From Self to Social Relationships 9781107093799, 1107093791

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
Half-title page......Page 3
Series page......Page 4
Title page......Page 5
Copyright page......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Figures......Page 11
Acknowledgements......Page 12
Prologue......Page 13
Part I Assumptions......Page 21
Introduction......Page 23
The need for dark matter......Page 24
A problem......Page 29
A solution......Page 34
Towards integration and consilience......Page 40
Introduction......Page 45
What is relational essence?......Page 46
Too much self-ishness......Page 50
Definitions and theories of social motivation......Page 55
Selvations and self in evolutionary context?......Page 67
Part II Selvations theory......Page 75
Introduction......Page 77
What are selvations?......Page 78
Knitting together an Asian elephant......Page 79
The spider in the web......Page 99
Bigger or smaller brains?......Page 103
Introduction......Page 105
What is coping?......Page 107
Knitting together an African elephant......Page 112
The cultural matrix......Page 124
A clash of cultures?......Page 127
Part III Implications......Page 131
Introduction......Page 133
So what indeed?......Page 134
Implications of selvations theory......Page 139
Implications of relational essence......Page 156
Implications of integration and consilience......Page 161
Epilogue......Page 164
More than a metaphor?......Page 165
Selvations theory in everyday life......Page 169
The undiscovered country......Page 176
Conclusion......Page 181
References......Page 182
Index......Page 205

Citation preview

From Self to Social Relationships What is it that moves and motivates us in our lives? Martijn van Zomeren proposes social relationships are at the essence of this key question and, in a fascinating investigation into human motivation, he develops a novel and integrative psychological theory termed ‘selvations theory’. The theory suggests that we are essentially relational beings that seek to regulate relationships in response to felt changes in our network of relationships (selvations). However, we need to do this in culturally appropriate ways, and this is where our culturally construed self comes to be of use. From Self to Social Relationships constitutes a powerful argument about human essence, integrating major theories in and around psychology, which has strong implications for the study and practice of social motivation. martijn van zomeren is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Psychology at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. In 2009 he was awarded a prestigious VENI grant from the Dutch Science Foundation, and in 2011 he was awarded the Kurt Lewin Medal, an early career award from the European Association for Social Psychology. Dr van Zomeren has published a number of contributions to the literature on collective action and social change in high-impact psychology journals.

STUDIES IN EMOTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION Second Series Series Editors Keith Oatley University of Toronto Antony S. R. Manstead Cardiff University Titles published in the Second Series The Psychology of Facial Expression, edited by James A. Russell and José Miguel Fernández-Dols Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality: Part/Whole Analysis, by Thomas J. Scheff Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny, edited by Stein Bråten The Social Context of Nonverbal Behavior, edited by Pierre Philippot, Robert S. Feldman, and Erik J. Coats Communicating Emotion: Social, Moral, and Cultural Processes, by Sally Planalp Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals, by Anna Wierzbicka Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition, edited by Joseph P. Forgas Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling, by Zoltán Kövecses Gender and Emotion: Social Psychological Perspectives, edited by Agneta H. Fischer Causes and Consequences of Feelings, by Leonard Berkowitz Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts, edited by Nico H. Frijda, Antony S. R. Manstead, and Sacha Bem Identity and Emotion: Development through Self-Organization, edited by Harke A. Bosma and E. Saskia Kunnen (Continued after Index)

From Self to Social Relationships An Essentially Relational Perspective on Social Motivation

Martijn van Zomeren

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107093799 © Martijn van Zomeren 2016 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2016 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Zomeren, Martijn van, 1979– author. From self to social relationships : an essentially relational perspective on social motivation / Martijn van Zomeren. Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2016. | Studies in emotion and social interaction | Includes bibliographical references. LCCN 2015041118 | ISBN 9781107093799 (hardback) LCSH: Motivation (Psychology) | Social psychology. LCC HM1201 .Z66 2016 | DDC 153.8–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015041118 ISBN 978-1-107-09379-9 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To Marieke, Tim, and Eline: My safe haven as well as my secure base

Contents

List of figures Acknowledgements Prologue PART I Assumptions

page ix x 1 9

1 Towards theoretical integration Introduction The need for dark matter A problem A solution Towards integration and consilience

11 11 12 17 22 28

2 A shift from self to selvations Introduction What is relational essence? Too much self-ishness Definitions and theories of social motivation Selvations and self in evolutionary context?

33 33 34 38 43 55

PART II Selvations theory 3 Selvations theory I: Value infusion Introduction What are selvations? Knitting together an Asian elephant The spider in the web Bigger or smaller brains? 4 Selvations theory II: Coping with value-infused events Introduction What is coping? Knitting together an African elephant The cultural matrix A clash of cultures?

63 65 65 66 67 87 91 93 93 95 100 112 115 vii

viii

Contents

PART III Implications 5 So what? Introduction So what indeed? Implications of selvations theory Implications of relational essence Implications of integration and consilience

119 121 121 122 127 144 149

Epilogue More than a metaphor? Selvations theory in everyday life The undiscovered country Conclusion

152 153 157 164 169

References Index

170 193

Figures

1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2

Networks of social relationships embed individuals in (one or multiple) ‘culture(s)’. 24 Selvations theory’s integrative two-step model of the social-motivational process. 29 The proto-self enables the (primordial) ‘feeling of what happens’. 69 Two-dimensional model of attachment styles. 76 Key differences between the four relational models (adapted from Fiske, 1992, pp. 42–49, Table 1). 82 Two dimensions of coping. 98 Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) representation of psychological consequences of self-construal. 104

ix

Acknowledgements

This book could not have been written without others to move or motivate me to start writing it, continue writing it, and stop writing it; as such the book is the product of both my and their relational essence. I would like to thank the following people for spending considerable time and effort in reading and commenting on the initial book proposal and/or one or more chapters of this book (listed in alphabetical order): Greg Boese, Roger Giner-Sorolla, Paul van Lange, Craig McGarty, Thomas Pollet, Tom Postmes, Tamar Saguy, Daan Scheepers, Fabian Schellhaas, Eliot Smith, Russell Spears, Wolfgang Stroebe, Susanne Täuber, and Vivian Vignoles. I am also grateful to Tony Manstead, who provided very useful feedback on the manuscript as a whole. I would also like to thank Rebecca Taylor, Charlotte Thomas, Jessica Murphy, Jacqueline French, Hetty Marx, and Carrie Parkinson at Cambridge University Press for their input and assistance in the process. My thinking and writing also benefited from the feedback from different audiences to which I presented (aspects of) my line of thought, including the Social Psychology labgroup at the University of Groningen, the Environmental Psychology labgroup at the same university, and the NIAS/KLI 2015 workshop on social support. Furthermore, the feedback of a number of anonymous reviewers on two theoretical journal articles that apply my general line of thought to specific literatures has also been very helpful in clarifying my argumentation towards different audiences.

x

Prologue

I vividly remember how my one-year-old daughter responded to seeing me eating a cookie, while shaking my head to make absolutely clear to her that she wouldn’t get any of it. Her response was to cry out as if I had just committed murder. But I remember even more vividly what happened afterwards, when I, obviously failing as a consistent parent, soft-heartedly offered her the cookie: what happened was she ran to me in tears and hugged me intensely, ignoring the cookie altogether. Isn’t that . . . well, surprising? After all, I provided my one-year-old with the opportunity to get what she wanted – she just had to take the cookie and eat it – but she didn’t take the cookie. Why? * The explanation I provide in this book is that most of us, most of the time, prioritize our social relationships over the cookie. Indeed, the cookie never was what was at stake in this event. From my daughter’s intuitive understanding of our relationship, the cookie was ours to eat. She did not cry out because she did not get the cookie, but because I did not go about our relationship the way she intuitively expected me to. I put the relationship at stake when I denied her the cookie; and she ran to me in tears and hugged me afterwards because she prioritized maintaining our relationship over getting the cookie. It is this particular prioritization of relationships that this book is about. It illustrates the shift I propose in our understanding of what generally moves and motivates us, namely a shift from self to social relationships. This shift implies a view of humans as relational beings that are, in their very essence, moved and motivated by their need to regulate (that is, generate or maintain) social relationships.1 As such, social relationships reflect a core aspect of the human essence: that which makes a human being what it fundamentally and necessarily is, and without which it would no 1

My analysis is indebted to the lines of thought of many scholars, but in particular relies on Fiske (1991, 1992), Rai and Fiske (2011), and Fiske and Rai (2015).

1

2

From Self to Social Relationships

longer be what it is.2 As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1942) beautifully put it in his haunting novel Flight over Arras: ‘Man is a knot into which relationships are tied.’ * My argument is not that new and not that strange. There exist plenty of pointers in this respect and these will be outlined in the following chapters. For instance, human beings cannot live, survive, and procreate without social relationships. From infancy onwards, relating to others is essential to our development, well-being, and health. Without social relationships, human life becomes cold, empty, and meaningless. Thus, when human beings are faced with love, friendship, solidarity, social loss, mourning, social exclusion, or loneliness, they show their very essence, their true colours. It is telling that our social brains seem to respond to severed relationships as if severe physiological pain is felt and such that fundamental needs temporarily shut down. Loneliness has even been referred to as a silent killer because of its negative effects on mental and physical health. All of these observations already paint a picture of the notion that humans are relational beings that are, in their very essence, moved and motivated by others. This is one way to interpret the book’s cover featuring Luigi Russolo’s The Solidity of Fog: As lost and lonely souls hovering together in the fog, which obstructs their connectedness. One might expect psychological theories of motivation to use this knot of relationships as their point of departure, particularly in subfields devoted to the social origins of motivation. However, this is not quite what one will find. In Western scholarly thought as well as popular culture, ‘others’ are typically viewed as just one of the many things connected to our self: that consciously experienced sense of who we are and through which we think, feel, and act. The engrained view, implicitly or explicitly stated, is that humans are essentially individuals who are moved and motivated by anything that is relevant to their self (such as their self-interest, or other self-motives). The point of departure is the self, not social relationships. What needs to be explained is why people are social; not why people are self-ish. Indeed, such self-ish theories, as I call them, implicitly or explicitly assume that others may for sure play some part in moving and motivating us, but this is because others are factors that lead one to protect or promote the self (e.g., threatening or enhancing our self-esteem or self-interest). 2

Some might feel safer, philosophically, staying clear from positing any ‘essence’. For current purposes, I make use of the notion of essence in order to make explicit theoretical assumptions (see Slife & Williams, 1995).

Prologue

3

Against this general backdrop, the premise of this book is very simple: what would a theory of motivation look like if it were to be based on the explicit assumption that individuals essentially regulate social relationships? Asking this question is important for three reasons. First, it offers a clear relational principle that enables theoretical integration of a variety of existing theories, models, and hypotheses across different (sub)disciplines. Second, it offers a clear starting point for a relational interpretation of theories and findings about motivation. And third, it offers a new and integrative theory that puts social relationships first and accords the self a more modest, yet still pivotal, position. This theory proposes a two-step social-motivational process. In the first step, humans can intuitively feel any changes in their network of social relationships, which moves and motivates them; they are indeed the knot in which relationships are tied. In the second step, the culturally construed self helps us cope with how to go about those social relationships in culturally appropriate ways. Both steps in the social-motivational process serve to regulate relationships: the first step determines when we are moved and motivated, whereas the second determines how we go about it in situ. For this reason, I will consistently use the term social motivation, which implies instances of motivation for which at least one other relational entity (human or nonhuman, actual or anticipated) is required for need fulfilment. * There may be some implicit or explicit resistance to any argument about relational essence. One reason for this may be that the engrained view on social motivation stems largely from theorists from Western countries. Although there is no need to posit a one-to-one correspondence between geography and culture, it is no coincidence that ideas about individualism, autonomy, and individual rationality and responsibility have become interwoven with assumptions of psychological theories of motivation, which implicitly or explicitly put the self at centre stage.3 Indeed, most theorizing about social motivation takes place in Western cultural settings that normatively value the individualistic, rational, independent self. The result: self-ish theories. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with such implicit or explicit cultural projection (one has to start somewhere), it does hamper scientific progress when it provides assumptions that may not be valid outside Western cultural contexts. Indeed, accumulating insights in cultural psychology suggest clear limits to what I call a self-ish view of social motivation. For instance, viewing one’s self as an individual, 3

See, for instance, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2004, 2010); Smith, Bond, and Kag˘ itçibas¸i (2006); and Smith et al. (2013).

4

From Self to Social Relationships

autonomous, rational entity is more of a cultural ideal of what people should do and be like than what they actually do and are like.4 This is not to say that self-ish explanations of social motivation are wrong – they may be accurate within specific cultural settings. What is wrong, I believe, is to essentialize the self (implicitly or explicitly), because such an assumption has strong implications for what we then believe individuals are moved and motivated by. Self-ish explanations are not utterly wrong, but they do start off on the wrong foot. In this book I try starting off on the other foot, with three interrelated aims in mind. The first aim is to argue for more integrative theorizing about social motivation across otherwise isolated different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines. The mass production of empirical findings in psychology and beyond is powerful and promising, but requires the development and valuation of ‘bigger’ theorizing that enables the interpretation of not only sets of localized findings but, to an even greater extent, a range of general patterns of findings across different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines. To borrow from Wilson (1998), I believe we urgently need theories that seek theoretical integration towards achieving the larger aim of consilience (defined as the coming together of knowledge across different fields and disciplines). They are needed to hold together all those innumerable empirical snippets of research that all the factories of knowledge around the world are producing. They are needed to make bigger sense of the rampant empirical fragmentation in and around psychology. In fact, this is a second way to interpret the cover illustration: as social scientists yearning for sunlight behind the solid fog that surrounds them. To me, the sunlight symbolizes the human essence that we seek to understand, whereas the fog symbolizes everything that obscures it. The challenge is to determine what reflects the sunlight and what obscures it. The main message in this book is that a relational perspective on social motivation exposes the sunlight, but this requires letting go of the (to many quite familiar) self-ish assumptions that resemble our cultural fog. As such, the second aim of the book is to develop a relational perspective on social motivation based in a proposed shift from self to social relationships. This means that I will assume individuals, in their essence, to be geared towards relationship regulation. A relational view enables a new groundwork for the development of an integrative theory of social motivation that puts social relationships first – the third and final aim of this book. This synthesis introduces the 4

See, for instance, Heine et al. (1999), Heine (2005), and Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010).

Prologue

5

novel notion of selvations, defined as individuals’ intuitive feeling of any changes in their network of social relationships. In selvations theory, selvations trigger the motivational process geared at the generation or maintenance of social relationships, and they do so in order to secure social inclusion in and prevent social exclusion from one’s network of social relationships. The lead metaphor for this is the spider that can feel any movement in its web so that it can respond to it. In a similar fashion, I propose that most people, most of the time, are moved and motivated by feeling any movement in the social relationships in their social network. Selvations theory outlines this first step of the motivational process by synthesizing, on the basis of relational assumptions, a number of otherwise isolated theories from different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines. This contributes to a modest but necessary step towards theoretical integration. Yet selvations theory does not forget, ignore, or otherwise downplay the importance of the self. In the second step of the motivational process, it outlines how the self translates selvations into culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and courses of action (which are all experienced through the culturally construed self), and it does so in order to secure social inclusion in and prevent social exclusion from the larger culture in which one’s network of social relationships is embedded. Thus, it proposes that, for most people and most of the time, it is through the self that they regulate relationships in culturally appropriate ways. The self is like a Rough Guide to relationship regulation in situ. Selvations theory outlines this step of the motivational process by synthesizing, again on the basis of relational assumptions, a number of otherwise isolated theories from different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines, taking another modest but necessary step towards theoretical integration. * In outlining what a theory claims, it often helps to specify upfront what it certainly does not claim. Four issues stand out. First, selvations theory does not claim that all motivation is due to selvations. Human beings obviously have biological needs and instincts, such as those revolving around bodily functions such as hunger and thirst, which do not necessarily require social relationships, or other people for that matter, for their fulfilment. Relationship regulation does. The scope of selvations theory is nevertheless broad: it describes and explains the motivational process that, somewhere along the road, requires dealing with other people. Indeed, selvations serve to guard the integrity of one’s network of social relationships; just as biological needs and instincts serve to guard the integrity of one’s body. Although a focus

6

From Self to Social Relationships

on biological needs and instincts is certainly important in its own right, the current book focuses on selvations. Second, selvations theory does not claim that self-motives (such as individuals’ presumed need for self-esteem, self-enhancement, or selfverification) are unimportant in the motivational process. It simply does not essentialize such motives. In selvations theory, self-motives depend on cultural norms about how to regulate which relationships. For this reason, one can find such an impressive variety of self-understandings around the world (ranging from the self as an autonomous unit to an interdependent or even collective Gestalt, and from ideal selves as ambitious and independent to modest and self-sacrificing). By contrast, the need of individuals to regulate relationships is much less variable, for most people and most of the time. Third, selvations theory does not claim that individuals want to regulate all their possible social relationships. It does not paint a picture of human beings as caring for everyone. Individuals want to regulate relationships with those they interact with in their social networks because this provides a safe haven, or because it offers a secure base from which to explore their broader world (and possibly expand their network). But there are clear limitations to how many relationships one can regulate. Furthermore, individuals prioritize one social relationship over another (e.g., ‘family first’), or regulate one relationship by regulating another (e.g., being friendly towards one’s former spouse’s new partner). The key point here is that although a relational perspective on social motivation may appear to be about dyads, selvations theory explicitly conceptualizes social relationships as part of a social network. Finally, selvations theory does not claim to be supported by radically new evidence. The novelty and added value of selvations theory lies in how it theoretically integrates existing ideas and models of motivation on the basis of relational assumptions. Some might say that the theory is therefore untested and even speculative. This is true only to a certain extent. The integrative approach to theorizing that I use implies that selvations theory relies on existing and established theories that are supported by empirical research, each in their own and often isolated part of the empirical universe. It is the synthesis itself that is new, which exemplifies the notion that different assumptions have different implications. One such implication is that I hope it contributes to theoretical integration and perhaps even to consilience. Psychology urgently needs a focus on a ‘big picture’. Indeed, my personal aim in writing this book is to make explicit what a relational ‘big picture’ looks like when applied to social motivation; and more specifically, what its different assumptions imply for our understanding of what moves and

Prologue

7

motivates us. I further hope that selvations theory will be tried and tested, developed and extended, and revised and reformulated in the future. To me, this is what true scientific progress should be like – not merely empirical productivity, but the ability and willingness to interpret all kinds of different snippets of localized research through integrative theorizing.

PART I

Assumptions

CHAPTER 1

Towards theoretical integration

Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind. (Attributed to Immanuel Kant, 1724–1804) Integration demands letting go of an either/or approach in favor of openness to the possibility of a both/and perspective. One must be willing to learn not just one, but multiple, psychologies in sufficient detail to be able to translate terms, identify commonalities, and recognize relationships between the models. In the resulting synthesis, each primary model now becomes a part of the integrative one, the set becomes a subset, context becomes content, and what was the whole system becomes a subsystem. (Walsh & Vaughan, 1983, p. 392) The merits of a scientific theory are to be judged in terms of the range of phenomena it embraces, the internal consistency of its structure, the precision of the predictions it can make and the practicability of testing them. (Bowlby, 1969, p. 173)

Introduction This maiden chapter zooms in on the book’s first aim: to foster a theoretically integrative approach to social motivation with the larger aim of consilience. Consilience refers to the principle that ideas and evidence from very different and independent research literatures can converge into clear and general conclusions, and thus to a jumping of knowledge across fields (Wilson, 1998). It reflects a type of über-integration that can be achieved only through focused theoretically integrative efforts. In the above quotation, Walsh and Vaughan (1983) nicely describe how theoretical integration changes one’s perspective from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ approach. However, theoretical integration is an approach towards science that is, in practice, not always met with great enthusiasm. For this reason, it is important to explain why integrative theorizing is valuable and necessary, which means answering the ‘so what?’ question (which 11

12

Assumptions

I will do in detail in Chapter 5, after I have presented the new theory in Chapters 3 and 4). The current chapter is organized into two parts. In the first part, I explain my stance towards theoretical integration. In the second part, I illustrate how I will put this into practice in this book. Through this setup, the current chapter serves to communicate why theoretical integration is important, but also how this is translated in the context of social motivation in the chapters to come. As such, it is a way to ease into the relational perspective, the novel notion of selvations, and the selvations theory of social motivation I propose in later chapters. For readers who do not appreciate being eased into my line of thought, there is some good news. I have organized the book such that readers who are particularly interested in the proposed shift from self to selvations can turn directly to Chapter 2; those particularly interested in the specifics of selvations theory can turn directly to Chapters 3 and 4; and those already asking the ‘so what?’ question can turn directly to Chapter 5 and the Epilogue, which outline the many theoretical and practical implications of a relational perspective on social motivation. Although the current chapter may not be the briefest and simplest of chapters, I encourage readers to keep reading as it contains the broadest message of all – that scholars of social motivation need to move towards integrative and even consilient theorizing, which reflects, in my view, what scientific progress is all about. Indeed, theoretical integration is necessary because the current status of psychology – the main field to focus on social motivation – is one of empirical fragmentation that is holding back the field (see Ellemers, 2013; Wilson, 1998). Indeed, my view is that psychology suffers from a degree of fragmentation that would unsettle even the most postmodern thinker.

The need for dark matter Percepts are useless without concepts. What we see requires interpretations, and our interpretations require observations. In science, this implies that empirical findings are useless without theoretical interpretation. Thus, the interpretation we choose, implicitly or explicitly, will have great impact on what we expect to see. For that reason, we had better spend time on carefully choosing our interpretation. We had better spend time on theorizing (Slife & Williams, 1995). More specifically, we need theoretical integration more than ever in the social sciences. Integrative and even consilient theorizing is urgently needed to overcome the undesirable state of empirical fragmentation that I will refer to as empty empiricism. I strongly agree with those who take the stance that a lack of theoretical integration impedes the progress

Towards theoretical integration

13

of any scientific field (e.g., Ellemers, 2013; Wilson, 1975, 1998; see also Steel & Konig, 2006). This is because insights may increase in number but not necessarily in quality or synthesis. Like many scientists, psychologists have a strong tendency to compartmentalize their findings, theories, and insights.1 Insights from each subdiscipline are typically stored in very different compartments of knowledge, each of which is used and developed mostly within that specific compartment. Only rarely does one find integrative work that crosses compartmental boundaries (yet for such exceptions, see Bandura, 1997; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Fiske, 1991; Fiske & Rai, 2015; Forbes, 2011; Haidt, 2012; Henriques, 2011; Tetlock, 2002; Wilson, 1975). This is unfortunate because without theoretically integrative efforts, science is blind; and a blind science is nothing more than a very large storage container of empirical trivia. It is and does what a very large storage container is and does: it is very large, and it contains and stores things. And within, it is divided into so many sections and subsections that one may spend a lifetime counting or easily lose count. One may also quickly tire of looking inside each section because within each section, there will be different ’local’ languages, definitions, concepts, and rules for what makes empirical findings worthy of being added to the very large storage container. The very large storage container invites empirical fragmentation and disencourages a search for a bigger picture, for general principles, for human universals. It obstructs theoretical integration. It obstructs progress. It is a problem. * One solution to this problem is that we need theories that are not only internally consistent, parsimonious, and testable (as suggested by Bowlby, 1969) but also integrative and even consilient – a term coined by Wilson (1998) to refer to the ability of a theory to explain a broad array of phenomena (and thus not limited by ‘local’ definitions). Consilience can only be achieved when one takes an integrative and broad approach that moves beyond (sub)field and (sub)disciplinary boundaries and definitions within the very large storage container. Furthermore, consilience becomes possible when different insights from different sections in the 1

For instance, there is a dazzling array of theories about the self. Developmental psychologists study how individuals’ sense of self develops (e.g., Erikson, 1959; Kag˘itçibas¸i, 1995), neuropsychologists study where the related ‘action’ is in the brain and which neurological processes are associated with it (Damasio, 2001, 2010; LeDoux, 2002), personality psychologists study the genetic and cultural factors that contribute to individuals’ sense of self that they believe to be their personality (McCrae & Costa, 1997), and social psychologists study how individuals’ self-construal shifts or changes as a function of situational cues (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Turner et al., 1987).

14

Assumptions

very large storage container appear to fit with the same core assumptions. Consilience requires theoretical integration based on such assumptions. It is encouraging, in this sense, that even core assumptions that scientists seem to agree on may change as a function of time – a phenomenon known as a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962; see also Lakatos, 1970). Galileo tried to remove our world from the centre of the universe; Darwin tried to remove our species from the centre of our planet; Freud tried to remove our rationality from the centre of ourselves; and for all we know, contemporary assumptions about what moves and motivates us may also turn out to be temporary. I believe we are in need of a paradigm shift in our thinking about and understanding of social motivation, which can be accomplished by taking efforts towards theoretical and even consilient theorizing seriously.2 My view is that there would be something terribly wrong with science if different perspectives on the same phenomenon (such as social motivation) would not, at least at some level, reveal something true and valid about it. Put differently, there should be a general simplicity above and beyond many specific complexities. There should be a general framework within which specific theories fit together. There should be human universals, within which cultural variance occurs (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). There should be some form of essence that can be separated from that which is variance. The painting by Luigi Russolo on the book’s cover attests to precisely this belief: that there should be sunlight behind the solid fog. But in the foggy environment of the very large storage container that stimulates empirical fragmentation, the challenge is to find and expose the sunlight and to appreciate its warmth. So how do we find the sun? * My answer is that we need to identify dark matter in the lonely empirical universe of the very large storage container. We need a conceptual counterforce to overcome the empty empiricism that has led to a major fragmentation of empirical findings. This dark matter metaphor is based on the image of the aftermath of the Big Bang that cosmologists tell us about. The universe, at least as they know it, is one that has been expanding since the Big Bang (Hawking, 1988). To put it in my own, no doubt fairly crude, terms: with the passage of time, everything is drifting away from everything else; as such, every star is getting more and more lonely. This state of affairs corresponds to all the isolated pockets of research done in so 2

However, theoretical integration and consilience do not seem to appear on scholars’ priority lists. This is unsurprising because of the compartmentalization of knowledge produced by the phenomenon that scholars are typically specialists, not generalists (for the case of social psychology, see Ellemers, 2013; Mather, 2007).

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15

many laboratories and behind so many desks and desktops and laptops across the world, no doubt identifying interesting empirical trivia, yet failing to connect to each other or a bigger picture. The result is a pervasive sense of loneliness and emptiness. What is missing in this empirical universe is a conceptual counterforce that builds bridges between all those isolated, lonely stars. If this counterforce is sufficiently strong, it may be able to hold the empirical universe together and avoid a lonely and empty expansion beyond return. Physicists and astronomers have a strong suspicion that this counterforce exists, but they have had difficulty identifying it because they cannot directly observe it. For this reason, they have invoked the notion of dark matter, the accumulated mass and gravity of which would help explain that there is such a counterforce. This is why I believe integrative and even consilient theorizing is the dark matter of the empirical universe. We need ‘big theories’ with sufficient mass and gravity to hold together what is otherwise drifting away. We need theoretical integration to prevent any further fragmentation that will leave us with an understanding merely of what is valid and valuable just around the corner, rather than what lies over the rainbow. Some might object that it is too early to even contemplate a ‘theory of everything’ for the social sciences. Obviously the only way to test such an argument is to invest efforts in such attempts and see how they fare (which in my view should be applauded; e.g., Henriques, 2011). Some might object that consilient theorizing necessarily implies reductionist theorizing, because it requires a core assumption with which to integrate other theories. I do not agree with this objection for two reasons. First of all, it is better to be explicit about one’s assumptions than to be (intentionally or unintentionally) implicit about them (Slife & Williams, 1995). All theories need a point of departure. If this counts as reductionism, then all theories are reductionist and the critique becomes meaningless. Second, there is a difference between a theory that uses just one assumed principle, mechanism, or process (which could be viewed as reductionist), and a theory that integrates different principles, mechanisms, or processes through a core assumption. Indeed, selvations theory is meant to provide a modest but necessary first step towards consilience in the specific domain of social motivation. It does so through integrative theorizing about what essentially moves and motivates us that includes theories from different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines, on the basis of relational assumptions. Specifically, it assumes that, for most people and most of the time, social motivation is generated by felt changes in individuals’ network of social relationships (i.e., selvations), which does not yet concern the consciously experienced sense of who we are and through which we think, feel, and act (the self). It

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nevertheless suggests the self has an important function in the second step of the broader motivational process. Thus, selvations theory is not only a theory of social relationships and social motivation, but also a theory of self.3 * In my line of thought, a focus on integrative theorizing about social motivation requires a shift of assumptions about what essentially moves and motivates us, namely a shift from self to social relationships. In most work on social motivation, there is an implicit or explicit assumption about the self as a psychological basis for social motivation, for instance with respect to the notion of self-interest (e.g., Edwards, 1962), the presumed necessity to perceive events as self-relevant before the individual can feel moved and motivated by them (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), or other self-motives (see Vignoles, 2011). Indeed, many theories implicitly or explicitly identify the self as a psychological basis for social motivation (e.g., Sedikides, Gaertner & Tokuchi, 2003). These theories provide a self-ish looking glass through which to explain social motivation. They remind me of the Greek myth about Narcissus who looked into the water and fell in love with his own self-image – rather than with the water.4 We may only see what we want to see. By contrast, integrative theorizing often requires us to also explain what we may not want to see.5 Fortunately, the times may be changing. Developments in cultural psychology suggest that both the meaning and structure of the self differ considerably as a function of cultural variables (see Fiske et al., 1998; Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004; Vignoles, 2011). Indeed, there has been acknowledgement – beyond mere lip service – that the field is not helped by its reliance on an almost exclusively Western database (i.e., samples of participants that are drawn from populations that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic, or WEIRD; see Henrich et al., 2010; Sears, 1986). Arguably, less attention has been paid to the observation that this narrow database has been combined with an equally narrow theoretical lens through which findings are typically interpreted (Van Zomeren, 2014). Specifically, social scientists have used 3

4

5

This implies that the variables identified in selvations theory are not simply put together as a ‘laundry list’. Creating laundry lists of variables potentially related to motivational differences is not the same as integrative theorizing. Laundry lists do not help us explain much more than empirical variance, because theoretically they reflect organization without understanding. Ironically, as biologists will tell us, water makes up roughly more than half of what we are. This is also reflected in empirical research: a focused test of one particular hypothesis typically results in a finding that is unlikely to explain the bulk of the empirical variance.

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a predominantly self-ish theoretical lens to explain what essentially moves and motivates us, effectively turning psychological re-search into mesearch, and social motivation into self-motives. There is nothing inherently wrong with this as long as the lens led to twenty-twenty vision and a panoramic view. Unfortunately, the self that studies the self because it sees only the self does not lead to those outcomes. It blinds us from what lies beneath the self; moreover, it blinds us from what lies beyond one’s own culture.

A problem Western culture proudly assigns the unique individual a central position in the universe (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Within such cultures (which some have defined as those who are industrialized and individualized; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993), individuals are expected not only to carry out their duties and responsibilities, but also to be autonomous and free, to make decisions rationally and reasonably, and to reliably behave in their own interests. On the one hand, individuals are thus assumed and believed to constitute the locus of social order and influence; but on the other hand, they are assumed and believed to want to grow, prosper, and be self-reliant and happy. This strong focus on the individual may be one reason why psychologists have heavily debated whether humans, as self-ish beings, have any potential for altruism and ‘prosocial’ behaviour (e.g., Batson, 1990; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cialdini, 1991; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). If the default is the self, then the thing to be explained is that which is selfless. Few have gone so far with respect to celebrating individualism and rejecting altruism as Ayn Rand in her literary and philosophical writings (e.g., Rand, 1943, 1957, 1982). Rand takes an extreme and normative individualist stance that views the individual as an end in and of itself – a unique creature that can do great things as long as it is ‘authentic’. The main characters in her books, such as the architect Howard Roarke in The Fountainhead (1943), paint a picture of successful individuals being those who are at first scorned by society because of their deviance and originality but who later become celebrated and successful for exactly the same reasons. In worshipping the presumed ‘natural’ goodness of the unique individual, Rand firmly rejects the goodness of other parts of society such as families, relationships, communities, institutions, and authorities. These are viewed as forces that prevent the individual from selfactualization and thus from achieving natural glory. They force the individual into dependency and submission. Obviously, there is a dark side to glorifying self-interest. For instance, the motto of the supercapitalist character Gordon Gekko in

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the 1987 movie Wall Street was that ‘greed is good’ – a motto that does not necessarily pertain to the greater good, as the movie (and the 2008 global financial crisis) showed. This tension between individuals’ capacity for seemingly egoistic and altruistic behaviour has fascinated psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and other scholars for a long time. Not inconsistent with Rand’s (1982) normative philosophy and Gekko’s practical life motto, psychological research based mainly on American college students (Henrich et al., 2010; Sears, 1986) has painted a portrait of human beings as pursuing self-interest, selfenhancement, and even self-glorification (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sedikides et al., 2003), complementing the portrait of human essence painted by economists and social scientists as individual and rational actors (Edwards, 1962; Olson, 1965; but see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In fact, there is a strong convergence between typical Western cultural norms revolving around the self, and typical Western scholars’ assumptions about what moves and motivates individuals in their self-ish essence. In this broad view, the cornerstone of motivation is the self, and thus individuals’ behaviour should be interpreted, by default, as being egoistically motivated. As a consequence, altruistic behaviour does not (and in fact cannot) exist in this particular universe. Any potential manifestations of altruism (e.g., helping a stranger) have to be explained by ‘hidden’ selfish motives (e.g., helping makes one feel better about oneself). The problem is that such self-ish portrayals of social motivation are incomplete and unrealistic at best. Even the evolutionary value of a selfish essence is unrealistic (Sober & Wilson, 1999) – we often seem to forget how ultra-social human beings are, particularly in comparison with other species. Indeed, it is hard to argue for a self-ish human essence when individuals, even in individualistic societies, engage in so many acts of kindness and compassion (Batson, 1990; Batson & Shaw, 1991) and are so embedded in group life (e.g., Brewer & Chen, 2007). One can think about ‘heavy’ examples such as saving a child from drowning, joining a social movement to improve the lives of others, donating to charity, and even fighting and dying for one’s country. But there are even more ‘light’, everyday actions that substantiate the point: helping an elderly person to cross the street, signing an online petition, giving some pocket money to a homeless person, or wearing the colours of your national team when it plays in the World Cup. They can also include sending a get-well card to an acquaintance, paying respects to the dead at a cemetery, and obeying a leader, parent, or boss when he or she requires it. Against this backdrop, a self-ish human essence effectively relegates social relationships to the status of

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derivatives of the self, which needs to be protected or promoted. This is unrealistic. * Some might not like the idea of de-essentializing the self. However, I am not suggesting that the self is unimportant in understanding social motivation. To do so would be not only unrealistic but also foolish. What I propose is to be explicit about the function of the self in social motivation; in my analysis, this function lies in its intricate connection with culture (which I define psychologically as shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable in the world; see Smith et al., 2006, 2013). Indeed, recent work in cultural psychology has cast doubt on the universality of the self-enhancement motive (e.g., Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997). Within the Japanese cultural context, for example, individuals seem to self-critize, rather than self-enhance, and to seek modesty and harmonious social relationships rather than taking pride in individual achievement (see Fiske et al., 1998; Heine, 2005; Kitayama et al., 1997). As such, the self may help to explain the extraordinary amount of cultural variance in human behaviour. The self clearly makes us unique; but it is not our essence. A key reason why the self is often, implicitly or explicitly, essentialized is that psychology’s own WEIRD cultural matrix heavily restricts the theorizing within (Van Zomeren, 2014). In fact, the vast majority of psychological theorizing occurs within individualist societies such as the USA and the UK (see Adams, 2005; Adams, Bruckmuller & Decker, 2012; Fiske, 1992; Heine et al., 1999; Heine, 2005; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). As a consequence, the individualistic self is viewed in much psychological theorizing as an essential cornerstone of explanations of human behaviour, including views of the individual as a rational actor. That is, individuals are believed to be individualists, selfish and calculating, pursuing decisions and actions that optimize subjective utility (Fiske, 1992; Tetlock, 2002). Put differently, individuals become motivated to engage in those behaviours that have a positive benefit–cost ratio (Heckhausen, 1991; see also Opp, 2009). Similarly, psychology’s WEIRD cultural matrix also required ‘fixes’ or ‘add-ons’ to explain any deviations from an individualistic and rational default. For instance, theories of motivation focus on other self-motives, such as self-enhancement, self-esteem, and self-verification (e.g., Leary, 2005; Swann & Reid, 1981; Vignoles, 2011; see also Keller, 2011). This may be why one can find such an amazing number of theories devoted to the self (and its associated term, identity). A non-exhaustive list includes the following: self-affirmation theory, self-discrepancy theory, self-categorization theory, self-validation theory, self-verification theory, self-efficacy theory, cognitive/experiental self-theory, self-determination theory, self-esteem theories, self-perception

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theory, self-regulation theories, self-complexity theory, self-evaluation model, selfconsistency theories, self-awareness theory, social identity theory, identity fusion theory, identity theory, Eriksonian identity theory, uncertainty-identity theory, self-identity theory. The very fact that this list is non-exhaustive suggests that if a relational perspective on social motivation implies a different, culture-dependent understanding of the self, this will have broad implications for a large number of theories about the self. Indeed, self-motives are heavily dependent on culture (Becker et al., 2012; Vignoles, 2011; see also Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013; Keller, 2011). Self-interest is a cultural norm (Miller, 1999), as much as other selfmotives presumed universal such as self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2003). Indeed, an underlying presumed need for positive self-regard may be valued in Western contexts but not beyond (Heine, 2005; Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997). This is worth stating explicitly: a self-ish perspective on social motivation should be recognized as a WEIRD cultural norm; not as essence. In fact, a relational perspective reconceptualizes self-motives as important aspects of relationship regulation within a particular cultural matrix. This does not make them unimportant for the study of social motivation; they remain absolutely pivotal. But we should not essentialize what is culturally normative. * I have made reference to culture in the previous section deliberately through the notion of a ‘cultural matrix’. The metaphor derives from what the main character Neo discovered in the first part of the 1999 blockbuster The Matrix (Wachovski & Wachovski, 1999). In this movie, Neo discovers that his peaceful life has taken place mostly within his own mind, embedded in a computer-generated ‘matrix’. This realization comes to him only when he has been able to escape his illusory world by taking a special red pill that, unlike the blue pill that would allow him to live ignorantly within his own mind, enables him to experience reality outside of the matrix. Inspired by one of Haidt’s TED-talks6 and Fiske et al.’s (1998) notion of the ‘cultural matrix of social psychology’, I refer to the ‘cultural matrix’ as the complex set of cultural norms – shared amongst individuals, social networks, and institutions – that suggest which social relationships we should prioritize and how we should regulate them. Within the cultural matrix, our sense of self represents our Rough Guide to relationship regulation in situ, suggesting obligations and taboos that secure social inclusion and prevent social exclusion. Yet, as in the movie, the cultural matrix imprisons the mind as well as providing us with a safe haven. 6

See www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en.

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The contours of a cultural matrix become visible when transgressed, as when individuals cross cultural boundaries (e.g., when travelling or living abroad, or when meeting foreigners at home; see Haidt, 2012), or when cultural taboos are violated (Tetlock, 2002; see also Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). As such, exposure to other cultural matrices (either in positive or negative ways) may lead individuals to recognize the contours of their own cultural matrix, analogous to taking the red pill.7 One’s way of understanding oneself may be just one way of doing so, and even represent an exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, exposure to other cultural matrices can lead to the experience of being ‘lost in translation’. As a consequence, our beliefs about what people are like and what is valid and valuable in the world may change (see Ward, Bochner & Furnham, 2001). A cultural matrix is shared among individuals, social networks, and institutions (Markus & Kitayama, 2004; see also Bond et al., 2004). Specifically, it reflects a system of shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable in the world (Smith et al., 2006, 2013). It exists by virtue of individuals’ relational, rather than self-ish, essence, and thus requires the regulation of social relationships within. Thus, individuals are embedded in networks of social relationships that are, in turn, embedded in one or more cultural matrices. This analysis is directly applicable to the presumed essence of self-ishness. It is a cultural norm that perpetuates itself because it is transmitted through parents, family, peers, and communities (Fiske et al., 1998; see also Miller, 1999).8 Recognizing such views as cultural norms, rather than as human essence, enables us to evaluate what is common and what is WEIRD (Henrich et al., 2010; see also Henrich et al., 2005). In this case, the above may tell us that a small and quite possibly somewhat strange Western part of mankind is strongly devoted to celebrating the individual self by positioning it at the centre of life (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984; Gergen, 2009). This tells us that individuals may believe that they are moved and motivated by the self. It reveals something quite special about human 7

8

I once believed that were few cultural differences between the Netherlands and the United States; more specifically, I believed that the cultural matrices were very similar, containing very similar obligations and taboos. After visiting a summer school in the States, however, I had to discard this belief; I have never felt so European in my life as I did during that summer school in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Within many Western societies, individuals thus ‘believe in themselves’, ‘need to discover who they are, and ‘act in their own interests’. Popular words of wisdom illustrate this profound tendency towards individualism in these societies: ‘You are born alone and you die alone’, ‘You need to love yourself before you can love someone else’, and ‘You need to help yourself before you can help someone else.’ Literary books as well as self-help books – the latter representing a clear cult of their own – often reinforce these cultural aphorisms.

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beings in general, namely that they are capable of believing that they are moved and motivated by factors other than the ones that they are actually moved and motivated by.9 Through the culturally construed self, we have a unique capacity for mental make-believe in order to regulate our social relationships. And this is how I believe Western scholars have been studying social motivation within their own cultural matrix, assuming a self-ish perspective, and forgetting about, or perhaps remembering and then rationalizing away, the knot of relationships that constitutes our relational essence.

