Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad: Post-war Reconciliation in International Perspectives [2021 ed.] 9783030551438

Table of contents :
Book_BookNotesTitle_1
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Editors and Contributors
Introduction
Reconciliation: A Definitory Approach
1 Introduction
2 A Definitory Approach to an Emotive Term
2.1 Reconciliation: A Multi-dimensional Process
2.2 Emotional Control and Reconciliation: Story of an Emotional Relationship
3 Remember, Forget, and Reconcile
3.1 Experience of Violence and the Difficulty of Dealing with the Past
3.2 Dialogic Remembering as the Foundation for Reconciliation
3.3 Finding the Right Moment
4 Summary: Reconciliation as a Sensitizing Force for the Interaction and Networking of Many Narratives
References
“Motor of Europe” as a Potential Role Model for the Western Balkans
1 Introduction
2 Political Leadership and Reconciliation: Spirals of Mutual Blame
3 Stumbling Blocks of Rapprochement: Inflammatory Rhetoric Along Party Lines
4 Stumbling Blocks of Rapprochement: Incompatible Narratives of Conflict
5 The Role of Cultural Actors: Strong Civil Society Infrastructure for Reconciliation
6 The Role of the EU: Between Promotion and Turning a Blind Eye
7 Rapprochement of Serbia and Croatia: Contextual Differences and Lessons Learned
References
From Discourse to Practice: A Case Study from the Western Balkans on the Transferability of Franco-German Experiences
1 Introduction
2 Challenges and Limits to Franco-German Transfers of Experience
3 From General Discussions About Youth Exchanges in the Balkans to the Creation of RYCO
3.1 The Dynamics of the Berlin Process
3.2 Active Support by Franco-German Actors
4 Finding the Balance Between Regional Ownership and External Involvement
4.1 A Twofold Role
4.2 Moderating and Facilitating
5 Looking at Other Experiences and Avoiding Attempts to Copy-Paste
5.1 Hearing About Other Experiences
5.2 RYCO’s Structure in Comparison to the FGYO
6 Conclusion: How to Continue? Developing Cooperation and Sharing “Lessons Learned”
References
The Franco-German Reconciliation Narrative from the Dutch Perspective
1 Introduction
2 So Near and Yet So Far
3 Object of Study and Methods
4 Corpus
5 Quantitative Evaluation
5.1 Phony Friendship
5.2 The Franco-German Friendship as a Threat
5.3 The Joint Role
5.4 Irrelevance
5.5 Coming to Terms with the Past
6 Historical Contextualization
7 Conclusion: “More Germany Means Less France” (J. Gerritsen 1993)
References
An Inspiring and Intimidating Relationship: Franco-German Cooperation from the Polish Perspective
1 Introduction
2 Intersection: Historical Overview
3 Inspiration: Looking to the West
4 Anxiety: Fearing the West
5 Hope: Joining the West
6 Conclusion
References
On the Transferability of the Franco-German Model: The Case of Ukraine and Russia
1 Introduction
2 The Russian–Ukrainian War
2.1 Historical Background
2.2 Political Background
3 The Transferability of the Franco-German Model onto Russian–Ukrainian Relations
3.1 History
3.2 Institutions
3.3 Leadership
3.4 International Context
4 What Next?
References
Reconciliation Through Trust and a Common Destiny: The Algerian and Moroccan Relationship on the Line
1 Introduction
2 The Relationship Between Algeria and Morocco: A Historical Primer
3 Conflict and Reconciliation in Algeria and Morocco: A Current Analysis
3.1 Grief 1—The Algerian War of Independence Against France (1954–1962)
3.2 Grief 2—Territories, Borders, and Regional Ambitions
3.3 Grief 3—Oil Wealth and Different Economic Cultures
3.4 Grief 4—Closed Border, Security, and Collaboration
4 A Franco-German Model? National Reconciliation and Economic Integration
5 Future Scenarios: Changing Public Perceptions and Stereotypes
6 Conclusion
References
Transferability of the Franco-German Model in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
1 Introduction
2 Geographical Proximity: Defending and Crossing Borders
3 Transforming Relationships: Looking for Common Ground
4 Geopolitical Change: (The End of) the Cold War as a Factor of Rapprochement
5 Discussion
References
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Difficult Pathway Toward Reconciliation: A Conversation
1 Introduction
2 What are the Origins of the Conflict Between Iran and Saudi Arabia? How has it Developed Until Today?
3 Have the Two Countries Tried to Carry Out a Reconciliation Process or at Least a De-escalation Process in the Last Few Decades? Who were the Initiators and the Actors in this Process, and Which Factors have Supported or Hindered this?
4 In the Case of the Franco-German Relationship, External Actors Such as the USA Played a Decisive Role. Is this also the Case for Iran and Saudi Arabia?
5 To What Extent Does Civil Society Play an Active or Passive Role in the Relationship Between Iran and Saudi Arabia?
6 To What Extent do the Narratives of Conflict Differ? Are There any Attempts to Bring Them Together, for Example by Historians?
7 What is the Image of Iran/Saudi Arabia in the Respective Neighboring Country Today? What Role do Stereotypes Play in the Bilateral Relation?
8 To What Extent Can the Franco-German Experience be Helpful for Observing the Relationship Between Iran and Saudi Arabia? To What Extent Can the Franco-German Model not be Transferred to It?
9 What Scenarios are Conceivable Today for the Future of the Iranian-Saudi Relationship and for the Region in the Next Decade?
Indo-Pak Reconciliation Through the Franco-German Mirror
1 Introduction
2 A Very Different Historical Background
2.1 Emergence of National Identities and Bilateral Relations
2.2 The Cold War Factor
3 Reconciliation and Normalization of State Relations: A Difficult Comparison
3.1 Different Experiences of Reconciliation Attempts
3.2 Significant Experiences
3.3 Back Channel Talks
4 Opportunities and Limits of the Human Factor
4.1 Humanitarian Assistance
4.2 SAARC: An Instrument for Promoting Regional Cooperation?
4.3 External ‘Assistance’
5 Looking Ahead
References
Generous Gesture? Franco-German Reconciliation from the Korean Perspective
1 Introduction
2 Franco-German Rapprochement: A Difficult Model for Japanese-Korean Relations
2.1 Unresolved Historical Problems
2.2 Only a Historical Point of Reference
3 Heated “Shadow of the Past”
3.1 Two Different Visions of the Politics of Memory
3.2 Controversy About “Comfort Women”
4 Coming to Terms with the Past
4.1 Reconciliation as a Complex Process
4.2 Two Sides of Reconciliation
5 Lessons Learned from the Franco-German Experience
5.1 Failure of Bilateral Cooperation on the Governmental Level
5.2 Joint Textbook Projects
6 Conclusion
References
Franco-German Reconciliation Through the Prism of East Asia: A Japanese Perspective
1 Introduction
2 Franco-German Reconciliation—A Model for East Asia?
2.1 Reconciliation and Coming to Terms with the Past
2.2 Coming to Terms with Colonial History
3 Historical Dialogue and Transnational Commemorative Cultures
3.1 Historical Dialogue and History Textbooks in East Asia
3.2 What the Franco-German History Book Can Teach Us
3.3 Reconciliation and Memory as Political Symbolism
4 The Vitality of Civil Society and the Creation of a “Parapublic” Sphere
4.1 Youth Exchanges
4.2 City Twinnings
4.3 The Trans-Nationalization of the Media
5 Conclusion: Germany and France in the Global “Reconciliation Cloud”
References
The Deconstruction of Ethnic Identity: Germany, France, and Rwanda
1 Introduction
2 The Construction of Divisions and Ethnic Identity in Europe and Rwanda
2.1 Divisions and Divisionism in Rwanda
2.2 Nationalism and Divisionism in Germany and Europe
3 The Deconstruction of Ethnic Identities
3.1 The Politics of National Reconstruction After the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
3.2 Deconstruction of German/French Conflict Identities
4 Comparative Overview
5 Conclusion
References
South Africa’s Reconciliation Project 25 years After Democracy
1 Introduction
2 Reconciliation: A Conceptual Clarification
3 Salient Features of the Franco-German Reconciliation Process
4 Reconciliation in South Africa at a Crossroads
5 The Franco-German and South African Reconciliation Processes: Similarities and Differences
6 Conclusions
References
Debating the History of Franco-German Reconciliation with Third-Party Countries: A Review
1 Introduction
2 Conditions of Expertise
2.1 Initiating Meetings: French and Germans or Third-Party Countries in Conflict
2.2 Formal Frameworks—Informal Meetings: A Blurred Line
3 Benefits and Limits of Meetings with Third-Party Countries
3.1 Different Types of Specialist Contributions
3.2 Limits and Pitfalls of Comparison
3.3 Conveying Symbolic and Diplomatic Messages Against the Odds
3.4 Risk of Increased Tension and Boomerang Effects
4 The Tale of “Franco-German Reconciliation” Seen from Outside
References
Post-War Reconciliation Around the World: Lessons Learned from the Franco-German Experience

Citation preview

Frontiers in International Relations

Nicole Colin · Claire Demesmay Editors

Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad Post-war Reconciliation in International Perspectives

Frontiers in International Relations Series Editors Benjamin Tallis, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic Maren Hofius, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany Elke Schwarz, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK Kristin Haugevik, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway

This book series pushes the boundaries of International Relations (IR) and breaks new ground by thinking and writing from the limits of the discipline and beyond. Frontiers in International Relations (FIR) welcomes original scholarship that expands and challenges our understanding of IR by exploring new subfields, offering innovative perspectives on pressing problems, or enquiring into IR’s analytical and normative premises. To that end, it explicitly seeks works that engage in cross-disciplinary dialogue with related disciplines and develop innovative ways to analyse and approach the subject matter. The series welcomes standard monographs and edited volumes, as well as handbooks. It particularly encourages early-career scholars and innovative projects to submit manuscripts, and provides rapid and constructive feedback. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16555

Nicole Colin Claire Demesmay •

Editors

Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad Post-war Reconciliation in International Perspectives

123

Editors Nicole Colin Aix-Marseille University Aix-en-Provence, France

Claire Demesmay German Council on Foreign Relations Berlin, Germany

ISSN 2662-9429 ISSN 2662-9437 (electronic) Frontiers in International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-55143-8 ISBN 978-3-030-55144-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

In cooperation and with friendly support:

Editors Nicole Colin Claire Demesmay Concept Claire Demesmay Members of the Scientific Board Gili Drori, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Ronja Kempin, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin/Germany Barbara Kunz, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Germany Christian Lequesne, Center for International Studies (CERI), Paris/France Hélène Miard-Delacroix, Sorbonne University, Paris/France Ton Nijhuis, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Pernille Rieker, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo/Norway Stefan Seidendorf, Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg (dfi), Germany Publishing Editor Oliver Gascoigne Collaborator Alix Brodersen Translators Translated from the French and German by Merrick Nock, Bridget Schäfer and Imogen Taylor

Foreword

On 22 January 2019, on the occasion of the 56th anniversary of the historic Élysée Treaty, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel signed a new Franco-German Treaty in the city of Aachen. This “Treaty of Aachen” stipulates even closer cooperation between France and Germany in their bilateral and international relations, including between the German and French ministries, border regions and civil societies. Born in Saarland, a region steeped in Franco-German history, I am particularly grateful for the close and trusting relationship between the two countries. Who could have imagined that, after three wars since 1870 and just 75 years after the end of the Second World War, a united Germany would be a fully sovereign member of the European Union? After the German war of aggression had devastated large parts of Europe and claimed millions of victims, who would have expected that Germany would so soon be welcomed back into the community of civilized nations? Courageous and visionary Europeans in France and Germany, but also in Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands paved the way for European cooperation and reconciliation. The key to this development lays in the willingness of the French to reach out their hand to Germany through the Franco-German rapprochement, a process which ultimately led to true reconciliation between the two countries. The Élysée Treaty of 1963 was a historic step in the reconciliation process between France and Germany. It rejected the notion that the two countries were sworn enemies and represented a clear affirmation of Franco-German friendship and the further advancement of the European project. Although we have often had differing perspectives on various European topics, and still do today, it has always been possible to reach compromises that have also found support among our European friends and partners. Reconciliation was possible because both parties not only looked ahead, but also undertook an honest examination of their common past and acknowledged their joint responsibility for peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

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Foreword

The close bilateral cooperation between France and Germany, carried out in a spirit of mutual trust, has also contributed to improving multilateral cooperation. In 1975, on the initiative of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the heads of government from France, Germany, the USA, Japan, the UK and Italy gathered at the Château de Rambouillet to find shared and coordinated solutions to the oil crisis. This was the founding moment of the G7 (at that time the G6, with Canada joining one year later). While the forum was initially founded as a platform for discussing economic policy issues, it soon broadened its focus to include foreign and security policy. Today, France and Germany are once again pushing for more multilateral cooperation. Together, we are the spearhead of the “Alliance for Multilateralism”, which advocates global cooperation at a time of increasing nationalism. And we contribute jointly to peacebuilding and reconciliation projects in third countries, such as Mali or Ukraine. Too often, however, we focus on political history, forgetting that FrancoGerman reconciliation has been achieved first and foremost by the citizens of the two countries. Civil society is the backbone of our relations. As early as 1950, Ludwigsburg and Montbéliard established the first of today’s 2200 Franco-German town twinning partnerships. Since then, innumerable encounters between French and German citizens have ensued. The work of the Franco-German Youth Office brings the younger generation closer together and helps to challenge and overcome national stereotypes. This is why the Treaty of Aachen makes ever closer civil society exchange a priority. What can be learned from the process of Franco-German reconciliation with regard to other conflicts in the world? This is the question guiding this excellent research project. Looking at different conflicts around the world and comparing them through the lens of the Franco-German experience are a highly effective approach. Conflicts are of course always unique: culture, history, religion and geography make them difficult to compare. Nevertheless, the experience of Franco-German reconciliation can still provide very useful insights into crisis resolution in general. It is a source of inspiration and an example of a successful practice that can be adapted to the respective context. This project is also invaluable as it prompts us to ask ourselves what France and Germany can still learn from analysing current conflicts. It is an important reminder that Franco-German reconciliation cannot be taken for granted and that we have to keep working hard each day to sustain and further develop our cooperation. In July 2020, Germany has taken over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with France set to assume the role in January 2022. The EU currently faces immense challenges and has endured a decade of crisis, which has led to rifts appearing between North and South, and East and West. The way we overcome the current COVID-19 pandemic over the next few years, both in terms of health policy and socio-economic solutions, will be decisive for the future success of the European project and our common vision of a “Europe united”. The couple franco-allemand must now build on the experience it has gained in recent decades and set its sights on reconciling the different perspectives and approaches

Foreword

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within the EU and between member states and strengthening European sovereignty. We cannot afford to understate the value of the European Union or lose sight of what it is: the most successful peace project in history. Berlin, Germany

Heiko Maas Bundesminister des Auswärtigen

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) for its support in coordinating this research project and disseminating its findings. The DGAP provides wide-ranging expertise at the interface between science and politics in the fields of international relations and the Franco-German relationship and is well acquainted with preparing political recommendations. In particular, we owe a debt of gratitude to Sara Jakob, who invested a great deal of energy and creativity in the smooth organization of the workshops in Berlin, to Alix Brodersen, who went to great lengths and dedicated much time helping to make this publication what it is, and to Henning Hoff, who shared his inventiveness with us. Thanks are also due to the Federal Foreign Office for funding the workshops and this book and which will also work to raise the profile of the outcome of this project beyond academic circles. The project conception was supported by our collaboration with the Franco-German Youth Office, whose financial and substantive support made it possible to share the ideas contained in this book with a young audience interested in peacebuilding. Thanks to their academic profiles and their geographical distribution around the world, the centres for German and European studies of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) enabled us to find a number of suitable experts for the different regions. We are particularly grateful to the Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam not only for offering its expertise, but also for funding translation costs. Finally, the project would not have been possible without the commitment of many fine minds. We are sincerely grateful to all the authors who embarked with enthusiasm on this intellectual adventure and the members of the scientific council who contributed to the book’s quality with their valuable comments, as well as our two translators and our publishing editor.

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nicole Colin and Claire Demesmay

1

Reconciliation: A Definitory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ulrich Pfeil

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“Motor of Europe” as a Potential Role Model for the Western Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tara Tepavac

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From Discourse to Practice: A Case Study from the Western Balkans on the Transferability of Franco-German Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nicolas Moll

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The Franco-German Reconciliation Narrative from the Dutch Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Britta Bendieck and Nicole Colin

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An Inspiring and Intimidating Relationship: Franco-German Cooperation from the Polish Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kornelia Kończal

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On the Transferability of the Franco-German Model: The Case of Ukraine and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alla Paslavska

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Reconciliation Through Trust and a Common Destiny: The Algerian and Moroccan Relationship on the Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Idriss Jebari Transferability of the Franco-German Model in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Cécile Cohen-Blaser and Gisela Dachs

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Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Difficult Pathway Toward Reconciliation: A Conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Adnan Tabatabai Indo-Pak Reconciliation Through the Franco-German Mirror . . . . . . . . 145 Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy Generous Gesture? Franco-German Reconciliation from the Korean Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Dong-Ki Lee Franco-German Reconciliation Through the Prism of East Asia: A Japanese Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Akiyoshi Nishiyama The Deconstruction of Ethnic Identity: Germany, France, and Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Eric Ns. Ndushabandi and Rainer Schmidt South Africa’s Reconciliation Project 25 years After Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Jan Hofmeyr Debating the History of Franco-German Reconciliation with Third-Party Countries: A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Corine Defrance Post-War Reconciliation Around the World: Lessons Learned from the Franco-German Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Claire Demesmay

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Nicole Colin Full professor of German culture at Aix-Marseille University (AMU), director of the German-French graduate school “Conflicts of cultures—cultures of conflicts” (AMU/University of Tübingen) and honorary professor at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). Her research interests focus on the theory of cultural transfer, the cultural exchange between France and Germany, cultural heritage and the sociology of cultural fields. Selected publications: Colin, N., & Umlauf, J. (2018). Im Schatten der Versöhnung: Deutsch-französische Kulturmittler im Kontext der Europäischen Integration (In the Shadows of Reconciliation: Franco-German Cultural Mediators in the Context of European Integration). Göttingen: Steidl Verlag; Colin, N., Defrance, C., Pfeil, U., Umlauf, J. (2015). Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945 (Lexicon of Franco-German Cultural Relations after 1945). Tübingen: Narr. Claire Demesmay is head of the “France/Franco-German Relations” programme at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. Her research focuses on Franco-German cooperation in European policy, as well as on French and German foreign policy. Before joining the DGAP in 2009, she worked at the Chair of French and Francophone Studies at the Technical University of Dresden (1998–2002), then as a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri) in Paris (2002–2009). She holds her Ph.D. in political philosophy from the University of Paris 4-Sorbonne and the Technical University of Berlin. Selected publications: Demesmay, C. (2018). Idées reçues sur l’Allemagne. Un modèle en question (Common preconceptions about Germany. A model in question). Paris:

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Le cavalier bleu; Calla, C. & Demesmay, C. (2013). Que reste-t-il du couple franco-allemand? (What remains of the Franco-German couple?). Paris: Documentation française; Franco-German Parliamentary Prize 2016.

