FUE EL ESTADO: How the Mexican Government Got Away With Murder

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FUE EL ESTADO: How the Mexican Government Got Away with Murder

Abby Milonas HIST 498 Senior Paper 1 December 2017

“Mexico: Mother to Foreigners, Stepmother to Mexicans.”1 This quote originated as a critique of the Porfiriato, the period roughly from 1876-1911 during which Mexico was under the control of the dictator Porfirio Díaz. It gives reference to Díaz’s attempts to modernize Mexico so as to legitimize the country in the eyes of the United States, then led by President Ulysses S. Grant. The quote can equally be applied to policies adopted by the the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) during the early- to mid-twentieth century. The PRI, which had originated as a staunchly left party and aimed to uphold the socialist principles of the Mexican Revolution, stayed in power from 1929 to 2000. The early decades of its rule saw enormous economic growth and the transformation of Mexico into a major player on the world stage, particularly after World War II. This era is known to historians as the “Mexican Miracle.” The supposed miracle, however, did not apply to every stratum of Mexican society, as would become evident in the 1950s-60s. Economic travails prompted a series of labor strikes which the PRI swiftly crushed. This would spiral into a circle of violence and corruption so antithetical to the revolutionary principles on which the new government had been founded that it gave way to a movement which challenged the very Constitutional legitimacy of the PRI’s rule. The movement is primarily defined by the participation of university students, in particular during the late summer of 1968, and so is commonly referred to by historians as the Mexican Student Movement of 1968. This period was marked by institutional violence and systemic oppression of protesters. Through their monopoly on popular media and extralegal means such as the use of ​granaderos​,2 the PRI disguised the true depths of its corruption and its violent suppression of the ‘68 protest movement. In the late summer of 2014, two events occurred which mark the point at which the two halves of my life are severed. The first occurred on 9 August, in the tiny town of Ferguson, Missouri. That day, at about noontime, Michael Brown, Jr. was shot in cold blood by police

William Schell, ​Integral Outsiders: The American Colony in Mexico City, 1876-1911​, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp. ix. 2 In Spanish, this word is derived from “grenadier” and typically refers to an elevated class of soldier who would stand at the head of a military regiment and whose primary weapon would be a hand grenade. In the context of Mexico ‘68, the granaderos were a heavily militarized police unit which was frequently employed by the government to suppress student protests in Mexico City. This latter definition is the one I will be using in this paper. 1

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officer Darren Wilson.3 It was an event which sparked a national debate over the nature of racism and relations between police and minority groups in the United States. Everywhere you went it was all that people talked about, and everyone had an opinion- oftentimes based on shaky, if not completely false evidence. It seemed that everyone in my life split into different camps: those on the side of the police, and those on the side of the protesters. I placed myself vehemently within the latter. It became an acquaintance litmus test- ​What’s your sign, where are you from, do you support the extralegal slaughter of unarmed black Americans by the police? It became commonplace for me to cut out friends and even family members over something which, to me, was then intrinsic to my identity. What struck me most during that period of my life was how very ​wrong so much of the information circulating was. Conservative networks such as Fox News, Breitbart, and Rush Limbaugh were spreading rumors or outright lies about protesters’ actions and motives. In one instance, for example, a group of protesters chanting “No more killer cops” was misinterpreted as a call to “kill cops”.4 Black-owned businesses in Ferguson suffered robberies due to out-of-town agitators seizing on the chaos, but news outlets claimed that protesters were looting stores.5 Claims that protests “turned violent” were rampant, though many news outlets neglected to mention that it was the police who arrived in riot gear and shot rubber bullets, noise cannons, and tear gas at completely unarmed protesters.6 Nearly all the “evidence” against protesters was totally misconstrued or outright made up. What is even more frightening is the string of deaths following Michael Brown’s murder. Whether these things had always occurred and America was just waking up to them, or whether the outrage surrounding the events in Ferguson led to an increase in police violence against African Americans (I believe both of these conditions to be true, although the latter has increased with the passage of time and especially since the 2016 presidential election), there was suddenly much more attention being paid to the issue of police murdering black civilians in the United 3

United States Department of Justice,​ Department of Justice Report Regarding the Criminal Investigation Into the Shooting Death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer Darren Wilson​, 2015. 4 Kim LaCapria, “Chants Encounter,” ​Snopes,​ 18 July 2016. 5 Jason Hancock, “‘Outside agitators’ worsening unrest in Ferguson, Mo., residents say,” ​The Kansas City Star​, 2014. 6 Margaret Hartmann, “National Guard Deployed After Chaotic, Violent Night in Ferguson,” ​New York Magazine 2014.

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States. Names such as John Crawford, Tamir Rice, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Kajieme Powell, and Yvette Smith began to crop up in news reports with increasing frequency, and not always to the benefit of their memory. It became common practice for moderate or even more liberal mediums such as the ​New York Times and ​Huffington Post to smear victims’ names by using mugshots or similarly unflattering photos in broadcasts, presenting rumors of insignificant or false criminal charges as proven fact, citing negative attributes such as divorce or alcoholism, sometimes not of the victims themselves but of members of their family, as evidence of their poor upbringing; in essence, doing their best to justify the deaths of innocent, unarmed civilians, while presenting actual, white criminals (the Bundy brothers, Dylann Roof, Jed Frazier, Julia Shields) as kind, peaceful, “lone wolves” who “never seemed like the kind of person to do something like this.”7 To me, the hypocrisy of the media seemed so obvious. I couldn’t understand how people were able to trust news outlets which published inaccurate or blatantly false information. There were videos, photos, audio recordings, verbal and written testimony, and physical evidence, to say nothing about the established history of human rights violations by American police. I was appalled by the willingness of the public, my own family members and close friends among them, to unquestioningly follow the popular narrative perpetuated by the media. I gleaned most of my own information from social media and blog posts by people present at the scenes of the events in question. Firsthand witnesses, in my mind, though not purely objective, were the truest and most reliable sources. The second groundshifting event occurred less than two months later. On 26 September 2014, around one hundred students from the ​Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural Teachers College of Ayotzinapa, in Tixtla, Guerrero, Mexico, traveled to Iguala, Guerrero. Their exact motives are not entirely certain. An article from the Mexican newspaper ​El Universal c​ laims that the students intended to take part in a protest against María de los Ángeles Pineda Villa, wife of Iguala’s then-mayor José Luis Abarca Velázquez, whose rule was marked by corruption and whose family held close ties with local cartels.8 An article in the ​New Yorker written by Francisco Goldman claims that the students stopped in Iguala because they needed to obtain two more buses to transport everyone to their ultimate destination. They did not know that Pineda Villa 7 8

German Lopez and Soo Oh, “Police killings since Ferguson, in one map,” ​Vox​ 2017. Redacción Red Política, “PERFIL Abarca y Pineda, la ‘narcopareja’ que gobernó Iguala,” ​El Universal​, 2014.

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would be holding a conference that evening, nor were they aware of her close familial ties with the Guerreros Unidos cartel.9 Another account from ​Fusion ​features a video created by Ayotzinapa students, showing them working on their vegetable garden. The students, who are largely children of rural ​campesinos,​ or Mexican peasant farmers, do not have to pay to attend the school, but rather sell the produce which they grow themselves on the grounds. The ​Fusion video says that the students were going to Iguala in order to sell their produce.10 As the latter source was created by actual Ayotzinapa students, it is tempting to believe that its narrative is much closer to the truth. Whatever their motive, Mexican Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam confirmed11 that Iguala’s mayor, concerned that the students’ actions may interrupt the conference his wife was holding, ordered Iguala police to detain the students. Of the original hundred, fifty-seven went missing, though fourteen of those returned to their families within days. The remaining forty-three still have not been found. Shortly after the attack, José Luis Abarca Velázquez and María de los Ángeles Pineda Villa disappeared and were later found, and eventually confessed to ordering the attack. Initially, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto was supportive of the efforts to locate the students and claimed to be investing resources into it. Less than two months later, on 7 November 2014, Karam held a press conference in which he announced that the students’ bodies had been found. Two members of the Guerreros Unidos cartel had admitted to kidnapping the students and burning their bodies, then dumping the remains in plastic bags which they deposited in the San Juan river. Karam pronounced the case finished, and concluded the conference by saying “Ya me cansé”- “I’m tired”, or “I’ve had enough”. This throwaway comment became a rallying point for many protesters, who used it to express their frustration with the state’s poor handling of the situation.12 In truth, the remains which had been found in the San Juan had no genetic correlation with any of the missing students. The gang members claimed that they had burned the remains in a dump outside the town of Cocula, but an experiment conducted in September of 2016 by fire scientist José Torero demonstrated that a fire necessary to destroy that many carcasses would Francisco Goldman, “Crisis in Mexico: The Disappearance of the Forty-Three,” ​New Yorker​, 24 October 2014. Manuel Rueda, “See exclusive video of missing Ayotzinapa students before their disappearance,” ​Fusion​, 2014. 11 Milenio Digital, “Abarca ordenó atacar a normalistas, confirma PGR,” ​El Universal,​ 2014. 12 Kari Paul, “Mexico’s Missing 43: A timeline of a mass kidnapping,” ​Mashable​, 2014. 9

