Futile Diplomacy, Volume 1: Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts, 1913-1931 [1 ed.] 1138907510, 9781138907515

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FUTILE DIPLOMACY

By the same author Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-25

Futile Diplomacy Vol. I : Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts 1913-1931 Futile Diplomacy Vol. I I : Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the E n d of the Mandate

Futile

Diplomacy VOLUME ONE

E A R L Y ARAB-ZIONIST NEGOTIATION ATTEMPTS 1913-1931 Neil Caplan Vanier College, Montréal

Ë F R A N K CASS

First published 1983 in Great Britain by

FRANK CASS A N D COMPANY LIMITED G a i n s b o r o u g h House, 1 1 G a i n s b o r o u g h Road,

London, E11 1RS, England and in the United States of America by F R A N K CASS A N D C O M P A N Y L I M I T E D c / o B i b l i o Distribution Centre 81 Adams Drive, P.O. Box 327, Totowa, N.J. 07511

Copyright

©

1983 Neil C a p l a n

Caplan, Neil Futile diplomacy. V o l .1 : Early Arab-Zionist negotiation attempts

1913-1931. I . Jewish-Arab relations I. Title

956

DS119.7

I S B N 0-7146-3214-7

A l l rights reserved. N o part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in

any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission ofFrank Cass and Company Limited.

Photoset i n Baskerville b y S a i l d e a n Limited.

Printed and bound i n Great Britain b y Robert Hartnoll L t d . Bodmin, Cornwall

For Mara, Benjie and Hanna

Those who grab for everything, who forget that politics is the art of the possible, in the end may lose all.

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (1979)

Contents

List of Illustrations

Xi

L i s t of Documents

X111

List of Abbreviations

XVI

Preface Introduction

Chapter 1 Furst Attempts Nature and Development of Arab-Zionist Relations i n Palestine, 1882-1914 - Growing Awareness of a Conflict - T h e Turkish Factor - First Negotiation Attempts, 1913 - Renewed Contacts, 1914 - Failure of the 1914 Conference

10

Chapter 2 Post-War Diplomacy, 1918-1920 Aftermath of W o r l d W a rI - Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente - First Local Contacts: Cairo and Palestine The British Factor - Weizmann-Faisal Negotiations The Undoing of the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement

28

Chapter 3 High-Level Meetings in the Early Twenties Another Palestinian-Zionist Encounter - Early Relations with A m i r Abdallah Syrian Nationalists - Collapse of the Cairo Talks

47

:

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

x

62 Chapter 4 Grass-Roots Contacts During the Twenties Local Zionist Proposals for an Agreement Arab Initiatives for an Agreement - Arab and Jewish Motives :

for Co-operation

80 Chapter 5 Relations in the Wake of Crisis, 1929-1931 Negotiating Opportunities and the Wailing Wall Dispute Uncertainties of British Policy - ThirdParty Intervention: H . St.-John Philby Zionist Rejection :

:

o f t h e Philby M e d i a t i o n

:

Split i n Z i o n i s t R a n k s -

Daniel Oliver: Quaker Mediator - Preventive Diplomacy: The Joint Bureau Kalvaryski’s Personal Diplomacy *

:

Rutenberg Proposals - Weizmann’s Personal Diplomacy - Development Scheme Negotiations - Conclusion Conclusion Lessons o f Experience Palestinian and Non-Palestinian Arabs Third-Party Considerations Terms of Agreement - L o w Priority o f an ArabZionist Accord

109

:

:

DOCUMENTS

131

Notes

233

Bibliography

264

Index

271

Lust ofIllustrations Between pages 110 and 111 C h a i m Weizmann and A m i r Faisal (near Aqaba, June 1918) M . David Eder Ittamar Ben-Avi

ON

Col. Frederick H . Kisch

SA

H . M . Kalvaryski

Hajj A m i n al-Husaini, Musa K a z i m al-Husaini, Salim A l i Salam, Raghib an-Nashashibi (Jerusalem, January 1930) .

Jamal al-Husaini

Omar Salih al-Barghuthi Awni A b d al-Hadi 10

J u d a h L . Magnes

11

Daniel Oliver

12

H.St,J. Philby

13

Weizmann-Faisal Agreement, 3 January 1919

14

Reservation,; i n Arabic,, byDYA m i r Faisal accom-

panying signature 15

to

agreement w i t h Weizmann

Handwritten T r a n s l a t i o n o f Faisal’s A r a b i c Reser-

vation, b y T . E . Lawrence 16

Letter, i n T . E . Lawrence’s hand, from A m i r Faisal to Felix Frankfurter, 1 March 1919

x1

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

x11

17

French and Arabic segments o f Agreement between Y . H a n k i n and N . Sfeir et al., 26 March

1920 18

No.

|

Draft of Points presented t o Philby by Arabs a t Damascus, 21 October 1929

is reproduced by c o u r t e s y of the Weizmann Archives; Nos. 2, 4, 5, 10,

13, 14, 15, 16, 17, the Central Zionist Archives; No. 3, I m S h a h aArtzma’utenu, 1961; Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9 , the Institute for Palestine Studies; No. 11, the Library

of the Religious Society of Friends, London; No. 18, the Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College

List ofDocuments No.

page

Extract of Report by S. Hochberg t o V. Jacobson,

17 M a y 1913 (Mission t o Cairo and Beirut)

131

Jacobson Proposals, as transmitted to Cairo b y

Asad Daghir [May-June?] 1914

134

Notes of Conference held a t Shepheard’s Hotel, Cairo, between the Zionist Commission and Sa‘id Shugair Pasha, D r F a r i s N i m r a n d S u l a i m a n Bey

Nasif, 27 March 1918

135

Memorandum drafted by the “Palestine Committee’, Cairo, as a basis for discussion with the Zionist Commission, early April 1918

137

General G.F. Clayton’s telegraphic report o f Weizmann’s visit t o Faisal, 4 June 1918

138

D r Weizmann’s report o f his meeting w i t h A m i r Faisal, as given to t h e 1 7 t h m e e t i n g o f t h e Zionist Commission, 16 J u n e 1918

141

D r Weizmann’s report o f his interview with Amir Faisal, Carlton Hotel, London, 11 December 1918; Col. Lawrence acting as interpreter

143

Text of Agreement between A m i r Faisal and D r Chaim Weizmann, 3 January 1919

145

Notes of meeting between unnamed Zionist representative [A. Hyamson?] and Awni A b d al-Hadi and Ahmad Qadri, H o t e l Meurice, Paris, 25 January 1919

148

X111

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

X1V

10 11

Letter from Faisal t o Felix Frankfurter, Paris, 1 March 1919

Letter from Felix Frankfurter t o Faisal, Paris, 5 March 1919

12. H . M . Kalvaryski, Programme for a Judeo-Arab Entente, [May-June?] 1919 13

149 151 152

Extracts from ‘ “ T h e E m i r Faisal o n Palestine and

the Jews”, Interview i n TheJewish Chronicle, 3 14

15

16

17

18

October 1919

153

Extracts from M . Ussishkin, Visit t o the Head of the Town Council ofJerusalem [Musa Kazim al-Husaini], 8 October 1919

157

Sh. Levin e t al., Memorandum of Interview with Amir Faisal and Awni A b d al-Hadi, Carlton Hotel, London, 19 October 1919

159

Treaty between Zionist representative and “The Nationalist Group i n Syria and Lebanon”,

26 March 1920

162

Proposed Arab-Jewish Entente: Note of Conference a t 34, Park Street, London [home ofJames de Rothschild], 7 November 1921

163

Meeting between the Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation a t the Colonial Office, 29 November 1921

168

19. Letter from D r Weizmann t o the Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 1 December 1921

189

First Meeting between Zionist delegation and representatives of the “Executive Committee of the Congress o f Parties o f the Confederation of Arab Countries’, Cairo, 18 March 1922

191

21

Second Meeting, Cairo, 19 March 1922

194

22

Third Meeting, Cairo, 2 April 1922

196

23

Fourth Meeting, Cairo, 4 April 1922

199

20

L I S T O F DOCUMENTS

24

25

A . Saphir, General Lines o f Preliminary Propositions of an Understanding between Arabs and Jews, 7-8 September 1922

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

200

Letter from H . M . Kalvaryski t o D r Weizmann, 21 September

26

XV

1922

203

E x t r a c t o f l e t t e r from Palestine Z i o n i s t Executive,

Jerusalem [Col. Kisch] t o the Secretary, Zionist Executive, London [ L . Stein], 12 December 1922

204

F . H . Kisch, Note of Conversation with Musa K a z i m al-Husaini, 23 October 1923

205

D r Weizmann’s Report of t w o Meetings with K i n g Faisal, 6 October 1925

208

Letter from H . St. John Philby t o Lord Passfield (Colonial Secretary), Damascus, 21 October 1929

209

Draft of Points Presented t o Philby by Arabs a t Damascus, 21 October 1929

212

Basis of an Arab-Jewish Understanding i n Palestine (Magnes Proposals), October 1929

213

Letter from H . St. John Philby t o Lord Passfield, Cairo, 1 November 1929, enclosing Final Draft

216

K i n g Faisal’s Suggestions for Solving the Palestine Problem, Baghdad, 8 December 1929

221

H.M. Kalvaryski, Note of Secret Accord Proposed b y O m a r Salih al-Barghuthi, 25 February 1930

224

Proposals submitted t o the Colonial Office by Pinhas Rutenberg, M a y 1930

225

H . M . Kalvaryski, Platform for Judaeo-Arab Accord, 4 August 1930

228

List of Abbreviations Ac. - Arabic A E. - Arab Executive

CAH]JP - Central Archives for the History o f the Jewish People* C O - Colonial Office C.S. - Chief Secretary, Palestine Government Ctee. - Committee CZA - Central Zionist Archives*

DBFP — Documents on British Foreign Policy*

doc. - document D P N M — Documents of the Palestine NationalMovement* D.Z. —Dissenter in Zion* Eng. - English

FO - Foreign Office H.C. - H i g h Commissioner for Palestine Heb. — Hebrew H H — History of the Hagana (Sefer Toldot ha-Hagana)* J.A.(E.) - Jewish Agency (Executive)

J B . — Joint Bureau of Jewish Public Bodies in Palestine J.N.F. - Jewish National Fund L C W — Letters ofChaim Weizmann* M . C . A . - Muslim-Christian Association

M E C - M i d d l e East Centre, St. Antony’s College* M N.A. - Muslim National Association

OETA(S)

-

Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South)

PCW — Papers ofChaim Weizmann* P R O - P u b l i c Record Office* P . Z E . - Palestine Zionist Executive

R H - Rhodes House Library, Oxford* S M C . - Supreme M u s l i m Council XVI

L I S T O F ABBREVIATIONS

t g m . — telegram

transl. — translation V.L.(E.) - Vaad L e u m i (Executive) V . Z . - Vaad Z ’ m a n i WA - Weizmann Archives* ZAC

-

.

Z i o n i s t A c t i o n s Committee

Z C . - Zionist Commission t o Palestine Z . E . - Zionist Executive Z O . - Zionist Organisation

* —For details, see Bibliography.

XVII

Preface

The present study is an offshoot of an admittedly “one-sided” dissertation which dealt with the attitude o f Palestinian Jews t o t h e i r “Arab q u e s t i o n ” . M a k i n g the jump to a t o p i c d e a l i n g

with both sides has n o t been an easy one, especially i n view o f the highly-charged emotions which continue t o plague the Palestine-Israel conflict. Despite m y best efforts a t treating the parties i n dispute even-handedly, the fact remains t h a t I a m a Canadian J e w

who has had previous research experience primarily w i t h Zionist sources. B u t , whatever their personal background, historians i n pursuit o f fairness and equilibrium i n this field are b o u n d t o encounter obstacles w h i c h are i n h e r e n t i n t h e

subject-matter itself. First of all, there are many people involved i n the conflict who still hold passionately t o the exclusive rightness of their side. For these people, “fairness” is a false objective i n such studies, t h e o n l y “ v a l i d ” history

being that version which further justifies their partisan claims. I n this sense, I hope that those committed singlem i n d e d l y to the A r a b o r Z i o n i s t cause w i l l find l i t t l e

satisfaction from the present volume. A second difficulty seems t o be inherent i n the different ways i n which Arab and Zionist leaders have approached history. W h i l e both have tended t o record t h e i r history i n a

personalized way, filtering i t through justificatory hindsight, ]

2

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

Zionists seem t o have h a d a more Western, “businesslike”

approach t o the keeping of contemporary written records: i.e., correspondence, diaries, minutes o f meetings, notes o f conversations, etc. H e n c e , we find a built-in i m b a l a n c e i n t h e sheer

quantity o f documentary source-material for researchers to sift through on subjects related t o the Palestine-Israel problem.

This general imbalance of written evidence is accentuated i n t h e case o f t h e specific topic of this book: c o n t a c t s a n d a t t e m p t s t o reach a n agreement. T h e m a t t e r itself seems t o have b e e n considered a n i m p o r t a n t o n e o n l y t o a l i m i t e d

number of people between 1913 and 1931; these individuals were almost exclusively on the Zionist side. Zionists, furthermore, would have had more of a vested interest t o keep records o n this subject, for i t was necessary, whether for internal morale o r for external propaganda, to find as m u c h

evidence as possible that there were Arabs who might, one day, come around to accepting Zionism o n g i v e n terms.

Since, for Arabs, contacts with the other side often constituted a breach o f nationalist “ d i s c i p l i n e ” o r consensus, there w o u l d

have been a decided disinclination t o keep written records o f any meetings with Zionists. A fourth related imbalance for the researcher s t e m s from contemporary differences i n the organization a n d accessibility

o f historical documents. Most individuals and groups on the Z i o n i s t side have come t o accept the p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e i r

political and private papers should ultimately become public property, and they have deposited them i n public or semip u b l i c archives w h i c h are obliged t o provide access t o all “serious” researchers. A r a b private papers seem t o b e , o n t h e whole, more difficult for researchers to consult, w i t h access dependent o n t h e consent o f i n d i v i d u a l s a n d families w h o are

cautious and selective i n granting such access. The Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine Liberation Organisation Research Centre i n Beirut are seeking t o become, like their Zionist counterparts i n Israel, central repositories for those private and group collections which exist. As the Institute for Palestine Studies has informed me that i t had “nothing i n the way of private papers, diaries or unpublished memoirs which would be o f use” t o me for my research, I

PREFACE

have h a d t o r e l y , for purposes o f

3

this s t u d y , o n o n l y p u b l i s h e d

works i n Arabic. Notwithstanding

the

above

obstacles t o “balanced”

research, I have done m y best t o provide as complete a n d as dispassionate a n account as possible. I have tried to leave t o

others the tasks of advocating claims and counterclaims, and o f ascribing moral qualities of good and evil t o the historical actors and their behaviour. For I do n o t believe that this conflict is one between heroes o n one side a n d villains o n t h e other. N o r d o I wish to portray the history o f negotiation

attempts as a long, tragic series of missed opportunities, peace agreements t h a t m i g h t o r o u g h t to have been. *

This book, which will be followed by one dealing with the period 1931 to 1948, 1s d i v i d e d i n t o t w o parts. I n t h e first part,

I have provided an analysis of selected episodes and have placed each i n its historical c o n t e x t . The bargaining tactics, motives and goals of the protagonists have been emphasised. I have left t o others the sort of close textual analysis which might usefully be done of the documents which are reproduced, i n chronological order, i n the second part of this volume. M a n y of these documents appear here for the first time, and they should provide raw material for other researchers t o develop t h e i r o w n hypotheses about the early

development o f the Arab-Zionist conflict and about the negotiating process as i t applied t o that conflict. *

I n the course o f preparing this study, I have been fortunate t o have had material and moral support from several quarters. I was enabled t o take t i m e off from m y teaching duties a n d to

undertake research trips i n 1975, 1977 and 1981 ‘thanks

to grants from the V a n i e r College Professional Developm e n t Fund, the Government of Québec, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I a m

also grateful to have benefitted as a Lester Martin F e l l o w a t

the Harry S. Truman Institute of the Hebrew University o f Jerusalem (1977) a n d as a Visiting Scholar a t the Oxford

Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (1981).

4

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

N o less important has been the practical and professional assistance received from individuals. I a m grateful to Marie Syrkin and Ben Halpern, who gave the original spark to this project. The help received from a number o f individuals was especially appreciated when i t was accompanied b y their friendship and invaluable encouragement, and i n this regard I a m happy to acknowledge m y debts to: E l i e Kedourie,

Walter Laqueur, Yehoshua Porath, Emmanuel Sivan, Moshe Mossek, Bernard Wasserstein, Kenneth Stein, Philip Mattar, A n n Lesch, Nazmy Mobarak, Michael Heymann, Arieh Goren, Nehama Chalom, Gillian Grant, Ian Black, Yosepha Tislitsky, Reuven Koffler, Michael Plotkin, Shawkat Shibly, Elyakim Rubinstein, E l i Shaaltiel, Jane Lawless, Andrew Lawless, H u g h Armstrong and H a l Shuster. Having spent much of m y time in Israeli and British archives, I w a n t t o express m y warmest thanks t o their Directors and staffs for treating m y requests with efficiency a n d m e w i t h such kindness. T h e archives are: t h e C e n t r a l

Archives for the History of the Jewish People (CAHJP), Hebrew University, Jerusalem; the Central Zionist Archives

(CZA), Jerusalem; the Israel State Archives (ISA), Jerusalem; the Private Papers Collection, M i d d l e East Centre (MEC), St Antony’s College, Oxford; the Public Record Office (PRO), London; the Rhodes House Library ( R H ) , Oxford; and the Weizmann Archives (WA), Rehovot, Israel. I thank D r Michael Heymann of the CZA, Nehama

Chalom of the WA, Sabri Jiryis of the P L O Research Centre, Beirut, M a i El-Kadi of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, and Gillian Grant o f the M E C for kindly making available photographic material for the illustrations. Most of all I thank Mara for her limitless support and patience.

N.C. Montréal M a r c h 1983

Introduction

Most students of the history of Arab-Jewish relations have come to take for granted the stubborn resistance o f the

continuing dispute t o any form of lasting and “reasonable” solution. The explanations and interpretations of the conflict offered by these men and women will vary with their initial assumptions. One common assumption is that this conflict, although difficult and seemingly intractable, is like all other conflicts and ought t o be resolvable i n the end. From this starting-point many writers have been tempted t o explore the history o f the conflict by concentrating on the missed opportunities for peace. Some have singled o u t the e x t r a n e o u s third-party interference which has apparently prevented the main protagonists from settling their differences. Others have chosen to a d m o n i s h one o r more o f t h e parties i n v o l v e d ,

either for its lack of foresight and wisdom, or else for its evil or misguided intentions.’ Another frequently-advanced explanation o f the ArabZionist conflict is presently being tested i n the international political arena: namely, that the conflict has persisted because o f an absence of communication and contact among the major interested parties. This, i n turn, is attributed t o the Arab refusal t o recognize the r i g h t o f Israel t o exist as a sovereign state o n a territory considered to be stolen Arab

land.

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

6

Since 1973, w e have been witness to t h e beginnings o f a

whittling down of the psychological barriers of non-contact, a process highlighted i n November 1977 b y the historic visit o f Egypt's late President Anwar el-Sadat t o Jerusalem. T h e Egyptian-Israeli peace process which followed has had its ups and downs, and analysts o f the conflict have begun examini n g different dimensions than those previously focused on. One question often addressed i n this new era of Arab-Israeli relations is: Can the accumulated effects of wars and the hardening of attitudes on both sides be overcome through diplomacy and renewed contacts”? Although the present study is concerned w i t h the past, and not the present o r future scenarios, i t has been undertaken o n

the assumption that early Arab-Zionist negotiating experience has direct relevance to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e

possible outcomes of diplomatic approaches to resolving this conflict. The discussion of selected episodes and the reproduction o f historical documents is n o t m e a n t t o provide a single, definitive explanation of the persistence o f the Arab-Zionist conflict. N e i t h e r 1s i t a n a t t e m p t to provide authoritative evidence to v i n d i c a t e t h e partisan c l a i m s o f one side o r another. I t s m a i n purpose is to assemble a n d discuss some o f the raw m a t e r i a l w h i c h m a y h e l p us to focus more clearly o n the origins o f t h i s conflict, a n d perhaps t o e l i m i n a t e some

recurring fallacies about its development and the prospects for its resolution. A n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e period 1913 t o 1931 reveals a w e a l t h

of previous negotiating experience which is today n o t well known or, a t least, n o t very w e l l remembered. Increased

information about the actual “ q u a n t i t y ” of such previous experience may prevent some contemporary observers from jumping t o o quickly t o the conclusion that the communication and interaction which were lacking after 1948 have always been absent. I t may also cast some doubt on the thesis that misunderstanding and/or ignorance o f the other party’s true’

aims and peace-terms are at the heart o f the

present impasse, and that an expansion or a re-opening o f contacts w i l l automatically remove misunderstanding and lead t o peace. As Yehoshafat Harkabi warned i n M a y , 1973.3

INTRODUCTION

7

T h e day negotiations start w i l l i n d e e d b e a great occasion

for celebration. Yet let us remember the lessons psychologists teach - that direct c o n t a c t s between human groups do n o t always draw them together, b u t may make them realize how far apart they are and thus lead t o further estrangement. Apart from the “ q u a n t i t y ” o f negotiating experience, the evidence examined during our period also indicates that there was little o r n o movement o f any o f the parties i n the

direction o f modifying its basic m i n i m u m demands and aspirations. The major protagonists seem t o have come, a t a n early stage, to rather pessimistic conclusions regarding t h e

possibility o f reconciling their conflicting interests and the future o f Z i o n i s t - A r a b relations. I n 1919, D a v i d B e n - G u r i o n

perceived the situation i n these “inconvenient” terms:# Everybody sees a difficulty i n the question o f relations between Arabs a n d Jews. B u t n o t everybody sees t h a t there is n o solution t o this question. N o solution! There is a gulf,

and nothing can fill that gulf. I t is possible t o resolve the conflict between Jewish and Arab interests [only] b y sophistry. I do n o t know what Arab w i l l agree that Palestine should belong t o the Jews - even i f the Jews learn Arabic. A n d we must recognize this situation. I f we don’t acknowledge this, a n d try t o come u p w i t h “ r e m e d i e s ” , then we risk d e m o r a l i z a t i o n . . . . W e , as a n a t i o n , w a n t this country t o b e ours; t h e Arabs, as a n a t i o n , w a n t this country

to be theirs.... The Palestinian nationalist leader, A w n i A b d al-Hadi, also saw t h e conflict i n s i m i l a r terms. “ S o m e t i m e ago”, wrote

Moshe Shertok (Sharett) i n his note o f a conversation between in early 1932, A w n i and H a y i m Arlosoroff h e [ A w n i ] h a d come t o t h e definite conclusion t h a t there was n o p o i n t whatever i n negotiations o r attempts t o reach a m u t u a l understanding. T h e goal o f t h e Jews was t o r u l e the country, a n d the a i m o f the Arabs was t o fight against

this rule. H e understood the Zionists quite well and respected them, but their interests were fundamentally

8

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

opposed to Arab interests, a n d h e saw n o possibility o f a n agreement... .>

What place, then, can negotiations have i n the settling o f Arab-Zionist differences when important leaders on both sides have agreed on their basic futility? B y negotiation, we commonly mean a procedure by which parties i n conflict engage i n debate and dialogue and - i n the classic situat i o n- “gather round a table a n d , a t the cost o f mutual concessions, a t t e m p t to define t h e terms o f a n agreement

which will take their respective interests into account”.® I f w e want t o appreciate t h e record o f negotiation i n t h e

on-going Arab-Zionist conflict, we must look beyond this somewhat formalistic notion and focus on the intricacies and nuances o f the process. I n this way, we m a y discover h o w

negotiations were utilized i n the service of the Zionist and Arab causes. Rather than looking at each encounter as a missed opportunity and seeking t o apportion blame for its ultimate failure, we shall be discussing, whenever appropriate, one or more o f the following aspects:

1. The motives for negotiating. 2. The timing o f contacts. 3. T h e status o f the negotiating partners.

4. The role and interests of third-parties. 5. The proposed terms of agreement. Placing these considerations into the c o n t e x t o f Zionist and Arab leaders operating between 1913 and 1931, we may imagine the following sorts o f questions suggesting themselves to would-be negotiators. Is i t worthwhile t o go into talks w i t h the other side? D o we have a chance of gaining more than we w i l l b e asked t o concede? W h a t d o we stand t o lose b y

remaining aloof? Will our opponents be bargaining i n good faith? Assuming the latter, w i l l our negotiating partners have the necessary authority and stature t o implement their share of the bargain we may work out? What concessions are we prepared o r able t o offer ( w i t h o u t b e i n g r e p u d i a t e d b y o u r

followers or allies), and what concessions do we expect or insist the other side should make i n return? W h a t impression

INTRODUCTION

9

will be created on important third-parties, or on public opinion, by our participation i n , or abstention from, these proposed talks? I n this sense, much of our concern will focus on the tactics and strategies employed b y both sides. I t is hoped that this survey, w i t h accompanying documents, w i l l add something t o o u r understanding o f the n a t u r e o f this particular conflict and

o f the process o f conflict-resolution where the gap between the ostensible vital interests o f the parties is so deep and wide.

For, i f o u r examination reveals much about how parties used the n e g o t i a t i n g process for t h e i r o w n e n d s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e evidence, during the period 1913-1931, o f any imaginative and realistic formulae being seriously explored i n an attempt t o harmonize the goals of the parties i n conflict. D u r i n g this period, neither side felt that the growing conflict required any re-evaluation and/or reduction o f its exclusive national goals. I t would be only i n the period after 1931 that some innovations and possible compromises would be discussed more seriously. Some o f the negotiation attempts and person-

alities involved during the 1930s and 1940s are perhaps better known than those discussed i n the present volume: e.g., Ben-Gurion’s talks with Arab leaders (1934-1938); the attempt

by “the Five”

(G. Frumkin, J. L.

Magnes, M.

Smilansky, P. Rutenberg, and M . Novomeyski) t o break the Arab general strike of 1936; the Jewish Agency’s dealings with Lebanese and Syrian groups; the Jewish Agency’s relations w i t h the A m i r A b d a l l a h ; the ‘““HyamsonNewcombe” proposals, discussed b y Magnes, Izzat Tannous and Nuri al-Sa’id; and the St James (“Round-Table”) Conference o f 1939.7 Y e t , as we shall show below, the earlier a t t e m p t s a t a negotiated settlement - a l t h o u g h equally f u t i l e

i n the end - provided leaders on both sides with valuable experience for their later encounters. Also, reciprocal attitudes and patterns of interaction between Arabs and Zionists became firmly rooted during the period discussed i n this volume.

CHAPTER 1

Furst Attempts

N A T U R E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T O F ARAB-ZIONIST R E L A T I O N S IN PALESTINE,

1882-1914

T h e first real attempts to find a “diplomatic s o l u t i o n ” t o the

budding Arab-Zionist conflict date back to 1913 and 1914. I n order to understand the context o f these moves, we m u s t go back to the year 1882, which m a y b e taken as a convenient

starting point for any discussion of Arab-Jewish relations i n Palestine. This year marked the beginning of the first of severalmodern1 waves of Jewish immigration €-alya”, literally meaning ‘‘ascent”; pl. “aliyot”) t o those provinces o f the Ottoman Empire which later became Palestine o f the British Mandate, and subsequently the Jewish s t a t e of Israel. T h e net result o f the first t w o “aliyot”prior t o 1914 more than tripled the number of Jews i n the area, from a n estimated.23,000_ (1882) t o 85,000 (1914). The Arab population during the same period grew less strikingly, from roughly 500,000 te 600,000, w i t h emigration detracting from the natural. in! crease.

Perhaps more important than these numerical changes, the new type of J e w i n Palestine contributed t o a striking change

i nArab-Jewish

relations. The Jews

of the “ o l d yishuv” (the

Jewish community prior t o 1882) had been accustomed t o a self-contained and subservient life i n the predominantly M u s l i m society a r o u n d t h e m . N o t so t h e n e w Zionist settlers.

Contrary t o popular misconception, relations between the native Arab population and these new settlers were n o t idyllic.? I t is only by comparison, or for propaganda purposes, that Jews or Arabs i n later years would look back w i t h nostalgia on a period o f relatively peaceful and “brotherly” relations. Serious research into the 1882-1914 period now 10

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11

shows us that “ t h e trend of subsequent developments i n Palestine was already set” before 1914, that is, that theseeds o f today’:s Arab-Israeli dispute weresownbefore that date.

O n e o f the practical results of the application o f Z i o n i s mi n the daily lives of Jewish settlers i n Palestine was the social and economic segregation of the new ypishuv. Local Jewish leaders became preoccupied with the task o f building u p an autonomous and self-sufficient community. Even men like D r Arthur Ruppin—whose colonization work led h i m t o stress t h e need t o i m p r o v e relations w i t h t h e Arabs—realized a t a n

early stage that the practicalbusiness o fJewish settlement had t o be carried out systematically, b y n o t permitting ourselves t o be scattered at random throughout the country, b u t by concentratingon a few points.... I t is only i n this fashion that we can, within certain limits, achieve today [1913] the objective we have i n v i e w , n a m e l y , t h e creation o f a Jewish m i l i e u a n d o f a

closed Jewish economy, i n which producers, consumers and middlemen shall all be Jewish.#

Such autonomy was fostered both symbolically and i n practical ways. National symbols were actively promoted: star o f David, Zionist flag and anthem (‘‘ha-Tiqua”, The Hope), Jewish National Fund (JNF) stamps. M u c h effort w e n t into the organization o f ‘‘national-communal” institutions: e.g., schools, local self-governing councils, a Jewish watchmen’s association (ha-Shomer), land-purchase and banki n g facilities.” I n fact, m o s t o f the socio-economic infrastructure o f today’s Israeli society was already being developed before 1914. G R O W I N G AWARENESS O F A C O N F L I C T

T h i s preoccupation w i t h internal organization may, i n part, help us t o understand the frequent criticism (usually made with hindsight) that early Zionists were naively “unaware” of the Arab population residing i n Palestine. Caught up i n the redemption o f t h e i r o w n people, m a n y , indeed, d i d not

perceive the Arabs as constituting a rival “ n a t i o n ” in Palestine.

12

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

The settlers d i d see, of course, that there were Arabs living i n the country, and no one would have denied that goodneighbourly relations were important. B u t beyond the avoid a n c e o f unnecessary friction a n d disputes, i t seemed natural t o almost all Jews that their principal energies would b e

devoted to b u i l d i n g u p their o w n separate society, a n d not to

integrating themselves into w h a t was, for them, another

foreign (i.e.,Arab) cultural and social milieu.s B u t soon i t became evident t h a t there w a s a

national/

political dimension involved, and some perceptive observers began t o suspect t h a t a larger clash o f interests was involved. Indeed, prior t o 1914 a n u m b e r o f spokesmen were already

predicting an inevitable clash of destinies. Najib Azouri, a Christian Arab who had served as an Ottoman government official i n Jerusalem, prefaced his book, Le Réveil de la nation arabe (published i n Paris i n 1905), with remarks concerning n o t one, b u t two, relatively u n k n o w n movements i n Turkish A s i a , namely:

the awakening of the Arab nation, and the latent effort o f the Jews to reconstitute, o n a very large scale, the ancient kingdom o f Israel. These t w o movements [he w e n t o n t o p r e d i c t ] are d e s t i n e d t o fight

c o n t i n u a l l y u n t i l one

is

victorious over the other. The fate of the entire world will hinge o n the final outcome o f this struggle between two

peoples representing t w o contradictory principles.’ Reviewing the pre-War experience from the Zionist side, Y. Radler-Feldman (who was later, under the pen-name of “ R a b b i Binyamin’”, t o fight the official Zionist leadership i n t h e n a m e o f Jewish-Arab rapprochement) made n o secret o f

the fact that the Jews had been unable “ t o establish friendly relations with the Arabs” .8 A t t h e m o m e n t [ M a r c h 1913] t h e i r hatred against us is

being fanned b y the press and animosity is becoming more frequent. Altogether, i t m u s t be accepted tliat t w o nations such as the Jews and the Arabs can only live side by side either i n friendship or i n enmity. A third relationship, one o f indifference, does n o t exist.

D u r i n g the first decades of Zionist land-purchase and

FIRST ATTEMPTS

13

settlement, contacts between the “new Jews” and the local population provided several areas for tension and friction.® I n the towns, too, t h e n a t i v e merchant class came to look o n t h e _ an_ unwelcome challenge t o their

new J ewisharrivals as

traditional social and commercial predominance.'°_ W h e n

outlying Jewish colonies began t o abandon the--practice-of hiring local Arabs i n favour o f having.Jews.as_watchmen (soon organized i n t o a country-wide quasi-militia, ha-Shomer),

this gaverise to some Arab fearsandcomplaintst h a tthe Jews

were armingi n orderto seize 7€ control of the country. 1 1 All o f the above areas of friction might have been regarded as normal i n circumstances o f immigrant-vs-native or infidelvs-Muslim. A tactful and conciliatory attitude on the part o f the newcomers might, normally, have been enough t o remove native suspicion and to promote better relations. I n fact, a

number of Zionist observers!? did dwell on this aspect and felt that much would be achieved by a less contemptuous or a less oblivious attitude on the part of the new settlers. Long before 1914 these observers were actively campaigning for a deliberate Zionist initiative t o promote good-neighbourly relations. T o some extent these exhortations d i d contribute to improved relations. Settlers themselves came t o realize the practical

wisdom of encouraging good relations by allowing Arab fellahin t o take advantage of free Jewish medical services, or b y i n v i t i n g some Arabs to send t h e i r children to study i n

Jewish educational institutions. Another, more natural, impetus for positive relations came through commercial dealings,

which often produced patterns of mutual gratitude, dependence and/or friendship. B u t increasing the volume of personal c o n t a c t s between the two peoples was n o t necessarily a one-way street l e a d i n g

towards mutual t r u s t and friendship. Intimacy w i t h Zionist t h i n k i n g o r institutions, for example, c o u l d also l e a d to

heightened Arab fears, resentment or jealousy w i t h regard t o the Jewish newcomers.!> Whatever the beneficial effects o f early Zionist public-relations efforts, they were fragile enough to be shaken by inadvertent misunderstandings, Zionist indiscretions, or deliberate incitement b y anti-Zionist elements. I n sum, during the 1882-1914 period, few. concerned and informed observers could be really satisfied with the

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14

f ionist-Arab relations i n t h e country. development o Z

I f their internal preoccupations made Zionists play down

the external reality of the Arabs, there can be little doubt that i n certain Arab circles there was growing uneasiness and concern over the Zionist activity and development i n their midst. As early as 1910, articulate voices were denouncing the “exclusiveness” and aloofness of the Jewish settlers. I n that year, Shukri al-Asali, the Governor o f Nazareth, complained at length of Zionist aims and separateness as expressed. i n their habits, symbols and institutions.!* Similar denunciations were made one year l a t e r i n t h e T u r k i s h parliament.’> I n

April 1914, Nahum Sokolow’s t o u r o f the M i d d l e East and his explanations of Zionism t o the Arab press evoked the following rejoinder from Rafiq al-Azm, one o f the leaders of t h e A r a b Decentralist

Party:

Quite the contrary [to Sokolow’s assurances], we see the Jewsexcluding themselves completely from t h e Arabsi n language, school, commerce, customs, in their entire economic life. They c u t themselves off i n the same way from the

indigenous government, whose protection they enjoy, so that the [Arab] population considers them a foreign race. This is the reason for the grievance o f the Arabs o f Syria and Palestine against Jewish immigration. The Arabs have as yet made n o steps o n t h e road to t h e i r

national renaissance.... they, therefore, see their very existence threatened b y the Jews. M a n y also see a political

danger i n that the Jews retain foreign nationality and i n this way conquer the country for foreign states.!6 … The youth of Palestine is already inspired w i t h the idea o f assembling i n order t o take u p the struggle against the Zionist m o v e m e n t . We do n o t think that the educated Jews and Zionists w i l l mock at the defence m o v e m e n t o f the Arab youth and intelligentsia.!”

THE TURKISH FACTOR

This hostility t o Jewish immigration and settlement m u s t be seen i n t h e context o f t h e “ a w a k e n i n g ’ w h i c h was t h e n

affecting intellectual and political leaders i n the Arabic-

FIRST ATTEMPTS

15

speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire.!® Originating i n secret societies a n d literary clubs i n t h e late 1 9 t h century, a movement was growing for a “ d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ” o f t h e

Empire which would have allowed the Arabs greater regional autonomy and self-government. The Turks resisted these “separatist” tendencies, as they d i d a l l other threats t o t h e

unity of the Empire. The 1908 revolution b y the “Young Turks” was followed by a centralizing policy of “Turkificat i o n ” o f the ethnically-diverse Empire, and this had the effect of strengthening the Arab movement’s desire for decentralization. I n this Turkish-Arab tug of war, the Arabs became a powerful factor. I n the new parliament the Arab bloc held 60 o f the 245 seats. Complaints against the indifference of the authorities i n the face o f the Zionist “danger” became one of the main issues i n Turkish-Arab relations and i n the election campaigns.!® Protests received from Palestinian notables and pressure inside parliament periodically led the authorities t o tighten the regulations (some restrictions dated back t o 1881) concerning Jewish immigration.” Completing the triangle were the Zionists, who-since 1882 had been using whatever pressure they çould muster (e.g., through foreign consuls) t o obtain from the ruling Turks

conditionsfavourable t o Jewishimmigrationandsettlement i nPalestine. I n response t o such pressure, a n d i n the hope of securing Jewish financial assistance, the Turks would periodically relax or overlook restrictions.?”! B u t Arab nationalists resented Zionist reliance on the Turks, a n d i n their overtures t o the Zionists their outstretched h a n d s e e m e d t o imply a n anti-Turkish “alliance.” This w a s s o m e t i m e s reflected i n t h e

“friendly” advice that the Zionists should be careful—that governments (i.e., Turks) come a n d go, w h i l e the native

population (i.e., Arabs) were a permanent factor.?? B u t even those terms

Zionists who appreciated the urgency of coming t o with the A r a b s were r e l u c t a n t t o engage i n a n y

activities which had anti-Turkish undertones. Thus any development o f Arab-Jewish relations had to involve the Turkish factor.

Following the first World Zionist Congressa t Basle in 1897 a n d t h e publication o f Azouri’s Réveil de la nation arabei n 1905,

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16

a growing number of Arab nationalists and Zionists became increasingly preoccupied w i t h each other’s existence and aims. A t first, mostZionists w h o g a v e the matter any attention tendedto‘discount the of the nascent Arab movement,a n d some engaged in what provedt o b e wishful thinking when they supposed that this movement would confine its appeal to Arab lands outside Palestine. For their

strength

part, some Arab observers went t o the other extreme o f

fearing that they were facing imminent domination b y a new Z i o n i s t kingdom

which

would stretch

from

the

Nile to the

Euphrates.?? Whatever the exaggeration or underestimation i n the perceptions of both sides, the possibility o f a showdown grew as each came to understand some o f the contradic-

tions between its own position and that o f its rival. I t was after 1908 that an anti-Zionist campaign gained real ‘momentum i n and around Palestine.” After several years of escalating. verbal threats a n d warnings i n the Arab press, leadersi n both camps were beginning t o give serious thought to the option o f a t t e m p t i n g t o reach a formal accord. T h e

Zionist inclination for talks with Arab leaders came i n direct reaction t o the unfavourable climate being generated b y the press. M u c h energy went i n t o answering hostile articles and trying to create a more favourable image o f Z i o n i s m i n the newspapers o f the Arab w o r l d . Zionist contacts were extend-

ed beyond the original circle of Arab notables who had been important simply from the point of view of land purchase; Zionists n o w began t o devote more a t t e n t i o n t o c u l t i v a t i n g the goodwill o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h political influence o r press contacts. As Yaacov Ro’i has summarized his study of the

situation after April 1 9 0 9 , Arab attacks o n i n d i v i d u a l Jews i n the towns a n d villages o r o n t h e roads, t h e violation o f Jewish fields a n d

plantations and the molestation of livestock, and a number of vehement articles i n the Arab press, and speeches i n the Ottoman parliament could n o t help b u t make Zionists everywhere conscious o f the need to come to terms w i t h the l o c a l A r a b population.

Another factor influencing Zionists i n the direction of paying more a t t e n t i o n to t h e Arabs was related t o the

FIRST A T T E M P T S

17

growing Arab-Turkish estrangement. Zionists valued their good relations with the Turks, who after all controlled the gates o f Palestine a n d regulated l a n d sales. W h i l e Zionists

felt that they could not contemplate any alliance with the Arabs which would alienate Turkish sympathy, they were attracted by Arab overtures because an accord with the Arabs—if i t could be reached within the framework of continued loyalty t o the Turks—had the advantage o f solidifying Zionist-Turkish relations. For, i f Arab anti-Zionist protests could be minimized through such an accord, then the Turks would have little excuse for denying the concessions which the Zionists were seeking.” I n fact, i t was the Grand

Vizier, Talaat Bey, who advised the Jews i n September 1913 that they “must first o f a l l come to a n understanding w i t h the Arabs; we shall d o the rest”, b y which h e meant improving

conditions affecting Jewish immigration and settlement. Thus, an Arab-Zionist accord had, for the Turks, the possible attractions of keeping the Arabs off their backs, while allowing them t o earn Zionist gratitude. For the Zionists, an accord with the Arabs stood to further better relations with the

rulers of Palestine.

Arab motivation for talks w i t h Zionists was not u n m i x e d .

The ‘“decentralist” and “reformist” groups were always searching for allies i n their struggle with the Turks. As early as 1911, M u h a m m a d Rashid R i d a , a founder-member o f the

Decentralist Party and a leading M u s l i m thinker, pointed o u t that the “Arab awakening” would require European knowhow, the support o f the Western press and large sums for economic development. Since, i n his analysis, the Jews controlled the European press and bank(!), the Syrians were obliged to consider the o p t i o n o f a n accommodation w i t h the

Zionists over Palestine. Rida was certain that the Zionists desired “ t o take possession o f the H o l y L a n d ” , and consequently the Arabs w o u l d have to proceed w i t h utmost care so as t o avoid the l i k e l y dangers o f t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n o r government falling i n t o debt, a n d / o r the Zionists gaining a

foothold i n Palestine through land purchase. As Arab fears continued to grow that “Zionist power” might soon overrun the Fertile Crescent, Rida advised Arab leaders i n 1914 that they were confronted with a clear-cut choice:

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18

Either make an agreement with the Zionist leaders i n order to resolve the differences between the interests of both parties . . . o r else gather a l l t h e i r [i.e., Arab] forces t o

oppose the Zionists i n every way, first b y forming societies and companies, and finally b y forming armed gangs who will oppose [the Zionists] b y force.3?

F I R S T NEGOTIATION-ATTEMPTS,

1913

Such were the motives and the mood o f Zionist and Arab leaders i n 1913 and again i n 1914 when steps were taken for the first time t o try to resolve t h e i r differences through

diplomacy. Since this episode is the first recorded instance o f Zionist-Arab political negotiation, let us examine its course i n detail. I n early 1913, as the columns of Cairo’s al-4 hram heated u p w i t h a n t i - a n d pro-Zionist articles, t h e arguments seemed t o climax i n t h e suggestion for a j o i n t meeting t o resolve the

contradictions once and for a l l . ” O n April 11, 1913 Salim Najjar, on behalf o f the Cairo Decentralist Committee, contacted his former employer, Sami Hochberg, the Jewish editor of le Jeune Turc, a paper subsidized b y the Zionist Organization i n Istanbul. Najjar proposed t o Hochberg that D r Victor Jacobson, the official Zionist representative i n I s t a n b u l , be impressed w i t h the need for the Jews t o come to a n agreement w i t h h i s Party. I n h i s l e t t e r Najjar claimed to

have the Zionists’ best interests a t heart, and he suggested that by joining w i t h the Decentralists they would n d t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e g r o w i n g M u s l i m a n d Christian

animosity.

Jacobson responded b y charging Hochberg w i t h the mission o f travelling t o Arab capitals t o investigate the possibilities o f an accord. Hochberg’s trip was quite successful.* H e spoke with twenty leading members o f the C a i r o Decentralist a n d Beirut

Reformist committees, including Rafiq al-Azm, Salim Najjar,

Haqqi

al-Azm, Iskandar A m m u n ,

Ahmad

Mukhtar

Bay-

hum, Rizqallah Arqash and Ahmad Tabbarah. Hochberg reported that there were only t w o men who declared themselves firmly opposed t o any Jewish immigration. W i t h the

FIRST ATTEMPTS

19

rest h e was a b l e to formulate a preliminary “ e n t e n t e v e r b a l e ” ,

according t o which the Cairo Committee—‘ ‘being i n principle favourable t o Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine and i n favour of an agreement w i t h the Zionists”— agreed t o work for a n Arab-Jewish rapprochement t h r o u g h

oral propaganda and through the Arab press. I n exchange, le Jeune Turc c o m m i t t e d itself t o supporting the Arab cause

(“insofar as i t remained compatible with the unity and integrity of the Empire”) i n its columns and through its contacts w i t h the European press. Although this limited agreement i n effect obligated only Hochberg and his paper (and n o t the Zionist Organization), the atmosphere between Zionists and Arabs improved considerably during the followi n g months. Several series o f articles favouring an alliance were published, while the Arab press generally displayed a more moderate tone o n the Zionist i s s u e .

A “ f u l l accord” was foreshadowed i n Hochberg’s preliminary talks, b u t this had t o await the results of the First Arab Congress, which was held i n Paris i n June 1913.36 Hochberg attended as an observer and lobbied on behalf o f his rapprochement scheme, winning the support of the Congress’ chairman, A b d al-Hamid az-Zahrawi. T h e Congress passed n o resolution hostile to J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n , a n d some favourable statements were obtained i n press interviews. B u t

the Paris Congress turned o u t t o be the high-point of the 1913 rapprochement attempts. T w o days after the conclusion of the Congress, moves towards a Zionist-Arab alliance were

virtually frozen w i t h the arrival from Istanbul of a draft Turkish-Arab agreement for reforms within the Empire. While a t first H o c h b e r g felt t h a t a three-sided u n d e r s t a n d i n g was

imminent, the n e x t few weeks proved that m o s t Arabs i n Paris, Istanbul and Beirut considered that their anticipated agreement w i t h the T u r k s made a n y further negotiations w i t h

the Zionists unnecessary. RENEWED CONTACTS,

1914

F o r a while i t seemed as though the i n i t i a t i v e taken toward a

Zionist-Arab accord was being dropped i n favour of less ambitious moves toward mere “cordial relations”. B u t the

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Cairo Decentralists were soon dissatisfied with this situation. The group’s annoyance was reflected i n bitter press articles against the Zionists;® the tirade against Jewish exclusivism quoted above (page 14) is b u t one example. “Nice words” from Zionist leaders were challenged, and the latter were accused o f n o t living u p to t h e i r professed desire for a n

agreement with the Arabs. These accusations were among the stimuli for the preparations which were made i n 1914 for a “round-table” conference of Arab and Zionist representatives. Other trends and events combined t o promote t h e idea o f such a conference.

Apart from the more radical Cairo group, other Arabs returned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Z i o n i s t factor once i t became

clear that the promised Turkish reforms would not be satisfactorily implemented. Contacts i n Istanbul, which had lapsed since January 1914, were resumed by D r Jacobson and

Richard Lichtheim i n April. Conversations were held with Ahmad Bayhum, Najib Shuqair, Shukri al-Husaini, Sa‘id al-Husaini, Raghib an-Nashashibi, Sa‘id Shahin, Asad Daghir, Faris al-Khouri and others.* During his visit t o Syria and Palestine i n April 1914, N a h u m Sokolow of the Zionist Executive spoke w i t h a number of Arabs, including Nasif al-Khalidi, M u h a m m a d Kurd

A l i , A b d a r - R a h m a n ash-

Shahbandar, Georges Fakhuri, Shukri al-Asali and M u h a m mad al-Inglizi.‘° I n his attempts t o reassure them about the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f t h e two movements, Sokolow discussed t h e

possibility of convening a round-table meeting t o clear u p any persisting misunderstandings. O n M a y 27th and 29th, an unnamed “Zionist leader” i n Istanbul (probably D r Jacobson) c o n t r i b u t e d a pair o f articles t o the ongoing Cairo press

debate, also calling for a joint meeting. Meanwhile, Nissim M a l u l , a Palestinian Jewish member o f the Decentralist group, h a d t o reassure his Arab colleagues that the Zionist leaders were indeed sincere i n their desire for an agreement. B y late M a y 1914 i t appeared that a conference would soon be organized, and i n anticipation the Cairo press closed its columns t o any further discussion o f the Zionist q u e s t i o.*! n A s negative as these m o t i v a t i o n s were for t h e Zionists t o resume formal talks w i t h A r a b representatives, t h e s i t u a t i o n

i n Palestine provided more negative, and more compelling,

FIRST ATTEMPTS

21

reasons. Since J u l y 1913 the Palestinian press (al-Karmil o f Haifa and Falastin of Jaffa)? had been denouncing the apparent leniency of their Syrian and Egyptian “cousins” on the Zionist question. D u r i n g the winter of that year three Jews were murdered i n Northern Palestine. Anti-Zionist clubs were formed i n several towns and b y April 1914 the

local press had reached such heights of anti-Zionist incitement that the Turkish authorities intervened t o order the closure of Falastin.* The elections t o the third Turkish parliament also gave vent t o local anti-Zionist campaigning and sentiments. Thus, by M a y 1914 a meeting between Arab and Zionist representatives seemed essential i n order to de-fuse a poten-

tially explosive s i t u a t i o n . The actual mechanics o f organizi n g the conference rested with Nasif al-Khalidi, a Jerusalemite working as chief engineer i n Beirut; Hayim Margaliut Kalvaryski, a l a n d agent o f t h e Jewish Colonization Associa-

tion (ICA) stationed i n Rosh Pina i n Northern Palestine; and D r Yaakov Thon, who worked w i t h D r Ruppin i n the Zionist Jaffa office. The conference, tentatively set for J u l y a t Brumana, Lebanon, was first postponed by K h a l i d i , who needed m o r e t i m e t o a s s e m b l e a n A r a b d e l e g a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g

this first postponement, Zionist leaders found their own reasons t o seek further postponements, as they had reached the conclusion t h a t t h e conference was d o o m e d t o f a i l u r e .

I n fact, the meeting never took place; the outbreak o f w a r o n A u g u s t 4 t h p u t a n e n d to a n y further moves i n t h a t

direction. FAILURE OF THE 1 9 1 4 CONFERENCE

I n order t o appreciate the reasons for the failure o f the 1913-14 attempts a t a n agreement, i t w o u l d be useful t o focus o n t h e following areas: ( a ) t h e status o f t h e negotiators, ( b )

third-party considerations, and (c) the proposed t e r m s of agreement. Specifically, the questions w h i c h need t o be answered are: W o u l d the delegates t o the proposed conference have been able to execute their respective parts o f any agreement arrived at? W h a t effects w o u l d this Zionist-Arab

accord have had on relations with the Turks? What could the Zionists have offered to the A r a b s for the sake o f a n

22

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

agreement? Could the Zionists have made those concessions which appeared necessary t o w i n Arab assent?

(a) Status of the Negotiators. Among the obstacles which made a successful accord highly unlikely we may begin with the proposed agenda and the personnel involved i n the aborted conference o f 1914. The general Zionist scepticism about the chances o f a real and lasting entente resulted i n the leaders designating “lesser” personalities as delegates. They d i d not wish to accord too formal a status to talks whose likely failure would have been harmful t o their cause and their credibility. T h e Zionist delegates were instructed to avoid

any commitments and to keep the talks at the “exploratory” level only. The Arabs, on the other hand, were expecting a completely different kind of meeting, best described as a “showdown” with the official Zionist leadership. The agenda which they proposed read as follows: 1. [The Zionists] should explain, as far as possible by producing documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism and the colonization of Palestine connected therewith. 2. Thereafter the Arabs will formulate their demands, acceptance of which would determine whether the [Zionist] Movement could be considered harmful t o the Arabs or not. Such a n agenda clearly p u t t h e Zionists o n the defensive; l i t t l e wonder t h a t efforts were made t o secure a n honourable

postponement o f the conference. The choice of Arab delegates t o the conference also pointed t o the unlikelihood o f a successful accord. I n the past, Zionist negotiators had found i t difficult to ascertain the status o f their various Arab counterparts. As D r Jacobson complained, every Arab leader “claimed that i t [was] he who [was] the real, t h e o n l y real, t h e i m p o r t a n t o n e . . . . There is n o w a y o f

knowing what truth there is i n what they say, what is behind them. They do n o t have a single organisation.” A slightly different problem faced the Zionists w i t h regard t o the 1914 talks. Some o f the Arab delegates selected by Nasif al-Khalidi were known o n l y too well. Zionists would have found

themselves face to face w i t h four of their most articulate and bitterest enemies—Muhammad Kurd

Ali (of

t h e paper,

FIRST ATTEMPTS

23

al-Muqtabas), Yusuf al-Isa (of Falastin), Abdallah Mukhlis (of al-Karmil) and Jamal al-Husaini (later Secretary o f the Palestine Arab Executive and a power behind the Arab Higher Committee); four possible “friends” (Ahmad Bay-

hum, Rizqallah Arqash, Abd ar-Rahman ash-Shahbandar and Nasif al-Khalidi); and t w o unknown quantities. Nasif had evidently had some difficulty i n assembling ten Arab leaders w i t h both stature i n Palestine and a n “accommodati n g ” a t t i t u d e towards Zionism.5! L i t t l e wonder, t h e n , that

Zionists saw little point i n continuing to plan for a conference once the list of Arab delegates became known. ( b ) Third-Party Considerations. T h e Turkish attitude provides yet another ill-omen when assessing the failure o f the 1914 conference. One o f the organizers o f the ill-fated talks, H . M . Kalvaryski, i n later years severely criticized the Zionist leadership for poor judgement i n acceding to Turkish advice, a t the cost of alienating Arab opinion.’? For, i f the Turks had earlier been encouraging a Zionist-Arab accord, they made a quick about-face as the Brumana conference drew near. A t a meeting w i t h the Vali o f Beirut, the Zionists

were influenced by the clear disparagement of the Turks. Kalvaryski became fond of recalling Nasif al-Khalidi’s words to D r Thon following t h a t meeting: “Gardez-vous bien, mes-

sieurs les sionistes: u n gouvernement passe mais u n peuple reste’.>

While

Kalvaryski’s

critique

makes t o o m u c h o f Zionist

deference t o Turkish wishes, i t 1s to D r T h o n t h a t we m u s t look for a fuller a n d more balanced assessment. W h i l e t h e Turkish attitude was a n a d d i t i o n a l reason to shy away from

the proposed conference, Thon had seen only ‘great obstacles” i n the way of a successful Zionist-Arab agreement:

The Arabs will n o t let themselves be played off w i t h simple phrases, while we can hardly consent to such concessions as they would i n fact demand from us: restriction o f land purchase, the partial restriction o f Hebrew i n favour o f Arabic i n schools and i n public life, and living together with them i n the exclusive Jewish quarters... .. (c)

Proposed Terms of Agreement. D r Thon’s analysis brings

24

us

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

to

the

most

serious reason for the failure of the 1913-14

negotiation attempts. I t is important to take a closer look at

the terms and conditions being offered by both sides i n the course o f the attempted rapprochement. The ‘‘entente verbale” (above, page 19) is one example o f the kind of ““give-and-take” that suited certain Arab leaders. There were a number of other conditions which other Arabs attached t o proposals for an alliance with the Zionists. The ones most frequently mentioned a t this time may be summarized as follows:*3 1. Zionists must renounce their foreign citizenship (and special protection enjoyed under the Capitulations) to

become Ottoman subjects. 2. Under any agreement, the Zionists would have to undertake to guarantee that n o fellahin would b e dispossessed o f

their lands. 3. Zionist schools m u s t be open t o Arab children, and Zionist funds and skills should be applied t o the improvement of Arab education. 4. Zionist efforts at t h e revival o f Hebrew should not b e so intensive as to detract from Arab efforts t o revive Arabic as

the national language of the future Arab state. 5.

Zionists must open their local economic institutions for

Arab use a n d benefit.

6. Zionists must find large capital sums to finance public works and other development projects in the Arab countries. 7. Zionists should use their political influence and their press connections i n the West in support of the Arab movement.

8. Zionists should settle i n all Arab countries, rather than concentrate themselves exclusively i n Palestine. What were Arab spokesmen willing to give i n exchange for Zionist agreement to the above k i n d o f terms? Here the Arabs

were less explicit. Nothing was said about a “national” existence, o r i n t e r n a l autonomy for t h e J e w s . ’ T h e terms

being offered by the Arabs a t this time were t o give their

25

FIRST ATTEMPTS

blessing to continued b u t controlled Jewish immigration i n t o

what they regarded as their lands. This, they felt, was big enough a concession: they were offering to cease their hostile clamours, b u t wished to exercise control over future Zionist development so as t o benefit from anticipated material

advantages but without exposing themselves t o potential political risks. Against this, Zionist leaders found themselves i n a most uncomfortable bargaining position. The Arab approval of controlled immigration was being offered i n anticipation o f the supposed power of the Jews i n the European press and financial community, a n d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f J e w i s h “ b r a i n s ”

to the development of Syria and Palestine. I t is n o t difficult to see w h y the possible terms o f such a

Zionist-Arab “marriage” were hardly appealing t o the Zionists. T h e y i n d e e d wanted t o see a n e n d t o t h e m o u n t i n g

hostility. B u t they d i d n o t believe that this desire was enough t o assure a successful accord. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e Zionist

“bride” was being courted for her imagined riches, riches which she knew she d i d not really possess; o n t h e other, her

persistent Arab “suitor” was already anticipating her possible infidelity and was laying down stringent conditions. I n the eyes of the Zionists the guarantees being sought b y the Arabs would have stifled the raison d'être of Zionism, and an alliance a t this time and o n these terms seemed doomed from the start.

Quite apart

from t h e i r assessment o f w h a t t h e Arabs c o u l d

and would deliver as their part of the bargain, Zionists were also troubled b y their own “total inability... to fulfil Arab

demands both i n the cultural and financial fields”.5® I n this connection, the seemingly harsh appraisal o f Richard Lichtheim, who had been through many long discussions. with

Arab leaders i n

Constantinople,

should

n o t strike u s as

unduly negative. Although he continually stressed the primary importance of working towards improved relations w i t h t h e Arabs, h e was, as Y . R o ’ i concludes, “ n o t : very

hopeful that they could be permanently established”.® “ T h e Arabs”, Lichtheim wrote in November 1913, are a n d will remain o u r natural opponents. They d o n o t care a straw for t h e “ j o i n t Semitic s p i r i t ” . . . . T h e Arabs d o

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

26

not require a Semitic revival. They want orderly government, just taxes and political independence. T h e East o f to-

day aspires to no marvels other than American machinery and the Paris toilet. O f course the Arabs want t o preserve

their nation and cultivate their culture. What they need for this, however, is specifically European: money, organization, machinery. The Jew for them is a competitor who threatens their predominance i n Palestine.... I n such a situation we must naturally make every effort to hold back

Arab animosity.

From what we have seen of the period 1908-1914, i t appears evident that Zionist moves towards an entente with the Arabs were made largely under duress. Zionists had a sufficiently accurate picture of Arab motives and strategy. They knew that t h e Arabs wished to save Palestine from the i m m i n e n t ‘‘dangers” o f Z i o n i s m , a n d they met n o Arab

leader who came close to understanding Zionism and accept-

ing i t on its o w n

terms.

And i t is this gulf between the aims

and interests o f the two parties which was probably the most

important reason for the failure o f the 1913-14 attempts at rapprochement. This is also evident from the tactics used. Both parties looked on an entente more as a defensive manoeuvre than as a positive step involving substantial mutual concessions and leading to the utopia o f ‘“‘semitic brotherhood”. Through an accord the Arabs hoped t o exploit “Jewish power” without being harmed by i t , while the immediate objective o f the Zionists was the limited one of deflecting anticipated threats and obstacles. Many Zionists felt, like Lichtheim, that “holding back Arab animosity” was the most they could have expected t o gain through an accord with Arab leaders. I n summary, then, there was a variety of reasons—basic contradictions, proposed agenda, choice of delegates, disapproval of the Turks—why the 1914 conference fell through. I t was the Zionists i n this particular case w h o felt their interests

would be better served by pulling back from the talks proposed by the Arabs. B u t i t should appear obvious that, even had the conference gone ahead, i t would have ended i n

bitter failure. Similarly, had the 1913 talks n o t been halted by

27

FIRST ATTEMPTS

Arab disinterest, they too m i g h t w e l l have floundered o n the same basic incompatibility—Zionist inability to provide what

the Arabs would have demanded i n exchange for continued

Jewish immigration

and settlement. Even

if

a l l o t h e r condi-

tions had been favourable, the proposed terms of an agreement were not attractive or workable. Three and a half years later, towards the end of the First World War, a variety of new circumstances would combine t o push Zionists and Arabs once again towards talking about rapprochement. These talks form the subject of the n e x t chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Post-War Diplomacy, 1918-1920

AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I!

Although several informal Jewish-Arab meetings took place during World W a r I , uncertainty regarding the anticipated changes led both parties to behave with extreme caution. The next major round o f contacts was to take place i n the closing stages o f the war, with the advent o f British troops to the

M i d d l e East. This chapter and the following one will focus on the intense diplomatic activity of the period 1917-1922, mainly involving the emerging leader of the Zionist movement, D r Chaim Weizmann. W e w i l l deal with Zionist relations with the A m i r Faisal, his brother A m i r Abdallah, Palestinian notables, and Syrian nationalists. Before discussing the actual negotiations of the period, let us o u t l i n e briefly some o f the important changes i n the M i d d l e East situation a t the close o f the war. Most significant

among these changes were the replacement of Turkey by Great Britain as the ruling power over Palestine, and the new, greatly inflated, expectations o f both Jews and Arabs. Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of Germany i n 1914 foreshadowed an all-out European penetration o f the area. A t the same

time,

the Decentralist

Party

in Cairo and the

nationalist clubs o f Beirut and Damascus saw new opportunities for the realization of their hopes for Arab autonomy or independence. British representatives i n Cairo established secret contacts with Arab leaders—most notably w i t h the

Sharif of Mecca, Husain ibn Ali—and sought their aid i n the form of an anti-Turkish revolt. I n exchange, Britain committed herself t o support some form o f Arab “ i n d e p e n -

dence” within defined areas. The e x a c t t e r m s o f the under28

POST-WAR DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

29

standing reached between Sir Henry McMahon (British High Commissioner to Egypt) a n d Husain—still a source o f

unresolved controversy among historians—were embodied i n an exchange o f letters between July 14, 1915 and January 30, 1916. I n June 1916, what became known as the “Arab Revolt” was launched, and the Arabs became allies of the

British i n a n anti-Turkish military campaign which was t o result, t w o and one-half years later, i n the expulsion o f the

Turks from the Arab Middle East. Meanwhile, b y M a y 1916, Great Britain and her allies France and Russia had devised a plan for control and spheres of influence i n the territories to be conquered from the Turks. Georges Picot and Mark Skyes were the French and British signatories to a soon-to-be-famous agreement which would have seen (a) direct French and British rule i n what was later to become Lebanon and Iraq, respectively; (b) nominally “independent” Arab states under French and British spheres of influence i n the future territories of Syria and Transjordan, respectively; and (c) Palestine under an international condominium. A third major wartime commitment made b y Great

Britain—the Balfour Declaration—also involved Sir Mark Sykes, who lent his considerable influence and energy to Zionist lobbying for British support. Early i n the war, Herbert Samuel, one of the m o s t prominent Jews i n British politics, had presented his cabinet colleagues with a plan for a British protectorate over and sponsorship of a Jewish national home i n Palestine. Beginning i n February 1917, meetings involving Sykes, D r Chaim Weizmann and other leading British Zionists prepared the ground for the issuance, t e n months later, of the Balfour Declaration, on November 2,

1917. By its terms, Great Britain committed herself t o using her “best endeavours” to facilitate “ t h e establishment i n Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. Publication o f the Balfour Declaration was timed t o

coincide with a major military offensive i n the M i d d l e East.