A solution So far I have argued that (a) empirical fragmentation is a problem and theoretical integration a solution, and that (b) the self-ish Western cultural matrix is a problem in a search for essence in the psychology of social motivation. In this section, I will argue that a relational perspective on social motivation is a solution to this problem. As such, the aim of the current section is to briefly sketch the logic of selvations theory by introducing lead metaphors for the two different steps of the motivational process that signal the potential for theoretical integration. The spider in its web serves as the lead metaphor of the first step in the motivational process, which revolves around the novel notion of selvations (the feeling of any changes in our network of social relationships that enables us to regulate social relationships). After all, if humans are indeed relational beings geared towards relationship regulation, then we can expect them to be ultra-sensitive to the social relationships that constitute their social network. They have an inner spider that feels any changes in its webby social network. The selvations theory I am proposing suggests that individuals are moved and motivated by their social relationships, which are generated and maintained through social interaction (Rai & Fiske, 2011).10 To capture this relational esssence, I propose that selvations serve to safeguard the integrity of one’s network of social relationships, similar to how biological needs and instincts serve to safeguard the integrity of one’s body. Thus, it is our intuitive feeling that something in our web of social 9

10

This is an important theme in both classic and contemporary work, to be found, for instance, in Freud’s (1926, 1929) perspective on intra-psychic conflict, but also Nisbett and Wilson (1977), in Haidt’s (2001, 2007, 2008, 2012) notion of moral intuitions, and in Kahneman’s (2011) notion of unconscious processes (referred to there as System I). This is in line with a broader literature that is critical of reductionist individualism (e.g., Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978) and that views humans as relational beings (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Geertz, 1979; Gergen, 2009; Slife, 2004; Van Zomeren, 2014).

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relationships is changing that generates the motivational process. This is the core of the first step of the motivational process as proposed in selvations theory. In the second step, selvations need to be translated into culturally appropriate thoughts, feelings, and behaviour that facilitate relationship regulation within the cultural matrix (the second lead metaphor); this matrix prescribes or proscribes how to regulate which relationships within. In this second step of the motivational process, individuals rely on their culturally construed self, as a Rough Guide to one’s cultural matrix, to regulate relationships in situ. Given the self’s talent for applying mental make-believe, individuals also have beliefs about the origins of their own motivations (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This is where the mental make-believe of rationalization, justification, and so forth occurs (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Indeed, this is how the culturally construed self enables one to live in sync with cultural prescriptions and to generate and maintain social relationships based on a shared sense of validity and value. To know thyself, as the oracle of the ancient Greeks would have it, is thus for sure valuable, but not in order to prevent tragedy from occurring, but to promote social inclusion in and prevent social exclusion from the cultural matrix. To sum up, selvations are the guardians of the integrity of one’s network of social relationships, whereas the self is the Rough Guide to broader cultural inclusion in the cultural matrix. In this respect, the culturally construed self allows a set of relational rules that apply even to those in the cultural matrix that one does not interact with (e.g., a fellow countryman rather than someone in one’s network; see Tönnies, 1887). Given that there are qualitatively different ways in which individuals can regulate their relationships in situ (ranging from relationships based in principles of unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality; see Rai & Fiske, 2011), there will be much more cultural diversity and flexibility in the workings of self-based thought, feeling, and action than in the workings of selvations. This integrative picture, necessarily simplified for present purposes, is represented in Figure 1.1. The spider’s ability to sense any movement in its web represents individuals’ sensitivity to their network of social relationships. Selvations, defined as the feeling of any change within 11

Importantly, this refers to actual or anticipated felt changes; for instance, if we think about what life would be like without one’s partner or parent, selvations can also be triggered (through mental simulation). As I will discuss in the Epilogue, individuals can also feel relationships between others in one’s social network (e.g., between two good friends; or between two actors on stage) because it is the integrity of the network of social relationships we are sensitive to, even if change occurs between others (i.e., when one is not directly involved).

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Assumptions Cultural Matrix A

Cultural Matrix B

Figure 1.1 Networks of social relationships embed individuals in (one or multiple) ‘culture(s)’. The spider represents the individual; its web and the circles represent the individual’s network of social relationships. The large squares refer to the cultures in which those are embedded (for the sake of simplicity here limited to two), which provide cultural norms for how to regulate which relationships.

the webby network of relationships, move and motivate individuals to regulate social relationships in situ. However, which movement spurs the strongest or weakest motion and how individuals should regulate those relationships in more detail depends on the cultural matrix within which the network is embedded. This conceptualization of individuals’ motivational process within a social structure of relationships, networks, and cultures further explains how individuals can believe themselves to be moved and motivated by self-interest or other self-motives (e.g., seeking a promotion at work), whereas in fact this belief derives from cultural norms, and the underlying motivation was to regulate their relationship with their boss (who suggested a promotion in order to make the individual work harder). * The proposed shift from self to selvations is not unlike Neo taking the red pill that enabled his departure from his Matrix. This shift represents a stepping out of psychology’s WEIRD cultural matrix. From this stance, a relational perspective enables the development of a new and integrative theory of social motivation that connects ideas about what humans essentially share with ideas about what their culture-specific differences are. Such a theory should contain essential aspects that are universal

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(e.g., selvations, social relationships, social networks) as well as aspects that account for the enormous cultural variance that we know exists around the globe (e.g., different cultural norms, and different types of self-construal and self-motives; e.g., Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). It should identify what is our essence (our social relationships), and what makes us unique (our culturally construed self).12 Although there already are many pointers towards the importance of social relationships in social motivation, many of them can be found in different locations in the very large storage container. For instance, newborns already relate to others in the absence of any culturally construed self (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Infants instinctively attach to their caregiver through attachment behaviour (e.g., smiling, crying, clinging), which leads the caretaker to respond, which reflects the interactive enactment of a social relationship (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969; see also Ainsworth et al., 1978). This implies that we are all born into this world as relational beings. Many different empirical snippets of research support this line of thought (Van Zomeren, 2014). Social relationships move and motivates us across the lifespan (for reviews see Ainsworth, 1989; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). Ostracism or social exclusion is known to be experienced quite literally as ‘social pain’ (Williams, 2000, 2007, 2009; see also MacDonald & Jensen-Campbell, 2011); that is, the brain processes thought to underlie this experience do not appear to be very different from those involved in physical pain (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). In yet another literature, loneliness has been found to be bad for one’s mental and physical health (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). In fact, Holt-Lunstad, Smith, and Layton (2010) found in a meta-analysis that a lack of social relationships is a considerable risk factor for mortality, on par in its effect size with smoking and exceeding other usual suspects such as obesity and lack of physical exercise. All of this attests to our relational essence and thus for the importance of social relationships and networks for our health and happiness. Furthermore, it is not just the absence or loss of relationships that affects human functioning; it is also their continuous presence and 12

Although selvations theory relies on a broader tradition that is critical of reductionist individualism, this broad relational perspective has rarely been applied to social motivation (but see Slife & Richardson, 2008), and certainly not with the distinct aim of piecing together an integrative or even a consilient theory. Because selvations theory does not rely on individualist assumptions about the self and thus about the pursuit of self-interest or other self-motives, it enables theoretical integration with a number of specific theories of social motivation that otherwise could not be connected. What makes this possible is the novel notion of selvations.

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enactment. Love and friendship prevent feelings of loneliness (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Stroebe et al., 1996), whereas embeddedness in family and other social networks buffers against the effects of negative life events (Berkman et al., 2000; Heaney & Israel, 2008). Responsiveness within relationships – a core feature of the interactive enactment of relationships – seems responsible for strengthening relationships (Reis & Clark, 2013). Attachment to groups seems to have positive effects on one’s mental and physical health (Jetten, Haslam & Haslam, 2012). Thus, social relationships are not just bad for you when you lack them; they are also good for you when you enact them. Indeed, unlike self-motives, social relationships have all the appearances of a human universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Similar to the most vital biological body functions that motivate human behaviour (e.g., to breathe, to eat, to drink, to maintain body temperature), the first thing human infants do is relate to others (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; see also Ainsworth, 1979). An inability to do so implies that one is ill or otherwise ‘disordered’, suggesting that socio-emotional disorders dramatically impair human functioning (e.g., depression, antisocial/avoidant/borderline personality disorder, social phobias and autism; e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 1994). And, of course, major life events are most likely to be socio-emotional ones: the death of a loved one, marriage, the birth (not to mention the death) of a child (e.g., Lucas, 2007). This is not merely coincidence; according to selvations theory, this suggests that we need social relationships in order to survive at the biological as well as the cultural level. * It is important to note that a relational perspective on social motivation is different not only from other approaches in psychology (see Heckhausen, 1991), but also from approaches in the broader economic and social sciences that portray humans as rational actors that seek to optimize their self-interest (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Geys, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). From the vantage point of selvations theory, rational actors are relational actors that cope, within a particular cultural matrix, through a focus on self-interest. As will be outlined in later chapters, this view is possible because Western culture’s conceptualization of the atomized individual in society reflects only one out of four fundamental ways of relating (one of which refers to a market-like individualistic type of relationship). Because this view is quite different from mainstream approaches, it may explain what otherwise appear to be paradoxical findings in and across different literatures. For instance, a rational actor approach would predict that most individuals, most of the time, value fair

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outcomes (e.g., higher pay for harder work). Yet research finds that individuals often value fair procedures (e.g., being heard by the other, being given voice in a decision) more than fair outcomes (e.g., Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Selvations theory explains this preference because most individuals, most of the time, value relationship regulation over material outcomes. Indeed, this is why my one-year-old daughter prioritized our relationship over the cookie I offered her, in the Prologue’s opening example. Similarly, a rational actor approach would predict that most individuals, most of the time, refrain from engaging in investing time and effort in strangers (altruism; e.g., Trivers, 1971) or collectives that do not bring tangible benefits (collective action; e.g., Geys, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1965). Yet individuals seem more than willing to invest, for instance, in punishing strangers for defection in public goods dilemmas (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), in doing volunteering work (Gillath et al., 2005), and in supporting social movements fighting against discrimination or other unfair treatment (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Simon et al., 1998). Selvations theory suggests that individuals engage in such actions to regulate relationships, moved and motivated by felt changes in their network of social relationships (e.g., defection; unfair treatment), and guided by cultural norms that suggest appropriate ways to regulate the relationship (e.g., punishment; peaceful mass demonstrations). In this sense, selvations theory casts doubt on whether a presumed differentiation between ‘egoistic’ and ‘altruistic’ behaviour makes sense (Batson, 1990; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). From a self-interest point of view, any behaviour that appears to be altruistic (e.g., helping others in need, solidarity with groups in need) needs to be explained by egoistic motivation (e.g., helping someone makes one feel good about oneself; acting for a group makes sense when the individual and group’s interests are aligned). From this perspective, self-sacrifice makes sense only if there is something to be gained from it. For instance, a suicide bomber may be thought of as being motivated to engage in self-sacrifice by the prospect of the promise of seventy-two virgins in heaven. But this is a doubtful line of reasoning, because the type of behaviour predicted (egoistic or altruistic behaviour) is defined on the basis of its presumed predictor (individual self-interest). For the same reason, explaining suicide bombers’ motivation by evoking a ‘group self’ (Turner et al., 1987; see also Ellemers, 2012) defines behaviour as ‘group-selfish’ through its predictor of a group self that presumably makes individuals act for the group. Now, consider the vantage point of selvations theory. From this perspective, a suicide bomber can be understood as regulating social relationships (see Fiske & Rai, 2015, for many instances of violence that follow from perpetrators’ relationship regulation). As a consequence, it

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Assumptions

does not require any label of the behaviour itself as egoistic or altruistic. What we need to understand about such behaviour is how it reflects which relationships are regulated within which cultural matrix. This fits notions about helping and acts of group solidarity as regulating social relationships because, to suggest a few possibilities, helping may reflect a collectivist obligation (e.g., Shweder, 1991; Shweder et al., 1997) or an obligation to a higher authority or being (e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2015), or helping reflects the individualist ‘illusion of exchange’ (e.g., Holmes, Miller & Lerner, 2002; Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998). In any event, all of these reflect different ways of going about one’s network of social relationships, yet guided by different cultural norms. As such, selvations theory cautions against labelling behaviour as ‘egoistic’ or ‘altruistic’; in fact, it suggests that a relational perspective to social motivation does not require such labels.

Towards integration and consilience I now turn to the actual task of theoretical integration in this book, based in a shift in assumptions from self to selvations. Indeed, on the basis of a broad relational perspective that assumes that humans regulate relationships, I developed an integrative and essentially relational theory of social motivation. As such, selvations theory synthesizes insights from different compartments in the very large storage container. This final section of the chapter outlines how I have tried to achieve this. I selected relevant theories of motivation on the basis of a number of criteria. First, theories had to have the potential to tell us something psychologically meaningful about social motivation. I relied on theories that acknowledge human universals while also considering and acknowledging cultural variance. This selection of theories, then, needed to fit together, like a key in a lock, in order to be successfully synthesized in selvations theory. Of course, as it goes with keys and locks, at some point some lubricant is needed to help the key to turn. The lubricant in my particular case always was the notion of selvations and whether a relational essence could be included in the logic of the relevant theory without damaging its core insights. Second, the selected theories had to have a consistent internal structure, testable predictions, a fair amount of empirical support, and potentially cover a fairly broad range of phenomena. As a consequence, any integration of these theories would benefit from exactly those features that Bowlby’s (1969) opening quote attests to as being those that make for a good theory. Third, the selected theories had to fit conceptually with the notion of selvations. That is, they had to fit with the possibility that individuals’

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feelings of changes in their network of social relationships play an essential role in the motivational process. In this way, I identified theories about social motivation that I could work with to construct an integrative and even consilient theory that puts individuals’ social relationships centre stage, but does not forget, ignore, or otherwise downplay the self. The net result of this process is that selvations theory represents a novel synthesis of core insights drawn from six theories about social motivation. The six theories originate from different (sub)fields and (sub)discplines, such as developmental, social, and clinical psychology (Bandura, 1997; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Lazarus, 1991, 2001); neuropsychology (Damasio, 1994, 2001, 2010); cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004; see also Fiske et al., 1998); and cultural anthropology (Fiske, 1991, 1992, 2000, 2005; see also Fiske & Rai, 2015). They all tell us something important about social motivation, they all are open to the idea that there are human universals and also cultural differences, and they are all amenable to the notion of selvations as moving and motivating us. They all have a consistent internal structure, testable predictions, a fair degree of empirical support, and they potentially cover a broad range of phenomena. The six theories, as can be seen in Figure 1.2, can be grouped into two triads. The first triad revolves around selvations and networks of social relationships, whereas the second triad revolves around the self and culture. The theories of Damasio, Bowlby, and Fiske are synthesized to reflect the universal process of value infusion, which concerns the generation of the motivational process that revolves around selvations. The Selvations theory MOTIVATIONAL PROCESS FIRST STEP

SECOND STEP COPING WITH VALUEINFUSED EVENTS

VALUE INFUSION

Proto-self theory

Attachment theory

Relational models theory

CMR theory

Self-efficacy Self-construal theory theory

Figure 1.2 Selvations theory’s integrative two-step model of the social-motivational process.

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theories of Lazarus, Bandura, and Markus and Kitayama are synthesized to reflect the complex and heavily culture-dependent process of coping with value-infused events, which revolves around the culturally construed self within the cultural matrix. Although these theories each have their own domains, together they provide an integrative organizing framework for the very large storage container. Through this framework, it becomes possible to understand individuals’ need to regulate social relationships through a variety of core constructs and processes involved in the psychology of social motivation, ranging from attachment and social relationships within social networks to the culturally construed self, emotion, and efficacy beliefs. It becomes possible to conceptualize a relational essence that moves us towards relationship regulation, and a culturally construed self that translates this into an appropriate modus operandi. It also becomes possible to see that although individuals can believe themselves to be separate, atomized, individuals who ought to act in selfish ways, they are still essentially relational beings who regulate relationships and engage in mental make-believe. And finally, it becomes possible to see that conceptualizing social motivation as originating from our inner spider in its cultural matrix thins out the fog and allows some sunlight to shine through. As such, it may function as a first and modest step towards identifying the dark matter we need to connect all the lonely stars in that large and fragmented universe of empirical findings. * I realize that this first chapter has not been the briefest or simplest of chapters. Now that we are coming to the close, let me therefore summarize what I have argued in this chapter. I proposed that empirical fragmentation is a problem and theoretical integration a solution; I further proposed that the Western cultural matrix’s self-ish assumptions about social motivation pose a problem for theorizing about it, but that a relational perspective holds a solution. Thus, in order to see the sun, we need to abandon foggy self-ish assumptions about social motivation and embrace relational ones instead. Furthermore, I have previewed an essentially relational and integrative theory about social motivation, which is based in the core assumption that individuals regulate relationships. The new selvations theory specifies that this motivational process includes two steps – the first integrating three major theories through the notion of selvations (illustrated by the lead metaphor of the spider in the web), and the second integrating three other major theories through the notion of the culturally construed self (illustrated by the lead metaphor of the cultural matrix).

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This is how the remainder of the book is organized. In Chapter 2, I outline in detail why we need a shift from self to selvations in the specific context of theories of social motivation. I discuss self-ish and relational perspectives, review major theories of motivation to identify their self-ish assumptions, and suggest that self serves selvations. I also explain in this chapter how selvations fit with theory and research on social networks, and how selvations fit with a broader evolutionary perspective. Chapter 3 specifies the first step of the motivational process in selvations theory, which is the process of value infusion that revolves around selvations. I outline the value-infusion process by integrating insights from neuropsychology (Damasio’s proto-self theory) with insights from development and clinical psychology (Bowlby’s attachment theory) and from cultural anthropology (Fiske’s relational models theory). At its core, value infusion relies on selvations that serve to safeguard the integrity of one’s network of social relationships; this process has a biological basis, and it does not require a culturally construed self. As such, the process of value infusion reflects a human universal. Chapter 4 specifies the second step, which is the process of coping with value-infused events. I reconceptualize coping as relationship regulation in situ, which requires translating infused value into culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and behaviour. The culturally construed self reflects cultural norms that serve to promote inclusion in and prevent exclusion from the cultural matrix. In this step, I integrate insights from major theories of Lazarus, Markus and Kitayama, and Bandura. At its core, coping with value-infused events has a cultural basis, and it requires a culturally construed self. As such, the coping process is complex and culturally variant. Chapter 5 discusses the many implications of selvations theory that follow from a shift to relational assumptions. I discuss implications for the theories of social motivation I reviewed in Chapter 2 and show how selvations theory can reinterpret a number of otherwise unrelated debates, models, and findings through its relational perspective. I also reflect on the implications of a ‘relational actor’ model for the broader social sciences, and for the goals of theoretical integration and consilience more generally. The concluding Epilogue pushes a relational perspective on social motivation a bit further to outline practical implications of selvations theory for everyday life. If we indeed have a relational essence, then this has clear implications for what makes us healthy and happy. The aim of this chapter is thus to extrapolate what a shift from self to selvations implies for our everyday life and for what constitutes a ‘good life’. Indeed, if ‘there is nothing as practical as a good theory’ (a dictum

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attributed to Lewin, 1951), then we might as well invest time and effort in integrative theorizing and assess the implications of a shift to relational assumptions about social motivation. In closing, allow me to repeat one more time that theoretical integration matters and is necessary – in fact, I believe it reflects the dark matter in an otherwise rather lonely and empty empirical universe. Theoretical integration is what enables an interpretation of otherwise isolated scatterings of empirical findings; and it is what enables us to move beyond ‘local’ definitions, concepts, and rules of conduct. Integrative theorizing is what provides meaningful organization in the very large storage container. It is like like taking the red pill; as such, it is likely to include the notion of, at times, changing your mind. Indeed, when it comes to our understanding of social motivation, I think it is time to change our minds.

CHAPTER 2

A shift from self to selvations

Man is a knot into which relationships are tied. (de Saint-Exupéry, 1942, p. 50) . . . the need to belong can provide a point of departure for understanding and integrating a great deal of the existing literature on interpersonal behavior. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 497)

Introduction The aim of Chapter 2 is to propose a shift from self to selvations in theoretical assumptions about social motivation. In the previous chapter I briefly sketched what this shift entails and implies; in the current chapter I will apply this relational shift to theory and research on social motivation more specifically. This shift requires letting go of perhaps quite familiar assumptions. For instance, it suggests that individuals’ desires to be independent and autonomous reflect cultural norms (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012), but not our essence. From a relational perspective, this is not surprising: we need to feel safe and secure before we can explore the world (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). We are interdependent before we can learn how to become independent. In this chapter I outline the notion of selvations, defined as the feeling of any changes in one’s network of social relationships, against the backdrop of a relational perspective on social motivation (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Slife, 2004; Van Zomeren, 2014). Second, I define in detail what characterizes self-ish theories of motivation, which basically revolve around notions of individuals’ self-interest and perceived selfrelevance. In the third section, I review self-ish theories of social motivation (about inner needs, drives, and instincts, and about incentives, emotions, and goals; e.g., Heckhausen, 1991) and discuss how a shift from self to selvations enables theoretical integration and moves us closer to consilience (i.e., the integration of knowledge across different (sub) fields and (sub)disciplines; Wilson, 1998). The final section explores

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whether and how a relational perspective revolving around selvations fits with evolutionary theorizing.

What is relational essence? I refer to essence as that which makes a human being what it fundamentally and necessarily is, and without which it would no longer be what it is.1 Thus, relational essence implies that a human being without social relationships would no longer be a human being. Indeed, my argument is that human beings do not require a culturally construed self (e.g., a oneyear-old child, without a clear sense of self, is still a human being), but one cannot remove its social relationships without doing permanent damage. My argument for an essentially relational perspective on social motivation is twofold: there is a biological argument and a cultural argument. The biological argument is that, for humans, social relationships are necessary for survival and procreation, thus serving gene interests. Bowlby’s (1969) ideas about the function of infants’ attachment behaviour come close to this line of thought: he believed that its primary function was to seek protection from predators.2 One can even assume a broader function: to increase chances of survival and procreation via increased protection, but also via increased support to regulate relatonships to secure social inclusion and avoid social exclusion. Given this broad function, social relationships serve gene interests. One could therefore expect selvations to be of central importance in the motivational process; that is, one could expect its mechanism to be ‘hard-wired’ and to be similar to mechanisms related to the regulation of other biological needs or instincts. Indeed, selvations theory proposes that selvations have strong biological underpinnings and share much of the brain ‘machinery’ associated with the regulation of biological needs or instincts. A related argument for why selvations are biologically important concerns the link between social relationships and psychological and physiological health. A lack of social relationships is clearly unhealthy for individuals. Loneliness acts as a silent killer (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010); social exclusion hurts (Eisenberger, 1

2

As noted previously, some may feel that essence is too strict a term with too problematic a history in philosophy. I use it rhetorically in an effort to at least be explicit about core assumptions about social motivation, and to contrast a relational perspective with a self-ish one. Moreover, I use it to refer to human universals rather than cultural variance. Tinbergen (1963) differentiated four ‘whys’ of a behaviour (the more proximal causal and ontogeny explanations, and the more distal function and phylogeny explanations of the same behaviour). Bowlby’s notion of the function of attachment behaviour as securing protection from predators is an example of a functional explanation.

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2012; Wiliams, 2000, 2007, 2009); and social loss takes a long time to process and adapt to (e.g., Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987; Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2005). As with all things essential in life, we tend to experience our need for social relationships most poignantly when we lose them (or anticipate their loss). Indeed, both Freud (1926, 1929/2002) and Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) suggested that individuals’ anxiety about being abandoned by (or separated from) others represents a strong psychological force that can lead, at worst, to mental disorder.3 This fits with more recent theorizing and research showing that when ostracized or otherwise socially rejected, individuals respond either with strong negative emotions or with psychological numbness (for summaries see Williams, 2000, 2007, 2009). Even when ignored in a virtual ball-tossing game, individuals respond in this way (Eisenberger et al., 2003), and this occurs even when ignored by others whom we do not even like (Gonsalkore & Williams, 2006). This line of thought links selvations not only to social relationships but also to social networks. Selvations requires one or more individuals with whom one can interact in order to regulate social relationships. As such, it may not be surprising to learn that inclusion in social networks appears to be key in preventing the damaging effects of loneliness (Cacioppo, Hawkley & Berntson, 2003; Hawkley & Cacioppo, 2010; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). Individuals adopt others into their network through social interaction, particularly when it concerns relationships that are available and responsive (Bowlby, 1969; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b; Reis & Clark, 2013). This may be why humans can even form parasocial relationships (e.g., Cohen, 2003, 2004; Cole & Leets, 1999; Finn & Gorr, 1988; Jin & Park, 2009; Rubin & McHugh, 1987 Rubin, Perse & Powell, 1985), which are relationships with fictitious characters (e.g., Rachel from Friends), as well as relationships with inanimate objects (e.g., giving a name to an old car). Such findings and observations make perfect sense when we assume that social relationships represent our social-motivational essence. As human beings, we live and prosper through our social relationships in our social network. It is the integrity of this network that selvations safeguard by alerting us to actual or anticipated changes within it; just as biological needs and instincts safeguard the integrity of the body. Then there is also the cultural argument for why social relationships are essential. Social relationships hold the key to smooth and successful social interaction that enables individuals to generate or maintain different social relationships in different ways within cultural pre- and proscriptions (e.g., Fast, Heath & Wu, 2009; Kashima, Klein & Clark, 3

William James (1890b/1950b, p. 418) writes: ‘The great source of terror in infancy is solitude.’

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2007). Moreover, they can serve as a ‘safe haven’, which signals that one is among ‘people like us’, with similar oughts and don’ts. This may be in part why birds of a feather tend to flock together and why individuals tend to self-segregate (Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux, 2005). This may also be in part why individuals seek romantic partners who are generally similar to them (Wetzel & Insko, 1982); why they tend to compare themselves to others who are like them, and why they tend to like others who are like them (Festinger, 1954); and why they are likely to be influenced by others who are like them (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Social relationships are important channels for the transmission of cultural norms (e.g., how ‘we’ should act), ranging from the family to broader social networks to culture (Kag˘ itçibas¸i, 1995, 1997, 2005).4 In fact, individuals often simulate what others think or would say (Smith & Mackie, 2014); they value what others in their social network and culture value, arguably even more than what they value themselves (Chiu et al., 2010; Zou et al., 2009); and when they talk with others, they talk most of the time about others (Dunbar, 1997, 2003, 2010). Some have even suggested that humans have social brains (Adolphs, 2003; Cozolino, 2006; Dunbar, 2003), geared at a primary ecology that is rich with other humans (Beckes & Coan, 2011; see also Samson et al., 2010).5 Thus, the cultural argument for social relationships as reflecting our social-motivational essence is very similar to the biological argument – sticking to cultural norms enables the love, support, and protection of many others. It secures social inclusion and wards off the specter of social exclusion. This implies that we should be ultra-sensitive to social relationships and have intuitive knowledge about how to regulate them. This relates to the twin notions of obligations and taboos, which are at the core of any social relationship, and the topic of the next section. * There is a clear link between regulating social relationships and a need for a moral compass (Rai & Fiske, 2011). From a relational perspective, social relationships include obligations and taboos that serve to maintain them. This does not imply, however, that individuals cannot be autonomous. In fact, according to Bowlby (1969), individuals’ sense of autonomy is often based in a secure sense of interdependence on others. By contrast, 4

5

As such, social relationships allow for the transmission of cultural ‘memes’ (Dawkins, 1976), which some believe drive ‘cultural’ rather than ‘natural’ selection in modern times (but see Haidt, 2012, for a counterargument). Moreover, core themes in individuals’ lives typically are love and work (Bowlby, 1969; Freud, 1929/2002). Although work may appear not to include social relationships, it is hard to find work in which social relationships are altogether absent. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, humans abhor a social vacuum.

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individuals’ sense of autonomy that isolates themselves from all others is often referred to as ‘false’ autonomy – the psychological equivalent of an overdose of individualism, associated with feelings of alienation and loneliness (Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006; Hawkley & Cacioppo, 2010; see Durkheim, 1951). A secure sense of interdependence brings with it the trust and social support that individuals need in order to function autonomously within a culture that values autonomy. Thus, although cultural norms may dictate autonomy and achieving one’s personal goals (as in the Western cultural matrix), the reason why individuals experience this motivation is that they want to regulate their social relationships. In this sense, autonomy and individuality are culture-dependent ways to regulate social relationships. This line of thought fits well with Fiske’s (1992) relational models theory (see also Fiske & Rai, 2015; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Fiske, by training a cultural anthropologist, argues that social relationships reflect the fabric of social structure. He argues that, cross-culturally, individuals need social relationships to enable and coordinate social interaction. One of his key ideas is that although social relationships reflect a human universal, culture affects the way they are conceived of and enacted. Fiske proposes that social relationships can take four elementary forms (which will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 3) that involve different interpretations of what is consensually believed to be valid and valuable, involving different obligations and taboos (Rai & Fiske, 2011; see also DeScioli & Krishna, 2013; Simpson & Laham, 2015). This implies that, within a given cultural context, one elementary form of social relationship may generally take precedence over the other, whereas in another cultural context it may be the other way around. Individualist cultural contexts, for instance, can be characterized by valuing relationships that involve psychologically separate and seemingly ‘selfish’ individuals who require a form of social contract and instrumental exchange to be able to live together. Collectivist cultural contexts, however, may rely more on relationships that involve psychologically bonded and ‘selfless’ individuals who are morally bound and obligated to live together. But whatever the type of relationships involved, individuals still seek to regulate them. Although there certainly may be forms of individualism that border on the asocial (e.g., autism disorder, sociopathy), most often individualism is a specific way of relating to others. Fiske’s theory has been an important inspiration for me in developing the notion of selvations, the shift from self to selvations, and the integrative selvations theory I propose. Fiske’s theorizing suggests that self-interest does not represent our social-motivational essence, but rather a way to relate to others that is particularly valued in individualistic cultures (as in the Western cultural matrix I described in the

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previous chapter; Geertz, 1979/1984; Gergen, 2009). Fiske’s explicit assumption is that individuals are geared towards regulating relationships (see also Rai & Fiske, 2011, and Fiske & Rai, 2015), which foreshadows the proposed shift from self to selvations. Nevertheless, selvations theory moves beyond Fiske’s relational models theory in different ways. First, it proposes the novel notion of selvations, which integratively connects the broad notion of relationship regulation explicitly to biological and cultural aspects of different theories of social motivation. Second, it proposes a psychological process model of social motivation that enables the development of an integrative theory of motivation that puts social relationships first, and the culturally construed self second. For those and other reasons, selvations theory is a theory that connects and integrates quite different theories of motivation. And through the notion of individualism as a particular way of relating to others, it points to our Western mental make-believe that so often leads us, inside as well as outside of the ivory tower, to erroneously essentialize the self.

Too much self-ishness At surface level, most things usually make sense. Consider, for instance, the following statements: People are selfish beings. People are social beings. People are social animals. People need to survive. People want to be happy. People are rational beings. People are emotional beings. People are individualists. People are group animals. One may find it hard to disagree with any of these statements. They all may seem true, to some extent. And for that very reason, such statements are empty and pointless. Exactly for this reason, it is important to be explicit about core assumptions in theorizing about, in this case, social motivation. The problem is that although most theorizing about motivation has self-ish assumptions, those often remain implicit because they reflect theorists’ and researchers’ preconceptions about what moves and motivates individuals (Slife & Williams, 1995). Sometimes researchers simply appear agnostic about their assumptions by believing that their measures are their concepts and their data is their theory – a prototypical case of empty empiricism. But more often, self-ish assumptions remain implicit and hidden, creeping up through the use of undefined words like ‘natural’, ‘selfevident’, etc.). Sometimes they may refer to notions of self-relevance, sometimes to self-interest, sometimes to self-evaluation or selfenhancement and self-esteem. The problem with this is that it makes an explicit comparison between relational and self-ish assumptions

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something like fighting a shadow made of quicksand – it is hard to argue with hidden assumptions.6 I will nevertheless try. I focus particularly on two manifestations of selfish assumptions that, I believe, once seen, will be seen everywhere: selfrelevance and self-interest. A first manifestation of self-ish assumptions lies in assumptions that motivation is based in the appraisal of selfrelevance (meaning that individuals pursue any goal they perceive to be relevant in a given situation; Lazarus, 1991). One can recognize this assumption in theories of, for instance, stress and coping, emotion, and social comparison. One can also recognize it in theories about attitudes, goals, and values. At surface level, the self-relevance assumption makes a lot of intuitive sense – after all, we surely do not work hard to achieve things that are irrelevant to us. Unfortunately, the self-relevance assumption often relies on circular logic. Circular logic involves assuming that the presence of one variable implies that another variable must also be there (for a discussion see Opp, 2009). For instance, we may assume that individuals are motivated to achieve a specific goal because that goal is relevant to them; but this specific goal is believed to be self-relevant because individuals are motivated to achieve it. This is circular logic that is unhelpful in understanding social motivation. If we want to be able to explain why we want what we want, our analysis has to move beyond the notion that we want what we want, because what we want is relevant to us. It has to include an analysis of what relevance entails and why. Even established theories in psychology fail to move beyond such circular logic. Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory, for instance, suggests that individuals become motivated to competitively achieve goals when they compare themselves to a slightly better other (not quite neutrally labelled the ‘unidirectional drive upwards’). As noted by Brown (2000, p. 86), however, social comparison theory does not specify particularly well how that target of comparison is chosen in the first place. With whom do we compare ourselves? The theory suggests that individuals seek to compare themselves with similar others (e.g., Festinger, 1954). This implies that there must have been already a social comparison to establish similarity in the first place (see Goethals & Darley, 1977). Alternatively, the theory suggests that individuals compare themselves with relevant others (e.g., Tesser, 1988). Thus, individuals compare themselves with another person because the situation or the person is relevant to them; and this is relevant to them because they engage in social comparison. 6

Even more problematically, hidden assumptions are hardly ever tested – precisely because they are hidden, and precisely because they are assumptions.

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Assumptions

Similarly, appraisal theories of emotion typically assume that individuals experience emotions in response to self-relevant events7 (Frijda, 1986; Iyer & Leach, 2008; see Lazarus, 1991, for the notions of ego relevance and goal congruence). This descriptively points to the observation that, whenever we feel a specific emotion, we experience the event as relevant to ourselves. This is fine, but it does not follow that we feel specific emotions because the event is relevant to ourselves. Although it is clear that emotions and the motivational power they hold indicate that there is something at stake, it remains unclear whether it is the appraised relevance that explains the motivation, or the motivaton that explains the appraised relevance. Again, at surface level, it makes perfect sense that emotions like fear and anger are not evoked by the irrelevant. But the key point here is that this does not answer the question of how self-relevance comes about – it is simply assumed, often implicitly, and therefore rarely discussed. Selvations theory is very clear about this in the context of social motivation: our selvations determine what we, later on in the process, may come to believe to be self-relevant. * A second, typically more explicit, manifestation of self-ish assumptions about motivation is that motivation is ultimately based in self-interest (seeking to maximize individual subjective utility; Edwards, 1962; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). One can recognize this assumption in notions of rational actors in the broader social sciences (Geys, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; for a discussion see Opp, 2009); notions of social dilemmas (in which individuals are assumed to view a tension between their own outcomes and that of a collective; e.g., the tragedy of the commons, public good dilemmas, environmental issues; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & van Dijk, 2013); and notions of cost–benefit calculations in decision-making (e.g., Olson, 1965). Such an assumption implies that individuals should prioritize outcomes over procedures, money over identity, and ‘selfish’ over ‘moral’ or ‘altruistic’ behaviour. It is a mesh of individualism and market ideology that seems to form a homo economicus, or rational actor (see Mill, 1863). Homo economicus, however, turns out to be quite an implausible homo, as far as essence is concerned. The notion of the individual rational actor cannot deal with a number of diverse and robust research findings, for instance that individuals help others in the absence of any clear selfinterest (e.g., Batson, 1990; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Shweder, 1991). Furthermore, social dilemmas are really only dilemmas for individualists – for collectivists, there is no tension or 7

I use the terms event and situation interchangeably throughout this book.

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dilemma (Klandermans, 2002; Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Moreover, individuals often prioritize procedures over outcomes because of relationships (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler et al., 1996), they may prefer identity or relationships over money (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; DeScioli & Krishna, 2013) and engage in ‘altruistic’ or ‘moral’ behaviour even when they have a clear opportunity to engage in ‘selfish’ behavior (Batson, 1990; Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). Intriguingly, Miller and colleagues (e.g., Holmes et al., 2002; Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998) showed that, in US culture, there is a strong cultural norm of self-interest that individuals feel obliged to pursue (as a social fact; Durkheim, 1895). This is worth repeating: individualists feel obliged to pursue their self-interest. It is how they have learned to relate, for instance within the workplace or as a citizen. For this reason, the rational actor model may very well reflect what individualists believe to move and motivate other individualists, but that does not tell us much about what actually moves and motivates them. They are relational actors, regulating relationships through pursuing self-interest, because this is valued (by others) in their cultural matrix. The view of the individual rational actor as reflecting socialmotivational essence is wrong in two respects: first, its assertion that the individual essentially seeks to maximize subjectivity utility (rather than regulate social relationships); and second, the notion that this implies an individual rationality that is associated with cost–benefit calculation (Edwards, 1962; Heckhausen, 1991; Olson, 1965). This portrayal should lead to the prediction, for instance, that battered women should readily leave their abusive husbands – which they often do not (e.g., Rusbult & Marz, 1995). Similarly, it should lead to the prediction that the death of a loved one should be easily compensated with a new partner – which often is not the case (Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987). It should lead to the prediction that individuals would be very unlikely to show ‘altruistic’ behaviour – which they often do show (Batson, 1990; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Batson & Moran, 1999; De Waal, 1996, 2008, 2012; Dovidio et al., 1990). It should also lead to the prediction that individuals’ engagement in collective action is mainly determined by individualistic cost–benefit calculations (Olson, 1965) – which it is not (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; see also Louis, Taylor & Neil, 2004). Finally, it should lead to the prediction that one should not relate to fictitious others (such as parasocial relationships; Cohen, 2003, 2004), or more generally to engage in relationships with a negative cost–benefit ratio (Rusbult & Marz, 1995; see Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). To focus on the rational actor in social motivation is to focus on only one aspect of only one side of a distinctly cultural-relational medal; it is more likely to be the exception than the rule (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005, 2010).

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Theories of motivation that most explicitly make this self-interest assumption are, unsurprisingly, those linked to economics (Miller, 1999; see Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). Although there were times when economics and psychology represented opposing camps in predicting human behaviour (see Steel & Konig, 2006), recent developments resulted in more integrative and multi-disciplinary fields such as behavioural economics (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Within this field, unfortunately, scholars have assumed the axiom of self-interest to be the essential motive for human behaviour. The core change in recent years has been a shift from a rationality model to a bounded rationality model (Opp, 2009). In the former model, many assumptions are made that psychological research simply does not support (e.g., self-interest is about material outcomes, individuals always have all the information available to make the objectively ‘best’ decision, etc.; e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). Rationality models typically describe how rational actors should behave if they were indeed rational actors (Opp, 2009). They are normative models. The bounded rationality model, by contrast, suggests that individuals are assumed to act on non-material (i.e., subjective) as well as material incentives and are thought to do what they believe to be in their best interest. This bounded rationality perspective arguably makes rational actors more ‘human’ by injecting some psychology into their motivation (Opp, 2009; see also Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nevertheless, even this perspective builds on the individual actor’s built-in calculator to somehow decide what is relevant for us. Unfortunately, this assumption is also problematic. Motivation on the basis of self-interest is certainly plausible and likely (e.g., Boninger, Krosnick & Berent, 1995), but it is less essential than it may seem (Adams, 2005; Fiske, 1991; Miller, 1999). Individuals are often either unwilling or unable to make the cost–benefit calculation needed for a ‘rational’ decision (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974, 1981). Moreover, norms of individualism can lead individuals to ascribe their actions to their self-interest where in fact this is not the case (Miller, 1999). Indeed, humans often rationalize their own behaviour without being conscious of it – a portrayal of humans as ‘emotional dogs with rational tails’ (Haidt, 2001), or, in this case, relational dogs with self-ish tails. * As you may have noted, my tone in the previous section was a bit more confrontational than it was in the previous chapters. This is because the only way to chase implicit assumptions out of the shadows is to charge them with being incorrect. This may come across as if I have something

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against explanations of social motivation as self-interested or calculative – yet this is not the case. There certainly is a role for self-motives and calculative processes in the broader motivational process (see Chapter 4), but there is simply no need to essentialize them. Indeed, the broader aim of this section was to make clear that we should not take self-ish assumptions about social motivation for granted. Even if they may be perceived as social facts within a cultural matrix (e.g., Holmes et al., 2002; Miller, 1999), this does not mean they reflect our essence. To examine this, we need to reveal and evaluate them in the light of plausible alternatives. In fact, without doing that, there is no light that enables us to see plausible alternatives. The key point here is that there is too much self-ishness in theorizing about social motivation, hidden or unhidden, that I think is worth reconsidering and reconceptualizing through a relational perspective on social motivation. I therefore turn now to definitions and theories of motivation to identify their self-ish assumptions.

Definitions and theories of social motivation The aim of this section is to briefly review a number of definitions and theories of motivation from different (sub)fields. As such, it does not aim to provide a comprehensive review of the literature (for excellent reviews see Heckhausen, 1991; Weiner, 1991, 1992); it is purposefully selective. It does not aim to provide in-depth reviews of specific theories, either; rather, it paints a broad picture of different approaches of motivation to illustrate how selvations theory builds on, borrows from, and synthesizes aspects of all these different approaches. Rather than having implicit core assumptions, selvations theory is quite explicit about them. Thus, the theory aims to be integrative and directive; open but neither eclectic nor reductionist. For instance, it suggests that selvations function much like biological instincts, generating the motivational process. Yet, at the same time, it suggests that selvations need to be translated into culturally appropriate selfbased thought, feeling, and behaviour. Specifically, it identifies different forms of coping with value-infused events, which depend heavily on the culturally construed self. Indeed, the first step of this process may be relatively simple and universal (revolving around selvations and social relationships in one’s social network), but the second step is relatively complex and culturally variant (revolving around the culturally construed self). As such, social motivation relies as much on our inner spider as on our Rough Guide to our cultural matrix.