Contributors1 Britta Bendieck University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Cécile Cohen-Blaser University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland; Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Nicole Colin Aix-Marseille University, Aix-en-Provence, France Gisela Dachs Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Corine Defrance CNRS, University of Paris, Paris, France Claire Demesmay German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany Jan Hofmeyr Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, South Africa Idriss Jebari Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland Kornelia Kończal Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, India Dong-Ki Lee Professor, Department of Peace Studies, Kangwon National University, Chuncheon, South Korea Nicolas Moll Independent researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Eric Ns. Ndushabandi Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace-Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Akiyoshi Nishiyama Kyoritsu Women’s University, Tokyo, Japan Alla Paslavska Ivan Franko National University, Lviv, Ukraine Ulrich Pfeil Université de Lorraine, Metz, France Rainer Schmidt University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Adnan Tabatabai Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn, Germany Tara Tepavac Karl-Franzens University, Graz, Austria 1

Authors of joint contributions appear in alphabetical order. This does not represent any judgement, neither on the commitment of the individual authors, nor on their scientific position.

Introduction Nicole Colin and Claire Demesmay

Abstract Franco-German reconciliation after 1945, which has long been perceived as self-evident in both countries, has a high symbolic value worldwide. In many countries involved in conflicts, the history of the rapprochement of the historical hereditary enemies offers a promising point of orientation for the future. However, it seems questionable whether the Franco-German example can actually be applied to other cases. Based on this observation, the introduction clarifies the conditions under which experts from fifteen different countries analyze Franco-German relations “from the outside” and relate the principles of their reconciliation to the history and political topicality of their own country. Above all, it explains the need for a multiperspective approach that takes into account the political, cultural, and civil society dimensions of the respective conflicts in equal measure and at the same time makes us aware of the “myths” of this reconciliation process.

The idea for this book emerged in the course of several visits abroad in the context of Franco-German projects, during lectures and discussions with audiences who were not familiar with the history of conflict and rapprochement between the two countries. In Macedonia, for example, the Franco-German Youth Office organized a panel discussion on Franco-German relations in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty. The discussion was lively, and the young people present were clearly seeking keys to understanding their own situation. Similar encounters occurred in subsequent years in Israel and Russia, and further afield still in China and Japan. As Corine Defrance shows in this book, the way Franco-German history is interpreted in other countries is always defined by different viewpoints that are shaped by national and regional contexts. This approach can be one-dimensional, N. Colin Aix-Marseille University, Aix-en-Provence, France e-mail: [email protected] C. Demesmay (B) German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_1

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and it is sometimes instrumentalized. However, for experts in Franco-German cooperation traveling abroad, the level of interest is striking, particularly in contrast to the frequently indifferent perception of Franco-German relations among the populations of Germany and France.1 After all, the exemplary development of Franco-German reconciliation and the advantages it offers have long been taken for granted. From outside, however, many are still fascinated by the fact that, after centuries of war and conflict, historic hereditary enemies were able to become close allies. This achievement has been an object of admiration for over 70 years, and it shows no sign of wearing thin. One reason is certainly that the impacts of this reconciliation clearly go well beyond mere bilateral cooperation. The effective functioning of the Franco-German tandem is seen as the main driver of European integration and is more important than ever in an era characterized by trends toward renationalization and European skepticism. Berlin and Paris also see themselves as more than just the driving force for other countries to take joint responsibility for Europe; over the decades of their productive collaboration, they have also developed a kind of consensus workshop on the practical level, based on close coordination processes, with the aim of taking divergences and fashioning them into acceptable compromises to which other partners can also subscribe. All these reasons help explain the powerful symbolic significance attributed to the history of rapprochement between Germany and France and its positive impacts on a region of the world that had suffered wars for centuries and that was marked since the nineteenth century by a profound, often divisive nationalism. Confronted today with their own territorial rivalries and conflicts, many countries find in this example a screen onto which to project their situation and a model inspiring hope for their own future. At the same time, however, it is questionable whether the Franco-German example can in fact be applied to other international conflicts. After all, historical developments are unique in themselves and have no general applicability. In that respect, it is not a matter of exporting or importing a particular model; rather, the important thing is to analyze how the German and French experience is viewed in other countries in order to better grasp its specific characteristics from a third-party perspective. This seems to be the only way to find out which aspects of FrancoGerman reconciliation can give a productive impetus to other countries and where the limits of its application may be. The question of how far the history of Franco-German reconciliation can be applied to other situations is not new. Existing studies have already repeatedly pointed out that while it may be a source of inspiration for other countries, this can only be 1 Germany and France benefit from a largely positive image among the population of the respective

partner country. However, the neighbors see each other more as partners than as friends. In 2013, the year marking the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, the term that respondents most frequently associated with the Franco-German relationship was “partnership” (69% of the French, 59% of the Germans), well before “friendship” (30% and 40%, respectively), and even more so “trust” (16% and 20%, respectively). See Ifop/German Embassy in France (2013). Regards croisés sur les relations franco-allemandes à l’occasion du 50ème anniversaire du Traité de l’Élysée (Crossed views on Franco-German relations on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty), http://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2116-1-study_file.pdf.

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understood in the sense of a best practice example that needs to be adapted in different ways to the historical experiences, political culture, and conflict situation of the relevant actors. In this context, however, we are confronted with the difficulty that the Franco-German relationship is often seen as an actual myth, i.e., the parties merely have a superficial knowledge of a few heroes, such as General De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, and a few outstanding events, such as the Élysée Treaty. Apart from a few historians, hardly anyone really has a profound grasp of the chasms, problems, and conflicts that lined the path to reaching the joint agreements. At the same time, the ramifications of institutional, cultural, and civil society networks between the two societies are often ignored, although they facilitated the complex rapprochement process time and again and, in some cases, were what made this possible. This lack of sound knowledge appears problematic in the political context, not least because it can easily lead to misunderstandings and false conclusions, particularly in geographically distant areas of the world that are faced with fundamentally different conditions. These misunderstandings can then, at a later stage, also be instrumentalized in a negative sense. These ambivalent findings form the starting point for our research project about how the history of the Franco-German relationship is perceived and interpreted from outside. Our research aims to juxtapose the particular national characteristics determining how it is perceived in different regions of the world with how these regions perceive their own conflicts. To achieve this, the question of the extent to which the Franco-German narrative is transferable is examined not simply in general terms, but in very concrete geopolitical and transcultural contexts. Franco-German collaboration is presented as a mirror in which others can see their own situation in the present and future. Part of our focus is on determining which elements of the Franco-German relationship play an important part in how countries perceive their own conflict situations and how far it may be possible to integrate these elements into their own political future scenarios. This book is more than a mere collection of essays. It is the result of a joint project in which experts from 15 different countries participated—from South Africa to Iran and Ukraine to India and Japan. They were all willing to apply themselves to a common issue and to structure their analyses based on the same core questions. The first step comprised of two workshops in Berlin at which participants had the opportunity to present existing international conflicts in their regions from the point of view of possibilities for rapprochement and to debate convergence and divergence in the perception of the Franco-German relationship in their own countries or regions, emphasizing any special features. Having established these different perspectives, the case studies were discussed with specialists in the field of the Franco-German relationship at the historical, political, and cultural levels, analyzing the extent to which the Franco-German model can actually offer inspiration for future measures. Another important aspect of the discussions was the fact that participants not only questioned each other’s individual positions; the aim was for them to engage in critical self-reflection in the presentation of their own position.

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The project coordinators were able to identify various problem zones during the workshop discussions, which the authors could then focus on in their contributions. One important aspect was initially the general linking of historical backgrounds and current political trends, as well as specifically addressing the extent to which cultural and civil society initiatives have influenced or were able to influence the conflict. This linking of historical, political, and cultural aspects seems particularly important in the global context in view of the discrepancy that emerged between the positive resonance towards Franco-German rapprochement and the lack of basic knowledge of the complexity of the process. Five additional aspects also appeared significant: 1. Alongside the general multi-perspective approach described above, a basic precondition for the analysis we aim to achieve is placing each conflict in its historical and political context. This must also address the issue of how far thirdparty actors have played, or could play, a role (positive or negative) in relation to rapprochement. Just as the Franco-German reconciliation cannot be understood without taking Cold War conditions into account, current conflicts are also embedded in wider geopolitical developments that, in some cases, the affected countries are hardly in a position to influence. At the same time, third-party actors who accelerate developments, such as the U.S. in the case of Germany and France, may nevertheless trigger ambivalent reactions among those directly involved. After all, France’s relationship to the U.S. was, and is, fundamentally different from Germany’s. 2. A second aspect is the fact that success stories are written in retrospect, and many crises and problems are simply forgotten once agreements have been successfully signed. One example in this context is the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Élysée Treaty. A superficial glance may lead us to interpret the treaty as the result of perfect harmony between the two countries, but it is well known that this was not in fact the case. On the contrary, General de Gaulle threatened to break off negotiations shortly before the treaty was signed because the German Bundestag insisted on a preamble emphasizing the great significance of transatlantic relationships. Since France had a different (namely competitive) relationship with the U.S., this idea was not warmly received on the other side of the Rhine, though it was accepted in the end. Moreover, the Élysée Treaty’s importance has increased over the years. The myth surrounding it was built up only gradually during the 1980s as anniversaries were reached and celebrated. 3. A third important point is the issue of working through the countries’ joint history, as well as the level of importance ascribed to this aspect. Is this really the sine qua non for a successful reconciliation process? Looking at projects such as the Franco-German history textbook, widely respected around the world, it is tempting to conclude that a consensus about countries’ (joint) history is an important element of the process of rapprochement. However, a closer look reveals that the opposite was the case. Precisely, this point was initially given a wide berth at the political level after the Second World War, leaving it to civil society and academic initiatives such as the Committee of French and German Historians. Only much later was it possible to address this topic at the political level as well.

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This aspect is often forgotten in the public awareness, frequently contributing to the myth of the Franco-German reconciliation. 4. Another factor that often has an important impact on the extent to which elements of the Franco-German reconciliation process can be transferred to other conflicts is the symmetry or asymmetry in the relationship of the two countries concerned in terms of both power politics and also, in some circumstances, in the cultural field. Germany and France are equal in terms of their size and population density, as well as with respect to their scientific and cultural significance. This can definitely not be claimed in relation to other countries. On the contrary, particularly in the context of conflicts arising from situations of colonialism or oppression, we are confronted with an asymmetry that, in the post-conflict phase, results in a fundamentally different constellation from Franco-German history. Interestingly, the symmetry in the Franco-German relationship is a recurring question that occupies experts, journalists, and politicians, particularly in times of tension. 5. Last but not least, the cultural and civil society dimension of the reconciliation process between Germany and France must be taken into account. The FrancoGerman “marriage” before the treaty was signed took place in Reims Cathedral; the two politicians who exchanged vows were both Catholics, of the same generation, and influenced by similar experiences. An initial situation marked by such similarities is rare in other conflicts. On the contrary, cultural differences are often an important cause of the political conflict that then also results in negative consequences for the rapprochement of civil society. Based on these preliminary considerations, acknowledged experts from around the world have prepared contributions to this volume in which they consider conflict situations in their regions in the light of the Franco-German relationship. In so doing, they not only present the opportunities and limits of its transferability from their external perspective, but also critically examine the myth of reconciliation itself. The selection of case studies is, of course, not intended to be in any way comprehensive. Not only would that be impossible in view of the range of conflicts in the world, it would also not be useful since the project’s aim is to elucidate different elements of the German–French narrative and examine how far the methods applied in that context may be applied and transferred in a global perspective. The main criterion for the selection of case studies was the diversity of situations covered in this book. This diversity is reflected first of all in the geographical sense. The book includes contributions not only from Europe, but also from Africa and Asia—precisely the locations where the reconciliation myth often turns out to be a classic European narrative. We also selected conflicts of different kinds: Armed conflict versus political rivalry; past versus ongoing conflicts; inter-state versus innerstate conflicts; conflicts with or without a colonial background, and with or without religious factors. Finally, France and Germany play different roles in the various situations. They are both external actors in some conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan or in Southeast Asia; in others, in contrast, they play an active role, whether directly, as in the German-Polish relationship, or indirectly as a former colonial power, such as France in the case of Morocco and Algeria. During the course of the

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project, taking account of this diversity at different levels proved to be an essential criterion in order to grasp the special features of the Franco-German experience. Another decisive factor was to link experts on the conflicts examined with specialists on the Franco-German relationship, enabling both sides to exchange views and adopt new approaches to looking at history and international relations. The interplay between these diverse viewpoints also proved to be extremely productive in that it enabled participants to acquire a certain critical distance to their own positions. This distance was particularly important because, in some contributions—especially those dealing with ongoing conflicts—it was impossible to avoid a certain degree of emotional subjectivity in the presentation. Where this subjectivity did not impede a scientific approach, we decided to retain it as a special feature, a mark both of the authenticity of the positions described and of the conflicts’ wide-ranging significance. To do justice to the diversity of viewpoints and to each particular topic, we also chose a range of approaches. The situation in Southeast Asia, for example, is the subject of two texts by a Japanese and a South Korean author, respectively. In contrast, the conflict between Morocco and Algeria is presented in a single chapter based on an exchange of ideas between two experts, one Moroccan and the other Algerian. Finally, we would like to point out that, in suggesting this focus, we intended to facilitate an examination of aspects that are often neglected in conflict analyses undertaken purely from the standpoint of political science. In particular, many authors have emphasized as exemplary the civil society contacts, successfully intensified by Franco-German institutions funded in equal measure by both countries such as the Franco-German Youth Office and the Franco-German University, lending support to the relationship in the long term. The history of how the oft-mentioned Franco-German history textbook was created presents prospects for conflict situations in which dealing with the past has stagnated at the political level or is even strongly rejected. The same applies to the dense network of cultural contacts between Germany and France: Artists, writers, and theatermakers are all doing their part to help dismantle stereotypical images of (former) opponents. In addition to offering a concrete examination of Franco-German strategies developed in the post-war and Cold War eras and their viability, this book is intended to be an academic contribution to the discussion of Franco-German relations in general and the new tasks the countries face in particular, which were given a concrete framework with the signing of the Treaty of Aachen in January 2019.

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N. Colin Full professor of German culture at Aix-Marseille University (AMU), director of the German-French graduate school “Conflicts of cultures – cultures of conflicts” (AMU/University of Tübingen) and honorary professor at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). Her research interests focus on the theory of cultural transfer, the cultural exchange between France and Germany, cultural heritage and the sociology of cultural fields. Selected publications: Colin, N., & Umlauf, J. (2018). Im Schatten der Versöhnung: Deutsch-französische Kulturmittler im Kontext der Europäischen Integration (In the Shadows of Reconciliation: Franco-German Cultural Mediators in the Context of European Integration). Göttingen: Steidl Verlag; Colin, N., Defrance, C., Pfeil, U., Umlauf, J. (2015). Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945 (Dictionary of Franco-German Cultural Relations after 1945). Tübingen: Narr. Claire Demesmay is head of the “France/Franco-German Relations” programme at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. Her research focuses on Franco-German cooperation in European policy, as well as on French and German foreign policy. Before joining the DGAP in 2009, she worked at the Chair of French and Francophone Studies at the Technical University of Dresden (1998–2002), then as a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri) in Paris (2002–2009). She holds her Ph.D. in political philosophy from the University of Paris 4-Sorbonne and the Technical University of Berlin. Selected publications: Demesmay, C. (2018). Idées reçues sur l’Allemagne. Un modèle en question (Common preconceptions about Germany. A model in question). Paris: Le cavalier bleu; Calla, C. & Demesmay, C. (2013). Que reste-t-il du couple franco-allemand? (What remains of the Franco-German couple?). Paris: Documentation française; Franco-German Parliamentary Prize 2016.

Reconciliation: A Definitory Approach Ulrich Pfeil

Abstract After the Second World War, the term “reconciliation” disappeared from the language for the time being, since the German–French and also the reconciliation in Europe in the interwar period had remained only superficial and had neither been able to prevent the rise of National Socialism nor the Second World War. Thus, in the first ten years after the Second World War, more neutral terms such as “rapprochement” and “understanding” were chosen above all. It was only at the end of the 1980s that the term experienced its real breakthrough, which it owed not least to impulses from the present. This development was accompanied on the one hand by the overcoming of apartheid in South Africa and the way it was dealt with, and also by the reconciliation policy in Rwanda. On the other hand, the term was also used in the states of the former Eastern Bloc after the Cold War had been overcome. Now, initiatives under the sign of reconciliation began in order to jointly come to terms with the divided history of conflict. The focus of this chapter is precisely how history is dealt with in post-conflict constellations.

1 Introduction Samuil Marschak (1887–1964), a Russian author of children’s books, once watched schoolchildren playing and wrote a poem about the encounter in 1957. “What are you playing?” he asked. The prompt answer was: “We’re playing war!” Marschak replied: “You should play peace instead!” “That’s a good idea!” cried the children. There was a sudden silence, until one of the children asked, “Grandfather, how do you play peace?” In view of the violence experienced in Europe and the world since 1914, perhaps it is not surprising that during the long post-war years, nations had to relearn how to live together in lasting peace, in order to establish it in social practice and as a form of social interaction. Reconciliation is the term normally used today to describe U. Pfeil (B) Université de Lorraine, Metz, France e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_2

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efforts to overcome long-term hostility. The word was used, for example, by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in his speech in Wielu´n on September 1, 2019 at the ceremony to mark the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War: We cannot undo the injustice and suffering that was inflicted back then. We also cannot make a tally. And yet, Poland has offered Germany the hand of reconciliation. In spite of everything. We are profoundly grateful for the hand they have extended, for Poland’s willingness to walk with us down the path of reconciliation. The path of reconciliation has led us to a common, united Europe. A Europe that was founded on the spirit of resisting vile, racist doctrines, as well as totalitarianism and tyranny – and on the spirit of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. (Steinmeier 2019)

Some critics of reconciliation processes object, among other things, to the inflationary use of the term; its definition is often all too vague and its conceptualization expresses a range of approaches, some incompatible. Public figures and academics often use the terms understanding, rapprochement, and reconciliation synonymously (Schwelling 2012). One reason for the often unthinking use of the term may be its positive connotations. After all, reconciliation implies the desire for peace and harmony in personal as well as in political life. “It evokes images of reuniting what was divided, overcoming alienation, solving conflicts, and leading to the emergence of a new, intact community” (Reuter 2002: 15). This article undertakes a definitory approach to the term reconciliation and introduces its most important facets. It aims to differentiate between the term and related concepts such as understanding, rapprochement, friendship, and trust. It also explores the significance of remembrance and forgetting in reconciliation processes, a field that has often proved to be a decisive characteristic of reconciliation in recent years.

2 A Definitory Approach to an Emotive Term 2.1 Reconciliation: A Multi-dimensional Process “Reconciliation is the sincere, wholehearted establishment of peace and friendship between people who have clashed in strife and pernicious quarrels, and requires mutual forgiveness of any previous unpleasantness that may have been committed,” is how the four-volume Brockhaus “Bilder-Conversations-Lexikon für das deutsche Volk” of 1841 puts it. This definition underlines the close relationship between reconciliation and terms such as atonement, penitence, forgiveness, justice, amends, healing, and truth (Rognon 2016). It also indicates that reconciliation can take place on both the interpersonal and the social level, whereby the two levels are themselves closely linked; after all, social reconciliation depends on individual bearers and interpersonal initiatives in specific socio-political contexts (van de Loo 2009: 222 et seq.). From an academic point of view, three main approaches to reconciliation

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can be identified: 1. the religious, ethical dimension; 2. the political component; and 3. the socio-psychological aspect.