General Allenby’s

troops

moved

through G a z a a n d north-

ward to capture Palestine south of a line drawn between Jaffa and Jerusalem. The General’s entry into Jerusalem i n December 1917 marked the beginning of the 31-month

30

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

military rule of Palestine under O.E.T.A.(S)—Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South). I n a second and final major offensive i n September 1918, the northern part o f Palestine was taken b y British forces. O n October 1, 1918 Damascus to the east fell t o a force o f Australian a n d Arab

units, the latter under the leadership of the A m i r Faisal, third son of Husain o f Mecca. The armistice signed b y Turkey on October 30th marked the end o f the war i n the M i d d l e East. ARAB-ARMENIAN-ZIONIST ENTENTE

The post-war situation left Great Britain i n control o f former Turkish territory, and with both Arabs and Jews expecting British support for the speedy realization of their respective goals. Political discussions a t the time were further complicated b y the ascendancy of a new credo—the doctrine of national self-determination.? Ideally, according to this doctrine, each recognized ‘‘nation” was entitled to be the master of its own destiny, and t o enjoy statehood, sovereignty and national dignity i n harmony with other recognized nationstates. This principle, which has today become an “absolute” i n international politics, was given strong American moral backing, and was expected to guide the post-war settlement. B o t h Arabs a n d Zionists presented their cases to the world i n terms of this doctrine, and i n the M i d d l e East (as elsewhere)

i t was going to b e difficult t o justify a n y form o f rule t h a t was

considered “foreign” or imposed against the w i l l of the local inhabitants. Powers, great and small, soon adapted their activities and interests t o t h e rhetoric o f the n e w slogan. Sykes, a t a n early stage, had recognized the need to reconcile Arabs and Jews to each other’s desires w i t h i n t h e context o f a British presence,

and he even tutored D r Weizmann t o operate w i t h this i n mind.* Expanding his ideas to include Armenians, Sykes began promoting an “Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente” soon after publication of the Balfour Declaration. Needless t o say, a scheme i n which native M i d d l e Eastern peoples would be a p p e a r i n g before t h e P e a c e Conference u n a n i m o u s l y i n

favour o f a British presence i n the area could only have reflected well on Great Britain and promoted her interests

POST-WAR DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

31

vis-a-vis rival European powers.* Supporting the slogan “Armenia for the Armenians, Judaea for the Jews, Arabia for the Arabs”, B r i t a i n would be seeking t o appear as the patron

of the simultaneous and harmonious revivals o f these three previously oppressed peoples. While Sykes was setting u p an Arab-Armenian-Zionist committee i n L o n d o n , Sir Gilbert C l a y t o n (Chief Political Officer) i n Cairo was urged to d o the same. Despite the

latter’s initial scepticism, both men used every opportunity i n the winter o f 1917-1918 t o encourage Arabs and Zionists t o consider mutual co-operation under the auspices of this three-sided entente.’ Although this intended alliance never became a real political force i n the post-war settlement, the scheme was nevertheless a n important channel through

which Zionist and Arab representatives learned more about each other’s intentions. More significantly, British support of the scheme eventually developed into the Weizmann-Faisal negotiations, which will be discussed later i n this chapter (pages 36f). F I R S T L O C A L C O N T A C T S . C A I R O A N D PALESTINE

I n the wartime climate of uncertainty, the news of the Balfour Declaration was received with some apprehension i n Arab political circles. T h i s was especially true i n Palestine,

where the exuberance and inflated expectations o f the local Jewish population (the yishuv) contributed t o Arab uneasiness. Anti-Zionism became a rallying cry and a focus for uniting Christian and M u s l i m elements o f the local population i n branches of what soon became the “Muslim-Christian Association” (MCA).¢ The first major disappointment for the Jews i n Palestine was the decision of the military authorities to prohibit official publication o f the Balfour Declaration, a b a n w h i c h was t o

remain i n effect until after the San Remo Conference i n April 1920. This was part of a concerted effort on the part o f O.E.T.A.(S) to dispel exaggerated Arab fears. The authorities encouraged, and expected, responsible Z i o n i s t leaders t o assist

them i n pacifying and reassuring the Arab population that the true aims of Zionism

did

not i n c l u d e t h e t h r e e t h i n g s

32

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

which the Arabs seemed to fear most, viz. (1) the immediate

imposition of a minority Jewish government, (2) the expulsion o f Arab inhabitants to make room for massive Jewish

immigration, or (3) Jewish desecration o f Muslim or Christian holy places.’ The burden of this public-relations campaign fell o n members of the “Zionist Commission to Palestine” (Z.C.), a visiting delegation of Zionist representatives from several allied countries, conceived at the British Foreign Office as a body t o advise the authorities i n Palestine “ i n all matters relating t o the Jews, o r w h i c h m a y affect the establishment o f

a National Home for the Jewish people i n accordance with the [Balfour] Declaration”. Ranking fifth among the Z.C.’s seven enumerated tasks was “ t o help i n establishing friendly

relations w i t h the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities”8 D r Weizmann headed the Commission, which soon became the most authoritative Zionist body i n Palestine, having i t s o w n departments parallel to those o f t h e British

administration.’ The early diplomatic activities of the Z.C. followed the general spirit o f the “Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente”, and included meetings w i t h representative Arab leaders. I n the attempt t o dispel anxieties and pave the w a y for future

co-operation, Weizmann and the Z.C. held Cairo talks w i t h Faris N i m r , Sa’id Shuqair, Sulaiman Nasif, K a m i l alQassab, A b d ar-Rahman Shahbandar, Rafiq al-Azm and others.!° These meetings were cordial enough, and some of the Arabs involved prepared a draft outline for ‘ t h e desired policy of mutual understanding, co-operation and alliance between Palestinians and Zionists”’.! The main points of the plan were: (1) inviolability of the holy places; (2) “ . . . a system of government based on even-handed justice and equality of rights between the different elements irrespective of their comparative numbers ...”’; (3) Arabic as the official language; (4) suspension of land sales until after the war; (5) establishment o f a government agricultural loans bank; (6) framing of a law “similar t o the Five Feddan L a w i n Egypt”; (7) “honest opportunity” for Zionists t o purchase State lands, b u t leaving ‘‘a reasonable share t o the other elements”; and (8) establishment o f an arbitration commission o f Muslims,

P O S T - W A R DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

33

Christians and Jews t o examine disputes and t o promote co-operation. The Z.C. chose n o t t o reply t o the proposals, finding the terms “ q u i t e unacceptable even as a basis for discussion”. The Zionists had their doubts about the motives a n d t h e status o f t h e A r a b personalities involved i n t h e talks,

but perhaps more importantly they recognized these terms as falling short o f their expectations for the new régime.!? Upon arriving i n Palestine from Cairo, the Z.C. held formal and informal meetings with local leaders, including

Kamil al-Husaini (then Mufti of Jerusalem), Musa Kazim al-Husaini (Mayor o f Jerusalem u n t i l 1920; thereafter President of the Palestine Arab Executive), Ismail al-Husaini, A b d

ar-Rauf Bitar, Amin Tamimi, al-Hajj Tawfig Hamad, Shibli Jamal and others.!* Despite the superficial cordiality shown i n many ( b u t not a l l ) o f these encounters, the contacts were

hardly satisfying t o either side.!* There is ample evidence of Zionist frustration i n dealings with local Palestinian notables. During his first meeting w i t h Kamil al-Husaini, D r Weizmann found the Mufti “extremely guarded” and demonstrating a spirit “which was unyieldi n g ” ; the Zionist leader had asked the Mufti for a public fraternal message, b u t the latter ‘‘refused”. Relations between the two m e n somewhat improved following the gift o f a

Quran (and, i t was rumoured, a financial consideration); yet, one month later, Zionists found the Mufti taking a hard line during further discussions.!*

Even more revealing is the account o f a later meeting

involving another Zionist leader, Menahem Ussishkin, who became chairman o f the Z.C. i n late 1919. Almost immediately after his arrival in Jerusalem i n October, Ussishkin paid courtesy visits to the Mufti a n d to the M a y o r , M u s a K a z i m

al-Husaini. I n both cases Ussishkin reported his reception as being marked b y “ t h a t superficial warmth so common i n the East”; both conversations turned on a single point—“the ‘burning question’ o f Zionists, Arabs and their relations”; and both men, concluded Ussishkin, were leading opponents o f the Jews.!6 Weizmann, Ussishkin and others had discovered for themselves one of the lessons learned during the pre-war period by Lichtheim (above, pages 25f.) and others: namely, that there

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

34

was an important distinction to be made between those Arabs residing i n Palestine and those from Egypt, Syria or elsewhere. The former were more difficult to deal with, and yet any agreement reached would ultimately have to win the approval of these “stubborn” local leaders." Zionist strategy was to adapt to this difficult situation b y trying, i n the first instance, to reach a n understanding with

non-Palestinians and then, with their help, hoping to convince the Palestinians t o co-operate for the m u t u a l benefit o f all

three elements.!® Thus, D r Weizmann would soon look t o a possible entente with the A m i r Faisal i b n H u s a i n as a w a y t o

overcome the unpleasantness and the difficulties o f negotiati n g directly w i t h local Palestinian leaders.

T H E B R I T I S H FACTOR

I n interpreting these local encounters, as well as the Weizmann-Faisal meetings, we m u s t n o t overestimate the seriousness with which each party took the other. For, i t was usually with one eye fixed firmly o n t h e i r B r i t i s h advisers that

both Zionist and Arab spokesmen operated, with the knowledge that, ultimately, British “say” would prove more decisive than any “understanding” reached with the other party.

Even though most British officials were pleased w i t h Weizmann’s first meetings w i t h Arab representatives, Weizmann himself was far from satisfied. H e was especially

annoyed w i t h the stubbornness shown by local Palestinians, while expressing contempt for the “merely financial” interest shown by non-Palestinian landowners. After three weeks of

talks, the Zionist leader turned o n the British with complaints (which were t o be echoed b y Zionists for decades afterwards) that negotiations were greatly hindered b y the fact that the B r i t i s h were n o t m a k i n g i t “ c l e a r ” e n o u g h t o t h e A r a b s t h a t

Zionism was there t o stay. “ I t is very desirable”, W e i z m a n n wrote t o Balfour,!?

that the Arabs o f Palestine should be brought t o realize the a c t u a l position a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h a t this work o f education can b e carried o u t o n l y b y the

POST-WAR DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

35

Authorities themselves. I t is o f n o use for us to attempt it, m a i n l y because t h e Arabs, so far as we can t e l l , are n o t i n a

frame o f m i n d i n which any explanations offered by us would receive serious attention. What is necessary is … that i t should be made perfectly clear t o them that [the Balfour] declaration represents the considered policy of H . M . Government, and that i t is their duty t o conform to it.

Whether t h i s was a n attempt t o evade Zionist responsibility

for facing Arab opposition head-on, i t is clear that many Jews i n Palestine were becoming increasingly suspicious of British attitudes and activities i n perpetuating, or even exciting, Arab opposition, rather than actively disarming it. Whatever the justification for these suspicions, i t is difficult t o discuss Arab-Zionist negotiations without taking into account the British factor. Another example o f British influence s t e m s from the British position as intermediary. M u c h o f the Arab-Zionist interaction of 1918-1920 was influenced by the fact that neither party was viewing the other directly, but rather through the eyes o f its British advisers. Thus, Arab and Zionist perceptions of each other were very often coloured by British prejudices o f one kind or another. Sykes’ and Clayton’s advice t o Arabs who were being encouraged to support the “Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente” held o u t the carrot of fabulous Jewish wealth, political connections and determination which, i f properly treated, would have been shared with the Arabs i n their search for international recognition and national renaissance. Similar images were conveyed t o K i n g Husain, i n the Hogarth message which reassured h i m that the Balfour Declaration offered no cause for alarm.” Zionists, likewise, learned from the British t o regard the Arabs according to certain fixed stereotypes. Thus, for example, William Ormsby-Gore, while serving as British liaison officer attached t o the Z.C., frequently expounded his contempt for the degenerate, “Levantinized” elements o f Palestine and Western Syria, while romanticizing the “real m e n ” o f the desert. Zionists accepted and echoed his distinction between the “so-called Arabs o f Palestine”, o n the one

hand, who were “dishonest, uneducated, greedy, ... unpatriotic”,

36

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

and the ‘“‘pure” Arabs of the “real Arab national movement” under Faisal, on the other.?! WEIZMANN-FAISAL NEGOTIATIONS

Perhaps the most famous o f all Zionist-Arab negotiations is the episode concerning D r Weizmann and the Amir Faisal. I t was their secret agreement o f January 1919 which sought to harmonize the interests o f Arabs and Zionists (and the British) a t the Paris Peace Conference, and which might have become the basis o f a long-term accord. The significance of the agreement, and the reasons why i t was never fully consummated, have been the subject o f much comment and interpretation. The standard Arab view is that Faisal was faithfully advancing nationalist aspirations throughout, and that any alleged agreement with the Zionists was—at best—based on misunderstandings and misinterpretations, or—at worst—a product o f British/Zionist pressure, deception and/or forgery.?? Most Zionists have viewed Faisal as a well-intentioned b u t weak leader, w h o fully understood the terms o f h i s agreement w i t h D r W e i z m a n n b u t w h o was

unable t o satisfy the Zionists largely because the Great Powers were unwilling to grant h i m full independence i n Syria.?* The truth, no doubt, lies somewhere between these two extremes, although there is certainly enough ambiguity i n the historical evidence t o allow each of these one-sided interpretations t o appear credible t o its respective proponents. I n the remainder o f this chapter, o u r purpose is to situate

this episode i n the context o f the situation i n Palestine, British-Arab-Zionist relations, and Anglo-French relations, w i t h special emphasis o n the motives o f the t w o leaders a n d t h e i r ability to “ d e l i v e r t h e goods” i n a n agreement. A s suggested above (page 34), 1t was just a t the p o i n t where D r

Weizmann was reaching a dead end i n his talks with Palestinian Arabs that British plans for a meeting w i t h Faisal (first suggested i n February by Gen. Clayton) took shape. T h i s offered W e i z m a n n a convenient w a y o u t o f t h e impasse

which had been reached locally, and he proceeded t o dismiss t h e “ p r o b l e m o f o u r relations w i t h t h e Palestinian A r a b s ’ as

POST-WAR D I P L O M A C Y ,

1918-1920

37

“ a n economic problem, n o t a political o n e ” , while looking

forward to a “real political entente” with Faisal at their proposed first meeting i n early June 1918.24 Faisal, for his part, would soon be encouraged, both by his British advisers and b y Weizmann himself, to look upon the Zionists as potential powerful allies. Although Faisal was extremely guarded a t their first meeting, their British interpreter claimed that both leaders had understood quite clearly the lines of a future “exchange of services” and the mutual advantages to be expected.? This preliminary understanding was elaborated further i n meetings held i n London i n December 1918 on the eve o f the Paris Peace Conference and following the installation of Faisal’s Arab administration i n Damascus.? The terms of their agreement were ratified i n the historic treaty dated January 3 1919.7 Some of the short-term objectives of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement were easily p u t i n t o effect during the Peace

Conference. I n his February 6th appearance before the Council of Ten, Faisal claimed full Arab independence, b u t was reported to have left the question of Palestine “ o n one side”, i n deference t o its “universal character’.2 For his part, D r Weizmann continued t o argue, i n their joint interest, for the abolition of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Rabbi Stephen Wise o f the American Zionist delegation to Paris was a b l e to

arrange an interview for Faisal with President Woodrow Wilson. Still i n the future lay the prospect that the soon-to-be independent Arab state would benefit from Jewish capital ? investment and loans. Taken together, the British and Zionist records o f their meetings and agreement would suggest that the interests and strategies o f Weizmann and Faisal on the eve o f the Paris Peace Conference were as follows:

(1) Both Weizmann and Faisal felt their respective causes t o b e greatly dependent o n British goodwill a n d diplomatic support. B o t h were prepared t o go t o great lengths to please

their British patrons b y signing the agreement, which was being encouraged b y the energetic T . E . Lawrence.

(2) Both leaders saw i n the Sykes-Picot agreement a serious obstacle t o the realization o f their iespective aims. B y

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

38

reaching an accord of their own—under British guidance and inspiration—they might be helping t o undo the objectionable

Anglo-French agreement. (This would have coincided neatly w i t h Britain’s o w n attempts to evade fulfilment o f that

agreement.) -

(3) Weizmann, for his part, would have obtained the assent of the most prestigious Arab leader o f the period to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the exclusion o f Palestine from the broader claims for an independent Arab state. I n a practical sense, Faisal would have been called upon t o use his influence t o moderate the cries of the more militant elements

in Damascus and in Palestine. (4) For the Arabs, Faisal would have obtained Zionist technical, organizational and financial support for his young administration, plus political/diplomatic assistance from in-

fluential Zionists in Western capitals, especially in Paris, where difficulties were anticipated. (5) Faisal clearly saw his agreement with the Zionists as another weapon which would be needed to counter French pretensions to Syria—thus his important reservation that he would n o t “ b e b o u n d b y a single word” o f t h e agreement should his demands for a n independent Arab state n o t b e

granted. T H E UNDOING O F T H E WEIZMANN-FAISAL A G R E E M E N T

February 1919 seems t o have been the high-point o f the

usefulness and the credibility of the Weizmann-Faisal accord. Despite persistent Zionist hopes during the n e x t year that the essentials of the agreement might still be put i n t o effect, a series of internal and external contradictions began t o undermine both men’s ability t o “deliver the goods” which each had promised. The March 1, 1919 letter from Faisal to Felix Frankfurter of the American Zionist delegation t o Paris— usually cited as an additional proof of the Amir’s commitment to Jewish-Arab brotherhood and co-operation—must really be recognized as a dément: hastily extracted for the purpose of undoing some o f the harm caused b y Faisal’s hostile comments given i n a n interview to a French newspaper.! T h e

POST-WAR D I P L O M A C Y ,

1918-1920

39

publicity given t o this letter (the January agreement with Weizmann remained secret for several years) i n turn provoked sharp Arab suspicion o f the A m i r , beginning a pattern which was t o be repeated d u r i n g the coming months. Several local Syrian and Palestinian leaders went on record as denouncing the concessions which Faisal appeared t o be making to the Zionists. I n fact, within weeks o f the signing of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, members of Faisal’s own entourage were already working a t cross-purposes to the lines of its compromise. Awni A b d al-Hadi, a Palestinian nationalist then serving as Faisal’s secretary i n Paris, approached a member o f the Zionist

Delegation there i n late January 1919. Reacting t o the official 2 . 0 . proposals t o the Peace Conference, Awni explained that t h e Arabs were “ t r o u b l e d o n t h e p o i n t o f Zionist claims t o

British Trusteeship for Palestine as they believe[d] that such claim would strengthen the French claim for Trusteeship o f Syria”.3 What the Arabs really wanted, Awni claimed, was that “ S y r i a should b e a n independent state under Arab r u l e ” ,

and that Jews and Arabs should “arrange matters between themselves i n the m o s t favourable way for both”, i.e., putting aside the European powers. W i t h i n a proposed federation of Arab countries, he suggested, “ a l l rights and liberties would b e given t o t h e Jews i n Palestine o n e q u a l terms w i t h t h e

Arabs’. The Zionist representative noted that such a scheme fell short of the Zionist programme, but promised t o communicate Awni’s views t o D r Weizmann. I t is difficult to t e l l w h e t h e r A w n i was speaking unofhcially

for Faisal. I n any event, no confederation scheme was formally proposed by Faisal t o the Peace Conference. A reflection o f the difficult position Faisal found himself in i n

Europe, the “Arab question” remained ambiguous enough for British, French and Zionists all t o believe that Faisal would ultimately be able t o harmonize his interests with their own. After Faisal’s return to Damascus i n the summer o f

1919, the ambiguities of his position persisted, leading one British intelligence officer to evaluate his agreement w i t h

Weizmann as being “ n o t worth the paper i t [was] written on o r the energy wasted i n the conversation t o make 1t”. O n the

other hand, he continued,*

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40

if i t becomes sufficiently known among the Arabs, i t will be somewhat i n the nature o f a noose about Faisal’s neck, for he will be regarded b y the Arab population as a traitor. N o greater mistake could be made than to regard Faisal as a representative o f Palestinian Arabs . . . ; he is i n favour with them so long as he embodies Arab nationalism and represents their views, b u t would n o longer have any power over them i f they thought he had made any sort of agreement with Zionists and meant to abide b y i t . B u t i t seems that h e is capable o f making contradictory agree-

ments with the French, the Zionists and ourselves, of receiving money from all three, and then endeavouring to act as h e pleases. This is a n additional reason w h y his agreement with Weizmann is o f l i t t l e o r n o value.

Soon i t became very difficult for Zionists t o ignore the evidence o f Faisal’s inability t o w i n his followers over t o the

proposed Zionist-Arab rapprochement. The Syrian Congress meeting i n Damascus (July 2 1919) declared its opposition t o “ t h e pretension o f the Zionists to create a Jewish common-

wealth i n the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine”, and t o any “ Z i o n i s t migration to any part o f o u r country”: “ F o r we d o not acknowledge their t i t l e b u t consider t h e m a grave peril t o o u r people from the n a t i o n a l , economical, a n d

political

points of view”.

D e s p i t e British

satisfaction

with

Faisal’s o w n moderation a t t h i s time, D r W e i z m a n n felt t h a t

the Amir’s testimony before the King-Crane Commission was “ n o t fair” and i n flagrant violation of their understanding. When Faisal returned to Europe i n the fall o f 1919, he had considerably less room for manoeuvre.?” Once i t became clear that the French expected the implementation of a t least part of the Sykes-Picot provisions, the British, i n effect, abandoned Faisal and Syria t o French wishes. Weizmann and Faisal met again i n London i n September, b u t the Zionist diplomatic support once promised for t h e A r a b cause amounted t o

nothing. Lacking British backing for the purpose, and themselves lobbying for French sympathy, Zionists were i n no

position

to

take up Faisal’s claims against the French

determination to occupy a l l of S y r i a . I n an interview w i t h the Jewish Chronicle of London i n early

POST-WAR DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

41

October 1919, Faisal had kind words for D r Weizmann’s “moderate” Zionist aims. B u t , when pressed b y the interviewer, he stated that he regarded Palestine not as an a u t o n o m o u s Jewish domain, b u t rather as a province o f his future Arab kingdom.*® During one o f several meetings sought b y Zionists to obtain favourable “clarifications” t o what they considered the “unfortunate impressions” left b y this interview, Awni A b d al-Hadi again spoke u p for his version of Arab and Palestinian rights.‘ H e denounced the Balfour Declaration as a serious obstacle to Arab-Jewish understand-

ing, and “advised the Zionists, in their own interests t o stop all talk of a Jewish Palestine”: This manner o f speech was very offensive to the Palestinian

Arabs, who regarded Palestine as their country, having lived there for so many centuries.... Today the Jews were still i n a very small minority, and i t was to h i m unthinkable that the Arabs could renounce their claim to Palestine i n favour of the Jews. Completing his arguments, Awni further advised t h e Zionists i n t h e i r o w n interests n o t to p u t b l i n d

faith i n the British Government. H e absolutely failed to understand why they had so much confidence i n and friendship for Great B r i t a i n . . . [T]he Zionists asked for the friendship o f the Arabs, but what had they done for the Arab cause?

I n reply, the Zionist representatives proceeded t o elaborate the historical and contemporary reasons for their loyalty to

Great Britain, and asked what

sort

of help Awni was

seeking for the Arabs. Awni then repeated his earlier proposal

that the Z.O. support a settlement of the Eastern question i n which Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia would be united i n an “independent confederation with an Arab king, under the League of Nations”, leaving only spheres o f economic influence to England and France. The Zionists emphasized that this suggestion could “ n o t be entertained for a moment” and reaffirmed their preference for a European-backed Zionist programme:

42

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

[T]he promise o f a Jewish Palestine ... was made b y all the Great Powers, and i t was o n the strength o f that hope that

the Jews would put forth a l l their energy and enthusiasm. I f that hope were removed, . . . the Near East would n o t be

able t o attract those Jewish elements [i.e., capital, technical expertise, etc.] which were indispensable.

W i t h these and other negative undercurrents to his dealings with Europeans and Zionists, Faisal’s ability t o “say nice things” to the latter i n public—as h e had done i n a n

interview with the London Times and in his letter to Frankfurter —was n o w reduced t o almost n i l . O n e o f t h e reasons, as Faisal himself confessed to N a h u m Sokolow, was

his deference t o “ t h e feeling among Arabs i n Palestine’ .#2 I n private, however, Zionists and Faisal kept u p their cordial relations, maintaining the evident discrepancy “between Faisal’s public utterances and his readiness t o bargain with the Zionists behind the scenes—where he was safe from possible detractors”’.4 Faisal soon found h i m s e l f unable to provide the Zionists

with the requested calming influence over the mounting anti-Zionist campaign waged b y the Palestinian C l u b and other nationalist circles in Damascus. I n January 1919, Sir Mark Sykes had personally intervened t o scold Damascus politicians n o t t o interfere i n Palestinian affairs;** notwithstanding his efforts, anti-Zionist agitation there increased throughout 1919 and the first half o f 1920. Anti-Jewish riots and a general uprising were feared i n March 1919; northern Palestine experienced insecurity and raiding i n late 1919; peaceful demonstrations were followed by full-scale rioting i n Jerusalem i n the spring of 1920.45 Whatever his earlier intentions regarding an agreement w i t h the Zionists, Faisal was soon at the head o f a n

anti-European and anti-Zionist wave of nationalist feeling i n Syria a n d Palestine. I n a n a t t e m p t to pressure t h e European

powers with a fait accompli, the Syrian Congress i n early March 1920 proclaimed Faisal K i n g o f an independent and united A r a b K i n g d o m , which included Palestine, and declared its strong opposition t o Zionist a i m s . ‘ Most British reports during this period portrayed Faisal as a moderate

POST-WAR DIPLOMACY,

1918-1920

43

being swept along by radical forces, while Zionist reports indicated that the new King was still secretly hoping for Jewish financial and political support i n the context of an Arab-Zionist agreement.‘ B u t i t is difficult t o believe that anyone could have seriously contemplated a successful Arab-Zionist agreement at this t i m e . Despite B r i t i s h reports o f Faisal’s professions o f

continued friendship and of the likelihood o f his not opposing the Jewish national home if certain concessions were granted to him, 4 Faisal’s public pronouncements o n the Zionist question were categorical enough. H e protested the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel as first High Commissioner for Palestine as a step leading to the formation o f a “Jewish govern-

ment” there.’ H e called for an Arab government i n Palestine, to be linked with Syria i n a decentralised relationship, with a n

end t o Jewish immigration and land-purchase.® For the purposes of “calming the people who [were] i n a most agitated state o f mind and spirit”, h e requested the British to issue a “satisfactory declaration” to the effect that n o British-Zionist

commitments stood in the way of Palestine being considered a part o f greater Syria. And, as for the question o f his alleged

“acquiescence i n the creation of a national home for Jews i n Palestine”, he explained i n a letter t o General Allenby: I believe there is some misunderstanding. A l l that I have admitted is t o safeguard the rights of the Jews i n that country as m u c h as t h e indigenous Arab i n h a b i t a n t s are safeguarded and t o allow them the same rights a n d

privileges. The Arabs o f Palestine, both Christians and Moslems, have repeatedly availed themselves o f every opportunity t o protest against any agreement or pledge that would make their motherland a national home for the Jews.

Notwithstanding the “correctness” o f Faisal’s official pronouncements o n t h e Z i o n i s t question, Arab nationalist suspicions were aroused b y persisting ambiguities. Reacting to

rumours that some Syrian officials were i n fact holding secret talks w i t h Zionists i n June 1920 (cf. pages 67-8 below), a Palestinian representative i n the Syrian Congress made the following declaration :3?

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

44

i n the future we will be unable to be silent and will not agree to Palestine’s being sacrificed on the altar of [Syrian]

independence. . . . The Government m u s t deny the reports which have spread . . . and deliver specific instructions t o its emissaries t o reject all the rumours connected with the Zionist question. . . . The Palestinians have been silent until now because of the honour o f the Syrian state; b u t wretched Palestine has been devastated. Throughout this episode i t was not only Faisal who proved unable to “deliver the goods” foreshadowed i n the tentative agreement. D r Weizmann, as we have noted, was unable to apply any pro-Arab pressure on the French; when one Zionist made the suggestion that American Jews might assist Faisal b y influencing their government not to recognize the French c l a i m t o S y r i a , h i s i d e a was considered too dangerous t o Zionist-French relations t o be acted upon.3 The financial support a n t i c i p a t e d by Faisal a l s o came t o n a u g h t . O n t h e

one hand, Zionist funds were not easily forthcoming for purely Zionist purposes i n Palestine. Given its instability and bankruptcy, the declining Arab administration a t Damascus offered little attraction for Jewish investors, who could n o t fail to notice the hardening anti-Zionist line which animated political circles there.“ The final act i n the undoing of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement coincided w i t h t h e French military advance a n d

Faisal’s downfall i n the summer of 1920. Although D r Weizmann seems t o have been tempted momentarily t o accept an invitation to meet with Faisal at this time, he was discouraged from doing so by a combination of several factors. I t is likely that he was influenced b y British advice that a

visit

t o t h e independent D a m a s c u s

régime might have

implied “recognition”, while his own personal appraisal could not have doubted Faisal’s real impotence t o carry o u t a n agreement. A t t h e same time, t h e decision o f t h e powers a t

San Remo, which had accorded the Palestine Mandate t o Great Britain under the terms of the Balfour Declaration (and the Syrian M a n d a t e to France), was a major political

victory for the Zionists; this, no doubt, made an agreement with Faisal seem less urgent than previously.

POST-WAR D I P L O M A C Y ,

1918-1920

45

When their one-time ally was expelled from Syria on J u l y 24, 1920 b y the French, Zionists seemed relieved rather than

disappointed. From their point of view, Faisal had proved incapable of providing a m i n i m u m of order and stability, whatever his intentions or goodwill; the arrival of the French, at the very least, would mean an improvement of the security situation in the north. The extent of Zionist sympathy for Faisal o n his expulsion comes out clearly from the record o f the meeting which took place in Haifa o n August 6th between

the deposed King and D r M . D . Eder of the Z.C.% D r Eder took the opportunity t o scold the Amir for having tried t o be “too clever” and suggested that he might have been more successful with a ‘straightforward policy”. Faisal, for his part, was already thinking ahead t o his return to Syria and was

enquiring about political support from Zionists in Western capitals, and from “ t h e Jewish press, which was so powerful”. Eder replied that any future collaboration would take place only on condition that Faisal (a) win uncontested recognition as the leader of ‘ ‘ a united Arab nation, outside the limits o f Palestine”, (b) “use his influence with the Arabs t o stay their anti-Zionist propaganda”, and (c) “recognize fully the Zionist influence i n Palestine, stopping all cries of United Syria”.

O n this

note

ended the famous Weizmann-Faisal negotia-

tions. Despite their ultimate failure, D r Weizmann would look back, i n 1930, to his relations with Faisal and describe them as “ a landmark of the ground which has been lost i n these ten years.’ Indeed, the unconsummated WeizmannFaisal agreement w a s t o become a model for future

Zionist

suggestions for solving the Palestine problem, as well as a

formative experience for D r Weizmann’s own personal diplomacy with Arab leaders. The episode was also valuable i n providing some immediate lessons i n the processes of Arab-Zionist diplomacy:

(1) I t underscored the distinction between the local Palestinian, and the wider pan-Arab, dimensions o f Arab-Zionist negotiations.

(2) Given the tenuousness of the pan-Arab ideal, the inability o f a single Arab leader to consolidate an effective leadership over all Arabs (including Palestinians), and the

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

46

“hard l i n e ” adopted b y local Palestinian leaders o n the Zionist question, there was little real chance for a successful Zionist-Arab “exchange of services” along the lines o f the Weizmann-Faisal agreement. (3) Even i f the above handicaps had been overcome, i t was essential for any Arab-Zionist agreement t o coincide w i t h t h e

interests and plans of the great powers i n the area—i.e., both Great B r i t a i n a n d France a t this time. Neither Arabs nor

Zionists could be considered free bargaining agents. A major attraction o f an agreement for Zionists and Arabs alike lay i n the positive effect that each side felt an accord would have o n its relations w i t h one or both of the great powers. (4) Neither Arabs nor Zionists were really capable of

providing what the other needed most a t the time. Just as Faisal had proven unable t o “deliver” his part of the agreement, so too had D r W e i z m a n n . B o t h parties found that

the European powers were the effective donors o r withholders of what each was seeking. The Zionists wanted nothing less than the application of the Balfour Declaration policy t o Palestine, while the Arabs sought a maximum degree o f independence i n

most o f t h e Fertile

Crescent.

Only

the

British and the French were i n any position t o assure these

goals for either party.

(5) I n a sense, a full political entente between Arabs and Zionists was of incidental importance, both to the principal antagonists and t o the great powers. The latter lent their support t o t h e lofty ideal o f a n accord o n l y w h e n i t was considered useful t o t h e i r m o r e u r g e n t pursuits.

CHAPTER 3

High-Level Meetings in the Early Twenties

A N O T H E R PALESTINIAN-ZIONIST ENCOUNTER

As we have already noted, the first results o f the post-war settlement announced a t San R e m o were m u c h t o the

satisfaction o f the Zionists, and hardly t o the satisfaction of the Arabs, least of a l l to the Arabs of Palestine. Negotiation attempts i n 1921-1922 were situated primarily i n this context.

Apart from the serious rioting of M a y 1921, Zionists were faced with the nuisance value o f Arab opposition and the possibility that unfavourable Arab reaction might adversely affect t h e terms o f the draft Mandate for Palestine, which was t o receive final approval from the League of Nations i n J u l y 1922. Lobbying for European support was thus accompanied

b y Z i o n i s t diplomatic a c t i v i t y a i m e d a t disarming o r m u t i n g Arab opposition, w h i l e t h e Arabs tried to use n e g o t i a t i n g opportunities to reverse some o f the gains o f the new

European mandatory powers and o f the Zionists. The consolidation of Zionist success after San Remo seemed t o be well under way when Sir Herbert Samuel was named Palestine’s first High Commissioner (H.C.), putting a n end to t h e military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , whose relations w i t h

the ypishuv h a d become strained t o the breaking-point. Following Samuel’s arrival i n Palestine on June 30, 1920, significant improvements i n the atmosphere were felt throughout the country, while the fall o f the Arab régime i n Damascus added to the n e w feeling o f peace a n d security.! B y

March 1921 Palestine appeared as the only M i d d l e Eastern country where England had n o worries. When the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, visited there, he received a memorandum from the Jewish community, expressing profound gratitude t o Great Britain, singing

47

48

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

t h e praises o f S i r Herbert Samuel, a n d r i n g i n g w i t h o p t i m i s m

about a peaceful and prosperous future. I n contrast, the

Executive Committee of the Arab Congress held i n Haifa (December 1920), known as the Arab Executive (A.E.), presented a lengthy catalogue of Arab objections t o the Jewish National Home policy on legal, historical, moral, economic and political grounds. Neither M r Churchill nor the H.C. had any hesitation i n dismissing the memorandum (inspired b y “The Jewish Peril”) as a n exaggerated portrait of gloom and doom.? The rioting® which erupted five weeks later (May 1st) i n Jaffa and which spread to neighbouring settlements came as a shock t o Jews and British

alike, b u t

especially t o S i r Herbert

Samuel. Samuel’s reaction—based o n a n e w conviction that

the Zionists had t o prove b y their deeds (economic development) and b y their words (conciliatory statements) that they had no intention of harming Palestinian Arab interests— quickly lost h i m the esteem of the Zionist camp, which looked upon h i m as lacking the backbone needed t o stand u p t o

Arab violence and political blackmail. Although i t d i d heighten Zionist concern for, and produce deeper analyses of, their “Arab question”, the crisis of May-June 1921 d i d not lead to any direct Arab-Zionist talks. As i n the case o f the previous rioting of A p r i l 1920 i n Jerusalem the aftermath o f such a n event was hardly t h e

proper ‘psychological m o m e n t ’ : any rapprochement, declared one Zionist observer, was “forbidden alike by Jewish self-respect and b y Arab self-confidence”.¢ S i r H e r b e r t Samuel, aware o f Zionist disappointment i n

his

chosen policy of conciliation, nevertheless insisted that “ U n less there [was] very careful steering i t [was] upon the Arab rock that the Zionist ship may be wrecked.”’” Largely in response to this k i n d o f urging, the Zionist Congress meeting i n Carlsbad i n September 1921 passed a resolution solemnly declaring its d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o l i v e w i t h t h e Arab people o n terms o f

concord and mutual respect, and together w i t h them t o make the common home into a flourishing Commonwealth, the u p b u i l d i n g o f w h i c h m a y assure t o each o f its

peoples an undisturbed national development.8

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N THE EARLY TWENTIES

49

Also i n response to Samuel’s pressure, a meeting was arranged between members o f the Palestine Arab Delegation visiting London® and D r Weizmann of the Zionist Organisation (Z.O.) at the Colonial Office. Neither Weizmann nor

Musa Kazim al-Husaini, who headed the Arab Delegation, seemed enthusiastic about the meeting, b u t neither was i n a position t o resist the pressures being exerted by the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, and the Head of the C.O. M i d d l e East Department, Sir J o h n Shuckburgh.!® W e have three sets of minutes of the meeting o f November 29, 1921, and all illustrate the frustrations and futility o f the discussions.!! According t o the British record, D r Weizmann began his statement i n a conciliatory tone, offering to discuss with the Arabs the two main points proposed b y the British as a basis for discussion: (a) Arab fears of Jewish immigration, and (b) Arab fears of Jewish political ascendancy. H e “professed t o disregard all the events o f the last six months [i.e., Jaffa riots] and the pin-pricks o f earlier periods”. Although the point could have had little, i f any, positive effect on the Palestine delegation, Weizmann justified his position b y recalling “ t h a t his views had been completely understood b y the E m i r Faisal and had been accepted b y h i m as the representative o f the Arab w o r l d ” .

Musa Kazim, speaking for the Arab Delegation, seemed t o ignore D r Weizmann’s statement, a n d went directly t o a n

attack o f the proposed British Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. I t was as though h e d i d n o t wish t o recognize t h e

Z.O. as a party to his dispute w i t h Great Britain. Perhaps he was offended b y D r W e i z m a n n ’ s tone d u r i n g t h e encounter,

which was described b y one British observer as “unfortuna t e ” , as though h e were ‘ ‘ a conqueror h a n d i n g to beaten foes the terms o f peace”.!? Indeed, Weizmann’s attitude was offensive enough t o become legendary, a n d was recalled (forty

years after the event) by Jamal al-Husaini i n the following terms: D r Ch. Veitzman [sic] said t o the Delegation ... that they should better take heed of the power o f the Jews. H e said because Russians had pogroms against Jews, the Jewish people were able to destroy Russia and t h a t anyone w h o

50

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

stands against their interests will similarly be destroyed. I n protest against this threat, the delegation withdrew from the meeting.!* From the Zionist leader’s point of view, the meeting had been “rather humiliating”; he saw the Arabs as being “ i n a very strong position” and “exceedingly well coached b y their British advisers” 14 Thus ended this rare British-sponsored meeting which a i m e d a t a direct conciliation between Z i o n i s t a n d Palestin-

ian leaders. À few private meetings were subsequently held between Zionist representatives and individual members of the Arab Delegation who were considered to be more “moderate”. W e i z m a n n himself m e t with M u ’ i n al-Madi,

while other meetings included one with Ibrahim Shammas, where a possible trade-off between the Arab demand for a “national government” and the Zionist insistence o n noninterference with immigration was considered. B u t none of these meetings produced any breakthrough t o a n accord o n

the proposed Mandate or the future constitution of Palestine.!5

I t seems that b y this time the tactic of boycotting the Zionists was already a cornerstone o f the Palestinian Arab

approach.!é This was reflected i n (a) the firm and repeated rejection of the Balfour Declaration or any document (Pales-

tine Mandate, Palestine Constitution) which incorporated it; (b) the successful Arab boycott of the elections for the first Legislative Council (1922-1923); and (c) the rejection o f the successive

British

proposals t o create a n Advisory Council

(summer 1923) a n d a n ‘ ‘ A r a b A g e n c y ” t o b e considered

parallel t o the Jewish Agency (November 1923).17 T h e official Arab position a t this t i m e , as defined b y the

Haifa Congress resolutions of December 1920, included the annulment of the Balfour Declaration and the creation of a representative ‘national government”.!®* There was no possib l e deal w i t h the Zionists, o n terms acceptable t o t h e latter,

which could have helped t o advance these goals. The Palestine Arab Delegation left London i n mid-1922 after rejecting the new Statement of British Policy (Churchill

White

Paper,

June 1922) a n d ,

subsequently, t h e

Mandate

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N T H E E A R L Y TWENTIES

51

approved by the League of Nations.! The Zionists, on the other hand, accepted these two documents as the basis o f continuing

their activities i n Palestine, and turned increasingly t o the British for sympathetic implementation of their obligations t o the

Jews, if need be without the desired Arab assent.2 E A R L Y RELATIONS W I T H A M I R A B D A L L A H

A t t h i s stage there appeared t o b e n o c o m m o n ground o n which Zionist or Palestinian leaders could meet with a view t o

a political entente. Meetings such as the last one described n o d o u b t confirmed the Zionist tendency to p u t aside the

Palestinians as a political factor i n favour of “pan-Arab” diplomacy. Since 1918, Zionist Arab policy seemed t o prefer maintaining social and economic relations w i t h certain amenable Palestinian Arabs, while shunning any political dealings with M.C.A. or Haifa Congress leaders—1i.e., boycott i n g , i n effect, a significant sector o f the local leadership. This

tactic neatly complemented the weapon being perfected by the latter Palestinian leaders, t o produce the now-familiar pattern o f mutual non-recognition. Happily for the Zionists, relations with Arab leaders outside Palestine h a d n o t yet reached this p o i n t , a n d i n the

post-war period important talks were held w i t h Abdallah I b n

Husain, as well as with Syrian nationalists. While Zionists had foresaken Faisal’s sinking ship i n 1920, they were nevertheless r e l u c t a n t t o a b a n d o n completely t h e q u e s t for

good relations w i t h the “one great leader” who could be considered representative o f t h e A r a b world as a w h o l e . A s

early as November 1919, D r W e i z m a n n had come t o the

conclusion, on the basis o f his experience with Faisal, that the “ m a i n difficulty” i n the Arab question was “ t h e fact that there [was] no responsible head o f the Arab nation with whom one can d e a l ” . Other Zionists shared this view, which

implied

t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e Arabs w a s dependent less

o n t h e i r o w n willingness o r o n t h e possible terms, t h a n o n

internal conditions within the Arab world. I n order for any negotiations to succeed, Zionists felt, the Arabs would have t o present a common front under a single, undisputed leader whose d i p l o m a c y w a s unlikely t o b e repudiated.??

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While o n several occasions (1922, 1925 and 1930) D r Weizmann did entertain some hope o f reviving his “exchange of services” with Faisal, who became K i n g o f Iraq i n 1921,2 more serious attention was soon devoted to A b d a l l a h , Faisal’s

elder brother, who was installed i n Transjordan b y Winston Churchill i n March 1921. Contacts which began later that year were to continue u n t i l Abdallah’s assassination b y a

Palestinian i n J u l y 1951. B y looking at the early phases of Zionist-Abdallah relations, i t is not difficult to see a resemb-

lance to the Weizmann-Faisal episode, both i n terms of the mutual expectations and the seeds of failure. The creation i n 1922 of the Emirate of Transjordan, separate from Palestine w e s t o f the Jordan River and excluding the application o f the Jewish National H o m e provisions of the Mandate, was a blow t o all Zionists. But, ironically, i t gave them and the A m i r Abdallah a common interest: the reunification of Transjordan with western Palestine—although each party had a distinctly different vision o f the nature o f t h e reunited country. F o r A b d a l l a h i t was to b e

the first step toward his dream o f ruling a united Arab kingdom which would include Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and I r a q . ” F o r Zionists i t was t o be a return to the original

scope of the land “promised” a t the time o f the Balfour

Declaration. Abdallah’s a m b i t i o n s were evident w h e n , i n l a t e O c t o b e r

1921, he made friendly overtures t o Zionist representatives i n Palestine, seeking a loan and h e l p i n g to spread rumours t h a t

the French might consider having h i m rule a t Damascus. T h e suggestion was made that i f the Zionists would help h i m w i n French approval, then the A m i r would be “well disposed” t o Zionism i n Palestine. Zionists expressed relief when nothing came o f these “fantastic” rumours.? A year l a t e r A b d a l l a h travelled to L o n d o n t o negotiate a new treaty w i t h Great B r i t a i n . While i n L o n d o n , the Amir

held a t least five secret meetings w i t h D r Weizmann. A l t h o u g h the precise details o f these talks are n o t k n o w n , i t seems likely that the two leaders explored the possibility o f

Zionist financial assistance for Transjordan, and Abdallah’s recognition o f the Jewish National Home i n exchange for his becoming the ruler o f a reunited Palestine.

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N THE EARLY TWENTIES

The Weizmann-Abdallah talks appear

to

53

have been preli-

minary only, b u t once word had leaked out that they had taken place, both leaders found themselves facing strong internal criticism. A number o f Palestinian leaders found this the first of many occasions t o suspect the motives and manoeuvres of their new Hashemite neighbour, who seemed a l l too w i l l i n g to advance his o w n personal projects a t their

expense.? O n the Zionist side, rumours of Abdallah’s “expansionist” ambitions caused much alarm.® Suspicion, hostility a n d cries o f “ s e l l - o u t ” were directed a t D r W e i z m a n n when

press reports implied that official Zionist circles favoured a strong Arab state under Abdallah. David Ben-Gurion led the

critics of this “secret diplomacy”, declaring that only a empowered t o take s u c h a n i m p o r t a n t

Z i o n i s t Congress w a s

step; D r Weizmann, he warned, having already ‘failed once

with Faisal ... m u s t be

careful n o t t o d o t h e s a m e t h i s time”

with Abdallah.® I n defence of Weizmann’s position, Col. F . H . Kisch o f the Palestine Zionist Executive (P.Z.E.) explained that, i n all their negotiations, Zionist leaders were i n s i s t i n g o n terms w h i c h w o u l d leave Palestine one day

“qualitatively and quantitatively Jewish”. As for their attit u d e to A r a b u n i t y proposals, K i s c h saw “diplomatic sympathy’ as a small price to pay for the likely advantages o f

Arab goodwill and, i n British eyes, “the credit for having shown . . . good-will towards the Arabs’.30 Whatever had been Weizmann’s first assessment o f the real possibilities of a deal with Abdallah when they talked i n

October 1922, the Zionist leader had reached a decidedly negative conclusion following a visit t o Palestine. I t was, he reported i n February 1923, “very doubtful whether the Emir carries any weight i n Palestine or even i n Trans-Jordania itself, and whether his promises and guarantees do represent a n asset o f any real value”. Furthermore, D r Weizmann was forced to admit that “Jewish opinion i n Palestine and i n the World generally . . . would no doubt resent such a project”, i.e., Abdallah enthroned over a r e u n i t e d P a l e s t i n e . ’ Despite the fact that British officials were never attracted t o the idea,3? the rumour-mill periodically suggested that Abdallah was on the verge of winning British support for his reunification s c h e m e , which had the predictable effect of exciting

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

54

Jewish suspicion of British intentions and accusations of lack of vigilance directed against their own leaders. I n their future dealings with Abdallah, Zionists would

often find the Amir’s dream of reuniting Palestine lurking behind his friendly smile. But, owing to Jewish public opinion and the uncertain authority of the Amir, there were no further serious n e g o t i a t i o n s

with Abdallah

until the

1930s.

Good relations were continued, however, o n an informal, non-political basis, marked b y ceremonial visits and exchanges of friendly greetings,* and undaunted b y the occasional anti-Zionist public statements b y the Amir. SYRIAN NATIONALISTS

Although the Zionist leadership would have much preferred to deal with a single respected Arab leader, they could not afford to exclude other options, such as lesser politicians o r

nationalist circles. While a number of overtures were easily sidestepped once t h e status o r m o t i v e s o f t h e A r a b s proved

doubtful, there was one group which in 1922 appeared worthy of serious consideration and D r Weizmann’s personal attention. I n November 1921, while the Palestine Arab Delegation was i n London, meetings were arranged between D r Weizmann and Riad as-Sulh, the exiled son o f a former minister i n Faisal’s Damascus government and a future Prime

Minister of the Lebanon. Riad was also a personal friend o f t w o yishuv activists, H . M . Kalvaryski and Ittamar Ben-Avi (editor o f the paper, Doar ha-Yom), and had hoped t o serve as a

go-between for

t a l k s between Palestinians a n d t h e

Z.O.

in

L o n d o n . While failing to serve any useful function between the t w o principal antagonists, R i a d d i d take part i n private discussions w i t h D r Weizmann, James de Rothschild and Ittamar Ben-Avi1.%

The basis for these discussions w a s a d o c u m e n t drafted by Ben-Avi, entitled “Proposed Arab-Jewish E n t e n t e ” # a n d framed i n the spirit o f the recent “common-home” resolution passed b y the Zionist Congress (page 48, above). T h e proposed entente h a d t h e following provisions: ( 1 ) a n endorsem e n t and interpretation o f the Balfour Declaration; (2) equal recognition of Jewish and Arab nationalities i n Palestine,

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N THE EARLY TWENTIES

55

w i t h respect for minority rights i n mixed areas; (3) support for the development of self-government; (4) the gradual introduction of native Palestinians into all b u t the highest civil service posts; (5) Jewish immigration limited only b y the economic absorptive capacity of the country; (6) a law of c i t i z e n s h i p a n d nationality; ( 7 ) Z i o n i s t “ m o r a l a n d material

support” for Arab states and “ t h e Arab people i n its efforts t o realize its legitimate national aspirations”, with Arab support for the Jews i n establishing their national home; (8) mutual respect for religious rights, customs and holy places; and (9) Arab participation i n Zionist economic undertakings i n

Palestine. Everyone seemed pleased with the draft, with the exception o f R i a d ’ s desire t o i n c l u d e a clause specifically repudiating

any future Jewish state. D r Weizmann preferred t o “ l e t sleeping dogs l i e ” , and suggested that Riad reconsider his reservations. Contacts were resumed i n Cairo i n March 1922, w i t h D r Weizmann unable t o attend. The Zionist delegation was headed b y D r Eder of the P.Z.ÆE., and included Baron Félix de Menasche (an Egyptian banker) and Ascher Saphir (Ben-Avi’s colleague o n Doar ha-Yom). Riad as-Sulh was joined b y Rashid Rida (above, p. 17), Kamil al-Qassab and Emile Khouri,

w h o represented t h e m s e l v e s as t h e E x e c u t i v e C o m -

mittee of the “Syrian U n i o n Party”.39 The Arab and Zionist negotiators opened their March 18th meeting b y recognizing each other as “ a power w i t h whom it was h i g h l y desirable a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y useful t o reach complete understanding”. T h e Arabs went further t o accept the

Jews as a “nation, originating i n the East... historically related to the A r a b s ” , and as “ t h e agents o f t h e external

civilisation of which the Arabs are i n need”. The Arabs suggested that neither party should invoke the Balfour Declaration or the McMahon-Husain correspondence, but insisted that “Arabs a n d Jews m u s t discuss today, as n a t i o n to

nation, make mutual concessions and must recognize one another’s r i g h t s ” . They also made i t clear t h a t “ i t was n o t

their intention t o ask the Jews t o declare themselves against any foreign power”. I n reply t o the Arabs’ opening statement, the Jews set o u t

their position clearly. W h a t they required was:

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(1) Peace and tranquillity in Palestine. (2) The cessation of all hostilities against the immigration and settlement o f the Jews i n Palestine, within the scope of the economic capacity of the country. (3) The cessation o f anti-Jewish propaganda by the Arab press and the Arab Committees i n Palestine [1e., the M.C.A.] and abroad [1.e., the Palestine Arab Delegation]. I n exchange for this, the Jews will place a t the service o f the Arabs all the resources of a political, economic and propaganda nature which are a t their command. I n a

word, they will collaborate sincerely w i t h the Arabs towards the realisation of the final object.... This “final object” was given the following definition during the second day of talks: Complete independence o f the Arab countries, w i t h Palestine as the Jewish National Home where Jews and Arabs will constitute a Palestinian national unit with equality of rights and obligations. Jewish culture and civilization will develop freely i n Palestine for the common good. Discussion then turned to the guarantees which each party

would require, and the proof of the authority of each t o sign and execute an agreement. I t 1s easy t o understand the attractiveness of the proposed entente, particularly for the Jews. D r Eder, reporting to D r

Weizmann on these meetings, was fired with new hope for an honest and far-reaching accord w i t h the Arab world. H e regarded t h e proposed exchange o f services as s i m i l a r to t h e

Weizmann-Faisal agreement. The Jewish delegates were impressed with the sincerity o f the Arab representatives, and obviously flattered t o b e negotiating as “ e q u a l nations”. “They w o u l d l i k e us to recognize t h e Arabs as t h e p o w e r i n the Near E a s t ” , wrote Eder, ‘ ‘ a n d receive a Balfour Declarat i o n from t h e m . ” F i n a l l y , Eder was pleased t h a t t h e entente

under consideration was “ o n [the] lines of [the ‘““commonhomie’) Congress resolution—which d i d n o t call for Jews alone i n Palestine” 40 Three lessons o f the Faisal affair were quickly apparent t o those who were subsequently informed of the secret talks.

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N T H E E A R L Y TWENTIES

57

Eder himself immediately raised t w o questions w i t h regard to the Arab committee: “ W i l l Palestine [Arabs] recognize them?” and “Can

they

d e l i v e r t h e goods?’ O t h e r Zionists

raised a third, and perhaps more decisive, question: Would a n agreement w i t h this group be compatible w i t h Zionist loyalty t o British a n d European interests i n the M i d d l e East? A t the March 26th meeting of the P Z . E . , * no one expressed outright hostility t o continuing the talks, b u t all were emphatic o n the need t o ascertain very carefully how

“representative”; responsible and sincere these Arabs were. D r Arthur Ruppin (p. 11 above), while welcoming the new orientation as corresponding to h i s o w n views, was nevertheless

opposed t o signing any specific agreement: if t h e Arabs wished to make use o f this diplomatic step for t h e i r o w n ends . . . , then the whole t h i n g would b e not only valueless, b u t actually fraught with danger, for we would u n d e r such circumstances n o t o n l y n o t get t h e sympathy o f

the Arabs, b u t we would most likely lose the confidence of

the British... David Yellin, one of the few yishuv leaders t o be taken into the confidence of the P.Z.E. on these talks, felt “doubtful about” the Arab representatives for a very specific reason: The Palestinian Arabs had n o t wished t o start these negotiations fearing that they would have t o make compromises. The Arabs i n Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt could achieve some positive results w i t h the support o f the Jews and were n o t afraid o f losing anything. I t was therefore necessary, before c o m i n g t o a decision, to find o u t to what e x t e n t these Arabs could wield influence upon the Arabs o f Palestine.

After receiving D r Weizmann’s approval#2 the Cairo talks were resumed o n A p r i l 2nd. A t this meeting the Zionist

representatives pressed the Arabs for more specific proofs o f t h e i r authority t o speak o n behalf o f t h e Arab world; for the

inclusion of a Palestinian i n future talks; and for a renewed assurance that the proposed e n t e n t e would be consistent w i t h “ a policy of friendship towards the Great Powers”. I n reply, the Arab delegates willingly offered t o provide all necessary

58

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

documents t o prove their authority, and referred the Jews t o their explicit assurances already given on the question of the Great Powers. B u t they rejected the Zionist suggestion for altering “ t h e constitution of our Executive”, 1.e., for the inclusion o f a Palestinian. I n a personal message to the April

4 t h meeting, D r Weizmann (who was then i n Rome) invoked h i s o w n negotiations w i t h Faisal as proof o f h i s desire t o

collaborate with the Arabs and expressed his eagerness to sign a suitable agreement as soon as possible. A Joint Commission was to continue meeting to work o u t details, a n d the delegates parted a m i d words o f m u t u a l esteem a n d good-will.

COLLAPSE OF THE CAIRO TALKS

Zionists were thus continuing the Cairo talks, b u t with some uneasiness o n a t least three points: (a) uncertainty as to the

authority and influence of the Arab negotiators; (b) the unwillingness (or inability) o f their negotiating partners t o

invite Palestinian representatives i n t o the discussions; and (c) concern about endangering the Zionist-British connection. T h e lack of Palestinian involvement may well have reflected t h e Syrians’ wish to avoid a scandal; for, indeed, w h e n word

o f the talks subsequently leaked out, the Haifa newspaper, al-Karmil, reacted violently:#

There is a group of Syrian Arabs who believe that moderation on the problem of Palestine w i l l evoke the affection o f Britain and the Zionists with respect to the

problem and especially the Syrian problem.... Anyone w h o t h i n k s t h a t t h e sacrifice [ o f Palestine] is likely t o

help save another spot is suffering from a repugnant brain disease and should stay o u t of the world of Arab politics until he gets well.

B u t the most serious reservations held b y the Zionists were related t o their “British connection”. None of the Zionist leaders doubted for a m o m e n t that some form of “green light” from the Colonial Office would be indispensable for the continuation o f the Cairo talks.# While there seemed t o be some justification for optimism after initial consultations w i t h British officials i n Jerusalem and R o m e subsequent advice

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N THE EARLY TWENTIES

59

from Sir John Shuckburgh a t the Colonial Office effectively dampened the original Zionist enthusiasm for the proposed e n t e n t e . I n a personal a n d p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o D r Weizmann,

Shuckburgh explained the reasons why he “felt very dubious about the whole business”. These reasons included the questionable s t a t u s of the Arab representatives, and the d i s t i n c t possibility o f arousing F r e n c h criticism a n d w i d e r

European resentment: “There would be much talk o f a Jewish intrigue t o rob the Western powers of the fruits of victory.”+ F r o m Jerusalem, too, came C h i e f Secretary Wyndham Deedes’ more pointed analysis of the anti-European dimensions o f the talks: I f England could be represented as secretly encouraging t h e Jews to co-operate w i t h those w h o desire t o b e quit o f

French rule i n Syria, i t may be hoped, by these Syrian Nationalists, that a breach between England and France might be effected and, consequently, that French and E n g l i s h co-operation and m u t u a l support i n regard t o local

Nationalist movements may be weakened. As for Zionist interests (with which he was sympathetic), he felt t h a t these were “ u n l i k e l y t o concern [ t h e Syrians] very

deeply except insofar as [they] may be made temporary use of i n the attainment of what is sought’ .# Largely as a result o f such warnings, Eder was soon given t h e order to “ t e m p o r i s e ” as m u c h as possible, a n d b y J u n e

1922 the negotiations had reached a standstill. Although he was m o s t unhappy about the reasons for the suspension, Eder was o f course aware that the contradiction between European

and Arab interests was becoming a serious one. H e himself admitted that the Syrians “intend[ed] t o do everything t o make t h e French Mandate difficult t o o b t a i n ” , a n d as part o f

their mutual understanding he had seen no objection t o the Arab suggestion that the Zionists abstain from supporting any Mandate other than the one for Palestine. B u t t h e mere fact o f m a i n t a i n i n g contact w i t h these Arabs was b e g i n n i n g t o p u t the Zionists i n the anti-French “camp”,

and a choice soon had t o be made. I n spite o f his commitment to a global Zionist-Arab agreement, D r W e i z m a n n felt

emphatically that “ o n no account” could the Zionists do

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60

anything which might be interpreted as anti-French.# Thus, b y June 1922, the openly anti-French propaganda of the

Syrians had

the

effect

o f forcing t h e Zionists t o keep their

distance. Once again, Zionists found themselves caught between maintaining their “British (and/or French) connection” and responding t o overtures from the Arab side. The situation I n the summer of 1922 recalled the Zionists’ talks with Awni A b d al-Hadi i n 1919 (above, pp. 39f). The final nail i n the coffin of the Cairo talks came from Nahum Sokolow. Then i n the United States, Sokolow had been kept informed of the progress o f D r

Eder’s negotiations.

H i s correspondence reveals

the same ambivalence expressed by D r Rupin and others. While warning o f the anti-European implications of the talks, Sokolow nevertheless encouraged Eder t o “use every opportunity for talking friendly with the Arabs”, but without being “too hasty” about signing agreements.>* H e well appreciated that any public Zionist support for the French mandate over Syria would be considered b y the Arabs as ‘“an a c t of hostility”. B u t Sokolow soon found that ratification o f the French Mandate was ‘‘an indispensable condition for the confirmation of the Palestinian Mandate.” By mid-July, press reports reached Palestine describing Sokolow’s active role as a lobbyist i n the U.S. o n behalf o f t h e French c l a i m t o Syria. D r

Eder cabled for an official denial o f the report, which had produced “fresh unnecessary ill-feeling” among the Arabs w i t h whom he was still i n contact. H e subsequently reported angrily on the ‘very disastrous’ results which Sokolow’s American activities had had i n Palestine. Despite the suspension of these talks in summer 1922, D r W e i z m a n n d i d resume contact w i t h R i a d as-Sulh a n d others

i n December, while Kalvaryski and Saphir held other meetings w i t h Ihsan al-Jabiri, Shakib Arslan, H a b i b Lutfallah and others i n Europe.‘ But the same three drawbacks encountered i n earlier talks—viz., uncertain ability o f the Arabs t o “deliver the goods’, exclusion of Palestinians, and Zionist fear of alienating British opinion—were still present. “ I n any case’, comments Ben Halpern, “ b y the end of 1922 the division of the M i d d l e East into distinct political entities was

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS I N T H E EARLY TWENTIES

61

too final a n act for Jewish-Arab negotiations t o b e conducted w i t h a view to reversing i t . ” I n Professor Halpern’s analysis, there were a number o f clear-cut reasons for the failure o f the

1922 negotiation attempts: I f the creation of a federal Arab state, covering both the French and British mandated territories, were t o be a condition of Arab acceptance o f the Jewish national home [cf. page 56, above]—as i t had been i n the case of the Faisal-Weizmann agreement—it was a condition that the Jews h a d n o power to meet. O n the other h a n d , the Jews

could hardly accept the suggestion that they abandon legal titles like the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate . . . for a still-to-be-defined t i t l e to Jewish autonomy i n Palestine

that depended on Arab success i n establishing a single federal state from Palestine to Mesopotamia. Finally, the authority o f t h e Arab negotiators to speak for a u n i t e d pan-Arab national movement was n o t beyond question.

CHAPTER 4

Grass- Roots Contacts during the Twenties’

After the initial flurry of postwar Arab-Zionist negotiation attempts, the confirmation o f the Mandate brought a halt to

any further efforts t o tackle any large political questions. Neither the Arabs n o r the Zionists h a d i t i n t h e i r power t o

provide what the other was really after. The Palestinian Arabs’ campaign t o subvert, o r a t least freeze, the implemen-

tation of the Jewish National Home policy confined itself to protests and pressure directed at the British authorities and the League of Nations Mandates Commission. For their part, the Zionists now concentrated their efforts on obtaining from the British a firm attitude toward any possible unrest, and a sympathetic approach t o Zionist immigration, land-purchase and settlement. W i t h the Arabs i t now appeared sufficient for Zionists to have “normal”, friendly day-to-day relations i n a n

atmosphere of peace and prosperity, while touchy political issues would b e best left to one side. T h e Arabs, too, found

limited intercourse w i t h the Jews tactically or maternally useful. Given the absence o f official Zionist-Arab negotiations after 1922, a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f the grass-roots contacts d u r i n g t h e 1920s m a y h e l p t o shed a d d i t i o n a l l i g h t o n t h e n a t u r e a n d

quality of Arab-Jewish relations i n Palestine. For the Zionists, this lower-level “diplomacy” often had very practical purposes.

(1) “Preventive Diplomacy”. For the Zionists, the violence of A p r i l 1920 and M a y 1921 gave rise, predictably, t o heightened concern for hagana and for a firmer attitude on the part of the British. But, beyond this, c o n t a c t s w i t h Arabs i n Palestine and i n the neighbouring countries were also considered important for the purposes o f better “public-relations” 62

GRASS-ROOTS CONTACTS DURING THE 1 9 2 0 s

63

and, more urgently, intelligence-gathering.? Such contacts usually fell short of full-fledged “negotiations” w i t h authoritative Arab spokesmen, b u t even political negotiations were sometimes seen as a device for forestalling an expected calamity.3

(2)

Press a n d “Public-Relations” Work. A n o t h e r

frequent

Z i o n i s t motive for contacts i n the 1920s was the work o f

gathering signatures o n petitions (‘‘mazbatas’’) i n support o f Zionism. These signatures were obtained from villages for small sums, and were then used for external propaganda t o show that the Arab population was n o t unanimously hostile to t h e Zionist presence i n Palestine. I n the struggle for a

favourable public image inside Palestine itself, Zionists found themselves attempting to counteract hostile newspaper commentaries by encouraging the appearance of “friendly” or “ m o d e r a t e ” Arab statements o n t h e Zionist question.” After

more than eight years o f direct (and frustrating) experience,

Col. Kisch o f

the

P.Z E. described t h e s i t u a t i o n as follows:6

This 1s a simple m a t t e r o f money. N o single Arabic paper

pays its way and all are subventioned from one hostile source or another. Whatever else we may do for improving relations, . . . the first essential is that we should stop this i n c i t e m e n t wherever we can, a n d t h e w a y to stop it is to

acquire an interest i n as many of the papers as possible by a contribution t o their m o n t h l y budget. This is a perfectly legitimate s t e p — i n fact I t h i n k t h a t to neglect i t is a crime.

W i t h the regular expenditure o f £100 a month, the whole tone o f the Palestinian press would be changed. If o n l y such funds were made available to h i m , K i s c h argued,

he felt sure he could get “results”. Such results w o u l d not o n l y mean the reduction o f

incitement t o crime, and consequently less crime, but would also make i t much easier for well-disposed Arabs t o favour reconciliation and understanding.

But, even when the required funding was available, the subsidizing o f editors or writers almost never brought satisfactory, enduring results.’ A n o t h e r project w h i c h was designed to contribute t o good

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FUTILE DIPLOMACY

relations with the Arab population was the sharing of Jewish medical services with neighbouring Arab villages. Gratitude and respect were the expected rewards, and this helped t o cement good social a n d economic relations, b u t o n l y so l o n g as thorny political questions were k e p t to one side. Likewise,

Hadassah medical work and anti-malarial efforts had a positive effect. Suggestions were often discussed i n Zionist circles for the extension ofJewish credit, social or educational facilities to Arab friends, or for involving individual Arabs i n specific Jewish economic undertakings.8 (3) Support for Arab “Moderates”. Beginning w i t h the premise that the vast unorganized majority of the Arab population was a neutral factor subjected almost exclusively t o the “negative” influence of political agitators, Zionists quickly saw the need to devote special efforts to w i n n i n g the friendship o f this neutral factor. W h a t was required, i t was

felt, was that the Zionists and the Government should provide the proper organizational tools and political support for the creation o f a party or association which would make its “positive’ influence felt i n Palestinian politics.? During the 1920s, the P.Z.E. attempted t o c r e a t e and/or support three such parties: the Muslim National Association

(M.N.A.), the Palestine Arab National Party and several regional “Farmers’ Parties”.!® These organizations suffered from many liabilities, chief among which were: (a) their reliance o n Zionist funds, w h i c h were n o t always available i n

ample supply; (b) the widespread public knowledge that they had been “established largely owing t o Jewish influence”; (c) the failure o f the British authorities t o show these groups any signs of favour!? (largely owing t o (a) and (b)); and (d) the dubious level o f dedication of their members t o the ideal of Arab-Zionist co-operation. Despite much Zionist fostering, none o f these associations emerged as a strong “Moderate Party” capable o f dominating the local political scene and o f destroying, once and for all, the power of the “extremists”. Instead, Zionists had t o measure the success of such ventures i n terms o f t h e fact t h a t t h e activities o f t h e “extremists” were

devoted t o “defending themselves against the [“moderate’] party rather than attacking u s . ” Indeed, from late 1923 onwards, the hold o f the Muslim-Christian Association

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(M.C.A.) over the Palestine Arab community was visibly weakened, owing mainly t o internal feuding with rivals, many o f whom had received moral and material support from the P.Z.E. L O C A L Z I O N I S T PROPOSALS F O R A N AGREEMENT

As we have indicated above, local contacts initiated by Zionists were usually of a limited or defensive variety, aiming chiefly a t keeping Arab animosity from developing t o o far, b u t without attempting t o define the terms of a specific entente to be signed by the recognized leaders of each side. There were, however, exceptions t o this r u l e , a n d o u r discussion

of

four

exceptional cases w i l l reveal several w o u l d recur t h r o u g h o u t t h e M a n d a t e problems associated w i t h appealing t o the

difficulties which

period: (a) the so-called “materialistic instincts” of the Arabs; (b) the official Zionist leadership’s difficulty i n controlling the unauthorized peace attempts of persistent individuals; and (c) the limited n a t u r e o f even t h e short-term benefits w h i c h either side could

offer to the other. With respect to the latter, the situation was already like the one which Arthur R u p p i n was t o describe i n 1931: “What w e can get (from t h e Arabs) is o f n o use to us, a n d w h a t w e need w e cannot get from t h e m . ”4 I. Let us begin w i t h a detailed account o f one o f t h e few far-reaching a t t e m p t s to reach a global agreement. I n J u l y

1919, H . M . Kalvaryski outlined before the Vaad Zmam (V.Z.: Provisional Council of the Jews of Palestine) a seven-point plan. Kalvaryski sought that body’s official endorsement o f the plan, which he had already begun discussing with Arab notables i n Syria and Palestine. H i s Programme for an Arab-Jewish Entente—which was the first of several similar versions he was t o elaborate over t h e n e x t twenty years—contained a faint embryo o f later

“bi-nationalist’’ proposals, starting from the premises of Jews and Arabs being semitic kin and o f Palestine being the homeland of all its inhabitants, whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish. Free Jewish immigration and the principle of a Jewish N a t i o n a l H o m e were to b e recognized b y t h e Arabs, i n

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exchange for the opening u p of Jewish economic and other institutions (under Arab suspicion of being “exclusivist”) t o all members o f the population. Hebrew and Arabic were to b e taught as compulsory languages i n state-run schools, and

civil-service recruitment would favour bilingual candidates. 6 Several V.Z. members were quick to pounce on the obvious contradictions between this programme and the yishuv’s own “National Demands”.!” Some reacted sharply t o the criticism, expressed or implied by Kalvaryski and his supporters, that the Jews were treating (or might treat) the Arabs unjustly i n the pursuit of Zionist aims. Several speakers saw i n this an “exaggerated” concern for Arab interests and a corresponding weakening of the Jewish national position, and they replied t o Kalvaryski’s ideas by stressing that i t was important to “ l e t the Arabs know” the situation clearly. Since Arab nationalists were t h e n demanding a greater Arab kingdom w h i c h was t o

include Palestine, Yosef Sprinzak urged his colleagues t o

avoid misleading the Arabs: The “agreement” must be clear, with no nonsense. W e must receive Palestine without limitation or restriction... We must receive Palestine within defined boundaries.... There is room for h a l f a m i l l i o n Arabs i n a greater Jewish

Palestine, but there is no room here for an Arab kingdom. I t is best that this conflict be sharp from the start, so that the matter will be clear t o Arab psychology, and t o all human psychology. T h e V . Z . thus clearly opposed any Jewish i n i t i a t i v e to try to w i n over the Arabs, and rejected Kalvaryski’s programme for a n entente. L o o k i n g back w i t h some bitterness twenty

years later, Kalvaryski attributed the decision t o the same reason that [had] foiled the first attempt i n 1914: [ t h e Yishuv’s] contempt for the Arab national movement a n d the Arab people ( w h i c h were dismissed as unimpor-

tant), and an exaggerated appraisal of our own strength and the [anticipated] help from Europe and America.!8 There 1s certainly some truth i n this assessment, for a t this time the Yishuv d i d explicitly choose t o p u t aside any “peace

offensive’, preferring instead to ‘‘win o v e r ’ the

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Arabs by a combination of the anticipated long-term econom i c benefits of Zionist development and a firm endorsement o f the Balfour Declaration policy by the Powers. This reluctance about embarking on a peace offensive, however, reflected more than a low estimation of the importance o f the Arab factor; i t also reflected a significantly pessimistic appraisal of the possibility of ever winning Arab assent, whatever its desirability or importance. Undaunted b y such rebuffs from within his own camp, Kalvaryski nevertheless went o n to present his proposals to

Arab leaders i n his name alone. But what, we may ask, was the Arab reaction t o Kalvaryski’s overtures o f 1919 and 1920, a n d was h e justified i n singling o u t yishuv attitudes as t h e cause for his failure to produce a n Arab-Zionist entente at this

time? A

close look a t the evidence seems to p o i n t to the

conclusion that—notwithstanding Kalvaryski’s claims t o the contrary—his programme did not w i n any significant Arab support. T h e programme appears to have been presented to Arabs o n at least three occasions: (1) prior to the V . Z . debate

discussed above; (2) soon after that debate (August 1919); and (3) in the last days o f Faisal’s reign a t Damascus (June 1920). W e have only Kalvaryski’s own accounts o f a positive reception on the first t w o occasions.!® But for the third there are several independent sources w h i c h tell a different story.