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Definitions Defining the term motivation is easier said than done. For instance, Heckhausen (1991, p. 9) observed wryly that the concept of motivation is a global concept for a variety of processes and effects whose common core is the realization that an organism selects a particular behavior because of expected consequences, and then implements it with some measure of energy, along a particular path. The observed goal-directedness of the behavior, the inception and completion of a coherent behavioral unit, its resumption after an interruption, the transition to a new behavioral sequence, the conflict between various behavioral goals and its resolution, all of these represent issues in motivation. That is why the concept ‘motivation’ is not well suited as a hypothetical construct.

Indeed, it does not seem well-suited. Yet in its essence, motivation refers to psychological motion or movement. Motivation derives from the Latin movere, which means to move or to stir (which makes it different from emotion, which derives from e-movere, which means to be moved by something external). It is exactly this psychological movement that selvations theory seeks to explain by proposing that selvations refer to any (anticipated or actual) felt changes in one’s network of social relationships, after which individuals cope through culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and behaviour in order to regulate the relationship. From this point of view, social motivation is defined as a multicomponent psychological process rather than as a unitary construct; the function of this process is relationship regulation; and it originates from the interplay between the individual and the environment (conceptualizes as social relationships within social networks, which are in turn embedded in one or more cultural matrices). However, scholars studying motivation have, as specialists in their own fields tend to do, defined motivation from the perspective of their own micro-cosmoses (Steel & Konig, 2006). In relying on ‘local’ definitions, some scholars may have focused too much on the machinery that enables the psychological experience of motivation. For instance, Frijda (1986), a pioneer of emotion theory and research, suggests that motivation ‘can be considered in large part as the activation of behavioral systems by appropriate external stimuli’ (p. 377). This seems too general a definition of motivation. It does not tell us what is special about motivation, nor does it appreciate that motivation can also come from within (rather than from ‘appropriate external stimuli’). As detailed in the following chapters, selvations theory suggests what ‘appropriate external stimuli’ are, namely any felt changes in one’s network of social relationships. Moreover, selvations theory specifies how very different

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‘behavioral systems’ can become ‘activated’ as a function of how individuals cope to regulate relationships in situ. Similarly, LeDoux (2002), an influential brain scientist, defines motivation as ‘neural activity that guides towards goals, outcomes that we desire and for which we will exert effort, or ones that we dread and will exert effort to prevent, escape from, or avoid (p. 236). To restrict motivation to neural activity may seem reductionist; in any event this definition does not take into account the point that human activity takes place within a network of social relationships, embedded in culture. Although there is little doubt that neural activity is important in understanding generic motivational processes (such as selvations), it is unclear how useful it is in studying more complex and culturally dependent aspects of motivation (such as coping processes). In line with the notion of selvations, contemporary theory and research in the fields of neuropsychology and social neuroscience suggest that the human brain appears, more and more, to be regarded as a ‘social’ brain, reflecting or mediating much of human behaviour (e.g., Cozolino, 2006; Harmon-Jones & Winkielman, 2007), and geared towards a primary ecology that is rich with other humans (Beckes & Coan, 2011). Compared with definitions of motivation that are too general, however, others seem to have been too specific when talking about social motivation. From a social-cognitive perspective, Bandura (1997) notes that Most human motivation is cognitively generated. In cognitive motivation, people motivate themselves and guide their actions anticipatorily through the exercise of forethought. They form beliefs about what they can do, they anticipate likely positive and negative outcomes of different pursuits, and they set goals for themselves and plan courses of action designed to realize valued futures and avoid aversive ones. (p. 122)

Thus, for Bandura motivation has a strong cognitive aspect that focuses on the processes by which individuals set goals and achieve them. The focus is thus largely on beliefs that are consciously held, goals that are consciously set, and a self that reflects the agent in individuals’ beliefs about their agency. This definition excludes, or at least downplays the importance of, motivation that is not consciously experienced; moreover, such a definition does not cover the external factors that move and motivate individuals. By contrast, the notion of selvations suggests that social motivation comes both from within and without; that is, it arises from their nexus. Moreover, the notion of ‘cognitive motivation’ reflects one particular way of coping that hinges on the human faculty of

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forethought. This is certainly an important part of the motivational process, but it is not the only one and, importantly, it does not reflect its relational essence. Others in this tradition even equate motivation with the concept of goals. Moskowitz (2012, p. 1) notes the following: ‘A goal is an end state that the organism has not yet attained (and is focused toward attaining in the future) and that the organism is committed to approach or avoid.’ Thus, the definition of a goal actually seems to include the notion of motivation. Goals may indeed reflect desired outcomes, but not the psychological processes that are engaged in achieving them. As such, goals may be defined as representations of desired end states (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996), but of course individuals do not blindly adopt, set, and seek to achieve any goal. What is missing in this definition is the explication of the very nature of the motivational process that gives meaning and direction to the goal concept. From a selvations point of view, this is relationship regulation. In sum, I agree with Heckhausen that motivation is difficult to conceptualize as a psychological construct. At the same time, however, it is possible to define social motivation as a multi-component psychological process that describes and explains what moves and motivates individuals and how they subsequently cope with this experience. In selvations theory, this motivational process serves to regulate relationships; it originates from the dynamic interplay between the individual and the environment (including networks of social relationships, embedded in culture); and it needs to be differentiated in terms of how it is generated (which revolves around selvations), and how relationships are regulated in situ (which revolves around the culturally construed self).

Theories In most definitions of social motivation, the starting point is the individual. Obviously, the motivational process occurs for an important part within an individual, but this should not restrict theorizing about social motivation to intra-psychic processes. Indeed, if one takes the view that individuals are geared towards relationship regulation, then theorizing and research about social motivation should include individuals’ network of social relationships and the culture(s) within which these are embedded. Such an analysis will likely be different from any analysis that departs from self-ish assumptions. Below, I review different approaches to social motivation and identify their implicit or explicit self-ish assumptions in order to show what a shift from self to selvations implies for how we think about social motivation. I discuss a broad range of approaches to

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motivation because, as a set, they paint a picture of an overdose of selfishness in theorizing about social motivation. * Instincts and needs. Historically, motivation has often been explained by individuals’ instincts, needs, and drives. Drives refer to basic aspects of organism functioning such as hunger and thirst (which often reflect negative deviations from a desired end state; Hull, 1943, 1951). These drives were postulated to give rise to the need to reduce them, thus motivating people to eat when they feel hungry or drink when they are thirsty. Drives thus refer to mostly biological functions of the human body that signal that specific set-goals are violated (e.g., too little food intake, too much dehydration). Festinger (1962) applied the notion of drive reduction to the psychological domain by proposing a theory called cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance was viewed as a negative drive that individuals seek to reduce, which occurred whenever individuals perceived an imbalance between attitudes. Cognitive dissonance was thus thought to motivate ways to redress psychological imbalance (for its modern equivalent, see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Similarly biological in origin, others explored the notion of a set of basic needs or instincts that one ‘naturally’ seeks to fulfil. McDougall (1932), for example, identified eighteen distinct instincts such as the propensity to seek food, sex, and shelter, but also the propensity to feel fear, disgust, and anger. Other than theories of drive reduction, however, these theories also focused on the more positive side of goal achievement. Arguably the most well known theory is Maslow’s (1943, 1958), who proposed a pyramid of basic needs that reflected a presumed hierarchy of different needs. Most important, according to Maslow, were the physiological (e.g., hunger, thirst) and safety (e.g., security, health) needs, followed by the belonging (e.g., love, friendships), achievement (e.g., recognition, self-esteem), and self-actualization (e.g., spiritual growth) needs. The key idea here was a hierarchical one, namely that individuals need to tend to their more basic needs before they can start fulfilling their less basic needs. Thus, in situations where individuals do not feel safe and have little to eat or drink, for example, individuals should have less space to feel their need to belong, their need to be recognized, and their need to self-actualize. According to Maslow at least, not all drives have equal priority (although all can be active at some level at the same time). Selvations theory suggests that physiological and relational needs are on equal footing with respect to triggering the motivational process and may even be based in similar brain structures. In fact, because selvations

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refer to both positive and negative deviations from a desired end state with respect to social relationships, selvations are more accurately described as instincts or needs than drives. At the same time, however, selvations are more than instincts – selvations do not necessarily lead to a specific type of behaviour, but provide the impetus for complex and culturally variant feeling, thought, and action. Therefore, selvations are instinctoid (as coined by Maslow, 1958). Whereas biological needs function to regulate the integrity of the body (e.g., hunger, thirst, etc.), selvations function to regulate the integrity of one’s network of social relationships, which requires a more complex ‘follow-up’ response than fulfilling biological needs. * Incentives. A different line of thought, typically associated with more pragmatic and instrumental types of social motivation, explains social motivation as being due to external rewards and punishments of behaviours, and thus of the gains and pains experienced and learned as a consequence of one’s behaviour. Thus, the focus is on individuals who are assumed to approach pleasure and avoid pain – a very general perspective that no doubt has truth in it, but restricts its analysis to individuals’ evaluation and experience of situations. Although many theories of motivation incorporate this essential aspect, some are less and some are more elaborated with respect to the psychological processes involved in motivation. Behaviourist approaches, for instance, focus on reinforcement as a form of automatic stimulus-response conditioning, yet they do not require the concept of incentive or motivation to explain the effects of rewards on behaviour (Skinner, 1963). Although perhaps historically important in its own right, modern psychology has demonstrated that behaviourism is no longer a plausible approach to understanding social motivation (Heckhausen, 1991). This is fortunate because behaviourism reduced not only the motivational process to a ‘black box’, but also individuals’ context (including social relationships, social networks, and culture) to a given situation. Other theories are more elaborate about psychological processes in social motivation, although few do justice to the structure of the cultural and relational context in which individuals are embedded. For instance, the idea that individuals respond positively or negatively to external events that deliver pleasure or pain, respectively, is at the basis of a number of incentive theories. Vroom’s (1964) instrumentality theory, for example, proposes that individuals decide on a course of action that delivers the occurrence of something positive and/or the non-occurrence of something negative. This view of motivation is ‘instrumental’ because it refers to expectations of the costs and benefits of a particular course of

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action (see Klandermans, 1984). Expectancy-value theories explicate this idea by suggesting that social motivation constitutes the product of the value of a goal and the expectancy of achieving this goal. Motivated behaviour is, in this view, more likely to occur when individuals value the goal more strongly and believe it to be more attainable. Note here that both value and expectancy are concepts that implicitly or explicitly refer to individuals, and that the underlying cost–benefit model of decision-making assumes a self-ish social-motivational essence. Unsurprisingly, a shift from self to selvations leads to a different interpretation of social motivation in at least two ways. First, it suggests that ‘value’ is determined by selvations. This implies there is no necessary correspondence between this notion of value and self-ish assumptions about social motivation (as based in self-interest or perceived selfrelevance). Second, a shift from self to selvations suggests that there is no trade-off between ‘value’ and ‘expectancy’. Each is simply part of a different phase of the motivational process: whereas ‘value’ relates to the first step, ‘expectancy’ relates to just one particular way of coping. As such, there is no need to treat them as if they are part of the same ‘calculative’ process. A major theoretical advance on the basis of instrumental valueexpectancy theories is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Prospect theory suggests, for instance, that anticipated losses loom larger than anticipated gains, and therefore have a powerful differential effect on motivation in the context of decision-making. This is consistent with, but more elaborate than, the larger claim that negative events are more psychologically consequential or potent than positive events (Baumeister et al., 2001). In a similar vein, Higgins’ (1997) regulatory focus theory suggests that individuals can focus on promoting or preventing gains and losses. A prevention focus is thought to focus on individuals’ oughts and minimal standards (e.g., I need to write at least 1,500 words today, otherwise this day is a write-off), whereas a promotion focus is thought to focus on individuals’ ideals and maximal standards (e.g., wouldn’t it be great if I could write 1,500 words today?). This surely enhances the predictive power of such theories to differentially predict specific behaviour (e.g., approach or avoidance behaviour). However, these theories contain a self-ish essence. For sure, my example about writing 1,500 words today included the word ’I’ – which illustrates how hidden assumptions, in this case self-ish ones, reveal themselves. Moreover, the implicit assumption in these theories is that the psychological basis for motivation is individuals’ self-interest, which implies that some perceived or expected changes (e.g., gains, losses) are more or less self-relevant. Specifically, regulatory focus

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theory is a self-ish theory that relates individual motivation to individual gains, losses, oughts, and ideals. Thus, like many theories of motivation, it is an individualistic theory that, through its self-ish assumptions, views social relationships as external, not integral, to the motivational process. * Emotions. Historically, the domains of emotion and motivation have been viewed as separate (Heckhausen, 1991), despite their clear overlap in entymological roots (as noted previously, both derive from the Latin movere). There is even a scientific journal called Motivation and Emotion, suggesting – at least among emotion researchers – a need for analytical differentiation. Indeed, for a long time, specific emotions were viewed as experienced affects that derived from lower needs, drives, or instincts that represented ‘irrational’ motivational forces. From this viewpoint, specific emotions did not sit well with the notion of goal-directed motivation.8 Nevertheless, modern insights into the psychology of the emotion process tell quite a different story and put specific emotions center stage when it comes to social motivation (Lazarus, 1991; see also Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Iyer & Leach, 2008). The reason for this is that theoretical assumptions about specific emotions have changed: they are now viewed as functional and adaptive (rather than irrational passions). Emotions are viewed as part of a broader goal-directed process that continuously monitors the situation. One particular branch of emotion theories, appraisal theories of emotions (for a summary see Scherer, Schorr & Johnstone, 2001), has been particularly influential. These theories suggest that emotions have strong motivational power and that specific emotions push individuals towards different behavioural tendencies (e.g., approach or avoid, appease or antagonize). This is mainly because emotions can be viewed as individuals’ responses to events that meet with a cognitive ‘primary appraisal’ that evaluates whether the event has psychological implications for the individual (e.g., appraised goal relevance, goal congruence, or ego relevance; or more specifically: appraised threat or opportunity, novelty, urgency, and so forth). Thus, the experience of specific emotions requires some primary appraisal that indicates that there is something in the situation that is evaluated as self-relevant. Furthermore, the ‘secondary appraisal’ of the event evaluates which options there are for the individual to influence the event, for instance because there is a clear source of threat, a clear culprit that can be blamed for an injustice, and/or sufficient resources to engage in action. Although 8

Freud’s (1926) ideas about anxiety and catharsis are examples of this view.

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there are different specific appraisal theories (e.g., those of Lazarus, Scherer, and Frijda; for an overview see Scherer et al., 2001), they share considerable common ground that suggests that individuals’ pattern of appraisal of an event leads to the experience of a specific emotion. The experience of anger, for instance, is often based in appraisals of goal blockage, injustice, and/or control/power. Fear, on the other hand, is often based in appraisals of a certain imminent threat and lack of control (which is differentiated from anxiety, for instance, which is based in appraisals of an uncertain and non-imminent threat). The notion of (patterns of) subjective appraisal explains why individuals may differ in their emotional response to the same event (because they appraise the event differently), whereas it also explains why individuals may respond quite similarly to very different events (because of the same subjective appraisal; Scherer et al., 2001). Thus, appraisal theories of emotion identify the cognitive appraisal process as a key antecedent of individuals’ emotional experience and thus their motivational state (Lazarus, 1984, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001). Nevertheless, appraisal theories of emotion are self-ish theories. The implicit and sometimes explicit assumption is that specific emotions function as guardians of individuals’ self-interest (e.g., Frank, 1988; Frijda, 1986; Scherer et al., 2001). Historically, their development was a response to the view of emotions as irrational forces, often associated with biological needs and instincts. In fact, much of the work in this domain has sought to move away from notions such as basic needs, and instincts (Scherer et al., 2001). This moving away has certainly been successful, as emotions are viewed more and more in psychology as functional and adaptive responses to events (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). However, the underlying perspective is still an individualistic one, although, as we shall see later, Lazarus’ (1991) perspective has some relational aspects to it (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; see also Bruder, Fischer & Manstead, 2014). Another development in the literature has arguably made appraisal theories of emotion more ‘social’ by conceptualizing emotions as groupbased (rather than individual). Group-based emotions felt on behalf of a group self or identity (e.g., as a man, as Dutch, etc.; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Smith, 1993; Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007). Intergroup emotions theory (e.g., Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008) is a core example of this approach, as it assumes that a group self underlies and directs the appraisal process that leads to the experience of specific group-based emotions in a given situation. However, selvations theory locates such a self-based process, together with the experience of specific emotions, in the second step of the motivational process. Even theories about group-based or intergroup emotions are self-ish theories.

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Although I applaud the development towards making appraisal theories of emotion more ‘social’, there is some irony in my observation that this development also made it more self-ish. What would really make appraisal theories more ‘social’, in my view, would be to integrate them into a theory of social motivation with relational assumptions (i.e., based in a shift from self to selvations). Indeed, selvations theory specifies where the appraisal of ‘self-relevance’ comes from without having to assume any underlying sense of self. It does not require a self to predict an appraisal of self-relevance. Moreover, it suggests that the appraisal process, including the primary appraisals, will be heavily reliant on cultural norms. This focus on self-relevance is also evident in work on physiological states that are conceptualized to reflect aspects of the cognitive appraisal process. For instance, Blascovich and Tomaka’s (1996) biopsychosocial model of arousal regulation views motivation as being driven by physiological threat and challenge responses (for a critical review see Kirby & Wright, 2003). This model assumes that when an event is self-relevant (e.g., performing a public speech), the experience of an event as threatening or challenging determines how individuals cope with the event (e.g., influencing performance). Threat is defined as when individuals’ resources are insufficient to meet the event’s demands, whereas challenge is defined when internal resources outweigh external demands. Both motivational states are assumed to be reflected in different cardiovascular indices (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure) and to lead to different forms of coping. Interestingly, this weighing of resources and demands is assumed to occur at a very basic level. Yet it occurs, according to the authors, when events are already self-relevant to the individual. Thus, threat and challenge constitute different types of motivation but do not reflect what generates the motivational process. Individuals under threat or challenge are simply assumed to be already motivated, which conveniently sidelines the issue of what moves and motivates individuals in the first place. A shift from self to selvations at least makes explicit what this essence is. Furthermore, it locates appraisals of threat and challenge, quite possibly reflected not only in the body but also in the brain (see Koslov et al., 2011) in the second step of the motivational process, which revolves around a culturally construed self. In sum, there is clear overlap between theories of emotion and the motivational process as proposed in selvations theory. This is why, as we shall see in Chapter 4, selvations theory borrows from these approaches to conceptualize the second step in the motivational process, which revolves around coping within the cultural matrix through the culturally construed self. At the same time, positing a relational essence changes the interpretation of those theories with respect to the experience of specific emotions. According to selvations theory, the experience of

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specific emotions is part of the coping process that guides individuals to regulate relationships in situ. * Goals. Goals feature prominently in cognitive theories of motivation such as Bandura’s social-cognitive theory, and more specifically the selfefficacy theory that is part of the larger social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997). These theories derive from expectancy-value theories but move beyond them by emphasizing human agency through the faculty of forethought and the exercise of control via one’s own behaviour. Bandura proposes that individuals become motivated to achieve goals when they feel capable of achieving them through their own actions. As such, from this perspective goals are viewed as subjective and internal states that enable individuals to exercise control over their life and their world. Indeed, ‘Exercise of control that secures desired outcomes and wards off undesired ones has immense functional value and provides a strong source of incentive motivation’ (Bandura, 1997, p. 2). Bandura points in particular to the issue of reactivity and proactivity with respect to exercising control. Whereas drive theories, for instance, conceptualize goal-driven behaviour as reactive (i.e., to reduce the negative state that a drive produces; to respond to threats, opportunities, and such), self-efficacy theory focuses predominantly on the individual who proactively tries to exercise control over his or her lot. As such, it focuses on cognitive beliefs such as efficacy beliefs as precursors of motivated behaviour, and on behaviour-based trainings to develop efficacy beliefs. The scope and power of the theory is large: efficacy beliefs have been found to relate to motivation across a large array of domains, spanning health psychology, sports psychology, and clinical psychology (for an overview see Bandura, 1997). Stronger efficacy beliefs typically enable individuals to master skills and achieve goals in very different domains. Because of its cognitive orientation, it is no surprise that the concept of efficacy is also incorporated in more general theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 2005).9 However, it does not focus on explaining motivated behaviour unguided by conscious forethought. An integrative theory of social motivation needs to include both aspects – a reactive and a proactive 9

The theory of planned behaviour (see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005) predicts that individuals’ attitudes, perceived social norms, and self-efficacy beliefs (all cognitive variables) predict their intentions and behaviour, as far as it concerns planned behaviour. It is a theory that includes self-efficacy (although its label for this construct is perceived behavioural control) but excludes emotions from the equation. Given the overlap with Bandura’s theory and the prominence of emotions in selvations theory, the theory of planned behaviour did not make my list.

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part. Selvations theory includes both of these aspects in the second (coping) phase of the motivational process. It refers to homeostatic and exploration forms of coping, both of which serve to regulate relationships. Homeostatic forms of coping revolve around the experience and regulation of specific emotions (i.e., emotion regulation; see Gross, 1998), whereas exploration forms of coping revolve around the experience of self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., the exercise of agency; see Bandura, 1997). Both forms of coping are psychologically based in the culturally construed self, which includes an independent or individualistic view of self, an interdependent or relational view of self, and a collectivistic view of self. This is important because selfefficacy theory is a thoroughly self-ish theory in which the self is considered as the representation of the individual (Bandura, 1997), with shared forms of efficacy conceptualized as efficacy by proxy (Bandura, 2000). Similarly self-ish in nature are theories about goals that represent a marked tendency away from theories like Bandura’s (for a review see Aarts & Elliot, 2012). This line of thought draws heavily on the implicit cognitive processes that are thought to affect goal-directed behaviour. In this view, important sources of goals are needs, drives, or instincts (Moskowitz, 2012). Prominent in this view is the idea that goals can be ‘externally activated’ (Smith & Mackie, 2014). This means that individuals can pick up external subtle hints at a particular goal in experiments and be influenced by it without being aware of it (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2010). In fact, much of this literature emphasizes the power of unconscious goals (versus conscious goals) to affect individuals’ goal-directed behaviour (e.g., Aarts, Custers & Marien, 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010). Indeed, selvations operate at this level, although the perceived changes in social relationships that give rise to their feeling can be implicit or explicit. For instance, individuals can quickly draw (what I would interpret as relational) meaning from facial emotional expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) and from subtle (relational) signals involved in processes of mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).10 * 10

Another emphasis in this literature is a growing pile of differentiatons with respect to the goal concept, which is reminiscent of the image of the very large storage container I introduced in the previous chapter. For instance, researchers have differentiated conscious and unconscious goals, mastery and performance goals, approach and avoidance goals, abstract and concrete goals, global and local goals, reflection and implementation goals, long-term and short-term goals, promotion and prevention goals, and so forth. This is reminiscent of the long list of theories that somehow involve the self, and the long list of needs, drives, and instincts that scholars have come up with (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Murray, 1938). One can question whether all these taxonomies, at least in the absence of a theoretically integrative structure that organizes them into a coherent whole, are either helpful or necessary.

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Selvations theory is quite a different theory of social motivation from most others. Yet it does not come out of nowhere. My brief review of definitions and theories of social motivation served to flag similarities and differences, including aspects of needs and instincts, incentives, emotions, and goals. Selvations theory provides a two-step process model of selvations, the first of which is based in selvations, positing a relational essence in human beings that safeguards the integrity of one’s network of social relationships. The second step is based in the culturally construed self, positing that relationship regulation in situ relies on the translation of selvations into culturally appropriate forms of coping. As such, it includes aspects of the key notions of needs and instincts, incentives, emotions, and goals. But in addition to merely assembling all those aspects (i.e., a laundry list), selvations theory also theoretically organizes them around the proposed relational essence of social motivation. In this way, our selvations determine what we may experience as being ‘self-relevant’ or in our ‘self-interest’.

Selvations and self in evolutionary context? A relational perspective provides quite a different interpretation of social motivation from those guided by (implicit or explicit) self-ish perspectives. I have argued that mainstream views of social motivation typically have self-ish assumptions, but that it is doubtful whether those assumptions are valid. Moreover, I have argued that a relational perspective is in line with the idea that social relationships appear to be a human universal, which fits the notion of relational essence. Shifting from self to selvations, therefore, thins the fog and exposes the sun. Indeed, through positing a relational essence (via the notion of selvations), we arrive at a position from which synthesis can occur. Is this position compatible with evolutionary theorizing? This question is relevant because evolution theory explains how, at a macro-level, which changes in population traits (or phenotypes) occur as a function of different environmental pressures (Darwin, 1859). It thus describes and explains processes that give rise to general structures in the human organism (e.g., Wilson, 1975), seeking to provide not only proximal explanations of a given behaviour (e.g., causal and ontogeny questions) but also more distal ones (e.g., function and phylogeny questions; Tinbergen, 1963). If selvations theory is compatible with evolutionary theorizing, then we should be able to explain why it has its proposed structure (such as the two-step motivational process, the first based in selvations and networks of social relationships, and the second in self and culture). Put differently, an evolutionary approach seeks to address the ‘deeper’ issue of why the general structures and motivational processes

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that selvations theory identifies should be there in the here and now (Hinde, 1987; see also Nettle, 2009). Indeed, why should humans have a relational, rather than self-ish, essence?11 Aren’t genes selfish? My answer is that this type of selfishness (i.e., the transmission of genes through the reproduction of individuals) does not imply psychological selfishness (Sober & Wilson, 1999; see also Dawkins, 1976). There is no necessary tension between a view of selfish genes and ‘unselfish’ individuals. In fact, selvations theory suggests that selvations facilitate individuals’ (and thus their genes’) probability of survival and reproduction because they serve to safeguard that which protects them: their network of social relationships. Although this may start as a kin-based network (e.g., parents, siblings, extended family), in later life this network also includes non-kin (e.g., friends, colleagues). Viewed in this way, there is no necessary tension between gene-interest and a relational perspective on social motivation. Although there have been many attempts to wed evolutionary insights with psychological mechanisms (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996), it is notoriously hard to address such ideas with empirical data. Perhaps for this reason, theorists often simply avoid the issue by simply assuming uncritically that evolutionary processes fit with their theory (a hidden assumption), or by suggesting that their theory does not require an evolutionary basis to predict the phenomena it predicts. Yet, if one wants a theory of social motivation to be integrative and even consilient, and one agrees that evolutionary theorizing outside the field of psychology has received widespread support (e.g., Dawkins, 1976; Gould, 2002; Nettle, 2009), I believe that this point needs to be explicitly addressed. Although I am not an expert and despite the fact that selvations theory indeed does not require an evolutionary grounding, I will nevertheless explore below the fit between evolution and selvations theory – because if the shoe fits, one might as well wear it.

Selvations The notion of selvations fits with the often-posited social and groupdwelling nature of human beings (e.g., Caporael, 1997, 2001; Dunbar, 1997, 2003, 2010). Furthermore, scholars studying social behaviour among primates (e.g., De Waal, 2008) and scholars studying the social brain (Adolphs, 2003; Beckes & Coan, 2011) all suggest a direct linkage 11

My aim here is to explore whether selvations theory, which applies to humans, fits with evolutionary theorizing (which is not restricted to humans). Although for evolutionary biologists or psychologists my use of the term human may imply that I am looking for what makes human unique compared to other species, this is not the case. I focus, within the human species, on whether the notions of selvations and self make sense in an evolutionary context.

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between humans’ social nature, their biological make-up, and evolutionary processes that revolve around humans’ ultra-sociality (e.g., Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; Haidt, 2012). My inner generalist sees this as potentially reflecting a broader trend across different (sub)disciplines and (sub)fields towards a portrayal of humans as relational beings – a portrayal that moves away from the confines of homo economicus yet stays within an evolutionary perspective on social motivation. To me, this trend suggests that the Zeitgeist is favouring an increased focus on the first step of the motivational process in selvations theory (that of value infusion). In fact, arguably much previous work on social motivation can be characterized as having focused on its second step (that of coping with value-infused events). This potential shift will be fruitful because although it may be hard to find basic evolutionary principles to clearly govern the second step (given the immense cultural variance to be expected there), it should be easier to find a fit for the first step. Core aspects of selvations theory’s first step, to be outlined in more detail in the next chapter, do indeed seem to fit. Humans instinctively form bonds with others in order to feel secure and, on average, are as a result more likely to survive and reproduce (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). Individuals intuitively use similar conceptualizations of social relationships (Fiske, 1991) and have intuitions about moral obligations and taboos (Haidt, 2001, 2007, 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2011; see also Hume, 1739/ 1978), which prevents the social and cultural exclusion that would decrease their chances of survival and reproduction. Indeed, individuals instinctively need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and they constantly monitor their level of social inclusion (Leary, 2005; see also Brewer, 1991) as well as their environment (Lazarus, 1991). And as noted, the importance of social relationships is particularly observed when something goes awry – loneliness, social exclusion, and social loss can lead to processes of sadness, anger, grief and, in the long run at least, a final acceptance of absent friends (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Panksepp, 2003; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987; Williams, 2000, 2007, 2009). All of these aspects point to selvations. Specifically, the notion of selvations as being able to feel social relationships is part of the process by which events are infused with value (i.e., in the first step of the motivational process). Without such a basic faculty, we would be blind to signals of social exclusion and unable to regulate relationships (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; see also Kovacs, Teglas & Endress, 2010). Indeed, the equal status of physiological and relational needs in this process is important because they safeguard the integrity of one’s body and one’s network of social relationships – both of which are key to survival and reproduction. Indeed, if there is survival value in safety

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(Darwin, 1859), and safety comes from one’s network of social relationships (Bowlby, 1969), then there should be markers of physiological safety and markers of one’s network of social relationships that feature prominently in the process of value infusion.12 We should be ultrasensitive to the integrity of our networks of social relationships. This line of thought further fits with the notion that selvations are adaptive. However, a note of caution is warranted when thinking about the evolutionary notion of adaptiveness. Behavioural inclinations can be viewed as adaptive when they increase (or are believed to have increased) the fitness of an organism in the population (i.e., when they contribute their genes to the next generation). Evolutionary processes are not only about single individuals, however, but also about populations in context (or niches or ecologies; see Beckes & Coan, 2011): different niches may invite selection for different traits. This is important because it implies that human universals are ideal candidates for a direct evolutionary grounding. Social relationships, and by extension selvations, reflect such a human universal. Nevertheless, any evolutionary explanation requires a narrative about how certain population traits have come about (for a discussion, see Haidt, 2012). In fact, evolutionary theory suggests that population changes occur through processes of random variation and natural selection (Darwin, 1859). As such, population changes often occur on the basis of structures already developed (Pinker, 2003), which is associated with the notion that form follows function (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999) – not because it is designed to be so but because structures already exist on which successful adaptations (i.e., changes that increase fit) may occur. This implies that our essence may indeed not change much (just as our biological needs for food and a certain body temperature should not change much), and that what we observe in a one-year-old (equipped with selvations but not yet with self) may reflect more of the sunlight because there is not yet so much (cultural and self-based) fog to peer through. Against my line of thought, it could be argued that it hardly seems adaptive for individuals to form, for instance, parasocial relationships (Cohen, 2003, 2004) with characters from television shows or books (or, for that matter, with pets, jobs, cars, and the like). Yet all of these reflect genuinely felt connections, mediated through the same psychological pathways as social relationships with real humans. This is neither 12

Intriguingly, recent theorizing and research has focused on the notion of social thermoregulation (IJzerman et al., 2015). Thermoregulation is the mechanism by which organisms regulate their body temperature. Social thermoregulation refers to humans’ ability to regulate others’ temperature, for instance, when a newborn receives warmth from the caregiver’s skin or touch. This is an exciting new line of theorizing and research that will explore more deeply the synergy between biology and social relationships.

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impossible nor dysfunctional. Although it is pretty clear that bonding with George Clooney will not lead to his protection and thus has little actual fitness value, this means neither that the underlying attachment mechanism is faulty or maladaptive, nor that the consequences for individuals will not be experienced as ‘real’.13 Selvations theory suggests that one reason why parasocial relationships are possible in the first place is that modern technology makes them so real to our relational essence that we can include even fictitious characters in our social network as if they are flesh-and-blood relationships.

Self If selvations reflect a human universal, selected for through evolutionary processes; then where does that leave the self? The notion of a complex culturally construed self, and particularly its individualistic type, seems unique for humans (and in particular for their unique relative size of the brain’s neo-cortex). For instance, although other species such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants are capable of recognizing themselves in a mirror (Plotnik, de Waal & Reiss, 2006; Reiss & Marino, 2001),14 this does not imply that they can construe the self in the many and complex ways that humans can (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In human children, however, it is clear from a young age onwards that they have the capability not only of self-recognition but also of self-construal (Berthenthal & Fischer, 1978). And although this young age is noteworthy, it also suggests that the culturally construed self is not necessary for a child of this age to be moved and motivated (see also Bloom, 2012). Self-construal may be unique for humans, but it is not their essence. Historically, there is strong reason to believe that the Western notion of self is not only socially construed but also a relatively recent social invention (Danziger, 1997; Richards, 1996; Stam, 2006; see also Gergen, 2006) which can be traced back to the eighteenth–nineteenth century. Stam (2006, p. 102) writes: Industrialization and modernization came with a pervasive sense that actions were like property, and not unlike other objects we chose and 13

14

My high school period coincided with the rise and fall of the UK boy band Take That. Anyone who has ever been part of or witness to the phenomenon of boy bands may easily recognize the attachment dynamics operating in their adolescent-girl fanbase, not just when being ‘near’ to their idols during a concert but also when the band (inevitably) breaks up. It is hard to defend that, for those inside those attachment dynamics, the relationship is somehow ‘not real’. Intriguingly, like humans, these other species not only have the faculty of selfrecognition but also are social mammals that live in groups with a complex social organization. This fits the core premise of this book, which is that self serves selvations.

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Assumptions certainly not necessary, nor prescribed by tradition. The new sense of self and personhood accompanying this change was one based on the notion of consciousness. But consciousness is a reification of the act of being conscious of what one is, does, thinks and so on, originating in our being conscious over time. William James most clearly captures this at the end of the 19th century by making it the core of his conception of ‘the sense of personal identity’ (James, 1890a/1950a, p. 330) What became our modern, western sense of self then was not an attribute of a personal soul or other more permanent transcendental structure but was the outcome of our being conscious and the continuity of our own consciousness, namely remembering that we are the same person today as we were yesterday.

This is an important view that fits my argument that self-construal is culture-dependent and that particularly the Western notion of self as an independent and autonomous unit reflects a cultural matrix that has not been with us for very long. There is no conceivable reason for essentializing something so ‘young’. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the faculty of self-construal more generally can be viewed as adaptive in terms of evolutionary thinking. Selvations theory suggests that self-construal serves to transform selvations into culturally appropriate thought, feelings, and behaviour, such that individuals can regulate relationships in situ. Yet for such an adaptation to occur, there must have been a point in human evolutionary history for which selfconstrual was, for instance, a beneficial trait for individuals that environmental pressures somehow selected for. Put differently, there must have been a reason why self-construal increased fitness at some point in time. My educated guess would be to locate this at a point in evolutionary time when social groups became too large to be felt through the enactment of social relationships (moving beyond Gemeinschaft; Tönnies, 1887). This is in line with the so-called ‘social brain hypothesis’ (Dunbar, 2003), which suggests that the relative size of the neo-cortex in the human brain co-evolved with the increased social complexity of living in larger groups (see also Brewer & Caporael, 1990, 2006; Caporael, 1997, 2001; Caporael et al., 1989; Pinker, 2003). Specifically, Dunbar (2003) argues that the faculty of language co-evolved in this way, enabling gossip to be used as a means of social order and control within such larger groups. I would call this a period in evolutionary history where, in addition to existing networks of social relationships, cultural matrices started to emerge. This is when individuals benefited from having a rudimentary Rough Guide; that is, self-construal. I suspect that the ‘default’ type of self-construal is one that resembles selvations. This relational type of self-construal is interdependent

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self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004), in which individuals are defined by others and are geared towards regulating and harmonizing relationships within the group. Interdependent self-construal would have facilited individuals’ application of their selvations to others in their larger group who were effectively outside their network of social relationships. It would have provided cohesion in groups that otherwise would have disintegrated into different social networks. Given that attachment behaviour is thought to fulfil the evolutionary function of providing safety (e.g., from predators; Bowlby, 1969), I assume that the human ability for interdependent self-construal may have derived from this. The emergence of independent self-construal, in which individuals view themselves as isolated units, is most likely to have evolved much later in evolutionary history (for educated guesses, see Sedikides, Skowronski & Dunbar, 2006), perhaps when safety concerns within groups were structurally met, enabling a focus on exploration behaviour and potentially individual differentiation and risk-taking (which may relate to selfmotives such as distinctiveness; Vignoles, 2011). Put differently, this is the time at which groups were able to provide structural safe havens, such that they could also function as secure bases for individuals on which to explore. Indeed, increased wealth and presumably some form of safety is associated with increased individualism (Inglehart, 1997); moreover, priming the concept of money in modern-day humans makes them construe their self in a more individualistic and independent way (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006, 2008). As such, globalization may be rapidly individualizing otherwise collectivistic societies – provided that globalization also brings structural wealth and safety. Of course, this line of thought, and particularly the last few sentences, is very speculative. It is notoriously difficult to pinpoint a time in human history at which particular psychological faculties emerged. And for reasons good or bad, evolutionary theorizing in psychology has somewhat of a reputation for creating its own mental make-believe to fit whatever phenomenon observed (but see Nettle, 2009). Yet given the powerful theoretical and empirical track record of evolution theory, I do believe psychologists and social scientists in general should consider Tinbergen’s (1963) different types of explanations and therefore also the evolution-based functional explanation. Indeed, the aim of this final section was not to provide a bullet-proof case for the evolutionary grounding of selvations theory; rather, the aim was to see whether it was possible to find a fitting shoe. For selvations, and even for selfconstrual, I think the shoe fits, and that, for the time being at least, it does not hurt to wear it.

PART II

Selvations theory

CHAPTER 3

Selvations theory I: Value infusion

Man is a perpetually wanting animal. (Maslow, 1943, p. 371) . . . the most essential possession of any living being, at any time, is the balanced range of body chemistries compatible with healthy life. It applies equally to an amoeba and to a human being. All else flows from it. Its significance cannot be overemphasized. (Damasio, 2010, p. 46)

Introduction This chapter outlines the first step of the motivational process (that of value infusion). In this first step, selvations theory integrates theories from developmental psychology, neuropsychology, and cultural anthropology (those of Bowlby, Damasio, and Fiske, respectively), grounded in relational assumptions about social motivation. The process of value infusion revolves around selvations, which means that individuals feel changes in their webby network of social relationships. Selvations thus reflect guardians of the integrity of one’s network of social relationships; just as biological needs or instincts reflect guardians of the integrity of one’s body. As such, selvations are part of the same system that regulates biological needs or instincts, thus according biological and relational needs an equal footing. A culturally construed self is not required for this first step of the motivational process; as such, selvations theory proposes that, in our very essence, there is value without self. The process of value infusion integrates insights from Damasio’s protoself theory with Bowlby’s attachment theory and Fiske’s relational models theory. Whereas Damasio’s theory identifies the (brain and body) mechanisms by which we experience ‘the feeling of what happens’ (i.e., an internal experience of changes in the outside world), Bowlby’s theory identifies how infants and adults attach themselves to relationship partners (or objects) in their social world and internalize the feeling of their availability and responsiveness (which may alter one’s sensitivity to feeling any change in these social relationships). In turn, Fiske’s theory

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identifies individuals’ social interaction as serving to regulate social relationships and thus connects individual mechanisms (Damasio) to relational dynamics (Bowlby), including taboos and obligations that enable relationship regulation (Fiske). This is not just a laundry list of three theories; it is a synthesis on the basis of relational assumptions. Selvations theory extends Damasio’s theory by outlining how selvations influence ‘the feeling of what happens’; it extends Bowlby’s attachment theory by suggesting that selvations instigate relationship regulation processes, and it extends Fiske’s theory by offering a broad yet focused psychological account of how value is infused into events (and thus shapes what becomes ‘selfrelevant’). In summary, selvations theory’s first step synthesizes the insights of these three theories to offer a novel and distinctly relational account of what essentially moves and motivates us.

What are selvations? Selvations theory suggests that individuals are moved and motivated to regulate their social relationships through social interacton (Rai & Fiske, 2011). To capture the motivational essence of social relationships, I introduce the novel notion of selvations, defined as individuals’ feeling of any change in their network of social relationships. Thus, it is our feeling that something in our spider’s web of social relationships changed or is changing that moves and motivates us. Note that this ‘feeling’ (as a verb) is not the same as consciously experiencing a specific emotion because the latter requires a self (as the agent feeling an emotion). Indeed, selvations represent essential aspects of individuals’ biopsychological make-up that enable us to feel any change in our network of social relationships so that we can tend to regulating those relationships (that is, to generate or maintain them; Rai & Fiske, 2011). In this sense, both the structure and the function of selvations should be a human universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Against this backdrop, selvations theory’s account of value infusion is based on integrating core insights from three theories around the notion of selvations (e.g., Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Damasio, 2001, 2010; Fiske, 1991). However, selvations do not operate in a world without social structure. In selvations theory, individuals are embedded in networks of relationships, which are embedded in one or more cultures. Culture represents shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable (Smith et al., 2006), which includes pre- and proscriptive norms about which relationships to prioritize or sanction (Fiske, 1991; Fiske et al., 1998). Selvations theory suggests that the translation of selvations into culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and action (e.g., De Leersnyder, Boiger & Mesquita, 2013;

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Nisbett et al., 2000; see also Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997) reflects the second step of the motivational process (coping with valueinfused events; which reflect an integration of three theories about selfconstrual, emotion, and efficacy; Bandura, 1997; Lazarus, 1991; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In this process (which will be outlined in detail in Chapter 4), the culturally construed self is absolutely pivotal because it is a psychological basis for the (self-based) experience of specific emotions and agency that guide us towards regulating relationships in situ.1 For now, however, let us start by integrating three different theories around our relational social-motivational essence.