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require an immense amount of wood- 20,000-40,000 kg, or approximately 44,000-88,000 lbsand that such a fire would not only have to burn for days, but would be incapable of destroying every bit of organic matter in the remains (the ashes which investigators found at the river contained almost no organic matter). Further, there simply were no signs of a fire of that magnitude occurring at the dump.13 A mass grave where the gang members said they had deposited more remains contained no physical evidence of the young men in question, but investigators found four more mass graves in the area- none of which corresponded with the bodies for which they were searching. Locals knew that the region was a popular burial place for the Guerreros Unidos, so it was not much of a surprise to most.14 Thousands of people are “disappeared” (​desaparecidos)​ every year in Mexico, mainly in connection with the cartels which exercise an alarming level of governmental control on the local and federal level.15 Despite the scientific evidence to the contrary, the Peña Nieto administration gave up on the search for the missing 43, prompting a wave of nation- and worldwide protests in support of the students and their families. I, too, found myself swept up in the movement. Like with the shooting of Michael Brown, I was exasperated and infuriated by the incompetence and corruption of the law enforcement system. Two years later, in the fall of 2016, I enrolled in a class called Latin American Cities in Historical Perspective, taught by my advisor, Dr. Lisa P. Covert, author of ​San Miguel de Allende: Mexicans, Foreigners, and the Making of a World Heritage Site​. At the time, I could not have imagined how much the class would have influenced the trajectory of my historical career. It was there that I first learned of the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre, the day on which the Mexican government murdered several hundred protesters in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, and the means by which the scale of the violence was kept from the public. I was struck by the similarities between the events of 1968 and 2014. The Mexican student movement became a focal point of my studies from then on. In this essay I aim to synthesize accounts of the massacre and the months of protest leading up to it from a variety of different perspectives, and through

Lizzie Wade, “‘Burning bodies’ experiment casts doubt on fate of missing Mexican students,” ​Science​, 13 September 2016. 14 Paul, “Mexico’s Missing 43,” 2014. 15 Alexander Dawson, “Politicians, Narcos, Missing Students, and Mexico’s Crisis,” ​Simons Papers in Security and Development​ No. 47 (2015). 13

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that synthesis demonstrate the disparities between the official narrative and that of the protesters and the degree to which the Mexican government attempted to obscure the truth of its corruption.

I “Al asegurar la continuidad gubernamental, el Partido ha sido un instrumento de paz y estabilidad.”16

Mexico was the first “developing” country to be chosen to host the Olympic games-17 but this statement in itself demonstrates the complexities of Mexico’s role on the international stage during the 1960s. The country was experiencing the tail end of a nearly three-decade-long period of economic growth and political stability which historians have dubbed the “Mexican Miracle”. In the immediate years following the end of the Mexican Revolution and the ascension of the PRI, Mexico’s presidents embraced the socialist ideals which had defined the revolution.18 Official policy was starkly anti-traditional, such as the reclamation and redistribution of land by the government to the peasants and the suppression of the Catholic Church.19 Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Ruiz Cortines employed public works programs which improved infrastructure, Miguel Alemán instituted devaluations which stabilized the peso, and Adolfo López Mateos established social welfare programs which benefitted Mexico’s burgeoning industries. These gains, however, were experienced almost exclusively by members of the economic elite. The devaluations of the peso in 1948 and 1954, while beneficial to investors, caused severe inflation with which rising wages could not possibly hope to keep pace. The boons of the “Miracle” did not extend far beyond the borders of the elite urban centers.20 The Miracle created another legacy besides class disparity: the ideological shift of the PRI from leftist to moderate. The years leading up to the second World War saw the PRI inching further and further right in an attempt to appeal to the United States. The socialist policies of the

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“To ensure governmental continuity, the Party has been an instrument of peace and stability.” Octavio Paz​, “México: la última década,” University of Texas Press, 1969, pp. 14. 17 Eric Zolov, “Discovering a Land ‘Mysterious and Obvious’: The Renarrativizing of Postrevolutionary Mexico,” in Fragments of a Golden Age,​ edited by Gilbert Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, & Eric Zolov, 234-272, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 258. 18 Elaine Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico,​ Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 18-19. 19 Zolov, “Discovering a Land,” in ​Fragments of a Golden Age,​ 2001, pp. 237. 20 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 18-22.

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immediate postrevolutionary era had become unnerving to a United States entering the early stages of what would become the Cold War, and so its nearest southern neighbor was unable to reap the benefits of the occidental world.21 Mexico initially remained neutral, but after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, President Manuel Ávila Camacho pledged aid to the United States and severed Mexico’s ties with the Axis powers.22 America began to see Mexico as an ally in the growing fight against Communism. Tourism from the United States to Mexico exploded within a few short years as Camacho and the Mexican Tourist Association seized on and promoted this image of a modernized Mexico, a true twentieth-century country but still retaining a splash of the “exotic”. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, although Mexico did not end ties with Cuba, President López Mateos separated himself from Castro, denounced communism abroad, and punished Mexican communists and labor unions. This solidified the country’s place in the Cold War, tucked snugly within the bosom of the United States as American investments began to pour into Mexican industry.23 The situation turned sour with the beginning of the labor strikes in the late 1950s. First came the 1958 telephone workers’ strike, which called for increased wages and more reasonable hours. This was accompanied by strikes by railroad and petroleum workers, the electricians’ union, secondary and university instructors, and more. Though these protests were handled brutally by the granaderos, the government could not entirely cover up the fervor which had infected the working class.24 Scholar Elaine Carey suggests that these strikes contributed significantly to the air of protest which influenced the student movement of 1968. Indeed, she cites ideologue José Revueltas, who stated: “The 1968 movement is not an isolated historical process, but it has its roots in the lack of independence of the working class and the repression of 1958, ten years earlier, against the railroad workers”.25 These manifestations of class consciousness would contribute to the revolutionary spirit of 1968. The strikes did not completely disappear, but in the succeeding decade, the PRI managed to shove much of the dissension underground and maintain Mexico’s image as a modern nation

Zolov, “Discovering a Land,” in ​Fragments of a Golden Age,​ 2001, pp. 238. Christopher Minster, “The Unsung Ally: Mexican Involvement in World War II,” ​ThoughtCo.com​, 13 July 2017. 23 Zolov, “Discovering a Land,” in ​Fragments of a Golden Age,​ 2001, pp. 239-259. 24 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 23-32. 25 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 30. 21 22

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free from the travails of poverty and oppression. ​President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz saw an opportunity to solidify this image in the form of the XIX Olympiad. Officials quickly came under fire for the measures taken in preparing for the games. People were critical of the funds being funneled into the construction of the Olympic stadium and the ​limpieza (“cleansing”) of the city26 so as to make it more palatable to global audiences, while actual Mexican citizens in the Federal District who were without homes, food, and resources.27 As public funds were poured into building new facilities and even special metro lines for athletes and spectators, the impoverished and disenfranchised, many of them of indigenous descent, were shunted to the side like a problem the president simply hoped to forget.28

II “Yo no soy el mismo; todos somos otros. Hay un México antes del Movimiento Estudiantil y otro después de 1968. Tlatelolco es la escisión entre los dos Méxicos.”29

