From Huntington to Trump : Thirty Years of the Clash of Civilizations 1498578195, 9781498578196

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Introduction
Chapter One. Civilizations and International Relations: History and Development
Chapter Two. The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder”
Chapter Three. The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue
Chapter Four. Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam
Chapter Five. The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue
Chapter Six. The United States of America
Chapter Seven. Western Europe
Chapter Eight. Central Europe
Conclusion
Appendix: Author’s Personal Interviews (Anonymized and Chronological)
References
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

From Huntington to Trump

From Huntington to Trump Thirty Years of the Clash of Civilizations Jeffrey Haynes

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2019 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN 978-1-4985-7819-6 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4985-7820-2 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

List of Tables

vii

Introduction 1 1  C  ivilizations and International Relations: History and Development

25

2  The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder”

45

3  The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue

65

4  R  ight-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam

87

5  T  he UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue

107

6  The United States of America

131

7  Western Europe

153

8  Central Europe

175

Conclusion 197 Appendix: Author’s Personal Interviews

215

References 221 Index 247 About the Author

253 v

Tables

Table 4.1.  Securitization of Islam: General Discursive Structure

97

Table 4.2.  Securitization of Islam: Threats and Potential Solutions

99

vii

Introduction

The late American political scientist Samuel Huntington (1927–2008) sought to analyze the impact of intercivilizational conflict on international relations after the Cold War. Huntington focused attention on the perceived incompatibilities of various civilizations, especially the Western and the Islamic. Given the amount of attention paid to his arguments (1993, 1996), especially since the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), it seems very likely that they have significantly influenced scholars and politicians in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere.1 This book examines the impact of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” “paradigm” or “framework” on (1) post-Cold War intercivilizational conflict and cooperation at the United Nations, and (2) right-wing populism in the USA and Europe. The influence of Huntington’s clash of civilizations argument on international relations and domestic political outcomes can be seen in key events of the last two decades. They include: (1) the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, which focused global attention on what some saw as a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world; (2) the United Nations’ response to 9/11; (3) Donald Trump’s presidential election in 2016, which employed strident anti-Muslim rhetoric; and (4) recent election success for right-wing populists in various European countries, including: Italy, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In addition, other European countries, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, saw growing political influence of right-wing populists. Like Trump, right-wing populists in Europe employ a novel ideology, “civilizationism” or “Christian civilizationism” (Brubaker 2017; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Csehi 2019; Ozzano 2019). The overall point is that the “clash of civilizations” framework encouraged some politicians to portray Muslims and Islam in a malign way and to use this as part of a populist approach to gaining political power.2 Many right-wing 1

2

Introduction

populists have found it politically useful to employ explanations for increasing popular dissatisfaction with the status quo by pointing to perceived civilizational incompatibilities between the West and the Islamic world. Huntington’s 1993 article on the “clash of civilizations” was published shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, at a time when the impact of globalization was beginning to influence how scholars and politicians viewed how the world “works.” After the Cold War, Huntington believed, “civilizations” would interact much more than during that conflict. Such relations would not necessarily be harmonious, as they would reflect civilizations’ differing, often divergent, values. The book is divided into two sections and eight chapters. The first section, comprising the introduction and chapters 1–4, surveys intercivilizational interactions in both historical and contemporary contexts. Chapter 1 focuses on intercivilizational relations during the colonial era and the Cold War, that is, from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries. The context is that from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Western colonialism, spearheaded by British and French imperialism, sought to spread “Western civilization,” by extending the Western state model and the presumed civilizing effects of Christianity, into non-Western territories in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Following each of the two world wars, there were colonial backlashes against Western colonialism and imperialism, leading eventually to a New World Order. This was symbolized after World War II by the creation of the United Nations, informed by a speedy process of decolonization. Hedley Bull (1985) identified the process of decolonization and the creation of a new entity in international relations, the “Third World,” as a “revolt against the West.” Post-World War II decolonization overlapped with the Cold War and attendant bipolarization of international relations, a period which came to an end in the early 1990s, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Chapter 2 examines intercivilizational interactions after the Cold War, detailing the development of a New World Disorder in the 1990s. The demise of the Soviet Union was followed by a brief period of Western optimism that a benign and progressive New World Order would now emerge. This did not occur and, by the mid-1990s, there were several new focal points of intercivilizational friction and tensions, involving differing values-based interpretations of the world, played out both in national contexts—for example, civil war in former Yugoslavia between different groups of culturally-orientated combatants—and internationally, for example, Islamist extremists, such as al Qaeda, who regarded the West as seeking to impose alien civilizational values on Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere. The third chapter examines efforts in the 1990s to establish and develop a “dialogue among civilizations” at the United Nations. A key initiative in this



Introduction 3

regard was made in 1998 by the then president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami. Despite hearing him politely, the UN General Assembly did not authorize an institutionalization of his initiative. It was not until after 9/11 that the UN took concrete steps to institutionalize inter-civilizational dialogue efforts via establishment of the UN Alliance of Civilizations in 2005. At the same time at the UN there was also a long-running debate about the merits of individualistic versus collective values and rights, which served to pit the West against various non-Western countries. The 1993 UN Human Rights Conference held in Vienna was a focal point of this divergence, which Huntington refers to as indicative of the different values expressed by the West and the “Rest.” September 11, 2001, was a game changer which brutally exposed and focused differing values, underlining for some the argument that Huntington had made about how differing civilizational values would in some contexts lead to international conflict. Chapter 4 surveys the development of securitization of Islam after 9/11, both at the UN and in the USA and Europe. Following the attacks on the United States on 9/11, George W. Bush launched the West’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) under US leadership. The UN also devoted much attention to the threat of Islamist terrorism, via anti-violent extremism and anti-terrorism programs and policies. Securitization of Islam helped to encourage increasing Islamophobia, which some right-wing populists augmented by adhesion to a novel ideology: “Christian civilizationism.” The first section of the book provides the historic and ideational background to the recent political rise of Islamophobia and Christian civilizationism in both the USA and Europe. The second section of the book comprises four chapters, chapters 5–8. Each focuses upon an aspect of current relations between the West and the Muslim world. Chapter 5 looks at the United Nations, chapter 6 at the USA, chapter 7 at Western Europe, and chapter 8 at Central Europe. The overall aim of the section is to examine relations between the West and the Muslim world in selected national, regional, and international environments. Chapter 5 looks at the UN’s response to a perceived clash of civilizations, especially between the West and the Muslim world, following 9/11. Stimulated by the failure of the UN’s Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, which exposed deep divisions over values between member states, the UN sought a “dialogue among civilizations” in the 1990s. Chapter 6 focuses on the growth of anti-Muslim sentiment and an associated ideology, Judeo-Christianism, in the USA. It examines the political rise of Donald Trump, underlining that Trump’s ascendancy to the presidency reflected a rise of anti-Muslim sentiment in the country. It also drew on plentiful allusions to “Judeo-Christian values,” as foundational to “American

4

Introduction

values” more generally. Trump fanned economic fears by his allusions to “uncontrolled” immigration and the malign effects of economic globalization on the US economy and workers’ jobs. Chapter 7 turns to Western Europe and traces a rise in anti-Muslim feeling, manifested in the political emergence of right-wing populists’ employment of the ideology of Christian civilizationism. In Western Europe, right-wing populists identified Muslims as the “enemy within,” an issue which came to a head in the 2015 refugee crisis. For Western European populists, such as Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Muslims are culpable in wanting to undermine the secular, post-Christian values of gender equality and liberalism. Chapter 8 examines four countries in Central Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Each has seen a recent rise right-wing populism and Islamophobia. Unlike Western Europe, where the concern is with Muslims as “the enemy within,” in these countries, right-wing populists, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, claim that Muslims represent a major threat to civilizational values and must be excluded from his country. The book’s conclusion summarizes the arguments and findings of the book. METHODOLOGY The book adopts a qualitative methodology, primarily informed by eightytwo, mainly face-to-face, personal interviews conducted by the author with individuals with knowledge of the “clash of civilizations” issues and controversies. The interviews took place in the USA and in various European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom) between 2015 and 2018. A full list of anonymized interviewees, as well as places and dates of the interviews, is provided in Appendix 1. Additional material was also collected from the author’s attendance at the seventh United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Global Forum, held in Baku, Azerbaijan, 25–27 April, 2016, and at various UN events during 2015–2017. The author was an invited speaker at the seventh Global Forum, and this led to numerous useful conversations in Baku and later which also informed the research for and contents of this book. Finally, research for the book was also conducted via internet archive investigations, which yielded many relevant primary and secondary source documents. In addition, hard copies of other relevant documents were provided by those interviewed during the research for and writing of the book. The starting point for the research was a three-year research program (2015–2017) conducted under the auspices of the Enhancing Life Project (ELP), led by Professor Bill Schweiker (University of Chicago, USA) and



Introduction 5

Professor Gunther Thomas (Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany), supported by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation (http://enhancinglife.uchicago.edu/). The author of the current book was one of the thirtyfive scholars involved in the ELP, working on a project entitled: “The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations: An Effective Actor to Improve Global Dialogue?.” The results of my research on the ELP project were published in Haynes (2018a, 2018b). Following the end of the ELP research project in August 2017, I decided to augment that study with a wider geographical focus to include not only the United Nations in New York, but also the newly inaugurated administration of Donald Trump in the USA and the contemporaneous growth in right-wing populism in several European countries. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm was a common theme in each of the three contexts—the UN, the USA, and Europe. To pursue the theme of the impact of the “clash of civilizations” on international, regional, and national contexts, further interviews were undertaken in Washington, DC, in April 2018 and in the same year in several European countries, including the UK and Poland and at the European Union. Early results of the research were published in Haynes (2019a, 2019b). The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: first, we look at the main components of Huntington’s paradigm. Second, we assess how well-founded and persuasive his arguments are. HUNTINGTON’S “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” PARADIGM The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington 1993: 22)

The “new world” that Huntington is referring to came into being as the Soviet Union fell apart, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. At this time, the United States sought to export democracy and individualistic interpretations of human rights to non-democratic areas of the world. The four decades-long conflict of the Cold War had been both ideological and economic—with the USA and Soviet Union squaring up to each other, each seeking to make themselves unchallenged global leader. But in the late 1980s, the Cold War

6

Introduction

unexpectedly ended. The implosion of the Soviet Union, a multinational state increasingly beset by ethnic divisions, soon followed. The collapse of the USSR was related to the structure of the state itself. The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, mono-ideology state, comprising fifteen different republics. Collectively, the Soviet republics comprised dozens of ethnicities, languages, and cultures, many of which lived in uneasy harmony or disharmony with each other. In some, a Russian majority was parachuted in—and Russians sometimes sought to bully or dominate the locals. Unsurprisingly, this often created or fuelled inter-ethnic or inter-cultural tensions, for example, in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). In 1989, emergence of nationalist movements in the Soviet bloc led to regime change to Poland. Demands for national self-expression spread to Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, as well as to non-Soviet but communist Yugoslavia. In the resulting turmoil, several erstwhile Soviet republics began to divide along ethnic lines, encouraging separatist movements in, inter alia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the three Baltic states. Yugoslavia fell into a decadelong civil war (1991–2001) with fractured relations involving Muslim Bosnians, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Catholic Croats. For both the USSR and Yugoslavia, the conflicts proved to be too much for their fragile unity and the power of their central states rapidly and terminally withered. In December 1991 the Soviet Union came to an end, followed a month later by the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Beissinger 2009). These two near-simultaneous events—the breakup of the USSR and the demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—were very recent when Foreign Affairs published Huntington’s article on the “clash of civilizations” in the Summer 1993 issue. For Huntington, the collapse of these two long-established multinational states,3 the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, reflected three wider developments: (1) the post-Cold War world was a new international environment without the ideological givens of the previous four decades; (2) many states around the world were under pressure from ethnic, nationalist, cultural and/or religious demands for greater autonomy or independence; and (3) future international conflicts would chiefly be along “cultural” lines,4 especially at the “fault lines” between civilizations which, Huntington believed, would be “the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1993: 22). It was not only the nationalist and inter-cultural wars in Yugoslavia and the messy contemporaneous breakup of the Soviet Union which attracted scholars’ and politicians’ attention. In addition, there was widespread realization that in the early 1990s a post-Cold War “New World Disorder” was emerging, characterized by clashing value systems between the West and “the Rest,” notably various Asian and Muslim-majority countries. The rift



Introduction 7

was exposed at a major UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993. The conference was expected to be both a celebration of the West’s “triumph” over the Soviet Union—and communism more generally—and also a landmark statement about the universality of the Western approaches to human rights and democracy. In the event, however, the Vienna conference was characterized by fervent disputes about values, with the West on one side and the Muslim world and Asian allies on the other. The divergence of views about the appropriateness of individualistic human rights and “Western-style” democracy suggested to some that Huntington was right: the post-Cold War world was characterized by emerging conflict between civilizational blocs; the West’s values were not universal but culture- and civilization-specific, as Huntington (1993) contended. Huntington was not the first scholar to make the “clash of civilizations” argument. As long ago as 1957, the British orientalist Bernard Lewis had argued that there was a “clash between civilizations” in a speech at Johns Hopkins University. Lewis later returned to this theme in an influential article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” published in The Atlantic Monthly magazine in September 1990.5 Lewis argued that Arab Muslim-majority countries and Western nations had different values, which would lead to political conflicts. In the late 1950s, Lewis’s contentions did not create much of a stir in the West. This was hardly surprising given that the main foreign policy issue for the West was how to deal with an apparently expansionist Soviet Union. In addition, in the late 1950s many Muslim-majority countries were still under Western colonial or quasi-colonial control, and the issue of a civilizational clash seemed implausible. In 1990, however, as the Soviet Union tottered and Yugoslavia began to fall apart, Lewis’s argument seemed to some, including Huntington, to be prescient, leading the latter to include Lewis’s phrase in the title of his 1993 article. Huntington stated in the preface to his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, that it was “not intended to be a work of social science. It is instead meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War. It aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers” (1996: 13). The apparently interchangeable terms that Huntington uses, “paradigm” and “framework,” both imply an interpretative structure or belief system adopted heuristically to try to make sense of the world. A “framework” is a “basic structure underlying a system, concept, or text,” while a “paradigm” is “a belief system (or theory) that guides the way we do things, or more formally establishes a set of practices. This can range from thought patterns to action” (emphasis added; “What is your paradigm,” n/d). Compare this with the term “social science” which “in its broadest

8

Introduction

sense” means “the study of society and the manner in which people behave and influence the world around us” (Economic and Social Research Council 2019). Like Lewis in the 1950s, Huntington was seeking in the 1990s to interpret what he saw happening after the Cold War, as events unfolded and longer-term developments were unclear. In other words, his “framework” or “paradigm” was constructed impressionistically, employing both empirical and anecdotal information and ideas which might not necessarily stand up to the scrutiny of enquiry meeting social scientific criteria. But it had its own value. The purpose of a paradigm (Greek: paradeigma) “is to provide an audience with an illustration of similar occurrences. This illustration is not meant to take the audience to a conclusion, however it is used to help guide them there.” Thus, Huntington probably believed he was identifying similar developments in various contemporaneous contexts that “guides the way we do things, or more formally establishes a set of practices” (“paradigm,” n/d). Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) influential exposition of the nature of a paradigm suggested that a paradigm does not have to be “correct”—that is, stand up to social scientific scrutiny—but it does have to be widely believed. Thus, a paradigm could conceivably be built on bigotry, paranoia, or manipulation and distortion of the “facts.” What is most important, however, is that enough people believe its claims to make it de facto “common knowledge,” that is, “information that the average, educated reader would accept as reliable without having to look it up” (“What is common knowledge,” n/d). The relationship between a paradigmatic argument and popular understanding can be straightforward: If a paradigmatic argument is persuasive—however “erroneous” some may think it—many will believe its claims. This occurs when enough people want to believe it because, for example, it fits in with their prejudices and pre-existing explanatory frameworks. 9/11 is a useful example of what I am referring to. The egregious attacks on the USA were carried out by just nineteen hijackers—all of whom were Muslims. For many Americans, the attackers’ shared religion was the key explanatory factor—encouraging the conclusion that by association all Muslims have “anti-US” and by extension “anti-Western” sentiments and, as a result, should be regarded with suspicion or hostility. The fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were from Saudi Arabia did not encourage an obvious, alternative, explanation: Saudi Arabian nationals wanted to harm the USA. In other words, the hijackers’ religion was taken to be the main motivating factor of the 9/11 attacks, not the national identity of most of them. The events of September 11, 2001, were instrumental in creating a climate of Islamophobia in the USA, which over time became embedded in the worldviews of many Americans, a trend encouraged and exacerbated by growth in right-wing media outlets and social media (Beydoun 2018; Foody 2018; Love 2017). These developments significantly contributed to a “clash



Introduction 9

of civilizations” understanding of the world in the USA, reflected in Donald Trump’s success in the presidential election of November 2016 (Haynes 2017a). Without 9/11 and its consequential social, political, and cultural impact in the USA and the West more generally, which continues to reverberate today, Huntington’s “framework” of the “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world, would likely have been debated only by a few scholars, with little impact on the perceptions of politicians and the public. The events of 9/11 made Huntington’s paradigm both mainstream and center stage. But this was not the first such attack, although it was the most destructive and caused the most deaths. The 9/11 attacks followed several others which, while not being ignored, did not lead to the embedding of Islamophobia in the minds of millions of people in the USA and the West more generally. More than eight years before 9/11, on 26 February 1993, there was a jihadist bomb attack on New York’s Twin Towers, followed in 7 August 1998 by Islamist extremist assaults on two US embassies in Africa. The 1993 incident was the first jihadi terrorist attack on US soil, resulting in six deaths and more than 1,000 injured (Bernstein 1993). The jihadist attacks in 1998 were near-simultaneous attacks on US embassies in Mombasa (Kenya) and Dar es Salam (Tanzania), which resulted in 224 dead. Neither the 1993 or 1998 attacks prompted the US government to respond significantly against the perceived aggressors. The US government reacted to 9/11 differently: initiating and leading invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), viewed by many as exemplary punishment of Muslims tout court for the horrors of 9/11. The US-led invasions helped to focus global attention on Huntington’s paradigm of claimed incompatible values which were said by some fundamentally to divide the Western and Muslim worlds. In addition to claiming to pursue retributive justice against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the government of the USA also overtly sought to spread Western values of democracy and human rights to Afghanistan and Iraq’s Muslim-majority societies. Neither President George W. Bush (2001–2009) nor his successor President Barack Obama (2009–2017) publicly identified the invasions as linked to a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” paradigm. Both presidents stressed that the USA was not at war with Muslims generally, only with jihadi extremists and terrorists who wished to do down the USA. Many in the USA and the West believed that 9/11 was evidence that “Islam” is built on different and inferior values compared to the “Christian” West, with Muslims said to be more comfortable with and tolerant of both violence and conflict (Bottici and Challand 2010). Such a perception was bolstered for many in the West by the emergence and brief period of vigorous ascendancy by so-called Islamic State (IS) from the mid-2000s, a rise achieved by egregiously brutal methods.6 IS advocates global jihad, driven by a Wahhabi-Salafist ideology. IS wants a borderless Islamic caliphate to

10

Introduction

replace today’s nation-states, eliminate all rival religions, and convert and absorb all surviving ethnic and religious groups to their “brand” of Islam. IS jihadists see themselves as fighting a global war, defending pure Islam against the forces of decadent Western civilization and its puppets in the Islamic world (Cockburn 2017). As George (2016: 52) notes, Islamic State’s “extensive use of Quranic messages has made it harder for observers to absolve the religion of blame. As a 2015 cover story in the Atlantic observed, ‘The reality is that Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic.’” But this was at best a partial truth, as George notes: “[W]hile Islamic State zealots may believe that they are following the Qur’an’s dictates to the letter, the notion that theirs is either the most authentic or the most representative reading of Allah’s will is contradicted by the vast majority of devout Muslims.” Fox’s (2005) large-scale empirical study provides scant support for the view that Islam is inherently or uniquely antidemocratic or prone to violence. Instead, as many have noted, political attitudes do not differ greatly between most citizens of the Muslim world and those of the West, with majorities in both respecting the virtues of democracy and representative governments (Kamali 2015). “Several studies have emphasized that correlations between Islam and violence are better explained by nonreligious factors, including asymmetric conflict that makes peaceful dispute resolution appear impossible” (George, 2016: 52). The truth or not of post-9/11 intercivilizational conflict between the West and the Muslim world largely boils down to the assertion that each civilization is autonomous and built on different sets of dichotomous, clashing values. This was Huntington’s claim. His 1993 article on the “clash of civilizations” in Foreign Policy soon followed his influential 1991 book on the “third wave” of democratization. This book was influential, helping stimulate much discussion about the spread of (liberal) democracy, after the Cold War and the demise of Europe’s communist states. Huntington outlined in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century the significance of a global trend that saw more than sixty countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa undergo some form of democratic transitions in the quartercentury since Portugal’s “Carnation revolution” of 1974.7 Huntington was convinced that the spread of (liberal) democracy had clear and obvious limits, linked to a society’s history, traditions, culture, and values. Huntington’s argument in his 1993 “clash of civilizations” article, developed and embellished in his 1996 book, was that a society’s values, traditions, and culture inform its attitude not only towards democratization and democracy but more generally in relation to human rights. Huntington’s 1993 article was, in large measure, a riposte to the optimistic vision of his former student, Francis Fukuyama, advanced in a 1989 article and subsequent book, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Fukuyama’s claim was that



Introduction 11

with the decline and eventual demise of the Soviet Union, communism could no longer be a significant challenge to the spread of Western-style liberal democracy and capitalism. In the words of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), democracy was now “the only game in town.” For Huntington, the spread of democracy could presage more benign, less fractious, international relations, based on the premise both that democracies do not go to war with each other and that capitalism does best during periods of peace. However, this would pertain only to countries with shared civilizational values. As the 1990s progressed, initial optimism à la Fukuyama of a less fractious post-Cold War “New World Order”—characterized by the global advance of capitalism, democracy, and improved human rights—diminished. At this time, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was one of the few areas of the world apparently untouched by the third wave of democratization. The MENA region comprises more than twenty countries and, with the exception of Israel, all are Muslim-majority states. For Huntington, this was not in the least accidental but reflected what he regarded as the anti-liberal, anti-democratic, and anti-human rights values of the MENA’s Muslim countries, the great majority. The overall point is that, set in train by various events in the 1990s, and seemingly embedded by 9/11 and subsequent developments, including the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, Huntington’s hypothesis about inter-civilizational “clashes” entered the mainstream, informing the worldviews of many politicians, policy makers, and “ordinary people.” While intercivilizational “dialogue,” initiated at the UN following the divisive 1993 human rights conference in Vienna, sought to be a decisive response to the claims of a “clash of civilizations,” over time many countries’ core concerns, as well as their international relations, were interpreted through the lens of the clash of civilizations, a situation which in Europe and the USA right-wing populists were able to exploit for electoral gain (Pew Research Center 2006). CIVILIZATIONS, CONFLICT, AND VALUES: HOW HAS HUNTINGTON’S ARGUMENT FARED? We are concerned in this book with the alleged “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world. In all, Huntington (1993) identified “seven or eight” “major” civilizations: 1.  Sinic: the common culture of China and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, plus Vietnam and Korea. 2.  Japanese: Japanese culture as distinctively different from the rest of Asia.

12

Introduction

3.  Hindu: identified as the core Indian civilization. 4.  Islamic: Originating in the Arabian Peninsula, spread across North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and Central Asia, with several distinct subdivisions, including: Arab, Turkic, Persian, and Malay. 5.  Orthodox Christian: centred in Russia and separate culturally from “Western Christendom,” seen as the foundation of “Western” values. 6.  Western: comprising the countries of Western Europe and North America, plus Australia and New Zealand. 7.  Latin American: Central and South American countries with a past of a corporatist, authoritarian culture. Most with Catholic Christian majority and growing Protestant minorities, and “possibly”: 8.  African: Huntington averred that while sub-Saharan Africa lacked a developed sense of “pan-African identity,” regional peoples were developing it. The “core state” leading this drive to increased regional would be either Nigeria or South Africa, widely regarded as Africa’s most powerful and influential states (Huntington, 1996: 45–46).8 For Huntington, the West was distinctive compared to other civilizations in three fundamental ways: 1.  The West’s ability to maintain military superiority. This was accomplished via non-proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to non-Western parts of the world (Huntington 1996: 190). It was vital for the West’s continued hegemony that it maintained its military dominance. 2.  Promotion of Western political values, including human rights and democracy. Many Western governments, including the US government, considered this to be vital to achieve a relatively cooperative and conflictfree world. 3.  Restriction of non-Western immigrants and refugees into Western societies. According to Huntington, “dilution” and debasement of Western civilization would follow mass migration from non-Western parts of the world, sounding the death knell of Western civilization (Huntington, 2004). From a “non-Western” point of view, however, these three components of the West’s claimed civilizational distinctiveness can be viewed as both indicative and supportive of long-running Western attempts to perpetuate global dominance and maintain cultural hegemony. Following the demise of Western colonialism by the 1980s, the issue came to the fore at the UN’s



Introduction 13

1993 Vienna human rights conference. At the conference, a succession of non-Western countries, mainly from the Muslim and Sinic civilizations, critiqued the West’s lionizing of individualistic human rights and “Westernstyle” liberal democracy, claiming they were not appropriate for their different historical, cultural, political, and societal contexts (Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2007). The issue acquired additional complexity and political controversy because at this time, post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, some of which were Orthodox Christian nations, including Russia, as well as Latin American and many African states, seemed to be developing Western-style democratic political systems reflective of a wider and deeper process of Westernization (Haynes 1998). By the end of the 1990s, however, this apparent Westernization trend had dwindled, exemplified by the end of the third wave of democracy and, in many cases, a diminution not accretion of human rights. For some, this was evidence that Huntington was correct: “Western values” of democracy and individualistic human rights do not travel well and other civilizations do not willingly adopt them. Huntington claims that the Cold War would be followed by “intercivilizational” conflicts involving autonomous, culturally-defined, blocs of states characterized by dichotomous values. Now, three decades on, what has become of Huntington’s prophesy of such inter-civilizational conflicts? According to Huntington, core states of civilizational blocs would now be in a period of sustained, values-based, conflict. Huntington’s claim was not only that after the Cold War Western countries would be conflicting with the states of the Muslim world but, in addition, would be at loggerheads with China, the core country of the “Sinic” civilization. Working on the assumption that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Huntington contended that Muslim states and China would logically work together to confront and compete with the West. Competition and conflict would be both underpinned and driven by each bloc’s different value systems, that is: the West lionized democracy and human rights, liberalism and individualism, while China and the Muslim countries did not (Huntington, 1996: 94). In the chapter of his 1996 book entitled “The Global Politics of Civilizations,” Huntington focused on a three-way emerging civilizational conflict involving the Muslim world, China, and the West. Now, several decades later, whither this presumed inter-civilizational conflict? As I write these words, in mid-2019, the USA is engaged in a deepening trade war with China. This is not however an inter-civilizational conflict which, for Huntington, was rooted in clashes of values and beliefs. Instead, the deepening trade war between the USA and China centers on the massive trade imbalance which the American government wants to see reduced by making Chinese goods entering the USA more expensive and US exports to China increased by China’s lowering of

14

Introduction

relevant tariffs. Both sides adhere to the same civilizational framework in this context: international trade along capitalist lines under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. In short, it is not necessary to invoke civilizational amity or enmity when seeking to identify causes of the USA’s trade war with China. This is directly antithetical to the claims of Huntington expressed in his “clash of civilizations” framework. Turning to relations between the West and the Muslim world, Huntington claimed that a conflict would ensue, encouraged by each side’s adherence to different values. While the West’s fundamental values are said to center on individualistic human rights and liberal democracy, according to Huntington those of the Muslim world are different, being unconcerned with or positively hostile to (liberal) democracy and (individualistic) human rights. Huntington claims “that the Muslim world lacks the core political values that gave birth to representative democracy in Western civilization: separation of religious and secular authority, rule of law and social pluralism, parliamentary institutions of representative government, and protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state” (Inglehart and Norris 2003). “Islam” is a religious faith followed by 1.8 billion people around the world, approximately one quarter of the global population (Pew Research Center 2017). Huntington focused on significant Muslim-majority countries, such as Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan. While none were, he believed, identifiable as Islam’s “core country,” collectively they represent adhesion to values fundamentally different from those characterizing the West. A second claim of Huntington is that “Western culture, particularly American culture, emphasizes individualism to an extent no other culture that I know of does. Other cultures put the emphasis on community, family, and social factors, whereas we talk about the rights of individuals.” As a result, it was futile, he alleged, for the West to try to export its values to the rest of the world as civilizational incompatibilities meant that the West’s appeal would not only fall on deaf ears but likely be seen as a neo-imperialist gesture (Pew Research Center 2006). To what extent does Huntington’s assertion stand up, that is, that “Western culture, particularly American culture, emphasizes individualism,” and “other cultures put their emphasis on community, family, and social factors”? He made this claim in 2006 in the aftermath of the 2003 US overthrow of Iraq’s then leader, Saddam Hussein and, consequently, the attempt to introduce and consolidate democracy. Huntington believed that this was an impossible task because of civilizational incompatibilities between the West and Muslimmajority Iraq. But how difficult would it be for any external actor to seek to impose its preferred political system and human rights preferences on a country which it had recently invaded and dominated by force, leading to



Introduction 15

the deaths of hundreds of thousands of local people?9 In other words, many Iraqis no doubt opposed the US-led invasion of their country—but this was not necessarily linked to their supposedly different “civilizational” values featuring an Islamic-inspired aversion to democracy and human rights. It was likely connected to resentment at a foreign invasion and subsequent deaths of hundreds of thousands of countrymen and women. Evidence for this interpretation can be found in a 2014 study conducted by researchers from the Universities of Toronto and Tübingen. The study found that while “people living in Muslim-majority countries are on average less tolerant than people living in the West . . . a significant part of the reason for this difference is that Muslim-majority countries tend to be less economically developed and more economically unequal than Western countries.” In addition, the study reported that: the most socially tolerant category of people are non-practising Muslims living in Western countries. In Muslim-majority countries, there is no difference between Christians and Muslims in terms of their level of social tolerance in at least one Western country—France—Christians are less tolerant than are Muslims. (Millligan, Andersen and Brym 2014: 239)

In sum, the findings of the Universities of Toronto and Tübingen study suggest that “in Muslim-majority countries, the nature of socio-economic conditions and political regimes supports a relatively high level of social intolerance. Taking these factors into account, Islam still has a significant effect on intolerance in Muslim-majority countries, but that is largely because state and religion are so tightly intertwined” (emphasis added). This is a way of saying that many people in Muslim-majority countries, including in the Arab-majority states of the MENA, are strongly critical of their (nearly always unelected) governments and they see their religious leaders as part of a self-serving coterie of elites. In other words, as Muslims they are not casually indifferent about a lack of democracy and most believe in the desirability of representative government, although they are often personally and collectively subject to unwelcome political arrangements which the mass of the people have no real opportunity to change via the ballot box (Millligan, Andersen and Brym 2014). Events of the Arab Spring of 2011 and its aftermath indicate that many people in the Muslim-majority countries of the MENA care very much about how they are governed and the values used by those ruling them to justify their positions of power. Recent surveys report that many—perhaps most—Muslims believe very much in the virtues of human rights and democracy (Haynes 2013). Thus, contrary to Huntington’s claims, Muslims do not necessarily have views and beliefs incompatible with the West’s perceived “civilizational” values. Many Westerners may indeed

16

Introduction

celebrate the values of “individualism,” and many Muslims may highlight the values of “community, family, and social factors,” but this does not seem to be of great importance when both Westerners and Muslims contemplate the values and virtues of human rights and democracy (Haynes 2017a). A third claim by Huntington is that civilizations are autonomous and internally share the same values. Yet, both the Muslim and Western worlds are socially and politically divided by the divergent values and beliefs held by those who live there. In relation to Islam, for example, there have long been profound religious and valued-based differences between Sunnis and Shias. Today, the “Muslim world,” especially the twenty-two Arab countries of the MENA,10 is increasingly fragmented along sectarian lines. The Sunni/Shia division is politically manifested in intra-Muslim competition and conflict in several regional countries, including Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conflict is a key political, social, and security concern exercising many Muslim governments and populations. Islamic State and other schismatic Sunni extremist groups target Shias while Shia groups, such as Hezbollah and various “Iranian state agents from special national paramilitary and intelligence services” focus their animosity on Sunnis (Lynch, 2008). In addition, Turkey has a decidedly condemnatory policy towards two Muslim groups: Sufis and Alevis, with the latter comprising an estimated 15–25 percent of the country’s population (Bâli 2018: 244). In sum, contrary to Huntington’s presumption, Islam is not civilizationally unified, and many Muslim countries, especially in the MENA, are focal points of intra-Muslim friction, competition and conflict. It is doubtful whether there are any ubiquitous “Western” civilizational values. For example, the USA, as well as several European counties, such as Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, do not exhibit clear adhesion to a supposed core Western civilizational value: high levels of concern for individual human rights. This is the case when one is thinking about the rights of homeless street sleepers as much as the much larger category of the tens of thousands of refugees and others who have sought entry into Europe in recent years (Karpazli 2017). It might be inferred that Western civilizational values only find traction in relation to Westerners, without extending to the economically disadvantaged or those from different civilizational backgrounds. What of Huntington’s claim that the West is constructed on a fundamental belief in democracy? The heyday of Western attempts to export democracy was the 1990s and early 2000s. Since then, many Western governments seem to be primarily concerned with seeking to bolster national security and, as a result, many appear willing to support or be indifferent to many nondemocratic regimes, such as the current military-based autocracy in Egypt or the human rights-denying governments in the Philippines and Saudi Arabia;



Introduction 17

none are characterized by commitment to Western-style human rights or democracy (https://freedomhouse.org/).11 Finally, some Western countries, notably France and the Netherlands, seek to emphasize their secular or liberal credentials—although this is in the context of seeking to highlight their cultural “superiority” compared to Muslim immigrants, not necessarily to burnish their liberal characteristics (Henley 2018). Far-right politicians such as Marine Le Pen in France, Italy’s Matteo Salvini, and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands claim that Europe’s Muslim immigrants pose a clear and persistent threat to “European” civilizational traditions of tolerance, freedom, and democracy. Wilders, for example, points to many Muslims’ allegedly homophobia and views of females as subservient in order to highlight his own superior “secular” and “progressive” views (Brubaker 2017a). The USA is a core Western state. Yet, the country exhibits profound political divisions both internally and in relation to external relations, which in recent years became apparent, especially following Donald Trump’s election as president in November 2016. Numerous commentators express the view that the USA is ideologically and politically divided, without shared civilizational values except, increasingly, Islamophobia (Beydoun 2018; Foody 2018; Love 2017; Whitehead et al 2018). In relation to America’s international relations, Trump eschews use of American power to seek to spread and extend democracy and human rights around the world. Instead, he prefers to cultivate good relations with political leaders, whose main attributes do not necessarily include a clear preference for liberal democracy. They include: Kim Jong-Un (North Korea), Xi Jinping (China), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Vladimir Putin (Russia), Rodrigo Duterte (the Philippines), Mohammed bin Salman (Saudi Arabia), and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt) (Kalamur 2018). Fourth, in addition to contending that civilizational blocs led by “core” states would comprise the key framework and divisions of post-Cold War international relations, Huntington also claimed that the importance of polarized, secular ideological divisions would decline. According to Huntington, states’ post-Cold War orientation would be decided, not by what you believe, but by who you are. The implication is that alignments would be less amenable to easy changes in an era characterized by coalescing civilizational blocs. Evidence, however, significantly undermines this claim. Rather than civilizational characteristics defining alliance preferences, we see many national interest-rooted, ideologically-linked, affiliations between countries which are not civilizationally linked. For example, in 2019 there appeared to be a symbiotic relationship between the USA, Israel, and Saudi Arabia involving the fate of the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia’s population is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Sunnis (c.85–95 percent) and Shia (c.10–15 percent). The country, by virtue of it being the home of the two most holy places in Islam, Mecca and Medina,

18

Introduction

is undoubtedly a “core” state within the Islamic civilization.12 In addition, according to Huntington (1996: 48), Israel’s creation in 1948 provided for the “Jews . . . all the objective accoutrements of a civilization: religion, language, customs, literature, institutions, and a territorial and political home.” What unites the governments of these three civilizationally different countries is a shared security concern: the growing influence of Iran in the MENA region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, as well as Iran’s alleged (covert) program to develop nuclear weapons. The diplomatic closeness of the USA, Israel, and Saudi Arabia is demonstrated in relation to the highly controversial issue of the US embassy in Israel moving from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, whose announcement by Donald Trump led directly to the deaths of dozens of Palestinian demonstrators at the hands of Israel’s security services on and around 14 May 2018. For Palestinians, 14 May is a historic day marking the “catastrophe” that occurred on 14 May 1948, when Israel was founded and Palestinians had most of their land occupied by Israelis with the backing of both the USA and the USSR. How did the government of Saudi Arabia respond to the deaths of dozens of fellow Muslim Palestinians in May 2018? It did not respond at all, staying silent when many other countries, including some Western states, condemned both the USA and Israel for the deaths of the Palestinians. While close political and diplomatic relations between the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Israel involve three countries with differing civilizational characteristics, this is clearly no barrier to their strong alliance, as they are united in their empathy to Iran, like Saudi Arabia a majority Muslim country. This example indicates that Huntington had it wrong: civilizational amity or enmity does not define and mold contemporary international relations, especially when civilizationally different countries are united diplomatically and politically by what their governments see as shared national interest concerns expressed in relation to a common enemy. In this section, we saw that Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm is faulty in that, contrary to what he claimed: civilizations are not autonomous entities; civilizations do not have clear-cut borders; interactions between civilizations are historically ubiquitous; and civilizations do not have discrete sets of values, making them unique. GLOBALIZATION, GLOCALIZATION, AND SECURITIZATION: EFFECTS ON BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their



Introduction 19

culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the US department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West. (Huntington 1996: 217)

Huntington is highlighting in the quotation what he sees as the reasons for an emerging “clash of civilizations”: clashes of values which would sharpen and be more apparent as the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was no more. The early and mid-1990s was a time of deepening globalization which, although Huntington did not clearly seem to realize it, would fundamentally undermine his claims about civilizational autonomy and separateness. When, thirty years ago, Huntington began to focus on “clashing” civilizations and what he claimed were their unique, individual characteristics, he was looking back to what he saw as the characteristics of the Cold War era to envisage the future. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the world was fundamentally changing when Huntington advanced his “clash of civilizations” paradigm. The late 1980s and early 1990s were notable for three epochal developments: the end of the Cold War, the collapse of two multi-national communist entities (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), and the intensifying impact of “globalization,” an array of multifaceted cross-border interactions (Haynes 2005). Globalization is profoundly important for understanding both international relations and domestic outcomes. This is because it fundamentally affects state autonomy and associated governmental ability to rule according to national preferences alone, as well as governmental capacity to deliver preferred political, economic, social, and cultural outcomes (Haynes 2005). Surprisingly, Huntington is not much concerned with the impact of globalization on civilizational interactions, even though by 1996 when his 360-page book was published, globalization was the “hot” topic in sociology, cultural studies, international relations, and comparative politics. The book mentions globalization briefly only twice: on page 68 he comments that “globalization theory” understands as a consequence of globalization an “exacerbation of civilizational, societal and ethnic self-consciousness,” and on page 90 he mentions “globalization of the defense industry,” without further comment. Initially, it was widely thought that globalization was an uncontrollable force, a tsunami that sweeps all before it, effectively rendering powerless governments, societies, communities, and individuals. It is clear, however, that globalization interacts with local contexts, histories, and outcomes, leading to what the sociologist Roland Robertson (1994) calls “glocalization.”

20

Introduction

Glocalization refers to “the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies in contemporary social, political, and economic systems.” It “represents a challenge to simplistic conceptions of globalization processes as linear expansions of territorial scales,” reflecting how the “growing importance of continental and global levels is occurring together with the increasing salience of local and regional levels” (Robertson 1995). In other words, globalization interacts with local factors and actors to produce glocalization, characterized by “the growth of local and regional identities and loyalties” (Richardson 2012). How does glocalization affect our understanding of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm? For Huntington, the clash of civilizations would be expressed in growing international conflict, especially at the fault lines between civilizations, involving Western, Muslim, and Sinic countries. Contrary to Huntington’s expectations, recent years have seen what might be characterized as civilizational frictions and conflicts mainly within countries, as a result of the coming together of global and local issues: glocalization. For example, the defining issue in both the USA and many European countries is the (unwelcome) prospect of large-scale and continuous foreign emigration, especially from contiguous countries and regions. For the USA, this is Mexico and Central America, while for Europe it is Muslims from the Middle East and North and sub-Saharan Africa. Immigration concerns are an important issue in the United States, fuelled by both internal and external factors (Harrell, Soyoka, and Iyengar 2017). Existing concern about emigration from the USA’s southern border was augmented after 9/11 by the coming together in some Americans’ minds of the presence of small but growing numbers of Muslims in the USA with apprehension at increasing Islamist terrorism and extremism worldwide. Fears of increasing Islamist terrorism encouraged those with pre-existing or developing anti-Muslim sentiments—people sometimes characterized as “Islamophobes”13—increasingly to voice their opinions openly and with candor. A prominent American Islamophobe and lawyer, David Yerushalmi, claimed in 2007 that “[o]n the so-called Global War on Terrorism, GWOT, we have been quite clear along with a few other resolute souls. This should be a WAR AGAINST ISLAM and all Muslim faithful” (capital letters in original; CAIR 2010). A few years later, Donald Trump claimed during the presidential campaign in March 2016 that “I think Islam hates us.”14 In addition, after his election as president in November 2017, Trump retweeted “a series of anti-Muslim propaganda videos shared online by a high-ranking official in the ultra-nationalist UK political group Britain First” (Kreig 2017). A few months later, in early 2018, Trump appointed several people which some have identified as exhibiting “anti-Muslim” sentiments to senior posts in his administration, including: Mike Pompeo as secretary of state, John



Introduction 21

Bolton as White House national security advisor, and Fred Fleitz as National Security Council’s executive secretary and chief of staff (Patel and LevinsonWaldman 2017; Hassan 2017; Johnston 2018). According to the Washington, DC, based Council on American Islamic Relations,15 what these men have in common is a set of views which designate “Islam” and “Muslims” as dangerous people, potential or actual terrorists, who aim to spread sharia law, which they claim has no place in the USA (CAIR 2018). In relation to both the USA and Europe, a fear is that large-scale or— worse—”uncontrolled” emigration would lead to irreversible undermining of established cultures. Some European countries have a pronounced fear of “flooding” of other cultures, especially Muslims. Such concerns coalesce into an extensive European fear of malign Muslim migration, which would bring increased Islamist extremism and terrorism. This is glocalization in action: pervasive fears of widespread, destabilizing, globally-orientated Islamist terrorism interacting with local perceptions of desecuritising and economicallyundermining concerns of local effects of widespread Muslim emigration. We shall look at these issues in specific international, regional, and national contexts in the second part of the book. CONCLUSION In the decades following the emergence of Huntington’s framework on the clash of civilizations, right-wing populist politicians in both Europe and the USA increasingly, and increasingly openly, seek to portray “Islam” as a key problem facing their countries. These concerns focus on both culture/values and security. In recent years the clash of civilizations issue is not only a key issue of domestic policy in many countries but also a major international relations issue, including at the United Nations. The focus on Muslims and their alleged different values, including denial of democracy and human rights and being comfortable with extremism and terrorism while swamping countries with millions of Muslims migrants, is a key factor in the recent rise of right-wing populism in both the USA and Europe. Right-wing populist politicians on both sides of the Atlantic focus in their election campaigns on Muslim-linked immigration and terrorism. There is also a clear international relations dimension: Syrian civil war 2015 (Europe) and Trump’s allegedly “anti-Muslim” foreign policy (Hassan 2017)). In sum, the clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world is manifested in foreign policy issues affecting the USA and Europe. It is also implicated in domestic policy issues in the USA and many European countries, in the context of a widespread rise of right-wing populism, securitization of Islam, and the growth of the political ideology of Christian civilizationism.

22

Introduction

NOTES  1. The editors of Foreign Affairs, where Huntington’s initial article appeared, stated that it “was one of the most influential pieces in the magazine’s illustrious history” http://www.pewforum.org/2006/08/18/five-years-after-911-the-clash-of-civ ilizations-revisited/). The scholarly significance of Huntington’s article and book is that by February 2019, Google Scholar recorded that the 1993 article had received 14,370 citations and the 1996 book had received 23,289 citations (https://scholar .google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&q=huntington+clash+of+civilizations). By the time of his death in 2008, Huntington’s book, The Clash of Civilizations, had been translated into thirty-nine languages, making it one of the most widely translated IR books.   2.  Such effects did not occur only in the West. Other countries, such as Brazil, India, and the Philippines, have also seen right-wing populists come to power in recent years.   3.  Each had endured for more than seven decades when they collapsed: the USSR was created in 1917 and Yugoslavia a year later, in 1918.   4.  “Cultural” in this context is a composite term reflecting the influence of religious, ethnic and “civilizational” factors.   5.  The starting point of the “30 Years” in the title of this book refers to the date of publication of Lewis’s article in The Atlantic Monthly. The book surveys the period 1990–2019, that is, thirty years.  6. “ISIL originated as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999, which pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and participated in the Iraqi insurgency following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by Western forces.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_ Iraq_and_the_Levant).   7.  Reflecting this development, the Journal of Democracy first appeared in 1990, followed by Democratization in 1993. Both are still extant in 2019.   8.  In his 1996 book, Huntington adds another civilization to the list: Buddhist, increasing the total to “eight or nine major cultures.”   9.  An academic study, covering the period from the US invasion in March 2003 to June 2011, that is, six months before the US left the country, estimated the number of deaths of Iraqis at about 500,000 during this period (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-24547256). This is an average of roughly 5050 deaths for each of these 99 months, that is, over 168 a day or seven an hour. 10.  The Arab world consists of twenty-two Arab countries. Those countries are Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Comoros Islands, Iraq, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates. 11.  “President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who first took power in a July 2013 coup, continues to govern Egypt in an authoritarian manner, though the election of a new parliament in late 2015 ended a period of rule by executive decree. Serious political opposition is virtually nonexistent, as both liberal and Islamist activists face criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Terrorism persists unabated in the Sinai Peninsula and has also struck the Egyptian mainland, despite the government’s use of aggres-



Introduction 23

sive and often abusive tactics to combat it.” (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom -world/2018/egypt) 12.  In addition to Saudi Arabia, “Iran [and] Pakistan . . . have . . . explicitly defined themselves as Muslim countries and have actively attempted to exercise influence in and provide leadership to the ummah” (Huntington 1996: 178). 13. Islamophobia, also referred to as “anti-Muslim racism” and “intolerance against Muslims,” first used in a 1997 Runnymede Trust report. 14. To some extent, Trump may have been “playing to the gallery,” expressing a sentiment that he thought would be received favorably by some voters. For a summary of US presidents’ response to Islam, see https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2017/05/american-presidents-explain-islam-to-muslim/527415/ See https://medium.com/nilc/86-times-donald-trump-displayed-or-promoted-islam ophobia-49e67584ac10 for an alleged eighty-six times (until April 2018) that Trump was negative about Muslims including: “In an interview on Fox News [on 13.12.15], Trump is asked if all Muslims should be banned from the United States. He responds, ‘There’s a sickness. They’re sick people. There’s a sickness going on. There’s a group of people that is very sick. And we have to figure out the answer. And the Muslims can help us figure out the answer.’” 15.  The Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a Muslim civil rights and advocacy group with regional offices across the USA.

Chapter One

Civilizations and International Relations History and Development

This chapter aims, first, to provide essential historical background information to Huntington’s post-Cold War focus on the “clash of civilizations.” The chapter surveys the civilizational impact of a century of geographical expansion of Western colonialism, from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War. Second, the chapter argues that the values, norms, and anticipated political and social developments associated with the expansion of Western “civilization” via colonization were initially widely accepted among emerging nationalist elites of the colonies. Later, however, significant differences emerged and in the post-Cold War era these were manifested in differing perspectives on human rights and their interpretation. Concerns were expressed inter alia at the major United Nations’ human rights conference in Vienna in June 1993 which brought out into the open serious civilizational differences about democracy and human rights and how they were interpreted and understood. Today, nearly three decades after the UN Vienna conference, these concerns remain as key ideational topics informing debate about civilizational attributes, norms, and beliefs. The chapter explains that the issue of competing or clashing civilizations has always been very political and locates post-Cold War developments in both historical and ideational contexts. The focus of the book is on a supposed dichotomy between the West and the Muslim world. This alleged division is, however, of recent origin and it is useful to remind ourselves that in the recent historical past, many Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt, looked to the West for reformist economic and political models. This underlines that the idea of a clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world is a recent development, ideologically driven by the aspirations to power of right-wing populist politicians, on the one hand, and jihadis, on the other. 25

26

Chapter One

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the chapter surveys the spread and impact of European colonialism, whose “official” goal was to transmit “European civilization” to “less-civilized” parts of the world. The process affected many non-Europeans, including Muslims, with different civilizational attributes during the era of European imperialism and colonialism. The Europeans utilized both soft and hard power to advance their interests. Decolonization gathered speed after World War II, when nationalist elites in colonized territories took advantage of Europe’s post-war weakness to demand independence. The chapter also examines the impacts of the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the contemporaneous dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the effects of globalization on civilizational interactions. Examination of these issues provides an entry point to the concerns of chapter 2, which focuses on the aftermath of the Cold War, including the putative New World Order and its subsequent antithesis: emerging chaos and disorder of the New World Disorder, exacerbated by 9/11 and its significant impact on global security and stability. CIVILIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The century covering the period from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early 1990s was characterized by major changes in international relations. The period of European colonialism, which came to an end with World War II, was a time of competing civilizations. This was not, however, the first time that international relations had been significantly molded by intercivilizational interactions. Prior to 1648—the epochal date of the Peace of Westphalia which ushered in increasingly secular international relations—international relations were significantly affected by both intra- and inter-religious and cultural conflicts between Christians and Muslims and Catholics and Protestants. As international relations became increasingly secular, a period of revolutions and emergent nationalisms ensued during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The latter century was also characterized by competitive Western colonialism, imperialism, and nationalisms, a period which ended with World War II and Europe’s subsequent weakness and the rise of the USA and the Soviet Union. After the war, the United Nations was created to mark a new era of supranational authority and international law. The authority of the UN was, however, severely tested by the contemporaneous emergence of the Cold War. Before the Peace of Westphalia, the history of international relations was not primarily a tale of centralized political control focused on inter-state inter-



Civilizations and International Relations 27

actions which today organizations such as the UN seek to moderate and steer towards cooperation. Instead, the pre-Westphalia period was fundamentally about emergent states’ and other entities’ inter-religious and inter-cultural interactions and states. As Bowden (2012) notes, “the international states system only emerged following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, hence IR [International Relations] has its historical limits.” Contemporaneously, the idea of a “civilized” state developed. According to Bowden (2012), a “civilized state” was regarded as having the following characteristics: (a) basic institutions of government and public bureaucracy; (b) organizational capacity for self-defense; (c) a published legal code and adherence to the rule of law; and (d) recognition of international law and norms, including on the conduct of war and diplomatic exchange. If a state wanted to be seen as civilized, it needed to demonstrate that it had these characteristics. Initially, they affected only emergent states, initially clustered in northwestern Europe, whose governments wished to be thought of by their peers as sufficiently civilized to be allowed into the “club” of enlightened nations. The idea developed that a “civilized” state was also “modern” and “Western.” Several European states, notably France and Britain, sought from the second half of the nineteenth century to project what they regarded as their particularistic civilizations via extra-European colonialism and imperialism. The justification was that such European states regarded themselves as both “civilized” and “developed” exemplars par excellence to which other—allegedly “lesser”—forms of political and social organization were slightingly compared. Such European colonization of Africa and parts of Asia was a key motor of development of the international states system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Later, following World War I de novo international organizations were founded, notably the League of Nations, followed after World War II by the United Nations. The institutional values of these international organizations overtly reflected the presumed “superiority” of Western civilizational ideas and values. Membership of these organizations was accordingly reserved for “civilized” states, as the only entities worthy of full membership in international society. When World War II began, international relations were still dominated by European states with their colonial empires, a situation which changed swiftly and dramatically in the decades after the war. This period saw the fundamental decline of Europe’s international domination, characterized by the profound loss of colonial possessions, the rise of the United States and Soviet Union to global prominence, and the creation of supranational organizations such as the United Nations. After World War II, membership of the UN was extended to post-colonial states, such as India, which constitutionally adhered to “Western” values, including democracy, human rights, and religious freedom.

28

Chapter One

The League of Nations and the United Nations were regarded as focal points of civilized states and their values, enabling a dividing line to be drawn between them and “uncivilized” territories. International law developed in the twentieth century, recognizing that certain “civilized” state attributes were both necessary and desirable in order for states to play a full role in international relations. But as the twentieth century progressed, such states would no longer be referred to as “civilized”; instead, they were identified as modern polities, adhering to values and conventions of international law and normative practice. CIVILIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARSHIP This section seeks to explain (1) why currently there is increased interest in the role of civilizations in international relations and (2) what civilizations are thought to do in current international relations and what their impact is on international stability and security. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “civilization” in two ways. First, it is “[t]he stage of human social development and organization which is considered most advanced” and, second, it is “[t]he process by which a society or place reaches an advanced stage of social development and organization” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/civilization). Thus, according to the OED, civilization is both process and end state. How we perceive if something or someone is “civilized” or not depends on subjective judgements about the type of behavior which the entity exhibits and the values which it appears to reflect. However, in contemporary international relations scholarship, there is no consensus regarding what civilizations are or what they do. Both Huntington (1993, 1996) and Lawrence (2010) regard civilizational discourses as a useful analytical tool for international relations scholars. Huntington defines a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity,” characterized by “common language, history, religion, customs, institutions,” and by people’s subjective self-identification (Huntington 1996: 43). Lawrence (2010: 157) also understands the notion of “civilization” in a comprehensive way: that is, “the broadest, most capacious envelope of cultural traits related—directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, to geographic location and temporal shifts. Civilization equals culture writ large over space and time. Space predominates. Time becomes crucial in trying to chart changes in modes of production and patterns of influence that characterize civilization from



Civilizations and International Relations 29

pre-modern to modern phases of history.” This is not to imply that contemporary figures such as Huntington and Lawrence are the only scholars to use the term analytically. For example, Huntington’s contemporary, Alexander Panarin (1940–2003), as well as earlier theorists such as the historians Fernand Braudel (1902–1985), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), and Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), helped lay the foundations for today’s focus on intercivilizational interactions and discourse in international relations. Having said that, recent concern with civilizations in international relations is novel, becoming noticeable in the decades following the end of the Cold-War. This is traceable in part to the impact of post-Cold War globalization, during which there has been a significant “decrease in the primacy of political-economic ideology for the identity formation of individuals, states, and geopolitical blocs or alliances” and a “commensurate resurgence in the importance of culture in both the formation of identity and the increase in the occurrence of conflict and tensions based on ethnic, tribal, and religious identity and divides” (Sleboda 2013). Not only international relations scholars use the term analytically, as journalists, commentators, and politicians, including policy-makers, also do so. They tend to employ the terminology of intercivilizational interactions to explain and account for some current instabilities in international relations, especially between the West and the Muslim world. In the latter context, it was especially 9/11 and its aftermath—the US-led “Global War on Terror”—which encouraged focus on alleged civilizational incompatibilities between Western and Muslim worlds. How to understand what civilizations “do” in today’s international relations? Bettiza (2014: 4) suggests that civilizations have three roles in contemporary international relations, all linked to the “rapid change and globalization” of the post-Cold War era. First, civilizations serve as a means to express and understand identity in new and different ways. Second, civilizations are a focal point in the context of normative critiques of globalization. Third, “powerful actors in world politics” now use civilizational discourses for practical, political reasons: that is, to acquire and hold on to citizens’ support in bids to gain or retain political power. For example, it is commonplace to see right-wing populists in the USA and Europe using highly polarized interpretations of Christianity and Islam—expressed as “Christian civilizationism” and “Islamism”—to condemn the allegedly baleful influence of the latter on national and international relations (Brubaker 2017; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Csehi 2019; Ozzano 2019). In addition, perceptions of what civilizations “do” in current international relations are generally linked to the presumed growth in the importance of culture as a motivating force for interpretation and action. It is appropriate to underline the salience of understandings of the world rooted in the (perceived malign) influence of globalization, which fuels

30

Chapter One

dislike and fear of the “other” in order to help explain re-emergence of civilizations as an important analytical tool in both international relations and domestic political contexts. Bettiza avers, however, that the term “civilization” is an “empty signifier,” that is, not a “signifier for anything.” Instead, he argues that in present-day international relations civilizations are best understood as “carriers” of particular kinds of knowledge. That is, the notion of civilization takes, collects, and gives meaning to a “disparate number of objective trends, subjective interpretations, normative orientations, and interests at work at this juncture in international society.” The “empty signifier” of civilization is facilitated by swift and often barely understood changes. In response, “civilization” offers a useful framework for interpreting the world, characterized by a shift from national, state-centric, interpretations towards modes of understanding and explaining global political in more identity-centred, alternative ways of thinking. These include, for instance, “the state-centrism of standard International Relations (IR) theories, the economic-centrism of neo-liberal and Marxist perspectives, and the individual-centrism of the human rights discourse” (Bettiza 2014: 4). While the trend towards analysis of the role of civilizations in international relations may be said to have begun with Huntington’s influential contributions from the early 1990s, Katzenstein’s (2010, 2012a, 2012b) insightful three-volume edited series on “civilizations in world politics” provides a more recent and comprehensive survey of what civilizations do in today’s international relations. Unlike Bettiza, Katzenstein does not regard “civilization” as an empty signifier. For him, they are finite and material, “both plural and internally pluralistic, come into being and go extinct.” They are “social constructions of partial primordiality” that “can become politically reified, particularly when they interact with other civilizations” (emphasis added). Civilizations may “clash, compete, cooperate, cross-pollinate, evolve, and hybridize in their relations with other civilizations”; moreover, conflict regularly occurs within civilizations, as well as on occasion between them. Civilizations are also “loose and internally differentiated, rather than coherent, homogenous, and unified, intersubjective cultural complexes that lack well-defined limits or borders and often overlap one another” (Katzenstein, 2010: 6–7). Civilizational perceptions or understandings may animate state or non-state actors to act in certain ways, linked to what they see as their group’s most important cultural preferences in relation to those of others. Civilizations exist today “within a broader geographic and historical global ecumene,” which reflects the existence of “multiple modernities” constituent of what Katzenstein perceives as “a world polity” (Katzenstein, 2010: 7). The conclusion is that interpretations of civilizations and intercivilizational interactions in contemporary international relations underline that while



Civilizations and International Relations 31

there is no consensus on what civilizations are and what they “do,” there is more agreement that we are witnessing increased analytical attention to civilizations compared to the Cold War period. It is also clear that civilizations are neither autonomous nor internally coherent, or destined to be in conflict. Civilizations are contested environments, characterized by political and social divisions. They also reflect the notion that confronted by what is or appears to be a hostile country or countries claiming to be animated by different civilizational, cultural, or religious norms, then in response targeted entities may seek to organize themselves in relation to what are perceived to be their shared civilizational features, which importantly set themselves apart from others. Finally, the interpretations noted in this section underline that civilizations did not spring fully formed at the end of the Cold War, created by powerful states or blocs of countries to deliver novel forms of power and authority in the post-Cold War environment. Instead, the idea and practice of civilization is a highly political and subjective principle and practice with its roots in the historical past. CIVILIZATIONS, COLONIALISM, AND EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN NORMS AND VALUES A key reason why the notion of civilization is relatively unfamiliar and unhelpful to some contemporary scholars of international relations is that the theories that many employ are state-centric, including mainstream Realist and Liberal approaches. International relations analysis generally is state-centric because of the nature of the modern international system, which places states at the core, along with nations, nationalisms, and national interest. Earlier, however, representative entities of differing civilizations, identifiable by distinctive cultures and/or their religious attributes, jockeyed for influence and on occasion fought each other. Between the late eleventh and thirteenth centuries (1095–1291), soldiers of the Latin or Western Christian church sought to recapture the “Holy Land” from Muslims. In Europe, Protestants and Catholics fought conflicts which broke out soon after the Protestant Reformation in 1517, continued for over a century, and gradually came to an end in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). Over time, the political influence of religion and culture waned as centralized, secular, states increasingly dominated territory, first in Europe and then, via colonialism, in much of the rest of the world. The last major example of Christian/Muslim conflict was in the late seventeenth century. In 1683, Muslims of the Ottoman Empire attempted to invade Europe. They were stopped by a Christian coalition at the gates of Vienna. Following the ensuing war, which ended in 1699,

32

Chapter One

the Ottomans lost nearly all their remaining European territory, located in what is today Hungary (Koller 2012). Henceforward, Europe’s religious—or, intercivilizational—wars became a thing of the past. The immediate precursor to a focus on civilizations in contemporary international relations is the role of civilizations in the expansion of Western political, economic, and cultural influence from Europe to Africa and Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this time, the idea of European states’ civilizing role in international relations was in vogue among many nationalist politicians. It was a useful ideological device to help justify expansionist foreign policies in non-European areas. During the nineteenth century, state-centric nationalism became increasingly prominent in international relations, first in Europe and then via colonialism to much of the rest of the world. By World War I, European states and administrations were globally dominant. After World War II, this domination swiftly diminished as many European colonies gained their independence, a process virtually complete by the 1980s. Technological developments were highly important to the successful spread of European imperialism and colonization. In particular, modern weaponry enabled Europeans to quell the frequent revolts and expressions of societal dissatisfaction at their generally unwanted and unwelcomed presence. European states possessed an unprecedented range of power, reflecting a comparative advantage in both naval and military technology. They also drew strength from their statehood itself. That is, nationalism (1) provided them with the means to mobilize and concentrate their power, and (2) enabled them to construct a form of collective ideology that helped support colonial and imperialistic endeavors through what governments projected as collective expressions of the popular will. Europeans expressed the ability and willingness to use large-scale violence, based on technological supremacy, to achieve their objectives. This was apparent in any of the European wars of imperial acquisition from the early nineteenth century which in all cases— from Morocco in the west to Indonesia in the east—ultimately succeeded because the Europeans could rely upon sophisticated and technologically advanced “weapons of mass destruction,” such as the machine gun, artillery, and bomber airplanes. Apart from territorial and commercial interests, European imperialism was also important in another way to enhance our understanding of current international relations. Imperialism helped to spread and embed European political and economic models which eventually developed following the Cold War and attendant globalization into a truly global system of international relations. What became a political and economic political unification of the world stemmed directly from a European, Christianity-orientated, state



Civilizations and International Relations 33

system. Centralized European states, for the most part developing after the Peace of Westphalia, differed from their predecessors in a number of crucial respects: most importantly, however, in making centralization of political power in a national government a fundamental aspect of their “stateness”—as opposed to other forms of political power, such as the decentralized Ottoman Empire whose geographical focus was Constantinople but which also allowed local suzerains to wield much power as long as they paid financial and diplomatic tribute to the leaders of the Empire. Overall, European imperialism and colonialism made global unification possible by ensuring that territories in the Global South which they controlled followed approved European-style administrative and governmental structures and following the European departures, mainly after World War II, left forms of government as a legacy which adhered to European norms and conventions. An assured European cultural and civilizational supremacy was central to European expansion as it both underpinned and bolstered associated political, economic, and social institutions. This was an integral part of the European civilizing project, furthered during European expansion in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East from the second half of the nineteenth century. Territorial takeover by European powers followed a pattern: “European-style”—that is, “modern”—administrative, political and economic institutions were put in place, with the aim of turning the controlled territories into European-style polities. European expansion, fused with the power of both secular nationalism and civilizational-inspired certainties, provided the foundation on which the Europeans managed unprecedentedly to globalize their influence over a century or more in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During this time, nearly all parts of the globe became increasingly interdependent, laying the foundations for today’s technologically driven globalization. The power of independent statehood, combined with the force of nationalism, provided the basis on which the great maritime European colonial empires, which lasted in some cases from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, were founded and consolidated. To an extent the world was also politically unified as a result of this process, with colonial countries eventually adopting European forms of state, administration, and economy. Essentially, the near-global domination of the Europeans rested on their multiple—political, economic, organizational, and technological— strengths. These were crucial factors when it came to the translation of potential advantage into actual domination. Note, however, that the processes, practices, and structures of European rule may have (superficially and temporarily) unified the globe politically under Western domination, yet they also helped to create divisions and tensions that became especially notable after decolonization during the twentieth century (Haynes, Hough,

