taymiyya's rulings. They quote many of the same texts, to the extent that Gwynne suggests that bin Laden may have borrowed from Faraj. She does not identify a specific “Salafi” orientation in bin Laden's text or an “ikhwani ” orientation in that of al-Faraj. See Rosalynd Gwynne, ‘Usama Bin Ladin, the Qur’an and Jihad’, Religion vol. 36, no. 2 (2006), pp. 61–90. (35) Usama al-Munafisi, ‘al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya: bidayat wa malat [Salafi Jihadism: The Beginnings] (Part 5 of 10)’, (al-Inba’, 2005). (36) Bruce Livesey, ‘The Salafist Movement’, Frontline (www.pbs.org), 25 January 2005. (37) ‘Leading Progressive Qatari Cleric: By Permitting Suicide Operations, AlQaradhawi and His Ilk Have Caused a Moral Crisis in Islam’, MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 968 (2005). (38) Kepel, Jihad, p. 255. (39) ‘hiwar ma‘ al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423 ’. (40) “Q: The Fronts that have been opened in Chechnya, Afghanistan and elsewhere have enticed many youth from this current and tens of them have gone there. How do you view this move? It is said that you opposed it. A: The fronts that have opened in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere have clearly benefited the call and the struggle [al-da’wa wa’l-jihad]. I may not have been in favour of vacating the fronts near us and letting our youth Page 23 of 24

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Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries? emigrate, but there have been benefits in terms of experience and expertise in the military field […] and it has influenced the local populations, and this is certainly a blessing for the struggle. However, I did ask the influential proselytisers and the religious students in particular to stay in their countries.” From “hiwar ma‘ al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423.” (41) Thomas Hegghammer, Violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism. Paris: Sciences-Po (PhD thesis), 2007. (42) Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global:Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. (43) Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt. (44) R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, p. 59. (45) Barry Rubin, ‘Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998), 17–24; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. (46) The origin of this tripartite typology is not clear, but it has been articulated by authors as different as the scholar Fawaz Gerges and the Islamist ideologue Mulla Krekar. See Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, pp. 1– 2; Mulla Krekar, Med Egne Ord [In My Own Words], Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004, p. 239. (47) See for example Peter Waldmann, ‘Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures’, in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organisations, edited by Donatella Della Porta, Greenwich: JAI, 1992, pp. 237–57. (48) See for example John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology vol. 82, no. 6 (1977), p. 1218.

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Debates Within the Family

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Debates Within the Family Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, Takfir, Extremism, Suicide Bombings, and the Sense of the Apocalypse Reuven Paz

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0012

Abstract and Keywords This chapter gives a history of Jihadi Salafism and shows how different currents in the movement have led to the contemporary form of Jihadi Salafism. The chapter provides insight on major issues such as takfir and jihad, based on knowledge acquired after extensive reading of Jihadi-Salafi websites. Keywords:   Jihadi Salafism, takfir, websites, jihad

Debates Among the Jihadi-Salafis Since the emergence of the global Jihadi current in the mid-1990s, and especially since the two major phases of Jihadi-Salafi terrorism—September 11, 2001, and May 2003, with the US occupation of Iraq—this current has been known as Jihadi-Salafi. The huge number of new interpretations, doctrines, and debates with other Islamic currents—Salafi, Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabi, and others—and many innovations in the field of terrorist modus operandi, in addition to their widespread public presence on the internet, brought about two contradicting developments. The first was a tendency of Jihadis themselves— along with scholars or lay supporters—to view it as an independent current undergoing a process of consolidation, with the unifying goal around doctrines, and means of tawhid. The other was the emergence of a growing number of debates, either from within the movement against a background of the more intensive but controversial terrorist/Jihadi activity, or because of external

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Debates Within the Family pressures by Islamic establishments and institutions, governments, or parts of Muslim societies. (p.268) Since September 11, 2001, this contradiction has also marked the public opinion of many Muslim societies and even governments. On the one hand, there has been a growing anti-American sentiment, which emerged as a consequence of events in Iraq. This has led to the support by many Islamic scholars, Arab officials, and the majority of Muslim public of the jihad in Iraq, not to mention Israel and Palestine. On the other hand many innocent Arabs and Muslims suffered from indiscriminate terrorism, upon which most Jihadi- Salafischolars bestowed total legitimacy. The emergence of the internet as “the Open University for Jihad Studies,” with many thousands of students, brought about two significant developments. Firstly, the rise of a Jihadi community with a growing sense of solidarity and brotherhood. This community was intensively encouraged to take part in the debates, as the “virtual jihad ” became a legitimate branch of the “Jihadi war of minds”. Secondly, the emergence of Jihadi “internet scholars”, whose main target was to indoctrinate the Jihadi-Salafis, direct them, and consolidate the Jihadi current. Both groups of scholars and “students” developed a strong sense of the apocalypse, which inspires the Jihadi-Salafi arena. They await the defeat of the United States in Iraq; the fall of the US as an empire along the lines of the Afghan contribution to the fall of the Soviet Union; terrorist attacks on American soil; terrorist attacks in Europe against those countries that are still fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, those who support Israel, or who are “oppressing” Muslim communities in Europe by imposing new laws—whether they concern the veil, immigration, limiting civil rights in the name of the “war on terror”, outlawing Muslim charities or the publishing of anti-Muslim cartoons. They want the Jihadis to use weapons of mass destruction, they want to see the collapse of Arab and Muslim apostate governments; the establishment of shari‘a ruled Islamic states, and so on and so forth. By feeding the sense of the apocalypse, and through the growing number of Jihadi groups, scholars, supporters and sympathisers, self-radicalised youth, and laymen whose knowledge of Islam is poor, the arena is broadened with further debate. In the past two years, a growing number of topics under open and public debate have emerged within the Jihadi-Salafi current. During 2007, one of the most significant topics among Jihadi-Salafischolars and groups was the foundation and conduct of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Another debate concerned the killing of Muslims in general and innocent ones in particular. The debates over “sacred and untouchable topics” started around 2005 and involved serious Jihadi-Salafischolars. They probably exploited the fact that (p.269) the killing of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 created a new situation in Iraq, which is Page 2 of 13

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Debates Within the Family still the most significant model of Jihadi struggle. Another issue to note here is the diversity of the origins of the Jihadi-Salafi current, the flexibility of its development, and the dynamics of its emergence from being a very marginal Islamic trend to coming to the forefront of Islam, primarily in the eyes of Western society. The latter has come to view Islam as a religion whose rationale is supposed to be moderate and peaceful but is in fact moving towards the most extremist and violent form, on an axis where the clash between the two worlds seems inevitable. The doctrinal sources of Jihadi-Salafism require a separate study. Nevertheless, their diversity is part of the issue at stake. They include three different branches, whose connection to classical, pure, political, or reformist Salafism is questioned. • The first branch originated in Egypt from among the radical sections of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—mainly scholars like Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, otherwise known as ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz AKA Dr. Fadl. Other sources were Egyptian exiles in Saudi Arabia, and the selfradicalised fathers of the Egyptian Jihad and Jama‘at al-Islamiyyah in the 1970s. • The second branch has its roots in Saudi Arabia, in Neo-Wahhabism, led by the mufti and prominent Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz and his disciples, who created among other issues, the Movement of the Awakening (Harakat alSahwa), led by the “twin” Shaykhs Salman al-‘Awdah and Safar al- Hawali. During the 1990s, this branch was legitimised by two other classes of NeoWahhabi scholars to which the older clerics belong, such as Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaymin, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Jarbu‘ and Salih al-Fawzan, as well as the younger clerics, who participated in the jihad in Afghanistan, such as Ahmad alKhalidi, Nasir al-Fahd, Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Jandal alAzdi, and many others. • The third branch derives from Palestine, and consists of the “Palestinian Trio” of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, ‘Umar Abu ‘Umar Abu Qatada, and above all ‘Isam al-Burqawi, otherwise known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The latter is the spiritual father of the fusion between the Wahhabi tawhid —unity of God—and the violent takfiri jihad —excommunication of the infidels. They are an inspiration for a new generation of Jihadi clerics, who have graduated from Saudi Islamic universities, primarily Jordanian-Palestinians, such as Abu ‘Umar Sayf or Abu Anas al-Shami, whose role has been significant in both Chechnya and Iraq. (p.270) The most important element of this Jihadi “texture” of principles and doctrines is that it has lost all connection with the original reformist Salafism of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, and the current purist Salafism. The Jihadi-Salafis have turned the jihad into a Page 3 of 13

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Debates Within the Family dynamic that purifies Muslim society through a small elitist fighting group, which claims to be following the exact steps of the Prophet and his companions —the “pious generation” (al-salaf al-salih). Being a Jihadi-Salafi means above all creating as closely as possible an exact copy of the first ideal generation of Muslims, but primarily in the militant dimension. However, this aim has created another element in the Jihadi doctrines, the principle of takfir, by excommunicating not only every infidel but also every Muslim who does not follow the Jihadi-Salafi doctrines. There is a kind of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary touch with the signs of the destruction of the “old society” in favour of building a new type of Muslim and a new Muslim society. Such a society will be established through a permanent war with a diversity of enemies, who constitute a growing list of “others”, all of whom disagree with the present-day Jihadi doctrines. This intolerance derives primarily from the teachings of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, but also from the original Wahhabi zealotry, which dominates the Saudi part of the sources of Jihadi-Salafism and many of the Jihadi scholars and terrorists. The apostasy of the rest of Muslim society in Jihadi eyes created a process which in the space of ten years, between 1995 and 2005, widened the definition of the “enemy of Islam”, to include the vast majority of Muslim society. Doctrines that had previously been used to develop some of the ideas of Jihadi-Salafism—such as the concept of social justice developed by Sayyid Qutb—were neglected in favour of the “magic touch” of violent jihad. However, the takfiri strain in JihadiSalafism is the main reason for creating a contradiction between the search for unity (tawhid) and the purification of society from apostate elements, even when this means killing innocent Muslims. The latter include Shi‘is, Sufis, Yazidis, or Sunni Muslims whose sole sin is, for example, their employment in companies that provide services to the Americans in Iraq or the Iraqi and Afghan governments. During 2005 and 2006, there were several cases of harsh criticism of Zarqawi himself, as well as his severe anti-Shi‘a policy, and his violent and extremist opinions on takfir. Some of this criticism came from leading scholars of al-Qaeda and global jihad, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Basir al-Tartusi in London, and Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi's mentor in Jordan. In the case of the latter, the criticism was made in public during an (p.271) interview for Al Jazeera. However, Zarqawi and his followers in Iraq enjoyed tremendous prestige and popularity, receiving full support in Jihadi forums, based on the principle that “the mujahidin in the field know best how they should act”. It was almost like the Islamic principle of “Allahu a‘lam ”—Allah knows best—and in this case—“themujahidin know best”. The respected “salon scholars,” were politely asked to keep silent and respect the wish and strategy of the fighters in the field. In this regard, the killing of Zarqawi in June 2006, had little effect on

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Debates Within the Family the strategy of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the field of anti-Shi‘ism, the terrible violence against civilians, and the principle of takfir. However, despite the success of his violent anti-Shi‘a policy and operations and its on-going application by his successors, there seems to be a decline in the religious position, prestige, and legitimacy of this policy. The shift from al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers to the Islamic State in Iraq in October 2006, increased the anonymity of the present leadership of the Iraqi al-Qaeda on the one hand, and the independence of other Jihadi insurgent groups, on the other. Zarqawi's successor AbuHamzaal-Muhajir is in fact totally anonymous, much like the “imam ” of the ISI, Abu ‘Umaral-Baghdadi. His only prestige, if any, comes from his so-called Qurayshi-Hashemite origin. The other prominent commander of the faithful (amir al-mu’minin)—Mullah ‘Umar in Afghanistan—is not regarded as a serious religious cleric or scholar, despite his or his commanders’ success since early 2006 in leading the Taliban and supporters of al-Qaeda into a growing insurgency in Afghanistan, using the same modus operandi as the Iraqi al-Qaeda. For the vast majority of the supporters of global jihad on the internet, he is more a symbolic model of the Jihadi apocalypse, comparable to Osama bin Laden. In the absence of dominant personalities such as Abu Mus‘abal-Zarqawi in Iraq, some of the other Jihadi or Islamic groups of the Sunni insurgency have allowed themselves either to criticise al-Qaeda or even to enter into clashes with its members, followed by some violent counter-attacks by al-Qaeda. The position of al-Qaeda as the leading force of the Jihadi insurgency has been challenged, although the attempt to impose the ISI upon all Iraqi Sunni Jihadis has, so far, failed. The absence of dominant scholars such as, the Jordanian Abu ‘Umar Sayf, or the Saudis Yusufal-‘Uyairi and ‘Abdal-‘Azizal-Muqrin, who are all dead, and of the Saudi Abu Jandalal-Azdi, and the Jordanian/Palestinians Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who are imprisoned, has created a huge vacuum. This vacuum leaves the door open for increasing public (p.272) criticism and allows room for the emergence of debates within the Jihadi- Salafis on the one hand, while making them vulnerable to outside criticism and attacks by Saudi nonJihadi-Salafis and affiliated scholars, on the other.

Towards a Jihadi-Salafi pluralism? These debates and critiques find a fertile ground in the e-jihad, and it should be noted that supervisors of the various sectors of Jihadi forums do nothing to block or hide them. By doing so, they allow for the development of more pluralism among the community of the e-jihad and the establishment of a kind of “virtual democracy” within this growing community. It has also led to the emergence of “semi-parties” who take opposing positions on very significant issues, some of which are crucial for the Jihadi global arena—the ISI, the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict, Page 5 of 13

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Debates Within the Family Iran, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, suicide bombings outside Iraq or against civilian Muslims, Saudi Arabia, extremist takfir, other trends of Salafism, and the authority of Islamist scholars, including Jihadi-Salafis. It is hard to say if there is a directing hand behind this “pluralism,” or if it is perhaps a result of the growing use of the internet, or the “competition” between different Jihadi forums that want to serve as the widest platforms for Jihadi ideas. In some cases, it might also be the result of confusion and lack of clear direction from the supervisors. From the few cases of such supervisors and webmasters who were arrested—such as the Moroccan Younis al-Tsouli in London, who was known as Irhabi 007, or the Tunisian Mohamed Ben El Hadi Messahel, who was sentenced in March 2007 in Morocco to twelve years in prison for a terrorist plot—we learn that their religious knowledge was poor. They were mainly devoted to the cause, self-radicalised and proud to be Jihadis, but their knowledge of Islam was limited to basic Jihadi doctrines. However, Saudi webmasters such as the late Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, or the webmaster nicknamed “al-muhtasib,” who recently spent two years in a Saudi prison, were serious Islamic scholars, albeit without a formal Islamic education. It is also difficult to say whether or not this phenomenon is harmful for the mujahidin in the long run. Furthermore, reading between the lines of some posts in Jihadi forums, we can conclude that many of these supervisors know each other, if not in person at least via email. Hence, there seems to be a directing hand behind the policy of pluralism. It is obvious that at least in the field of publishing statements, declarations, video and audiotapes, and other material of propagandistic nature, there has in recent years, been a well-organised order, no competition (p.273) or rivalry but respect for each other, and good cooperation under the leadership of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). This order might also be a result of the fact that there has been a growing awareness of the importance of this mission in the Jihadi “war of the minds” and its legitimacy as an integral part of jihad. It seems that the effective and easy use of the e-jihad helps in creating a kind of a “Jihadi virtual state” that allows itself a growing openness to a pluralism of views and positions within the joint Jihadi mission of tawhid.

Internet Jihadi Scholars Against the above-mentioned background, there is also a developing phenomenon of “Internet Jihadi scholars,” who appear by real names or nicknames, but gain a growing respect from their virtual audience. This new phenomenon seems to have more influence over the “lay” supporters of global jihad.

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Debates Within the Family As mentioned above, the e-jihad or the widespread use of the internet by Jihadis and sympathisers, seems to create a process of pluralism, which results in a growing number of topics under debate, even those previously regarded as untouchable within a framework that is seeking a maximum of doctrinal unity. However, this pluralism has so far been limited to the “family”, and does not cause splits or gaps in the ideological umbrella of the Jihadi-Salafi current, as long as the fight looks promising and successful, especially with the sense of the apocalypse that characterises it. An example of the debates and the new class of internet scholars is the following case. On 16 May 2007, Dr. Nasir ibn Sulayman al-‘Umar, one of the leading Saudi Salafischolars to support the Saudi government, published on his website an article about recent terrorist attacks in an “African Arab country,” referring in fact to Algeria. The article, in the style of a fatwa, was entitled “The Position Regarding Explosions in Muslim Countries”.1 The author explained that he was asked to write his opinion on these specific attacks, but since he had no information about them, he preferred to state his general opinion about “Jihadi” terrorist attacks in Muslim lands. The attacks in Algeria took place on 11 April 2007, when two car bombs exploded, one near the Prime Minister's office and the other in a police station. The explosions killed 33 people and injured at least 220. They coincided with similar attacks in Morocco, carried out in the two countries by Al-Qaeda (p.274) in the Islamic Maghreb, the name the two Moroccan and Algerian groups adopted after they had both publicly joined al-Qaeda and paid loyalty to Osama bin Laden. The group has openly taken responsibility for the attacks. The double explosions in Algeria were the first major suicide attacks in the country for quite some time, although several attacks had taken place in rural areas outside the Algerian capital. These explosions marked the renewed operational ability of the part of the GSPC that had merged with al-Qaeda, to launch lethal attacks in a country that has witnessed the killing of some 150,000 people since the beginning of 1992, most of them innocent Muslim civilians. Later in April 2007, the Saudi authorities arrested 172 Saudis suspected of being al-Qaeda terrorists. It seems therefore that the article by Dr Nasir al‘Umar was initiated by the Saudi authorities as part of their theological/ ideological campaign against al-Qaeda, including a project to de-radicalise jailed Saudi Islamists and those who have returned from Iraq, or have been released from Guantanamo Bay and other prisons outside the kingdom. The Saudi campaign is taking place against a background of growing numbers of JihadiSalafi arrestees in the kingdom, which means that the support for the organisation is slowly on the increase. Furthermore, the Saudi authorities face serious accusations about the large numbers of Saudi nationals amongst the Jihadi suicide bombers in Iraq—as many as half the bombers from the last three

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Debates Within the Family years are believed to have been Saudis. Suicide bombings in Iraq, especially against civilians, including Shi‘is, are carried out almost solely by al-Qaeda. The de-radicalisation of Islamists is now becoming a strategy in Arab countries, as well as in the United States and it is vital that it succeeds in the countering of the on-going Salafist jihad, especially in the light of the rising effect of Jihadi indoctrination through the internet, and self-radicalisation in many parts of the Muslim world or Muslim communities in the West.

Dr Nasir Al-‘Umar'S fatwa Dr. Nasir al-‘Umar was born in Buraydah/Qasim in Saudi Arabia in 1952, to one of the most respected families of the Najdi aristocracy—the Bani Khalid—whose origins are in the tribe of Quraysh. He is a professor of Islamic religion in the Islamic University of Imam ibn Sa‘ud, in Riyadh. His article/fatwa is quite different from other Saudi writings on the issue of terrorism in the past year, since he is very cautious and hesitant and it seems that the writing was imposed upon him. He tries to refrain from direct accusations (p.275) of the Jihadis, since the explosions “might have been carried out by people who cover by religion a wish for revenge against oppression or injustice, or by criminals who do not wish to appear as such.” However, in both cases these are people who are totally “ignorant of religion.” On one point al-‘Umar is crystal clear: the killing of innocent Muslims or foreigners on Muslim soil is forbidden. “Do they think that by exploding a building or killing a tourist, they will defeat a state and establish a new regime? […] We do not approve wrongdoings [by governments] or ignore their deeds and submit to their rule. However, opposing their policies should be done according to religious laws and not by terrorising people who are protected or weak, and whose blood and property are secured […]. Good intention—even if it is really good—is not enough as long as it is not in accordance with Islamic law.” Furthermore, if the ruler or the government does not rule according to the shari‘a, they should not be opposed unless there is a ruling by a group of Islamic clerics, who agree upon their wrongdoings beyond any reasonable doubt. But, here is the catch. Jihad according to Dr al-‘Umar, as well as all Muslims, exists until the end of history. “It has its rules and therefore is legitimate in certain places such as Palestine, Iraq, and other regions, but jihad should not be done by terrorising protected [foreign] people or innocent Muslims.” Like most Saudi scholars and clerics, who are recruited to protect the kingdom against Jihadi terrorism, despite prohibiting terrorism against innocent people—Muslims or protected non-Muslims—al-‘Umar legitimises Jihadi terrorism in Palestine and Iraq. By doing so he does not differ from the ambivalence of most of the Saudi scholars on questions of terrorism, suicide bombings, and the fight against occupation. Whatever is prohibited in Saudi Arabia and Arab or Muslim

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Debates Within the Family countries is always legitimate in Palestine, but also in Iraq.2 There other rules apply.

The Response of Abu Yahya Al-Libi The response to al-‘Umar was swift and came from one of the new “stars” of the of Jihadi “internet scholars”, Hasan Muhammad al-Qa‘id, better known as Abu Yahya al-Libi. On 11 July 2007, Al-Fajr Information Center of the Supporters of Global Jihad posted his response in the Jihadi forums, it was (p.276) entitled The Dispersal of the Diamonds in Discussing the Denial of the Explosions in Algeria, a rather grand title, which emphasises its significance.3 Moreover, the response is written in a form similar to Qur’anic exegesis, where the original text is presented “verse after verse” with the analysis of al-Libi in between. Al-Qa‘id, a Libyan who was one of the first Arab volunteers to go to Afghanistan was, until the end of 2001, the webmaster of the Taliban website. He was captured in 2002 in Karachi by Pakistani and US forces and imprisoned in Bagram. In July 2005, he and three other Arab prisoners managed to escape from that prison. Following the escape, he published a long report on the prisons where Jihadis were detained and the methods of the American interrogators,4 and afterwards became a well-known scholar through his articles in Jihadi forums. He is part of a popular group of Jihadi scholars who know how to use the internet effectively for Jihadi indoctrination, and his popularity in Jihadi forums is rising. He is also a good example of the on-going popularity and glorification of the first generation of “Afghan Arab” scholars, who are still regarded as the founder generation of Jihadi-Salafism. In 2006, Al-Libi published three pamphlets in which he stated his main points of view. One was Our War: Between the Harshness of Yesterday and the Achievements of Tomorrow.5 Another was: Jihad or Resistance on the terminology of the jihad,6 which served as an introduction to a broader discussion on the War of Terminology.7 His fundamental assumption is that the war between Islam and the infidels is eternal and neither side will stop until it has totally vanquished its opponent. Therefore, the use of the term resistance-muqawamah (which is used by some Jihadi scholars, above all by Abu Mus‘ab al- Suri) is misleading and tends to relate only to part of the comprehensive meaning of jihad ––the defensive one against occupation. In his writing Our War (Ma‘rakatuna), he warns against the “tricky enemy from within,” identified as Arab and Muslim governments, or other elements within Arab societies. These show sympathy for the mujahidin while they only want to take control over their jihad and betray them in the future. “The mujahidin should know that these are more dangerous and hostile to their jihad, and wish to (p.277) thwart them even more than the Crusaders.” The conclusion is that victory can be achieved only by complete reliance on an uncompromising “total” jihad in its purest Islamic interpretation. Al-Libi's lack of trust in many Muslim elements within the ummah, is clear. The only way to secure victory is by Page 9 of 13

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Debates Within the Family producing “rivers of blood of martyrs, high mountains of torn organs, and souls carried forward by the zealotry of religion, searching for martyrdom and running towards the broad gardens of paradise.” According to al-Libi, most Muslims, in Algeria or elsewhere, are weakened by oppression—mustadh‘afin —and only a small group of mujahidin can defend them, since the infidel enemy includes many circles and only the mujahidin are motivated by the true principles of Islam. “We should fight all the infidels, whether apostates or Crusaders, nationals or foreigners, Arabs or non-Arabs, whether their names are ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bouteflika, ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, ‘Abdallah ibn Husayn, Mu’ammar Qadhafi, or George Bush, Tony Blair, Sarkozy, or Olmert.” However, the main question raised by Dr. al-‘Umar was “what was the fault of the Muslim societies and nations that suffer so much from this jihad?” And here is the catch of al-Libi and his Jihadi colleagues, whom he tries to represent: “the poor nation is oppressed and attacked by the ‘fire’ of Devilish laws, from which the mujahidin try day and night to liberate it.” In other words, the only way to liberate the Muslims from the Devil is by encouraging and inciting them to take part in militant jihad. Al-Libi also opposes the distinction made by Abu al-‘Umar and others between Iraq, Palestine, or Chechnya, where the fight is against the foreign infidel occupation and hence, jihad is legitimate and blessed, and the Arab lands, where it is prohibited since these lands are not occupied. According to al-Libi, there is no religious evidence to distinguish between these various lands. “The apostate Arab governments are those that enable the occupation of the foreign infidels in Muslim lands.” Therefore, Islamically, there is no difference at all between the jihad in those occupied lands and in lands occupied by Arab apostates. By doing so, he reaffirms the principle of the Algerian and Jihadi takfir (excommunication) of all those elements within Muslim societies that do not accept his form and definition of jihad.

Conclusion Jihadi terrorism in Muslim lands and against Muslims is one of the “Achilles heels” of al-Qaeda and global jihad and a good reason for criticism. Abu Yahya alLibi's response is therefore, not just a reply to al-‘Umar's opinion, but also a (p. 278) fundamental element in the growing debate over terrorist attacks against Muslim civilians or in Muslim lands. In recent years, since the bombings in London and Amman in 2005, and criticism of the murderous attacks against Shi‘a civilians in Iraq, there is an on-going debate between two schools of thought within al-Qaeda or global jihad: the first school to which Abu Basir alTartusi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi belong, is opposed to the second school of Saudi Jihadi-Salafischolars, which provides full support for what we may call the “Zarqawi doctrine”––indiscriminate violence against everyone who does not support Jihadi-Salafism. The “Zarqawi doctrine” is quite similar to the Algerian takfir of the 1990s, and hence, the debate between al-‘Umar and al-Libi on the Page 10 of 13

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Debates Within the Family Algerian case is significant. It has gained additional significance since the “upgrading” of Iran and the Shi‘a to the status of main enemies by the successors of Zarqawi in Iraq, backed by Arabian Jihadi-Salafischolars such as the Kuwaiti Hamid al-‘Ali and several “internet scholars” such as al-Libi. In the background stands the question of what exactly is the position of the old central leadership of the “mainstream al-Qaeda,” especially Dr. Ayman alZawahiri. Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, the amir of the Islamic State in Iraq, who is anonymous, seems so far to follow the “Zarqawi doctrine”. On 8 July 2007, in one of his last videotaped speeches on the internet, he even threatened the Iranian government—the “Persian dogs” as he called them—and gave Iran an ultimatum of two months to withdraw its support from the Iraqi Shi‘is, and “to stop interfering directly and indirectly in the affairs of the Iraqi State of Islam.” His call was aimed at “all Sunnis, and the Salafi-Jihadist youth in all parts of the world in particular, to get ready for this war and make the preparations for it. I ask you not to spare any effort once our instructions are given to you.” AlBaghdadi was talking as if he was amir of an entire Islamic Caliphate covering the whole Muslim world, not just the Islamic state in Iraq. This is the first time such pretentiousness has appeared from a leader recognised by al-Qaeda, and raises another question as to the control of “mainstream al-Qaeda” over the Jihadi insurgency in Iraq, or in other regions, such as the Maghreb, Lebanon, or Somalia. Al-Baghdadi also spoke a little differently from his previous speeches about the Iraqi Shi‘is, trying to distinguish between their Shi‘a leadership and the larger Shi‘a masses. Nevertheless, in the meantime, we are witnessing a growing use of indiscriminate suicide bombings and attacks against Muslims in other parts of the Muslim world, in Algeria, Somalia, Pakistan, and most recently in Libya. Algeria has traditionally been a significant model for Arab (p.279) movements, both nationalist and Islamist, and several of the leading Jihadi- Salafischolars (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Abu Qatada al-Filastini, Abu Basir al-Tartusi) were deeply involved with its Jihadi groups and their internal conflicts and debates. In that light, the response of Abu Yahya al-Libi is significant too. It seems that out of all the Jihadi insurgencies and terrorist orgnisations, Algeria is still a model and supporters of al-Qaeda are proud to present the renewed jihad there as a great achievement. On 8 August 2007, a member of a Jihadi forum posted a statement issued by Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, in which the group claimed responsibility for attacking a patrol of the Algerian police in northeast Algeria. A video lasting 13.27 minutes, which is part of the Under the Shadow of the Swords series, was provided and showed the attackers without masks, as well as the terrain, the equipment used, and the equipment seized. One of the main features of this video was the self-confidence radiated by the Algerian group. The Algerian model is also important against the background of the failure of al-Qaeda and global jihad to find a model in Page 11 of 13

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Debates Within the Family Palestine. Hamas is not only a “thorn” in the side of al- Qaeda's ambitions, but is also criticised a lot by al-Qaeda's scholars for many of its “sins.” One of its harshest critics was Abu Yahya al-Libi himself in a long videotape in April 2007. In the past year, Abu Yahya al-Libi has been playing a significant role not only in defending or promoting the positions of al-Qaeda and global jihad, but also as one of the “theologians” of global jihad in countering the attacks by opposing Muslim clerics. The fact that he belongs to the first generation of al-Qaeda members grants him more influence and glory among the supporters of global jihad, especially through the internet. In the two years since his escape from prison, he has joined the ranks of the Jihadi-Salafischolars that advocate the “total jihad.” His formal Islamic education is not at all clear. Nevertheless, his readers on the internet are less interested in his diploma than the bottom line of his conclusion: the legitimacy of the “total takfiri jihad,” where the rules of engagement permit every move that promotes the Jihadi aim, or “catch as much as you can.” However, it should be noted that for those who try to understand the mindset of the Jihadi scholars through their indoctrination over the internet, Abu Yahya alLibi and his colleagues are easier to understand than the ambivalence of their counterpart scholars, especially the Saudis, whose writings are imbued with double-talk. The role of the “internet scholars,” either the wellknown among them, who appear by their real names, or those who hide in (p.280) Jihadi forums behind nicknames, is to back and legitimise the extreme positions their audience wants to hear. Such writings are an integral part of what has recently become a legitimate branch of jihad —Jihadi propaganda. It provides a lot of satisfaction and a sense of identity and belonging to a growing number of “students” in the “Open University of Jihad Studies”. Zealot scholars like al-Libi, model topics like the jihad in Algeria, or numerous videotapes from Iraq or elsewhere, are part of a system that fires the imagination of radicalised youth, who can join the jihad, starting from home. They are no longer regarded as “dodgers of jihad ” or mutaqa‘idin, the term coined by Sayyid Qutb for those who do not join the military jihad. The “total jihad ” of al-Libi, including in Muslim countries and against Muslim “apostates,” enables them to channel many emotions of frustration, personal or social stress, hatred, and fear, into a legitimate jihad, religiously approved by real or false scholars. There is a big question mark over the use of the term “Salafi” regarding the Jihadi groups. It is more appropriate to name this current Jihadi-takfiri rather than Jihadi-Salafi. Furthermore, when we look thoroughly at the impression of these doctrinal debates upon the Jihadi audience of followers, sympathisers, and self-radicalised youth, we can come to the conclusion that they are not particularly interested in definitions of Salafism. They obviously look for the

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Debates Within the Family bottom line—whether the most extremist forms of militant jihad are approved or not. The manner in which the approval is reached is less appealing for them. Notes:

(1) Dr Nasir al-Umar, al-Mawqif min al-tafjir fibilad al-muslimin. See on-line in: http://www.almoslim.net/articles/show_article_main.cfm?id=2146. (2) On US frustration concerning the Saudi positions on Iraq see the New York Times, 27 July 2007, URL— http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/world/ middleeast/27saudi.html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin. (3) Abu Yahya al-Libi, Nathr al-jawahir fimunaqashat al-mu‘taridh ala tafjirat alJaza’ir. See on-line in: http://www.al-hesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=140297. (4) See on-line in: http://w-n-n.com/showthread.php?t=4271. (5) Ma‘rakatuna: bayan shiddat al-ams wa-ihtiraz al-ghad. See on-line at: http:// www.tawhed.ws/r?i=4328. (6) Jihad am muqawamah? See on-line at: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3895. (7) Harb al-Mustalahat. See on-line at: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=4032.

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current Brynjar Lia

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0013

Abstract and Keywords This chapter is based on extensive research into one of the most prominent Salafi-Jihadi activists, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who played an important role in the jihad in Afghanistan. The chapter traces his history and his ideas. Special attention is given to the fall-out between Abu Qatada al-Filastini and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the differences between them concerning strategy, doctrine and violence. Keywords:   jihad, doctrine, Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Qatada, Afghanistan

Introduction Quintan Wictorowicz's seminal article, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’ divides the Salafi movement into three currents: purists, politicos, and Jihadis, united by a common Salafi creed, but sharply divided on how to interpret the context and reality in which the Salafi creed should be implemented.1 Such a categorisation is illuminating and useful as a first step towards understanding contemporary Salafi movements. However, it does not provide much help in understanding the numerous doctrinal disputes and conflicts within the Jihadi current (al-tayyar aljihadi).2 Furthermore, it may mislead us into thinking of (p.282) contemporary Jihadis as simply radicalised elements within—or as by-products of—a broader Salafi phenomenon. The writings of the Syrian al-Qaeda theorist and strategist Mustafa ibn ‘Abd alQadir Sethmariam Nasar, better known by his pen names Abu Mus‘ab al- Suri or Page 1 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, is a good starting-point for understanding some of the doctrinal disputes within the Jihadi current. Until his arrest presumably in Quetta, Pakistan, in late 2005, al-Suri was one of the most outspoken and articulate writers within this movement, and his critical analysis of previous Jihadi experiences, especially on Algeria, provoked strong responses and debates. Furthermore, his own experiences from a variety of Jihadi battle fields, his training as an historian, and his ambitions to recount and analyse the Jihadi current “objectively” in his writings, also make his books very interesting reading. Broadly speaking one may identify two tendencies within the Jihadi current, of relevance to this chapter, which were prominent in the period from the mid-1990s until 2001, as described in al-Suri's books from this period. This divide was not formalised in any way and is perhaps better described as a spectrum, or a continuum, of positions, defined by two extreme positions. On the one extreme were the Salafi purists for whom doctrinal purity was of quintessential importance, even if it meant fighting side-battles, alienating allies, and shattering any semblance of a common front against the Zionist-Crusader enemy. At the other extreme were semi-independent thinkers and strategists like al-Suri, whose main preoccupation was strategy, i.e. the ways in which Jihadi current can fight its enemy most effectively, not doctrinal purity for the sake of purity. Al-Suri who himself was born into a Syrian Sufifamily (the Rifa‘iyya order in Aleppo), came to adopt and defend Salafi doctrines in his writings, but he did this only because that was the name of the game. From his writings, one gets the sense that had he been born twenty years earlier, al-Suri would have fought equally hard under Marxist or pan-Arab slogans. He styled himself as a writer, theorist, and strategist, and he consistently refused to be called a and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of the Islamic Nation. The Jihadi current has also adopted the program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims.’ See ’Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, History, and Experiences. Part II: The Call, Programme and Method (in Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, December 2004); [Hereafter cited as The Global Islamic Resistance Call], p.685. (p.283) scholar or a cleric. In Afghanistan, where he became a prominent lecturer on guerrilla warfare theory, al-Suri faced criticism for citing Western, and even leftist, sources in his lectures.3 Against this background, it is not surprising, therefore, that al-Suri clashed with “purist Salafi” elements on a number of occasions. While the specific issues varied greatly, they all revolved around the general dilemma of how to strike a balance between ideological purity versus political utility. I will show two examples of his anti-Salafi rhetoric: the first is taken from his experience with Abu Qatada alPage 2 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Filastini in London and the second deals with his frictions with hard-line Salafis in Afghanistan. Both cases suggest that the spread of purist Salafi doctrines in the Jihadi current, rather than being a source of strength and renewal, has instead constituted a considerable obstacle to Jihadi mobilisation, and has more often than not served to handicap and cripple Jihadi groups by embroiling them in schisms and internal conflicts. More generally, al-Suri's critique also highlights what is probably a general phenomenon in any organised ideological insurgent movement, namely the struggle between ideological purists and politicomilitary pragmatists. The ‘Destructive Role’ of Salafi clerics

While a general discussion of the architecture of the Salafi ideological landscape is outside the scope of this paper, it may be useful to recapture why Jihadi ideologues like al-Suri came to use such vitriolic and harsh words about leading Salafi clerics. Al-Qaeda's struggle against the United States and its European and Arab allies, Saudi-Arabia in particular, has always depended on a minimum of political-religious legitimation, which explains why there is far more literature on Jihadi websites dealing with the question “why jihad?” rather than “how jihad?”.4 Since the mid-1990s, leading Salafi clerics from Saudi-Arabia and Yemen have refuted bin Laden's message and defended the regimes against Jihadi (p.284) propaganda, earning them derogatory labels such as the Sultan's clerics (‘ulama al-sultan), and worse. Al-Suri took considerable interest in these disputes, and he authored a long study, detailing and analysing bin Laden's and the Londonbased Saudi dissident leader Sa‘d al-Faqih's criticism of Shaykh ibn Baz and Shaykh ibn ‘Uthaymin, two of Saudi-Arabia's most famous scholars.5 Not seeing himself as a religious cleric who could challenge the clerics on their own turf, al-Suri found it most useful to launch his attack through the words of the two most well-known Saudi dissidents, one from the reformist camp and the other from the Jihadi camp. The intended audience was clearly Jihadi sympathisers and recruits who were hesitant to join al-Qaeda without the necessary religious legitimation. This is also what concerned al-Suri the most regarding the negative role played by “the purist Salafis”. Their clerics “mislead the mujahidin ” and turned them away from the battlefield by preaching loyalty to corrupt rulers who had allied themselves with the Infidels. Al-Suri's account of bin Laden's little known Jihadi experience in Yemen from 1989 onwards may be helpful to illustrate why revolutionary Jihadis like al-Suri faced such a formidable challenge from both purist and politically minded Salafis. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 and the foundation of al-Qaeda, bin Laden attempted unsuccessfully to establish “a Jihadi base” in Yemen, al-Suri recalls. This attempt was bin Laden's first military Page 3 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ adventure outside Afghanistan.6 The conflict over the new constitution for the unified Yemen between Islamists and secularists had offered a window of opportunity for the Jihadi current in a country, which, in al-Suri's assessment had all the preconditions for a successful Jihadi uprising. Al-Suri lays part of the responsibility for the failure of bin Laden's efforts in Yemen at the door of leading “Salafischolars”. Bin Laden had gone to great lengths, sparing no efforts or money, to sway them to his side, believing that any uprising in Yemen must have their support to succeed. Al-Suri and other radicals around him had egged him on, saying that he should push ahead, even without their support, but bin Laden hesitated. As it turned out, key leaders (p.285) in Yemeni society, from the tribal leaders, to Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafischolars, sided with ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih's government. Even Yemenite veterans of the Afghanistan liberation war, who had trained and fought with bin Laden, were bought over by the new regime, and accepted government posts.7 The prominent Salafischolar Shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i had played a particularly “damaging and destructive” role vis-à-vis bin Laden. In al-Suri's recollection, al-Wadi‘i: “had written a book in which he described Shaykh Usama bin Laden as the root of all civil strife (ra's al-fitna) in Yemen. He put out recordings to sell on street corners to the people as they left the mosques after their Friday prayers. In those recordings he severely attacked bin Laden, and made false claims that the latter had given him money to recruit him to a jihad that aimed to cause civil strife in the country. […] I had heard Shaykh Usama speak with some of his guests once about this and he said that if he were to forgive everyone who had ever harmed him in his life, he would never forgive al-Wadi‘i.”8 What incensed al-Suri the most was the fact that the Salafi anti-bin Laden rhetoric seemed to find fertile ground among al-Qaeda's key support base in Yemen: “Certain young Yemeni mujahidin had claimed that al-Wadi‘i was shaykh al-salafiyyah!! [i.e. the principal cleric of the Salafist creed].”9 Clearly, Salafi rhetoric, in its more purist and anti-revolutionary form, had such an important impact on the Jihadi current and its recruitment bases that it could not be overlooked by writers and theorists like al-Suri. Hence, al-Suri dealt extensively with the ideological component of the Jihadi current in general, and the Salafi“problem”, as he put it, in particular.10 The reason why anti-bin Laden rhetoric by leading Salafischolars had such resonance among al-Qaeda's core recruitment base was that the Jihadi movement did not have a well-established and unified ideological foundation, separate from the Salafischool; its ideological character was multifaceted, evolving, and open for new influences. In al-Suri's analysis, the Jihadi current's ideology derived from a variety sources, among which doctrinal Salafism was a Page 4 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ latecomer. Its ideological impact began in earnest during the Arab participation in the Afghan liberation war during the 1980s, and its influence on the Jihadi current had grown ever since. (p.286) In al-Suri's view, the main sources of the Jihadi current's ideology included: • the organisational programme of Sayyid Qutb, especially his principles of alhakimiyya [i.e. God's sovereignty on earth] • the legal-political doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya and the Salafiyya school, especially the basis of loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wa al-bara’) • the jurisprudential and doctrinal heritage of the Wahhabite call11 • “some basic elements” from the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood legacy was important, even though their embrace of “democratic Islamism” towards the end of the twentieth century created a huge cleavage between them and the Jihadi current. Despite his emphasis on Qutb and the Brotherhood's legacy, al-Suri did not underestimate the strong Salafi component in the Jihadi current, and he often used the term “Salafi-Jihadi School”.12 In al-Suri's opinion, this had become, ”the main ideological programmatic identity which characterised the Jihadi Current during the 1980s and 1990s”.13

Salafism As a Source of Internal Discord and Conflicts Obviously, purist Salafis, democratic members of the Brotherhood and Qutbist revolutionaries do not get along easily, and al-Suri was unequivocal about the potential of internal conflicts and splits due to the presence of several competing ideological influences within the Jihadi current. For this reason, al-Suri devoted ample space to discussing and analysing the origin and evolution of the Salafi creed, offering his views of how its potential for conflict could be reduced.14 What interests us here is why and how al-Suri came to conceptualise the Salafis as “a problem”. (p.287) When recounting the evolution of the Islamic theology and the emergence of the Salafi doctrines, al-Suri follows the traditional tenor of Muslim historiography, by emphasising that corrupting external influences on Islam during the Medieval Period, especially from Greek philosophy and rationalism, “have had a negative influence of serious proportions” on Islam.15 However, he differs from purist Salafis in pointing out that the introduction of logical reasoning also has had its advantages, even though, to be sure, they were less than the damage it caused to the development of the Islamic creed.16 When discussing the great debates and schisms in Medieval Islam involving the al-Asha‘ira, Ahl al-Hadith, the Mu‘tazila, and others, al-Suri does not seem overly preoccupied by telling his reader who was right and who was wrong. Instead, he deplores how these doctrinal conflicts within the Sunni-faith bred “partisan fanaticism” (al-ta‘assub Page 5 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ al-madhhabi), and partyism (tahazzub), which in turn led to “bloodshed, conspiracies, and internecine fighting”.17 Al-Suri finds that such intra-faith schismatic battles were somewhat contained during the anti-colonialist struggles in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but have reemerged with full force during the latter half of the twentieth century, as a result of the rise of “contemporary Islamic revivalism” (al-sahwa) and the spread of the contemporary “Salafi trend”.18 Al-Suri depicts the Salafis as the most conflict-prone of all: they are a sect at war with “nearly every other revivalist school, […] in particular the reformist schools (al-madaris al-islahiyya), the Sufis, the tablighi movement (Jama‘at al-Tabligh wal-Da‘wa), most official clerics and imams, as well as the clerics of the four schools of jurisprudence.”19 It seems overly clear that al-Suri conceives of the Salafis as a pain in the neck for the Jihadis. He would rather be without them and their hapless doctrinal feuds, but that is unfortunately not an option, because, as al-Suri points out, “most of the Jihadis chose the Salafi doctrine, jurisprudence and programme”; in this way, “the problem came to us, eventually”, he laments.20 rate theories in Part Two of his book. Together, they constitute al-Suri's comprehensive war-fighting strategy. The first of these practical theories is “the fighting creed”, which discusses the ideological foundation of the Jihadi movement. This section is of nearly 200 pages, and it can obviously not be discussed at length here. Ibid., pp. 886–1077 (p.288) Al-Suri goes at length in describing the divisive and disruptive impact of the Salafis on the Jihadi movement. The various conflicts emanating from the disputes over the Salafi doctrine constitutes a serious threat to the Jihadi current: it is “one of the most intractable contentious issues […] because at the end of the day, it will constitute an entry point for divisiveness, partyism, and intolerant jurisprudence, which in turn breeds fanaticism in the domain of political ideology as well as in organisational terms within the Jihadi movement itself. It causes internal strife among Muslims and within the Resistance movement itself at a time when we are being invaded by the American and Zionist Mongols and their war machines, and at a time when their satellites are eavesdropping on our ideological murmurs and monitoring our daily movements […].”21 In other words, the controversies surrounding the Salafi doctrine represent a significant security hazard for the Jihadi movement, and a considerable threat to the movement as a whole. Furthermore, the arrogant exclusiveness propagated by Salafi doctrinarians has led to the inability of the Jihadi current to form alliances and cooperative relationships with other Islamic militants. According to Page 6 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ al-Suri, “numerous relationships were ended and disputes started” as a result of the Salafis.22 Their presence in the Jihadi current created in reality an incompatibility of strategic proportion, in al-Suri's view: the Salafis provoked conflicts with each and everyone, while “the resistance has to be popular, meaning a complete participation of all sects of the population, including all of its multiple diverse groups,” if it were to succeed.23 Al-Suri also finds that the Salafis share the responsibility for the spread of takfiri (excommunication) ideas and practices within the Jihadi current. He is at pains to refute the notion that the mainstream Jihadi ideology “has merged with takfirism”, as is often argued by Jihadi opponents, but he does concede that: “some prominent men from the Salafi-Jihadi current, or at least those scholars and students who followed them, offered interpretations which were either extremist, or were articulated in such a general manner that some ignorant jihadis took a step further and widened the concept of excommunication others (takfir)”.24 This and the fact that “those actually belonging to the takfiri trend relied on these texts […], led in turn to a narrowing of the margin between the Jihadi (p. 289) and the takfiri trend”, a weakness which has been amply exploited by the enemy, al-Suri laments.25 Since the rise of modern political Islamism, with its numerous factions or offshoots, in the first half of the twentieth century, the issue of takfir has probably been the most divisive issue of all. Hence, al-Suri's criticism here is indeed very significant. Al-Suri provides a number of examples where the adoption of hardline Salafi positions by leading members of Jihadi groups have negatively affected their movement. In the following we will discuss two cases, one from London/ Algeria and the other from Afghanistan.

Al-Suri and Abu Qutada In London, 1993–6 The first example involves the media cell of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (better known by its French acronym, GIA) in London, which published the wellknown al-Ansar Newsletter (Nashrat al-Ansar) between 1993 and 1998.26 Al-Suri was a leading member of this cell from 1994 until mid- 1996 and he worked closely with its chief editor, Shaykh ‘Umar Mahmud ‘Uthman Abu ‘Umar, better known as Abu Qutada al-Filastini, a well-known Palestinian cleric residing in London, who had started to preach in a prayer hall in London in 1994 and had adopted the Algerian jihad as his core issue. By then, he had already attracted many followers after several years of preaching in Peshawar. By the end of the decade, he had emerged as a key Salafi-Jihadi cleric and spiritual leader “at the European level”.27 (p.290)

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Abu Qutada and al-Suri's relationship was characterised by many ups and downs. A former member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in London describes it as “a love-hate relationship”. It was “a headache for everyone”.28 Gradually, however, their relationship was souring, and al-Suri came to reserve some of his harshest words of criticism for Abu Qutada.29 The latter had a much stricter and more rigid Salafi orientation than the hard-line, but pragmatic, militarily oriented Jihadism of al-Suri. When he left London in 1997, one of the first objectives he set for himself was to write his memoirs of his involvement in the GIA media cell in order to expose Abu Qutada and reveal his “catastrophic influence” on the Jihadi current in Algeria, a project many of his fellow AfghanArabs strongly discouraged him from fulfilling.30 Like al-Suri, Abu Qutada had also been in Peshawar, but only since 1990, and he went inside Afghanistan only after Kabul had been reconquered in 1992.31 After they fell out with each other, al-Suri began reminding his readers that Abu Qutada only came to the Afghanistan scene “after the Afghan jihad had ended” and was not a proper Jihadi with field experience.32 This point is also illustrative of al-Suri's criticism of the Salafis. The Salafis had not earned their credentials on the battlefield, and they were ill-equipped to guide the Jihadi movement in the increasingly more inhospitable and complicated security environment confronting the Jihadis from the mid 1990s onwards.

Al-Suri'S Description of Abu Qutada'S Rise to Prominence is Revealing: “His prayer hall became a place where bulletins were distributed, donations were collected, and a place where Jihadis and zealots gathered. It also became a spot where the British security service and other secret services monitored the Islamists. With his simplicity and easy manners, Abu Qutadah became the religious reference point for (p.291) these Algerian youth, Arab-Afghans and others in London who joined his school. After a period of time, he became the reference point for many others in European capitals. […] This happened in spite of the fact that Abu Qutada himself was not a Jihadi and had no history in that field. However, his Salafi background, his oratory zeal, and his adoption of the Jihadis’ ideas together with the thirst in Jihadi circles for any scholar or student of knowledge, who would support their programme and cover their needs, made him into a shaykh and a Jihadi reference point for this circle”.33 Al-Suri recalls how Abu Qutada attracted a crowd in a way he found disconcerting due to his own constant security alertness: “He had been a supporter of the Tabligh group, before he converted to the Salafi ideology. He inherited these oratory qualities, the open, unsnobbish and sociable manners. He loved extensive meetings. He opened his house and subsequently his mosque to every visitor, where every issue was discussed with each and everyone in a spontaneous and unsnobbish manner. Secret houses were opened, where dinner parties were held for Page 8 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ the group. In spite of what this style [of activism] brought in terms of a warm atmosphere and many followers, its security complications were an inescapable issue, especially in the climate of London and among the supporters of jihad in Algeria”.34 When the headquarters of the al-Ansar Newsletter was raided by British police in 1995, al-Suri had called upon Abu Qutada and his followers to see this as a wake-up call. After all, they were behind enemy lines and should start thinking of applying guerrilla warfare tactics to their media work: “I made them understand that we were in a hit and run war. I presented to them a plan how to continue: work on the publication of a new journal, change the place of issuing it to one of the Scandinavian countries, and spread the activities to more than one place. I warned them that “the security storm” was coming, and that we were forced to deal with it in the manner of a guerrilla war of hit and run, even in the field of our media activities”.35 These warnings fell on deaf ears, however. Instead al-Suri says he was ridiculed by Abu Qutada's supporters who called him “James Bond”. Underneath the disagreement over the practical organization of the media cell, one may discern a more profound clash between al-Suri's pragmatic military-oriented jihadism and Abu Qutada's strict purist Salafist orientation. Writes al-Suri: “Abu Qutada was extreme in his support of Salafism and the Ahl al-Sunnah school and the ideas of the Wahhabite Call. He was strongly opposed to other schools within the broader circle of Ahl al-Sunnah. He vehemently fought sectarianism (madhhabiyya); he was aggressive in his discussions, stern in his expressions, issued bold fatwas and (p.292) rulings, had excessive confidence in himself, and was not tolerant of other opinions. […] He had a list of heresies, (lit. “innovativism”, al-mubtadi‘a) in Islam. He dubbed it “the school of straying from the right path and heretic tendencies” (ahl aldalal wa-lahwa), and it included most of the Islamic doctrinal, legal and missionary, reformist and political schools, even a number of the jihadi schools, new as old, their programs and their men”.36

Their ideological differences went so far that Abu Qutada's followers began accusing al-Suri of being an heretic. Al-Suri claims he attempted to dissuade Abu Qutada form adopting hard-line positions on doctrinal issues since they were useless or even negative for the struggle. Abu Qutada and his followers did not listen: “In their eyes, we were only activists (harakiyyun), who theorized in politics. We were not clean of the Muslim Brotherhood virus, despite the fact that we were among the jihadis. We did not understand the issues of Islamic doctrine!! […] It did not take long before his followers, especially Page 9 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Abu Walid al-Filastini [one of Abu Qutada's closest aides], began issuing fatwas, saying that I was an heretic (lit. “innovator”, min al-mubtadi‘a)”.37 Al-Suri came to blame Abu Qutada for the growing popularity of hard-line Salafi doctrines among the GIA supporters in London and beyond. There is little doubt that this type of hard-line Salafi rhetoric were present in GIA publications in Europe in the subsequent period, and had become the language by which the GIA's bloody purges of opponents from 1995 onwards were justified.38 In alSuri's view, this had a tremendously destructive effect on the jihadi movement: “[Shaykh Abu Qutada al-Filastini's influences] also had consequences for the ‘Salafi- Jihadi (excessiveness) extremists’ school’ (manhaj ghulat alsalafiyya al-jihadiyya), which gradually became more prominent in the (shadow) of this cause. Abu Qutada should be considered—in my view— among the most prominent theoreticians of this school. Together with a few others, Abu Qutada threw himself into his role as chairmanship in the period that followed. He seduced them to his side and they issued fatwas on whatever the extremist listeners in Algeria and followers in London and elsewhere in Europe requested from them.”39 Not being a recognized religious cleric himself, al-Suri had no way he could confront Abu Qutada on religious grounds. He witnessed with growing (p.293) bitterness how his former Algerian disciples and trainees from the Peshawar period now joined Abu Qutada's circle: “they were Salafis who were inclined to extremism like him [Abu Qutada]. The youth adhere faithfully to their shaykhs, and attach a holiness and infallibility to them”.40 For a period of time, there was a mutual boycott between Abu Qutada and alSuri. During the crisis following the GIA's execution of two leading mujahidin leaders from the Algerianist (or al-Jaza’ira) current, violent quarrels occurred between them.41 The al-Ansar Newsletter was completely taken over by Abu Qutada's followers, and al-Suri says he had to purchase the bulletin at the entrance of Abu Qutada's prayer hall, where he was treated like “a stranger”.42 He was especially incensed by the fact that his name remained so closely associated with Abu Qutada's writings in al-Ansar Newsletter where the latter bestowed legitimacy on the bloody purges in Algeria after the jihad had “deviated” under Jamal Zaytuni's emirate. Al-Suri portrayed Abu Qutada as someone who whitewashed the GIA, but not as the GIA's primary religious reference point: “The GIA leadership in Algeria was a group of deviants already and the Algerian intelligence completed their deviance and employed them, but Abu Qutada's role was that of a mufti who bestowed legitimacy on the deviancy after it had occurred for the audiences in exile. He had no role internally in Algeria as far as I know. […] Abu Qutada and Abu Walid played Page 10 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ for ‘Abd al-Rahman Amin [Zaytuni], and his group of criminals and supporters in exile the same role as Ibn Baz and Ibn ‘Uthaymin play for the ruling Saudi family. This was their crime”.43 On arriving in Afghanistan in 1997, al-Suri isolated himself in a desert guesthouse near Qandahar where he wrote a 130 page manuscript in order to tell the true story about Abu Qutada, but facing strong opposition from other leading Jihadis, he decided to postpone the publication. Only in 2004 did his book on Algeria and Abu Qutada appear on the Jihadi web, and it remains the most biographical of all his written publications. Few Jihadi writers have used stronger words about Abu Qutada, a cherished Jihadi ideologue. Although egotism, a clash of personalities and rivalries clearly played an important part in al-Suri's conflict with Abu Qutada, this conflict highlights not only the presence of a significant ideological divide right at the core of the Jihadi current, but also the depth of this ideological (p.294) chasm. Al-Suri's critique also provides insight into what kind of policy dilemmas and negative operative implications a rigid application of doctrinaire Salafism may create for the Jihadi current, since it implies that religious learning and observance of strict religious doctrines are prioritized to the detriment of skills such as organizational experience, military training and strategic expertise.