While tensions between students and police were not new to Mexico, the approach of the Olympics and the ​limpieza of Mexico City signaled the beginning of something more concrete. The emergence of what could directly be called the ​movimiento estudiantil (“student movement”) can roughly be traced to the events of late July 1968. Elaine Carey places the initial tensions on 22 July, during a struggle between students from the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The two schools had always been at odds with one another, but in this instance the tensions were aggravated by the presence of several members from two prominent Mexico City youth gangs, los Arañas (the Spiders) and los Ciudadelos (the City Boys). While this kind of violence was not necessarily unheard of, the environment shifted when the granaderos were summoned to take control of the situation. The press seized on the gangster element in order to perpetuate the idea that the student

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“1968,” El Universal, 2008. Celeste González de Bustamente. “1968 Olympic Dreams and Tlatelolco Nightmares: Imagining and Imaging Modernity on Television,” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 26, no. 1 (2010): pp. 7-8. 28 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 37-38. 29 “I am not the same; we are all changed. There is a Mexico before the Student Movement and another after 1968. Tlatelolco is the split between the two Mexicos.” Luis González de Alba, in ​La noche de Tlatelolco: testimonios de historia oral,​ ed. Elena Poniatowska, Distrito Federal, MX: Ediciones Era, 1971, pp. 15-16. 27

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protesters were no more than violent thugs and the police were necessary to preserve peace.30 On the following day, according to Mexican scholar and student protester Carlos ​Monsiváis, a demonstration on 23 July saw students jeering and throwing rocks at the police guarding the school building outside which they were gathered. Their primary aim was to protest the violation of university autonomy by virtue of law enforcement’s presence. Besides UNAM and IPN, the crowd also consisted of students from the Normal School, the Chapingo School of Architecture, the National School of Anthropology, and the College of Mexico. Their actions were met with tear gas and clubs. Officers then entered the school, chasing down students who had gone inside to seek refuge and injuring unarmed students and teachers in their classrooms. None of this information- neither the coming together of students from previously warring schools, nor the inexcusable violence exercised by the heavily armed police officers- made its way into the news reports.31 The struggle reached a climax on 26 July. President ​Díaz Ordaz was conscious of the “problem of the youth”32 and the police had been granted permission to quell student disturbances by whatever means necessary.33 Both protests occurring that day had been approved by city authorities and began with little incident. One consisted mainly of students from the Federación Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos (National Federation of Technical Students, FNET), most of whom were affiliated with IPN, gathering to protest the violence and defamation of the previous day’s encounter. The other, planned for the same day, contained mostly UNAM students and members of the Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticas (National Federation of Democratic Students, CNED) and was intended to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of Fidel Castro’s attack on the Moncada barracks which started the Cuban Revolution, which became known as the 26 de Julio (26 July) Movement. When the two protests unintentionally converged in the ​Z​ó​calo​, the granaderos entered the scene.34 According to a secret message to US President

Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 39-40. Carlos ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar,​ Ediciones Era, 1970, sec. 15. 32 ​Masacre de Tlatelolco,​ Directed by Robert Latorre, 2010, D.F., Mexico: Tomlinson-de Onis Productions for Discovery Channel Latin America, 2010, YouTube. 33 ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar​, Ediciones Era, 1970, sec. 15. 34 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 40-41. 30 31

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Lyndon B. Johnson, the march had “degenerated into vandalism and arson”35 and the police had no choice but to use violent tactics to maintain the peace. According to ​Monsiváis, the protest began in the Plaza del Carillón near Santo Tomás and was initially peaceful, but when police stepped in, students began to seize their trucks and head for the Z​ó​calo, the main square of the city, which had become a frequent site of student activity36. This information is somewhat misconstrued. While the students did not intend to meet at the Z​ó​calo, the presence of the granaderos sent many to seek shelter in the nearby school buildings. The buses were used to barricade the school against the heavily armed police. By the following morning, on 27 July, the students had been dispersed and the newspapers were rife with misinformation. The dominant narrative, perpetuated by the government, was that the students were armed and thuggish, that they had initiated the violence, and some had looted nearby stores. Eyewitnesses, however, said that it was the granaderos and the ​porros​government agents who pose as protesters in order to stir trouble so that the government can justify intervening- who had started the violence.37 Internal speculation on the nature of the protest was somewhat convoluted. A 31 July memorandum to LBJ declares that there is no concrete proof of Communist influence, but the attached message from the US Embassy in Mexico City claims to have “solid evidence” of such. The document contains speculations on both sides that the Mexican Communist Party (​Partido Comunista Mexicano,​ PCM) was behind the clash. Some believed that Communist entities were attempting to instigate revolutionary activities in the wake of the Prague Spring which had recently shaken Czechoslovakia. The report takes note of the PCM publication ​La voz de México,​ which had initially been in support of the Czech rebels, but at the time of the report had fallen silent on the issues. Another PCM newspaper, ​Revista internacional​, had published an article back in April sympathizing with “Cuban tactics”, i.e. violent revolution; the CIA took this to be a subtle sign from the PCM to encourage militancy among the student protesters. President ​Díaz Ordaz played into the “red fear”, issuing an official crackdown on communist activity in the

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White House memorandum, “Student Disturbances in Mexico City,” 31 July 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998. 36 ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar​, Ediciones Era, 1970. 37 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 41.

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country38 and labeling student protesters and any other kind of dissenters “communists”, immediately rendering their voices invalid.39 On 28 July, newspapers announced the arrests of several prominent “communist agitators” after the police raided the PCM headquarters and the offices of ​La voz de México. The government justified this by invoking national fears of foreign Communist influence. Newspapers emphasized the “outside” element by primarily listing arrestees with non-Mexican names. Far from discouraging the students, however, the arrests became a rallying point of student and worker solidarity and a source of revolutionary inspiration.40 Further protests on 29 and 30 July led to riot police and paratroopers entering the conflict. Around 9:00pm on 29 July, according to a heavily redacted US Defense Intelligence Agency report, students protesting in the ​Z​ó​calo began to throw rocks and Molotov cocktails at police, then barricaded the streets with stolen buses and set the buses on fire. Granaderos used batons, tear gas, bayonets, and armored vehicles, but were unable to subdue the students. At 12:30am, the Mexican army was called in.41 The unarmed students fled into UNAM Preparatory School 142 to escape, but the paratroopers “broke in...thereby violating university autonomy” and “roughed up” the protesters43. Police claimed to have attempted to negotiate, but when the students refused,44 they used a bazooka to blast open the doors45. While the episode at Prep School 1 “officially” concluded around 1:00am, military activities continued through the night, and by the morning of 30 July, the military occupied four preparatory and one vocational school.46 Mexico Secretary of Defense Lt. Gen. Marcelino García Barragán authorized troops to do whatever was necessary to quell student protests. According to a government report, they discovered “300 Molotov cocktails, 250 liters of gas and many empty bottles, plus knives, stones and chains in the buildings from which

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White House memorandum, “Student Disturbances in Mexico City,” 31 July 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 42. 40 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 42-44. 41 CIA Weekly Summary, “Students Stage Major Disorder in Mexico,” 2 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998, pp. 20. 42 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 49. 43 CIA Weekly Summary, “Students Stage Major Disorder in Mexico,” 2 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre,” pp. 20. 44 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 49. 45 “1968: Los 71 días que sacudieron a México,” El Universal, 2008. 46 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 49. 39

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students were dislodged. One rifle also reportedly was confiscated”.47 García Barragán’s private documents, however, illustrate that police actually found only ten Molotov cocktails, two canisters of gas, five bottles of acid, one bottle of ammonia, and a box of PCM propaganda.48

III “[The movement has spread] no porque tengamos una gran capacidad para la agitación, sino porque es natural que la inquietud se propague.”49

The bulk of the students’ organization was carried out by the ​comités de lucha (committees of struggle), assemblies in which students- most from UNAM, but some from the other main schools in the capital as well- gathered to discuss the movement and plan further protests.50 These drew up what would become the seven core demands of the movement, which were as follows: a. Removal from jobs of Federal District Police Chief (Army Lt Gen Luis Cueto Ramirez) and his assistant. b. Firing of those responsible for injuries to students and damage to facilities at Vocational School #5. c. Payment of indemnity to students injured. d. Changes in law pertaining to intervention of authorities during disorders. e. Destruction of police dossiers opened on students arrested. f. Release of detained students. g. Immediate withdrawal of police and federal troops from all school properties.51 Corona del Rosal met with the students on 30 July to discuss the demands. He was at first hesitant, but shortly relented under the threat of further protest. He agreed to release students

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DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998, pp. 2. 48 Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, México, D.F., “Informa las actividades realizados con motivo de la Misón ancomendada a esta unidad,” 30 July 1968, in ​Parte de guerra Tlatelolco 1968: Documentos del general Marcelino García Barragán: los hechos y la historia,​ edited by Julio Scherer García and Carlos Monsiváis, Mexico City: Nuevo Siglo, 1999). 49 “[The movement has spread] not because we have a great capacity for agitation, but because it is natural for disquiet to propagate itself.” Luis González de Alba, ​Los días y los años​, Ediciones Era, 1971, pp. 39. 50 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 54. 51 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre,” pp. 2.