Kalvaryski’s own reminiscences (1937) of the June 1920 meetings refer t o discussions organized by M u ’ i n al-Madi (a Palestinian) and Riad as-Sulh (Kalvaryski’s Lebanese friend; cf. p p . 54f above), w i t h the participation o f three Syrians (Ihsan al-Jabiri, A d i l Arslan, H a s h i m al-Atassi) a n d another

Palestinian (Rafiq Tamimi). After “ l o n g discussions”, Kalvaryski claims that his programme received Arab approval.? From the Hebrew press o f the period and the despatches o f another Zionist agent i n Damascus, i t appears that talks with Palestinians there broke down on the issues of Jewish imm1gration and Arab recognition o f the Jewish National Home.? A rare Arab report of a meeting between Kalvaryski and S. Felman (representing the Zionists) and Rafiq Tamimi, M u ’ i n a l - M a d i a n d A m i n al-Husaini (the future Jerusalem mufti) gives a d e t a i l e d account o f t h e Arabs’ rejection o f t h e

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Kalvaryski programme.? After dealing w i t h the programme point by point, the Arabs insisted that any further negotiations b e carried o u t o n a more official level, b y t h e ‘’author-

ized representatives of the Jewish institutions” i n Palestine, and under the following conditions: N o Arab would negotiate . . . unless [the Z.C.] agreed t o the following conditions: 1. Palestine 1s a part of independent

Syria. 2. The idea of the Jewish National Home is unacceptable. 3. Hebrew cannot be an official language. 4. Jewish immigration is n o t acceptable. T h e hostile tone o f the above report, submitted to the

Syrian Congress, may well have been exaggerated for “nationalist” consumption. According t o Zionist sources, talks d i d continue in utmost secrecy. B u t when news o f the ongoing

negotiations leaked out, Rida as-Sulh was forced t o resign his ministry in Faisal’s cabinet because of his son’s involvement. W h e n t h e contacts were finally broken off, the Arab delegates

had still not agreed t o recognize the principle o f the Jewish National H o m e . Thus, our examination of the Kalvaryski programme and the reactions i t received from both sides would seem t o reveal how distant Kalvaryski was from the mainstream o f political thinking i n both the Zionist and the Arab camps. Unfortunately, his conviction regarding the need for an agreement, and h i s persistence i n trying to persuade b o t h parties o f this, were n o t enough t o bridge the gap between the strongly-held positions of Zionists and Arabs. *

I I . Simultaneous w i t h Kalvaryski’s efforts i n Damascus, a similar Zionist-Arab agreement was actually concluded on March 6, 1920 between Yehoshua Hankin (a land-purchase agent and Arab “expert”) and three Lebanese politicians: Najib Sfeir, D r Rashid Karam and Yusuf Mu’azzin (who claimed also t o sign o n b e h a l f o f Najib H a s h i m a n d D r

A n t u n Shihade).# The Arabs presented themselves as the “Nationalist Group i n Syria and Lebanon”, and sought t o pave the way for fruitful tri-lateral relations between the

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future independent states of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. T h e tone a n d contents o f the agreement were q u i t e similar to

Kalvaryski’s plan, giving perhaps more stress on Arab recogn i t i o n o f the status o f the Jewish National H o m e . Such a n agreement, h a d i t been discussed b y yishuv representatives,

might have proved slightly more palatable than Kalvaryski’s programme. B u t t h e entente was, i n fact, never discussed

publicly or revealed. I t remained an inoperative piece of paper, largely because of the lack of authority of the Arab signatories, who would surely have been denounced by the advocates of a “Greater Syria” i n Damascus. One Jewish observer further suspected t h a t these

Arabs were insignificant

journalists “eager t o m i l k the Z i o n i s t cow”. Indeed, one concrete requisite o f the agreement was t o have been the

setting u p of an Arabic newspaper, for which purposes the Z i o n i s t Organization was solicited to subscribe L E . (Egyptian

pounds) 6000.% *

OI.

T w o further Z i o n i s t i n i t i a t i v e s serve t o illustrate the

limited

usefulness of

reaching a n understanding

built

on a

“bridge of silver”. The first case was Kalvaryski’s relations with Musa Kazim al-Husaini, the President of the A.E., and, i n the mind o f m o s t Jews, the symbol of Palestinian “extremism’’ and “intransigence”. I n November and December of 1922, Kalvaryski met w i t h members of the Palestine Arab Delegation i n Lausanne, during the latter’s futile mission t o reverse some of the diplomatic results of the peace settlem e n t . While Kalvaryski had indeed found members of the Delegation u n y i e l d i n g , h e was able to report t h a t t h e i r leader,

Musa K a z i m , had indicated i n a private conversation that “ h i s attitude towards us is i n our hands”. After underlining this phrase i n a letter t o L o n d o n , Kalvaryski continued: “ I understood what h i s words were h i n t i n g at. I believe t h a t i f w e k n o w h o w t o get o n w i t h h i m w e can b r i n g h i m over t o

our s i d e . . . ” Kalvaryski’s hunch was indeed correct. U p o n receipt of a s u m o f money from the Zionist Central Office i n London,

Musa Kazim reportedly pledged t o use his influence t o prevent bloodshed in Palestine. For a time, Kalvaryski

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accepted various minor proofs of Musa Kazim’s new “moderation”,

a n d hoped

that

this

would

b e t h e first

step i n

eventually winning over the entire M.C.A. leadership. But there were soon too many inconsistencies i n Musa Kazim’s behaviour for Kalvaryski t o ignore, and when confronted by the latter i n mid-1923 the Arab leader proudly claimed that h e was s t i l l a patriot a n d had not sold himself o r his people over to the Zionists. *

I V . Another similar deal between Zionists and Arab notables i n Palestine revolved around the British attempt to set u p a n appointed Advisory Council, to provide for Arab

participation in the administration. The P.Z.E. took an active interest i n helping Government officials to register a victory over the M . C . A . , which attempted to block the formation

of the Council b y pressure and threats against nominees. Col. F. H . Kisch of the P.Z.E., together with Kalvaryski, held several meetings with some o f the Arab nominees and attempted to convince them to resist the p u b l i c cam-

paign being mounted against their participation on the Council.? B u t both Zionists were quick to realize h o w ineffective they were b y using verbal arguments alone. A t a cost o f £800, they

obtained the temporary “moderation” of t w o prominent Arabs: Arif Pasha ad-Dajani and Raghib Bey an-Nashashibi. % B u t t h i s was not enough to have t h e Government’s Advisory

Council established. Once i t became clear that the required number of willing Arab nominees could n o t be found, the scheme had to be dropped.3! A R A B INITIATIVES F O R A N A G R E E M E N T

I n most o f t h e p r e c e d i n g pages, w e have concentrated o n the

Zionist view ofJewish-Arab contacts. Arab motives for certain kinds of co-operation w i t h Zionists have been touched on i n the context o f Arab reactions to, a n d participation in,

endeavours initially proposed by the Jews. A n examination of several Arab-inspired schemes for some sort of Jewish-Arab “ a g r e e m e n t ” o n l i m i t e d issues w i l l h e l p to c o m p l e t e o u r

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picture of Arab motives and attitudes i n their contacts with the Jews.

I. W e have already seen evidence o f the mercenary interest o f some Arab leaders, and the first case under discussion here illustrates this aspect even more clearly. I n late 1920, a local Jewish committee was given the task of “seeking an understanding with the Palestinian Arabs.3? Its efforts seemed t o be rewarded i n early 1921 when several leaders of the Haifa Congress (December 1920) approached its members ( H . M . Kalvaryski, S. Tolkowsky and M . Dizengoff) “ w i t h the i n t e n t i o n to come t o a definite understanding between Arabs

and Jews”. Unlike some previous approaches, the personalities now involved were influential leaders. While the exact terms o f the proposed ‘“‘understanding” are n o t known, constitutional issues a n d land-sales to Jews were discussed. T h e financial angle o f the talks, however, seems to have been

the predominant one. T h e yishuv committee urgently requested the L o n d o n Zionist Executive to grant i t £5000 for

“expenses”; and t o arrange facilities w i t h the Anglo-Palestine Bank for granting loans u p t o a total of £10,000 “which may be i n part lost”. But this opportunity of coming t o an“understanding” with t h e Haifa Congress leaders, described at the time as “ a new situation . . . rich in the greatest possibilities”, came to nothing,

because (as Dizengoff complained bitterly after the M a y 1921 riots) the committee’s urgent request for funds had received n o r e p l y from L o n d o n . ” A l l along, members o f t h e

committee had been working almost entirely a t their ‘’own private expense’, and the “scope and effectiveness” of their work had been “greatly restricted”, owing partly t o the fact that conditions had ‘‘not been favourable for important political work, but chiefly owing t o the lack o f financial resources”. Although written evidence of opinions on this delicate subject is understandably rare, we may be sure that Tolkowsky, Kalvaryski and Dizengoff were n o t the only Jews who based their activities on the belief that Arab ‘‘materialism’ h e l d the key t o m a n y difficulties i n ArabJewish relations.** Very few Arabs or Jews took a moralistic approach t o this question. For the Zionists, a t least, the

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matter was an eminently practical one: on the one hand, they were faced with an apparently obstinate and noisy group of opponents, whose motives and representativeness seemed t o them doubtful, while, o n the other hand, there appeared to b e n o shortage o f Arabs w h o were ready t o sell t h e i r loyalties o r t h e i r services t o the highest b i d d e r , o r t o profit from

land-sales t o Jews, however unpatriotic.* Under such circumstances, the buying-off o f opposition appeared a natural and effective way of dealing with that opposition. *

II.

I n the three r e m a i n i n g cases to b e discussed i n this

chapter, the ulterior motive of the Arab initiators was purely political: i n t w o cases, Jewish-Arab agreement was broached in manoeuvres vis-à-vis the British regarding the Legislative Council, while in the third the Husaini clan proposed an electoral alliance w i t h t h e Jews o f Jerusalem i n a n attempt to

defeat rival candidates of the Nashashibi family. I n none of the three cases was the ultimate objective a lasting agreement with the Zionists. Following the successful boycott of the elections t o the proposed Legislative Council (February-March 1923) a n d t h e refusal o f Arabs to accept n o m i n a t i o n to a n Advisory Council

(June-July 1923), the British had proposed the establishment o f a n “Arab Agency”, to be considered parallel to t h e Jewish

Agency. I n regretfully acknowledging the Arabs’ rejection of this third proposal, the British Government then announced that n o further attempts would b e m a d e to i n v o l v e t h e Arabs

i n the constitutional government o f the country. Palestine would be ruled by the H i g h Commissioner and an Executive Council of senior British officials. Practical consideration o f any new proposals regarding self-government would be resumed only when the Arabs themselves took the initiative and expressed their “readiness t o participate”’,36 Although the Palestinians’ rejection o f proposals which would have implied their recognition of the Jewish national home policy was ideologically linked w i t h their basic demands, i t was not so b l i n d l y adhered to as is sometimes

suggested. Members o f the A.E. were quite capable o f tactical manoeuvres on this issue, and a few o f them soon began

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working for the re-opening of discussions on the question of representative government.” The rejected Legislative Council proposal, with all its inadequacies, had been, after all, closer to the desired form of “national government” than government b y an Executive Council o f colonial officials, which began operating i n December 1923. Thus, i n late 1924, Jamal al-Husaini discussed constitutional questions with H . M . Kalvaryski, and made the following suggestion: the A.E. would withdraw its demand for complete “national self-government” i n favour o f a Jewish-Arab agreement on a bi-cameral Legislative Council, with a lower chamber elected o n a proportional basis and an upper chamber formed along the lines of the British proposal of 1923 (i.e, 10 officials, 8 Muslims, 2 Christians, 2 Jews). The upper house would have t o confirm all decisions o f the lower, and a n immigration committee of 2 Jews, 1 Muslim, 1 Christian and a British chairman would be formed. As a further safeguard t o Jewish interests, Jamal was reportedly

willing t o agree that the High Commissioner could maintain a right to veto any legislation. Kalvaryski enthusiastically reported his conversations t o the P.Z.E., and proposed that Col. Kisch m e e t with Jamal. Kalvaryski h i m s e l f found the terms q u i t e generous, and was anxious n o t to lose t h i s opportunity for a n accord w i t h t h e

A E » B u t Kisch received the p l a n coolly. Whatever the motives of the A.E. i n making these proposals, he saw such a bi-cameral situation leading to an inevitable clash between an appointed upper house and a popularly-elected, and ultimately more legitimate, lower chamber. Jewish public o p i n i o n i n Palestine was even more hostile to a n y revival o f

discussions regarding a legislative assembly, and rejected the suggestion out-of-hand. Kalvaryski also discussed the plan w i t h Sir Herbert Samuel, but the H i g h Commissioner was sceptical for his own reasons (see below). I n the end, this Arab initiative was dropped from lack o f response. I t i s interesting t o speculate o n t h e motives o f t h e A E . i n i t s

secret approach to the Jews w i t h such a plan. O n the surface, i t seemed to i n d i c a t e a shift from attempts to t u r n back t h e clock, at one go, t o t h e pre-Balfour Declaration days. While

not signalling any change i n the basic Palestinian goals, this

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overture to the Jews was evidence of a pragmatic approach: accepting and working with whatever tools were available t o thwart, and perhaps contain, the growth of the Jewish national home. But why

did Jamal need t o

approach t h e Zionists for this,

when i t was the British w h o had the power t o create the

desired self-governing institutions? One possible e x p l a n a t i o n is that i t was important for the prestige o f the Arab Executive to make i t appear that renewed suggestions for a Legislative Council were coming from the Zionist and/or British sides, and were not the result o f the Arabs giving i n t o conditions

dictated by the Government. Hence, Kalvaryski and others were i n fact used b y Jamal to test the reactions o f the High

Commissioner. The interviews which Kalvaryski and Sulaiman Bey Nasif ( a recognized ‘“moderate”) had w i t h Samuel were, i n fact, the result of Jamal’s suggestion, and the latter afterwards tried to create the appearance that i t was the

British who were Initiating discussions for a Council—a false impression which Samuel was eager to remove.# *

III.

T h e next instance o f a local Arab overture to make a

deal w i t h the Jews involved the Jerusalem municipal elections

of 1927.4 The

p e c u l i a r nature o f t h e

1926 Municipalities

Ordinance provided for proportional representation for the M u s l i m (5 seats), Jewish (4 seats) and Christian (3 seats) communities o f Jerusalem, b u t d i d n o t provide for separate

communal ballots. Each voter could cast a vote for all twelve posts, a n d thus each community had the opportunity o f

affecting the results of the other communities. Both the Jews and the Husaini faction had opposed this arrangement, preferring separate communal lists, b u t their objections had n o t been heeded b y the British. The incumbent mayor, Raghib an-Nashashibi, who had been appointed by the military authorities i n 1920, had developed among the Jews the reputation of being a poor administrator. B u t , despite the fact that he had drawn frequent criticism from the Jews of Jerusalem for his poor treatment of their community, i t seemed likely that he would profit against his Arab nvals from Jewish votes, simply

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because he belonged to the anti-M.C.A., anti-Husaini camp — a n d was, therefore, dubbed a “ m o d e r a t e ” . T h e Husainis set

o u t to prevent the election o f their hated rival, and were prepared to d o almost anything—even make a deal w i t h t h e

Jews—to accomplish this end. Jamal al-Husaini m e t with Col. Kisch o f the P.Z.E. i n January 1927 and attempted to persuade h i m o f the advantages o f encouraging the Jewish electors o f Jerusalem not to

cast any votes for Arab candidates.‘? Jamal had little concrete to offer, apart from the veiled threat o f incurring the wrath

o f the Husainis, coupled w i t h the vague incentive that, although “ a n y understanding now reached for the purpose o f the elections should not b e assumed as i m p l y i n g a n

understanding o n other points”, i t would nevertheless be “regarded . . . as a sign of good-will and as a step towards co-operation’. Shortly afterwards, the Jewish judge and native Jerusalemite, Gad Frumkin, was honoured by a surprise visit from no less a personage than Hajj A m i n al-Husaini, the Grand Mufti, accompanied b y t w o members of the Supreme M u s l i m Council, Abdallah Dajani and Hajj Sa’id Shawa.4®* O n this occasion, Frumkin was also urged t o persuade the Jerusalem Jewish community t o co-operate i n blocking the election o f Raghib Nashashibi. This time t w o advantages for the Jews were more clearly spelled out: (a) more favourable treatm e n t for the Jewish community by the future (Husaini) administration o f the municipality, and (b) a concession i n the A E s official demand for national self-government— namely, that the subjects o f immigration and land-purchase m i g h t b e excluded from the competence o f a Legislative

Council. Whatever the attractions of a Zionist-Husaini alliance for some people, t h e majority o f Jerusalem Jews decided t o use their votes to prevent the H u s a i n i / M . C . A . - b a c k e d candidates

from gaining a foothold i n their municipality. The Jerusalem Jewish Community Council succeeded i n organizing a single slate o f candidates, w h o were acclaimed, while g i v i n g t h e mot d’ordre to Jewish voters to work for a Nashashibi victory.

Given the choice, they clearly felt their interests better protected b y voting for “Raghib al-Nashashibi’s wretched

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administration and not for their national enemies”.4 Raghib’s personal victory was supplemented b y the election of five supporters and two Husaini candidates, including Jamal al-Husaini. A s many interpreted i t a t the time, “ t h e result was

that the Husainis never forgave the Jews for helping their biggest rival, Raghib Nashashibi, w h i l e Raghib was not a t all

happy that they had brought his greatest adversary, Jamal, into his municipal council as a watchdog”.4> B u t , belying this exaggerated appraisal of “Jewish power”, the Jewish vote had had, i n fact, n o real impact on the outcome of the election. *

IV. Prior t o the outbreak of riots in August 1929, some Palestinian leaders were again working to have the British re-open the question of self-governing institutions.4’ A t this t i m e , Zionist opposition to any form o f legislative council was as clear and unanimous as ever, a n d several A r a b leaders felt i t advantageous t o couple their pressure o n the British w i t h a n a t t e m p t to soften the Z i o n i s t stand o n t h i s question. Thus,

when the Syrian nationalist, Ihsan al-Jabiri, was i n Jerusalem

i n 1928, he and H . M . Kalvaryski held talks together with Palestinian leaders, including Rashid al-Hajj I b r a h i m and A w n i A b d al-Hadi.#® A s a step towards ending the Jewish-

Arab feuding, the Arabs offered to phrase the resolutions of t h e i r forthcoming Congress i n such a w a y as to avoid explicit

denunciation of the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration. The offer was duly implemented, as the resolutions o f the VIIth Palestine Arab Congress (June 20, 1928) merely re-affirmed previous Congress decisions i n general terms.® According t o Kalvaryski, this gesture was to have been

followed by Zionist-Arab talks. Indeed, in the wake of the Congress, the Arab leadership, through its official organs, sounded a note o f “ m o d e r a t i o n ” and taunted t h e Jews t o

abandon their opposition t o representative government. B u t the P.Z.E. was reluctant to pick u p the challenge,

leading K a l v a r y s k i t o b l a m e the Zionist leadership for another “missed opportunity” for an accord w i t h the Arabs, I n p o i n t o f fact, t h e

P.ZE.

w a s q u i t e d e t e r m i n e d t o avoid

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re-opening the question o f representative institutions, wishing neither to negotiate with the Arabs on this issue, nor to give the impression to the British that the Zionists were softening their opposition to a n elected assembly.5! I n any case, the

build-up i n tension over Jewish rights at the Western Wall after September 1928 (cf. Chapter 5, below) pushed any prospect of Zionist-Arab negotiations even further into the background. A R A B A N D JEWISH MOTIVES F O R CO-OPERATION

The foregoing overview of the various episodes o fJewish-Arab grass-roots contacts i n the decade after World W a rI reveals a variety of motives for local co-operation. As we have seen, the search for a global peace agreement was not a primary motive

for local Arab-Jewish contacts during this period. Nevertheless, there were real forces operating t o bring Jews and Arabs i n t o contact w i t h

each other.

Zionists

still

needed to

have

“normal”, friendly day-to-day relations with their neighbours in an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. Arabs, too, found limited intercourse with Jews tactically or materially useful. T h e major objective of the Zionists appears t o have been “preventive diplomacy”—the buying of a temporary peace, while hoping for the continued growth of the Jewish National H o m e through immigration, land-purchase and economic development. I n their attempts t o find Arab “friends” w h o

would overpower their Arab “enemies”, the Zionists found internal divisions within Arab society of distinct advantage. I n the clan rivalry between Husaini and Nashashibi, Zionists leaned towards the latter. Inherent Muslim-Christian rivalry, which was partially submerged i n the anti-Zionist M.C.A. coalition, usually led the Zionists into tactical alliances w i t h Muslims, discreetly fostering the latter’s suspicions o f the powerful Christian minority.? O n other occasions, local “friends” were found through the promotion of relations with minority non-Muslim sects, such as Samaritans, Druze and Circassians.

Similarly, Zionists found a basis of co-operation i n the countryside notables’ resentment against the townfolk.

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Whether Jewish workers supported “fellahin” against “effendis”, or whether yishuv “capitalists” sought good relations with the latter’3— i n all cases, the Jews found, a t best, only small pockets of “friends” i n the Arab community. Invariably, the Jews sought to prove t o the Arabs that—at least from an economic point of view—the coming o f Zionism to Palestine was i n their interests as well. I n deference to what they considered to be a “natural instinct” of the Arab, Zionists employed subsidies, gifts and easy loans for selected individuals. As much as they may have wanted to believe otherwise, Zionists knew that the distinction between “moderate” and “extremist” Arabs was a dubious one. The need for baksheesh t o buy moderation, whatever its shortterm advantages, indicated

t o m a n y that t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between Arab and Jew in Palestine was fast becoming one based o n mutual contempt. More significantly, the fact that baksheesh was often the only way of winning “friends” was a telling indication of the slim chances of the Arabs ever coming to accept Zionism i n a way that could b e embodied i n an enduring political agreement. Most co-operation evinced by Arabs towards Jews i n Palestine could n o t b e equated w i t h any form o f acceptance o f the basic goals o f Z i o n i s m . I t

w a s u s u a l l y for

some short-term economic or political advantage that w e find Arabs willing to co-operate i n one o f t h e various

activities initiated b y Jews. The Arab desire for western education or training, or for an administrative post, was often behind the expressed interest in collaboration with the J e w s . E v e n so p r o m i n e n t a n adversary as M u s a K a z i m a l - H u s a i n i , w h o w a s a l m o s t “ b o u g h t ” by the Zionists i n 1922-23, had apparently offered i n 1920 t o “ b e friendly

t o t h e Zionists” i n exchange for a post i n t h e W a q f a d m i n -

istration.’ The quest for financial backing for the publication of a newspaper was another frequently recurring Arab motive for co-operation, while land-owners sought purchasers, and vice versa, on the open market. The myths o fJewish power, Jewish wealth or Jewish international connections also played their part i n attracting Arab interest. I n addition, politically-astute Arabs learned how certain dealings with Zionists could be

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79

useful i n a t t e m p t s t o outflank t h e B r i t i s h o n given occasions,

or to outmanoeuvre an Arab rival on others. W h e n looking a t the period after 1928, we shall see h o w the same Arab and Zionist motives reappear, both a t the level o f grass-roots contacts and i n the cases o f higher-level diplomacy.

CHAPTER 5

Relations in the Wake of Crisis, 1929-1931

N E G O T I A T I N G OPPORTUNITIES A N D T H E WAILING WALL DISPUTE

The riots of August 1929 provided a security and political crisis which p u t into question the very foundations o f Zionist-Ab-British relations i n Palestine. O n Yom Kippur, 23-24 September 1928, a n apparently t r i v i a l incident touched off a chain o f events w h i c h was to result i n r i o t i n g

and bloodshed i n August 1929.! The sensitive question o f maintaining the status quo w i t h respect to Jewish rights of worship at the Muslim-owned Western (“Wailing”) Wall i n Jerusalem? unleashed a public controversy, which was fanned primarily by the leading Muslim authorities i n Palestine —the Supreme Muslim Council (S.M.C.) under the Presidency of Hajj A m i n al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem—and by Revisionist Jews, w h o c o m b i n e d to elevate t h e controversy

from one involving religious rights to one of national prestige. O n paper, a t least, there existed provisions for the mediation o f religious disputes i n Palestine through the ‘‘good offices” of the British. But this particular conflict quickly took on passionate national and political dimensions. The situation progressively worsened without any mediation procedures being either applied by the British or pressed for by Muslim or Jewish authorities.* Neither is there, during the eleven months of mounting tension, any evidence of either Jewish or M u s l i m leaders (religious o r lay) seeking to de-fuse t h e s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g h direct contacts o r negotiations w i t h t h e i r counterparts. À few

isolated Jewish suggestions t o settle the question by “friendly 80

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talks” with M u s l i m leaders® were soon buried beneath the emotional propaganda and counter-propaganda issued b y the committees which were launched i n defence of their respective H o l y Places. Each party turned t o the British n o t to mediate, b u t rather t o vindicate i t s o w n

exclusive claim b y denouncing the pretensions of the other side. There was, however, one futile attempt at Zionist-Arab negotiation, under the guise of British ‘‘mediation”, with a view t o preventing the rioting which was to erupt on August 23, 1929. This was an eleventh-hour meeting, called by the Officer Administering the Government, Harry Charles Luke, acting on a suggestion made several days earlier by a member o f the P.Z.E.¢ T h e style o f the meeting was a familiar one i n

Palestine, one which had been used, for example, to calm passions after the outbreak of the Jaffa riots in M a y 1921.7 O n the evening of August 22nd, six local notables m e t a t Luke’s house: Awni A b d al-Hadi, Jamal al-Husaini and Subhi al-Khadra, members of the A E . and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Isaiah Braude and D r Yitzhak Levy, representing the Jewish side.

The meeting began with a discussion of

two

parallel

declarations o f i n t e n t which h a d been drafted; these were to be p u b l i s h e d i n a n attempt to c a l m t h e two excited commun-

ities. After some thought, the Jewish representatives decided that they could not sign their half of the proposed statement o n the grounds t h a t the ambiguous wording m i g h t have

prejudiced Jewish claims which were still t o be decided. Instead, the Jews then proposed a second draft communiqué—a single proclamation, to be signed jointly, which stated that a t a j o i n t meeting between us w e came t o t h e conclusion

that the present excitement among Moslems and Jews is chiefly d u e to misunderstanding. W e are convinced t h a t b y

goodwill the misunderstanding can be cleared u p and for this purpose we demand of both Jews and Moslems t o do their utmost to endeavour t o attain peaceful and quiet relations. W e a l l deprecate any a c t s of violence t o each other, a n d w e appeal to everyone to assist t h e i r supreme

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institutions i n the sacred work of obtaining peace between b o t h nations.8

This draft the Arab representatives refused t o sign. I t was finally decided that the m a t t e r should be postponed for several days, during which time, the Arabs assured their Jewish counterparts, the Arab community would be

urged in t h e direction o f peace a n d restraint. Despite t h e “friendly feeling” with which one Jewish representative left the meeting, rioting broke o u t i n Jerusalem the next

day. Despite t h e conclusions

of

the

Shaw Commission

that the

“disturbances” were not premeditated, i t seems likely that

there were forces working towards a violent outbreak— whether at the behest o f the Mufti o r in spite o f his efforts at

pacification.® The three Arab spokesmen, if we accept their sincerity i n wanting to maintain law and order, were probably i n no position to reverse the scheduled course of events. Even had the six local leaders been able t o agree upon the text o f a pacifying communiqué, i t is doubtful whether its

publication would have done much t o prevent the violence which erupted on August 23rd. News o f the Jerusalem riots—usually i n the form of rumours that Jews h a d bombed o r attacked the mosques?

—sparked off attacks on Jews in other parts of the country, including the brutal massacre of sixty orthodox men, women and children i n Hebron on August 24th, and the ransacking of the Jewish quarter of Safed (with the loss of 18 lives and 80 wounded) on August 29th.!! During these troubled events, one successful local Arab-Jewish encounter did result i n the publication o f parallel proclamations urging peace and restraint i n T'iberias.!? Partly because of this, Tiberias was one o f t h e towns w h i c h were spared d u r i n g t h e week o f unrest and w h i c h were less subject to t h e agitation

which continued for several months after the actual rioti n g .13 J u s t as t h e n e g o t i a t i n g process h a d done l i t t l e to prevent the outbreaks o f August 1929, so too was its role negligible i n s e t t l i n g t h e religious dispute over rights at t h e W a i l i n g Wall.

Several offers t o mediate the dispute came from prominent

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non-Palestinian Muslims and Arabs, including some general suggestions for resolving the wider Palestine dispute from K i n g Faisal of Iraq.!® But none o f them was taken u p

seriously by any of the parties i n deadlock. I n Palestine, Zionist representatives sought t o encourage Arabs who opposed t h e Mufti

t o issue a conciliatory statement w h i c h

would have softened the official M u s l i m stand on the Wall issue;!6 b u t this p l a n came to nothing, as d i d a l l attempts t o

resolve the matter amicably through secret face-to-face negotiations.!” The question of the Holy Places, which had been turned over to the League o f Nations, became the subject o f a special

Commission which visited Palestine and received submissions from religious leaders i n June and J u l y o f 1930.!® The Report of this special Commission (June 1931), although n o t well received b y either party, did nevertheless contribute to the

removal of the issue of religious rights from its provocative prominence.!? UNCERTAINTIES O F BRITISH P O L I C Y

The riots o f 1929 had, of course, raised more than the question of rights a t the Holy Places of Jerusalem. T h e whole question of Zionism and Arab-Jewish relations i n Palestine remained i n abeyance i n the years following the riots. H o w were ‘“normal” relations to b e resumed? A n d , were there to be

major changes in British policy? While events certainly convinced Zionist leaders of the need for improved security a n d for greater a c t i v i t y o n the “Arab front”? feeling was near-unanimous that overtures for negotiation w i t h their erstwhile assailants were o u t o f the

question a t this time.?! “Even those Jews who held advance d pacifist views”, n o t e d D r L e o K o h n ( l a t e r a senior offi-

cial i n the Jewish Agency Executive [J.AE.]), felt that any approach t o the “momentary spokesmen of the Palestinian Arabs” would inevitably be interpreted as a sign of weakness: negotiations would necessarily involve concessions and the natural inference would be that i f the killing of one hundred Jews could yield such results as would now be

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obtained, the killing of one thousand might yield the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration and that of a few thousand more perhaps the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine. Likewise, the context was not ripe for any Arab-sponsored moves towards an accord with the Jews. The riots were followed n o t b y reconciliation, b u t b y a vigorous Arab campaign for boycotting all contacts—commercial and social, as well as political —with the Jewish community.”

This unfavourable climate for direct Arab-Zionist negotiation continued beyond 1929, largely owing t o the uncertainty o f British policy i n the wake of the riots. W i t h both Arab and Zionist leaders looking towards the British for “favourable” clarifications of government policy, there seemed little incentive for direct contacts. D r Judah Magnes, President of the Hebrew University (see below, pp. 87f.), was among those who had expected a more positive British role duri n g this period. B y mid-1930, h e was “ a t a loss t o under-

stand that i t was beyond the power of the British Government to insist upon a [Jewish-Arab] meeting”. What was equally distressing, i n his view, was “ t h e fact that even individuals of the t w o sides here hardly m e e t for an exchange of views”#4 The hearings of the Shaw Commission of Inquiry i n late 1929 h a d served as a sounding-board for Arab a n d Zionist

grievances, with each party hoping for a report which would vindicate its case.?>

From

March to J u n e 1930, a D e l e g a t i o n o f

Palestine Arabs visited London t o press demands a t the C.O. While this visit m i g h t have afforded an opportunity for secret talks w i t h Zionists, as i n 1 9 2 1 , there is n o record o f

any such meetings taking place at the C.O. or elsewhere. Jamal al-Husaini informed a British member of the J.A. Administrative Committee that the Arab Delegation would meet the Jews only i f forced to do so by H.M.G,, and later reported that the Delegation had refused t o m e e t D r Weizm a n n because ‘“they d i d n o t recognize that [he] o r any other

non-Palestinian Jew had anything t o do w i t h Palestine”. A w n i A b d al-Hadi also made i t plain that he would n o t meet w i t h Zionist leaders, whether o u t of pique (at Zionist

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85

attempts t o embarrass h i m during the Shaw Commission hearings)? or, as h e later claimed,? out o f his recognition that

Arab and Zionist interests were fundamentally irreconcilable. Since the Prime Minister had offered t o invite Arab and Zionist delegations together only i f he felt sure, i n advance, of “ a prospect o f a n amicable conversation” * the Arab Delegation’s efforts were aimed exclusively a t British policy-makers. ?

T e publication, i n April 1930, of the Shaw Commission’s Report severely disappointed the Zionists and was welcomed by the A E . as “unobjectionable and i n [their] interests”.32 But before Arabs or Zionists could settle down to the new status quo, the British asked both parties, in effect, t o await a further authoritative report, that of Sir John Hope Simpson, w h o h a d been appointed o n M a y 6 t h to investigate the land

question. The accompanying temporary suspension of immigration further depressed the Zionists,’ adding to the reasons

for a “wait-and-see” attitude which held little incentive for Arabs o r Zionists to approach each other.

The expected “final” word on British Palestine policy seemed to come o n October 21, 1930, w i t h the publication o f

the Hope-Simpson Report and the accompanying Passfield White Paper.* The Report and White Paper were, for the Zionists, the worst shock they h a d yet received a t the hands o f

the British. The unfriendly tone, the proposed restrictions and the prospect of a Palestinian Legislative Council contained i n these documents l e d t o a n a n t i - B r i t i s h u p r o a r a m o n g world

Jewry and t o the resignations o f D r Weizmann and others a t the head of the Jewish Agency. Because their full official demands h a d n o t been m e t , most

Arabs were less than pleased w i t h what was, i n effect, their greatest political victory to that date.3 O n e exception appears t o have been the Jerusalem Mayor, Raghib an-Nashashibi, who approached Col. Kisch t w o days after publication of the White Paper, “intoxicated w i t h j o y ” , taunting the Zionist representative w i t h the following words: “ H o w do you do—Kisch, m y brother! When you have finished your protests, which are o f course necessary, will i t n o t b e better to sit down together?’’38 B u t most Arab reactions were cautious

and restrained, tempered with fears o f a reversal o f the White Paper b y Zionist pressure i n L o n d o n .

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I n contrast to official Zionist attacks on the Passfield White Paper, Col. Kisch was able to note that i t was having a t least one salutary effect: namely, that i t caused some discussion i n the Arabic press “ o f the possibilities o f coming to a n

understanding with the Jews”.# B u t such public discussion

remained theoretical, as i t was

not

followed by any

concrete

overtures from Palestinian Arab politicians.! Noting the impossibility o f “induc[ing] the t w o parties t o meet”, the H.C., Sir John Chancellor, commented: “After the disturbances the Jews naturally enough would not m e e t the Arabs, and n o w the Arabs will not meet the Jews u n t i l the Balfour

Declaration has been cancelled and the Mandate withdrawn.”’42

F o r their part, Zionist leaders i n London directed all their energies a t securing, through a C a b i n e t Committee, a reversal

o f the severe set-back they had received from Lord Passfield.# These Zionist-British negotiations finally resulted i n a letter s e n t by t h e P r i m e Minister, J. R a m s a y MacDonald, t o D r W e i z m a n n , d a t e d February 1 3 , 1 9 3 1 , purporting t o clarify t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e W h i t e Paper.# I n effect, t h e l e t t e r u n d i d m u c h o f t h e damage caused t o t h e Zionist p o s i t i o n by t h e

White Paper, and became known as the “Black L e t t e r ” to the

Arabs, whose disappointment became a watershed i n the development o f a more concerted anti-British orientation of Palestinian Arab politics i n the 1930s.45 The publication o f the MacDonald Letter provided yet another uncertain context for possible Arab-Zionist negotia-

tion. D r Weizmann, who visited Palestine within weeks of the Letter’s publication (see below, pp. 105f), sought t o make the most o f what he felt was a most propitious time for talks with Arab leaders.# The A.E., on the other hand, d i d everything possible t o avoid Arab-Zionist meetings i n order t o underscore their displeasure w i t h t h e “Black L e t t e r ” . O n l y a few

Arab personalities seemed t o feel that this was a good moment “for the Jews to take a bold step and open their arms t o the Arabs”, and t h a t such a move “ w o u l d b e received w i t h a great heart, because the Arabs [felt] very m u c h hurt b y the

British government’ .# The general view, i n the opinion of the British Administrative Officer i n Nablus, was that the MacD o n a l d L e t t e r had resulted i n “[r]acial animosity …

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87

again becom{ing] a c u t e and the possibility of establishing better relations between Arab and Jew [being] further off than ever”.4 Thus, the period from late 1929 until early 1931 offered few fruitful opportunities for direct Arab-Zionist diplomacy. Despite the crisis created b y the riots and the serious attention given t o the problem by all sides, the very fluidity of British policy a t this time did much t o prevent any sustained attempts at a negotiated solution. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: H . ST. J O H N P H I L B Y

Having sketched above the generally unfavourable political context for direct Arab-Zionist talks, w e m a y n o w proceed to

deal w i t h those negotiating episodes which did, nonetheless, take place i n the aftermath of the 1929 riots. The first came, i n late October 1929, i n the form of a mediation offer from H . St.-John Philby, a former British Representative i n Transjord a n (1921-24), a n d a m a n w h o was t o figure i n l a t e r attempts

t o mediate between Zionist leaders and K i n g A b d al-Aziz I b n Sa‘ud. Philby enjoyed a reputation and self-image somewhat similar t o T . E . Lawrence, with w h o m h e shared a strong

belief “ t h a t an injection ofJewish brains and money into the Arab world would improve Arab chances of successful independence”.

W h i l e e n route back to Arabia from

London he visited Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo. Acting purely o n h i s o w n initiative,’ a n d probably h o p i n g t o impress

the C.O. with his achievement, Philby discussed w i t h Syrian and Palestinian leaders i n Damascus the lines of a possible settlement of the Palestine question. As a result of his suggestions, the Arabs prepared a list of their demands, i n their most “moderate” form, which Philby communicated privately t o Lord Passfield.3? When Philby arrived i n Jerusalem, he m e t n o t only with the Mufti and other leading Arabs, b u t also with a correspondent of the New York Times, who subsequently introduced h i m to D r Judah Magnes. The latter was very impressed with Philby’s ideas on an Arab-Zionist agreement,” w i t h the result that Philby spent a day “ i n vigorous discussion” o f a peace

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plan, dashing back and forth between D r Magnes, on the one hand, and the Mufti, on the other. His efforts were crowned with success when he felt he had secured the agreement of both sides t o a ten-point plan for the future of Palestine. According to P h i l b y ’ s p l a n ,

the country

was to b e

governed “ o n a democratic constitutional republican basis”, with a Legislative Council and a Council of Ministers i n which Jews and Arabs would be represented “ i n proportion t o their numbers i n the population”. The H.C. would have a veto power over acts o f these t w o bodies to guard against

anything “inconsistent with the proper exercise o f [Britain’s] international obligations... or detrimental t o the rights of minorities o r foreigners o r injurious to the peace a n d prosperity o f the country”. Immigration w o u l d b e free, “especially t o

Arabs and Jews”, subject t o the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Provision was also made for the continuation o f t h e Jewish Agency as a “ p u b l i c body competent t o advise

and co-operate with the Palestinian Government i n all matters affecting the interests of the Jews i n the country”, with the right o f the M u s l i m and Christian communities i n Palestine t o set u p s i m i l a r agencies.

Philby’s last act i n this scenario was to send a copy o f the

plan t o Lord Passfield, “ i n the conviction that a n offer b y the British Government o n these or similar lines [had] a very good chance of acceptance by a l l concerned”.5 Lord Passfield, however, showed n o interest i n P h i l b y ’ s scheme a n d chose n o t t o reply t o his letters. Philby thereupon left t o D r Magnes the thankless tasks o f getting the “Jewish extremists... t o recognize what is practicable and what is n o t ” , and o f persuading the H.C., Sir John Chancellor, t o force both sides into discussions.56

Z I O N I S T REJECTION O F T H E P H I L B Y M E D I A T I O N

W e have only Philby’s word that his scheme would indeed have been endorsed b y the Arab leadership, i f properly put forth b y the British government.” B u t i t soon became clear enough t h a t P h i l b y h a d n o t found a locutor valable in D r

Magnes. There were a number o f reasons why Magnes failed utterly in his attempt t o rally Zionists t o support these

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proposals for an agreement. These may be summarised under the following headings: (a) Timing. T h e predominant feeling i n the yishuv and among Zionist leaders was, as we have noted, that the morrow o f bloody rioting was n o t the right m o m e n t even t o

offer t o discuss political questions w i t h the Arabs. First of all, the Jews felt, the proper punishments for lawbreaking had to be imposed and nothing be done which might be interpreted as a reward for violence.‘ I n the atmosphere prevailing after the riots, Jews saw n o sign of remorse or humility i n the Arab leaders, b u t rather an inflated self-confidence which seemed to threaten further violence—not exactly their view o f conditions for successful negotiations. Furthermore, the Shaw Commission of Inquiry had just begun hearing evidence— evidence which the Jews were hoping ( i n vain, i t turned out) w o u l d produce a report sympathetic t o the Z i o n i s t position

and critical of the Arabs. Negotiations would be more opportune, i t was felt, after the publication o f such a report.

( b ) Status of the Negotiators. The J.A.E., for its part, insisted that political negotiations could be conducted only b y its own officials, or b y persons working under their close supervision. D r Magnes was n o t only unauthorised b y the J.A.E., b u t was considered too m u c h o f a n individualist to b e trusted b y the

elected officials. A t this time, any contacts w i t h Arabs were either the personal portfolio of D r Weizmann (below pp. 103f.), o r to b e organized through t h e J o i n t Bureau ( b e l o w ,

pp. 96f.). (c) Terms of Agreement. Not only was Magnes acting as a “lone wolf”, b u t he was already well-known, as a Brit-Shalom sympathiser, to b e too ready to compromise o n p o i n t s o n

which the J.A E.—representing the Zionist movement—felt there was no room for compromise. I n particular, Magnes was deviating from the official stand by agreeing t o direct proportional representation, the limitation of the competence of the Jewish Agency from world Jewry t o Palestinian Jewry,

equal

status o f A r a b

and

Jewish

immigration, and

the

implication that the Jews were merely a religious group, along with Muslims and Christians. But Magnes’ deviation was perhaps greatest i n his willingness

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90

to

discuss t h e question

o f representative i n s t i t u t i o n s — t h e

principal Arab demand. This was the last question Zionists wanted included i n any discussions at this time.6! I t had been dropped i n 1923, b y virtue of Arab rejection, and since then the Zionists had been hoping that the British would not re-open formal consideration of the subject u n t i l the Jews became much stronger i n the country, or until there emerged an Arab leadership willing t o work within the terms of the Mandate. I f the Zionists had objected t o the resumption of discussions on constitutional questions before the riots, they now felt they had new and stronger proof that the Arabs were not “ready” for self-government. A t the very least, they argued, the introduction o f self-governing aggravate, rather t h a n improve,

bodies a t t h i s time w o u l d Arab-Jewish relations i n

Palestine.’ Magnes’ very willingness t o discuss this delicate subject a t this time was out-of-step w i t h official Zionist tactics

vis-à-vis the British.6+ ( d ) Third-Party Considerations. Effective mediation requires the confidence of both parties i n the chosen mediator. The fact that this mediation was undertaken by H . St-John Philby was, for some Zionists, enough reason to want the whole affair dropped as soon as possible. A l t h o u g h h e had, a t one time,

been considered a friend,% some of Philby’s actions as Abdallah’s adviser i n the early 1920s had earned h i m the reputation of being a schemer against good relations between the A m i r and the Zionists. I t was, therefore, with great relief that Zionists learned that Philby had n o backing or encouragement from official British circles i n London o r i n Jerusa-

lem.® I n fact, t h e C o l o n i a l Secretary considered t h a t Philby’s “past record of consistent hostility to British policy i n the M i d d l e East would clearly disqualify h i m ” as a trustworthy mediator. SPLIT IN ZIONIST RANKS

The Philby

m e d i a t i o n attempt t h u s c a m e t o n o t h i n g ,

thanks

to a determined refusal o f both B r i t i s h and Zionist leaders to

have anything t o do w i t h i t . B u t the affair d i d highlight some o f the problems w h i c h D r Magnes was to continue to have

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with the Zionist establishment until his death. His “irresponsible and unauthorized” negotiations with Philby made Magnes extremely unpopular w i t h yishuv public opinion.”

Yet, like H . M . Kalvaryski had been doing since 1919 (above, pp. 65f), Magnes would remain independently active i n the search for a political breakthrough, defying the discipline imposed on the Jewish community b y its leaders, and apparently unmoved by the occasional pronouncements of Arab scorn for his efforts.” D r Magnes’ activities had indeed exemplified the recurring problem of Zionist discipline and co-ordination i n the pursuit of a single “Arab policy”. This need for co-ordination i n dealings with Arabs would later be underlined i n a Zionist Congress resolution (1933) which declared that “ i n special cases the Executive has the right t o demand that … special political activities [sic]... which e n t e r the sphere of the Executive’s activities should be permitted only after receiving its consent.” B u t , apart from disagreements over t i m i n g , discipline, tactics and the contents o f negotiations, there were also more

fundamental differences which emerged between D r Magnes and the Zionist leadership a t this time. D r Magnes’ starting assumptions had been enunciated t o D r Weizmann immediately following the shock of the August riots.” H e rejected what he called “militarist, impenalist, political Zionism” i n favour o f “pacific, international, spiritual Zionism”. For h i m , a Jewish H o m e i n Palestine b u i l t u p on bayonets and oppression [was] n o t worth h a v i n g , even t h o u g h i t succeed, whereas the very a t t e m p t to b u i l d i t u p peacefully, co-

operatively, with understanding, education and good will, [was] worth a great deal, even though the attempt shouldfail. [ m y emphasis, N.C.] For Magnes, Z i o n i s t

policy

had

to

be

based o n “ i n n e r

c o n v i c t i o n ” , and n o t o n “political necessity’: I t m u s t b e o u r endeavour first t o convince ourselves and then to convince others t h a t . . . Moslems, Christians and

Jews have each as much right there, no more and no less than the other.’ If the Arabs were n o t capable o f rising above chauvinistic talk

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o f “war a l a victoire integral [sic]”, then “we Jews must be, else w e are false to o u r spiritual heritage and give the l i e to

our much-vaunted high civilization”. After P h i l b y arrived a n d t h e text o f a programme was

actually formulated, D r Magnes found himself alone among Zionists in his promotion of the scheme as the “ o n l y possible honourable way [ t o ] peace a n d [ t h e ] avoidance o f bloodshed.” H e further earned the resentment of Zionist leaders and Jewish public opinion b y using the Hebrew University as a platform for the propagation of his views,’ and by maintaining private contacts with the H i g h Commissioner regarding the scheme.”” By early December, even D r Magnes’ most influential supporter expressed regret t h a t the

Arab camp was “crowing” over the evident split i n Jewish ranks.’s

David Ben-Gurion defined his differences w i t h D r Magnes i n the following t e r m s : I disagree with Magnes not only on the final goal of Zionism [i.e., Jewish vs. bi-national state], but also on the way to a solution to t h e Jewish-Arab problem, w h i c h will n o t c o m e about all-at-once o r b y means o f a w i n n i n g formula.

The improvement of relations is an extended process of progressive co-operation.... O n l y w i t h the growth of our strength i n t h e country a n d w i t h o u r efforts at co-operation w i t h the Arabs w i l l we find, i n due course, a solution to the p r o b l e m : n o t o n t h e basis o f p o l i t i c a l formulae about final

goals, but on the basis of day-to-day interests.

Along w i t h the labour-Zionists, who appealed for an “Arab policy” based on joint work with the “broad Arab masses” 8° other Zionists a t the time also derided the idea o f searching for a political formula. W h a t they d i d stress was t h e need for

improved security (‘“‘hagana’) and ‘‘practical work” —accelerated immigration, settlement and economic development, c o m b i n e d w i t h quiet b u t steady attempts at rapprochement a t the grass-roots level.8! As Col. Kisch explained during his last months as the head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department:8?

I n m y view i t 1s entirely futile t o seek today [April 1931] any agreement based upon a political formula, while our

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o w n m i n i m u m aspirations and the m i n i m u m aspirations o f

the Arab politicans are still poles apart. I n these circumstances, the o n l y thing to d o is to pursue a l l ways and

means for developing social, economic and intellectual cooperation i n order gradually t o break down the prevailing atmosphere of antagonism which i s a b a r t o progress towards a political understanding.

A further basic difference i n approach between Magnes and other Zionists lay i n the relative importance they attached to a n agreement w i t h t h e Arabs, a n d t h e chances

they gave of ever reaching such an agreement. M e n like Magnes and Kalvaryski took i t as a basic “given” of the situation that an accord, however difficult i t seemed, was indeed possible. I n his more pessimistic moments, D r Magnes felt that even the effort shown i n abortive attempts had redeeming moral value. B u t , whereas Magnes and Kalvaryski tended to see a n agreement w i t h the Arabs as a n absolute imperative for Z i o n i s m , most decision-makers i n the Zionist camp saw the

importance of an Arab-Zionist accord i n relative terms. I n fact, the concern felt in official circles after 1929 for an understanding w i t h the Arabs was motivated i n large part b y the need to lessen t h e dangerous strains w h i c h were developi n g i n Zionist-British relations. A s H a y i m Arlosoroff was t o

remark several years later: the estrangement between us and the British authorities has been growing apace. The riots of 1929 came and, i n their wake, the waves of r e s e n t m e n t and bitterness from the Jews t o the English and from the English t o the Jews. We are today [November 1932] even farther away from a possibility of a n agreed and co-ordinated policy between the Mandatory Government and the Jews than we were twelve years ago. D A N I E L OLIVER: Q U A K E R M E D I A T O R

I t is interesting t o contrast t h e m e d i a t i o n a t t e m p t o f H . St.

John-Philby with the mission undertaken by an American

Quaker long-resident i n Lebanon, Daniel Oliver. I n early

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1930, apparently o n Oliver’s own urging, members of the

Society of Friends in the U S A . and in Britain began soliciting their governments and local Jewish personalities t o support the idea of engaging Oliver to act as a conciliator between the Arabs & Jews, bringing

them together i n conference, during which their troubles could be thoroughly discussed, and an endeavour made to promote in each a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties o f the other.8° H i s p l a n of action called for the winning of sympathy and support from: (1) Arab leaders ( “ a n d their agreement to sit i n

conference with Jewish leaders”), (2) Jewish leaders ( “ a n d their agreement t o sit i n conference w i t h Arab leaders”), ( 3 ) the press, (4) the British government (“and its agreement to

non-interference i n the negotiations so long as the course of negotiations was n o t a t variance with British policy i n Palestine’), and (5) American and British Jewry. I n A p r i l and M a y , Oliver seems to have met w i t h some

success i n implementing the second and fifth points of his plan, and even took some steps towards the fourth. I n America, Felix Warburg welcomed the affiliation with the Quakers, who were “so well known for their impartial Christianity”.8? After meeting with D r Weizmann i n London, Oliver proceeded to Geneva, where he sought to give effect to the first point of his plan. Exploiting his much-vaunted close connections with “influential friends i n the Arabic speaking countries”,

Oliver renewed his “Intimate” acquaintance with Shakib Arslan, who directed the Syro-Palestinian Committee there. During a four-hour talk, Oliver reported that

I told h i m that I wanted to bring together the Arabs and the J e w s . . . . I said that the t h i n g has got to b e ; you have got to meet D r Weizmann and you have got to talk this situation over, a n d you have got to find a basis for agreement.

Arslan was careful t o reply that he would “try” to do as O l i v e r r e q u e s t e d , b u t t h a t a final d e c i s i o n rested

with

the

Palestine Arab Delegation’s Secretary, Awni A b d al-Hadi. B u t A w n i , as O l i v e r reported, was very u n l i k e l y to agree t o

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meet w i t h D r Weizmann “for personal reasons” (cf. above, p. 84f). In J u l y 1930, while the Western Wall Commission was in Palestine, Oliver came to Palestine at Col. Kisch’s invitation i n a n effort to develop fruitful contacts with some o f the prominent

Muslim personalities who were then i n the country.® In

these, as i n subsequent,®® meetings, O l i v e r was cautious a n d

modest in his expectations. His thinking was close t o that of the Zionist leadership, both on the inappropriateness of striving for a far-reaching political formula à /a Philby/Magnes, and also in his appraisals of Arab politics and society. A formal ArabZionist conference, he felt, could not take place for a t least another year? and i n the meantime he urged Zionists t o help i n the creation of a better atmosphere. O n the methods to create such a n atmosphere, Oliver’s

recommendations seemed to dove-tail perfectly w i t h Col. Kisch’s approach. Press activity was needed; i n particular, a subsidy to obtain the services o f a n influential Arabic

newspaper which would urge reconciliation between Arabs and Jews (al-Muqattam was being considered). A more drastic suggestion was the ‘‘elimination”; “ b y suitable inducement corresponding t o the financial loss entailed”; of the activity of “ a few persons who live upon the maintenance and extension of anti-Jewish agitation”. Only i f these steps were taken could any serious hopes be attached t o winning “ t h e support of the real leaders in Arab public life”? N o t h i n g seems to have been done to p u t any o f Oliver’s

suggestions into effect. I n early 1931, when D r Weizmann visited Palestine (see below, pp. 105f), he m e t with Oliver and t h e i r discussions s t i l l centred o n t h e need t o set u p “ a

high-grade Arabic journal which could combat the hostile propaganda conducted by the extremists”.° Both Kisch and Oliver remained convinced a t this time that economic co-operation had t o precede any political rapprochement, and, further, that the British attitude of respect for the ‘’extremists’ was a major stumbling-block.% After Hayim Arlosoroff replaced Kisch as Head o f the Political Department of the J.A.E., Oliver would again put forward suggestions for increased propaganda with a possible role for himself:

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I have felt for a long time ... that you ought t o have a man

who would be free t o travel about i n Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, lecturing and getting i n touch w i t h the leading people, and dispelling suspicion and fear and making the Jewish position clear to the Arabs.

But, as Oliver recognized, such activity required sums of money, and these sums were n o t readily available.% I t also appears that, after making a favourable impression on Warburg, Weizmann and Kisch, Oliver came t o be regarded rather negatively by other officials i n the J.A.E. Political Department.”

Finally, a n o t h e r

factor

damaging t o h i s media-

tion chances was t h e British a t t i t u d e t o Oliver, w h o m they

regarded as ‘ ‘ a well-meaning busy-body . . . unlikely t o .% This opinion, conveyed t o the F.O. b y its achieve anything” representative i n Beirut, led to a certain coolness o f almost all

British officials towards his efforts—a coolness which often left Oliver discouraged. PREVENTIVE D I P L O M A C Y : T H E J O I N T B U R E A U

O n e very practical Zionist response to t h e 1929 riots was t h e

creation, in December 1929, of the “Joint Bureau of Jewish Public Bodies i n Palestine”.10 T h e activities of the Joint Bureau (hereafter: J.B.) were the official resumption— with a pretence o f broader consultation—of the “ A r a b work” w h i c h

the P.Z.E. had allowed t o stop i n early 1928.10! T o use the Bureau’s own terminology and retrospective assessment, the c l i m a t e for its “ p o s i t i v e ” work was n o t very

favourable throughout 1930; yet, some limited success was achieved i n the realm of its “negative” activities—or, what w e have described i n t h e preceding chapter as “ p r e v e n t i v e

diplomacy”. While steering clear o f the question o f representative institutions and avoiding high-level talks on broad political issues, the J.B. set about restoring grass-roots contacts between

Jews and Arabs on the basis of the following p r i n c i p l 102 e: The improvement o f relations is t o be sought primarily i n persistent a n d progressive efforts t o promote Jewish-Arab

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co-operation i n those spheres i n which such co-operation can find a natural and disinterested basis. These are: (i) Intellectual Co-operation; (ii) Social Co-operation; (iii) Economic Co-operation. This orientation, which closely reflected Col. Kisch’s personal approach, was later endorsed (even as the J.B., as such, was being dissolved) b y the Executive elected at the Zionist Congress of July 1931.102 I n practical terms, the main work o f the Bureau was focused on (a) press and propaganda work—e.g., refuting accusations of Jewish designs on the Holy Places, promoting Arabic press criticism o f “extremist” stances, helping in the preparation of the Zionist case before the Shaw Commission o f Inquiry; (b) intelligence-gathering—the monitoring of trends and plans i n the Arab community; (c) economic rapprochement—e.g., breaking the Arab boycott, helping Arab “friends”, especially fellahin and workers; and (d) support for the creation o f would-be moderate political

groupings. Âs the memory o f the riots faded, there was some evidence o f

the gradual resumption of “normal” peaceful relations a t the grass-roots level.!® Jews insisted, when concluding local accords with Arab villages, on the careful observance of Palestinian customs so as to provide for the best possible guarantees for

future stability.!° The Arab boycott against contacts with Jews also broke down after several months, evidenced by a resumption of friendly ( i f n o t always substantial) conversations between Arab leaders andJewish representatives. 106 B u t the record of local efforts a t re-establishing peaceful relations w i t h Arabs was a modest one. T h e local contacts and

activities initiated by the Bureau showed no marked departure from those undertaken i n the previous decade, despite the self-criticism and the quest i n some quarters for a really n e w a n d effective p l a n for work a m o n g the Arabs.!°’ T h e nature a n d quality o f grass-roots relations a n d the motives for Arab-Jewish contacts were, i n t h e wake o f t h e 1929 riots, very

similar t o what has been described i n the preceding chapters. N o Arab or Jewish representative, w i t h the exceptions o f Magnes a n d Kalvaryski (see below, p p . 99f), was a i m i n g at a

long-term peace accord.

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The principal area for potential co-operation was, as i n the 1920s, the creation and strengthening of Arab groups who would challenge the existing “extremist” leadership, at this time personified i n the Mufti of Jerusalem. One colourful episode may be recounted here to illustrate the general limitations of this sort of work. I n March 1930, Tahir al-Husaini, nephew of Hajj A m i n and the son o f the previous Mufti, Kamil al-Husaini, took advantage of his uncle’s absence i n London to conspire t o declare himself the “true” Grand Mufti.1® Tahir secretly contacted the Jews and c l a i m e d to have open o r tacit support from Hajj A m i n ’ s m a n y

rivals and enemies i n Palestine: he also expected the H.C. to endorse his intended “coup”. What he wanted from the Jews was the provision of an impressive house and expenses with which to entertain the notables who, he claimed, would flock t o Jerusalem t o welcome his appointment. H e also wanted C o l . K i s c h t o sound o u t the

H.C.

for

his

reaction t o the

scheme. I n exchange, Tahir offered to make any declarations advocating peace with the Jews which the P.Z.E. would dictate, a n d h e promised a n amicable resolution to the

dispute over the Wailing Wall. Although i t may have seemed tempting to Zionists to see their arch-enemy replaced b y a “moderate” Mufti, they refused to become embroiled i n this likely fiasco, partly owing t o appraisals of Tahir al-Husaini’s mental stability.!® The work undertaken b y H . M . Kalvaryski, who headed the J.B., and others i n the sphere of promoting “moderates”

displayed the same difficulties as were encountered i n the 1920s, despite attempts at frugality and greater efficiency.!!0

For example, after a year of Jewish “fostering” and an investment o f more than £P.2150, a group o f Arab “moder-

ates” i n Jaffa had still “not found i t possible t o fulfil their pledges and t o e x e c u t e the plan which they had set for themselves. A n d even i f they d i d undertake a few sporadic actions, i t must b e admitted that these attempts brought l i t t l e success compared w i t h their o r i g i n a l expectations.”!1!

B y late 1931 the J.B., as such, had ceased operations and its functions were absorbed into the Political Department o f the J-A.E.112 Those responsible for administering the J.A.’s Arab policy never really entertained any high hopes for the

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“so-called Moderate leaders w h o seek o n l y to use us against

the Mufti’s party”.!!3 Instead, as i n the 1920s (above, p. 64), they continued t o measure t h e i r success i n negative terms,

viz., the apparent disunity which returned t o the Arab camp following the high-point of solidarity which Palestinian politicians had achieved i n 1929114 KALVARYSKI’S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

During the t e n s e months following the 1929 riots, H . M . Kalvaryski showed the same eagerness t o find a dramatic breakthrough w i t h Arab leaders that we witnessed i n 19191920 (above, p p . 65f). I n January 1930 he m e t w i t h Awni A b d al-Hadi, w h o refused to discuss a n accord seriously, b u t instead used the opportunity t o harangue Kalvaryski o n t h e importance o f the l a n d question, a n d to heap scorn o n the

latter’s pleas for Jewish-Arab understanding: As for me, I ' l l tell you frankly that I ' d rather deal with Jabotinsky or Ussishkin than w i t h you. I know that those m e n are sworn enemies w h o want to crush us, take our lands and force us t o leave t h e country, and t h a t we must

fight them. B u t you, Kalvaryski, seem t o be our friend, while deep-down I don’t see any difference between your goal and Jabotinsky’s. You, too, stick firmly t o the Balfour Declaration, the National Home, unrestricted immigration and the uninterrupted acquisition o f lands occupied by the Arabs. 115 M o r e amenable to discussion was the Jerusalem lawyer, O m a r Salih al-Barghuthi, w h o was to figure i n several other

Zionist-Arab meetings during the coming decades. I n February, Kalvaryski attempted t o reassure Barghuthi that the Jews would agree t o safeguard the rights of Arabs affected by Jewish land purchases. I n response, Barghuthi declared that he would be willing t o renounce exclusive Arab sovereignty over Palestine “ i f there were a possibility of achieving a true Jewish-Arab co-operation i n a l l spheres of activity”. But, he w e n t on, “ n o human being c o n s e n t s willingly t o extend his neck so that he might be strangled”. Although i t appears that Kalvaryski was genuinely hoping

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that h i s talks w o u l d lead to a full-fledged Zionist-Arab

entente, his Arab interlocutors could only have had more l i m i t e d , tactical considerations i n m i n d . F o r a t t h a t time a

delegation was being assembled to press Arab claims i n L o n d o n , ” and Arab hopes were confidently turned towards the British for a favourable change i n policy. I t was hardly the

moment for any responsible Palestinian leader t o consider making any binding or serious concessions t o the Jews. The key interest of Barghuthi soon became clear: Zionist financial support for t h e creation o f a n e w party dedicated to the

overthrow of the Mufti. Col. Kisch overruled Kalvaryski’s recommendations and decided n o t t o invest i n such a venture. !18

B u t the r e t u r n of the Palestine Arab Delegation i n June 1930 —disappointed i n terms of the far-reaching hopes with which i t had set o u t — d i d provide a temporary incentive for Arabs t o talk more seriously w i t h the Jews.!!9 Kalvaryski soon reported a n i n v i t a t i o n from A w n i A b d al-Hadi to present t h e

A.E. with his ideas for a Jewish-Arab accord. Kalvaryski s u b m i t t e d a “Platform for Judaeo-Arab Accord” o n August

10th, “with the knowledge of the Zionist Executive, but without its official endorsement’ .120 The document began by outlining the historic background of the t w o “ancient Semitic tribes” and their aims and encounters in modern times. I n the nine points of the proposed m i n i m u m platform, we can see many similarities with the plan advocated by Kalvaryski i n 1919-1920 (Doc. 12). I t s terms were, however, more explicitly “bi-nationalist”, contained a mutual ‘““non-domination” pledge, and made more specific reference to two contemporary A r a b concerns:

fear of economic dispossession, and hopes for the creation of a federation o f A r a b states. T h e rest o f the d o c u m e n t was

replete with assurances of Jewish good intentions vis-a-vis both fellah and effendi, and of Jewish sympathy for legitim a t e Arab aspirations—even for a Legislative Council, “ i f i t conducts its work in a manner beneficial to a l l the people o f

the country”. The Arabs accepted the Platform as a basis for continuing negotiations, but only on the condition that i t receive the

J.A.’s official

endorsement.!*! T h e r e w a s o b v i o u s l y n o point i n

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engaging i n further negotiations i f the plan represented only one man’s views; furthermore, given the gap between the Platform and the known position o f the J.A., the Arabs n o doubt welcomed the opportunity t o pressure the latter t o move i n Kalvaryski’s direction. B u t official endorsement o f the Platform was not, as

Kalvaryski had hoped, forthcoming. Col. Kisch had t o point out to Kalvaryski that he had gone too far, notably: (1) i n implying, through insufficient disclaimers, that official Jewish bodies might feel bound by his purely private memorandum; ( 2 ) i n declaring t h a t t h e Jews w o u l d have n o objection t o

Palestine joining an Arab confederation and would claim no special status therein; and (3) i n the extent t o which he emphasized that the Jews would welcome a Legislative Council.122 The t o n e of Kisch’s letter was carefully supportive o f Kalvaryski’s continued contacts w i t h Awni Abd-al-Hadi, b u t only after amendment of the Platform on these three points. Kalvaryski appears t o have ignored these suggestions, and instead waited—in vain—for either the J.A.E. or the A E . to move beyond the deadlock which had developed.!2 R U T E N B E R G PROPOSALS

A s indicated above, t h e riots o f 1929 caused Zionists m u c h

concern i n the area of their relations with the British. After the publication of the Shaw Report (April 1930), D r Weizmann co-opted Pinhas Rutenberg—an influential Palestinian industrialist then serving as President of Palestine Jewry’s Vaad Leumi—to carry o n Zionist-British negotiations a t the

C.O. Like Judah Magnes, Rutenberg had his doubts about the wisdom and the abilities of the duly-elected Zionist leadership, and sought to supply his o w n ideas and i n i t i a t i v e i n

London i n mid-1930. But unlike Magnes or Kalvaryski, R u t e n b e r g was given a free h a n d to p u t forward a series o f

proposals? to British officials and he began his activities with D r Weizmann’s blessing.!? W i t h the disappointments of the Shaw Report as his negative inspiration, Rutenberg presented a p l a n to t h e C . O .

which contained provisions t o curb the powers of the Mufti a n d to reorganise the Palestine administration so as to

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include only those officials who were “ i n sympathy with the

Jewish National Home policy”. Strict censorship was

to

be

enforced t o prevent any incitement to racial or religious strife. The Prime Minister would be called upon to issue a public statement i n solid support of the Zionist programme. Other aspects of the plan included: separate, democratically-elected institutions t o deal w i t h internal matters of the t w o communities; immigration limited only b y the absorptive capacity of t h e country; Government supervision o f land sales t o protect

displaced fellahin; credit facilities t o ease the burden of

fellahin debts

to

money-lenders;!1% a development loan for

Transjordan; and the involvement of individual Arabs i n Jewish undertakings. Unlike Magnes or Kalvaryski, Rutenberg directed his plan a t t h e British, a n d apparently held n o direct o r indirect

dialogues with any Arabs on the subject.!? The style of his intervention was, i n effect, a request for an “imposed solution” to be handed down b y the all-powerful masters o f the country. Rutenberg’s hope was that such a plan, coming from the British, would have had the effect of breaking Arab solidarity and of winning the support of the Nashashibi and other opposition factions, thus isolating the “extremists” and rendering them powerless. 128 For a brief moment, Lord Passfield seemed interested i n re-orienting British policy along the lines suggested by Rutenberg. The Colonial Secretary was particularly impressed because the proposals “represent[ed] [a] considerable advance on anything with which the Zionists [had] hitherto shown themselves willing to be associated”. But, i n fact, official Zionist backing for Rutenberg’s negotiations a t the C.O. soon became clouded w i t h reservations. Members of the Executive both i n London and i n Jerusalem were taken aback a t Rutenberg’s secretiveness and failure to

consult them, and they expressed grave concern over his proposal to give t h e Arab community its o w n separate

elective body.!® I n the end, ironically, i t was the strenuous intervention of the H.C., Sir John Chancellor—a man “none t o o friendly t o Zionism” —which saved Zionists from what Col. Kisch considered “ a political catastrophe of our own creation” 13!