Knitting together an Asian elephant In a famous poem, John Godfrey Saxe had various blind men of the fictitious country of Indostan explore different parts of an (presumably Asian) elephant to identify its essence (see Skitka et al., 2010). Because they each focused on a different part of the elephant (e.g., tail or knee), they came to very different conclusions (e.g., it’s a rope or a tree). Thus, Saxe concluded in the final lines: ‘And so these men of Indostan / Disputed loud and long / Each in his own opinion / Exceeding stiff and strong / Though each was partly in the right / And all were in the wrong!’ Clearly, if we are to see the essence of the elephant, we need to take into account different perspectives on the same beast in order to avoid potential misrepresentations of its essence. In fact, this is why we need theoretical integration. I aim to knit together such an elephant (a phrase I borrowed from Skitka et al., 2010) by outlining the core elements of the process of value infusion. These are the proto-self, which enables humans to feel within what happens outside; attachment, which is the process that enables humans to generate and maintain social relationships through social interaction; and relational models, which enable humans to apply only a limited number of ways of relating to others in social interaction, grounded in taboos and obligations that pinpoint the oughts and don’ts in the relationship. Because these theories derive from different 1

Some may wonder whether the notion of selvations is not similar to Leary’s (2005) sociometer concept – a psychological gauge of social inclusion, indexed by individuals’ self-esteem. Although there are certainly parallels to be drawn between those two notions, the key difference is that selvations theory does not suggest that self-esteem is an index of one’s inclusion in social relationships. The main reason is that high selfesteem can actually impede the creation or maintenance of relationships, as attested by research on narcissism and aggression (Baumeister, Bushman & Campbell, 2000; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Moreover, cultural psychologists have criticized the notion that self-esteem has universal meaning (see Heine et al., 1999), which makes it problematic as an index of a process that is assumed to be universal.

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approaches that focus on different parts of the elephant, integrative theorizing is much like knitting our Asian elephant together.

The proto-self enables the ‘feeling of what happens’ The notion of selvations builds on the notion of the proto-self as proposed by the neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio (2001, 2010). In this view, the proto-self can be viewed as a continuous process that functions to monitor the (internal) well-being of the organism as well as (external) changes in the environment. Specifically, the proto-self can be understood as the process by which these different streams of information are integrated and ‘mapped’ in the brain. It thus combines information from within and without, and connects bodily states and environmental changes through the brain. As such it leads to what Damasio (2001) elegantly termed ‘the feeling of what happens’. Being a brain scientist, Damasio views the proto-self as a neural process based in particular brain structures. He also views it as the organism’s gateway to experience the body proper and through that bodily experience the external world. For this reason, the proto-self operates outside of consciousness. It is not construed and experienced in the same sense that the consciously experienced self is construed and experienced. Indeed, despite its name it is not a self at all (because it does not tell us who we are), although it may provide the psychological basis for a proper self to emerge (referred to as the ‘autobiographical self’ by Damasio, which does tell us who we are). The principal output of the proto-self process is what Damasio calls primordial feelings. These feelings provide the basic experience of the organism’s well-being and thus provide a gateway to experiencing any changes in the outside world as ‘the feeling of what happens’. Importantly, primordial feelings signal whether the organism’s well-being deviates from important standards (e.g., whether body temperature is not too high or low). The same process also applies to whether environmental changes violate important standards (e.g., whether there is a threat to the organism). As such, the proto-self functions as a guardian of the integrity (and thus wellbeing) of the organism as a whole and the body proper in particular, taking into account information about changes within the body proper (e.g., signs of hunger, thirst, pain, etc.) as well as information about changes in the environment (e.g., threat, opportunity, etc.). It can function as a guardian because it relies on the principle of homeostasis – any violation of essential standards requires a response towards normalization. Figure 3.1 represents my interpretation of this process.

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Produces

“Feeling of what happens”

PROTO-SELF

Monitors Informs

Informs Monitors

Well-being of the organism

Changes in the environment

Figure 3.1 The proto-self enables the (primordial) ‘feeling of what happens’.

The importance of this psychological mechanism for selvations theory seems clear because it provides the beginning of an explanation of how events come to be infused with value. However, there are at least three assumptions to be kept in mind before we engage further with Damasio’s theorizing. First, being a brain scientist, Damasio’s focus is on brains and how they mediate or reflect basic psychological processes such as motivation. As such, his analysis focuses on what brains do, even when they are not human brains (see also LeDoux, 1998, 2002). In fact, Damasio suggests that although culturally construed selves are unique for humans, this is not the case for the proto-self. His argument is that very basic non-human brains act upon the same principles as the proto-self. In his view, any account of social motivation should include this very basic aspect of brains. This is in line with the notion that the value-infusion process is based in (human) universals. A second assumption in Damasio’s thinking that is good to bear in mind is that he accords a major role to emotion in this basic process. Emotion is not meant here as the label for the conscious experience of specific emotions (like anger, fear, etc.), but it is meant as the general structure (or ‘machinery’) that enables the organism to experience what is

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happening from the inside and outside. This is possible because the proto-self produces primordial feelings that represent the well-being of the organism vis-à-vis an external event. Thus, just as the proto-self provides a raw basis for a proper self to emerge, primordial feelings provide the raw basis for specific emotions like anger and fear – yet these must be based in a culturally construed self in order to be consciously experienced. This means that primordial feelings are present even when specific emotions are absent, just like the proto-self is present even when there is no sense of culturally construed self (such as in a oneyear-old child). Third, although Damasio provides a specific mechanism by which the human organism feels what happens, his assumption about its function is a rather individualistic one: social relationships are nowhere to be found. What is missing in Damasio’s analysis is the incorporation of social relationships into the proto-self. Selvations are the missing piece of the puzzle. When inserted into the puzzle, selvations can be viewed as the guardians of the integrity of one’s network of social relationships; just as biological needs or instincts are the guardians of the integrity of one’s body. As such, selvations signal deviations from social relationship standards (e.g., threat of loss, oppportunity to connect or reconnect), after which the proto-self produces primordial feelings that reflect, to paraphrase Damasio, ‘the feeling of what happens to my network of social relationships’. In this sense, the proto-self provides the basic machinery through which we can literally feel changes in our network of social relationships. It thus has biological underpinnings, it is experienced through bodily states, and it represents the social relationships humans are motivated to regulate. Thus, the proto-self provides a micro-level analysis of how felt changes in social relationships infuse value into otherwise, psychologically speaking, ‘empty’ events. The proto-self also determines what individuals, in the second step of the motivational process, will appraise as ‘self-relevant’. Specifically, it lends priority to some signals from the organism (e.g., hunger, thirst, selvations), and the environment (e.g., an imminent threat, an angry face), and thus also selects from the integrated streams of information that it monitors. In this sense, the proto-self does not merely monitor the relationship between the organism and its environment but also selects which information should be considered valuable. It prioritizes. It values. And as such, Damasio’s analysis implies that there is indeed value without self. But on what basis does the proto-self select, prioritize, and value? Damasio (2010) suggests that the criterion for value is biological value. This refers to the idea that biological value is designated by anything that increases chances and the quality of survival and effective life

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management. As such it is tied, at least according to Damasio, to the principle of homeostasis (i.e., seeking a return to balance after violations of particular standards). For instance, the body’s temperature should be within a fixed range to prevent damage to the body, or worse. A violation of the standards of these parameters thus triggers the need to return to baseline, to balance, to equilibrium. Damasio suggests that the very same process is responsible for life regulation in general. And because the outside world cannot be experienced through anything other than bodily experience, homeostasis also includes external events that violate specific standards and thus influence the primordial feelings produced by the proto-self. Selvations fit nicely with this line of reasoning because they identify social relationships as key to ‘life regulation’. From an essentially relational perspective, social relationships and feeling any changes in them are not merely likely to increase chances and the quality of survival and effective life management – they are necessary. At the same time, however, there is more to human life regulation than homeostasis. Agency and exploration, for instance, are also important in social motivation (Bandura, 1997; Bowlby, 1969). However, selvations theory suggests that these come into play at the second step of the motivational process – as a form of coping with value-infused events. Yet the first step of the motivational process, value infusion, can be understood through a focus on homeostasis alone. A critic may wonder at this point how Damasio’s analysis of the primordial feelings that emerge from the proto-self fits with Russell and Feldman-Barrett’s notion of core affect (see also Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009). Core affect is ‘a pre-conceptual primitive process, a neurophysiological state, accessible to consciousness as a simple non-reflective feeling: feeling good or bad, feeling lethargic or energised’ (Russell, 2009, p. 1264). Indeed, just like primordial feelings, core affect is not felt emotion (which presupposes a self that feels it). This is important because selvations theory suggests that felt emotion (e.g., the experience of anger or fear) is part of the coping process. Moreover, like primordial feelings, core affect can change as a function of changes in the individual’s internal or external milieu (Russell, 2005, 2009). However, selvations theory suggests that selvations shape core affect, and relies on the notion of the proto-self to produce it. In sum, Damasio’s proto-self theory provides an important process that selvations theory extends by including a relational essence. Selvations are the relational equivalents of biological needs or instincts that serve, according to the homeostatic principle, to safeguard our body, brain, and our network of social relationships. The general ‘feeling of what happens’ thus importantly includes the ‘feeling of what happens to my

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network of social relationships’. The primordial feelings that follow from it infuse value into otherwise, psychologically speaking, ‘empty’ events. Of course, this raises the question of which social relationships are essentialized in selvations, and why. Selvations theory suggests that attachment theory holds fitting answers to those questions and thus integrates insights from this theory with that of Damasio. And so the knitting continues.

Attachment security calibrates selvations standards Selvations theory draws on attachment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; for recent advances see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b; see also Schmitt et al., 2004) to suggest that attachment behaviour is a form of social interaction that generates or maintains social relationships; that attachment bonds are the result of such relationship regulation; and that attachment security (that is, the feeling that social relationships are available and responsive) modulates, or calibrates, selvations standards. The first and second suggestions imply that only those social relationships that are regulated through social interaction have the potential to become selvations. The final suggestion implies that secure social relationships – that is, those that are available and responsive (see also Reis & Clark, 2013) – are more likely to be generated and maintained and thus become more important to attend to. Attachment processes are important in selvations theory because they psychologically link selvations to social interaction and relationship regulation. At a general level, attachment processes are responsible for the webby network of social relationships that individuals build across the lifespan. Selvations represent the feeling of what happens inside that web. * Calibrations. Attachment theory was originally based in a clinical and developmental perspective that focused on young infants’ relationship with their principal caretaker. Both Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth and colleagues (1978) pioneered the systematic study of how infants bond with caretakers through attachment behaviour (e.g., smiling, crying, clinging, etc.). The importance of attachment processes is not restricted to infancy, however (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). For instance, theory and research also focused on how attachment processes apply to adults’ romantic relationships, empathy, leadership, religion, and intergroup relations (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b; see also Granqvist et al., 2012). Furthemore, theory and research also examined how changes in

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attachment bonds have a very strong impact on individuals (e.g., Stroebe et al., 2005). At the core of attachment theory is the notion that humans, from birth onwards, seem pre-wired both to seek and to respond to contact with their primary caretaker(s). Thus, the tendency to relate seems innate. Bowlby (1969, p. 140) defines such attachment behaviour as ‘the result of the activity of behavioural systems that have a continuing set-goal, the specification of which is a certain sort of relationship to another specified individual’. Attachment behaviour is viewed as ‘instinctive’ because it ‘follows a recognizably similar and predictable pattern . . . is not a simple response to a single stimulus but a sequence of behavior . . . certain of its usual consequences are of obvious value in contributing to the preservation of an individual or the continuity of the species . . . many examples of it develop even when all the ordinary opportunities for learning it are exiguous or absent’ (ibid., p. 38). Thus, Bowlby accords such attachment behaviour the status of instinctive behaviour (see also Baumeister & Leary’s [1995] notion of the need to belong), suggesting that attachment behaviour is common among humans as well as among other species that rear their young (i.e., social mammals). This view is highly compatible with Damasio’s analysis of the protoself. This compatibility between Damasio’s and Bowlby’s analyses is at first glance remarkable given that Damasio is a brain scientist whereas Bowlby (1969) was a clinical and developmental psychologist. Nevertheless, Bowlby’s work has been so influential and insightful because he analysed attachment behaviour from a biological/ethological perspective, thus viewing attachment behaviour as functional and adaptive because it ensures a ‘safe haven’ (in which to find shelter and thus return back to balance; i.e., homeostasis), or provides a ‘secure base’ (that facilitates exploration). In fact, Bowbly (1969) is clear in his view that the function of attachment behaviour is to prevent the organism from falling prey to predators. The primary caretaker is the first who can provide a safe haven for the infant and thus is typically the first attachment figure to fulfil that function. This line of thought is compatible with Damasio’s theory of the proto-self, but links it with humans’ relational essence, as proposed by selvations theory. Attachment theory specifies two key features of any attachment figure, or social relationship for that matter, that play a major role in what individuals expect from others with whom they relate. These factors are the availability and responsiveness of the attachment figure (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). Availability refers to the attachment figure being present in case of need; responsiveness refers to whether the attachment figure can be relied on to respond to need (see also Reis & Clark, 2013). Infants typically develop more secure attachment bonds when they learn

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they can rely on the caretaker’s availability and responsiveness. They learn to trust others and, more specifically, to trust that they can depend on others. Attachment theory suggests that, through social interaction, individuals develop a general ‘working model’ that includes representations of both themselves and others. Although the contents of these working models may differ in and across cultures, all humans seem to develop such working models of self and other (van IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008; see also Schmitt et al., 2004). Working models carry with them expectations about social relationships and thus about relationship regulation (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 1978). Specifically, working models can be viewed as the basis for security expectations about social relationships. They tell us what we can expect from others with respect to their availability and responsiveness in times of need, whether others can be trusted or not, and whether others will stick around or abandon us in times of need. In this sense, working models are intricately linked to attachment security. Selvations theory suggests that attachment security calibrates selvations’ standards. That is, for any social relationship, attachment security defines the threshold for the ‘feeling of what happens’. For instance, for those to whom we feel securely attached, we should be most attentive to any major changes in the social relationship. By contrast, for those to whom we feel insecurely attached, we should be mostly attentive even to small changes in the social relationship. Put differently, for those whom we securely trust and on whom we rely, we do not need to regulate our relationship all the time – we can find shelter in the safe haven it represents for us, or use it as a secure base from which to explore our world. Indeed, some have suggested that the presence of such others is our ‘social baseline’ (Beckes & Coan, 2011) that allows more degrees of freedom to explore. However, for those with whom we are insecurely related, we need to be hyperattentive. This calibration pattern can be observed nicely in individual differences in attachment. Indeed, for some individuals the calibration of selvations standards may be narrower or broader than for others, thus creating variance across individuals with respect to motivational thresholds. Certainly, individuals can differ dramatically with respect to their expectations of caretaker availability and responsiveness. For instance, it is clear that situational influences are important in shaping the working models individuals have and on which they rely; and that they do not have one working model for all relationships, but can entertain specific ones for specific attachment figures or contexts (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). More specifically, attachment theory proposes that individuals can be classified as securely attached and insecurely attached individuals (Bowlby,

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1969, 1973, 1980; see also Ainsworth et al., 1978). The latter type of attachment, insecure attachment, consists of two subtypes: anxious and avoidant. Securely attached (meaning non-anxious and non-avoidant) individuals assume that there will always be a caretaker around and a safe haven to return to – which effectively constitutes a secure base from which to explore. As a consequence, securely attached infants are unlikely to panic when the caretaker leaves the room, and, by extension, securely attached individuals are unlikely to panic when a loved one leaves for a while (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Securely attached individuals will generally trust their partners and have confidence in their social relationships, which they view as self-evident and natural. By contrast, insecurely attached individuals do not have such a positive expectation of social relationships and they certainly do not view them as natural and self-evident. They have learned to be cautious when it comes to connecting to others. As such they are less trusting of others and they have less confidence in their social relationships. For instance, insecurely attached infants are likely to panic when the principal caretaker leaves the room because they do not trust him or her to return (Ainsworth, 1979, 1989). As a consequence, they may have social relationships in which they are constantly anxious about whether the other still values and commits to the relationship, or avoid them altogether (see Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). These two different ways of responding to one’s expectations of the caretaker’s availability and responsiveness relate to the two different subtypes of insecure attachment (anxious and avoidant). Based in concerns that this three-group classification is too simplistic (e.g., Bartholomew & Horwitz, 1991), however, more recent work on attachment theory has employed a more fluid and flexible conceptualization by proposing a two-dimensional structure of attachment: attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance (see also Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). As visualized in Figure 3.2, individuals can score low on either dimension, which would make them securely attached. However, individuals can also score high on either dimension, or on both, which reflects an ambivalent type of attachment. This refers to a mixture of anxious and avoidant attachment, which often results in strong ruminative conflicts within the individual about whether to approach or avoid social relationships (Ainsworth, 1979, 1989). These two dimensions (attachment anxiety and avoidance) connect two core classes of relational phenomena: past events that shaped attachment styles with respect to social relationships; and expectations about current and future social relationships. As such they provide a psychological gateway between past, present, and future with respect to expectations of the availability and responsiveness of social relationships. The two-dimensional model explains the enormous variance that individuals

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INSECURE: ANXIOUS

ATTACHMENT ANXIETY

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INSECURE: AMBIVALENT

ATTACHMENT AVOIDANCE

SECURE

INSECURE: AVOIDANT

Figure 3.2 Two-dimensional model of attachment styles.

show in whether and how they approach or avoid social relationships. Nevertheless, it is clear that even those who seem to avoid relationships do not do so because they do not want to engage in social relationships – they just do not have sufficient trust in themselves and others to avoid being rejected, harmed, or otherwise hurt (e.g., Carvallo & Gabriel, 2006). Thus, although there is variation in how individuals approach social relationships (as one would expect in the second step of the motivational process), the general tendency is either to engage in or to be engaged with them, in practice or in one’s mind. According to selvations theory, this is because the overarching function of social motivation is relationship regulation. In fact, it suggests that attachment security modulates, or calibrates, selvations standards. Once these standards are violated, value infusion occurs and, in the second step of the motivational process (outlined in Chapter 4), individuals seek culturally acceptable ways to regulate relationships in situ. * Bridges. Let me emphasize here the distinction between a ‘secure base’ and a ‘safe haven’ (see Maxwell et al., 2013). In attachment theory, seeking security in social relationships comes in two forms: individuals’ desire for a safe haven (a form of homeostasis; a return to safety), or for a secure

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base (from which to explore the world, trusting that there will be someone around to rely on in times of need). Although the notion of a safe haven makes perfect sense when one thinks about the protective function of attachment processes (e.g., protection from predators, according to Bowlby), I can only emphasize that a secure base facilitates exploration behaviour – that is, behaviour that is more risky and agentic than retreating to seek shelter in one’s safe haven. Indeed, an important feature of attachment theory is that individuals who believe they have a secure base – those who are more securely attached – are more likely to explore unfamiliar surroundings and develop the confidence to approach the unknown (see Maxwell et al., 2013). In selvations theory, this exploration aspect is viewed as part of coping with value-infused events, rather than as part of value infusion. Relatedly, Bowlby emphasizes again and again in his theorizing that, perhaps seemingly paradoxical at first sight, a secure sense of independence is fostered by, and can only be fostered by, a secure sense of interdependence. Having a secure base affords exploration behaviour, whereas lacking a secure base impedes it because homeostatic behaviour will have a stronger priority. Thus, knowing that one can rely on others to be available and responsive in times of need ensures that we can go about things alone. Put in his own words (Bowlby, 1973, p. 392): ‘Thus there is nothing incompatible . . . between being prepared to seek aid from others in appropriate circumstances and the development of independence.’ Of course, this seems particularly true in Western cultures, where independence is equated with individual freedom and autonomy, and with a particularly individualistic way to construe and value the self (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004). Thus, again it seems particularly important to separate value infusion from coping, and selvations from self. Let me further emphasize that, for selvations theory, attachment behaviour is a form of social interaction that generates or maintains social relationships; that attachment bonds are the result of such relationship regulation; and that attachment security (that is, the feeling that social relationships are available and responsive) modulates, or calibrates, selvations standards. Recent work on attachment theory has built and expanded on Bowlby’s theorizing, the major difference being one of increased refinement. As Mikulincer and Shaver (2007b, p. 141–142) put it: We have summarized the adult attachment literature in terms of a three-phase, or three-component, model of attachment-system activation and dynamics. The first component concerns the monitoring and appraisal of threatening events and is responsible for activation of the attachment system. The second component involves the monitoring and

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Selvations theory appraisal of the availability and responsiveness of attachment figures and is responsible for variations in the sense of attachment security. The third component concerns the monitoring and appraisal of the viability of social proximity seeking as a means of coping with attachment insecurity and is responsible for variations in the use of hyperactivating (anxious) or deactivating (avoidant) coping strategies. (italics added)

Note the many elements described here fit with Damasio’s proto-self theory. The first component concerns (but does not identify) selvations and the second component concerns the calibration of selvations standards, both of which refer to the first step of the motivational process. The third component concerns coping with value-infused events, which refers to the second step in the motivational process. In fact, put in this more recent form, there are clear bridges between attachment theory and Damasio’s theorizing. For example, there is a shared assumption that individuals have the ‘machinery’ available that monitors and selects information from the environment. However, whereas attachment theory refers to external factors and the activation of the attachment system, Damasio refers to how the proto-self feels the body experiencing both the inside and outside world. As such Damasio provides a micro-level process model for how the attachment system is activated – not just by external activation, but also from within; and both are experienced through the body. In this sense, the notion of core affect (Russell, 2005, 2009) is again informative because it suggests a fit between its valence (feeling good or bad) and activation (feeling active or lethargic) dimensions with attachment anxiety (feeling bad about the availability and responsiveness of the other) and avoidance (feeling like avoiding the other given past experience). Moreover, both proto-self and attachment theories refer to violations of standards as inducing (homeostatic) motivation and suggest that the activation of the attachment system does not require conscious thought (or a culturally construed self, for that matter). In fact, it operates in infants as well as in adults. These features suggest there is something universal about the notions of the proto-self and attachment that fit with the notion of selvations as a human universal. Furthermore, because attachment theory differentiates between the appraisal of external stimuli and the appraisal of availability and responsiveness of attachment figures, attachment theory adds something important to Damasio’s analysis. Indeed, for Damasio social relationships are nothing special. This may be surprising given his focus on biological value as the core principle of every living cell, every living animal, every living human on the planet. Surely, social relationships have biological and cultural survival value. Of course, this is where attachment

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theory suggests that the attachment process starts – with the development of attachment bonds with the primary caretaker. However, attachment theory takes Damasio’s analysis of biological value further in terms of how that value also needs to incorporate individuals’ social relationships with others. In a similar vein, Damasio’s analysis adds something important to attachment theory. For instance, attachment theory is clear about the value of social relationships for protection, for the purpose of having a safe haven or secure base. At the same time, attachment theory does not explain well the process by which these systems are activated. Damasio’s theory of the proto-self and the importance of its dual capacity to monitor the external environment as well as the bodily state is an important and fitting addition to attachment theory. Interestingly, however, Damasio does not cite Bowlby, and recent formulations of attachment theory do not refer to Damasio – an excellent example, I believe, of how theoretical integration itself bridges otherwise isolated theories on the basis of a core assumption. Now, if social relationships are essential for social motivation, and if selvations are a human universal, then one would expect a limited number of ‘types’ of social relationships with different oughts and don’ts to exist, in order to facilitate relationship regulation. This is exactly what cultural anthropologist Alan Fiske has observed and theorized. In his relational models theory (e.g., Fiske, 1991), Fiske suggests that there are four ways to relate to others and that those four relational models rely on different taboos and obligations – that is, shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable to do or not do towards others in the world. For this reason, the knitting still continues.

Relational models revolve around taboos and obligations Fiske’s (1991, 1992) relational models theory proposes that the structure that social relationships take provides valuable clues as to their function (see also Fiske, 2000; Fiske & Rai, 2015; Rai & Fiske, 2011; see also Haslam, 1994, 2004; Haslam & Fiske, 1992, 1999). Based in insights from cultural anthropology, Fiske proposed that there are four elementary types of relationships – relational models – that humans learn and develop throughout the course of their life, that revolve around taboos and obligations that enable the regulation of relationships, and that enable relationship regulation. As such, Fiske suggests there are four qualitatively distinct relational models with four associated distinct sets of taboos and obligations. These four relational models are thought to be universals, although they may be used differently as a function of different cultural norms (e.g., Clark, 1984; Clark & Waddell, 1985). For instance, one type of

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relational model may be viewed as more valid and valuable in one culture than another culture.2 These elementary types of relationships operate as shared and implicit models that enable individuals to generate coordinated, consistent, and culturally comprehensible interactions (Fiske, 1991). Relational models provide basic rules for the enactment of social relationships in order to generate or maintain them. Because these rules are shared when individuals are within the same mode of thought provided by the relational model, one can view these relational models as a foundation stone for maintaining social relationships within (one or multiple) culture(s) – a shared understanding of what is valued and what is valid (Smith et al., 2006, 2013). Relational models thus allow individuals to live together in harmony within one (or multiple) culture(s). They do so by embedding moral standards that, once violated, may lead to social exclusion, and once enacted, enable social inclusion and the generation of new relationships. Fiske (1992) himself puts it like this (p. 689): The relational models theory explains social life as a process of seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, adjusting, judging, construing, and sanctioning relationships. It postulates that people are oriented to relationships as such, that people generally want to relate to each other, feel committed to the basic types of relationships, regard themselves as obligated to abide by them, and impose them on other people (including third parties).

As such, Fiske’s approach is a prime example of a relational perspective on social motivation – one from which selvations theory heavily borrows. * Four relational models. The four relational models differentiated by Fiske are communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. They reflect relationships based in principles of unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality (Fiske, 1991, 1992; see Rai & Fiske, 2011). For instance, I can relate to my romantic partner or children as if we are one; I can relate to my boss such that (s)he is the boss; I can relate to a friend who lives far away by visiting him first so that he will visit me afterwards; and I can relate to a colleague by paying him for research assistance. First, communal sharing is a relational model defined by mutual solidarity and a sense of oneness, and therefore by a strong sense of unity and 2

Fiske also identifies so-called null relationships, in which individuals treat others as if they are objects (i.e., as means or tools to achieve a goal). Thus, in such relationships, individuals use the other as a means to egoistic ends. However, a relational perspective suggests this is the exception, rather than the rule. I will discuss this category in Chapter 5, in the context of dehumanization and conflict.

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loyalty to others (Fiske, 1992; see also Van Zomeren, 2014). Within this relational model, pursuing self-interest is taboo. Communal sharing is often found in traditional tribe-like societies, but can also easily be identified in communes, communist ideology, patriotism, and the initial parent–child bond (Fiske, 1992; see also Van Zomeren, 2014). Entitlement derives from need, which means that anyone should take whatever he or she needs from the collective resource and should not be counting. The group is as one and any individual is fused with the group. For instance, the sharing of food in more collectivistic societies is an illustration of behaviour motivated by the relational model of communal sharing. Second, authority ranking is a relational model characterized by mutual acceptance of a power differential and thus offers precedence to the authority figure and invites respect and submissive behaviour from those not in power (Fiske, 1992; see also Van Zomeren, 2014). Within this relational model, the underlying taboo is disrespect for authority. Authority ranking is often found in hierarchical societies, but can also be identified in organizations, notions of social dominance and another form of the parent–child bond. The sharing of food may also be a relevant example here, given that the authority figure will decide on the rules of how to share and others will accept those rules. Third, equality matching is characterized by reciprocal behaviour such as tit-for-tat-like interactions and a focus on equality (Fiske, 1992; see also Van Zomeren, 2014). Under this relational model, the underlying taboo is a lack of reciprocation. Equality matching is often found in alliances or coalitions, but can also be identified in other forms of cooperation that depend on each actors’s repeated input to be reciprocated. For instance, if a colleague does one a favour, individuals count this as a favour to be returned in kind. If one receives a specific birthday gift (let’s say a book worth 20 euros), then this relational model dictates that a similar thing of similar value needs to be returned at the birthday of the other person.3 Equality matching is thus very much about balancing the relationship such that equality is achieved and indebtedness is avoided. Fourth and finally, market pricing reflects an intuitive way of relating to others in which, paradoxically, individuals view themselves as detached and uniquely different from others (Fiske, 1992; see also Van Zomeren, 2014). Under this relational model, individuals believe that they should 3

In an episode of the currently popular sitcom The Big Bang Theory, the main character Sheldon Cooper (a genius who lacks social skills) does not know what to do when the female lead character, Penny, provides him with a Christmas gift that, to him, is priceless (a napkin with the signature of Leonard Nimoy, who played Mr Spock in the original series of Star Trek). In exchange, he feels he needs to compensate for this in an exact sense and thus buys her a ridiculous number of gift baskets.

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calculate the value of themselves and others and translate that into a single currency (e.g., being worth your paycheck). This type of relationship is defined by proportionality – there should be a fair deal in any exchange. As such, individual self-interest and a strong sense of individuality are important in order to successfully negotiate a fair deal, and the relevant taboo is not to engage in this process (e.g., by giving commodities away for free or charging exorbitant prices). Market pricing is often found in WEIRD populations (i.e., those who are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; see Henrich et al., 2010), but can also easily be identified in capitalist ideology, individualism, and the parent–child bond once the child has come of age (Fiske, 1991). It is reminiscent of a world full of rational actors with a strong independent self, uniquely different from others, that motivates individuals to act on behalf of themselves and themselves alone. One might thus refer to it as an individualistic way of relating to others. There is an interesting parallel here between these four relational models and the types of relationships that infants seem to use and develop at different ages (as observed by Fiske, 1991; see Figure 3.3). For instance, communal sharing appears to converge with a state of fusion

DOMAIN

COMMUNAL SHARING

AUTHORITY RANKING

EQUALITY MATCHING

MARKET PRICING

MOTIVATION

Intimacy

Power

Equality

Achievement

INFLUENCE

Conformity

Obedience

Compliance

Cost-benefit incentives

MORAL JUDGMENT

Caring

Respect for authority

Balanced reciprocity

Utilitarian

By age three

Soon after fourth birthday

During ninth year

DEVELOPMENT Infancy

Figure 3.3 Key differences between the four relational models (adapted from Fiske, 1992, pp. 42–49, Table 1). Reprinted with the permission of the Free Press, a division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. from Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations by Alan Page Fiske. Copyright © 1991, Alan Page Fiske. All rights reserved.

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with the attachment figure – a state associated with the early phase of infancy, first because the infant cannot discern the boundary between self and caretaker, and later because the infant develops a bond with the caretaker that does not include a clear boundary between the infant and the caretaker (Bowlby, 1969). Authority ranking kicks in at a later age (around age 3, according to Fiske), when normative boundaries need to be set about the child’s behaviour. The caretaker then needs to be an authority figure who clearly separates him- or herself from the child in order to establish normative boundaries. Equality matching becomes salient at still a later age (around age 4, according to Fiske), when the child begins to understand what reciprocity is and what its benefits are. And only at quite a late age (around age 9, according to Fiske) does the child develop the ability to engage in market-pricing relationships. Fiske speculates that this development across time may mirror the development of societies from a tribal (communal-sharing) to modern (market-pricing) society. He thus suggests that ontogeny reflects the influence of culture, but that, in our very essence and from the moment we are born, we are motivated to attach, relate, connect, and learn how to regulate these relationships within the cultural matrix in which we live our lives. An admirable quality of relational models theory, I believe, is its postulate that humans are relational beings who ‘come equipped’ with the faculty to relate in at least four essential ways. Which models are used in social interaction depends on culture, ontogeny, and previous experience. It is interesting that Fiske (1991) suggests, with an eye to ontogeny, that the different relational models develop quite early in life, some before the first year of life. This fits with the ideas developed in attachment theory about the instinctive nature of attachment behaviour that produces a sense of attachment security that guides the generation and maintenance of social relationships. One of the most beautiful and comforting insights, I believe, from relational models theory is the conceptualization of market pricing (and thus individualism) as a way to relate to others. That is, in Fiske’s view, individuals are essentially relational beings who can, under particular cultural circumstances, conceive of and engage in social relationships through the notion that each individual is separate and unique (see also Mikulincer, 1995). This does not imply that those individuals are not motivated to relate; rather, they are movatived to relate in an individualistic way. However, they cannot sustain that way of relating without social interaction, which may be the difference between such ‘relational individualism’ and utter loneliness (or even sociopathy). Another important implication of relational models theory is that social interactions will be relatively smooth when individuals share the same relational model (e.g., when both romantic partners view their relationship

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as one of communal sharing, or when both partners view their relationship as one of market pricing). However, interactions will be likely to become problematic or conflictual when individuals use different relational models (e.g., when one partner uses communal sharing whereas the other uses market pricing). One core feature of the theory is therefore that knowing when to use which model enables individuals’ regulation of relationships (e.g., their friendships, their romantic relationships, their group, their society, their culture). As such, relational models theory suggests that individuals are first and foremost relational beings who need and seek relationships embedded in social networks within (one or multiple) culture(s).4 The links between relational models theory, attachment theory, and proto-self theory are remarkable, especially given their different origins (and thus different ‘local’ definitions). Whereas Damasio is a brain scientist and Bowlby was a developmental psychologist and clinical practitioner, Fiske is a cultural anthropologist who developed relational models theory on the basis of participant observations among the Moose, a tribe living in the African country of Burkina Fasso (Fiske, 1991). But despite these vast differences in perspective and methods, the three approaches converge around the notion that social relationships are key to the ‘feeling of what happens’ with respect to social motivation. Indeed, it is this relational essence, conceptualized as selvations in selvations theory, which identifies the product of my knitting as an Asian elephant. This synthesis is also important for relational models theory because although there is research supporting the general idea of different relational models (e.g., DeScioli & Krishna, 2013; for an overview of ealier work, see Haslam, 2004), it typically lacks a clear connection with specific psychological theories of motivation. Indeed, one reason for this is, interdisciplinary ‘delay’ in dissemination aside, is the problem of a missing middle-level process theory. Ironically, Fiske’s theory may be perceived as being too broad to be easily translated to psychological processes at the micro-level. Selvations theory solves this problem by synthesizing insights about micro-level processs (the feeling of what happens) with relational dynamics (attachment) and relational models that come equipped with taboos and obligations that enable relationship regulation. * Taboos and obligations. A relational perspective on social motivation suggests that enactment in social relationships should take note of the 4

In a recent extension of the theory, Fiske (2012) introduced the notion of meta-relational models that expand the scope of relational models theory to include different constellations of different relational models between different parties (e.g., in order to regulate my relationship with my partner, I need to regulate my relationship with my daughter). I will revisit this in Chapter 5 with respect to social networks.

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rules associated with the specific relational model employed. Indeed, each relational model brings with it a set of moral standards (obligations) and potential violations of them (taboos; see Rai & Fiske, 2011). Obligations signal the road to ensuring social inclusion within the relationship, whereas taboos signal the ominous threat of social exclusion. For instance, communal sharing brings with it a collective morality that everything is everyone’s, and thus that refusal to share represents a violation that the community will sanction. Similarly, in authority ranking the morality is one of respect for and deference to social power, and thus disrespecting the authority is viewed as a moral violation. Indeed, social relationships not only reflect biological value, but also bring with them taboos and obligations that help to regulate that relationship. Because individuals are motivated to regulate their relationships, they are careful not to put them at risk; and when they are at stake, individuals are motivated to maintain them through enacting and protecting the relevant ‘sacred’ values (Skitka, 2010; Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2000). Relational models theory specifies those obligations and taboos for different relational models – an element clearly missing from the other bits of the elephant I knitted together. In fact, Rai and Fiske (2011) have argued that much of moral psychology is actually about relationship regulation. This is a different assumption than, for instance, assumptions made in Haidt’s moral foundations theory. Haidt and colleagues have argued for a set of universal affectiveintuitive bases on which individuals come to moralize particular issues or events (e.g., Haidt, 2007, 2008, 2012; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011). Although the notion of the ‘emotional dog and its rational tail’ (Haidt, 2001) fits with the distinction between value infusion and coping with value-infused events (although the latter is not merely ‘rational’ in the way suggested by Haidt), selvations theory interprets these different bases for moralization in a relational, rather than self-ish, way. Specifically, in Haidt’s (2012) analysis of ‘the righteous mind’, individuals come into the world with a preparedness to respond to moral violations. This preparedness is experienced as intuitions or feelings (see also Hume, 1739/1978), which are rationalized after the fact (aptly referred to as the emotional dog wagging its rational tail; Haidt, 2001). This notion of preparedness features prominently not only in Haidt’s work but also in that of Fiske, Damasio, Bowlby, and of course in selvations theory. These approaches are also consistent with the notion that intuitive feeling is the mechanism by which we experience motivation following the violation of standards, although Haidt and colleagues focus on distinct moral standards whereas Rai and Fiske (2011) suggest these are embedded in relational models.

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Indeed, selvations theory suggests that moral foundations are not as essential as Haidt and colleagues argue because they are embedded in relational models. In their initial theorizing and research, they identified five foundations on which issues or events can be moralized (and recently a sixth foundation, revolving around liberty and oppression, has been proposed; see Haidt, 2012). Two of them are usual suspects in moral psychology, which are the moral foundations of harm/care, and of fairness/reciprocity. Violations of the harm principle, for instance, can be recognized when individuals respond angrily to violence, whereas violations of the care principle can be recognized when individuals respond in a similar way to neglect. Moreover, violations of the fairness principle involve issues of discrimination or distribution, whereas violations of the reciprocity principle include issues of exploitation. These two foundations are referred to as individualizing foundations of morality. In contrast, Haidt and colleagues have identified three other foundations that they refer to as binding foundations of morality. These are the respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and sanctity/purity foundations of morality. Violations of respect for authority refer to a lack of deference to a leader or other authority; violations of group loyalty refer to treason; and violations of sanctity/purity refer to any instance of behaviour that desecrates the body (i.e., that does not treat the body as a temple, or as a gift from a higher deity). The core idea advanced by Haidt and colleagues is that these are the five psychological bases on which individuals can moralize issues. Individuals come prepared into the world to do this, but cultural influences determine which foundations individuals will use most. For instance, Graham et al. (2011) found cross-cultural evidence that political liberals use the individualistic foundations most (i.e., harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) and find it difficult to understand that the other three foundations can also be used to moralize issues. By contrast, political conservatives typically use all five moral foundations, which can lead to sharp misunderstandings and moral conflict about issues based in group loyalty, respect for authority, and sanctity/purity foundations (for a review see Haidt, 2012). Nevertheless, Haidt and colleagues assume that moral foundations are experienced, across the board, as intuitive feelings of violations of these foundations (see Hume, 1739/1978). In their psychological approach, individuals first feel that a principle they value is violated, and then rationalize their feeling by explaining it to themselves (e.g., ‘I believe this is immoral because . . . ’; Haidt, 2001). Indeed, from other work it appears that individuals sometimes cannot reason themselves out of their feeling, which leads to the experience of ‘moral dumbfoundedness’. They know something is wrong but they cannot articulate why (e.g., Haidt & Hersh, 2001).

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Despite all these convergences, a missing element in Haidt’s analysis is how social relationships embed those foundations in different relational models (see Rai & Fiske, 2011).5 As such the theory features an unnecessary juxtaposition of individualizing versus binding foundations. Although Damasio’s analysis does not focus on social relationships either, at least his perspective offers a structure (the proto-self) that can include social relationships through the notion of selvations. With Haidt’s theory, however, this is more difficult to achieve because the juxtaposition of individualizing and binding foundations is central to his analysis – a contrast that is unnecessary from a relational perspective (as even individualism can be a way to relate with others).6 And this is where the knitting ends, for now. Not unlike John Godfrey Saxe’s blind men of Indostan, I have tried to knit together an Asian elephant. I forged an integrative union between three theories that contribute to an integrative understanding of the process of value infusion: proto-self theory, attachment theory, and relational models theory. Importantly, I synthesized core insights from these theories on the basis of relational assumptions. Indeed, in selvation theory’s first step in the motivational process, the process of value infusion revolves around selvations. Within, attachment theory explains how social interaction is tied to social relationships and how the calibration of selvation standards is linked to attachment security. Relational models theory explains how taboos and obligations provide moral content to social relationships in order to enable relationship regulation within social networks that are embedded within (one or multiple) culture(s). In fact, selvations safeguard the integrity of those networks of social relationships; they safeguard the knots into which relationships are tied.

The spider in the web The lead metaphor of the spider in the web reflects the observation that individuals have networks of social relationships, which explicitly connect individuals to others in a given social network. The notion that our biological and cultural survival depends on networks of social relationships suggests that we should be able to feel any changes in our web of social relationships – which is exactly what selvations are. Selvations rely 5

6

There is another missing element: Haidt does not differentiate between networks of social relationships, and culture. Recent work indeed suggests that individual differences in relational construal predict moral judgments (Simpson & Laham, 2015). Similarly, Koleva et al. (2014) show that attachment insecurity predicts endorsement of moral foundations. Thus, support seems to be accumulating for the notion that moral judgments are based in relational essence, although clearly more work needs to be done.

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on social interaction, which is the enactment of social relationships. Indeed, the key difference between social networks and cultures (see Chapter 4) is that relationship regulation within our webby networks occurs through social interaction, whereas relationship regulation within cultures occurs through cultural norms (as one simply cannot interact with all members of a culture; see Dunbar, 1997, 2003, 2010). As such, selvations theory’s first step has the potential to connect and integrate not only different theories from different locations in the broader literature but also a relational perspective on social motivation with insights from the rapidly increasing literature on social networks (e.g., Katz et al., 2005) – a ‘hot’ topic in the social sciences (Borgatti et al., 2009; p. 892). This is important because the study of social networks focuses on social networks as objective social structures that afford or impede possibilities for any individual in it, depending on his or her position in the network (e.g., how central one is, how ‘connected’, and so on). Thus, social networks can be used to explain why some individuals have better access to high-quality education or top positions, whereas others have less access or none at all. Notions such as social capital (i.e., investments in connections) and weak ties (e.g., acquaintances) have become popular, not least because of their association with the opportunities and obstacles such capital and ties afford through social networks (Granovetter, 1973, 1982; Putnam, 1993, 2000; see also Gladwell, 2000). However, notwithstanding their potential and popularity, social networks have thus far been treated as objective structures that pull the focus away from individuals’ social-motivational essence. Indeed, the focus in social network theory is on how one’s position in a network influences one’s behaviour, with little eye for what the individual needs or wants, or is moved and motivated by. As such, individuals are treated indeed as ‘nodes’ (or black boxes) rather than the essentially relational beings that they are. Those nodes, I believe, need to be humanized and they need to be related directly to relationship regulation through social interaction. Although it is clear that individuals are embedded in networks of social relationships, selvations theory suggests they are not prisoners of the position they occupy in the network. By contrast, selvations theory suggests that individuals are motivated to regulate relationships within the network and thus are moved and motivated by any change in their network of relationships. Moreover, it suggests that how individuals go about regulating those relationships is influenced by cultural norms within which those networks of social relationships are embedded. Sharing some form of culture is also what makes different networks more or less similar. It is this cultural-relational approach that is missing in theorizing about social networks and, partly for this reason, such theorizing focuses too much on structure and too little on people.