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who had not broken the law, withdraw military forces from the occupied schools, close police files on protesters unless they later broke the law, and make payments to those who had been injured during clashes in cases where reparation was warranted. He also said he would consider the students’ feedback about police action during protest situations, and the remaining demands would be deliberated later on. By the end of the day, troops were withdrawn from all but two schools.52 For some of the protesters, this was a major victory for the forces of Mexican democracy. Others, however, were frustrated with the mayor’s ambiguity and would not stop for anything less than total, unquestionable fulfillment of every one of the seven demands.53 The students officially published their demands on 1 August.54 Later that day, 40,000-85,000 protesters (the numbers vary depending on the source) marched from UNAM up Insurgentes Avenue and then back around, led by rector Barros Sierra. The marchers did not head for the ​Z​ó​calo​, although police were stationed there just in case. Among the participants were students and faculty from UNAM, IPN, and several other nearby schools. Despite a heavy rainstorm, the congregation persisted and the event concluded without incident, prompting Secretary of Defense ​Barragán to praise their peaceful actions. At the end of the day, troops withdrew from the remaining two schools.55 Newspapers applauded the protests, emphasizing their nonviolent nature and the authority lent to the events by the presence of Barros Sierra.56 It seemed that the protesters were on the way to achieving their goals. On 8 August Corona del Rosal suggested a commission of government, student, and faculty representatives to discuss the events and establish the truth of what had occurred.57 Students reacted, as they had to the mayor’s partial agreement to their demands, with a mixture of relief and frustration. Most of the area schools had canceled classes as students remained on strike until their demands were completely fulfilled. The National Strike Committee (CNH), supported by Barros Sierra,

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DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 53 ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar​, Ediciones Era, 1970. 54 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 54. 55 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 56 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 55-61. 57 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.”

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encouraged and organized much of this action.58 The comités de lucha continued to meet and discuss the key questions of their movement. Why strike? Why fight? Why sacrifice so much for a future that may never be realized? While the internal divisions among the students were too great to manifest in anything close to a precisely organized assembly, it was undeniable that there was an energy seizing the city which emerged from a deep well of desire for direct action. Despite the limitations59 on their power, the students were approaching something very close to a revolutionary democratic movement.60 It quickly became evident that Corona del Rosal’s commission would never manifest, and it was relegated to the realm of idealist fantasy. A newspaper interview with Secretary ​Barragán declared that the government was pro-peace, not anti-students, and President ​Díaz Ordaz issued public calls for unity in the face of social division. The official claim was that during the 26 July protest, a group of radical pro-Cuba leftists had steered the “true” (i.e. moderate) students away from their path and onto that of communism and violence. Even with these heavy accusations, however, a 5 August report from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency indicates considerable popular support for students in Mexico City. While residents did not speak openly against Díaz Ordaz and his administration, many believed that the measures taken by the army and police were too harsh for the situations at hand.61 This is a considerable contrast to the earlier views of students as violent thugs and gangbangers.62 Even so, there was little to be done with the threat of imprisonment or “disappearance” that contributed to the censorship prevalent in popular media63. The tentative reprieve from violence ended and government sources continued to praise the army’s actions. A protest on 13 August numbered around 80,000 people (an increase nearly

Luis González de Alba, ​Los días y los años​, Ediciones Era, 1971. CIA Weekly Review, “Mexican Government in a Quandary Over Student Crisis”, 23 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998, pp. 25. 60 ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar​, Ediciones Era, 1970, sec. 14. 61 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 62 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 39-40. 63 Chris Harris, “Luis González de Alba’s ​Los días y los años​ (1971) and Elena Poniatowska’s ​La noche de Tlatelolco​ (1971): Foundational Representations of Mexico ‘68,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies 29, no. 1 (2010): 107-127. 58 59

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27 times that of 26 July),64 including not only Mexican students but also foreigners from Poland, Japan, Argentina, Chile, and more,65 resulted in over 1,600 arrests. The relative of a platoon officer among the units used to monitor the schools related to United States government sources that soldiers standing guard were surrounded by student demonstrators who began to taunt and spit on them. In response to an officer’s orders to “take care of it”, the soldiers dispersed many of the students and took others inside the school, subjecting them “to the hazing that students at the Military Academy (Heroico Academia Militar) receive”.66 Though the DIA report is significantly redacted, it states 4 dead and 200 injured, while students declared 48 dead, and the Mexican government denied that anyone had been killed at all. The report declares that the Mexican army had “performed creditably” and goes on to say (emphasis mine):

Some eye-witness accounts indicate they may have acted a little too firmly, and it is apparent that, once deployed, they acted ​with little hesitation.​ There has been little press criticism of the military’s role in the riots and the students have selected the Granaderos (riot police) and regular police for most of their anger.67 In light of criticisms against the army’s actions, Secretary ​Barragán insisted that they had not violated university autonomy but were in fact protecting it, with the implication that the students were the true enemies of autonomy. Although the mayor’s commission had not worked out the way the parties had hoped, students did not give up their efforts at political recognition. Several legislators from the Congress of the Union agreed to meet with the students on 20 August to hear their demands, but when the students arrived for the meeting, the legislators never showed.68 Two days later, Secretary of the Interior (who would later serve as President of Mexico from 1970-1976) Luis

64

DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 65 González de Alba, ​Los días y los años,​ 1971. 66 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre,” pp. 5. 67 DIA Intelligence Information Report, “Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots, c. 15 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre,” pp. 4. 68 “1968,” El Universal, 2008.

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Echeverría attempted to initiate peace talks with protesters, but disagreed with the students’ insistence that the talks be completely public and open.69 Students wanted full autonomy for schools, prevention of military and police involvement in school affairs, and repairs for buildings damaged during the protests, and they refused to accept anything but a completely public announcement. Government representatives resisted this latter demand because, as a CIA report claims, they feared that giving in would lead to further demands later on.70 This differs somewhat from the reasons which the representatives gave to the protesters, which was that further investigation was necessary in order to determine the proper measures that the administration should take to fulfill their demands.71 Sources vary on what occurred immediately after the attempts at peace talks fell through. Chris Harris’s version claims that 400,000 people marched to the ​Z​ó​calo on 27 August to protest the government’s silence. Some were armed, but his analysis shows that Poniatowska and especially González de Alba played down this element; and in any case, they were nowhere near the level of the police.72 Two United States government documents, one issued on 29 August and the other on 6 September, seem to be describing the same protest but in different ways. The 29 August document describes “clashes” between police and students on 28 August after the latter “desecrat[ed] public buildings and denounc[ed] Mexican officials”.73 The report also notes the presence of “slum dwellers” among the “roving bands” of students. According to this, the students seized the Cathedral (it is not mentioned by name in any of the sources, but one can assume it is the Metropolitan Cathedral, which is located near the ​Z​ó​calo) and flew a red and white flag in the main square. This prompted a government crackdown on student activity.74 The 6 September report claims that the students tried to hold a peaceful “camp-in” at the Z​ó​calo on 27 August, and after they were disrupted by police they occupied the Cathedral and raised the

Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010. CIA Weekly Review, “Mexican Government in a Quandary Over Student Crisis”, 23 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre,” pp. 24. 71 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 68. 72 Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010. 73 White House message, “Student Situation in Mexico,” 29 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998. 74 White House message, “Student Situation in Mexico,” 29 August 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 69 70