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I t was Chancellor’s telegraphic advice i n early June and personal meetings i n J u l y w h i c h p u t a n end to any C . O . movement i n the direction of supporting Rutenberg’s proposals.132 While Rutenberg had been willing t o assume responsib i l i t y for the economic clauses of his plan, i t was the British government alone which could have provided—but which chose n o t t o provide!3—the vital and coercive political

component o f the proposed policy. T h e formulation o f British

policy i n the second half of 1930, as we have seen, followed a completely different course, the results of which gravely shocked the Zionists and which was reversed i n February 1931 only after further intensive Zionist-British negotiation a t the C . O .

WEIZMANN’S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

I t would be wrong t o assume that mavericks like Magnes and

Kalvaryski completely monopolised the field of c o n t a c t s with Arabs i n the months following the 1929 riots. I n addition t o the network o f grass-roots contacts established b y Col. Kisch and the J.B. i n Palestine, D r Weizmann secretly engaged the services of a number of individuals who maintained links with Arab personalities. One o f these, the journalist Ittamar Ben-Avi (above, pp. 54f.), reported frequently on his meetings w i t h Arabs i n Palestine, Egypt, London and Europe during 1930.'% While his reports made for interesting reading, his persistent o p t i m i s m regarding a n i m m i n e n t breakthrough t o

serious negotiations was never rewarded by any actual meeting involving D r Weizmann.155 A British-based German-Arab, Rudolphe Said-Ruete, also served secretly as one of D r Weizmann’s personal emissaries. Said-Ruete developed contacts with A w n i A b d al-Hadi, Jamal al-Husaini and others,!% and travelled t o the M i d d l e East to sound o u t Arab o p i n i o n for the Zionists. H i s reports,

closer i n t o n e t o those o f Daniel Oliver than t o Ben-Avi’s, underlined Arab resoluteness and were n o t optimistic about the prospects of face-to-face meetings.!” While appreciating his honesty a n d devotion to the cause o f Jewish-Arab reconciliation, W e i z m a n n a n d K i s c h g r a d u a l l y came t o

!38 doubt the usefulness of Said-Ruete’s efforts.

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During August 1930, attempts were made to arrange a

meeting between D r Weizmann and King Faisal of Iraq, d u r i n g the l a t t e r ’ s visit t o Europe. I n t h e end, n o m e e t i n g took

place, owing t o incompatibilities i n the t w o leaders’ timetables.159

Through the efforts of a French-Jewish journalist, Ovadia Camhy, contacts were established later that year between the

former Egyptian Khedive, Abbas Hilmi II, and Zionist officials. Following a suggestion of a member o f Abbas’ World Islamic Council,#® D r Weizmann m e t the ex-Khedive i n Paris i n mid-November and some general principles were outlined. The two men discussed the common origins of the two peoples and their fundamental compatibility, and D r Weizmann evoked his post-War agreement with Faisal. They agreed upon the desirability o f convening a round-table conference, of setting u p a prestigious mixed Jewish-Arab committee, and o f having an Arabic newspaper i n Palestine t o foster the idea of co-operation.!4! But the talks remained without any serious follow-through—to Camhy’s and apparently t o Abbas’ chagrin42—lJargely because the Zionists doubted the e x t e n t of the ex-Khedive’s influence i n Palestinian Arab circles.43 As an outgrowth of this episode, Camhy worked closely w i t h Mahmud Azmi, an Egyptian journalist who would later serve as a useful l i n k between Zionist and A r a b leaders.!4 D u r i n g 1931, C a m h y was forced t o realize t h e futility o f

political talks and instead directed his energies, together with Azmi, towards “intellectual co-operation” between Arabs and Jews. But the funds required to launch their proposed journal were n o t forthcoming from the J A.E . 1 4 5 D r W e i z m a n n also attempted to win over the I n d i a n M u s l i m , Shawkat Ali, t o act as a moderating influence among

his Palestinian co-religionists. Weizmann, Kisch and Oliver each m e t w i t h Shawkat, and were independently impressed

by his straightforwardness.!4 B u t after a few days i n Palestine, o n t h e occasion o f h i s l a t e brother’s b u r i a l i n t h e H a r a m

ash-Sharif, Shawkat A l i quickly came

to

share the Mufti’s

attitude t o resolving the Arab-Zionist p r o b l e m . ’ Another dimension of official Zionist concern for better relations with Arabs was the effort t o cultivate friends i n the

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countries surrounding Palestine, particularly Egypt and Transjordan.!48 I n February 1931, for example, C o l . K i s c h made a relatively high-profile visit t o Amman t o strengthen the

Zionists’

“ H a s h e m i t e connection”.

The timing of the

visit—immediately following publication of the MacDonald Letter—had the deliberate purpose of “reduc[ing] the likelihood o f support being afforded from A m m a n t o the fresh

anti-Jewish agitation inaugurated by the Palestine Arab Executive”.15 The visit also helped prepare the ground for D r Weizmann’s proposed visit the following month. The climax of D r Weizmann’s personal diplomacy after 1929—but b y no means a triumph—was the Zionist leader’s open attempt to meet Arab leaders during his visit to Palestine in March 1931. Undeterred b y threats against his life or b y advice from close associates, Weizmann was intent o n capitalising o n t h e publication o f the MacDonald Letter,

which he felt gave h i m new strength with which t o approach the Arabs.!5! Despite reservations of some C.O. officials,!52 Lord Passfield asked Sir John Chancellor t o “ d o everything i n [his] power to assist [ D r Weizmann’s] efforts towards so desirable an end”, 1.e., an accommodation with Arab leaders. T o this the H . C . loyally agreed.!53 Anticipating Weizmann’s visit only five days ‘after the MacDonald Letter, Falastin reacted: W e . . . want t o make i t clear t o Weizmann that there is no hope for cooperation unless the black interpretation of the White Paper is withdrawn. Therefore let h i m , i f he likes, save himself the trouble of coming here for the purpose of cooperation.

Some Arabs, i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e MacDonald L e t t e r as “expressly authoris[ing] t h e Jews t o boycott t h e A r a b s ” , regarded their ! boycott o f the Zionist leader as a retaliatory measure. Editorials which greeted the Zionist leader on his arrival were scornful and taunting. The A E . in a proclamation dated March 24th, reminded the nation n o t only of D r W e i z m a n n ’ s deviousness and seductiveness, b u t also o f t h e

larger issue involved:13

The mere negotiation of Arabs either officially or semiofficially w i t h the foreign Zionists, apart from its being n o t

106

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

profitable to the political interests o f the Arabs, constitutes i n itself a recognition of the Balfour Declaration, of the Mandate i n which the Declaration is embodied, and of the

Zionist policy which is based upon it. Feeling against D r Weizmann became sufficiently worked u p as to cause a n almost complete refusal o f Arabs to meet with

him.!5” I t even resulted in a leading Jewish businessman begging t o be excused from visiting the Zionist leader, since he wished to avoid the “serious risk o f arousing the suspicions of those Arabs with whom [he was] working” and t o whom he

had promised t o keep a low political profile. While the “boycott Weizmann” movement was gaining momentum inside Palestine, Col. Kisch (with the assistance of Mahmud Azmi) went ahead w i t h plans for the Zionist leader’s visit to the A m i r Abdallah.!° B u t even the friendly

A m i r , who had initially appeared eager to receive D r Weizmann in Amman, bowed to the pressure and called off the meeting, offering diplomatic excuses. 6° When D r Weizmann m e t w i t h the H.C. i n Jerusalem, he was forced to a d m i t the failure o f h i s attempts to open a dialogue w i t h Arab leaders. Trying t o sound a n optimistic

note, Weizmann suggested that those few meetings he d i d hold were an indication that grass-roots feeling for an understanding “ w o u l d grow and that i n eight months or a year’s time i t would be possible to bring about co-operation between the Arabs and the J e w s 1 ” 6! Chancellor’s reaction was characteristically cool. A l l along, he had felt i t prudent t o defer t o Arab sentiment, and not t o exert any pressure on D r Weizmann’s behalf. H e was sceptical about Weizmann’s optimism, and suggested that ArabZionist meetings would be more promising i n London than i n Palestine.’62 Although he d i d not press the point w i t h British officials, D r W e i z m a n n felt t h a t t h e

failure

of

his “peace

i n i t i a t i v e ” was a t least i n part d u e to the absence o f positive

support from the H.C. 163 D E V E L O P M E N T SCHEME NEGOTIATIONS

W e conclude our discussion of post-1929 negotiating opport u n i t i e s with a brief m e n t i o n of o n e o f t h e few positive

RELATIONS I N T H E W A K E O F CRISIS

107

features o f British Palestine policy a t this time: the consideration of a scheme for the economic development of the country and the re-settlement of Arabs who had been displaced by Jewish land-purchase.!64 The preparation of such a development scheme, being a constructive and ostensibly “‘nonp o l i t i c a l ” question, seemed to offer a reasonable hope for q u i e t Z i o n i s t - A r a b co-operation, a n d even for

tri-lateral

British-Arab-Zionist negotiations. !6 B u t the issue was, indeed, a “political” one for the AE., which was still feeling the effects of the MacDonald Letter. I n response to the British invitation to send a delegation t o London, the A.E. set o u t the following conditions for Arab participation:166 1. That the Arab representatives’ participation in the discussion shall n o t be interpreted as meaning that they adhere t o the Jewish National H o m e policy. 2. That the discussion shall n o t be based upon the MacDonald letter or any other s t a t e m e n t confirming that policy. 3. That the discussion shall take place i n Palestine through an accredited representative and not i n London, because the programme which w i l l be the objective [sic] of the discussion w i l l be applied t o Palestine. 4. That the Arab representatives shall n o t participate i n the discussion together with the Jewish delegates.

Privately, however, i t was rumoured that the Arabs would likely forego the third condition—especially as Sir John Chancellor was offering to defray the delegation’s transporta-

tion costs t o London.!67? Also, Col. Kisch believed that there was some chance, once the Arabs d i d reach L o n d o n , that

“they might be induced t o depart from” their fourth condition.!68 But, i n the end, such optimism proved unwarranted, and the Arabs refused t o go t o London. The intended “round-table” style of discussion was consequently abandoned i n favour o f parallel British-Zionist and British-Arab talks i n London and Palestine, respectively.!7° Once again the Zionists were disappointed i n the British rôle.

As Col. Kisch n o t e d : ! ” 1 I cannot b u t t h i n k t h a t w i t h a little m o r e patience and

108

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

encouragement the Arabs here could have been brought to change their minds about sending a delegation to Lon-

don.... This is another case of the absence of persistence o n the part o f the Government when i t is a matter o f bringing

Jews and Arabs together.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the riots of 1929 were serious enough to provide new incentives for reassessments of the whole question of Jewish-Arab relations and British policy i n Palestine. I n particular, i t caused some people to reconsider, for the first time since 1922, diplomatic solutions to a conflict which had just displayed its dangerous potential for getting out-of-hand. O n a formal level, at least, official Zionist circles displayed

a heightened concern for their “Arab problem’; the new Executive elected by the 1931 Zionist Congress declared that one o f its main goals was “ t o take active measures i n the economic, social a n d political spheres w i t h a v i e w to further-

i n g friendly relations and establishing a rapprochement between Jews and Arabs i n Palestine”.’2 Even a t the level of Jewish public opinion, Col. Kisch was “glad t o say that since the riots of 1929 a considerable advance [had] been made.... I t i s n o w [February, 1931] a t least possible for us to discuss t h e

issues with Arab leaders without being accused of treachery’’.3 There were also brief moments when, as w e have

noted, the Arab press spoke of the possibilities o f an ArabZionist understanding. Y e t , looking a t actual cases o f attempted negotiations, w e

saw few radical departures from the patterns which had been established before the riots. The period following the riots was highly fluid and uncertain politically; as a result, there was n o single moment when both sides simultaneously felt convinced about t h e need to find a n immediate solution

through compromise and Arab-Zionist negotiations. Most of t h e t i m e , each party appeared t o b e working towards i n v i t i n g the British to impose a settlement w h i c h was favourable t o its

exclusive national interests.

Conclusion

Looking back over the period surveyed i n this volume, we can see that each party had had, b y 1931, a fairly rich experience o f contact and negotiation with the other. O u r examination included a dozen serious attempts a t a n agreement: episodes which took place i n periods o f c a l m , o f uncertainty, o f tension

and o f violence; episodes which involved individuals a t various levels within the hierarchies of each camp. In

none o f these episodes d i d

w e find

t h e necessary

conditions and incentives for the successful conclusion of an Arab-Zionist entente. The interest i n an accord shown i n 1913

and 1914 by both parties was soon overtaken by doubts and hesitations relating mainly t o the realization of a real gap separating their respective positions and the disruptive effect of shifts in Turkish interests. The post-War period of uncertainty and exaggerated expectations was a period during

which, despite the intensity o f diplomatic activity, the t r u e object of Zionist and Arab attention was the new British masters o f the area. Once the Jewish National H o m e policy of the British Mandate was i n place, the goal of Arab nationalists i n Palestine was to subvert that policy, w h i l e t h e Zionists directed their efforts a t m a i n t a i n i n g a satisfactory level o f

British sympathy and firmness i n applying that same policy.

109

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

110

After 1922, neither side felt that a full-blown entente with the other was necessary for the achievement of its national goals. Nor was there any ad hoc incentive or pressure on either side to initiate serious negotiations w i t h the other. Those political

and quasi-political

encounters

which did take place were

motivated, as we have seen, b y considerations other than the desire to conclude a total peace agreement. The riots of 1929 and their aftermath provided a strong incentive t o explore diplomatic solutions to the Arab-Zionist conflict, b u t i n the immediate wake of the crisis there were no radical departures from the patterns or approaches of the 1920s. Despite a brief flurry of negotiating activity, both sides were primarily

i n t e r e s t e d i n e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e reformulation

of post-1929 British policy did as little damage as possible to

their original, irreconcilable goals. LESSONS O F E X P E R I E N C E

Although they produced no workable entente, the early Arab-Zionist contacts surveyed above did provide a rich experience for negotiators and would-be negotiators on both sides. Some of the common lessons learned b y both sides may be summarised as follows:

(a)

Appearances. Since we tend to praise, almost automati-

cally, any party which seems to want to negotiate ( a n d to

condemn, i n advance, a party which is reluctant or refuses t o sit down t o talks)!, both Arab and Zionist leaders recognised the need t o give the appearance o f being interested i n holding talks. O n given occasions, leaders found themselves faced

with

t h e t a c t i c a l necessity o f c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e external

impression that negotiations were possible, o r actually under-

way. Despite their profound scepticism about the successful conclusion o f a satisfactory accord, Zionists were frequently i n the position where they had t o demonstrate t o the British that they were, indeed, making every effort a t being reasonable and conciliatory i n their attitude t o the Arabs. Likewise, they saw the advantage o f fostering Arab “ m o d e r a t e s ” , whose

existence and occasional pronouncements helped create the impression, for British eyes, that there existed Arab spokes-

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- i t must be asked whether such an agreement would have been successfully consummated even i f there had been no British-Zionist connection. I n the episodes we have seen above, the absence of positive Palestinian involvement and the doubtful ability of Arab negotiators t o “deliver the goods” were, i n themselves, serious enough obstacles t o cause the failure o f those negotiation attempts.

(d) Status of the Negotiators. F r o m t h e i r experience o f contacts prior t o 1931, Arab and Zionist representatives made assessments of their opposite-numbers in terms of background, family or communal connections, ideological positions, and the authority which they commanded within their respective political communities. The Zionists were quite systematic i n this respect, and b y late 1931 the J.A.E. Political Department had a detailed card-index of some 800 Arabs i n Palestine and i n the neighbouring countries. 6 By this time, Arabs already knew that any deal arrived a t w i t h people like H . M . Kalvaryski or D r Judah Magnes had little chance of bearing fruit. Even though these t w o personalities w e n t further than other Jews i n the direction of meeting their demands, Arab leaders d i d n o t expect much from their relations with these Jewish “moderates” —either because they

CONCLUSION

115

suspected that they were “extremists” i n disguise, or because they knew that only Z.O. officials, like D r Weizmann or Col. Kisch, had the real power t o “deliver the goods” for the Zionist end of any bargain. The frequent use of men like Kalvaryski, Ben-Avi and others by the P . Z E . or by D r Weizmann as semi-official go-betweens only complicated the p r o b l e m o f the s t a t u s o f Zionist negotiators.

For their part, Zionists began to realize—despite their

recurring pleas t o the British t o support the “moderate” Arabs and n o t t o curry favour w i t h the “extremists” —that only negotiations with their committed opponents could eventually lead t o a worthwhile peace accord. Accumulated Zionist disappointments i n the political strength and conviction of so-called Arab “moderates” prior t o 1931 made i t clear that the latter could n o t be counted upon t o “deliver” their end of any political deal. This lesson was to be one of David Ben-Gurion’s starting-points after 1933, when he would deliberately seek t o negotiate w i t h the “genuine” patriots who could not be bought. PALESTINIAN A N D NON-PALESTINIAN ARABS

Another lesson learned by Zionists regarding the status of Arab negotiators relates t o the important distinction between Palestinians and non-Palestinians. Experience soon taught them h o w difficult i t was to reach a political agreement between themselves a n d the Palestinians o n a purely local

basis. Hence Zionists developed a two-pronged strategy: political relations would be reserved for leaders of the wider “pan-Arab” movement, while within Palestine they would strive t o establish healthy day-to-day social and economic relations with the Arab population.'8 I t was at a relatively early stage that Zionists realized that, for an agreement w i t h the Arabs on Zionist terms, the problem needed to b e considered i n a w i d e r frame o f

reference than Palestine alone. Hence they sought o u t credib l e , strong non-Palestinian leaders w h o could b e expected to

view the issue as a regional question. I n his talks w i t h Arabs before World W a r I , Richard Lichtheim suggested t o them that t h e “Arab q u e s t i o n ” was

116

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

more extensive than the Palestine question. I f the Arabs

allow us to buy land i n Palestine and t o colonize ( i n the process of which the fellaheen must somehow be cared for), they will b e a b l e t o w i n through o u r agency t h e goodwill o f

the European press and eventually of Jewish financial circles for the development o f Arabism.!° A distinctly

local

Palestinian

patriotism,

reinforced

by

a

hard-line local opposition to Zionist development, was already an element i n the conflict before the First World War? and continued into the period covered i n this volume (and down to the present day) to be an obstacle to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable t o the Zionists. When the latter dealt with the Arab Decentralists (1913-1914), with the Amirs Faisal or Abdallah, with Riad as-Sulh, or with other non-Palestinian pan-Arabists, they were able t o find some common ground o n which t o discuss the ingredients o f a n

exchange of services. For this exchange of services t o be implemented, however, the acquiescence of the local Palestinian leadership was essential. I n the end, no combination of Zionist inducements and pan-Arab urging would be strong enough to win this acquiescence. I n fact, i t may be argued that the very process of repeated attempts t o solve the Zionist-Palestinian conflict through the offices of nonPalestinian politicians only stiffened local loyalties and suspicions of outsiders. Although, i n ideological terms, Palestinians also shared the hopes and dreams o f Arab u n i t y , m o s t of t h e m were n o t so devoted to the ideal o f pan-Arabism, o r so loyal to a n

individual pan-Arab leader, as to be willing to sacrifice the o p t i o n o f a n independent Palestinian-Arab state. Whenever

Palestinians felt that their participation i n pan-Arab confederation or unity schemes might further the prospect o f real independence from the British or Zionists, they were ardent pan-Arabists. B u t once this hope appeared t o fade, and especially when a deal to accommodate Z i o n i s t interests was

rumoured, their pan-Arab orientations became secondary t o defence of narrower local interests.?! The activities and attitudes of A w n i A b d al-Hadi offer a vivid illustration o f this Palestinian point o f view.?

117

CONCLUSION

Thus, (a)

the mutual

non-recognition of Zionists and

Palestinians as legitimate partners for serious political negotiations,

(b)

t h e Z i o n i s t preference

for

dealing

with

non-

Palestinian leaders, and (c) the Palestinians’ suspicions of the latter were becoming, by 1931, an enduring pattern of Arab-Zionist diplomacy and a formidable obstacle to the

successful conclusion o f a negotiated accord. THIRD-PARTY CONSIDEFATIONS

I t is sometimes said that a solution t o the Arab-Zionist conflict would have come about more easily i f only Arabs and Jews had been left t o themselves to settle their differences without outside interference. Such speculation seems based on wishful thinking and is almost beside-the-point, given the evidence we have seen of the role played first b y the Turks and then b y the British. The point is n o t that Turks and Englishmen have subordinated Arab and Zionist interests t o their own; true enough, both Aftab and Zionist leaders have had t o take into consideration the wishes and interests of these powerful outsiders. The crucial point t o n o t e here is that both parties—despite frequent lip-service t o the notion that the t w o

parties

o u g h t t o negotiate directly i n order t o ar-

rive at an understanding between them?— have deliberately chosen to invite the involvement of these outside powers whenever they felt i t would help them advance their respective national interests. G i v e n t h e s i t u a t i o n

in

w h i c h n e i t h e r party was a

sovereign, independent factor, b u t rather dependent on the great power which controlled Palestine, Arabs and Zionists looked first, i n almost a l l the episodes discussed above, t o t h e Turks o r British for w h a t they w a n t e d m o s t . They a p p r o a c h e d

each other only when i t appeared that such a move was necessary to further their respective causes. This is n o t t o say that the contribution of third-parties t o the worsening conflict has been, o n balance, benign, or even neutral. That contribution, i t m u s t be concluded, has indeed been a negative one, b u t n o t i n a w a y which w o u l d support

the simplistic thesis t h a t peace-efforts o f Arabs a n d Jews have been sabotaged by evil, m a c h i a v e l l i a n i m p e r i a l i s t s . W h a t i s evident from the episodes we have surveyed is that the

118

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

conflict was aggravated b y ambiguities of British policy and

by fluctuations i n Arab and Zionist perceptions of British intentions. This uncertainty allowed (and sometimes encour-

aged) o n e side o r

the other to

inflate

i t s expectations t o the

point where frustration and disillusionment were inevitable. Uncertainties of British policy also influenced Arab and Zionist tactical decisions on whether t o negotiate with each other, or—more often—when t o a b s t a i n from meetings. W e must also avoid viewing the British position in the Arab-Zionist-British triangle as that of impartial umpire or disinterested mediator between t w o rival parties. I t is true that the British did, on several occasions, seek t o present themselves as arbitrators, going through the motions o f joint consultations i n a n attempt to hammer out a set o f terms

acceptable t o both sides (e.g., the 1922 White Paper; talks t o resolve the Wailing Wall crisis). But, given the drastically unequal power as between the “mediator”; on the one hand, and the parties i n conflict, on the other, this so-called mediation was in reality a process i n which pressure and incentives were employed i n order to coax one or both parties to accept, “ v o l u n t a r i l y ” , the i n e v i t a b l e .

Arab and Zionist leaders, for their part, certainly d i d not perceive the British as “honest brokers”. More often than not,

they viewed the British as unfairly favouring the other side and as the cause o f the other party’s unreasonable expectations and behaviour. Zionist-Revisionists were most eloquent on this point, although they were b y n o means alone i n the Zionist camp when they argued that improved Arab-Jewish relations would come about

only as a result o f a firm [British] attitude calculated t o convince the Arab population that the Jewish National H o m e policy, and especially the active encouragement of Jewish immigration, is the guiding principle o f the Administration, a principle from which i t w i l l never depart. Such firmness, they claimed, was t h e o n l y means t o discourage t h e extremist section among

the Arabs and t o strength[en] the influence of their moderate circles—circles willing t o negotiate w i t h the

CONCLUSION

119

Zionists on the basis of an unequivocal acceptance o f

[Zionist rights i n Palestine].?s Arab spokesmen, for their p a r t , found i t “impossible to

think that Britain w i t h her splendid tradition of Justice and Fair Dealing should i n Palestine continue a policy not only against the wishes of the people, b u t rousing their deepest resentment”. As far as they could see, the British government had “placed itself i n the position of a partisan i n Palestine of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept because it

means his extinction sooner or later’. The Arabs repeatedly professed their disbelief that the British could give their backing t o Zionist demands which, they felt, would result i n the injustice of Jewish political ascendancy and the consequent ‘“smother[ing of] their n a t i o n a l life under a flood o f

alien immigration” .% Such Zionist and Arab views of the British rôle led, n o t unnaturally, t o requests for what may be called “imposed solutions” t o the conflict. Zionists consistently urged the British to apply the Balfour Declaration policy so firmly that

the problem would be “solved” b y the Arabs being forced t o accept the fait accompli o f a permanent and flourishing Jewish

majority. The Arabs, for their part, submitted demands, issued protests, a n d resorted t o violence i n their efforts t o

convince the British t o abandon the Balfour Declaration policy, and thereby pave the way for what they felt was the only just solution t o the conflict: “ t h e Arab people of Palestine cannot and will n o t tolerate the Jews except o n the

pre-war system of equal rights and privileges w i t h themselves founded o n a numerical basis”. ? TERMS O F AGREEMENT

O n the basis of pre-1931 negotiation attempts, one 1s tempted to conclude t h a t , i f there was ever the faintest hope o f a successful Arab-Zionist agreement, i t s terms w o u l d have been

those of a pan-Arab exchange of services: for the pan-Arab leader(s), Jewish development capital, technical assistance and international political support for the broad “Arab cause’; for t h e Zionists, Arab recognition o f some form o f

120

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Jewish national existence i n Palestine, including pressure on the Palestinian Arabs t o moderate their hostility t o the Zionist programme. Quite apart

from

the

near-impossibility

of a

pan-Arab

leader being able t o “deliver” the Palestinian acquiescence

required for s u c h a

bargain, there were

difficulties even a t

the

level of the apparently ideal terms being proposed. Although they were never fully p u t to the test, Zionists were n o t really

capable of providing either weighty pro-Arab political lobbying or substantial economic assistance for the Arabs. T o the extent that the A m i r Faisal’s expectations had been aroused, he found that the Zionists were unable t o deliver even a sample of the “goods” which he required.? The apparently generous terms offered t o Zionists by pan-Arabists also proved less substantial than the former would have wished. From their point o f view, the agreement with Faisal (Document 8 ) was the most that could be expected. I n its text, Zionists had w o n the Arab ruler’s implicit

r e c o g n i t i o n o f a separate, “Jewish” P a l e s t i n e , a n d

his

explicit acceptance of the Balfour Declaration (Art. III) and o f the need t o encourage Jewish immigration t o and settlement i n Palestine (Art. IV). W i t h i n months of the signing o f the agreement, however, Faisal claimed that he had agreed only t o a Jewish national enclave within his future united Arab kingdom (Document 13). I n 1925, h e informed D r W e i z m a n n t h a t n o agreement

would be possible unless Jewish immigration were restricted, so as to assure the Palestinians t h a t the Jews w o u l d never become a majority i n the country (Document 28). I n 1929, h e

added his voice t o the Palestinian Arab demand for the setting u p of “ a national government … i n accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants” (Document 33). Likewise, the terms o f agreement proposed t o Zionists b y other pan-Arabists, however attractive a t first o n paper,

usually amounted t o placing the yishuv under the suzerainty of an Arab ruler, w i t h some autonomy for the Jews i n the areas where they had already settled, and limited immigration to a l l parts o f the proposed A r a b federation. I f we wish to look o n l y a t the possible terms w h i c h Zionists

and Palestinian Arabs were prepared t o consider as a basis for

CONCLUSION

121

agreement, we must first review their respective nationalpolitical aims and demands. Despite the vagueness of the expression, ‘national home’, the Zionist m o v e m e n t was indeed aiming, through the upbuilding of this “national h o m e ” , a t radically changing the demographic-political status o f Palestine. T h e Jews were t o become the majority; the Arabs, the minority.? Immigration was the vital key to such a

transformation. (The Jewish population, which amounted t o

7% of the population in 1918, rose only

to

17% by 1931.) The

Balfour Declaration pledge of the British government, ensh-

rined in the League of Nations Mandate of 1922, was the cornerstone of the Zionist position, and Zionist demands consisted of pleas for the maintenance of British policies faithful to their interpretation of these two texts. Palestinian-Arab demands and aims were defined partly i n reaction t o the Zionist claim. Before World W a r I , Palestinians had participated with other Arab nationalists i n a movement which sought a decentralization o f the O t t o m a n

Empire. The immediate post-War goal was a single Arab state, b u t this a i m was revised as soon as the European powers

about dividing the Middle East i n t o separate mandated territories. Once the Palestinians’ hope of independence as “Southern Syria” under Faisal was lost i n 1920, their spokesmen invoked, in fine legal detail, wartime pledges and the post-War doctrine of national self-determination i n order to establish a claim for an independent Arab-Palestinian state. Official Palestinian demands underwent no major changes during the 1920s. These were: (a) “creation of a National Government . . . responsible t o a Parliament elected by those natives o f Palestine who lived i n the country before the War’’;% (b) revocation of the principle of the Jewish national set

h o m e u n d e r the Balfour Declaration, whose two clauses

(“establishment i n Palestine of a National Home for the

Jewish people”;

“ n o t h i n g . . . done which may prejudice the

civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities i n Palestine”) were seen to b e mutually contradictory;3

and (c) the stoppage ofJewish immigration until such time as a N a t i o n a l Government were formed to establish its o w n

immigration policies and regulations.

122

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

Given this wide gap between the stated positions of the t w o parties, one may wonder on what possible basis an agreement

between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs could have been built. Could the Zionists have incorporated into their programme provisions allowing Palestine to retain its Arab national-political character? Could Palestinian nationalists have reconciled themselves t o the existence of a Jewish majority within their “Arab” Palestine? While agreeing to respect the “ c i v i l and religious” rights o f the Arab population of Palestine, Zionist

leaders argued t h a t

there was room for only one set o f “ p o l i t i c a l ” rights i n the country: viz., their o w n rights to establish a Jewish national

home. Given this stance, and notwithstanding the conciliatory spirit o f Zionist Congress resolutions referring to the

“common home” of the t w o peoples, the only “agreement” which Palestinian Arabs could have had from the Zionists during this period, had they so desired, would have been one a long t h e

lines

of the

Weizmann-Faisal t r e a t y ,

a t t h e cost o f

abandoning their local national goals: within the future Jewish Palestine, constitutional-legal guarantees would have safeguarded the existing civil, religious and economic rights (the future “minority rights”) of the Arab population, while the commercial interests and national-cultural needs o f the Palestinians would have been satisfied through their participation i n the regional confederation. This option was, as we have seen, categorically rejected b y Palestinian nationalists. Even for Palestinian pan-Arabists, like Awni A b d al-Hadi, the guiding principle remained that Palestine was “ a n Arab country and must remain as such”; any policy calculated t o “give a different political status t o Palestine [was] doomed t o failure.’ Given this position, the only “agreement” which Zionists could have had from the Palestinian leadership, had they so wished, was one under which the s t a t u s of the Jews—and their actual numbers i n the country—would have reverted t o what they had been before the War, w i t h none of the privileges which had been instituted since 1917. “ T h e A r a b s have always l i v e d o n peaceful terms w i t h the

Jews i n

a l l previous c e n t u r i e s ” , wrote

Awni Abd

al-Hadi i n

his Memorandum on the Passfield White Paper,* “ a n d were

CONCLUSION

123

i n accord w i t h t h e m i n every m a t t e r which was i n the interest

of the country and its prosperity.” But, he warned, the Arabs were “ u n a b l e to resume their former relations w i t h the Jews so long as the Jews adhere[d] to the colonizing p o l i c y . . . and

so long as their aspirations conflict[ed] with the national aspirations o f the Arabs”. T h e Arabs were “willing to accept

any policy which tend[ed] to further the interests of this Arab country”, but, unfortunately, the A.E. believed that “the Zionist Jews will never abandon their policy as regards the creation of a majority of Jews i n Palestine”. A n d this, Awni concluded, the Arabs were “ i n n o circumstances, prepared to accept”.

I n discussing these terms, i t may be asked: should these incompatible, maximalist positions be taken at their face value? Were these n o t formal political stances, stated for public consumption, deliberately exaggerated and worded i n t h e i r most “ e x t r e m e ” form? W a s there n o t , behind this

ideological fagade, a pragmatic and realistic appreciation t h a t , one day, for t h e sake o f a n agreement, such terms w o u l d

have t o be scaled down t o more “moderate” dimensions? And, is i t n o t natural for participants i n bargaining situations t o open with tactically maximalist positions, from which subsequent retreat would be possible? Unfortunately, the historical record shows that official spokesmen on both sides have n o t maintained the classic negotiator’s dichotomy between “opening” and “final” bargaining stands.3 Essential, “final” negotiating stances have often been disclosed from the start, and, whenever actual discussions d i d take place, negotiators found themselves with little o r n o room for manoeuvre—few “ d i s p o s a b l e ” items

which could have been given u p i n exchange for concessions from the other side. Thus, i n his reply to D r Judah Magnes’ enquiry whether there might be a possible basis for ArabJewish understanding within the t e r m s o f the above-quoted Memorandum, Awni A b d al-Hadi further elaborated his idea of the only kind of “agreement” which was possible. “The Arabs’, he wrote,” d o not a t a l l refuse that the Jews shall enjoy i n this country

the same rights as the Arabs, both politically and econom:-

124

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

cally, and i t w i l l not harm them that the Jews shall work i n Palestine for reviving their original Hebrew language and for developing i t and their literature. B u t the political problem could be solved only b y the Jews “accepting the Arab national political aims”. “ I hope”, he went on,

that the Zionists who are following today i n Palestine a policy contrary to the Arab national wishes, will realize tomorrow the futility o f such a policy which will bring to the country n o good, and that they will not prevent the

Arab countries from acquiring unity and independence including Palestine, i n which the Arabs do n o t refuse that the Jews shall live and shall work for the development of their language, literature and sciences with complete freedom. I f the Zionists would “give u p altogether the idea of creating a Jewish National Home with political aspects”, then, Awni concluded, “there w i l l remain nothing which will prevent an agreement between both parties”. During the period u p to 1931, neither party had to

reconsider and redefine its fundamental aims and the possible terms o f agreement w i t h the other side. O n l y outside o f

leadership circles d i d a few individuals dare t o depart from the official “ l i n e ” , but their willingness t o compromise on basic goals was n o t enough to produce a n agreement w h i c h

could command majority support i n either camp. Although there are, before 1931, some scattered hints that recognized leaders were beginning to consider the need for some basic compromises i n order t o reach a n Arab-Zionist accord,® i t

would be only several years later that more imaginative terms of agreement would be actively considered: e.g., the nondomination principle, parity formulae, bi-nationalism, cantonization, limitations on Jewish immigration or on the Jewish population ratio, and partition. L O W PRIORITY O F A N ARAB-ZIONIST A C C O R D

Early Arab-Zionist encounters were, as we have suggested,

CONCLUSION

125

sufficiently n u m e r o u s t o provide leaders o n b o t h sides w i t h a

wealth o f v i t a l experience. They came t o know leading

personalities on the other side, their ways of thinking, the constraints acting o n them, and t h e terms o f agreement which were available. Ignorance o r misunderstanding o f the other

side’s position could not, as is sometimes suggested, be counted among the real obstacles t o a settlement. O n the contrary, knowing t h e other side’s aims and terms only too

well should be more accurately listed as an important explanation for the absence of success. While i t is easy t o dismiss as hyperbole o r distortion many o f t h e statements

coming from official Arab and Zionist protests and comp l a i n t s , even Zionists h a d to a d m i t t h a t a m a n l i k e A w n i A b d

al-Hadi had well understood the motives behind Zionism when he wrote:®

Whether moderates or extremists, they all have one purpose, namely, the creation of a Jewish majority i n Palestine. They are unable to conceive of any National H o m e which does n o t secure this object. Should they . . . remain at a l l times a minority i n Palestine, t h e i r position

. would i n no way differ from that i n any other country i n which they are also a minority. T h e i r object is, therefore, to

have i n Palestine a National H o m e i n which the 16,000,000 Jews scattered a l l over the world, would be represented by a majority and exercise a national ascendancy.

Likewise, when Zionist leaders like Frederick Kisch and David Ben-Gurion stressed quiet co-operation and nonpolitical grass-roots relations w i t h Arabs, this was i n recognition of the impossibility of satisfying the national-political

demands of the Palestinians. There can be little doubt that Arab and Zionist leaders d i d not, prior t o 1931, direct their major energies towards reaching a m u t u a l accord. E a c h party was dedicated to the

achievement of its own exclusive national goals, and an agreement w i t h t h e other side was n o t given h i g h priority.

Given the assessments which each made of the position o f the other side, there was l i t t l e hope t h a t a n acceptable entente was possible. Jamal al-Husaini believed that i t was

126

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

a gross error to believe that Arab and Jew may come to an understanding i f only each of them exchanges his coat of extremism for another of moderation. When the principles

[my

emphasis,

N.C.] underlying

t w o m o v e m e n t s d o clash,

i t is futile t o expect their meeting halfway. Even whenever i t was felt that some effort i n pursuit of an accord was nonetheless worthwhile, the likely results were usually considered an incidental benefit rather than an urgent requirement. Many of the negotiating episodes which d i d take place, as we have seen, were motivated b y considerations other than a real hope o f resolving the Arab-Zionist problem, once and for all. For Zionists, i t was often “preventive diplomacy” t o de-fuse threatening situations; for Arabs, i t was often a tactical alliance to outmanoeuvre rival politicians; for both, o n other occasions, it was the need to

influence the British. I t is n o t difficult

to

understand why Palestinian Arab

leaders felt n o need to come t o terms, through a negotiated agreement, w i t h the newly-politicised Jewish minority i n the

country. Despite their real fears for their future i f the Zionist enterprise were allowed to develop apace w i t h British support, Palestinian Arabs still

c o n s t i t u t e d t h e overwhelming

majority of the population and would protect their interests best by continuing their attempts t o reverse British policy. Growing pan-Muslim and pan-Arab solidarity for the Palestinians a t the beginning o f the 1930s seemed t o augur well for the Arab case,*! while the common stereotype o f the weak, despised J e w n o d o u b t contributed to Arab self-confidence.#

I f the militaristic Crusaders had once come and gone, the Arabs saw l i t t l e need t o make compromises for t h e anticipat-

ed temporary presence of the Jewish minority, with its new-found pretensions t o sovereignty.+ Zionists, likewise, were only temporarily and superficially disturbed, for the m o s t part, b y the overt expressions o f Arab hostility t o their presence i n Palestine. The pressure t o consider the need for an agreement with the Arabs was mitigated b y three interrelated beliefs: (a) that the economic blessings w h i c h Z i o n i s m w o u l d b r i n g t o t h e country

would

ultimately win Arab appreciation; (b) that local anti-Zionist

127

CONCLUSION

feeling was n o t very genuine, b u t was manipulated b y a

handful of self-seeking and corruptible politicans; and (c) that anti-Zionist solidarity among the Palestinians was a fragile thing, easily offset by family and communal divisions. The heavy religious undertones t o the serious 1929 riots were seen b y some Zionists as proof that they were not

dealing with a “genuine” nationalist opposition.*5 Although greatly outnumbered i n Palestine, Zionists felt confident i n t h e u l t i m a t e success

of

their venture

by

the “qualitative”

difference which they believed existed between themselves— modern Europeans—and the Arabs—‘ primitive” natives. I n summary, the period 1913-1931, although nch i n Arab-Zionist encounters, brought no positive results i n the form o f a negotiated settlement to the worsening conflict. T h e

gap beween the basic national-political demands and the perceived “ v i t a l ” interests of Palestinian Arabs and Zionists was so wide as to b e virtually unbridgeable. N o outside party, British o r non-Palestinian Arab, h a d the resolve o r t h e ability to impose terms o f a settlement o n either o r b o t h o f the local adversaries. A t n o single moment were there internal o r

external pressures strong enough t o force both sides, simultaneously, t o perceive the urgency of reducing their respective national demands for the sake o f coming to terms w i t h each other. A t any given moment, a t least one of the parties felt that it had to—and that i t could afford to—hold o u t for something very close to its o w n full claims; hence, i t either

abstained from negotiations, or else caused their ultimate failure.

We

have seen n o t

only

the futility

of the negotiating

process as a means o f ending the Arab-Zionist conflict, b u t

also the skilful use o f diplomacy b y both parties as a tactical weapon i n their determined struggle t o control Palestine. I n effect, Arab a n d Z i o n i s t leaders have inversed t h e famous

dictum of von Clausewitz: for them, diplomacy and negotiation have been an extension o f their basic war by other, non-violent, means.

Documents

Note:

The documents reproduced i n this section are i n chronological order, and not necessarily the order i n which they are discussed i n the preceding section.

Document 1

Extract ofReport by S. Hochberg to V. Jacobson, 17 May 1913 (Mission to Cairo andBeirut) . . . 1t is certain that the majority of the members of the Cairo and Beirut committees are favourable to Zionism and would even l i k e to conclude a n entente w i t h the Zionists w i t h a view t o joint action. I gave them m y opinion, according t o which

t h e Zionists w o u l d probably n o t enter i n t o such a n entente

before the Arab organization adopts as its own the demands o f t h e Zionists. I n other words, not until i t accepts the Zionist

programme as part of its own programme. Otherwise, the Zionists would probably not wish t o contribute, naturally and logically, towards the formation of a force which might turn against them. I t goes without saying that neither the Cairo nor the Beirut committee, nor t h e two together, has t h e authority to make i t ( i e , a n agreement w i t h the Zionists). I t would require a

congress at which delegates from all the committees of Syria and Palestine would take part. But the convening o f such a congress will n o t be possible until after the completion of the organization of the movement, which will take place after the Paris Congress.

After a lively exchange of views on the subject with the Cairo committee, I c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e m t h e f o l l o w i n g entente

verbale:

1)

The Cairo Committee, being i n principle i n favour of

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Jewish immigration i n t o Syria a n d Palestine a n d o f a n entente

with t h e Zionists, will make i t i t s duty to work for a

rapprochement o f the Arab world to the Jewish world, and to dissipate, through oral propaganda and the Arabic press, all the prejudices which have been current u n t i l n o w in the Arab world o n the subject of Jewish immigration and which have

impeded an Arab-Jewish rapprochement.

2)

I n exchange, Le Jeune Turc [the Istanbul paper of which

Hochberg was the editor] will make i t its duty to support the cause o f the Arab movement so l o n g as i t remains compatible

with the unity and integrity of the [Ottoman] Empire. Le Jeune Turc will do everything possible so that the European papers (especially in Germany) w i t h which i t has dealings should do the same. This entente verbale is, in o u r view (both m i n e a n d the

members of the Cairo Committee), nothing more than an exchange o f services destined t o prepare the ground and, above all, t o enlighten Arab public opinion, which has until now been poorly informed on the aims and goals of Zionism, with a view to a full accord i n the future. This entente was completed b y a decision o f the Committee

(inscribed in the minutes) concerning its attitude towards O t t o m a n Jews and b y some statements b y Rafiq Bey al-Azm,

Chairman of the Committee, destined for publication i n Le Jeune Turc and i n the Arabic newspapers, concerning Jewish immigration and the restrictive measures of the Government. These statements were read and approved b y other influential

members of the Cairo Committee. Here is the t e x t of the statements by Rafiq Bey al-Azm:

“ O u r Party is determined t o safeguard the rights of the Jewish nationality a n d t o accept n o law, n o restrictive or

exceptional measures, against them. As Ottomans, the Jews ought to enjoy the same rights as a l l Ottomans; as foreigners, they

ought to enjoy the same rights as all foreigners. Any exceptional measure taken against them on account o f their nationality is anti- constitutional and contrary to the liberal principles o f our Party.

“ Y o u are aware that there is a wave of Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine. Unfortunately, our Party has n o t yet

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had the time, given the short length of its existence, t o study this question i n depth, but I a m sure that the day when this question will be brought u p for discussion, i t will be resolved by a common accord for the good of both interested parties: the Jews and the Arab population. We understand too well the valuable assistance that Jewish capital, manpower and intelligence can bring us for the rapid revival o f our provinces for us to commit the error

of rejecting them. Certainly, regulations as exist i n all civilized countries regarding immigration, whether Jewish or other, w i l l perhaps be necessary. But there is an enormous difference between a reasonable and just regulation and exceptional measures such as those enacted under the old régime and maintained under the new régime.” I n order t o be able t o make the most of the press campaign w h i c h w i l l b e undertaken, I have asked M r Najjar to write a

series o f articles i n the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian papers. These articles will carry the signature of one or another of the members of the Cairo Committee. Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum Bey, an influential member of the Beirut Committee w h o came to Cairo at the same t i m e as I d i d , took part i n a l l the discussions and the entente verbale

which followed. H e communicated i t t o several influential members of the Beirut Committee, and has promised t o go there to get m e i n t o contact w i t h t h a t Committee...

T h e entente verbale was also accepted b y the Beirut Committee, and was completed b y a statement from Rizqallah

Arqash, an important member o f the Committee. Here is the text:

“ O u r entente w i t h the Muslims also includes the Jewish element, which we like because i t 1s hard-working and educated. I t follows from our very programme that its interests as a n a t i o n a l i t y m u s t b e safeguarded to t h e same extent as those o f a l l other elements living i n the Arab

provinces. “As for Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine, we can o n l y b e favourable to i t . T h i s Jewish i m m i g r a t i o n , b y

virtue of the level of culture of the immigrants, the capital which they introduce into the country, the new methods of

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work which they practise, constitutes one of the most powerful factors for the upbuilding of these provinces. I t would b e a crime against the fatherland [patrie] to impede

sugh immigration. “Those among us who are opposed are only interested parties who think they can thereby extort money from the Jewish companies involved, or are usurers whom Jewish immigration, b y enriching the fellah and improving his condition, will prevent from practising, as before, large-scale usury with a view t o despoiling the fellahin of their goods and reducing them to slavery. Honest and intelligent people can only wish t o encourage this immigration. The Government should realize this and abolish the restrictive measures taken under Abdul Hamid against an immigration which is useful and harmless.” The practical results of m y mission can thus be summarized as follows: 1) a complete study o f the state o f the Arab movement, as well as its attitude towards Z i o n i s m , 2) first contacts made with the members of the m o v e m e n t with a

view to a n entente, 3 ) clarification o f certain points which facilitate a n accord, 4 ) a first accord a i m i n g at enlightening

public opinion, and 5) statements o f several leaders i n favour of Zionism... PA

Source: CZA, Z3/114. Reproduced i n P . A . Alsberg, “ T h e Arab Question i n the Policy o f the Zionist Executive Before World W a r I ” ( i n Heb.). Shwat Zion I V (1956-57), 190-193.

Above is my translation of the original French text.

Document 2

Jacobson Proposals, as transmatted to Cairo by Assad Daghir (? May-June) 1914 1.

The Arabs and Jews are from one stock, and each

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[people] possesses attributes complementary t o the other. The Jews have knowledge, funds and influence; while the Arabs have a vast land, awesome power, cultural treasures and inexhaustible material wealth. Therefore a reconciliation between both [peoples] will be to the good of both and to the

good of all the Orient. 2. The Arabs w i l l receive the Jews i n Arab lands as their brethren, on condition that the Jews become Ottoman subjects and that Palestine will not be exclusively theirs. 3. I n exchange, the Jews pledge t o put their cultural and material power at the service of the Arab cause; they will support the Arab groups and place at their disposal three million guineas.

4. A n Arab-Jewish conference will be held i n Egypt when the Syrian and Iraqi deputies return from Constantinople [during parliamentary recess] to their lands. *

Source: Neville J . Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism before World War

I (London/Berkeley, 1976), 198.

Document 3

Notes of a Conference held at the Shepheard’s Hotel, Cairo, between the Zionist Commission and Sa‘d Shuqair Pasha, D r Faris Nimr and Sulaiman Bey Nasif, 27 March 1918 D r N i m r informed the commission that the conversations which Major Ormsby-Gore had held w i t h h i m the previous day have assured h i m t h a t there was n o t h i n g inimical t o t h e

Arabs in the Zionist Aims and aspirations. As far as he personally was concerned, he was very glad to meet D r

Weizmann and the members of the Commission, and hoped that they will be able to work together i n harmony and understanding.

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D r Weizmann expressed pleasure a t meeting the Arab leaders who were present. He then stated that he had been informed of the conversation which Major Ormsby-Gore had

held with D r Nimr the previous day, but, for the sake of perfect frankness, he wished to say that one of the main tasks o f the Commission was t o prevent land speculation in Palestine. I t was a t his instigation that M r Balfour had arrived a t this decision and had communicated i t t o the Authorities

in Egypt and Palestine. I t was the earnest wish o f the Zionists t o live o n friendly terms with the Arabs. We were n o t putting forward a claim t o

monopolise the whole of the administration of Palestine, which he understood was their main fear. H e certainly wished to clear away a misconception which seemed t o be very common amongst the Arab leaders, viz., that the Zionists

wished to establish a Jewish State i n Palestine immediately after the War. The Zionists desired to see as the result o f the War a British Palestine which would act fairly a n d justly t o a l l groups which inhabit the country. H e wished t h e Arabs to

appreciate that whatever the Jews had i n m i n d would be t o the benefit and prosperity of the country as a whole. W i t h regard to the Holy Places, the maintenance of which h e understood was causing anxiety to the Arabs, h e wished to say that the Jews d i d not p u t forward any claim t o control the

Holy Places. O f course, the Jews have their own H o l y Places, over which they desired to have control.

Suliman Bey Nassif and Shoucair Pacha expressed their complete satisfaction at this statement. Suliman Bey Nassif added that, as far as Palestine was concerned, there was room for a million more people without affecting the position of the present inhabitants. Major Ormsby-Gore p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e British Governm e n t had n o t p u t forward a claim for a B r i t i s h P a l e s t i n e . I t

was a matter w h i c h would have to b e decided b y the Peace

Conference. M r Aaronsohn discussed the position of the Arabs i n the Jewish colonies, the burden of his remarks being that with the growth of the Jewish colonies the Arab population had increased i n number and prosperity.

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I n concluding the interview D r Weizmann again expressed his pleasure at meeting the Arab leaders and, i n reply to Major Ormsby-Gore’s remarks, stated that n o matter what

the British Government thought on the question of Palestine, the Zionists wished t o see such a solution as a result o f the War.

Source: CZA, 74/483.

Document 4

Memorandum drafted by the “Palestine Committee”, Cairo, as a basisfor discussion with the Zionist Commission, early April 1918 1. The inviolability of Holy Places and their retention as i n the past i n the hands o f their respective owners w i t h the free exercise o f their rights and privileges. 2. The institution of a system of Government based on even-handed justice and equality of rights between the different elements irrespective o f their comparative numbers (majority or minority o f votes). 3.

T h e laws o f the country to apply equally to a l l the

elements

4.

of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w i t h o u t d i s t i n c t i o n .

T h e official language to b e t h e language o f t h e country

viz. Arabic, the teaching of which t o be compulsory in Government schools. 5. A l l persons coming into the country as colonists, whatever may be their nationality, be subject alike t o the laws o f the country.

6. I n view of the general impoverishment of the population through the war, which affords a wide field for merciless exploitation, i t would be necessary t o suspend, during the war, any transaction o f purchase or sale of property, whether rural or urban.

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7. The institution at the earliest possible opportunity of an agricultural bank under government control to afford impartial financial help to the people. 8.

T h e a d v i s a b i l i t y o f framing a law s i m i l a r to the F i v e

Feddan L a w i n Egypt, i n Palestine.

9. The offering o f honest opportunity to Zionist colonization b y facilitating their purchase of State lands, especially i n the first rush of immigration, leaving a reasonable share of these lands to the other elements. 10. The institution of a mixed Commission composed equally of three elements and independent of the Government, whose functions are to examine any cases of aggression or injustice i n economic or moral matters that may arise between the different elements, to take the necessary steps under government auspices w i t h a view to their settlement

and non-recurrence. The permanent duty of this Commission would be t o study and devise all such means as are calculated t o strengthen the ties of friendship between the different elements, promote a good feeling of neighbourliness, inculcate the principle of union and solidarity, and inspire i n all a public spirit and the unselfish desire for the common weal. *

Source: Appendix “ A ” , W m . Ormsby-Gore t o Balfour, Report No. 1 o n Zionist Commission, 7 April 1918 P R O 371/3394, file

W44 /83691 /11053.

Document 5

General G. F. Clayton’s telegraphic report of Weizmann’s visit to Faisal, 4 June 1918 Weizmann has returned from his visit t o Feisal and is much pleased with the result. H e 1s very favourably i m pressed with Feisal’s personality and they appear t o have

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DOCUMENTS

established excellent personal relations. T h e general results o f the meeting are as follows: (1) After cordial exchange of greetings Weizmann stated he had been sent by British Government t o enquire into developments of Jewish interests in Palestine and that the most important o f his duties was to gain touch w i t h Arab leaders and endeavour to cooperate w i t h them. (2)

After a l l u d i n g t o historical traditions o f both races Feisal

expressed his opinion of necessity of close cooperation between Jews and Arabs especially at present time.

(3) Feisal p o i n t e d o u t inability o n political q u e s t i o n s as he was

t o express definite o p i n i o n s merely his father’s agent i n

such matters, but he considered that interests of Jews and

Arabs must be closely Allied. (4) Weizmann pointed o u t that a Jewish Palestine would assist the development of an Arab Kingdom and that an Arab Kingdom would receive Jewish support. (5) Weizmann explained the Zionists did n o t propose t o set u p a Jewish Government, but wished t o work i f possible under British guidance i n order t o colonize and develop the country without encroaching on other! legitimate interests. (6)

Feisal stated h e was u n a b l e to discuss the future o f

Palestine either as a Jewish state? or a country under British guidance as these questions were already the subject of much

German and Turkish propaganda and would be misinterpreted by the’ Bedouins i f openly discussed. When Arab affairs were (more) consolidated profitable discussion might take place. H e personally accepted the possibility of future Jewish claims t o territory i n Palestine but could n o t discuss them publicly* as h e was not representing a n Arab Government a n d was greatly afraid o f enemy propaganda. H e again empha-

close cooperation for mutual benefit of both.

sized necessity o f

(7)

between

Jews a n d

Arabs

W e i z m a n n explained h e was proceeding shortly to

America and that Zionists influence i n that country and elsewhere would be used i n favour of Arab m o v e m e n t and

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necessity for an Arab country. This statement afforded Feisal great satisfaction.

(8) The interview ended w i t h cordial expressions of mutual sympathy and an invitation from Feisal to renew the meeting after Weizmann’s visit t o America. Colonel Joyce who was present throughout the interview gives as his private opinion that Feisal really welcomed

Jewish cooperation and considered i t essential t o future Arab ambitions though unable t o express any very (?definite) views i n absence of authority from his father. I t is Colonel Joyce’s opinion that Feisal fully realizes the future possibility o f a Jewish Palestine and would probably accept i t if i t assisted

Arab expansion further north.” I a m of opinion interview has had excellent results in promoting (?mutual) sympathy and understanding between Weizmann and Feisal. Both are frank and open in their dealings and nothing but good can result from a personal

interview such as has now taken place. Notes below indicate some of the minor differences between C l a y t o n ’ s telegram a n d the handwritten draft report o f the meeting

by Col. P. C. Joyce, in MEC/F(A).

DORON

For “other”, read “anybody’s” For “state”, read “colony”. After “the”, add “uneducated”. After “publicly”, add “officially”. I n place o f “Zionists influence”,r e a d ‘ ‘influence o f the Jews”. I n place o f “ necessity for a n Arab country”, read “formation o f a n Arab Kingdom”. 7. (Joyce continues:) They have both one great point i n common a n d which I think they both understand—and that is that outside t h e Jews a n d Arabs n o one else h a s a n y territorial c l a i m o n

Syria.

O n that point they are a strong combination. D r Weizmann was very diplomatic and pressed for no question or opinion that might be afterwards brought u p i n statements. ... we

Sources: Clayton t o Foreign Office, 12 June 1918, P R O , F O

371/3398, file W44/105824/27647.

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Document 6

D r Weizmann’s report ofhis meeting with Amir Faisal, as given to the 17th meeting of the Zionist Commission, 16June 1918 D r Weizmann informed Faisal that he was the Chairman of the Commission s e n t by H M . G . t o study the conditions i n Palestine, to lay plans for the future and to get i n t o contact

with the representatives of the Arab nation. U p t o then he h a d been trying to d o h i s best to get i n t o contact w i t h the Arabs i n Palestine a n d Egypt, a n d h e was n o w very pleased to see the representative o f the H e d j a z . . . . [Faisal] generally

hoped that there would be an intimate collaboration between the Jews and Arabs i n Palestine and elsewhere, as this was essential for the progress of both nations. But, he added, i t was o f course very difficult for h i m t o deal w i t h political

questions, as all political affaires [sic] were concentrated i n his father’s hands, as i t was his father who decided all such matters. D r Weizmann replied t h a t . . . he was also aware that he had been nominated the agent of his father and Commander

Source: C Z A , Z4/2989. English translation o f Faisal’s reservation taken from George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, 1946), 439.

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Document 9

Notes ofmeeting between unnamed Zionist representative [A. Hyamson?] and Awni A bd al-Hadi and A hmad Qadri, HotelMeurice, Paris, 25January 1919 Abdul Hades [sic] — Ahmed Kadry medecin particulier de

S.A.R. Emir Feysul called to-day (Jan. 25th)

at

the Meurice.

They told me that they had seen the Zionist proposals (I do not know w h o showed them the proposals) and t h a t they are

troubled on the point of the Zionist claims

to

British

Trusteeship for Palestine as they believe that such claim would strengthen t h e French c l a i m for Trusteeship i n Syria.

Their point of view is that Syria should be an independent state under Arab rule. They say that the Jews and the Arabs could arrange matters between themselves i n the most favourable way for both whilst on the other hand British Trusteeship in Palestine and French Trusteeship in Syria would create an endless source o f friction and intrigue. They said that i f a British Trusteeship could be obtained for all

Arab

countries

in

the

Near

East

they

would consider

such

solution as most desirable. But as this cannot be attained they think the best w a y would b e to establish a great federation o f

independent countries and to enter into close relations with Great Britain in order that a l l the essential functions of Trusteeship [be executed?] without the formal proclamation. O n m y question whether they represented the Arab Syrian public opinion and i f Shukri Ganem D r Samne [sic] had any following i n Syria they replied that these gentlemen were quite isolated and were supported only by a n insignificant group of Syrian business men living i n Paris who depended on little favours of the Quai D’Orsay[.] R e Zionist aspirations both declared that all rights and liberties would be given t o the Jews i n Palestine o n equal terms w i t h t h e Arabs etc. I

explained t o them that such rights and liberties would n o t cover our Zionist programme which was a national movem e n t i n order t o make Palestine a Jewish Country and that we would n o t be satisfied w i t h emancipation o r guarantees o f n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y w h i c h we claimed i n other countries, t o

which they replied that they would even go further i n their

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concessions b u t that this must be an arrangement exclusively between Jews and Arabs, who had common interests e t c . I asked whether they represented Feysul’s views, they said they spoke unofficially, nevertheless I h a d t h e impression t h a t they

were sent b y Feysul. There is even some reason t o believe that

there is some connection with conversation which Feysul had yesterday with President Wilson. I gave them no assurances except promised them only to examine their views and to communicate w i t h D r Weizmann o n the matter.

Source: CZA,Z4/56.

Document 1 0

Letter, in Lawrence’s handwriting, signed by Amir Faisal, addressed to Felix Frankfurter, Paris, 1March 1919 [See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111]

Dear Mr. Frankfurter, I w a n t t o take this opportunity of m y first contact with American Zionists t o tell you what I have often been able t o say t o D r . Weizmann i n Arabia and Europe. W e feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins i n race, have suffered similar oppressions a t t h e hands o f powers stronger

than themselves, and b y a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment o f their national ideals [deletion] together. W e Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. O u r deputation here i n Paris is fully acquainted w i t h the proposals submitted yesterday

by

t h e Z i o n i s t Organisation

t o t h e Peace Confer-

ence, and we regard them as moderate and proper. W e will do o u r best, i n so far as we are concerned, t o help t h e m through: we w i l l wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

W i t h the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. W e i z m a n n we have h a d , and continue to have the closest

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relations. H e has been a great helper i n our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be i n a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness. W e are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. T h e Jewish movement is national, and not imperialist: our

movement 1s national and not imperialist, and there is room i n Syria for both of us. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other. People less informed a n d less responsible t h a n o u r leaders

and yours ignoring the need for co-operation of the Arabs and Zionists have been trying t o exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise i n Palestine i n the early stages of our movements. Some o f them have, I a m afraid, misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jewish peasantry, with t h e result t h a t interested p a r t i e s have been able t o make capital o u t of what they call our differences. I wish t o give you m y firm conviction that these differences

are n o t o n questions o f p r i n c i p l e , b u t o n matters o f detail such as m u s t i n e v i t a b l y occur i n every contact o f neighbour-

ing peoples, and as are [sic] easily adjusted by mutual

goodwill. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge. I look forward, a n d m y people w i t h m e look forward to a

future i n which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries i n which we are mutually interested may once again take their place i n the comity of the civilised peoples of the world. Believe me,

yours very sincerely [ i n Arabic] Faisal

Source: C Z A , Z4/25001.

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Document 1 1

Felix Frankfurter reply to Faisal, Paris, 5March 1919 A l l o w me, o n behalf o f the Zionist Organisation, to

acknowledge your recent letter w i t h deep appreciation. Those of us who come from the United States have already been gratified by the friendly relations and the active cooperation maintained between you and the Zionist leaders, particularly D r Weizmann. W e knew i t could n o t be otherwise; we knew that the aspirations o f the Arab and the Jewish

peoples were parallel, that each aspired

to

reestablish its

nationality in its own homeland, each making its own distinctive contribution to civilisation, each seeking i t s o w n

peaceful mode o f life. The Zionist leaders and the Jewish people for whom they

speak have watched with

satisfaction t h e s p i r i t u a l vigour o f

the Arab movement. Themselves seeking justice, they are anxious that the just national claims of the Arab people be confirmed and safeguarded b y the Peace Conference. W e knew from your acts and y o u r past utterances that the

Zionist movement—in other words the national aims of the Jewish people—had your support and the support o f the Arab people for whom you speak. These aims are now before the Peace Conference as definite proposals by the Zionist Organisation. W e are happy indeed that you consider these proposals “moderate and proper”, and that we have i n you a

staunch supporter for their realisation. For both the Arab and the Jewish peoples there are difficulties ahead—difficulties that challenge the united statesmanship of Arab and Jewish

leaders. For i t

i s n o easy task t o r e b u i l d t w o great civilisations

that have been suffering oppression and misrule for centuries. W e each have o u r difficulties w e shall work o u t as friends,

friends who are animated by similar purposes, seeking a free and full development for the two neighbouring peoples. The Arabs and Jews are neighbours i n territory; we cannot b u t

live side by side as friends. Very respectfully, Source: CZA, S25/3142.

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Document 1 2

H . M . Kalvaryski, Programmefor aJudeo-Arab Entente

[May-June?] 1919 I . Palestine constitutes the homeland [patrie] o f all those who inhabit i t : Jews, Muslims and Christians are citizens on a n equal footing [de même degré).

II.

The Jewish People, of Oriental semitic origin, is in need

o f a territory i n which to develop its national culture.

Palestine, its country of origin, forming a sort of isle i n the midst o f a very large sea of territory and o f peoples equally o f semitic origin and stretching from the Taurus to Gibraltar through North Africa, constitutes theJewish National Home. III.

Freedom of Worship. There is no state religion i n Palestine.

IV. Administration. Everyone, without distinction of race or religion, will be admitted. When recruiting civil servants, only the abilities of the candidates will be taken into consideration. I n the public interest, i t is necessary for civil servants to know the two languages of the country: Hebrew and Arabic (not t o mention English, the language of the

Mandatory Power). But, since i t is difficult t o find a t present people who do know the t w o languages, both among the Jews as among the Arabs, a period o f 5 , 10 o r 15 years will b e fixed,

the end of which the knowledge of these t w o languages will be compulsory for civil servants.

at

V . Schools. I n state-run schools, especially i n secondary schools, the teaching of the t w o languages, Hebrew and Arabic, is compulsory. The t w o languages complement each other. Beyond the moral advantages (better understanding and closer unity among the two elements, the development of a Hebrew-Arabic

literature

which will recall

the Golden

Age

o f the Arab Caliphs, etc.) there w i l l result economic advantages. A l l doors w i l l b e open to state employees w h o know

both [languages] (not t o mention English, the language of the

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153

Mandatory Power). I n finance and i n industry preference will always be given to a n employee w h o knows the two lan-

guages. As for private schools, I have advised m y political friends to impose the Arabic language [ i n Jewish schools]. I hope that our Arab friends will appreciate their interests and will a c t i n like fashion regarding Hebrew i n their schools. VI.

Abolition of all Exclusivism, whether Jewish, Muslim or

Christian.

Until

now the

Jews of

Palestine, forming

only

a

religious community, had their charitable works and their public institutions, while the Christians and Muslims had theirs. W i t h the formation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine some duties o f state fall upon them. They are obliged t o think of everything and everyone without distinction of religion. There w i l l n o longer b e poor Jews a n d poor M u s l i m s

and poor Christians. A l l the poor will have the right t o the same care. W e shall open u p schools, orphanages and hospitals for all. W e shall create agricultural [loan] and i n d u s t r i a l banks for a l l , and shall come to t h e a i d o f the

fellah. VII. Freedom of Immigration. The affluence of Jewish capital and manpower i n a poor and underpopulated country like Palestine can only be very profitable t o the country, and complete freedom should be accorded t o Jewish immigration. *

Source: CZA, A113/13. M y translation from the French text.

Document 1 3

Extractsfrom “The Emir Faisal on Palestine and theJews”, Interview in The Jewish Chronicle, 3 October 1919 . . . “ L e t m e tell you with a l l goodwill,” continued His Highness, “ t h a t Jews make a vast mistake to use the language that extreme Zionists d o i n respect t o Palestine. After the

Balfour Declaration, some Jews i n Palestine already began t o

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lord i t over the Arabs and t o boast that the country was

theirs.... I need n o t tell you that this sort of thing greatly incensed and disconcerted the Arab population, and i f i t had not been that I exercised a strong restraining influence, I a m afraid there would have been considerable active resentment against the Jews there. “ L e t m e b e quite frank w i t h y o u , ” went o n t h e Emir; “ t h e Arabs have inhabited t h e country for many c e n t u r i e s c o n t i n uously. They did n o t expel the Jews. The Romans expelled

the Jews, and the Arabs won the land from the Romans. I t is theirs. I t i s t o t h e m a sacred l a n d . I t s associations are part a n d

parcel of the Arab’s life. And, moreover, Palestine is and must remain part and parcel of Syria. There is no natural boundary, no frontier, between the t w o countries. What affects one must affect the other. I f there is disorder i n Palestine there will be disorder i n Syria. From the point of view o f the Arab, Palestine is a province, not a country, and

our intention is to build u p an Arab Empire which must consist, as a minimum, of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. From that we cannot recede. There is not a n Arab throughout

the world who would n o t resent any whittling down o f this our m i n i m u m c l a i m . T h e Arabs are solid i n regard to

Palestine, and I do n o t think,” added the E m i r w i t h just a soupcon of the ironical, “ t h a t you can claim such a united o p i n i o n i n regard to Palestine o n t h e part o f t h e Jews.

“ I have had several conferences with D r Weizmann, the able leader o f the Zionist movement,” proceeded H i s Highness. ‘ H e showed m e only w i t h i n the last few hours his proposals, and t o those proposals I raise no objection. You seem surprised,” continued the Emir, as h e noted the puzzled

look of our representative, “ a n d you think that there is something inconsistent in m y agreeing t o D r Weizmann’s proposals and i n what I have said i n regard t o Arab aspirations respecting Palestine. B u t I found D r Weizmann’s proposals q u i t e m o d e r a t e a n d practical.

