From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 0813531179, 9780813531175

Citation preview

ANDREI LANKOV ~

Frolll Stalin to Killl 11 Sung The Formation

of North Korea

1945-1960

HURST& COMPANY,LONDON

019111,

by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

First published in the United Kingdom by

C. Hunt & Co. (Publishen) Ltd., 38 King Street, LoodOn WC2E 8JZ C Andrei l.ankov, 2002 All rip11 n:set mi

ISBN 1-8506S-56>-4 The ript ofAndrei Lankov to be identified u the authoc of this work hu been asserted by him in acconlmce with the Copyright, DesigPs and Patents Act, 1988.

Printed in India

Dlg•tl" "'

Got gle

Ot!Oirol fron1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

To my mother Valentina LAnkova (Algazina)

ovt•z•

Go gle

Ong Ml f1om

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

I

&r1~

I o-t'f-k), who in 1937 was a tank

01gitized by

Google

Original frcm

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Soviet Oaupation a11d the Birth ofthe State

5

out the pre-war period had clearly been subordinated to the much more important tasks ofSoviet policy toward Japan and China, Korea itself not being taken too seriously. Thus, when the 25th Army entered North Korea, even Korean interpreters were absent: the army had been preparing to fight with the Japanese and a Korean factor was not taken into account. In fact, the commanders of the 25th Army knew nothing about the country which they now unexpectedly had to govern. Most decisions had to be improvised. According to J.M. Chistiakov, the most important political decision - to entrust the 25th Army with the occupation of Korea - was taken on 25th August, after the actual fighting had already finished. Marshal K.A. Meretskov, the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, met J.M. Chistiakov and, having told him about this decision, offered two possible locations for the 25th Army Headquarters: Hamhung or Pyongyang. Chistiakov chose Pyongyang.8 This half-accidental decision probably determined the location of the future North Korean capital. Whatever reasons Chistiakov had (and his considerations may well have been purely military}, his choice was quite reasonable: of all the cities located in the Soviet zone ofoccupation, Pyongyang was not only the biggest but also one of the oldest. It was one of Korea's historical capitals, which made a government located there look more legitimate. In the economic field the new Soviet military authorities had to sustain the North Korean economy, satisfy the needs of the population in food and basic supplies, organise emergency repair works and maintain public order. It was not an easy task. As the Japanese retreated, they inflicted significant damage on the Korean economy. According to Soviet estimates, often cited in later Soviet publications, out of 1,034 small and medium-sized enterprises then existing in the territory of North Korea, 1,015 were destroyed by the retreatingJapanese.9 officer and one of many profession.al Korean officers in the Red Army, is insuuctive. Lilce many others, he was arrested in 1937. The investig;ators denlalldcd that he admit to being a Japanese spy, but he did not give in. When former Soviet security chief Ezhov was cfurnissed, the new bosses of the secret police g;ave the order to free all military officers who did not confess their 'crimes'. Ch'oe was freed, fought in the war and later spent some time in the DPRK, first as a Soviet military adviser and then as one of the commanders of the Korean army. 81.M. Chistialcov, 'Bocvoi put' 25 arrnii', Osvobozhdmk Kam, Moscow: Nauka, 1976, p. 44. 9Ibid., p. 51.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

From Stalin lo Kim II Sung

6

In addition, the Japanese who occupied most middle-level and almost all high-level managerial and professional positions had either left before the occupation or intended to leave soon. It was also necessary to bring Soviet soldiers to order. Their behaviour at the beginning of the occupation was far from exemplary. According to numerous testimonies in contemporary publications, in the first weeks theft, looting and rape were rather widespread. Some of these accusations might have been dictated by hostile propaganda if they had not also been made by those sympathising with the Soviet Union and its Korean policy. to The author himself was told by some older Koreans about looting committed by Soviet troops during the first days of the occupation. By late September, however, the Soviet military leaders had taken measures to improve the discipline of the troops. These measures were generally successful, but some problems remained and throughout 1945-8 the continuing presence of a large number of often rather thuggish Soviet troops was a major source of irritation between the locals and the Soviet administration. 11 10An

example of a non-friendly source is found in the declassified and published files of the American military intelligence: 'North Korea Today. for American Eyes Only (G-2, American Army Forces in Korea, August 1947)', An Anthology ofSelttted Pitcn from the ~lass!fitd Fik of &aet US Matnials in Korea before and during the Korean War, Seoul: National Unification Board, 1981, p. 31. Such incidents are reported, for instance, by Bruce Cumings who is very critical of US policies in Korea: Bruce Cumings, ~ Origins of tht Korean War, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 388. Another such item of evidence is a remark made by Anna Saong (as mentioned by Eric vm Ree in So