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red and ​black flag75 (that ​this ​flag, rather than a red and white one, served as the official symbol of anarchy is confirmed by photos from ​El Universal76). The report adds that demonstrators held up signs proclaiming “vulgar abuse” of the president, which reportedly upset members of the public who had previously been supportive of the students’ efforts.77 Further, photos from ​El Universal claim that on 28 August, students entered the Cathedral, rang the bells, and raised the red and black flag, and refused to leave until government officials agreed to meet with them on 1 September, while 3,000 more demonstrators remained in the Z​ó​calo proper and were later removed by the army.78 So, in sum: on either 27 or 28 of August, thousands of people went to the main plaza for a protest, either were or were not interrupted by police, and seized the Cathedral on one or both days, raised either a red and black or red and white flag, and did or did not offend the public with scathing slogans denouncing the president. The ​El Universal photos hold considerably more weight than the written government testimony, but images are not in themselves arbiters of absolute truth. In any case, the students got their wish: they secured a meeting with government representatives on 1 September. On that day, 5,000 students went to the Z​ó​calo to attend the meeting. They waited; but, just as had occurred twice already in the previous two weeks, the representatives did not appear. Instead, students were pursued and scattered by soldiers manning tanks.79 By 23 September, President ​Díaz Ordaz, as part of his official crackdown on student activity, had ordered the military to occupy university campuses. UNAM rector Javier Barros Sierra attempted to resign in protest, but his resignation was rejected.80

75

CIA Weekly Summary, “Mexican Government Stalls Student Movement,” 6 September 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998. 76 “1968,” El Universal, 2008. 77 CIA Weekly Summary, “Mexican Government Stalls Student Movement,” 6 September 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre.” 78 “1968,” El Universal, 2008. 79 Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010 80 “1968,” El Universal, 2008.

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IV “Calma, no llores...este momento no es para llorar; es para grabártelo a fuego y recordarlo cuando tenga que pagarlo quien deba pagarlo.”81

The Olympic games had already begun drawing particular national and international media attention when the violence of the summer of 1968 broke out. Protests heightened the interests of international outlets, much to the frustration of the Díaz Ordaz administration.82 Foreign journalists had already begun arriving, and their presence gave the protesters a new platform to spread their message. Audiences abroad, particularly in areas such as France and the American south which were also beset by student protest, expressed sympathy and solidarity with the Mexican cause.83 To protect the interests of the country in relation to the games, Minister Echeverría formed a paramilitary group called the Olympic Battalion. They acted in secret, but were identifiable by the white gloves which they wore on their left hands.84 Few could have guessed, on that cool October morning, the violence that would unfold in a few hours. For the students of Mexico City, it began as a day full of promise. On the morning of 2 October, 1968, three students, Luis González de Alba among them, were to meet with representatives of the president in order to present their demands. The representatives responded that public talks would not be acceptable; any agreements would have to be made in private. That was simply not a point on which the students were willing to bend, so they left dissatisfied. 85

.They joined their comrades in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas for a pre-planned demonstration.

It began as most others had, with signs, chants, and songs. Florencio López Osuna was the only one of the speakers who got a chance to address the crowd before the blood began to flow.86 It began with a bang. Helicopters overhead dropped a pair of red flares which trickled down into the plaza, framed by the silhouette of the Cathedral which symbolized the Spanish presence and influence on Mexican history. The flares served as a signal for the Olympic

81

“Calm yourself, don’t cry… this moment is not for crying; it is to record the anger and remember it when those who are responsible have to pay.” (Overheard by the author in a crowd on the day of the massacre.) González de Alba, ​Los días y los años,​ 1971, pp. 191. 82 González de Bustamente, “Olympic Dreams,” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 2010. 83 Carey, ​Plaza of Sacrifices​, University of New Mexico Press, 2005, pp. 76. 84 ​Masacre de Tlatelolco,​ dir. Robert Latorre, 2010. 85 Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010. 86 Giles Tremlett and Jo Tuckman, “Mexican police exposed as killers,” ​The Guardian,​ 2001.

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Battalion, who opened fire on the plaza. Armed with automatic rifles, their primary targets were not students but members of the military, so as to make it look like the protesters were the ones who had begun the violence. In the confusion, hardly anyone noticed the flash of rifle fire from the windows of the apartment buildings surrounding the plaza. In the end, the snipers committed more destruction than even the army, but the official version of the events perpetuated by the government was that unknown members of the movement had done the shooting.87 That day, according to Mexican politician and writer Octavio Paz, was the end of the movement.88 Ultimately, the official narrative was that no more than 24 students had been killed,89 not to even think of the wounded, arrested, and disappeared. Student sources estimated the actual death toll to be between 150 and 500,90 and at least two thousand arrested and transported to Military Camp Number One,91

V “...el gobierno controlaba todo...absolutamente todo.”92

The PRI was careful not to let national media get ahold of the massacre. As Celeste González de Bustamente discusses in her article analyzing Mexican news stories surrounding Tlatelolco, the government’s claws were deep in the media, portraying the students as violent radicals and justifying the excessive militarization tactics.93 At the time, although television was still rather new to its status as a popular consumer product, it enjoyed serving as the primary outlet for consumer news. Telesistema Mexicano (now Televisa) was the largest news channel at that time. A phenomenon emerged which González de Bustamente refers to as “hybridity of framing”: while the media attempted to portray events in a certain way in order to influence viewers to their perspective, the people watching (especially the youth) interpreted it much

​Masacre de Tlatelolco,​ dir. Robert Latorre, 2010, 11:47-34:43. Octavio Paz​, “México: la última década,” University of Texas Press, 1969, pp. 10. 89 Elaine Carey and José Agustín Román Gaspar, “Carrying on the Struggle: El Comité 68,” Nacla.org. 90 ​Masacre de Tlatelolco,​ dir. Robert Latorre, 2010, 23:03. 91 González de Bustamente, “Olympic Dreams,” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 2010. 92 “...the government controlled everything...absolutely everything.” Sergio Aguayo, in ​Masacre de Tlatelolco​, dir. Robert Latorre, 2010, 4:49. 93 Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010. 87 88

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differently.94 For example, a news report may describe a clash between students and police as an outbreak of violence instigated by protesters, but a student watching that report may interpret the story as one of police extralegally attacking innocent, unarmed citizens. News television was, quite literally, in the pocket of the government. Much of its funding came from the PRI, and it would not do well to broadcast stories pinning genocide charges on one’s benefactor. The media purposefully downplayed the massacre, most reports not even giving it a passing mention. Most of the news was aimed at the Olympics. Other stories did not directly discuss the massacre, but contributed to the government narrative surrounding it. For example, one newscast included a story about the president reappropriating land for the benefit of the campesinos, supposedly to shift opinion away from the government’s enormous spending on the Olympics. Another report mentioned the arrest of Germans and Guatemalans who had been caught smuggling weapons, potentially as a way to highlight the element of foreign influence on the student movement as opposed to internal criticisms.95 Censorship was a prevalent fear in twentieth-century Mexico. The government’s enormous shares in the newspapers- up to 90%- meant that they controlled print as well as television news. Much of the revenue for the newspapers came from ads placed by the PRI, and as Monsivais says, “it is not convenient to offend the principal sponsor”.96 Journalists who wished to express contrary views had to slip them in subtly, buried deep beyond the surface of the front page headlines. Editors who missed them, intentionally or not, risked losing the entire paper. Many journalists had to use satire to convey their views, but even that was dangerous. It was about more than profit: there was a real fear of the government’s power. In the two decades following 1968, forty-seven journalists were killed or went missing in Mexico.97 Claire Brewster claims that writing books afforded dissidents a bit more freedom than newspaper journalism, but not much. Elena Poniatowska, for example, while writing ​La noche de Tlatelolco, ​found herself followed by government representatives not just in Mexico abroad as well, as far as New York.