The Controversy Over the Taliban'S (lack Of) Islamic Legitimacy The policy dilemmas resulting from the rise of a doctrinaire Salafisubcurrent within the Jihadi movement were also very visible in Afghanistan, the main playing field for the Jihadis since the late 1980s.44 There were significant differences in religious observance and practices between the Arab volunteer fighters, many of whom were observant Salafis, and the Afghan resistance, who by and large observed the Hanafischool and were tolerant of Sufishrines and other practices that Salafis regarded as godless ‘innovatism’ in Islam. This had been a problem during the first Arab-Afghan experience from the mid- 1980s to c.1992, and no less so during the ‘second round’ following the Taliban's seizure of power in 1996 until its downfall in late 2001. A significant segment of the Arab-Afghan community in Afghanistan mistrusted the Taliban as they mistrusted and despised the Afghan population for its superstitious and deviant religious observance, which came on top of their contempt for Afghanistan's general backwardness and primitiveness. Partly due to the prevalence of hard-line Salafi attitudes among them, the Arab-Afghans soon became embroiled in tense ideological disputes over whether the Taliban regime should be considered an Islamic Emirate for which it was worth fighting and to which emigration was obligatory. Many Arab militants who had moved to Afghanistan, simply considered the Islamic Emirate just another temporary safe haven, from which they might train their members and reorganise their forces in preparation of an armed campaign in their home countries. For them, the Page 11 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Taliban regime was not a kernel or a starting point for the coming Islamic Caliphate. Hence, fighting alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance was not a religious duty. Among the hard-line Salafis in the Arab-Afghan community, the criticism of the Taliban went (p.295) much further: They argued that it was utterly impermissible to fight alongside the Taliban regime because it meant fighting under an infidel banner.45 In his books, al-Suri described at length the destructive role played by the Salafi hard-liners in Afghanistan who seized on any occasion to reprimand and correct ‘deviant behaviour’ among those Arab fighters who adapted to local customs, for example by praying in the manner the Afghans prayed. The Salafis’ contempt for the Taliban and other non-Salafi mujahidin fighters knew no boundaries: “One of the astonishing things I must mention in this context is a statement made by one of those extremist Salafi Jihadis. He told me in one of our conversations that “jihad must be under the Salafi banner; its leadership, programme, and religious rulings must also be Salafi; and everything should be subjected to proof [in accordance with Salafi methodology]. If we should accept that non-Salafis participate with us in jihad, we do only do so because we need them. However, they should not have any leadership role at all. We should lead them like a herd of cows to perform their duty of jihad.” I couldn’t really understand how we are going to participate in jihad with our brethrens in religion and faith if we should deal with them as a herd of cows […]!”46 Obviously, such contemptuous attitudes opened up serious divisions in the ArabAfghan diaspora regarding the future course of action, especially with regards to their position on the Taliban. In Afghanistan, al-Suri became known as one of the Taliban's most faithful defenders against the Salafis. Al-Suri had always displayed pragmatism and leniency vis-à-vis non-adherence to the strict Salafi code of conduct as long as the zeal and determination to fight a jihad was beyond doubt. This, he found among the Taliban.47 Al-Suri became spokesman for a current of thinking that advocated paying allegiance to Mullah ‘Umar, the Taliban's supreme leader and working directly with the Taliban authorities.48 Al-Suri vigorously (p.296) defended the Emirate in his publications and during his lectures and travelling inside Afghanistan. His first published work in Afghanistan after his return to the country was a long epistle primarily designed to refute hardline Salafi charges against the Taliban regime that the conditions for the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), to which true Muslim believers should emigrate, were not yet present in Afghanistan. Thus, the Taliban government was not a legitimate government, and their war against the Northern Alliance was not a jihad (“in this war both the killer and the killed will go to hell”).49

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Judging by letters and documents uncovered in Afghanistan after the USled invasion, al-Suri was clearly seen as an important Taliban advocate. His book on the Taliban remains one of his most cited books, and was referred to by trainees in al-Qaeda's training camps.50 In one letter discussing the “Taliban's infidelity”, he was accused of having written a long research paper stating that “it is permissible to fight under the banner of infidelity”, supporting his by the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Ra’y al-‘Amm in April 1999, he had not yet met with Mullah ‘Umar. It was only in early 2000 that he met with Mullah ‘Umar and swore an oath of allegiance to him. From then on, he “maintained extensive relations with Mullah ‘Umar”, according to Spanish court documents. According to one source, al-Suri used to spend many hours sitting with the Taliban leader at the latter's office in Qandahar. See ‘Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Communiqué to the British and Europeans regarding the London Bombings in July 2006’, Middle East Transparent website, 23 December 2005, www.metransparent.com/texts/ abu_massab_assuri_communique_calling_for_terror_in_europe.htm, accessed October 2006; ‘Meeting with the Kuwaiti Newspaper (al-Ra’i al- ‘Amm) in Kabul, 18 March 1999’ (in Arabic), transcript of audiofile No.2, p. 5; “Communiqué from the Office of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri” (in Arabic), 22 December 2004, p. 7; ‘Juzgado Central de Instruccion N° 005, Madrid, Sumario’, 17 September 2003, p. 28; and José María Irujo, ‘El hombre de Bin Laden en Madrid’, El Pais 2 March 2005, www.elpais.es/comunes/2005/11m/08_comision/ libro_electronico_red_islam/red_islamista_01"doc.pdf, accessed July 2006, p. 18. (p.297) opinion with quotes from here and there.51 In other correspondence, his name arose when the Taliban's request for UN membership was condemned. (The hard-line Salafis viewed the UN as an infidel organisation.)52 The Salafi problem was not simply a disturbing factor in the Arab-Afghan community's relationship with the Taliban. It also threatened al-Qaeda's legitimacy as bin Laden moved to solidify his alliance with Mullah ‘Umar. According to memoirs by an Arab-Afghan veteran who attended Khalden training camp from 1996 onwards, the ideological conflict over the Taliban's Islamic legitimacy had been particularly strong at that camp, especially at the Institute for the Faith Brigades (Ma‘had Kata‘ib al-Iman), located next to the camp.53 The students at the Institute, who were mostly North African Jihadis, began publicising bin Laden's “misguided errors”, especially the fact that he fought with the Taliban, many of whom were “immersed in the greatest of sins”.54 Their criticism of bin Laden also included his relationship with the Sudan and leading politicians in Pakistan. They also accused a leading figure in al-Qaeda's juridical committee, Abu Hafs al-Mawritani of being a follower of Mu‘tazila, an unorthodox school in early Sunni Islam, mostly known for denying that the Qur’an was eternal and insisting upon free will.

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ This hard-line Salafi agitation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda led to heavy pressure being placed on the Khalden camp administration to discipline the radicals. While some of the radicals chose to leave the camp, others began changing their views about the Taliban. This shift came partly as a result of (p. 298) al-Suri's efforts in propagating the case for the Taliban. Together with other leading Jihadis, such as the Abu Layth al-Libi, a leading member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), he was instrumental in persuading them to accept al-Qaeda's policy of fighting for the Taliban.55 Judging by his writings after his arrival in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, al-Suri appears to have grown increasingly disappointed by the inability of the Jihadi organisations to rally the Islamic Nation, the umma, in defence of the Taliban. When he looked back at the Afghan experience of 2004, he lamented the fact that so few had decided to settle in the Islamic Emirate and defend it. His disenchantment with the scholars is evident: “none of the Muslim scholars, particularly renowned clerics, and none of the symbols of Islamic call (da‘wa) who deafened the world with empty slogans about jihad, emigrated there.”56 AlSuri and those Arab-Afghans who wished to make the Taliban a pillar of their Jihadi project had clearly failed, not only because they fought an uphill battle against the Taliban's external enemies, but perhaps even more so because of the sizeable anti-Taliban opposition within the Jihadi currents themselves, let alone the general condescending Arab attitude towards the Islamic Emirate.

Concluding Remarks Al-Suri's critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi current has highlighted some interesting ideological cleavages inside al-Qaeda and contemporary Jihadism, which often tend to be overlooked since most Jihadi writers avoid the topic or couch it in such obfuscated language that it becomes unintelligible for outsiders. There is little doubt that doctrinaire Salafi influences have profoundly altered the ideological character of the Jihadi current since the early 1990s, following decades of Qutbi dominance in militant Islamic rhetoric. The rise of Salafi discourses and doctrines has in many ways reduced the political content in contemporary Jihadi ideology, and weakened its ability to provide formulas for alliances with other political forces. Indeed, perhaps the most important element in al-Suri's critique of the Salafis is their exclusiveness and (p.299) eagerness to engage in side-battles with “deviancy” and “un-Islamic sects”. By the very presence of these ideological elements at the heart of the Jihadi Current, this global insurgent movement is bound to have limited popular appeal and is destined to remain what al-Suri did not want it to be, namely “elitist”, “marginal”, and doomed to failure.

List of Selected Works By Abu Mus‘Ab Al-Suri

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Books and Booklets

‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria: Part I: The Experience and Lessons (Hopes and Pains). Part II: Ideology and Programme (Research and Foundation in the Way of Armed Revolutionary Jihad) (in Arabic) (Peshawar: publisher unknown, May 1991).57 ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, Observations on the Jihadi Experience in Syria (Peshawar (?), undated but probably May 1991).58 ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), Afghanistan, the Taleban and the Battle of Islam Today (in Arabic), (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies, 11 October 1998, The Series Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No.1). ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Responsibility of the People of Yemen towards the Holy Places of Muslims and their Wealth (in Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies, October 1999, The Series Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No.2). ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Muslims in Central Asia and the Comming Battle of Islam (in Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies, 5 November 1999, The Series Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No.3). ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Sunni People in the Levant Confronting the Nusayris, the Crusaders and the Jews (in Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies, 22 June 2000, The Series Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No.4). ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Testimony of the Leaders of the Mujahidin and the Reform [Current] about the Sultan's Clerics in the Land of the Two Holy Places, Called Saudi Arabia: A Reading and Commentary of the Letters and Communiqués by Shaykh Osama bin Laden and Doctor Sa‘d al-Faqih to Shaykh ibn Baz, Shaykh ibn ‘Uthaymin and the Clerics of the Land of the Two Holy Places (in Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies and Media, 31 January 2001, Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No.5). ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988–1996 (in Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, 1 June 2004, The Series Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness No. 6). (p. 300) Al-Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, Musharraf 's Pakistan: The Problem and the Solution…! A Necessary Obligation (in Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, October 2004).

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, History, and Experiences. Part II: The Call, Programme and Method (in Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, December 2004).

Articles, CommuniquéS, Audiotapes. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, “The Ideological-Programmatic Gap in the Contemporary Jihadi Current: A Dangerous Fissure which has to be Mended”, Majallat Qadaya Zahirin ‘ala al- Haqq no. 2 (Dhu’l-Hijja 1421 or late February/early March 2001), published in Kabul by the Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, “A Call to the Mujahidin Youth and the Jihadi Groups in the Islamic World” (in Arabic), Majallat Risalat al-Mujahidin No. 3, pp. 18–19. “Communiqué from the Office of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri in Response to the US Department of State's Announcement” (in Arabic), 22 December 2004. “The Testament of Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri which He Requests be Fulfilled in Case of his Capture or Martyrdom” (in Arabic). Undated. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), “Message to the British and the Europeans— Its People and Governments—regarding the London Explosions, July 2005” (in Arabic), August 2005. “Text of Audio Communiqué by Shaykh Umar Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri) Addressing the British and the Europeans regarding the London Explosions, and the Practices of the British Government” (in Arabic), August 2005. “Meeting with the Kuwaiti Newspaper (al-Ra’y al-‘Amm)” (in Arabic). An interview with Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri by the journalist Majid al-‘Ali in Kabul, Afghanistan, 18 March 1999. Recorded on 10 audiofiles. Bibliography Bibliography references: Lia, Brynjar, “Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet infrastructure”, Jane's Intelligence Review Online, January 2006. ———, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab AlSuri, London & New York: Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2007. Taber, Robert, The War of The Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 1965/2002. Wictorowicz, Quintan, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39.

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Notes:

(1) Quintan Wictorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. (2) For the purpose of this article, al-Suri's own definition will suffice: He defined the Jihadi current rather comprehensively, determined partly by ideology and partly by its main enemies: “It comprises organisations, groups, assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, symbolic figures, and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed jihad against the existing regimes in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling not by what Allah said (bi-ghayr ma anzala Allah), by legislating without Allah, (3) In fact, the most important item on his guerrilla warfare curriculum appears to have been an Arabic translation of Robert Taber's The War of The Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, published in 1965. During his second stay in Afghanistan, from 1998 onwards, he gave many lectures based solely on this book. The Arabic translation of the book was entitled ‘War of the Oppressed’. See Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, ‘Explanation of the Book “War of the Oppressed”’ (in Arabic), posted on Muntadayat al-firdaws al-jihadiyyah, 21 Sept. 2006, www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=16892&highlight=%E3%D5%DA %C8+%C7%E1%D3%E6%D1%ED, accessed Oct. 2006. (4) See Brynjar Lia, ‘Al-Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet infrastructure’, Jane's Intelligence Review Online, January 2006. (5) ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), The Testimony of the Leaders of the Mujahidun and the Reform [Current] about the Sultan's Clerics in the Land of the Two Holy Places, Called Saudi Arabia: A Reading and Commentary of the Letters and Communiqués by Shaykh Usama bin Laden and Doctor Sa‘d al-Faqih to Shaykh ibn Baz, Shaykh ibn ‘Uthaymin and the Clerics of the Land of the Two Holy Places (in Arabic) (Kabul: The Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies and Media, 31 January 2001, Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness, No.5). (6) The Global Islamic Resistance Call, p. 775. (7) Ibid., p.776. (8) Ibid., pp. 775–6. (9) Ibid., p.775. See chapter 14 in this volume for more on Muqbil al-Wadi‘i. (10) Ibid., p.1060. (11) True to his pedagogical, tutorial style of writing, al-Suri summed up the basic components and elements of the Jihadi current with this neat mathematical equation: “Some basic elements from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology + The organisational program of Sayyid Qutb + The legal-political Page 17 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ doctrine of Imam ibn Taymiyya and the Salafiyya school + The jurisprudential and doctrinal heritage of the Wahhabite call—The political legal organisational programme for the Jihadi Current.’ Ibid., p. 698. (12) He defined it as “a mixture of jihadi Qutbist organisational ideology (al-fikr al-haraki al-jihadi al-qutbi), the Salafi creed and the Wahhabite call.” Ibid., p.697. (13) Ibid., p.697. (14) This analysis came as part of his presentation of “practical theories”, which constituted the core part of his book, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, and is outlined in eight sepa(15) Ibid., p.1059. (16) Ibid., p.1059. (17) Ibid., p.1060. (18) Ibid. (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. (21) Ibid. (22) Ibid., p. 846. (23) Ibid. (24) Ibid., p. 842. (25) Ibid. (26) This section draws heavily on my book: Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab Al-Suri, London & New York: Hurst and Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 182–8. (27) Abu Qutada has been repeatedly taken into custody by British authorities who have called him “the most significant extremist Islamic preacher” in the country. In October 2001, the UN Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee listed him as an individual “belonging to or associated with Al-Qaeda organisation”. See Ministracion de Justicia, ‘Juzgado Central de Instruccion no. 005, Madrid,Sumario (Proc.Ordinario) 0000035 /2001 E’, dated 17 September 2003, [indictment against the Abu Dahdah network], available at http:// news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/espbinldn91703cmp.pdf,accessed February 2004, p. 27; ‘Profile: Abu Qatada’, BBC News, 9 May 2006, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4141594.stm, accessed Oct. 2006; and United Page 18 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ Nations Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, ‘The list of individuals belonging to or associated with Al-Qaeda organisation/Last updated on 25 July 2006’, www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/pdflist.pdf, accessed,m July 2006, p. 28. (28) Author's interview with Noman Benotman, London, 15 September 2006. (29) Their conflict was not only over ideology. It was also personal. The sociable, highly articulate and charismatic Abu Qutada had overshadowed al-Suri and won over to his camp many of al-Suri's followers. Al-Suri had simply failed to establish himself as a leader, and gather a large crowd of followers, even though he was respected for his knowledge and expertise. Author's interview with Camille Tawil, London, 14 September 2006; and author's interview with Sa‘d alFaqih via telephone, 17 September 2006. (30) Cited in ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), A Summary of My Testimony on Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996 (in Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, 1 June 2004, Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness Series no.6), [hereafter, Summary of My Testimony on Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996], p. 27. (31) ‘Q&A with Muslim cleric Abu Qatada’, CNN.com 29 November 2001, http:// archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/27/gen.qatada.transcript.cnna/, accessed Oct. 2006. (32) Summary of My Testimony on Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996, p. 29. (33) Ibid., p. 21. (34) Ibid., p. 28. (35) Ibid., p. 32. (36) Ibid., p. 28. (37) Ibid., p. 31. (38) For an illustrative example, see ‘The Ruling of Fighting the Innovators’ (in Arabic), Majallat al-Jama‘a, no. 10 (Sept. 1996). (39) Summary of My Testimony on Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996, p. 29. (40) Ibid. (41) Ibid., p. 36. (42) ‘Meeting with the Kuwaiti Newspaper’, audiofile no. 4, p. 3; and ibid., p. 35. (43) Summary of My Testimony on Jihad in Algeria, 1988–1996, p. 37. Page 19 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ (44) This section draws heavily on my book: Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 239–45. (45) See the discussion in ‘Are the Taliban from Ahl as-Sunnah?’, At-Tibyaan Publications website, http://tibyaan.atspace.com/tibyaan/articlef7c9.html? id=1116,accessed Feb. 2007. The article contains extensive quotes from al-Suri's book Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the Battle of Islam Today (in Arabic, 1998). (46) The Global Islamic Resistance Call, pp. 844–5. (47) Due to his conflict with bin Laden, he could obviously not afford also to be on bad terms with the Afghan government, but there was clearly a strong ideological component behind his decision. Abdel Bari Atwan, the Arab news editor who met with al-Suri several times during the mid- and late 1990s, recalls that al-Suri telephoned him in 1997 or 1998, saying that he had stopped working for al-Qaeda, and that instead he now served as media adviser for the Taliban. Author's interview with Abdel Bari Atwan, London, 28 April 2006. (48) However, his relationship with the Taliban expanded gradually. At the time of interview (49) ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Battle of Islam Today (in Arabic), (Kabul: The al-Ghuraba Center for Islamic Studies, 11 October 1998, Issues for the Triumphant in Righteousness Series no. 1), pp. 2–3. This criticism has also been referred to on later occasions on Jihadi web forum discussions about the Taliban. See ‘An Interpretation of Imam Mullah ‘Umar, May God Protect him’ (in Arabic), muntada al-safinet 10 November 2005, www.al-saf.net/vb/showthread.php?t=18448&highlight=%E3%D5%DA%C8+ %C7%E1%D3%E6%D1%ED, accessed November 2005. (50) See Document No.AFGP-2002–801138, ‘Various Admin Documents and Questions’, p. 45, www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-801138-Trans.pdf, and www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-801138-Orig.pdf, accessed April 2006, p. 50 (translation). (51) Document No. AFGP-2002–601693, ‘Status of Jihad’, Combating Terrorism Center website (West Point), www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-601693Trans.pdfand www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-601693-Orig.pdf, accessed April 2006. (52) The letter stated: “We saw, through the story of the Syrian brother AbiMos’ab and others, how they were making insignificant excuses in order to continue requesting a seat at the United Nations. Once they declare, ‘We only need the seat to prompt the countries of the world to acknowledge us’ they consider that as a license to have rights. Meanwhile, they say ‘This is a rotten organisation; let's send a bad man.’ Where can we find people who are able to Page 20 of 21

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‘Destructive Doctrinarians’ challenge the world [to recognise that] destroying the idols that were left behind is not as great a sin as joining the United Nations?” Cited in Document No. AFGP-2002–602181, ‘Political Speculation’, Combating Terrorism Center website (West Point), www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-602181-Trans.pdfand www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-602181-Original.pdf, accessed April 2006. (53) See ‘The truth of Abu Abdallah Muhajir who led al-Zarqawi astray and enabled the latter to shed blood’ (in Arabic), muntadayat al-mahdi, 14 July 2005, www.almahdy.name/vb/showthread.php?t=3354, accessed August 2006. I am indebted to my colleague Truls Hallberg Tønnessen for this information and for locating these memoirs on the web. (54) Ibid. (55) Ibid. (56) The Global Islamic Resistance Call, p. 40. This excerpt can also be found in ‘Thirteenth Part of Serialized Book on al-Zarqawi and al-Qa‘ida Published Part 13 of serialized book: “Al-Zarqawi… The Second Generation of al-Qa‘ida”’ by Fu’ad Husayn, Jordanian writer and journalist’, al-Quds al-‘Arabi (London) 11 July 2005, via FBIS. (57) Posted on muntada al-tajdid 31 May 2006. Accessed June 2006 at www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums/showthread.php? s=6548b36708e3c3eff8db8327623a51e8&threadid=41941. (58) This publication appears to be an excerpt from ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria: Part I: The Experience and Lessons (Hopes and Pains) ( in Arabic) (Peshawar: publisher unknown, May 1991).

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Madawi Al-Rasheed

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0014

Abstract and Keywords The chapter is based on extensive reading of Jihadi Salafi texts. It considers the issue of identity and how Salafis try to find their territorialized identity between the international umma and local tribal groups, bypassing national, non-Islamic entities. Keywords:   umma, identity, tribal groups

Global Salafijihad is a constructed category, perpetuated in the discourse of academics, think tank consultants, politicians, policy makers, terror experts and journalists, on the one hand, and Jihadi ideologues and sympathisers on the other. The first group identifies a global menace that requires the mobilisation of governments, military strategists, civil society activists and media professionals across the world to justify the global “war on terror”.1 The second group endeavours to mobilise Muslims across cultures, nations and geographies in the pursuit of deterritorialised battles that nevertheless take place in specific localities, such as world financial centres, railway stations, expatriate residential compounds, tourist resorts, shrines, mosques and markets.2 The (p.302) global dimension of this phenomenon is strictly a reference to the strategy of suicide bombing, which has devastated the aforementioned sites, but the same strategy is adopted by other secular and religious groups, including the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK.3

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse In more sophisticated accounts, the new term “transnational salafiyya ” is invoked to describe a religious discourse that travels beyond nation-states as a result of both state sponsorship and non-state initiatives. Moreover, the term describes networks, consisting of deterritorialised actors, preachers and terrorists. Sometimes this academic exercise glosses the diversity within Salafism in the twenty-first century, of which the Jihadi variant is but one trend. While the debate about transnational salafiyya is often motivated by an open agenda to identify the ideological source of contemporary terrorism, one must not succumb to this specific agenda in serious academic research. I have dealt elsewhere with the complexity of Salafism as a transnational phenomenon, and specifically with the role of Saudi Arabia in promoting it across the globe.4 Suffice it to say here that this so-called “transnational salafiyya ” encompasses a wide range of positions from the pietist and quietist trend to the more activist and jihadi aspect. It promotes both a personalised private piety centred on ritual purity and an activist action oriented towards a vigorous campaign to change the world by various means. In both situations, transnational processes may lead to outcomes unanticipated by their initial sponsors. The transnational often becomes embedded in a web of local cultural traditions, political contexts and socio-economic conditions. Also, the two polar trends (from pietist to Jihadist) can overlap and become enmeshed in each other, thus defying clear-cut categories and classifications. The challenge is to identify a set of conditions that promote the transformation of one position into another and vice versa. The global messages and practices of Salafi Jihadis, especially those that appear on the internet, has obscured the local dimensions of terrorism, which range from the Sinai desert and the rugged mountains of Afghanistan to the cosmopolitan or peripheral urban spaces of European cities, or the struggle of (p.303) various Islamists groups within a specific context.5 Blinded by the global media messages of Jihadi ideologues and the monotonous images and strategies of violence, we are led to believe that we are seeing the same thing, namely a monolithic global Jihadi-Salafi assault on the civilised world, thus overlooking the specific contexts in which Salafi Jihadis operate, react or against which they rebel. We are also led to believe that a global e-jihadi university and library are responsible for initiating future novices, simply by posting messages and instructions in several languages to recruit would-be bombers. While the global messages are important to understand and explain the phenomenon, new research suggests that recruitment is actually more complex as it is grounded in real experiences, networks, friendships, and family and kin circles rather than in virtual and imagined spaces.6 Some have argued that virtual jihad is cathartic, a substitute for real engagement in violence, especially among the young computer literates of the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora. According to one author, Jihadi e-forums can be completely innocuous, and actually serve a cathartic function.7 However, governments that have failed to contain the menace continue to spend thousands of dollars on monitoring Jihadi internet Page 2 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse sites and countering a global virtual ideology without successfully dealing with the context in which such messages assume meaning and resonance among Muslim men and women.8 The global “war on terror” (p.304) has become truly virtual inasmuch as the global Salafi Jihadi trend had already been so in its own literature. The failure of this war to deliver its stated objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere has shifted the attention of governments to the virtual war against terror. Moreover, scholars are challenged to formulate a list of significant causes for a global phenomenon. We are called upon to explain the social and economic backgrounds of several categories of Jihadis ranging from the Westerneducated bourgeois student of Hamburg to the proletarian impoverished resident of Casablanca's shanty towns, passing by the narco-Jihadi of the opium fields of Afghanistan, the thugs of the narrow alleys of Nahr al-Barid camp in northern Lebanon and the simpleton drop-out Bedouin Saudi Jihadi of Hay al-Suwaidi, described by his government as brainwashed but with good instinct (‘ala alfitra). Common to all such Jihadis is their stated claims, publicised in their obituaries, life histories and literary production on the internet by sympathisers and ideologues. They claim that they die for faith, many boasting about their Jihadi adventures in multiple global as well as local spaces.9 Our quest for causes results in a very long list, most of which consists of indicators of the ideological orientation of the theorists who compose such lists. Among these causes we find references to authoritarian Arab regimes and their torture chambers; the absence of democracy, civil society and political participation; misguided Western foreign policy that antagonises the Muslim world; socio-economic deprivation, marginalisation and alienation of troubled Muslim youth; unemployment and increasing economic inequality; bigoted Saudi–Wahhabi religious educational material; Muslim Brotherhood extremist ideology; the emergence of nationalist-Islamic solidarity; Al Jazeera 's antiWestern broadcasting; the failure of Islamists to topple their near enemies; the fragmentation of religious authority in the Muslim world; and the (p.305) quest for a mystical activist globalised piety. The list of hypothesised causes is very long indeed.10 Regardless of whether there is consensus over the main cause, we assume that the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers in New York, the al-Muhayya compound in Riyadh, the American embassy in Kenya, the railway station in Madrid and many other spectacular acts of terrorism emanate from the same causes, simply because the professed and publicised ideology, strategy and outcome are the same. Here we tend to confuse context with causes. Another problematic, yet equally constructed, concept is the term “Salafi Jihadi” itself. Everywhere we find references to the medieval theologian Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and the eighteenth–century founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92); we conclude that Salafi Page 3 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Jihadis draw on these sources, which in turn become part of the ideology of terror.11 Others come across references to the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) and the Palestinian ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam (1941–89), and conclude that the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as it developed in the twentieth century is the source of inspiration, rather than Wahhabism.12 In an attempt to implicate, accuse or prove innocent, we are left with simplistic statements misguided by preconceived ideological and political positions. Yet if there is a Salafi inspirational discourse, it must be seen as a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity. The outcome is a cross-fertilisation of sources that is both transnational and local. Today the ideology of Jihadis is a postmodern hybridity, whose sources, if ever we can accurately identify them, are found in the past and present, and in both the Muslim and Western worlds. The result is a devastating ideology that inspires novices, glorifies reinvented ancestors, and could potentially induce a (p.306) future cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions, defined politically, morally, economically socially and culturally as poles that will never meet or overlap. The ideology is one of difference, against a background of incredible similarity and a desire to be like the despised other, who nevertheless must be eliminated. Contemporary Salafi Jihadis are products of modernity. They could not have emerged in traditional Muslim societies. The Jihadis of the previous era, from Morocco to Indonesia, were a different category of people, a product of different political, economic and social pressures. ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, alJaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were traditional Jihadis, often remembered as the “Sultans of Jihad” in the North African context and the “Amirs of Jihad” in the Near East, who were, above all, prepared to die to liberate an occupied land (Libya, Algeria and Palestine, respectively). They travelled across the Muslim world, seeking refuge and solidarity, but they were not transnational actors, simply because their nations were not fully established, let alone theorised and imagined. At the time of their jihad, nations were still in the process of emerging. They were a direct response to foreign occupation, capitalist penetration, the marginalisation of traditional forces, and foreign settlements. Contemporary Jihadis are a different phenomenon. They die for faith, not land; they share the modernity of the West, despite their straightforward professed rejection and critique of this modernity.13 Like Western post-industrial consumer capitalist societies, they call for a global world order, in which Muslim solidarity overrides ethnic and national boundaries. In this respect, they share the rationale of the free capitalism of the late twentieth century and the postnational free global market, prominent in neo-liberal political theologies. More specifically,Jihadis incorporate the Western ethos of changing the world by action. While reason and profit are central in the Western neo-liberal modernity project, faith is crucial in the Jihadi narrative. Making Islam hegemonic in the Page 4 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse world, rather than on an equal footing with other narratives, in a manner similar to the way in which Western neo-liberalism struggles to become hegemonic as a world-view, is the common thread. Today, this can only be achieved through a process of subjectification and privatisation that empowers individual Muslims in the face of real or imagined adversaries. Similarly, Western neo-liberalism insists on both a subjective experience of the world and a privatisation of pleasure and pain, loss and gain, (p.307) and wealth and poverty, to improve life, spread prosperity, and dominate as a world system. Without these two processes, both Jihadism and late Western modernity would fail in the contemporary world. French scholar of violence René Girard argued in an interview in Le Monde after 9/11 that violence does not originate in difference but is situated in mimetic rivalry, competition between groups, cultures, and countries that all desire to imitate each other. On the violence that destroyed the Twin Towers in New York, Girard offers a perceptive comment. “By their effectiveness, by the sophistication of the means employed, by the knowledge that they had of the United States, by their training, were not the authors of the attack at least somewhat American? Here we are in the middle of mimetic contagion.”14 It is important, however, to pose and investigate the local context of each Jihadi case to understand the ways in which the shared ideology and strategy are reflections of local developments, contradictions, frustrations and struggles. There is no doubt that there is a set of global utterances, religious arguments, poetry, images, iconography and discourses that Jihadis themselves have circulated in global media and applied in real localities. Yet it is important to examine local contexts, and their relevance to the emergence of Jihadi groups. More relevant is the tension and contradictions between the global messages and local concerns. Focusing on the contradictions and tensions within the Saudi Jihadi project is the subject of this chapter. I will argue that Saudi Jihadis represent postnational non-state actors who, although initially part of a state project, draw on the rhetoric of the global jihad while remaining immersed in the locality of Saudi Arabia. They exhibit an unresolved tension between the global and the local, which is a direct outcome of the troubled relationship between religion and politics in Saudi Arabia. The formation of the state, its ideology and practices are an important dimension that triggers unexpected consequences, one of which is the consolidation of a Saudi global Jihadi movement, seeking legitimacy both at home and abroad. Saudi Jihadis subscribe to the global dimension of contemporary Salafi Jihadi discourse, which draws on universal religious texts rather than the practices of Muslims that flourish in specific cultural contexts. By appealing to universal sacred texts and interpretations, they hope to mobilise others around specific global issues. The unity of the ummah, its humiliation and its expected Page 5 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse rejuvenation are portrayed as transnational themes mobilising (p.308) Muslims regardless of their cultural background, geographical location or contemporary experience as living members in communities in the Muslim world or the diaspora. This emphasis conceals tensions between the global focus and the reality of local contexts. The tension manifests itself in debates that flourish among Saudi ideologues, ‘ulama and sympathisers. Using Saudi Arabia as a case study, I aim to capture the tension in Jihadi-Salafi thought that arises from the intersection between the global orientation and the reality of specific local contexts. Rather than selecting famous contemporary Jihadi ideologues, I draw on the messages of lesser-known Saudi authors of jihad to demonstrate the centrality of the local in the global project of making Islam a dominant and hegemonic moral world-view. Despite slogans about liberating the Arabian Peninsula from infidels, Saudi Jihadis are not specifically concerned with foreign military presence in the homeland. In fact, their violence escalated immediately after American military presence in Saudi Arabia was partially transported to neighbouring Qatar in 2003. Their project centres on the hegemony of Islam as a world order (ila kalimat al-din). However, they are still immersed and trapped in the very locality of their own homeland.

Contesting the Local State Saudi Jihadis glorify the first Saudi state (1744–1818) as dawlat al-tawhid, the monotheistic state, a political entity unbounded by defined territorial boundaries, unrecognised by the international community and uncontaminated by international treaties and legal obligations.15 This state is a local political configuration that defied regional and international forces and promised to make true Islam hegemonic. Saudi Jihadi authors regard this state as a revival of a Prophetic realm in which the community is subject to divine law and whose borders are limitless. Membership is determined not by recognised frontiers but by submission to the rightful imam, whose authority over distant territory is recognised by paying zakat, acknowledging the authority of his judges and performing jihad under his banner. In this first state, unity was expressed by belief in one God, applying his rule and swearing allegiance to his political authority on earth. Many Saudi Jihadis regard Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, rather than Muhammad ibn Saud, as the main agent and architect of this state; the former is seen as the interpreter of God's words while the latter is the executive force that enforced them. While Saudi historiography (p.309) depicts Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as the one who offered allegiance to the House of Saud, Jihadis theorise a reversed oath of allegiance (bay‘a), in which Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab received the loyalty of an insignificant local personality in an unknown settlement by the name of Diriyya in central Arabia. While Jihadis commend the Saudi ruler, they give more credit to the religious reformer, his so-called uncontaminated Islam and his efforts to fight blasphemy in the Arabian Peninsula.

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse They give this emerging state no name apart from dawlat al-tawhid, a deterritorialised polity pursuing the ultimate message of Islam, subjecting the individual to the sovereignty of God. As such, it cannot be confined to manmade borders, cultural and historical factors, ethnic and linguistic considerations or any other attributes common in defining the modern nation-state. They view it as the ideal Muslim state that rebelled against blasphemy, religious innovations and man-made law. Its collapse in 1818 at the hands of Ottoman Egyptian troops left its advocates impatiently waiting for the revival of dawlat al-tawhid in the twentieth century. However, this revival and the historical contexts in which it took place made the contemporary state contentious among Saudi Jihadi ideologues. The current Saudi state, founded in 1932, remains contested. Saudi Jihadis contest its legitimacy, name, law, borders and foreign policies. Many regard it as a corruption of the first polity. Its creation is attributed to an illegitimate relationship with an infidel power (Britain). Its name is denounced as a family fiefdom; its nationality is rejected as a modern innovation that is not anchored in Islamic text or historical practice; its foreign relations, especially its alliance with the West, violate the tenth principle of faith (iman), namely al-wala’ wa-lbara’ (association with Muslims and dissociation from infidels). In terms of the global Jihadi message it remains a rejected aberration, unlike its ancestor, the first monotheist state. Faris al-Shuwayl (also known as Shaykh Abu Jandal al-Azdi, arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2004), discusses the differences between the first state and the contemporary one in reply to a query. His reply outlines how a Muslim should proceed in his evaluation of the first state. He glorifies it, and argues that in each family there are those who are good and those who are bad. One must distinguish between the good and the debauched within the Al Saud family. The first state was one that corresponds most to the ideal Islamic polity. He lists its assets: making religion triumphant (nasrat al-din); fighting blasphemy; applying shari‘a; and purifying Islam from Sufis, philosophers and other innovators. Its unity is not derived from the cultural or ethnic characteristics of (p.310) people, common economic interest or geographical boundaries, but from belief in one God.16 The first state embodied a borderless salafiyya uncontaminated by practices or perceptions of the contemporary nation-state. The first Saudi state is contrasted with the contemporary state, which accepted a limit to its jurisdiction over territories determined by foreign powers, hence by definition a submission to blasphemous and innovative practices. Rather than spreading the flames of jihad, and consequently true Islam, the contemporary state, under foreign pressure, prohibited it. Furthermore, it opened its territories to foreign troops and allowed military bases to be established in the land of Islam. In addition, it allowed istitan, settlements of foreigners who brought their ways of life to sacred space, which should remain pure and Page 7 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse uncontaminated by the blasphemous ways of Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists.17 In spite of the global rhetoric of Jihadis, the local seems to predominate. While debating the legitimacy of the Saudi polity takes place against global slogans praising the umma, a deterritorialised configuration unbounded by cultures, borders or frontiers, Saudi Jihadis yearn to re-establish the first polity in a specific territory. In order to reach their objective and put their preaching into action, they need a state. For this purpose, they appeal to a narrow identity, the tribe, which becomes the small unit tasked with bringing about the global project. The centrality of the local states features prominently in other Jihadi projects, from Afghanistan to Iraq and Somalia. The capture of a small, insignificant city or area is immediately accompanied by a declaration of the formation of an Islamic state where shari‘a is applied. The spectacle of Islamic justice, the rule of law, public punishment and the command of virtue and prohibition of vice become symbols of the state, rather than its flag, leadership or borders.

Local and Global Identities Those who reject the contemporary state accept only two identities, one extremely narrowly anchored in either regional or tribal affiliation, and the other globally defined in a deterritorialised imagined utopia, the Muslim (p.311) umma. Jihadi ideologue Faris al-Shuwayl clearly articulates this position. In a famous letter entitled “Saudi Nationality under my Foot”, he introduces himself as Faris ibn Ahmad ibn Juman ibn Ali al-Shuwayl al-Hasani al-Zahrani al-Azadi, thus anchoring his identity in Zahran, one of the Hijazi tribes of contemporary Saudi Arabia. He asserts that he does not recognise Saudi nationality: “I am a Muslim among Muslims. I read history and did not find something called nationality (jinsiyya). Each Muslim must operate in the realm of Islam (dar al-Islam) wherever he wants and without borders restraining him or passports confining him and without a despotic nation (taghut watan) to worship. My fathers are known, my family is known, my tribe Zahran belong to the Azd. Therefore I do not belong to Al Saud, who have no right to make people belong to them.”18 By invoking his narrow tribal affiliation, al-Shuwayl departs from other Arab and Muslim Jihadis. While the latter adopt noms de guerre drawing on their homelands or home towns, for example Abu Mu‘sab al-Zarqawi, Abu Mu‘sab alSuri, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, Faris al- Shuwayl cannot possibly call himself Abu Jandal al-Saudi, an appellation rejected in his treatise on the contemporary Saudi polity. In this respect, he follows the footsteps of his comrade, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamdi (‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Ali ibn Sa‘id al-Ghamdi), one of the most prominent Saudis who fought and died in Chechnya. Unsurprisingly, I have not come across a Jihadi who presents himself as ‘Abu so-and-so al-Saudi’. Page 8 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse In a world where names and naming are crucial identity markers, this is significant. On birth, people are assigned names. However, when they adopt new names, noms de plume, or noms de guerre in later life, they do so as a political exercise. Renaming themselves becomes an important marker of a constructed identity, a rebellion against those who had initially assigned them a name. Names fix and detach. Detachability renders names a powerful political tool for establishing or erasing formal identity and crossing boundaries.19 Al-Shuwayl erases a Saudi identity, assigned by a state, contained within a geography and recognised by the international community to replace both with a new construction, drawing on ancient imagined primordial tribal belonging. He calls upon the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to remember that the return of their glory will be dependent on returning to Islam and rejecting a government that revealed obvious (p.312) blasphemy (kufr bawah), applied rule other than that of God, opened the land to Jews and crusaders, killed pious Muslims, arrested people of knowledge and stole public wealth. He calls upon the “lions of the Peninsula”, the grandsons of the muhajirun, early Muslim converts to Islam who migrated with the Prophet to Medina, and the ansar, the Medinans who supported them, to dissociate themselves from the contemporary state. It is through an appeal to the narrow tribal affiliation that al-Shuwayl envisages the rise of his brothers against the blasphemous polity. Tribal affiliation becomes the first important marker of a narrow identity that defines the individual and anchors him in an old hierarchy of noble tribes, whose prestige and standing stem from their early support for the message of the Prophet. While this identity is constructed on the basis of kinship and blood ties, the tribe acquires local significance in the war on blasphemy and the purification of the community from polytheism. It is incumbent on this narrow tribal construction to make Islam dominant and hegemonic again: local identification is put at the service of the global message. From the narrow confines of local tribal identity, al-Shuwayl moves to the global Muslim ideal, where brotherhood is established as a result of tawhid, in its spiritual rather than geographical meaning. In this typology of identities that move from the very local to the global, there is no space for modern constructions such as nationality (jinsiyya) and citizenship (wataniyya). AlShuwayl invites Muslims to reject these modern constructions, considered as instruments of division between Muslims, whose unity cannot be established on common economic interest—or any other interest except belief in one God. Common economic markets, strategic interests or any other pragmatic unifying factors are rejected as worldly and insignificant. Only the unity that stems from belief in one God is legitimate and everlasting. Al-Shuwayl strongly believes in a global “war on blasphemy”, a mirror of the global “war on terror”, both reinforcing each other. Transnational world actors, for example the successful international banker moving between New York, Page 9 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse London, Riyadh and Singapore, the transnational educator in international teaching colleges, the Ugandan, South African or Australian security guard in Baghdad, the charity worker in Qandahar and Darfur, and the international policy consultant of local governments, all have lost allegiance to a nationstate but retained a narrow marker of identity, perhaps their place of birth. Similarly, al-Shuwayl accepts only one narrow identity—that which is bestowed on him by birth within a clan, lineage and tribe. While the transnational banker is not only transnational but also cosmopolitan, embedded in (p.313) multiple spaces with an appreciation of their local cuisine, women and business networks, al-Shuwayl and many others are also cosmopolitan, seeking exogamous marriages in their new destinations, adopting the dress and culinary tastes of their temporary hosts, building transient support and solidarity networks and melting away in the complexity of new geographies. In Bosnia, Chechnya, Morocco, Afghanistan and Indonesia, transnational Saudi Jihadis enter the cultural, economic, religious and social networks of local communities. Yet all struggle to reconcile their own locality with the globalism of both their rhetoric and practices. The longing for the local in the global will continue to haunt not only violent Jihadis but also other, one hopes less destructive, transnational actors.

Tension Between the Local and the Global Nationality and citizenship cannot mediate between the very local and the very global, as has become the norm and practice in the world. There is only one path that can achieve this: the space of jazirat al-‘arab or bilad al-haramayn, a geographical entity that casts a common supra-identity deriving its legitimacy from Arab heritage and the sacred message of Islam. The Arabian Peninsula becomes the regional mediator between the tribe and the global umma. Its people become the grandsons of the companion of the Prophet, ahfad al-sahaba. This model should be the only possible and legitimate one. It stands as an elevated category among other regional configurations, for example bilad alrafidayn, bilad al-maghrib al-‘arabi, bilad al-sham and bilad alsind, all part of Islamic provinces (wilayat) out of which the Muslim umma should be constituted. The people of the Arabian Peninsula were chosen in the seventh century to carry the message of Islam, and so are they now endowed with a moral and religious responsibility. Are these wilayat not mirrors, seeking to reflect contemporary constructed cohesive sub-geographies on the basis of which world society defines the role of the local in the global from Africa and the Mediterranean to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean? Lewis ‘Atiyat Allah, another significant nom de plume, is an umami Saudi Islamist whose vision encompasses an Islamic world order that opposes and defies the current international world order, under US hegemony.20 His jihad is very much dependent on the notion of an Islamic umma, encompassing (p.314) different races, nationalities and cultural groups. The unity of this umma is derived from faith rather than race. However, Lewis turns his attention to his homeland, the most sacred territory and the core of the Muslim world, the Land of the Two Page 10 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Holy Mosques, bilad al-haramayn. His homeland is central in the establishment of the Islamic world order, but unfortunately, according to Lewis, it has become, under the current Saudi leadership, a vehicle for Western hegemony. Lewis seems to blur the boundaries between the so-called national and transnational Islamists, a dichotomy that has become fashionable in several academic studies of the Islamist movement after 9/11. The first are often seen as moderate Islamists, whereas the latter are considered representatives of the radical trend, held responsible for globalising jihad out of desperation and defeat. When Lewis “returns” to bilad al-haramayn, he is transformed into a nationalist who invokes notions of sacred territory, historical responsibility and the glorious past. For him bilad al-haramayn is not only Mecca and Medina, which are theoretically closed to non-Muslims, but the whole Arabian Peninsula. As such, the land of Islam needs to be freed from acts of defilement, manifested in the actual physical presence of non-Muslims. This foreign presence encompasses not only US soldiers and military bases, but also non- Muslim workers, especially Western expatriates. According to Lewis, foreigners, obviously regarded as profane, violate the purity of this geographical entity. Here the boundaries of bilad al-haramayn are seen as having become porous, allowing in the process a greater defilement and molestation to take place not only on the periphery but also in the core of this sacred territory. The parallels with governments struggling to limit immigration in an age of globalised capitalism, where the unbounded flow of capital and people is essential, are striking. For Lewis bilad al-haramayn 's sacredness stems from the presence of the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina as well as the fact that the last Prophet, Muhammad, appeared in this land with a sacred mission, the message of Islam. Another element in this sacredness stems from the role played by the people of this land in spreading the call (da‘wa), starting with the early companions of the Prophet, the caliphs and later generations of bilad al-haramayn. In addressing the people of this land, Lewis uses the term the grandsons of the early companions of the Prophet (ahfad al-sahaba). He calls upon ahfad al-sahaba to expel the infidels from jazirat al-‘arab, following the Prophetic tradition. Jazirat al-‘arab is another central term for Lewis. It invokes “Arab” possession of a territory, which the descriptive (p.315) nomenclature al-jazira al-‘arabiyya fails to capture. Furthermore, jazirat al- ‘arab conveys a different meaning from that implied by bilad al-haramayn. The first invokes the centrality of the Arab dimension of the jihad option and the historical responsibility of the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula to take the lead in the struggle. When Lewis invokes jazirat al-‘arab, there is no doubt that he is an Arab nationalist, thus exposing the tension between the universal Muslim community, the umma, and the particular, his own homeland. He resolves this tension by ascribing a central role to his own native land, fusing the local—his homeland—in the global project, the envisaged Islamic world order. The Arabian Page 11 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Peninsula is no longer a geographical entity but a common cultural space with a shared religion, history and destiny. It is an “imagined community” with a perceived common political and cultural heritage that falls somewhere between the modern nation-state and the larger transnational community such as the umma. According to Lewis, the hegemony of the international world order is dependent on the survival of the Saudi state in its present form, pejoratively referred to as al-nizam al-Sululi. This regime, he says, needs to be dismantled. Three conditions will contribute to its downfall. First, the Islamic reform movement was the only voice that exposed the reality of the regime, its corruption and support of Western domination in the region. As such, this movement plays an important role in dismantling the web of lies upon which the regime bases its legitimacy. Second, internal disputes within the royal family will eventually lead to the regime's downfall. Third, regular violence like that in Riyadh in 2003 and 2004 demonstrates that bin Laden is preparing the ground for the collapse of the Saudi state or a series of assassinations of key figures among the royal family. The above factors would, according to Lewis, dismantle the state that has “served the West for the last seventy years”, paving the way for Western projects and supporting their interests. Once this essential obstacle is removed, the Islamic world order would be established. However, Lewis warns that a period of chaos may ensue in the short term. Chaos often accompanies drastic changes such as the one expected to shake the nation (tahuz al-umma) after decades of submission, hypocrisy and evil. He also does not rule out the inevitability of dissent (fitna), which normally accompanies serious political and social changes. Lewis has an apocalyptic vision of the liminal period, which he describes as being chaotic and lawless. He forecasts a situation in which people will die of thirst, hunger and at the hands of thugs and criminals. This is the high price that must be paid for the establishment of the Islamic world order, (p.316) starting with the central core, bilad al-haramayn/jazirat al-arab. For Lewis, this is the collateral damage that Muslims should endure to establish the Islamic world order. The centrality of the local in the global Jihadi project manifests itself in the desire to cleanse the Arabian Peninsula and Arabs from the sin not only of actively contributing to the destruction of the Islamic caliphate in the First World War but also becoming the vanguards of this destruction. The participation of Saudis in Jihadi projects on the periphery of the Muslim umma is an act of both purification of the self and a reclamation of lost glory. While many Jihadi ideologues regard it as such, the migration of Saudi Jihadis to the periphery of the Muslim world remains contested in Saudi Jihadi circles.