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Similarly, Katz and colleagues (2005) identified consensus in the field of small group dynamics around the idea that ‘people’s behavior is best predicted by examining not their drives, attitudes, or demographic characteristics, but rather the web of relationships in which they are embedded. That web of relationships presents opportunities and imposes constraints on people’s behavior’ (pp. 311–312). Furthermore, ‘the focus of analysis should be the relationships between units, rather than the units themselves or their intrinsic characteristics. Nothing can be properly understood in isolation or in a segmented fashion’ (p. 312). Selvations theory certainly agrees with the importance of social networks and a focus on social relationships, given that it identifies a relational essence in social motivation. However, it also identifies the process of value infusion as enabling relationship regulation. As such it potentially bridges theories of social motivation (that typically do not consider networks) and theories of social networks (that typically do not consider individuals’ ‘drives, attitudes, or demographic characteristics’, ibid.). As such, selvations theory may help explain why individuals engage in social networks, and how individuals come to occupy a position in the network in the first place. Unfortunately, the main theoretical perspective guiding the study of why individuals live in social networks is a self-ish one. According to Monge and Contractor (2003), different perspectives include theories of self-interest, collective interest, and social exchange – all theories that are grounded in self-ish assumptions. Furthermore, Borgatti and colleagues (2009) suggest in their review of the field that there is a lot of theorizing involved in research on social networks in the social sciences, yet they ironically fail to list a single clear theoretical perspective. This is precisely where I believe that theorizing on social networks can benefit from a relational perspective on social motivation. A relational perspective on social motivation makes explicit what should move and motivate the ‘nodes’ in a social network. Specifically, selvations theory suggests that we should conceptualize individuals in their social network as relational actors. This view is clearly at odds with, for instance, a rational actor view. This view is most commonly found in the broader social sciences (Geys, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; for a discussion see Opp, 2009), but also in particular branches of psychology such as behavioural economics (see Chapter 2). This view portrays human beings as instrumental beings who seek to maximize their self-interest. It is assumed in this view that the core psychological mechanism involved in human rationality is cost–benefit calculation – that is, individuals are assumed to have any relevant information in order to make a decision or choice, and to have the ability to carefully and correctly weigh the costs and benefits to come to a rational

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choice or decision. Thus, it is a perspective that puts the individual in the driver’s seat of social motivation and views social relationships and social networks as a derivative of individuals’ self-interest. The strongest version of the rational actor perspective is clearly flawed. Psychological research has shown that individuals often do not have all the relevant information available, and are not always able or motivated to calculate the costs and benefits in an accurate manner (see Chapter 2). Thus, although their choices or decisions may sometimes seem ‘rational’, by now psychologists know better. Some argue in this respect that unconscious information processing leads to many choices or decisions (e.g., Bargh, 2011), whereas others suggest that intuitive feelings underlie most of our choices or decisions (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Post hoc, these choices or decisions are often rationalized, but that does not mean that rationality was involved in arriving at them. In fact, some have argued that the reason for such rationalizations is a cultural myth that prescribes the maximalization of self-interest (Miller, 1999). A softer version of the view of individuals as rational decision-makers takes into account the implausibility of some of the assumptions of the hard-core view. For instance, there is no need to assume that individuals always have all the relevant information available and are perfectly ably to make the correct cost–benefit calculation (for a discussion see Opp, 2009). Like other psychological mechanisms, the cost–benefit calculation mechanism depends on input from the environment. This input needs to be appraised, selected, and if necessary and possible acted upon. Of course, as in any mechanism, the input may be flawed, although at the time of processing it may have been as accurate as was then possible. As a consequence of flawed input, the mechanism may lead to flawed outcomes. Nevertheless, the mechanism itself is functional and adaptive. In this view, rationality means ‘bounded rationality’. It is rationality because it relies on cost–benefit calculation that aims to maximize individuals’ self-interest. It is bounded because humans have limits both in their ability and motivation to have all the relevant information and in their ability and motivation to calculate the costs and benefits in an objective way. It is a more ‘human’ rationality that portrays individuals as maximizing self-interest as far as they are motivated and able to pursue it. According to selvations theory, this view of bounded rationality is not incorrect as long as cost–benefit analysis is conceptualized as a way to cope with events already infused with value, and as part of a market pricing relationship. Unfortunately, this is not the kind of rationality implicitly or explicitly assumed in much work in the broader social sciences. Too often one can find sociological or political science treatments that reduce human beings to implausible rational agents. For instance, work from these disciplines on social protest tended to treat

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individuals in this way (Olson, 1965). As a consequence, the focus in this work shifted away from explaining why individuals protest against social issues and instead moved towards how social structures afford it (Opp, 2009). By now, it is clear that it is hard to understand how social structures afford the occurrence of social protest without a modern and up-to-date understanding of what makes individuals tick (Van Zomeren, 2013). In fact, this is one key reason for why we need integrative theorizing more than ever in and around psychology.

Bigger or smaller brains? This final section of this chapter zooms in on one particular part of the Asian elephant, namely its brain. I think it is important to consider a number of questions about the brain in the process of value infusion. Selvations theory proposes, for instance, that this process is a human universal, requires some level of ‘preparedness’ (see Haidt, 2012), and therefore should have strong biological origins. This is related to the issue of humans’ ‘big brains’. According to Damasio, the most basic processes of life regulation, as he calls it, do not require big brains (see also LeDoux, 2002). Similarly, attachment behaviour should be enabled by systems that do not require big brains. As Bowlby succinctly put it (1969, p. 40): ‘Those who dispute the view that there is in man behavior homologous with what in other species is called instinctive have a heavy onus of proof on their hands.’ For selvations theory, this implies that selvations do not require big brains. In fact, it suggests that bigger brains (and particularly a relatively larger neo-cortex; Dunbar, 2003) are required for the second step in the motivational process, which relies on coping through culturally construed selves (called ‘autobiographical selves’ by Damasio) within the complex cultural matrix in which humans find themselves embedded. In this sense, humans seem truly unique compared to other species – it is our bigger brains (or more specifically our relatively large neo-cortices), relative to those of other species, which enable the cultural construal of a self. And along with our bigger brains come a number of fairly uniquely human faculties (e.g., self-construal, language, consciously experienced emotions, efficacy beliefs, reflecting homeostatic and exploration types of motivation). As we shall see in the next chapter, these uniquely human faculties all help us to regulate relationships in situ, but they do not represent our essence. The core insight from Damasio’s theory is that humans do not require a complex brain to achieve homeostasis. Homeostasis is a principle that permeates the behaviour not only of humans but also of non-humans that have no consciousness or culturally construed self, and can even be found

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at the level of individual body and brain cells.7 More complex brains may have brought with them a stronger sense of consciousness and reflective thought, including a stronger sense of ‘knowing about’ and ‘owning’ one’s experience, but of course more complex brains did not create or develop the principle of homeostasis, and nor did they generate social motivation. The self is for coping, whereas selvations are for value infusion. The self reflects what makes us unique, but selvations represent our essence. This line of thought boils down to the insight that the proto-self, despite its name, does not yet make for a conscious, culturally construed self. We need bigger brains for the latter, which is related to the more cognitively complex and thus demanding task of navigating the complex cultural matrix in which we find ourselves embedded. According to Damasio, precisely that which makes us sentient beings develops via the integration of, on the one hand, different streams of information gathered by the proto-self with, on the other hand, different streams of information that come from what the proto-self produces and sets in motion (i.e., primordial feelings, and subsequent coping responses).8 In sum, my strategy in this chapter has been one of theoretical integration in action. I knitted an Asian elephant by outlining selvations theory’s first step, namely the process of value infusion, which revolves around selvations. This step integrates core insights from different theories from different sub(fields) and (sub)disciplines, suggesting that individuals are essentially relational beings, moved and motivated by their selvations, which safeguard the integrity of individuals’ network of social relationships. It is a first and modest yet necessary step towards theoretical integration and even consilience. The next step in the motivational process, outlined in Chapter 4, is how individuals go about regulating relationships in situ.

7

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It is important to note here that Damasio does not really talk about social motivation, but biologically driven motivation (e.g., needs, instincts) based in homeostasis. Although the process of value infusion may be as universal as Damasio suggests, its social aspect (selvations) is more of a human universal (likely shared by other social primates). This higher-level order of integration is the basis for a conscious and culturally construed self (by metaphor comparable to a monitor that monitors a monitor). Because of this higher level of integration, humans are able to think of themselves as holistic beings with arms, legs, feet, and a head, all belonging to the self. Everything that does not belong to the self thus belongs to the ‘outside’. This enables humans to reflect upon, and form ideas about, who they are. This is a remarkable feat and makes human beings clearly different from other animals. But uniqueness does not imply essence.

CHAPTER 4

Selvations theory II: Coping with value-infused events Culture is a way of coping with the world by defining it in great detail. (Attributed to novelist Malcolm Bradbury, 1932–2000) M O R P H E U S : The Matrix is everywhere. It is all around us. Even now, in this very room. You can see it when you look out your window or when you turn on your television. You can feel it when you go to work . . . when you go to church . . . when you pay your taxes. It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth. . . . A prison for your mind. (Excerpt from: The Matrix: Wachovski & Wachovski, 1999) Paradoxically, the truly self-reliant person when viewed in this light proves to be by no means as independent as cultural stereotypes suppose. (Bowlby, 1973, p. 407)

Introduction Chapter 3 involved the knitting together of an Asian elephant, based loosely on Saxe’s blind men of Indostan’s quest for essence. Chapter 4 involves the knitting together of an African elephant (the main difference between the latter and its Asian cousin being its size, thus requiring not six blind men but more likely a small battalion of the blind to converge on its essence). Indeed, a key difference between the first and second steps of selvations theory’s analysis of the motivational process is the relative complexity and culture-dependency of its second step. Therefore, the three different theories integrated in the current chapter revolve around the culturally construed self (defined as the consciously experienced sense of who we are and through which we think, feel, and act). Whereas selvations explain how value is infused into events, the culturally construed self explains how individuals cope with valueinfused events (in terms of culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and action). Indeed, cultural norms are, at least in part, internalized through socialization in the culturally construed self, which is continuously produced and reproduced in social interaction (Gergen, 1977,

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2006). As such it is a Rough Guide to relationship regulation within the cultural matrix. This implies that l redefine coping here as being about how to regulate which relationships within a given cultural matrix. What is appropriate within a given culture – defined as shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable (Smith et al., 2006) – is determined by cultural norms that individuals have learned to use and apply in the contexts in which they are embedded. As Morpheus tells Neo in The Matrix, the matrix is ‘the world that has been pulled over your eyes’; one only sees it when the rules of that world are violated, or when, as in Neo’s case, he is offered a red pill that allows him to see reality as it is. But taboo violations and red pills aside, for most people and most of the time, the practice of daily life takes place within the confines of the cultural matrix because, within, we have learned how to cope. Within, we intuitively know how to regulate our relationships. We typically do not see the cultural matrix around us. As in the previous chapter, the three theories integrated here do not reflect a laundry list, but rather they are selected for synthesis on the basis of relational assumptions. Selvations theory extends Lazarus’ cognitivemotivational-relational (CMR) theory by positing a relational essence that suggests that coping is for regulating relationships in culturally appropriate ways; it extends Markus and Kitayama’s self-construal theory by specifying why individuals self-construe and how they cope with the regulation of relationships; and it extends Bandura’s self-efficacy theory by suggesting that there are different selves that individuals can construe to regulate relationships. More specifically, it proposes that cultureguided self-construal is geared towards regulating relationships in culturally appropriate ways through homeostatic and exploration forms of coping. The former serves to regulate self-based emotions (such as anger, anxiety, and happiness), whereas the latter serves to direct selfbased agentic action (through individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs, based in the human faculty of forethought). Homeostatic forms of coping fit with the notion of a ‘safe haven’ (in which to find shelter and thus return back to balance; i.e., homeostasis), whereas exploration forms of coping fit with the notion of ‘secure base’ that facilitates exploration and agentic attempts to change the world. This is intimately related to the issue of how which relationships are regulated in situ. Communal-sharing relationships, for instance, often prompt the experience of ‘us’, whereas market-pricing relationships often prompt the experience of ‘me’ (Fiske, 1991; see also Mikulincer, 1995). As a consequence, coping includes a broad variety of ‘self-based’ feelings (ranging from anger and fear to shame and guilt and pride and happiness), self-based efficacy beliefs (e.g., individual efficacy, group efficacy), and behaviours (e.g., seeking support, helping, fighting,

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arguing, competing, cooperating, inaction; either alone or together with others). The culturally construed self thus guides individuals towards a broad spectrum of coping responses, limited mainly by what is culturally inappropriate. Indeed, in order to regulate social relationships in a cultural matrix, individuals need to flexibly think, feel, and act in ways that avoid relevant taboos and stay in line with relevant obligations. It is this complexity and flexibility, according to selvations theory, that requires bigger brains. Indeed, we need our bigger brains (and in particular a relatively large neo-cortex1) to flexibly implement our relational essence in a complex cultural world; coping is about defining the world in great detail.

What is coping? Cultural anthropologists do not tire of telling us that cultural variance in human behaviour is enormous (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984; Henrich et al., 2005, 2010; see Fiske & Rai, 2015). However, this does not mean that such variance cannot be organized in theoretically meaningful ways (see Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). In a first step towards organizing this variance, I employ the notion of coping (e.g., Lazarus, 1991, 2001; see also Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2012), which in the context of selvations theory means coping with value-infused events. Coping is generally defined as a process revolving around efforts aimed at successfully negotiating the person–environment relationship2 (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Emotion is central to coping efforts because, as Lazarus (1984, p. 124) notes, ‘emotion reflects a constantly changing person–environment relationship. When central life agendas (e.g., biological survival, personal and social values and goals) are engaged, this relationship becomes a source of emotion. Therefore, an emotional experience cannot be understood solely in terms of what happens inside the person or in the brain, but grows out of ongoing transactions with the environment that are evaluated.’ Thus, in Lazarus’ thinking, coping is a way of dealing with person–environment relationships. Part of this process is an emotional one, which is based on continuous monitoring of the environment, and transactions with that environment. As a consequence 1

2

See Damasio’s notion of sociocultural regulation, and Dunbar’s notion of language (and more specifically gossip) as a means to regulate relationships in groups in which one cannot interact with all of its members. Stricter definitions are possible but not necessary for present purposes. For instance, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defined coping as ‘constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person’ (p. 141).

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of coping efforts, individuals may engage in a variety of behaviours (e.g., approach, avoidance, denial, acceptance), which can lead to changes in the person or in the environment, which can then be cognitively reappraised (Lazarus, 1991). Selvations theory uses the notion of coping to describe the general process by which individuals regulate relationships in situ (i.e., within their cultural matrix). It extends Lazarus’ (1991) thinking by positing a relational essence in the motivational process that suggests that person– environment relationships, for most people and most of the time, are social relationships (see Bruder et al., 2014; Manstead & Fischer, 2001, for the importance of others in the emotion process). Within this general process, selvations theory suggests that different forms of coping can be identified, which reflect different ways to regulate relationships within the cultural matrix. * My usage of the notion of coping should not be misunderstood as pertaining to stressful events (which was the original usage of the term in the literature). The question in this early work was how stressful events can lead to different forms of behaviour, and which factors modulated these different responses. For instance, research showed that stress could lead individuals to perform better at a task, perform worse at this task, or disengage from the task altogether. Thus, stress seemed to motivate, as well as demotivate. For this reason, according to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), another factor was needed to explain how stress could lead to all these different outcomes. Their solution was the notion of coping, defined as efforts aimed at successfully negotiating the person–environment relationship, which is assumed to be conducive to well-being (see Van Zomeren et al., 2012). The notion of coping thus referred to the process by which stress was regulated within a given, stress-inducing event (in behavioural but also in cognitive ways). For instance, one could engage in thoughts or actions in an effort to lessen the experience of stress by ignoring or denying it; this is a coping strategy that does not do anything about the external stressor but rather operates on the level of stress itself. However, another coping strategy is to try to act to remove the stressor; this is a coping strategy that typically requires action (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Much research followed up this general idea (e.g., Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; for reviews see Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), and the notion of coping became widely adopted. These ideas about stress and coping were applied in very different domains where stress was assumed to be present, such as health, sport, and education.

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However, it was not until the 1990s that Lazarus removed his reliance on the notion of stress. Instead, his novel CMR theory (Lazarus, 1991) focused on many ideas put forward in the domain of appraisal and emotion, but explicitly linked the notion of appraisal and emotion with the notion of coping. Particularly new was the idea that emotions have relational meaning, with specific emotions having a specific relational theme (e.g., anger as being part of the theme of a demeaning offence against me or mine, and anxiety as being part of the theme of facing uncertain, existential threat). This relational aspect, however, applied to the person–environment relationship in general (in order to maintain or increase well-being) rather than to social relationships in particular. Yet selvations theory suggests that social relationships matter even more than Lazarus argued, because it assumes that coping is for relationship regulation, and therefore that coping efforts are aimed at successfully negotiating relationships, which requires a continuous monitoring of one’s (network of) relationships. The ultimate focus of coping is not on well-being, but on relationship regulation.

Homeostatic and exploration forms of coping Much empirical effort focused on identifying the most common and important coping strategies used by individuals to deal with stressful situations. In their impactful 1984 book, Lazarus and Folkman proposed that emotion-focused and problem-focused coping strategies were among the most prominent. Emotion-focused coping refers to the goal of reducing the stress experience (for instance through distraction or denial; see also Gross, 1998), whereas problem-focused coping refers to the goal of removing the source of stress (for instance through negotiation). Put differently, these two different forms of coping focus on changing something in the person, or changing something in the environment. More recent work, including by Lazarus (1991) himself, expanded on this analysis and included a stronger focus on emotion. For instance, recent work on coping suggests that forms of coping differ along at least two dimensions, namely approach/avoidance and emotion-/problemfocused (e.g., Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Stanton, Parsa & Austenfeld, 2002). This classification suggests four different forms of coping (see Figure 4.1). First, emotion-focused avoidance coping resonates with how people typically, in laymen’s terms, understand the notion of coping – dealing with a threat by altering one’s perception of it and thus lower or even avoid its emotional experience. Examples of this type of strategy are denial and avoidance, and the typical emotion to be downregulated is anxiety. Acceptance is also a common response. Emotion-focused approach coping is a second strategy

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PROBLEMFOCUSED AVOIDANCE

E.g., withdraw, refuse

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PROBLEMFOCUSED APPROACH

E.g., achieve, solve

AVOIDANCE COPING

EMOTIONFOCUSED AVOIDANCE

E.g., deny, accept

EMOTION-FOCUSED COPING

APPROACH COPING

EMOTIONFOCUSED APPROACH

E.g., defy, attack

Figure 4.1 Two dimensions of coping.

that uses the experience and expressions of emotions to approach the source of threat (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). For instance, expressing one’s anger may lessen one’s experience of it and can help one to feel more powerful, both of which may change one’s perception of the situation. Examples of this type of strategy are defiance and antagonism, which are indeed typically associated with anger. Importantly, for either form of emotion-focused coping, the emotion process is at the core of one’s efforts to regulate relationships within the cultural matrix. The third and fourth forms of coping are problem-focused approach coping and problem-focused avoidance coping. The former represents the strategy of dealing with a threat by trying to remove its source through behavioural approach (e.g., negotiation), whereas the latter represents the strategy of dealing with a threat through behavioural avoidance or withdrawal. In contrast to emotion-focused forms of coping, problem-focused forms of coping rely mainly on individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs, which reflect the human faculty of forethought (Bandura, 1997). For instance, individuals may believe that their vote will help their preferred party to win an election and therefore head for the ballot (which reflects problem-focused approach coping). However, they may also believe the opposite (that their vote won’t make a difference) and thus engage in problem-focused

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avoidance coping (staying at home, refraining from voting). In either case, however, the experience of specific emotions is not at the core of problem-focused coping – it is the belief about whether one’s actions can achieve certain goals. It is the human faculty of forethought at work. These four forms of coping are distinct yet serve, in selvations theory, two overarching functions. Emotion-focused coping is a homeostatic form of coping, basically serving to regulate relationships through emotion regulation. Problem-focused coping is an exploration form of coping, basically serving to regulate relationships through the faculty of forethought. The focus of the former is one’s experience and expression of self-based emotions, whereas the focus of the latter is one’s self-based efficacy beliefs about changing the environment (and thereby to impose agency on the world). Note that the flexibility of self-construal suggests that one can cope with emotions and efficacy beliefs experienced by oneself alone, together with someone else or shared with a collective. This suggests that coping can be as much an individual as collective enterprise, depending on how one construes the self (which is guided, of course, by cultural norms). * My reconceptualization of coping is based on the relational assumptions that individuals are geared towards relationship regulation and that selvations infuse events with value. The logical second step for selvations theory’s account of the motivational process is that coping serves to regulate social relationships within the cultural matrix. Importantly, it identifies homeostatic and exploration forms of coping because these also fit with relational assumptions. Specifically, homeostatic forms of coping correspond to Bowlby’s notion of looking for shelter in a safe haven, whereas exploration forms of coping correspond with Bowlby’s notion of exploration once a secure base is in place (see Maxwell et al., 2013).3 There are further similarities between Lazarus’ CMR theory and Bowlby’s attachment theory. For instance, Bowlby suggests that the specific emotions most relevant to attachment dynamics are anxiety and anger (in response to the availability and responsiveness of the other) and their associated tendencies to avoid or approach the other. In Lazarus’ CMR theory, anxiety is often related to avoidance coping, whereas anger is often related to approach coping (for a parallel with emotions and attachment to groups, see Smith, Coats & Murphy, 1999; Smith et al., 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Selvations 3

Indeed, Beckes and Coan (2011) suggest that social proximity and interaction reflect a primary ecology that the human brain is geared towards exploring – a ‘social baseline’. By contrast, the notion of exploration coping refers to coping with a value-infused event facilitated by a secure base and mediated by self-construal.

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theory suggests that this is not a coincidence; it is a clear indication of relationship regulation. Anxiety about the availability and/or responsiveness of the other invites avoidance of the other; anger about the availability and responsiveness of the other invites approach to the other. In this sense, selvations theory expands on Lazarus’ theory by providing an account of what leads to coping with value-infused events in the first place.4 Indeed, any primary appraisal of goal relevance, goal congruence, and ego relevance presumes a culturally construed self. After all, such appraisals are made within the cultural matrix. Appraisal of a situation cannot be separated from the cultural matrix in which it and the person appraising it are embedded. Selvations theory specifies what it is about those primary appraisals that infuse events with value.5 Selvations theory further expands on Lazarus’ CMR theory by integrating it with Bandura’s (1997) self-efficacy theory (a possibility mentioned by Lazarus himself in his 1991 book), and with Markus and Kitayama’s (1991, 2004) self-construal theory. The latter theory expands on the former two by suggesting a richer and culture-dependent account of the self as an explanation of how individuals cope with value-infused events in their cultural matrix. The next section outlines this integrative effort, this time resembling the knitting together of an African elephant.

Knitting together an African elephant In this section, I aim to knit together an African elephant by outlining the core elements of the relatively complex and diverse process of coping with value-infused events within a cultural matrix. These are selfconstrual, which enables individuals to locate and own their emotional experience and agency; self-based emotion, which enables them to cope with value-infused events through emotion regulation; and self-based efficacy, which enables them to cope with value-infused events through the faculty of forethought. These theories derive from different approaches and represent different parts of this particular elephant. Because self-construal is most clearly associated with the cultural matrix, my knitting starts there. 4

5

I certainly do not claim that selvations theory provides a broader analysis of coping than CMR theory. For instance, one can also cope with the challenge of fulfilling biological needs in situations in which others are absent and irrelevant to need fulfilment. Selvations theory simply does not focus on ‘asocial’ events (or null relationships for that matter), mainly because they are the exception to the rule: for most people and most of the time, motivation is about relationship regulation. Lazarus (1991) suggests that an event needs to be appraised as having ego or goal relevance for the individual. Such self-ish assumptions about motivation are problematic.

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The culturally construed self as a Rough Guide to the cultural matrix Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 225) defined two different types of selfconstrual: We suggest that for many cultures of the world, the Western notion of the self as an entity containing significant dispositional attributes, and as detached from context, is simply not an adequate description of selfhood. Rather, in many construals, the self is viewed as interdependent with the surrounding context, and it is the ‘other’ or the ‘self-inrelation-to-other’ that is focal in individual experience. (italics added)

Note that although such interdependent self-construal is about relationships, this is essentialized in a self. It is a self-ish perspective on self and others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) further suggested that many approaches to understanding the self have relied too much on a ‘Western’ view of the self. This view portrays the self as an agentic unit that is isolated from its environment, a self that chooses to connect with others, a self that has unique characteristics that make for a distinct personality; a self that focuses on realizing personal goals and ideals, and serving the person’s own interests. Markus and Kitayama contrasted this independent construal of the self with the construal of the self as interdependent. In this ‘Eastern’view of the self, the self is only agentic to the extent that it interacts with others; it is not isolated from its social context but rather is very much a part of, and indeed defined by, it; a self that is bonded with and bound to others; a self that focuses not on the person’s own needs but on those of the relationships with others on whom the person depends (see also Cross, Hardin & Gercek-Swing, 2010; Cross & Madson, 1997; Gardner, Gabriel & Lee, 1999). The latter type of self-construal is most likely to be found in the ‘Eastern’ part of the world, prominent examples being China and Japan (e.g., Heine et al., 1999). It is clear that since Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) introduction of the concept, there now is a more nuanced understanding of this process (see Becker et al., 2012; Cross, Bacon & Morris, 2000, Cross et al., 2010; Matsumoto, 1999; Smith et al., 2006; Vignoles, 2011; see also Markus & Kitayama, 2004, 2010). Their theory stimulated a wealth of research, which across the board highlighted the importance of self-construal for what individuals think, feel, and (are motivated to) do (for reviews see Fiske et al., 1998; Smith et al., 2006). As Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 225) put it: ‘One general consequence of this divergence in selfconstrual is that when psychological processes (e.g., cognition, emotion, and motivation) explicitly, or even quite implicitly, implicate the self as a target or a referent, the nature of these processes will vary

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according to the exact form or organization of self inherent in a given construal.’ The main critique of self-construal theory is not in relation to the consequences of different types of self-construal, but about the presumed correspondence between culture-level and individual-level self-construal and the difficulty of achieving clear empirical tests of this link (e.g., Matsumoto, 1999). That is, some believe that the equation of culturelevel individualism (e.g., in the USA) with independent self-construal and collectivism (e.g., in Japan) with interdependent self-construal lacks validity (e.g., a meta-analysis by Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier & Coon, 2002; but see Smith et al., 2006, for reasons why such a conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn). The issue therefore mainly seems to rely on identifying cultures in existing social structures (e.g., countries, continents; see Hofstede, 1980, 2001). For selvations theory, this is unnecessary because it employs a subjective definition of culture (as shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable in the world) as embedding networks of individuals’ social relationships. Nevertheless, one response to this critique has been that self-construal theory may omit ‘missing’ types of self-construal, such as those that blend autonomy and interdependence, or those that differentiate between relational and collective self-construal (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Cross et al., 2000, 2010; Kag˘itçibas¸i, 2005; Smith et al., 2006; see also Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). For selvations theory, self-construal should be able to cater flexibly to the individual (‘me’), to social relationships (‘us’ as in ‘you and me’, and to culture (‘us’ as in ‘all of us’). Therefore I regard this self-construal triad as faciliting the process of coping with value-infused events. * Before knitting further, it is important to specify the relationship between self-construal and culture. In line with Markus and Kitayama (2010) and Gergen (2006, 2009), I see their relationship as mutually constitutive; that is, self and culture dynamically influence each other through social interaction (see also Gergen, 1977). With the notion of culture I refer to shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable (Smith et al., 2006). Because of this sharedness, they exist not only within but also beyond the individual mind. Culture is thus not just a bunch of norms in the individual mind, but also part and parcel of individuals’ social structure (see Bond et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001). Culture is also not just a static entity, because individuals can change their culture, as clearly attested by the effects of globalization (e.g., Inglehart, 1997). As Markus and Kitayama (2010, p. 422) note: ‘Culture is located in the world, in patterns of ideas, practices, institutions, products, and artifacts.’ This is precisely why I chose

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the cultural matrix as the metaphor for culture; it embeds networks of social relationships that embed individuals. It is this three-layer structure that is also reflected in the different forms of self-construal. For selvations theory, the notion of self-construal is important because it locates and makes individuals own their experience of emotion and their efficacy, each of which is the centre of homeostatic and exploration forms of coping to regulate relationships. Indeed, once value is infused, self-construal facilitates a way to regulate relationships that fits the relationship in question (e.g., a communal sharing, or market pricing relationship) within the cultural matrix (e.g., individualism or collectivism, high or low power-distance, tightness or looseness; see Smith et al., 2006, 2013). The key point here is that self-construal can, but need not be, a reflection of one’s cultural matrix – yet successful relationship regulation within that cultural matrix will be dependent on not violating its taboos and keeping in line with its obligations, both about which relationships to regulate, and how to go about this in practice.6 Theorizing and research that followed Markus and Kitayama’s lead generally supported selvations theory’s conceptualization of selfconstrual as a psychological basis for different forms of coping. For instance, research suggests that differences in self-construal are related to the experience of different emotions (for a review see Markus & Kitayama, 2004; see also Figure 4.2). Emotions such as guilt, shame, and pride, for instance, are associated more with independent self-construal than with interdependent self-construal. Other research has shown that individuals can experience different emotions when thinking about themselves as an individual or as a group member (e.g., Smith et al., 2007). Similarly, selvations theory suggests that different self-construals are also related to the experience of different efficacy beliefs (e.g., independent self-construal with individual efficacy beliefs, interdependent self-construal with relational efficacy beliefs, and collective self-construal with group efficacy beliefs). Obviously, these are not the only correlates of different types of self-construal, but for present purposes they serve as the focus while knitting together our African elephant.7 In closing this subsection about self-construal, let me be explicit about why selvations theory builds on self-construal theory rather than on (the many) other theories of self. For instance, much like self-construal theory, 6 7

In Fiske and Rai (2015), the authors refer to this as ‘cultural preos’. Interdependent self-construal seems more strongly related to holistic processing, whereas independent self-construal seems more strongly related to analytic cognitive processing (Nisbett et al., 2000). Women seem to tend towards stronger interdependent self-construal, while men seem to tend towards stronger independent self-construal (Cross & Madson, 1997), which fits with other approaches to gender differences (explained culturally by Eagly & Wood, 1999; and biologically by Taylor, 2002, 2006).

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COGNITIVE PROCESSES

SELF-CONSTRUAL

EMOTIONAL PROCESSES

MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES

Figure 4.2 Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) representation of psychological consequences of self-construal.

social identity theory (and the self-categorization theory that developed out of it) assumes that individuals can subjectively draw and redraw the boundaries between themselves and others at different levels of inclusion (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987; see also Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Nevertheless, there are three reasons for why selvations theory draws on the notion of self-construal rather than on the notions of social identity and self-categorization. First, the former has a stronger emphasis on the importance of relationships with others (through its notion of interdependent self-construal), whereas the latter view relationships with others as a self with a higher level of inclusion and abstractness (but see Brewer & Chen, 2007; Postmes, Haslam & Swaab, 2005; Yuki, 2003). As such self-construal theory provides a better conceptual fit with selvations theory’s relational assumptions. Second, self-construal has a closer and more explicit relationship with culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004, 2010) than social identity and self-categorization theory. Again, this fits better with how selvations theory conceptualizes self and culture in the process of coping with value-infused events. Finally, social identity theory is built on the premise that individuals are universally motivated to develop, maintain, and protect a positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This may be too bold an assumption (e.g., Heine, 2005; Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997). For this reason, it is important to differentiate between an independent (or individual),

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interdependent (or relational), and collective type of self-construal (Brewer & Chen, 2007; see also Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).8 Indeed, this self-construal triad facilitates my knitting of the African elephant because it reflects the culturally based diversity of the process of coping with value-infused events.

Emotion regulation Whereas the proto-self allows individuals to feel changes in their network of social relationships, self-construal allows them to experience specific self-based emotions as part of the relatively complex and culture-dependent process of coping with value-infused events. Thus, I use the term emotions here to refer to the conscious and subjective experience of distinct emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety, fear, sadness, joy, guilt, shame, pride). Emotional experience relies, in selvations theory, on the notion of appraisal as put forward by appraisal theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001). Appraisal refers to the perception and simultaneous evaluation of the environment (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991) with respect to its potential consequences (harm or benefit, according to Lazarus, 1991). More specific appraisal dimensions are goal relevance, goal congruence, ego relevance, accountability, coping potential, and future expectations (Lazarus, 1991), all of which combine to reflect so-called appraisal patterns that make the experience of a distinct emotion more likely (e.g., anger, fear, or sadness have different appraisal patterns). Primary appraisals are thought to reflect the impact of an event on the individual (e.g., goal relevance and congruence, ego relevance), whereas secondary appraisals are thought to reflect the potential impact of the individual on the event (e.g., accountability, coping potential, future expectations). In turn, the experience of different specific emotions is thought to coincide with different specific action tendencies that prepare the organism for adaptive action (Frijda, 1986). For instance, anger would typically be associated with approach tendencies and anxiety with avoidance tendencies. Although different versions of appraisal theory identify somewhat different appraisal dimensions (Scherer et al., 2001; see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012), all versions share a general set of agreed-upon assumptions. For 8

This has implications for the many ‘self-motives’ suggested in the literature – for instance, motives to be distinct from others, to be similar to others, to enhance the self, to verify the self, and so forth (e.g., Sedikides & Spencer, 2007; Swann & Read, 1981; Vignoles, 2011) – in selvations theory, these motives are not essentialized and should be understood in the context of the social relationships and cultural matrices in which they are embedded. Self-motives are part of coping, not value infusion.

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instance, these theories assume that individuals appraise their environment more or less continuously, which implies a dynamic analysis. In doing so, they scan the environment and provide the organism with upto-date information about the state of the external milieu. Moreover, key appraisals are understood as evaluating whether the organism is affected by the situation and how the organism can respond to it. Underlying these assumptions is the belief that emotions are part of an adaptive psychological mechanism, and that the experience of discrete emotions facilitates the adaptiveness of that system. Indeed, consciously felt emotions are integral to the experience and enactment of relationships. For instance, as Bowlby (1969) put it: ‘No form of behaviour is accompanied by stronger feeling than is attachment behaviour’ (p. 209). In this sense, it may not be surprising that different types of self-construal affect the experience of different emotions (see Markus & Kitayama, 2004; Smith et al., 2006). Finally, because different emotions are thought to nudge individuals towards different behaviours (e.g., seek confrontation or appeasement; avoid or approach), selvations theory suggests that emotional experience and enactment are important drivers of social interaction to regulate social relationships. * From Darwin (1896) onwards, scholars have studied the expression and communication of emotions towards others (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009). For instance, in the context of a negotiation setting, research found that communicating anger to the opponent about the offer made led the other to make greater concessions in subsequent negotiation rounds (Van Kleef, de Dreu & Manstead, 2004; see also Van Kleef, 2009, for a review of communicative effects of other specific emotions). In arguably less individualistic market-pricing contexts, De Vos et al. (2013) found that the communication of anger about injustice within intergroup relations increased empathy for the complainants on the part of the receivers of that emotional communication. These findings nicely illustrate the relational meaning associated with anger (and other specific emotions; see Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton’s [1994] analysis of guilt) – it is not merely the expression of something we feel, but a signal to the other(s) about how we go about relating to each other. For instance, in marketpricing-type settings, one is obligated to favour oneself over the other, whereas in more communal settings, one is obligated to think about the collective process and outcomes. In either event, however, emotions are absolutely pivotal in regulating social relationships (Gross, 1998; Niven, Totterdell & Holman, 2009; Parkinson, 1996). For purposes of illustration, let me return to two discrete emotions that Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) views as core emotions with respect to

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attachment and relationships: anxiety and anger. In an attachment view, anxiety is related to worry about the availability and responsiveness of caretakers. Relationships are so important that significant others’ absence or unresponsiveness indeed constitutes an uncertain, existential threat. Anger is also based in their presumed unavailability and unresponsiveness, but the focus (and blame) is on the other rather than on the self. Both felt emotions are thus strongly relational in nature and which one will be experienced depends not only on the working models developed but also on the appraisal of self- or other-blame. Yet selvations theory suggests that this appraisal is guided by the construal of the self as independent or interdependent, with stronger independent self-construal being likely to give rise to stronger appraisals of other-blame and thus anger. Similarly, stronger interdependent self-construal likely gives rise to stronger appraisals of self-blame and thus anxiety. Although Bowbly preferred the emotion label ‘fear’ over that of anxiety when it concerned a specific emotional experience (to disconnect his thinking from that of Freud’s early work on anxiety), he referred to anxious attachment when he talked about that part of individuals’ working models that represents their beliefs about whether others value having a relationship with them. For Bowlby, anxiously attached individuals fear being left by others and thus try to be around attachment figures as much as possible (‘anxious attachment is to retain maximum accessibility to attachment figures’; Bowlby, 1973, p. 293). The core of these attempts is to be close to a safe haven that individuals fear will otherwise leave them. It thus represents an attempt at homeostasis. It is in this respect that he used the term anxiety – as a felt emotional prelude to the fear of separation. By contrast, according to Bowlby (1973), the function of anger is to maintain relationships that one wishes to continue when there is a threat of separation. Specifically, if separation is believed to be temporary, Bowlby (1973) suggests from an attachment perspective that anger may assist in overcoming obstacles to reunion and discourage the other person from going away again. As he put it on p. 287: ‘Anger acts to promote, and not to disrupt, the bond.’ Fischer and Roseman (2007) provided support for this idea when they found that the expression of anger within couples is often related to relational maintenance (whereas the expression of contempt is a good predictor of the termination of the relationship; see also De Vos et al., 2013). My focus on anxiety and anger serves to highlight how selvations theory’s relational essence is already reflected in relevant theory and research. Yet what has been missing thus far, in my view, is an attempt to knit together the African elephant that represents the bigger picture. Selvations theory suggests that felt emotions are one pivotal way in

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which individuals cope with value-infused events. Some emotional experiences lead us towards approaching the other (e.g., anger, as a form of emotion-focused approach coping; see also Van Zomeren et al., 2012), whereas others lead us towards avoiding the other (e.g., anxiety, as a form of emotion-focused avoidance coping; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Note that who the ‘other’ is depends on how the self is construed (as individual, relational, or collective) within the context of the specific social relationship and cultural matrix. Thus, selvations theory suggests that emotion is for coping, and coping is for regulating relationships within the cultural matrix. From this view, it is quite right to say that emotions are ‘social’ and ‘functional’ (Parkinson, 1996; see also Keltner & Haidt, 1999), but selvations theory provides a relational essence to these labels. That is, felt emotions are part of a homeostatic form of coping with value-infused events, which means that they are emotionally felt responses to felt changes in social relationships, serving to regulate them in culturally appropriate ways (see also De Leersnyder et al., 2013). However, in selvations theory there are also ways of approach and avoidance coping that do not focus on emotion regulation, but on agency and exploration.