2.1.1

The Religious, Ethical Dimension

The religious, ethical concept of reconciliation is based on the Bible and has two dimensions. In its vertical dimension, it refers to the relationship between the individual and God that is disrupted by sin; in the horizontal dimension, it is applied to relationships between people (P˛ekala 2018; P˛ekala and Dingel 2019). The prerequisite for reconciliation in this context is both the acknowledgment of guilt and the plea for forgiveness. The sinner must sincerely and wholeheartedly repent of their deeds; the victim must forgo revenge and forgive the culprit: Reconciliation can only be reached when the culprit is led by the realization of their guilt and repentance to acknowledge their culpability and (if possible) to make amends, and when, on the other hand, the victim is prepared not to resent and take revenge for the wrong done to them, but to forgive. (Reuter 2002: 22)

Reconciliation is not intended to lead to a status quo ante; after all, the wrong done to the victim cannot usually be undone, as the Strasbourg theologian Frédéric Rognon emphasizes: Reconciliation means a new relationship: Words themselves, or even the promise not to repeat the wrong, are not sufficient. It requires a gesture, a form of behavior, a material or symbolic compensation, and a truly new start to the relationship. In other words, reconciliation is a form of forgiveness that is expressed in actions, not simply in words. (Rognon 2016: 22)

The initiatives to achieve reconciliation between individuals and collectives, supported by ecclesiastical actors, are located at the interface of religion and politics, one example being the Polish bishops’ pastoral letter of November 18, 1965 to the German episcopal conference (“We forgive and ask for forgiveness”), with which the Polish side offered the hand of reconciliation to the Germans 20 years after the end of the war. On the one hand, the letter emphasized Christianity’s and the Church’s great contribution to civilization, while at the same time expressing the desire for dialogue across the Iron Curtain in order to achieve reconciliation after the mass murders committed by Germany in Poland and the expulsion of Germans from the country. The Christian faith was the foundation, motivation, and legitimation for this initiative set against a traumatic historical background, although it principally pursued a Polish agenda.

2.1.2

The Political Dimension

In a speech to the German Bundestag in November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to make clear to the Germans that even if they do not always understand the French “France loves you” (Macron 2018). This statement demonstrates

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the fact that relationships between states and societies can be emotionally underpinned. Terms such as friendship, trust, and even reconciliation, originally used for the personal, private sphere, are nowadays used to describe relations in the political arena, contradicting Charles de Gaulle’s statement that “nations have no friends, only interests.” Yet General de Gaulle knew more than most statesmen about the importance of emotions for international relations. The growing influence of public opinion on diplomatic decision-making processes during the twentieth century has given emotions a greater role, with the result that reconciliation also gained an increasingly important role in international and inter-society relations, playing a part in foreign policy activities in many countries. In contrast to the religious, ethical idea of reconciliation, the political approach does not necessarily include the element of forgiveness (Daase et al. 2016): Reconciliation is generally understood as process and result, as the healing of wounds, losses or humiliations suffered at the individual, interpersonal, or social level (reconciliation between formerly hostile groups or populations of different political units). (Fischer 2008)

Political, social, and cultural reconciliation processes are intended to prevent new acts of violence and to result in structural alterations and changed attitudes. This applies to reconciliation processes both within society and transnationally, processes that—even if they are often referred to as “sealed”—are never complete, as French lawyer and legal expert Antione Garapon emphasizes: Nothing is more absurd than to understand reconciliation as a single moment […], like a play that reaches resolution once and for all in the final act, after which life returns to normal. Reconciliation must be defined as a never-ending political task. (Garapon 2009: 17)

In this respect, reconciliation is a condition to be aimed for: “The reconciliation horizon deconstructs the opponent as such and opens up symbolic, future-oriented communication with him.” (Guttierez 1999: 183). Understanding, rapprochement, and reconciliation are differentiated synonyms. In the sometimes asymmetrical process of achieving understanding, empathy is necessary as a first step in order to include the other side’s interests and to regain the mutual trust that is so important for international relations (Osterhammel and Loth 2000). “Mental demobilization,” “moral disarmament or disarmament of hatred,” “antibelligerence” or “overcoming enmity”—a range of terms mainly dating from the first half of the twentieth century, all signified, among other things, the dismantling of hostile images in one’s own head. These were able to lay the foundation for overcoming a “dialog of doves” and reestablishing the “norms of “civilized” behavior,” (Horne 2009: 8) in order for the sides to gradually approach each other. Rapprochement and reconciliation processes both aim to guarantee a peaceful future and restore lost trust. These are both never-ending processes; they are never complete. The great difference between them, however, is how they deal with the past. In a statement typical of those made in relation to rapprochement processes, Winston Churchill’s speech in Zurich in September 1946 envisaged the foundation for Europe’s future as lying in an “act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past” (Churchill 1946). The then mayor of Montbéliard, too, based the first

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Franco-German city partnership in 1950 on this “keeping silence” (Hermann Lübbe): “The past is too dark; instead, let us look together to the future.” (Tharradin 1950: 3).

2.1.3

The Socio-Psychological Dimension

Reconciliation also has a socio-psychological component; it aims to trigger learning processes in order to overcome negative emotions and feelings between people. These are cognitive evaluative assessments that are essentially social constructs. They are based on previous experiences and future expectations; in other words, people can both construct and deconstruct hostile dispositions (Frevert 2009; Plamper 2012). It is important for reconciliation processes to recognize that (hereditary) enmities are not determined by fate or preordained by nature and therefore unavoidable; they must be seen as social constructs based on emotions that people can break open with political will and involvement in civil society. Reconciliation is thus based on trust that international relations are strongly referring to rules and institutions that guarantee a cooperative international order and that are accepted by nation states. It is seen as the emotional cement (Frevert 2003, 2013) of the system of international states and is the basis for friendship that appeals more strongly to “the joint responsibility for cooperation and solidarity” (Tholl 2017). Both require consistency and reliability, and should not be subject to events in daily politics. Friendship can be symbolized by treaties and gestures, but it also requires inter-society cooperation. It is a (potentially reversible) condition, its emergence closely interwoven with rapprochement, requiring trust-building measures, and in the end, it can introduce a reconciliation process.

2.2 Emotional Control and Reconciliation: Story of an Emotional Relationship Peace studies also address these mental dispositions and cognitive factors for overcoming conflicts. Dieter Senghaas, one of the best-known researchers in the field, defined a civilizing hexagon that construes “emotional control” as one of six conditions for preserving peace (Senghaas 1995: 203). This approach works on the basic assumption that people can learn to create peace and make it last. It is aimed at people’s minds, where control mechanisms should be located, in order to control spontaneous feelings and make provisions for the future. If we understand emotions to be part of interpersonal communication (verbal and nonverbal) that decisively influence perceptions and cognition, they also play an essential role in reconciliation processes and their historical interpretation—in the analysis of long- and medium-term self-images and the images imposed by others, for example. The application of emotionally loaded and conflict-laden images

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and narratives, particularly in the reciprocal linking of hetero-stereotypes and autostereotypes, can result in a conflict between two countries that—in the case of FrancoGerman relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—led to a series of wars. The often invoked notion of “inherited enmity” confirms Hans Manfred Bock’s theory that “the causes and occasions of conflicts and tension between two nations are far more often sourced in imaginary than in real contradictions, and more frequently in mental, rather than material, antagonisms” (Bock 1996: 37). More recent studies in this context show how those convictions, values, norms, memories, and identities, that are—at least in part—steered by emotions, as an integral part of rational, interest-guided negotiations in international relations, must also be taken into consideration in reconciliation processes, as dynamic, constructivist factors (Kreis 2015: 8 et seq.). This applies in particular to the emotional dynamics that can emerge in international policy from memory, or the presence of the past: Generally speaking, emotions regulate not only perceptions, but also memory that is constantly influenced by emotions. Past feelings not only shape thinking and behavior; they also filter memories. (Bauerkämper 2013/14: 321)

Hence, reconciliation is an expression of emotions that are primarily social constructs, such as trust and contempt, friendship and hostility, and that rest on previous experiences and future expectations.

3 Remember, Forget, and Reconcile 3.1 Experience of Violence and the Difficulty of Dealing with the Past Peace negotiations do not simply clarify the question of how war-related guilt is to be dealt with and the territorial and military peace conditions that are to be laid down. Following a conflict, governments, societies, and individuals are also challenged to define ways of dealing with the past. These range from drawing a line under the past, even to the extent of amnesia (repression and forgetting) to an excessive level of recollection (hypermnesia). For example, after the Franco dictatorship, Spaniards forged a “pact of silence”; however, this pact has disintegrated in recent years, poisoning social coexistence (Capdepón 2007, 2015). For many years, France declared its own army’s practice of torture in Algeria to be a taboo subject, with the result that the past still strains its relations with that country (Stora and Harbi 2004; Kohser-Spohn and Renken 2006). While the Germans deliberately kept silent about their participation in the crimes committed during the “Third Reich” (Bergem 2003), the reunited Germany was quick to address the SED dictatorship in the GDR, particularly in order to offer compensation to the regime’s victims. This part of history “is still smoking” (Barbara Tuchman); it is still the subject of controversial discussions in reunited Germany.

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The crucial factor for the different ways of dealing with the past are, as a rule, divergent experiences with violence and war. Up to and including the nineteenth century, the concrete, personal memory of the conflict just past was restricted to a relatively small number of (fallen) soldiers. Subsequently, twentieth century wars were characterized by immense suffering among the civilian population, by hitherto unthinkable numbers of victims as a result of “total wars,” and the genocides often associated with them (Beyrau et al. 2007). As a result, reconciliation processes could no longer be restricted to acts and gestures between rulers or politicians; they also had to be enshrined in society. The presence of the past thus gained a new social and emotional dimension.

3.2 Dialogic Remembering as the Foundation for Reconciliation Reconciliation and memory thus mutually determine each other, because memory does not simply entail looking back to a past that cannot be changed, but is also a question of ordering and interpreting past events in relation to the present. Consequently, the work of remembrance can decide whether people are able to coexist harmoniously, or even cooperate, in the future, as former German President Joachim Gauck emphasized in his speech on March 24, 2013 in Sant’Anna di Stazzema, Italy, site of a massacre: […] here in Sant’Anna, human dignity was brutally trampled underfoot, and human rights violated on a massive scale. In this war, people were worth nothing to most other people. And that is why, when we gather together here, we want to celebrate the miracle of reconciliation. It is important that the facts are spoken of, that the atrocities are named as such, yet we can still create reconciliation, particularly in places like this where the wrongs can be seen so clearly. To achieve reconciliation, people do not have to forget what happened; on the contrary, only when they know about this, but are still prepared to engage in reconciliation, only then can reconciliation genuinely take place. Otherwise you can only achieve a superficial peace. (Gauck 2013)

Reconciliation processes do not avoid looking at the “dark past.” On the contrary, they aim to shed light on it, and today they are based on recollection: The different branches of Christianity share the opinion that forgiving cannot be the same as forgetting: Forgiving can also mean that guilt is recognized, without forgetting the injury. In this sense, the work of remembrance is the same as forgiveness. (Rognon 2016: 17)

Aleida Assmann developed the concept of “dialogic remembering” for this work of remembrance between victims and perpetrators. She defines this concept as “the mutual recognition of victim and perpetrator constellations in relation to a shared history of violence.” Whereas national memory is usually organized as a monolog and often only exists in isolation, dialogic remembering aims to lead to the recognition that national memories are interlaced, and to deconstruct unified constructions of

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memory. Dialogic remembering is not an attempt to construct a collective European identity through a joint European memory culture: The point is not to create a unified European master narrative, but solely the dialogic relation and mutual recognition and connectivity of national images of history. (Assmann 2013: 197)

Assmann’s concept is a call to overcome national memory blockades and is intended to trigger self-critical reflection in order to integrate unpleasant facts, too, into national images of history. Dialogic remembering in the service of reconciliation aims to open up heroic national memories that focus primarily on heroes and martyrs, symbolizing the idealized past of a homogenous, united nation, “our” virtue and the evil “other.” They are generally bearers of antagonistic memories and emotions that are directed against the other. They serve the “use of memory in the service of identity politics” (Assmann 2013: 143), thus blocking the productive dialogic approach to the shared past. Looking at the valuable role memory can play in reconciliation, Claus Leggewie also advocates “publicly addressing competing national European historical narratives” (Leggewie 2011: 185). Work on dialogic remembering must on no account blur responsibilities; perpetrators must be named and receive their just punishment. Above all, however, perpetrators should offer the victims the public acknowledgment of their suffering in order to restore at least part of their dignity (Gardner Feldman 2012: 3–11). The victims cannot demand reconciliation and forgiveness, but they can receive the expression of regret both individually and collectively. Remembering their suffering is equivalent to an apology, as Joachim Gauck also emphasized: “The victims have a right to recollection and remembrance, recollection of the barbaric wrong done to them, and they have the right to remembrance of their names.” (Gauck 2014).

3.3 Finding the Right Moment Looking back at history, we see that post-war processes of remembering and forgetting were subject to alterations in terms of their significance (Wolfrum 2003: 120). The work of remembrance is viewed today, above all in Europe, as the often evoked secret of achieving lasting peace. Examples from other parts of the world, however, show that remembrance is not a universal instrument of reconciliation in every case; the freshly healed wounds are often still fragile. As the American author David Rieff put it in an interview on his book “In Praise of Forgetting”: “Remembering is not always helpful; on the contrary, it can contribute to the persistence of conflicts, bitterness and division.” (Rieff 2016b). With this remark, he counters the often quoted statement that people who forget the past are condemned to repeat it. His aim is not to trivialize past violence, but to find the psychologically and emotionally right moment for remembrance in the aftermath of actual wars or inner-society conflicts (Rieff 2016a). A look at how landscapes of memory have developed in Europe also shows that nations may pass through different stages in terms of political history, both internally

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and in their relations to their neighbors. Whereas in Western Europe, the Shoah took center-stage in public memory at the latest since the 1970s, Communist regimes suppressed these memories, thus sweeping anti-Semitism and participation in the murder of European Jews under the carpet. Only once the Cold War ended were the taboos of political history set aside. Yet at the same time a competition of memories arose. For example, the governments of the Baltic States promoted memories of the Gulag and Soviet crimes over memories of the Shoah. The past 30 years in Europe show that different cultures of memory make dialogic remembering more difficult. On the levels of both politics and civil society, therefore, following trust-building measures, the right moment must be identified at which societies can set out to introduce a joint learning process, in order to deal with the most painful aspects of the traumatic past (Meier 2010). Post-war experiences also show, however, that inter-state rapprochement falters if the “walk through history” does not take place. Taboo experiences of violence continue to feed mutual distrust, with the result that the help of mediators and third parties is sometimes necessary in order to define the modalities of bilateral work of remembrance. Thus, it remains key for those involved in the project of reconciliation on all sides to develop a dialogic culture of history that suppresses individual and collective memories as little as possible while ensuring that they do not develop into new sources of hatred and enmity.

4 Summary: Reconciliation as a Sensitizing Force for the Interaction and Networking of Many Narratives Counterproductive “reconciliation kitsch” occurs “when every normal political act between two neighboring states is no longer considered a normal event, but counts as ‘reconciliation’” (Bachmann 1994). This was former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s definition of the concept in 2009, the International Year of Reconciliation. By no means every trade agreement, school exchange, or concentration camp visit is necessarily an act of reconciliation. As Annan put it, reconciliation is the “highest form of dialogue.” There are preceding stages; the path leads through a peace accord between formerly hostile states and societies, de-escalation, rapprochement, trustbuilding measures, understanding, and cooperation, to reach a foundation on which a phase of dialogic remembering may perhaps be initiated and an expectation horizon for reconciliation defined. Along the way, discourses that “draw a line” under events and “peace-giving forgetting” should be pushed back to make space for a self-critical historical review of the past, as Herman Van Rompuy, former President of the European Council, emphasized when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union in 2012: “In politics as in life, reconciliation is the most difficult thing. It goes beyond forgiving and forgetting, or simply turning the page.” (van Rompuy 2012). The aim of reconciliation processes is not to create a normative joint memory space in order to develop a joint identity. Reconciliation is not the result of narratives about

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the past that link people, but of sensitizing people to the interaction and networking of many narratives. Reconciliation processes are never linear and do not form a permanent narrative of ongoing progress; they can be lined with obstacles and setbacks, are never finished for all eternity, and require daily work—not least because emotions, mentalities, cognitions, and interests stand in interactive and sometimes contradictory relation to one another. Only when two societies “can together face up to the difficult parts of our past” can “reconciliation occur,” to quote Joachim Gauck’s speech on March 7, 2014 at Lingiades, the site of a massacre in Greece: If we take the path of remembrance, we are not doing so because we are fixated on the past. Nor is it because we are still under its spell. Rather we are looking to the past to take on its message for the present and the future: […] Respect and seek out the truth, which is a sister of reconciliation. (Gauck 2014)

References Assmann, A. (2013). Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention (The new unease with the culture of remembrance: An intervention). Munich: C.H. Beck. Bachmann, K. (1994, August 05). Die Versöhnung muss von Polen ausgehen (Reconciliation must come from Poland). Die Tageszeitung. Bauerkämper, A. (2013/14). Emotionen im Gedächtnis: Erinnerungskonflikte über den Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Deutschland und Italien (1949–1979) (Emotions in remembrance: Conflicts in memory about the Second World War between Germany and Italy [1949–1979]). In Historische Mitteilungen, 26 (Historical notes, 26) (pp. 319–340). Stuttgart: Steiner. Bergem, W. (2003). Barbarei als Sinnstiftung? Das NS-Regime in Vergangenheitspolitik und Erinnerungskultur der Bundesrepublik (Barbarity as a source of meaning? The NS-regime in politics of dealing with the past and culture of remembrance of the Federal Republic of Germany). In W. Bergem (Ed.), Die NS-Diktatur im deutschen Erinnerungsdiskurs (The NS-dictatorship in the German discourse of memory) (pp. 81–104). Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Beyrau, D., Hochgeschwender, M., & Langewiesche, D. (Eds.). (2007). Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Forms of war: From antiquity to the present). Paderborn: Schöningh. Bock, H. M. (1996). Wechselseitige Wahrnehmung als Problem der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen (Reciprocal perception as a problem of Franco-German relations). In L. Albertin, H. M. Bock, M. Christadler, A. Kimmel, I. Kolboom, R. Picht, & H. Uterwedde (Eds.), Frankreich-Jahrbuch 1995 (Yearbook of France 1995) (pp. 35–56). Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Capdepón, U. (2007). Erinnerungsdiskurse im Widerstreit: Der öffentliche Umgang mit der Franco-Diktatur in Spanien (Discourses of memory in conflict: The public dealings with Franco-dictatorship in Spain). Berlin: LIT. Capdepón, U. (2015). Vom Fall Pinochet zu den Verschwundenen des Spanischen Bürgerkrieges: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Diktatur und Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Spanien und Chile (From the case of Pinochet to the missing of the Spanish Civil War: Dealing with dictatorship and violations of human rights in Spain and Chile). Bielefeld: Transcript. Churchill, W. (1946, September 19). Winston Churchill’s speech. Zurich University. Retrieved December 20, 2019 from https://www.churchill-in-zurich.ch/site/assets/files/1807/rede_wins ton_churchill_englisch.pdf. Daase, C., Engert, S., Horelt, M.-A., Renner, J., & Strassner, R. (Eds.). (2016). Apology and reconciliation in international relations: The importance of being sorry. London: Routledge.