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Tension In the Practice of jihad Should Saudis perform jihad at home or abroad? This question has worried Saudi Jihadis themselves and triggered off a debate among their ideologues. Jihad at home prioritises the local over the global, but in a world where these boundaries are increasingly blurred, it is difficult to see how the debate can be resolved in favour of one destination over the other. While Jihadis make decisions for strategic purposes, for example to consolidate the local network at certain times, or encourage it to go abroad either to escape local oppression or to avoid defeat, strategic decisions still need a propaganda campaign to sell them to their followers, package them in theological and ideological statements, and justify them along non-pragmatic lines. It is therefore important to trace the patterns and internal logic according to which these decisions are propagated. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered a debate about the destination of jihad among Saudi affiliates of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This invasion coincided with the augmentation of the group's activity in Saudi Arabia itself. Between 2003 and 2005 the country witnessed the worst terrorist attacks in its modern history, when government buildings, foreign residential compounds and consulates, and individual Westerners were targeted. After 9/11, the government was in a state of denial regarding the involvement of Saudi citizens in Jihadi violence. However, when this violence came home, it became clear that it represented a wake-up call, requiring the implementation of security, social and religious policies, the objective of which was to ward off the menace at home. Under the euphoria of the success of several terrorist attacks, some Saudi Jihadis clearly argued against travel abroad, and gave their reasons. Jihadi ideologues (p.317) ‘Isa al-Ushan (killed 2004), ‘Abdallah al-Rushud (killed in 2005), Sa‘ud al-‘Utaybi (killed in 2005) and Salih al-‘Uyfi(killed 2005) all supported jihad at home and made it a priority, although many later were killed in Iraq, following the tight security measures at home.21 The decision to stay at home was justified on the basis that the home front is more urgent as one cannot leave the honour of local Muslim women unattended while defending that of others abroad. Saudi Jihadis invoked belonging to the locality at the expense of the global Muslim ummah, believed to be less urgent—at least at this phase in the Jihadi project. Other Jihadis had different priorities, and proposed pursuing the two projects (at home and abroad) simultaneously. They tended to downgrade the notion of homeland, nationality and country in favour of a global project, whose aim was above all to dissolve these boundaries, believed to be an artificial colonial creation, based on a conspiracy to fragment and weaken the global umma. So far it is difficult to judge which side will gain pre-eminence. Many factors may intervene before the debate is resolved. The tightening of security at home, the increased surveillance and the ease with which Saudis travel to pursue the project of dying for faith may all be contributing factors. Those who prioritise Page 13 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse one destination over the other will certainly find a plethora of theological opinions in support of their preference. Yet many will continue to see the two as complementing and enforcing each other. The arrival of Saudi Jihadis in Iraq after its occupation in 2003 attests to the victory of those who encourage the global project at the expense of the local one.22 Also, this reflects the changing and flexible strategy that Jihadis adopt, when faced with tight local security measures. The proliferation and scattering of Jihadis globally can be a direct response to local defeat and pressure. Yet, since 2005, the Saudi government claims that it has seized weapons, funds and literature from local Jihadi cells. In 2006 and 2007, the Ministry of Interior circulated several security success stories. While it is difficult to authenticate these stories from independent sources, they clearly point to the continuing activity of local Jihadi groups. It seems that the local and the global are not (p.318) mutually exclusive. Rather, they are complementary, and both are subject to urgent conditions and practical considerations, but also in need of an ideological justification. The Saudi state itself is unique in the Muslim world because it alone projects itself as the rightful Muslim state that sponsors Islam abroad. It relies on this narrative to boost its own Islamic credentials, thus contributing to its population's internalising an understanding of a borderless Islam. Although its discourse has recently shifted towards nourishing concepts of nationhood, citizenship, pride in local achievement, prosperity and development, it remains dependent on propagating a myth that it is central to Islam achieving a hegemonic status around the world. The Saudi king is projected as the defender of the faithful wherever they happen to be. The state's outreach by religious programmes, sponsorship of Islamic global organisations, charitable funds and educational initiatives foster in Saudis a sense of being Islamic vanguards. It has proved too easy to turn those vanguards into warriors. It is this local context that has not changed while the security situation and the accompanying justification for jihad at home or abroad are in a state of flux. The persistent state mythology is constant. It is this mythology that provides the background for Saudi involvement in overseas adventures. Salafi Jihadi discourse creates unresolved contradictions. In Saudi Arabia, dissident Jihadis recognise only one state (the first Saudi state) and two identities: one originating in tribal affiliation; and one in a global Muslim construction, with the Arabian Peninsula mediating between these two distant poles. Other mediating constructions such as nationality and citizenship are rejected as forms of innovation and blasphemy whose main purpose is to divide and undermine Muslim unity. However, when action is concerned—for example, pursuing jihad —there is an ongoing debate that does not seem likely to be resolved in the near future. Some Saudi Jihadis will therefore remain at home to correct the aberration and topple the contemporary Saudi state while others will choose to pursue jihad abroad as an act of purification of Arab sins. We will continue to find them ‘ala al-thughur (on the periphery of the sacred core of the Page 14 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse world of Islam). From afar, they will aspire to make Islam once again dominant and hegemonic. In pursuing this project, Saudis are called upon to play a leading role. Their local identity is paramount in the global project. A transnational salafiyya exists as an analytical category, in addition to being the language of Jihadi violence, yet its interpretation must not override a serious assessment of local contexts, which are different from causes. (p.319) Bibliography Bibliography references: Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Awan, Akil, ‘Virtual Jihadist Media and the Ummah as Transnational Audience: Function, Legitimacy and Radicalising Efficacy’, Journal of European Cultural Studies, 10, 3 (2007), pp. 389–408. Azzam, Maha, “al-Qaida: The Misunderstood Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence”, London: Chatham House Briefing Paper 1, 2003. Bunt, Gary, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments, London: Pluto Press, 2003. Bunt, Gary, Virtually Islamic and Computer Mediated Communication and Cyber Islamic Environments, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000. Burgat, François, Face to Face with Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. Euben, Roxanne, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Gerges, Fawaz, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Hafiz, Mohammed, Suicide Bombers in Iraqi, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. Lawrence, Bruce, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, London: Verso, 2005. Olivetti, Vincenzo, Terror's Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences, Birmingham: Amadeus Books, 2003. Packer, George, ‘Knowing the Enemy’, interview with David Kilcullen, The New Yorker, 18 December 2006. Page 15 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, 2005. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, ‘The Minaret and the Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London: Hurst & Co., forthcoming (2008). Al-Rasheed, Madawi (ed.), Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Routledge, 2005. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, and Marat Shterin (eds), Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World, London: I. B. Tauris, forthcoming (2008). Schwartz, Stephen, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and its Role in Terrorism, New York: Anchor Books, 2002. al-Shuwayl, Faris [Abu Jandal ], ‘The Difference between the First and Contemporary Saudi States’, available at www.newarabia.org, accessed 26 June 2007. 319 (p.320) ———, ‘Saudi Nationality under my Foot’ (bayan sawti (oral message)), www.islah.tv, accessed 27 June 2004 (link no longer available). Tincq, Henri, ‘What is Occurring Today is a Mimetic Rivalry on Planetary Scale’, interview with René Girard, Le Monde, 6 November 2001. vom Bruck, Gabriele and Barbara Bodenhorn (eds), The Anthropology of Names and Naming, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Notes:

(1) The term “global jihad” is coined by several works drawing on many academic disciplines ranging from political science to Islamic studies. A search for the title will yield hundreds of items that circulate not only in bookshops, policy papers, pamphlets and media but also in academic studies of the phenomenon. (2) A good place to find such statements is Bruce Lawrence's translation of Osama bin Laden's speeches. See Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, London: Verso, 2005. Page 16 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse (3) Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, 2005. (4) Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.), Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 1–18; and Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 102–33. (5) An industry has grown around monitoring and disseminating these messages to Western audiences. One such industry is MEMRI, an Israeli internet business specialising in translating and disseminating two extreme messages found in the Arab media, one Jihadi and one extremely liberal. Other, in–between, views are simply ignored. Other Israeli websites include www.e-prism.org. (6) Identifying Jihadi networks proved to be more efficient in combating violence than simply controlling the internet. David Kilcullen, an Australian adviser to General Patreus in Iraq, explains the way Jihadi networks operate. See interview with David Kilcullen by George Packer, ‘Knowing the Enemy’, The New Yorker, 18 December 2006. (7) Akil Awan argues that e-jihad can be cathartic, and the radicalising effect of Jihadi internet material has been vastly inflated by media and scholars alike, particularly in discussion of Muslim diasporic audiences. See Akil Awan, ‘Virtual jihadist media and the ummah as transnational audience: function, legitimacy and radicalising efficacy’, Journal of European Cultural Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (2007), pp. 389–408. On e-jihad that is held responsible for radicalisation, see Gary Bunt, Virtually Islamic and Computer Mediated Communication and Cyber Islamic Environments, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000 and Gary Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments, London: Pluto Press, 2003. (8) In December 2007 the Saudi intelligence services held a conference in Riyadh, the main focus of which was the internet as a vehicle for the transmission of al-Qaeda messages and radicalisation of the youth. Conference participants discussed ways to control the flow of information. The assumption was that such e-messages were instrumental in radicalisation and recruitment. The government had already implemented two re-education and rehabilitation programmes (al-nasiha and al-sakina) but it also reported that some Jihadis have not been successfully reformed. For a glimpse of government's initiative to rehabilitate Jihadis returning from Guantánamo, see France 24 Reportage at http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/special-reports/FRANCE-24Reports/20071207-reporters-saudi-arabia-guantanamo-jihadist-rehabilitation. (9) See Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin (eds), Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World, London: I. B. Tauris, forthcoming (2008). Page 17 of 19

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse (10) There is a vast literature aiming to identify social, economic, religious and international causes of Jihadi violence. For a sample see, Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003; François Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003; Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and its Role in Terrorism, New York: Anchor Books, 2002. (11) For a caricature of this position, see Vincenzo Olivetti, Terror's Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences, Birmingham: Amadeus Books, 2003. (12) Maha Azzam, ‘al-Qaida: The Misunderstood Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence’, London: Chatham House Briefing Paper 1, 2003. (13) An excellent treatise on this issue is Roxanne Euben's seminal work on Sayyid Qutb: see Roxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. (14) Henri Tincq, ‘What is Occurring Today is a Mimetic Rivalry on Planetary Scale’, interview with René Girard, Le Monde, 6 November 2001. (15) On the first Saudi state, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 14–38. (16) Faris al-Shuwayl [Abu Jandal], ‘The Difference Between the First and Contemporary Saudi States’, available at www.newarabia.org,accessed 26 June 2007. (17) Faris al-Shuwayl, ‘Saudi Nationality under my Foot’ (bayan sawti (oral message)), appeared on many websites, including Saudi al-Saha and opposition websites ( www.islah.tv), accessed 27 June 2004. This link is no longer available. (18) Ibid. (19) Gabriele vom Bruck and Barbara Bodenhorn (eds.), The Anthropology of Names and Naming. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 4. (20) For a full biography of this internet Jihadi pen, see Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, pp. 175–210. (21) See Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, pp. 134–74. See also Mohammed Hafiz, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007, pp.174–8.

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The Local and the Global In Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse (22) On Saudi Jihadis in Iraq, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, ‘The Minaret and the Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, London: Hurst & Co., forthcoming (2008).

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen?

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Laurent Bonnefoy

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0015

Abstract and Keywords In this chapter traces the history of Yemeni Salafism and the problem of staying apolitical in a political context. It also describes how Yemen, through Salafi schools, became an international hub of Salafism. Keywords:   Hadi al-Wadi’i, Yemen, quietist Salafi, schools

The frequent use of the term “transnational” to describe contemporary political and religious movements can be misleading. In recent years it has increasingly become a buzzword used by academics, journalists and rulers alike to analyse Islamist groups whether violent or peaceful, political or quietist. The labelling of these movement as “transnational” or “global”, tends to highlight the fact that they are largely deterritorialised and organised in loosely structured networks.1 As such, “transnationalism” is surely a meaningful concept and helps one grasp the complexity of these important players in Middle Eastern and world politics. Yet, when people claim to be studying the transnational dimensions of the Islamist movements, these claims are often reduced to centralised foreign policy interventions and to “big politics” and national interests. Transnational organizations are considered as puppets and their own agency and agendas rarely recognised. Dominant narratives then tend to obscure the truly transnational and grass-roots dimensions of Islamist groups by focusing on state power and its supposed capacity to manipulate and control non-state organizations. The “jihad ” in Afghanistan during the 1980s is largely analysed (p.322) within such a framework and linked to the larger issue of the Cold War. Many today would acknowledge that al-Qaeda is a kind of byproduct of American Page 1 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? foreign policy or a sort of Frankenstein, a creature that simply got out of control. The Lebanese Hezbollah is said to take its orders from Tehran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s is often seen as a mere creation of the Pakistani and Saudi secret services. For its part, the Salafi movement in Yemen is perceived as a kind of “Trojan horse” of Saudi interests. For many of its opponents (many of whom have a Zaydi background) but also for some external observers, the emergence of the Salafi movement in the early 1980s around the figure of Muqbil ibn Hadi2 al-Wadi‘i embodies a process of “Saudisation” and as such is seen as a central proponent of Saudi regional policy.3 Through the funding of various Salafi institutes, the allocation of scholarships, and the control of scholars, the Saudi government has been able to forge the loyalty and allegiance of specific groups and individuals. In a way, Salafism because of its own “transnational” or “global” nature has been considered alien from Yemeni society—an imported and consequently illegitimate religious movement. Implicitly such representations question the authenticity of the organizations and assert that their development and their agenda actually have little to do with local phenomena. The transnational dimension then becomes a threat to socalled authentic national identity. All these examples tend to show how transnationalism is rarely taken seriously. The local, transnational or translocal processes in which non-state organizations take part are in fact neglected or deemed insignificant. Religious movements are considered as parts of a larger agenda that they cannot control. In that framework, transnationalism or globalism turn into slogans and merely become more fashionable ways of talking of classical state-centred international relations. As Peter Mandaville puts it: “Many International Relations theorists today would tell you that we have moved beyond our obsession with the state […]. The spectre of the state, however, is still very much with us. We tend to slip easily into realist-type language when asked to explain some aspect of contemporary world politics to someone outside the discipline […]. Theories of international relations have tended to assume that ‘proper’ politics is something involving particular forms of decision-making by particular actors within specific institutional places […]. There are other forms of world politics to which IR theory is (p.323) effectively blind because it has only been taught to recognize a limited range of shapes and colours as political.”4

The concept of “transnationalism” appeared in the 1970s in the field of international relations with a very precise meaning that has often been lost along the way.5 It was originally designed to describe processes and organizations able to escape state power intentionally or not, to act for themselves on the world scene and not for the sake of some kind of abstract national interest. The whole purpose of that concept was to highlight the Page 2 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? existence of mundane political interactions outside of the state, in the gaps of “realist” international relations and power politics. Obviously, it would be foolish to claim that transnational flows, particularly religious ones, are never used by governments or are immune from power relations. Transnational organizations (such as business firms, NGOs or churches) can indeed lack autonomy but it would be equally wrong to ignore their independence for the sake of giving easy explanations or designating culprits (Iran, Saudi Arabia, American imperialism, etc.) for the development of “unwanted” political and religious movements. Building on the case study of Salafism in contemporary Yemen, we mean to evaluate the capacity of religious movements to interact on the world scene outside of state control in often informal, mundane and non-institutionalised ways. More specifically, we intend to show that, contrary to what is stated in many narratives, Salafism in Yemen has acquired significant autonomy from Saudi Arabia and has adapted to the local context while still structuring itself around specific transnational relations. If one is to accept the idea that Salafis in Yemen are part of a globalised and transnational movement, one must also understand their capacity to act as autonomous organizations that may have their own agenda, one distinct from those states that supposedly sponsor them.

Overview of the Salafi movement In Yemen The contemporary Salafi movement emerged in Yemen at the beginning of the 1980s around the figure of Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and his Dar al-Hadith (p. 324) institute in the small town of Dammaj (around 250 kilometres north of San‘a).6 From the start, the personal history of its founder and particularly his experience in Saudi Arabia (from where he was expelled in early 1979) have established the Salafis as a transnational entity. Inside Yemen, the development of the movement has been rendered particularly visible by a number of distinctive practices such as clothing and socio-linguistic habits. Through these, Salafis clearly express their will to stay as much as possible out of “corrupt” society by refusing to participate in social events, such as religious festivals, traditional music or qat consumption.7 What sets them apart from other Islamist groups (with whom links may exist) is their quietist and apolitical stance. Indeed they refuse to participate in elections and strongly reject party politics (hizbiyya), democracy and all kinds of institutions, be it charity or proselyte associations.8 Political intervention and opposition to governments in the Muslim world can even be considered as wholly negative as they only bring about corruption and division among the population. Building on Ibn Taymiyya's aphorism asserting that “sixty years under an oppressive imam are preferable to one night without one”, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i says that the independence of South Yemen from British rule in 1967 was worse than colonialism since it brought to power a socialist government and led to the death of fellow Muslims.9 Consequently, power must be respected, even if it is corrupt; Muslims should be

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? patient and, God willing, wait for better times. In that context, the ‘ulama can only intervene in the political field by giving reverential advice to the ruler. This Salafi ideal, although challenged by some of its followers in the 1990s and more recently after Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's death in 2001–2002, remains dominant. It lives on through a network of institutes, mosques and (p.325) bookshops that are present in most regions of Yemeni territory. In less than three decades it has emerged as a significant religious identity able to compete with existing groups: Zaydis, Sufis or even the Muslim Brothers.10 Since Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's death, three major figures remain: Muhammad al- Imam in Ma‘bar and Yahya al-Hajuri in Dammaj are considered the perpetrators of alWadi‘i's doctrine, while Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi in Ma’rib, a cleric of Egyptian origin, is accused of being overtly political, of creating a charity association, and of betraying the movement. Inside the Salafi institutes, the main occupation of the scholars and students is to study the hadith (sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad). They inspired to authentic (sahih) broadcast of the hadith. The content of the hadith is secondary, Salafis seek to apply the text literally. Their ambition is universal and apolitical. Whatever the time and place, no matter the context, the teachings and prescriptions found in the hadith and in the Qur’an are to be implemented. Every trivial question then finds an easy and irrefutable answer in the sayings and actions of the Prophet and of the first generations of Muslims. Through that work, Salafis seek to re-evaluate the dominant assumptions and might even go against the consensus of the four traditional Sunni schools of jurisprudence (madhhab). For instance, Salafis in Yemen believe it is not compulsory to take one's shoes off to enter a mosque. For them, the sources of jurisprudence are clear. Scholars need not know the context to give sane advice. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, al-Wadi‘i criticised the tendency of some former Salafis (who had established an association called al- Hikma) to get involved in politics, accusing them of claiming that in Yemen Salafis should refer to scholars who are knowledgeable of the local situation, which is only possible when they themselves are Yemenis. Al-Wadi‘i then asserted that his only references are the Qur’an and the Sunna which know no borders. The Salafi creed's focus on the questions of cult and religious guidance (prayer, fasting, dress code, etc) imply a decontextualisation of the references. Whether a question is asked in the Paris suburbs, in Dammaj, Birmingham, Riyadh or Jakarta makes no difference. With that in mind, the fatwa and advice given by the ‘ulama in books, recorded conferences or on the (p.326) internet are theoretically the same everywhere and should be implemented whatever the situation and nationality.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Such universalist ambition implies a will to bypass states, and permits the Salafis to easily enter transnational flows. Indeed, as far as they are concerned, the state and the nation are not legitimate points of reference. Throughout most of their publications, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and his followers insist on their respect for the decisions taken by the governments and rulers (as long as they are Muslim). As they say, their aim is not to exercise leadership and take power, in return they ask that the governments just let them be. On the objectives of the Salafi doctrine, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i states: “Your doctrine is clear, the rulers know that you do not want government positions (karasi) and do not care for mundane things, that you do not advocate revolt (khuruj) against them since your doctrine doesn’t advise you to disobey a Muslim government. For instance, I pay the custom duty for my car even though I think taxes are illegal but it is the state's duty to determine the level of these taxes, not mine.”11 In a 1995 conference, the founder of the Yemeni Salafi movement went on to say: “If I am censored, there will be strong reactions […]. That is why I advise the government not to do it. You were courageous when people abroad accused you of harbouring terrorists and you answered ‘No, we only have ‘ulama that teach the Qur’an and the Sunna’. My brothers, I tell you, if the government was intelligent, it would leave us alone.”12 Furthermore, from the Salafi perspective, states only have limited powers that can be applied to specific territories, and they are often inefficient and incapable by themselves of implementing the word of God. Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i asserts: “The victory of Islam today is the result of the work done in mosques. […] America and Russia are more frightened of the people of the Islamic awakening than of the leaders and kings. They are not afraid of our tanks, planes and military. They are afraid of Islam and of those who are active in Islam.”13 The Salafis’ stance towards the state and the nation favours participation in transnational flows and dynamics. Indeed, their disparagement of state structures as well as their fear of repression (that al-Wadi‘i experienced in the (p.327) late 1970s while in Saudi Arabia) encourages them to find other spaces and scales of intervention. The multiple connections between the political and religious arenas in Yemen and Saudi Arabia also reinforce such a propensity. Beyond its financial dependence on sponsorship from various foreign institutions and individuals, Salafism in Yemen is characterised by a number of transnational practices and, at least partially, appears as a result of the interpenetration of the societies of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, through common history, migrations and proximity.14

Manifestations of Transnationalism The Salafi movement in contemporary Yemen structures itself around multiple transnational flows. These often manage to go largely unnoticed by the Page 5 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? governments and are certainly not the products of centralised foreign policies. Within these flows, one should be careful to distinguish between different levels of transnationalisation. The types of flows between scholars and institutes are different from those between activists and at grass-roots level. While the first might be well organised and structured around specific proselyte objectives, the latter are not necessarily purpose built and can appear as largely fortuitous or even incidental. Indeed, Salafism has found a fertile ground because of the already massive transnational flows inside the Arabian Peninsula, whether commercial, cultural or religious. In fact, while these might most often be considered as meaningless when compared to more direct interventions (sponsoring of institutes, circulation of books, scholarships offered to students, building of mosques) they most certainly play a central role in the development of Salafism and consequently should not be ignored. While states and governments are able to control the number of immigrants and can close borders, they can hardly stop communication and exchange. Emigration from Yemeni villages to Saudi cities, personal and collective trajectories and the growing scarcity of job opportunities (in the mid-1980s, around a quarter of the male workforce of North and South Yemen worked abroad, largely in Saudi Arabia) have profoundly transformed ways of life and religious identities in the homeland. Like that of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's own experience in Saudi Arabia has been structural. (p.328) Obviously, it would be wrong to consider that emigration automatically transforms one's religious practice and leads to Salafism. The uncomfortable and precarious status of the Yemeni mughtaribin (expatriates) while in Saudi Arabia and the brutal eviction of around 800,000 of them in 1990, during the Gulf War, have left them bitter. The image these individuals get of the Saudi religious sphere is far from clear: flawed representations are transmitted to those remaining in Yemen. The religious doctrine Salafis and others try to follow is a kind of proxy that institutions and states are incapable of really controlling. It becomes a mix of Muqbilian doctrine, of local reinterpretations and of larger scale da‘wa presented in television shows or built by the imaginations and aspirations of individuals or groups. Consequently, outcomes of the whole process are unexpected. Salafism at grass-roots level is particularly flexible, it adapts to one's own experience and agenda and underlies a whole variety of different social habits. In such a context, the development of Salafism in Yemeni society is much less linked to the direct experience of Saudi society or to the concrete intervention of foreign organizations than to the indirect effects of migration and the interpenetration of societies and of religious fields. Salafism travels through images, through the marketing of identities and is a kind of subculture that appeals to young men and women because of its novelty.15 It also travels because of its association with the economically successful Saudi environment

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? and way of life most Yemenis are now unable to enter because of the migration restrictions.

Flows of Audiotapes, Books and People The origins of the religious references used by the movement are an indication of the Salafis’ global, universal and transnational approach. You can see within these flows the central role played by Saudi organisations and references, which often appear to play the role of big brothers, godfathers or sponsors. The transnational flows are part of a larger and more ambitious policy that Gregory Gause once described as a “Riyalpolitik”.16 Petrodollars are an efficient way of buying the loyalty of its competitors. Yet, as we will see further (p.329) on, one should not be mistaken: the development of Salafism in the Yemeni environment is far more than merely a process of “Saudisation”. In the Salafi bookshops thousands of recorded conferences or preachings are made available to all. These originate from Yemen and Saudi Arabia but also from Egypt, Syria or the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf states. Each country seems to have a specialised set of themes. The development of the Sururi Salafi movement in Kuwait (which is more overtly political than the Muqbilian trend) and the interaction with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have produced politicised sermons, while conferences on religious guidance or recitations of the Qur’an seem to be Saudi specialities. It is for instance, quite striking that no Yemeni is famous for these recitations (tajwid). In the bookshops, conferences addressing a whole variety of themes are copied onto audio tapes in an informal way according to the customer's demand. They are often poor in quality and sometimes even inaudible when they have been recorded over the telephone. These play a central role in the development of the Salafi doctrine all over Yemen. The high levels of illiteracy (51 per cent of the population in 2002 according to the World Bank), the low price of the tapes (less than a dollar each) as well as their robustness turns these recorded conferences into efficient instruments of propaganda that can easily be reproduced. They are not distributed through pre-established networks. A few Egyptian or Saudi recording companies do sell their own recordings, labelled and beautifully wrapped, yet these are marginal in number. The dominant scheme of distribution is rather decentralised. Interpersonal relations between owners of bookshops, the purchase of a specific recorded conference by a student or the imam of a mosque during a visit to another town or country are the main circulation patterns of this media. Therefore no consistent ideology can be predetermined and found throughout the territory; confronting sources might even be sold in the same shop: some critical of Saudi Arabia, others praising its government, others close to the Muslim Brothers etc. The Tasjilat al-Iman cassette shops, established by ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, the main leader of the radical fringe of the Muslim Brotherhood, are present in all the major cities of the country. Yet their catalogue of recorded conferences and publications is not fixed from one Page 7 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? shop to another. The fact that some of this network's shops even sell conferences by Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i who was known for his harsh criticism of al-Zindani and of the Muslim Brotherhood is an illustration of the loose ideological control of the (p.330) distribution. Such diversity and absence of a fixed and coherent ideology has consequences for the capacity of the local organizations to adapt to their own specific context and build their own agenda. At an individual level, they have a tendency to mix different sources and therefore can not appear as pure Salafi ideal-types. The doctrine fixed by the ‘ulama is never fully respected and implemented. The circulation of books is certainly more structured and also indicates the level of transnationalisation of the movement. The main Yemeni Salafi publishers are Dar al-Athar and Maktabat al-Athariyya, which both publish the texts of Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i. In their bookshops, they not sell only the publications of the Yemeni scholars but also of many foreign ‘ulama, some of whom are close to the Saudi government (like Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan or ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd alRahman ibn Jibrin) and published by Dar al-Imam Ahmad, based in Cairo, or by other publishing houses in Riyadh. A San‘a bookshop called Al-Imam al-Albani sells Egyptian Salafi publications almost exclusively. Many foreign publications, pamphlets or tracts are photocopied, bound together and then sold in small shops. Publications by international Islamic organizations, particularly Dar alWatan that sells books by the Saudi religious establishment, or Maktabat alFurqan of the United Arab Emirates that sells pamphlets at a very low price, are widely available. Periodicals, some of them Yemeni (al-Fiqh fî-l-Din for example), are published by the supporters of Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi. Nida’ al-Salafiyya is published by the association of the female students of al-Sharqayn mosque in San‘a, and some transnational titles like al-Salafiyya, al-Furqan, al-Sunna or alBayan also appear. All participate in the circulation of Salafi ideas among the public at large. They are also an indication of the integration of the Salafis in Yemen in a larger transnational field that shares certain references and social practices. Despite the fact that it is theoretically banned by Muqbilian Salafis, television plays an increasingly important role. The new generation of the Salafi movement around the al-Hikma association and Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, is less critical of this media. Private satellite channels funded with Saudi or Kuwaiti money like Iqra and al-Majd, which broadcast shows hosted by former Saudi militants Salman al-‘Awda and ‘A’id al-Qarni are a reference point for activists. The internet too has become a new space for the circulation of Salafi ideas. Yet, its role should not be over-emphasised in a country like Yemen where few people actually have access to the world wide web. Certain foreign sites such as sahab.net with its particularly active forums, played a central role in the (p.331) competition between the supporters of Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’rabi and Yahya alHajuri after Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's death. On the different transnational Page 8 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Salafi websites, national and international events are analysed and those texts deemed particularly interesting may be printed out to be sold in bookshops, using a more traditional channel of circulation. The main figures of Salafism in Yemen all have their own websites which give access to some of their publications and latest conferences. Nevertheless, these websites play a limited role inside Yemen and rather being considered useful tools for spreading ideas outside the country. For example, the large Salafi institute of Muhammad alImam in Ma‘bar grants no internet access to its students and in 2006 there were still no public connections in town. The low level of computer equipment reflects a reluctance towards the internet itself which is often regarded as a corrupt medium. It is quite significant that the sahab.net homepage has a link towards a section devoted to the theological justification for the use of computers and internet. The transnational aspects of Salafism mean a capacity for projection beyond national borders, and the ability to receive, but also emit, information, people and funds outside the traditional inter-state norms. Yemen is not only a recipient but also a transmitter of religious flows. Although reliable data is missing, the external influence of Yemeni Salafism is symbolised by the presence of numerous foreign students in the teaching institutes. Students from the Horn of Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, West Africa and Western Europe have transformed Yemen into a truly global centre of Salafism. The fact that its society appears to outsiders as having been preserved from Western influences and “corruption” when compared to other Arab and Islamic countries has turned Yemen into a place of authenticity and of refuge for many activists.17 European Salafi websites give lists of the direct phone numbers of different Salafischolars, some of whom are Yemeni.18 Some students are sent to the Yemeni institutes at an early age, as is the case of a Somali who claimed to have already been at the al-Khayr for four years by the time he was fifteen. In various conferences Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi‘i himself defends the presence of foreigners in his network of institutes and insists on the fact that they play a central role in spreading the doctrine. Referring to his own harsh experience in Saudi Arabia, he declares that he would prefer to have his own house destroyed by (p.332) bulldozers than see one of his students deported or imprisoned. He then adds that “foreign students are an honour to Yemen.”19 The issue of the networks that help these students to come to Yemen is largely taboo and is the object of many fantasies by the Yemeni government, foreign analysts and the Salafis themselves. The influence of former Dar al- Hadith students in Somalia and Indonesia, for instance, is probably underestimated, as they are likely to play roles in the ongoing conflicts in these countries. (For more on the transnational relations between Indonesian students and Yemen, see chapter 7).

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? The titles given to a number of recorded conferences by Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi‘i and other scholars sold in Salafi bookshops are also a sign of the global integration of Salafism. Amongst these conferences, the most prominent ones are Jawahir al-Sunniya fial-As’ila al-Faransiyya [The Sunni Jewels in French Questions], As’ilat ba‘dh al-Mughtaribin fiAmrika [Questions of some Expatriates in America], As’ilat Shabab Indunisya [Questions of the Indonesian Youth] and As’ilat al-Salafiyyin al-Britaniyyin [Questions from the British Salafis]. In return, such transnational influence is a source of legitimacy and prestige for the Yemeni ‘ulama. The international mobility of the leaders of the Salafi movement tangibly marks their participation in global dynamics. Such a phenomenon is not new, the ‘ulama have long been travellers. Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's experience in Saudi Arabia is not unique: Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi arrived in Yemen fleeing repression in Egypt, scholars from socialist South Yemen found refuge in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, while other Salafis, like Ahmad Hasan al- Mu‘allim of the al-Hikma association spent numerous years in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Transnational Sponsors Another central element of the transnationalisation of Salafism is obviously its funding. This issue should not be over-emphasised and it would be wrong to assume that sponsorship automatically forges an allegiance and engenders dependency. Much has been said about the sponsoring of Islamic movements by the Gulf states and by proselytising associations. It is certain that different Saudi organisations, such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Nadwa al-‘Alamiyya li-l-Shabab al-Islami) and the World Islamic League, but also (p.333) Kuwaiti ones, such as the Organisation of the Revival of the Islamic Heritage (Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami), which are close to the government, have played and still play an important role in the development of Salafism in Yemen. The Scientific Institutes (Ma‘ahid ‘Ilmiyya), an important parallel network of primary and secondary schools, with a religious syllabus that is said to have favoured the emergence of conservative Islamist movements and was indirectly funded by the Saudi state and headed by individuals close to the Muslim Brotherhood, only came under government control in 2002.20 Since the 1970s, scholarships offered by the Saudi embassy in San‘a have allowed Yemeni students to study in Saudi religious universities, particularly the Imam Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud University of Riyadh (established in 1953) and the Islamic University of Medina (established in 1961). These experiences have helped structure the political and religious fields in Yemen around specific figures that have been educated in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the large fortunes of the ‘ulama of the Saudi establishment, most specifically of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, as well as the large network of charity organisations, have helped finance the activities of Salafi centres in Yemen. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, former Saudi militant, explained that in the 1980s, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and Dar al-Hadith received 15,000 Saudi riyals every two Page 10 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? months from the Saudi government: “This aid was only interrupted when two supporters of al-Wadi‘i visited ibn Baz and, in a public assembly, questioned the legitimacy of the Saudi government.”21 In the hagiography he published after ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz's death, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i insisted on how much the mufti of Saudi Arabia had helped many Yemeni students to study at Saudi institutes and to “go wherever they wished”.22 Indeed, Ibn Baz played an important role in maintaining transnational relations between the Salafi groups despite diplomatic tensions between the two countries and despite Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's harsh criticism of the Saudi government. In the 1990s, the alHaramayn Charity Foundation (Mu’assasat al-Haramayn al-Khayriyya), indirectly controlled by the Saudi government, (p.334) sponsored the Dar al-Hadith Institute. In a number of conferences, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i recalled the supportive role of this particular association which after 9/11 came under intense American scrutiny and was dissolved in 2004. The institutional origin of the funds led to much debate within al- Wadi‘i's movement. Many asked whether it was legitimate to accept money from foreign associations while Salafis actively reject the creation of associations. Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i disavowed alHaramayn in the mid-1990s when this charity organisation started sending more money to dissident Salafi groups such as al-Hikma and al-Ihsan, whom he deemed illegitimate. These dissident Salafi organisations also received assistance from Saudi and Qatari activists especially during “summer tours”. For a former Saudi activist who participated in these proselytising tours for the alIhsan association: “These visits in the Yemeni Salafi centres allowed us to give conferences and helped us control the syllabus in order to see if it matched the desires of the Saudis who were financing the association. This money complemented the money already paid by the Saudi government.”23 As stated earlier, such transnational institutional sponsorship should not draw attention away from other forms of finance that are less structured. Individuals, particularly Saudi businessmen of Yemeni origin, but also workingclass expatriates, finance these institutes and selected local mosques without necessarily being Salafis themselves. Such contributions are simply part of larger strategies that help get their names known through generosity. In return, these flows (that are not specifically religious) help to give migration a positive image and to promote Saudi Arabia as a land of opportunities and prestige. One often likes to think that Islamist movements, like terrorist groups, require large sums of money and that targeting the sources of funding is the best way to weaken their influence.24 This is not entirely true. In fact it appears that flows of money are not the main indicators of transnationalisation. As Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi‘i states: “Our da‘wa is humble and does not require much money. We manage to mobilise people simply with a few dates and water.”25 Indeed, the management of the institutes and mosques does not seem to require large amounts of riyals, it does not use sophisticated techniques of (p.335) propaganda and is largely self-financed through local forms of solidarity. Page 11 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Through the system of zakat and sadaqa (Islamic taxes) and because these mosques are integrated in the awqaf (a centralised system that redistributes the money gathered by religious properties, often in the form of rents), the institutes manage to be at least partially independent. The institute buildings and the dorms of the students are in poor shape and very humble, even at times dirty, and students often insist on the austerity of their life in Dar al-Hadith.

‘Saudisation’ Versus Transnationalisation As stated earlier, the transnationalisation of the Yemeni Salafi movement is not to be considered as mere ‘Saudisation’. Despite the fundamental role played by the various Saudi organizations and sources, some of which can even be considered to represent the government, Muqbilian Salafism has long been critical of Saudi Arabia and has, to a certain extent, structured itself in opposition to the monarchy. As such, the movement is a clear example of how influence and sponsorship do not automatically translate into the emergence of an allegiance. Salafism clearly expresses the power and capacity of transnational flows to escape control. Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's links to the Saudi environment and state and to the Salafis in general since the beginning of the 1980s are ambiguous. Throughout most of his life, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i has been an opponent rather than a supporter of the Saudi government. On many occasions he attacked the monarchy, insulted King Fahd, calling him “stupid”,26 and saying that “he is a man who doesn’t like religion, who helps enemies of Islam and hates the ‘ulama.”27 He even asked the Al Sa‘ud to resign, arguing that they are not legitimate because they are not from the Quraysh and said: “We hated the royal family and we continue today to inform of its bad actions in terms of religion and of the numerous atrocities it has committed in the Land of the two Sanctuaries, of Najd and of Hijaz and of its sponsoring of heretics.”28 At times, he even refused to use the word “Saudi” since, as he claimed, it hasn’t (p.336) been revealed by God and constantly referred to Ard al-Haramayn wa Najd (Land of the two sanctuaries and Najd) when speaking of contemporary Saudi Arabia. Yet, his most severe verbal attacks focused on Saudi foreign policy in South Yemen. He accused the government of helping the heretic communist regime in Aden, of supporting the socialist secession in 1994 and of trying to divide Yemeni society in order to steal its resources. It was only in 2000, when he was severely ill (suffering from cirrhosis or liver cancer) that Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i returned to Saudi Arabia and was formally reconciled with the government. The settlement was later explained in a book called My Experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that was published after his death and in which he asked that his publishers censor his previous critiques of the Saudi government. Despite this final about turn, al- Wadi‘i cannot be considered an instrument of Saudi Arabia. Not only had he previously Page 12 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? shown his independence, but he expressed disagreements with the ‘ulama from that country, whether they were close to the royal family or part of the opposition. While he did not forbid his students from going to study at the Islamic University in Medina, he did not advise them to go there either. Besides considering ibn Baz to be wrong in 1990 when he authorised the presence of foreign troops in the Arabian peninsula, he also criticised his conception of refutation and rectification (jarh wa ta‘dil), a central Islamic notion. Indeed, while ibn Baz and the ‘ulama of the Wahhabi institution say advice to the ruler should be kept silent in order to maintain loyalty and unity, al-Wadi‘i said that disagreements with the wali al-amr (political ruler) and between ‘ulama can be made public in order to “shake their conscience and correct them”.29 He claimed that it is then possible to insult and stigmatise ignorants on the condition that we are ourselves people of knowledge (ahl al-‘ilm) or that we have been oppressed by those we criticise (which is the case with al- Wadi‘i as he believed he was unjustly expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1979). This interpretation of jarh wa ta‘dil allows the Salafi entrepreneurs to actually play a political role. They therefore neglect their vow of allegiance to the ruler or at least “voice” their differences. Al-Wadi‘i's relations with Saudi opposition movements were not simple either. The Sahwa al-Islamiyya30 movement and the Sururiyya (see for more (p.337) on the case of movement led by Muhammad Surur Zayn ‘Abidin, in the section on biographies of Salafi thinkers and leaders, as well as chapter 7 and the role of the Sururiyya in the disputes between Indonesian Salafis) which emerged in the 1980s as the most popular rivals of the monarchy were both criticised as they were accused of practising hizbiyya (party politics). Osama bin Laden, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the other jihadi movements were, for their part, accused of practising takfir and of not respecting the ruler. In the mid-1990s, alWadi‘i criticised bin Laden, whom he accused of “refusing to give 20,000 Saudi riyals to build a mosque while he gave 100,000 riyals to buy machine guns.”31 Through all these differences with both official and dissident groups, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i built a distinct but popular Salafi doctrine, showing his independence from the Saudi model while continuing to be influenced by, and to influence, the global Salafi movements.

The Limits to Transnationalisation Salafism is certainly not a free-floating movement that is disconnected from power politics. In the broad picture of Salafism in Yemen outlined throughout this chapter, we intend to show that states and localities are not absent and indeed can play a significant role. As a matter of fact, the governments’ capacity for control and the Salafis’ own restrictions create a number of limits to the transnationalisation of the movement.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? The first and most significant limit is the fact that Salafism has consistently been used by the Yemeni state. The “apolitical” Salafis play a very political role and have received indirect assistance and benevolent tolerance from the government. For instance, it turned a blind eye towards manifestations of violence by Salafi militants against Sufigroups in Aden and Hadramaut in 1994 and 1995.32 Since 2004 and the start of the Sa‘da conflict between the government and Zaydi groups, headed by Husayn al-Huthi and his brothers, Salafi militants are also said to have assisted the army in repressing this group. During the September 2006 presidential elections, Salafischolars, particularly Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi and his rival Yahya al-Hajuri, highlighted the illegitimacy of all opposition candidates (even the one supported by the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), who indirectly supported President ‘Ali ‘Abd Allah Salih. (p.338) From the government's point of view, the Salafi doctrine is convenient, as it helps undermine support for more political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brothers and the Zaydi revivalists, as well as for socialists in former South Yemen. Furthermore, the Salafis’ stigmatisation of other political and religious groups or parties has created tensions between the different organizations. The division of its opponents has long been a strategy of ‘Ali ‘Abd Allah Salih's regime and, owing to his length of time in power (he has been ruling Yemen since 1978), appears to be quite successful. The Muqbilian Salafi doctrine indeed helps keep parts of the population away from politics and considers all opposition to the ruler to be illegitimate. Salafis are not direct competitors and as such they have been the indirect allies of the government. Consequently, abstention during local or national elections favours candidates of the ruling party. In the post-9/11 context and following Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's death, the refutation of violence and terrorism has become a central issue inside the Salafi movement. The rising repression of Islamist groups whether by the Yemeni government or by other states has put the Salafi movement under much scrutiny and has given the state new ammunition.33 Its transnational dimensions have become suspect and scholars and activists alike have become eager to clarify their position on the matters of violence in order to escape state repression. Books condemning terrorist attacks have been published,34 and Muhammad alImam, now probably the most charismatic Salafi figure in Yemen, organised a conference in 2003 condemning jihad in Iraq against the US-led occupation35 . He claimed that in order to be legitimate, jihad had to be endorsed by the Yemeni government, which as a new ally of the United States in the “global war on terror” it would never do. In such a context, Yemenis leaving for Iraq were considered illegitimate fighters. While Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i's personality helped the Yemeni Salafi movement remain relatively independent, his reconciliation with the Saudi government and his subsequent death indirectly restored the influence of the Page 14 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Saudi ‘ulama close to the Wahhabi establishment and to the state, particularly Rabi‘ al-Madkhali and Salih al-Fawzan. No figure in Yemen seemed fit and knowledgeable enough to pursue al-Wadi‘i's mission. Since then, the Salafi (p. 339) movement in Yemen has normalised its position and has along the way abandoned much of what constituted its trademark. As such, its leaders appear, more than ever to defend both the interests of the Yemeni and Saudi governments, therefore limiting its truly transnational dimensions. Another restraint to the transnationalisation process can be found in the Salafis’ own practices and restrictions. For long, their willingness to remain independent from other movements and from other states, but also to legitimise themselves inside Yemen has limited their “globalness”. The movement is by no means totally deterritorialised as it has sought to embed itself in Yemeni society. The Salafis’ nationalist and religious criticism of Saudi Arabia until 2000 is a clear example of adaptation to Yemeni standards36 and debates.37 Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi‘i's stance during the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s also expresses a restraint in regard to the global dimensions of Salafism. This war against the Soviet Red Army has often been considered as the symbol of the transnationalisation of Islamist groups, yet for Muqbilian Salafis, fighting in the far away Afghan highlands was considered a lower priority than the struggle against the socialist regime of South Yemen. They therefore remained critical of the political outcomes of the Afghan war and preferred to stay away from such transnational networks of fighters. Its tense relations with the Saudi government also led to a certain degree of isolation of the Yemeni Salafi movement. Yemeni Salafischolars certainly lack mobility when compared to other truly transnational figures such as the Sufis from Hadramawt al-Habib ‘Ali al-Jiffri and al-Habib ‘Umar ibn Hafidh who have built networks reaching out in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, North America and Europe. Apart from his Saudi experience (and possibly a visit to Egypt, where he apparently (p.340) started a doctorate in the mid-1970s), Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i does not seem to have travelled much, while his heirs did not study abroad and as such might appear secluded. Obviously the limited transnational characteristics of Yemen's Salafi movement highlighted here are not sufficient to erase the various and complex transnational flows that have structured Salafism in Yemen for the last thirty years. At the level of the religious leaders as well as at grass-roots level, Salafism has developed largely due to its penetration of societies within the Arabian Peninsula. Commerce history, migration and communications have been able to bypass political borders and build an integrated space with a certain coherence. Salafism has also emerged as a significant movement through ordinary daily transnational practices. This capacity to combine local concerns and references while still being rooted in the larger context and shaped by the social and religious interpenetrations in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, is a remarkable feature of Salafism in Yemen and has been key to its success.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? Bibliography Bibliography references: Abu Zayd, Amin, al-Wahhabiyya wa khataruha ‘ala mustaqbal al-Yaman al-siyasi, Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Basa’ir, 1991. Bonnefoy, Laurent, ‘Les identités religieuses contemporaines au Yémen: convergence, résistances et instrumentalisations’, Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée (Aix-en-Provence), no. 121–122 (2007), pp. 201–15. Burgat, François, and Sbitli, Mohamed, ‘Les Salafis au Yémen ou … la modernisation malgré tout’, Chroniques Yéménites (San‘a), no. 10 (2003), pp. 123–52. Carapico, Sheila, ‘Arabia Incognita: An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies’, in M. Al- Rasheed, R. Vitalis (eds), Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, New York: Palgrave, 2004, pp. 11–33. Du Bouchet, Ludmila, ‘The State, Political Islam and Violence: The Reconfiguration of Yemeni Politics since 9/11’, in A. Blom, L. Bucaille, L. Martinez (eds), The Enigma of Islamist Violence, London: Hurst, 2007, pp. 137– 64. Gause, Gregory, Saudi–Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Haykel, Bernard, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad alShawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. al-Imam, Muhammad, Hay ‘ala al-jihad… lakin, recorded conference, 2003. al-Imam, Muhammad, Tanwir al-dhulumat bi-kashf mafasid wa shubuhat alintikhabat, NE, 1996. Keohane, Robert, and Nye, Joseph, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. Knysh, Alexander, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi-SufiConflict (from Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 4 (2007), pp. 503–30. (p.341) Mandaville, Peter, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, London: Routledge, 2001.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? al-Ma’ribi, Abu al-Hasan, al-Tafjirat wa al-ightiyalat: al-asbab, al-athar, al-‘ilaj [Bombings and Killings: Reasons, Effects and Solutions], Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004. al-Nuqaydan, Mansur, ‘Géographie des islamistes en Arabie Saoudite et affaire du takfîr. Commenté par Alain Gresh’, Maghreb Machrek, no. 179 (2004), pp. 117–31. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Rosenau, James, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. al-Sayani, Abd Allah Hashim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Salafiyyun fial-Yaman, San‘a: Markaz al-Ra’id, 2002. Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: Al-Qaeda and the Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror, London: I. B. Tauris, 2007. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, Middle East Policy (London), vol. 8, no. 4 (2001), pp. 18–38. Selection of the Writings and Conferences of Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i

———, Hadhihi al-Sururiyya faihdharuha! (This Is the Sururiyya, So Be Careful!), recorded conference, 1995. ———, (ed.), Tarjamat Abi ‘Abd al-Rahman Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, San‘a: Maktabat al-Athariyya, 1999. ———, al-Dibaj fimarathat shaykh al-islam samahat al-shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz [The Silk in the Funeral Oration of the Shaykh al-Islam , His Excellency Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz], San’aa: Maktabat al-Idrisi al-Salafiyya, 1999. ———, al-Makhraj min al-fitna [The exit from disorder], 3rd edn, San‘a: Maktabat al- Athariyya, 2002. ———, Ijabat al-sa’il ‘ala ahamm al-masa’il [Answer to Those Who Ask The Most Important Questions], San‘a: Maktabat al-Athariyya, 2004. ———, ‘Hawl kalimat Wahhabi’ [About the word Wahhabi] in M. al-Wadi‘i (ed.), Maqtal al-shaykh Jamil al-Rahman al-Afghani [The Murder of Shaykh Jamil alRahman al-Afghani], San‘a: Dar al-Athar, 2006, p. 32–42. ———, al-Suyuf al-batira li-ilhad al-shuyu‘iyya al-kafira [The Cutting Swords for the Impious Communist Heresy], no date. ———, al-Madhhab al-Zaydi (The Zaydi School), recorded conference, no date. Page 17 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? ———, Jawahir al-Sunniya fial-as’ila al-Faransiyya [The Sunni Jewels in the French Questions], recorded conference, no date. ———, Nasihati li-l-sha‘bayn al-Yamani al-Sa‘udi [My Advice to the Two Peoples of Yemen and Saudi Arabia], recorded conference, no date. ———, Ihdharu fitnat al-Sa‘udiyya [Beware of the Saudi Disorder], recorded conference, no date. ———, As’ila ‘an hayat al-shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i wa siratuhu [Questions on the Life of Shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and His Biography], recorded conference, no date. 341 Notes:

(1) Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, Middle East Policy (London), vol. 8, no. 4 (2001), pp. 18–38. (2) For more on Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, see the brief biography of him at the end of this volume. (3) Amin Abu Zayd, al-Wahhabiyya wa khataruha ‘ala mustaqbal al-Yaman alsiyasi [Wahhabism and its danger for Yemen's political future], Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Basa’ir, 1991. (4) Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 8. (5) Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972. See also, James Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. (6) A complete autobiography of the founder of the Yemeni Salafi movement was published in the 1990s: Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i (ed.), Tarjamat Abi ‘Abd alRahman Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, San‘a: Maktabat al-Athariyya, 1999. His most famous book, originally published in the early 1980s, also insists on his Saudi experience: Muqbil ibn Hadi al- Wadi‘i, al-Makhraj min al-fitna [The exit from disorder], 3rd edn, San‘a: Maktabat al- Athariyya, 2002. (7) Qat is a mildly narcotic plant chewed daily by large portions of the Yemeni population. (8) Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Imam, Tanwir al-dhulumat bi-kashf mafasid wa shubuhat al-intikhabat [Lighting of the Darkness Through the Revelation of the Devastations and Uncertainties of the Elections], NE, 1996.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? (9) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Ijabat al-sa’il ‘ala ahamm al-masa’il [Answer to Those Who Ask The Most Important Questions], San‘a: Maktabat al-Athariyya, 2004, p. 229. (10) On the rivalry between the Salafis and the Muslim Brothers in Yemen: François Burgat and Mohamed Sbitli, ‘Les Salafis au Yémen ou … la modernisation malgré tout’, Chroniques Yéménites (San‘a), no. 10, (2003), pp. 123–52, and ‘Abd Allah Hashim al-Sayani, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa alSalafiyyun fial-Yaman [The Muslim Brothers and the Salafis in Yemen], San‘a: Markaz al-Ra’id, 2002. (11) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, al-Madhhab al-Zaydi (The Zaydi School), recorded conference, no date. (12) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Hadhihi al-Sururiyya fa ihdharuha! (This Is the Sururiyya, So Be Careful!), recorded conference, 1995. (13) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Ijabat al-sa’il, p. 225. (14) Sheila Carapico, ‘Arabia Incognita: An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies’, in M. Al-Rasheed, R. Vitalis (eds), Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, New York: Palgrave, 2004, pp. 11–33. (15) Laurent Bonnefoy, ‘Les identités religieuses contemporaines au Yémen: convergence, résistances et instrumentalisations’, Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée (Aix-en-Provence), no. 121–122 (2007), pp. 201–15. (16) Gregory Gause, Saudi–Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 112. (17) Such a representation of Yemen as a safe haven echoes a hadith that states: “If disorder occurs, Yemen is left for you” (Idha hajat al-fitan fa ‘alaykum bi-alYaman). (18) List presented in a French Salafi blog: ‘Numéros de téléphone des savants de l’islam’ http://alhaaq.over-blog.net/categorie-175818.html(accessed August 2008). (19) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Hadhihi al-Sururiyya fa ihdharuha! [This is the Sururiyya, So Be Careful!], recorded conference, 1995. (20) According to official figures, during the 1994–5 school year, 13 per cent of the overall number of students in Yemen were registered at the semi-private Scientific Institutes.

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? (21) Mansur al-Nuqaydan, ‘Géographie des islamistes en Arabie Saoudite et affaire du takfîr. Commenté par Alain Gresh’, Maghreb Mashrek, no. 179 (2004), pp. 117–31. Translation and editing of a text that was originally published in Arabic on the internet in February 2003. (22) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Al-Dibaj fî marathat shaykh al-islam samahat alshaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz [The Silk in the Funeral Oration of the Shaykh alIslam, His Excellency Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz], San’aa: Maktabat al-Idrisi alSalafiyya, 1999. (23) Interview, Jeddah, March 2006. (24) For a deconstruction of this representation of terror networks: Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: Al-Qaeda and the Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror, London: I. B. Tauris, 2007. (25) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Jawahir al-Sunniyya fi-l-as’ila al-Faransiyya [The Sunni Jewels in the French Questions], recorded conference, no date. (26) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Nasihati li-l-sha ‘bayn al-Yamani wa-l-Sa‘udi [My Advice to the Two Peoples of Yemen and Saudi Arabia], recorded conference, no date. (27) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, Ihdharu fitnat al-Sa‘udiyya [Beware of the Saudi Disorder], recorded conference, no date. (28) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, al-Suyuf al-batira li-ilhad al-shuyu‘iyya al-kafira [The Cutting Swords for the Impious Communist Heresy], no date, p. 255. (29) Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, As’ila ‘an hayat al-shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi‘i wa siratuhu [Questions on the Life of Shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and His Biography], recorded conference, no date. (30) Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. (31) For more details on the rivalry between Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i and Osama bin Laden: see chapter 12, p.. (32) For in-depth analysis of the Salafi and Sufirivalries in Hadramawt: Alexander Knysh, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi-SufiConflict (from Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 4 (2007), pp. 503–30. (33) Ludmila Du Bouchet, ‘The State, Political Islam and Violence: The Reconfiguration of Yemeni Politics since 9/11’, in A. Blom, L. Bucaille, L. Martinez (eds), The Enigma of Islamist Violence, London: Hurst, 2007, pp. 137– 64. Page 20 of 21

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How Transnational is Salafism In Yemen? (34) Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, al-Tafjirat wa al-ightiyalat: al-asbab, al-athar, al-‘ilaj [Bombings and Killings: Reasons, Effects and Solutions], Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004. (35) Muhammad al-Imam, Hay ‘ala al-jihad… lakin (Call for jihad … but), recorded conference, 2003. (36) Salafischolars in Yemen tend to value local religious references above more global ones, including Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In a small pamphlet, alWadi‘i clearly rejects the term “Wahhabi” (calling it a “malicious name”) and claims that Yemeni scholars like Ibn al-Amir al-Sana‘ani and Muhammad alShawkani were much more knowledgeable than Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, ‘Hawl kalimat Wahhabi’ [About the word Wahhabi] in M. al-Wadi‘i (ed.), Maqtal al-shaykh Jamil al-Rahman al-Afghani [The Murder of Shaykh Jamil al-Rahman al-Afghani], San‘a: Dar al-Athar, 2006, p. 32–42. On Muhammad al-Shawkani, who shared much with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab but also criticised his use of takfir, and was even used by the Zaydi imam to counteract the Wahhabi offensive, see: Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 267. (37) The emphasis Salafischolars in Yemen put on the refutation of hizbiyya (party politics) is in itself an adaptation to the multi-party political system of unified Yemen. In a country like Saudi Arabia where political parties are banned and no general elections are organised, the issue of apoliticism is obviously less central than in Yemen.