34

Chapter One

Malik and Pettiford 2017: 40-41), including in relation to the clash of civilizations and the resentment and anger which Bernard Lewis (1990) argued characterized the Muslim Middle East from the 1960s, an interpretation which Huntington later built on and developed further. Initially regarded by many Europeans as a desirable and acceptable way of spreading their Christian culture and associated values and norms, European domination of non-European parts of the world became increasingly contentious as the twentieth century progressed. Publication of John Hobson’s Imperialism: A Study (1902) was a benchmark in this respect. Hobson contended that the major European powers’ imperialistic rivalries were a dangerous source of friction which would inevitably lead to sustained and serious international conflict. Both Hobson and his Russian communist counterpart, Vladimir Ilych Lenin, believed that European imperialistic rivalries were a key cause of World War I. Hobson also argued that the Europeans’ competition was not only contoured by their competing nationalisms but was also molded by associated desire for territory. This was necessary to demonstrate national “greatness” and expand national economic “markets” to overseas contexts in order to increase the profitability of British capitalists. For example, Britain’s imperial activities in India sought both to acquire territory for the sake of British nationalist aggrandizement but also because India provided significant scope for selling goods produced in Britain to a growing number of Indian consumers. Turning to the relationship between European nationalism and imperialism in Africa during the colonial era, there was typically close affinity between Christian missionaries and European colonial administrators. This did not only rest on a shared Christian beliefs and values. It was also informed by an understanding that the Europeans had to work in a concerted and unified fashion if they were to retain their domination and spread to “savages” European civilizational norms and values, such as: the rule of law, a money economy, and human rights, notably ending slavery. While Christian missionaries and leaders were, on occasion, unhappy with certain aspects of colonial policy— such as European settlers’ confiscation of Africans’ land in Kenya’s White Highlands without compensation, which incurred the wrath of the British-run Anglican Church—there were many points of agreement between Christian leaders and colonial administrators. This is because both religious and secular figures were pursuing the same broad aims, as they saw it: to bring the benefits of European civilization, including the Christian God, to “benighted” Africa (Haynes 1996). In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge posed by expansionist Islam was a key factor which helped unite the Europeans culturally and civilizationally. By the early nineteenth century Islam had a significant regional pres-



Civilizations and International Relations 35

ence in west, east, and, to an extent, central Africa. Initially, during the early phase of European colonialism in the early nineteenth century there were frequent conflicts between Muslims and Europeans in many parts of Africa. However, over time, both Muslim leaders and colonial administrators had by and large arrived at a modus vivendi. The normal arrangement was that the former would guarantee their communities’ acquiescence to European rule in exchange for personal financial rewards and for a large measure of religious and social autonomy. Christian missionaries had no choice but to accept the fait accompli; in some places, for example in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria, they were not allowed to proselytize (Haynes 1996). Of course, Europeans did not bring only Christianity to Africa and other parts of the Global South. They also brought with them many other aspects of Western-style modernization, including: the money economy, urbanization, Western education, and centralized government. In doing so, Europeans helped to mold and develop changing responses to European colonialism. From an initial welcome, a groundswell of demands for autonomy and then independence gathered pace. By the early 1950s African nationalist leaders, encouraged by the success of India, Indonesia, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in achieving independence from colonial rule in 1947, were demanding the same for themselves and their followers. Many leading nationalists were Christians educated in schools and colleges founded by European Christian organizations. By the early 1970s, just twenty-five years after significant agitation for independence began, nearly all African countries had thrown off European imperial rule. The Europeans employed a mix of soft and hard power techniques. For example, many among the colonized no doubt resented Europeans’ domineering intrusion but they also often pragmatically recognized the benefits the Europeans could also bring: Western-style education, health care, and development of infrastructure, including roads, railways, and harbors. These benefits were not necessarily available to many Muslim areas as they often civilizationally shunned European influences and as a result entered the postcolonial era less prepared than their Christian counterparts, even within the same country, such as in Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire. The decolonization process took off after 1945, started by the independence of various countries in Asia, before spreading to Africa in the mid-1950s with the independence of Sudan (1956) and Ghana (1957). Decolonization was a result of a dual process involving both international and domestic factors. Internationally, there was widespread acceptance that colonization was now unacceptable and national self-determination both necessary and legitimate. The situation was compounded by the evident weakness of the war-weary colonial powers, notably Britain and France, who began to question the desirability of retaining

36

Chapter One

colonies in Africa and elsewhere. Nationalist politicians in Asia and Africa were becoming more confident, openly demanding their countries’ freedom. Beginning with a trickle in the 1940s and 1950s, the pace of decolonization picked up in the 1960s. By the 1980s there were very few Western-controlled colonies left. States which emerged from the colonial period in the Global South were qualitatively different from those created in an earlier epoch in Europe. In Europe the nation usually created the state. This is a way of saying that people had a shared sense of being part of a nation—as for example in England, France, and Spain—which gradually developed into a nation state with the founding of centralized and authoritative government from the seventeenth century. In the post-colonial Global South, the situation was different. Governments of newly-created countries sought to try to forge nations from often disparate people: a difficult, sometimes seemingly impossible task, as for example in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. What did such countries have in common following the withdrawal of colonial powers? After the Second World War many observers broadly lumped them all together as “Third World” countries, implying that there were significant characteristics which they shared. But in fact, these were disparate countries which had little in common beyond for the most part having been European colonies. The term “Third World” included nations with very different cultures, societies, and economies, embracing regions and individual countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Middle East under the assumption that they shared a common predicament: directly or indirectly they suffered the after-effects of colonization and they came late— and on disadvantageous terms—into the competitive world economy. The focus of international relations scholarship developed with new emphasis on how relations between mainly secular states were developing. No one was concerned with civilizations at this time. Post-World War II, and especially during the Cold War, the analytical focus was on secular ideologies—that is, liberal democracy/capitalism and Communism—in the context of a bipolar international order dominated by two superpowers: the USA and the Soviet Union. Civilizations appeared passé and there was very little attention paid to the topic by international relations scholars until the work of Lewis in the late 1950s and again in 1990, significantly augmented by Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” approach to international relations during the 1990s. This section has covered the expansion of European expansion to nonEuropean areas in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries. This process served to bring together and coalesce political, social, and economic forces in efforts at civilizational domination. The European control of nonEuropean areas of the globe fundamentally shaped international relations



Civilizations and International Relations 37

from the nineteenth century until the unexpected and sometimes precipitant withdrawal of European control from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East after World War II. WESTERN CIVILIZATIONAL IDEAS, MODES, AND STRUCTURES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF “INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY” The expansion of European civilization to much of the rest of the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is a formative component of modern international relations. It helps explain and account for the role of civilizational differences in current international and domestic contexts. O’Hagan (2017: 185) argues that “civilizational ideas, practices, and contestations” were fundamental in accounting for “the constitution and diffusion of international society, though their role is multifaceted. This is in part due to the multidimensional nature of civilization as a political concept, as well as to shifts in the constitutive norms and structures of international society.” This section traces the development of international society—reflecting the spread of Western civilizational ideas, modes, and structures via colonialism and imperialism. The ideas, principles, and structures which Western states saw as normal and natural and characteristic of a generic global standard of civilization, underpinned by European standards, were initially widely accepted by many of those on the receiving end. Eventually, however, the Europeans’ attempt to impose their civilizational norms and values on non-Europeans in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere was increasingly resisted by emergent nationalist leaders. Such politicians used anti-Europeanism as ideological ammunition for independence campaigns against continued European domination of their territories. The idea of international society is that states form a community shaped by shared ideas, values, identities, and norms that are—to a significant extent—common to all. The “English School” of international relations theory maintains that there is a “society of states” at the international level, despite the condition of “anarchy” (literally the lack of a ruler or world state). For international society to work, it requires a corresponding arrangement or regime based on general acceptance of common values, norms—including the body of international law—and institutions that seek to enforce it, such as, for example, the United Nations in the modern era. This involves regular and institutionalized interactions between states and various non-state actors, all deploying rules, mechanisms, and understandings that collectively work

38

Chapter One

to manage mutual coexistence and interdependence. Although there is no decided set of issues that all such actors would agree on, some areas of consensus exist, including: desirability of improved human rights, improved human and social development, greater political involvement of the mass of the people, and, more tenuously, protection of the natural environment (Haynes, Hough, Malik and Pettiford 2017: 20–21). O’Hagan (2017) refers to the first period of construction of international society as the “imperial era”: the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. During this time European countries dominated most of the globe and, as a result of their control, were able to create the current international states system. This political unification of the world emerged directly from a European, Christianity-oriented civilization centering on the then emerging nation-states of Western Europe. These states differed from their predecessors in a number of crucial respects, making the unification of the globe possible and ensuring that it followed certain patterns and took certain forms. Linklater (2016) points out that much of the recent civilizational literature in international relations implicitly or explicitly focuses upon a pivotal contribution from the “English School” of international relations: Bull and Watson’s (1984) edited volume on the “expansion of international society.” Contributors to Bull and Watson’s book seek to make the case that in the nineteenth century European colonialism was the motor of expansion of what they characterize as “international society,” that is, a “society of states” with shared civilizational characteristics initially deriving from Christianity allied with the development of international law. Earlier, Wight (1979) had emphasized that successive civilizations—for example, ancient Greek, the Roman empire, early Chinese, and post-Westphalian European—were believed to share awareness of and pride in a shared identity based on an understanding of belonging to a common civilization. Such civilizational understandings underpinned a feeling of solidarity socially and politically arrayed against what were widely regarded as generically “savage” or “barbaric” peoples of the world. It is said to be easier to agree on principles and practices regarding values and institutions when actors share a civilizational background. Wight (1979) averred that states embed in their worldviews various core beliefs and norms, generally inherited from the past, which can facilitate acting harmoniously together even when the wider international society is characterized as “anarchical” (Bull, 1984). Crucially, a sense of coming from the same civilizational background is said to encourage states to put constraints on the use of force, albeit only in relation to their dealings with those believed to share their civilizational characteristics. Concern with shared civilizational background and values did not extend to “outsiders,” especially those characterized as “bar-



Civilizations and International Relations 39

barians” or “savages,” said to have very different, much less desirable, societal and cultural characteristics. When Europeans or Westerners more generally, including the USA in its colonial adventures in the nineteenth century in inter alia Cuba, the Philippines, and various islands in Oceania, had dealings with “barbarians” and “savages” then there were few or no constraints on the use of force to ensure success. Neither “barbarians” nor “savages” could be expected to adhere to acceptable codes of behavior of the kind observed by the “civilized” nations. We can see recent parallels with these nineteenthcentury examples. For example, during the post-9/11 USA-led Global War on Terror, the enemy was referred to by the US government and its western allies as comprising uncivilized or barbaric terrorist entities (Barnes 2016). Consequently, it was considered appropriate to treat such people worse and if necessary more punitively than would be the case with people adhering to Western civilizational standards. In addition, recent migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers are frequently identified to by right-wing populist politicians, such as the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, as “uncivilized,” “savages,” or “barbarians” (Winkler 2017). This issue is discussed in the book’s second section. The relationship between European colonialism and imperialism and the growth of an international society were analyzed by the “English School” of international relations, which emerged in the 1950s as an alternative to and reaction against the then dominant analytical framework of international relations: Realism. Unlike the latter, whose core belief is that states are sovereign actors seeking power maximization via mainly autonomous actions, English School analysis stresses that in international society, states share many norms and values, including the importance of diplomacy and international law, to facilitate many peaceful and cooperative international relations. Conceptually, the idea of “international society” involves a network of “autonomous political communities”—that is, states—free of control from any higher authority. For the doyen of the English School, Hedley Bull, the “starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population” (Bull 1977: 8). Thus, for Bull, the main focus of study of the discipline of international relations is the “world of states” not sub-state entities—such as nations, ethnic groups, religious communities or civilizations—or claimed universal categories, such as “humanity.” The English School approach contends that when states interact regularly and systematically they do not merely form an international system—that is, a purely functional arrangement for mutual benefit—but comprise an international society. An “international society” differs from an “international

40

Chapter One

system,” in that the former is an arrangement whereby constituent members believe or implicitly accept that they have much in common—such as the pursuit of peace or good trade relations—which leads them to behave in certain ways, involving responsibilities towards one another and to the whole society; members of an “international system,” on the other hand, interact only because it is for perceived mutual benefit. The English School approach contends that during the colonial era European states comprised an international society—not “just” an international system—whose constituent parts interacted and were bound together by pursuit and protection of common interests, as well as shared values, rules, and institutions rooted in shared civilizational affinities, deriving initially from Christianity. The English School’s distinctive approach to the study of international relations emphasises problems of coexistence, cooperation, and conflict, especially in relations between sovereign states (Little 2016). Chris Brown contends that today international society is “an occasionally idealized conceptualization of the norms of the old, pre-1914 European states system” (Brown 2005: 51). This implies that an international society must be constructed on consensual—or at least widely shared—norms and values to which members of that society can agree to adhere. Brown is referring to the notion that the pre-1914 European-dominated international order functioned relatively well—in one key sense: there were no significant international conflicts in Europe in the century between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the First World War in 1914. Can this “century of peace” be linked to the relatively high level of cultural homogeneity among the then active members of international society which were almost exclusively European? Europeans elites were educated to believe that they shared a common history and cultural values informed not only by ancient Greek and Roman civilizations but also by a common Christianity. This was said to encourage inter-European civilizational unity, especially when faced with challenges by extra-Europe and extra-Christian powers, such as Islam, in Africa and elsewhere. In sum, “European” values, norms, beliefs, and ideas are thought by Brown and others to be integral to the creation and development of international society in the nineteenth century. Today, however, an international society with unified values and beliefs is a much more problematic idea. This reflects the fact that after World War II, the erstwhile European domination of international relations was quickly replaced by a multicultural international system with potential for both competition and conflict. This was because there was no longer a collective normative basis for international society, formerly based on shared European civilizational affinities During an intense period of Western colonial expansion—that is, the decades beginning in the second half of the nineteenth and ending with World



Civilizations and International Relations 41

War I—Western states did not accept that their colonies were equals and as a result they could not be regarded as ready to join the institutions of international society. Consequently, extant Western colonies could not join the League of Nations when it was founded in 1919 nor the United Nations in 1945. This course of action was only possible once the colonies won their independence. As decolonization gathered pace from the 1950s and 1960s, numerous newly independent countries did achieved membership of the UN, through public allegiance to the values of the UN, whose foundational statements are the Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Bain 2003). For most Western colonial powers, it was a highly unexpected development that their erstwhile colonies would so soon be de facto equals, reflected in membership of the UN on achieving independence. European colonial powers thought it would take many years, perhaps hundreds or even thousands, to “raise up” their subjects in the colonies to appropriate levels of civilizational development in order to be treated as equals. To achieve this, it would necessarily require a full and lengthy “program” of civilizational upgrading, involving a multifaceted and wide-ranging process of intense and intensive Western-style modernisation and development of Christian cultural values. Only when this process was complete would colonial “graduates” be “fit” to take up a role as fully fledged members of international society, allowed to have a comparable position to the extant “civilized” states of Europe and the West more generally. The putative graduates would have to learn by example and the decision to admit them to the club of civilized nations would be in the hands of the civilizationally superior Western states. Following World War II, the timescale for acceptance into international society was for most colonies surprisingly and dramatically shortened. The exigencies of World War II, which made the erstwhile European colonizers considerably weaker than they appeared to have been before the war, encouraged often unexpectedly swift decolonization. This followed often tightly contested yet relatively brief campaigns for independence. As a result, European colonizers, led by the British and followed more reluctantly by the French, agreed to grant their colonies in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean independence. There was no consensus whether “civilizationally” they were ready and equipped for this decisive moment of liberation and national development. Some thought: probably not; yet, as the balance of power dramatically and decisively shifted from the Europeans, they were no longer in a position to dictate the terms of membership in international society. One major consequence was that soon after World War II, the UN rapidly expanded its membership, which was almost entirely due to the admission of new countries as a result of decolonization from European control. However,

42

Chapter One

there were still extant civilizational standards which had to be met as a condition of membership. Rather than belonging to an erstwhile Christendom, all countries joining the UN had to agree to the dictates of the UN Charter and attendant human rights norms. While they were widely regarded as entirely defensible because they were thought by the framers of the Charter to be universal in scope, application, and culturally neutral, over time it became clear that some UN-endorsed conventions—such as individualistic human rights or liberal democracy—are not necessarily regarded by the governments and citizens of some non-Western countries as applicable to them and their specific cultural characteristics. Brown’s conception of international society—that is, “an occasionally idealized conceptualization of the norms of the old, pre-1914 European states system”—cannot be a satisfactory starting point for understanding interstate interactions in contemporary international relations. Why? Because most of the world’s nearly 200 extant states are not European nor Western? What of the 140+ that are not? What values if any might they be said to share? Moreover, what of the values and ideologies of, for example, Western and Eastern European states? Do they have more in common than what separates them culturally and civilizationally? How likely is it that non-Western states would clearly adhere to “European” or “Western” values,” when most threw off Western colonial control relatively recently, often within the lifetimes of people still living? We examine these issues in later chapters, especially those which focus on the United Nations as a key focal point of the “international community.” CONCLUSION The aim of the chapter was, first, to provide an essential historical and international relations background to Huntington’s post-Cold War focus on the “clash of civilizations.” To do this, the chapter surveyed the civilizational impact of a century of geographical expansion of Western colonialism and imperialism from the second half of the nineteenth century. Second, the chapter argued that the expansion of Western “civilization” via colonization was built on perceptions of certain values, norms, and structures, which were initially widely accepted among emerging nationalist elites of the colonies. Later, however, significant differences emerged, often manifested in the post-Cold War era in differing perspectives on human rights and their interpretation. It is often stated that “modern” international relations dates from the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a watershed separating two periods: the first, when religion and inter-religious conflict characterized international



Civilizations and International Relations 43

relations and the second, during which the secular ideology of nationalism developed and informed the spread of European colonization to most nonEuropean parts of the world. As a result, the international system grew greatly in size, albeit with wide variations in economic development among states. Today, there are now many more states (the UN has a membership of 193), and many important non-state actors, compared to the period of European expansion from the latter period of the nineteenth century. Europeans were pivotal to the expansion of international relations from the late eighteenth century via imperialism, colonization, and the spread of nationalism. Over time, however, this led to a backlash from the colonized countries, with European domination gradually being undermined—starting in Latin America in the early nineteenth century—before European imperialism came to an end in the decades after World War II. In the wake of European colonialism and imperialism an international society developed, characterized by the dominance of European countries, with their perceived cultural and civilizational characteristics. Clashing European imperialisms and nationalism had been a highly significant cause of the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The immediate aftermath of the war saw a concerted attempt to found an international organization, the League of Nations, in order to advance the cause of collective security and prevent another world war. Although the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, the League did provide the basic foundations for its successor, the United Nations, founded in 1945. The UN symbolized a new period of international relations with a pronounced focus on the importance of supranational authority and the growth and spread of international law. The authority of the UN was, however, severely tested by the contemporaneous emergence of the Cold War. These developments occurred in the context of rapid technological change, political transformations, industrialization, emergence of the “developing world,” and rise and fall of ideological conflict between the USA and the (now defunct) Soviet Union during the Cold War. As we shall see in the next chapter, concerns about which values should predominate in the international community were first raised at the United Nations’ post-Cold War human rights conference held in Vienna in 1993. The disputes and disagreements which marked what was supposed to be a triumphalist event highlighting the demise of Soviet Communism instead highlighted emphatically serious differences about civilizational differences. Today, nearly thirty years after the Vienna conference, such concerns are key ideational topics informing debates about civilizational attributes, norms, and beliefs.

Chapter Two

The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder”

Chapter 1 examined the development of “international society” by Europeans during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consequential to acquisition of extensive foreign territories, European powers, notably the French and British, sought to spread their political institutions and values via colonialism and imperialism, with the stated aim of expanding their “civilization,” undermining “barbarism,” and teaching “savages” how to be “civilized.” Many Europeans believed that such international society-building activities were not only legitimate but also necessary to enable power balancing, following a long period of nationalist turmoil in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. European efforts were not, however, always welcomed by emerging national elites in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. After World War I, with the European powers weakened by the conflict, a slow process of decolonization began, which picked up pace after World War II. Overall, the decolonization process was an important component in the unravelling of a Europeancontrolled international society. This was shown from the late 1980s, when the end of the Cold War was followed by demise of the Soviet Union and initially the apparent triumph of Western-style democracy and capitalism, which appeared to presage a new phase of international relations: a New World Order based on Western values with increasing, maybe universal, legitimacy. It soon became clear, however, that a benign, cooperative New World Order based on the spread of perceived Western values was not going to develop; instead a New World Disorder came into being, marked by often virulently clashing values which some saw as linked to the differing values of competing civilizations with mutually incompatible cultures and associated worldviews. In this context, Huntington identified the West in competition 45

46

Chapter Two

and likely conflict with both China and the Muslim world, both of which were seen as having different and incompatible values compared to the West. This chapter traces how the initial Western post-Cold War optimism that a Western-style liberal New World Order would ensue soon gave way to the reality of a New World Disorder, marked by conflict based on seemingly incompatible cultural values of different actors. The chapter covers a thirty-year period: from the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s/early 1990s to the late 2010s, a period characterized by increased incidence of cultural conflicts in many parts of the world, including Europe and the USA. The overall aim of the chapter is to explain and account for growth of apparent intercivilizational incompatibilities in the context of a shift from (presumed) New World Order to New World Disorder. Chapter 3 looks at attempts at intercivilizational dialogue at the UN, while chapter 4 explains that attempts at intercivilizational dialogue were stymied and instead a widespread securitization of Islam ensued after 9/11. Henceforward, this characterized both the UN’s approach to relations between the West and the Muslim world and relations between Muslims and host communities in both the USA and many European countries. The first section of the chapter examines how the brief optimism regarding a “New World Order” after the Cold War soon turned into the pessimism of a “New World Disorder.” The second section surveys the civilizational characteristics of the “New World Disorder.” Section three assesses the contribution of Islamist extremism and terrorism to the “New World Disorder,” and Western responses to it. FROM “NEW WORLD ORDER” TO “NEW WORLD DISORDER” During an interview with Prospect magazine in 2014, the former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, was asked whether he thought the world was “getting more orderly.” Kissinger replied that he saw things “moving towards a world that is reordering itself and that may appear more ordered at some periods of time,” but overall he saw “no sign that we are moving towards a world order in my definition of it—namely, a system which is accepted, which is internalized by the majority of the key participants. . . . [I]n the sense of world order as a combination of legitimacy and balance of power, I don’t think that exists today.” What does Kissinger mean by “world order”? How does he interpret the term? Why did he claim not to see it in 2014? The notion of world order can be made explicit in one of two main ways: first, in the liberal sense of an “active, idealistic promotion of liberal democracy and free



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 47

markets” and, second, in the search for a “a rule-governed world” without the requirement of the order being based on shared values (Maddox 2014). Two key developments marked the end of the Communist system in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. First, there was a widening and deepening of globalization, identified here as a multifaceted process characterized by economic liberalisation and the spread of capitalism, a prioritization of liberal democracy, and a focus on individualistic human rights to countries lacking them. By the 1990s, it was clear that all states—rich and poor, big or small, developed or underdeveloped—were significantly affected by globalization, which had notable political, economic, technological, and cultural impacts (Haynes 2005). Second, the end of the Cold War and the onset of deepening and widening globalization was also marked by an increased spread of ideas, actors, and forces, including sundry non-state actors which took advantage of the new circumstances to interact transnationally. Some, such as transnational corporations, were widely seen as serving to encourage and develop the globalization of capitalism, while others, including non-Western, non-individualistic, “Asian Values” and the self-proclaimed champions of “radical” or “extremist” Islam, such as Osama bin-Laden and Islamic State/Daesh, worked to achieve different objectives. Such entities strongly opposed Western-led globalization, seeing it as a “Trojan horse” to spread an unwelcome Western civilization, characterized by a malign process of Westernization/Americanization, whose purpose was to undermine or destroy non-Western ways of life and achieve what European colonialism and imperialism had failed to do: subjugate non-Western areas in perpetuity (Bayrakli and Havez 2017). Two radically different visions of the future were mooted in the aftermath of the Cold War. On the one hand, there was Huntington’s framework of international relations characterized by a clash of civilizations. As Troy (2012: 44–45) notes, Huntington’s paradigm was “one of the few theoretical approaches to an explanation of politics after the Cold War to reflect a ‘New World Order’—or ‘World Disorder’—that has succeeded the era of the hegemonic paradigm of bipolarity.” On the other hand, there was the vision of the then US president, George H.W. Bush, who contended that after the Cold War circumstances were conducive for a New World Order to develop, built under the auspices of the USA, in pursuit of normatively desirable goals, including: universal liberal democracy and human rights and enhanced development in the world’s poorest countries. Many suspected that Bush’s goal of a benign and cooperative New World Order was in reality a pretense, a device to try to expand American hegemony after the Cold War. Certainly, earlier examples of potential New World Order—such as, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) after the Thirty Years War; the Congress of

48

Chapter Two

Vienna (1815) after the Napoleonic Wars; the Treaty of Versailles (1919) after World War I; and international agreements signed at Yalta and Potsdam after World War II (1945)—were characterized by the desire of the victors to reformulate and rebuild the international system according to their own preferences and desires. Thus, it was entirely consistent that Bush’s expressions of a desire to establish a New World Order after the Cold War were made in the context of US aspirations to post-Cold War supremacy, perhaps achievable now that the Soviet Union was no more. Although the USA did not “win” the Cold War, there was initially widespread Western optimism that a “liberal democratic” “New World Order” would characterize post-Cold War international relations. For the West, its defining feature would be the triumph of American/Western norms and values—resulting in the globalization of democracy, Western-style human rights and capitalism. The New World Order would also be characterized by a renewed, reenergized, and ideationally cohesive international society, with widely shared commitment to such values. The Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori summed up the prevalent mood in San Francisco in 1990, during the annual American Political Science Association meeting. Sartori claimed that, after the Cold War, Western-style democracy “now found itself without enemies or viable alternatives.” This view was also articulated by the American commentator Francis Fukuyama in an influential article (1989) and subsequent book (1992). There was a clear Western normative interest in this outcome. The alternative, Kissinger noted, was to see the world “in a state of revolutionary disarray” (Pastusiak 2004). Western triumphalism and optimism turned out to be short-lived. Even before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was apparent that the West’s political control of world events and dangers was more aspiration than reality. This was made plain by the events of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, fought by the West under United Nations auspices and led by the USA to oust Iraq from Kuwait, which it had invaded. This conflict highlighted an important challenge to the Western-dominated New World Order, as Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, under attack from the USA, made a religious, cultural, and civilizational appeal to fellow Muslims in the ummah to support Iraq, a country whose population is over 90 percent Muslim, with both Sunni and Shia communities (Burns 1990). To underline the intercivilizational nature of the conflict from which Saddam sought to highlight and benefit, Iraq directed rocket attacks against Israel, even though Israel was not involved in the fight. Contemporaneously, a multifaceted cultural conflict began in Yugoslavia, with combatants divided by both religion and culture and appealing to civilizational allies for assistance. The conflicts in Iraq and Yugoslavia left both countries weak and divided, suitable environments for the spread



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 49

of Islamist jihadi fighters who were willing and able to exploit the resulting state fragility. Rather than indicative of a cooperative New World Order characterized by increased peace and cooperation underpinned by improved human rights and liberal democracy, the conflicts and their aftermath reflected the re-emergence and re-focusing of older cultural and ethnic tensions and struggles. The Iraq and Yugoslavia conflicts significantly affected international order and stability, fatally undermining the expectation of a consensual post-Cold War international society. This was not an expanding, normatively progressive consensual international society based on shared Western values, but its opposite: increasing international fragmentation characterized by ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts (Kaplan 1994). With hindsight, it is easy to see that the optimistic scenarios of Western scholars, such as Sartori and Fukuyama, were both simplistic and wrong. They were simplistic because it was no more than wishful thinking to believe that the demise of the Soviet Union would herald a new era of Westernapproved human rights and democracy; they were wrong because it was erroneous to believe that it was possible easily or quickly to spread and embed norms and institutions of liberal democracy and improved human rights into many previously undemocratic countries. This was especially the case when such attempts at implantation were the result of foreign invasion, such as US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. America’s efforts “to promote a universal Western culture” and its “values of democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights, individualism, the rule of law” may have been well-meaning but they were highly problematic (Huntington 1996: 183–184). While these attempts may have been embraced by “minorities in other civilizations,” they served primarily to generate a range of responses from “skepticism . . . to intense opposition” by majorities in non-Western cultures. As Huntington bluntly concludes: “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest” (ibid, p.184). Attempts by Western states to spread their values and norms in relation to democracy and capitalism were made in the context of enhanced globalization after the Cold War. The three decades since George H. W. Bush expressed aspirations for a New World Order based on “American/Western values” have not turned out as he planned. The period has instead been beset by profound differences of opinion on the way forward, reflecting a severe lack of consensus on what values and norms should a post-Cold War new international order pursue and seek to embed. As Vaclav Havel, a former president of the Czech Republic, noted: “[C]ultural conflicts are increasing and are more dangerous today than at any time in history” (quoted in Huntington, 1996: 28). The thirty years since Bush’s aspirations for a New World Order were expressed have led

50

Chapter Two

to its opposite: New World Disorder, with frequent, often intense and openended conflicts with cultural, religious, ethnic, or nationalistic characteristics. Many involve, explicitly or implicitly, a questioning of the universality of liberal democracy, individualistic human rights, and Western-style capitalist development. This situation was marked by a series of so far unresolved events and developments, including: the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the global economic crisis of 2008, Arab Uprisings of 2011, and Europe’s refugee emergency (2015). New World Disorder developed in the context of deepening and widening globalization, affecting post-Cold War international relations in three main ways. First, economic interrelations, with particular impact on both manufacturing and employment, a result of the relentless globalization of the world economy; second, in scientific discovery, with important advances in communications technology of particular significance. Third, while some believed that liberal democracy would become the global template for political relations, there were instead diverse political outcomes; some were towards democracy and others were not. This was not the “end of history” that Fukuyama prophesied; instead it was a return to history, characterized by revival of older forms of politics, including ethnic, nationalist, cultural, and religious anxieties and expectations—serving, both within countries and between them, to reopen conflicts long thought to be a thing of the “traditional” past. Taken together, these developments dashed the chances of a unified, consensual, international society developing, with shared values, norms, and beliefs. Globalization fundamentally undermines the possibility of the domination of one set of values. Historically, international society expanded under European-dominated conditions. Today, the impact of globalization on international relations is not to reinforce but to undermine the notion of a consensual international society with shared values, norms, and beliefs (Held and McGrew 2002). Post-Cold War globalization led to a lessening of states’ ability to have sole authority in various crucial areas, including economic relations and cyberspace. Finally, the last few decades have seen growth in numbers and variety of non-state, transnational actors, including cross-border terrorist entities, whose values, norms, and beliefs differ fundamentally from what are often mooted at the UN and elsewhere to be universal values, such as, democracy, human rights, and religious freedom. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW WORLD DISORDER This section examines several interpretations of causes and characteristics of the New World Disorder, highlighting the views of a Financial Times journal-



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 51

ist and commentator, Martin Wolf, and four scholars of international relations: Robert Kaplan, Gilbert Achcar, Tzvetan Todorov, and Stanley Hoffman. Each has written extensively about the New World Disorder in book-length treatments or, in the case of Wolf, plentiful op-eds in his newspaper. Wolf (2017, 2018) and Kaplan (2017) argue that Europe is in steep decline, with non-European powers, notably Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, achieving ascendant positions. Achcar (2007) argues that the post-Cold War world is characterized by a “clash of barbarisms.” Todorov and Hoffman (2004) identify conflicts which to them define the New World Disorder: the global war on terror, unresolved wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and declining relations between the USA and Europe. Taken together, these aspects of New World Disorder highlight both intercivilizational clashes (the West vs. the Muslim world: 9/11, associated terrorism) and the rise of non-Western powers, including Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. Wolf (2018) notes that the contemporary “global economic and political system originated as a reaction against the disasters of the first half of the 20th century. The latter, in turn, were caused by the unprecedented, but highly uneven, economic progress of the 19th century.” Today, however, the European-led international society which developed in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries is replaced by a widespread revival of “strident nationalism and xenophobia.” Thus, aspiration for a “brave new world of progress, harmony and democracy, raised by the market opening of the 1980s and the collapse of Soviet communism between 1989 and 1991,” have “turned into ashes.” Like Wolf, Kaplan (2017) also perceives a New World Disorder following short-lived post-Cold War optimism that a cooperative new world order would soon emerge. For Kaplan, “Western civilization” acquired an unprecedented position of “geopolitical concision and raw power” during the Cold War and just after it. After World War II until recently, “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) condensed a millennia-long tradition of political and moral values—the West, in shorthand—into a robust military alliance. NATO was a cultural phenomenon before it was anything” (Kaplan 2017: 2). Kaplan asserts that NATO was the guarantor of Western dominance, a modern, collective exponent of Western civilizational values with, additionally, sufficient military capacity to enforce, when necessary, its claims of superior civilizational values. In recent years, however, the collective will expressed in what Kaplan perceives as NATO’s Western values underpinned by massive military power, has largely dribbled away. Now, Kaplan contends, Europe has “disappeared,” replaced by a new international actor of significance: Eurasia. The emergent “supercontinent” of Eurasia is a “fluid, comprehensible unit of trade and conflict,” benefitting from the weakening of the Westphalian

52

Chapter Two

system of states, which has facilitated resurgence of older, hitherto regarded as spent, imperial and civilizational legacies: Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Turkish. Globalization’s impact is reflected in Kaplan’s claim that “every crisis from Central Europe to the ethnic-Han Chinese heartland is now interlinked. There is one singular battlespace” (Kaplan 2017: 5). Achcar’s (2007) starting point is that, in the wake of 9/11, Huntington’s predictions regarding the clash of civilizations were correct—except for one major component. Whereas for Huntington, the clash would involve a superior civilization—the Western—pitted against challenges from Asian and Islamic rivals, Achcar believes that the clash is one of competing “barbarisms.” Achcar’s central argument is that Huntington mistook “a clash of barbarisms” for “a clash of civilizations.” Achcar portrays a depressing picture of the post-Cold War era, seeing the emergence of a “global Dark Ages” with baleful connotations. His analysis highlights and explicates the “dark sides” of both Western and Islamic civilizations—with their respective barbarities—mutually competing in this new Hobbesian world order. For Achcar, international behavior is either “civilized” or “barbaric” and certain standards of behavior are necessary to be thought of as “civilized” by the international community. Unlike the era of European colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, different civilizations now “officially” have equality. This implies a refusal normatively to recognize the kind of hierarchies which characterized nineteenth century discourse on civilizations versus barbarians. Today, the “barbarians” are the “terrorists” tout court. In January 2015, following the jihadi attack on the Charlie Hebdo office and personnel, the then US secretary of state, John Kerry, stated that: “Today’s murders are part of a larger confrontation, not between civilizations, no, but between civilization itself and those who are opposed to a civilized world . . . The murderers dared proclaim, Charlie Hebdo is dead. But make no mistake, they are wrong” (emphasis added; Kerry quoted in Cassidy 2015). Competing barbarisms—that is, the Global War on Terror versus the grotesque activities of al Qaeda, IS, Boko Haram, etc.—lead to a seemingly endless cycle of accelerating violence and mutual recriminations. Achcar argues that these are competing barbarisms not civilizations because the latter would by definition be incapable of dealing with each other in this way. Like Wolf, Kaplan, and Achcar, Todorov and Hoffman (2004) address fundamental questions about New World Disorder which for them are exemplified by “the war on terrorism, the Iraq conflict and its aftermath and the current state of transatlantic relations.” Todorov and Hoffman note that instead of the political-cultural divisions typical of the twentieth century, that is, East and West and North and South, today the New World Disorder reflects a situation of ungoverned—or, ungovernable—globalization. This involves a bifurcation of the



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 53

world into two areas: one dominated by “fear” and the other by “resentment.” For Todorov and Hoffman, the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 were the pivotal point in development of a New World Disorder, involving both a “clash of civilizations” and a clash “within civilizations.” In addition, they see a further component of New World Disorder, reflected in a crisis of representative democracy, both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Wolf, Kaplan, Achcar, Todorov, and Hoffman all make similar points about causes and effects of the New World Disorder. They agree that it has emerged in the post-Cold War world due to the sometimes-malign impact of globalization and the rise of “civilizational” terrorism marked, on the one hand, by the Global War on Terror, and, on the other by 9/11 and its aftermath. In addition, the New World Disorder also reflects a widespread crisis of representative democracy, with a consequential rise of right-wing populism in some Western countries. Overall, the growing electoral successes of rightwing populism in Europe (Norris, 2005) and the USA highlights the issue of real or imagined civilizational differences within countries, with much attention paid to civilizational relations between “Westerners” and “Muslims.” These issues form a key component of the New World Disorder and are examined at length in the chapters of the second section of the book. ISLAMIST EXTREMISM AND NEW WORLD DISORDER Todorov and Hoffman (2004) point to a major division of the world into two conflicting areas: one characterized by “fear” and the other marked by “resentment.” While they do not clearly identify which parts of the world are characterized by “fear” and which by “resentment,” it is probably safe to assume that Western regions, such as the USA and Europe, exhibit “fear” while areas filled with many young “have-nots,” such as several countries in the Muslim world, including the Middle East and North Africa, both feel and regularly express “resentment” as, for example, during the Arab Uprisings of 2011–2012. This is not the only component which analysts and scholars point to when seeking to explain the development of post-Cold War New World Disorder, but it is the case that many would identify the post-9/11 spread and expansion of Islamist extremism and terrorism as providing a key focal point. Many Western governments and societies’ apparent suspicion or dislike of Muslims, especially extremists and terrorists, is linked to the threat they pose to their countries’ security and stability. Following 9/11, it seems likely that many Western governments looked anew at Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm. Some might have

54

Chapter Two

viewed it as an appropriate framework through which to explain the growth of Islamist extremists and terrorist groups including but not limited to al Qaeda and Islamic State. Their behavior and actions were seen not only as opposed to a “moderate” Islam, whose values and norms overlapped to a large extent with those of Western civilizational understandings, but were also explicitly against the West’s norms and values. “Islamic extremism” was seen by many as a “perverted” form of Islam opposed to “ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom,” collective core values of European and by extension Western civilization, as suggested by Huntington (1996: 311). Huntington (1993, 1996) contended that the West’s governmental systems, based on liberal democracy and individualistic human rights, did not come about by accident or by chance, but as a result of a society’s collective cultural and political will to develop such values and norms of behavior. Without this crucial foundation, neither liberal democracy nor capitalist economic ties would have developed in the West. In Huntington’s view, while “kin cultures” do not fight each other, it may on occasion be necessary for culturallyallied blocs of states to enter into conflict (or at least contend) with rival blocs. Thus, for Huntington, the West, with its liberal democratic values and free-market economic frameworks, would almost inevitably pit itself against rival blocs whose cultural norms were fundamentally different, such as the Muslim world and China and other Asian countries with similar views and norms. An ensuing clash of civilizations would be driven by the expansionist nature of the rival cultural blocs. The rise of Islamist extremism—crystallized by 9/11 and the rise of, inter alia, al Qaeda and IS—was conceptualized by Western governments as part of a wider conflict between the West and the “global jihad,” with both sides animated by fundamentally “globalizing” ideologies. Thus, the post-Cold War Western efforts to promote its core values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance, and to advance its economic interests were countered by various Islamist extremists. Both sets of actors—that is, Western governments and the Islamist extremists engaged in “global jihad”—regarded the conflict in similar ways. Both perceive the conflict as essentially borderless, a universal struggle for dominance, whose outcome would depend on which side could win the most hearts and minds (Shahar 2019.) Many would agree that “Islamist extremism,” such as that demonstrated by al Qaeda and IS, is a serious threat to the stability and security of the West and an important dimension of the New World Disorder (Haynes, 2005; Fox, 2015: 239–242). Evidence from recent events involving Islamist extremists in, inter alia, Algeria, Mali, and Syria point to the following conclusions regarding how the relationship between Islamists and the



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 55

West has changed over time. First, they underline that a key Westphalian principle, reflective of the development of a Western-dominated international society, was until recently sustained by two important conditions: first, the absence of transnational—that is, cross-border—ideologies that fundamentally compete with nation states for people’s political loyalties. Although, potentially there were competing civilizational or religious affiliations, such as the Muslim ummah, the Roman Catholic Church, or the Communist International, they did not generally or routinely replace most people’s loyalty to the nation-state. Second, a set of shared values generally espoused by governments, that inter alia engendered an element of respect for other rulers and regimes, sustained international society by adhesion not to universal but to particularistic—that is, Western—values at international fora including the United Nations. Recent activities of transnational Islamist extremists, such as al Qaeda and IS, exposed a fundamental weakening of these two “pillars” of the Westphalian system, both by focusing their relationship with the West on putatively civilizational issues and by their ability to attract sizeable numbers of Western citizens to their cause. An estimated 40,000 Westerners joined IS as fighters in the 2010s (Schmid 2015). The challenge this represented to the West and to international society was reflected in the emergence of new or newly significant transnational allegiances which challenged popular identity with the nation-state, in this case focusing on incompatible alternative Islamist extremist values, beliefs, and norms which are not compatible with Westphalian principles of international order based on Western values. This was especially the case if these beliefs and values rejected and hence undermined the norms and values on which post-Westphalian international order was built and the institutions, such as the UN, which sought to maintain it. This was expressed in four main ways: 1.  Rejection of the nation-state as the main political unit. This reflected denial of the principle that leaders of states have the right and duty to deal with other leaders in international relations and to speak for all their citizens. 2.  Negation of the principle that states are the sole possessors of legitimate force. Other actors face significant restrictions on the use of force (for example, in international law civilians cannot legally be targets of war; terrorists, on the other hand, may explicitly target civilians as a key warfighting technique). 3.  Violent non-state actors undermine state–society relations by weakening the ability of governments to carry out one of their basic, generalized responsibilities to their citizens: comprehensive security. It is of course

56

Chapter Two

impossible for any governments to protect all its citizens from random terror attacks, such as those carried out by Islamist extremists on 9/11 in the USA, 11 March 2004 in Spain, and 7 July 2005 in London, and since then, numerous terrorist outrages in Western European countries, including France, Belgium, and Germany. 4.  The actions of violent non-state terrorist actors often provoke governments to strong reactions. For example, the USA lashed out against al Qaeda following 9/11, invading both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), with long-lasting regional and international ramifications. This had the effect of undermining a long-accepted code of conduct in international relations: state sovereignty is sacrosanct. The ubiquity of Islamist extremists and terrorists encourages a generic “fear” and suspicion of Islam in many Western countries. This began to grow soon after the end of the Cold War and before 9/11. In 1995, following an upsurge of political Islam in the early 1990s, expressed for example in the civil war in Algeria and the first unsuccessful al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers in 1993, the then NATO secretary-general, Willy Claes, asserted that, “Muslim fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism once was. . . . Please do not underestimate this risk . . . at the conclusion of this age it is a serious threat, because it represents terrorism, religious fanaticism and exploitation of social and economic injustice. . . . NATO is much more than a military alliance. It has committed itself to defending basic principles of civilization that bind North America and Western Europe” (Claes quoted in Sciolino 1996). According to Sciolino (1996), Claes’s “remark prompted King Hassan of Morocco, one of North Africa’s most pragmatic and Westernoriented leaders, to retort: ‘I don’t think NATO was created to fight fundamentalism, but to fight Soviet guns and missiles. Anyway, if fundamentalism has to be engaged in battle, it would not be done with tanks’.” Claes was using an explicitly civilizational argument. On the one hand, he sought to highlight what he saw as a major security threat to international order from “Muslim fundamentalism,” which he identified by “terrorism, religious fanaticism and exploitation of social and economic injustice.” On the other hand, he contended that the West exhibits opposite, and superior, values, that is, “basic principles of civilization that bind North America and Western Europe democracy”: democracy, religious freedom, and social and economic justice. The source of Claes’s concern was not, however, “Islamist terrorism” which in the mid-1990s was seen as rather low on the list of Western security concerns. Instead, he was concerned with what he saw as the rise of “Islamic fundamentalism” in North Africa, especially the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, which he believed was a serious security



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 57

threat to Europe and thus an issue for NATO. At a meeting in Brussels in February 1995, sixteen NATO ambassadors agreed that “more attention should be paid to the instability of areas such as Northern Africa and the Middle East.” The governments of Italy and Spain, it was reported, feared that Claes’ statements about Islamic fundamentalism would increase the risk of terrorist attacks in their countries.” In late 1994, as a result of the fear of the national and transnational spread of Islamic fundamentalism across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the wake of Algeria’s civil war, “Spain introduced the idea of a dialogue [later formalized as NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue], which was supported by [other Southern European states], Italy and France. Launched as a North Atlantic Council initiative,1 NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue involves seven regional countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia” (“Islamic Countries Criticize NATO Dialogue on Extremism,” 1995; Author’s interviews #4, 5, 14, 45, 60).2 Claes’s comments about the threat to the West’s security from “Muslim fundamentalism” highlight the possible impact on Europe of Islamist governments gaining power in North Africa. Claes’s concern was stimulated at least in part by the then contemporaneous Algerian civil war. However, following pressure from MENA governments, Claes stated that “religious fundamentalism, whether Islamic or of other varieties, is not a concern for NATO.” Aware that it was not politically or diplomatically possible for Western governments to intervene directly in MENA countries, instead NATO initiated a Mediterranean Dialogue with countries neighboring Europe deemed most at risk from “Islamic fundamentalism.” In addition, more covertly, the West involved itself in the region’s security both directly and indirectly with a view to thwarting “Islamic fundamentalism.” Claes’s mid-1990s remarks and NATO’s stated aim to enter into “dialogue” with governments of some Mediterranean Muslim-majority countries was indicative more generally of a shift to include civilizational and cultural concerns in NATO’s security remit. More widely, this reflected a wider “reorganization of world politics that followed the end of the cold war and the release of new waves of globalization” (Murden 2005: 539). Initially, following the Iranian revolution in 1979, the threat to the West was seen to be the coming to power of a geographically proximate “Muslim fundamentalist” government in Iran, characterized as symptomatic more generally of an emerging New World Disorder which highlighted the declining international authority of the USA and the West more generally. A few years later on 9/11, the al Qaeda attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon was a game changer in two respects: first, they highlighted increased likelihood of Islamist extremist attacks on the West and, second,

58

Chapter Two

they underlined the repressive political systems of many Middle Eastern countries, geographically close to Europe but frequently deficient in terms of development, despite the widespread presence of oil, and a lack of human rights. In this context, NATO’s initiative to develop dialogue with MENA countries, although no doubt well-meaning, had little impact. Generally, 9/11 and its aftermath made attempts at meaningful dialogue between the West and the countries of the MENA very difficult. On the one hand, 9/11 encouraged many people in the West to believe that they were threatened by “Islamist” or “Islamic” terrorism. On the other hand, as Robert Kaplan has commented: the “police states of North Africa and the Levant,” which he characterizes as “dictatorships” which hold “their peoples prisoner inside secure borders—borders artificially drawn by European colonial agents” enabled Europeans to “lecture Arabs about human rights without worrying about the possibility of messy democratic experiments that could lead to significant migration.” The FIS election victory in Algeria in 1991 seemed to many Western governments a security threat on two counts: First, Algeria, geographically close to France, would henceforward be governed by “Islamic fundamentalists’ which would, second, encourage many Algerians who disagreed with such a government to attempt to flee to France and elsewhere in Europe. Later “democratic experiments,” including those emanating from the Arab Uprisings of 2011, as well as the impact of the Syrian civil war and the aftermath of the USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, encouraged many often-desperate people to try to flee the MENA region and start new lives in the presumed comfort and safety of Western Europe. This did not, however, represent a “Muslim plot” to take over Europe. Instead, it reflected a rational human desire to leave insecure and unstable places and replace them with something better. The political upheavals in the region seriously weakened several regional governments, such as those in Syria and Iraq. Islamic State moved in to fill the gap left by the decline of state authority, becoming briefly a key regional disseminator of religious extremism, calling on Muslims’ religious and civilizational loyalties to support it. As already noted, by 2017 more than 40,000 foreign Muslims had responded to IS’s invitation to fight in Syria (Wood 2017). Despite the fears of Claes, Kaplan, and others, “Islamic fundamentalist” regimes à la Iran have not become commonplace within the countries of the Muslim world. What did become more frequent were seemingly intractable conflicts within regions, involving conflicts which often spilled over from one country to neighboring countries, with associated impacts on regional stability and peace, such as stimulating the desire of many local people to escape to more secure and stable environments in Europe. Not only in the Middle East but also more generally, such conflicts rarely have clear-cut reso-



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 59

lution. Instead they tend to drag on for years or even decades, contributing to the phenomenon of “failed” or “failing” states,” that is, where the ability to develop both stability and security is dramatically undermined by longlasting ethnic, nationalist, and/or religious conflicts. Partly as a result of these factors, Western optimism that a peaceful, cooperative post-Cold War order, stimulated by the spread of liberal democracy and improved human rights to formerly communist Eastern Europe and the developing world, ebbed in the 1990s, just a handful of years after expressions of New World Order hopefulness. In addition, new, urgent issues emerged at this time, posing questions without easy or simple answers, particularly in relation to regional and global stability and security. During the 1990s and 2000s a growing number of intrastate conflicts in many parts of the world underlined that one of the less expected and most unwelcome results of the end of the Cold War was an array of nationalist, religious, and ethnic clashes, especially in parts of the developing world, which often emerged as the ideological straitjacket of the Cold War was removed. Part of the dynamism for these developments was provided by globalization, including the impact of vigorous, cross-border transfers of people, information, capital, and goods. The overall effect of post-Cold War globalization on international relations was to stimulate major changes, which are still being played out today. In this global era people from numerous countries and civilizations are for the first time in human history able to work and play together with ease, while at the same time, globalization has also encouraged other, darker developments including civilizational conflicts both within and between civilizations. DEALING WITH NEW WORLD DISORDER? W. B. Yeats’s famous poem “The Second Coming” (1919) refers to “things falling apart” with the “centre” no longer able to hold its position in the face of “mere anarchy” being “loosed on the world.” Yeats’s celebrated poem captures a feeling of insecurity, instability, and fracturing which for many characterizes the post-Cold War New World Disorder, which comprises four separate but conceptually linked developments: a fracture in Western unity; decline of attractiveness of key “Western” values, such as liberal democracy and individualistic human rights; reduced willingness of governments to work cooperatively to secure collectively beneficial outcomes; and widespread revival of nationalism and populism, especially right-wing versions. First, the political and economic fracturing of the West has an important ideological dimension. On the one hand, there are right-wing populist leaders,

60

Chapter Two

such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Matteo Salvini. On the other hand, there are the liberal conformists: Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Theresa May, and the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sánchez. The West’s ideological division is expressed in policy divisions: separated both internally—principally about how to deal with increased migration and the threat of terrorism—and externally. Western governments are deeply concerned by both the economic rise of China and the security threat posed by Russia. According to Martin Wolff, “We have reached the end of an economic period, that of western-led globalization, and a geopolitical one—the post-cold war ‘unipolar moment’.” We are at a crossroads where the post-World War II, US-created, liberal order is apparently unravelling into deglobalization and widespread conflict. Some see the Trump presidency as weakening liberal democracy—that is, democracy that rests on a neutral rule of law—and a concomitant strengthening of autocracy due to Trump’s apparently enthusiastic embrace of what many would regard as nationalist-populist dictators around the world (Landy 2016; Feldstein 2018; Hallin 2019). In the former communist countries of eastern Europe, such leadership is expressed in a style of plebiscitary dictatorship, sometimes euphemistically called “illiberal democracy,” Viktor Orbán’s preferred term. In addition, Vladimir Putin’s Russia seduces admirers and encourages imitators, while the emphatic victory of Turkey’s president Erdogan in a referendum on presidential power in June 2018 seemingly moved Turkey further in this direction. Illiberal democracy, sometimes identified as “democratic backsliding,” is characterized not only by the undermining of previously, relatively free and fair elections but by reduction or eradication of previously entrenched liberal freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom to criticize, and religious freedoms, all previously seen as cornerstones of Western civilization that set the West apart from other parts of the world, including the Muslim world. Moves undermining Western cooperation have been led by the Trump administration, which has pulled the USA out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Climate Change agreement, and the UN Human Rights Council. The result has been that these political developments have fractured the West as an ideologically coherent entity. It also reflects the withdrawal of the USA under Trump from close cooperation from an international system which was primarily a creation of American will and power, abetted after World War II by European leaders keen to try to ensure that regional conflict, leading to world war, would not occur again. To this end, the six-state European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1950, developing over time into the twenty-seven-member European Union. Under Donald Trump’s leadership, the Western community is under dire threat. “The centre of that power currently repudiates the values and perception of interests that underpinned this idea. That changes just about everything” (Wolff 2018).



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 61

Second, the values reflecting modern Western civilizational ideals, that is, liberal democracy, individualistic human rights, and liberal global markets, appear to be losing both prestige and appeal. This is not only the case in the Global South but more widely, evidenced by the fact that democracy is no longer spreading and, in many countries and regions, is currently retrenching. The electoral successes of nationalistic populists and chauvinistic authoritarians in both the USA and Europe indicates that these ideals are also less appealing than they once were to many Western citizens (Luhrman et al 2018). Third, a key principle of international society as it developed after World War II was cooperation to deal with collective security problems. The United Nations was founded for this purpose, and its mandate included “managing the world economy, the global commons (notably climate) and security issues.” Creation of the UN reflected the fact that post-war “co-operation between high-income and emerging countries, above all China” is necessary. “The old days of domination by the leading high-income countries are over. Securing co-operation among such diverse countries is extremely hard” (Wolf 2018). Fourth, the recent rise of and increasing political importance of both rightwing populism and authoritarianism also encompasses the increasing salience of what increasingly appears as a global revival of nationalism which, Rachman (2018) claims, is led by Donald Trump. The rise of right-wing nationalism is seen in many countries around the world, not only in the USA and Europe, but also in India, Brazil, the Philippines, and elsewhere, may reflect and encourage development of an “international nationalist movement” and a “nationalist international” (Rachman 2018). This, however, appears to be something of an oxymoron as it purports to identify a group of like-minded, values-based, nationalist politicians in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere, united by dislike of liberalism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism; but they only have a negative unifying solidarity—of hatred, fear, and dislike of the Other—and, it would appear, no shared positive ideology intellectually to link putative members of the “nationalist international.” They are all, however, anti-internationalist, with many of Europe’s rightwing populists suspicious of the United States, and especially of Donald Trump, with his palpable dislike of Europe and his perception that the region is a drag on the USA both financially and militarily. For Rachman (2018), Trump is the main figure in the “international nationalist movement,” encouraged by ideological fellow travelers, such as his former chief strategist, Steve Bannon. Bannon was active in Europe in 2018 seeking to organize right-wing populists prior to May 2019’s European parliamentary elections. The elections have encouraged efforts to cooperate. For example, Sebastian Kurz, Austria’s chancellor, has mused about organizing

62

Chapter Two

a “Berlin-Rome-Vienna” axis to fight illegal immigration. Richard Grenell, the US ambassador in Germany, has talked about empowering Trump-style “conservatives” across Europe. Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief strategist, convened meetings of nationalist parties in Rome during the Italian elections, writing later: “It’s hard not to feel we’re on the right side of history” (Nadeau 2018). Rachman comments that right-wing populists’ “emphasis on the enduring importance of the nation-state clearly resonates with voters,” although it is the case that the voters are by no means seen as an undifferentiated “mass” but rather they are divided between the “civilizationally acceptable” and the “non-civilizationally acceptable.” Demands for tougher control of illegal migration flow naturally from that idea—since the question of who is entitled to citizenship is central to national identity. This raises the issue of how right-wing populist nationalists in Europe and elsewhere view the principle and practice of the nation: it has a strong “cultural and racial element.” If you think of “outsiders as less worthy than your compatriots—indeed, as people who ‘infest’ your nation (in the words of President Trump)—then it becomes much easier to treat them brutally” (Rachman 2018). CONCLUSION Although the idea of a “nationalist international” as a counterforce to liberal internationalism is clearly attractive to some right-wing populists, such a world would be essentially unstable. As we saw in the 1930s, a global environment where leaders of nation-states regard others as rivals who must be defeated is a world where conflict is likely to eventuate. In this chapter, we examined how a New World Disorder developed after the Cold War. In relation to “Islamist extremism,” there are clear changes between today and the immediate post-Cold War world, which saw the rise of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the dire warnings from the then NATO secretarygeneral, Willy Claes, regarding the threat to Europe consequential to the coming to power of the “Islamic fundamentalist” of the FIS. Algeria’s imbroglio not only led to long and bloody civil war. It also precipitated NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue with seven North African countries. Although NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is still officially extant, it has in practice foundered on issues of democracy and human rights, and the unwillingness of the often-unelected leaders of the region to allow more of them (Author’s interviews #58, 43, 62). (Of the more than twenty countries in the MENA, only Tunisia underwent a successful post-Arab Uprisings transition to democracy.) Today, however, three decades on from Willy Claes’s warn-



The “Clash of Civilizations” and the “New World Disorder” 63

ing about the threat of the FIS to Europe’s stability and security, the north African region is beset by transnational Islamist extremism. While in the 1990s, such groups were largely autonomous and country-based, today they are transnational and animated by expansionist motivations. To some extent, this reflects what Todorov and Hoffman (2004) noted nearly two decades ago: increasing “resentment” among the increasingly restive and youthful populations of the Middle East and North Africa and corresponding “fear” exploited by right-wing populists in Europe, America and elsewhere. How helpful are “fear” and “resentment” in explaining causes and consequences of today’s New World Disorder and its corollary: widespread intercivilizational conflicts? Today, many right-wing populists are focusing their political appeals on “civilizational issues,” which have appeal in the context of the sometimes-malign effects of globalization and polarisation between “liberal” and “illiberal” values within and between countries. The New World Disorder is today a “values-based issue,” a central component of post-9/11 world with its polarized politics and a shrinking “centre ground” (DeHanas and Shterin 2018). There are, however, clear differences between events separated by three decades: the Algerian civil war of the 1990s and Islamic State and al Qaeda in the 2010s. Whereas the former was largely contained within one country, the latter is a regional and, increasingly, global issue. The rise of an Islamist political movement in Algeria occurred in the 1980s, at a time of increasing economic hardship. Between 1980 and 1993, Algeria’s economy declined by 0.8 percent a year while population growth was around 3 percent annually (Metz 1994). Today’s transnational Islamist extremism represents a considerable change in the focus and aspirations of Islamist extremist entities, from autonomous groups in Algeria seeking political power via the ballot box in the late 1980s to a civil war against the state and its Western backers in the 1990s. That decade was also noteable for the growth in number of al Qaeda-sponsored plots against Western targets, such as the 1993 attack on the Twin Towers in Manhattan. Later, growth of IS not only emphasized its international appeal, linked to its skillful use of social media, but was also able to exploit the intercivilizational rift between Sunnis and Shias. While “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamist extremism” have attracted much scholarly and policy attention, there was increasingly serious sectarian division and conflict across much of the MENA, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The situation was exacerbated by the Arab Uprisings and its aftermath where state weakness or breakdown combined with the impact of politically assertive religious actors saw increasing pressure on religious minorities to convert to the dominant religious tradition or, failing that, to flee for their lives.

64

Chapter Two

NOTES 1.  The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body of NATO. 2.  All of the author’s interviews with those who contributed their knowledge and thoughts to the writing of this book are anonymized and referred to by number in the chapters where they are cited. A full list of numbered, anonymized interviews is provided in the appendix. They are presented chronologically, listed by interview dates.

Chapter Three

The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue

Chapter 2 focused on the growth of apparently deepening intercivilizational incompatibilities between the West and the Muslim world, exemplified after the Cold War in the ideational shift from New World Order to New World Disorder. Perceptions of New World Disorder were inextricably linked to Western fears of Islamist violence and extremism, which were seen to undermine the West’s security and stability. The current chapter assesses efforts of the United Nations to develop intercivilizational dialogue after the Cold War as a response to fears of intercivilizational conflict between the West and the Muslim world. The next chapter, chapter 4, will examine how attempts at intercivilizational dialogue were undermined by securitization of Islam, both at the UN and within individual Western countries. Securitization of Islam, not intercivilizational dialogue, primarily characterizes the UN’s approach to relations between the West and the Muslim world, as well as relations between Muslims and host communities in many Western countries. The UN sought to address the problem of intercivilizational incompatibilities via an initiative, “Dialogue Among Civilizations,” supported by the UN General Assembly. The initiative was launched in 1998 by the then president of Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. It was followed by a UN General Assembly-endorsed “International Year of Dialogue among Civilizations” in 2001. On September 11, 2001, however, al Qaeda unexpectedly yet effectively attacked emblematic targets in the USA. This epochal event, leading to around 3,000 deaths, was seen by many as marking a new stage in the “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Muslim world. It was widely regarded as a watershed, stimulating the government of the USA to commence a Global War on Terror, with the stated aim of rooting out and killing Islamist terrorists. Critics suggest that the USA also sought to take the opportunity to try to impose its vision of a “liberal and cosmopolitan Western political and 65

66

Chapter Three

economic world order” characterized by “socially intrusive and aggressive neoliberal capitalist-driven globalization and modernization” (Sleboda 2013). Given the proactive manner which the USA used to try to further its vision of a New World Order, critics found it unsurprising that as an apparent result Islamist extremism and terrorism increased (Bowker 2016; Phillips 2017). Instead, it was seen by some as a predictable response, effectively repudiating Francis Fukuyama’s (1989, 1992) “historically deterministic, and triumphalist liberal democratic/capitalist ‘End of History’ paradigm,” and provided further evidence of the veracity of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” framework to understand post-Cold War international relations and onset of a New World Disorder (Sleboda 2013). For Huntington, the only way to avoid or mitigate the emerging “clash of civilizations” was for the international community urgently to build a multipolar and multicivilizational international order. Discussions on how to do this would necessarily focus on multicultural and intercivilizational discourses, in order to try to find solutions to issues seen to exacerbate intercivilizational friction and lead to conflict. A Realist, Huntington understood post-Cold War international relations as being dominated by civilizational core states, which he saw as potentially key “sources of order,” able to lead by example with civilizational like-minded states regarded as “cultural kin.” For Huntington, “[a] world in which core states play a leading or dominating role is a sphere-influenced world” (Huntington 1996, 156). Core civilizational states would act as the primary actors of and negotiators between civilizations, helping to construct a New World Order. This sphere-influenced world would necessarily be multipolar. According to Shahar (2019), the aim of Khatami’s “Dialogue among Civilizations” initiative at the UN was to start the process of building such a New World Order which, if successful, would likely mitigate or even prevent the expectation of a “clash of civilizations.” This chapter is concerned with post-Cold War attempts at the UN to establish and develop a “Dialogue Among Civilizations.” It begins by examining controversies linked to the concept of intercivilizational dialogue, which were played out at the UN’s 1993 human rights conference in Vienna. The chapter also surveys selected Western and Islamic approaches to intercivilizational dialogue, identifying both common ground and differences. Finally, the chapter surveys a key attempt to develop intercivilizational dialogue at the United Nations: Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations.” Khatami chose the United Nations to launch his initiative in a climate of awareness that, contra to the founding philosophy of the UN, after the Cold War there were no longer clearly identifiable universal values. In other words, whereas in the aftermath of World War II it seemed possible, following the defeat of fascism and Nazism, to identify core liberal values to animate and guide the



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 67

emergent United Nations, fifty years later this was no longer clearly the case. Presumed universality had been shattered by the cultural relativism on show at the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights at Vienna. The chapter concludes by explaining that the inability of the UN General Assembly to take Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” initiative seriously, was linked to many powerful Western states seeing the concept as an Iranian and Muslim idea, leading them to treat it with both suspicion and hostility. The chapter is divided into four sections: (1) “Intercivilizational Dialogue: Controversies”; (2) “Universal Values and Cultural Relativism at the United Nations”; (3) “Intercivilizational Dialogue: ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ Perspectives”; and (4) “Intercivilizational Dialogue at the United Nations: ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ (1998) and ‘The Year of Dialogue among Civilizations’ (2001).” INTERCIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUE: CONTROVERSIES Webb (2015: 429) contends that recent attempts at intercivilizational dialogue “whether from a Confucian, Islamic or Christian standpoint” are frequently “limited to intellectual abstractions” which rarely clearly and consistently connect “with social issues on the ground.” More generally, there is much scepticism about whether such initiatives can achieve what they set out to do. What is intercivilizational dialogue? What is its purpose? The National University of Singapore (NUS) delivers a short-term international program which seeks to clarify the notion of intercivilizational dialogue. Its purpose is to “facilitate the exchange of ideas, highlight the diversity of communities and promote mutual understanding” via “lectures, visits to cultural sites and meetings with leaders of various faiths” (National University of Singapore n/d). Like the NUS program, the Berlin-based Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute (DOC-RI) “aims to foster inter-civilizational dialogue based on a respectful understanding of other cultures and to research the most complex issues pertaining to inter-relationships among civilizations” (“Intercivilizational dialogue of #RhodesForum” 2016; Author’s interviews #2, 3). For Bahrain’s leader, Shaikh Khalifa, a dialogue of civilizations is necessary to highlight “the need for tolerance and respect for religious, cultural and intellectual diversity and for the protection of human rights and freedoms.” At a three-day conference in Bahrain in May 2014, “Shaikh Khalifa stressed the importance of promoting ‘dialogue, understanding and peaceful coexistence among all civilizations, religions and cultures in all their diversity.’” The emphasis is “on human rapprochement and its effect on the welfare of people and on the concept that civilizations should not conflict with one another. . . . [H] uman rights and democracy are the outcome of civilizations” (Gulf News 2014).

