Freedom and Reason

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FREEDOM AND REASON

FREEDOM AND REASON BY

R. M. HARE FELLOW OF DALLIOL COLLEGE OXFORD

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4 GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

BOMBAY CALClflTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACCA CAPE TOWN

SALISBURY

NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRA

KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG

© Oxford University Press I963

FIRST PUBLISHED

1963

REPRINTED LITHOGRAPHICALLY AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD FROM CORRECTED SHEETS OF THE FIRST EDITION

1964

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

ONU'.P

PREFACE THE function of moral philosophy-or at any rate the hope with which I study it-is that of helping us to think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought is expressed. When I wrote my first book, which was a study of the chief moral words, I had no more than a dim notion of what account of moral reasoning would develop out of this study-only the convic­ tion that, if it were well done, our understanding of moral questions would be increased. In the years since, this hope has not proved entirely vain; and, although I am still far from clear on many matters, I think it worth while to publish this progress report, if only to enlist the help of others in becoming clearer. My views have been the subject of a great deal of con­ troversy; but any reader who is looking in this book for a full-scale rebuttal of my critics will be disappointed. I did, indeed, in preparation for writing it, draft about fifty pages of polemical matter irt answer to the most widely canvassed objections; but, having thus convinced myself that they could be answered, I came to feel that the answers to them were less exciting than the positive things which I had to say, and possibly of less durable interest; I therefore put them aside, to appear elsewhere. I have profited greatly from these dis­ cussions; but I am obstinate enough to believe that, though they have added much to what I thought before, they have not taken much away. There will be found, therefore, in this book, only passing allusions to these wrangles. Lest they should be thought to be directed at the views of particular people, I must make clear that, in all cases except where names are mentioned, the

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PREFACE

views referred to are ones which I have heard in discussion, but cannot ascribe to any identifiable person. I must, how­ ever, express my thanks to a great many identifiable, but for reasons of space unidentified, people, for the interest which they have shown in my opinions, and for the help they have given me in finding out what objections I have. to meet. Much has been omitted besides polemics, for the same reasons as were given in the preface to my first book. In particular, I have, as before, left two or three palpable loose ends, knowing that any book about moral reasoning is bound to be incomplete wherever it stops. For example, I have devoted only a very short digression to the problem of free will; a whole book would be required to say anything useful about this problem. I have, on similar grounds, contented myself with pointing out certain affinities between my own position and that of the writers of the utilitarian tradition; I have left unanswered many questions which must be asked by anybody who wishes to produce a watertight theory of this sort. Here, as in many other places, I have tried only to provide material for future discussion. Books and articles are constantly appearing on the subject of moral language and moral thought; and if I may seem to have ignored most of them, I have the excuse that to have attempted to read them all would have put an end to my hopes of writing anything. Those which I have read were picked out more by chance than by any considered policy or assessment of the merits of their authors; I have learnt much from them, and can only ask the forgiveness of those whose work I have neglected. These, I am sure, include many ,,·ho have criticized me; perhaps they may find, in the positive v�ews here put forward, some defence against their criti­ cisms. I owe a great debt of thanks to the Council of Humanities of Princeton University for appointing me, in the autumn of 1957, to the fellowship which gave the opportunity to start

PREFACE

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writing this book under ideal conditions; to my colleagues in the department there for much stimulating discussion; and to my own college, Balliol, for setting me free for that term. It is written for all who are seriously troubled by moral questions, and dedicated especially to my children. May it be that, through the discussion of the problems of ethics, the world in which they have to live may be one in which these matters are better understood. Balliol College 1962

R. M. H.

CONTENTS PART I DESCRIBING AND PRESCRIBING I.

Introduction

I

2.

Descriptive Meaning

7

3· Principles

30

4· 'Ought' and 'Can'

51

5. Backsliding

67

PART II MORAL REASONING

6. A Moral Argument

86 v

7. Utilitarianism

112

8. Ideals

1 37

9. Toleration and Fanaticism

1 57

PART III FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 1

o. Logic and Morals

1 1.

A Practical Example

INDEX

186 203 225

PART I

DESCRIBING AND PRESCRIBING He to whom thou was sent for ease, being by name Legality, is the son of the Bon