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Fischer, M. (2008). Friedens- und Versöhnungsprozesse im westlichen Balkan: Von den Schwierigkeiten des Umgangs mit gewaltsamer Vergangenheit (Peace and reconciliation processes in the Western Balkans: The difficulties of dealing with a violent past) (Berghof Working Papers, No. 4). Retrieved December 21, 2018 from https://www.berghof-foundation.org/filead min/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/wp4d_mf_znf.pdf. Frevert, U. (Ed.). (2003). Vertrauen: Historische Annäherungen (Trust: Historical approaches). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Frevert, U. (2009). Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen? (What place for feelings in history?). Geschichte und Gesellschaft (History and Society), 35(2), 183–208. Frevert, U. (2013). Vertrauensfragen: Eine Obsession der Moderne (Questions of trust: An obsession of modernity). Munich: Beck. Garapon, A. (2009). Les commissions Vérité-Réconciliation: une nouvelle forme politique (Truth and reconciliation commissions: A new form of politics). In E. Jaudel (Ed.), Justice sans châtiment: Les commissions Vérité-Réconciliation (Justice without punishment: The truth and reconciliation commissions) (pp. 7–19). Paris: Odile Jacob. Gardner Feldman, L. (2012). Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation: From enmity to amity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Gauck, J. (2013). Gedenken an die Opfer des Massakers von Sant’Anna di Stazzema (Commemoration of the victims of Massacre of Sant’Anna di Stazzema). Der Bundespräsident (The President of Germany). Retrieved October 11, 2019 from https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/ Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2013/03/130324-Sant-Anna-Italien.html. Gauck, J. (2014). Gedenken am Mahnmal von Lingiades (Commemoration at the memorial of Lingiades). Der Bundespräsident. Retrieved October 18, 2019 from https://www.bundespraesi dent.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2014/03/140307-Gedenkort-Lingiades. html. Guttierrez, J. (1999). Friedens- und Versöhnungsarbeit: Konzepte und Praxis. Unterwegs zu einer dauerhaften, friedensschaffenden Versöhnung (Peace and reconciliation work: Concepts and practices. On the way towards a lasting, peacebuilding reconciliation). In J. Calliess (Ed.), Agenda for peace: Reconciliation (pp. 152–196). Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, Protokollstelle. Horne, J. (2009). Guerres et réconciliations européennes au 20e siècle (Reconciliation and war in the 20th century). Vingtième siècle: Revue d’histoire (20th Century: History Journal), 2009(4), 3–15. Kohser-Spohn, C., & Renken, F. (Eds.). (2006). Trauma Algerienkrieg: Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts (Trauma Algerian War: The history and coming to terms with a tabooed conflict). Munich: Campus. Kreis, R. (2015). Arbeit am Beziehungsstatus: Vertrauen und Misstrauen in den außenpolitischen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Work on the relationship status: Trust and distrust in the foreign policy relations of the Federal Republic of Germany). In R. Kreis (Ed.), Diplomatie mit Gefühl: Vertrauen, Misstrauen und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Diplomacy with emotions: Trust and distrust in the foreign policy relations of the Federal Republic of Germany) (pp. 7–16). Berlin: Oldenbourg. Leggewie, C. (2011). Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung (The fight for European memory). Munich: C.H. Beck. Macron, E. (2018). Rede von Staatspräsident Emmanuel Macron anlässlich der Gedenkstunde zum Volkstrauertag (Speech by President Emmanuel Macron on occasion of the commemoration of the Volkstrauertag). Deutscher Bundestag. Retrieved June 29, 2019 from https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/580034/08acc4cada11d97943a64a985d850377/ kw46_volkstrauertag_gedenkrede_macron-data.pdf. Meier, C. (2010). Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns: Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit (The imperative of forgetting and the irrefutability of memory: Of public dealings with a bad past). Munich: Siedler.

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Osterhammel, J., & Loth, W. (Eds.). (2000). Internationale Geschichte: Themen, Ergebnisse, Aussichten (International history: Subjects, results, prospects). Munich: Oldenbourg. P˛ekala, U. (2018). Deutsch-polnische Versöhnung an der Schnittstelle von Religion und Politik (German-Polish reconciliation at the crossroads of religion and politics). In U. P˛ekala & I. Dingel (Eds.), Ringen um Versöhnung: Religion und Politik im Verhältnis zwischen Deutschland und Polen seit 1945 (Struggling for reconciliation: Religion and politics in German-Polish relations since 1945) (pp. 9–48). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. P˛ekala, U., & Dingel, I. (Eds.). (2019). Ringen um Versöhnung II: Versöhnungsprozesse zwischen Religion, Politik und Gesellschaft (Struggling for reconciliation II: Reconciliation processes between religion, politics and society). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Plamper, J. (2012). Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte (History and feelings: Principles of the history of emotions). Munich: Siedler. Renken, F. (2006). Frankreich im Schatten des Algerienkrieges: Die Fünfte Republik und die Erinnerung an den letzten großen Kolonialkonflikt (France in the shadow of the Algerian War: The fifth republic and memory of the last major colonial conflict). Göttingen: V&R Unipress. Reuter, H.-R. (2002). Ethik und Versöhnung: Prinzipielles zu einem aktuellen Thema (Ethics and reconciliation: Principles on a current topic). In G. Beestermöller & H.-R. Reuter (Eds.), Politik der Versöhnung (Politics of reconciliation) (pp. 15–36). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Rieff, D. (2016a). In praise of forgetting: Historical memory and its ironies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rieff, D. (2016b). Interview by M. Brönning. Es lebe das Vergessen! (Long live oblivion!). Internationale Politik und Geslellschaft (International Politics and Society). Retrieved September 24, 2016 from https://www.ipg-journal.de/interviews/artikel/es-lebe-das-vergessen-1623/. Rognon, F. (2016). Expiation, repentance, pardon et réconciliation: concepts religieux et valeurs des sociétés européennes contemporaines (Expiation, repentence, pardon and reconciliation: Religious concepts and values in contemporary European societies). Cahiers SIRICE, 2016(1), 15–23. Schwelling, B. (2012). Transnational civil society’s contribution to reconciliation. In B. Schwelling (Ed.), Reconciliation, civil society, and the politics of memory: Transnational initiatives in the 20th and 21st century (pp. 7–21). Bielefeld: Transcript. Senghaas, D. (1995). Frieden als Zivilisierungsprozess (Peace as a civilising process). In D. Senghaas (Ed.), Den Frieden denken: si vis pacem, para pacem (To think the peace: Si vis pacem, para pacem) (pp. 196–223). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Steinmeier, F.-W. (2019). Commemoration of the beginning of the Second World War at Wielu´n. Der Bundespräsident. Retrieved October 10, 2019 from https://www.bundespraesident.de/Sha redDocs/Reden/EN/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2019/09/190901-Poland-CommemorationWielun.html. Stora, B., & Harbi, M. (2004). La Guerre d’Algérie, 1954–2004: La fin de l’amnésie (The Algerian War, 1954–2004: The end of amnesia). Paris: Laffont. Tharradin, L. (1950). Rencontre de Maires français et allemands à Stuttgart (Meeting of French and German Mayors in Stuttgart). Allemagne (Germany), 8, 3. Tholl, M. (2017, July 03). Wenn Staaten Freunde sein wollen (When states want to be friends). Der Tagesspiegel. van de Loo, S. (2009). Versöhnungsarbeit: Kriterien—theologischer Rahmen—Praxisperspektiven (Work of reconciliation: Criteria—Theological frame—Practical perspectives). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. van Rompuy, H. (2012). From war to peace: A European tale. European Commission. Retrieved December 20, 2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPE ECH_12_930. Wolfrum, E. (2003). Krieg und Frieden in der Neuzeit: Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (War and peace in modern times: From the peace of Westphalia to the Second World War). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

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Ulrich Pfeil is a German historian, professor of German civilization at the University of Lorraine in Metz. His research topics include German-French relations in the twentieth century, reconciliation processes in Europe, Germany during the Cold War, and the history of German and international historiography. Selected publications: Flucke, F., Kuhn, B., Pfeil, U. (Eds.). (2017). Der Kalte Krieg im Schulbuch (The Cold War in the school book). St. Ingbert: Röhrig; Defrance, C., Greine, B., Pfeil, U. (Eds.). (2018). Die Berliner Luftbrücke—ein Erinnerungsort des Kalten Krieges? (The Berlin Luftbrücke—A Place of Remembrance of the Cold War?). Berlin: Ch. Links.

“Motor of Europe” as a Potential Role Model for the Western Balkans Tara Tepavac

Abstract This chapter focuses on the Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation model as a potential role model for improving the relations and cooperation between Serbia and Croatia. It examines key similarities and differences in the particular socio-historical context of the Western Balkans and today’s dynamics of the EU, which impact the extent to which these two countries can mirror the Franco-German model as “core countries” that could push for reconciliation and regional cooperation within the region. In order to examine the extent and applicability of this model to relations between Serbia and Croatia, the chapter compares the context in which the reconciliation process among these countries took place, with a particular focus on the role of the political leadership, thereby mapping contextual differences that could present potential shortcomings in transferring the lessons learned from the Franco-German model.

1 Introduction The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia left Serbia and Croatia buried deep in the trenches of the two opposite sides. Following Tito’s death in 1980, the issue of the transformation of the Yugoslav Federation coupled with a web of rising nationalisms throughout federal republics has put calls to redefine the status of federal republics in the spotlight. With a wholesale lack of willingness to compromise on all sides, rising tensions in the former Yugoslavia culminated in 1991 with calls for independence in Slovenia and Croatia. The two states were often seen as archenemies in the violent conflicts that marked the disintegration of the federal state. However, their relations as well as the break-up of Yugoslavia cannot be attributed to a single cause. They cannot, for instance, be explained simply as a historically predetermined dissolution of an “artificial” alliance, attributed to the “ancient ethnic hatred” among Yugoslav nations or “intrinsic violence” characterizing this “powder keg” region‚ rooted in the T. Tepavac (B) Karl-Franzens University, Graz, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_3

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discourse of Balkanism, or analyzed solely through the lens of post-Cold War division between the East and the West. The origins of Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution are a complex “ensemble” of multiple factors. These include a variety of inherited and contemporary problems that Yugoslavia was facing, long-term crisis fueled by political and economic restrictions and unsatisfactory responses on the part of the ruling elite, as well as the influence of the wider context within the changing global landscape (Nakarada 2008; Jovi´c 2009; Baki´c 2011; Bieber et al. 2014). Almost three decades after these devastating conflicts, tensions de-escalated and relations between the two states achieved a fragile normalization. The Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia was signed in 1996 in Belgrade and was an important step in this process. Following the regime changes in both countries in the early 2000s, despite hopes for their development in regional factors of stability and democratization, both countries were focused on internal transition-driven issues, while the topic of neighborhood relations and reconciliation remained neglected. The first initiative for improving mutual as well as regional cooperation came in 2010, with significant support for reconciliation from Croatian President Ivo Josipovi´c and Serbian President Boris Tadi´c. However, the ongoing process of rapprochement in their relations did not yet create scope for a wide-ranging reconciliation process. If we follow Ilievski’s interpretation, which distinguishes between three stages in the process of reconciliation, we could argue that Serbia and Croatia completed the first stage of the process in which fear is replaced with non-violent co-existence, while two more stages remain to be reached—the second stage including building confidence and trust, and the final stage involving the achievement of empathy (Ilievski 2008: 6). However, continuous and comprehensive actions on the part of the states through official reconciliation policy that would demonstrate substantive commitment to building mutual confidence and trust are still lacking, including, for instance, fostering stronger economic and political ties and implementing comprehensive education reforms or strategies for public remembrance in both countries. On the contrary, mutually exclusive and conflicting public narratives on the shared past nurtured in the two countries, particularly on the conflict in the 1990s, and also on the more distant past, continue to generate mistrust among citizens, thereby helping to widen the gap between these societies.

2 Political Leadership and Reconciliation: Spirals of Mutual Blame This gap between the societies clearly manifests itself on certain political occasions, such as, in particular, elections or anniversaries marking significant national events, which still give rise to torrents of harsh words, mutual blame, and accusations, bringing all the signs of deep divisions between the two countries to the surface. For instance, former Serbian President Tomislav Nikoli´c and founder of the Serbian

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Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka—SNS), in his campaign for presidential election, stated in an interview for a German newspaper in 2012 that a “greater Serbia was [his] unrealized dream,” and also that “Vukovar was a Serbian town to which Croats should not return,” which then prompted Croatian President Ivo Josipovi´c from the Social Democratic Party (Socijademokratska partija Hrvatske) to fire back that “Croatia knew how to defend its sovereignty [in the past] … it will know how to defend it today” (Pavelic 2012). Such statements are still present today among the (most) influential decision-makers, including leaders of some of the biggest political parties in the two countries. The spirals of mutual blame that periodically occur on such occasions can be illustrated by the “crossfire” of statements between Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovi´c, President of the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica—HDZ) on the one hand, and Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin leader of the Movement of Socialists (Pokret socijalista) on the other, along with Foreign Affairs Minister Ivica Daˇci´c, President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistiˇcka partija Srbije—SPS) that were made only last year. After commending the importance of the Serbian national minority’s support to the ruling majority in his address on the occasion of the Orthodox Christmas reception organized by the Serbian People’s Council (Srpsko narodno ve´ce—SNV), Croatian Prime Minister Plenkovi´c also declared that no reconciliation can happen “without Serbia accepting that Croatia was a victim of the aggression of Miloševi´c’s Greater Serbian regime”, and highlighted that “the process of peaceful reintegration is one of the greatest legacies of President Franjo Tudman because this model prevented many new victims” (Radio Television of Vojvodina 2019). Prompt reactions to the statement came from two Serbian ministers. Aleksandar Vulin stated that if he seeks the truth in the relations of the two countries, he should also accept that the “truth is that in the criminal action ‘Storm’ Croatia killed more than 2000 and expelled 220,000 Serbs, Croatian citizens”, further highlighting that the “truth is that prior to the ‘Storm’, for which no one was held accountable before the court, another 200,000 Serbs, Croatian citizens, were expelled, especially from cities where there were not even armed conflicts” (Novosti 2019). Serbian Minister Daˇci´c joined the “debate” by condemning Plenkovi´c’s statement praising the legacy of Tudman’s policy of reintegration as “shameless”, thereby referring to 220,000 Serbs expelled during the “Storm”, and also making reference to the legacy of Croatia’s fascist regime during the Second World War, emphasizing that reconciliation could only take place “when Jasenovac ceases to be represented as a place of good entertainment and theater performances, when the threats on banning Serbian parties and the Cyrillic alphabet cease, when there are no plates emblazoned with ‘Ready for the Home(land),’ and when Croatian state leaders cease to dance to the music of Thompson” (Index.hr 2019). Such inflammatory statements have a strong potential to easily heighten the tensions between the two countries, despite the fact that almost 30 years have passed since the disastrous conflicts that laid waste to the ties between the people of former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, quite a different discourse could be heard in the statements by the key state representatives that marked the same occasion several years before. For

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instance, in 2013 the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusi´c, an outspoken liberal from the Croatian People’s Party—Liberal Democrats (Hrvatska narodna stranka—Liberalni demokrati—HNS), used the occasion of the SNV’s Orthodox Christmas reception to announce that Croatian-Serbian relations were “at the beginning of a new stage” and that the two countries were working on mutual relations on a number of levels, underlining that they were “going in the right direction” (T Portal 2013). This example also illustrates the oscillations in communications between the two countries along the lines of party affiliations of incumbent state representatives. The fiercest rhetoric and degradations in communications can be found in the statements by former actors of the conflicts of the 1990s, or representatives of the successor parties of those who led or contributed to these conflicts in different ways, whose statements are still entrenched in the discourse of the 1990s. On the one hand, the cooperation between Boris Tadi´c as the Serbian President and Ivo Josipovi´c as the Croatian President between 2010 and 2012 is most often pointed to as the period in which the biggest improvement in relations between Serbia and Croatia took place, with a number of mutual visits by the two statesmen, the joint announcement of a new phase in the relations between their countries, mutual support and cooperation in the process of EU integration, and the signing of agreements on cooperation. On the other hand, the period after 2012 was characterized by a considerable increase in tensions, crises, and the downgrading of relations between the two countries. This deterioration in the relations between the two countries coincided with the nationalist center-right parties coming to power in both of the countries, with the election of Tomislav Nikoli´c as the new Serbian President, and shortly thereafter the formation of a new parliamentary majority around his party—the Serbian Progressive Party led by Aleksandar Vuˇci´c. At the same, Kolinda Grabar Kitarovi´c was elected as the new Croatian President in early 2015, with her party the Croatian Democratic Union, founded by Franjo Tudman, soon after forming a new parliamentary majority in Croatia. The year 2015 was, for instance, marked by the incident during which the leader of the Serbian Radical Party and war criminal Vojislav Šešelj, and incumbent member of the Serbian Parliament, burned the Croatian flag in Belgrade, as well as by a week-long “customs war” in September, commenced when Croatia closed the border and blocked trade between the two countries. The tensions continued to escalate in 2016 with the so-called diplomatic war, which was sparked by the annulment of the judgment of the controversial Croatian Second World War figure Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, seen by Serbia as the rehabilitation of fascism and the legacy of the fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH). These tensions were amplified by the decision of the Croatian High Court to revoke the verdict and to reopen the trial of Branimir Glavaš, charged for crimes against Serbs in the 1990s, as well as by the boycott of the memorial event at Jasenovac by the Serbian and Jewish community. These setbacks and incidents illustrate the trend that slowed down and downgraded relations between Serbia and Croatia, following the changes in the leadership of the two countries, which were brought about by the nationalist, center-right, conservative

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parties that intensified and normalized the rhetoric founded on 1990s nationalism and contemporary populism in the public sphere.

