French Imperialism in Syria: 1927-1936 0863722431, 9780863722431

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Note on Transliteration
Foreword
Preface
Introduction
1 The French search for a new policy: coercion and cooperation
2 France’s imposition of a constitution 1930
3 Syria’s rejection of the treaty
4 Syrian Parliament suspended 1933-1935
5 General Strike in Syria, January 1936
6 Reflections on the period, 1927-1936
7 Aftermath: deception and deliverance, 1936-1946
Appendix
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

F rench

I m p erialism in Syria I927-1936

F ren ch /O

imperialism in Syria i 927- i 936

P e t e r A . S h a m bro o k W ith a foreword by P hilip S. K houry

ITHACA

French Imperialism

in

Syria

1927-1936 Ithaca Press is an imprint o f Garnet Publishing Limited

Published by Garnet Publishing Limited 8 Southern Court South Street Reading RG1 4Q S UK Copyright O Peter Shambrook 1998 All rights reserved. N o pan o f this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review. ISBN 0 86372 2 4 3 1 First Edition British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data, catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Jockei design by Michael Hinks Typeset by Samantha Abley Printed in Lebanon

In loving memory

°f Eileen Keenan, my mother, a rem arkable Irishwom an, who dem onstrated the heart an d Leslie, myfather, an Englishm an o f integrity through whom I grew up w alking down the road o f history in the shoes o f two quite different tribes

Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations Note on Transliteration M ap Foreword by Philip S. Khoury Preface Introduction

ix x xi xii xiii xv 1

1 The French search for a new policy: coercion and cooperation 2 France’s imposition o f a constitution 1930 3 Syria’s rejection o f the treaty 4 Syrian Parliament suspended 1933-1935 5 General Strike in Syria, January 1936 6 Reflections on the period, 1927-1936 7 Aftermath: deception and deliverance, 1936-1946 Appendix Bibliography Index

5 41 85 141 185 247 253 291 299 309

[viil

Acknowledgements

I owe a particular debt o f gratitude to the late W illiam ('Bill’) Conner, his wife Cherie, and D r Charis Waddy - friends and mentors, who introduced me to the past and present complexities, joys and pains o f the West s relationship with the Middle East; M M . Jean Gaulmier, Jean-Louis Aujol and Sir Richard Beaumont, veterans o f the period, whose distilled hindsight unravelled many mysteries; to M . Pierre Foumié o f the Archives Department at the Quai d’Orsay and M M . Pascal Even and Bruno Ricard o f the Centre for Diplomatic Archives at Nantes, for their wholehearted cooperation; M aurice and Angela Nosley, for their kind hospitality in Nantes over many months; to Arthur and Helen Lodge» my parents-in-law, for their love and support and, not least, Alison, Patrick, Teresa and Anthony for happily surviving the whole pilgrimage.

[ix]

Abbreviations

CA D N C A D N /B CH EAM DDF FO M AE M AE/SL MD PREM PRO SPRS

Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes, fon ds Beyrouth (not paginated) Centre de Hautes Etudes Administratives sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes (Paris) Documents Diplomatiques Français Foreign Office (London) Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Pâlis) Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Série Syrie-Liban Ministère de la Défense (Vincennes) Prime M inister/M inister o f Defence files Public Record Office (London) Spears Papers, St Antony’s College, Oxford, and Churchill College, Cambridge.

H

Note on Transliteration

N o diacritical marks are used. The Arabic letter 'ayn is represented by an opening quotation mark, and the ham za by a closing quotation mark, but only when these occur in the middle o f the word; thus, Sa'dallah and Fu ad. Commonly accepted English forms, however, are used for some personal and place names; for example, Saud rather than Sa ud.

(«il

TRANSJORDAN

Syria and Lebanon during the French M andate, circa 1930

Foreword

D r Peter Shambrook’s book makes a significant contribution to the historical professions knowledge o f French imperial policy in the interwar M iddle East. It stands as the most fully researched study o f French policy in Syria in the middle years o f the French Mandate. M odem Syrian studies is perhaps the most exciting M iddle Eastern area o f scholarly inquiry today. This is a fairly recent development and is direcdy connected to the access scholars now have to Syria and to the opening up in the late 1980s o f the consular archives o f the French M andate, which are housed in Nantes, France. Owing to these two developments, several scholars have recently produced fascinating studies on a variety o f topics: King Faysals interregnum in Damascus immediately after World War I; the development o f minority politics in the Druze and Alawite regions o f Syria between the two world wars; the growth o f political consciousness and activism among women; and the radical ideological and military movements that eventually toppled the ancien régime in the aftermath o f World War II. D r Sham brooks study can be included in this group. It is a meticu­ lously researched narrative history o f the crucial, but litde understood middle period o f the French M andate, from the end o f the Great Syrian Revolt o f 1925 until the French agreement to negotiate an independence treaty in 1936. I know o f no scholar who has mined the Nantes archives on Syria in this period to the degree that D r Shambrook has. Until the appearance o f D r Sham brooks book, my own Syria an d the French M andate: The Politics o f A rab N ationalism , 1920-1945 (Princeton University Press, 1987), was thought to be the most thorough study o f Franco-Syrian relations in the period 1 927-1936.1 think this is no longer the case. D r Shambrook reaffirms some o f my findings and interpretations and revises others, especially with regard to how French imperial policy developed its liberal character in the wake o f the Syrian Revolt. W hat

F re nch I mp eri ali sm in Syri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

becomes clear after reading Dr Shambrook is that French com prehension o f the aims o f Syrian bourgeois nationalism was considerably more acu te than I and other scholars had suggested. Indeed, the French played th e politics o f notables with an adept hand, and even if Paris was a d istan t and often baffled bystander in the daily politics o f the era, French civil officials in the held were considerably more competent and savvy th an previously thought. Their failings cannot in the end be laid at their ow n feet but rather were direcdy connected to the complex political scene in Paris which so often constrained, indeed paralysed, French officials in Damascus and Aleppo. D r Shambrook writes in an engaging manner. He is passionate about his subject, and this is just as it should be. H is study will attract the attention o f historians interested in the comparative study o f French imperialism, a subject that is seemingly inexhaustible. And it should attract the notice o f M iddle East specialists, among them the emerging group o f North American and European scholars focused on Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and Iraq. Philip S. Khoury Professor o f History Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

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Preface

The study o f Frances informal empire in Syria and Lebanon (1920-46) has been a neglected subject. Since the Second World War there has been no detailed study published by any French historian on the subject. With the exception o f Philip S. Khourys masterly study Syria an d the French M andate: The Politics o f A rab N ationalism , 1920-1945 which focused on the internal dynamics o f Arab nationalism in Syria during the period, little has been published on the subject since the French archives were partially opened during the 1970s. Reasons for this neglect are not hard to find: in particular, the lack o f completeness and limited depth o f the E-Levant (Syrie-Liban) series then available at the Quai d’Orsay precluded any detailed study o f French policy in the Levant. Some o f the military archives are still inaccessible. Furthermore, as the late Albert Hourani pointed out, Trench historians . . . could find little to interest them in an episode o f their imperial history that could n o t . . . be regarded as one o f fulfilment and voluntary transfer o f power.’1 This situation changed in 1987, when a large collection o f French historical documents became accessible at the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques at Nantes, which include some 3,003 boxes o f archives o f the French High Commission for Syria and Lebanon. The larger part o f this collection consists o f files o f the ’Cabinet Politique’ o f the High Commission (boxes 362-1530, 1562-1673). The copious correspondence between the Quai d’Orsay and the High Commissioner in Beirut found in these volumes now enables scholars, for the first time, to make a detailed analysis o f the internal dynamics o f French Mandatory policy in Syria. This study - the first focused on French mandatory policy - is based on those unpublished primary sources {fonds ‘Beyrouth’), British archival sources, and interviews with veterans o f the period. It sheds new light on the consolidation o f Syria as a nation state and provides fiesh perspective on the conundrum that the French never really solved

F re nch I mperi ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

in Syria: how to maintain effective control, while attempting to a p p e a r faithful to their official M andatory duty to emancipate the territories.

N o te

1 Foreword by Albert Hourani in Philip S. Khoury, Syria an d the French M an d a te : The Politics o f A rab N ationalism , 1 9 2 0 -1 9 4 5 , London, I.B. Tauris, 1987, p. v ii.

Introduction

The subject o f this book is the process o f French political decision-making in Syria between the end o f the Great Revolt in 1927 and the FrancoSyrian Treaty o f ‘Friendship and Alliance’ in 1936. The First World War witnessed the defeat and dismemberment o f the Ottom an Empire - the last Muslim great power in global terms - under which most Arab countries had lived for centuries and which had served as some kind o f protection against European rule. Britain and France emerged as the major powers on the winning side with their colonial empires intact, and their military control o f the Middle East and the Maghreb stronger than ever. Britain’s interests in the M iddle East focused on safeguarding the route to India, securing cheap and accessible oil for her navy, maintaining the balance o f power in the Mediterranean to her advantage, and guarding her commercial and financial concerns. France, for her part, hoped to preserve her centuries-old ties with the Catholics o f Syria, gain a strategic and economic base in the eastern Mediterranean, ensure a cheap supply o f cotton and silk, and prevent Arab nationalism from infecting her North African empire. Nevertheless, the face o f western imperialism began to change. Both Britain and France lacked the men and the money to maintain empires in the grand old style o f Queen Victoria and Jules Ferry. From Moscow, Lenin predicted the rebellion o f all colonial peoples against their colonisers, while in Washington Woodrow Wilson declaimed his Fourteen Points, throughout which ran the principle o f self-determination for small nations.1 During the Versailles peace conference, a bargain was struck between what Britain and France perceived to be their vital interests, and the internationalism and anti-imperialism then in vogue. This compromise was the principle o f Mandate by which an advanced’ state was to tutor a less advanced state in the complexities o f democratic self-government until it was ready to rule itself. Imperial domination was formally qualified

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

by providing for eventual full independence. The Mandate was a lib eral­ sounding concept which covered and ‘legitimised’ outright im p erial control. In contrast to a colony or protectorate, it was officially a tem porary arrangement, although its duration was unspecified. According to A rticle I o f the Mandate Act, France was required to prepare and promulgate a n organic law (i.e. a constitution) for Syria and Lebanon within a p erio d o f three years o f the coming into force o f the Mandate. In late 1918, Emir Faysal had begun to set up an Arab adm inistration in Damascus with British support. He claimed Syria on several coun ts: the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, Arab services to the Allies during the war, and his existing administration. France clung tenaciously to its own wartime understanding with Britain, the Sykes-Picot agreement (May 1916), which had promised France a Syrian sphere o f influence. France eventually won its case because Britain judged that Anglo-French solidarity in Europe was too important to be jeopardised over Arab affairs. In April 1920 the Supreme Council o f the League o f Nations announced that (pre-First World War, geographical) Syria was to be partitioned into the two French Mandates o f Lebanon and Syria and the British Mandate o f Palestine, while Iraq was to remain undivided as a British Mandate. On 14 July 1920 the French Commander-in-Chief, General Gouraud, sent Faysal an ultimatum, which was accepted. Nevertheless, the French had already decided to seize Syria and ten days later French troops advanced from Beirut and occupied Damascus. Faysal was expelled and was received in exile by an embarrassed British government.2 France officially received the Mandate for Lebanon and Syria from the League o f Nations two years after these events (July 1922). By the time it came into force (29 September 1923), the French had already made de facto arrangements for the establishment o f boundaries and forms of administration which the League was in no position to reverse. After creating le Grand Liban, the French put Syria through several legal and territorial permutations, primarily in an effort to prevent the country from uniting politically. They created the two separate states of Damascus and Aleppo in 1920 out o f the two former Ottoman provinces. W ithin the Aleppo state, the sanjaq o f Alexandretta, with its significant Turkish population, enjoyed a largely autonomous administration. In 1922, the Jabal Druze was proclaimed a separate unit under French protection, with its own governor and elected congress. In similar fashion the mountain districts behind Latakia, with their large Alawite population, [2]

I n t r o du c t i o n

were made an autonomous state. In 1922 a Syrian Federation was proclaimed, bringing together the Aleppo, Damascus and Alawite states. This was dissolved at the end o f 1924 and replaced by a Syrian state comprising the states o f Damascus and Aleppo and a separate sanjaq o f Alexandretta. The Alawite state, however, was excluded from the new arrangement. M inor rebellions were quashed, nationalist leaders exiled, and the country pacified. The French authorities governed Syria directly, behind a façade o f native figureheads. In the summer o f 1925 a combination o f local grievances and the heavy-handedness o f General Sarrail, the third High Commissioner, provoked a rebellion by the Druze. It quickly developed into a revolt o f national proportions and took twelve months to suppress. The Syrian nationalists had no foreign power to whom they could turn for armed support, and by the summer o f 1926 the French had 50,000 troops in Syria. By October 1926 the French Army were mopping up the few remaining centres o f resistance, nationalist leaders were in exile or in prison, whole villages in the Jabal Druze had been blown up, Damascus was encircled by barbed wire, some 6,000 rebels and 2,000 French (mostly French empire) troops had been killed and 100,000 people were homeless. France was not getting a very good press worldwide, in spite o f her continued efforts to call the rebels ‘bandits' and ‘common criminals’.3 Following the suppression o f this Great Revolt French mandatory policy became slightly more flexible and co-operation with certain nationalist elements played an increasing role. This study describes Frances efforts during this middle decade o f the Mandate to administer a strategic region in the face o f a growing Arab nationalist movement, and the eventual official accommodation between the two sides. It finishes at the end o f 1936 for two reasons: most o f the essential French archives are still inaccessible; the agreement reached opened up a new and rather different phase in Fran co-Syrian relations. The 1936 treaty was never ratified in Paris because the Popular Front government broke up, war clouds gathered in Europe, Turkey protested about the sanjaq o f Alexandretta and a series o f weak governments in Paris from 1936-9 gave in to pressure from various military, financial and cultural lobbies. Within the setting o f a chronological framework, this study specific­ ally analyses seven subjects. First, the variety o f tactics - some more subde than others - employed by the French authorities to outmanoeuvre the 13]

F re nch I mp eri ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

growing Syrian/Arab nationalist movement. Second, the un prepared* elections o f 1928 and the ‘prepared’ ones o f 1931-2. Third, F ren ch efforts to produce a Syrian Constituent Assembly, constitution a n d parliament, that would ratify a Franco-Syrian treaty à la française. F o u rth , French attempts to anaesthetise Syrian politics between 1934-5. F ifth , the French decision to change course and negotiate an agreement w ith the nationalists in 1936 following the General Strike. Sixth, the len gth y and complex treaty negotiations - described here in detail for the first time - between the Syrian Wafd and two French governments, leadin g to the Franco-Syrian Treaty o f 'Friendship and Alliance’ o f 9 Septem ber 1936. Seventh, developments and divisions within the Syrian nationalist movement. The last chapter o f the book, ‘A ftermath: deception an d deliverance’, describes the tumultuous final decade o f France’s occupation o f Syria (1936-46), which saw the refusal o f successive French governments to ratify the Treaty, the Anglo-Free French invasion o f Vichy Syria in 1941 and the latter’s emergence as a sovereign, independent state at the end o f the Second World War.

No tes

1 See Mary C. Wilson, K ing A bdullah, B ritain an d the M aking o f Jordan , Cambridge, Cam bridge University Press, 1987, pp. 39-40. 2 For a notable addition to the literature on the subject (up to September 1920), see Gérard D . Khoury, L a France et l ’o rient arabe: naissance du Liban moderne, 1914-1920, Paris, Armand Colin, 1993. 3 See P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 58-9, 196, 203.

[4]

1

The French search for a new policy: coercion and cooperation Having received the mission to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent sûtes and to guarantee protection and rights to every citizen, the Mandatory Power will not (ail in its task. High Commission statement, given by Colonel Catronx to journalists, Beirut, 26 July 1927.'

The new High Commissioner Henri Ponsot arrived in Beirut in early October 1926. Fifty years old when he took up his post, he had been an official o f the French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs since 1904. His previous post had been Assistant Director o f the ‘Orient-Africa’ Section at the Quai d’Orsay (which included the Levant). Acutely aware that Frances imperial image and prestige had been tarnished by the Revolt, his brief was to restore calm and order, and to investigate all possible options, within the mandate framework, for the future political organisation o f the territories. In marked contrast to his predecessor, Henry de Jouvenel, who during the Revolt had emphasised on numerous occasions Frances liberal intentions towards Syria, Ponsot steered a deliberately cautious course. French declarations at that stage would have only antagonised spirits further and made it more difficult for the military to re-establish their grip over the whole country. Nevertheless his silence was somewhat deafening, as he travelled around the Levant, Colonel Catroux at his side, listening to the doléances, wishes and programmes o f representatives o f Syria’s different communities.2 In Damascus and elsewhere, he heard familiar demands: a general amnesty, Syrian unity (some Druze and Alawites excepted), compensation for the losses sustained during the Revolt, an organic law to be promulgated by a Constituent Assembly, a 30-year treaty with France similar to the British treaty with Iraq, a national judicial

F re nch I mp eri ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

system, and the admission o f Syria into the League o f N ations.3 I n February 1927, with their lips still firmly closed, Ponsot and C a tro u x returned to Paris, to report to the Quai d’Orsay and to consider so lu tio n s to the Syrian question. According to Article I o f the Mandate Act, France was required to prepare and promulgate an organic law for Syria and Lebanon w ithin a period o f three years from the coming into force o f the Mandate (2 9 September 1923).4 In September 1926 the Council had, for the th ird time, acquiesced to Frances request, this time for a further six-m onth delay. So March 1927 found M . Ponsot in Geneva having long private conversations with members o f the Permanent Mandates Com m ission (PM C), indicating that the French Government initially envisaged a further delay o f one year, but that he hoped it could be less. O n 12 March, Briand officially asked the Council to grant France a further delay, o f unspecified length. Briand gave as his reason the antagonism among the diverse communities, some o f whom wished to be politically autonomous (from each other). This had complicated Frances task o f preparing the Organic Law, especially in the aftermath o f the insurrection which had profoundly menaced public security.3 By the M andates terms, the French were also required to publish and submit an annual report on Syria and Lebanon to the PM C, which would then report its conclusions to the Council. As the Commission was largely made up o f members from the European Powers, such as The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, as well as France - often divided by conflicting foreign policy interests - the French were confident that it would not play a determining role in the internal affairs o f the Mandate.6 By the end o f May 1927 Ponsot had drawn up the main lines o f a programme for Syria with officials at the Quai d’Orsay. It entailed a series o f successive operations - a carefully crafted, step-by-step approach, whereby the High Commissioner would be given the liberty to choose his method and moment for each step. This programme was to guide Ponsot during the next six years o f his tenure. In broad oudine, it envisaged the retention o f French dominance over the territories, while allowing - at the appropriate moment - the Syrians to hold elections, elect a Constituent Assembly and vote an organic law (constitution), as promised by M . de Jouvenel and as required by the League o f Nations. First an announcement would be made, sometime after the High Commissioner’s return to the Levant, that at the appropriate time, the [6]

T h k F r e n c h s e arch f or a ne w p ol i c y

promises o f M . de Jouvenel would be fulfilled. Carefully scripted, the announcement would be as circumspect as possible on all contentious issues. Second, a study would be made to decide how to resolve the relationship between Syria, Lebanon and the Alawite and Druze states. Third, a Syrian government would be constituted, whose leader would accept French proposals in advance and who would also be capable o f organising’ elections. With the elections won and the authority o f the government legitimised, negotiations would be opened with the latter, as promised by M . de Jouvenel. Finally, the government, held firmly in line, would ratify an agreement regulating the relationship between the four states (the question o f unity) and subsequently vote a Syrian Constitution compatible with the Mandate. Or, if the High Commissioner preferred, it would ratify a treaty with France along the lines o f the Anglo-Iraqi treaty o f 1922.7 It was not until six weeks after the High Commissioner returned from his extended visit to France that the formal policy statement was delivered, and then not by the aloof Ponsot, but by Colonel Catroux. Speaking to journalists in the old Sérail o f Beirut on 26 July, Catroux firmly denied the rumours in the international press that France was about to relinquish her Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. He then went on to say that France intended to integrate oudying districts inhabited by religious minorities (the Druze and Alawite states) with the Arab populated regions, while safeguarding their special interests and rights. France would encourage the preparation and establishment o f the statut définitif des pays du Levant’ and the devolution o f the affairs o f state onto local heads o f government. But France would not tolerate any actions that threatened the M andates security and the Common Interests, including customs, posts and telegraphs, concessionary companies, and the monetary system. He concluded: The Mandate, by its very nature, seeks neither to be perpetuated nor to oudive its time. Impatience, far from hastening the desired solutions, will only delay them. Violence will destroy the most legitimate hopes. The liberalism of the French Republic cannot be questioned by anyone. Having received the mission to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent sûtes and to guarantee protection and rights to every citizen, the Mandatory Power will not fail in its task.*

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

The general reaction in Syrian political circles to the d eclaratio n was overwhelmingly negative. The absence o f any mention o f a tr e a ty along Anglo-Iraqi lines or the establishment o f a national army m ade i t all too clear that the French did not seriously intend to relax their d ire c t control over Syria’s domestic affairs. And no one seriously believed th a t the French, in the wake o f military victory, were intending to co n ced e one o f the nationalists’ main demands, namely to unite the m in ority districts with the nationalist heartland. To the defeated nationalists, th e declaration was a natural consequence o f France’s military victory. In Paris, Philippe Berthelot, General-Secretary o f the Quai d’O rsay, was disturbed by the imprecision o f Ponsot’s declaration, but Robert d e Caix, the French representative at the Permanent Mandates Com m ission in Geneva, reassured him that a more detailed declaration w ould have raised the political temperature unnecessarily and com prom ised the authority o f the Mandate. In particular, as the role o f the H igh Commissioner was to act as arbiter in the forthcoming negotiations between the four states, the latter would have been denounced as a sham if the High Commissioner had announced his own intentions in advance.9 For three months, local nationalists uttered no word in response as they shutded between Damascus and Cairo during the long, hot summer, consulting on what course ought to be followed. They realised their options were few, and feuding within the Syrian-Palestinian Congress (a group o f exiled nationalist leaders in Cairo) made mapping out a strategy that much more difficult. Under the circumstances, the development o f a more conciliatory strategy was inevitable. The nationalist response was finally issued on 25 October. It was precipitated in pan by the ratification earlier that month o f a revised constitution for Lebanon not only legitimising the existence o f Greater Lebanon but also suggesting the characteristics o f the Constitution Ponsot had promised Syria. The response came in the form o f a statement drafted at the conclusion o f a six-day conference held in Beirut and attended by nationalists from the main towns o f Syria and Lebanon. Expressing their disillusion at the High Commissioner’s vague’ proposals, they asked if he was sincerely predisposed to conclude a treaty; whether martial law, including arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, was to be lifted; whether a general amnesty, the right to political association and freedom o f the press were to be granted. Then followed the familiar demands for a Constituent Assembly freely elected by universal suffrage and the (8)

T hf F rench search for a new poli cy

reunification o f Syria in its entirety. Finally, it concluded on a melancholic but highly revealing note: We believe in the necessity of collaboration based on the reciprocity of interests and on the determination of mutual obligations . . . we are not at all the enemies o f France . . . the Syrian nation is absolutely ready to hold out a hand o f friendship and to forget the painful past, as she achieves her national sovereignty and her legitimate aspirations.10 With these words a new era in Fran co-Syrian relations dawned, labelled by nationalists the era o f ‘honourable cooperation. In transmitting the declaration to the French Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Ponsot observed that it contained no new proposals, but was clearly designed ‘not to break o ff relations, nor to yet take a definite position." The Beirut conference had one other important outcome. From it emerged a new nationalist organisation in Syria, the National Bloc (al-Kuda al-Wataniyya), which would steer the course o f the independence struggle in Syria until its completion nearly two decades later. O f the 15 Syrian and Lebanese representatives gathered in Beirut in October 1927, seven formed the core o f the National Bloc: Ihsan al-Sharif from Damascus, Ibrahim Hananu and Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali from Aleppo, Najib al-Barazi and Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani from Hama and Mazhar Raslan and Hashim al-Atasi (the conference President) from Homs. This core group was to be enlarged by the return to Syria o f several Revolt leaders pardoned by the French in March 1928.12 Ponsot now faced the task o f preparing the ground for phase two o f his plan: organising the elections for a Constituent Assembly. In fact, some preparations were already well in hand. The Service des Renseignements, the ‘eyes and ears’ o f the High Commissioner, had been told at the end o f August to prepare detailed reports for all thirteen districts concerned evaluating the variety o f political parties or groups in evidence, their numerical strength, potential candidates for the Assembly, their chances o f success in an election and their present attitudes to both the Mandatory power and to the Damad government. The overall picture which emerged from these reports did not leave the authorities much cause for complacency. From the rural districts came the familiar theme that there were no existing political parties in the modern sense o f the term, and that it was ‘up to us to push or discourage candidates’; from (9)

F re nch I mperi ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

the larger towns like Aleppo, there were warnings that if the nationalists were left free to act, it would ‘assure their victory’;15 and from D am ascus, the report concluded that if ‘un-rigged elections’ were to take place, it would mean a serious electoral battle between nationalists and th e government, the outcome o f which was very uncertain.14 Initially Ponsot favoured keeping the Damad in power to oversee th e elections. Damad Ahmad Nam i, a Circassian aristocrat and Francophile, had presided over three cabinets since becoming Prime M inister in A pril 1926. In the last week o f December, however, the Dam ad surprised the High Commissioner when, in the middle o f secret negptiations concerning the nature o f the envisaged constitution, he suddenly threatened to resign if the French refused to support the elaboration o f a royalist constitution. In effect, he wanted the French to enthrone him. Moreover, he readily admitted to Ponsot that without the sustained support o f the French authorities he would lose the elections. Ponsot replied that the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who were very unpopular in nationalist circles for having accepted office during the Revolt, would receive the full support o f the Mandate authorities if, and only if, their election pro­ gramme remained that o f order, peace and loyal cooperation with the M andatory power.15 Perplexed, Ponsot wrote to Briand that if France remained neutral in the elections, not working to separate the illiterate masses from the activities o f the extremists and rally them around the government, then the interests o f the M andate would be put at risk. But given the motives o f the Prime Minister, an alliance with him would henceforth become a royalist conspiracy. And if the Damad then won the elections, France would be righdy accused o f having flouted public opinion, having already declared that, within the Mandate framework, the Constituent Assembly would be free to choose whatever kind o f constitution it wished, whether republican or royalist. If, on the other hand, the Damad lost the elections, it would leave the French position isolated and compromised. By the New Year, with the Damad showing no signs o f changing his mind, Ponsot began to cast around for an alternative government, and in particular a ‘reliable’ Prime Minister, to oversee the elections he was now planning for the Spring.16 After twelve months in the Levant, Ponsot had come to certain conclusions which were to raise a few eyebrows in Paris. The measured tone o f the nationalist declaration o f October, his discussions with some [10]

T he F re nch search for a new p oli cy

o f the nationalist leaders, and the frequent reports he received from his team o f delegates, as well as the weekly intelligence bulletins concerning the nationalists’ intentions, allowed him - almost encouraged him - to consider pursuing a policy o f conciliation. Ponsot emphasised to Paris that there had been a genuine evolution in many nationalist minds since their defeat, that the old formulae o f doctrinal opposition had lost prestige and that the idea o f an entente with the M andatory power was gaining ground. In reality, the nationalists were the only organised group in the country, and were a force that could no longer be discounted - the moderate nationalists, in fact, represented the average opinion in the country. One day or another France would have to come to terms with them, and better to do it now, in the aftermath o f victory, than later: We must seize this occasion and choose: either we continue to practise a policy based above all on our military force, or we make a definite attempt to come to terms with the nationalist opposition and let it eventually come to power.17 Ponsot felt that it was not possible to turn back the clock and that a limited but guaranteed degree o f control was worth more than ’extensive powers that are constantly contested’.18 Berthelot, surprised - even amazed - by the tone o f Ponsot’s correspondence, enquired whether he was now seriously considering bringing a moderate nationalist government to power and if so, how was he going to persuade it to ratify a constitution compatible with the M andate.19 The High Commissioner, already involved in the delicate process o f easing out the Damad and looking around for a suitable altern­ ative, replied that in order to solve the Syrian question - an admittedly complex problem - he saw no better alternative than the conclusion o f a treaty, along the lines o f the Anglo-Iraqi treaty o f 1922. The Department had specified the need o f a strong, yet firmly controlled government, in order to sign such a treaty with France. Yet the Dam ad’s Government was so weak that the French could not possibly depend upon it. So he was hoping to confer the overseeing o f the elections to men who, afterwards, in a peaceful atmosphere, would form a legitimate government, with some credit and authority, and which would be able to ratify a treaty.20 Around 20 January 1928, Ponsot started secret talks with Shaykh Muhammad Taj al-Din al-Hasani, considered by the French to be a [ill

F re nch I mp eri ali sm in Syri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

moderate nationalist. Within two weeks, Shaykh Taj and Ponsot had agreed on a government programme, that would be announced in the form o f a ministerial declaration, on Taj’s assent to power. Born in 1885 in Damascus, Taj was the son o f Shaykh Badr al-Din al-Hasani, the most revered and popular religious scholar in Syria. Although reared in the conservative religious atmosphere o f m adrasa and mosque and surrounded by his noted fathers disciples from all over the Islamic world, the 43-year-old Taj was neither well educated nor pious - in fact, he had very little administrative experience. H is one proven skill was his ability to use his fathers popularity ‘to feather his own nest’. Behind a short, rather stout, and lame appearance lay a shrewd intriguer. Taj had realised early on that to be invited to head a government, it was necessary to find an almost unattainable balance between outright collaboration with, and rejection of, French rule. By early 1928 he had managed to do just that. The High Commissioner picked him because o f his moderate nationalist stance and good family connections. No doubt Ponsot had also scrutinised the confidential dossiers kept - and regularly updated - on all Syrian agitators and personalities: for the French, Taj lacked the qualities necessary to play a leading role, but could perhaps be used to muzzle a large section o f the opposition, who have rallied to him in the absence of more militant and more talented leaders.21 As soon as Ponsot received the approved declaration from Paris - and with Taj ready in the wings - the High Commissioner asked the Damad to resign. The parting o f the ways was chiefly noticeable for its politeness. In his letter o f resignation the Damad emphasised his desire to let others take over, now that he had steered the country to the threshold o f a constitutional era. Ponsot, in his official letter accepting the Prime M inister’s resignation, praised his courage in accepting the post in April 1926 and pointed to the ‘positive results’ obtained during the previous two years, saying you are leaving a legacy o f peace and a growing prosperity, where you found revolt, mourning and ruins.’22 Eight days later, Shaykh Taj was officially invited to form a ‘provisional government’, whose immediate task was to oversee the elections. The composition o f Taj’s cabinet was obviously meant to have some conciliatory effect on middle-of-the-road nationalists, for it included [12]

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one openly committed nationalist, Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani o f Hama (Minister o f Commerce and Agriculture), and another whom the French considered a moderate, Sa‘id al-Mahasini (Interior Minister). Others were Jam il al-Ulshi (Finance), Muhammad Kurd Ali (Education), Tawfiq Shamiyya (Public Works) and Subhi al-Nayyal (Justice). To smooth the way for Taj's accession to power - and to undercut the anticipated attacks o f the extremist nationalists - the formation o f the new government was accompanied by a High Com m issioners proclamation that martial law and censorship o f the press were to be lifted, that an amnesty for Syrian rebels would soon be granted and that free elections would be held shordy. Three days later, the provisional governments programme appeared in the press. It affirmed its desire ‘to work with the support o f France and within the framework o f the Mandate, to achieve Syrian national aspirations'. In the decade to come this already well-worn phase would continue to be a favourite o f the authorities. But the paradox it contained was to become increasingly visible to many Syrians; whilst the framework remained firmly in place, national aspirations continued to be stifled. Furthermore, it did not go unnoticed that the High Com m issioners proclamation contained no reference whatsoever to a treaty, and the provisional governments announced programme only mentioned a treaty in a very circumspect fashion. The partial amnesty granted to Syrian insurrectionists by the High Commissioner in mid-March was accompanied by the publication o f a ‘Black List’ containing the names o f 64 persons, including Dr Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, Shukri al-Quwwadi, and Sultan al-Atrash, who were forbidden to return. Among the surprises on the amnestied list were Faris al-Khuri, Nasib and Fawzi al-Bakri. By granting only a limited number o f pardons, the High Commission and the native government it supported aimed to exacerbate divisions among nationalists.23 Those pardoned were generally not militants, nor were they overtly identified with British or Hashemite interests. The one exception was the Bakri brothers, whose influence among the chiefs o f the popular quarters o f Damascus was unrivalled. The Bakris, who had ended up penniless and in exile in 1927, were bitterly divided from the Istiqlali rebel leaders in Cairo, whom they accused o f corruption. But they also withdrew their support from Shahbandar when he used funds from Iraqi sources to open a private clinic in Cairo in 1927. Exiled revolt leaders tended to fight among themselves for control o f the movement in exile. By [13]

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December 1927, two separate and antagonistic Committees functioned in Cairo, each claiming to be the legitimate Executive o f the Syrian-Palestinian Congress. One was Lutfallahs Abdin Committee, which included D r Shahbandar and other rebel chiefs; the other was composed o f Rashid Rida and various Istiqlalis, headed by Shukri al-Quwwatli.24 Quick to capitalise on such splits, the French now saw a golden opportunity to isolate Shahbandar and his followers by wooing the financially destitute Bakris back to Damascus with the offer o f a full pardon including the return o f their vast properties in and around the capital.” To the High Com m issioners delight, Fawzi al-Bakri decided to stand as a candidate for the Assembly on the government ticket headed by Shaykh Taj. The Prime Minister, a long-time friend, had worked hard to ensure the return o f the 43-year-old Bakri. In return, Fawzi promised Taj his support. From his Cairo headquarters an irate and jealous Shahbandar declared that those so-called' nationalists who had been amnestied had achieved their pardons in underhand ways.26 Indeed, with the Bakris’ defection, demoralisation in nationalist ranks deepened perceptibly. The High Commissioner s tactic had worked. Nationalists were further upset by the High Com m issioners insist­ ence that the elections would be held under the existing electoral laws, established by General Weygand and Subhi Barakat in 1924. In particular the nationalists demanded that the sanjaq - and not the qadha - become the electoral constituency. The existing law stated that candidates could only stand for election in the qadha where they lived. One major problem hieing the nationalists was that widespread illiteracy and traditionally rigid relations o f personal dependence with big landowners allowed the French to control the Syrian peasantry quite easily. Rural districts were thus far less politicised than the towns; mostly they were outside the mainstream o f nationalist political activity. (The sanjaq can be compared approximately to a large English country, the qadha to a local district. For example, the sanjaq o f Damascus contained ten qadha.) In public, Ponsot emphasised that maintaining the status quo would prevent agitation and demonstrate Frances neutrality in the elections, which he had declared would be free.27 In private he admitted that if the sanjaq became the electoral constituency, it would allow professional politicians to stand as candidates in the rural areas, thereby undercutting support for the government, the qadha system tending to produce [14]

T he F re nch search for a new p oli cy

pro-government deputies with parochial ideas.28The maintenance o f the electoral law was thus a key element in the High Commissioner s strategy to keep the nationalists embarrassed and divided. If the latter boycotted the elections, claiming that the electoral law was unjust and out o f date, they risked being excluded from a legally constituted assembly. If they participated - and lost - their claim to represent the nation would have been discredited.2* At the end o f March after several weeks o f heated discussion, the National Bloc decided that in spite o f the unjust electoral law, the representatives o f the nation would 'confront the future’.40 The confrontation was now scheduled to take place on 10 and 24 April. On the eve o f the elections, the National Bloc in Damascus and Shaykh Taj had worked out a 'tacit alliance’. Both parties agreed to submit a joint list o f six government and four nationalist candidates for the second round. But when it became known that the government was using the public services at its disposal to procure the return o f its nominees in the primaries, nationalist leaders were incensed. They accused Sa'id al-Mahasini, the Interior Minister, and Taj him self o f bribing candidates and having police tamper with ballot boxes in their respective quarters o f residence, Suq Saruja and al-Qaymariyya.31 In an effort to prove that nationalist charges were groundless, Shaykh Taj had rallies organised on his behalf in Suq Saruja. The following day, Fawzi al-Ghazzi, a nationalist candidate and a popular figure in local politics, led much larger demonstrations against Taj and his government in the aristocratic Suq Saruja and in Shaghur. Despite a voter turnout o f 60 per cent, the highest ever, the alliance between the National Bloc and the government had foundered.32 Nationalists now demanded the resignation o f the Ministers o f Interior and Justice as a precondition to a joint list in the second round. But although Taj wanted for tactical purposes to continue collaborating with the nationalists, he would not abandon his ministers. So the nationalists finally submitted an independent list; one, however, which included Shaykh Taj. Their object was to placate the Prime M inister in the hope o f isolating him from his natural allies and limiting the repressive measures the French-backed government was expected to take, particularly in the rural areas. On the evening before the second round, Taj, at the head o f both lists, gave no more than vague indications to his followers as to which list to vote for. This incensed his ministers, who felt betrayed and isolated.33 115]

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In spite o f these troubles, the elections in Damascus went o f f smoothly. The results were very favourable to the nationalists. O f the nine elected deputies from Damascus, seven were members o f the National Bloc. Only Shaykh Taj himself, who polled 530 o f the 731 maximum electoral votes, and Yusuf Linyadu, a Jewish merchant who was unanimously elected as his community’s representative, could not be considered committed nationalists.* As for Taj’s supporters, four o f his six cabinet ministers were soundly defeated. In Damascus, Sa‘id al-Mahasini only managed to win 279 votes, Tawfiq Shamiyya 264, and Jam il Ulshi 211. Subhi Nayyal, the Justice Minister, lost in Aleppo; the Minister o f Education, Kurd Ali, did not stand for election. The only cabinet minister who was elected, apart from Shaykh Taj, was the M inister o f Agriculture, Abd al-Qadir Kaylani, who was considered to be a committed nationalist. Those defeated immediately offered to resign, but later were persuaded by the High Commissioner to change their m inds.* Surprisingly, in Aleppo, with its sizeable Christian minority, the National Bloc also predominated, although only 35 per cent o f the registered voters turned out in the primaries.36 It seems that Subhi Barakat, one o f Taj’s main rivals, had tried to bribe Christian leaders to see that their communities nominated electors sympathetic to him. A large landowner from north-west Syria, Barakat had been the French-appointed President o f the Federal Council o f Syria between 1922 and 1924 and, like Taj, aspired to become the first President o f an elected Syrian parliament. When Shaykh Taj’s supporters caught wind o f Barakat’s activities, they physically threatened these same Christian leaders who, in the end, decided to play on both sides o f the fence: they accepted Barakat’s bribes and then discreetly discouraged their communities from going to the polls. The absence o f Christian voters in the primaries left an almost completely Muslim constituency to elect nine deputies. The National Bloc list, headed by Ibrahim Hananu and Dr Kayyali, won easily. Subhi himself, who had little support among the Muslim community o f Aleppo, saw the writing on the wall and withdrew his candidature only hours before the second round o f voting started.37 Subhi had fought against the French in 1919, surrendered to them in 1920 and was then enticed by lucrative offers (perhaps a pardon plus tax remittances) to collaborate. A native Turkish speaker, whose spoken Arabic was poor, he was neither a committed nationalist, nor from [16]

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Damascus, which encouraged the French to use him. Nevertheless, he was a shrewd operator and, as we shall see, turned out to be an unreliable ally for the French. Nationalists were also swept into the Constituent Assembly from Homs and Hama, which registered a 50 per cent turnout in the primaries. Only three, however, were members o f the National Bloc. Yet, when all the tabulations were in, French authorities were not displeased. As was anticipated, French intelligence officers had managed to get elected a large group o f small-town and rural notables from predominantly agricultural districts in the interior and the sanjaq o f Alexandretta where the nationalists were poorly organised. And the nationalists elected from the urban areas held only 22 o f the 70 Assembly seats, a little less than one third.3* Nevertheless, whatever optimism Ponsot might have had was soon dissipated. Touring the country, meeting most o f the newly elected members in their constituencies, he found the vast majority o f rural deputies that his team had managed to get elected were indeed parochially minded. It was - as he confirmed to Paris - precisely because they were divided by clan rivalries, leaderless and had no overarching idea to inspire them that the French had succeeded in having them elected. There was a disadvantage: this majority o f moderates would be no match for the more skilful, urban, nationalist politicians. Given too that the nationalists were now sending him conciliatory signals, the High Commissioner concluded that it would be a tactical error to organise the moderates as a kind o f war machine in an effort to combat them. So he decided to adopt - at least temporarily - the persuasive approach. The nationalists had been warned in no uncertain terms that the constitution would only be considered legal if it received Frances approval. That should suffice. Given the nationalist success in the elections, he really saw no other way forward.39 The extreme weakness o f the government also encouraged Ponsot to try a tactful, discreet approach. Rather than invite the government to prepare the constitution, which would have been immediately suspected to be a ‘Quai d’Orsay product, he decided that he would give the Assembly - once he had convened it - the impression that it was free to organise its work. Only when difficulties arose, would the High Commissioner intervene and impose, if necessary, ‘reasonable solutions’.40 In the meantime, attacks in the nationalist press on Taj and his government

F r k n c h I mp h ri a u s m i n S y r i a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

only served to encourage Ponsot to keep Taj on; he could not afford to be seen to bow to nationalist pressure. If he agreed to even a partial cabinet reshuffle his authority would be compromised and it would whet nationalist appetites for more. So he concentrated on trying to reunite the cabinet, by convincing Taj that by changing his colleagues, he w ould simply be replacing one group o f detractors and rivals by another, an d by explaining to the nationalists that the constitutional process had to be adhered to. ‘Vote your constitution, elect your President. He can then freely choose his cabinet’, was the French message to the nationalists who were demanding the resignation o f the provisional government.41 Robert de Caix, who had toured Syria just after the elections, was alarmed by what he witnessed, namely Ponsot s indecisiveness and the election o f a potentially rebellious Assembly. After lengthy sessions with Ponsot in Beirut, he wrote a trenchant letter to Berthelot, which set alarm bells ringing. If the Mandate did not know what it wanted, he wrote, the sheep would rally around the nationalists, who were the only group with a political programme, an organisation, financial support from abroad, and men capable o f working in France, in Egypt and elsewhere - all endeavouring to outflank the policies o f the High Commission. Having done nothing since his arrival, Ponsot had plunged the country into elections, without organising them, and the ship was adrift. Ponsot had no political programme and it was high time that France decided what she wanted in this affair. One could not be responsible for a country without remaining its master. The Quai d’Orsay must choose one o f two alternatives: either try to come to some sort o f agreement with the nationalist ring-leaders,4’ to see if they would accept in the constitution the clauses relating to the Mandate, or impose an indigenous government to rally the sheep, and in that way ensure the organisation o f the Syrian state. De Caix strongly favoured the second option, to ‘rally the sheep and govern with them’.4’ For him, the entente with the nationalists offered no guarantees for the future and in the final analysis, there was no point in collaborating with them: . . . you m ust ask Ponsot straight out - without o f course, mentioning m e - what he is planning to do so that the work o f the Assem bly will not question the essential powers o f the M andate, nor the rights o f the auton om ous states that we have created . . . I don’t say that this question will save the situation, but it m ight force Ponsot to choose a definite political program m e that he would have to inform

(18)

T hk F rench search for a new poli cy the D epartm ent about. H e needs to be helped not to go beyond such a program m e, nor to let the country go beyond it either.44

Berthelot responded to de Caix’s suggestion by sending Ponsot a personal letter, couched in friendly terms, reminding him that the Mandate existed as a fact pre-dating and superior to the Syrian Constituent Assembly and asking him to spell out his programme, so that the Department could affirm its agreement with it.45 The High Commissioner opened the Constituent Assembly on 9 June. The spectacle at the Sérail was something to behold. Gathered together were members o f what seemed to be two alien worlds: one was old, rural and conservative; the other, by comparison, was modern, radical and urban. Here, traditionally attired rural notables and Bedouin chiefs sat across from their urban nationalist colleagues in fezzes and European business suits. These contrasts were greatly accentuated by the fact that the 'moderates’, who were seen to represent the will o f the High Commission, found themselves in the presence o f a minority group o f purposeful and more skilful deputies.46 Following the opening speeches o f the High Commissioner - who mentioned the word ‘treaty’, without going into any details - and Shaykh Taj, it immediately became clear who was going to run with the ball. Nationalist deputies confidently called for the resignation o f the routed ‘provisional Government’ (to no avail)4' and then proposed that the Assembly move on to the election for the Presidency. With no party programme and no backstage signal from the High Commissioner, the ‘majority o f moderates’ saw which way the wind was blowing and were easily swayed.48 The result was that Hashim al-Atasi, instead o f Shaykh Taj, was elected President o f the Chamber (by 47 votes out o f 67). Three days later, Ibrahim Hananu was elected Chairman o f the Assembly Committee to draft the Syrian constitution. Joining him were 25 other deputies, most o f whom were nationalists. The latter now effectively controlled the Assembly. Thus, from the outset, it was an official institution opposed to the French-appointed Government and in nationalist hearts and minds, its presence marked a small but definite step forward on the road towards independence.49 It took the editorial committee less than six weeks to write a draft constitution o f 115 articles. Clearly inspired by European democratic systems, it adopted a parliamentary republic, with a single Chamber to 119]

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be elected, for four years, by universal suffrage exercised in two stag es. The constitution was a modern, sophisticated document reflecting n o t only the highly trained legal minds o f its main authors, Fawzi al-Ghazzi and Fa’iz al-Khuri, but also the democratic élitism o f the National B lo c . It did, however, contain six articles which were to cause considerable indigestion in Paris. These declared that Syria, including Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, was one and indivisible (Article 2), that th e Syrian government was to organise its own national army (Article 110), and that the President o f the Republic was empowered to conclude treaties, receive ambassadors, grant pardons and declare martial law (Articles 74, 75, 73 and 112).50 These articles, if ratified and accepted by France, would have meant quite simply the end o f the Mandate. It would only have remained for M. Ponsot and his team to pack their bags and embark for Marseilles, together with the Armée du Levant. As it was, Ponsot had received no instructions from Paris to that effect. Maugras, the new Secretary-General o f the High Commission, who was in frequent contact with the Editorial committee, had kept Ponsot well informed o f what was being written into the constitution. During these weeks, the committee members received a constant message from the French: D ecide yourselves whether you want one o r two cham bers, a m onarchy or a republic, b u t leave alone the question o f unity, the national army, diplom atic representation and so on . . . all that will be sorted ou t at the tim e o f the treaty.’ 1

But the nationalists, for once with a free hand, were not going to let the opportunity pass and drafted a constitution which consecrated their fundamental rights to sovereignty and independence. No amount o f verbal persuasion by the cordial Secretary General would make them modify the six ‘offending* articles. They refused, too, to consider the alternative French suggestion, that an explicit reference be made in the constitution to the Mandates remaining in force until a treaty had been concluded between the two countries. They had never previously acknowledged the right o f the Mandate to exist and to consecrate its recognition now, in a written constitution, would be tantamount - they claimed - to committing political suicide. If the French removed the [20]

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articles, so be it, but they would prefer not to have a constitution, rather than sign away the very basis o f their popularity.” By the time the editorial committee finished its work and sent Ponsot the complete draft on 18 July, the most Maugras had managed in trying to square the circle was to agree on a compromise with the nationalists: the Assembly would address a motion to the newly elected President o f the Republic, inviting him to open negotiations with the French government for the conclusion o f a treaty. The motion would contain a reference to the special rights o f France vis-à-vis Syria. Convinced that he could not wring any more concessions from the nationalists, Ponsot sent the proposed motion and the draft constitution to Paris and proposed that, such as it was, the constitution should be accepted by the French authorities ‘in good grace’.” Otherwise, he saw no other alternative than the use o f force, which had not proved very successful in the past. By this time the Quai d’Orsay was experiencing acute indigestion. At home in Rosny-sur-Seine, de Caix received an urgent summons to Paris, where he conferred with Berthelot and the head o f the Levant Section, M. Saint Quentin.” The next day, Ponsot received stria instructions - drafted by de Caix and signed by Berthelot - to hold the line. The leaders o f the Assembly must be informed that they would have to choose one o f two alternative procedures: either to remove from the constitution all clauses affecting the exercise o f the Mandate or, if they wished to maintain the clauses, to add to it an explicit reference to the Mandate. If this were not done, it would amount to a fundamental negation o f the Mandate.” De Caix was particularly irritated by the nationalist assertion that the Iraqi constitution was a useful model to be followed. He pointed out quite accurately to Berthelot that the Anglo-Iraqi treaty o f October 1922 preceded the establishment o f the Iraqi constitution. This treaty safeguarded British rights and powers corresponding to their obligations vis-à-vis the League o f Nations and while it was true that the Iraqi constitution included references to the powers o f the President, foreign policy and the construction o f a national army, it specifically acknowledged that it remained subordinate to the treaty already in force. This was, in fact, how the British had kept a firm grip on Iraq, while appearing to pursue a rather progressive, liberal policy. In terms o f maintaining imperial interests, the Mandate was for the French in Syria the equivalent o f what the treaty was for the British in Iraq.

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Nevertheless Ponsot, now under clear instructions to intervene in th e Assembly if it did not accept French demands, persisted and warned P aris that even if he dissolved the Assembly, and organised’ the subsequent elections, the French would never be able to produce a Chamber prepared to ratify a constitution induding reservations for the Mandate. Moreover, the French position and that o f the nationalists were separated more b y form than by substance; more by juridical definitions than by realities; no verbal ‘formula’ in itself was going to solve a problem that had resisted eight years o f effort. He emphasised that the concessions he had m ade concerning the constitution were almost entirely theoretical and illustrated his point by referring to article 112, which proposed the creation o f a national army: As lon g as we keep full control o f the custom s revenues, [he told Paris], the local governm ent will not have the m aterial m eans to form an army.*'

This cut no ice in Paris. On 3 August, Berthelot repeated his instruc­ tions o f the previous week and added that if the Assembly did not agree to these ‘moderate and conciliatory requests’ o f the French government, Ponsot should suspend the Assembly until the Autumn, to give it time to ‘reflect on the matter’.57 Four days later, the draft constitution was introduced to the Assembly by Fawzi al-Ghazzi, who proposed that the Assembly accept the project o f the draft constitution and suggested that each article be debated and voted on, one by one, on 9 August. Ponsot’s policy o f persuasion was now to be severely tested: his no-further-than-this line for the nationalists had to be publicly drawn.5" When the Assembly opened on 9 August, Maugras read out a declaration from the High Commissioner, warning the members that six articles in the draft constitution were contrary to the international obligations o f the Mandatory power and that if the Assembly persisted in maintaining them, the High Commissioner would be unable to promulgate the constitution in that form.59 This caused considerable emotion in the Assembly, which was further aggrieved when the Prime Minister, primed by Ponsot, recommended that the Assembly accept the High Commissioner’s demands. Shaykh Taj’s remarks provoked a bitter attack by Fakhri al-Barudi who accused him, quite accurately, of squandering public funds for personal ends.60 Exactly what happened 122]

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after Taj stormed out o f the Assembly is not absolutely clear, but it certainly revealed, on the one hand, the French backstage organisation o f the moderate deputies and, on the other, the tactics o f intimidation employed by the nationalists. According to the French records, it seems that immediately after Shaylch Taj’s intervention, Wadi* Shishakli, a pro-French deputy, had passed to the President o f the Assembly a motion in the form o f a petition, signed by seven other deputies, proposing that the Assembly accept the French demands. The French records clearly show the hand o f the High Commissioner behind this initiative.61 But Hashim al-Atasi ignored this motion, and gave the floor instead to a series o f prominent nationalists, including Fakhri al-Barudi, who strongly opposed the French demands. With the atmosphere now highly charged, the President put the acceptance o f the draft constitution, including the six articles, to a vote by a show o f hands. A clear majority o f hands were raised, the President announced that the draft constitution had been passed and the Assembly then issued a declaration claiming that the suppression o f the six articles would have been equivalent to ’amputating the constitution, because it denied Syria’s rights to sovereignty and independence. Not one deputy had dared to open his mouth in support o f the High Commissioner, apart from Shaykh Taj. For once, a French-orchestrated initiative had not succeeded.62 The session where each article would be debated and voted on was postponed. It would now take place on 11 August. The new era o f cooperation and understanding, inaugurated between the National Bloc and the High Commission only a few months earlier, faced its first major crisis. Ever since the elections there had been increasing criticism o f Ponsots policies among right-wing fictions in France, and the establishment o f the Constituent Assembly only served to heighten their fears that France’s abdication o f the ’Orient’ had begun. Ponsots opponents in the Armée du Levant and the Service des Renseignements had for some time been communicating their criticisms o f the ‘indecisive’ civilian High Commissioner to their colleagues in right-wing military circles in France. These criticisms were in turn fed to the French press, which began a violent campaign against the High Commission.65 Critics such as the Comte de Gontaut-Biron, a right-wing publicist and author, claimed that the High Commissioner’s amnesty in March had allowed the wolves back into the sheep pen, that the High Commissioner had allowed nationalists [231

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to undermine the Mandate and that the ultimate aim o f the Constituent Assembly was to throw the French into the sea.64 Gontaut-Biron was a n admirer o f General Sarrail (’who had the audacity to bomb Damascus*) and, after the autumn o f 1927, a severe critic o f what he considered to be Ponsots indecisive, liberal policies in the Levant. The H igh Commissioners enemies, by stirring up French public opinion over th e question o f Syria, wanted to convince the Quai d’Orsay to maintain a firm stand: the ‘imperative character o f Frances international obligations* must not be questioned.6’ Ponsot, a hard-working, courteous and thoughtful diplomat, w as well aware that most o f the tide in France was running against him - in Parliament, in the press and in military and business cirdes. But he quietly maintained his conviction that, in the end, the tongue was more effective than the bayonet, and more in keeping with the liberal, republican tradition o f France. And Berthelot, although often influenced by the more doctrinaire de Caix, continued to support him. Nevertheless, Ponsot recognised that by allowing the nationalists some room to manoeuvre, they had pulled some unexpected cards out o f the pack. They had managed to win 22 seats, their man (Hashim al-Atasi) was President o f the Assembly and not Shaykh Taj, and the constitution, as drafted, was an unadulterated nationalist missile targeted direcdy at the heart o f the Mandate. And having privately promised him the opportunity to take a hard look at the draft before they sent it to the Bureau o f the Assembly, they had caught him short by sending it to the printers on the same day as they sent him a copy; an effective ‘fait accompli’ on their part.66 Philip S. Khoury maintains that Ponsots chief failing was his mis­ calculation o f what the whole Syrian constitutional process represented to the colonial party in France.67 But Ponsots letters to Paris between January and August 1928 show that he was well informed o f the virulent and widespread opposition to his policies.6* Furthermore, by 1928 Ponsot, who was no slouch intellectually, had spent nearly 25 years in the diplomatic field. Perhaps it was not so much a miscalculation o f the strength o f the opposition to his liberal policies, but rather a lack o f any credible alternative policy to pursue? The Quai d’Orsay was expecting him to maintain the traditional firm line, while at the same time instructing him, publicly at least, to allow elections and the establishment of a Constituent Assembly. Ponsot was caught between an un-evolving’, traditional Quai d’Orsay vision o f the Mandate and an evolving situation (24]

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on the ground. By allowing for the establishment o f an elected Assembly, Paris had, in effect, unscrewed the top o f a toothpaste tube; given the (nationalist) pressure, the toothpaste was coming out and it would have been extremely difficult for Ponsot, or any other High Commissioner, to get the toothpaste back into the tube. Creating a Syrian monarchy had never been a central concern for French policy-makers. Once the French had forced King Faysal and his followers out o f Damascus in July 1920 and imposed their own military administration on Syria, the issue was effectively shelved. From time to time it had surfaced in the form o f rumours in the Syrian or French press, either planted by a hopeful candidate or even perhaps by the Quai d’Orsay. The most active claimants had been the Hashemites, but since the British had installed Faysal on the Iraqi throne in 1921, the French feared - not unnaturally - that a Hashemite throne in Syria would increase the influence o f ‘perfidious Albion in what they considered to be their pitch. Now, however, that the French were allowing a Syrian Constituent Assembly to be established, which could ‘freely choose its own regime, the question was automatically back on centre-stage. Since his ‘major misunderstanding’ with the French in 1920, King Faysal had never lost his appetite for Syrian politics.69 A week after the Constituent Assembly opened, the King sent three o f his entourage to Syria: his most trusted advisor, Rustum Haydar, and two prominent politicians, Nuri Sa‘id and Yasin al-Hashimi. Their appearance in Damascus and Beirut certainly helped to bring the Syrian throne question to the fore. But what they discovered gave them little room for comfort, for the Syrians, in fact, were deeply divided on the issue. Those who favoured a monarchy belonged either to the religious establishment or to the class o f retired military officers. For the ulam a, a monarchy would help to stem the tide o f secularism which had been eroding their social prestige and political influence. As for the ex-Sharifian officers, they observed the situation o f their Iraqi counterparts who now exercised considerable political influence in Baghdad, and hoped for the same in Syria.70 On the other hand the reaction o f the nationalist leaders in the Constituent Assembly to the prospect o f a monarchy was overwhelmingly negative. Although sympathy for Faysal among nationalists was wide­ spread, few o f them in 1928 seriously entertained the idea o f a Syrian monarchy. Nationalist politicians, for the most pan well educated and sophisticated, were openly republican by this time, ironically inspired by 125]

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the democratic system o f the French republic. It was standard hire in nationalist speeches to speak o f France as the mother and exporter o f liberal republican ideals - freedom and the rights o f man - and then to express bafflement at the suppression o f those same ideals by the French authorities in Syria. These men feared that a king, most probably an outsider, was likely to become a pawn in French hands. Moreover, in Iraq an imported monarch had split nationalist ranks by constituting a third political force in the country, something that the Syrian nationalists understandably wanted to avoid happening in their country. Around the third week o f June, the Iraqi emissaries were granted an audience by Ponsot, who informed them that he personally favoured a monarchy and would consider only a Hashemite candidate. But he warned them that he could not prejudge the attitude o f the French government. Furthermore, a royalist regime in Syria would place the Syrians in an awkward position, caught between the hostility o f the Hashemites if they chose a Wahabi for King and the hostility o f the Wahabis if they chose a Hashemite. As to French ultimate intentions, Ponsots guarded comments left the emissaries guessing, which was exactly what the High Commissioner wanted. But given Ponsots previous announcement that the Assembly was Tree’ to choose its own regime, and with the French-picked government o f Shaykh Taj and the National Bloc already firmly committed to the idea o f a Syrian republic, they realised that the French were unlikely to change direction and impose a monarchy.71 Following the failure o f his emissaries to discern French intentions, Faysal called in M. Maigret, the French Consul in Baghdad, for what the King described as a personal, frank and friendly talk. The King informed the Consul that, according to his emissaries, some 55 Assembly members were supporters o f a monarchical regime in Syria. Would the French oppose a Hashemite candidate if the Assembly voted to establish such a regime? The Consul, aware o f the French official policy o f neutrality concerning the Syrian throne question, indicated in as vague a way as possible that the position o f France was unchanged and that he would pass on the Kings enquiry to his superiors.72 Ponsot knew, in fact, that many deputies were divided on the throne question. His meeting with the Iraqis came just as the nationalists were preparing to focus on the critical issues o f Syrian unity and the return o f the districts that had been annexed to Lebanon in 1920. By agreeing to meet the Iraqi emissaries [261

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during this period, Ponsot effectively kept the throne issue at the forefront o f debate among the deputies, endeavouring to split the Assembly into small and jealous factions: the High Commissioner obviously was more than just a liberal diplomat, as his understanding o f the fragility o f Syrian political life revealed. Nevertheless, by the beginning o f July Ponsot had been informed that the editorial committee had clearly opted for a republican-style constitution. Furthermore, he received no encouragement at all from Paris to pursue the throne question, his own team at the High Commission were divided on the issue and he decided to drop it.73 Before the crucial session on 9 August, Ponsot had been assured by Taj that a majority o f deputies would vote for acceptance o f the French demands. But both were shocked and disappointed by the proceedings o f that day and Ponsot had no alternative but to inform Paris that in spite o f making Taj come out openly in favour o f the French demands, and having used ‘all means’ to encourage the moderates, the High Commissions plan had failed. He would therefore suspend the Assembly sine die, because on 11 August it planned to open the discussion o f the constitution, article by article.74 On 10 August, Hashim al-Atasi handed Ponsot the official reply o f the Assembly, namely its refusal to accept the High Commissioners demands. Ponsot courteously but firmly told the President that he now had no alternative but to stop the Assembly’s work, whereupon al-Atasi pressed him not to dissolve the Assembly nor to suspend it sine die. Such a decision, he stressed, would lead to considerable agitation in the towns, which was clearly in no one’s interests. The following day Atasi informed the Assembly that he had received a decree from the High Commissioner, suspending the Assembly for three months.'3 Shaykh Taj was absent from the Assembly that day, for some reason only known to himself. Before breaking up - to cries o f Vive la nation!’ and Vive l’indépendance!’ - the deputies issued a final statement, which indicated the National Bloc’s frame o f mind: T h e Assem bly . . . welcomes its adjournm ent, voluntarily, but with resignation. It m aintains its com plete rights intact hoping that after this adjournm ent obstacles will be ironed out and its wishes realised.'"

Such sentiments were more an admission o f weakness than a sign o f magnanimity, but then the French had not left them much room to manoeuvre. 127]

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The adjournment o f the Assembly caused greater tension in Damascus and in other nationalist towns than at any time since the Revolt. Fearing massive disturbances, the French increased the number o f troops posted in the capital. But nationalist deputies had given Ponsot their promise not to provoke disturbances and, apart from a few isolated incidents, calm was maintained. Ponsot was surprised and annoyed to read in the Beirut press the day following the adjournment that the Assembly had rejected - by a ’considerable majority’, 42 votes to 8 - the reservations that he had demanded.77 In Paris, even the conservative daily Le Temps, a paper that normally took its cue from the Quai d’Orsay, accepted this version o f events and ran the same story on its 12 August edition, calling it a ’crushing majority’.78 This was not Ponsot’s interpretation o f events at all and something had to be done. Ponsot telegraphed his version o f the story to the Quai d’Orsay, who edited it into telegram form. The ‘independent’ news agency, Havas, then issued the telegram in Paris - as a telegram ‘received’ from Beirut - to the Parisian press, on 13 August: W e are surprised to learn, via telegram s in the European press, that the Syrian Assem bly refused, by a ‘crushing m ajority’ to accept the m essage in which the H igh C om m ission er asked for the disjunction o f those articles which form ally contradict the m andate. In fact, im m ediately after the m essage was read o u t in the Cham ber, a m otion o f disjunction was proposed by a certain num ber o f m em bers, but was deliberately ignored by the Bureau o f the C ham ber, who pu t to the vote an opposin g m otion and proclaim ed its adoption follow ing a show o f hands - abou t which the least that can be said is that it was very dubious. Two days later the A ssem bly calm ly w elcom ed the reading o f the decree suspending the A ssem bly for three m onths.79

It was not surprising that Le Temps changed its tack on the story, as soon as the Havas telegram had been ‘received’. On 14 and 16 August, it denied that the Syrian Assembly had overwhelmingly rejected the High Commissioner’s demands and went to some length to explain the ‘correct’ version o f recent Syrian Assembly proceedings. For good measure - and no doubt to bolster Ponsot’s authority - Havas (i.e., read ‘Quai d’Orsay) sent the following telegram on 13 August from Paris to Beirut:

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T he F rench search for a new p oli cy Political circles entirely approve o f the firm and yet conciliating attitude taken by the H igh C om m ission er concerning the Syrian Assem bly . . . By including in the constitution those clauses which form ally contradict the M andate - and m oreover which are unnecessary for the organisation o f public affairs - the Assem bly had com m itted itself to a path which could not lead it to an agreem ent with the M andatory Power, concerning the elaboration o f the definitive O rgan ic Law for Syria.*0

By such methods the Quai d’Orsay planted information in the press and thus orientated French and Syrian public opinion during this period. A few weeks later, Ponsot proceeded to the métropole to meet with Berthelot and other senior Quai d’Orsay officials, who were still irritated and perplexed over developments in Syria. With the Assembly suspended for three months the French had a breathing space, but not a long one, to come to some conclusions about what to do next. Apart from the fate o f the Assembly, and the question o f the future political organisation o f Syria, the Quai d’Orsay was also concerned about its position in Geneva. The Syrian elections o f April 1928 should have been followed by the establishment o f a constitution, which Paris would then have presented to the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council o f the League in partial fulfilment o f its Mandatory responsibilities. But the nationalist-manipulated’ Assembly had thwarted French designs in this direction - for the moment. The Quai d’Orsay did not intend to have its plans thwarted again. In Syria the situation remained remarkably quiet. Having discouraged violent protest, the National Bloc decided that the best way to maintain a high profile was to stage large but peaceful public rallies in the interior towns. On 26 August, one such nationalist gathering took place in Aleppo. Held in the grounds o f a popular cafe near the town centre, 6,000 participants turned out, among them nationalist youth, quarter chiefs, religious shaykhs, merchants and artisans. The four main speakers were Ibrahim Hananu and Dr Kayyali, deputies and leaders o f the Aleppo wing o f the National Bloc, Fathallah Asiyun, a young nationalist deputy, and, from Damascus, the Greek-Orthodox deputy Fa’iz al-Khuri. In front o f a home crowd, their language was understandably unrestrained, as for instance, in Dr Kayyali’s speech:

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I proclaim that the Syrian nation - competent and responsible, has never recognised the mandate, does not recognise the mandate and never will recognise the mandate, whatever sacrifices that may entail. The Mandate, its slavery! The division of Syria, its colonisation!*1 Each spoke about the six controversial articles o f the draft constitu­ tion, warning the gathering that certain self-styled nationalists - namely Shaykh Taj and his ilk - had actually sided with the High Commission in refusing to accept the articles. Khuri, for his part, preached the need for patriotic solidarity between Christians and Muslims and advised his Christian brothers not to be misled by either French or British offers o f protection since the constitution, which he, a Christian, had helped to write, clearly respected the rights o f religious minorities; in fact, he added, it accorded them more rights than any Mandate government could possibly provide.8* Fearful that Shaykh Taj would consolidate himself in power quite independently o f the Assembly - and keen to take power themselves - Hashim al-Atasi and Jamil Mardam, on behalf o f the nationalist leaders, privately approached Maugras around the beginning o f September. They assured him o f their desire to pursue the politics o f collaboration and to reopen negotiations, either in Damascus or in Paris. Significantly, they indicated that they were confident that they would be able to persuade their colleagues to add an article, acceptable to both sides, to the constitution. Although they refrained from spelling out the details o f the crucial article, they were appearing to concede in private what they had previously refused to concede in public. This concession by the nationalists - albeit quite unofficial - to agree to an additional article, left Berthelot in a quandary. Should Paris accept the nationalist offer and reopen negotiations with them concerning the crucial wording o f the article to be added, or rather propose the opening o f negotiations for a treaty? Berthelot favoured negotiating a treaty first, on the grounds that if the French chose the additional article ‘route’, and thus established a constitution before a treaty, it would bring the nationalists to power sooner. He was concerned that once established in power, the nationalists would immediately attempt to limit the importance o f the added article, and take up an uncompromising position concerning the treaty. Better to negotiate a treaty first, which would keep the nationalists docile and fairly malleable, at least for the 130)

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period o f negotiations, which could be lengthy. Furthermore, it was certainly unnecessary to hold the negotiations in Paris. If this happened, the Syrian emissaries would make contact with French deputies, who knew nothing o f Syrian realities, and use them to pressurise the French negotiating team. Moreover, they would return home with increased authority. All this activity would cause further embarrassment to the High Commissioner. Berthelot thus instructed Maugras to discourage any Syrians from coming to Paris, and simply to ask the nationalists for further information, in order, he said, for him to be able to present it to the French government."’ Ponsot, as the future French negotiator with the Syrians, saw the situation quite differently from his boss: if the French were now to accept to negotiate a treaty, the nationalists would take it as a sign o f French weakness and would tell their allies that they had forced the French to change direction, to capitulate. The French should keep the discussion with the nationalists centred on the constitution. Furthermore, normal conditions for the discussion o f a treaty did not exist in Syria. The nationalists had broken o ff relations with the provisional government o f Shaykh Taj, who did not count in the matter, and it would thus be with an opposition that the French would have to negotiate/4The example o f Iraq, which some invoked, where a treaty had been negotiated before a constitution was established, was not appropriate, as the treaty had been concluded under quite different circumstances: when the British negotiated in Baghdad, it was with a king already in place. The fact was that the French gpvernment was not in the presence o f Syrian authorities qualified to negotiate but rather an Assembly elected to establish a constitution. And that constitution could only be recognised by the French if it accepted the Mandate, because it was by the Mandate Act that Syrian independence had been provisionally recognised internationally."4 Although the French discouraged Syrian politicians from travelling to Paris, a small delegation o f Syrian moderates associated with Shaykh Taj, and later Jamil Mardam, on behalf o f the National Bloc, undertook the journey and met Ponsot and senior Quai d’Orsay officials, to try to work out an acceptable constitution. But the overriding question for the Quai d’Orsay during this period was how to maintain the Mandate (how to get the top back on the toothpaste tube) and the Syrian emissaries, although politely received in the French capital, had no alternative but to return to Syria empty-handed. 13H

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By the end o f October Ponsot had drafted a series o f proposals for future French policy in Syria, which he presented to Berthelot as a working paper. It included a very carefully crafted formula to be added as Article 116 to the constitution —which completely safeguarded the rights o f the Mandatory power, and which the Assembly leaders would be called upon to accept in its entirety. Ponsot proposed that if they rejected this compromise, the French should not hesitate to take their Responsibilities’ accordingly, supported by the League o f Nations. In other words, the Assembly should be dissolved and the French should arbitrarily promulgate the Syrian constitution.16 In spite o f this rather hard-line approach by Ponsot, it is noteworthy that in his proposals to Berthelot, he also continued to plead for a liberal policy towards Syria. He emphasised that the case o f Syria could not be resolved by methods that had worked elsewhere, notably in North Africa. The final goal to be attained, defined by the Mandate Act, was completely different to that which was imposed upon France in their other possessions or protectorates. French policies in Morocco, for example, were undergirded by an army o f 72,000 men, almost entirely financed by the métropole, by an administration o f not less than 7,000 French functionaries and by over 100,000 settlers. Tunisia was (proportionally) similar. In Syria, Ponsot pointed out, he had 15,500 French troops and 350 agents, and colonisation could not be envisaged (the Syrians themselves emigrated). These were the facts. Thus the liberal route was the only one which would bear fruit. He concluded: We may need to mark time, but it is not the time to change direction, nor to go backwards.*7

At the beginning o f November the High Commissioner, still in Paris, renewed the decree adjourning the Assembly for a further three months.88 This news set off some minor disturbances in some towns as Syrians awaited news o f the High Commissioners return to Beirut, or his dismissal. A month later Ponsot was allowed to return, arriving in Beirut on 26 December 1928, and this time with precise instructions: if the Assembly leaders persisted in their refusal to give the High Commissioner the necessary assurances concerning the modifications o f the constitution, he was to dissolve the Assembly and then promulgate - on his own authority - the Syrian constitution, modified according to 132]

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the requirements o f the Mandate. But the Quai d’Orsay told the High Commissioner to promulgate it with the rider that it would only come into force when the situation permitted. In this way the Prime Minister would not be constrained to hold elections immediately following the establishment o f the constitution, for elections would put ‘everything into question again’. * On 11 January 1929 Ponsot personally handed to the President o f the Assembly the text o f the clause which contained the essential French reservations concerning unity and the rights o f the Mandate. The High Commissioner did not indicate what the French response would be if the nationalists refused to accept the addition o f this clause - in its entirety - to the constitution. The nationalists promised to reply within eight days.90 Jamil Mardam, the official National Bloc negotiator from Paris —although not actually an Assembly member - came to Beirut a week later and asked Ponsot to modify the clause slightly, which he maintained would not alter its essential meaning. He was, in Ponsot’s words, ‘looking for a crack’ for the nationalists to squeeze through.91 Ponsot gave him no satisfaction and insisted on an official reply from the Bureau o f the Assembly, which had been mandated to keep the contact with the French representative. The nationalists officially gave their counter-proposals to Ponsot on 25 January. They suggested adding a clause which, while leaving the six articles in the constitution, would make them subject to special agreements with the French until the conclusion o f a treaty. To agree to pass a constitution which explicitly recognised the Mandate would be, they claimed - as they had before - a recipe for political suicide as well as being morally abhorrent to them.92 Ponsot had little hope that the nationalists’ counter proposals would be acceptable to Paris, but he nevertheless telegraphed them to the Quai d’Orsay. Berthelot’s response was immediate: H old to m y instructions o f 6 Decem ber. We cannot accept any form ula which leaves a dangerous am biguity between the principle and the exercise o f the M andate.95

Ponsot drafted the decree to dissolve the Assembly and informed Paris that he would promulgate it on 31 January. On 29 January, however, Berthelot unexpectedly telegraphed Ponsot that dissolution o f the Assembly would be interpreted in France and abroad as the abandonment

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o f Frances liberal policies that she had followed in Syria since the Mandate was entrusted to her. Therefore he suggested that Ponsot make a fresh attempt to make the nationalists accept their responsibilities’; to declare to them that if they did not accept this very moderate clause - which did not mention the Mandate explicitly, but only French obligations to the League o f Nations - the High Commissioner would adjourn the Assembly for three months. This, said Berthelot, would allow time for the nationalists to reflect on the necessity to conform to Article 22 o f the Pact and to the declaration o f the Mandate, which was the basis o f their independence.94 Ponsot, however, felt he had already exhausted all his options. In his view, a new attempt to pressurise the nationalist leaders to accept the clause simply would not work and would put him in a very awkward position. The nationalists were impatient and anxious since giving him their counter-proposal on 25 January - they would seize the occasion to decline responsibility by a categorical refusal - and publicise their refusal as a means o f re-establishing their credibility and prestige in the country which at that moment was very diminished. If for general reasons, telegraphed Ponsot to Paris, and in particular to assuage French public opinion, it would be better not to dissolve the Assembly, he could envisage an adjournment o f the Assembly sine die. But an adjournment now o f a further three months, rather than calming the unrest, would only aggravate it, both among the Syrians and in French circles in Syria. It would be taken as a sign o f weakness and hesitation on the part o f the High Commissioner and would only increase the intransigence o f the nationalists. And, concluded Ponsot, during these three months, with a restless public opinion, none o f the administrative or social reforms that the Department was keen to see achieved could be started. Given the firmness o f Ponsot s conviction on the issue, Berthelot agreed to a suspension o f the Assembly sine die.” Ponsot decided to accompany the promulgation o f the decree suspending the Assembly with a declaration in the form o f a letter which he addressed to the President o f the Assembly. Its purpose was, in part, to publicly demonstrate French liberal intentions towards Syria. But just as important, by indicating in the letter that the door remained open for future negotiations with the nationalists, Ponsot hoped to avert any violent reactions from the more extreme nationalists. The letter, in courteous terms, spelled out at length the French version o f the negotiations between [34]

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the Bureau o f the Assembly and the French authorities and why they had not reached a successful conclusion. The foundation stone o f his argument was that the principle o f the Mandate, which had been entrusted to France, could not be questioned. This was the crux o f the matter: T h e sim ple provision o f special agreem ents to be achieved w ould not be sufficient to provide those general interests in question with full and im m ediate guarantees, which the principle o f the m andate itself obliges us to provide.96

The High Commissioner signed the decree suspending the Constitu­ ent Assembly sine die, and the letter to the President o f the Assembly, on 5 February. Two days later the decree was published in Damascus and on the same morning, Thursday 7 February 1929, Ponsots Delegate in Damascus personally handed Hashim al-Atasi both documents.12345678''

N otes

1 MAE/SL, vol. 203, p. 60. 2 MAE/SL, Bulletin o f the Service des Renseignements, Beirut, 15 April 1927, vol. 202. 3 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 245. 4 Article One o f the Mandate Act states: ‘The Mandatory shall frame, within a period o f three years from the coming into force o f this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon. This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes o f all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development o f Syria and Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect o f the organic law, the Government o f Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit o f this mandate. The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.' League o f Nations Official journal, August 1922, pp. 1013-17. 5 MAE/SL, vol. 224, p. 209. 6 Pierre Fournié, ‘L'Administration française au Levant 1918-1930', dissertation. Ecole nationale des Chartes, Paris, 1986, p. 215. 7 MAE/SL, ‘Note de M. Ponsot indiquant son programme et approuvée par le Gouvernement’, 31 May 1927, vol. 225, pp. 1-18; ibid., 'Note de M. Robert de Caix’. 5 August 1927, pp. 39-47. 8 MAE/SL, vol. 203, p. 60; Le Temps, 30 July 1927; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 246.

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F re nch I mp eri ali sm in Syri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 9 Le Comte Robert de Caix de Saint-Aymour (1870-1969). Formerly the Secretary-General o f the French High Commission in Beirut under General Gouraud, de Caix was thereafter the perennial accredited French representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva (1923-39). A highly intelligent, articulate and fervent French nationalist —and a leading member o f the Colonial Party - his influence on French policy in Syria and Lebanon throughout the whole o f our period under study was significant, and on occasion, decisive. M AE/SL, vol. 225, pp. 3 4 -8 ,9 7 ; M AE/SL, vol. 203, pp. 39-47. 10 MAE/SL, vol. 203, p. 249; M AE/SL, vol. 225, pp. 71-80. 11 M AE/SL, vol. 225, p. 69 12 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 248. 13 Lt Colonel Mortier, head o f the Service des Renseignements for Syria and the Druze State, requested the preparation o f these reports on 31 August 1927. CA D N /B, Damascus, 10 November 1927, vol. 398. Ibid., Lt Burtin, Service des Renseignements, Nebek, 20 September 1927. Ibid., Couvert, Director o f Service des Renseignements, Vilayet o f Aleppo, 30 September 1927. 14 'une consultation populaire non-truquée’. In this report, the words ‘non-truquée’ have been underlined in thick black crayon, probably by the writers superior, and handwritten in the margin is the phrase, ‘they must be rigged, but skilfully (il faut en truquer, mais habilement). Ibid., Captain Collet, Service des Renseignements, Damascus city, 30 September 1927. 15 MAE/SL, vol. 225, pp. 104-8. 16 Ibid., pp. 93-4. 17 Ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 7 February 1928, p. 132. Ibid., p. 134. 18 Ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 14 January 1928, p. 139. 19 ‘What conclusion must we draw from this beautifully woven tapestry o f words? That Ponsot believes that he must, before organising the elections in Syria, constitute a government o f moderate nationalists with whom we will come to an agreement concerning a programme that will include the conclusion o f a treaty between the Mandatory Power and the state under Mandate?’ Ibid., Berthelot, Paris, 8 January 1928, p. 126. 20 Ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 22 January 1928, pp. 145-52. 21 See ‘Affaires Politiques - Aide Mémoire sur les principaux personnages politiques et agitateurs’, CA D N /B, Damascus, 30 May 1936, vol. 471; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 328. 22 The Damad and his government resigned on 8 February 1928. For copies o f both letters, see CA D N /B, 8 February 1928, vol. 466. 23 Decree (No. 1817) authorising the partial amnesty was signed by Ponsot on 16 February 1928. See CA D N /B, vol. 466 for the ‘Black List’, same date. 24 MAE/SL, 24 April 1927, vol. 213, pp. 85-6; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 240. 25 M AE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 7 April 1928, vol. 204, p. 32. 26 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 333. 27 In his proclamation, dated 15 February 1928, which appeared in the press 17 February 1928, Ponsot specifically referred to the electoral laws which would 'guarantee the impartiality o f the elections’. CA D N /B, 17 Feb. 1928, vol. 466. 28 M AE/SL, Ponsot to Quai d’Orsay, 15 March 1928, vol. 204, pp. 4 -6 . Ponsot did, in fact, make some minor changes to the electoral law, by Decree no. 1889 (20 March 1928). CA D N /B, 20 March 1928, vol. 466.

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T he F re nch search for a new p ol i cy 29 M AE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 15 March 1928, vol. 204, p. 5. 30 'affronter l’avenir’. Ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 7 April 1928, p. 32. 31 C A D N /B , ‘Inhabitants o f Damascus’ to Ponsot (telegram), 12 April 1928, vol. 4 6 6 . According to the Damascus correspondent o f the newspaper W atan, Taj only received 25 votes, out o f a possible 222, on the first day o f voting, in al-Qaymariyya. Hence the appearance the following morning o f his Minister o f the Interior at the voting station, accompanied by 26 policemen. It was alleged that the Minister expelled the local ‘controllers’ for half an hour, and then left the building, proclaiming that the elections had been conducted impartially. C A D N /B , 14 April 1928, vol. 398. 32 M AE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 17 April 1928, vol. 204, p. 51. 33 C A D N /B , Beyrouth, 16 April 1928, vol. 398. Ibid., ‘Information no. 314’, 9 May 1928; M AE/SL, vol. 204, p. 114. 34 For the second degree election results, see C A D N /B , Information no. 301, Beirut, 4 May 1928, vol. 398. 35 CA D N /B, Ponsot to Quai d’Orsay, 28 April 1928, telegrams nos. 213/6- 214/6. 36 Approximately 35 per cent o f Aleppines were Christians. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 16. 37 CA D N /B, Delegate in Damascus to Ponsot, 27 April 1928, vol. 466. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 335. 38 P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 335. Only a week before the second round o f elections, Ponsot had written to Briand that ‘we estimate that not more than a dozen extremists will be elected.’ M AE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 17 April 1928, vol. 204, p. 53. 39 Ibid., pp. 113-15. 40 ‘solutions de bon sens’. C A D N /B , Ponsot to Briand, 10 May 1928, vol. 398. 41 MAE/SL, vol. 204, p. 115; C A D N /B , Ponsot to Briand, 4 July 1928, vol. 465. 42 ‘les meneurs nationalistes’. MAE/SL, vol. 225, p. 199. 43 organiser b pleine et à gouverner avec elle’. Ibid., p. 200. 44 Ibid., pp. 199-203. 45 Ponsot replied, in part, to Berthdot’s request, on 19 July. See MAE/SL, vol. 225, p. 234. 46 P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 336. 47 In his declaration calling the provisional government to power, Ponsot had carefully avoided specifying the length o f its duration. In similar vein, the Constituent Assembly was equally open-ended. This gave Ponsot room to stretch the political timetable as required, to keep the maximum number o f options open. The French constantly thought ahead: ‘To govern is to antidpate.’ Shaykh Taj was to remain provisional prime minister for nearly four years. 48 T refused to let our agents campaign for a Presidential candidate, whose defeat would have been our defeat.’ M AE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 13 June 1928, vol. 204, p. 127. 49 C A D N /B , Damascus, 10 June 1928, vol. 465. M AE/SL, vol. 204, p. 134. 50 M AE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 20-39. 51 Ibid., vol. 225, p. 204. 52 Ibid., vol. 226, pp. 10,74. 53 Ibid., vol. 226, p. 19. Ibid., vol. 225, pp. 215-16. 54 Ibid., p. 40.