68

Chapter Three

Katherine Marshall, a former senior World Bank official and executive director of an international non-governmental organization, the World Faiths Development Dialogue, asserts that intercivilizational dialogue is not straightforward. This is because “[d]ialogue and action” among civilizational actors come in many shapes, sizes, colors, and tones, ranging “from talk around a dinner table to grand affairs of church and state. The nature of action varies, shaped by available tools and the implicit or explicit ‘theory of change’ that lies behind the action.” While some such “efforts are tangible and pragmatic (for example joining together to protect religious sites from direct threats or lobbying for specific humanitarian action). Others have a much more general goal of increasing understanding among different communities and faiths and thus helping to build solid community relations, or social cohesion” (Marshall 2017: 7). Marshall identifies an immensely important issue. That is: the difficulties inherent in trying to understand and make sense of what—often selfdeclared—“civilizational representatives” at dedicated fora seek to accomplish in relation to intercivilizational dialogue. They may pursue improved inter-cultural relations by following Western individualistic approaches or by primarily accepting civilizational diversity and the value of collective responses. This obviously implies a lack of consensus among such “civilizational representatives” about what is achievable via associated dialogue. In the last sentence of the quotation, Marshall point to another important concern, a key goal of intercivilizational dialogue: “increasing understanding among different communities and faiths and thus helping to build solid community relations, or social cohesion.” This is precisely what the UN has sought to achieve in recent decades, to be accomplished via successive modes of intercivilizational “dialogue,” which began in 1998 with Khatami’s initiative, “Dialogue Among Civilizations” (DAC). For Fabio Petito, Khatami’s DAC framework centers on a “re-opening” and “rediscussion” of “the core Western-centric and liberal global order.” A stated aim of intercivilizational dialogue is to try to secure enhanced peace and security via improved management of the “inevitable tensions and conflicts between the Great Powers, or civilizational core states,” compared to “realist ‘Concert of Power’ balancing.” Thus, the DAC “represents a powerful normative challenge to the contemporary political orthodoxy implicit in all the major political discourses of the future world order” (Petito 2009: 12). For Khatami and scholarly proponents of the DAC framework such as Fred Dallmayr (2014), “[c]ivilizational discourse is . . . useful as an analytical tool for international relations scholars and foreign policy-makers.” This is because it reflects a “decrease in the primacy of political-economic ideology for the identity formation of individuals, states, and geopolitical blocs or alli-



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 69

ances following the end of the bipolar Cold War era, and the commensurate resurgence in the importance of culture in both the formation of identity and the increase in the occurrence of conflict and tensions based on ethnic, tribal, and religious identity and divides” (Sleboda 2013). This perception acknowledges the importance of Huntington’s post-Cold War assessment of the importance of intercivilizational interactions but rejects the notion that they will lead to international conflict. To its proponents, Khatami’s DAC is both normative and idealistic without being utopian. This is because the initiative is perceived to depend not on absolute faith in progress, false universality, or a belief in human perfectibility which often seems to inform liberal cosmopolitanism. Instead, according to Petito (2009: 52), a model of an alternate world order inspired by Khatami’s DAC has three dimensions. First, there is a spatial orientation of multipolarity, with macro-regions balancing power along civilizational lines. In addition, states would take seriously multilateral negotiation as a potential normative source of knowledge, which would provide a “democratic” legitimization of regional integration processes (Mouffe 2007; Zolo 2007: 7). Such a balance of power with its inherent temptation for those involved “to clash” would need to be strengthened with a sustained importance on the DAC’s second—normative—dimension, that is, a new, cross-cultural jus gentium (law of peoples) (Petito, 2009: 56). This would seek both to dovetail with and buttress the UN Charter’s principles, while simultaneously underlining and reinforcing state sovereignty while rejecting externally-derived interference in domestic affairs and, finally, rejecting interference via the revisionist Western conception of the “Right To Protect,” Western notions of so-called “universal” human rights, and the legal positivism characteristic of international law. These should be replaced, according to Dallmayr (2004: 47), by dedicated and sustained cross-cultural dialogues focusing on “morality, the recognition of cultural differences,” and the social ethics of “really existing communities.” The third component of the DAC is a meaningful commitment to seek to achieve peace via active multicultural and multicivilizational dialogue and discourse, carried out at multiple levels and in several spheres. Overall, such a DAC would aim not to construct walls or fences of containment and separation between civilizations, but to build bridges between them, based on sustained development of mutual understanding between the actors involved. As Petito (2009: 6) notes, such “[a]n active politics of a dialogue of civilizations represents the combination [of a] mechanism of connection between multipolarity and the new crosscultural jus gentium, both as a way to reduce the risk of cultural enclosure in the former and to dialogically inscribe plurality in the latter.” Advocates of the “Dialogue Among Civilizations” framework see it as a useful and necessary alternative to the evident failure of core Western states,

70

Chapter Three

notably the USA, to impose its values on often unwilling states. The USA’s aim, critics argue, is to create a new liberal US-dominated international hegemony (Cypher 2016). This would be reflected both in neoliberal economic globalization with its attendant exploitative connotations as well as sometimes “culturally inappropriate” liberal democracy. The likely outcome from this point of view of such US attempts is increased geopolitical friction and conflict, consequential to an emerging multipolar world organized around a “thin” “Concert of Powers” balancing. According to its advocates, a “genuine” DAC, on the other hand, one that also brings in non-state actors from civil society as equal partners, theoretically provides a better, more holistic, possibility of dealing with serious global issues, including: resource depletion, environmental deterioration, and climate change. Sleboda (2013) asserts that, as a starting point, the “BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) already have the structure, membership, and expressed principles” to facilitate their development as potential focal points of increased and improved multicultural and multicivilizational dialogue and cooperation. For him, “Eurasianism is an example of an ideology and international social movement that embraces these principles” and which is “conducive to a peaceful global order.” This is because, it is claimed, Eurasianism has the potential to “act as a preventative antidote to the possible negative politicization of cultural differences on a global scale, providing legitimate channels for the expression of dissent, preventing antagonisms from taking the extreme forms of dissent we identify as culturally fundamentalist terrorism today.” Proponents of Eurasianism, who juxtapose the “Atlanticist New World Order” with the Russian-orientated “New Eurasian Order,” are sometimes seen in the West as de facto spokespeople for the Kremlin (The Conversation 2017). Given the values polarization evidenced by, inter alia, the violent extremism and terrorism of Islamic State, increasing assertiveness of right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazis in some Western countries, and persistent questioning of Western values by various governments, such as those of China, Russia, and Turkey, it is not clear how intercultural dialogue could make headway at the UN and elsewhere. According to Dallmayr, “goodwill” is “the crucial component for commencing a dialogue that leads to improved reciprocal understanding.” He asserts that improved intercivilizational dialogue is necessary, not only for civilizations to talk to each other consistently and purposively but also to enable them to realize that in the context of serious— and growing—global problems, they have as much in common as separates them (Marchetti 2016: 124, citing Dallmayr). Finally, Dallmayr perceives that civilizational diversity is necessary—reflecting the fact that cultural frameworks are irreducible to one another, and thus it is necessary to reject



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 71

civilizational “universalism in the name of a reaffirmed pluralism” (Dallmayr quoted in Naumkin 2013). On what basis might this “pluralism” develop? That is, if values differ widely, then it might be very difficult to make clear and sustained progress in intercultural dialogue. The discussion in this section, drawing heavily on the arguments of Petito, Dallmayr, and Sleboda, has sought to illustrate that there are initiatives, such as the DAC, which believes that there are plausible ways to construct an improved international order. This would be based on improved intercivilizational dialogue as a necessary step in building a pluralistic and realistic multicultural order following the decline of US dominance and the rise of newly assertive powers, with differing cultural characteristics, such as Brazil, China, Russia, and Turkey. Because of the changing balance of power, the governments of such countries see no need to accept demands to pursue Western-style universalism. As we shall see in the next section, however, it is one thing to engage intellectually with the problem of how to make a newly reformed international order to take account of civilizational diversity but quite another to expect the United Nations to have the wherewithal or capacity to enact such changes. As result, little of benefit to enhanced intercivilizational relations occurred when the UN sought to develop a dialogue among civilizations in the 1990s—not least because the UN’s more powerful member states saw little purpose in pursuing it with vigor or clarity. UNIVERSAL VALUES AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM AT THE UNITED NATIONS What is the relationship between the UN’s core values and those of the most powerful states? What mechanisms, if any, does the UN have to assert preferences in this regard? How might the UN pursue its core values via a comprehensive and consensual DAC framework? The UN has two fundamental sources of foundational values: The Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948). The UN Charter, the organization’s founding document, was ratified in June 1945, only a month after the Allies declared victory over the Nazis in Europe. The second paragraph of the Charter’s preamble proclaims, “We the people of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Article 2 of “Chapter I: Purposes and Principles” of the Charter states: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”1 The point here is that the UN was founded in the immediate aftermath of war, a conflict fought

72

Chapter Three

by the Western allies to defeat extremist ideologies. The Charter states the UN’s faith in liberal values, including the notion that all states, big or small, are equal in the context of international law. The UDHR was adopted by the UN General Assembly three years later, in 1948. Article 1 states that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Yet, because the issue of human rights was controversial, it was kept separate from discussions about the UN Charter. The UDHR laid the groundwork and established the principles of international human rights law and the United Nations. Critics allege that “[t]hese efforts were based on an inchoate notion of shared values and standards of civilization common to humanity” (Puchala et al 2007: 120; also see Gerstenfeld and Berk 2016). The basic problem which intercivilizational dialogue aims to resolve is to find improved ways for civilizations to “speak to each other,” find common ground, and act together in trying to solve pressing global problems. But who or what can plausibly claim to represent civilizational viewpoints? At the time of its founding, the UN was aware of the need to find shared cultural understandings in the wake of the trauma of World War II and, as a result, a dedicated agency was created: the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO worked from the premise that to improve and expand on cultural understandings, it would be necessary to discover “[n]ew ways of living peacefully together [which] must be ingrained in human society” (Kulnazarova and Ydesen, 2017: 4, quoting a UNESCO document from 1965). The UN’s shared goals in this regard were, according to the then director-general of UNESCO, Kōichirō Matsuura, “reconciliation” and “peace,” which are “predicated on universal acceptance and observance of basic human rights,” concepts made prominent in the UDHR (UN Press Release 2000) (Author’s interviews with #13, 47, 59, 66). UNESCO’s long-term focus on “culture” is part of a decades-long UN initiative to foster the integrity of cultures, while at the same time encouraging them to find common ground and work in harmony towards shared goals. In 1995, the then UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, declared that A truly global culture of peace—based on mutual respect and creative exchange . . . is at the heart of the great historical enterprise that is the United Nations. . . . The raison d’être of the United Nations is to foster the integrity of cultures and upon this basis, to promote information, dialogue, understanding, and co-operation among the peoples of all the world’s diverse cultures. Upon this foundation, the United Nations can proceed towards the realization of the three pillars of a global culture: a culture of peace, a culture of development, [and] a culture of democracy. (quoted in Sargent 2007: 125)



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 73

Boutros-Ghali’s comments underline that the UN has long claimed to “cultivate integrity, dialogue, understanding and cooperation among the peoples of all the world’s diverse cultures” (Sargent 2007: 136). Article 27 of the UDHR “affirms the right of access to, and the right to participate in cultural life as a fundamental right of all individuals in all communities” (ibid.). As outlined in 1999 by the then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan in a presentation to the World Bank, “Most researchers agree that it is useful to distinguish between ‘structural’ or long-term factors, which make violent conflict more likely, from ‘triggers,’ which actually ignite it. The structural factors have to do with social and economic policy, and the way that societies govern themselves” (quoted in Sargent 2007: 136). Annan is referring to key events in the late 1980s and early 1990s when he refers to “structural changes.” The 1990s saw the sudden and unexpected fall of communism, the “third wave of democratisation,” widespread demands for improved human rights, and geographical expansion of free market economic systems. Taken together, these developments might suggest that a new orthodoxy of liberal universalism would develop, and the UN would play an important role in making it happen. But this was an illusion, exposed as a chimera at the divisive Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. Rather than a celebration of the “triumph” of liberal universalism, proclaiming the globalization of individualistic “Western values,” the conference was noteworthy for the strong claims made in relation to human rights by various non-Western actors in support of cultural relativism rather than universalism. At the conference, according to Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate (2007: 17), “[l]iberalism and the universality of human rights came under siege as proponents of values embedded in different cultures and traditions suggested that Western notions of rights were not in fact universal.” The lack of consensus highlighted at Vienna was also apparent in the ambivalence to which the UN General Assembly subjected Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” a few years later. While the initiative was fulsomely supported by the governments of several Islamic countries. The ‘dialogue’ was interpreted by Western governments as another attack on liberal conceptions of universal human rights, whereas the Islamic world perceived the protection of cultural diversity as a vital issue of international security. These intercultural debates over universal values reveal active resistance to dominant Western conceptualizations as well as the lack of consensus on universal values. (Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate, 2007: 17)

Assertions of differing versions of human rights based on culturally-inspired understandings were widely condemned by many in the West. According

74

Chapter Three

to The Economist magazine, at the Vienna conference, “cultural relativists” advanced a “damaging attack on the idea of international human rights.” Their key claim was that the entire concept of human rights was a product of Western-style individualism, and seeking to inculcate such rights to non-Western parts of the world was cultural imperialism. Such arguments were advanced by, inter alia, “exponents of Asian values . . . [and] Islamic fundamentalists” (“Controversies and culture” 1998). Huntington earlier made a similar argument, predicting “that culture, not ideology,” would in future account for most major conflicts. He claimed that “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against ‘human-rights imperialism’ and a reaffirmation of indigenous values” (Huntington 1993: 40). What of the claims of the cultural relativists? For some they are unconvincing, not least because the assumption underlying such claims is that there are autonomous and separate “Western,” “Islamic,” and “Asian” cultural values. On the other hand, a moment’s reflection serves to undermine such a claim. For example, there is no clear, single articulation of “Asian values.” That Huntington has four of his “seven or eight” civilizations as deriving from Asia—Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, and Buddhist—is itself a refutation of the popular catch-all of “Asian” values. Nor is Christianity or Islam monolithic. Instead, there are many views, across a spectrum of perception and understanding, from religiously “fundamentalist” to aggressively secular (Barr 2007; Cesari 2013; Chiriyankandath 2007; Freston 2007). Cultural relativists also assume that the core political and civil rights identified in international human rights documents are exclusively Western. Is this the case? Expressions of universalistic human rights reflect values that are widely, if not universally, distributed across many cultures. These include: respect for the sacredness of life and for human dignity, tolerance of differences, and a desire for liberty, order, fairness and stability. In addition, the issue of what should take precedence, individual or collective rights, has been debated endlessly across many cultures (Donnelly 1984). It is often claimed that those in power tend to refer to what might be called Islamic or Asian values in order to try to justify political repression and restrictions of rights. Often, however, it is the people who feel oppressed by their actions who appeal to the West or the UN for assistance to try to improve their position (Author’s interviews with #18, 23, 24).



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 75

INTERCIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUE: “WESTERN” AND “ISLAMIC” PERSPECTIVES The need for improved intercivilizational dialogue works from the premise that there has been a sharp deterioration in relations, especially between Western and Muslim societies, reflected, inter alia, in increased Islamist violent extremism and terrorism. This is in part traceable to perceptions, especially among many young Muslims in Africa and the Middle East, that their existential position is characterized by a lack of justice and fairness. There is, in other words, perceived to be a lack of global justice. Distinct from international justice, which focuses predominantly on relations between states and/or nations, global justice is concerned with “justice among human beings.” Global justice focuses on “individual human beings as of primary concern” and on “what fairness among such agents involves.” Global justice is concerned with “actions that cut across states or involve different agents, relationships, and structures that might be invisible in an inquiry seeking justice among states exclusively” (Brock 2015: 2). For Brock, an issue becomes a concern of global justice “when the problem either affects agents resident in more than one state or the problem is unresolvable without their co-operation.” She also notes that “possibly the next most prominent global justice issue after considerations of proper use of force concerns the impact of, and responsibilities created by,” globalization, including: gender, immigration, the natural environment, and health issues (ibid.: 4). Many have noted the deleterious impact of post-Cold War globalization on relations between the West and the Muslim word, with the former being seen as disproportionately benefiting, while also highlighting the international impact of various expressions of the use of force post9/11, specifically US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and continuing subjugation of the Palestinian people by the state of Israel supported by the USA, the European Union, and other Western actors. In addition, adding to the conditions conducive to a “clash of civilizations” and the linked rise of extremist entities, such as al Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab, there is a “securitization of aid.” This refers to a situation whereby Western state development aid is focused increasingly on “prevention of violent extremism” rather than programs to build development capacity to improve people’s lives (Pahlman 2014). For Fraser (2003: 1), the post-Cold War international order is marked by “increased salience of culture,” observable in various ways, including: “declining centrality of labor vis-à-vis religion and ethnicity in the constitution of collective identities; in heightened awareness of cultural pluralism in the wake of increased immigration . . . and finally, as a consequence of all these

76

Chapter Three

shifts, in a new reflexive awareness of ‘others,’ hence in a new stress on identity and difference.” Fraser ponders the ramifications of culture’s increased salience for understanding international relations and the prospects for improved intercivilizational dialogue. Fraser (2003: 1) sees a “defining feature of globalization” in “the widespread politicization of culture, especially in struggles over identity and difference.” Such “struggles for recognition” have increased markedly in recent years, suggesting “an epochal shift in the political winds: a massive resurgence of the politics of status.” The turn to recognition characterizes an expansion of political contestation, as an enhanced understanding of global justice, necessitating looking for understanding beyond questions of distribution, to include “issues of representation, identity and difference.” In this perspective, injustice appears in the guise of status subordination, rooted in institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value. . . . The remedy . . . is recognition, understood broadly . . . to encompass not only reforms aimed at upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups but also efforts to recognize, and valorize, diversity, on the one hand, and efforts to transform the symbolic order, deconstruct the terms that underlie existing status differentiations, and thus change everyone’s social identity, on the other. (Fraser 2003: 3)

Fraser is pointing to a widely perceived deleterious impact of post-Cold War globalization on millions of people, especially among the poor in the Global South. Many have argued that it is necessary to find ways to improve and make more equitable international development outcomes in order to reduce associated negative impacts, including radicalization, extremism, and terrorism; in short, to improve global justice to reduce likelihood of extremism and terrorism. As Lynch (2012) notes, when we consider the polarizing effects of international development in the context of globalization it is logical to move from its initially moral dimensions to consider a highly material factor: “neoliberal competition of the ‘market’ [in] international development.” From there it is but a short jump to begin to ponder on how more generally the conditions of globalization appear to encourage or exacerbate an unjust and polarized world, where the rich benefit disproportionately. In short, post-Cold War globalization has been instrumental in creating a new language of political claims-making. The “center of gravity” has changed “from redistribution to recognition.” “From the distributive perspective . . . justice requires a politics of redistribution” (Fraser 2003: 2, 4). In this context, we can understand what are often seen as intercivilizational tensions and conflicts, including between Western and Muslim societies.



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 77

Fraser (1998: 5) also identifies an associated issue: the need for improved political or participatory justice. Improvements in this regard would require “social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers.” To be serious about participatory parity requires a more equal “distribution of material resources” so as to “ensure participants” independence and “voice.” Second, “the institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. Both these conditions are necessary for participatory parity.” In addition to Fraser, other Western scholars, such as Petito (2007) and Uthup (2010), also point to the vital importance of improved intercivilizational dialogue for better, more harmonious relations between the West and the Muslim world. Uthup (2010) asks how can “global divides, particularly in the area of culture, be bridged?” This is especially problematic for many Muslims following US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) which, coupled with the aftermath of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks on Western targets and perceived Western-supported Israeli subjugation of the Palestinians, provided some with sufficient reasons to doubt the benign nature of Western actions in and in relation to the Muslim countries of the Middle East (Author’s interview with #7). The point remains, however, that improved recognitive parity is a sine qua non for an improved relationship between Western and Muslim societies. But this position can only be reached and then maintained if the relationship is based not on one “side” aspiring to overall superiority over the other but instead draws on a situation of durable mutual respect: that is, with Muslims and Westerners learning from each other’s civilizational and cultural strengths and accomplishments and using this knowledge to cooperate in pursuit of shared goals. These concerns tap into a primary concern of the UN, a system and framework founded three quarters of a century ago on a fundamental principle, reflected in the UN Charter: an unjust world can never be a peaceful and cooperative world. In October 2015, the then UN secretary-general, Ban Kimoon, highlighted in this regard the relevance of improved intercivilizational dialogue, aiming “to promote dignity, justice and stability for all people” (“Secretary-General”s remarks,” 2015). Clearly, concerns with improved justice permeate the UN system. But what justice and for whom? Is this the justice of Fraser with its roots in Western liberal values? If so, how does this sit with possible alternative approaches to justice, such as that exhibited in an Islamic perspective? Like the concept of justice within the UN legal order, the notion of justice in Islam centrally includes fairness and equity issues. Samuel notes that “justice is an absolute right at the heart of the Qur’an and a primary objective of its revelation also: such that it is the supreme, overarching, and quintessential

78

Chapter Three

value in relation to legal, political, and social issues.” In addition, he avers, another “key feature of Islamic justice is the Islamic conception of legitimacy and authenticity” (Samuel, 2010: 112). Note however that the conception of justice in Islam is much more profound and overarching compared to that found in the supposedly “universalist” UN values. This is because Muslims believe that the conception of justice in Islam comes not from humans but from a higher source: God. In Islam, justice is “the end served by equity, but also to be synonymous with equity” (Higgins, 1994: 220), a claim that chimes well with Fraser’s notion of participatory justice. In short, in Islam, equity has a key function in the pursuit of improved global justice. It is an overarching principal, incorporating key social and human development issues, to be addressed by purposeful and goal-orientated concern with global justice, including reduction and eventual elimination of poverty in the context of addressing glaring developmental and economic inequalities in the Global South. Echoing Fraser’s concerns with participatory, distributive, and recognitive justice, a Muslim scholar, Abdul Aziz Said (2002: 7), calls for “intercivilizational bridge building,” with three interrelated goals. These are: (1) development and deepening of normatively desirable values, including expanding common understandings of truth; (2) transformation of conflictfilled relationships to those exhibiting collective good works which serve humanity; and (3) demonstration of the appropriateness and applicability of shared civilizational values. While achievement of these goals may be problematic—not least, because of their wide-ranging nature and the need for durable cooperation at the international level to achieve them—it is necessary to mention them in order to highlight common ground between “Western” and “Islamic” conceptions of justice (Author’s interviews with #31, 72). Seeking to affirm common ground in relation to global justice between Western and Islamic approaches, a prominent Islamic legal scholar, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, seeks to reconcile his identity as a Muslim with his commitment to universal human rights, a key component of Fraser’s worldview, central to her three strands of global justice. In his book, Muslims and Global Justice (2010), An-Na’im advances the theme of global justice from an Islamic perspective, critically examining the role that he believes Muslims should play in developing a pragmatic, rights-based framework for justice. An-Na’im also discusses the Islamic approach to political violence, showing how Muslims began grappling with this problem long before the 9/11 attacks. He also calls for improved cultural legitimacy of human rights in the Muslim world. An-Na’im argues that in order for a commitment to human rights to become truly universal, it is necessary to accommodate a range of different reasons for belief in those rights. This view recalls Fraser’s commitment to participatory justice in that it affirms the right of all peer voices to be



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 79

heard. Finally, also conceptually linked to Fraser’s concept of participatory justice, An-Na’im proclaims the necessity of building an effective human rights framework for improved global justice. This would involve a “peoplecentred” approach to rights and global justice which would purposively empower local actors, enabling their concerns on human rights to be peoplecentred and not reliant on state regulation. Both Fraser and An-Na’im point to the importance for improved intercivilizational dialogue of not restricting the conversation to governments alone. However, the UN, despite frequent lip-service paid to the importance of civil society and other non-state actors, is dominated by states, who not only pay the financial costs of running the UN but also insist on being its key decision makers. The ramifications of this for improved intercivilizational dialogue are unfortunate. Despite Khatami’s desire to open up the conversation to include non-state actors, just as the UN had sought to do in 1946 when formulating the UNDHR, states’ stranglehold on power at the UN meant that the DAC was approached in the UN General Assembly through the lens of individual and collective civilizational self-interest (Author’s interviews with #72, 74). The result was that the DAC did not make progress and did not form the basis of the UN’s future approach to improving intercivilizational dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. INTERCIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUE AT THE UN: “DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILIZATIONS” (1998) AND “THE YEAR OF DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILIZATIONS” (2001) Despite the Charter of the United Nations and organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which focused on culture, dialogue, increasing awareness and man’s spiritual growth while attempting to remove poverty and racial discrimination, and despite efforts to promote human rights, justice and freedom while resolving differences through logic, reason and justice, force regretfully prevailed. (Khatami 2012) What I propose is that dialogue should take place among cultures and civilizations. And as a first step, I would suggest that cultures and civilizations should not be represented by politicians but by philosophers, scientists, artists and intellectuals. [. . .] Dialogue will lead to a common language and a common language will culminate in a common thought, and this will turn into a common approach to the world and global events. (Khatami 2009)

In his DAC initiative, Khatami sought to lay out a new ethical paradigm of international relations and the formulation of a truly multicultural international

80

Chapter Three

society based on a simple premise “unity in diversity.” In addition, the DAC initiative reflected Khatami’s desire to develop political acceptance and manifestation of the world’s inherent cultural pluralism seated in the aspiration of cross-cultural respect and understanding. According to Tazmini, Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” was a way of “theorizing a more just and diverse multipolar world order.” As the quotations at the start of this section indicate, his aim was to achieve improved global peace and security, as a means to manage “the inevitable tensions and conflicts between the Great Powers, or civilizational core states, [better] than [a] realist ‘Concert of Power’ balancing.” However, “from the outset, there were serious limits to achieving constructive dialogue with the west through the philosophical project of the Dialogue Among Civilizations. To begin with, the objectives of the enterprise were not clearly defined. Was the goal to be the attainment of some tangible political benefits, albeit through a philosophical project?” (Tazmini, 2009: 93; also see, pp. 92–97). Khatami introduced the DAC at the UN General Assembly in 1998 in response to what he saw as the serious global issues and crises which emerged after the Cold War to confront all of humankind, especially deteriorating relations between the West and the Muslim world (Tazmini, 2009). For Khatami, the DAC was the best “possible answer to this” unfortunate state of affairs, “an international political theory for the normative structure of a multicultural and multipolar international society” (Petito, 2009, 53, 60). In this section, we will see that Khatami’s DAC framework was primarily an attempt to express an alternative world order, one in which the West no longer had a hegemonic role but was but one entity among a number of equals, each characterized by differing civilizational values and characteristics. The theoretical and policy-focused aim was to replace the Westerndominated international order with its attendant civilizational values, with a just and multipolar world order reflecting today’s international diversity. Using the vehicle of the DAC, Khatami hoped to find a way to improve intercivilizational relations after the Cold War via a reworking of international structures of power. His initiative reflected a recent development: in addition to Western civilization, there were various non-Western civilizational entities, including Russia, China, Iran, and India, which potentially were coherent and powerful international actors after the Cold War. Seeking to address the “clash of civilizations” as an issue at the UN necessarily confronts the fact that power is in the hands of a small number of dominant states, which collectively wield a great deal of influence via their use both of soft power and the threat or use of hard power. The governments of powerful states, such as Russia, China, or the USA, seek to portray themselves as civilizational core states, although it is conceptually and empirically



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 81

difficult to separate such a claim from one which contends that states always act out of individual self-interest (Cropsey and Halem 2018). In other words, the issue is trying to decide where the interests of the “state” end and those of “civilization” begin and vice versa. The fact is that the modern state system is so organizationally and structurally state centric that attempts to deal with pressing global problems, whether it is climate change, resource depletion, or “clash of civilizations,” is generally focused upon by governments in terms primarily of self-interest (Author’s interview with #47). Khatami’s normative vision was critiqued for being more a philosophical statement about what is desirable rather than a framework for practical improvement. In Iran, Khatami’s aim to improve dialogue with the USA and with the West more generally was not welcomed, especially by conservatives, while in terms of Iran acting as the Muslim core civilizational state there was a seemingly insurmountable problem: Iran is the only country with Shi’i Islam as its state religion, and Iran is “viewed by many Sunni countries with suspicion, and they clash on many geo-political, strategic and religious issues” (Tazmini, 2009: 94). Khatami sought to address the issue of Western-Muslim relations by calling for regular dialogue under UN auspices and, implicitly, by contending that the best way forward was recognition of civilizational diversity rather than a “one size fits all” mentality emanating from the idea that Western civilizational values are universal. Following Khatami’s intervention, the General Assembly unanimously designated 2001 as the “Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations.” However, before Khatami’s initiative had the chance to develop, the DAC was significantly undermined by 9/11 and its aftermath: US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Undertaken in the name of the “war on terrorism,” these military actions were perceived by many Muslims as reflecting a Western desire “to punish” Muslims collectively for 9/11 (“A Year after the War,” 2004). According to Khatami: Dialogue among civilizations is not a philosophical or political theory per se. We presented the issue as a paradigm; as a desirable model and example for relations among humans, societies and different groups. In the current era, but particularly in the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm was that of war. . . . In my view, the level of violence noticeably increased after 9/11 and dialogue and understanding were overshadowed. However, I also believe that a promising movement towards freedom, understanding and against violence has emerged from the abyss of violence in the world. I believe a common objective must be defined for dialogue: namely, fighting extremism and dangerous prejudices that may be found in any religion, culture and civilization in the East or the West. (emphases added; Khatami 2012)

82

Chapter Three

From the quotation, we can see that Khatami’s intention in introducing the DAC paradigm at the UN was to improve relations among “humans, societies and different groups” and to reject “extremism and dangerous prejudices.” It was intended as an overt counterpart to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” by seeking to develop appropriate means so that the “civilizations [are] able to talk and find their commonalities while maintaining their own identities.” Khatami is not, however, specific about which actors might rise to prominence as main representatives of civilizations and thus be perhaps able to “talk and find their commonalities while maintaining their own identities.” In addition, he questions the privileges of the established power holders at the UN, asking rhetorically why “a few countries [should] have privileges because they won the last world war and have more power, and why should they be able to use the institutions and tools created in the United Nations for promoting peace and understating to impose their demands and interests?” Nor does Khatami clarify what specific measures would be necessary to take the DAC from being an idealistic and theoretical construction to one able to reflect and carry practical, realistic and effective strategies. This would surely necessitate reforming extant structures and hierarchies of power, authority, and legitimacy, both at the UN and beyond: a very difficult task. Finally, Khatami does not address what diplomatic, organizational, or financial resources the UN would need to provide to bring about the DAC, so it would be in a realistic position to make a beneficial difference to improve intercivilizational dialogue, develop peace and cooperation, and undermine chances of conflict and perhaps war (Author’s interviews with #59, 66). In 2012, fifteen years after he launched the DAC initiative at the UN, Khatami wrote a reflective piece in the UN’s “in-house magazine,” the UN Chronicle.2 Khatami makes plain in the article his disappointment about the lack of progress of the DAC, as “[t]he spread and promotion of the idea seems to have decreased” (Khatami, 2012).3 Initially, however, things looked promising for Khatami’s initiative. In a rare unanimous vote, the United Nations General Assembly adopted his proposal to designate 2001 as the “Year of the Dialogue among Civilizations.” Khatami (2012) regarded UNESCO as the key UN agency for developing the DAC, because of its established concern with “culture, dialogue, increasing awareness and man’s spiritual growth while attempting to remove poverty and racial discrimination.” According to Hans d’Orville, special advisor to the director-general of UNESCO and formerly UNESCO’s assistant directorgeneral for strategic planning, “[d]ialogue is not only a ‘necessary answer to terrorism but, in many ways, its nemesis,’ one of the most effective ways ‘to promote the best in humanity’” (d’Orville 2012, quoting “United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session Agenda item 25 United Nations Year



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 83

of Dialogue among Civilizations, A/56/523, November 2, 2001”; author’s interviews with #29, 54). Such a concern was also articulated on 2000 by Koichiro Matsuura, then director-general of UNESCO. According to Matsuura, “[o]nly dialogue could bring about reconciliation and peace,” a remark made at the launch of the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations, 2001. This is because cultural dialogue helps to sow the seeds of peace and should be predicated on universal acceptance and observance of basic human rights. Within a broad moral framework, meaningful intercivilizational dialogue would enable individual cultures to know that their voice would be both heard and accepted. According to Matsuura, “dialogue meant exposing—not blanketing over— different ways of thinking” (UN Press Release 2000). In November 2001, the UN General Assembly announced in Resolution 56/6 (2001), “The Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations.” The “Global Agenda” was “a nonbinding program of action [which] enumerated 14 types of initiatives that nation-states, UN bodies, regional intergovernmental organizations, and civil society actors [were] encouraged to utilize in an effort to promote [related] objectives” (Smith, 2003: 557–8; also see Sargent, 2007: chapter 5). Like many other UN General Assembly Resolutions, “The Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations” sought to provide guidance and advice on what to do in relation to a particular situation that threatens global peace and security but without the ability to pressurize the relevant parties to take action. However, there was no commitment to institutionalize the “Year of Dialogue among Civilizations” as a permanent UN entity, no symbols or manifestations of permanence: no High Representative, no Secretariat, no “Group of Friends,” and no permanent funding mechanism. Hans d’Orville (2012) and Giandomenico Picco (2000), personal representative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, would agree that the “Year of Dialogue” was blown off course by 9/11. Certainly, 9/11 had a dramatic impact on international relations, significantly affecting chances of success of intercivilizational dialogue. However, as Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coates (2007: 117) note, The UN is an institution in which solutions to global problems are debated and sometimes crafted. But at a deeper level, the UN is also a place where the international community attempts to identify commonly shared values. Actionable political positions and policy choices depend on value consensus, and disagreements about fundamentals like ends and means concerning the human condition are often at the roots of inaction at the UN. Agreeing on universal values in an organization of 192 [sic.] member states composed of thousands of ethnic, religious, and cultural groups is difficult.

84

Chapter Three

This quotation usefully highlights three aspects of what the UN does, while identifying problems it has with acting meaningfully. First, the UN raises and discusses global problems, occasionally coming up with potential ways to solve them. Second, UN member states seek to “identify commonly shared values,” while recognizing that finding solutions to related problems is going to be tricky in the light of often myriad views on values-based issues. Third, the euphemistically-named “international community” meets at the UN “to identify commonly shared values.” Or maybe the opposite is true: Maybe the UN is the forum where the “international community” finds it has few if any shared values? Some aver that the “international community” is reducible to the USA alone. Some assert that the “international community” is the USA plus other Western states. Some perceive the term “international community” as a synonym for the collectivity of states, Western and non-Western, which gather at the UN. The point however is that the term international community is not understood in the same way by all state actors at the UN. However, the notion of international community is understood, it is clear that the UN struggles not only to recognize universal values but also consistently to act in their defense. CONCLUSION Khatami’s 1998 attempt at the UN General Assembly to initiate a “Dialogue among Civilizations” predated 9/11. Its failure to progress reflected an earlier controversy and impasse which surfaced in the unresolved debate about cultural relativism that shook the Vienna Conference in 1993. A Group of Eminent Persons was recruited by the then UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, to turn Khatami’s rather vague and theoretical initiative into a workable project. They started from the position that it should be possible to “find a new way of looking at our neighbors, globally, locally and even individually, and also to understand the significance of the United Nations” (Picco 2000: 41). The function of the Dialogue, its promoters explained, was essentially to promote cultural forms of peaceful interaction while yet preserving cultural diversity: but inasmuch as the “dialogue” sought universal appreciation for cultural differences rather than the pursuit of universal commonalities, it could be interpreted as a more (Puchala, Laatikainen and Coate 2007: 130). Despite the UN General Assembly’s agreement to pursue the idea, there never was a meaningful attempt to embed or institutionalize a DAC at the UN in the light of Khatami’s initiative. Not only was the program dramatically underfunded—with only Switzerland contributing financially and with no allocations to the Dialogue project from the UN’s regular budget—but there



The United Nations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 85

was in practice at best marginal interest in the undertaking. While the DAC was not officially killed off, it never gained traction at the UN, remaining an underfunded and underappreciated initiative linked to UNESCO activities and never a program which was of significance for either the General Assembly or the Security Council. But why was this the case? In the context of New World Disorder with growing concern with culturally-linked extremism and terrorism in many parts of the worlds, why did the UN fail to take the DAC sufficiently seriously to institutionalize Khatami’s initiative? The 1990s had seen the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and the attempt by Saddam Hussein to invoke a civilizational conflict by targeting Israel with rockets during the UN-led attempt to topple him under the leadership of the USA and United Kingdom. The short answer why Khatami’s apparently sincere appeal for cultural tolerance was not embraced more enthusiastically by the General Assembly of the UN, is in part explicable because Khatami is both an Iranian and a Muslim, qualities which did not endear him to all governments in the General Assembly. Second, the egregious failure of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 was laid by many Western actors at the door of the cultural relativists who were seen to be undermining the long-standing universality of the UN. Third, the meaning of the DAC was fundamentally disputed from the word “go,” building on the skepticism which the failure of Vienna had initially engendered (Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coates 2007: 131). The impact of 9/11 on the DAC should not be exaggerated. By that time, it had already lost much of its initial impetus, which had begun before the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA. On the other hand, 9/11 certainly did not help in trying to build a culture of enhanced tolerance at the UN. Representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference understandably struggled to progress the notion of Dialogue after 9/11, given that tolerance was central to the initiative and after 9/11 it was especially hard to assert that this was a core Muslim value. Another reason why the DAC initiative struggled to make an impact on the international community at the UN was because there was little or no agreement regarding what the term “civilization” actually means in international politics. Who is a member of a civilization? Who is not? Who can represent civilizations at the UN or elsewhere? How are the representatives to be chosen? How might they be deselected as representatives? None of these questions seemed to be easily dealt with and none seemed to be examined thoroughly at the UN, whether in the 1990s or subsequently (Haynes 2014; 2018a). Rather than enhanced intercivilizational dialogue per se, what primarily ensued after 9/11 was a securitization of Islam both at the UN and in individual Western countries; and in this context improved dialogue between

86

Chapter Three

the West and the Muslim world took a back seat. That is, while a dedicated intercivilizational entity, the UN Alliance of Civilizations, was founded in 2005 in response to 9/11, it did not become an authoritative actor at the UN. Instead, there was a pronounced focus on countering and preventing violent extremism, which in practice mainly meant targeting “Islamist” extremists and terrorists. The next chapter turns to this issue. NOTES 1. The UN Charter and UDHR can be found at http://www.un.org/en/charter -united-nations/ and http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ respec tively. 2. “The UN Chronicle, a quarterly journal published by the Department of Public Information since 1946, covers information and debate on activities of the United Nations system. It features essays and opinions from official, non-governmental, academic, and policymaking groups connected with the Organization. The journal covers a wide-range of topics including: human rights; economic, social and political issues; peacekeeping operations; international conferences; youth related matters; women and children; and global health” (https://unchronicle.un.org/basic-page/about-us). 3.  In the same article, Khatami claims that the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, created in 2005, cannot replace the DAC.

Chapter Four

Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam

In chapter 3, we saw that the then president of Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, was an important advocate of inter-civilizational discourse through his “Dialogue Among Civilizations” (DAC) framework, first presented at the UN General Assembly in 1998. Khatami envisaged the DAC as a practical antidote to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm, imagining the initiative as advancing “tolerance, peace and understanding,” which would set the “tone for Iran’s rapprochement with the international community and internationalization of the Iranian economy” (Tazmini, 2009: 1). More widely, it was clear that Khatami saw the DAC initiative as helping facilitate increased intercivilizational dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. The UN General Assembly received Khatami’s proposal politely but did not enthusiastically recommend its institutionalization, nor provide practical means to take it forward. It became more difficult to advocate enhanced dialogue after 9/11, not least because it did not seem plausible to many that agreement could be reached between the West and the Islamist terrorists of al Qaeda. Thus 9/11 was instrumental in further undermining the DAC initiative, indicating not improved “tolerance, peace and understanding” at the UN but rather their opposite: intolerance, conflict and a lack of understanding, which some individual countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, sought to overcome via national efforts (Gulf News 2018). Overall, however, there were two main effects of 9/11 on calls for intercivilizational dialogue. On the one hand, coordinated punitive policies against jihadi extremists and terrorists were introduced both at the UN and in many individual countries in the West and elsewhere. The UN’s anti-terrorism activities were focused in two initiatives: “Preventing Violent Extremism” (PVE) and “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE). The overall effect of policies to thwart Islamist terrorism, both at the UN, in the form of PVE/CVE, and in individual 87

88

Chapter Four

countries, was to encourage a widespread securitization of Islam. These initiatives underlined that both internationally and within individual countries, 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks on Western targets significantly increased state and societal concerns, encouraging the conclusion that Islamist extremism and terrorism posed a serious threat to international, regional, and national security and stability (Cesari 2013). At the same time, there were renewed calls at the UN for improved intercivilizational dialogue after 9/11, led by the government of Spain with strong support from that of Turkey. The result was the creation in 2005 of the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), which unlike Khatami’s DAC was institutionalized at the UN, although as we shall in a later chapter that the UNAOC has so far struggled to make much of an impact, whether at the UN or more widely (Haynes 2018a). Attempts at increased dialogue were also attempted in other international and regional fora. But the UN’s problems in this regard were replicated in both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Author’s interviews with #3, 4, 14, 45, 60). They not only faced difficulties in taking intercivilizational dialogue beyond rhetoric to practical action but also met the skepticism or cynicism of some member states who did not believe that improved dialogue on its own would not be sufficient to diminish the threat from Islamist extremists and terrorists (Author’s interviews with #64, 67). Whether or not it was intended to have this effect, securitization of Islam has led to or was accompanied in some countries by increased state and/ or societal intolerance towards Islam and Muslims. First, concerns focused on “mass” Muslim immigration, centering on significant numbers of many Muslim people seeking to escape the Syrian civil war in the summer of 2015, when the crisis became a key focus of media attention. It occasioned both tolerant responses—for example that of the government of Germany, which allowed up to a million refugees from the war to enter the country—and less tolerant ones—for example, Hungary’s response was to close tightly the country’s borders to the refugees. Second, there was increasing Islamophobia1 in many Western countries, manifested socially and politically in both Europe and the USA by increasing political significance of right-wing populism (Kalmar 2018; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Haynes 2019a, 2019b). Right-wing populist politicians sought for electoral gain both to exploit and stoke extant societal fears about Islamist extremism and terrorism. Third, right-wing populism was typically invoked to bolster nationalist appeals, seeking to pit a country’s indigenous people against culturally different migrant newcomers, especially Muslims, with their allegedly “deviant” cultural and civilizational attributes. Fourth, there was a close relationship between the ideology of right-wing populism in Europe and the USA and what Rogers



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 89

Brubaker (2017a) identifies as “Christian civilizationism.” In some Western countries, for example, Germany, right-wing populists proclaimed “the right of the “native and self-proclaimed ‘indigenous’ Christian[s]” to take “discourse and action onto the streets ‘fighting’ extremist fundamentalist Islam” and claiming to “save our women,” particularly, if sexual violence against women is seen to be exercised by non-white and non-Christian men” (Vieten and Pointing 2016: 536). An identitarian ideology, “Christian civilizationism” draws on racism, xenophobia and nationalism while lionizing alleged values of “Christian civilization,” and comparing them unfavorably with Islam’s claimed civilizational, religious and cultural “deficiencies.” This chapter examines (1) the post-9/11 securitization of Islam within many Western countries, (2) the associated rise of right-wing populism in both Europe and the USA, and (3) the identitarian ideology of Christian civilizationism. The following chapter, chapter 5, shifts focus to the UN, to examine (1) securitization of Islam, via PVE and CVE programs, and (2) simultaneous attempts to build an Alliance of Civilizations to pursue intercivilizational dialogue. Chapters 6–8 examine in more detail the rise of right-wing populism and Christian civilizationism in the USA, Western Europe, and East Central Europe. Together, these three chapters argue that while there are different contextual factors at play in the various contexts, what they reflect is: (1) securitization of Islam, (2) increasing anti-Muslim sentiment, and (3) rise of Christian civilizationism, reflecting a lionizing of claimed religious and cultural heritages, which coalesce allegedly “superior” civilizational values to those of Islam and which are exploited by right-wing populists’ for electoral gain. The current chapter is structured as follows. First, we examine a shift from relative “tolerance” to “liberal zealotry” in relation to Muslims and Islam in the West in the context of growing Islamophobia. The first section examines the circumstances whereby Muslims and Islam seem less tolerated in the West today than they were in the recent past, that is, a relative tolerance which is replaced by widespread values-based judgements of the “unsuitability” of Muslims because of their presumed beliefs and precepts. Second, we survey an outcome of this shift: the rise of overt anti-Muslim sentiment in the West articulated in the form of a securitization of Islam. This occurred in the aftermath of 9/11, subsequent Islamist terrorism, especially in Western Europe, and increasing political concern about Muslim mass emigration. In the third section, we briefly examine the political exploitation of these concerns by right-wing populists, before lengthier treatments in individual chapters in the second part of the book. Fourth, we describe use by many right-wing populists of an anti-Muslim political ideology: Christian civilizationism, which has particular political expression in the USA, Western Europe, and Central Europe.

90

Chapter Four

ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT IN THE WEST: FROM “TOLERANCE” TO “LIBERAL ZEALOTRY” Several scholars have recently noted that the cultural, social, and political position of “Muslims” and “Islam” has become a major political and social topic in most Western countries (Brubaker 2017a and 2017b; Kalmar 2018; Vieten, Poynting 2016). This section addresses what happens politically, socially and, culturally when this occurs, and argues that it encourages anti-Muslim intolerance, securitization of Islam, right-wing populism, and an identitarian ideology: Christian civilizationism. Recent opinion surveys in Europe and the USA indicate that where there was once widespread—albeit sometimes begrudging—tolerance towards Muslims, today there is often open intolerance, dislike, and fear (Allen and Nielsen 2002; Sobolewska 2017). The United States introduced stringent anti-immigrant policies in the early 2000s. Under both Democratic and Republican presidents, successive administrations have continued with this policy (Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez, 2016). The issue of American Muslims’ loyalty to the USA was widely called into question by right-wing commentators, politicians, and some sections of the media after 9/11 and during the subsequent US-led Global War on Terror (Waldinger 2018). Since the early 2000s, the issue of Muslims and their patriotism has become a hot political topic, with an increasingly clear Christian civilizational dimension, expressed, for example, in derogatory terms by Brigitte Gabriel, head of ACT for America. This organization is said by the Southern Poverty Law Center to be “the largest grassroots anti-Muslim group in the country,” with a claimed million or more members (https://www.actforamerica.org/). The Council on American-Islamic Relations describes ACT for America as “one of the main sources of growing anti-Muslim bigotry in our nation,” while the British newspaper, The Guardian, notes that ACT for America is “widely identified as anti-Muslim” (Beckett 2017). Gabriel herself appeared to confirm such a view in 2007 when, at the Christians United for Israel annual conference, she delivered a speech that included the following: The difference, my friends, between Israel and the Arab world is the difference between civilization and barbarism. It’s the difference between good and evil . . . this is what we’re witnessing in the Arabic world. They have no soul, they are dead set on killing and destruction. And in the name of something they call “Allah” which is very different from the God we believe. . . . (Bijog 2018)

Although views such as that of Gabriel are widely regarded as “hate speech,” a 2018 poll commissioned by the US-based Institute of Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) found that such sentiments are becoming



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 91

increasingly mainstream in the USA. The poll surveyed the views of 2,481 Americans. It found that “white [Christian] Evangelicals” expressed “the highest levels of Islamophobia” among seven identified groups, some faithbased, some not (ISPU, 2018). Forty percent of “white Evangelicals” agreed that “most Muslims living in the United States” are “more prone to violence than other people,” are “hostile to the United States,” are “less civilized than other people,” are “partially responsible for acts of violence carried out by other Muslims,” and “discriminate against women.”2 In other words, four in ten white Evangelicals in the USA believe Muslims are uncivilized, violent, against the USA, and misogynist. A recent Pew Research Center (2018) study on “Religion in public life,” indicates that one-quarter (25.4 percent) of Americans identify themselves as Evangelicals, that is, around 80 million people. Of these three-quarters (76 percent) are white. Thus, extrapolating from the data in the abovementioned ISPU survey, around 60 million Americans are “white Evangelicals.” If 40 percent see America’s Muslims as uncivilized, violent, against the USA, and misogynist, this implies that around 24 million white Evangelicals in the USA, share such beliefs. In addition, according to the 2018 poll, 31 percent of Protestants and 22 percent of Catholics hold similar views. In the 2016 presidential election, 81 percent of white Evangelicals, 60 percent of “white Catholics,” and 58 percent of “Protestants/ other Christians” voted for Donald Trump, while, respectively, 39 percent and 37 percent voted for Hillary Clinton (Pew Research Centre, 2016). Turning to Europe, recent Eurobarometer data (April 2018) identify high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment among citizens of the twenty-seven European Union member states (“EU27”).3 Evidence for this comes from responses to several questions asked by Eurobarometer: the “fight against terrorism” is seen as the most important issue in the May 2019 European Parliament elections, with an average of 49 percent in the EU27 claiming that it is the most important issue.4 The second most important concern is “combatting youth employment” (48 percent). “Immigration” (45 percent) is the third most important issue to EU27 voters and the fourth is “economy and growth” (42 percent). It is probably safe to assume that for many Europeans, both “terrorism” and “immigration” are primarily associated with Muslims. This was reflected, for example, in the Brexit campaign prior to the June 2016 referendum in the UK, with a key issue erroneously highlighted by the “leave EU” campaign that the UK would be compelled to open its borders to Turks, that is, some 80 million people, most of whom are Muslims. In addition, several European countries, including Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, the Netherlands, and Italy, had election campaigns in the late 2010s in which Muslim immigration was a significant electoral issue. In addition, economic insecurity concerns may well reflect fears that immigrants, including Muslims, are believed to undercut wage

92

Chapter Four

levels of indigenous workers by accepting mainly unskilled or semiskilled jobs at relatively low wages (Haynes 2017b). How do we explain the development of anti-Muslim sentiment in the USA and Europe? For Taylor (2018: 388), growing intolerance towards Muslims and Islam is explained by “the hazardous attempt to go ‘beyond toleration.’” Taylor explains that “[t]oleration is the traditional term under which Westerners have sought to bring people of diverse allegiances and identities—religious, historical, ethnic, linguistic—together under the same political roof.” “Tolerance” has enabled this process to be carried out without “violence,” “unnecessary suffering,” and, sometimes, without “the domination of some by others.” Tolerance employs a necessary language, whereby “Western civilization was able to deal with the Other” and, if all went well, assimilate newcomers into society, economy, and politics (Taylor, 2018: 389). For Taylor, what has changed in recent times is that the concept and practice of toleration came under attack because today in “our multicultural societies” we have “gone beyond toleration” as there is “something demeaning to the beneficiaries in talk of tolerating this or that group.” The notion of “toleration” pertains to putting up with something that is “dangerous, or disturbing to social peace, or unpleasant, or distasteful” (Ira Katznelson, quoted in Taylor 2018: 389). Exercising tolerance, we decide not to take measures to deal with what is dangerous, disturbing, unpleasant, or distasteful and instead choose not to apply “necessary”—even if punitive—measures or, at least, not “to their full extent. That is toleration.” But, as Taylor points out, the “logic of toleration” is not the same thing as exercising rights. That is, “there are limits to toleration which make it less encompassing than rights” which are “inscribed in all the Charters” (390). Beydoun (2018) points to the rise of “liberal zealotry” connected to “[t]he present wave of Islamophobia spreading in the Western world: xenophobic and exclusionary sentiments which give themselves what seem impeccable liberal and feminist credentials can be unleashed without restraint” (Taylor, 2018: 390; also see, Kalmar, 2018). For Beydoun (2018), anti-Muslim zealotry is not the sole province of the political right. He notes that there are liberal Islamophobes too, including in the USA people such as Bill Maher and Sam Harris. According to Beydoun (2018), such people “weaponize atheism as an ideology that not only discredits the spiritual dimensions of Islam but also demonizes it in line with longstanding orientalist, political terms. For these new atheists, Islam is illegitimate because it is a religion, but unlike other religions, is distinctly threatening because it is inherently at odds with liberal values.” Where does the liberal attack on Islam come from? Taylor contends that attacks on Islam, from both right and left, are a reaction to the fact that secularization and “spiritual pluralism” cohere to water down “the previ-



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 93

ously dominant mode of religious life, which in Europe took the form of the confessional state.” This was reflected in a tight societal unity, now fundamentally fractured. The implication is that whereas confessional societies were once common in Europe, today they are not, or at least not to the same extent. That is, the people who inhabit my neighborhood, town, region, and country are not necessarily of my faith or civilizational background. Once, virtually all Europeans and Americans “lived their spiritual and humanitarian lives primarily in the church.” Today, they don’t as people split their “activities . . . into separate dedicated bodies”: church, “medecins sans frontieres” (sic.), “some form of meditation,” and so on. For Taylor (2018: 391) this situation reflects the “decline and eventual dissolution of Christendom,” whereby “a society and a civilization” whose aspirations once sought to reflect “the Christian faith in all aspects of life: political, cultural, artistic, and, of course, moral,” no longer do so. Finally, “[s]ome people regard the dissolution of Christendom as fatal for an acceptable religio-political-moral environment which is foundational for an acceptable understanding of political and ethical order, without which our civilization will decline, or even break up” (Taylor 2018: 392). The demise of Christendom and diminution of Christian values is one form of backlash, but it is not the only one. Recent decades have seen growing immigration into many Western countries, including the USA and Western Europe. Mass migration has in many countries stoked “cultural fear and malaise among ‘old stock’ populations” (Taylor 2018: 393). Farny (2016) reports that, in recent years, “many [Western] countries have seen a rise in immigration, coupled with an increasing fear of “terrorists,” “illegal migrants,” and other threats to internal safety.” Huysmans (2000: 751) notes that “migration has developed into a security issue in western Europe and . . . the European integration process is implicated in it.” Some governments, such as that of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, act decisively to deny entry to groups of people, especially Muslims, with demonstrably unfamiliar religions and customs. Some other European governments, including, those of Austria, Denmark, France, Belgium, Latvia, and Bulgaria, place restrictions on some visible signs of cultural practice. In these countries, it is typically a ban on Muslim women wearing the burkha, as the practice is said to be indicative that such females would rather keep their existing customs or faith than to assimilate and confirm to the values of their new countries. Under a regime of relative toleration, such as that practiced in, inter alia, the United Kingdom, authorities indicate that, albeit often uncomfortably, such immigrants’ alien ways and customs are tolerated at least in the privacy of one’s own home, although not necessarily in the workplace where dress codes of “normal” standards may be adhered to (Haynes 2017b). But our era is characterized by a vocifer-

94

Chapter Four

ous demand for “rights.” Even in countries like Britain, whose government is unwilling to prevent women from wearing the burkha if they choose, there is a widespread backlash against people having the right to conform and adhere to the dress code of their particular culture. In the case of the burkha, the issue is linked to fears of Islamist terrorism (Cesari 2013, 2016). How do I know that that the female in a niqab—that is, a garment of clothing that covers not only the face but also the body, worn by some Muslim women as part of their interpretation of hijab (modesty)—is not a terrorist? She might be using the niqab as camouflage for a suicide vest. So, tolerance is tempered. While many of us are “far too liberal” overtly to want to disallow legitimate practices, we may draw the line at a “clear” moral-political-security threat, one which undermines core Western principles: female-male equality, and safety and security from existential threats, including those from violent jihadi terrorism. “What would earlier (where toleration was the issue) have been seen as a gentle restriction to make us natives happier is now seen as an imperious demand to fight back against evil and its agents” (Taylor 2018: 392). Even publicly discussing such issues has provided a pretense to some for often vicious attacks, verbal and sometimes violent, on visible minorities. As Taylor notes, stigmatizing “certain people as enemies or subverters of our order has been to liberate xenophobic and illiberal individuals from the inhibitions they previously felt, and unleashing them to poison the atmosphere of society.” Examples of such behavior have been widely seen in Europe and elsewhere in the last three decades. They include former Yugoslavia’s civil wars in the 1990s, strong antagonism to Turkey’s request to join the European Union, wars in Yugoslavia, and Victor Orbán’s erection “of barbed wire against refugees in the name of ‘Christian civilization’” (Taylor 2018: 392–393). While these issues are variable in terms of cause and effect, what they have in common is an implicit or explicit civilizational and cultural dimension. They are nevertheless complex phenomena, with many variants, whose provenance is linked in often complex fashions to local, national, regional, and global issues and developments. Taylor (2018: 393) contends that the “principle variation is between faith- and devotion-inspired mobilization, on the one hand, and largely cultural-historical identity-formation, on the other.” According to Brubaker (2017a), the United States is in the first category, exhibiting “Judeo-Christian values,” while Western Europe, notably the Netherlands and France, are examples of the second type, demonstrating secularist and feminist credentials (Taylor 2018: 393). As we shall see in later chapters, these kinds of cultural-political coalescing seem to be growing both in attractiveness and in geographical spread. As a result, we may be witnessing the practical demise of societies and political systems characterized until now by either secular-orientated diversity or religio-cultural hegemony.



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 95

SECURITIZATION OF ISLAM IN THE USA AND EUROPE Buzan and Waever remind us that “limited collectivities (states, nations, and as anticipated by Huntington, civilizations) engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities and . . . such interaction strengthens their we-feeling.” But because this “involves a reference to a ‘we,’ it is a social construct operative in the interaction among people. A main criteria of this type [sic.] of referent is that it forms an interpretative community: that it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events” (Buzan and Waever, 2009: 255). A context of complexity and fragmentation encourages securitization of Islam. Due to events over the last two decades, including 9/11, egregious jihadi terrorism, and fears of mass (Muslim) migration, Muslims are now widely seen in Europe and the USA as a significant security threat. This threat reflects the “unacceptable” civilizational values which many Europeans believe Muslims espouse. The overall effect is to securitize Islam. Didier Bigo suggests the notion of a “security continuum” to explain the West’s recent securitization of Islam. On the one hand, it reflects a feeling of general insecurity which has developed over time, encouraged by traumas and travails connected to globalization, a context within which “distinctions like internal/external security, police/military etc. are fading.” In addition, as already noted, in many countries there are widespread societal “fears of crime, foreigners, unemployment, drugs, terrorism and war,” which are often connected or merged, and “repeatedly listed together in official documents, without any overarching justification for this classification” (Bigo quoted in Buzan and Waever, 2009: 267). When encouragement of “moderate” Islam does not appear to lead to cessation or at least significant diminution of “extremist” Islam, then governments often take explicit measures to securitize the faith. This is what occurred after 9/11 both in individual Western countries and at the UN. It has connotations for how Muslims are treated more generally. Cesari (2016: 231) explains that the framework of “securitization encompasses the multifaceted process through which the normal rule of law is suspended in favour of exceptional measures justified by extraordinary situa­tions” that are said by government “to threaten the survival of the political community.” The originators of the securitization paradigm, Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde (1998), emphasize that securitization of Islam does not function within the sphere of “normal politics.” That is, government portrays a threat as abnormally serious, an existential threat to people and state. Cesari notes that “successful

96

Chapter Four

securiti­zation rests on the capacity of a securitizing actor (primarily state officials and politicians) to “speak security.” She means by this, presentation of a specific “problem as a significant menace that challenges the survival of a referent group or community, in a way that resonates with a significant audience.” In this regard, Islamic extremism, especially since 9/11 and 7/7—that is, 7 July 2005 bomb attacks in London by Islamist extremists, inspired by al Qaeda—became a key security issue in both the USA and Europe (Cesari, 2016: 231). Eroukhmanoff notes that “[t]he dominant paradigm within securitization studies pays attention to the securitization of Islam through extraordinary speech acts, such as the justification for the War on Terror and the persistent conflation of Islam with political violence.” More generally, securitization theory suggests that “national security policy is not a natural given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers.” In this context, political issues become significant security issues that must be dealt with immediately when they are categorized by someone with the appropriate authority as “dangerous,” “menacing,” “threatening,” or “alarming.” This takes the issue “beyond ordinary politics.” In other words, security issues are not simply there, waiting to be discovered by vigilant authority figures. When, for example, immigration is identified as a threat to a “threat to national security,” it becomes a securitized issue requiring urgent efforts to secure borders. In sum, “[s]ecuritisation theory challenges traditional approaches to security in IR and asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as ‘security’ issues that they become security problems” (Eroukhmanoff, 2017: 104) President George W. Bush launched the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the aftermath of 9/11. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, Bush sought to draw a clear line between the “99.9 percent of the global population,” who are “civilized or wanting-to-be-civilized people,” that is, virtually all the people, with the exception of the terrorists themselves. Bush’s GWOT projected “strong elements of existing order universalism—all states against non-state terrorists, order against chaos—mixed with a US-centred inclusive universalism” (Buzan and Waever 2009: 65). The GWOT drew a clear line between “moderate” Islam and “extremist” Islam. The former is traditionally tolerated in the West, seen as commensurate with “Western values,” which for many derive from Christian foundations. On the other hand, “extremist” Islam is definitely not acceptable, and must be stopped. Launching the GWOT, this was Bush’s core message after 9/11. During the GWOT, governments in both the West and in the Muslim world sought to encourage “moderate” Islam among their Muslim citizens and internationally and by any means necessary crush “extremist” Islam, seen to be hand-in-glove with



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 97

Islamist terrorism (Bosco 2014; Eroukhmanoff, 2017). But what, it may be asked, is “moderate” Islam? What are its key characteristics compared to “extremist” versions of the faith? As already noted, today Muslims tout court are regarded by some governments and citizens in both Europe and the USA as an existential threat to their security and stability. Table 4.1 indicates how securitization of Islam developed in the USA and Europe after 9/11. An existential threat is an object (or ideal) that is identified as potentially harmful. A referent object is an object (or ideal) that is being threatened and needs to be protected. Table 4.1 indicates that “Islamic radicalism/extremism/ terrorism” as well as “Islamist ‘totalitarian’ values” are seen as “existential threats” in many Western societies. On the other hand, “religion [Islam] as true faith” and “moderate” Islam, reflecting “liberal political values,” should be encouraged. Attempting to assuage such fears by showing that they have the policies to thwart the Islamist extremists and terrorists, politicians may portray Muslims as a significant threat to stability and security. In recent years, this has gone down well electorally among some sections of society and right-wing populists in particular are more than willing to exploit such concerns politically. There are somewhat different factors in play in Europe compared to the USA. In the former, following the Arab Uprisings of 2011 and the Syrian civil war, there was an attempted mass exodus of local people in 2015, many of whom were Muslims, from the Middle East and North Africa region. Many sought to enter Europe either to get away from political upheaval, instability, and insecurity or, in some cases, simply to seek a better life. In many Western European countries, relationships between host societies and Muslim communities became increasingly controversial and, sometimes, more confrontational. More generally, the issue of “Muslim emigration” to Europe proved to be fertile terrain for Europe’s right-wing populists, swift to exploit the Table 4.1.  Securitization of Islam: General Discursive Structure

Macro Frameworks: USA and Europe

Existential Threat

Referent Object

“Religion as Ideology”: Islamic radicalism/extremism/ terrorism “False” interpretations of Islam espoused by radicals/ extremists/terrorists “Radical” Islam Islamist “totalitarian” values “Perversion of religion” ->

Religion as “true faith,” with appropriate “civilized” values Islam’s “true meaning”

Source: Adapted by the author from Bosco, 2014: 43.

“Moderate” Islam Liberal political values National security

98

Chapter Four

situation for political gain. They called for (much) greater restrictions on the numbers of Muslims allowed to settle in Europe. For the right-wing populists, this is a security issue: the more Muslims you have, the more extremists and terrorists you have too. In the USA, Muslims are a “problem,” although the key issue is not increased mass migration in the context of Syria’s civil war and the Arab Uprisings. It is instead connected to Islamist terrorism or the fear of it. September 11, 2001, was emphatic proof of the former, while the latter is emphasized by Islamophobes who see a terrorist lurking behind every expression of Islamic belief, whether moderate or not. Some European governments sought proactively to encourage “moderate” Islam after 9/11, that is, support Islam characterized by liberal values, in order to deter or undermine extremist versions of the faith. Such efforts, undertaken for example by the British and French governments, fit into a wider picture of deterrence in order to undermine manifestations of generalized insecurity. As Bosco (2014: 5) notes, for such governments, “national security is linked to the triumph of real, authentic”—that is, ‘moderate’—“religion over ‘pseudoreligion,’ or religion as ideology—religious faith twisted to suit strategic or political ends. Pseudo religion is posited as a threat to the successful emergence of real religion . . . .” What is “real” religion? In the West, because of prolonged secularization, “real” religion is often regarded as secondary to the West’s core liberal values and ethics, which are closely linked to various staples of Western-style modernization and development, including: secularism, toleration, individual freedoms, citizenship, and democracy. As Bosco (2014: 5) notes, “The security of the Western secular state thus requires that real religion—embodied in ‘moderate’ Islam—be promoted and protected as a referent object for security.” To counteract “radical” and “extremist” Islam, as well as Islamist terrorism, the governments enact “programs to encourage the development of Islam’s authentic voices and promote the emergence of a global civil religion more in line with secular liberal priorities” (emphasis added; Bosco, 2016: 44). These efforts were not, however, notably successful, as they found it difficult to get strong support from their countries’ Muslims in the context of the post-9/11, US-led Global War on Terror and domestic PVE and CVE programs. Many Muslims regarded both the GWOT and PVE/CVE as explicitly “anti-Muslim” initiatives, with all Muslims— “moderates,” “extremists,” and those in between—seen to be guilty as a result of the crimes of a few terrorists (ibid.). It is no coincidence that many right-wing populists focus upon the presumed existential threat from Islam and Muslims. But their claim is not that Islamic extremists and terrorists are the sole existential threat; instead, the faith of Islam itself and all Muslims in general are often claimed to be fundamental threats to the existing political and social order. For many right-wing



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 99

Table 4.2.  Securitization of Islam: Threats and Potential Solutions Existential Threat

Referent Object

Solution?