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Growth and Fragmentation

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Growth and Fragmentation The Salafi Movement in Bale, Ethiopia Terje Østebø

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0016

Abstract and Keywords The Salafi movement in Ethiopia is interesting for its position as a minority in an otherwise Christian country. This chapter sketches the reasons for the rise of Salafism in Ethiopia, where Islam has shallow roots. He analyzes how Salafis have been able to acquire higher status and power within the Muslim community by claiming to have superior knowledge over traditional Islam. He also demonstrates the appeal of Salafism for the Ethiopian youth. Keywords:   Ethiopia, youth, status

Introduction Events on the global arena and the subsequent “war on terror” in recent years have sustained the focus on terms such as reformist Islam, radical Islam, Islamism and fundamentalism. These terms too often figure as representations of a seemingly homogenous phenomenon in which evaluative presumptions encumber us from a real investigative analysis. This tendency has moreover been accelerated by conceptualisations developed by contemporary Islamic movements themselves, who see the world through binary sets of concepts; “impure” and “pure” and “right” and “wrong”. Just when we thought we had surpassed dichotomies such as “the saint” and “the scholar” and the “greater and smaller tradition”, we are about to be caught up in yet another. By drawing a impenetrable boundary between what we construct to be the “local” and the “trans-local”, we are too often misled to interpret Islam of the former as tolerant and pragmatic, threatened by a trans-local Islam characterised as intolerant and Page 1 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation exclusivist. Applying such mutual exclusive and binary categories, we end up with inaccurate analytical tools, and are moreover prevented from discerning the heterogeneity and dynamics of contemporary Islamic movements. (p.343) The study of Salafism thus needs to consider the interactions between the local and the trans-local. It needs to recognise how local manifestations are determined by the manner in which ideology is imbued, the nature of its agents, the interaction of existing trans-local and local discourses and the religiocultural heritage of the particular locality. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of Salafism in the locality of Bale in Ethiopia, with the focus on the movement's growth and subsequent setback and its internal discourses of the last decade.1 Special attention is given to the movement's interactions with its respondents and to the internal discourses surfacing in this period. Besides providing much needed information on the situation in Ethiopia, this chapter will also present perspectives relevant for other localities and thus serve to broaden our understanding of contemporary Salafism in general.

Questions Objectified and Answered Among numerous relevant perspectives, I have chosen to use the concept of objectification as a point of departure. As formulated by Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, the concept has been presented as a process where existential questions are objectified and put to the forefront of the believers’ minds. They are explicitly formulated as “What is my religion? Why is it important to my life? And how do my beliefs guide my conduct?”.2 Eickelman and Piscatori have argued that these questions shape “the discourse and practice of Muslims in all social classes”, and have identified three characteristics of the process of objectification: it is distinctive of the modern era, it creates a new religious discourse involving a broader array of actors, and it reconfigures the symbolic production of Muslim politics.3 Although the concept is relevant for understanding the emergence of new religious movements, some clarifications and amendments are required. At the (p.344) outset, it becomes inaccurate and misleading to say that it is merely the articulation of questions such as “what is my religion?” that shapes the practice and discourse of Muslims. Although to ask such questions obviously is intrinsic to the process of objectification, it is difficult to imagine a process of objectification without alternative ideas being made available to the believer. Asking questions must be connected to providing answers. Access to new and alternative ideas has moreover been stimulated in the socalled globalised era, when the flow of ideas crosses both cultural and spatial boundaries at a pace unprecedented in history.4 If we are to say something meaningful about the discourses and practices of Muslims today, such as the local manifestations of transnational movements such as Salafism, we need to discern the content of this flow of ideas and the complex interactions between Page 2 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation contexts, in other words, the dialectics of the global and the local. Merely pointing to links between locality and “universalistic principles of Islam” is insufficient.5 Thus, rather than reducing contemporary Islamic movements in a locality to categories such as fundamentalism, Islamism, reformist or radical Islam, which means leaving the actual ideological particularities in obscurity, we need to make an effort to determine and identify the specific ideological content of such movements, to trace the influx through time and space and recognise the role of the locality in influencing the ideological content.6 The concept of objectification is also relevant in a discussion of new discourses on religious authority altering the production and usage of religious symbols. What is clear from the case of Bale is that the process of objectification has enhanced the individual's religious subjectivity, a process that in turn has led to increased diversity, fragmentation and even to conflicts. In addition, this issue is intersected with the struggle for authority, which has been complicated by the new relationship between personalised and textual authority. (p.345) Lastly, I suggest that the process of objectification should be framed in a wider and encompassing process of identification.7 In this particular case, I find it relevant to distinguish between what I call the process of religious objectification and ethnic objectification, seeing the two as part of the same process of identification. As the fall of the Marxist regime (the Derg) in 1991 paved the way for a highly politicised public debate on ethnicity in Ethiopia, the cultural and political legacy of the Derg, the political transition itself and a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future, have opened up a complex web of unanswered questions concerning identity, belonging and meaning. This chapter intends to demonstrate that ethnic and religious discourses are clearly linked, in the sense that they can both be complimentary, yet also constitute a bipolar relationship, impinging on each other. On the one hand, factors such as language, social institutions and common history together with religion may serve as reinforcing factors in the construction of identities. On the other hand, ethnic and religious boundaries can be distinguished by demarcating social relations from religiously motivated evaluations, in turn leading to contradictory patterns of identification.

Islam In Ethiopia The first contact between Islam and Ethiopia was established already in 615 AD,8 yet it was not until the ninth century that Islam asserted its grip on the Somali littoral, and subsequently in the Ethiopian hinterland. In the following centuries, Islam managed to penetrate into different regions of the country, particularly in the southern parts, giving rise to a rich and flourishing Muslim culture. Although the Muslim population constituted a significant minority in Ethiopia,9 Islam remained historically in the shadow of the Christian Ethiopian (p.346) state. The intermarriage between the state and the church, in which the allegiance to the monarchy and the Christian faith constituted the defining Page 3 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation elements of Ethiopian nationhood, led to the perception of Islam as its antithesis. Islam was perceived as an external threat to the Christian kingdom, a perception that was enhanced by the refusal of Ethiopian Muslims to let themselves become culturally/religiously integrated into this Ethiopianness. Marginalised and subject to a policy of subjugation, Islam nevertheless managed to assert its influence over a number of areas and peoples within Ethiopia. The area became home to numerous shrines, which attracted large numbers of pilgrims and saw the development of Islamic scholarship, particularly in Harar and the northwestern region of Wollo. However, in spite of its proximity to the Islamic world, Islam in Ethiopia remained relatively isolated from the rest of the Islamic world, which contributed to the development of a distinct cultural zone where indigenous religious elements became merged with the Islamic stratum. The Marxist revolution in 1974, ending the state-church marriage, was expected to increase the Muslims’ parity with the non-Christian population. Some concessions were initially made, but soon all of the country's religious groups found their rights curtailed by the Derg regime (1974–1991). The Derg continued the policy of the imperial government of prohibiting the Muslims from forming religious organisations, thus contributing to the highly deinstitutionalised and decentralised character of Ethiopian Islam.10 The new policies introduced by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which assumed power in 1991, have had farreaching consequences for the Islamic community in Ethiopia. The new regime sought to reverse and readdress the past by asserting constitutional rights for the country's diverse religious and ethnic population. As a consequence, restrictions on Hajj and the ban on the import of religious literature were lifted, confinement on the construction of mosques was removed and Islamic organisations and newspapers and magazines were legalised.11 This to official statistics the Muslims counts for 30.8 per cent of the population, while the CIA world factbook gives an estimate of 45–50 per cent. Probably the correct number would be somewhere in between these two figures. (p.347) inevitably led to much enthusiasm from the side of the Muslims, resulting in a renewed religious consciousness, to the carving out of public space and to the emergence of several religious reform movements.

The Emergence of Salafism In Bale In contrast to other areas of Ethiopia, where Islam had gained a foothold centuries ago, it was not until the late eighteenth and nineteenth century that Islam established itself among the Oromo population of Bale, becoming the dominant religion of the area.12 A Sufiorientation is discernable, yet without the development of any trans-local Sufiidentity or affiliation to the established mystic brotherhoods. Sufism revolved around the veneration of various shrines, in particular that of Shaykh Hussein (the main Sufishrine in Bale), where Oromo religious elements remained imbedded within the performed rituals. Likewise, Page 4 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation the tradition of Islamic scholarship was not well developed, encumbering conformity to mainstream Sunnism and the performance of obligatory Islamic practices.13 Two parallel developments in the 1950s and 1960s facilitated a process of religious change in Bale. A process of modernisation was surfacing, with increasing urbanisation, the growing division of labour, the development of markets and the improvement of communication. In the course of this development, a new class of merchants emerged in Robe (the current zonal capital of Bale), who were exposed to a wider territorial and cultural area and increasingly came into contact with alternative religious trends. Starting to question the existing religious concepts and practices, this group organised themselves in a society (jama‘iya) in the newly constructed Nur mosque of Robe in 1963–64, and devoted themselves to the study of the Islamic scriptures.14 (p. 348) Simultaneously, Muslims from Bale increasingly started to travel abroad in search for religious knowledge, noticeably to Saudi Arabia.15 This latter process was stimulated by the establishment of several Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia in the early 1960s and the access to scholarships for foreign students in the kingdom.16 From the end of the 1960s, graduates from these universities started to return to Bale, making a decisive impact on the religious landscape of the area. One of the most important of these scholars was Shaykh Abu Bakr Muhammed, the first to explicitly take up the Islamic call (da‘wa), boldly criticising the prevailing Sufipractices and promoting Salafi ideas.17 Conflict was inevitable, and after a period of intense controversies, the local government intervened by arranging a large meeting in 1972, during which the authorities urged the warring parties to end their hostilities. However, instead of reaching a consensus, the meeting resulted in providing the Salafis with official recognition, in addition to securing their right to promote their ideology. The alliance that emerged between the scholars returning from Saudi Arabia and the class of merchants in Robe would prove to be pivotal for the development of Salafism in Bale. Whereas the latter were ideologically influenced by the former—bringing them closer to the Salafi doctrines—the former benefited from the protection and financial support provided by the merchants. The merchants were also instrumental in establishing a religious educational centre in 1976, the Salafiyya Madrasa, which they continued to support financially. in Bale, Ethiopia’, Paper presented at the conference; The 16th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Trondheim, Norway, 2–6 July, 2007. (p.349) Although the expansion of the Salafi movement was largely checked by the Marxist Derg regime, which restricted their activities to teaching at the Salafiyya Madrasa and to da‘wa in the Robe mosque, the Derg failed to Page 5 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation completely suppress the movement. Having secured the necessary space in Robe, this town remained the main Salafi centre throughout the Derg period. The Derg would, however, leave a lasting impact on the religious and cultural landscape in another way, by managing to create a stark and clear break with past values, traditions and structures. Through a coercive modernising process, it reorganised society along new bureaucratic lines and expanded modern education rapidly. Its aim was to bring about a rupture with Ethiopia's “feudal and reactionary” past and raise an enlightened and secularised generation in the image of the Marxist revolution.18 Due to recurrent insurgencies and resistance to the regime, this process was accompanied by a policy of harsh countermeasures against the civilian population. Leaving an unknown number killed and producing a massive wave of refugees to neighbouring Somalia, these measures led to a further destruction of traditional Oromo institutions and authorities.19

Salafism In Post-Derg Ethiopia The political changes after 1991 created a climate highly conducive to the Salafi movement in Bale. With the new, more liberal regime, any obstacle encumbering the propagation of religion was removed and the new political (p.350) situation created a general atmosphere of high expectancy among the Muslims. Suddenly, the call to prayer (adhan) and the Friday sermons were broadcasted by loudspeakers, Islamic dress appeared on the streets, public prayers were allowed and religion became a subject of daily conversations. The Salafiyya Madrasa, whose school-buildings had been confiscated by the Derg, was relocated at the end of the 1980s and gradually expanded its activities. The school played an important role in the survival and expansion of the Salafi movement as the centre of the initial movement and the meeting place of senior Salafi‘ulama.20 Due to the new conducive political environment a rapid expansion of the Salafi movement took place together with the introduction of new ideological currents. Heavily focusing on da‘wa among the population of Bale, a new movement emerged, calling itself Ahl al-Sunna, which mostly recruited among the young generation in Bale.21 Although da‘wa already had surfaced at the end of the 1980s, it now expanded and became more organised. It was led by Shaykh Ahmed Usman, a young student from the eastern lowlands of Bale. He had initiated da‘wa in 1988, using the Nur mosque in Robe as a starting-point, but the real expansion came with the fall of the Derg. In 1992, he set up a da‘wa office in the Nur mosque and succeeded in recruiting fifty activists who were sent to various parts of Bale. In addition to Robe, the town of Dello surfaced as an important centre for Salafi ideas and activism. This was due to a large number of Salafi inspired Oromo refugees (qawetti) returning from Somalia when the Derg fell22 and a certain Shaykh Ahmed “Buluga”, who after receiving

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Growth and Fragmentation (p.351) his training in Bale and in neighbouring Hararge, had established himself in Dello in the early 1990s as an important Salafi ideologue. Shaykh Ahmed Usman was also active in organising da‘wa activities among Robe's high school pupils after 1992. These increased until 1997, when individual Salafi propagandists managed to induce a passionate state of fervour among the pupils. Besides urging their fellow-pupils to comply with the duties of Islam, the activists also toured the rural areas teaching the farmers about such issues as daily prayers and the strict observance of the notion of tawhid. The high school activism, which included demands for the designation of certain areas for prayers within the school compound and the abolishment of the ban on wearing head-scarves for female pupils,23 soon led to a fierce conflict with the school's administration, as well as with the local authorities. The local government finally intervened, arresting the main activists, and effectively stamped out the high school da‘wa in 1997. Describing the ideological content of the Ahl al-Sunna and establishing the genealogy of their influences is difficult. The lack of a fixed organisational structure, its informal structure and divergent individual interpretations of Islam, made the movement highly heterogeneous and its ideology sometimes contradictory. Although adhering to the main Salafi doctrines, their practice of idiosyncratic interpretation of the religious texts (ijtihad) sometimes produced peculiar results.24 In contrast to the senior Salafi‘ulama, who were mostly graduates from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, the young Ahl al- Sunna members were auto-didacts with little formal religious education, which was usually acquired within the locality of Bale or its neighbouring areas. Shaykh Ahmed Usman for example, had studied a few years at Salafiyya Madrasa, before dropping out, due to a conflict with his teachers. The lack of ideological coherency was largely caused by their random selection of fragmentary sources.25 Although the da‘wa was dominated by the recurrence of topics introduced in the early 1970s, such as the condemnation of the Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & Co., 2004, pp.114ff. (p.352) veneration of saints and the celebration of birthday of the Prophet (mawlid alnabi), the Ahl al-Sunna introduced a new and more radical discourse. In its battle to purify Islam, a number of Oromo customs and practices, particularly rituals connected to weddings and funerals, were denounced and labelled as both backward and irreconcilable with the life of a true Muslim. The activists of the movement moreover propagated the strict observance of copying the life of the Prophet (Sunna), focusing on outward appearances, such as the growing of beards and the wearing of trousers above the ankles (isbal) for males and the veil covering the face for females (niqab). These issues were strongly emphasised as part of the duties (wajibat) of Islam. In addition, they condemned the chewing of qat,26 a custom common to the Horn of Africa, smoking cigarettes, listening to music, watching TV, in addition to the mixing of the sexes.

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Growth and Fragmentation Although they repeatedly made references to Salafischolars, the Ahl al- Sunna's attitude towards Saudi Arabia was ambiguous. Even if figures such as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abdallah ibn Baz, the former grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammed ibn Salih al-Uthaymin and Nasir al-Din al-Albani were held in great respect, much of the Saudi ‘ulama were at the same time accused of moral laxness and of being subservient to the corrupt Saudi regime.27 A similar ambiguity is noticeable in their view on the relationship between Islam and politics. Although sharing many of the anti-Western and anti-American ideas of the wider Islamist movement, they adhered to a purist and apolitical form of Salafism.28 They, for instance, explicitly distanced themselves from movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, whom they despised and labelled Sufis. The issue of jihad was mentioned on a few occasions, during which they criticised the senior Ethiopian Salafi‘ulama for omitting it from their teaching. Yet the issue was never elaborated in detail, nor were targets for, or the nature of, an eventual jihad articulated. Rather than focusing on societal or political issues, their attention was absorbed by the religiosity of the individual: the need for personal piety and zeal. In fact, the da‘wa of the Ahl al-Sunna had a clear eschatological flavour, stressing salvation in the after-life and the (p.353) dangers of damnation. My informants were constantly recalling the preachers’ stories about doomsday, the eternal suffering in hell and the fire and the divine wrath for those who neglected the duties of Islam. “From my house I could listen to the da‘wa from the mosque. They talked about what Islam was, and about the criteria for being a Muslim […]. When I heard about the criteria for being a Muslim, that I needed to pray, I got some feelings. They said that if you followed Allah you would enter paradise. If not, you would go to hell. They said that I needed to pray and fast. If I didn’t do this I would go straight to the fire. I was shocked; I was a Muslim, my name was Muslim, but this I hadn’t heard before. I had some knowledge about the Qur’an from before, but I hadn’t understood it in this way. My family never spoke of it in this way. At that time I was afraid of hell. I started going to the mosque and heard many da‘wa about tawhid, and how to be a Muslim.”29 The da‘wa was highly successful in appealing to the Muslims of Bale, particularly to the younger generation. After 1991 most of the young people began to follow the ideas of the Ahl al-Sunna. They actively participated in the da‘wa, frequenting the mosque and expressing a distinct religious zeal. The main reason for the appearance and the rapid growth of the Ahl al-Sunna movement must be ascribed to the experiences during the Derg. The regime's policy of enforced modernisation had produced a generation of Ethiopians that was influenced yet at the same time antagonised by the modernising ideology of the Derg. When the red stars and the statues of Lenin were removed, this generation harboured a profound sense of disorientation and found themselves in a psychological and ideological vacuum. As agents of change, determined to Page 8 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation redress these past experiences in the name of Islam, the propagandists of the Ahl a-Sunna found fertile ground in a generation disenchanted with the past and burdened by an uncertainty regarding the future. These circumstances had led to the explicit formulation of modern questions of belonging and orientation— questions the Ahl al-Sunna was ready to answers. The movement thus provided the individual with a new religious reference on what it meant to be a Muslim. It thus is a clear demonstration of how religion can emerge as a compelling force, “correcting” the worldview and self-image of the audience that was addressed. In order to understand how the Ahl al-Sunna captured the minds of the youth the choice of topics and the style of their message must be analysed. As Eickelman observes, there has been a general trend in “turning away from situating meaning in local and immediate ritual and symbolic contexts”, towards (p.354) the realignment of “context and style”.30 This is exemplified by the description of a da‘wa activist of his own sermons: “First I start with a loud voice, speaking about the punishment of hell. I describe this… After that I speak with a softer voice, about how to enter paradise…The young people like to listen to a young person. They like the way I approach them. They don’t like the approach of the old shaykhs; people go away when they practice da‘wa. But they listen to me…Also I don’t sit still while I am talking; I walk around in the room. It is like Muhammed, they said his face was red, on fire, when he did da‘wa.”31 Speaking the same language as the young generation, addressing issues directly related to their daily lives, the message of the Ahl al-Sunna found a welcome reception among the youngsters. Caught up in a contradictory reality, where religious authority had been fragmented and where past references made less sense, the new teaching, both in style and content, was seen as a sound and meaningful alternative.

Religious Conflict, Fragmentation and Objectification Starting from 1991, Salafism expanded at a remarkable pace in Bale while the veneration of the shrines plunged abruptly and the celebration of mawlid alnabi disappeared.32 Whereas a great deal of social pressure was exerted on members of society to pray regularly and fast during Ramadan, former practices were discouraged. Salafism had thus, in a very short time, become the dominant ideology of Bale. The senior Salafi‘ulama were, however, becoming increasingly discontented with the Ahl al-Sunna, its da‘wa and the attraction the movement found among the young generation. While they both held the same negative views on issues such as the veneration of the shrines, the senior Salafi‘ulama were more reluctant to condemn customs and traditions inherent to the Oromo culture. The senior ‘ulama were moreover critical of the various aspects of the Sunna which the youth regarded as obligatory, such as the isbal and the niqab. They were also Page 9 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation opposed to the Ahl al-Sunna's unrelenting and sometimes violent (p.355) methods of imposing its views. The Ahl al-Sunna, on its part, was both directly and indirectly criticial of the senior ‘ulama. Making insinuations of corruption, due to their connections to wealthy Saudi donors, in addition to insisting upon the compulsory nature of several aspects of the Sunna, was a means of portraying the ‘ulama as lax and prone to compromise their religion. It is interesting to note how this conflict resembles the critique directed at the Salafi establishment in Saudi Arabia. However, there are differences. Whilst the critical voices in the Saudi kingdom refer to contemporary political affairs, this has been less the case with the Ahl al-Sunna movement. In fact, both the senior Salafis and members of the Ahl al-Sunna remain well within the fold of what can be regarded as the “purist” current.33 The crisis escalated when the senior Salafi‘ulama embarked on a campaign aimed at smearing the reputation of the leaders of the Ahl al-Sunna and warning the youngsters about the dangers of the movement. As a result, some of the youngsters followed the advice of the ‘ulama, and soon the conflictual pattern was to divide both the youngsters and the rest of the Muslims of Robe into two parties. This development took an abrupt turn in 1993, when an unsigned letter addressed to the main ‘ulama was delivered at the Nur mosque. Accusing them of hampering the spread of “real” Islam, the letter contained direct threats to particular members of the ‘ulama, as well as a warning that the mosque would be blown up. A month later, a prominent merchant and senior Salafi was stabbed in the Nur mosque during the afternoon prayer. The victim survived the incident, and the attacker escaped. However, subsequently, the da‘wa office of Shaykh Ahmed Usman was closed, and he and his compatriots were held responsible for the incidents. During a round up of the suspects of the threats, five leading members of the Ahl al-Sunna were arrested. The rest of the leadership of the Ahl al-Sunna fled the town, some establishing themselves in the rural areas, others leaving Ethiopia for countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Shocked by the violence and intimidated by the local government's measures, the vast majority of the movement's followers became disenchanted and distanced themselves from the movement. Some support continued among the high school pupils, who during the school term 1995–1996 remained faithful to the da‘wa of the Ahl al-Sunna. Yet, this movement also was quelled (p.356) by the local authorities when the pupils organised a demonstration in January 1997. This incident was followed by a broader campaign to arrest the main da‘wa activists, causing an even greater number to flee the area and deepening the dissolution of the Ahl al-Sunna movement.34 Banished from the urban areas, the Ahl al-Sunna shifted its attention to the countryside. Infiltrating the existing rural jama‘as, as well as establishing new ones, the movement managed to attract a large number of students from the rural areas. This network of jama‘as, some of them hosting several hundred Page 10 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation students, would become crucial for the existence of the movement in Bale. Moreover, the construction of Hamza mosque in Robe in 1997 came to serve as a link between the rural and the urban, and constituted a gateway for the gradual return of the Ahl al-Sunna back into Robe. The mosque was controlled by the younger generation, led by locally trained imams affiliated to the Ahl al-Sunna movement. This overview of the history of Salafism in Bale demonstrates how the movement in Bale became less coherent. While it was introduced by Ethiopians directly trained in Saudi Arabia, belonging to and bound by the locality of Bale, Salafism became increasingly dominated by young actors seeking to carve out space for themselves. This “generation of the Derg” was far more autonomous than the elder generation, which was more constrained by traditions and more prone to follow individualistic and sometimes random interpretations of Salafism. This was moreover augmented by the lack of any institutional structures and paved the way for the fragmentation of the Salafi movement. Although the conflict adopted doctrinal character, it never reached an advanced theological level debate and this was not the only issue. As important was the issue of authority and positions, resembling similar controversies in other parts of the continent.35 Seeking to comprehend this process of fragmentation, the issue of objectification constitutes a relevant analytical tool. (p.357) Intrinsic to the process of objectification is the decline of established religious authorities and the rise of a more autonomous religious subjectivity. This leads to new religious affiliations, to independent interpretations of doctrines and to increased fragmentation. As a result of the spread of mass-education, masscommunication and print culture (which widens the access to sacred writings) the process of objectification is accompanied by a constantly larger number of actors who are invited to participate in religious scriptural discourses, leading, in turn, to the production of new and fragmented interpretations. Whereas the initial conflict between the Salafis and their “traditionalist” opponents in Bale revolved around scriptural “evidence” versus references to inherited practices and customs, the next phase in the history of Salafism in the region was dominated by a conflict over interpretations of scriptures. Eventually, the movement fragmented when individual understandings produced a multitude of alternatives. It is often presumed that the erosion of traditional religious authorities is accompanied by a process where knowledge of Islam is transformed from faceto-face interactions, which are hierarchically structured and attributed to personalised authorities, to impersonal relations that are more easily accessible for a wider audience.36 In contrast to previous authorities, in whom esoteric knowledge and spiritual power (baraka) were embodied, the text is increasingly being recognised as the exclusive and final source of knowledge: as impersonal, objective and certain. The cognitive aspect of the text is similarly emphasised, Page 11 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation where “the sacred message must be understood in order to be obeyed”.37 In conditions where the vast majority of Muslims are unable to comprehend advanced theological debates and where (Arabic) literacy is “restricted”,38 as is the case in Bale, this will enhance the authority of the expert with direct access to the holy texts. Thus, the emerging paradox is the enhanced importance of personified authority at the expense of the written word. In contrast to personified authority in a more traditional sense, the distinctive character of this contemporary phenomenon is that of diversity and fragmentation. (p.358) The dialectical relationship between the expert and the audience, where the former is competing for adherents, and where the latter remain dependent on those who actively engage in the discourse over interpretations, all contribute to such a development. This would also consequently affect the process of objectification for the larger public. On the one hand, it contributes to the production of different alternatives for religious orientation, which in turn leads to the formation of different parties cementing fragmentation. On the other hand, conflicting alternatives in a heated discourse can also lead to the bewilderment among the audience who become alienated from all parties.

Salafism and Ethnic Objectification Parallel to the expansion of Salafism in Bale during the 1990s, was the growth of Oromo ethno-nationalism. This ideology was framed and politicised under the banner of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), one of the separatist guerrilla movements that participated in the overthrow of the Derg in 1991.39 Since the rebellion in the 1960s, the population in Bale had shown strong sympathies for the so-called Oromo cause, which in the succeeding decades gained strength in other parts of Oromiya. When the OLF entered Robe in the summer of 1991, the popular support was overwhelming. The whole town was in the streets to welcome them. Expressed by one of the senior Salafi‘ulama: “had it not been for the laws of Islam, we would have danced with joy”. The Nur mosque was decorated with the OLF flag, and every segment of society came out to celebrate what they conceived were the first steps towards freedom for the Oromo. Although the OLF's political and military presence in Bale was brutally suppressed by a highly repressive campaign by the EPRDFregime, a strong, yet hidden, popular sympathy for the movement, based on a (p.359) general ethnonationalist fervour, has remained prevalent among the people of Bale.40 Signifying what I have labelled as the process of ethnic objectification, the Oromo movement was actively constructing a meta-narrative with a clear primordialist character, involving the re-production and invention of Oromo cultural values and principles for the creation of the imagined community of Oromumma.41 For the “generation of the Derg”, this project has proved important in re-creating some sort of continuity with the past. The notion of Oromumma was in many ways a new construct in the locality of Bale, where the Muslim Oromo previously had referred to themselves as Islaamaa, as marking their religious affiliation, but also a term defining them as Page 12 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation an ethnic group within the locality of Bale. It was not until the last years of the Derg that Islaamaa was replaced by Oromo, introducing a conceptual distinction between religious and ethnic affiliation. Religion came to be an individual matter between man and God, whereas ethnicity was the collective identity marker by which the individual identified himself in relation to a larger collective: “Today my religion and my ethnicity are two different things. One is faith, the other is nation. Religion is about reaching Allah, but it is my nationality that I am proud of. Oromo was before Islam, it is from my forefathers, it is my belonging and my background. Religion is different.”42 Inevitably, this development would have a clear impact on the Salafi movement in Bale. The senior Salafis were, like the rest of the population, supportive of the OLF, while the Ahl al-Sunna initially held a rather ambivalent position towards the organisation as exemplified by an Ahl al-Sunna member describing his first encounter with the OLF in the late 1980s: “When we were studying [religion], the OLF came to teach us afaan Oromo (Oromo language) and the Latin letters. We saw the women soldiers wearing trousers, and they were beating the darassas [religious student]… They didn’t pray and they never spoke about Islam. This made us look negatively on them. In general, the OLF was following the Oromo culture, not the religion.”43 (p.360)

Acting as a representative for the whole Oromo population, aimed at superseding religious boundaries within the ethnic community and pronouncing a secular programme devoid of religious references, the OLF was thus initially received with unease by many of the Ahl al-Sunna adherents.44 Although Oromo ethno-nationalism eventually gained momentum among the members of the Ahl al-Sunna, the question of Oromo culture and Islam has remained a major problem for them. While some senior Salafis tried to reconcile the two, arguing that many of the Oromo practices were prescribed in the shari‘a, the Ahl alSunna held a more radical stand. In their quest for religious purity, the movement's advocates were denouncing traditional customs at an accelerating rate, eventually causing a heated debate on culture and religion in the latter part of the 1990s. The controversy culminated in a series of meetings in 2000 and 2001, where the senior ‘ulama of Bale together with prominent Salafi‘ulama from Addis Ababa managed to repress the views of the Ahl al-Sunna and further marginalise the movement. The Ahl al-Sunna's negative attitude to Oromo cultural values and traditions has complicated the perception of them by the local people, whereas strong advocates of the Oromo nationalist movement see them as their adversaries. Similar views are increasingly held by the young generation in Bale, labelling Page 13 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation them as a foreign phenomenon: “the Ahl al-Sunna are wrong, they follow the Arab culture, but we are not Arabs […]. Even the Arabs have their culture and religion doesn’t interfere with that.”45 At the outset, ethno-nationalism constituted an alternative point of orientation for the youth from that of religion. As they lost their confidence in the Ahl alSunna, the notion of ethnic identity gained influence as a substitute for the former. Hence, the ethnic and religious objectification came to form a bipolar process, in turn furthering the decline of the support of the Ahl al- Sunna. Combined with the increasing conflictual pattern, the young generation therefore saw the movement as a less relevant force in their quest for identity and meaning.

Concluding Remarks: the Limbo of Objectification The development of Salafism and ethno-nationalism in Bale were interwoven with the political discourse of the time. Local and regional events have caused (p.361) the current regime to take rather harsh measures hampering the development of both the ethnic and religious movement in Bale. Salafism is thus consequently monitored and stigmatised as a local offshoot of international violent Islamic groups, whereas the OLF is portrayed as the most imminent securitythreat in the Oromo speaking areas. In a parallel development, the opening up of post-1991 Ethiopia to the wider world, bringing Hollywood and “Bollywood” into the locality of Bale, has made the younger generation more exposed to other sets of influences. Satellite-TV, video-houses and Western pop-culture are increasingly competing with Islam for the attention of the younger generation. As the Ahl al- Sunna lost its momentum in Robe and in other towns, the youngsters have by and large remained indifferent to the senior Salafis. They are not found in the mosques and only a few observe the daily prayers on a regular basis. Consequently, the young generation find themselves in a limbo, drawn between contradicting sets of norms and ideas, between different sets of loyalties and devoid of a coherent narrative for their daily reality. Hampered by poverty, lack of opportunities for education and widespread unemployment a general state of hopelessness prevails among them. Antagonised by the current regime, alienated from their cultural heritage and denied any meaningful orientation for identification, this generation of frustrated youth carry within them a strong force of concealed discontent. The question that remains is how this discontent will be manifested in the future. Bibliography Bibliography references:

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Growth and Fragmentation Bauman, Zygmunt, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Oxford: Polity Press, 1998. Braukämper, Ulrich, Islamic History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays, Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2002. Brenner, Louis, “Introduction: Muslim Representations of Unity and Difference in the African Discourse,” in Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub- Saharan Africa,Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 1–20. ———, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Results for Oromiya Region, Office of Population and Housing Census Commission: Addis Ababa, vol. 1, 1994. Clay, Jason W., ‘The Case of Bale’, in Jason W. Clay, Sandra Steingraber and Peter Niggli (eds), The Spoils of Famine: Ethiopian Famine Policy and Peasant Agriculture, Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival Inc., 1988, pp. 136–156. (p. 362) Commins, David, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia,London: I. B. Tauris, 2006. Donham, Donald, Marxist Modern, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Eickelman, Dale F ., ‘The Study of Islam in Local Contexts’, Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 17, (1982), pp. 1–18. ———, ‘Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies’, American Ethnologist, vol. 19, no. 4 (1992), pp.643–655. ———, Dale F., and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Erlich, Haggai, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity, and Politics Entwined, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2007. Gebru Tareke, ‘The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 3 (2000), pp. 635–667. Goody, Jack, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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Growth and Fragmentation Hall, Stuart, ‘Introduction: Who Needs Identity’, in Stuart Hall (ed.), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage Publications,1996a, pp. 1–17. ———, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson (eds), Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, London: Blackwell Publishing, 1996b, pp. 595–663. Hussein Ahmed, ‘Islam and Islamic Discourse in Ethiopia (1973–1993)’, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Michigan, 1994 pp. 775–801. ———, ‘Islamic Literature and Religious Revival in Ethiopia (1991–1994)’, Islam et societés au sud du Sahara, vol. 12, (1998), pp. 89–108. International Crisis Group, Somalia's Islamists. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group Report No. 100, 2005. Lambek, Michael, ‘Certain Knowledge, Contestable Authority: Power and Practice on the Islamic Periphery’, American Ethnologist, vol. 17, no. 1 (1990), pp.23–40. Leenco Lata, The Ethiopian State at the Crossroad: Decolonization & Democratization or Disintegration, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999. Lincoln, Bruce, ‘Notes toward a Theory of Religion and Revolution’, in Bruce Lincoln (ed.), Religion, Rebellion, Revolution, London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 266– 292. Marchal, Roland, ‘Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War’, in Axel De Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & Co., 2004, pp. 114–145. Mohammed Hassan, ‘The History of Oromo Nationalism: 1960s-1990s’, in Seyoum Hameso and Mohammed Hassan (eds), Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-Determination, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 2006, pp. 237–278. Niezen, Ronald W., ‘Hot Literacy in Cold Societies: A Comparative Study of the Sacred Value of Writing’, Comparative Study of Society and History, vol. 33, no. 2 (1991), pp. 225–254. Roff, William R., ‘Islamic Movements: One or Many?’, in William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning, London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 31–52. Schreiter, Robert J., The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local, New York: Orbis Books, 1997. (p.363) Page 16 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation Sindi, Abdullah M., ‘King Faisal and Pan-Islamism’, in Willard A. Beling (ed.), King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, London: Croom Helm, 1980. Trimingham, Spencer, Islam in Ethiopia, London: Frank Cass, 1952. Tronvoll, Kjetil, Ethiopia: A New Start?,London: Minority Rights Group International, 2000. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. Østebø, Terje, A History of Islam and Inter-Religious Relations in Bale, Ethiopia,Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International,2005. ———, ‘Religious Change and Islam: The Emergence of the Salafi Movement in Bale, Ethiopia’, Paper presented at the conference The 16th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Trondheim, Norway, 2–6 July, 2007. ———, ‘The Power of Muslim Institutions in Consolidating Democracy: A Perspective from Bale’, Forthcoming in Kjetil Tronvoll (ed.), Contested Power: Traditional Authorities and Elections in Ethiopia, Leiden: Brill, 2009. 363 Notes:

(1) The data for this chapter was collected during extensive fieldwork in Bale in the period 2005–2007. (2) Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 39. (3) Eickelman and Piscatori see the process of objectification as occurring in a modern setting in which the evolvement of mass-education, masscommunication, the development of the printing press and the broader access to religious knowledge have impinged on traditional structures, institutions and authorities (ibid., pp. 38ff.). See also Louis Brenner, ‘Introduction: Muslim Representations of Unity and Difference in the African Discourse’, in Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 2ff. (4) Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Oxford: Polity Press, 1998; Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local, New York: Orbis Books, 1997. (5) Dale F. Eickelman, ‘The Study of Islam in Local Contexts’, Contributions to Asian Studies17, (1982), p. 1. (6) Discussing various Islamic reform-movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Roff has, by framing them in a discourse between “principle Page 17 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation and reality”, argued for their similarity in content. See; William R. Roff, ‘Islamic Movements: One or Many?’, in William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning, London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, pp.31ff. This conclusion is insufficient, because ideological linkages and inspirations must be discerned in order to identify the tenets and pattern of these movements. (7) This relates to issues such as the fluctuating self and the de-centred individual—intrinsic to the phenomenon of identity in the modern era. My perspective on identity and identification is largely informed by Stuart Hall's contributions. See his introduction ‘Who Needs Identity’, in Stuart Hall (ed.), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage Publications, 1996a, pp. 1ff.; Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall et al. (eds), Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, London: Blackwell Publishing, 1996b. (8) In the incident referred to as the Axumite hijrah, early followers of the prophet fled from persecutions in Mecca and received asylum by the Christian king in Axum (Ethiopia) in 615 AD, seven years before the formal establishment of Islam in 622 AD. For more details, see Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, London: Frank Cass, 1952, pp. 44ff. (9) There is no consensus on the exact size of the Muslim population in Ethiopia. According (10) The only exception is The Ethiopian Islamic Affair Supreme Council (EIASC), established in 1974. The council has since its establishment (and still is) been closely monitored by the government. (11) Hussein Ahmed, ‘Islam and Islamic Discourse in Ethiopia (1973–1993)’, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Michigan, 1994; Hussein Ahmed, ‘Islamic Literature and Religious Revival in Ethiopia (1991–1994)’, Islam et societés au sud du Sahara vol. 12, (1998), pp. 89ff. (12) The Muslims constitute approximately 78 per cent of the population of Bale, Orthodox Christians 19 per cent while the rest are Protestant and Catholic Christians and adherents of the traditional Oromo religion. For more details, see Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Results for Oromiya Region, Office of Population and Housing Census Commission: Addis Ababa, vol. 1, 1994. (13) For more details on the history of Islam in Bale, seeTerje Østebø, A History of Islam and Inter-Religious Relations in Bale, Ethiopia, Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 2005. (14) This was part of a more general pattern among Oromo-speaking Muslims in southeastern Ethiopia. In neighbouring areas, such as Arsi and Hararge, Page 18 of 22

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Growth and Fragmentation Salafism was at this time slowly gaining ground. For more details on the initial emergence of Salafism in Bale, see Terje Østebø, ‘Religious Change and Islam: The Emergence of the Salafi Movement (15) Travel to Saudi Arabia increased during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia when the Italians actively encouraged and financed the Hajj to the Hijaz. See Haggai Erlich, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity, and Politics Entwined, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp. 72ff. (16) The establishment of Islamic universities and the Muslim World League in 1962 were partly done to balance the influence of Nasser's pan-Arabism in the Arab world. The Islamic universities had an extensive scholarship programme admitting a large number of students, in turn becoming pivotal in disseminating Salafi doctrines to the wider Islamic world. See David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I. B. Tauris, 2006; Abdullah M. Sindi, ‘King Faisal and Pan-Islamism’, in Willard A. Beling (ed.), King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, London: Croom Helm, 1980. (17) Da‘wa, which usually means propagation and preaching, with the objective of converting someone to Islam (or to the correct observance of Islam), was by my informants used for any activity promoting Islam through preaching, arguing, giving advice, lecturing, etc. Hence, I am applying this understanding of the term in this chapter. (18) My approach to the phenomenon of modernity is informed by Donham's concept of “vernacular modernity”, which, besides the material and technological underpinnings of modernity, also underscores the socio-cultural impacts. Donham argues that modernism has altered “peoples” imaginations— their sense of their place in world and the shape of their pasts and their future. See Donald Donham, Marxist Modern, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. (19) Resistance started by the so-called peasant-rebellion in the 1960s and continued after the revolution in 1974. The Oromo of Bale were during the insurgency in the 1970s organised under the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF). Fighting culminated in the Ogaden-war in 1977–1978. For more details, see Jason W. Clay, ‘The Case of Bale’, in Jason W. Clay, Sandra Steingraber, and Peter Niggli (eds), The Spoils of Famine: Ethiopian Famine Policy and Peasant Agriculture, Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival Inc., 1988, pp. 139ff.; Gebru Tareke, ‘The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited’, International Journal of African Historical Studies vol. 33, no. 3 (2000), pp. 639ff.; sTerje Østebø, ‘The Power of Muslim Institutions in Consolidating Democracy: A Perspective from Bale’, Forthcoming in Kjetil Tronvoll (ed.), Contested Power: Traditional Authorities and Elections in Ethiopia, Leiden: Brill, 2009.

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Growth and Fragmentation (20) In 1991–1992 the Salafiyya Madrasa had 875 students. This number increased to 1,246 in 2005–2006. New buildings were constructed in the early 1990s and additional ones in 1996 with the support of the African Muslims Agency. From among the twenty-seven former and present teachers at Salafiyya, twenty have earned their degrees from institutions in Saudi Arabia, mainly from the Islamic University of Medina. (21) Although all Sunni Muslims would refer to themselves as ahl al-sunna or ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a, this term has increasingly become a common label for the young generation of Salafis in Ethiopia. It is used by themselves and by their opponents. (22) During 1980s, Salafi and other Islamic reform movements had started to make a clear impact on Somali society. My informants, however, repeatedly stressed that the Somali influence was less important for the Oromo refugees. Although the prevailing environment must have had an indirect influence, it seems that the situation in the refugeecamps—an absence of preservative cultural structures and a general state of vulnerability—made it conducive for Oromo Salafis to attract followers. For more details on the religious development in Somalia, see; International Crisis Group, Somalia's Islamists Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group Report no. 100, 2005; Roland Marchal, ‘Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War’, in Alex De Waal (ed.),Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, London: Hurst & Co.,2004, pp. 114ff. (23) There is a general ban on wearing (Muslim) head-scarves throughout Ethiopia, yet it is not codified in any written form, it seems. Demands for repealing this ban have on occasions been expressed by Muslim communities in various parts of the country. (24) One example is the idea that it was permissible for a Muslim to marry more than four wives. (25) Such sources could be audio-cassettes, books and pamphlets, yet far more important was the internal discourse among themselves—where ideas were passed on from one to the other, thus being moulded and altered in this process. (26) Qat is mild narcotic leaves widely consumed in the Horn of Africa, as well as in Yemen. (27) Some of my informants differentiated between the Salafi establishment in Saudi and what they labelled as “the true Ahl al-Sunna”. They refrained, however, from elaborating on who would belong to this latter category. (28) The movement's character corresponds to some degree to what Wiktorowicz has labelled “the purists”. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi

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Growth and Fragmentation Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39. (29) Interview, Robe, 13 July 2005. (30) Dale F. Eickelman, ‘Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies’, American Ethnologist vol. 19, no. 4 (1992), p. 648. (31) Interview, Robe, 20 July 2005. (32) Reports from the early 1970s estimated the total number of pilgrims to Shaykh Hussein was more than 100,000. During my visits in 2002, I estimated the number to be around 15,000. See Ulrich Braukämper, Islamic History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays, Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2002, p. 141. (33) Within the Ahl al-Sunna movement in Addis Ababa, the al-Madkhaliyya movement has since 2006 gained increased momentum. This group has accused the mainstream Salafis of not being purist enough, and demonstrates how Wiktorowicz's (2006) tripartition (and the features attributed) does not fit the Ethiopian context. (34) The local government's interventions need to be related to events on the national level, causing the regime to take strong measures against the Muslim community, which is perceived as becoming increasingly radicalised. These events included clashes between worshippers and police at al-Anwar mosque in February 1995, an attempt to assassinate the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 in Addis Ababa, and several bombings by al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, an Islamist group from Somalia, which eventually led the Ethiopian government to destroy their military bases within Somalia in August 1996. (35) Louis Brenner, C ontrolling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West African Muslim Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. (36) Ibid., Eickelman, ‘Mass Higher Education’; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics; Michael Lambek, ‘Certain Knowledge, Contestable Authority: Power and Practice on the Islamic Periphery’, American Ethnologist, vol. 17, no. 1 (1990), pp. 23–40. (37) Ronald W. Niezen, ‘Hot Literacy in Cold Societies: A Comparative Study of the Sacred Value of Writing’, Comparative Study of Society and History vol. 33, no.2 (1991), p. 229. (38) Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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Growth and Fragmentation (39) Together with Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and several other guerrilla movements, OLF constituted one of the major parties in the new Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) formed in July 1991, but withdrew its support soon February 1992. Since then, the OLF has been engaged in armed struggle against the current regime, with the central-office in the Eritrean capital Asmara. See Lata Leenco, The Ethiopian State at the Crossroad: Decolonization & Democratization or Disintegration, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999; Mohammed Hassan, ‘The History of Oromo Nationalism: 1960s-990s’, in Seyoum Hameso and Mohammed Hassan (eds), Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and SelfDetermination, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 2006, pp. 275ff.; Kjetil Tronvoll, Ethiopia: A New Start?, London: Minority Rights Group International, 2000. (40) In November 1991, a decisive two-day fight between OLF and TGE soldiers led to the defeat of OLF. Through subsequent attacks on OLF bases in Bale and a repressive campaign targeting the civilian population in the period 1992–1997, the regime managed to crush the strength of the OLF in Bale. (41) Oromumma can best be translated as ‘Oromoness’, signifying belonging to the Oromo people. (42) Interview, Robe 13 July 2005. (43) Interview, Robe 14 March 2006. (44) This was something the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya (IFLO), a rival organisation of the OLF exploited, propagating a policy with more explicit religious references, underscoring the enmity towards the Christian population. However, the support for ILFO was marginal and short-lived in Bale. (45) Interview, Robe, 13 June 2005.

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Salafism In France

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Salafism In France Ideology, Practices and Contradictions Mohamed-Ali Adraoui

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0017

Abstract and Keywords The chapter deals with the reasons for the rise of Salafism—especially its quietist version—among young Muslims in France. The main theme is the empowerment of young Muslims who are victims of discrimination and who have few opportunities. They are psychologically empowered against the French secular, republican cultural environment, which they see as antagonistic. The Chapter provides insight into the background and practices of Salafis in France as a specific subculture. Keywords:   France, young Muslims, empowerment, discrimination, Salafism

Introduction For the past decade the subject of the French Muslim communities’ reIslamisation, the famous “Revenge of God”,1 has been the focus of public attention. Whichever dimension is emphasised, be it integration, secularism, political participation, community spirit or radicalism, Islam has become, even before the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, a dominant theme in French public debate. While in the 1980s intellectuals, opinions-makers and politicians used to talk about full citizenship, the struggle for equality (in the labour market, or in the housing sector) and the integration of immigrants and their (p.365) children, during the last few years, the religious dimension has in many ways replaced the ethnic or social criteria in public debate.2

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Salafism In France One of the main reasons for this transformation of public debate in contemporary France is related to the increasing number of Muslims who define themselves as strict believers.3 Their identity is based exclusively on Islam, and any feeling of social, political or cultural adherence that is not entirely based on religion, is rejected. Among this category, we find the Salafis.4 They are mostly youths from traditional Muslim families who have become convinced that Islam is a complete and total system of values and codes that rejects all other influences. Purist Salafism in France is mainly localised in the suburbs of large cities such as Paris, Lille-Roubaix and Lyon.5 Living separately from the rest of society, migrant youth have become convinced they no longer belong to the national community. Facing social anomie, they tend to identify primarily with their quartier and not their country or their parents’ social class. Most of the time, purist Salafism is not the very first “Islamic identity” (p.366) Muslim youth acquire. During their first stage of “conversion” they have been introduced to Islamic morals through the Tablighis6 or through preachers who focus on Islam as a peaceful message that promotes harmony between the duties of a believer and a French citizen.7 The main difference between Salafi discourse and other Islamist discourses is related to the “Salafi clarity”. Purist Salafis claim they embody true Islam and that Salafism represents Islam in its pristine form. The rigidity of these views leads us to the question why such an ideology has for the last decade and a half been so successful in a secular and nonMuslim society such as France?8 What has helped Salafism to gain adherents is the weakness of the allegiance, especially of Muslim youth, to the national community that is based on a social contract between the state and the citizen.9 Usually described as a highly centralised nation-state, France is also a country that lays claim to the historic role of disseminating to the world the universal values of the Enlightenment, which propounds the separation of religion and state (laïcité). This philosophy bans religion from the public sphere and restricts it to the private lives of its citizens. Islam is therefore seen as an obstacle to the integration of the Muslim community (even if most of Muslims claim there is no contradiction between their faith and belonging to the French nation). In this context, Salafi Puritanism exerts a strong attraction on Muslims who feel alienated and who contest the dominant national ideology of republicanism and laïcité that requires assimilation. The appeal of Salafi Puritanism lies in its ability to provide a way of not only opting out of society but of creating an alternative, superior community based on the unity of God (tawhid). It can justify the (p.367) Salafi Puritanism alienation from society while submitting oneself only to God and fighting all forms of religious heterodoxy. In contrast to the often deplorable situation of its followers, Salafism empowers these “dropouts” by providing them with a transcendental dimension, a holy identity, and the belief that they are chosen. That is why, in the context of competition between different “Islamites”, it is understandable that Muslims looking for existential answers are attracted by the Page 2 of 20

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Salafism In France “absolute Islam” that Salafism provides. This has led to a revolution in their lives. Instead of being passive “followers”, they have become active “models” for others. Where before the migrant lived on the fringe of society (mentally rather than effectively), as a Salafi he now stands at the centre of the world and embodies a sacred history. Morally and symbolically the migrant has climbed up the social ladder and is able to look down on the rest of society. If, for instance, in their previous lives Paris represented the cultural, political and economic power and values that France stands for, in their new lives it has become the city of kufr (impiety); powerful people and institutions that previously rejected them now are regarded as immoral and illegitimate, from their newly acquired exalted position. Their own community has replaced the alien French nation and Islam has supplanted the antagonistic West. Neighbours become unbelievers (kuffar) and non-Salafi Muslims are deviants. If before the goal was to integrate, it has now has become a means to find an exit from an iniquitous society that will be vanquished due to its immorality. But this is only half the story: the more Salafis have the feeling they are following a divine path and are busy disengaging themselves from real life, the more they are blind to the elements they adopt from French society. For despite their vehement assertion of their disengagement, they still are interacting with French society in some kind of “competition” (economically, symbolically, intellectually…), creating a “negotiated identity”.10 In fact, this constitutes the central paradox of Salafism in France: without realising it Salafis are still French in some of their values and attitudes. So, in a sense, purist Salafism can be regarded as a religious socialisation related to the problems of the banlieus and the crisis of the French concepts of laïcité and the nation. One of the best ways to analyse the field of French Islam is to regard it as a market.11 According to classic economic theory, supply and demand find a (p. 368) balance in the market. This applies to religion as well, when it is regarded as a product. The Muslim search for the real Islam constitutes a market. By selling goods to potential consumers of this product, “firms” try to improve their market share and hope to make a profit. By claiming to supply products that represent the true Islam these firms compete with other firms and try to undermine their competitors’ market share. For this purpose, they develop sales strategies, expand their communication abilities and launch advertisement campaigns, claiming they alone are capable of fulfilling their consumers’ needs. The competition is ardent in the French Islamic market due to a relatively high number of Muslim organisations. Furthermore, this market is subjected to the same tensions and fluctuations as that experience by the global Islamic market. Thus, in economic terms, re-Islamisation is an interactive process, since each stage of re-Islamisation in the global field or in the national field, such as France, can only succeed if there is a balance between the supply of the producer and the demand of the consumer. An Islamic “firm” is successful when it succeeds in creating among the consumers of its product the conviction that it Page 3 of 20

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Salafism In France practises the real Islam. This conviction must also explain why their previous way of life went awry and inform them how to correct it, become a true believer and follow correct Islamic rules. Of the three currents of Salafism,12 purist, political and Jihadi-Salafism, the appeal of the purists, on which I will concentrate in this chapter, lies in its claim to be an undiluted, true Islam.