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F re nch I mperi ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 55 MAE/SL, Berthelot to Ponsot, 27 July 1928, vol. 226, pp. 41-2. See also ibid., ‘Note de M . de Caix’, 1 August 1928, pp. 84-90. In my opinion, Berthelots instructions ate an obvious adaptation o f this note. This would date de Caix’s note about 26 July 1928. 56 Ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 2 August 1928, p. 118; ibid., pp. 13, 79-80; ibid., vol. 204, pp. 234-5. 57 MAE/SL, vol. 226, p. 124. 58 CA D N /B, ‘Compte-Rendu du 13ème séance; discussion générale du Destour’, 7 August 1928, vol. 465; MAE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 129-32. 59 MAE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 133-6; M AE/SL, vol. 204, pp. 240-3. 60 F 0 3 7 1/4390, vol. 13074. Hole to Lord Cushendun, 9 August 1928. 61 According to the French records, Shishaldi introduced the motion ‘at the request o f the High Commissioner’. CA D N /B, Damascus, 10 November 1928, vol. 465. 62 As there were fifty deputies at the session, including twenty committed nationalists, it can be convincingly argued that a sizable majority o f hands did actually go up. MAE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 134, 150, 157. For the French version o f this session, see ibid., Ponsot to Briand, 10 August 1928, pp. 133-6. 63 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 341. 64 M AE/SL, vol. 204, pp. 191-3. 65 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 341. 66 CA D N /B, Ponsot to Briand, 4 July 1928, vol. 465; MAE/SL, vol. 204, p. 138; MAE/SL, vol. 225, pp. 204-5; M AE/SL, vol. 226, p. 81. 67 See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 342. 68 MAE/SL, vol. 225, pp. 204-5, 237. 69 ‘un grand malentendu, in Faysal’s own words. The French put a different interpretation on the events o f 1920. See MAE/SL, vol. 204, p. 141. 70 R Khoury, op. cit., p. 338. 71 CA D N /B, Ponsot to Briand, 4 July 1928, vol. 465. For any ambitious, professional Syrian politician and whatever his attitude towards the French, the monarchical solution would effectively bar him from attaining the highest office o f state. There was already no lack o f candidates for the top job. 72 MAE/SL, vol. 204, pp. 141-2. 73 Ibid., p. 162; CA D N /B, Ponsot to Briand, 4 July 1928, vol. 465. 74 MAE/SL, vol. 226, p. 134; ibid., p. 136. 75 Decree no. 2063,11 August 1928. 76 CA D N /B, Damascus, 11 August 1928, vol. 465. 77 ‘une majorité considérable’. M AE/SL, vol. 226, p. 157. 78 Ibid., vol. 226, p. 161. 79 Ibid., p. 164. 80 Ibid., p. 165, 169. 81 Quoted by R. de Gontaut-Biron, in a letter to Berthelot, and also to the French prime minister, M. Poincaré. See MAE/SL, vol. 205, pp. 76-87. 82 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 344. 83 MAE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 190-1; ibid., pp. 183-9. 84 ‘Le Gouvernement ne compte pas.’ MAE/SL, vol. 226. p. 13. 85 Ibid., Paris, 23 October 1928, pp. 199-205. 86 MAE/SL, vol. 226, ‘Note’, Ponsot to Briand, Paris, 30 October 1928, pp. 223-32. 87 Ibid., p. 231.

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T hu F rench search eor a new poli cy 88 Decree no. 2195, 5 November 1928. 89 Berthelots instructions were confirmed by letter. MAE/SL, Bcrthelot to Ponsot, 6 December 1928, vol. 227, pp. 12-20. 90 For the text o f the clause, see ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 30 January 1929, pp. 69-70. 91 *11 cherchait la fissute.’ Ibid., Ponsot to Berrhelot, 22 January 1929, p. 30. 92 Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 26 January 1929, pp. 45-53. 93 Ibid., Berthelot to Ponsot, 25 January 1929, p. 44. 94 Throughout our whole period under study, France used her obligations' to the league o f Nations and the Mandate that she had ‘received* as almost unassailable ‘givens* o f her case, to justify her continued presence in the Levant as a Mandatory' power. A more accurate interpretation was expressed in a private interview between the French Ambassador in Rome and Mussolini in May 1928. The Italian leader asked the Ambassador whether France would support Italy’s right to take over a Mandate from France, if one became available. The Ambassador replied firmly that it was not the Assembly at Geneva but the Allied Powers who, at the Peace Conference, had re-divided the territories under Mandate. The league had only one right: that was to examine, by means o f a Committee, the conditions o f administration o f the Mandatory power, and then to make observations. MAE/SL, Beaumarchais to Briand, 19 May 1928, vol. 168, p. 18: MAE/SL, vol. 227, pp. 67-8. 95 Ibid., pp. 72-4; ibid., Berthelot to Ponsot, 1 February 1929, p. 76. 96 Ibid., p. 83. 97 For Ponsot’s letter to the President o f the Assembly, see M AE/SL, vol. 227, pp. 97-9. The Constituent Assembly was adjourned sine die by Decree no. 2385, 5 February 1929. Ibid., pp. 107-8.

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2 France’s im position o f a constitution 1930 T o announce a liberal policy and then not to im plem ent it does not conform to the gpnius o f France.

Fonaot to Briand» 8 December 1929'

A detailed analysis o f the process o f French decision-making with regard to Syria during the period under study necessitates an appreciation o f the particular ’mental baggage’ o f influential policy advisors like de Caix, as well as the study o f die wider issues involved, such as Frances self-image as a world power, her military concerns and her cultural and financial interests in the region.2 Born in the year that Alsace and Lorraine were lost to Prussia, de Caix’s thinking was deeply coloured by the nineteenth century. For de Caix the Fashoda incident, the Dreyfus Affair, Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East before and during the First World War - and above all the sacrifice o f 1.3 million French soldiers during that war - formed part o f his emotional make-up, his living experience. Appointed as Gourauds deputy in 1919, he was already 49 years old, a seasoned journalist and a leading member (with his friend Berthelot) o f the Colonial Party, which was ’the highest stage not o f French capitalism but o f French nationalism*.’ His vision o f Syria at that time was thus understandably - although unfortunately for the Syrians - intensely French-centred: T h ere are tw o ways o f envisaging our future actions in Syria: the first consists o f seeking to build a Syrian nation which does not yet exist, m aking it as hom ogeneous as possible by attem pting to sm ooth ou t the deep rifis which still divide it. T h e second consists o f getting the country to stand o n its feet as m uch as possible, but taking care to cultivate and m aintain all the phenom ena, requiring o u r arbitration, that these divisions give [us]. I m ust say that only

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the second option interests me. I have to adm it that I am profoundly nationalist, not in the sense o f the C am elots du R oi, but in a more thoughtful way: for m e there are? only two things in the w orld, those which serve my country, and those which harm it. I d o n t look at political questions in any other lig h t/

De Caix was at the heart o f the pacification and political organisation o f the Levant between 1919 and 1923 and although officially the French Representative at the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva from 1923 to 1939, he spent much o f this period in Paris, where he was the éminence grise at the Quai d’Orsay on the Levant question. Berthelot and his successor Alexis Léger (Director General o f the Quai d’Orsay, 1933-40) relied heavily on de Caix’s advice. His incisive comments following the adjournment o f the Constituent Assembly in February 1929, that the French government had absolutely no reason, either moral, juridical or political’ to re-open talks with the Syrian nationalists or to make any concessions to them seem to illustrate that after nearly a decade o f intimate involvement in the shaping o f French policy in the Levant, de Caix’s attitude towards Syria had not perceptibly changed: M orally, it is scandalous that the notables o f a people w ho did absolutely nothing towards the independence o f their country, which was entirely paid for by Allied blood, should endeavour to m ake us pay dearly for what we want, and refuse to recognise this tem porary situation i.e., the M andate . . . Juridically, we are only m aintaining the law em anating from article 2 2 o f the Pact, and in so doing, we are fulfilling the clear wishes o f the Permanent M andates C om m ission . . . Politically, we have no reason to m ake any concession to m en who have declared they will not make any to us . . . It is probable that the ring-leaders o f the Assembly, if they don’t succeed in inducing us to talk about a treaty, will start talking again about the constitution. But if they keep alo o f - refusing to talk with us - what can they do? T hey don’t have the Druzes with them, as they d id in 1925 . . . If, so to speak, the M andatory Power outflanks their opposition by adm inistrative and econom ic im provem ents . . . it has a chance o f gaining som e sym pathy from the miserable masses and the certainty that it has fulfilled its international o b ligatio n s/

The implications o f the last sentence jn particular must not be underestimated: in de Caix’s mind, France would have fulfilled her 142]

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international obligations by implementing administrative and economic reforms. The development o f political organisations, the elections, the whole constitutional process, the treaty question - all these should remain on a back-burner. Syria was not ready for political emancipation and the sooner the nationalists knuckled under the better for all concerned. This, in large measure, was the prevailing attitude o f the Quai d’Orsay after ten years o f what was, in effect, direct rule in Syria. Ponsot’s prediction that there would be no appreciable - or dangerous - reaction to the adjournment was borne out. The nationalists had mixed feelings: disappointment because the High Commissioner had again pulled the rug from under their feet and satisfaction because they had not compromised with the Occupying Power and thus remained, in their eyes, the unsullied champions o f the nation. Surprisingly, no manifestos o f protest were published by the National Bloc which, unable to advance the independence movement at all, turned instead to building and broadening the base o f its organisation. As for Shaykh Taj, the episode enabled him and his unpopular (provisional!) government to entrench themselves further. Taj himself was pleased to have his position re-enforced, but disappointed that the Assembly had not been dissolved. His main hope for survival hinged on Ponsot’s reluctance to hand the political ball to the nationalists. A cartoon in Dabbour showed Fakhri al-Barudi asking Shaykh Taj (sitting squarely in the Prime Ministers seat) ’Isn’t it time you fell from power?’ ’You can be sure that not one hair o f my head will fall without the permission o f the High Commissioner’, replies Taj.6 Haqqi al-Azm probably spoke for most moderates when he declared how happy he was to see that the French authorities had finally realised that there was just no way o f cooperating with the nationalists: it was an occasion for the French to revert to their old friends.' Events in Syria caused a minor ripple o f interest in Paris. The press - except L'H um anité- took the line that the adjournment was necessary, given the intransigence o f the nationalists. The influential daily Le Temps sounded like the Quai d’Orsay speaking: . . . concerning the Assembly, the liberalism o f French policy has been stretched to its very lim it and it can go no further in its desire to reach an agreem ent (with the Assem bly), because, i f it did so, it would be unable to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities."

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Some o f the right-wing press went so far as to attack the (French) government for its irrational policies in Syria, where the populations were in no way ready for self-government and where the Syrian Assembly, full o f incapable politicians with no gpvemmental experience, had made preposterous demands.9 The lone voice o f LH um aniti - expressing, no doubt, Moscow's vision o f Syrian-French relations - attacked Ponsot’s classic coup de fa n e in liquidating the Assembly. Ponsot had acted, it claimed, because the Assembly had decided to govern (its own country), to negptiate and sign treaties, to control taxes and to manage its own budget and because it declared that Syria wished to be independent. In brief, because Syrians, without exception, rejected French colonisation, disguised under the name o f ‘Mandate’.10 Sentiments o f equal vehemence were to be found in the telegram o f protest from the Istiqlal wing o f the Syro-Palestinian Congress o f Cairo, which advised the Syrian nationalists to abandon collaboration, as French policy had not progressed at all: it remained one o f colonisation, injustice and violence." But such protests, restricted to the written word, hardly raised the eyebrows o f the policy-makers at the Quai d’Orsay. So not surprisingly when Ihsan al-Jabiri, a leader o f the unofficial Syrian Delegation at the League o f Nations, managed to put his proposals concerning a treaty to M. Saint Quentin a fortnight later, he received a polite brush-off: the head o f the Levant Section told Jabiri that M. Ponsot’s door was always open to the nationalists and they should address the High Commissioner if they wished to reopen talks, which had been interrupted through their own intransigence.12 M. Ponsot s door may have been theoretically open, but following the adjournment he reverted to the style he had adopted on first arriving in the Levant —that o f aloofness and studied inscrutability. He pretended to be uninterested in all political issues, substituting instead a public preoccupation with Syria’s economic development. Mundane political issues were left to the new delegate in Damascus, M. Solomiac, whom Ponsot had transferred from Lebanon where his reputation had been that o f a ‘skilful manoeuvrer’. Solomiac’s task was to fragment the ranks o f the National Bloc and to quiedy encourage the formation o f a coalition o f moderate groups that would act as a counterweight to the nationalists. At this time the mainstream o f the National Bloc was still resigned to maintaining the policy o f collaboration with the French authorities. Consequendy, the political scene during the Spring and early Summer o f [44]

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1929 were characterised by occasional negotiations between nationalists and the High Commission, interspersed with remarkably mild public rallies and demonstrations, which were designed both to remind the French o f the Bloc's influence and to reinforce its position among Syrians. This lull in political activity in Syria, however, was shattered by events in Palestine. There, mounting tensions between Arabs and Jews broke out in violent riots in August 1929, riveting the attention o f Syrian Muslims and pan-Arabists alike. Demonstrations started in Damascus on 26 August and culminated after Friday prayers on the thirtieth, when some three thousand demonstrators chanting ‘down with the Balfour Declaration!’ gathered and attacked the police station at Midhat Pasha Square. Infantry and tanks were sent in to disperse the crowd. One demonstrator was fatally wounded and nine arrested. The demonstrations were, on the surface, largely anti-Zionist and anti-British in character, but the French felt they were dangerous because if they continued, they would stir up Arab fanaticism, which would be exploited by the nationalists and thus be turned into anti-French demonstrations.13 The National Bloc played a peculiar role in these events. Bloc leaders discouraged demonstrations o f any sort against Britain for fear o f jeopardising any future British support against the French. Bloc leaders did not want the attention o f the Syrian masses diverted from the most pressing problem o f all: how to ease the French out o f their country. Thus, the Bloc leadership increasingly sacrificed pan-Arab sentiments to the more localised Syrian national struggle. Meanwhile in Paris, Ponsot was consulting with senior Quai d’Orsay officials, endeavouring to put together a political programme for Syria that would continue to guarantee all o f France’s essential interests, but that could be defended in Geneva. A permanently adjourned Syrian parliament meant potentially awkward questions in the French parliament, as well as at the PMC. On 31 October, on Ponsot’s return from Paris, Hashim al-Atasi reiterated his call for a Franco-Syrian treaty. Now, however, he stressed the progress being made between Britain and Iraq and called for France to follow an identical course.14 Ponsot had indeed a programme in mind, but it definitely did not include replying to Atasi’s call or anyone else’s. Two significant decisions had been taken in Paris: the High Commissioner would promulgate the Syrian constitution arbitrarily, suitably modified - at some as yet undefined date - but probably before the June 1930 session o f the PM C. Secondly, there would be no further collaboration (451

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with the nationalists unless they modified their position. His instructions were to continue his combined fast track and slow track programme: the fast track consisted o f pushing ahead with the reorganisation o f the Mandatory administration and implementing economic reforms that would favourably impress public opinion and thus help to prepare’ the elections. On his arrival in October 1926, Ponsot had found a top-heavy, inefficient and expensive administration. At the High Commission, he regrouped seventeen sections into four: henceforth only four section-heads reported directly to the Secretary-General. Ponsot attempted, with some success, to develop an administration similar to that o f the British in Iraq - to maintain a small number o f Mandatory officials at the High Commission, combined with a number o f French advisors under contract to the different states. Like the British in Iraq, the dilemma for the French was how to maintain effective control as cheaply as possible. A further hindrance to the smooth running o f the Mandate was that even by 1930, the rank o f Mandate personnel still had to be enshrined in well-defined legislation. One result was that the brightest, upwardly mobile French government officials were distinctly reluctant to be posted to a ’difficult’ country, where their future was uncertain. No one knew how long the Mandate would last. Personnel was still one o f Ponsot’s major headaches at the end o f 1929.15 The slow track was to continue the politique temporisatrice - to keep the constitutional process moving as slowly as possible - and to postpone elections until the appropriate’ moment. His immediate political task was to sound out all the various groups and to install the most reliable one in power as a transitional government that in the long term would negotiate a treaty - he himself having already promulgated the constitution.16 The choice o f team turned out to be singularly difficult. In the months following his return the moderate, royalist and nationalist groups presented their programmes to High Commission officials, who listened politely but gave no indication o f French intentions. The silence continued for some months: when Ponsot met Atasi on 11 April 1930, the nationalist leader was politely informed that the High Commissioner was still ’in consultation with Paris’ on the subject.17 At the beginning o f January 1930, the ‘United Parties’, an Alliance o f Moderates led by Haqqi al-Azm, presented their proposals to the Secretary-General in Beirut: [461

F r a n c e ' s i mp os i t i on of a c o n s t i t u t i o n 19 30 Install us . . . as a transitional governm ent and we will sign a Treaty with you; you prom ulgate a C onstitution, m odified to your require­ ments and alter 1 2 -1 8 m onths o f preparations’, hold elections for a Parliament, which will then ratify the Treaty and the C onstitution.1*

Ponsot thus found himself in the presence o f two programmes - nationalist and moderate - and a variety o f possible teams. The catch was that in essence, both programmes were identical: they involved different stages, but both led to the same final objective. All the non-nationalist programmes on offer, including the Damad’s, Subhi Barakat’s, Rikabi’s, the Royalists’ and even Taj’s (on paper) considered that the Mandate regime was out o f date and demanded, with varying degrees o f insistence, that French-Syrian relations be defined and regulated by a treaty consecrating the independence and sovereignty o f their country. In Ponsot’s opinion, personal enmities and group rivalries, rather than principles, separated the moderates from the nationalists.1'’ Ponsot ruled out bringing the nationalists to power because France would lose moral prestige’ and be forced to make concessions whose consequences could not be anticipated. Moreover, the necessary instrum ents for the safeguard o f our essential interests are still not in placer"

Significantly, Ponsot rejected the royalist programme because although he acknowledged that it would give France some room to manoeuvre, and would probably guarantee some stability, he considered that the moment had passed when the election o f an Emir or King could be arranged by France. Furthermore, having raised no objections to the Assembly’s explicit preference for a republican regime, he could not backtrack without running the risk o f a ‘dangerous public reaction’. '1 He ruled out calling on the moderates because both main contenders had been tried once before, with unsatisfactory results." Ponsot decided to back Taj because the alternatives had no more chance o f success than Taj himself: he saw no point in risking a new transitional team unless the incoming one was an improvement! Taj’s only advantage over the other candidates was being already in the saddle. In de Caix’s opinion, Taj had the further advantage o f being completely compromised in the eyes o f his countrymen, having openly supported the High Commissioner (47)

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on the constitutional issue the previous August. ‘He now understands that his only support is the Mandatory power .2) As another option, Ponsot could have proposed to Paris the con­ tinuation o f the thinly disguised direct rule regime, which would have fitted well with prevailing attitudes at the Quai d’Orsay as well as in the French parliament. That so many o f his letters to Paris were a mixture o f political analysis combined with explicit, if polite, broadsides to his hard-line critics, reveals the magnitude o f his struggle to justify the relatively liberal route he had decided to take: We d id not reach an agreem ent in 1928 because we did not dare to risk the consequences o f a change o f policy, a policy [which w ould have been] openly directed towards the ending o f the m andate, in accordance with the prom ises we have m ade. O u r policy could not evolve then because o f the prevailing counter-currents in France. Such an evolution w ould have been equally condem ned by the vast m ajority o f French in the L e v a n t . . . and by em phasising its liberal policies, Britain is pu ttin g us in a delicate position. We really cannot call into question either the reality or the depth o f A rab national sentim ent, even w hen, as for the last three years, it has expressed itself in a non-violent manner. It isn’t adequate to say that we only have 20 0 politicians opposing us and that the m ass o f the population will be content with a French policy lim ited to ‘food p ro vision . I f that were the case, the revolt o f 1925 w ould rem ain unexplained because all these (2 0 0 people) were either behind bars or in exile and yet it still took a year to deal with it. T h e truth is that A rab nationalism has grow n, m oderated, becom e m ore disciplined and is aw aiting its m o m e n t . . . O n ce again, we are at the cross-roads, and it w ould be pointless to take refuge behind the opinions o f the League o f N ation s . . . To announce a liberal policy and then not to im plem ent it does not conform to the genius o f France. I f certain opinions, m ost com m only held in m ilitary and business circles, were to prevail, we could certainly increase our direct control . . . by turning our back on our prom ises . . . However, if the liberal route is to be chosen, and I m ade m y choice a long tim e ago, we will have to apply such a policy according to its principles and to define its consequences regarding all our interests, m ilitary and civilian, financial, e c o n o m i c . . . For that, a declaration o f a H igh C om m ission er is not sufficient. N o n e o f m y predecessors, m ilitary or civilian, was able to successfully conclude what he started. I m yself cannot attem pt to

[48]

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reach a successful outcome . . . in safeguarding our essential interests, except with a programme fixed in Paris, and with the active participation o f all the relevant Ministries and the formal approval of the Government.14 Ponsot s proposals, including a revised constitution for Syria, arrived in Paris at the end o f February 1930. They contained few surprises for Quai d’Orsay officials. Ponsot recommended firstly, to accept the 1928 elections as valid and to promulgate the constitution, amended only as necessary to fit French international obligations and French interests. Secondly, to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Thirdly, to present the Organic Law o f the different States (Lebanon, Syria, Latakia, Jabal Druze) to the League o f Nations, and until then take no decision concerning the convocation o f a new Assembly, whose establishment would mark the coming into force o f the constitution. Fourthly, to maintain the government o f Shaykh Taj in power to manage the affairs o f state until the coming into force o f the constitution would bring to power a regularly constituted government. Finally, to prepare the future’, by taking appropriate measures, for example an enlarged amnesty, at the appropriate time.” Encouraged by the evolution o f British policy in Iraq and with no apparent progress being made towards a treaty with France, radical nationalists increasingly advocated abandoning collaboration. On 11 April, Hashim al-Atasi met with the High Commissioner to warn him o f a possible upheaval unless there was some announcement o f French intentions. Ponsot replied that he was still awaiting instructions from Paris and asked Atasi to have faith in France’s liberal intentions toward Syria - and to wait a little while longer.26 Under pressure from more radical colleagues, Atasi published a statement on 15 April entitled An Appeal to the Syrian N ation, in which he refuted charges that he was pandering to the French. There was, however, no mention o f a ‘rupture’ with the French: in words carefully chosen for their moderation, he placed the burden o f responsibility for the lack o f progress on the High Commission, but avoided mentioning Ponsot.27 Nevertheless Ponsot realised that it was the tip o f a rising iceberg o f discontent. With the situation deteriorating and the June session o f the Permanent Mandates Commission coming up, Ponsot set his plan in motion. The dilemma was how to promulgate the decrees without

(491

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provoking more than verbal dissent. Keeping Syria in a state o f tranquillity was his permanent concern: above all else, France could not afford a repeat performance o f 1925-7. The whole affair must be low-key: there would be no announcement by the High Commissioner or his deputy, French intentions would be a closely guarded secret until the last minute and the French press would be informed - and suitably orientated - the evening before the decrees were made public in Beirut. Delegates in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Latakia and Suwayda would be sent copies o f the decrees and given precise instructions how and when to inform local leaders. Furthermore, all the decrees would be made public simultaneously: Ponsot calculated that if all the politicians were, at the same time, involved in their own affairs, studying the decree which affected themselves and their own state, overall reactions would be dampened.2* On 22 May, around twenty Beirut journalists were summoned - separately - to the High Commission for a 10 o’clock meeting; they had no idea that anything o f importance was to be announced, until they all found themselves together. Copies o f the decrees were then handed out to them. A similar procedure was followed in Damascus. At 9 o’clock the same day, Hashim al-Atasi at his home in Homs was handed a personal letter from the High Commissioner, together with a copy o f all the decrees, including the Syrian constitution. Shaykh Taj and President Dabbas, the Lebanese Head o f State, received similar visits from high ranking officials.29According to one Beirut newspaper: The French announced the [Syrian] constitution as if they were announcing a decree concerning the hunting season or the campaign against locusts.30 The Parisian dailies announced the good news: Syria finally had a constitution. The chorus o f approval for the High Commissioner’s liberal measures was almost a repeat performance o f August 1928. One daily even announced that the Syrian extremists were enchanted by the High Commissioner’s action, although the newspaper had, in fact, gone to print some hours before the decrees were made public in Syria: The extremists themselves, who refused to cooperate in 1927, are satisfied with the initiative taken by the High Commissioner. They know foil well, even if they do not dare to say it publicly, that Syria still needs France, and they are enchanted to see the genuine interests [501

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of their country being fulfilled in such a manner, without themselves compromising their biased nationalist ideas. L’Echo de Paris, 22/5/30” The commentary was indeed the echo o f Paris and certainly not the echo o f Damascus. With the French Parliament and public opinion fed on a distinctly one-sided diet o f reality regarding Syrian affairs, it is not to be wondered at that the French nation was unprepared psychologically to make concessions to the growing demands o f a Syrian nationalist movement. However satisfied the French were with the news, the nationalists in Syria were thoroughly dissatisfied: the decrees maintained the divisions o f the country and the High Commissioner had not said anything about an enlarged amnesty, nor given any date for elections, nor indicated who would preside over those elections. M ost important o f all, the constitution imposed on Syria was a significantly revised version o f that o f August 1928, and not, as the French maintained, a slight modification’.32 Ponsot accepted five o f the original six offending articles: only Article 2, which referred to Syrian unity, was modified. But ten other articles were changed and most significantly, he added the same Article 116 as he had in 1928: this article effectively safeguarded the French position in all cases where the constitution proved to be in opposition to French obligations under the Mandate. The added article and the six decrees in general sanctioned the status quo established by General Gouraud nearly a decade earlier. The royalists were unhappy too, but for a different reason: the decrees consecrated the evolution o f Syria towards a republican regime when, in their view, the majority o f the population were in favour o f a monarchical regime. Only the moderates were satisfied with the constitution which, in effect, maintained the status quo. The one issue uniting moderates, nationalists and royalists was dissatisfaction that Shaykh Taj was still in the saddle. At the end o f the month, frustrated nationalist leaders met in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, to try and see what to do next. Their options were few and moreover, they were not united: while Jam il Mardam and some others from Damascus counselled calm and continued cooperation with the French - violent protests at this stage would not make the Quai d’Orsay more amenable to relaxing its grip on Syria - more radical nationalists proposed sending protest manifestos to Paris, 151)

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followed by a delegation. Unable to agree, the radicals, mostly from Aleppo, decided to hold a demonstration, while the Damascus nationalists used a different tactic. On 10 June a rally was held in Shahbandar Park, Aleppo, ‘to honour the Aleppo Deputies and the Constituent Assembly where a series o f speakers, headed by Ibrahim Hananu and D r Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali rejected the imposed constitution, as keeping Syria ‘in chains’: Why did Francewait two years before promulgating this constitution? I can tell you: to gain time and to take away the rest of Syria’s gold. Why is she preparing the next elections? To have deputies that will serve her. Moreover, she has used the time to form political parties in Damascus, to undercut our influence. But we are not afraid of that. . . " The following day Damascus suks closed down in protest, the nationalists claimed, against the imposed constitution. The French claimed that the protest was against the local government, which had just imposed a new octroi tax and a tax on shop signs. Some suks had, in fact, closed the day before and the nationalists used the opportunity to initiate a larger shut-down the following day.54At an afternoon meeting organised by Fakhri al-Barudi at his home, gendarmes moved in and arrested 17 people. In reply, nationalist leaders encouraged people to move on to Jam il Mardam’s house, where the meeting passed o ff peacefully.35 The nationalists were even more irritated when they read French press reports that the constitution had been warmly welcomed in Syria. It looked even worse a month later when Iraq, considered by Syrian nationalists as culturally and socially inferior, was given a treaty and promised entry into the League o f Nations. As a whole, the Treaty and its annexes represented a limited progress towards national sovereignty.36 Politically frustrated, National Bloc leaders left for their cottages in the gardens around the towns or for the resorts o f Bludan and Sofar for the summer. Popular attention turned toward the economic sphere. The economic and financial picture in Syria in 1930 was dismal. Real wages were falling in certain trades and unemployment reached new heights, owing to a combination o f factors, not least the continued decline in traditional handicraft industries. Conditions were aggravated by the seasonal nature o f many Syrian industries, the onset o f the world depression which slowed down the construction industry, the institution (52]

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o f new municipal taxes, and the depreciation o f the Turkish m ejidi (silver piece) often used to pay wages. No short-term remedy suggested itself; even a visiting French economic mission could do little more than to note the regrettable state o f general stagnation.17 Consequently, the summer o f 1930 was marked by strikes o f a more purely economic nature. In Hama, where one strike against the depreciation o f Turkish silver had already been conducted at the end o f January, the town closed down completely on 19 June, to protest against a new bread tax. In Aleppo, workers in the traditional sector o f the textile industry went on strike for higher wages at the end o f July. Meanwhile, Damascus was in the midst o f a strike that had begun in mid-July among thousands o f textile workers led by the activist Union o f Weavers. It should be noted, however, that during this period workers’ struggles were regularly ’moderated’ by the unions which included both workers and patrons and were often headed by National Bloc partisans. The dominant position o f foreign - especially French - goods on local markets, supported by low duties, posed a direct challenge to local production and hurt both small producers and workers, whose wages were already very low. By the end o f 1930 the economic picture in Syria was difficult, if not desperate. The political scene, on the other hand, was looking brighter for the French authorities than it did a year previously. Whereas at the end o f 1929 opinion in Syria was almost unanimous that Shaykh Taj and his government should be dismissed, and affirmed the nationalist leaders as the spokesmen o f the Syrian nation, the situation by the end o f 1930 seemed, to a certain extent, to have been reversed. During the summer and autumn o f 1930, Shaykh Taj reshuffled his Cabinet three times, mostly in an attempt to strengthen his - and his government’s - moral authority in the country, in preparation for the elections. During these months the nationalists appeared to be powerless to stir up public opinion against the imposed constitution, or to profitably exploit certain local grievances. They failed in their efforts to send a delegation to Geneva or Paris, mostly for financial reasons, or to attract certain moderates who had been hostile to the Government. The French noted with considerable satisfaction that Hashim al-Atasi, taken up with family difficulties, had rarely taken pan in nationalist deliberations during the autumn; the prestige o f Sa’dallah al-Jabiri had been tarnished by the arrest o f his brother for a crime relating to his family; Dr Kayyali had compromised himself by his relations with the mandatory authorities; Ibrahim Hananu [53]

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and Jam il Mardam were both plagued by money problems and the latter, accused o f (over)moderation by the hard-liners o f the party, had no apparent success as a mediator in his frequent travels between Damascus, Homs and Aleppo.3* The noticeable lull in political activity during autumn and winter 1930 may also have been, in part, related to the enforcement o f a High Commission decree in September which forbade any worker or employee o f the government either to write manifestos or participate in any political gathering, meeting, demonstration etc. The penalty was either the loss o f job or imprisonment or both.39 If the ground, that is their support throughout the nation, appeared to be giving way under their feet, the worst blow that the nationalists suffered was probably the declaration o f unqualified support for France by the PM C and the Council o f the League o f Nations in September 1930: the unqualified approval given by the League to French policies and to the High Commissioner, and the moral authority thereby gained by him, dashed, temporarily at least, all hopes the nationalists had placed in the League. The PM C was, o f course, a kind o f closed shop: although it took (theoretical) note o f petitions from groups o f Syrians, no Syrian personality or official was ever given the opportunity to express themselves in front o f the Commission. And although the League had been both the judge that the nationalists appealed to, and the authority that they now rejected, it was difficult for them to evade the moral and political consequences o f such a declaration.40 By the end o f 1930 the French thought, not for the first nor the last time, that they had the situation well in hand: the nationalists were divided, disorganised and without financial resources; the League had officially approved French policies in the Levant; the Syrian Government had been in power for nearly three years and its experience and authority had grown appreciably; and lastly the pro-Mandatory parties had rallied around the latter. For the French, These trump cards should enable us to play the election game with a reasonable hope of success. The first Syrian parliament must both accept the Constitution as promulgated, and vote a future Treaty. As our prestige and interests are at stake, there must be no possibility that the parliament refuse to vote positively on these two issues. The need to secure a sufficient majority in the Syrian chamber to assure us of success on these two issues will dominate our policies from now on .. /" 154]

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In the New Year 1931» French optimism concerning the weakness o f the nationalists seemed to be confirmed when Hashim al-Atasi and Jam il Mardam declared in separate press interviews that the National Bloc was willing - with regret and some reservations - to accept the High Com m issioners modifications to the constitution and to participate in elections provided that firsdy, the broad outlines o f a treaty be made public beforehand and that secondly, guarantees were made against ‘illicit interference* by Taj’s government and its French patrons. These concessions, however, were not accepted by all Bloc members. There was particularly strong criticism o f Mardam, whose pragmatism now began to distinguish him from his Bloc colleagues. Indeed, it was during this period that Solomiac, in the absence o f Ponsot, met regularly and almost exclusively with Mardam to try and reach an agreement with the National Bloc about election procedures.42 Although the French viewed Faysal and his family as instruments o f British policy hostile to France and its position in the M iddle East, they had been willing in 1925, and again in 1928, to discuss with the King the possibility o f a Hashemite return to Damascus, in order to obtain tactical political gains. (Faysal met Berthelot in November 1925, during the Syrian Revolt: the encounter was pan o f the French diplomatic effort to bring the Revolt to an end. In 1928, Ponsot raised the throne issue, as mentioned in Chapter One, in an effort to weaken the nationalists.) Ponsot may have been impressed by the evolution o f British policies in Iraq, but the Quai d’Orsay never seemed to have had any serious intention o f establishing a monarchy in Syria or o f having a member o f the Hashemite family as Syria’s ruler. In 1930, however, the balance in the French-Iraqi relationship slighdy, but nevertheless perceptibly, changed. This was due, in pan, to an increasingly emancipated Iraqi government, but mainly because France wanted a favourable settlement on the pipeline issue. O il had been discovered in major quantities in Iraq in October 1927 and since then the Iraq Petroleum Company, a multi-national company which was largely controlled by the British, but in which the French had a 23.75 per cent stake, had been involved in complicated negotiations with the Iraq government concerning royalties, production, distribution and other issues.43 For both British and French governments it was not simply a matter o f whose hand would control the oil tap: wider imperial strategic interests were at stake and the greatest obstacle [551

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to the implementation o f French plans for the region were rival British schemes. The British planned to lay a pipeline carrying Iraq’s oil to the Mediterranean, with Haifa serving as its terminal point, and to construct as inexpensively as possible a related railway linking Baghdad to Palestine - and thus also to Egypt. For a change, both British and Iraqi interests coincided. The Iraqis calculated that if the pipeline was routed through French-controlled Syria, it would make the French even more reluctant to leave that country. The Iraqi preference thus combined neatly with the British desire to run the pipeline over British-controlled territory. At the end o f June 1930 the Iraqi government confirmed that it had no intention whatsoever o f revising the IPC’s concession unless the pipeline debouched at Haifa. France, however, wanted Tripoli to serve as a terminal point for the Iraqi pipeline, and planned its own railway connecting Tripoli with Abu Kamel on the Syrian-Iraqi border. Linked to the Iraqi railway system, it would make the proposed Baghdad-H aifa line largely redundant and economically onerous.44 France had good reasons to insist on Tripoli as the terminal for the pipeline: a pan o f Frances oil supply would thus be guaranteed, and economic advantages would accrue to continental France as well as to Syria and Lebanon. Moreover, its efforts to secure a northern terminal for the pipeline relied on one major advantage - it was the shonest and cheapest route. The British and Iraqis suspected, correctly, that the French were trying to use their control o f the Levant coast to develop their strategic position and assets in the whole region.4’ The semi-independent Iraqi government, although acting under British guidance, clearly had some role to play in making the decision for or against a northern alignment. Somehow, the goodwill o f the Iraqi government had to be obtained and M . Lepissier, Frances chargé d’affaires in Baghdad, was instructed to obtain it. A linkage between the oil pipeline and King Faysal’s ambitions in Syria existed; Lepissier’s task was to turn it in the right direction. He did so by initiating a meeting with the King in January 1931, in which he presented the latter (orally) with the combined prospect o f a potential promise-cum-threat: France was once again considering the possibility o f a Syrian throne and the three candidates were Faysal’s brother Ali or two arch rivals, Sharif Ali Haydar or one o f the sons o f Ibn Saud.46 In the same month, Faysal’s eldest brother, ex-King Ali, made a ‘surprise’ three day visit to Beirut and Damascus at Ponsot’s invitation for discussions. No detailed record o f what took [561

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place between Ali and the French during his visit to Beirut on 11-12 January is available, but what is known is that Ponsot arranged for his Chief Press Officer, Maurepas, to meet Ali at the border and to accompany the ex-King everywhere for the next two days.47 Ponsot entertained Ali to dinner at the Residency in Beirut on 11 January (followed by a visit to the theatre together) and to lunch the following day; two weeks later A lis youngest brother, Zayd, received similar hospitality. A lis reception in Damascus, where he made a one-night stopover on his way back to Baghdad, was a low-key affair. No nationalists or government officials called upon him at his hotel, indicating that both the National Bloc and Shaykh Taj were resolutely opposed to a monarchy for Syria.4* In the months following A lis visit, royalists assumed that Ponsot would put Ali on the throne, despite signs to the contrary. But stalwart republicans considered talk o f a monarchy a French diversion to lessen Syrian hostility to the Mandate or an expedient to assist the setdement o f the pipeline problem which would be disavowed as soon as the pipeline matter was resolved. In the event, their analysis proved accurate. Each party manoeuvred delicately to have the other propose a concrete offer. Berthelot, who supervised the negotiations from Paris through Ponsot in Beirut and Lepissier in Baghdad, would at first not go beyond a statement o f willingness to discuss a règlement d'ensemble o f Iraq’s relations with Syria. Faysal tried in vain to seek French clarifications. But nor would he enumerate his own expectations. A month later, however, he saw Lepissier again and expressed his willingness to promise bifurcation at Haditha49and a flow o f 50 per cent o f Mosul’s oil to the Tripoli terminal, provided that the French government gave him ’a moral commitment to take into account, in its policy in the Levant, the legitimate national aspirations common to Syria and Iraq’.40 Berthelots reply was distinctly cautious: he was willing to please the Iraqis on various economic points, but a commitment to the Hashemites concerning the Syrian throne was not forthcoming. All the Quai d’Orsay would do was remove the threat made by Lepissier in January to install a rival family in Damascus.41 The French heaved a sigh o f relief when on 24 March the new IPC convention was signed, including the bifurcation at Haditha. A few weeks later, when the convention came before the Iraqi parliament for ratification, Faysal tried to exert fresh pressure on the French to make a firmer commitment on the Syrian throne issue, to no avail. The French knew that as the convention had also given the British much o f what 157]

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they wanted, the ratification o f the convention including the Haditha bifurcation was not in serious danger. They showed some flexibility, nevertheless, to retain Faysals goodwill. Three issues were defined as outstanding between France and Iraq with regard to Syria. On two o f them, the convening o f an Iraqi-Syrian economic conference and the opening o f an Iraqi consulate in Beirut, the Quai d’Orsay was willing to display magnanimity. Significantly, Ponsot objected to an Iraqi consulate in Beirut, arguing that it would accentuate the uneven pace o f political emancipation in Iraq and the Levant States, but he was overruled by the ministry. The Quai d’Orsay, however, was not willing to make more than cosmetic concessions on the one issue that was really important to Faysal. Its formal position was that Syria now had a republican constitution: all it could offer the Iraqis was the theoretical possibility o f a subsequent constitutional change and a promise not to support the candidacy o f Sharif Ali Haydar or one o f Ibn Saud’s sons. That promise, furthermore, was to be made orally. There would be no written commitment.” Faysal was incensed. He easily saw the sens profond o f the French message and knew that he was powerless to revoke the concessions already made to the French. All he could do was vent his frustration on the French chargé d ’affaires. France’s attitude, he told Lepissier, was a step hostile to the legitimate ambitions o f his family and above all . . . the official expression of the maintenance in Syria of a regime based - it is claimed - on arbitration, which decisively distances the Levant States from any cooperation with [other Arab States].” In the same period articles appeared in the Syrian, Egyptian, Italian and British press, announcing that the French had signed an agreement with Ali, whereby the latter would be enthroned as the King o f Syria. Puzzled French diplomats cabled the Quai d’Orsay requesting clarification. Berthelot’s reply, sent for their personal’ information, left little doubt as to French intentions in the matter: It is essential not to make any categorical public denial to the assertions you refer to because it serves our interests to treat King Faysal indulgently.” While the Syrian throne question generated much euphoria in pro-Hashemite and royalist circles in Damascus, it was more than an [58]

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annoyance to Syrian nationalists and even to some moderates in and out o f government. For one thing, it highlighted divisions within the nationalist movement, both at home and in exile, on the questions o f Syrian independence and pan-Arab unity. At least four overlapping factions could be discerned at this time. Two o f these were committed first and foremost to Syrian independence and paid increasingly less attention to the idea o f Arab unity, particularly o f the Syrian-Iraqi variety. One faction revolved around Jam il Mardam and the moderate wing o f the National Bloc; the other looked to D r Shahbandar and the exiled Abdin wing o f the Syrian-Palestine Congress in Cairo. While the Bloc faction was staunchly republican and was unwilling to tolerate any Hashemite interference in Syrian affairs, the Shahbandarists were, by and large, royalists. The other two nationalist factions were composed o f radical pan-Arabists. They were not so easily distinguished from one another as were the National Bloc and the Shahbandar groupings one was identified with Shukri al-Quwwadi, whom the French had amnestied in July 1930, and the other with Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri, who both remained in exile. Both pan-Arabist factions were devoted to the idea o f Arab unity and, unlike the mainstream o f the National Bloc, were more or less o f the opinion that Syrian independence was not an essential stepping-stone to the achievement o f this larger ambition. Both Arslan and al-Jabiri were interested in bringing about a Syrian-Iraqi union as quickly as possible and advocated consolidating this union by a Hashemite throne. The younger group o f Syrian Istiqlalis, however, led by Shukri al-Quwwadi in Damascus and including members o f the Executive Committee o f the Syrian-Palestine Congress in Cairo, was not well-disposed to the idea o f a theocratic state or a constitutional monarchy in Syria. N or were they particularly enamoured o f the Hashemites, including Faysal. They were, however, as committed as Arslan and Jabiri to the idea o f greater Arab unity, and had cooperated with them to this end.” Yet Faysal did not lose all hope. He took advantage o f a trip to Europe in August 1931 to launch a third round o f negotiations with the French government. Before meeting with Berthelot, he tried to prepare the ground through an old acquaintance, M . Georges Picot, telling him that he intended to discuss Frances plans for Syria’s future regime. Now that France had its oil pipeline to Tripoli, he was trying to entice her with the other strategic asset she desired. He alluded to a personal preference (59)

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for building a railway between Iraq and the Mediterranean across Syrian territory, the projected Baghdad-H aifa line appearing too lengthy and too costly. But the French government did not rise to the bait: it knew better than to corrode the foundations o f an agreement with Britain from which it had so clearly benefited.*6 Nevertheless, the French showed the King much courtesy. M . Reynaud, the minister for the colonies, entertained him at a luncheon in which he toasted Faysal as ‘king o f all the Arabs’ and gave him the impression that he was shordy to be invited to accept the throne o f Syria. The minister, it must be said, had something o f a reputation for his ‘passion for oratory and ill-timed utterances’.*7 According to the King’s understanding o f the talks, France, while wishing to leave the actual choice o f a ruler to the Syrian people, would welcome his return to Syria as King. On returning to Baghdad, he gave the impression to the acting British High Commissioner that the French government had extended an offer o f a Syrian throne, and that the British government was not opposed to such a development. London, in fact, was not at all predisposed to a Syrian-Iraqi confederation or union ruled by Faysal. It was feared that if he divided his time between Iraq and Syria, his already weak position in Baghdad would further deteriorate: the extreme nationalist party there might be tempted to seize power and establish a republic.** Moreover, since the locus o f Faysal’s power and interests was bound to shift in the direction o f Syria, given her higher state o f development and more advanced urban culture, French influence in Syria might eventually threaten or even supplant British influence in Iraq. For these reasons, the British discouraged Faysal from pursuing a Syrian throne. From the French perspective, Faysal had ‘gravely misrepresented’ their attitude to the British. According to Ponsot, the King had interpreted his cordial reception in Paris as an official declaration that France was prepared to accept him as King o f Syria, a construction that was, in Ponsot’s words, ‘entirely fantastic’.*9 Some weeks later the French finally abandoned the ambiguity and subtleties that had served them so well in the preceding months and issued a flat denial. The King felt both cheated and humiliated and an atmosphere o f acrimonious chill’ descended on France’s relations with the Iraqi Hashemites which lasted well beyond Faysal’s death in 1933.60 As a chapter in the diplomatic history o f the interwar M iddle East, the French-Iraqi negotiations are perhaps less significant for their actual impact on the course o f events than for what [60]

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they reveal about the forces and actors themselves. Frances effort to amplify its strategic posture in the M iddle East was largely unsuccessful, and FaysaTs ambition to return to Damascus remained unrealistic in the face o f Frances unyielding opposition to him and to his family. Following the promulgation o f the Syrian constitution in May 1930, Ponsot had initially suggested to Paris that elections be held in Syria that October, only to be overruled by the Quai d’Orsay, who instructed him to postpone elections until the spring o f 1931.61 In early 1931, however, it was Ponsot s turn to recommend to Paris that elections be postponed - and for the same reason: in what he described as the four ’citadels o f nationalism’, namely Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, he could not count on a favourable result. In particular, the delegates were either not up to the job (Homs and Hama) or too recendy arrived (Damascus) to have been able to ’tame’ the nationalist leaders there. Furthermore, Shaykh Taj’s jealousy o f other moderate leaders made it difficult to unite those loyal elements into a group with any prospect o f success against the nationalists.62 While approving the High Commissioner’s suggestion and leaving him free to decide the length o f time necessary to prepare the electoral terrain, Paris informed him that ’he must succeed’ and sent him a package o f recommendations. These included: to appoint, as soon as possible, the personnel who would orientate public opinion. Secondly, to modify the electoral law so that the representatives o f the minorities be elected by the minorities themselves: the Quai d'Orsay was unhappy that such deputies were elected by the Muslim majority, which invariably made them the ‘satellites o f extreme nationalism’. Finally, to prevent Shaykh Taj and his government from campaigning against other personalities who were capable o f leading the moderate lists to victory, such as Subhi Barakat in Aleppo.63 Throughout 1931 - with elections in the air but not announced - the National Bloc led the drive for a republican government in Syria while it discreedy worked to upset FaysaTs project for a Syrian throne. Ironically, its efforts in this direction were indirectly aided by the coalition gpvemment o f Shaykh Taj, adamandy opposed to monarchy and Hashemite interests. The Damascus Bloc, in particular, was committed to a policy o f ‘honourable cooperation’ and wanted to circumvent all issues that might cause a rupture with the French and possibly the cancellation o f elections. In the event, the year 1931 ushered in a wave o f pan-Arab activities. But at the many large rallies in solidarity with different [61]

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Arab and Islamic struggles in the months before the elections, Bloc leaders avoided the limelight: they did not participate actively in demonstrations in late April 1931 in Damascus and Aleppo against Italian atrocities in Libya nor, more surprisingly still, in the ceremony on 6 May to commemorate the hanging o f Syrian leaders by the Turks in 1915-16. The Blocs refusal to assume a pan-Arab programme in Syria became starkly clear when it did not participate in demonstrations in Damascus at the end o f October to commemorate the execution o f the Libyan resistance leader, Umar Mukhtar, on the customary fortieth day. Instead o f Bloc leaders, Sa‘id al-Jaza’iri, a local moderate notable, was at the head o f the tumultuous anti-Italian procession through Damascus. (Jaza’iri was trying to rehabilitate his image in time for the elections: he had been accused, quite accurately, o f having sold some o f his vast landholdings in Palestine to the Zionists.)64 Although Ponsot had, in customary fashion, made no mention o f the possible timing o f elections when he promulgated the constitution in May 1930, French agents had, nevertheless, been silently preparing for them since then. For the Quai d’Orsay, there was to be no question o f a repeat performance o f 1928: Ponsot and his team were commissioned to produce, one way or another, a ‘sincere’ parliament that would ratify a treaty, à la française. So under Ponsot’s watchful eye, Messrs Solomiac in Damascus, Lavastte in Aleppo and Cahour in Homs, with the collaboration o f two Assistant Delegates, M . Durieux in Alexandretta and Colonel Trenga in Dayr al-Zur, pursued a strategy o f continued wear and tear against the National Bloc. The successive adjournments o f the Constituent Assembly and its eventual suspension, Ponsot’s vacillations, his occasionally lenient policies, his temporary closures o f the many newspapers and magazines which had been allowed to publish (or in many cases to reappear) after the Great Revolt, all tended to dull political enthusiasm and to create weariness and discouragement. And by occasionally praising the Bloc for its sincerity and cooperation, the High Commissioner endeavoured, with some success, to ‘soften some o f the nationalist leaders. After five months o f careful planning in Paris and Geneva, Ponsot returned to Beirut on 17 November 1931 with some big surprises for the Syrians. As events were soon to show, his pre-election game-plan was, as the Syrian-Catholic leader Archbishop Tappouni later declared, a coup de maître and caught everyone - moderates, royalists and nationalists - by surprise.6' Following his welcome party, the first one ever attended [62]

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by Syrian nationalists, he went to Damascus, where he received Shaykh Taj on the morning o f 20 November and informed him that his services were no longer needed. Later the same morning, Ponsot communicated three decrees to the press, which, together with an official letter to Taj, embodied his pre-election game-plan. The letter explained the need for the High Com missioner to take direct responsibility for applying the Mandate Act, announced the end o f the provisional regime, the coming into force o f the constitution, the holding o f free elections before the end o f January 1932 and an appeal to all those o f goodwill to participate in the venture. By the first decree Ponsot established a Consultative Council, whose purpose was to advise him on the application o f the constitution. The second decree put the business o f government in the hands o f a Secretary-General and the remaining members o f Taj’s cabinet - minus Jamil al-Ulshi, the Minister o f the Interior, who, together with Taj, was sent upstairs’ to join the Consultative Council. Finally, Ponsot assumed the functions o f the Chief o f State himself for the purpose o f the elections without, however, specifying exactly when they would take place.66 The National Bloc was patently caught o ff guard by the speed o f Ponsot’s actions and was unsure what attitude to take. Although it was happy to see the last o f Taj and Ulshi, it complained that a major stumbling block to the holding o f genuinely free elections remained: most ofT aj’s ministers and the whole gpvernment apparatus, liberally sprinkled with Taj’s nominees, was still firmly in place. The High Commissioner may have announced free elections in his letter to Taj, but from the nationalist perspective, if the previous experiences o f 1926 and 1928 were to be relied upon, the French definition o f ’free’ elections simply meant that the puppet government would be given the exclusive freedom to rig them, backed up folly by the Mandatory power. Furthermore, o f the eleven eminent personalities’ that Ponsot had invited to join the Consultative Council, ten were pro-French collaborators. The only Bloc member invited to join the Council was Hashim al-Atasi, in his capacity as the ex-President o f the Constituent Assembly/’7 As for the appointment o f a Secretary-General, there was apprehension that it would merely disguise direct and autocratic government by the High Com mission, and that the chief role in the Secretariat would be played by a French official. These fears were partly allayed by the appointment o f Tawfiq al-Hayani, at the time the m utasarrifo f the Hawran. Hayani, a member (63]

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o f a prominent landowning, bureaucratic family o f Aleppo, had served in various posts in the Ottoman provincial administration and had a reputation as fair, honest and capable. Although he had no definable political leanings, he was thought in some circles to be secretly sympathetic to the National Bloc.6* Ponsot s game-plan, so carefully shaped over many months in Paris in conjunction with the highly experienced, professional diplomats o f the Quai d’Orsay, revealed itself in stages in the weeks that followed. Ponsot had anticipated just about all possible eventualities - as the nationalists ruefully admitted later. Following the announcements o f 20 November, the nationalists tried to draw Ponsot into talks, in the hope o f eliciting guarantees from the High Commissioner, in return for participating in the elections. But Ponsot was not to be drawn; he refused all requests to meet nationalist emissaries, who were referred by High Commission staff to the published decrees and to the High Com m issioners declarations in Geneva.69 An acrimonious Nationalist Congress, held in Damascus between 25 November and 2 December, revolved around the debate between those who favoured participation, namely Atasi, Mardam and others, and those who advocated boycotting the whole ‘fraudulent’ proceedings. The participationists argued that the elections, however unfair they were, marked the beginning o f decisive events in the history o f Syria and that Syrian and international public opinion would be unsympathetic to a nationalist decision to boycott the elections, which in turn would allow pro-French collaborators to exercise power for four years. The hard-liners, essentially the Aleppo Bloc, argued that ‘it would be imprudent to throw ourselves into the sea, without the guaranteed presence o f a lifeboat at hand.’70 Ponsot remained officially mute, but let it be known that as the National Bloc along with all the other groups was represented in the Consultative Council, the latter would be the correct forum for negotiation and for requesting guarantees as to the liberty o f the elections and other issues. The Council, in fact, had no authority, its official role was defined by the High Commissioner as ‘advisory’ and as Atasi, the one Bloc member, knew well, any complaints that he raised in such a ‘loaded’ gathering would be quite ineffective. At the end o f the Congress, the nationalists, unable to agree whether to participate or not, but determined to keep up a public front o f unity, decided to postpone their decision until the High Commissioner [64]

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had made his position dear on certain key issues.71 Refused an interview with the High Commissioner, Atasi spelled out his demands in a letten he complained that the Syrian people still had no idea o f what the French actually meant when they spoke about a treaty, or o f ultimate French intentions concerning the unity o f Syria. He requested a general amnesty for those patriots still in exile, so they could participate in the future o f the country, modifications to the unjust electoral law, the dismissal o f certain functionaries and the control o f the voting stations by all candidates, not just the local (i.e., pro-French) functionaries.72 Ponsot, o f course, had been waiting for this nationalist manoeuvre. To outflank it, he played the next card in his game-plan: calling a meeting o f the Consultative Council, he placed Atasi in a moral and political dilemma, as to whether or not to take his place in the Council. To participate in the Consultative Council would be to implicitly recognise the Constitution o f 14 May 1930, including Article 116, to commit him self to a policy o f cooperation and to participate in the elections with all the risks that it involved for him and his friends, given they had received no guarantees at all from the High Commissioner. On the other hand, to refuse would be to put him self in a difficult position vis-à-vis the High Commissioner; it would signal a return to a ‘negative’ policy, o f which public opinion was weary. Furthermore, if the nationalists finally decided to boycott the elections, not only would it condemn Atasi to remain out o f power for perhaps as long as four years, it would place the nationalists in an awkward position concerning Geneva: the French would claim that the extremists had boycotted the elections because they feared putting their proclaimed popularity to the test.72 In the end, Atasi sent a brief note to the High Commissioner declining his invitation. As the nationalists suspected, the meeting o f the Consultative Council on 7 December was more in the nature o f a High Commission announcement than a consultation. Ponsot opened the session with a declaration repeating French promises to negotiate a treaty with a regularly constituted Syrian government, without going into any details at all. He indicated that all other issues being discussed in the newspapers were not on the agenda, and in particular rejected the Bloc’s demand that the broad outlines o f a treaty be spelled out before the elections and its proposal that the electoral law, with all its admitted imperfections, be modified at so late a date.74 He concluded by announcing a number o f [65]

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decrees concerning the elections, and in particular, the opening o f the electoral period on 8 December, the first round taking place on 20 December and the second round on 5 January 1932. After Council members had murmured their assent and asked a few perfunctory questions, the High Commissioner closed the meeting by thanking them for the spirit in which the debate had taken place. Following the meeting Solomiac handed out the High Commissioners declaration to journalists; Ponsot himself declined to be interviewed. None o f the nationalist demands had been clarified at the meeting. It was a polite brush-off. The first meeting o f the Council was also the last: perhaps the High Commissioner considered that he needed no further advice from the eminent personalities and that the Council had served its real purpose, i.e. to outflank nationalist demands for guarantees concerning participation - to provide a cover for what was, in fact, direct control by the French and the local government o f the elections. By announcing the election dates, Ponsot raised the hurdle a notch higher for the nationalists. It took two days o f intense debate within nationalist circles before the High Commissioner achieved his immediate objective: on 10 December, a nationalist manifesto in the press, signed by Hashim al-Atasi, announced that . . . in spite of the silence surrounding the nations demands and its desire to achieve its unity, in spite of the fret that a large number of Syrians are in exile and are not allowed to return home, and in spite of the numerous and acknowledged fruits in the electoral law and its powerlessness to guarantee peoples rights, and finally in spite of the maintenance of the present administration which casts a grave doubt on the freedom of elections . . . we feel that our patriotic duty prohibits us from abandoning the field of battle in the delicate circumstances that our nation is going through, and on which its long term future depends.” The appearance o f the above effectively marked the opening o f the electoral campaign. The nationalists had again been dragged, struggling, into elections on Ponsots terms. His election plans remained on track and he was not displeased: The result of all this is that the nationalists are going to participate in the elections without having received any guarantees whatsoever, having publicly declared the opposite...* 166]

F r a n c e ’s

imposition

of a c o n s t i t u t i o n

1930

The High Commission employed a mixture o f heavy-handed and subtle methods to control the elections. In Damascus and Aleppo, for instance, the authorities kept nationalist candidates under surveillance until election day, certain newspapers and magazines supporting nationalist candidates were suppressed and several editors, intimidated by security agents, refused to publish nationalist manifestos and declarations. The ‘responsible’ press, on the other hand, headed by Sha‘banis newspaper, al-Ahali, was given full rein and savagely attacked the nationalists for their crimes, misdeeds and political immaturity.77 Among the more subde methods employed by the High Commission were the reapportionment o f electoral districts and the reshuffling o f deputies. For example, the turbulent anti-French Maydan quarter o f Damascus, which returned some 170 electors in the 1928 elections, was suddenly discovered to have a much smaller population than previously reported. Consequendy, it was allowed to elect only 140 electors in the primaries.7* In similar vein, the Greek-Catholic community o f Damascus had, to the dismay o f the High Commission, voted in a nationalist candidate in 1928. On 2 December, at an election planning session in Beirut, M . Chauvel had asked Archbishop Tappouni whether or not the Greek-Catholic seat should be transferred to Aleppo. According to Tappouni, Selim Jam ban, the Greek-Catholic Aleppine notable, would be an ideal candidate, but that everything depended on the quality o f the eventual Greek-Catholic candidate in Damascus. If the latter was sure to succeed, better to leave it. If however, the result was in doubt, or the candidate insincere, better to give the seat to Aleppo.79 Ponsot took no chances. Among the election decrees announced at the end o f the Consultative Council meeting three days later, was one transferring the Greek-Catholic seat from Damascus to Aleppo. The reason, the High Commissioner explained to the Council, was not political, but simply an administrative one, based on the figures obtained following a revision o f the electoral lists, which revealed a greater number o f Greek Catholics in Aleppo than in Damascus.*0 The first-round elections were hody contested. In the capital, four political fictions competed. Shaykh Taj and his followers, the moderate and republican Reform Party (Hizb al-Islah) o f Haqqi al-Azm, the monarchists led by Rida Pasha al-Rikabi, and the National Bloc. One week before the primaries, the French managed to form a loose coalition o f the three other factions to stand against the Bloc. Their list included (671

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Taj, Haqqi al-Azm, Rikabi, Badi al-Mu’ayyad, who had been working closely with M . Solomiac to promote pro-French candidates, and Nasib al-Bakri. Yet, even before election day, nationalist complaints against the interference o f police and other government agents electrified the political atmosphere, leading to gang wars between supporters o f Taj and the Nationalist Youth (al-Shabab al-Watani). The Chief o f Police, Bahij al-Khatib, and the Acting Governor o f Damascus, Wathiq al-Mu’ayyad, were keen supporters o f Taj. In blatant pre-election manoeuvres they had, over the previous month, packed local security forces with their personal henchmen and dismissed regular police without explanation. The Nationalist Youth, formed in 1929 from high school and university students, was motivated by Fakhri al-Barudi." On election morning, the government unveiled its plan for rigging the voting. The moment the voting booth opened in the Qaymariyya quarter, where Taj and Jamil al-Ulshi were candidates, voters were forcibly turned away by police and gendarmes. Then, paid agents protected by local security forces appeared, stuffed the boxes with papers carrying the names o f electors chosen by the government, and quickly disappeared. No doubt their task was made easier by the fact that not one o f the dozens o f officials controlling the voting in Damascus was a nationalist. When nationalist leaders later appeared and tried to inspect the boxes they were told that this had already been done. They immediately called for a total boycott o f the fraudulent elections, which qabadayat (toughies) and the Nationalist Youth promptly enforced. Fighting broke out all over the city. In al-Qanawat, Zaki al-Khatib, one o f the Bloc candidates, insisted on remaining at the polling station to discourage voters from casting their ballots. But Wathiq al-Mu’ayyad ordered the police to throw him out. Khatib then delivered an impromptu speech which sparked a large and increasingly violent march on Merje square and government headquarters. In the square, demonstrators, many o f them students, pelted the police with stones, who responded in kind and then opened fire into the crowd. This last incident brought the French Army into the streets. Solomiac announced the suspension o f the elections in Damascus, tanks occupied strategic points in the city and a curfew was imposed.'2 Five persons were killed and 50 injured in the rioting. The following day large crowds congregated at the Umayyad Mosque to hear nationalist leaders attack Shaykh Taj and his accomplices. The possibility o f renewed violence, however, dissipated under the judicious policing o f the Nationalist 168]

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Youth, commanded by Fakhri al-Barudi.'3 By contrast, elections in the rural areas adjacent to Damascus went smoothly in all but one district, Duma, where the Army was obliged to intervene. In most constituencies the terrain had been suitably prepared over many months by French agents and there was thus only one candidate to choose from. As the nationalist newspaper, al-N ida, had commented some two weeks previously: In spite of all that is said, the future deputies have already been chosen and in the qadhas we can consider that the elections are, in fact, already over. There only remain the official formalities to go through.*4 The primaries in Hama produced scenes analogous to those in Damascus and Duma. There, the political situation was very much tied to the growth o f an active but illegal trade union movement and to the group o f young, middle-class intellectuals and professionals who had helped to inspire it. The patron and major personality o f the union movement was Nawras al-Kaylani, a locally educated aristocrat and religious leader, who, aided by Abd al-Hamid Qumbaz, a 34-year-old pharmacist, had formed 21 unions in Hama, between 1928 and 1931. By the end o f 1930, a Higher Council o f Trade Unions had been established, incorporating 20 o f these unions and presided over by Qumbaz.” In the face o f the usual electioneering fraud engineered by the French, and in this case the local Service des Renseignements officer, Captain Chiaroni, Qumbaz convinced the Higher Council o f Trade Unions to call for a complete boycott o f the primaries. Chiaroni had, in fact, tacdessly stuffed the voting boxes so full that when the polling station opened and electors arrived, no further papers could be forced into the boxes.*6The nationalist candidate, Shishakli, and Ra’if al-Mulqi, who headed the local branch o f the Nationalist Youth, immediately brought the latter on to the streets, which led to violent clashes between protesters and the gendarmerie in which four townsmen were killed. The Trade Union Council maintained the boycott for two more days and singled out merchants suspected o f voting against the nationalist list. The elections were suspended. Homs and Aleppo were the only nationalist centres in Syria that managed to complete both the primary and second-round elections on schedule. However, the conditions in each were radically different. In Homs, the political fief o f Hashim al-Atasi, the National Bloc list won

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

easily. The popularity o f Atasi was so preponderant that the French admitted - in private - that it did not seem possible to effectively attack it.'7 Joining Atasi in parliament were two other Bloc partisans, Mazhar Raslan and Rafiq al-Husayni. In Aleppo, where the National Bloc had won all ten seats in the Constituent Assembly in 1928, the government list surprisingly defeated the Bloc, winning all ten seats in a bitterly fought contest. Since 1927, Ponsot’s perennial dilemma had been simple to define but difficult to solve: how to produce a united bloc o f moderates in parliament who could effectively outflank the nationalists. Given the popularity o f the nationalists in Damascus, and the overwhelming Muslim population there, it was patently obvious that only in and around the Aleppo region o f Northern Syria could a substantial bloc o f moderates be produced. This northern region, with its mostly rural, i.e. safe, constituencies, combined with the town o f Aleppo, with its substantial non-Muslim population, sent 30 deputies to parliament, out o f a total o f 69. Aleppo thus became the keystone in Ponsot’s electoral strategy: the nationalists had to be defeated there, and Lavastre was instructed to use all means necessary to produce the required result. In Aleppo, where Christians constituted 35 per cent o f the popula­ tion, a significant fraction o f the Christian business classes was generally ill-disposed to the aims o f Syrian-Arab nationalism, which directly threatened its material interests. Already by the summer o f 1931, long before the announcement o f any elections, a Committee for the Defence o f Minority Rights had been established in Aleppo, with the blessing and encouragement o f the Delegation. Aware o f the danger o f multiple candidatures among the Christian communities, it sought to establish a united list, which would have the support o f all two hundred Christian voters, and to form an alliance with ‘liberal’ M uslim s." The committees work was reinforced by discreet but effective campaigning by Archbishop Tappouni and other Christian leaders, who were informed by High Commission officials that France will side with the minorities in Syria, but they must prove their loyalty to the Mandatory Power; the occasion has now come to prove that loyalty.1*’ M. Lavastre’s task o f winning over the Christian vote by playing on fears o f religious persecution was made easier by the Aleppo Bloc’s rather [70]

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complacent attitude towards the Christian vote, which it all but ignored. According to Lavastre, Christians would be consigned to a ‘sea o f islam’, if they did not vote correctly in the elections. Indeed, for many Christians the major political struggle in Syria continued to be expressed in terms o f cross versus crescent’ rather than in terms o f European domination versus national independence.90 From the brazen tone that seemed to permeate Lavastre’s reports to Beirut during this period, he seemed to relish his allotted task and pulled out all the stops: political meetings were banned, newspaper editors menaced, nationalist candidates harassed and their homes put under 24-hour police surveillance.91 The moderates’ clean sweep was largely achieved, however, by the interaction o f three factors. First, Lavastre managed, with considerable difficulty, to mould two loosely-knit coalitions o f rival notables into a single political group which came to be known as the ‘Liberal Constitutionalists’. Its leaders were Subhi Barakat and the 62-year-old Shakir N im at al-Sha‘bani (the publisher o f the al-Ahali newspaper). Although their programme called for Syrian unity and independence to be consecrated in a treaty with France and by admission into the League o f Nations - standard platforms for all parties in Syria in the early thirties - the Liberal Constitutionalists worked completely hand-in-glove with the High Commission. Second, Lavastre made no effort to prevent the Liberal Constitutionalists, in collusion with the local government, from stuffing ballot boxes in the primaries with the names o f Aleppines who had long been deceased.9*' Third, the Christian bloc o f voters elected in the first round, with a kind o f Lavastre-Tappouni three-line whip operating from the wings, do seem to have voted en masse for the Barakat-Sha‘bani list in the second. The National Bloc was not oblivious to the fraudulent procedures which characterised the ‘free’ elections in Aleppo. However, disturbances around the polling stations were quickly dealt with by the police and gendarmerie, who were under strict orders from the Delegate. And with Ibrahim Hananu ill and confined to his bed, the nationalists seemed unable to take charge and organise a boycott. By the evening o f 20 December, the Bloc had been stung by the first-round results. O f the several hundred individuals nominated to elect Aleppo’s future parliamentarians, the majority were committed to the Barakat-Sha‘bani list. Disturbances continued for the next few days, reaching a climax on 25 December. Just after noon prayers on Friday, an enormous crowd [71]

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burst out o f the Great Mosque into the main arteries and converged on Lavastres headquarters in the town centre. But the French Army, on alert, charged the crowd and broke it up. One demonstrator was killed and several dozen arrested, including Sadailah al-Jabiri, a nationalist candidate. The High Commissioner refused all nationalist demands that the first-round elections be cancelled there; the moderates had the upper hand and Ponsot wanted to consolidate their first-round victory in the second round.93 The question o f resuming elections in Damascus and Hama was more complicated. In Damascus the disturbances o f 20 December were directed largely against Shaykh Taj and two o f his protégés, Wathiq al-Mu ayyad, the Acting Governor o f the city, and Bahij al-Khatib, the Chief o f Police, who had rigged the voting in order to favour the pres­ idential plans o f the former Prime Minister. The immediate resumption o f elections, which would only have been possible with the use o f a considerable number o f troops to maintain law and order, would have been represented as a French operation o f force, for the benefit o f the manifestly unpopular Taj and his faction. The French feared that such an operation could lead to new disturbances or, as in 1926, to a near total boycott, something which they wanted to avoid. So Ponsot decided to postpone the Damascus, Hama and Duma elections until after Ramadan, which started on 10 January.94 On 31 December, Hashim al-Atasi, in his capacity as a member o f the Consultative Council, was granted a meeting with Ponsot, where he requested the cancellation o f all the elections, including those in Aleppo. The High Commissioner had no intention o f cancelling any elections, particularly those o f Aleppo, where the prospects were shining brighdy for a moderate victory. At the same time, he wanted to avoid a nationalist boycott o f the second round in Aleppo, which would have meant that ‘the fruit o f many months o f preparation would have been lost’.93 So a little sugar followed his salty refusal. He referred Atasi to Articles 57 and 58 o f the electoral law, which in effect rendered illegal the cancellation o f elections in the middle o f the electoral process, and informed the nationalist leader that if the authorities were constrained to cancel the Aleppo elections, it would mean the cancellation o f the entire Syrian elections, which would be postponed sine die. Atasi would then be held responsible, in Geneva as well as in Syria and France, for the interruption o f the normal development o f the Mandatory powers liberal policies in (721

F r a nc e ’ s i mposi ti on of a c ons t i t ut i on 1930 Comparative study of Aleppo election results April 1928

tea i»a«Lu>al«at

D m a k t 1931/ i m m i ? 1932

J

Ibrahim Hananu Sa'dallah al-Jabiri Abd al-Rahman Kayyali Shaykh Abd al-Qadir Scrmini Ahmad Rifai

280 233 289 241 289

Subhi Bey Barakat Ghaleb Bey Kataraghassi Shakir Ni'mat aJ-Sha‘bani Nourri Moudarres Ncssim Koudsi

310 293 290 283 280

Nicolas Djandji Mihran Bozantian

270 402

Nicolas Djandji H radje Papazian

293 285

Armenian-Catholic

Ai— ian-Cubolic Fathallah Assioun

299

Louis Hindi

273

Gmk-Catholk

Sjfrita-OrAodn 278

Georges Azar

Selim Jamban

2%

Syrian-Catholic

Sjrriaa-Catholic 289

Larif Ghanimc

Latif Ghanime

299

Defeated nationalist list 1931/32

Defeated moderate list in April 1928 not found in archives

Abd al-Rahman Kayyali Ibrahim Hananu Sa'dallah al-Jabiri Khalil Moudarris Shaykh Abd al-Qadir Sermini

196 189 170 166 154

Mihran Bozantian Vahan Smerdjibachian

180 180

Armenian-Catholic Fathallah Assioun

182

Gmck-Catholic Nicolas Mcgarbane

171

Syrian-Catholic Edmond Rabbath 50.341 18.416 36

Registered voters Votes cast Percentage (approx) Government list, % o f vote Nationalist list. % o f vote

41.3 58.7

Registered voters Votes cast Percentage (approx.) Government list, % of vote Nationalist list. % o f vote

174 49.897 18.661 37 61.9 37.6

Swiag to G o m m M litt ia 1931/1932 clccrio— 20.6%

Sources: CAD N/B, vols. 467, 398 (December 1931/January 1932 results); CADN/B, vol. 466 and MAE/SL, vol. 480, p. 247 (April 1928).

1731

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

Syria. As for concessions» Ponsot accepted Atasi’s request that the nationalist candidates in Aleppo who had been arrested and jailed by M. Lavastre would be freed in time to participate in the second round, and that, as a special favour’, two nationalists could be present as observers’ in one o f the polling stations in Aleppo during the voting operations.96 It was the authorities’ acceptance o f this second request that decided the nationalists to participate in the second round. That decision, only taken on the evening before the second round, was motivated by the conviction that the concessions would be enough to assure them o f winning half the seats in Aleppo.97 The Aleppine nationalists seem to have been singularly overoptimistic about their chances at this stage. They probably did not appreciate the strength o f the three-line whip that the Christian and Jewish delegates were subject to, from Delegation officials and religious leaders. Ponsot certainly would not have agreed to allow two nationalist observers if there was any possibility o f it affecting the results at that stage. Too much was at stake. On 5 January 1932, the final round o f elections was held amidst intense security precautions, especially in Aleppo, which resembled a garrison town. But trouble never materialised. When it became evident in Aleppo that there was no chance o f defeating the government list, Sadailah al-Jabiri, under instructions from the convalescing Ibrahim Hananu, withdrew the National Bloc list. It was a remarkable, if questionable victory by the moderates. Longrigg, writing before the French archives became accessible, states that in the Aleppo elections ‘fortune did not favour the more extreme party, that o f Hananu and the Jabiris . . .’ Indeed it did not.91 The Quai d’Orsay, in an official five-page report on the Syrian elections that it sent to thirty-six French Consuls worldwide, maintained a fiction o f French neutrality: In accordance with formal assurances given by the High Commis­ sioner, Mandate officials scrupulously abstained fromany interference in electoral battles. Their action was limited to taking some measures necessary to maintain public order and to guarantee that voting procedures were free and correct.” The Consuls would have received a more stimulating analysis o f the affair, and certainly a less fictional account, if they had read the letter [74]

F r a n c k ’ s i m p o s i t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n 1930

sent to Pierre Alype, the head o f the Levant Office in Paris, by M. Roux, one o f Ponsot s inner team in Beirut: Lavastre has done a good job in Aleppo. I was there myself for a certain time and I saw him at work. His task wasn’t that simple. On one side, Hananu, who is genuinely popular, combined with a substantial muslim population. On the other: the moderates, often embarrassed, nearlyall timid, and the memories of 1928 which weigh heavily. To unite the moderates, make the Christians into a bloc, chase away their fears and galvanise them enough so that they would not lose heart and flee at the last moment: such was the goal to be achieved. To do it needed infinite patience, constant diplomacy and faultless determination. Lavastre had these qualities; I saw them at work and he merited his success . . . it seems that we now have an important trump card [a bloc of northern moderates] in our hands.10“ Ponsot was delighted at the results; o f the 53 deputies elected by 6 January, some 48 were moderates. Most important o f all for the High Commissioner, the sweeping success o f the moderates in Aleppo meant that, together with the moderates from the neighbouring sanjaq o f Alexandretta, a pro-Mandatory bloc o f 29 deputies had been achieved.101 Lavastre s policy o f confronting the Aleppo Bloc head on was clearly a success. In a rare expression o f appreciation, the Secretary-General o f the Quai d’Orsay wrote to Lavastre and his team, thanking them for the ‘intelligence, tact and firmness’ that they had shown in carrying out the High Commissioner’s instructions during the electoral campaign.102 Solomiac, on the other hand, who took a more flexible approach to the nationalists, was sharply criticised by the military brass for his failure to carry the primaries o f 20 December by force.10* Such criticism was largely unjustified. Ponsot s basic strategy in Damascus since 1928 had been to ‘tame’ the Damascus bloc, by a judicious mixture o f cajolery and coercion; Solomiac’s election preparations were a logical continuation o f that strategy. It was only the presence o f a substantial non-Muslim population in Aleppo that gave Lavastre the opportunity to confront the Aleppo Bloc head on with any chance o f success. By the beginning o f February, with Aleppo and Damascus still simmering, nationalist newspapers continuing to poison public opinion - according to the French - with their attacks on the fraudulent elections, 175]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

and crucial elections in Damascus and Hama coming up, the High Commissioner decided that sterner measures were required. He had already - on 18 January - suspended the nationalist daily al-Yom (Damascus) because its tone ‘had reached an intolerable pitch’.104 In an unusually harsh decree, suitably entided ‘Répression des Infractions de nature à troubler l’ordre public’, Ponsot announced stiff penalties and long terms o f imprisonment for the slightest disturbance o f public order; ‘seditious discourse, be it in speeches, songs or shouting in the street’ became illegal and unauthorised political meetings were prohibited.105 Although French officials maintained that all ‘fauteurs de troubles’ would be dealt with equally, irrespective o f party, the decree was unambiguously aimed at stifling the nationalist campaign. Ponsot did not intend to have his election plans upset a second time.106 M . Berthelot, with unhappy memories o f 1928, advised Ponsot to resume elections without delay because he feared - as did the High Commissioner - that the continuing nationalist agitation would soon unsettle the moderate deputies and thus make treaty negotiations difficult. The Secretary-General now favoured the conclusion o f a Franco-Syrian treaty as soon as was reasonably possible. He had his sights set on September 1932, when Iraq was due to be received into the League o f Nations as a full member. It would strengthen the French Government’s position in Geneva if it had reached an agreement with a Syrian gov­ ernment before Iraq’s independence was consecrated in Geneva and Britain’s liberalism so openly demonstrated.107 In spite o f opposition from Hananu and Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri, secret negotiations re-started in mid-February between Solomiac and some o f the Damascus nationalists, who took it for granted that the local government would never give up its customary practices, which had enabled it to win some o f the Damascus seats in 1928. So the only route to parliament, i.e. to power, was to reach some kind o f accommodation with the authorities. Jamil Mardam, regarded by the French as a highly intelligent ‘eel’,10* suggested to Solomiac the formation o f a mixed moderate/nationalist list, to be agreed by both parties in advance. Solomiac, in fact, was quite keen on the proposal, partly because it would bring about a ‘détente’ in the city, but mostly because it would enable us to get some moderate deputies elected in Damascus, where the nationalists are assured of total success.109 [76]

F r a n c e ’ s i m p o s i t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n 1930

No wonder the delegate favoured negotiating a mixed list!110 Five weeks o f secret talks ensued before a (verbal) deal was struck: elections would be free if the nationalists guaranteed not to present more than six candidates for the nine contested seats, the remainder being reserved for three moderates, to be chosen by Solomiac. After a long struggle with the leaders o f the National Bloc in Aleppo, M aidam s compromise solution prevailed. On 30 March primaries were held as scheduled in Damascus, Duma and Hama. Solomiac held up his end o f the bargain and on 5 April the second-round elections passed o ff peacefully.1" In Damascus, the six National Bloc candidates headed by Jamil Mardam won convincingly. However, only two o f the three candidates whom the High Commission hoped to see elected managed to secure the necessary majority o f votes: Muhammad Ali al-Abid and Haqqi al-Azm. Solom iacs favourite candidate, Rida al-Rikabi, was placed second behind Nasib al-Bakri on the list o f those who had failed to gain a majority. On 9 April, Bakri, supported by the Bloc, won a special run-off election for the remaining seat by a large margin.112 Shaykh Taj, who had been told by Ponsot not to bother to enter his name, suffered a humiliating defeat. The moderate wing o f the National Bloc, under Jamil Mardam’s guidance, had scored an important victory. In Hama, all three seats were won by nationalist candidates, which raised the number o f avowed nationalist deputies to 14, out o f a total o f 69.113 Mardam was confident that the vast majorities o f deputies, being 'non-entities’ from rural constituencies, could be swung round to the nationalist perspective, at least on controversial issues, as had happened in the Constituent Assembly. Ironically, one Quai d’Orsay report displayed no less confidence than Mardam in the future success o f its policies: . . . the essential characteristic of this election is a massive majority which, compared to its predecessor of 1928, is coherent and disciplined, held well in hand by energetic leaders and alreadydecided to work in the direction of practical projects, leaving aside the sterile fantasies of the extremists.' '* In the months to come such optimism - on both sides - was to be severely tested.

[771

F r e n c h I mp e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 N o tes

1 MAE/SL, vol. 227, p. 235. 2 Source material on the French background in the Levant is often polemical. See in particular R. Ristelhueber, Traditions fia n faises au U ban , Paru, Alcan, 1918; Charles François-Roux, France et chrétiens dorien t, Paris, Flammarion, 1939; Abdallah Sfer Pasha, Le M andate fran çais et les traditions françaises en Syrie et au U ban , Paris, Plon, 1922; André Bruneau, Traditions et politique de la France au Levant, Paris, Alcan, 1932; R.J.M. Cressaty, ‘Le Rattachement de la Syrie à la France’, Bulletin de la Société de Géographie et d ’E tudes Coloniales de M arseilles, Marseilles, tome XI (1917); J.P. Spagnolo, ‘French Influence in Syria prior to World War I: The Functional Weakness oflmperialism’, The M iddle E ast Jou rn al, vol. 23, no. 1 (1969); William I. Shorrock, ‘The Origin o f the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon: The Railroad Question, 1901-1914’, InternationalJo u rn al o f M iddle E ast Studies, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 133-53. A useful study o f French imperial policy between 1914 and 1924 is C. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The C lim ax o f French Im perial Expansion 1914-1924, London, Thames and Hudson, 1981. 3 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, op. cit., p. 26. 4 Private papers o f Robert de Caix, dated 28 February 1921, quoted in Gérard Khoury, ‘Le Démembrement de l’empire ottoman: question d’orient ou d’occident?*, Les Nouvelles Questions d ’o rient, Paris, Hachette, 1991, p. 28. 5 MAE/SL, vol. 227, pp. 165-6. 6 Le D abbour, Beirut, 23 February 1929. See CAD N/B, vol. 465. 7 CADN/B, Damascus, 7 February 1929, vol. 465. 8 Le Temps, 9 February 1929; MAE/SL, vol. 227, p. 121. 9 See especially G aulois, 10 February 1929 which, under the headline ‘Nos erreurs en Syrie’, speaks o f ‘ . . . les exigences absurdes d’une Assemblée de politiciens incapables, dominée par quelques ambitieux sans expérience gouvernementale. . . ’ in CADN/B, vol. 465. 10 L ’H um anité, 11 February 1929; CADN/B, vol. 465. 11 The Shahbandar/Lutfàllah wing o f the same committee merely sent the nationalists a lukewarm message o f support. MAE/SL, vol. 227, p. 141. 12 Ibid., pp. 146-7. 13 MAE/SL, vol. 206, p. 57. 14 In September 1929 the British government announced its intention to support Iraq’s admission to the League o f Nations in 1932, and to negotiate a new treaty recognising Iraq’s independence. See Peter Sluglett, B ritain in Iraq 1 9 1 4-1932, London, Ithaca Press, 1976, pp. 169-70. 15 MAE/SL, Ponsot to Berthelot, 19 December 1929, vol. 227, pp. 275-6. 16 Ibid., pp. 293-4. 17 MAE/SL, vol. 478, p. 70. 18 MAE/SL, ‘Confidential Note on the Political Situation in Syria’ (High Commission report), Beirut, 20 February 1930, vol. 227, pp. 236-7. 19 MAE/SL, vol. 477, pp. 241-2. 20 Ibid., p.245.