3 Stumbling Blocks of Rapprochement: Inflammatory Rhetoric Along Party Lines All the major political parties support the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU in their programs, which is predicated on resolving bilateral issues left over from past conflicts as well as fostering good neighborly relations. However, the acts and rhetoric of their leaders do not necessarily reflect their agendas. As the above mentioned examples indicate, the oscillations in official communications between Serbia and Croatia reveal that several groups of key political actors frequently use the inflammatory rhetoric related to the conflicts from the 1990s in order to heighten tensions in the public sphere. These oscillations correlate to a significant degree with the party affiliation, reflecting the ideology and interest of the center-right, nationalistic parties. Such narrow-sighted, interest-driven behavior on the part of politicians, who should, on the contrary, actively contribute to the process of reconciliation between the two countries, which is in the best interests of the citizens and the region as a whole, is one of the key factors standing in the way of the process of reconciliation. Along these lines, inflammatory rhetoric increasing tensions between Serbia and Croatia tends to conveniently enter the public spotlight precisely when the homogenization of the electorate is needed, on either one or both sides, in order to secure the support of citizens for upcoming elections. Moreover, different issues have regularly been used to invoke the discourse of the “other”, both prior to election campaigns in one of the countries, and on the occasions of increased public debate on bilateral issues brought about by other events. One such issue are the military capabilities of the two countries, and the “arms race” discourse, which came in handy with respect to deflecting the public focus from other, more daring topics, particularly prior to elections. In the last few years, Serbia has entered into a new phase of modernizing its military capabilities, primarily in the air force and air defense. Through arrangements with Russia and Belorussia, Serbia is modernizing its MiG-29 fleet, while new combat helicopters were purchased from both Russian and Western companies (Airbus). While Serbian authorities have argued that such modernization only serves defensive purposes, this development caused distress and agitated responses in Croatia, which formally announced the tender for purchasing 12 fourth-generation fighter jets by the end of 2020. Croatia also recently procured a number of combat vehicles. Although these developments were part of long-term plans by both countries, the timing was rather unfortunate as it coincided with the deterioration of relations between the countries. This was thus publicly declared to be an “arms race” and framed as a security dilemma. Security dilemma refers to a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than

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an increase in the original state’s security (Tang 2009; Herz 1951; Jervis 1976, 1978). Nevertheless, given that Croatia is a member of both the EU and NATO, and Serbia has been neutral (non-aligned) in military terms since 2007, such efforts to modernize military capacities should not be perceived at all from a bilateral standpoint, as they are not primarily motivated by bilateral concerns. This has, unfortunately, not prevented political actors on both sides from touting it as an offensive military step, particularly during election campaigns or other incidents, such as those pertaining to Cyrillic road signs in Vukovar. As the main event (such as the pre-election campaign) passes, which caused frictions between the countries in the first place, military or other targeted issues raising tensions between Croatia and Serbia are steadily disappearing from the public eye, most often without a concrete epilogue. In addition to the danger of growing out of control, this kind of spin is damaging the already fragile relations between the two nations, fostering distrust and obstructing the long path toward reconciliation. In addition to the inflammatory rhetoric fueling tensions, there are several other issues that prevent the countries from making further progress on the path toward much-needed reconciliation. One of the key issues is the lack of an overall comprehensive dialogue on the future of joint relations, which could bring the perceptions of shared history in the two countries closer to each other, as they are currently on quite incompatible and often contradictory footings. This would, furthermore, imply the need for public acknowledgment followed by a clear and complete distancing from the crimes and wrongdoings committed during the conflicts of the 1990s on both sides, including a public disavowal by all political actors in Serbia of the ideas reflecting the ideology of the Greater Serbia and crimes committed in its name, as well as a public disavowal by all active political actors in Croatia of the crimes and wrongdoings against the Serbian community in Croatia under Tudman’s regime. It was a legitimate expectation on both sides that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would contribute to establishing the truth, as well as boost reconciliation by bringing individual perpetrators to justice. However, it appears that none of the sides in the conflict are actually satisfied with the work and outcome of the ICTY trials. Serbs have accused the ICTY of being biased and perceived it as anti-Serbian court, focused on determining a collective guilt on the part of Serbs for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Croats were deeply disturbed by the trial of the key figures of what is known as the Homeland War, Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markaˇc, despite the fact that they were ultimately acquitted. While the legacy of the ICTY is certainly paramount from the point of view of criminal justice, from a societal perspective, there is an overwhelming dissatisfaction with the ICTY, which is particularly evident in ethnically mixed environments such as Vukovar (Clark 2012). It should, however, be noted that no judicial mechanism can achieve transitional justice on its own. Criminal courts are only one piece of the puzzle necessary for bringing war criminals to justice, but have to be supported by a plethora of political, societal, cultural, and other efforts invested both in coming to terms with the past and laying down strong new foundations for future relations. Unfortunately, it seems that the non-legal efforts required for a substantive impact on fostering reconciliation are predominantly lacking.

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One of the reasons for such a development could be the position of political actors from 1990s, who continue to be particularly influential as far as the discourse and political life in both countries are concerned. In fact, the inflammatory statements revert to and revolve around Miloševi´c’s and Tudman’s heritage. The lack of strength and determination to face the crimes and wrongdoings committed both by Miloševi´c’s regime, and also against the Serbian community in Croatia under the regime of Franjo Tudman during the conflicts, as well as further back in history, under the regime of NDH in the Second World War, is one of the setbacks that holds the key to making progress in the relations between the two countries. The source of the biggest disputes between Serbia and Croatia, even today, lies in particular episodes in the past, while, at the same time, their present is marked by common challenges that could be overcome much more easily through mutual understanding, support, and cooperation. Taking a step back to achieve a broader perspective of the region, which makes up only a small part of Europe, is a necessary and valuable reminder of the necessity and benefit of mutual understanding, cooperation, and solidarity. These two countries have a shared history, linguistic understanding and strong tradition of joint initiatives that stood up to the violence and conflicts throughout the darkest chapters of recent history. At the same time, they have common societal challenges such as employment, youth emigration, or environmental issues. Mutual cooperation is therefore the key for overcoming the challenges that are holding these two countries, as well as the whole region, back. For this reason, a more dedicated and decisive approach by the political leadership of both countries is needed. Furthermore, support and concrete activities taken by Serbian and Croatian state institutions in developing and implementing educational reforms as well as strategies for public remembrance would be a crucial step toward building closer ties among citizens. Finally, the prevalent tone of media reporting and the picture of the “other” is strongly influencing citizens’ perceptions and trust in the reconciliation process, especially in the era of fake news and widespread disinformation that are generating distrust and insecurity. The media thus plays a vital role in fostering mutual understanding and trust, as well as supporting the process of rapprochement.

4 Stumbling Blocks of Rapprochement: Incompatible Narratives of Conflict The official narratives of the conflicts from the 1990s in these two countries are incompatible, each deeply rooted in its own one-sided and mutually opposite perspective. In Croatia, the conflict is seen as a strategic aggression against Croatia committed by Serbia, from which Croatia emerged as the winner. From the Serbian perspective, the 1990s conflicts are predominantly seen as a sort of civil war in which all sides involved suffered losses, and from which Serbia emerged as the loser and the victim of historical injustice. The Croatian perspective of the conflicts with Serbia is

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portrayed solely in terms of victory and of the long-awaited liberation of the nation through the Homeland War in Croatia, along with the glorification of the fascist Independent State of Croatia. On the other hand, war crimes, expulsions, and other forms of violence against the Serb civilian population are most often ignored or downplayed, while the crimes committed by the Ustasha regime during the Second World War are most often marginalized (Suboti´c 2013; Pavasovic Trost 2012). In the same manner, the Serbian perspective of the conflict with Croatia is focused only on the victims, suffering, and the ethnic expulsion of the civilian Serb population, while at the same time ignoring the violence and aggression committed by Serbian nationalists that preceded it. However, attempts have been made by civil society and historians to overcome these barriers, engage in a wider discussion on these narratives, and foster a more comprehensive and common understanding of our joint history. A number of prominent historians such as Tvrtko Jakovina (Croatia) and Dubravka Stojanovi´c (Serbia) have gone to great lengths to do this, yet the reach of their messages is, unfortunately, still restricted to much smaller audiences, in comparison to the reach of more nationalistic, inflammatory, and even revisionist rhetoric of some of the key political actors. Nevertheless, their continuous and fearless work represents a significant contribution to the process of reconciliation. One of the most prominent projects in this regard is doubtlessly the Joint History Project launched by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) back in 1999, with the aim to provide education materials for history-teaching throughout the Western Balkan region that present historical events from multiple perspectives, as an alternative to ethnocentric history books, as well as a tool for fostering critical thinking, debate, and shared history in all its diversity (Fajfer 2013; Touquet and Miloševi´c 2018). So far, two volumes of history workbooks have been developed in 11 languages, covering the historical period from the Ottoman Empire to the Second World War, as well as the Cold War and transition in Southeast Europe up until 2008, also including the conflicts from the 1990s. Although the number of students who have had the chance to learn from these textbooks continues to grow, reaching around half a million, there is still resistance toward such an approach in both countries. A similar initiative, the Joint Franco-German History Book, was launched in 2006 with the goal of challenging ethnocentric history lessons as well as encouraging critical thinking and debate (Siegel and Harjes 2012). Although a wide and strong infrastructure of reconciliation initiatives has been developed over the years on the ground in both countries, with the expectation that these efforts by civil society and ordinary citizens at the grassroots level would be reflected in changes at the top (David 2019), the lack of comprehensive and honest efforts on the part of the political elites and state officials in both countries still represents one of the biggest challenges for the substantial improvement of cooperation between Serbia and Croatia.

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5 The Role of Cultural Actors: Strong Civil Society Infrastructure for Reconciliation Artists, cultural workers, and intellectuals have preserved and fostered their cooperation even during the harshest conflicts between the two countries. A strong and dedicated network of civil society organizations and activists contributed since the very beginning of the conflict in the 1990s to the process of reconciliation, fighting against the rhetoric of hatred, nationalism, ethnocentric divisions, and historical revisionism. They called for an end to the bloody clashes, for the protection of human rights, acknowledgment of all crimes committed by all sides that were involved in the conflicts in an official or unofficial capacity, and respect for all of the victims. The endeavors of civil society comprised various forms of activities, from artistic antiwar and reconciliation projects including performances, theater plays, concerts, and visual arts exhibitions to reconciliation initiatives launched by human rights-oriented as well as other non-governmental organizations. These also included various projects fostering mutual dialogue and face-to-face encounters, which sought to bring the citizens of the ex-Yugoslav countries together in order to build a culture of genuine remembrance modeled on Franco-German “facing the past dialogue groups” (David 2019: 2). Along these lines, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR) was established throughout the region in 2003, based on this methodology, which has so far included more than 15,000 young people participating in its various programs. The initiatives focusing on youth also include the more recent establishment of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) as an independently functioning institutional mechanism, founded in 2016 by the six Western Balkans countries (unfortunately without Croatia) with the aim of promoting the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between young people in the region through youth exchange programs.1 The initiatives for advancing mutual cooperation have continued until this day, among which some have a direct focus on coming to terms with the past as a precondition for reconciliation. One of the most prominent examples is establishment of the unique regional Coalition for RECOM, which stands for the Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2001.2 The RECOM Coalition, launched in 2006 as a joint regional initiative of three non-governmental organizations and associations of families of missing persons and victims from Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided scope for a comprehensive social debate led by civil society with the aim of fostering a regional approach to coming 1 For more about youth exchanges organized

by the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) in the Western Balkans (not including Croatia), see the contribution by Nicolas Moll in this book. 2 For more information, see Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Right Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2001, https://www.recom.link/ about-recom/what-is-recom/. Accessed 10 October 2019.

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to terms with the past. As a result, the Initiative was transferred to the political level in 2011, through the petition signed by 555,000 citizens throughout the region calling for the establishment of RECOM as an official intergovernmental commission jointly established by the former states of Yugoslavia. While initiatives such as RECOM may certainly contribute to reconciliation, primarily by giving victims and their families the opportunity to tell their stories and to be heard, they cannot achieve durable results in the long term on their own. One of the prerequisites for strategic rapprochement is resolving the issue of missing war victims from both sides, which can only be done through honest and persistent efforts by the parties involved, such as continuous attempts to identify and locate the remains of missing persons. Although the RECOM Initiative has gained international support, the international community cannot do much more at this stage. However, the main problem is that all of these initiatives were taken and relied solely upon the personal commitment of courageous, respected individuals, or small groups of such individuals based on personal stances, a sense of responsibility, and a belief in the values of peace, solidarity, and democracy. They publicly advocated for reconciliation, called on societies to face up to their past, and managed to foster cooperation across borders and trenches despite all bans, threats, and obstacles. However, the need to institutionalize such personal, individual endeavors was never recognized as crucial, and thus it never became a project of the state, as was the case in the Franco-German rapprochement. Therefore, creating such a policy at the level of the state and, even more importantly, taking substantive actions to implement such a policy and monitor its impact is a crucial precondition for regional reconciliation.

6 The Role of the EU: Between Promotion and Turning a Blind Eye The EU and the process of European integration play a crucial role in fostering relations between Serbia and Croatia. The first initiative for boosting regional cooperation through the improvement of relations between these two countries, launched by the two presidents Boris Tadi´c and Ivo Josipovi´c in 2010, framed their efforts in the context of the joint goal of joining the EU. The EU placed strengthening regional cooperation in the Western Balkans among the key preconditions for progress in European integration process, in order to foster a stable and productive environment that can contribute to overcoming the challenges that the countries of the Western Balkans continue to face, both in political as well as economic terms. These challenges include democratic backsliding, lack of economic growth, and disappointing social progress with the result that the region is lagging behind EU standards. A particularly important role in this process is envisaged for Serbia and Croatia as a potential engine that could drive regional cooperation in the Western Balkans.

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However, over the years, the issue of regional cooperation is frequently sidelined by “more pressing” political and economic issues with the expectation that the reconciliation process will automatically follow regional integration and economic cooperation. While resolving bilateral issues by the two countries was placed among prerequisites for advancing the EU accession process in order not to “import” any more bilateral disputes among neighboring member states into the EU, assessing progress on the comprehensive issue of reconciliation is far less tangible. Moreover, Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013 provoked uncertainties among a section of the Serbian public regarding the motivation of the political leadership to continue with cooperation and reconciliation initiatives. The reason for this lies in the potential lack of incentives, which are losing their strength without the EU imposing conditions on boosting regional cooperation and reconciliation between the two countries. Following Croatia’s accession to the EU, relations between the two countries shifted automatically, placing a greater focus on the economy and trade within bilateral relations, and also by giving Croatia the comparative advantage of being an EU member state with the capacity to influence decisions and to support or block Serbia on its path toward EU membership. Although Croatian officials have reiterated the importance of regional cooperation and support for Serbia in the EU accession negotiations on a number of occasions, several incidents between the two countries are continuing to increase uncertainty among the Serbian public. The Croatian Presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2020 provided a unique opportunity to demonstrate a readiness to make substantive improvements to the cooperation between Serbia and Croatia by placing Croatia’s support for the EU integration process in the spotlight. Indeed, Croatia included enlargement policy and the EU-Western Balkans summit among the key topics of its presidency, although the hazardous outbreak of COVID19, which has paralyzed Europe and the rest of the world, has sidelined most of this plan.

7 Rapprochement of Serbia and Croatia: Contextual Differences and Lessons Learned The Franco-German partnership is one of the most influential reconciliation projects, developed from a focus on the part of post-war societal and political leaders of the two countries on a clear moral imperative to confront the past (David 2019). The Franco-German model is therefore seen as a role model for dealing with the past and fostering cooperation for many post-conflict societies around the world, including the former Yugoslav countries. This model is particularly exemplary for relations between Serbia and Croatia, often seen as a potential engine for promoting regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, both in terms of common understanding and

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cooperation in ensuring regional peace and stability, and also as regards cooperation in the service of economic prosperity, modernization, and improved livelihoods of their citizens and, by extension, citizens in the region as a whole. However, there are important contextual differences that should be taken into account in the closer examination of the scope for transferring the lessons learned from this model to the Western Balkans region. The Franco-German model developed in the context of the period after the Second World War, characterized by visionary political leadership and élan for reconciliation and integration in both countries, dedicated to the project of reconciliation, and ready to take bold and decisive steps needed not only to overcome mutual animosities fueled by nationalistic rhetoric, but also to substitute them with Franco-German friendship as the core of mutual relations. In addition, the continent was immersed in a unique endeavor of building the European peace project as the basis of today’s EU, with significant economic support delivered via the Marshall Plan, and with hope and optimism for a better future in a common Europe (re)built on the basis of democratic values. The Western Balkans is facing quite a different wider socio-political context today. Both Serbia and Croatia are facing challenges brought by growing populism, with inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric still present in the public discourse, as well as a lack of visionary political leadership that could bring inspire renewed dynamism in improving mutual relations and regional cooperation. Trust vis-à-vis democratic institutions and actors is decreasing and disenchantment with the EU fueled by populistic agendas all around Europe is on the rise, along with uncertainty about the future. Another important difference lies in the fact that Franco-German rapprochement was invigorated by the leadership of the two countries, first and foremost as a bilateral, genuine effort to reconcile the two societies. On the other hand, the efforts by the political leadership in both Serbia and Croatia to improve mutual relations were predominantly underpinned by prospects in the region for joining the EU. Despite a number of initiatives launched by civil society that could have been acknowledged and transferred to the political level, the political leadership failed to take the tangible action needed for a comprehensive reconciliation strategy in both countries. Nevertheless, despite the contextual differences, Serbia and Croatia can certainly draw on the lessons learned from the Franco-German model as “core countries” in pushing for both reconciliation and regional cooperation within the region, as well as for making progress in the European integration of all the countries of the Western Balkans. The success of the Franco-German rapprochement, with the two countries at the EU’s core, and the evidence of immense benefits for their citizens and societies, should be enough for the leadership of Serbia and Croatia to recognize the need for taking the decisive action needed in order to complete the process of rapprochement and play a leading role in the regional integration of the Western Balkans into the European family, to which it belongs.

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Tara Tepavac is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Graz with a background in political science. She holds an MA in Southeastern European Studies from a joint interdisciplinary program at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, and University of Graz. She works as a Senior Researcher and Coordinator of the Open Parliament at the Center for Research Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

From Discourse to Practice: A Case Study from the Western Balkans on the Transferability of Franco-German Experiences Nicolas Moll

Abstract Since the end of the wars during the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation have often been presented as an example to follow both in and for the Western Balkans. However, while there have been many discourses on the “Franco-German model,” they have rarely led to a concrete transfer of experiences. One of the rare exceptions relates to the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), created in 2016 by the six governments of the Western Balkans. The Franco-German Youth Office played a significant role in the process of establishing this new institution, not only as a point of reference, but also as a facilitator and coordinator, with the political support of the German and French governments. This chapter offers a more precise analysis of the role of the Franco-German actors involved in the establishment of RYCO and examines how the question of transferring experiences was handled in practical terms and discussed during this process.

1 Introduction Since the end of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, the German and the French governments have supported various Franco-German activities in the Balkans, especially in the field of civil society and culture. In 2000, for example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac invited the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO) to extend its activities to the countries of former Yugoslavia. With the financial aid of both foreign ministries, the South East Europe (SEE) Initiative of the FGYO has since supported around 500 encounters involving youth organizations and civil society actors from France, Germany, and the various post-Yugoslav countries (FGYO 2010, 2015). In the last 20 years, it has also become a tradition of French and German embassies in the Balkans to organize common events and symbolic gestures, for example, on the occasion of the anniversaries of the Élysée N. Moll (B) Independent researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_4

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Treaty on Franco-German cooperation of January 22, 1963. These activities are generally embedded in a discourse on Franco-German reconciliation, which is often presented as a model, or at least as an inspiration for post-Yugoslav societies, as an example to follow to help overcome their own post-war tensions. In a region where sustainable cooperation is lacking and the legacies of the wars of the 1990s and other issues continue to be highly divisive, the potentially positive value of the FrancoGerman example is also regularly highlighted by a certain number of politicians and civil society actors from the Western Balkans (Moll 2016a: 684–690). The difficult sociopolitical context is one of the reasons why the discussions about the “Franco-German model” have, in general, remained at the level of discourse and not led to a concrete transfer of experiences in the Balkans. However, there is one notable exception to this: the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), created in 2016 by the governments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, as a structure to support and develop youth encounters within the region. The example of the Franco-German Youth Office played a significant role in the establishment of RYCO, as well as the FGYO as an institution and the German and the French governments as political actors. In this article, I will analyze more precisely the role of Franco-German actors in the establishment of RYCO and examine the question of how transferability was handled and discussed during this process. I will do this not only as a historian, but also from the point of view of an involved actor. I have been involved in different activities of the FGYO in the Balkans, and from 2015 to 2017, I was part of the FGYO team that supported the establishment of RYCO. This article is based on previous research, my own observations, and conversations with other actors involved.1

2 Challenges and Limits to Franco-German Transfers of Experience Each attempt to transfer international experiences to another context is a sensitive and difficult enterprise. This also applies to discussions about Franco-German cooperation and their transferability to the Balkans, which have met with a certain number of challenges (Moll 2016a: 687–692). One of these is that the war and post-war situation between France and Germany after 1945 differs very much from the (former) Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Bieber 2000; Moll 2008: 35–37). The situation today is also 1 My

special thanks for stimulating discussions go to Frank Morawietz, Special Representative of the FGYO for SEE, Ðuro Blanuša, Secretary General of RYCO, Marija Bulat, Head of the Local Branch of RYCO in Serbia, and Kreshnik Loka, Head of Local Branch of RYCO in Albania. All have been involved in the creation of RYCO since the beginning of the process: Ðuro Blanuša, Kreshnik Loka, and Marija Bulat were members of the Fact Finding Mission and the RYCO Working Group in 2015–2016, as representatives respectively of the Ministry of Youth of Serbia, the Ministry of Youth of Albania, and the National Youth Council of Serbia. Frank Morawietz organized the Fact Finding Mission on behalf of the FGYO and was then part of the FGYO team tasked with assisting the establishment of RYCO.