USA

Radical Islam/ terrorism

“Moderate” Islam

Europe

Radical Islam/ terrorism

“Moderate” Islam

Alliances abroad/go it alone if necessary (Use “smart” Power = “hard” + “soft” power) Preventing Violent Extremism/ Countering Violent Extremism

Radical Islam/ terrorism/sharia Radical Islam/ terrorism/sharia

“Moderate” Islam “Moderate” Islam

International

Domestic USA Europe

Surveilling Muslims; stop sharia law Surveilling Muslims; stop sharia law

Source: Adapted by the author from Bosco, 2014: 43.

populists, there is no such thing as “moderate” or “acceptable” Islam (Fox 2019; Ozzano 2019; Kaya and Tecmen 2019). Consequently, governments may regard it as prudent to be wary of Muslims and, if necessary, to suppress, control, and neutralize them by all necessary means. Table 4.2 indicates the measures taken in Europe and the USA to try to deal with what is sometimes perceived by governments and many citizens as an existential threat emanating from Islam as faith and Muslims, especially extremists, as people. Views on terrorism, immigration, economic uncertainty, and insecurity are not necessarily connected to a view of the world contoured by civilizational concerns. Nevertheless, when today’s right-wing populists in Europe and the USA seek to identify the “enemies of the people” they often highlight the threat allegedly posed by Muslims, whether as “terrorists”—intent on killing Europeans or Americans”—or as “extremists” who want to spread and embed their “alien” views and values. Both are said to pose serious challenges and in extreme cases, an existential threat, to the West’s extant values and norms (O’Brien, 2016). RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE USA AND EUROPE Waever (2006) notes that it is today fashionable to “talk of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and Islam.” Damaging events characterized as the results of “Islamist terrorism” have taken place in many European countries

100

Chapter Four

in the last few years (Kaya and Tecmen 2019). For many, this suggests that the West is engaged in an intercivilizational conflict with Islamist extremists and terrorists. This conflict, which for many began with 9/11, is widely seen to be gathering pace, posing serious problems for the West’s social and political stability. As Waever (2006) notes, some now believe that “the world” is “standing on the brink of a long conflict, perhaps a new ‘cold war’ that features small-scale, but spectacular violence.” Concern with escalating intercivilizational conflict has recently bolstered support for right-wing populists in many Western countries (Joppke 2018). One of the key characteristics of right-wing populism is that its representative politicians and supportive voices in the media highlight what they see as the cultural, political, and societal dangers of “uncontrolled” Muslim immigration. Beyond political exploitation of fears of large-scale immigration, right-wing populists share further traits. First, right-wing populist arguments are used in support of approaches to win power and rule via “personalistic leadership that feeds on quasi-direct links to a loosely organized mass of heterogenous followers” (Weyland, 2013: 20). Second, populism is often identified as a “thin” ideology that “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde, 2007: 23). Third, as Ekström, Patrona, and Thornborrow (2018: 2) note, populism can be either “left-wing” or “right-wing.” Right-wing populist politicians have recently enjoyed electoral success not only in many European countries but also in the USA. Strategies and electoral platforms are not, however, identical, as what occurs in individual countries is affected by “nationally specific factors such as political history, system and culture” (Greven, 2016). Having said that, right-wing populists do have generic ideological similarities, which inform their political messages, platforms, and programs. First, the main target of populism, both left-wing and right-wing varieties, is a (supposedly corrupt) elite political class, from which the mass of the ordinary people needs defending, and the populist politician depicts him or herself as a “genuine” popular voice in opposition to the corrupt power holders. Second, right-wing populists claim to champion the rights and legitimacy of the indigenous “ordinary people” against the “immigrant-loving” self-serving elites in politics and business. The latter in particular are said to be keen to see mass immigration for their own economic reasons: to flood the jobs market with myriads of people from different cultures able and willing to work for relatively low wages and thus undercut local workers’ wage levels. According to Huntington (2004: 268): “these transnationals have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only function now is to facilitate the elite’s global operations.” Third, right-wing populists in the USA and Europe routinely vilify Islam as a faith and Muslims as a community,



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 101

in ways reminiscent of the lack of support for Jewish refugees in the late 1930s and early 1940s in the USA and many European countries (Friedman 1973; García 2018). Fourth, right-wing populists typically seek to identify Islam as a faith and Muslims as a group as a fundamental “civilizational” threat to historically and culturally-defined “Christian” or “post-Christian” nations of the USA and Europe, which challenges them culturally, religiously, civilizationally, socially, and politically. Typically, right-wing, anti-immigration, populist politicians have recently gained electoral support in Europe by exploiting societal fears of a “Muslim invasion,” stimulated by the Arab Uprisings and impact of the Syrian civil war (Brubaker 2017a; Haynes 2016; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Kratochvil 2019; Ozzano 2019). Right-wing, anti-immigration, populist politicians have either won power, or a significantly increased share of the vote, albeit without achieving power, in recent elections in both the USA and several European countries, including: the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden (Brubaker 2017a, 2017b; Haynes 2019a; Joppke 2019; Kaya and Tecmen 2019). In the USA, the rise of right-wing populism was manifested in Donald Trump’s election as president in November 2016. During the campaign and on achieving power, Trump expressed what many regarded as his anti-Muslim feelings, with policies aiming to prevent Muslims from certain countries entering the USA (Mandaville 2017; Subtirelu 2017). The issue had earlier become a focus of heated discussions during the presidential election campaign. The topic was, on the one hand, illegal immigration into the USA from Mexico and central America and, on the other hand, Trump and several other Republican candidates openly questioned the loyalties of the three million or more American Muslims (Mandaville 2017). Both issues centered on whether ethnically or religiously different people— that is, Mexicans and Muslims—were to be fully to be trusted in America. Do they demonstrate “sufficient” and “acceptable” levels of loyalty, commitment, and identity to the USA, a country scarred by—and scared of—terrorism, especially since 9/11 (Crandall, Miller, and White 2018a). Trump made much political capital by stressing that, as president, he would stop migration from Mexico into the USA by building an impassable wall on America’s southern border which he would compel Mexico to pay for. He also promised to curtail dramatically Muslim emigration into the USA (Haynes 2016). CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATIONISM IN THE USA AND EUROPE: PROVENANCE AND PRACTICE “Christianism” (or “Christian civilizationism”) is an ideology which trumpets the perceived superiority of “Christian values.” A blogger, Andrew Sullivan

102

Chapter Four

(2013), is widely credited with coining the term in 2003. Sullivan defines “Christianism” a “partisan ideology wrapped in a veneer of Christianity.” Sullivan stated that the new term referred to “those on the fringes of the religious right” in the USA “who have used the Gospels to perpetuate their own aspirations for power, control and oppression.” Sullivan averred that the Christianists were “as anathema to true Christians as the Islamists are to true Islam.” Another blogger, Skye Jethani, commented that what Sullivan saw as a fringe minority nearly two decades ago now seems to “be rapidly expanding to the point of becoming tolerated as mainstream.” Jethani (n/d) saw this development in the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president, a massively popular choice for president of most right-wing Christian evangelicals in the USA. This was hardly likely to be because Trump’s “character, story, agenda, or candidacy . . . finds alignment with Scripture, the cross, the gospel, or personal/social transformation (Bebbington’s evangelical markers in simple terms). However, his ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan, along with his maligning of women, immigrants, and all ‘losers’ while triumphantly holding up a Bible, fits Christianism perfectly.” More generally, recent years have seen right-wing populist politicians in both the USA and Europe take “Christianity” as a defining feature of national purity. However, as “with the idea of Islamism this has little, if any, theological depth to it, but it is the application of Christianity to a political ideology, one that establishes the pure people against outsiders” (Ryan 2018). In the USA, Christian civilizationism draws inspiration from and has foundations in what are portrayed as “Judeo-Christian” values (Haynes, 2017a). The ideology of Christian civilizationism derives from a belief that culturally, socially, and politically, US principles and achievements have their roots in the country’s claimed Judeo-Christian values. This view has been politically weaponized in recent years, with other cultural groups, especially Mexicans and Muslims being vilified. Republican politician Steve King called immigrants “dogs” and “dirt” while, when a presidential candidate, Donald Trump “infamously declared that most immigrants crossing the southern border were ‘rapists and criminals’ and pledged to ban all Muslims from entering the US” (Siddiqui 2019). Trump’s election also reflected his particular aversion to globalization, as he was able to link the decline of certain sections of US industry with the economic rise of China and how that country was exploiting the conditions of globalization for its economic and developmental benefit (Author’s interviews with #70, 71, 73, 75). A third aspect of Trump’s electoral appeal was to see not only Mexicans but also Islam and Muslims as an existential threat to America and its civilizational values. For Trump and those with similar views, such as Steve King, Islam is a cultural, ideational, and emerging existential challenge to the United States which must be con-



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 103

fronted. This would require policies both to limit the numbers of Muslims in the USA and to prevent the spread of sharia law. In addition, the US should continue to use its vast military muscle to deal with Islamist violence and extremism in Syria and Iraq where until late-2018 Islamic State had a significant presence, including control of large areas of both countries. In Western Europe, the political ideology of Christian civilizationism tends to draw extensively on a claimed contrast between “liberal” and “illiberal” values. The former is exemplified by, for example, French civilizational values. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, suggested in July 2017 that Africa’s problems are civilizationally-rooted, a mix of security, social, and political issues. Macron claimed that Africa’s “problems . . . are completely different” to those of Europe, as they are “civilizational” and include: “[f]ailed states, complex democratic transitions and extremely difficult demographic transitions. . . . Islamist terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking’” (Dearden 2017). Macron’s depiction of present-day Africa highlights what he appears to regard as the latter region’s lack of modernization and development. According to Huntington (1996: 68), “[m]odernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures . . . .The qualities that make a society Western, in contrast, are special: the classical legacy, Christianity, the separation of church and state, the rule of law, civil society” (emphasis added). The quotation suggests that being “modern” and being “Western” are different things. That is, “modernity” has generic qualities—including, industrialization, urbanization, and higher levels of literacy, education and wealth. Being “Western,” on the other hand, implies adhesion to a historically-derived civilization (“the classical legacy”) and religion (“Christianity”), and foundations in ubiquitous political and social institutions (that is, church-state separation, “the rule of law,” and independent civil society). According to Macron, some non-Western civilizations, such as those found in Africa, do not have these attributes. Instead, the region has many “failed states,” and very high birth rates, a lack of democracy, widespread Islamist terrorism, and extensive criminality. These are depicted by Macron as the inescapable cultural and civilizational differences characterizing the West and Africa respectively, which explain the relative political, economic, and social stability and security in the former compared to the latter. This notion of irreducible cultural differences between the West and non-West is a key claim of Christian civilizationism in both Europe and the USA, which facilitates targetting Muslims as the undesirable Other. Finally, in Central Europe, including in the politically important rightwing populists in the four Visegrád countries on which we focus in chapter 8, Christian civilizationists employ a Christianist ideology in order to

104

Chapter Four

“culturalize” religion and citizenship to the detriment of Muslims (Author’s interviews with #69, 79). “Culturalization” refers to the adaptation to or imposition of the culture of a nation or people on another group, in these countries the “Christian” indigenes and not Muslims who are portrayed as the Other. According to Rogers Brubaker (2016), “the culturalization of religion is doubly convenient from a nationalist-populist point of view.” This is for two main reasons. First, “it allows Christianity to be privileged as culture in a way that it cannot be privileged as religion, given the liberal state’s commitment to neutrality in religious matters. On the other hand, it allows minority religious practices, redefined as cultural, to be restricted in a way that would not otherwise be possible, given the liberal state’s commitment to religious freedom.” CONCLUSION What stands out, in both the USA and Europe, is the willingness of right-wing populists and their supporters to highlight what they regard as key civilizational differences between themselves and their supporters and Muslims. Figures such as Stephen Bannon lionize the virtues and values of Christian individualism, capitalism, and their perceived links to “Judeo-Christian values” (Haynes, 2017a). In Europe, the focus is on—often increasingly secular— “European values” which are nevertheless thought to emanate from Christian values, different from those to which Muslims are said to adhere. Electorally successful right-wing populists, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, put themselves forward as defenders of Hungary/Europe’s “Christian” civilization, which they claim authorizes draconian anti-immigration policies to prevent Hungary/Europe from being “overrun” by Muslim “hordes.” We shall look at these issues in detail in later chapters. In Central and Eastern Europe, electoral support for right-wing populists stems in part from popular dissatisfaction with mainstream, established parties which in some regional countries have been in power for long periods following the fall of Communism nearly three decades ago. Regional right-wing populists employ ideologies of “Christian civilizationism” which interact with nationalism. This seeks to characterize the nation as stemming from, and be civilizationally dependent on, a Christianized culture. Islam is said to be a culturally inappropriate faith, with different, less culturally acceptable, values. In highly secular Western Europe, there is less opportunity to highlight Christian values. Instead, right-wing populist politicians such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands attack Islam because of its allegedly unenlightened and



Right-Wing Populism, “Christian Civilizationism,” and Securitization of Islam 105

anti-progressive values and highlight post-Christian “enlightened” and “socially progressive” approaches to social issues, including women’s rights and gay marriage. Figures like Wilders contrast their “liberal” views with those of supposedly “illiberal” Muslims. Finally, in the USA, “Christian civilizationism” draws primarily on allegedly “Judeo-Christian” values, lionized by certain right-wing politicians, such as Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, and ideologues, such as Stephen Bannon and Sebastian Gorka. Muslim immigration and fears of Islamist terrorism are common factors in securitization of Islam in the USA and Europe. Coupled with this is a general, dramatic, and palpable decline in “toleration” especially in relation to Muslim immigrants who, many believe, are civilizationally—that is, culturally and religiously distinct—from the USA and Europe’s host communities. These divisions undermine the chances of democracy working for everyone, while making relationships between civilizations of great interest to students of democratisation and society (Fox 2019; Kaya and Tecmen 2019). Finally, the ideology of “Christian civilizationism” encourages some rightwing politicians and commentators in the USA and Europe to characterize Muslims uniformly in a malign way. This approach makes no distinction between, on the one hand, the mass of “moderate,” “ordinary” Muslims and, on the other hand, the tiny minority of Islamist extremists and even smaller fraction of violent extremists and terrorists among Muslims. This, the current chapter has argued, encourages Islamophobia in both Europe and the USA, which is primarily characterized by a perception of “all-Muslims-as-threat,” whether via violent extremism and terrorism, by the specter of (extremist) sharia law, or by (the fear of) Muslim mass immigration. Whatever the cause of the concern, however, the outcome is said to be the same: irrevocably to change host cultures for the worst. This leads to the conclusion that the socalled “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West has two interactive, although conceptually separate, dimensions: Islam as security issue and Islam as civilizational issue, focusing on culture and values. NOTES 1.  The term “Islamophobia” is “a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam” (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1) 2.  The poll measured “Islamophobia” on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 the highest. In addition to “white Evangelicals,” other groups scored as follows: Protestants, 31 percent; “General Public,” 24 percent; Jewish, 22 percent; Catholics, 22 percent; Muslims, 14 percent; and “Non-affiliated,” 14 percent. 3.  The United Kingdom, the twenty-eighth member of the EU, is set to leave the EU although at the time of writing (May 2019), the precise date was unknown.

106

Chapter Four

4.  The relevant question was: “Which of the following themes should be discussed as a matter of priority during the electoral campaign for the next European Parliament elections? Firstly?” (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/ eurobarometer/2018/eurobarometer-2018-democracy-on-the-move/top-results/en -one-year-before-2019-eurobarometer-results-annex.pdf)

Chapter Five

The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue

This chapter focuses, first, on post-9/11 attempts by the United Nations to improve intercivilizational dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. Second, the chapter examines the contemporaneous rolling out of the UN’s Countering/Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE) programs to target violent Islamist extremists and terrorists. Like the national and regional contexts (the USA, Western Europe and Central Europe) surveyed in chapters 6–8, the UN shows in these policies a duality which employs both soft and hard power techniques to try to deal with two interrelated issues: improving relations between the West and the Muslim world and reducing Islamist terrorism and violent extremism. Whether these two goals are compatible is examined in the chapter. The first section of the chapter assesses the values which underpin the UN, reflected in the organization’s foundational statements: the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN was founded as a secular organization in a secular era. Nevertheless, it is often argued that the UN’s foundational values are secularized versions of Christian values articulated by the Western states, especially the USA, which were central to the UN’s creation. Over time, as we saw in chapter 4, the UN’s Western-derived values were openly questioned by many non-Western countries, including many in the Muslim world and from Asia whose civilizational backgrounds and history were different to those of the “Christian” West. The second section examines the origins and objectives of the UN Alliance of Civilizations, created after 9/11 to improve intercivilizational dialogue and reduce the likelihood of conflict between the West and the Muslim world. The third section looks at another UN response to Islamist violent extremism and terrorism post-9/11: the Countering/Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE) program, 107

108

Chapter Five

which seems not to have been helpful in improving intercivilizational dialogue. Like the Dialogue of Civilizations initiative of President Khatami of Iran in the 1990s, which was politely heard at the UN but not pursued with vigor, the UN Alliance of Civilizations reflects one soft power approach to intercivilizational conflict at the UN—dialogue—while the CVEPVE program reflects another—hard power—to try to deal with post-9/11 violent extremism and terrorism. THE UN’S FOUNDATIONAL VALUES: INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS COMMUNITY-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS The UN is a secular organization and does not have foundational principles which derive from explicitly “Christian” values. Robert Traer (1995) notes that when the United Nations was founded in 1945, “human rights were at first a minor concern” in “the drafting of the [UN] Charter.” It took “persistent lobbying” by “a few religious leaders” to change that. The result was that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) affirmed “faith in human rights.” Traer’s comments can be interpreted in two mutually exclusive ways. First, they might suggest a belief—that is, a faith—in human rights as a highly desirable objective which all “right thinking” people would appreciate. Second, it might refer to the roots of human rights being based in faith-based understandings. Beittinger-Lee (2017: 122) asserts that “it was thanks to a few religious leaders that human rights became a point of concern and were enshrined into the Charter of the United Nations.” A “Lutheran professor and clergyman,” O. Frederick Nolde, successfully lobbied the then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, “to expand the provisions for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the UN charter.” Nolde “influenced human rights language in the U.N. Charter and . . . wrote the Declaration’s freedom of religion section” (Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia 2012). This suggests that the UN’s foundational human rights values as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights derive from a Christian—explicitly Protestant—understanding of those values. But because the UN is a decidedly secular entity, with no official or institutionalized voice or role for religion, it was necessary to secularize “Christian” human rights values for the purposes of the UDHR (Golebiewski 2014). At a 1995 symposium to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, organized by the Lutheran Theological Seminar at Philadelphia, Dr. Susanne Riveles, then director of the Africa Desk for Lutheran World Relief in New York (1995–2001), noted that “the Universal Declaration was originally



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 109

a western concept, which may not always be culturally adaptable throughout the world.” She asked “How do we maintain a universal concern for rights and at the same time avoid having cultural relativism as an excuse for violations?” (Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia 2012). Riveles is referring to the idea that the individualistic interpretation of human rights presented in the UDHR is primarily a Western and “Christian” concept which may be of only limited relevance to some other cultural and religious traditions. This has long been a concern to non-Western actors at the UN, which came to a head at the 1993 UN’s Human Rights Conference in Vienna. Traer (1993) notes that individualistic understandings of human rights, including those related to religious freedoms, “reflect the Western notion of religion, as a voluntary activity of individuals who join together to practice what their individual consciences tell them is right.” This contrasts with a view, held by more traditional religious communities, who are much less enthusiastic about an emphasis on an individual believer’s rights. In the “traditional” view, rights are allowed by God to the community of the faithful, and individualistic rights are of secondary importance, as the rights of the entire community take precedence. This issue formed a focus of disagreement at the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna. It was also a key feature of a long-running, controversial issue at the UN, defamation of religion (Skorini 2019). The foundational values of the UN—reflected, for example, in the Charter and the UDHR—are rooted in individually-orientated human rights, which reflects the Western domination of the UN at the time of its founding. Carrette and Miall (2013: 39) note that “individually based universal human rights” take precedence at the UN, reflecting the organization’s “Western Judaeo-Christian tradition.” The UN does not officially recognize religious actors, with the notable exception of the Holy See. The latter gained permanent observer status at the UN in 1964 and Vatican City is the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the UN. In addition, northern-based Christian faith-based organizations (FBOs) are significantly over-represented at the UN, in terms of numbers of Christians in the world, in relation to members of other faiths. Other world religions, with the exception of Judaism, are significantly under-represented in terms of numbers of FBOs at the UN compared to the overall numbers of followers of those faiths, including in relation to the world’s second largest faith: Islam (Haynes 2014). Carrette and Miall (2013: 20) note that at the UN “more than 70 percent of ‘religious’ NGOs identified themselves as Christian,” while around 50 (that is, one-sixth) are “Islamic.” Although the number of Islamic FBOs at the UN is slowly growing, those with official consultative status at the UN are still very few compared to northern-based Christian FBOs (Haynes 2014).

110

Chapter Five

The issue of human rights and how to protect them has polarized debate at the UN for two decades. It is a major unresolved bone of contention, dividing those who believe that it is unacceptable to critique religion from those who aver that a (secular) human right—the right of freedom of expression—is more important than protecting religious scruples. Since its introduction in 1999, the “defamation of religion” campaign at the UN has been led by the fifty-seven-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), operating in tandem with several non-Islamic actors. Critics aver that the OIC-led campaign is actually designed to protect just one religion—Islam—in order to enable governments in some Muslim-majority countries, such as Pakistan and Sudan, to malign and/or mistreat religious minorities, including Christians, with impunity (Skorini 2019). These issues emerged at the UN in the late 1990s, and were subsequently given increased international focus by a sequence of events. These included: the attacks on the USA by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001; the subsequent US-led Global War on Terror, including the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); the “Danish cartoons” controversy, which followed publication of denigratory cartoons in the Jyllands-Posten newspaper (2005); online circulation of a 2012 film, “Innocence of Muslims,” which, like the Jyllands-Posten cartoons, outraged many Muslims by depicting the Prophet Mohammad in a very unfavorable light; and, also in 2012, the appearance of further cartoons satirizing the Prophet Mohammad in a French weekly satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo. In addition, in 2014, the position of Muslims in Europe was highlighted by increased votes for far-right political parties, including the Front National (France) and the Freedom Party (Austria), in European parliamentary elections, a position exacerbated following by the 2015 refugee crisis associated with the Syrian civil war. The UN became the key global battleground for disagreements about a key “human right”: the right to denigrate religions in the context of freedom of expression, a cornerstone of human rights expressed in the UN Charter. The “defamation of religion” controversy at the UN reflects three key points: • The UN is willing to address (although not easily resolve) a highly charged issue which centers on the relationship between religion and culture and human rights; • Individualistic human rights, with roots in the Western Judaeo-Christian tradition, are regarded by one set of actors at the UN as more important than the right of religion not to be critiqued, a view held by another group; • Safeguarding of minority rights—of Muslims, Christians, and minority faith groups, such as the Bahá’ís and Ahmadis—is a highly contentious issue at the UN (Carrette and Miall, 2013: 39).



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 111

The OIC-led campaign against “defamation of religion” reflected wideranging international concern with human rights after the Cold War. The campaign was initially tolerated or supported—often in a rather desultory fashion—by many governments and non-state actors at the UN. Over time, however, it became apparent to many governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and FBOs that a person could be ill-treated or even executed for “defamation of religion” in an OIC-member state, such as Pakistan (Fox 2015). This led to a waning of support for the OIC-led campaign as it seemed very hard to square such treatment with an acceptable human rights regime. The OIC-led campaign was opposed by many Western states, the European Union, and the Holy See (Larsen, 2014). The main bone of contention was the issue of human rights versus those of religion not to be insulted or defamed. The OIC-led campaign was seen by many in the West to be primarily a selfinterested fight not only to privilege Islam over other faiths but also to try to cover up the fact that in some Muslim countries, for example, Pakistan and Sudan, a person may be executed for “defaming” Islam by, for example, seeking to convert to a different faith. In addition, critics believed that, if adopted, defamation of religion would be used to make life harder for already besieged religious minorities in some Muslim countries, such as Ahmadis and Bahá’ís (Author’s interviews with #34, 42). Finally, opponents of the defamation of religion initiative averred that, if adopted, the measure would likely be used in some Muslim-majority countries to prevent non-Muslim missionaries from proselytizing. Under OIC leadership, the campaign crystallized in a series of resolutions at the UN. The starting point was to aver that justification for the “defamation of religion” measure was not new: instead, it was already existing in various UN human rights documents which, the OIC campaign contended, made combating defamation of religion a necessary goal of the UN. Consequently, so the argument went, governments around the world were duty bound to take steps in support of the campaign. In addition, the events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent focus on intercivilizational conflict, suggested that if there was a strong measure to make religious hate speech unacceptable then there was a better chance to develop improved intercivilizational harmony (Author’s interviews with #31, 76, 78, 82). The long-running OIC-led defamation of religion campaign highlighted significant differences at the UN over, on the one hand, “defamation of religion” and, on the other, “freedom of expression.” The “Islamic bloc” led by the OIC supported the former while Western countries collectively opposed the OIC resolutions. Many Muslim-majority countries were unhappy at how freedom of speech was being used with impunity, they claimed, to insult and

112

Chapter Five

defame Islam, while the West believed that anti-defamation sentiments could be used to oppress freedom of speech and undermine legitimate protest and dissent (Kayaoglu 2012). The “deadlock” was broken, however, “in April 2011 when the OIC introduced and the Human Rights Council in Geneva adopted by consensus Human Rights Resolution 16/18. This resolution was designed to combat intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons based on religion or belief” (Federal Foreign Office 2017). After a dozen years of rankling about the issue, the UN officially recognized the human right to blaspheme in September 2011 (UN Human Rights Committee 2011). This appeared to reflect the triumph of the “human rights” view over the “defamation of religion” approach at the UN, although as we shall see below this did not resolve the matter. THE UN ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS: ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES The controversy about freedom of expression versus defamation of religion was not the only issue concerning intercivilizational relations which attracted the UN’s attention. The UN was also concerned about how to improve intercivilizational dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. We saw in chapter 4 that in the late 1990s there was an unsuccessful attempt, led by President Khatami of Iran, to institutionalize a “dialogue among civilizations.” The events of 9/11 presented a major challenge for the UN: How to address a serious international conflict which was not an inter-state clash? The UN was created in 1945 to prevent future international conflicts but the context and focus was and is primarily on interstate wars. Intercivilizational conflict, represented by the attacks by al Qaeda on the USA on 9/11, was outside the UN’s existing experience and expertise and it did not have the tools to address it. The UN sought to respond to 9/11 in two main ways which seemed to some extent mutually exclusive: punishment of the perpetrators and improved intercivilizational dialogue. On the one hand, the USA, under UN auspices, launched the seemingly endless Global War on Terror, which targeted violent jihadi extremists in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, following an initiative from the government of Spain, supported by Turkey, then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan established a dedicated entity, the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), to find ways to improve intercivilizational harmony. Although the UNAOC was concerned



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 113

with improving relations between the West and the Muslim world, it did not explicitly draw on identified religious values to try to find common ground between them. Instead, the UNAOC drew on the UN’s “universalistic” foundational values, as expressed in the Charter and the UDHR (Haynes 2018a) (Author’s interviews with #1, 6, 8, 9). The UN General Assembly unanimously agreed to the creation of the UNAOC. This should not be taken to imply that the UN suddenly “got” religion after decades of secular focus or even that the UN unexpectedly became an environment where religion is now a consistently significant voice (Haynes 2014). In fact, the UN was unwilling to link intercivilizational conflict solely or explicitly with interfaith dialogue. Instead, the aim was to try to find common ground between the West and the Muslim world, in terms of common values, in order to try to forge a way forward. To this end, the UNAOC interacts with various intercivilizational interlocutors. Some are religious figures, many are not; what is necessary is that all of the UNAOC’s interlocutors must accept that the values of the UN as expressed in the Charter and UDHR are of universal validity. As UN secretary-general Guterres stated at the opening ceremony of the UNAOC’s 8th Global Forum in New York in November 2018: Our efforts must be anchored in respect for universal human rights. As we commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights next month, let us recall that the inherent dignity and equal rights of all members of the human family provide the foundation for freedom, justice and peace. This includes respect for freedom of religion and expression, freedom from discrimination of any kind, and the right to participate in and preserve the cultural life of our communities. (https://www.unaoc.org/2018/11/ unaoc-high-representatives-remarks-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-8th-un aoc-global-forum/)

A former high representative of the UN Alliance of Civilizations also believes, like Guterres, civilizational differences between the West and the Muslim world are not insurmountable, and can be overcome by finding common human rights ground. The goal might be achieved by “promoting good governance of cultural diversity at large.” Currently, however, the gap between cultures is a division and there is an urgent requirement “to bridge [it] because of the growing rifts amidst communities, the rise of extremism, polarisation of attitudes and perception of the world, intolerance, xenophobia and racism” (Author’s interview with #13). A more pessimistic view of the current situation is advanced by a former UN undersecretary general and personal representative of secretary-general Kofi

114

Chapter Five

Annan, United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, 2001.1 He believes that “the reality we are facing today is diametrically opposed to the one in Crossing the Divide,” published on 9 November 2001 (Author’s interview with #47). On that day, in Resolution 56/6, the UN General Assembly asserted that “Dialogue among civilizations is a process between and within civilizations, founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue” (UN General Assembly 2001 Resolution 9.11.2001). Crossing the Divide is the title of a 250-page report on how to improve intercivilizational relations, presenting the views of twenty-one “Eminent Persons,” selected by Annan. In 2017, a former UN under-secretary general and personal representative of secretary-general Kofi Annan informed the current author that in his view Crossing the Divide “carries the exact opposite message of what we hear in the news today and from the voices of so many leaders . . . Some leaders use political and religious divides to promote themselves, and seek an enemy they can vilify.” While he was unwilling to be explicit, the former UN under-secretary was likely referring to the growing electoral support for right-wing populist politicians in the USA, Europe and elsewhere. Such people routinely portray relations between the West and the Muslim world as a “clash of civilizations.” This overlooks fundamental differences between the values and goals of jihadi extremists and terrorists and those of “mainstream,” moderate Muslims. The former UN under-secretary added the following: I believe the divide is getting deeper and deeper and that the divide now is not only among nation states, but also increasingly among entities. In fact, the current climate scares me; I feel we are moving backward. I am not sure that the book [Crossing the Divide] would be appreciated by many today. It was a different time. . . . One day we shall have leaders who could lead without [an] enemy but we are not there yet. Political and religious and economic divides have replaced the Cold war of yesteryear (Author’s interview with #47).

In 2004, three years after Crossing the Divide was published, the then prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, supported by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, suggested the creation of the UNAOC at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly. The initiative was accepted by the General Assembly. The Alliance was formally launched in 2007 by Kofi Annan’s successor, Ban Ki-moon, who appointed Sampaio as the UNAOC’s high representative. Sampaio was replaced by Qatar’s Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, a former president of the UN General Assembly, in



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 115

March 2013. Al-Nasser was replaced by a former foreign minister of Spain, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, in January 2019. The aim of the UNAOC is to build “a global network of partners including States, International and regional organizations, civil society groups, foundations, and the private sector to improve cross-cultural relations between diverse nations and communities” (http://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/). To this end, a “Group of Friends”2 was created to support the UNAOC. It grew over time and a decade later, in January 2019, comprised 120 governments and twenty-six international organizations (IOs) (http://www.unaoc. org/who-we-are/group-of-friends/members/). In addition, the UNAOC has “memorandums of understanding” with sixteen “Partner Organizations,” including some IOs which are also members of its Group of Friends, including the Council of Europe and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and some entities which are not, including the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Global Dialogue Foundation and La Francophonie (http://www.unaoc.org/who-weare/partner-organizations/). The aim of the UNAOC in reaching out to both state and non-state actors is to highlight its wide-ranging focus: not solely an UN-located, top-down body, remote from the concerns of governments, but also representative and responsive to civil society and “ordinary” people (Author’s interviews with #16, 17, 38, 50). How to assess attempts at intercivilizational dialogue at the UN since 9/11 and its institutionalisation in the form of the UNAOC? Bettiza notes that “[t] he concept of civilizations has not only remained at the level of language” at the UN, but in addition is now “embedded, instantiated, and operationalized within the global governance architecture, most prominently with the creation of the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) in 2005.” In addition, Bettiza claims, (2014: 2) the UNAOC is “acquiring growing and persistent authority over time in the global public sphere and within global governance institutions” (Bettiza 2014: 20). Bettiza’s opinion of the UNAOC is in contrast to many other views expressed by knowledgeable parties, which the current author learned of in the course over eighty dedicated interviews during 2015–2018. For example, a former Western diplomat was skeptical about the value of intercivilizational dialogue at the UN: I see you have been focusing on United Nations Alliance of Civilizations and also other organizations. But the overall, very lofty concept of dialogue, it’s so much [in] the core of it; and I do also see a lot of actors and players who just try to instrumentalise it for—of course, naturally—their own political needs and agendas and so on. And I think it’s quite the right moment right now to actually also discuss on that broad, highest UN level about dialogue. (Author’s interview with #43)

116

Chapter Five

A serving diplomat was skeptical about the Alliance’s “soft power” approach via intercivilizational dialogue: The world has moved on since AOC was founded in 2006 (sic) and AOC has not moved with it. The rise of terrorism has been a game changer and the AOC has not risen to the challenge. The AOC was initially envisaged as a key “soft power” tool in the context of “clash of civilizations” and 9/11. But in recent times it has been looking for a new profile. AOC has been squeezed and “put into a corner” by the rise of terrorism and violent extremism, and many of the important countries couldn’t see much point in soft power or in the AOC as a vehicle to try to deal with terrorism and violent extremism. As a result, AOC has been “left halfway,” showing willingness but not clear what role it can now play. (Author’s interview with #25)

Another Western diplomat, his country’s Focal Point with the Alliance,3 who represents his country at UNAOC Group of Friends meetings,4 was fairly dismissive of the UNAOC’s main showcase event: the Global Forum, seeing it as only a “talking shop.” For him, the main problem is that the Global Forums lack “big agendas.” In his view, the Global Forums, “fail to discuss the key issues of our time, notably terrorism and violent extremism and inter-faith, especially inter-Muslim (Shia/Sunni), tensions, conflict and violence.” For example, the depredations of so-called Islamic State have not been addressed by the Alliance, “not least because the issues which have led to its rise are linked to failures of governance within countries as much as international civilizational and cultural concerns” (Author’s interview with #26). As a result, The P5 [the five permanent members of the UN Security Council] is sceptical [of the Alliance]. The EU is not that engaged corporately, although some individual member states are still keen. The reason is that AOC has little or nothing concrete to contribute to the fight against violent extremism and terrorism, perhaps the most significant international issue of today. Islamic State was a game changer, destabilising great areas of the Middle East, particularly Syria and Iraq, especially by involvement of foreign terrorist fighters, which number around 40,000 worldwide . . . Emphasis at the UN has shifted from AOC’s intercivilizational dialogue, which emerged after 9/11, to PVE [preventing violent extremism], which became of central importance after the rise of Daesh in Iraq in 2006 and Syria in 2014. (Author’s interview with #26)

A former Western diplomat, who now works with a Europe-based international organization and who had extensive dealings with the Alliance over a decade from the mid-2000s, regards the Alliance as being unambitious and “not smart”:



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 117

The UNAOC, first of all, defined such vague objectives, and then also did not take the courage—and this is what I’ve learned after 10 years of being on the borderline between kind of a diplomat in the political-civil-servant situation, but also kind of an NGO activist—[you] have to combine these two poles. And you have to play on both mandolins, on both pianos. You have to [place] the politicians and the political backgrounds in a safe environment, so that they cannot burn their fingers with anything that might turn out to be very delicate on a diplomatic level. But you can also—and there are ways if you are clever and smart enough—you have to outsource certain aspects, that are too dangerous for being done on a UN branding or a UN level, to NGOs and to channel money there. And I think this is what the UNAOC has failed to do. (Author’s interview with #54)

This former Western diplomat claimed that the UNAOC has been too content in recent years to focus on high-profile projects which lack a wider, constructive impact. For example, there are the Intercultural Dialogue awards, and the Global Fora, which are politically very easy going and nothing actually can happen there. But where are the concrete projects [that] can really navigate the political, delicate, issues outside of the spectrum? And for that, you have to take [great care] . . . because, otherwise, you’ve got also, at a certain point of time, political dilemmas which say, “Sorry, this is a red line; you can’t do that. This is politically too delicate for us, that you can really engage now in a Sunni-Shia dialogue here, at the UN level. We are going to face serious problems.” Okay, then you have to take a decision within the Secretariat on the operational/[implementing] side. You take the project, which we believe will trigger some change at a certain point of time, and outsource it. And they can rely and trust us that we will still find ways to support them financially and politically, but not with our label or banner. (Author’s interview with #43)

Further, two senior representatives of a Western international organization expressed the view that the UNAOC is not good at consistently pursuing its objectives. As a result, few members states of their organization now “actively support” the Alliance. There is widespread recognition in this international organization that whereas the UNAOC once had “potential” now it is regarded as a “failure,” side-tracked by “political agendas and egos” (Author’s interview with #65). A colleague from the same international organization concurred, stating that member states of the organization she represents “seem to find the UNAOC problematic.” While it has “untapped potential,” it is “not delivering,” a view “shared by many UN member states,” represented on the UNOAC’s Group of Friends (Author’s interview with #68). It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the terms, “civilizations” and “intercivilizational dialogue” mean different things to different people and

118

Chapter Five

that the UN is a meeting place for various, sometimes diverse, views. This was made clear in 2010, where there was a lengthy debate in the UN Security Council about “intercultural dialogue,” during a session chaired by Lebanon on “Maintenance of international peace and security. Intercultural dialogue for peace and security” (UN Security Council 2010).5 How should “intercultural dialogue” be understood and what should it mean? The discussion enabled representatives of states on the Security Council to express their opinions. Records of the discussion indicate that there was a variety of understandings—between Western and non-Western states, as well as “among Christian and Muslims, [and] also among European countries.” For example, the French representative stressed the importance of a secular state, where religion is an issue belonging only to the private sphere of each singular person. The Lebanese representative highlighted the problematic role played by issues of oppression, hegemony, and injustice, which “render dialogue itself questionable” (Security Council 2010). Japan’s representative saw “intercultural dialogue” in the light of practice and pragmatic activities of diplomatic exchange programs. The United Kingdom representative defended the role of the UN Alliance of Civilizations as a way of promoting dialogue and understanding through civil society and media. However, he also stated that “First, while intercultural dialogue should acknowledge our differences, it must also be built on universal human values.” In order to enhance “intercultural dialogue” at the UN, several activities were proposed, including roundtables with civil society representatives to conferences and other events open to a wider public, to policy-related activities, in order to address the issue of discrimination in immigrant-receiving countries, as well as more institutional and diplomatic activities, such as diplomatic exchange programs. “Therefore, all the Representatives were clearly referring to different typologies of activities and had different philosophies as grounds for these activities” (Bello, 2013: 7–8). In addition to the views of state representatives on the UN Security Council and the author’s interviewees, academics and practitioners have also expressed critiques of the Alliance. For Salt (2012: 209), the Alliance “remain[s] a utopian ideal, chalking up small victories but having little or no effect on problems regarded as the most threatening to global peace and order.” Spielhaus (2010) argues that the UNAOC started from a major disadvantage “when it comes to making concrete progress as it is shackled by its own terminology. The two sides”—that is, the West and the Muslim world— are “often portrayed in simplistic terms.” Spielhaus claims that the UNAOC’s main problem is that its “binary” approach emphasizes a bifurcated terminology: “the West” and “Islam.” While “dialogue and direct communications between individuals are to be preferred to violent conflicts,” Spielhaus noted,



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 119

“it remains questionable whether they will lead to solutions or further partitions if the terminology remains binary” (Spielhaus quoted in Amies 2010). Bosold contends that UNAOC lacks fundamental ability to achieve its desired results because it is top-down focused and consequently lacks consistent connection with civil society: UN initiatives such as the AoC are only useful in terms of symbolic politics by creating a more open atmosphere for political discussions among political leaders . . . In order to achieve concrete results, AoC lacks at least three aspects: it is not able to connect with civil society in both the Islamic world and theWest in order to bring significant parts (sic) from both sides into a permanent dialogue; it is elite-driven and not a grass roots-level endeavour, notwithstanding its pretension to achieve that very end. (Bosold quoted in Amies 2010)

For Bosold, the problem seems to have been exacerbated because the UNAOC does not have a clear or viable framework outside the UN. He also suggests that having an institutionalized role in the UN is no longer necessarily sufficient to be influential more generally. This is because today the UN is not as central to international relations as it was seven decades ago when it was founded, immediately following World War II: “Since the Secretary Generals of the UN have increasingly lost the ability to set the international agenda, I don’t see how this problem might be remedied when it comes to the AoC” (Bosold quoted in Amies 2010). Finally, Beittinger-Lee (2017, pp. 121–22) notes that the UNAOC is not a UN “agency or body per se” but “established under the auspices of the UN and funded by a Voluntary Trust Fund” (VRT), which makes it “susceptible to criticism.” The VRT receives financial contributions from various state and non-state “key partners,” notably the German luxury car maker, BMW (Author’s interview with #46), which cannot “be identified even in the UNAOC’s Annual reports.” In sum, critics of the UNAOC claim that it is (1) “utopian,” unable to deal substantively with important issues threatening global peace and order; (2) “shackled” by its own—binary—terminology; (3) a top-down initiative that does not connect well with civil society; and (4) it is not funded transparently. Overall, these comments not only reflect widespread skepticism among diplomats, academics, and practitioners who engage with the UNAOC on the benefits of intercivilizational dialogue but also underline that such initiatives may more generally be lacking in relevance in relation to helping achieve solutions to intercivilizational conflicts. For example, it is often rightly noted that across the Middle East there is a strong focus on Muslim-Christian relations both within countries and internationally, but next to no overt concern with “intra-civilizational” initiatives, especially in relation to Shia/Sunni issues, which are linked to many extant conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere

120

Chapter Five

(Haynes 2013a, 2016). On this note, it is worth bearing in mind the intracivilizational dimensions of the seemingly endless civil war in Yemen—in which between June 2016 and September 2018, an estimated 56,000 people were killed, that is, an average of 2,000 a month or nearly 70 a day (Cockburn 2018). In addition, over 20 million people are said to be in need of humanitarian aid, including 14 million who are lacking clean water facilities (OCHA 2018). The Yemen conflict is a proxy war between (mainly Sunni) Saudi Arabia and (mainly Shia) Iran and there is no sign of intrafaith dialogue being employed to try to end it—or, if it is, there are no signs of such dialogue achieving success to end the war. Not all of those who engage with the UNAOC find it to be disappointing. A senior representative of a non-Western international organization indicated that “the Alliance of Civilizations is one of our [key] areas that we cooperate with [at] the UN, especially in [various] initiatives and the [UNAOC] Global Forum. The Alliance started as just a small initiative but now it’s become a big thing” (Author’s interview with #30). This interviewee stated that his organization has a very good relationship with the Alliance and believes that the UNAOC was doing good work. In addition, a senior figure from a nonWestern international organization considered that the UNAOC is reasonably successful in pursuing inter-cultural dialogue but doubts whether it is that effective in undermining the spread of radicalization in the Middle East and North Africa, the region on which his organization focuses (Author’s interview with #63). It might be that those who deal with the UNAOC at the UN and in other international fora miss the Alliance’s achievements in relation to civil society and the individuals with which it engages. For example, the UNAOC ran educational summer schools annually for six years from 2010. From the limited evidence available,6 it would seem that many participants in the summer schools benefitted from their experiences. During 2010 and 2015, the UNAOC ran annual summer schools “based on the conviction that youth are a driving force for positive social change and should receive adequate support to enrich their action.” During 2013–2015, the summer schools were run in New York State in partnership with EF Education First, a private international education company. Overall, the summer schools attracted nearly 500 young people from 119 countries who were to benefit from the opportunity “to increase their understanding of other cultures and faiths, of the similarities that unite us despite our differences and to act for positive social change.” The participants received “concrete, applicable tools for growing and sustaining their impact as activists, change-makers and leaders in their initiatives and organizations (https://www.unaoc.org/what-we-do/projects/ summer-schools/). One of the participants, Lynn Pinugu from the Philippines,



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 121

expressed the following sentiment: “The program provides young leaders a unique opportunity to deepen one’s understanding of the different challenges that one encounters in promoting peace-building, while gaining access to a variety of possible solutions in order to overcome them. The discourse is further enriched by the diverse experience of the 74 other youth participants, who are also striving to make a system-wide change, in their chosen advocacy” (https://www.lynnpinugu.com/). Pinugu is co-founder and executive director of Mano Amiga Philippines. Founded in 2008, Mano Amiga Philippines, is “a nonprofit organization providing high quality education & community development services to children & families from low-income communities” (https://www.lynnpinugu.com/). Pinugu attended the last of the UNAOC/EF Education First summer schools in 2015. Further (anonymous) supportive comments from attendees of the 2015 summer school are available to view at http://unaocefsummerschoolblog.tumblr.com/. Both the importance and controversial nature of the concept of intercivilizational or intercultural dialogue at the UN can be ascertained from remarks by the last three UN secretary-generals, Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon, and António Guterres. Annan addressed a meeting on “dialogue among civilizations” at the UN in New York in September 2000. He stated: “The United Nations itself was created in the belief that dialogue can triumph over discord, that diversity is a universal virtue, and that the peoples of the world are far more united by their common fate than they are divided by their separate identities.” Annan went on to state that the history of the UN should teach us also . . . that, alongside an infinite diversity of cultures, there does exist one global civilization in which humanity’s ideas and beliefs meet and develop peacefully and productively. It is a civilization that must be defined by its tolerance of dissent, its celebration of cultural diversity, its insistence on fundamental, universal human rights and its belief in the right of people everywhere to have a say in how they are governed. It is a civilization that we are called on to defend and promote as we embark on a new century. (http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000905.sgsm7526.r1.doc.html)

Ban Ki-moon stated in a speech delivered at the School of International Relations in Tehran, Iran, in August 2012, that: “Our collective responsibility is to build bridges of mutual understanding. This is the very heart of the Alliance of Civilizations, which is an initiative by the United Nations, an initiative inspired by Iran itself through dialogue among civilizations. This is what your country has proposed. All nations should be true to that higher calling” (https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2012-08-30/secretarygenerals-remarks-school-international-relations).

122

Chapter Five

In a presentation to the UNAOC’s Group of Friends in New York in November 2018, António Guterres remarked that: “In these troubled times, the Alliance is a unique and inclusive platform for Member States, the private sector, youth, civil society and the media to exchange views and commit to dialogue and new partnerships. It is closely aligned with my own priorities and the vision that I have outlined in my prevention agenda” (https://www .un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm19354.doc.htm). Annan, Ban, and Guterres are all affirming the importance of intercultural dialogue at the UN. Annan is relating the concept of “dialogue of civilizations” to UN founding principles, Ban is referring to the UNAOC as a vehicle to pursue “mutual understanding,” as “bridges” need to be built between different civilizations, and Guterres’s claim is that the Alliance “is a unique and inclusive platform.” Annan perceives “civilization” as a universal value, characterized by: open-mindedness to dissent, celebration of cultural diversity, “fundamental, universal” (that is, individually-orientated) human rights, and (liberal) democracy. This was not a new approach. “The Commission on Global Governance” had taken “a similar tack in 1994,” in the report Our Global Neighborhood (1995). The report took civilization as a human-based concept, implying that there are not civilizations, but rather a single human civilization with a variability of expressions within it, albeit clustered around common themes and understandings. This was also the focus of a 1995 intervention from the then German chancellor Roman Herzo, who also referred to civilizational commonality, stating that “our aim should not be the clash of cultures or civilizations but the development of a common civilization built on consensus and mutual trust” (Herzog quoted in Balci, 2009: 101). According to Bloom (2013), civilizational commonality was only a “secondary theme through a high level discourse,” which attracted “interest particularly among non-Western states.” On the other hand, the apparent lionizing of Western civilization and its contrasting with Islamic civilization seemed to some to suggest an Orientalist reading of the world. In his Tehran address, Ban spoke of the importance of building bridges between civilizations, implying a lack of inter-cultural consensus regarding “civilizational” values, with the Alliance of Civilizations as the key UN vehicle to achieve this goal. The UNAOC High Level Report (HLGR 2006) pointed both to the existence of civilizations in the plural and the necessity of establishing preventative mechanisms in order to forestall a Huntingtonian “clash.” This approach reflects what Bloom (2013) calls the “mosaic view of civilizations,” which emphasizes how civilizations are sometimes regarded as separate, without commonalities with other civilizations. Rising disparities of wealth and opportunities within societies lead to marginalization and exclusion. Gender inequality, unemployment, and particularly



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 123

youth unemployment, fuel radicalization and push people towards violent extremism. . . . Many years of experience have proven that heavy-handed approaches and a single-minded focus only on security measures have failed. We know that extremism and terrorism flourish when human rights are violated and aspirations for inclusion ignored. We must pay particular attention to addressing the causes of violent extremism . . . Too many people, especially young people, join terrorist groups because they lack prospects and meaning in their lives. (“UN News Centre,” 2016)

The remarks in the above quotation were made by the then Alliance high representative, Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser, at the 7th Global Forum held in Baku, Azerbaijan, in April 2016. They capture the concerns of the Alliance as expressed in the UNAOC’s foundational high-level group report, published in 2006. Yet, despite the Alliance highlighting such issues since its founding, some UN member states regard the Alliance as simply ineffectual, not worthy of close or sustained support, including consistent or sufficient financial backing (Author’s interviews with #25, 26, 65, 68). This reflects a perception that the Alliance is not effective in improving intercivilizational relations, including between Western and Muslim societies. In addition, despite the efforts of the Alliance, there is realization that violent extremism and terrorism are constant features of international relations today. A key Alliance objective, as set out in the 2006 high-level group report, was to address and seek to counter perceptions of injustice, inequality and alienation as a key means to counter violent extremism and terrorism. The report stated the following: 1.2 We also live in an increasingly complex world, where polarized perceptions, fueled by injustice and inequality, often lead to violence and conflict, threatening international stability. . . . Some political leaders and sectors of the media, as well as radical groups have exploited this environment, painting mirror images of a world made up of mutually exclusive cultures, religions, or civilizations [. . .] 2.5 Poverty leads to despair, a sense of injustice, and alienation that, when combined with political grievances, can foster extremism. Eradication of poverty would diminish those factors . . . as called for in the Millennium Development Goals [. . .] 3.13 . . . Effective counter-measures cannot rely solely on attacking adherents of such ideologies. . . . The only durable solution lies in addressing the roots of the resentment and anger that make exclusivist and violent ideologies attractive in the first place. Nowhere have exclusivist ideologies, adversarial perceptions, cultural arrogance, and media stereotypes combined more dangerously with conflicts bred of perceived and real injustices than in relations between Western and Muslim societies.” (HLGR 2006: 3, 5 10)

124

Chapter Five

Some of the measures recommended in the report to reduce injustices and thus undermine the attractions for some of violent extremism and terrorism are controversial. For example, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is sometimes seen as a zero-sum game, whereby an increase in justice for one party is inevitably seen as a decrease in justice for the other. In addition to the Israel/Palestinians situation, the report also called upon the international community to address other “big issues,” such as: causes of “poverty” and “political grievances,” as well as to work to eliminate “exclusivist ideologies, adversarial perceptions, cultural arrogance and media stereotypes” which, in the context of “conflicts bred of perceived and real injustices,” were thought to fuel tensions between Western and Muslim societies (ibid.: 10). In the context of critiques noted above, the aspirations of the Alliance expressed in its 2013–2018 review suggest that the UNAOC is aware that its activities should be grounded in “real world” issues, problems, and solutions, and work closely with civil society (UN Alliance of Civilizations Strategic Review and Plan, 2013–2018, 2013). Regarding its terminology, the UNAOC is part of a UN system which since 9/11 has identified the issues of violent extremism and terrorism largely in the context of relations between the West and the Muslim world and this terminology is now so established and embedded in the UN culture that it is very difficult to see what the UNAOC could do alone to change things in this regard. Finally, the lack of transparency in funding of the UNAOC could easily be addressed if the Alliance and its Group of Friends—the key funding mechanism of the UNAOC—agreed to publish full funding details. So far, however, this has not occurred (Haynes, 2018a: 80–89). Since its inception, the Alliance has sought to be an important “soft” power tool, different from the “hard” power of military and economic clout, working to find common intercivilizational ground against violent extremism and terrorism and develop an enhanced sense of global citizenship, that is, a sense of belonging to a broader community and common humanity. The Alliance has developed various educational programs, including the summer schools and their regional successors, which, according to the limited evidence available, have been successful in helping develop a sense of global citizenship among the hundreds of young people who have taken part in the programs over the years. The UNAOC has been slow systematically to develop in partnership with cognate UN agencies, such as UNESCO, although there are signs that in recent times the Alliance and UNESCO are becoming more closely aligned in their aspirations and goals. The fact remains however that the Alliance, as well as UNESCO and many other UN agencies, are working in conditions



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 125

which are increasingly unconducive to closer inter-cultural and inter-faith relations between the West and the Muslim world. As noted earlier, in 2014 more than 32,000 people died as a result of violent extremism and terrorism. Even if there is a center ground where “representatives” from the Christian and Muslim worlds can agree on the way forward, is this going to be enough to undermine the often-murderous activities of the hard men and women of, inter alia, al Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab? The difficult task that the UNAOC is trying to pull off in its educational activities is to establish, develop, and consolidate a common set of values, truths, and beliefs based on the UN Charter, reflected in the notion of global citizenship, as a basis for shared inter-cultural understandings of the world and a template for what is appropriate and what is simply wrong (Author’s interviews with #52, 53, 55). Finally, the main aim of the Alliance—to enhance the lives of those on the sharp end of inter-cultural enmity, extremism, and terrorism—is to be achieved by stakeholders working closely and flexibly together pursuing consensual goals in the context of enhanced global governance. The 2017 UNAOC annual report indicates that the Alliance is now seeking to work more closely with a variety of partners both within and without the UN, a process to be encouraged by the Alliance’s new high representative, supported by UN secretary-general Guterres. ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM: THE UN’S RESPONSE The events of 11 September 2001 were directly responsible not only for the creation of UNAOC but were also a symptom of what many saw as growing polarization between the West and the Muslim world. The response of the international community at the UN to 9/11 was Janus-faced. On the one hand, it focused on intercivilizational dialogue via the UN Alliance of Civilizations. On the other hand, the UN also introduced a program, Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), in 2006. The aim was to counter, roll back, and eventually eliminate violent extremism and terrorism, much of which was seen to emanate from jihadis. The UN’s PVE initiative was adopted by the UN General Assembly in the context of the UN’s “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” The Strategy was based on four pillars: (1) tackling conditions conducive to terrorism; (2) preventing and combating terrorism; (3) building countries’ capacity to combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and (4) ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.

126

Chapter Five

While UN policies to combat terrorism emerged as a reaction to acts of extreme violence, they were mainly repressive in nature. Conducted in the name of national security, they largely overlooked pillars (1) and (4) of the Strategy. Perhaps best exemplified by the US-led “Global War on Terror,” this security-based approach seems to have comprehensively failed, if judged by the number of deaths from violent extremism and terrorism across the globe, which increased nearly ten-fold between 2000 and 2014, rising from 3,329 to 32,685, before falling 22 percent to 25,673 in 2016 (Global Terrorism Index 2017). In 2017, however, numbers of deaths rose steeply mainly due to the Syrian civil war. The Global Extremism Monitor reported that: “At least 84,023 people in 66 countries died during the year” because of violent extremism and terrorism (Global Extremism Monitor 2018). The alarming rise in deaths from violent extremism and terrorism from 2000 prompted the international community via the UN to shift the focus to preventing terrorism rather than countering it. In 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2178 advocated countering violent extremism (CVE) as a mean to prevent terrorism, thus augmenting the original PVE concept. While the UNAOC sought to use its soft power to address intercivilizational tensions and conflicts involving Western and Muslim societies, most governments of UN member states seemed more convinced of the effectiveness of hard power. This was illustrated in the comments of some of the present author’s interviewees noted earlier in the chapter, especially in comments from some state representatives who commented on what they saw as the Alliance’s failings. On the other hand, the appeal of the use of hard power seemed to some clear and obvious: it was necessary in response to the egregious terrorist attacks in various parts of the world, including the USA and Western Europe, not least in order to convince skeptical electorates that their government was doing something to fight the terrorists. In the two decades following 9/11, many Western European countries experienced terroristrelated incidents, including the 11 March 2004 attack on Madrid’s railway which saw more than 200 killed by an al Qaeda-inspired extremist and which led directly to Spain’s initiative regarding the Alliance of Civilizations. In addition, the early 2000s saw the emergence of new, transnational jihadi organizations, including: Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al Shabaab, which seemed to many to pose a new kind of threat of terrorist capacity to attack the West.7 There is no evidence to indicate that such jihadi groups would change their ways because of Alliance-style soft power approaches. From the early 2000s, the UN was also seeking to deal with a number of “failing” or “failed” states, such as Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Iraq, Syria, and following the overthrow and death of Gadhafi in 2011, Libya. Many such countries became focal points of transnational and national jihadi groups to



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 127

control territory and populations. The UN’s response, along with that of the USA, United Kingdom, and many other Western countries, was to rely primarily on hard power methods to try to deal with such violent extremism and terrorism. Seeking to deal with a wave of violent extremism and terrorism, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” on 8 September 2006. The strategy was designed to be a unique global instrument to enhance national, regional, and international efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Fink (2014: 1) notes that adoption by the UN of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 was a more comprehensive approach than hitherto, as it “includes preventive efforts, sanctions, law enforcement, and legal measures, as well as a human rights dimension.” The subsequent establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) provided the UN with a central platform to coordinate the terrorism- and violent extremism–related activities of thirtyfour UN-related entities. On 24 September 2014, eight years after the UN adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the then UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, informed a special session of the UN Security Council that “[t]he world is witnessing a dramatic evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat. . . . Eliminating terrorism requires international solidarity and a multifaceted approach—among the many tools we must use, we must also tackle the underlying conditions that provide violent extremist groups the opportunity to take root” (“Secretary-General’s Remarks to Security Council High-Level Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” 2014). Ban was addressing the UN Security Council at a time when many member states were increasingly concerned with the murderous activities of so-called Islamic State, which at the time was successfully carving out for itself control of enclaves in several territories in the Middle East, including in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, as well as in several African countries, such as Mali. A 2014 UN report made it clear that Islamic State was a key threat to regional and international peace and security, as it was shaping “the contemporary conflict environment” by using its “considerable resources and sophisticated communications technologies to attract” extensive international support, including fighters from numerous countries (UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 27 October 2014,” 2014). It is clear that Islamic State was seen by the UN as a significant international menace, one which no country or regional organization acting alone could resolve. As a result, it was necessary, the then US president Barack Obama stated, to develop an international coalition that could “degrade and ultimately destroy” Islamic State (“UN Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014,” 2014). Security Council Resolution 2178 won the unanimous support of UN member states. The severity and immediacy of the threat

128

Chapter Five

from the Islamic State reflected the fact that thirteen years after 9/11 and nine since the creation of the UNAOC, the United Nations was confronting an unprecedented terrorist threat from an extremely violent, transnational, nonstate entity whose aim was to provoke a high degree of regional instability which severely undermined international peace and security. While the UN Security Council took swift yet controversial action in adopting Resolution 1373 in September 2001, which allowed the United States to invade Afghanistan in pursuit of al Qaeda, a dozen years later there was a lack of clarity about how the United Nations could effectively respond to Islamic State and other evolving security challenges, while also supporting non-military, that is, soft power, approaches to combating terrorism, such as that provided by the UNAOC. In 2005, around the same time as creation of the UNAOC, the then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan announced what was known as the “five Ds” in its counter-terrorism strategy: dissuading putative terrorists, deterring states from supporting them, denying them safe haven and resources, developing state capacities, and defending human rights (“UN General Assembly and UN Security Council,” 2002).8 These five core principles shaped several subsequent multilateral counterterrorism efforts, most notably the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which sought to express a more comprehensive approach to tackling violent extremism and terrorism to include preventive efforts, sanctions, law enforcement, and legal measures, as well as a human rights dimension (Fink 2014). CONCLUSION The events of 9/11 were a direct stimulus to the UN to seek to use both soft and hard power tools to tackle the scourge of violent extremism and terrorism and improve what the UN called intercivilizational dialogue. Regarding soft power, the Alliance of Civilizations sought to encourage “right-minded” people from both the West and the Muslim world to work together in support of the UN’s foundational values, as represented in the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both were the bedrock of the UN’s values in the 1940s, at a time when the UN comprised mainly Western states. Over the next few decades, numerous non-Western states gained independence and the values which they sought to express were not necessarily those of the West, which were generally secularized values derived from Christianity, reflecting individualistic interpretations of the world. The long-running saga of the defamation of religions issue at the UN from the late 1990s demonstrated just how far apart many UN member states were when it came to human rights and the value of certain rights over others.



The UN Alliance of Civilizations and Intercivilizational Dialogue 129

The UNAOC had a role in the UN’s ability to deliver the “five Ds,” by its use of soft power both to try to dissuade violent extremists and terrorists to desist and instead defend human rights. Nonetheless, in the light of developments including the capacity of Islamic State to achieve territorial successes (most of which it had lost by 2019), it seemed clear by the second decade of the twenty-first century that soft power alone was insufficient to dissuade most violent extremists and terrorists to stop their activities. Despite the territorial failures of the Islamic State, jihadi terrorism still had the capacity, it appeared, seriously to threaten regional and international peace and security, often in the form of so-called “lone wolf” attacks on “soft” targets in many parts of the world (Antinori 2017). While the UNAOC sought to project soft power in its activities to enhance intercivilizational dialogue with a view to finding common ground between civilizations and cultures, the UN simultaneously adopted a proactive policy to undermine, diminish and ultimately root out violent extremism and terrorist, especially that emanating from jihadi entities, responsible for most of the deaths and injuries by terrorism in recent years. Such deaths rose from around 3,000 in 2000 to 32,000 in 2014 before declining in 2016 to around 25,000 and then rising again to more than 84,000 in 2017, mainly due to the Syrian civil war. It is a moot point to what should be ascribed the fall in terrorist-related deaths—down 22 percent between 2014 and 2016—or whether the UN’s PVE program is responsible. Equally, it is not clear to what extent, if at all, the UN’s PVE/ CVE programs were of significance in the Syrian civil war. What is clear that neither violent extremism or terrorism have gone away and they continue to receive much attention from the international community at the UN and elsewhere. The next three chapters transfer attention to national and regional settings and assess how the “clash of civilizations” has played out in recent years in both the USA and Europe. NOTES 1.  Picco was, for twenty years (1973–1992), a UN negotiator involved in the Geneva Agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq following their war (1980–1988), and the liberation of Western hostages in Lebanon and others detained without due process. 2. “A Group of Friends is a usual practice both in the UN framework and in other international arenas by which the country which is sponsoring a particular international initiative—whereas it is Spain and Turkey at the Alliance of Civilizations process, Finland with the Helsinki Process, or Canada in the Responsibility to Protect—creates an informal group with those other member states supportive of the

130

Chapter Five

initiative to promote it, give support and content and ensure its advance in the agenda of the different intergovernmental bodies” (Manonelles, 2007: fn. 3). 3.  “All members of the Group of Friends have been invited to appoint a Focal Point for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in their capitals or headquarters. Focal Points are officials working in Governments and international organizations who coordinate the UNAOC’s related work in their institutions, facilitate and coordinate regular communication between each member of the Group of Friends and the Office of the UNAOC in New York. Through the network of Focal Points, the UNAOC benefits from national and international inputs and contribution to its strategic orientation, programs and initiatives. The High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations convenes Focal Points annual meetings and working sessions in the framework of the annual forums of UNAOC” (https://www.unaoc.org/ who-we-are/group-of-friends/). 4.  The UNAOC Group of Friends is a 146-member body comprising 120 states and 26 significant NGOs. Details at https://www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/group-of -friends/. 5.  This was the first meeting of the Security Council that the USA had attended as a member of the Group of friends of the UNAOC, which it had just joined. 6.  There is only limited evidence, at least in part because the UNAOC does not make public the feedback from those attending its special projects, including summer schools. 7.  Boko Haram was founded in 2002, so-called Islamic State emerged after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and Al Shabaab originated in 2006. The Institute for Economics and Peace, a New York-based research group, estimates that in 2016, there were a reported 25,673 deaths from terrorist activities, with so-called Islamic State directly or indirectly responsible for around three-quarters of the fatalities (http://economicsandpeace.org/research/). 8.  For Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s speech, see “Secretary-General’s Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security—“A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism.” 10 March 2005, at http:// www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1345.