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F r a n c k ' s i m p o s i t i o n ok a c o n s t i t u t i o n 1930 21 Ibid., p.248. 22 Haqqi Bey was a ‘weak character o f mediocre intelligence’, the Damad a ‘nonchalant if courteous gentleman with narrow political views and without administrative experience’. MAE/SL, ‘Confidential note’, 20 February 1930, vol. 227, p. 253. 23 MAE/SL, ‘Note’, Paris, 20 March 1930, vol. 478, p. 41. Note written by de Caix, commenting on Ponsot’s proposals and suggesting that the Department approve them, with some very minor modifications. 24 MAE/SL, Ponsot to Briand, 8 December 1929, vol. 227, pp. 230-7. 25 MAE/SL, vol. 477, pp. 185-8. 26 MAE/SL, vol. 478, pp. 68-71. 27 Ibid., pp. 66-7. 28 MAE/SL, Ponsot to Paris, 25 January 1930, vol. 477, p. 99. 29 MAE/SL, Ponsot to Paris, 29 May 1930, vol. 479. 30 Le Journ aliste Errant, n. d. CADN/B, Beirut, 26 May 1930, vol. 468. 31 MAE/SL, vol. 479, pp. 36-7. 32 Ibid., p. 38. A detailed comparative study o f the two constitutions reveals that Articles 2, 8, 17, 24, 25, 35, 41, 60, 68, 108 and 115 had been changed. Article 41 is a particularly interesting example: 'Les élections se font à deux degrés au scrutin de liste; chaque candidat pourra surveiller ou charger de surveiller pour lui les opérations électorales des deux degrés’. Ponsot changed it to ‘Le mode de scrutin est déterminé par la loi. Tout candidat a le droit de participer au contrôle des opérations électorales dans les conditions prévues par la loi’. The fact was that the electoral law in force did not allow nationalists to have any kind o f surveillance o f what happened in the polling stations, which were in the hands o f the ‘local authorities’, i.e., in pro-mandatory hands. Overall, Ponsot was distinctly less than candid in maintaining that the 1928 Constitution had been only slighdy modified. The June 1928 Constitution, as approved by the Assembly, is to be found in MAE/SL, vol. 226, pp. 91-115. The six decrees promulgated by Ponsot on 14 May 1930, including the Syrian Constitution, are in CAD N/B, vol. 467. 33 CAD N/B, ‘Information’, Aleppo, 11 June 1930. Speech by Ibrahim Hananu. 34 For the French version o f events, see CAD N/B, Ponsot to Paris, 12 June 1930, vol. 468; ibid., ‘Service des Renseignements Bulletin no. 116’, 12 June 1930. 35 Ibid. 36 P. Marr, The M odem H istory o f Iraq, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 51. 37 Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria an d Lebanon under the French M andate, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 189; P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 348-9. 38 MAE/SL, vol. 480, pp. 8-9. 39 The decree was signed by Shaykh Taj. Decree no. 2,449, 20 September 1930, cited in P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 350. 40 M. Ponsot presented his report on Syria and Lebanon to the PM C in Geneva on 27 June. At the end o f the session, held in private, the Commission declared itself to be satisfied with the High Commissioner’s explanations, and expressed its intention to reinforce ‘par une approbation sans réserve la situation de la Puissance Mandataire à l’égard de l’opposition locale’. It was only two months later, in presenting its report to the League, that the PM C publicly announced its unambiguous approval for French policies in the Levant. See MAE/SL, vol. 479, p. 153. 41 MAE/SL, vol. 480, p. 16.

179]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 42 See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 350. 43 In March 1925 the Iraqi government granted an oil concession to the Tuikish Petroleum Company (TPC), renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company, I PC, in 1929. Except for the five per cent which was held by a wealthy Armenian investor, C.S. Gulbenkian, the T PC was owned in equal amounts o f 23.75 per cent by four different groups representing four separate nations, acting together as a conglomeration. These groups were the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British), Royal Dutch-Shell (60% Dutch, 40% British), Compagnie Française des Pétroles (French) and Near East Development Corporation (an American consortium). However, at the insistence o f the British government, the concession required the T P C to be registered in Britain and always to have a British Chairman. These provisions, combined with the substantial degree o f British ownership, enabled the British government to exert a considerable amount o f control over the company. Daniel Silverfarb, B ritain s’ Inform al Em pire in the M iddle East, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 94. 44 P. Sluglett, op. cit., p. 198; Rabinovich, Itamar, ‘Oil and Local Politics: French-Iraqi Negotiations in the Early 1930s’ in Uriel Dann (ed.), The G reat Powers in the M iddle East, 1919-1939, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1988, p. 174. 45 M. Ponsot expounded hb vbion o f Tripoli as a crucial link between Iraq and Iran and the Mediterranean to none other than the British High Commissioner in Iraq during the latter’s vbit to Beirut in April 1931. In hb account to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Francis Humphrys described how hb French homologue ‘gave me to understand that it was hb ambition to link up Tripoli with Mosul and Northern Persia by the Palmyra Dayr al-Zur route’. Tripoli, in turn, Ponsot explained, would be connected to Marseilles through an efficient service o f French Flying Boats. PRO, E2627/294/89, Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Passfield, 1 May 1931. Quoted in I. Rabinovich, ‘Oil and Local Politics’, op. cit., p. 174. 46 I. Rabinovich, ‘Oil and Local Politics’, op. cit., p. 177. 47 MAE/SL, ‘Note’, Maurepas (Head o f the Press Section, High Commission, Beirut), 15 January 1931, vol. 480, pp. 49-55. 48 ‘Ali’s only visitors were a number o f ex-Sharifian officers, among them Rida al-Rikabi, who still cherished the monarchical idea and its promise o f future employment. Several o f these officers had already formed their own royalbt party (Hizb al-Umma al-Malaki) in the summer o f 1928. This party later merged with another Fiction o f royalist veterans headed by Arif Pasha al-Idlibi, an Ottoman-trained officer. He and his colleagues were keenly interested in a constitutional monarchy for Syria which they believed would eventually lead to a union with Iraq and a treaty with France. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 353. 49 For strategic reasons, the British wanted the bifurcation, if there was to be one, at Rutba, some 240 km south-west o f Haditha. 50 See MAE/SL, vol. 459, which contains a lengthy and detailed note on this subject entitled ‘The Hashemite Candidature for the Syrian Throne’, 10 April 1934. 51 I. Rabinovich, 'Oil and Local Politics’, op. cit., p. 178. 52 Ibid., p. 179. 53 MAE/SL, ‘The Hashemite Candidature’, vol. 459. 54 MAE/SL, Berthelot to Chargé d’Affaires, Jeddah, 16 April 1931, vol. 480, p. 89. 55 P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 355-6.

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F r a n c e ’ s i m p o s i t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n 1930 56 I. Rabinovich, ‘Oil and Local Politics’, op. cit., p. 179. 57 Gomaa, Ahmad, ‘The Syrian Throne: Hashemite Ambition and Anglo-French Rivalry, 1930-1935’ in Uriel Dann, op. cit., pp. 183-93. 58 Ibid., p. 189. 59 Ponsot’s remarks were made to the British High Commissioner o f Iraq during the latter’s visit to Beirut in late October 1931. F 0 3 7 1/5483, vol. 15364. FO to Clerk (Angora), 4 November 1931. Furthermore, in June 1931, the Quai d’Orsay had sated before the Permanent Mandates Commission ‘its intention to conclude in the near future treaties with the Governments o f Syria and the Lebanon, taking into account the evolution which has taken place and the progress which has been achieved’. The treaty with Syria would entail the selection o f a President or a King, but the French carefully refrained from specifying which. See Y. Porath, In Search o f A rab Unity, 1930-1945, London, Frank Cass, 1986, p. 10. 60 MAE/SL, ‘The Hashemite Candidature’, vol. 459. 61 MAE/SL. vol. 478, pp. 188-90. 62 MAE/SL, vol. 480, p. 63. 63 Ibid., p. 64. 64 See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 360. 65 CADN/B, ‘Conversation with Mgr. Tappouni’, Chauvel, Beirut, 2 December 1931, vol. 399. 66 For the text o f the three decrees and Ponsot’s letter to Shaykh Taj, see CAD N/B, vol. 469. 67 Ibid. The Consultative Council was constituted in two sections, A and B: Section A : M embres Je D roit.

1. Jamil Ulshi, Head o f Provisional Government (1920). 2. Haqqi al-Azm, Governor o f the S a te o f Damascus (1920). 3. Mustapha al-Barmada, Governor o f the State o f Aleppo (1923). 4. Subhi Barakat, President o f the Syrian Federation (1923). Syrian Head of State (1926). 5. S A le Damad Ahmad Nami, Syrian Head o f Sure (1926). 6. Shaykh Taj al-Din al-Hasani, Prime Minister (1928). 7. Hashim al-Atasi, President, Constituent Assembly (1928). Section B : Autres membres

1. 2. 3. 4.

68 69 70 71 72 73

The President o f the Council o f S a te (Haqqi al-Azm). The President o f the Court o f Cassation (Mustapha al-Barmada). The Rector, University o f Damascus (Riza al-Sa‘id). The President, Administrative Council, Sanjaq o f Alexandretu, (Ibrahim al-Mu’men). 5. President, Chamber o f Commerce, Aleppo (Salim Jamban). 6. President, Chamber o f Commerce, Damascus (Arif Halbouni). P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 363. CADN/B, Ponsot to Paris, 6 December 1931, vol. 467. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., Atasi to Ponsot, Damascus, 6 December 1931. See CADN/B, ‘Note’ (Political Bureau o f the High Commission), Beirut, 24 November 1931, vol. 468.

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 74 ‘However imperfect the present electoral law may be . . . it would be fairer to maintain this system, which is known and has been practised for a long time, than to modify it at the last m om ent. . . to give satisfaction to those interests, which, however respectable they are as individuals or as a party, are o f less importance than the general interest.’ CAD N/B, Ponsot to Consultative Council, 7 December 1931, vol. 467. Disingenuous: Ponsot definitely had a talent for words. Unassailable generalities were his forte. 75 CADN/B, vol. 399; The manifesto was published in L a Syrie, 11 December 1931. 76 CAD N/B, Ponsot to Paris, 11 December 1931, vol. 467. 77 CAD N/B, ‘Service de la Presse’, 9 December 1931, Beirut, 18 December 1931. 78 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 365. 79 CADN/B, ‘Conversation with Mgr. Tappouni’, Chauvel, Beirut, 2 December 1931, vol. 399. 80 CADN/B, ‘Compte-Rendu, Consultative Council, 7 December 1931. The High Commissioner also transferred the Syrian-orthodox seat in Aleppo to the Haute Jazira, where, according to the High Commissioner, that community had increased in numbers due to immigration since 1928. The Syrian-Orthodox community in Aleppo had also voted nationalist in 1928. 81 See P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 365-6. 82 For the French version o f 20 December events, see CAD N/B, ‘Report o f Action o f the Gendarmerie on 20 December 1931’, Colonel Naudin, Damascus, 21 December 1931, vol. 467; ibid., ‘Report on the Events o f Sunday, 20 December 1931’, General Directorate o f Police, State o f Syria, Damascus, 21 December 1931; ibid., ‘Secret Telegrams’, Ponsot to Paris, 20 and 23 December 1931. See also F0684/5/4/31. Hole to FO, 22 December 1931. Longrigg (op. cit., p. 191) argues, mistakenly in my view, that ‘The High Commissioner . . . believed, as did all French and much ‘‘moderate’’ opinion, that extremist violence was a weapon used for purposes o f intimidation to conceal lack o f popular support.’ This was, o f course, a standard (public) French argument. The High Commissioner, in fact, knew foil well that most o f the violence had little to do with intimidation by ‘extremists’ - rather, it was an expression o f fhistration against the highly controlled electoral procedures which he himself had established. 83 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 366. 84 al~N ida, 9 December 1931. CADN/B, Service de la Presse, Beirut, 9 December 1931, vol. 468. 85 After the Revolt, al-Kaylani was elected as Council President o f Hama’s only government secondary school, a post he used to build a following among young teachers and professionals. 86 Conversation with Jean Gaulmier, Paris, 7 January 1993. Gaulmier was the Education Counsellor in Hama during that period. 87 CADN/B, ‘Confidential Bulletin’, n.d., p. 3. Probably written by Chauvel between 10-24 December 1931. 88 CADN/B, David (Acting Assistant Delegate, Aleppo) to Solomiac, 12 August 1931, vol. 399. 89 Ibid., Chauvel to Tappouni, Beirut, 2 December 193190 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 362. 91 For Lavastres version o f why and how the Aleppo moderates won the elections, sec CADN/B, Lavastre to Ponsot, 9 January 1932, vol. 467. For his vigorous

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92 93

94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102

103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

111 112

rejection o f nationalist accusations concerning the elections, see ibid., Lavastre to Ponsot, 25 February 1932. For nationalist accusations, see MAE/SL, Hananu to Ponsot, Aleppo, 18 December 1931, vol. 480, p. 170. Hananu later spelled out nationalist protests in a 49-page report to the High Commissioner and to the League o f Nations. See CAD N/B, Hananu to Ponsot, 20 March 1932, vol. 468. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 372. Ten petitions o f protest, with thousands o f signatures, were sent to the Governor o f Aleppo, who refused to receive them. They were then sent to Lavastre, who also refused to receive them. Such refusals were contrary to normal practice. Ponsot finally agreed to receive them, following his meeting with Atasi on 31 December, as an appeasement tactic before the second-round elections, but made no comment upon them. CAD N/B, Atasi to Ponsot, Damascus, 2 January 1932, vol. 467; MAE/SL, vol. 480, p. 232. Ibid., ‘Confidential Bulletin, Chauvel, Beirut, 9 January 1932, pp. 227-9. See CA D N /B, Roux to Paris, n.d., vol. 467. Probably 6 -7 January 1932. MAE/SL, vol. 480, pp. 230-1. The evening before the second-round elections in Aleppo, Ncgib al-Rayes, the al-Ahmm correspondent, telegraphed Cairo that the nationalists would win all the Hama seats and half o f the Aleppo seats. See CAD N/B, Roux to Paris, n.d., vol. 467. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 191. MAE/SL, 3 February 1932, vol. 481. CAD N/B, Roux to Paris, n.d., vol. 467. MAE/SL, Ponsot to Paris, 7 January 1932, vol. 480, p. 218. Same telegram is in CAD N/B, vol. 467. CADN/B, Léger to Ponsot, Paris, 8 February 1932, vol. 467. A month later, Lavastre wrote to the High Commissioner asking whether this ‘sentiment o f appreciation* o f the Quai d’Orsay could be translated into promotion for one o f his team in particular, a certain Captain Desfarges, who had ‘managed to liberate his constituency from the nationalists, who had it in their grip for the last four years, and to produce 86 votes out o f 111 for the two moderate candidates, even though their opponents were among the most lively and most popular o f the nationalist party*. Ibid., Lavastre to Ponsot, 8 March 1932. F0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO, 8 April 1932. See CADN/B, Ponsot to Paris, 23 January 1932, vol. 467. MAE/SL, Decree no. 4, Syria, 12 February 1932, vol. 481, pp. 16-26. CADN/B, ‘Confidential Note’, Cahour, Homs, 3 March 1932, vol. 467. Sec MAE/SL, Berthelot to Ponsot, 2 March 1932, vol. 481. CADN/B, Roux to Paris, 5 February 1932, vol. 467. Ibid., Solomiac to Ponsot, 7 March 1932. In 1928, the nationalists won all ten Damascus seats; the government list was routed. ‘The success o f the extremists in the towns is indisputable*. CAD N/B, Ponsot to Paris, 25 April 1928, vol. 466. For the Damascus election results o f 1928, see ibid., ‘Information no. 262’, Damascus, 25 April 1928 and ibid., ‘Information no. 270’, 28 April 1928. F0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO, 8 April 1932; CAD N/B, Ponsot to Paris, 30 March 1932, vol. 467; ibid., Ponsot to Paris, 8 April 1932. For Damascus election results, see ibid., Decree no. 8, 18 April 1932.

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 113 For the complete list o f Syrian deputies, see MAE/SL, vol. 481, pp. 165-7. On the list, the French class 14 as Nationalist and 55 as moderates. Two o f the Damascus Deputies, Yusuf Linyadu (Jewish) and Muhammad Ali al-Abid are both classed as moderates. But Linyadu had run on the nationalist list, as he had in 1928. Abid, by his own admission, was ‘not for the nationalists, nor for heaven, nor for hell, but (destined) for purgatory’. CAD N/B, Solomiac to Ponsot, Damascus, 8 March 1932, vol. 467. 114 MAE/SL, vol. 481, pp. 81-2. The note attached to this Quai d’Orsay report o f 14 April 1932, entided ‘L’Oeuvre de la France au Levant durant la XlVème législature’, indicates that it was destined for external use, such as the Jo u rn al O fficielo f the French Chamber. Perhaps this explains its distincdy over-optimistic tone. It was certainly not written by de Caix. Quai d’Orsay reports destined for internal consumption only were generally more realistic than this. Throughout our period under study there is often a distinct contrast in the tone o f reports prepared by the Quai d’Orsay for internal consumption, and those destined for the Minister’s desk or the press.

3 Syria’s rejection o f the treaty All my efforts of persuasion, of goodwill, of reason are concentrated on guiding the Syrian leadership towards the conclusion of aTreaty which will place French-Syrian relations on a definite footing. Fonsot to Berdidot, 4 Jone 1932.'

The antagonism felt by nationalists throughout Syria, and particularly in Aleppo, did not subside with the conclusion o f elections. Between January and May 1932, the defeated Aleppo wing o f the National Bloc waged a campaign o f terror and intimidation against the Liberal Constitutionalist deputies and their supporters which resulted, according to Lavastre, in a number o f ‘politically inspired mortalities’ as well as 20 violent attacks, 48 arrests o f suspects, four large demonstrations and 50 demonstrators arrested.1 On 12 April a student wielding a knife attempted to kill Subhi Bey Barakat in the salon o f a Beirut hotel. Subhi Bey had a lucky escape, but the student grievously wounded one o f his supporters before turning the knife on himself. Abd al-Basset Bounni, a native o f Homs, died in hospital that evening, but not before explaining to M. Lavastre that he wanted to kill Subhi as a protest against the unjust elections in the north, for which he held Subhi Bey responsible.1 The bitterness which now permeated the political situation in Syria was matched equally by the depth o f dissatisfaction in commercial and agricultural sectors which had to shoulder most o f the burden o f high taxation just as the depression was being felt most heavily. Aleppo textile workers went on strike in early June against Frances failure to protect the local market against the influx o f Japanese goods. In the Syrian countryside the small peasant proprietor, sharecropper, and wage labourer suffered under a harsh taxation system rendered intolerable by fluctuations o f exchange. The failure o f winter rains and a late ground frost in the spring o f 1932 entirely destroyed hill crops and vineyards in the plains [851

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and many thousands o f livestock perished in the cold; whole districts now faced the prospect o f starvation. Unorganised and inarticulate, rural society’s grievances received litde attention from the High Commission.4 Until the middle o f May, the High Commissioner was fully occupied with the constitutional crisis in Lebanon, where the prospect o f the election o f Muhammad al-Jisr, the Muslim Speaker o f the Lebanese Chamber, to the Presidency o f the Republic, precipitated the French into suspending the Lebanese constitution on 9 May. The French maintained that the suspension was brought about by the increasing financial and administrative disorder that the Lebanese Parliament seemed unable to cope with; there was indeed some truth in this assertion.’ But an internal Quai d’Orsay report o f the period explicidy reveals a truer picture o f French motives: The need to prevent the election of a Muslim President precipitated a measure that we would have needed to take, in anycase, six months later. . . given that reforms were necessary in all domains.6 Having successfully defused the political crisis in Beirut, the High Commissioner could now give his full attention to Damascus, where, following the elections for the first Syrian Parliament, customary political procedure presaged the convocation o f the Chamber by the High Commissioner within a reasonably short space o f time, the election o f a President o f the Syrian Republic and a President o f the Chamber and the constitution o f a regular government under the leadership o f a Prime Minister, chosen by the President o f the Republic. For the French authorities, the dominant political question was who should be the Mandatory power’s candidate for the Presidency o f the Republic. The latter, elected for five years, represented the element o f stability in the constitutional organisation which would come into force. Furthermore, the President’s powers, both external (foreign affairs and later the conclusion o f treaties), and internal (promulgation o f laws, disposition o f the Armed Forces, choice o f Prime Minister, right to dissolve the Parliament, etc.), would be exercised in the framework o f the Mandate itself. As long as the latter existed, the President o f the Republic was the pivotal agent o f contact between the Mandate and the local authorities. Consequently, it was essential for the French that he would be a faithful servant o f the Mandate and equally, particularly in 186]

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the forthcoming period o f evolution, that he would benefit, at least to a certain extent, from the popularity o f the Syrian populations.7 In Ponsots mind, the President should be a factor o f entente and not an instrument o f combat: In Syrian affairs, thorny and difficult as they are, it is important to look for balanced solutions . . . that satisfy at the same time (as much as possible), the conflicting demands of two sensitive currents of opinion: French opinion, which is too often attached to a previous era and to conceptions that are not applicable in Syria, and Syrian opinion, which is today exasperated by the hasty liberation of Iraq, a development which we can do nothing about.* Subhi Bey Barakat, who on the invitation o f the French had success­ fully rallied the moderates o f the north and was now the acknowledged leader o f the 29 Liberal Constitutionalist deputies, the majority grouping in the parliament, justifiably anticipated that he would receive the full support o f the High Commissioner for his election to the Presidency o f the Republic. Unfortunately for Subhi, the High Commissioner had little intention o f following such parliamentary traditions: Subhi just did not fit the bill as the required candidate o f entente. M. Ponsots judgement that Subhi Bey represented the "incarnation o f the antagonism o f the North against the South’9 was valid, for political circles in Damascus remained unanimously and violently hostile to him. Held responsible for the events o f 1925-6 and particularly the bombardment o f the city, Subhi was known as the man who, profiting from the support o f the Mandatory power, falsified the results o f the elections in Aleppo.10 According to the Delegate in Damascus, M. Solomiac, there was all to be feared in an operation which would lead to his becoming President o f the Republic. His candidature would exacerbate the atmosphere o f agitation and disorder, resulting from his election. The gesture o f the Homs student could be imitated tomorrow by a hundred others. Solomiac warned that the southern moderate deputies grouped loosely around Haqqi Bey al-Azm would make "common cause’ with the nationalists against the moderates o f the north. In the ensuing parliamentary battles, French plans to have a treaty signed would undoubtedly be thwarted." Only a week after elections ended in Damascus, M. Chauvel, under instructions from the High Commissioner, started conversations with Subhi Bey and politely but firmly endeavoured to steer the northern (87)

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leader towards accepting the post of Speaker of the Chamber. Subhi was distincdy upset and threatened not only to retire from politics, but also to actively aid the extremists take political control of Aleppo, thus destroying the northern Bloc of moderates, with all the consequences.12In his mind the offer of this secondary post clearly showed that the French had no intention of taking into account the services that he had rendered to them in the past, and in particular during the insurrection of 1925-6. When M. Lavastre asked him what other candidate, apart from himself, appeared to him the best, Subhi Bey replied ‘Personne. Après moi, le déluge’.15 He would not be budged: either he would be the High Commissioners designated candidate for the top job, or he would retire. It took three lengthy strategy sessions, on 14, 19 and 30 May in Beirut, for Ponsot and his inner team to choose a candidate. Lavastre, who supported Subhi, argued that first, the latter represented the only genuine force on which the French could rely to thwart the nationalists. Second, Subhi was prepared to make concessions to the nationalists and envisaged appointing a nationalist Prime Minister and a nationalist cabinet. Third, Subhi already had twenty-eight deputies behind him, a number which could increase, with some moderates from other regions. As President o f the Republic, Subhi Bey, who had hilly accepted to follow all French directives concerning French plans for the administration and the treaty, would polarise these elements and make them into a coherent, disciplined force at the disposal o f the High Commission; they also represented the majority in the Chamber. Without Subhi, these elements, deprived o f a chief, would disperse and probably go over to the nationalists. Fourth, apart from Subhi, there was no other suitable candidate in the North. Muhammad Ali al-Abid had given too many guarantees to the nationalists to be considered as anyone other than a nationalist candidate which meant that if the French supported al-Abid, it would disconcert the moderate (pro-French) deputies. And last but not least, Subhi Bey and his supporters won the elections; people would not understand, notably in France, why this success had not been rewarded.14 M. Solomiac for his part argued that it was preferable to seek a solution o f conciliation between the two factions in the Chamber. Haqqi Bey al-Azm, francophile from the very beginning, who had never wavered in his allegiance, offered the Mandate the guarantees desired. An objection could be raised concerning his lack o f dynamism, but the evolution o f Syrian politics did not depend on one man, and the [88]

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action o f the Mandatory power would, in any case, exercise itself daily on the government.15 Subhi was not the only Syrian leader who looked in the mirror during those weeks and found himself studying the face o f the first President o f the Syrian Republic. Shaykh Taj, the Damad, Haqqi Bey and Muhammad Ali al-Abid all made representations to the High Commissioner, either direcdy or through intermediaries. The Damascus nationalists favoured Muhammad Ali al-Abid as a compromise candidate, but moderates feared that he was simply a stalking horse for Hashim al-Atasi, who would emerge at the last moment.16On 30 May, Muhammad Ali al-Abid wrote a confidential letter to the High Commissioner. Abid may well have already given verbal guarantees to the nationalists, as moderates strongly suspected he had, but his letter to Ponsot left little doubt as to his potential subservience to French authority: I consider that the authority of France must remain entire and unquestioned in Syria and that to fulfil its task every Syrian govern­ ment must acknowledge to itself that it is subordinate to that authority . . . As for my programme, it can be resumed in one phrase: Economy in every domain, justice for all.17 During that final week o f May, Ponsot had received fresh instructions from Berthelot, which were precipitated by the swing in the French Chamber from the Right to the Centre-Left, following the General Elections o f 1 and 8 May. Although the new cabinet had not yet been appointed,1* Berthelot seemed to anticipate the general attitude o f the incoming government to the Syrian Question:I I will have to report to the incoming Foreign Minister, after the Parliamentary meeting, on Syrian and Lebanese affairs . . . it is very important that the [French] government can state [in the Chamber] that the Syrian constitution promulgated by you, after having been adopted in principle by the Constituent Assembly of 1928, has been applied in its entirety i.e., that a Parliament has been established and a regular government set up. It is necessary that the question of the Syrian government be settled before your return to Parisand that we can saythat negotiations will be started with the government in the Autumn to conclude a treaty, which will allow us to replace, as in Iraq, the mandate by new relations between Syria and the former mandatory power. 189]

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. . . [So], firstly, put into effect a programme of profound reforms in Lebanon. Secondly, constitute as soon as possible a Syrian government capable of concluding with us a treaty, presuming that the constitutional administration functions from now on .. Armed with these instructions, Ponsot announced at the end o f the 30 May session, that Haqqi Bey - the candidate o f entente - was to be their choice. Ponsot decided to convoke Parliament for 7 June, but refrained from publicising the decree until 2 June, to leave the hard-line nationalist opposition as little time as possible to organise demonstrations.20 Against a background o f economic grievance and continued political dissatisfaction, Parliament opened on the morning o f 7 June 1932 under heavy police protection. The deputies from Aleppo barely reached the Chamber, having been liberated only moments before from their hotels where angry protestors had imprisoned them. In Aleppo itself, the bazaars were shut down by the local branch o f the National Bloc to protest at the convocation o f the fraudulently elected Parliament. Similar scenes took place in all nationalist centres.21 Aside from the 68 deputies, several French observers attended, including Solomiac and Lavastre. After the text o f the decree convening Parliament was read, the oldest deputy, Muhammad Yahya al-Adali o f Antioch, assumed the task o f Speaker pro tempore. But before he could reach his chair, Fakhri al-Barudi called upon the Chamber to observe two minutes o f silence in memory o f the late Fawzi al-Ghazzi, the author o f the much-contested constitution, who had been poisoned by his wife three years earlier (after he discovered that she had committed adultery).22 Barudi then encouraged his colleagues to act in Parliament according to their consciences, to vote for a personality dignified and capable o f serving the country and that given the interventions of the counsellors on the deputies that we have observed during these last days, we say that if the authorities want to elect themselves, they only have to do so.21 From the other side o f the Chamber, Shakir N im ats response was immediate - and rather less candid:I I do not agree with him concerning the attitude of the authorities: they are too dignified to intervene in such questions. The proof is (90)

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that M. Solomiac brought us together yesterday to tell us that, in his capacity as the representative of the High Commissioner, he had no preference for one or another candidate and that we were free to elect whoever we wished to .. .u As the acting Speaker tried to proceed with business, Zaki al-Khatib, taking Barudi’s suggestion literally, interrupted with a long speech and would not be seated in spite o f the Speakers injunctions. Fa’iz al-Khuri joined in and general uproar ensued. The Speaker ordered a policeman to remove Khuri from the Chamber but he refused to budge, aptly quoting Mirabeau: ‘We are here by the will o f the people and we will not leave except by the force o f bayonets’. Instead, the policeman was ejected and the Speaker adjourned the meeting for twenty minutes until relative calm was restored.” When the session was reopened the Chamber moved on to the business o f electing a Speaker. The results o f the first ballot were inconclusive. Subhi Barakat received 28 votes, Haqqi al-Azm, 23, and Hashim al-Atasi, 17. Since no candidate had secured a simple majority, a second ballot had to be cast. The nationalists, sensing the inevitable, decided to abstain, enabling Barakat to poll 30 votes to Azm’s 23. Basically the north formed a bloc around Subhi Bey, the moderates o f L’Euphrate and the south gave their votes in both rounds to Haqqi Bey, and the nationalists, who voted for Atasi on the first round, abstained on the second, except for two, who gave their votes to Subhi.26 From the Speakers chair, Subhi announced his commitment to work harmoniously with all parties and, in particular, the National Bloc. A few moments later he turned around and placed his followers from the north in all the important parliamentary posts. It was not an astute move: the nationalists and the southern moderates sensed the need to join forces in the face o f this northern offensive. But now the crucial moment had come, namely the election for the President o f the Republic. Subhi Bey, backed by his bloc o f 28 northern deputies, was the odds-on favourite. But Solomiac, his own plans to get Haqqi Bey elected clearly under threat, caught the eye o f one o f his clients in the Damascus delegation and signalled him to move for an adjournment. This request immediately drew the support o f the nationalist deputies who also realised that their candidate had no serious chances o f winning. ‘We are 17, Haqqi s group are 23, which means that a majority o f 40 are for

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postponing’, declared Atasi. ‘We don’t approve’, replied Shakir Ni'mat al-Sha‘bani.27 Eventually Subhi announced a 30-minute recess. When the deputies returned, Sha‘bani unexpectedly withdrew his objection and it was agreed to postpone the election for four days. Even more importandy, it was agreed by a show o f hands that the election for the President o f the Republic could not be done on the same basis o f relative majority. In bringing this action-packed opening meeting to a close, Barakat announced that postponement was conditional upon deputies no longer being imprisoned in their hotels.21 By the time Parliament reassembled on 11 June, several days - and nights - o f fierce political intrigue had elapsed. By the morning o f the tenth, opinion in Damascus had hardened against the candidature o f Subhi. That evening, the nationalists publicly declared that they would retire from the Assembly, to mark their disfavour for such a ‘solution o f combat’.29 During the late night sessions between the groups, it became clear that Haqqi’s candidature was equally doomed, while that o f Muhammad Ali al-Abid, whom the French had previously considered, and then rejected in the hope o f rallying the northern moderate votes to Haqqi, was likely to gain an absolute majority in the first round.30 In the course o f the night the French obtained the agreement o f Haqqi’s group to this solution and later that same morning, 11 June, Abid was elected the first President o f the Syrian Republic, defeating Subhi Bey by 36 votes to 32, the nationalists and Haqqi’s group having combined to defeat the northern challenge. Subhi Bey, who presided over the election with calm and authority, announced the result and congratulated his happy rival, which caused unanimous applause. (Privately, Subhi Bey and Shakir N im at were distincdy unhappy with the turn o f events. In general, the northern deputies found it difficult to understand the motives o f the French, who they felt had abandoned them. This feeling was compounded when the composition o f the cabinet was announced.)31 Abid was escorted to his new headquarters by a very enthusiastic crowd patrolled by the Nationalist Youth. There, he received a 17-gun salute and witnessed the unfurling o f the new Syrian flag. Like the Hashemite flag flown over the Syrian Congress o f 1920, it had three horizontal bars o f green, white and black (representing the Fatimid, Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, respectively). But across the white bar were added three red stars, indicating Syria’s wish to distance herself from Hashemite influence.32 192]

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Muhammad Ali al-Abid hailed from a line o f well-connected merchants and landowners o f Damascus who spanned four generations in the service o f the Ottoman Empire, and who, with their relations, the Azms and the Yusufs, constituted the cream o f Ottoman-Arab society. Muhammad Ali grew up in an aristocratic milieu in Istanbul and was educated at the Galata Serail School and in Paris, following which he joined the Ottoman Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, and advanced rapidly to become Minister to Washington in 1908. But his six-week stay there was cut short by the Young Turks’ July Revolt which ousted many o f the Sultans influential advisors, including Muhammad Ali s hither, Izzat Pasha al-Abid. Muhammad Ali spent the next decade in exile in Paris, helping his father manage his many financial interests. He returned to Damascus in 1919, but spent the following decade on the margins o f political life, accused by many o f being a francophile.” Ironically, but perhaps inevitably, President Abid invited Haqqi al-Azm to form a government on 15 June 1932. The High Commissioner had probably offered Azm the consolation prize o f Prime Minister for his quiet withdrawal in favour o f Abid. What was a surprise was the political complexion o f the cabinet, no doubt chosen by the High Commissioner: Selim Jam ban, Mazhar Raslan and Jamil Mardam.” Jam ban, at 59, was a prosperous Greek-Catholic merchant from Aleppo and a Liberal Constitutionalist, although he had not approved o f the electioneering methods used by his northern colleagues. Raslan, a 45-year-old bachelor and notable from Homs, had served Faysal and later Abdullah before returning to Syria in 1924. Implicated in the Great Revolt, he was jailed at Arwad Island and then exiled until the amnesty o f 1928. A month later he was elected a deputy from Homs to the Constituent Assembly. A member o f the moderate wing o f the National Bloc, he was, nonetheless, regarded as a dedicated nationalist. As for Jamil Mardam, the principal strategist o f the Bloc policy o f ‘honourable cooperation, he publicly labelled the new cabinet, the ‘Ministry o f mutual understanding and honour’.” The inclusion o f Raslan and Mardam in the Azm government and the fact that the new cabinet took so little time to be formed following the election o f the President suggests that the National Bloc and M. Solomiac had struck a secret deal during that hectic week o f bargaining and intrigue preceding the session on 11 June, or even earlier. The appearance o f these two nationalists in ministerial posts seemed to be an (93)

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important French concession. Moreover, they had two ministries each, whereas the moderates had only three ministries (two for Azm and one for Jambart). To all intents and purposes, it was a nationalist-orientated cabinet, headed by a weak, if honourable francophile. Subhi Bey and Shakir Ni'mat and all their moderate group o f northern deputies felt betrayed by the French.36 Their version o f events o f 11 June was that having received the firm promise from M. Lavastre that Subhi Bey really was the designated candidate o f the High Commission, they arrived in Damascus to see that the French counsellors had other ideas, but that they were not re-oriented by any senior High Commission official before the session. M. Weber, the new Delegate in Damascus, rejected this version and insisted that, on the day, 'every deputy was specifically orientated, individually.37 Syria experienced a 'summer o f discontent’. Those nationalists, and Jamil Maidam in particular, who collaborated with the Syrian government were actively opposed from the very start by a certain number o f extremists, and not just those o f Aleppo. Certain activists like Shukri Quwwatli worked hard to coordinate the opposition, in liaison with pan-Arab circles in Cairo and Jerusalem, and they found considerable support in Faysalian circles. Steadfast opposition to compromise was an easy way to score popularity points, especially at a time o f devastating economic depression.38 An opposition offensive launched at the commemorative ceremony o f Maysalun (24 July) served once again to highlight nationalist divisions. Two nationalist groups argued next to the tomb o f Yusuf al-Azma. On the same occasion just two years before, Mardam had violently denounced the government o f Shaykh Taj, and extolled the Bloc as the apostle o f unity and independence. In 1932 he did not even attend the ceremony. He left it to another nationalist deputy from Damascus, Zaki al-Khatib, to ask the Syrians to have confidence in the nationalist members o f the Government. Moments later, Shukri Quwwatli, the man destined to be Mardam’s chief rival on the national political scene, replied by violently criticising the collaborationists and accusing Mardam and other nationalists o f treachery and deceit; in similar vein Arif Bey Nakadi delivered a veritable indictment o f the policy o f collaboration.39 In an Aleppo mosque, a few days later, Ibrahim Hananu delivered a particularly passionate speech, which according to Helleu ‘constituted a recommendation to armed revolt’, but which in fact led to the organising [94]

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o f a delegation to Damascus.40 Under the Presidency o f Jamil Ibrahim Pasha, this delegation, made up o f more than a hundred people, started out on 30 July, passed through Hama in the middle o f a considerable crowd and was welcomed at the outskirts o f Homs by a boisterous demonstration organised with the participation o f the youth o f the lycée, which the local police and the gendarmerie had the utmost difficulty in controlling. At 10 o’clock on 2 August, the delegation arrived at the home o f the President o f the Republic, to present him with their demands: the suspension o f Decree no. 4 o f the High Commissioner concerning public order, the dismissal o f the Vali, o f certain other officials in Aleppo, the abolition o f the municipal council o f Aleppo as well as the recently constituted Wakfs Commission, the abrogation o f the concession o f the Water Company, etc. The President not only received a deputation o f the delegation, but entertained the whole delegation to tea that afternoon, which earned him a rebuke from the General-Secretary, Helleu, who accused him o f weakness. Helleu clearly felt more had to be done to keep the ship on course, so he suspended sine die the nationalist newspaper, al-Shaab, which had, he alleged, reported the affair in an intolerable fashion and warned Ibrahim Hananu that he would be arrested, without any further warnings, if he repeated such inflammatory speeches.41 The political malaise was aggravated by the deepening o f the world depression. During the summer, a series o f boycotts culminated in a massive strike o f workers and employers in the local textile industry against low tariffs for Japanese imports. Although this agitation forced the French to double the tariff, the subsequent refusal o f employers to raise their workers’ wages resulted in two more weeks o f strikes. At the same time, the National Bloc leadership revealed its bourgeois character by defending managers and owners, many o f whom were Bloc partisans, against workers. Bloc headquarters distributed propaganda calling for the solidification o f national ranks against the French, the true enemy o f the Syrian people. The Aleppo Bloc tried but failed to turn its economic grievances against Mardam and Raslan. Not even popular demonstrations staged at the end o f August in Damascus calling for their resignation managed to shake them out o f office. Instead, police surrounded Bloc headquarters at the centre o f the capital on 31 August and arrested 30 local leaders, who were later tried for plotting against the security o f the state. Mardam, feeling the pressure, tactfully took refuge in Lebanon for a few weeks.41 195]

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The elections in France in May 1932 brought the Union des Gauches to power after an absence o f eight years, but unlike the Cartel des Gauches o f 1924, it was simply an alliance for electoral purposes. Edouard Herriot, the brilliant professor turned politician and leader o f the Radicals, the largest left-wing party in the Chamber, formed a coalition government from his own party, members o f the radical Left (left o f centre) and left-wing republicans (right o f centre).43 It was basically a centrist government; the socialists refused to participate in Government and their support in the Chamber was intermittent. The Radicals had no alternative economic or social policies to offer, but simply continued to apply, in a more drastic way, the same unpopular and unsuccessful 'orthodox’ measures introduced by previous right-wing governments (l’Union Nationale).44 Much the same could be said about Herriot’s policy towards Syria and Lebanon. Although a passionate radical and an acknowledged connoisseur o f Mediterranean civilisation, there is no evidence that Herriot genuinely wished to loosen the French grip on Syria, i.e., there was no fundamental change in the French vision o f Syria. Rather, the Quai d’Orsay, following instructions from Herriot, who was Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister, decided to take its foot o ff the draft treaty that it had so carefully crafted during the previous summer, and to stan negotiations without delay. The reason for this change o f tack by the Quai d’Orsay was in large measure the successful transformation o f the Iraq Mandate by the British into a treaty o f friendship and alliance. The French naturally sought to turn this development to their own advantage, rather than remain embarrassed by it: In invoking the Iraqi precedent, and in following it as closely as possible, we will, at best, safeguard French interests, while avoiding the double hazardcreated by the intransigence of the Syrian extremists and by the vigilant opposition of certain Powers. The force and value of this [Iraqi] precedent will become weaker if we do not put all our energy into obtaining a result within a few months and if we do not profit from the next meeting in Geneva of the Permanent Mandates Commission .. On 3 October 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League o f Nations as a sovereign and independent state. On this occasion, Britain was congratulated and the attitude o f the main powers regarding the evolution o f mandates was reaffirmed. Such was the atmosphere o f the occasion 196]

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that even the French representative, M. Henry Berenger, felt called upon to confirm, in general terms, the French commitment to the evolution o f the mandates. He managed to do so without specifically mentioning French intentions toward the Syrian and Lebanese Mandates.46 A little over a week later (12 October), M. Ponsot received fresh instructions from the Quai d'Orsay, authorising him to pursue treaty negotiations with the Syrian government: It is in our interest today to move quickly, to keep complete freedom to manoeuvre and to assureourselves, fromthestart, of the benevolent assistance of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in order to deal with any problems. The Syrian affair, in contrast to our colonial problems, has to evolve on an international plane. And in firmly maintaining it on this level, we will keep the risks to a minimum, and respond in the best way to the concerns of public opinion.47 The High Commissioner would start treaty negptiations as soon as he returned to Damascus and obtain, if possible within a month, the Syrian governments signature on an accord in principle', based on the twelve point draft treaty as written in Paris in 1931.4* Armed with this agreement, the High Commissioner would then arrive in Geneva, make an appropriate declaration that a definitive treaty was firmly en route - thus strengthening the French government's position as well as that o f the Syrian government - and then return to Damascus, to start discussions concerning the financial, military and other conventions. The whole treaty would be signed before the following summer, and in particular before the next Mandates Commission session in June 1933. Such was Ponsot's plan when he left Paris in mid-October for the Levant.49 In the meantime (14-18 October), the National Bloc held a Congress at So far, to decide on policy before the High Commissioner’s return. Led by Hananu, the northern nationalists and Shukri Quwwatli o f Damascus vigorously attacked the policy o f collaboration and demanded the immediate resignation o f Mardam, Raslan and other nationalist deputies, the boycott o f the ‘fraudulently elected’ parliament, the easing o f public order restrictions in Aleppo and a general amnesty. Furthermore, there should be no opening o f negotiations with the High Commissioner until the French had publicly defined the bases o f the treaty, in particular concerning unity. They advocated sending a delegation to Geneva and Paris, to publicise the real situation.40 For their part, the nationalists o f [97]

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Damascus, Homs and Hama, who as deputies and ministers, were favourable to staying at their (paid) posts, advocated taking over the presidency o f the Chamber by making an alliance with the moderates o f Damascus. Given that the Franco-Syrian treaty was on the negotiating table, Mardam argued that they could not, without harming the interests o f the country, resign horn the government and let the moderates blindly sign a treaty that would have been written in Paris. Mardam demanded a delay o f some months for their plans to succeed, and gave Hananu the solemn assurance that he would resign, with éclat, in the first days following the return o f the High Commissioner, if there was no radical change in the internal policy o f the French.51 When the Congress broke up, Hananu was still insisting that Mardam should resign and that the parliamentary sessions be boycotted; Mardams line remained, 'lets wait and see what the High Commissioner returns with’. One sign o f this debilitating division in Bloc ranks was the fact that no communiqué was issued to the press at the end o f the Congress.52 M . Ponsot reached Aleppo on 21 October. His first gesture was calculated to sweeten nationalist hard-liners: all political detainees in the town were to be released immediately. Then, as if he were trying to make up for lost time, he rushed on to Damascus. At the Rayak train depot, just outside the Syrian capital, he announced to a group o f moderate deputies who had come to welcome him, the commencement o f negotiations towards a treaty which he described only as being more ‘liberal’ in content than the Anglo-Iraq Treaty.53 Then Ponsot informed the President o f the Republic o f French intentions to discuss with him the question o f a cabinet re-shuffle and the opening date o f Parliament. But he soon realised that with the hardening o f the nationalist claims following the So far Congress, the search for a broader-based coalition cabinet would lead to increased clashes between the opposing groups, which would delay his plans. So he suggested to the President that as the question o f the evolution o f the Mandate was the first priority, it seemed preferable not to rock the boat, i.e., keep the present cabinet in place and Subhi as President o f the Chamber, have the Chamber meet as soon as possible and work for a vote o f confidence to be given to the government, to enable it to start negotiations for a treaty before his departure to Geneva.54 In the days to follow, Ponsot repeatedly reaffirmed his desire to enter into negotiations with government representatives o f all political [98]

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parties. But most Bloc leaders remained unconvinced that the French genuinely wanted to conclude a treaty. In their view, since December 1925, when Henry de Jouvenel, in an effort to bring the rebellion to a halt, had tantalisingly mentioned (in general terms) the magic word, ‘treaty’, until October 1932, the French had never shown any serious intentions o f negotiating a treaty with them. Bloc leaders could see little reason why the French should have changed their minds. Senior High Commission officials stepped up contacts with President Abid, Hashim al-Atasi, and other Bloc leaders. These officials made plain their desire to see the Bloc preserve its policy of'honourable cooperation. M. Weber was especially frank and encouraged the Bloc to trust M. Ponsot, promising that this time the Quai d’Orsay had empowered him to treat the Syrian Question in its entirety.” Parliament met on Saturday 29 October. All the moderate deputies were present, apart from one who was sick. Fifteen nationalist deputies decided, after much debate, to boycott the session; only Mardam and Raslan, as government ministers, made an appearance. The French counsellors had been active and Subhi Bey was easily re-elected President o f the Chamber, by 49 votes, out o f 54 who voted.” Two days later, at the second session, the nationalists again did not appear, apart from Fa’iz al-Khuri, who had made it known in Sofar that he had been elected to defend his country from the pulpit’ and not from the street’.” Instead o f the customary Ministerial Declaration, followed by a vote o f confidence, the government, in agreement with Subhi Bey, proposed and obtained an adjournment until the following Saturday 5 November, to allow time for the different groups, i.e., the nationalists, to ‘weigh their responsibilities with regard to the treaty’.” Yet another National Bloc Congress took place in Homs, from 2 -4 November, ostensibly for reorganisation purposes, but also to reassess the strategy o f 'honourable cooperation. According to P. Khoury, the Homs Congress was the ‘nastiest and most perilous’ in the Bloc’s brief history.” The outcome o f three days o f intrigue, violent personality clashes and compromise was a decision to participate in Parliament, but if immediate progress in negotiations were not made, then the Bloc would again withdraw. All Bloc leaders feared the consequences o f a split in the party. They also knew that public opinion found it difficult to accept the attitude o f deputies who continued to receive their salaries while refusing to take part in parliamentary sessions. 199]

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On 4 November, a nationalist manifesto appeared in the Damascus press: . . . At agiven moment, we thought it was our duty not to participate in the work of Parliament until the bases of a Treaty were clearly defined, aTreaty that would not be inferior to that of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. But the last talks have convinced the nationalist ministers, and certain members of Parliament, that the provisional continuation of the policy of collaboration can help in the achievement of our national aims. This is why we have judged it suitable to wait longer to demonstrate again the goodwill that the nationalists have always shown, in view to obtain a solution to the present crisis, and to accord the country Independence and Unity. We hope that from the French side, our attitude will be appreciated and that their goodwill will be equally forthcoming.60 On 5 November, with all the nationalist deputies present (apart from Hashim al-Atasi), the Prime Minister read out the Ministerial Declaration. A very lively discussion ensued, the returning Bloc deputies demanding - without success - that the government state precisely what it meant by national aspirations’. Nevertheless, in the end they formally demanded that the Chamber grant President Abid authority to negotiate a treaty ‘regulating the future relations between France and Syria in harmony with the desires o f the country’, and in preparation for the entrance o f Syria into the League o f Nations. The government obtained a vote o f confidence (65 votes out o f 66), by a show o f hands on this motion; only the embittered Shakir N i‘mat al-Sha‘bani cast a negative vote. With the Liberal Constitutionalists now supporting the idea o f a treaty and the hard-line nationalists outmanoeuvred, all seemed set fair for the commencement o f negotiations.61 That same evening (5 November), Ponsot started preliminary talks with President Abid, who was very keen to play a central role in the affair.62 Both he and the High Commissioner wished to reach a successful conclusion, but the treaty that Abid had in mind was considerably different to the draft which, unbeknown to the Syrian President, had been in the High Commissioner’s pocket for a year. Unfortunately for the Syrians, and in contrast to some o f the highly trained and finely tuned minds o f certain nationalists, like Mardam or Fa’iz and Faris Khuri, the President only had general notions [100]

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about the treaty, and the stages that would be involved towards its implementation.61 Although he was politically shrewd, he was no match for the well-prepared Ponsot, who knew exactly where he wanted to lead the Syrians. The President unwisely accepted Ponsot s suggestion not to involve the cabinet directly in the negotiations, and only to include it when, for instance, a stage had been completed or when it was necessary to mark the orientation o f the whole process. Thus, for the following fortnight Abid became, in practice, the key Syrian negotiator.64 Two days after the vote o f confidence in the Chamber, Ponsot gathered together, around a cup o f tea, the President o f the Republic, the President o f the Chamber, the Prime Minister and the cabinet and in informal terms gave them a general introductory exposition o f French government intentions, referred to previous French declarations, and indicated his Government’s positive disposition to define the terms o f Syrian evolution towards independence. He stressed the significance o f the Anglo-Iraq treaty and took care to describe, in some detail, the nature and the substance o f the successive agreements that took place between Britain and Iraq between 1922 and 1930 and the necessity to anticipate, before the establishment o f a new regime in Syria, a period o f adaptation o f present institutions, the probable duration being in the order o f four years. He emphasised the distinction between those subjects that were the domain o f the treaty, namely the future relations between France and Syria, and such subjects as unity and a general amnesty, which were, in his view, outside the treaty domain and therefore best left out o f the negptiations in hand. Ponsot then informed the cabinet that if the Iraqi precedent were to be followed, it would be appropriate that its method be followed also i.e., first o f all the negotiation o f a treaty, a brief’accord de principe’ o f twelve articles, defining the bases o f future relations between the two countries. With the treaty concluded and announced, a period o f adaptation would start, namely the progressive involvement o f the local authorities in the exercise o f responsibilities up until then reserved for the Mandatory power, the treaty coming into force when this adaptation was complete. During the adaptation period, and as soon as the treaty in principle had been ratified, negotiations would continue concerning the conventions to be applied, which would be considered an integral part o f the treaty.64 On 16 November, Ponsot again brought the cabinet together and read out to them a draft treaty o f 12 articles, but took care not to hand [101]

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them a copy. The draft, he informed his listeners, had been written following his discussions with the President. In fact, it was almost identical to the draft that had been in his pocket for twelve months. In similar vein, he declared that even if the Syrian government agreed with it, he would need to send it to Paris for the French government to study it and give its approval.66 This too, was diplom atic’ truth as the draft had already been approved by Paris twelve months previously. In fact, the Syrian government was worried more by what was left out o f the draft i.e., the question o f unity, than the contents o f the 12 articles. Furthermore, the Syrian press had so dazzled local opinion that a treaty would soon be signed, which would signify the abolition o f Article 116, that the Syrian government was forced to spend considerable time searching for nuanced verbal formulae’ that would mask the necessity o f a period o f adaptation.67 Concerning the thorny issue o f unity, the government reluctandy accepted Ponsot’s demand that the subject be shelved, at least until after the signing o f the accord de principe’. Yet the government desperately needed to show public opinion that some progress was being made on the unity issue, however minimal. Hence it was very keen that mention be made in the accord de principe’ o f the maintenance o f the Common Interests organisation, which covered ‘Syria’ and the Druze and Alawite regions, as well as Lebanon. This suited the French well, because the draft treaty approved by the Department in 1931 contained precisely such a safeguarding clause.6* Nevertheless, the issue raised a longer-term problem for the French. A method o f management that would assure the representative o f the ex-Mandatory power the control o f legislation (customs tariffs) and the administration o f local resources (fonds communs) would be incompatible with the independence o f the State o f Syria. The maintenance o f this control would be viewed by Geneva, the Syrian government and the foreign powers as a means o f continued French predominance in economic affairs.69 Ponsot wrote to the Department, proposing two tactics. First, the insertion o f a general clause in the treaty whereby Syria and Lebanon would ask for French arbitration, in the event o f a financial dispute between the two Levant states. Second, the discreet participation o f French financial counsellors in key positions within the future Syrian Common Interests Secretariat.70 The correspondence between Ponsot and the Quai d’Orsay on this vital issue demonstrated once again the almost unbridgeable gulf between the French and the [102]

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Syrian vision o f Syria’s future. For the French, the eventual replacement o f the Mandate regime in Syria by a treaty meant, in large measure, the maintenance o f old wine (French essential interests) in a new skin (the treaty) whereas for the Syrians, any treaty was meant to be a practical demonstration o f the transformation o f the French-Syrian relationship and a substantial step toward complete emancipation from French control.7' By the time the High Commissioner left for Geneva on 22 November, he had managed to obtain the cabinets verbal agreement concerning a draft treaty, but there was no exchange o f formal documents. Both sides knew that there was little o f real value in a text which mentioned conventions without giving any details. The substance o f the treaty would lie in the financial, military and economic conventions, none o f which had been discussed. So instead, the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Syrian government, issued a communiqué which merely stated that the High Commissioners declaration in Geneva would describe the results o f his preliminary contacts with the Syrian government, and what could be forecast from them, concerning the political evolution o f Syria and the negotiation o f a treaty.72 In Geneva, Ponsot prefaced his remarks by referring to the end o f the Iraqi Mandate as having raised great hopes in the Arab world, which must lead to normal consequences that I am unable to avoid’.'' Then followed a few sentences that must have caused some amusement to Commission Members who, like the High Commissioner himself, were seasoned veterans o f diplomatic negotiations and in particular the preparation of'position papers: In Syria indeed, it is believed that the H igh Com m issioner had ‘in his pocket’ a prepared draft o f a Franco-Syrian treaty. N othing o f the kind. Such a text has never existed. I f M . Ponsot has the main outlines in his head, he plans to freely discuss it with his qualified interlocutors. H is intention is not to im pose on his interlocutors, by surprise, those points that unbeknown to them, he has already fixed in advance.'4

He concluded his introductory remarks with an obvious, if implicit, challenge to the nationalists: And even if, in spite o f our expectations, I were to com e across unexpected difficulties in Syria itself, I will not allow m yself to be

[103]

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stopped. I will say: ‘With you or without you, I will continue down the road and prepare the evolution and the end of the Mandate’.7’ Ponsot then went on to spell out his proposal. He suggested that the territory under French Mandate be divided into two zones, one a ‘treaty zone’, to comprise the State o f Syria, and the other a ‘Mandate zone’, to include Greater Lebanon, the Alawite state and the Jabal Druze. According to the High Commissioner, the formula o f the treaty was valid for Syria, whilst it was not necessary for the regions that accepted the Mandate o f their own accord: Syria, by means of its numerous organisations, has always contested the mandate. We never encountered similar difficulties, neither in Lebanon, nor in the Alawite State, nor in the Jabal Druze.76 When questioned by Baron Aloisi, the Italian President o f the Commission, whether the Alawites and Druze did, in (act, accept the Mandate, Ponsot replied: One should not attach too precise a meaning to the expression ‘to accept’ used here. In Syria, the Chamber, comprising 69 deputies, is not hostile to the Mandatory Power.77 It was a misleading response because the Syrian Chamber he referred to did not contain any deputies from the two autonomous regions in question. M . Ponsot went on to explain that in accordance with the Mandate Act, two states, Lebanon and Syria, were called to an ‘international vocation and that neither o f the two autonomous regions had been orientated towards constituting a State from the international point o f view; that because o f their political underdevelopment the best organisation to assure their evolution was autonomy; that their future would remain undecided until the termination o f their evolution and that if it pleased or suited either o f these regions to stay longer under the Mandate regime, he thought that it would be difficult for him to oppose or contest the value o f their reasoning’. In all, it was not a work o f division, but a constructive work o f preparation that the French were planning to accomplish and he proposed to settle such questions gradually, as they became ripe.78 [104]

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When pressed by the Dutch member o f the Commission, M . Van Rees, to describe his conception o f the ultimate future o f the two autonomous regions, the High Commissioner refused to be drawn: It is premature to resolve such problems . . . which are so delicate that if we try to settle them now, we will put back the progress that is being made at the moment . . . in order to have a better final solution, it is preferable not to raise the question today.79 The Quai d’Orsays real attitude to the unity issue was actually quite different: It is obvious that, contrary to the opinions of the Italian and German delegates in Geneva, France can grant independence to the former territories of Syria at different dates and in different forms.90 The above expressed the true French position. Just how seriously the Mandatory power intended to carry this idea through to its logical conclusion remains a mystery, but in 1933 it clearly thought that it was an option. This attitude was in stark contrast to repeated French declarations that, in accordance with the Mandate Act, two states, Lebanon and Syria, had an ‘international vocation.91 And in declaring that it faithfully intended to bring both Syria and Lebanon to full independence, in accordance with its Mandatory responsibilities, yet at the same time privately maintaining the option to bring a number o f regions o f Syria to independence at different times and in different forms, the French government showed, at the very least, that it did not take the League very seriously on this major question.92 Syrian nationalists reacted to Ponsot’s speech with disappointment and anger. Not only had he stalled and side-stepped on the issue o f Syrian unity, he had also refused to accord the National Bloc the foil recognition that it felt it deserved, by emphasising the presence in Syria o f different nationalist elements. And his phrase ‘with you or without you, near the beginning o f his speech, was a veritable ultimatum to the nationalists, although they were, at the same time, encouraged by his explicit reference in the same sentence to the ‘end o f the Mandate’,M Initially the High Commissioner received the heaviest criticism in Geneva, from Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in their periodical, La Nation Arabe.** Encouraged by the Commissions pertinent questioning (1051

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o f the High Commissioner, particularly on the question o f unity, Arslan and Jabiri lost no time in sending the good news to Cairo and the Levant. In Syria, political opinion was electrified when what the Secretary-General o f the High Commission, M. Helleu, described as the ‘misleading and tendacious’ reports o f the Geneva proceedings, appeared in the Beirut and Damascus press. Helleu endeavoured to calm the situation by publishing a communiqué which declared that all such reports were premature, because the official declarations o f the High Commissioner would only be made public when the Commission reported its conclusions to the Council, sometime in January 1933.85 Nevertheless, when the Syrian Chamber met on 15 December, following a fortnights adjournment, Zaki al-Khatib immediately raised the issue o f unity: he put down a motion summoning the gpvernment to declare whether or not it intended to take on the defence o f the nations aspirations, as it had committed itself to do. The Prime Minister, embarrassed and momentarily speechless, was saved by the nationalist minister, Mazhar Raslan Pasha, who stood up and declared that it would be appropriate to wait for the return o f the High Commissioner.86 Ponsot arrived back in Beirut on 6 January, disappointed that he had not received the approval o f the Commission for his policies, but nevertheless determined to pursue the negotiations. However, instead o f heading to Damascus, he stayed the whole o f January in Beirut, to deal with a series o f problems that required his immediate attention, in particular the Lebanese budget deficit, troop reductions and measures to relieve the distress o f nomads and peasants in the interior, where, because o f the long drought o f late 1932, an estimated one million livestock had perished. Syria was deep in the clutches o f the World Depression: the value o f her exports fell between 1929 and 1933 by one half, and that o f imports by 38 per cent, increasing the trade deficit by 18 per cent. Not only trade in the towns suffered - the drought ultimately led to famine conditions in the Hauran and Eastern Syria. It was against this background o f severe hardship for the vast majority o f the population (agricultural peasants) that the political conflict between the nationalists and the French authorities was played out.87 Meanwhile the unexpected turn o f events in Geneva continued to stimulate nationalist activity within Lebanon and Syria. On 20 January Ibrahim Hananu, speaking in a mosque on the subject o f the economic crisis, passionately recommended the non-payment o f taxes. Four days 1106]

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later, in another mosque speech, Hananu and his colleagues announced that they would follow a policy o f opposition to the government, which they accused o f buckling under to French pressure. They vigorously attacked the nationalist ministers." Ponsot probably could have dealt with this particular campaign o f nationalist activity without too much difficulty, had it not been for an event which took place on 24 January in Geneva, when the PM C report on Syria and Lebanon was presented to the League Council. The Italian President o f the Council, Baron Aloisi, remarked that according to his understanding, the Mandatory power envisaged to proceed in stages, in granting, for the moment, independence to Syria, that is to say, to only one o f the four administrative units into which the Mandatory power had divided the territory under mandate. But, he continued, . . . did the spirit of Article 22 and even the letter of the Mandate for Syria allow that the territory be shared, dismembered into many political units, to which one envisaged a different destiny?*4 His comments were immediately taken up by the German repres­ entative, M. Von Keller, who declared first, that he shared the opinion o f the Italian Government that the Mandate should end all in one go and second, that the plans tending to grant the independence o f Syria, whilst maintaining under mandate a country as developed as Lebanon, would not conform to the true political and economic interests o f the territory as a whole. In the face o f this unexpected attack on French policy, the Under-Secretary o f State, Pierre Cot, extricated himself by referring to M. Benes’s report, expressing the desire to postpone the debate until further information had been obtained. According to M. Cot, it therefore would be preferable to abide by the Commissions recommendation and not to open a debate at that moment on the matter.40 Following the session, the Italian delegation assured the French Ambassador in Geneva that neither they nor Baron Aloisi had been in prior contact with the Germans on the issue. However, the French had not failed to notice that the declaration o f support o f M. Von Keller was read from typed text and concluded that it probably was, in fact, a pre-meditated and concerted attack.41 The French immediately suspected that Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri, in liaison with the official Iraqi Delegation at the League, 1107]

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were behind the interventions and had probably supplied the Italian and German Delegates with all the necessary information on the question.92 Later, when the Delegate in Damascus asked Jam il Mardam for his opinion o f the incident, the Finance Minister replied that it probably was a manoeuvre o f Faysals, in order to put obstacles in the way o f the Franco-Syrian treaty. Mardam suggested, in particular, that the King probably resented the attitude taken by the French representative in Geneva at various times, notably on 19 May 1932, at the Council o f the League, concerning minorities in Iraq. On that occasion, M . Paul Boncour had insisted that for the Assyro-Chaldeans as well as the Kurds, the protection o f minorities should be expressed by autonomy.99 The Germans and Italians had no particular love o f the Syrians, nor much sympathy for their independence struggle against the French; the Syrian Question was a bargaining chip to be used in debates at the League at a time when relations between Paris, Berlin and Rome were deteriorating.94 Nevertheless, for Berlin and Rome it was not just a question o f playing the Syrian card at the League. The Italian and German governments were deeply suspicious - and perhaps correctly so - that France, in working to reach a settlement with Syria (o f the four towns), secretly desired to maintain its Mandate for a long time over the littoral (Lebanon and Latakia), and very firmly establish itself there, in expectation o f an international conflict, primarily because o f strategic reasons: the coastal region offered a potentially vital base for a naval fleet. Second, they equally feared that France would take advantage o f this situation to prevent Syria from obtaining an opening to the sea, and thus placing it economically at the mercy o f those states or governments o f the coast where the influence o f France would remain predominant. Hence both these countries wanted France to present a concrete plan as soon as possible on which the Commission would pronounce, before it was put into effect; if this procedure was not followed, they feared that they would find themselves in the presence o f a ‘fait accompli’.95 But for the French government such a procedure was out o f the question. The High Commissioner had been instructed to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the Syrians similar to the Anglo-Iraq Treaty o f 1930, which would then be sent to the League, for its approval. To accept to have their political plans for Syria and Lebanon examined in Geneva, before the conclusion o f a treaty with the Syrians, would have completely compromised the French position. [108]

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When the Organic Laws were promulgated in May 1930, the Quai d'Orsay anticipated that the evolution o f Syria and Lebanon would be conducted following the same rhythm and that their candidatures would be presented to the League at the same time. The French planned, however, that the future terms o f the Franco-Syrian treaty and the Franco-Lebanese treaty would be different, ‘with the second one having to preserve our position o f control and to assure us o f an installation more complete than the first’. * In 1930 the Lebanese constitution had been in operation for four years; the Syrian constitution had been promulgated but was not in force. By 1933 the situation was reversed: the Syrian constitution was functioning, the Lebanese constitution had been suspended for over a year and could not, according to the French, be re-established ‘without precautions and delays’. The French were thus led to deal with the Syrian situation before the Lebanese and to anticipate the presentation in Geneva o f the Franco-Syrian treaty during a period when they could only give the Lebanese assurances o f their good intentions. After six years o f relative quiet in Geneva on the Syrian Question, the interventions had reopened the debate on an international level and had considerable repercussions. Nationalists everywhere interpreted them as an official expression o f Germany and Italy in favour o f Syrian unity and they reinforced the position o f nationalist groups in exile, notably in Switzerland, Egypt and Iraq.97 And in Beirut, a dismayed Ponsot acknowledged that they had put the question o f unity ‘back on the front burner’.* Immediately exploiting this undisguised intervention o f Italy and Germany in favour o f Syrian unity, Shakib Arslan and Ihsan Jabiri, in Geneva, sent a telegram to the press in Damascus: We ask you to deny the rumour of our agreement with the High Commissioner. We firmly demand complete unity and entire inde­ pendence.” To combat this news the High Commissioner immediately published a communiqué in which he denied that any agreement had been reached between him and the Syrian leaders in Geneva.100 Uncertainty reigned in government circles and in the face o f an increasingly strident nationalist campaign in the press and the mosques, centred on the unity issue and led [1091

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by Hananu and the Aleppo Bloc, the government’s silence demonstrated the fragility o f its position, rather than its strength. The High Com ­ missioner counter-attacked by placing his thesis on unity, such as he had outlined it in Geneva, fully in the Syrian public arena. By putting the Syrian government, the Chamber and public opinion fully in the picture, the High Commissioner hoped to take the steam out o f the hard-line nationalists’ unity campaign and to strengthen the position o f the government both in the Chamber and in front o f public opinion. On 1 February he invited the President o f the Syrian Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister o f Finance to Beirut. After reading out to them the declaration that he had made in Geneva that he had refrained from using until then and the verbal report o f the discussion at the Mandates Commission, he handed them the official Commission report and the Benes report, as well as various German and Italian press cuttings related to the German and Italian interventions in the Council. He highlighted the conformity o f his declarations in Geneva with the assurances that he had given them before leaving Damascus the previous November and emphasised the necessity, before any real re-starting o f negotiations, to publicise as widely as possible his declarations and the foreign reactions to it. President Abid, Haqqi al-Azm and Jam il Mardam raised no objections to this proposal. As a deliberate tactic, the High Commissioner then published the documents in the Lebanese and Syrian press over a period o f three consecutive days: on 2 February, his Geneva Declaration, on 3 February the verbal report o f the discussion o f the Mandates Commission and on 4 February the official Commission report and M. Benes’s report to the League Council.101 The frankness o f the documents published and the obligation to take up a position on them caused a certain disarray in nationalist circles. At a series o f meetings in Damascus the group o f immediate supporters o f Jamil Mardam, which included the deputies Fa’iz Khuri, Lutfi H aflar and A fif Solh, seemed concerned above all to warn the Party against a rupture with the French. But others, notably Zaki al-Khatib, Ihsan Sharif and Fakhri Barudi, considered it impossible to compromise on the question o f unity. As for Jamil Mardam, he remained extremely prudent and avoided expressing any word that would make him vulnerable one way or another on the unity issue. A born politician, his philosophy seemed to be to ’turn’ the issue, rather than to decide on it, just as other issues had been successfully turned in the past, such as the participation U10]

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o f the nationalists in the elections, their presence in sessions o f Parliament and their recognition o f the Constitution. According to Mardam, a promise o f unity having been demanded by the nationalists as a pre-condition, before negotiations, the simple fact o f a re-starting o f official talks would, in reality, turn the issue because they would constitute an abandonment o f that position o f principle. This attitude was inspired by tactical considerations, rather than a genuine acceptance o f the terms o f the High Commissioners programme.102 For different reasons, both the Syrian government and the French were keen to conclude the treaty negotiations before the summer. The French had their eyes on the June session o f the Mandates Commission in Geneva, when no doubt the Germans and Italians would be tempted to once again play the Syrian card. If, however, the Mandatory power managed to arrive in Geneva with a treaty signed and ratified by the Syrian Chamber, its position would be considerably strengthened vis-à-vis such manoeuvres. For its part, the Syrian government, in particular the two nationalist ministers, were seriously worried that if the talks had not been successfully concluded by the time o f the opening session o f Parliament in mid-March, there could be a vote o f no-confidence taken, where the moderates, irritated at being completely excluded from the negotiations, would temporarily join forces with some o f the nationalists (Atasi, Zaki al-Khatib and others), to bring down the government. Mardam and Raslan Pasha were, moreover, animated by the understandable desire not to abandon their cabinet posts, and to consolidate their personal popularity by a re-starting o f the talks.103 As for Ibrahim Hananu and his supporters, the publication o f the documents forced them once again to make their position clear. They invited Hashim al-Atasi to Aleppo, who arrived there by car on 12 February, accompanied by Negib Agha Barazi and Tawfiq Shishakli, deputies from Hama. Hananu welcomed them outside the city with a cortege o f 65 cars and around 4,000 supporters. Hard-line speeches to the crowd from the balcony o f Hananus home followed. The event signalled the start o f another National Bloc Congress, this time on Hananus home ground. Ihsan Sharif, Afif Solh, Shukri Quwwadi, Paris al-Khuri and others soon arrived from Damascus and intense discussions ensued.104 But Mardam, Raslan and Riyad Solh stayed away under various pretexts and only arrived on 16 February, to verify their own position and to prevent a rupture with the party.104 Over the following three days o f intense debate, Mardam and

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his supporters found themselves continually on the defensive, facing a barrage o f criticism for continuing a useless policy o f collaboration. The Congress ended on Saturday 19 February, when a National Bloc manifesto appeared simultaneously in the Damascus and Aleppo press, signed by Hashim al-Atasi: The Bloc has decided to proclaim to the noble people, in the interior and the littoral, their attachment to the rights of the country based on its unity and sovereign nationality. Any treaty or negotiation for a treaty of alliance with France not based on these foundations do not merit acceptance. . . and members of the National Bloc will not enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty until assured of the achievement of Unity and the acceptance of negotiations on this basis.106 Hananu and the hard-liners had got their way: no member o f the Bloc was to negotiate until the High Commissioner accepted the Blocs position on unity. In their ‘wear and tear’ conflict with the nationalists, the French authorities used a considerable number o f unofficial tactics. The Mandate archives in Paris and Nantes include reports written by paid informers, many o f them describing the details o f private nationalist gatherings, mosdy the who said what’ variety. There was also regular interception o f telephone calls and letters by French officials. Typical is an intercepted letter from Hananu to Abd al-Hamid Karami, the nationalist leader in Tripoli, Lebanon, written immediately after the Aleppo Congress. Hananu concludes: ‘The French believe it is not possible for us to revolt and playing on our weakness, try to play with us. We can say to them: it probably is not in our power to rise militarily against you - but we retain our faculty to love or to hate. And it would be better for France to show us goodwill, for the Mandate is not eternal. If we were to obtain some benefits from France, our minds would retain grateful memories o f her. But if she wishes to accomplish the dismemberment o f our country, and through that our degradation, we will be forced by the facts to hate her. It will not be by such that a new page o f glory in the history o f France will be written, nor by it that the French Army will find new admirers’.'07 But at the same time as the nationalists were actively campaigning for unity, a movement against these Damascus claims was developing in [112]

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the Alawite region and in the Jabal Druze, carefully orchestrated by High Commission officials. In Latakia, all the tribal chiefs and main religious leaders gathered from 13-19 February to examine the situation. The text it adopted following this Congress expressed the Alawite preference for an administrative independence which would ‘guarantee the desired evolution under the protection o f the Mandatory power. According to the High Commissioner, this text ‘reflected reasonably accurately the average Alawite point o f view’.101 In the Jabal Druze, notables gathered in Kanawat on 23 February, the residence o f the main Druze religious leader, Abd al-Ghaffar Pasha al-Atrash. On his initiative a manifesto was adopted and sent to M . Ponsot: ‘we support your declarations made to the Mandates Commission and confirm our profound attachment to the Mandatory pow er.109 Whilst the nationalists were meeting in Aleppo, the High Com ­ missioner held a series o f private, i.e. unofficial, negotiating sessions with President Abid in Damascus. Neither the Prime Minister nor any o f the cabinet were present at any o f these sessions."0 After three months o f difficult negotiations, centred on the draft treaty, which had proved to be a minefield o f political issues, and in particular unity, Ponsot decided to change tack. Having re-stated to the President that it was 'useless to continue discussions concerning unity’, he suggested that they discuss and establish the conventions to be annexed to the treaty first, and return to the draft treaty later."1 The High Commissioner hoped that once the procedures to be followed during the period o f evolution had been agreed, the political questions o f the draft treaty could be more easily settled. The President readily agreed to this change o f priorities and over ten days the two men examined such questions as the judicial laws, the status o f foreigners and the economic equality o f League members concerning trade and tariffs."2 M. Ponsot returned to Beirut on 23 February to deal with an evolving Lebanese situation and to prepare for the Conference o f Common Interests, scheduled for the first week o f March. His departure from Damascus also gave the Syrian government time to consider an official reaction to the nationalist manifesto o f 19 February. Since the previous November Jamil Mardam had very adroidy run two horses at the same time - as the Syrian government negotiator and as a faithful member o f the National Bloc. But following the explicit and well-publicised decision o f the Aleppo Congress, his room to manoeuvre had greatly [113]

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diminished. Nevertheless, the Minister o f Finance was not so easily outmanoeuvred. He ‘turned’ the problem by interpreting the passage concerning the guarantee o f unity as authorising the ministers to negotiate if they were convinced that in doing so they would facilitate the achieve­ ment o f unity. In Beirut for the Conference o f Common Interests Mardam impressed upon Ponsot that the Syrian government thus considered itself ready to re-start talks on the basis o f his declarations in Geneva. At the same time, Mardam did not hide from the High Commissioner that if a guarantee relative to unity was not indicated for the future, it would be difficult to conclude the negotiations."3 The High Commissioner drew the conclusion that the government and its nationalist supporters hoped above all to remain in power, albeit in an ambiguous position, and to gain time discussing the technical conventions, hoping that the Mandatory power would make some concessions on the treaty’s political clauses before the June session in Geneva."4 Ponsot returned to Damascus for a few days on 12 March and re-started unofficial and unpublicised talks with the Syrian government."3 An announcement o f the re-starting o f negotiations so soon after the publication o f the nationalist manifesto would have put the government, and Mardam in particular, on the spot. At the same time, the High Commissioner was concerned that if the government was unable to take refuge behind the argument that official negotiations were in progress, it would risk being overthrown at the first debate in Parliament, which was scheduled to meet for the Spring/Summer session a week later."6 So, as a precautionary measure and to give the government more time to manoeuvre, President Abid signed a decree on 13 March postponing the opening session for a month, to Saturday 22 April."7 A fortnight later, the High Commissioner judged the situation calm enough to re-start official talks on the conventions and from 31 March to 7 April, Ponsot met daily with Mardam in D am ascus."1 Meanwhile an event took place in Paris which added a new element to the political debate in Syria. On 30 March, in the French Chamber, M. Sixte-Quentin, who had on numerous occasions publicly supported the Syrian nationalist cause, called again for the immediate evacuation o f the Levant and the consequent unification o f Syria to the benefit o f the Muslim majority. He was supported by another deputy, M. Renaudel, who recommended evacuation to alleviate French military expenditure."9 U14]

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In reply to this attack on French government policy, M. Daladier, Prime Minister, pointed out that in conformity with the Mandate Act, the government was pursuing the emancipation o f the Levant States. It wanted them to be admitted to the League o f Nations after having settled, by means o f a Treaty o f Alliance, all the financial, military and economic questions upon which the future o f French relations with them depended. In particular, he vigorously affirmed the historic French responsibilities towards all the populations under Mandate. He noted the 'mosaic o f races and religions’ present in Syria, ‘the special importance o f religious conflicts in the oriental countries’ and the difficulties that the superposition o f ‘economic, ethnic and moral diversities' placed on the Mandatory power. He continued in the following terms, which were applauded: The day that you recall our troops without having settled the problems that I have just mention«!, you risk seeing the different races pounce upon one another, as has happened very often in their history. . . What do you want us to do? We want to progressively reduce the military occupation. We want to reduce the expenses. We want to lead Syria, in a sentiment of profound friendship, to the League of Nations. But we do not want, by an adventurous or reckless policy, to compromise the results that have already been obtained.120 The French Prime Minister seemed to have forgotten that since the last episode o f inter-communal strife in the Levant in 1860, the races o f Europe had pounced upon each other twice. Moreover, in his speech M. Daladier contrasted the extreme variety o f races in Syria to the situation in Iraq, where ‘Great Britain was able to proceed much more rapidly and with greater ease than ourselves, because it exercised its Mandate over populations that are for the most part homogeneous, over an area that already had a certain unity and where, over the centuries, a sort o f collective conscience had emerged’. The Prime Minister was indeed fortunate that his listeners in the Chamber probably knew less about Iraq than they did about Syria. When the British installed Faysal on the throne o f Iraq in 1921, one o f their major problems in pacifying the country was the fact that the populations were far from homogeneous and there was no sense o f national unity.121 When, in the second week o f April, the details o f M. Daladier s speech in the Chamber arrived in the 11151

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Levant, they became the main point o f discussion amongst the nationalists gathered in Damascus and the main story in the Syrian and Lebanese press. Not surprisingly, in Beirut the right-wing l'O rient highlighted the passage concerning Frances mission to raise Syria to a state o f political independence and endeavoured to show that such an achievement could not be instantaneous: that it demanded the conclusion o f economic, financial and military agreements. On the other hand al-Qabas and other Syrian nationalist papers were understandably more passionate and protested violendy against Daladier’s allusion relative to the ‘mosaic o f races, doctrines and religions’ that were to be found in Syria. Remarking that ‘in Europe massacres are tolerated’, whenever they were the work o f a powerful state like Germany, and when its heroes were Hider and the Nazi Party, al-Q abas concluded: We form a unique nation by our language, our race, our interests, our suffrances, our hopes and our territory. We desire a single state uniting Sunnites, Shi'ites, Druze, Alawites, Catholics and Orthodox, and whether or not we adore God or the Devil, it is not you who are responsible for the relations existing between ourselves and the objects of our veneration.1" Meanwhile, the re-starting o f official talks at the end o f March coincided with increased nationalist activity, which once again stirred up public opinion against the collaborationist government. Zaki al-Khatib published a hard-line manifesto in the Damascus press on 4 April, denouncing Mardam’s policy and declaring that he would break o ff relations with the Finance Minister if unity was not achieved.123 In the same week, on the occasion o f the Bayram feast, the town o f Homs was the theatre o f demonstrations in honour o f the nationalist leaders from the north. Gathered at Hashim al-Atasi’s house, 150 persons acclaimed Ibrahim Hananu and Dr Kayyali, who reassured their audience that the treaty had not been signed, in spite o f rumours to the contrary - and then formulated their demands: unity, the abolition o f French administrative advisors and the creation o f a national army. If the ministers did not accept to follow this line, they would be disavowed.124 A pessimistic Jamil Mardam reluctantly took the road to Homs, where the nationalist gathering developed into a National Bloc Congress and transferred to Damascus. Hananu, Atasi and the Damascus-based Istiqlalis feared that Mardam would queer the abstentionist campaign by proposing [1161

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an eleventh-hour deal, which could redivide the fragile Bloc. Or, they feared, he might tty to convince his moderate supporters to carry out negotiations independently o f the Bloc.1” A few days later, another National Bloc manifesto appeared in the Damascus press, signed by Atasi: The liberal-nationalists have not finished their talks. They are, however, unanimous in maintaining the decision taken at the last Conference in Aleppo.126 In the face o f this latest definition o f doctrine, Mardam, becoming increasingly desperate, endeavoured to manoeuvre.127 Meanwhile the High Commissioner, whose eyes were firmly set on the opening session o f the Syrian Chamber on 22 April and the June meeting o f the PM C, decided to change tack once again and to lead the discussion back to the political clauses o f the treaty, which in his view were ‘the only ones on which the debate can be finally settled’.12* There were four clauses in the draft treaty which warranted particular attention: unity, independence, the Common Interests and the protection o f minorities. Concerning independence, it was a question o f the provision o f the length o f delay before Syria would be admitted to the League. The French suggested four years. The question o f the management o f the Common Interests was fundamentally a question o f control. At the time, the High Commissioner had complete control o f the Common Interests, which provided a considerable part o f the budget o f all the territories under Mandate. The (provisional) budget figures for 1932 (millions o f francs): Lebanon 104, Syria 186, Alexandretta 16, Jabal Druze 6, Latakia 26, Common Interests 165. Total: 503. In other words, the Common Interests made up approximately one third o f the total budget o f the territories under Mandate, and over 88 per cent o f the total Syrian budget.124 The protection o f minorities did not form pan o f the nationalists’ demands, but from the stan o f talks in November 1932 the Syrian government admitted its discussion and declared itself ready to make, with the French government, a commitment similar to that which Iraq had taken vis-à-vis the League o f Nations, and to register this commitment in the treaty. For the French, the crux o f the problem was that although the Syrian Constitution included articles concerning permanent guarantees o f public law conferred on individuals and communities, the status o f [1171

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communities themselves and the personal status o f minorities belonging to different confessions was not defined in any organic text. Such a text, o f secondary interest as long as the Mandate continued, would become vitally important under a treaty regime. For the French it was essential that such a text be established before the treaty came into force. But the verbal complexity o f the definitions involved necessitated a long period o f time to write such a definitive text and to negotiate it with the Syrians, and at that stage the French were keen to conclude. The High Commissioner emphasised to Paris that the minorities were extremely worried by the draft treaty, as were certain elements within the Chamber itself: ‘It has to be remembered that the support o f the minorities was the key element for the success o f the moderate list in the North [in the 1931-2 elections]; that the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, grouped under the Presidency o f Subhi Bey Barakat, was cemented together by minorities o f all the different rites, and that Subhi Bey himself, before being nominated as head o f the party, had to make the most formal commitments to the Christians. M gr Tappouni, the Syrian-Catholic patriarch, was the kingpin o f this whole com bination.130 For the French, however, whilst the protection o f minorities was a vital issue, unity was the vital issue. The question was, could it be turned?131 On 15 April, while Atasi and Hananu continued to steer the Bloc Congress sessions, the High Commissioner arrived in the capital from Beirut. Over the next four days, Ponsot had six lengthy meetings with President Abid, all o f them concerned exclusively with the question o f unity.132 The High Commissioner reported to Paris his continued affirmation to the Syrian Government that his position was defined by his declarations in Geneva and that this meant that ‘Latakia and the Jabal Druze . . . did not yet have an international vocation, and to postpone any decision on their future as long as local developments have not been confirmed and as long as Syria has not proved itself. . .’ (The word yet’ here was later crossed out by the High Commissioner - a Freudian slip on his part?) The President and the cabinet were searching for a written formula on which both sides could agree. On the evening o f 18 April, President Abid, who was exceedingly keen that the negotiations succeed, privately handed the High Commissioner two such efforts, both o f which started by an affirmation o f unity. One was probably the work o f Jamil Mardam and the other that o f the President himself.133 [118]

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The first formula stated: ‘A lthough an integral part o f Syria to which the present Treaty is applied, but given certain considerations and certain particular necessities, the two regions o f the Alawites and the Jabal Druze will be endowed with a special regime susceptible to progressive modifications, in harmony with the local evolution. The coming into force o f this regime will terminate the present regime in force in these regions. Considering on the other hand that, at the moment when the frontiers o f the Lebanese Republic were fixed, the vital interests o f Syria were not taken into account, the modification o f these frontiers will proceed by means o f direct negotiations between the two Governments with a view to safeguarding the rights o f Syria and to guaranteeing its maritime routes o f communication/ The High Commissioner saw Jamil Mardams hand behind this formula. The second formula read: ‘The two contracting parties recognise that whilst being pan o f Syria, the Governments o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze, finding themselves in a particular situation, make it necessary for them to be placed under a special regime. The definition o f this regime should be fixed in taking account o f the aspirations o f the populations o f the two regions/ M . Ponsot thought that this formula was the work o f President Abid himself, ‘in an extreme desire to be conciliating'/34 Having studied both formulae, the High Commissioner concluded that it would be premature to accept either o f them. His reasoning was quite simple. He informed Paris that, in his opinion, we cannot indicate further, concerning the future, without perturbing those populations that have been conferred on us and without risking to provoke reactions that would cause the immediate coming about of unity. . . if unity is for the nationalists a question of doctrine, it is for us a question of the Syrian government appreciating and facing facts.114 Neither the Quai d’Orsay nor the High Commissioner were seriously worried that communal warfare might break out if unity was conceded, in spite o f what Daladier had declared in the French Chamber.116 Ponsot was always concerned about the security in the Jabal Druze, but the potential outbreak o f an insurrection provoked by the imposition o f unity by the French was never a concern o f the High Commissioner. It is dear that men like St Quentin, the aristocratic, deputy head o f the Middle East desk during this period who wrote many o f the reports on (H 9)