The exercise of agency My knitting has to include not just homeostatic forms of coping, but also exploration forms of coping. Self-efficacy beliefs are beliefs about whether one believes oneself to be able to achieve a certain goal through a certain behaviour or amount of effort (Bandura, 1997). These beliefs are made possible through the human faculty of forethought; our ability to take our expectations about future events into consideration. Bandura’s (1997) self-efficacy theory, which is part of his larger social-cognitive theory, suggests that individuals become more strongly motivated to achieve goals, and persist more strongly in achieving them, the more they believe that they can perform the required behaviour and the more they believe that they can achieve a relevant goal through performing that behaviour. This ‘self-efficacy’ part of the theory is well accepted and has been applied widely throughout the psychological literature (Bandura, 1997). For instance, self-efficacy beliefs play an important role in predicting individuals’ academic achievement, sport performance, and health behaviour. The human faculty of forethought enables the anticipation and expectation of goal achievement through one’s own actions. Efficacy beliefs, in this sense, provide individuals with a sense of agency that moves beyond a view of social motivation that includes a focus on homeostasis. Such agency allows for the creation of goals and envisioned futures, and motivates individuals to achieve them provided that they believe they

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have the efficacy to do so. Selvations theory therefore views the efficacy domain as integral to an exploration form of coping (which results from having, or believing onself to have, a secure base). It is a form of coping that has more degrees of freedom for the actor than homeostatic coping (which results from not having, or believing oneself not to have, a secure base; see Maxwell et al., 2013). However, self-efficacy theory’s conceptualization of the self is an individualistic one. Selvations theory extends it by suggesting that the self in self-efficacy can be construed as individual (or independent), relational (or interdependent), or collective, which suggests that individuals subjectively can believe to be agentic by themselves, with someone else, and with entire collectives (see also Bandura, 2000, for the notion of collective efficacy as a form of proxy efficacy). Furthermore, a relational perspective suggests that individuals may believe themselves to be agentic even without taking action themselves. Instead, one can feel agentic by seeing one’s group in action (e.g., the January 10/11 mass marches in Paris and elsewhere stating ‘Je suis Charlie’ in response to the terror attack of 7 January 2015). Bandura’s (1997) theory suggests that efficacy beliefs are not only potential predictors of motivated behaviour, but also consequences. Indeed, the exercise of control through our own behaviour can be empowering to the extent that it increases the efficacy beliefs that motivated our behaviour in the first place. It is of course also possible that failure to achieve the goals that one believed were possible to achieve through one’s own actions decreases these very same efficacy beliefs, thereby leading to a decreased likelihood of enacting that behaviour. This dynamic element of Bandura’s theorizing is compatible with Lazarus’ CMR theory because the latter conceptualizes coping as a process that is fed by continuous appraisal and reappraisal of the environment and one’s coping responses to it (see also Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Furthermore, this feature is also prominent in the concept of selfconstrual, which is thought to both constitute and be constituted by culture. There are other clear links between the theories that facilitate theoretical integration. Lazarus (1991) identified coping potential and future expectations as core secondary appraisals. These come very close to the notion of self-efficacy, because they signal the impact individuals can have on their environment and the faculty of forethought on which selfefficacy beliefs are based. Furthermore, efficacy beliefs are associated with action to achieve specific goals, rather than with homeostasis (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Lazarus, 1991; Van Zomeren et al., 2012), which fits with the notion of problem-focused approach coping. Indeed, problemfocused avoidance coping can be characterized by low self-efficacy

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beliefs (as when individuals engage in free-riding or social loafing; Olson, 1965).9 * Thus far, I have outlined a coping framework that integrates different theories of motivation through the core notions of self-construal, emotion, and efficacy. I have also argued that coping serves to translate infused value into culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and action in order to regulate relationships in situ. I have also argued that what is perceived as culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and behaviour results from the interplay between self and culture. This brings me, once more, to the twin notions of taboos and obligations that prevent social exclusion from and promote social inclusion in the cultural matrix. Here I outline how Fiske’s relational models and their associated taboos and obligations relate to the coping process.10 Specifically, I suggest that taboos and obligations delineate the culture-guided ‘playing field’ within which individuals can cope. Indeed, taboos imply cultural norms that can sanction (i.e., necessitate social exclusion) whereas obligations imply cultural norms that can reward (i.e., ensure social inclusion). As such, they guide individuals towards coping in culturally appropriate ways (e.g., culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and behaviour) through regulating relationships through social interaction. Because different cultures place different value on different relational models and thus different taboos and obligations, culture provides clear constraints on how individuals can regulate their relationships in situ. For instance, wanting to pay for one’s own share of a restaurant bill can be seen as admirable in cultural matrices that reward market-pricing relationships but as an offence in cultural matrices that reward communal-sharing relationships. Bringing (to work) a birthday gift for one’s boss can be seen as a sign of respect in a cultural matrix that values authorityranking relationships, but as an obligation to reciprocate in a cultural matrix that values equality-matching relationships. This is why we need the culturally construed self as a Rough Guide to our cultural matrix. This has implications for how individuals cope with value-infused events within their cultural matrix. Specifically, it provides pointers to 9

10

Self-efficacy is also roughly associated with the expectancy aspect of value-expectancy theories (although such expectancy is more akin to outcome efficacy beliefs, rather than self-efficacy beliefs). Relational models are important in the value infusion process because they specify the core taboos and obligations that apply to a particular social relationship in one’s network. But taboos and obligations can also take the form of cultural norms about how which social relationships should be regulated (i.e., in individualist or collectivist ways, in how to deal with authority, and so forth).

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self-construal, emotion, efficacy, and behaviour. For instance, within market-pricing relationships, self-construal is more likely to be independent (or individual) and self-based emotion and efficacy are more likely to revolve around self-focused emotions and personal efficacy beliefs. By contrast, communal-sharing relationships invite interdependent (or relational) or collective self-construal, which suggests that the subsequent self-based emotions and efficacy beliefs are likely to revolve around otherfocused or group-based emotions and joint efficacy. This illustrates how relational models apply to both dyadic relationships and groups. Moreover, it illustrates how relational models, types of self-construal, and forms of coping are related to each other. Authority-ranking and equality-matching relationships may invite different types of self-construal, depending on the specific situation, relationship, and cultural matrix. For instance, a parent–child relationship may call for mutual respect (for either dominance or submission) and thus lead to an interdependent or relational self-construal (not dissimilar to the blend of autonomy and communality that some argue was missing from Markus and Kitayama’s [1991] approach). Similarly, equality-matching relationships may invite individual (or independent) self-construal but be based in a conditional ‘us’ that is defined by reciprocal behaviour. For instance, one can maintain relationships with a friend who lives far way by sending each other birthday cards each year. In any event, selvations theory predicts that culture and relational models are related because culture values certain models over others; and culture and self-construal are related because the latter provides individuals with a psychological basis for emotion and efficacy to regulate regulationships in situ. * My line of thought also fits with Tetlock et al. (2000) sacred value protection model (SVPM), which proposes the notion of sacred values, defined as ‘any value toward which a moral community proclaims, at least in rhetoric, an unbounded or infinite commitment’ (Tetlock, 2002, p. 458). The SVPM suggests that when sacred values are violated, individuals can engage in different value-protective strategies. For instance, individuals can respond with moral outrage, which includes the strong experience of emotions like anger and the desire to punish the transgressors. Second, individuals can respond with moral cleansing, which includes the need to reaffirm one’s values, for instance by behaving more like a ‘good’ group member or ‘rallying around the flag’. Selvations theory would conceptualize both the moral outrage and cleansing responses as part of emotion-focused approach coping, likely based in collective

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self-construal (as part of that moral community), and geared at regulating relationships (with the in-group or with the out-group). Skitka and colleagues have taken this line of thought further by proposing the concept of moral conviction (e.g., Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005; see also Skitka, 2010). Moral convictions are defined as strong attitudes about right and wrong that are believed to be universal (e.g., I believe A, and therefore everyone should believe A; and if someone does not believe A, he or she is likely to be a danger or a fool). Skitka and colleagues (2005) predicted and found that when moral convictions are violated, individuals respond with strong emotions like anger. Moreover, individuals tend to experience their moral convictions as truths, use them to legitimize non-conformist (and even vigilante) behaviour (for a review see Skitka, 2010), and experience them as part of their individual and unique moral identity (see Turiel, 1983, 2002). By contrast, selvations theory offers a broad, integrative, and culturalrelational perspective on taboos and obligations that views them as deriving from a limited set of relational models. It suggests, in line with Rai and Fiske (2011) that violations of moral standards are violations of relational standards and this is why the experience and response to moral violations is typically so intense. Moral violations move us in our very essence because they threaten the safe haven of our web of social relationships or our cultural matrix. As such moral violations may make us less likely to explore the broader world. This concludes my knitting of the African elephant. In the second step of selvations theory, I synthesized three theories that contribute to an integrative understanding of the process of coping with value-infused events. On the basis of CMR theory, self-construal theory, and selfefficacy theory, I developed the notion of coping as geared towards relationship regulation within the cultural matrix. I adapted selfconstrual theory to encompass different (individual, relational, and collective) forms of self-construal, each of which can function as a psychological basis for the experience of different (individual, relational, and collective) emotions and efficacy beliefs, each of which can lead to approach or avoidance. Taken together, they represent homeostatic and exploration forms of coping within a cultural matrix. It is this cultural matrix to which I now turn.

The cultural matrix In selvations theory, culture is about shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable (Smith et al., 2006), and this applies to how which relationships should be regulated. As a consequence, culture is also about the

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taboos and obligations that one has learned to avoid or abide by. Culture thus provides norms about how to regulate which relationships inside and outside of one’s own social network. Indeed, it is because of this intricate link between culture, relational models, and taboos and obligations that selvations theory argues for the importance of selvations and self in the motivational process, although selvations reflect our essence and the self is what makes us unique. My definition of culture is a psychological one, not a geographical one (Smith et al., 2006). As such, culture can apply to whole countries or mere villages, rich multinationals or poor small businesses, big universities or small departments – as long as shared beliefs about what is valid and valuable in the world can be derived from it. In this sense, this definition is not far off from Tetlock’s (2002) notion of moral communities (which derives from Durkheim, 1925), or from Haidt’s (2012) metaphor of a moral matrix. Nevertheless, selvations theory posits a relational essence underlying the need for such matrices in the first place. This is mainly because there are typically many more people in a cultural matrix than in one’s network, which implies that there are many people within the cultural matrix wih whom one is unable to engage in social interaction. Indeed, it is hard to put relationships into practice with a whole group or culture.11 Those in one’s social network are likely to include friends and family, neighbours and colleagues, but also pets, familiar objects, and even fictional characters (parasocial relationships; e.g., Cohen, 2003, 2004). Social networks exist by virtue of individuals’ enactment of social relationships, driven by their selvations that generate social motivation. The mechanism is different with respect to culture. Indeed, one may encounter strangers who look culturally familiar and to whom cultural stereotypes may apply. These may guide the use of which relational model in social interaction. In fact, selvations theory suggests that individuals do not care for social interaction with individuals with whom they do not know whether or how to relate; but if required, they will use their implicit knowledge of their culture to select a relational model (e.g., market pricing in a highly individualistic cultural matrix; extreme hospitality in a collectivist cultural matrix). The key point here is that culture not only guides individuals in valuing types of relationships and specifying how to go about regulating them, but also provides a basis for projection, or default, for situations in which relationships are unknown 11

Public figures may be in a position to reach a broad audience; in fact, they literally need to ‘relate’ to their audience in order to have influence. Bill Clinton has been credited with the notion of a charisma-like ‘reality distortion field’, which basically means the ability to relate with strangers in a split second such that they experience it as intimate and as a real connection (e.g., through a handshake and eye contact; see Ellsberg, 2010).

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(e.g., Corcoran, Pettinicchio & Young, 2011; Lee, 2006). This may be one reason why any cultural matrix is quite hard to escape – it is our inner default for understanding the world that has been pulled over our eyes (as Morpheus said in, (and about) The Matrix). This also explains why the experience of the Western human condition can be one of homo duplex – including the relational, moral, self-ish, emotional, and agentic actors that all seem to be accurate characterizations of human beings, at least at some broad level. It explains why we can experience strong feelings that push us towards a given behaviour but also strong beliefs about achieving a certain goal that push us in the same (or opposite) direction. It explains why we can carefully consider the costs and benefits of such action, why we can act selfishly, but also why we can feel the need to help others in need. Selvations theory suggests that the nature of this dual experience lies in the culturally construed self. It is through the self that we come to understand the world and ourselves, and thus we have at our disposal all of our forms of coping that our culture teaches us.12 This experience of homo duplex is likely to be quite an adaptive bias. Within the cultural matrix, it is adaptive to stay within the cultural limits of appropriate thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. As noted, violating taboos leads to social exclusion whereas abiding by obligations secures social inclusion. Indeed, within the cultural matrix, social life is coordinated and social interaction should typically run smoothly. Within the cultural matrix, it is clear across the board which relationships should be regulated in which way, how individuals should see themselves, which emotions are normative, and how much agency is possible and appropriate. As such, cultural matrices have a tendency towards stabilizing themselves. Nevertheless, cultural matrices can and do change. They change because individuals in their social networks constitute them and thus can change them together; and cultural matrices change because of external circumstances, such as political developments and wars. Globalization is a key force in the modern-day world, changing cultural matrices across the globe (Inglehart, 1997). At the same time, societies also need to deal with those who migrate elsewhere and those who enter society anew. It may not be surprising, according to selvations theory, that many people have difficulties relating to, and coping with, immigrants; and that immigrants have difficulties coping with indigenous members of the host society. The general pressure towards assimilation 12

Indeed, we often essentialize how we cope, not how we are moved and motivated. This is precisely where, I believe, WEIRD psychologists may project too much of themselves and their culture into their theorizing.

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of immigrants into a society (e.g., Berry, 1997; Bourhis et al., 1997) typically represents the enforcement of a cultural matrix on people who are used to a different cultural matrix. Indeed, like social relationships, one’s cultural matrix (and its core taboos and obligations) become visible particularly when violated, for instance through contact with others who are accustomed to a different set of cultural taboos and obligations (e.g., a religious person who does not want to shake hands with a woman). In this sense, the cultural matrix typically serves as a safe haven, within which individuals seek to regulate relationships in a joint comfort zone. It is the unknown that seems unsafe and unrelatable, only to be explored when individuals experience their own cultural matrix as a secure base; a stepping-stone to exploring the alternative realities of other cultural matrices.13

A clash of cultures? The Greek philosopher Heraclites of Ephesus is credited with the notion of panta rhei, which basically means: everything flows (or changes). This notion is associated with the saying that one cannot step in the same river twice, given that neither the river nor oneself will be the same when stepping in it for the second time. Stability, it seems from this perspective, is an illusion. Yet selvations theory suggests that cultural matrices tend to stabilize themselves, and that individuals are geared towards relationship regulation such that relationships are generated or maintained. Where does change lie in this perspective? This is the topic of the final section of this chapter. The main answer to the question is that, in selvations theory, change is always just around the corner. This is because different relational models can clash and require change; because different cultural matrices can clash and require change; and because relational models can clash with cultural matrices and thus require change. In all these clashes, there is moral conflict involved; that is, conflict about relevant taboos and obligations (either in relationships or within a cultural matrix). According to selvations theory, if clashes occur between relational models and cultural matrices, there will be a clear priority, namely to regulate one’s relationships over regulating one’s culture. This is why a son who has committed a crime remains a son; and why Romeo and Juliet defied cultural norms in order to be together. Importantly, such clashes make visible what typically appears to be invisible within a cultural matrix, or within a given relationship. As such 13

In the next chapter, I will outline in more detail selvation theory’s implications for immigration and the notion of the multi-cultural society.

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they hold the potential for change (for better or worse) because they allow for comparisons between different ways to regulate relationships. Indeed, when the world that was pulled down over one’s eyes becomes visible, change becomes imaginable and possible. This could mean trying to change the relational model in question, or trying to change the cultural norm in question, but in either case, such clashes potentiate change. A clash between relational models may occur, for instance, when couples start living together and need to find a way to organize their finances. Will they opt for a joint bank account that is a home for both of their incomes? Does one have authority over how the money should be spent? Do the two of them have to match any expenditure (e.g., each pays for half the couch)? Is there a ratio that the two have negotiated to fairly represent their individual situations? If one partner prefers communal sharing whereas the other prefers authority ranking or market pricing, the outcome will be a clash of relational models and thus a violation of relevant taboos and obligations. Nevertheless, selvations theory predicts that individuals are geared towards maintaining relationships, which means there is scope for change. However, if it becomes clear that the social relationship cannot be regulated in situ, then it may end. A clash between cultural matrices is reminiscent of Huntington’s (1996) ‘clash of civilizations’, but selvations theory does not define culture in terms of geography (and where it does, it does so to describe a general pattern, not a necessary correspondence between, let’s say, national values and individual values). At the same time, it does concur with the general prediction that the major source of conflict will typically be about culture (which can but does not have to include religion); that is, differences between what communities (that embed social relationships that embed individuals) believe to be valid and valuable in the world. Selvations theory suggests that such conflicts, even if they are violent (Fiske & Rai, 2015), can be understood as relationship regulation. At the time of writing, the terrorist attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (January 7, 2015) lives fresh in the memory. This example serves to illustrate how, in line with selvations theory, cultural taboos become visible when violated and how this visibility mobilized individuals into mass marches in Paris, but also in numerous other cities in Europe. Most people seemed to interpret the attack as a violation of individuals’ right to freedom of expression, independent of whether such expression would be offensive to others living in a different cultural matrix. This is an important part of a cultural norm of individualism and is likely to be related, across the board, with an independent selfconstrual (also indicated by the slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’, rather than ‘Nous

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sommes Charlie’) that guides emotion-focused approach coping via anger, outrage, and indignation, resulting in social protest (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). As Tetlock (2002, p. 461) noted: ‘Durkheim (1925/1976) may have been right. Group expressions of outrage and cleansing may increase the cohesiveness of communities of co-believers. Communities that censure together may stay together.’ * The cultural matrix, as a metaphor of culture in selvations theory, is by no means a static and deterministic feature of the social structure. Change can and often does occur, be it within romantic relationships, within families, within groups of friends, within organizations, within nations, within ‘civilizations’. As such, it may indeed seem hard to step into the same river twice. At the same time, social structures have a way of stabilizing themselves. When social interaction within the cultural matrix is smooth, taboos and obligations seem invisible and the world is pulled over one’s eyes. This is an adaptive bias – selvations theory assumes that individuals need to relate, and through their inner spider and the enactment of such relationships within the cultural matrix guard the integrity of the relationships in their social network. Without clashes between relational models, between relational models and cultural matrices, and between cultural matrices, change does not come to mind. This means that, ultimately, there needs to be a healthy balance in society between social harmony and conflict.14 Some may suspect that most clashes will be between communalsharing and market-pricing relational models, or cultural norms that foster individualism or collectivism. Thus far, I have indeed mainly used communal sharing and market pricing in examples of relational models. This is a deliberate choice because their obligations and taboos are almost opposite to one another and arguably most relevant to those with a WEIRD perspective on the world (Van Zomeren, 2014). It is important to note that the two other relational models in Fiske’s theory are also worth emphasizing because each is qualitatively different from the others (and thus also present potential moral clashes). First, social interaction based in authority ranking reflects an obligation to conform to and otherwise respect authority and a taboo of disobeying 14

Selvations theory suggests that frequent social interaction, or ‘contact’, between individuals living in different cultural matrices effectively moves such individuals into one’s social network. Intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; for a review and metaanalysis, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) suggests that positive and frequent intergroup contact may lead to reduced prejudice. Selvations theory suggests that for this to occur, individuals in contact need to share a relational model that can be applied to not just that individual, but the group as a whole.

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or otherwise disrespecting authority (e.g., the leader, one’s nation). At the same time, for authority figures this relationship means an obligation to be responsible for one’s followers and a taboo of violating trust in one’s authority. This is reflected in psychological theorizing about system justification and social dominance (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005; Jost, Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1994), which suggests that individuals are motivated to maintain social stability rather than seek social change. Second, equality matching reflects a relational model based in an obligation of proportionality and a taboo of inequality. Perhaps here, more than in other relational models, social interaction itself (that is, reciprocity of behaviour) is what generates and maintains the relationships (e.g., Clark, 1984; Clark & Waddell, 1985). Indeed, so-called tit-for-tat strategies can forge long-term cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). In closing, I have argued in this chapter that although social motivation originates from selvations that infuse events with value (i.e., the spider in its web), individuals need to cope with value-infused events in order to regulate relationships in situ (i.e., within the cultural matrix in which they and their relationships are embedded). This is a relatively complex and heavily culture-dependent coping process that requires bigger brains (and in particular a relatively larger neo-cortex) than the value-infusion process. Coping serves relationship regulation through finding ways not only to achieve homeostasis through emotion regulation but also to explore and impact on their world through their own agency and forethought. Indeed, selvations theory suggests that this is exactly why we often may feel like homo duplex – as ‘passionate economists’ (Van Zomeren et al., 2012), or as victims of homeostasis as well as architects of our own agency. In this sense, the African elephant I knitted together in this chapter represents a theoretically integrative portrait of relational beings who cope in diverse and culture-dependent ways to regulate their relationships.

PART III

Implications

CHAPTER 5

So what?

Definitions do not arise out of the blue; they are an integral part of a theory that helps delimit the phenomena of interest and organize observations. (Lazarus, 1984, p. 124)

Introduction Shifts in assumptions and definitions have implications (Slife & Williams, 1995). The aim of this chapter is to outline the many implications of selvations theory that follow from its relational assumptions. In line with this book’s first aim (to develop an integrative theory of social motivation), these include implications for theory and research about social motivation, but also a variety of implications for different fields (e.g., social relationships, social networks, the self, culture, coping, emotion, and efficacy). In line with the book’s second aim (to consider relational rather than self-ish assumptions about social motivation), selvations theory also has implications for those who make use of selfish assumptions about social motivation, for instance in the broader social sciences (e.g., sociology, political science; see Opp, 2009). One key message here is that selvations theory argues for a relational actor perspective, rather than a rational actor perspective, on what moves and motivates individuals. Finally, selvations theory also has implications for a third aim of this book, which is to argue for theoretical integration as a way forward in the science of social motivation. I will discuss the precise meaning of a shift from self to selvations in thinking about human beings more generally. I realize this sounds like a lot of implications. Yet, to me at least, this already suggests the promise and potential of a relational approach to social motivation. Together, this set of implications also represents my answer to the so-what question that may be the engaged and critical, or bored and indifferent, response to theoretically integrative attempts. After all, why go to all the trouble of devising an integrative and alternative view on social motivation if the net result is unclear, or turns out to be not that different from the mainstream view? Has this integrative 121

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enterprise just been an armchair philosophy exercise? What have we learned at the end of the day? The chapter is organized in three sections that represent my discussion of key implications at different levels (for social motivation, relational assumptions, integration and consilience; or, alternatively, for psychology, the broader social sciences, science in general). I will suggest that selvations theory, through its integrative potential, can be used to understand a variety of phenomena studied in relative isolation in psychology; that a relational essence in social motivation helps us to understand paradoxes that otherwise would remain contradictions; and that the approach taken in this book may be a first, modest, yet necessary step towards an integrative and even consilient understanding of what is stored in the very large storage container. Before we get there, however, for the sake of clarity I first want to defuse four potential misunderstandings of selvations theory that may give rise to the so-what question in the first place.

So what indeed? Selvations theory is an integrative theory of social motivation that synthesizes core insights from theories about social relationships, the instinctive feeling and regulation of these relationships, attachment dynamics, relational models, moral psychology, coping, the culturally construed self, self-efficacy beliefs, appraisals and emotions, and approach and avoidance behaviour. It suggests a relational, rather than a self-ish, social-motivational essence in humans. This shift from self to selvations has the potential to change the interpretation of existing empirical data and models of specific phenomena. As such, the potential implications of adopting selvations theory are many, and likely to generate new insights and thus added value. For this reason, it is important first to be explicit about what selvations theory claims and what it does not claim (but may be misunderstood as claiming). To this end, I discuss four potential misunderstandings of selvations theory and pre-emptively correct them. One. It is possible that one misunderstands selvations theory as a theory that, by suggesting relational essence in the process of value infusion, is biologically reductionist. If, such a line of reasoning may go, selvations are ‘hard-wired’ and on an equal footing with biological needs and instincts, then selvations theory effectively reduces social motivation to biological needs that, sneakily lurking below the surface, determine individuals’ behaviour, leaving the remainder of human psychology to be nothing but a side effect of our biological make-up. Selvations theory would thus be guilty of the sin of reducing psychology to biology.

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This is not the case. The explicit integrative aim of selvations theory is that it seeks to explain social motivation as a process that features both human universals (which are anchored in biology; see Damasio’s and Bowlby’s and even Fiske’s1 theories) and cultural differences (which are anchored in psychology; see Lazarus’, Markus & Kitayama’s, and Bandura’s theories). This larger motivational process cannot be reduced to biology because individuals would easily get lost without the ability to navigate their cultural matrix through their self-construal. This is precisely why selvations theory’s two-step approach to the motivational process moves beyond theorizing about needs and instincts – selvations provide the impetus for coping in situ, but this latter process is relatively complex and culture-dependent. As such, the broader motivational process is reduced neither to biology, nor to culture. They are interdependent and interactive parts of a larger whole – that is, of a bigger relational picture. Can the specific process of value infusion then be considered a reductionist part of selvations theory? It cannot. The process of value infusion revolves around selvations, defined as felt changes in individuals’ network of social relationships, which is proposed to use the same brain and body ‘machinery’ as biological needs and instincts that guard the integrity of the body. This is what I mean when I use the term hard-wired. But selvations themselves are not there when a baby is born; like Haidt (2012, p. 153), I like Marcus’ (2004) notion of innateness to mean ‘organized in advance of experience’. Selvations’ blueprint is already there, organized in advance of experience, for newborns to start relating the moment they enter into the world. Through infancy, individuals quickly develop a (rudimentary) social network through attachment behaviour (Bowlby, 1969), of which selvations are the guardians. These processes are already instinctoid, to use Maslow’s term – they require more flexibility than a simple ‘hunger–eat’ association. This flexibility comes from being able to use different relational models, which Fiske (1991) suggests starts around age three (which is when children are thought to learn to use not only communal sharing but also authority ranking). Thus, even the process of value infusion is not biologically reductionist. Two. A second potential misunderstanding of selvations theory is that it claims to remove self-interest from the study of social motivation, suggesting that people cannot be motivated to act in line with their self-interest (or other self-motives, for that matter). After all, doesn’t anyone who reads the newspapers and watches the news just know that human beings are selfish? Isn’t any notion of relational essence unrealistic? 1

Fiske (1991, p. 199): ‘My hypothesis is that . . . the four basic models are represented in the human genome.’

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My response is that selvations theory does not claim that individuals cannot act in their self-interest, but that a notion of self-ish essence is actually the unrealistic one (see Sober & Wilson, 1999). In its second step of the motivational process, selvations theory allows for individuals to behave in line with their self as a way of coping with value-infused events. For instance, an individualistic (or independent) self-construal may follow from regulating market-pricing relationships that are valued within an individualist cultural matrix. As such, people may believe that they act selfishly if they carefully calculate the costs and benefits of their own actions, but selvations theory suggests that they do so to regulate relationships in a particular (and even peculiar) way that fits cultural norms about how to regulate which relationships. It is this powerful form of mental make-believe that obscures our relational essence. There is an important disclaimer here, which depends on more basic definitions of selfishness. Obviously, selvations theory does not claim that, in essence, individuals will not protect themselves when attacked, or will not act in favour of self-preservation and survival when necessary. When one’s life is in danger, for instance when caught in a fire, selvations theory of course does not predict that motivation does not arise. But these examples are not about the self that selvations theory talks about. Rather, it is body and brain taking over in a crisis situation to safeguard the integrity of the body – this is the bodily alarm system. To define the tendency towards life (rather than death) as ‘selfish’ is to confuse biological survival (based on evolutionary notions of self-interest, which is gene interest) with psychological self-interest (Sober & Wilson, 1999). To argue that relational essence implies a death wish in biological survival situations would be nonsensical. And it is simply not what selvations theory predicts – it predicts that, such situations aside, the social-motivational process starts with selvations and employs self-construal to translate selvations into culturally appropriate thought, feeling, and action. Thus, in selvations theory, essentializing selfishness is due to a cultural myth (Miller, 1999), to be found in WEIRD societies. Ironically, this is precisely why those inside that particular cultural matrix may feel that a shift from self to selvations cannot possibly be true. Within such a cultural matrix, criticizing the prominence of the individual self may be akin to a taboo violation. Perhaps this would be indicative of selfish essence if that type of self-construal was a human universal and had been with us for a long time. But alas, our ability for independent self-construal seems to be a WEIRD exception (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984; Gergen, 2009; Henrich et al., 2005, 2010; see also Heine, 2005; Heine et al., 1999), our experience of the self in such a way may have started only in the eighteenth–nineteenth century (e.g., Stam, 2006; see also Seigel, 2005), and our understanding of market-pricing relationships comes relatively late in development

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(around age 9, according to Fiske, 1991). Thus, selvations theory does not remove self-interest from the motivational equation; it simply allocates it a more modest (but nevertheless pivotal) position in the broader motivational process, associated with coping within the cultural matrix. Three. Selvations theory should also not be interpreted as an attempt to construct a ‘theory of everything’ (see Henriques, 2011). This is because integration does not equal ‘everything’ – even consilience does not equal ‘everything’. Nevertheless, selvations theory is certainly an attempt towards consilience through being integrative on the basis of relational assumptions. As such, it clearly strives towards an ideal of what scientific progress should be about. This is clearly different from the current state of ‘empty empiricism’, in which any bit of empirical research should be thrown into the very large storage container (coupled with one-liners for media coverage). Indeed, I suggested earlier that this lonely empirical universe requires ‘dark matter’, the gravity of which may be able to hold it all together. It is not necessarily selvations theory that has to provide this gravity, but I do believe that the theory reflects a modest but necessary step towards identifying such dark matter. Note that this proposed shift in theoretical assumptions is by no means new or revolutionary. I borrow from and build on a broader theoretical tradition that rejects overly individualist perspectives on social motivation (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Gergen, 2009; Gilligan, 1982; Goffman, 1971; Mead, 1934; Slife, 2004; Slife & Richardson, 2008; Vygotsky, 1978) – a tradition with roots in cultural anthropology (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Henrich et al., 2005, 2010) and which is developed in cultural psychology (e.g., Adams & Markus, 2004; Becker et al., 2012; Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013; Vignoles, 2011) and even social neuroscience (e.g., Beckes & Coan, 2011; Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Cozolino, 2006). To my inner generalist, all of these developments seem to be heading towards an integrative and consilient view revolving around relational essence. But obviously, shifting assumptions from self to selvations might be the first step in a (very) long journey. Four. A final misunderstanding of selvations theory is to dismiss it in advance because it focuses on integrating theories, rather than relying on specific data. Selvations theory would be, in this view, nothing but a pipedream. And if in ten years from now, so goes the reasoning, one part of the theoretical framework turns out to be empirically unviable, then the whole theoretical construction falls apart. Therefore, this line of thought continues, one should be wary of trusting theories in general and one should in any event trust data over theories. One should certainly not theorize without having data supporting each and every claim made. This is an understandable concern from the vantage point of empty empiricism, in which empirical fragmentation is the necessary state of

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affairs and ‘bigger pictures’ are believed to be unrealistic or even impossible. My response to this is twofold. First, selvations theory connects different theories that I selected on the basis of, amongst other criteria, a fairly solid empirical body of support. For those who question the importance of self-efficacy beliefs in social motivation, I refer to Bandura’s (1997) exposé of evidence for this theory, which is indeed generously supported by many studies across a variety of topics (e.g., academic achievement, sports, health, learning, group behaviour). Similarly, those who would like to reject the notion that emotion is important in social motivation have a heavy burden of proof on their hands (e.g., Damasio, 1994, 2001, 2010; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001; see also Haidt, 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Tetlock, 2002). Those who question the importance of social relationships for social motivation can be referred to the robust empirical support for attachment theory across many decades (ranging from, e.g., Bowlby, 1969, to e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b) and a rich diversity of anthropological evidence for different relational models and the notion of relationship regulation (Fiske, 1991; Fiske & Rai, 2015). Finally, those who doubt the influence of self-construal and culture on social motivation, I refer to a rich literature in cultural psychology (for reviews see Smith et al., 2006, 2013). As such, selvations theory does not represent ‘just’ an integration of ‘some’ theories; it is through the integration of theories that have a fairly solid empirical status that it hopes to construct something much more solid than a pipedream, and also something more solid than any isolated theory of social motivation. Second, it is good to make explicit here that selvations theory is not untestable. Like other theories, and particularly because it is explicit about its underlying assumptions and its definitions of the core concepts, it can be falsified or supported by empirical research. For instance, one can test, within a given cultural matrix, whether and how relational models and self-construal relate and whether and how self-construal relates to different forms of coping. One can even test, presumably with different methods, whether and how individuals respond to changes in their web of social relationships within a given cultural matrix; and how they subsequently report about their feelings of being moved and motivated. Finally, one can certainly test whether and how individuals from different cultural matrices come to infuse value into events and cope with it in different ways. Thus, selvations theory is not ‘just’ a theory; it is a testable theory. Nevertheless, I fundamentally question the notion that one should test an integrative theory before developing and formulating it. When parts of the theory are already supported by empirical research, theoretical integration has the unique potential to lead to a renewed interpretation of

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that empirical evidence via a broader perspective – in the present case, an essentially relational perspective on social motivation. This is indeed the meaning of synthesis; a proposition that resolves tension between other propositions and affords broader, more encompassing vistas. This is especially important for theories that seek to integrate insights from different (sub)disciplines, which requires moving beyond ‘local’ definitions, concepts, methods, and interpretations (e.g., Andringa, Van den Bosch & Vlaskamp, 2013; Steel & Konig, 2006). In conclusion, I hope to have ruled out four potential misunderstandings of selvations theory. The next step is to outline the many and different implications of selvations theory on three levels: implications of formulating selvations theory, shifting from self to selvations, and moving towards further theoretical integration and consilience.

Implications of selvations theory Psychologists study social motivation most closely, at least since the demise of behaviourism in the discipline. Skinner’s (1963) ‘black box’ is no longer black and not even a box anymore – it has become a prism through which rainbows can be seen. In selvations theory, this is highlighted by the complexity and diversity of coping with value-infused events. Individuals construe their selves as a function of selvations and culture, and, as a consequence, cope through individual or shared emotion and efficacy, through individual or shared approach and avoidance, and more generally through individual or shared homeostasis and exploration. Selvations theory thus strongly implies an appreciation and acknowledg[e]ment of the diversity of, and flexibility involved in, how individuals cope in situ. Indeed, one can expect huge cultural variance in the second step of the motivational process (in addition to considerable relational and individual variance). This implies that any theory of motivation that does not do justice to this enormous amount of variance leaves important questions about social motivation unanswered. At the same time, selvations theory also explicitly posits a relational essence in the domain of motivation (biological needs aside). As such, it signals that there are human universals that guide our understanding of cultural differences. The complex and diverse culture-dependent coping process is not a random collection of self-based thoughts, feelings, and behaviours; it serves to regulate relationships through seeking safe havens or through exploring via a secure base. For this reason, the novel notion of selvations has many implications for theories of motivation. It provides a different perspective on why people are moved and motivated whenever they find themselves self-conscious, emotive, or

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efficacious. It points to the importance of others, our social network, and the larger culture(s) in which our lives play out. This implies that any theory of motivation that is implicit about what and why it essentializes leaves key questions about social motivation unanswered. Against this backdrop, below I first revisit the major theories of social motivation discussed in Chapter 2 to show how selvations theory synthesizes elements from all approaches through the notion of selvations. In the second subsection, I focus on more specific models and hypotheses about motivation that may require a different interpretation when viewed through the looking glass of selvations theory.

Implications for different theories about motivation Needs and instincts. Selvations theory clearly draws on theories about needs and instincts (e.g., Hull, 1943, 1951; McDougall, 1932). The base of the Maslow pyramid, for instance, is reflected in selvations theory when it comes to the process of value infusion: physiology and safety needs can be recognized in biological needs and selvations. Biological needs, however, often require one particular type of behaviour. However, selvations are, in Maslow’s terms, instinctoid – they require more flexibility with respect to their translation into different behaviours (for an analogue, see Lazarus’ [1991] line of reasoning about stress and coping). This is visible in the notion of relationship regulation, and the many forms this can take in practice. However, selvations theory also clearly moves beyond needs and instinct because it suggests that selvations require coping. It also suggests that biological and social needs are on an equal footing and may not always be easily differentiated. Rather than viewing belonging needs as lesser needs than physiological and safety needs, Bowlby’s (1969) theorizing in particular points to the importance of attachment processes as providing safety and support and, ultimately, protection from predators. A sense of a secure base, in turn, is necessary to allow individuals to explore their world (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). Similarly, some biological needs cannot be met in social isolation, but have to be fulfilled within a cultural matrix – which is why we typically do not urinate in public and do not start eating our groceries when still in the supermarket. The key point here is that for biological needs, the relevant behaviour is often more static than is the case for selvations (e.g., only eating satisfies hunger; yet very different behaviours can regulate a relationship), although in specific cases there may be considerable overlap. The tip of Maslow’s pyramid reflects more humanistic theorizing about people fulfilling their true potential when they ‘self-actualize’. This is also

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reflected in selvations theory, although it suggests that self-actualization is geared to relationship regulation and is heavily culture-dependent. Indeed, in selvations theory, any self-motive must specify both how the self is construed (e.g., as independent) and as part of which relational model it is understood (e.g., market pricing). Self-actualization is often conceptualized in a culturally ‘Western’ view (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Maslow, 1958), in which individuals introspectively ‘discover’ their true and unique self. However, selvations theory suggests that individuals may also self-actualize from an interdependent (or relational) or collective self-construal. For instance, individuals may discover where their family roots lie or the significance of their national identity. Self-motives are thus much broader than those referring to the individual self. Taken together, selvations theory includes elements of approaches to motivation that emphasize the power of needs and instincts, but also moves beyond them. Incentives. In selvations theory, motivation does not only come from ‘within’. Whereas needs and instincts ‘push’ individuals, incentives ‘pull’ them towards achieving particular goals. For instance, punishments or rewards for certain behaviours can ‘teach’ us how to behave. Selvations theory suggests that the core punishments and rewards that individuals are sensitive to are often social ones; most prominently, individuals dread social exclusion and seek social inclusion. They generally stay clear, for that reason, of violating taboos and seek to act in line with obligations.2 Socialization, in this respect, is essentially about accurately understanding such taboos and obligations, either implicitly or explicitly. It is about learning how to cope with the world in detail. Another important aspect of incentives relates to the valueexpectancy considerations that include considerations of costs or other external barriers that may outweigh any inner motivational ‘push’ (Heckhausen, 1991; Weiner, 1992). Clearly, such incentives matter for motivation (e.g., Keizer, 2014). Selvations theory acknowledges the importance of value-expectancy approaches (Rotter, 1954; Vroom, 1964; for an application, see Klandermans, 1984), but conceptualizes the assumed mechanism of cost–benefit calculation as part of (problemfocused) coping with value-infused events, based in independent selfconstrual and individual self-efficacy (and outcome efficacy; Bandura, 1997) beliefs. As such, selvations theory views value-expectancy processes as culture-dependent processes. Thus, selvations theory does not essentialize value-expectancy processes and does not essentialize the 2

Punishment can of course take a physical form (e.g., violence). However, such punishment often comes from others and thus also has a clear relational connotation (Fiske & Rai, 2015).

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cost–benefit calculations individuals are assumed to make in those processes. Furthermore, according to selvations theory, not all objective costs have equal subjective status. The notion of value refers to what Damasio (2001) calls ‘biological value’, which safeguards by means of the general process of ‘life regulation’. This may include safeguarding body and brain, but also, according to selvations theory, safeguarding one’s network of social relationships through selvations. It is what infuses value into events; yet the expectancy aspect only enters at the second step of the motivational process. As such, the value referred to in valueexpectancy theories is rather limited and even unrealistic if it is taken to imply an economic essence. For this reason, it makes little sense to combine (i.e., to multiply) value and expectancy scores. From selvation theory’s point of view, the two concepts are located in two qualitatively different processes and multiplying their empirical approximations effectively means trying to multiply apples and oranges. Indeed, selvations theory captures expectancy in the notion of exploration coping, based on the faculty of forethought (see Bandura, 1997; Lazarus, 1991). Extending Bandura’s (1997) analysis, however, it allows for individual, relational, or group efficacy beliefs that depend on which form of selfconstrual they are based on. As such, human agency is broader than that of the single individual. Selvations theory applies a similar transformative logic to currently popular theories of motivation such as regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). This theory suggests that individuals avoid pain and see pleasure but achieve those goals through focusing on preventing or promoting particular outcomes (as ways to approach pleasure or to avoid pain). Similarly, prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) specifies heuristics that individuals use when assessing risk under uncertainty, suggesting that anticipated losses loom larged than anticipated gains (arguable because of the stronger diagnostic potential of negativity; Baumeister et al., 2001). Selvations theory conceptualizes such goaldirected processes in a very different way because it posits a relational essence and distinguishes between value infusion and coping with valueinfused events. Selvations theory suggests that, across the board, the pain of (anticipated) social exclusion may be more diagnostic for individuals than the pleasure of (anticipated) social inclusion, and thus preventing social exclusion may even be more important than promoting social inclusion. Taken together, selvations theory includes elements of approaches to motivation that emphasize the power of incentives, but also moves beyond them. Emotion. The conscious experience of emotions such as anger or anxiety is a central aspect of selvations theory’s second step, which employs

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Lazarus’ (1991) CMR theory. Furthermore, selvations theory’s first step builds on Damasio’s (2001) notion of ‘the feeling of what happens’ to refer to the basic brain machinery that enables the proto-self to produce the primordial feelings that connect our internal with our external milieus. The use of this terminology may be confusing, so I will reiterate here that my use of the term feeling or feelings refers to the first step of the motivational process, whereas the term emotions refers to its second step. The latter are based in the culturally construed self, whereas the former are not. Nevertheless, primordial feelings are blueprints for the conscious experience of specific emotions that do require a construed self (Scherer et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2007; see also the notion of core affect; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009). This is why we cannot feel primordial feelings directly, and therefore why we cannot feel infused value directly. Indeed, this may be why a number of theories invoke a concept of ‘generalized arousal’ or ‘stress’ that translates into more concrete psychological states to refer to motivation (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Taylor, 2006; Tetlock, 2002). Thus, selvations theory provides a theory not only about consciously experienced emotions, but also about the feeling(s) that give rise to them. Selvations theory further adds a distinct relational essence to Lazarus’ (1991) CMR theory that provides a new answer to the question of what underlies an appraisal of self-relevance (or more specifically: goal relevance and congruence, and ego relevance). Indeed, what individuals appraise as ‘self-relevant’, biological needs aside, is based in selvations and in the particular relational model that brings with it relevant taboos and obligations to guide relationship regulation. This fits with the reconceptualization of coping as aiming to regulate relationships in situ. Thus, selvations theory includes elements of approaches to motivation that emphasize the power of emotions and feeling, but also moves beyond them. Goals. In selvations theory, the overarching goal of the broader motivational process is the regulation of relationships. Theories such as Bandura’s self-efficacy theory (1997) refer to individuals’ ability to anticipate, set, and enact goals in order to achieve them. In selvations theory, this experience of agency fits with the notion of exploration coping with value-infused events, and represents one way of regulating relationships. The other, homeostatic coping, relies on the experience of specific emotions. Together, they paint a portrait of a rudimentary hierarchy of goals: homeostasis and exploration as subgoals of the main goal of relationship regulation. This conceptualization echoes insight from attachment theory about why relationships matter – they not only provide protection at the most general level but also provide individuals with a safe haven or secure base at a more specific level.