Salafism In France: a Sect? Attraction of the Gulf

One of the reasons why Salafism has become one of the main forms of reIslamisation among young French Muslims, as well as young French converts to (p.369) Islam, is that it is directly imported from the “Country of the Two Holy Sanctuaries” (bilad al-haramayn), Saudi Arabia. Salafis’ strength lies in their claim to be simply Muslims, who act according to the religious doctrines coming from a region where Muslims practice Islam in its pure form, the Gulf and especially Saudi Arabia, the country that has established its official ideology on the teachings of one the most important historical Salafi clerics, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), the founder of Wahhabism.13 Saudi Arabia's respect for Salafism, is, according to them, apparent in the application of its severe rules, the prominent role orthodox ‘ulama play in interpreting Islamic laws, the hostility they demonstrate towards other religions, including Shi‘ism, and the vigilance of the religious police (mutawwa‘i) in preserving an orthodox way of life. Saudi Arabia is, in their eyes, the most perfect political and religious system in the world and comes closest to emulating the model of the “pious ancestors” (al-salaf al-salih). They even call it “the preachers country” (bilad aldu‘at), implying that religion is dominant. Moreover, the huge oil wealth of that country and its ability to promote its form of Islam in the rest of the world, including Europe, is regarded as a heavenly reward for the strict adherence to true Islamic values. For Salafis the only road to salvation lies in the literal application of Saudi Salafi juridical and moral norms, which are universal and de-territorialised, in France.14 Taken in by Saudi religious propaganda, they are unaware of the political aims of the regime and feel insulted when other Muslims accuse Saudi Arabia of hypocrisy,—spreading lies or maintaining a political alliance with the United States.15 What looks like a paradox—how can they regard Saudi Arabia as the ideal state, when in fact it is led by worldly political interests—is the result of a naive conception of reality. Blinded by their search for a true transnational Islam, they follow officially-sanctioned Saudi Salafischolars, who represent as it were an “Islamic technocracy” in the form of the Higher Council of ‘Ulama. This institution, whose members are appointed by the state, has the monopoly over orthodoxy and its texts and interpretations, but at the same time is subservient to rulers to whom it can only give advice (nasiha) and whose rule is legitimised as a barrier against sedition and chaos (fitna).16 (p.370)

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Salafism In France In fact, on the basis of their admiration for Saudi Arabia, together with the strong urge to migrate mentally and physically from the land of the unbelievers to a real Muslim country where the only source of the social contract is Islam, many French Salafis have decided to migrate to Saudi Arabia. In that way they can “Salafise” their daily lives and practise Islam in its pure form. Ironically, in contrast to their idealistic goals of leading a pious life, in practice the material and religious often become entwined. For them religion is a real economic investment in the religious market, a venture that not only ensures them eternal salvation but whose efficacy is reflected in material wealth in this life. A good example is the life story of a twenty-eight year old Salafi, whom I interviewed, and who had adopted the Salafi method (manhaj) almost eight years ago.17 Whereas in the past he used to be hired only for low-skilled, badly paid, temporary jobs, such as work in call centres, one day he decided to migrate to Dubai where some of his “Salafi brothers” started to buy and sell high quality goods such as mobile phones or pocket computers. By reselling them in France, where they were more expensive, to his neighbours and friends, he started to earn a considerable income, which he invested in a restaurant in the United Arab Emirates. Today, he is a wealthy man and explains his current prosperous situation as a gift from Allah who has rewarded him materially for his decision to join Salafism and have faith in God and walk the straight path of the true Islam. Compared to his friends who are still “deviant” or totally “alienated by un-Islamic morals” (ceux qui sont dans l’égarement) (drinking alcohol, mixing with the kuffar), his present position has improved considerably and his newly acquired status has become the object of envy. Having won eternal grace in the hereafter, for which he is recompensed on earth, his decision to become a Salafi is regarded as smart. That he has been saved and is rewarded by becoming wealthy obviously demonstrates that he has joined the right current. These relatively widespread Salafisuccess stories seem to confirm the Weberian thesis that there exists a correlation between religious investment and economic success.18 However, in contrast to the Calvinists, this young Salafi brags openly about the benefits accruing from his recent investments (religious and economic), saying in my interview with him, “al-hamdulilah, (praise God) I have never earned so much money in my whole life ”.19 In the (p.371) terminology of Salafism, these successful Salafis ascribe their good fortune to being a member of the “saved group” (al-firqat al-najiya) or the “victorious branch” (al-ta’ifa almansura).20 Politics

It is clear, however, that Salafism due to its rejection of French society, has severe consequences for the political participation of Muslims in France. For, in addition to cultural and social integration, political participation is also condemned as leading to a loss of identity and a compromise of one's religion. Page 5 of 20

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Salafism In France Violence is rejected by purist Salafism as a form of politics that distracts attention that most be wholly devoted to God.21 Any form of seeking political influence is regarded as a lack of the faith in God; God admonishes believers to lay their fate in his hands. Besides, political action, whether peaceful or violent, leads to dissent. The total conformity that characterises their behaviour in the Gulf has, however, a different meaning in France. If in Saudi Arabia it dovetails with a conservative political and social system, purist Salafism acquires in France culturally, socially and politically a contentious (or at least an equivocal) dimension, as Salafis on the one hand ask Muslims to refrain from open rebellion against the political structure but at the same admonish Muslims not to follow the path of the unbelievers. The modus vivendi Salafis have reached with the state does not solve this problem, for in exchange for their recognition of the secular state the state respects their belief but the ambivalent situation is continued. This, more than the threat of violence, lies at the heart of the challenge Salafism poses for French society. Given that the only rules a Salafi can obey are those of God, Salafis cannot participate in a democratic or any other kind of political system that is not based on the strict respect of divine commandments. The only way to gain God's satisfaction is to resist anything non-Salafi. This attitude is one of the major differences between them and many other Islamic actors and competitors in the religious market in France, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis are consistent in rejecting political behaviour such as voting, becoming a member of a political party, or even discussing public issues. During the last two presidential elections, in 2002 and 2007, many Salafis tried to incite other Muslims, especially the younger ones, to abstain from voting and giving their voices to an unbeliever who does not follow Islamic precepts and will not govern “according to what Allah revealed.”22 During my research I personally (p.372) witnessed a vehement struggle between a young Salafi and an elderly Moroccan, who as an immigrant urged young people to vote and to defend their democratic rights. The Salafi insisted strongly on the fact he would not submit himself to politicians or scholars and that as a follower of the true path he did not have to justify himself in a Western country. He believed he was an example for others, who should unquestionably follow him. This included even older people, whose lives had always been devoted to prayers and worship. Such an attitude is typical for the struggle between generations and the manner in which the younger generation tries to wrest away the religious and moral power from the older generation. But it also has consequences for the political integration of French Muslims. Culture

The main appeal of Salafism, however, does not lie so much in the rejection of politics but in the cultural field. As Salafism can be defined as a counterculture,23 habits and projects traditionally related to the improvement of the status of a minority in a liberal society are abandoned in favour of stressing Page 6 of 20

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Salafism In France the difference between “us” and “them”. Cultural indicators such as clothing or time management illustrate the manner in which Salafis do their utmost to distinguish themselves from secular as well other non-Salafi Muslim members of society. By wearing the qamis (the traditional long robe of the Gulf countries) and the trousers that reveal the calves (izhar),24 or the refusal to work in some sectors of the economy, such as banks, they send a specific message to the rest of society that they are the chosen ones, whereas the rest of society is lost and will end in hell. As one Salafi once told me: “how can you make a distinction between a Muslim and a kafir if you don’t know how to recognise them? You must dress Islamically, that is compulsory.”25 What he was saying, was “tell me how you dress and I will tell you who you are and whether you are sincere or not ”. By dressing like the pious forefathers, Salafis show to the rest of society that they are proud to belong to the “saved group” (al-firqat al-najiya). And by turning the tables, they, the formerly discriminated minority, are no longer judged by standards of others but have themselves become (p.373) judges.26 Empowered by their new identity they have escaped the obligation to meet what they regard as external, alien norms. For who can evaluate them if they live according to the rules of the very first generations of believers who were pure in their faith and walked the straight path? This is especially the case with many young Muslims who live in the French suburbs.27 For young Muslims Islam becomes a potent way of sending messages to the rest of society and positioning themselves symbolically in relation to that society according to their own conditions.28 Choosing the path of the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih) Salafis, in a sense, make an investment: they will sacrifice some immediate benefits (like being positively regarded by French authorities and opinions-makers who often make a distinction between “modern” and “archaic” Islam),29 in the form of work, respect, acceptance and a career. In return, they will acquire a status that translates into a moral superiority on earth and salvation in the hereafter. Considering themselves as “the wardens of Islam”, Salafis adopt a strategy that allows them to escape from a social context that will inevitably ensure a loss of purity and a decline in the scale of Muslim values. This depreciation of Islamic symbols that life in a Western country entails can only be countered by a strict management of space and time in accordance with sacred doctrine. An example is the strict adherence to the routine of daily Muslim prayers, which must be executed at a precise time in a mosque, preferably a Salafi mosque. Simply adhering to the obligation to pray five times a day means that their appointments and their entire social life are subjected to a sacred timescale. In this manner, in the cities and suburbs where Salafis are numerous, such as Mantesla-Jolie, Villeneuve-la-Garenne or Les Mureaux (three cities near Paris), the Salafi way of life has relegated French norms and values to the margin. In these enclaves Salafis live separately from the rest of the society. Their mosques and homes have become the focus of their existence and they try to evade the Page 7 of 20

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Salafism In France city centres that are regarded as impious areas. For example, one day the buses weren’t running in Saint Denis, near Paris so a group of Salafis had to cross the (p.374) town on foot. They did this as fast as possible, keeping a steady pace, passing churches, without raising their gaze, pointedly ignoring everyone around them and disregarding the region of kufr and the kuffar, who are condemned to divine wrath.30 Their rigidity stands for their commitment to the holy texts and spirit of Islam, for what is at stake is nothing less than their eternal salvation, which can only be attained by implementing the “Salafi way of life” (al-manhaj al-salafi) and proving on a daily basis their independence from other groups. From a sociological point of view, the main consequence of this attitude is the imperative to build a subculture, which is in fact a counterculture based on a strict religious state of mind never to give up the straight path. Actually, it means that each Salafi has to maintain, during his whole life, the purity of his soul, practice and body. That demands strict endogamy and segregation and a severe hierarchical view of the society (which is reminiscent, in a sense, of the caste system in India), which enhances their feelings of superiority to the rest of society. If this is not possible, they can always escape from the “land of unbelievers”. The term sect therefore is applied by some researchers to the Salafis.31 Economics

In the terms of Albert Hirschmann Salafi behaviour can be described as an exit strategy.32 Three options are open to someone who is confronted with a social crisis: loyalty, voice or exit. That is, the option to remain loyal and defend the former situation; to take the floor and express one's view to say how to manage changes; and the option to exit from this situation. Generally speaking, Salafism can be summed up as an exit strategy developed by young Muslims who are unable, or unwilling, to adjust to French society. In their economic life, Salafis resemble orthodox Jewish communities in New-York or Montreal, who tend to live on their own by setting up small businesses (pizzerias, phone shops…). It means that the cash nexus is the only link they are allowed to maintain with the rest of society. However, as we have seen in the case of the Salafis who went to the Gulf, economic activity has changed their character. While on the one hand they try to force an intellectual and social break in (p.375) everyday contacts with their direct cultural and social environment and French society at large, on the other hand, through their entrepreneurship, they adopt predominant economic values, which are based on earning money and taking advantage of life regardless of major political issues or the people they trade and deal with. In this new relationship, non-Salafis are no longer seen as kuffar, but have been transformed into consumers, suppliers or clients. Thus, one side of modernity, in the form of mass consumption, has been unwittingly adopted as it is believed to be unable to tarnish their purity.

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Salafism In France Crisis of Authority, Individualism, Postmodernism and Post-Islamism Salafism as a deviant social and cultural practice cannot be understood without an analysis of the crisis of the traditional Islamic structures of the family and the “neighbourhood imam ”. Given that in North African countries children are primarily educated by parents, who adhere to a non-orthodox form of folk Islam, and then by clerics who live in the community and share its daily life, the acculturation young Muslims in France have experienced has led to a totally new arrangement for their upbringing and their religious education. It entails a revolution of the old forms of Islamic knowledge and its transmission. A new type of ‘ulama, who claim to be the “real owners of the sacred science” (les détenteurs de la vraie science), have taken over this task. Their power has increased as result of the loss of authority the parents have experienced due to their economic problems and their inability to give their children an “authentic” Islamic education.33 Another factor that has contributed to the increase of their power is the loss of authority of counter-forces in the Islamic market. Having put too much stress on the need to integrate into the republican mould, official republican discourse has alienated most of the Muslim youth from the so-called defenders of the rights of the immigrants’ children whose discourse is based on citizenship. Intellectuals or moderate preachers, such as Tariq Ramadan are, against this background, said to lack a real interest in Islam. Too Westernised in dress and speech and apologetic for Islam, reinterpreting Islam and Islamic sources in the light of western concepts, such as freedom and modernisation, they are accused of diluting the true word of Islam. On the other hand, other Islamic currents that share Salafism's rejection of a “rational”, Westernised Islam, such (p.376) as the Tablighi movement, which also proselytises among the same Muslim youth, are believed to be “scientifically” weak.34 Since they focus exclusively on fulfilling the obligation to pray and the basic duties of Islam, but neglect the whole range of demands on the believer in the form of fighting innovations, searching for the right scientific method of studying hadith and purifying religious practices that Salafism pursues, the latter is regarded as more rigorous and challenging. As the ultimate source of legitimacy is to live according to the precepts of true Islam, the criteria for measuring the religiosity of a young Muslim is his adherence to the most demanding religious current.35 The consequence of following the Salafi method is that the young Muslim becomes estranged from his newly found homeland. In other words, even if their goals resemble those of other individuals in society—acquiring self-esteem, pursuing a career, or the search for respectability—which derive from the individualisation of all citizens of postmodern Western societies, the result is totally different. Salafism in particular and Islam in general, use a sacred discourse that integrates people into a totally different social environment that to ordinary Frenchmen appears utterly foreign. Religion as practised by Salafis fully covers the term the “revenge of God”. However, as we have seen it also Page 9 of 20

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Salafism In France situates the believer in a complex dual relationship with society: while in theory the believer lives in a parallel, separate society, in practice he or she interacts, is influenced by and competes with the rest of society. The term “compete” is used here because in France the whole Salafi discourse is geared to distancing the Salafis from the rest of society, while in reality the methods used by Salafis to expand their following and impose their rules have been heavily influenced by the practices in the rest of French society. Even the migration of Salafis to what they regard as true Muslim societies, where Muslims live according the strict Islamic precepts, obeys Western norms. The uprooted, postmodern French Salafi is a globalised individual who is no longer interested in his own cultural roots and the land of his parents, preferring instead the non-cultural economic dynamic regions of the Gulf, such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi.36 These regions have the advantage that they are (p.377) modern, international and prosperous, as well as being Muslim, and allow Salafis the right religious and economic environment to set up and run their businesses. Despite their attempt to flee France and the decadence of nonreligious Western societies, Salafis remain imbued with some of the basic values of postmodern societies, such as mass consumption and material success, and try to combine the quest for religious purity with economic prosperity. Neglecting their past and the poverty of their parents, the East has acquired mythical status and is regarded as a region where purity effortlessly dovetails with prosperity.37 In a sense, it is not an exaggeration to say that French Salafis promote a typical Orientalist view about the Near and the Middle East as lands of true Islam, purity and salvation.38 Why are we allowed to describe Salafi Muslims as postmodern people? While the concept of “postmodernism” is undoubtedly problematical, it can nevertheless be used to define the Salafi way of life. It is actually relevant when we study “the Salafi basics”. First of all, Purist Salafism insists on a free support principle. To convert a majority of people is not as important as to build a “saved group” with totally devoted Salafis who are conscious that “true Islam” does not allow any weakness or moderate support. All the Salafis that I have met explain that they joined this current of Islam because they were convinced that it was authentic, pure and far away from human interpretation. It was Islam. From a sociological point of view, we can use the word postmodern to describe this kind of religious identification because “postmodern ways of life” suppose free consent and above all individual development. This personal progression has to be done far away from the “traditional” authorities which used to form group identities. With Purist Salafism, believers abandon the will to change the world. Although they would be very happy if mankind decided to follow their path, in fact, the qualitative dimension is much more essential than the quantitative one because. Salafism is first of all an intensive progression within orthodox Islam and not an extensive plan to convert people by sacrifying the purity of their faith. In other words, the main goal is not to obtain power but to shine like lighthouses. Not knowing political parties, religious associations or philosophical currents, Purist Page 10 of 20

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Salafism In France Salafism creates a “tribe sociability”. Believers are no longer linked by the desire to change the world (p.378) but by the wish to be united in worship. Moreover, when we look at their attraction for mass consumption and free market societies where making money is easy, Salafi Muslims can also be seen as postmodern individuals. Political primacy has disappeared in favour of their preference for trade and self-made careers. The goal they want to achieve, in reality, is dual. First, achieving eternal salvation by the means of strict adherence. Then, enjoying all the premitted aspects of modernity. As young Salafis are both fascinated and repelled by the West they develop what we can call a “negotiated identity”.39 Despite the pains they take to distance themselves from French society, they creatively manipulate their identity in order to give themselves the most beneficial status on the dominant scale of social hierarchy of that same society. In line with the economic theory of the maximisation of profits, we can compare this search for the most prestigious status with the strategy to challenge and compete with the main historical Muslim players: the parents, traditional imams and Islamic institutions, and other fundamentalist competitors. Like a business that launches advertising campaigns to instil in the consumer the idea that his brand is the only brand the consumer craves, Salafism has been highly successful in marketing its form Islam as the only form of Islam.40 Salafism seems to have combined all facets of life into a successful product. Its “sacred science” and its claim to truth, have given it an intellectual dimension lacking in other currents and the economic success of Salafist businesses confirms their social status as the “saved group”. In this sense, Salafism has become one of the most original and at the same time one of the most problematical players in the re-Islamisation process in France. Marketing their comparative advantages, Salafis are successful in playing on the feelings of alienation and the search for alternatives among young French Muslims. My research of Salafism has led to the conclusion that the Salafist attraction comes from its ability to translate former social habits and ideals into sacred religious codes. The step to “convert” to Salafism is less drastic than most outsiders imagine. Most people who have embraced the Salafi path used to consider themselves alienated from society before choosing Islamic purism. In that sense Islamic revivalism can be seen as nothing but a symbolic resource for another form of integration into French society. Islam in general and purist Salafism in particular can be interpreted as a new form of integration into secular French society. To counter the absence at school, (p.379) and the economic and political discrimination of Muslims, religion is mobilised to construct a new link with society. In contrast with the commonly-held notion that Islam is an obstacle to full citizenship, it can also be regarded as a symbolic resource that empowers people. More precisely, it can be defined as one of several identities. Individuals are constructed by several identities and insist on some more than others. Despite the Salafis’ insistence on being different, all forms of Islam in Western Europe are in one way or another connected with the Page 11 of 20

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Salafism In France issue of integration. For information on this issue, the debates in France on Islam are not very helpful: they say more about France and French society than about Islam and how Islam functions in France.41 In other words, Islamic discourses are hardly relevant to integration. Rather it is the other way round: in reality religious identities are more the results than the reasons for a certain behaviour.

Salafism and Post-Islamism If we study conditions that have contributed to the birth of a Salafist rebellious form of Islam in Muslim communities in France over recent years, we can find three reasons or hypotheses for its emergence. Each is directly linked to some pathological condition in French society. First of all, for three decades, we can observe that the topic of re-Islamisation has functioned in a cycle. Re-Islamisation does not work as a continuous, accumulative movement, but as a succession of waves of movements that affect the lives of people seeking a sacred dimension in their lives. The first step in the process of re-Islamisation in France was made in the 1980s by the Tablighis, a powerful missionary movement that was born in the Indian subcontinent in the 1920s and is based on the call to Muslims to fulfil their duties, and is regarded as the basis of the Islamic revival.42 In contrast to Salafis, the Tablighis are not doctrinaire. They try to mobilise Muslims by stressing their common features and neglecting their differences. The only non-negotiable issues are the obligation to fulfil prayers and constant reference to primitive Islam. The Tablighis do not uphold the elitist concept of the chosen group (p.380) that alone will enter paradise. The main contribution the Tablighis made is to help Muslims in France to rediscover their identity. The Tablighis, however, were not sophisticated enough to meet the need of most Muslims—to help them to find a place in society as Muslims. That is the main reason why the 1990s were the decade of Muslim discourse on the contextualisation of Islam in French society and the rise of what can be called “intellectual Islam”. This debate that promoted an “integrationalist” Islam was represented by two major figures or institutions that have competed successfully with “historical French Muslim figures” such as “la Grande Mosquée de Paris”. The main protagonists were, on the one hand, the Union of French Islamic Organisations (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), and on the other hand, Tariq Ramadan. This debate emerged as a result of the coming of age of the second generation of French Muslims. Promoting an interactive and dynamic identity that allowed Muslims to be citizens as well as believers, this new tendency questioned the Muslim sacred sources with the purpose of meeting the growing challenges that integration and France's republican ideals presented to Muslims.

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Salafism In France To many Muslims, however, the ambiguous character of the integrationist debate reinforced the idea that Islam was being sacrificed at the altar of French republicanism. There was widespread feeling that Muslims were being shortchanged in the integrationist deal. Another reason why it did not succeed was that political Islam, as was practised and expounded in France, had its roots in the Middle East, where it usually had a strong nationalist dimension. In these countries political Islam functioned as a means of political integration because it stressed the political dimension and participation of Muslims. In such completely different circumstances as in France, where most Muslims felt alienated, political Islam and its promotion of the “believing citizenship” (citoyenneté croyante)43 did not make any sense. Much more appealing in these circumstances, was the notion that religion was all-inclusive, monopolising the heart, the body and the soul of a Muslim; that religion was everything and nothing but religion. In this light the rise of purist Salafism can be regarded as the result of the disillusionment of the second wave of re-Islamisation with terms like citizenship, integration or political participation, which had dominated the previous debate. The strength of Salafism lies in its uncompromising stand. Drifting away from “hard Islam” and formulating a “soft”, integrationist Islam based on universal Islamist norms (p.381) and values, the integrationists failed to convince French Muslims of the ultimate value of these goals, the more so as their cooperative strategy did not succeed in undermining Islamophobia, or helping the social emancipation of Muslims in France. Tariq Ramadan, for instance, is still suspected by French society of hiding his real views behind his smile and his progressive rhetoric. In contrast to the “Westernisers”, the Salafis presented themselves as simple Muslims who only obeyed God and did not compromise their religion. Their “self-sufficient Islam” and their exhibitionist strategies to convert other Muslims were highly successful among a new generation that gradually realised they had no interest in becoming part of French society or any other non- Muslim society. This brings us to the last point: what are the consequences of the rise of Salafism in France? As Islamism in its postmodern Western context can be analysed in terms of the issue of integration, non-revolutionary Salafism can eventually be analysed as one of the modalities of post-Islamism.44 In the literature of Western political science, modernity is an eminent political concept that emphasises the acquisition of political power. Postmodernism can be understood as the decline of political consciousness and the notion that the individual can fulfil his dreams and achieve collective political goals by means of the economy, business and trade. In that sense Salafism is a form of postIslamism and constitutes the beginning of the postmodernisation of Islam and the lives of Muslims. No longer interested in acquiring political power and conquering the state, purist Salafism has developed a new kind of ideology based on the need to “become someone”, i.e. social emancipation, by means of setting up a business and achieving social prestige and respectability in one's Page 13 of 20

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Salafism In France own community. Politics has been devalued and the focus of attention and competition has shifted to the economy. Rather than an asset, political power has become a liability that must be avoided. The defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood45 in several countries in the Middle East, or at least their inability to force Arab secular governments to put Islam on the top of their agenda, has enhanced the concentration on economic prosperity and the “self help” (p.382) philosophy of Salafism. Moving away from politics as the symbol of moder nity and closer to the economy as the symbol of postmodernity, purist Salafism represents an important aspect of post-Islamism.46 In a sense, Salafism is “a form of Islamism that leads away from Islamism”. It is important to remember the contradictions in French Salafism that illustrate the double socialisation in which they are or have been involved. Whereas, theoretically, Salafis only acknowledge one identity, the religious one, of “true Islam”, one must keep in mind that this is an ideological construct. Each individual is always tied to other people by means of different processes of socialisation: family, nation, school, friends, intellectuals, clerics, customers, and so on. All the levels of socialisation interfere in their lives to create personalities that can be more or less inclined to social and cultural deviance. Bibliography Bibliography references: Adraoui, Mohamed-Ali, Le salafisme en France: socialisation et rupture d’un groupe social, Mémoire de master de recherche, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Programme monde musulman, 2005. Amghar, Samir, ‘Les salafistes français: Une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse?’Maghreb- Machrek, no. 183 (Spring 2005), pp. 13–31. Antonio, Robert J ., ‘After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 106, no. 1 (July 2000), pp. 40–87. Bolle De Bal, Marcel, La tentation communautaire: Les paradoxes de la reliance et de la contre-culture: Essai psychosociologique à partir d’un récit de Bernard Lassens Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1985. Bouzar, Dounia, L’islam des banlieues: les prédicateurs, nouveaux travailleurs sociaux? Paris: Syros, 2001. ———, Quelle éducation face au radicalisme religieux? Paris: Dunod, 2006. Brouard, Sylvain, and Tiberj,Vincent, Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque, Nouveaux Débats, 2005. Dewitte, Philippe (ed.), Immigration et intégration: L’état des savoirs, Paris: La Découverte, 1999. Page 14 of 20

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Salafism In France Donnadieu, Gérard, ‘Vers un marché du religieux, le nouveau paysage du croire’, Futuribles, no. 260, (January 2001), pp. 5–22. Goffman, Erving, Stigmate, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1975. (p.383) Hirschmann, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. Iannacconne, Laurence R., ‘Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion: Symposium on the rational choice approach to religion’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 34, no 1 (1995), pp. 76–89. Kakpo, Nathalie, L’islam, un recours pour les jeunes, Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2007 Kastoryano, Riva, La France, l’Allemagne et leurs immigrés: négocier l’identité, Paris: Colin, 1996. Kepel, Gilles, Les banlieues de l’islam: Naissance d’une religion en France, Paris: Seuil, 1991. ———, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, Cambridge:Polity Press, 1994. Leveau, Rémi, Withol de Wenden, Catherine, and Mohsen Finan, Khadija (eds), De la citoyenneté locale, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2003. Masud, Muhammad Khalid (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama’at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal,Leiden, 2000. Ménoret, Pascal, The Saudi Enigma: A History, London:Zed Books, 2005. Rentz, George S., (ed.), The birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhāb (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia, London: Arabian Publishing, 2004. Roussillon, Alain, ‘Dans l’attente du postislamisme’, La vie des idées, vol. 10, no. 6 (2005), pp. 45–55. Roy, Olivier, ‘Le postislamisme’, Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, vol. 72, no. 85/86 (1999), pp. 9–147. Said, Edward, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Harmondsworth, New Edition, 1995. Smith, Richard Allan, After Postmodernism: Education, Politics and Identity, London: Falmer Press, 1995. Page 15 of 20

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Salafism In France Todd, Emmanuel, Le destin des immigrés: Assimilation et ségrégation dans les démocraties occidentales, Paris, Seuil, 1994. Tribalat, Michèle, Faire France: Une enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants, Paris: La Découverte, 1995. Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York: Scribner's, 1930. Wiktorowicz, Quentin, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2005. Notes:

(1) Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. (2) For instance, when Nicolas Sarkozy was Minister of Interior in 2003, he started a huge row by appointing Aïssa Dermouche to a high position on account of his religious origins. Besides being a “symbol of integration” Aïssa Drmouche was also a political friend of Sarkozy, with the same contacts and from the same network. He became known as the “Muslim Prefect”. The controversy surrounding his appointment is illustrative of the the current debate about “French Affirmative Action”. (3) As, according to the French law one should speak of citizens without any reference to their ethnic origin or beliefs, the issue of the number of Muslims in France is taboo. There are probably between five and six million Muslims in France. The subject can easily be used for political purposes by anti-immigration parties or populist leaders, and therefore it is difficult to make serious studies on the subject. Two of the most serious researchers, Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, estimate in their book Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque (Nouveaux Débats, 2005) that the number of people who describe themselves as Muslims is 3.5 million,10 to 15 per cent of them practising Muslims. According to Piotr Smolar in his article in Le Monde, “Mouvance éclatée, le salafisme s’est étendu aux villes moyennes” (22 February 2005) there are 5,000 Salafis, a number that he obtained from the French Intelligence Services. It is hard to confirm this number since Salafis are constantly migrating back and forth between France and Muslim societies and there are “conversions” of Muslims and non- Muslims to Salafism. (4) In fact, while the term “Salafist” is far more prevalent than “Salafis”, used mainly by journalists—I prefer using the latter because that is the term used by Salafis themselves. By calling them “Salafis” we in a sense are “westernising” Salafism by referring to a political allegiance.

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Salafism In France (5) It is remarkable that big cities such as Marseille, which has a large Muslim community of Algerian immigrants and their children, has comparatively few Salafis. It is conspicuous that in the 1970s the suburbs of Paris, Lille-Roubaix and Lyon were the three main French regions where far left parties were prominent. (6) The Tablighi movement is one of the most successful Muslim revivalist movements of the twentieth century. It was founded by Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi (1885–1944) in the province of Mewat in India in the 1920s and was created in order to provide Indian Muslims with an authentic faith that would not be tarnished by un-Islamic influences. One of the key principles of the Tablighi movement concerns the duty to migrate in order to preach to other Muslims. (7) That is the case of one Salafi whom I met, whose parents come from Tunisia. He has been initiated into Islam by attending Hassan Iquioussen's conferences, the former President of Jeunes Musulmans de France, who was strongly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and who always insists on Muslims’ rights and duties in French society. (8) Dounia Bouzar (préface de Michel Duvette), Quelle éducation face au radicalisme religieux? Paris: Dunod, 2006. (9) Michèle Tribalat, Faire France: Une enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants, Paris: La Découverte, 1995. Emmanuel Todd, Le destin des immigrés: Assimilation et ségrégation dans les démocraties occidentales, Paris, Seuil, 1994. Philippe Dewitte (ed.) Immigration et intégration: L’état des savoirs, Paris: La Découverte, 1999. (10) Riva Kastoryano, La France, l’Allemagne et leurs immigrés: négocier l’identité, Paris: Colin, 1996. (11) Laurence R. Iannacconne, ‘Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion: Symposium on the rational choice approach to religion’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 34, no 1 (1995), pp. 76– 89; Gérard Donnadieu, ‘Vers un marché du religieux, le nouveau paysage du croire’, Futuribles, no. 260, (January 2001), pp. 5–22. (12) Quentin Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. In this book, three kinds of Salafism are presented: political, purist and Jihadi. Whereas Jihadis stress violence and political Salafis insist on religious and legal reforms, purists are mainly interested in purifying their beliefs and behaviour. Saved by Allah, they tend to develop what we can call a “Noah syndrome” like the most famous prophet (Noah) who was saved by God for obeying Him.

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Salafism In France (13) George S. Rentz (ed.), The birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhāb (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia, London: Arabian Publishing,2004. (14) Samir Amghar, “Les salafistes français. Une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse?”Maghreb- Machrek, no. 183 (Spring 2005), pp. 13–31. (15) Pascal Ménoret, The Saudi Enigma: A History, London: Zed Books, 2005. (16) http://mouslim.over-blog.org/article-15119229.html; http:// labonnereference.overblog.fr/categorie-10023695.html. (17) This is a Salafi whose evolution to Salafism I have observed over a number of years. (18) Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, New York: Scribner's, 1930. (19) Interview held in 2005 with a Salafi who never really travelled in his whole life but started to discover the world, more precisely the Gulf region, after becoming a Salafi. (20) http://www.al.baida.online.fr/les_reglesbasesmanhaj.htm. (21) http://www.sounnah.free.fr/dawah_attentat_albani.htm. (22) Qur’an, 5: 44, 5:45 and 5:47. (23) Marcel Bolle De Bal, La tentation communautaire: Les paradoxes de la reliance et de la contre-culture: Essai psychosociologique à partir d’un récit de Bernard LassensBruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1985. (24) http://www.salafs.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=10089. (25) Interview conducted in 2007 with a twenty-seven year old Salafi whose family comes from Morocco. (26) Erving Goffman, Stigmate, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1975. (27) Dounia Bouzar, L’islam des banlieues: les prédicateurs, nouveaux travailleurs sociaux? Paris: Syros, 2001, and Gilles Kepel, Les banlieues de l’islam: Naissance d’une religion en France,Paris: Seuil, 1991. (28) Nathalie Kakpo, L’islam, un recours pour les jeunes, Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2007. (29) For example, many French philosophers and journalists divide Muslims into two groups: those who accept republican values (les valeurs de la République), and those who uphold barbarian attitudes and stand for “the dark side of Islam”. Page 18 of 20

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Salafism In France (30) http://salafs.com/modules/news/print.php?storyid=215. (31) Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam. (32) Albert O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. (33) Dounia Bouzar, L’islam des banlieues. (34) http://www.salafs.com/modules/news/article.php? storyid=11&keywords=tabligh. (35) http://al-bayan.fr/t374-Pourquoi-suivons-nous-les-Salafs-Salihs.htm. http:// sounna.over-blog.org/categorie-921546.html. http://www.salafs.com/modules/ news/article.php?storyid=30. (36) Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Le salafisme en France: socialisation et rupture d’un groupe social. Mémoire de master de recherche, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Programme monde musulman, 2005. (37) The majority of French Salafis do not go and live abroad but this proportion is currently rising. http://Salafidunord.over-blog.com/categorie-1045586.html, http://pourmahijrainshallah.superforum.fr/. (38) Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Harmondsworth, New Edition, 1995. (39) Kastoryano, La France, l’Allemagne et leurs immigrés. (40) Such strategies exist in the luxury sector, where goods are not named after the brand but by establishing a confusion between the name of the item and the name of the brand. (41) For instance, to what extent should Islam be integrated in the French political landscape? How to deal with secularism? What answers can be given to some points such as marriage with non Muslims, and how to position these politically…? (42) Travellers in faith: studies of the Tablighi Jama’at as a transnational Islamic movement for faith renewal, Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.),Leiden, 2000. About Tablighi movement in France, see Gilles Kepel, Les banlieues de l’islam. (43) Rémi Leveau, Catherine Withol de Wenden et Khadija Mohsen Finan (eds), De la citoyenneté locale, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2003.

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Salafism In France (44) Richard Allan Smith, After Postmodernism: Education, Politics and Identity, London: Falmer Press, 1995. Robert J. Antonia, ‘After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 106, no. 1 (July 2000), pp. 40–87; Alain Roussillon, ‘Dans l’attente du postislamisme’, La vie des idées, vol. 10, no. 6 (2005), pp. 45–55; Olivier Roy, ‘Le postislamisme’, Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, vol. 72, no. 85/86 (1999), pp. 9–147. (45) Called by Salafis “corrupted brothers” (ikhwan mouflissin). http:// www.darwa.com/forum//archive/index.php/t-574.html. (46) Although Post-Islamism can be regarded as a buzz word, it is useful to explain the rise of purist Salafism. Post-Islamism refers to the inability of Islamist parties to obtain political power and also refers to a kind of activist tiredness. Political and social militancy is replaced by preaching and the search for purity, thus implicitly recognising the defeat of political Islam. The youth I interviewed, many coming from Algeria, showed a deep aversion for what happened in Algeria during the “civil war” in the 1990s.

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Salafism and British Muslim Youth Sadek Hamid

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0018

Abstract and Keywords This chapter provides a history of Salafism in Britain, tracing its origins and development through a host of different groups. It explains why Salafism, on account of its clarity and simplicity, has such an appeal, especially for the British Muslim youth. The chapter also shows how Salafism, due to its sectarian character, is prone to splits, and discusses the debates that dominate the contemporary Salafi scene in Britain. Keywords:   Salafism in Britain, youth, splits, sectarian

Introduction The appeal of Salafism to second-generation British Muslims accelerated in the early 1990s. Its adherents believe that their understanding is based upon a retrieval of a correct “pure” religion, an authentic religious praxis free of historical deviations and accretions, a return to a version of Islam as it was understood by the first generation of believers. This chapter suggests that the attraction of Salafism for British Muslim youth is attributable to the convergence of a number of overlapping factors. British Salafism however, has become diversified to such an extent that it is no longer recognisable as a single movement, with its development taking unexpected turns, challenging popular monolithic representations. This chapter, rather than providing a detailed history of its emergence and establishment, will offer a broad narrative on why

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam and how Salafi thought has competed successfully among other Islamic trends within Muslim communities in the UK. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: I am grateful to Yahya Birt for encouraging me to write this chapter and for his comments on an early draft and also to all the people I spoke to who increased my awareness of the British Salafiscene, particularly Usama Hassan who made suggestions for improving the text. (p.385) British Muslims are a tapestry of various strands of the global Muslim community with a current population of between 1.6–1.8 million, of whom around two thirds are of South Asian backgrounds.1 Over fifty per cent were born in the UK and about the same percentage are under the age of 25, with approximately 33 percent under the age of 16. Comprising a diverse range of sectarian traditions, four major tendencies are identifiable: the largest community is the Barelwi2 tradition, followed by the Deobandis,3 the JamaatiIslami4 inspired institutions and finally the Ahl-e Hadith mosque network5. All of which are theological and ideological trends imported into the UK with the arrival of the South Asian settler communities in the 1960s and 1970s. Though the terms Salafism and Wahhabism are often used interchangably it is worth commenting on their differences. Yahya Birt, writing about the establishment of Salafi trends in the UK, preferred to use the term Wahabbism to describe British Salafis.6 Followers protested that the term is inaccurate as they claim to follow the salaf al-salih, the righteous first three generations of early Muslims and not the eighteenth century figure, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab (1703–1792); indeed an apologetic tract has been written addressing this very point.7 However the origins of the modern Salafi movement can be traced to nineteenth and early twentieth-century reformist thinkers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849– 1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935). According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, the two streams of thought converged when Wahabbism co-opted the language (p.386) and symbols of Salafism and the two became indistinguishable.8 Today, influential British Salafis are reluctant to call themselves Salafi due to the bitter internal disputes that erupted during the 1990s and the current negative connotations associated with it. Protestations aside, Muslims who gravitate to this perspective can be linked genealogically to the puritanical reform movement which burst onto Arabia in the eighteenth century.9

The Rise of British Salafism Pinpointing the precise entry of Salafi ideas into the UK is speculative and only a handful of mosques openly identify themselves as Salafi. Key among them are the Green Lane Mosque and the Salafi Institute in Birmingham, Masjid Ibn Taymiyyah in Brixton, London, and the Islamic Centre in Luton. Undoubtedly the organisation that was instrumental in spreading Salafism in the UK was the Jamiyyah Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah (The Society for the Revival of the Prophetic Page 2 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Way, JIMAS), through its leader Manwar Ali, aka Abu Muntasir.10 Considered by many to be the father of the Salafida‘wa (preaching) in the UK, he is credited with being largely responsible for the spread of Salafism among Muslim youth through his delivery of countless speeches at “study circles” at mosques, community centres and universities across the country.11 Though not formally qualified in Islamic studies, he grew up in a religious family and his father was a distinguished historian. The young Abu Muntasir's teenage years reflected the common tensions experienced by second generation British Muslims seeking to reconcile religious upbringing with the influences of majority non-Muslim society. Having decided to dedicate himself to a committed religious identity, he sought to learn about Islam on his own (p.387) from English sources wherever he could find them. The contradiction between what he understood from the textual ideals and what he saw as being taught and practised in Muslim communities, strengthened his resolve to deepen his knowledge and share it with others of his generation. This sometimes got him in to trouble with traditional Deobandi and Barelwi imams whom he challenged in their mosques, sometimes being physically thrown out on the street. Abu Muntasir started his career in the Islamic youth organisation Harakat Islah al-Shabab al-Muslimin (The Movement of Reform of Muslim Youth, HISAM), which he helped to found in the early 1980s with a few of his friends and individuals from Birmingham who were close to the Ahl-e Hadith trend. The movement was led by Muhammad Abdul Karim Saqib who is director of the AlHijrah Muslim Girls School in Birmingham. Abu Muntasir, however, later assumed the HISAM leadership due to his communications skills and his ability to bridge the cultural and linguistic gaps that were emerging among the second generation, by explaining Islamic teachings in fluent English to younger people who did not understand the liturgical importance of Arabic or did not know their mother tongue languages of Urdu, Bengali or Gujarati. Disputes over leadership led to the secession of Saqib, who with a handful of followers continued the work of HISAM, while Abu Muntasir founded JIMAS in 1984. This split represented the first significant moment in the establishment of British Salafism and marked the defining influence of Abu Muntasir. JIMAS, under the leadership of Abu Muntasir, was the main organisation for the promotion of Salafism across the UK. Abu Muntasir was successful in attracting key individual members such Usama Hasan, Abu Aliyah and also converts who became prominent in later years, such as Abdur Raheem Green, Abu Sufyan and Abdul Haq Baker, who all respected his activism and sense of mission.

Guardians of Orthodoxy: Salafism'S Appeal Samir Amghar has noted that al-salaf al-salih were distinguished by their exemplary piety and their involvement in the military conquests that laid the basis for Islamic empires. He cites prominent theologians who established a causal relationship between the faith of the “pious forefathers” and their subsequent political and economic success.12 Since then every time a Muslim Page 3 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam (p.388) society has been confronted with a political, economic or social crisis, Islamic revivalists have argued for a return to the way of the early salaf. The contemporary Salafi understanding of religion is constructed upon a clear and narrowly defined textual basis.13 Methodologically, Salafism relies upon literalist scripturalism, revolving around a set of binary opposites: tawhid (oneness of God) as opposed to shirk (all forms of divine associationism), loyalty to the Sunna (Prophetic example) in matters of belief and religious ritual as opposed to bid‘a (innovation), the emblematic respect for the pious first three generations of Muslims as opposed to the rejection of subsequent Muslim intellectual history and rejection of taqlid (adherence to one school of Islamic law). As Quintan Wiktorowicz has observed, a distinguishing feature of Salafi hermeneutics has been the minimisation or elimination of the role of the human intellect in interpreting the text: “…the application of human intellect and logic to the original sources (‘rationalism’ in the Salafi lexicon). Salafis operate as though the Qur’an and hadith are self-explanatory: if the scholar has enough training and knowledge, then the vast majority of derived rulings are clear and indisputable. As a result, there is no need to apply human systems of logic. The scholars are, in a sense, reduced to the archeology of divine texts: their function is to simply unearth the truth that lies somewhere in the Qur’an and Sunna. In this understanding, there is really no such thing as interpretation—the sources either sanction or prohibit particular beliefs, choices, and behavior; there is a single truth, as revealed by Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad; and there is no room for interpretive differences or religious pluralism.”14 Perhaps the earliest manifesto in the English language of what Salafida‘wa stood for was an early publication by JIMAS: “The Salafi Dawah is that of the Quran and the Sunnah. It is the Religion of Islam— pure and free from any additions, deletions or alterations. It is to adhere to the Path of the Messenger (sallallahu ‘alaihi wa sallam) and of the True Believers (as-Salaf us- Salih). As-Salaf is a collective term referring to the Pious Pioneers in Islam and all those who follow in their footsteps in belief, actions and morals.”15 Published in 1993, it demarcates the theological and methodological positions of early British Salafi thought. It provides a broad general framework (p.389) which is not as exclusivist and strident (a common feature) as much of contemporary Salafi literature. Stylistically, it represents a genre that is characteristically minimalist, offering references only to the Qur’an and hadith and is only cross-referenced with other related verses from these primary texts. The format is only interrupted when it is necessary to refer to a select group of scholars: the medieval jurist Taqi al-Din ibn al-Taymiyya (d.1328), ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz Page 4 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Baz (d. 1999), Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and Muhammad al-‘Uthaymin (d. 2000), who provided contemporary exegesis. Further on in the document the main tenets of the Salafi approach are listed as, “Who are the ‘Salafis?” Upon examination, most Muslims reading this booklet would find little to disagree with in the sense that the reference points and general framework contain Qur’anic guidelines and prophetic admonitions which are normative aspects of Muslim belief and praxis. This is also precisely where the core appeal of the Salafi perspective lies: “The call to return to a pristine Islam—the sublime Quran and to the Prophet's authentic Sunnah—[.…] in accordance with the understanding and practice of as-Salaf.”16 For most Muslims it is a seductively simple message as no orthodox Muslim would reject the two primary textual sources of Islam that are universally agreed upon, even by the non-Sunni schools. Among the most influential publications published by JIMAS was a translation of al-Albani's Book The Prophet's Prayer Described. This marked a more scholarly attempt to popularise Salafi perspectives, boosted by a wave of literature translated by converts such as Dawud Burbank and Jamal Zaraboozo, particularly the Fundamentals of Tawheed by Bilal Philips, which was widely read outside the traditional Salafi-inclined readership. The mass circulation of a Saudi-funded translation of the Qur’an17 and magazines like Al-Jumuah further helped to spread Salafi doctrine. A noticeable feature of these books and publications was that they were saturated with variations of the phrase “the pure Qur’an and Sunnah”. Furthermore, replicating global patterns, the spread of Salafism was underwritten by Saudi financial investment in religious institutions and the distribution of Salafi literature from Saudi Arabia, which was enhanced by the support of graduates from the two main religious universities in Saudi Arabia.18 (p.390) In the early 1990s, Salafis became involved in ongoing disputes between the different Muslim currents in Britain. They objected to the practices of British Muslims who followed more traditional understandings that were shaped by centuries of cultural interaction and diversification of theological and juristic differences based upon divergent local customs, times and conditions. The Salafis particularly objected to “Barelwi Islam”, the version of the majority of British Muslims from South Asia. This is identifiable by its particular theology, ritual practices such as the focus on the nature and status of the Prophet Muhammad, the celebration of his birthday and the impermissibility of seeking spiritual assistance of the revered deceased. In contradistinction, the Salafis claimed to represent the “truth”: “… The aims of the Salafi Da‘wah are no different than those of the Da‘wah of Islam. Therefore the Salafis remain distinct from the various sects and groups in the way and methodology of their Da‘wah. They call to Islam as a whole—to its correct understanding and implementation. Misguided Page 5 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam groups and deviant sects emphasise and call to particular aspects of Islam, thereby neglecting its other aspects to suit their own needs, as well as losing sight of the purpose and perspective for which they have been created.”19 Asian Muslim young people, who were tired of “cultural Islam” and a religious leadership that was distant and unable to communicate with them, found in the Salafi perspective a “de-culturalised” Islam, an approach to religious commitment that seemed to be intellectually rigorous, evidence-based and free of perceived corruptions of folkloric religion or the “wishy washy” alternatives offered by rival Islamic tendencies. By deliberately challenging the Islam they were socialised into, the Salafis were able to achieve a religious authenticity that the youth deemed absent among fellow Muslims. The act of denying authority to a transmitted religious tradition and transferring it to another religious tradition of their own choice also empowers individuals. Adopting a Salafi identity while still young is a process of exchanging and rerouting religious language and symbols and as such is part of a wider search for meaning and identity construction. Due to their lack of scholarly reference points and perception of compromise with the culture of the kafir (unbeliever), the messages of other groups were not seen as convincing. To enhance their standing and authenticity and to silence those with an inferior command of scholastic frames of reference, British Salafis frequently cited the senior scholars of Saudi Arabia—Ibn Baz, ‘Uthaymin and the hadith specialist al-Albani. (p.391)

Tribal Religion: Islamic Groups As Football Teams The 1990s were the defining era for second-generation Islamic revival and activism; indeed this decade was perhaps the most intense for its identity politics. Membership of a jama‘a (association) provided the strong friendship networks that are a by-product of group identity, and are especially important for Muslim youth keen to escape racism and feel part of something bigger than themselves. These informal networks provided opportunities to develop an Islamic identity and create communities of shared meaning and alternative religious practice structured by intergenerational change and rebellion against the Islam of their parents. A commitment to an Islamic identity and to activism is constructed by an overlapping combination of local socio-economic and international geo-political factors, and is linked to the emergence of a global Muslim identity. The “Islamic elite” was relatively small at that time, while most Muslim youth admitted to being nominal in practising their religion, experimenting in hybridising their ethnic, cultural and religious identities that were strongly influenced by their secular Western socialisation. Against this background, each Islamic group had its own message and emphasis and each affected the other's modes of operation and discourse production. What they had in common was an active commitment to reaching out to Muslim youth who were perceived to have gone astray. As Page 6 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam noted by Lewis, Salafism, like other Islamic movements, sought to recreate an idealised past which “posits a golden age in the past, an historical utopia that can be reproduced in contemporary Islam”.20 In the early 1990s, Muslim youth who wanted to take their religion seriously could choose between three main contenders. Besides JIMAS, the significant players in the field of Islamic activism were the Young Muslims (YM) and panIslamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Reformist Islamic youth organisations in Britain are best exemplified by the Jammat-Islami inspired work of the YM and Young Muslim Organisation, (YMO) and since 1997, the youth wing of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The reformist approach to young people is primarily based on the necessity to reconnect them with their religious heritage and reverse the perceived decline in morality. Such an outlook is predicated on the assumption that youth require a moral compass that will address their intellectual, physical, social and spiritual needs. The Salafi (p.392) trend differed by stressing theological and ritual differences, whilst the reformists had more ideological imperatives. Moderate Islamists prefer a strategy of a gradualist social Islamisation, while HT prefers a revolutionary methodology of raising religious consciousness and political entryism. Though all the trends wanted “a return to Islam” they disagreed sharply over priorities and strategies. Towards the mid-1990s the Islamic scene in Britain was dominated by the struggle between the Salafis and HT for hegemony in the field of Islamic activism. An important factor in favour of the Salafi perspective was the perception that its adherents had superior religious knowledge. They were seen to be demonstrably practising Islam according to the Qur’an and “authentic Sunnah” and gained respect for coming to the aid of fellow Muslims in physical danger.21 The messages of other groups were regarded as being less persuasive, partly due to their lack of religious scholarship and justification for their da‘wa. They appeared to being suffering from a weak manhaj (proselytising strategy). What helped their cause was their claim to have the big Saudi scholars on their side, which gave them authority and silenced others who had weaker frames of reference. Their superiority over the “clean-shaved kids” from YM and HT was enhanced by their serious efforts to learn Arabic. Competition between the groups became so intense in this period that it acquired a tribal character and resembled the rivalry and loyalty of football supporters. Towards the mid-1990s, Salafism as a religious paradigm became well established nationally, through mosque networks, publications, the media and a large body of literature available on the internet. The Salafi trend attracted mainly young second-generation South Asian Muslims, with a significant number of black and white converts. The followers were aged, on average ages between 18 and 30, and geographically they were most often located near the Salafi mosques already mentioned. Compared with other Muslim groups, the Salafi Page 7 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam trend seemed to offer a cohesive identity that young people could purchase, which could explain its relatively sronger attraction for converts seeking a “rationalised Islam”—one already stripped of the niceties and ambiguities of juristic reasoning, the complexities of theology and the subtleties of Sufism.22 (p.393) Joining the Salafida‘wa meant acquiring membership of a multi-ethnic supranational identity and reviving “pure” Islamic practices and a form of protest religion. In the 1990s, male JIMAS members in particular became conspicuous for wearing military jackets, trousers and boots. Many Salafis also chose to be known by their kunya (their Muslim name preceded by Abu, father of, or Umm, mother of). These identity markers were statements of difference and established discursive and physical territorial boundaries. Muslim observers at the time commented that although they were not alone, many Salafis were seen as arrogant in their relations with other non-Salafi Muslims, and were characterised by an exclusivist and intolerant attitude, giving people the impression that they belonged to the “saved sect” (al-firqa al-najiya). A consequence of the unremitting and harsh critiques of other sectarian trends helped to polarise Salafis against other Muslims and isolate them. This produced tensions and fallouts between friends, family members and other Islamic organisations.

Evolution and Fissure: Emergence of the ‘Super Salafis’ The development of British Salafism reached a critical juncture in 1995 when tensions that had been simmering for a couple years between factions inside JIMAS eventually caused the organisation to rupture and leave an ideological and methodological split that remains to this day. Ever since the Gulf War of 1991, Salafischolars had been divided over the presence of US troops in the heart of the Muslim world. The origins of this fracture started within the Saudi Arabia when a faction of younger scholars began questioning why the rulers had invited the Americans to fight another Muslim country, and worse still, establish military bases on holy territory. Ideologically these junior Salafi figures were led by two Saudi scholars, Salman al-‘Awda (b.1955) and Safar al-Hawali (b.1950), the so-called Sahwa (Awakening) shaykhs, who gained prominence through their critique of the Saudi government. Intellectually influenced by the reformist ideas of the Ikhwan, they were more informed of international relations and geopolitical strategies. Wiktorowicz provides a helpful typology in differentiating three main global trends that were identifiable as a result of this emerging factionalism; purists, politicos and Jihadis.23 In this scheme, the “purist” remained loyal to (p.394) the principles of the Salafi‘aqida (creed) and the Saudi state and resisted any attempt to challenge the authority of the rulers. Their priority was peaceful preaching—reform and correction of Muslim belief and ritual practice. The “politicos”, while agreeing on the importance of the Salafi creed, argued that the Page 8 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Salafimanhaj had to take into consideration the complex and changing socialpolitical realities taking place in the world, in addition to the concerns of the Salafida‘wa. The “Jihadis”, on the other hand, were impatient of the status quo, had participated in theatres of conflict like Afghanistan and wanted to take direct action and use violence to effect change. All three tendencies share Salafi positions in matters of theology but differ in their analysis of problems in the Muslim world and on how they should be solved.24 These currents had a direct impact on the Salafiscene in the UK. The splits were transported to Britain. While JIMAS and individuals associated with them had made links with oppositional Salafi politicos in Saudi Arabia, a pro- Saudi government member, Abdul Wahid (Abu Khadeejah), led the opposition within JIMAS. He challenged Abu Muntasir and those who were sympathetic to the Sahwa movement, resulting in the fragmentation of the organisation over the period of a year. Despite attempts by senior figures within the Salafi community to mend the rift, it became irreconcilable and the purist, Abu Khadeejah, broke away, taking a significant number of people with him to form the Organisation of Ahl al Sunnah Islamic Societies (OASIS),25 which later went on to establish Salafi Publications and the website Salafi.com. The purists then established the Salafi Institute in Birmingham and became known for their increasingly intolerant and polemical attitude to former colleagues as well as their vindictiveness towards other Muslim groups. They installed a sort of purist inquisition that began to label other Muslims as deviant. This mirrored developments in America, where a similarly bitter schism took place.26 According to Usama Hasan, at the time a senior member of the JIMAS executive, the divisions were inevitable. He believed that the JIMAS had become too successful and so large that diverse currents which were pursuing their own interests would have broken away sooner or later.27 (p.395) A sample of the outlook of the purist leader Abu Khadeejah and the disdain his group had for fellow Salafis can be gleaned from a entry their in house web discussion group Salafi talk.net. Writing in a post about “Giving Da‘wah to the innovators, its nature, conditions, and context” he lists some of the main targets who failed the Super Salafi criteria: “…we took issue and oppose Bilal Philips with his open attachments to the likes of Ali Timimi, Zarabozo, JIMAS and others known for their hizbiyyah (links to organisations/movements in this case) and deviation, and going to the platforms of the likes of these people—all of whom are known to be amongst the Harakiyyoon (political activists), upon the manhaj of Safar and Salman and Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq and others.”28 This is an example of the ongoing dispute about the real manhaj of Salafism and how the well-known Salafi figure Bilal Philips had, according to them, failed to uphold it. The details of actual differences between various protagonists are a Page 9 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam labyrinth of theological argument, claims and counter-claims, accusations and rebuttals, which can be sampled by a visit to their main websites.29 On these sites fellow Salafis were accused of “Hizbiyyah,” “Qutbiyyah”, or of being “Suroori” and “Kharajites”.30 Because of their ruthless witch-hunt, and condemnation of other Salafis for their alleged adulterations of true Salafi belief and methodology, the purist Abu Khadeejah and his followers were labelled “Super Salafis.” Here again, Wicktorowicz's analysis of the patterns of fragmentation in the Salafi movement globally provides an ideological context that was reflected in the bitter debates in the UK.31 The name-calling was a tactic in the power struggle to delegitimise the credentials of fellow Salafis.32 (p.396) This resulted in a form of religious McCarthyism about issues such as who followed the right manhaj and who was a true Salafi. Blacklists, boycotting and character assassination continue to divide British Salafis to this day. This practice of vilification also has had severe consequences for the personal relationships between members and their families, leading to divorces, and what has become known as “Salafi Burnout”,33 a term denoting a dramatic loss of faith and a steep decline in religious practice. In this period, however, the majority of Salafis did not only have to defend themselves against the inquisitional practices of the Super Salafis, but also had to cope with the emergence of the Salafi Jihadist trend, which was spearheaded by the Jamaican convert Abdullah al Faisal (b.1960) and Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Qatada al-Filastini (b.1960). Both men caused anxiety among JIMAS and the Super Salafis on account of their superior religious knowledge. Their jihadi or takfiri (excommunicating) rhetoric presented a major problem to British Salafis of all persuasions for some time. The challenge was further complicated by the jihadi antics of the notorious Abu Hamza al-Masri (b.1958) and ex-British leader of HT, Omar Bakri Muhammad (b.1958). What distinguishes this trend from the purists and politicos was their open incitement of British Muslims to violence in Britain and to attack the British of interests abroad.34 With the exception of Bakri, who emigrated to Lebanon in 2005 and was threatened with arrest if he returned, all the others have been convicted or are in police custody under antiterrorism legislation.