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Lebanon and Syria, flavoured them - and understandably so —with his own ‘colonial party’ attitudes. The Minister thus received a particular vision o f affairs and in the case o f Syria, this vision was not always that o f the man on the spot. So perhaps we should not be surprised by the tone and content of, for instance, M . Daladier’s Declaration to the Chamber on 30 March 1933. The French were more concerned that if they made the slightest concession at that stage on the issue, not only would the nationalists take the credit and in so doing weaken the French negotiating position, but more importandy, the minorities would likely come to some immediate arrangement with the Muslim majority —taking out a kind o f ‘insurance policy’ for the future.137This potential ‘change o f sides’ by the minorities was a constant theme o f the High Commissioner to Paris during this period. Furthermore, if unity was conceded, the whole French position concerning the historic protection o f minorities in the Levant would be questioned, with incalculable consequences for their position in Lebanon.138 By mid-April Mardam despaired o f squaring the circle. The High Commissioner showed no sign o f giving an inch on the unity issue, the doctrinaire attitude o f the Bloc seemed equally inflexible and Mardam himself had no desire to split an already fragile Bloc, an event from which only the French would benefit. On 18 April Mardam gave the President his letter o f resignation.139 The same day, Mardam wrote to Hashim al-Atasi, as leader o f the Nationalist Party, informing him o f his resignation in obedience to the decision o f the party. He also expressed his regret at abandoning a road which to him appeared to assure the achievement o f their national aims, including unity. He placed the responsibility for the rupture on the President o f the party.140 President Abid and Mardam hoped that most o f the nationalist deputies and the principal nationalist militants who took part in the Damascus Congress would then immediately write to Atasi, to support Mardam’s point o f view. Faced with a large number o f official letters, Atasi and Hananu would back down from taking such a doctrinaire position as they had at the Congress, and would show some tolerance in the face o f the majority tendency, concerned that otherwise they could be undermining an effort which showed signs o f working.141 In the event, the manoeuvre failed, because two days later Atasi and Hananu published their manifesto: 1120]

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The negotiations that have taken place so far between the Syrian negotiator and the officials of the High Commission arc basically in the framework of the declarations of the High Commissioner to the Mandates Commission. They contain no acknowledgement of Syrian unity . . . The continuation of the policy of cooperation is only possible in the presence of sincerity on the pan of the French negotiators . . . That is why we see it as our duty to halt the policy of cooperation, started by the nationalist party in Parliament, until the French show an attitude that contributes to the restarting of negotiations.. .14J That same day, 20 April, Mardam announced his departure and was carried from his office at the Sérail to his residence on the shoulders o f a cheering crowd. Not long after this rather astonishing spectacle, Mazhar Raslan Pasha submitted his resignation. It was no mean victory for the Bloc which, with Hashim al-Atasi and Ibrahim Hananu to the fore, had once again demonstrated its leadership o f the independence movement.'45 The next day, 21 April, following the Friday prayers, a group o f around 400 persons tried to march to Parliament, to demonstrate against it, and to discourage deputies from attending the opening session, fixed for the following morning, but were easily dispersed by the police.144 Nevertheless, the authorities took no chances. M. Weber had a cordon o f troops and road blocks around the Parliament building in place by seven o’clock the next morning.145 The French then cut the telephone lines within the city and to the outside world to prevent the circulation o f rumours. As the deputies arrived, armoured cars circulated in the streets and groups o f protestors sang national songs outside the Parliament building.146 In this atmosphere Parliament met. Although nationalist deputies stayed away, a quorum o f one-half was mustered (38 out o f 69 deputies attended) and the Assembly opened. After the reading o f the Minutes o f the last session, the word was given to the Prime Minister, who immediately asked the Chamber to adjourn until the following Thursday, out o f respect for the President o f the Republic, who needed some time to resolve the crisis following the resignation o f the two Ministers.147 Shakir Ni'mat then demanded the microphone and made an ardent and eloquent speech which could have come from the mouth o f any o f the militant nationalist deputies. He missed nothing: the remembrance o f all those who had died during the (121)

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various insurrections, the minute o f silence for the repose o f their souls; Maysalun, the Ghouta, the Jabal Druze, the insurrections o f the north, followed by an enthusiastic oudining o f all the nationalist programme consisting o f sovereignty, independence and unity, the last being cited several times. He then proposed that the resignation o f the two nationalist ministers had in fact terminated the existence o f the government, because only one Ministry, that o f Public Works, remained working (according to Shakir Ni'mat, the Prime Minister was not a minister). Shakir clearly hoped for a place in a new cabinet. Various moderates voiced their disapproval o f Shakirs speech and proposed that the Prime M inisters motion be put to the vote. As M. Weber later recalled: By what could be imputed as a parliamentary error, but more likely was a move by Subhi Bey to torpedo our initiative, the President of the Chamber gave the priority to Shakirs motion, which only received three votes, including Shakir himself__'** The Prime M inisters motion, to adjourn the Chamber for five days, was then put to the vote and unanimously adopted, minus one vote, that o f Shakir N i‘m at.149 On 28 April, the High Commissioner sent Paris a revised text o f the draft treaty, with two protocols attached. He planned to re-start the negotiations as soon as a new cabinet was formed and had received a vote o f confidence in the Chamber or, to be more precise, he planned to lead the Syrian government to ‘define its position on the treaty in its entirety and the two protocols: It is . . . on these carefully examined positions that we will be called to do battle, the normal outcome of which will be their acceptance or refusal of the Treaty.150 The High Commissioners treaty crossed with fresh instructions from Paris. On 29 April, the Quai d’Orsay confirmed Ponsots suggestion, o f the nineteenth, to maintain the French position o f principle on the question o f unity and reconfirmed their previous instructions to the High Commissioner: First, tell the Syrians that we are resolved to conduct toward eman­ cipation all the populations presently placed under our tutelage, 1122]

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those of Lebanon, the Alawites and the Jabal Druze, as well as Syria. Second, repeat to them the sound advice to organise themselves, in the framework of the Treaty, on the territory that is at present under the control of the Damascus Government, in order to prove their capacity to administer new territories. Third, add that France would not oppose the extension of the Syrian state, provided that the will of the populations, as manifested by the qualified organisations (Rep. council of the Alawites and the Government Council of the Druze) was respected: substantial autonomy would be an essential condition of any re-connection. Fourth, leave aside the territorial questions of Syria and Lebanon, but insist on the necessity to perfect the organisation of Common Interests, in order to create a solidarity of economic interests that would facilitate the solution of political problems. . . . [This programme] should help to gain the approval of the Mandates Commission when we submit the treaty to it, and if, contrary to our hopes and our interests, we are not able to present the treaty in Geneva this June, it would at least largely prevent us from bearing responsibility for the failure to bring the treaty.151 On May 3, Prime Minister Haqqi al-Azm managed to come up with a new government. He retained the Ministry o f Interior and Selim Jam ban took on the Education portfolio, in addition to that o f Public Works. The newcomers to government were Muhammad Yahya al-Adali o f Antioch, the doyen d ’âge o f the Chamber (Agriculture and Commerce); Shaykh Sulayman Jukhadar o f Damascus, a former counsellor at the Court o f Cassation (Justice) and the provocative Shakir N im at al-Sha‘bani (Finance).152 The French hoped that as the new cabinet was composed entirely o f moderates, it would be more flexible in the treaty negotiations, have a reasonable majority in the Chamber and that under the influence o f Shakir N im at, whom they expected to play a leading role, a bloc o f northern and southern moderates might be formed, who until then had been quite divided.153 Before negotiations restarted, the High Commissioner informed the Quai d'Orsay: A positive or negative conclusion must soon be reached, for the tone of the Treaty and the protocols annexed have already been thoroughly examined and we cannot henceforth make any concessions whatsoever on any of the articles as submitted for Your Excellency's approval by [me] on 28 April.'54 [123]

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The new cabinet was about to be asked by the High Commissioner to sign more or less on the dotted line. M. Ponsot once again warned Paris o f what might happen if he modified his position on unity: . . . The present crisis is the trial of strength of nationalism . . . At the first sign of our abandonment the autonomists like the minorities would in (act endeavour to obtain the most favourable position at the heart of the promised unity, by coming to an agreement with our adversaries.155 On 7 May, another National Bloc manifesto was published in the main nationalist newspapers o f Damascus, signed by Atasi and Hananu, denying rumours that Bloc policy had modified in any way and stressing the impossibility o f the Bloc to pursue a policy o f collaboration.156 On 8 May, with troops again surrounding Parliament and the suqs closed at the behest o f the nationalist activists, Haqqi al-Azm presented his new cabinet for a vote o f confidence to the Chamber. Forty-three deputies were present; the nationalists did not appear. In his Ministerial Declaration, the Prime Minister undertook that the government would carry on treaty negotiations in the concern to achieve its national aspirations and in particular Syrian unity. Nearly all the 43 deputies present gave their support to the government, the ’Liberal Constitutionalists’ happily leading the way, with two o f their members now in the cabinet. The Chamber adjourned.157 In spite o f considerable internal debate, the nationalists continued to boycott Parliament for the test o f the summer session. Negotiations started with the new cabinet, but progress was slow and the High Commissioner had no brief to make any further concessions. By mid-May the Quai d’Orsay was becoming very concerned.15* If the negotiations were not terminated before the June session o f the Mandates Commission, it knew that the discussion would then start not from a text but from our intentions, that is to say in the most dangerous conditions for us, because our adversaries, both at home and abroad, would have complete freedom to manoeuvre.1W Nevertheless, after less than two weeks o f talks with the new cabinet, the High Commissioner decided that it was impossible to conclude the negotiations before the Mandates session: the moderate Syrian government [124]

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simply could not be persuaded to make the concessions that the French regarded as essential. As the French had no wish to arrive in Geneva vulnerable’, some diplomatic tactic now became imperative, in particular to outflank the Italian and German manoeuvres that were anticipated at the session. The High Commissioner then came up with a novel idea. On 25 May, he suggested to Paris that the French Government write to the Council o f the League o f Nations, requesting that it examine the administrative chapters o f the annual report during the June session o f the Mandates Commission session, and postpone the examination o f the political chapters o f the report until the October-November session.'60 In response M. de Caix, the French representative at the PM C in Geneva, commented in a lengthy note from Paris (7 June) that first, it would be impossible to arrive at the session for a ’reduced’ examination without the Commission’s prior agreement. Second, present circumstances allowed the French less than ever to depan from a procedure resting on a firmly based precedent. Third, the Commission was depending on a political statement from the representative o f the Mandatory power in June 1933, having indicated in its observations to the League Council, at the end o f the previous session, that it would give its advice when the Mandatory power had furnished more details. Finally, the Commission would probably consider itself more than ever obliged to raise the question o f the evolution o f French relations with the countries under Mandate because o f the observations made on 24 January in the League Council. De Caix proposed that the only procedure to follow to try and carry out the High Commissioner’s request was to write to the Secretary-General o f the League that M. Ponsot being ill and wanting himself to give a political report, the French Government regretfully requests that the examination of the report be postponed to the Autumn session.161 M. de Caix’s reference to the High Commissioner’s illness is signi­ ficant. M . Ponsot had, in fret, fallen ill - at least officially - during the last days o f May. Indeed, in bringing to a close the summer session o f the Syrian Chamber on 31 May, Haqqi al-Azm had expressed his sympathy, on behalf o f all the deputies, for the High Commissioner and hoped that he would make a speedy and full recovery from his illness and be able to pursue and conclude the treaty negotiations, to fulfil the aspirations o f the country.162 [1251

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The Quai d’Orsays answer to M . Ponsots suggestion was sent on 12 June by M . Alexis Léger, the newly appointed Secretary-General o f the Quai d'Orsay, who confirmed that the postponement o f the examination o f the report to the Autumn session was ‘indispensable’ and that certain members o f the Commission would be tempted to renew their manoeuvres against French policy at the session: Under these conditions I intend to write to the Secretary General of the League of Nations this week, to inform him of your illness and to ask him to postpone until the Autumn the examination of our administratorship, so that you yourself can present the report on the political situation. But I will add that, in order to avoid overcharging the October session, the Department is ready to send M. de Caix to Geneva, to deal with and reply to questions about the administrative side of the report.163 The Quai d’Orsay reasoned that if the Commission decided to postpone the examination o f the report entirely, it would have taken a neutral position that would be difficult to change. On the other hand, if it preferred to examine the report immediately, M . de Caix would attempt to keep the treaty excluded from the debate and ‘endeavour to limit the curiosity o f the Commission as much as possible.’ M . Alexis Léger was officially appointed Secretary-General o f the Quai d’Orsay on 28 February 1933: he remained in office until 1940. On 23 June, the Quai d’Orsay telegraphed M. Ponsot that it had received from the Mandates Commission the following resolution: The Commission deeply regrets that M. Ponsot was forced to renounce his hope of collaborating with it during this present session. It hopes for the prompt and complete recovery of his health. The Commission will be happy to examine, horn the 29 June onwards, with the assistance of M. de Caix, the annual report on the situation in Syria and Lebanon for 1932. It will, as usual, ask M. de Caix all questions on the administration of this territory and of its evolution in the political, economic and social domains under the Mandate regime. In accordance with the wish of the French Government, it will postpone until the Autumn 1933 session the examination, with M. Ponsots participation, of questions that remain open after the audition with M. de Caix.164

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The first paragraph o f the citation above is straightforward. The second is a notable example o f diplomatic textual artistry o f a high order. As M. de Caix admitted, it was necessary to study every last word in order to interpret the meaning o f the resolution.'6’ De Caix, in fact, was reasonably confident about the strength o f the French position in Geneva. In his opinion, the organisation that they had given the Levant was in conformity to the spirit and terms o f the Mandate Charter and the League had accepted not only that organisation, but also the Organic Law o f 1930 that consecrated it. The difficulty was not to reply to Geneva, but to speak in a way that would not add to the High Commissioners difficulties in Damascus: We must avoid both exciting the unitary nationalists as much as possible and avoid weakening our position by disheartening the minorities, beneficiaries or not of autonomy, who would rally enthusiastically to the nationalists if they believed themselves to be abandoned by u s .. .m All went smoothly for the French at the PM C on 29 June, when M. de Caix was heard. The French representative had somehow managed to make a prior agreement with the Italian President o f the Commission that no general report would be given at the beginning o f the examination. In fact all the thorny questions that the French feared might be raised were left aside. In particular there was no mention o f the autonomous states, the protection o f minorities or the question o f a Franco-Lebanese treaty. The only questions raised concerned the previous twelve months and petitions that were unrelated to the political future regimes o f Syria and Lebanon.167 Robert de Caix was by this time a veteran operator at the PM C, having represented France there for a decade. He knew the Commission members personally and no doubt a great deal o f diplomatic bargaining took place in the corridors o f the PM C building in the days prior to 29 June. Three days after de Caixs hearing in Geneva, the High Commissioner had recovered enough to leave Beirut by boat and head to France for his customary summer holiday.iM What is absolutely clear from the above is that following the failure o f the High Commissioner to conclude the negotiations in May 1933, the Quai d'Orsay used M. Ponsot s illness as a pretext to avoid a discussion on the treaty and other politically awkward questions at the PM C in (1271

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June 1933. What is less dear - but equally interesting - is whether the High Commissioner was, in fact, genuinely ill during June 1933. Perhaps he was diplomatically ill. Many elements in the story support this hypothesis. Those mentioned below are merely the most obvious. First, when M. Léger described in his letter o f 12 June why it was ‘indispensable’ that the session be postponed, before starting a new paragraph with the phrase, under these conditions’, there was no mention at all - in the aforementioned conditions - o f M . Ponsot’s illness.169 Second, M. Ponsot had been ill on a number o f occasions during his tenure in Beirut. On each previous occasion, he had been replaced by his deputy, who continued to file reports to Paris on the High Commissioner’s behalf.170 On this occasion, M. Ponsot was not replaced. Although he was ill for five weeks, the High Commissioner remained well enough to send Paris a normal number o f telegrams and letters, some o f them lengthy and detailed, which he signed personally. In those letters, M . Ponsot made no mention o f his illness at all, except in the context o f the events as described above.171 Moreover, whenever he had been ill before, the archives contain messages from M. Ponsot’s colleagues/friends at the Quai d’Orsay, asking about his condition and expressing their wishes for his speedy recovery. During June 1933, there are no such messages in the archives. All in all, it was an extremely timely illness. Less than a fortnight after the High Commissioner’s departure, the news arrived in the Lebanese capital o f his nomination as Resident in Morocco and o f his replacement in the Levant by the Comte de M artel.172 In Syrian political circles reactions were muted and there was general agreement that as the control o f Syrian policy remained with the Quai d’Orsay, the replacement o f M. Ponsot would probably not precipitate any significant change in French policy. In Beirut the majority o f press commentaries were favourable to M. Ponsot although there was considerable divergence concerning his achievements. Lissan declared that the High Commissioner left ‘the best impression by his modesty, liberalism and democratic spirit’. The press also noted the authoritarian reputation o f his successor. At the time, several opinions - and many rumours - were offered to explain Ponsot s transfer. According to P. Khoury, British observers noted that he had become so involved in local politics that he had completely neglected other matters, such as the administration o f justice, and fiscal and customs policies. Some French officials claimed that the symptoms [128]

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o f agitation in Morocco, a country o f far greater importance to France, urgently required an expert o f his stature whose keen administrative and political skills would ensure the French presence in North Africa. Others believed he was removed because he had failed to uphold Frances traditional politique orientale, which stressed French support for the Maronite community. There were even rumours that the French Zionists had conspired against him, because he was hostile to Zionist ambitions in Palestine.173Another factor which may have been significant and which P. Khoury and other scholars o f the Syrian Mandate have so far failed to mention is the ’Geneva’ factor, as encapsulated in the last sentence o f the Mandates Commission resolution o f 20 June 1933: In accordance with the wish of the French Government, it will postpone until the Autumn 1933 session the examination, with M. Ponsots participation, of questions that remain open after the audition with M. de Caix.174 This sentence must have caused a considerable concentration o f minds at the Quai d’Orsay in late June and early July 1933. The French position remained vulnerable. Moreover, the High Commissioner had warned his superiors that he could not guarantee the success o f negoti­ ations before the November session.173As he had failed to persuade either a nationalist (orientated) or a moderate government to sign a treaty, perhaps the Quai d’Orsay decided to ring the changes and start afresh with a new man, who might have a more determined approach to the Syrian politicians. And by replacing the High Commissioner the Quai d’Orsay could inform the Mandates Commission at the appropriate moment before the November session, that the new High Commissioner had just arrived at his new post and made contact for the first time with the Syrian negotiators, and therefore there was little o f significance to report to the Commission concerning the treaty negotiations. As with all four o f his predecessors, M. Ponsots efforts to govern and organise the territories were handicapped by an inherent and permanent conflict at the very heart o f the Mandate system itself. On the one hand, France claimed its Mandate for Syria and Lebanon on the basis o f its historic, special interests: cultural, economic and military. O n the other hand, the official duty o f the Mandatory Power was to lead those two countries, in a spirit o f disinterested goodwill, towards complete [129)

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independence and democracy, oblivious o f those special interests. Thus from the very beginning, Mandatory policy was to a certain extent schizophrenic: partially determined by the legal and moral conception o f the Mandate and partially by self-interest. M. Ponsots official brief therefore, was to emancipate, albeit gradually, both Lebanon and Syria. At the same time, his less publicised brief, as a loyal servant o f the Republic, was to maintain and develop French essential interests in those countries. What the Syrians witnessed, in large measure, were the High Commissioners practical endeavours to carry out the latter, whilst he publicly continued to declare his faithfulness to the former. Throughout his tenure in Beirut, Ponsots approach to the nationalist movement in Syria was to exploit its deep divisions, which had surfaced in the wake o f the Great Revolt. By isolating those nationalists who showed no interest in cooperation, and cultivating others who believed that some degree o f cooperation was the last option available, he managed to convince a small but influential group o f ambitious and intelligent nationalist politicians, headed by Jamil Mardam, to play the political game by French rules. This tactic did not go down well in certain circles in the métropole. Throughout his tenure, Ponsot faced attacks from conservative parliamentarians as well as the military for his cooperation with moderate nationalists. He likewise alienated many French officials both on his own staff and in Paris, who feared that such tactics would lead to a premature evacuation o f the country.176 Initially, the High Commissioner hoped that Mardam and his allies might draw in some o f the more hard-line nationalists, but few responded. His determination to produce a ‘responsible’ Legislative Assembly and out o f it a Constitution which recognised the Mandate, meant ‘preparing’, or to be more frank, rigging the 1931-2 elections, in particular in Aleppo, and playing the Christian card in that city in such a way that Aleppine nationalists were excluded completely from the Chamber. Lacking a stake in either Parliament or government, Hananu and other leaders felt that as long as they were not pan o f the political equation, then Jamil Mardam and his more moderate colleagues had to be prevented from effecting the type o f compromise that would first, benefit the French more than the Syrians and second, enable those who collaborated with the French to reap all the political benefits. But ultimately Ponsot was unable to divide the Bloc. Above all, he was unable to offer the Syrians the son o f concessions that would allow negotiations to succeed, largely because he was bound by [130]

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instructions from Paris, where throughout his whole tenure the Quai d’Orsay vision o f the Mandate in Syria remained largely unchanged. Most scholars, including P. Khoury, note that M. Ponsots task was not made any easier by the chronic political instability o f France during this period, a hallmark o f the Third Republic.177To a certain extent this is true. During Ponsots tenure in Beirut, France experienced ten different Governments, including five Foreign Ministers. This phenomenon, how­ ever, contrasts sharply with the exceedingly small turn-over o f personnel at the Quai d’Orsay during the same period, where figures like M. St. Quentin, Robert de Caix, Philippe Berthelot and Alexis Léger provided a certain underlying rhythm and continuity to French policy in the Levant. It should also be mentioned that although French politics was characterised at the time more by crises than by continuity, there was nevertheless, concerning colonial affairs, a basic similarity o f vision, even a kind o f unofficial consensus, amongst those Right and Centre-Left politicians who held government office during this period. When, for instance, a journalist suggested to M . Paul-Boncour in May 1933 that French policy towards the Levant had hardly changed at all since the coming to power o f the leftist parties, the Foreign Minister replied: The panics of the Left as those of the Right are faithful to France and to justice. If sometimes we disagree on certain principles, we can only have the same point of view of reality. Furthermore, there is above us an authority [the League o f Nations] which has not given us any greater power than which was conferred on the others. May your country keep its confidence in us because we are only working in its interests.17* When M . Ponsot finally left the Levant in July 1933, there was no question as to who still governed Syria. The Syrian Question, however, remained unresolved.

No tes

1 M AE/SL, vol. 481, p. 146. 2 Ibid., p. 151. 3 Ibid., p. 78.

U31]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 4 F 0 3 7 1/2645, vol. 16085. Hole to Simon, 7 May 1932; P. Khouiy, op. cit., p. 375. 5 See M AE/SL, vol. 483, p. 1-2; M AE/SL, ‘Situation o f the Levant Sûtes in 1932’ (Quai d’Orsay report), 25 January 1933, vol. 482, pp. 124-5. See also Samia Hannachi, 'Le Liban sous Mandat Français de 1930-1933’, Master’s Disserution University o f Lille, 1992, pp. 101-21. 6 CA D N /B, ‘The Lebanese Problem’ (Quai d’Orsay report), n.d., vol. 472. Probably written between July-O ctober 1933. See also M AE/SL, vol. 484, p. 106. Since the opening o f some o f the archives, there is really no ambiguity on this issue: ‘Je me permettrais d’ajouter que si nous sommes engagés dans cette voie, cela n’a pas été dans le dessein initial de réformer l’E u t. En d’autres circonstances, pour urgent que cela fût à certains égards, j’aurais pu attendre quelques mois, et cela m’eut permis de m’en expliquer au préalable à Paris. M ais le fou était à la maison et il s’agissait d’éviter que le Liban se donnât un président musulman. La manoeuvre, en face d’un danger aussi certain que redoutable a réussi; c’est un point dont on peut se souvenir dans les difficultés actuelles’. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 27 May 1932, vol. 498, no. 422. Cited in ‘Le Liban’, S. Hannachi op. cit., p. 124. Given the previous debate on this issue, I have left this important citation untranslated - so the reader is in possession o f the original. The Lebanese constitution was only folly re-established (by de Martel) on 4 January 1937. It was suspended for the second time on 21 September 1939, this time by Gabriel Puaux. See Kamal Salibi, H istoire du L iban, Paris, Naufal, 1988, pp. 311-12. 7 M AE/SL, ‘Mémorandum’, Ponsot to MAE, 4 June 1932, vol. 481, pp. 148-53. 8 Ibid., pp. 146,149. 9 Ibid., p. 92. 10 Ibid., pp. 114,128-9. 11 Ibid., pp. 128-30, 150. 12 Ibid., pp. 109-11. 13 Ibid., p. 122. 14 M AE/SL. vol. 481, pp. 128-34, 148-53. 15 Ibid., pp. 128-34, 151. 16 CA D N /B, ‘Inform ation, Beirut, 23 April 1932, vol. 467. 17 CA D N /B, Abid to Ponsot, Damascus, 30 May 1932, vol. 469. 18 It was only on 3 June 1932 that the French President, Albert Lebrun, officially asked Edouard Herriot, the leader o f the Radicals, the largest left-wing party in the Chamber, to form a government. 19 M AE/SL, Berthelot to Ponsot, 25 May 1933, vol. 481, p. 137. 20 Ibid., p. 141. 21 F 0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO , 8 June 1932. 22 M AE/SL, Tetreau to MAE, 8 July 1929, vol. 206, p. 21; ibid., Tetreau to M AE, 12 October 1929, pp. 116-18. 23 CA D N /B, Compte Rendu, first Session o f the Syrian Parliament, 7 June 1932. 24 Ibid. 25 F 0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO , 8 June 1932. 26 M AE/SL, vol. 481, p. 217. 27 CA D N /B, ‘Compte Rendu, first Session o f the Syrian Parliament, 7 June 1932, vol. 469.

1132)

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44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52

M AE/SL, vol. 481, p.217; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 377. CA D N /B, Pbnsot to MAE, 11 June 1932, vol. 469. Ibid. CADN/B, 'Information no. 2804’, 14 June 1932, vol. 469; CAD N/B, 'Concerning the Northern Bloc o f Moderates’, 16 August 1932, vol. 467. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 377. Ibid., pp. 377-8. CA D N /B, Pbnsot to MAE, 1$ June 1932, vol. 469. See P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 379-80. CA D N /B, Weber to Helleu, 16 August 1932, vol. 467. Ibid. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 9. Ibid., p. 10; F0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO, 15 August 1932. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 10. Ibid., pp. 10-11. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 381. On his arrival in power, Herriot declared that he had three priorities: the financial crisis, Lausanne and Geneva. Financially, it was a question o f balancing the nation’s budget. Lausanne concerned the international conference on German war reparations: in January 1932 the German Chancellor, Bruning, had brusquely announced that Germany would refuse to restart any payments to France. Geneva concerned the disarmament conference, which opened in February 1932. There also, with German nationalists keen to rearm and the British unfavourable to what they considered to be French ‘militarism’, the French position was under considerable pressure. See J-B Duroselle, Politique étrangère de la France. L a Décadence 1932 -1 9 3 9 , Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1979, pp. 30-1. In his memoirs, Herriot devoted 70 pages to his 1932 Ministry, o f which 53 pages relate to foreign affairs. The Syrian Question is not mentioned. E. Herriot, Jo d is, Paris, Flammarion, 1952 (two vols). See volume 2, pp. 287-367. P. Bernard and H. Dubief, The D ecline o f the Third Republic 1 9 1 4-1938, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 219-20. M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 75-6. Ibid. Ibid., p. 77. 'The draft treaty was carefully examined in Paris throughout 1931 by the relevant ministries and appropriate instructions were given to the High Commissioner by M. Aristide Briand (no. 760 o f 16 November 1931), to which were annexed the conventions drawn up by the relevant ministries. In general, this draft and the conventions still reflect today an accurate idea o f our interests within the framework o f the possibilities offered by the Mandate regime itself and by the Iraqi precedent, such as it has been established in Geneva’. M AE/SL, ‘Note for Prime M inister, n.d., vol. 482, p. 75. This Quai d’Orsay note was approved by the Foreign Minister, 12 October 1932. Ibid. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 76. CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 4652’, Beirut, 17 October 1932, vol. 1871. Ibid. Ibid., 'Information no. 4668’, 18 October 1932; ibid., inform ation no. 4671’, 19 October 1932.

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71

72 73 74

75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82

P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 382. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 27 October 1932, vol. 482, pp. 107-10. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 383. M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 112.115-19. Ibid., p. 114; F0684/5/4/32. Hole to FO, 1 November 1932. M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 114,120. P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 383-4. M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 138-9. Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 5 November 1932, pp. 120-3. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., pp. 171-2. Ibid., p. 148. Ibid., pp. 143,149. Ibid., pp. 149-50. Ibid., pp. 155-7. Ponsot sent this suggestion to P uis on 18 November 1932, but both tactics had been conceived by the High Commissioner during the summer o f 1931. ‘Under the treaty regime . . . the M andatory Power will maintain a predominant position in the emancipated state (control o f foreign affairs, military missions and foreign advisors) and will be the moral guarantor o f the responsibilities taken on by the new member o f the League o f Nations, both towards other members (economic equality, running o f schools, charities) and towards racial and religious minorities’. M AE/SL, ‘Note for the Minister’, 28 March 1933, vol. 484, p. 10. The treaty was to last 25 years (Article 9). M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 172-4. Ibid., p. 204. Ibid., p. 205. This is a quote (tom the verbal report o f the session, which changes from paragraph to paragraph from the first person to the third person singular. Five months later die High Commissioner wrote: ‘A first draft treaty had been attached to my instructions o f 12 October last. This draft, after tbe talks in Damascus in November, had been revised on 20 November and I personally handed the new text to the Department on 28 November [1932] before going to Geneva’. M AE/SL, Ponsot to P uis, 28 April 1933, vol. 484, p. 127. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 207. Ibid., p. 210. See the brochure entided, ‘Syrie et Liban: Déclarations du Haut-Commissaire à la Commission permanente des Mandats les 2 et 3 Décembre 1932’. C A D N /B, vol. 470, p. 13. M AE/SL, vol. 482, pp. 204-13. See brochure, ‘Syrie et Liban’. CA D N /B, vol. 470, pp. 18-19. M AE/SL, ‘Report’, 22 February 1933, vol. 483, p. 196. Sec brochure, ‘Syrie et Liban’. CA D N /B, vol. 470, p. 8. The High Commissioner later observed to the Quai d’Orsay that the M andates Commission, ‘so attentive to have d u ified the policies pursued by us in Latakia and the Jabal Druze’, had not questioned Great Britain’s right to set a different

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pace o f evolution in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. In particular, the Commission had ‘raised no objection to the constitution o f Transjordan as a political entity entirely distinct from Palestine. Palestine and Transjordan are, however, only one Mandate, the Mandate for Palestine . . . Finally, it seems that neither the Mandates Commission, nor the League Council have ever asked the London Government for any information concerning the probable duration o f its establishment in Palestine or Transjordan.’ M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 26 May 1933, vol. 484, pp. 224-5. CA D N /B, ‘The Evolution o f the Mandate and the Treaty Question in Geneva’, 5 February 1933, vol. 470, p. 3. M AE/SL, vol. 483, pp. 206-7; P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 385. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 220; C A D N /B, Helleu to MAE, 12 December 1932. vol. 470. M AE/SL, vol. 482, p. 227. The desire for unity was for from being an exclusively nationalist sentiment: ‘Every Syrian involved in politics sees it as his duty to support i t . . . ’ M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE 21 April 1933, vol. 484, p. 79. M AE/SL, vol. 483, pp. 4 7 ,1 9 1 -2 . See also P. Khoury, op. d t., pp. 397-9. CA D N /B, Ponsot to Paris, 27 January 1933, vol. 470. Ibid., ‘Verbal Report’ (70th session o f the League Council), 24 January - 3 February 1933. Ibid., The report o f M . Benes was adopted without modification by the League C oundl. Ibid., MAE, to Ponsot, 1 February 1933. CA D N /B, MAE, to Ponsot, 25 January 1933, vol. 470. M AE/SL. Helleu to MAE, 29 July 1932, vol. 482, pp. 5-6. CA D N /B, Weber to Ponsot, 6 February 1933, vol. 470. A dolf Hider was called to be Chancellor o f Germany by the ageing President Hindenberg on 30 January 1933. See Duroselle, op. d t., p. 58. M AE/SL, vol. 483, pp. 194-5. CA D N /B, 'The Lebanese Problem’ (Quai d’Orsay report), n.d., vol. 472. Probably written between July-O ctobcr 1933. MAE/SL, vol. 483, p. 196. The German and Italian press reported the interventions widely. See CA D N /B, Ponsot to Damascus Delegate, 2 February 1933, vol. 470. M AE/SL, vol. 484, p. 58. One positive result o f the Italian intervention, according to the newly arrived French Ambassador in Rome, Henry de Jouvenel (former High Commissioner in Beirut), was that the Italian Government could no longer advocate the abandonment o f the Syrian Mandate by France, in favour o f Italy. CA D N /B, MAE, to Ponsot, 28 January 1933, vol. 470. M AE/SL, vol. 483, p. 35. At this point, it seems that Arslan and Jabiri encouraged the nationalists in Syria to gain time and not to come to an agreement before the debate on unity could be brought once again before the Mandates Commission. M AE/SL, Ponsot to Paris, 11 May 1933, vol. 484, p. 167. M AE/SL, vol. 483, pp. 102-4, 108-12; ibid., vol. 484, p. 11. Ponsot informed the Syrian government that both they and the Syrian public were fully informed o f his Declarations in Geneva and o f the verbal report o f the discussion that took place afterwards at the PM C, This is largely true, but not entirely: a booklet published and distributed by the High Commission, entidcd ‘Syria and Lebanon, Declarations o f the High Commissioner to the PM C 2 -3 December 1932’,

H35]

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102 103 104

105 106 107

108 109

110

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appropriately contained the word ‘extracts’ in very small print on the tide page. Although the High Commissioner’s declarations concerning unity appeared in the booklet, the question o f elections, for instance, which were discussed in Geneva, did not appear. The complete documents were not published. CA D N /B, Ponsot to Assistant Delegate, Aleppo, 31 January 1933, vol. 470. The booklet is in CA D N /B, vol. 470. M AE/SL, vol. 483, pp. 137 -8 ,1 4 0 -1 . CA D N /B, 5 February 1933, vol. 470. M AE/SL. vol. 483, p. 141. CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 180’, Aleppo, 12 February 1933, vol. 470. During the first days o f the Congress, Christian members o f the Bloc, notably Faris al-Khuri, Edmond Rabbath and N a‘im Antaki, spent considerable time visiting the Christian community leaders o f Aleppo, including the Armenians, in an effort to wean them away from the French and to rally them to the Muslim/nationalist position. Numerous Christians paid visits to Hashim al-Atasi and according to M . Lavastre, who was observing events very closely, ‘all the non-nationalist circles are stirred by this activity and seem ready to move toward the nationalists’. Ibid., Lavastre to Ponsot, 15 February 1933. Ibid.; M AE/SL, vol. 483, p. 177. CA D N /B, 19 February 1933, vol. 470. CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 66/S.P.’, High Commission, Tripoli, Lebanon to Ponsot, 28 March 1933, vol. 470. On this level o f ‘intelligence gathering’, die Nationalist-French conflict was very one-sided, for the former never had a mole in the Quai d’Orsay during the Mandate. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 3 March 1933, vol. 483, pp. 215-24. Ibid. In his correspondence to Paris, the High Commissioner failed to mention that in both regions French agents had, in fact, initiated both gatherings, as they had in the past on numerous occasions (presumably such activities by French officials on the spot were taken for granted in Paris). In the Jabal Druze, it was Captain Désidère, head o f the Services Spéciaux, who ordered the meeting to take place, the petition was written in advance and Druze chiefs were simply asked by Abd al-Ghaflar Pasha - after a short speech - to sign on the dotted line. The latter, a renowned adversary o f the French during the Great Revolt, had since made his peace with the authorities. For a revealing and probably accurate description o f such French activities, see ‘Report o f the Executive Committee o f the Syro-Palestinian Committee o f Egypt to the League o f Nations on the political and economic situation in Syria during 1933’. CA D N /B, Helleu to Paris, 28 July 1933, vol. 470. Ponsot arrived in Damascus on the evening o f 11 February and met President Abid the following morning. He thought it wiser not to contact Mardam whilst the Aleppo Congress was in session. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, vol. 483, pp. 172-7. Ibid. On this occasion, Ponsot did not beat about the bush: ‘A t my first meeting with the President I told him . . . that the question o f unity was not ready in concrete terms, nor in terms o f theoretical dem ands. . . that unity would mean the withdrawal o f French forces from the Jabal, that it was inconceivable that France would spend money to keep troops there, in order to maintain the population under the law o f Damascus functionaries. Was Syria herself up to sending to the Jabal Druze sufficient forces to maintain the security o f this difficult region,

[136]

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112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

123 124 125 126 127

128 129 130 131 132 133

134 135 136

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inhabited by a turbulent race, and to assume the international responsibility that it would entail concerning security, given the presence o f the British pipeline close to the Jabal Druze. Clearly not. The President willingly agreed’. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 17 February 1933, vol. 483, pp. 181-2. Ibid., 22 February 1933, pp. 190-9. Ibid., pp. 239,241. M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 54-5. M AE/SL, vol. 483, p. 244. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 26 March 1933, vol. 484, p. 8. Decree no. 9 9 9 ,1 3 March 1933. CA D N /B, vol. 470. M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 4 1 -3 ,4 5 -5 2 . Ibid., ’Note for the Minister’, 13 May 1933, p. 182. For the complete text o f M . Daladier’s speech, see M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 14-18. See P. Sluglett, op. d t., p. 4. CA D N /B, ‘Press Review’, Ponsot to MAE, 21 April 1933, vol. 470. In his speech the French Prime Minister had quoted from the book by Maurice Barris, Au pays du Levant, in which the author described the ‘mosaic o f religions’ to be found in Syria, including ‘sects who adore the devil in person’. Fk>r the text o f the manifesto, see CA D N /B, vol. 470. CA D N /B, Ponsot to MAE, 7 April 1933. vol. 470; M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 26-33. P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 387. M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 53-4. Just before leaving for Homs, Matdam had asked Ponsot to appoint him Prime Minister. 'H e asked me . . . to strengthen his position in such a way that would correspond to the increasing responsibilities that he was being forced to take, in order to allow him, if persuasion foiled, to impose the treaty’. Ponsot refused and told him to be ‘folly responsible in front o f his party’. Ibid. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., ‘Situation o f the Levant States for 1932’, p. 130. M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 21 April 1933, vol. 484, pp. 73-8; ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 23 May 1933, pp. 214-15. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., pp. 5 6 -9 .6 1 . Ibid., pp. 6 0 ,7 9 -8 3 . All the political parties in Syria advocated unity; ‘they differ only on the procedure to obtain it’. M AE/SL, ‘Report’, Quai d’Orsay, 22 February 1933. vol. 483, p. 198. M AE/SL, vol. 484, p. 81. Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 19 April 1933, pp. 60-1. Throughout our period under study it is often possible to discern a marked difference, in the analysis o f Syrian affairs, between the High Commissioners reports to the Quai d’Orsay and the latter’s reports, written for the Minister o f Foreign Affairs. For example, on the question o f Syrian unity the Quai d’Orsay advised the Minister, Paul-Boncour, that ‘it is certain that to currently connect the Jabal Druze to Syria would provoke an insurrection in the near future, which could lead to an intervention o f the British in Transjordan’. Ibid., ‘Note for the Minister’, 24 April 1933, p. 123. Ibid., p. 74.

(137)

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 138 On the subject o f the juridical laws (concerning the protection o f minorities) to be written and annexed to the treaty, M. Ponsot wrote ‘whatever the juridical framework that is to be established, the keystone o f this framework can only be the existence o f Lebanon as an independent state, destined to constitute for the minorities o f the Orient a foyer, a centre o f influence and, should the occasion arise, a refuge’. Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, p. 78. The profound and genuine fears o f the Christian minorities in Syria were expressed in a letter o f Archbishop Tappouni, the Syrian-Catholic Patriarch o f Antioch, to Prime Minister Daladier. The Archbishop pleaded for guarantees for the minorities; that Syria was not ready for independence and that Lebanon would never want independence. CA D N /B, Archbishop Tappouni to Daladier, 7 April 1933, vol. 470. 139 Ibid., Mardam to President Abid, 18 April 1933; M AE/SL, vol. 484, p. 89. 140 CA D N /B, Mardam to Atasi, 18 April 1933 (evening), vol. 470; M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 90-2. 141 CA D N /B, Weber to Ponsot, 19 April 1933, vol. 470. 142 Ibid., 20 April 1933; M AE/SL, vol. 484, pp. 93-4. 143 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 388. 144 CA D N /B, Weber to Ponsot (Message no. 4 7 7 /Q , 21 April 1933, vol. 470. Aleppine nationalists sent numerous telegrams asking for the resignation o f the President o f the Republic and the dissolution o f the Chamber and demonstrations were planned to protest against the Parliamentary session. See ibid., Aleppo, 20 April 1933. According to M . Lavastre, ‘Christians are invited, under threat o f reprisals, to participate in the demonstrations. Measures will be taken in agreement with the Army to guarantee order . . . I consider that any weakness on our part must not be tolerated if we wish to prevent the Christians and moderates from rallying to the nationalists’. Ibid., Lavastre to Ponsot, 21 April 1933. Aleppo closed down for the day, but there were no incidents. 145 Ibid., Weber to Ponsot, 22 April 1933. 146 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 388. 147 M AE/SL, vol. 484, p. 109. 148 See CA D N /B, Weber to Ponsot, 22 April 1933, vol. 470. 149 Ibid. 150 M AE/SL, Ponsot to MAE, 28 April 1933, vol. 484, p. 129. A copy o f the draft treaty and protocols are attached to this letter. 151 Ibid., MAE, to Ponsot, 29 April 1933, pp. 151-2; ibid., ‘Note for the Minister’, 13 May 1933, pp.186-9. M. Ponsot’s letter to Paris a week later clearly illustrates the importance o f the June session o f the PM C in Geneva for the Quai d’Orsay, as well as for the High Commissionen ‘I carefully noted the sentiment o f Your Excellency o f the timeliness o f presenting to the Mandates Commission, in its June session, either the Treaty, or the justification o f the breaking o f relations. All my efforts over the last six months have had this object in mind.’ Ibid., Ponsot to Paris, 3 May 1933, p. 155. 152 Ibid., p. 154. 153 Ibid., ‘Note’, 6 May 1933, p. 162. 154 Ibid., p. 156. 155 Ibid., p. 157. 156 CA D N /B, vol. 4 7 0 ,6 May 1933. 157 CA D N /B, 8 May 1933, vol. 470.

[1381

S y r i a ’ s r e j e c t i o n of t h e t r e a t y 158 ‘La Question présente un caractère de grande urgence’. M AE/SL, ‘Note for the Minister’, 13 May 1933, vol. 484, p. 185. 159 Ibid. 160 See M AE/SL, MAE, to Ponsot, 12 June 1933, vol. 485, p. 39. The High Commissioner’s telegram, no. 1037, 25 May, in which he made the suggestion and which should be in vol. 484 (around pp. 220-3), is missing. Telegrams 1038 and 1039 are in the file. 161 M AE/SL, ‘Note’, Roben de Caix, 7 June 1933, vol. 485, pp. 19-24. 162 CA D N /B, Weber to Ponsot, 31 May 1933, vol. 470. 163 M AE/SL, Léger to Pbnsot, 12 June 1933, vol. 485, pp. 39-40. 164 M AE/SL, Léger to Ponsot, 23 June 1933, vol. 485, p. 77. 165 Ibid., ‘Note’, Roben de Caix, 26 June 1933, p. 99. 166 Ibid., pp. 100-1. 167 Ibid., ‘Note’, Roben de Caix, 29 June 1933, pp. 109-16; ibid., MAE, to Helleu, 10 July 1933, p.134; ibid., MAE, to Helleu, 11 July 1933, pp. 137-8. 168 CA D N /B, Helleu to MAE, 7 July 1933, vol. 470. 169 See M AE/SL, Léger to Ponsot, 12 June 1933, vol. 485, pp. 39-40. 170 See CA D N /B, Roux to Pierre-Alype, n.d. (probably 5 January 1932), vol. 467. The High Commissioner was in bed with the ’flu for several days during the first week o f January 1932. A. M . Baudet signed some o f Ponsot’s lenen to Paris during that period. 171 As well as his letters to Paris on the subject o f the PM C session (14 and 16 June), he wrote a detailed, seven-page letter (9 June) concerning Faysalian propaganda, a four-page lener (16 June) concerning the nationalists, Faysal and Ibn Saud and a letter concerning Subhi Barakat (23 June), whom he received for a long talk the same evening. There is a somewhat deafening silence - no letters - in the files between 23 June and 7 July 1933. M AE/SL, vol. 485, pp. 25-31, 55-9; CA D N /B, Pbnsot to MAE, 23 June 1933. vol. 470. 172 Beirut received the news on 13 July, via Havas reports. CA D N /B, Helleu to MAE, 21 July 1933, vol. 470. 173 See P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 390. 174 M AE/SL, vol. 485, p. 77. 175 M AE/SL, Pbnsot to MAE, 21 April 1933, vol. 484, p. 82. 176 See P. Khoury, op. d t., p. 391. 177 Ibid. 178 CA D N /B, Ponsot to MAE, 26 May 1933, vol. 470. M. Joseph Paul-Boncour was undoubtedly the most liberal o f the French Foreign Ministers during Ponsot’s tenure in Beirut. As such, his attitude toward the Syrian Question is quite revealing: 'We never thought that the Syrians doubted French intentions, because we have nothing to gain from our Mandate in Syria. But the nationalists . . . claim sovereignty and unity. We have given them the first, in instituting the Republic o f Syria, and in giving very large responsibilities to the local authorities, which limits in particular our political influence. But we cannot withdraw completely because we are committed to protea this people and we are responsible before the League o f Nations. Just as we cannot make Syria a colony, neither can we grant it absolute independence prematurely. Besides, the League considers that our presence is necessary. As for unity, it does not depend on us but on the three governments o f Syria, and each one at the moment wishes to keep its autonomy. . .

[139]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 M . Ponsot, who is one o f our most able and honest men, would never do anything contrary to Syrian interests. He is responsible for all his actions to the League o f Nations, which has instructed M . de Caix to furnish the League with a report on the situation in the Levant. M . de Caix is not the French delegate, as you in Syria believe he is, but that o f Geneva’. Ibid.

4 Syrian Parliament suspended

1933-1935 Politics is asleep. Minds have turned to administrative, economic and financial affairs. There is hardly any talk of parliament or the treaty. As a result the nationalist party, not knowing who or what to attack, is becoming weaker and disintegrating. Martel to MAE, 13 April 1934'

On 12 October 1933 the new French High Commissioner, Comte Damien de Martel, stepped ashore in Beirut from the Mariette Pasha to the customary ceremonial fanfare. At the dockside, the Lebanese President, Prime Minister and cabinet and other notables were in attendance as well as General de Bigault du Grandut, M. Helleu and other ranking High Commission officials. The pomp and ceremony suitably emphasised to all present the continuing supreme authority o f the Mandatory Power. Indeed, it was a fitting welcome for the 55-year-old aristocrat, whose reputation as a somewhat authoritarian, if pragmatic, diplomat had preceded his arrival. Following the traditional troop review, the cortège motored through the city, the crowded streets bedecked with French and Lebanese flags. Flowers were thrown from balconies as the cortège passed through the Place des Canons.2 Born on 27 November 1878, Comte Damien Joseph Alfred Charles de Martel was a career diplomat, who had served in Peking, Siberia and the Caucasus, before being appointed French Ambassador to Japan in 1929. He was appointed High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon on 16 July 1933, and was to retire in February 1939. The new High Commissioner wasted no time. The next morning he was in Damascus, being received by the Syrian authorities; another colourful troop review, followed by a large reception, where deputies, including Hashim al-Atasi and other nationalists introduced themselves. Then followed a private meeting with President Abid: on M artels recommendation, the opening session was adjourned from 17 October for (1411

F rench I mperi ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

two weeks. No official explanation was given.3The High Commissioner, in fact, had arrived in the Levant with specific instructions from the Quai d’Orsay and he needed a few weeks’ space to meet and size up all the notable Syrian political personalities, to assess the overall government and parliamentary situation and to decide on his plan o f action. The goal to be achieved was clear; how it was to be achieved was left largely up to the new man: T h e H igh C om m ission er w ill . . . restart the negotiations at the point where M . Ponsot left them last A pril and endeavour to obtain, as quickly as possible - w ithout however giving any im pression o f haste that could be exploited by the Syrian side - a positive or negative reply to the texts that constitute the draft o f the Treaty, the annexed protocols and the declaration concerning unity. I f the response is positive and circum stances suitable, im m ediate parliam entary ratification in D am ascus w ill be sough t.4

At the end o f October, following a five-day fact-finding trip to Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Alexandietta and Tripoli, Martel convoked Haqqi al-Azm and his cabinet in Beirut, receiving them first as a group and then individually. As a group, they assured him first, o f their predisposition and capacity to conclude the treaty negotiations; second, o f their confidence that the moderate majority in Parliament would support them and third, that they were firmly resolved to remain united. In individual sessions with Martel, however, they were somewhat franker, confirming his suspicions that their unity was indeed fragile. At the end o f the afternoon, the High Commissioner announced that he would inform them o f his ’practical conclusions after further consultations in Damascus’.3 This sudden flurry o f diplomatic activity did not elicit a strong response from the National Bloc, chiefly owing to news from Palestine o f violent demonstrations by the Arab population o f Jaffa against Jewish immigration. Throughout the summer and early autumn, Syrian nation­ alists had refrained from engaging in mass political activities, but the Palestine issue at this moment was an excellent focus for such activities. The fear that Jewish colonisation would expel the Arab population o f Palestine from the land provided fertile ground on which pan-Arab agitators could sew seeds o f resistance not just to the Zionist movement and Britain, but to all foreign occupation.6At a meeting on 1 November, the ulama o f Damascus, in conjunction with the National Bloc, decided [142]

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to use the occasion o f the anniversary o f the Balfour Declaration to hold a massive demonstration. On 3 November, after prayers in the main mosque, a crowd o f around 1,500 persons attacked the central police station and attempted to enter the Jewish quarter in the old city and the British Consulate. One demonstrator died, four were wounded and twenty-five arrested, including Zaki al-Khatib and the President o f the Damascus Bar Association.7The High Commissioner had arrived in the Syrian capital the day before the demonstration and had no intention o f revising his timetable because o f it. He spent the week as planned, in extensive consultations with the whole spectrum o f Syrian political personalities, former ministers, moderate and nationalist notables and by the end o f the week his mind was made up.* He decided to maintain the present government in place,9 support Subhi Bey Barakats re-election as Speaker o f the Chamber10 and, above all, endeavour to have the treaty signed before the opening session and this for two reasons. First, he preferred to have an unambiguous situation when the parliament reassembled and second, he envisaged tense parliamentary debates if treaty negotiations were to continue parallel to parliamentary sessions, which during the Autumn session were officially supposed to deal primarily with budget affairs. By this time the opening session was only a week away (18 November) and could not be easily postponed again." On 11 November Martel started what he described as negotiations with President Abid and Haqqi al-Azm and his cabinet on the treaty and unity. It is important to appreciate, however, that negotiations in the normal sense o f the word did not take place: I will not elaborate on the tedious details of the negotiations them­ selves. They consisted essentially in explanations given concerning the initial establishment and the sense of each of the articles, then in the search for verbal formulae which would enable the government to present those same principles to Parliament and the public." Explanations given are the key words and demonstrate the true nature o f the talks - or rather ‘persuasion sessions* - between the imperial authority and the figurehead local government. The High Commissioners most formidable challenge o f the week, however, was not to persuade the Syrian government to sign the treaty: it was the race against time with the nationalists. From the evening o f 11 November, the date when the text o f the treaty and its annexes were sent to the President o f the 1143]

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Republic, it was in their hands too. Seeing that the text on offer was essentially the same as that which Mardam and Raslan had resigned over some seven months earlier, they immediately put all their energy into sabotaging M artels endeavours, spreading malicious rumours about the treaty and the unhappy fate that would befall any Syrian cowardly enough to sign it.13Within a few days, according to Martel, the whole o f Damascus was convinced that the treaty imposed conscription, the sending o f soldiers to the Rhine and Sudan and the payment o f 15 milliards francs to France: It is difficult to combat this propaganda, acting on an illiterate public and on deputies elected by it.14 On 14 November the National Bloc received warning signs from Selim Jambart (Minister o f Public Works and Education) that Haqqi al-Azm was about to sign. After a dramatic scene in a Damascus church in which Jambart prayed for his own personal salvation - and safety —and that o f the Syrian nation, he resigned from government. The terms o f the treaty were too unfavourable, even for this moderate Aleppine merchant. Martel replaced him the same day with another Uniate from Aleppo, Latif al-Ghanima, who was also a deputy.13Agreement had been reached on all points by the evening o f the fifteenth and it was agreed to sign at nine o’clock the next morning. Just minutes before the signing, however, the Minister o f Justice, Sulayman Jokadar, raised some fresh objections, particularly concerning the Common Interests. Encouraged by the nationalists, he questioned Article 3 o f Protocol B, which implicidy confirmed the present divisions o f Syria and led the nationalists to suspect that the French wished to maintain their control o f the Common Interests. To assuage Jokadar, Martel changed the text slightly, and then introduced future agreements between the two governments on the Common Interests into a clause in the treaty itself, which will stabilise the Organisation o f Common Interests for 25 years’.16 At this point Martel moved briskly into overdrive and the talks continued without interruption for sixteen hours. The Syrians finally acquiesced at 1.45 the next morning. A senior High Commission official immediately accompanied the Prime Minister to President Abid’s residence where at three in the morning the texts were signed and countersigned (17 November).17 Later that day - even before it had seen a copy o f the official [144]

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text - the Bloc published a manifesto which although courteous in style, was explicit in its criticism o f the treaty: . . . these texts constitute a chain around the necks of the Syrian people . . . and deprive the nation of its true independence and unity." Damascus was tense when the Chamber opened on 18 November. All the deputies stood for a minute in silence, in memory o f King Faysal, who had died on 11 September. Although all 69 deputies were present, Dr Shishakli (Hama) immediately made it clear that the National Bloc would not take part in the deliberations o f the Chamber, including the election o f the Bureau. By way o f explanation, whilst Fa’iz al-Khuri calmly declared that the nationalists wished to collaborate with France - but wanted to know, above all else, the text o f the treaty - Fakhri Barudi asserted that ‘even if seventy-thousand cannons are mobilised, this parliament will not vote for a faulty treaty’.19 With French support, Subhi Bey Barakat was re-elected Speaker o f the Chamber by 50 votes, out o f the 52 deputies who voted. The Chamber then adjourned for two days.20 Rumours continued to circulate around Damascus that at the next session the nationalists would be armed and that blood would flow.21 More disturbing to Martel, however, was the news that the nationalists had managed to persuade an unknown number o f moderate deputes to sign a petition rejecting the treaty. As Martel now realised, ratification o f the treaty was going to be no easy affair: The difficulty of our position is due to the fact that those over whom we have influence are the Minorities, the rural deputies and some elements of the towns, all of whom prefer, more or less openly, the Mandate to the treaty . . . These elements would only vote for the treaty in order to oblige us. This sense of obligation melts away in the face of nationalist threats. The moderates feel that by voting for the treaty they will incur the hostility of the nationalists, with whom they have to live, while by voting against the treaty, they are confirming the Mandate, for which they assume we have a secret preference. Thus our troops are not standing up to the shock . . . The nationalists, for their part, appear to be beyond reasonable argument, and are looking for an explosion, without regard for the consequences.22 (145)

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To combat nationalist propaganda and to avoid any repetition o f the events o f 9 August 1928, Martel immediately took two initiatives. First, he published in the Damascus press (19 November) the text o f the treaty and the annexes and letters concerning unity, which he preceded by a declaration o f the position as he saw it. The latter emphasised the crucial importance o f the coming debates in parliament for the future o f the country, his firm intention to obtain a decision, whatever it was, and concluded that the rejection o f the treaty by the Assembly, following the crisis o f last 20 April, would obviously show the French government and the League o f Nations the insufficient preparation o f Syria for the consecration o f its international status by means o f a treaty.23 This explicit warning, however, cut no ice with the nationalists, who intensified their pressure on wavering deputies and took advantage o f the published texts to point out their imprecision and to condemn the treaty en bloc.24 It must be said that the treaty lent itself to such attacks: it was a statement o f principles, to which were attached two protocols concerning military, economic and juridical questions, all o f which would be subject to negotiations following the signing o f the treaty. It was a vague, insubstantial document, which created ample room for suspicion that France simply wanted to maintain the Mandate under a different label - which indeed was the case. Moreover, Martel had made no concession whatsoever on the vital issue o f unity: in an exchange o f letters attached to the treaty, he confirmed to President Abid that the Alawite and Druze regions were to remain detached from the Syrian state.25 M artels second initiative was not at all public: he invited Subhi Bey Barakat to his residence, where in the presence o f Messrs Lavastre and Weber, the High Commissioner solemnly reminded the Speaker o f the Chamber o f his constitutional responsibilities, namely that he was responsible to maintain order in the Chamber and that by the terms o f the Constitution (articles 44 and 100), the election o f the budget and other Commissions must take place before any other issues were debated in the Chamber. It was agreed between them that M. Weber would have a decree in his pocket suspending the Chamber, to be used if the need arose. On Subhis suggestion, the suspension was limited to four days.26 The following day (21 November) the second session opened. Guards were posted inside the Chamber in case o f violence. Although the session started calmly enough, it rapidly heated up. After the Secretary had read out 38 telegrams, all o f them protesting against any treaty that [146)

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did not achieve independence and unity, Dr Shishakli (nationalist) took the floor: Does the French Government wish to conclude a treaty with Syria by force?. . . A treaty is invalid if it is dictated by the force of arms. . . The treaty that we have read in the press deprives the country of what it holds most dear, its unity and its sovereignty . . . it has no more value than a piece of paper . . . we disapprove of it because it does not match the liberalism and honour of France.27 In the face o f this attack, the articulate Minister o f Finance (Shakir N im at al-Sha‘bani) responded: We are passing through a historic period in the life of the country. .. Let us speak frankly. Have you seen any country or nation achieve its unity and independence in one leap? . . . You know the steps taken by Iraq, whose treaty with the British was modified three times in 1922, 1926 and 1930. And Egypt, how many stages has it been through?. . . The Government is resolute to examine with you all the details of the treaty. It is you who will have the last word. I’ll say no more than that today. Nevertheless, the Government declares that it was not possible to obtain more than this . . . “ ‘Today is the day to discuss it’, shouted Lutfi Haffar and Jamil Mardam. To cries o f ‘D ont interrupt the speaker from the moderate benches, Mardam turned towards Subhi Bey Barakat and proposed that the treaty be discussed immediately. The President called for a vote: a majority o f hands went up. With the Chamber now in near disorder, Sha‘bani endeavoured to call attention to the parliamentary rules, to which Zaki al-Khatib and Mardam retorted, ‘That’s enough! The vote is agreed*. As Subhi Bey tried to re-establish order, repeatedly slapping the table with his hand, Mardam went to the tribune and started to read out the petition. Before he had finished, M. Weber, in the middle o f this general tumult, stood up and started to read out (in French) the High Commissioners decree suspending the deliberations o f the Chamber for four days. The shouting subsided and the Chamber emptied in an orderly fashion.” That afternoon there were two minor demonstrations in the town, one in support o f Jamil Mardam and the other against President Abid, the latter demonstration being broken up by troops.*0 Such street agitation [147]

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did not faze the High Commissioner, who had something o f a reputation as a ‘lion-tamer’, but he was quietly fuming with Subhi’s behaviour at the session, as reported to him by his Delegate. Martel considered that Subhi had tricked him: at their secret session the previous day, Subhi Bey had promised he would scrupulously fulfil his constitutional duties. Had he done so, it would have given time for tempers to cool and favour a normal and serious examination o f the treaty in later sessions. Instead, he had allowed a discussion on the treaty to develop and thus given the nationalists an opportunity to carry out their manoeuvre.31 The next day an irate High Commissioner called in the Speaker o f the Chamber and frostily asked him to account for his actions. Subhi Bey protested: the Government made the mistake o f opening the discussion on the treaty and the Delegate was at fault too; he should have intervened earlier than he did. Nevertheless, Subhi acknowledged that M . Weber started his intervention before Jamil Mardam finished reading the petition and moreover, Mardam had then put the petition back in his pocket and not given it to the Bureau to be deposited in the parliamentary archives. Given these facts, the High Commissioner insisted that the petition was illegal and would not figure in the official record.32 Some hours later Martel discovered that Subhi Bey had inserted the reading o f the petition into the official record o f the session. In M artels view this completely falsified the sense o f his own intervention, which appeared to be solely in order to save the treaty, whereas its real purpose —he claimed —was to prevent manoeuvres o f intimidation and the violation by the Chamber o f the Constitution and o f its own rules. Furthermore, the insertion o f the petition in the official record o f the session would lead to the rejection o f the treaty at the following session, by the simple adoption o f the official record, that the French could not avoid taking place: Subhis treason deprives us of control of the Assembly and exposes us on Saturday to a session which, scorning all constitutional rules, could even lead, by the deposition of a petition written out of session, to the indictment of the President of the Republic and the government.33 Martel immediately informed Paris that he planned to suspend the parliament for the rest o f the autumn session and thus avoid the danger of being faced with a fa it accompli. It would also enable him to put the (148]

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treaty on 'hold*, a treaty which would keep its value as long as it had not been officially rejected by the Chamber. And finally, it would give him time to take in hand again those deputies who had ‘turned’, a task he considered impossible, given Subhi’s attitude: [My aim is] . . . to take the treaty out of the realm of the conflict - and to hang it on the wall, well out of reach of those who, during the next two months, could be tempted to seize it.34 In an astute move, the High Commissioner placed the official responsibility o f the withdrawal o f the treaty on the Syrian government. At M artels bidding, President Abid wrote to the parliament, on behalf o f the government, officially withdrawing the treaty. This meant the High Commissioner could reopen discussion on the treaty whenever he deemed it timely to do so - and the French government’s position in Geneva was strengthened. On 24 November, Martel sent Subhi Bey the decree suspending the parliament for the rest o f the autumn session and President Abid’s letter withdrawing the treaty.” Subhi was furious. The next day - when the session should have been taking place - some 48 deputies (i.e., 70 per cent o f the Chamber) gathered at Subhi’s official residence and held a meeting which they declared to be a legally constituted session o f parliament. Motions were passed protesting against the suspension, approving the official report o f the session o f 21 November, rejecting the treaty and nominating a Commission to pursue, in the name o f the deputies present, ‘their work’. Finally, they passed a motion o f no-confidence in the government and pronounced the illegality o f any o f its future acts. According to Martel, although ‘the most subversive’ propositions were discussed, no concrete plan o f active opposition emerged from the meeting, which ended without incident.” Martel, confident that there was no real trouble brewing, left the Syrian capital for Beirut the next morning as a deliberate gesture to demonstrate that a line had been drawn under events in Syria.37 At the same time, High Commission officials started to discreedy encourage those moderate deputies who had signed the petition to return to their constituencies. By the end o f the month, a majority o f deputies had left for home.3* On 4 December the National Bloc issued a manifesto protesting against the suspension. Although couched in strong language, it was far from a veritable call to arms.39 At the same time, the Bloc privately 1149]

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proposed to the High Commissioner - via emissaries - that they would guarantee to ’play the game* and not provoke any incidents in the Chamber, if another government, made up o f nationalist and non-nationalist personalities, was formed and parliament convoked; they further agreed that the treaty question be (temporarily) shelved. This offer was combined with a threat, namely a campaign to obtain enough signatures o f deputies to demand an extraordinary session o f parliament, such a meeting being possible as soon as the suspended session had legally finished, i.e., 31 December.40 Martel, quite determined not to be blown o ff course, refused to reply to such advances. From Beirut, where he was fully involved in preparing Lebanese elections, he sent written instructions to M . Weber and his other Delegates. First, the treaty was hors de question. The explosive demonstrations that the nationalists provoked had furnished the authorities with the best pretext to exclude them from the project. Second, the fate o f parliamentary institutions was certainly at stake. The High Commissioner was personally little inclined to encumber himself with an Assembly whose inexperience, incompetence and instability he had assessed. Third, the High Commissioner was very ill-disposed towards the nationalists, whom he hoped would be intelligent and tolerant, but whom he had found to be excitable, partial and lacking a sense o f pragmatism, lacking political acumen and lacking a sense o f the nations interests. Fourth, there was no question o f an extraordinary session in January; any attempt to force the High Commissioners hand with a view to a session before March would definitely lead to a suspension sine die o f the Assembly. Fifth, the condition sine qua non o f restarting deliberations, whenever it might happen, was the pure and simple annulation o f the anti-constitutional manoeuvres that led to the suspension o f the present session. The pseudo-meeting held at Subhi’s residence on 25 November must be held not to have taken place. Similarly the petition rejecting the treaty. When the Chamber reassembled and the official record o f the last session was read out, it must simply mention the fact that Jamil Mardam, having climbed up the tribune in order to read a document, was interrupted by the decree o f the High Commissioner suspending the deliberations. Sixth, Delegates must not discuss the question o f a future government. Finally, whilst maintaining Subhi Bey at arms length, he must be watched carefully, so that M. Weber was not taken by surprise by a reckless move, such as a resignation. If he persisted [150]

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in his attempts to approach M. Weber, the latter should tell him that ‘the value o f his verbal commitments was henceforth considered to be zero’.41 In a note written for the High Commissioner, M. Chauvel (Director o f the Political Cabinet, High Commission, Beirut) observed that before restarting normal parliamentary life, it was imperative to implement a recovery operation that would guarantee the formation o f a counter-weight to nationalist activity. This implied the constitution o f a strong, homogeneous cabinet, which would collaborate effectively with the Mandatory power, gather around it the moderate elements and undertake, without waiting for the Chamber to meet, a programme o f administrative recovery. The present cabinet was weak, divided and unpopular. According to the High Commissioner, the cabinet would not survive 24 hours in the Chamber, there was no moderate personality within the Chamber available to the French who could play the role o f team-leader, and outside parliament the only candidate o f value was the former Prime Minister Shaykh Taj al-Din, who was ‘intelligent, experienced in power, determined and who understands our psychology'.42 After several unsuccessful attempts, the nationalists finally got together on 1 February in Homs, the fiefdom o f the former President o f the Constituent Assembly. Hashim al-Atasi was confirmed as President and Ibrahim Hananu Vice-President. The hard-liners won the day: after two days o f strenuous discussion, particularly on the unity issue, the congress separated after having confirmed the national pact: complete unity (Jabal Druze, Alawites, Tripoli and the four qadhas attached to Lebanon), national sovereignty, administrative, political and economic independence and a general political amnesty. M. Weber noted with disquiet that there was no schism within the Bloc, no manifesto issued and that the Bloc demand for unity now included Tripoli and the four qadhas.43 Whilst the Homs Congress was in progress, the High Commissioner left Beirut (3 February) for the métropole, which was itself in the middle o f a major political crisis. Between his departure from Beirut and his arrival in Paris, some seventeen French demonstrators died and two thousand were wounded on the street o f the French capital. On 7 February, the French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier, resigned and President Lebrun summoned a former President o f the Republic, Gaston Doumergue, out o f retirement, to be Frances saviour.44 The almost 1151]

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endemic difficulties o f the National Assembly during this period were not reflected, however, by any turn-over o f personnel at the Quai d’Orsay. Martel reported to M. St Quentin that the political situation in Syria had hardly changed at all since the events o f November. The leader o f the moderates had gone over to the enemy, the moderates had disintegrated, the Prime Minister, without any real authority, was in acute conflict with the ambitious and combative Minister o f Finance (Sha'bani), who was inordinately keen to occupy the Prime M inisters chair himself.45 On the nationalist side, rivalry reigned between the Aleppo and Damascus leaders, with Hananu and the Aleppines sticking consistendy to their intransigent doctrine. The High Commissioner warned, however, that if the occasion arose for a hostile manoeuvre towards the Mandatory power, their personal intrigues would vanish and the party would solidify into a united opposition bloc: If the Chamber meets in March under these conditions, with an unpopular Cabinet, adecapitatedgroup of moderates and a re-united nationalist bloc, we would be headingstraight for a riskyadventure.46 Martel proposed first, to go ahead with the adjournment o f the ordinary session o f March. Second, to choose the favourable moment to replace the Haqqi al-Azm cabinet by a coalition presided by Shaykh Taj al-Din, and third, to facilitate the latter’s task by allowing him to put into action an adequate programme o f economic reforms.47 In conclusion, the High Commissioner suggested that the reorganisation o f government would make possible a regrouping o f the parties, thus allowing them to envisage reopening parliament in October, which would be free either to re-examine the treaty in a serene fashion, as in normal parliamentary debates or, if this was considered to be premature, to let the government continue normally and to unilaterally pursue the evolution o f the Mandate according to the policy and rhythm o f the Mandatory power.48 The evening he returned to Beirut (10 March), Martel met President Abid and informed him o f his decision to suspend the parliament for six months, until the October session. The following morning the text o f the decree was given to the Prime Minister and the Speaker o f the Chamber.49 The nationalists, following a tactic that they willingly employed in such circumstances, waited for a more explicit indication from the High Commissioner o f his intentions, particularly concerning the [1521

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future o f Haqqi al-Azms government, before expressing their position.” They did not have long to wait. Martel arrived in Damascus at midday on 16 March and contacted the President o f the Republic at four o’clock. Once reassured by the High Commissioner that his own position was secure and that it was simply a matter o f a change o f government, the Presidents resistance to the High Commissioners plans melted. At first, the Prime Minister refused to resign, declaring that he was surprised, shocked and his dignity wounded, especially as a long-time loyal friend o f France. The elderly Francophile wanted to be compensated: Martel appointed him President o f the Council o f State with the rank, prerogatives and salary o f a Minister. Shakir N i’mat and the Ministers o f Public Works and Education put up no resistance.51 Later that evening, Martel convoked Shaykh Taj, and after having reminded him that it was strictly a question o f forming a cabinet consti­ tutionally, the President remaining at his post and the present parliament to be convoked in October, he sent him to President Abid accompanied, at the Shaykhs request, by two senior High Commission officials. It was the early hours o f the morning (17 March) before the President and Shaykh Taj agreed on a cabinet and the decrees were signed. Haqqi Bey handed his lener o f resignation to the High Commissioner at eleven o’clock that same morning. Barely five minutes later, the new cabinet met at the Shaykhs house. At midday the cabinet were at the President’s home, at 12.30 at the High Commissioner’s residence and at one o’clock at the Sérail.52 Taj’s new cabinet included two o f his closest associates: Jamil al-Ulshi (Public Works), one o f the most distrusted politicians in Syria, and Husni al-Barazi o f Hama (Education), the former nationalist minister who had all but broken with the National Bloc by 1931. Other appointees were the respected Damascene notable, Ata al-Ayyubi (Justice), the Antioch deputy, Muhammad Yahya al-Adali (Agriculture) and the Armenian-Catholic deputy o f Aleppo, Henri Hindiyya (Finance). Shaykh Taj took on the Interior Ministry, as well as the Premiership.55 The rapidity o f the operation surprised nationalists and moderates alike. The nationalists were particularly upset that Ata Bey and Husni al-Barazi had been chosen by the Shaykh and had immediately accepted to collaborate with him. The former were their own candidates for the formation o f a ’neutral’ cabinet.54 Their attempts to close the suks and provoke a taxi strike in Damascus largely failed. As the news o f Shaykh Taj’s nomination spread, Hama closed down entirely, but only for a day. (153]

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Jamil Mardam and other members o f the ‘Parliamentary Commission* met in Damascus and published a manifesto protesting against the suspension o f the Chamber and the appointment o f Shaykh Taj, whose ‘experience has proved his inaptitude and whose only aim is to satisfy his personal ambitions’.” Deliberately excluded from the political process, the frustrated nationalists looked on helplessly as once again the French installed another unelected figurehead government in the Sérail. Martel had offered the Premiership to Shaykh Taj on the strict understanding that politics would be completely excluded from the government’s official programme, which would instead concentrate on administrative, financial and economic reforms.” Parallel with this programme - but more discreetly - Martel set as the government’s mission to take in hand those elements ‘that we will be able to use again for political purposes’ so that by the autumn the situation would be sufficiently stabilised to allow for the convocation o f parliament, whose sessions would be limited to budget discussions: Our concern must be to restart the constitutional machinery, before thinking of making it take on the responsibility of major problems.’7 Shaykh Taj enthusiastically fulfilled his allotted role and in mid-May set out in the company o f President Abid on a two-week tour o f Syrian towns and provinces. The Prime Minister wanted to encourage his supporters, surprise his adversaries, study for himself various administrative and economic measures that needed to be taken and attempt to retrieve some o f the ‘lost sheep’.58 In Aleppo, their visit provided the occasion for the Bloc to express its frustration and for the High Commissioner to demonstrate his authority. Given the news that the President o f the Republic and the Prime Minister had decided to pray at the central Mosque, a crowd o f around 250 supporters o f Ibrahim Hananu hurriedly entered the mosque some minutes before prayers were due to start and occupied the places reserved for the two Presidents. At the same time, a large bomb went o ff next to the home o f Fuad Adali, a former minister o f Shaykh Taj, fortunately causing material damage only. To avoid a confrontation between the ‘agitators’ and government supporters who, according to the French, ‘numbered around 3,000 and who welcomed the two Presidents enthusiastically, the two distinguished guests said their prayers in the back o f the mosque and departed from it at noon, (154)

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without any incidents. The police then closed three o f the four exit doors in order to canalise the demonstrators as they came out. In the mêlée, 119 persons were arrested, including three Aleppo Bloc leaders, Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri, Dr Hasan Fuad Ibrahim Pasha and Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Sarmini.” Dr Kayyali sent numerous telegrams from Aleppo all over Syria, announcing that armed force had violated the mosque. Martel immediately issued a press communiqué denying the charge and declaring that those responsible for any disorders whatsoever would be prosecuted. Dr Kayyali and Ibrahim Hananu were convoked to the Aleppo Delegation (Hananu pleaded sickness and stayed at home). There, M. Lavastre read out a message from the High Commissioner, warning them that they would be held personally responsible for the smallest incident that took place. The warnings were heeded: the court session (30 May) later passed o ff without incident. The rest o f the trip had passed o ff less eventfolly, but the touring party nevertheless scheduled their return to Damascus in the late evening, to avoid the possibility o f hostile demonstrations." Although Martel had put politics officially to sleep, he secretly pushed ahead with the political programme as defined by the texts signed the previous November. The arrival o f General Huntziger, the new Commander o f the Armée du Levant, allowed him to conclude the study o f military questions raised by the treaty and the protocols. At the same time he established a commission which started to elaborate the texts defining the status and the guarantees o f the various minorities: All political activity today, however, must be carried out discreetly if we wish to avoid reactivating the opposition, which is at present crumbling. Therefore I am trying to concentrate the publics attention on economic projects.61 This was the heart o f the High Commissioners strategy for the next 18 months in Syria. In early July, for instance, the High Commissioner used a trip to Damascus installing M. Lavastre as the new Delegate to the Syrian government to personally read out a carefully crafted communiqué to the local press, spelling out in detail the Mandatory powers efforts to improve the economic situation in Syria (the carrot), and concluded with a warning (the stick): [155]

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As you know, the agreement for the enlargement of the port of Beirut. . . was ratified by the General Assembly of the concessionary company, and the work has already started . . . The programme for this year for Syria includes first, the extension of the Baghdad railway line, from Tell Ziouane to the Iraqi frontier. Second, the study of a broad-gauge electrified line between Beirut and Damascus. Third, the improvement of the Damascus-Baghdad road. Fourth, the building of the dam at Homs and finally, the improvement of the airports at Aleppo and Damascus . . . the re-starting of normal parliamentary life will not be decided until October: the decision will depend upon both the atmosphere of calm that prevails - or not - and the political maturity of those who have to get accustomed to a parliamentary regime where order and calm are indispensable." Whilst such efforts in the economic domain by the Mandatory power were genuinely welcomed by all Syrians, who were still suffering grievously from the world depression, the nationalists continued to complain - in vain - that the High Commissioner was using his ‘economic mission as a tactic to postpone dealing with the issue, namely the political evolution o f the Mandate. Although the High Commissioner ostensibly - and with some success - concentrated his efforts on economic affairs, in private his main concern remained the issue o f parliament, which was due to meet on 16 October.63At the beginning o f August the new Delegate in Damascus, M. Lavastre, met the High Commissioner at the latter’s residence in Aley, overlooking Beirut, where they discussed the problem at length. According to Martel, the question o f the Syrian parliament had to be examined in the light o f the following elements: first, the Quai d’Orsay had left him with his hands free. Second, the moderate ‘majority’ in Syria, disunited and dispersed, could only be grouped together by Shakir N im at al-Sha‘bani - and he was completely discredited. Third, they must be under no illusion about the unpopularity o f Shaykh Taj. Fourth, the treaty question was for the moment o ff the agenda and finally, it would not be difficult to justify their ‘pause’ policy in Geneva.64 Lavastre: So what is to become of the deputies? Martel: In my mind, the Parliament is dead - it is useless to pay Subhi Bey and the Deputies The High Commissioner underlined his point by succinctly out­ lining his instructions from Paris: [156]

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Hold the coast and the pipeline, and, thanks to Beirut, Damascus, Homs andTripoli, hold on to the whole country6’ The Comte de Martel had made up his mind: the parliament would not be convoked in November and he would decide on his return from Paris whether it was a question o f dissolving or just adjourning it. M. Lavastre was instructed to discreetly inform the other Delegates o f this decision.66 Before leaving for Paris in mid-September the High Commissioner asked President Abid to postpone the opening session o f parliament (15 October) for a month: he needed enough time in Paris and wanted to return well before parliament actually met, in order to be in a position to carry out whatever instructions he had received in Paris. To conceal such reasoning, however, he put exactly the same request to the Lebanese president - who made no objection: . . . the measure taken in Damascus can thus only be interpreted as responding to my wish to be present when parliamentary activity is due to restan.67 In the French capital, Martel reported that Shaykh Taj’s government, efficiently supponed by French counsellors, administered the rural areas without any difficulties at all, whilst in the towns the administration o f government was not really hindered by the hostile nationalist elements.6* He added that if the parliament met, the constructive work o f Shaykh Taj’s cabinet would be undermined by the systematic obstruction o f the seventeen nationalist deputies, whereas if he suspended the Parliament sine die on his return, the operation could be carried out calmly and in an atmosphere o f almost complete indifference. Moreover, in maintaining public order during such an operation, he would have demonstrated the powerlessness o f the nationalists: It is not a matter of ‘breaking olf relations’ with them; they broke off relations with us. It is a matter of unambiguously demonstrating the proof that we can bypass themcompletely, that agovernment of experienced Syrian notables can efficiently administer the country without them and that in concert with the Mandatory Power, such a government can introduce practical legislative and administrative reforms whichwill later producea formof Franco-Syrian collaboration that guarantees the interests of both countries/ '' H57]

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Martel thus proposed to suspend the Syrian parliament sine die, rather than dissolve it and to continue to establish the detailed texts o f the treaty conventions.70 Even more significantly, he proposed to take advantage o f the suspension to initiate - in secret - a major project, based on the administrative decentralisation o f Syria (including the Alawite and Druze states) into a number o f sanjaqs, that involved bypassing the nationalist opposition, creating an alternative (partly nominated) parliament and establishing a modified constitution. Ultimately he hoped it would resolve the unity conflict and lead the Syrians to sign a suitable treaty. Such a scheme, in fact, signified a considerable change o f tactics by the French. The goal, however, remained the same, namely the ratification o f a Franco-Syrian treaty, à la française, by Damascus. In outline, M artels proposal entailed administrative autonomy for each sanjaq, whose affairs would be managed by elected councils, together with a representative o f the central government, as in the sanjaq o f Alexandretta; a government (nominated by the head o f state and responsible to him alone), assisted by a central council would manage the affairs o f state. The central council’s powers would be limited, notably on the question o f financial expenditure. Finally, to avoid the drawbacks associated with general elections, the central council would be composed o f members delegated from the sanjaq councils, mandated for either a year or for each session. The project o f course, would be presented to the public as a purely administrative reform, entirely devoid o f any political implications. As the whole scheme would be carried out in stages, there would be no need for the French to introduce a solemn document, as M. Ponsot had done in May 1930. No such target would be offered to the nationalists. Instead, the new constitution would emerge during the final stage o f the project. After the initial process o f decentralisation, at the sanjaq level, delegates from the sanjaq councils would be convoked to help the government study a particular issue. This experience could be renewed a number o f times. The final stage would be the promulgation o f a text defining the organisation as a whole [a new constitution], which would be submitted for ratification to the central council. Only then would the question o f the re-attachment o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze be introduced, the adoption o f the new constitution being a condition o f that re-attachment.'1 This is the earliest written report where the French themselves propose to accept the political re-attachment o f the two autonomous (158)

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states (albeit on a firm basis o f administrative autonomy), on condition that the Syrians, for their part, ratified a suitable’ constitution. The High Commissioners report reveals the thought-processes o f a pragmatic politician who, although he had little sympathy for the aspirations o f Arab nationalists, had come to the conclusion that the issue o f unity was the fundamental - and untumable - obstacle to any agreement. Therefore, to get a treaty ratified and the French position in the Levant stabilised, some way had to be found to give the Syrians satisfaction on the issue, without giving the appearance that France had made any concession (if they appeared to concede, the Syrian negotiators would immediately raise Tripoli and other Syrian/Lebanese frontier issues). Martel returned to Beirut on 22 October, with all his proposals approved by the Quai d’Orsay: to suspend the Syrian parliament sine die, to maintain Shaykh Taj and his government in power and to pursue his economic mission. In private, the High Commission would continue to elaborate the military, judicial, financial and other texts that made up the treaty conventions. At the same time, the High Commissioner quietly set M. Fauquenot (the French advisor to the Syrian Interior Ministry) to work, preparing the texts for the programme o f administrative decentralisation.72 The High Commissioner reached Damascus on 2 November, gathered his Delegates and representatives o f the provincial towns, gave them their instructions and put the Army on alert.71To take the nationalists by surprise, the whole operation was kept a closely guarded secret.74The following morning, the two Presidents were convoked and at the end o f their visit to the High Commissioner, both the decree suspending the parliament sine die and also a press communiqué were published simultaneously in Damascus and Beirut, where explanations and com­ ments were given to the press and agencies.'5 In the press communiqué, the High Commissioner emphasised that the opposition consistently held both the government and the Mandatory power responsible for the economic and financial crisis whilst it refused to take on the responsibilities o f power (resignation at the beginning o f 1933 o f nationalist ministers, disavowal o f Jamil Mardam’s activities) and attributed the suspension to the obligation that the Mandatory power found itself under to speedily carry out a programme o f economic, financial and administrative reforms which could not be compromised by the still imperfect functioning o f parliamentary institutions in Syria.''’ 1159]