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very different: The last war between France and Germany was more than 70 years ago, and both countries have now experienced more than 50 years of close cooperation, while for the post-Yugoslav countries, their wars took place only 20 years ago and continue to have a strong and negative impact on relations between (and within) societies.2 Another challenge is that, since the 1990s, there have been many international interventions in the post-Yugoslav sphere with a view to promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation. These were often made without coherence and knowledge of the situation on the ground and executed with one-sided, top-down approaches with local actors rarely involved as equal partners. This has led to a great deal of frustration in the field and also to mistrust vis-à-vis international actors and their intentions (Moll 2016b). Not taking into consideration these challenges, as an international actor in the Western Balkans, can create many pitfalls and misunderstandings and also limits the possibilities for transferring Franco-German experiences. One illustrative example is the attempt to promote the common Franco-German history textbook with a view to inspiring the development of textbooks and cooperation within the Balkans. In 2007, the French and German embassies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) organized a presentation of the textbook by two of their authors, for history teachers from BiH. After the presentation, several of these teachers said that this was certainly an interesting book, but not very useful for them as the Franco-German history textbook presents a common narrative for both countries, while for BiH, there is not, at this moment, even a dialog between the different, antagonistic historical narratives; before trying to develop a common narrative, the first step would be to establish a dialog between the different narratives, and to develop a readiness to listen to the different “historical truths”.3 Moreover, in 2014, the French Institute in Skopje and the German Embassy took the initiative to organize, together with the FGYO, a workshop with history teachers from Macedonia marking the centenary of the beginning of the First World War, with the aim of developing teaching material for schools in Macedonia. During this workshop, the Franco-German textbook was also presented. But communication both about and during the workshop was very difficult because the history teachers had the impression that the Franco-German side wanted to teach them something, without taking into account the fact that they themselves already had a great deal of experience in intercultural and pedagogical cooperation, between Albanian and Macedonian teachers.4 In general, the presentations of the Franco-German history textbook have not led to an attempt to develop something similar in the post-Yugoslav sphere, especially since actors in the region had not waited for this textbook before launching their own initiatives: One example is the “Joint History Project,” developed by historians and teachers from 11 countries in South Eastern Europe. The idea for this project had already been launched in 1999,

2 For

the differences between France, Germany, and the Balkans, see also the contribution by Tara Tepavac in this volume. 3 Own observation from 2007; I was the moderator of the textbook presentation. 4 Own observation from 2014; I was, on behalf of the FGYO, one of the moderators of this workshop.

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with the first books edited in 2005, while the idea for the Franco-German history textbook only came up in 2003, with the first volume published in 2006.5

3 From General Discussions About Youth Exchanges in the Balkans to the Creation of RYCO While the example of the history textbook highlights the limits of the transferability of Franco-German experiences to the Balkans, the example of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), on the other hand, illustrates that such discussions can also be useful and yield concrete results. The idea for a Balkans Youth Office, which led to the creation of RYCO, was launched in 2014, but there had already been discussions about this issue over the previous 15 years. Since the end of the wars of the 1990s, various youth encounter programs were developed in the region with international support. These programs were seen by local and international actors as a potential tool for strengthening civil society and reconciliation processes in the region. In this context, the question was also raised at times as to what extent it would make sense to create a regional structure that would, in a more systematic and sustainable way, support and develop such encounters. After 2010, youth organizations from the Balkans started to openly advocate this idea, for example, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), which is itself organized on a regional basis (Moll 2016c: 17–20).

3.1 The Dynamics of the Berlin Process These discussions stayed mainly within the scope of civil society, however, without being adopted by the governments of the region. This changed in the summer of 2014 with the Western Balkans Summit hosted in Berlin by Chancellor Angela Merkel, which became the starting point of what is known as the Berlin Process. The aim of the Berlin Process was to improve the lack of regional cooperation within the Western Balkans through concrete projects and to create a new dynamic in the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans. During this Berlin summit, the idea of a Balkan Youth Office was promoted particularly by Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, and the idea was then quick to receive the support of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in particular. For several months afterward, it was not clear whether the aim was to establish a bilateral Serbian-Albanian Youth Office, or a regional one, but the idea of the latter was finally announced during the second annual summit of the Berlin Process in Vienna in August 2015, with a Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the Western Balkans. 5 For

the Joint History Project see https://cdrsee.org/projects/education-projects/joint-history-pro ject. Accessed 26 March 2020.

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After this summit, the six governments established a Working Group, formed of representatives from the youth ministries and youth organizations from the six countries involved. This Working Group then elaborated concrete proposals for the mission, structure, activities, and financing of the future office. On this basis, the treaty creating RYCO was then signed by the six Prime Ministers at the subsequent summit of the Berlin Process, which was held in Paris in July 2016. In the following months, the Governing Board of RYCO was constituted, the Secretary General and his Deputy selected, and the employees of RYCO hired; as a result, in the summer of 2017, the RYCO Secretariat became operational, with a head office in Tirana and local branches in the capitals of the other five countries (Moll 2016c; Hackaj and Peci 2017).6 In this process, the FGYO and the German and French governments played a role at different levels. First, the FGYO has often been cited as a point of reference, already before the concrete idea of RYCO was articulated, by the YIHR, for example, when it advocated the creation of a governmental agency to coordinate regional youth exchange. When Vuˇci´c launched the idea within the framework of the Berlin summit, he explicitly said that it should be carried out based “on the model of the FGYO.” Vuˇci´c and Rama have, in several public declarations, referred also more generally to Franco-German cooperation as an inspiration for their initiative, and in the Joint Declaration of August 2015 at the Vienna summit, the six governments stated that their project was “inspired by the model of the Franco-German Youth Office” (Moll 2016a: 695).

3.2 Active Support by Franco-German Actors However, beyond being only a point of reference, the FGYO and the German and French governments have also become actively involved in the process of establishing RYCO (Moll 2016a: 695–696; FGYO 2018). Six months after the Berlin summit, Vuˇci´c and Rama invited the General Secretaries of FGYO to Belgrade and Tirana to discuss the FYGO’s possible support in the establishment of the planned youth office. The FGYO then organized a Fact Finding Mission to Paris, Berlin, and Vienna for representatives of the Youth Ministries and civil society from the Western Balkans in June 2015. The members of this group, with the support of the FGYO, elaborated a concept paper that helped to prepare the Vienna summit and the Joint Declaration, which announced the concrete plan to create RYCO. In the Joint Declaration at the Vienna summit, the six governments also invited the FGYO to facilitate the upcoming working process. The FGYO then formed a three-person team, a Moderation Team, which organized the working process of the RYCO Working Group created after the Vienna summit. After they signed the RYCO treaty in the summer of 2016, the six governments asked the FGYO to continue its coordinating role until the opening of the RYCO Secretariat. The Moderation Team of the FGYO, now named the Joint 6 For

details, see also the RYCO website: https://www.rycowb.org. Accessed 26 March 2020.

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Coordination Team, then facilitated the first Governing Board meetings until the Secretariat became operational in the summer of 2017. Not only the FGYO, but also the German and French governments, as well as other international actors involved in the Berlin Process, played a very active role in the creation of RYCO. During the Berlin summit, Chancellor Merkel strongly backed Vuˇci´c’s proposal to create a Balkan Youth Office. The involvement of the German and the French governments and the importance of the Berlin Process appear symbolically in the fact that the signing of the treaty creating RYCO took place during the Paris summit, at the Élysée Palace; while the six prime ministers of the Western Balkans were signing the document, Angela Merkel, François Hollande, and other international actors were standing behind them. The German and the French governments also provided constant support to the FGYO when coordinating the working process with the governments and civil society actors from the Western Balkans. The fact that the governments of the Western Balkans asked the FGYO to be actively involved can be explained mainly for three reasons: Firstly, Franco-German cooperation is widely seen, not just in the EU, but also in the Western Balkans, as a European success story, and the FGYO is considered to be an integral part of this story. Secondly, the FGYO had been active in the region since 2000, with the support of the French and German governments, and therefore already had many contacts and a wealth of experience in working with actors from the Western Balkans. Thirdly, the governments were well aware that creating such a regional institution was a delicate enterprise: because of the involvement of six different countries, the lack of general cooperation in the region, and, even more importantly, persistent tensions, especially between Serbia and Kosovo. In this context, external moderation by an institution backed by the German and French governments was seen as a factor that would increase the chances of this project being realized.

4 Finding the Balance Between Regional Ownership and External Involvement One of the main challenges for the different Franco-German actors was to find their roles in getting involved. On the one hand, they wanted to avoid jeopardizing the principle of regional ownership and responsibility during the creation of RYCO: A youth exchange structure cannot be viable […] if it is essentially not desired, designed, and supported by the stakeholders involved, and is instead simply the result of the work of external stakeholders. […] From the beginning, the governments of Germany and France, the FGYO, and the facilitator team emphasized to governments and stakeholders in civil society from the Western Balkans that they will gladly assist in setting up RYCO in various ways, but that the actual decisions relating to the creation and design of RYCO must be taken in and by the region itself. (FGYO 2018: 24–25)

On the other hand, the Franco-German actors also knew that it was important, given the complexity of the task involving governments and civil society actors from six

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different countries in a difficult political context, to play a very active supportive and advisory role in the process if the realization of the idea was not to fail.

4.1 A Twofold Role This active support was manifested in concrete terms on two levels. On the one hand, through the structural and structuring work of the FGYO on the ground, the Moderation Team and then the Joint Coordination Team cooperating with the representatives of governments and civil societies gathered in the Working Group and also in the Governing Board. Their work was comprehensive and intensive: organizing the logistics of the meetings of the Working Group and then the Governing Board, finding the funding for these meetings and the working process more generally, and preparing and moderating the content of the meetings while ensuring constant communication with all involved stakeholders. During this process, the FGYO was not an entirely “neutral” actor: When they deemed it to be useful, the members of the Moderation Team also gave their opinions and advice regarding substantive questions in the discussions. However, decisions on all questions were always taken only by the Working Group, the governments they represented, and then by the Governing Board. On the other hand, the German and the French governments, as well as other international actors involved in the Berlin Process, fully supported this project and the FGYO’s role in it, especially as RYCO was the first very concrete idea to have emerged from the Berlin Process. The governments also intervened directly when the process of establishing RYCO encountered difficulties. For example, even before the start of the Working Group, Aleksander Vuˇci´c and Edi Rama had publicly announced that Belgrade and Tirana should host the headquarters of RYCO. The other four governments had not been consulted about this and did not agree with this proposal. This was a highly political issue that was made even more sensitive as the proposals had been discussed publicly, and this disagreement risked blocking the entire working process. In this situation, the Working Group asked the FGYO to sensitize, with support of the German and French governments, their governments to the importance and urgency of clarifying the headquarters issue. Following various discussions behind the scenes, a meeting then took place in Sarajevo with the diplomatic advisors of the six heads of governments and in the presence of the German, French, and Austrian Ambassadors. During this meeting, the six governments agreed to have just one main headquarters and that it would be located in Tirana.

4.2 Moderating and Facilitating As this example shows, when substantial differences of opinions arose, they were not between Franco-German actors and those of the Western Balkans, but rather among

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the latter. In this situation, a third-party mediation was instrumental in finding a constructive solution that was acceptable for all, even more so as the Working Group and also the Governing Board had established as their own rule that all their decisions needed to be based on consensus. Moreover, while the members of the six countries within the Working Group were very committed and eager to move forward, their hierarchies were often not very responsive as they usually had many other priorities to deal with. “In this situation,” one former member of the Working Group recollects, it was very important to have the FGYO and the German and French governments, which were a door to knock on when there was an issue, and to have with them two guardians in the background which were there from the beginning to the end. They were the ones who reminded the Ministries to stay committed.7

The positive Franco-German influence is also highlighted by other former members of the RYCO Working Group: This political support occurred not only in the problematic situations, but in a more general way, as a good ‘wind at your back’, through the Berlin Process, through all the encouragements from German and French government – yes, go for it, it’s a good thing, you should do it – and this influenced our Prime Ministers. Without that political support, encouragements, sometimes gentle pressure, our governments would certainly have been less committed.8

One member of the Working Group had the following to say regarding the role of the FGYO more specifically: For sure it was more than facilitation. It was political foster care combined with very accurate and structured facilitation. There was a lot of positive energy coming from the Moderation Team. It was more than moderation; it was a lot of understanding for the specificities of the region. And there was the political support, coming especially from Berlin, during the process, which was more behind the scenes, but it was in the air, and the FGYO was ensuring this political support.9

5 Looking at Other Experiences and Avoiding Attempts to Copy-Paste One question that was often present during the working process was this: When looking at the FGYO, what can be useful or applicable to RYCO? Even if the paradigm “the FGYO as a model” was frequently used in the political discourse, for the actors working on the ground, it became clear very rapidly that it would make no sense to try to imitate the FGYO, but that it was essential to develop a structure sui generis, taking into consideration the specific political situation in the Balkans, and also the fact that RYCO is a gathering of six countries and not two. Avoiding attempts to copy-paste was also one of the guiding principles of the FGYO while 7 Skype

interview with Kreshnik Loka, December 23, 2019. interview with Marija Bulat, December 25, 2019. 9 Skype interview with Ðuro Blanuša, December 24, 2019. 8 Skype

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coordinating the working process leading to the creation of RYCO. At the same time, it was deemed important not to ignore existing experiences as they could provide stimulating elements regarding possible paths and challenges.

5.1 Hearing About Other Experiences From the outset, during the Fact Finding Mission and the first session of the Working Group, the FGYO therefore organized meetings with their Secretaries General, and also with representatives of the German-Polish Youth Office, the Franco-Québécois Youth Office, the Tandem—Czech-German Youth Exchange Coordination Centre, and the former Baltic Sea Secretariat for Youth Affairs. Furthermore, during the discussions about the Treaty and Statute of RYCO, the Working Group looked at examples of international cooperation from the Balkans such as the Regional Cooperation Council and the Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe. In a later report, the FGYO stated the following: It was important for participants to deal with existing experience, such as support structures for youth exchange in Western and Central Europe, or with regional structures in the Western Balkans […]. The work of dealing with existing and diverse experience led to suggestions and ideas about the things that should be similar, but also different, in shaping RYCO. On this basis, something new was created with RYCO – an office tailored to the specific situation, the specific needs, and the specific context existing in the Western Balkans. (FGYO 2018: 7)

The fact that hearing about the FGYO and other experiences was useful in different ways is also underlined by former members of the Fact Finding Mission and the Working Group. Firstly, it helped to make things more concrete: “For many, it was abstract what the future institution should look like; for us in the Working Group, the example of FGYO was a kind of basis; it gave us some very concrete directions where to go and then to develop it in relation to our specific context.”10 Secondly, these examples provided an encouraging message: “Hearing about the experiences of preexisting youth exchange offices yielded a very useful and important conclusion for us: it works! There are existing experiences of youth exchange supporting structures, and even if they were bilateral, this was a very strong positive driver for our work. At the same time, we knew that we need to develop something completely new.”11 Thirdly, some experiences also raised awareness of potential dangers: What I found the most striking during the Fact Finding Mission was the example of the Baltic Sea Secretariat for Youth Affairs [which was closed 13 years after being established], as an example for how an initiative can come to a dead end because the governments are not committed. This experience came up later several times during the working process as a warning. We were a group full of hope, and we saw that we must be careful, that we are

10 Skype 11 Skype

interview with Marija Bulat, December 25, 2019. interview with Ðuro Blanuša, December 24, 2019.

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N. Moll constructing something which is fragile, and that it is crucial to find ways to always keep up the interest and the commitment of our governments.12

Finally, referring to other experiences could also be instrumental in internal discussions and decision processes: I remember that in Paris we also met partner organizations from FGYO: it showed that FGYO really recognizes role of civil society, sees them as partners, that it is not just a donor-grantee relationship, but really about working together, which is great. For some of our governments, there was also the will from the start to involve civil society. But other governments were very skeptical: why should we involve civil society so much? But we really believed that it was important to give civil society an important role in RYCO. We collected arguments to convince the others, and the example of the FGYO was a strong argument for us.13

5.2 RYCO’s Structure in Comparison to the FGYO The fact that RYCO did not become a copy-paste of FGYO, nor of any other existing institution, becomes clear when looking at its final structure. Certainly, there are similarities: FGYO and RYCO are both based on an intergovernmental treaty, and their main aim is to support youth exchange projects between the involved countries. Both have a similar general structure, with a Governing Board in which the youth ministers are present, an Advisory Board, and then the office itself, presided over by a Secretary General (with one Deputy for RYCO, while FGYO has two equally important heads). However, there are also a considerable number of differences: RYCO is formed of six countries, not two; it does not have two head offices, but one with local branches in the other countries; its budget is not financed exclusively by the constituting states, and the financial contributions are not shared in the same way by the various governments, but calculated on the basis of quotas depending on the size of each country. Representatives of Ministries and of youth organizations share an equal number of seats on the Governing Board of RYCO (while the representatives of public authorities form the majority at the FGYO), and their decisions are taken by consensus (and not by majority). RYCO has chosen English and not the official languages of its member countries as the official language of communication. Moreover, the program formats and grant procedures adopted by RYCO are quite different from those of the FGYO. While the FGYO provides grants for individual measures, RYCO does this for entire projects that include a number of encounters over a period of several months. And while grant application procedures are rather simple at the FGYO, they are far more complex for RYCO. “When we heard about FGYO’s simple procedures when organizations are asking for grants, we found it very attractive. But in the end we didn’t follow this path.”14 FGYO already had a great deal of experience, has a lot of confirmed partners, and also a lot of money to distribute. For us, we knew that our funding would be more limited, that we 12 Skype

interview with Kreshnik Loka, December 23, 2019. interview with Marija Bulat, December 25, 2019. 14 Skype interview with Kreshnik Loka, December 23 , 2019. 13 Skype

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would not have enough money to give it to everybody, and that we needed to have a strict selection, and that it would not be easy to select those who will implement the programs.15 It is true that for our procedures we looked more at European youth projects, but also at existing procedures in the Western Balkans. We had to take into consideration the situation in the Western Balkans, and also the capacities of our beneficiaries, and we also have to be sure to avoid any misuse of grants. That’s why, for the moment, we have some more strict and complex procedures, but our aim is also to simplify them step by step.16

Another example shows how looking at the FGYO could also lead to very different conclusions. Today, the FGYO is supporting various projects on dealing with the past. However, when the FGYO was created in 1963, with the aim of supporting reconciliation between both countries, the work of remembrance was not formulated as an aim, but was even taboo. Given the success of Franco-German reconciliation, for some members of the Working Group, this raised the question as to whether it was perhaps better to avoid such a delicate topic. However, for others, given the omnipresent legacies of the wars of the 1990s, aiming to achieve reconciliation without tackling the past would not make sense, and for them, previous experiences from the Balkans, for example, the YIHR, and also the current work of the FGYO in this field, illustrated that it is possible to connect both. The Working Group opted for this latter point of view and was also encouraged in this by the explanations of the Moderation Team about the specific context during the creation of FGYO in the 1960s, and also by the subsequent evolution of its approaches. In the end, the Working Group, and then later the six governments, decided to enshrine as one of the aims in the Statute of RYCO not just “reconciliation,” but to complement it with “constructive approaches to remembrance.”