A sI

understand, he is

working for a regulated immigration into the country, for conditions i n which the Jew w i l l have equal rights with the Arab, shall take part i n the government o f Palestine, shall have full control o f Jewish schools, shall have the means o f establishing there a Jewish cultural centre, and shall have free

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use of the Hebrew language. There is nothing t o object t o i n that. Indeed, we would welcome the assistance which an immigration of Jews could give us i n developing the country. W e naturally would prefer an immigration of Jews than of any other people, n o t only because Jews have vast resources b y which the land can be developed, but because they are Semites like ourselves. They are cousins, and we would willingly make them brothers. B u t when some Zionists speak about Palestine becoming as Jewish as England is English, because o f the c l a i m which Jews have to the country, they are

really talking unreasonably. . . . ” O u r representative e x p l a i n e d t h a t

practically

the

whole o f

Jewry imagined that the Balfour Declaration m e a n t that the Jews were t o be assisted b y cultural, economic and political measures for the setting u p i n Palestine of a National Home which would ultimately become a Jewish State. A n d he asked the Emir frankly to say whether Zionist aspirations of this nature

clashed i n any way with Arab ideals.

“ T o be sure they do. I n the first place, as I have said, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria are inseparable; and although we cannot legislate for the far future, still we Arabs cannot yield Palestine as part of our kingdom. Indeed, we would fight to the last ditch against Palestine being other than part of the Kingdom and for the supremacy of Arabs i n the land. I

have seen statements made t h a t when the

immigration o f Jews is sufficiently large, then the predominance o fJews would be established as, for instance, when there was a majority ofJews there. B u t I do not trouble much about that because, in m y view, the number that you can possibly settle i n Palestine for years t o c o m e cannot b e more than a thousand o r fifteen h u n d r e d p e r a n n u m . . . . [ I ] f y o u m e a n a

Jewish population, self-supporting, industrious, I a m quite sure that no larger immigration than I have mentioned is possible. . . . So we need n o t bother our heads about the time when the Jewish population w i l l exceed that o f the Arabs, and until i t does, there surely can be no right on the part of

Jews

t o ask t h a t t h e country s h a l l

be

taken a w a y from t h e

Arabs and given to them.... “ . . . you Jews,” urged the Emir, “can do a great work i f you

would

co-operate

with

u s i n t h e formation o f t h i s

[Arab]

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FUTILE DIPLOMACY

kingdom. Instead of our relying upon any of the great Powers for means of development, for material help, we should like to have the co-operation in these things of the Jewish people. You have the means, and we have the numbers, and when o u r Arab Kingdom is b u i l t u p and set upon firm foundations

of R i g h t and Justice and constituted with the most modern ideas of a State, then i t may be that there would be a concentration of your people i n Palestine and that you would make of Palestine a sub-province of the Arab Kingdom. But that always presupposes that there shall be equal rights, equal opportunities, equal privileges a n d a n absolute nondifferentiation between Arab and J e w . . . . The Jewish people can get everything they desire, such as a Jewish cultural centre, and the Jewish population in Palestine can l i v e its o w n

Jewish life. But regard m u s t be paid n o t alone t o Arab [sic, for “Jewish”’] sentiment which, of course, is extremely strong and has been strengthened by the Balfour Declaration; regard m u s t be paid also t o justice and right where the Arab is concerned.... U p t i l l the time of the Balfour Declaration, the question as between Arabs and Jews i n Palestine never arose. A l t h o u g h w e d o n o t ask the country to be called A r a b , a n d although w e are content to l e t i t remain Palestine, still Palestine i n effect is t h e L a n d o f t h e Arabs, and must remain

an integral portion of the new Arab State. So far as Jews are concerned they can come into the country with equal rights, equal privileges, a share i n the government proportionate to

their population, the control of their schools, and the use of their language.

“lI appreciate quite fully,” said the E m i r i n conclusion, “ Z i o n i s t aspirations, even extreme Zionist aspirations. I quite understand the desire o f Jews to acquire a country, a

homeland. B u t so far as Palestine is concerned, i f they have made u p their minds that i t shall be Palestine or nothing, then i t must be Palestine subject t o the rights and aspirations and the sentiments of the present possessors of the land. “ O f course, i f Jews had chosen for their National Home a land, possession of which they could gain undisputed—but then t h a t is a m a t t e r for the Jewish people. I can only say,

and would ask you t o impress upon all your people, that we wish Jews t o co-operate w i t h us i n perfect amity and

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friendship, for Jews, like ourselves, are Semites. I cannot put i t stronger than b y repeating: w e are cousins; we wish to be

brothers. But that involves a brotherly feeling on the part of Jews for Arabs, as well as of Arabs for the Jews.” *

(Reprinted with permission.) Document 1 4

Extractsfrom M . Ussishkin, Visit to the Head of the Town Council [i.e., Mayor] ofJerusalem [Musa Kazim al-Husaini], 8 October 1919

[The conversation began with Musa Kazim asking Ussishkin about the latest news from Paris regarding the peace settlem e n t . Ussishkin noted that the general situation was still unclear. H e continued:] However, with regard t o our country there is one thing that is clear, and that 1s t h a t Palestine is to b e separate from Syria; Syria is to be under the protectorate o f France a n d Palestine

under that o f England. M u s a K a z i m : B u t we d o n o t agree to this. W e asked for the

protection of America, and England only enters into the second degree of our considerations. We demand no separat i o n from Syria, w i t h n o changes i n t h e internal situation, a n d

with no special privileges for anybody. U . : I have already told Your Worship that there is no longer any doubt on this question. Palestine is separated from Syria, and this has become a fact. There is no going back now. W i t h regard to the “privileges” to which you refer, you mean of course the Jews. I can say that we have already spoken t o the A m i r Faisal o n this matter, a n d we have come to a n

agreement. Y o u have read o f this i n the newspapers, I presume? M.K.: Indeed, w e read t h e newspapers. B u t w e d o n o t submit

to the A m i r Faisal with regard t o our political demands. N o r d o we rely o n h i m i n this matter. W e are opposed to

any special rights for the Jews. We c a n n o t consent t o language rights, immigration nights, e t c . I speak n o t only

158

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

for myself, but for all m y Arab brothers. W e have already

repudiated the concessions made by the Amir. U . : B u t the British government has also promised Rights to the Jews, and they have issued a special declaration on this matter, the famous Balfour Declaration about which you have heard, n o doubt. A n d i f England gave a promise, she knew what she was promising and without doubt w i l l know how t o keep her promise. M . K . : Yes! W e heard that the British government has given a promise, b u t t h a t promise was given for the present only to the Jews, and not to us. I t is therefore impossible for us to agree

with their exaggerated and premature demands which follow one upon the other. Wait u n t i l the official a n n o u n c e m e n t is made b y the British government, and t h e n . . . And, generally speaking, the demands o f the Jews are just the beating of a hollow drum and arise mostly from lack of knowledge o f the conditions of the people of the country, their habits, and their outlook. They are therefore very annoying to the Arabs. A n d

this is n o t the right and proper thing for you t o do. Indeed, the Jews are superior to us i n knowledge, c u l t u r e , wealth a n d capabilities—in

everything

r e l a t e d t o t h e i r e c o n o m i c con-

cerns, etc. B u t just as the m i n d o f the European Jew is sharp and thoughtful, the m i n d o f the Oriental is not so dense that h e cannot see what 1s before h i m , a n d what is i n store for h i m i n the near future from the Jews, i . e , from t h e mass

immigration of the Jews. I may also mention that we have nothing against the Jews who are citizens of this country. These we know and they know us. W e have lived together with t h e m and are d o i n g so n o w , a n d will c o n t i n u e to d o so i n peace a n d friendship. There i s n o quarrel o r outcry except

that we shall oppose the immigration of Jews w i t h all our m i g h t . F o r they have n o tact a n d t h e i r a i m s are quite clear a n d w e l l known t o us. They w a n t — a n d they have h a d the

impertinence t o announce i t publicly i n the newspapers and i n p u b l i c speeches— they w a n t t o d r i v e us o u t o f t h e l a n d a n d t o take possession o f o u r houses a n d estates. They were n o t ashamed to state clearly that they wish to p u t us u p o n the backs o f camels a n d send us off t o t h e Hejaz. A c c o r d i n g t o

them—and these are words which have been quite frank— there is n o room for two m e n i n one chair; a n d Palestine,

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159

according to them, will serve only as the seat of honour for the Jews and the Arabs will have no share i n i t . This will never be! A n d generally the Jews lack tact and are not a t all

diplomatic. The Arabs differ from them i n this respect. The Arabs are b y n a t u r e charitable a n d generous a n d disburse charity t o the l i m i t o f their ability. B u t i t is obvious that they

must b e treated politely—their friendship must be encour-

aged and you must e n t e r into relations with them and visit them, so that over coffee and cigarettes they are bound to

forget everything and will compromise i n every way. The welcome o f guests is a quality i n which the Arab goes too far.

B u t this cannot be so when they are approached with claims and demands one after another. I f you do this you will not succeed. The Arabs know how t o oppose these demands. U . : As regards the demands o f the Jews, I must say that there is no exaggeration, b u t indeed the reverse. For the present they are minimum demands, based upon right andjustice upon which there can be no compromise whatsoever. I f there is room for compromise a t all, i t is particularly with regard t o tact and details, i f we find that i t is as you say that we have made mistakes i n this direction. N o doubt mistakes were made on your side also.... *

Source: C Z A , Z4/1392/I-b. Eng. translation with m y modifications based o n Hebrew original. Ussishkin, acting Chairman of the Z.C., was accompanied b y Yosef Meyuhas o fJerusalem, who presumably acted as interpreter (Hebrew-Arabic).

Document 15

Sh. Levin, Ben V Cohen, S. Landman, Memorandum of Interview with Amir Faisal and Awni Abd al-Hadh, Carlton Hotel, London, 1 9 October 1919

[Levin extended invitation t o Faisal t o attend Balfour Declaration anniversary celebrations.] H e stated that he hoped that the E m i r would on that occasion make a statement favourable to Z i o n i s m , so as to show the Jewish

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

160

people that they c o u l d count o n h i m as a friend, a n d w i t h the more important object o f effacing t h e unfortunate impression

created by the interview with the “Jewish Chronicle” [of 3 October]. The E m i r expressed his regret that he could not accept the flattering invitation, because he was leaving for Paris the next morning, and did n o t know whether he could return i n time. [They agreed to work out the text of a message to be sent by Faisal for the occasion.]

[After Faisal withdrew, Awni remained and asked in what way the Jewish Chronicle interview was unsatisfactory.] I t was

pointed

out to

him that the

statement

attributed

to

Faisal,

asking for Palestine to be a province o f a n independent Arabia, was contrary to the aspirations o f t h e Zionists.

Further, the objection t o the phrase of D r Weizmann viz. “ t h a t Palestine was to b e as Jewish as England is English”

could not fail to evoke disapproval among the Zionists. Finally, the restriction of immigration t o very small numbers was especially likely to arouse Zionist dissatisfaction.

M r Hadi replied very fully, elaborating the following standpoint:— M r Balfour’s declaration was very unfortunate, i n that i t aroused the opposition of the Palestinian Arabs against the Jews. This opposition had been aggravated by the statements of the Zionists, especially in Palestine, in which they talked of Palestine as “Eretz Israel” the Jewish Land. This manner of speech was very offensive to t h e Palestinian Arabs, w h o

regarded Palestine as their country, having lived there for so many centuries during which time Jews had been far away. Today the Jews were still i n a very small minority, and i t was to h i m unthinkable t h a t t h e Arabs c o u l d renounce t h e i r c l a i m

to Palestine in favour of the Jews. H e advised the Zionists, in their own interests t o stop all talk of a Jewish Palestine, and limit themselves t o colonisation and development of their own culture and institutions, with a maximum o f self-government i n internal matters a n d a certain

degree of representation in the Government of the country. W h e n i t was p o i n t e d out to h i m t h a t Great B r i t a i n was l i k e l y to accept t h e m a n d a t e o n t h e terms o f t h e Balfour

Declaration, he said nothing was yet settled, but advised the Zionists i n their o w n interests not t o p u t b l i n d faith i n t h e

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British Government. H e absolutely failed t o understand why they h a d so much confidence i n and friendship for Great Britain. I t was p o i n t e d o u t to h i m t h a t Great Britain h a d been

the traditional friend and protector of the Jews, and that the Jews intended t o be loyal t o Great Britain. H e said that the Zionists asked for the friendship of the Arabs, b u t what had they done for the Arab cause? When asked what he would desire t h e m to do, h e suggested the following:— h e had seen a

member of the American Peace Delegation recently, in Paris, and had discussed with h i m the position regarding Arabia and Palestine. H e gathered i t would n o t be very difficult t o persuade America t o insist that Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria should become an independent Confederation, w i t h an

Arab King, u n d e r t h e League o f N a t i o n s , England t o have commercial predominance i n Palestine and Mesopotamia and France i n Syria. H e thought the Zionists would be more likely t o satisfy their aspirations b y supporting such a settlement than b y asking for a British Mandate. H e had heard from a very high French authority [that France?] would under no circumstances allow the British t o colonise Mesopotamia w i t h Hindoos or Palestine with Jews. T h e Zionist representative replied that such a proposal was

entirely a t variance with the demands made a t the Peace Conference, a n d c o u l d n o t be entertained for a m o m e n t . T h e

Zionists were anxious t o work side by side with the Arabs i n the restoration of the Near East. D r Levin stated that such restoration was impossible without Jewish experts and Jewish capital, which they were prepared t o devote freely t o this purpose. As regards the promise o f a Jewish Palestine, this was made b y a l l the Great

Powers, and i t was on the strength o f that hope that the Jews would p u t forth all their energy and enthusiasm. I f that hope were removed, as i t would be i f the course o f action suggested i n the interview w i t h the “Jewish Chronicle” as being satisfactory t o the E m i r Feisal were adopted, the Near East would n o t be able to a t t r a c t those Jewish elements which were indispensable. M r Hadi said that the Arabs would prefer t o develop their country, t h e i r railways, their roads, w i t h Jewish c a p i t a l a n d

Jewish experts, rather than French or Engl:sh.

162

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

D r Levin replied that i f they invited Jewish experts, they would be only too pleased t o come, provided always that the proposals o f the Zionists were n o t departed from.

Reverting t o the message from the E m i r Feisal for the 2 November Demonstration, M r Landman emphasised the necessity o f a very clear message from the Emir, so as to undo

the effect of the “Jewish Chronicle” interview. M r H a d i promised to d o h i s best to find a satisfactory formula.

This ended the interview. %*

Source: CZA, Z4/1392/I-b. D r Levin spoke i n Hebrew; M r Landm a n translated into French for A w n i ; Awni translated into Arabic for Faisal.

Document 1 6

Treaty between Zionist representative and “The Nationalist Group in Syria andLebanon”, 26 March 1920 between pp. 110 and 111] photocopy [See The undersigned, M r Yehoshua Hankin, representing the Zionist Organisation i n Palestine, and Messrs Najib Sfeir, Yusuf Muazzin, D r Rashid Karam, M r Najib Hashim and D r A n t u n Shihade, representing the Nationalist Group in Syria and Lebanon, i n view of the gravity of the political situation in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and desirous of co-ordinating their political activity for the good of these three countries, have agreed after discussion on the following basic principles:—

1.

T h e Governments of Syria and Lebanon recognise the

independence o f Palestine w i t h i n boundaries to b e fixed b y a

committee with representatives of both sides (Syria and Lebanon, on the one hand; Palestine, on the other), and the Zionist Organisation w i l l have the right to b u i l d there a

National Home for the Jewish people, b y organising a mass

163

DOCUMENTS

immigration of Jews from every land into Palestine, and by obtaining political and economic privileges necessary t o ensure the calm and free development of the National Home. 2. The Nationalist Group i n Syria and Lebanon will do everything necessary t o prepare public opinion among the A r a b people for t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d t o a c c u s t o m t h e

Arabs

to [look upon] the Jewish people as neighbours. 3. The Zionist Organisation undertakes i n future n o t t o go beyond the borders of Syria and Lebanon as will be determined i n accordance with paragraph 1. 4. The Zionist Organisation undertakes t o respect the religious rites and customs of Muslims and Christians i n Palestine, and not t o interfere i n questions affecting the holy places. 5. The Zionist Organisation undertakes t o assist the Governments of Syria and Lebanon i n the development of their countries, a n d t o arrange for capital loans o n terms to b e

agreed.

6. A l l the inhabitants of Palestine without distinction of religion will enjoy complete civil and economic equality. [Signed and dated a t Jerusalem; text i n French, Arabic and Hebrew. Karam signed also for Shihade; Sfeir signed also for Hashim.] *

Source

CZA, S25/9907. Above text is m y translation from the French.

Document

17

Proposed Arab-Jewish Entente:Note of Conference at 34, Park Street, London [Home of James de Rothschild] 7 November 1921 Present:- M r James de Rothschild, D r Weizmann, Riadh Eff. E l Sulh, M r I . Ben-Avi, M r Leonard Stein, M r Wolfenson. M r de Rothschild submitted t o D r Weizmann and t o Riadh Eff,

164

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a draft basis for discussion, of which a copy is attached

[follows]. (Note—This draft was based o n a draft prepared by M r Ben-Avi, in consultation with Riadh Eff and on an alternative draft prepared b y M r Stein.) D r Weizmann said that he was disposed to accept M r de Rothschild’s draft, though ‘he reserved the right t o suggest certain changes of form, i f such should appear desirable on further consideration. I t must be understood that h e was speaking in his personal capacity and that h e h a d not yet consulted his colleagues,

without whose concurrence he could, naturally, not commit the Zionist Organisation. A t the request of Riadh Eff, M r de Rothschild then proceeded to

translate the draft into French.

Riadh Eff. accepted the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 2 (a) and (b). With regard t o article 2 (c), he took exception t o the words “when the time is ripe”. H e pointed out that Article 22 o f the Covenant of the League of Nations recognised the independence of territories under “ A ” Mandates, of which Palestine was one. This was a point on which the Arabs laid great stress. They would also require an express repudiation of the idea of a Jewish State. D r Weizmann demurred to an express repudiation. This was a matter i n which i t was best to let sleeping dogs lie. H e could

b i n d his children and his children’s children. Riadh Eff said that he was convinced that D r Weizmann really envisaged a Jewish state and, indeed, he personally would not not

respect h i m i f he d i d not. After some discussion, i t was agreed that Riadh Eff should further consider the draft and should formulate counterproposals on points on which the draft was unacceptable. D r Weizmann suggested, and i t was agreed i n principle, that n e g o t i a t i o n s s h o u l d proceed i n L o n d o n , w i t h a view t o t h e

conclusion o f a formal agreement a t a Conference t o b e held

i n Cairo or Jerusalem n e x t February or March. M r de Rothschild emphasised the importance of bringing the negotiations to their final stage before the proposed confer-

ence was convened. 77 Great Russell Street [Z.O. London Office] 8 November 1921

DOCUMENTS

165

A r a b -Jewish Entente Draft Basisfor Discussion T h e following resolution was passed a t the Twelfth Zionist

Congress held i n Carlsbad:— “ W e d o hereby reaffirm o u r desire t o a t t a i n a durable

understanding which shall enable the Arab and Jewish peoples to live together i n Palestine o n terms o f mutual respect and to co-operate i n making the common h o m e into a

flourishing community, the u p b u i l d i n g o f which will assure to each of these peoples an undisturbed national development.” I n the spirit of this resolution the following n o t e s have been drafted: Taking n o t e of the Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, and of its subsequent reaffirmation by H i s Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Principal Allied Powers: Deploring the misconceptions which still exist as to the manner i n which the Balfour Declaration is t o b e construed:

1.

The promise o f a n a t i o n a l h o m e i n Palestine m a d e t o t h e Jewish people by His Britannic Majesty’s Government (and concurred in by the Principal Allied Powers) is t o be interpreted as a promise to secure the international recogni-

tion, under the guarantee of the League of Nations, of the right o f the Jews to constitute themselves i n Palestine as a

national unit;* 2. (a)

T h e Jews o n the one h a n d and the Arabs o n the other

are to be regarded as living side b y side on a footing of perfect equality i n all matters, including the official use and recognition o f their respective languages. ( b ) I n areas i n w h i c h there is a m i x e d population, the rights o f t h e m i n o r i t y are to b e fully guaranteed, i n c l u d i n g the right

of representation on the local administrative bodies. (c) The existence i n Palestine o f the Jewish National Home is n o t to be a bar t o t h e recognition o f Palestine, w h e n the

time 1s ripe, as a self-governing commonwealth. * T h e words “distinct nationality” have been added, t o appear parallel w i t h “ n a t i o n a l unit”.

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

166

3. The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine w i l l support the demand for the development of self-governing institutions on a

representative basis, i t being clearly understood that the

terms of this agreement will remain binding and inviolable, as w i l l also the provisions o f the Mandate, so l o n g as the

Mandate is in force. 4. The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine will support the demand that non-Palestinian officials, with the exception of the High Commissioner, the C i v i l , Financial and Legal Secretaries, a n d the heads o f t h e principal Departments, shall

be gradually replaced by Palestinians, due regard being had, i n the case o f District

officials, t o the Arab o r Jewish

character, as the case m a y be, o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n concerned.

Jewish immigration is t o be limited by the capacity of Palestine, from t i m e t o t i m e , to absorb i t , b u t n o t otherwise. I t is declared * * that there is not nor has there ever been any

desire or intention t o disturb the existing Arab population or any part of it. The right of the Arab inhabitants and their descendants to the secure enjoyment of their homes and prosperity is unequivocally recognised and guaranteed.

(a) I t is agreed that the L a w of Nationality should recognise as citizens of Palestine all persons who being presently resident i n the country a t a date to be subsequently fixed, d o not

decline such

c i t i z e n s h i p , provided t h a t n o person o w i n g

allegiance to another state shall become a citizen until h e has

renounced such allegiance. (b) I t is further agreed that facilities should be provided for the acquisition of citizenship by persons who take u p their permanent residence i n Palestine, the qualifying period t o be settled by common agreement w i t h the Mandatory Power. 7 The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine will give all * T h e word “Leaders” is replaced b y the word “Organisation”. words “ I t is declared’ are replaced b y “The Zionist Organisation declares”.

** T h e

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DOCUMENTS

the moral and material support i n their power to the various Arab States which have been constituted or are i n the process o f constitution and will, in general, co-operate wholeheardedly with the Arab people i n its efforts t o realise its legitimate national aspirations. The Arabs, on their side, will loyally work with the Jews i n a l l matters appertaining t o the establishment o f the Jewish National Home. I t is the ardent desire o f both parties t o lay the foundations of a generally Arab-Jewish understanding t o the advantage of the Jewish people and the Arab world as a whole and i n the interest of the fruitful development of the Near and Middle

East. 8. The Zionist Leaders* categorically re-affirm their repeated assurances that they d o not contemplate and have never

contemplated the smallest interference with the religious

rights and c u s t o m s of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, for which they undertake to show the most rigorous and scrupulous regard. I n particular, do they recognise the Moslem

and Christian H o l y Places as i n v i o l a b l e a n d formally

repudiate the injurious and wholly unfounded suggestion that i t is desired, directly or indirectly t o trespass upon them. T h e Arabs, o n their part, undertake to show a n equal

regard for the H o l y Places and the religious rights and customs o f the Jews.

9. A l l the various Jewish Organisations,** which have i n view the economic reconstruction o f Palestine on an extensive scale, will welcome the co-operation of the Arab inhabitants and undertake to afford them a full opportunity of participating i n such economic endeavours as they may initiate. J]

S o u r c e : P R O , C O 733/16, file 5 6 0 2 0 . C h a n g e s i n d i c a t e d are those

which appear i n a version o f the draft, dated 4 December 1921, i n Zionist files. (CZA, S25/3070.) * T h e word “Leaders” is replaced by the word “Organisation” (verb and pronoun agreements adjusted as a result) ** “ A l l t h e v a r i o u s Jewish O r g a n i s a t i o n s ” i s replaced Organisation’

(verb agreement

adjusted a c c o r d i n g l y )

by

“The

Zionist

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Document 1 8

Meeting between the Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation at the Colonial Office, 29 November 1921 M r Shuckburgh ( i n the chair) Colonel Meinertzhagen

[Present Colonial Officer

M r Clauson

M r Mills M u s a Kazim Pasha al-Husaini

A r a b Delegation:

M r Shibli Jamal M r Ibrahim Shammas a n d three other members Zionist Organisation: D r Weizmann D r Feiwel

M r Halpern M r Stein M r Shertok

Three sets of minutes are presented below: (a) Colonial

Office; (b) Arab Delegation;

( c ) Zionist Organisation.]

(b)

(a)

(c)

Mr. Shuckburgh represented the Secre-

tary of State [ M r Churchill]. 1. the

I t was agreed at outset

that

the

proceedings were of a n i n f o r m a l nature and were not t o be made public.

2. M r Shuckburgh stated

five

general

propositions concern-

Shuckburgh, repres e n t i n g t h e Colonial Secretary, spoke:

a

1. We would all like

non-controversial nature as an indication that there were

Palestine t o b e happy and i n full prosperity.

ing Palestine

of

c o m m o n grounds

2. W e would all like there to be religious

M r Shuckburgh assumed general acceptance o f certain assumptions, e.g. all present desired welfare of Palestine, inviolability of H o l y Places, etc.

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DOCUMENTS

between t h e t w o par-

ties.

equality. 3. T h e H o l y Places w i l l r e m a i n i n the hands o f their guardians.

4. We w a n t Palestine t o progress in its a g r i c u l t u r e and its e c o n o m y , a n d it needs money for that.

5. Fourthly [sic], we want Palestine t o advance politically.

6. Until,

one

day, i t

becomes advanced, i t w i l l take its place a m o n g t h e nations

and will be politically well-behaved. 7, U n t i l we achieve those wishes, i t will definitely have t h e support o f the English government. 7. [ s i c ] E n g l a n d ’ s s u p p o r t for P a l e s t i n e

w i l l be accorded only in special conditions. T h e most important required condition is that she carry out her pledges w h i c h she

Again, a l l agreed t h a t i n the i n i t i a l stages Palestine needed the

support and guidance of Great Britain. (Both sides indicated assent.) Great Britain could

give that support, etc. only o n t h e basis o f

engagements entered i n t o during the war.

gave during the war; firstly, t h e B a l f o u r Declaration. 8. T h e declaration

has

t w o parts: ( 1 ) es-

tablishment

of a

Jewish

national h o m e ; ( 2 ) safeguarding the rights of the

Arabs. x

Xx Xx

The declaration was incorporated in the T r e a t y o f Sèvres,

H e referred especially t o the Balfour Declaration which was incorporated in

the

Treaty of Sevres and in the draft Mandate: note/especially Article 2.

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FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

which has not been

signed until now. I t w a s m e n t i o n e d again i n the terms o f the draft Mandate. T h e draft M a n d a t e (article 2) states that the English govern-. ment is responsible for the establishment o f a national home

Mandate reiterates the pledge and engages G.B. t o take steps t o carry i t out.

[... gap i n original] The English government will assist i n the

implementation of this work. T h e text o f the Mandate w i l l n o doubt be approved by the Council o f the Lea-

gue of Nations. I t has yet approved it.

not

The

League

of

True, approval of League o f Nations not obtained. But after last session o f League, P r e s i d e n t o f

Council wrote to Prime M i n i s t e r say-

in

ing (inter alia) “Confi-

August d i d not examine it, but the matter is n o longer as

dent H . M . G . would

i t was at first. T h e

spirit o f draft mand a t e u n t i l position

Nations

meeting

President

of the

Council of the Leag u e of N a t i o n s w r o t e

continue administra-

t i o n o f country i n

regularised”.

a letter t o t h e P r i m e

Minister here. T h e Council expects the English

government

to administer the Mandate i n the same existing spirit as the draft mandate until i t is finally confirmed. T h i s event will happ e n immediately,

and

the government will a c t i n accordance

with it. The [Balfour] Declaration has t w o parts; i t is evident that t w o

T h i s is w h a t H M . G . i n t e n d t o do.

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DOCUMENTS parties are connected

i n this case. For that reason, the Colonial Secretary [ . . . mean-

ing unclear] leaders o f both sides t o meet and negotiate about

this matter.

With

everything

he

had said, he found fears and misunderstanding.

3.

H e suggested

that both parties should leave the r e g i o n o f abstract politics and discuss

The way he suggested: Let us leave high policy aside and leave

aside t e x t s of unrealistic explanations. Let

concrete realities a n d

u s b r i n g u p real,

he offered t w o points upon which he invit-

practical

ed the parties t o give their views: —

issues.

Let

us see what are the frightening things

which would happen

Suggested that i n approaching the question they should

begin by getting away from high policy and abstract definitions. What are the terrible t h i n g s p e o p l e are really afraid of?

under British policy

in

Palestine.

Even

this meeting makes it

possible t o bring i n measures t o eliminate those fears. H e d i d not want t o enter into details; rather he wanted t o hear from t h e t w o sides only, and would mention two

important

Two important points.

points:

A. Jewish Immigra-

( a ) T h e r e a l fear w i t h which the Arabs regarded the idea o f

(1)

Jewish immigration.

tion. They say that immigration will take a w a y t h e people’s

tion. T h e idea that this means thousands o f Jews pouring i n like locusts and eat-

They say that

t h e people are afraid

of Jewish immigra-

jobs. H e bore i n m i n d that

the Pasha had said t h a t we w o u l d not object t o immigration

i n g u p the land. Nothing of the kind. A t recent luncheon at w h i c h Secretary o f State was present, the Pasha himself said,

t o t h e extent that the

“ N o objection t o Jewish immigration

people could bear it

in itself, so long as i t

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FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

(he h a d said it at breakfast) [ . . . mean-

did not outrun capacity of country t o ab-

ing unclear] and he didn’t know what the

sorb i t ” . That, t o the best o f belief, is the

Zionists wanted, on the other hand? When politicians come t o find a form

policy. I do not imagine Z O . c o n t e m plates anything else.

o f s o l u t i o n , they and find

negotiate

the form o f solution, such as 5, 10, 15, and

they find ways t o so solve the problem.

(b) with

The real fear which

regarded

[2] Many times the

B.

real fear is not the

gested that what Arabs really afraid of is setting u p of Jewish

they

existence o f t h e Jews

t h e contin-

in Palestine, but rather Jewish supre-

gency o f Jewish political ascendancy in

Palestine.

macy and Jewish d o m i n a t i o n . Sover-

eignty and domination are very much [unclear word i n original] here, but let’s

Sometimes sug-

political ascendancy. N o intention of introd u c i n g ‘Ascendancy’ (an ill-omened

phrase) into Palestine, cf. Carlsbad

Resolution No. 5.

not assume t h a t all

Safeguards for t h e former were already

provided by the enof t h e prin-

unciation

ciple that immigrat i o n should depend upon the ability o f the country t o support t h e immigrants.

Safeguards for the latter were being provided by a Draft Constitution now under consideration whereby the creation and establishment o f a n e l e c t e d Legislative Assembly was contemplated.

o u r i n t e n t i o n s are evil. I f t h e fears exist, precautionary measures would be taken t o remedy them and t o make their effects disappear.

We

certainly will k n o w t h e proposals for t h e creation (of

constitutional law) on the question of representation.

They

are now looking i n t o i t i n Palestine. T h e

High

Commissioner

over there is continuI n g t o negotiate w i t h leaders on both sides, and he will not decide anything

I f there were really risk o f this, would not remedy be t o set u p suitable constitutiona l safeguards? Proposals for consti-

tution now under consideration, includi n g proposals for introduction o f representative elements i n Government. High

Commissioner

is c o n s u l t i n g representatives o f various interests and will n o t submit proposals t o us u n t i l he has their views. But still intended

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DOCUMENTS

before

it

later to consult Arab

t o t h e government

Delegation, if still i n

here. When the

L o n d o n , a n d also 2.0.

submitting

proposals arrive here,

i t will be possible for them to take our ideas about them i n t o account.

C o u l d not these t w o

[... meaning unclear]

subjects be matters

N o w he requested the

n o w o f f r a n k and open discussion t o p r o v i d e eventually for a rapprochement

Pasha or D r Weizmann t o listen closely.

between t h e t w o par-

ties? 4. Mussa Kazim

Pasha el Husseini stated that the Arab D e l e g a t i o n h a d al-

ready forwarded their idea o f a proper solution t o the problem o f Palestine.

T h e Pasha: Our demands are: 1. T h e formation o f a N a t i o n a l Government, w i t h a Representative Assembly elected b y the people, w h o will keep a n eye on the Government. 2. The present policy should be nulliied and the matter

of immigration should be under the control o f the Nationa l Government. 3. T h e H o l y Places should be in the hands of their guardians. 4. T h e British A r m y is unnecessary, and should be replaced b y a N a t i o n a l Gendar-

merie.

Musa Kazim invited t o offer o b s e r v a t i o n s s a i d :—

“We have already put forward a solution”. ( I t s h o u l d b e observed t h a t M u s a Kazim invariably spoke t h r o u g h Shibly J e m a l a n d as a rule

a p p a r e n t l y o n the latter’s promoting.) Pressed t o e x p l a i n what he meant b y the solution he referred t o the

Delegation’s

letter t o the Colonial Office of (? October 28th). After some delay, ex-

plained Delegation came t o confer w i t h Government o n following demands:(a) National Assembly, elected b y prewar residents. ( b ) Zionist policy t o be rescinded. (c) I m m i g r a t i o n t o be controlled by National Assembly.

174

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

(d) Holy Places t o remain i n hands o f present guardians.

(e)

British A r m y t o

be replaced by Gendarmes t o be p a i d out of Palestinian revenue.

5. M r Shuckburgh pointed out that the solution i n question

could n o t be the basis o f discussion because

H i s Britannic Majesty’s Government insisted o n adherence t o the Balfour Declaration.

M r Shuckburgh: As for the National Government, Mr C h u r c h i l l has said that the country is n o t r e a d y for t h e creation o f a n elective

M r Shuckburgh. They must take it that for t h e present E x e c u t i v e

power would be i n the hands o f H M . G .

acting through High Commissioner.

representative assem-

bly. H e would only consider a n y government

establishing

a

Legislative Council, the majority of whose members represent the country and the minorities would be represented (proport i o n a l representation). As for executive power, i t w o u l d be i n the hands of the British Government, w i t h the H i g h Commissioner. T h e Assembly would

have the rights of l e g i s l a t i v e councils:

t o enact laws, t o implement them, t o criticise the

govern-

ment, t o ratify the b u d g e t . B u t some powers must remain i n the hands o f the H i g h Commissioner.

Musa Kazim. What

will be the powers of the Assembly?

M r Shuckburgh. I t will have power t o introduce and pass Ordinances, criticize G o v e r n m e n t , pass Budget, and other s u c h f u n c t i o n s as u s u a l l y exercised b y

Legislative Assembly. B u t certain powers would have t o to High

be res-

I t would be possible

erved

t o discuss t h e subject

missioner, — exactly how was a matter for discussion. Probably

of the powers of the High Commissioner l a t e r . T h e High C o m -

High

Com-

Commissioner

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DOCUMENTS

missioner had the right to stop their i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , just as in the dominions the King had the

right t o v e t o a n y law

6. Dr Weizmann made a statement i n

which he professed disregard

all

to the

events o f the past six months and the pinpricks o f earlier periods.

whatsoever. But he d i d not see this as the time [ t o discuss] this issue in detail. O u r aim today at this meeting is t o bring together the two parties so that we might reach a n agreement i n principle for work i n Palestine. D r Weizmann: H e thanked the representative, o f the British Government for put-

would have power of reserving for S. of S. Ordinances on particular subjects. This was a common practise, but i t would be best t o await written

draft of Constitution. is t o ar-

Object today

rive at basis for dis-

cussion between Jews and Arabs with view t o common action.

D r Weizmann. 1 will disregard w h a t

has

happened i n last six months. I t is deplora-

t i n g before us clearly

ble a n d I

the purpose o f this meeting. H e was sure that the work o f the British Government was v e r y difficult, and i t appears t h a t the goal of the t w o parties was t o facili-

everyone who cares for good o f Palestine deplores it.

a m sure

tate t h e business o f

H . M . G . i n the execut i o n o f their aim. H e wanted, i n a b r i e f word, t o divert attent i o n from the events o f the last six months. H e declared, w i t h sorrow, that the events o f t h e first half-year had caused p a i n for all w h o hold dear the honour o f

Palestine. I n spite o f the great distance which exists between the t w o par-

ties, he had a hope

S t i l l hopeful solution w i l l be found which w i l l unite both forces which are necessarily

176

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

s o m e form

that

of

solution w o u l d be found for the administration of the country. H e wanted t o remind

His Grace, the Pasha, that he had been the first m a n t o receive h i m when he set foot o n Palestinian soil O n that occasion His Grace, the Pasha, had explained to Dr W e i z m a n n t h a t he

working for the upbuilding of Palestine.

O n m y first arrival in Palestine the Pasha t o l d m e that long ago

he had been working w i t h Jews for upbuilding of Palestine and especially for upbuilding of Jewish Colonies.

was s t r i v i n g for t h e

restoration o f Palestine and for the up-

building of the colonies there.

H e argued that his views had been completely understood b y the E m i r Feisal and had been accepted b y h i m as the represent a t i v e o f the A r a b world. The two nations k i n d r e d i n blood and language

[ . . . gaps i n original] H e and his responsible colleagues had attempted many times t o make a n agreement w i t h the Arabs. I t appears t h a t he had succeeded many times t o meet one o f the great leaders, the Amir Faisal (he m i g h t possibly have done so), who strove t o resolve the Arab question at the time o f the war and was authorised

[to

d o so].

Some Palestinians were w i t h h i m , like

could hope for a

his

prosperous and happy country through the agency o f mutual good-will.

[ A b d al-Hadi]. O n

Secretary,

Awni

every occasion D r W e i z m a n n and his colleagues s t r o v e t o explain that their

a i m s i n Palestine

were tine

to

make Pales-

prosperous.

A t that t i m e (April 1918) w e repeatedly tried t o come t o a n

understanding with the Arabs. T h e one important representative of the Arab nation w h o was acceptable t o us was Feisul. W e were in contact, not only with him, but with many o f his entour-

age, who included a number of Palestinians.

W e m a d e i t clear what we aimed at.

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DOCUMENTS

Before the end o f the war he met Faisal i n Ma’an, and after that i n Paris. Before they p r e s e n t e d their demands t o the Peace Conference, the Amir

negotiated with his organisation. He wanted t o remind us o f t h e text o f the statement which the Amir Faisal had made: [... meaning u n c l e a r ] T h e s e are

During war I visited F. at Maan, and

subsequently in Paris. Before we submitted our proposals to Peace Conference, F . a n d h i s colleagues were informed of

them, and F. public approved o f t h e m .

(Reads Feisul’s letter t o Frankfurte r)

t h e principles on which he and his associates had agreed w i t h A r a b leaders.

Did D r W.

A m o n g these leaders

tine[?]

A n Arab representative. negotiate

w i t h Arabs of Pales-

were “ t h e late Mufti

and A w n i Abd a l His colleagues

Hadi”.

Dr

in Palestine have had

Yes-e.g. with the late Mufti [Kamil al]

c o n t a c t s o n various

subjects.

Weizmann.

Husseini and

with

F a i s u l ’ s secretary,

Awni is a Palestinian. With leaders i n Pales-

tine [gap in original]. H e didn’t give their names now: Nashas h i b i a n d others, whom he did not

w h o w a s a Palestin-

i a n ,- [Awni] A b d u l Hadi. (Arab representative still presses for names of Palestinians)

identify.

H e h a d written a note requesting a meeting with the

Delegation, and the moment o f this joint m e e t i n g n o w is a solemn moment. H e believed the interests o f b o t h sides deserved a speedy agreement. H e d i d not trouble himself t o know what

Dr

Weizmann

proceeding. - When Arab Delegation arrived, I wrote them a letter. I received n o reply[.] However, I

‘disregard that. T h i s is a s o l e m n moment, and we are b o t h interested i n coming t o a practical understanding.

178

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

the British Government would do i n Palestine.

When the drafting of the basic law is con-

cluded, they will sub-

When draft constitut i o n shown t o us, we shall have opportuni-

m i t i t t o us, for each

t y of offering o u r

p a r t y t o s t a t e i t s ob-

remarks. W e only l i k e t o repeat w h a t was s a i d a t Carlsbad, — carrying

servations. However, he wanted t o make clear s o m e t h i n g

that

Declar-

was said at Carlsbad,

out o f Balfour

and that is: “The Bal-

ation does not mean

four Declaration does not impose any harm on the legitimate

infringement o f legiti-

rights of the country” [... gap i n original]

Desired t o give o n e

H e d i d not want a quarrel. O n e o f t h e

mate interests o f Ar-

ab population.

One of illustration. principal A r a b grievances i s t h a t i f

widespread views o n the matter o f immigration is t h a t the Jews will evict and

Jewish

dispossess t h e Arabs

N o t a single Arab has

of their lands. [meaning unclear...] He h a d not found one evicted from his lands. H e wanted t o declare that the Jews had in Palestine [enough] l a n d for coloni-

sation plans for five o r six years a n d w o u l d n o t need more. According to the o p i n i o n o f experts w h o are authorised, [we have] a capability o f s e t t l i n g 300,000 Jews. B u t we are not thinking o f carrying out emigration on this scale for at least ten years. Therefore, he d i d not find the slightest h a r m has

immigration

goes on, Jews will evict Arabs from their land. in fact been evicted

by a Jew. Not only so, but I would like t o say that w e

have en-

ough land in P . now t o go o n colonising for next five or six years without b u y i n g another square inch.

According t o opinion o f qualified experts,

we can eventually settle o n lands we have n o w about 300,000 Jews.

B u t we do not contemplate an immigration a n y t h i n g l i k e that w i t h i n next ten years. W e c a n g o o n

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DOCUMENTS

touched the rights of

without in slightest

t h e Arabs. O n the contrary, the Jewish p e o p l e are p a y i n g more than £1 million s t e r l i n g e a c h year. A t least half this amount enters the pockets o f Arabs i n legitimate ways. These are the facts. H e d i d not find

degree encroaching

propaganda which

city of Jews and you

refuted these facts.

will find they contrib u t e o u t o f all

H e believed that it was enough that the amount of taxes

o n A r a b interests.

On contrary Jews now spend over £1,000,000 i n P . a year, and at least half o f this goes ( q u i t e legitimately) into Ara b pockets. Look at taxable capa-

proportion t o their numbers.

which the Jews paid was far greater than their numbers [war-

ranted). [... meaning unclear] H e did not want t o enter

into

details.

He insisted that Zionism m e a n t n o encroachment u p o n the legitimate politi-

The Arabs had grievances. H e w a s not

cal aspirations of the

n o t - and he would n o t c l a i m that the t r u t h was a l w a y s w i t h the Jews. There was one way t o a solution: we should

indigenous Arabs.

aware whether they

were i n the right or

agree on this basis

As for A r a b grievances, I d o not pretend we are always right. But whatever grievances both sides have, we can only deal w i t h t h e m b y accepting

principle that w e build u p

have got t o P . together.

that the t w o parties

shall build up the

J e w i s h t h e o t h e r pur-

country w i t h joint efforts. I t was possible for him to have proposed a form of solution. Look at this map. L e t us suppose we proceed along these lines. T h e o b vious t h i n g would be

ely Arab. B u t that solution was not t o

t o form the Jewish having community

the

special interests, and

H e might, i f he had chosen, have concentrated upon measures w h i c h w o u l d have resulted i n Palestine being divided into t w o— one half purely

advantage

of

I could have proposed easy solution. (Shows map)

Look a t this Map. We could proceed on lines there indicated, and built u p a strong, self-sufficient Jewish Community surr o u n d i n g ourselves w i t h a n iron wall and

180

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Palestine and he

this

preferred t o treat t h e

would not have the remaining section.

future Palestine as a c o u n t r y where t h e t w o nations could live

i n political harmony and related recipro-

community

I t was possible t o encircle themselves w i t h

leaving rest of Palestine as i t is. That would be a judgment of Solomon: it would be cutting the child in two. That is what

citizens. H e also stat-

a wall of iron. That would be like K i n g Solomon’s Judgment.

what every Palestinian patriot does not

ed that he had been in

B u t this is not o u r

w a n t and certainly

touch w i t h many Arab leaders w h o were in sympathy w i t h this

i n t e n t i o n . Every

loyal

what H . M . G . does

patriot does not even

n o t w a n t n o r t h e Lea-

View.

ment certainly does

cally as Palestinian

want

it. The Govern-

not want i t ; neither does t h e League o f

Natlons. O u r intent i o n is t o live side b y side and that we help one another. I f we have grievances, which is natural and always inevitable, let us clarify these grievances openly without exaggeration, and their solution will not

we d o not want, and

gue o f Nations.

We m u s t go forward side by side, helping one another, and if, as is natural, grievances arise, t h e y should be clearly formulated without ex-

aggeration face t o face and settled o n

the basis of mutual respect.

be possible except o n t h e basis of respect of the two parties for each other. H e d i d accuse

O n e more word. A policy o f pogroms i n

anyone. H e believed a policy o f riots and

P. will be ruinous for P. I t will be a boo-

not

want to

killing would be ruin-

merang. Pogroms

ous for t h e country,

have destroyed many greater nations. T hey

and he wanted [ t o say t h a t ] this w o u l d turn

have never destroyed

against it. This policy did n o t destroy t h e Jewish nation in Germany and elsewhere. The policy has des

Jewry i n Russia and

t r o y e d Russia a n d Germany. H e d i d not accuse anyone a n d

I

[... meaning unclear] that we a l l regretted

t h e y will

certainly

destroy i t i n P. They have destroyed not

Russia .

accuse n o one.

+

hope w e all deplore

these outbreaks.

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DOCUMENTS

these incidents. I n any case he took his stand on the Draft

Mandate the principles of which were unalterable. H e offered t o open discussions w i t h the Arabs o n the

points mentioned by M r Shuckburgh.

I f the D e l e g a t i o n (his final words) w o u l d agree, o n the forego-

ing basis, to the Draft Mandate, it would be possible for us t o negotiate about

the

grievances which w e could settle here or i n Palestine, a m o n g ourselves o r through t h e mediation

of t h e G o v -

ernment. Precious t i m e has been lost unt i l now.

I t would be better for everyone if we

carry on these talks, and unite i n coming t o the English Government and present our thoughts t o it. H e did not want t o enter i n t o a theoreti-

cal discussion: d i d we have the right to share i n the restoration o f Palestine[?] B u t he repeated that the restoration would

I f gentlemen o n other side w o u l d accept

principle of mandate and formulate their grievances, m y colleagues a n d I would be ready t o discuss those

grievances, whether here or i n Palestine, whether among ourselves or under Presidency o f a representative of H M . G .

Too much time has been lost already. I t w i l l be easier for a l l o f us i f we unite i n comi n g t o H M . G . and expressing our wishes w i t h regard t o the future o f the country. I have not entered u p o n a n academic d i s c u s s i o n as t o whether we had the right to

build n a t i o n -

a l home i n P . That is for us beyond discussion. I repeat that this

have a good effect o n

upbuilding will be t o

the t w o nations. I n this spirit he request-

the advantage of both nations and i n this spirit I invite my

ed the gentlemen [ t o

friends opposite t o

negotiate].

enter into discussion. x

Xx

x

have heard pleasing

M r Shuckburgh. D r W. has made conciliatory

Weizmann] had officially

speech and given definite invitation.

i n v i t e d us t o enter officially i n t o negotiation w i t h him. T h e

I should be much disappointed i f that in-

M r Shuckburgh: W e words. H e [ D r

wants this thing and would feel

Speaking for S. of S.,

Minister

v i t a t i o n rejected.

great disappointment

I t has always been view o f H . M . G . that

182

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

if we refused. The view of the

best course is for both interests t o endeavour

Government |... gap

t o c o m e together a n d

i n original] There always existed t w o parties w h o had important interests i n Palestine. T h e best way was for these t w o parties to come together, to negotiate,

place before us something in the nature

of

agreed

proposals.

and t o place before the Government a form o f s o l u t i o n w h i c h results from t h e negotiation. I t was the intention and t h e desire o f t h e Eng-

lish Government t o hold the balance equally between the two

parties

and t o

I t is the desire and intention o f H . M . G . to hold balance

equally and t o carry out both parts of B.D. honourably and fairly.

carry o u t t h e t w o parts of the Balfour Declaration justly

and honourably. H e knew that i t was said t h a t t h e t w o parts were inconsistent, w i t h n o reconciliation between them. B u t the Government believed that an acc o m m o d a t i o n was possible between the two, and i t was the task of the Government t o reconcile the two

parties. O f course

i t was possible for the English Government t o force a n agreement u p o n t h e t w o parties

b y saying that this is what i t wants and this must be carried out. B u t every one o f us believes that an

H . M . G . has never accepted t h e v i e w that

the two parts of B . D . are inconsistent and irreconcilable.

H.M.G. could, of course, impose a settlement o n b o t h parties; but everyone must agree imposed settlement cannot be compared w i t h one based on agreement of both parties concerned.

183

DOCUMENTS

agreement which is imposed on the people

from

outside

should not predominate over the other [ k i n d o f agreement].

The first [kind of] agreement would be a military solution. I t

does not mean an increase i n the armed forces, but i t would

be military [ i n the sense t h a t ] it w o u l d not be with the ap-

proval o f the two parties involved i n this issue. W e ask t h e members o f the Delegation t o accept D r

Weizmann’s intent i o n regarding nego-

tiations on this question.

I appeal to my friends of t h e Arab delegation to consider D r W’s invitation t o discussion i n a conci-

liatory spirit. Musa Kazim. Will discussion be based o n acceptance b y us o f B.D.? M r Shuckburgh. Discussion must be based on acceptance by both sides of both parts o f B . D .

H e hoped t h a t we would not enter i n t o theoretical questions.

Musa Kazim. What is the B.D.? M r Shuckburgh. Y o u w i l l remember earlier i n afternoon I begged you t o get away from definitions and abstractions. Musa Kazim. W e want t o k n o w o n what

basis Jews are coming in.

He

read

to us the

Carlsbad Resolution: ‘ I t is t h e a i m of t h e

Jews t o come t o Palestine and t o share

M r Shuckburgh reads Carlsbad Resolution (Political) No. 5.

184

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

w i t h t h e Arabs i n

making i t prosper in such a way that each of the t w o parties will promote its nationali t y without oppressing

7. Mussa K a z i m Pasha el Husseini replied that the Dele-

t h e other’. H e repeat-

ed [these] words and h o p e d we w o u l d e n t e r into n e g o t i a -

Musa Kazim. W e had

policy

so protested t o the

tions: W e both understood that the Government wants us t o work out a state ment. M r Churchill believes, above

League

Nations

anything, that w e

a g a i n s t i t s terms. They d i d not under-

s h o u l d agree together

and reach a solution,

thought

stand the meaning of

which he will submit t o the Government.

proceed o n more informal lines. Musa Kazim. W e d i d n o t come here t o come t o a n under-

gation h a d already informed H i s Britann i c Majesty’s Government that the Draft M a n d a t e was inac-

ceptable, and had alof

the Balfour Declaration.

Why could

not

H i s Britannic Majest y ’ s Government give

a clear interpretation so that Arabs might know where they were? I n the present circumstances they

were unable t o discuss anything at all since they knew not what t o discuss.

hoped H.M.G. would make statement o n its

in

Palestine

and that that would be preliminary t o any further discussion.

M r Shuckburgh. M r Churchill, as intimate d a t recent l u n cheon, subsequently

standing

it

better

with

to

the

people whom we consider as aggressors b u t t o negotiate

with

H . M . G . t o save us

from injustice which is being done. We do not recognise right of anyone in

Palestine, except that o f people w h o live there. W e have sent i n our demands t o H . M . G . and we ask H M . G . t o reply t o them.

Mr Shuckburgh. Am 1 t o take i t that the offer o f discussion is declined? Musa Kazim. Yes i f i t is t o be o n basis o f

B.D. A t any rate we must

185

DOCUMENTS

begin w i t h an interpretation o f t h e B . D .

D r Eder has stated that Arabs are not t o have equal rights. D r Weizmann. Issue has now shifted from r e s c i n d i n g o f BD. t o i t s interpretation.

L o o k a t Mandate. Mandate says H . M . G . t o encourage

Jewish immigration

[ D r Weizmann:] H e s a i d t h a t Jews all over the world had t h e r i g h t t o enter Palestine and that n o power and n o right would stop them

from [doing] that. T h i s w a y is mentioned in the draft Mandate. W e d i d not want t o rule over the Arabs. I f there are some people w h o want t o rule, i t is

consistently w i t h interest o f population and with its position, w h i c h includes its political position. W e c a n n o t recede

from claim t o right, subject t o limitations

of Article 6, of Jews of whole world t o enter Palestine. W e are attached t o i t b y religious and historic ties which n o force i n the world can break. W e d o not wish t o

rule over the Arabs. I f we did, we should be prevented by

the English. A League o f Nations exists, [but] all the declara-

H.M.G., by League of

t i o n s i t issues are without benefit.

world.

W h a t w e d o want is

W h a t we w a n t t o create is Jewish national home i n P . There exists an Arab national home there.

t o form and establish a national homeland i n Palestine for the Jews. There also exists, now, a n A r a b national homeland as well,

a n d w e want

t h e m t o participate w i t h each other to

Nations, and b y the conscience o f t h e

W e w a n t these t w o

n a t i o n a l homes t o work together to create a flourishing P .

and perhaps our chil-

186

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

make

Palestine

happy.

I t would be possible, i n fifty years, [for] our

dren i n fifty years will re-discuss the position. T h a t is all, but

that is enough.

children [ t o discuss the position]. x

Xx Xx

Musa Kazim. W e can-

The Pasha: We recog-

not

nise only one Arab

tine as home of any

homeland. We have

p e o p l e b u t t h e Arabs.

protested against the draft Mandate t o the

A s to terms of Mandate, we have protested against them both

L e a g u e o f Nations a n d w e d o n ’ t recog-

n i s e a n y o n e else’s right in our country. x «a

recognise Pales-

to H M . G . League of

and t o Nations.

W e t h i n k best solution is to leave the matter to

HM G.

8. M r Shuckburgh informed t h e Delega-

Shuckburgh: I f there

M r Shuckburgh. I f you

were a n acceptable

tion that the Draft M a n d a t e must stand

explanation

Balfour Declaration],

b u t i t m i g h t be possible t o offer a n e w for-

were we prepared t o negotiate w i t h the

d i d know what B . D . meant would you be prepared t o enter i n t o a discussion?

mula in regard t o the substance o f the Balfour Declaration and its legal corollary the Draft M a n d a t e . Supposing that i t were possible to draw u p a formula of this k i n d as a basis of discussion, would the Arabs be willing to enter dis cussion again? A t one time they had dem-

Zionists [?]

[of

the

anded the complete re-

scission of the Declara-

tion: now it appeared t h a t they w o u l d be willing to negotiate upon an interpretation of that Declaration other than those already advanced.

9.

T h e Delegation

[Musa Kazim:}] No.

M u s a K a z i m . Yes-

187

DOCUMENTS

r e p l i e d t h a t they

Only

w o u l d welcome another interpretation:

Government.

with

the

- with H M . G . M r Shuckburgh. B u t not w i t h Z.O.? Musa Kazim. Let us have i n t e r p r e t a t i o n first then we will see.

M r Shuckburgh said: The thinking of the

M r Shuckburgh. I f

®t Xx *

it might form the basis of discussion b u t the Government were t o remember t h a t the Draft Mandate was quite repugnant. (The implica-

t i o n was that the new

formula might still be unacceptable and

w o u l d lead them again t o demand the rescission o f the Bal-

four

Declaration

and

its sequelae). (Initialled:) E[ric] M[ills]

30.11.1921

Minister was not t o present a n interpretat i o n different from the first one. H e would put [it] before the Minister and obtain an interpretation. k

% «*

[ T h e m e e t i n g ] terminated after lasting approximately t w o hours.

chance o f further form u l a leading t o useful discussion I would b e prepared t o sub-

mit t o S. of S. that we should be authorised t o prepare such a formula. B u t it must be understood that the formula will be i n accordance w i t h t h e Mandate, which will not

be departed

*

SOURCE: P R O , C O 537/855. Note: T h e comments o f E . Mills,

SOURCE: Handwritten notes taken b y member of Arab

w h i c h compensate for

Delegation during

the relative brevity of the C . O . minutes, are given below.

duced in DPNM, 184-

the meeting, as repro-

86. M y translation from the Arabic. A s terisks appear i n t h e

original text. Order s l i g h t l y readjusted.

SOURCE: WA.

from.

188

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Comments by M r Mills on proceedings at joint discussion with Arab Delegation and Zionists. 1. Dr. Weizmann, while his speech was conciliatory, adopted an unfortunate manner i n delivering i t . H i s attitude was of t h e nature o f a conqueror

handing t o

beaten

foes t h e

terms

of

peace. AlsoI think he despises the members of the Delegation as not worthy protagonists- that i t 1s a little derogatory to h i m to expect h i m to meet them o n the same ground.

2.

The unanimity of the Arab Delegation is, I a m sure,

artificial. They are forced to adopt a n uncompromising

attitude because: — (a)

they know they are discredited i n Palestine.

(b) they know that if any one of them weakens the remainder will attach t o him all ignominy when they return to Palestine. 3. I n Palestine itself the Arab population shows signs of weariness of political strife, b u t their feelings will run high i f provocative action be taken by the Zionists or the Govt. Probably they w i l l accept with resignation the situation when

the mandate is definitely granted. 4. I t seems to m e t h a t i t is q u i t e hopeless to expect Arabs and Zionists to meet o n common ground when t h a t ground is

already occupied by H . B M . Government on the Balfour Declaration, n o matter what b e the interpretation o f that Declaration a n d n o matter i n what form its substance is embodied. 5.

I a m i n c l i n e d to t h i n k that there are o n l y two modes o f

action:— (a) Allow dilatory measures with the Delegation t o continue until either their funds are exhausted or until the people i n Palestine express a desire that the Delegation should n o longer profess to represent them. (N.B. T h e Delegation are n o w said to b e feeding a t Slater’s Restaura n t , although i t is possible t h a t funds m a y be expected

from Syrians i n America).

DOCUMENTS

(b)

189

Summon both parties before the Secretary of State

and t e l l them firmly that we are going to govern the

country and that we shall tolerate no more provocation by the Zionist publicists and no more activity from a small

band o f n o t

disinterested Arabs.

T h i s course is to b e recommended i f the mandate can b e

granted i n the immediate future and after that mandate is granted. 6. I n Palestine we may have to face disorders, b u t i t is more l i k e l y that we shall have to prepare for non-co-operation b y

Arab officials and municipalities, (provided always that both the Palestine Government and Zionists do n o t openly give the impression of tending t o encroach upon Arab rights). I n time i t w o u l d be seen t h a t the policy o f non-co-operation d i d not

hurt the Jews and did not break u p the Government machinery altogether (many Arabs could be found to occupy existing posts should the present occupants decide t o carry out the policy of non-co-operation). (Initialled) E . M . 30/11.

Source: PRO, C O 537/855.

Document 1 9

Letterfrom D r Weizmann to Under-Secretary ofState, Colonial Office, I December 1921 I have given careful consideration t o the proceedings a t the Colonial Office on November 29th, when I had the advantage of meeting members of the Palestine Arab Delegation for the purpose o f a n informal exchange o f views. I desire n o w to draw attention to certain conclusions w h i c h appear t o m e t o emerge. 2. After refusing, a t the outset, to recognise the Balfour

Declaration, the Arab representatives shifted their ground

190

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

and ended b y pressing for its re-interpretation. This indicates, to m y mind, a certain weakening and suggests that the Arab Delegation is conscious of the futility of a frontal attack. 3. O n the other hand, I a m convinced that the Delegation w i l l never come to grips w i t h concrete realities, so l o n g as i t

has any hope, however illusory, of securing by a side-wind what could a t least be represented as a change of policy. Before any progress can be made, i t is essential that the Delegation should realise that the Mandate is regarded by H i s Majesty’s Government as chose jugée. Any suggestion of a re-statement, as distinct from a reiteration, of British policy i n Palestine could only have the effect o f gravely impairing any prospect there may be of a working agreement on issues of practical importance. I t would a t once weaken very seriously the bargaining-power of the Zionist Organization and encourage interminable debates of an abstract character, from which no practical advantage could result. 4 . 1 venture to suggest, therefore, that before any progress can b e effected, i t m u s t b e made clear to the Arab Delegation,

beyond any possibility of doubt, that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate are intangible [sic] and that H i s Majesty’s Government are n o t prepared t o embark upon a n analysis o f them i n the abstract. Faced

with a n

unambiguous intimation

to this effect, the Delegation, which appears, as I have

suggested, t o be already weakening, will doubtless see the expediency of descending into the region of practical politics. 5. The Zionist Organization remains, on its side, fully prepared to enter i n t o the discussion o f a working agreement. I desire o n l y to reiterate m y conviction that n o such discussion can b e fruitful, so l o n g as the basis o n which alone i t can b e conducted appears, to t h e Arab eye, to b e shifting. *

Source: L C W X , 304f.

DOCUMENTS

191

Document 2 0

First Meeting between Zionist Delegation and representatives of the “Executive Committee of the Congress ofParties of the Confederation of Arab Countries”, Cairo, 18 March 1922 O n the 18th of March 1922, a t 5:00 p.m., t w o delegations, one representing the Zionist Organization and the other the

“Executive Committee of the Congress of Parties of the Confederation of the Arab Countries” met i n Cairo with the purpose of reaching, after an exchange of views, an under-

standing which would make i t possible for both parties

to

collaborate i n the development of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and other Arab countries on a footing of equality of rights and interests. I n holding that meeting both parties were actuated by their reciprocal desire to inaugurate a n e w era o f peace and understanding and i n order to p u t a n end to the dissensions

and misunderstandings which divide them and which, if continued, would only react t o the detriment of their interests, both common and individual, and would retard the realization o f the legitimate aspirations of both parties. Having recognized this necessity, each of the t w o parties declared that i t is cognisant o f t h e o t h e r party as a power w i t h

whom i t was highly desirable and particularly useful t o reach complete understanding.

The Arab delegation declares that their countries, after several centuries of destructive and corrupt administration, are finding i t impossible to reconstitute themselves i n order t o

take their assigned place i n the world once again without the close collaboration between the nationals of these countries and the agents of civilization [which] are divided into t w o categories: 1) well-established European peoples, i n other words, colonialist powers, whose presence i n relatively backward countries constitutes a particularly grave danger to the independence

and political unity of these countries; [and]

192 2)

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

the Jewish nation, originating i n the East, whose memb-

ers dispersed around the world c o n s t i t u t e o n e o f t h e best

forces o n which modern civilization and progress are based. Taking i n t o consideration the ancient origin of the Jewish nation which, without doubt, is historically related t o the Arabs; and considering, on the other hand, that Jewish colonization does not present a n y

political peril, since t h e

Jews who settle i n a country become attached to it, make i t their fatherland [patrie] and as a result d o not colonize [ i t ] for

the benefit

o f a specific foreign power; t h e

Arab

delegates

declare that i n order to advance their countries towards modern civilization and progress they give all preference t o the Jews, and would be particularly happy t o collaborate with them t o the end that the Jews may become, t o the greatest possible extent, the agents o f the external civilization

of which the Arabs are in need. I n reply to this declaration, the Jewish delegates, expressing happiness a t the confidence shown t o them, and insisting for their part o n the old relationship, declared t h e i r readiness t o

collaborate [ w i t h the Arabs] i n the inauguration of an era o f peace and work and t o be the factor of peace and progress i n the above-mentioned countries. O n the other hand, they drew the attention of the Arab delegates t o the specific legal interests and aspirations which the Jews have i n Palestine as their historical and national cradle [berceau]. While recognizing these aspirations, the Arab delegates asked that the discussion should n o t have as its basis either the Balfour Declaration or the accord entered into between the British and King Husain [the McMahon-Husain correspondence]. The accord t o be reached between the two parties m u s t not be influenced by either of those t w o political documents. Arabs and Jews must discuss, today, as nation to nation, make mutual

concessions and recognize each other’s rights. The accord t o be reached should comprise t w o parts: (1) the object, (2) the means of execution. The goal is the complete and final independence of the above-mentioned countries joined i n confederation. O n this occasion, the Arab delegates clearly specified that i t was n o t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o ask the Jews to declare themselves against foreign governments, j u s t as t h e y d i d n o t i n t e n d , for

DOCUMENTS

193

their part, to begin their p o l i t i c a l work b y a show o f hostility

towards these same governments. The work which should unite Jews and Arabs in close collaboration w i l l be a l o n g process, a n d the two parties

appreciate full well that the object towards which they are jointly striving is not one which can be attained overnight. But i t 1s agreed that from now on they would work together, b y harmonious and systematic preparation i n all spheres of activity and b y every legal means, towards shortening the term of the mandates. T h i s w i l l constitute t h e basis o f a n accord between the two

parties i n which all the means of execution will be specified i n detail. After approving the Arab declaration, the Jewish delegates specified their immediate demands and presented them i n this form:

1) Peace and tranquillity i n Palestine. 2) The cessation of all hostilities against immigration and settlement of Jews i n Palestine within the scope of the economic capacity of the country once the accord is signed. 3) The cessation of anti-Jewish propaganda by the Arab press and b y Arab committees i n Palestine and abroad. I n exchange for this, the Jews would place a t the service of the Arabs all the political, economic and propaganda resources a t their disposal. I n a word, they will collaborate sincerely with the Arabs towards the realization of the final goal already determined. As for the guarantees which the Arabs would have to give the Jews, the Jewish delegation insisted, i n particular, o n

the rioting which could erupt i n Palestine during the month of April o n the occasion o f the holidays [Nebi Musa and Easter] as

a result of the excitement of mob feeling. T h e Arab delegation was quick to recognize that the demand was well-founded a n d , wishing to give the Jews a first

tangible proof of the sincerity with which they intended t o cooperate w i t h them, suggested that i t would undertake as soon as possible the pacification o f spirits i n Palestine w i t h a

view to preventing the troubles i n question. I t declared that i t has n o w decided to delegate one o f its members i n Palestine to bring to t h e organizations i n that country a message o f

195

DOCUMENTS

execution o f this programme, will begin working immediately after the signing of the entente towards the pacification of

spirits and

to

prepare the [population], carefully and surely,

t o accept these n e w principles.

The

delegate

whom they promised

to

send t o

Palestine t o

bring the word of peace on the occasion of the [Nebi Musa and Easter] April holidays will leave during the coming week. The Jewish delegates, for their part, will devote themselves, as was agreed a t the previous session, to preventing any provocative demonstrations o n the part o f their coreligionists.

The Arab delegates were not asking the Jews t o declare themselves against the British Mandate for Palestine, b u t they insist that the Zionist Organization should refuse t o support the obtaining of other mandates i n other Arab countries of t h e Arabian p e n i n s u l a . A s for the position w h i c h t h e Arabs will have t o take on the Palestine Mandate, this w i l l be the subject o f a n entente between the t w o parties through the

setting u p of a joint committee. This joint committee, the establishment of which was proposed by the Arab delegates, w i l l consist of the members of the Arab Executive Committee [ o f the Cairo Congress] and any Jewish members who will be delegated for this purpose by the Zionist Organization (a maximum of four, equal t o the number of Arab delegates). This joint committee will elaborate the programme and its execution i n a l l its details, w i l l agree o n the means t o take to bring t h e efforts o f t h e two parties towards the common goal.

The Arab delegates declare that they have already been provided with the necessary powers t o sign any e n t e n t e and t o work o u t any programme, as w e l l as [ t o decide] the composition o f the said committee.

The Jewish delegates, while accepting i n their private capacities all the principles already enumerated, declare that they m u s t confer w i t h the head office of their organization before they can definitely sign the accords. The signatures will be forthcoming once the Jewish delegates have obtained the necessary full powers for this purpose. x

Source: See source o f preceding document.

194

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

i n t h e name of t h e congress. F o r t h e i r part, t h e Jewish delegates m u s t devote themselves t o preventing any provoca-

peace

t i v e demonstration o n

their side.