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It worked - taken completely by surprise, the suspension profoundly shook nationalist circles who, undecided how to react, multiplied their meetings and endeavoured to close the suks. Damascus and Hama closed down for half a day and then reopened.77 Four days later a strongly worded National Bloc manifesto appeared in the Damascus press. Written by Jam il Mardam and Luth Haffar, it protested against France’s ‘illegal dictatorship’, the continued partition o f Syria, her misappropriation o f the Common Interests revenues and her ‘irregular methods o f financial and political administration’.7* Syrian nationalist feelings were, however, perhaps best summed up by al-Qabar. . . . we are not claiming bread alone. . . It is a matter of a divided-up country, an amputated constitution, a closed parliament, evaporated economic resources and an overburdened people . . . France has been through financial crises more acute than ours, but ‘feu Poincaré did not suspend Parliament in order to deal with it and would not have done so, even if it had resorted to all possible kinds of unconstitutional behaviour. The difference is that France is a sovereign country and Syria is ‘governed’ . . . We repeat: ‘Political questions first and then the bread!’79 For its part, the Aleppo bloc sent letters o f protest to the League o f Nations and the French Government.*0 Subhi Bey Barakat, in his capacity as President o f the suspended Chamber, sent letters and telegrams o f protest to Martel, the French Foreign Minister, the President o f the French Senate and o f the French Chamber o f Deputies.*1 And no doubt encouraged if not enjoined by the High Commissioner, the two Vice-Presidents o f the Syrian Chamber, Faris al-Zubi and Henri Hindiyya then sent messages o f approval for the High Commissioner’s action to the exact same three destinations.82 On 17 November, the date that the parliament should have opened, the nationalists managed to close down half the bazaars in Damascus and some women tried to form a cortège, which the police unceremoniously broke up. Hama too closed down for the day, but nothing happened in Homs or Aleppo.** By the end o f November Syria was calm again. Once again the French thought they had the measure o f the nationalists, who appeared to be a ‘divided, spent force’.“ Martel’s course was now set: maintain the government o f Shaykh Taj in power, keep politics asleep, push ahead with his ‘economic mission (160)

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and implement, in stages, the project o f administrative decentralisation. Martel thus instructed his team, first to courteously decline to meet leading nationalists, so as not to give them any prominence, and second, to inform nationalist emissaries who contacted them that the representatives o f France had sincerely sought and practised collaboration until the spring o f 1933, when it was terminated by a decision o f the National Bloc congress: It is up to the latter to change its attitude, if it acknowledges that it made a mistake, by a similar decision. But I do not look with favour upon the double-dealingwhich consists of giving us assurances of goodwill in private meetings and contradicting them the day after in public declarations and speeches in mosques.*' The above was M artels strategy to keep the nationalists completely out o f the political arena. The similar decision that Martel demanded, namely a National Bloc congress resolution that would implicitly accept the French position concerning the question o f unity and minorities, was an extremely unlikely development - even the eel-like Mardam had failed to turn the Bloc on the unity issue.*6 But by deliberately making the price o f collaboration too high for any nationalist to accept, the High Commissioner inadvertently encouraged the two divided wings o f the National Bloc to begin to move closer together.*7 Following the suspension o f the Syrian chamber in November 1933 and throughout 1934 the nationalists, increasingly exasperated by their impotence to further the independence struggle directly, were forced to turn their attention to other political issues that they could use, as vehicles o f protest, in order to keep the French mindful o f their influence on the Syrian population. Other issues did, in fact, begin to come to the fore during the early 1930s, among them a question o f concern to all Arabs: land sales to Zionist organisations in Palestine. In February 1934, Damascus merchants, frustrated by the depression, by increased competition from Jewish textiles and the Palestine-Jewish owned confectionery industry, and by the continued smuggling o f Zionist goods into Syria, initiated a boycott o f Zionist products. A month later, when rumours circulated in Damascus that the biggest landowning family in the Syrian capital, the Yusufs, had sold their large property, al-Btayha, to the Jewish National Fund, there was an outcry and large stocks o f Jcwish-manufactured cloth were publicly burnt in Suq (161)

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al-Hamidiyya. Several Syrian nationalist committees were hastily formed to intensify the anti-Zionist propaganda campaign and to encourage the peasants o f al-Btayha to resist evacuation. There was serious concern that the latter would be ousted to make room for Zionist immigrants, as had occurred in Palestine. The National Bloc protested to the High Commission in an endeavour to halt the sale, which, it turned out, had yet to be finalised. On 20 March, the High Commission announced two decrees which prohibited the sale to foreigners o f lands on the frontiers o f Syria-Lebanon with Palestinc-Transjoidan. To make certain that these decrees had their desired impact, they were conveniently pre-dated to 18 January 1934, that is, before the Yusuf-Jewish National Fund deed o f sale was signed." In so doing, the High Commission, which in general had little sympathy for the Zionist movement, demonstrated its intention to block the sale o f the Yusuf properties and to prevent future Zionist purchases o f Syrian land near the Palestine frontier. The Prime Minister and his government claimed the credit for the decrees, which were undoubtedly popular with the Syrian population. The role played by the National Bloc in the Btayha campaign indicated a slight shift from exclusively national concerns to a broader pan-Arab position. But it was not only the Bloc leadership s anxiety about Zionist penetration into Syria which provoked such a response. Other factors were at play that pushed the Bloc towards a more pan-Arab approach, in particular the increasing role o f a radical youth organisation founded in 1933, the League o f National Action. On 20 August 1933, an élite group o f nearly fifty radical Arab nationalists from all over the Arab East secredy gathered in the Lebanese village o f Qarna’il. Their aim: to set the nationalist independence movement in the Arab territories on a firmer footing by systematically coordinating their activities. From this meeting emerged the League o f National Action (Usbat al-Amal al-Qawmi).*9 The new organisation embodied the beliefs and ambitions o f a new generation o f angry young nationalists which had begun to emerge throughout the Arab East. Its gpals were Arab sovereignty, independence, and comprehensive Arab unity, and it particularly emphasised the need for economic development in order to wage a successful struggle against the exploitation o f foreign powers and against feudal landlords. In its view, the National Bloc had drifted away from its heritage o f pan-Arabism towards a local Syrian nationalism,

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as exemplified by the Blocs policy o f ‘honourable cooperation, which the League rejected.90 In contrast to the Bloc leadership, which was drawn mainly, but not exclusively, from a segment o f the landed and old mercantile Syrian upper class, the leadership o f the League was rooted in the professional middle class, the intelligentsia, educated youth, and the middle levels o f the bureaucracy. All o f the Leagues leaders had advanced training, half in Europe (mosdy in France) and the other half at the Syrian University in Damascus. By contrast, only 20 per cent o f the National Bloc leadership had an advanced Western education, while 56 per cent were trained in Istanbul in preparation for the Ottoman Empires civil service.91These educational differences, when coupled with the generation gap, placed the Leagues leadership on a more sophisticated intellectual footing than its National Blocs elders. Nevertheless, given the age o f the founders o f the League o f National Action and their lack o f a political organisation among the urban masses, the only way they could express their dissatisfaction with the well-entrenched leadership o f the Syrian independence movement was to mount a challenge to the Blocs youth wing, the National Youth. They did this through the schools and the Boy Scouts Association. The tajhiz (government secondary school) was one o f the principal centres o f nationalist activity during the Mandate. The influence o f the school’s highly trained teachers upon the intellectual and ideological formation o f many bright young minds had already begun to have an impact by the time Syria entered the 1930s. As this generation reached maturity in the early 1930s, pan-Arabism appeared to undergo a revival. This spirit o f pan-Arabism alive in the tajhiz was at odds with the spirit o f the Nationalist Youth controlled by the Syrian-bound National Bloc. Pan-Arabism also gave ideological shape to the amorphous disillusionment widespread among Syrian youth with the National Bloc's policy o f ‘honourable cooperation and its manifest failure to loosen French political, military or economic control over the country. The League, however, was not a mass-based party. Rather, it was distinctly élitist and became well-organised in government schools, the university, and in institutions such as the Boy Scouts, whose leaders also became members o f the Leagues inner circle.92 As long as the French ruled Syria, the League was destined, albeit grudgingly, to collaborate with the National Bloc in the day-to-day

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struggle for independence. Not only was its leadership too young and inexperienced and its political base too narrow to pose an effective chal­ lenge to the Bloc’s influence, but its links outside Syria were insufficiendy developed to allow complete independence from the Bloc. Instead, it engaged in a push and pull batde with the Bloc leadership, to force the Bloc’s radicalisation along League lines: it advocated a hard-line stance o f no compromise with the French, an active display o f hostility to any party prepared to cooperate with the colonisers and its members vowed not to accept any government posts as long as foreigners remained in control o f Syria.” In order to retain their control o f the overall nationalist movement and in particular to prevent the Istiqlalis and the League o f National Action from monopolising the pan-Arab card, Bloc leaders made renewed efforts during 1934 to strengthen their ties with the Arab world. In May 1934, Jam il Mardam, as head o f the Syrian Red Crescent Society and accompanied by Dr Shishakli, the nationalist deputy from Hama, went on a personal mission to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to assist casualties o f the Saudi-Yemeni War. In fact, the principal aim o f their trip was to seek Ibn Saud’s active support for Syrian nationalist strategy, which in the event was not forthcoming.94 A month later Hashim al-Atasi visited Jedda and Alexandria, where he met Nahas Pasha, the leader o f the Egyptian Wafd Party, in an effort to encourage the Wafd to actively support the National Bloc.” Bloc supporters prepared demonstrations o f sympathy for the returning nationalist leader and decided to close down the Homs suks for a day. Convoked by the Homs C hief o f Police, Bloc activists were informed that cortèges and demonstrations were forbidden. Nevertheless, on 29 July the town shut down and about a thousand people went in small groups across the countryside to the M azraa bridge, 7 kilometres west o f Homs, on the road to Tripoli, to meet Atasi. At seven in the evening the cortège, comprising a dozen cars and between one and two thousand people, arrived in the town and came up against a road block set up by the police. The latter suddenly found themselves under a hail o f pebbles. Demonstrators ran forward to dismantle the road block, the police were overwhelmed and the Delegate then called in the cavalry, who broke up the demonstration. There were no serious injuries and Atasi reached his home by a roundabout route.96 The longer-term significance o f this relatively minor incident was underlined by the Delegate in his report: (164]

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The change in HashimAtasis attitude and his supporters’ should be noted. Thoughtful, a man of good sense, he had always counselled calm. Yesterday, the demonstration had been prepared with his agreement and he passively participated in the violent demonstration. In the three years that I have been stationed in Homs, I have never seen the crowd attack the police, even during the troubled election period. Yesterday, the demonstration clearly took place with his approval and the demonstrators were quite vicious. It must be assumed that on his trip, the nationalist leader was encouraged to behave in this manner.*7 Although such an incident was small beer in a country which had experienced a major revolt less than a decade previously, it illustrates the growing sense o f alienation between the Syrian population and the French authorities. Other policies which helped to aggravate tensions between Syrian nationalists and the French included the question o f Assyrian migration. Since the autumn o f 1933, Assyrian refugees had been entering north­ east Syria from Iraq where their rebellion against the newly independent Baghdad Government had been ruthlessly quashed. The Syrians feared that the Assyrians (Nestorian Christians) would become a fifth column and likened their coming to that o f the Armenians after the First World War. When the French Government announced in 1934 that on humanitarian grounds France would help to settle this refugee community o f some several thousand Christians in homes in the Jazira, the National Bloc was livid. Nationalists justifiably asked how the Syrian Government could offer financial assistance and even build homes for Assyrians on Syrian soil when it had neglected to lift a hand on behalf o f the thousands o f Syrian citizens in the Hawran and elsewhere who, because o f the devastating drought, had been forced to quit the land. But the Blocs protest went unheard as more and more Assyrians were settled under the supervision o f the League o f Nations and granted full Syrian citizenship by the Mandate authority.9* By the beginning o f 1935, the High Commissioners energetic and authoritarian methods appeared to have been reasonably successful. Syria was calm, Shaykh Taj al-Din and his government had held together and performed satisfactorily for nine months, a programme o f large and small-scale public works was under way, the High Commission was quiedy drafting the texts concerning the treaty conventions and decentralisation, [1651

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and last but not least, the nationalists seemed to be powerless." Ibrahim Hananu was not well and M. de Martel dismissed all Jamil Mardam’s discreet attempts - via emissaries - to approach him.100 Early March found the High Commissioner once again in Paris, having left the new Secretary-General, M. Ernest Lagarde, in charge in Beirut. M artels two reports to the Quai d’Orsay (12 March) contained no new proposals. Rather, they were essentially a detailed re-statement o f his programme o f the previous October. They are, nevertheless, important documents because o f what they reveal o f the High Commissioner’s own attitude on four key issues: the gpvernance o f Syria, unity, the nationalists and French longer-term imperial/strategic intentions. Concerning the governance o f Syria, the problem to be resolved was the following: to have a government that was strong enough to take on the responsibilities o f affairs, and at the same time weak enough for the French to maintain effective control through the Delegates and counsellors: . . . a control, however, which is discreet enough for the men in power not to be perceived by public opinion as simply instruments in our hands.101 According to the High Commissioner, Shaykh Taj al-Din’s govern­ ment was not ’perfect’, but was performing reasonably well. On unity, Martel underlined that the problem had proved to be particularly difficult because o f the conflict between Damascus nationalism - refusing to allow a European power the right to have any say in the internal affairs o f an independent Syria - and France, who could not possibly abandon the minorities to the nationalists without guarantees. Traditionally, her protection o f minorities was the very justification o f her presence in the Levant. Hence: We find ourselves led to conceive of a regime of provincial autonomies which will be sufficiendy flexible to allowthe Aleppines - and eventually the Alawite and Druze regions - to live at ease in a unitary Syrian state.102 Concerning the nationalists, Martel argued that it was inconceivable for the Mandatory power to persist in pursuing the policy o f the treaty, as long as its ‘essential partner’ shirked its responsibilities. The very purpose 1166]

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o f the treaty policy was to disarm them. The nationalists had been told that private talks were useless until a nationalist congress decided officially to re-start a polity o f collaboration, but nationalism could not change direction 180 degrees publicly: The Mandatory power thus finds itself rid of Syrian nationalism until such rime as it commits the imprudence to restore to Syrian nationalism the means of action - and of pressure - that it does not presently possess, by restarting premature negotiations with certain of its emissaries.'41 Finally, the High Commissioner raised some ‘vitally important’ considerations: what bases did France intend to keep in the Levant States for imperial and strategic purposes? Those bases had never been spelled out in any detail, nor had the areas that the Army intended to keep in its possession after Syrian independence, nor the airports that the Air Force intended to keep under its control, nor the fall-back lines in case o f war. The administrative reforms clearly needed to be carried out in the light o f those considerations, which were pardy outside his jurisdiction.104 To this last question, M. Léger (21 March) replied that the issue had been studied in depth in 1931 by M. Ponsot with the Department and the relevant Ministries and that the study could be usefully re-started. He asked the High Commissioner to draft a report, in cooperation with the Commander o f the Armée du Levant, General Huntziger and Vice-Admiral Rivet (Chief Naval Officer in Beirut), defining the framework and elements o f the study. The Minister would pass this report to the relevant ministries in Paris and arrange inter-ministerial meetings when the High Commissioner and General Huntziger were next in Paris.101 For the rest, the Quai d’Orsay approved M artels proposals to maintain Shaykh Taj and his government in power, to concentrate (publicly) on the economic recovery programme and to continue to draft the administrative decentralisation texts, which would undergird the system o f protection for the minorities and prepare the way for the solution to the Syrian unity problem. And finally, to continue to draft the various conventions annexed to the treaty, which would enable the Mandatory power to achieve a state o f affairs that the treaty and its conventions were destined to describe. Once that goal was achieved, the (1671

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role o f the Syrian party would be limited to taking note and ratifying the treaty, including the conventions: According to the Iraqi precedent, this ratification would constitute the necessary prelude to Syria’s admission to the League of Nations as an independent State. The problem for the Syrians to solve would thus be reduced to essentials. It would consist of weighing up - with regard to the independence offered - the price of the conditions inscribed in the treaty.106 On his return to the Levant in early April, Martel's silence con­ cerning French political intentions heightened nationalist frustration. Demonstrations, manifestos in the press and letters o f protest to Paris and Geneva had litde effect on a confident and all-pervasive imperial administration which, since its establishment some fifteen years previously, had not hesitated to use military force whenever its control was questioned. Although the Bloc’s policy o f honourable cooperation, initiated in 1928, was deemed to have failed by the spring o f 1935, armed confrontation was not considered a serious option by the Syrian nationalist leadership. Powerless to exert any noticeable influence on Taj’s government and denied access to the High Commission, the nationalists’ room to manoeuvre remained very limited. By the summer o f 1935, after eighteen months o f political exile, the mood o f the nationalists had shifted from one o f resignation and frustration to that o f deep-seated anger. This in turn expressed itself in a growing willingness to take a more confrontational stance towards the French. The clearest expression o f this more determined approach was the start o f a new boycott o f the Damascus Tramway and Electricity Company, which began in June. A vestige o f Damascus's Ottoman past, this French-capitalised, Belgian-based concession was one o f the most annoying reminders o f the European exploitation o f Syria. Throughout the period o f Mandate government isolated incidents against the company occurred, some o f which were violent. By the thirties, it was the Nationalist Youth who led the attack, which usually consisted o f overturning tramcars and setting them on fire.107The 1935 boycott was called for by the National Bloc. Fakhri al-Barudi inspired it, and by accusing the company o f selling electricity at prohibitive prices he had little difficulty keeping the boycott alive. Although it reportedly cut the company’s receipts by more than half, the controlling group in Brussels refused to (168]

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capitulate, fearing that any show o f weakness might encourage the repetition o f the same tactics on future occasions. At the beginning o f August, in an endeavour to end the boycott, the police arrested the Secretary o f the Boycott Committee, Wahid al-Hakim - to no avail. The boycott continued, on and off, throughout the summer and autumn.10* During this period the nationalists sent numerous petitions to the Quai d’Orsay detailing the ’disastrous’ French policies in Syria and requesting that a French Parliamentary Committee o f Enquiry be sent to the Levant.109At the same time they unofficially endeavoured to make contact, via emissaries, with High Commission officials in Beirut, who replied that secret contacts were inappropriate as long as the nationalist leaders lacked the courage to advocate in public the moderation that they professed they were committed to in private meetings.110 On 2 September, the High Commissioner met with Shaykh Taj al-Din at the Levant Office in Paris, to put the finishing touches to the plan for administrative decentralisation.111The draft document - all 103 pages o f it - had already been carefully examined and approved in general terms at a meeting with M . St Quentin at the Quai d’Orsay in July. The September meeting focused on three practical points, namely the mode and date o f promulgation, and the division o f the constituencies."2 On the first point, the High Commissioner and the Prime Minister agreed that as the plan was likely to raise nationalist opposition, it would be more appropriate for the plan to be introduced by the Mandatory Power. Martel feared that if the local government promulgated the decree, its position could be seriously weakened - something he was keen to avoid. For his part, Shaykh Taj al-Din declared that his gpvernment had no wish to shirk its responsibilities, but as the new provincial organisation was to serve as the basis o f a new constitution, it seemed necessary that the decree be enacted by the sole authority that held constitutional power in Syria.1" Concerning the date, it was finally decided to promulgate the text sometime between 15 December and 1 January (1936), which would allow elections to take place at the end o f February or beginning o f March and for the provincial councils to meet immediately afterwards (two months were needed for the constitution o f electoral lists).114 On the third question - the number o f provincial constituencies - the proposal as drafted in July recommended the fusion o f the four sanjaqs o f Homs, Hama, Damascus and Hauran into two vilayets. Shaykh Taj al-Din observed, however, that such a proposal risked stirring (1691

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up local opposition and would be likely to be exploited by the nationalists. He reminded the meeting that the basic object o f the proposed reform was to create a Central Council established according to a different procedure from that o f the present parliament. That was the operation that must succeed. It therefore seemed appropriate to avoid everything that could cause further difficulties and that was not vital to the success o f the operation. The High Commissioner agreed that the maintenance o f the four sanjaqs, although it had the drawback o f reducing the framework in which provincial autonomy would be exercised, would not compromise the overall implementation o f the project - the four sanjaqs were maintained.115 The Prime Minister arrived back in Beirut on 4 October and was warmly welcomed at the quayside by 40 deputies and a cortège o f 150 persons, who escorted him to Damascus.116 The nationalists tried unsuccessfully to close the Damascus suks. Their efforts only produced a mild demonstration in the Umayyad Mosque during which Fakhri Barudi made a speech attacking Shaykh Taj: This small verbal outburst was the only expression of hostility against the Prime Minister. Once again, nationalist threats have turned out to be nothing but bravado."7 Although the High Commissioner and his team were confident that they could handle any nationalist threats, they were equally under no illusions about the deep discontent that reigned in Syria: . . . The politicians are very critical at not being able to continue their activities, property owners seemalarmed at the fall in the price of property, the industrialists and shopkeepers claim that their interests are not being safeguarded, the young intellectuals find no careers, the artisans areworking for ‘famine’ salaries and thecultivators declare theyarecrushed under taxes. . . if there is no change [soon] in the economic and political situation, we can expea demonstrations and attacks on public order, especially as this population is unlikely to remain indifferent to European activities around the Red Sea."* Given their own recent history, the Syrians were hardly likely to remain indifferent to one European dictators efforts to build an empire in North-East Africa. On 3 October, Mussolini sent his legions into (170)

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Abyssinia, an event which had considerable repercussions in Europe, as well as in Africa and the Middle East. The Italian invasion put another nail in the coffin o f the League o f Nations, which was unable to prevent it. French foreign policy, which had been based since the early 1920s on collective security under the League, was gready weakened - and the issue further embittered relations between the Left and the Right in France."9 With the demise o f the international order, rumours began to circulate that a world war was imminent. It was argued in some nationalist circles that a war would ultimately improve Syria’s chances o f liberation. Similar sentiments were expressed throughout the Middle East. In general, however, Arab nationalists had litde hope that France could be dislodged from her pre-eminent position in the Levant — in the short term.'20 They also had litde respect for II Duce and even less confidence that he would help them in their independence struggle, despite the flirtations o f such respected leaders as Shakib Arslan with the Italian dictator. Italy’s reputation in the Arab world had long been impaired by her ruthless colonial rule in Libya and by bitter memories o f her bombardment o f Beirut in 1912. Dismayed by the High Commissioner’s silence following his return, the nationalist leaders gathered together in Baalbek during 17-18 October. Leading members o f the Bloc were present, with the excepdon o f Ibrahim Hananu and Hashim al-Atasi, who seemed to keep their distance from the group directed by Jamil Mardam. The two tendencies within the party once again confronted each other. For the nationalists o f the south, the possibility o f participating in power with other elements was considered acceptable under certain conditions, in particular if Syria was promised a treaty not less advantageous than that o f the Anglo-Iraq treaty. The hard-liners remained solidly behind the resolution o f the Homs Congress o f February 1934, affirmed the uselessness o f a waiting* policy and advocated immediate action.121 Informed o f the details o f the nationalist discussions, the High Commissioner remained unperturbed - after two years in the Levant he was accustomed to such rhetoric. The nationalists were still divided over tactics, they had almost no arms and no funds to procure them and could barely afford to send a representative to Paris. Moreover, it seemed that the attitude o f the hard-liners would remain in the realm o f theory:

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. . . because the indifference of the masses to the nationalist minority appears to render very risky any active opposition to the Mandatory Power.1“

N o tes

1 CADN/B, vol. 473. 2 CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 12 and 13 October 1933, vol. 470. 3 Decree no. 1748, 15 October 1933. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 14 October 1933, vol. 470. 4 MAE/SL, ‘Note for the Minister’, October 1933, vol. 486, p. 244. 5 Ibid., Martel to MAE, p. 227. 6 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 392. 7 Ibid., p. 393; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 3 November 1933, vol. 472; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 5 November 1933, vol. 470. 8 CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 5 November 1933, vol. 472. 9 ‘Although the government was weak. . . in maintaining a constitutionally qualified team as my interlocutor, I would avoid the risk involved in the choice o f new men, whose names I didn’t even know and the drawback o f committing them to an uncertain adventure. Furthermore, to put together a new cabinet, I would have had to look for men who are not deputies. . . we do not have at our disposal many moderate ‘men o f ability’; we arc forced to use them all at the same time. We only have as Muslim notables, Subhi Bey Barakat, Haqqi al-Azm and Shakir Ni‘mat al-Sha‘ban i. . . The elimination o f Subhi Bey would mean his replacement by one o f the other two. This operation would present. . . the drawback o f either depriving the Cabinet o f its chief, or o f the one minister who is intelligent, active and courageous.’ MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933, vol. 487, pp. 106-7. 10 Both Subhi Bey and Shaykh Taj had spent pan o f the previous summer in France, each competing for the ear o f the Quai d’Orsay and business circles in Paris. During that time Subhi wrote to the French Foreign Minister, making five requests. First, a firm, definitive French policy in Syria. Second, the return o f Tripoli to Syria. Third, administrative reform in the Alawite and Druze states, based on decentralisation. Fourth, a vigorous economic programme and finally, a general amnesty for political crimes. This letter, published in the Syrian press and discussed widely in Syrian political circles, was not viewed favourably at the High Commission. MAE/SL, Subhi Barakat to MAE, 24 August 1933, vol. 486, pp. 106—8. ‘Subhi Bey’s candidature needed to be questioned because o f the declarations that he made in France. The recantation that he indulged in to my face on his return led me to consider that his maintenance at the presidency, if it did not give me watertight guarantees, was at least the only way that I had to neutralise him and the only way that would allow me to maintain intact the government with whom I was going to negotiate.’ MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933, vol. 487, p. 107.

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Syrian Parli ament suspe nde d 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 5 11 Ibid., p. 106. On 28 October, President Abid had issued a decree (no. 1789) postponing the opening o f parliament for a further fortnight. As the initial postponement o f two weeks started from 17 October, the parliament was now due to open on 17 November. However, that day was a public holiday, so the Chamber was convoked for 18 November. See CADN/B, vol. 469. 12 MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933. vol. 487, pp. 107-8. For Martel, one o f the difficulties o f the talks was the total ignorance o f the Prime Minister, concerning the negotiations conducted under his auspices in November 1932 and between January and April 1933 by Jamil Maidam. Ibid., p. 108. 13 Ibid., p. 108. 14 Ibid., p. 109. 15 Ibid., p. 108; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 393; by decree no. 1862 (15 November 1933). Latif al-Ghanima was nominated Minister o f Public Works. By the same decree, Haqqi al-Azm took over the Education Ministry. CAD N/B, vol. 472. 16 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 23 November 1933, p. 90. Such comments by the High Commissioner unambiguously demonstrate that the French intended to keep effective control o f the Common Interests for the duration o f the treaty; in reality maintaining the Mandate until (at least) 1962. 17 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933, p. 108; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 17 November 1933, vol. 472. 18 CAD N/B, ‘National Bloc Manifesto’, 17 November 1933, vol. 470. 19 CAD N/B, ‘Report o f the First Session’, Damascus, 18 November 1933, vol. 472. 20 Ibid; ibid., Martel to MAE, 18 November 1933, telegrams nos. 904-7. 21 MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 21 November 1933, vol. 487, p. 71. 22 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 20 November 1933, pp. 69-70. 23 CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 19 November 1933, vol. 472, telegrams nos. 908-12. 24 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 20 November 1933, telegrams nos. 915-16. 25 For the text o f the treaty, including the protocols and annexed letters, see MAE/SL, vol. 487, pp. 13-29, 39-43. Most o f the principles as enunciated in the twelve point treaty were more or less acceptable to the nationalists. For instance. Article 1 o f the treaty reads: i l y aura paix et amitié perpétuelles entre la France et la Syrie. Une alliance est établie entre les deux Etats indépendents et souverains en consacration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la Paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.' Such verbal formulae, however, did not reflect reality, which lay elsewhere - for example, in Article 5 [Military Affairs]: ‘La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre en Syrie et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement syrien. Toutefois, en vue de faciliter l’exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes du présent Traité, le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire à la Syrie pendant la durée de ce Traité suivant les prévisions de la Convention annexe . . . ’ One then turns to the ‘Convention annexe’ [Protocol A, Article 1]: ‘Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d’accord pour négocier et conclure dans le plus bref délai les Conventions militaires dont le principe est inscrit à l'article 5 du Traité.' Similar carefully crafted imprecision characterises the articles concerning the Common Interests, the judiciary and the role o f French counsellors, The treaty was, on all major issues, the same that Ponsot had elaborated with the Department during summer 1931 and which he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Haqqi al-Azm’s government to sign earlier in 1933: ‘The treaty and attached protocols.

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as communicated to me on 17 November reproduce the text approved by the Government and the Department last April and last September, apart from some very slight minor modifications o f form, made so as not to offend Syrian suscep­ tibilities.’ Ibid., MAE to Martel, 23 November 1933, p. 92. CAD N/B, ’Commentary on the President o f the Republic’s letter to the Delegate in Damascus’, 27 November 1933, vol. 470, no. 569. CAD N/B, ‘Chamber o f Deputies’, 4th session, 21 November 1933, vol. 472, pp. 11-13. Ibid., pp. 13-16. Ibid., ‘Report’, Damascus, 21 November 1933. The High Commissioner’s decree (No. 169 L/R, 21 November 1933), read out by the Damascus Delegate suspending the deliberations o f the Chamber until 25 November, invoked the responsibility o f the High Commissioner to maintain order and his concern to guarantee the free functioning o f the constitutional machinery, free o f all external pressures. CAD N/B, vol. 472. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21 November 1933, Telegrams nos. 922-5. ‘The extremists don’t hold back from using any measure in order to achieve the result they want. . . Students make up their troops as well as prostitutes disguised as women from the ‘upper crust’ o f society, who on the street acclaim Maidam and shout down the Government. The veil facilitates these activities, which can raise the temperature o f this already tense town very quickly.’ MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933, vol. 487, pp. 108-9. CA D N /B, ‘Commentary on the President o f the Republic’s letter to the Delegate in Damascus’, 27 November 1933, vol. 470, p. 3. Subhi’s recollection o f what was agreed at the secret meeting was quite diffèrent: ‘I only made one commitment to the High Commissioner: that was to prevent, within the Chamber itself, any disturbance that could be offensive to the Ministers or physically threatening to them.’ Ibid., p. 5. See CAD N/B, Weber to Barakat, 24 November 1933, vol. 472; ibid., Barakat to Weber, 27 November 1933, no. 569; CADN/B, Weber to Martel, 13 December 1933, vol. 470. At the meeting o f 22 November, Subhi’s memory was distinedy selective. It was Dr Shishaldi for the nationalists who had started the discussion on the treaty, not the government. In similar fashion, he maintained that as the Delegate had a decree in his pocket, he should have used it as soon as the government opened the discussion on the treaty. The French asserted that Subhi should have intervened first: as President o f the Chamber, it was his responsibility to see that the rules o f the Constitution were upheld. As the French realised perfectly well, Subhi Bey wanted the Delegate to intervene first and thus take the entire responsibility for the suspension and its consequences. Ibid., Commentary on the President o f the Republic’s letter to the Delegate in Damascus, 27 November 1933, no. 569. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 22 November 1933, pp. 80-1. The real puipose o f his intervention was not to prevent a politically immature parliament from violating the constitution and its own rules. The day before, Martel had telegraphed Paris: ‘The nationalists tried hard to beat us to it, in presenting us with a fait accompli. . . and they partially succeeded because they gathered 43 signatures for the petition that Jamil Mardam tried to read out this morning . . . We only just avoided the rejection “coup” by suspending the deliberations.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21

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November 1933, p. 75. A hypothetical question, but nevertheless worth pondering: if the nationalists had changed tack and precipitated a vote in parliament ratifying the treaty before the election o f the budget commission, how would the French authorities have reacted? By declaring the vote invalid, because it violated articles 44 and 100 o f the constitution? Unlikely. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 23 November 1933. vol. 487, p. 88. CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 24 November 1933, vol. 472. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 26 November 1933, vol. 487, p. 111. Ibid., Martel to MAE., pp. 111-12; CAD N/B, Weber to Martel. 29 November 1933, vol. 472. ‘Le Rideau est tiré sur la scène syrienne.* MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 26 November 1933, vol. 487, pp. 112-13. Martel later described the 25 November session as ‘an attempt to repeat the famous gesture o f the “Jeu de Paume" CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 8 December 1933, vol. 470. So it was, but the High Commissioner had a substantial, well-equipped and above all loyal Army to back up his policies - unlike the unfortunate Louis XVI. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 8 December 1933. On 30 November, the High Commissioner promulgated a decree (no.l76/LR), temporarily placing legislative power in the hands o f the President o f the Republic, given that the Chamber had been temporarily suspended. Article one o f the decree included: ‘The legislative decrees will take effect once officially approved by the High Commissioner.’ See CAD N/B, vol. 472. CAD N/B, ‘Information, 4 December 1933, vol. 470. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 19 December 1933, vol. 472, telegrams nos. 1.212-1.216. Ibid., Martel to Weber, 19 December 1933. ‘In effect, I cannot possibly allow myself to be placed again in exactly the same situation as I was a month ago, with the perspective o f the rejection o f the treaty without discussion and as well as its rejection, an ungovernable Assembly, a President o f the Chamber more incoherent than ever and a Cabinet crisis that I could not resolve except by submitting to nationalist conditions. That would be to head straight into a conflict and the dissolution o f Parliament. . . ’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 19 December 1933, telegrams nos. 1.212-1.216, p. 3. MAE/SL, ‘Note’, Chauvet, n.d., (probably January 1934), vol. 488, pp. 50-61. This note served as the basis o f an official note o f M. de Martel to the Quai d’Orsay. Ibid., ‘Note on the situation in Syria’, Martel to Quai d’Orsay, 3 February 1934, pp. 88-97. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 3 February 1934, pp. 42-5, 62; ibid., Lagarde to MAE, 9 February 1934, pp. 63-9; CAD N/B, Weber to Lagarde, 14 February 1934, vol. 473. Previously, for the Bloc it had only been a question o f the re-attachment o f the Alawite and Druze regions - officially. For an illuminating description o f one o f the methods used by the High Commissioner’s team to sound out the population’s opinion o f the treaty, see the report o f Colonel Jacquot, the Deputy-Delegate o f the Euphrate territory, which included: ‘I intend to gather at Dayr al-Zur, on 3 February, the Deputies, notables, tribal leaders and representatives o f the minorities etc., o f the Euphrate region, in order to hold a political meeting, to sound out opinion concerning the treaty and to gather together all the comments that it provokes in the region. The meeting

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will be restricted to those personalities who accept two points, in advance. First, that Syria can only achieve its aspirations with the help o f the Mandatory power, delegated, to this effect by the League o f Nations. Second, that “unity” must take into account local autonomies, the rights and interests o f minorities, notably Druze and Alawite, and that any strengthening o f political bonds must be the result o f legislative agreements between Syria and the autonomous minorities. The adhesion to the above two principles, o f collaboration and contractual unity, will be demanded via a written motion. Only those who have signed will be allowed to attend.’ Ibid., Colonel Jacquot to Martel, 25 January 1935. Throughout the whole o f the Mandate period, there is a remarkable coincidence, to say the least, in the timing o f such initiatives by Mandate agents, just when the nationalists were about to meet, were meeting or had just met. All the evidence suggests that such initiatives were standard Mandatory policy, to counteract nationalist influence. P. Bernard and H. Dubief, op. cit., pp. 226-8; William L. Shirer, The Collapse o f the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the F a ll o f France in 1940, London, The Literary Guild, 1970, pp. 195-206. Daladier had been in power for all o f seven days, following the downfall o f the scandal-ridden Chautemps ministry on 27 January 1934. MAE/SL, ‘Note concerning the situation in Syria’, Martel to MAE, 3 February 1934, vol. 488, p. 90. Martel took advantage o f a short visit to Damascus in early January to convince what he termed the two ‘brother-enemies’ not to open a cabinet crisis. He gave the same message to President Abid. ‘I let all three know that they had all to lose and nothing to gain by such an adventure. In order to make my visitors suitably worried, I later ostensibly received Shaykh Taj al-Din, whose coming to power all o f them fear’. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 8 January 1934, vol. 472. MAE/SL, ‘Note concerning the situation in Syria’, Martel to MAE, 3 February 1934, vol. 488, p. 93. Martel was convinced that the troubles o f November 1933 were not entirely home-grown: ‘. . . Baghdad was not a stranger to the launching o f the nationalist activity during the last crisis. Decisions were taken in Baghdad following the celebration o f the fortieth day after the death o f King Faysal, which a large number o f Syrians and even Lebanese attended. The aim o f the Iraq Government, pursuing its aim o f Arab unity, was to prevent a French-Syrian agreement, which would delay for 25 years any possible Syrian-Iraq union . . . This foreign interference presently constitutes a real stumbling block and will be the most dangerous threat to the stability which is essential for the development o f our policies.’ MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 30 November 1933, vol. 487, pp. 125— 6MAE/SL", ‘Note concerning the situation in Syria’, Martel to MAE, 3 February 1934, vol. 488, p. 96. ‘Such reforms require a stable government, one whose composition gives it the necessary authority and which inspires confidence both at home and abroad. Its Ministers must possess enough authority and prestige within Syria to neutralise the political activity o f the nationalists. The present cabinet is not up to i t . . . Since last November, a good pan o f my political activity has consisted in keeping together a team whose natural and consistent tendency has been to break apart. . . Apart from the nationalists, to whom we cannot turn without totally losing our influence over those who have so far put their confidence

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Syri an Parli ament s uspended 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 5 in us, there is only one personality who could take over from Haqqi Bey: that is Shaykh T a j__ there is no doubt that the passage to power o f Shaykh Taj will be a delicate operation. We must not proceed with it prematurely; we do not want to ‘brûler’ the only personality that we presendy have at our disposal in Syria.’ Ibid., pp. 94-6. 48 Ibid., pp. 96-7. M. Weber, the Damascus Delegate, was keen that France pursued the ‘unilateral evolution’ o f the Mandate. On 29 January 1934, just five days before the High Commissioner left for Paris, he wrote a 13-page report to the latter, which concluded: ‘The unilateral evolution which we would accomplish would correspond to the evolution o f British policy in Cairo. For our policy in the Levant, it would be, in short, the substitution o f the Iraqi precedent for the Egyptian. Until the treaty is signed, we would also have an advantage over Britain, in that we would be in a legally defined and internationally recognised position . . . There is one striking conclusion to be drawn, given the history o f the last fifteen years: in Syria, in order to emancipate a people, it is necessary to keep control.’ CAD N/B, Weber to Martel, 29 January 1934, vol. 473. 'This report says nothing new’, was Martel’s handwritten comment across the front page49 Decree no. 54/LR, 10 March 1934. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 11 March 1934, vol. 488, p. 107; CA D N /B, Delegate (Damascus) to Martel, 11 March 1934, vol. 471. 50 MAE/SL, Manel to MAE, 23 March 1934, vol. 488, p. 120. Some nationalists hoped that the High Commissioner might accept the formation o f a coalition cabinet, o f nationalists and moderates, under the premiership o f a moderate. Around 15 March, Dr Kayyali suggested as much to M. Lavastre, who listened politely, knowing full well that M. de Martel’s quite different plan was about to be launched. CAD N/B, Lavastre to Martel, 16 March 1934, vol. 473. 51 CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 17 March 1934, vol. 471; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 23 March 1934, vol. 488, pp. 118-24. 52 Ibid. 53 CAD N/B, ‘Communiqué’, High Commission, 17 March 1934, vol. 471. 54 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 26 March 1934. 55 CAD N/B, ‘Manifesto’, 20 March 1934, vol. 473. Ibrahim Hananu’s reaction was quite different: ‘The question o f governments and parliaments no longer interests us . . . Let the French do whatever they wish in the country, but they must understand that the nation is not satisfied with their policy. We do not recognise the governments that the French nominate. . . It is to France alone that we must henceforth address our words. She is our adversary. It is with her alone that we must settle accounts. This is the line we must adopt from now on.’ Ibid., ‘Information’, Damascus, 18 April 1934. 56 See CADN/B, ‘Report on the Political Situation, Captain Collet, 13 April 1934, vol. 471, p. 18. An immediate problem for Martel and the Syrian government arose from the death in the middle o f March o f the moderate deputy o f Kuteife, a small rural constituency near Damascus. In itself, the event was not particularly noteworthy. However, by article 60 o f the constitution, the vacancy had to be filled within two months, which would have meant convoking the electoral colleges by 15 April, to which the Syrian government objected. In its view, Syria was calm - an election would revive passions and interrupt its programme o f

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reforms. Martel agreed: ‘Politics is asleep. People’s spirits have turned toward administrative, economic and financial affairs. There is almost no talk o f parliament or o f the treaty. As a result the nationalist party, not knowing who or what to attack, is becoming weaker and disintegrating.’ CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 13 April 1934, vol. 473. For the High Commissioner, there was an even more important factor to consider. The moderates, and especially certain members o f the previous cabinet, tried to use their removal as a bargaining chip. To obtain some compensation from the High Commissioner, they affected to be uninterested in politics and spoke o f resigning. ‘Two o f them come from Aleppo. In the present circumstances, local elections in Aleppo would have the most serious drawbacks.’ Ibid. Martel therefore issued a decree suspending local elections in Syria for the period o f the suspension o f the Chamber. Decree no. 81/LR, 14 April 1934. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 20 April 1934, vol. 473. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 18 May 1934. ‘Shaykh Taj would have quite willingly gone by himself, to receive the applause and to be able to work in peace. But the President o f the Republic sticks to him. Moreover, it seems to me preferable that the two Presidents appear together, thus emphasising their solidarity and their mutual attachment to the constitution, which defines their respective responsibilities.’ Ibid. Ibid., David to Martel, 26 May 1934; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 26 May 1934, vol. 471. In all, 57 persons were sentenced to prison terms. Sa’dallah al-Jabiri was sentenced to 8 months in prison and fined 50 pounds, Dr Hasan Fu’ad, brother o f Jamil Ibrahim Pasha (6 months in prison); the rest were sentenced to terms o f up to 2 months. CADN/B, ‘Communiqué o f the High Commissioner’, n.d., vol. 473; ibid., ‘Message to Ibrahim Hananu and Dr Kayyali’, n.d.; ibid., Martel to MAE, 29 May 1934; ibid., Martel to MAE, 30 May 1934; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 30 May 1934, vol. 471; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 31 May 1934, vol. 473; ibid., Martel to MAE, 1 June 1934. For the complete list o f the 119 individuals arrested at the mosque exit on 25 May 1934, see CADN/B, vol. 473. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 5 June 1934, vol. 488, p. 200. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 20 April 1934, vol. 473. Ibid., L ’O rient, 6 July 1934. In an earlier declaration to the press (9 May), the High Commissioner had stated that Syria suffered from an excess o f politics and that it was time to remember that the economy undergirded politics. He concluded: ‘I am simply applying this principle, without paying attention to partial and systematically hostile commentaries. Moreover, if I had deliberately left aside such a programme, those who criticise my projects today would reproach me for having* done nothing for the economy o f the country.’ Ibid., ‘Press Declaration’, 9 May 1934. In June 1934, M. Lavastre became the Delegate in Damascus, on the departure o f M. Weber from the Levant. M. David became the Deputy Delegate in Aleppo. Ibid., ‘Visit o f President Abid and Shaykh Taj’, Beirut, 9 June 1934; CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 15 June 1934, vol. 471. The Mandatory power disposed o f a six-month delay before it sent on petitions emanating from the territories under mandate, in order to formulate observations on them. This gave France a considerable amount o f room to manoeuvre: * . . . we can send on the petitions or formulate our observations, to the extent that the High Commissioner judges it appropriate to discuss Syrian affairs during the

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November session. I firmly believe the best thing would be if we can avoid this discussion until we have placed the Commission before a fa it accom pli I would prefer that there is no petition examined in October that would require the presence o f a Mandatory representative, even if it were only me.’ MAE/SL, De Caix to St Quentin, 1 September 1934, vol. 506, p. 309. CAD N/B, ‘Succinct Report o f Questions discussed at Aley, 2 August 1934, vol. 471, p. 3. Ibid., i broached the treaty question with the nationalists in a spirit o f complete frankness and loyalty, and they replied to my appeal by a brutal refusal to cooperate, by an attempt to take power, and that was sufficient to absolve me o f any obligations toward them . . . under these conditions, to try and seek some grounds for cooperation with them would be, for the moment, a fool’s bargain; they should weigh up their vanity, their pretensions and their actual powerlessness . . . Although parliament cannot be left indefinitely adjourned, such a defective apparatus can be replaced: the system set up in Lebanon seems viable and is beginning to prove itself. What is good perhaps for Syria’s sister republic could be also good for Syria herself.’ Ibid., Martel to Lavastre, 5 August 1934, pp. 3-5. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 10 September 1934, vol. 473; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 1 September 1934, vol. 489, p. 39. Ibid., ‘Note’, Martel, September 1934, pp. 72-3. At the end o f August, Martel had reported: ‘Although deprived o f parliamentary authority, Shaykh Taj al-Din’s government is holding together and administrating without any incidents, in spite o f the undeniable economic difficulties; the nationalists are disarmed in the presence o f this government which asks nothing o f them.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 31 August 1934, p. 38. Ibid., ‘Note’, Martel, September 1934, p. 79. Ibid., p. 78. Dissolving it would raise the question o f fresh elections. Ibid., ‘Political Evolution in Syria’, Martel, September 1934, pp. 80-3. Martels proposal to the Quai d’Orsay includes two most intriguing sentences. First, ‘From the point o f view o f the evolution o f the Mandate, the Syrian constitution has the great drawback o f maintaining a centralised sure, thus making the re-attachment o f the Jabal Druze and Alawite states to Syria more difficult. This re-attachment has been, in principle, admitted.’ Second, ‘It is at the final stage o f the project that the question o f the re-attachment o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze would be introduced, the adoption o f the new constitution being a condition o f this re-attachment.’ MAE/SL, Leger to Martel, 17 October 1934, vol. 489, pp. 107-8. The same letter, approving Martel’s proposals, is in CAD N/B, vol. 471. CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 9 November 1934, vol. 474. That same evening, the nationalists organised a big reception at Hani Jallad s house in honour o f Jamil Mardams return. Fifteen hundred persons attended, including Subhi Barakat, Lutfi Haffar, Fakhri Barudi, Hashim al-Atasi and other well-known nationalists. Ibid., information no. 3723’, 5 November 1934. It seems they had no idea of the High Commissioners plans. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 9 November 1934. Ibid., Decree no. 258/LR, 2 November 1934. ‘At my suggestion the two Presidents agreed - without much prodding - that it was necessary to immediately

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77 78 79 80

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83 84 85 86 87

implement the programme o f economic, financial and administrative reform and that in the absence o f parliamentary control, a ‘visa’ system o f control should be established, similar to that which is discreedy used in Lebanon.’ M AE/SL, Martel to MAE, 3 November 1934, vol. 489, p. 141. CADN/B, ‘Communiqué to the Press’, Damascus, 3 November 1934, vol. 474; CAD N/B, L a Syrie, 4 November 1934, vol. 469. The communiqué concluded: ‘The Mandatory Power will spare no effort to cooperate and support those Syrian personalities who assume the responsibilities o f power and the work o f rebuilding in these difficult times. Fully conscious o f its duties, the High Commissioner appeals —without any distinction whatsoever as to persons or parties - to the patriotism o f all the sane elements o f the Syrian population . . . ’ Ibid. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 4 November 1934, vol. 474; ibid., ‘Information no. 105/SS’, Damascus, 5 November 1934. Ibid., ‘Manifesto’, 7 November 1934; ibid., ‘Syrian Press’, 7 November 1934. Ibid., al-Q abas, 5 November 1934. Ibid., ‘Information no. 3732’, 6 November 1934. There were also letters o f protest from Homs and Hama. See MAE/SL, Homs, 6 November 1934, vol. 507, pp. 161-3; CADN/B, Dr Shishakli to General-Secretary, League o f Nations (copy to Martel), 12 November 1934, vol. 474. This letter was signed by over 600 persons. MAE/SL, Barakat to MAE, n.d., vol. 489, pp. 162-4; CAD N/B, Barakat to Martel, 7 November 1934, vol. 474; ibid., Martel to MAE, 16 November 1934. Ibid; MAE/SL, Al-Zubi and Hindiyya to MAE, 5 November 1934, vol. 489, pp. 143-4. For a useful résumé o f the nationalist case, see the 32-page letter o f protest from Fakhri Barudi and Rashid al-Maluhi to the President o f the PM C (30 November 1934), which included: ‘We are again back to the first period o f what is called “provisional military occupation”, but under worse conditions, for the simple reason that the country no longer possesses any resources and has no right to manage its own interests . . . The Customs are still in French hands, for no reason whatsoever. The only reason the French gave to justify this control o f the nation’s greatest resource was to pay the [Ottoman] public debt. This debt has now been settled. Nevertheless, the French continue to maintain control over this immense source o f revenue . . . Customs receipts amounting to several milliards have been spent without any legal Syrian or French control, which is quite a unique phenomenon, because even in the most primitive French colonies, budgets are submined for approval to the ‘Cour des Comptes’ in Paris . . . It appears in effect that the parliamentary regime is completely incompatible with M. de Martel’s dictatorial tendencies.’ MAE/SL, Barudi and Maluhi to President, PMC, 30 November 1934, vol. 507, pp. 19-50. C A D N /B , Martel to MAE, 17 November 1934, vol. 474. Ibid., Lavastre to Martel, 20 November 1934. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 25 January 1935, vol. 489, p. 270. Ibid. Martel instructed his team that if the nationalist leaders insisted on coming to visit them, they should be received courteously, in a personal capacity only and on the clear understanding that a political interview would raise questions that could only be dealt with by the High Commissioner: ‘Concerning economic

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matters, the High Commissioner has appealed to all people o f goodwill and thus his Delegate would welcome and examine all practical suggestions, from wherever they come . . . The Mandatory power does not intend to systematically ignore the nationalist party, but if the latter wishes to “come in from the cold”, it could give no better proof o f its loyalty than by collaborating with the work o f public salvation undertaken in the country.' Ibid. P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 447,448. Ibid., pp. 400-1. The term qaw m i (literally: belonging to a nation) was indicative o f the Leagues orientation: nationalists used qawmiyya to mark a ‘feeling o f loyalty to the whole Arab nation’ and thus distinguished it from the term w ataniyya - a preference o f the National Bloc - which denoted an attachment to the fatherland, the specific country o f one’s birth. Ibid., pp. 401,406. Ibid., p. 415. Ibid., pp. 409-14. Some troop leaders were associated with the Bloc, others with the League. Each year, on 6 May, Syria and Lebanon celebrated the memory o f the 14 supporters o f independence, hanged by the Turks in 1916. Following the 6 May 1934 celebration, when some three thousand persons gathered in Damascus and listened to speeches from Zaki al-Khatib and others, Martel reported: ‘The corteges once again showed how rapidly the Boy Scout movement is expanding and its complete submission to the nationalists; whereas last year, at the same occasion, there were only around fifty Boy Scouts who took part, this year there were more than five hundred’. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 11 May 1934, vol. 488, p. 162. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 430. MAE/SL, Maigiet to Martel. 16 June 1934. vol. 488, pp. 214-17; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 6 July 1934, vol. 473. Ibid., ‘Letter no. 38’, 1 August 1934; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 450. CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 242/RP’, Homs, 30 July 1934, vol. 473; ibid., Martel to MAE, 3 August 1934. Ibid., ‘Information no. 242/RP’, Homs, 30 July 1934. See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 451. According to the French, the increasing militancy o f the Bloc during this period was due in part to the encouragement that it received from Arab nationalists o f other countries, particularly Iraq. Martel was irritated by the ‘impolite’ behaviour o f Iraqi personalities who arrived in Damascus at ‘delicate’ moments, their meetings with Syrian nationalist leaden and their concern to avoid all contact with the Mandatory authorities. When Nuri al-Sa‘id (Iraq Foreign Minister) visited Damascus at the end o f December 1934, he avoided the French representative who had been sent to greet him at the airport. Instead he held lengthy meetings with the nationalist leaden and had lunch with Jamil Mardam, Fakhri Barudi and Subhi Barakat. CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 4 January 1935, vol. 474. In early January 1935, for instance, the celebrations marking the end o f Ramadan passed off calmly throughout Syria and Lebanon, and in spite of nationalist efforts in Damascus to have the population boycott the ceremony at the Umayyad Mosque, the ritual prayen took place in front o f a crowd that was larger than in previous years. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 11 January 1935. At the end o f Ramadan, ‘Shaykh Taj had the good sense to have large quantities o f flour

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101 102 103 104 105

distributed to the poor, paid for by money raised from the functionaries’. Ibid. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, vol. 489, pp. 269-70. Another sensitive issue straining Syrian nationalist nerves was the réintroduction o f the Tobacco Monopoly on 1 March 1935. In the twenties, the Régie de Tabac remained a French-owned and administered monopoly. But in 1930, when the monopoly lapsed, it was replaced by the banderole system, whereby the growing o f tobacco and the manufacture o f cigarettes belonged to privately owned establishments under licence, whose products were taxed according to the banderole (adhesive label) attached to the package in the factory. The réintroduction o f a modified version o f the Régie in late November 1934 by the High Commission angered both producers and consumers, largely because this new monopoly was granted to a privately owned Franco-Lebanese combine, the Compagnie Libano-Syrienne de Tabacs, which, in turn, adopted an arbitrary pricing policy. See P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 451-2; Longrigg, op. cit., p. 268. MAE/SL, ‘Note’, Martel, 12 March 1935, vol. 490, p. 104. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., pp. 103-4. Ibid., pp. 107-8. CAD N/B, Léger to Martel, 21 March 1935, vol. 471. Six months later, there was an exchange o f letters between the Minister o f War and the Quai d’Orsay on the future o f the Levant States. The Minister (4 October 1935) considered that the Alawite region and the Jabal Druze should certainly remain under French authority (during the treaty) and that their re-attachment to an independent Syria would risk serious consequences: ‘Tripoli is the terminus o f the natural route, via the Homs valley, that unites the sea not only to the state o f Syria (Aleppo and Damascus), but also Iraq (the Mosul pipe-line). Two upland regions overlook Tripoli and the Homs valley: Lebanon in the South and the Alawite State in the North. To te-attach the Alawite region to an independent Syrian state would deprive our forces in Tripoli o f all security on their northern flank. It would also deprive us o f our control over the Homs valley and o f the possibility to control the roads to Damascus and Mosul and thus the pipe-line. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Alawites and Druzes are the only war-like races in the territories under Mandate. They are excellent soldiers and from whom we recruit our best local troops. To te-attach the Alawite people and the Druze to Syria would be to deprive ourselves o f an excellent means o f support and give our eventual adversaries in the Levant the possibility to recruit armed troops, which they are presently unable to do.’ MAE/SL, Minister o f War to Pierre Laval (Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), 4 October 1935, vol. 491, pp. 100-1. In reply, the Quai d’Orsay (31 October) reminded the Minister o f War that the Mandate was essentially a temporary mission o f education and adaptation, the termination o f which would be the achievement o f complete independence and sovereignty o f the territories: ‘Concerning the conditions under which the States under Mandate can achieve full independence and sovereignty, the Iraqi precedent constitutes jurisprudence. The British government, having organised the Iraqi state, concluded with the government o f that state a treaty o f alliance, on the basis o f complete equality, sovereignty and independence . . . and submitted the treaty to Geneva in presenting the candidature o f Iraq to the League o f

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Nations. The agreement o f Geneva acquired. Great Britain thus found itself discharged o f her international obligations as a Mandatory Power as well as having her special position acknowledged, which guaranteed her essential interests in Iraq. [Syria and Lebanon) being territories placed under the guarantee o f article 22 o f the Pact and which cannot be annexed or placed under a protectorate, this solution is particularly advantageous, in that it will allow us to consolidate, with the minimum o f risks, the positive results o f a precarious occupation. These advantages have held our attention since 1926. Since then, the Iraqi precedent has been constantly invoked by the Syrians; Geneva could not now refuse to grant us, without major reasons, what was granted to Great Britain. These are the motives that have led us to orientate the evolution o f the Mandate toward a treaty regime. Concerning the territorial application o f the treaty regime, we must anticipate its extension to all the territories under French Mandate . . . these territories only comprise two sates which have an international vocation. The Mandate Act describes them by name: Syria and Lebanon. The future o f the Latakia and Druze governments must therefore be sealed before the end o f the Mandate. These territories were pan o f Syria and are claimed by Syrian public opinion. We cannot hope to establish Franco-Syrian collaboration on a contractual basis without consenting to their re-attachment to Syria.’ Ibid., Laval to Minister o f War, 31 October 1935, pp. 115-19. The lener is unsigned and whether M. Laval ever saw it or even approved it remains a mystery. Nevertheless, this important document clearly describes (for internal consumption), official Quai d’Orsay policy on the issue and in particular highlights the gap between the laner and the French military concerning the future o f the Levant States. It also confirms, once again, that by 1935 the Quai d’Orsay had decided to concede on the unity issue - eventually. The question was how to concede, without having appeared to do so. As mentioned before, the decentralisation project was an essential pan o f French strategy to solve this problem. CAD N/B, Léger to Manel, 21 March 1935, vol. 471, p. 7. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 453. In the summer o f 1924, it first came under nationalist fire for doubling tram fares without warning. Local notables and religious leaders organised a boycott which lasted nearly three months. Another boycott took place in 1931, just before the parliamentary elections, when electricity prices were again raised. Ibid. MAE/SL, Lagarde to MAE, 9 August 1935, vol. 491, p. 69; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 453. MAE/SL, Aleppo Bloc to President, PM C, 15 July 1935. vol. 507. pp. 231-40; MAE/SL, Mardam to St Quentin, 16 July 1935, vol. 491, pp. 50-3; CADN/B, National Bloc (Hama) to MAE, 23 July 1935, vol. 474. Through such letters, the Quai d’Orsay was, in fact, well informed o f nationalist sentiment. MAE/SL, Lagarde to MAE, 9 August 1935, vol. 491, p. 70. The Prime Minister spent the summer in France, ostensibly on a private visit to the spa resort o f Vichy, for medicinal purposes. Ibid., Manel to MAE, 21 June 1935, p. 3; MAE/SL, Manel to MAE, 28 June 1935, vol. 507, p. 224. CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 2 September 1935. vol. 471. A copy is in MAE/SL, vol. 491, pp. 76-84. The meeting (2 September) was also attended by M. Chauvel, o f the Africa-Levant section, Quai d'Orsay; M. Lavastre, the Delegate in Damascus; M. Fauquenot, the Counsellor to the Syrian Interior Ministry, Damascus, and the

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author o f the document; Emir Ali, the Syrian Delegate at the Levant Office, Paris. M. Fauquenot spent a great deal o f time throughout 1935 drafting the 103-page text, which is in MAE/SL, vol. 491, pp. 210-313. This text is undated, but found in files between 27 December 1935 and 1 January 1936. CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 2 September 1935, vol. 471. Ibid. It was also decided that the Syrian government would promulgate without delay the new laws on the m ukhtars and the professional associations - even before the Prime Ministers return. Ibid. In approving the decisions taken at this meeting, the Quai d’Orsay later emphasised to the High Commissioner that the project would demonstrate to Geneva that 'we have re-started a policy o f collaboration, on a provincial basis, with elected representatives o f the local populations and will symbolise a positive change o f direction, responding to the concerns o f the Permanent Mandates Commission. MAE/SL, MAE, to Martel, 29 October 1935, vol. 491, p. 114. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 18 October 1935, p. 105; ibid., Lagarde to MAE, 11 October 1935, p. 102. Although the Prime Ministers trip was an unofficial one, the High Commission advanced Shaykh Taj the sum o f 50,000 French Francs, to cover the expenses o f his trip. By the beginning o f September the Prime Minister, who was still in Paris, had spent over 154,000 Francs - all out o f the Syrian budget. Ibid., Lagarde to Martel, 6 September 1935, p. 87. Meanwhile, in July the acting Prime Minister, A u al-Ayyubi, had found himself‘without any means o f action’ and asked M. Lagarde for an advance o f 2,000 Syrian pounds from the ‘secret funds’ (covered in Chapter 15 o f the Syrian budget), in order to continue subsidising the newspapers, and for his entertainment allowance and other expenses. Shaykh Taj had, in fact, an authorised allowance o f up to 500 Syrian pounds per month, from the ‘secret funds’, to cover such expenses. By July 1935, the Prime Minister had spent the whole allocation for that year (6,000 pounds). CAD N/B, ‘Fonds Secrets’, Roux to Martel, 10 July 1935, vol. 474. MAE/SL, Lagarde to MAE, 11 October 1935, vol. 491, p. 102. The High Commissioner returned to Beirut a week after the Prime Minister. CAD N/B, ‘Information Report no. 35’, 30 August 1935, vol. 474. This was a weekly report sent by the Services Spéciaux o f Damascus and Hauran to the High Commission, Beirut. Shirer, op. cit., pp. 229-31. See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 455. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 25 October 1935, vol. 491, pp. 107-9. Ibid., p. 108. Although Martel was not expecting any serious disturbances, he nevertheless took the precaution, in mid-November, to postpone once again the promulgation o f the decentralisation decree (from the second half o f December) to 7 January 1936, this time because December was the period o f Ramadan ‘during which the danger o f agitation caused by the latent excitability o f people’s spirits hardly allows any useful political work to be done in a Muslim country’ . Ibid., Martel to MAE, 22 November 1935, p. 137.

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5 General Strike in Syria, January 1936 It should not be forgotten that the system of the recently concluded treaties consists in maintaining our essential interests in Syria and a solid base in Lebanon, whilst satisfying the national aspirations of the populations. Martel to MAE, 13 January 1937.'

On the morning o f Thursday 21 November 1935, Ibrahim Hananu died. He was in his sixty-sixth year and had been in poor health for a considerable time. A national hero, he had kept the ranks o f the Aleppo National Bloc unified and successfully prevented the more moderate Damascus wing o f the Bloc from making damaging compromises with the French authorities. His selfless dedication to Syrian independence was unrivalled. Suks throughout Syria closed down for three days. Although some French feared that his funeral might spark o ff violent demonstrations, the High Commissioner instructed M. David, the Aleppo Delegate, to keep the police contingent (for crowd control) as low-key as possible, to avoid giving the impression that the authorities were concerned about the maintenance o f order, and troops o f the Aleppo garrison were confined to barracks. French residents in Aleppo were warned by the High Commission not to show themselves in public at the time o f the funeral, which in the event, passed o ff peacefully.2 The funeral was attended by delegations from all over Syria. A notable feature was the public association o f Christian and Muslim clergy and the fact that Christian as well as Muslim symbols were used in the designs o f the floral tributes carried in the procession, which consisted o f about 30,000 persons and stretched for 2 kilometres.3 The calm which prevailed throughout that day (23 November) was, however, more a reflection o f the mourners’ respect and affection for their esteemed leader, than o f their disposition in general. Events in

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Egypt during November 1935, where there were massive pro-Wafd demonstrations by students, contributed to maintaining a certain effervescence o f spirits in Syria - and other parts o f the Arab world too. Initially, the underlying current o f sympathy that united Syrian nationalist circles to the Egyptian Wafd only manifested itself in the sending o f telegrams o f support. At the beginning o f December, however, an important development occurred. In Aleppo nationalist leaders began to meet and plan their activities in Han anus home, which the latter had bequeathed ‘to the nation*, in similar fashion to Sa‘d Zaglul’s ‘house o f the nation {bayt al-umma) in Egypt. At the same time, the Damascus Bloc rented a building in the Kanaouet quarter as an office.4This initiative was not simply symbolic. In effect, since the emergence o f the Bloc following the Great Revolt, nationalist leaders had met in each others homes, or in a local hotel. Now, however, the organisation o f the Bloc in Damascus and Aleppo took on a new form. Between 3 and 13 December, the Aleppo Bloc held six meetings at the ‘home o f the nation’, each attended by 200-300 persons. Discussions focused on events in Egypt, French plans to ‘re-divide the country’ (news o f the decentralisation project had leaked out), raising funds for propaganda purposes and in particular how to take advantage o f the large crowds in the mosques on four forthcoming occasions: December 20 anniversary, the end o f Ramadan (26 December) and the celebration o f the 40th day o f Hananu’s death, which was scheduled for 2 January in Aleppo and 10 January in Damascus.5 In Damascus there was a similar upsurge o f nationalist activity, largely directed by Jamil Mardam and Fakhri Barudi, centred around the newly rented office in Chabeklie Street. Bloc activists attempted to restart the electricity boycott. Nationalists were gready encouraged too by the news from Egypt, where the British had just conceded the re-establishment o f a constitution. On 15 December, a National Bloc manifesto appeared in the press: The Syrian National Bloc, shaken by the triumph in Egypt of right over wrong, rejoices to see the wrong caving in and finds no words to express its joy in witnessing her sister Egypt triumph in her aspirations and her right to re-establish her place under her sun. The support given by Divine Providence to Egypt. . . constitutes an eloquent lesson that the Orient must take to heart and a striking example that must be followed .. .6

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On the same day, al-Qabas published a letter from Hashim al-Atasi, in which he oudined the National Blocs three-point programme: first, to liberate Syria o f all foreign domination and lead her to complete independence and sovereignty; unite all the regions divided from her into a single state with a single government, it being understood that Lebanon retained the right to decide its own future within its 1861 limits. Second, coordinate local efforts with those employed in other Arab regions in order to produce a federation, which nevertheless would not obstruct the aspirations o f any particular region. And third, guarantee the liberty and equality in rights and obligations o f all citizens without distinction o f religion; raise the level o f social and economic life, expand public education and raise the patriotic sentiments o f the masses. In conclusion, the nationalist leader declared that the entire nation and all its material and moral resources should be devoted to the 'patriotic jih a d until the aforementioned goals had been achieved.7 Such stirring references to the troubles in Egypt and to a Syrian patriotic jih ad brought cold comfort to M. Fain, the Damascus Delegate, who informed a nationalist emissary the next day that 'events in Egypt are no concern o f ours and that whatever happens, law and order will be maintained in Damascus’.* A mere four days later, on the eve o f the 20 December anniversary, the National Bloc published a further manifesto, this time signed by Jamil Mardam: If [French] activities demonstrate anything it is their determination not to bring a solution to the Syrian Question, whatever the situation may be . . . During calm periods the French declare: the country is satisfied with its regime and there is no need at all to modify it. During an insurrection, they declare: violence reigns in the country and we cannot undertake any programme while it continues . . . If conciliation proves to be useless, Syriawill adopt the most determined stance.. The following day (20 December), after the midday prayers, Fakhri Barudi, Zaki al-Khatib and Rashid al-Maluhi (a young Damascus lawyer) took it in turns to speak in the Umayyad Mosque to a large crowd. After the usual criticisms o f the Mandatory power and in particular the efforts o f the local authorities to organise the professional associations, which were taking place at that moment, the faithful were exhorted to unite (187)

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like their brothers in Egypt. But there were no incidents. On 26 December, the Bayram feastday (end o f Ramadan) passed o ff equally peacefully. The nationalists organised a demonstration in the Umayyad Mosque, and seized the official seats - as had happened the previous year. But to no avail: forewarned, Shaykh Taj simply went to another mosque to say the ritual prayers.10 Thus, as the New Year arrived, Syrian nationalists on the whole found little cause to rejoice. Shaykh Taj al-Din was still firmly in place, the Syrian parliament remained shut, the High Commission was unprepared to resume treaty negotiations (except on its own, stringent terms), and prospects that the Syrian people would emulate their Egyptian brothers seemed remote: although deeply discontented, the population showed little signs o f stirring en masse." Nevertheless, the High Commissioner took no chances. Nationalist preparations to take advantage o f the 10 January occasion prompted him once again to postpone the promulgation o f the decentralisation texts, this time from January seventh to the twentieth: To avoid the January 10 ceremony becoming heated by some typists indiscretion, the texts will only be sent to the printers on 11 January: it needs approximately ten days for them to be printed and distributed. . . " He therefore decided to sign the texts on the evening o f 10 January, and to publish them on 20 January. However, in order to minimise their political impact, i.e., to divert peoples attention from them, he signed and immediately promulgated another decree (3 January), convoking the Lebanese Parliament for an extraordinary session, to elect their new president o f the Republic, on precisely the same day (20 January).13 M . Ponsot had used a similar tactic for the promulgation o f the Syrian Constitution on 22 May 1930 (see Chapter 2). Meanwhile, by the beginning o f January, the Bloc office in Damascus increasingly resembled the embryo o f a political patty headquarters: Jamil Mardam and Fakhri Barudi are there permanently, receiving visitors and giving advice. They are assisted by Shawfiq Jabiri, ex-director of the I. R, Khalid Shulak and Mehdi Murtada, former businessmen and well-known agitators, as well as two typists. Dossiers are carefully being put together which detail the composition of [188]

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nationalist committees in the various quarters. A daily bulletin of information is put together by Shawfiq Jabiri and sent, typed, to different newspapers.. As well as preparing for the 10 January occasion - which was to be followed by a secret Nationalist Congress, to decide on a ‘new line o f action - the Bureau o f the Bloc also decided to take in hand the management o f the boycott o f the Electricity Company, which had lapsed during December. A committee o f around sixty members was established, representing the different quarters o f Damascus, with Fakhri Barudi as President, and an active propaganda campaign was launched to encourage subscribers to send letters to the Company, requesting that their meters be removed.” The High Commissioner decided to nip this growing activity in the bud. Fakhri Barudi was convoked to the Delegation (6 January), where M. Fain read him the riot act: the Delegate read out a statement warning Barudi and ‘other troublemakers* that all unauthorised public meetings and processions were forbidden. In particular the planned procession on 10 January from the mosque to the university would not take place, and if Barudi did not desist, he and others would be subject to ‘harsh and coercive punishment*. The deputy replied that personally he was indifferent to threats from any quarter, he had made a vow to be ready to give his life for his country and he did not understand why the authorities were interfering in an affair that should be settled directly between the population and the company. He accused the Delegate - and correctly so - o f forbidding the newspapers from supporting a campaign in favour o f the interests o f the population. The Delegate turned and stalked out o f the room.16 Far from desisting, Barudi continued to put pressure on the Electricity Company to start negotiations with the boycott committee, and preparations for the 10 January occasion went ahead.17 At a secret nationalist congress held on the morning o f 10 January, before the official ceremony at the mosque, all tendencies o f the National Bloc closed ranks and adopted a hard-line pan-Arab programme. Bloc militants condemned any cooperation with the High Commission as illusory and advocated the union o f all Syrian political movements, in order to be able to speak in the name o f a single public opinion, as had just happened in Egypt.11As this meeting took place, M . Fain positioned troops in key (189)

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points in and around the city, as an obvious warning to the nationalists, who then officially cancelled the procession: after prayers in the mosque people went instead in small groups to the university, where a series o f speeches were made in honour o f the dead leader. Significandy, the full programme o f the National Pact was spelled out and affirmed as the only acceptable solution to the Syrian Question. At the end o f the meeting, Jam il Mardam declared in strident tones that ‘the period o f mourning having ended, the batde will start’.19The importance o f such an explicit declaration o f hostility, uttered by the key nationalist figure known for his moderate discourse, was not lost on the Damascus Delegate, who predicted that if the usual disputes did not occur, the authorities would find themselves hieing a combination o f forces guided by the extremists to the detriment of the temporisers like Jamil Mardam who was, in (act, until now the principal animator of the National Bloc.10 In spite o f this news, however, the High Commissioner remained reasonably confident that the effervescence o f Syrian spirits would soon pass. It did not appear that the nationalist leaders had managed to galvanise the public in order to use events in Egypt while they were still on the boil, and they know hill well that in a country where passions hide as quickly as they rise, it will be difficult for them to keep up the momentum for very long.21 The High Commissioners assessment was not surprising, given the pattern o f events in Syria over the previous decade. In effect, the nationalist leadership had little if any idea what to do next in practical terms, apart from pursuing the boycott campaign, which after six months had produced little result. In the event, it was the High Commissioner’s action, or rather reaction, which lit the fuse. Following the 10 January occasion, nationalist gatherings (unau­ thorised public meetings’, according to the French) continued daily at the Hananu houses, and on the evening o f 17 January Fakhri Barudi and some friends distributed a tract around Damascus, signed by him self and a young lawyer, Sayf al-Din Ma’mun, which concluded with the following appeal:

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The Boycott Committee invites the people to support it and to facilitate its task. All users will turn off the electricity at home and at work. Each will individually send the Company a request to have their electricity cut off and the appropriate money refunded. The victory of this blessed effort will be guaranteed from the moment they stay united. May God guide us toward the Good. Greetings.” M artels patience ran out. He had no intention o f presiding over a repeat performance o f events in Egypt, where the British authorities had been caught unawares, and the deteriorating situation in Damascus required immediate, firm measures. The next morning (Saturday 18 January) the Bloc headquarters, i.e., the ‘Hananu house* in Damascus was raided by the police, documents confiscated and the doors locked and sealed. That evening Fakhri Barudi and Sayf al-Din Ma’mun were arrested and simply disappeared. No one knew where the authorities had sent them.” The arrests and the closing o f the Bloc headquarters caused a great deal o f tension in the towns. In Damascus, Bloc members immediately met at Jam il Mardam’s house, and decided to organise demonstrations the following day, to close down the suks and to issue a manifesto, which appeared in the press the next morning (19 January): __ If by closing one of the houses of the National Bloc they believe they can extinguish the flame of patriotism which is burning throughout the whole country, or to wipe out the idea that the Bloc stands for, they are deceiving themselves because every Syrian home is an office for the Bloc. . .M Later that day, after hard-line speeches by nationalist activists in the Umayyad Mosque, where the faithful were invited to demonstrate in front o f the Sérail and the Police Headquarters, the crowds poured out o f the Mosque to cries o f ‘Allahu akbar!’ and *We are all Fakhri Barudi!’, and attempted to go to the deputy’s house. En route they pelted trams with stones, but were eventually dispersed by police.” The next day bazaars shut down and a crowd o f students and quarter youth gathered in front o f Nasib al-Bakri’s home to prepare for a march to the Sérail. Led by Bakri, Jamil Mardam and Shukri Quwwatli, the demonstrators never got past the end o f Bakri’s street, where a ‘cordon o f police’ was posted. The police fired into the air dispersing the crowd and arrested several students.” 1191]

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The next morning (21 January), 3,000 demonstrators in Damascus overwhelmed the services o f law and order (100 gendarmes and 200 police), who were pelted with stones and roof tiles, and a tram was set on (ire. In reply, M. Fain called in the Army: Commander Collet and three squadrons o f cavalry, supported by tanks and armoured cars, swept through the Bab Jabie quarter. Two demonstrators died, 39 policemen and 40 soldiers were wounded, and 250 persons arrested, most o f whom were released later because o f their young age.27 On the same day, security forces raided the ‘Hananu house’ in Aleppo. In retaliation, local leaders declared the closure o f the towns mammoth bazaar and rallied their supporters to demonstrate. By the end o f the day two persons had been killed and some 150 persons arrested.28 On 22 January, 20,000 persons marched in Damascus at the funeral o f the two protesters who had (alien on the previous day, but there were no incidents. In Homs, however, where bazaars had been closed for two days, French troops killed three demonstrators and wounded another twenty.29 During this period the National Bloc had little control over events in Damascus. Rather, student leaders, mosdy from the League o f National Action, and qabadayat (toughies) were at the forefront o f the political agitation. In (act, at Friday noon prayers on 24 January, some 3,000 faithful listened to pleas for the restoration o f calm from Nasib al-Bakri and Hani Jallad, a prosperous merchant connected with the Bloc Their appeal was immediately counteracted by Munir Ajlani, a young militant lawyer, who after an emotional speech gathered three hundred very excited youth: they left the mosque, attacked the road blocks and pillaged the Suk Hamidiyya police station, before retreating back into the mosque, where the police could not follow. One demonstrator died, many were wounded and three policemen were seriously injured.10 The following day several thousand people attended the funeral o f the previous days victim at the Umayyad Mosque, and then walked in procession to the cemetery, led by Nasib Bakri and Jamil Mardam.31 On 26 January, the High Commissioner agreed to receive a delegation o f fifteen persons, all o f them notables and merchants, apart from Fa’iz Khuri, the nationalist deputy and professor o f Law. Given the ‘moderate’ make up o f the delegation, Martel expected a constructive discussion focused on efforts to restore calm, which would lead to a reopening o f the suks. Instead, the delegation handed him a statement containing the maximum demands o f the National Bloc, including the (192)

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abolition o f the Mandate, and making its adoption the condition for the re-establishment o f order. The High Commissioner refused point blank to discuss the contents o f the statement, emphasised the cowardly nature o f nationalist tactics (’hiding behind lines o f irresponsible children ), and curtly told them to work to re-establish calm, instead o f fermenting disorder.32 The statement had, in fact, been prepared by Bloc leaders in Jamil Mardams home and was signed by Mardam, Shukri al-Quwwadi, Hashim al-Atasi and 35 other well-known nationalists. According to Martel, the delegation was simply a cover under which the Bloc leaders presented him an ultimatum.33 After brusquely dismissing the delegation, Martel immediately convoked journalists to the Residence, where he gave them a statement: . . . The High Commissioner refused to examine any political question under the pressure of disorderly elements and he enjoined members of the delegation to try to influence those milieux whom they claimed to represent, to make them understand the necessity of no longer making trouble. Furthermore, to stop the campaign of lies concerning first, the alleged harsh treatment of the youth by the authorities and second, the authority’s intentions to pursue by its administrative reform aims other than those which emanate horn the text itself.34 On 27 January, Mardam, in the name o f the National Bloc, called for a General Strike to last until the High Commission restored con­ stitutional life to Syria.33 In effect, a General Strike had been under way - by workers, shopkeepers, students and government functionaries - for nearly a week and the Bloc had been following rather than leading the urban masses. Even after that date, in spite o f its uncompromising public stance, behind the scenes the Bloc made conciliatory overtures to the French.36 On 29 January, a delegation o f merchants met M . Fain and after a two-hour session promised him that they would reopen. At the same time they gave him a petition, protesting against the reception given to the Delegation o f notables by the High Commissioner three days earlier, and supporting the notables' demands.37 But militant students and radical nationalists, capitalising on the spontaneity o f the urban mob, prevented the merchants from reopening and Bloc leaders from effecting any compromise.3* On 30 and 31 January there were no serious incidents in any o f the four main towns, but the central suks in Damascus and Aleppo remained closed.39 11931

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By 31 January Martel considered that the troubles were probably over and informed Paris that the climax to the recent events had been the ‘cowardly and dishonest* nationalist manoeuvre o f 26 January. From that moment the die was cast; the nationalists found themselves forced to either stir up the town to revolt, or to recognise their powerlessness: But the town had enough of trouble. Since then disorders have died down in Damascus and in all other Syrian towns. It is only intimidation that prevents the central suks of Damascus horn re-opening.. .40 How much the intimidation factor played a pan in the continuation o f the strike is a matter o f debate.41 What is not in question is that for the whole o f February 1936, and in spite o f the ambiguous attitude o f the Bloc, Syria was almost completely paralysed by a strike that affected every sphere o f the country: most shops were shut and commercial life was stifled, public services were disrupted, and attendance in schools and the university went down considerably. On 4 February troubles erupted in Homs and Hama that necessitated the intervention o f the Army. On 6 February the local Bloc leader o f Hama, DrTawfiq al-Shishakli, was arrested. In retaliation, a crowd attacked a cavalry troop, which opened fire, killing seven persons and wounding another forty. Responding to the Hama incidents, nationalists in Homs renewed their agitation, leaving three more dead on 8 February. By 10 February, violence had spread as far as Dayr al-Zur, where French troops killed five demonstrators.42 Since the beginning o f the agitation, Mardam and the Bloc had basically ‘moved with the wind*: when their ultimatum o f 26 January produced no tangible result, and sensing the frustration and weariness o f the business community, the Bloc - in private - preached calm.43 On 2 February the Bloc even issued a manifesto indicating that the country should return to work.44 But by this time the Bloc was losing credibility with the population. It was glaringly obvious to all that in spite o f the Bloc, the youth were successfully keeping the suks closed and that the management o f the movement was moving to League leaders. To regain lost ground, a more hard-line response was therefore required. On 9 February a National Bloc manifesto proclaimed: For more than twenty days, the Syrian people, without arms, has not stopped protesting, by striking and peaceful demonstrations, [194]

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for the achievement of its aspirations. The Authorities have replied by gunfire and the spilling of blood. . . In complete unanimity, the nation supports nationalist aspirations, concerning the achievement of unity and independence, until the country arrives at a state of stability . . . the Syrian nation declares once again to the world the failure of the Mandate regime.. The next day (10 February), Martel requested General Huntziger, the Commander o f the Armée du Levant, to use the necessary troops to re-establish order in Damascus.46 Huntziger immediately applied martial law to Damascus, forbade assemblies in the streets o f more than three persons and warned the populations that his soldiers would return blow for blow.47Jam il Mardam and Nasib al-Bakri were arrested and deported the next day, and on 12 February the French extended martial law to Aleppo, Homs and Hama.4* In response to the imposition o f maniai law on the four towns o f the interior, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon all closed down in protest. In Damascus, the homes o f Shukri al-Quwwatli and Lutfi Haffar were surrounded by police, but they were not arrested. On 13 February, French troops arrested four o f the principal Aleppo Bloc leaders: Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, Hasan Fu ad Ibrahim Pasha, Dr Kayyali and Na'im Antaki.4’ Thus by mid-February, ten leading agitators and nationalist leaders had been placed under house arrest, i.e., sent to distant villages, mostly in the Jazira or near the Turkish border.40 On 16 February, in a further bid to break the back o f the Damascus nationalist leadership, the High Commission forced the Khuri brothers to resign their teaching posts at the Faculty o f Law.4' Having effectively neutralised most o f the nationalist leadership, Martel once again thought that the disorders had ended and reported to Paris that what remained to be overcome was a kind o f 'passive resistance’. As to the origins o f the disturbances, the decisive factors were unquestionably the Ethiopian Affair and the consequent incidents in Egypt: . .. the most striking feature in Egypt, as in Syria, was the mobilisation of the schools. In a backward population, students enjoy considerable prestige, and the incidents proved that bands of University and school students, judiciously gathered in advance in a central mosque or school, and then flooding into the alleys of the suks, are sufficient to paralyse the whole of a large town. The prestige of Hitlerian (195)

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methods certainly inspired the nationalist leaders to proceed with this indoctrination of the youth . . . To resume, the rural areas and the nomadic tribes remained calm and the agitation remained restricted to an active and organised minority in the towns, who responded to the lure of pan-Arabism.*2 On 19 February, the High Commissioner again agreed to receive a delegation o f notables and merchants, provided they were unattached to political affairs. In contrast to the previous occasion, however, Martel took the initiative at the beginning o f the meeting and informed them that he had arrived in 1933 with instructions to achieve the legitimate aspirations o f the Syrian nation. These instructions were still in force. However, in April 1933 the nationalists had broken o ff contact with his predecessor; they had persisted in that attitude, obstructing the treaty project, and for three years refused his invitation to restart talks, and then declared war on the authorities on 10 January last. In so doing, they had led the population to demonstrate; the troubles had now been dealt with . . .” The High Commissioner then proposed to his suitably enlightened listeners that they issue a joint declaration «p lain in g that the favourable intentions o f France had never varied, describing the misunderstandings which generated the useless agitation and proposing that the passive resistance should be stopped. At the same time he promised to take extensive measures o f clemency, as soon as the situation had returned to normal. But the delegation immediately proposed another declaration, which enumerated various concessions o f a political nature, and which implicitly justified the agitation: This is the crux of the problem. The National Bloc, instead of acknowledging the sterilityof threeyears of obstruction and agitation, intends to transform its failure into a success as spectacular as that of the Egyptian nationalists.” On 23 February, in a further effort to neutralise the Bloc and pacify the country, the High Commissioner asked the unpopular Shaykh Taj al-Din and his cabinet to resign, and the same day called on Ata Bey al-Ayyubi to form a new government. The new Prime Minister was a worthy and perceptive choice: a notable from an old and well-known Damascene family with considerable administrative experience, Ayyubi was a former class-mate o f Hashim al-Atasi, and although not a member [196]