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Selvations theory further suggests that goals exist at both the unconscious and the conscious level (e.g., Aarts & Elliot, 2012). In line with a differentiation between feeling and the conscious experience of specific emotions, selvations mainly operate at the unconscious level, whereas coping requires consciousness, a culturally construed self, and bigger brains. In this sense, the theory offers scope for individuals’ adoption of unconscious goals (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2010), as well as conscious agency and careful deliberation about how to achieve goals (Bandura, 1997). Thus, selvations theory includes elements of approaches to motivation that emphasize the power of self-efficacy beliefs and implicit and explicit goals, but also moves beyond them. In sum, I have revisited the same theories of social motivation that I discussed in Chapter 2. Selvations theory synthesizes elements from each perspective around the notions of selvations, coping, and the culturally construed self. By doing so, I have outlined ways in which selvations theory provides new and integrative insights into the motivational process, which has implications for the approaches it integrates. Below I move one step further by discussing how a shift from self to selvations enables new interpretations of various relatively isolated models and hypotheses about social motivation.

Reinterpreting debates, models, and hypotheses The aim of this section is to illustrate how selvations theory can reinterpret a number of otherwise isolated debates, theories, models, and hypotheses about social motivation. Indeed, selvations theory suggests that a consilient theory of motivation should be able to do exactly this because of its ability to be applicable to a broad range of phenomena. The egoism–altruism debate. A debate that lasted, at least in social psychology, from the 1970s into the late 1990s revolved around the question of whether ‘true’ altruism exists in humans (e.g., Batson, 1990; Cialdini, 1991). That is, the basic question in the debate was whether individuals are essentially selfish or altruistic. As in many of such debates (certainly not restricted to social psychology), various research outcomes did not converge theoretically, some supporting humans’ selfish orientation, and some supporting humans’ tendency towards altruism. As a consequence, such debates often have no satisfactory resolution, unless one can take a different theoretical perspective that is able to synthesize the two propositions. Here is the first proposition. Cialdini and Kenrick (1976) argued and showed in different studies that individuals engage in helping behaviour because it makes them feel more positive about themselves. This line of thought implies, for instance, that individuals in a sad mood would be

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more than happy to help others in order to improve their own mood (i.e., a self-ish explanation for helping behaviour). A later explanation was similarly self-ish: individuals help others with whom their self has ‘merged’, which implies that one helps others because it is experienced as self-interest (Cialdini et al., 1997). As I have argued in Chapter 2, this line of reasoning is unlikely to be universally true. Indeed, a shift from self to selvations is important because a relational perspective has a larger integrative potential than a selfish perspective on social motivation. Indeed, the Cialdini and Kenrick (1976) findings about negative mood relief did not converge with other findings (e.g. Batson et al., 1988, 1989; Dovidio, Allen & Schroeder, 1990). Sober and Wilson (1999) concluded from the vantage point of evolutionary theory and after careful inspection of a broad literature, that ‘natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives’ (p. 12). Batson’s (1990) argument for the existence of ‘true’ altruism rests on the notion of empathy (or empathic concern). More specifically, he predicted that empathy stimulates helping others in need in order to relieve their needs. Indeed, Batson and colleagues went to great pains to show that, in their studies, ‘true’ altruism can indeed occur (e.g., Batson et al., 1988, 1989; see also Batson & Moran, 1999). Specifically, Batson’s efforts were geared not only at showing a positive link between empathy and helping but also at showing that this link cannot be explained in a selfish way. Of course, the only reason why that additional evidence was necessary in this debate is that the default assumption was a self-ish one to start with. These different propositions about selfishness and unselfishness led to a debate in which the lead authors, Batson and Cialdini, repeatedly replied to one another, clarifying their conceptualization and presenting new findings, while at the same time digging deeper into their metatheoretical trenches (e.g., Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cialdini, 1991). This is a prime example where, I believe, throwing more data into the very large storage container will not help to resolve the debate, or even help to better understand the different propositions involved. What is needed is a shift in theoretical perspectives that relieves the tension between the two positions. Positing a relational essence is a way to solve the egoism–altruism debate. It does so because it changes the lead question, which is no longer whether individuals care about their own needs or about others’ needs, but rather whether and how they regulate their relationships. From such a relational perspective, there actually is little sense in labelling behaviour as ‘egoistic’ or ‘altruistic’, because both ‘types’ of behaviour can serve to regulate different relationships. Empathy-based altruism seems characteristic of communal-sharing relationships (e.g., helping a partner

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or friend), but also of authority-ranking relationships (e.g., a parent helping a child). Psychological egoism seems characteristic of marketpricing relationships, or of null relationships. The issue is no longer whether individuals have a selfish or altruistic essence; they have a relational essence that encompasses both and thus relieves the tension between them.3 The Cialdini–Batson debate has attracted attention across different fields (e.g., psychology, biology, philosophy) and raised an important question about the human essence. At the same time, I believe it provides a clear illustration of the urgent need for integrative and even consilient theories of motivation. It suggests that empirical data alone will not be decisive in such matters. Furthermore, selvations theory suggests that helping may facilitate relationship regulation in different ways. Helping may occur without a doubt and without taking count when it comes to communal-sharing relationships; it may occur to obey authority or to direct subordinates, such as in parent–child interactions; it may occur to establish a pattern of reciprocity, in which backs are mutually scratched; and helping may have a price that individuals have carefully considered, calculated, and negotiated. Such a conceptualization of helping becomes possible only when one abandons self-ish assumptions to label the specific behaviour in question in the first place. The cognition–emotion debate. Another relevant debate in psychology in the 1980s and 1990s concerned the relationship between cognition and emotion. The main proponents of this debate were Zajonc (1984) and Lazarus (1984), who disagreed mainly about whether individuals were essentially cognitive or emotive beings (or, in the specific terminology of the debate, about whether emotion or cognition had ‘primacy’ over the other). Zajonc posited famously that ‘preferences need no inferences’. For instance, individuals who are ‘merely exposed’ to previously unknown stimuli (such as Chinese characters) were found to like them more with increased exposure, and even without understanding what they mean or represent (Zajonc, 1968, 2001). Lazarus posited that there was a primacy of cognition over emotion because every emotional experience requires cognitive processing (i.e., the appraisal of the environment). Thus, for Zajonc cognition and emotion referred to different systems of the mind, whereas for Lazarus one was required to produce the other. Commentators (e.g., Cornelius, 1996) concluded that this debate mainly revolved around different definitions of emotion. Whereas Zajonc referred to a form of feeling (which does not require consciousness or a culturally construed self), Lazarus referred to the experience of specific emotions, which indeed requires cognitive appraisal. Selvations 3

See also De Waal (2012) about the potential for empathy among chimpanzees.

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theory thus solves this debate because it explicitly makes this conceptual distinction: selvations are about the feeling of what happens to the relationships in our network, whereas the conscious experience of specific emotions like anger and anxiety relies on their underlying appraisal pattern. In this sense, selvations theory does suggest that relational preferences need no inferences. At the same time, selvations theory suggests that it is also true that cognition is required in order to consciously experience specific emotions. Since the time of the cognition–emotion debate, progress in the fields of neuropsychology (e.g., Damasio, 1994, 2001, 2010) and cultural psychology (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2004, 2010; Rai & Fiske, 2011) has greatly facilitated the integration of insights from different subdisciplines. Cognition and emotion are studied in conjunction in very different fields with very different methods, giving hope and scope for a rich and nuanced understanding of their relationship (e.g., Phelps, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005). The time seems ripe, or at least riper than it was in the 1980s, to imagine an integrative theory of social motivation that ‘connects the dots’ (see Ellemers, 2013). Yet what is needed for this is a shift from self to selvations, together with efforts towards consilience in the study of social motivation. The sociometer. The notion that humans have a need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) comes close to Maslow’s belongingness need that succeeded the physiological and safety needs in his pyramid of needs. It fits the observation that humans are ultra-social by comparison with other species (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), although psychologists still focus prominently on the individual. Leary (2005) suggested in this respect that individuals continuously monitor their level of social inclusion (a so-called sociometer) because of their essential need to belong. In fact, Leary and colleagues suggest that individuals derive an important part of their selfesteem from satisfying their need to belong (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000). This need is assumed to be satisfied when they perceive themselves to be socially included. Thus, the need to belong is based on the idea that a lack of belongingness lowers self-esteem, which in turn signals that more social inclusion is needed. Thus, Leary and colleagues refer to this system as the sociometer that gauges their level of social inclusion through their self-esteem. Note that the sociometer is clearly a homeostatic device (e.g., when self-esteem is too low, seek social inclusion). There are two important ways in which the need to belong and sociometer hypotheses deviate from selvations theory. First, the notion of self-esteem suggests that a culturally construed self is required in order to monitor one’s level of social inclusion. For selvations theory, this points to selfmotives located in the process of coping with value-infused events, rather than to selvations. Second, the sociometer is based on the principle of

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homeostasis, which lacks the element of agency that selvations theory includes in the second step of the motivational process. One reason for this focus is that most work on the sociometer is about negative interpersonal events, such as rejection (Gunther Moor, Crone & Van der Molen, 2010). As Smart Richman and Leary (2009, p. 366) put it: ‘We begin with the assumption that the psychological core of all instances in which people receive negative reactions from other people is that they represent, to varying degrees, threats to the goal of being valued and accepted by other people.’ Selvations theory suggests that above this goal is the broader goal of relationship regulation, with different relational models suggesting differences in what it means to be valued or accepted by others (e.g., accepted as someone ‘like us’, as a subordinate, as a leader, as an ally, or as a consumer). Ostracism. As noted in previous chapters, a robust finding in psychology is individuals’ fear of social exclusion. Williams (2000) conducted a systematic programme of experimental research on ostracism in which participants were ‘given the cold shouder’ (i.e., ignored) by others, or excluded from a group. Different experiments used different methods and contexts, varying from online to offline ostracism, and from anticipated to actual ostracism. The core finding in this programme of research is that individuals respond negatively to ostracism, even when they do not particularly care for the group or others that ostracize them. Specifically, this research showed that ostracism thwarts important psychological needs, such as the presumed need for self-esteem, control, meaning, and belongingness.4 Similar findings have been reported in work that employed a virtual instance of the same paradigm. The Cyberball game involves individuals being included or excluded from a virtual ball tossing game. In those studies, virtually ostracized individuals report lower levels of psychological needs than virtually included individuals, which are interpreted by the researchers as thwarted needs. Moreover, the use of this online paradigm allowed an examination of individuals’ brain activity. Eisenberger 4

In a typical ostracism study, participants had to wait in a waiting room to participate in a study (for reviews see Williams, 2007, 2009). What they did not know is that the actual experiment had already started at that point because two other participants were also waiting in the room. One of them picked up a small ball and tossed it to the other person, as a way to kill the time. Now, these were not actual participants, as the real participant believed them to be, but they were confederates (i.e., actors), hired by the researcher. They were instructed to do one of two things. In the exclusion condition, they kept tossing the ball to each other, but ignored the real participant. In the inclusion condition, they tossed the ball to each other including the real participant. The typical outcome is that individuals in the exclusion condition score lower, on average, on a number of self-reported psychological needs than individuals who were in the inclusion condition, suggesting those needs are thwarted.

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et al. (2003) used fMRI methods to compare the brain activity of individuals who were or were not virtually ostracized. They found that particular brain regions were activated for socially excluded (but not for socially included) individuals. Furthermore, these brain regions were the same brain regions that are known to be active when individuals are in physiological pain. This led Eisenberger et al. (2003) to conclude that social exclusion quite literally aches (see also Eisenberger, 2012). Selvations theory explains the findings of this research programme from a relational perspective. It suggests that ostracism is felt as a change in social relationships, which needs to be coped with in the cultural matrix that is partially controlled by the researcher. This explains nicely why research has documented a diversity of motivational responses to ostracism, ranging from emotional numbness, anxiety, and avoidance, to anger, approach, and even aggression (for a review, see Williams, 2007, 2009). Thus, this line of research on the ‘social pain’ of social exclusion (see also MacDonald & Jensen-Campbell, 2011) comes potentially close to directly supporting the relational essence posited in selvations theory. Moreover, selvations theory also has the potential to accomodate the broad range of responses to social exclusion that have been documented by ostracism researchers. Tend-and-befriend. Taylor’s (2006) tend-and-befriend model is a neuropsychological model of how individuals cope with stress through affiliation with others (i.e., engaging in attachment behaviour, seeking social support, taking part in group or other forms of social life). The model is neuropsychological because it links different neuroendocrine systems to different forms of coping with stressors. Key to the model is the system that produces oxytocin (colloquially known as the ‘bonding hormone’), which is thought to promote a way of coping known as tendand-befriend (see Taylor et al., 2000). Taylor suggests that this way of coping with stressors functions to strengthen psychological ties with others in order to provide protection of others or the larger social group. This echoes insights from attachment theory; and indeed, oxytocin has been identified as a central hormone underlying sociality and attachment (Insel, 1997; Porges, 2001; see also De Dreu et al., 2010; De Dreu et al., 2011). Thus, the tend-and-befriend model fits nicely with selvations theory. According to Taylor, tend-and-befriend is a way of coping found more prominently among women. She juxtaposes this with the fight-or-flight way of coping that is found more prominently among men, in which the hormone testosterone is associated with increased arousal and heart rate (whereas oxytocin is associated with lower arousal and heart rate). Thus, the model relies heavily on a biological difference between men and women with respect to the workings of different neuroendocrine

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systems. In fact, Taylor (2002) suggests that this difference between the genders is the evolutionary product of natural selection processes, favouring females through maternal care with the evolution of a ‘tending instinct’. Selvations theory does not have specific predictions about gender differences5 in neuroendocrine systems or in forms of coping. Nevertheless, it appears that the two forms of coping identified by Taylor (2006) fit well with the notion of self-construal as the psychological basis for different forms of coping. Tend-and-befriend fits with coping on the basis of an interdependent (or relational) self-construal, whereas fight-and-flight seems more related with an independent or (individual) self-construal. Indeed, women tend to define themselves more in interdependent ways than men, whereas the opposite is true for independent self-construal (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997). Furthermore, tend-andbefriend seems closely related to notions of relationship regulation (Rai & Fiske, 2011) and protection through social support (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). For this reason, the hormonal evidence for different coping patterns can be seen as substantiating selvations theory’s second step of the broader motivational process. At the same time, this raises the question of how biologically determined the tend-and-befriend and fight-or-flight patterns are with respect to gender. Indeed, this is what I currently see as the main problem of integrating the tend-and-befriend model into selvations theory. In selvations theory, social relationships matter for both biological and cultural reasons. Its logic implies that, although there may be baseline biological differences between men and women with respect to the relative prominence of either the one or the other neuroendocrine system, there should also be an influence of culture on the development and enactment of those systems in men and women. What is required is a consideration of how these bodily mechanisms (or even a ‘social’ nervous system; Porges, 2001) respond to cultural influence, for instance through the enactment of social relationships and the cultural value attached to different relational models to regulate gender relationships. Another important issue here follows from selvations theory’s logic with respect to the Taylor model, namely whether measures of specific hormonal patterns, or other biological measures (e.g., cardiovascular responses, skin conductance responses) are indicative of ‘stress’ or 5

I am aware that the ‘gender’ label is often reserverd for culture-based differences differences (e.g, social roles), whereas ‘sex’ is used to indicate biological differences between men and women. For present purposes, I decided to use ‘gender’, especially given my thoughts on this in the next paragraph.

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‘coping’. According to selvations theory, tend-and-befriend and fight-orflight most likely correspond with different forms of coping (through different forms of self-construal); as such, the corresponding hormonal patterns are unlikely to be indicative of infused value. This also fits with the conceptualization of cardiovascular ‘threat’ and ‘challenge’ patterns of response in Blascovich and Tomaka’s (1996) biopsychosocial model, which are viewed as what selvations theory would conceptualize as coping responses. These observations may point to a more general observation that although it is often tempting to interpret bodily changes (e.g., change in heart rate, pupil dilation, change in hormone levels) as being indicative of the generation of motivation, they actually may be more likely to reflect how individuals cope with it. Motivational primacy of the individual self. Selvations theory locates self-motives in the second step of the motivational process, which revolves around self-construal within the cultural matrix. Thus, selvations theory does not essentialize the self with respect to motivation. Furthermore, it suggests that although there may be different ways to construe the self, none of them necessarily has ‘primacy’ over the others. Indeed, the argument is that cultural taboos and obligations will have a strong impact on whom to relate to and in which way. For instance, in the WEIRD Western world, individuals may believe that their individual self is the most important in daily life (Geertz, 1979/ 1984; Gergen, 2009). However, there is no reason why that particular form of self-construal should have universal motivational primacy across different cultural matrices. Yet this is exactly what Sedikides, Gaertner, and colleagues have argued for: a pan-cultural motivational primacy of the individual self (Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999; Gaerter et al., 2002; Gaertner et al., 2012; Sedikides et al., 2013). Their systematic programme of research typically relies on interesting and creative experiments in which they measure participants’ responses to threat or affirmation of their individual, relational, or collective self (see also Gaertner et al., 2012). The findings typically indicate that individuals respond most intensely to threats or affirmations of the individual self, responding most negatively when individually attacked, and feeling most positively when their individual self is applauded. However, a closer look at these patterns of data suggests that this effect relies mostly on comparing the individual and collective self. Intriguingly, threatening or affirming the relational self leads to quite similar responses across the board as when threatening or affirming the individual self – a pattern observed by Sedikides et al. (2013, pp. 35–36) when summarizing their findings: ‘The individual self is at the top (i.e., is

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most motivationally potent), followed closely by the relational self, which is followed distantly by the collective self.”6 Selvations theory reinterprets this pattern of findings on the basis of its relational assumptions. It suggests that because this research programme explicitly targets the self, participants’ responses should be conceptualized as forms of coping. Lazarus (1991) suggests that social support is important in guiding coping responses, for instance because the presence of others can alleviate or even prevent stress (e.g., Beckes & Coan, 2011; Schachter, 1959). This implies that the core finding that individuals are most reactive to individual-self threats or affirmations can alternatively be interpreted as implying that collective self-construal can buffer against such threats (as it may reflect a safe haven). As such it could in fact imply a more stable self-construal than independent or interdependent self-construal. Specifically, the more support I expect to have from my group, the more I will not blink when threatened; nor do I need to celebrate when the collective self is affirmed. Put differently, the individual self may be so reactive because it is the weakest form of self-construal – it provides neither a safe haven nor a secure base. By contrast, the relational and particularly the collective self may provide this. In any event, this already shows that the same general pattern of data can be interpreted differently because of different theoretical assumptions.7 Self-affirmation theory. A related self-focused theory is Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation theory. Self-affirmation is the motivational process that defends threats to self-integrity in one self-domain by compensating for it on another self-domain (e.g., stressing one’s morality after a competence threat). This suggests that individuals can cope better with stressors if they self-affirm. As such the theory is a motivational theory, it accords a 6

7

The evidence reviewed by Sedikides et al. (2013) for the motivational primacy of the individual over the relational self relies on studies showing that individuals fear losing their individual self more than their relational self; feel their individual self is more ‘true’ than their relational self; and associate the individual self with greater monetary value than the relational self. For each finding, it seems that the self addressed is the consciously experienced and culturally construed self, which, according to selvations theory, may entail some culturally grounded mental make-believe. Sometimes it is not hard to recognize the self-ish assumptions underlying empirical research. For instance, Gaertner et al. (2012, Study 3) found that individuals tended to report a higher monetary value when asked to sell their individual self than their collective self, the former once more followed closely by the relational self. Although this method is certainly creative, one can wonder about how it could be interpreted as reflecting something universal. Rather, the very method used to assess motivational primacy seems to favour the individual self in the context of market-pricing relationships. Indeed, other research shows that the very notion of money may prime people towards a stronger sense of independence (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; see also Adams et al., 2012; DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010).

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central role to the self, and suggests some homeostatic mechanism to restore self-integrity. To selvations theory, this is all part of coping with value-infused events, in which self-motives play an important role within the cultural matrix. This becomes particularly clear when looking at the manipulations, or interventions, that rely on self-affirmation (e.g., Cohen et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2009). The core idea is that when individuals affirm their self, they will respond less defensively to a self-threat. In studies, individuals are led to self-affirm by writing about the life domain they value most (e.g., family, friends, work, etc.), or about choosing, from a given list, their most relevant personal value. Although research typically reveals that selfaffirmation leads individuals to respond less negatively to threat (compared to a control condition), research has struggled to identify explanatory mechanisms underlying such effects (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Intriguingly, a recent review suggests that what self-affirmation manipulations may be affirming is not the self, but social connectedness (Eggleston, 2015). Again, two issues are key in interpreting those patterns of data. First, personal values are not universally valued, but are strongly culturedependent. Second, experiments employing the ‘most-relevant-value’ manipulation typically construct the list of values to choose from by either copying the list used in previous research (often with WEIRD samples) or adapting the list to the sample under study – which means making them self-relevant to start with. Thus, most studies that manipulate self-affirmation focus on processes within a cultural matrix, without showing evidence for its universality. In fact, selvations theory suggests that self-affirmation may help individuals to cope, but it does not infuse value into events. Furthermore, it suggests that selfaffirmation overlooks the power of culture and social relationships, particularly with respect to the twin notion of taboos and obligations. Indeed, selvations theory suggests that it is the affirmation of one’s social relationships (or cultural matrix) that increases individuals’ sense of a safe haven, or even a secure base. Contact hypothesis. Intergroup contact is a well-researched and popular notion within psychology, with many believing that contact between members of different groups can harmonize otherwise conflictual intergroup relationships. This notion has a long history – indeed, Allport (1954) famously proposed the idea that, under certain conditions, contact between members of different groups (e.g., majority and minority group members) would replace one’s ignorance about the other group with understanding and empathy towards them, thereby lowering one’s prejudice towards the other group. This implies that contact between groups is good within a society that views prejudice as a bad thing.

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Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) meta-analysed an impressive number of studies that examined the efficacy of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice. Their findings suggested strong support for it, even to the extent that contact worked well, even in the absence of the ‘Allport conditions’. This converges with selvations theory’s notion of relationship regulation, in which individuals are geared to creating or maintaining their webby network of social relationships. Contact is relational interaction. However, the logic of selvations theory further implies that, for this very reason, there is no necessary ‘effect’ of intergroup contact on prejudice. Indeed, research suggests that a major reason why contact sometimes does not work is that individuals may like a member of the other group after contact with him or her, but do not generalize this increased liking to the group as a whole (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Thus, one’s immigrant neighbour may turn out to be a nice guy, but may also no longer be perceived as a representative of the group of immigrants. Selvations theory explains this by pointing to the notion of contact as relational interaction, and to the necessity of collective self-construal during such contact in order for positive effects to generalize. This line of thought fits with other voices in the literature that call for a more realistic view of the potential of intergroup contact interventions to reduce prejudice. For instance, Dixon and colleagues (2005) documented how strong the human tendency is for ‘birds of a feather to stick together’, a tendency they refer to as self-segregration. As a consequence, intragroup contact is much more likely than intergroup contact. Similarly, individuals may be so geared to regulate relationships during intergroup contact that, to them, contact may be viewed as successful when they managed to sustain social harmony (Saguy et al., 2009). Perhaps for this reason, there may be some promise in the notion of ‘imagined intergroup contact’ (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Crisp et al., 2008), which suggests that imagining an intergroup contact encounter may lead to a reduction in individuals’ prejudice. For selvations theory, the advantage of imagined intergroup contact could be that it can be experienced as a safe situation (in one’s mind) that provides a secure base on which to explore in real intergroup encounters. This may mentally prepare individuals for real intergroup contact in which relationhips are regulated. Fair treatment and system justification. The notion of relational essence in selvations theory fits with different and relatively isolated sets of research findings about the notion of procedural fairness (i.e., how fairly one feels treated by another, a group, an organization, an authority, a system; see Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and system justification (i.e., a preference to maintain harmony within the system through legitimizing its actions; see Jost et al., 2008). Selvations theory

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suggests that, across the board, it should be absolutely pivotal for individuals that they are ‘fairly’ treated by others because, at the level of one’s network of social relationships, this secures social inclusion and lowers the risk of social exclusion. At the same time, it should also be important to individuals how ’fairly’ authorities treat them. The reason for why I write ‘fairly’ is that different relational models imply different meanings of fair treatment. For communal sharing, fair means unity-enhancing treatment. For authority ranking, fair means hierarchy-respecting treatment. For equality matching, fair means equality-enhancing treatment. And for market pricing, fair means proportional treatment. Although theory and research on procedural fairness does not make those distinctions, it does suggest that although individuals do generally care about distributive fairness, they care even more about procedural fairness (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler et al., 1996). For instance, when individuals are given voice in a managerial decision that negatively affects their own outcomes, they are more likely to accept that outcome (see Brockner et al., 2001; Brockner et al., 2005). Selvations theory would suggest that this is due to an authority-ranking relationship with the other in which their perceptions of procedural fairness are indicative of respect for the manager. Furthermore, selvations theory predicts that regulating market-pricing relationships may entail perceptions of outcome fairness as indicative of proportionality. That is, in such situations individuals may expect to be treated as rational actors who are primarly interested in their own outcomes. Fairness perceptions are also what connects selvations theory to theory and research documenting individuals’ tendency to justify the system in which they live (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005; Jost et al., 2008). For instance, advantaged group members may feel that societal arrangements are ‘fair ‘because, in a Western meritocracy, anyone can make their own fortune. As a consequence, there does not have to be any social security, because those who need it actually do not deserve it. System justification posits ‘relational needs’ as a determinant of such system justification (Jost et al., 2008), but selvations theory moves beyond this by conceptualizing system justification as a way to regulate relationships within the cultural matrix. In this way, selvations theory has the potential to integrate theories about intergroup relations that are, within the confines of their own and often disconnected fields, typically viewed as mutually exclusive. Indeed, system justification responses reflect the regulation of authority-ranking relationships, which are exactly the same relationships that collective action and social movement responses try to change. For example, whereas participating in mass protest can be viewed as regulating relationships with both one’s in-group (generating or maintaining a

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communal-sharing relationship) and the powers that be (wanting to change the authority-ranking relationship), system justification implies wanting to maintain the authority-ranking relationship with the powers that be. The resistance that individuals may encounter while seeking to maintain or change the system is based on the dynamic in which individuals want to regulate the same relationship, but in different ways, reflected by different taboos and obligations. It is relational conflict, but also moral conflict, for that matter. But it is relational interaction in either case.8

Implications of relational essence A shift from self to selvations also has clear implications for theory and research on any topic in the broader social sciences that makes use of assumptions about social motivation. Although the focus of interest and attention in disciplines like sociology, political science, economy, and history is typically on societal structures rather than on the motivated humans populating them, they nevertheless make assumptions about what moves and motivates individuals in order to make predictions about structures. Below I outline the major implications of focusing on relational essence. Towards a relational actor model. Selvations theory’s key message for the broader social sciences is that the ‘rational actor’, as the essence of social motivation, does not exist. This rational actor (e.g., Geys, 2006; Olson, 1965; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; for a discussion see Opp, 2009) is viewed as an individualist who seeks to maximize subjective utility through the careful consideration and calculation of costs and benefits. This portrait of social motivation is a WEIRD cultural norm, seemingly projected onto the world at large (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984). Of course selvations theory does not question that individuals can have beliefs about selfinterest, or that they can engage in cost–benefit calculation. But it does not essentialize this. It predicts that individuals do so in order to cope with value-infused events. Specifically, beliefs about what is in their interest and careful calculations of costs and benefits enable a sense of the potential for agency and exploration, and thus for relationship regulation in situ. In selvations theory, human beings are relational actors; they are the knots into which relationships are tied. Any rational actor assumption therefore misspecifies the nature and multiplicity of social motivation. 8

This book is not the place for a complete outline of how system justification and social identity theories of intergroup relations can be integrated. The key point here is that selvations theory’s relational perspective enables such integration by allowing one to see similarities between the theories that otherwise would remain unseen.

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What does this line of thought imply for those assuming that individuals are rational actors? First, rational actors can certainly be found, their most likely location being market-pricing-type cultural contexts (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Lange et al., 2013), within which individuals cope in a problem-focused way with value-infused events, guided by independent self-construals (Utz, 2004). Nevertheless, even within such contexts individuals use different relational models for certain relationships, such as those between parents and children, or those between lovers. Selvations theory suggests that different self-construals, such as interdependent or collective self-construal, should be responsible for this. Thus, even within the WEIRD cultural matrices presumably inhabited by true rational actors, human beings are so much more than this (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Lange et al., 2013). This calls for a relational view on how individuals behave in social dilemmas and other experimental games (e.g., DeScioli & Krishna, 2013). Nevertheless, many theories and research programmes rely on rational actor assumptions, for instance about voting or voter turnout (Geys, 2006; Smets & Van Ham, 2013) or collective action participation (for discussions see Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). For instance, social dilemma research typically confronts individuals with a numerical pay-off matrix for a presumed dilemma in which the outcome of one person’s choice depends on another person’s choice. Different types of dilemma include the prisoner’s dilemma, the trust game, and the dictator game (for reviews, see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Lange et al., 2013), all of which unknowingly or intentionally push participants into a market-pricing mindset in which choices imply clear numerical outcomes. For instance, in the classic prisoner’s dilemma, participants receive a payoff matrix in which they make either one of two choices, the outcome of which is dependent on one’s partner’s choice – to claim the other is innocent, or betray the other. The pay-off matrix typically indicates that if both claim the other’s innocence, then there is no case for the police and they have to set both free. When both betray each other, each will get a medium-sized punishment. However, when one betrays the other while the other claims the other’s innocence, the betrayer gets a lower punishment and the other a higher punishment. The typical finding is that, although the best joint outcome would come from both claiming the other’s innocence, most participants choose to betray the other because they assume that they will be betrayed by the other as well (which may be one of the reasons why this effect is even stronger when the game is played between groups; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Note that the ‘culture’ in which this relationship is set is a clear marketpricing one, likely involving independent self-construal. In the absence of any other indication of how to treat the relationship with this other

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person, selvations theory predicts that individuals will treat it as the culturally valued one. Relationship regulation here thus means coping through independent self-construal, self-efficacy beliefs, and careful cost– benefit calculation to arrive at the conclusion that the other is likely to be a rational actor. This is the mental make-believe that can become essentialized when we take individuals’ behaviour in social dilemma situations as approximations of what people in general are like. Again, selvations theory suggests that it may not be so difficult to change those dynamics. One can change the relational model being used (DeScioli & Krishna, 2013), one can change how individuals self-construe (Brockner et al., 2005; Utz, 2004), or one can change the main cultural norm (Wong & Hong, 2005; see also Henrich et al., 2005) – in all these cases, the rational actor disappears quite quickly from the stage. For this reason, it makes little sense to essentialize it. A shift from self to selvations promises a considerable change in our understanding of collective behaviour, for instance, as studied by sociologists and economists (e.g., Olson, 1965; but see also Opp, 2009). The typical assumption here is that individuals are free-riders (or social loafers). In situations where one can undertake action that has uncertain collective benefits (e.g., a protest against a new law), individuals are easily persuaded not to act because this (a) saves them their individual costs of acting and (b) inaction does not exclude the possibility that others will act and thus ensure the collective benefits. This assumption – that individuals are typically free-riders – has many implications for how groups, movements, and societies seek to mobilize individuals to support their agendas. For instance, in order to gain public support, institutions need to lower the costs of individual participation. Institutions with a pro-environmental agenda may believe that they motivate individuals to engage in proenvironmental behaviour by suggesting that the costs of doing so are not so high (e.g., just turn down the heating in your home). Similarly, institutions with a tax agenda believe that they motivate individuals to pay their taxes by suggesting fines for not complying (e.g., Wenzel, 2004). Furthermore, when social movements with an equality agenda host large protest events, they may believe that they motivate individuals to join when they organize free transportation to the event (e.g., Klandermans, 1997). According to selvations theory, this line of thought is understandable when couched in the WEIRD contexts that individuals may find themselves living in. Again, selvations theory does not suggest this line of thought is wrong, but rather that it should not be essentialized. In fact, because it suggests that human have a relational essence, selvations theory recommends that persuasion, mobilization, and participation

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policies should be focused on regulating (i.e., creating and maintaining) relationships between the individual and the group, the movement, the leader, the politician, the president. By this I mean that relationships imply not just their presence, but also their dynamic expression and enactment (i.e., availability and responsiveness, in attachment theory terminology). Relationships have to be experienced and enacted. Once the proper relational model is established (i.e., communal-sharing, authority-ranking, equality-matching, or market-pricing), individuals will perceive ‘costs’ in light of that relational model (and for some, such as communal sharing, this may imply that economic costs will not matter very much). Towards social networks and cultural embeddedness. A shift from self to selvations also implies a focus on individuals’ networks of social relationships. In the current age of mobile communication, social media, and social network sites, this is particularly important (Gergen, 2002; see also Castells, 2012; Centola, 2010). Networks are important not only in providing access to resourcesbut also in providing buffers of social support, love, and friendship. Moreover, social networks can be extended nowadays so that they are potentially more diverse, although selfsegregation may of course be prevalent on the Internet as well. Nevertheless, a focus on social networks fits with developments towards a stronger potential for relationships and communities, be it offline or online (Gergen, 2009). A focus on social networks also brings with it a focus on what Fiske (2012) refers to as meta-relational models (see also Rai & Fiske, 2015). Meta-relational models are constellations of different relational models – which come even closer to the knots into which relationships are tied. For instance, my reason for saying no to my one-year-old daughter’s desire for my cookie may have been that my partner was a witness to this situation. In order to regulate my relationship with her (e.g., by conforming to what ‘we’ feel we should do as parents), I needed to regulate my relationship with my daughter (e.g., not give her the cookie under any circumstance). Thus, meta-relational models suggest that we are not only regulating one relationship at the time, but also moved and motivated by felt changes in other relationships as well. As Fiske and Rai (2015) argue, this can sometimes also mean terminating relationships in order to fulfil relational obligations to someone else (e.g., an honour killing). Another example is that for voters to be able to relate to a politician or leader, this person needs to show how he or she goes about his or her relationships with others. This implies that knowing how others handle which relationships may reveal their essence, their true colours. This line of thought fits nicely with observations that gossip

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plays an important role in regulating relationships within social networks (Dunbar, 1997, 2003) and that reputation is key to establishing and maintaining cooperative efforts in social dilemmas (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Lange et al., 2013). Furthermore, this focus on social networks implies that individuals can also be moved and motivated by felt changes in relationships between others in their social network. For instance, if two of my closest friends stop talking to each other, this can be considered a breach in the integrity of my webby network of social relationships (another example is what happens to a child witnessing its parents breaking up). This is important to emphasize because it illustrates that what triggers selvations does not have to directly impact the individual. We can be moved and motivated by what others do to each other, by how they violate taboos or enact obligations, and as a result we try to regulate their relationship. To paraphrase Damasio, it is our feeling of what happens to others. Moving towards relational essence also highlights the importance of cultural embeddedness in navigating one’s network of relationships, and beyond. Culture is not simply a bunch of norms or a geographical region somewhere on the globe; it is a shared set of beliefs about what is valid and valuable in the world. This can certainly be associated with certain geographical regions, but this does not have to be the case. And those shared beliefs certainly include norms, but selvations theory specifies them by relying on taboos and obligations that flow from such norms. Cultural embeddedness implies a way of conceptualizing context or social structure, linking the individual with others through social relationships to constitute social networks, which in turn are embedded in one or more cultural matrices. This conceptualization of social structure has strong implications for the interpretation and status of empirical findings. For instance, an empirical study needs to not only be explicit about the individuals being studied, but also identify relevant relationships, networks, and cultural taboos and obligations in order to make clear how the findings contribute to the literature. Indeed, given the enormous cultural variance in coping with value-infused events, it would be helpful if researchers started acknowledging the limits of their specific findings more accurately. Although media coverage pressures may push researchers to simplify the key message of an article, selvations theory suggests we need to contextualize any research finding from the start of the article. By this I mean that researchers should be explicit about the cultural matrix in which their data were collected. This is not a weakness but a forte because it will make much clearer whether a finding is culture-dependent or more universal. Although establishing consensus about how to go about this

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will certainly be a challenge (although the last decade has witnessed a rich and promising debate about how to go about this; e.g., Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier & Coon, 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; see also Markus & Kitayama, 2004, 2010; Smith et al., 2006, 2013; Vignoles, 2011), it represents a way to organize the very large storage container such that it is conducive to theoretical integration.

Implications of integration and consilience Selvations theory steers clear of false and potentially limiting dualisms in the social sciences, such as those between ‘biology’ (or ‘nature’) and ‘culture’ (or ‘nurture’). According to selvations theory, such dualisms are false because they may appear to exist from the perspective of a thesis or antithesis, but not from the synthesis that follows from a relational approach. In selvations theory, ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ are both important in facilitating relationship regulation, with the former being most visible in the notion of selvations and the process of value infusion, and the latter being most visible in coping and the culturally construed self. Similarly, biology is most visible in selvations, whereas culture is most visible in the self. Nevertheless, the broader motivational process aimed at relationship regulation suggests that both aspects are required. As such, biology and culture cannot be separated from social relationships, which is why a relational perspective on motivation functions as a bridge between different (sub)fields and (sub)disciplines. Selvations theory also stays clear from another dichotomy in the social sciences, which is the one between ‘agency’ and ‘social structure’. The notion of coping with value-infused events within the cultural matrix already suggests that humans have agency, but this underlies just one general form of coping. Indeed, exploration forms of coping are most likely when individuals have a secure base; that is, a webby network of relationships in which individuals are available and responsive. For this reason, selvations theory conceptualizes social structure as social relationships, embedded in social networks, embedded in cultural matrices. This may come across as a conceptualization that is robbing individuals of their freedom and limiting their potential; however, selvations theory suggests that individuals’ relational essence helps them not only to seek such secure bases, but also to use them in order to explore their world in an agentic way. In this sense, selvations theory represents a theory in which individuals are not passive victims of an invisible system (such as in The Matrix), but instead are active and agentic relational actors who interact with the system through regulating their relationships. As such, selvations theory is not only a structuralist but also a functionalist theory. It assumes that for most of the people, most of the time,

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the twin motivational processes described in this book are adaptive. Indeed, rather than a Freudian intra-psychic focus; rather than a Skinnerian focus on conditioned behaviour that needs no black box; rather than a cognitive focus on humans as computers; and rather than a humanist focus on well-being, flourishing and growth; selvations theory is a functionalist theory of social motivation in which aspects of each of these traditions play a role. Despite its integrative potential, even at this level, however, selvations theory nevertheless is distinctively functionalist. It assumes there are good reasons why these processes are there; and that those reasons are reflected, to some extent, in the form those functions take (e.g., relational essence in the first step, cultural translation in the second step). This is precisely why I explored basing the theory, in Chapter 3, in evolutionary processes. Selvations theory assumes that social relationships are a sine qua non for survival and procreation. * The notion of self within the cultural matrix suggests that selvations theory even has the potential to include history as an analytical dimension. Projecting one’s self onto other cultures is not restricted to psychological geography; it may be equally valid when we consider history. How entrenched is our self-ish view of social motivation when we think about social motivation in times of the ancient Greeks, Egyptians, and Romans? And what about life in the Middle Ages, or the Renaissance? Stam (2006) has argued, along with others (e.g., Geertz, 1979/1984; Gergen, 2006, 2009) that our (WEIRD) contemporary understanding of the self has not been with us for long, which makes it unlikely that we can project it uncritically onto older historical ages (see also Seigel, 2005). Selvations theory suggests that the one thing we can safely project is that individuals, then and now, were and still are essentially relational beings. Thus, if we want to understand social motivation in earlier times, selvations theory provides a clear point of departure, together with the need to know as much as we can about the cultural matrices in that time. At the broadest level, the shift from self to selvations implies a pending paradigm shift. Thomas Kuhn (1962) is well known for his work on paradigm shifts in science – shifts that can be considered revolutions, or giant steps from one worldview into another. The prototypical example is the shift from a Ptolemaean worldview to a Copernican worldview, a shift that no longer put humans at the centre of the universe. Closer to the domain of psychology, paradigm shifts occurred when psychoanalysis made way for behaviourism, and behaviourism made way for the ‘cognitive revolution’ (e.g., Slife & Richardson, 2008). Indeed, Kuhn (1962) suggested that such a shift occurs because different perspectives have different axioms that cannot be reconciled – they are incommensurable.

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For this reason, he evokes the idea of struggle and revolution, reminiscent of selection processes (Hull, 2001), and potent with the notion that, much like Harry Potter and Lord Voldemort, only one can and will persevere. Thus, Kuhn (1962) suggests that there is something special about the notion of reconsidering and replacing axioms of broadly held and often well-accepted theories, in this case of social motivation. Indeed, this very notion of an axiomatic shift implies the potential for paradigm shift, or a scientific revolution. My views on how science progresses and how new insights develop, emerge, and sneak into the larger picture are more closely related to those of Lakatos (1970). He suggested that, rather than complete paradigms and worldviews that undergo major revisions in a scientific revolution, it is research programmes that have axioms that are believed to be true. Indeed, most theories about social motivation can be considered as representing such a programme. Lakatos argues, in contrast to Kuhn, that many studies form a layer of cement around the axiom to protect it from being threatened by other insights and findings (often from other research programmes). Indeed, researchers often protect the core of their theory by making changes, if necessary, to its less central parts. When a competing research programme is able to explain the same as the leading research programme and even more, only then, according to Lakatos, will there be a gradual shift from one axiom to the other. I hope this will be the fate of selvations theory – to serve as an inspirational pointer towards theoretical integration and even consilience; that is, towards what I believe leads to true progress in understanding social motivation.