As regards the guarantees which the Arabs requested from the Jews, the Arab delegates felt they had t o confer with other members of their Congress, and thus stated that they would present their demand for guarantees a t a subsequent meeting to

be held the n e x t day, March 19th, a t 3:00 p.m. ok

Source. PRO, FO 371/3773, file E3559/65/65. M y translation from the French, i n conjunction with A . Saphir’s translation and texts as submitted t o the Peel Commission (1937), i n C O 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. Some parts of the minutes i n F O 371 are erroneously combined w i t h those o f the meeting o f 19 March (below, Document 21) and have

been correctly reassembled here.

Document 2 1

Minutes ofSecondMeeting, Cairo, 19 March 1922 T h e two parties m e t again for a second session o n the 19th

of March a t 3:00 p.m. The Jewish delegates asked for clarifications regarding the rights and interests which the Arabs would be granting them i n Palestine. The Arab delegates went over the principles which would have t o constitute t h e basis o f a common programme for the

parties with the following formula: Complete independence of the Arab countries, with Palestine as the Jewish National Home, where the Jews and the two

Arabs shall constitute a Palestinian national u n i t

with

equality of rights and duties. Jewish culture and civilization will develop freely i n Palestine for the common good. As for the guarantees, whatever they are they can i n no way have any real value unless both parties e x e c u t e them with sincerity. T o this end, the t w o parties commit themselves t o use a l l their honesty and the honour o f their w o r d i n the service of the said programme.

The Arabs, while recognizing the difficult character of the

196

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Document 2 2

Minutes of ThirdMeeting, Cairo, 2 April 1922 T h e two parties met for t h e third t i m e o n the 2 n d o f April,

1922 at 4:00 p.m. The Zionist representatives stated that they were officially instructed t o communicate t h e contents o f a telegram from

D r Chaim Weizmann, President of their organization, who was presently i n Rome. The telegram read as follows:

After having read the documents approve entirely your negotiations. W e accept i n principle projected accords. W e nominate Sokolow, Eder, Menasche, Kalvarisky as our delegates o n the j o i n t committee to continue to negotiate and establish the text o f a n accord. I f our presence

necessary, will come. I f not, will sign accord in Geneva. This latter course will be preferable. Try t o precise more

clearly Palestine question.* The Arab delegation took note of this communication and manifested its desire t o see the joint committee constituted and commence work as early as possible. However, they drew the attention of the Jewish representatives t o the fact that the presence of M r Sokolow i n America and the presence o f t w o other members i n Palestine d i d not seem to permit commencement o f the work o f the j o i n t committee w i t h as much speed as they had wished to proceed i n the general interest.

They asked that, i f it was impossible for the four members nominated b y D r W e i z m a n n to arrive w i t h i n a very short

time, other delegates be nominated i n their place to proceed with the work as quickly as possible. *The wording of this telegram seems t o have been embellished b y the Zionist delegates. The t w o recorded telegrams from Weizmann authorizing Eder t o pursue the negotiations read: (1) “Yours Cairo. Fully agree; wire further progress...” (21 March) and (2) “Agree proceed fully informing H i g h Commissioner. Treaty m u s t emphasize our priority Palestine. Form mixed committee. Suggest Eder, Kalvarisky, Menasce, Sokolow. Could final signature [be] arranged Rome, o r [ i s ] m y c o m i n g necessary?” ( 3 0 March). See

LCW 1x, 7 5 .

DOCUMENTS

197

The Jewish delegates took note of this suggestion and said they wished t o have the following points e l u c i d a t e d— : 1) whether the A r a b delegates were i n a position to produce documents certifying as to their authority,

2) whether the organization which delegated them was favourable t o H i s Majesty Faisal, K i n g of Mesopotamia, as

well as t o His Majesty Husain I , K i n g of the Hejaz, 3) whether the A r a b delegates were n o t o f the o p i n i o n that i t would be advantageous to have one o r two Palestinian

members join i n the negotiations, seeing that the latter will, i n any case, be the most directly affected [les principaux intéressés] b y a l l questions pertaining to that country,

4)

whether the Arab organizations had among their memb-

ers representatives o f the Christian A r a b community, 5 ) whether the Arab delegates were not in full accord w i t h the Jews as to a policy o f friendship towards the Great Powers, i t b e i n g understood that this friendship was n o t to b e o f a nature t o hinder i n any way the final object t o which both parties look forward.

The Arab delegates replied:— A s to t h e F I R S T P O I N T , when w e decided i n p r i n c i p l e u p o n m u t u a l collaboration we h a d n o desire to ask t h e Jews to give any guarantee, b u t wished, o n the contrary, to offer t h e m one. W i t h regard to the authority o f o u r organization,

this could n o t be better proved than by facts and tangible proofs. In

addition

t o t h e d o c u m e n t a t t e s t i n g t o o u r authority,

w h i c h w e shall produce to the Jewish delegates o n their p r o d u c i n g t h e i r o w n credentials, w e propose to annex to the treaty o f accord a clause providing that, i n the event o f o u r n o t b e i n g able to prove our authority for the execution o f

decisions which will be taken by the joint committee, such accords shall be deemed t o be n u l l and void. As t o the S E C O N D P O I N T , Their Majesties Faisal and Husain are t w o soldiers i n t h e A r a b cause. L i k e a l l the sons o f Arabia,

they work i n harmony with the Arab organizations. I n case o f necessity we shall be able t o obtain documents from

198 Their

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Majesties attesting t o t h i s truth a n d / o r get

Their

Majesties to make a verbal declaration to the Zionist delegates, thereby proving their complete approbation of our

policy i n this matter. A s to the

THIRD POINT,

n o one can influence o u r decisions

concerning the constitution of the members of our Executive.

Nevertheless, we shall be able, i f necessary, t o put the Jews i n touch with such Palestinian personalities as they may desire to confer with.

As t o the F O U R T H P O I N T , the Arab organizations do not desire that there should be any difference between Christian and Moslem Arabs. A l l are considered equal and brothers, b u t i f the Jews so desire, w e shall b e able to demonstrate to

them that the Christian element is widely represented i n our organization. A s to the FIFTH P O I N T , we desire to bring to m i n d the minutes o f our two preceding meetings when i t was categorically stipulated o n our side that we desired under n o

circumstances t o manifest any hostility against any of the Allies. W e wish to a d d that w e count upon the friendship o f

the Allies, who themselves desire the realization of our national aspirations.

The Jewish delegates rendered homage to the precision and the frankness of this declaration. I n view of the fact that the Jewish special envoy who w e n t to I t a l y [S. van Vriesland] to convey the documents relative to

this question t o D r Weizmann was due t o arrive the following m o r n i n g at Alexandria, the m e e t i n g was adjourned to the next day without fixing the hour, so as to allow t h e Jewish

delegates t o acquaint themselves w i t h the instructions s e n t t o them b y D r Weizmann. =

Source: C O 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. Text follows A . Saphir’s translation, w i t h modifications i n accordance w i t h the original French text.

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Document 2 3 Minutes o fFourth Meeting, Cairo, 4 April 1922

The meeting opened on the 4th of April, 1922, a t 11:00 a.m. in the presence of the envoy who carried D r Weizmann’s instructions. The protocol o f the preceding meeting having been read and certain corrections having been made i n the text, the special envoy conveyed D r Weizmann’s anxiety to see the

Joint Committee constituted and commencing its work as early as possible. This desire was confirmed b y the suggestion o f the Arab delegates as noted i n the protocol of the preceding meeting, a n d w a s accepted with satisfaction.

I t was therefore decided that the Joint Committee should meet at the end of next week. Meanwhile, the Jewish delegates w h o were to have returned t o Palestine o n the same

day would prepare their own draft agreement as a basis of the accord. The Arabs for their part would draw u p their own proposals.

The envoy added that D r Weizmann was delighted t o learn o f the result of the Jewish-Arab negotiations and would be very happy t o see them reach a complete a c c o r d . I t h a d always been his desire to reach a n understanding w i t h the

Arabs. His duties presently kept h i m i n Rome, b u t as soon as h e was free h e would come to Cairo to take part i n the

negotiations and, i f unavoidably prevented, he would be

happy

t o m e e t t h e members o f t h e E x e c u t i v e somewhere i n

Europe i n order t o countersign the agreement. N o t h i n g could

prove better his desire t o collaborate with the Arabs than his negotiations

with Faisal w h e n His Majesty

w a s i n London.

The President o f the Arab Executive [Rashid Rida]

replied by thanking D r Weizmann and declaring that he had n o d o u b t o f the sincerity o f his desire to collaborate w i t h the

Arabs. They were aware of his negotiations w i t h H i s Majesty K i n g Faisal. The road t o accord and collaboration was today opened. W e must proceed with frankness and confidence. There were some Moslem and Christian Arabs who claimed that the Jewish reign was condemned never again t o

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see the light of day. We believe and wish t o the contrary. So far as I a m personally concerned, I have given expression to that wish through m y commentaries on the Koran. The Jewish delegates asked for a copy of that part of the commentaries i n which reference was made to them and were given the assurance that they would be provided with such a copy as soon as possible.

At the end of the meeting the Arab delegates expressed their desire that the Jewish delegates who had hitherto conducted the negotiations with them and who, thanks to their tact and sincerity, had won all their sympathy, might be asked n o t t o withdraw from the negotiations, and might continue to lend their valuable support and p u t their knowledge o f m e n and affairs a t the disposal o f the Joint

Committee u n t i l such time as an agreement had been

reached. Source:

See source o f preceding document. T h e m i n u t e s o f a l l four

meetings were taken by Emile Khouri. N o draft proposals for the text o f a n agreement were found i n Zionist files.

Document 2 4

General Lines ofPreliminary Propositions of an Understanding between Arabs andJews, 7-8 September 1922 As a result of the two conversations which took place on Thursday and Friday, 7th and 8th September, 1922, between the Syro-Palestine Delegation on the one hand and M r A . Saphir on the other, the following succinct summary was drawn u p i n common accord. The conversations are t o constitute i n principle the basis and the general lines of a Draft Agreement between Arabs and Jews. The said conversations resulted i n the following:—

1) Arabs and Jews consider themselves mutually as a force which must be taken into consideration. These forces have

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the possibility of siding with one another i n an effective way with a view to realizing their aspirations. B y working together

rather than apart or one against the other, they could achieve very satisfactory results for both parties. 2) T o facilitate the negotiations of detail to reach this understanding, and t o avoid dissatisfaction, i t would be convenient that the Jewish organization which would negotiate t h a t accord should n o t use as a n argument, i n the course

of negotiations, either the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, o r the terms o f the Mandate as approved b y

the Council of the League of Nations. During these negotiations, the Arabs would also refrain from using as an argument the Treaty between Great Britain and the Hejaz of 1915. 3)

T h e two parties shall discuss the conditions o f a n accord

basing themselves on the reciprocal aid of united collaboration for the welfare o f all the Arab countries, Syria, Mesopotamia, as well as Palestine. 4)

Arabs and jews shall devise the modus o f a declaration to

be made concerning the particular links of the Jews with Palestine. Such declaration shall be drawn u p i n a form which, while making clear the attachments of the Jews t o Palestine, shall equally establish the rights o f the Arab inhabitants o f t h e country a n d shall b e based o n t h e complete

equality of a l l the inhabitants without any distinction of race and religion. 5) The Jews, for their part, shall help the Arabs of the said countries, economically and politically and by such other means i n their power as w i l l b e deemed useful to employ, to

obtain by legal and constitutional means the realization of the final aspirations of these countries. 6)

T h e two parties shall find a common ground o f under-

standing which will unite them i n the mutual cause of the u n i o n o f the two peoples, Arabs a n d Jews, w h o b e l o n g to one

race and speak nearly the same language a n d who both carry

the banners of the same civilization, viz., the civilization of the East. The goal o f the t w o parties must be t o restore t o its ancient splendour that Semitic and Oriental civilization which

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has given everything to the world i n the interest o f that same

civilization, for the specific happiness of these countries which have been abandoned, neglected and ruined during so many t w o parties shall employ all possible and conceivable means t o avoid dissatisfaction and dissensions i n

centuries. The

the course of the negotiations, and t o arrive once and for all a t a definite a n d cordial accord between t h e t w o peoples, the

interests of whom—common as well as individual-—moral as well as material —are so closely bound.

7)

T h e t w o parties

shall use all

t h e means a t t h e i r

disposal

t o find a w a y to regulate a n d l i m i t the question o f immigra-

tion into Palestine or into any other neighbouring Arab country i n a manner that w i l l satisfy the two parties

concerned. 8) I n order t o achieve this end and t o facilitate the negotiations and the enforcement of the agreement, i t is — proposed t o take immediately into consideration: a ) a truce as regards the cessation o f anti-Jewish agitation

i n Palestine must immediately be proclaimed. The intrigues and political antagonism and the machinations of one side against the other, Arabs and Jews i n different countries outside Palestine, m u s t cease;

b) There shall be constituted forthwith a Joint Committee consisting of representatives o f the delegation or of the Syro-Palestine Congress as well as authoritative representatives of Palestine (Moslems and Christians) on the one hand, and o f representatives of t h e Z i o n i s t O r g a n i z a t i o n which may, i f i t deems necessary, co-opt other influential personalities i n the Jewish world, on the other side. T h i s J o i n t Committee shall work o u t a l l the details o f a

Draft Agreement on the basis of the principles enunciate d above;

c) When the text of the Draft Agreement has been definitely settled i n a l l its details and accepted b y both parties, a new J o i n t C o m m i t t e e representing the two parties shall

be constituted and shall be responsible for the enforcem e n t o f t h a t Agreement. W h e n agreement has been

reached, the form and the constitution of this Joint Committee, t o be known as the Executive Committee,

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mittee, shall be prescribed i n detail b y the Joint Committee charged with the preparation o f the Draft Agreement referred to above; d) I t is well understood and agreed that i n order to make it possible for the Delegations t o reach a satisfactory conclusion, all negotiations and conversations between the two parties shall be kept secret, except insofar as concerns the persons directly interested, until such time as the text o f

the Agreement has been definitely settled and accepted. *

Source: C O 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. The text follows Saphir’s translation of the French original, with slight modifications i n accordance w i t h the French.

Document 2 5

Extract ofLetterfrom H . M . Kalvaryski to D r Weizmann, Geneva, 2 1 September 1922 [Reports meeting w i t h Shakib Arslan and others; discussions on points drawn u p between Saphir and Arabs (Doc. 24).] These preliminary propositions are the same, o r nearly the

same, as the ones we elaborated before Easter i n Egypt, and they present the same disadvantages (paras. 3 and 5). But what 1s above all inadmissible is the “limitation of Jewish immigration”, especially as these gentlemen understand it. The A m i r Shakib told me clearly that by the limitation of immigration h e means that we, o n o u r side, commit ourselves to

the assurance that the Arabs will always be a majority i n Palestine, that immigration will be regulated i n such a way that the Jewish population w i l l not outnumber the Arab, and not even become equal to i t . They want the Jews to remain

forever as a minority. I told them that here was a point which was unacceptable. They also are insisting on our renouncing the article i n the Mandate concerning the creation o f a Jewish Agency. W i t h o u t b e i n g q u i t e sure that these two points are accepted b y us, they d o n ’ t w a n t t o undertake

anything. What do you think? You know how much I desire a Jewish-Arab entente, b u t the sacrifices which we are being

204

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

asked i n exchange for their intervention with the Palestinian delegation to make them stop their “intrigues” seem to me too great. I don’t

deny that

the intervention o f

Shakib Arslan

and Ihsan al-Jabiri could have some effect towards pacifying spirits i n Palestine, but can we renounce the most precious and most essential things i n the Mandate? …

Source: W A . M y translation from the French.

Document 2 6

Extract ofLetterfrom Palestine Zionist Executive [Col. F.H. Kisch] to the Secretary, Zionist Executive, London [L. Stein], 12 December 1922 1)

A r a b Negotiations: Immediately upon arrival a t

Cairo,

D r Weizmann entered into negotiations with the Group o f Arabs who will hereafter be referred t o as the “Amour Group”, w i t h a view to reaching a n understanding o n the

following basis:—

The Zionist Organisation to recognise and support the

Arab desire for a confederation of Arab States comprising i n the first instance Palestine, Irak, Transjordania and the Hejaz. The Arabs t o allow the Z i o n i s t Organisation a free hand i n Palestine and i n its dealings with the British Government

in regard t o Palestine, with the ultimate aim i n view that Palestine should become quantitatively and qualitatively Jewish. À number of interviews took place i n Cairo w i t h regard t o the above proposition, i n the course of which D r Weizmann

was asked whether i t would b e possible for h i m i n regard to Arab aspirations outside Palestine to cooperate w i t h the Arabs

i n political action directed against England and France. D r Weizmann made i t clear that such a course would be impossible, which declaration was understood and accepted.

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D r Weizmann explained, however, that he would, i n the event o f a complete understanding being arrived a t , b e able t o assist t h e Arabs

materially

i n t h e i r political

negotiations

with England and France. The negotiations have been continued i n Palestine and have reached a stage which justifies the hope that definite cooperation with the Arabs i n question, on the above lines, is assured. T o make such cooperation effective as regards our own interests, i t is necessary t o do everything possible t o strengthe n the position o f t h e Representatives o f the A m o u r Group i n Palestine. This needs money which is a t present n o t available, but without any assistance from us the Amour Group has already made considerable progress i n the country within the last few months. Four members of the Group have been elected as Palestinian Representatives a t the forthcoming Arab Congress t o be convened the 15th of this month a t Cairo, and the leaders of the Group hope t o be able t o command a preponderant voting power a t the Congress. T h e

Congress will sit about ten days and D r Weizmann will be present a t Cairo d u r i n g the later sessions, the results o f which

w i l l be communicated to you i n due course.

Source: C Z A , Z 4 / 4 1 1 3 .

Document 2 7

F . H . Kisch, Note of Conversation with Musa Kazim al-Husaini, 2 3 October 1923 The conversation took place a t the residence o f D r Helen Kagan. M a h m u d Effendi Husseini acted as interpreter. I t should be mentioned that this i f the first occasion on which I have met M u s a K a z i m , w h o has i n the past declined the attempts o f friends t o arrange a meeting, w h i l e I would n o t risk a rebuff b y calling o n h i m o r i n v i t i n g h i m t o see me.

206

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I brought the conversation t o the question of Palestine by venturing the remark, after a medical discussion, that when a patient is sick i t is necessary for a l l the doctors who are treating him for different ailments should consult together.

Musa Kazim replied that when a patient has been reduced t o his death agonies, the doctors should leave h i m alone. I disputed of course his appreciation of the state o f the patient i n question. Subsequently the conversation was developed i n more

direct

terms

and

Musa

Kazim

stated

that

our

programme and his (which he claimed t o be representative of

the views of the country) were so widely different that consultation would be useless. H e stated that the Government was aware of the two programmes, and i t was for the Government to decide between one o r the other. H e asked o n what our claims to Palestine were based. I

gave h i m the reasons on which our claims to return to Palestine were based. I explained to h i m the spirit i n which o u r people return t o Palestine, h o w i t is the desire to give t o t h e country

a l l we can and to take nothing from it. H e replied we had given nothing, that we had taken the bread o u t o f the mouths of the Arabs. I asked h i m to explain and he only referred to the employment of Jewish workmen on the roads whereas Arab workmen should have been employed. I told h i m that i n the first place only a small proportion of Jewish workmen were employed b y the Government, while the Government

paid for the roads o u t of taxes collected from both communities. I emphasized that the roads were used b y the whole population, and that whoever built roads i n a country, the opening u p o f the country invariably tended to increase

general economic activities and prosperity. I n connection with my views on the historical biblical argument as constituting one factor i n the basis o f Jewish claims i n Palestine, M u s a K a z i m stated t h a t i f G o d h a d

placed the children of Israel i n Palestine, H e had also driven them o u t and given the country to the children o f Ishmael. I pointed out that

i f H e had d r i v e n t h e m o u t , H e h a d a l s o

promised that they should return, and that the statement that H e had given the country t o the children o f I s h m a e l was not

i n accordance with the Scriptures. M u s a K a z i m asked what money we had brought t o the

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207

country. I told h i m that i n the last four years some eight

million pounds of Jewish money had been spent in Palestine, of which he feared the greater proportion was by now undoubtedly i n Arab hands. I f large sums had been taken out

o f the country i t was mainly by absentee Arab landlords, but i n any case Jewish activities had tended vastly to enrich the Arab population. I also said that I was surprised a t [sic] M u s a

Kazim, who is a Moslem, should measure sacrifice by gifts of money.

However i t was on the subject of money that the conversation finished with Musa Kazim stating that the money had mostly gone into the pockets of certain Zionist leaders. T o this I replied with some violence stating that I refused t o continue the conversation w i t h h i m i f h e intended t o use such

arguments which he knew perfectly well to be false. I told h i m that such arguments were unworthy of a man who claims t o speak on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. H e did not withdraw his remark, but stated that he had merely quoted from some newspaper which he had seen and that he supposed i t was true. Note: I n this conversation Musa Kazim showed what the Americans call “ a one-track m i n d ” and I would add, a mind o f a very narrow track, also m u c h pettiness: somewhat the

temperament of Poincaré without any of his ability. I do not think that any further discussions are likely t o arise from this conversation, or that discussion with such a man can produce any useful result. Before leaving the room Musa Kazim asked that the conversation should b e treated as absolutely secret a n d that

this secrecy should be maintained even as regards the fact that he had met me privately. H e 1s evidently afraid of his entourage. [Extract from cover letter to D r W e i z m a n n , 24 October

1923:] I have nothing to add to what I have recorded i n the note, except that M u s a K a z i m gave the impression of a m a n who

feels that he is slipping from power and that I think i t was this feeling that prompted h i m t o see what would transpire a t

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a conversation with me. The conversation once launched however, his temperament took control with the result that the discussion never showed any signs o f producing any useful results.

Source: CZA, Z4/16050.

Document 2 8

D r Weizmann’s Report of Two Meetings with King Faisal, 6 October 1925 Conversations with Faisal (strictly confidential) I have had two conversations with Faisal, lasting altogether 6 to 7 hours. The subject o f these conversations was as follows: Faisal said t o me: You would be astonished i f I told you h o w many Arabs from Palestine have come t o m e w i t h the

wish that I mediate between Zionism and the Arabs. I replied to Faisal that we do not know who really represents the Arabs i n Palestine, and asked h i m to tell m e o n

what basis, i n his opinion, we could come t o an agreement with the Arabs. Faisal replied that at present the Arabs were much more capable of negotiating than they had been three years ago. The sole fear of the Arabs is that they w i l l be dominated by a Jewish majority. H e gave as an example the speeches that were made at [ t h e Zionist] Congress, which made the Arabs extremely uneasy, a n d demanded a limitation o n immigra-

tion. I replied that, as far as we were concerned, this condition

was n o t negotiable. I then explained t o him quite frankly that w e desired a Jewish majority i n t h e country, b u t t h a t w e were at the same t i m e ready to guarantee t h a t such a Jewish majority w o u l d not oppress t h e

Arabs. This

was the

platform

on which we could negotiate. I asked Faisal not to answer Yes or N o right away, but to think i t over. Whereupon we had a further conversation with Faisal, who

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declared that I should come t o Palestine; he would then announce the platform on which we could negotiate. Faisal asked w h y Jewish capital was not coming to Baghdad as well [as Palestine]. I answered that the reason for t h i s was t h a t the Jews always feared difficulties from the

Arabs. Faisal then declared that the Jews who came to Baghdad would be under his personal protection. *

Source: Z A C minutes, 21 October 1925, CZA, Z4/271/3. Translat i o n from the German by D r T . H . Zeiber. M y division i n t o paragraphs differs from the original.

Document 2 9

Letterfrom H. St. John Philby to Lord Passfield [Colonial Secretary], Damascus, 21 October 1929 I arrived here two days ago and have been i n close touch with certain leaders of the Nationalist Party, whose attention is at present focussed o n developments i n Palestine. I t h i n k therefore that i t m a y interest you to have a private apprecia-

tion o f the situation and I am taking advantage of your kind permission t o write t o you.

As you will doubtless have heard from official sources the Nationalists here had arranged a monster demonstration for

yesterday i n protest against the latest regulations issued by the H . C . i n respect o f the Wailing Wall. The French disallowed the projected processions t o the various Consulates a n d t h e demonstration was confined to a m e e t i n g i n t h e great

mosque, a minor procession which was broken u p by the police, and an almost complete closing o f all shops. There was no disturbance, but i n the evening there was an important private meeting o f the leaders o f the Nationalists t o discuss the policy to be pursued i n view of the Arab congress arranged for the 27th. This meeting was attended by delegates from the Palestine Supreme Moslem Committee and may therefore be

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considered representative of all important elements. Before these occurrences I had met some o f the leaders and had impressed on them firstly the necessity of conducting their case peacefully and constitutionally and, secondly, the inadvisability i n their own interests of making demands which the British Govt could not possibly consider. I p u t i t to t h e m that t h e British Govt was perfectly sympathetic

towards the Arabs and suggested that their best policy now would be t o frame their demands with due regard t o the other commitments of H.M.G. Their demands should represent a sine qua non m i n i m u m and not a mere bargaining position; and I assured them that, i f their demands were practical and reasonable, H M . G . would never refuse t o discuss them. This morning a small deputation of leaders, including the chief delegate from the Palestine C o m m i t t e e , came t o see m e

as the result of their discussions of last night. They explained to m e that the coming Congress a t Jerusalem could scarcely

do otherwise than adopt. certain resolutions of an extremist character i f only as a sop to the m u l t i t u d e ; a n d i t would

probably demand the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration, the abolition of the Zionist Agency and the modification of the Mandate, e t c . They assured me however that such demands need n o t be taken too seriously i f the British Govt is prepared to discuss a reasonable settlement i n the future

interests of general peace and prosperity. They then handed me a written draft of what they consider a reasonable settlement m i g h t be. They h a d considered it

very carefully and had excluded everything possible i n their desire for a swift a n d permanent settlement. I cannot d o

better therefore than give you a literal translation of the document and I think you will agree that i t provides a basis for serious consideration and i t certainly represents the opinion of the best elements among the Arab leaders. A n offer b y t h e British Govt to discuss a settlement o n t h i s basis can

safely be guaranteed a favourable reception. The document runs as follows ( i t must n o t o f course b e treated as a n official

proposal by the Arab leaders): — (1) Govt.

Palestine to b e r u l e d b y a constitutional, r e p u b l i c a n

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(2) Legislative power shall vest i n a representative assembly elected by direct or indirect voting and comprising Arabs and Jews i n proportion t o their numbers residing i n the country, excluding absentees both from reckoning i n the population and from the right of voting. (3)

T h e executive administration shall vest i n a Govt

responsible t o the representative assembly and comprising Jews and Arabs i n proportion as above. (4)

The British High Commissioner shall watch all acts o f

the Legislature and Executive, and shall have a right of veto in respect o f any decision inconsistent with the undertakings assumed by the British Govt i n the Mandate for Palestine relating t o the rights of minorities and of foreigners and contrary to t h e interests o f the country.

(5) The High Commissioner shall have the right t o maintain a staff o f officials to assist h i m i n the carrying out of his mandatory duties and functions. (6) The immigration of foreigners (particularly Arabs and Jews) shall n o t be forbidden, though the Palestine Govt may l i m i t the numbers o f immigrants t o the capacity of the country t o absorb them i n agriculture and industry.

(7) There shall b e n o objection to the continuance o f the Zionist Agency acting i n a n advisory capacity to the Palestine

Government i n matters affecting the interests o f the Jews; a n d t h e Arabs shall have t h e right t o set u p a s i m i l a r agency

to protect the rights o f the Arabs.

(8) The High Commissioner shall remain responsible for the administration o f public security u n t i l the national Govt becomes fit t o assume that responsibility; and he may transfer such responsibility t o the national government i n instalments from time to time at his discretion. (9) The organic law shall be subject t o revision and modification once every five years.

Such is the document. I hope i t may help you i n the

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212

problem which confronts you, and you may be sure of Arab goodwill towards any proposal on such lines. x

Source PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411.

Document 3 0

Draft ofPoints Presented to Philby by Arabs at Damascus, 21 October 1929 [See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111] 1. Palestine to be ruled by a republican, constitutional

government. 2. A n elected representative assembly, composed of Arabs and Jews in proportion to the numbers of Palestinian residents, will enact legislation and will approve the constitution. 3.

A national government, responsible to the representative

assembly and composed o f Palestinian Arabs and Jews, shall exercise executive power. 4. The High Commissioner has the right t o veto any regulation or law which conflicts with Britain’s international obligations concerning the rights of minorities and foreigners and religious and civil matters. I n case of disagreement, the whole m a t t e r w i l l be submitted t o the League of Nations.

5. The High Commissioner has the right

to

hire assistants t o

help h i m i n his functions.

6. Foreigners, especially Arabs and Jews, will n o t be forbidd e n t o i m m i g r a t e t o Palestine. However, the Palestine govern-

ment has the right to limit

the number which can be

admitted annually and [to define] qualifications i n accordance with the social and economic possibilities of the country.

7.

T h e r e is n o objection t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n

of

t h e Jewish

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DOCUMENTS

Agency as a consultative authority

for t h e interests w h i c h

affect the Jews. The other groups have the right to establish

agencies equal t o i t i n their rights. 8. The H i g h Commissioner will continue t o be responsible for public security until the national government becomes capable of bearing responsibility for public security. The army will be under the control of the High Commissioner and its expenses w i l l be [borne] b y it. The police force will be under the control of the national government and its expenses

will be [borne] by it. 9. The Hejaz Railway running through Palestinian land will be handed over t o the Islamic wagf administration of Palestine; however, i t must find a n equitable settlement for

the existing equipment among the other areas. The [Supreme] Muslim Council agrees t o amalgamate its administration.

10. The national government pledges itself t o freedom of religion. 11. The national government is bound by the public debts, expenses and agreements signed between the Palestine government and the neighbouring countries. 12.

These articles shall be revised once every five years.

Source: Undated, untitled list of points in M E C / P , X / 1 . M y translation from the Arabic and conjectural identification o f the origin and date o f the document.

Document 3 1

Basis of an Arab-Jewish Understanding in Palestine [Magnes proposals], October 1929 (1) Palestine is a land where both Arabs and Jews live o f right and not of sufferance.

(2)

Palestine is t o be recognised as an independent govern-

ment as i n Transjordan. T h e government o f Palestine 1s to be

214 democratic

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

and

representative.

The

British

High

Commis-

sioner occupies the position of head of the State i n a manner similar to the Governors General of the Dominions. H e appoints and dismisses the Cabinet of Ministers who are responsible t o t h e Legislative Assembly. The C a b i n e t i n c l u d e s Ministers for Agriculture, Education, Health, Commerce and

Industry, Transport, Finance, Justice, Interior, and for Jewish Affairs. T h e last named is to cooperate w i t h the Jewish Agency and to represent the interests o f the Jewish National

Home i n the Cabinet. (3) Before Palestine’s independence is t o be declared, a treaty is to be made with Great Britain and a constitution is to be worked out. B o t h are to be ratified b y the Palestine

Legislative Assembly by a three quarter majority and b y the League of Nations. The constitution can be amended only through a vote o f three quarter o f t h e Assembly and w i t h the concurrence o f Great Britain and the Council o f the League o f

Nations. (4) The Assembly is to be elected b y secret and equal vote of the citizens of Palestine over 20 years of age. A l l questions of the l a w o f election are to be decided b y a special commission.

Palestine citizens above the age o f 30 who can read and write can be voted for. O n e representative is to be chosen for each 15,000 of the settled population. A suitable representation of minorities is to b e guaranteed i n t h e electoral l a w as it is i n

the law of Transjordan. The H i g h Commissioner is t o appoint the representatives of the non-settled Beduin population according to their numbers. (3) I n the British Palestine Treaty and i n the Constitution i t is t o be laid down that free immigration t o Palestine of Jews and Arabs is t o be granted dependent upon the economic capacity of the country. The regulation of Immigration is t o be i n the hands of a commission composed o f 4 Arab and 2 Jewish members of the Assembly together with 3 nonPalestinian i m m i g r a t i o n experts t o be appointed b y the

League of Nations. (6) Every immigrant has the right after a residence o f t w o years within the last three years t o acquire Palestinian

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citizenship. The granting o f citizenship is not to be dependent upon the arbitrary decision of the authorities, b u t is a legal right of the applicant. I n case o f refusal he has a right of recourse t o the courts and then t o the H i g h Commissioner.

(7) The Arabic and Hebrew languages are the official languages o f Palestine. B o t h languages have equal rights i n the Assembly and i n all Departments o f the Central Government. I n the District and local administration both languages are to b e used, i f there b e i n the district o r community a

minority o f a t least t e n per cent. B o t h languages are t o be used by government bureaus, for transactions by public bodies and i n the courts and as a language o f legislation and o f all public declaration.

(8) The Arabic and Jewish people i n Palestine are to have cultural autonomy which extends over the whole school system a n d cultural life. T h e school system o f each people is

administered b y a national Education Board. The Ministry of Education having only the right of coordination and technical supervision. Local communal School Boards are t o maintain the elementary schools, while secondary schools are to

be maintained by the National Education Boards. The

State makes the necessary financial grants i n aid. The object o f the school system is to give free compulsory education to all

boys and girls between the ages of 6 and 14. (9)

Arabic and Jewish Palestinians are to b e employed i n all

grades of

the Government

Service i n

proportion

t o their

numbers in the population. Due regard being had to their qualifications. Non-Palestinians are t o

be employed o n contract

for only a given period and preference is t o be given t o British subjects. Every Minister and every District Administrator is to have a

British Advisor w h o is to have a five years contract

which can be renewed for periods of five years thereafter. (10) The conduct of foreign affairs, the representation o f Palestinian interests abroad, public security within the country and at i t s frontiers are to be u n d e r the absolute and

direct control of the British High Commissioner without the right o f interference by the Legislative. (11)

The British Palestine Treaty is t o define the additional

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216

rights o f Great Britain. They concern among other things the

exclusive control of the Airways, the control of transport by rail and road and their proper repair, the control o f harbours, the control of financial policy and the granting o f concessions. (12) All laws require the signature of the H i g h Commissioner before they become effective. This signature must be withheld i f the law contravenes the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or the British Palestine Treaty. The Palestine Legislative has the right of appeal to the British Cabinet and from there to the League of Nations.

(13) Similar to the Lebanon Palestine has n o State religion. There 1s to be full religious freedom. A l l religions and all citizens have equal rights before the law and enjoy equal protection i n all their legal transactions. (14)

The sacred places of Christians, Mohammedans and Jews

i n Palestine are t o

be

extraterritonalized.

They

are t o

be

exclusively under the High Commissioner who is t o be responsi-

ble

for their administration t o the League o f Nations

with

the

aid of definite religious bodies created for this purpose. (15) The e n t r a n c e o f Palestine into the League of Nations or its union with neighbouring States are to be determined b y a 3 / 4 v o t e of the Legislative with the consent of Great Britain and the League of Nations. I n case of the Union the above mentioned constitutional principles will continue to remain i n force as a constitution o f the autonomous Palestinian Administration. a

Source: P R O , C O 733/175, file 67411.

Document 32

Letterfrom H . St. John Philby to Lord Passfield, Cairo, 1 November 1929, enclosing Final Draft

Since writing you m y letter o f October 21st from Damascus I have h a d a busy a n d interesting t i m e a t Jerusalem where I

DOCUMENTS

217

arrived o n the 25th. I t m a y be o f interest t o you i f I give you

the results o f m y sojourn there and I may say that I a m the more encouraged to d o so b y the tenour o f M r L u n n ’ s recent statement o n your behalf i n the House o f C o m m o n s to the

effect that you are contemplating the calling of a round table conference of Arabs and Jews for the purpose o f working o u t a n agreed settlement. That seems t o m e t o b e t h e o n l y method w h i c h holds a n y promise o f success, a n d i t seems

essential that as a preparation for such a conference both

parties should be induced by their friends t o shed the extreme features o f their respective claims. I t is at any rate o n those

lines I have tackled m y Arab friends, and an accident has intervened which b i d s fair to make m y sowing perhaps more

fruitful thanI could have dared to hope. O n October 26th I spent the whole morning a t the offices o f the supreme Moslem Council i n conversation w i t h Haji A m i n al Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and a number o f his chief lieutenants. I spoke to them o n the lines

of the draft proposals I sent you from Damascus, and the result was very encouraging. I found them fully disposed to

British Government half w a y by whittling d o w n their extreme public demands (which of course for the time

meet the

being they dare n o t publicly withdraw) to a practicable

minimum. A n d i n effect I found them quite prepared t o consider something on the lines of the Damascus draft. That was a l l to the good and, as J a m a l Bey al H u s a i n i was o n the p o i n t o f going to England to represent the Arab Executive there i n case o f need, I gave h i m a letter o f i n t r o d u c t i o n to

you and other friends i n England and impressed upon h i m and the Grand Mufti the urgent necessity of adopting a moderate and reasonable attitude i n discussing matters I n England. Furthermore the Damascus draft was discussed i n detail and certain modifications proposed, which I would have s e n t t o you had i t n o t been for the accident above referred to. That same evening a t m y hotel I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of the Near East correspondent of the N e w York Times, M r Joseph Levy, and of discussing the Palestine situation with him. W e found ourselves substantially i n agreement as t o the practical steps n o w necessary for the

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FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

permanent s o l u t i o n of t h e Palestine p r o b l e m ; a n d as a result

of our talk he asked me to prepare a statement of m y considered views for publication i n his paper. T o t h i sI agreed and, as I was leaving next morning for Cairo, I sat down to the task at once and had completed m y statement i n the early hours of the morning. I handed i t t o h i m a t 8 p.m. before l e a v i n g for t h e s t a t i o n , a n d t h e s a m e evening I reached Cairo

with n o further t h o u g h t o f the matter a n d fully i n t e n d i n g t o

leave for Jidda a t the first opportunity. I merely assumed that

my article would duly appear i n the N. Y. Times i n a day o r two.

M r Levy however was apparently so impressed with the possibilities of m y scheme for a settlement that, without m y consent and indeed without consulting me i n any way, he showed m y a r t i c l e t o D r J.L. Magnes, t h e P r i n c i p a l o f t h e University; a n d he i n turn showed i t w i t h o u t disclosing its authorship t o various friends of his among the

Hebrew

leading Jews of Jerusalem. The result was apparently sufhiciently satisfactory to encourage D r Magnes to take u p the matter seriously; a n d o n the n i g h t o f the 28th I was called u p o n the telephone from Jerusalem b y M r Levy, w h o suggested that i f possible I should a t once return to Jerusalem for a

discussion with D r Magnes. T o this I agreed, and I left Cairo the following day, arriving a t Jerusalem on the 30th and leaving again the day after. The whole i f [sic] the 30th I spent i n vigorous discussion of a possible solution by agreement, partly with D r Magnes and M r Levy and partly with Haji A m i n al Husaini and his friends. The result o f discussion w i t h D r Magnes was a draft scheme; and t h i sI later submitted t o Haji A m i n for consideration and revision. The result is a final draft which I enclose herewith for your perusal i n the conviction that an offer b y the British Government on these or similar lines has a very good chance o f acceptance b y a l l concerned. I have n o t i m e a t present to develop t h e matter further b u t a m anxious that

you should have our proposals without delay. I a m leaving Cairo for Jidda i n h a l f an hour’s time. H o p i n g that some practical result may ensue [ . . . ]

[Text o f enclosed Final Draft (dated 31 October), with

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DOCUMENTS

insertions based o n a comparison with the Arabic

text

done

for D r Magnes b y D r Goitein, 20 March 1940:]

(1) Palestine shall henceforth be administered on a democratic constitutional republican basis.

*(2) Immigration t o Palestine shall be free, especially t o Arabs and Jews, subject t o d u e regard for the interests o f t h e country and its economic capacity to absorb such immigrants.* *

(3)

All legislative authority shall vest i n a representative

assembly elected by persons of Palestinian nationality resident i n Palestine and comprising Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews [Ac. text: comprising Muslims, Christians and Jews] i n proportion t o their numbers i n the population.

(4)

Any person who has resided continuously for a period of

not less than t w o years i n Palestine i s entitled

t o adopt

Palestinian citizenship. (5)

Executive authority shall vest i n a Palestinian council o f

ministers comprising Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and

Jews [Ac. text: comprising Muslims, Christians and Jews] i n the same proportions as above and responsible t o the representative assembly for the administration of the country a n d adequate provision shall b e m a d e for t h e enlistment o f

Arabs and Jews [Ac. text: Muslims, Christians and Jews] for both senior a n d junior grades of t h e administrative services with due regard t o their numbers and qualifications.

(6) The High Commissioner shall remain responsible for the public security of the country u n t i l such time as i n the opinion of the League of Nations the Palestine Government

shall be capable o f armed forces i n the the and discharging such responsibility;

[Ac.

text: the N a t i o n a l

country

shall

be under

Government]

his

d i r e c t control p r o v i d e d t h a t the

Palestinian Government may raise police forces for the purposes of the local administration, and such forces shall be composed of Arabs and Jews [Ac. text: of Muslims, Christians and

(7)

Jews] i n

proportion t o t h e i r n u m b e r s a n d qualifications.

The High Commissioner, on behalf of the League o f

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FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Nations, shall have a right o f veto over a n y executive o r

legislative act o f the Palestinian Government o r repesentative

assembly [Ac. text: over any executive act of the National Government or legislation of the assembly of representatives] which is inconsistent with the proper exercise o f its international obligations of the British Government or detrimental to the rights of minorities and foreigners or injurious to the peace and prosperity [Ac. text: progress] o f the country;

provided that the representative assembly o r Government [Ac. text: t h e Palestinian Government o r t h e assembly o f represen-

tatives] shall have a right of appeal t o the Council of the League of Nations for the solution of any dispute. (8) T h e Jewish Agency shall continue to b e recognised as a p u b l i c body competent to advise and cooperate w i t h [Ac. text: t o advise and assist] the Palestinian Government in all

matters affecting the interests o f the Jews i n the country; and

the M u s l i m and Christian communities shall have the right t o set u p similar agencies with similar status and functions.

(9) The Palestinian Government shall assume full responsibility for all debts and international treaties heretofore contracted. (10) These arrangements shall be subject t o review and revision by the Council of the League o f Nations a t intervals o f five years; and no basic alteration shall be made i n them otherwise than b y a n unanimous vote o f the Council o f the

League. *“

Sources: P R O , C O 733/175, file 67411; M E C / P , X / 2 ; CZA,

S25/2993. Note:*An earlier draft, consisting of 12 points, had the following clause (no. 2) preceding clause 2, above:— “Throughout Palestine there shall be absolute freedom of religious belief and practice.” ** T h e earlier draft had the following clause (no. 4) following clause 2, above:— “Freedom of cultural expression shall be guaranteed t o all inhabitants of Palestine, and Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the country.” T h e clauses were dropped i n deference to Arab wishes. See Philby t o Passfield, 10 November 1929, M E C / P , X / 2 .

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221

Document 3 3

King Faisal’s Suggestionsfor Solving the Palestine Problem, Baghdad, 8 December 1929 I wish first of a l l t o express m y sincere thanks t o His Majesty’s Government for their h a v i n g so k i n d l y asked for any observations that I may have regarding Palestine, i n view o n the one hand of the strong friendly relations which bind me w i t h H i s Majesty and His Government and people and the considerable interest which we hold in common, and on the other hand of the racial and religious traditions and relations which b i n d me w i t h the Arabs of Palestine. 4.

I t appears t o me that any possible solution should be

sought for i n t h e actual pledges made, o r more correctly i n a

definition of these pledges, the determination of the extent and limit of their application, and the manner and possibility o f giving effect thereto. I believe that, but for the pledge made t o the Zionists, there would have been n o need for a discussion of the pledges given to t h e Arabs, because t h e l a t t e r are natives o f t h e l a n d and t h e

Declaration o f 1918 can bear no misconstruction or argum e n t . I n this question, there is no difference between the people of Palestine and those of Syria and ‘Iraq where the Arabs are urging E n g l a n d and the Allies to give effect to that

declaration which was the last pledge made t o them, and reject any other action. As regards the Zionists, they claim that the Balfour Pledge makes Palestine a national home for them. While claiming this the Zionists declare, notwithstanding their being a minority, that the object of that (pledge) is the establishment o f a purely Jewish Government i n which nobody else shall participate. W e find that they take n o account o f any other

race even a race which possesses a crushing majority, and has been settled i n the country for hundreds of years and holds the same sacred promises and pledges as they themselves claim to hold. I n short, the Arabs deny that which the Jews possess and

222

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

the Jews deny that which the Arabs possess, and each party gives the widest interpretation possible t o what i t has received, and His Majesty’s Government find themselves confronted with two conflicting claims. Extrication from this impasse can b e effected only b y reversion t o t h e pledges

responsible for the creation of this troubled situation and by interpreting i t [sic] in such manner as will enable the determination of its [sic] scope and of the manner of giving effect to i t [sic]. 5. H i s Majesty’s Government have on many occasions declared that by using the expression “National Home”, they d i d n o t intend t o expel the Arabs, a t once or gradually, from their home and replace them b y the Jews, with the object of establishing a purely Jewish Government i n Palestine, but that they only intended t o find a place o f refuge for the Jews who were despised i n the various countries of the world, i n order that i f any Jew wished t o emigrate he might find for himself a place i n which he could take shelter and reside. I f the object of the Declaration, both in spirit and letter, be as indicated above, I can see n o great obstacle t o prevent a n

understanding. 6. Assuming the case t o be as above, what are the solutions that may occur t o the m i n d for dealing w i t h this new situation? I n the first place, the Arabs should n o t call upon His Majesty’s Government t o cancel the Balfour Pledge, as this is not easy for His Majesty’s Government t o do. Similarly His Majesty’s Government should n o t call upon the Arabs t o recognise the Balfour Pledge, as this is likewise n o t easy for the Arabs t o do. The Arabs believe that such recognition will doom their future t o destruction. Therefore, Britain should give the Jews plainly t o understand t h a t they s h o u l d n o t claim m o r e than is c o n t a i n e d i n

the British declaration together w i t h the interpretation t o be appended t o that declaration; and the Jews should accept this whether they are satisfied o r not.

7.

I m a y n o w set forth the solutions w h i c h o c c u r to m y

mind. They are three i n number, viz: —

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DOCUMENTS

First.

Syria, Palestine and ’Iraq

to

be unified and made a

national home for the Semitic race, both Arab and Jew, with due regard, from the international political point of view, t o the Sykes-Picot Agreement, as far as circumstances will permit, I admit that this solution is very far reaching and complicated (or difficult) but i t is based on a lofty principle which may prove very beneficial for humanity i f minds and efforts, coupled with good intention, cooperate i n preparing the way for i t and i n its realisation. Second. Transjordan and Palestine to b e unified a n d a treaty concluded o n the basis mentioned i n the third solution. T h i s i s less difficult than the first.

Third. A National Government t o be set u p within the present boundaries of Palestine. This I think is the nearest approach to a n ideal solution and the most easy o f accom-

plishment. I t should n o t prove difficult t o bring about an understanding i n this way; provided that an Anglo-Palestine Treaty is concluded on the following lines: ( a ) À national government to b e set u p i n accordance w i t h

the wishes of the inhabitants. ( b ) Both parties to b e silent as regards the Balfour Pledge.

(c) Immigration t o be restricted and a maximum fixed thereto subject t o the extent t o which economic conditions may permit. (d) T h e nationality of immigrants n o t to be stated. Acquisition o f Palestinian nationality and the enjoyment of “ public rights” to b e made conditional o n residence for a period o f o n e o r t w o years as necessary.

(e) Following naturalization an immigrant should sever relations with the country from which he has emigrated. (f) The Holy Places of the various religions t o remain under the control of the representative of H i s Majesty’s Government. ( g ) Certain reservations (or safeguards) to b e provided for o n

the lines of those contained i n the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. 8.

The foregoing is a summary of m y views regarding future

policy

i n P a l e s t i n e . A s regards t h e r e m e d y i n g o f t h e present

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FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

situation arising from the Wailing Wall question, I consider it

advisable that His Majesty’s Government should

create a n

opportunity for directly interested Moslem nations, especially the

Arabs, t o send representative

to

give their

opinions o n the

solution of this question. I n any case, I myself would not fail to render any service for the purpose of facilitating what has

been mentioned above, should His Majesty’s Government find that agreeable. *

Source:

L e t t e r t o A c t i n g H i g h Commissioner for Iraq, P R O , F O

371/14485, file E444/44/65.

Document 3 4

H . M . Kalvaryski, Note ofSecret Accord Proposed by Omar Salih al-Barghuthi, 25 February 1930 Omar Salih, who was formerly one of the leaders of the

National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani), who fought the Supreme M u s l i m Council, and w h o has been called upon to play a n

important rôle i n the new Arab party (that of the youth) now being organized, has made me the following proposition: That a secret accord be concluded between himself a n d us,

according to which: 1.) he and his party will fight the Mufti tooth and nail, until he is overthrown:

2.) he w i l l wage, with his group, an energetic campaign inside the Arab Executive and i n the press against the [Arab] boycott and against all forms and acts of violence against the Jewish population;

3.)

i f his party predominates over the others, he will come

o u t i n favour of a régime similar t o the Swiss one; in other words, r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t w o equal n a t i o n s i n t h e country;

DOCUMENTS

4.)

225

he would accept a reasonable (moderate) [level of]

Jewish immigration; 5.) h e would n o t object to l a n d purchases by Jews, so long as t h e fellahin d i d n o t suffer;

6.) he would ask for (Palestinian) Home Rule, [but] would agree that the policy o f the Mandate should be beyond the competence o f the local administration; 7.)

w e w o u l d commit ourselves t o support h i s party finan-

cially and morally, whenever necessary. (Financial aid would consist of a single payment of £1000. and a monthly subsidy o f £100.) Note: Bulos Shihadeh, who was present during the interview, agrees w i t h O m a r Salih on this proposal. x Source:

CZA, S25/3466. M y translation

from the French.

Document 3 5

Proposals Submitted to the Colonial Office by Pinhas Rutenberg, May 1930 1. Complete separation of religious functions from the economic and political functions o f any institution, Government official or public servant.

2.

(a) Separate Jewish and Arab democratically elected national institutions to deal each with their [sic] own business under Government guidance and control. (b) For matters concerning both Jews and Arabs—a Joint Advisory Committee consisting of two Jews and two Arabs under the Chairmanship o f the Chief Secretary. I n case of disagreement the H i g h Commissioner t o decide. Right of Appeal t o the Secretary of State t o be given t o both the Jewish and Arab institutions. *(c) T h e matters o f competence o f the two national institutions to be:

226

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

7. All other matters which

1. Labour

2. Agricultural

Credit

3. Education 4. Health 5. Social Welfare 6. Supervision o f

t h e High C o m m i s s i o n e r

will

deem necessary and advisable 8. Right of taxation for the carrying out of the * above purposes.

religious i n s t i t u t i o n s

3. Immigration only to the extent of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Decision by the H i g h Commissioner only. 4. Land (agricultural): N o Deed of Sale t o be executed without authorization of the Government previously satisfied that tenants or owners ( i f Fellahin) adequately provided for, either by land, money or otherwise. 5.

T h e Palestine Administration to b e reorganized o n the

principle of the personnel t o be in sympathy w i t h the Jewish National Home Policy, in particular:— (a) A new Chief Secretary (b) A new Chief o f Police . . . (c) Censorship of Press with severe punishment of any attempt at incitement o f racial and religious strife (d) Thorough and immediate clean sweep of Communists, both Jews and Arabs (e) Assist Arabs i n their required development of Transjordan with a loan (one million pounds) on reasonable terms t o be agreed.

6.

Credit arrangement (£50,000) under Arab-Jewish Man-

agement for repayment o f felahin [sic] debts t o moneylenders, i n sums u p to £50, a t t h e current rate o f interest. W h e n experiment successful, the Government t o take over

control, increasing the capital i f necessary.

7. Getting individual Arabs interested i n existing Jewish undertakings.

*8. H.M.G. t o convey t o t h e A r a b D e l e g a t i o n a n d t h e Jewish representatives their policy as above, dealing only w i t h the following p o i n t s— : (Para. 2. Constitutional questions)

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DOCUMENTS

(Para. 3. Immigration) (Para. 4. Land) From Para. 5 only the sub-clauses (c) and (d) i.e. censorship o f press and ridding the country o f Communists.*

*9.

The proposed scheme concerns only the affairs o f the

Jews and Arabs i n Palestine, and cannot affect i n any way the

and

rights

functions o f t h e

Jewish Agency

under t h e M a n -

date.*

10. The Prime Minister to make a public statement confirming the Jewish National Home Policy, announcing the measures t o be taken and expressing appreciation of the Jewish achievement i n Palestine (this to counter-balance the depressing effect of the Shaw Report on Jewish public opinion). *

Source: Initialled draft, dated 26 M a y 1930, sent to D r J . L . Magnes, CAHJP, P3/2426. Note:— Earlier drafts (12? May, PRO, C O 733/192, file 77255, and

21 May, CZA,J 1 / 2 2 ) do n o t contain the sections marked *———*. Clause 2 ( c ) i n these drafts read as follows: “The C h i e f Secretary t o have one assistant for Jewish affairs and one for Arab affairs.” See also: Passfield t o Chancellor, tgm. 151, 31 M a y 1930, PRO, C O

733/183,file 77050/B.

Document 3 6

H . M . Kalvarysk:, PlatformforJudaeo-Arab Accord, 4 August 1930 [The Platform begins with a lengthy historical survey of the origins and encounters of the “Semitic tribes and races”] I therefore propose a general Judaeo-Arab Covenant on the following foundations:

1)

The t w o Semitic races, Jews and Arabs, undertake t o

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help one another in all spheres o f human endeavour, economic, social and cultural. 2) The Arabs welcome their Jewish brethren returning to the East, their ancient Homeland, and throw open the gates o f their extensive territories to Jewish immigration.

3) I n consideration of this Jews will do their

utmost

in

giving their resources, energy and experience towards the

development of the Semitic East, and towards its progress t o a great future.

4) I n all the Oriental lands where Jews will reside, they will have the same rights accorded to national minorities i n the more advanced European [countries], e.g. Czechoslovakia, etc.

5)

I n view of its past and its association to the two Semitic

peoples and

to autonomous u n i t

the three faiths, Palestine will form an with a special C o n s t i t u t i o n . That Constitu-

tion will postulate the formation of Palestine into a uni-racial b u t n o t u n i - n a t i o n a l Territory, which will belong n o t t o o n e or another of the Semitic races, but t o both of them jointly and equally irrespective of which of them forms the majority and which forms the minority at any given time.

6) Within the boundaries of this Territory the Hebrew language shall have equal rights with the Arab[ic] language.

Jewish culture and Arab culture shall develop side by side i n perfect and undisturbed harmony.

7) The Jews shall declare that they have n o intention of dominating anyone i n Palestine nor of hampering the deve-

lopment of Palestinians other than Jews, but they will desire that no one shall dominate them or hamper their own development. 8) The Jews shall undertake not t o dispossess their Arab Fellah nor prejudice the rights of the Arab workman. So far from their entertaining any such intentions, there] will be a great c u l t u r a l effort, [an] endeavour t o improve t h e deplorable conditions of the Fellah and [they] w i l l offer the Arab workman employment where he has had none before. So far,

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229

t h e country a t large a n d the Arabs i n p a r t i c u l a r have

benefitted directly or indirectly from Jewish Immigration. I n future, Jewish organisations will have to be established with a view t o enhancing the indirect interests of the Arabs in Jewish activity.

9) The Jews undertake n o t t o oppose [the] National aspira-

tions of the Arabs. Should a Federation of Arab States be formed i n the Near East, Palestine could form part of this

Federation because nothing will add more happiness t o the Jew than the glory and regeneration of the Semitic race.

The above are the main clauses of an Accord upon which the Judeo-Arab Covenant must be based. They form only a nucleus Covenant to which other clauses may be added but from which nothing may be deducted. T h e dangers t o which the Arabs are allegedly exposed as a

result of Jewish work is imaginary, not real. The penetration into Semitic countries in general and into Palestine i n particular o f a Semitic race will result i n n o danger to the Arabs. O n t h e contrary, i t w i l l contribute to i t s vigour and

add t o its inherent strength. W e Jews shall n o t thrust ourselves an alien growth upon the body politic of the Arabs, as many extreme nationalists believe, b u t we shall form a

beautiful ring i n the chain of the United Arab Confederation. T h e Arab Confederation does n o t alarm us. Therefore, the sooner the Covenant is signed between us, the better for a l l o f

us, for us Jews as well as for you Arabs. The present fraternal strife now [r]aging between us is ruinous to us as well as to you. O u r heart goes o u t to the

many innocent victims [who] fell last year on both sides. Will there b e a n a b a t e m e n t o f t h i s bloody strife?

I n m y view the

time is ripe for a truce to b e declared, for a hand o f peace to b e extended b y one side to the other. Some o f t h e friends o f

the Arabs protest that the Jews stand i n the way of Arab Constitutional development and prevent them from securing a Legislative Assembly, a handicap which is prejudicial to the

interests of the people. T o these protestations I shall counter b y saying that t i m e was when we Jews were anxious t o have a

Legislative Assembly and you the Arabs refused t o have i t for various reasons. Now the tables have been turned. Is i t any

230

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

wonder? I think that i n the present circumstances there is little wonder that the Jews have grown apprehensive. But I believe that even on this issue an agreement may be reached provided there is mutual understanding. I admit that a Legislative Council may prove of considerable benefit t o the country i f i t conducts its work in a manner beneficial to all the people o f this country, to its present as well as to i t s future

population, b u t i t can be a dangerous instrument i f i t conducts its work in a manner beneficial to one section only of the population. I t can prove of invaluable benefit i f i t admits a full equality in the rights o f the two races, b u t i t will

result i n considerable injury i f its promoters live u p to the statement of one of their leaders before the Shaw Commission: “ W e have n o t protested a t the Seventh Congress [1928] a t the Balfour Declaration, neither have w e asked for i t s

cancellation, because we have insisted on the establishment of a Parliament, which amounts to the same t h i n g . ” T h e Arabs

had better know that no Jew could concur in a Parliament which would invalidate the Balfour Declaration. B u t the truth is that those who have recommended at the Seventh Congress that the Arabs should neither protest against the Balfour Declaration nor ask for its cancellation have not sought to deceive anyone. I know them well as [men] of honesty and integrity. They have deplored and bemoaned the internecine strife that has been going o n between the two

parties and are anxious t o form a bridge between the t w o Semitic races. I t 1s w i t h regret t h a t I have to state t h a t neither party was q u i c k to seize the extended hand o f peace, a n d

meanwhile we have had the Wailing Wall issue which has resulted in many innocent casualties on both sides. The time has come for a proper appreciation [of] the situation and for each party to declare openly [what] i t believes. I say: Jews are n o t opposed to a Legislative Council. I n o u r present s i t u a t i o n as a minority i n the country, we are n o t u n m i n d f u l o f the m a n y handicaps o f such a n I n s t i t u t i o n to t h e Jews. Nevertheless, w e should n o t oppose i t i f w e are given adequate guarantees that i t w i l l n o t b e abused w i t h a view t o

hampering the Development of the National Home i n Palestine. That is—for the time being. A n d i f after the lapse of a certain period of cooperation i n the legislative Forum

DOCUMENTS

231

and i n the political life o f the country we are satisfied that you have n o intention of restricting our development and we are convinced that the Legislative Assembly w i l l prove of benefit to the two races alike, I a m confident that we shall a l m a t a n even greater measure o f political cooperation w i t h a view to widening the platform o f j o i n t political endeavour

in the country. %*

Source: CZA, A113/13. From the polycopied English text; spelling a n d typographical errors have been corrected i n the above.

Notes

Introduction T hese various tendencies are illustrated, i n one form or another, i n the

following,

now-standard,

works: Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to

Israel, 1917-1948 (Bloomington/London, 1973), Aharon Cohen, Israel

and t h e Arab World (New Y ork, 1970), G i l Carl AIR oy, Behind the M iddle East Conflict (New York, 1975), Simha Flapan, Zionism and the .

Palestinians (London/New Y ork, 1979). E.g, Yehuda A m i r , ‘ I n t e r p e r s o n a l C o n t a c t

between A r a b s

and

Israelis’, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 13 (Fall, 1979), 3-17; A l o u p h Hareven,

‘Can We Learn t o Live Together?’, 1b:d., no. 14 (Winter, 1980), 8-17. . Palestinians andIsrael (Jerusalem, 1974), 209. . Speech t o Vaad Zmani| V.Z.], 10 June 1919, Central Zionist Archives [C.Z.A.], J1/8777. Cf. Elyakim Rubinstein, ‘An Outline of Zionist Positions o n the Jewish-Arab Conflict before 1936’ (Heb.), in Sh. Ettinger et al., Zionism and the Arab Question (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1979), 60, 63, 65. 12 February 1932, C Z A , S25/3051. Cf. Sharett, Political Diary (Heb.),

vol. I (1936) (Tel Aviv, 1968), 135f.; W. Laqueur,A History of Zionism (London/New York, 1972), 258f. . M . Duverger, The Idea ofPolitics (London, 1966), 169f. . À companion volume t o the present one, dealing w i t h 1931-1948, is n o w i n preparation.

Chapter 1 —First Attempts . See Neville J . Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism before World War I (Berkeley/London, 1976), xxi, xxiv; Y ehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (London, 1974),

16-17; Neil Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925 (London, 1978), 6, 220-21 (n. 8).

233

234

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Mandel, op. cit, xviii-xix; Laqueur, History ofZionism, 211f. N.J.

Mandel, ‘Turks, A r a b s

and

Jewish Immigration

into

Palestine,

1882-1914’, in St. Antony’s Papers, no. 17 (Oxford, 1965), 108 and his Arabs andZionism, 231. Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers (Jerusalem, 1936), 62; cf. Flapan, Zwnism andPalestinians, c h . 6.

S . N . Eisenstadt,Israeli Society (London, 1967), 19-24. See, e.g., Arab Bulletin, no. 64, 27 September 1917, 389f,; Laqueur,

History ofZionism, 217, 230; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 14. M y translation from the French. T h e excerpt is quoted i n Mandel, Arabs and Zwnism, 52, Porath, Emergence, 26, and elsewhere. O n Azouri, see Mandel, op. cit, 49-52. . Quoted i n Yaacov R o ’ i , ‘The Zionist A t t i t u d e t o the Arabs, 19081914’, Middle Eastern Studies I V (1968), 235. O n R a b b i Binyamin, see Hans K o h n , ‘ Z i o n and the Jewish N a t i o n a l Idea’, i n Zionism Reconsi-

dered, ed. M . Selzer (London, 1970), 206-208. F o r accounts o f these first contacts, see: Mandel, op. cit, ch. 2; Porath, op. cit, 20-30; Laqueur, op. cit, 211-33; Cohen, Israel and the Arab World,

45-69; R o ’ i , op. c i t , 202-27; M i c h a e l Assaf, Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1860-1948 (Heb) (Tel Aviv, 1970), 9-83. 10. Ro’i, op. cit, 224-25; Mandel, op. cit., 39-40; Porath, op. cit, 26. 11. Laqueur, op. cit, 222. 12. E.g. Yitzhak Epstein (see Laqueur, op. cit, 215f.), Arthur Ruppin (see Ro’i op. cit, 222f.), the philosopher-essayist Ahad ha-Am (see Kohn, op. cit, 195f.), Hayim Margaliut Kalvaryski (see Caplan, op. cit, 4, 14, 36-37,

40-45), and the American Zionist Harry Friedenwald (see :b:d., 39). 13. F o r positive examples, see R o ’ i , op. cit., 228f. F o r the negative instance involving Hajj A m i n al-Husaini, later Mufti of Jerusalem, see Ittamar Ben-Avi, With the Dawning ofOur Independence (Heb.) ( T e l Aviv?, 1961),

419; o t h e r negative

instances alluded t o

by

Yosef Meyuhas i n Caplan,

op. cit., 202. Cf. Amir, op. cit. 14. Mandel, op. cit, 88-92. 15. Ro’i, op. cit., 225; Cohen, op. cit, 79-80. 16. By r e t a i n i n g t h e i r foreign passports, Jewish settlers c o u l d benefit from privileges enjoyed b y foreign nationals under the Capitulation agreements and from consular protection. 17. al-Mugattam, 14 April 1914, in Roi, op. cit, 218. For similar views, see N . J . M a n d e l ‘ A t t e m p t s at a n Arab-Zionist E n t e n t e : 1913-1914,

Middle Eastern Studies 1 (1964-65), 243, 253-54; P. A. Alsberg, ‘ T h e A r a b Question in the Policy o f the Zionist Executive Before the First World

War’ (Heb.), Shwat-Zion I V (1956-57), 200-201; Nevill Barbour, Nis: Dominus (London, 1946), 53; Laqueur, op. cit., 214f. . See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, 1938); C . Ernest D a w n , From Ottomanism to Arabism (Chicago/London, 1973); Mandel, Arabs and Zionism, 148f.; Porath, op. cit, 20-30. 19. Mandel, op. cit, 64-66, 119-20, 182-85, 230; Porath, op. cit, 27. 20. Mandel, op. cit, chs. 4-5 and pp. 136f., 209; Laqueur, op. cit, 223. 21. Mandel, op. cit, 142f., 165f., 172; R o i , op. cit, 208-9, 226-27.

NOTES

235

22, Mandel, ‘Attempts’, 260; Laqueur, op. cit., 226. 23. Mandel, ‘Attempts’, 263-65; Laqueur, op. cit, 233; Porath, op. cit, 27-28: Mandel, Arabs andZionism, 213. 24. See, e.g., Mandel, ‘Attempts’, 252; Richard Lichtheim, A Remnant Will

Return (Memoirs; Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1953), 256. 25. R o ' i , op. cit, 203, 205, 226f.; Laqueur, op. cit, 214f., 221.

Y. Ro’i, ‘Attempts

of

the

Z i o n i s t I n s t i t u t i o n s t o Influence

t h e Arabic

Press i n Palestine, 1908-1914’ (Heb.), Zion XXXII (3-4), (1967), 200-27. 27. ‘Zionist Attitude’, 205. Cf. ibid, 210, 220, 226-30, 234; Mandel, Arabs

and Ziwnism, 214-17; Lichtheim, op. cit, 250; A . W . Kayyali, Palestine: A

Modern History (London, 1978?), 24-30. 28. R o ’ i , op. cit, 208, 226-27. Cf. Cohen’s critique o f the Zionist attitude,

Israel and the Arab World, 99-101. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Lichtheim, op. cit, 251; Ro’i, op. cit., 208-209. Ro’i, op. c i t , 213; Mandel, op. cit, 168; Cohen, op. cit, 102-103. Mandel, op. cit, 153-54, 188. Cf. Lichtheim, op. cit, 254-55. 27 March 1914, quoted i n Mandel, op. cit, 188. O n Rida, see ibid, 45-49, 213-14; Sylvia G . H a i m , Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1964), 19-25; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939 (London, 1962), C h . 9.

33. T his section follows Mandel, ‘Attempts’ and A rabs a n d Zionism, 149f. 34. H i s Report t o V . Jacobson is reproduced, i n part, below (Document 1). C f . M a n d e l ,4 rabs and Zionism, 154-58; Cohen, op. cit., 91-95. 35. Mandel, op. cit, 158-59. 36. See hid, 159-62; Kayyali, op. cit, 30-31; Alsberg, op. cit, 195-206; Hourani, op. cit., 283-84; Cohen, op. cit., 96f. 37. Mandel, op. cit, 162-64, 169. . Ibid, C h . 9 and ‘Attempts’, 253-54. 39. Mandel, Arabs andZionism, 195, 206; Lichtheim, op. cit, 254-55. R o i , op. cit, 216-18; Cohen, op. cit, 108. 41, Mandel, ‘Attempts’, 254-55. 42. M a n d e l , Arabs and Zionism, 172f., 204f.; Porath, op. cit, 26-27; Kayyali, op. cit, 31-33.