Chapter Six

The United States of America

Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm depicts what he regards as uniquely Western civilizational values—including a preference for liberal democracy and other individualistic freedoms, like certain human rights, such as religious freedom (Haynes, 2008). For Huntington, there is no chance that these would become “global values,” universally appreciated and upheld, because, he believed, there are no such values which are applicable worldwide among extant cultures and civilizations. Instead there are diverse, civilizational values, linked to various religions and cultures, which differently inform what people think, say and do. Huntington’s clash of civilizations approach was a riposte to Francis Fukuyama’s contemporaneous account of how the end of the Cold War marked the end of history. Fukuyama (1989, 1992) argued that the West’s values and goals, including liberal democracy and individualistic human rights, were now a global template for widespread, post-Cold War, progressive changes. Huntington was having none of it. Scornful of Fukuyama’s one-size-fitsall claim, he contended that Western-style, liberal democracy and human rights were not widely extendable—certainly not universal (Haynes 2013b). Instead, they were rooted in appropriate civilizational values; the West exhibited these, other civilizations did not. The spat between Huntington and Fukuyama took place as both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart. Initially, things appeared to be moving in a pro-democracy direction, with not only the former Soviet Union but also Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and much of Asia apparently democratizing (Haynes 2001). Huntington’s “realist constructivism” was in part a response to Fukuyama’s (1989, 1992) claims that “Western [civilizational] values”—that is, liberal democracy and “individualistic freedoms”—were, or could become, universal. According to 131

132

Chapter Six

Eriksson (2013), “Huntington not only rejected Francis Fukuyama’s then recently published piece on the end of history” and, for Fukuyama, “the anticipated international expansion of liberal democracy,” but also “reinvigorated the much-critiqued Realist worldview of the never-ending tragedy of global power politics. Huntington did so by simply replacing the clash of ideology with the clash of civilizations (read: religions).” For Huntington, the United States is the core Western state. After the Cold War, the United States played a key role in “democracy promotion,” seeking to extend recognizably liberal democratic political systems and values to areas of the world that had not been characterized like this before. This was a strategy to advance US civilizational values—including, liberal democracy, individual freedoms, and human rights more generally—via US foreign policy goals, both because liberal democracy and improved human rights were desirable in themselves and also because countries with such systems and values were thought to be more conducive to good relations with the United States and by extension the West more generally. Successive US administrations pursued democracy promotion with limited success: some countries democratized and improved human rights, while others did not. After a decade of promoting liberal democracy and improved human rights in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet bloc, US foreign policy was turned on its head by the al Qaeda attacks on 9/11. While the United States did not officially jettison its pro-liberal democracy and human rights focus, the centrality of the goal of trying to eliminate Islamist violent extremism and terrorism was clear. This chapter examines the political impact of the use of Christian civilizationism by influential right-wing populists in the USA, including Steve Bannon, Steve King, and Donald Trump (Greven 2016). Steve Bannon, President Trump’s chief strategist in 2016–2017 and later a major figure in the transnational “Christian civilizationist international,” claims to see the impact of “Judeo-Christian” values in the rise of the USA and of the West more generally (Mast and Alexander 2019). According to William S. Smith (n/d) “Huntington’s theory has become associated with the views of Steve Bannon, who, as a call-in participant in a conference at the Vatican in 2014, was thought to have echoed Huntington when he declared that the West is now ‘in an outright war against jihadist Islamic fascism.’” Stephen Walt (2017) labels Bannon’s views “Huntingtonian,” arguing that ”seeing the future as a vast contest between abstract cultural groupings is a self-fulfilling prophecy: If we assume the adherents of different religions or cultural groups are our sworn enemies, we are likely to act in ways that will make that a reality.” Emma Ashford (2016) avers that the Trump “administration seems to have fully embraced the ideas of Harvard historian Samuel Huntington, not



The United States of America 133

only on the clash of civilizations, but on American decline, the idea of a West encircled by enemies, and even on immigration.” In January 2019, a Republican congressman, Steve King of Iowa, was castigated by his own party for employing political rhetoric reminiscent of Christian civilizationism. King was vilified for his supremacist views on “White civilization,” when asking rhetorically how did “‘white supremacy’ and ‘white nationalism’ became offensive terms?” (Siddiqui, 2019). King is a strong supporter of Donald Trump. Siddiqui (2019) claims that “the Republican response to King also exposed uncomfortable truths about the party’s penchant for attracting white nationalists: the individual most championed by the latter’s movement resides in the White House.” “In many respects, Steve King was the easier target to go after. The harder target is Donald Trump,” said Michael Steele, former chairman of the Republican national committee. “We have had now three years of Donald Trump, as candidate for president and as president, espousing very similar views,” he added (Steele quoted in Siddiqui, 2019). The chapter is structured as follows. The first section examines the rise of “Christian civilizationism” which in the USA is based on “Judeo-Christian” values. In this conception, “Muslim values” and those of Judeo-Christianity are compared to the detriment of the former, although, as we shall see, there are in fact many similarities and overlaps between them. The second section examines what critics have seen as growing vilification of Islam in the USA, following 9/11 (Bail 2015). The presidential candidacy of Donald Trump picked up on this theme, seeking to portray Muslims in a bad light, by linking some of America’s “problems,” such as emigration into the USA, with the theme “undesirable” people entering the country for nefarious reasons (Khan, Adnan, Kaur, Khuhro, Asghar, Jabeen 2019). The third section examines the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump in relation to their approaches to Islam and Muslims at both home and abroad. CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC CIVILIZATIONS IN THE USA: COMPLEMENTARY OR CONFLICTING? The Pew Research Center estimated that there were 1.8 billion followers of Islam worldwide in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2017). Of these, an estimated 325,000 are believed to be at risk of “becoming radical,” that is, 0.00018 percent. An even smaller percentage, Pew noted, would be willing to pick up a weapon to become personally involved in jihad. An estimated 5,000 Europeans left for Iraq and Syria in order to join Islamic State (IS) (LaCasse 2015), while overall IS attracted an estimated 40,000 “foreign fighters.” On

134

Chapter Six

the other hand, the great majority of Muslims believe that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified. In Indonesia, 92 percent of Muslims believe this, while in Iraq the percentage is 91 percent. Regarding the USA, a 2011 survey found that 86 percent of Muslims believe that “such tactics are rarely or never justified. An additional 7 percent say suicide bombings are sometimes justified and 1 percent say they are often justified.” In sum, while a tiny minority of Muslims become involved in anti-Western extremism and terrorism, it would be grossly inaccurate to regard all, or even most, Muslims in this way (Pew Research Report 2017). The number of Muslims in the USA is estimated by the Pew Research Center at 3.45 million, that is 1.1 percent of the USA’s total population (Pew Research Center 2018). The fact of having few Muslims in the USA has not prevented certain issues—such as, Muslim emigration, extremism, terrorism, and the fear of imposition of sharia law—from becoming topical, controversial and consistent political issues, especially during the Trump presidency (Waldinger 2018). Recent Pew Research Center data indicate that approximately 58 percent of US Muslims are immigrants, while 42 percent are “homegrown”: “descendants of Muslim immigrants, converts to Islam (many of them black) and descendants of converts.” Thus, fewer than six out of ten Muslims in the USA are from foreign countries. Anti-Muslim feeling in the USA reflects not only antipathy linked to the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath, that is, an “outside threat” as Brubaker (2017b: 363) would term it. In addition, perception of threat from Muslims in the USA underlines the success of projection of Islamophobia by certain politicians, commentators, and media outlets, which has gained in prominence over the last two decades, since 9/11 (Waldinger 2018; Khan, Adnan, Kaur, Khuhro, Asghar, Jabeen 2019). However, it is claimed that such arguments collectively exaggerate values-based incompatibility between Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans (Sherkat and Lehman 2018). In the USA, recent years have seen increasingly unfavorable coverage of Muslims in the media, such that when Islam and Muslims are depicted it is typically with negativity. An effect of unfavorable media coverage combined with often-critical political discourse leads to what Waldinger (2018) refers to as a “banalization” of Islamophobia, with many Americans having one-sided, negative perceptions generally about Islam and Muslims (Waldinger 2018). The US-based Institute of Social Policy and Understanding commissioned a poll of 2,481 Americans in early 2018. It found that “white [Christian] Evangelicals” expressed “the highest levels of Islamophobia” among seven identified groups, some faith-based, some not (ISPU, 2018). Forty percent of



The United States of America 135

“white Evangelicals” agreed that “most Muslims living in the United States” are “more prone to violence than other people,” are “hostile to the United States,” are “less civilized than other people,” are “partially responsible for acts of violence carried out by other Muslims,” and “discriminate against women.”1 In other words, four in 10 white Evangelicals in the USA believe Muslims are uncivilized, violent, against the USA, and misogynist. The Pew Research Center has recently undertaken several extensive polls among Americans to ascertain the relationship between their religious beliefs, on the one hand, and understanding of the social and political world, on the other. Pew has gathered interesting information as a result. Pew’s findings are that around a quarter of Americans who identify themselves as “Evangelical Christians” have pronounced views about Muslims and Islam. Eighty million Americans fall into the category of “Evangelical Christians”; three quarters of them are white. Four out of ten view Muslims as uncivilized, prone to violence, women-haters, and critics of America. In addition, according to Pew (2018), nearly a third (31 percent) of Protestants and more than a fifth of Catholics (22 percent) agree. In 2016, Trump secured the votes of 81 percent of white Evangelicals, while Catholics and Protestants voted for him 60 and 58 percent respectively. According to the Pew Research Center, most Americans know extremely little about Islam and personally know very few if any Muslims; Muslims are thin on the ground in the USA: about 1 percent of the country’s overall population, or 3.5 million people (Pew Research Center 2017). This is the context in which Donald Trump has successfully exploited politically Americans” concerns about a perceived “Islamic threat,” especially from “radical Islamic terrorism” and sharia law. Trump’s tactics paid off: the great majority of Republican voters backed him rather than Hillary Clinton in 2016, sufficient to propel him to the White House as president. There appears to be a link between most Americans’ avowed lack of knowledge about the Islamic faith and Muslims and the ability of Donald Trump to play to the gallery, especially among Republicans. A 2017 Pew Research Center Report indicates that Republicans are more fearful of Muslims than are Democrats. Quoting the Austrian author Kurt Seinitz, Kamali (2015: 204) notes that for all the talk of globalization bringing increased diversity, many Westerners, including Americans, continue to demonstrate a widespread lack of basic knowledge about Islam. That deficiency is compounded in the USA, as elsewhere in the West, by social secularization and accompanying death of religious taboos, which serves to decrease interest in and empathy with non-Western religions. This helps explain how right-wing populist politicians in the USA and other Western countries are successful electorally by pointing to a perceived or imagined existential threat from “Islam” and Muslims, especially “radical

136

Chapter Six

Islamic terrorism,” to justify draconian, anti-Muslim policies in the interests of “security.” Examples of such a policy include President Trump’s executive order barring from entry into the USA people from six or seven mainly Muslim countries, from which no one had ever been convicted of terrorism in America (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016). In the USA, the ideology of Christian civilizationism draws on “JudeoChristian” values, believed by some to reflect “fundamental values of Western society that are believed to come from both Judaism and Christianity” (Altshuler 2016). Rabbi Shmuley Boteach contends that “Judeo-Christian values are the underpinning of Western civilization,” including “the principles of democracy [that] stem from the biblical principle that everybody is created equal” (Boteach quoted in Altshuler 2016). Religious freedom is an important principle of democracy and fundamental to Judeo-Christian values in America. What does an examination of the political use of “Judeo-Christian values” in today’s USA tell us about Christian civilizationism in that country? The term “Judeo-Christian values” is employed by right-wing populists, such as Steve Bannon, as a synonym for a rather fuzzy “Western Christian” religious and cultural outlook or worldview. In addition, in the USA employment of the term “Judeo-Christian” also suggests a more general meaning: a way to differentiate between “them and us,” in order to highlight “superior” American values versus the “less-desirable” tenets of Islam (Brubaker 2017b). What are “Judeo-Christian” values? According to Sarna (2004: 267), “The term “Judeo-Christian” entered the contemporary lexicon as the standard liberal term for the idea that Western values rest on a religious consensus that included Jews.” Shalom Goldman, a professor at Middlebury College in Vermont, avers that “Judeo-Christian” is a term “defined by exclusion,” implying rejection both of secular values and those of different faiths, including Islam. “It’s essentially saying our values are not the values of the Enlightenment or the Constitution, but instead our values are the values of the Bible.” For Rabbi Jack Moline, president of the Washington-based Interfaith Alliance, the term is a generalization, which some “Christians in particular use to put a patina of universality on a certain Christian culture in the United States. . . . Whatever the term may have meant in the 1930s and in the 1950s, what it now means is the religious right—and you can’t ignore that” (Altshuler 2016). How do Judeo-Christian beliefs compare with those held by Muslims? The Qur’an contains several clear pointers to Muslims’ prescribed ethical behavior, and there are obvious similarities with those expressed in Judeo-Christian values. Such examples include: (1) “Worship only Allah” (Qur’an 17: 23); (2) “Be kind, humble, and honorable to one’s parents” (17:23/4:36); (3) “Be neither miserly nor wasteful in one’s expenditure” (17:26–27); (4) “Do not



The United States of America 137

engage in mercy killings for fear of starvation” (17:31); (5) “Do not commit adultery” (17:31); (6) “Do not kill unjustly” (17:33); (7) “Care for orphaned children” (17:34); (8) “Fulfil promises” (17:34); (9) “Be honest and fair in one’s interactions” (17:35); (10) “Do not walk on earth arrogantly” (17:37); (11) “Fear Allah and speak truth” (17:37/31:18); (12) “Remain away from intoxicants and gambling” (5:90); (13) “Be good and kind towards relatives and neighbours” (4:36); and (14) “There is no compulsion in religion” (2:256) (“Islamic Studies,” n/d). Judeo-Christian belief in the “sanctity of human life” is captured in the Muslim ethical framework by “Do not kill unjustly.” The Judeo-Christian principle of the importance of “personal responsibility” in Islam in various ways, including: “Fear Allah and speak truth,” “Be honest and fair in one’s interactions,” and “fulfil promises.” A “high regard for marriage” in the Judeo-Christian lexicon is matched in the Muslim one by “Do not commit adultery,” while, finally, “compassion for others” is expressed in the Muslim ethical context by “Be good and kind towards relatives and neighbours” and “Care for orphaned children.” There is also survey evidence pointing to some significant congruities between Christian Americans and Muslim Americans: 70 percent of the former and 69 percent of the latter say that religion is “very important in my life,” while 47 percent of American Christians and 45 percent of American Muslims claim to “attend religious services at least once a week” (Pew Research Center 2017). Given that American Christians and US Muslims seem to have many ethical and religious similarities, why do many Americans express acute worries about Muslims in their midst and more generally in the world? We have already noted one likely reason: most Americans’ relative ignorance of Muslims’ belief system. In addition, it is likely linked to public opinion being shaped by anti-Muslim rhetoric and cues coming from some right-wing politicians and other sources. Evidence of such an effect comes from a 2017 Pew Research Center survey, which highlights differing perceptions of Muslims by Republican and Democrat voters. It found that Republicans “are more likely than Democrats to say they are very concerned about extremism in the name of Islam around the world (67 percent vs. 40 percent) and in the U.S. (64 percent vs. 30 percent).” In addition, a December 2016 survey found that more Republicans than Democrats say Islam is likelier than other religions to encourage violence among its believers (70 percent of Republicans vs. 26 percent of Democrats). While most Americans (57 percent) believe there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims in the United States today, views are again split by party: “69 percent of Democrats and those who lean Democratic and 40 percent of Republicans and GOP leaners hold this view” (Pew Research Center 2017). In sum, negative perceptions of Muslims both in

138

Chapter Six

America and around the world are held more frequently by Republican voters compared to their Democrat counterparts. There are recent, robust survey data indicating that most Muslims support religious freedom. A Pew Research Center report (2013), “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” showed that “Most Muslims around the world express support for democracy, and most say it is a good thing when others are very free to practice their religion.” For example, percentages of Muslims saying that “religious freedom is a good thing” are as follows: SubSaharan Africa, 94 percent; Southeast Asia, 93 percent; Southern-Eastern Europe, 95 percent; Middle East-North Africa, 85 percent; Central Asia, 92 percent; South Asia, 97 percent (Pew Research Centre 2013). Pew Research Center data also indicate a considerable degree of compatibility between Islamic and Judeo-Christian values. While the 2013 Pew Report also points to some aspects of belief among a majority of Muslims surveyed that differ from those of Judeo-Christianity—for example, that “many Muslims want religious leaders to have at least some influence in political matters”—this does not fundamentally deny strong areas of commonality between the values of Islam and Judeo-Christianity, including on the issue of religious freedom. AFTER 9/11: ISLAM AND THE BUSH, OBAMA, AND TRUMP PRESIDENCIES Initially, after 9/11, President George W. Bush sought not to portray “Islam” as “the problem”; nor did his successor, President Barack Obama. Candidate and President Trump saw things differently and targeted “Islam,” especially extremist Muslims, as a key problem for the USA in both domestic and foreign policy. George W. Bush Presidency (2001–2008) Mr. Bush often voiced respect for Islam and rightly insisted that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends” but the “radical network of terrorists” and governments supporting them. But he and his Republican allies also used words like “crusade” and “Islamic fascists,” feeding fears that the so-called war on terrorism was really a war on Islam. The horrors of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, and Mr. Bush’s unnecessary war in Iraq, greatly compounded the problem. (Editorial, “End of the clash of civilizations,” New York Times editorial, 2009)

Following 9/11, many Americans saw Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” framework as an appropriate way to understand how the USA should



The United States of America 139

react to the al Qaeda attacks. President George W. Bush responded to 9/11 by instigating US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, under the rubric of a Global War on Terror (GWOT). According to President Bush, the US-led attacks were not aimed at “Islam” per se but actions sought to target “Islamist terrorists,” that is, terrorists who were also Muslims. Bush’s actions in this regard were an example of liberal internationalism, that is, a “clash for civilization” (Eriksson, 2013). The “clash of civilizations” scenario outlined above by the 2009 New York Times editorial was not the only way of looking at post-9/11 US foreign policy vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims. According to Eriksson (2103), “There is proof however that the ‘clash’ thesis has been politically utilized in a liberal and rather unexpected way, beyond, and even contradicting, the usual story about bolstering neoconservative notions of war on terrorism and Islamophobia. Surprisingly, the best example of this is how former president George W. Bush used the concept of a clash of civilizations.” This is a reference to President Bush’s foreign policy which was widely referred to as “neoconservative,” “following rather than refuting the idea of a clash of civilizations, citing as evidence his distinction between ‘civilized nations’ and ‘rogue states’” (Eriksson 213). On the other hand, Bush’s observations in this regard also conveyed elements of liberalism. For example, in a Presidential Address to the Nation on September 11, 2007, Bush commented on his “war on terrorism” in the following manner: “this struggle has been called the clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention” 2007). This refutation of Huntington’s idea was repeated many times by Bush and members of his administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and his successor, Condoleezza Rice (Nabers 2016). President Bush stated a week after 9/11 that “[t]hese acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith.” The US response, Bush decreed, was to go to war, not with “Islam” per se, but with al Qaeda terrorists specifically, whose words and deeds, according to Bush, perverted “the peaceful teaching of Islam” (“Islam is Peace, says President” 2001). Nevertheless, “this rejection of Huntington’s idea did not, however, mean that Bush found it useless.” Instead, Bush found it useful to define “civilization” in liberal terms, to include associated values, such as democracy, and individual freedoms, including religious freedom. As Eriksson (2013) notes, this effect was achieved by a “simple rewording from a clash of to a clash for civilization. This liberal underpinning of Bush’s foreign policy was reinforced by many other rhetorical elements of the ‘war on terrorism,’ such as how ‘the force of freedom’ will stop the ‘rise of tyranny,’ and how the war on terrorism was defined as a war of ideology and ideas—not religion.”

140

Chapter Six

“While Huntington’s pessimistic clash of civilizations presumed religious communities as static and impermeable to change, Bush’s optimistic clash for civilization presumed that communities are susceptible to fundamental value change” (Eriksson 2013). As Eriksson (2013) notes, Bush argued in his 2007 State of the Union Address that: “Free people are not drawn to malignant ideologies—and most will choose a better way when given the chance.” In addition, on several occasions, Bush made it clear that he believed in the transformative power of spreading ideas of freedom and democracy (Eriksson 2013). Bush’s proclamation that the “war on terrorism” was a “clash for civilization” was followed by similar action at the United Nations (UN). As we saw in chapter 3, the UN sought to grapple with the epochal changes marked by 9/11 by developing a strategy to strengthen and embed a “dialogue of civilizations,” as a clear counter-narrative aimed to reduce chances of a widespread clash of civilizations developing. Both the Bush and UN initiatives saw the West and “moderate” Muslims on one side of a civilizational divide with Islamist extremists on the other. Both the UN and Bush’s “clash for civilization” strategy underlined the view that “civilization” was not a Western attribute tout court but was instead believed to be a universal set of values prizing both democracy and a range of human rights, including religious liberty. Islamist extremists and terrorists, on the other hand, did not express views held by all or even most Muslims, as they regarded a clash of civilizations to be inevitable, because the values of the West and of such Islamists were not compatible (Haynes 2018a). Barack Obama Presidency (2009–2017) Despite President Bush’s claimed respect for Islam, during his presidency, US foreign policy was characterized by what some saw as having an antiMuslim focus, marked by punitive actions (Esposito 2015). Summing up Bush’s foreign policy soon after he left office, a New York Times editorial pointed to a “poisonous post-9/11 clash of civilizations mythology that drove so much of President George W. Bush’s rhetoric and disastrous policy.” The editorial claimed that: Not only are Mr. Obama’s words and tone better [compared to those of President Bush], his policies are better. He opposed the Iraq war and has begun planning an orderly withdrawal of American troops. He is trying to engage Iran after 30 years of mutual isolation. And he has promised an active effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reaffirmed support for a two-state solution—a goal that Israel’s newly elected prime minister says he does not share. (“End of the clash of civilizations” 2009)



The United States of America 141

These issues—the Iraq war, withdrawing US troops from that country, engaging with Iran, and apparent support for the Palestinians in their quest for a state—marked Obama’s foreign policy worldview (Kreig 2016). The issues suggested that Obama sought a normalization of relations with the Muslim world. Obama came to the presidency just as the 2008 global economic crisis was being felt most severely and his foreign policy focused heavily on economic objectives. The change of policy was supported by a clear shift in public perceptions of the desirable goals of US foreign policy. A 2011 Pew Research Center poll indicated that public support for US promotion of human rights abroad declined from 37 percent in 2005 to 29 percent in 2009. In addition, public support for the idea that the USA should promote democracy abroad also declined—albeit by a smaller margin—from 24 percent in 2005 to 21 percent in 2009. Finally, the Pew poll also showed a decline in the view that the US should seek to improve living standards in poor countries from 31 percent in 2005 to 26 percent in 2009. Overall, the three policies noted here— promoting human rights and democracy abroad and seeking to improve living standards in poor countries—were, according to public opinion, bottom of the list of priorities of US foreign policy goals, which numbered 11 overall (Pew Research Center 2011). In relation to the USA’s relationship with the Muslim world under Obama, redirection of US foreign policy reflected more a change of tactics rather than of policy. Obama sought to replace the post-9/11 clash of civilizations narrative with a nuanced, more pragmatic approach. Obama sought to enlist governments of “moderate” Muslim-majority countries in a generic GWOT. Like Bush, Obama did not respond to Islamist extremist attacks on US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by declaring war on “Islam” per se and sought to deny that there was a “clash of civilizations” between the West/USA and the Muslim world. In June 2009, four months after becoming president, Obama made a major speech in Cairo, when he sought to reach out to Muslimmajority countries, urging “a new beginning between the United States and Muslims.”2 His aim, following the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, was to set relations between the USA and those countries—and by extension other Muslim-majority countries—on an improved footing. President Obama defended his decision to increase US involvement in Afghanistan and did not apologize for the invasion of Iraq that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. On the Israel-Palestine conflict, while Obama did not call for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, he did liken the Palestinian struggle to the US civil rights movement and said Israeli settlement building should stop. Finally, he acknowledged the US role in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected government. This did not imply of course that the US government was content with Iran’s nuclear

142

Chapter Six

capacity-building3 program and continued strongly to oppose it. It is not, however, clear that Obama’s Cairo speech did much to rebuild links between America and the Muslim world. A July 2011 Zogby International survey of Egyptians found only 5 percent had a favorable opinion of the USA, a lower proportion than during the George W. Bush administration. In addition, a Pew Research survey taken in early 2011 found that Egyptians overwhelmingly (82 percent) disapproved of Obama’s handling of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, while over half—52 percent—felt that Obama was not handling well political change in the Middle East during the time of the “Arab Spring” (Maginnis 2011). The position of the USA under both Bush and Obama appeared to decline in the view of many Muslims in the Middle East. At home, neither Bush nor Obama appeared to be successful in preventing a “clash of civilizations” mentality from spreading and gaining strength among some constituencies in America, including right-wing Christian evangelicals and at Fox News, the most popular right-wing cable news channel, which became increasingly critical of Muslims and Islam (Khan, Adnan, Kaur, Khuhro, Asghar, Jabeen 2019; Powell 2018). It is noteworthy that Obama, while having redirected US foreign policy in many significant ways (emphasizing multilateralism, ending the war in Iraq, shifting focus to East Asia), actually continued rather than changed Bush’s liberal foreign policy rhetoric. In a speech before the Turkish Parliament in April 2009, Obama stated that the United Stated “is not and will never be at war with Islam,” echoing Bush’s words that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends” (Goldberg 2015). Despite Obama’s unwillingness to blame “Islam” per se, critics of the USA’s foreign policy in relation to the Middle East during his presidency point to his prematurely withdrawing American troops from Iraq, and for being rather lukewarm when it came to trying to prevent Syria becoming a focal point of Islamic State activities. While it would have been a difficult sell at home, not committing US troops to try to fill the gap left by a viable state in Syria rather paved the way for the jihadists’ temporary takeover of large swathes of territory in the country. In conclusion, Obama did not appear to be convinced by a Huntingtonian approach to the post-9/11 world, seeming not to be convinced by analysis which claimed the world was falling headlong into a clash of civilizations after the Cold War, and its incipient clash of civilizations between the west and the Muslim world. On the other hand, his presidency also indicated failure of the US foreign policy goal of developing and spreading democracy and human rights to areas that lacked them or to deal adequately Islamist extremism and terrorism. “During his presidency, Donald Trump was able to exploit



The United States of America 143

this prevarication in dismissing shared liberal values as the common basis for American identity in favor of a protestant, Anglo-Saxon cultural identity,” which, as we shall see in the next section, critics argue “was reflected in Trump’s nativist, policy focus” (Ashford 2016). Donald Trump Presidency (2017– ) A common thread connects President Donald Trump’s foreign policy appointments: belief that the United States is engaged in a civilizational war against “radical Islamic terrorism.” It would seem that several members of his administration have embraced the ideas of Samuel Huntington, not only on the clash of civilizations, but on American decline, the idea of a West encircled by enemies, and even on immigration (Ashford 2016; Mills and Rosefielde 2016). Donald Trump was elected as US president in the context of rising antiimmigration and “anti-Muslim” sentiment. This was manifested in several ways. First, Trump started to employ “clash of civilizations” rhetoric during his presidential campaign and has continued with this theme since assuming the presidency in January 2017, not least because it seemed to go down well with some voters (Author’s interviews with #57, 70, 73, 77). During the campaign presidential campaign in March 2016, Trump had stated that: “I think Islam hates us” (Campbell 2016). Since then, he has continued to express anti-Muslim sentiments, without always making plain differences between “moderate” and “extremist” Muslims, or between the mass of “ordinary” Muslims and the tiny number of “radical Islamic terrorists.” It is sometimes claimed that Trump is a “nativist” (Cha 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Lieberman, Metzler, Pepinsky, Roberts, Vallely n/d). A nativist is someone who believes that the rights of indigenous people are much greater than those of immigrants. For the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, nativism is “xenophobic nationalism . . . an ideology that wants congruence of state and nation—the political and the cultural unit. It wants one state for every nation and one nation for every state. It perceives all non-natives . . . as threatening. But the non-native is not only people. It can also be ideas.” Nativism is most appealing during periods when people feel the harmony between state and nation is disappearing. This is not to claim that Trump is necessarily a nativist because of belief rather than as a result of opportunism. According to Mudde, Trump quickly learned during the presidential campaign that “nativism was popular; Mudde notes that Trump’s campaign speeches were initially quite boring, often with copious allusions to his “always successful” real estate deals, but he noticed that crowds were very pleased when he spoke “building a border wall with Mexico or barring radical Islamic terrorists from the country” (Mudde quoted in Freidman 2017).

144

Chapter Six

Such a popular response to the mention of Mexicans and Islamists might reflect key fears of many voters, at a time of growing economic insecurity in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It is not the case that a resort to nativism is a uniquely Trumpian tactic to acquire votes. García notes that such sentiments have long been a feature of US politics. For example, initial naturalization laws in the US allowed only white European immigrants to be eligible for naturalization. In the mid-nineteenth century, nativists, known as the “Know-Nothings,” opposed the entry into the USA of German and Irish immigrants. Later, in 1882, Congress voted to bar Chinese immigration to America. In the early twentieth century, the anti-immigrant targets sought to enter the USA from Eastern and Southern Europe, including Russia, Poland, Italy, and Greece. In the early 1920s, immigration was severely limited from these parts of Europe under a quota system. From the 1930s, the nativists’ main fear was unacceptable levels of immigration from Mexico; many blamed them for the economic woes of the Great Depression. The 1970s saw the invention of a new term, “illegal alien,” which criminalized those attempting to enter the USA illegally. In 1994, California passed “Proposition 187” “that denied the undocumented, including their children, access to public services, including education” (García 2018). Clearly there is nothing novel about Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric and policies; such ideas have been a feature of US politics for more than a century. As García (2018) puts it, “nativist and racist sentiments unfortunately continue under Trump. He is part of a long line of white Americans who fear ‘losing’ what they perceive to be ‘their country’ and not be ‘infested,’ as Trump puts it, with immigrants and refugees of color.” During the 2016 presidential campaign, it was clear that there was major concern in the USA about the impact and effects of illegal migration from Mexico, as well as the threat to the USA from “radical Islamic terrorism.” These topics were a focus of often-heated discussions in the context of the 2016 presidential election. The issue was, on the one hand, about illegal immigration into the USA from Mexico and elsewhere in Central America, and, on the other, it focused on the position of hundreds of thousands of Muslims already living legally in America and the policy to be adopted with regard to others who also wanted to immigrate to the USA. Some among them, Trump claimed, were actively engaged in terrorist activities (Milton 2017). In the USA, many who hold nativist views see Judeo-Christian values as superior to other beliefs. According to Zinberg (2017), “21st-century nativists have weaponized ‘Judeo-Christian values’ in their bid to purge America of any influence outside of its ‘European’ or ‘Western’ heritage.” During the 2016 presidential campaign, several Republican presidential contenders from different points on the ideological spectrum, professed to admire “Judeo-



The United States of America 145

Christian values.” For example, Ohio’s “moderate” Republican governor, John Kasich, proposed creating a new federal agency “to promote JudeoChristian values.” A conservative Republican, Texas senator Ted Cruz, referred to “Judeo-Christian values” as an essential building block of American society (Altshuler 2016). Neither Kasich or Cruz defined what they meant by Judeo-Christian values. For Donald Trump, Judeo-Christian values seem to be reflected in his desire to say “Merry Christmas” rather than “Happy Holidays.” During the presidential campaign, Trump stated: “You go into a department store. When was the last time you saw ‘Merry Christmas?’ You don’t see it anymore. They want to be politically correct. If I’m president, you will see ‘Merry Christmas’ in department stores, believe me, believe me . . . America is a nation of believers and together we are strengthened and sustained by the power of prayer” (Trump quoted in Merica 2017). In an August 2016 interview, Trump was asked by Steve Strang, founder of a conservative Christian magazine, Charisma, if he believed that America was constructed on “Judeo-Christian values.” Trump replied: Yeah, I think it was. I think, to a large extent, when I look at football coaches being fired because they held a prayer on the field, like yesterday, I think it’s absolutely terrible, I think it’s a terrible thing. I see so many things happening that are so different from what our country used to be. So religion’s a very important part of me and it’s also, I think it’s a very important part of our country. (Blue 2016)

Spencer (2017a) notes that Trump is “not known for his piety.” For example, he was unwilling or unable to identify for reporters what is his “favorite biblical verse.” On the other hand, as a young man he did attend Marble Collegiate Church, when it was run by Norman Vincent Peale, best-selling author of The Power of Positive Thinking (1990). According to Spencer (2017a), Trump’s Christianity is of a rather unorthodox kind: “a kind of selfhelp Christianity that managed to blend ‘worldliness’ with godliness.” Where it would seem most obviously to connect with Bannon’s idea of JudeoChristian values and Western civilization is in a shared sense of “baptized nationalism,” that is, “the [US] nation having an almost God-given centrality in [Trump’s] worldview” (Spencer 2017a; see also Spencer 2017b). During the 2016 presidential election campaign, Trump surrounded himself with anti-Muslim ideologues, including Stephen Miller, Stephen K. Bannon, and Sebastian Gorka, all of whom became short-lived (Bannon, Flynn, Gorka) or longer-term members of his administration (Miller). Such men share an understanding that the USA is engaged in a “long war” with “radical Islamic terrorists,” specifically various non-state entities including al Qaeda and IS. Miller is Trump’s chief speechwriter and is credited with authoring

146

Chapter Six

the president’s “American carnage” inaugural address. He has been a key adviser since the early days of Trump’s presidency and was a chief architect of Trump’s executive order restricting immigration from several Middle Eastern countries. Few on the hard-right thought he needed to offer any clarification or qualification for this policy.4 Stephen Bannon is a former White House chief strategist, past Breitbart5 chief, and key member of a far-right populist international movement, “The Movement.” The Movement was founded in January 2017 by Mischael Modrikamen, leader of the Belgian People’s Party, which gained 1.51 percent of the votes in Belgium’s election in 2014. While Modrikamen is a minor political figure in Belgium, Bannon is an influential figure on the far-right both in the USA and internationally. He regards himself as an ideologue and defender of Christian civilization which he believes is under assault, both in America and the West more generally, from “radical Islamists” (“Steve Bannon interview transcript” 2018). Bannon believes that America’s foundational values are rooted in “Judeo-Christian” ethics and principles, which are quite different from those of Islam (Tondo, 2018). During the first nine months of the presidency of Donald Trump, Bannon was a key adviser. He was ousted from his role in September 2017, following infighting in the White House, involving Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Bannon is both an economic nationalist and advocate of a specific American manifestation of Christian civilizationism, which builds on the country’s allegedly “Judeo-Christian” origins and values. Bannon is an admirer of several right-wing French ideologues and novelists, including Renaud Camus, who coined the phrase “The Great Replacement,” and Jean Raspail, author of a 1973 novel, The Camp of the Saints. Camus refers to what he understands as a “plot” to replace ethnic French people with Muslim migrants. In his 2012 book, The Great Replacement, which echoes the concerns of Raspail’s earlier book, Camus writes of the conspiracy theory that native Catholic French people, and Christian Europeans more generally, will eventually be completely sidelined and substituted by waves of immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. This theory found a ready home among some right-wing nationalists in the USA, such as Richard Spencer (Malice 2018). Raspail’s ideas are at the root of the “identitarian” doctrine, which claims that globalization has the effect of creating a homogeneous culture, with disappearing distinct national and/or cultural identities. An alternative, “true pluralism” or “ethnopluralism” would imply separation of races. These ideas are said to have influenced both “Steve Bannon at Breitbart and the American white supremacist leader Richard Spencer” (Jones 2018). What does Bannon understand by “Judeo-Christian values”? In 2014, he was asked to outline his worldview at a conference at the Vatican in Rome



The United States of America 147

(at which he appeared by video-link from the USA). During his appearance, he repeatedly used the term “Judeo-Christian” to describe his political beliefs, stating, inter alia, that: “When capitalism was, I believe, at its highest and spreading its benefits to most of mankind, almost all of those capitalists were strong believers in the Judeo-Christian West.” Judging by this response, Bannon’s political philosophy seems to boil down to a strong belief in three essential, interactive qualities: Capitalism, Western civilization, and “JudeoChristian values” (“Steve Bannon in his own words,” 2016). Sebastian Gorka identifies “Islam” as an “enemy ideology” with which the USA is engaged in a war (Simon and Benjamin 2017). Gorka, who served from January to August 2017 as deputy assistant to the president, is a former national security editor at the right-wing website, Breitbart. There, he was “empowered to translate” the ideological assessment of a clash of civilizations between the USA/West and the Muslim world “into national strategy” (ibid.). Gorka rejects the view that Islamist radicalism and extremism might be connected at least in part to temporal grievances such as the many egregious failures of governance in the Middle East and North Africa, the polarization of wealth in many Muslim societies, and the effects of serious societal and political conflicts including the post-2011 Arab Spring events. Gorka dismisses this as “the famous approach that says it is all so nuanced and complicated . . . This is what I completely jettison.” For Jaffe (2017), Gorka’s brusque dismissal of a nuanced explanation for Islamist radicalism and extremism reflects a simplistic view, namely that “the terrorism problem has nothing to do with repression, alienation, torture, tribalism, poverty, or America’s foreign policy blunders and a messy and complex Middle East.” The approach to international relations of President Trump and his ideological allies includes a values-based division between the “Judeo-Christian” USA (de facto leader of the Western nations) and “Islam,” that is, Muslim-majority countries. For Trump, it appears that “Islam” is an “enemy ideology” with which the USA is engaged in a civilizational war (Milton 2017; Feaver and Brands 2017). Figures such as Gorka dismiss the idea of a nuanced explanation for Islamist radicalism and extremism, seemingly preferring to project a simplistic, one-dimensional view highlighting what they see as significant religious and cultural differences. According to this view, expressed by former Trump advisor, Sebastian Gorka, “Islamic/Islamist” terrorism has nothing to do with repression, alienation, torture, tribalism, poverty, or America’s foreign policy blunders and a messy and complex post-colonial Middle East. Instead, in this view, Islam is itself the problem, because of its different values (Simon and Benjamin 2017). Although much “Islamist terrorism”—including the murderous activities of Shia and Sunni extremists in Iraq and Syria, and that of Sunni fundamentalists attacking Sufis in Pakistan—is not directed against the

148

Chapter Six

USA or other Western targets but targets fellow Muslims, this point is ignored by, or appears irrelevant to some nativists and right-wing ideologues. ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE USA According to Brubaker (2017b), Islamophobia in the United States is more “superficial” than in northwestern Europe. Brubaker claims that Islam is securitized in the USA primarily as a result of 9/11 and its aftermath, including the GWOT and subsequent Islamist terrorist attacks against Western, mainly European, targets. Brubaker asserts that “Islam” is rejected by many Americans “more for security reasons as it is associated with ‘foreigners’ and ‘migrants’ coming from an unsafe zone, thus islamophobia is part of a nationalist discourse rather than a civilizationist one: Muslims are seen as an outside threat” (“Conférence du 06/03/2017: Rogers Brubaker,” 2017: 2). On becoming president, Trump’s attempt to impose what several US judges considered an arbitrary and unconstitutional ban on citizens from seven, later reduced to six, mainly-Muslim countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) appeared to indicate that, in his view, potentially any citizen from these Muslim-majority countries might be a putative or actual terrorist.6 If not, it might be asked, what is the justification of a blanket ban seeking to bar nationals of those countries from entry to the USA? The irony is that no citizens from these six countries have ever been convicted of terrorism on US soil. The nineteen al Qaeda terrorists who perpetrated the 11 September 2001 attacks were, according to the Central Intelligence Agency, from Saudi Arabia (15), United Arab Emirates (2), Egypt (1), and Lebanon (1) (“11 September 2001 Hijackers,” 2002). None of these countries are on President Trump’s list of people excluded from the USA. Islamophobia has been growing in the United States since the early 1990s, exacerbated by 9/11 specifically and fears of Islamist terrorism generally (Love 2017; Author’s interviews with #51, 72, 74, 78, 79). Islamophobes have sought to exploit such concerns, growing bolder in voicing their extremist opinions openly and with candor. Islamophobes assert that American Muslims do not share the same values as non-Muslim Americans, for example, wishing to see sharia law implemented across the USA. David Yerushalmi, an American lawyer and Islamophobe, claimed in 2007 that “[o]n the socalled Global War on Terrorism, GWOT, we have been quite clear along with a few other resolute souls. This should be a WAR AGAINST ISLAM and all Muslim faithful” (capital letters in original) (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2010). In November 2017, Donald Trump retweeted “a series of anti-Muslim propaganda videos shared online by a high-ranking official in



The United States of America 149

the ultra-nationalist UK political group Britain First” (Krieg 2017). Britain First, whose slogan is “Taking Our Country Back,” is explicitly Islamophobic, campaigning to prevent any more mosques being constructed in the UK. In January 2019, YouTube removed an advertisement for “Britain First from its platform, after clips promoting the group began appearing on the videohosting website” (MacWhirter 2019). During 2018, Trump appointed several people who have been characterized as Islamophobes to senior posts in his administration, including: Mike Pompeo as secretary of state, John Bolton as White House national security advisor, and Fred Fleitz as National Security Council’s executive secretary and chief of staff. What these men have in common is a set of views which depict Muslims as dangerous terrorist sympathizers who wish to see sharia law implemented across the USA (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2018). Beyond the specific issues of Islamist terrorism and extremism and sharia law, President Trump appears to see the world divided into mutually hostile civilizational blocks, similar to Huntington, notably the “Christian West” and “Islam” (Robinson 2017; Tariq 2017; Lozada 2017; author’s interview with #80). Huntington argued that The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the US department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West. (1996: 217)

According to the Center for American Progress’s “Fear Inc.” website, “six individuals . . . are responsible for orchestrating the majority of misinformation about Islam and Muslims in the United States today. All six are actively promoting [a] deeply mistaken portrayal of Islam . . . ” (https:// islamophobianetwork.com/). To these can be added: • Frank Gaffney, founder and president of the Center for Security Policy, a member of Republican Senator Ted Cruz’s National Security team during the 2016 presidential campaign and of Trump’s transition team; • David Horowitz, CEO of the David Horowitz Freedom Center and, in 2017, according to the Washington Post, behind “the Trump administration’s major policy initiatives” (https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/trump-administra tion-david-horowitz-conservative-influence/2017/06/05/id/794214/);

150

Chapter Six

• Daniel Pipes, founder of conservative think tank, the Middle East Forum; • David Yerushalmi, founder of the Society of Americans for National Existence and of the American Freedom Law Center, which in August 2017 filed an amicus curiae in support of Trump’s “Muslim travel ban” (https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/david -yerushalmi); • Robert Spencer, co-founder of “Stop Islamization Of America” and a strong supporter of Trump’s “Muslim travel ban” and of his controversial speech in Warsaw in July 2017, which praised Poland’s hardline approach to Muslim immigration. Spencer claimed that, “unlike Obama,” President Trump is “working very hard to ensure that Judeo-Christian civilization survives” (https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/robert-spencer); and • Steven Emerson, founder of the Investigative Project on Terrorism. Pamela Geller, co-founder of “American Federation Defense Initiative” and “Stop Islamization Of America,” and Brigitte Gabriel, CEO of “ACT for America,” which claims a million members. According to the Center for American Progress’s “Fear Inc.,” “eight donors . . . contributed $57 million to the Islamophobia network between 2001 and 2012.” Contributions included: • $27 million from Donors Capital Fund, • $10.5 million from Scaife Foundations, • $6.5 million from Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and smaller yet still sizeable sums from five other foundations and trusts (https://islamophobianetwork.com/). Recipients include: • • • • •

the not-for-profit Clarion Project ($18.5 million), the Middle East Forum ($12.5 million), David Horowitz Freedom Center ($11 million), Center for Security Policy ($7 million), and the Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation ($5 million). CONCLUSION

The November 2016 presidential election, which saw Donald Trump elected as president, took place in the context of a widespread rise or resurgence of



The United States of America 151

right-wing populist, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, anti-refugee politicians and parties in various countries in Europe and elsewhere (see chapters 7 and 8). In the USA, Trump successfully focused on popular fears of an “influx” of foreigners, including Mexicans and Muslims (Milton 2017). Such a development was portrayed, on the one hand, as a malign result of economic globalization and, on the other, as indicating America’s growing threat from terrorism. That migration might be beneficial to the American economy was summarily dismissed by Trump and other right-wing populists as simply wrong (Haynes 2016). Instead it was portrayed as an unmitigated problem leading to increased crime and increasingly serious societal conflicts between immigrants and established communities in what were once formerly neighborhoods without significant numbers of “outsiders” (Waldinger 2018). Such concerns frequently inform xenophobic populist propaganda, for example, during Austria’s 2016 presidential election, which saw the emphatic electoral side-lining of the country’s formerly dominant (and moderate) conservative and social democratic parties and nearly the election of a far-right candidate as the country’s president (Potrafke and Russell 2016). In short, globalists see economic globalization as a key to greater national and international stability and security, while anti-globalists do not. Bush sought, at least rhetorically, to undermine the clash of civilizations narrative, while helping fuel it with post-9/11 US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. At the start of his second term, Obama sought to build bridges with the Muslim world in a major speech in Cairo. However, he might well have undermined this initiative with American support for the Preventing Violent Extremism program, in which the USA played a major role at the UN and in its own foreign policy initiatives. Both Bush and Obama sought to distance themselves from the “all Muslims are a threat” narrative, underlining that in their opinion the USA was at war with Islamist extremists and terrorists—not the vast majority of “ordinary,” “moderate” Muslims (Author’s interviews with #14, 53). While their presidencies exhibited US foreign policy goals that sought to target Islamist extremists and terrorists and highlight the commensurate values of “moderate” Muslims, Donald Trump exhibited a change of emphasis. NOTES 1.  The poll measured “Islamophobia” on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 the highest. In addition to “white Evangelicals,” other groups scored as follows: Protestants, 31 percent; “General Public,” 24 percent; Jewish, 22 percent; Catholics, 22 percent; Muslims, 14 percent; and “Non-affiliated,” 14 percent. 2.  Full text of Obama’s speech is at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09.

152

Chapter Six

3. https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/ncr-today/nativist-anti-immigrant -sentiment-us-has-long-history. 4.  The Southern Poverty Law Center reported in February 2017, soon after Trump assumed the presidency, that the numbers of “anti-Muslim hate groups” in the USA had tripled between 2015 and 2017, increasing three-fold: from 34 to 101 (https:// www.splcenter.org/). 5.  Breitbart is a right-wing website. 6.  The percentages of Muslims from these countries are as follows: Iran (c.99 percent), Libya (c.97 percent), Somalia (99 percent), Sudan (c.97 percent), Syria (c.91 percent), and Yemen (c.99 percent).

Chapter Seven

Western Europe

Donald Trump’s election as US president in November 2016 was not an isolated example of an apparently anti-immigrant, right-wing populist achieving political power. Instead, it seemed representative of a wider trend taking place contemporaneously in Europe and elsewhere. In Western Europe, for example, right-wing populist politicians and parties acquired increased political significance in, inter alia: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In Central and Eastern Europe, similar right-wing politicians and parties became more prominent in, inter alia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. In both Europe and the USA, right-wing populist politicians exploited local fears of an “influx” of immigrants, especially Muslims, for their own political purposes. The aim was to separate culturally indigenous citizens from non-indigenous newcomers in order to vilify the latter and win votes from the former. Some rightwing populist politicians made significant political gains, although nowhere in Western Europe have they (yet) achieved power on their own via the ballot box.1 Elections for the European parliament in May 2019 were a big electoral test for right-wing populists. Success or failure in those elections would indicate if their anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, anti-globalization, anti-European Union, policies were electorally popular enough to propel them to positions of political influence and power. Western European is often noted as the most secular of regions, with the religious, social, and political largely disengaging from each other due to secularization. Nevertheless, a new political ideology has emerged: Christian civilizationism. This chapter examines the political impact of Christian civilizationism in various countries in Western Europe, including: France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.2 Although not identical in these countries, Christian civilizationism is always societally divisive, articulated 153

154

Chapter Seven

in all in the context of opposition to a claimed “Islamization” of Europe (Molle 2019). In short, the chapter looks at attempts by right-wing populists in Western Europe to win political power by use of the ideology of Christian civilizationism. The first section of the chapter surveys the political impact of Christian civilizationism in Western Europe. The second section surveys Western Europe’s secularization process, and locates the political rise of Christian civilizationism within this context. The third section assesses the culturalization of religion and citizenship in Western Europe. The concluding section summarizes the concern of the chapter in the context of right-wing populist parties’ civilizationist approaches to the European parliamentary elections of May 2019. CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATIONISM AND POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Christian civilizationism is a significant feature of current expressions of right-wing populism in Western Europe. Right-wing populists are now widespread in the region; some are politically significant; all seek to exploit many people’s increasing sense of insecurity. Increasingly, right-wing populists in Western Europe share a “Christianist”/“Christian civilizationist” worldview, which sees “Islam,” Islamism, and Muslims as major threats to indigenous “Christian” Europeans’ “civilizational integrity” (Brubaker 2017a, 2017b; Joppke 2018; Haynes 2019b). Although Christian civilizationism is generically characterized by anti-Islamism, how it is expressed differs from context to context, reflecting the specificity of political narratives according to local concerns. One the one hand, right-wing populists may express “putatively liberal views on issues of gender and sexuality as a way of distinguishing a ‘Christian civilization’ from allegedly regressive and repressive Islamic cultures.” This approach was adopted successfully both by the assassinated Dutch populist, Pim Fortuyn, and his ideological successor, Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom. Others, such as Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s National Rally (formerly National Front), expresses support for conservative “family values” (Joppke 2018). In Western Europe, the ideology of Christian civilizationism stems from the presumption that there is no common cultural ground linking Muslims and Christians because of supposedly different cultural characteristics. For Christian civilizationists, the Muslim presence in Europe is destabilizing and leads to increased societal insecurity. European right-wing populist parties employ Christian civilizationist ideology reflecting one of two perspectives.



Western Europe 155

Brubaker (2017a: 1203) observes that such parties tend to fluctuate between two opposing views. First, there is a “traditional,” patriarchal vision of society focused on Christianity’s conservative interpretation. Such “traditional” Christian values express socially and politically conservative ideas regarding gender issues, sexual morality, and personal rights. Second, there are the right-wing populists characterized by a proclaimed liberalism which highlights Islam’s alleged illiberalism, and which also includes “philosemitism, gender equality, and support for gay rights.” These are regarded by such right-wing populists as “common European values,” along with respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. Dutch right-wing parties have long been at the forefront of the right-wing populist liberal approach to Islam’s claimed illiberalism, while recently France’s National Front, renamed in 2018 Rassemblement National (“National Gathering”), is said to be moving in this direction. According to Scrinzi, however, the NF/RN is now “internally divided between two ‘souls’ of the party.” On the one hand, there is “the secularist neo-Gaullist line embodied by the leadership” and, on the other, there is “the liberal-conservative faction which has linkages with the conservative Catholic milieu” (Scrinzi 2017: 96, quoted in Ozzano 2019). In a broader European perspective, the contours of Dutch right-wing populist, anti-immigrant politics are atypical, especially with respect to the centrality of the themes of sexual liberation and gay rights. Nevertheless, antiimmigrant right-wing populist parties not only in France, but also in Norway, Denmark, and elsewhere are beginning to place more emphasis on gender equality, human rights, freedom of speech, individualism, and gay rights as they seek to expand their electorate and gain mainstream legitimacy by repositioning themselves as defenders of liberal values, grounded in a secularized Judeo-Christian culture, against the “threat” of Islam (Herbert 2019). Despite such differences, Dehanas and Shterin (2018: 178) observe that the “same dynamics of Christian civilizationism are mirrored in many cases throughout Europe and in the U.S.” Brubaker (2017), Joppke (2018), Kalmar (2018), Lloyd (2017), and Haynes (2019a) all identify Christian civilizationism as a key driver of right-wing populist ideas informing a sense of “panEuropean civilizational identity,” which is said to be threatened by and ready to threaten another civilizational identity—Islam. In doing so, Lloyd (2017) claims that it “poses grave dangers to liberal democracy.” Apart from its political impact, Christian civilizationism is highly socially divisive because its pits one group of people—that is, practicing Christians or cultural Christians— against another: practicing Muslims and cultural Muslims.3 The core of the civilizationist appeal expressed in the political ideology of “civilizationism” is the clamed primacy of the cultural and religious bonds between one group of

156

Chapter Seven

people and not others. “Key factors contributing to conflict principally relate to the fact of [allegedly] irreducible cultural differences” (Marchetti, 2016: 123). As Joppke (2018: 238) notes, “The fact that the Christian references were made just when the opposition to Muslim immigrants became central to these parties (which it had not always been), suggests that its adoption is not religiously but culturally, even instrumentally, motivated: Christianism in the hands of extreme right parties is simply a club to beat Islam.” Christian civilizationism highlights the linked issues of identity and multiculturalism in today’s Europe. Many European Muslims today, especially among the young, confront religious, cultural, and identity issues in ways that differ from their parents’ often more fixed cultural personalities (Cesari 2016). This reflects a changed position compared to a few decades ago, when Islam was virtually unknown in Europe: an “exotic” faith with minimal presence, physically manifested only by a few mosques in a handful of major population centers. The situation began to change with the expansion of Muslim migration to Europe from the 1970s, picking up pace following 9/11—with its connotations of terrorism, colored by egregious recent terroristic outrages in Europe—the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, which enabled, right-wing populists to claim that immigrants were taking the jobs of indigenous people, and the 2015 refugee emergency. Together, these events and developments provided fuel for right-wing populists to allege that Europe was being “swamped” by Muslims—with deleterious societal, cultural, and political effects. Initially, European host societies tended to define “Muslim” immigrants mainly by their nationality and economic function. For example, Turks in Germany—who entered the country in large numbers from the early 1960s— were referred to as gastarbeiter (“guest workers”).4 In this circumscribed context, the immigrants’ religion and culture seemed relatively unimportant: such people were in Germany to do an essential economic task—helping to rebuild a shattered country following World War II; once that was completed they would go home. According to Nonneman (1996: 382), “this reflected the migrants’ own perception of their place in their European surroundings, and their relative lack of concern with opportunities for socio-religious expression within the context of the host society.” Decisions taken half a century ago by the German government led to today’s outcome: a settled and growing Muslim presence in the country, a situation added to by Angela Merkel’s decision in 2015 to allow up to a million mainly Syrian Muslim refugees to enter the country with a view to living their permanently. What has occurred in Germany in relation to an Islamization of its indigenously Turkish and Syrian citizen, also took place in the United Kingdom. There, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis entered the country in large



Western Europe 157

numbers in the 1960s, while in France there was an influx of people from France’s former North African colonies. Over time, these people from diverse countries were no longer primarily identified as Turks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, or Algerians but identified tout court as “Muslims.” Numerically small, semi-autonomous groups of migrant workers expanded into larger, more complex social communities. By the late 1980s, there were collectively about five million “Muslims” in Britain, France, and Germany—countries whose Muslim male “guest workers’” families were allowed to join them. By the early 2000s, it was estimated that there were more than 10 million Muslims living in Western Europe (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 1), and by 2017, according to the Pew Forum, the twenty-eight EU member states were home to 19 million Muslims, 3.8 percent of the overall population. By 2050, another Pew study projected, “Muslims will make [up] 7.4 percent (if all migration into Europe were to immediately and permanently stop—a ‘zero migration’ scenario) up to 14 percent (under a ‘high’ migration scenario) of Europe’s population” (Pew Research Center 2017). A growing Muslim presence in Western Europe was followed by growing electoral clout for anti-immigrant, right-wing populist parties in several regional countries, including: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Their collective claim was that a growing Muslim presence was not conducive to the thriving of “European culture” because politically and socially “assertive” Muslims—that is, Islamists—saw Western individualistic liberalism as both unauthentic and antipathetic to their culture and religion (Roy 2004; author’s interviews with #72, 79, 82). Roy argues that to try to counter malign stereotypical constructions of Islam in Western Europe, which often do not get beyond presumptions of “Islamic fundamentalism” or “Islamist extremism,” it is necessary significantly to raise public awareness of most European Muslims’ “normal” behavior. According to Roy (2004), many Muslims in Europe “do all those things [Islamic] fundamentalists say Muslims should not do,” including: selling and drinking alcohol, voting for secular parties, having non-Muslim friends, and marrying non-Muslims—and still considering themselves to be good Muslims. On the other hand, Salafists (or, “Islamic fundamentalists”), who do not engage in such behaviors, are a growing and high-profile presence, and many Europeans simply identify the minority of Salafists with the wider Muslim presence. “Christian civilizationism” is not necessarily the same in form and content wherever it manifests itself. For Brubaker, the populist discourse in Northern and Western Europe is substantially different from the American and Eastern European populist movements, in that the former has civilizational aspects to the fore, while the latter does not—or at least to the same extent. In each of the three contexts on which we focus in this book—the USA, Western Europe

158

Chapter Seven

and Central and Eastern Europe—expressions of “Christian civilizationism” highlights Muslim “infiltration” for allegedly malign purpose, reflected in, inter alia: international mass migration, Islamist extremism and terrorism, and plots by the Muslim Brotherhood or fellow-travelers to install sharia law. In both Central and Eastern Europe and the USA, fears of mass Muslim “infiltration” strongly informs the Christian civilizationist narrative, while in Western Europe it is the presence of millions of Muslims which animates right-wing populists, such as Le Pen and Wilders. In Western Europe, Huysmans (2000: 751) notes, “migration has developed into a security issue [and] the European integration process is implicated in it.” Farny (2016) observes that, in recent years, “many [Western] countries have seen a rise in immigration, coupled with an increasing fear of ‘terrorists,’ ‘illegal migrants’ and other threats to internal safety.” According to Davies (2018), the rise of right-wing populist politicians in Western Europe is explicable both “as the expression of cultural anxieties surrounding identity and immigration” and “in largely economic terms—as a revolt among those ‘left behind’ by inequality and globalization” (Author’s interviews with #64, 82). The perceived malign impact of globalization, which according to populists such as Le Pen, not only increased inequality in Western Europe, but also drove right-wing populism, Christian civilizationism and Islamophobia (see, for example, a 2017 campaign speech by Marine Le Pen, reproduced by Kern 2017). Marchetti observes that: “Within the political and economic context of globalization, characterized by a high degree of political and economic exclusion, the perspective of civilizations offers grounds for a conservative rejection of global transformations” (Marchetti 2016: 122). The “global transformations” to which Marchetti refers have cultural, political, social, economic, and technological impacts (Haynes 2005). While the multifaceted impact of globalization was widely noted for decades after the Cold War, a focusing of identity issues on civilizational configurations is a more recent phenomenon. According to Brubaker, “opportunities for populism” in both Europe and the USA were stimulated by “two sets of decades-spanning structural trends,” involving four “transformations”: “party politics, social structure, media, and governance structures.” The overall effect was to promote and support “a generic populism—a heightened tendency to address ‘the people’ directly—and the demographic, economic, and cultural transformations that have encouraged more specific forms of protectionist populism.” These changes were focused on various security issues since 9/11. Since then, there has been a “conjunctural coming-together of a series of crises”: “the Great Recession and sovereign debt crisis” in 2008, “the refugee crisis” from 2015 in the context of Syria’s civil war, and “a security crisis” consequential to succes-



Western Europe 159

sive terror attacks by Islamist extremists in several Western countries. For Brubaker, these events occurred “in the context of a crisis of public knowledge—to form a ‘perfect storm’ that was powerfully conducive to populist claims to protect the people against threats to their economic, cultural, and physical security” (Brubaker, 2017b: 369). In addition, as a senior member of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University notes, there was an “elective affinity between the economic backlash and a cultural backlash against liberal modernity” (Author’s interview with #80). Despite the widely observed and continuing effects of globalization on national sovereignty, governments in Europe and elsewhere still seek to portray themselves as being in control, able to shape events and not just to respond (Haynes, 2005). Recent events affecting Western Europe and its constituent governments indicate that such claims are sometimes without foundation. For example, the post-2008 economic crisis, the 2015 refugee and migration emergency, Brexit in 2016, and recent examples of Islamist terrorism in the West collectively highlight how governments may struggle to stay in control and dictate outcomes in the context of often fast-moving events. Governments of even hitherto stable and secure governments, such as those of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK must respond to events without necessarily being able to control them. In such countries, the rise of right-wing populism with an ideology of Christianism is indicative of a political, economic, and social environment which is significantly changing and, many would say, for the worse. Destabilizing events such as those noted in the previous paragraph were paralleled by significant growth in support for the populist right in several Western European countries.5 For example, Norbert Hofer came very close to winning the presidency of Austria in late 2016, and Marine Le Pen was a strong contender for the same post in France in 2017. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilder’s profoundly anti-Muslim Party for Freedom was for a time the most popular party in the country (Brubaker 2017b). In September 2018, a far-right, anti-immigrant, populist party—the Sweden Democrats—achieved over 17 percent of the vote in traditionally “tolerant” Sweden. In Italy, Matteo Salvini, leader of the far-right League and Italy’s Interior Minister, was probably the country’s most high-profile politician in 2019 (Ozzano 2019). What such right-wing populists have in common is to extol the virtues of Europe’s “Christian civilization” in a manner reminiscent of Samuel Huntington, with his claim that Western civilization is both unique and superior to any other. According to Geert Wilders (2011), Europe’s civilizational foundations are “Rome, Athens and Jerusalem.” Wilders is alluding to both secular and Christian values which, he claims, collectively characterize Western Europe’s cultural and historical foundations and progress. These values

160

Chapter Seven

are now said to be under threat in Europe from “multiculturalism” and “excessive” immigration, with particular concern expressed in relation to Islam. Juxtaposed with the issue of the status of Europe’s civilization, the roles and position of Muslims raises new questions about the social and political role of religion and culture in the context of a long-running, pan-European debate about what Europe is and what values it represents. Brubaker (2016) notes that in Western Europe prior to 9/11 there was “growing civilizational preoccupation with Islam . . . responding to the increasing global visibility of political Islam in the post-Cold War environment. But of course, 9/11 and subsequent attacks in Europe gave it an enormous boost.” The 2015 refugee crisis was another “enormous boost” to the emergence and profile of Christian civilizationism, a catalyst for greatly increased political and media attention on desperate people fleeing conflicts in Syria and elsewhere, and some politicians and media chose to highlight that the great majority were Muslims. It coincided with the run up to the UK’s June 2016 “Brexit” referendum during which right-wing populist politicians, such as the then leader of the UK Independence party (UKIP), Nigel Farage, chose to publish a highly misleading advertisement which purported to illustrate that there was an almost unlimited demand from “Muslims” and other non-Europeans to enter the UK. The thrust of Farage’s poster was that these people were not Europeans and could not be expected to adhere to European values and cultural norms. But Farage’s was not an isolated voice; as Sharify-Funk (2013) notes, in the title of a recent article: there is a “pervasive anxiety about Islam.” In Western Europe, right-wing populist discourse is often Islamophobic, and Farage’s stance is not unusual. Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, where right-wing populist governments of the Visegrád group base their popular appeal on preventing mass Muslim immigration (see chapter 8), several Western European countries have relatively large percentages of Muslims of between 3–8 percent.6 In several regional countries, such as, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, right-wing populists identify Muslims as the “enemy within,” which threatens European civilization. Both George (2016) and Polakow-Suransky (2017) argue that real or instrumental rightwing outrage against “radical Islamic terrorism,” sharia law, and the alleged misogyny of many Muslim men is a key component of political project whose aim is to increase popular support and the political profile of European right-wing populist politicians. While they profess no dislike for or aversion to individual Muslims, they do proclaim strong aversion to the politicization of Islam in the form of Islamism and associated attempts to “impose” unwelcome “Muslim values” on “Christian Europe.” The electoral appeal of right-wing populist politicians is to their fellow citizens that share their concerns by focusing on the “competing” civilizational norms and values, which coalesce around individualistic, liberal values on the one hand, and collective,