Epilogue

My daughter is now three years old and she still likes cookies. However, she no longer cries out as if I have just committed murder when I eat a cookie while making clear to her that she cannot have one. Instead, she simply comes to me, sits next to me, and smiles expectantly (sometimes she shamelessly combines this with saying things like: ‘You are the sweetest daddy in the world’). And after once more failing as a consistent parent by soft-heartedly offering her half of my cookie, I realize not only that she has learned how to regulate our relationship within the safe-haven culture we call our family, but that this now also enables her to regulate our relationship and get the cookie. She has learned how to regulate which relationships within the little cultural matrix we call home. Of course, both of us are still the same essentially relational beings as two years ago. Yet during those two years, we have developed, through social interaction, a joint relational model within broader cultural norms that facilitate relationship regulation in our house. Life is still not about the cookie. But the cookie now harmoniously fits in to how we regulate our relationship. * In this epilogue, I reflect on the core messages of this book by pushing them a little further to connect them to implications for everyday life. Although selvations theory is not a normative theory, one can derive a number of practical messages from it. For instance, individuals’ relational essence implies that a social network of meaningful relationships will be profoundly important in their lives. Without such a network, for most individuals most of the time, they lose their very essence, which invites the experience of meaninglessness, emptiness, and loneliness. If one assumes this to be true, then it suggests that investing time and effort into social relationships and their regulation is, in the long run, a wise and rewarding choice. It implies taking one’s inner spider very seriously. Another core message is that we should also take our cultural matrix seriously. Selvations theory suggests that although individuals have a relational essence, there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between selvations and specific ways of relationship regulation. Culture 152

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rewards as much as it sanctions. Thus, to answer the question of how to regulate relationships, we need to attend to which relational model is culturally appropriate for regulating which particular relationship. This implies attending to how we regulate relationships within our social network, as well as to their more general praxis within the cultural matrix. As such, investing time and effort in relationships is a first recommendation that follows from selvations theory; but investing time and effort into regulating them in culturally appropriately ways seems equally important. We thus need to be attentive to our inner spider but also apply our Rough Guide to our cultural matrix. For this reason, selvations theory suggests that we are not all about ourselves. We are more than what Narcissus sees in the water – we are also the water. In fact, our selves are part of the mental make-believe that obscures our relational essence. At the same time, our selves help us to navigate our cultural matrix and thus are valuable and represent an absolutely pivotal aspect of the broader motivational process. Therefore, selvations theory does not suggest that we should not attend to the culturally construed self; rather, it suggests we should appreciate that it can increase the fog that obscures the sunlight. The self obscures as much as it guides.

More than a metaphor? In the course of this book I have used three lead metaphors to communicate its key messages. First, I have suggested that empirical fragmentation in science requires the gravity of theoretical integration, just as the universe requires the gravity of dark matter, in order to hold it all together. Second, I have suggested thinking about selvations as the inner spider that feels any movement in its web, such that selvations refer to (actual or anticipated) felt changes in one’s network of social relationships. And third, I have suggested thinking about culture in terms of a cultural matrix, within which networks of social relationships are embedded, together with relevant taboos and obligations to guide the regulation of which relationships and in what ways. Let me revisit them in turn here to explore whether they are more than just metaphors. Seeing sunlight in dark matter. I proposed that theoretical integration and consilience are what should be on scientists’ priority lists because they metaphorically represent the dark matter in the universe, the gravity of which holds together all the matter that exploded away from its genesis. Integrative theorizing is important because it offers an encompassing and unifying way of achieving synthesis. As such it helps to organize and comprehend what lies within the very large storage container of empirical findings across different (sub)fields and (sub)

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disciplines, and constitutes progress. It paves the way to bringing different corners of the academic universe into contact with each other. As such it offers a broad, integrative, and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study, unaffected by seemingly trivial micro-level debates and discussions, and by the (temporary) dominance of one particular model over several others. And similar to what astronomists and physicists did in recent history, for social scientists the time may have come to identify this dark matter, instead of believing it cannot be identified, or that it does not exist. This is not to say that scholars should suddenly pursue integrative and consilient theorizing just as fanatically as they pursued empty empiricism. The key word here is balance. Balance requires that, at least in the short run, there should be more theoretical integration in order to achieve consilience while retaining an impressive level of empirical productivity. There certainly is a long way to go and a lot to keep up with. The consequences of the Big Bang cannot be stopped, but the counterforce to it can become quite a bit stronger. Indeed, this is why I view selvations theory as having a twin goal – one of necessity but also one of modesty. I would like to extend this particular metaphor even further. That is, astronomists and physicists are unclear about whether the expansion of the universe, caused by the Big Bang, will ever stop (Hawking, 1988). They disagree, as scientists tend to, for reasons good and bad. But, even if they were to agree that the expansion of the universe will stop, then they still have doubts about whether this halt would be final, or whether the gravity of dark matter will pull it back again, closer and closer to each other, until the universe implodes into whatever there was before the Big Bang. Wilson’s views on consilience may reflect more of the Big Crunch scenario than the Big Balance scenario. He views consilience as a process that will bring the different disciplines in science closer and closer to each other until boundaries between them become redundant and disappear. I share this view, although I am unsure about the timescale. Indeed, in fifty years’ time, where will we be? In a hundred years? Two hundred? Will boundaries between disciplines such as psychology and biology and physics have become fuzzy? Will these different labels still exist and will universities still have separate departments based on those labels? Will we have come closer to a consilient theory about social motivation? Or, will fifty, one hundred, or even two hundred years have moved us further in our own micro-cosmoses of empirical fragmentation, leading to a meaningless, empty, and lonely view of the world? Will we have managed to move beyond our selves? Feeling our inner spider. A core message of this book is that a human being is indeed a knot into which relationships are tied. Our inner

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spider, feeling any movement in its web, guides us towards what moves and motivates us: our network of social relationships. We regulate them in order to promote social inclusion and prevent social exclusion. This is why obligations and taboos are so important, and why different cultural matrices imply different ways to go about relationship regulation. The notion of a relational essence is not a romanticized one, however. Relationships bring out the best and the worst in us, ranging from our amazing ability to cooperate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) to our equally amazing capability for violence within relationships, social networks, and cultures (Fiske & Rai, 2015). Selvations theory does not suggest that relational essence implies a fairy-tale life for individuals in which everything is hunky-dory; within relationships, there will be conflicts, clashes, and violations of taboos and obligations just as there will be harmony, cooperation, and affirmations of shared ideals. Sartre (1989) referred to ‘the Other’ unapologetically as ‘hell’. He suggested that who we are derives from others and their judgements, which implies that one is never truly free. Indeed, it is clear that social relationships move and motivate us not only in positive ways but also in negative ones. They define us and limit us. Yet within such ‘hell’, relationships also elate and empower us; they allow us to be more than just an individual. Relationship regulation means not just the maintenance of relationships, but also the generation of new ones, and even, if necessary, the termination of old ones. The notion of the inner spider also fits with Durkheim’s (1893) view of humans as homo duplex; as torn between inner needs (referred to as will) and socialization (referred to as collective conscience). Indeed, for Durkheim the beings we call human only become fully human in and through society. Selvations theory explains why: individuals’ relational essence binds them into social relationships that constitute social networks, embedded in cultural matrices. Relationships reflect both will and collective conscience. Nature abhors a vacuum1 as much as our inner spider abhors a social vacuum. Indeed, without safe havens or secure bases, our health and happiness may become easily compromised (e.g., Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). A Rough Guide to our cultural matrix. Humans regulate relationships within a cultural matrix that guides how we cope with value-infused events. Psychologically, culture affects us through our self-construal, which provides a clear psychological agent to which we can attribute our thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. In this sense, the self is both a Rough Guide and the thick fog blocking the sunlight in Russolo’s 1

A dictum attributed to Aristotle.

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painting on the cover of this book. This may be why the self can be experienced as a mystery, a friend, a foe, an alien, a source of wisdom, a source of bias, or perhaps even all of the above. This is why one can search for the self without ever finding one. Viewing the self as an obstacle to identifying essence has a number of broader implications for how we should expect ourselves to be able to study it. First, self-reports are reports from the self, not from what lies beneath. They might reflect the latter, but do not necessarily do so (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; see also Baumeister, Masicampo & Vohs, 2011). For this reason, selvations theory suggests that non-self-report methods are important to include in systematic empirical studies of social motivation. Indeed, I suspect that most research on social motivation actually taps into the second, rather than the first, step of the motivational process. Most studies about social motivation may be in effect studies of how we cope. Theistic religion may be underlying many of the most pronounced cultural matrices, such as those with specific taboos and obligations (e.g., the Ten Commandments). Indeed, theistic religion often has a direct impact on self-construal, such as being dependent on a supreme being. Such supreme beings can serve as attachment figures and thus as safe havens or secure bases (Granqvist et al., 2012). This makes religious behaviour a form of relationship regulation, even if such behaviour entails violence against other groups or individuals. Note here that this line of thought absolutely does not normatively excuse such violence, but simply interprets it in a relational way (Fiske & Rai, 2015). Interestingly, Buddhism is an example of a non-theistic religion, which underlies a cultural matrix in which individuals believe that the self is an illusion. Indeed, its anatta doctrine states that the self is not an essence. In fact, the self is viewed as that which is partly responsible for our suffering in life. Although one may be tempted to see links between this set of beliefs and selvations theory, Buddhism extends this lack of essence even to others and the attachments one feels towards them. In the Buddhist universe, there is no essence, and therefore also no relational essence. In a modern world full of globalization and cultural clashes, it is not surprising to find aspects of the Buddhist cultural matrix merging with life in the WEIRD world. For instance, mindfulness training is currently popular (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2005); here individuals are trained to observe, in silence and/or meditation, their culturally construed self and the associated thoughts and feelings that the self brings to mind. In such training, individuals learn to observe and thus become aware of their self and their self-driven feelings and thoughts. The obvious question, then, is: if one can observe the culturally construed self, then who is doing the

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observing? Selvations theory suggests a speculative answer: it may be the proto-self.2

Selvations theory in everyday life One can wonder what core messages empty empiricism brings to the table that can be applied to everyday life. For instance, one study may suggest that self-esteem is good for you, whereas another may suggest it is not (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2000). One study may suggest that conscious thought leads to better decision-making, whereas another may suggest that it is better to use intuition (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). One study may suggest that the individual self is primary, whereas another may suggest it is the collective self (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2013). It is difficult to infer basic laws or principles from such studies, and the reason for that is that they cannot be understood or interpreted on their own. Theoretically integrative theories, and certainly those that move closer to consilience, have the potential to provide meaningful principles for people’s everyday lives. Indeed, consilient theories cannot exist solely in ivory towers – they do not fit ‘local’ definitions. From selvations theory follow at least three points that are potentially helpful for individuals on a daily basis: (1) that selvations and thus social relationships need to be taken seriously when experiencing ‘inner’ conflict; (2) that the rules within the cultural matrix conveyed through social relationships need to be taken seriously when experiencing ‘social’ conflict; and (3) that the culturally construed self can both obscure and clarify how we cope with such conflicts and thus should be taken seriously as well as treated with some healthy scepticism. Taking relational essence seriously. Modern life seems replete with complaints about how time and energy spent at work goes at the expense of time and energy spent with family and friends (or vice versa); and about how time and energy invested in activities goes at the expense of time and energy invested in rest and sleep (or vice versa). Sometimes skipped meals and fastfood cravings become the outcome of presumed drives for achievement and power; sometimes love can consume us to the point of self-destruction. Such inner conflicts arise from conflicts between different needs. In fact, for Freud, intrapsychic conflict was conflict between different desires or urges, which mostly occurred under the radar, in the unconscious. 2

Intriguingly, mindfulness interventions promise to reduce stress, anxiety, pain, and depression. Selvations theory suggests that they may do by providing a safe haven in one’s own mind.

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Taking one’s inner spider seriously implies two things. First, it implies differentiating self from selvations. And second, it implies essentializing and thus prioritizing selvations. It means deciding how to invest one’s time and energy by recognizing different ‘needs’ for what they are – as related to our relational essence, or to our culturally construed self. Selvations theory is clear about which needs are indicative of the former (e.g., safety, belonging) and which ones are indicative of the latter (selfactualization, uniqueness, differentiation), and selvations theory is clear about which ones reflect our essence and which ones make us unique. Selvations theory differentiates between biological and relational needs and instincts on the one hand, and coping processes on the other hand. It suggests that, biological needs aside, we cope in order to regulate relationships, triggered by selvations. This implies that if we feel like wanting to self-actualize, for instance, or to be unique and different from others, this is because of selvations. We may want to feel unique because this is how we regulate our relationship with our mother, our partner, or anyone else through whom we are embedded in our social network. Or we may want to self-actualize because that is what people do in your social network. To put it differently, selvations theory suggests that we should be suspicious of any felt ‘inner’ need that is directly related to the culturally construed self. In these instances, I believe we are running the risk of mistaking our self for our essence. For this reason, when we push selvations theory to its limits, it implies that a good life follows the general blueprint of the motivational process that it proposes. Indeed, Artistotle’s good life was a virtuous life, which in selvations theory means: a life that involves a network of well-regulated relationships. Moreover, selvations theory suggests that a good life also implies a healthy life, because it is quite literally essential to have an available and responsive network of social relationships. Because selvations represent the bodily feeling of what happens to our network of social relationships, our bodies should be healthier if we listen to our selvations. Taking one’s inner spider seriously implies taking seriously the relationships that constitute one’s social network and prioritize them. Social relationships are not only essential for survival, but also for the quality of our lives. Taking one’s cultural matrix seriously. According to selvations theory, taking one’s cultural matrix seriously implies not just that relationship regulation matters, but also that it is extremely important how one does this regulation. It implies taking seriously the taboos, obligations, and other norms that prescribe or proscribe forms of relationship regulation within the cultural matrix. It implies that successful coping across a variety of social relationships is an art form. It requires implicit and

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explicit knowledge about the cultural praxis of relationship regulation, whether this is along communal-sharing, authority-ranking, equalitymatching, or market-pricing lines. Indeed, for this reason the self serves as the Rough Guide to regulating relationships with one’s parents, friends, partner, colleagues, and so forth. ‘Know thyself’ has clear value, but for reasons different from those that we usually associate with this dictum. Other people are absolutely pivotal in learning about the norms within any cultural matrix. Humans are amazing imitators (through mimicry; e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), and vicarious learning is one of the key ways in which individuals learn about their social world (e.g., Bandura, 1965, 1997). Furthermore, others are key to coping within the cultural matrix as well. For instance, others can help individuals to regulate their emotions (Niven et al., 2009; see also Gross, 1998) and help to increase their self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Thus, others are integral aspects of homeostatic and exploration coping processes within the cultural matrix. Let me note that we of course do not live our lives in one, solid, monolithic cultural matrix, especially not in a modern globalized world. Selvations theory suggests that although dealing with convergent cultural norms seems psychologically unproblematic, dealing with culturally divergent norms is likely to pose a greater likelihood of psychological problems but also opportunities. On the one hand, those who encounter such divergence (e.g., collectivists within an individualist country) are likely to contribute to the variance within a culture and thus to its moral diversity. On the other hand, they are also more likely to have more difficulties in ‘fitting in’ and to doubt whether there actually is a place for them to call ‘home’ (i.e., a safe haven). Selvations theory suggests that individuals experiencing such cultural or identity conflict will have difficulties knowing which forms of coping are most likely to be adaptive in their social worlds, and these difficulties are associated with a more complex (and not always satisfactory) understanding of their self. Indeed, problematic forms of self-understanding are related to fragmented identities and identity confusion (e.g., Erikson, 1959). As such, there are potential problems but also opportunities in the notion of clashing cultures. In this sense, selvations theory also has something to say about acculturation processes (e.g., Berry, 1997; Bourhis et al., 1997; Cross, 1995). In this literature, scholars try to understand how migrants and host society members cope with each other’s presence in the same country. Berry (1997) distinguished four psychological strategies on the part of immigrants – integration, assimilation, separation, and individualism. Assimilation entails migrants becoming like ‘locals’ on important identity dimensions (e.g., resembling authority ranking at first, but communal

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sharing when fully assimilated), whereas integration entails migrants adapting on some dimensions while also retaining their own unique identity on other dimensions (resembling equality matching).3 Thus, in the literature about how individuals cope with a new (and often different) cultural matrix, different relational models and self-construal are clearly reflected in different acculturation strategies. They are about whether individuals want to cling to their culturally construed self or allow it to adapt to the new cultural matrix, and whether they want to regulate their social relationships in the context of the new cultural matrix, or prefer to do this in the context of their original cultural matrix. This analysis has implications for the differentiation between integration and assimilation, which is often confused in political rhetoric and media talk (where people tend to use ‘integration’ when they actually mean ‘assimilation’). For instance, European politicians who take a stance against mass immigration typically use the word ‘integration’, whereas what they really mean is that migrants should assimilate completely to the new host culture. According to the acculturation literature, integration implies keeping one’s own identity but also adjusting to the host culture (thereby developing a so-called ‘dual’ identity). It is assimilation that entails letting go of one’s original identity while adjusting to (and thus conforming to) the host culture (and thereby developing a new identity). Selvations theory suggests that this difference can be explained by the relationships maintained within one’s own group and those newly developed outside one’s own group. As such, the focus should arguably be less on ‘self’ and ‘identity’ (i.e., on what ‘we’ and ‘they’ are), and more on social relationships (i.e., on how they relate to us and how we relate to them) and social interaction. Indeed, perhaps true integration is rooted in a network of social relationships that embeds social interaction with (and between) members of the old and the new group. Finally, an important extension of this line of thought concerns individuals’ occupations. In the cultural West where the independent self is celebrated, individuals’ work should be a strong aspect of the self that one construes. This can be related to social status but also to the idea that whatever it is that the self is doing, it must be important. From the vantage point of selvations theory, however, individuals develop relationships through social interaction in the workplace, which they seek to regulate. These can include different types of relationships, for instance market-pricing or authority-ranking relationships with their boss; 3

Separation refers to a preference to not adapt to and not to engage in contact with the ‘locals’ and thus to form migrant enclaves. Individualism refers to a strategy of blending in without reference to one’s unique group identity.

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communal-sharing or equality-matching relationships with colleagues, and so on. This has implications for understanding organizational behaviour in the workplace. For example, organizational citizenship behaviour (which essentially means doing more than you are officially supposed to do; Organ, 1988) may be a result of individuals regulating communal-sharing relationships with other colleagues, or authority-ranking relationships with one’s boss. This helps to explain why, at least for some people, a job is experienced as more than a job. Indeed, when individuals are laid off some ‘take it personally’, fall into depression, or show other responses indicative of relational pain. Similarly, the notion of ‘burn out’ (see Maslach, Schaufeli & Leiter, 2001) may be directly related to how people relate to their job and the network of social relationships that it entails. Indeed, a job can also be seen as a knot in which relationships are tied. As such, individuals’ motivation to achieve things at or through work is likely to be based in their relational essence, often under the guise of ambition, status, or power. The logic of as-if relationships. Selvations refer to felt changes in one’s network of social relationships, but importantly those felt changes can be actual or anticipated (the latter of which are mental simulations [e.g., Smith & Mackie, 2014; see also Samson et al., 2010; Chiu et al., 2010], or as-if relationships). For instance, if we think about how life would be like without one’s partner or parent, we can feel this as if the change is real. Importantly, this may also refer to felt changes in relationships between others in one’s social network (e.g., a break-up between two of your friends). Indeed, selvations theory suggests it is changes in the integrity of the social network of relationships we are ultra-sensitive to. Through mental simulation (potentially connected to the notion of the ‘as-if body loop’ in Damasio’s theorizing), we can even feel what happens to others in our social networks, or to what we imagine could happen to those close to us. For example, I remember a scene from a documentary in which a mother chimpanzee is carrying her baby in her arms. She climbs with it, she sits down with it, she takes it everywhere. She offers it food and she offers it water, but the baby does not respond. Then it becomes clear that she has been doing all of this for a few days now. It becomes clear, for observers, that the baby chimp is in fact dead, but the mother does not yet realize this. She keeps carrying it, climbing with it, offering food and water to her baby, although the baby still does not respond, and in fact will never respond. The psychological motion I experienced when viewing this scene may be quite similar to what I experience when I actually pay money to go see a theatrical tragedy. Such tragedy refers to a positive or negative

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emotional or even cathartic experience among members of an audience when something bad happens to a main character in a play. Selvations theory provides a relational explanation for this experience, even though observers know that the events that befall the characters on stage are fictitious. Such theatrical tragedy lies in a clash between relational models (e.g., lovers’ application of different relational models that unavoidably will destroy their relationship), or between relational models and a cultural matrix (e.g., a shared relational model between lovers sanctioned by cultural norms). Selvations theory suggests that observing such clashes with an unhappy ending can, through mental simulation, evoke the feeling of what happens to others as if it happens to one’s own selvations. The prime example of theatrical tragedy is Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Specifically, this play exemplifies how social relationships can clash with the prevailing cultural matrix. In their beloved Verona, the two archetypical young lovers come from different houses (the Capulets and the Montagues) that are sworn enemies. The two nevertheless fall in love and are secretly married. However, Romeo is shortly afterwards exiled from Verona and, in the resulting scenes of the play, misunderstandings even lead to the tragic and unnecessary deaths of the two. As such, the tragedy lies not just in a relational essence that is sanctioned in the cultural matrix in which they live, but also in the termination of the relationship (that otherwise would have led to health and happiness). As observers, we can be profoundly moved by theoretical tragedy because the termination of the relationship between Romeo and Juliet in the cultural matrix that sanctions their love feels as if the integrity of our own social network is compromised. This illustrates the power of selvations in moving and motivating us. Indeed, this is the principle that Shakespeare clearly understood well: without our relational essence, there would be no tragedy.4 Do ‘self-help books’ help the self? In our WEIRD part of the world, individuals seem to spend an extraordinary amount of time and effort in trying to achieve self-understanding. This is illustrated by the extraordinary number of self-help books that populate the virtual or actual shelves of the average bookstore or library. Some focus on knowing one’s personality, some focus on understanding one’s upbringing, some 4

Obviously this is not the monopoly of Shakespearean plays. There are plenty of examples in Greek mythology of social relationships and their regulation as the essence of tragedy (Fiske & Rai, 2015). Furthermore, many of the currently popular television dramas (e.g., Breaking Bad, Broadchurch, Dexter, Games of Thrones, Mad Men, and the like) revolve around social relationships and their regulation; the same can be said of soap operas such as Neighbours, and The Bold and the Beautiful. Indeed, from the perspective of selvations theory, good fiction is relational fiction – defined not so much by interesting (and changing) characters, but by interesting (and changing) relationships.

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focus on how to cope best with stress, some focus on being mindful, and others focus on spirituality. Yet the bulk of these self-help books seem to suggest that, in one way or another, the self is something one can be changed for the better. They imply that if one has a problem, the self is both the problem and the cure.5 The trouble with self-help books is that people may be great seekers of their ‘true’ self but not necessarily great finders of it. This fits with the general idea in this tradition that finding the self is about the path to, and the process of change – not about the outcome of actually finding it. In this respect, finding one’s ‘true’ self (Newman, Bloom & Knobe, 2014) is likely to be a never-ending story because one does not know what one is looking for. Yes, the process of seeking may increase awareness of and knowledge about one’s culture and one’s place in it. But it also produces a stronger belief in the self as one’s essence, as the real thing that we only see reflections of in Plato’s cave, and thereby increases the density of the fog that prevents us from seeing the sunlight. I do not take issue with any positive influence that self-help books may have on people’s lives. I do take issue with the interpretation of the ‘wisdom’ of self-help books when it comes to implicit ideas about human essence and social motivation. For instance, it is doubtful whether the culturally construed self can be changed very easily. It is culturally construed, not self-construed. That we can believe in the possibility of such change is an example of the mental make-believe that the culturally construed self is capable of. Thus, according to selvations theory, one can try to change the self, but one should perhaps not expect much change as long as social relationships and cultural matrices remain the same. Indeed, if the self is construed via the enactment of social relationships, then arguably a more effective way of changing oneself would be to seek out new social relationships and new cultural matrices. According to selvations theory, it is doubtful whether the construed self has any ‘authentic’ quality. Many self-help books quite literally aim to help the reader to discover his or her ‘true’ self, or to discover ways to ‘break free’ from the old one that is believed to be responsible for holding one back in life. After all, if there is a self that one can experience as ‘authentic’, then the experience of motivation attributed to it can be viewed as ‘intrinsic’ and ‘real’. As such an authentic self is associated with one’s path in life, one’s life task, even one’s destiny. However, selvations theory suggests that there is no authentic self that can be known. Like gravity, one cannot be aware of the proto-self itself – only 5

This echoes many approaches in the psychological literature. For instance, approaches to improving intergroup relations often assume that the reason for prejudice lies in the self, and the solution is therefore to change the self (e.g., through recategorization).

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of its consequences. Nevertheless, selvations theory does suggest that one may experience the construed self as ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ when it faithfully reflects the cultural matrix in which one is embedded. In this case, the self provides a way of navigating one’s cultural matrix and therefore help one to ‘know what to do’. This has little to do, however, with any objective authenticity of any self. It is culturally construed. Of course, it does not help that major television shows promise that finding the self is the road to individual happiness. According to self-help books, finding oneself will make everything easier – work, relationships, the experience and expression of emotions, the making of difficult decisions, and so forth. If life is made easier in this way, individuals can reach a state of happiness that they could not previously imagine. Finding one’s self is thereby presented as a road to salvation. Arguably this provides individuals with a reason to believe these ideas, especially those in need of something that would make their lives easier. Selvations theory straightforwardly rejects this line of thought. It predicts that health and happiness ultimately lie in social relationships and their regulation in situ; not in searching for one’s ‘authentic’ self. The bright side of this message is that, in sharp contrast to there being just one supposedly ‘authentic’ self, there are many social relationships to be found. The reason why I devote attention to this particular corner of psychology is that academic textbooks at times read very much like self-help books. This is not a coincidence. Both worlds are governed by the same cultural myth of individualism. In both worlds it is generally assumed that there must be a self that underlies social motivation. In both worlds it is generally assumed that the self is the key to health and happiness. Selvations theory, as should be clear by now, suggests that a shift from self to selvations actually implies that these ideas have biased assumptions that generate biased implications. This is not to doubt that self-help books may help some individuals sometimes in some way. I nevertheless doubt whether they help them for the reasons outlined in such books.

The undiscovered country In this final section I discuss the implications of selvations theory for understanding different aspects of the future. First, I focus on the implications of the increasing availability of parasocial relationships, for instance through mass media and the Internet, and suggest that this enables individuals to find safe havens or secure bases, even when these may reflect fiction. Second, I focus on the notion of social change and suggest how people may be able to change their futures for better or worse on the basis of newly discovered secure bases.

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Parasocial relationships. The modern age provides individuals with a range of mass media (television, Internet, social media) that individuals can use in order to relate to the world, with some being more interactive and responsive than others. Indeed, Facebook and other social media sites may have made it considerably easier for individuals to regulate their relationships. It follows that the modern world may provide, through such technological advances, a greater number of potential safe havens and secure bases than ever before (at least, to those who have access to these media). Researchers have the notion of parasocial interaction to refer to fictitious relationships (e.g., Cohen, 2003, 2004; Cole & Leets, 1999; Finn & Gorr, 1988; Jin & Park, 2009; Rubin & McHugh, 1987; Rubin et al., 1985). For instance, individuals can develop social relationships with television characters, celebrities, or even with their personal computer. This suggests that social relationships may be so essential that individuals can relate to virtual humans, non-humans, and objects as well (a well-known phenomenon in developmental and clinical psychology where the notion of object-attachment is reminiscent of Freudian times; see Bowlby, 1969). Indeed, infants are known to attach themselves to teddy bears, blankets, and the like; just as grown-ups, or at least some of them, can become attached to a car or a house. Similary, some of Isaac Asimov’s well-known science-fiction novels6 revolve around robots that, in a far future, can no longer be differentiated from human beings, which in some cases leads human characters in those novels to fall in love with a robot. Attachment theory provides a relational and adaptive perspective on what underlies such attachment behaviour, namely the need for a safe haven. Similarly, watching the same television series every night may lead to a parasocial relationship with actors and likely has the same function. For this reason, the death of one’s childhood pet, the loss of one’s teddy bear, the death of one’s favourite television character, or the total loss of one’s old car may, in a psychological sense, not be so very different from each other. Indeed, I would not find it surprising to learn that recent efforts to integrate robots (unlike those in Asimov’s novels these are clearly recognizable as machines) in elderly homes to assist with basic tasks will also have strong social effects. I have little doubt that such robots can and will be included in individuals’ selvations, as long as they can interact with them and as long they perceive them to be available and responsive to one’s needs (Reis & Clark, 2013). Note that the very notion of parasocial relationships is difficult to explain from a self-ish perspective. One would have to assume that one’s teddy bear is reflective of one’s sense of self, for instance, or simply 6

In particular, his Foundation and Robot series employ this premise.

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dismiss such relationships as dysfunctional. Indeed, parasocial relationships are also hard to explain from a more instrumental relationship perspective, in which others are viewed as external to the self and perceived costs and benefits are carefully calculated in order to decide whether to continue or exit the relationship. After all, teddy bears and actors (let alone an old car or house) are unlikely to reciprocate one’s affection. Thus, the notion of parasocial relationships and interaction is that they fit selvations theory’s focus on relational essence in terms of selvations, while suggesting that individuals do not exclusively need actual relationships. This is why we grieve when we think about when our childhood pet died (even though it was twenty years ago), why we can get angry when our computer crashes (even though nothing was permanently lost), or when our car does not start (even though we need not go anywhere urgently). Selvations infuse value into otherwise meaningless and motionless events, independent of whether the felt changes in relationships they embody are actual or anticipated, or whether we label them as ‘social’ or ‘parasocial’. This may also shed new light on the phenomenon of social media use, which once was thought to lead to the alienation of individuals from the ‘real’ world. In the last decade or so, it has become clear that what individuals actually do with social media is highly social, as indicated by popular network sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and the like. Selvations theory explains both why individuals use new technology like this to regulate (that is, maintain or generate) relationships, and why this does not necessarily result in alienation or loneliness in the ‘real’ world. At the level of selvations and infused value, there may be little difference in terms of the psychological processes associated with regulating online and offline social interaction (indeed, the social media clearly facilitate availability and responsiveness). In this sense, the Internet’s potential for maintaining and generating social networks can be viewed as facilitating individuals’ relational essence and thus the regulation of their relationships. Moreover, for some the Internet’s potential may even facilitate a secure base rather than a safe haven: activists may use its potential to feel more efficacious (e.g., Alberici & Milesi, 2012) in trying to change the world for what they believe is the better. Social change. A typical reading of how individuals come to care about and even fight for social issues is that they first need to sympathize with a relevant group (e.g., a political party, a social movement, a neighbourhood committee; see Klandermans, 1997). This, in turn, motivates them to engage in action on behalf of that group (e.g., voting, participating in social protest, chairing the neighbourhood committee). Psychologically, sympathizing means that individuals feel committed to group goals and interests and that they view themselves (put differently, they construe

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their selves) as members of the group in question (e.g., as a woman, as a ‘leftie’, as an activist). This transforms individuals’ perceptions of themselves and the social world they inhabit from an individual to a collective perception, which they assume to be shared by fellow group members. Collective action to achieve social change requires collective perceptions and therefore a sense of identification with the collective (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). This comes very close to the notion of culture in selvations theory, and of course the notion of a culturally construed collective self. Nevertheless, selvations theory offers a different answer to the question of why individuals’ group identities become ‘self-relevant’ than the one suggested by other models of collective action and social change. It suggests that individuals become moved and motivated to take part in collective action because of their selvations and thus locate the origins of social movement participation in individuals’ networks of social relationships – networks that seek change in the larger cultural matrix around them (Van Zomeren, 2014). Specifically, selvations theory suggests that collective action is relational action, generated by affirmations of obligations or violations of taboos that belong to relevant relational models. It further suggests that individuals join social protests in order to achieve relational homeostasis through emotion regulation, or to explore by exercising their agency. The likely self-construal is collective self-construal, and thus their emotional experience and their agency will be the joint and shared emotions and efficacy of the collective, pushing individuals towards approach coping. Selvations theory thus stresses that collective action is, for most people and most of the time, about social relationships and quite often about potential violations of their underlying taboos. The most, at first glance, radical change in our understanding of collective action is that self-interest, as individually and ‘rationally’ defined, is not a core motivation for collective action participation. This may disappoint sociologists and political scientists whose assumptions about social motivation rely almost exclusively on the notion of self-interest. Yet such disappointment aside, selvations theory suggests that individuals can use the notion of self-interest to explain to themselves why they act (or do not act, in the case of free-riders). But it is not essential to the enterprise. Individuals are relational actors, not rational actors (Van Zomeren, 2014). Free-riders are either those who are moved and motivated yet fail to engage in approach coping; or they are those who are simply not embedded in the relevant networks of social relationships that move and motivate them. Intriguingly, this implies that the free-rider issue, as documented and discussed in the broader social science literature, is not the huge obstacle

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to political participation that many believe it to be. The free-rider issue is typically taken to mean that collective action brings ‘mixed motives’ to the individual table: on the one hand, collective action could provide collective returns (e.g., achievement of the collective goal); on the other hand, the choice to expend effort in pursuit of the goal is individual (e.g., does one participate or not?). The rationality of individual self-interest dictates, according to many commentators (e.g., Klandermans, 1997), that individuals are likely to take a ‘free ride’, that is, to choose not to act while in the hope that others will expend the effort to achieve the collective goal. However, this ‘logic of collective action’, as Olson (1965) dubbed it, derives from culture-specific assumptions about self, not selvations. What selvations theory’s logic of collective action suggests is that those who seek to motivate individuals for collective action should focus, first and foremost, on social relationships. However, selvations theory has further implications. For instance, according to selvations theory, it is only in the mobilization process (i.e., the communicative efforts to reach others not included in the small networks, to reach the group at large, or to even influence public opinion in general) that an explicit sense of ‘me’ or ‘us’ becomes relevant (e.g., Bryan et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). It becomes relevant because it provides individuals with a Rough Guide for navigating their cultural matrix. Indeed, such communicative efforts lay out a road map towards emotion regulation and/or problem-solving that individuals can put into practice. Put differently, mobilization efforts tell individuals what to feel and what to do in order to achieve which goal. Although selvations theory predicts that such mobilization efforts will influence those already motivated because they offer a clear road map, it is unlikely that this will be helpful for those who are not already motivated. This means that mobilization efforts typically affect coping, not value infusion. Of course, selvations theory suggests a particular way for them to do so. Mobilization efforts, with this goal in mind, should target selvations and thus social relationships in their communicative content (Van Zomeren, 2014). Specifically, they should target the taboos that are violated for the particular social issue that is believed to be in need of social change. Selvations theory suggests that organizers, politicians, and other social practitioners and engineers should communicate with the aim of disturbing the web of individuals’ inner spider; and then provide a Rough Guide to guide their coping in culturally appropriate ways. Thus, selvations theory provides a distinctly relational theory of social motivation that can be used as a relationship-based blueprint for designing mobilization messages to change the future.

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Conclusion I hope this book is understood as I intend it to be: a plea for a relational essence in social motivation, a shift in thinking about social motivation from self to selvations, and a call for a shift towards a theoretically integrative and consilient understanding of all the fragmented empirical efforts to understand what moves and motivates us in our (relational) essence. I also hope to have shown that different assumptions about social motivation have different implications. For this reason, selvations theory is not just a theory that resides in a philosopher’s armchair or comfortably lingers within an ivory tower. The general shift it proposes from self to selvations has implications for how we understand the core business of everyday life and the challenges of the future. Indeed, the key message of this epilogue is that selvations theory implies that our health and happiness in everyday life depend critically on taking one’s inner spider and one’s cultural matrix seriously. In practice, this means taking seriously the value quite literally provided by social relationships and respecting the obligations and taboos they entail in the prevailing cultural matrix. Indeed, selvations theory tells us something important when it suggests that we are the knots around which our relationships are tied. It tells us how much we differ from the cold and calculating rational actors that some suggest we are. And it tells us that as much as we may have learned to love our selves within our WEIRD cultural matrix, it is those selves that actually play make-believe with us by hiding our relational essence. Of course, this is precisely why I was surprised to see my one-year-old daughter not take the cookie I offered her. This is precisely why I was surprised that, instead, she ignored the cookie altogether and hugged me intensely. Perhaps we might be surprised to find out how often social motivation is actually not at all about ‘the cookie’.

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Index

acculturation, 159, 160 altruistic behaviour, 18, 27 anger, 51, 57, 94, 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 117, 130, 135, 137 anxiety, 50, 51, 75, 78, 94, 97, 99, 105, 107, 130, 135, 137, 157 appraisal theories of emotion, 40, 51, 52, 105 as-if relationship, 161 attachment security, 72 autonomy, 3, 36, 77, 102, 111

emotion-focused approach coping, 108, 111, 117 emotion-focused avoidance coping, 108 empirical fragmentation, 4, 12, 13, 14, 22, 30, 125, 153, 154 empty empiricism, 12, 14, 38, 125, 154, 157 evolution theory, 55, 61 exercise of agency, 54, 108 exploration coping, 99, 130, 131, 159

bounded rationality, 42, 90 Buddhism, 156 burn out, 161

faculty of forethought, 46, 53, 94, 98, 99, 100, 108, 109, 130 fair treatment, 142 free-rider, 167

clash of civilizations, 116 cognitive-motivational-relational (CMR) theory, 94, 97, 99, 100, 109, 112, 131 consilient theorizing, 12, 14, 15, 154 contact hypothesis, 141 core affect, 71, 78 cost–benefit calculation, 41, 42, 89, 90, 129, 144, 146 cultural embeddedness, 147, 148 cultural norms, 6, 20, 27, 33, 36, 79, 88, 93, 99, 110, 115, 117, 159 cultural psychology, 3, 16, 19, 29, 125, 126, 135 cultural variance, 14, 19, 25, 28, 34, 57, 95, 127, 148 drives, 33, 47, 48, 50, 54, 89, 157 egoism–altruism debate, 132–133 emotion regulation, 54, 99, 100, 108, 167, 168

globalization, 61, 102, 156 happiness, 25, 94, 155, 164 health, 2, 26, 34, 155 hidden assumption, 56 homeostatic coping, 109, 131 homo duplex, 114, 118, 155 homo economicus, 40 human universals, 13, 14, 28, 29, 34, 58, 123, 127 incentives, 33, 42, 55, 129, 130 independent self-construal, 61, 102, 103, 107, 116, 124, 129, 138, 145 individual self, 21, 139, 140, 157 individualism, 3, 17, 21, 22, 25, 37, 38, 42, 61, 102, 103 instinctoid, 48, 123, 128 interdependent self-construal, 61, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 140

193

194

Index

life regulation, 71, 91, 130 loneliness, 2, 15, 25, 26, 35, 37, 57, 83, 152, 166 mental make-believe, 22, 23, 30, 38, 61, 124, 140, 146, 153, 163 meta-relational models, 147 mimicry, 54, 159 mindfulness, 156 moral conflict, 86, 115, 144 moral conviction, 112 moral foundations theory, 85 moral psychology, 85, 86, 122, 179 morality, 85, 86, 140, 180 need to belong, 33, 47, 57, 73, 135 ostracism, 136–137 paradigm shift, 14, 150 parasocial relationships, 35, 41, 58, 113, 164, 165 person-environment relationship, 95 primordial feelings, 68, 70, 71, 72, 92, 131 problem-focused approach coping, 98, 109 problem-focused avoidance coping, 99, 109 prospect theory, 49 proto-self theory, 31, 65, 71, 78, 84, 87 rational actors, 18, 19, 26, 40, 42, 82, 143, 145, 167, 169 regulatory focus theory, 49, 50, 130 relational actors, 26, 41, 89, 144, 149, 167 relational models theory, 31, 37, 38, 65, 79, 80, 83, 84, 87 relational obligations, 147 religion, 72, 116, 156, 179 robots, 165 sacred values, 111 safe havens, 61, 127, 155, 156, 164, 165 secure bases, 61, 149, 155, 156, 164, 165 self-actualization, 17, 47, 129, 158 self-affirmation, 140, 141

self-construal theory, 94, 100, 102, 103, 112 self-efficacy theory, 19, 53, 54, 94, 100, 108, 109, 112, 131 self-enhancement, 6, 18, 19, 20, 38 self-help books, 21, 162, 163, 164 self-interest, 2, 16, 17, 25, 38, 40, 81, 90, 133 self-motives, 2, 6, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 43, 61, 105, 123, 135, 139, 141 self-relevance, 33, 38, 39, 40, 49, 52, 131 self-verification, 6, 19 social baseline, 74 social brain, 56, 60 social capital, 88 social change, i, 118, 164, 167, 168 social dilemma, 145, 146 social exclusion, 2, 25, 136, 137 social identity theory, 20, 104 social media, 147, 165, 166 social network, 6, 22, 23, 35, 88, 89, 117, 147, 148, 153 social neuroscience, 45, 125 social sciences, 12, 15, 26, 31, 40, 88, 89, 90, 121, 122, 144, 149 social structure, 24, 37, 66, 102, 117, 148, 149 sociometer, 67, 135 subjective utility, 19, 40, 144 synthesis, 4, 6, 11, 13, 29, 55, 66, 84, 94, 127, 149, 153, 179 system justification, 118, 142–144 taboo violation, 124 tend-and-befriend, 137, 138, 139 theoretical integration, 3, 4, 6, 12, 14, 25, 28, 79, 92, 121, 126, 149, 151, 153 theories of motivation, 2, 3, 19, 28, 31, 33, 38, 43, 48, 50, 53, 84, 110, 127, 130, 134 unconscious, 22, 54, 90, 132, 157 value-expectancy, 49, 110, 129, 130 WEIRD, 16, 19, 20, 114, 117, 169 well-being, 2, 68, 70, 96, 97, 150 working model, 74

STUDIES IN EMOTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

Titles published in the Second Series (continued from p. ii) Speaking from the Heart: Gender and the Social Meaning of Emotion, by Stephanie A. Shields The Hidden Genius of Emotion: Lifespan Transformations of Personality, by Carol Magai and Jeannette Haviland-Jones The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion, by Patrick Colm Hogan Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, edited by Antony S. R. Manstead, Nico H. Frijda, and Agneta H. Fischer Collective Guilt: International Perspectives, edited by Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje The Social Life of Emotions, edited by Larissa Z. Tiedens and Colin Wayne Leach Emotions and Multilingualism, by Aneta Pavlenko Group Dynamics and Emotional Expression, edited by Ursula Hess and Pierre Philippot Stigmatization, Tolerance and Repair: An Integrative Psychological Analysis of Responses to Deviance, by Anton J. M. Dijker and Willem Koomen The Self and Its Emotions, by Kristján Kristjánsson Face-to-Face Communication over the Internet: Emotions in a Web of Culture, Language and Technology, edited by Arvid Kappas and Nicole C. Krämer What Literature Teaches Us about Emotion, by Patrick Colm Hogan Emotion: A Biosocial Synthesis, by Ross Buck