6 Conclusion: How to Continue? Developing Cooperation and Sharing “Lessons Learned” Once the RYCO Secretariat had become operational, the Joint Coordination Team completed its mission and dissolved itself in the summer of 2017. What role should the FGYO play now? Within the FGYO, some thought it would be important to step back—because RYCO should grow on its own, because “we have already done enough,” and because the FGYO should again focus more on Franco-German issues. However, others deemed that it was important to stay connected: Because, in a European spirit, it would make sense to develop cooperation with the new institution, and owing to the fragile political context, it would continue to be important for RYCO to have external allies. The latter option prevailed, especially since the wish for further cooperation was and continues to be shared by RYCO itself: “Even if the situation has changed, the cooperation should remain, and the political influence can

15 Skype 16 Skype

interview with Marija Bulat, December 25, 2019. interview with Ðuro Blanuša, December 24, 2019.

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still be relevant.”17 RYCO therefore also proposed that one of Secretaries General of the FGYO become a member of the RYCO Advisory Board, and both institutions have developed several cooperation projects since 2017, especially in two fields: the organization of political support, for example, by developing contacts with the Parliaments of the countries of the Western Balkans, and the development of pedagogical training and research. In November 2019, the cooperation officially materialized in a Memorandum of Understanding, underlining the specific links between both institutions, based on a common history (RYCO 2019). At the same time, RYCO has developed a great number of external partnerships, both within and outside the Western Balkans. This regional and international support seems even more necessary when looking at one of the main differences between the FGYO and RYCO: The FGYO was created as a direct consequence of the Élysée Treaty and was therefore embedded within a framework of political cooperation; within the Western Balkans, such a general politics of cooperation does not exist, and RYCO is one of the rare examples of regional institutional cooperation within an unstable political context. The experience with RYCO raised another question for the FGYO. Should it get more involved in other transfer processes? For decades, the FGYO has received visits from organizations from other countries wishing to find out more about its work and hoping to find inspiration and concrete ideas for their own intercultural work. However, this is usually limited to encounters lasting only a few hours, after which the delegations return home and possibly attempt to do something with these insights. The establishment of the German-Polish Youth Office (GPYO) was a different story, however: between the signature of the German-Polish Treaty in June 1991, which created the GPYO, and the opening of the Office in January 1993, there were regular consultations between the future Secretary General of GPYO and the FGYO regarding internal functioning, programs, and granting procedures (Defrance 2014: 33–34; Gmelch 2017: 22–24). But with RYCO, the FGYO went a step further even, as the focus here was not only on consulting, but also on moderating, facilitating, coordinating, and lending political support to the creation of another structure. The extent of the FGYO’s involvement with RYCO was therefore something completely new. The challenges also included the fact “that everything had to be done in a very short-term way” and “that the RYCO working process and the FGYO involvement were very much process-oriented, with a lot of unpredictability and many uncertainties. For an institution such as the FGYO, which is very much used to clear rules and structures and a results-oriented approach, and which likes to work with clear and secured steps in order to reach a goal, this meant dealing with a certain loss of control. The reservations related to this partial loss of control could only be addressed via a permanent dialog among the different people from the FGYO involved in the process, by showing a capacity for improvisation and an aptitude for limiting risks, as well as with the readiness of the General Secretaries to accept a certain unpredictability within this unusual working process” (FGYO 2016: 10). In 2018, the FGYO edited a publication with the title “Franco-German relations as inspiration: Strengthening dialogue and joint action of young citizens across 17 Skype

interview with Marija Bulat, December 25, 2019.

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borders”: The aim was to present “lessons learned” from the process that led to the creation of RYCO and “to summarize some of the most important experiences to arise out of this process, and to share these with all those who are working with great dedication, every day, to foster and strengthen peaceful encounters among young people from different cultures.” This publication illustrated the will of the FGYO to share its experiences, again not as a copy-paste model, but in order to provide suggestions and as a basis for reflection and discussions, also “beyond youth policy […], for other political fields of action – not only in this region, but also wherever the objective is to cultivate trust, build bridges and promote regional cooperation in a post-war situation” (FGYO 2018: 4). At the same time, it is rather doubtful that the FGYO will go on to become a regular facilitator and provider of youth cooperation structures that might emerge elsewhere. The involvement with RYCO developed within a very particular historical and political constellation, which is unlikely to happen again in a similar way. Overall, the involvement of the FGYO in the process of establishing RYCO has been an enriching learning experience for the FGYO itself: “The FGYO enlarged and deepened its own competences concerning (a) facilitating and moderating working and political processes in the field of institution-building and (b) learning how to deal with new situations and with insecure processes.” (FGYO 2016: 11). Furthermore, the existence of RYCO as a new institution, functioning and developing on its own, and as a new partner of FGYO can provide an additional dimension to the question of transfer of experiences, as illustrated by the following statement by the current Secretary General of RYCO: Establishing and developing RYCO is an ongoing process. I see a great deal of scope for cooperation with FGYO. And I also see that there will be scope for transferring our experiences back to Western Europe, not only to the FGYO, but also to other actors in the field of youth cooperation, so that the transfer of experiences is not a one-way, but a two-way process.18

References Bieber, F. (2000). Pomirenje u bivšoj Jugoslavji: Sluˇcajevi Francuske i Nemaˇcke kao Modeli (Reconciliation in former Yugoslavia: The case of France and Germany as model). In A. Fati´c (Ed.), Problemi Srpske Politike (Problems of Serbian politics) (pp. 92–111). Belgrade: Centar za Menadžment. Defrance, C. (2014). Das Deutsch-Französische Jugendwerk: Ein ‘Modell’ für die Einrichtung des Deutsch-Polnischen Jugendwerks? (The Franco-Germany Youth Office: A ‘modell‘ for the establishment of a German-Polish Youth Office?). In C. Defrance, M. Kissner, J. Kusber, & P. Nordblom (Eds.), Deutschland—Frankreich—Polen seit 1945 (Germany—France—Poland since 1945) (pp. 127–143). Brussels: Peter Lang. Franco-German Youth Office. (2010). Dialogues for a European future: 10 years of the South Eastern Europe initiative of the Franco-German Youth Office. Paris: FGYO. Retrieved April 02, 2020 from https://www.fgyo.org/media/ofaj-balkans-dialogues-for-a-european-future.pdf. 18 Skype

interview with Ðuro Blanuša, December 24, 2019.

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Franco-German Youth Office. (2015). Versöhnung als Inspiration: 15 Jahre Südosteuropa-Initiative des DFJW (Reconciliation as an inspiration: 15 years of South-East-Europe initiative). DFJW Magazin, 2015(1), 6–39. Franco-German Youth Office. (2016). The RYCO working group: Looking back at a successful working process in order to draw lessons learned for the future: Report from the evaluation meeting of the RYCO working group, Berlin, September 20–23, 2016. Retrieved March 12, 2020 from https://rycoblog.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/report-evaluation-ryco-workinggroup-2016. pdf. Franco-German Youth Office. (2018). Franco-German relations as inspiration: Strengthening dialogue and joint action of young citizens across borders. Paris: Franco-German Youth Office. Gmelch, A. (2017). Jugendwerke in internationalen Versöhnungsprozessen: Der Modellcharakter des Deutsch-Französichen und Deutsch-Polnischen Jugendwerks (Youth offices in international reconciliation processes: The model character of the Franco-German Youth Office). Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag. Hackaj, K., & Peci, D. (2017). Let’s know regional youth cooperation office. Policy brief, youth, February 2017. Tirana: Cooperation and Development Institute. Moll, N. (2008). La réconciliation franco-allemande et les Balkans: une motivation, pas un modèle (Franco-German reconciliation and the Balkans: A motivation, not a model). L’Europe en formation (Europe in the Making), 349–350(3–4), 33–54. Moll, N. (2016a). Lässt sich Versöhnung exportieren? Deutsch-französische Aktivitäten in den Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens (Can reconciliation be exported? Franco-German activity in the successor states of Yugoslavia). In C. Defrance & U. Pfeil (Eds.), Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem “Zivilisationsbruch”? Deutschland in Europa nach 1945 (Understanding and reconciliation after the “break with civilisation”? Germany in Europe after 1945) (pp. 681–699). Brussels: Peter Lang. Moll, N. (2016b). “La réconciliation ne peut pas être imposée de l’extérieur”: La difficile interaction entre l’international et le local dans le champ de la réconciliation en ex-Yougoslavie (“Reconciliation cannot be imposed from outside”: The difficult interaction between the international and the local in the field of reconciliation in former Yugoslavia). Cahiers SIRICE, 2016(1), 83–98. Moll, N. (2016c). Youth exchange as motor for regional cooperation? Origins, development and the political significance of the future ‘regional youth cooperation office’ (RYCO). Südosteuropa Mitteilungen (South-Eastern Europe Announcements), 56(5–6), 17–26. Regional Youth Cooperation Office. (2019). RYCO signs memorandum of understanding with OFAJ. Regional Youth Cooperation Office. Retrieved March 12, 2020 from https://www.rycowb.org/? p=7226.

Nicolas Moll was born in Brussels in 1965 and holds French and German citizenship. He received his Ph.D. in Contemporary History from the University of Freiburg in 2002. He was Professor for German Studies at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris (1992–1996), Head of the Department for Intercultural Education and Research at the Franco-German Youth Office in Berlin (2001– 2007), and Deputy Director of the French Cultural Centre André Malraux in Sarajevo (2009– 2011). He has lived in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 2007, where he is currently working as an independent researcher and as a freelance trainer and consultant. He is currently working on questions relating to coming to terms with the past, memorialization, and reconciliation in post-war societies, as well as on questions of international cooperation and civil society development with a focus on South Eastern Europe and Western Europe. He is a coordinator of Memory Lab—Trans-European Exchange Platform on History and Remembrance. More information is available at https://www.nicolasmoll.eu/.

The Franco-German Reconciliation Narrative from the Dutch Perspective Britta Bendieck and Nicole Colin

Abstract While the Franco-German reconciliation process developed in an exemplary way at a political, economic, and societal level after the Second World War, in the Netherlands, there was still some strong resentment toward its German neighbor up until the middle of the 1990s. Starting with this asymmetry, this chapter seeks to analyze the portrayal of the Franco-German process of rapprochement and reconciliation in the most important Dutch national daily newspapers in the context of the important anniversaries of the Élysée Treaty. For this purpose, different patterns of argumentation that are dependent on their context in contemporary history and which dominated the discourses between 1990 and 2015 are analyzed and the causes of the identified shifts in perception are examined through historic contextualization.

1 Introduction “Germany and the Netherlands are currently the best of friends,” stated Jacco Pekelder in 2013. In the Dutch press, Germany is, for the most part, judged positively and, according to opinion polls, the population has a predominantly favorable attitude toward its neighbor (Pekelder 2013: 9). The path leading to this point was a rocky one, however. While the Franco-German reconciliation process after the Second World War, which transformed the traditional hereditary enemies into “hereditary friends,” took place on a political, economic, and civil-society level, an asymmetry can be seen with respect to the rapprochement between the Germans and the Dutch. Although the two countries have long been engaged in most intensive cooperation on a political and economic level, the Netherlands, by contrast, took noticeably longer to develop a positive attitude toward its neighbor at a civil-society level. After B. Bendieck University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] N. Colin (B) Aix-Marseille University, Aix-en-Provence, France e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_5

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not coming to terms with the traumatic experience of the Second World War, the post-1968 political events in West Germany and, in particular, the way in which left-wing terrorism was handled triggered various protests in the Netherlands and reinforced existing prejudices (Pekelder 2008; Martens 2008). At the beginning of the 1990s, societal relations reached a temporary low in the wake of xenophobic attacks against foreigners in Germany, especially in Lichtenhagen, Rostock, and Solingen (Van Oudehoven and Matser 2007). After a Dutch youth radio station organized protests, Helmut Kohl received more than a million postcards from private individuals with the words “Ik ben woedend!”—I am angry! (Wielenga 2000: 220– 222). A social-scientific study by the Clingendael Institute of International Relations published shortly afterward came to the alarming conclusion that, above all among the younger generation, extreme animosity toward Germany prevailed (Pekelder 2013: 23).1 According to the study (which was not uncontroversial), around half of the young people questioned appeared to be influenced by negative stereotypes. The Germans were “arrogant” (60%) and “dominant” (71%). Germany was thought to be a belligerent country (46%) that wanted to rule the world (47%). Only 16% indicated that they had a positive image of their neighbor (Jansen 1993).

2 So Near and Yet So Far This situation was not only surprising in view of the good political and economic cooperation between the two countries, but also because Germany’s cultural and linguistic affinity with the Netherlands is great. However, unlike in France, where the dark chapters of Germany’s past were largely not addressed and instead the focus was on an intensive rapprochement with Germany, in the Netherlands, the memories of the Second World War and the Holocaust continued to form the basis for the image of Germany across several decades. By contrast, France very quickly took a position, especially at the level of civil society that emphasized the two countries’ commonalities and also their cultural similarities. Beyond the political acts on a symbolic level, such as the signing of the Élysée Treaty, this is thanks to a great number of intermediaries who played a key role in shaping the Franco-German rapprochement, especially in the civil society and cultural contexts (Colin and Umlauf 2018). By contrast, the Netherlands remained largely fixated on a model that underlined the differences between the two countries and which divided historic events and actors into goed and fout—good and bad (Bendieck 2020: 166). In more recent times, this gulf manifested itself once again in the debate surrounding the so-called gray past, a debate which flared up among Dutch historians at the beginning of the 2000s in response to the publication of Chris van der Heijden’s Grijs Verleden (Van der Heijden

1 After

1945, numerous studies on the image of Germany in the Netherlands were published, including in reaction to this problem. These include Lademacher (1990), Trautmann (1991), Aspeslagh (1995), Renckstorf (1996) and Boterman (2000).

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2001). The work called into question the traditional black-and-white juxtaposition in the Dutch portrayal of the history of the Second World War (Thijs 2011). With respect to the tensions that exist between Germany and the Netherlands, experts on intercultural conflicts like to talk about the so-called Calimero syndrome, which refers to the feeling of intimidation experienced by a small country vis-à-vis its larger neighbor (Thomas and Schlizio 2007: 50–51). This effect is reflected ex negativo in the Netherlands’ markedly more relaxed relationship with the Austrians. In this case, the rapprochement at the level of civil society succeeded amazingly quickly after the Second World War, despite the enormous weight of negative historical experiences. For example, former Austrian Chancellor Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who was largely responsible for the annexation of Austria by the German Reich, ordered the deportation of at least 100,000 Jews in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands from 1940 onwards. Indeed, this historical fact did not prevent the Dutch Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, founded by Prince Bernhard, from awarding the first prestigious Erasmus Prize2 to, surprisingly, “The People of Austria” in 1958. It was not surprising that this Calimero effect has a bearing on the Dutch assessment of the Franco-German reconciliation process. As Katharina Garvert-Huijnen shows, the political rapprochement in the Franco-German relationship was often commented on in a downright jealous manner from the Dutch side. The ink was barely dry on the Franco-German Treaty of friendship when fierce resistance towards the bilateral agreement stirred in The Hague, as it was felt to have a marginalizing effect. The entire Dutch parliament reacted with rejection and there were also some impulsive reactions. The permanent representative to the European Community, Dirk Spierenburg, suggested “setting an example” and “signing an agreement with the United Kingdom, Benelux, and, if possible, Italy that would embody the same spirit of the Franco-German Treaty of friendship and which would allow a deepening of cooperation on a political, military, cultural, and economic level and include consultation ahead of important EEC decisions”. (Garvert-Huijnen 2013: 131)

Spierenburg’s suggestion shows that the rapprochement between the two countries awakened feelings of competition in the Netherlands and was even felt to be a threat. The question of including the United Kingdom in the “Europe of six” played a central role with respect to the apparent fear of Franco-German dominance right from the beginning of the EEC (Garvert-Huijnen 2013: 131). Leading on from these general observations, the aim of this article is to examine the perception of the Franco-German process of rapprochement and reconciliation in the Netherlands over the past 30 years using empirical discourse analysis as a theoretical approach. In order to narrow this very wide field, we will focus on the representation of and comments on the Élysée Treaty in the most important Dutch national daily newspapers—Algemeen Dagblad, Financieel Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, Het Parool, De Telegraaf , Trouw, De Volkskrant, and Nederlands Dagblad. The period examined covers the years from 1990 to 2015 with a look forward to the period 2 The list of

award winners is long and ranges from artists such as Charlie Chaplin and intellectuals such as Martin Buber, even including institutions such as Amnesty International. Robert Schuman and Karl Jaspers received the prize in 1959.

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Fig. 1 Number of published articles on the Franco-German relationship from 1990 to 2019

up to 2019. The analysis thus begins in the year of German reunification and ends with the reactions to the Treaty of Aachen. It should be stated in advance that only an initial outline summary of the results can be given here. A more detailed account would have been beyond the scope available here and will have to be set out elsewhere at a later stage.

3 Object of Study and Methods The study initially assumes the hypothesis that more complex opinion pieces on Franco-German relations that, beyond the daily political news, investigate the historical dimensions of the reconciliation process refer back to the Élysée Treaty in some way. For this reason, the initial approach was to search for articles in the aforementioned newspapers in which the term “Élysée-verdrag” occurred using the search engines Delpher and LexisNexis.3 An initial quantitative sifting of the results confirmed that, as was expected, the Dutch press paid particular attention to FrancoGerman relations at times close to important anniversaries of the Élysée Treaty (Fig. 1). However, the statistics also show that, contrary to what could be assumed to be the case, the interest on the part of the press was greater in 2003 than in 2013, when major events celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty took place throughout the year in Germany and France. Opposite to this presupposition, more articles were published in 2003 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary (24 in total) than on the 50th anniversary, when only 15 articles were found. In general, a quantitative reduction in coverage can be observed over the years—not only in terms of the number, but also as regards the length of the articles. 3 These

two search engines had to be combined as the Delpher archive only goes up to 1995 and LexisNexis only begins in 1992. We would very much like to thank Lily Vage for her constructive cooperation on the development of the empirical research and the creation of graphic images.