Western Europe 161

conservative values, on the other. In addition, there is the widespread popular fear of Islamist extremism and terrorism. Nigel Farage, then leader of the UK Independence Party, stated in March 2015: I think perhaps one of the reasons the polls show an increasing level of concern is because people do see a fifth column living within our country, who hate us and want to kill us. So don’t be surprised if there isn’t a slight increase in people’s worries and concerns. You know, when you’ve got British, when you’ve got people, born and bred in Cardiff, with British passports, going out to fight for Isis, don’t be surprised if there isn’t an uptick in concern. There has been an uptick in concern, but does it make us a prejudiced people? No. (Mason, 2015)

Farage’s comments can be understood in the context of successive UK governments’ attempts to encourage a multicultural society in Britain. According to Zemni, “multiculturalism has taken shape as a legitimising paradigm of the Western democracies, and of the European Union itself. It has developed into a cultural-political cornerstone of societies simultaneously in full transition towards economic globalization on the one hand, and potentially prey to the advent/resurgence of far-right and/or fascist political organizations on the other hand” (emphasis added; Zemni 2002: 158). Writing nearly two decades ago, Zemni saw multiculturalism as a “legitimising paradigm” and “cultural-political cornerstone” of both the European Union and Western democracies in general. It would be difficult to make the same claim with assurance today. This is because many Western countries, including several in Western Europe, have experienced a diminution of the perceived desirability of multiculturalism and a parallel increase in rightwing populism with civilizationist characteristics, pitting practicing and cultural Christians against Muslims. It is important to be clear that this is not a reassertion of religious differences or a generic “return of religion” to the public realm in Western Europe. Rather, it is the employment of culturalized political language following the real or perceived malign socio-economic impacts of globalization, including significant job losses in certain industries and cultural anxieties surrounding identity and immigration. Secularization and Secularism in Western Europe Until recently, Western European countries were linked by their high levels of modernity, characterized in part by advanced secularization. Huntington (1996: 68) noted that “[m]odernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures . . . .The qualities that make a society Western,

162

Chapter Seven

in contrast, are special: the classical legacy, Christianity, the separation of church and state, the rule of law, civil society. (emphasis added)

For Huntington, being “modern” and being “Western” are different things. While for him “modernity” has generic qualities—including, industrialization, urbanization, and higher levels of literacy, education, and wealth—being “Western” implies adhesion to a specific culture (“the classical legacy”) and religion (“Christianity”), as well as to “suitable” political arrangements (church-state separation, “the rule of law,” and independent civil society). For Huntington, non-Western civilizations, including Islam, do not share these attributes. While political concerns informed by faith-based, Christian understandings of the world are relatively rare today in Western Europe, expressions of “Christianism,” “Christian civilizationism,” or, simply, “civilizationism” are becoming common. Brubaker (2016) argues that in Western Europe, the ideology of Christian civilizationism “informs assertively secular understandings and discourses of nationhood—and not simply as their evident target, but as their putative foundation” (emphases in original). Christianized “assertive secularism” is “directed against Muslim immigrants and their descendants” (Kuru 2009).7 It is an “Islam-focused secularism” which is often but not always an ideology of the Right. Brubaker (2016) identifies Christianism’s assertive secularism, with its claimed objective of “protecting liberal and Western values against Islam. . . . as a potential new masterframe of the European nationalpopulist Right.” What, if anything, is distinctive about secularization in Western Europe? “Secularization” involves a significant diminishing of religious concerns in everyday life, and Western Europe has seen this to a greater extent than anywhere else (Author’s interviews with #57, 62, 79). Secularization was once thought to be a unidirectional process, characterizing progress from tradition to modernity. As societies moved in this direction, it was thought inevitable that they would progress from a sacred condition to one where religion had decreasing ability to influence public outcomes. The point would eventually be reached whereby the sacred would become both socially and politically marginal. Secularization theory confidently proclaimed that religion was destined universally to become “only” a private matter, losing its public significance. As Shupe (1990: 19) notes, “the demystification of religion inherent in the classic secularization paradigm posits a gradual, persistent, unbroken erosion of religious influence in urban industrial societies.” Such was secularization theory’s hold on the understanding of successive generations of social scientists, that Casanova (1994: 17) could aver that secularization theory “may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status



Western Europe 163

within the modern social sciences.” Casanova’s comment followed the understanding of most of the leading figures of nineteenth and twentieth century social science—including Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Talcott Parsons, Herbert Spencer and Max Weber. All believed that secularization was an integral facet of “modernization,” a global trend of major developmental relevance everywhere as societies modernized. They “all believed that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial [that is, modernised] society. The belief that religion was dying became the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the twentieth century” (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 3). As modernization extended its grip, so the argument went, religion would everywhere be “privatized,” losing its grip on culture, becoming a purely personal matter. Thus, religion would no longer be a collective force with significant mobilizing potential for social and/or political changes. In short, secularization, the US sociologist Donald Eugene Smith proclaimed, was “the most fundamental structural and ideological change in the process of political development” (Smith 1970: 6). It was thought a one-way street: societies gradually—but inexorably—move away from being focused around the sacred and a concern with the divine to a situation characterized by significant diminution of religious power and authority. Secularization theory tout court turned out to be wrong. Rather than fading away, it is now frequently observed that religion has made a return to social and political prominence in many countries, especially in the developing world, over the last two or three decades. Many would now accept that the opposite to religious marginalization occurred: widespread religious resurgence, with ramifications for how we understand politics and international relations (Moghadam 2003; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). Religion’s social and political influence is said to be high in several regions of the world, not “only” in much of the developing world, but also in a key Western, “developed” country: the USA. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s secularization theorists predicted the “death” of religion, now many accept they were wrong. For example, the late Peter Berger (1999: 3), once a leading proponent of the secularization thesis, later accepted that, “far from being in decline in the modern world, religion is actually experiencing a resurgence . . . the assumption we live in a secularized world is false. . . . The world today is as furiously religious as it ever was.” Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, “modernization” did not actually weaken religion— but instead strengthened it, leading to a widespread religious resurgence. We are now as a result experiencing a religious revival, which consequently brings religion into renewed political activity and prominence in many parts of the world. Norris and Ingelhart (2004: 215–6) state that “some of these

164

Chapter Seven

reported phenomena [of religious resurgence] may have been overstated” but it is the case that “the simplistic assumption that religion was everywhere in decline, common in earlier decades, ha[s] become implausible to even the casual observer.” Among the world regions, only Western Europe continues to experience a waning of the public importance of religion. This makes the region distinctive compared to many others. How to measure secularization? The public decline of religion is often measured by falling income levels for institutionalized religions—in Western Europe, this generally means long-established Protestant and Catholic churches—as well as declining ordinations of religious professionals, diminishing church attendances, and waning popular observance of traditional church-dictated codes of personal behavior in relation to conventions regarding sexuality, reproduction, and marriage. Overall, in Western Europe, these trends point to “a process of decline in the social significance of religion” (Davie 2000; Bruce 2003). Consequently, institutionalized Christianity in Western Europe has now lost many of the functions it once fulfilled for other social institutions. For example, the Christian churches once provided legitimacy for secular authority in a number of ways; they not only endorsed public policy while sustaining with “a battery of threats and blandishments the agencies of social control,” but also claimed to be the only fount of “true” learning (Wilson 1992: 200). The Church was also largely responsible for socializing the young and sponsoring a range of recreational activities. Signs of significant religious decline are now palpable throughout Western Europe, including the predominantly Catholic south of the region, involving countries including Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Italy, Spain, and Portugal have all seen rapid decline in the authority and prestige of the Catholic Church (Davie 2007; Itçaïna 2019). Yet, even in secular Western Europe, there has been primarily a shift in the institutional location of religion, not unabashed secularization with religion no longer present (Davie 2002). Put another way, Western European societies are undoubtedly becoming more secular—while at the same time numerous individuals inhabiting the countries of the region still seek religious or at least spiritual objectives. While the facts of widespread and continuing secularization in Western Europe are not seriously in dispute, recent works on the sociology of religion concerned with several highly secular societies in Europe—including those of France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden—point out that “secularization” may not be the right term to apply to what has happened. This is because there is much evidence that religious belief survives, most of it Christian, despite widespread alienation from the established Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. The British sociologist Grace Davie (2002) suggests that an important distinction can be drawn between “belonging” and “believing”



Western Europe 165

in Western Europe. She contends that in Western Europe, traditional mainline Christian religious institutions have undoubtedly lost public influence. At the same time religious beliefs and practices continue to be important in the lives of millions of Europeans. Sometimes this takes the form of new or renewed religious expressions, with associated increments of religious fervor, often focused in what Berger (1999) refers to as religious grassroots movements. In the context of Christianity in Western Europe, there is a trend of “culturalizing” religion, reflected in the phenomenon of Christian civilizationism, often linked to the growing political influence and in some cases ballotbox success of right-wing populist parties. According to Joppke (2018), a significant force “driving this culturalization” is “radical right parties that depict a ‘Christian’ Europe as threatened by immigrant Islam.” It is important to underline that today Christianity per se is very rarely referred to in relation to “Western European state identities,” reflecting “the unmatched degree of secularism in this part of the world” (Joppke 2018). For example, despite much discussion, the European Union did not include any references to Christianity when attempting to formulate a constitution in 2003. Among Western Europe’s political parties, it is notable that right-wing populist parties are at the forefront of attempts to highlight and characterize European state identities as “Christian.” This does not reflect a “return” of religion. It relates to the anti-Muslim ideology of Christian civilizationism, whose proponents contend that Europe’s Muslims are dangerous arrivistes whose presence threatens security and stability. CULTURALIZATION OF RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPE The singular secularization trajectory of Western Europe informs the nature of Christian civilizationism (or, “Christianism”) employed by right-wing populists in several regional countries. Brubaker claims that “the national [right-wing] populisms of Northern and Western Europe form a distinctive cluster within the wider north Atlantic and pan-European populist conjuncture.” What makes right-wing populism in Western Europe distinctive, according to Brubaker? He claims that it is unique “in construing the opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms. This partial shift from nationalism to “civilizationism” has been driven by the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam, with several distinct characteristics.” The outcome is the emergence of an “identitarian ‘Christianism,’ a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech.” In

166

Chapter Seven

other words, in Western Europe Christianism has distinctive characteristics. It is expressed within the context of secularism, claims to defend a range of liberal values and human rights, and is supportive of Jews and the state of Israel (Brubaker 2017a). The rise of Christianism in Western Europe indicates that although the region has secularized, its claimed civilizational distinctiveness—understood as a “marker of differences” (Lloyd 2017)—remains a potentially divisive cultural factor. Of course, Huntington (1993, 1996) had made this contention the cornerstone of his analysis, with Islam identified as one of the key opponents of Western civilization after the Cold War. Christianism, Identity, and Secularism The previous section briefly examined the unprecedented and probably irreversible trajectory of secularization in Western Europe. It led to widespread secularism throughout the region—that is, a widespread belief that religion should not be involved with the ordinary social and political activities of a country. Thus, “Christianism” is not a “return” to religion. It does not imply that secularism is being rolled back or that traditionally significant religious institutions are regaining their diminished social and/or political power. It is best understood in the context of a novel “culturalization” of religion in a secular territory, Western Europe, similar to what has recently occurred in the USA, manifested in Donald Trump’s unexpected political success of being elected as president in 2016. In both Western Europe and the USA, “culturalization” of religion dichotomizes “Christianists” and followers of Islam. In this view, Christianity is not a “decultured” faith of universal relevance but is linked to followers’ cultural (or civilizational) attributes. Regarding Islam, Joppke (2018) argues following Olivier Roy (2014), that there has been a “deculturalization” of the faith followed by the rise of “pure” religion in secular Western Europe. At the same time, there is also a growing phenomenon of transnational Salafism which has led to tens of thousands of European Muslims, most of whom are sons/daughters/grandchildren of immigrants, following a version of Islam, providing identity reference points in terms of dress, reading and viewing habits, and other cultural markers (de Koning and Pall 2017). For example, Germany is said to be home to an estimated 10,000 “militant Salafists,” France is said to have 5,000 Salafists, and in the UK “Salafi mosques” comprised 9.4 percent of mosques (182) compared to 147 in 2015.8 However, as Jakelić (2018) notes, no religion, Christianity including, is ever only about identity. But if Christianity is approached as not only a matter of theological ideas but also a lived, his-



Western Europe 167

torically embedded and culturally embodied tradition, then Christianity, just like any other religion, is also about identity and it is certainly also about particular group identities. The populist take on identitarian Christianity, in other words, is only the last iteration in a long history of narratives about Christianity as a civilizational or identity marker.

Several other scholars, including Brubaker (2017a), Joppke (2018), and Kalmar (2018), make the same point. Christianism, Liberal Values, and Human Rights To what extent—if at all—is there an inevitable and unbridgeable incompatibility between Muslims residing in Europe, including values, norms, and beliefs, and the typically secular organizing principles of non-Muslim Europeans? Put another way, is there necessarily a “clash of civilizations” between Europeans who are cultural or religious Muslims and those who are cultural or religious Christians? Esposito (2002) and Ayubi (1991) contend that there is no fundamental incompatibility—because Islam is primarily pragmatic, with separation between on the one hand, religious/cultural principles and institutions and, on the other, between the temporal ruler and the state. As a result, there are not only grounds for expectations of compatibility between Islamic precepts and the world of nation-states but also no impracticable obstacles of principle to a reasonable degree of compatibility between “Islamic” and “Western” practices regarding citizenship and the agreed nature of sociopolitical organization. “‘European Muslims’ reactions (themselves varying strongly) may often be less a matter of ‘Islamic practice’ than of a cultural minority’s sense of discrimination leading to a search for rallying points” (Nonneman 1996: 384). This is not to suggest that Muslims in Europe are necessarily complaisant about the norms, values, and practices they encounter. Muslim leaders often express concern for the development of their faith and its adherents, especially in relation to the moral wellbeing and education of the young. For many Muslims, Western society/civilization is essentially meaningless, rootless, characterized by crime, juvenile delinquency, riots, collapse of marriages, and sexual promiscuity (Ahmed 1992; Leiken 2012). In addition, some Muslims believe that the values and norms of Islam could provide an alternative, appropriate lifestyle to correct European secular societies’ focus on selfcentered materialism and individualism. Sometimes the goal can be achieved, it is believed, by adopting a political program of “Islamicization” via what Roy (2014) calls “neo-fundamentalism.” Others take a different path: they pursue Islamic authenticity via Salafism or other expressions of Islamic “extremism” or, in a tiny number of cases, terrorism (Leiken 2012). Roy’s

168

Chapter Seven

term, “neo-fundamentalism,” refers primarily to the idea of a transnational Islamic community constructed largely via the Internet and focusing on Europe’s Muslims. It equates Muslim identity with Islamic (sharia) law. At the same time, it breaks with traditional Islamic jurisprudence whereby Muslims are obliged only to follow sharia ritual, not its legislative dimensions (Roy 2004). The result is that the call for sharia law among Europe’s Muslims can have widely different implications for understanding and behavior. According to Brubaker, right-wing populist parties in Western Europe strongly support a “‘liberal’ European culture” against the allegedly obscurantist Muslim culture (“Conférence du 06/03/2017: Rogers Brubaker,” 2017: 1). Far-right figures, such as Gert Wilders in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen in France, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, claim that Europe’s Muslim immigrants pose a clear and persistent threat to “European” values, including: tolerance, freedom, and democracy. Wilders, for example, points to many Muslims’ alleged homophobia and views of females as subservient in order to highlight his own superior “secular” and “progressive” views (Kern 2018). Led by Mattteo Salvini, Italy’s anti-immigration Lega focuses on the Christian crucifix as a strong symbol of the country’s cultural—rather than Christian—foundations. In 2019, Lega held the balance of power in the Italian government. It campaigns for crucifixes to be compulsory in all public buildings, including schools, ports, and prisons. “Salvini, deputy prime minister of Italy, has made a point (despite vociferous criticism from the Church) of holding a rosary during speeches. Salvini does, it seems, attend mass (though he was publicly a neo–pagan for many years)” (Ryan 2018; also see Ozzano 2019). Salvini’s aim, it would appear, is to highlight cultural differences between the mass of practicing or culturally Christian Italians and in this way highlight the differences between them and the country’s small but growing Muslim population of around 2.6 million. In Germany, Angela Merkel’s poll ratings declined significantly in the wake of her handling of the post-2015 international migration and refugee crisis which served to open up space for a challenge from the populist right, both within and outside her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Political debate in Germany is significantly molded not by Merkel’s claim in relation to mass—mainly Muslim—migration, “Wir schaffen das” (“We shall manage”), but by challenges to it. From within the CDU, thirty-eight-yearold Jens Spahn, health minister and a self-confessed “burkaphobe,” is a good example of a mainstream politician who employs identifiably Christianist language to vilify Muslims (Oltermann, 2016). Spahn would like to see the burka banned in Germany. By early 2019, there was a partial ban. In addition, six Western European countries have nationwide or partial bans “on faceveils, and others have legislation pending for additional bans” (Sanei 2018). Justification for banning the burka is because, as Ahmari (2018), notes: many



Western Europe 169

people have “anxiety and discomfort” about it: the “‘Average Joe’ in the USA and his ‘European counterparts . . . have a right to deplore the burka.’” It can also be seen as concern over the idea of a Muslim covering her face, meaning that her visage cannot be seen by others, providing putatively good camouflage for the planning and/or execution of terrorist outrages. According to Spahn, “Germany may not be the right country for those who want to keep their wife in a burka or niqab, especially now that we have become such a sought-after destination. We need to send strong signals about what is acceptable and what isn’t” (Spahn quoted in Oltermann, 2016). Spahn paints the issue as polarizing Western “liberal” values with those of non-liberal Islamists in relation to cultural choices regarding women’s clothing. Finally, Ryan (2018) notes that until recently the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) “was being criticized for abandoning any ‘Christian’ aspect to their politics. Today they are campaigning for crucifixes and cribs in schools—in part to head off the challenge of the far right” populists of Alternative für Deutschland which in late 2018 recorded an unprecedented 18 percent in the polls, second only to the CDU. In addition to Germany, several other Western European countries have full or partial bans on the public wearing of the burka, part of a pattern securitizing aspects of Muslim belief.9 As Cesari notes, many European countries have securitized aspects of Muslim expression which go far beyond what is normally understood as security threats, such as terrorism and extremism. They include immigration policies and administrative measures limiting “Islamic practices” as a way to demean Muslim values and beliefs. Muslims are regularly targeted politically or socially “within the bounds of regular political procedures.” The effect, Cesari argues, is that “legal constraints and the subsequent securitization of Islam reinforce the percep­tion of Islam and Muslims as the typical ‘others within the West.’” The almost inevitable corollary is that, as a result, many Muslims now believe that state agencies closely watch them and their community in order to bring them under close control. “This is especially the case for those Muslims who wish to affirm their religious faith via, for example, suitable dress code and regular involvement in public religious activities.” In recent years, reflecting increasing securitization of many aspects of being a Muslim and associated “signs of these activities, such as mosques and minarets, but also dress code, Islamic education, halal meat, etc., have become highly suspect” (Cesari, 2016: 232). Christianism and Philosemitism Mudde noted in 2007 that “the most clear and convincing examples of philoSemitism are found in the literature of the Belgian VB, which has never openly expressed anti-Semitism.” More recently, the party has depicted itself

170

Chapter Seven

as a defender of Flemish Jews—while also asserting its strong support for the state of Israel. In an interview with a conservative Jewish weekly published in New York in 2005, Dewinter, then leader of the VB, boasted that “very often we were the only political group defending Israel, both in publications and in parliament” (The Jewish Week, 12 September 2005, quoted in Mudde 2007). As Mudde notes, given such right-wing populists’ vilification of Muslims for choosing to clothe themselves in “Islamic” apparel, the VB’s changing position as a claimed defender of Flemish Jews stance seems unlikely, given that “the Jewish community of Antwerp includes a relatively large section of Hassidic Jews, who are highly visible with their black robes and hats, and against whom much of the VB”s critique of the alleged resistance to assimilation of the Muslim population could also be directed” (Mudde 2007: 84). How then should we understand the changing position of the Belgian VB? Tamir Bar-On (2013: 225) notes that “numerous radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe are philo-Semitic and pro-Zionist,” including the Belgian VB. Moffitt (2017) sees this as a way for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe approach to express what they regard as an “honorable” and “rational” way to contextualize their Islamophobia. That this, these parties want to be elected to government and they recognize that appealing to “Enlightenment values” is more likely to win votes among Western European voters than appealing to naked xenophobia. As Akkerman (2005) observes, this involves a shift from an “ethnocratic nationalism” centering on one allegedly singular ethnic group to a wider, more comprehensive “civil nationalism” which seeks to bring together all those who share a set of liberal values. As Brubaker (2017a: 1202) notes, this shift has been notable in Western Europe’s right-wing populist parties adopting philosemitism, that is, a regard for Jews and Judaism, as a core value. This obviously contrasts with earlier manifestations of right-wing populism in Western Europe and, as in the USA where right-wing populists are often extremely vocal in their support of the state of Israel, it reflects a shift in ideological thinking which sees Jews as part of the Western civilization to be defended against the “enemy” civilization of Islam. Geert Wilders is notable in this narrative. Moffitt (2017: 117) quotes Wilders from 2010 when he portrayed Jerusalem as the “frontier” of the West against Islam: “if Jerusalem falls into the hands of the Muslims, Athens and Rome will be next.” Akkerman (2005: 348) observes that in such arguments, “Western culture is essentially liberal, and liberal values can only be defended against Islam by way of a cultural war. As Islam is essentially an anti-liberal religion, in this view, it should be rejected wholesale” (quoted in Moffitt 2017: 117). Such arguments obviously have the intention of drawing a “clear line in the sand” dividing the liberal values of the West and those, whom the right-wing populists declare, oppose them: national elites, elites in



Western Europe 171

the EU, and Muslims. In addition, Wilders claimed in 2017 that “almost all politicians of the established parties are promoting Islamization” and that “the establishment, the elite such as universities, churches, unions, the media, politicians put our enforced freedoms at stake” (in PVV FractieNoord-Brabant, 2017, quoted in Moffitt 2013: 117). CONCLUSION: RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF MAY 2019 The alleged civilizational contrast between the “Judeo-Christian” West and Islam is a key claim of the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. According to Brubaker (2017b), this indicates “a shift from a national to a civilizational register, and from nationalism to what one might call ‘civilizationism.’” This does not deny that more traditional forms of nationalism are thriving in some parts of Europe, such as in the countries of former Yugoslavia. As this chapter has indicated, a civilizational narrative increasingly overlaps with a nationalist one in many Western European countries. Consequently, the very labels of “nationalist,” on the one hand, and “civilizationist,” on the other, are no longer singular terms, as they have increasing similarities. While “nations” will not soon disappear, neither will “civilizations” take the attention and sense of identity of millions of people in Western Europe. What we can see, however, is that “nation” is increasingly characterized civilizationally in Western Europe and what links nations, civilizationally, seems more important than what divides them. Why do growing numbers of Western Europeans seem to fear or regard with hostility and suspicion their Muslim neighbors? Why do so many increasingly adopt a defensive civilizationist position? Part of the answer is that as a result of easy access to global news, everyone can be almost instantly aware of what is happening around the world. In recent years, the rise (and fall) of the so-called Islamic State, the still-continuing civil war in Syria, sectarian conflicts in various countries, including Muslimmajority Iraq and Pakistan, the apparent rise of Islamic extremism, accompanied by distinctive clothing and lifestyle choices by some Muslims and regular terrorist outrages in various European countries, coalesce in many Europeans’ minds as components of an increasingly serious security problem: Muslims’ alleged propensity to resort to “anti-Western” behavior apparently characterized in various ways, including extremism, violence, and terrorism, in order to achieve social, political, cultural, and religious objectives.

172

Chapter Seven

The widespread view in Europe of Muslims as being prone to violence and extremism greatly facilitates the rise of right-wing populist politicians, who are able to pitch their arguments to putative voters. These are people who are already in many cases feeling destabilized and insecure due to a combination of economic woes and cultural traumas. As a result, the post-war solidarity of Western European countries, as represented by the European Union, is now under serious threat of fracture with unknowable consequences to peace and cooperation. In January 2019, such concerns led thirty of Europe’s most significant intellectuals, including Bernard-Henri Levy, Milan Kundera, Salman Rushdie, and Orhan Pamuk, to co-sign a 662-word manifesto—“Fight for Europe—or the Wreckers Will Destroy It” which was published on 25 January 2019 in various periodicals, including the UK’s Guardian newspaper (“Fight for Europe—or the wreckers will destroy it” 2019) Here are the opening lines of the manifesto: The idea of Europe is in peril. From all sides there are criticisms, insults and desertions from the cause. Enough of “building Europe”! is the cry. Let’s reconnect instead with our “national soul”! Let’s rediscover our “lost identity”! This is the agenda shared by the populist forces washing over the continent. Never mind that abstractions such as “soul” and “identity” often exist only in the imagination of demagogues. Europe is being attacked by false prophets who are drunk on resentment, and delirious at their opportunity to seize the limelight. It has been abandoned by the two great allies who in the previous century twice saved it from suicide; one across the Channel and the other across the Atlantic. The continent is vulnerable to the increasingly brazen meddling by the occupant of the Kremlin. Europe as an idea is falling apart before our eyes. This is the noxious climate in which Europe’s parliamentary elections will take place in May [2019]. Unless something changes; unless something comes along to turn back the rising, swelling, insistent tide; unless a new spirit of resistance emerges, these elections promise to be the most calamitous that we have known. They will give a victory to the wreckers.

The signatories were thinking ahead to the European parliamentary elections of May 2019, in the context of the noticeable rise of right-wing populism in Western Europe and their lionizing of so called “European civilizational values,” expressed via the ideology of Christian civilizationism



Western Europe 173

(Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016). Held every four years, the European parliamentary elections are Europe’s biggest electoral contest, although not seen as especially important by many voters. The first elections for the European parliament elections were held in 1979 and voter turnout has been declining ever since. The signatories of the manifesto were highlighting what many incumbent European leaders—such as France’s Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel of Germany—were also emphasizing: the May 2019 European parliamentary elections were seen as decisive for the future of Europe by many European leaders. The co-signatories of the manifesto were no doubt thinking of the right-wing populists of Europe, seeking to acquire votes in the elections, as well as allied, burgeoning social movements, such as, German PEGIDA movement, whose acronym stands for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlands (English: “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident”). Around this time, the Austrian far-right party, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) adopted the following slogans: “Schweinskotelett statt Minarett” (“Pork chop instead of minaret”), “Daham statt Islam” (“At home instead of Islam”), and “Abendland in Christenhand” (“Occident in Christian hands”) (Joppke 2018). In addition, Italy’s most popular politician, Matteo Salvini, declared that the elections would be “a referendum between the Europe of the elites, of banks, of finance, of immigration and precarious work” versus “the Europe of people and labour,” while Hungary’s nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orbán, claimed that the poll was a chance to say farewell “not simply to liberal democracy . . . but to the 1968 elite” (Mason 2019). Increasingly, it appears that Western Europe’s political landscape is polarizing between, on the one hand, the populist right-wing and, on the other, those who regard integration and cooperation as a fundamental component of living together, enabling culturally different people to live together in peace and harmony. NOTES 1.  In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega rules in coalition with the populists of the Five Star Movement (M5S), who are not clearly or solely right-wing populists (Molle 2019). M5S “claim[s] to be neither left nor right, and their defining feature is an “anti-establishment” attitude” (https://www.thelocal.it/20180206/political-election -understanding-italys-five-star-movement-m5s-di-maio-grillo). 2. Western Europe is a geographic region which lacks precise definition. Over time, the connotation of its name has changed. During the Cold War, Western Europe was both a geographic and socio-political concept used to differentiate ideologically between the European countries of the “First World” of the West and the Commu-

174

Chapter Seven

nist countries of Eastern Europe (“The Second World”). Today, Western Europe conventionally comprises countries in Europe’s western section: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. With the exceptions of Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, all are full members of the European Union. Except for Greece, 98 percent Christian Orthodox, all have dominant Roman Catholic or Protestant churches. 3.  A cultural Muslim is religiously unobservant, secular, or irreligious. Yet, such people continue to identify with Islamic or Muslim culture as a result of personal and/ or social factors, including family background, personal experiences, or the social and cultural environment where they grew up. A cultural Christian has the same traits from a Christian perspective. 4.  In the mid-twentieth century, West Germany underwent an “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder). The sudden building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 prevented the flow of additional labor from the eastern part of the country. Needing an additional supply, the government of West Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Turkey’s government on 30 October 1961, which led to large numbers of Turks subsequently entering West Germany to work. By 1962, as a result of pressure from German employers, the “guestworkers,” initially only able to work in the country for two years, were able to stay for longer and, gradually, many became long-term residents. 5.  Not all such contemporary expressions of populism are right wing. We have already noted the M5S in Italy, while in Greece Syriza has been in government for several years and in Spain Podemos is a significant political force. 6. See http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/ for percentages. Highest in Western Europe were: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany. Average is 4.9 percent. 7. According to Brubaker (2016), he uses the term “assertive secularism” in a “broader and looser” sense than does Ahmet Kuru (2009). 8.  Germany is said to have 10,000 “militant Salafists” (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Islam_in_Europe). In the UK, 9.4 percent of mosques are reckoned to be Salafist (http://www.muslimsinbritain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf), and in France there are an estimated 5,000 Salafists (http://europeanpost.co/170-of-salafists-places-of -worship-in-france-since-2010/). 9. Austria, Belgium, France, and Denmark have comprehensive bans, and the Netherlands (in schools, hospitals, and on public transport) has a partial ban.

Chapter Eight

Central Europe

The main argument of this book is that right-wing populists in the USA, Western Europe, and Central Europe try to gain political power at the ballot box via use of the ideology of Christian civilizationism. The collective aim is to highlight what they see as significant threats from Muslims in relation to their society’s extant cultural and civilizational values and beliefs. The ideology of Christian civilizationism (or, “civilizationism”) draws—often implicitly—on the paradigm of the “clash of civilizations,” originally advanced by Samuel Huntington in the 1990s. Huntington’s claim was that in the post-Cold War world the West would find itself in conflict with incompatible civilizational actors. Today, many right-wing populists in the USA and Europe adopt this analytical framework, often implicitly, to build political ideologies which target Muslims as a significant threat to their society’s security, stability and well-being. The current chapter examines the political rise of civilizationism in four neighboring countries in Central Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, collectively known as the Visegrád group or V4.1 Each has seen a recent significant rise in support of right-wing populism which uses the ideology of Christian civilizationism to justify anti-Muslim policies (Goździak and Marton 2018; Hafez 2018; Kalmar 2018). Despite tiny numbers of Muslims inhabiting each of the Visegrád group countries, local right-wing populists highlight a fear of “uncontrolled” Muslim emigration, allegedly driven by the European Union, to which all four Visegrád countries belong. They link Muslim emigration to the threat of terrorism, extremism, and cultural attack, while at the same time using such concerns to target the European Union as an intrusive actor seeking to disrupt and change their cultures and civilizations. In short, right-wing populist politicians in the Visegrád group tap into and seek to exploit for political gain 175

176

Chapter Eight

societal fears of being overwhelmed by a wave of Muslim immigrants with alien values, and subjected to terrorism and extremism. RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND CIVILIZATIONISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE Like the focus of the last chapter, Western Europe, Central Europe is a region without definitive geographical, cultural, or religious parameters. To justify the analysis and resulting conclusions of the current chapter, four regional countries, which together form the Visegrád group, form its focus.2 All four Visegrád group countries became members of the European Union on 1 March, 2004. In 2018, the V4 countries entered into talks with Italy and Austria to agree on a common, highly restrictive, policy in relation to Muslim immigration. Like the V4 countries, Austria and Italy have recently elected rightwing populist politicians to power. According to Than, the “V4 + 2 countries form an ‘illiberal’ bloc to challenge the EU”s ‘liberal’ policy on immigration, coordinated by their right-wing populist governments” (Than 2018). Recent political advances by right-wing populist politicians and their parties in the four Visegrád countries is partly traceable to the events and developments that encouraged right-wing populists and, in some cases, delivered electoral success, in Western Europe and the USA. They include the socially destabilizing effects and aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008, 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror, and the effects of the 2011 Arab Uprisings and 2015 refugee and migrant crisis, involving mainly Muslim refugees fleeing from Syria’s civil war. The latter in particular fueled popular concerns about Muslims fleeing the conflicts to enter Europe as a safe haven. Right-wing populists in the Visegrád Four portray themselves as “Christian ‘bulwarks’ against Islam” (Brubaker 2017a), working to prevent their countries being “swamped” by Muslim immigrants. Recall that a bulwark is a defensive wall and use of this metaphor could encourage the idea that the V4 countries—portrayed by right-wing populists as on the frontline of Muslim efforts to reach the European “promised land”—must work assiduously to stem the Muslim “tide.” If not, their civilizationally distinctive countries’ cultures, with their Christian foundations and values, would be fatally undermined. These concerns encourage widespread feelings of insecurity, manifested politically in recent years in declining support for traditional mainstream political parties and growing backing for right-wing populist ones in the V4. Overall, right-wing “[p]opulists are strongest in [Central and] Eastern Europe. They routinely out-compete the political mainstream and have



Central Europe 177

already taken power” not only in the V4 but also in Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Serbia. In addition, right-wing “populist parties are junior coalition partners in two additional Eastern European countries, and dominate the opposition in three more” (Eiermann, Mounck and Gultchin, 2017: 2). The rhetoric and political appeal of right-wing populists in the Visegrád group does not merely represent a generic right-wing populism, a one-size-fitsall approach to political and economic challenges. As Greven (2016: 1) notes, “[r]ight-wing populism across Europe and the United States takes different forms depending on nationally specific factors such as political history, system and culture, but there are similarities.” Similarities include right-wing populists’ allusions to a corrupt transnational “political class,” “elite,” or “establishment,” whose raison d’être is allegedly to try to dupe hard-working “ordinary people.” Consequently, the “people” need the right-wing populists to defend them against the depredations of the liberal, transnational elite, whose only concern is their own well-being. A second similarity is that in the Visegrád countries, “[r]ight-wing populism adds a second antagonism of ‘us versus them.’” Right-wing populists understand the “people” to be “culturally homogenous” and “attempts are made to juxtapose [their] identity and [supposed] common interests, [which] are considered to be based on common sense, with the identity and interests of ‘others,’ usually minorities such as migrants, which are supposedly favored by the (corrupt) elites” (Greven 2016: 1). This issue was of major significance in the context of the May 2019 European parliamentary elections and, prior to these elections, a transnational “anti-immigrant” group of parties sought to coordinate their activities to try to maximize their political appeal. We return to this issue in the concluding section of the current chapter. The geography of populism is key to an understanding of current political transformations in Europe, which encourage right-wing populists’ political gains. In this respect, trends in Central Europe differ from those in Western Europe. An attempt to look at European averages, or only at individual countries, would mask some of the most consequential trends. But there is also a second dimension along which it is important to disentangle populist movements: ideology (Eiermann, Mounck and Gultchin 2017). The nature of the message projected by right-wing populist politicians is partially dependent on the location where the ideas are expressed. For Brubaker, there is a “particularity of the populist discourse in Western Europe, differentiating it from the American and Eastern European populist movements”: the right-wing populist parties and politicians in Western Europe are characterized, Brubaker claims, by “a civilizational aspect” (“Conférence du 06/03/2017: Rogers Brubaker,” 2017: 1). This is

178

Chapter Eight

made apparent in the foci of right-wing populists, such as Geert Wilders and Jens Spahn in the Netherlands and Germany respectively, who portray Islam and its associated values as a threat to their countries’ liberal, secular tenets, for example, in relation to gender equality. In the V4 countries, on the other hand, Islamophobes, such as Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, utilize Christian civilizationist arguments to portray Islam as a threat to what Orbán claims are Hungary’s national and Christian cultural foundations and values. Despite cultural, social, political, and economic differences between the USA and Western Europe, Brubaker (2017b) contends that “populist movements in North Atlantic societies share a kind of ‘civilizationism’ in which they see Islam as a threat to their civilizational integrity. These tend to respond to this threat with a political ideology known as ‘Christianism.’” To the USA and Western Europe, we can add the V4 countries of Central Europe. Like the USA, right-wing populist leaders in the V4 claim that their countries are under siege from millions of Muslims who want to enter their countries. Unlike the USA, with the memory of 9/11 still recent, the V4 countries have no record of terrorist or extremist incidents involving Muslims. Both the V4 countries and the USA highlight their foundational “Christian values” and their feared undermining by the “alien” tenets of Islam. For right-wing populists, this is primarily what distinguishes the “civilized” western societies from “barbaric” Muslims. Among the right-wing populists of Europe and the USA, the role of Christianity is “almost entirely identitarian,” that is, it relates to and is supportive of indigenous white people’s political interests. DeHanas and Shterin (2018: 178) explain that “[p]opulist politicians evoke a reinvented Christian past to warn about the existential threat of its loss in the face of invading Muslims robbing it from the present. . . . It is clear . . . that populist politicians borrow liberally from each other.” The first section of the chapter briefly surveys the political emergence of Christian civilizationism and anti-Muslim politics in the Visegrád group of countries. The Visegrád grouping was founded nearly 30 years, in 1991, as the Communist systems which developed after World War II as result of Soviet control, fell apart. The claimed raison d’être of the Visegrád group is a shared civilizational and culture emanating from their common claimed adhesion to the Roman Catholic church. The second section covers the social and political impact of secularization, during both Communist and postCommunist eras. The third section examines “Christianism” and “culturalization” of religion and citizenship in the Visegrád countries. The concluding section summarizes the concern of the chapter in the context of V4 right-wing populist parties’ civilizationist policies in relation to the May 2019 European parliamentary elections.



Central Europe 179

THE VISEGRÁD FOUR: CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATIONISM AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM The Visegrád Group (also known as the “Visegrád Four” or simply “V4”) reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots in diverse religious traditions, which they wish to preserve and further strengthen. (Emphasis added; “About the Visegrád group” 2019; http:// www.visegradgroup.eu/about)

This quotation refers to the V4 countries as being “part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots in diverse religious traditions.” Each of the four member countries has an important Roman Catholic church and a tiny Muslim minority (Author’s interviews with #69, 81, 82). The allusion to a shared “single civilization” in the quotation highlights right-wing populists’ claim that Islam is an alien culture and religion. This claim is not only based on recent events, such as 9/11 and subsequent Islamist terrorism and extremism in Western Europe. There is also a pronounced historical dimension. For example, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, frequently refers to historic events in his anti-Islamic rhetoric, notably Hungary’s ancient conflict with putative and actual Muslim invaders, by highlighting an unsuccessful attempt by a Muslim army to invade Vienna in 1683 (Mandhai 2017). A second dimension of a historically-based foundation of the fear of Islamic expansion is reflected in the origins of the Visegrád Group, formed, as the Soviet empire fell apart, on 15 February 1991 at Visegrád, Hungary. The then president of the Czechoslovak Republic, Václav Havel; the then president of the Republic of Poland, Lech Wałęsa; and the then prime minister of the Republic of Hungary, József Antall, agreed to create “an imaginary historical arch linking the idea of this meeting to the idea of a similar meeting, which took place there in 1335.” This meeting was “attended by John of Luxembourg, King of Bohemia, Charles I of Anjou (Charles Robert), King of Hungary, and Casimir III, King of Poland. The central motif of the two meetings was the desire to intensify mutual cooperation and friendship among the three Central European states” (“History of the Visegrád group” 2019). Two years after the founding of the modern iteration of the Visegrád group, in 1993, Czechoslovakia divided into two separate countries: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. An important purpose of the 1335 meeting was to highlight the shared civilizational and cultural values of the then rulers of Bohemia, Hungary

180

Chapter Eight

and Poland. In 1991, the common enemy of the modern states of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was Soviet Communism and their shared goal was to establish liberal democratic political systems, following encouragement from the USA and the European Union. Today, the priorities of the V4 have changed: liberal democracy is challenged by what Orbán refers to as “illiberal democracy.” There is great concern at the nature of the European Union’s influence as, it is alleged, it seeks to encourage Muslim emigration. This was particularly pronounced during and after the 2015 refugee crisis. From this time, V4 governments began “to politicize migration and started to promote a ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative identifying ‘migrants’/‘refugees’ as threats to indigenous cultures and as a danger to workers “whose jobs they were supposedly taking, and later as potential terrorists threatening Europe” (Majtenyi, Kopper and Susanszky, 2019: 179). The V4 governments’ stringent anti-immigration policies were necessary, they claimed, to protect their countries from being “overrun” by Muslim “hordes,” who would threaten the economic livelihood of indigenous people, while also posing a security threat due to terrorism. The four Visegrád group countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—have a combined population of circa 63.5 million people.3 This represents a sizeable proportion of people who inhabit Central Europe. Collectively, they see themselves as having common civilizational and cultural attributes, including a shared Christian civilization. Brubaker (2017a) claims that their governments’ strongly anti-Muslim stance is ideologically different than that of right-wing populists in Western Europe, including those in Germany, Italy, France, and the UK. For Brubaker, a key difference between right-wing populists in Western compared to those of Central Europe, including the V4 grouping, is that in Western Europe they focus on the “enemy within,” that is, the millions of Muslims that currently live there. Many Western European countries were particularly concerned by the cultural and social effects of impact of the hundreds of thousands of mainly Muslim refugees and migrants who entered Germany in particular in 2015. Governments in the Visegrád group, on the other hand, exploit the fear of what might happen if their countries were “flooded” by Muslim refugees/migrants, fearing the effects on their cultures and civilizations. Each of the V4 countries has a background of Communism, which is now widely condemned in each of them. In addition, right-wing populists in the V4 decry Muslims and Islamism as a totalitarian ideology aiming to destroy indigenous Christian cultures and civilizational values. The right-wing populist pose two key questions: Is Islam compatible with Western democracy and liberal conceptions of human rights? If not, is it capable of reform? (Delingpole 2016).



Central Europe 181

Each of the Visegrád countries has seen recent significant growth in support for anti-Muslim, right-wing populist parties. In Hungary, the Fidesz party won a landslide majority in parliamentary elections in April 2018. The Organization for European Cooperation and Development, which was monitoring the election, found that the poll was marred by “intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric, media bias and opaque campaign financing” (Walker and Boffey 2018). In Poland, the PiS party achieved 37.6 percent of the vote in the 2015 parliamentary elections which provided the party with 235 of 460 seats (51 percent), an overall majority of four (BBC News 2015). The Czech Republic’s most recent parliamentary elections took place in October 2017. The ANO 2011 party won seventy-eight of 200 seats, an increase of thirty-one seats compared to the previous election in 2013. The rise of ANO 2011 was mirrored by the decline of the traditionally dominant, Czech Social Democrat Party, which lost thirtyfive seats in 2017 compared to 2013. Finally, in Slovakia, the 2016 elections were overall a good result for assorted right-wing populists. Two such parties, the Slovak National Party and Kotleba—People”s Party Our Slovakia respectively gained fifteen and fourteen seats in the 150-seat parliament. In addition, another right-wing populist party—a new one, called We are Family—gained eleven seats. In 2019, there was no dominant party in the parliament, a position once filled by Robert Fico’s Direction—Social Democracy Party. Following the 2016 elections, Fico’s party had forty-nine seats, down from eighty-three in the previous parliament. Overall, right-wing, anti-immigration parties did well in the parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2016. RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND SECULARIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST CENTRAL EUROPE The countries of the V4 are not religiously uniform, although in each the Roman Catholic church is the dominant confession. Poland is often noted as a Christian country, partly because 95 percent of Poles profess allegiance to the Church, and partly because nearly half (47 percent) of young Poles claim to attend Mass weekly. Hungary, on the other hand, is an example of a post-Christian, secular nation: half of Hungarians report that they are not practicing Christians; a mere 3 percent of young Hungarians attend Mass weekly (Bullivant 2018). These data suggest that Hungary is “one of the least religious European countries, with less than 10 percent of the population regularly attending church services” (“Why an anti-Islam campaign has taken root in Hungary, a country with few Muslims,” 2016). Like Hungary, the Czech Republic is also notably secular. According to Evans (2017), “The vast majority of adults in Central and Eastern Europe

182

Chapter Eight

identify with a religious group,” citing evidence from a recent Pew Research Center survey (2017b) of eighteen countries in the region. But there in one country in the V4 which is an exception to this pattern: the Czech Republic, where a majority of the population is religiously unaffiliated and does not believe in God. It is often argued that the Czech Republic is one of the most secular countries in the world. This claim is usually based on sociological surveys and census data which show that only a small proportion of Czechs goes regularly to church and that most of the Czech Republic’s population does not report even a formal affiliation to any church (Hamplova 2010). Seven in ten Czechs (72 percent) do not identify with a religious group, including 46 percent who describe their religion as “nothing in particular” and an additional 25 percent who say “atheist” describes their religious identity. When it comes to religious belief—as opposed to religious identity—66 percent of Czechs say they do not believe in God, compared with just 29 percent who do. (While a lack of affiliation and a lack of belief may seem to go hand in hand, that is not always the case. In the USA, for example, a majority of religiously unaffiliated adults—61 percent—claim to believe in God.) “Even in the former Eastern Bloc that was dominated by the officially atheist Soviet Union throughout much of the 20th century, the Czech Republic is a major outlier by both of these measures” (Pew Research Center 2017b). As in the Czech Republic, Slovakia’s largest church is the Roman Catholic church, to which just under 70 percent of Slovaks profess membership. Smaller Christian denominations include Lutherans (6.9 percent), Greek Catholics (4.1 percent), Protestant Reformers (2.0 percent) and the Orthodox Church (0.9 percent). “In general, it can be said that people in Slovakia are religious (at least, more religious than most of the European countries). Although, many Slovaks claim being part of a religion, but actually, except of days like Christmas or Easter they do not visit the church a lot (or never)” (“Religion” 2015). Overall, the religious landscape in the V4 is variable. Hungary and the Czech Republic stand out for their lack of enthusiasm for religion, including Christianity. Poland and to an extent Slovakia are notable for their zeal for religion, especially Christianity. In each of the four countries, Islam has a tiny, highly minority, presence: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia each have fewer than 0.1 percent, that is, in Hungary, some 30,000 people in a country of 38 million (“Islam in Hungary,” n/d); in Poland, fewer than 10,000 people; 3,500 people in the Czech Republic, and, in Slovakia, 0.4 percent4 (Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr 2017; “Islam in Hungary,” n/d; “Religion” 2015). Poland is the only country in the V4 which has a close link between the ruling right-wing populist government and the dominant Christian church.



Central Europe 183

In 2015, Poland elected a right-wing, anti-Islam, populist party, the Law and Justice Party (Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc, or PiS). PiS, founded in 2001 by twin brothers, Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, has a close relationship with the upper echelons of the Catholic Church. PiS gained power “on a platform of restoring Polish pride and keeping refugees out of the country” (Mandhai 2017). “In the PiS conception, the Polish people are considered to be homogenous and catholic” (Greven 2016). A Catholic radio station, Radio Maryja, provides symbolic support of the coalescing of Catholicism and Polish identity (Hennig 2011). In other words, Poland’s current government is not simply nationalist, as Brubaker (2017a) contends; it also invokes Poland’s Catholic culture in its anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies (Kalmar 2018). Poland is sometimes identified as a nation contoured by anti-Semitism and it appears that this historic “anti-Other” sentiment is transferred into today’s anti-Islamism (Greven 2016). Today, Poland is marked by clear signs of anti-Muslim feeling. For example, the country’s Independence Day march in 2017 attracted an estimated 60,000 people. Many were thought to be from far-right groups. A banner carried at the march pictured “a trojan horse labelled ‘Islam’ attempting to enter a fortress marked ‘Europe.’” Inside the trojan horse was a stereotyped caricature of a Middle Eastern man with a long nose, wearing a suicide vest and carrying a banner which read “I’m a refugee” (Mandhai 2017). According to a Krakow University of Economics assistant professor, Konrad Pedziwiatr, who has written extensively about Islam and Muslims in Europe, “fears of Islam and an influx of refugees to Poland, similar to what neighbouring EU countries experienced, have been amplified by politicians and sections of the media.” Pedziwiatr explains that sections of the media “lump together the issues of terrorism, the refugee crisis, and Islam,” a situation which “helped the Law and Justice party come to power” (Mandhai 2017). Decades of Communism and years of membership of the European Union combined to encourage a trend towards secularization in many countries in Central Europe (Krzystof 2006; author’s interview with #21). Modernization theory long predicted weakening of religious faith and consequent demise of religious institutions as societies became more “modern,” that is, more secular, and in the case of the V4, more focused on becoming “European,” that is, having the attributes of Western European countries. Under Communist rule in particular, “Science” attacked faith unremittingly, undermining question spiritual explanations of the world. Literal interpretations of religious teachings, on which traditional religious hegemonies were based, were strongly, even fatally, undermined. Communist domination hastened the decline of the hold of religion in communist-controlled Eastern Europe. Following the Bolshevik revolution and subsequent Soviet Communist control of Eastern

184

Chapter Eight

Europe, ruling regimes sought to absorb the religious in the political, and even the scientific within the political. Furthermore, the repressive force of the state and decades-long official atheistic campaigns helped accelerate secularization, making predictions of religious demise all the more compelling. Modernization tends to go hand in hand with secularization, manifested in various ways, including: declining percentages of people believing in God, numbers of people coming into the clergy, and in relation to church-related behavior, including attendance at services of worship and adherence to church-dictated codes of personal behavior—on sexuality, reproduction, and marriage. In some European countries, Catholics, including many women, once regarded as completely under the thumb of papal domination, now increasingly choose to follow their own conceptions of morality and not that of the Church. For example, three Western European Catholic countries—that is, Ireland, Italy, and Spain—have seen a rapid decline in church-related religion (Itçaïna 2019). Consequently, the Church is now much less authoritative than it once was, especially when seeking to pronounce on social, moral and ethical issues. The situation in Central Europe followed a similar pattern following the retreat and demise of Communism. Perhaps surprisingly, the post-Communist era did not lead to a uniform reassertion or regaining of the Church’s former social and political power in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (Michel 1994). This would seem to support the claim that secularization normally proceeds in industrialized societies except when “religion finds or retains work to do other than relating people to the supernatural” (Wallis and Bruce 1992). Generally, in Europe, exceptions to this include Muslim emigrants and their offspring in Western European countries, including the Netherlands, France, and Germany. What many had in common was a desire to retain their religious and cultural behavioral codes and sense of identity as a means to try to cope with often profound change identity problems as they moved to what many perceived as alien cultural contexts. However, such a counter-example is not sufficient to falsify the theory that normally modernization leads to increased secularization. Two decades ago, Berger (1999: 35) predicted onset of a “massively secular Euroculture and it is not fanciful to predict that there will be similar developments in eastern Europe.” Focusing pro-democracy demands in various Christian churches in the 1980s in several Soviet-controlled countries, including the German Democratic Republic and Poland, was not because the anti-communist opposition necessarily believed that strong religious involvement was necessary for democratization. It was for an altogether more mundane reason. In Soviet-controlled societies there were few if any alternative social spaces where political opposition could organize—as in these totalitarian environ-



Central Europe 185

ments all aspects of life, except for the interior of churches, were dominated by the party-state. Church buildings sometimes offered a physical space—if their clergy was sympathetic to anti-Communist, pro-democracy demands; not all were: many priests also worked for the KGB or the Stasi (Philips 1997). Yet, crucially, the state—watched closely in the 1980s and early 1990s by international human rights groups—became no longer prepared to use strong-arm tactics reminiscent of the 1950s to control or crush religion tout court. In Soviet-controlled countries, the churches’ political importance was essentially transitory in the period between the demise of Communism and the onset of democratic politics (Johnston 1993, Michel 1994). It was almost wholly reflective of a fundamental shift in public opinion during a brief historical period—that is, an increase in dissidence which of necessity focused upon the churches as relatively open social spaces, places from where the anti-communist struggle could be organized. However, once democracy was won, churches’ political influence quickly waned. Put another way, there was a partial religious reprivatization which led to a declining political and social voice. This was despite widespread adherence to religious beliefs at the level of the individual. Overall, the aggregate trend in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe was that, under conditions of democratic pluralism which occurred from the early 1990s, secular materialism was the main goal of many people and in the process most turned away from traditional forms of religiosity. While churches were often emblematic of anti-Soviet nationalism in the USSR’s satellites, once the Communist regimes were removed and democratically competitive party systems were introduced, most people quickly transferred political allegiances to secular political parties. In recent years, many have looked to right-wing populist parties and their leaders to reflect their political preferences. At the end of the 1980s, almost overnight, it seems, there was an extensive— and, for the most part, surprisingly peaceful—shift in power from Communist authorities to post-Communist regimes. The return of religion, as a civilizational alternative to the aggressive secularism of Communism, was not widely anticipated. In the early 1990s, Michel (1991:125) had predicted that this could happen only “by some miracle.” A handful of years later, Martin (1994) claimed to see evidence of a reversal of secularization, in effect, a re-Christianization of post-Soviet Eastern Europe. It is important however to be clear as to what has and what has not happened. A renewed right for religious institutions to work openly and without state control does not necessarily imply a situation where they necessarily regain previously high levels of social and political power. In addition, the onset of post-Communism religious freedom did not necessarily negate the effects of secularization and does not mean that people inevitably

186

Chapter Eight

become religious again. After Communist rule, secularization advanced in the V4 and in Central and Eastern Europe more generally, in the sense of a palpable and seemingly permanent reduction of the political importance and social significance of religious leaders, dictates, and institutions. CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATIONISM AND THE “CULTURALIZATION” OF RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES We noted earlier that “Christianism” is an ideology which self-identified adherents of “Christian civilization” employ to try to make their values and beliefs the only ones which are respected. Sullivan (2003) is often credited with coining the term in 2003. He defines “Christianism,” also referred to as “Christian civilizationism,” as a “partisan ideology” with only a superficial appearance of Christianity. Writing nearly 20 years ago, Sullivan believed that he was identifying an emerging ideology associated with America’s religious right which, he averred, drew on the Gospels for political reasons, that is, to try to increase their “power, control and oppression.” For Sullivan, however, such people were not “true” Christians but were using the faith instrumentally for partisan political ends. Jethani (n/d) notes that what appeared to Sullivan as a fringe minority in 2003 is now a major presence in the USA, and has become mainstream. Earlier, we noted that Trump’s election to president in November 2016 was helped by the strong support of various self-identified Christian groups, notably white Christian evangelicals, as well as Catholics and Protestants (who supported Trump in the election with 81, 60, and 58 percent respectively). It may be that Trump represents to such voters a good example of a Christian; or, perhaps more likely, although Trump may not appear to be especially “Christian” to such voters, it is his brand of conservatism, which some have contended is notable for its radical views on some minority groups in the USA, which appeals to them. As Ryan (2018) notes, his appeal is encapsulated in the slogan “Make America Great Again,” which to some evokes past images of a mainly “white” America. Right wing populists in the V4 use Christianist ideologies to “culturalize” both religion and citizenship, often to the detriment of Muslims. “Culturalization” refers to adaptation to or imposition of the culture of a nation or people on another group, in this case, “Christian” Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks acting in reference to Muslims. According to Rogers Brubaker (2016), “the culturalization of religion is doubly convenient from a nationalist-populist point of view. On the one hand, it allows Christianity to



Central Europe 187

be privileged as culture in a way that it cannot be privileged as religion, given the liberal state’s commitment to neutrality in religious matters.” In addition, “it allows minority religious practices, redefined as cultural, to be restricted in a way that would not otherwise be possible, given the liberal state’s commitment to religious freedom. The most striking example of this is the French legislation banning the full face veil in public.” Religion’s culturalization overlaps with what is sometimes referred to as the “culturalization of citizenship.” This is a reference to the “increasingly salient role of culture (‘emotions, feelings, norms and values, and symbols and traditions’) in debates about access to full citizenship and about ‘what it means to be a citizen.’” Religion is of course widely seen as a prime milieu of political culture, and culturalization of citizenship “brings religion to the fore in debates about immigration, integration, and citizenship” (Brubaker 2016; also see Joppke 2018 and Kalmar 2019; author’s interview with #49). According to Brubaker (2017) in the V4 countries and more widely in Eastern Europe, right-wing populism’s political appeal has three main components. It is anti-liberal, anti-Muslim, and pro-nationalism. In addition, there is a cultural “memory” of invasion including, most recently, Russian Communism and much longer ago, periodic attempts at Muslim invasion. In Eastern Europe, both Islamic and liberal values are rejected. The rejection of Islam is to be understood in the context of the 2015 refugees crisis and “the reactivation of an old imaginary of Eastern countries as a Christian ‘bulwark’ against Islam. As for liberal values, they are seen as a threat for the nation integrity, reminding us [that is, foreign observers] of the communist past of these countries” (“Conférence du 06/03/2017: Rogers Brubaker,” 2017: 1) Regarding anti-liberalism and anti-Islam, the political appeal of right-wing populists in the V4 is strongly linked to their capacity to take the mantle of indigenous cultural values and contrast them with the claimed alien liberal values of the EU and the “anti-liberal,” “traditional” Muslim values which, the right-wing populists claim, are inferior and culturally alien to their own— allegedly superior—“Christian values.” The “liberal values” of the EU extend to the claim of right-wing populists that political and business elites, who are said to control the Union, are intent on flooding their countries with Muslim immigrants with the intention not only of undermining “Christian civilization” but also of undercutting wage levels of indigenous workers. A “liberal” billionaire, the Hungarian-American George Soros, is the main target in this respect. Soros’s considerable financial capacity is said to bankroll the policy (Majtenyi, Kopper and Susanszky 2019: 179). Each of the four Visegrád countries gives a high political profile to what their governments claim is a serious threat from large numbers of Muslims not only intent to enter and live in their countries but also, as result, undermine

188

Chapter Eight

their “Christian civilization” and replace it with an “alien” Islamic one. Csaky, a senior researcher with Freedom House, noted that: “Central Europe has little experience with immigration, and recent terror attacks in Western Europe could easily be used by politicians to whip up negative feelings” (Csaky, quoted in Maza). The right-wing populists tend to be rather instrumental in this regard, “approaching the question very cynically and seeing it as an opportunity to increase support.” The same could be said for their anti-EU stances, which were key aspects of their policies in relation to May 2019’s European parliamentary elections (Maza 2017). Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, was a trailblazer in this respect. Orbán’s party, Fidesz, first gained power in 2010. Since then, Orbán has projected himself as the only real defender of Hungary and its “Christian civilizational” values, a staunch opponent of a Muslim “tide” engulfing Hungary, strongly antipathetic to Islam’s allegedly “alien” values, principles, and tenets. Orbán is “a strong opponent of the EU’s migration policies, and built a fence on Hungary’s southern borders in 2015 to keep out migrants, saying protecting the EU”s external borders was the only way to preserve Christian values” (Than 2018b). Orbán instrumentally uses references to Hungary’s Christian civilization, traditions and history for political gain. These themes featured in his 2017 national “Christmas message” broadcast on Hungarian state media. In the broadcast, Orbán contrasted what he alleged were different “Christian” and “Islamic” values: Our [Christian] culture is the culture of life. Our starting point, the alpha and omega of our philosophy is the value of life, the dignity every person received from God—without this, we couldn’t value “human rights” and other modern phenomena either. And this is why [it] is questionable for us, whether these can be imported into civilizations built on different pillars. [. . .] The fundaments of European life are under attack. We don’t want our Christmas markets to be renamed, and we definitely don’t want to retreat behind concrete blocks [. . .] We don’t want our Christmas masses to be surrounded by fear and distress. We don’t want out women, our daughters to be harassed in the New Year’s Eve crowd. (“Viktor Orbán”s Christmas message” 2017)

Several overtly anti-Muslim components of this speech stand out, illustrative more generally of Orbán’s claims about Muslims. He identifies “human rights” with Christian values only, alleges that Christmas is under threat due to multiculturalism, identifies Islamist terrorism as a significant threat, and fears that Hungarian females are not safe on the streets because of Muslim sex criminals, in an implicit reference to alleged events on the streets of Köln and several other German cities on New Year’s Eve, 2015 (Pasamonik 2019).



Central Europe 189

Three of the four Visegrád countries had right-wing populist governments in 2019 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Several had large majorities. Both PiS and Fidesz have built their electoral appeal by emphasizing a “nationalism based on soil, blood, or culture; take a hard line against immigration; and have . . . quickly started to dismantle key democratic institutions like the free media and an independent judiciary” (Eiermann, Mounck and Gultchin 2017). Henley (2018b) notes that both Fidesz and PiS “only started showing their true colours—populist, culturally conservative, authoritarian— after they were first elected.” In 2019, the governments of Hungary and Poland were “attacking core liberal institutions such as the independent judiciary and free press, increasingly defining national identities in terms of ethnicity and religion and demonising opponents, such as the Hungarian-born Jewish financier George Soros, in language reminiscent of the 1930s” (Henley 2018b). Poland’s government “accuses past governments, the opposition and the urban elites of hankering after European approval and acceptance to the detriment of Polish interests.” According to Rafal Pstragowski, mayor of Sniadowo: “Poland is a traditional Christian country and Poland respects other religions, but we want our culture to be respected, too.” In addition, he claimed, “[t]here is a fear among people that Western secularism is a threat to our traditional culture. If things in Europe keep going in the same direction, people think that the migration crisis and terrorist attacks could start here, too” (Erlanger 2018). The Hungarian government claims to be in the forefront of attempts to defend both Hungarians and by extension “European values” from an “assault” by the “European Union’s leadership” which, Orbán’s government claims, seeks to “dismantle nation-states and Christian civilization, using mass Islamic migration as a battering ram.” In an interview with The New American at the cabinet office in Budapest in September 2018, a Hungarian government spokesman, Zoltán Kovács, condemned what he believed was EU bullying, linking the issue to the bid for prolonger centralized control which developed during Communist rule—and which was resisted by Hungarians and others, leading to the demise of the Soviet Union and regional expressions of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the threat of sanctions and “other attacks from Brussels,” Kovács claimed that Hungary’s government would “continue resisting and upholding the will of the people as expressed at the voting booth” (Newman 2018). The political successes of Orbán in Hungary is demonstrative of a wider development in the V4: the appeal of many long-established, mainstream parties of the left, right, and center has significantly weakened and the beneficiaries have been right-wing, anti-Muslim, populist politicians and their parties. Typically, they find themselves vilified by established power holders and this helps to reinforce their message of being outsiders who, like the mass

190

Chapter Eight

of ordinary people, are cold-shouldered by a remote, liberal, and corrupt elite both within their countries and the European Union. The right-wing populists highlight in their political and electoral strategies identity issues. At the core of their conceptions in this regard are civilizational issues, namely the issue of Europe’s Christian culture, allegedly under attack from Islam. In the Czech Republic, the centrist ANO movement—led by the billionaire media mogul Andrej Babis˘, whom some have compared to Donald Trump (Achilleos-Sarll and Martill 2019)—won elections in October 2017 with 29.6 percent of the vote. Three parties were close to tying for second place, including the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD). Following announcement of the election results, the SPD leader, Tomio Okamura, announced that his party wanted to “stop any Islamization of the Czech Republic; we push for zero tolerance of migration” (Maza 2017). Babis˘’s ANO did not form a government with the SPD; instead, it entered into a coalition with the Civic Democratic Party, a liberal-conservative grouping. On the other hand, as Zselyke Csaky, a senior researcher with Freedom House, noted: “the SPD’s Islamophobic rhetoric has pushed ANO to take a tougher stance against immigrants and refugees, many of whom come from Muslim countries” (Maza 2017). This suggests that, as in Hungary and Poland, the Czech Republic is seeking to confront a “fear of the unknown.” That is, unlike most Western European states, the Visegrád countries have not experienced mass migration, whether of Muslims or any other identifiable group. Nevertheless, recent Islamist terrorist attacks in France, Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere have been used by right-wing populist politicians in the four countries to encourage negative opinions of immigration in general and Muslim immigration in particular. As in the United States and a number of Western European countries, some right-wing politicians and activists express views about Muslims characterized by Islamophobia. Prominent among them is Czech lawyer, activist, and politician Klára Samková. She argues that “Islam is a ‘criminal’ ideology which deserves to be ranked with ‘Nazism, fascism and communism,’ is ‘incompatible with the principles of European law’ and, like its totalitarian predecessors, must inevitably be defeated.” She made these claims in a speech in the Czech Parliament in May 2016 to an audience which included some ambassadors from Muslim countries—including the representative of Turkey, who walked out in the middle of the speech. Samková’s speech addresses issues rarely aired in what a Breitbart journalist calls “polite circles in Western democracies,” which are said to “find it convenient to dismiss them as extremist or Islamophobic or needlessly inflammatory” (Delingpole 2016). Although Samková is widely regarded as an extremist, her views do not seem categorically different from the Czech prime minister, Andrej Babis˘.