. Mandel, op. cit, 217-20; P o r a t h , op. cit, 28-29; Kayyali, op. cit, 33-36. Mandel, op. cit, 179-80; Ro’i, ‘Attempts’, 209; Lichtheim, op. cit, 253; Assaf, op. cit, 76; Kayyali, op. cit, 38-39. . Mandel, op. cit, 182-85; Kayyali, op. cit, 37-38. M a n d e l (Arabs and Zionism, 203f.) notes t h a t ‘wo separate sets o f

arrangments were being undertaken, one centred on Cairo and the other on Syria. T h e l a t t e r o n l y i s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . O n t h e former, see Document 2, below. 47, Mandel, op. cit, 202-203. 48, Ibid, 195, 200; Cohen, op. cit, 108. 49. Mandel, op. cit, 202-203, 205. 50. 3 M a y 1914, quoted i n R o ’ i , ‘Zionist Attitude’, 219. C f . Lichtheim,

quoted in Mandel, op. cit, 196. 51. Mandel, op. cit, 202, 205-206. Cf. 2b:d., 151, 195.

236

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

52. E.g., his speech t o the V.Z., 10 June 1919, CZA, J1/8777; At theParting ofOur Ways (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1939), 39; Cohen, op. cat, 110. 53. See, e.g., Caplan, PalestineJewry, 41. O n Turkish disparagement of the talks, see Mandel, op. cit, 201-202.

. Quoted in Ro’), op. cit, 231-32. 55. Taken from Mandel, op. cit, 190, 198, 206-207; Lichtheim, op. cit, 251, 255; Eisenberg, a t meeting of 1 July 1914, C Z A , L2/44; Cohen, op. cit,

109, 106. 56. While Zionists did n o t rush t o do t h i s i n order t o w i n Arab sympathy, they d i d make such efforts on two other occasions: (1) I n 1908, t o increase t h e number o f eligible voters in t h e Turkish e l e c t i o n s , and (2) after t h e outbreak o f W o r l d War I , t o a v o i d expulsion from Palestine

as ‘enemy aliens’. 57. Only Ascher Saphir’s 1911 reports spoke of Arabs who were willing t o grant some form o f national-cultural autonomy t o the Jews. H i s 1913 reports refer t o

Arab

expectations t h a t t h e Jews w o u l d become

‘good

Syrians’. See Saphir, Unity or Partition? (Jerusalem, 1937), 16-17; Cohen,

op. cit, 85; Mandel, op. cit., 187. 58. R o ’ i op. cit, 219. Cf. ibid, 214, 219-20; Cohen, op. cit, 98, 109; Lichtheim, op. cit., 255; Mandel, op. cit, 198, 207.

Op. cit, 214. Cf. Lichtheim, op. cit, 251; Laqueur, op. cit, 229. Ro’i, op. cit, 219-20; Lichtheim, op. cit., 255; Cohen, op. cit, 101. Chapter 2 — Post War Diplomacy . For various views of this turning point, see: Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine (London, 1978), chs. 1-3; A n n Moseley Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939 (Ithaca/London, 1979), 32-35; Porath, Emergence, ch. 1.

On

t h e place o f national

self-determination

in

t h e post-war discus-

sions, see Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine:A Study of Jewish, Arab, andBritish Policies (New Haven, 1947),1, 213f.

. M . Sykes t o Graham, 8 May 1917, Public Record Office [hereafter: PRO] FO 371/3053, file W44/93349/84173; same t o Clayton, 16 November 1917, M i d d l e East Centre, Private Papers Collection, St

Antony’s College [hereafter: MEC], S (Sledmere Papers); Letters and of Chaim Weizmann, series A : L e t t e r s [hereafter: LCW] v o l . VII,

Papers

344f., 407, 453, 489; Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, 23f. Flapan, op. cit, 45. T h e French, for t h e i r p a r t , were n o t i d l e , b u t were

Arab f a c t i o n s in s u p p o r t o f a Frenchs p o n s o r e d A r a b confederation w h i c h w o u l d have left F a i s a l a n d t h e British o u t i n the cold. I n the end, however, it would be the British-sponsored Hashemites w h o w o u l d win t h e battle for s t a t u s a n d s t i m u l a t i n g anti-Hashemite

credibility i n early 1919. Flapan, op. cit, 23-24, 35f.; Eliezer Livneh, Aaron Aaronsohn: The Man and

His Times (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1969), ch. 15. The Sledmere Papers and t h e papers o f C a p t a i n William Y a l e are drawn u p o n by these authors.

NOTES

237

©©

Porath, op. cit., 31-39, 123-25; Kayyali, Palestine, 43-59; Lesch, op. cit. 84-88; Wasserstein, op. cit, 36.

Caplan, Palestine

Jewry, 17.

Ibid, 16-17. . I n 1921, the Z . C . became the Palestine Zionist Executive (P.Z.E.) which itself was reconstituted as the Jewish Agency Executive (J.A.E.) after 1929. 10. See Document 3, below; meeting of ca. 1 April 1918, CZA, Z4/538;

Ormsby-Gore

to

Balfour, 7 April 1918, PRO, FO 371/3394, file

W44/83691/11053; L C W V I I I , 111; Antonius, Arab Awakening, 269f.; Aaron Aaronsohn, Diary 1916-1919 (Heb.) ( T e l A v i v , 1970), 384;

Flapan, op. cit, 24, 40; Jon Kimche, Palestine or Israel (London, 1973), 166. C f . Sulaiman Nasif t o Yale, 15 February 1939, M E C / Y , 1/6. 11. See Document 4, below. 12. CZA, L4/392/1. Cf. LCW VIII, 102, 137f; Flapan, op. cit, 40, 56;

Caplan, op. cit, 18; A. L . Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921 (London, 1978), 266f.

13. Z.C. meeting, 13 April 1918, CZA, L3/285; Weizmann speech,

Jerusalem Governate, 27 April 1918, i n Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, series B : Papers [hereafter: PCW], vol. I , doc. 42; OrmsbyGore t o Military Governor, Jaffa, 7 M a y 1918, C Z A , L4/58/I; Ormsby-Gore t o Balfour, 19 April 1918, P R O , F O 371/3395, file W44/86912/11053; Clayton t o Balfour, 16 J u n e 1918, :b:d., file W44/130342/11053; Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London, 1943), 341; M o s h e P e r l m a n n , “Chapters o f Arab-Jewish D i p l o m a c y , 1918-1922”,

Jewish Social Studies V I (1944), 131-32; W a l i d Khalidi (ed.), From Haven to Conquest (Beirut, 1971), 183-90; Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, 137f.; Kimche, op. cit., 168-73; Tibawi, op. cit., 269-71. 14. LCW VIII, 171; Tibawi, op. cit., 270-71. 15. Z.C. meeting, 13 April 1918 (n.13); Kimche, op.cit., 172-73. 16. S e e Document 14, below, for a n e x t r a c t o f t h e n o t e s o f t h e m e e t i n g w i t h M u s a Kazim, 8 October 1919. 17. See Mandel, Arabs and Zionism, 152f., 199, 206-207, below, pages 115f. 18. L C W VIII, 202, 205; Caplan, op. cit., ch. 9; D . E . K n o x , “Weizmann’s First Visit t o Palestine”, Wiener Library Bulletin XXVIII (1975; new series nos. 33/34), 11-12; Flapan, op. cit, 56f. 19. LCW VIII, 130 (16 April 1918). Cf. Neil Caplan, “Britain, Zionism

and the Arabs, 1917-1925”, Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 6-7; Flapan, op. cit., 56-57, 59-60. 20. Sykes t o C l a y t o n , 1 4 November 1 9 1 7 , M E C / S ; s a m e t o A r a b Committee (Cairo), 16 November 1917, loc. cit.; same t o Clayton, 1

December 1917, PRO, FO 371/3054, file W44/234304/86526; Hogarth message t o K i n g Husain, 4 January 1918, q u o t e d i n Esco, Palestine 1, 191; S y k e s t o S y r i a n Welfare Committee, 15 February 1918, PRO, FO 371/3398, file W44/27647/27647; Flapan, op. cit, 34f. 21. I C W VIII, 202; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 167-68; Wasserstein, op. cut, 12-13; Flapan, op. cit, 3 2 f , 3 6 f , 3 8 f , 35-56; Weizmann, M e m o of

Appointment with Sykes, 9 March 1917, W A .

238

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

22. R u s t u m Haidar (one of Faisal’s Secretaries at the Peace Conference), q u o t e d in Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-1939: From the Papers of Akram Zuaytir [ hereafter: DPNM] (Beirut, 1979),

An Arab View (London, 1966), 228-31 520-22; S. Musa, T. E. Lawrence:

(quoting Awni Abd al-Hadi, another of Faisal’s Secretaries); A . L . T i b a w i , “ T . E . Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann”, Royal Central Aswan

Journal LVI (1969), 156-63. Cf. Porath, Emergence, p. 89. 23. C . Weizmann, Trial and Error (London, 1949), 294, 306-09, Perlmann, “Chapters”, 132-48; Flapan, op. cit., 31-55. Cf. N . Caplan, “Faisal I b n Husain and the Zionists,” International History Review (forthcoming). 24. L C W VIII, 205. Cf. Knox, loc. cit.; Flapan, op. cit., 33; Kimche, op. cit. 166. 25. Document 5, below; cf. PCW I , doc. 44. For another version of the June 4 t h meeting, see Document 6, below. 26. Meeting of 11 December 1918, Document 7, below; cf. LCW IX, 69-71. See also Faisal’s interview i n The Times, 12 December 1918, and his

banquet speech o f 21December 1918, CZA, Z4/56. 27. Document 8 , b e l o w . 28. D . H . Miller, M y Diary at the Conference of Paris, vol. X I V (New York,

1924), 230. Cf. zb:d., IV, 298f.; J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London, 1969), 113; E l i e Kedourie, England and the Middle East (London, 1956/1978), 152; Esco, Palestine 1, 138. For the view that Faisal d i d not set Palestine aside from his global demands, see: Musa, op. cit., 224f.; Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations, 342f.

29. O n W e i z m a n n ’ s efforts t o a n n u l t h e Sykes-Picot agreement, see LCW VIII, 230 and IX, 4, 63, 70. O n arrangements for an interview between Faisal and President Wilson, see: Aaronsohn, Dury, 471, 475; Nevakivi, op.cit., 134(n).; Flapan, op. cit., 45. O n the possibility of a loan, see: Clayton report, Document 5, below; L C W IX, 12-13, 15; Flapan, op. cit., 42f. 30. Cf. Perlmann, op. cit., 133-41; Musa, op. cit., 230f. 31. Documents 10 and 11, below; Perlmann, op. cit., 139; Frankfurter t o

Weisgal, 3 December 1929, CZA, S25/3142; LCW XIV, 138, 146f.; Flapan, op. cit., 46; Cohen, op. cit., 143f.; Musa, op. cit., 229f. (quoting Awni Abd al-Hadi); Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations, 348f; Esco, op. cit., 204f. 32. Porath, op. c i t , 88f.; Lesch, op. cit., 133; Kayyali, op. cit., 68; Esco, op. c i t , 142f.; Flapan, op. cit., 47, 59; M u s a K a z i m al-Husaini, quoted below, Document 14. 33. Document 9, below. For other evidence of Faisal’s uneasiness about British and French intentions a t this time, see: Yale-Faisal interview, 13 February 1919, MEC/Y, 1 / 4 ; Faisal reception ofyishuv Delegation, 15 A p r i l 1919, CZA, J1/8791 (Eisenberg report, 28 M a y 1919). . J. N. C a m p , “ A r a b M o v e m e n t a n d Z i o n i s m ” , 12 August 1919, i n Documents on British Foreign Policy [ h e r e a f t e r : DBFP], First S e r i e s , vol.

TV,

ed. E . L . Woodward and R . Butler (London, 1952), 364-65. 35. A b u Khaldun Sati al-Husari, The Day o f Maysalun, transl. S. Glazer

(Washington, 1966), 136. Cf. Cohen, op. cit., 157; Kayyali, op. cit., 69.

NOTES

239

36. L C W IX, 199f. 37. O n the increasingly “false position” Faisal found himself i n a t this time, see Yale interviews w i t h Rustum H a i d a r (30 September) and Faisal (2 October 1919), M E C / Y , 1/5. 38. L TX, 222f., 230; Flapan, op. cit., 48f.; DBFP TV, 421f. 39. Document 13, below. Cf. Perlmann, op. cit., 143-45; Flapan, op. cit., 49. 40. T h e interview discussed here (19 October) is reproduced below, Document

15. O t h e r

episodes i n c l u d e : Herbert Samuel-Faisal inter-

view, 15 October 1919, C Z A , L 3 U / 2 7 ; Hyamson to Weizmann, 18 October 1919, Z 4 / 1 6 0 1 5 ; same t o Sokolow, 30 O c t o b e r 1919, loc. cit.; L e v i n (Balfour D a y greetings), 31 O c t o b e r 1919, S o k o l o w - F a i s a l meetings, 14 a n d 15 N o v e m b e r 1919, Z4/25002; Faisal t o Samuel, 23 November 1919, Z4/25001I; same t o

Faisal

to

Sh.

Z4/25001/I;

same, 10 December 1919, ISA 100/5. Cf. Z O . Political Ctee meetings,

6 and 7 November 1919, CZA, L3/310; Cohen, op. cu.,Pa 161f; Perlmann, op. cit., 143f147; Caplan, “Faisal I b n Husain”. 41. See notes 26 and 31, above. 42. Sokolow-Fisal interviews, 14-15 November 1919 (n.40). Perlmann, op. cit., 147. . T i b a w i , “ T . E . Lawrence”, 160f. 45. Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 33f., 48f., 55f.; Kayyali, op. cit, 70-77; Lesch, Arab Politics, 200-04. 46. al-Husari, op. c i t , 138-40; Z e i n e N. Z e i n e , The Struggle for A r a b Independence (Beirut, 1960), 138. 47. DBFP XIII, ed. R . Butler and J . P . T . Bury (London, 1963), 221, 223,

224f., 233; S. Felman reports, 23 April, 10 and 28 June 1920, CZA, Z4/16078. 48. DBFP XIII, 223, 231, 233f. 49, Ibid, 284f.; cf. draft (mistakenly? dated 8 M a y ) i n EC/F(S) and :b:d,, 255f. 50. U n d a t e d draft tgm., i n F a i s a l ’ s h a n d , MEC/F(S). 51. DBFP XIII, 257f. and draft in MEC/F(S). Cf. 161d, 285; Zuaytir, DPNM, 36. 52. Izzat Darwaza, quoted i n Porath, Emergence, 89. 33. Eder t o Weizmann, 14 March 1920, CZA, Z4/16078. 54. Loc. cit; Felman report, 22 January 1920, loc. cit. and those cited i n n.47, above; Hoofien t o Weizmann, 15 M a r c h 1920, loc. cut. Cf. Ben-Avi, With the Dawning, 443; Flapan, op. cit, SOf., 53, 60; Kedourie, op. cit, 158f.; al-Husari, op. cit, 128; Zeine, op. cit, 159. 55. Felman reports (n. 47); LCW IX, 350, 355; Flapan, op.cit., 54. 56. Eder t o Weizmann, 9 August 1920, C Z A , Z4/16031; Eder-Samuel interview, 9 August 1920, L3/222. Cf. Cohen, op. cit, 162; Flapan, op.cit., 5 4 .

57. LCW XIV, 207. 58. Below, pages 49, 52, 58, 103f.; sources cited i n n.23 t o Chapter 3; Document 28, below; PCW I I , docs. 22 and 39; D . Ben-Gurion,My Talks

with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem/New York, 1972), 4f., 208f.

240

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Ww

—h

Chapter 3 — High-LevelMeetings Caplan,PalestineJewry, 64-72. 2. Ibid., 79-83; Zuaytir,DPNM, 64-72; Kayyali, Palestine, 91-94. O n the riots, see: Caplan, op. cit, 85-87; Lesch, Arab Politics, 204-07; Wasserstein, British in Palestine,

101f.; Z u a y t i r , DPNM, 72-76; Kayyali,

eS

op. cit, 95-97, Caplan, op. cit, 98-105. Ibid., 63f. Leonard Stein, quoted in :b:d., 97f. Samuel t o Weizmann, 10 August 1921, CZA, Z4/16151. Report of the XIIth Zionist Congress (London, 1922), 150. Cf. Caplan, op. cit, 114-17. O n the activities of the A r a b Delegation i n London, see: Zuaytir,

DPNM, 88-97, 105-57, 173-92, 196-241, 247-49, 274, 284-348; Porath, Emergence, 137-47; Lesch, op. cit, 158-64; Kayyali, op. cit, 101-4, 10. O n t h e confused circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e meeting, see: Zuaytir, DPNM, 123, 1 2 5 f . 128, 131, 178, 183; LCW X ,

295; M . Mossek, Palestine Immigration Policy under Sir Herbert Samuel (Cass, London, 1978), 54f.; Lesch, op. cit, 161f. 11. Documents 18(a), 18(b) and 18(c), below. 12. E r i c Mills comments, Document 18(a). 13. Letter to W i l h a m Yale, 9 February 1962, M E C / Y , 1/6. I t should be n o t e d t h a t J a m a l ’ s c o l o u r e d account was second-hand, as h e h a d n o t personally a t t e n d e d t h e meeting. 14, LCW X , 328. Cf. h i s r e p o r t t o Z.E., L o n d o n m e e t i n g , 29 November

1921, CZA, Z4302/6; P C W I, doc. 65; below, Document 19. 15. LCW X , 318; n o t e s o f conversations w i t h members of the A r a b Delegation, 16 January and 2 February 1922, W A . I n Palestine, D r E d e r h a d been active i n c o n t a c t i n g A r a b s t o prepare t h e ground for a

possible breakthrough i n London. See his letters t o Weizmann, 13

November 1921 (CZA, Z4/2701/V) and 11 December 1921 (WA); Ben-Avi, With the Dawning, 416f.; Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians,

62f. 16. Porath, op. cit, 64-67; Zuaytir, DPNM, 125f., 131, 178; below, pages

105f. F o r t h e pre-War r o o t s o f t h i s a p p r o a c h , see M a n d e l , Arabs and Zionism, 207. 17. Porath, op. cit, 147-58, 169-78; Lesch, op. cit., 179-87; Zuaytir, DPNM, 309-13; Kayyali, op. cat, 111-23; Caplan, op. cit., ch.8. . Porath, op. cit, 108-10; Kayyali, op. c i t , 87-90; Lesch, op. cit, 90f; Zuaytir, DPNM, 118-20, 145-47; below, page 121. 19. C m d . 1700 (British Statement of Policy, and correspondence w i t h Palestine Arab Delegation

and

with

Z.O.),

r e p r o d u c e d i n p a r t i n The

Israel-Arab Reader, ed. Walter Laqueur ( 3 r d ed., New York, 1976), doc. 12; Zuaytir,DPNM, 271-74, 289-34, 296-306.

20. Cf. below, page 121. 21. LCW IX, 256. Cf. Weizmann, Trial and Error, 294. 22. S t e i n t o Kisch, 12 June 1923, CZA, Z4/16061; Jabotinsky t o Kisch, 31

NOTES

23.

24.

25. 26.

241

December 1922, S25/2073: Jacobson, quoted i n Ro’i, “Zionist A t t i t u d e ” , 219. W e i z m a n n - S h u c k b u r g h interview, 10 January 1922, Z4/16145; Shuckburgh t o Weizmann, 7 February 1922, PRO, C O 733/18, file 4804; L C W X I I , 409, 412f., 425; ibid X I V , 307, 361, 364f.; ibid, X V , 53; below, page 104; below, Document 28. Weizmann became fond, in later years, of referring t o his ‘‘lifelong friendship” w i t h Faisal. See: Trial and Error, 294; LCW XVI, 45f.; Ben-Gurion, M y Talks, 208f. Joseph Nevo, Abdallah and the Palestinian Arabs (Heb.) (Tel A v i v , 1975), 11-26, and his ‘ A b d a l l a h and the Arabs of Palestine’, Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 51f. Caplan, op. cit, 172, 246; W . Kazziha, “The Political Evolution of Transjordan”, MiddleEastern Studies X V (1979), 250. I have found n o records of the Weizmann-Abdallah talks i n the C Z A o r M E C / P . W h a t follows is pieced together from the following sources:

Z . E . , L o n d o n meeting, 26 October 1922, C Z A , Z4/302/7; WeizmannShuckburgh interview, 9 November 1922, Z4/16135; Stein-Philby conversations, 4 and 27 December 1922, Z 4 / 1 3 9 2 / I I - b and Z4/16135;

LCW XI, 193f.; Falastin, 13 February 1923, Eng. transl. in Z4/1392/II-b; ha-Aretz, 27 February 1923; M . Medzini, Ten Years of Palestine Politics (Heb.) (Tel A v i v , 1928), 233f.; Esco, Palestine I , 570f.; Perlmann, “Chapters”, 152; Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, 190f.; N e v o À , bdallah, 13; Elizabeth Monroe, Philby ofArabia (London, 1973), 125f. 27. Falastin, 13 February 1923 (n. 26); Anis Sa’igh, The Hashemites and the Palestine Question (Ac.) (Beirut, 1966), 124. 28. Caplan, op. cit., 172-78.

V . L . Meeting, 2-3 January 1923, CZA, J1/7226. 30. Kisch t o Weizmann, 9 January 1923, Z4/16049. Cf. LCW XI, 237f., 240; Kisch letters t o Stein (9 January) and t o Weizmann (10 January 1923), Z4/16049; Kisch t o Z . E , London, 12 December 1922, 74/4113; Kisch remarks, V . L . meeting, 9 M a y 1 9 2 3 , J1/7226. 31. R e p o r t o n Visit t o Palestine, 15 February 1923, PRO, C O 733/62, file 9354. Cf. Stein t o P h i l b y , 26 M a r c h 1923, C Z A , Z4/16135; Sharett, Political Diary 1,211; b e l o w , page

114.

32. Weizmann-Shuckburgh interview, 9 November 1922 (n.26); SteinShuckburgh interview, 19 January 1923, Z4/16135; Samuel conversations w i t h Palestinian leaders, 11 and 15 February 1923, PRO, C O 733/43, file 10145. H . St. J o h n Philby seems t o have been the only B r i t i s h backer o f t h e scheme. See: first t w o sources c i t e d i n t h i s note;

Perlmann, op. cit, 152f. 33. Nevo, Abdallah, 13f.; Caplan, op.cit., 173f. 34. F.H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London, 1938), 93-100, 103-06; Sa’igh, op.cit., 125f.; Caplan, op.cit., 179-81; K i s c h t o Z . E . , London, 6 February 1924, C Z A , Z4/Z421; Jacobs t o Kisch, 18 M a r c h 1924, loc. cit.; Kisch t o Stein, 15 April 1926, Z4/4112; below, pages 105f. 35. E.g., Abdallah t o Chancellor, 5 October 1929, a “private’’ letter which

242

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

the Amir allowed t o be published in the local press. See: Chancellor t o Passfield, 24 November 1929, Rhodes House, Chancellor Papers (hereafter: R H / C ) , 11/4; al-Jami’a al-A rabiyya, 14 October 1929, Eng.

summary i n C Z A Z4/4112. 36. R iad seems t o have been a m o n g the A r a b s w h o t o o k part i n talks w i t h Zionist representatives as early as 1911. Ben-Avi held a very high opinion o f h i m (With the Dawning, 417, 451; Diary, O c t . 1922, C Z A ,

S25/905), while Chief Secretary Wyndham Deedes regarded him as a “very slippery c u s t o m e r ” (according t o E d e r t o W e i z m a n n , 27 November 1921, Z4/16151). P . Z . E . Treasurer, S . A . van Vriesland, considered

Riad

t o b e o n l y “financially

interested

i n friendly

rela-

tions” (letter t o Weizmann, 22 November 1922, W A ) , while BenGurion a p p a r e n t l y i n c l u d e d h i m a m o n g t h e t r u e A r a b p a t r i o t s w h o

could not be bought (My Talks, 18). C f . K i s c h t o Weizmann, 3 January 1923, CZA, Z4/16119; van Vriesland t o Kalvaryski, 3 M a y 1923, S25/10296. 37. Weizmann report, Z . E . , London meeting, 24-25 October 1921, C Z A , Z4/302/6; PCW I , doc. 65; Ben-Avi, op. cit, 417f; A.S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World (Baltimore/London, 1970), 198f.; Porath, op. cat, 112. 38. Document 17, below. 39. Documents 20, 21, 22 a n d 23, below. C f . Cohen, op.cit., 184-88; Esco, Palestine I , 564-70. O n the Syrian U n i o n Party, see: Zuaytir, DPNM, 222, 227f., Sulaiman Nasif t o Yale, 15 February 1939, M E C / Y , 1/6; Porath, op.cit., 113, 115f; Philip S. Khoury, “Factionalism among S y r i a n Nationalists

d u r i n g t h e F r e n c h M a n d a t e ” , International

Jour-

n a l of M i d d l e East Studies XIII (1981), 443-52. 40. Eder t o Weizmann, telegram and letter dated 19 M a r c h 1922, C Z A , Z4/16056. Cf. Eder t o Z . E . , 6 J u n e 1922, Z4/1392/II-a. 41, C Z A (no file no.). 42. L C W XI, 75, 80, 83. C f . Document 22, below. 43. 5 July 1922, quoted i n Porath, op. cit, 114. 44. L C W XI, 83-84, 87, 106; Eder t o Weizmann, 26 April 1922, C Z A , Z4/1392/II-a. 45. Eder report, P . Z . E . meeting, 26 M a r c h 1922, C Z A (n.41); R . Graham t o Curzon, 29 March 1922, P R O , F O 371/7773, file E3559/65/65; L C W XI, 83. Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 18 A p r i l 1922, CZA, Z4/16056. C f . same t o Stein, 11 A p r i l 1922, loc. cit.; Stein t o Weizmann, 6 April 1922, W A ; same to same (tgm.), 18 April 1922, C Z A , Z4/1392/IT-a. 47. Deedes t o Churchill, 8June 1922, ISA 2/145. . E d e r t o Weizmann, 20 M a y 1922, C Z A , Z4/16056. Cf. same t o same

(tgm.), 21 March 1922, loc. cit; same t o same, 26 April 1922, Z 4 / 1 3 9 2 / I l - a ; same t o Z . E . , 6 J u n e 1922, loc.cit.; same t o W e i z m a n n ,

21 J u n e 1922, W A . 49. L C W XI, 106. 50. Stein t o Eder, 1 J u n e 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/H-a; Stein t o Kisch, 2

January 1923, Z4/16049.

243

NOTES

A further complication was the pan-Islamic propaganda alleging a Jewish threat t o the M u s l i m holy places of Palestine. See: Porath, op.cit., 264; Lesch, op.cit., 138; Caplan, op.cit., 123.

51. S o k o l o w t o S t e i n , 5 M a y 1 9 2 2 , C Z A , Z 4 / 1 3 9 2 / I L - a ; same t o Weizmann, 6 June 1922, W A . Cf. Wormser’s fears regarding the November 1921 preliminaries t o these talks (letter t o James de Rothschild, 12

November 1921, CZA, Z4/16055); Sokolow

to

Weizmann, 8 April

1922, Z4/16145; Ben-Gurion, My Talks, 50.

52. E d e r t o Z . E . (tgm.), 22 J u l y 1 9 2 2 , Z 4 / 1 0 5 3 . C f . E d e r t o Z . E . , 23 July, same t o Stein, 26 July, and same t o Z . E . , 30 J u l y 1922, loc.cit.; Stein t o Eder, 7 J u l y 1922, S25/4782, Sokolow t o Weizmann, 14 July 1922, Z4/16145. 53. Documents 24, 25 and 26, below. See also: LCW XI, 166-68, 174; Kalvaryski t o Weizmann, 4 August 1922, W A ; Saphir t o Weizmann, 21 September 1922, C Z A , Z4/16145; Kalvaryski t o Weizmann, 29 November 1922, W A ; same t o Sokolow, 30 November 1922, C Z A , S25/10295; same t o same, 2 December 1922, Z4/1392/11-b; K i s c h ,

Palestine Diary, 46f.; Perlmann, op.cit, 151; Cohen, op.cit., 188f. 54. B e n H a l p e r n , The Idea of theJewish State ( C a m b r i d g e , 1961), 331.

Chapter 4 — Grass-Roots Contacts . À m o r e d e t a i l e d v e r s i o n o f t h i s C h a p t e r a p p e a r e d as “Arab-Jewish

Contacts i n Palestine After the First World War”, Jnl of Contemporary History XII (1977), 635-68, w i t h a Hebrew version i n ha-Mizrah he-Hadash XXVII (1977), 18-45. . Z . C . meeting, 7 December 1919, C Z A , L 4 / 6 5 / V ; History of the Hagana [hereafter: HH], ed. Benzion D i n u r e t al. (Tel A v i v 1964), vol. I p t . 2, 664; E . Dekel, Shai: The Exploits ofHagana (London, 1959), chs. 1 , 5 and 6. E.g., S. Felman, Damascus report, 28 January 1920, C Z A , Z4/25082. . I S A , file 2/30; Zionist Bulletin (London), 21 A p r i l and 6 August 1920;

V.L.E.-Z.C. joint

meeting,

J1/6282; petition , 23 March 1 9 2 1CZA,

to

Churchill, 29 M a r c h 1921, PRO, OO 733/2, file 21698; Porath, Emergence, 227-28; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 130. See, e.g., Kisch, Palestine Diary, 29, 47, 52f., 74. A t one time or another during the Mandate period, al-Akhbar, Lissan al-Arab and Murat ash-Sharg were receiving Zionist subsidies. See also Kayyali, Palestine, 85. K i s c h t o Weizmann, 23 April 1931, W A . C f . same t o Warburg, 7 J u l y

1930, C Z A , S25/3053; below, page 95.

For details, see Caplan, “A rab-Jewish Contacts”, 639. Details i n :b:d., 640; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 136-40; ChancellorRutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, RH/C, 14/2; Rutenberg proposals, below, pages 101f. and Document 35; material on Palestine Potash Works i n Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People [hereafter: CAHJP], file P3/2426; van Vriesland t o Kalvaryski, 20 M a y 1 9 3 0 ,CZA, A113/47. E.g., L . Stein, “Situation i n Palestine, August 1921”, PRO, C O

244

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

733/16, file 52260; Y . H . C a s t e l , “ R e : T h e Solution o f the A r a b Question i n Palestine”, 16 August 1921, W A ; S. Tolkowsky, “ T h e A r a b Problem i n Palestine”, 24 August 1921, W A ; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 98-104, 127-33; L C W X I , 232-35; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 49f. 10. See Caplan, “Arab-Jewish C o n t a c t s ” , 641-47. 11. Samuel t o Churchill, 18 November 1921, P R O , C O 733/7, file 59565; Kayyali, op.cit., 106; Lesch, Arab Politics, 51-52, 93-94, 97; Porath, op.cit., 220. 12. L C W XI, 221; Caplan, “ B r i t a i n , Zionism and the Arabs”, 12-13; Porath, op.cit., 220-21. . K i s c h t o W e i z m a n n , 5 December 1923, C Z A , Z4/16050. Cf. same t o

same, 16 November 1923, loc.cit.; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 87. 14. Memoirs, Diaries, Letters, ed. A l e x B e i n (London, 1970), 258. C f . Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York, 1971), 179; Moshe

Dayan, in The Israel-Arab Reader, 440. 15. C a p l a n , “Arab-Jewish Contacts”, 635-37. 16. Document 12, below. 17. F o r a fuller account o f V . Z . reactions, see Caplan, “Arab-Jewish Contacts”, 650-51, and Palestine Jewry, 41-43. 18. A t the Parting, 33. Cf. Cohen, Israel a n d the Arab World, 157. 19. V . Z . meeting, 10 J u n e 1919, CZA, J1/8777; Kalvaryski t o Yellin, 25 a n d 31 August 1919, A153/149; same t o Eder, 28 August 1919, loc.cit. . A t the Parting, 3 3 ; Cohen, op.cit., 174.

21. S. Felman, Damascus report, 28 January 1920 (n.3); M . Assaf, The A r a b Awakening in Palestine (Heb.) ( T e l A v i v , 1967), 89. 22, Report t o S y r i a n C o n g r e s s , 17 June 1920; H e b r e w t r a n s l a t i o n m a d e b y E l i a h u Sasson, who obtained a copy of the original Arabic report i n J u l y 1941, CZA, S25/3115. 23. Felman reports, 20 and 28 June 1920, Z4/16078. 24. See Document 16, below. 25. Felman t o Eder, 21 February 1920, L3/278. 26. Sfeir t o Weizmann, 3 M a y 1920, Z4/16078; Eder t o Weizmann, 17

May 1920, Z4/16033; LCW I X , 359-60. Weizmann

later

referred

to

S f e i r as “ i n t e l l i g e n t , has ideas, very neurotic, always wants lots o f

money and becomes very unpleasant i f he cannot get i t . ” L C W X V , 222, 27. Kalvaryski t o Sokolow, 2 December 1922, C Z A , Z4/1392/11-b. Cf. sources cited i n n.53, ch.3, above. 28. Sokolow t o Kalvaryski, 4 December 1922, S25/10320; Kalvaryski t o Political Department, Z . E . , 12 A p r i l 1923, Z4/1392/II-b; same t o same, 26 A p r i l 1923, S25/10296; K i s c h to Stein, 30 April 1923,

Z4/16049; Kalvaryski t o Political Department, Z.E., 18 July 1923, S25/10296. Cf. Document 27, b e l o w ; Porath, op.cit., 67-69; L e s c h , op. c i t , 52; L C W XI, 250f. Kayyali (op. cit, 130) describes M u s a Kazim’s attitude i n late 1923 as “moderate”. . Kisch t o Weizmann, 20 J u n e 1923 ( “ V e r y Secret”), C Z A , Z4/16050; K isch, Palestine Diary, 60-67; Kisch-Sulaiman Nasif interview, 8 J u n e 1923, W A ; Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z . E . , 11 J u n e 1923,

245

NOTES T O PAGES

CZA, S25/10296; Kisch t o Stein, 13 J u n e 1923, Z4/16035; K alvaryski t o Political D e p a r t m e n t ,

Z.E., 3 August 1923, Z4/1392/II-b; Lesch, op.

cit, 185-86; Caplan, ‘“Arab-Jewish Contacts”, 655.

30. Kisch t o Weizmann, 20 June 1923 (n.29); Kalvaryski t o

Department, Z.E., 24 June 1923, S25/4793; same

to

Political

same, 26 June

1923, Z4/2421; K i s c h t o Stein, 27 J u n e 1923, Z4/16035; same t o same, 5 October 1923, Z4/16050; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 65, 67. 31. Porath, op. cit, 169-72. 32. Tolkowsky, Kalvaryski and Dizengoff t o Z.E., 4 March 1921, C Z A , ZA /1366. See also Tolkowsky t o inner Executive, Z O . , 7 J u l y 1921, loc. cit. 33. V . L . meeting, 16 M a y 1921, J1/7224; Z . E . L o n d o n meeting, 22 March 1921, Z4/302/6. 34. E . g , Aaron Aaronsohn, Arab Bulletin, 27 September 1917, 391; Moshe Smilansky, quoted i n Ben-Gurion, M y Talks, 77-79; Rutenberg, quoted below, n.127 t o ch.5; Weizmann, i n interview w i t h Chancellor, 20 M a r c h 1931, RH/C, 14/4; L C W I X , 257, 359f. C f . Caplan, “ A r a b Jewish Contacts”, 656-58. 35. E.g., LCW VIII, 137f. and XIV, 329; M . Miller t o Kisch, 11 April 1923, CZA, S25/518; Porath, op. cit, 67-69 and “The Land Problem i n Mandatory Palestine”, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 1 (Fall, 1976), 23-25. 36. Cmd. 1989; Zuaytir, DPNM, 309-13; Lesch, op. cit, 179-87; Caplan, PalestineJewry, 161-64. 37. Kisch report, 25 July 1926, CZA, S25/3252; Chancellor diary, 15 N o v e m b e r 1929 (reporting conversation w i t h M u s a K a z i m a l

Husaini and Yaqub Farraj), RH/C, 16/3; Kayyali, op. cit, 136f; Lesch, op. cit., 187-90; Wasserstein, British in Palestine, 152. 38. O n Jamal a l - H u s a i n i ’ s suggestions, see: K i s c h t o S t e i n , 7 November 1924, Z 4 / 2 4 2 1 ; K a l v a r y s k i t o Rothschild, 4 February 1925,

A113/25/1; Kalvaryski report, V.L.E.

meeting,

16 April 1925,

A 153/152-a; Lesch, op. cit, 188. 39. Kalvaryski l a t e r c l a i m e d t h a t h e h a d opposed t h e proposals. See E. Rubinstein, “ T h e 1928 Questionnaire on the A r a b Question”, i n Essays in the History of Zionism (Heb.), ed. Y . Bauer et al. (Jerusalem,

1976), 329. Samuel, n o t e

o f interviews w i t h Kalvaryski

a n d S u l a i m a n Nasif,

17

March [1925], ISA 100/10. 41. See: Kisch, Palestine Diary, 234; K i s c h t o Stein, 1 December 1926, C Z A , S25/668; 2 memoranda on municipal elections [April 1927], loc. cat.

42, Kisch, n o t e of meeting w i t h Jamil al-Husaini and Jamal al-Husaini,

11 January 1927, loc. cit. 43, G. Frumkin, The Way of a Jerusalem Judge (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1954),

280f., 287-90. Cf. Porath, op.cit., 238-40. Porath, op.cit., 239. 45. Frumkin, op.cit., 289. 46. R a g h i b received 1152 A r a b votes (plus 1196 Jewish votes), against Jamal’s 1032 A r a b votes (plus 33 Jewish votes).

246

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

47. Porath, op.cit., 247, 253, 272-73, 308-309; Wasserstein, op.cit, 154-56; Lesch, op.cit., 188-91.

48. See Kalvaryski, At the Parting, 34f.; Cohen, op.cit., 265; Porath, op,cit.,

253, 365. 49. Congress resolutions i n Zuaytir, DPNM, 321f. O n the Congress, see:

K alvaryski report, [June/July] 1928, CZA, S25/4210; Kayyali, op.cat., 137; Lesch, op.cit., 99-101. I t should be noted that the resolutions of all previous Congresses were clearly anti-Zionist. C f . below, page 121. 50. Falastin, 13 July 1928 (Eng. translation in S25/4210); :6:d., 31 July

1928 (Eng. summary i n S25/3004). Cf. Isra”l (Cairo), 20 July 1928 (Engl. summary, loc.cit.); K i s c h m e m o , 15 August 1928, S 2 5 / 3 0 5 0 .

51. K isch memo, loc.cit. 52. Caplan, “Arab-Jewish Contacts”, 643; Hoofien t o van Vriesland, 6 J u n e 1928, S25/3004. C f . K i s c h t o Weizmann, 10 March 1930, W A . 53. Caplan, op.cit., 647-49. 54. E.g., V . L . meeting, 14 February 1923, J1/7226. Cf. Caplan, op.cit,

662. 53. S. Felman t o Weizmann, 30 January 1930, WA.

Chapter 5 — Relations in the Wake ofCrisis . O n t h e riots, see: H H I I ( 1 ) , c h . 19; Wasserstein, British in Palestine,

221-35; Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 208-12; Sykes, Cross Roads, 108-12; Esco, Palestine I I , 595-609.

. O n the legal and religious s t a t u s of the Wall and the status quo policy of the Administration, see Porath, Emergence, 258-62. Ibid, 266-67; Sykes, op.cit., 100-02; Lesch, op.cit, 208-10; Wasserstein, op.cit., 225-31.

Luke to Amery, 19 October 1928, P R O , C O 733/160, file 57540/I;

Shuckburgh

to

Chancellor, 1 January 1929, C O 733/163, file 6 7 0 1/3

29/1; Chancellor t o Shuckburgh, 12 January 1929, loc. cit.; Porath,

op.cit., 258f., 265; Kayyali, Palestine, 139. Zionists felt that one possible solution lay i n the purchase, through the delicate intermediary o f the Government, of the property giving access t o the Wall. See: Kayyali, loc.cit.; L C W XIII, 506-08, 519. ha-Aretz, 27 September 1928, Eng. summary i n P R O , C O 733/160 (n.4); H . A . Goodman t o C . T . Foxcroft, 14 December 1928, :bid., file

57040111; Ruppin, Memoirs, 243. Cf. Kalvaryski, “Open Letter t o Our M u s l i m Brothers”, al- Jami’a al-Arabiyya, 26 October 1928, reproduced i n ha-Olam, 23 November 1928, i n C Z A , A113/13. Details from: H H I I ( 1 ) , 309-11; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Commission o n the Disturbances o f August 1929, Evidence Heard ... in Open Sittings (London, 1930; Colonial N o . 48), vol. I , 270, 316, 320, 356, 482 and vol. I I , 598, 887 and Exhibits 47 and 47(a) (hereafter cited as: Shaw, Evidence); Luke, Diary of Events, 16-25 August 1929, RH/C, 12/2. C f . Kayyali, op.cit., 143; Wasserstein, op.cat., 231.

Y . E . Chelouche, Story of My Life (Heb.) ( T e l A v i v , 1930/31), 382f.; H H I I ( 1 ) , 83.

247

NOTES

S h a w , Evidence 1,

356. Cf. Ben-Zvi 1929, C Z A , J1/7232.

report,

V . L . meeting, 8

September

Sykes, Cross Roads, 113; Ben-Zvi, note of talk w i t h Tahir al-Husaini, 1 A p r i l 1930, S25/3006 (cf. below, page 98). These two sources accept t h e v i e w t h a t t h e Mufti had i n d e e d engineered t h e v i o l e n c e , while o t h e r sources m a i n t a i n t h a t s p o n t a n e o u s p o p u l a r e x c i t e m e n t and exaggerated rumours led t o a situation which t h e Mufti was powerless

t o control. See: Kayyali, op.cit., 143f.; Lesch, op.cit, 210f.; P . Mattar, “The Mufti o f Jerusalem: Muhammad A m i n al-Husayni, a Founder

of Palestinian Nationalism” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1981), ch.ITI. 10. Chelouche, op.cit., 415f.; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 262, 445. 11. H H II(1), chs. 20-22. 12. Shaw, Evidence 11, 1079, Exhibit 82; H H 1I(1), 334. A similar attempt t o issue a

joint pacifying s t a t e m e n t

was made

by

M o s h e Smilansky.

See Shaw, Evidence II, 756, E x h i b i t 117. 13. Kisch, op.cit., 253; Chelouche, op.cit., 419. 14. Prince M u h a m m a d A l i t o Chancellor, 29 August 1929, P R O , C O 733/163, file 67013/II; Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 25 September 1930,

W A , and Kalvaryski

to

Kisch, early October 1930, C Z A , S25/4142

(both re: R i a d as-Sulh); Kisch, op.cit., 317-18, 15. Document 33, below. Cf. Passfield t o Humphreys, 22 January 1930,

PRO, F O 371/14485, file E444/44/65. 16. Joint Bureau (hereafter: J.B.) Council meeting, 23 July 1930, CZA,

S25/3066. 17. Drafts for voluntary agreement o f Wailing Wall dispute (n.d.), Bentwich file, M E C ; K i s c h t o Weizmann, 19 August 1930, CZA, S25/3066; A w n i A b d alHadi t o Bentwich, 10 September 1930, A 255/622; Magnes t o Bentwich, 15 October 1930, A255/594; Chancellor diary, 5, 8 and 24 ( = 25?) October 1930, R H / C , 16/3 (see

Bibliography); Chancellor

to

Williams, 22 October 1930, PRO, C O

733/182, file 77050; Kisch, op.cit., 328-43, 392f.; Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939 (Cass, London, 1977), 7.

18. P o r a t h , op. cit, 6-8. British

O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , d a t e d 8 J u n e 1931. E s c o Foundation,

Palestine I I , 614. For reactions t o the Report, see: Zuaytir, DPNM, 354-58; E . Samuel t o Bentwich, 14 J u n e 1931, C Z A , A255/607; Porath, op. cit, 12, U . Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council 1921-1937 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, 1978),

387f, 403; Kisch, op. cit, 362, 424f. 20. K i s c h memo, 17 November 1929, C Z A , S25/9115; D . Ben-Gurion, Memoirs (Heb.), vol. I (Tel A v i v , 1971), 362-66; Ben-Gurion memo, 23 October 1929, S25/6; K i s c h t o Ben-Gurion, 13 November 1929, loc.cit.;

H H II(1), ch.25. 21. Chancellor, note of interview w i t h Sacher, 8 November 1929, P R O , C O 733/175, file 6 7 411 /TII; J . A . Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929, C Z A , S25/3050; K i s c h m e m o , 17 N o v e m b e r 1929 (n.20);

V . L . Resolutions, 13-14 November 1929, encl. i n Rutenberg t o

248

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Chancellor, 22 November 1929, PRO, loc.cit.; L C W XIV, 65, 77f., 99,

123. Cf. below, page 89. 22. Kohn, note o f conversation w i t hJ .Horowitz, 28 October 1929, W A . 23. Vaad Leumi, Documents (Heb.), ed. M . Attias (Jerusalem, 1963; 2 n d enlarged ed.), 1 6 4 ; Davar, 1 6 September 1 9 2 9 , E n g . summary, M E C / L ;

M. Beilinson, i nJews and Arabs in Palestine, eds. Enzo Sereni and R . E . Ashery (New York, 1936), 161; Chancellor tgm., 12 October 1929, i n CP 343, November 1929, PRO, loc.cit.; Chancellor, minutes of interviews, 9 and 17 October, 15 and 21 November, and 5 December 1929, RH/C, 14/1 and 2; K i s c h memo, 17 November 1929 (n.20); Kisch t o T i d h a r , 22 November 1929, C Z A , A153/162; Report of Activities of J.B. for 1930,S25/4141; Ruppin, Memoirs, 248. 24. Magnes t o Philby, 19 M a y 1930, MEC/P,X/2. . Porath, op.cit., 3; Kayyali, op.cit., 156f.; Kenneth W . Stein, The Land

Question in Mandatory Palestine, 1929-1936 (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of Michigan, 1976), ch. 4. Cf. below, page 89. 26. Cf. above, pages 49f., 54f. O n hopes for such secret talks in 1930, see: Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 14 January and 23 March 1930, W A ; Kisch t o Weizmann, 20 March 1930, C Z A , S25/3478; Porath, op. cit., 24. 27. Chancellor interview w i t h members o f P a l e s t i n e A r a b D e l e g a t i o n , 18

June 1930, RH/C, 14/3. The meeting between Jamal al-Husaini and Major Nathan led t o published reports that D r Weizmann was making o v e r t u r e s t o t h e Delegation

a n d w a s b e i n g rebuffed. T h e

Z.O. took

pains t o deny these reports. See: Kisch t o J. A. E . , London, 5 M a y 1930, C Z A , loc.cit.; Namier t o Kisch, 15 M a y 1930, loc.cit.; LCW XIV, 275. 28. D . Oliver t o B. Hubert Cooper, 2 J u n e 1930, W A ; Shaw, Evidence I I ,

572f., 741.

The

two

points which

the Zionist counsel, Sir

Boyd

M e r r i m a n , and P . Z . E . member, Harry Sacher, brought u p were (a) Awni’s legal case-work on behalf of a land-owning family proceeding w i t h the eviction of tenants, and (b) Awni’s suggestions for a n Arab-Jewish anti-British alliance. O n the former, see C Z A files

S25/3472 and S25/9783; Hankin

to

Palestine Land Development

Company, 3 December 1929, Z 4 / 3 4 4 4 / I I I ( I a m indebted t o Prof. Kenneth Stein for these references). O n the latter point, see above, pages 39, 41 and below, pages 112f. 29. Above, pages 7f. See also draft of interview of al-Ahram’s special correspondent w i t h A w n i , datelined Jaffa, 27 February 1932, ISA 6 6 / b o x 159.

30. W e i z m a n n n o t e , L u n c h e o n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h R a m s a y MacDonald and others, 28 March 1930, W A . 31. R. S a i d - R u e t e t o W e i z m a n n , 30 April 1930, WA; Magnes t o Philby, 19 M a y 1930 (n.24); Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 29 M a y 1930, W A; Lesch, op.cut., 167-69, Some informal Arab-Jewish meetings nevertheless took place. These involved A w n i A b d al-Hadi, I . Ben-Avi, B. Rubinstein, I . Sieff and D r K o h n . See: Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, loc.cit.; ShielsGoodman interview, 30 December 1930, PRO, C O 733/183, file 77050/VI. Cf. G . Sheffer, “Intentions and Results of British Policy i n Palestine: Passfield’s White

DOCUMENTS

249

Paper”, Middle Eastern Studies I X (1973), 49, 57-58. 32. Porath, op.cit., 4. For Zionist reactions t o the Report (Cmd. 3530), see:

V.L.,Documents, 169-71; Stein, op.cit, 231-34; LCW XIV, 302, 305, 306. 33. Magnes t o Philby, 19 M a y 1930 (n. 24); Rutenberg-Brodetsky-Passfield interview, 18 July 1930, CZA, J1/22. 34. Magnes t o Philby, 19 M a y 1930 (n.24); Stein, op.cit.,, 235-38, 243f., 254f. A n isolated suggestion t o use H o p e Simpson’s visit t o Palestine as a n

occasion for an Arab-Jewish round-table conference for the discussion of economic questions c a m e

from D r

Arthur Ruppin o f P.Z. E. See his l e t t e r t o

the Z .E.,London, 4 June1930, CZA, S25/3091. 35. Cmd. 3686 and Cmd. 3692, respectively. 36. L C W XIV, 387-91 and X V , 8f.; V . L . , Documents, 174f.; Sykes, op.cit., 117f.; Stein, op.cit., 259-80, 287-97; Esco Foundation, Palestine I I , 636f. Cf. Rutenberg t o M . MacDonald, 16 October 1930, W A . 37. Chancellor diary, 22 October 1930, RH/C, 16/3; Chancellor t o Passfield, 4 November 1930, PRO, C O 733/182, file 77050; Ajaj N u w a y h i d t o Oliver, 24 October 1930, W A; Lesch, op.cit.,, 170; Kayyali, op.cit., 160; Sykes, op.cit, 119; Stein, op.cit, 289-91; Kisch, Palestine Dzary, 358. 38. Diary entry, 23 October 1930, CZA, Z4/5042/1. Cf. his Palestine Diary, 358. 39. Chancellor diary, 14-15 November 1930, RH/C, 16/3; Zuaytir, DPNM, 333-54; A . W . Kayyali, Documents of the Palestiman Resistance against the

British Occupation and Zionism (AC) (Beirut, 1968), 190-228; Porath, op.cit., 31; Chancellor t o Passfield, 13 a n d 19 November 1930, PRO, CO 733/183, file 77050/D/A; Lesch, loc.cat. . 40. Kisch t o J . A . E . , London, 12 December 1930, C Z A , S 2 5 / 3 1 2 1Cf.LCW X V , 9, 24-25; NewJudaea,, November 1930. 41. Kisch t o Z.E., London, 24 February 1931, W A ; Said-Ruete t o Weizmann, 31 October 1930, W A . The overture by Abbas H i l m i (below, page 104) was apparently triggered b y t h e Passfield W h i t e Paper.

42. Chancellor diary, 24 ( = 25?) October 1930, RH/C, 16/3. Cf. his letter t o Williams, 22 October 1930, PRO, loc.cat. 43. LCW XV, 34-113 passim; Stein, op.cut., 305-15; V . L . Documents, 177. Text i n Laqueur, Israel-Arab Reader, doc. 13. Cf. Weizmann, Trial and

Error, 413-15; Kisch, Diary entry, 16 February 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/1. 45. Esco Foundation, Palestine I I , 659, 765, 769f.; Porath, op.cit., 33f,; K a y y a l i , Documents, 228-31, and Palestine 162f.; Lesch, op.cit., 170f; K i s c h t o Z . E . , L o n d o n , 24 February 1931, W A ; Chancellor diary, 16-21 February and 12 M a r c h 1931, RH/C, 16/3. 46. LCW XV, 111-12, 120, 122-23. 47. Kisch t o Z.E., London, 24 February 1931, W A ; Kisch, Diary entry, 2 March 1931, C Z A , Z 4 / 5 0 4 2 / I ; Lesch, loc.cit.; Porath, op.cit., 34-36. 48. M usa À l a m i t o Magnes, 28 February 1931, CAHJP, P3/2426. 49. M . Bailey t o C.S., 11 M a r c h 1931, PRO, C O 733/197, file 87050. Cf. Chancellor diary entries cited in n.45, above. 50. Monroe, Philby of Arabia, 103. Cf. ibid, 138-39, and Philby t o Passfield, 10 November 1929, M E C / P , X/2.

250

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

51. T o Magnes h e appears t o h a v e presented himself as a c t i n g o n behalf o f L o r d Passfield, while t o the Anglo-American Committee he claimed t o have been invited t o mediate by Jewish circles in Jerusalem. See: Magnes testimony, Committee on the A r a b Question, 10 April 1940, C Z A , S25/2993; Philby memo t o the Anglo-American Committee, 11 March 1946, M E C / P , X / 2 ; Chancellor diary, 4 November 1929, RH/C, 16/3. 52. Documents 29 and 30 below. Cf. Monroe, op.cit., 160f.; Susan Hattis-Rolef, “The Zionists and St. J o h n P h i l b y ” , Jewish Social Studies

XXXIV (1972), 110-12; Magnes testimony (n.51); Porath, op.cat., 21f. 53. N e w York Times, 24 N o v e m b e r 1929. Cf. Magnes’ response ( “ A n International Enclave”), loc.cit.; reproduced i n A . A.Goren, Dissenter in

Zion:From the Writings ofJudah L. Magnes (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), doc. 66 (cited hereafter as DZ). 54. Document 32 below. See also Document 31 for a draft of Magnes’ proposals.

55. Document 32. Cf. Philby t o Passfield, 10 November 1929 (n.50). 56. Philby t o Magnes, 20 February 1930, MEC/P,X/2. 57. I have n o t seen any A r a b sources which discuss this episode. Cf. Porath, op.cit, 21-22; Sacher memo, 11 November 1929, C Z A , S25/3050; Weizmann remarks, J . A . Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929 (n.21). 58. Weizmann speech, Albert H a l l , 1 September 1929, in The Position in Palestine (London, 1930), 8-9; V . L . , Documents, 157-61; Ctee. of Hebron Refugees t o Chancellor, 5 September 1929, M E C / L ; ha-Aretz, 1, 16 and

17 October 1929, loc.cit.;

Chancellor meeting with

Jewish representa-

tives, 17 October 1929, loc.cit: LCW XIV, 77,119. 59. Melchett remarks, J. A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929 (n.21); LCW XIV, 69, 82, 109, 126; Weizmann speech, 2 December 1929, in Position in Palestine, 24-27. K i s c h t o Weizmann, 6 November 1929, C Z A , Z4/16134; ChancellorSacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.21); Sacher memo, 11 November 1929 (n.57); Melchett remarks (n.59); V . L . resolutions, 13-14 November 1929 (n.21); Sacher remarks, Z . E . meeting, London, 13 January 1930, Z4/302/17; Ben-Gurion, Memoirs 1, 404; LCW XIV, 78. 61. Chancellor-Sacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.24); L C W XIV, 77, 105, 344, 347; Weizmann speech, 23 June 1930, quoted i n Ben-Gurion, Memoirs I , 404. 62. Symes t o Amery, 24 June 1927, PRO, C O 733/142, file 44602; Kisch memo, 15 August 1928, C Z A , S25/3050; Kaplansky t o Passfield, 11

July 1929, CO 733/174, file 67372; summary of views expressed in r e p l y t o Z.E. q u e s t i o n n a i r e , 1929, CZA, A113/22/2. Cf. a b o v e , pages 76f. 63. ha-Aretz, 1 and 28 October 1929, Eng. summaries, M E C / L ; World U n i o n of Zionist-Revisionists, memo, November 1929, I S A , 68/46; Kisch t o .E., London, 10 November 1929, C Z A , S25/3050; Sacher memo, 11 November 1929 (n.57); Rutenberg t o Chancellor, 22 November 1929 (n.21); P . Z . E . resolutions, 29 November 1929,

251

DOCUMENTS

S25/4165; LCW XIV, 347-48, 350; Kisch to J . A . E . , London, 10 June

1930,525/6297. Only d u r i n g 1930 w o u l d

men

like S a c h e r

a n d K i s c h p u t themselves o n

record, i n Zionist forums, i n favour o f a more positive approach t o the

constitutional issue. See, e.g., Z . E . , L o n d o n meeting, 13 January 1930, Z 4 / 3 0 2 / 1 7 ; Kisch t o Z . E . , London, 12 December 1930, S25/3121. 65. Weizmann remarks, J.A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929

(n.21); LCW XIV, 64, 65, 69, 78-79; Hattis-Rolef,

op.cit.,

108, 112.

L C W IX, 349; Stein t o Philby, 23 J u n e 1924, M E C / P , X / 1 ; HattisRolef, op.cit., 107-08. 67. v a n V r i e s l a n d t o W e i z m a n n , 3 October 1922, C Z A , Z 4 / 1 6 1 3 9 . Likewise, P h i l b y was l a t e r feared t o b e p o i s o n i n g I b n S a ’ u d ’ s a t t i t u d e t o Z i o n i s m . See Report t o t h e A C . o n t h e w o r k o f t h e Political D e p t , 4

June 1926, A137/93. L C W XIV, 65-66, 79; Kaplansky t o P Z E .

28 November 1929,

S25/3050. 69. Passfield t o Chancellor, 25 November 1929, PRO, C O 733/175, file

67411/II1. Cf. Shuckburgh

to

Chancellor (private), 18 November 1929,

RH/C, 16/4; Monroe, op.cit., 161; Hattis-Rolef, op.cit., 111. 70. American Jewish Congress, press release, 22 November 1929, CZA, S25/3050; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 313-14, 327; Kayyali, Palestine, 151. Magnes, defending himself before the V.L., insisted that “there had been n o negotiations between myself and anybody. I n m y opinion the time for n e g o t i a t i o n s has n o t yet arrived. B u t , p r i o r t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w e

need t o clarify where things stand. T h e period of negotiating should be preceded b y a period o f debating, a period o f preparation, a period o f

educating the public and preparing public o p i n i o n . . . ” V . L . meeting, 13 November 1 9 2 9 , J1/7233. 71. “ L i k e All the Zionists?” Falastin (Eng. ed.), 1 February 1930; Magnes t o Weizmann, 3 J u n e 1930, i n DZ, doc. 68; “ A New Intrigue”, al-Yarmuk, 14 December 1930, summary transl. i n C Z A , S25/3050; L C W XIV, 344; “Magnes More Dangerous Zionist than Ben-Gurion”,

Davar, 21 March 1946 (quoting Ahmad Shuqairi). 72. Susan Lee Hattis[-Rolef], The Bi-Natiwnal Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times

(Haifa, 1970), 66. This p a r t i c u l a r

resolution w a s

likely

motivated by the independent negotiations undertaken by H . Farbstein and E . Neumann w i t h the A m i r Abdallah i n late 1932. T h e “separatist” tendencies ofJewish labour circles caused similar concern. See: Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 134-35; Kisch, op.cit., 374; Kalvaryski memo, 5 M a y 1930, C Z A , A113/25/2. 73. Magnes t o Weizmann, 7 September 1929, DZ, doc. 64. 74. Magnes t o Warburg, 13 September 1925, ibid, doc. 65. Cf. A . Kedar, “Brith Shalom”, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 18 (Wiinter, 1981), 67. 75. Same to same, tgm., | November 1929, PRO, C O 733/175, file 67411 / I I I . Cf. Magnes t o Weizmann, 6 November 1929, W A While Warburg seems t o have agreed, initially, w i t h Magnes, he soon j o i n e d ranks

with

those

who deprecated h i s independent

activities. See: Warburg to Weizmann, 4 and 6 November 1929, W A ;

252

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Kaplansky

to

P.Z.E., 28 November 1929 (n.68); Davar, 13 September

1929, E n g . summary, M E C / L ; Aguda Israel t o Chancellor, 4 December 1929, P R O , loc.cit.; H . Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1949, 2nd ed.), 293; Hattis-Rolef, “Zionists and P h i l b y ” , 1 1 1 f ; Porath, op.cit., 21. 76. Convocation address, 18 November 1929, i n Addresses by the Chancellor

of the Hebrew University (Jerusalem, 1936), 98-99 and 102-03. Cf. J. L. Magnes, Like A l l the Nations? (Jerusalem, 1930); New Judaea, MarchApril 1930, 148; Kisch t o Weizmann, 10 March 1930, WA; Hattis, Bi-NationalIdea, 66f.

77. Chancellor diary, 4 November 1929, R H / C , 16/3; Chancellor t o Passfield, 2-4 November 1929, P R O , loc.cit.; Chancellor-Sacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.24); Kisch t o Weizmann, 20 M a y 1930, W A ; Hattis-Rolef, “Zionists and P h i l b y ” , 111. 78. W a r b u r g t o Magnes, 4 December 1929, CAHJP, P3/2394. O n t h e continuing s p l i t - w h i c h tended t o separate London

and

Palestinian

Zionists (anti-Magnes) from American “ n o n ’ - Z i o n i s t s (proMagnes)

-

see: K i s c h t o W e i z m a n n , 10 M a r c h 1930, W A ; Ben-Avi t o

Weizmann, 23 March 1930, W A ; Resolutions o f the Palestine Jewish

Bar Assn., 16 M a y 1930, CZA, S25/3050; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 313f.,

327, 349; Ben-Gurion, Memoirs I , 404f., 413. 79. Ben-Gurion, op.cit, 491. Cf. 1bid., 337-41 and My Talks, 22. Beilinson, i nJews and Arabs (n.26), 171f., 178f.; Ben-Gurion, “ P l a n n i n g Zionist Policy”, i n :bid., 148f.; Ben-Gurion, Memoirs I , 490f. 81. Ben-Gurion, “ P l a n n i n g Zionist P o l i c y ” (n.80), 130; Beilinson, op.cit., 167f.; Ben-Gurion, memo, 23 October 1929 (n.20); K i s c h memo, 17 November 1929 (n.20); Weizmann speech, 2 December 1929 (n.59),

26; J . A . memo, May 1930, PRO, CO 733/192, file 77275; Kisch, op.cit., 272-73, 283, 429-30; Kisch, Letter t o the Chairman, Political Commission, X V I I t h Zionist Congress, June 1931 (copy in P R O , C O 733/207, file 87286), 5-7.

Kisch t o Hoofien, 30 April 1931, ISA, 103/658/8. Cf. Hattis, op.cit., 58; K isch t o Vilensky, 26 M a y 1931, C Z A S25/3136.

E.g. Kisch t o Vilensky, 26 May 1931, CZA, S25/3136. Arlosoroff t o Weizmann, 21 November 1932, WA. Cf. his Jerusalem Diary, 30, 188-89, 342-51; Ben-Gurion, Memoirs I , 405 (Sacher remarks) and 521; Sykes, op.cit., 122; Ben-Gurion, “Planning Zionist P o l i c y ” (n.80), 148. .

“ N o t e s R e : Arab-Jewish S i t u a t i o n

in

Palestine”, 2 a n d 4

April 1930,

W A . Cf. Cooper t o Watson, 7 M a y 1930, P R O , F O 371/14486, file E2688/44/65; Watson to Lindsay, 8 M a y 1930, loc.cit. M e m o o f a Quaker P r o p o s a l for Peace i n P a l e s t i n e , e n c l o s e d i n A d l e r t o W a r b u r g , 2 2 A p r i l 1930, W A ; C o o p e r t o W a t s o n , 7 M a y 1 9 3 0 (n.85); Watson t o Lindsay, 8 M a y 1930 (n.85); Oliver t o Cooper, 2

J u n e 1930, W A ; Watson, M e m o o n Oliver-Cooper correspondence (25

May - 10 July), 27 July 1930, PRO, loc.cit., file E4274/44/65. 87. Warburg t o Weizmann, 6 M a y 1930, W A . C f . L C W X I V , 295; Cooper t o Watson, 7 M a y 1930 (n.85). Oliver t o Cooper, 2 J u n e 1930, W A ; Watson memo, 27 J u l y 1930 (n.

253

NOTES

86). Cf.

“Notes Re: Arab-Jewish Situation”

(n.85); LCW X I V , 337;

Cooper t o W a t s o n , 7 M a y 1 9 3 0 (n.85).

89. Kisch, Diary entries, 3 and 5 July 1930, CZA, Z4/5042/1; Palestine Diary, 320f.; L C W X I V , 358; Watson memo, 27 J u l y 1930 (n.86). Oliver

a p p a r e n t l y met, a t t h i s t i m e ,

with

t h e Mufti,

K i n g Faisal,

Shawkat Ali (see below, page 104), and had hopes o f travelling t o meet

King I b n Sa’ud. See: Ajaj Nuwayhid t o Oliver, 24 October 1930, W A ; Oliver t o K i s c h , 1 8 F e b r u a r y 1931, W A ; s a m e t o same, 27 March 1931,

C Z A , S25/3053; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 345.

91. See n o t e 86, above. 92. K isch, Diary entry, 5 J u l y 1930 (n.89); K i s c h t o Warburg, 7 J u l y 1930, C Z A , S25/3053; Palestine Diary, 320f.; Watson memo, 27 J u l y 1930 (n.

86). Cf. above, page 63. 93. Kisch, Palestine Diary, 394-5; Oliver t o Kisch, 27 March 1931 (n.90). Oliver t o Kisch, loc. cit.; Kisch t o Oliver, 5 April 1931, C Z A , S25/3053. 95. Oliver t o Weizmann, 20 J u n e 1932, W A . 96. K isch, Diary entry, 24 March 1931, C Z A , Z4/5042/1; L C W X V , 321f. 97. Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary, 269; Sharett, Political Diary 1, 215, 224; E .

Epstein t o B. Joseph, 25 January 1939, S25/3054/A. 98. Satow t o Monteagle, 1 June 1930, P R O , F O 371/14486, file E2838/44/65. 99. Kisch, Diary entry, 24 March 1931 (n.96); Palestine Diary, 395; Kisch t o Weizmann, 6 November 1931, W A ; Williams-Brodetsky interview, 15 October 1931, P R O , C O 733/198, file 87054. 100. T h e f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t d r a w s e x t e n s i v e l y o n Elyakim Rubinstein, The Zionist and Yishuv Leadership in Palestine and the Arab Question, 1928-1930 (Heb), unpublished M . A . thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Cf.

Rubinstein, “ A n Outline of Zionist Positions”, 52-53; Kisch, circular letter t o Members o f the Z . E . , 13 M a y 1930 [ K / 8 2 4 / 3 0 ] ; Report o n

Activities of the J.B. during 1930, n.d., CZA, S25/4141: Report on Work of the J.B., i n Kisch, Letter t o the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81), 22-35. 101. K i s c h t o Franck, 12 January 1928, C Z A , S25/10320; same to Stein, 16 October 1929, S25/3101. 102. Conclusions o f discussion o f J.B. Council, quoted i n Kisch, Letter to

the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81), 34-35. 103. Sokolow statement, quoted i n Esco Foundation, Palestine I I , 749. 104. E.g., Kalvaryski memos, 5 M a y 1930 (n.72) and 3 October 1930, C Z A , S25/4142; K i s c h t o Weizmann, 19 August 1930, S25/3066; Kisch, Letter t o the Chairman, J u n e 1931 (n.81), 26, 30-31, and Pale-

stine Diary, 393, 407, 411, 421-22; E. Samuel, “The Improvement of Jewish-Arab Relations i n Palestine”, n.d. (late 1931), I S A , 103/658/8; same t o N . Bentwich, 6 M a y 1931, C Z A , A255/607; Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary, 99, 119, 272. 105. K i s c h t o Weizmann, 23 April 1931, W A ; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 301-02, 406-07; Arlosoroff, op.cit, 250-31. 106. Between October 1930 and September 1932, Kalvaryski reported numerous talks w i t h Arabs, including O m a r Salih al-Barghuthi,

254

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Jamal al-Husaini, Subhi al-Khadra, Hasan Khalid, Awni Abd al-Hadi, M u s a Kazim al-Husaini and R i a d as-Sulh. See C Z A ,

S25/4142. Cf. below, pages 99f. and sources cited i n n.110. O n Kisch’s meetings with Arabs, including Raghib an-Nashashibi, Hasan Sidqi ad-Dajani and Taysir Dawjah, see CZA, S25/3052; his letters t o Weizmann, 7 December 1929 (Z4/16137) and 20 March 1930 (S25/3478); his Palestine Diary, 303, 314, 342, 411 and 413-14. 107. E.g., Beilinson’s critique of Zionist Arab policy i n “Problems of

Jewish-Arab Rapprochement”, in Jews and Arabs (n.23), 167-94; H . Arlosoroff, “ A n A t t e m p t a t S u m m i n g - U p ” , i n Writings ( H e b . ) v o l . I

(Tel Aviv, 1934), 101-40. 108. Laniado to Kisch, 30 March 1930; Ben-Zvi, note of meeting w i t h T a h i r al-Husaini, 1 A p r i l 1930; Kisch, note o n T a h i r al-Husaini, 2

April 1930; all in CZA, S25/3006. 109. Perhaps less sensational, b u t more practical, from the Zionist point of

view w a s t h e a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n from Tahir some d o c u m e n t e d evidence t h a t t h e Mufti had i n d e e d organised t h e 1929 r i o t s . Such evidence was not, in the end, provided, despite Tahir’s promises. 110. Constitution o f Nazareth Agricultural Party, C Z A , S25/4141; Kal-

varyski reports i n files S25/4142 and S25/3466; Kalvaryski memo, 5 M a y 1930 (n.72); Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary, 33, 93, 130, 219; Porath, op.cit., 50-54, 70-71; L C W XV, 58, 92, 222, 322; Kalvaryski-Ahdab correspondence, September-October 1930, S25/4142 and A113/47;

Kisch t o Kalvaryski, 7 January 1931, A113/25/2; Kisch, Diary entry, 14 April 1931, Z4/5042/1. 111. Report on

J.B. Activities during 1930 (n.100). Cf. Kalvaryski memo, 5 16 Opposition”,

May 1930 (n.72); “Negotiations with the Jaffa January 1931, S25/4141; Porath, op.cit., 70-71.