The Counter-attack of ‘Traditional Islam’ While the popularity of Salafi perspectives was growing, in part as a protest to the more traditional, “devotional Islam” prevalent in South Asian Muslim communities, the Barelwi tradition, which was in danger of being completely abandoned by second generation Asian Muslims, was rescued by the same processes of globalisation and trans-nationalism of religious ideas as the Salafis. Influential Sufischolars such as Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (b.1945) attempted to respond to Salafi polemics against Sufism by taking the (p.397) doctrinal objections head-on and using the same primary textual sources to defend their interpretations of theology and ritual practice. Kabbani's seven volume Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine was among the major publications produced Page 10 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam that offered a scholarly rebuttal to the Salafi anti-Sufiliterature.35 As Ron Geaves has observed, this approach was part of a broader set of strategies deployed by traditionalist communities to counter the appeal of Salafi and reformist groups. They realised that in order to appeal to young people they would need: “…(i) to win the loyalty of British-born Muslims who are alienated from ethnic and religious divisions brought by their parents from their place of origin (ii) to develop a systematic doctrinal challenge based upon the Quran and Hadith that counteracts the teachings of the reform movements (iii) to develop an educational system in Britain that rivals the dar al-ulums (seminaries) established by the reform movements and (iv) develop organisational structures that compare with tight-knit movements found amongst the reformers.”36 In practice this meant organising more activities and producing literature aimed at recapturing younger members of the community. While retaining traditional Sufimotifs the Idra Minhaj ul Qur’an (The Way of the Qur’an) movement, led by the Pakistani scholar Tahir Qadri, (b.1951), imitated reformist movements in their structures and operational modes in order to be more appealing to young British Muslims. Its activism led to the establishment of centres that provided Islamic education and launched websites as well as issued The Revival magazine, which resembled the YM's Trends magazine. Among the Deobandi communities the relationship with Salafi discourse was more complicated as they had historically shared elements of the Salafi critique of Barelwism. They too criticised the strong focus on the pre-eminence of the Prophet, shrine culture and associated rites. They differed sharply, however, with the Salafis over their disinterest in following the traditional schools of Islamic law and prioritising the study of hadith over fiqh (jurisprudential reasoning). This resulted in some British second generation graduates of the Deobandi seminaries producing books justifying their methodology of hadith authentication, arguing the importance of following one madhhab, and implicitly suggesting the superiority of the HanafiSchool, which most South Asian (p.398) Muslims traditionally adhered to. The Deobandis also felt the need to reach out to younger Muslims by offering grand one—and two—day conferences, which for the first time had speeches in English, they also turned to electronic and print media to disseminate their messages. The leadership among both of these theological trends realised the need to adapt and become relevant as their young were more attracted to Salafi and reformist currents. On the other hand, Salafism in the UK was affected by the arrival of a different form of traditional Islam, which was initially popularised by charismatic American convert scholar Hamza Yusuf Hanson (b.1960). He seemed to mesmerise audiences with the depth of his knowledge of Islam and apparent polymathic command of subjects as diverse as music, science and classical Page 11 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam literature. At the time, prominent moderate Salafis publicly dismissed him as a Sufi, despite being privately in awe of his learning. The traditional Islam trend, an intellectual, activist form of classical Sufism, became popular for many young Muslims across the sectarian and ideological spectrum. In effect it appropriated some of the authority from the Salafis scholars, which resulted in reducing the aura of knowledgeability of British Salafis and offering a broader, richer understanding of Islam that emphasised the spiritual dimensions of religion and the promotion of jurisprudence which could claim an isnad (continuous chain of learning). The impact of Hamza Yusuf 's message was reinforced and echoed by two other prominent traditionalist scholars: the British Abdal Hakim Murad (aka Tim Winters), (b. 1960), a Cambridge University Lecturer in Islamic Studies, and the American SufiSheikh Nuh Keller (b.1954), who is based in Jordan. They challenged the dominance of Salafi and reformist interpretations of Islam. This was executed by attempting to discredit the politicised readings of Islam found in the literature of the reformist Islamists and by deconstructing the claims to textual orthodoxy of the Salafis.38 This trend represented a modern, highly articulate, scholarly alternative that emphasised respect for traditional scholarship as represented in the four juristic legal traditions and recognition of tassawuf (sciences of spiritual self purification) as being a valid adjunct of the Islamic tradition. The consequence of this counter-response became a form of ‘neo-Sufism’ emboldening the traditional South Asian Sufigroups, who had until then been dominated by the Islamists and Salafis. (p.399) From 1995–2000 this trend made a major impact upon all groups across the Islamic spectrum and began to set the Islamic reform agenda in many ways. Also worth mentioning is the impact of the writings of Tariq Ramadan who spent one year in the UK researching for his influential book To Be a European Muslim, which helped to provide scholarly Western Muslim arguments for an inclusive vision of Islam in Europe. Yusuf and Ramadan were both, in different ways, crucial in broadening the understanding of Islam away from the narrow sectarianism that had hampered young British Muslims until then. Behind the scenes a significant number of prominent younger members of both the Salafi and Islamists trends became interested in the alternative perspectives of the two figures. A notable example is the fact that JIMAS started to invite non-Salafi and even Sufispeakers to address their annual summer conferences.39

The Effect of Terrorism The repercussions of 11th September 2001, were a major factor in the evolution of British Salafism as more media attention began to focus on the possible role of Saudi Salafism and terrorism. The purists and politicos went to great lengths to distance themselves from al-Qaeda's ideology. It is worth noting that (Super) Salafi publications had for years opposed rebellion against Muslim governments, and had reproduced a fatwa by Grand Sheikh Ibn Baz, condemning the theology Page 12 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam and tactics of bin Laden, indeed anyone sympathetic to them was labelled a neo-khawarij. The attacks in London on 7 and 21 July 2005, became Britain's 9/11, and proved to be another crucial milestone in the evolution of British Salafism. The increased media and political scrutiny as well as the force of new anti-terrorist legislation provided an impetus for intra-Muslim cooperation and finding common ground for agreement. Having adjusted their rhetoric after 9/11, the London bombings brought home the potential danger of extremist exclusivist Salafi discourses. An unexpected example of this is the breaking down into tears and public apology of Abu Muntasir at a public event in 2005.40 He, along with other prominent Salafis, began sharing platforms with Hamza Yusuf and made efforts to undo what they concluded was the logic of polarisation, accumulated after years of (p.400) hard-line Salafi rhetoric. He also made extra efforts to reach out to other Muslims across sectarian divides and today the JIMAS organisation has been transformed from being the incubator of British Salafism to a friendly-faced voluntary organisation with charity status. As chief executive of JIMAS, Abu Muntasir started to build bridges with non-Muslim organisations and is keen to demonstrate his Britishness and sense of civic duty. His current da‘wa lectures are peppered with references to Western philosophy, British history and the importance of interfaith work.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to show that the search by young South Asian British Muslims for a religious identity resulted in the adoption of religious orientations from a wide choice of competing sectarian and ideological menus. The adoption of a Salafi identity was ultimately an attempt by them to learn and practise their religion, it provided certainty, a strong textual evidence base and group identity. For a time they were very successful in winning over young Muslims and converts to their point of view by means of their activism, attractive image and their claim to be digging down to the original Islam buried under centuries of alien cultural influence. The Arab Salafiscene was quite separate and closed off linguistically and culturally to the second generation British Salafis. However, moderate politico-influenced Arab Salafi institutions like Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust, have accommodated non-Arab Salafis and the wider Muslim communities since the late 1990s41 . While the number of Salafi mosques is in the low double figures their influence is disproportional as a result of the effectiveness of their distribution of literature and their strong web presence.42 Today, people who subscribe to Salafi perspectives can broadly be described as those that gravitate towards the outlook of the “Super Salafis”; those that feel more comfortable with the JIMAS approach; others whose religious praxis is what could be described as a “methodological Salafism”—a literalist reading of scripture, but not aligned with any particular group; and finally those who might be described as post-Salafi. Leading British Salafis, such as Abu Aliyah, Abu Muntasir and Usama Hasan, are no longer obsessed with defining themselves as Page 13 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Salafi. As Birt noted, today “formerly hard-line Salafis (p.401) are happy to go by the name of ‘Sidi’43 and to emphasise the traditionalist aspects of the Hanbali madhhab. Mawlid,44 dhikr,45 rihla,46 ijaza47 — all these terms and practices are embraced again; Sufism is no longer the despised, disreputable cult of uneducated parents, as it was once thought to be not too long ago”.48 More complex hybrid identities are emerging, and someone like Usama Hasan is willing to go as far as to refer to him self as a Wahhabi–Sufi. In an interview with the author, he argued that some of the categories used by analysts miss the complex, evolving nature of contemporary British Salafi trends. This stands in contrast to the lack of nuance in the representations of Salafism in recent times and indicates the dynamic and organic nature of the formation of religious identity. Leading activists are now trying to bridge the sectarian divides once thought impossible. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and vicious intraMuslim violence, there have been high-profile attempts to reconcile opposing theological trends. For example The Amman Message49 and The Sunni Pledge50 are broad doctrinal/legal cooperative platforms which are supported by British Muslim scholars and leaders across the sectarian spectrum. Unsurprisingly, the “Super Salafis” have been vociferous in their opposition. In conclusion, it is argued here that in Britain the attraction of Salafism for young Muslims can be attributed to five reasons: firstly, the globalisation of wellfunded Saudi Salafi discourse, buttressed by the funding of mosques, the massive distribution of Salafi literature, the pre-eminent presence of Salafism on the internet and the influx of graduates from the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, a fertile reception among British-born Muslims who were in search of religious identities that would restore their religious confidence and pride. Thirdly, the appeal of Salafism grew organically and evolved both as a result of the external influence of global Salafism and due to competition with rival Islamic trends and intra-Salafi debates that arose out of the fragmentation of Salafi discourse internationally. Fourthly, the (p.402) counter-response of scholarly traditional Islamic perspectives, a “muscular Sufism”, so to speak, persuaded more reflective Salafis to defect to more accommodating sophisticated understandings of Islamic civilisation. And finally the repercussions of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks forced introspection, rapprochement and convergence, where there had previously been divergence. Bibliography Bibliography references: Abou El-Fadl, Khaled, ‘The Orphans of Modernity and the Clash of Civilizations’, Global Dialogue, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–16. ———, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam Back from the Extremists. New York: Harper –Collins. 2006. Page 14 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Abu Khadeejah, “Giving Da’wah to the innovators, its nature, conditions, and context”, http://www.Salafitalk.net/st/viewmessages.cfm?Forum=6&Topic=562. Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Amghar, Samir, ‘Salafism and Radicalization of Young European Muslims’, in European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels: Centre for European Policy, 2007. pp 39–40. The Amman Message, http://www.ammanmessage.com/index.php?lang=en Birt, Jonathan, ‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and Reactions’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.) Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 168–84. ———, The Islamist: A Review: htpp:// www.yahyabirt.com. Geaves, Ron, ‘Tradition, Innovation and Authentication: Replicating the ‘Ahla Sunna wa Jammat’, in Britain in Comparative Islamic Studies, vol. 1. no. 1, London: Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2005, pp 3–20. Jamiyyah Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah, A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da’wah, Ipswich, Suffolk: 1993. Kabbani, Hisham, The Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine, vols. 1–7, As-Sunna Foundation of America. Chicago: Kazi Press. 1998. Lee, Umar, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Dawah in the US’, http://umarlee.com/ 2007/01/31/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-salafi-dawah-in-the-us-final/. Lewis, Philip, Young, British and Muslim, London: Continuum, 2007. Murad, Abdal Hakim, ‘Islamic Spirituality: the forgotten revolution’, http:// www.masud. co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/fgtnrevo.htm. Murad, Abdal Hakim, ‘Traditional Islam’: http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/ default. htm. Oliver, Haneef James, ‘The Wahhabi Myth’, http://www.thewahhabimyth.com. O’Neill, Sean, and McGrory, Daniel, The Suicide Factory. London: HarperCollins, 2006. Peach, Ceri, ‘Britain's Muslim Population: an Overview’, in Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 18–46. (p.403)

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam Pledge of Mutual Respect and Cooperation Between Sunni Muslim Scholars, Organisations, and Students of Sacred Knowledge, http://www.yahyabirt.com/? p=99 as-Suhaymee, Abdus Salaam ibn Saalim, ‘Be a Serious Salafi!’, http:// www.Salafimanhaj.com/pdf_page.php?pdf=46. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan, New York: State University of New York Press. 2000. ———, ‘The Salafi Movement: Violence and the Fragmentation of a Community’, in Miriam Cooke, and Bruce Lawrence (eds), Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop, University of North Carolina Press, 2005. ———, Radical Islam Rising. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. ———, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 207–39. Notes:

(1) Ceri Peach, ‘Britain's Muslim Population: an Overview’, in Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 18–46. (2) Refers to the strand of South Asian Islam coalescing around the teachings of Ahmad Riza Khan (1856–1921). (3) Followers of the -Islamic revivalist school initiated at Darul Uloom, Deoband, India (est. 1866). This movement was developed as a reaction to British colonialism. (4) Political religious movement formed in 1941 in India by Islamist Ideologue Sayed Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979). (5) Literally, the people of prophetic narrations, this is another reform movement that grew out of India in the 1870s. See chapter 5 for more on the Ahl-e Hadith in this volume. (6) Jonathan (Yahya) Birt, ‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom: Manifestations and Reactions’, in M. Al-Rasheed (ed.) Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 168–84. He has since changed his mind on terminology. See his ‘Wahhabi Wrangles’, which can be viewed on his website: www.yahyabirt.com/?p=119. (7) ‘The Wahhabi Myth’, by Haneef James Oliver, provides a rather unsophisticated polemic against the usage of the term ‘Wahabbi’. It can be read on line at: http://www.thewahhabimyth.com. Page 16 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam (8) Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam Back from the Extremists, New York: Harper–Collins. 2006. He has also described this fusion as “Salafabism” and as interpretative methodology that retreats to the “security of the text” and empowers followers to project their socio-political anxiety onto it. See Khaled Abou El-Fadl ‘The Orphans of Modernity and the Clash of Civilizations’, Global Dialogue, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–16. (9) Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002. This essay provides a scholarly if somewhat polemical history of the linkages. (10) The organisation's work today can be viewed at: http://www.jimas.org. (11) It should also noted here that in the beginning JIMAS was helped to gain credibility through the personal backing of the influential scholar Dr. Suhaib Hasan (father of Usama Hasan), who was at one time leader of the British Ahl-e Hadith Network and founder member of the UK Islamic Shariah Council. (12) ‘Salafism and Radicalization of Young European Muslims’, in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, Michael Emerson (eds) European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels: Centre for European Policy, 2007. pp 39–40. (13) Quintan Wiktorowicz provides a comprehensive summary of Salafi ideology in his Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan. New York: State University of New York Press. 2000, p. 113. (14) Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 207–39. (15) As quoted in A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da’wah, Ipswich, Suffolk: Jamiyyah Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah, 1993, p 1. (16) Ibid., p. 1. (17) The Noble Quran, translated by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hillali and Dr Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Riyadh. Maktab Dar-US-Salam.1993. (18) Birt's ‘Wahabbism in the United Kingdom’ provides insight into this political and economic background. (19) See A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da’wah, p. 7. (20) Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim, London: Continuum, 2007, p 139. (21) For example JIMAS members were known to challenge racists in urban areas like Birmingham and some of its leadership fought in Afghanistan immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. Page 17 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam (22) Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, p. 52. (23) Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, pp. 207–39. Samir Amghar offers a similar classification in his ‘Salafism and Radicalization of Young European Muslims’. (24) Wiktorowicz, in ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, pp 207–35. (25) The OASIS was originally created to rival FOSIS (Federation of Students Islamic Societies) the main UK Muslim student support body. (26) For more background on this see the insightful ten-part blog Umar Lee ‘The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Dawah in the US’, http://umarlee.com/2007/01/31/therise-and-fallof-the-salafi-dawah-in-the-us-final/. (27) Interview with author on 11 September 2007. (28) http://www.Salafitalk.net/st/viewmessages.cfm?Forum=6&Topic=562. (29) The sheer bitterness of the polemics of the “Super Salafis,” is particularly evident in Salafitalk.net: http://www.Salafitalk.net/st/ index.cfm,SalafiManhaj.com: http://Salafimanhaj.com/.Rival responses can be found on sites inspired by the Sahwa Sheikhs such as Islamicawakening.com: http://www.islamicawakening.com/articles.php?subcatID=78. (30) Hizbiyyah would imply that individuals/factions were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), Muhammad Surur— who was a prominent Salafi figure lived in the UK for two decades until the late 1990s—and the Kharajites, the earliest radical sect in Islam. (31) Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The Salafi Movement: Violence and the Fragmentation of a Community’, in Miriam Cooke, and Bruce Lawrence (eds), Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop, University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p 215. (32) The endless discussion on who is a true Salafi can be seen by viewing the booklets produced by Salafi Manhaj.com, for example ‘Be a Serious Salafi!’ by Abdus Salaam ibn Saalim as-Suhaymee. Available at: http:// www.Salafimanhaj.com/pdf_page.php?pdf=46. (33) Term coined by British SufiScholar Abdal Hakim Murad in his article ‘Islamic Spirituality: the forgotten revolution’. Available to view at: http:// www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/fgtnrevo.htm. (34) For the best account of these dynamics to date see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, and Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory. London: Harper-Collins, 2006. Page 18 of 19

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The Attraction of “ Authentic” Islam (35) Hisham Kabbani, The Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine, vols. 1–7, As-Sunna Foundation of America. Chicago: Kazi Press. 1998. (36) Ron Geaves, ‘Tradition, Innovation and Authentication: Replicating the ‘Ahla Sunna wa Jammat’, in Britain in Comparative Islamic Studies, vol 1. no. 1, London: Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2005, pp 3–20. (38) Abdal Hakim Murad has been prolific in this regard, for examples see one of the most popular resources for ‘Traditional Islam’, http://www.masud.co.uk/ ISLAM/ahm/default.htm. (39) This is evidenced by viewing the JIMAS annual conference guest speaker lists between the 1990s and the early 2000s: http://www.jimas.org/cnfrncs.htm. (40) City Circle, 15 July 2005, weekly lecture programme in London. Further background information can be viewed at: http://www.thecitycircle.com/ events_full_text2.php?id=350. (41) For background see website: http://www.almuntadatrust.org/home/ (42) Total number estimated at between 13 and 20 out of a total of approximately 1500 mosques nationally. (43) Respectful address to a fellow Muslim. (44) Celebration of Birth of the Prophet Muhammad. (45) Suficollective practice of the remembrance of God. (46) Tradition of traveling to seek religious knowledge. (47) Scholarly authorisation to teach religious knowledge. (48) Yahya Birt, The Islamist: A Review: htpp:// www.yahyabirt.com. (49) Details can be viewed at: http://www.ammanmessage.com/index.php? lang=en. (50) Pledge of Mutual Respect and Cooperation Between Sunni Muslim Scholars, Organisations, and Students of Sacred Knowledge available at: http:// www.yahyabirt.com/?p=99.

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Changing World Views and Friendship

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

Changing World Views and Friendship An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafis in the Netherlands Martijn de Koning

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.003.0019

Abstract and Keywords The chapter gives an in-depth view of the experiences of two female Dutch Salafis and describes why and how they became Salafis, besides giving an overview of Dutch Salafism scene. It analyzes their attitudes towards clothing, holy texts and their changing attitudes towards Dutch society after their conversion to “pure Islam.” Keywords:   conversion, pure Islam, Dutch Salafism

Introduction1 “About four years ago I had many personal problems. My future was all planned but I did not know anymore whether I wanted that future myself or because other people had influenced me in my choices so that I would become like they wanted me to be. […] Something had to change. I wanted peace in my life, answers to my questions. So I asked Allah to guide me, to help me, to lead me on the ‘straight path’ but I never expected Allah to lead me to Islam.” The above quotation is from Umm Salamah, a Moroccan-Dutch woman when she explained to me why, after years of “not really practising Islam” she turned to Islam in order to rearrange her life. Umm Salamah is one of the Salafi women who have been willing to talk to me about their lives, the choices they have made and in particular about their religious lifestyle. The aim of this research is to gain insight into how Salafi men and women are actively creating their own Page 1 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship notion of what constitutes correct Islamic beliefs and practices, based on their interpretation of Salafi doctrines. I will be looking at their “personal myths”: the continuously revised biographical narratives of (p.405) those patterns of behaviour and episodes in life that form answers to the question: “Who am I?”2 In this chapter I will focus on the lives of two young women: Umm Salamah and Aicha. Research on Salafism has paid little attention to female Salafis, particularly in the Netherlands. Journalists Janny Groen and Anieke Kranenberg3 have however thoroughly researched the women of the Hofstad network in the Netherlands. The latter is the network of Jihadi-Salafis including Mohammed Bouyeri (the murderer of film director and writer Theo Van Gogh who made the film Submission I together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali) among others. Another important member of this network was Samir Azzouz who first came into the picture after he tried to get to Chechnya in order to fight with the Jihadis against the Russians. Later, in 2004, he was arrested for having plans for an attack at Schiphol Airport, an accusation of which he was acquitted at first but latterly convicted to six years. In 2006 he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment again for planning a terrorist attack (the socalled Piranha case). In another study, Withuis4 compares communist women and Dutch “Islamist women”, focusing on the paradox of subordination disguised as emancipation: women who are victims of patriarchy but seem to acquiesce or even seek to subordinate themselves to the males in these movements.5 This is a theme that frequently emerges in much of the literature on women and “fundamentalist” movements: the question of why women participate in them when the creed of these movements enhances women's subordination to men? Gender itself is an important theme for these movements and it is often used as an issue to mobilise supporters and discredit oppositional (p.406) forces.6 In the Netherlands for example it was one of the Salafi groups that launched the campaign against the proposed ban on the burqa. According to Hawley,7 in “fundamentalist” movements women's behaviour is not only seen as a symptom of a moral crisis but as one of the causes of that crisis. This crisis seems to be felt by women as well when we look at Meertens’8 focus on relative deprivation and ‘groupthink’ to explain the radicalism among women. According to him feelings of anger and frustration about discrimination, insecurities about the self and the social group to which an individual belongs, make people susceptible to radical movements that provide them with a strong counter-identity. Neither Meertens nor Withuis, however, provide an indepth analysis of the lives of female members of these groups themselves, which leaves many questions unanswered with regard to why they join particular radical movements (since not all women who experience deprivation or seek to empower themselves by subordination align with Salafi movements) and how this is related to the social networks to which they belong. In other words: an analysis of the agency of women is lacking.

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Changing World Views and Friendship In this chapter I will argue that focusing on the themes of changing worldviews and friendships in the life stories of women provides us with more adequate answers. I will start with an account of the most important developments among Moroccan-Dutch Muslim youth, the Dutch Islam debate and the emergence of Salafi movements in the Netherlands. Subsequently I will describe and analyse the life stories of Umm Salamah and Aicha. Umm Salamah is a young MoroccanDutch woman who was arrested in 2006 and accused of failing to disclose information about her husband's plans for terrorist attacks. Aicha is a young Moroccan-Dutch woman who was part of the Hofstad network until the end of 2004.

Emergence of Salafi movements In the Netherlands Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth and the Search for a ‘Pure’ Islam

Many of the discussions about Salafism in the Netherlands focus on Muslim youth and in particular Muslim youth of Moroccan descent. Given the fact (p. 407) that those between the ages of 10 and 19 represent 20 per cent of the Moroccan migrant population and those between 20 and 30, another 20 per cent, it is clear that the young constitute an important part of the MoroccanDutch community in the Netherlands.9 Most studies pay little attention to the way people are religious and to the question of how they construct their religious identity. In my PhD research I tried to fill that gap and I will summarise the most important points here.10 The way young people construct their religious identity can best be described as a quest for a true or pure Islam. The idea of “one's true self ” is combined with the idea of an authentic core of Islam that is neither “Moroccan” nor “Dutch”. The ideas of purity and truth are constantly negotiated with non-Muslims in different contexts. With regard to the Dutch population, Moroccan-Dutch youth are increasingly confronted by the native Dutch tendency to categorise them as Muslims. During the last decade both native Dutch as well as Moroccan-Dutch youth have interpreted perceived differences between them in religious terms. According to Moroccan- Dutch youth the native Dutch usually categorize them negatively; Islam is portrayed as suspicious, related to terrorism, intolerance, and the oppression of women. This leads to a confusing situation wherein the search for a Muslim identity means, in relation to native Dutch people, an attempt to transcend the perceived dichotomy between “Moroccan” and “Dutch”. Thus, one boy's statement: “When I’m a Muslim, it doesn’t matter whether I’m Moroccan or Dutch.” At the same time it also means trying to maintain a certain distance towards Dutch society and their parents. In constructing their own identity Moroccan-Dutch youth not only have to deal with non-Muslims and their views about Islam, but also with other Muslims and their beliefs and practices. Parents frame the behaviour of their children in terms of halal (permissible) and haram (forbidden), they tell stories about the life of the prophet Muhammad, who serves as a role model, and they teach the children how to pray. For the parents, Morocco remains important as a continued frame of reference for their presence in Dutch society and also Page 3 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship for their religious beliefs and practices. This is not the case for second generation Moroccan-Dutch youth. Partly (p.408) this is a normal process during which the new generation tries to adapt an existing religious tradition to the challenges of modernity. Because of the inevitable changes that come with this re-interpretation, many older people often experience these developments with regret and nostalgia. Sometimes this may lead to conflicts over the question of who interprets Islam the right way and who represents “the truth”. Girls have an important position in the identity politics of young Muslims because they are held responsible for reproducing the culture of their parents and Islam. Girls, much more than boys, are frequently scrutinised by other Dutch Moroccans and native Dutch people who focus on their behaviour and attire. By politicising gender in relation to Islam, young girls become the core of the struggle between Muslims and native Dutch people over the control of the Moroccan-Dutch Muslims in the Netherlands. The girls themselves are, however, not passive agents in these debates. By articulating their own construction of true Islam they try to accomplish gender equality. With regard to native Dutch people, girls also use the discourse of true Islam to defend themselves and Islam and to criticise the stereotypes that native Dutch entertain about them. In order for young people to structure the available repertoires of knowledge they have to gather knowledge about Islam. The internet has become one of the most important tools that young people use when looking for authoritative sources and persons. Although most of them tend to look for information on Moroccan-Dutch11 sites, the sites of the Salafi movements in the Netherlands stand out for their user-friendliness and the huge number of texts and answers to the specific questions the younger generations have. In almost all discussions, therefore, texts from these sites are used to answer other people's questions or convince them of the validity of their own opinions.

Globalisation, Secularisation and Security: the Rise of the Dutch Salafi movements The events of 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri in November 2004 serve as the examples that are used to explain what is wrong with Islam, or, conversely, what is wrong with the host countries of Muslim migrants. In the Netherlands, Muslims and non-Muslims recognise that since 9/11, criticism of Islam and Muslims is no longer taboo and in some cases it (p. 409) is almost acceptable to do this in the strongest way possible: the critique of Islam has sometimes been expressed in the harshest and the bluntest terms. After 9/11, but especially as a result of the murder of Van Gogh, on 2 November 2004, the discourse on Islam in the public debate has been not only a mixture of issues relating to the role of religion in the public sphere in a secular country, immigration and integration, but is now also related to security and the “war on terror”. Salafi movements in particular have become the focus of attention,

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Changing World Views and Friendship linking them to intolerance, promoting violence against “infidels” and inciting hatred against politicians and other opinion leaders. However, besides the insightful publication of Buijs and his research team12 and some publications from intelligence and security services, not much is known about the emergence of the Salafi groups in the Netherlands. What we know is that most of their leaders migrated to the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s. Their migration and the emergence of the Salafi groups in Europe should be seen in the context of internal developments in Saudi Arabia (where the regime co-opted the Sahwa shaykhs or forced some of them to take refuge in Europe), Syria and Egypt, in combination with global migration and developments in international politics.13 During the 1990s, and with increasing speed after 9/11, the different branches of Salafism developed into social movements by building their own mosques, websites and informal networks used for resource mobilisation and dissemination. Nowadays we can distinguish between three main groups, each with its own internal divisions. First of all there are the Selefies (Salafi as it can be pronounced in Dutch, Selefie is the label they give themselves), a quietist group that follows shaykh Rabi‘ al- Madkhali, who is loyal to the Saudi state. This group refuses to take part in (Dutch) politics or to become involved in societal issues and claims to be nonviolent. One of the main preachers within this group is Abdelillah Bouchta as well as several native Dutch Muslims who have studied in Saudi Arabia. The second group consists of the more politically involved Salafis, who are also non-violent but do engage in national and international politics. In 2001 the most important leaders of this group in Amsterdam (Imam Shershaby), The Hague (Imam Fawaz Jneid) and Tilburg—in the south of the Netherlands (Imam Ahmad Salam) established the Foundation Islamic Committee for Ahlu-sSunnah in the Netherlands. Imams Fawaz Jneid and Ahmad Salam are (p.410) both of Syrian descent and have been associated by the Dutch security services with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The Foundation is part of the Committee for Ahlu-sSunnah in Europe with members in Spain, France, Germany, Belgium and England with Adnane Al-Aroor (also from Syria) as president. The third strand is known as the jihadi/takfiri branch of Salafism in the Netherlands, which in almost all instances is directly or indirectly connected to the core of the old Hofstad network (of which the assassin of Van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, and his friend Samir Azzouz are the most well-known members). In all these currents, but in particular in the Hofstad network, young women play an important role as translators, facilitators and thinkers.

Snapshots of the Lives of Two Women Aicha and Umm Salamah are both of Moroccan descent and both of them became affiliated with Salafi movements after they went through a period of not “really practicing” the faith. This transitional period should be regarded as a type of conversion. Before I turn to their life stories I will elaborate on some important conceptual issues that are involved with the changes they have Page 5 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship experienced. Conversion is regarded here as a “(radical) change of worldview and identity”.14 There is a large amount of literature on conversion, mostly dealing with people moving from one major religious tradition to another. Research has compared the competition between religions as ideas on the religious market. Religion in this sense is seen as a commodity that is offered on the expanding market of religious goods that can be picked and bought by religious people. This type of approach has gained widespread adherence and is applied to new religious movements,15 Christians16 and Muslims.17 Within (p. 411) this research different types of motive for conversion are explored, and the kinds of answers different modalities of Islam provide for converts in different times and places are analysed.18 Wohlrab-Sahr sees conversion as a symbolic transformation of crisis experiences that offers a solution to several personal problems. In her study, which especially focuses on the conversion from another major religious tradition to Islam, she argues that this process brings a new kind of belonging and community into existence, while providing the greatest contrast with the culture of origin and a critical framework with which to engage with society.19 Although this study is not about conversion from one major tradition to another, many of the aspects mentioned above are also evident in the life stories of Umm Salamah and Aicha. Their conversion is what Stark and Finke call a reaffiliation within the same religious tradition.20 In order to analyse this, I focus on the choices women have made in the religious market. Making choices and reflecting upon them are important aspects of the construction of an identity.21 A key issue that is related to the process of making choices and reflecting upon them is that of agency. Often women's involvement in religious movements is seen as a sign of female superstition, irrationalism, fanaticism, or the result of a false consciousness22 and their perceived submission to male supremacy is often poorly understood. Women, however, are more than (p.412) just the object or symbols of the religious movements, as Franks shows in her research on Christian and Islamic revivalist movements.23

Umm Salamah: Who Am I? Umm Salamah is 23 years old and lives in a small, historical provincial town in the south of the Netherlands. She is of Moroccan descent and was born and raised in the Netherlands. She attended Christian primary and secondary schools. Subsequently, she enrolled in a secondary vocational school (MBO), where she studied for an international business degree. During most of her childhood she had mostly native Dutch friends and only a few Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch friends. She enjoyed going out with her friends, drinking alcohol and she had a few boyfriends. According to her female friends, she loved the company of boys and had one boyfriend for a longer period of time. After a while she became engaged to him and they planned to marry. According to Umm

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Changing World Views and Friendship Salamah she and her family were not really practising Muslims, but this past she tries to elide with her new identity. Umm Salamah:24

“I do not like to talk in detail about my life before I got to know Islam. What I can tell you is that I come from a Muslim family, but was not brought up really ‘Islamically’, more in a traditional way. Many Muslims, in particular the first generation, confuse culture or tradition with Islam. […] was I “Moroccan” or was I “Dutch”? I was going to “Dutch” schools and had mostly “Dutch” people as friends. That was very confusing for me because I could not identify myself with anyone.[…] After Allah lead me to Islam, […] I realised I was first and foremost a Muslim with a Moroccan background, born and raised in the Netherlands. Proud of my Moroccan roots, but also of my Dutch qualities. […] Being Dutch or Moroccan was not that important to me anymore.” Umm Salamah expresses her quest for authenticity against the culture of her parents and that of the dominant Dutch culture. More than just a break with both of her parents’ and Dutch culture, this quest represents a merging of the idea of the authentic self with the idea of a pure Islam as revealed (p.413) by Allah.25 This quest for individuality and authenticity is not only important for Muslim youth but also for Christian youth nowadays.26 It reflects a transformation in a society that enhances self-fulfilment, individual choice and assertiveness.27 Combining the idea of one's true self with the search for the true Islam forces people to study Islam themselves and to ask the question “what does Islam really say?” In the case of Umm Salamah, she embarked upon this quest by starting to visit mosques, attend lectures and surf the internet. After a while she moved to another city. In this new city she became active in one of the Salafi mosques, where she gave Arabic lessons. This step was taken at the end of a very turbulent period in her life that was full of personal problems. Her self-doubt about her future is expressed in the second quote given above. At this juncture in her life, Islam gave her a sense of inner peace, a new direction and provided the right answers to her questions: Umm Salamah:

“Questions I had back then were: Why am I here? What is the meaning of this life? What happens after death? Etcetera. I know now that I am here to worship Allah and that this life is a test, that I have to follow what is good and stay away from evil, that I can reach that by following the Qur’an and the Sunnah and that I have to earn Allah's satisfaction in order to deserve a place in Paradise where there is eternal life, contrary to this life that is temporary and can be over any moment.” Page 7 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship What Umm Salamah has done can be characterised as a self-conscious attempt to define and analyse the difficulties in her life and to plan how to change it and rewrite her own life-story. Her reaffiliation started for the most part as an individual quest that involved embracing another world view and an affiliation with Salafi thought, albeit without a clear association with one of the Salafi organizations in the Netherlands. Although at times she participated in teaching Arabic, she can be regarded as an “engaged observer”: someone who visits meetings, provides moral support, but has no leadership or (p.414) activist role.28 The transition she made was reflected in her choice of a husband who shared the same ideas about Islam and who helped her with her religious studies. She had met him during a course in England, after which they got married. Umm Salamah's old friends and classmates had the impression that it was her husband who forced major changes upon her. This is doubtful however since she had already started wearing the headscarf in 2004 after she came back from a visit to Morocco, and in 2006, when she became more interested in political issues and moved to the UK, she began to wear the niqab. The headscarf and later on the niqab express Umm Salamah's embodiment of the changes in worldview she has experienced. Since the niqab is highly contested in Dutch society in general and in the Moroccan-Dutch community in particular (especially among first-generation Moroccan-Dutch Muslims), her niqab also articulated the sharp contrast with Dutch fashion customs and the Islamic traditions of her Moroccan parents. Seeking an Islam that is neither “Moroccan” nor “Dutch”, the change in worldview was therefore not only a matter of inward experiences but also of outward appearances. Although her husband certainly exerted considerable influence on her and she sometimes resented his dominant behaviour, she also supported him in his ideas and endeavours. The relationship is therefore too complicated to frame in a dichotomy of the dominant husband and subservient wife with a “false consciousness”. She was attracted to him partly because he seemed to be a pious Muslim. This mirrored the choices she had already made, and becoming wife to a pious man gave her the opportunity to fulfil one of her dreams to become a pious Muslim mother. The couple had a child and her position as a mother and a good wife was, for Umm Salamah, an avenue to becoming a good Muslim. Slowly but surely she also left her former circle of friends and entered new friendships with other women whom she met virtually on discussion forums and MSN email groups on the internet. She did not cut all her ties with the past; she kept sending messages by email to some of her old friends. Most of these messages were reminders to her old (and new) friends about the temporality of this life and the need to return to the “true” Islam before it is too late. Her poem “Sudden Realization” is an example of such messages. Sudden Realization (Excerpt) Don’t let your death become simply another person's realization

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Changing World Views and Friendship Take consideration now and start preparing for your death without hesitation (p.415) For life isn’t a game that when you lose you get a second round Your deeds all go on record whether hideous or sound Life was not created in jest for amusement and play and utter dismay Indeed our Lord will hold us to account and have the last say So realize now and don’t wait around for yourself to civilize For you know not whether you will get another chance to sit and wonder and all of a sudden realize…

These acts of disseminating texts by Umm Salamah can be perceived as attempts to urge other people to reform themselves and to raise their awareness about the “critical state the ummah is in”. This is certainly the case, but based upon an analysis of her discussions with others on the internet and a few of my conversations with her, I think there is more to it. Her constant reminders to others about the “true” Islam also are signs of a continuous dialogue with herself and an expression of her affiliation with “true” Islam. This should not only be regarded as an act of spreading the call, da‘wa, but also as an ongoing process of asserting one's own place in the world as a person who tries to be a devout Muslim. Her poems have helped her in her quest for the “truth”, and the act of disseminating them is therefore as much an act of da‘wa as it is a way to recall and relive her “rebirth” as a Muslim.29 More or less the same can be said about a letter she wrote to her husband, with whom she was arrested in 2006 in the UK. On his laptop blueprints for an explosive were discovered together with articles such as “Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self-Sacrificial Operations—Suicide or Martyrdom?” Umm Salamah was charged with failing to disclose information in her possession that might be of assistance in preventing an act of terrorism. On her husband's laptop a letter was found written by Umm Salamah in which she allegedly, according to the prosecutor, offered her son for the violent jihad:30 “[…]I am writing you this letter to let you know you have my support and to remind you to be strong and not let Satan influence you, to remind you that Jihad is now compulsory and you are obliged to protect the well-being of Islam and help your brothers and sisters and fight the Kuffar. I really wish I could go with you because I too feel obliged to do all this and look to participate in any way I can. But everything happens by the will of Allah, may he be praised, only maybe, God willing I can follow you and if I could I will send your son to you so he can follow his father's footsteps. (p.416)

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Changing World Views and Friendship I will pray to Allah he will release you from (this world) by granting you martyrdom and pray to Allah to reunite us in heaven, as your wife, together with your son in heaven. God willing I will do anything in my power to raise our son the best way I can so he can be a righteous Muslim. I will also tell him all about his father so he can be proud of him and follow in his footsteps.” According to Umm Salamah the text above was not a letter to her husband but merely a poem. Both said in court that they more often wrote about violent jihad and researched the subject extensively. In the end Umm Salamah was found not guilty of all charges; her husband was found guilty on minor charges and sentenced to three years imprisonment. During my contact with her it was clear that she was very much involved with “injustice against Muslims”. In the past she had never been active in political issues although at one time she signed a manifesto against the negative image of Dutch Moroccans in the Netherlands and, according to her old friends, she could react very strongly against discriminatory remarks about Moroccans or sexist remarks against women. The letter she wrote could have functioned as a means to incite her husband to commit terrorist acts, as was alleged by the prosecutor, but, as was the case with her other poems, it was also a sign of her individual continuous quest. The letter and her solidarity with the “suffering of Muslims worldwide” expressed her political thoughts, but also served as a reminder of her spiritual quest, in the sense that fighting the violent jihad is a form of following Allah's will (and therefore the “true” Islam) and making people aware of that (including herself) gives a feeling of empowerment and moral virtue and it is not necessarily an incentive for action.31

Aicha: Faith(Less) Through Friendship The symbolic transformation of Umm Salamah's life does not immediately explain how she became an engaged observer of the Salafi movements. One of the aspects that might shed some light on that issue is the importance of friendship networks. This theme is clearly apparent in Aicha's life story. Aicha lived with her parents (who came from Morocco), two sisters and her brother in a city in the south of the Netherlands. She went to an Islamic school and there she grew very disturbed by the lack of interest among her fellow pupils in matters concerning the faith. Her contact with most of the pupils was quite (p. 417) limited, although they admired her for trying to be a pious Muslim. At a new school one of the few people she came into contact with was Samir Azzouz. Samir caught the attention of the Dutch media earlier when he tried to go to Chechnya to wage jihad; together with his friend he was sent back at the Russian border. Aicha was very critical of and very interested in the Arab regimes which she saw as corrupt and oppressive. She also criticised the attitude of the traditional Muslim umbrella organisations in the Netherlands, which according to her, were too complacent towards those Dutch politicians Page 10 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship who were “attacking Islam”. She was already involved in doing volunteer work for a foundation that raised funds for “victims of the Israeli occupation”. In Samir she found someone with kindred interests and views. Also his large collection of Jihadi anasheed32 music attracted her; it moved her and made her emotional. Samir gave her a text written by two of his friends that explained the importance of the concept of tawhid and judging the world by Allah's laws only. This handwritten text was, he told her, a basic tenet of the study group of which he was a member. It was the same group with which Aicha was already acquainted; she was introduced into this group by Mustafa, a young MoroccanDutch man who studied in Syria. The group, now known as the Hofstad network, was led by Abu Khaled, an asylum-seeker from Syria. The fundraising foundation became an increasingly important factor in Aicha's life since the only friends she had were also members of this foundation. Although Aicha never attended the classes of Abu Khaled, the spiritual leader of the Hofstad network, she became increasingly involved in its women's network. Its young women approached Aicha to be part of the “sisterhood”.

Aicha:33 “‘You should join us. We all support each other and take care of each other’, one of them said to me.” Her friendship with the other “sisters” and with some of the members of the Hofstad network shows the importance of friendship networks in explaining the participation of people in social movements. People are much more inclined to join religious movements when they are approached by people who they trust on other grounds.34 Research on other movements shows how (p.418) new members of the movements were recruited in circles with a high proportion of people such as friends and relatives who were already members.35 Networks of friendships and relatives continue to play an important role in the mobilisation of participants as well.36 Identification with and participation in a social movement can also contribute to acquiring friendships. Membership of a social movement brings about feelings of belonging and provides a sense of security, brotherhood (or sisterhood), comfort, trust and solidarity, as research on the Belgian radical right movement shows.37 An important issue is also that social networks make certain beliefs plausible and provide the prospect of rewards for conformity and converting.38 The issue of plausibility is important in the lifestories presented here. The questions “Who am I?” and “What is Islam?” mean that the new identity has to make sense for the women involved. In Umm Salamah's case her Moroccan and Dutch identity did not make sense anymore, given the fact that they seemed contradictory; the Islam that she sought was not the Islam of her parents since they mixed tradition with Islam, according to her. Plausibility also explains why in Aicha's case she turned to a different type of Salafi movement than members of her family, who had found their niche in the circles of the Dutch Madkhali Salafis. Their loyalty towards political and Page 11 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship religious leaders in the Middle East, however, neglected, according to Aicha, the crisis faced by Muslims throughout the world. Her new network initially provided that plausibility. For example, when she joined the “Lions of Tawhid” chatroom, particular texts of Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah were discussed and explained by several participants (in particular Mohammed Bouyeri). What particularly attracted Aicha were the clear and unequivocal answers that the texts of these Salafi (p.419) scholars provided to her questions and their critical stance towards Middle Eastern politics. Aside from the experience of “sisterhood” or “brotherhood” and the creation of plausibility, a competition of piety also seems to play an important role in these networks. Aicha:

“You always have to give a hundred per cent. It is difficult to say now I have studied enough. It is difficult to say this is my limit and no further. It is very attractive because you do it for Islam. And when for example you cannot wear a headscarf at work, you feel guilty. It is not allowed and you are the only one…then say yes but later when you have to account for yourself before Allah, you are alone as well.” The young women in the group did not want to be exposed as having a weak faith and stimulated each other to deepen their piety. However, Aicha did not feel satisfied in the end as she believed the piety the group promoted was more concerned with outward appearance than with spirituality. During the summer of 2004 she became more distant from the Hofstad network and sent one of the boys an email explaining why she no longer wanted to be part of it. She told me: Aicha:

“I was really searching and full of doubts, but it [the Hofstad network] did not feel good. And if it does not feel good, you should not do it. But I did feel attracted to it, for a very long time I have been angry at the attitude of the Islamic leaders. Also everyone made it seem so romantic; they were a little bit like dreamers.” Another reason for her increasing alienation from the network was that she had growing doubts about some of their practices, such as marrying a man in order to secure a residence permit for him: Aicha:

“In 2004 I got this call from one of the sisters. Did I want to engage in a fake-marriage?39 For the sake of Allah, she said. I got pretty angry, refused and told her that I did not want her to contact me anymore.”

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Changing World Views and Friendship Above all she rejected the promotion of violence against infidels. This in particular made her no longer “feel good” to be part of the network. She broke with it on 2 November 2004. On that day, the same day Van Gogh was killed, the women of the fundraising foundation she worked for gathered in the evening. After five minutes she left the meeting and never came back. The fact (p.420) that participating in the group was no longer appropriate in Aicha's view can be seen as a symptom of a situation in which an individual becomes her own highest authority. At the same time the conclusion she reached was also to do with the lack of plausibility of her network. The sisterhood proved not to be very strong according to Aicha and she found the (in her view) obsessive attention to women's attire extremely superficial and their inclination towards violence very disturbing. In much of the social movement literature the importance of friendship networks is only considered inasmuch as they contribute to the feeling of solidarity in the movement. This functionalist approach does not explain Aicha's relation to the Salafi movements. At a certain time the plausibility she found in the ideas of the Hofstad network faded away. This had more to do with her deteriorating relationship with the other members of the group and their ideas about violence and the position of women, than with the ideas of the Salafischolars mentioned above.

From Born-again Muslims to Salafis Aicha and Umm Salamah's processes of conversion (or reaffiliation) can be seen as a process of revitalisation of their faith resulting in both of them affiliating with Salafi thoughts and networks. Many of the choices they made and the motives for their reaffiliation are similar to those of converts from Christianity to Islam, who feel the need for a strong identity, self-realisation and the symbolic transformation of a personal crisis. For these women Islam and the Salafi doctrines enable them to rewrite their own life stories and to construct their sense of self as strong women who find their purpose of life in Islam, thereby challenging the notions of women as passive, subjugated victims. This means that both women have the capability, mediated by Salafi thoughts and networks, to connect their own individual experiences with the larger narratives of Islam and the ummah. The choices of Umm Salamah and Aicha should be understood within cultural contexts in which particular kinds of selfpresentations are stimulated and others are discarded. Choices based upon free will and authenticity are valued above choices that are forced upon them by their parents. We can see this in the stories of both young women who talk about the process of re-affiliation as an individual quest, during which they rebuild their own lives in relation to their newly found faith. Moreover, unlike those converts who acquire through Islam a strong counter-identity to the society in which they were brought up, the two women studied in this chapter found that the Salafi movement provided a strong counter-identity to both (p.421) Dutch society as well as the first generation Moroccans and the more traditional form of Islam they adhered to. To distinguish themselves from Dutch society and the Islam of Page 13 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship their parents they adopted totally new outlooks and practices. Umm Salamah wears a niqab and Aicha a headscarf, Umm Salamah changed her name and both became much stricter with regard to the separation of the sexes. In both stories we can see a continuous interplay between inner feelings and outward appearances; both reflecting each other and stimulating each other. The processes of individualisation and choice-making through faith mean that the worldview of each person can be actively changed within such societal contexts as the emergence of the Salafi movements, their dominance of the religious market on the internet, the huge attention to Islam in the public sphere, international developments and the differences between first and second generation immigrants. This individual change and the plausibility, support and warmth people find in social networks are important in showing how and why people align themselves with social movements (but also why they leave them). Bibliography Bibliography references: Allievi, S ., Les converts à l’islam: Les nouveaux musulmans d’Europe, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998. Bartels, E ., ‘Die hoofddoek is mijn eigen keuze’, in E. Bartels, A. v. Harskamp and H. Wels (eds), Cultuur maken, cultuur breken: Essays voor Hans Tennekes over mogelijkheden en onmogelijkheden van invloed op cultuurverandering, pp. 46–59, Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 2001. Bilsen, K. and Witte, H.D., ‘Waarom worden individuen actief binnen een extreem-rechtse organisatie? Integratie van de beschikbare literatuur in een hypothetisch kader ter verklaring van extreem-rechts militantisme’, Tijdschrift voor Sociologie, vol. 22, no. 1 (2001), pp. 37–62. Bolton C.D.s, ‘Alienation and Action: A Study of Peace Group Members’, American Journal of Sociology, 77, 1972, pp. 537–61. Bracke, S., ‘Author(iz)ing Agency’, The European Journal of Women's Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 335–46. Brink, G. van den, Geweld als uitdaging: De betekenis van agressief gedrag bij jongeren, Utrecht: NIZW, 2002. Buijs, F.J ., Demant, F. and Hamdy, A ., Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.

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Changing World Views and Friendship Buitelaar, M, ‘Staying close by moving out: The contextual meanings of personal autonomy in the life stories of women from Moroccan descent in the Netherlands’, Contemporary Islam, vol. 1, no. 1 (2007), pp. 3–22. (p.422) Coleman, S., ‘Continuous Conversion? The Rhetoric, Practice and Rhetorical Practice of Charismatic Protestant Conversion’, in A. Buckser and S. D. Glazier (eds), The Anthropology of Religious Conversion, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, pp. 15–27. Prins, M., The fragmentization of youth, Nijmegen: MacDonald/SSN Nijmegen, 2006. Duits, L. and Van Zoonen, L., ‘“Headscarves and Porno-Chic: Disciplining Girls”’ Bodies in the European Multicultural Society’, European Journal of Women's Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–17. Franks, M., Women and Revivalism in the West: Choosing ‘Fundamentalism’ in a Liberal Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001. Gerami, S. and Lehnerer, M., ‘Women's agency and household diplomacy: Negotiating Fundamentalism’, Gender & Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2001), pp. 556– 73. Gerlach, L.P. and Hine, V.H., People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1970. Gooren, H., ‘The religious market model and conversion: towards a new approach’, Exchange, vol. 35, no. 1, (2006), pp. 39–60. Groen, J. and Kranenberg, A., Strijdsters van Allah: Radicale moslima's en het Hofstadnetwerk, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 2006. Hawley, J.S., ‘Introduction’, in J. S. Hawley (ed.), Fundamentalism and Gender, New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 3–46. Hoffmann, G., Muslimin werden: Frauen in Deutschland konvertieren zum Islam, Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Kulturanthropologie und Europäische Ethnologie, 1997. Iannaccone, L.R., ‘Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion’, in L. E. Young (ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summa y Assessment, New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 25–45. Jacobsen, C., ‘The Quest for Authenticity: Islamization Amongst Muslim Youth in Norway’, in J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the secular state, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 155–68.