González de Bustamente, “Olympic Dreams,” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 2010, pp. 4. González de Bustamente, “Olympic Dreams,” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 2010, pp. 12-13. 96 Claire Brewster, ​Responding to Crisis in Contemporary Mexico: The Political Writings of Paz, Fuentes, Monsiváis, and Poniatowska,​ University of Arizona Press, 2005, pp. 16. 97 Brewster, ​Responding to Crisis,​ 2005, pp. 17. 94 95

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VI “Se sabía que el poder engendra corrupción. Aún se ignoraba que la falta de poder también engendra corrupción.”98

During his presidency in the early seventies, Echeverría firmly denied his Battalion’s involvement in the massacre,99 and he has continued to do so since. In late June of 2006, a Mexican court issued a warrant for his arrest for his involvement in the Tlatelolco massacre.100 This came just four months after a government report was leaked, detailing Mexico’s “dirty war” and the heinous acts carried out by military troops against insurgents during the mid-twentieth century. Then-president Vicente Fox did not endorse the report and promised to release a completed version. It was not published in full until November of 2006, marking the first instance of the Mexican government admitting responsibility for the miseries of 1968.101 Even so, Echeverría continued to profess his innocence. He is the oldest former Mexican president still alive, and the first one to be arrested. In a written statement to the judge, he said, “Nothing proves that I was the author of or participated in any crime” and claimed to charges that labeling the massacre a genocide “is an absurd distortion of the clash that happened that day”.102 Concrete evidence such as the leaked draft are difficult to find, as the PRI destroyed many of the records of their corruption. Many of the archives were reopened in the early 2000s after the PRI lost power, but when it came back into office with the election of ​Peña Nieto, many more files were simply “lost”. The Mexican archivists took up their dreadful mantra: ​no existen.​ 103 It is for this reason that the firsthand accounts by people within the movement are so valuable. There are four primary scholars which have produced what are now considered foundational works on Mexico ‘68: Luis González de Alba, ​Los días y los años (​ ​The Days and the Years​); Elena Poniatowska, ​La noche de Tlatelolco (​The Night of Tlatelolco​); Carlos Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar (​Days to Remember​); ​and Octavio Paz, “​ México: la última década” (“Mexico: the Last Decade”). Each of these figures participated movement of ‘68 in their own

98

“It was said that power engenders corruption. Still it was ignored that the absence of power also engenders corruption.” ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar,​ Ediciones Era, 1970, sec. 15. 99 Tremlett and Tuckman, “Mexican police exposed,” ​The Guardian​, 2001. 100 Carey and Gaspar, “Carrying on the Struggle,” Nacla.org. 101 Juan Forero, “Details of Mexico’s Dirt Wars From 1960s to 1980s Released,” ​Washington Post,​ 2006. 102 “Former Mexican president on genocide charges declares innocence,” ​The Canadian Press​, 2006. 103 “They do not exist.” Abby Milonas, conversation with Dr. Lisa P. Covert, July 2017.

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capacities. Their experiences are not homogenous, and each one brings a unique perspective to the body of literature about the movement. Paz was a journalist, poet, and politician one generation removed from the other scholars but who still empathized with the movement and resigned his position in protest of the government’s actions. González de Alba and Monsiváis were both protesters themselves, though the latter remained politically radical and continued to write about Mexico and the ‘68 movement throughout his life while the former went on to lead what could be considered a “normal” (or rather, not as explicitly political) life after 1968. Poniatowska was not directly involved in the protests themselves, but she was living in Mexico City at the time of the protests and was present on the day of the massacre. Each of these scholars contributes something unique to the study of the movement and lifts up the largely unheard voices of the students of ‘68. At the time of the massacre, Octavio Paz was entering his sixth year as Mexican ambassador to India and had established himself as a prominent Mexican journalist and poet.104 Monsiváis was a graduate of UNAM, which Paz also claimed as his alma mater, and recognized as one of the major proponents of the Mexican left.105 Unlike Paz, he was directly involved with the student side of the protests of the summer of 1968 and published his first book, ​Días de guardar​, about his experiences in the movement, in 1970. His foray into political activity began for the same reason that Paz’s ended. After the Tlatelolco massacre, Paz resigned from his position in protest of the government’s treatment of the students.106 Monsiváis, however, jumped right into the political scene with his works on Mexican identity, women’s rights, and gay rights. Decades later, he was a vocal supporter of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation, whose primary function was to reclaim rights for the indigenous peoples of Mexico.107 Monsiváis’s sharply left leanings show in his work. His writings are tinged with an icy wit which reflects his bitter regard for what he views as the pillars of Western society: rabid consumerism, capitalist materialism, and a kind of “mental colonialism” of the ​jipiteca culture

Jason Wilson, ​Octavio Paz: A Study of His Poetics​, CUP Archives, 21 June 1979, pp. 2. Tracy Wilkinson, “Prolific Mexican writer and critic Carlos Monsiváis dies at 72,” ​Los Angeles Times,​ 21 June 2010. 106 Wilson, ​Octavio Paz,​ CUP Archives, 21 June 1979, pp. 2. 107 John Kraniauskas, “Critical Closeness: The Chronicle-Essays of ​Carlos Monsiváis,” in​ ​Mexican Postcards​, Carlos Monsiváis,​ London: New Left Books, 1997, pp. x-xx. 104 105

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(Mexican youth who embodied the hippie culture of the United States, promoting peace and free love over war and glorifying and reappropriating aspects of indigenous culture) characteristic of middle class urban youth.108 In a section of ​Días de guardar in which he is criticizing the aristocracy of the Porfiriato, he writes, “Y podría usted decirnos, señor Levi-Strauss, ¿son las páginas de sociales un rito mitogenético [sic]? Sucede que la exhibición de la riqueza (​conspicuous consumption​) se convierte en el sentido final de la riqueza” (“And could you tell us, Mr. Levi-Strauss [referring to the denim jeans hegemon], are the pages of social rites a genetic myth? It happens that the display of wealth (conspicuous consumption) becomes the ultimate sense of wealth”).109 In other words, he is reflecting upon the irony of the upper class, in that they are not truly wealthy but simply keep up the appearance of wealth through consumption of Western (primarily US) products. This disdain for the occidental is a prominent theme in his work and was reflected in his activities in the student movement; he was a member of CNH and sided with the faction of the organization which leaned more toward radicalism and complete fulfillment of the student demands.110 If Monsiváis was the voice of dissension, Paz was that of logical reason. He was a good deal older than the students at the time of the protests and, though not exactly moderate, did not espouse the same explicitly leftist opinions as Monsiváis. The bulk of his work consists of fictional prose and poetry, and this is reflected in his political writings. One of his most memorable works is ​El laberinto de la soledad (​The Labyrinth of Solitude)​ , first published in 1950, which contains a number of essays reflecting on Mexico’s colonial past and the nature of Mexican identity. Editions after 1975 included his essay “Postdata”, about the 1968 student movement.111 In his definitive work on the 1968 movement, “​ México: la última década”, he delivers a brief but densely factual analysis of the events leading up to the Tlatelolco massacre and places them within a solid historical context. This publication is almost strikingly bare compared to the lilting poetry of ​El laberinto de la soledad​, but maintains Paz’s characteristic realism. Take, for example, the following passages:

José Agustín, ​La contracultura en México,​ Debolsillo, 2012, pp. 46. ​Monsiváis, ​Días de guardar​, Ediciones Era, 1970, sec. 9. 110 Brewster, ​Responding to Crisis,​ 2005, pp. 42. 111 Harold ​Bloom, ed, “Introduction,” in ​Octavio Paz,​ Pennsylvania: Chelsea House, 2002, pp. 9. 108 109

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Durante la segunda guerra mundial se terminó el período propiamente revolucionario del México moderno y se inició la etapa del desarrollo económico. El proceso ha sido semejante, aunque no idéntico, en todos los países en donde han triunfado movimientos revolucionarios que no contaban con una base económica previa y capaz de afrontar sin bancarrota el peso de las reformas sociales.112

México se levanta entre los dos mares como una enorme pirámide trunca: sus cuatro costados con los cuatro puntos cardinales, sus escaleras son los climas de todas las zonas, su alta meseta es la casa del sol y de las constelaciones.113

The first is quite dry in its matter-of-fact treatment of the data, particularly in comparison to the second. The passage from ​Laberinto de la soledad is more characteristic of Paz’s prose; his words paint an image in the reader’s mind of a country which contains every climate and every direction, at the center of the cardinal (compass) points and thus at the center of the world. This contrast is what makes “​ México: la última década” so striking in its concise analysis of the student movement and its historical context. His perspective is one of an older generation, a journalist, poet, and politician who came of age during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas and was imbued with the principles of the revolution from birth. His analysis of 1968 is tinged with an air of disillusionment as he systematically explores the ways in which the PRI transformed from its revolutionary roots into the violent police state of mid-twentieth century, in essence betraying all the ideals upon which it had been founded. At the same time, this analysis, while not being fully objective (if such a thing is possible), refrains from the acerbic commentary of Monsiváis or the emotional overtures characteristic of his own work.114

112

During the second World War the strictly revolutionary period of modern Mexico ended and the age of economic development began. The process has been similar, although not identical, in all the countries in which revolutionary movements have triumphed without a sound prior economic base and the capacity to keep the value of the currency aligned with the social reforms without going bankrupt. Paz​, “México,” University of Texas Press, 1969, pp. 16. 113 Mexico rises between the two seas like a truncated pyramid: her four coasts are the four cardinal points, her staircases are the climates of all the zones, her high plateau is the house of the sun and of the constellations. ​Octavio Paz, ​El laberinto de la soledad​, ​D.F., México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992, pp. 393. 114 Paz​, “México,” University of Texas Press, 1969.