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o f the National Bloc, commanded a certain respect in nationalist circles.” Significandy, his cabinet included three men who could best be described as Very moderate’ nationalists, or perhaps nationalist ’fellow travellers’.56 Sa'id al-Ghazzi (Justice) was a well-known lawyer and cousin o f the former nationalist leader, Fawzi al-Ghazzi; Emir Mustafa al-Shihabi (Education) was a member o f the Arab Academy, and Edmond Homsi (Finance) a Christian banker from Aleppo. Mustafa Kussairi (Agriculture and Public Works) was a moderate from Antioch.57 To analyse M artels choice o f team, it is important to recall his basic strategy: to separate public opinion from the National Bloc, which in his view was ’trying to save its prestige at any price’.5* In precise terms, Martel considered first, that as the local government had been completely bypassed (maintenance o f law and order had passed to the Army) and the drama had been played out between the students and nationalists on one side, and the Mandatory power on the other, it would be difficult for Shaykh Taj al-Din to take affairs in hand again. Second, the new cabinet had the advantage o f containing elements who, by their links with the Bloc, could not be accused o f betraying the vital interests o f the country and who would be led, by their cabinet responsibilities, to restrain nationalist activities. In attacking them, the nationalist leadership would simply demonstrate its systematically negative and sterile political stance. Finally, some o f Shaykh Taj’s cabinet had indicated their desire to resign some days previously and Martel preferred to take the initiative himself and pre-empt any cabinet crisis.59 Having installed a new government in the Sérail, the High Com ­ missioner immediately played his next card. In order to calm public opinion, and to increase the standing o f the Ayyubi government, Martel published a letter to the new cabinet, describing in general terms the liberal principles o f French policy in Syria, namely French intentions to conclude a treaty, to lead Syria to the League o f Nations, to encourage unity, provided local autonomies were respected, and his desire to be lenient, in order to favour détente. At the same time he told the cabinet that it was up to them to manoeuvre skilfully, in order to claim the success o f having re-established normal life and to have demonstrated that only a policy o f loyal collaboration with France was in conformity to Syrian interests.60 The Bloc met in lengthy sessions for two full days (25-26 February), to decide how to respond to the new government. According to M. Fain, 1197]

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the meetings took place in an atmosphere o f collective over-excitement, where ‘reason played no pan in the discussions: We are in the presence of a collective psychosis; even those who claim their authority from the elections . . . having unleashed to masses. . . can no longer do anything to contain those irresponsible elements who, in an effort of super-nationalism, are ready at the first sign ofweakness to shout themdown. . . Students and professors have made a vow not to return to their courses until the Khuri brothers have been reinstated . . . The nationalists reckon they can hold on some time longer.. The nationalists may have been excited, but the Bloc manifesto published the next day (27 February) was a hard-hitting, level-headed document, which critically analysed, paragraph by paragraph, the High Commissioner’s letter to the Ayyubi cabinet, describing it as a repetition o f previous French declarations, i.e. vague, inadequate and not responding to the legitimate aspirations o f the nation, and concluded by calling on the High Commissioner to issue a further document, which would eschew generalities, and announce unambiguous French proposals concerning the bases o f a treaty, unity, the dates o f elections, and independence. In a word, a change o f government, as such, was no answer and the nationalist programme was the only acceptable solution to the Syrian Question.“ That afternoon, demonstrators attacked Army and police patrols with stones around the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, but there were no casualties. The same morning (27 February), Martel had officially announced his forthcoming departure for France, in order to participate at the meeting o f the Haut Comité Méditerranéen,63 fixed for 25 March, and to confer with the French Government about means o f implementing the programme that he had oudined in his declaration to the Ayyubi cabinet. His announcement was a cleverly timed signal to the nationalists that there would be no political developments before his return, which would not be before mid-April. The High Commissioner was convinced - and probably correcdy so - that the nationalists would be unable to keep the country in a state o f excitement, and in particular keep commerce paralysed, for a further six weeks. Moreover, the reopening o f the shops and the subsequent détente would weaken the Bloc position. For these reasons Martel expected the Bloc to attempt some kind o f ‘coup de force’, before his departure, to force him to make concessions.64 [198]

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That evening, Martel telegraphed the Quai d’Orsay that under such conditions, he faced a stark choice: either to immediately offer new concessions, in accordance with the Syrian National Pact; this he could not do without the formal approval o f the French government, which alone could weigh up the repercussions that such instructions might have on North Africa. O r be ready to face a ‘coup de force*. In order to deal with it, Martel emphasised that he needed to be in a position to declare that he had the formal approval o f the French government for his actions. His telegram crossed with fresh instructions from the Quai d’Orsay, which arrived in Beirut at eight the next morning (28 February): The maintenance of order and the security of the territories is one of the essential obligations imposed on us by the Mandate Act. . . You are capable of appreciating the timeliness of decisions apt to favour a detente in Syria . . . the planned meeting of the Haut Comité Méditerranéen on 25 March can only help your situation. Given that the Committee is authorised to study programmes of action concerning our four Mediterranean establishments, all decisions on any questions of principle are therefore normally held in suspense. So if some doctrinal demands are presented to you before this meeting, you are at liberty to welcome them simply as elements of information, to be submitted for examination by the French government.“ In other words, the High Commissioner was instructed to maintain law and order, make no fundamental concessions to the nationalists and at the same time, take steps to favour détente. A tall order for any High Commissioner already locked in a conflict where over the previous ten weeks some thirty persons had died, hundreds had been wounded and over three thousand were in prison. Meanwhile in Damascus, General Blanc, in a communiqué to the local press, issued a strong warning to ‘troublemakers’ in Damascus that aggression against the Army, as had occurred the previous day, could not be tolerated for very long and that however distasteful it was for the commanding officer to order his troops to use their arms, he would do so if troubles continued, in spite o f the bloodletting that would result.66 In spite o f this warning, after the customary Friday prayers at the Umayyad Mosque (28 February), an excited crowd o f 3,000 demonstrators attacked [199]

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an Army post near the Hamidiyya suk. Alter the police had been overwhelmed, troops opened fire. Four demonstrators died and many more were wounded.67 As these events took place, the Syrian Minister o f Justice, Sa'id al-Ghazzi, met with Martel in Beirut and informed him that unless the High Commissioner gave him immediate assurances on the unity issue and the dates o f elections, ‘to calm his friends’ impatience’, he would be swept aside by a combination o f the National Bloc and violent events on the streets. Martel, encouraged by the instructions he had received that morning, replied that he would release the Government o f its responsibilities, and himself take the initiative to convoke Hashim al-Atasi.6* The next afternoon (Saturday 29 February) witnessed the first o f three eventful sessions in the High Commissioners office in Beirut between the National Bloc, initially represented by Hashim al-Atasi, accompanied by Dr Kayyali, and the High Commissioner. Also present, or rather in attendance, were the Prime Minister and all the cabinet: they took almost no pan in the proceedings. M anel started o ff by announcing that his letter to the Ayyubi cabinet had received the complete approval o f the French Government and consequendy ‘this must be our point o f departure’. For his pan, Atasi confirmed that he wanted a definitive solution to the Syrian Question, and suggested that a Syrian Delegation go to Paris, to which Martel readily agreed. It was further agreed that such a Wafd would be composed o f two cabinet members and four o f the ‘population, chosen by the government, in agreement with the National Bloc. Martel raised no objections. The discussion then moved on to the question o f clemency for all those arrested since 20 January. Not surprisingly, a chicken and egg debate ensued. To reassurances by Dr Kayyali that acts o f clemency would be interpreted as such, and not as signs o f weakness, the High Commissioner replied that he would show clemency, once the disturbances ceased. They would cease, responded Dr Kayyali, if the political detainees were released, those sentenced to prison terms were pardoned and the schools reopened. In the end Martel promised that he would do all he could, in the circumstances. In an endeavour to calm people’s spirits it was agreed to issue a joint communiqué, and after a lengthy debate, Martel conceded that the reference to a treaty (in the communiqué) would be qualified by ‘not inferior to the rights granted to Iraq in the last treaty’, a modification o f ‘inspired by the Iraqi precedent’.69 [200]

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By the end o f the evening, Martel justifiably felt quite relieved: his principal concern, to bring the opposition 'back on board’ and obtain a political ceasefire, seemed just around the corner, discussion o f the unturnable issue o f unity, as well as election dates and independence had been avoided, and in his mind the next days session would be limited to signing the minutes o f that first session, and finalising the text o f a joint communiqué. Moreover, the news o f Atasi s arrival in Beirut had begun to ease tensions in Damascus. The following morning, however, the President o f the Bloc raised for discussion two further issues, unity and the elections, with a view to their inclusion in the communique.70 Martel, o f course, had no intention o f opening that Pandoras box. He politely repeated his previous declarations concerning the impossibility for him to go beyond what he had stated in his letter to the Prime Minister and added that concerning unity, the conclusions o f the Mandates Commission (24th Session, 25 October 1933) formally mentioned local autonomies. Thus any demand for more assurances would simply make that obstacle reappear, which his letter to the Prime Minister had managed to avoid. He remained impervious to all suggestions to clarify the issue further, insisting that it should be discussed in Paris. The problem then was to find a formula for the communiqué which allowed the government to announce some clarifications by the High Commissioner which would calm down the mood o f the population, and which nevertheless obtained the National Bloc’s approval, even though the High Commissioner had no new element to offer.71 By eight o’clock that evening a formula was found and the following morning (2 March), the Government communiqué appeared in the press. Equal to any o f M . Ponsot’s masterly efforts, it was a superbly balanced piece o f verbal dexterity: In the course of meetings held in Beirut on 29 February and 1 March, the Syrian cabinet met with the High Commissioner. The government was keen that Hashim al-Atasi was included in the talks. The latter was accompanied by Dr Kayyali, Fa’iz al-Khuri and Afif Solh. The High Commissioner declared that the terms of his letter to the Prime Minuter had just received the approval of his government. The aim of his next visit to France is to define the means of carrying out that programme. The High Commissioner, who applauds the patriotism of the Syrian people, agreed with the desire expressed to him, that it (201)

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would be timely for a delegation to travel to Fiance, which would pass on its views to the French government, in order to prepare for the conclusion of a treaty. During the course of the meetings, the delegates were reassured by the High Commissioner’s explanations concerning the terms of his lenen their fears, as expressed in the declaration signed by Hashim al-Atasi, were dissipated. In effect, on the question o f unity, the cabinet received the assurance that France was only interested to define the practical methods of application of the principles which are defined both by the League of Nations, to which France is responsible, and by the Syrian constitution, which the Syrian government intends to apply. These methods will be studied in Paris by the Delegation. Concerning the treaty, it is agreed that the rights which the Syrians will be accorded will not be inferior to those accorded to the Iraqi government in the last treaty. Under these conditions, the government considers that the return to parliamentary life, in accordance with the electoral law piesendy in force, the principle of which is no longer in doubt, is henceforth re-established. The terms of the present appeal having received the joint agreement of the High Commissioner, of Hashim al-Atasi and the other persons present at the meetings, the government appeals to the patriotism of the Syrian people to aid it in its task of achieving its national aspirations. signed: Hashim al-Atasi

signed: D. de Martel.72

In a report analysing the terms of the communiqué, the High Commissioner informed the Quai d’Orsay that first, the mention of unity threw the nationalists back on to the League of Nations which was particularly sensitive to the issue of the protection of minorities. Second, the allusion to the treaty, in reproducing assurances already given previously by France, would allow the local government to deny the malicious rumours that the French were preparing a less liberal treaty than the Iraqi precedent. Third, in affirming that the return to parliamentary life was already accomplished, he was able to avoid specifying any particular date. Fourth, the reference to the electoral law allowed him to avoid certain premature demands for universal suffrage and the expansion of the constituencies, which would have allowed the nationalism of the towns to overwhelm the political apathy of the rural areas. Finally, he admitted that the sending to Paris of a delegation probably had some [202]

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drawbacks, but that unofficial emissaries would have arrived anyway in Paris, whose unauthorised activities could not have been channelled. In brief, he had achieved a political ceasefire, and drawn the nationalist leadership back into a policy o f collaboration, without having conceded anything o f fundamental importance.71 This view o f the dénouement o f the affair differed considerably from that o f the Bloc, for whom the talks were not so much a matter o f misunderstandings sorted out, but rather one o f concessions extracted from the French authorities by the heroism o f the Syrian people. In announcing an end to the 43-day-old-strike, a ‘victorious’ National Bloc manifesto (March 3) declared that the French side had approved, in a signed, official document, five essential points that they had not agreed to before. First, the rights o f Syrians in the forthcoming treaty would not be inferior to those accorded to their Iraqi brothers in the last treaty with Great Britain. Second, the French side had no interest in the dismemberment o f Syria, and that it was only concerned to establish unity in a form which was in agreement with the principles recognised by the Syrian constitution and by the League o f Nations. Third, to transfer the negotiations to Paris. Fourth, to restart parliamentary life as soon as possible, on the basis o f general elections and finally, the immediate granting o f an amnesty for all those detained or sentenced following the incidents which occurred in Syria since 18 January, and the suppression o f administrative measures taken in schools.74 What were, in fact, the fundamental reasons which prompted the High Commissioner to reopen talks with the nationalists and make a public agreement with them, after studiously ignoring them for 27 months? First, conditions within Syria itself: the High Commissioner and his staff feared that the agitation was about to spread to the rural areas, rumours were increasing about a campaign o f civil disobedience, in particular a tax strike, and the nationalists' state o f ‘collective psychosis', as reported by M . Fain, must have caused the High Commissioner to weigh u p’his options very carefully.71 But external factors also played a significant part. In Paris, the right-wing government o f Pierre Laval was replaced in late January 1936 by a more centrist, caretaker government, headed by the Radical-Socialist, Albert Sarraut, which ‘removed support for a heavy hand in Damascus'.76 Intensely concerned about Italian aggression in Ethiopia, the French Chamber also witnessed a bitter debate during February 1936 concerning the ratification o f the Franco-Soviet (2031

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pact, which if passed would provide the ideal pretext - according to much o f the French Right - for Hitler to remilitarise the Rhineland, thus precipitating a severe European crisis. (As early as 21 November 1935, André François-Poncet, Ambassador in Berlin, had warned the Quai d’Orsay that he believed Hitler would use the Franco-Soviet Pact as a pretext for remilitarisation.) With such major issues on its plate, arguments to ’clear the decks' elsewhere were no doubt strengthened.77 Nevertheless, it took some weeks for the change at the Matignon to filter through to Beirut, via the Quai d’Orsay. It is difficult to discern the timetable o f the shift in precise chronological terms, but one significant meeting may have been that o f the Haut Comité Méditerranéen on 22 February, where the Syrian Question was discussed.7* Although foreign diplomats, as well as Syrian nationalists, considered the 1 March agreement to be a major concession by the French, official and conservative opinion in France viewed it differendy. Le Temps, for example, in reporting the agreement (3 March), said only that a Syrian delegation would be sent to Paris. A long follow-up article (5 March) denied that French policy had been checked: France might be prepared to recognise the independence o f Syria, but the future o f the minorities had to be assured, and political independence would not necessarily mean any diminution o f French activities in the country. Only the extreme left, anti-colonialist in principle, publicised the agreement as a change o f French policy.79 Even though the text o f the agreement was published in the Syrian and Lebanese press, the French government did not make it available either to foreign diplomats or to the French press. The British Government, in fact, had to obtain a copy from the League o f Nations.*0 Throughout the week following the Bloc ’triumph’, Damascus witnessed scenes o f joy unparalleled in living memory. Thousands welcomed home Jamil Mardam on 3 March and four days later, Fakhri Barudi (the Jeanne d’Arc o f the party, according to the French), was met by a cheering crowd o f over 40,000.*' Nevertheless, the 1 March agreement was not universally welcomed in Damascus. Zaki al-Khatib and his supporters, together with Subhi Barakat issued a ’United Patriotic Front’ manifesto (3 March), claiming that larger concessions could have been obtained, that it was imperative for the parliament to meet, to choose and approve the Delegation that would go to Paris, and that the suks should remain closed until the Delegation returned from Paris.*2 But in 1204]

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spite o f this opposition, the Bloc leadership, helped by the enthusiastic welcome received by the liberated personalities, succeeded in reasserting its control over public opinion. On 8 February, Bloc leaders reassembled in front o f the bazaars to cut the green cords which had been strung across their entrances, symbolising that only the National Bloc had the power and authority to reopen the Syrian capital.*3 Meanwhile, behind the scenes, considerable debate and intrigue within nationalist circles prefigured the selection o f the Syrian negotiating team for Paris. The final composition o f the delegation was dominated by four National Bloc leaders - Hashim al-Atasi, Jamil Mardam, Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, and Faris Khuri - and included two government ministers, Amir Mustafa al-Shihabi, a French-trained agronomist, and Edmond Homsi, an Oxford-educated Greek-Catholic banker from Aleppo.*4 On Sunday 22 March, the Syrian Delegation left for Paris by the Taurus Express, amidst scenes o f great public enthusiasm. It would be six months before they returned.*5 The general strike and the 1 March agreement were without doubt the National Blocs biggest triumphs to date. In less than two months, the Bloc had managed to salvage its policy o f 'honourable cooperation, which now meant a treaty not inferior to the 1930 Anglo-lraq treaty’ and ultimately the right o f the Bloc to share power with the French. Bloc leaders never really bargained for anything more. They could not fail to notice that some six years after their cousin-brothers in Baghdad had signed a treaty of'independence’, the British presence there remained very considerable. For Syria too, independence in progressive stages was clearly the only reasonable option. But, while the General Strike helped to restore the reputation o f the National Bloc, it also severely taxed the Syrian economy and the livelihood o f the mass o f townspeople. Business was almost at a standstill throughout the strike: with students and qabadayat enforcing the shut­ down, few shop-owners dared go against the prevailing current. Further afield, the strike aroused considerable emotion. Leading articles in Baghdad newspapers condemned French policy and petitions were sent from Iraq to the League o f Nations. In Palestine there were several large meetings, demonstrations and strikes sponsored by the Istiqlal Party. Money was collected for the strike victims and telegrams o f support sent to Syria expressing the solidarity o f the people o f 'Southern Syria’, i.e. Palestine, in pan-Arab parlance.*6 Events in Syria were very closely watched in [205]

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Palestine, and for good reason. Just as the Egyptian Wafd had provided a valuable example for the National Bloc, so the Syrian General Strike provided a paradigm and a catalyst for nationalists in Palestine. On 25 March the Haut Comité Méditerranéen listened to the H igh Commissioner, who outlined recent events in the Levant and suggested it was an appropriate moment to restart negotiations for a treaty, and to General Gamelin, who spelled out the Ministry o f War's point o f view concerning the French military organisation to be maintained in the Levant during the treaty regime. Reflecting the Army’s primordial concern to maintain ‘des intérêts impériaux de la France’, Gamelin invoked all the traditional arguments: French imperial prestige in the Mediterranean, her prestige as a Muslim Power (dangerous consequences o f any concessions in the Levant for North Africa), protection o f minorities, protection o f French communication and imperial interests (pipeline, communication routes to Indochina, railways, naval bases in Tripoli and Beirut), protection o f French economic interests (potential oil deposits in the Jazira) and finally, Turkish, Italian and British designs in the Eastern Mediterranean. For all these reasons, Gamelin argued, it was imperative to maintain the military establishment in the Levant at its present level. In particular, the continued occupation o f the main towns, especially Homs and Damascus, as well as the whole o f the Druze and Latakia regions, were vital - as was the continued control o f the Syrian local troops by French officers. The discussion following the General’s presentation was dominated by the concern ‘not to weaken France’s imperial position in North Africa’.'7 Three days later (28 March), in an interview with the French Prime Minister, Albert Sarraut, the High Commissioner suggested that the main lines o f the treaty were already known and the juridical and financial questions did not seem to him to be a potential cause for a breakdown in negotiations. The essential problem, however, was the military question, particularly because we have to fuse together in Syria strategic concerns and effective protection of the minorities. We cannot start any important conversation until this military question has been defined.8* On 2 April, the Syrian delegation was received by the French Foreign Minister, M . Pierre-Etienne Flandin, who offered a lunch for (2061

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them. The diplomatic formalities dispensed with, the very substantial gap between Syrian aspirations (independence and political unity) and Quai d’Orsay intentions (downgrade the status o f the talks; procure a ‘reasonable’ agreement) were soon revealed the next morning, when Fans al-Khuri and Jamil Mardam, accompanied by Na‘im Antaki, were received by Messrs Chauvel and Keiffer at the Quai d’Orsay. Faris al-Khuri opened the talks by outlining the Delegation’s initial intentions: first, to obtain all the details on the ‘reservations’ that France intended to include in the treaty, and second, to revise the November 1933 Franco-Syrian treaty, and adapt it to the Iraqi precedent o f 1930. The French officials replied that negotiations, strictly speaking, could only be started with a constitutionally qualified government. The Department had authorised the High Commissioner to make an enquiry concerning the claims o f Syrian public opinion, with a view to informing the Haut Comité Méditerranéen and the French government. At the request o f the nation­ alist leaders, the sending o f a delegation to France had been decided. But the presentation o f views by the Syrian delegation in Paris only constituted another form o f the enquiry. The Department was therefore fully ready to listen to the delegates, but if they wished to immediately proceed to the writing o f texts, the ‘enlargement’ o f the meetings would raise questions o f principle that necessitated a new study. Mardam, with twenty years’ experience o f dealing with Empireminded French officials, was quite un-fazed by this standard imperial tactic designed to limit the importance o f the talks and to put the Syrian Delegates ‘in their place’. Following 1 March, he replied, two procedures were possible: either immediate elections, followed by the constitution o f a qualified Government, which would immediately start negotiations, or, following the Iraqi precedent o f 1922 and the Egyptian precedent, the preparation o f a treaty with a delegation representing Syrian opinion, the establishment o f an agreed electoral programme on the basis o f this treaty, the approval o f this programme by a Nationalist Congress, elections held on the basis o f this programme and the consecration o f the treaty by the signature o f a responsible government and a parliamentary vote. It was in this spirit that the Delegation had come to Faris. If it was only a matter o f a general presentation o f views that the Mandatory power had known anyway for a long time, and if these views could not be spelled out in practical detail by studying a text and by the communication o f French reservations, then the mission conferred on the Syrian delegation 1207]

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seemed to him to be o f little use. Mardams remarks uncorked the session, which continued ‘with no holds barred’. The ensuing discussion focused on the contentious issues o f minorities and Syrian unity. On the latter issue, the Syrians were invited to ponder on both the French and Geneva aspects o f the problem, and to take the situation, such as it was, as their point o f departure.” By any account, it was not an auspicious start to the talks, which continued for the next four weeks at the Levant Office, not the Quai d’Orsay. The talks, in fact, were led from the French side not by the Foreign Minister, but by the High Commissioner, aided by M . Keiffer and other High Commission officials, who kept in close touch with Messrs St Quentin and Chauvel at the Quai d’Orsay.90 Parallel to the talks, inter-ministerial meetings between the Ministries o f Foreign Affairs, War and National Defence, and Finance took place, whose discussions focused on preparing the military clauses o f the treaty, and the issue o f the Military and Civil Debt that Syria owed to the Mandatory power.91 On three major issues, Syrian unity, minorities and the military establishment, the Syrian Delegates found themselves faced with a French bargaining position that moved a little more than the Eiffel Tower in the wind - but not much. The French side insisted on maintaining, inter alia, the constitutions o f the two autonomous regimes for the duration o f the treaty. In their view, the principle o f autonomy was the basis o f the 1 March agreement and the texts which defined the form o f this autonomy had been approved by the Permanent Mandates Commission, as well as by the populations o f the two regions. The French government was therefore not in a position to undermine those two regimes.92 There was, nevertheless, some dissension on the issue between the Quai d’Orsay and the more pragmatic High Commissioner. In a meeting in St Quentin’s office (24 April), M. Chauvel remarked that the vague wording o f Article VIII o f the 1933 treaty, which the Syrian Delegation objected to, had the clear objective o f covering those autonomous regions, and in particular the Jabal Druze and the Alawites, which were not part o f Syria. When someone objected that the re-attachment o f the two territories were the crux o f the talks, M . Chauvel insisted that it was impossible, when negotiating with Syria, to decide and formulate laws concerning territories which were not Syrian, thus prejudging the result o f a popular consultation that must take place after the coming into force o f the treaty. The re-attachment o f the two [208]

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territories to Syria should only take place when the treaty came into force. At this point the High Commissioner declared, with equal insistence, that no treaty with Syria would be possible which did not provide for, in one way or another, the immediate re-attachment o f the Jabal Druze and Alawite regions to the Damascus government; this was the sine qua non o f a treaty, whose other articles were subject to discussion: If the Department proposes to again offer a formula analogous to that of the 1933 treaty, it would be preferable to immediately find some pretext to break off the talks, in order to avoid allowing the Syrian negotiators to accuse us of insincerity.” The Quai d’Orsay, however, saw no overriding reason why it should not remain firm on the issue. On 27 April, Mardam once again endeavoured to prise out o f the French negotiators their fundamental position on Syrian unity. He raised three questions. First, what would be the extent o f the administrative and financial autonomy granted to the Jabal Druze and the Alawites? Second, under what conditions and what time scale would the union be carried out? Third, under what conditions would the deputies o f the territories take their seats in the Syrian parliament? The French politely stonewalled. All they would offer was a symbolic concession, whereby the French governor o f the two regions would henceforth be nominated by a decree o f the President o f the Syrian Republic, rather than the High Commissioner. The decree would signify the re-establishment o f a political ’link o f allegiance’ between the Damascus government and the two autonomous states. But the autonomous constitutions o f the two regions would remain in force for the duration o f the treaty. Although Martel stressed the significance o f the ‘link o f allegiance’, the Delegates assessed it - correctly - as mere decoration: in accepting it they would gain nothing (the autonomous constitutions would remain, and the French governors), whilst in return the French would expect them to make concessions concerning the occupation o f the two regions. In private, the French regarded it in exactly the same light: a symbolic gesture that would allow the Syrian negotiators to justify themselves in front o f public opinion’.” On military affairs the French displayed a litde more flexibility. The Syrian Delegation stressed the impossibility o f selling a treaty to Syrian public opinion if the former consecrated the country’s occupation, rather [209)

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than its independence. After a series o f inter-ministerial meetings at the Quai d’Orsay, the latter persuaded the Army Command to renounce the occupation o f the large towns, notably Damascus and Homs (the direct route connecting the Jabal Druze to the Alawites passed by both towns). But the Ministry o f War would not consider any degree o f withdrawal from the Jabal Druze or the Latakia region. The Homs region, just east o f Tripoli (pipeline terminal and major army base) had to be secured on both its flanks (Latakia to the north, Anti-Liban mountains and Jabal Druze to the south). It was still a far cry from Syrian daim s.” The French argued that the continued occupation o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze was essential, first, to reassure the compact minorities and second, to carry out ’the needs o f the Franco-Syrian alliance’. In fact, the overriding concern o f the Army Command had litde to do with protecting the Druze or the Alawites (although it planned to continue raising local troops from both regions). Rather, it was a matter o f the security o f the French military establishment in the Eastern Mediterranean.96 Concerning the third contentious issue, minorities’, the Syrian Delegation strongly attacked Article VII o f the 1933 treaty, in which France’s right to intervene on behalf o f the minorities was partially transferred to the League o f Nations. In Syrian eyes, the issue was an entirely internal affair.97 But the High Commissioner informed the Delegation that French public opinion, which had been alerted by the press, would not agree to the article being removed from the treaty, and the French government could not run the risk o f being criticised in Geneva for having abandoned the minorities, ‘as Britain did in Iraq’.98 The minority Assyrian community (British clients in Iraq before 1930) had been massacred in 1933, just after Iraq had joined the League o f Nations. The survivors o f this community were settled in Syria, in the Jazira. Following the massacres, the British government came under some criticism at the Permanent Mandates Commission. There was an acknowledged impasse on this issue.99 Up to the end o f April, the talks consisted largely o f French clarifications’ o f the articles and protocols o f the 1933 Franco-Syrian treaty (the initial French bargaining position), the Syrian Delegates’ objections to those proposals, and the piecemeal communication o f (written) French counter-proposals to the Syrian objections. It was not until 6 May that the Delegation was in possession o f a complete [210]

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(French) draft o f the treaty and its conventions.100The French press did not report on the lack o f agreement, but articles appeared occasionally, in support o f the French contentions.101 Although the French draft was patendy unacceptable to the Wafd, the latter deferred its official response because o f political developments in France, where on 26 April, general elections sealed the fate o f the Sarraut government, and brought to power the Popular Front, a left-wing coalition o f Radical-Socialists, Socialists and Communists, headed by the Socialist Party leader, Léon Blum. But because the old Chamber did not expire officially until the end o f May, the incoming government could not take office until the beginning o f June. (The second round o f the general elections took place on 3 May.) There were good reasons for some Syrian procrastination at that stage because the image o f the Popular Front was anti-imperialist. In particular, the newspapers o f both the Communist and Socialist parties had supported the Syrian General Strike.102 After the elections there were additional indications that the Syrian delegation could expect a more favourable attitude from the new government. In a speech on 16 May, Léon Blum declared that our party remains anti-colonialist’.10’ On 31 May, Le Populaire called for the emancipation o f Syria104, and the next day, the Socialist Congress passed a resolution that Syria should be granted independence, unity and admission to the League o f Nations in accordance with the Iraqi precedent.104 Although negotiations were officially suspended for the month o f May, unofficial talks restarted around 20 May, culminating in an official letter from Hashim al-Atasi (30 May) to the High Commissioner. The President o f the Syrian Delegation criticised the French draft sent to the Wafd on 6 May, whose conventions sought to render illusory the sovereignty that it acknowledges. It would tend to replace the present mandate, to which Syria has never subscribed, with a new kind of mandate . . . Under these conditions, the Syrian delegation . .. can only leave Your Excellency to appreciate whether it would be more equitable and timely to furnish it with the occasion to establish, in agreement with the French negotiators, a new draft treaty of alliance and friendship, which would be inspired by the March 1 declaration and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty .. The High Commissioner replied on 4 June, reassuring Atasi o f the French governments disposition to fully maintain the value o f the 1 (2111

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March agreement and inviting the Syrian Delegation to formulate its criticisms in a more detailed manner. In that way, the High Commissioner declared, he would be in a position to submit a complete dossier o f the present stage o f their negotiations to the incoming French government.107 On June 11, the Syrian Delegation communicated its detailed criticisms o f the French draft in a 14-page note. In particular, it singled out Article V, which in its view, consecrated the military occupation o f Syria for an unspecified length o f time. The Wafd pointed out first, that in Iraq, two unpopulated locations, comprising a total area o f 8 square kilometres, were assigned to British troops for a maximum period o f five years. In contrast, the French project consisted o f the stationing o f French troops throughout two large regions (Jabal Druze and Latakia), o f some 20,000 square kilometres, whose limits had been extended in two directions, so that a) it reached the outskirts o f Homs and b) it linked up to M ont Liban. Second, the French project fixed at six the number o f aerodromes, whilst the Anglo-Iraq treaty limited the number to two, in spite o f the undeniable importance o f the imperial routes o f communication for the British. Finally, contrary to the Iraqi precedent, the French project placed no time limit on its military occupation o f the country. The Wafd stressed that the genuine sovereignty o f Syria was quite incompatible with such a large-scale, open-ended military occupation, and no written formula could camouflage it, as the final paragraph o f Article V endeavoured to do, viz., ‘the maintenance o f such forces which encircle the State do not constitute an occupation and do not undermine its sovereign rights’. All the Wafd would accept (so it said) was the temporary presence o f a French force on a fixed point o f Syrian territory, until a national army had been formed.100 Meanwhile, the month-long political vacuum in France was finally filled. On 5 June, Léon Blum presented himself and his cabinet to the French Chamber and the next day received a vote o f confidence. For the Wafd, one encouraging sign that the negotiations might be salvaged was the appointment o f 39-year-old Pierre Viénot as the Popular Fronts new Under-Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs in charge o f Morocco, Tunisia and the Levant Mandate. A past member o f Joseph Paul-Boncours Socialist group and a former collaborator o f Lyautey, Viénot was not only intelligent and pragmatic - he was above all a ‘sensitive listener. Whereas Quai d’Orsay thinking had previously focused on the quasi-permanent (212)

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conservation o f French imperial control and prestige in the Levant, Viénot’s conception o f the Mandate was more forward-looking. In his opinion, whilst French essential interests had to be maintained, the Mandate was indeed ‘transitory’ and if France refused to recognise the fundamental rights o f Syrian nationalism, French influence in the region was likely to be surpassed by one o f Frances allies or rivals.109 On 16 June, Viénot convened a meeting at the Quai d’Orsay with the High Commissioner and representatives o f the War, Air and Navy Ministries, during which the decision was made to continue the discussions with the Syrian Delegation.110 On Saturday 20 June, Viénot wrote to Atasi, inviting the Syrian Delegation to meet with him at the Quai d’Orsay the following Tuesday (23 June), in order to restart the official talks.'" Before their departure for the French capital, Wafd members had displayed unusual reticence in public, in order to keep their options open before the talks started. Nevertheless, they let it be known that the question o f Tripoli and the four Lebanese qadhas would be on the negotiating agenda in Paris, which set alarm bells ringing in Beirut. But during the first round o f talks in April, Lebanese fears were partly allayed by the firm position taken by the French negotiators, who refused to allow the issue to be discussed in the talks."1 Following the French elections, however, rumours reached Beirut that the Wafd had again raised the issue with Quai d’Orsay officials and political personalities (particularly on the Left)."1 In response, the Maronite Archbishop o f Beirut, Mgr Mubarak, hurried to Paris in early June, where he was received by Prime Minister Blum, M. Viénot, senior Quai d’Orsay officials and other leading French personalities. Invoking Lebanon’s historic loyalty to France, he appealed to the French government to reassure Lebanese public opinion by reaffirming Lebanon’s territorial integrity."4 The Archbishop’s counter-offensive fitted well with the Quai d’Orsay’s overall design to stabilise the French position in both Lebanon and Syria. On 22 June, M. Viénot, on behalf o f the French government, telegraphed a message to the President o f the Lebanese Republic, which confirmed the French government’s intention to grant Lebanon independence within its present borders and its admittance to the League o f Nations under similar conditions to that o f Syria.'" Although the Wafd, in fact, had never been optimistic about obtaining any satisfaction on the issue, they were still quite irritated to see the Popular Front cabinet adopt an equally (213]

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firm attitude as that o f previous right-wing governments on the issue.116 The French government message effectively removed the Syro-Lebanese border question from the Franco-Syrian negotiations. For some Lebanese, but not all, the Archbishops campaign had been providential.117 The second phase o f talks started on Tuesday 23 June and continued for eleven weeks. Viénot’s comparatively enlightened perspective did not mean, in fact, that the Popular Front was that much more accommodating to Syrian claims than previous governments. It was - but only up to a point. The Blum government had its own built-in limits and it also faced pressures from French right-wing parties and special financial and cultural interest groups which vehemently opposed granting Syria any concessions at all. Behind the scenes, the Ministry o f War was particularly reluctant to make any more concessions and the French negotiating team made it perfecdy clear to the Wafd that there was unlikely to be any French government in the near future which would be more accommodating.118 Viénot’s authority and more accommodating attitude to the Wafd s claims were undoubtedly crucial to the development o f the negotiations. It should be noted, however, that Viénot did not bring with him a new French negotiating team, American style’: on a day to day basis, the Wafd continued to face Messrs de Martel, Chauvel, Keiffer and occasionally St Quentin. Viénot met the Wafd more on a week-to-week basis. Behind the scenes, the influence o f the Ministry o f War on the French negotiators was considerable. During discussions concerning the military convention o f the treaty, military representatives were present, but normally the French side was restricted to Quai d’Orsay officials. As negotiations proceeded throughout July and August, news filtered back to France o f demonstrations in Latakia, the Jabal Druze, and elsewhere for and against union with Syria.119 In Latakia, the Alawitedominated Representative Council, strongly encouraged by local French officials, sent a veritable stream o f petitions to the High Commissioner, the French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and the League o f Nations, which staunchly opposed any form o f reattachment to Damascus.120 But such troubles in the minority areas were overshadowed by another development, the Bloc’s creation o f its own paramilitary force, the Steel Shirts. Since the establishment o f the Nationalist Youth in the late 1920s, Fakhri al-Barudi, among others, dreamed o f transforming it into the [2141

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nucleus o f a future national army. The Steel Shirts (al-Qumsan al-Hadidiyya) first appeared in Damascus in the aftermath o f the General Strike on 8 March and in no time branches appeared all over Syria.121 Guided by the idea o f sacrifice, devotion and service to the nation - and in particular to the independence struggle, the Steel Shirts (who received athletic and military training), formed the élite cadre o f the Nationalist Youth. By July 1936 there were as many as 3,000 members in Damascus. The Aleppo branch, known as the National Guard (al-Haras al-Watani), numbered around 1,200 uniformed youth. Smaller groups appeared in Homs, Hama, Latakia, Jarablus and Dayr al-Zur.122 With the High Commissioner away, Meyriers overriding priority was to maintain calm whilst negotiations continued in the French capital.123 So whilst the French authorities considered it a quasi-illegal organisation, and viewed its rapid development with considerable anxiety, they restricted themselves to periodic warnings to Barudi and other Steel Shirt leaders to maintain a low profile.124 Although the relative paucity o f documents available in the French archives for July and August 1936 renders any detailed analysis o f the development o f the Franco-Syrian negotiations during those critical weeks singularly difficult, the main lines are clear enough. Apart from the crucial military question (occupation o f the Jabal Druze and Latakia), the four major political problems which remained unresolved at the end o f the first phase o f talks were the protection o f minorities (Article VI), the Common Interests (Article VII), the length o f the transition period, and last - but not least - Syrian unity.123 Concerning minorities and the Common Interests, a compromise was found by the end o f August, whereby the substance o f the two issues was dealt with in letters annexed to the treaty.126 The transition period was finally agreed as three years, a compromise between the four years as stipulated in the 1933 treaty, and the Syrian delegations initial request for a two-year period. Later in the negotiations, the Wafd endeavoured to use the Common Interests question as a tactic to reopen the Lebanese question. They proposed that a form o f Syro-Lebanese federation be established that was not limited to a common management o f the Common Interests (customs union, posts and Syro-Lebanese currency). A federal council, within which the two states would be represented in proportion to their populations, would have the power that the High Commissioner held, (215)

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concerning the maintenance o f internal law and order, the defence o f the territory, foreign affairs and other attributions o f sovereignty.127 Concerning the minority question, the Wafd succeeded in excluding any mention o f it in the articles o f the treaty, but at French insistence, the same article, slighdy modified, appeared in an annexed letter (No. 5). The French agreed to replace the word minorities’ by ‘individuals and communities’. The question o f Syrian unity was considerably more complex. By the beginning o f July, the Quai d’Orsay had resigned itself to coming to some kind o f genuine accommodation on the issue.12* Nevertheless, as the French knew it was the issue for the Wafd, they decided, as good negotiators, that the price the Wafd would pay to obtain it would be the latter’s acceptance o f the whole treaty.129The starting position o f the Wafd was to claim the immediate achievement o f unity before any ratification o f the treaty, the autonomous regimes o f the two territories being defined by a Syrian law that the Syrian parliament would approve.130 During August, however, the Wafd conceded first, that the administrative and financial autonomy o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze would be equal to the degree o f autonomy o f the sanjaq o f Alexandretta, and second, that the re-attachment and the autonomy would be defined by a decree o f the High Commissioner, and not by the Syrian government. These concessions by the Wafd raised two fundamental questions. First, the date that the decree would come into force and second, the governance o f the two regions during the transition period and during the treaty. The Wafd proposed to incorporate the High Commissioner’s decree into the treaty, which would give it an immediate validity. Deputies from the two regions would participate, in the Syrian parliament, in the vote o f ratification. The consultation o f the elected local councils, Alawite and Druze, would thus become a formality, o f no practical significance. Unity would have been achieved over their heads. For their part, the French proposed that the decree be promulgated as soon as the treaty had been ratified by the Syrian parliament. There seemed to be no compromise solution.131 Concerning the governance o f the two regions, the French proposed that following the re-attachment, the Syrian government would reconfirm the French governors in their positions, and the latter would remain French for the duration o f the treaty. The French further insisted that the duration o f French military occupation o f Syria, and especially the [216]

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Jabal Druze and Latakia regions, should remain unspecified."2 This was simply too much for the Wafd to swallow, who emphasised that they had received a mandate to achieve unity: having already conceded that there would be two autonomous regimes (similar to Alexandretta), it would be impossible for them to maintain that they had fulfilled their mission if a) those regions continued to be governed directly by Frenchmen and b) French troops were to remain in both regions (potentially) for the following 28 years. The Wafd pointed out that the Anglo-Iraq treaty provided for a British occupation o f bases in Mosul and Baghdad lor five years only: it should be the same for the Franco-Syrian treaty. At the end o f five years, Syria would guarantee her own external and internal security, that is, Syria would decide whether she would request French troops to remain or not. In reply the French declared that the problems o f the Franco-Syrian alliance and the Angio-Iraqi alliance were completely different. First, concerning possible adversaries, Iraq’s situation was different to Syria’s. Second, Britain had major bases relatively close to Iraq, in Egypt and Palestine, while France had no equivalent bases in the region. Under these conditions France was obliged to maintain a secure base in the Orient in order to fulfil her commitments to the alliance (in order to come quickly and effectively to Syria’s aid, in case o f war). Third, the Iraqi President had allowed Britain to remain in the region west o f the Euphrate for an undetermined period. Finally, no one could forecast what the internal and external situation o f Syria would be, five years after the coming into force o f the treaty."3 Thus by the middle o f August the negotiations stuck.134 Viénot and the Wafd, however, were distinctly keen to see the talks succeed, and by 7 September, some five months after the Wafd’s arrival in Paris, agreement was reached on all issues.133 The French conceded that the High Commissioner’s decree would be incorporated into the treaty. But in a distinctly subtle move - to put it no more strongly - both sides secretly agreed that the text o f the treaty would not be made public until after the Wafd and the High Commissioner had returned to Syria, taken both local councils in hand, and ’obtained’ their consent to the teattachment. In that way, the fiction o f consultation o f the elected representatives’ o f the two regions would be safeguarded.136 The French also accepted that the future governors o f the two regions would be Syrian, and nominated by the President o f the Syrian Republic."' And (217)

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finally, the French agreed that their troops would evacuate Jabal Druze and Latakia five years after the treaty came into force, if requested to do so by the Syrian government.13* The treaty, loosely modelled on the Anglo-Iraq treaty o f 1930, provided for ’peace’, ’friendship’ and ‘alliance’ between France and Syria. It was to commence as soon as Syria was accepted into the League o f Nations and was to last for 25 years. As with previous treaties, its substance lay not in the twelve articles (two pages in length), which merely formalised the general guidelines o f Franco-Syrian relations and which were never really in dispute, but in the military convention (eight articles covering four pages), five protocols and eleven exchanges o f letters (twelve pages) attached to the treaty. The preamble to the treaty stipulated, in part, that the military convention, protocols and exchanges o f letters were to be considered an integral part o f the treaty. In particular, the substantial length o f the military convention reflected the French Ministry o f War’s concern - which was considerable —to maintain its military control over Syria. The convention provided for French assistance to protect Syrian sovereignty. The Syrian government would equip and maintain a national army consisting o f at least one division o f infantry and a cavalry brigade, presumably on the French scale. France was allowed to maintain two military air bases at mutually agreed locations, not less than 40 kilometres from any one o f the four interior towns. France was also given all transport and harbour facilities needed in connection with these air bases and French garrisons. A French-led military commission would be established, and all military advisors to the Syrian armed forces would be French. As mentioned before, French troops would remain in the Latakia and Druze regions for five years following the coming into force o f the treaty. The treaty contained no formal acknowledgement o f the separate existence o f the Lebanese Republic: the subject was entirely excluded from the texts. As to the regulation o f outstanding questions between Syria and Lebanon, including the administration o f the controversial Common Interests, these were to be negotiated by the Lebanese and Syrian governments during the transition period. Finally, France relinquished the right to obtain from Syria the reimbursement o f the cost o f its administration and protection o f the country during its exercise o f the M andate.139 In specific terms, the measures to be taken during the three-year transition period included first, the handing over o f Syrian troops to a (future) Syrian Ministry o f Defence and the elaboration [218]

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o f the regulations o f the Military Mission. Second, the withdrawal o f French troops to locations as described in the Military Convention. Third, the abolition o f the positions o f Special Services Officers. Fourth, the application o f provisional judicial measures and the negotiation o f a new judicial protocol. Fifth, the transfer to the Syrian Government o f the Public Services then controlled by France: Sûreté Générale, Passport Department, Police, Gendarmerie, Tribe Control Department, Customs, Press, Hijaz Railway, Wakfs, Antiquities, Control o f Concessionary Companies and Mines. Sixth, reduction in the number o f French func­ tionaries and the settlement o f their technical responsibilities. Seventh, the evaluation o f the cost o f buying the French installations and handing them over to the Syrian gpvernment. Last but not least, the establishment o f Syrian diplomatic relations with (first) France and countries bordering Syria. The French Republic would be represented by an Ambassador.140 The Franco-Syrian treaty was solemnly initialled on Wednesday 9 September at one o’clock in the Salon de l’Horlogp, at the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. M . Viénot signed for France and Hashim al-Atasi, President o f the Syrian Delegation, for Syria. Also present were Prime Minister Léon Blum, M . Chautemps (Minister o f State), M. Violette (Minister o f State), representatives o f the French Army, Navy and Air Force Ministries, M. de Martel, M. Ponsot (French Ambassador to Turkey since March 1936), and members o f the Syrian Delegation. M . Viénot made a speech congratulating the Syrian Delegation for the happy results obtained and rendered homage to the qualities exhibited by the latter during the course o f the negotiations: . . . The substantial texts define our agreement and englobe all aspects of future relations between France and Syria, on the bases of complete sovereignty and independence and are highly significant. These texts open the way for Syria’s sovereignty to be recognised by all the members of the League of Nations. It thus completely satisfies all the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. . . Atasi replied . . . M. Minister, we are firmly convinced, as you are, that the transfer of your responsibilities to the young Arab republic of Syria will be rapidly and successfully achieved in an atmosphere of entire goodwill and friendly collaboration .. .Ml

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Following the ceremony, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs offered lunch in honour o f the Syrian Delegation. When the news reached Syria on 9 September that the treaty had been initialled in Paris, all government departments closed for the day, and many were bedecked with flags, as were the majority o f suks and businesses. For the first time, National Bloc offices displayed the flags o f France and Syria side by side.142 On Viénot’s instructions, M. Meyrier went to Damascus that morning, where he was received by President Abid, who had gathered an appropriate galaxy o f personalities to celebrate the happy occasion: Haqqi al-Azm, Said Ghazzi, Mustafa Kussairi, Shukri Quwwatli, Fakhri Barudi, Lutfi Haffar, Fa’iz Khuri, Ihsan Sharif and the Hamiote deputy Najib Barazi and some o f his followers. The President o f the Republic, in reply to M . Meyrier’s words o f congratulations to him, the government and the Syrian people, expressed his delight at the agreement in Paris which, he said, satisfied the aspirations o f the Syrian people and which 'made French-Syrian relations closer and more cordial’.143 Surprisingly, nationalist leaders in Damascus instructed leaders o f the various youth groups not to allow any public demonstrations. Nevertheless, that evening some groups o f Steel Shirts organised a torchlight procession, singing patriotic songs in the main streets o f the town and similar joyful processions took place in all the main towns.144 News o f the signing was greeted, in fact, with great enthusiasm in most, but not all, nationalist circles. Although the League o f National Action declared itself satisfied by the results obtained,143 members o f the Patriotic Front, at the behest o f Zaki al-Khatib, complained that the treaty was too favourable to France, and in particular had betrayed Lebanon and the National Pact.146 In Cairo, Dr Shahbandar deliberately refrained from making any comment: he wanted to see the text before deciding what attitude to adopt.147 Leaders o f the Christian communities went to the Bloc headquarters in Damascus and congratulated Bloc leaders, but in private they were deeply worried. The Armenians, in particular, declared that they would be the first to be badly treated, 'following the French departure’, given that they were refugees who were doing jobs previously done by Syrians.148 In Latakia and the Jabal Druze, the initial public reaction to the news was almost non-existent. In Latakia, the mood was quite tense among the separatists. In the Jabal Druze the supporters o f unity spread the rumour that the French would soon leave the Jabal. Each [220]

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side waited for the publication o f the treaty, to discover what had been decided concerning their future. In the sanjaq, the Turkish elements o f the population abstained entirely from the joyful demonstrations that took place following the news.'49 The Syrian Delegation left Paris by train on 17 September, stopping in Geneva and Istanbul, where they were shocked by their conversations with Turkish officials, who left them in no doubt that Turkey had its sights firmly set on Alexandretta.150 On the morning o f 27 September, Aleppo station was the scene o f massive demonstrations as the Wafd’s train arrived from Turkey. The High Commissioner, who arrived by plane in Tripoli two days previously, took a special overnight train to Aleppo in order to participate in the occasion and arrived at the station a few minutes after the Wafd: Our meeting was greeted by the large crowds in and around the station with joyful shouting, whilst the nationalist youth played the Marseillaise . . . An immense crowd filled the town. From all over the country people arrived to salute the liberators of the motherland.. .m The Steel Shirts assisted the Bloc leadership in bringing into the town between 30,000 and 40,000 villagers from the surrounding area. In fact, to all appearances it seemed that executive authority had already passed to the nationalists. Since the General Strike, in effect, they had established their own organisations in the various quarters for dealing with local administrative matters, and police arrangements during the demonstrations and celebrations following 9 September seem to have been largely in their own hands.192 Similar parades and demonstrations greeted the delegation as it passed through Hama and Homs on its way to Damascus, where it arrived on 29 September. There, nationalists staged the activities. However, the Steel Shirts, assisted by the Boy Scouts, had great difficulty in controlling the joyful crowds that had gathered at the Hijaz Station for the victory march to the Sérail.152The simultaneous appearance o f Hashim al-Atasi and the High Commissioner on the balcony o f the Sérail was greeted by a long ovation from the crowd massed in the square, along the banks o f the Barada river, and the terraces o f the houses.154 Celebrations lasted four solid days. (221)

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Having obtained from the Bloc an agreement which in large measure consolidated French essential interests in Syria, the Quai d’O rsay was understandably keen to see the Bloc come to power and ratify the agreement. Martel decided to associate himself with the festivities, which marked a ’happy development’ in Franco-Syrian relations, primarily in order to help that operation succeed.1'5 The High Commissioner now faced a series o f urgent, complex and delicate tasks. First, to make contact with the Druze and Alawite populations and to make them agree to their re-attachment to Damascus. This delicate operation needed to be carried out without delay because the French had secredy promised the Wafd to promulgate the decrees concerning the re-attachment quite soon, in order that the Delegation could use them as a weapon during the election campaign.1* Second, to open the electoral period and to work with the National Bloc, to establish the lists o f its candidates that would assure it a parliamentary majority, without which the treaty would remain a dead letter.1'7 Finally, to negotiate the promised treaty with the Lebanese Government as rapidly as possible and to have it ratified in Beirut at the same time as the Franco-Syrian treaty. In effect, as soon as the latter was ratified, the question o f a Syrian-Lebanese settlement would be raised by the Syrians because o f the termination o f the French management o f the Common Interests (customs union, postal services, currency, railways), a settlement that the French wished to limit to economic and financial issues, but which the Syrian government would undoubtedly try to extend to political issues.1'* In Latakia, in order to demonstrate French intentions and to ’facilitate the necessary evolution, the High Commissioner sent M. Schoeffler, the Governor, on leave and transferred several o f the Special Services officers to other regions.1'9 M. David took over as interim Governor until the nomination o f a Syrian Governor by the Syrian government. On 3 October, Messrs David and Keiffer met with the twelve Alawite, Christian and Isma’ili members o f the Representative Council o f Latakia (the five Sunnite members were still involved in festivities in Damascus). The new governor explained at length the conditions under which the re-attachment to Damascus had become possible by the formal commitment o f the Syrians to the principle o f Alawite autonomy, in accordance with the definition given by the League [222]

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o f Nations and under the guarantee o f France. Such French assurances, the 'separatists’ emotionally declared, would not cover future generations. The Alawite Mountain had resisted Sunnite Muslim domination for thirteen centuries. To appease the Syrians, France had now sacrificed them. The Alawites would probably not openly take arms against France, whose administrative tutelage it had appreciated, but if the latter disappeared, did the French government intend to force (by military means) the Alawites to accept the law o f Damascus? Finally, if the Mandate ended in Syria and could not be continued in Latakia, the Alawites emphasised they would face the Sunnites by themselves, and 'let the Sunnites try and take the mountain, if they can’. In fact, the Alawites feared massacres less (they considered they could defend themselves in their mountains) than the abuses o f an administration and courts controlled by Damascus which, they suspected, would withdraw all the advantages o f equality o f rights with Sunnites, which the French presence for the last fifteen years had guaranteed. The ‘separatists’ who, according to the French, were ‘violently hostile to the Muslims’, resolutely refused to meet Bloc emissaries from Damascus.160 Bloc leaders in (Damascus then suggested to Martel that a show o f authority’ by the French government, indicating its determination, would soon solve the problem, but Martel told them it was politically impossible for France to mount a military operation to force the Alawites into the Syrian fold 'without compromising everything in Geneva’.161 Furthermore, although the treaty defined the framework o f Alawite and Druze autonomies, the participation and consent in advance o f the official organisations representing the two populations was indispensable for the initiation o f the new regime; it was therefore imperative to carry out a political operation o f persuasion and flexibility, and the Bloc should 'shoulder its responsibilities’. The Bloc agreed to make a further approach to the Alawite leaders, to try to win them to the idea o f re-attachment, by reassuring them o f Damascus’s liberal intentions.162 To no avail. The separatists, headed by Ibrahim Kinj, the Alawite President o f the Representative Council, continued to refuse any contact with the Bloc and sent the High Commissioner another autonomist’ petition. Their stand-off attitude was reinforced by their hope to see the sanjaq o f Alexandretta obtain, through Turkish intervention, substantial guarantees that would then be extended to the Latakia region.16* It took two months o f delicate persuasion by High Commission officials to lead to a detente. Little by little, the Alawites 1223)

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got used to the idea that France was not abandoning them, but that her protection was changing in form (the French thesis).'64 After tedious negotiations which took place in Beirut at the beginning o f December, the whole council finally agreed to a text analogous to that o f the sanjaq. The only injunction that the separatists demanded was a written guarantee that the borders o f Latakia would remain the same. The decree promulgating the constitution o f the Alawite territory was signed by the High Commissioner on 3 December.164 The evolution o f the Druze question was somewhat different. On 11 October, the French Governor (Colonel Tarrit) gathered, in his residence at Suwayda, a Druze Assembly consisting o f notables representing all the factions o f opinion, the local government council and religious leaders. M. Keiffer oudined to them the main lines o f the treaty and in particular the points concerning the Jabal Druze, following which . . . violent arguments raged between those who supported total separation and the young nationalists, who by their tacdessness aroused the ire of the functionaries and notables.146 Nevertheless, in the end a majority, whilst deploring the loss o f their total independence, expressed their confidence in the French government and accepted, in principle, the re-attachment.167 In general, opposition to unity with Syria was less pronounced in the Jabal than in Latakia, partly because the Jabal was not divided along sectarian lines - the landowning class and the peasantry were both Druze. Moreover, conscious o f their military prowess, the Druze looked at Damascus in a completely different light from the Alawites. According to the French, ‘The Alawites fear the Damascenes. The Druze scorn them’.16* Following the 11 October meeting, Martel emphasised to the leadership in Damascus that it was up to them to make an agreement direcdy with the Druze chiefs, to settle the forms o f the new regime. After six weeks o f interminable discussions, which led nowhere, the Wafd asked the High Commissioner (as it had for Latakia) to pursue a policy o f force', i.e. to promulgate the decree o f re-attachment immediately, without waiting for the approval o f the Druze. Martel once again replied that it was impossible for him to be liberal in Damascus and brutal in Suwayda.169

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Finally, on 1 December, the High Commissioner convoked all the Druze notables to his residence in Damascus, together with Hashim al-Atasi and other Wafd members. At the end o f a lengthy and emotional session, all 26 Druze notables signed a document signalling their agreement to a text o f a constitution for the Jabal Druze analogous to that o f Alexandretta. The High Commissioner published the decree o f re-attachment the next day.170 In Syria (of the four towns), following the homecoming celebrations, the Bloc confidently began to lay the groundwork for the implementation o f the treaty. But the hesitation by the French government and the Wafd to publish the terms o f the treaty was soon seized upon by the opposition, notably Zaki al-Khatib’s pro-Shahbandar organisation, the Patriotic Front, whose attacks on the Bloc increased daily. In order to undercut this opposition and thereby keep his election plans on course - and in spite o f the blocked situation in Latakia and the Jabal Druze - the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Wafd, decided to publish the treaty on 22 October.1' 1 The treaty was issued accompanied by a manifesto, signed by Hashim al-Atasi, which was cleverly composed for both Syrian and French audiences. On the one hand, Atasi stressed the need to develop a corporate national consciousness and the ‘ideal o f inter-Arab brotherhood’ and, on the other, he praised the ‘free men o f France in forgoing the refund o f the cost to them o f the Mandate, which reached many millions o f francs’. He skilfully presented the need for a special regime for Latakia and the Jabal Druze as an invitation to Lebanon to melt into union with Syria.1'2 However, although the reception o f the treaty was generally favourable in Muslim circles, some nationalists were deeply dissatisfied with it, and pointed in particular to its military clauses and to the abandonment’ o f Lebanon.171 In Christian circles there was deep disappointment: they feared that the clauses concerning individuals and communities were insufficient and lacked practical importance. National Bloc leaders responded by multiplying their meetings, where they enthusiastically explained the clauses o f the treaty, à leurfaçon.r * Martel’s problems were not to be found exclusively among Syrian circles. Following the publication o f the treaty, some civilian and military Mandatory agents adopted an attitude o f insubordination concerning the treaty policy and became, according to the High Commissioner,

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willing propaganda agents, spreading alarmist and inaccurate news’.17' The High Commissioner responded prompdy to this dangerous trend. On 24 October, he gathered in Beirut all his top officials, civilian and military, and after explaining to them the treaty policy and their obligation to unite all their efforts to make it succeed, he offered to obtain, for those who preferred not to continue to serve in Syria under the new conditions, their reintegration into their original departments.176 General elections, conducted in the customary two stages, were executed relatively smoothly on 14 and 30 November. As anticipated, the Bloc won landslide victories throughout the country. In most rural districts and minority enclaves, the nationalists did not try to install their own candidates. Instead, they wisely allowed local candidates, mainly rural landowners, tribal shaykhs, and minority leaders - most o f whom were known as 'servants’ o f the Mandate - to declare themselves nationalists’.177Thus in its composition, the new Chamber was, according to the High Commissioner, 'basically similar to the preceding one’.17* The most notable change took place in Aleppo, where none o f the ten deputies o f the previous Chamber were re-elected. The elections on the whole constituted a plebiscite o f the treaty and categorically affirmed the National Bloc’s legitimacy and popularity.179 During October and November, Aleppo had been the scene o f violent clashes between Christians and Muslims. In response to the rapid establishment o f the Steel Shirts and to the news that the National Bloc had succeeded in Paris, a Christian paramilitary organisation called the White Badge emerged in Aleppo. Headed by an ex-military officer, Abbud Qumbaz, it called for Aleppo’s separation from Damascus and attracted mainly Catholics. Clashes with the Steel Shirts were inevitable. The worst incident occurred on 11 October when eight people died and around 150 were injured. But in fact the White Badge proved to be a passing phenomenon, largely because many Christian dignitaries in Aleppo refused to support the Badge’s extremist position. In spite o f the Christians’ genuine fears for their future, Christian leaders in Syria during this period were particularly sensitive not to appear to be in opposition to national feelings.1*0 Meanwhile, during the run-up to the Syrian elections, significant developments occurred in Beirut, where the Lebanese parliament (15 October) unanimously elected a commission o f seven members, who joined the government, in view to the opening o f treaty talks, which 1226]

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started the next day. After a month o f negotiations, a Franco-Lebanese treaty was signed on 13 November, presented to parliament on 17 November and ratified unanimously.'8' By this treaty o f friendship and alliance, France - it would seem - transformed Lebanon into a thinly disguised form o f Protectorate. Throughout the negotiations Muslim opposition was very active. On 15 November there were disorderly scenes in Beirut and in Tripoli the suks closed for a month. In spite o f its election victory, one obstacle remained to the Blocs plans to give themselves all the important posts: the President o f the Republic. President A bids resignation would allow the Bloc to install Hashim al-Atasi as the new President and open the way for Mardam to become Prime Minister. The elderly Francophile, however, whose mandate only expired in June 1937, had no intention o f sacrificing himself. The Bloc asked Martel to give President Abid the necessary ‘indication, but the High Commissioner refused, declaring that it was an internal political manoeuvre related to timing, which did not allow him to take sides.'82 Finally, the Bloc privately threatened the President that he risked being tried by the High Court for having countersigned Shaykh Taj al-Din’s decrees, during the period when the Chamber was suspended.183A few days before parliament opened, the President informed Mardam that he would in fact resign, which precipitated further intense bargaining among Bloc leaders for cabinet positions.'84 At ten o’clock on Monday 21 December, 82 representatives (three were absent) packed into parliament to distribute the highest offices o f state. Once again Muhammad Yahya al-Adali, the eldest parliamentarian, occupied the Speaker's Chair until Paris al-Khuri was elected Speaker by a near unanimous vote (81 votes). President Abid's message o f resignation followed. After a short suspension o f the session, the Speaker read out the Cham bers reply. Both messages were appropriately dignified and underlined that President A bids tenure was marked by the conclusion o f the treaty.183There was no debate as to who would replace him: Hashim al-Atasi was immediately elected (74 votes) as the next President o f the Syrian Republic.186 Events then moved to the Sérail, where the new President received the resignation o f the Ayyubi cabinet and charged Jamil Mardam to form a new cabinet. Aside from the Premiership, Mardam assumed the portfolio o f National Economy (Commerce, Public Works, Agriculture, Health and Veterinary Services, Posts and [227]

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Telegraphs), Sa'dallah al-Jabiri became Minister o f Foreign Affairs and the Interior, Shukri Quwwatli o f Finance and Defence and D r Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali o f Justice and Education. Aleppo had never before been so satisfactorily represented in a Syrian cabinet. The eventful day was rounded o ff by the customary official visit o f both cabinets - and later the President o f the Republic - to the High Commissioner, who conferred Commander o f the Legion o f Honour on Ata al-Ayyubi, to honour the 'talent and tact’ that the Prime Minister had demonstrated during his presidency.123*7 The next day, in a deliberately low-key ceremony before the session opened, the High Commissioner and the Syrian plenipotentiaries, Jam il Mardam, Sa'dallah al-Jabiri and Shukri al-Quwwadi, signed the treaty, which was deposited immediately on the Bureau o f Parliament.1** The Prime Minister then presented his government to Parliament and read out the Ministerial Declaration.1*9After a short discussion the government received a unanimous vote o f confidence. The session concluded with the nomination o f a Commission o f 19 deputies, charged to examine the treaty.190 On Saturday 26 December the Commission reported favourably on the treaty and with no organised opposition to the Bloc within the Chamber (the League o f National Action and Zaki al-Khatib’s Patriotic Front were unrepresented in Parliament), the government secured its ratification by a unanimous vote.191 Sixteen years after France had occupied Syria by force, expelled Faysal, abolished the fledgling Arab Kingdom and imposed its own quasi-colonial administration, a French government and the Syrian nationalists had signed a highly publicised and detailed contract o f ‘friendship and alliance’, and Syria’s first exclusively nationalist govern­ ment was ‘in power’: a new experiment in Franco-Syrian relations was about to commence.

N otes

1 CAD N/B, vol. 508. 2 MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 21 November 1935, vol. 491, p. 123; Ibid., Martel to MAE, 24 November 1935, p. 139; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 29 November 1935, vol. 474. 3 Sec P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 455.

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G enf .RAL Stri ke in Syri a , J anuary 1936 4 CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 19 January 1936, vol. 475. 5 CAD N/B, David to Martel, 19 December 1935, vol. 474; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 19 December 1935, vol. 491, p. 199. On 20 December 1931, several demonstrators died during disturbances in Damascus. Each year there was a memorial service for them. See Chapter II. 6 CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 435*. 16 December 1935, vol. 474. The manifesto was signed ‘The Bureau o f the Bloc’. The file only contains the French translation o f the manifesto, not the original in Arabic, and the phrase ‘constitutes an eloquent lesson that the Orient must take to heart and a striking example that must be, followed’ was underlined, probably by a French official. The French were clearly worried that events in Egypt might precipitate disturbances in Syria. 7 CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 437’, 16 December 1935, vol. 474. 8 CA D N /B, Fain to Martel, 16 December 1935, vol. 474. 9 MAE/SL, ‘Manifesto’, 19 December 1935, vol. 491, pp. 205-6. ‘Its language is quite virulent, considering that it is signed by the main representative o f the so-called ‘‘collaborationist” nationalists, who take it upon themselves to offer us some bait whenever the Bloc thinks it is in its interest to do so.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 27 December 1935, p. 202. 10 CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 27 December 1935, vol. 474. 11 \ . . the major programme o f public works that the end o f the annual payments o f the Public Ottoman Debt enabled the Mandatory Power to establish, has led to the completion o f two undertakings: the laying o f water pipes in the Salkhad region o f die Jabal Druze and the extension o f the Baghdad railway line to the Iraqi border. The line now finishes at Tell Kotchek, less than 100 kms from Mosul . . . The other major works in hand, the Homs dam and the improvements to the port o f Beirut, are continuing normally. These tangible results o f the Mandatory power, that public opinion is little by little learning to appreciate, constitute no doubt one o f the basic reasons for the peaceful atmosphere that is noticeable in the Levant, in spite o f the difficulties o f all kinds produced by the world crisis and the commercial restrictions that follow from it.’ MAE/SL, ‘Situation des Etats du Levant sous Mandat Français en 1935’, n.d., vol. 491, pp. 314-21. 12 CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 3 January 1936, vol. 475. 13 '1 chose this date [20 January] in order to make it coincide with that o f the publication o f the texts concerning the reform o f the Syrian administration.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 3 January 1936. 14 CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 10/S’, 6 January 1936, vol. 475. 15 Ibid., 'Information no. 9/S’, 6 January 1936. 16 Ibid., Fain to Martel, 6 January 1936. 17 Ibid., Fain to Martel, 8 January 1936. 18 CA D N /B, Martel to MAE, 23 January 1936, vol. 537; CA D N /B, ‘Note’, Fain to Martel, 18 January 1936, vol. 475. 19 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 10 January 1936. For the complete ‘National Pact’ speech, see ibid., Martel to MAE, 14 February 1936. 20 ‘Following the Congress o f Homs (4 February 1934), Ibrahim Hananu never stopped proposing the fusion o f all these elements - the Bloc, the Nationalist Youth and the League, into a “Grand Nationalist Party”, whose regulations would have consisted o f a programme o f action reflecting the wishes o f the different

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21 22 23

24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

32 33 34

parties. The obstacle to achieving this was from the start the attitude o f certain politicians, such as Jamil Mardam, who hoped that a change in the situation might bring them to power, and in the opposition o f the League leaders, who demanded the adoption o f their entire programme. Since then, the Congress held in Baalbek, on 23 October 1935, marked a step forward in the material and administrative organisation o f the party, applying the decisions o f the Homs Congress. At the Congress held in Damascus on 10 January, the nationalist programme changed horn a strictly Syrian one to a pan-Arab one. There is thus an attempt to unite the Syrian nationalist parties around a much more intransigent and extensive programme o f action.’ Ibid., ‘Note’, Fain to Martel, 18 January 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 10 January 1936. Ibid., ‘Information no. 30/S’, 18 January 1936. They were placed under house arrest in two villages in the Jazita, Qamishli and Hassaja. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 23 January 1936, vol. 537; CA D N /B, ‘Information no. 31/S’, 20 January 1936, vol. 475. The Deputy Delegate at Dayr al-Zur, General Jacquot, advised local (pro-Mandatory) leaders to send the High Commission ‘télégrammes fulminantes', so that they could not be accused o f lukewarmness. Ibid., Jacquot to Fain, 20 January 1936. On 12 December 1935, as the situation began to warm up in Syria, the High Commissioner had taken a precautionary measure o f issuing a decree (no. 293/LR), by which ‘the removal o f political undesirables could be undertaken without reference to the law’s inconveniences. The first to feel the effects o f the new order was Fakhri Barudi. . . ’ F0371/20065, p. 16. MacKereth to Eden, 21 January 1936. CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 27/S’, 20 January 1936, vol. 475. Ibid., information no. 31/S’, 20 January 1936. Ibid., information no. 33/S ’, 20 January 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 20 January 1936. Ibid., Fain to Martel, 21 January 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 22 January 1936. O f the 185 persons arrested by the Gendarmerie on 21 January, 72 per cent were under 21 yean o f age and 94.5 per cent under 31 years o f age. Ibid., ‘Récapitulatif par âge’, 22 January 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21 January 1936. See P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 458. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 24 January 1936, vol. 475. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 25 January 1936. Bloc leaders were always at the head o f funeral processions for the victims o f the disturbances during this period. To the chagrin o f most young militants, who readily ‘took on’ the police, the same leaders were conspicuously absent from almost all o f the actual demonstrations. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 26 January 1936, vol. 475. Ibid., Fain to Martel, 27 January 1936. Ibid., ‘Communiqué’, 26 January 1936. A nationalist ‘campaign o f lies’ concerning the purpose o f the administrative reforms? ‘The re-establishment o f the 1923 constitution in Egypt obliges us for the moment to abandon the idea o f superimposing a political organism, drawn from the Muhafâzat councils, provided for by my recent administrative reform . . . However, in thus maintaining this first stage o f administrative reform, we keep open the possibility that if the parliament fails, we can produce a new representative system from these Muhafazat councils . . . ’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 1 March 1936.

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G eneral Stri ke in Sy ri a , J anuary 1936 35 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 458. 36 For instance, on 28 January, Nasib al-Bakri met the Damascus Delegate: ‘Bakri pretended to be surprised. "You wanted to see me, M. Delegate?” , when in fact it was he who asked for the meeting, but they are all seated stiff o f compromising themselves. Interminable waffle about the situation, treaty, harshness o f the police. I courteously but firmly put the record straight. At the end two points stood out: Bakri admitted that the nationalist leaders have lost control o f their troops, and he asked me to issue a communiqué (saving the nationalists’ face). Naturally I refused.’ CA D N /B, Fain to Martel, 30 January 1936, vol. 475. 37 Ibid., ‘Information no. 75/S’, 30 January 1936. 38 According to the French records, the student thesis was as follows: ‘The people o f the National Bloc and the merchants have nothing to lose; they will keep their jobs and their shops, but we are risking our careers. Perhaps we will obtain something if we continue the agitation, but in any case we will pester the Bloc and the merchants, who have got us into this mess’. Ibid., Fain to Martel, 30 January 1936. 39 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 30 January 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 31 January 1936. 40 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 31 January 1936. 41 *. . . in spite o f the important police presence, it is difficult to deal with the system employed by the adversaries o f re-opening. In the middle o f a crowded suk, the agitators approach the merchants and discreedy show them a closed fist: “If you open, this fist will smash your windows.” That is sufficient, because a merchant dare not alert a policeman, for fear o f being accused o f treachery.’ Ibid., Fain to Martel, 3 February 1936. 42 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 6 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 7 February 1936; ibid., ‘Note’, 8 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 10 February 1936. 43 Ibid., ‘Information no. 87/S’, 3 February 1936; ibid., ‘Information no. 89/S’, 3 February 1936. 44 Ibid., ‘Information no. 90/S’, 3 February 1936. 45 Ibid., information no. 114/S’, 9 February 1936. 46 Ibid.,‘Réquisition, 11 February 1936. 47 See ibid., ‘Note pour la presse locale’, 28 February 1936. 48 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 12 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 13 February 1936. 49 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 460. 50 CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 16 February 1936, vol. 475. 51 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 460. 52 CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 18 February 1936, vol. 475. 53 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21 February 1936. 54 Ibid. 55 In customary fashion, the official decrees described President Abid as calling on A u al-Ayyubi to form a new government. In fact, the President called on no one: Martel chose the new Prime Minister, as well as each new cabinet member. President Abid simply signed on the dotted line. ‘The consultations that I have undertaken have confirmed my impression that Shaykh Taj al-Din can no longer remain associated with a policy that I had to take in hand myself. I broached this subject with him, and he agreed with me and following this, I decided to hand his resignation to the President o f the Republic tomorrow. As soon as this

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56

57 58 59 60

61

62 63

64 65 66 67 68

formality is complete, I propose to discuss the new situation with President Abid and to make him authorise the choice that I make concerning a new cabinet.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 22 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 22 February 1936. Martel described the three new moderate nationalist ministers as ‘nationalisants’, rather than ‘nationalistes’. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 25 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 23 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 21 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 23 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 25 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to Ata Bey al-Ayyubi, 24 February 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 25 February 1936. On 26 February, prison doors were opened for all those who had been arrested but had not been brought before a court. But there remained 3,080 persons who had been sentenced by military and civil courts to terms o f imprisonment in connection with the strike since 20 January. FO 371/1941, vol. 20065. MacKereth to Eden, 4 April 1936. For Shaykh Taj’s official letter o f resignation, President Abid’s reply, Martel’s letter to the new Prime Minister and the Ministerial Declaration o f the Ayyubi government, see CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 28 February 1936, vol. 476. CAD N/B, Fain to Martel, 26 February 1936, vol. 475. According to the Delegate, the atmosphere o f collective over-excitement was exacerbated by the Damascus press, ‘which is vile and in the hands o f disreputable individuals, who exploit events and who, although they were paid by Shaykh Taj al-Din, are taking advantage o f the change o f government to ask for more money . . .’ Ibid. A High Commission report (27 February), concerning Syrian youth noted: ‘The sate o f mind o f the youth is always extremely excited . . . They are no longer satisfied with official pronouncements, they have no confidence in the local government (Ata Bey is called a “Frenchman” and Mustafa Shihabi and Sa'id al-Ghazzi are “traitors”) . . . they judge the political situation for themselves and have no wish to let anyone else setde the political crisis. . . Since the beginning o f the present troubles, the means o f using the youth have hardly changed at all. What has changed is that the youth themselves are more and more convinced o f the importance o f their role, the effectiveness o f their action and that they are opeating on the front line o f the political scene, and uniquely on their own account, namely, for the glory o f Syria and not for the glory o f Jamil M aidam.’ Ibid., ‘Note’, 27 February 1936. Ibid., ‘Déclaation du Bloc Nationaliste’, 26 February 1936. The manifesto was signed by Hashim al-Atasi, in his capacity as President o f the National Bloc. The Haut Comité Méditerranéen was a sub-committee o f the French Cabinet established in 1935 to coordinate policy and administation in France’s Islamic territories, responsibility for which was divided among the Foreign, Interior and Colonial Service Ministries. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 27 February 1936. Ibid., MAE, to Martel, 27 February 1936. Ibid., ‘Note pour la Presse locale’, 28 February 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 28 February 1936; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 461. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 28 February 1936, vol. 475.

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G e n e r a l S t r i k e in S y r i a . J anuary 1936 69 CAD N/B, ‘Procès-Verbal’, 29 February 1936, vol. 476; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 29 February 1936, vol. 475. 70 Ibid. al-Atasi’s suggestion to enlarge the discussion was not the only surprise the High Commissioner received. That morning Martel found himself facing four Bloc members: al-Atasi and Dr Kayyali had been joined by Fa'iz al-Khuri and Afif Solh. 'Soon I will be in the presence o f the whole National Bloc!’, declared the High Commissioner. CA D N /B, ‘Séance du 1er M an (2ème. séance)’, 1 March 1936, vol. 476. 71 CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 1 March 1936, vol. 475. The French verbal reports o f the three sessions o f 29 February and 1 March are refreshingly detailed and once again underline the centrality o f the unity question in the French-Nationalist conflict. CAD N/B, ‘Procès-Verbal’, 1 March 1936, vol. 476. 72 Ibid., ‘Communiqué du Gouvernement Syrien’, 1 March 1936. Officially, the Bloc assisted at the talks between the High Commissioner and the Syrian government. Nevertheless, this fictional framework was laid aside at the end o f the communiqué, which was signed by the two real actors in the drama, Hashim al-Atasi, on behalf o f the Bloc, and the High Commissioner. 73 CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 1 March 1936, vol. 475. 74 Ibid., ‘Communiqué du Bloc Nationaliste’, 2 March 1936. When M. Fain observed to Hashim al-Atasi that the triumphalist tone o f the Bloc communiqué did not reflect the spirit o f the talks, the Bloc President invoked the special circumstances involved and the obligation that he and his friends found themselves in, to increase their authority over the public. Martel reported later that a public denial on my part would have risked compromising the results already obtained and reinforced the extremist opposition, which is still very strong within university circles, i.e., to sacrifice essential realities for a question o f prestige. For the moment I prefer to let the nationalists taste the joys o f triumph.’ Ibid., Martel to MAE, 6 March 1936. 75 Ibid., Martel to MAE, 8 March 1936; ibid., High Commission ‘Note’, n.d. (found in files between 10-11 March 1936]. 76 F 0 3 7 1/20065. MacKereth, 10 February 1936; ‘Martel’s solos became dissonant’ is Philip Khoury’s apt phrase (op. cit., p. 459). 77 See André François-Poncet, The Fateful Years; M em airs o f a French Am bassador in Berlin, 1931-1938, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949, pp. 188-9. Quoted in Michael Paul Zirinsky ‘France, Syria and Lebanon: The Treaties o f 1936*. Ph.D. thesis, Chapel Hill, 1976. The debate over ratification began in the French Chamber on 11 February, and continued until the vote to ratify on 27 February. Sarraut had been picked to replace Laval (25 January 1936) largely because he seemed to be the political figure who gave the least offence either to the Left or the Right. According to Shirer, Sarraut’s thoughts and energies were not concentrated, as one might have expected, on the threat o f war from Italy over the Ethiopian sanctions, or from Germany over the Rhineland, but ‘on the coming Spring elections in which all the Left parties, including the Radicals and the Communists, o f the newly formed Popular Front, were making a strong bid for victory - a prospect that sent shivers down the spines o f the solid bourgeoisie, both in Parliament and in the country’. Shirer, op. cit., p. 239. 78 The Prime Minister presided over the meeting attended by Foreign Minister Etienne Flandin, Colonial Minister Jacques Stern, General Georges representing the Minister o f War, Governor General Le Beau o f Algeria, Resident General

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79

80 81 82

83 84 85

Peyrouton o f Tunisia, Resident General Henri Fonsot o f Morocco, M . St Quentin o f the Quai d’Orsay, and Pierre Alype, the Head o f the Levant Office in Paris, representing M. de Martel. Although there is no official account o f this meeting available, it seems that Martel was instructed to 'make any concessions which might be necessary to break the deadlock . . . within the limits, o f course, o f the Mandate’. See George Samné, 'Au Haut Comité Méditerranéen, Correspondance d ’O rient, March 1936, pp. 103-3; F 0 3 7 1/20065, MacKereth, 3 March 1936; ibid., MacKereth, 31 March 1936. ‘En Syrie, M. de Martel obligé de condamner publiquement sa propre politique. Il a dû promettre le rétablissement de la Constitution et l’ouverture du Parlement.’ L'H um anité, 5 March 1936. F 0 3 7 1/20065. Ward, 1 April 1936. CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 10 Match 1936, vol. 475. Ibid., ‘Manifeste du Front Patriotique Uni’, 3 March 1936. The manifesto severely criticised three points in the 1 March agreement. First, the right to ‘pass on its views’ to the French Government did not mean that France accepted that the Delegation was invited to negotiate with her. Second, the agreement contained nothing about the extent o f the unity. Lebanon also wished to conclude a treaty with France. If it did so, the unity problem would become even more complicated. Syria would be in the presence o f a new fa it accom pli and then France could say that she was constrained by commitments made to Lebanon, just as at that moment she was holding fest to her ‘international obligations’ and ‘the terms fixed by the League o f Nations’. And third, the government stated chat it would apply the constitution. But which one?. . . that o f 1928, or the one modified by the French? These criticisms were effectively smothered by the Bloc, who underlined the ‘concessions’ it had managed to extract from the French, and orchestrated the homecoming o f the arrested heroes. Subhi Bey, as the President o f the suspended Chamber, was particularly keen that the Chamber be re-opened. Hashim al-Atasi was opposed to the idea, ostensibly because he considered it a product o f French election-rigging, and not representative o f national opinion. According to M. Fain, ‘all these ploys have the same aim: to win the leadership o f the Delegation’. Ibid., Fain to Martel, 7 March 1936. LA ’ sie Française, no. 337 (February 1936), pp. 77-8. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 11 March 1936, vol. 475. Ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 23 March 1936. The delegation took its role as plenipotentiaries o f the Syrian nation seriously and asked High Commission officials for documents concerning the most recent draft treaty, the June 1930 Anglo-Iraq treaty, the last budget o f the Common Interests, and the officers o f the back-up troops. Concerning the Common Interests budget, a subject o f vital concern to the Delegation, the Minister o f Finance (Edmond Homsi) simply removed it from his files, and asked the High Commission what to do. M. Hun told him not to hand it over. Ibid., Fain to Meyrier, 18 March 1936; ibid., Fain ‘Note’, 18 March 1936. The Delegation also requested diplomatic passports, and supported their case by citing the feet that Shaykh Taj al-Din and Emir Kazem, for their ‘personal’ trip to France the previous summer, had travelled with diplomatic passports. The High Commissioner eventually granted this request.