Central Europe 191

Like his counterparts in Hungary and Poland, Babis˘ was against the EU’s proposal to introduce a quota system by which all EU member states would take in a predetermined number of refugees from developing countries, including the Muslim world. Speaking in September 2018, Babis˘ claimed that: “Illegal migration from Muslim countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East poses a danger to European civilization based on Christian foundations . . . We [in the Czech Republic] take illegal migration as a threat to the European civilization.” He continued: “We don’t want to live [in our home] like people live in Africa or the Middle East. We must stop [immigration from Muslim states]. If Frenchmen, the Dutch or Belgians want to obtain [more Daesh supporters] than they have today, it’s up to them.” Babis˘ then went on to address the border issue, speaking out for tightening the EU’s external borders (“Muslim migrants are “threat” to European civilization—Czech PM” 2018). Finally, Slovakia was plunged into political turmoil when its government lost power in March 2018. Robert Fico’s government was compelled to resign following an enormous political scandal. As noted above, the scandal centered on the murder of an investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancé, Martina Kušnírová. Both were found dead at their shared home in the village of Veľká Mača, about 60 km east of the capital, Bratislava. They had been killed by gunshot wounds in what appeared to be a targeted assassination (Bruna 2018). Fico proclaimed in May 2016 that “Islam has no place in Slovakia” because “migrants change the character of our country.” He declared that he would not allow such a change to affect Slovakia (Tharoor 2016). The fact that Fico was no longer prime minister after May 2018 did not mean that pressure on Islam abated in Slovakia. Taking into consideration the size of the tiny Muslim community in Slovakia—Muslims make up around 0.1 percent of the total population, around 5,000 people—Islamophobia is not historically a major topic in Slovak political and social discourse. This, however, changed dramatically during and following Europe’s 2015 “refugee crisis.” Yet because Slovakia offered shelter to almost no refugees, the discourse was mostly virtual. As a result, by far most obvious is Islamophobia on the Internet and Islamophobic statements by many Slovak politicians, such as Fico (Islamic Foundation in Slovakia 2017). Given the tiny number of Muslims in Slovakia and the strong desire not to allow more into the country, Slovakia’s bid to criminalize Islam seems both surprising and unnecessary. Werleman (2018) reports that the aim of the bill was to amend a pre-existing law. This stated that “a religion must attain 20,000 followers (signatures) before it can be considered a state religion.” Not having this legal status allows the state to identify a religion as unlawful. It also has the effect of making the religion “ineligible for government tax

192

Chapter Eight

subsidies, while, at the same time, forbidding public houses of worship. The new law, however, doubled the threshold from 25,000 to 50,000 signatures” (ibid.). Slovak politicians may be aware that they appear to use a sledge hammer to crack a nut, given that the country contains so few followers of Islam. Why then make the law? Slovak National Party (SNP) chairman Andrej Danko, in an interview with Reuters in 2016, stated that: “Islamization starts with a kebab and it’s already under way in Bratislava, let’s realise what we will face in five to 10 years . . . We must do everything we can so that no mosque is built in the future” (Jancarikova 2016). Overall, the governments of the Visegrád countries argue that protection of their borders and reducing immigration to a minimum is a sine qua non to protect and preserve their Christian foundations and values. In this respect, maintenance of Christian values dovetails neatly with nationalism, which focuses on the undesirability of allowing people into the country who do not share extant national values based in Christian values and belief. Such nationalism, it is claimed, is widely inclusive, as it claims to welcome all peoples, races, and ethnicities to share in the blessings of Christian civilization, as long as they are willing to protect and perpetuate a common tradition, custom, and culture rooted in Christian ideals and practices (Turley 2017). It is often the case that an anti-Islam stance in a country is closely linked to an economic downturn, whereby increased immigration implies for many new competitors for jobs, some of whom would be prepared to undercut the wage levels of indigenous workers. However, “the Czech experience shows it can be more complicated than that. Only 2.3 percent of the country’s workforce is out of a job, the lowest rate in the EU” (Henley 2018b). In 2017, the Czech Republic’s economy grew by 4.3 percent, well above the EU average, and the country was untouched by the 2015 European refugee crisis. But in the 2018 general election populist parties won just over 40 percent, a tenfold increase from 1998. As in Poland, the Czech Republic demonstrates that the “factors behind populism’s surge are both far more complex and infinitely more varied than first thought, and that a voter’s decision to cast their ballot for a populist party is just as often a reflection of psychological state as of circumstances and identity” (ibid.) Each of the four Visegrád governments have positioned themselves at the forefront of Central European nations opposing migration quotas. Each of the four governments claims to be acting in defense and support of “Christian values.” In Hungary and Poland, Fidesz and PiS have learned that their political fortunes are tied to their ability to highlight cultural and identity politics, contrasting their “desirable” “family values” with, on the one hand, unwelcome liberal EU values (“godless, freethinking, gender-bending Western Europe”) and, on the other, allegedly alien values of Islam: “extremism,” terrorism, propensity to violence, misogyny, and sharia



Central Europe 193

law (Haynes 2019a). Both Hungary and Poland have, in addition, taken steps to close their borders to mass immigration and the ensuing cultural upheaval that such immigration would entail (Goździak and Marton 2018). Viewing the attempts of Germany to integrate up to a million mainly Muslim refugees from Syria and elsewhere, the Polish government announced in April 2017 that it would not accept 7,000 immigrants that it had previously agreed to take under European Union pressure. Polls indicate that this was in line with the preferences of most Poles (Henley 2018b). CONCLUSION: RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF MAY 2019 Huntington expressed the ideology of a “clash of civilizations” approach when he claimed to identify an emerging clash of civilizations between the West and various non-Western civilizations, including Islam. It would be necessary, he averred, for civilizational allies to work together to defend shared values. Such a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” ideology is a key component of the approach of politically important right-wing populists in the countries of the V4, including in the largest countries of the grouping, Hungary and Poland. Uniformly, the V4 governments attack the so-called liberal values of the EU, especially in relation to cultural values—which V4 governments claim are rooted in their countries’ cultural histories, especially Christian foundations and beliefs. Finally, V4 governments claim that the EU is seeking to undermine those values by wishing to compel all member states to accept “unwanted” Muslim refugees, including from the civil war in Syria, whose presence, they claim, would fatally undermine extant Christian civilizational values by “diluting” them with different, and inferior, “Muslim values”: that is, “extremism,” “terrorism,” “misogyny,” and “sharia law.” Justification for this approach is that the governments of the V4 claim that the four countries’ partnership, with its foundations in a meeting held nearly 700 years ago—in 1355—has “always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots in diverse [Christian] religious traditions, which they wish to preserve and further strengthen” (“About the Visegrád Group” 2019). The V4 governments not only “advocate for highly restrictive immigration policies and protectionist economic policies” which are presumably electorally popular—but also “embrace nationalist ideology and defend Christian cultural legacies” (Eiermann, Mounck and Gultchin, 2017). On the other hand, the V4 countries do not want to leave the European Union, from which

194

Chapter Eight

there are welcome financial subventions (Meijers and van de Veer 2019). But they do wish to reform the EU rather fundamentally, making it less an ever-closer union with, they believe, unacceptably “liberal” values to a looser alliance of nations not an increasingly collaborative enterprise leading to a European “super state.” The chapter highlighted and sought to explicate some of the views of what is identified as a “coalition of Christian traditionalists” in the Visegrád grouping of countries (“Viktor Orbán welcomes Steve Bannon’s efforts on behalf of the European far right” 2018). Leading up to the May 2019 European parliamentary elections, Donald Trump’s former chief strategist, Steve Bannon, sought to lend his experience and expertise from involvement in the successful Trump presidential campaign in 2016 to work with the V4’s Christian traditionalists and other European right-wing populists. This was in the context of a transnational entity of which Bannon was a member, called “The Movement.” Its aim was to assist right-wing European populists achieve political success in the May 2019 European parliamentary elections. The overall aim, according to Bannon, was that by 2030 Europe would look “like a community of independent and sovereign nation-states that cooperate free from Brussels’ dictate.” According to the British newspaper, The Guardian, in November 2018, Hungary’s Fidesz was “sending mixed signals,” although Viktor Orbán was said to be personally supportive of “The Movement.” A journalist, Leila Munteanu, listening to Orbán at a May 2018 meeting of the V4, stated that she “was hearing the voice and seeing the face of Steve Bannon . . . the newest apostle of populist internationalism and anti-globalization” (“Viktor Orbán welcomes Steve Bannon’s efforts on behalf of the European far right” 2018). On the other hand, Poland’s PiS was “unlikely to join” Bannon’s Movement, while the Czech president, Miloš Zeman stated: “I absolutely disagree with [Bannon’s] views” (Lewis and Rankin 2018). Bannon’s attempt to organize transnationally the right-wing populist parties of the Visegrád group and of Central Europe was illustrative of deepening conflict between several of the original Western European member states of the EU—such as Germany and France—and some newer members of the Union, among them several post-Communist countries in Central Europe. The apparent unravelling of the EU’s once dominant liberal values was seen by some as the main threat to the cohesion and survival of the Union. As the New York Times reported in February 2018, this was “not a simple clash, but a multibannered one of identity, history, values, religion and interpretations of democracy and ‘solidarity’” (Erlanger and Santora 2018). Our examination of right-wing populism in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in this chapter indicates that purveyors of the ideology of Christian civilizationism not only share a perception that the EU is unac-



Central Europe 195

ceptably “liberal.” In addition, right-wing populist leaders share a political stance contoured by a fear or dislike of “Muslim invasion” of their countries, which goes down well electorally with at least some of their countries’ citizens. By extension, their political message involves fears of Islamist extremism and terrorism, of mass Muslim immigration, and of often explicit defense of “Christian values,” expressed in Christian civilizationist ideology. NOTES 1.  Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is an OECD term for a group of countries comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=c entral+and+eastern+europe+countries). Once, all CEECs part of “Eastern Europe,” satellites of the Soviet Union. Today the term “Eastern Europe” no longer covers the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, which are located in Central Europe and, since 2004, have been are members of the European Union. 2.  Visegrád is a city in Hungary. 3.  Hungary, 9.8 million; Poland, 38 million; the Czech Republic, 10.5 million; and Slovakia, 5.5 million (2017 figures). 4.  “But the Poles emerge as the unquestionable leader in these overestimations. Although Muslims make up only around 35,000 of a 38 million population, Poles believe that their number is actually 2.6 million, which would make the Polish Muslim population one of the largest in the European Union after France, Germany and the UK” (Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr 2016).

Conclusion

Bernard Lewis published his influential article on the clash of civilizations in Atlantic Monthly in September 1990. His focus was on conflict between the West and the Muslim world. The issues that he raised remain of central importance both to international relations and to many countries’ domestic social and political arrangements. The topic was picked up by Samuel Huntington, and three decades on, it is still controversial. Huntington’s article and book are among the most cited in political science and international relations literature (Huntington 1993, 1996). The issue upon which he focused—the perceived incompatibility of Western and nonWestern civilizations because of their supposedly conflicting values—is also of central importance at the United Nations, whose dedicated entity, the Alliance of Civilizations, is tasked with finding ways to improve intercivilizational interactions, especially between the West and the Muslim world. Often implicitly, Huntington’s analytical framework has also been instrumental in informing the ideas and ideology of various right-wing populisms, informing a central component of a novel political ideology, Christian civilizationism (or “civilizationism”), a counterpart to Islamism (or political Islam). On the face of it, it seems implausible that Lewis’s argument is still remembered, much less widely seen to be of relevance, given that he first made it nearly seven decades ago. His 1957 speech referred to an article— “Communism and Islam”—which he had published in the international relations journal, International Affairs, in 1954. Lewis asserted in the article that he was “by no means certain that [democracy] represents the common destiny of mankind” (Lewis 1954: 2). He believed that in “the Middle East, only democratic Turkey and democratic Israel were reliable: the Turks, because they had long experience of Russian imperialism; the Jews because of their long experience of Russian antisemitism. Turkey and Israel were forward 197

198

Conclusion

positions against the enemies of freedom, deserving of full support” (quoted in Kramer 2018: 242). Twenty years later, Lewis’s 1976 article (“The return of Islam”) presciently noted the resurgence of political Islam, just as Iran was entering into a period of revolutionary change which would lead to its Islamic state. According to Kramer (2018: 242), Lewis found Huntington’s use of the phrase “clash of civilizations” “too harsh”—even though Lewis had himself coined it. Instead, Lewis believed that a more apposite phrase was “encounter between civilizations” (Lewis 1994: 158).1 This points to the interpretation that Huntington upped the ante when applying Lewis’s ideas to the immediate post-Cold War world, a time of major upheaval, during which the West’s values would not be the only ones that were surfacing and seeking increased influence. Lewis believed there was not a “clash of civilizations” but a clash between “freedom and tyranny.” He believed that democracy could take root and develop anywhere. “Anyone, anywhere in the world . . . [could] develop democratic institutions of a kind” (Lewis 1994: 160 quoted in Kramer 2018: 243). While Lewis believed that Islamist extremism would not be conducive to democratic advances, he had no problem with Islam per se, including in relation to “freedom and democracy,” asserting that Islam “wasn’t antithetical to either. With Western and especially American encouragement and assistance, Arab societies could evolve their own forms of democracy” (Kramer 2018: 244). What was the “crisis of Islam”? Was it the faith of Islam, or political Islam (Islamism), or terrorism, or global jihad? Lewis wasn’t sure—but he was certain that it was the West’s, especially America’s, responsibility to help the Muslim world, especially the Arab world to develop democracy and suitable democratic institutions. Not to do so, would lead inevitably to the demise of the West (Lewis 2006). Huntington’s (1993, 1996) assessment of the situation was to see the Muslim world as more of an overt and immediate threat to the West and its values than did Lewis. Huntington argued that one of the two “sides” was ideationally destined to prevail over the over. Because of their differing values, it would not be possible for them to unite to defeat humanity’s myriad common problems (such as climate change, environmental protection, sustainable development and gender inequality). Over time, a Lewisian view—that is, it is not Islam per se that is the problem but “perversions” of the faith expressed in extremism or terrorism which are the danger—has been significantly amended by many right-wing populists and those adhering to a Christian civilizationist ideology to see the faith and by extensions Muslims tout court as dangerous and threating to the West and its freedoms and democracy. Expressions of Islamist extrem-



Conclusion 199

ism and terrorism since the 1990s were significant in shaping a shift in attitudes. Yet, neither President George W. Bush nor President Barack Obama responded to terrorism carried out by actors motivated by Islamist ideologies by declaring war on “Islam.” President Bush stated a week after 9/11 that “[t]hese acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith.” The US response, Bush decreed, was to go to war with al Qaeda terrorists, whose words and deeds perverted “the peaceful teaching of Islam” (“Islam is Peace, says President” 2001). A few years later, Obama also denied that there was a “clash of civilizations” between the USA and the Muslim world. In June 2009, five months after becoming US president, Obama sought to reach out to Muslim-majority societies in a major speech in Cairo (“The President’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning” 2009). However, the two presidents were not successful in preventing a “clash of civilizations” mentality from spreading and gaining strength at the popular level in America, especially among those who identify with the political and religious right. Right-wing political media such as Fox News and certain politically conservative evangelical leaders became more and more bluntly critical of Islam with each passing year (Khan, Adnan, Kaur, Khuhro, Asghar and Jabeen 2019). By the time of the US presidential election in November 2016, the issue of the relationship between the USA and the Muslim-majority world was very much in the spotlight. During the electoral process, Donald Trump, the republican candidate for president, stated that “I think Islam hates us” (“I Think Islam Hates Us,” 2017). There was no attempt to clarify that he was referring only to “radical Islamic terrorists” (“The Inaugural Address” 2017). What drove Trump’s political campaign in relation to the stated desire to reduce significantly the entry of Muslims into the United States? Part of the answer is linked to the impact of 9/11 on the psyche and worldview of many Americans, some of whom seemed prepared to accept Trump’s claim that “Islam hates us” (García 2018; Waldinger 2018). A fear of “uncontrolled” immigration was another key political issue during the 2016 presidential election, with much concern expressed by Donald Trump about undocumented “Mexicans” entering the United States via the southern border. Like the “Muslim issue,” Trump sought to stoke fears among voters by repeatedly claiming that the US’s southern border was “open,” facilitating the entry of numerous criminals, and prospered politically by doing so (Haynes 2016). Overall, the experiences of the United States are reflective of two issues that have significantly contoured a wide-ranging focus on “the clash of civilizations”: first, international migration, and, second, violent extremism and terrorism. In relation to both, Muslims are often seen to be implicated, despite their own worldviews and values which may well be far away from those of

200

Conclusion

the extremists and terrorists of Islamic State, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and so on. The resulting political impact has been felt not only in the USA but also more widely, in many Western countries’ domestic politics and, internationally, at the United Nations. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPE AND THE USA International migration has been steadily increasing in every region of the globe since the end of World War II. In recent times, individual mobility has increased enormously. Today, approximately 200 million people live outside the country where they were born, while tens of millions of people regularly cross borders. International mobility is part of a broader trend of globalization, which includes trade in goods and services, investments and capital flows, greater ease of travel, and a veritable explosion of information. While trade and capital flows have long been central to many accounts of globalization, international migration is also now an issue of key concern (Haynes 2016). Political conditions in both Europe and the USA are reflective of many people’s approach to politics: they fear “uncontrolled migration.” This was manifested, for example, in June 2016 in the UK, where the vote to “Brexit” from the European Union reflected a widespread belief that migration into the UK was “out of control.” Add to this the impact—and fear—of Islamist violent extremism and terrorism, and the result is an unprecedented “securitization” of Islam in Europe and the USA. Large-scale international migration into Europe became a key issue across the region during and after the summer of 2015, when more than one million people arrived on Europe’s shores; most of them were fleeing political and/ or economic turmoil. Specific issues included the multifaceted aftermath of the Arab Uprisings; continuing political, social, and economic ramifications of Syria’s civil war; declining state capacity in Iraq and Pakistan; state collapse in Afghanistan; and intra-Muslim sectarian violence across much of the Middle East. These individual factors coalesced in the context of globalization and its effects upon national sovereignty. In Europe, right-wing populists sought to thrive politically on the social divisions linked to these developments. In the USA, the then Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, gradually built impressive electoral support by highlighting the dangers of “uncontrolled immigration.” States play a major role in managing international migration. Governments are pivotal in determining migration outcomes, “even when they choose to



Conclusion 201

accept high levels of illegal immigration or when borders are porous and they do not have the capacity to control many forms of migration” (Hollifield and Jacobson 2012). Of course, people migrate for various—political, economic, and social—reasons, but the conditions they encounter and the end results of their quest to move from one territory to another are fundamentally linked to the political and legal conditions which states put in place to deal with migration. It is clear that large-scale international migration into Europe and the USA is transforming politics in both territories. On the one hand, it facilitates the rise of right-wing populists from Austria to Scandinavia. On the other hand, it encourages some previously centrist politicians, such as Nicolas Sarkozy in France, to portray migrants and refugees as pests, undeserving and unwanted, with no right to be treated as citizens (Chazan 2016). If governments are willing to allow international migrants legal access to national territory, to open their countries’ borders to controlled numbers, and to explain the economic necessity of this policy, then in times gone by many voters were willing to accept significant levels of international migration in order to strengthen national economies. When international migrants are accepted legally into a country, then they inevitably soon begin to obtain rights. In the longer term, this process characterized policy towards international migrants in, for example, the UK, France, and Germany, countries which all welcomed economic migrants in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s as necessary to rebuild war-ravaged economies and to set these countries on the road to increased prosperity and economic well-being (Haynes 2017b). But, as is only too clear today from the continuing furore attending the issue of international migration into Europe and the USA, international migration now has profoundly polarizing political as well as economic implications. The message following Europe’s 2015 refugee/migration crisis was found in an increasingly-common refrain: “We”—Germany, France, the UK, and so on—have “too many” Muslims. “Their” values are not “our” values; “we” want “our” country back, and we will get it by ensuring that the number of Muslim immigrants is drastically curtailed. This would ensure not only that indigenous Europeans are treated “fairly” when it comes to economic goods and welfare benefits, but it would also improve security prospects by reducing numbers of potential or actual Muslim terrorists in Europe. Concerns focus on the issue of “our” values and the apparent differences manifested by Muslims and other immigrants. By trying to wear a “burkini” on a French beach, a Muslim female is apparently showing not only that she is subjugated by Islamic males but also indicating open contempt for France’s foundational “secular” and republican values. The importance of the issue is demonstrated by the fact that in 2019 “even” “liberal” Germany was contemplating a partial ban of the Muslim full-face veil. As the prominent CDU

202

Conclusion

politician, Jens Spahn commented, “Germany may not be the right country for those who want to keep their wife in a burka or niqab, especially now that we have become such a sought-after destination. We need to send strong signals about what is acceptable and what isn’t” (Oltermann 2016). Ostensibly, this is about “liberal” German values over which overbearing “Muslim fundamentalist Wahhabis” want to ride roughshod by forcing “their” women to cover their faces and bodies, away from the view of lustful German men. It can also be seen as concern over the idea of a Muslim covering her face, meaning that her visage cannot be seen by others, providing potentially good camouflage for the nefarious planning and execution of terrorist outrages. The “burkini” issue is not only about the right of women to dress—or undress—as they see fit on French beaches. It is also about securitization of the Muslim presence in Europe. Why do many Europeans now seem to fear or be suspicious of their Muslim neighbors? Part of the issue is that today, as a result of the ease of accessing global news, we are now almost instantly aware of what is happening around the world. The rise (and fall) of Islamic State, the civil war in Syria, sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Pakistan, and repeated bomb blasts in many Middle Eastern countries, including Turkey where many Europeans go for the holidays, appear to many Europeans to be components of an increasingly serious security problem: alleged propensity of some Muslims to resort to violence to achieve their religious and/or political objectives. As a result, for some Europeans, a significant Muslim presence in Europe is now unacceptable. If a Muslim tries to enter Europe, for example, to flee Syria’s lengthy and brutal civil war, how do Europeans know that the Muslim in question is not a closet terrorist, sent by Islamic State or al Qaeda to wreak havoc among Europe’s increasingly fearful citizens? The same suspicion is rife in the USA. In May 2016, Guido Menzio, a non-Muslim, University of Pennsylvania Economics professor, delayed a flight in the USA because a fellow passenger became worried and suspicious about the mathematics equation he was working on. Menzio was temporarily removed from the plane and questioned by staff and had to show them the differential equation he was working on. The flight was delayed by two hours as a result (The Guardian 2016). Both the USA and European countries are experiencing twin pressures. On the one hand, Western values are seemingly under attack from very conservative forms of Islam, such as Wahhabism and Salafism, which have spread from the Middle East as a result of globalization. On the other hand, there is a widespread backlash more generally against immigration in both Europe and the USA, on both economic and social grounds, which has become the staple diet of a new generation of influential right-wing populist politicians.



Conclusion 203

A CRISIS OF VALUES? While it is the case that not every major concern that Europe has faced since the summer of 2015 has been due to the international migration/refugee crisis, many have been linked to it. The unexpected, apparently uncontrollable influx of a million people arriving in Europe from the Middle East and elsewhere in the late summer of 2015 demonstrably caused shockwaves to European politics and institutions. The crisis also caused major self-questioning in Europe, in a manner reminiscent of the fall of the Berlin Wall more than a quarter of a century ago: What is Europe, and what is its place in a fast-changing global context? While Angela Merkel’s humanitarian lead in Germany in relation to the 2015 migration crisis was for some people a fine example of humanitarianism, it was not welcomed or followed by all regional governments. Some demonstrated their antipathy to the putative migrants and refugees by closing their borders to them; others promised a lot but delivered little in this regard. Overall, critics noted that Europe failed a profound moral test: What do you do when, as a large bloc of mainly rich countries, you are faced with an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis, involving poor people of different cultures from disfavored parts of the world? Europe’s overall response was unedifying. Rather than working together to find immediate as well as medium- and longer-term solutions, the unresolved migration and refugee crisis was the catalyst for soul searching: on the European Union (“What is it good for?”), Europe’s nationstates (“Who should have the right to be their members?”), and Europeans in general (“What is our view of fellow human suffering in the brunt of very serious and prolonged political and economic disruptions?”). In short, 2015’s international migration/refugee crisis openly exposed Europe’s previously mostly latent divisions and its organizational ineptitude in the face of a major humanitarian crisis. These issues fueled centrifugal political pressures across Europe, whose ultimate impact on the EU may not end with Brexit alone but also go on to include sustained attacks on the integrity of the EU from some dissident countries, such as Hungary and Poland (Goździak, and Marton 2018). According to a senior official of the OIC: Right-wing populism in Europe and elsewhere is driven by socio-economic inequality and malaise of political leadership, disenfranchisement, [and] failure of liberal political elites to offer a satisfying vision of the future. In addition, Europe has historically been relatively homogenous compared to Africa or Asia. The discovery of differences is of the West’s making and globalization has become a conduit of dark undertones. (Author’s interview with #82)

The senior OIC official is highlighting what in his view are some of the reasons for the political advance of right-wing populists in both Europe and

204

Conclusion

the USA. In Europe, the international migration crisis of 2015 helped endow previously marginal nationalist and populist parties and politicians with an unprecedented level of authority and legitimacy, in the same way and for the same reasons that Donald Trump was able to attract and retain a relatively high level of electoral support, especially among the United States’ “dispossessed.” Such people are mainly un- or under-employed white men in lowlevel, unskilled, or semi-skilled jobs, mostly lacking a college education, who have seen their current positions and future prospects diminish as a result of both the effects of globalization (“exporting jobs from America”) and the large numbers of sometimes illegal immigrants from Mexico and Central America who are often prepared to work for less in diminished conditions than indigenous Americans (Jackson, 2016). Many such people appear to believe in Trump’s clarion call “to make America great again.” While in America anti-globalization and anti-immigration zealots rallied around President Trump and supported many of his policies, in Europe a key component of the EU endeavor—the passport-free Schengen area created in 1995—was in disorder. Following the 2015 immigration crisis, Schengen was suspended in February 2016. How and/or when it would be reinstated was unclear. Across much of Europe, rather than a dismantling of border controls, there was widespread societal reinstatement, in response both to the influx of international migrants and refugees and a seeming Europe-wide incapacity to police the region’s borders effectively. What was required and what must be done to improve things in this regard was both a workable desire and practical policies to significantly strengthen and improve the management and security of Europe’s borders. This was necessary to assure voters that Europe’s leaders not only have the will, but also the capacity to increase the region’s security, if “only” to keep terrorists and illegal migrants out. The 2015 international migration and refugee crisis made it crystal clear that Europe was not a hermetically sealed rich person’s club, able to keep the world’s woes away through a policy of benign neglect. A combination of the refugee/migration crisis coupled with unprecedented fears across the region linked to extremism and terrorism brought it home to many European politicians and voters that the region could not any longer shield itself from the political travails of the Global South. This was especially the case in relation to geographically contiguous regions, including the Middle East, western Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, all of which contain extensive areas undergoing pronounced state weakness, economic travails, societal fragmentation, and terrorist outrages. Europe responded, on the one hand, with a much-critiqued deal with Turkey to try to curtail the flow of refugees and migrants across the Aegean Sea. In addition, the EU dangled the carrot of increased development aid to sub-Saharan countries to encourage African states to take back



Conclusion 205

migrants not entitled to asylum in Europe. Ultimately, however, such deals, even if successful (which is doubtful), were no more than temporary dressings for a wound: migrants’ and refugees’ determined efforts to reach the promised land of Europe from the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa would not significantly diminish until the latter regions were safer (in a security sense) and more prosperous, so that most people—rather than an elite few— felt that they were benefiting from economic growth and societal peace. Despite much talking, including about refugee quotas for each EU member state, Europe did not cover itself in glory. What many saw as a shabby deal with Turkey seemingly undermined Europe’s much-cherished human rights principles. Terrorism and fears of terrorism fuelled right-wing paranoia about migrants and immigrants, a concern that was now mainstream and which politicians everywhere in Europe seemed to feel duty-bound to respond to, vying with each other to appear as “tough” as possible in relation to citizens’ concerns. As already noted, this was also the approach taken by Donald Trump in the USA with unexpected electoral success, especially among most Republican voters. Across both Europe and in the USA, identity politics were on the ascendant, and the result was increased political polarization between right-wing populists, on the one hand, and liberals and social democrats, on the other. This is not to deny or overlook the many signs and signals of unity and sympathy for fellow human beings which many in Europe evinced following the 2015 international migration/refugee crisis. In response, across the region, numerous selfless people responded to the crisis with significant and continuing efforts to distribute food and clothes, while some in addition offered shelter in their own homes to migrants and refugees. Several years later, issues raised by the summer 2015 international refugee and migrant crisis showed no clear signs of being dealt with or overcome by Europe’s elected politicians. In the USA, the result of the November 2016 presidential election appeared to indicate what kind of country many Americans now wanted their nation to be: not one that was necessarily open and welcoming to incomers—that is, the founding philosophy of the USA—but one that now regarded new official barriers to those seeking to emigrate to the country, even for legitimate reasons, as both legitimate and necessary. The concerns in Europe are not dissimilar, but are at the same time different. On the one hand, the notion of a liberal Europe is enshrined in the EU and its founding values: a region with no meaningful national boundaries based on free movement of people which made good economic sense but increasingly for many people did not seem so desirable for social and cultural reasons. The key problem in this regard, according to political buoyant rightwing populists, was “excessive” migrants from economically poor countries and a flood of often “bogus” refugees, whose aim, they argued, was to exploit

206

Conclusion

Europeans’ generosity. Arguments that might once have been influential— such as, Europe needs many thousands of migrants each year for economic reasons and to keep the wheels of commerce turning—no longer had the capacity to persuade as many people as they once did. Now, the talk was increasingly of how can “we” keep “them” out? How can “we” stop “them” from abusing “our” welfare? How can “we” stop “them” from spreading “their” alien, Islamic beliefs and precepts which undermine “our” cherished, foundational, European values and principles? Europe did not manage to deal with a crisis caused by factors largely beyond its control. Europe could of course theoretically deal with such issues in a security sense—as shown by agreements with Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa over sending migrants and refugees back. As a last resort, this could include building unsurmountable walls—as President Trump wants to do, or as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán already has accomplished—which are of course designed to keep out the unwanted. This approach was pioneered by the state of Israel, endeavoring to keep out Islamist terrorists from Palestine and other Arab territories (Sfard 2018). But if one is concerned that Europe keeps its liberal ideals alive, then such a “solution” is ultimately futile or worse, as it irrevocably coarsens and diminishes politics by denying the capacity of people outside Europe from enjoying the rights and privileges that Europeans take for granted. THE UNITED NATIONS AND PREVENTING/ COUNTERING “VIOLENT EXTREMISM” The UN value system is a “bubble” which has become institutionalized, with various issues of great importance such as PVE/CVE. Why is this issue so prominent at the UN? It is because it is linked to security issues. CVE is “good” for maintaining/increasing military spending. Governments fear that not to spend “enough” money on the military opens them to the accusation that they are “soft” on terrorism. (Author’s interview with #82)

In Europe and the USA, right-wing populists depict international migration as a central component in a developing “clash of civilizations” between the “West” and the Muslim world. At the United Nations, the clash of civilizations is also a crucial important topic, which led to two, contrasting, responses. On the one hand, the UN was seen to be keen to develop a “dialogue among civilizations” which, after several years of prevarication, was given concrete form in the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), created in 2005. Around the same time, the UN also adopted the Countering Violent Extremism/Preventing Violent Extremism (CVE/PVE) programs. While both had



Conclusion 207

their roots in the events of 9/11 and their aftermath, the creation of the two very different programs sent differing signals to Muslims around the world. Unlike President Khatami’s “dialogue among civilizations” idea, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative soon found significant corporate backing both from within the UN and from outside. The Alliance sought to construct “a global network of partners including States, International and regional organizations, civil society groups, foundations, and the private sector to improve cross-cultural relations between diverse nations and communities” (http:// www.unaoc.org/who-we-are/). In pursuit of its goals, the Alliance created a “Group of Friends” to support its work, while also enjoying the support of a number of “Partner Organizations,” comprising both prominent international organizations and civil society representatives. It would seem that the main purpose of the UNAOC reaching out to both state and non-state actors was to highlight its expansive focus: The Alliance would not be solely a UNfocused, top-down body, remote from the concerns “ordinary” people and civil society, including both secular NGOs and faith-based organizations. The downside of this expansive outlook was that it might appear that the Alliance was all things to all people: without clear focus or directions and lacking the mechanisms and strategies meaningfully to work towards improved inter-civilizational dialogue in order to improve international relations. What of the stated UNAOC goal of achieving improved “cross-cultural relations between diverse nations and communities”? Historically, neither Western or Muslim societies have worked assiduously to achieve improved inter-civilizational dialogue and bridge building. Yet, a new and mutually rewarding relationship developed via the Alliance of Civilizations might have the potential to bring Muslim and Western societies closer together, if it was recognized and acted upon to employ accumulated wisdom and insights to provide the basis of a valued coexistence. It seems clear that an improved relationship between Muslims and the West cannot be premised on or constructed via counter-productive ideas of cultural superiority of one “side” over the other, but necessarily built on mutual respect and an openness to cultural eclecticism. In other words, Muslims and Christians should try to learn from and cooperate with each other in the pursuit of desirable shared values, such as improved human rights, including religious freedom. As Said remarks, the goal in this regard was to engage meaningfully and consistently in inter-civilizational bridge building. According to Said, the overall objective should be to “develop and deepen normatively desirable values and expand common understandings of truth, to transform an increasingly conflictfilled relationship to one with collective good works serving humanity and the demonstration of the soundness of common values and contribution to civilizations” (Said 2002: 7).

208

Conclusion

Achievement of normatively desirable inter-civilizational goals of the kind that Said highlights could only come about through authentic development of purposeful, sustained, and focused “global dialogue”2 involving different but mutually sympathetic cultural groups. The UNAOC emphasized that a key imperative supporting its creation was awareness that, with the “return” of cultural and religious tensions and conflict to international relations after 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror, the UN needed to discover how to incorporate voices and concerns, both from among the elites and from among ordinary people collected in civil society organizations, into its strategies to reduce what many saw global injustices. These include polarizing developmental outcomes, which the Millennium Development Goals and its successor, the Sustainable Development Goals, seek to address (Haynes 2018b). To what extent could the UNAOC initiative make headway when the global context was seemingly of increasing polarization between the West and the Muslim world? September 11, 2001, was not only directly responsible for the creation of UNAOC, but also underpinned a securitization of Islam. The response of the international community to growing examples of terrorism was to initiate the CVE/PVE program at the UN. This initiative began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which underlined to many in the international community an urgent need to combat terrorism via coordinated, collective efforts. The results of the initiative took concrete form in 2006 when the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Strategy has four pillars: (1) tackling conditions conducive to terrorism; (2) preventing and combating terrorism; (3) building countries’ capacity to combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and (4) ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism. Policies to combat terrorism were a reaction to acts of extreme violence, but they were mainly repressive in nature. Conducted in the name of national security, they largely overlooked pillars (1) and (4) of the strategy. Perhaps best exemplified by the US-led Global War on Terror, this security-based approach seems to have comprehensively failed, if judged by the number of deaths from violent extremism (VE) and terrorism across the globe. Between 2000 and 2014, such deaths increased nearly ten-fold, from 3,329 to 32,685. Rising numbers of deaths prompted the international community to shift its focus from countering to preventing terrorism. Nevertheless, in 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2178 advocated CVE as a means to prevent terrorism. In this climate, it was scarcely surprising that UN initiatives to build trust between cultures, including those led by UNAOC and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), struggled to make headway (Haynes 2018a).



Conclusion 209

At the UN, the importance of the prevention of violent extremism seemed clear—necessary to complement CVE strategies with preventive measures that sought to address its drivers. In 2015, the then UN secretary-general, Ban-Ki moon, announced a “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” which aimed at “tackling conditions conducive to terrorism.” The plan, which was largely a reaction to a rising new generation of groups, such as Islamic State, capable of spreading violent extremist ideologies at an increasingly rapid pace via social media and other hard-to-control instruments, recognized the links between violent extremism and terrorism. All over the globe, often via social media and other internet-based means, numerous mainly young individuals are regularly exposed to violent material and ideologies via blogs, films and podcasts. Reflecting this development, Islamic State was able to inspire violent extremism in dozens of countries in a short space of time (Burke 2017). If each radicalization process is unique, qualitative research suggests that drivers of VE can be categorized into “push” and “pull” factors. “Push factors,” which refer to the structural conditions that can drive an individual into VE, include: the lack of socio-economic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalisation in prisons. “Pull factors,” on the other hand, refer to individual processes like backgrounds and motivations; collective grievances and victimization; distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies, and ethnic and cultural differences; and leadership and social networks. Against this background, one can easily see how VE can take root in countries in the Arab region, as many have a 30 percent youth unemployment rate, protracted political conflicts, exclusive understandings of ethnic, religious, and other forms of identities, non-inclusive governance, poor human rights records, and so on. Many regional societies and communities have fragmenting social fabrics while, simultaneously, millions of uprooted internally displaced people (IDPs) face marginalization or ostracisation in host communities with limited resources. In these circumstances, it is perhaps not that surprising that some, mainly young, people resort to violent means of expression. Such examples were regionally widespread during the Arab Uprisings and their aftermath; and it is possible, given that conditions have not significantly improved, that such incidents might occur again perhaps even more violently and widely. If this happens, the possibility of the Arab region achieving the sustainable development goals set by Agenda 2030 are very remote (“Emerging and Conflict-Related Issues Division” 2019). To forestall the chances of this happening, still-prevalent “hard” securitybased policies in the region need to be augmented effectively by additional

210

Conclusion

other policies that address VE’s drivers and root causes. These policies have primarily materialized through government-led initiatives aimed at producing discourse counter-narratives. A new wave of such initiatives has emerged in recent years. However, much like their predecessors that saw the light of day in the 2000s, they are likely to prove insufficient, if not counter-productive, for two main reasons. First, counter-narrative initiatives do not address the “push factors” of VE. By focusing on counter-narratives, discussions in fact drive the attention away from the structural conditions that create VE’s “push factors.” Counter-narratives should be complemented by policies that promote inclusive growth and development, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights. Providing counter-narratives on one side while violating human rights on the other will continue to fuel grievances and perpetuate sentiments of victimisation. Not addressing “push” and “pull” factors simultaneously will fail to produce effective and sustainable PVE strategies. Second, such initiatives will be seen as illegitimate by individuals who perceive governments and their institutions as the agents responsible for their grievances. Counter-narratives need to be developed through all-of-society approaches that incorporate civil society actors and the local level. In Egypt, Cairo’s Al Azhar University’s online Observatory for Combating Extremism (2015) trains local Imams to rebut extremist religious interpretations in their communities through social media. In northern Morocco, women-led dialogues are organized at the community level, after research showed that mothers are among the most influential forces on an individual’s choice to join violent extremist groups (Rached and Smail-Salhi 2016). With the exception of initiatives such as those developed by UNAOC and UNESCO, the international community has since 9/11 mainly focused on securitizing Islam. Over the last fifteen years, the UNAOC in particular has sought to play a leading role both at the UN and in the wider international community in relation to inter-cultural dialogue. Yet, during this period, the focus of the UN has shifted from seeking to improve Western/Muslim relations via “inter-faith” dialogue to expressing sustained concern with Islamist terrorism and extremism and how to prevent and combat them (Author’s interviews with #11, 31, 54, 64, 67, 70). Reflecting this reality, the Alliance has recently refocused its initiatives to focus on preventing/countering violent extremism. This was exemplified in the most recent annual UNAOC report covering 2017, which indicates that the Alliance has moved into PVE/CVE, including in relation to its educational initiatives. The Alliance has long emphasized a link between improved education of the young and the prevention of violent extremism. During 2017, the Alliance took a leading role in various related events. In February, for example, the UNAOC and the United Nations Academic Impact3 co-organized a round table discussion at UN headquarters



Conclusion 211

in New York on the theme “Media and information literacy: educational strategies for the prevention of violent extremism.” The aim of the event was to identify ways that enhanced media and information literacy could be utilized to help “deliver a long-term strategy for promoting a culture of peace and understanding among individuals from different cultural and religious backgrounds” (UNAOC Annual Report 2017: 7). In March, following a request from UNESCO, the Alliance participated in a round table discussion on “Preventing violent extremism through universal values in curriculum.” The discussions focused on the personal and professional experiences of leading scholars in the field and their substantial contributions to inclusion, peace education and human rights in various contexts worldwide. Like the February event, the aim was to stimulate wide-ranging discussion on how best to help prevent—or at least diminish—violent extremism by means of formal and non-formal educational activities. In 2017, the UNAOC’s then high representative, Nassir Abdulaziz AlNasser, was appointed a member of the UN secretary-general’s “high-level action group on the prevention of violent extremism.” At a meeting of the group in December, Al-Nasser enumerated Alliance projects designed to support grassroots efforts by young people to prevent violent extremism, including the regional inter-cultural events discussed earlier (Author’s interview with #50). In the same year, the Alliance was a member of an advisory board which reviewed and edited a comprehensive, 300-page “Youth-led guide on prevention of violent extremism through education” produced by the UNESCO Mahatma Gandhi Institute of Education for Peace and Sustainable Development in New Delhi (UNESCO 2017). The guide includes “testimonies and experiences of more than 150 youth from over 58 countries across the globe, including Alliance programme alumni.” In addition, the volume sets out “guidelines and recommendations for teachers, school administrators, policymakers, youth and other stakeholders with the overall aim of preventing violent extremism among youth” (UNAOC Annual Report 2017: 7). During 2017, in line with the aim of the then newly appointed UN secretarygeneral, António Guterres, to “streamline” UN Secretariat activities, the Alliance worked to “mainstream” its work, including its educational activities, into UN Headquarters’ structures in New York. Yet, the strong impression, created via many of the more than eighty interviews undertaken by the author since 2015 in relation to the UN, member states, and non-state actors, is that the work of the Alliance is rather marginal within the UN, highlighting a subsequent need to work more closely with a variety of partners at the UN. Increasingly, the UNAOC seeks to develop joint or mutually reinforcing capacity-building programs and projects with other United Nations entities in accordance with their comparative advantages and respective mandates. In

212

Conclusion

furtherance of this goal, a new UNAOC high representative, Miguel Angel Moratinos of Spain,4 took office on 1 January 2019. It is hoped that Moratinos will encourage the Alliance to work in closer greater cooperation and collaboration with other United Nations system entities. CONCLUSION The book has sought to address three main issues: Why have the “clash of civilizations” arguments of Lewis and Huntington continued to attract the attention of many politicians, scholars, and “ordinary” people? Why do they form important components of the arguments of many right-wing populists in Europe and the USA? Why do they inform policies and programs at the UN? The answer to the first question is that for many politicians and societies in both Europe and in the USA, Huntington’s claim of a values-linked conflict between the West and the Muslim world is self-evidently true, supported not only by egregious examples of violent extremism and terrorism perpetrated by Islamic State in particular, but also by the large numbers of Muslims in Europe and America who, according to right-wing populist politicians, do not wish to assimilate or support “Western” values. Second, right-wing populists in Europe and America have collectively developed a political ideology of Christian civilizationism which while generically similar does differ from place to place in its nuances and foci, responding to local traditions, cultures, and histories. The ideology of Christian civilizationism is an important component of right-wing populists’ political platform because they are effective, playing into fears of alien invasion and forced adhesion to unfamiliar values, norms and beliefs. Finally, the arguments of Huntington directly inform the Alliance of Civilization’s policy of intercivilizational dialogue because it is seen as a UN value worthy of the organization’s sustained support (Haynes 2018a). Whether the Alliance’s policy is effective or not is hard to gauge. Ultimately, however, while it is important to be seen to be trying to improve things in this regard, not managing to deal with the issue of intercivilizational tensions and conflicts plays into the hands of those who are convinced that civilizations are fundamentally different and some seek to demonstrate this via right-wing populist policies which, ultimately, make it very likely that extant civilizational divisions become worse rather than better. NOTES 1.  In the 1994 revised edition of his 1964 book, The Middle East and the West, renamed: The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, Lewis wrote the following: “We



Conclusion 213

shall be better able to understand this situation if we view the present discontents of the Middle East not as a conflict between states or nations but as an encounter between civilizations” (Lewis quoted in Kramer 2018: 244). 2.  According to the Global Dialogue Foundation, an Australia-based NGO, a partner organization of the Alliance of Civilizations, “global dialogue” refers to a “model for the citizen-civil sector in the frame of the UN—to work with all cultures and civilizations; addressing their needs, preserving identity, cultural heritage and using dialogue as the instrument for building a peaceful coexistence” (globaldialoguefoundation.ning.com/). 3.  “The United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) is an initiative that aligns institutions of higher education with the United Nations in supporting and contributing to the realization of United Nations goals and mandates, including the promotion and protection of human rights, access to education, sustainability and conflict resolution.” In 2019, more than 1,400 universities worldwide were members of the UNAI (https://academicimpact.un.org/content/about-unai). 4. Moratinos was Spain’s minister of foreign affairs and cooperation between 2004–2010, has had various senior UN roles, including presidency of the Security Council, as well as chairmanships-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the Council of the European Union (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/21/c_137620394.htm).

Appendix Author’s Personal Interviews (Anonymized and Chronological)

1.  Personal interview via telephone with former Senior Advisor, Strategic Development and Partnerships, Secretariat of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNOAC), 1 October 2015. 2.  Personal interview with member of International Coordinating Committee of the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations,” London, 20 October 2015. 3.  Personal interview with member of International Coordinating Committee of the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations,” London, 22 October 2015. 4.  Personal interview with senior member of NGO involved in Swiss-led “Nyon Process” (Swiss government/Middle East North Africa [MENA] intercultural dialogue), 22 October 2015. 5.  Personal interview with senior member of NGO involved in Swiss-led “Nyon Process” (Swiss government/Middle East North Africa [MENA] intercultural dialogue), 22 October 2015. 6.  Personal interview with former Special Adviser of the UN SecretaryGeneral on the Alliance of Civilizations, 25 October 2015. 7.  Personal interview via Skype with former staff member of Secretariat of the UNAOC, 26 October 2015. 8.  Personal interview with High Level Group member, London, 27 October 2015. 9.  Personal interview via Skype with former Deputy Director of the Office of the UNAOC, 30 October 2015. 10.  Personal interview with senior official of the Cordoba Foundation, London, 1 November 2015. 11.  Personal interview via Skype with academic and former UNAOC interlocutor, via Skype, 8 December 2015. 215

216

Appendix

12.  Personal interview with former senior World Bank official and CEO of NGO focused on Development, Washington DC, Oslo, Norway, 20 December 2015. 13.  Personal interview with former High Representative of UNAOC, via written responses to author’s questions, 19 January 2016. 14.  Personal interview with Senior Advisor, European and Mediterranean Affairs; Academic, Cultural and Interfaith Issues UNAOC, New York, 26 January 2016. 15.  Personal interview with former UNAOC Project Management Specialist - Media, New York, 26 January 2016. 16.  Personal interview with former Director of Secretariat of UNAOC, New York, 27 January 2016. 17.  Personal interview with UNAOC official concerned with political issues, New York, 27 January 2016. 18.  Personal interview with senior member of UN Population Fund, New York, 28 January 2016. 19.  Personal interview via written questions/answers with UNAOC former education expert, 22 February 2016. 20.  Personal interview with senior official of Global Dialogue Foundation, Australia, 22 February 2016. 21.  Personal interview with senior official, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, London, 17 October 2016. 22.  Telephone interview with Spain’s former ambassador to the UNAOC, 29 November 2016. 23.  Personal interview with former Chair, Committee of Religious NGOs at the United Nations, New York, 17 January 2017. 24.  Personal interview with senior official of Unitarian Universalist Association, UN Office, 23 January 2017. 25.  Personal interview with senior Western diplomat 1, New York, 24 January 2017. 26.  Personal interview with senior Western diplomat 2, who was his government’s Focal Point with UNAOC, New York, 24 January 2017. 27.  Personal interview with renowned scholar of the UN, New York, 24 January 2017. 28.  Personal interview with senior official of Finland’s permanent mission to UN, New York, 24 January 2017. 29.  Personal interview with senior official of UNESCO, New York, 25 January 2017. 30.  Personal interview with senior “non-Western” diplomat, New York, 25 January 2017.



Appendix 217

31.  Personal interview with Deputy Permanent Observer of OIC to UN, New York, 25 January 2017. 32.  Personal interview with UK diplomat at the UN, New York, 25 January 2017. 33.  Personal interview with Maltese diplomat at the UN, New York, 25 January 2017. 34.  Personal interview with former senior official of “Baha’is at the UN,” New York, 26 January 2017. 35.  Personal interview with senior official of Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs, Fordham University, New York, 26 January 2017. 36.  Personal interview with senior official of UN Global Compact, New York, 27 January 2017. 37.  Personal interview with senior official of Tannenbaum Center for Interreligious Dialogue, New York, 27 January 2017. 38.  Personal interview with UNAOC staff member, New York, 27 January 2017. 39.  Personal interview with senior official of UN Global Compact, New York, 27 January 2017. 40.  Interview via written questions and answers with representative of Office of Ethnic Communities, New Zealand Government, 1 February 2017. 41.  Personal interview with senior official of UN Global Compact, New York, 27 January 2017 42.  Personal interview via Skype with senior official of “Baha’is at the UN,” 10 February 2017. 43.  Personal interview via Skype with former senior Western diplomat and staff member of the King Abdullah International Centre for Interreligious and Dialogue, Vienna, 8 May 2017. 44.  Personal interview via telephone with Special Adviser to UNAOC, New York, 8 May 2017. 45.  Personal interview via Skype with senior official of Anna Lindh Foundation (Middle East North Africa intercultural dialogue), 8 May 2017. 46.  Personal interview via telephone with senior official of BMW on topic of UNAOC “Intercultural Innovation Award,” 2 June 2017. 47.  Personal interview via written questions and answers with former Personal Representative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations and former Under-Secretary General, UN, 2 June 2017. 48.  Personal interview with senior official International Organization for Migration, New York, 19 June 2017.

218

Appendix

49.  Personal interview with senior official, “On Our Radar,” recipient of Intercultural Innovation Award from UNAOC/BMW, London, 6 June 2017. 50.  Personal interview with current UNAOC staff member, New York, 19 June 2017. 51.  Personal interview with senior official of interfaith dialogue NGO, “Religions for Peace,” New York, 20 June 2017. 52.  Personal interview with UNAOC staff member, New York, 22 June 2017. 53.  Personal interview with former Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Society, UNAOC, New York, 23 June 2017. 54.  Personal interview with former senior official of UNESCO and KAICIID, New York, 23 June 2017. 55.  Personal interview with UNAOC staff member, New York, 23 June 2017. 56.  Personal interview with senior official of Universal Peace Federation, New York, 24 June 2017. 57.  Personal interview with Director of the Alliance Program and former Director of the British Council in New York and Senior Adviser at the UNAOC, New York, 24 June 2017. 58.  Personal interview via Christian pastor involved in the “Nyon Process” (Swiss/MENA intercultural dialogue), 24 June 2017. 59.  Personal interview with scholar and former diplomat involved in “Dialogue among Civilizations” at the UN, Seton Hall University, Orange, New Jersey, 25 June 2017. 60.  Personal interview via telephone with senior official, Anna Lindh Foundation (MENA intercultural dialogue), 4 July 2017. 61.  Personal interview with senior official of EF Education First/UNAOC, London, 4 July 2017. 62.  Personal interview via telephone with senior official of Swiss government, Nyon Process (MENA intercultural dialogue), 6 July 2017. 63.  Personal interview via telephone with North Africa-based NGO, 19 July 2017. 64.  Personal interview via Skype with senior official of European Union, 21 September 2017. 65.  Personal interview via Facetime with Senior Western diplomat 3, 22 September 2017. 66.  Personal interview via Skype with former co-organizer of “Dialogue among Civilizations” at the UN, 10 October 2017. 67.  Personal interview via Skype with senior official, European External Action Service, 10 October 2017.



Appendix 219

68.  Personal interview via telephone with Senior Western diplomat 4, 14 November 2017. 69.  Personal interview with former senior official (2008-2012) of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE), Warsaw, 1 December 2017. 70.  Personal interview with former U.S. Department of State’s Acting Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Washington, DC, 17 April 2018. 71.  Personal interview with state department diplomat with twenty-three years’ experience in the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, DC, 17 April 2018. 72.  Personal interview with co-founder and executive director of Muslim Public Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 17 April 2018. 73.  Personal interview with former White House Press Secretary and currently Washington-based communications consultant, Washington, DC, 19 April 2018. 74.  Personal interview with senior official of the Brooking Institution and former US State Department member, Washington, DC, 24 April 2018. 75.  Personal interview with former US diplomat and Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 24 April 2018. 76.  Personal interview with consultant to the Holy See, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 24 April 2018. 77.  Personal interview with former US special representative for religion and global affairs and director of the US Department of State’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Washington, DC, 24 April 2018. 78.  Personal interview with senior member of Brooking Institution and former US Department of State, Washington DC, 24 April 2018. 79.  Personal interview with former senior Pakistan diplomat, Washington, DC, 25 April 2018. 80.  Personal interview with senior official of Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 25 April 2018. 81.  Personal interview with academic and expert on international migration, Maria Grzegorzewska University, Warsaw, Poland, in Berlin, 19 June 2018. 82.  Personal interview with senior official of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Muslim Minorities Division, London, 20 June 2018.

References

11 September 2001 Hijackers (2002). Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-infor mation/speeches-testimony/2002/DCI_18_June_testimony_new.pdf. Last accessed April 12, 2017. About the Visegrád Group (2019). Available at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Achcar, Gilbert (2007). Clash of Barbarisms: The Making of the New World Disorder: The Making of the New World Order. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Achilleos-Sarll, Columba, and Benjamin Martill (2019). Toxic Masculinity: Militarism, Deal-Making and the Performance of Brexit. In Moira Dustin, Nuno Ferreira and Susan Millns (Eds.), Gender and Queer Perspectives on Brexit (pp. 15–24). New York and London: Routledge. Adida, Claire D., David L. Laitin and Marie-Claire Valfort (2016). “Don’t Fear Muslim Immigrants. They Aren’t the Real Problem,” Foreign Affairs. Available at http://marieannevalfort.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ForeignAffairs2016_ VALFORT.pdf. Last accessed 13 May 2019. Ahmari, Sohrab (2018). “Confessions of a Burka-Phobe,” Commentary, 8 August. Available at https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/confessions-of -a-burka-phobe/. Last accessed 14 February 2018. Akkerman, Tjitske (2005). “Anti-Immigration Parties and The Defence of Liberal Values: The Exceptional Case of the List Pim Fortuyn,” Journal of Political Ideologies, (10)3, 337–354. Allen, Christopher, and Jørgen S. Nielsen (2002). Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001on Behalf of the EUMC European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Department of Theology, The University of Birmingham. Altshuler, George (2016). “What Are ‘Judeo-Christian’ Values? Analyzing a Controversial Term.” Washington Jewish Week, 1 December. Available at http://wash ingtonjewishweek.com/34907/judeo-christian-values/news/national-news/. Last accessed 13 April, 2017. 221

222

References

Amies, Nick (2010). “Alliance of Civilizations: Intercultural peace forum or talking shop?” Deutsche Welle, May 28. Available online: http://www.dw.com/en/ alliance-of-civilizations-intercultural-peace-forum-or-talkingshop/a-5610155. Last accessed 23 November 2017. An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed (2010). Muslims and Global Justice. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Antinori, Arije (2017). The “Jihadi Wolf” Threat. The Evolution of Terror Narratives Between The (Cyber) Social Ecosystem and Self-Radicalization “Ego-System.” Paper presented at the 1st European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) conference on online terrorist propaganda, 10–11 April 2017, at Europol Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands. Available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/./antinoria_thejihadiwolfthreat.pdf. Last accessed 10 May 2019. Ashford, Emma (2016). “Trump’s Team Should Ditch the Clash of Civilizations.” Washington DC: CATO Institute, December 7. Available at https://www.cato.org/ publications/commentary/trumps-team-should-ditch-clash-civilizations. Last accessed 14 February 2019. ———. (2017). “What We Get Wrong About the Clash of Civilizations.” CATO Unbound. A Journal of Debate, 6 February. Washington, DC: CATO Institute. Available at https://www.cato-unbound.org/2017/02/06/emma-ashford/what-we -get-wrong-about-clash-civilizations. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Ayubi, Nazir (1991). Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London: Routledge. Bail, Christopher (2015). Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bain, William (2003). Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balci, Ali (2009). “The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?” Insight Turkey, (3)3, 95–108. Bâli, Asli (2018). “A Kemalist Secular Age? Cultural Politics and Radical Republicanism in Turkey.” In Mirjam Künkler, John Madeley and Shylashri Shankar (Eds.), A Secular Age Beyond the West. Religion, law and the state in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 234–264). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, Jamal (2016). “The ‘War on Terror’ and The Battle For the Definition of Torture.” International Relations, (30)1, 102–124. Barr, Michael (2007). “Confucianism, From Above and Below”. In Jeffrey Haynes (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics (pp. 64–78). Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Bayrakli, Enes, and Farid Havez (Eds.) (2017). European Islamophobia Report 2017. Istanbul: SETA. BBC News (2015). “Poland Elections: Conservatives Secure Decisive Win,” 26 October. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34631826. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Beckett, Louise (2017). “Leader of Group Widely Identified as Anti-Muslim Meets with White House.” The Guardian, 22 March. Available at https://www.theguard



References 223

ian.com/us-news/2017/mar/21/act-for-america-brigitte-gabriel-muslim-white -house-meeting. Last accessed 10 March 2019. Beissinger, Mark (2009). “Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism.” Contemporary European History. Available at https://www.scribd.com/document/132760186/Beissinger-ceh-Article-on-the-Collapse-of-Ussr. Last accessed 14 May 2019. Beittinger-Lee, Verena (2017). “Blessing or Bother? Religion and Religious NGOs at the UN in New York.” In Jeremy Carrette and Hugh Miall (Eds.), Religion, NGOs and the United Nations: Visible and Invisible Actors in Power (pp. 119–53). London: Bloomsbury. Bello, Valeria (2013). “‘Intercultural Dialogue’ as it Developed in the Security Council of the United Nations” (2000–2012). Policy Report No. 01/03. Barcelona: United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility (UNUGCM). Berger, Peter (Ed.) (1999). The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion in World Politics. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans. Bernstein, Richard (1993). “The twin Towers: Terrorism; Blast Shatters the Illusion That U.S. Soil Is Immune from Assault.” New York Times, 7 March. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/07/nyregion/twin-towers-terrorism-blast -shatters-illusion-that-us-soil-immune-assault.html?pagewanted=all. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Bettiza, Gregorio (2014). “Empty Signifier in Practice: Interrogating the ‘Civilizations’ of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations.’” EUI Working Papers. RSCAS 2014/95. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Beydoun, Khaled A. (2018). “US Liberal Islamophobia is Rising—And More Insidious Than Rightwing Bigotry.” The Guardian, 26 May. Available at https://www .theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/26/us-liberal-islamophobia-rising -more-insidious. Last accessed 13 February 2019. ——— (2018b). American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Bijog (2018). Brigitte Gabriel Biography. Available at https://bijog.com/biography/ brigitte-gabriel/page-1. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Bloom, Tendayi (2013). “A Historical Overview of The Relationship Between ‘Intercultural Dialogue’ And Associated Terminology in UN-Level Documents in The Mid to Late Twentieth Century.” Policy Report No. 01/01. Barcelona: United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility (UNU-GCM). Blue, Michael (2016). “Lance Wallnau: Trump’s Wall ‘Isn’t About Mexico,’ It’s About Biblical Prophecy.” Right Wing Watch, 19 August. Available at http://www .rightwingwatch.org/post/lance-wallnau-trumps-wall-isnt-about-mexico-its-about -biblicalprophecy/. Last accessed 14 April, 2017. Bosco, Robert (2014). Securing the Sacred. Religion, National Security and the Western State. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Bottici, Chaira and Benoit Challand (2010). The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

224

References

Bowden, Brett (2012). “Politics in a world of civilizations: Long-term perspectives on relations between peoples,” Human Figurations, Vol. 1, Issue 2. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0001.204?view=text;rgn=main. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Bowker, Mike (2016). Russia, America and the Islamic World. London: Routledge. Brock, Gillian (2015). Global Justice. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/ justice-global/. Last accessed 24 November 2017. Brown, Chris (2005). Sovereignty, Rights and Justice. International Political Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. Brubaker, Rogers (2016). “A New ‘Christianist’ Secularism in Europe.” The Immanent Frame. Available at https://tif.ssrc.org/2016/10/11/a-new-christianistsecularism-in-europe/. Last accessed 1 February 2019. ——— (2017a). Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment In Comparative Perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, (40)8, 1191–1226. ——— (2017b). Why Populism? Theory and Society. (46)5, 357–385. Bruce, Steve (2003). God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Religion and Spirituality in the Modern World. Oxford: Blackwell. Bruna, Christian (2018). Slovakia’s Political Crisis: The Murder That Forced A Whole Government to Resign. The Conversation, 29 March. Available at https:// theconversation.com/slovakias-political-crisis-the-murder-that-forced-a-whole -government-to-resign-93756. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Bull, Hedley (1977). The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press. ——— (1985). The Revolt Against the West. In Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Eds.), The Expansion of International Society (pp. 217–228). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bullivant, Stephen (2018). Europe’s Young Adults and Religion. Findings from the European Social Survey (2014–16) to inform the 2018 Synod of Bishops. London: Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society. Burke, Jason (2017). Rise and Fall of Isis: Its Dream of a Caliphate Is Over, So What Now? The Guardian, 21 October. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Burns, John F. (1990). MIDEAST TENSIONS; Iraqi President Renews Threat to Attack Israel. New York Times, 10 October. Available at https://www.nytimes. com/1990/10/10/world/mideast-tensions-iraqi-president-renews-threat-to-attackisrael.html. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner. Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever (2009). Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory. Review of International Studies, 35, 253–276.



References 225

CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) (2010). Backgrounder: Who is David Yerushalmi? Available at https://www.cair.com/backgrounder_who_is_da vid_yerushalmi. Last accessed 12 February 2019. ——— (2018). CAIR Calls for Removal of Anti-Muslim Hate Group Leader from White House National Security Council Staff. Available at https://www.cair.com/ cair_calls_for_removal_of_anti_muslim_hate_group_leader_from_white_house_ national_security_council_staff. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Campbell, Colin (2016). Trump: “Islam Hates Us.” Business Insider, 10 March. Available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-islam-hates-us-2016-3? r=US&IR=T. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Carrette, Jeremy, and Hugh Miall (2013). Religious NGOs and the United Nations. New York and Geneva. Canterbury: University of Kent. Casanova, Jose (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Cassidy, John (2015). Charlie Hebdo and the “Clash of Civilisations,” The New Yorker, 8 January. Available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/ charlie-hebdo-clash-civilizations. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Cesari, Jocelyne (2013). Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ——— (2016). Securitization and Secularization: The Two Pillars of State Regulation of European Islam. In Jeffrey Haynes (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, 2nd. ed. (pp. 231–247). Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Cha, Taesuh (2016). The Return of Jacksonianism: The International Implications of the Trump Phenomenon. The Washington Quarterly, (39)4, 83–97. Chazan, David (2016). Nicolas Sarkozy Demands Border Controls for Thousands of Migrants in Calais Be Shifted to Britain. The Daily Telegraph (London), 28 August. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/28/nicolas-sarkozy-demands -border-controls-for-thousands-of-migrant/. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Chriyankandath, James (2007). Hinduism. In Jeffrey Haynes (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics (pp. 79–91). Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Cockburn, Patrick (2017). The Age of Jihad: Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East. London: Verso ——— (2018). The Yemen War Death Toll Is Five Times Higher Than We Think— We Can’t Shrug Off Our Responsibilities Any Longer. The Independent, 26 October. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-war-death-toll -saudi-arabia-allies-how-many-killed-responsibility-a8603326.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Commission on Global Governance (1995). Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conférence Du 06/03/2017: Rogers Brubaker (2017). Report of Rogers Brubaker’s Contributions to Discussions About “The Nationalist Populist Moment in Europe.” It Took Place During The Seminar “Religion, Politics And Populism In Europe” Organized By The IEE Pôle Jean Monnet, The CEVIPOL And Arc En Valeur

226

References

(2017) Available at http://cevipol.ulb.ac.be/sites/default/files/conference-rogers -brubaker-c.r.etudiants.13-3-17.pdf. Last accessed 5 October 2018. The Conversation (2017). Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism, and the American Election. Available at https://theconversation.com/alexander-dugin-eurasianism-and-the -american-election-87367. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Crandall, Christian, Jason Miller and Mark White (2018). Changing Norms Following the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: The Trump Effect on Prejudice. Social Psychology and Personality Science, (9)2, 186–192. Crosey, Seth, and Harry Halem (2018). Clash of Civilizations—Or Clash Within Civilizations? The American Interest, (14)2. Available at https://www.the-amer ican-interest.com/2018/08/31/clash-of-civilizations-or-clash-within-civilizations/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Cypher, James M. (2016). Hegemony, Military Power Projection and US Structural Economic Interests in The Periphery. Third World Quarterly, (37)5, 800–817. Dallamyr, Fred (2004). Peace Talks—Who Will Listen? Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Davie, Grace (2002). Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd. ——— (2007). Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge. In Nancy Ammerman (Ed.), Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives (pp. 21–35). New York: Oxford University Press. Davies, William (2018). Why We Stopped Trusting Elites. The Guardian, 29 November. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/29/why-we-stoedtrusting-elites-the-new-populism. Last accessed 14 February 2019. de Koning, Martijn, and Zoltan Pall (2017). Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism: Informality, Social Capital and Authority in European and Middle Eastern Salafi Networks. Journal of Muslims in Europe, (6)1, p. 67–103. Dearden, Lizzie (2017). Emmanuel Macron Claims Africa Held Back By “Civilisational” Problems and Women Having “Seven Or Eight Children.” The Independent, 11 July. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ emmanuel-macron-africa-development-civilisation-problems-women-seven-eight -children-colonialism-a7835586.html. Last accessed 13 February 2019. DeHanas, Daniel Nilsson and Marat Shterin (2018). Religion and the Rise of Populism. Religion, State and Society, (46)3, 177–185. Delingpole James (2016). Czech Politician: West Will Have to “Crush” Islam, Breitbart, 21 May. Available at https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2016/05/21/ czech-politician-islam-is-incompatible-with-western-civilization/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Donnelly, Jack (1984). Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, (6)4, 400–419. Economic and Social Research Council (2019). What is Social Science? Available at https://esrc.ukri.org/about-us/what-is-social-science/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. The Economist (2018). Controversies and Culture. Special Report, 3 December. Available at https://www.economist.com/special-report/1998/12/03/controversies -and-culture. Last accessed 13 February 2019.