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González de Alba presents a precarious medium between the two. He was the youngest of the four and at the time of the massacre was a student of psychology at UNAM, though he never practiced because he became wholly involved in the movement after concluding his studies. He was heavily influenced by the leftist ideology prevalent in Mexican youth culture during the 1960s and spoke openly against the Díaz Ordaz administration. He was a leading member of the National Strike Committee (CNH) and one of the premiere protest organizers. 115 His background and works more closely resemble those of Monsiáis, though his writing verges closer to the poetic realm of Paz. His major work about the student movement, ​Los días y los años,​ was written while he was interred in the Lecumberri jail116 and presents a cutting narrative of the events of 1968 laden with overt criticisms of the PRI and the police state which silenced him and his comrades. The work serves as both historical document of the events and a personal reflection from the perspective of someone heavily and directly involved therein. It presents a poignant and unflinching recollection that is explicitly intended to make the reader question the dominant (i.e. government’s) narrative.117 The fourth of these principal scholars takes quite a step outside the mould. Poniatowska is of Mexican descent, though she was born in France where her mother had fled to escape the Mexican Revolution. As a young child her family returned to Mexico among the turbulence of WWII, and there she grew up and later became a journalist. At the time of the massacre she was a young wife and just four months a mother, but she’d never allowed the trappings of domestic life to interfere with her journalistic ambitions. She arrived at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas before the blood had fully dried on the stones of the ancient ruins and began to conduct interviews of those still lingering in the plaza.118 The result was ​La noche de Tlatelolco (translated in English as ​Massacre in Mexico)​ , which is now cited as the principal work on the Mexican student movement of 1968.119 The book is a collection of quotes from various parties involved in the events, from protesters to UNAM professors to politicians, some of them taken from direct interviews conducted by Poniatowska and some taken from other sources, and

115

Teresa Zerón-Medina Laris, “Luis González de Alba, Perfil,” Nexos.com.mx, 1 December 2013. EditorialOtroAnguloINFO, “Los días y los años, de Luis González de Alba,” ​Otro Ángulo,​ 2 October 2017. 117 Luis González de Alba, ​Los días y los años​, Ediciones Era, 1971. 118 Brewster, ​Responding to Crisis,​ 2005, pp. 27-30. 119 Harris, “Foundational Representations,” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 2010​. 116

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interspersed with relevant poems from contemporary authors (including Octavio Paz) and slogans from protesters’ signs and banners. The work is largely impersonal in that Poniatowska does not implicitly command the narrative- although this could be contested, as one could argue that by virtue of conducting the interviews and assembling the material, she is the narrative’s principal constructor- but the honesty and sincerity of the recollections therein strike a poignant emotional chord within the reader, making it, perhaps, the most personal work of them all. One has to wonder, then, why Poniatowska’s work is so widely recognized and touted by historians of twentieth century Mexico while ​Los días y los años largely occupies the sidelines; sections of which are even included in ​La noche de Tlatelolco​. The personal reputation of González de Alba is possibly something to keep in mind. He was openly gay and advocated for gay rights alongside other writers and activists, including Monsiváis. He dedicated much of his professional life following the end of the movement to his various business ventures, among them a sex shop and several gay bars.120 In the era of the 1970s, with a nation still clenched in the gradually loosening jaws of conservatism, it would make sense for this less palatable background to hinder the visibility of González de Alba’s works. He was also, like Monsiváis, more overtly radical in his ideology and actions than his categorical counterpart. Poniatowska is also known for her leftist leanings, but not quite to the same degree as the former.121 One can’t help but notice, in this context, that González de Alba is also left out of much of the historiography. Take, for example, two of my major secondary sources. One is Claire Brewster’s ​Responding to Crisis in Contemporary Mexico​, which looks at the works of Paz, Poniatowska, Monsiváis, and Carlos Fuentes; the other is Chris Harris’s essay comparing ​Los días y los años to ​La noche de Tlatelolco and exploring the roles of these works in forming the foundation of public perception of the massacre. In the former, González de Alba is only mentioned twice, and only in the capacity of a witness, rather than a leader and foundational contributor to the scholarship of the movement. This book was published in 2005, while Harris’s essay was published in 2010. Is it possible that so much took place in the space of those five years that it completely changed the way historians engage with González de Alba’s work? Or, is it possible that this is merely a fluke, a coincidental oversight on the part of the relatively small 120 121

Zerón-Medina Laris, “Luis González de Alba,” Nexos.com.mx, 1 December 2013. Brewster, ​Responding to Crisis,​ 2005, pp. 28.

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selection of works that I chose to analyze? It is impossible to determine without an all-encompassing analysis of the historical literature surrounding the topic. For its part, Brewster’s book provides a holistic analysis of the literature on the Mexican student movement. She does not focus on getting to the “truth” of the events (which, of course, is subjective in itself), but rather on the contexts of the authors and the subsequent influences upon their writings. It is, in this sense, a truly historiographical work, and I have no contest with her main points. Her work also highlights the contributions of Carlos Fuentes to the scholarship of ‘68, which, although it is not incorporated in any significant capacity in my work, as most of his material consists of fiction and is in any case difficult for me to get ahold of, was beneficial to my research process. The remainder of my primary sources consist of multimedia publications. ​El Universal published a collection of photos in 2008 in honor of the fortieth anniversary of the Tlatelolco massacre. These photos offer a literal view into the world of the student protesters, allowing one to pair written reports with visual evidence. The newspaper itself was heavily involved in the protests, and the scathing photo captions demonstrate a clear pro-student exuberance and a personal passion. I also looked at a Spanish language documentary which incorporated a fascinating combination of verbal testimony from former professors and students at UNAM and footage from the day of the massacre. The footage shows a flash from one of the upper floors where the soldiers of the Olympic Battalion fired their semi-automatic rifles into the crowd. From that angle, it is easy to see how the people in the plaza would not have noticed the source of the gunfire. The documentary further created a reenactment of the Battalion, demonstrating how they might have infiltrated the building beside the plaza and the angle at which they would have shot in order to take out the soldiers and shove blame onto the students. The major primary source, however, is the government documents assembled by the U.S. National Security Archive in 1998 to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the massacre. These documents are of course from an American perspective, but the information is derived from sources within the Mexican government. Many of the documents were classified, and so their revelation offers an internal perspective which would have been kept secret from the public at the time of the events in question. Besides the fact that the Mexican government’s data was

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considerably skewed, the papers themselves are riddled with contradictions (see pp. 9 and pp. 16) and often based in speculation rather than concrete proof. The specter of Soviet involvement infiltrates reports of even seemingly completely unrelated events,122 reflecting the paranoid spirit of the Red Scare. While the protest movement did contain leftist ideologues and even members of the Mexican Communist Party, and the revolutionary Che Guevara was a major inspiration for many of the students, there is no actual evidence that they were funded or encouraged by Cuba or the Soviet Union. The remainder of my secondary sources can fall into several other rough categories. The first is the most superficial, consisting of articles from online periodicals which I cite rather scantily and primarily only use to inform a minor point which supports my idea but cannot go un-cited. These articles are for the most part brief, factual, and accessible, and they collectively make up a generous portion of my bibliography without adding significant substance, yet are still vital to my project. Two more categories can be identified: that of a few well-known secondary sources which it seems any sensible Mexicanist has on her bookshelf, and that of a few, somewhat more obscure mixed-media sources. Members of the former can be distinctly recognized: Eric Zolov’s ​Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture​; Jeremi Suri’s ​The Global Revolutions of 1968​; and Elaine Carey’s ​Plaza of Sacrifices.​ These titles are ones that appear consistently in the footnotes of more distilled journal pieces and Wikipedia articles. The same names tend to crop up across bibliographies: José Agustín, Tanalís Padilla, Julio Scherer ​García, and Louise Walker are some of those that immediately come to mind. These authors and their works span a variety of topics and perspectives, from feminist critiques of the roles of political prisoners to anthropological analyses of the slogans on the banners held by protesters during marches. These are supplemented by a collection of scattered gold mines that I discovered in the library’s databases which drew from the big names discussed above as well as more obscure and specific sources which I otherwise would not have been able to access, such as Celeste González de Bustamente’s article about the ways in which television and newspapers treated the Tlatelolco massacre.