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G e n e r a l S t r i k e in S y r i a . J anuar y 1936

86 87 88 89 90

91

92 93 94

95 96

97

Ibid; ibid., ‘Passeports diplomatiques*, n.d. [found in files between 26-27 March 1936]. For a useful summary o f developments in Syria between 18 January-21 March 1936, see CAD N/B, ‘La Situation en Syrie’, by Commander Robert Montagne, n.d. [found in files o f 10 April 1936], vol. 481 (53-page report). George Antonius File. Antonius memorandum (Jerusalem), 8 February 1936, Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford. CAD N/B, MAE, to Meyrier, 26 March 1936, vol. 47$. CAD N /S, ‘Compte Rendu’, 28 March 1936, vol. 478. CAD N/B, MAE, to Meyrier, 2 April 1936, vol. 481; CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 6 April 1936, vol. 478. MAE/SL, ‘N ote, 19 May 1936, vol. 492. pp. 133-6; MAE/SL, 7 July 1936, vol. 493, p. 88. M. Flandin had his hands more than fiiil, dealing with the fallout o f Hider’s carefully planned initiadve o f 7 March, when the German Chancellor sent troops into the Rhineland. CAD N/B, MAE, to Meyrier, 7 April 1936, vol. 481; ibid., MAE, to Meyrier, 18 April 1936; CAD N/B, ‘La Créance’, 7 May 1936, vol. 490; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 12 May 1936, vol. 492, pp. 115-16. CA D N /B, High Commission ‘Note’, n.d., [found in files between 10-11 March 1936], vol. 475; CAD N/B, ‘Observations’, n.d., vol. 480, pp. 12-13. CAD N/B, ‘Compte-Rendu’, 24 April 1936, vol. 478. Ibid., ‘Pourparlers’, 27 April 1936. The Quai d’Orsay offor on unity (5 May 1936) ran as follows: 'The Syrian Delegation either A) accepts the maintenance o f the present constitutions and first, on the ratification o f the Franco-Syrian treaty, the High Commissioner will promulgate a decree, transferring his responsibilities (provided by decrees 3.113 and 3.114 o f 14 May 1930), to the Syrian Head o f Sure. [This was the symbolic 'link o f allegiance’.] Second, on the promulgation o f this decree, Syrian decrees «411 be promulgated, confirming M. Schocffler and Colonel Tarrit in their positions. Third, an annexe to the Franco-Syrian treaty, which will come into force at the same time as the treaty, will confirm the autonomous constitutions for the duration o f the treaty. Finally, this annexe will sure that for the duntion o f the treaty the Governors «411 be nominated in agreement with the French Government and «411 be French, as long as the security situation requires it. Or, B) the delegation refuses the maintenance o f the present autonomous constitutions, such as they are, and this refusal will lead to the pure and simple return to M. de Jouvenel’s formula.’ (Jouvenel had accepted the principle o f re-attachment, ‘if the populations freely consented to it’. For de Jouvenel, the 'populations’ meant the (pro-Mandatory) local councils.) MAE/SL, ‘Note’, 5 May 1936, vol. 492, pp. 93-8. Ibid., ‘Note de M. de Manet’, 3 June 1936, pp. 157-8. 'In Ireq, Britain, whose principal concern was to assure her imperial com­ munications - and «rho by controlling Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, controls all the desen zone - was able to content itself with fonified points West o f the Euphnres. In Syria, where French forces have a more extensive mission, and who find themselves with their backs to the sea, the Army Command considers that the security o f the military esublishment requires the control o f the zones surrounding the French troops.’ Ibid. Anicle VII: ‘The Syrian government commits itself to maintaining the permanent guarantees o f public law stipulated in the Syrian constitution in favour of

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98 99

100 101

102 103

104 105

individuals and communities, and to carrying out these guarantees hilly. Concerning the rights o f ethnic and confessional minorities and their personal sum s, it commits itself to assuring that these rights are maintained, in conformity with the general principles o f the League o f Nations concerning these matters.’ MAE/SL, vol. 487, p. 40. MAE, ‘Note de M. de Martel’, 3 June 1936, vol. 492, p. 157. ‘The most intransigent nationalists deny the existence o f the [Minority] problem; the more moderate ones declare that such confessional matters should be settled among the Arabs themselves. But in so doing, Arab nationalism assumes the problem is already solved, when in feet its evolution is still happening. If it is true, in feet, that confessional divisions among the elite are dying away, some fanaticism still exists among the masses . . . Moreover, the minority leaders declare, if not in public, then at least in private, that for a substantial period in the future, their only effective guarantee o f protection is the presence o f French troops.’ Ibid., pp. 156-7. The Quai d’Orsay later noted: ‘We cannot abandon this article because of first, the commitments we have undertaken to the minorities. Second, our assurances to the Vatican. Third, our previous declarations in Geneva and fourth, the attitude o f the Mandates Commission . . .’ CAD N /B, ‘Garanties des Minorités’, n.d. [found in files o f July 1936], vol. 480. MAE/SL, ‘Note’, 19 May 1936, vol. 492, pp. 133-6. Le Temps (11 April), published a long letter signed by Fauzi al-Atrash under the headline ‘La Question Druze’. He denied that the Druze wanted to be re-attached to Syria: ‘A la France nous demandons de continuer en notre pays la politique quelle a si heureusement menée à bien jusqu’à présent et de se conserver en Syrie deux amitiés indéfectibles et deux forteresses imprenables: le Liban à la porte de l’Orient et le Jabal Druze à la porte du désert.’ In an article on the Syrian problem, L a Dépêche Coloniale (21 April) similarly indicated its desire for France to continue her protection o f the Syrian minorities. The problem was complicated because whatever France would do in the Levant would have ‘répercussions dans tout l’Empire et principalement en Afrique du Nord.’ ‘La lutte du peuple syrien pour sa liberté’, L ’H um anité, 8 February 1936. ‘Le sang coule en Syrie!’, Le Populaire, 25 February 1936. L a Dépêche Coloniale, May 20, 1936. Blum also indicated that the policy o f the new government would not be a party policy, but rather that o f the rassemblement populaire, still, L a Dépêche Coloniale was worried enough to call on Blum to follow an imperial policy, to remember that the colonies were six hundred years old, and that many parts o f the empire had requested French protection. Jean Longuet, ‘Donnez ses libertés au peuple de Syrie!’, Le Populaire, 31 May 1936. The text o f the resolution: ‘Le 33ème congrès national du Firti socialiste S.F.I.O., conscient des espérances que la victoire du Front populaire a feit justement naître chez tous les peuples opprimés; rappelle que depuis dix ans déjà le Parti socialiste a affirmé sa volonté de voir donner au peuple de Syrie, conformément à la justice et à l’intérêt de la France elle-meme, son indépendance et son unité nationale. Le congrès confirmant ses déclarations antérieures; demande que, soit établie entre la France et la Syrie une ère d’amitié et d’alliance, dans les conditions mêmes ou l’Empire britannique l’a réalisée pour l’Iraq et que soient reconnues l’indépendance et l’unité de la Syrie, avec son admission à la S.D .N .’, Le Populaire, 2 June 1936.

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G eneral Stri ke in Syri a , J anuary 1936 106 107 108 109

110

111 112 113

114

115 116 117

MAE/SL, Atasi to Martel, 30 May 1936, vol. 492, pp. 152-3. CA D N /B, Martel to Atasi, 4 June 1936, vol. 478. Ibid., ‘Etude critique du projet français’, 11 June 1936. J. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie, Paris, 1939; Alben Hourani, Syria an d Lebanon: A P olitical Essay, London, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 168-9. Although there is no direct account o f it in the available archives, two elements o f secondary evidence suggest that this meeting was o f some significance in the subsequent development o f the negotiations. First, M. Chauvel informed M. Clerk, a member o f the British Embassy staff (following the meeting), that France had no choice, in view o f the terms o f the Mandate, but to include the Jabal Druze and Latakia regions within the Syrian Republic. France would insist, nevertheless, on ‘full safeguards’. F 0 3 7 1/20066, Clerk, Paris, 22 June 1936. Second, Marcel Hornet, a critic o f the policy o f ‘abandonment’, claimed in his book that at this meeting the French government decided that Syria and Lebanon would form two independent republics and that the Druze and Alawite regions would be re-attached to Syria while maintaining ‘a degree o f freedom’. Marcel Hornet, L ’H istoire secrète du truité franco-syrienne, Paris, Peyronnet, 1938, pp. 147-8. MAE/SL, Viénot to Atasi, 20 June 1936, vol. 492, p. 251. Ibid., N ote, 10 June 1936, pp. 173-5. CADN/B, Mgr Arida (Maronite Patriarch) to Delbos, 12 June 1936, vol. 478; ibid.. Mgr Raram (Greek-Orthodox Archbishop o f Lebanon) to Martel, 20 June 1936. CADN/B, L a Revue du L iban, ‘Mgr. Mubarak à Paris’, July 1936, vol. 478, p. 6. Mgr Mubarak later sent M. Blum a note, reconfirming his verbal request. Ibid., ‘Liban et Mandat Français’, Mubarak to Blum, n.d. CADN/B, L a Revue du Liban, July 1936, p. 5. CADN/M AE/SL, ‘Note’, 25 June 1936. vol. 493, p. 2; CAD N/B, Information’, Fauquenot to Meyrier, 1 July 1936, vol. 481. ‘It has to be said, in all impartiality: in the recent and happy evolution o f Franco-Lebanese relations, Mgr. Mubarak played the most decisive pan. His presence in Paris was providential’. Abbot Delley, La Revue du Liban, op. cit., p. 6. Which side o f the ‘borders’ debate God favoured (if either) remains debatable, in my view. The same edition o f L a Revue du Liban (pp. 8-9) also contains an open letter from Mgr Mubarak (27 May) to Léon Blum, entitled ‘The Lebanese Claims’. Following Viénot’s official message to President Edde, Manel confirmed in a lener to Atasi (27 June), that the French government did not intend to call into question the Lebanese borders. In his reply, al-Atasi (6 July) described at length the political background to the issue from an Arab nationalist perspective (‘decree o f General Gouraud was a unilateral act’) and suggested that the just and democratic solution to the question would be a free plebiscite in the disputed regions (Tripoli and the four qadhas). See MAE/SL, Atasi to Martel, 6 July 1936, vol. 493, pp. 75-8. Viénot’s response (7 July) was categorical: ‘The French government cannot call into question the Syro-Lcbancse frontiers such as they were fixed on 31 August 1920. The Syrian Delegation, in insisting on introducing into the debate a question which is exterior to the programme o f work established by the

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m in S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6

118 119

120

121 122 123

124 125

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agreement o f 1 March, would raise problems, whose evocation, by their very nature, would risk compromising the happy and rapid conclusion o f the present negotiations, which Your Excellency knows I am very keen to accomplish’. CAD N/B, Viénot to Atasi, 7 July 1936, vol. 478. MAE/SL, Minister o f National Defence and War to MAE, 1 August 1936, vol. 493, pp. 170-1; R Khoury, op. cit., p. 466. MAE/SL, ‘Telegram’, n.d., vol. 492, p. 213; ibid., 15 June 1936, p. 219; MAE/SL, Meyrier to MAE, 27 June 1936, vol. 493, pp. 13-14; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 29 June 1936, pp. 17-18; ibid., ‘Note’, 1 July 1936, pp. 29-32; ibid., 2 July 1936, pp. 36—40; ibid., ‘Note’, 24 July 1936, pp. 151—3; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 21 August 1936, pp. 193-7; MAE/SL, Meyrier to MAE, 9 September 1936, vol. 494, pp. 27-30. MAE/SL, Kinj to Blum, 8 June 1936, vol. 492, pp. 193-204; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 12 June 1936; MAE/SL, Kinj to Delbos, 24 June 1936, vol. 493, pp. 7 -9 ; ibid., Kinj to Delbos, 3 July 1936, pp. 53-7; ibid., Kinj to Delbos, 7 July, pp. 113-17; ibid., Kinj to MAE, 29 July 1936, p. 156; ibid., Viénot to Meyrier, 25 August 1936, p. 208. CAD N/B, Meyrier to MAE, 9 April 1936, vol. 481; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 3 July 1936; P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 472-5. CADN/B, Meyrier to MAE, 3 July 1936, vol. 481; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 18 July 1936. Ibid., Meyrier to Deputy Delegate, Alexandretta, 30 April 1936. M. Meyrier took over as Secretary-General o f the High Commission from M. Lagaide in March 1936. In September 1936, M. St Quentin was appointed French Ambassador to Rome and M. Lagaide became the Deputy Director o f the Africa-Levant section at the Quai d’Orsay. MAE/SL, Meyrier to MAE, 10 July 1936, vol. 493, pp. 108-11. Ibid., MAE, to Minister o f War, 4 August 1936, p. 172. On 4 July, Viénot sent Atasi a new 29-page draft text o f the treaty, including French ‘observations’ o f the Delegation’s 'Etude critique’ o f 11 June. CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 4 July 1936, vol. 478. Fifteen pages o f the draft concerned the Military convention. Talks restarted on 9 July 1936. Ibid., Atasi to Viénot, 6 July 1936, vol. 478; MAE/SL, 7 July 1936, vol. 493, p. 88. Ibid., MAE, to Minister o f War, 4 August 1936, p. 172. By 24 July the French negotiating team decided that they could not compromise any further and that it was up to the Minister to make a final decision on both issues. CAD N /B, ‘Agenda pour la Discussion’, 24 July 1936, vol. 478. ‘It is quite obvious that a solution o f this nature would have placed Lebanon, with its 750,000 inhabitants, under the complete domination o f Syria, whose population is three times that number. It was consequently put aside, but only after lengthy debates, by a protocol specifying that the questions in suspense between Syria and Lebanon would be negotiated between the two states after the Franco-Syrian treaty had been ratified. Moreover, to prevent Syria, if the case arose where the existing customs union was broken, from establishing a customs barrier in order to put Lebanon at its mercy, protocol [No.2] specified that Syria would not take any discriminatory measures, concerning Lebanon, compared to measures taken concerning any other states detached from the Ottoman Empire.’ MAE/SL, MAE, ‘Report’ (to 44 French Consulates), 15 October 1936, vol. 495,

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pp. 5-9. In this way, the French endeavoured to safeguard Lebanon’s political and economic future. ‘The status that we are proposing to maintain in the autonomous governments is, following the example o f Alexandretta, a status o f privileged provinces within the Syrian Republic.’ Ibid., Viénot to Meyrier, 2 July 1936, p. 35. CA D N /B, 'La question de l’unité’, n.d., vol. 480. CAD N/B, ‘Agenda pour la Discussion’, 24 July 1936, vol. 478. MAE/SL, MAE, to Minister o f War, 4 August 1936, vol. 493, p. 173. Ibid., Minister o f National Defence and War to MAE, 1 August 1936, pp. 170-1. CAD N/B, ‘Note’, 1 August 1936, vol. 495. MAE/SL, MAE, to Minister o f War, 4 August 1936, vol. 493, pp. 172-4. CAD N/B, Viénot to Minister o f War, 18 September 1936, vol. 478. Ibid., ‘Commentaires’, n.d.; CADN/B, Martel to Baghdad, 1 October 1936, vol. 481; ibid., Viénot to Martel, 17 October 1936. In practical terms, this French concession was not very substantial. The Quai d’Orsay reassured the Ministry o f War that a) during the transition period, the Syrian m u tasarrifwould be controlled by the High Commissioner’s Delegate and b) at the end o f the transition period, the Delegate would disappear, but French control would continue through the Administrative Counsellor, for the duration o f the treaty. MAE/SL, MAE, to Minister o f War, 4 August 1936, vol. 493, p. 174. See also MAE/SL, Martel to Atasi, n.d. [found in file around 15 September 1936), vol. 494, p. 92. Viénot’s correspondence with the Ministry o f War reveals that he had as much difficulty to persuade the latter to make concessions, as he had with the Wafd. On 7 September, for instance, the Ministry o f War again emphasised to Viénot that the Military Convention should provide for the potential maintenance o f French troops in Latakia and the Jabal Druze after the five-year period. As this was the final point o f contention, Viénot overruled this military request, and then obtained the French cabinet’s agreement to the whole treaty package. Ibid., Minister o f National Defence and War to MAE, 7 September 1936. p. 19; MAE/SL, Minister o f National Defence and War to MAE, 8 August 1936, vol. 493, p. 177; CAD N/B, Viénot to Minister o f War, 18 September 1936, vol. 478. For the complete text o f the treaty, see CAD N/B, vol. 482; ibid., vol. 478; Hourani, Syria an d Lebanon, op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 314-33. The stipulations in the treaty which were inspired by the Anglo-Iraq treaty o f 1930 are clear. First, a 25-year alliance. Second, compulsory consultation on foreign affairs. Third, diplomatic, and then military aid, in case o f war. Fourth, commitment to a French military mission. Fifth, commitment to French military equipment for the Syrian Army. Sixth, the Syrian government would only employ French technical counsellors. Seventh, the transfer to the Syrian government o f the international obligations undertaken by France on Syria’s behalf. Finally, the provision of a transitional period o f three years before the treaty came into force and Syria was admitted to the League o f Nations. MAE/SL, MAE, ‘Report’ to 44 French Consulates’, 27 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 46-8. The differences between the two treaties centred on the inclusion o f provision for the protection o f minorities, which was absent from the Anglo-Iraq treaty. I l l esc guarantees consisted o f first, the maintenance o f an extensive administrative and financial autonomy for

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the compact minorities o f Latakia and the Jabal Druze (letters no. 6). Second, the commitment o f the Syrian government toward the French gpvemment to maintain the guarantees in public law stipulated in the Syrian constitution in favour o f individuals and communities, and their promise to carry them out hilly (letters no. 5). This covered in an overall fashion the articles o f the constitution concerning equality before the law, liberty o f conscience, respect for religious interests and personal status, liberty o f thought, o f teaching, o f access to public employment and the representation o f religious minorities. Finally, the presence o f French military forces with the authority to move to wherever their presence seemed necessary. The stipulations in the treaty which guaranteed specific French interests were a) letters no. 8, concerning the respect for the financial and economic rights (previously acquired) o f French nationals, b) letters no. 9, concerning the parity o f the two currencies, c) letters no. 7 concerning French-run schools, charitable organisations and antiquities, and d) protocol no. 3, which provided for the negotiation o f a University convention. Finally, the Syrian Delegation agreed to put off until a later date negotiations concerning a judicial convention, which allowed the French to avoid making any concessions that could be used against them during the negotiations that were due to start with Egypt and Great Britain concerning the legal status that French nationals benefited from in Egypt at that time. Ibid. CAD N/B, 'Programme des mesures a prendre’, n.d. vol. 478. CAD N/B, ‘Comment fut paraphé l’accord de Paris’. 9 September 1936, vol. 483; MAE/SL, MAE, to Meyrier, 9 September 1936, vol. 494, pp. 21-2. CAD N/B, Garreau to Meyrier, 11 September 1936, vol. 491. Ibid., Viénot to Meyrier, 8 September 1936; ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 10 September 1936. For the complete texts o f President Abid’s and M. Meyrier s speeches, see Les Echos de la Ville, 11 September 1936, in CA D N /B, vol. 483. Bloc leaders spread the word: ‘respect the law, remain calm, do not demonstrate until the Wafd returns.’ Ibid., 'Information no. 3254’, 11 September 1936; ibid., 'Information no. 830’, 11 September 1936; CAD N/B, Meyrier to MAE, 14 September 1936, vol. 491; CADN/B, ‘Information no. 3300’, 14 September 1936, vol. 483; ibid., 'Information no. 3288’, 14 September 1936. They calculated that it would be difficult to stir up the enthusiasm o f the masses twice within the space o f a few weeks and decided to put all their efforts into demonstrating the solidarity o f the country and its pro-nationalist sentiment on the occasion o f the Wafd’s return. CAD N/B, Fain to Meyrier, 15 September 1936, vol. 491. Ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 14 September 1936. Ibid., Fain to Meyrier, 15 September 1936; CADN/B, ‘Information no. 524/S’, 16 September 1936, vol. 483. Ibid., Meyrier to MAE, 14 September 1936. Ibid., ‘Information no. 854’, 15 September 1936. CADN/B, Meyrier to MAE, 14 September 1936, vol. 491; ibid., Colonel Tarrit (Delegate, Suwayda) to Martel, 24 September 1936; MAE/SL, Meyrier to MAE, 18 September 1936, vol. 494, pp. 111-16. Ibid., MAE, to Meyrier, 17 September 1936, p. 102; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 6 October 1936, vol. 508; F 0 3 7 1/20066. MacKereth to Eden, 27 October 1936, p. 237. In Istanbul the Turkish interim Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Saiadjoglu Shukri Bey, informed the Delegation that whilst Turkey looked sympathetically

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at Syria’s move toward independence, the precarious situation o f the sanjaq should be the subject o f a satisfactory settlement. The Wahl refused to be drawn, and replied that they were unable to deal with international questions as they had no knowledge o f diplomatic agreements made by France. The s a y in Istanbul o f the Syrian Delegation provoked a vigorous press campaign, which was clearly inspired and controlled by the Turkish Government. The most moderate newspapers limited themselves to insisting that the rights o f the Turkish populations o f the sanjaq were spelled out and respected, within the framework o f the existing treaties; most claimed a regime o f extensive autonomy for the territory; some claimed the complete annexation by Turkey o f the A lexan d ria and Antioch region. All o f them, without exception, alleged that the large majority o f the population o f the sanjaq were o f Turkish race. CAD N/B, Lescuyer to Delbos, 1 October 1936, vol. 524. In fact, Turks numbered approximately 40 per cent o f the population o f the sanjaq. During this period o f increasing global insecurity, the French wanted a treaty o f Alliance and Friendship with Turkey, whilst the latter wanted Alexandreta - primarily, it seems, for strategic reasons. Negotiations started in November 1936, the French appeased increasing Turkish demands and in July 1939 the sanjaq, re-named the H aay, was annexed by Turkey, over the heads o f a helpless Syrian government. Syrians have never really accepted the loss o f the sanjaq. See Appendix for a brief account o f the opening round o f this contentious episode. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 3 October 1936, vol. 483; ibid.. Martel to MAE. 27 September 1936. F0371/20066. Farr to Eden, 5 October 1936, p. 96. The origins, regulations and activities (March-October 1936) o f the Steel Shirts, League o f National Action, Scouts, Syrian Popular Party and White Flag organisations are described in a High Commission Report in MAE/SL, ‘Les Chemises de Fer', n.d., vol. 495, pp. 75-130. Nationalist leaders in Damascus requested the help o f the Army (3ème. bataillon du Levant) to control the crowds. CAD N/B, Fain to General Fougire (Army Commander, Southern Syria), 25 September 1936, vol. 483. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 30 September 1936. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 19 September 1936, vol. 478. The Quai d’Orsay, in fact, was quite concerned that on its return the Wafd might ‘jeopardise everything’: “The Wafd’s authority stems from its nationalism, and from that alone. This nationalism, from the Syrian point o f view, becomes suspect as soon as it makes an agreement which does not satisfy all Syrian demands. These demands include in particular the unconditional fusion o f the Governments o f Latakia and Jabal Druze with Syria, the absorption o f Lebanon by the Syrian Sate, the abolition o f all clauses o f protection for the minorities and the liquidation o f all French companies. On all these points, the Wafd’s demands were rebuffed and the text reflects, on the contrary, the consolidation o f the present sa te o f affairs. The Wafd will be attacked on all these points. As the feelings o f the extremists correspond, in fact, with its own, the Wafd will certainly be tempted, on its return, to make declarations which adulterate the sense o f what was agreed in Paris. Any manoeuvre o f this nature . . . risks provoking . . . serious troubles among Syrian minority communities, the Alawites, the Druze and even in Lebanon itself. Concerning Lebanon, the activities o f Damascus

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militants, finding a favourable terrain among the Muslims o f the coast and taking advantage o f divisions within the Maronite community, could irremediably undermine the consolidation o f Lebanon, which is the very base o f our operations.’ MAE/SL, ‘Note’, 10 September 1936, vol. 494, pp. 49-50. Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., ‘Our supervision o f the Syrian elections, strictly speaking, is to facilitate the constitution o f a parliamentary majority which will guarantee the ratification o f the treaty. This majority must be strong and the electoral campaign must be carried out in a way that the results cannot be contested. I propose to leave the initiative to the Bloc leaders, who are completely committed to the treaty, limiting myself to damping excessive ardeurs, to avoiding too obvious exclusions, to leading the Bloc to include on their lists representadves o f the minorities, and to preventing electoral propaganda which adulterates the sense o f the Paris agreement.’ CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 19 September 1936, vol. 478. ‘Lebanon can only defend itself against Damascus’ activities if its political status and its own international vocation to sovereignty and independence have been defined and consolidated in advance.’ MAE/SL, ‘Note’, 10 September 1936, vol. 494, p. 48. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 30 September 1936, p.158. M. Schoeffler was well known for his ardent support o f continued Alawite separation from Damascus. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 4 October 1936, pp. 193-6; ibid., Quai d’Orsay ‘Note’, 27 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 50-1. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 24 October 1936, p. 37. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 6 October 1936, vol. 494, pp. 197-9. Bloc leaders proposed, for instance, that they would be ready to acknowledge the powers o f the Representative Council for the transitional period o f three years. Ibid; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 16 October 1936, vol. 490. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 21 October 1936, vol. 495, p. 22; ibid., MAE, to Martel, 22 October 1936, p. 24; ibid., ‘Note’ (Quai d’Orsay), 27 October 1936, pp. 49-56. CAD N/B, ‘Situation politique et financière de la Syrie et du Liban’, n.d. [found in files end January 1937], vol. 509. Ibid; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 31 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 73-4. CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 12 October 1936, vol. 478. Ibid. Nevertheless, concerning the forms o f re-attachment, the Druze demands were no less excessive than the Alawite: designation o f a Druze governor, with the title o f Emir, who would be the second magistrate, after the President o f the Republic; respect for individual rights; priority designation o f Druze in the local civil service (members o f the Atrash family would share the key positions, in particular the management o f financial affairs); the establishment o f a High Court and Court o f Appeal in Suwayda; the Druze squadrons would become the cavalry o f honour o f the Syrian Army. MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 30 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 61-2. Ibid., ‘Note’ (Quai d’Orsay), 27 October 1936, p. 52. ‘The normal elements in the situation are the profound mistrust o f the Druze for Damascus, their lack o f willingness to accept effective Syrian control, their clearly fixed intention to take advantage o f our departure to themselves occupy the positions presently held by

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French agents, and the ferocious rivalry which exists between the various clan chiefs, the eventual candidates for these positions.’ Ibid., pp. 52-3. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 4 December 1936, vol. 478. Decree no. 265/LR, 2 December 1936 in CAD N/B, vol. 502; CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 2 December 1936, vol. 478; ibid., Martel to MAE, 4 December 1936; CAD N/B, ‘Compte-Rendu, 1 December 1936, vol. 502. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 15 October 1936, vol. 481. Pierre Vilnot informed the League Council (27 September 1936) that out o f deference to the Syrian gov­ ernment, which would have to consider the treaty, and which had not yet been elected, the text o f the treaty and its annexes could not be published. F 0 3 7 1/20066. British Delegation (Geneva) to FO, 27 September 1936, p. 31. Before 22 October, opponents o f the treaty could only make general criticisms o f the treaty (abandonment o f Lebanon and the betrayal o f the National Pact). They also pointed to the public satisfaction expressed by the French authorities at the signing o f the treaty, which clearly proved that the Wafd had been ‘tricked’. Bloc supporters spread the rumour that the French had postponed the publica­ tion o f the treaty in order to find out the international repercussions o f the treaty, and notably Turkeys opinion, before doing so. Ibid., information no. 3725’, 12 October 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 23 October 1936. Copy o f Atasi’s declaration also in MAE/SL, vol. 495. pp. 28-33. CAD N/B, information no. 4028’, 24 October 1936, vol. 481. Leaders o f the League o f National Action now joined Zaki al-Khatib in expressing their disapproval o f the treaty. In Cairo, Dr Shahbandar expressed his opposition to the treaty, whose terms ‘confirmed his pessimism. It does not fulfil our essential claims . . .’ MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 30 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 70-2; CAD N/B, information no. 4081’, 28 October 1936, vol. 481; ibid., information no. 4080’, 28 October 1936; MAE/SL, Martel to MAE, 28 October 1936, vol. 495, pp. 58-9. Ibid., information no. 4081’, 28 October 1936. CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 23 October 1936, vol. 481 (Telegrams nos. 881-2). Copy also in MAE/SL, vol. 495, pp. 25-6. Ibid., Viènot to Martel, 27 October 1936, p. 45; CAD N/B, ‘Note de Service no. 145’, 20 October 1936, vol. 491. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 20 November 1936. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 4 December 1936. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 4 December 1936, vol. 491; CAD N/B, information no. 4772’. 3 December 1936, vol. 483. See MAE/SL, vol. 493, pp. 249-54; ibid., vol. 494, pp. 8, 208-9; ibid., vol. 495, pp. 1-2, 39. CADN/B, 'Situation politique et financière de la Syrie et du Liban’, n.d. [found in files end January 1937], vol. 509; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 20 November 1936, vol. 478. It was ratified unanimously by all 24 deputies present. One deputy. M. Mukkadam, deputy o f North Lebanon, was absent. He sent a letter to the President o f the Republic protesting against the re-attachment o f Tripoli to the Lebanese Republic. Ibid. Inspired directly by the Franco-Syrian treaty, it differed essentially in its length, military convention and clauses concerning

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minorities. Whilst the renewal o f the (25-year) Franco-Syrian treaty was ‘subject to negotiations’, the (25-year) Franco-Lebanese treaty was renewable lor another 25 years by ‘tacit agreement’. Article 5 o f the military convention fixed no limit to the duration o f the presence o f French forces (Army, Air and Navy). The particular conditions o f their presence and the collaboration between them and Lebanese forces would be worked out in periodic agreements between the two Governments. Lasdy, in Lebanon it was the Muslims, rather than the Christians, who wanted specific guarantees. The major criticisms o f Muslim representatives against the 15 years o f the Mandate concerned the predominance o f Christian elements in the administration; the financial inequality that subsisted between the Christian region o f the former autonomous Mount Lebanon and the districts with a Muslim majority that had been attached to the latter in 1920; the abuses o f administrative centralisation which some districts suffered from, like the Muslim town o f Tripoli. Detailed clauses were introduced in an annexe to the treaty, which provided for the equitable distribution o f public offices, the establishment o f financial equality and certain measures o f administrative decentralisation. CA D N /B, ‘Situation politique’, n.d., [end January 1937], vol. 509. CAD N/B, Fain to Martel, 9 December 1936, vol. 481; ibid., Martel to MAE, 9 December 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 11 December 1936. Ibid., ‘Information no. 696/S’, 17 December 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 18 December 1936. CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 5038’, 18 December 1936, vol. 483; ibid., ‘Information no. 5060’, 19 December 1936; CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 20 December 1936, vol. 491; ibid., Martel to MAE, 25 December 1936. If Atasi had waited until President Abid’s official mandate had expired, his candidature might have been under threat from Dr Shahbandar, who could have returned from exile by that time. Moreover, Atasi was not very attracted by the idea o f becoming Prime Minister until June 1937 because he considered that after six months in power, the cabinet would be ‘brûlé’. CAD N/B, Fain to Martel, 8 December 1936, vol. 481; CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 4929’, 11 December 1936, vol. 483. For the text o f both messages, see CAD N/B, ‘Traduction’, 21 December 1936, vol. 491. CAD N/B, ‘Information no. 699/S’, 21 December 1936, vol. 485. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 22 December 1936, vol. 491. The Bloc may have officially ‘come to power’, but in one symbolic incident that day, Martel reminded the Bloc who remained, in power ‘When presenting the new cabinet to me, Jamil Mardam asked me, in his usual diplomatic language, when I planned to pay a visit to the new President. I immediately cut him short and replied that I would happily fulfil this duty, after having received a visit from Hashim al-Atasi. An hour later, I was asked to fix a time, at my convenience, and the meeting was extremely cordial. But it seemed necessary to me to let it be understood from the outset that nothing has changed yet, and that in matters o f protocol, as in all other domains, the High Commissioner o f the Republic comes first.’ CAD N /B, Martel to MAE, 1 January 1937, vol. 481. CAD N/B, Martel to MAE, 22 December 1936, vol. 508. The High Commissioner purposely kept the signing a quiet, unpretentious affair in order not to irritate the Turkish Government. Ibid., Martel to MAE, 7 December 1936.

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G eneral Stri ke in Syri a , J anuary 19 36 189 For the text o f the Ministerial Declaration, see CADN/B, ‘Information no. 708/S’, 24 December 1936, vol. 485. 190 Ibid., 'Information no. 704/S’, 23 December 1936. 191 Ibid., ‘Information no. 710/S’, 27 December 1936. The treaty was ratified by 81 deputies, including those from the sanjaq o f Alexandretta. On the occasion o f the ratification o f the treaty. Messrs Del bos and Viénot received some congratulatory telegrams from Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, who signed himself ‘Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Syria*. Viénot replied (to Martel): ‘I have no objection in principle to the Syrian ministers choosing whatever they want to call themselves, provided that there is no misunderstanding as to the fundamentals. The ratification o f the Franco-Syrian treaty does not abolish the Mandate and by Article 3, the Mandatory Power is responsible for Syrian foreign affairs, until its mission has ended.’ CADN/B, Viénot to Martel, 28 December 1936, vol. 487. Viénot asked Martel to thank Jabiri for his telegram and to ‘clarify the matter appropriately*. M. Viénots telegram was later read out to the Syrian ministers by M. Fain in Damascus. Ibid. In response, Sa'dallah al-Jabiri observed to the Delegate that ‘the title o f Minister o f Foreign Affairs was chosen for reasons o f form, to take public opinion into account and also because everything has to have a beginning . . . Syrian policy is inspired by the evolution that has taken place in Iraq . . . In starting to create a Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, the government is signalling its intention to send to Paris, as soon as the treaty has been ratified by the French parliament, a Minister plenipotentiary, this step being followed by the establishment o f Syrian consulates in Egypt and Iraq.’ CAD N/B, Fain to Martel, 4 January 1937, vol. 487. A Quai d’Orsay ‘Commentary’ on the terms o f the treaty, written (around) 9 September 1936, reveals this disagreement: ‘The Syrian Delegation consider that independence has been achieved. We informed them that we could only be relieved o f our responsibilities by Geneva, and that three years were necessary’. CAD N/B, ‘Commentaires’, n.d., vol. 478.

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6 Reflections on the period,

1927-1936

Perhaps the first and most obvious observation that can be drawn from the preceding pages is the predominant and perpetual concern demonstrated by France to maintain its political control o f the region, primarily for strategic reasons. Whatever its public pronouncements to the contrary, which were numerous, ‘Hold the country* was the touchstone around which all French operational strategy revolved. The latter included, among others, the maintenance o f racial, linguistic and religious divisions within geographical Syria, to stifle the growth o f the nationalist movement; the semblance o f a liberal policy for the benefit o f Geneva as well as Paris and Damascus; the maintenance o f rural-centred electoral laws; the occasional suppression o f the press; a ‘minimal cost* policy. Such strategies were on occasion slightly modified to meet changing circumstances, but always within the framework o f overall imperial concerns. Most scholars o f the Mandate have noted that French policy often seemed to be inflexible, hesitant and reactive - as indeed it was in many ways. But why? In my view many o f the twists and turns and slow, slow, quick, quick, slow o f French policy were the inevitable outcome o f this primordial, consistent and largely undeclared quest for quasi-permanent control o f a country which had never recognised the legitimacy o f its occupation. Having announced a relatively liberal policy in August 1927, the new High Commissioner slowed the constitutional development o f the country to a snail’s pace and then rigged the 1931-2 elections in a singularly vigorous fashion, in order to produce a malleable parliament that would vote a suitably ‘responsible’ constitution, as required o f France by the League o f Nations. In Autumn 1932, when the admission o f Iraq to the League o f Nations re-focused attention in Geneva on French intentions in the territories under their Mandate, the pace and direction o f French policy was appropriately modified. To turn the situation to their advantage, rather than remain embarrassed by it, M. Ponsot was [2471

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instructed to take the treaty out o f his pocket (drafted in Paris during Summer 1931) and open negptiations with the local government. Six months later, after the resignation o f the two nationalist cabinet ministers, and further negotiations - or rather, explanation sessions — with a completely ‘moderate’ government, the High Commissioner had still failed to obtain their signature to a document which, in reality, would have simply legitimised the French position. A more vigorous approach was then applied, in the shape o f M. de Martel, who - by a judicious use o f ‘hanging tough' tactics and secret funds to wavering deputies - achieved in one month what M. Ponsot had failed to do in six. On 16 November 1933, following an uninterrupted 16-hour persuasion session that finished at three o’clock in the morning, the Syrian Prime Minister reluctandy signed on the dotted line. Such demonstrations o f the continuity o f imperial will are o f course, hardly surprising. To assume that during the early 1930s the French seriously intended to negotiate a treaty that would set the Syrians on the road to meaningful independence would be to misunderstand the mood o f the period —and the nature o f imperialism. Second, although the French set the boundaries o f the political game, they were, nevertheless, skilfully outmanoeuvred by the nationalists on a remarkable number o f occasions. Two notable examples: in August 1928, the Constituent Assembly ratified a constitution (by a show o f hands) which in effect abolished Mandatory powers and declared Syria a re-united, sovereign state. M. Ponsot had no alternative but to suspend the ‘irresponsible’ Assembly. Even more spectacular was Jamil Mardam’s manoeuvre, with Subhi Barakat’s help, in the November 1933 session, where the lion-tamer’s plans to have the treaty ratified by the parliament were blocked by Mardam’s reading in the Chamber o f a petition, signed by 43 deputies (70 per cent o f the Chamber), rejecting the treaty before it had even been discussed. M. de Martel, in similar fashion to his predecessor, suspended the Chamber, initially for four days, then for a further four months, then for a further six months and finally in November 1934, he suspended it sine die. Third, in my assessment o f M. Ponsot’s tenure, I emphasised four points, three o f which, I would argue, remained unchanged up to the end o f our period, viz. the two-track nature o f French policy, whereby the High Commissioner endeavoured to maintain French control and prestige in the region, whilst he continued in public to declare his faithfulness to [248]

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the official Mandatory policy o f progressive emancipation. Second, the underlying continuity o f overall French policy implemented by a handful o f Quai d’Orsay officials, in spite o f the large number o f short-lived French cabinets during the same period. In similar fashion, although the musical chairs continued in Paris (the premiership changed nine times between M artels arrival in Beirut and the end o f 1936), M. St Quentin remained at the Levant desk, and played a notable pan in the 1936 negotiations, alongside M. Viénot and the High Commissioner. And third, the wide consensus among the right and centre-left French politicians concerning colonial affairs. My fourth point concerned M. Ponsot’s strategy to keep the National Bloc leaders as divided as possible: enticing some to come ‘on board’, whilst excluding others. Shortly after M. de M artels arrival, however, this particular strategy was modified, pardy because o f changed circumstances, but mostly because the new High Commissioner’s approach to the nationalists was distinctly less benign than his predecessor’s. Having lost the opening round to ‘politically immature and irresponsible elements’ - a salutary baptism for the aristocratic and energetic French representative - the latter ‘hung the treaty on the wall’ and decided to put Syrian politics to sleep until he had ‘recuperated and re-organised the lost sheep’. The nationalists, all nationalists, were simply put aside. His political mission over, M. de Martel vigorously - and reasonably successfully - pushed ahead with his economic mission, with Shaykh Taj al-Din re-installed in the Sérail, until the pot boiled over at the beginning o f 1936. Far from taking the nationalists out o f the equation, however, the High Commissioner’s actions had encouraged an increasingly frustrated National Bloc - a collection o f weak and autonomous groups o f nationalists, with no arms and little finance - to draw closer together. It was M. de M artels arrest o f Fakhri Barudi and his closure o f the National Bloc offices (‘centres o f revolution) in Damascus and Aleppo which precipitated the disturbances leading to the General Strike. This brings me to my fourth main point: the French miscalculated the mood o f the nationalist leaders in early 1936 and underestimated the potential o f a rising generation o f more educated and radicalised youth to provoke significant and prolonged unrest. During the early 1930s, new political movements began to emerge in Syria in response to the gradual socio-economic and cultural changes occurring beneath the political surface. More radical than the National Bloc, these ascendant forces, o f 12491

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which the League o f National Action was the most significant, placed more emphasis on social and economic justice for the masses and on pan-Arab unity. Their role during the General Strike o f January-February 1936 was undoubtedly decisive. The presence o f a foreign ruler, o f course, enabled the National Bloc to direct popular discontent outward, away from the local structure o f power, and thus contributed to the prolongation o f the Blocs leadership. At the end o f our period, the framework o f urban notable politics, although increasingly challenged by a younger, more radical generation, remained largely unshaken. During February 1936, the High Commissioner attempted to ride out the storm with a series o f customary measures: the imposition o f maniai law and the exile o f key nationalist leaders. In a final attempt to restore order and divide the Bloc from the population, he installed a new cabinet in the Sérail, one with a nationalist tinge - to little effect. The spectre o f a potential repetition o f 1925-6 and o f recent events in Egypt, combined with a weak, centrist and stop-gap Government in Paris, led him to change tack and reopen talks with nationalist leaders, which led to the 1 March agreement. But the subsequent talks in Paris had little chance o f success because the French were initially quite unprepared to make anything except cosmetic concessions on issues o f substance, such as Syrian unity and the military occupation o f the country, primarily because o f the darkening international scene and their perennial concern not to take any action that might destabilise the French position in North Africa. An element o f flexibility on these and other issues showed by the Popular Front government, and in particular, M. Pierre Viénot, allowed - after a further eleven weeks o f tough but nevertheless more cordial negotiations - a Franco-Syrian agreement to see the light o f day. Victory (for the Syrians) o f a kind had been won, but it was a limited victory, a conditional independence. Although the French military never ‘swallowed’ the treaty,1 the French Government had ample reason to be pleased: the Republic o f Greater Lebanon had been contractually safeguarded and essential French interests in Syria had been consolidated. Moreover, the subsequent establishment o f an elected National Bloc Government in Damascus had considerable significance for the nationalist leaders, in potentially giving them a freer hand to exercise control within the country, but the French authorities still retained supreme power, and the vast majority o f the population still possessed no power at all. (250]

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Fifth, it cannot be denied that the French policy o f tight, hierarchical control at all administrative levels tended to stifle initiative and slowed down the establishment o f an efficient and dedicated Syrian administrative élite. The National Bloc government which came to power in December 1936 thus found itself (in this domain) with almost everything to create’, an immense task by any standards. Moreover, the years o f political instability produced by the French-nationalist conflict discouraged both local and foreign capital investment. Although some progress was made in developing Syria’s infrastructure - for example, its network o f communications improved - industrial growth progressed slowly.2 In other ’non-political’ domains such as Education and Health, the benefits o f the French occupation were not inconsiderable, and must obviously be taken into account in any overall assessment o f the French presence during this period.3 Sixth, during the 1930s French public opinion and gpvernment attitudes were broadly at one in assuming that the Mandated populations were simply ’not yet ready to dispense with tutelage.4 Mixed motives o f imperial self-interest and a vision o f civilising other societies’, combined with exaggerated preconceptions o f the uniqueness o f their national experience, led the French to analyse Syrian society, and more generally the ‘Orient’, from above*. In the eyes o f the French, more traditional, less modernised societies were thus considered to be less civilised than their own. Such attitudes tended to adversely colour their analysis o f Syrian society in general, and o f the nature, potential and legitimacy o f the Arab nationalist movement in particular, with negative consequences for both countries. Similar observations could also be made o f the British during this period (apart from the distincdy French mission civilisatrice factor),3who used a different set o f operational tactics, to achieve similar strategic goals in the region. Finally, the development o f French policies in Syria during our period, and in particular from 1930 onward, can only be understood against the backdrop o f an ever-worsening global crisis and a steadily declining margin o f relative military power. The student o f history must attempt to view French policies as a whole and to see the external difficulties as the Quai d’Orsay or successive French Frime Ministers saw them: as a set o f concurrent and interlocking challenges from the revisionist powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) as well as from growing nationalist movements within the empire, which in the minds o f French (2511

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leaders included the Levant. At the end o f 1926, Syria was held very firmly within the French imperial system. At the end o f 1936, whilst Syria could hail the dawn o f her independence, she nevertheless remained quite firmly, although more discieedy, held within the same system.

N o tes

1 See MAE/SL, Daladier to MAE, 20 October 1936, vol. 495, p. 20. Copy also in CADN/B, vol. 491. In this letter, Daladier declared that from information he had received from Syria, the application o f the treaty would run into serious opposition (from the Druze, Alawites, Alexandretta, conflict between the Steel Shirts and the White Badge). In the margin, St Quentin remarked: ‘In reality, this lener was imposed by General Gamclin, who has not swallowed (“pris sa part”) the treaty and is a little too hasty to declare the failure o f the treaty policy.' See also CADN/B, MAE, to Minister o f War, 30 October 1936, vol. 491. 2 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 624. 3 For a notable critique o f the Mandate see ‘The Legacy o f Equivocation’ by Jamil Mardam, written in September 1939, translated from French and quoted in Syria's Quest fo r Independence, 1939-1945 by Salma Mardam Bey, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1994, pp. IX-XXXII. 4 In a speech on 9 March 1939, M. Viénot observed: 'For the majority o f French public opinion, France “possesses” Syria. Her duty is to administer her, and to safeguard her interests there. But one does not “negotiate” with colonies. One keeps them, defends them against external attack and administers them. And that’s all. In effect, for the majority o f Frenchmen, our m andate in Syria is hardly anything but a fiction. Our duty is to hold on to what we possess, and a setdemcnt o f the kind that we have been led to envisage seems - and the word has been used - to be a kind o f treason.’ Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie, Paris, March 1939, p. 13. 5 ‘Because o f his Latin origins the Frenchman always feels himself something o f a missionary. He must teach the world, or show it what he believes to be the truth, his truth.’ Robert Montagne, ‘French Policy in North Africa and in Syria’, InternationalA ffairs, March 1937, p. 265.

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7 Aftermath: deception and deliverance,

1936-1946 O What a tangled web we weave. When first we practise to deceive! Sir Walter Scott, M ention, canto 6, at. 17.

France was dismissed from the Middle East in 1945, a mere decade after she had stabilised her position in the region by treaties with Syria and Lebanon. It was a tumultuous decade, which saw the refusal o f successive French governments to ratify the treaties, the decapitation o f the French Empire, de Gaulle’s crusade to restore France’s honour and grandeur, the Anglo-Free French invasion o f Vichy Levant - followed by four years o f Anglo-French discord, skilfully exploited by Syrian and Lebanese nationalist leaders - and ultimately complete independence in 1945 for both Levant States. Although some French archives (post-1936) are still inaccessible, the main threads o f French decision-making during the final decade o f Frances occupation o f Syria are clearly discernible.1 The optimism generated in Damascus by the ratification o f the treaty in December 1936 was soon dissipated as the new nationalist government found itself confronted with a bewildering combination o f political, social and economic issues to resolve, and precious few means at its disposal. First, there were the Turkish governments overtures to the French to deeply disturb the Syrians. They had almost no power to influence any arrangement that the two regional powers might make concerning the future o f the sanjaq. Ultimate power remained in French hands, and the mandatory administration was still firmly entrenched throughout the Levant, whatever had been signed in Paris and Damascus. Second, the treaty negptiations and the establishment o f a truly nationalist government in Damascus renewed the drive for minority separatism [253]

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in the Jabal Druze and Latakia. And in the remote Jazira, Kurdish tribes and Christian tribesmen, secretly encouraged by French officials, agitated against interference by ‘Damascus’ in their affairs. Third, the rebellion in Palestine was a hot potato for the Bloc, caught as they were between a combination o f pan-Arab forces and the merchants o f Damascus (important Bloc supporters), who wanted the disturbances in Palestine curtailed. Fourth, the sluggish Syrian economy demanded Bloc attention. The Popular Fronts fateful decision in the last days o f September to devalue the French franc after nearly a decade o f relative stability, led almost immediately to steep price rises on nearly all commodities. By the end o f 1936 the cost o f living index in Syria had risen by at least 30 per cent.2The economy was a major headache for Mardams government, as it was for the equally fragile Blum government in Paris. But ultimately the Bloc governments credibility rested on the ratification o f the treaty by the French parliament, and this was never a foregone conclusion. The Quai d’Orsay - its eyes focused on Berlin, Rome and the security o f the eastern Mediterranean - firmly placed the possibility o f a Franco-Turkish alliance ahead o f any desire to make progress in Franco-Syrian relations, and the Blum coalition government, beset on all sides by chronic political, social and economic problems within France, as well as the uncertain international scene, had little inclination to disregard the Q uais recommendations to put the treaty on the shelf. Its ratification became a (secret) bargaining chip in Franco-Turkish relations from the end o f 1936.3 The opponents o f the treaty were thus given time to build a case against it, and when Blum fell from power in June 1937, the colonial party launched a press campaign (in newspapers like République and Paris-Soir) against the alleged sell-out’. Led by a coalition o f rightist politicians, the military party, and special financial and cultural interest groups, and quietly supported by some permanent officials o f the Quai d’Orsay, this campaign opposed the treaty on several grounds: it reflected French vacillation and weakness abroad (possible repercussions in North Africa), prevented France from recovering her investments in Syria and dissolved the protection system the French had established for the religious minorities. Articles in the French press played on the sympathies o f the French public by asserting that the treaty would severely jeopardise France’s pre-eminent cultural position in the Levant. Books were published like those by Jérôme and Jean Tharaud, Alerte en Syrie!, and 1254]

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Marcel Hornet, L'Histoire secrète du traité Franco-Syrien, and articles appeared continually in the press. The colonial party was naturally pleased by the political shift to the right that occurred with the formation o f a new French government in 1937 headed by the radical socialist Edouard Daladier, and in particular by its commitment to the Empire. The Radical-Socialists vowed to 'defend (Frances) menaced colonial empire, the security o f French territory (and) French communications in the Mediterranean’.4 There was growing fear in French foreign policy circles, even among liberals, that because o f growing tensions in Europe, France should take no steps that might upset her position in the eastern Mediterranean. Debates were staged in Parliament over the nature o f the minorities in Syria, and Syrian minority leaders who opposed the treaty’s provisions for Syrian unity were invited to Paris to publicise their opposition; Cardinal Tappouni o f Aleppo, the head o f the Syrian-Catholic church, was an especially effective critic. To allay French fears, especially in the wake o f violence against Christians in the Jazira and Cardinal Tappouni’s visit to the Vatican and to Paris, Mardam agreed to negotiate on those issues which required greater elaboration. His visit to Paris in November 1937 resulted on 11 December in an exchange o f letters with M. de Tessan, the Under­ secretary o f State at the Foreign Ministry, providing an additional Syrian guarantee for minority rights, and affirming that Syria would rely on French technical cooperation for the organisation o f her public services. Such concessions by the Syrian Prime Minister aroused great opposition in Damascus. The entrance o f Turkish troops into the sanjaq (30 May 1937) was a deeply humiliating experience that the Syrian government, deliberately excluded from the Franco-Turkish negotiations, could do nothing to avert: passionate protests in the Syrian parliament altered nothing. The Armée du Levant prepared to retreat southwards, the Troupes Spéciales and the gendarmerie remained firmly under French command, and Ankara pondered its next move. Shukri al-Quwwatli’s resignation from the cabinet in February 1938, incessant attacks from a recently amnestied Dr Shahbandar, continued disturbances in Jazira, heightened tensions between National Bloc representatives and separatists in the Jabal Druze and Latakia, the growth o f strong pan-Arab sentiment in support o f the revolt in Palestine, and renewed disagreement with the Lebanese government over the Common Interests all combined to paralyse the Bloc government. Meanwhile, with the degeneration o f 12551

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the international situation, anti-treaty forces in France stepped up their campaign to protect her position in the eastern Mediterranean. Under heavy pressure, Jamil M aidam made one last effort to save his hard-won treaty. In August 1938 he returned to Paris to spend the next three months negotiating new arrangements that were intended to allay the French government’s apprehensions. He was still in Paris when the Quai d’Orsay announced (22 October) that Gabriel Puaux would replace Martel as High Commissioner. This unexpected development seemed to indicate a reversal o f French policy and the placement o f the treaty on the ‘scrap heap’. Nevertheless, on 14 November, Mardam and M. Bonnet, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, signed an agreement which, in addition to reaffirming the exchanges o f 1937, promised to renew the Banque de Syrie privileges, permit oil exploration, guarantee the place o f the French language in the Syrian educational system and a permanent cadre o f French officials in Syria, and ensure the rights o f minorities, in particular Christians. From its side, the French government now agreed to 30 September 1939 as the date when the treaty would go into effect and promised to submit it for ratification to parliament.5 But even before Jamil Mardam arrived back in Syria, the foreign affairs committees o f both houses o f the French parliament expressed serious doubts about the treaty (14 December), even with its modifica­ tions, and the Foreign Minister himself declared that his government did not want the treaty presented to Parliament at the present time’.6 Another broken promise. A fortnight later, the Syrian Chamber rejected the terms o f all agreements signed by Mardam after the original treaty o f 1936. By the end o f 1938, the writing was on the wall - for the treaty and for Mardam. Despite all the internal criticism he had faced, the separatist movements he had failed to suppress, the loss o f the sanjaq, his reluctance to become involved in Palestine, and the stagnant Syrian economy, his political credibility hinged ultimately on the treaty. This the French parliament refused to ratify, even with the considerable concessions agreed to by Mardam; and the Syrian parliament refused to accept any o f the compromises Mardam had conceded to France in 1937 and 1938. Mardam and his cabinet resigned in February 1939. The treaty, throttled by a combination o f French military, financial and cultural lobbies, was finally sacrificed on the altar o f French strategic concerns, as the Great Powers once again girded themselves for the unthinkable. [256]

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Puaux’s appointment around the time o f the treaty’s collapse thus signalled a resurgence o f French authority in Syria. With a mandate to re-impose French direct control in the Levant, the 56-year-old career diplomat announced his arrival with a radio broadcast from Beirut reminiscent o f Gouraud and Catroux’s insulting ’civilisez-vous’ rhetoric o f a previous decade: France has received from the civilised world the mission to establish order and justice in these countries. It possesses all the means to accom plish this mission . . . ’

Not surprisingly, the new High Commissioner received a hostile reception in Damascus, which he described as ’a cleverly staged frigidity . . . Not a living soul was to be seen in the streets. It seemed to me that I was leading a cavalry charge against an invisible enemy.’* He then set about abolishing, step by step, the fragile parliamentary system in Damascus. The new cabinet, headed by Lucfi al-Haffar, was composed almost entirely o f Bloc members. But it lasted barely a month, its resignation precipitated by demonstrations opposing its willingness to compromise with the French over the personal status law. President Atasi then appointed Nasuhi al-Bukhari to head a neutral (non-Bloc) government - but it fared no better. On 20 April, five leading nationalists resigned from the Bloc, Mardam announced his retirement from public life and the leadership o f the Bloc passed to a directorate o f three: Shukri al-Quwwadi, Luth al-Haffar and Ahmad al-Lahham. M. Puaux returned from a visit to Paris on 10 May and delivered another radio broadcast from Beirut. His government was willing, he announced, to resume negotiations based on the terms o f the 1936 treaty, as amended in November 1938, provided that there were satisfactory reassurances for safeguarding the vital interests o f both countries and especially the Syrian minorities. The Bukhari cabinet immediately resigned in protest. In early July M. Puaux informed parliament that its mandate was finished and issued four decrees suspending the Syrian constitution, dissolving parliament, placing the administration in the hands o f a Directorate (pro-French figurehead, Bahij al-Khatib), increasing local autonomy in the Druze and Alawite regions, and instituting direct French control in the Jazira. Faced with this fa it accompli, President (257)

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Atasi had no choice but to resign. The political cycle had gone hill circle. French policy had gone back to the point where it was on the eve o f the General Strike o f 1936 and the enfeebled National Bloc was back on the political sidelines less than three years after taking office. Out o f government and out o f power, the nationalist leadership seemed exhausted and politically bankrupt. Eight weeks later Europe was at war.9 In Syria and Lebanon the French authorities proclaimed martial law; strict censorship o f the press and other communications was imposed; political ‘subversives' were rounded up. The French closed down the Syrian Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Arab Club, and Fakhri al-Barudi’s Bureau for National Propaganda, as well as imprisoning Axis sympathisers and the leadership o f the League o f National Action. Although most members o f the National Bloc and D r Shahbandar’s Party were spared, they stepped up their harassment o f nationalist leaders. Dr Shahbandars assassination at the end o f June 1940 and the subsequent trial o f his assailants was the political event o f that year in Syria. What made the trial so sensational was that among those charged with complicity were Jamil Mardam, Luth al-Haffar, and Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri, all o f whom avoided arrest by fleeing to Iraq. Their departure from Syria weakened nationalist ranks even further, which suited French purposes. With Mardam, Jabiri, and Haffar in exile, Shukri al-Quwwatli was able, at long last, to make his bid for the leadership o f the national independence movement. Despite his apparent pro-Axis sympathies, which in fact were ‘opportunist’ not ideological, he did not refrain from attacking the Vichy authorities. His first serious opportunity came at the end o f February 1941 when a sudden shortage o f bread led to a sharp price rise and long bread lines in Damascus. At Quwwatli’s behest, the Bloc launched a shopkeepers’ strike in Damascus on 28 February, which soon spread to Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Dayr al-Zur. Marked by violence, French repression, and a number o f deaths, it lasted until early April, when the new High Commissioner Admiral Dentz, agreed to replace the Council o f Directors by one with legislative powers and control over the Département de Ravitaillement. Khalid al-Azm was appointed to head the new council. He was a prominent landowner and industrialist from the pre-eminent family o f Damascus. Azm’s appointment marked the re-emergence o f the Bloc with Quwwatli at its helm.10 1258]

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In July 1940 the French authorities in the Levant had reluctantly accepted the armistice and become neutral towards their British neigh­ bours. This suited the British, who were increasingly hard-pressed as war spread through the Mediterranean to the Middle East. The Italians were checked in Cyrenaica, but by May 1941 the Germans had overrun Greece and subjected British forces to a Balkan Dunkirk. As Britain’s position in the Mediterranean deteriorated, the possibility o f an Italian Syria now receded before that o f a German one, and meanwhile the Levant States remained in the uncertain hands o f Vichy. In British calculations they had to be secured somehow. The Free French were even more anxious to control Syria and Lebanon. The fundamentalist Gaullist attitude was that despite the defeat o f metropolitan France, the battle must be pursued by ‘Overseas France’. De Gaulle wanted ‘the reappearance o f our [French] armies on the battlefields, the return o f our territories to belligerence . . . to bring our sovereignty out from disaster’." Simply to provide British auxiliaries was unthinkable. In pursuit o f this vision, de Gaulle made his bid for Overseas France, gaining equatorial Africa and being denied West Africa, North Africa, the Levant and other territories. In this all-consuming quest, distinctions between colonies, protectorates and mandates became irrelevant. From September 1940 Gaullist attention was drawn towards the Levant, where hope still glimmered. If only its Frenchmen could be won over, Free France would be a substantial force with its own Mediterranean base. It would have a practical strength not enjoyed by governments-in-exile in London, and a distinct identity. Above all, it would have a solid fighting force in the Armée du Levant, 70,000 strong in June 1940. If de Gaulle could prevail over Vichy in the realm o f loyalties, this army could be the nucleus o f a formidable Free France. In the mind o f de Gaulle, these considerations mingled with more Machiavellian anxieties, including his ancestral suspicions o f British perfidy. Moreover, Dentz was already in trouble with the resurgent nationalists. Worse still, the Vichy regime seemed to be allowing the Nazis freely to confront Arab leaders with the ignominious paradox o f being ruled by a defeated France. If this state o f affairs continued, it could only be a matter o f time before France was evicted from the Levant altogether. Thus de Gaulle longed to reach Beirut and Damascus, stop the ‘rot’, patch up the French image and reassert France’s ‘historic mission [259]

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in the Levant. If all could be lost by doing nothing, the Allies had litde to lose by a bold gamble. From the earliest conceptions o f a possible joint venture in the Levant, British and Free French leaders never enjoyed unanimity o f motivation or objective. But in order to gain the Levant they would need each other. As the British Ambassador in Cairo later expressed it, Syria was a most valuable prize. If we could rally it to Free France we should at a stroke establish land connection with Turkey, obtain control of a breeding ground of Axis intrigue in the Arab world and give an impetus to the Free French who would obtain some troops and material. This to my mind remains the best solution to work for. We cannot occupy Syria for ourselves even for the duration of the war without appearing to break our pledge that we have no designs on French Colonial territory — 12 It was in this spirit that the British first responded to Free French schemes to acquire the Levant by one means or another. This project began in earnest when the ranking Free Frenchman, General Georges Catroux, arrived in Cairo at the end o f September 1940, where he found the British authorities sympathetic. To begin with, this former Governor-General o f Damascus and an old Islamic hand, thought o f inspiring a coup, or inducing a massive desertion o f Vichy troops across the Palestinian border. But the stony lack o f response from the Vichy French authorities forced Catroux to consider other tactics. He then came forward with a most fateful suggestion, destined to open a Pandora’s box o f political troubles: the Vichy authorities might be overthrown if Anglo-Free French pressure coincided with an anti-Vichy revolt. This could be fomented by promising the Arabs independence, fashioned on the Egyptian model. The perplexed Foreign Office warmly responded to this proposal. At a time when goodwill was so badly needed, the British could hardly afford to show indifference to Arab aspirations. But how to be seen to meet Arab aspirations without prejudice to first, the French position in the Levant and second, the future o f Anglo-French relations? From this point there gradually evolved two controversial and unhappy policies: British identification with any Free French pledge o f Syrian independence, and the idea o f British personnel making preparatory overtures to various [260]

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Syrians.11 These ideas were later interpreted by the Free French as the thin end o f the wedge which levered France out o f the Levant. Events in Iraq revived Free French hopes when a coup d’état swept the nationalist Rashid Ali al-Gaylani back into power on 3 April 1941, at the head o f a ’Government o f National Defence’. The deposition o f the pro-British Regent, Abd ul-Illah, caused intense excitement among large sections o f the Syrian population. Students were particularly stirred: some led demonstrations o f support for Rashid Ali in the major towns. Meanwhile others, mainly members o f the League o f National Action and Arab Club, volunteered to go to Iraq to join the struggle against British imperialism. However, with insufficient Axis support, Rashid Ali s venture collapsed. A hastily assembled Anglo-Arab column (Habfbrce), crossed 500 miles o f desert from Palestine, to relieve Habbaniya, and to fight its way to Baghdad by the end o f May when, as Churchill put it, ’a friendly government’ was duly installed.14 Both Britain and the Axis had been caught o ff balance by the coup and when the Vichy administration in Syria and Lebanon offered the Axis Powers air bases and other facilities to assist Rashid Ali’s movement, Britain, in cooperation with the Free French, decided to act. In Cairo, as in London, the military decision to invade the Levant raised urgent questions about the future political status o f the Levant. There was, o f course, a standing agreement to implement Catrouxs appeal to Levantine nationalism if the circumstances were favourable. Yet nobody asked whether the Catroux card should still be played amidst such altered circumstances. It was, after all, the desperate invention o f a man without an invasion force, who had hoped to precipitate an anti-Vichy coup. Such hopes had been dashed, and there was now to be a largely British invasion force. Nevertheless, Catrouxs independence pledge was simply detached from its raison d ’être and taken up in the context o f appeasing Arab aspirations, i.e., sapping any internal resistance to the joint occupation. Unfortunately, both Catroux and the British failed to see that its major achievement would be to saddle the Free French with a promise they did not plan to keep. His proclamation included the statement: I have com e to terminate the m andatory regime and proclaim you free and independent. You are henceforth sovereign and independent peo ples. . . Your independent and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a treaty which will also define our reciprocal relations . .

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The British initially proposed to endorse Catrouxs proclamation in a joint statement which would disavow any British ambitions in the Levant other than the war effort itself - an understandable diplomatic ploy, given that she was the major colonial power in the Middle East and currendy suppressing an Arab revolt. Technically, the Free French were rebels, their movement was unconstitutional, their numbers minimal, and their authority to act in the name o f France was purely a Gaullist act o f faith. Once British forces entered the Levant to the tune o f Catrouxs pledge, serious Arab resentment would be focused on Britain if the Free French did not produce a new deal for the Levant. None o f this cut any ice with de Gaulle, who flady rejected the idea o f a joint proclamation. He viewed the British proposal as a sudden and sinister intrusion, and reacted strongly. ‘Hardly had the decision to gp into Syria been taken when already the British let their intendons be seen . . . the word o f France had no need o f a foreign guarantee . . If de Gaulle was hoping that any such shots across British bows would give him a free hand in Syria, he was soon disillusioned. It was unrealistic, to put it mildly, to assert that the word o f France needed no guarantee in the Levant after the dishonourable French burial o f the 1936 treaty and her abandoning o f Alexandretta. In any case, de Gaulle was begging the question on ‘the word o f France*: he lacked any constitutional authority (or desire) to sign away a square metre o f French territory. Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s veto forced the British to prepare a separate public statement endorsing Catrouxs proclamation and denying any ambitions in the Levant. At dawn on 8 June 1941, Australian troops advanced in two columns into Lebanon, Indian and Free French troops moved into Syria, and Catrouxs proclamation was dropped in leaflets on both countries from the air. In spite o f appeals by Catroux, the Armée du Levant put up a fierce resistance, and fighting between Gaullist and Pétainist was particularly brutal and bitter. By July Dentz had lost 6,000 men and most o f his aircraft. On 12 July his envoys approached the British for an armistice, which was signed at Acre on 14 July between the Allied Command and Vichy authorities. The document contained no reference at all to the Free French, and Catroux was not allowed to sign it. Vichys local auxiliaries, the Troupes Spéciales, were handed over to the British, along with all surviving equipment. There was no mention o f the mandate or o f independence. Finally, the Allied Commander, General [262]

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‘Jumbo* Wilson signed a secret protocol which secured the repatriation o f Vichy troops and specifically denied Catroux the means to recruit them. The Armée du Levant would simply disappear. The convention ‘amounted to a pure and simple transference o f Syria and Lebanon to the British’, and confirmed de Gaulle’s deepest suspicions o f British perfidy. At Acre Britain failed to carry out a solemn agreement with a junior ally. In the ensuing uproar, Churchill and de Gaulle embarked on a famous feud, and the Levant problem entered a bitter new phase.17 The Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements o f 25 July, following de Gaulle’s fulminations in Cairo, recovered some o f the Free French position in the Levant - on paper. The new British Minister o f State in the Middle East informed de Gaulle that Great Britain has no interest in Syria and Lebanon, except to win the war . . . Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and Lebanon over any other European Power. It is in this spirit that we have always acted." De Gaulle told his London committee I concluded. . . an arrangement with Lyttelton [who] is writing me a letter recognising our entire sovereignty over the Levant States." In spite o f the 1941 proclamation promising independence, Britain agreed that the Free French should continue to control all the adminis­ trative levers in the Levant States, including the Troupes Spéciales, while Britain ensured the region’s overall military security. De Gaulle issued decrees declaring Catroux ‘Commander-in-Chief o f Levant’. Catroux was instructed to assume ‘all powers exercised hitherto by French High Commissioner for Levant and all responsibilities incumbent upon him . . . the mandate conferred on France . . . must be carried out to its conclusion and the work o f France must go on’.20 According to de Gaulle, France had regained ‘sovereign power* in the Levant through the medium o f the Free French, and the British Army was therefore a mere guest in an Allied territory. Churchill reacted vigorously. ‘The French’, he told Eden, [263]

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should be given a certain prominence, to showthat French interests in Syria are safeguarded . . . and that we have no desire to supplant France . . . However, all this is but one to four or five in our Syrian policy, which remains the independence of Syria and all its peoples. No French policy which conflicts with this major decision can be accepted. It is therefore for de Gaulle. . . to make the same kind of arrangements with Syria as we made in the case of Iraq.. .2I Churchill, who expected such negotiations to be ‘pressed earnestly and swiftly to a conclusion’, underestimated the Levant nationalists. Moreover, to support both the aspirations o f the Syrians and the privileged French position was illogical, for the deepest Syrian aspiration was to get rid o f the French. The fatal flaw in Churchill’s thinking was his inability to see beyond the analogy o f Iraq, despite the recent events there. His idea o f independence in the Middle East was based on the Anglo-Iraq Treaty o f 1930, which gave the European power a continuation o f special influence in the territory o f its former Mandate. This definition o f independence had now had its day. Churchill simply failed to comprehend (until 1945) that the Syrians themselves were no longer prepared to accept the limited independence o f an Iraq or an Egypt. The platitudes o f British policy in the Levant were therefore contradictory: Syria was supposed to be independent but the French must retain privileges which were anathema to the Syrians; and Britain had no imperial ambitions, but then again she did, for she must sponsor a Franco-Syrian deal in such a way as to satisfy Arab leaders in her own Muslim empire. Satisfying the Arab world was a purely British aim in the Levant, unblushingly imposed upon Free France.22 Even before the guns fell silent in the Levant, de Gaulle and Catroux arrived in Damascus and immediately contacted Mardam and other senior Bloc members. Cordial discussions ensued. Talks between Catroux and the Bloc continued throughout July, and de Gaulle himself returned to Syria at the end o f July, where he had several meetings with Mardam, Hashim al-Atasi and others. On 29 July he delivered a speech at the University o f Damascus at which all the leading nationalists were present. In his speech de Gaulle reconfirmed ‘that it was time for France, in agreement with you, to put an end to the regime o f the Mandate, M de traiter avec vous”’.23 De Gaulle’s desire to pursue cordial negotiations with the Bloc was to a large extent influenced by his own weak position, and by his suspicions o f the British. The Allied invasion had shifted the [264]

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balance o f power in Syria. Britain was already in contrpl o f Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Egypt. The massive British military presence in Syria and Lebanon, introduced through the invasion, clinched Britain’s predominance for just as at the end o f World War I, Britain’s physical presence in the Arab East dwarfed France’s, reawakening the fear that Britain intended to ease France out o f the region altogether. Moreover, de Gaulle knew that for several months before the invasion, Britain had been secretly preparing contingency plans with Turkey to occupy Syria. Before leaving Syria at the end o f July, de Gaulle instructed Catroux to pursue the conversations with Maidam and al-Atasi. The Bloc presented Catroux with a programme d'action for the effective realisation o f Syrian independence, and Catroux subsequently invited Mardam to assume the office o f Chef d’Etat. Mardam said that before he could give an answer, he would first have to know all the terms and conditions attached to such an office. To this end he proposed that he should draft the letters that would be exchanged between the two parties. In his draft o f Catroux’s letter to himself, the general was to reaffirm the immediate restoration o f the full independence and sovereignty o f Syria, which will be able to proceed immediately with organising its foreign representation and a national army’.24 Mardams conditions were not acceptable to either Catroux or the British. Catroux then tried to pursuade Hashim al-Atasi to form a government on the basis o f the status quo ante, i.e., the regime o f the 1936 treaty. But Atasi refused and Catroux was forced to turn to the ever-resilient Shaykh Taj al-Din al-Hasani, who assumed the Presidency on 16 September 1941 by an exchange o f letters with Catroux. No appointment could have angered veteran nationalists more. Catroux’s letter merely reiterated his independence proclamation o f June 8 and invited Shaykh Taj to accept the office o f President and to form a government. It contained no specific commitments regarding the implementation o f independence for Syria. Jamil Mardam, Shukri al-Quwwatli and other nationalist leaders were left in no doubt that the Free French, who had unambiguously put the Mandate clock back to the early 1930s, intended to maintain a very firm grip on affairs until a new Franco-Syrian treaty was signed.” By installing a figurehead republic in Syria, Catroux coolly side­ stepped the whole question o f independence negotiations, and presented the British with a fa it accompli. After some minor last-minute adjustments, Catroux published his manifesto o f Syrian independence on 27 September 1265]

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1941. Two months later he finalised a similar arrangement in Lebanon whereby M. Alfred Naccache became President o f a government which was no more constitutional or independent than its Syrian twin. Nevertheless both Governments were duly recognised by Britain. The realities o f the political situation were clearer in de Gaulle’s message to the League o f Nations, which gave formal notice that he was now guardian o f the French Mandate in the Levant, and advised that Catroux has proclaimed the independence of Syria and the Lebanon [but] this does not affect the legal position resulting from the Mandate, as this position can only be modified after the war . . . Catroux continues to exercise the powers of High Commissioner.. .* This revealed the true Free French position. As de Gaulle told Churchill and Lyttelton, Catrouxs declaration o f independence, must, from the standpoint o f international law, be regarded as provisional, since the Free French movement had . . . no power to negotiate the termination o f the Mandate’.27 The period from the instalment o f Catrouxs client republics to February 1943 was marked by perpetual Anglo-Free French disputes and a swelling opposition to French control. One issue that particularly irritated the French was the British-funded wheat scheme designed ’to make the Levant self-sufficient in cereal production which they ’denounced . . . as a British bid to control the Levant by economic means’.2' Local dissatisfaction and the objections o f Egypt and Iraq, who refused to recognise Catrouxs regimes, exposed the latter to growing pressure. Major General Edward Spears, a Francophile who had initially supported the Free French cause, and then crossed swords with de Gaulle in the Levant in the summer o f 1941, returned to the Levant in early 1942 as Britain’s official representative to the new republics. By this time he had become profoundly anti-Free French and increasingly Arabophile. Spears presented himself formally to the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents, but pointedly failed to pay Catroux the official visit which the Delegate-General had a right to expect as the representative o f the French Mandate. The message was clear - he no longer recognised the Mandate. Catroux could not openly deny the premise that independence was genuine, but he had somehow to refute Spears’s conclusion. This could only be done by saying that the Mandate was still legal, which was [266]

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embarrassing, for it undermined the effect o f Catrouxs independence decrees. Spears and Catroux locked horns almost daily, while in London de Gaulle complained to Eden. Spears’s despatches to London depicted - quite accurately, in fact - a disgruntled population alienated by Catrouxs puppet regime, and claimed that French prestige was being maintained at the expense o f the war effort. He urged that elections for a more representative government should be promised by a definite date. The Foreign Office - in its perennial quest to guide French policy in channels least damaging to Britain’s regional position - began to press the reluctant Free French to announce and hold general elections in the Levant States, and meanwhile to make some immediate and substantial administrative changes. On the subject o f elections, Catrouxs resistance was subde: he never objected to general elections in principle, but fell back upon a series o f delaying tactics and red herrings, such as the implementation o f the wheat scheme — a major project involving scores o f British and French officials - and Rommel’s alarming drive towards Egypt.” In April 1942 Catroux reported to de Gaulle that the British were adamant that elections must be announced in the near future, as Egypt and Iraq had refused to recognise Catroux’s republics, and Axis propaganda was exploiting this dissent. De Gaulle reluctandy concurred, but insisted that they should be announced ’as late as possible*, in the name o f France alone. Later, however, when Casey, the British Minister in Cairo, tackled de Gaulle about elections, the latter baldly declared that ’there will be no elections this year in Syria or in Lebanon and launched into a diatribe about British interference. Rejecting the old war effort argument, de Gaulle said Britain had no legitimate role in the internal affairs o f the Levant.50 In August, de Gaulle travelled through the Levant in an effort to restore the Free French position. In Beirut he told a Franco-Lebanese audience that independence was an accomplished fact, and that the necessary treaties o f friendship were ‘tacitly signed’ by the relationship already achieved between Free France and the new republics. In the present war conditions, o f course, elections were impractical. The day would come for that, he added, and France was eager to see it dawn. Meanwhile Free France would not allow her position to be undermined. Behind the scenes he set to work to divide his critics and exploit the gaps between the various British authorities. By meeting many individuals and 12671

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adopting a variety o f attitudes, he inspired a bewildering shower o f signals between London, Cairo and Beirut, and created enough confusion to win Free France a breathing space in the Levant.51 On 14 August de Gaulle formally protested to Churchill, alleging that the British government was breaking its agreements in the Levant by constantly interfering in internal affairs. Churchill replied: We are also concerned. . . that the proclamation issued by General Catroux . . . declaring the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and promising that the Mandate should be terminated, is effectively carried out. To this we are commited in. . . the whole Arab worid.” None o f this, de Gaulle was told, violated any agreement between Free France and the British, whose chief aim was Allied victory. D e Gaulle promptly rejected this. The argument became repetitive, since de Gaulle was focusing on the fact o f British involvement, at which he boggled, while the British reiterated its reason, military necessity. . . Nevertheless, by mid-1942 de Gaulle was getting support from the Foreign Office on one vital issue - the continuing validity o f the Mandate. His many public statements on this had caused a long dispute between British officials in Cairo, who argued that Catroux’s proclamation had, ‘if words meant anything’, terminated the Mandate, and the Foreign Office, whose lawyers speciously denied any conflict between the continued validity o f the Mandate and Catrouxs declaration o f June 1941. The latter, they argued, meant ‘to start on a course which would bring the Mandate to an end, not to end the Mandate there and then’. Moreover, London admitted, such a meaning had been suggested to Catroux in 1941 as a way to avoid any later claim that the Mandate had ended. Cairo reluctantly dropped the matter. This time the pro-French elements in Britain’s contradictory Levant policy had won.53 By December 1942, according to the original Free French assurances, elected governments should have been firmly established in Syria and Lebanon. Instead, the Free French had now agreed (in principle) to hold elections in the Spring o f 1943, and had an arrangement whereby intractable disputes could be referred to an Anglo-French committee in London. De Gaulle was still toying with the idea o f recalling the dissolved Parliament o f 1939 in the hope that they could persuade it to revive the 1936 treaty, which the French National Committee in Algiers [268]

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would then immediately ratify. An (unsigned) report proposed to the Committee: The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, ratified by the nationalist majority, ensured for France all possible guarantees for maintaining its position in the Levant. Yet that Treaty was stupidly rejected by the French Chambers at the instigation of Laval and L E tat-M ajo r. .. The disappearance of Shaykh Taj al-Din offers us an unexpected opportunity to repair honourably the initial error that Fighting France made in entrusting power to discredited men. It is to Jamil Mardam Bey that it will immediately have to appeal, as well as the Secretary-General of the National Bloc, Shukri al-Quwwatli. It would be more profitable to come to an understanding with them than to keep maintaining arbitrarily a system of authority, from which British propaganda draws its best arguments to destroy our prestige in the Arab world.14 Catroux returned to Syria at the end o f January 1943, authorised by the French National Committee to re-establish constitutional regimes in the Levant. Elections were scheduled for July. Nationalist rumours that Britain had decided to back the National Bloc in the forthcoming elections infuriated the French and embarrassed the British, who denied any such involvement. During the spring Catroux held meetings with all the political figures, particularly the Bloc, with whom he hoped to come to some arrangement whereby they would commit themselves to signing a treaty. In particular, he warned them o f the dangers o f leaving Syria exposed to Zionist and Turkish ambitions. To get round the problem o f elections, Catroux then proposed to Shukri al-Quwwatli that the 1936 Parliament be reinstated and that Hashim al-Atasi resume the Presidency o f the Republic. Atasi would then appoint a moderate interim government to include several members o f the National Bloc which Parliament would approve to carry out the elections. Meanwhile, Parliament would dissolve itself. But Atasi, on behalf o f the Bloc, would be required to sign a secret agreement that would guarantee Syria’s acceptance o f a treaty with France as a necessary preliminary to the acquisition o f complete Syrian independence. Quwwatli rejected Catroux’s offer. He calculated that as long as he was in a position to organise nationalist constituencies, the Bloc would sweep the elections. An increasingly desperate Catroux then appointed Ata al-Ayyubi as Chief o f State. It would be the duty o f his (269)

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Government to prepare Syria for elections, just as it had been seven years earlier.35 In Syria, elections were held in comparative calm on 10 and 26 July: the nationalists won an overwhelming victory. Shukri al-Quwwatli became the new President and the nationalist government was full o f familiar faces: Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri (Prime Minister), Jamil Maidam (Foreign Minister), Lutfi al-Haffar (Interior), Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali (Justice), Nasuhi al-Bukhari (Education and Defence), Khalid al-Azm (Finance), Mazhar Raslan (Public Works and Ravitaillement), and Tawfiq Shamiyya (Agriculture and Commerce). The nationalists’ jubilation was tempered by the fear that any moment the French might stage a coup and overthrow the fragile structure o f national government. And with the Troupes Spéciales and the Surêté Générale still in French hands, they would certainly be able to do so. Alongside this fear lay another: that at the war’s end British troops would withdraw to be replaced by French forces, enabling France to impose a treaty on Syria. The new government moved quickly to transfer or demote ranking bureaucrats who had collaborated closely with the French and replaced them with loyalists. This was expecially noticeable in the Ministry o f Interior and the police. The Lebanese elections in September passed o ff in comparative calm. The French had worked feverishly for a favourable result, and Spears tried to block their intrigues. The outcome shocked the French - another nationalist victory. Moreover, the extra delay in the Lebanese elections, caused by the Lebanese President’s manoeuvres, upset French calculations, for the result in Syria had a dramatic effect on Lebanese opinion. An alliance o f the Muslim and Christian commercial bourgeoisie brought the two major proponents o f an independent Arab Lebanon to power: Bishara al-Khuri, generally recognised as Britain’s candidate, became President and Riyad Solh became Prime Minister. Solh, o f course, had been a founding father o f the Bloc, a Bloc fund-raiser, and its closest Lebanese ally. He also happened to be a cousin o f the Bloc politician Afif Solh and was related by marriage to Sa’dallah al-Jabiri. By 1943, the two Prime Ministers, Solh and Jabiri, realised the advantage and necessity o f presenting a united negotiating position on the principle o f complete independence for both Lebanon and Syria. Never before had the two countries adopted such a cooperative spirit and compatible political aims; never again would Lebanon be a ‘pawn to be played o ff by the French against the Syrians’. Several other factors hardened the Levant’s new (270)

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diplomatic front as well. These included Arab support, especially Egypt’s, for both nationalist regimes, and unqualified diplomatic recognition o f the new Syrian and Lebanese governments by the United States and the Soviet Union.*6 Discussions between the French and the Syrian and Lebanese governments resumed in mid-October. Both governments asked for the transfer o f all powers. The French replied that the Mandate still existed if not de facto at least de jure and that such a demand could only be met through a negotiated treaty. The Lebanese and Syrians repeated: it was not possible to sign a treaty immediately because the Committee had no legal or constitutional status. The exasperated French Delegate-General, Jean Helleu, finally declared that he was travelling shortly to Algiers, where he would submit their views to the Committee. After the talks, Mardam commented: T h e French mentality had not changed despite the m isfortunes that befell them. T hey still believe that Syria and Lebanon are their undisputed property, that the nationals o f these countries are their subjects and that the idea o f independence and sovereignty was merely a joke. W hen France returns to its former power it will renege on its prom ises as in the past.*7

Helleu reported to the Committee: I naturally told [them] that a normalisation o f relations between France and their countries can only be achieved through a treaty. They gave evasive answers. It seems that both governments are satisfied for the m om ent, and, to save face, they will ask for certain m inor concessions."