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Changing World Views and Friendship Klandermans, B. and Oegema, D., ‘Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements’, American Sociological Review, vol. 52 (1987), pp. 519–31. Koning, M. de, ‘“You Follow the Path Of the Shaitan: we try to follow the righteous path.” Negotiating Evil in the Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims’, in L. Minnema and N. Van Doorn-Harder (eds), Coping with Evil in Religion and Culture: Case Studies, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2008a, pp. 137–48. Koning, M. de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008b. Langenhove, L. v. and Harré, R., ‘Positioning and Autobiography: Telling your life’, in N. Coupland and J. Nussbaum (eds.), Discourse and Lifespan Identity, Language and Language Behaviors, Newbury Park, London: Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 81–99. Maagdenberg, V. van den, ‘Jaarrapport Integratie’, Onderzoek verricht in opdracht van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek (ISEO) Erasmus Universiteit, 2004. McAdams, D., The Stories We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of the Self, New York: William Morrow, 1993. (p.423) Meertens, R.W., ‘Radicaliserende moslims en moslima's sociaal-psychologisch bekeken’, in K. Shahbazi (ed.), Radicaliserende vrouwen: Nederlandse communistische vrouwen (1945–1970) en de Nederlandse islamistische vrouwen (1989–heden), een comparatieve analyse, Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007, pp. 35–50. Nieuwkerk, K. van, ‘Introduction: Gender and Conversion to Islam in the West’, in K. Van Nieuwkerk (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Austin: University of Texas, 2006, pp. 1–17. Orum, A. M., ‘On Participation in Political Protest Movements’, Journal of Applied Behavorial Science, vol. 10 (1974), pp. 181–207. Pels, T., ‘Respect van twee kanten: Over socialisatie en lastig gedrag van Marokkaanse jongens’, Migrantenstudies, vol. 4 (2003), pp. 228–39. Prins, M., The fragmentization of youth, Nijmegen: MacDonald/SSN Nijmegen, 2006. Stark, R. and Finke, R ., Acts of Faith: Explaining the human side of religion, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Page 16 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship Stewart, A.J., ‘Women and the Social Movements of the 1960s: Activists, Engaged Observers, and Nonparticipants’, Political Psychology, vol. 19, no. 1 (1998), pp. 63–95. Waardenburg, J.D.J., Institutionele vormgevingen van de Islam in Nederland gezien in Europees perspectief, Den Haag, 2001. Werbner, P., ‘The predicament of diaspora and millennial Islam: Reflections on September 11, 2001’, Ethnicities, vol. 4, no. 4 (2004), pp. 451–76. Wilson, K. and Orum, A. M., ‘Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 4 (1976), pp. 187–202. Withuis, J., ‘Sekse en sekte: Moslima-terrorisme geanalyseerd en vergeleken’, in K. Shahbazi (ed.), Radicaliserende vrouwen: Nederlandse communistische vrouwen (1945–1970) en de Nederlandse islamistische vrouwen (1989–heden), een comparatieve analyse, pp. 7–34. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007, pp. 7–34. Wohlrab-Sahr, M., ‘Symbolizing Distance: Conversion to Islam in Germany and the United States’, in K. Van Nieuwkerk (ed.), Gender and Conversion, Austin: University of Texas, 2006, pp. 71–92. Notes:

(1) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to thank Roel Meijer, Joas Wagemakers, Edien Bartels and all the participants of the conference “Salafism as a Transnational Movement” held in Berg en Dal (The Netherlands) in September and October 2007 for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. (2) Marjo Buitelaar, ‘Staying close by moving out: The contextual meanings of personal autonomy in the life stories of women from Moroccan descent in the Netherlands’, Contemporary Islam, vol. 1, no. 1 (2007), pp. 3–22; L. Langenhove and R. Harré, ‘Positioning and Autobiography: Telling your life’, in N. Coupland and J. Nussbaum (eds), Discourse and Lifespan Identity, Language and Language Behaviors, Newbury Park, London: Sage Publications, 1993, p. 82; McAdams, D., The Stories We Live By: Personal Myths and the Making of the Self, New York: William Morrow, 1993, p. 266. (3) Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg, Strijdsters van Allah: Radicale moslima's en het Hofstadnetwerk, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 2006. (4) Jolande Withuis, ‘Sekse en sekte: Moslima-terrorisme geanalyseerd en vergeleken’, in K. Shahbazi (ed.), Radicaliserende vrouwen: Nederlandse communistische vrouwen (1945– 1970) en de Nederlandse islamistische

Page 17 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship vrouwen (1989–heden), een comparatieve analyse, Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. (5) Sarah Bracke, ‘Author(iz)ing Agency’, The European Journal of Women's Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 335–46. (6) S. Gerami and M. Lehnerer, ‘Women's agency and household diplomacy: Negotiating Fundamentalism’, Gender & Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2001) pp. 556– 73. (7) J.S. Hawley, ‘Introduction’, in J.S. Hawley (ed.), Fundamentalism and Gender, New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 27. (8) Roel Meertens, ‘Radicaliserende moslims en moslima's sociaal-psychologisch bekeken’, in K. Shahbazi (ed.), Radicaliserende vrouwen: Nederlandse communistische vrouwen (1945– 1970) en de Nederlandse islamistische vrouwen (1989–heden), een comparatieve analyse, Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007. (9) V. van den Maagdenberg, ‘Jaarrapport Integratie,’ Onderzoek verricht in opdracht van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek (ISEO) Erasmus Universiteit, 2004, pp. 13– 14. (10) Martijn de Koning, ‘“You Follow the Path Of the Shaitan: we try to follow the righteous path.” Negotiating Evil in the Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims’, in L. Minnema and N. Van Doorn-Harder (eds); Coping with Evil in Religion and Culture: Case Studies, Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2008, pp. 137–48. Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008. (11) Moroccan-Dutch here refers to websites that in name and outlook make references to Morocco and are aiming at a Moroccan-Dutch audience. (12) Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. (13) W. Waardenburg, Institutionele vormgevingen van de Islam in Nederland gezien in Europees perspectief, Den Haag, 2001, pp. 85–6. (14) Henri Gooren, ‘The religious market model and conversion: towards a new approach’, Exchange, vol. 35, no. 1 (2006), pp. 52.

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Changing World Views and Friendship (15) L.R. Iannaccone, ‘Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion’, in L. E. Young (ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summa y Assessment, New York: Routledge, 1997. R. Stark and R. Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the human side of religion, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. (16) Henri Gooren, ‘The religious market model and conversion: towards a new approach’, Exchange, vol. 35, no. 1 (2006), pp. 39–60. (17) S. Allievi, Les converts à l’islam: Les nouveaux musulmans d’Europe. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998. G. Hoffmann, Muslimin werden: Frauen in Deutschland konvertieren zum Islam, Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Kulturanthropologie und Europäische Ethnologie, 1997. M. Wohlrab-Sahr, ‘Symbolizing Distance: Conversion to Islam in Germany and the United States’, in K. Van Nieuwkerk (ed.), Gender and Conversion, Austin: University of Texas, 2006, pp. 71–92. (18) Karin van Nieuwkerk, ‘Introduction. Gender and Conversion to Islam in the West’, in K. Van Nieuwkerk (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Austin: University of Texas, 2006, pp. 1–17. (19) M. Wohlrab-Sahr, ‘Symbolizing Distance: Conversion to Islam in Germany and the United States’, in K. Van Nieuwkerk (ed.), Gender and Conversion, Austin: University of Texas, 2006, pp. 71–92. (20) R. Stark and R. Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the human side of religion, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 114. (21) Edien Bartels, ‘“Die hoofddoek is mijn eigen keuze”’, in E. Bartels, A. v. Harskamp and H. Wels (eds.), Cultuur maken, cultuur breken: Essays voor Hans Tennekes over mogelijkheden en onmogelijkheden van invloed op cultuurverandering, Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 2001, pp. 56. (22) Sarah Bracke, ‘Author(iz)ing Agency’, The European Journal of Women's Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 335–346. Linda Duits and Liesbet van Zoonen, ‘Headscarves and Porno-Chic: Disciplining Girls’ Bodies in the European Multicultural Society’, European Journal of Women's Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117. (23) M. Franks, Women and Revivalism in the West: Choosing ‘Fundamentalism’ in a Liberal Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. (24) The fragments are based upon letters from Umm Salamah, written to me in 2006 and 2007 unless otherwise indicated.

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Changing World Views and Friendship (25) C. Jacobsen, ‘The Quest for Authenticity: Islamization Amongst Muslim Youth in Norway’, in J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims and The Secular State, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 160; Oliver Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst, 2004, pp. 23. (26) M. Prins, The Fragmentization of Youth, Nijmegen: MacDonald/SSN Nijmegen, 2006. (27) Trees Pels, ‘Respect van twee kanten: Over socialisatie en lastig gedrag van Marokkaanse jongens’, Migrantenstudies, vol. 19, no. 4 (2003), pp. 228–39. G. van den Brink, Geweld als uitdaging: De betekenis van agressief gedrag bij jongeren, Utrecht: NIZW, 2002. (28) A.J. Stewart, ‘Women and the Social Movements of the 1960s: Activists, Engaged Observers, and Nonparticipants’, Political Psychology, vol. 19, no. 1 (1998), pp. 63–95. (29) S. Coleman, ‘Continuous Conversion? The Rhetoric, Practice and Rhetorical Practice of Charismatic Protestant Conversion’, in A. Buckser and S. D. Glazier (eds), The Anthropology of Religious Conversion, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. (30) The excerpts are based upon the transcripts of the court case. (31) Pnina Werbner, ‘The Predicament of Diaspora and Millennial Islam: Reflections on September 11, 2001’, Ethnicities, vol. 4, no. 4 (2004), pp. 451–76. (32) Anasheed is Islamic music. It is sung a cappella, sometimes accompanied by percussion instruments Jihadi anasheed often contain texts about the suffering of the Islamic umma and/or the heroic deeds of Muslim fighters. (33) The fragments are based upon interviews with Aicha in 2005, 2006 and 2007. (34) L.P. Gerlach, and V.H. Hine, People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1970. (35) C.D. Bolton, ‘Alienation and Action: A Study of Peace Group Members’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78, no. 3 (1972), pp. 537–61. A.M. Orum, ‘On Participation in Political Protest Movements’, Journal of Applied Behavorial Science, vol. 10, no. 2 (1974), pp. 181–207. K. Wilson, and A.M. Orum, ‘Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 4, no. 2 (1976), pp. 187–202. (36) B. Klandermans and D. Oegema, ‘Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements’, American Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 4 (1987), pp. 519–31. Page 20 of 21

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Changing World Views and Friendship (37) K. Bilsen, and H.D. Witte, ‘Waarom worden individuen actief binnen een extreemrechtse organisatie? Integratie van de beschikbare literatuur in een hypothetisch kader ter verklaring van extreem-rechts militantisme’, Tijdschrift voor Sociologie, vol. 22, no. 1 (2001), pp. 37–62. (38) Henri Gooren, ‘The religious market model and conversion: towards a new approach’, Exchange, vol. 35, no. 1 (2006), pp. 39–60. (39) By fake-marriage she meant a marriage that was arranged not out of love but for practical reasons, in this case a residence permit.

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Index

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.448) Index al-‘Abbad, ‘Abd al-Raziq ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin, 177–8, 184 ‘Abbas, Mahmoud, 229, 236–7 Abbasid caliphate, 4; and hisba, 12; and anti-Shi‘ism, 107, 110–111, 119 ‘Abd al-Khaliq, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 23–24, 48 against Sufism 162–3 and concept of politics 164–7 on da‘wa, 164 doctrine 150–1, 156 influence in Indonesia, 175–6 influence on Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan, 147–8 (note 10), 149, 161 on jihad163 on shirk, 164 ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, 306 ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Umar, 192, 194, 197, 208, 210 ‘Abd al-Raziq, Ahmad, 15 ‘Abduh, Muhammad, 7, 45–6, 117, 385 Abdul-Wahid see Abu Khadeejah Abu Anas al-Shami, 269 Abu Aliyah, 387, 401 Abu Basir al-Tartusi, 270 Abu el-Fadl, Khaled, 385 Abu Hamza al-Masri, 252, 396 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, 271 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, 269, 271, 309, 311 Abu Khaled, 417 Abu Khadeejah, 394–5 Abu Layth al-Libi, 298 Abu Muntasir, 385, 394, 399–401 Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, 13, 281–300, 311 Page 1 of 26

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Index and Abu Qatada al-Filistini, 283, 289–94 and Algeria, 279, 282 and Salafi doctrine 25, 276 and Taliban, 294–8 Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, 109, 270, 311 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 436 and al-Qaeda, 437 biography of, 436–7 campaign against Iraqi Shi‘a, 11, 108, 109–11, 121–4, 270, 437 as example in Palestine, 243 and Jihadi-Salafism, 27 and sectarianism 29 Abu Nida, 175–6, 184 Abu al-Samh, ‘Abd al-Zahir, 73 Abu Qatada (Qutada) al-Filistini, 251, 269, 271, 279, 289–94, 396 Abu Sa‘id, Fu’ad, 433 Abu Sufyan, 387 Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, 271, 278, 311 Abu Walid al-Ghamdi, 311 Abu Yahya al-Libi, 275–7, 279 Abubakr Muhammad, 434–5 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 7, 45, 117, 385 (p.449) Afghanistan 20, 37, 116, 136, 139, 162, 179–80, 202, 208, 251, 256 Ahl al-Hadith, 4, 61, 64, 287 Ahl-e Hadith, viii, 1, 6, 28, 65, 126–148, 180 in Britain, 385, 387 connections with Saudi Arabia, 130–133 Doctrine: against Hindu influences, 135, 141; bid‘a, 128; fiqh, 61; hadith, 61, 127–8; ijma‘, 127; ijtihad, 127; jihad, 130; qiyas, 127; shirk, 128; Sufism, 128, 141; taqlid, 127–9, 141; history, 126–7 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 64 influence on Nasir al-Din al- Albani, 61 and jihad, 130–131, 132, 134–5 and Tehrik-e Mujahidin, 131, 133 and other schools: Barelwis, 128, 131; Deobandis, 128; Wahhabism, 129 and Tahaffuz-e Haramain Sharifain Movement, 132 and Lashkar-e Taiba, 136–4 and Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya, 132 Page 2 of 26

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Index Ahl-e Hadith Youth Force, 131 Ahl al-Ra’y, 61 Ahl al-Sunna, 15, 28, 38, 291, 350–61 ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a, viii Ahmadis, 131 Akmal, Abu Munzir Zul, 177 Al al-Shaykh, 8 Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman ibn ‘Abdallah, 10, 87 Al al-Shayk, Sulayman ibn ‘Abd al- Rahman, 102 Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, 66, 74 Alawis, 118, 121 al-Albani, Muhammad Nasir al-Din, 6, 26, 28, 40, 45, 58–80, 130, 185, 389, 390 early life 63–5 in Saudi Arabia 65–67 in Syria 63–4, 66–7 internationalization of his ideas 77 doctrine: ‘aqida, 70; against taqlid, 63; and hadith, 58, 64–68; and law schools 45; and taqlid, 64; and the term manhaj, 47; and Wahhabism 8, 65–66; as muhaddith al-‘asr, 58; critique of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 42, 66; Hanbalism, 66, 68; political quietism, 17, 78; renewal of ijtihad, 59, 63, 66; Sufism 63; takfir, 19, tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya, 69; tasfiya, 24; veil 66 other thinkers and movements: and the Palestinian cause, 18, 19, 70; and the Sahwa, 68; Hasan al-Banna, 69; Ibn Baz, 65–66, 68; contrast with Jihadi-Salafism, 25; Muslim Brotherhood, 68–69, 74, 172; Sayyid Qutb, 69, 71; Tabligh, 74 relations with: Dar al-Hadith 73; neo-Ahl al-Hadith, 68; Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 204; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 100–101; Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba, 74–75; Palestinians 228; Sahwa, 67; Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 182, 430 Algeria, 22, 306 Page 3 of 26

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Index Al-‘Ali, Hamid, 278 Ali, Manwar see Abu Muntasir ‘Ali ibn Talib (caliph), 84, 113 al-Alusi, Muhammad Shukri, 117 al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri, 121 Amin, Kamaruddin, 40 al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa nahy‘an almunkar see hisbaanashid, viii, 417 Ansar al-Islam (Kurdistan), 437 al-Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammad - yya, 23–24, 73 'aqida, 159 and da‘wa, 148 and ikhtilaf, 152–58 and politics 146–67 and purification 150–1, 159, 161 and Wahhabism, 159 history 146 (note 8), 431 (p.450) al-Ansar Newsletter, 289, 291, 293 al-Ansari, Hammad, 73 ‘aqida, viii, 5, 15, 18, 22, 24, 59, 75, 131, 146, 393 ‘aql, viii “Arab-Afghans”, 276, 294 Arafat, Yasir, 224, 432 al-‘Arif, Shaykh Hashim, 227 Al-Aroor, Adnane, 410 Arya Samaj, 129 al-Asad, Hafiz, 11, 109, 118, 120 Ash‘arism, 39, 287 ‘Asif al-Din, Ahmad Faiz, 175 Association of Ahl al-Sunna (Palestine), 225–6 Association of the Book and Tradition of the Prophet (Palestine), 227 Association of Scientific Centre for Methodological Studies and Research (Palestine), 227 Astal, Yasin, 228–9, 236–7, 433 ‘Atiyyat Allah, Lewis, 26, 313–6 Australia, 140 ‘Awda, Salman, 185–6, 250, 269, 330, 393, 395, 418, 439 Aziz, Shah Abdul, 126 ‘Azzam, ‘Abdallah, 185, 254; biography, 440–1 and Jihadi-salafism, 269, 270, 305 Azzouz, Samir, 405, 410, 417 Ba‘abduh, Lukman, 186 Ba’asyir, Abu Bakr, 186 Baathism, 54 Baha’is, 131 Bahjat al-Bitar, Muhammad, 63 Baker, Abdul Haq, 387 Bakri Muhammad, Omar, 396 al-Banna, Hasan, 69, 155, 157 Page 4 of 26

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Index Barakat, Ibrahim, 225–6 Barelvi, Syed Ahmad, 126, 129 Barelwis, 37, 128, 131, 138, 385, 387, 390, 396 al-Bashir, Hasan ‘Umar Ahmad, 144 bay‘a, ix, 75 Baysa, Yusuf, 175–6 Bayt al-Ikhwan, 74 bid‘a/bida‘, ix, 6, 19, 39, 47, 87, 101, 115, 151, 171–3, 178, 225, 388 bin Laden, Osama, 185–6, 189 and al-Qaeda: in the Islamic Maghreb, 274 in Mesopotamia, 437 and Iraqi Shi‘is, 121 and Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad, 134 and Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, 180, 438 and al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 210 and Palestine, 227, 243 and quietist ‘ulama, 284 relations with Mullah ‘Umar, 297 as symbol 271 and Yemen, 284 and Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, 439 bilad al-haramayn, 26 al-Birri, Khaled, 200–3 Birt, Yahya, 385, 401 Bosnia, 256, 441 Bouyeri, Mohammed, 405, 408, 410, 418 Bouziane, Abdelkader, 78 Brigate Rosse, 262 Buddhists, 310 Bukhari, 34 Burbak, Dawud, 389 al-Buti, Muhammad Sa‘id Ramadan, 41 caliphs (rightly guided), 5, 11, 84 caliphate, 204 Centre for Islamic Studies (Birmingham), 434 Chechnya, 22, 255–6, 405, 440–1 Christianity (Christians), 84, 86, 110, 129, 310, 345, 410–12, 443 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 145 Copts, 197, 201 al-Dahlawi, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, 73 Dar al-Hadith (in Medina), 73 Dar al-Hadith (in Yemen), 430 Dar al-Hadith al-Khayriyya (in Mecca), 73 (p.451) Dar al-Islam, ix, 296 Dar al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna, 432 Dar al-Kufr, ix Dar al-Sulh, ix Darbala, ‘Isam, 194 Darul Islam movement, 177 Page 5 of 26

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Index da‘wa, ix, 4, 18, 60, 134, 138, 147, 171, 179, 181, 348 in Britain, 386, 392–4, 400 in France, 352–356 in the Netherlands, 415 Al Da‘wa Medical Mission, 139 al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya, 227 Al Da‘wa System of Schools, 135–6 al-Dayni, Yusuf, 251 Deobandi school, 2, 37, 138 and Ahl-e Hadith 128 and jihad, 136 and politics 7 doctrine of, 5–6 in Britain, 385, 387, 397–8 madrasas and politics 7, 132 Dehlawi, Shah Waliullah, 126 Dekmejian, R. Hrair, 257 Derg regime (Ethiopia), 346, 349, 350 al-Dihlawi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 121 al-Dimashqi, Ibn Nasr al-Din, 43 Dughmush, Mumtaz, 230 Durkheim, Emile, 265 Eickelman, Dale, F., 343, 353 ETA, 262 Ethiopia, 15–16, 21 al-Fahd, Nasir, 269 al Faisal, Abdullah, 396 Falata, ‘Umar, 73 al-Faqih, Sa‘d, 249, 284 Faraj, ‘Abd al-Salam, 96, 199, 254 Fatah, 224, 228, 232–8 fatwa, ix, 28, 175 al-Fawzan, Salih ibn Fawzan, 10, 89–90, 172–173, 269, 330, 338, 352 Faysal (King), 62 fisq, 97–8, 203 fitna, ix, 17, 41, 173, 236, 238, 247–8 al-Fiqqi, Muhammad Hamid, 46 fiqh, ix, 64, 213, 214, 215, 397 al-firqa al-najiya, ix, 5, 13, 34, 166 Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunna wal-Jama‘ah, 184 Front Pembela Islam 183 Garang, John, 152 (note 19) Girard, René, 307 Gause, Gregory, 328 al-Ghazzali, Muhammad, 211–2 GIA (Groupe Islamique Armée), 255–6, 289, 292–3 Gilani, Abdul Qadir, 128 GIMF (Global Islamic Media Front), 273 Gondalavi, Hafez Mohammad, 130 Page 6 of 26

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Index Grand Mosque in Mecca, 75 Green, Abdur Rheem, 38 biography of, 443–4 GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat), 249, 274 Guantanamo Bay, 262 Hafidh, al-Habib ‘Umar ibn, 339 Hadid, Marwan, 254, 434 hadith, ix, 4, 5, 7, 112 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 8, 64, 73 and Ahl-e Hadith 128 and hadith-revolutionaries, 73 and Ansar al-Sunna, 153 al-Hadiyya, Muhammad Hashim, biography, 430–1; 146, 149 (note 14) al-Hajuri, Yahya, 325, 331, 337, 430 hakimiyya, x, 25, 48, 96, 173, 194, 213 Hamas, 19, 22, 27, 221, 224, 228, 230, 233–243, 246, 257, 262, 272 Hanafi(school of law), in Afghanstan, 294 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 63 in Britain, 397 and Ahl-e Hadith, 129 Hanbalism, doctrine 6, 38 and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab, 112 and anti-Shi‘ism, 107, 112, 117 (p.452) Hanson, Hamza Yusuf, 398 haraka (harakis), x, 48 Harakat Islah al-Shabab al-Muslimin, 387 Haramayn Foundation, 131, 333 Hasan Khan, Siddiq, 61, 127 Hasan, Usama, 387, 394, 401 Hashim, Salah, 209 hashwiyya, 41 Hassan, Shaykh Abdul Ghaffar, 130 Hasun, Ahmad, 431–2 al-Hawali, Safar, 40, 130, 185–6, 269, 393, 395, 418 Hawwa, Sa‘id, 11 and anti-Shi‘ism, 119–20, 121 Hayat al-Sindi, Muhammad, 112 Haza, Sharif Fu’ad, 176–7 Hekmatyar, Gulbudin, 180 Hillis, Muhammad, 228 Hindu (ism), 6, 134–5, 310 Hirsi Ali, Ayaan 405 HISAM, 386–7 hisba, 28 and al-da‘wa al-salafiyya, 147 and Ansar al-Sunna 151 and the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya 12, 24, 190, 194–5, 198–9, 201 and Wahhabism 11–12 as political tool, 17 definition, ix doctrine, 190–1 Page 7 of 26

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Index in Indonesia, 183 Hizb-i Islami, 180 Hizb al-Tahrir/Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1, 4 and Salafism 13, 36 in Britain, 391–2 in Indonesia, 177–8, 182–3 in Palestine, 221–4, 239 hizbiyya, x, 17, 23 Hizbollah, 232, 246, 322 Hofstad Group, 410, 418–20 Husayn, Sayyid Nazir, 61, 127, 129 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 223 Hussein, Saddam, 116, 121, 234–5 Ibadites, 84 ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 4, 58–60, 250, 30, 369, 385 and ‘aqida, 59 and anti-Shi‘ism, 112–3 and bida‘428 and Hanbalism, 61 and ijma‘, 60 and influence on Jihadi-Salafism, 269, 286, 305, 308 and politics 19 and purification, 59 and Salafism, 385 and shirk, 60 biography, 428–9 critique by Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 42–43 his doctrine, 4, 428–9 and Ansar al-Sunna, 159 and tawhid, 59–60, 428 ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, ‘Abd al-Qadir (Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, “Dr. Fadl), 269 ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman, 43 Ibn ‘Arabi, 69 ibn ‘Atiq, Hamd ibn ‘Ali, 87–8, 102 ibn ‘Atiq, Sa‘d, 65 ibn Batta, 85 ibn Baz, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 10, 59, 130, 182, 184, 185, 269, 333, 352, 389, 390, 399 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 65–6 and critique of, 284, 336 doctrine of wali al-amr, 173 and fatwa on American troops in Saudi Arabia, 20, 23, 28, 175 and Ahl-e Hadith, 62 and Jews 89 and the Muslim Brotherhood, 172 and Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 23, 430 and the Palestinian issue, 432–3 and Palestinian Salafis, 228 and transnationalisation of the Salafi movement, 333 and Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, 20 Page 8 of 26

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Index ibn Hanbal, Ahmad, 4, 38, 39, 85, 112–3, 250 ibn Jarbu, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 269 ibn Jibrin, ‘Abdallah, 115 Ibn Kathir, 194 ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 38, 44, 46, 194 ibn al-Sa‘ud, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 8, 47 (p.453) ibn al-Sa‘ud, Muhammad, 7–8 ibn Taymiyya, Taqi al-Din, 4, 10, 59, 250, 431 and al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyya 12 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 59 and anti-Shi‘ism, 11 and ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, 96, 254 and Jihadi-Salafism, 286, 305 and political quietism, 324 and the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 194 as founder of Salafism 38–40, 43, 389 doctrine of, 43, 45; ijtihad, 59; and hisba12, 194 influence on reformism 59 and Sayyid Qutb, 254 a nd Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab, 428 and wala’ wa-l-bara’, 86 Ibrahim, Najih, 197 Idara Khidmat-e Khalq, 138 al-Ifriqi, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 73 ijaza, x ijma‘, x ijtihad, ix, 8, 10, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 61, 66, 214, 351 ikhwan (Wahhabi) 9, 114 ‘ilm, 13, 19, 22, 74 Ilyas, Mawlana Muhammad, 6 al-Imam, Muhammad, 325, 331, 338, 430 Imam Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud University, 333 iman, x, 97–8 India, 139 Indonesia, 169–88 Iqbal, Zafir, 133 IRA (Irish Republican Army), 262 Iran, 108, 115 and Shi‘i madrasas in Pakistan, 132 and the Iranian peril, 232, 234–5 and the Iranian revolution, 115, 170–1, 173, 223–4 Salafi condemnation of the Iranian revolution, 181–2, 433 Iraq, 106, 159, 401 and (Wahhabi) ikhwan10 and Jihadi-Salafism 21, 141, 232 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), 140 ISI (Islamic State in Iraq), 268, 272 Page 9 of 26

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Index Ishaq, Shah Muhammad, 127 Isma‘ilis, 131 Islamic Jihad Organisation (Egypt), 96, 189–90, 197–8, 208, 255, 257, 260, 262, 269 Islamic Jihad (Palestine), 223–4, 229 Islamic National Association, 223 Islamic University of Gaza, 228, 432 Islamic University of Medina, 20, 70, 73, 76 and Ethiopia, 435 and Indonesia, 176 and Jihadi-Salafism, 269 and Pakistan, 130, 132, 133 and Yemen, 333, 430 Isma‘il Shahid, Shah, 7 Israel, 89, 137, 139, 221 (Israeli occupation) 224, 235–7, 417, 433 jahiliyya, x, 4, 25, 48, 86, 172, 194, 204, 213, 230 Jaish-e Mohammad (Pakistan), 136 Jama‘at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, 46 Jamaat-e Islami, in Britain, 385; in Pakistan, 130 al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Egypt), 12, 18–19, 24, 27, 189–217, 260, 269 and Jihadi-Salafism, 254 as a socio-revolutionary group, 260 concerning da‘wa, 205 doctrine, 202–207, 210–11, 215–7 history, 190–4 jihad, 199, 202, 206, 215–7 rejection of hizbiyya, 206–7 Sayyid Qutb 29, 194 the Jihad Organisation, 189–90, 197–8, 208 the Muslim Brotherhood, 192, 196–7, 199 wala’ wa-l-bara’, 201, 207 Jama‘at al-Muslimin (Takfir wa-l- Hijra), 189, 246, 257 (p.454) Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (Saudi Arabia), 70, 73 and occupation of the Grand Mosque 74 and connections with Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 430 Jama‘at al-Tabligh (Pakistan), 37 Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, 437 Jamaat ul Da‘wa Pakistan (Pakistan), 138–9 Jamaat al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa-Ahl-i Hadith, 180 Jamaat ul Dirasat ul Islamiya, 140 al-Jami, Muhammad Aman, 20 and political submissiveness 34 and Salafiyya al-‘ilmiyya49 as heir of Nasir al-Din al-Albani 74, 76 Jami‘at-e Islami, 180 al-Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, 18 Jam‘iyyat dar al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna, 227 Jam‘iyyat Ihya al-Turath al-Islami, in Indonesia, 175–6 Page 10 of 26

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Index in Kuwait, 48, 161 in Yemen, 333 Jamiat Ulema-i Islam (JUI) (Pakistan) Jemaah Islamiyya (Indonesia), 140, 185–6 Jews, 86, 89, 110, 134, 212, 310 al-Jiffri, al-Habib ‘Ali, 339 jihad, Afghanistan, 130, 132, 141, 179, 269, 295, 310 against rulers, 50 and Deobandi organizations 136 and Islamic Jihad Organisation (Tanzim al-Jihad), 189–90, 197–9 and Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 198–9, 202, 211 and Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad, 134 and Lashkar-e Taiba, 136–41 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 11, 17 and organizations of Ahl-e Hadith, 130, 131, 132–41 and Palestine, 228, 230, 275 definition xi, 10 doctrine, 55, 252 Indonesia, 183–4 Iraq, 121–2, 268 the Netherlands, 414 right of the ruler, 114, 275 Saudi Arabia, 308–318 Sudan, 144 Syria, 434 Jihadi-Salafism, definition xi, 20, 24–27, 249, 253, 307; problematic nature of the term “Jihadi- Salafism” 245–264, 280, 303–5; countries: Afghanistan, 251, 268, 269, 289, 290, 293, 294–8, 304, 310, 313, 322; Algeria, 249, 255, 273, 278, 289–294; Chechnya, 255, 269, 277, 311; Indonesia, 313; Iran, 272, 278; Iraq, 260, 268–9, 277, 310, 316, 317; Israel, 268; Kenya, 30; Lebanon, 278, 304; United Kingdom 251; Maghreb, 278; Morocco, 252, 273, 304, 313; the Netherlands, 414; Palestine 255, 277; Saudi Arabia, 283, 304–5, 308–18; Somalia, 278, 310; United States, 283, 305, 316; Yemen, 284–5 democracy, 53; and Jahmis, 54; and Kharijis, 54; and Murji’is, 54; Page 11 of 26

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Index and Sayyid Qutb, 48, 50, 254, 305; and Sufis, 270; and Wahhabism 24, 269–70, 308; and Yazidis, 270 doctrine: ‘al-tawhid al-hakimiyya, 50; anti-Shi‘ism, 54, 108–111, 121–4, 270, (Zarqawi doctrine) 278; bida‘, 54, 151; fiqh64; ilmaniyya (secularism), 53; jahiliyya, 50, 254; jihad, 55, 275–7, 296, 310; kufr, 52–53, 311–2; merger of takfir and jihad, 279, 289; origins of the term, 48, 251 shari‘a, 53, 309, 310; shirk, 53, 151; takfir, 48, 52, 54, 95–101, 270, 271, 272, 277–8, 288–9; tawhid, 268, 267, 270, 309–10; tazkiya, 151; weakness of the term, 285; zandaqa (atheism), 54 (p.455) politics: against quietist ‘ulama (“sultan's clerics”), 284–5; al-Qaeda, 256; and apocalypse, 268; and postmodernism, 305–7; critique of Hamas, 279; critique by quietist Salafis of, 274–5, 283; and democracy 26; de-politicisation, 299; hybridity, 50, 305–7; “Internet scholars”, 439–40; lack of knowledge of its members, 272; major currents in, 267–80; Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad, 134; and the Muslim Brotherhood 50, 254–5; the near and far enemy, 256; and Palestine 225, 227, 229–30, 242–3; attacks in Riyadh May 2003, 215; Salafi purism as threat to waging jihad, 287–8, 295–9; strategy, 282, 316; and struggle against Shi‘is in Iraq 108–11, 121–4; suicide bombs in Iraq 110; utopia, 310; tali‘a, 50 sociology: e-jihad, 272–3, 303–4, 439; empowerment, 25–6; explanation for its rise, 302–4; identity, 310–1; Internet Jihadi scholars, 268, 273–4, 439–40; Page 12 of 26

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Index local-global, 313–8; modernism, 26; recruitment, 303; transnationalism, 26; “virtual jihad”, 268; and the West (mimicry), 26, 306–7 Jihad Organisation (Islamic Jihad), 257 Jihadism, 245–6, 260; global Jihadism, 258, 261–2, 267–80, 272, 279 jizya, xi JIMAS, 21, 28, 378, 389, 391, 393, 399, 443 Jneid, Fawaz, 409 Johnstone, Alan, 230 Jordan, 93 Kabbani, Muhammad Hisham, 396–7 kafir/kuffar, xi, 86, 95–101, 174, 367, 370 Kashmir, 131, 136, 139, 140, 141 al-Kathari, Muhammad, 45 al-Kawthari, Muhammad Zahid, 41 Keller, Nuh, 398 Kepel, Gilles, 1, 252, 255 khadim al-haramayn, xi al-Khalidi, Ahmad, 269 khariji/khawarij, xi, 42, 84, 182, 246 Khashoggi, Jamal, 251 al-Khatib, Muhibb al-Din, 117–8, 121 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 119, 170–1, 433 khuruj, xii, 19 kuffar (ahl al-kufr) 86, 88, 92, 94, 95, 99 in Britain, 390 in France, 36 in Pakistan, 131 Shi‘is as unbelievers, 113 kufr, xi, 52, 53, 92, 93, 94, 96–102, 166, 17, 202, 214, 367, 374 Kuwait, 93 Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), 136–41 and al-Qaeda 140 as Pasban Ahl-e Hadith, 139 transnational jihad, 140 Laskar Jihad, 184–6, 438–9 Leninism 25 al-Libi, Abu Yahya, 26, 275–80 Luxor massacre, 209 al-Madkhali, Rabi‘ ibn Hadi, Ethipia, 355 and political submissiveness 34, 249 and the Sahwa movement, 76 heir to Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 49, 76 Indonesia, 177–8, 185 (support of jihad) 184 Page 13 of 26

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Index the Netherlands, 409, 442 transnational networks, 20, 28 and Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 182 connections with Yemen, 338 al-Madkhali, Zayd Muhammad, and connections with Indonesia, 177–8 and Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 182 (p.456) madhhad, xii, 4 madrasas, in Pakistan 130–2 mahdi, 75 Mahri, Usamah Faisal, 177 al-Majlis al-‘Ilmi li-l-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya fi-l-Filistin, 228 Makki, Hafiz Abdul Rahman, 133 manhaj/manahij, xii, 15, 24, 47, 51, 173, 214, 370, 392–3, 395 al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, 10, 18, 27, 249, 270, 271 and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, 214 and Muhammad Surur Zayn al- ‘Abdin, 121 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 100–101 and biography, 435–6 and differences with Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, 96 and jihad, 95, 436 and origins of Jihadi-Salafism, 25, 250, 252, 255, 436 and Salafism 25 and Salafiyya al-‘ilmiyya, 49 and taghut/tawaghit 93–96 and takfiri-Jihadism, 269 and tawhid and takfir, 92–102 attacked by quietist Salafis, 337 takfir of the Saudi rulers, 20 and Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, 90–92, 436 and wala’ wa-l-bara’83, 91–102, 436 and the West, 255 influence on Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, 109, 121, 271, 436 al-Ma’rabi, Abu Hasan, 325, 330, 331, 337, 430 Markaz Da‘wa wal Irshad, 133–6 and jihad 135–6 and schools, 135 Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith, 131, 137 Marxism (-Leninism), 13, 270, 282, 345, 349, 434 al-Mu‘allim, Ahmad Hasan, 332 Muhammad, Abu Bakr, 348 al-Mukhtar, Omar, 306 Muslim Youth Association, 223 Muttahida Majlis-e Amal, 131 Mawdudi, Abu A‘la, 50, 130, 173 Mawdudi Islamic Institute, 179 mawlid (al-nabi), 16, 128 Mazru‘i, ‘Ali, 73 Messahil, Mohamed Ben El Hadi, 272 Military Academy Group, 189 Page 14 of 26

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Index Mir, Sajid, 131, 132 Moluccas, 184–6 al-Mu‘ayyidi, Sayyid Majd al-Din, 41 muhaddith, xii, 58, 70, 181, 228 muhajirun, 55 muhtasib, xii mujaddid, xii mujtahid, 42–3 mujahid, xii Mullah ‘Umar, 185–6, 271, 295 Muqri’, Mustafa, 210 Muqrin, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 269, 271 Murad, Abdal Hakim, 398 Murji‘, 39 murtadd, xii, 5 Musharraf, 132, 138 mushrik, xii, 5 Muslim Brotherhood, 2, 37, 381 active in: Britain, 391; Egypt, 432; France 250, 371, 380; Indonesia 23; Saudi Arabia, 62; the Sudan 23–24; Yemen 23, 325, 329, 333, 337–8 and ‘Aballah ‘Azzam, 441 and Jihadi-Salafism 27, 253, 286, 305 and Muhammad ibn Surur Zain ‘Abidin, 120 and Salafism: and Saudi Sahwa movement, 263 anti-Shi‘ism 118–121 as enemy of Salafism, 8, 13, 22 coalition with Salafi organizations 22 combining Salafi doctrine 23, 29, 48 cooperation with Salafis and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia in the 1980s, 179 critique by Salafism 18, 21, (called harakis), 48 in Kuwait, 250 (p.457) in the Netherlands, 410 in Palestine, 228, 233–4, 432, (as Hamas) 223–5, 232–43, 432 opposed by Nasir al-Din al-Albani 71, 78 opposed by neo-Ahl al-Hadith 76–78 purged from Islamic University in Medina 76–77 refuge in: Saudi Arabia, 62; Sudan (NIF) 144–167; Syria, 117–9, 410, 433 Salafi critique of in Indonesia, 23, 176–7; clashes with Salafis in Indonesia 178 the Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 192 Mustafa, Shukri, 246 mutawwa‘/mutawwa‘un, xiii and hisba, 12 Page 15 of 26

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Index Mu‘tazila, 287 mawlid, 197 Naik, Zakir, 141 Najd, 4 Najun min al-Nar (saved from the fire), 200 Nasar, Mustafa ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir Sethmariam see ‘Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri Nasif, Muhammad Husayn, 46 nasiha, 17, 146, 369 Nasser, 62 National Congress Party (NCP), 148 nawasib, 111 al-Nawawi, 205 Negara Islam Indonesia, 177 Neo-Ahl al-Hadith, 68–77 against Sahwa76 doctrine 68–71 in France 78 in Riyad and Burayda 73 influence on Juhayman al-‘Utaybi 75 internationalization of 77 practices 72 NIF (National Islamic Front), 24, 144, 148 NII (Negara Islam Indonesia), 177, 179, 182 9/11, 2, 268, 64, 402, 408, 439 niqab, xiii, 68, 414, 421 niyya, xiii, 25 Nuqaydan, Mansur, 333 Ottoman Empire 10 Pakistan, 1, 37, 116; and Ahl-e al- Hadith 126–41 Palestine, 159, 162, 215, 221–43, 255 Pan-Islamists, 258–61, 441 Pasban Ahl-e Hadith, 139 pesantren, xiii, 28 Philips, Bilal, 389, 395 Piscatori, James, 343 Punjab, 136 PKK, 302 Qadri, Tahir, 397 al-Qaeda, 48, 50, 278, 322 ‘aqida of, 51–56, 120 and Jihadi-Salafism, 256, 271 and Palestine, 22, 227, 230, 241–2 in Afghanistan, 297 in Britain, 399 jihad in Iraq 121 al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, 108, 123, 271 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, 273–4 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 211, 272 al-Qarni, ‘A’idh, 330 Page 16 of 26

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Index Qasim, Tal‘at Fu’ad, 194, 208 al-Qasimi, Jamal al-Din, 63 al-Qassam, ‘Izz al-Din, 223, 306 al-Qassam Brigades, 228 al-Qa‘id, Hasan Muhammad (Abu Yahya al-Libi), 275–7 qiyas, xiii, 61 quburiyyin (grave worshippers), 41, 129 quietism, 7 Qur’an, 4 Qutb, Sayyid, 28; and Muhammad Surur Zayn ‘Abidin 120, 434 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 96 and al-Qaeda 48 and critique by Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 69–7 (p.458) and hakimiyya, x, 19, 25, 48, 50, 96, 173, 194, 213, 286 and Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, 177 and jahiliyya, 48 and Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, 12, 194–5, 202 and Jihadi-Salafism, 25, 50, 253–4, 269, 270, 280, 286 Palestinian jihadi organizations 230 rejection by quietist Salafism (Qutbiyya), 21, 395 Rabitat al-Shari‘a, 178 al-Rahman, Jamil, 180, 251 rafida, xiii, 41see also Shi‘ism Rafiq, Ainur, 177 Ramadan, Tariq, 375, 380, 399 ra’y, xvi, 15 Red Mosque (Lal Masjid), 140 reformism 45–46, 59, 63, 287, 385 muraja‘at (revisionism), 210–7 Rida, Rashid: and Nasir al-Din al- Albani 64–65 and Jama‘at Ansar al-Sunna al- Muhammadiyya, 46 anti-Shi‘ism 117 enlightened Salafism 45 and Wahhabism 7, 47 Rightly Guided Caliphs, 84, 113 Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), 262 Rougier, Bernard, 23 Roy, Olivier, 13, 14, 36 al-Rushud, ‘Abdallah, 317 Rubin, Barry, 257 Sadat, Anwar, 96, 175, 198 Saeed, Hafez Muhammad, 133, 135, 138, 139, 140 sahaba, xiii Sahlab, Shaykh Ashraf, 227 Sahwa, xiii; and politics, 17, 20, 27, 50, 63, 67, 76, 78, 336, 393; and Muhammad Surur, 434 al-salaf al-salih, xiv, 4, 38 Page 17 of 26

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Index Salafism (salafiyya), definition, xiv; as self-description 249–51 doctrine and concepts: al-salaf alsalih, xiv, 3, 59, 152, 172, 226, 249; Ash‘arism, 3; ‘aqida, viii, 5, 15, 18, 22, 24, 40, 59, 61, 69–70, 71, 75, 131, 146, 150–1, 203, 393; bay‘a, ix, 75, 309; bida‘, ix, 6, 19, 39, 42–3, 47, 72, 82, 85, 86, 87, 101, 115, 127, 151, 171–3, 178, 225, 388; da‘wa, 21, 60, 72, 138, 147, 160, 165–6, 172–3, 176–7, 202, 210, 314, ; fatwa, 23, 28, 72, 115, 173, 213; fiqh, ix, 9, 14, 39, 60–64, 72, 192, 213, 214, 215, 217, 397; firqa, 47, 158; firqa al-najiya, ix, 5, 13, 34, 95, 96–102, 158, 166, 371–2, 393; fisq, 95, 97–8, 203; fitna, ix, 17, 41, 49, 173, 175, 212, 236, 238, 247–8, 315, 369; ghuluw, 212; hadith, ix, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19, 45, 61, 64, 65, 67, 73, 76, 94, 112–3, 127–8, 132, 153, 157–8, 242, 249, 325, 376, 388, 397; hijra, 90; hisba (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa nahy‘anal-munkar), ix, 11–12, 14, 16, 17, 24, 28, 147, 151, 183, 190–1, 194–5, 198–9, 201, 204–5, 207, 210, ; hizbiyya, x, 17, 23, 47, 164, 171–3, 177, 183, 186, 204, 206–7, 324, 336, 395, 430; ijaza, x; ijtihad, x, 4, 5, 9, 10, 42–4, 45–6, 51, 59, 61, 66–7, 127, 214, 351; ikhtilaf, 152–3, 157; ‘ilm, 9, 13, 22, 69, 71, 75, 76; iman, x, 97–8, 166, 309; jahiliyya, 48, 50, 52, 59, 172, 194, 204–5, 213; jarh wa-l-ta‘dil, 65, 336; jihad, xi, 10, 11, 14, 17, 24, 26, 27, 50, 55, 114, 121–2, 130, 131, 134–41, 144, 158, 162, 174, 179, 181, 184–7, 189–90, 197–9, 202, 206, 211, 213, 228–30, 240, 251, 268–9, 275, 288–95, 298, 308–18, 414, 434; jizya, 197; kafir/ kuffar, xi, 5, 16, 86, 90, 93, 113, 118, 131, 174, 204, 367, 370; kharaji/khawarij (Kharajites), 42, 84, 182, 236; kufr, xi, 52, 53, 87, 92, 93, 94, 96–102, 166, 17, 202, 214, 367, 374; mahdi, 75; manhaj, xii, 15, 22, 24, 47, 51, 155, 173, 194, 203, 214, 292, 370 (p.459) 392–3, 395; mawlid (al-nabi), 16, 197, 352, 354; mubahala, 176; munharif, 22, 155; nasiha, 17, 146, 369; niyya, xiii, qiyas, xiii; Qur’an 113, 152, 158, 160, 237, 242, 388; rafida/rawafid (anti-Shi‘ism), 11, 20, 40, 41, 54, 85, 112–4, 134, 224; ra’y, 15, 61; sahaba, xiii, 112; shari‘a, xiv, 53, 66, 93–4, 128, 140, 162–3, 174; Page 18 of 26

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Index shirk, xiv, 52, 60, 90, 92, 148, 160, 164, 178, 225, 388; Sunna, xiv, 52, 70, 113, 152, 159, 225, 237, 388; tafsir, 70, 192; taghut/tawaghit, 85, 93–95, 194, 311; al-ta’ifa al-mansura see al-firqa al-najiya; takfir, 5, 11, 19–20, 27, 50, 52–3, 70, 75, 96, 97–102, 173–4, 177, 181–2, 186, 202, 211, 213, 230, 244–8, 288–9, 337, 396; taqlid, xv, 9, 43–4, 51, 64, 141, 388; tarbiya, 161, 166, 178; tasfiya, xv, 24; tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya, 18, 49, 69; tawhid, xv-xvi, 14, 19, 38, 39 see also note 14, 42, 51, 59–60, 70, 88, 91, 161, 194, 207, 267, 308, 312, 351, 366, 417; ta’wil,156; tazkiya, xvi, 25, 151, 160–1; umma, 14, 27, 157, 160, 162–3, 191, 233, 258, 315–6; wahdat alwujub 69; wala’ wa-l-bara’, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 49, 82–102, 171, 214, 255– 7, 286, 309; wasatiyya, 212 and Enlightened Salafism 45, 59, 63 and eschatology, 352 and the four schools of jurisprudence 42–44, 325 and Hanbalism, 9, 42, 61, 66, 68, 85, 111–2, 250 and hybridity 23, 28, 62, 391 and intolerance 40–41 and scripturalism, 357 and Sufism, 21, 40, 42, 162, 324, 337, 392, 396 neo-Ahl al-Hadith 68, 71 purity (purification) of doctrine 17, 135 Wahhabism, 9, 11, 159 Zaydis, 337 media: image in the West, 34 influence modern media, 36 the role of Internet, 330, 401, 414, 421 and political quietism: 2, 14, 17–20, 49, 78, 147 (note 10) and democracy, 324 and fitna, ix, 17, 41, 173, 236, 238, 247–8, 369 and hizbiyya, x, 17, 23, 47, 164, 171–3, 177, 183, 186, 206–7, 324, 336, 395, 430 and political activism (haraki, harakiyyoon, etc), x, 2, 21, 40, 48, 182–3, 395 and utopia, 391 in Britain, 394–5 in Ethiopia, 352 in France, 20, 377 in Sudan, 144–5, 170, 221 doctrine of wali al-amr, 49, 173, 236–7, 324, 336, 430 in Yemen, 324–6 and political ambiguity: 2, 11, 14, 17–24, 49–50, 144 (note 10), 173–4, 264, 279, 280, 284, 302, 369 Page 19 of 26

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Index in Ethiopia, 352 in France, 381 in Iraq, 275 in Palestine, 232–6, 275 in Yemen, 335 and political practice: and fragmentation, 394–6 and Iran, 433 anti-Shi‘ism, 20, 40, 41, 54, 85, 107, 110–113, 119, 134, 170–1, 224 da‘wa, 47 in Egypt, 14, 17, 20, 23, 37, 48, 62, 198–217 in France, 369–71, 376–77, 381 in general, 17–24, 34, 35, 47–48, 144 (note 10) 164–6, 258–64 in Indonesia (Sururis), 174–80 in Palestine (Hamas), 221–229, 433 (p.460) in Saudi Arabia (Sahwa movement), xiii, 17, 20, 21, 48, 63, 67, 76, 336 in Sudan, 144–167 Madkhali school in Europe, 20 in Yemen, 325, 328–9, 430 sociological dimension: and alie - ation, 366, 376 and appeal to youth, 13–15, 350–3 and authority, 357, 377 and de-culturalisation 13, 21, 36, 390 and dress code and habits, 16, 35, 72, 352, 354, 371, 393 and empowerment, 13–14, 45, 367, 373, 379, 391 and gender, 408 and generational conflict, 375, 377, 407 and identity, 13–17 and informal networks, 351 and integration, 378 and modernism 7, 16 and objectification, 343–5, 357–8 and politics of identity, 15, 20, 28, 37, 379–80, 390–1, 392, 401, 406–8, 412, 442–3 and post-Islamism, 381–2 and postmodernism, 16, 28, 377, 381–2 and traditions, 354, 357, 360 and values (subculture), 367, 373–4 as a social and religious movement 34 economics, 374–5 fragmentation 12, 395–6 fragmentation 12, 395–6 in Britain, 384, 390–2, 400–1 in France, 366, 378, 381 in the Netherlands, 406–6, 442–3 social conservatism, 231–2 teacher-student relationship, 8 transnational dimension: and Afghanistan 28, 49 and Britain, 389, 401, 443–4 and Ethiopia, 342–6 and Europe, 14, 331 Page 20 of 26

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Index and France, 17, 28, 78, 36, 364–82 and funding, 333–4 and Indonesia, 21, 28, 170–1, 331–2 and Iran (Iranian revolution), 115, 170–1, 173, 181–2, 223–4, 232, 234–5, 433 and Iraq, 33 and Lebanon 23 and Malaysia, 331 and migration, 376 and mission and education, 37, 77, 116, 348, 351 and Muslim World League 116 and networks, 35, 430 and Pakistan, 129–30 and Palestine 23, 28, 37 and Saudi Arabia 17, 327, 335–6, 369 and Somalia, 332 and the Netherlands 28, 405–421 and West Africa, 331 and Yemen 49, 78, 320–40, 430 definition, 174–80 global and local relations, 27–9, 342–3, 356 in Africa, 14 relations 302, 313–40 Sahwa, xiii, 48, 409, 439 Salafi Institute, 394 Salam, Ahmad, 409 al-Sam‘ani, ‘Abd al-Karim, 38 al-Samawi, ‘Abdallah, 192, 194 Samudra, Imam, 185–6 al-San‘ani, Ibn al-Amir, 429 Saqib,Muhammad Abdul Karim, 387 al-Saqqaf, Hasan ‘Ali, 41 Saudi Arabia, p. 1, 2, 15, 215 ambivalence of policy, 169–70 ambivalence to jihad in Iraq and Palestine, 275 and anti-Shi‘a policy 115–6 and contacts with Ahl-e Hadith, 129–31 and critique by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 94 and dangers of takfir of rulers 19–20 and Muslim Brotherhood 22 (p.461) in Palestine, 228, 242 promotion of Salafism in Indonesia, 170–82 target of Jihadi-Salafism, 256 Sayf, Abu ‘Umar, 269 Sayyaf, ‘Abdul Rasul, 180 Schulze, Reinhard, 1 al-Sharif, Sayyid Imam, 269 Scientific Council for the Salafi Mission in Palestine, 227–8 as-Sewed, Muhammad ‘Umar, 185 shahada, xiii Page 21 of 26

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Index Shah Wali Allah, doctrine of 5–6 Sharab, Salim, 228 shari ‘a, definition, xiv, 4, 174, 179 as heresy 11, 93, 99 in Egypt, 124 in Ethiopia, 360 in Indonesia 183 in Pakistan 140 ‘Abd al-Khaliq ‘Abd al-Rahman on 192–3 in Saudi Arabia, 170–1 in Sudan 145, 153, 162 al-Shawkani, Muhammad ibn ‘Ali, doctrine of, 5 and schools of jurisprudence 44 connections with India 126 influence on Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 429 Shershaby, 409 Shi‘a (Shi‘is), definition of xiv, 6 and Salafism 39 and wala’ wa-l-bara’84–5 anti-Shi‘ism in Iraq, 106–111 anti-Shi‘ism in Saudi Arabia 114–116, 170–1, 224 anti-Shi‘ism of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 116–8 Palestinian Salafi attack on Shi‘ism, 234–5 sectarian conflict in Pakistan 131, 134 Shi‘a revolt against Saudi state 116 shirk, definition xiv, 39, 92, 93, 164, 178 al-Shu‘ayl, Faris see Abu Jandal al-Azdi Shubban al-Muslimin, 19 Shurrab, Saleem, 432–3 Shawqiyyun, 200 al-Sindi, Muhammad Hayat, 428 Sipah-e Sahaba, 136 Somalia, 349 Suaidi, Shaleh, 176 Suaidi, Qamar, 185 Sudan, 22, 208 Sufism, 221; in Britain, 396, 398 in Ethiopia, 347 mixing with Salafism 29 opposed by ‘Abd alKhali q ‘Abd al-Rahman 162 opposed by Ahl-e Hadith 128 opposed by Salafism 6, 41, 69, 294 return of, 401 Suharto, 179 Suhaymi, Salih, 184 Sungkar, ‘Abdullah, 186 Sunna, definition, xiv Supreme Muslim Council, 223 Supreme Council for the Salafi Mission in Palestine, 236 Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, Muhammad, 11, 21, 23, 48, 329 and Muslim Brotherhood 29, 50, 434 and the Sahwa, 434; in Saudi Arabia, 434, 160 Page 22 of 26