References 227

Editorial (2009) End of the Clash of Civilizations. New York Times, 11 April. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/opinion/12sun2.html. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Eiermann, Martin, Yascha Mounck and Limor Gultchin (2017). European Populism: Trends, Threats and Future Prospects.’ Report, 29 December. London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Ekström, Mats, Marianna Patrona, and Joanna Thornborrow (2018). Right-Wing Populism and The Dynamics of Style: A Discourse-Analytic Perspective on Mediated Political Performances. Palgrave Communications, (4)83, 1–11. Eriksson, Johan (2013). “The Clash of Civilizations” And Its Unexpected Liberalism. E-International Relations, March 6. Available at https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/06/ the-clash-of-civilizations-and-its-unexpected-liberalism/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Erlanger, Steven, and Marc Santora (2018). Poland’s Nationalism Threatens Europe’s Values, Cohesion. New York Times, 20 February. Available at https://www .nytimes.com/2018/02/20/world/europe/poland-european-union.html. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Eroukhmanoff, Clara (2017). Securitisation Theory. In Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters and Christian Scheinpflug (Eds.), International Relations Theory (pp. 104–109). Bristol: E-International Relations. Esposito, John L. (2002). Unholy War. New York: Oxford University Press. ——— (2015). Islam and Political Violence. Religions, (6)3, 1067–1081. Farny, Elisabeth (2016). Implications of the Securitisation of Migration. E-International Relations, 29 January. Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2016/01/29/ implications-of-the-securitisation-of-migration/. Last accessed 29 August 2016. Feaver, Peter, and Hal Brands (2017). Trump and Terrorism. U.S. Strategy After ISIS. Foreign Affairs (March/April). Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2017-02-13/trump-and-terrorism. Last accessed 13 May 2019. Federal Foreign Office (2017). Responsibility of Religions and Governments for Peace—Between Autonomy and Complementarity. Documentation. 5 December, German House, New York City. Feldstein, Steven (2018). Trump, Saudi Arabia and the Khashoggi Case: What Would Obama Have Done? Boise State University Scholar Works, Public Policy and Administration Faculty. Available at https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1094&context=pubadmin_facpubs. Last accessed 8 May 2019. Fight for Europe—Or the Wreckers Will Destroy It (2019). The Guardian, 25 January. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/25/fight -europe-wreckers-patriots-nationalist. Last accessed 26 February 2019. Fink, N. Chowdhury (2014). Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The Role of the United Nations Today and the Impact of Security Council Resolution 2178. Policy Brief. Global Center on Cooperative Security. Available at https://data2 .unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/44294. Last accessed 22 November 2017. Foody, Kathleen (2018). Muslims in the American Media: From Texts to Affects. Journal of Islamic Studies, (29)2, 230–251.

228

References

Fox, Jonathan (2005). Religion, Civilization and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium. Lanhan, MD: Lexington Books. ——— (2015). Political Secularism, Religion, and the State. A time series analysis of worldwide data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (2019). Civilizational Clash or Balderdash? The Causes of Religious Discrimination in Western and European Christian-Majority Democracies. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (17)1, 34–48. Fraser, Nancy (1998). Social Justice in The Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, Participation. Working paper. Koln: SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB. Available at Open Access Repository (www. ssoar.info). Last accessed 22 November 2017. ——— (2003). Social Justice in Globalization. Redistribution, Recognition, And Participation. Eurozine, January 24. Available at http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/ 2003-01-24-fraser-en.pdf. Last accessed 22 November 2017. Freston, Paul (2007). Christianity: Protestantism. In Jeffrey Haynes (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics (pp. 26–47). Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge. Friedman, Saul S. (1973). No Haven for the Oppressed. United States Policy Towards Jewish Refugees, 1938–1945. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Freidman, Uri (2017). What is a Nativist? And is Donald Trump One? The Atlantic, 11 April. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/ what-is-nativist-trump/521355/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Fukuyama, Francis (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. ——— (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. García, Mario (2018). Nativist, Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in The US Has A Long History. National Catholic Reporter, 27 June. Available at https://www.ncronline .org/news/opinion/ncr-today/nativist-anti-immigrant-sentiment-us-has-long-history. Last accessed 14 February 2019. George, Cherian (2016). Hate Spin. The Manufacture of Religious Offense and its Threat to Democracy. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. Gersenfeld, Manfred, and Jamie Berk (2016). The Moral Relativism of the United Nations. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 13. Available at http:// jcpa.org/article/the-moral-relativism-of-the-united-nations/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Global Extremism Monitor (2018). Available at https://institute.global/insight/co -existence/collections/global-extremism-monitor. Last accessed 10 May 2019. Global Terrorism Index 2017 (2017). Available at http://visionofhumanity.org/a/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Goldberg, Jeffrey (2015). What Obama Actually Thinks About Radical Islam. The Atlantic, 15 June. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2016/06/obama-radical-islam/487079/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Golebiewski, Daniel (2014). Christian Traditional Values Prefiguring the Development Of Human Rights. E-International Relations, 3 July. Available at https:// www.e-ir.info/2014/07/03/christian-traditional-values-prefiguring-the-develop ment-of-human-rights/. Last accessed 14 February 2019.



References 229

Goździak, Elżbieta M., and Péter Marton (2018). Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland. Central and Eastern European Migration Review, (7)2, 125–151. Greven, Thomas (2016). The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe And The United States. A Comparative Perspective. Perspective. May 16. Washington, DC: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The Guardian (2016). Professor: Flight Was Delayed Because My Equations Raised Terror Fears. 7 May. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/ may/07/professor-flight-delay-terrorism-equation-american-airlines. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Gulf News (2014). Bahrain Conference to Promote Inter-Civilisation Dialogue. Available at https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-conference-to-pro mote-inter-civilisation-dialogue-1.1327836. Last accessed 13 February 2019. ———. (2018). UAE to Celebrate 2019 as the “Year of Tolerance,” 15 December. Available at https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-to-celebrate-2019-as-the -year-of-tolerance-1.1544862554623. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Hafez, Farid (2018). Street-Level and Government-Level Islamophobia in The Visegrád Four Countries. Patterns of Prejudice, (52)5, 436–447. Hallin, Daniel C. (2019). Mediatisation, Neoliberalism and Populisms: The Case of Trump. Contemporary Social Science, (14)1, 14–25. Hamplova, Dana (2010). Are Czechs the Least Religious of All? The Guardian, 24 June. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/ jun/24/czech-republic-religious-atheism. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Harrell, Allison, Stuart Soyoka, and Shanto Iyengar (2017). Locus of Control And Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Political Psychology, (38)2, 245–260. Hassan, Oz (2017). Trump, Islamophobia and US–Middle East Relations. Critical Studies on Security, (5)2, 187–191. Haynes, Jeffrey (1996). Religion and Politics in Africa. London: Zed Books. ——— (1998). Religion in Global Politics. London: Longman. ——— (Ed.) (2001). Democracy and Political Change in the ‘Third World. ECPR Studies in European Political Science, no. 21, London: Routledge/European Consortium for Political Research. ——— (2005a). Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World. Cambridge: Polity. ——— (2005b). Al-Qaeda: Ideology and Action. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (8)2, 177–91. ——— (2008). Religion and a Human Rights Culture in America. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (6)2, 73–82. ——— (2013a). The “Arab Uprising,” Islamists and Democratisation. In Jeffrey Haynes and Guy Ben-Porat (Eds.), Religion, Secularism and Politics: A Mediterranean View. Special Issue of Mediterranean Politics, (18)2, 170–188. ——— (2013b). Religion, Democracy and Civil Liberties: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Ramifications. European Political Science, (12)2, 171–183. ——— (2014). Faith-Based Organizations at the United Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

230

References

——— (2016). Expert Comment: National Sovereignty, Globalisation and Securitisation of International Migration. Berlin: Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, 29 September. Available at https://doc-research.org/en/report2/national -sovereignty-globalisation-securitisation-international-migration/ ——— (2017a). Donald Trump, “Judeo-Christian Values,” and the “Clash of Civilizations.’” The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (15)3, 66–75. ——— (2017b). Religion and Multiculturalism.’ In Stuart Isaacs (Ed.), European Social Problems (pp. 51–67). London: Routledge, ——— (2018a). The United Nations Alliance of Civilisations and the Pursuit of Global Justice: Overcoming Western versus Muslim Conflict and the Creation of a Just World Order. New York and Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press. ——— (2018b). The United Nations Alliance of Civilisations and Interfaith Dialogue: What Is It Good For? The Review of Faith and International Affairs, (16)2, 48–60. ——— (2019a). Introduction: The “Clash of Civilizations” And Relations Between the West and the Muslim World. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (17)1, 1–10. ——— (2019b). From Huntington to Trump: Twenty-Five years of the “Clash of Civilizations.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (17)1, 11–23. Haynes, Jeffrey, Peter Hough, Shahin Malik and Lloyd Pettiford (2017). World Politics, 2nd. ed. London: Sage. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew (Eds.) (2002). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Cambridge: Polity. Henley, Jon (2018). EU Migration Crisis: What Are the Key Issues? The Guardian, 27 June. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/27/eu-migra tion-crisis-what-are-the-issues. Last accessed 12 February 2019. ——— (2018b). ‘How Populism Emerged as An Electoral Force in Europe,’ The Guardian, 20 November. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng -interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral-force-in-europe. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Hennig, Anja (2011). Conclusion: Religious Actors in The Public Sphere—Patterns and Perspectives. In Jeffrey Haynes and Anja Hennig (Eds.). Religious Actors in the Public Sphere. Means, Objectives and Effects (pp. 213–227). London: Routledge. Herbert, David (2019). Religion and Society. In Jeffrey Haynes (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Political Parties. London: Routledge. (Forthcoming) History of the Visegrád group (2019). Available at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/his tory/history-of-the-visegrad. Last accessed 18 February 2019. HLGR (High Level Group Report) (2006). Alliance of Civilizations. Available at https://www.unaoc.org/docs/AoC_HLG_REPORT_EN.pdf. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Hobson, John (1902 [2011]). Imperialism: A Study. Nottingham: Spokesman Books. Hollifield, James, and David Jacobson. (2012). Migration and the State. The WileyBlackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Available at:



References 231

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog389/abstract. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Hunter, Shireen T. (2017). God on Our Side. Religion in International Affairs. Lanham/Boulder/New York/London: Rowman & Littlefield. Huntington, Samuel (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. ——— (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, (72) 3, 22–49. ——— (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. ——— (2004). Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. Huysmans, Jeff (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, (38)5, 751–77. Ingelhart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003). ‘The True Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Policy 135 (March-April), 62–70. ———. (2016) Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659 Inter-civilizational dialogue of #RhodesForum (2016). Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, Berlin, 30 September. Available at https://doc-research.org/2016/09/ inter-civilizational-dialogue-rhodesforum/. Last accessed 26 February 2019. International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (2019) U.A.E. Expert Group Meeting on “The State and Future of Preventing Violent Extremism in the Arab Region: Regional Assessment and Future Prospects.” Emerging and Conflict-Related Issues Division and Hedayah’s ICCT International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 9 and 10 January. Islamic Foundation in Slovakia (2017). Islamophobia in Slovakia. Alternative Report for the 94th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Bratislava: Islamic Foundation in Slovakia. Available at: https://tbin ternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SVK/INT_CERD_NGO_ SVK_29437_E.pdf. Last accessed 8 May 2019. Islam in Hungary (n/d). Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Hungary. Last accessed 5 October 2018. Islam is Peace, says President (2001). Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. Available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Islamic Studies (n/d). Unit No.1: Concept of Ethics in Islam. Available at http://el earning.ascollegelive.net/studyMaterial/ba/islamic_studies_2nd_sem.pdf. Last accessed April 12, 2017. Islamic Countries Criticize Nato Dialogue on Extremism (1995). JTA Daily News Bulletin, (73)39, 28 February. Available at http://pdfs.jta.org/1995/1995_02_28 .pdf?_ga=2.266210759.998382919.1550055752-1388362470.1550055752. Last accessed 13 February 2019.

232

References

ISPU (2018). American Muslim Poll 2018: Pride and Prejudice Featuring the FirstEver National American Islamophobia Index. Available at https://www.ispu.org/ wp-content/uploads/2018/04/American-Muslim-Poll-2018.pdf. Last accessed 14 May 2019. Itçaïna, Xabier (2019). Catholic Mediations in Southern Europe: The Invisible Politics of Religion. London: Routledge. Jackson, Alex (2016). Mexico to USA Migration. Available at: https://geographyas. info/population/mexico-to-usa-migration/. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Jaffe, Greg (2017). For a Trump Adviser, An Odyssey from the Fringes of Washington to the Center of Power. The Washington Post, February 20. Available at https:// www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2Fworld%2Fnational -security%2Ffor-a-trump-adviser-an%2520odysseyfrom-the-fringes-of-wash ington-to-the-center-of-power%2F2017%2F02%2F20%2F0a326260f2cb%252011e6-b9c9-e83fce42fb61_story.html%3Ftid%3Da_inl%26utm_ term%3D.792e2a543db8&utm_term=.7cd5e59eb730. Last accessed 12 April, 2017. Jakelić, Slavica (2018). Religion and Populism: A Blind Spot for Social Sciences. Religion and its Publics. Available at http://relpubs.as.virginia.edu/religion-and-pop ulism-a-blind-spot-for-social-sciences-by-slavica-jakelic/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Jancarikova, Tatiana (2016). Slovakia Toughens Church Registration Rules to Bar Islam. Reuters, 30 November. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slo vakia-religion-islam-idUSKBN13P20C. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Jethani, Skye (n/d). Christianity Leads to Atheism. Available at https://skyejethani .com/trump-and-the-heresy-of-christianism/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Johnston, David Cay (2018). It’s Even Worse Than You Think: What the Trump Administration Is Doing to America. New York: Simon and Schuster. Johnston, Harry (1993). Religio-Nationalist Subcultures Under the Communists: Comparisons from the Baltics, Transcaucasia and Ukraine. Sociology of Religion, (54)3, 237–55. Jones, Tobias (2018). The Fascist Movement That Has Brought Mussolini Back to The Mainstream. The Guardian, 22 February. Available at https://www.theguard ian.com/news/2018/feb/22/casapound-italy-mussolini-fascism-mainstream. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Joppke, Christian (2018). Culturalizing Religion in Western Europe: Patterns and Puzzles. Social Compass, (65)2, 234–246. Kalamur, Krishnadev (2018). Nine Notorious Dictators, Nine Shout-Outs From Donald Trump. The Atlantic, March 4. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2018/03/trump-xi-jinping-dictators/554810/. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Kalmar, Ivan (2018). Islamophobia in the East of the European Union: An Introduction. Patterns of Prejudice, (52)5, 389–405. Kamali, Mohammad Kashim (2015). The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, Robert (1994). The Coming Anarchy. New York: Random House.



References 233

——— (2016). How Islam created Europe. The Atlantic, May. Available at https:// www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/how-islam-created-europe/ 476388/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. ——— (2017). The Return of Marco Polo’s World and the U.S. Military Response: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-first Century. New York: CNAS. Karpazli, Ertan (2017). How 6 Eastern European Nations Have Hunted Down Refugees—In Policy, And in Practice. Triworld. Available at https://medium.com/ trt-world/how-6-eastern-european-nations-have-hunted-down-refugees-in-policy -and-in-practice-2e6040ab9264). Last accessed 12 February 2019. Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) (2010). Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. ——— (Ed.) (2012a). Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. ——— (Ed.) (2012b). Anglo-America and its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond West and East. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Kaya, Ayhan, and Ayşe Tecmen (2019). Europe versus Islam?: Right-Wing Populist Discourse and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (17)1, 49–64. Kayaoglu, Turan (2012). Constructing the Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: A Case of Global Islamic Activism. Islam And Christian–Muslim Relations, (23)2, 129–147. Kern, Soeren (2017). Marine Le Pen: This Election is a Choice of Civilization. Document. Gjesteskribent. Available at https://www.document.no/2017/02/06/marinele-pen-this-election-is-a-choice-of-civilization/?cn-reloaded=1. Last accessed 26 February 2019. ——— (2018). Germany: Meet Jens Spahn, Merkel’s Possible Successor. Gatestone Institute. National Policy Council. Available at https://www.gatestoneinstitute .org/11912/germany-jens-spahn. Last accessed 5 October 2018. Khan Mohsin Hassan, Hamedi Mohd Adnan, Surinderpal Kaur, Rashid Ali Khuhro, Rohail Asghar, and Sahira Jabeen (2019). Muslims’ Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim-Islam Statement: A Critical Discourse Analysis. Religions, (10)2:115. Khatami, Mohammad (2009a). Dialogue, Justice and Peace. Lecture delivered at the Australian National University, March 24. Available at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=VEW5otoG0Ao. Last accessed 13 February 2019. ——— (2012). Dialogue Among Civilizations: Contexts and Perspectives. UN Chronicle, (49)2. Available at https://unchronicle.un.org/article/dialogue-among -civilizations-contexts-and-perspectives. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Koller, Markus (2012). Ottoman History of South-East Europe, European History Online. Available at http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/from -the-turkish-menace-to-orientalism/markus-koller-ottoman-history-of-south-east -europe. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Kramer, Martin (2018). The Three Wars of Bernard Lewis. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, (9)3, 239–245.

234

References

Kratochvíl, Petr (2019). Religion as a Weapon: Invoking Religion in Secularized Societies. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (17)1, 78–88. Kreig, Andreas (2016). Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. International Affairs, (92)1, 97–113. Kreig, Gregory (2017). Trump’s History of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Hits Dangerous New Low. CNN Politics, 30 November. Available at https://edition.cnn .com/2017/11/29/politics/donald-trump-muslim-attacks/index.html. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Krzystof, Michalski (Ed.) (2006). Religion in the New Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press. Kuhn, Thomas (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kulnazarova, Aigul, and Christian Ydesen (Eds.) (2017). UNESCO Without Borders—Educational Campaigns for International Understanding. New York: Routledge. Kuru, Ahmed (2009). Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LaCasse, Alexander (2015). How Many Muslim Extremists Are There? Just the Facts, Please. Christian Science Monitor, January 13. Available at http://www .csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2015/0113/How-many -Muslimextremists-are-there-Just-the-facts-please. Last accessed June 16, 2017. Landy, Joanne (2016). The Foreign Policies of Sanders, Trump, and Clinton: America and the World in 2016 and Beyond. New Politics, (16)1, 3–13. Larsen, Henrik (2014). Normative Power Europe and the Importance of Discursive Context: The European Union and the Politics of Religion. Cooperation and Conflict, (49)4, 419–437. Lawrence, Bruce (2010). Islam in Afro-Asia: A Bridge Civilization. In Peter Katzenstein (Ed.), Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives (pp. 140–160). Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Leiken, Robert (2012). Europe’s Angry Muslims. New York: Oxford University Press. Lewis, Bernard (1954) Communism and Islam. International Affairs, (30)1, 1–12. ——— (1976). The Return of Islam. Commentary, (61)1, 39–49. ——— (1994). The Shaping of the Modern Middle East. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ——— (2000). The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic Monthly (September) Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-mus lim-rage/304643/. Last accessed 14 May 2019. ——— (2006). Freedom and Justice in Islam. Imprimis, (35)9. Available at https:// imprimis.hillsdale.edu/freedom-and-justice-in-islam/. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Lewis, Paul, and Jennifer Rankin (2018). Steve Bannon’s Far-Right Europe Operation Undermined by Election Laws. The Guardian, 21 November. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/21/steve-bannons-rightwing-eu rope-operation-undermined-by-election-laws. Last accessed 18 February 2019.



References 235

Lieberman, Robert, Suzanne Mettler, Thomas Pepinsky, Kenneth Roberts and Richard Valelly (2018). The Trump Presidency and American Democracy: A Historical and Comparative Analysis. Perspectives on Politics, (1)10. Available at https:// www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/trump-presi dency-and-american-democracy-a-historical-and-comparative-analysis/E157E9B BA8D3E531A7DD4FD1A01E0478. Last accessed 13 May 219. Linklater, Andrew (2015). Civilisations and International Society. In Robert Murray (Ed.), System, Society and the World. Exploring the English School of International Relations, 2nd. ed. (pp. 40–44), Bristol: E-International Relations. Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Little, Richard (2016). Reassessing “the Expansion of International Society.” In Robert Murray (Ed.), System, Society and the World. Exploring the English School of International Relations, 2nd. ed. (pp. 24–33), Bristol: E-International Relations. Lloyd, John (2017). Commentary: Now, a Different Clash of Civilizations. Reuters: Commentary. 15 December. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyd -civilizations-commentary/commentary-now-a-different-clash-of-civilizations -idUSKBN1E923J. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Love, Erik (2017). Islamophobia and Racism in America. New York: New York University Press. Lozada, Carlos (2017). Samuel Huntington, a Prophet for the Trump Era. The Washington Post, 18 July. Available at https://www.bunkhistory.org/resources/685?rel ated=261&relationship_name=CORE%20IDEA. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Lührmann, Anna, Valeriya Mechkova, Sirianne Dahlum, Laura Maxwell, Moa Olin, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Rachel Sigman, Matthew C. Wilson, Staffan Lindberg (2018). State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion? Democratization, (25)8, 1321–1340. Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia (2012). Seminary’s First O. Frederick Nolde Symposium Defines Human Rights Achievements, Challenges. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20081120172043/http://www.ltsp.edu/news_events/ nolde.htm. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Lynch, Cynthia (2012). Religious Humanitarianism in a Neoliberal Age. The Religion Factor Blog, September 12. Available at http://religionfactor.net/2012/09/12/ religious-humanitarianism-in-a-neoliberal-age/. Last accessed 29 May, 2013. Lynch, Thomas F. (2008). Sunni and Shi’a Terrorism: Differences that Matter. Occasional Paper, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. West Point: New York. MacWhirter, James (2019). YouTube Removes Advert for Far-Right Britain First. The Guardian, 16 January. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/16/youtube-removes-adverts-for-far-right-britain-first. Last accessed 26 February 2019. Maddox, Bronwen (2014. New World Disorder: An Interview With Henry Kissinger. Prospect, 223. Available at https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/new-world -disorder-an-interview-with-henry-kissinger. Last accessed 12 February 2019.

236

References

Maginnis, Roy (2011). Muslim World More Anti-American Than Ever, Human Events, 18 August. Available at http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id= 45588. Last accessed 1 April 2012. Meijers, Maurits J., and Herman van der Veer (2019). MEP Responses to Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Poland. An Analysis of Agenda-Setting and Voting Behaviour. Journal of Common Market Studies. Available at https://onlinelibrary .wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12850. Last accessed 13 May 2019. Majtenyi, Balazs, Akos Koer and Pal Susanszky (2019). Constitutional Othering, Ambiguity And Subjective Risks Of Mobilization In Hungary: Examples From The Migration Crisis, Democratization, (26)2, 173–189. Malice, Michael (2018). Alt-Right Bible “Camp of The Saints” Proves Everyone’s Still Insane. Observer, 2 May. Available at https://observer.com/2018/05/the-insanity-of -alt-right-bannon-aroved-the-camp-of-the-saints/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Mandaville, Peter (2017). Designating Muslims: Islam in the Western Policy Imagination. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (15)3, 54–65. Mandhai, Shafik (2017). How Big an Issue is Islamophobia in Poland? Al Jazeera, 14 November. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/big-issue -islamophobia-poland-171113064903344.html. Last accessed 5 October 2018. Manonelles, Manuel (2007). Building an Alliance of Civilizations., Pace Diritti Umani, (4)1, 41–50. Marchetti, Raffaele (2016). Global Strategic Engagement. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Marshall, Katherine (2017). Interfaith Journeys. An Exploration of History, Ideas, And Future Directions. Washington, DC: World Faiths Development Dialogue. Marzouki, Nadia, Duncan McDonnell and Olivier Roy (Eds.) (2016) Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion. London: Hurst. Mason, Paul (2019). Will the Far-Right Triumph in Europe in 2019? New Statesman, 2 January. Available at https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2019/01/ will-far-right-triumph-europe-2019. Last accessed 26 February 2019. Mason, Rowena (2015). Nigel Farage: British Muslim “Fifth Column” Fuels Fear of Immigration. The Guardian, 12 March. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2015/mar/12/nigel-farage-british-muslim-fifth-column-fuels-immigration -fear-ukip. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Mast, Jason L., and Jeffrey C. Alexander (Eds.) (2019) Politics of Meaning/Meaning of Politics Cultural Sociology of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Maza, Cristina (2017) Could Czech Republic Ban Islam? Far-right, Anti-Islam Party Does Well in Elections. Newsweek, 23 October. Available at https://www .newsweek.com/far-right-anti-islam-party-does-surprisingly-well-czech-republics -elections-691000. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Merica, Dan (2017). Trump: “We Are Stopping Cold the Attacks on Judeo-Christian Values.” CNN Politics, October 13. Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/ 13/politics/trump-values-voters-summit/index.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Metz, Helen Chapan (Ed.). (1994) Algeria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at http://countrystudies.us/algeria/48.htm. Last accessed 26 February 2019.



References 237

Michel, Albin (1991). Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Polity. ——— (1994). Religion and Democracy in Central Eastern Europe. In John Fulton and Peter Gee (Eds.), Religion in Contemporary Europe (pp. 34–42). Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen. Milligan, Scott, Robert Andersen and Robert Brym (2014). Assessing Variation in Tolerance in 23 Muslim-Majority and Western Countries. Canadian Review of Sociology, (51)3, 239–261. Mills, Daniel Quinn, and Steven Rosenfielde (2016). The Trump Phenomenon and The Future of Us Foreign Policy. Hackensack, NJ, and London: World Scientific Publishing. Milton, Daniel (2017). Does the Cure Address the Problem? Examining the Trump Administration’s Executive Order on Immigration from Muslim-majority Countries Using Publicly Available Data on Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, (11)4. Available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/ view/625. Last accessed 13 May 2019. Moffitt, Benjamin (2017). Liberal Illiberalism? The Reshaping of The Contemporary Populist Radical Right in Northern Europe. Cogitatio, (5)4, 112–122. Moghadam, Valentine (2002). Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on Islamist Movements, States, and the International System. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, (1)2, 14–27. Mouffe, Chantal (2007). Carl Schmitt’s Warnings on The Dangers of a Multipolar World. In Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (Eds.), The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order (pp. 147–153). Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Molle, Andrea (2019). Religion and Right-Wing Populism in Italy: Using “JudeoChristian roots” to Kill the European Union. Religion, State & Society, (47)1, 151–168. Mudde, Cas (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murden, Simon (2005). Culture in World Affairs. In John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed. (pp. 45–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muslim Migrants Are “Threat” to European Civilization—Czech PM (2018). Sputnik News, 2 September. Available at https://sputniknews.com/europe/201809021067689 690-muslim-migrants-european-civilization/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Nabers, Dirk (Ed.) (2012). The Bush Leadership, the Power of Ideas, and the War on Terror. New York and London: Routledge. Nadeau, Barbie Latza (2018). Steve Bannon, Cardinal Burke, Minister Salvini, and The Plot to Take Down Pope Francis. Daily Beast, 20 June. Available at https:// www.thedailybeast.com/steve-bannon-cardinal-burke-minister-salvini-and-the -plot-to-take-down-pope-francis?ref=scroll. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Narkowicz, Kasia, and Konrad Pedziwiatr (2017). Why Are Polish People So Wrong About Muslims in Their Country? Open Democracy. Available at https:// www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/kasia-narkowicz-konrad-pedzi wiatr/why-are-polish-people-so-wrong-about-muslims-in. Last accessed 18 February 2019.

238

References

National University of Singapore (n/d). Inter-Civilisational Dialogue. Available at http://www.usp.nus.edu.sg/international-programmes/short-term-programmes/ inter-civilisational-dialogue. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Naumkin, Vitaly (2013). Cultural Diversity, Democracy and Good Governance. Available at http://www.theglobalexperts.org/comment-analysis/cultural-diversity -democracy-good-governance. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Newman, Alex (2018). Hungary Resists EU Assault On Sovereignty, Christian civilization. The New American, 21 September. Available at https://www.the newamerican.com/world-news/europe/item/30132-hungary-resists-eu-assault-on -sovereignty-christian-civilization. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Nonneman, Gerd (1996). Muslim Communities in Post-Cold War Europe Themes And Puzzles. In Ian Hampsher-Monk and John Stanyer (Eds.), Contemporary Political Studies 1996, Volume One (pp. 381–94). Proceedings of the annual conference of the Political Studies Association held at Glasgow, 10–12 April. Norris, Pia, and Ronald Inglehart (2004). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Brien, Peter (2016). The Muslim Question in Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. O’Hagan, Jacinta (2017). The Role of Civilization In The Globalization Of International Society. In Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit (Eds.), The Globalization of International Society (pp. 185–201). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. OCHA (2018). About OCHA Yemen. Available at https://www.unocha.org/yemen/ about-ocha-yemen. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Oltermann, Philip (2016). Young, Combative, “Burkaphobic”: The Man Who Could Replace Merkel as Chancellor. The Observer (London), 28 August, p. 23. Orville, Hans (2012). What the UN Can Do to Promote Dialogue Among Civilizations. UN Chronicle, (49)3. Available at https://unchronicle.un.org/article/whatun-can-do-promote-dialogue-among-civilizations. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Ozzano, Luca (2019). Religion, Cleavages and Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Italian Case, The Review of Faith and International Affairs, (17)1, 65–77. Pahlman, Kari (2014). The Securitisation Of Aid and The Associated Risks To Human Security And Development. Unpublished paper, Australian National University. Available at http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1672/pdf/ch06 .pdf. Last accessed 21 November 2017. Paradigm (n/d). Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradigm. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Pasamonik, Barbara (2019). Cultural Barbarism In Relation To Women?: Huntington’s Theory And The German Case Of Mass Sexual Assaults On New Year’s Eve 2015, The Review of Faith and International Affairs, (17)1, 89–103. Pastusiak, Longin (2004). After the Cold War: We Need To Build A New World Order. New York Times, 3 January. Available at https://www.nytimes .com/2004/01/03/opinion/after-the-cold-war-we-need-to-build-a-new-world-order .html. Last accessed 12 February 2019.



References 239

Patel, Faiza, and Rachel Levinson-Waldman (2017). The Islamophobic Administration. Brennan Center for Justice, New York. Available at: https://www.brennan center.org/sites/default/files/publications/BCJ_Islamophobic_Administration.pdf. Last accessed 8 May 2019. Petito, Fabio (2007). The Global Political Discourse of Dialogue among Civilizations: Mohammad Khatami and Vaclav Havel. Global Change, Peace & Security, (19)2, 103–25. Petito, Fabio and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (Eds.) (2003). Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile. New York: Palgrave. Petito, Fabio, and Michalis S. Michael (Eds.) (2009). Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions and Civilizations in International Relations. New York: Palgrave. Pew Research Center (2006) Five Years After 9/11, The Clash of Civilizations Revisited. Interview with Samuel Huntington. Available at http://www.pewforum .org/2006/08/18/five-years-after-911-the-clash-of-civilizations-revisited/. Last accessed 12 February 2019. ——— (2011). Strengthen Ties with China, But Get Tough on Trade. Available at http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/01/12/strengthen-ties-with-china-but-get-tough -on-trade/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. ——— (2013). The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. Available at http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-so ciety-overview/#democracy-and-religious-freedom. Last accessed June 16, 2017. ——— (2016). How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary 2016 Analysis. Available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-pre liminary-2016-analysis/. Last accessed 5 October 2018. ——— (2017). Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in The U.S. And Around the World. Available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims -and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/. Last accessed 12 February 2019. ——— (2017b). Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe. Available at http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and -national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. ——— (2018). Religion and Public Life. Available at http://www.pewforum.org/ religious-landscape-study/. Last accessed 5 October 2018. Philips, Alan (1997). Bible-Burning Cloud Over Russian Freedom. Electronic Telegraph, 647, 3 March. Phillips, David L. (2017). From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. New York: Routledge Picco, Giandomenico (2000). Crossing the Divide: Dialogue among Civilizations. Orange, NJ: Seton Hall University. Polakow-Suransky, Sasha (2017). Go Back to Where You Came From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the Fate of Western Democracy. New York: Nation Books. Potrafke, Niklas, and Felix Roesel (2016). A Banana Republic? Trust in Electoral Institutions in Western Democracies—Evidence from a Presidential Election in

240

References

Austria. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6524. Available at https://papers.ssrn .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908000. Last accessed 14 May 2019. Powell, Kimberley A. (2018). Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016. Religions, (9)9:257 Puchala, Donald, Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Roger A. Coate (2007). United Nations Politics. International Organization in a Divided World. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Rached, Ruth Abou, and Salia Smail-Salhi (2016). The Politics of Women-Focused Activism, Academia and the State in Middle East and North Africa. Contemporary Levant, (1)2, 83–92. Rachman, Gideon (2018). Donald Trump Leads A Global Revival of Nationalism. Financial Times, 25 June. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/59a37a38 -7857-11e8-8e67-1e1a0846c475. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Religion (2015) Available at http://www.slovak-republic.org/religion/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Richardson, Robin (2012). Islamophobia or Anti-Muslim Racism—Or What?— Concepts and Terms Revisited. Available at www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf. Last accessed 14 May 2019. Robinson, Eugene (2017). Trump’s Dangerous Thirst for A Clash Of Civilizations. The Washington Post, 6 July. Available at https://www.washingtonpost .com/opinions/trumps-dangerous-thirst-for-a-clash-of-civilizations/2017/07/06/ fb5398ea-6282-11e7-a4f7-af34fc1d9d39_story.html?utm_term=.3da2eb09620f. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Robertson, Roland (1994). Globalisation or Glocalisation? The Journal of International Communication, (1)1, 33–52. Roy, Olivier (2004) Globalised Islam. London: Hurst. ——— (2014). Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways. London: Hurst. Runnymede Trust, The (1997). Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. London: The Runnymede Trust. Ryan, Ben (2018). Christianism: A Crude Political Ideology and The Triumph Of Empty Symbolism. Religion and Global Society. Available at https://blogs.lse .ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2018/11/christianism-a-crude-political-ideology-and -the-triumph-of-empty-symbolism/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Said, Abdul Aziz (2002). The Whole World Needs the Whole World: Establishing A Framework for a Dialogue of Civilizations. Unpublished paper. Washington, DC: American University. Salt, Jeremy (2012). Idealism at Home and Abroad: Muhammad Khatami’s Utopian Quest For A Better World. In Lee Marsden (Ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution (pp. 203–221). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Samuel, Katja (2010). The Normative Influence of Shari’ah On Current UN Discourse on Justice and Sustainable Development. In D. French (Ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable Development (pp. 109–129). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Sargent, Wendy (2007). Civilizing Peace Building. Twenty-first Century Global Politics. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.



References 241

Sarna, Jonathan D. (2004). American Judaism: A History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sayyid, Salman (2018). Islamophobia and the Europeanness of the Other Europe. Patterns of Prejudice, (52)5, 420–435. Schmid, Alex (2015). Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues. ICCT Policy Brief. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism. Sciolono, Elaine (1996). Seeing Green; The Red Menace Is Gone. New York Times, 21 January. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/21/weekinreview/ seeing-green-the-red-menace-is-gone-but-here-s-islam.html. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Secretary-General’s Remarks to Security Council High-Level Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (2014). Available at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index .asp?nid=8040. Last accessed 22 November 2017. Sfard, Michael (2018). The Wall and the Gate: Israel, Palestine, and the Legal Battle for Human Rights. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Shahar, Yael (2019). Al-Qaida: A Vindication for Constructivism? North Carolina: Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict. Available at http://www.asymmet ricconflict.org/articles/al-qaida-a-vindication-for-constructivism/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Sharify-Funk, Meena (2013). Pervasive Anxiety About Islam: A Critical Reading Of Contemporary “Clash” Literature. Religions, (4)4, 443–468. Sherkat, Darren E., and James Lehman (2018). Bad Samaritans: Religion and AntiImmigrant and Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the United States. Social Science Quarterly. Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ssqu.12535. Last accessed 13 May 2019. Shupe, Anton (1990). The Stubborn Persistence Of Religion In The Global Arena. In Emil Sahliyeh (Ed.), Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (pp. 17–26). Albany: State University of New York Press. Siddiqui, Sabrina (2019). Steve King, White Supremacy And The Problem With Donald Trump. The Guardian, 20 January. Available at https://www.theguardian .com/us-news/2019/jan/20/steve-king-is-representative-of-the-problem-with-don ald-trump. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Simon, Steven, and Daniel Benjamin (2017). The Islamic Huckster in the White House. New York Times, 24 February. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/./the -islamophobic-huckster-in-the-white-house.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Skorini, Heini (2019). Free Speech, Religion and the United Nations: The Struggle to Define International Free Speech Norms. London: Routledge. Sleboda, Mark (2013. A “Dialogue of Civilizations” As A Theoretical Model for A Multipolar World Order. Geopolitica. Available at https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/ article/dialogue-civilizations-theoretical-model-multipolar-world-order. Last accessed 12 February 2019. Smith, Courtney (2003). The United Nations as a Vehicle for Dialogue. Peace & Change, (28)4, 555–569. Smith, Donald Eugene (1970). Religion and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown.

242

References

Smith, William S. (n/d). Samuel Huntington Was Not Like Steve Bannon. Center for the Study of Statesmanship, The Catholic University of America. Available at https://css.cua.edu/ideas_and_commentary/samuel-huntington-was-not-like-steve -bannon/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Sobolewska, Maria (2017). How Attitudes to Diversity Change After A Terrorist Attack. The Conversation, May 31. Available at https://theconversation.com/ how-attitudes-to-diversity-change-after-a-terrorist-attack-78244. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Spencer, Nick (2017a). From America to the UK, Religion Still Matters in Politics— As These Five World Leaders Prove. i-News. Available at https://inews.co.uk/ opinion/religion-still-matters-politics-five-european-leaders-prove/. Last accessed 14 April 2017. Spencer, Nick (Ed.) (2017b). The Mighty and the Almighty: How Political Leaders Do God. London: Biteback. Spielhaus, Reim (2010). Intercultural Peace Forum or Talking Shop? Available at https://en.qantara.de/content/alliance-of-civilizations-intercultural-peace-forum -or-talking-shop. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Steve Bannon in His Own Words (2016). Available at https://ricochet.com/390288/ steve-bannon-in-his-own-words/. Last accessed 12 April, 2017. Steve Bannon interview transcript (2018). ABC News. Available at https://www .abc.net.au/dat/news/transcripts/steve-bannon-interview-transcript.pdf. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Subtirelu, Nicholas (2017). Donald Trump Supporters and the Denial of Racism: An Analysis of Online Discourse in a Pro-Trump Community. Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict, (5)2, 323–346. Sullivan, Andrew (2013). The Decline and Fall of Christianism. The Dish, 23 October. Available at http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/10/23/the-decline-and-fall -of-christianism/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Tariq, Khwaja Khusro (2017). Trump and The Clash of Civilizations: This Dangerous Fantasy May Become Policy. HuffPost. Available at https://www .huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-and-the-clash-of-civilizations-this-dangerous_ us_58991468e4b02bbb1816beb7. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Taylor, Charles (2018). Afterword and Corrections. In Mirjam Kunkler, John Madeley and Shylashri Shankar (Eds.), A Secular Age Beyond the West (pp. 385–396). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tazmini, Ghoncheh (2009). Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. Than, Krisztina (2018a). Hungary Seeks Broader Anti-Migrant Alliance After Austria, Italy Elections. Reuters, 12 March. Available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/ uk-europe-migrants-hungary-minister/hungary-seeks-broader-anti-migrant-allianceafter-austria-italy-elections-idUKKCN1GO25A. Last accessed 18 February 2019. ———. (2018b). Hungarian PM Welcomes Bannon’s Anti-EU Project As “Diversity” In Thinking. Reuters, 27 July. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hun gary-orban-bannon/hungarian-pm-welcomes-bannons-anti-eu-project-as-diversity -in-thinking-idUSKBN1KH1EQ. Last accessed 18 February 2019.



References 243

Tharoor, Ishtan (2016). The Next EU President Says Islam Has No Place in His Country. The Washington Post, 21 June. Todorov, Tzvetan, and Stanley Hoffman (2004). The New World Disorder. Cambridge: Polity. Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2011.) God’s Century. Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Tondo, Lorenzo (2018). Italy’s Matteo Salvini Joins Bannon’s European Populist Group. The Guardian, 8 September. Available at https://www.theguardian .com/world/2018/sep/08/italy-matteo-salvini-joins-steve-bannon-european-popu list-group-movement. Last accessed 5 October 2018. Traer, Robert (1995). Religious NGOs at the UN: 1945 & 1995. Keynote Address Conference on World Christian Mission: Pacific Southwest Asilomar, California— July 28–31, 1995. Available at https://religionhumanrights.com/Research/un.udhr .htm. Last accessed 14 February 2019. ——— (1993). Faith in Human Rights. Our Challenge in the 1990s. Available at http:// zaprokul.org.rs/pretraga/91_14.pdf. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention (2007). Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/washington/w23policy text.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Troy, Jodok (2012). Christian Approaches to International Affairs. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Turley, Steve (2017). Poland is the Model Christian Nation for All of Europe. Turley Talks, 28 July. Available at https://www.turleytalks.com/blog-summary/ poland-is-the-model-christian-nation-for-all-of-europe-3. Last accessed 19 February 2019. UN Alliance of Civilizations Strategic Review and Plan, 2013–2018 (2013). Available at www.unaoc.org/wp-content/./130624_Final-Strategic-Review-Plan.pdf. Last accessed 11 October 2015. UNAOC Annual Activity Report (2017). Available at https://www.unaoc.org/re source/united-nations-alliance-of-civilizations-annual-activity-report-2017/. Last accessed 19 February 2019. UN General Assembly (2001). Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 56/6. Global Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations, 9 November. Available at https://www.un.org/documents/ares566e.pdf. Last accessed 14 May 2019. UN General Assembly and UN Security Council (2002). Identical Letters Dated 1 August 2002 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and President of the Security Council, A/57/273-S/2002/875, 6 August 2002, annex. Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. UN Human Rights Committee (2011) General Comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression. Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf). Last accessed 14 February 2019. UN NewsCentre (2016). Baku: Violent Extremism “Affront” To UN Principles, Global Forum Told in Opening Session. Available at http://www.un.org/as/news/ story.asp?NewsID=53782#.Wd421IZrz64). Last accessed 22 November 2017.

244

References

UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (n/d). Available at https://www.un.org/counterter rorism/ctitf/en/structure. Last accessed 14 February 2019. UN Press Release (2000). United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations, 2001 Launched with headquarters round table discussion. Press Release GA/9747. Available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000905.ga9747.doc.html. Last accessed 3 February 2019. UN Security Council (2010). Minutes of The Meeting Of The UN Security Council, S/PV 6322, 26 May. Available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/. Last accessed 14 May 2019. UNESCO (2017). Youth Led Guide On Prevention Of Violent Extremism Through Education. New York: UNESCO. Available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0026/002605/260547e.pdf. Last accessed 19 February 2019. Uthup, Thomas (2010). Bringing Communities Closer: The Role of the Alliance of Civilizations. CrossCurrents, (60)3, 402–418. Viktor Orbán’s Christmas message (2017). We Don’t Want to Rename Our Christmas Markets and Retreat Behind Concrete Blocks. Voice of Europe, 24 December. Available at https://voiceofeurope.com/2017/12/viktor-orbans-christmas-message -we-dont-want-to-rename-our-christmas-markets-and-retreat-behind-concrete -blocks/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Viktor Orbán welcomes Steve Bannon’s efforts on behalf of the European far right (2018). Hungarian Spectrum, 30 July. Available at http://hungarianspectrum. org/2018/07/30/viktor-orban-welcomes-steve-bannons-efforts-on-behalf-of-the -european-far-right/. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Vieten, Ulrike, and Scott Poynting (2016). Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe. Journal of Intercultural Studies, (37)6, 533–540. Waever, Ole (2006). Fear and Faith: Religion As An International Security Issue. Lecture at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, May 17. Available at https:// kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/30197/Ole%20W%c3%a6ver%205-17-06 .pdf?sequence=4. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Waldinger, Roger (2018). Immigration and the Election of Donald Trump: Why the Sociology of Migration Left Us Unprepared. . . . And Why We Should Not Have Been Surprised. Ethnic and Racial Studies, (41)8, 1411–1426. Walker, Shaun, and Daniel Boffey (2018). Hungary Election: OSCE Monitors Deliver Damning Verdict. The Guardian, 9 April. Available at https://www.theguardian. com/world/2018/apr/09/hungary-election-osce-monitors-deliver-damning-verdict. Last accessed 18 February 2018. Walt, Stephen M. (2017). America’s New President Is Not A Rational Actor. Foreign Policy, 25 January. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/americas -new-president-is-not-a-rational-actor/. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Webb, Adam K. (2015). The Rise of The Cosmopolitan Traditionalists: From the Arab Spring to A Global Countermovement. International Political Science Review, (36)4, 425–40. Werleman, C. J. (2018). Slovakia’s Deplorable Move to Criminalise Islam. The New Arab, 18 September. Available at https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/com ment/2018/9/18/slovakias-deplorable-move-to-criminalise-islam. Last accessed 14 May 2019.



References 245

Weyland, Kurt (2013). Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat From The Populist Left. Journal of Democracy, (24)3, 18–32. What is common knowledge (n/d). Available at https://integrity.mit.edu/handbook/ citing-your-sources/what-common-knowledge. Last accessed 14 February 2019. What is your paradigm (n/d). Available at http://www.erm.ecs.soton.ac.uk/theme2/ what_is_your_paradigm.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Why an anti-Islam campaign has taken root in Hungary, a country with few Muslims (2016). Visegrád Group. Available at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/why-an-anti -islam. Last accessed 18 February 2019. Wight, Martin (1979). Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Wilders, Geert (2011). The Failure of Multiculturalism and How to Turn the Tide. Speech by Geert Wilders in Rome on 25 March 2011. Available at https://pvv.nl/ index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/4128-speech-geert-wilders -in-rome-25-maart-2011.html. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Wilson, Bryan (1992). Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy. In Steve Bruce (Ed.) Religion and Modernization (pp. 195–210). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Winkler, Rafael (2017). The Long Walk From “Civilised” And “Barbaric” To A New World View. The Conversation. Available at https://theconversation.com/the-long -walk-from-civilised-and-barbaric-to-a-new-world-view-81110. Last accessed on 13 February 2019. Wolf, Martin (2017). The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder. Financial Times, 5 January. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/ef13e61a-ccec-11e6 -b8ce-b9c03770f8b1. Last accessed 13 February 2019. ——— (2018). The New World Disorder and The Fracturing of the West. Financial Times, 2 January. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/54104d98-eedd-11e7 -ac08-07c3086a2625. Last accessed 13 February 2019. Wood, Graeme (2017). What We Still Don’t Know About the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters. The Atlantic, 19 August. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/isis-foreign-fighters/537279/. Last accessed 26 February 2017. Ybarra, Vicky, Lisa Sanchez and Gabriel Sanchez (2016). Anti-Immigrant Anxieties in State Policy. The Great Recession and Punitive Immigration Policy In The American States, 2005–2012. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, (16)3, 313–39. Yeats, W.B. (1919/2000). The Second Coming, reproduced in W. B. Yeats, A Terrible Beauty is Born, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 33. Zemni, Sami (2002). Islam, European Identity and The Limits of Multiculturalism. In W. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld (Eds.), Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of the European Union (146–161). Leuven: Peeters. Zinberg, David S. (2017). A Great Judeo-Christian Nation? Jewish Standard, 30 June. Available at https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/a-great-judeo-christian-nation/. Last accessed 14 February 2019. Zolo, Danilo (2007). The Contemporary Use of The Notion of Empire. In Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (Eds.) The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order (pp. 154–165). Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Index

7 July, 2005, bombings in London, 56, 96 11 March, 2004, bombings in Spain, 56, 126 11 September, 2001 (“9/11”), 1, 3, 8, 20, 26, 29, 39, 46, 49, 56, 57, 58, 63, 65, 75, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 96, 98, 100, 110, 111, 123, 125, 126, 128, 132, 138, 142, 148, 151, 158, 208 ANO (Czech Republic), 181, 190 Achcar, Gilbert, 51, 53 Afghanistan, 9, 11, 16, 36, 49, 50, 51, 56, 75, 77, 81, 110, 112, 128, 151, 200 Africa, 2, 10, 12, 13, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 131, 132, 146, 203, 204, 206 Algeria, 54, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 157 Al-Nasser, Nassir Abdulaziz, 115, 123, 211 Al Qaeda, 2, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 63, 75, 96, 110, 112, 125, 126, 128, 132, 139, 148, 200 Al Shabaab, 75, 125, 126, 130 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed, 78, 79 anti-Semitism, 169 Annan, Kofi, 73, 83, 84, 112, 114, 121, 122, 128, 130

Arab Spring/Uprisings, 15, 50, 53, 58, 63, 97, 98, 101, 176, 200 Asia, 2, 10, 27, 32, 33, 36, 37, 41, 54, 131, 203, 204 Asian values, 47, 74 Austria, 16, 62, 93, 110, 135, 151, 159, 173, 174, 176 Babiš, Andrej, 190, 191 Bannon, Steve, 61, 62, 104, 105, 132, 136, 145, 146, 147, 194 barbarians/savages, 38, 39, 45 Belgium, 56, 160, 169, 174 Bettiza, Gregorio, 29–30, 115 bin-Laden, Osama, 47 Boko Haram, 52, 75, 125, 126, 130, 200 Bosco, Robert, 98 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 72, 73 “Brexit,” 91, 158, 160, 200 Britain. See United Kingdom Brown, Chris, 40, 42 Brubaker, Rogers, 89, 94, 104, 148, 157, 158, 162, 165 Bull, Hedley, 2, 39 burkha, 93, 94, 169, 202 “burkini,” 201, 202 Bush, President George H.W., 47, 48, 49 247

248

Index

Bush, President George W., 9, 96, 133, 138–140, 142, 151, 199 Buzan, Barry, and Waever, Ole, 95 Cairo, Barack Obama speech in (2009), 141 Camus, Renaud (The Great Replacement), 146 Central (and Eastern) Europe, 4, 13, 89, 103, 158, 160, 175–195 Cesari, Jocelyne, 95, 96, 169 Charlie Hebdo, 52, 110 China, 13, 14, 46, 51, 54, 60, 61, 70, 71, 80 Christian Evangelicals, 91, 134, 135, 142 Christian missionaries, 35 Christianity/Christians, 2, 34, 38, 39, 41, 93, 108, 110, 118, 125, 129, 155, 164, 187, 192 Civilization/civilizations, 6, 15, 17, 28–31, 38 Civilizationism, Christianism, 1, 3, 4, 21, 29, 89, 90, 101–105, 132, 133, 134, 146, 153, 154–174, 175, 178, 179–195, 198, 212 civilized state, 27 Claes, Willy, 56, 57, 58, 62 “clash for civilization,” 140 “clash of barbarisms,” 51 clash of civilizations, 1, 2, 5–11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 25, 36, 42, 47, 53, 66, 80, 81, 82, 87, 99, 114, 116, 131, 138, 143, 180, 193, 198 Cold War, the, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 19, 25, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 59, 65, 69, 111, 131, 142, 158, 174 colonization, Western, 26, 27, 32, 37, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 52 Communism, 183–186 conflict, 49 Council on American–Islamic Relations, 23 “Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force,” (CTITF) 127

“Countering Violent Extremism,” (PVE) 87, 89, 98, 99, 107, 126, 129, 206, 208, 209–210 Crossing the Divide, 114 cultural relativism, 74 culture, 21, 22, 34, 41, 76, 155, 165 Czech Republic, 1, 4, 16, 49, 91, 101, 153, 175, 181, 182, 184, 190, 192 Czechoslovakia, 6, 179–180 Dallmayr, Fred, 68, 69, 70, 71 decolonization, 26, 33, 35, 36, 41 defamation of religion, 111 Davie, Grace, 164 democracy, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 36, 47, 48, 49, 54, 59, 60, 61, 74, 131, 132, 139, 154, 180, 184 democracy promotion, 132 “Dialogue Among Civilizations” (DAC), 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 107, 207 d’Orville, Hans, 83 Egypt, 14, 16, 22, 25, 57, 142 El-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 17, 22 elites, 100 “English School” of International Relations, 37, 39, 40 Enhancing Life Project, 4, 5 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 60, 114 Ericksson, Johan, 139 Eroukhmanoff, Clara, 96 Eurasianism, 70 Europe, 1, 5, 10, 11, 20, 21, 29, 32, 46, 53, 58, 61, 62, 88, 89, 90, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 118, 200, 201, 203, 205, 212 European civilization, 26, 34, 37, 42, 172 European Union, the, 5, 75, 88, 91, 94, 105, 111, 161, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 180, 193, 194, 203, 204, 205 European values, 31–37, 39 faith-based organization (FBO), 109, 111



Index 249

Farage, Nigel, 161 Fico, Robert, 181, 191 Fidesz (Hungary), 181, 189, 192, 194 Foreign Affairs (journal), 6, 10 Fortuyn, Pim, 154 Fox News, 142, 199 France, 1, 15, 17, 27, 35, 36, 45, 56, 91, 93, 94, 110, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 168, 174, 184, 194, 201 Fraser, Nancy, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 Front National/National Front (France), 110, 154, 155 Fukuyama, Francis, 10, 48, 49, 50, 66, 131, 132 Gabriel, Brigitte, 90, 150 García, Mario, 144 Germany, 1, 56, 88, 89, 101, 153, 156, 157, 158, 160, 165, 168, 169, 173, 174, 180, 184, 194, 201, 203 global citizenship, 124 “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 125, 127, 128, 208 global justice, 75, 78, 79 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 29, 39, 53, 65, 90, 96, 98, 110, 112, 126, 139, 141, 148, 176, 208 globalization, 2, 4, 18–21, 26, 29, 33, 47, 50, 59, 60, 66, 75, 76, 135, 150, 158, 194, 203 glocalization, 18–21 Gorka, Sebastian, 105, 145, 147 Guterres, António, 113, 121, 122, 125, 211 hard power, 35, 80 Hobson, John, 34 Hoffman, Stanley, 51, 52, 53, 63 Holy See, 109, 111 human rights, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 42, 47, 49, 54, 58, 59, 61, 67, 74, 79, 108–125, 129, 131, 140, 154, 167, 180 Hungary, 1, 4, 16, 32, 88, 91, 93, 101, 104, 153, 173, 175, 178, 181, 182, 184, 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 203

Huntington, Samuel, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6–11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 28, 30, 34, 36, 42, 45, 47, 49, 53, 54, 66, 69, 74, 82, 87, 100, 103, 131, 132, 138, 140, 149, 161, 162, 165, 193, 197, 198, 212 Hussein, Saddam, 14, 48, 85 identitarian doctrine, 146, 165, 167, 178 illiberal democracy, 60 imperialism, Western, 32, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47 India, 12, 22, 27, 34, 35, 61, 70, 80 intercivilizational dialogue, 11, 65–86, 88, 107 intercivilizational interactions, 29 intercultural dialogue, 118 international migration, 200–202 international order, 75 international society, 37–39, 45, 49, 51 “International Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations,” 65, 67, 79, 81 Iran, 14, 18, 23, 25, 51, 58, 65, 80, 87, 112, 121, 141, 148 Iraq, 9, 11, 15, 16, 18, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, 63, 75, 77, 81, 103, 110, 112, 126, 127, 141, 147, 171, 200, 202 Islam, 34, 40, 97, 99, 109, 110, 165 Islamic civilization/values, 52, 74 Islamic/Muslim world, 2, 3, 7, 12, 14, 25, 29, 46, 54, 58, 65, 77, 86, 125, 142 Islamic State (IS), 9, 10, 16, 22, 47, 54, 55, 58, 63, 70, 75, 103, 116, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 171, 200, 202, 212 Islamism/Islamists, 29, 54, 55, 144, 157 Islamist terrorism/extremism, 20, 21, 53–63, 65, 66, 88, 89, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 116, 123, 125, 129, 133, 139, 140, 143, 144, 147, 158, 158, 160, 171, 198, 199, 205 Islamophobia, 3, 8, 17, 20, 23, 92, 105, 133, 148, 158, 170, 178, 191 Israel, 11, 17, 18, 57, 77, 123, 141, 170

250

Index

Italy, 1, 16, 91, 101, 153, 157, 159, 164, 168, 173, 174, 176, 183 Jethani, Skye, 102 Jews, 170 Judeo–Christian values, 3, 94, 102, 105, 109, 110, 132, 133, 136, 138, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150 justice, 77, 78

multiculturalism, 161 Muslim beliefs, 136–38, 174 Muslim Brotherhood, the 158 Muslim fundamentalism, 57, 58 Muslim migration/immigration, 12, 17, 20, 21, 88, 89, 91, 93, 97, 99, 101, 105, 133, 150, 156, 157, 158, 160, 165, 176, 177, 180, 187 Muslims, 2, 16, 118, 123, 142, 155, 167

Kaplan, Robert, 51, 58 Katzenstein, Peter, 30 Kerry, John, 53 Khalifa, Shaikh (Bahrain), 67 Khatami, Mohammad, 3, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 107, 112, 207 Ki-moon, Ban, 114, 121, 122, 127 King, Steve, 102, 132, 133 Kissinger, Henry, 46, 47, 48 Kuhn, Thomas, 8

nationalism, 33, 43, 59, 192 “nationalist international,” 62 nativist beliefs, 143 Netherlands, the, 1, 4, 17, 91, 94, 101, 104, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 168, 174, 184 New World Order, 11, 26, 45, 46–63, 70 New World Disorder, 26, 45–63 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 51, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 88

Le Pen, Marine, 17, 154, 158, 168 League of Nations, 28, 41, 43 Lewis, Bernard, 7, 8, 22, 28, 34, 36, 197, 198, 212 Libya, 126, 127, 148, 151 Linklater, Andrew, 38

O’Hagan, Jacinda, 37, 38 Obama, President Barack, 9, 133, 140– 143, 151, 199 Orbán, Victor, 4, 17, 60, 93, 94, 104, 173, 178, 180, 188, 189, 194, 206 Organization of the Islamic Conference/ Cooperation, 85, 110, 111, 112, 115, 203 Ottoman Empire, 31, 33

Macron, Emmanuel, 60, 103, 173 Mali, 54, 126, 127 Marshall, Katherine, 68 Matsuura, Kōichirō, 72 “Mediterranean Dialogue,” 57, 62 Merkel, Angela, 60, 156, 168, 173, 203 Mexico/Mexicans, 20, 101, 144, 199, 204 Middle East, the, 2, 11, 33, 36, 41, 119, 132, 142, 147, 200, 204 Middle East, the, and North Africa (MENA), 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 34, 37, 57, 58, 63, 97, 146 Miller, Stephen, 145 modernization, 35, 66, 161, 163, 184 Moratinos, Miguel Ángel, 115, 212, 213 Mudde, Cas, 143, 169

Pakistan, 14, 16, 23, 25, 110, 111, 147, 156, 157, 171, 200, 202 Palestinians/Palestine, 18, 75, 77, 123, 141, 141 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 26, 27, 33, 42, 47 Petito, Fabio, 69, 71 philosemitism, 169 Picco, Giandomenico, 83, 129 PiS (Poland), 181, 183, 189, 192 Poland, 1, 4, 5, 6, 16, 91, 101, 153, 175, 181, 182, 183, 184, 190, 192, 193, 195, 203



Index 251

Populism/populists, right–wing, 1, 4, 11, 21, 53, 59, 61, 62, 63, 88, 89, 97, 98, 99–101, 150, 153, 154, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179–195, 197, 212 “Preventing Violent Extremism” (PVE), 87, 89, 98, 99, 107, 126, 129, 206, 208, 209, 210 Putin, Vladimir, 17, 60

Sullivan, Andrew, 101–102 Sweden, 101, 153, 157, 159, 164 Syria (civil war), 16, 18, 21, 54, 58, 63, 97, 101, 103, 110, 126, 127, 129, 142, 147, 148, 151, 156, 158, 171, 176, 193, 202

Raspail, Jean (The Camp of the Saints), 146 refugees (in Europe), 50, 150, 156, 158, 176, 180, 187, 192, 201, 203, 205 religious freedom, 131, 139, 140, 154 Robertson, Roland, 19–20 Roman Catholic Church, 181 Roy, Olivier, 157, 167, 168 Russia ,51, 70, 71, 80

Taylor, Charles, 92, 93, 94 Thirty Years War (1618–1648), 31 Todorov, Tzvetan, 51, 52, 53, 63 toleration, 92 Traer, Robert, 108 Trump, Donald, 1, 3, 5, 9, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 60, 61, 62, 91, 101, 102, 105, 131–151, 153, 194, 199, 200, 204, 206 Turkey, 16, 25, 51, 60, 71, 88, 94, 142, 156, 157, 202, 205, 206

Said, Abdul Aziz, 78 Salafists/Salafism, 166, 167 Salman, Mohammed bin, 17 Salvini, Matteo, 17, 60, 168, 173 Samkov, Klára, 190 Sampaio, Jorge, 114 Sartori, Giovanni, 48, 49 Saudi Arabia, 8, 16, 17, 18, 23, 148 securitization of Islam, 3, 21, 46, 65, 89, 90, 95–99, 202 secularization, 136, 161, 165, 181 secularization theory, 162–165 sharia law, 21, 133, 149, 158, 160, 167 Sleboda, Mark, 70, 71 Slovakia, 1, 4, 17, 91, 101, 153, 175, 181, 182, 184, 191, 192 soft power, 35, 80, 115, 124 Somalia, 36, 126, 148, 151 Soros, Georg,e 189 Soviet Union (USSR), 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 19, 22, 27, 36, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 131 Spahn, Jens, 168, 169, 202 Spain, 88, 114, 164, 183, 213 Spencer, Richard, 146, 150 Sudan, 35, 110, 111, 148, 151

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 41, 71, 72, 79, 86, 107, 108, 109, 113, 129 United Kingdom, 1, 16, 27, 35, 45, 94, 105, 118, 127, 153, 157, 158, 161, 164, 165, 201 United Nations, 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 21, 26, 27, 28, 37, 41, 43, 46, 50, 55, 61, 65–86, 87, 95, 126, 128, 197, 206 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, 3, 4, 5, 86, 88, 107– 125, 128, 129, 197, 206–207, 210, 211, 212 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Global For a, 4, 116, 117, 123 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Group of Friends, 122, 129, 130 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations “High Level Report” (2006), 122– 125 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Summer Schools, 120, 121, 124 United Nations Charter (1945), 41, 42, 72, 77, 86, 89, 107, 109, 110, 129 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

252

Index

(UNESCO), 72, 82, 83, 85, 124, 208, 210, 211 United Nations Human Rights Conference, Vienna 1993, 3, 7, 11, 13, 25, 43, 66, 67, 73, 74, 84, 85, 109 United States of America, 1, 5, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 29, 36, 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, 53, 56, 60, 61, 75, 80, 81, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 131–151, 163, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182, 200, 204, 205, 212 Visegrád Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), 104, 160, 175–195 Waever, Ole 99 West, the, 2, 3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 25, 29, 54, 58, 65, 81, 86, 123, 125

Western civilization, 12, 42, 47, 51, 52, 61, 92, 145, 170 Western Europe, 3, 4, 38, 89, 97, 103, 153–174, 175 Western values, 13, 45, 49, 77, 81, 103 white nationalism, 133 white supremacy, 133 Wight, Martin, 38 Wilders, Geert, 4, 104, 154, 158, 159, 168, 170, 171 Wolf, Martin, 51, 53, 60 World Bank, the, 68 World War II, 27, 37 Yemen, 18, 63, 119, 148, 151 Yerushalmi, David, 20, 148, 149 Yugoslavia, former, 2, 6, 19, 22, 48, 49, 85, 94, 131

About the Author

Jeffrey Haynes is Emeritus Professor of Politics at London Metropolitan University, UK. He is the author or editor of 45 books, the most recent of which are: The United Nations Alliance of Civilisations and the Pursuit of Global Justice: Overcoming Western versus Muslim Conflict and the Creation of a Just World Order (New York and Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 2018). World Politics. International Relations and Globalisation in the 21st Century, 2nd. ed. (London: SAGE, 2017). Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, 2nd. ed. (London: Routledge, 2016).

253