Minor concessions were not at all what the Lebanese and Syrian leaders had in mind. For its pan, the Committee affirmed that the Mandate still existed, and could only be terminated by a treaty, and expressed its readiness to ratify the 1936 treaty. In Beirut the new government rode on a wave o f popular enthu­ siasm. The Lebanese knew that the moment had come: the French were relatively feeble; Catroux had made de-colonising noises in desperation, and the British had guaranteed his pledges; the time had truly come to dismiss the Mandate irrevocably, before the French re-appeared in force and British protection faded away. When the Lebanese parliament on (271)

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8 November approved certain measures that Solh had proposed the previous month, including the adoption o f Arabic as the sole official language in Lebanon, ’the deletion horn the constitution o f all references to the prerogatives and powers o f the mandatory state’, and the end o f Lebanon’s isolation from the Arab world, this precipitated a head-on collision with the Free French, for whom it could only mean surrender or retaliation, unless the Lebanese could be persuaded to compromise. It was soon evident that they could not. On 12 October Helleu tried to tell President Khuri that Riyad Solh’s demands could not be conceded unless the Lebanese signed a treaty with the French National Committee. But Helleu was roundly told, with reference to 1936, that the Levant States had no confidence in French Government treaties, let alone those offered by Frenchmen who did not constitute a Government. Helleu withdrew to Algiers for urgent consultations. After talks with de Gaulle, Catroux and Massigli on 3 November, Helleu started back towards Lebanon. Three days later, hearing that the Chamber was about to debate the amendments to the Constitution, Helleu sent a desperate message from Cairo, stating that he was carrying new proposals and requesting an adjournment o f the feteful debate. This was rejected and the Chamber gave overwhelming support to the abolition o f the Mandate. Helleu and his advisors were infuriated. Around 4 a.m. on 11 November the blow fell. President Khuri, Prime Minister Riyad Solh and most o f the cabinet were dragged from their beds and spirited away to the Rachaya fortress near the Syrian border by Surêté agents, accompanied by French Marines and Senegalese. At 8 a.m. in a terse radio message, Helleu announced a decree dissolving the Lebanese Chamber, suspending the constitution and dismissing the Riyad Solh government. In its place, Helleu installed the pro-French Emile Eddé, Khuri s most bitter rival, as Head o f State. Many newspapers were suppressed, a curfew was announced, and French patrols took to the streets. These dramatic events set o ff a flurry o f diplomatic activity, and various capitals felt the storm o f protest which arose throughout the Arab world. Beirut shut down and on 13 November, tensions boiled over into bloody incidents. Outside the British Legation in Beirut, a body o f students was fired upon by French Marines. In Tripoli and Sidon French troops fired on demonstrators or simply mowed them down with their vehicles. In all, about 20 people were killed and another 60 wounded. Spears was besieged by delegations demanding British intervention.39 [272]

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Tensions were also mounting in the diplomatic sphere. A lively debate in the Iraqi Chamber (13 November) became anti-British as most speakers stressed that the Free French position had been established by British arms and money. Some even described the French as ‘British mercenaries’ and there were demands for an armed Iraqi intervention to forcibly expel the Gaullists. Similar noises were made by the Egyptians. Cornwallis and Lampson were hastily instructed by London to stress ‘that we stand by promises o f final independence given to Levant States and intend to see them carried out’.40 For the British, uproar in the Arab world at that time would have been acutely embarrassing. On 12 November, London requested the immediate recall o f Helleu and the release o f the Lebanese ministers. De Gaulle replied that Helleu had been forced to exercise mandatory rights in the (ace o f provocation, and Catroux was despatched to Beirut ‘with appropriate instructions’.41 Meanwhile Casey informed London that unless the French had met British demands by 17 November, or unless the British began to patrol the larger towns by that date, the situation could get ‘irrevocably out o f hand’. In Lebanon the General Strike continued. On his arrival in Beirut, Catroux emphasised to Spears that Helleu had acted entirely on his own initiative - then proceeded to Rachaya where he vainly attempted to persuade the Lebanese President that Spears and a nationalist clique were to blame for the tragic affair. The President was not persuaded, nor released. On 19 November, Casey arrived from Cairo to carry out London’s instructions, namely, a British offer to host a conference - in a neighbouring British territory - between Catroux and the Lebanese, to seek a modus vivendi until the end o f the war. If however, the British Minister added, the French failed to meet London’s demands (Helleu’s recall and the release and reinstatement o f the Lebanese) by 10 a.m. on 22 November, there would be an immediate declaration o f British martial law in the Lebanon, and the imprisoned President and Ministers would be liberated by British troops. ‘This is another Fashoda!’ declared Catroux, thunderstruck. Nevertheless, on the morning o f 22 November, the President and Ministers were released by Catroux. In Beirut large crowds bore their heroes back to Parliament, and the Riyad Solh government reinstated itself. Two days later, Catroux accepted this fa it accompli and called officially on the President and the Ministers in their offices. The immediate crisis had passed.4*' [2731

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On 27 November, during a debate in the Syrian Chamber, the Prime Minister catagoricaliy declared that Syria did not recognise the French Mandate. His governments policy was recognition o f Syrian independence by the Allies, and Syrian readiness to put its territory and communications at the disposal o f the Allied war effort. And Syria would make no treaty incompatible with ‘real independence’. These well-timed assertions, made when the French were in some disarray, were not publicly disputed by Algiers. Nevertheless, Catroux refused to revoke Helleu’s original decree against Riyad Solh’s amendments: the French still formally rejected any repudiation o f the Mandate. And when Catroux, on the eve o f his return to Algiers, gave his parting exhortation to the French community, he counselled a calculating sort o f patience. Claiming that the British had inflicted ‘a second Fashoda’ upon them, Catroux added, ‘Until France is restored, they had no alternative but to accept the present situation’.43 So it was back to traditional tactics, conceding a little now and again, waiting for a change o f circumstances. Meanwhile, Spears continued to emphasise to London that the Syrians and Lebanese were simply not prepared to consider a treaty with France. London, however, did not really trust Spears’s accounts o f the Levantine attitude, and failed to realise just how misleading the Iraq model was - and, accordingly, felt that something could still be done for the French if Britain offered to play the ‘honest broker’. Spears retorted that the Levantines would ‘merely query the adjective and reject the offer’.44 In retrospect, the Lebanese crisis o f November-December 1943 signalled the end o f the French Mandate. Syrian and Lebanese steadfastness at this critical juncture emboldened both nationalist governments to resist the persistent French demand for treaties before independence. Still, the French held one last card - the Troupes Spéciales and the Surêté Générale —with which they hoped to impose their will. Catroux returned from Algiers (19 December) with instructions from the Committee to negotiate and conclude an arrangement over the administrative powers. Three days later, it was announced in Damascus that the Syrians and Lebanese had reached an agreement with Catroux regarding the transfer o f ‘powers exercised in their name by the French authorities’. It was a definite nod o f recognition by Catroux toward Syrian political susceptibilities. Basically it meant that the Intérêts Communs, ‘together with their personnel, will be transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese States with the right o f enacting laws and regulations, as from U74]

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1 January 1944V’ But fundamentally, the Mandate issue remained unresolved. On the French side, Helleus decree was not revoked, while the Lebanese regarded the decree as ultra vim . Both parties tacitly awaited future events and forces to setde the whole status o f the Levant once and for all. Psychologically, however, the crisis had profound results. On the French side, there was a lingering sense o f defeat and humiliation, and a resentment o f 'la perfide Albion, neatly expressed in the Fashoda slogan; there was also a failure to realise that London wanted the French to retain a position in the Levant. Given the presence o f Spears, o f course, that is hardly surprising. Among most French, it was assumed that the Mandate would have to be reaffirmed later - by French troops. In Syria and Lebanon, the crisis stiffened nationalist resolve: France would henceforth have to contend with a vigorous political will in both States which dwarfed anything that the British had faced in Egypt or Iraq when their treaties were negotiated. The idea o f independence had taken root and captured the simplest imaginations throughout the Levant. This was the most profound result o f the crisis - independence had become a grassroots belief, and there could be no peaceful return to the pre-war euphemism which the French and the British Foreign Office called independence. But at the end o f 1943, neither the French nor the Foreign Office saw this.46 On the surface, 1944 was a relatively quiet year in the Levant. The war moved ever westward, Italy had surrendered, the Levant was no longer threatened, and the Middle East was now a staging-post for Allied supplies and communications. Beneath the surface, however, the Levant was seething with unsettled questions. The local gendarmerie, trying to cope with a well-armed populace, needed better weapons - but the control o f this police force, and the nature o f its weaponry, became a three-sided dispute between the Syrians, the French and the British. Likewise, the transfer o f the Troupes Spéciales was the subject o f futile representations throughout the year. During February 1944 several proposals and counter-proposals were put forward by both sides without much progress being made. The French proposal envisaged the theoretical transfer o f the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian government until the end o f hostilities, i.e. the Syrian Minister o f Defence would be designated as head o f the Troupes Spéciales, henceforth to be called Syrian National Forces, and he would then place them for the duration o f the war under [275]

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French command. Meanwhile, the existing cadre o f French officers would remain and a military mission be established, in preparation for longer-term collaboration. The Syrian counter-proposals envisaged a more comprehensive transfer. All Troupes Spéciales, together with weapons, equipment depots, barracks and other military establishments, would pass to the Syrian National Army under Syrian command with the President o f the Republic as its Commander in Chief. However, for the duration o f the war, the Syrian government would accept the participation o f its army in the defence o f Syria in accordance with the plans established by the Allied High Command and the United Nations in the Middle East. In purely practical terms, the French and Syrian positions were neither insurmountable nor intractable, but in terms o f national prestige and principle, they were miles apart. The Syrians refused to be seen as recognising French territorial command, while the French refused to be seen as ceding it.47 The Syrians and Lebanese, their governments now recognised by Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and many other states, were confident that the international community would soon ratify their independence. They therefore confined themselves to ‘putting at the disposal o f the Allies’ their territory and communications, consolidating their position and pursuing the transfer o f the gendarmerie, the Troupes Spéciales and a few less controversial services. Holding actions were even more fundamental for the French. General Beynet, the new French Delegate-General in the Levant, strove to maintain the status quo without further concessions. French procrastination over the question o f the Army was designed to gain time until France was restored and an Anglo-French agreement was forged. Mardam, now Syrian Foreign Minister, and a seasoned veteran o f negotiations with Quai d’Orsay officials since 1913, feared another agreement ‘à la Sykes-Picot’. Anglo-French talks led by Eden and Massigli were held in London on 23 August 1944. The French obtained a promise from the British that they would try to exert pressure on the Syrians to conclude a treaty. Two days later de Gaulle strode through Paris in triumph and the Allies would soon be obliged to recognise a Gaullist government. Then there would be a proper French authority ready to sign a treaty with the Levant States. Spears again warned Eden o f the extraordinary depth o f feeling in the Levant against a treaty: it would be ‘an illusion’ to believe they could be persuaded to sign one.4" Spears’s entreaties fell on deaf 1276)

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cars. The Foreign Office, where perspectives on the Levant were distorted by the Eurocentric view which made Anglo-Gaullist cooperation essential, gave Spears the strictest instructions to recommend both Levant States to conclude treaties with the French. Spears reluctantly followed Edens instructions, ‘impressing on the local governments that the conclusion o f an agreement with the French i s . . . not only the best but perhaps the sole method o f securing full and unchallenged independence’.49 On 11 September he conveyed this to the Syrian President, who replied that such a treaty was simply ‘a licence to plunder’.” The Syrian attitude revealed what Spears had always attempted to tell the Foreign Office, but the latter still refused to believe. It hastened all the blame on Spears for not conveying London’s policy in an appropriate manner. This obsession continued to blind the Foreign Office to the real attitude o f the Syrians. Spears had almost certainly expressed London’s views without visible enthusiasm, but it was nonsense to suggest - as Eden did - that this had determined the Syrian attitude.91 The French, having secured British support for the conclusion o f a treaty with Syria, renewed their pressure. General Beynet (19 September) told Shukri al-Quwwatli point blank that the independence o f Syria was conditional on its formalisation by a treaty, and that the recent talks in London had realised ‘une parfaite entente’ between the French and British governments. Al-Quwwatli emphasised that Syria was ‘resolutely hostile’ to the conclusion o f any treaty, à l ’Irak, and again asked for an answer regarding the transfer o f the Army. Beynet replied that he would have to inform Paris o f this demand, before giving a reply. Paris not informed? The Syrians were not deceived. Feelings were now running high in the Levant. With the Syrian Chamber about to reconvene, trouble was brewing. When the Arab Congress in Alexandria prominendy endorsed Lebanese independence as asserted by the Riyad Solh govern­ ment, Beynet promptly called on the Lebanese President and hinted that this might force France to consider Catroux’s independence proclamations invalid. The French again refused a further Syrian request to transfer the Troupes Spéciales, and rumours spread o f the imminent arrival o f French troop reinforcements in Beirut.92 On 24 October, the Syrians and French resumed their official talks in Damascus. Six days o f convoluted and ultimately fruitless dialogue reflected the enormous gulf between the two sides. The Free French, having established themselves in Paris, had no intention o f handing over 1277]

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the Army until the Syrian government had signed on the dotted line. Meanwhile, European priorities were being reasserted in Paris. De Gaulles government was recognised by the Allies, and Churchill was invited to Paris for Armistice Day celebrations. At 11 a.m. on 11 November, the two men drove past cheering multitudes along the Champs Elysées, which rang with Churchills name. Armistice Day had a profound effect upon Churchill, and produced a temporary thaw in his relations with de Gaulle. In talks afterwards on the Levant, the two leaders again agreed on the old Iraqi analogy, and their subordinates did not get much further. The new Foreign Minister, Bidault, said that France would carry out the independence pledge and also retain special rights in the Levant. Eden protested mildly that the arrival o f French reinforcements would be unfortunate’, and suggested a compromise over the Troupes Spéciales.” In retrospect, these conversations demonstrated a singular lack o f understanding o f realities in the Levant, where both local governments, now widely recognised internationally as sovereign states, had categorically repudiated the Mandate and rejected any idea o f a treaty. Moreover, Beynet’s statement o f 19 September (‘no treaty, no independence’) had not been withdrawn, the Troupes Spéciales had not been transferred, the gendarmerie were still not re-armed and French reinforcements were imminent. Now, however, that La Patrie was liberated and her sovereignty restored, the French were eager to demonstrate that she was once again a force to be reckoned with. For many Frenchmen in the Levant too, it was time to avenge the sense o f resentment they had nursed since the humiliation o f November 1943. For de Gaulle himself, it was time to activate the dream o f resurrecting the whole o f the French Empire. With the Syrians and Lebanese denying the concept o f French rights, and the French insisting on far more than the Arab world would tolerate, there was clearly little time left to avert an armed clash. General Spears was widely regarded in the Levant as a supporter o f Syrian and Lebanese independence - as indeed he was - and his recall in December 1944 created considerable uncertainty in nationalist circles about the continuity o f British policy in the region. When large anti-French demonstrations in Damascus in the last week o f January 1945 were countered by a visible display o f French military strength in the Syrian capital and renewed statements from Paris about France’s special rights in the Levant, Britain renewed her efforts to encourage Syrian — not French - flexibility. Churchill, on his way back from Yalta in February, [278]

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even interceded with President Quwwatli, but this came to naught. Relations between France and the Levant governments deteriorated rapidly. Throughout the Middle East, British authorities were themselves apprehensive about Londons policy. On 23 December Lord Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson, now a peer) warned the Foreign Office that it was pursuing two conflicting policies in the Middle East. It was promoting Arab unity, but on the other hand it was supporting Zionism in Palestine and Trench predominance in Syria*. Killearn argued that even lip-service to French claims might be fatal: If we allow the French to impose a treaty on the Lebanese by force we shall soon become involved in a conflict with 90 per cent of the Arab world and sooner or later we shall end up by losing the Middle East. . . All sorts of nationalist problems are boiling up in the Middle East and even without the millstones of French and Zionists around our neck we shall have quite enough to handle." A very offended Foreign Office assured itself that it was misunder­ stood, that it did have a cohesive policy for the Middle East. It repeated to Killearn its support for Arab unity, implied that no decisions had been made on Palestine, and stated that the Levant States would not be forced to sign away their independence. Admitting that de Gaulle might try to use force and that this would create a worse crisis than November 1943, London nevertheless argued that this is precisely the reason why an agreement seems to us so necessary. We have not said that the Syrians and Lebanese must concede everything. . . But they are not feeing the need for an agreement at all and do not even knowwhat the French proposals are’." The Foreign Office, in feet, had no knowledge o f the French proposals either! At a meeting between FO officials and de Gaulle’s emissary, Count Ostrorog, on that very issue, the latter had declared, ‘These things could not be hurried in the East . . . The French would wait until the Sûtes saw the need for such agreements’. Yet London continued to press the Syrians and Lebanese to meet the French on the very dubious assumption that French proposals would not involve any ‘real derogation from the Sûtes’ independence." Quwwatli and Mardam [279]

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told the new British Minister in the Levant, Terence Shone, that while they appreciated Edens concern, the ball was in the French court, and that if Britain was sincere in wishing to defuse the situation, it should instead urge the French to transfer the Troupes Spéciales, since that was the only Syrian demand.57 By the end o f 1944 Franco-Syrian relations were very tense. On 13 January 1945, Beynet tactlessly informed a visiting Saudi diplomat that Syria and Lebanon were not fit for independence, General Spears had been at the root o f all the trouble, Britain’s policy was now in line with that o f France, the improvement o f France’s position in Europe would have repercussions in Syria, the Troupes Spéciales would not be handed over as the Syrian government would use them to expel France, and that France was ready to fight if the Syrians wanted another Maysalun.5* Franco-Syrian relations were becoming distinctly bitter. Two days later, following a visit to Damascus, Sir Edward Grigg, the new Minister o f State in Cairo, informed Eden that Unless the French change their methods and manners, we shall find ourselves alone with them and completely at variance not only with the Arab world but with our principal Allies.. Shone was soon convinced that Spears had been right in maintaining that to insist on a special position for the French was no longer realistic, and his wires to London destroyed any comfort the Foreign Office may have derived from Spears’s dismissal. Shone saw that it was too late for the French in the Levant. Thus the Foreign Office found that while their bête noire had been removed and his successor’s reports showed more restraint, the Levant problem was as bad as ever. The final blow to Eden’s illusions came from Sir Edward, who reported that Shone was trying to ‘reconcile the irréconciliable’.60 On 5 February Count Ostrorog finally arrived in Damascus from Paris, to tell a surprised Mardam that although he had come specifically to discuss the prevailing crisis, he was not authorised to discuss the Troupes Spéciales. He added that General Beynet might soon return to Paris to discuss ‘pending issues’ —and would Mardam consider travelling to Paris himself, to talk to the French government? Mardam wisely refused the offer, and repeated that the Syrians had only one demand, the transfer o f the Troupes Spéciales.61 [280]

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Franco-Syrian talks were resumed officially at the end o f February. Al-Quwwadi again told Beynet that Syria wanted to take over the Troupes Spéciales in one go, rather than in stages, and that they would have to come under Syrian control, but would be placed at the disposal o f the Ninth Army until the end o f hostilities. Beynet remained non-commital: he was not authorised to make agreements without referring to his Government, and was leaving shortly for Paris to report on the talks. He promised Mardam that on his return, which would be in a fortnight, he would bring with him proposals for an agreement.6*' At the end o f April, de Gaulle told the British Ambassador in Paris that as long as British troops remained in the Levant, he was not prepared to reduce the number o f French troops there, nor would he expect to hand over the Troupes Spéciales. He intended to send in three battalions and withdraw one. He did not think there was any danger o f disorder, as the British feared - and that disorder would only occur if the British provoked it.63 Playing for time, General Beynet was still in Paris on 6 May, when a French cruiser arrived at Beirut and the first French reinforcements - around 900 Senegalese troops - began to disembark. Beynet returned to Beirut on 14 May. Three days later more French troops disembarked. On 18 May, Beynet met Syrian and Lebanese Ministers in Damascus and presented his aide-mémoire, i.e., his list o f French requirements. These included extensive commercial and cultural concessions, transport facilities, military bases, naval bases and most importantly, control o f the Troupes Spéciales for ‘as long as circumstances did not permit the full exercise o f a national command’.64 Beynet was pressing not just for a return to 1936, while more French troops were arriving in Beirut, but for the classic pre-1936 position o f unfettered French military occupation. Rejecting the French terms as ‘absolutely incompatible with. . . sovereignty and independence’, the joint Syro-Lebanese government delegation announced their refusal to negotiate under such conditions. Perfecdy conscious o f Britain’s need to retain Arab goodwill, and o f growing international support, they refused to be intimidated, leaving London the stark choice o f honouring or evading its 1941 guarantee in the event o f hostilities.64 The situation rapidly deteriorated into open conflict. On 20 May a general strike was proclaimed in Damascus and Beirut, shops closed down and anti-French demonstrations led to rioting - and a savage reaction [281]

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from French troops. A brief lull was followed by a greater explosion o f violence in Homs, Hama and Damascus. French convoys were attacked, vehicles ambushed and burned, and beleaguered French troops had to beat o ff determined assaults. In Damascus the French gradually gained the upper hand and drove their adversaries back into the cover o f public buildings, including the Syrian Parliament and police headquarters. Beynet maintained that the abscess o f Damascus had to be lanced’, and now that ‘the barrel had been broached, wine must be drunk’.66 On 29 May, Oliva-Roget, the unstable French commander in Damascus, ordered a general shelling and bombardment which resulted in terrible civilian casualties and the wrecking o f Parliament, a mosque and many houses. Anti-French feelings reached the highest level o f intensity ever known in Syria. As for the Troupes Spéciales, by 29 May, 70 per cent o f all officers and 40 per cent o f all soldiers had defected; the rest were disarmed by the French and detained in their barracks.67 All this provided publicity which the French could ill afford, for the press had a field day during the Syrian crisis. The shelling o f Damascus and the paranoia o f Oliva-Roget, who thought he detected hordes o f British agents in disguise, were the loudest o f many sensational stories, most o f which condemned the French. This discomforted French delegates at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, where the concept o f the Trusteeships was being aired as a replacement for the discredited League o f Nations Mandates. Arab delegates roundly condemned the French for contradicting their own high-sounding case for Trusteeships, and Washington handed the French a stiff request to review their Syrian activities in the light o f United Nations principles.68 Meanwhile the shelling and wild machine-gunning went on in the streets o f Damascus and other Syrian cities. French encampments were besieged, and in Dera'a - near the Jabal Druze - a Syrian force overwhelmed and captured the 500 strong French garrison. In Damascus itself, the shelling continued through the night o f 30-31 May, after a brief armistice on the afternoon o f 30 May for the evacuation o f British and American communities. And during all this time, the British Ninth Army had not moved - as even de Gaulle admits. Yet the British were now under increasing pressure to intervene. To one embarrassed British official, al-Quwwatli declared that Damascus was being destroyed because the British foiled to keep their promise. Rather than preach restraint to [282]

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the Syrians, the President added, Churchill could do better by putting an end to the French onslaught.” On 30 May Shone urged London to intervene: The French have instituted nothing short of a reign of terror in Damascus. Apart from indiscriminate shelling, their troops, black and white, are behaving like madmen, spraying the streets with machine-gun fire . . . [Syrian animosity] will inevitably increase hourly if we fail to intervene, and will surely spread throughout the . . . Middle East. I can only put this to you and implore His Majesty’s Government to allow the Commander-in-Chicf to intervene without delay.70 Given that French forces were still being defied, and in a few cases had been captured or besieged, nothing but outside intervention could have prevented further hostilities. For the British, the choice was to enforce a ceasefire throughout the Levant or to allow the French to bludgeon Syria into submission. Shone’s messages convinced the British cabinet. Churchill ordered General Paget to assume command o f all Allied troops in the Levant and oblige the French to retire to barracks. At the same time the Prime Minister sent a message to de Gaulle.71 By the evening o f 31 May, Beynet had prevailed upon Oliva-Roget to observe a ceasefire. Paget, having communicated his intentions and requests to Beynet, arrived the following day in Beirut with a formidable escort o f tanks and combat vehicles, whose gunners held firing positions as they passed French troops - an ‘outrageous military display, according to de Gaulle.72 At Beynet’s residence, Paget repeated that French troops should return to barracks, and that British troops would henceforth maintain order in Syria. No French soldier would go out into the street without his authorisation, and if any French troops opened fire, their barracks would be bombarded by the British. Beynet smoothly replied that all this was now unnecessary, and he officially declined to accept Paget’s ultimatum. Nevertheless, he concluded, British troops were free to come and go as they liked. French troops gradually retired to barracks and later moved out o f the Syrian cities to outlying encampments. British units occupied major buildings and strongpoints throughout the Levant, and took over responsibility for public order.7* With these developments, the street war in Syria gave way to a verbal war between Paris and London. De Gaulle’s theatrical press [2831

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conference on 2 June made no mention o f the appalling violence, the many hundreds o f civilian casualties, or the fact that Truman backed Churchill at a Washington press conference on 31 May. Britain’s concern for her own future in the Arab world was, o f course, paramount in the decision to intervene. Nevertheless, Churchill had kept out o f the conflict for as long as possible, and when he did move it was not just to save face with the Arabs. The French assault on Damascus - shelling an urban population, whose independence had been recognised by the Allies - was a public affront to every civilised value for which the Allies were allegedly crusading. De Gaulle endeavoured to present Oliva-Rogets behaviour as a conventional military operation, but the contemporary press did not fail to juxtapose this ruthless repression with Frances own traumatic experience under the swastika.74Two days later, at the end o f a stormy interview with the (Francophile) British Ambassador, the latter was dismissed by de Gaulle in prophetic words: ‘We are not . . . in a position to open hostilities against you . . . But you have insulted France and betrayed the West. This cannot be forgotten.75 A day later, Churchill refuted de Gaulle’s accusations in a speech in the House o f Commons. On 19 June, during a debate in the Consultative Assembly, de Gaulle alleged that Britain sought ‘to polarise upon France the hostile movements o f opinion in the Near East’, and by supporting ‘native demands that they had instigated themselves’, and by employing numerous agents, the British had sought ‘the progressive eviction o f France’.76 As the war o f words faded during the summer o f 1945, so did the last vestiges o f the Mandate. Paget’s uncompromising directives deprived the French Delegate-General o f the means to enforce French decrees. As for France’s mission civilisatrice, already tarnished by French army activities during the Great Revolt, it was well and truly buried by Oliva-Roget’s indiscriminate shelling. By July, France had finally agreed to transfer control o f the much-contested Troupes Spéciales to the Syrians and Lebanese. With Syria all but folly independent, one last step remained: the withdrawal o f all French troops from the Levant. Renewed antiFrench protests in the towns o f Syria and Lebanon, regional and international pressure from the Arab League and the United Nations, and from Washington and Moscow, and, above all, Anglo-French discussions throughout the summer, autumn and winter o f 1945-6 brought by spring a complete withdrawal o f French (and British) troops and other

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military personnel from Syrian territory. By the end o f August 1946, Lebanon was also cleared o f a French military presence.77 The Anglo-French clash in the Levant and the subsequent destruction o f the French position has given rise to considerable controversy. In essence, most Francophiles have argued that one ruthless man, Major General Sir E. Spears, exploited the temporary British advantage in the Levant to destroy the French position. De Gaulle and his supporters, while attacking Spears, go further. In their view, British policy was ultimately to replace France at Damascus and Beirut, and Spears simply - and efficiently - carried out Churchills perfidious objective, i.e., to secure Arab goodwill at the expense o f the French Mandates. Arabophiles generally hold the view that French feudal behaviour, not British machinations, were to blame. There are, in fact, varying degrees o f truth in all three positions. Although the Foreign Office clearly wanted the French to retain a privileged position - o f some sort - in the Levant, Kirkbride and Glubb Pasha undoubtedly carried out anti-French propaganda in an effort to win the active support o f the Druze and desert tribes for the joint occupation in 1941.71As for Spears, his dual functions - liaison with the Free French and relations with the Syrians and Lebanese - became one more awkward factor in the whole affair. Given the circumstances, both functions were bound to collide continually. Moreover, his personal decision to encourage the Levant States (which he did) and actively undermine Catroux’s endeavours (which he undoubtedly did) to preserve French control has sometimes obscured the fact that no neutral ground existed. Had his priorities gone the other way he would have been similarly slated for harming Anglo-Arab relations. For his part, de Gaulle refused to acknowledge the long-term and profound failure o f French policy in the Levant. At the same time, the French rebel leaders single-minded pursuit o f resurrecting France, apdy symbolised by ‘L’indépendance, L’Empire et l’épée’, simply did not allow the Levant Question to be dealt with on its local merits. De Gaulle had neither the desire, nor the option (at least until the end o f hostilities) to surrender the French position, and sublime indifference to the weakness o f his military and constitutional position was essential to the progress o f his crusade. Such were the Gaullist realities behind the lofty rhetoric and

(2851

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equivocations employed. In his own words, ‘notre grandeur et notre force consistent uniquement dans l’intransigeance pour ce qui concerne les droits de la France’.79 Nevertheless, it seems clear that de Gaulle, in spite o f eighteen months’ service in the Levant in the early 1930s, had a limited grasp o f the complex realities o f Syrian and Lebanese politics. On this level, there was litde difference between himself and Churchill. Both were majestic, imperial men o f their age: immensely courageous, intensely proud, generally pragmatic - and singularly unsympathetic to growing nationalist aspirations within their empires. Neither appreciated the pace o f political evolution in the Middle East, nor the forces they had unleashed, and amidst all their heated disagreements they harboured a common anachronism in their formulation o f policies. It is hard to say, in retrospect, whose approach was more out o f date. If de Gaulle persisted in calling for a 1936-model deal, despite the estrangements which had followed that abortive affair, the British for their part were blind to the flaw in their own Levant policy. It was quickly spotted by the Arabophiles, but their views did not prevail in London. Churchill’s thinking had not proceeded beyond the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Behind the woolly (in Foreign Office parlance, ‘balanced’) terms o f Britain’s official policy in the Levant —impervious to realities in the Levant —lay the influence o f the formidable British Prime Minister. Yet the flaws in British and Free French policy cannot be attributed purely to the anachronisms and partialities o f the leading characters involved. An arguably more significant determinant in the whole affair was the conundrum o f the Anglo-Free French invasion itself - a maladroit improvisation, produced in a desperate military situation, and, given the history o f Anglo-French rivalry in the region, a potential political minefield. At the time, however, any action seemed better than an Axis walkover o f the Levant. In this response to an emergency neither the British nor the Gaullists were prepared for the problems inherent in their joint occupancy o f Syria. The worst problem o f all proved to be the political basis o f the campaign, Catroux’s independence pledge which, they hoped, would compensate for military inadequacies. The British, shaken by an Arab revolt, felt obliged to announce their guarantee o f Catroux’s pledge and to give it the weight o f a recognised government. Catroux, however, quickly discovered that his independence pledge had opened a box o f troubles. The Iraqi and Egyptian governments refused 1286]

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to recognise Catroux’s paper republics and the British, in accordance with their guarantee, reluctandy made increasing gestures in favour o f independence - and thus collided with the Free French, who were endeavouring to consolidate their authority. This ultimately wrecked Foreign Office hopes that any cracks in the arrangement might be papered over. The nationalists knew what they wanted: independence. The French knew what they wanted: continued military, financial and cultural privileges. The British wanted military security, Arab goodwill and reasonable relations with the French. In the end, the nationalists successfully frustrated Free French intentions by creating a threat to the first two British requirements.10 On a broader plain, the problems and tensions already identified were themselves the products o f a more deep-seated and universal dialectic at work during the period - the whole process o f decolonisation. By September 1939 the French were living on borrowed time in the Levant, and the fall o f the métropole proved to be a fatal blow. Henceforth the Mandate was under siege, and the nationalists were not taken in by de Gaulle’s attempts to salvage the authority o f France. Quwwadi, Mardam and other nationalist leaders, with no military or economic leverage whatsoever, orchestrated local unrest and skilfully used the extraordinary circumstances o f the time - the British occupation, Anglo-French divisions, and the emerging Arab state system - to obtain their cherished goal. In 1916, Messrs Sykes and Picot had delineated British and French spheres o f influence’ in the region. A decade later, France suppressed a major revolt in Syria. In 1936, the imperial government signed 25-year treaties o f ’Friendship and Alliance’ with Syrian and Lebanese nationalist governments. In 1946, France was forced to pull down its flag in both countries. Despite the actual intentions o f General Catroux, his 1941 proclamation was fulfilled at last: Syriens et Libanais! . . . j’abolis le Mandat et je vous proclame libres et indépendants. Vous êtes donc désormais des peuples souverains et indépendants.. A little later, in a mere flicker o f the eyelid o f history, the Union Jack disappeared from the region too.

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1 For the information in this chapter, I have relied heavily on scholarship by A. B. Gaunson, the late Salma Mardam Bey and Philip S. Khoury. As anyone familiar with this subject will quickly realise, I am deeply indebted to their work. 2 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 480. 3 See Anne Hadas-Lebel, ‘Les Milieux dirigeants français et le traité franco-syrien de 1936: histoire d’une “non-ratification’” , Dissertation (Mémoire de D.E.A.), Université de Paris IV, Sorbonne, 1991, p. 32ff. 4 The Radical Socialists adopted this policy at a Party Congress on 29-30 October 1937. 5 CADN/B, vol. 478, ‘Négociations franco-syriennes: textes’, 16 November 1938. 6 Le Temps, 16 December 1938. 7 CADN/B, vol. 535, ‘Messages aux Syriens’, 11 January 1939. 8 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 16. 9 P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 575-80. 10 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., pp. 25-33. P. Khoury, op. cit., pp. 590-1. 11 Charles de Gaulle, M émoires de guerre: UAppel 1940 -1 9 4 2 , Paris, Plon, 1954, pp. 87—8. 12 F 0 3 7 1/27321/E 1346. 13 The British Resident in Transjordan, Sir Alec Kirkbride, contacted the Druze and Major Glubb o f Transjordan’s Arab Legion, crossed the border and ‘opened communications with the tribes on the east o f the line Hama-Homs-Datnascus’. Lieutenant-General Sir J. B. Glubb, 7"he Story o f the A rab Legion, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948, p. 307flP, Sir Alec Kirkbride, A Crackle o f Thom s, London, John Murray, 1956, p. 147. 14 See A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo-French Clash in Syria an d Lebanon, 1 9 4 0 -4 5 , London, Macmillan, 1987, pp. 31-3. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 592. 15 Général Georges Catroux, D ans la B ataille de M éditerranée: Egypte-Leuant-Afiique du Nord, 1940-1944, Paris, Julliard, 1949, p. 137. 16 De Gaulle, L A ’ ppel, op. cit., pp. 198-9. 17 See Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 44-5. 18 Hourani, Syria an d Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 244-5. 19 De Gaulle telegram, 24 July 1941, in L ’appel, p. 386. 20 Wavell telegram, 27 June 1941, F0371/27346/E3484. De Gaulle, L'appel, op. cit., pp. 202-3. 21 Churchill minute, 3 July 1941, PREM 3 422/6. 22 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 77-8. 23 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 46. 24 Ibid., p. 48. 25 Following the Anglo-Free French occupation, Catroux, desperate to maintain French influence in the administration, had little alternative but to take on many former Vichy officials. Some 48 per cent o f the latter chose to s a y at their posts without rallying to de Gaulle, 30 per cent pledged allegiance to him, and 22 per cent returned to France. F0371/27318/E7988. 26 Text in Foreign Office telegram, 5 December 1941, SPR SIB/KI.

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27 SPR SII/4 and PREM 3 422/9. 28 E Keraudy, Churchill an d de G aulle, London, Collins, 1981, p. 196. The Office des Céréales Panifiables (OCP) was created and managed jointly by the British and French authorities in the Levant to secure the distribution o f wheat during the war. 29 Rommel was finally defeated at El-Alamcin, some 50 miles west o f Alexandria, in October 1942. 30 Gaunson. op. cit., p. 95. 31 Ibid., pp. 95-6. 32 FO371/31475/E5072, E5073. 33 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 103-4. 34 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 70. Shaykh Taj had died on 17 January 1943. Quwwatli and Mardam had returned to Syria during the autumn o f 1942, and the Shaykhs death sparked greater nationalist activity in Syria. 35 Ibid., pp. 72-3. P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 600. 36 P Khoury, op. cit., p. 614. 37 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 89. 38 MAE, vol. 9 9 9 ,4 October 1943. Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 89. 39 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 120-7. 40 Ibid., p. 127. 41 Makins telegram, 12 November 1943, SPRS 111/3. 42 Gaunson, op. cit., p. 136. 43 Spears telegram, (790) 30 November 1943, SPRS lll/3a. Catroux was 'most reliably reported’ to have said these things in an exclusively French gathering. 44 Spears telegram, (784) 30 November 1943, SPRS IU/3a. ‘It should be our objective to bring about treaties between France and Lebanon and Syria under which France will have a position in Levant broadly corresponding to ours in Iraq . . . it is not in our interest that Levant Sûtes should by unilateral action succeed in breaking all political ties with France . . . Formal execution o f treaties must await re-establishment o f peace when. . . France will regain formal authority lor treaty making. Meanwhile what*is needed is a modus vivendi as near as possible to projected terms o f treaty . . . We may be in a position to help the French to a v e something out o f the wreck o f their position in the Levant. It is to our interest to do th is. . . ’ Eden to Spears, 26-27 November 1943, SPRS III/3a. 45 Spears telegram, (856) 23 December 1943, SPRS IU/3a. 46 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 142-3. 47 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., pp. 118-20. 48 Spears letter, 28 August 1944, SPRS II/6. 49 Eden directive, 1 September 1944, FO371/40347/E5415. 50 FO371/40316/E5575, E5681. 51 Gaunson, op. cit., p. 157. 52 Ibid., p. 158. 53 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 54 Ibid., p. 165. 55 FO371/40307/E7876. 56 Ibid. 57 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 178.

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 58 Ibid., p. 169. 59 F0371/45557, 45556/E403, 17 January 1945. Grigg was successor to Lord Moyne, who had been assassinated by Jewish terrorists on 4 November 1944. 60 Grigg telegram, 23 January 1945, F 0 9 5 4 /1 5/624. 61 Salma Maidam Bey, op. cit., p. 178. 62 Ibid., pp. 186,188. 63 Ibid., p. 198. 64 Text o f aide-m ém oire in F0371/45568/E3643. 65 Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., pp. 204-8. 66 F0371/45566/E3498. Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 216. 67 Ibid., p.218. Gaunson, op. cit., p. 173. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., Salma Mardam Bey, op. cit., p. 217. 70 Shone telegrams, 30 May 1945, F0371/45568/E3626 and F 0954/15/716. 71 'In view o f the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant States, and the severe fighting which has broken out, we have with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene . . . in the interests o f the security o f the whole Middle East, which involves communications for the war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French forces, we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks.’ F0371/45568/E3677. De Gaulle, L e Salu t, pp. 229-30. This message was read to the House o f Commons at 3.45pm by Eden. Unfortunately, it did not reach de Gaulle until about 5pm. Naturally, the Frenchman regarded the timing and the telegram as ‘insolence’, and claimed that the delay prevented him from announcing that fighting in Damascus had already stopped. Churchill later maintained that an error o f transmission occured, with no intentional discourtesy. 72 De Gaulle, Le Salu t, pp. 231-2. 73 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 176-7. 74 Ibid., p. 176. 75 De Gaulle, Le Salu t, p. 233. 76 The Times, 20,21 June 1945. 77 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 617. 78 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 21-6. 79 De Gaulle, L A ’ ppel, p. 175. 80 Gaunson, op. cit., pp. 184-91. 81 Catroux, op.cit., p. 137.

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Appendix Franco-Turkish relations and Alexandretta during Autumn 1936: U début du grignotage

Since che Franco-Turkish agreement o f 1921 (Franklin-Bouillon Agree­ ment), the question o f the sanjaq’s future had never received the serious attention o f the Turkish government. The latter’s official involvement only restarted following the news o f the Franco-Syrian agreement o f September 1936. When M. Viénot informed the League Council in Geneva (27 September 1936) o f the happy conclusion o f the talks in Paris, the Turkish Delegate, Dr Rustu Aras, whilst praising the French initiative, reminded the gathering o f Frances agreements with Turkey, to maintain an autonomous regime for the sanjaq o f Alexandretta.1 In private, Dr Aras was more explicit. He emphasised to M. Viénot that the status o f the sanjaq would find itself modified by the emancipation o f Syria. The Turkish government, linked by a treaty with France, only acknowledged France and regretted that the Mandatory authorities, who had the power, had not accorded an independent status to the sanjaq. In a word, the government o f Ankara would go to any length, and even refuse to acknowledge Syria’s emancipation, in order to avoid a Turkish population being placed under Arab domination. M. Viénot replied that the Turkish government was obviously free to take whatever initiatives it pleased to, but that the League o f Nations would be the judge, if there was a disagreement between France and Turkey.2 On 9 October, the Turkish government officially requested the French government to elevate the sanjaq into an independent state, linked to France by a treaty similar to the Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian treaties.1 At the same time, minor incidents which occurred in the sanjaq (court cases against Turks in Antioch, insults to a Turkish flag) were reproduced in alarming headlines in the Turkish press.4 As for the French High Commissioner in Ankara, the reality o f Turkish intentions, whatever the Turkish government declared publicly, was quite unmistakable:

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As everyone here knows, it is less a matter of protecting a minority than of revising a frontier. Since the remilitarisation of the Detroits, no other issue interests Turkey more . . . The conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty took the Turkish government by surprise; their reaction was thus even stronger. The true dimension and value of the Alexandretta question is directly related to the military question: between Smyrne and Mersine Turkey has no naval base, no easy access by road. Mersine is of little interest. On the contrary, Alexandretta is rapidly accessible in three directions by railway: Istanbul and the Detroits, Samsoun and the Black Sea, Nissibin and the Eastern Provinces. Shared between two Powers, the Gulf of Alexandretta has no value, either as a naval base or a base for sea-planes: the Turkish base of Yamurtalik is threatened by Alexandretta, as Alexandretta is within artillery-range of Payas. In Turkish hands, however, Alexandretta, close to Cyprus, would become a formidable naval and territorial position; in Syrian hands, not much. This is the hidden conflict, the real issue that has become the priority question in the Turkish political establishment (which is controlled by the Military) following the settlement of the Detroits affair. It explains the violence of the attack launched immediately after the signature of the Franco-Syrian agreement: the daily appeal by the press to theTurkish public has no other aimexcept to prepare for the most wide-ranging discussion [with us] and to build up the atmosphere/ Two speeches in early November by President Atatürk, in which he spoke o f Alexandretta as the burning issue o f the day, transformed the future o f the sanjaq into the national issue for Turkey.6 On 9 November, in a letter to the Turkish government, the French government refused to contravene the stipulations o f the Mandate A ct and to separate o ff a third state from Syria and Lebanon: This operation would be the equivalent of dividing up Syria, an eventuality which the Mandatory Power is charged expressly to guarantee not to do. This [division of Syria] is not and cannot be the outcome of Article 7 of the 1921 agreement, which limited itselfto providing for the institution, in theAlexandretta region, of a special adm inistrative status. This text makes no mention of any special political status and does not acknowledge that the populations of the sanjaq have an international vocation nor the ability to govern themselves outside [292]

Appendix the Syrian com m unity as described by Article 22 o f the Pact and the M andate Act.'

On 17 November, the Turkish Foreign Minister handed M. Ponsot a note, which contained two main points. First, the regions o f Alexandretta and Antioch could not be treated less favourably than that o f Syria and Lebanon and second, if the French government maintained its position as defined by its note o f 9 November concerning the interpretation o f the 1921 agreement, ‘Turkey will be obliged to consider that she is released from all the previous agreements’.* Although the French government was quite unwilling (at that stage) to accept the idea o f an independent sanjaq, it had to respond to such Turkish pressures, and on 23 November it offered the Turkish government a choice o f two alternative procedures. If the Turkish government did not raise the question o f the political allegiance o f the sanjaq to Syria, achieved since the origin o f the Mandate, the French government was ready to proceed without delay to examining the guarantees that the Turkish government considered desirable to see stipulated in favour o f the Turkish elements o f the region, within the framework o f the 1921 agreements. If, on the other hand, the Turkish government insisted on requesting a new statute for the sanjaq, which implied its independence from Syria, the issue went beyond the jurisdiction o f the French government, in its capacity as the Mandatory power. The Council o f the League o f Nations would in that case be competent to interpret the Mandate Act and give an authorised judgement.9 The Turkish government readily accepted the second alternative.10 Meanwhile, in the sanjaq, the first round o f elections (15 November) clearly exposed the growing animosity among the various communities. Elections were a future with only 8 per cent o f electors voting, and the pro-Turkish party abstaining altogether. The Turks sent agents into the sanjaq to stir up the Turkish population against the Arabs and arms were reported to have been smuggled in on a large scale for the pro-Turkish element." Although Dr Ants affirmed in the National Assembly (27 November) that our claim is not a question o f a territorial revision: we wish to safeguard real and effective guarantees for the rights that the Turkish populations and ourselves have acquired by treaties’," other Turkish deputies, during the same debate, strongly criticised the suppression o f [2931

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the sanjaq’s Turkish population by the French authorities and threatened to seize the sanjaq by force, no matter what the outcome o f the League Council deliberations.13Three days later, Turkish elements attacked the houses o f the three newly elected deputies to the Syrian Parliament. French military intervention resulted in the death o f three Turkish demonstrators; seventeen others were injured.14 On 8 December, the Turkish Foreign Minister handed M. Ponsot a new set o f proposals: Alexandretta would be placed under a French-Turkish joint condominium, the region would be demilitarised, law and order would be maintained by the local police and gendarmerie, and an 'open port’ regime would be applied in the economic domain.14 Following a session concerning the sanjaq at the League Council on 14-15 December, during which both theses were presented, the Council adopted a resolution which recommended a series o f ‘holding’ measures, including the postponement by France o f the ratification o f the Franco-Syrian treaty, the sending o f a team o f neutral observers to the region and the suspension o f the settlement o f the fundamentals o f the problem, which would be examined by the League Council in its January 1937 session.16 Bilateral negotiations continued a week later in Paris (21-22 December). The Turkish Delegation offered, as an initial concession on their part, to include the sanjaq - elevated to an independent state and endowed with a Franco-Turkish guarantee - in a confederation that would also include Syria and Lebanon. The French countered this proposal by offering to study in detail the elaboration o f a constitution o f a special regime, economic and military clauses and a variety o f French guarantees. The whole package would be presented as a renewal o f the 1921 agreement, and would ‘calm the fears o f the Turks that the termination o f the Mandate had aroused’.17After three sessions the talks broke down when the Turkish Foreign Minister categorically reaffirmed that the discussion could only be usefully continued if the French side accepted that the sanjaq was not to be subordinate to any other state.11 The failure o f the talks in Paris profoundly disappointed the Syrian government, who were becoming increasingly convinced that France and Turkey had, in fact, already settled the issue and that the planned discussion at the League Council in January 1937 would be a mere formality.19Jamil Mardam was convinced that Turkey wanted to expand territorially into Syria and he told the British Consul in Damascus that [294]

Appendi x

the Syrian government would ‘never consent to the removal o f the sanjaq from Syrian sovereignty’, if only because it would bring disaster to the Aleppo district which had already been severed from its natural Turkish hinterland in 1920.” Precisely how far the Turkish government was planning to push the issue o f Alexandretta by the end o f 1936 is debatable. But Turkish dreams were undoubtedly increasing.

N o tes

1 MAE/SL, Lagarde (Geneva) to MAE, 27 September 1936, vol. 494, p. 152. The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement o f October 1921 called for the establishment o f a special administrative regime for the district o f Alexandretta. The Turkish language was given official recognition and M. Franklin-Bouillon wrote a letter to the head o f the Turkish Delegation which stated that the French Government would, as a general rule, appoint Turkish officials in those regions with a Turkish majority and set up schools for the promotion o f Turkish culture. The Syro-Turkish frontier fixed by this agreement was confirmed by Article 3 o f the Lausanne Treaty o f 1923, which Turkey signed. By Article 16 o f the same treaty, Turkey renounced *all rights and tide whatsoever over or respecting the territories to the south o f this frontier’. Later, in May 1926, France and Turkey signed a treaty which supplemented and clarified the provisions o f the 1921 agreement. As for the population o f the sanjaq, each community had its own statistics. According to the French High Commission (1936), o f an approximate total o f 220,000 persons in the sanjaq, 39 per cent were ethnic Turks, 28 per cent were Alawites, 11 per cent were Armenians, 10 per cent were Sunni Arabs, 8 per cent were other Christians (principally Greek Orthodox), and the remainder were divided between Kurds, Circassians, and jews (approximately 4 per cent). The Turkish government, however, claimed that the total population was closer to 300,000, o f which between 150,000 to 240,000 were Turks. The Turkish figures were inflated. Although the Turks constituted the single largest ethnic community, Arabic speakers, who included Alawites, Sunni Arabs, and most o f the non-Armenian Christians, were more numerous than Turkish speakers. As for the religious composition o f the sanjaq, nearly 80 per cent were Muslim (20 per cent Christian). However, Sunni Muslims formed barely half o f the local Muslim population, the Alawites making up the difference. This footnote is taken from R Khoury, op. cit., pp. 495-6. 2 CADN/B, Viénot to Martel, 5 October 1936, vol. 508. On the eve o f his departure for Geneva ( 13 September), Dr Aras had declared to journalists that he was delighted at the conclusion o f the Franco-Syrian treaty, which, he hoped, included a local and autonomous regime' for the regions o f Alexandretta and Antioch, ‘whose population o f 280,000 is almost entirely Turkish'. Ibid., Lcscuycr to MAE, 14 September 1936.

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F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 3 Ibid., MAE, to Davas, 9 November 1936. 4 Ibid., Lescuyer to Martel, 8 October 1936. ‘There is no doubt that in a country where there is no public opinion, such a campaign is artificial, and that the newspapers only consecrate entire pages on the issue by order o f the Ghazi.’ Ibid. 5 Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 25 October 1936. 6 Every year, President Ataturk used the occasion o f the opening session o f the National Assembly to outline the major political problems, both internal and external, that Turkey faced: ‘. . . The main question today, and which is a constant concern o f the Turkish people, is the destiny o f the Alexandretta and Antioch region which in reality is purely Turkish . . . Those who know the fundamentals o f the question, and who respect law and justice, well understand and find quite natural the force and sincerity o f the interest that we attach to the destiny o f this region . . (Sunday, 1 November 1936). Ibid., Ponsot to MAE, 3 November 1936. 7 Ibid., MAE, to Davas, 9 November 1936. 8 Ibid., Ponsot to Martel, 17 November 1936. 9 Ibid., Ponsot to Martel, 27 November 1936. 10 Ibid., Ponsot to Martel, 23 November 1936; ibid., Ponsot to Martel, 25 November 1936; D D F 1932-9, Ponsot to Delbos, 25 November 1936, vol. IV, pp. 44-5. 11 P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 500. 12 CADN/B, Ponsot to Martel, 28 November 1936, vol. 508. 13 According to the British Ambassador in Ankara, ‘Some deputies described the sanjaq as Turkeys Alsace-Lorraine and demanded immediate abolition o f the unnatural frontier which separated Turk from Turk, the annexation o f the sanjaq to the motherland, and the creation o f a new frontier from the Orontes to the Euphrates.’ F 0 3 7 1/7611, vol. 20068. Lorraine to Eden, 2 December 1936; CADN/B, Ponsot to Martel, 29 November 1936, vol. 508. 14 Ibid., Ponsot to Martel, 4 December 1936; F0371/7759, vol. 20068. Parr (Aleppo) to FO, 13 December 1936. 15 D D F 1932-9, Ponsot to Delbos, 8 December 1936, vol. IV, pp. 173-5. On 9 December, Paris informed Ponsot that the notion o f a condominium, which implied the sharing o f sovereignty, was inadmissible: ‘In effect, we cannot share a sovereignty with Turkey which has never belonged to us. Even if this new proposal had been reduced to sharing control o f the sanjaq’s affairs between France and Turkey, it would still be in formal contradiction to Article 4 o f the Mandate Act, by which we guarantee Syria “against the establishment o f any control by a foreign power” . . . Contrary to the contents o f the Turkish note o f 9 October, the Turkish government today affirms its territorial claims over the sanjaq, claims over which it simply consents to associate us. We obviously cannot start down this route.’ CADN/B, MAE, to Martel, 9 December 1936, vol. 508. For his pan, the High Commissioner in Beirut, now fully committed to implementing the treaty policy, was equally incisive: ‘The independence o f the sanjaq would ruin the whole system o f the Syrian treaty, based on unity. Whilst some previously detached territories are being reattached to Syria, Arab opinion would not understand that at the same time we detach a region which has participated for the last 15 years in Syrian political affairs . . . and against which the Turks had never protested in the past. Even more, the latter had explicidy recognised this

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Ap p e n d i x

16

17 18 19 20

state o f affûts in various international acts. . . It should not be forgotten that the framework o f the recendy concluded treaties consists in maintaining our essential interests in Syria and a solid base in Lebanon, whilst satisfying the national aspirations o f the populations. The Franco-Turkish condominium would destroy both these results.’ CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 13 January 1937, vol. 508. Ibid., MAE, to Martel, 15 December 1936; ibid., MAE, to Martel, 16 December 1936; ibid., Martel to MAE, 16 December 1936; ibid., MAE, to Martel, 17 December 1936. Significandy, it was the French side who during this session offered, in a spirit o f conciliation’, to postpone the ratification o f the Franco-Syrian treaty in Paris until the Alexandretta affair had been setdcd. Ibid. Ibid., MAE, to Martel, 22 December 1936. Ibid; see also D D F 1932-9, Delbos to Lescuyer, 22 December 1936, vol. IV, pp. 318-19. CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 23 December 1936, vol. 508; P. Khoury, op. cit., p. 500. F0371/88, vol. 20845. MacKereth to Eden, 31 December 1936. Martel was equally convinced that Turkey harboured territorial ambitions: ‘For Turkey, it is dearly not a matter o f guaranteeing the status o f some Turkish elements living on the other side o f the border. This situation is not unique to the sanjaq and Turkey accepts perfecdy well the existence abroad o f much larger minorities o f Turks, who are in a much less fortunate position. I recall from memory that in all the Balkan countries, and notably in Bulgaria, some eight hundred thousand Turks live peacefully. ‘But Kemalist Turkey . . . which has not stopped taking advantage o f European rivalries, has started to remember that it is the descendant o f a huge Empire. Realising that it has nothing to hope for in the Balkans, it does not forget that for centuries the Arab countries were under its domination. Moreover, it notes that these countries are becoming emancipated, without yet having acquired the political stability nor the force that would allow them to organise resistance on a national level. Finally, it considers that in an era when every State is claiming colonies and raw materials, Turkey, if it is to play the important role to which it aspires, cannot aim at a far-flung empire, but that on the contrary, she could find neighbouring territories to be developed economically, which would produce an essential product for an aggressive power oil. ‘Why should we be surprised then, that the Kemalist leaders have committed themselves completely. As the affair progresses, their dream grows more and more. Having first asked for independence for a territory o f some 200,000 souls, they have finally come up with a project o f a condominium that would make them, in practice, the masters o f all tbe Levant Sûtes placed under the French Mandate, following the foil o f the Ottoman Empire. It would be the return o f the Empire. . . ’ CADN/B, Martel to MAE, 15 January 1937, vol. 508.

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Index A

al-Atasi, Hashim 9, 19, 30, 49, 5 3 .9 1 - 2 , 99, 111, 116-17, 1 6 4 -5 ,2 0 0 , 221, 225, 258 chairman o f Constituent Assembly 19, 2 3 -4 , 27 constitution o f Syria and 50, 55 on Consultative Council 6 3 -5 in delegation to Piris 205, 211 elections o f 1931-2 and 6 6 ,6 9 - 7 0 , 72 Franco-Syrian treaty proposals and 4 5 -6 , 120-1, 124 Free French and 265, 269 nationalists* demands and 117, 187,

Abd ul-Illah 261 Abdin Com mittee 14 al-Abid, Izzac Pasha 93 al-Abid, Muhammad Ali 77, 88 as President o f Syria 9 2 -3 , 9 9 -101, 1 1 0 .1 1 3 - 1 4 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 0 ,1 4 9 . 1 5 2 - 4 ,1 5 7 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 7 Abyssinia, Italian invasion o f 170-1 al-Adali, F u ad 154 al-Adali, Muhammad Yahya 90, 123, 1 5 3 ,2 2 7 éd-Ahali (newspaper) 67 airports 156, 167 Ajlani, Munir 192 Alawites 2 - 3 ,7 , 1 0 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 9 ,1 4 6 . 2 0 8 ,2 1 6 re-attachment with Syria 22 2 -4 Aleppo airport 156 demonstrations and riots in 52-3, 62, 7 2 ,8 5 ,9 0 .1 5 4 - 5 . 226 elections in 16, 6 7 ,6 9 - 7 5 , 226 state 2 -3 Alexandretta autonomy o f 2 - 3 ,2 2 3 elections in 17, 75, 293 Turkish ambitions towards 221, 253, 255, 2 9 1-5 Ali, King 5 6 -8 Aloisi, Baron 104, 107 Alype, Pierre 75 Anglo-Iraqi treaties 11, 21, 3 1 ,9 6 , 101, 205, 217 Antaki, N a‘im 1 9 5 .2 0 7 Arab C lub 258 Aras, Rustu 291, 293 army bases 167, 210, 212, 2 16-17 Arslan, Shakib 59. 105-7. 109, 171 Asiyun, Fathallah 29 Assyrian refugees 165, 210

193 as President o f the National Bloc 151 as President o f Syria 227, 2 5 7 -8 Presidential candidate 89 signature o f Franco-Syrian treaty 219 Atatürk. Kemal 292 al-Atrash, Abd al-Ghaflar Pasha 113 al-Atrash, Sultan 13 al-Ayyubi, A u Bey 153, 196-7, 228, 2 6 9 -7 0 al-Azm, Haqqi Bey 4 3 ,4 6 ,6 7 - 8 , 77, 8 7 - 8 ,9 0 - 2 , 110, 125, 144, 220 as Prime Minister 93, 123-4, 153 al-Azm, Khalid 258, 270

B Baghdad railway 156 Baghdad-H aifa proposed railway 56, 60 al-Bakri, Fawzi 13-14 al-Bakri, Nasib 1 3 .6 8 . 77, 191-2, 195 Barakat, Subhi Bey 14, 16-17, 47, 71, 85. 8 7 -8 . 92, 94. 118, 160, 204 as Speaker o f Parliament 91 -2 , 99, 145-50 al-Barazi, Husni 153 al-Barazi, Najib 9, 220 Barazi, Negib Agha 111

[309]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yri a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 Com m on Interests organisation 102, 1 1 7 ,1 4 4 ,2 1 5 ,2 2 2 Com munist Party 258 Constituent Assembly 19-25, 29 elections to 4 ,9 - 1 0 , 14-18 suspension o f 2 7 - 9 ,3 2 - 5 ,4 3 Consultative Council 6 3 -6 C ot, Pierre 107

al-Barudi, Fakhri 2 2 - 3 ,4 3 , 5 2 ,6 8 - 9 , 90, 1 1 0 ,1 4 5 ,1 6 8 ,1 7 0 ,1 8 6 - 9 1 , 204, 2 1 4 ,2 2 0 ,2 5 8 Beirut Iraqi consulate in 58 port o f 156 Benes, Eduard 107, 110 Berenger, Henry 97 Berthelot, Philippe 8, 1 1 ,1 8 -1 9 , 21 -2 , 2 9 - 3 0 ,3 2 - 4 ,4 1 - 2 , 5 7 - 8 ,8 9 Beynet, General 276, 2 7 8 ,2 8 0 -1 , 283 Bidault, M . 278 Bigault de Grandut, General de 141 Black List 13 Blanc, General 199 Blum, Léon 2 1 1 - 1 3 ,2 1 9 ,2 5 4 Bonnet, M . 256 Bounni, Abd al-Basset 85 Boy Scouts Association 163 Briand, Aristide 6 ,1 0 Britain Anglo-Iraqi Treaties 11, 21, 3 1 ,9 6 , 1 0 1 ,2 0 5 ,2 1 7 empire o f 1 Free French plans in Levant and 2 6 0 -8 , 2 7 2 -3 ,2 7 6 -8 0 , 2 8 2 -7 Second World War and 259 al-Btayha 161-2 al-Bukhari, Nasuhi 257, 270 Bureau for National Propaganda 258

D Dabbas, President Daladier, Edouard

50 1 1 5 -1 6 ,1 1 9 -2 0 ,

1 5 1 ,2 5 5 Dam ad, Ahmad Nami 9 - 1 2 ,4 7 , 89 Dam ad government 9 -1 2 Damascus 2 -3 airport 156 Damascus Tramway and Electricity Com pany boycott 1 6 8 - 9 ,1 8 9 , 191 demonstrations in 45, 5 2 - 3 ,6 2 , 6 8 , 7 2 .9 5 .1 2 1 .1 4 2 - 3 ,1 4 7 - 8 ,1 6 0 - 2 , 170, 1 9 1 -2 ,1 9 8 -2 0 0 elections in 1 6 ,6 7 - 9 ,7 2 ,7 5 ,7 7 French shelling o f 2 8 1 -4 David, M . 1 8 5 ,2 2 2 demonstrations and riots 5 3 ,6 1 - 2 , 160 in Aleppo 5 2 - 3 ,6 2 ,7 2 ,8 5 ,9 0 , 1 5 4 -5 ,2 2 6 in Damascus 45, 5 2 - 3 ,6 2 ,6 8 ,7 2 , 9 5 , 1 2 1 .1 4 2 3 ,1 4 7 - 8 ,1 6 0 - 2 ,1 7 0 , 1 9 1 -2 ,1 9 8 -2 0 0 in France 151 General Strike (1936) 193-205 in H om s 9 5 .1 1 6 ,1 6 4 - 5 ,1 9 2 , 194 in Palestine 45, 142 Dentz, Admiral 2 5 8 -9 ,2 6 2 D eraa 282 Doumergue, Gaston 151 Druze see Jabal Druze Duma, elections in 6 9 ,7 2 ,7 7 Durieux, M . 62

C Cahour, M . 62 Cairo, Syrian nationalists in 8, 13 Caix de Saint-Aymour, Com te Robert de 8 ,1 8 ,2 1 ,4 1 - 3 ,4 7 ,1 2 5 - 7 Casey, Minister 2 6 7 ,2 7 3 Catroux, Georges 5-6 , 2 60-9, 2 7 3-4, 2 8 5 -7 Chautemps, M . 219 Chauvel, M . 67. 87, 151, 207-8 Chiaroni, Captain 69 Christian minority 16, 30, 67, 7 0 -1 , 220, 225 Churchill, Winston S. 2 6 3-4, 268, 278, 2 8 3 -6 Collet, Com mander 192 Colonial Party 4 1 ,2 5 4 - 5

E

Echo de Pans

51 Eddé, Emile 272 Eden, Anthony 267, 2 7 6 - 8 ,2 8 0 Egypt 1 6 4 ,1 8 6 ,2 7 1 ,2 7 3

[310]

Index

F

Hama demonstrations in 53, 160, 194 elections in 1 7 ,6 9 , 72, 77 Hananu, Ibrahim 9, 16, 19, 29, 52-4 , 7 1 .7 4 - 6 .9 4 - 5 ,9 7 . 106-7, 112, 154-5. 166 death and funeral 185 Franco-Syrian Treaty proposals and 1 1 1 ,1 1 6 ,1 2 0 - 1 ,1 2 4 al-Hasani, Badr al-Din 12 al-Hashimi, Yasin 25 Havas (news agency) 2 8 -9 al-Hayani, Tawfiq 6 3 -4 Haydar, Rustum 25 Haydar, Sharif Ali 56, 58 Helleu, Jean 9 4 -5 , 1 0 6 ,1 4 1 , 2 7 1 -4 Herriot, Edouard 96 Hindiyya, Henri 153. 160 Hider, A dolf 204 Hornet, Marcel 255 Hom s dam at 156 demonstrations in 95, 116, 164-5, 1 9 2 ,1 9 4 elections in 1 7 ,6 9 -7 0 Homsi, Edmond 197, 205 Humanité 4 3 -4 Huntziger, General 1 6 7 ,1 9 5 al-Husayni, Rafiq 70

Fain, M . 187, 189, 192, 197-8, 203 Fauquenot, M . 159 Faysal, King 2 , 2 5 - « . 5 5 -61. 108, 115, 145 Flandin, Pierre-Etienne 20 6 -7 France demonstrations in 151 elections in % empire o f 1 ,3 2 , 206, 254-5 French Mandate in Syria see under Syria Vichy government 4 Franco-Lebanese treaty (1936) 2 2 2 ,2 2 6 -7 Franco-Soviet Pact 2 0 3 -4 Franco-Syrian Treaty of'Friendship and Alliance' 1936 4 delegation to P ins 4 ,2 0 0 , 20 2 -3 , 205-21 Free French and 2 6 8 -9 , 271 implementation o f 2 2 5 -8 proposals and negotiations 3 0 -1 , 4 5 - 6 .7 6 ,9 7 - 1 0 3 .1 0 5 ,1 0 8 - 3 1 . 1 4 2 - 5 0 ,1 6 7 - 9 .2 0 0 ,2 4 7 - 8 ratification problems 25 4 -7 signature o f 2 1 9 -20, 228 G Gamelin, General 206 Gaulle, Charles de 259, 2 6 2-8. 273, 276, 278, 2 8 1 -6 al-Gaylani, Rashid Ali 261 General Strike ( 1936) 193-205 Germany 204 French Mandate in Syria and 107-9 Second World War and 259 al-Ghanima, Latif 144 al-Ghazzi, Fawzi 1 5 ,2 0 , 2 2 ,9 0 , 197 al-Ghazzi, S a id 197. 200, 220 Glubb, J.B . 285 Gontaut-Biron, Com te de 2 3 -4 Gouraud, General 2, 41, 51 Grigg, Edward 280

I Ibn Saud 56, 58, 164 Ibrahim, Hasan Fu ad Pasha 155, 195 Ibrahim, Jamil Pasha 95 Iraq 2 0 5 ,2 7 3 Anglo-Iraqi Treaties 11, 2 1 ,3 1 ,% , 1 0 1 ,2 0 5 .2 1 7 British Mandate 2 .4 5 - 6 , 52, 115 French relations with 5 5 -6 , 59-61 independence o f 76, % , 205, 247 monarchy in 26, 31, 115 oil in 5 5 -7 wartime revolt in 261 Iraq Petroleum Com pany 5 5 -6 Italy French Mandate in Syria and 104, 107-9 invasion o f Abyssinia 170-1

H al-Haflfar, Lutfi 110. 147, 160, 195, 220, 2 57-8. 270 Haifa, proposed pipeline to 56 al-Hakim, Wahid 169

[311]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yr i a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 Second World War and

259

al-Lahham, Ahmad 257 U tak ia 2 - 3 ,1 1 9 ,2 1 0 ,2 1 2 ,2 1 4 ,2 1 6 , 2 2 0 ,2 2 2 - 4 Laval, Pierre 203 Lavastre, M . 6 2 ,7 0 - 1 ,7 4 - 5 ,8 5 ,8 8 .9 0 , 9 4 ,1 5 5 - 7 League o f National Action (Usbat al-Amal al-Qawmi) 1 6 2 -4 ,1 9 2 ,2 2 0 , 2 2 8 ,2 5 8 League o f Nations 29, 52, 5 4 ,1 7 1 Mandate principle 1-2 French M andate in Syria see under Syria Permanent Mandates Commission (P M C , Geneva) 6 ,2 9 ,4 2 ,4 5 ,5 4 , 1 0 3 - 1 0 ,1 2 5 - 7 ,1 2 9 Syrian delegation 44 Lebanon 2 1 3 -1 4 constitutional crisis (1932) 86, 109 elections in 1 5 0 ,2 2 6 ,2 7 0 Franco-Lebanese treaty (1936) 222, 2 2 6 -7 Free French and 2 6 6 - 8 ,2 7 0 - 3 , 281 French M andate 2 ,6 independence o f 2 6 6 ,2 7 6 ,2 8 1 organic law (constitution) for 2 ,6 , 109 Fonsot*s proposals for 104-5 Presidential election (1936) 188 Lebrun, President 151 Léger, Alexis 4 2 ,1 2 6 ,1 6 7 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 1 Lepissier, M . 5 6 -8 Liberal Constitutionalists 7 1 ,8 5 , 100, 118 Libya 6 2 ,1 7 1 Linyadu, Yusuf 16 Lissan (newspaper) 128 Longrigg, Stephen H . 74 Lytdeton-de Gaulle agreements 263

J Jabal Druze 2 ,7 .1 0 4 ,1 1 3 , 119, 146, 2 0 8 - 1 0 ,2 1 2 ,2 1 6 ,2 2 0 re-attachment with Syria 222, 224-5 al-Jabiri, Ihsan 44, 5 9 ,1 0 5 - 7 , 109 al-Jabiri, Sa'dallah 5 3 ,7 4 ,7 6 ,1 5 5 ,1 9 5 , 2 2 7 - 8 ,2 5 8 ,2 7 0 in delegation to Paris 205 Jabiri, Shawfiq 188-9 Jallad, Hani 192 Jam ban, Selim 6 7 ,9 3 , 144 al-Jaza’iri, Sa id 62 Jewish minority 16 in Palestine 4 5 ,1 4 2 , 161-2 Zionism and 1 2 9 ,1 4 2 -3 , 161-2 Jewish National Fund 161-2 al-Jisr, M uhammad 86 Jouvenel, Henry de 5 - 7 ,9 9 Jukhadar, Shaykh Sulayman 123, 144

K Karami, Abd al-Hamid 112 al-Kaylani, Abd al-Qadir 9, 13, 16 al-Kaylani, Nawras 69 al-Kayyali, D r Abd al-Rahman 9, 16, 29 -3 0 , 5 2 - 3 ,1 1 6 ,1 5 5 ,1 9 5 ,2 0 0 , 227, 270 Keiflfer, M . 2 0 7 -8 , 222. 224 Keller, M . von 107 al-Khatib, Bahij 6 8 ,7 2 , 257 al-Khatib, Zaki 6 8 ,9 1 ,9 4 ,1 0 6 ,1 1 0 , 1 1 6 ,1 4 3 , 1 4 7 ,1 8 7 ,2 0 4 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 8 Khoury, Philip S. 2 4 ,9 9 , 1 2 8 -9 ,1 3 1 al-Khuri, Bishara 270, 272 al-Khuri, Fa iz 20, 2 9 - 3 0 ,9 1 , 99, 110, 145, 192, 220 al-Khuri, Faris 13, 111, 227 in delegation to Paris 205, 207 Killeam, Lord 279 Kinj, Ibrahim 223 Kirkbride, Alec 285 Kurd Ali, Muhammad 1 3 ,1 6 Kussair, Mustafa 197, 220 L Lagarde, Ernest

M al-Mahasini, Sa id Maigret, M . 26 al-Maluhi, Rashid M a mun, Sayf al-Din M andate principle French M andate in

166

[312]

13, 15-16 187 190-1 1-2 Syria see under Syria

Index al-Mulqi, Ra if 69 Murtada, Mehdi 188 Mussolini, Benito 170-1

Mardam, Jamil 3 0 -1 , 51, 55* 59, 7 6 -7 , 9 3 -5 , 154, 160, 164, 166, 186-8, 190-1, 193, 228. 248, 25 7 -8 , 270 constitution o f Syria and 52, 55 Franco-Syrian Treaty and in delegation to faris 205, 2 0 7-8 proposals and negotiation 98, 108, 110-11, 113-14, 116-17, 120, 147- 8 ratification problems 2 5 5-7 Free French and 265, 280 General Strike and 193-5, 204 as Prime Minister 22 7 -8 , 2 5 5 -6 Turkish plans for Alcxandretta and 2 9 4-5 Martel, Com te Damien de 128, 219, 248 -5 0 economic policies 1 5 5 -6 ,1 6 7 ethnic/religious minorities and 155, 166-7, 223-4 fact-finding trips 141-3 Franco-Syrian Treaty and implementation 225-8 proposals and negotiations 142-6, 1 48- 50, 167-9, 200, 209, 248 General Strike and 193-205 government o f Syria and 152-4, 156, 158-9, 165-6, 196-7 suspension o f Parliament by 146-50. 152-3, 1 5 6 -6 1 .2 4 8 installation as High Commissioner 141-2 proposed decentralization and 158-9. 161. 167, 169-70. 188 Syrian nationalists and 1 4 4.150, 166-7, 171, 191-2, 196, 200-3, 250 Massigli, M. 272 Maugras, M. 2 0 -2 , 30 Maurepas, M. 57 Mcyricr, M. 220 military bases 167, 210, 212, 216-17 Mirabeau, Honoré-Gabricl Com te de 91 Morocco 32. 128-9 al-Mu ayyad, Badi 68 al-Mu ayyad, Wathiq 68, 72 Mubarak, Archbishop 213-14 Mukhtar, Umar 62

N Naccachc, Alfred 266 Nahas Pasha 164 Nakadi, A rif Bey 94 National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya) see Syrian nationalists National Guard (al-Haras al-Watani) 215 Nationalist Youth (al-Shabab al-Watani) 6 8 - 9 ,9 2 , 168 ai-Nayyal, Subhi 13, 16 Netherlands, French Mandate in Syria and 105 al-Nida (newspaper) 69 Ni'mat, Shakir see al-Sha‘bani, Shakir N im at Nuri Sa id 25

O oil 55 -7 Oliva-Roget, M. 2 82-4 Orient (newspaper) 116 Ostorog, Count 2 7 9 -8 0 Ottom an Empire 1-2, 93, 163

P Paget, General 283-4 Palestine 1 2 9 .2 0 5 -6 British Mandate 2 Jewish migration to 142, 162 riots in 4 5 ,1 4 2 .2 5 4 pan-Arabism 59. 6 1 -2 , 94. 162-3, 189 Patriotic Front 204, 220. 228 Paul-Boncour, Joseph 108, 131. 212 Permanent Mandates Commission (PM C. Geneva) 6. 29. 42. 45, 54. 103-10, 125-7, 129 Picot, Georges 59 pipeline question 55-8 Poncet, André-Francois 204 Ponsot, Henri 219, 2 4 7 -9 Consultative Council and 6 3 -6 critics in France 23-4 elections and 1931-2 6 1 - 3 ,6 5 - 7 .7 0 .7 2 . 7 4 -5

[3131

F rench I mperi ali sm in Syria 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 Renaudel, M . 114 Reynaud, M . 60 Rida, Rashid 14 al-Rikabi, Rida Pasha 6 7 -8 , 77 riots see demonstrations and riots Rivet, Vice Admiral 167 Roux, M . 75

Constituent Assembly (1928) 9 -1 0 , 14-15, 18 Presidential 8 7 -9 ethnic/religious minorities in Syria and 118-19 illness 125-6, 128 installation as High Commissioner 5 Iraq and 58 policies o f 6 - 7 ,4 5 ,4 8 - 9 ,2 4 7 - 9 Constituent Assembly and 19, 2 1 -2 , 2 4 - 5 ,2 7 - 9 .3 2 - 3 economic 106 Franco-Syrian Treaty o f Friendship and Alliance 3 0 - 1 ,4 5 - 6 ,7 6 ,9 7 , 1 0 0 - 3 ,1 0 8 - 3 1 ,2 4 8 monarchy 2 6 - 7 ,4 7 , 55, 5 7 ,6 0 proposed division o f Syria 104-6 suppression o f unrest 76 Syrian constitution and 19, 2 1 -2 , 2 4 - 5 ,2 7 - 9 , 3 2 - 3 ,4 5 - 6 ,4 9 - 5 2 ,6 3 Syrian nationalists and 5 - 6 ,9 - 1 2 , 1 4 - 1 5 ,3 3 - 5 ,4 3 - 6 ,6 2 .9 8 ,1 0 5 , 1 3 0 -1 ,2 4 8 -9 Taj government and 11-12, 17-18, 4 7 - 9 ,6 3 transfer to Morocco 128 press French 2 8 - 9 ,4 3 - 4 , 50-1, 204, 211, 254-5 Lebanese 5 0 ,1 1 6 Syrian 43, 6 2 ,6 7 ,6 9 , 7 5 -6 , 9 5 ,1 1 6 Puaux, Gabriel 256-8

S Saint Quentin, M . 2 1 ,4 4 , 119, 152, 208, 249 al-Sarmini, Abd al-Qadir 155 Sarrail, General 3, 24 Sarraut, Alben 2 0 3 ,2 0 6 Saudi Arabia 164 Schoeffler, M . 222 Service des Renseignments 9 al-Sha'ab (newspaper) 95 al-Sha‘bani, Shakir Ni*mat 6 7 ,7 1 , 9 0 -2 , 9 4 ,1 0 0 ,1 2 1 - 2 ,1 4 7 ,1 5 2 ,1 5 6 Shahbandar, D r Abd al-Rahman 13 -1 4 , 5 9 ,2 2 0 , 258 Shamiyya, Tawfiq 1 3 ,1 6 , 270 al-Sharif, Ihsan 9, 110-11, 220 al-Shihabi, Emir Mustafa 197, 205 Shishakli, Tawfiq 111, 1 4 5 ,1 4 7 ,1 6 4 , 194 Shishakli, Wadi* 2 3 ,6 9 Shone, Terence 2 8 0 ,2 8 3 Shulak, Khalid 188 Sixte-Quentin, M . 114 Social Nationalist Party 258 Solh, A fif 1 1 0 -1 1 ,2 7 0 Solh, Riyad 1 1 1 ,2 7 0 ,2 7 2 - 3 Solomiac, M . 44, 5 5 ,6 2 ,6 8 ,7 5 - 7 , 8 7 - 8 ,9 0 ,9 3 Soviet Union 271 Spears, Edward 2 6 6 -7 , 270, 272, 274, 2 7 6 -8 , 2 8 0 ,2 8 5 Steel Shirts (al-Qumsan al-Hadidiyya) 2 1 4 -1 5 ,2 2 0 -1 strikes 5 3 ,8 5 General Strike (1936) 193-205 Sykes-Picot agreement (May 1916) 2, 287 Syria Ayyubi government 196-7, 227 constitution (organic law) 2, 6 - 7 , 1 9 -2 3 ,3 0 , 109

Q

al-Qabas (newspaper)

116, 160 qadha 14 Qumbaz, Abbud 226 Qumbaz, Abd al-Hamid 69 al-Quwwatli, Shukri 13-14, 59, 94, 97, 111, 191. 193, 195, 220, 227-8. 2 57-8, 269, 2 8 1 -3

R railways 56, 60, 156 Raslan, Mazhar 9. 70, 93. 106, 111. 121, 270 Rees, M. van 105 Reform Party (Hizb al-Islah) 67

1314]

Index

French imposition o f 45, 50-2, 55, 63 High Commissioner and 19, 21 -2 , 2 4 -5 . 2 7 - 9 ,3 2 - 3 ,4 5 - 6 .4 9 - 5 2 Syrian nationalists and 20, 30, 3 3 - 5 .5 1 - 2 ,5 5 creation o f 2 -3 Dam ad government 9 -1 2 Directorate government 257-8 division o f 2 -3 , 104-5 economy o f 52 -3 . 8 5 -6 , 95, 106, 1 5 5 -6 ,1 6 7 , 254 elections in 4 1931-2 6 1 - 3 .6 6 - 7 7 1936 2 2 2 ,2 2 6 1943 270 Constituent Assembly ( 1928) 4, 9 -1 0 , 14-18 Presidential 8 6 -9 2 ethnic/religious minorities in 2 -3 , 7. 16, 3 0 ,6 7 , 7 0 -1 . 113, 117-20, 1 6 5 - 7 .2 1 0 ,2 1 6 in post-Treaty period 254-5 reunion and 222-5 flag o f 92 French fighting in 281-4 French Mandate 2, 129-30, 247-52 British intervention and 260-8, 27 2 -3 , 276-80, 28 2 -7 Constituent Assembly and 2 0-4 Free French and 259 -8 7 French attitudes to 6 -8 , 18-19, 2 3 - 5 ,3 1 .3 3 - 4 ,4 1 - 4 , 5 0 - 1 .9 6 , 114-15,251 nationalists response to 2, 8 -9 , 11, 18-21, 2 9 -30, 33. 4 3 -5 . 4 9 .6 1 , 9 9 -100, 168 Permanent Mandates Commission (PM C. Geneva) 6, 29, 42. 45. 54. 103-10, 125-7. 129 staff o f 32, 46 Vichy administration 258-9, 261-2 see also Franco-Syrian Treaty o f Friendship and Alliance General Strike ( 1936) 193-205 independence o f 261, 265, 274, 276, 284, 286 -7

French negotiation on 2 7 7 -8 , 281 Mardam government 22 7 -8 , 2 5 5 -6 monarchism in 2 5 -7 , 47, 51. 55-61 Parliament 9 0 -4 , 123-4, 152-3 suspension o f 1 4 6 -5 0 ,1 5 2 -3 . 1 5 6 -6 1 ,2 4 8 , 2 5 7 -8 proposed decentralization o f 158-9. 161. 167. 169-70. 186, 188 rebellions in 3 ,6 amnesties after 13, 23 Secretary-Generals government (1931-32) 6 3 -4 Taj governments 1 1 - 1 3 ,1 5 - 1 8 ,3 1 , 4 3 .4 7 - 9 ,5 1 .5 3 ,6 1 .6 3 , 153-4. 157. 169-70. 196, 265 unity question 102, 105-6, 109-16, 146, 151. 158-9. 166, 2 08-9. 216 -1 7 reunion 222 -5 Syrian nationalists constitution and 20, 30, 3 3 -5 , 51-2, 55 crackdown on 191 demands o f 5 -6 , 8 -9 , 9 7 -8 , 187, 192-5, 198 divisions among 8, 13-14, 52, 59. 9 4 -5 , 9 7 -8 . 107 elections and 1931-2 6 4 ,6 6 - 7 7 1936 2 2 2 ,2 2 6 1943 270 Constituent Assembly ( 1928) 10, 14-17 Franco-Syrian treaty and delegation to Paris 4, 200, 2 02-3. 205-21 implementation o f 22 5 -8 proposals and negotiation 3 0 -1 , 4 5 -6 , 76, 9 7 -1 0 3 . 105. 108-31. 142-50. 167-9. 200 ratification problems 2 5 5 -7 Free French and 264 French High Commissioner and Martel 144, 150. 166-7, 171, 191-2, 196, 2 0 0 -3 , 250 Ponsot 5 -6 . 9 - 12, 14-15. 33-5 , 4 3 -6 . 62. 98, 105, 1 3 0 -1 .2 4 8 -9 General Strike and 193-205

[315]

F r e n c h I m p e r i a l i s m i n S yr i a 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 6 in government 9 3 - 4 ,9 7 - 8 , 107, 2 2 7 - 8 ,2 5 1 .2 5 5 - 6 ,2 7 0 intimidation o f opponents by 85 links with France 31 monarchy and 2 5 -6 , 5 9 ,61 offices 186, 188-9 organisations 8 - 9 ,1 6 2 pan-Arabism and 5 9 ,6 1 - 2 , 94, 162-3, 189 Permanent Mandates Commission (PM C, Geneva) and 104-6, 109 response to French Mandate 2, 8 -9 , 11, 1 8 - 2 1 ,2 9 - 3 0 ,3 3 ,4 3 - 5 ,4 9 , 5 5 ,6 1 ,9 9 - 1 0 0 ,1 6 8 response to riots in Palestine 45, 142-3 Steel Shirts 2 1 4 -1 5 ,2 2 0 -1 suspension o f Constituent Assembly and 43 suspension o f Parliament and 149-50, 160-1 Syrian economy and 95, 156, 254 unity question 102, 105-6, 109-16, 146, 151, 158-9, 166, 2 0 8-9, 216 -1 7 weakness o f 53-5, 157 Syrian-Palestinian Congress 8, 14, 44, 59

Tripoli, proposed pipeline to 5 6 -7 Truman, Harry S. 284 Tunisia 32 Turkey 3 ,2 6 5 ambitions towards Alexandretta 221, 2 5 3 ,2 5 5 , 2 91-5 French relations with 2 5 4 -5 , 2 9 1 -5 Ottoman Empire 1 -2 ,9 3 , 163 U al-Ulshi, Jamil 13, 1 6 ,6 3 ,6 8 , 153 Union des Gauches 96 Union o f Weavers 53 United Nations Conference 282 United Parties 4 6 -7 United Patriotic Front 204, 220, 22 8 United Sû tes o f America 271

V Versailles Peace Conference 1 Viénot, Pierre 2 1 2 -1 4 , 217, 219, 2 4 9 , 2 5 0 ,2 9 1 Violette, M. 219

W Wafd Party (Egypt) 164, 186 Wafd (Syrian delegation to Paris) 4, 200. 2 0 2 -3 ,2 0 5 -2 1 Weber, M. 9 4 ,9 9 ,1 2 1 - 2 , 146-8. 151 Weygand, General 14 White Badge 226 Wilson, General 263 W ilson, Woodrow 1

T Taj al-Din al-Hasani, Shaykh Muhammad 11-18, 2 2 -3 , 27, 30, 50, 6 7 -8 , 72, 77. 89, 151, 156, 188 government o f 11-13, 1 5 - 1 8 ,3 1 ,4 3 , 4 7 - 9 .5 1 ,5 3 ,6 1 ,6 3 , 196 second government 153-4, 157, 169-70 third government 265 Tappouni, Cardinal Archbishop 62, 67, 70. 118, 255 Tarrit, Colonel 224 taxation 52, 85, 106 Temps. Le 28, 4 3 -4 , 204 Tessan, M. de 255 Tharaud, Jérôme and Jean 254 trade unions 53, 69 Trenga, Colonel 62

Y Yemen

164

al- Yom (newspaper)

76

Z Zaglul, Sa ad 186 Zionism 129, 142-3, 161-2 al-Zubi, Faris 160

[316]