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Index anti-Shi‘ism, 120–1 biography of, 433–4 critique by the Ansar al-Sunna in Indonesia, 174–9, 182–5 in Saudi Arabia, 434 in Sudan, 147, 160 in Yemen, 238, 336–7 Sururiyya, in Britain, 395 Sururi, Sururiyya see Surur Zayn ‘Abidin, Muhammad Syria, 63, 66, 109 tabligh, xv, 138, 287 Tablighi Jama‘at, xv, 250, 291 accused of shirk, 6 definition of xv in France, 366, 375, 379–8 in Indonesia, 178 political quietism, 7 al-ta ’ifa al-mansura, definition xv and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 5, 34 tafsir, definition xv, 192 (p.462) taghut, definition xv and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 93, 194, 213 Taha, Rifa‘i Ahmad, 209 takfir, definition xv al-salafiyya al-takfiriyya, 147 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 10, 92–93, 97, 98, 99 and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 5 and Wahhabism, 19 as categorization, 246–248, 258, 264 (Britain), 396 in Egypt, 211; and hizbiyya, 173–4 in Indonesia, 186 of Palestinian society 230 of Saudi Arabia 181 opposition to takfir, 174 takfiri, 26 (problematic nature of), 245–264, 264, 396 Takfir wa-l-Hijra, (Egypt) 189, 246 as label 247–8 Taliban, 271, 294–8, 322, 440 Tamil Tigers, 302 Tanzim Jihad, 175 taqiya, 113 taqlid, definition xv, 6 and Wahhabism 8, 51 tarbiya, 4, 166 tasfiya (wa-l-tarbiya), definition xv, 18, 24 tawhid, concepts of, 6 and Jihadi-Salafism, 25 and wala’ wa-l-bara’88, 207 definition xv, 4, 5 awhid al-asma wa-l-sifat, xv, 39 Page 23 of 26

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Index tawhid hakimiyya, xvi tawhid rububiyya, xv, 39 tawhid uluhiyya, xv–xvi, 39 used against the Saudi state, 15 al-Tawil, Kamil (Camille), 252 tazkiya, xvi, 24, 25 Tehrik-e Mujahidin, 131, 133, 137 Thalib, Ja‘far ‘Umar, 23, (bio), 438–9 against Hizb ut-Tahrir and NNI, 182 against Sururiyya, 174–8, 182 and jihad183–6, 438 and opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood, 172 and transnational networks 28, 438 contact with Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 181–2, 438 Ideology, 177, 180–1, 183–5 Pesentran Al-Irsjad Tangeran, 180 al-Tibi, Shaykh Usama, 227 Timimi, Ali, 395 al-Tsouli, Younis, 272 al-Turabi, Hasan, 149 al-Tusi, Nasir al-Din, 119 al-‘Ufi, Salih, 317 al-‘Umar, Nasir ibn Sulayman, 273 ummah, 233, 307, 310, 415 Union of French Islamic Organisation, 380 United States, and invasion of Iraq 108 and jihad in Pakistan, 137, 138 and Jihadi-Salafism, 268 Ushan, ‘Isa, 317 Usman, Ahmad, 350–1, 355 al-‘Utaybi, Juhayman, 10, 28, 170, 250, 254 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 74 and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 92, 102 and condemnation of the Saudi monarchy 19–20 and Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, 430 and wala’ wa-l-bara’88, 90–92, 102 al-‘Utaybi, Sa‘ud, 317 ‘Uthaymin, Muhammad ibn Salih, 58, 172, 181, 185, 269, 284, 389, 390 al-‘Uyairi, Yusuf, (bio), 439–40 as ideologue, 269, 272 and Internet 26 and Jihadi-Salafism 25 Van Gogh, Theo, 405, 408–10, 419 veil 66 al-Wadi‘i, Muqbil ibn Hadi, (bio) 429–30 (general) 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, 70–1, 130, 185 (p.463) against political activism (hizbiyya), 324–5 and Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 429–30 and the Muslim Brotherhood 71 Page 24 of 26

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Index and political involvement, 335–7 and Saudi Arabia, 322, 323, 333, 335–6, 429–30 and Muhammad Surur, 182 and Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib, 181–2, 184 and Juhayman al-‘Utaybi 20, 430 crititicised by bin Laden, 285 doctrine, 325, 429–30 jihad in Afghanistan, 339 political quietism (wali al-amr), 336 rise of the movement, 323–, 429–30 the Iranian revolution, 181–2 Wahhabism (W ahhabiyya), 187, 428–9 doctrine 1, 2, 4; hadith8, 65; and Hanbalism 8, 66; ijtihad66 taqlid8 definition, xvi and jihad, 9 and modernity, 8 and politics, 19 and quietism, 8 and the Muslim Brotherhood, 8 and xenophobia, 9 anti-Shi‘a, 107–114; ‘ulama clash with ruler over Shi‘a policy, 114 as revivalist movement, 7 Gulf War 1990–1, 21 in relation to modern movements 8; tensions in, 9; in Palestine, 221 in relation to other revivalist movements 4–7; relationship with Ahl-e Hadith 61 influence on Jihadi-Salafism, 286 international promotion of Salafism 20; Wahhabism in Indonesia, 180 and Al al-Shaykh, 8, 429 al-wala’ wa-l-bara’: adherents: and Ibn Baz, 89; and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 91–102; and al-Jama‘a alislamiyya, 201, 207, 214; and Shi‘a, 84; and Wahhabism 9; Kharajites 84; and Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, 88–9; Saudi Jihadis, 309 doctrine, 49 and bida‘, 85; and radicalism 82; and ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, 255; Page 25 of 26

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Index and Sayyid Qutb, 255; and taghut/tawaghit92–4; and takfir, 92; definition xvi; instrument 16; leading to violence 17 history of concept, 82–102, 171 wali al-amr, definition xvi subservience to the ruler 19, 49 and Wahhabism 10 Waliullah, Shah, 126, 128–9 and Palestine, p. 236–7, 239 and Muqbil al-Wadi‘i, 336 “war on terror”, 301, 303, 342, 409 Wasatiyya, 212 Wifaq ul Madaris Salafiya, 132, 133 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 257, 281, 388, 393 World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 332 World Muslim League, 180, 332 Yemen, 49, 78, 181 Yusuf, Abu Hamzah, 186 Zaheer, Allama Ehsan Ellahi, life 131 Zaraboozo, Jamal, 389, 395 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 110, 185–6, 189 and anti-Shi‘a campaign in Iraq, 122–4, 270, 278 origins of Jihadi-Salafism, 251 Zaytuni, Jamal, 293 al-Zayyat, Mumtazar, 210 Zia ul Haqq, 134 Zionist-Crusader enemies, 282 al-Zindani, ‘Abd al-Majid, 329

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About the Contributors

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.424) About the Contributors ABOU ZAHAB, MARIAM is a specialist on Pakistan and a researcher affiliated with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) and a lecturer at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) and at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), in Paris, where she teaches the history and political sociology of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Her research focuses on sectarianism and jihadi groups and on Pashtun society. Among her publications are: ‘The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure)’, in A. Rao, M. Böck, M. Bollig (eds), The Practice of War: The Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, Berghahn, Oxford, 2007; ‘Between Pakistan and Qom: Shi‘i women's madrasas and new transnational networks’, in Martin van Bruinessen, Farish Noor and Yoginder Sikand (eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2008. She is co-author with Olivier Roy of Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, London, Hurst, 2004. [email protected] ADRAOUI, MOHAMED-ALI is a PhD Candidate and Lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris. He is associated with the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Chair and graduated in economics/business, political science and international relations from the Sorbonne University. He has participated in many conferences and written several publications, articles and reports for, inter alia, the French Ministry of the Interior and European think tanks. His research focuses on Islamism, full citizenship for Muslims in Europe and international relations. He contributed a chapter to Qu’est-ce que le salafisme?, Paris, Editions PUF, 2008 and for two years worked with the French Republic's Presidency at the Elysée Palace. [email protected] (p.425)

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About the Contributors BONNEFOY, LAURENT holds a PhD in International Relations from Sciences Po Paris. His research focuses on contemporary religious transnational relations in the Arabian Peninsula and more precisely on the question and narratives of the ‘importation’ of Salafi Islam in Yemen. He is currently based in San‘a conducting further fieldwork for an ANR/CNRS post-doctoral fellowship at IREMAM (Aix-enProvence) and collaborates with the Centre Français d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales de Sanaa (CEFAS). His publications include different articles on the issue of religious identities and politics and he is working on a monograph on Salafi movements in Yemen that will be published by Hurst, London, in early 2010. [email protected] DE KONING, MARTIJN ([email protected] website: http:// religionresearch.org/martijn) studied anthropology at the Free University of Amsterdam and completed his PhD on religious identities among young Moroccans. He is a participant in the ISIM/Radboud University research project ‘Salafism: Production, Distribution, Consumption and Transformation of a Transnational Ideology in the Middle East and Europe’. In his project he focuses on the demand side of religious knowledge by looking at how young Muslims actively engage with the writings of major Salafi religious leaders in the Middle East and their representatives in the Netherlands. HAMID, SADEK is Programme Leader and Lecturer in Muslim Youth Work at the University of Chester, England, where he is also completing a PhD on British Muslim youth, religious activism and the role of Islamic movements. His research interest areas include Muslim youth, Islam in Britain, Islamist groups, and the processes radicalisation and extremism. He has written for Q-News, The Muslim News and The Guardian. His most recent published academic works are ‘Models of Muslim Youthwork: Between Reform and Empowerment’, Youth and Policy Journal (2006), ‘Islamic Political Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizbut Tahrir’ in Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Comparative (Edinburgh University Press, 2007). He was also part of the British team commissioned by The European Union's Council of Ministers to study the nature of violent radicalisation in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Denmark (London, 2008.) [email protected] HAYKEL, BERNARD teaches Middle Eastern and Islamic studies at Princeton University's Department of Near Eastern Studies. He received his PhD in 1998 from the University of Oxford and his main research focuses on Islamic political movements and legal thought. Professor Haykel is presently (p.426) completing a book on the religious politics of Saudi Arabia since the early 1950s, when the Saudi regime developed institutions and strategies for projecting its version of Islam, known as Salafism or Wahhabism, throughout the world. Haykel has published extensively on the Salafi movement in both its pre-modern and modern manifestations. In particular, his book entitled Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani (Cambridge University Press, Page 2 of 6

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About the Contributors 2003) fully explores this strand of Islamic legal and political thought. This work is largely based on an extensive period of research and fieldwork in Yemen in the 1990s. [email protected] HEGGHAMMER, THOMAS (MA and MPhil Oxford, PhD Sciences-Po, Paris) is a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in Oslo. A specialist on militant Islamism, he is the author of Jihad in Arabia (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) and the co-author of Al-Qaeda in its Own Words (Harvard University Press, 2008). He has written about Saudi Arabia for the International Crisis Group and has testified in parliamentary hearings on counter-terrorism legislation in Canada and Denmark. He was a visiting researcher at King's College London (2005–6) and a postdoctoral research fellow at Princeton University (2007–8). [email protected] HROUB, KHALED is Director of the Cambridge Arab Media Project (CAMP) in association with the Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (CMEIS), University of Cambridge and a Queens’ College member. He is the author of two forthcoming books on the media: New Media and Politics in the Arab World and Broadcasting God on Arab Screen: Perils and Promises of Religious Media? He is also author of Hamas: A Beginners Guide London, Pluto Press, 2006 and Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, Washington, DC, 2000 and worked for the Middle East Programme of the International Institute of International Studies—London (IISS). His academic writings have appeared in Middle East Journal, Middle East International, Journal for Palestine Studies, ‘Shu’un Arabyya’ [Arab Affairs], Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Outre Terre (Paris) and INTERNATIONALE POLITIK (Germany). He writes for leading Arab newspapers including al-Hayat, al- Quds al-Arabi and al-Sharq al-Awsat (London). [email protected] LACROIX, STÉPHANE is a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford University and a fellow at Sciences Po in Paris, where he supervised the Kuwait Program of Gulf Studies in 2007–2008. He has published articles on Saudi Arabia and (p.427) Islamism in major academic journals, including the Middle East Journal and the International Journal of Middle East Studies. He is also a former consultant on Saudi Arabia for the International Crisis Group (ICG). His forthcoming book Awakening Islam: A History of Islamism in Saudi Arabia, based on extensive fieldwork in the Saudi Kingdom, will be published by Harvard University Press in 2009. [email protected] LIA, BRYNJAR is a Research Professor at the Norwegian Defense Research Est. (FFI), where he currently heads FFI's research on international terrorism and radical Islamism. Trained in Russian, Arabic and Middle Eastern studies, Lia obtained his PhD in contemporary Middle Eastern history at the University of Oslo. He was a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Harvard University from 2001–2. Page 3 of 6

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About the Contributors Lia is the author of several books, including The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt 1928–42 (Ithaca Press, 1998), Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism (Routledge, 2005). His most recent book is Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri, London, Hurst, 2007. [email protected] MEIJER, ROEL is senior lecturer in Middle Eastern history at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and a senior research fellow at Clingendael. His PhD was published as The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Politival Thought in Egypt, 1945–1958 (Routledge/Curzon, 2002). He has edited several books: Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East (Curzon, 1999), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State and Street (Curzon, 2000) and (co-edited) Iraq in Chaos: A Clash of Visions on a Humanitarian Disaster (2007, in Dutch), and published extensively on Islamist movements in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 2008–2010 he is conducting postdoctoral research for the ISIM/Radboud University Salafism project, Production, Distribution, Consumption and Transformation of a Transnational Ideology in the Middle East and Europe, focusing on Saudi Arabia. [email protected] HASAN, NOORHAIDI is a lecturer at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, currently affiliated to the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Carribbean Studies (KITLV), the Netherlands. His research interests include various manifestations of political Islam in contemporary Indonesia and other Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. He received his PhD from Utrecht University. He has published Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (p.428) (SEAP, Cornell University, 2006) and is the author of several articles on Salafism, Islam and politics in Southeast Asia. [email protected] PAZ, REUVEN graduated from Haifa University in Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies. From 1971–1994 he served in the Israeli Security Services. Most of his studies, research, and practical experience in the past thirty years have focused on Islam, Islamic culture, Islamic radicalism and the development of radical Islamic doctrine. In 1998, he was a visiting fellow in the Dayan Center in TelAviv University, and twice, in 2000 and 2001, in Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, DC. In 1997–2000 he was the academic director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. In 2003, he founded the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM— www.e-prism.org)in the GLO- RIA Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, which focuses on research on global Jihad. He has published dozens of articles on Palestinian society and politics and radical Islam. His forthcoming book (2009) is entitled The Mindset and Culture of Global Jihad. [email protected]

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About the Contributors ØSTEBØ, TERJE is an Associate Professor at the NLA School of Religion, Education and Inter-cultural Studies in Norway. He was awarded his PhD from Stockholm University, and his main research interests are Salafism and Islamic reform in Ethiopia. His publications include A History of Islam and Interreligious Relations in Bale, Ethiopia, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 2005; ‘The Question of Becoming: Islamic Reform Movements in Contemporary Ethiopia’, Journal of Religion in Africa, vol. 38, no. 4, 2008; ‘Islam in Ethiopia: Bordering the Borders of Christianity’, in A. Mesøy, S. J. Hansen and T. Kardas (eds), The Borders of Islam: Exploring Samuel Huntington's Faultlines, from AlAndalus to the Virtual Ummah, Hurst, London, 2009; ‘The Power of Muslim Institutions in Consolidating Democracy: A Perspective from Bale’. Forthcoming in K. Tronvoll (ed.), Contested Power: Traditional Authority and Elections in Ethiopia, Brill, Leiden 2009. [email protected] AL-RASHEED, MADAWI is Professor of Social Anthropology at King's College, University of London. She has published many books and articles on Saudi Arabia, Arab migration, Middle Eastern Christian minorities and Gulf transnational connections, most recently A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf (Routledge, 2005); Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic voices from a new generation (Cambridge University Press, 2007); (co-edited with Marat (p.429) Shterin) Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World (I. B. Tauris, 2008), and Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (Hurst, 2009). Madawi.al-rasheed@ kd.ac.uk SALOMON, NOAH is a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago Divinity School currently writing-up his dissertation while resident at Columbia University in New York. He spent over two years in Khartoum, central and western Sudan conducting fieldwork for a dissertation project entitled Toiling in the Shadows of Salvation: Sufis and Salafis in the Age of Late Islamism in Contemporary Sudan. The dissertation focuses on how Sufiand Salafi Muslims came to terms with the foundation of an Islamist republic in Sudan in 1989, as well the problems in its implementation in more recent years, through an exploration of how they both integrate and challenge the theological, epistemological, political and aesthetic concepts which state Islamism has brought to the fore. [email protected] STEINBERG, GUIDO is a senior fellow specializing in Middle East and Gulf Affairs at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. By training a historian of the Middle East and Islam, he has worked as a research coordinator at the Free University Berlin (2001) and as an advisor on international terrorism to the German Federal Chancellery (2002–2005). He appears frequently as an expert witness in German terrorism trials and has published widely on the Middle East, Saudi Page 5 of 6

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About the Contributors Arabian and Iraqi history and politics, the Wahhabiyya, Islamism and terrorism, including most recently: The Near and the Far Enemy: Islamist Terrorist Networks (in German) München 2005; The Iraqi Insurgency: Actors, Strategies, and Structures, Berlin: SWP, 2006. [email protected] WAGEMAKERS, JOAS studied English at Fontys Hogescholen in Tilburg and Arabic and Islam at Radboud University, Nijmegen. He worked as an English teacher for several years and is currently a lecturer and PhD candidate at Radboud University. His research focuses on the ideas of the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his influence on the radicalisation of the Jihadi-Salafi movement. His publications include ‘A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (forthcoming). [email protected]

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders

Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement Roel Meijer

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199333431 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001

(p.430) Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) Guido Steinberg Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was the founder of the Wahhabi movement, or Wahhabiyya, which his opponents named after him. He descended from the Al (= family) Musharraf, the most important family of religious scholars in central Arabia (Najd) between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century. The Al Musharraf came from Ushayqir, a town in the province of Washm, an important Hanbali centre of learning during the eighteenth century. His father ‘Abd alWahhab b. Sulayman was the judge in Uyayna. After early studies of Hanbali jurisprudence in Uyayna, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab travelled to Medina and Basra in order to complete his curriculum. Especially his time in Medina and his studies with the Najdi ‘Abdallah ibn Saif and the Indian scholar Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi (d. 1751) seem to have deeply influenced the young reformer. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab authored a fair amount of writings. The most important ones were short, concise handbooks (mukhtasarat) containing the essentials of his theology, which was heavily influenced by the medieval Hanbali scholar Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328). His most famous work was the Kitab al-Tawhid (Book of Monotheism). Ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab aimed at a reform of central Arabian society through a reform of religious life and a return to strict monotheism. According to his interpretation as laid down in his mukhtasarat, it was insufficient for a believer to merely profess the oneness of God (tawhid al-rububiyya). Rather, the individual Muslim had to arrange religious belief, ritual practice and personal conduct in (p.431) accordance with his profession of the oneness of God (tawhid al-uluhiya or tawhid al-‘ibada). This theory was based on the assumption that Muslims had Page 1 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders strayed from the straight path of the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih), i.e. the first generations of Muslims in Mecca and Medina in the seventh century. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab fought everything he considered to be unlawful innovations (bid‘a, pl. bida‘) of later generations like the veneration of saints and their graves. He aimed at a return of Muslim society to the ways of the pious ancestors and he looked to the Qur’an, but especially the Sunna, i.e. the corpus of reports (hadith) on the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, in order to establish how those ancestors had lived. Thus, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's reform was very much modelled along the thought of the eponymous founder of the Hanbaliyya, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855). The Wahhabi movement as a political force was born when Ibn ‘Abd al- Wahhab in 1744 entered into an alliance with Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud, the ruler of the small town of Dir‘iyya in Central Najd—a move that constituted the birth of Saudi Arabia. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab's offspring, the family of the Shaikh, Al alShaikh, have continued spreading his message until today. Although the family has lost parts of its former influence in the course of the twentieth century, the Wahhabi religious scholars remain important religious and societal players in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Wahhabiyya have decisively influenced the Salafi movement.

Muqbil Ibn Hadi Al-Wadi‘I Founder of Salafism In Yemen Laurent Bonnefoy Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i is regarded as the main founder of the Salafi movement in Yemen. Despite his death in July 2001, he remains to date one of the major references that have influenced the global apolitical Salafi groups since the early 1980s. Throughout his numerous publications and conferences, he has forged an original doctrine that is characterised both by its inspiration and links to the Saudi Wahhabi model and by its independence. Indeed, he has tried his best to embed Salafism in Yemeni society, using local references (mostly Muhammad al-Shawkani and Ibn al-Amir al-San‘ani). (p.432) Muqbil al-Wadi‘i was born in the late 1920s (or early 1930s) in northern Yemen, close to the city of Sa‘da, from a Zaydi tribal background. As a young man, like many of his fellow countrymen, he left for Saudi Arabia to work. Once there, he got acquainted with Sunni religious references like Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, largely unknown at that time in Yemen. He was seduced by the egalitarian nature of Sunnism and the capacity given to all Muslims to interpret the texts, a characteristic he opposed to the elitist social system of Zaydism, a branch of Shi‘a Islam, that gave specific power to the Hashemites. Back in Yemen he felt excluded from religious knowledge because of his low tribal status and resented his sect of origin. In 1963, he returned to Saudi Arabia and studied in various institutes, including at the Islamic University of Medina where he claims to have graduated with a master's degree in the science of hadith. His Page 2 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders approach to the Sunna was largely affected by the teachings of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. In the 1970s, his various activities in Saudi Arabia and particularly his links with the group of the Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba and with Juhayman al-‘Utaybi led Muqbil al-Wadi‘i to Jama‘a prison. At the time, he was accused of being the ghost-writer behind the Juhayman al-‘Utaybi's letters against the monarchy and was consequently expelled in early 1979. Once back in Yemen, he returned to his native region and opened an institute he called Dar al-Hadith in the village of Dammaj. He received grants from various Saudi organisations and personalities, including from ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz ibn Baz, but his continuing criticism of the Saudi regime led him to take a more independent option he only abandoned on the eve of his death when he reconciled with the Saudis and received treatment in Jeddah. While his teachings certainly lack consistency and are full of paradoxes, his main hallmark appears to be his rejection of party politics (hizbiyya) and his call for the respect of the political ruler (wali al-amr). Such a stance lead him to be very critical of all the other political and religious groups: the Muslim Brothers (he called Ikhwan al-muflisin, ie failed Brothers), Sufis, Zaydis, Jihadis, Nasserites and Socialists. His most famous publications, particularly, al-Makhraj min alFitna (Exit from Dissension) and al-Suyuf al-Batira (Sharp Swords) expressed his refusal of direct political intervention. As such, he, and his heirs (Yahya alHajuri, Muhammad al-Imam and Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi) were often used by the Yemeni government against its various opponents, whether Islamist or from the Left. (p.433)

Shaykh Muhammad Hashim Al-Hadiyya (1910–2007): a Spiritual Biography Noah Salomon Muhammad Hashim al-Hadiyya was born in 1910 in the town of Rufa‘a, Sudan on the east bank of the Blue Nile, about 130 kilometres south of Khartoum. Shaykh al-Hadiyya's family belonged to the Khatmiyya Sufiorder (tariqa), yet after moving to the capital as a young man al-Hadiyya began to feel dissatisfied by the Khatmiyya's spiritual programme and left it to join another Sufiorder: the ‘Azmiyya. The ‘Azmiyya was founded by an Egyptian ‘alim (scholar) who came to Sudan in 1895 to teach fiqh and organised his tariqa with the transmission of knowledge (ta‘lim) as a central modality of its practice. Shaykh al-Hadiyya cited the lesson circles that the ‘Azmiyya held as the key factor in convincing him to leave the Khatmiyya, switching Sufiaffiliations. It was this quest for an Islam based on rational knowledge of God and the Prophet, derived through evidence (adilla) found in Qur’an and Sunna, that would motivate al-Hadiyya throughout his life-long religious journey. In 1930, al-Hadiyya began to work at the Sudanese postal service where he met Ahmad Hasun, one of the key founders of the Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya organisation, the largest Salafi group in Sudan until today. Al-Hadiyya often Page 3 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders recalled that Hasun would criticise his Sufiaffiliation in a harsh manner. Such an approach had little effect on convincing al-Hadiyya of the righteousness of the Salafi way, and later in his life he often used the example of Hasun's lack of success in converting him to explain why in his own proselytisation he always made sure to speak to “errant” Muslims in a gentle manner (bi-l-rifq). In the early 1940s, al-Hadiyya began attending classes part-time at a Qur’anic school run by his cousin, ‘Abd al-Baqi Yusuf al-Ni‘ama, who had recently returned from Saudi Arabia. Al-Ni‘ama was very sceptical of al-Hadiyya's Sufism and pointed out that al-Hadiyya did not even understand the meaning of the litanies (awrad) that he read daily. Initially, al-Hadiyya was angered at this critique, but it did spark him to go to the shaykh of his tariqa and find out what the litanies meant. To his great surprise, he learned that the shaykh of the tariqa himself did not understand the meaning of the litanies. This apparent “ritual without meaning” caused a great crisis for al-Hadiyya and he abruptly left the tariqa, beginning a process of deep personal study of the Qur’an, and replacing his Sufilitanies with those offered by Ibn Taymiyya in his book al- Kalim al-Tayyib whose formulations have an explicit foundation in the Qur’an (p.434) and Sunna. In 1948, alHadiyya joined his old colleague Ahmad Hasun in his Ansar al-Sunna organization, which he felt upheld the religious convictions that he had arrived at through his struggle with Sufism and his immersion in the Islamic sources. Shaykh al-Hadiyya quickly rose up the ranks of the organisation and in 1952 he took over the presidency of the group. Shaykh al-Hadiyya served as president of Ansar al-Sunna for fifty-five years until his death on 19 September 2007. During his tenure, Ansar al-Sunna grew from a small urban group meeting in the homes of its founders to a major evangelist organisation with mosques across Sudan.

Shaykh Saleem Shurrab: the First Palestinian Salafi(1926–1986) Khan Younes—Gaza Strip Khaled Hroub Within the parlance of contemporary Salafism Shaykh Saleem Shurrab, who was born in 1926 in Khan Younes on the Southern part of the Gaza Strip, could be considered to be the founding figure of “modern Palestinian Salafism”. After high school he left to join al-Azhar University in Cairo where he finished two graduate degrees in religious studies in 1950 and 1952. During his university years he was politically active within the ranks of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Association of Palestinian Graduate Students. The Association was headed by the late Yasir Arafat and was known as the main organisation of Palestinian activism. At a young age, Shaykh Shurrab taught in Cairo schools until 1957, when he moved to Saudi Arabia to work at a teachers’ training institute in al-Ihsa’ city. He stayed in Saudi Arabia for nine years, where he established strong relations with a number of Saudi ‘ulama, chief among them Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, the leading figurehead of Wahhabi Salafism. By the time of his return to the Gaza Strip in 1966 Shaykh Shurrab had become

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders completely moulded in the Salafischool of thought, and felt a responsibility to advocate this thought among his own people. In the Gaza Strip he became involved in the education sector, with the Ministry of Education (then linked with Egypt) and other educational institutions including the al-Azhar University branch in Gaza. He was the founder of the Khan Younes Dar al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna, the first Salafi base in Palestine in modern times. He also helped in the establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza in 1978 by raising funds through his Saudi contacts. After a few years (p.435) of teaching at the faculty of shari‘a at the Islamic University he became discontent with the “orientation” of the university, which had evolved to become the stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Eventually he was sacked from the university in 1981 because of his insistence on different quantities and quality of the religious material that should be taught to students. Shaykh Shurrab's major influence on future Salafi tendencies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank stemmed from the free scholarships that he used to obtain from Saudi universities for Palestinian students in the 1970s and 1980s. According to his eldest son Humam, Shaykh Shurrab was the “representative” of Shaykh Ibn Baz in Palestine. Thus he was entrusted with sending “suitable” students to Saudi universities to pursue only religious studies. Many young Palestinian students benefited from these scholarships and returned back home indoctrinated by Salafi thinking. Leading Islamist names of the Gaza Strip today studied in Saudi Arabia via the help of Shayk Shurrab. These names include Shaykh Yasin al-Astal, the head of the SalafiSociety in Khan Younes; Shaykh Fu’ad Abu Sa‘id, a prominent member of that society; Shaykh Yunis al-Astal, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council from Hamas, and many other names occupying high posts in the Awqaf Ministry. Shaykh Shurrab published several booklets, mostly on classical Islamic themes, such as the fasting of Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca, advocating Salafi conduct for these rituals. The only political writing that he left is a hard-to-find book on Khomeini and the Iranian revolution which he published in the early 1980s. In the book he was very critical of Khomeini and his revolution largely because of their Shi‘i origin. Shaykh Shurrab was jailed twice by Israel, for three months in 1967 for resistance activities, then in 1984 for fifteen days for illegally maintaining a mosque in an area that was under military administration. Leaving eight sons (five of them studied shari‘a) and four daughters (from one wife), Shaykh Shurrab died in 1986 of sudden heart illness.

Muhammad Surur Zayn Al-‘Abidin Stéphane Lacroix Muhammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin was born in Syria in the Hawran region in 1938. He became an activist in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood while he was still at school in the 1950s. In the mid-1960s, when he had already become a (p.436) Page 5 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders second-rank figure in the Brotherhood, he started voicing increasing criticism of the movement on two grounds: on political matters, he subscribed to the minority “Qutbist” line, defended by Marwan Hadid, who had himself been a disciple of Sayyid Qutb in Cairo and had brought the latter's teachings to Syria. As a consequence, Hadid had been an early proponent of political violence against the Syrian regime, which would lead him to declare jihad against it in 1964. On religious matters, Muhammad Surur advocated a much more rigourist, Wahhabi-like, approach to creed (‘aqida) and criticised the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for tolerating Sufis within their ranks. As a consequence of these disagreements—and probably also because his political views had put him at risk of being arrested—Surur left for Saudi Arabia in 1965, at a time when the kingdom was giving shelter to thousands of Islamist activists. There, he worked as a teacher of mathematics and religion in the scientific institutes (ma‘ahid ‘ilmiyya) of Ha’il, from 1965 to 1967, and Burayda, from 1967 to 1974. Once in Saudi Arabia, his rift with the Muslim Brotherhood deepened, to the extent that he left the Brotherhood for good in 1968. He then decided to initiate a new form of Islamic activism, blending the political ideas of Sayyid Qutb with the religious views of the Wahhabis. As a consequence, in the highly dynamic Saudi Islamist scene of the late 1960s, a new jama‘a [group] emerged: al-salafiyyun [the Salafis], as they called themselves, or al- Sururiyyun [the Sururis] as their foes— both from the Muslim Brotherhood and from the al-Albani-inspired neo-Ahl alHadith —would refer to them. This jama‘a was to have a significant influence on Saudi Islamism: Salman al- ‘Awda—who had been a pupil of Surur in Burayda— and Safar al-Hawali, the two most prominent figures of the post-Gulf War Islamist dissent, were socialised within its ranks. As for Surur, he was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1974, and re-established himself in Kuwait, before leaving to go to Birmingham, in the United Kingdom, in 1984. There, he created the Centre for Islamic Studies, described by one of Surur's followers as “one of the main think-tanks of the jama‘a ” throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Surur left the United Kingdom in late 2004, and since then has been living in Jordan.

Shaykh Abubakr Muhammed Terje Østebø Shaykh Abubakr can still be seen strolling up and down the main street of Robe, the provincial capital of Bale, Ethiopia. Dressed as usual in his long grey (p.437) robe, his head covered by the red-and-white checkered scarf and with a solid grip on his walking-cane, he greets his friends and followers as they pass by. The shaykh, now in his seventies, is well-known all over Bale—and even in areas outside of the region. He is not considered a great scholar or a teacher, but is remembered and revered as the main instrument in planting Salafism in Bale. Referred to as Shaykh Mufti, he is celebrated as the one who turned the people

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders from making pilgrimage to the shrines and from worshipping at graves—to finding true belief in the one single God. Shaykh Abubakr was born in a small village called Shaya, just outside of Robe. He started his education at Dirre Shaykh Hussein, the main shrine of Bale that also served as an important centre for religious learning. He pursued his education in the towns of Harar and Dirre Da’wa, before departing for Saudi Arabia in 1962. His intention was to perform the Hajj, but for unknown reasons he remained teaching in Aden for two years. Arriving in Medina, many of his compatriots from Bale had entered the Islamic University. Shaykh Abubakr was, however, reluctant to pursue further studies, and left instead to Abha in the region of Asir. Here he remained under the guardianship of a certain Shaykh ‘Abdallah Wabile, allegedly devoting himself to learning the techniques of da’wa. He returned to Bale in 1969, and two years later he held his famous sermon in the Nur mosque of Robe. It was during this occasion that Shaykh Abubakr for the first time openly attacked the prevailing Sufipractices, labelling them deviations from Islam and calling on the people to change their ways. Conflict was inevitable and for years Shaykh Abubakr found himself in the middle of heated controversies. Those who know him well describe him as a stubborn, hottempered and wilful person. This character was crucial for his unyielding efforts to bring change. Withstanding the opposition from the local religious leadership and the suppressive measures of the Marxist regime (1974–1991), he faithfully propagated the tenets of Salafism; the ideology which today has become the dominating one in the region of Bale.

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi Joas Wagemakers Abu Muhammad ‘Isam ibn Muhammad ibn Tahir al-Barqawi, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, was born in Barqa (near Nablus) on the West (p.438) Bank in 1959. According to his website, he moved to Kuwait when he was a child and later moved to Iraq to study at the University of Mosul. After his years as a student, he frequently went back to Kuwait and also to Saudi Arabia, where he became familiar with the works of famous Wahhabi writers. He also went to Pakistan and Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets, though he is said not to have engaged in actual combat there. The time he spent in the Gulf states proved to be a great source of influence on him. In Saudi Arabia, he became acquainted with the writings and the followers of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the rebel leader who was responsible for occupying the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. Al-‘Utaybi's criticism of the Saudi state and particularly his denunciation of its rulers became part of al-Maqdisi's own beliefs. These were expressed first in Millat Ibrahim (The Religion of Abraham), released in 1984. In this book, al-Maqdisi developed the theory of al-wala’ wa-lbara’ (loyalty to God and Islam and disavowal of everything else) beyond the Page 7 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders strictly religious sphere by connecting it with takfir (declaring others to be unbelievers) of political rulers and his call for jihad against them. Al-Maqdisi applied the theme of disavowal of political rulers in other books in which he denounced Kuwait and, most famously, Saudi Arabia. His book on the latter country later became highly important to the Islamist opposition in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1990s, al-Maqdisi moved to Jordan where he set up an organisation called Jama‘at al-Tawhid, better known as Bay‘at al-Imam (Fealty to the Imam). This organisation, which he initially headed, strove to spread the Salafi ideas that al-Maqdisi espoused in his writings. Its membership consisted largely of Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan and included Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, the man who would later become infamous for his leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The organisation was deemed dangerous by the Jordanian authorities and many of its members, including al-Maqdisi, were arrested and imprisoned on and off during the 1990s. Maqdisi was released from prison in 2008.

Abu Mus‘Ab Al-Zarqawi (1966–2006) Guido Steinberg Ahmad al-Khalayla alias Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi was born in the Jordanian city of Zarqa and gained his first experiences as a Jihadist in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, where he contributed articles to a Jihadi news magazine. (p.439) After he returned, he joined a small militant group called Oath of Allegiance to the Imam (Bay‘at al-Imam), led by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. In November 1993, the members of the group were arrested because they had allegedly plotted attacks on Jewish targets in Israel or the occupied territories. During the following years in prison, Zarqawi took over the leadership of the group, while Maqdisi limited himself to the role of a spiritual mentor. When Zarqawi was released in 1999, he had already established himself as a leading personality among a small group of Jordanian militants. He left for Afghanistan and established a training camp for Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese in Herat. He did not join al-Qaeda, but instead built up an independent organisation called al-Tawhid (Monotheism). He rejected al-Qaeda's programme of global jihad and stuck to his original goals, namely to topple the Jordanian monarchy and to “liberate” Palestine. After coalition forces had evicted al-Qaeda and its affiliates from Afghanistan, Zarqawi fled via Pakistan and Iran to Northern Iraq. For several months, he found refuge with the Iraqi-Kurdish organisation Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) and rebuilt his organisation. From 2003, he redirected it to fight American forces and their allies in Iraq. He integrated large numbers of Iraqis into his organisation, which from 2003 he called Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (The Monotheism and Holy War Group). It was staffed by a growing number of Iraqis but relied heavily on volunteers from neighbouring Arab countries, in their majority Syrians and Saudis. Zarqawi's organisation was responsible for Page 8 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders most of the major suicide bomb attacks in Iraq from 2003. As the head of a new organisation which comprised several nationalities, Zarqawi adjusted his goals to the group's new social basis: since 2004, Zarqawi called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. Next, he planned to fight a “holy war” in neighbouring Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. And his ultimate goal was to “liberate” Jerusalem. The redefined goals thus reflected the changed national composition of the organisation. In order to destabilise Iraq, Zarqawi developed a strategy, which aimed at provoking the Shi‘is to enter a civil war against the Sunnis. Therefore, his organisation attacked Shi‘a religious leaders, politicians, officials and civilians. After Shi‘a and Kurdish parties won the elections in January and December 2005, some Shi‘a militia did indeed fight back and a civil war ensued. However, his organisation lost support because of its indiscriminate violence and even endangered its relations to al-Qaeda. In October 2004, Zarqawi swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and changed the name of his organisation to Qa‘idat al-Jihad in Mesopotamia (Qa‘idat al-Jihad fiBilad al-Rafidayn). However, the al-Qaeda leadership publicly rejected his anti-Shi‘a strategy and (p.440) demanded a more circumspect use of violence against Muslims. Zarqawi refused, and alQaeda in Iraq stuck to his strategy even after he was killed in an American airstrike in July 2006.

Ja‘Far ‘Umar Thalib Noorhaidi Born in 1961 into a Hadrami family in Malang, East Java, Indonesia, Ja‘far ‘Umar Thalib attended a primary school in his native town before he continued to a secondary Islamic teachers training school. While studying, Thalib was active in a student organisation linked to al-Irsyad, a reformist-modernist Muslim organisation popular among Hadramis. He refined his ideas of Islamic reform when he studied in an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) that belongs to Persis, another reformist organisation. Recognising the advantages of study at the Saudi Arabian-sponsored Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic in Jakarta, he registered himself at the institute and was accepted. In 1986, Thalib received a scholarship to study at the Mawdudi Islamic Institute in Lahore, Pakistan. After less than a year at the Mawdudi Institute, Thalib volunteered to join the mujahidin in the Afghan War. He claims to have initially joined Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami, before being sent to assist the Jami‘at-i Islami led by Sayyaf. For ideological reasons, however, Thalib eventually preferred to support the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-i Hadith, a strict Salafi faction and Saudi Arabian “principality” led by Jamil al-Rahman. He claims to have shared a tent with Sayyaf and to have had contact with bin Laden. During the war he also witnessed how Wahhabi doctrines were implemented by Afghan mujahidin and Page 9 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders Jihadi volunteers associated with the Wahhabi-supported factions. All these influences undoubtedly helped to explain the direction he took upon his return to Indonesia in 1989. During the 1990s he became one of the most influential Salafi leaders in Indonesia. He set up the Ihya al-Sunna Salafi network interlocking a dozen Salafi teaching centres scattered throughout various regions in the country. This achievement was partly determined by his success in establishing a special linkage with Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi‘i, a Salafi ideologue par excellence in Yemen. Despite its remarkable influence, the network barely registered among (p.441) Middle Eastern funding sources; as a result, it remained marginal and poor. Under these unfavourable conditions, the personal ties established between Thalib and his followers in the network continued to expand. In response to the bloody conflict between Muslims and Christians that erupted in 1999 in Indonesia's eastern islands, the Moluccas, he called for jihad and sent thousands of Salafi fighters to the islands under the auspices of the Laskar Jihad. Following the 9/11 events, allegations linking Thalib with bin Laden emerged. Caught in this unpleasant situation, Thalib increasingly lost support and, with it, the hope of sustaining his jihad action in the Moluccas. Just five days after the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, Thalib announced that the Laskar Jihad had disbanded. Following this disbanding, he was abandoned by almost all his lieutenants and fighters in the Laskar Jihad. Perhaps seeking new allies, or just company, Thalib had attended Dhikr Akbar, a Sufi-like practice of publicly chanting “the names of God,” in the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta on 17 August 2003. For many Salafis, the presence of Thalib in such a programme clearly indicated that he had deviated from the Salafimanhaj.

Shaykh Yusuf Al-‘Uyairi: a Model of Jihadi-SalafiScholar, Webmaster and Commander Reuven Paz The Saudi shaykh Yusuf al-‘Uyairi is so far, even after his assassination in May 2003, the best model of the new generation of Jihadi-Salafischolars, who also became masters of Jihadi indoctrination through the internet. His analytical writings are posted on every Jihadi site, and are used as legitimising material for the present class of Jihadi-Salafisupporters of al-Qaeda and global jihad. He also serves a model for a large class of self-radicalised Salafischolars who became in recent years “internet scholars,” with no formal education in Islamic studies, but provide important guidance in the field of Jihadi-Salafism. Al-‘Uyairi was born in 1967 in Saudi Arabia. In 1985, after he finished his studies at the age of 18, he went to Afghanistan to join the mujahidin in their fight against the Soviets. He soon became a prominent guide in the al-Faruq training camp, where he showed high skills in both military and religious affairs. His position brought him close to Osama bin Laden, and in about 1989 he was Page 10 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders appointed the personal bodyguard of the latter. When bin Laden (p.442) left Afghanistan for the Sudan, al-‘Uyairi left with him and remained his bodyguard, and part of the hard-core group of al-Qaeda's commanders and operatives. In 1993, he went to Sudan with bin Laden, and took part in the fight against US forces in Somalia. In 1994 he returned to Saudi Arabia and settled in the town of Dammam, where he organised logistic and financial support for the mujahidin in Bosnia. At the same time he studied with Salafi‘ulama and oppositionist Sahwa scholars, such as Salman al-‘Awda. In 1996, following the attack on the Khobar towers, al-‘Uyairi was arrested and interrogated, on suspicion of his involvement in the attack. He spent about a year in jail, until the authorities came to the conclusion that the attack has been carried out by Shi‘is. However, he was very active in jail and influenced a large group of prisoners with his Jihadi-Salafi doctrines. When he was released he was occupied with the Chechen uprising. He soon became the principal ideologue and Islamist guide of the Jihadi Arab volunteers to Chechnya. He wrote several articles and booklets on the issue, which serve until now important basis for the Jihadi doctrines there and elsewhere. Among them was the first Jihadi fatwa legitimising suicide operations by females. Later on he was also involved in supporting the struggle of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Al-‘Uyairi was one of the first Jihadi scholars to understand the enormous potential of the internet in the psychological war of the mind. Following the September 11 attack he opened the first official web site of al-Qaeda—al- Nida— from Saudi Arabia and was its first webmaster and chief indoctrinator. Al-Nida in fact, paved the way for the entire spectrum of Jihadi extensive use of the internet. In 2002–2003, al-‘Uyairi published dozens of unsigned long papers of indoctrination there, including significant material that contributed a lot to the shaping of Jihadi-Salafism. He was also the editor of the two most important Jihadi-Salafi magazines in Saudi Arabia—Sawt al-Jihad and al- Battar —which through the internet received a global influence and impact. In those years he kept his close contact with bin Laden, and became the first commander of Al-Qaeda in Arabia, calling for and planning primarily suicide attacks in Saudi Arabia. On 31 May 2003, al-‘Uyairi was killed by the Saudi police in a clash with a group of mujahidin in Riyadh. His name became known to the public only after his death, when he became a role model for new Jihadi scholars. (p.443)

‘Abdallah ‘Azzam Thomas Hegghammer The Palestinian-born ‘Abdallah Yusuf ‘Azzam (1941–1989) is one of the most important figures in the history of Islamism, though he is not a Salafi. He is considered the godfather of the Arab Afghans because of his role in mobilising Page 11 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders Arab fighters to the 1980s war in Afghanistan. He also articulated the influential doctrine of “classical Jihadism” which calls upon Muslims to fight in struggles of national liberation involving other Muslims anywhere in the world. Born near Jenin to a pious family, ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam was introduced to Muslim Brotherhood writings as a teenager by a local teacher. ‘Azzam subsequently studied Islamic Law, receiving a BA from Damascus university in 1966, an MA from al-Azhar in Cairo in 1969 (both degrees were completed by distance learning), and a PhD from al-Azhar in 1973. After Israel's annexation of the West Bank in June 1967, the ‘Azzam family moved to Jordan. Around 1969 he briefly participated in the fedayin movement and took part in cross-border raids into Israel, before taking up a lectureship at Jordan University in 1970. A year later he moved to Cairo where he spent two years studying for a doctorate at al-Azhar while rubbing shoulders with prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers. ‘Azzam returned to Amman in 1973 and started teaching at the University while playing an active and increasingly prominent role in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, becoming known as the “Sayyid Qutb of Jordan”. ‘Azzam's proselytising annoyed the authorities, who decided to remove him from his University post in 1980, at which point ‘Azzam decided to emigrate to Saudi Arabia, where he obtained a position at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jeddah through his Muslim Brotherhood connections. ‘Azzam became involved in the Afghan cause in late 1981 after an accidental meeting in Mecca with an old friend from Cairo who had just returned from a reconnaissance mission to Afghanistan on behalf of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Shortly thereafter, ‘Azzam moved with his family to Pakistan. From 1981 to 1984, ‘Azzam was based in Islamabad where he taught at the International Islamic University while writing and lecturing worldwide about the need for Muslims to support the Afghan jihad. In 1984 he moved to Peshawar and founded the Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidma) with (p.444) money from Osama bin Laden. The Services Bureau was the centre of the activities of the Afghan-Arabs. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam was an extremely prolific writer and speaker. His three most important works include Signs of the Merciful in the Afghan Jihad (1983), In Defence of Muslim Lands (1984) and Join the Caravan (1987). An extreme panIslamist, Azzam argued that all Muslims had an individual obligation to fight in the defence of any Muslim territory occupied by non-Muslims. His ideas inspired the involvement of foreign fighters in 1990s Bosnia and Chechnya as well as in post-2003 Iraq.

Abdullaah Abu Bakr Al-Maghrebie Martijn de Koning Page 12 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders Abdullaah Abu Bakr al-Maghrebie was born in 1981 in a small provincial town in the west of the Netherlands. He was the second youngest son of a family of Moroccan migrants. His father had come to the Netherlands in 1963 where he had worked in a large slaughterhouse. In 1982 he lost his job and was to remain unemployed from then on. The family lived in one of the migrant areas of the town and Abdullaah soon became involved in petty crime. He was eventually accused of more severe crimes (including violence) and this was the catalyst for his increased involvement with Islam leading up to the summer of 2001 and a holiday in Morocco. On his return many people noticed a change in him, and in my conversations with him he characterised this time as one in which he explored new directions in his quest for the true Islam. This direction came in the form of a new imam at the mosque he and his family visited. He was a young imam from Oujda in Morocco who had been brought to the Netherlands by the board of the mosque in order “to do something for young people”. The imam soon became very popular and indeed paid a lot of attention to young people, in particular boys. He was affiliated with the Madkhali Salafis, although the board of the mosque did not initially realise this. Abdullaah found in him someone who could show him direction and at the same time offer him a certain status. This status grew because of his changed behaviour. From being a rude and violent boy on the streets, he became a soft-hearted and gentle young man. He changed his appearance and name, growing a beard (p.445) and donning the djellaba. Abdullaah played an important role in mobilising street youth and bringing them into the mosque where the imam held his classes. Usually these classes were very basic, teaching them how to pray for instance, but he also stressed the importance of youth in Islam. Abdullaah's former career as a troublemaker was not detrimental to his new authoritative status in fact for other young people it meant that he had street credibility and knew the difficulties and problems of the Moroccan-Dutch youth. Around this time the imam became a controversial figure due to his criticism of particular Moroccan customs in the mosque and for advising against music and women women riding bicycles. According to many of the first-generation Moroccan-Dutch migrants the imam was not fit for Dutch society; a comment that in fact increased his status and also that of Abdullaah since it strengthened the impression that they advocated the “pure” Islam instead of one that was impure because of the influence of Moroccan traditions or adjustment to Dutch norms and values. This eventually led to a great conflict within the Moroccan-Dutch community of the town and ended with the imam leaving the mosque. Abdullaah remained in touch with him when he left for Morocco. He became involved with a few other young men in the Selefie movement (Madkhali Salafis) and they organised lectures with preachers from the Dutch Selefie movement and lessons in which in they had a telephone connection with a Salafischolar in Saudi Arabia. One of these lectures took place while the complete board of the mosque was absent during the summer of 2004. This was a lecture on the rulings about terrorism and displayed the stance of the Madkhali Salafis against terrorism and the acts of Osama bin Laden. At that time Page 13 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders Abdullaah had already become a “student of knowledge” at a university in the Middle East and there he remains to this day.

Abdur-Raheem Green, the Life of a British Convert to Salafism Sadek Hamid Abdur-Raheem Green, (previously Anthony Green) is a well known English Salafi Muslim convert. He was born in 1964, in Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania. His father was a colonial administrator at the time but returned with his family to the UK whilst Green was still a small child. He was sent to a monastic boarding (p.446) school in Gilling Castle at the age of ten, and later studied at Ampleforth College. He enrolled at London University to study history, but chose not complete his study. His interest in religion began at an early age, when only eight years old he began to have doubts about Christianity. It was while he was working in the city of London that he became dissatisfied with Western materialistic culture and began his quest for meaning by studying different religions and forms of spirituality and became a Buddhist for a period of three years. However it was his family holiday to Egypt that sparked his interest in Islam and his study of the Qur’an. This eventually led him to conversion and he has been a practicising Muslim since 1987. Prior to his involvement in the Jamiyyah Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah (The Society for the Revival of the Prophetic Way, JIMAS) movement, he briefly worked with the Islamic Parliament of Britain. He became attracted to the Salafi perspective because it matched his own approach to textual learning. After joining JIMAS he soon became a prominent member and a loyal colleague of its leader, Abu Muntasir. He became noted as a regular preacher at Hyde Park Speaker's Corner, and seemed to enjoy debating with evangelical Christians. This culminated in his well known public debates about the origins of Islam with Christian polemicist Jay Smith in the mid 1990s. He was popular among university student Islamic societies, where he often gave a lecture entitled “Drugs, Sex & Rock n Roll.” He was married to two wives (he now has one) and is father to six children. He currently works as the visits and da‘wa coordinator in Regents Park Mosque, London, and also runs a consultancy with a fellow convert, Yusuf Chambers. He maintains good relations with his former colleagues in JIMAS and continues his religious activism by giving public talks and writing on his personal internet blog page: www.islamsgreen.org.uk.He also appears on British television and radio.

C., the Life of a French Salafi Mohamed-Ali Adraoui C. is now 28 years old and has been a Salafisince he was twenty. With no profession and no academic degree, he claims to be a purist Muslim whose Page 14 of 15

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Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders religiosity is based on “true Islam”. Observing him today, always quoting verses (p.447) from the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet (hadith), is quite odd when one remembers his adolescence. In his youth, he used to be a regular visitor of night clubs, bars and other establishments currently described by him as “places of perdition”. Now he wears traditional Salafi clothes, is always perfumed and displays a thick beard, which people in the street find disturbing. He loves to walk proudly in the street, his chest puffed up, with an arrogant look that betrays his feeling of superiority. He was initiated into Islam by the internet, where he derived his first lessons on Muslim morality. He was further educated in religious knowledge during conferences organised by organisations close to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, one day, he met a young imam who explained to him that he was following the wrong path. He admonished him to convert to the real understanding of Islam in order to save his soul. The key factor of his conversion was the imam 's ability to provide him with written evidence showing that Salafism is authentic and the only current in Islam that demonstrates a strict respect for the original moral and juridical norms of Islam. He had met the imam after reading an announcement on a website of a mosque where he could acquire a better understanding of Islam. Crucial in this process of becoming a Salafi was the advice one of his brothers had given him to attend a dars (religious lesson) in a mosque in the city of Roubaix, in Northern France. During this trip he definitively adopted a precise definition of the correct Muslim values that would guide him for the rest of his life. This guidance is provided by three elements: the life of the pious ancestors as the highest model of morality, the texts of the Saudi Salafischolars as guidelines for his philosophy, and the solidarity of the Salafi“saved group” (al-firqa al-najiya) as “new family”. C. currently is the happiest Muslim as he knows himself to be orthodox, an adherent of a non equivoque and unchanged, pure Islam. C. has always enjoyed being positively different from the rest of the world. Before becoming a Salafi, for instance, he was attracted by any new hype. Salafism seems to embody the status he had always wanted to reach.

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