122

CIA Intelligence Cable, “Situation Appraisal: Status of the Mexico City Student Movement,” 9 September 1968, in “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968,” Kate Doyle, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998.

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González de Bustamente watched the reports themselves and marked the different topics which were discussed, noting how much time each one took up and drawing her conclusions from that. This kind of analysis is incredibly valuable to my thesis, yet I would not be able to incorporate it had I not uncovered this article. Altogether, I feel confident that I was able to assemble these different pieces of the 1968 story into something like a holistic synthesis of the different perspectives of the movement against that of the government.

VII I am twenty-two years old. Michael Brown, Jr. was eighteen when he died, only a year younger than me. Most of the students at UNAM and IPN and Chipango and the Escuela Normal and Vocational School #5 were around our age, too, when they died. They would be my father’s age if they were still alive today. They would have children who were not yet old enough to have their own children, they would be preparing to retire soon. Only fifty years have passed and still the wounds of Tlatelolco have not healed. This will continue to be so as long as the government that killed them is allowed to escape justice.

Five weeks from today, at a Halloween party in Baltimore, Maryland, a group of college students, including one from my own school, posted photos on social media dressed in orange jumpsuits with “Freddie Gray” (an African American man from Baltimore who was murdered by police in 2015) on the back and captioned them with racial slurs.

The week before that, a 10-year-old girl with cerebral palsy named Rosa Maria Hernandez was intercepted by immigration officers while en route to receive an emergency surgery. She is now facing either forced deportation or juvenile detention because she is the undocumented Mexican child of an undocumented Mexican family who came to the US in order to access better healthcare for their ailing infant.

Fifty years.

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Works Cited “1968: Los 71 días que sacudieron a México.” El Universal, 2008.

Doyle, Kate. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968.” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 10, 1998. González de Alba, Luis. ​Los días y los años.​ Ediciones Era, 1971. Masacre de Tlatelolco. Directed by Robert Latorre. 2010. D.F., Mexico: Tomlinson-de Onis Productions for Discovery Channel Latin America, 2010. YouTube. Monsiváis, Carlos. ​Días de guardar.​ Ediciones Era, 1970. Parte de guerra Tlatelolco 1968: Documentos del general Marcelino García Barragán: los hechos y la historia​. edited by Julio Scherer García and Carlos Monsiváis. Mexico City: Nuevo Siglo, 1999. Paz, Octavio. ​El laberinto de la soledad​. ​D.F., México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992. Paz, Octavio. “México: la última década.” University of Texas Press, 1969. Poniatowska, Elena. ​La noche de Tlatelolco: testimonios de historia oral.​ Distrito Federal, MX: Ediciones Era, 1971. Secondary sources Agustín, José. ​La contracultura en México.​ Debolsillo, 2012. Bloom, Harold, ed. “Introduction.” in ​Octavio Paz.​ Pennsylvania: Chelsea House, 2002. Brewster, Claire. ​Responding to Crisis in Contemporary Mexico: The Political Writings of Paz, Fuentes, Monsiváis, and Poniatowska.​ University of Arizona Press, 2005. Carey, Elaine. ​Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico.​ Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005. Carey, Elaine and Agustín Román Gaspar, José. “Carrying on the Struggle: El Comité 68”. Nacla.org. Dawson, Alexander. “Politicians, Narcos, Missing Students, and Mexico’s Crisis.” ​Simons Papers in Security and Development.​ No. 47 (2015): 3-41. 30

Dillon, Sam. “A General Illuminates ‘68 Massacre in Mexico.” ​New York Times,​ 1999. EditorialOtroAnguloINFO. “Los días y los años, de Luis González de Alba”. ​Otro Ángulo.​ 2 October 2017. Forero, Juan. “Details of Mexico’s Dirty Wars From 1960s to 1980s Released.” ​Washington Post​. 22 November 2006. Goldman, Francisco. “Crisis in Mexico: The Disappearance of the Forty-Three.” ​New Yorker.​ 24 October 2014. González de Bustamente, Celeste. “1968 Olympic Dreams and Tlatelolco Nightmares: Imagining and Imaging Modernity on Television.” ​Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos​ 26, no. 1 (2010): 1-30. Hancock, Jason. “‘Outside agitators’ worsening unrest in Ferguson, Mo., residents say.” ​The Kansas City Star ​18 August 2014. Harris, Chris. “Luis González de Alba’s ​Los días y los años (1971) and Elena Poniatowska’s ​La noche de Tlatelolco (1971): Foundational Representations of Mexico ‘68.” ​Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies​ 29, no. 1 (2010): 107-127. Hartmann, Margaret. “National Guard Deployed After Chaotic, Violent Night in Ferguson.” ​New York Magazine​ 18 August 2014. LaCapria, Kim. “Chants Encounter.” ​Snopes​, 18 July 2016. Lopez, German and Oh, Soo. “Police killings since Ferguson, in one map.” ​Vox​ 17 May 2017. Milenio Digital. “Abarca ordenó atacar a normalistas, confirma PGR.” ​El Universal 22 October 2014. Milonas, Abby. Conversation with Covert, Dr. Lisa P. July 2017. Minster, Christopher. “The Unsung Ally: Mexican Involvement in World War II.” ThoughtCo.com.​ 13 July 2017. Monsiváis, Carlos​. ​Mexican Postcards​. London: New Left Books, 1997. Paul, Kari. “Mexico’s Missing 43: A timeline of a mass kidnapping.” ​Mashable.​ 20 November 2014. Redacción Red Política. “PERFIL Abarca y Pineda, la ‘narcopareja’ que gobernó Iguala.” ​El Universal​ 4 November 2014. 31

Richman, Joe and ​Diaz-Cortes, Anayansi. “Mexico’s 1968 Massacre: What Really Happened?” Radio Diaries.​ National Public Radio. 1 December 2008. Rueda, Manuel. “See exclusive video of missing Ayotzinapa students before their disappearance.” ​Fusion​ 29 October 2014. Schell, William. ​Integral Outsiders: The American Colony in Mexico City, 1876-1911​. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Scherer García, Julio and Monsiváis, Carlos. ​Parte de guerra, Tlatelolco 1968: documentos del general Marcelino García Barragán : los hechos y la historia.​ Nuevo Siglo/Aguilar: Mexico, 1999. Shapira, Yoram. “Mexico: The Impact of the 1968 Student Protest on Echeverria’s Reformism.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs​ 19, no. 4 (1977): 557-580. Suri, Jeremi. ​The Global Revolutions of 1968​. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007. Tremlett, Giles and Tuckman, Jo. “Mexican police exposed as killers.” ​The Guardian.​ 10 December 2001. United States Department of Justice. Department of Justice Report Regarding the Criminal Investigation Into the Shooting Death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer Darren Wilson.​ 4 March 2015. Wade, Lizzie. “‘Burning bodies’ experiment casts doubt on fate of missing Mexican students.” Science.​ 13 September 2016. Wilkinson, Tracy. “Prolific Mexican writer and critic Carlos Monsiváis dies at 72.” ​Los Angeles Times.​ 21 June 2010. Wilson, Jason. ​Octavio Paz: A Study of His Poetics​. CUP Archives. 21 June 1979. Zerón-Medina Laris, Teresa. “Luis González de Alba, Perfil.” Nexos.com.mx. 1 December 2013. Zolov, Eric. “Discovering a Land ‘Mysterious and Obvious’: The Renarrativizing of Postrevolutionary Mexico.” in ​Fragments of a Golden Age,​ edited by Gilbert Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, & Eric Zolov, 234-272. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001. Zolov, Eric. ​Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture. U ​ niversity of California Press, 1999.

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