112. Kisch t o Weizmann, 23 A p r i l 1931, W A ; Report of the Executive submitted t o t h e XVIII Z i o n i s t (London, 1933), 250.

C o n g r e s s , Prague,

21-29 August 1933

113. Kisch, Diary entry, 13 March 1931, C Z A , Z4/5042/1. Cf. M . Shertok to Kalvaryski, 25 November 1931, S25/4142. 114. K i s c h t o Weizmann, 19 August 1930 (n.104); B e n - A v i t o Weizmann, 1 October 1930, W A ; Rutenberg t o M . MacDonald, 16 October 1930, W A ; Shertok, note o f talk w i t h A b d al-Qadir Shibal, 17 February 1932, C Z A , S25/3051; Kalvaryski t o Arlosoroff, 25 February 1932, S25/3070; Porath, op.cit., ch. 3; Kayyali, Palestine, 163, 165, 167; Y . Arnon-Ohana,

The Intemal Struggle w i t h i n the Palestinian Nationalist

Movement, 1929-1939 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1981), chs. 1-5. 115. Kalvaryski, note of meeting o f 20 January 1930, C Z A , S25/3051. Cf. Porath, Emergence, 68. 116. Kalvaryski, n o t e o f meeting o f 14 February 1930, loc.cit, Cf. Hattis, Bi-National, 272. 117. Porath, Palestinian Arab, 23f.; Kayyali, op.cit., 157f.; Lesch, Arab Politics,

167-69. Cf. above, page 84. 118. Document 34, below. Cf. Kisch to Stein, 9 March 1930, C Z A , S25/3466; Kisch, note o f questions submitted by a member o f the A E .

255

NOTES

likely a t t i t u d e t o f o r m a t i o n o f n e w anti-Mufti party and Kisch’s reply (26 January 1930), Z4/4004/1.

r e : government’s

Barghuthi’'s new I s t i g l a l Party proclamation, dated 7 March, declared t h a t i t w a s independent o f t h e i m p o r t a n t P a l e s t i n i a n

families

and ofJewish connections. Arnon-Ohana, op.cit., 163. 119. Kisch, Palestine Diary, 304f, 330f; Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 29 M a y 1930, W A ; L C W X I V , 281, 294; Porath, op.cit., 26f.; Kayyali, op.cit., 158; Chancellor diary, 6 J u n e 1930, RH /C, 16/3. 120. Document 36, below (dated 4 August 1930). 121. Kalvaryski t o Magnes, 6 August 1930, CZA, A113/25/2; At the Parting. 122. Kisch t o Kalvaryski, 21 August 1930, C Z A , loc.cit. Cf. Kisch, note of

talk with Taysir Dawjah, 12 M a y 1931 (n.106); Palestine Diary, 328. 123. Kalvaryski’s retrospective allocation o f responsibility for the failure of his initiative lacks consistency. I n November 1932, he wrote: “ N o person and n o institution, a fortiori n o official instituion, empowered m e t o take

this step.

Whatever I d i d i n t h i s regard was done u p o n m y

own responsibility; and that, i n m y opinion, is the weak point i n the document. F o r this reason i t awoke no powerful echo i n the A r a b circles which were anxious t o learn the stand o f official circles w i t h regard t o the matter. I t clearly follows t h a t a l l responsibility for this

step falls on me.” (Letter t o She’ifotenu, 27 November 1932, C Z A , A 1 1 3 / 1 3 ) . Y e t , i n a M a y 1937 speech, Kalvaryski complained t h a t t h e

J.A.E. had been responsible for the failure because i t had indefinitely p o s t p o n e d i t s endorsement o f t h e plan “until t h e p a t i e n c e o f t h e Arabs gave o u t a n d t h e y broke off t h e negotiations”. T o t h i s coloured

recollection, Kalvaryski w e n t o n t o add the even more dubious c l a i m t h a t h i s Platform

had b e e n endorsed by

t h e Mufti,

Jamal al-Husaini,

A w n i A b d al-Hadi, Adil Arslan, R i a d as-Sulh, K i n g Faisal, Amir Abdallah, and D r Weizmann! (At the Parting.). T h e latter version is accepted a t face v a l u e b y C o h e n (Israel and the A r a b World, 266).

124. Document 35, below. Cf. Rutenberg, note of interview w i t h Shuckb u r g h , 21 May 1930, CZA, J1/22; F l a p a n , Zwnism and the Palestinians, 69. R u t e n b e r g was a g a i n t o s h o w h i s initiative

a n d concern for

resolving Arab-Jewish difficulties in later years. 125. Z.F., London meeting, 21 M a y 1930, Z4/302/17; L C W X V , 291, 316,

318, 335, 351. 126. T h i s proposal was p u t t o t h e Z . E . in L o n d o n , b u t was n o t acted upon. Meeting, 13 M a y 1930, loc.cit. 127. Chancellor noted i n his diary, 5 November 1929: “ I t o l d h i m he would be doing much more valuable work if he would get i n t o touch w i t h some o f the Arab leaders . . . [Rutenberg] said that he would d o so b u t I a m afraid he dislikes and suspects the Arabs so much that he will not succeed. H e t h i n k s t h e o n l y w a y o f d e a l i n g w i t h a n A r a b is t o b r i b e

h i m , and he thinks that they can a l l be bribed . . . ” R H / C , 16/3. 128. Passfield t o Chancellor (private and most secret tgm.), 31 M a y 1930, P R O , C O 733/183, file 77050/B; Rutenberg t o M . MacDonald, 16

October 1930, WA. 129. Passfield t o Chancellor, 2 tgms., 31 M a y 1930, P R O , loc.cit. C f . Sheffer,

256

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

“Intentions and Results”, 50, 59; Flapan, op. cit., 93. London meeting, 27 M a y 1930, Z4/302/17; K i s c h t o Z E , London, 10 J u n e 1930, S25/6297; Kisch, Diary entry, 8 J u l y 1930, Z 4 / 5 0 4 2 / I ; L C W X I V , 381 and X V , 51-52, 66.

130.Z.E.,

131. Diary entry, 8 July 1930 (n.130). 132. Chancellor t o Passfield, 5 J u n e 1930, P R O , loc.cit.; Chancellor diary, 1 J u n e 1930, R H / C , 16/3; note of Passfield-Chancellor meeting, 18 J u l y 1930, P R O , loc.cit; Rutenberg t o Ben-Zvi, 3 August 1930, C Z A , J 1 / 2 2 ; L C W XIV, 319, 330, 335, 360; Sheffer, op.cit., 50. 133. Rutenberg/Brodetsky, n o t e o f interview w i t h Passfield, 18 July 1930, J 1 / 2 2 ; Rutenberg t o Weizmann, 21 J u l y 1930, loc.cit.; L C W X V , 66. 134. See, esp., h i s reports t o Weizmann, d a t e d 14 January, 23 M a r c h , 29

M a y and 25 September 1930, in WA. 135. T h e o n l y concrete results o f Ben-Avi’s efforts seem t o have been t h e sowing of some discord among r i v a l A r a b politicians. See his reports to Weizmann, dated 14 January and 1 October 1930, W A . I t is possible that Weizmann sought t o terminate Ben-Avi’s services once the latter reported that his Arab contacts wanted the Jews t o j o i n i n “ a common Judeo-Arab front a g a i n s t t h e British m a n d a t e ” . L e t t e r o f 25 Septemb-

; XIV, 99f. er (n.134). Cf. below, pages 1 1 2 f .LCW 136. Said-Ruete t o W e i z m a n n , 30 April 1930, W A ; same t o A w n i A b d al-Hadi, 31 M a y 1930, I S A , 66/box 152; same to J a m a l al-Husaini, 5 February 1931, W A . Cf. L C W XIV, 71, 94, 185f, 230, and X V , 200. 137. Said-Ruete t o Weizmann, 9 and 20 December 1929, C Z A , Z4/16137; same t o same, 30 April and 31 October 1930, W A ; L C W X I V , 126 a n d

X V , 200. 138. K isch t o Weizmann, 28 January 1930, C Z A , S25/3064; L C W X I V , 99, 185 and X V , 121, 200. 139. K i s c h t o Rosenbleuth, 24 J u l y 1930, C Z A , Z4/4004/1; Rosenbleuth to Weizmann, 13 August 1930, Z4/305/14A; Vilensky t o Kisch, 11 October 1930, S25/3136. Cf. L C W X V , 53. 140. C a m h y t o Weizmann, 30 October 1930, W A . À l i t t l e more t h a n a year later, Abbas H i l m i visited Palestine and his name became associated w i t h a scheme for an Arab-Zionist round-table conference and the cantonisation o f Palestine. 141. Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, 193-94. Cf. Camhy t o Weizmann, 24 November 1930, W A . 142. Cohen, o p . c i t , 194; C a m h y t o W e i z m a n n , 7 S e p t e m b e r 1931, WA. Cf. Camhy t o Weizmann, 4 M a r c h 1931, W A ; Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary, 161. 143. Sacher to Weizmann, 29 December 1930, W A . Cf. L C W X V , 76. 144. C a m h y t o Weizmann, 13 December 1930, W A ; Cohen, op.cit., 193. Cf. b e l o w , page

106 (n.159).

A z m i ’ s c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e Z i o n i s t s began

in 1924, i n his capacity as editor o f as-Siasa newspaper. See: Kisch, Palestine Diary, 117-19; Kalvaryski t o A z m i , 15 December 1926, CZA, S25/10299. 145. Camhy t o W e i z m a n n , 7 a n d 16 February, 13 a n d 28 April, a n d 7 September 1931, W A ; Weizmann t o Camhy, 14 April 1931, W A ;

257

NOTES

L C W X V , 114; Kisch t o J.A.E., London, 29 M a y 1931, C Z A , S25/3064. 146. L C W X V , 87-90; O l i v e r to Kisch, 18 February 1931, W A ; Kupferschmidt, op.cit., 332-34. 147. Kisch, Palestine Dury, 381; Diary entries, 9 February and 24 M a r c h 1931, C Z A , Z 4 / 5 0 4 2 / I ; O l i v e r t o Kisch, 27 March 1931, S25/3053; |

Chancellor diary, 11 February 1931, R H / C , 16/3. 148. E.g., N . Vilensky to Kisch, 18 April 1931, S25/3136; Vilensky memo, 6 M a y 1931, loc.cit.; L C W X V , 133; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 338, 344f., 361, 363, 374, 3 9 1 f , 404, 408, 422, 431; Notes for Col. Kisch’s Successor (Arab Affairs in Neighbouring Countries), n.d., S25/3489. 149. Kisch, Diary entries, 19 and 20 February 1931, Z4/5042/1; Palestine

Diary, 386-87; Note of Interviews

at

Amman, 20 February 1931,

L 9 / 3 5 1 ; Letter t o the Chairman, J u n e 1931 (n.81). Cf. Kisch’s 1924 visit t o Amman: Palestine Diary, 93-98; Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 179-81. 150. Kisch t o J.A.E., London, 23 February 1931, L9/351. Cf. Notes for Col. Kisch’s Successor (n.148). 151. Exchange of cables between Jerusalem and London Executives, 18 and 19 February 1931, S25/1717; Kisch, D i a r y entries, 1 and 2 March 1931, Z4/5042/1; L C W X V , 91, 97, 105, 120, 127; Kisch, Palestine

Diary, 391; Chancellor diary, 28 February 1931, R H / C , 16/3. Cf. above, page 86 (n.46). 152. Shuckburgh note, 6 February 1931, P R O , C O 733/197, file 87050/1. 153. Passfield t o Chancellor, 6 February, and Chancellor t o Passfield, 13 February, 1931, loc.cit.; Chancellor diary, 14 February 1931, R H / C , 16/3. 154. 18 February 1931, quoted i n Kisch t o J.A.E., London, 24 February 1931, W A . Cf. Chancellor diary 18 February 1931, R H / C , 16/3. 155. Chancellor diary, 16-18 February 1931, R H / C , 16/3. 156. al-Hayat, 26 March 1931, Eng. transl. in C Z A , S25/1717; al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya, 26 M a r c h 1931, Kayyali, Documents, 231f. Cf. Falastin, 19

March 1931, Eng. transl. i n S25/1717; LCW X V , 132. 157. O n t h e boycott, see: K i s c h , note o f interview w i t h H . C . , 26 February 1931, loc.cit.; resolutions o f a meeting o f the À.E., quoted in Report of the Executive of the J.A., J u l y 1931 (London, 1931), 39; Chancellor t o Passfield, 3 M a r c h 1931, P R O , C O 733/203, file 87139; Kisch t o Weizmann, 13 March 1931, C Z A , S25/1717; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 391, 394, 396; Lesch, op.cit., 170f. Cf. sources cited i n n.47, above. O n apparent breaches o f the boycott, see: N o t e o f offers from A r a b notables t o meet D r Weizmann, 10 February - 5 March 1931, S25/3070; Chancellor-Weizmann interview, 30 M a r c h 1931, R H / C ,

14/4; Kisch

to

Weizmann, 23 April 1931, WA; Weizmann

to

Kisch,

7 M a y 1931, W A ; LCW X V , 132f.; Porath, op. cit, 35, 70; Stein, op. cut, 319f. 158. Tolkowsky to Kisch, 24 March 1931, C Z A , S25/1717. 159. Abbas H i l m i t o Abdallah, 27 February 1931, W A ; Camhy t o Weizmann, 4 M a r c h 1931, W A ; Kisch, Diary entries, 11, 15 and 24 March 1931, C Z A , Z4/5042/1; K i s c h t o Weizmann, 13 M a r c h 1931

258

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

(n.157); Kisch t o A z m i , 22 March 1931, S25/1717; Kisch t o Cust, 24 March 1931, loc.cit.; L C W X V , 128f. 160. Abdallah excused himself o n t h e basis o f a p r i o r commitment, b u t t h e more likely reasons were: (a) pressure o f the A r a b boycott, and/or ( b )

fears for Weizmann’s security i n Transjordan. See: Kisch, Diary entries, 24 and 27 March 1931 (n.159); Fuad al-Khatib t o Weizmann, 24 March, and Kisch t o F u a d al-Khatib, 25 March 1931, S25/1717; Kisch to Warburg, 8 M a y 1931, W A ; Kisch, Palestine Diary, 396; Cohen, op.cit., 195; Sa’igh, Hashemites, 128. 161. Chancellor, note o f interview w i t h Weizmann, 20 M a r c h 1931, P R O , loc.cit. Cf. L C W X V , 132f.; Kayyali, Palestine, 162f. 162. Chancellor-Weizmann interviews, 20 and 30 March 1931, R H / C , 14/4. 163. Weizmann to Kisch, 7 M a y 1931, W A ; L C W X V , 128, 131, 171f. 164. Stein, op.cit., 326-35; Sheffer, op.cit., 51-54; Porath, op.cit., 36; L C W X V , 103, 105, 111, 131, 141f. 165. Chancellor-Weizmann i n t e r v i e w s (n.162); B r o d e t s k y , n o t e o f i n t e r v i e w w i t h Shuckburgh and Williams a t the C.O., 14 April 1931, W A ; L C W X V , 111. 166. Resolutions of meeting of A.E. (14 April), quoted in Report of the

Executive (n.157), 39. Cf. LCW X V , 145; Porath, op.cit., 36-37; Brodetsky-Shuckburgh-Williams interview (n.165). 167. S t e i n , op.cit., 326-27. 168. Palestine Diary, 406. Cf. Ruppin, Memoirs, 256; Said-Ruete t o Jamal

al-Husaini, 5 February 1931, WA. 169. Shuckburgh t o Weizmann, 18 April 1931, W A . 170. O n the Zionist-British discussions, see L C W X V , 141-44, 165-70. 171. Palestine Diary, 406. Cf. LCW XV, 24f. 172. Esco Foundation, Palestine I I , 749. See also: Z.E., London meetings, 24 September and 19 November 1929, C Z A , Z4/302/16; D . Avissar memo, November 1929, S25/3101; Ben-Gurion memo, 23 November 1929, i n Memoirs I , 406f; Ernst Simon memo, 12 March 1930, S25/3122; Z.E., London meeting, 16 March 1930, Z4/302/17. 173. Kisch t o Vilensky, 24 February 1931, S25/3136.

Conclusions F . C . Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964), 53f.

Above, pages 72f. and 76f., and sources cited in

notes

37 and 50 of ch. 4.

For additional sources, see: Porath, Emergence, 245-47, 254-57 and Palestinian Arab, 22; Lesch, Arab Politics, 100, 102; Wasserstein, British in Palestme, 220f.; A . M . Hyamson, Palestine: A Policy (London, 1942), 139f. O n the majlisyyyun-muaridun distinction, see: Esco, Palestine I , 468f.; Lesch, op.cit, 95-101; Kayyali, Palestine, 116f., 122f., 130-37; Porath, Emergence, c h . 5 .

. O n the first point, see: Zuaytir, DPNM, 223; Porath, op.cit., 61f; cables

and petitions, 9 August-10 September 1921, CZA Z4/1250; V.L. meeting, 10 August 1921, J1/7224; V.L. m e e t i n g , 21 January 1922, J1/7225. O n the latter point, mention should be made of Jacob de

NOTES

259

Haan, an outspoken anti-Zionist Aguda personality in Jerusalem who maintained contacts w i t h Arabs. See, e.g., Kisch, Palestine Diary,

119f., 135f.; E. Marmorstein, “ A Martyr's Message” (London, 1975), 9f. On t h e occasion o f t h e 1927 municipal e l e c t i o n s in Jerusalem (above, page 75), J a m a l al-Husaini had threatened that if the Jews v o t e d for t h e Nashashibis a g a i n s t t h e Hussainis, t h e l a t t e r w o u l d lend their votes t o an Aguda slate against the mainstream Jewish candi-

dates. I n the end the Jerusalem Jewish community presented a single

unified slate, nullifying any such possibility. . See also: note o f conversation w i t h Y u s u f Bek a n d Tawfiq

Bek

(?al-Ghussain) 27 April 1919, C Z A , Z4/16004; Chancellor-Rutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, RH/C, 14/2; Sacher, Shaw Evidence I I ,

791f.; Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 25 September 1930, WA. Above, page 56; Eder t o Z E . , London, 6J u n e 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/IIa; D r Y . Epstein, V . L . meeting, 5 April 1922, J1/7225; B e n - A vi diary, 26 October 1922, S25/905; Hoefler to Weizmann, 14 J u l y 1924, W A ; Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 25 September 1930, W A . Cf. the subtitle of T i b a w i ’ s article o n t h e Weizmann-Faisal

negotiations

(ch.2, n.22):

“ T h e 1919 A t t e m p t t o Secure an A r a b Balfour Declaration”; Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, 195.

Notes of meeting a t Mr. Balfour’s house, 22 July 1921, C Z A , Z4/16151; R . Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 1917-1956 (London 1959), 105f; R . Crossman,À Nation Reborn (London 1960), 131f.; Rutenberg remarks t o Chancellor, 2 3 October 1 9 2 9 (n.5).

Kalvaryski’s recollection of the words of Nasif al-Khalidi (above, page 23) has become the m o s t frequently-quoted expression of this idea; b u t Kalvaryski was b y n o means unique i n invoking this distinction. Yellin, T h o n , Remez and even a “hard-liner’’ like Menahem Ussishkin shared this view. See, e.g., V . Z . debate, 10 June 1919, CZA, J1/8777; Medzini, Ten Years, 81; Nordau t o Weizmann, 2 June 1920, Z4/16078. E.g., Ben-Gurion,My Talks, 12, 20.

. E.g., Saphir’s view of the failure of the 1922 Cairo talks. See Esco, Palestine 1, 569f. 11. Kisch, Political Report: Internal Arab Policy, 31 M a y 1923, CZA, Z4/16050. Cf. Lesch, op.cit, 20,47, 199f., 227. 12. L . Stein, report of conversation w i t h Philby, 4 December 1922, Z4/1392/11-b. 13. Caplan, PalestineJewry, 185-88. 14. Kisch to Weizmann, 21 March 1924, C Z A , Z4/16028, reporting conversation w i t h Hasan Sabri. Cf. his note of conversation w i t h Sulaiman Nasif, 25 January 1923, W A . 15. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestimans, 30f., 55; Medzini, op.cit., 232f.; Perlmann, “Chapters”, 152; Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, 184, 189; Esco, loc.cat. 16. C Z A , S25/3013 contains a list of 71 names selected from this card index in 1931. 17. M y Talks, 15, 78f. Cf. the contrary opinion of M . Milson: “Choosing partners for negotiations according t o the implicit assumption that

260

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

more extreme means more authentic i s a sure formula for d a m a g i n g

the chances o f a peaceful settlement.” For Milson, “ t h e extreme radical personalities and groups among the Palestinians” were “not necessarily t h e ‘ a u t h e n t i c ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ” o f P a l e s t i n i a n s i n t h e

West

Bank and Gaza territories i n the early 1980s. Commentary, M a y 1981,

35. 18. Perhaps t h e clearest s i n g l e s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s approach w a s m a d e by D r Weizmann i n his letter t o Balfour, 30 M a y 1918, L C W VIII, 205. Cf. a b o v e , page 3 4 , a n d sources c i t e d i n n o t e 18 t o chapter 2.

19. Letter t o Z.A.C., 28 M a y 1914, quoted i n R o ’ i , “Zionist A t t i t u d e ” ,

220. M a n d e l , Arabs and Zionism, xxii, 79, 128, 152f., 172f., 185, 199, 206f. and 231. 21. O n this point, see the work o f Yehoshua Porath: Emergence, ch. 2; “ T h e Palestinians

and

t h e N e g o t i a t i o n s for

t h e British-Hijazi

Treaty,

1920-1925”, Asian and African Studies (Jerusalem) VIII (1972), 20-48; “ T h e Palestinians a n d P a n - A r a b N a t i o n a l i s m ’ , Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 29-39. 22. Above, pages 7f, 39, 41, 76, 99-101, and below, pages 122-4. Cf. Porath, Emergence, 331 (n.). 23. E.g., LCW XV, 111. 24. Such a rôle for the British would be more accentuated d u r i n g the p e r i o d November 1 9 3 8 - M a y 1939 ( S t James Conference, M a c D o n -

ald White Paper). 25. World U n i o n o f Zionist Revisionists, memo, November 1929, ISA 68/46. Cf. the same organisation’s critique o f the MacDonald Letter, 25 February 1931, P R O , C O 733/197, file 87050/4; Caplan, “Britain, Zionism”, passim. 26. Zuaytir, DPNM, 288, 294, and 217. . Ibid, 97. 28. A b o v e , pages 44 a n d 49, a n d sources c i t e d i n n o t e 54 t o c h a p t e r 2. Faisal’s continued interest in Jewish investment capital was shown i n 1925 and in 1930. See: Document 28; Vilensky t o Kisch, 11 October

1930, CZA, S25/3136. D r Weizmann had t o remind Faisal of this point a t their 1925 meeting (Document 28). Cf. Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 28, 42, 44. 30. Zuaytir, DPNM, 118. Cf. ibid, 72, 145, 180, 184, 201, 321, 340f., 354; Statement

by

the Palestine Arab Delegation,

19

May

1930. RH,

Palestine volume (905.17.s.9(1930) ) . O n this and the following demands, see the excellent summary of official “Palestinian-Arab

ideology” in Porath, Emergence, 39-63. 31. Zuaytir, DPNM, 72,119, 129, 131, 146, 174, 180, 191f., 202, 206, 354. 32. Ibid, 72, 119, 122, 124, 132, 180, 184. I n the early 1920s, t w o further demands frequently appeared: (1) that Palestine should not be separated from her “sister states”, and (2) t h a t there s h o u l d be a return t o t h e legal status quo ante bellum. I b i d , 72,

119f., 147, 202. 33. See, e.g., Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 46; E d e r e v i d e n c e t o Haycraft

NOTES

261

Commission, 22 J u l y 1921, C Z A , Z 4 / 2 7 0 1 / V ; David Eder: Memoirs o fa

Modern Pioneer, ed. J.B. Hobman (London, 1945), 164f.; Crossman, 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

op.cit., 127f.; Esco Foundation, Palestine 1, 272f. and I I , 619f. Zuaytir, DPNM, 334f. Ibid., 333-54 (quotations are from p. 339). Iklé, op.cit., 207-10.

Both letters dated 12 February 1931, CAHJP, P3/2426. E.g., Weizmann’s Berlin speech, 27 August 1930, alluding t o bi-

nationalism. See: H a t t i s , B:-National Idea, 89. Cf. Kisch, Palestine Diary, 340; Ben-Avi t o Weizmann, 25 September 1930, W A . 39. Zuaytir, DPNM, 338. Cf. above, pages 7f. . Ihd, 321, 41. See, e.g. Lesch, op.cit., ch. 6. 42, See, e.g. Mandel, Arabs and Zionism, 32f.; E . Kedourie, The Chatham House Version (London, 1970), 334f.; Porath, Emergence, 60f.; S. Abraham, “ T h e Jew and the Israeli i n Modern Arabic Literature”,

Jerusalem Quarterly no. 2 (Winter, 1977), 119f. 43. W . L . O c h s e n w a l d , “ T h e Crusader K i n g d o m ofJ erusalem a n d Israel: A n Historical Comparison’, Middle East Journal X X X (1976), 221-26; M . Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (Harmondsworth, 1968), 162; E . Sivan, “Modern A r a b Historiography of the Crusades”, Asian and

African Studies (Jerusalem) VIII (1972), 109-49. Caplan, Palestine Jewry, 5f., 186-91, 199-203; Chancellor-Rutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, R H / C , 14/2; above, note 127 t o ch. 5.

45. Laqueur, History of Zionism, 257. Cf. the 1921 ywshuv discussions about t h e existence o f a n A r a b n a t i o n a l movement i n C a p l a n , Palestine Jewry),

94-98. 46. L C W VIII, 130, 161, 201f, and I X , 105; Caplan, op.cit., 14, 150; Lesch, op.cit., 234; E . Said, The Question of Palestine (New York, 1980), 26-28,

79-86.

Bibliography

Note on Sources The sources listed i n the bibliography have been divided into three sections.

(A) Primary Sources, t o which researchers tend t o attach relativel y more value, o n account o f their originality a n d authenticity. W i t h i n the “primary” category, the most original a n d authentic

materials tend t o be those found i n archives. B u t this should not lead the reader to minimise the importance o f many o f the primary

published works listed below. These include volumes of documents, letters, diaries and speeches. W i t h regard t o these volumes, the simple page reference has been given i n the n o t e s for the sake o f brevity. Thus, e.g., “ L C W VIII, 205,” is given i n place o f the fullest possible reference, which would have included the additional information: “Weizmann t o Balfour, 30 M a y 1918”.

(B) Autobiographical works and unpublished dissertations have been grouped i n a middle category here. The former tend to straddle the dividing-line between primary and secondary sources to the e x t e n t that they tend t o combine original material w i t h postfacto analysis and selectivity, ( C ) Secondary sources are subdivided into (1) books and (2) articles.

262

BIBLIOGRAPHY

263

A . PRIMARY SOURCES A.l

Archives

CAH]JP Central Archives for the History o f the Jewish People, Hebrew University, Jerusalem P3 Magnes Papers CZA

Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem J1 VaadZ’mani, VaadLeumi L 2 Palestine Office, Jaffa L 3 Zionist Commission, Jerusalem LA

Z i o n i s t Commission, Jaffa

L9

Presidency, Zionist General Council, Paris

S25 Political Department, Jerusalem Z 3 Central Zionist Office, Berlin Z 4 Zionist Office, London A113 H . M . Kalvaryski A153 David Yellin A255 Norman Bentwich

ISA

Israel State Archives, Jerusalem 2 Chief Secretary, Government o f Palestine 66 Arab Lawyers (numbers given after this notation refer to boxes, not files) 68 Leo Kohn Papers (numbers given after this notation refer t o temporary file

100 103 MEC

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College, Oxford Norman Bentwich file F(A) Faisal, Akaba file F(S) Faisal, Syria file L Harry Luke Papers, Palestine Disturbances (1929) file

P H . St John Philby Papers S Y

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PRO

Public Record Office, London CO773 Colonial Office, Palestine CO537 Colonial Office, Palestine (Supplementary) FO371 Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Political

RH

Rhodes House Library, Oxford

264

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

C

Sir John Chancellor Papers (mss. Brit. Emp. 5.284)

Note: 1 have

taken the liberty

of t r e a t i n g Chancellor’s letters

t o his son, Christopher, and to his wife (box 16, file 3) as a “Diary”, which they very much resemble. WA

Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel arranged chronologically Crown copyright records appear b y permission o f the Controller, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Excerpts from the Chancellor Papers ( R H ) are reproduced

with t h e kind permission A. 2

of Mr

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Aaronsohn, Aaron, Diary 1916-1919 (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1970. Arlosoroff, Hayim,Jerusalem Diary (Heb.), 2nd ed., Tel Aviv 1949. Arlosoroff, Hayim, Writings (Heb.), vol. I, Tel Aviv 1934. Attias, M., ed., Documents of the Vaad Leumi: (Heb.), 2nd enlarged ed., Jerusalem 1963. Ben-Gurion, David, “Planning Zionist Policy”, i n Jews and Arabs in Palestine, ed. Sereni and Ashery (New York, 1936), 123-53. Butler, R . , a n d Bury, J . P . T . , Documents on British Foreign Policy,

1919-1939, 1st series, vol. XIII, London 1963. DBFP—see: (1) Butler, (2) Woodward. DPNM—see: Zuaytir. D Z —see: Goren. Goren, A . A . Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L . Magnes, Cambridge, Mass. 1982. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Parliamentary Papers. C m d . 1700: Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation, London 1922. [including Statement of Policy, the “Churchill White Paper”] - - C m d . 1989: Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency. Correspondence with High Commissionerfor Palestine, London 1923. —Cmd. 3530: Report of the Commission (1929 Palestine Disturbances; “Shaw Commission”), London 1930. —Cmd. 3686: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development by Str_fohn Hope Simpson, London 1930. —Cmd. 3692: Statement of Policy (“Passfield White Paper”), London 1930. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Palestine Commission o n the Disturbances o f August 1929, Evidence H e a r d… in Open Sittings, 3 vols., Colonial No. 48, London 1930. Kayyali, A b d al-Wahhab, ed., Documents of the Palestinian Resistance

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Magnes, Judah L., Like A ll the Nations?, Jerusalem 1930. Magnes—see also: Goren Meinertzhagen, Richard, Middle East Diary, 1917-1956, London 1959. Miller, D a v i d Hunter, M y Diary at the Conference of Paris, vols. I V and X I V , N e w York 1924. PCW —see: Weizmann. The Position in Palestine, London 1930 (Zionist speeches). Ruppin, Arthur, Memoirs, Diaries, Letters, ed. Alex Bein, transl. K . Gershon, London 1970. Ruppin, Arthur, Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers,

Jerusalem . Sharett [Shertok], Moshe, Political Diary (Heb.), vol. I (1936), Tel Aviv 1968. Shaw—see: Great Britain. Colonial Office. Palestine Commission … V . L.—see: Attias Weizmann, Chaim, The Letters andPapers of Chaim Weizmann, series A : Letters

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266

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Weizmann, Chaim, The Letters andPapers of Chaim Weizmann, series B : Papers, ed. Barnett Litvinoff —vol. I (Aug. 1898—]J uly 1931)—forthcoming —vol. IT (Dec. 1931 —April 1952)—forthcoming Woodward, E.L., and Butler, R . , eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, vol. I V , London 1952. Zionist Organisation, Letter to the Chairman of the Political Commission,

XVIIth Zionist Congress, June 1931. (by F. H . Kisch) Z i o n i s t Organisation, Report on the XIIth Zionist Congress (Carlsbad,

1921), London 1922. Zionist Organisation, Report of the Executive to the XVIIth Zionist Congress, London 1931.

Zionist

Organisation,

Report

of

the Executive to the

XVIIIth

Zionist

Congress, (Prague, August 1933), London 1933. Zuaytir, Akram, Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 9 : F r o m the Papers o f A k r a m Zuaytir (Ac.), Beirut 1979.

B . 1 Autobiographical Works Ben-Avi, Ittamar, With the Dawning of Our Independence (Heb.), Tel Aviv? 1961. Ben-Gurion, David, Memoirs (Heb.), vol. I (to 1933), Tel A v i v 1971. Ben-Gurion, David, M y Talks with Arab Leaders, Jerusalem/New York 1972. Chelouche, Yosef Eliahu, Story of My Life (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1930/31. Frumkin, Gad, The Way of a Jerusalem Judge (Heb.), Tel A v i v 1954. Lichtheim, Richard, A Remnant Will Return (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1953. Saphir, Ascher, Unity or Partition’, Jerusalem 1937. Storrs, Ronald, Orientations, definitive ed., London 1943. Weizmann, Chaim, Trial andError, London 1949.

B.2

UnpublishedDissertations

Kupferschmidt, U n . M . , The Supreme Muslim Council, 1921-1937:

Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine, Ph. D., Hebrew University o fJerusalem, 1978.

Mattar, Philip, The Mufti ofJerusalem: Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, a Founder ofPalestinian Nationalism, Ph.D., Columbia University, 1981. Rubinstein, Elyakim, The Zionist and Yishuv Leadership in Palestine and

the Arab Question, 1928-1930 (Heb.), M.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976. Stein, Kenneth W., The Land Question in Mandatory Palestine, 19291936, Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1976.

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Arnon-Ohana, Yuval, The Internal Struggle within the Palestinian Nationalist Movement, 1929-1939 (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1981. Assaf, Michael, The Arab Awakening in Palestine and their Flight

Therefrom (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1967. Assaf, Michael, Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1860-1948 (Heb.), Tel Aviv 1970.

A t the Parting ofOur Ways (Heb.), Jerusalem 1939. Barbour, Nevill, Nist Dominus, London 1946. Bauer, Yehuda, et a l , eds., Essays in the History of Zionism (Heb.), Jerusalem 1976. Caplan, Neil, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925, Cass, London 1978.

Cohen, Aharon, Israel and t h e Arab World, New York 1970. Crossman, Richard, 4 Nation Reborn, London 1960. Dawn, C . Ernest, From O ttomanism to À rabism, Chicago/London 1973.

Dekel, Efraim, Shar: The Exploits ofHagana, London 1959. Dinur, Ben-Zion, et al., History of theHagana (Heb.), vols. I a n d IT, Tel Aviv 1964. Duverger, Maurice, The Idea ofPolitics, L o n d o n 1966. Eisenstadt, S.N., Israeli Society, London 1967. Elon, Amos, The Israelis: Founders andSons, New York 1971. Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study ofJewish, Arab,

andBritish Policies, 2 vols., New Haven 1947. Ettinger, Shmuel, et a l , eds., Zionism and the Arab Question (Heb.), Jerusalem 1979. Flapan, Simha, Zionism and the Palestinians, London/New York 1979. H H —see: D i n u r H a i m , Sylvia G., ed., Arab Nationalism: A n Anthology, Berkeley /Los

Angeles 1962. Halpern, Ben, The Idea of theJewish State, Cambridge 1961.

Harkabi, Yehoshafat, Palestinians andIsrael, Jerusalem 1974. Hattis [-Rolef], Susan Lee, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During

Mandatory Times, Haifa 1970. Hobman, J . B . , ed., David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer, London 1945. Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939, London 1962.

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al-Husari, A b u K h a l d u n Sati, The Day ofMaysalun, transl. S. Glazer, Washington 1966. Hyamson, Albert M . , Palestine: A Policy, London 1942. Iklé, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate, New York 1964. Kayyali, Abdul Wahhab, Palestine: A Modern History, London 1 9 7 8 . Kedourie, Elie, The Chatham House Version and other Middle Eastern

Studies, London 1970 (Cass 1974). Kedourie, Elie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921, London 1956/1978. Kedourie, Elie, and H a i m , Sylvia G., eds., Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Cass, London 1982. Khalidi, Walid, ed., From Haven to Conquest, Beirut 1971. Kimche, Jon, Palestine or Israel, London 1973. Klieman, Aaron S., Foundations ofBritish Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference, Baltimore/London 1970. Laqueur, Walter, A History ofZionism, N e w York/London 1972. Laqueur, Walter, ed., The Israel-Arab Reader, 3rd ed., New York 1976. Lesch, A n n Mosely, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration ofa NationalMovement, Ithaca/London 1979. Livneh, Eliezer, Aaron Aaronsohn: The Man and his Times (Heb.),

Jerusalem 1969. Mandel, Neville J., The Arabs and Zionism before World War I, Berkeley/London 1976. Medzini, Moshe, Ten Years ofPalestine Politics (Heb.), Tel A v i v 1928. Monroe, Elizabeth, Philby of Arabia, London 1973. Mossek, Moshe, Palestine Immigration Policy under Sir Herbert Samuel, Cass, London 1978. Moussa [ = Musa], Suleiman, 7. E. Lawrence: An Arab View, transl. À . Boutros, London 1966. Nevakivi, Jukka, Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920, London 1969. Nevo, Yosef, Abdallah and the Palestinian Arabs (Heb.), Tel A v i v 1975. Porath, Yehoshua, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, Cass, London 1974. Porath, Yehoshua, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1928-1939: From Riots to Rebellion, Cass, London 1977. Rodinson, Maxime, Israel and the Arabs, Harmondsworth 1968. Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, N e w York 1980. (Vintage Books). Sa’igh, Anis, The Hashemites and the Palestine Question (Ac.), Beirut 1966. Selzer, Michael, ed., Zionism Reconsidered, London 1970.

Sereni, Enzo, and Ashery, Robert E., eds.,Jews and Arabs in Palestine, New York 1936.

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Sykes, Christopher, Cross Roads to Israel, 1917-1948, Bloomington/ London 1973. Tibawi, A . L . , Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921, London 1978. Wasserstein, Bernard, The British in Palestine, L o n d o n 1978.

Zeine, Zeine N., The Strugglefor Arab Independence, Beirut 1960. C.2

Articles

Abraham, S., “ T h e Jew and the Israeli i n Modern Arabic Literature”, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 2 (Winter, 1977), 119-36. Alsberg, P.A., “The Arab Question i n the Policy o f the Zionist Executive Before the First World War” (Heb.), Shivat-Zion I V (1956-57), 161-209. Amir, Yehuda, “Interpersonal Contact between Arabs and Israelis”, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 13 (Fall, 1979), 3-17. Beilinson, Moses, “Problems o f Jewish-Arab Rapprochement”, i n Jews and Arabs in Palestine, ed. Sereni and Ashery (New York, 1936), 155-94. Caplan, Neil, “Arab-Jewish Contacts i n Palestine After the First World War”, Journal of Contemporary History XII (1977), 635-68; Heb. version i n ha-Mazrah he-Hadash XXVTII (1977), 18-45. Caplan, Neil, “Britain, Zionism and the Arabs, 1917-1925”, Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 4-17. Caplan, N e i l , “Faisal I b n Husain and the Zionists: A ReExamination w i t h 40 Documents”, International History Review (forthcoming). Hareven, Alouph, “ C a n We Learn t o Live Together?” Jerusalem Quarterly no. 14 (Winter, 1980), 8-17. Hattis-Rolef, Susan, “ T h e Zionists and St. J o h n Philby”, Jewish Social Studies X X X I V (1972), 107-21. Kazziha, Walid, “The Political Evolution o f Transjordan”, Middle Eastern Studies X V (1979), 239-57. Kedar, Aharon, “ B r i t h Shalom”, Jerusalem Quarterly no. 18 (Winter, 1981), 55-85. Khoury, Philip S., “Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists during the French Mandate”, International Journal of Middle East Studies X I I I (1981), 441-69. Knox, D . E., “Weizmann’s First Visit t o Palestine”, Wiener Library Bulletin XXVIII (1975; new series nos. 33/34), 2-13. K o h n , Hans, “ Z i o n and the Jewish National Idea”, i n Zionism Reconsidered, ed. M . Selzer (London, 1970), 175-212. Mandel, Neville J., “Attempts a t an Arab-Zionist Entente: 19131914”, Middle Eastern Studies I (1964-65), 238-67.

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Mandel, Neville J., “Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration i n t o Palestine, 1882-1914”, St Antony’s Papers no. 17 (Oxford, 1965), 77-108. Marmorstein, E m i l , “ A Martyr’s Message” (To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary o f the murder o f Professor De-Haan), London 1975. Milson, Menahem, “ H o w to Make Peace w i t h the Palestinians”, Commentary (May, 1981), 25-35.

Nevo, Joseph, “Abdallah and the Arabs of Palestine”, Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 51-62. Ochsenwald, W . L . , “The Crusader Kingdom o f Jerusalem and Israel: A Historical Comparison”, Middle East Journal X X X (1976), 221-26. Perlmann, Moshe, “Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 19181922”, Jewish Social Studies V I (1944), 123-54. Porath, Yehoshua, “The Land Problem i n Mandatory Palestine”,

Jerusalem Quarterly no. 1 (Fall, 1976), 18-27. Porath, Yehoshua, “The Palestinians and the Négotiations for the British-Hijazi Treaty, 1920-1925”, Asian and African Studies (Jerusalem) VIII (1972), 20-48. Porath, Yehoshua, “The Palestinians and Pan-Arab Nationalism”, Wiener Library Bulletin X X X I (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 29-39. Ro’, Yaacov, “Attempts o f the Zionist Institutions t o Influence the Arabic Press i n Palestine, 1908-1914” (Heb.), Zion XXXII (1967), 200-27. Ro’i, Yaacov, “The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs, 1908-1914”, Middle Eastern Studies I V (1968), 198-242; reprinted i n Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. Kedourie and H a i m (Cass, London, 1982). Rubinstein, Elyakim, “The 1928 Questionnaire on the Arab Ques-

tion” (Heb.), i n Essays in the History of Zionism, ed. Bauer (Jerusalem, 1976), 311-47.

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Question, ed. Ettinger et al. (Jerusalem, 1979), 37-70. Sheffer, Gavriel, “Intentions and Results o f British Policy i n Palestine: Passfield’s White Paper”, Middle Eastern Studies I X (1973), 43-60. Sivan, Emmanuel, “Modern Arab Historiography of the Crusades”, Asian and African Studies (Jerusalem) V I I I (1972), 109-49. Tibawi, À. L . , “ T . E . Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann: The 1919 A t t e m p t t o Secure a n Arab Balfour Declaration”, Royal Central

Asian Journal L V I (1969), 156-63.

Index

Aaronsohn, Aaron - 136, 245 Abbas H i l m i I I - 104, 249, 256 A b d al-Hadi, Awwni - 7f., 39, 41, 60, 76, 81, 84f., 94f., 99-101, 103, 113,116, 122-5, 148, 159-62, 1 7 6 f .248, , 254f. Abdallah ibnHusain - 9, 28, 51-4, 90, 106, 113f., 116, 241f., 251, 255, 258

Abdul Hamid (Sultan)

-

134

Advisory Council - see: Palestine Advisory Council À

gudat Israel — 248, 259

Arab state i n Palestine - 24, 116, 121

Arabic language - 7, 23f., 32, 66, 137, 152f., 201, 215, 220, 228

Arlosoroff, DrHayim - 7, 93,95 Armenians - 30. See also: À rabArmenian-Zionist Entente Arqash, Rizqallah - 18, 23, 133 Arslan, Adil - 67, 255 Arslan, Shakib — 60, 94, 203f. al-Asali, Shukri - 14, 20 al-A tassi, Hashim - 67

al-Azm,Haqqi - 18

Ahad ha-Am - 234 Ahdab, Khair ad-Din - 254 al-A hram — 18 al-A khbar — 243

al-Azm, Rafiq - 14, 18, 32, 132 A z m i , M a h m u d - 104, 106, 256 Azouri, Najib — 12,15

al-Alami, Musa - 86(n.48) Allenby, Gen. E . - 29, 43

Baghdad - 209, 221

Anglo-Palestine Bank - 71 A m m a n - 105f., 155, 257 A m m u n , Iksandar - 18

Balfour, Arthur James - 34, 136, 143 Balfour Declaration - 29-32, 35, 38, 40, 44, 46, 49f., 52, 54-6, 61, 67, 73, 76, 84, 86, 99, 106, 113, 119f., 146, 153, 155f., 158-60, 165, 16971,174,178, 182-8, 192, 201, 210, 221-3, 230 al-Barghuthi, Omar Salih — 99f., 224f., 253, 255 Basle — 15 Bayhum, A h m a d Mukhtar - 18, 20, 23,133 Beirut - 18f., 21, 96, 131, 133f. Ben-Avi, I t t a m a r - 54f., 103, 115, 163f., 242, 248, 256, 259 Ben-Gurion, David - 7, 9, 53, 92, 251 , 1 1 5 , 1 2 5242, Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak - 81 Bitar, A b d ar-Rauf- 33

Arab À gency Proposal - 50, 72, 211 Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente - 30-2, 35 Arab Congresses - 19, 48, 50f., 71, 76,131, 205, 209, 230. See also: Congress o f Parties; S y r i a n Congress

Arab Decentralization Party — 14f., 18f., 28,116,121 Arab E xecutive - see: Palestine A r a b Executive Arab federation - 39, 41, 52f., 61, 100f., 116, 120, 122, 148, 192, 204, 216, 223, 229, 236

Arab

H i g h e r Committee -

Arab Revolt (1916) - 29

23

Bailey, M . - 86f.(n.49)

271

272

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

bi-nationalism - 54, 65, 92, 100, 124, 224, 261

Binyamin, Rabbi - see: Radler Feldman

Declaration (Anglo-French) o f 1918 — 221 Deedes, Sir Wyndham - 59, 242 de Haan, Jacob - 258f.

Braude, Isaiah - 81

Development Scheme for

Brit-Shalom association — 89 Brumana - 21, 23

Palestine - 106f. Dizengoff, Meir - 71 Doar ha- Yom — 54f. Druze — 77

Cairo - 18-20, 28, 31-3, 55-60, 87, 113, 131-3, 135, 137, 164, 191f., 199, 204, 216, 235 Camhy, Ovadia - 104 cantonization — 124, 256 Capitulation Âgreements - 24, 234 Carlsbad - 48, 165, 172, 178, 184 Cecil, Lord Robert - 143 Chancellor, Sir John - 86, 88, 92, 98, 102f., 105-7, 209, 255 Christian-M uslim relations — 31, 77, 197f. Churchill, Winston - 47-9, 52, 168, 1 7 1 , 1 8 2184, , 187

Churchill White Paper (1922) - 50, 118 Circassians — 77 Clauson - 168f. Clayton, SirGilbert F . - 31, 351. 138-40, 142 Cohen, Ben V . - 159f. Colonial Office - 49, 58f., 84, 87, 101-3, 105, 158-90, 225f. Congress o f parties o f t h e

Confederation o f Arab Countries — 191-200. See also: Syrian U n i o n Party Constantinople -

25, 135. See also:

Istanbul Crusaders - 126 Czechoslovakia - 228 Daghir, Asad - 20, 134f. ad-Dajani, Abdallah — 75

ad-Dajani, A r i f- 70 ad-Dajani, Hasan Sidqui - 254 Damascus - 30, 37-9, 42, 44, 47, 52,

54, 67-9, 87, 142f., 209f., 212f., 216f. Darwaza, I z z a t — 43f. (n.52) Dawjah, Taysir — 254

Eder, D r M . David - 45, 55f,, 59f., 185, 196, 240 Egypt - 6, 21, 34, 57, 96, 103, 105, 133, 1 3 5 f .141, , 203 elected assembly, elective institutions — see: legislative council Epstein, D r Yitzhak - 234, 259 Executive Council - see: Palestine Executive Council

Faisal i b n Husain - 28, 30, 34, 36-

46, 49, 51-4, 56, 58, 61, 67f., 83, 104, 116, 120-2, 138-51, 153-62, 176f., 197-9, 208f., 221-4, 236, 253, 255, 260 Fakhuri, Georges — 20 Falastin — 21, 23, 105 Farbstein, Hershel - 251 Farmers’ Parties — 64, 112, 254

Farraj, Yaqub - 245 Feiwel, D r Berthold - 168f. Felman, S. - 67f.,69(n.25), 78(n.55) Foreign Office - 32, 96

France - 29, 36, 38-41, 44-6, 52, 59f., 142-4, 148, 157, 161, 204f., 236, 238 Frankfurter, Felix - 38, 42, 149-51 Friedenwald, D r Harry - 234

Frumkin, Judge Gad - 9, 75 Fuad (King of Egypt) — 113 Gaza - 29 Geneva - 94 G e r m a n y- 28, 132, 139, 141, 181 Ghanem, Shukri - 148 a l - G h u s s a i n , Tawfiq - 259 al-Ghussain, Yu s u f- 259

Goitein, Dr. —- 219 Great Britain - 28-31, 34f., 37-41,

273

INDEX

44-7, 49-53, 57-9, 72, 80, 84, 86, 88, 90, 93£., 96, 100-3, 106-9, 113f., 117-19, 136f., 139, 144f.,

al-Husaini, Kamil - 33, 98, 177 al-Husaini, M a h m u d - 205

147f., 157£, 160f., 168-90, 204£,

69f., 78, 157-9, 168-87, 205-8, 245, 254 al-Husaini, Said - 20 al-Husaini, Shukri - 20 al-Husaini, Tahir - 98, 254 Hyamson, Albert M . - 9 , 148f.

210, 214f, 217f, 221f., 236, 238, 248, 256 H a d a s s a h o r g a n i s a t i o n — 64 hagana - 62, 83, 92 Haifa - 45, 48, 50f., 58, 71 al-Hajj Ibrahim, Rashid - 76

Halpern,Ben - 60f. Halpern, George — 168f. Hamad, al-Hajj Tawfiq - 33 H a n k i n , Yehoshua - 68f., 162f. Haram ash-Sharif - 104 Harkabi, Y . - 6f. Hashemites - 53, 105, 236

Hashim, Najib - 68f., 162f. ha-Shomer — 11,13 Hebrew language ~ 23f., 66, 68, 124,

152f., 155, 157, 201, 215, 220, 228 Hebrew University — 84, 92, 218 Hebron - 82

Hejaz — 141, 145, 158, 197, 201, 204

al-Husaini, MusaKazim - 33, 49,

I b n Sa’ud, King Abd al-Aziz - 87, 251, 253 i m m i g r a t i o n - see: Jewish immigra-

tion al-Inglizi, Muhammad - 20

Iraq - 29, 52, 83, 96, 135, 204, 221, 223. See also: Mesopotamia al-Isa, Y u s u f- 23 Istanbul - 18-20. See also: Constantinople I s t i g l a l Party — 255 al-Jabiri, Ihsan - 60, 67, 76, 204 Jabotinsky, V l a d i m i r — 99

Jacobson, D r Victor - 18-20, 22, 131, 134f,

Hejaz Railway - 213

Jaffa - 21, 29, 48f., 81, 98

H i g h Commissioner for Pales-

Jamal, Shibli - 33, 168f., 173 Jerusalem - 29, 33, 42, 48, 58f., 72,

— 43, 47, 72-4, 86, 88, 98, 172, 174, 177, 196, 211-16, 219f., 225f. tine

Hochberg, Sami — 18f., 131-4

Hoefler, Jacques - 259 Hogarth message — 35

Holy Places - 32, 55, 80-3, 97, 136f., 144, 146, 163, 167-9, 173f., 216, 233, 243 Husain ibn À l i - 28f., 35, 55, 139, 141f., 192, 197 al-Husaini family — 72, 74-7 al-Husaini, al-Hajj (Muhammad)

A m i n - 67f., 75, 80, 82f., 87f., 98, 100f., 104, 112, 217f., 224, 234, 247, 253-5 al-Husaini, Ismail — 33 al-Husaini, Jamal - 23, 73-6, 81, 84,

103, 111, 125f., 217, 240, 245f., 254f.,259 al-Husaini, Jamil — 245

74-6, 80, 82, 85, 87, 90, 98, 102, 164, 245, 259 Jeune Turc - 18f., 132 Jewish Agency for Palestine — 9, 50,

72, 83-5, 88f., 95f., 98, 100-2, 104, 114, 203, 210-3, 220, 227 Jewish Chronicle - 40f., 153-7, 160-2 Jewish Colonization Association ( I C A )- 21 Jewish immigration t o Palestine - 10,14, 19, 25, 27, 32, 40,

43, 49f.,55f., 62, 65, 67f., 73, 75, 77, 85, 88f., 92, 99, 102, 118-21, 124, 132-4, 136, 144, 146, 153-5, 157f£, 160, 163, 166, 171-3, 178£, 185, 193, 202f., 208, 211f,, 214,

219, 223, 225-9 Jewish majority i n Palestine — 41, 119-21, 123, 125, 155, 160, 203, 208

274

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Jewish National F u n d - 11

“The Jewish Peril” - 48 Jewish state i n Palestine - 5, 16, 40, 55, 136, 139, 141, 155, 164

Joint Bureau ofJewish Public Bodies

Levy, D r Yitzhak — 81 Lichtheim, Richard - 20, 25f., 115f. Lissan al-Arab — 243

London - 31, 37, 52, 54, 69, 71, 84-6, 90, 101-3, 106f., 143, 164

Luke, Harry Charles — 81 Lunn, Mr (M.P.) - 217

i n Palestine - 89, 96-9, 103

Joyce, Col. P.C. - 140, 142

Lutfallah, Habib - 60 Kagan, D r Helen - 205

Kalvaryski, Hayim Margaliut - 21, 23, 60, 65-71, 73, 76, 91, 93, 97-103, 114, 152f., 196, 203f., 224f., 227-31, 234, 253-5, 259 Karam, D r Rashid - 68f., 162f. al-Karmil - 21, 23, 58 al-Khadra, Subhi - 81, 254 Khalid, Hasan - 254 al-Khalidi, Nasif- 20-3, 259 Khouri, Emile — 55f., 200 al-Khouri, Faris — 20 King-Crane Commission — 4 0

Kisch, Col. Frederick H . - 53, 63, 70, 73, 75, 85f., 92f., 95-8, 100-8, 113-15, 125, 204f., 251 K o h n , D r (Agudat Israel) — 248 K o h n , D r Leo - 83 K u r d A l i , M u h a m m a d - 20, 22 Labour-Zionists - 92, 113, 251 land purchase - 11f., 23, 32, 43, 62, 68, 71f., 75, 77f., 85, 99, 102, 107, 116, 136-8, 144, 178f., 225-7 Landman, Samuel - 159-62 Lausanne - 69 Lawrence, Col. T . E . - 37, 87, 143, 149 League o f Nations — 47,51, 62, 83, 164-6, 170, 180, 186, 212, 214, 219f. See also: M a n d a t e League o f N a t i o n s Covenant

(art.

22) - 164 Lebanon - 9, 21, 29, 54, 68f., 93, 162f.,216 legislative council proposals — 50, 55, 72-7, 85, 88, 90, 96, 100-2, 111, 120f., 166, 172-4, 210-12, 2 1 4 219, 223, 225f,, 229-31, 251 L e v i n , D r S h a m y a h u - 159-62

Levy, Joseph - 217f.

M a ’ a n - 177 MacDonald,J .Ramsay - 85f., 102, 227; his letter to Weizmann (1931) - 86f., 105-7, 111, 260 MacDonald White Paper

(1939) - 260

al-M adi, Malin - 50, 67f. Magnes, Dr Judah L . - 9, 84, 87-92, 97, 101-3, 114, 123£., 213-16, 218f., 250f. Malul, Nissim - 20 Mandate for Palestine - 44, 47, 4952, 57-62, 76, 86, 90, 106, 109, 113, 121, 160f., 166, 169f., 181, 184-6, 189, 193, 195, 201, 203, 210f., 225, 256 Mandate for Syria - 44, 59f., 193 M c M a h o n - H u s a i n correspondence - 29, 55, 192, 201

Mecca - 28 Meinertzhagen, Col.

Richard - 168f. Menasche, Baron Félix de - 55, 196 Merriman, Sir Boyd - 248 Mesopotamia — 41, 57, 154f., 161,

191, 197, 201. See also: Iraq Meyuhas, Y osef- 159, 234 Mills, E r i c - 168f., 187-9 Milson, Menahem - 259f. Mirat ash-Sharg — 243 M u’azzin, Y u s u f- 68f., 162f. Mufti ofJerusalem - see: al-

Husaini, al-Hajj Amin (1921 et. seq.) or al-Husaini, Kamil (pre1921) Muhammad Ali, Prince (Egypt) - 247 M u k h l i s , Abdallah - 23

Municipalities Ordinance (1926) - 74

275

INDEX al-Mugattam — 95 al-Mugtabas — 21

parity — 124 partition - 124, 180

Muslim-Christian Association — 31, 51, 56, 64f., 70, 75, 77, 114 M u s l i m National Association — 64, 112

Passfield, Lord - 85-8, 90, 102, 105,

Najjar, Salim - 18, 133 an-Nashashibi family — 72, 77, 102, 177f£, 259 an-Nashashibi, Raghib - 20, 70, 746, 85, 245, 254 Nasif, Sulaiman - 32, 74, 135f. Nathan, M a j o r H. L . — 84(n.27), 248 national self-determination — 30f., 121 Nationalist Group i n Syria and Lebanon - 68f., 162f. Neumann, Emmanuel - 251 New York Times - 87, 217f. Newcombe, Col. S.F. - 9

Nimr, D r Faris — 32, 135f. Novomeyski, Moshe - 9

Occupied E nemy Territory Administration (South) - 30f., 111 Oliver, Daniel - 93-6, 103f. Ormsby-Gore, W i l l i a m — 35, 135-7 Palestine - see also: A r a b Con-

gresses; legislative council; Mand a t e ; S u p r e m e Muslim Council

Palestine Advisory Council - 50, 70, 72 Palestine

Arab d e l e g a t i o n s — 49f,

54, 56, 69, 84f., 94, 100, 107f, 168-90, 226f., 248 Palestine Arab Executive — 23, 33, 48, 69, 72-5, 85f., 100f., 105-7, 111f., 123, 217, 224, 254f. Palestine Arab National Party - 64 Palestine Committee (Cairo) - 137f. Palestine: proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n

-50,172,175,214,228 Palestine Zionist Executive - 53, 55, 57, 64f., 70, 73, 75f., 81, 96, 98, 115, 204 Paris — 19, 38f., 131, 149, 157, 160, 177. See also: Peace Conference

209f., 216f. Passfield W h i t e Paper

(1930) - 85f., 122f., 249 Peace Conference (Paris) - 30, 36f,,

136, 144-7, 149, 151, 161, 177 Philby, H. StJohn - 87-93, 209-13, 216-20, 241, 250f. P i c o t , Georges - 29. See also: Sykes press — 16f,, 19-21, 24f., 38f., 45, 56,

63f., 69, 78, 86, 94f., 97, 104, 108, 112, 116, 132f., 193, 224, 226, 243 preventive diplomacy - 26, 62f., 77,

96f., 126 Qadri, D r A h m a d - 148 al-Qassab, Kamil - 32, 55

Radler-Feldman,Y. - 12 representative government/institutions - see: legislative council Réveil de la nation arabe — 12, 15 Revisionist-Zionists — 80, 118f. Rida, M u h a m m a d Rashid - 17f., DSf., 199 riots: 1919-20 - 42, 48, 62, 111, 113; 1921 - 47-9, 62, 71, 81, 111, 113,

175, 180f.; expected 1922 — 1935, 243; 1929 - 76, 80-4, 86f£., 89, 91, 96f.,99, 101, 103, 108, 110f., 113, 127, 229f.,247 Ro’i, Y aacov — 16, 25 Romans - 154 Rome - 58, 196, 198f. Rosh Pina - 21 Rothschild, James de - 54f., 163f. round-table conference - 9, 20, 104, 107, 135, 217, 249, 256 Rubinstein, Ben — 248 R u p p i n , Dr A r t h u r - 11, 21, 57, 60, 65, 234, 249 Russia - 29, 49, 181 Rutenberg, Pinhas — 9, 101-3, 225-7, 255 Sabri, Hasan - 259

276

FUTILE D I P L O M A C Y

Sacher, Harry - 248, 251 el-Sadat, Anwar — 6 Safed - 82 as-Sa’id, N u r i — 9

Said-Ruete, Rudolphe - 103 St James Conference - 9, 260 Samaritans - 77 Samne,D r Georges - 148

SirHerbert - 29, 43, 47-9, Samuel, 73f. San Remo - 31, 44, 47 Saphir, Ascher - 55f., 60, 194, 198, 200-3, 236, 259 Sasson, E l i a h u - 244 self-government, self-governing institutions — see: legislative council Sephardi Jews - 112 Sèvres Treaty - 169 Sfeir, Najib — 68f., 162f., 244 ash-Shahbandar, D r A b d arRahman - 20, 23, 32 Shahin, Sa’id - 20 Shammas, I b r a h i m - 50, 168f. Sharett - see: Shertok Shaw Commission o f Inquiry - 82,

84f. 89,97, 101, 111, 227, 230

Shawa, al-Hajj Sa’id — 75 Shawkat A l i - 104, 253 Shertok, Moshe - 7, 168f. Shihade, D r A n t u n - 68f., 162f. Shihadeh, Bulos - 225 Shuckburgh, Sr J o h n - 49, 59, 16887

Shugair, Najib — 20 Shugair, Sa’id - 32, 135f. Shugairi, Ahmad - 251 as-Swasa — 256 Sieff, Israel — 248

as-Sulh, R i d a - 68 Supreme M u s l i m Council - 75, 80, 112, 209, 213, 217, 224 Sursuk family - 145 Switzerland — 224 Sykes, Sir Mark - 29-31, 35, 42 Sykes-Picot Agreement - 29, 37f.,

40, 143, 223 Syria - 9, 19-21, 25, 28f., 34, 36, 38-45, 51f., 57-60, 65, 68, 87, 96, 113, 131-3, 135, 140, 148, 150, 154f., 157, 161-3, 191, 201, 221, 223, 235 Syrian Congress — 40, 42f., 68 Syrian Union Party - 55f., 113. See also: Congress o fParties Syro-Palestine Committee — 94, 200-3 Taalat B e y - 1 7

Tabbarah, A h m a d - 18 Tamimi, A m i n - 33

Tamimi, Rafiq - 67f. Tannous, Izzat - 9 T h o n , D r Yaakov - 21, 23, 259 Tiberias - 82 The Times — 42 Tolkowsky, Samuel - 71, 106 (n. 158) Transjordan - 29, 52f., 87, 102, 105, 204, 2 1 3 f .223, , 226 Turkey ~ 14-23, 26, 28-30, 109, 117, 133, 139, 141, 144, 236 United States of America - 30, 37, 44, 60, 66, 94, 139f., 142f., 145, 161, 188, 234, 252 Ussishkin, Menahem - 33, 99, 1579, 259

Simpson, Sir John Hope - 85, 249 Smilansky, Moshe — 9, 245, 247 Sokolow, Nahum - 14, 20, 42, 60,

196 Southern Syria - 121 Sprinzak, Y osef- 66 Stein, Kenneth W . — 248 Stein, LeonardJ. - 163, 168f., 204f.

as-Sulh, Riad — 54f., 60, 67f., 113, 163f., 242, 247, 254f.

Vaad Leumi — 101 V a a dZ mani — 65-7

van Vriesland, S. À . - 198f., 242

Wailing Wall -

see: W e s t e r n

Wall

Warburg,Felix — 92(n.78), 94, 96, 251

Western Wall dispute - 77, 80-3, 95, 98, 118, 209, 224, 230, 246

277

INDEX

Weizmann, D r C h a i m - 28-30, 3241, 44-6, 49-54, 56-60, 84-6, 91, 94, 96, 101, 103-6, 115, 135-47, 149, 151, 154, 160, 163f., 168-90, 196, 198f., 204f., 207-9, 248, 255, 258; his relations w i t h Faisal — 31, 34, 36-46, 49, 51-3, 56, 58, 61, 104, 122, 138-47, 149-51, 154, 157f, 176f., 199, 208f.

World Islamic Council - 104 W ormser, Gaston — 243

White Paper - see: Churchill

Zionist Congresses — 15, 48, 53f., 56,

(1922); Passfield (1930); Mac-

Donald (1939) Wilson, President Woodrow - 37, 149

Wise, D r

Stephen - 37

Wolfenson - 163

Yellin, David - 57, 259 az-Zahrawi, À b d al-Hamid - 19 Zionist Commission t o Palestine — 32f., 35, 45, 68, 135-8, 141 91, 97, 108, 122, 165, 172, 178, 184, 208 Zionist Executive (London) - 71 Zionist Organisation - 18f., 39, 41, 54, 69, 145, 147, 149, 151, 16287, 189-91, 195, 202, 204, 248

Since the 1880s, Arab-Zionist relations have been characterised primarily b y

escalating tension, struggle and violence. While each party in this dispute has had its fair share of experience of the other as active belligerent, little has been written about the extent to which each has dealt with the other a s a negotiating partner.

Dr Caplan’s sober study fills a gap in the literature by analysing the numerous — but fruitless — attempts made by Arab and Zionist spokesmen to find that elusive

formula by which their conflicting aims and interests in Palestine might have been reconciled. Beginning with the first recorded attempt at a n Arab-Zionist accord in 1913-14, this first volume of Futile Diplomacy goes o n to re-examine

the famous Weizmann-Faisal agreement of 1919, and sheds new light on lesserknown episodes which took place in the years leading u p to and immediately following the 1929 Palestine riots.

Rather than looking at each encounter a s a missed opportunity a n d seeking to

apportion blame for its ultimate failure, the author focuses on five interrelated factors: (1) the motives for negotiating, (2) the

timing of contacts, (3) the status of the negotiating partners, (4) the role and interests of third-parties, and (5) the proposed terms of agreement. The texts of thirty-six original documents of the period are reproduced, many published for the first time.

Early behind-the-scenes negotiations continued sporadically against a background of deteriorating Arab-Jewish relations and a growing pessimism and

Futile diplomacy / 336875 |

JEL]

3 6307 00203584 5

cynicism of leaders on both sides. Yet, in the course of their futile attempts, wouldbe negotiators learned much about their opposite-numbers’ aims and tactics. Leaders gained valuable experience from these early encounters, and reciprocal attitudes and patterns of interaction developed which would become more

deeply-ingrained in later decades. One such pattern was the repeated attempt to overcome the bitter local contradictions

between Palestinian Arabs and Zionists through an agreement between the latter and non-Palestinian Arab representatives.

The picture which emerges from this volume is one of parties in conflict learning how to use the negotiating process for their own ends, short of contemplating any substantial compromises i n their ultimate —

and inherently irreconcilable — national goals. During the period under review,

neither side felt that the worsening conflict required it to make any major concessions for the sake of an agreement with the other.

Neil Caplan, author of Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925 (Cass, 1978), teaches Humanities at Vanier

College, Montréal, Canada. His articles on the historical development of the ArabIsraeli conflict have appeared i n the

Journal of Contemporary History, ha-Mizrah he-Hadash, the Wiener Library Bulletin and the Jerusalem Quarterly.