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4 Corpus The aforementioned daily newspapers form a good basis for understanding the Dutch discourse on Franco-German relations, due to their differing political orientations. With a circulation of 450,000,4 De Telegraaf is the largest daily newspaper in the Netherlands. It serves a readership that comes from all levels of society; politically speaking, it tends to be right wing and also to print populist, tabloid-style statements. With 250,000 readers, the Algemeen Dagblad is the second-largest national daily newspaper. It claims to be politically and religiously neutral and thus seeks to appeal to a broad audience. De Volkskrant, which until the 1990s took a definite left-wing position, has moved to the center ground in recent decades. It is the third-largest newspaper in the Netherlands; a large proportion of its readership has an academic education and is interested in culture, science, and politics. In fourth position with a circulation of 200,000 is the liberal NRC Handelsblad. An important focus of the newspaper is on foreign news. It has also made a name for itself in the area of investigative journalism. Its readers are from a financially strong, academically educated level of society. The (Protestant) daily newspaper Trouw also addresses a liberal readership from the upper level of society. With a circulation of 86,000, it occupies fifth place and differentiates itself from the competition with a clear focus on issues such as religion, philosophy, nature and the environment, as well as education and science. The financial newspaper Financieel Dagblad, the Netherlands’ oldest newspaper, which has 45,000 readers, comes sixth. Its special target group is businesspeople, while at the same time, the newspaper has a highest percentage of young readers. Het Parool is a national newspaper that is, however, geared toward the inhabitants of the city of Amsterdam. It was originally founded as a resistance newspaper during the Second World War, and it can be classified as left-wing and social democratic. With a circulation of 41,000, it is ahead of the Nederlands Dagblad (19,000), which is orientated toward a Christian readership from the academic middle class. After the quantitative sifting of the articles, in a second step, longer articles were searched for that extensively dealt with Franco-German relations in general and the reconciliation process in particular. A total of 76 were selected that met these criteria and were subjected to a more precise qualitative analysis (Fig. 2). The table shows that the origin of the 76 articles selected certainly matches the profiles of the individual newspapers. NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, and Volkskrant are all equally known for quality journalism with in-depth analysis and comment that is directed toward an educated audience. The fact that 34% of the articles are from the NRC Handelsblad corresponds to the newspaper’s profile. The paper is known for high-quality foreign news coverage. The differing distribution also shows the limits of this discourse analysis. Due to the lack of basic articles from newspapers that tend to espouse right-wing or populist opinions, the results primarily reflect the opinions of a (left-wing) liberal, higher social, but also economically and politically influential, strata of society. 4 The

circulation figures quoted here are from 2017.

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Fig. 2 Number of researched articles in Dutch national daily newspapers

The analysis of the topoi is at the heart of the research. The object is primarily to identify certain reoccurring terms or pairs of terms that are part of the pattern of argumentation (requiring interpretation), which at a particular point in time played an important part in establishing the prevailing discourse on Franco-German relations. In order to better illustrate the developmental nature of the discourse, the research period of 1990–2019 was divided into four. The periods are determined by the relevant important anniversaries of the Élysée Treaty: 1990–2002 (1), 2003–2012 (2), and 2013–2015 (3). A look forward to newer developments is addressed in the period 2016–2019 (4). After a presentation of the results of the quantitative analysis, the main topoi are set in their historical context and interpreted with the aid of a number of examples. This is in order to gain more precise insights into the typical or dominant ways of thinking and patterns of perception in Dutch society. Unfortunately, a precise listing of the mentions made in all of the individual newspapers and a positioning of the opinions of the authors on the political spectrum of the newspapers had to be omitted as this would likewise have been outside of the scope of this article.

5 Quantitative Evaluation In the 76 articles selected, five central topoi were identified that determined the Dutch coverage of the Franco-German reconciliation between the description of the “phony friendship” and references to the “benefit of Franco-German relations.”

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5.1 Phony Friendship The “phony friendship” topos is, by a clear margin, the term that is most often mentioned and clearly dominates the discourse. It was used a total of 172 times between 1990 and 2019 in the articles analyzed, although the frequency declines noticeably over time. The topos has several sub-topoi: An important role is played by the reference to (mutual) mistrust (a), which is primarily ascribed to France, which, in turn, means that Germany is generally seen as the problematic factor in the relationship. Here, the criticism (a1) of Germany by the French is described and attributed to their fear of losing their position of power (including as a consequence of German reunification). Overall, German dominance (a2) is generally described negatively (as a country in the EU that is too powerful) and only seldom positively (as a driving force behind European integration). A further line of argumentation relates to the Élysée Treaty (b1), in which the symbolic value of the treaty is valued just as highly as the two countries’ efforts to come closer together; at the same time, there is also criticism of the fact that jointly formulated aims were often not realized (b2). To this, we must add the reference to the outdated form of the Élysée Treaty, whose relevance as a bilateral agreement no longer appears evident in a united Europe. The U.S. (c) is, at times, perceived as a common adversary. The last point relates to the two partners’ areas of discord (d). It is alleged that they lack a common vision and fight against each other during EU negotiations (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3 “Phony friendship”—average number of mentions of the sub-terms

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Fig. 4 “Franco-German friendship as a threat”

5.2 The Franco-German Friendship as a Threat A further frequently used topos is “friendship as a threat,” which expresses the Dutch fear of the two large countries’ dominant position. This scenario, which is perceived as a danger, belongs to the context of the Calimero syndrome, which was mentioned earlier. This dominance becomes especially tangible in the researched articles in terms of a small (EU) country’s concern that it might be overlooked and outvoted (2a). It is feared that it will not be possible to have an impact on the “front” of the Franco-German friendship—a term that is frequently used with a clear military connotation. The juxtaposition of the Franco-German friendship as a symbol of continental Europe on the one hand and, on the other, the Netherlands, which has traditionally always seen itself as being closely aligned to the United Kingdom, also belongs to this context. Moreover, Germany and France also represent a Europe in which the Union means a loss of sovereignty for individual states (2b), and this is viewed skeptically (Fig. 4).

5.3 The Joint Role Unlike the first two negative topoi, the third most frequently used term highlights the benefits of the alliance. In this instance, the Franco-German axis is seen as an important “stability factor” (3a), not only in terms of European integration, but also as regards trade and the economy in the Netherlands. In addition, the importance of the Franco-German friendship as a “symbol” (3b) of European integration and as an exemplary instance of solidarity between countries is emphasized. In this context, the common policy agenda of Germany and France is also ascribed the function of a positive “front” in terms of protection (3c) (Fig. 5).

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Fig. 5 “The joint Franco-German role”

5.4 Irrelevance This topos concerns the increasing decline in significance of bilateral treaties within the EU. Two aspects are prominent here: Firstly, the increasing disinterest of Germany toward France due to the progressing economic imbalance is addressed here. The second point relates to the lack of political interest in tangible joint projects (4b). This means that the treaty has no influence in pragmatic terms. The noticeable growth in the use of the term “irrelevance” and its subsequent disappearance is striking. However, it should be noted that the frequency of the mentions per article is so low that any potentially obvious conclusions should be treated with caution (Fig. 6).

5.5 Coming to Terms with the Past With regard to the topos “coming to terms with the past,” it is not surprising that an increased occurrence can be detected in the articles in the years of the important anniversaries of the Élysée Treaty, in which the historical significance of the FrancoGerman friendship is frequently referred back to. The term could be found 31 times in 2003. In the anniversary year of the Treaty in 2013—in which there was, overall, less coverage than ten years previously—there were nonetheless 18 occurrences. This topos has two sub-terms that adopt a present-day perspective with a differing emphasis on the long and intensive history that the two countries share: reconciliation (5a) and hereditary enemy (5b) (Fig. 7).

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Fig. 6 “Irrelevance”

Fig. 7 “Reconciliation” and “Hereditary enemies”

6 Historical Contextualization In general, it can be observed that a critical evaluation of the Franco-German relationship driven by skepticism is prevalent, but that this situation improves over time. This is clearly reflected in the most frequently mentioned topos, the “phony friendship,” across the four periods. The number of references to the “mutual mistrust,” which dominated the discourse in the 1990s, noticeably declines after the start of the new millennium. In total, this mistrust is mentioned 36 times in the articles, of which 15 instances were in 1993 alone. This was the year in which the 30th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty was celebrated. However, this term can no longer be found from 2016. The decline in frequency corresponds with the improvement in the Dutch–German relationship at the civil-society level in general. This relationship was, as illustrated, still clearly under strain in the 1990s. Germany’s dominance in

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Franco-German relations and France’s fear of losing its position of power within Europe faced with a markedly stronger German partner, both in terms of size and importance, also corresponds to Dutch fears. An interesting example in this context is provided by an article from the (left-leaning) daily newspaper Volkskrant, which in August 1998 reported on the exhibition “Vis-à-vis: Germany and France” at the Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepubik Deutschland in Bonn (Beusekamp 1998). At first glance, it appears to be a positive article that describes the exhibition as important and informative. According to the author, the exhibition catalogue is a history book that is a “must” for every European. However, a more precise discourse analysis of the report shows that it, indirectly, strikes a clearly critical tone with regard to Germany. In particular, the selection of the examples it cites to illustrate the perceptions of the Germans and the French of each other and the mutual prejudices and stereotypes repeatedly places deep mistrust center stage. While the French are collectively seen from the German perspective as chaotic, adverse to any sort of order, and always preoccupied with revolution, the French are afraid that the well-organized, jovial German beer drinkers could suddenly transform into barbaric Teutons. The argumentation grows stronger in the uncommented quoted passages, in which this image is effectively taken to the extreme: “One Frenchman: esprit. Two Frenchmen: love. Three Frenchmen: revolution. One German: poet. Two Germans: organization. Three Germans: war.” Even though it is defused by the humorous ironic tone, the quotation has, first and foremost, the obvious although only indirect effect on the Dutch reader of reinforcing old prejudices, which coincides with Dutch fears. The same applies to the (likewise ironic) title of the article: “Exhibition unites the hereditary enemies Germany and France.” By not using the more precise formulation “former hereditary enemies,” the title also subtly expresses the fear that this hostility has perhaps not yet been entirely overcome. The article can be seen as an example of the Dutch press in the 1990s in general in which the Franco-German alliance was, on the whole, often described as one dominated by tension and disinterest. Thus, Het Parool gave its article on the 30th anniversary of the Treaty on January 22, 1993, the headline “Adenauer and De Gaulle’s legacy in danger” (Elshout 1993) and alleged that the “marriage of convenience” between Bonn and Paris had been shaken to its foundations in recent years: “Where France sees its position of influence diminishing, Germany sees itself confronted with the problem of not knowing what to do with its new-found position of power” (Elshout 1993). The NRC Handelsblad also drew on the image of the fragile matrimonial relationship: “Cracks Appear in the Marriage of Convenience between Paris and Bonn – Franco-German Anniversary Sparks Little Enthusiasm” (Bik 1993). According to the article, Franco-German relations are of great importance, but after 30 years, previously unknown problems have increased against the backdrop of a completely new set of requirements. As far as the challenges are concerned, the article comes to a sobering conclusion: “It is the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty. The signatories have changed over time, but the treaty has not lost its importance” (Bik 1993). In the subsequent period from 2003 to 2012, the coverage of the Franco-German relationship by the Dutch print media is more intensive than at any other time, yet the

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patterns of argumentation change. On the one hand, the turbulence within the FrancoGerman relationship triggered by the fall of the Iron Curtain and German reunification continues to be described and commented on. These are said to threaten to push the interests of the two states in different directions in the long term. However, with respect to the ongoing yet less frequent labeling of the Franco-German relationship as a “phony friendship”, the second period shows a clear move from the reference to “mutual mistrust” toward criticism of the reconciliation between the two countries as (merely) “symbolic politics” in which the Élysée Treaty plays a central role. An article in the NRC Handelsblad of January 22, 2003, claims that the Franco-German axis was primarily of psychological importance, whereas the content of the Élysée Treaty was relatively pointless (Meijnen 2003). However, this change in position also heralds a (gradually developing) positive change in sentiment, insofar as the frequently occurring criticism regarding a lack of tangible results is accompanied with an increasing appreciation of the common aims that the Élysée Treaty aspires to. However, this positive change in the discourse can only be seen in complex opinion articles in newspapers that are aimed toward an academically educated target group. The very popular, but often also populist daily newspaper De Telegraaf has continued to use the terms “mutual mistrust” and has described a “skeptical France” in its reports for considerably longer. The positive change that can be seen in the other newspapers in the portrayal of the Franco-German relationship can be linked to the generally more positive image of Germany in the Netherlands. However, this new situation immediately produces a counter discourse in which the Franco-German friendship is now more frequently portrayed as competition and a threat. Yet in order to be able to establish such a threat, this friendship must first be taken seriously. The fact that Franco-German cooperation has blossomed once again after the crisis of the 1990s appears to be dangerous for the Netherlands insofar that, as a small country, it can do nothing to oppose the strong “front” of the Franco-German partnership in the EU. Another important aspect is the Netherlands’ partnership with the United Kingdom, which has always been of great importance. This relationship is connected to the fear that the UK could turn its back on the EU because of the strong FrancoGerman position and seek a closer alliance with English-speaking partners outside of Europe. Unlike the fading mistrust discourse, the references to this problem continue to intensify in the period after 2003. From a Dutch perspective, the Franco-German friendship symbolizes a continental Europe that stands in the way of the Dutch desire for further rapprochement with the United Kingdom and also one that makes the case for ceding state sovereignty. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom demands, as does the Netherlands, the right to be able to act independently without compromise in a global world. In light of the increased criticism of EU policy from the United Kingdom, which culminated in Brexit, this argumentation does not lose any of it significance. The fact that these are historic problems and that they played a role as far back as the 1960s with respect to the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the “Europe of six” (Garvert-Huijnen 2013: 131) is referred to in an article in the NRC Handelsblad of January 2013 in which the Dutch historian Matthieuw Segers is quoted as recalling

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that the signing of the Élysée Treaty was received with a sense of shock by the Dutch (Beunderman 2013). There are, however, positive aspects. After the “phony friendship,” the “benefit” of the Franco-German friendship is the second most often used topos overall and was found a total of 101 times in the period researched. However, the economic relevance of the Élysée Treaty is spoken about increasingly less frequently, which is primarily due to the fact that bilateral relations in general lose their importance owing to membership of the European Economic Area. The headline of Het Financieele Dagblad on January 29, 2001, therefore struck a gloomy note when it drew on the previously mentioned metaphor of the “marriage of convenience” in relation to the Franco-German alliance: “Franco-German Marriage of Convenience cannot be saved.” It said that that there was no longer room for an exclusive Franco-German relationship in a Europe of 20 member states. For this reason, it stated that the “end of the almost 50-year-old special relationship […] is irreversible” (Het Financieele Dagblad 2001). Faced with this situation, it is hardly surprising that, overall, the Dutch press is increasingly losing interest in the Élysée Treaty and the Franco-German relationship. This can be clearly observed in the period between 2016 and 2019. In this context, it should also be pointed out, however, that there was, at the same time, a further increase in the topos “common role” and the reference to the function of the partnership as a (positively connoted) symbol for the EU and also as its “motor.” When the Treaty of Aachen was concluded on January 22, 2019, Het Parool quoted former Dutch Member of Parliament Han den Broeke: “Berlin–Paris remains the driving force in European cooperation” (Van Huët 2019). One year before the conclusion of the Treaty of Aachen, Claudia Major, a German expert for Franco-German relations at the Berlin think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP), was interviewed in the daily newspaper Trouw. She said that there had always been differences of opinion and argued that the power of the Berlin–Paris axis lay in the ability to make compromises with which the other European countries can agree. She emphasized that this was more than just about politics and economics and cited examples of the comprehensive network of bilateral partnerships, such as Franco-German working groups and school and town twinning arrangements (Van de Poll 2017). In terms of the historic dimension of Franco-German relations, it can be established that the researched articles and comments focus primarily on the reconciliation process. There are repeated instances in the articles of the terms “reconciliation” and “friendship” being set against the “centuries old enmity,” the description of which is embellished with phrases such as “bloody wars,” “bloody” or “painful history.” While there was more or less equal use of these terms during the period between 1990 and 2015, there was an overall increase in the topos “reconciliation” in the period up to 2015. On the other hand, references to the “hereditary enemy” declined at the same time. The fact that the topos “reconciliation” is hardly mentioned from 2016, however, corresponds with the fact that bilateral relations are increasingly judged to be irrelevant in the context of European integration and also the increasing normalization of relations that were shattered and destroyed in the Second World War. By

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way of an example, this normalization is reflected in the fact that ironic comments that consciously relativize the emotional commemorations can now also be found. For example, Het Financieele Dagblad headlined an article of January 21, 2019, on the signing of the Treaty of Aachen “Condemned to friendship.” In terms of its content, the Treaty of Aachen was not necessarily thought to be groundbreaking, but instead had great symbolic power in difficult times. The article concluded with a touch of irony: “As De Gaulle once said: France has no other option than friendship with the Germans” (Het Financieele Dagblad 2019). This trend toward irony shows a clear change in mood in the Netherlands. The feelings of threat and competition have disappeared, and it is no longer necessary to declare Franco-German reconciliation to be a mere facade and a “phony friendship.” Instead, the outside perspective is used in order to call to mind (with a friendly and ironic undertone) the factual background to the reconciliation process including its problems and conflicts. Although the old prejudices against Germany have therefore not been completely forgotten, this ironic (and not at all cynical) portrayal bears witness to the fact that authors are increasingly distancing themselves from these stereotypes, which also certainly occasionally implies exercising self-criticism. The background article in the NRC Handelsblad by Hubert Smeets, an expert on Eastern Europe, with the title “Achtung! A Germany which is fearful of power cannot make it alone” (Smeets 2019) provides a graphic example of this. To mark the signing of the Treaty of Aachen, Smeets presents a short but nonetheless incisive analysis of the political situation in Europe with respect to new challenges such as Brexit. Even though the article begins with the assessment that the Berlin–Paris axis seems to be as strong as ever, Smeets then goes on to concentrate solely on Germany’s role in Europe and not on Franco-German relations. The article is notable for its ostentatious use of German terms such as Achtung, Alleingang (going it alone), Ostpolitik (policy toward the East), Westbindung (integration with the West), and Umwandlung durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement), which Smeets uses in order to review the changing course of German history. While in this instance Achtung only indirectly and totally ironically alludes to the time of the occupation, the other terms are specifically defined in the relevant political context—for example, with respect to the old Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt. The tendency within the article can also be observed generally in the articles analyzed from the period 2016 to 2019. Here, it is possible to discern an increasing loss of interest in the Franco-German friendship, which is compensated for by a stronger orientation toward Germany (Jürgens 2013).

7 Conclusion: “More Germany Means Less France” (J. Gerritsen 1993) In conclusion, it is possible to summarize that the portrayal of the Franco-German friendship in the Dutch press is, overall, very critical in the first half of the period of time analyzed but becomes increasingly normalized. The analysis clearly shows that

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comments are dependent on the general political events and developments within Europe, such as the fall of the Berlin wall or Brexit, which have a great impact on the coverage. Thus, the (political) tensions between Germany and France at the beginning of the 1990s are frequently an important issue in Dutch daily newspapers. At the same time, the articles also reflect the tensions in civil society between Germany and the Netherlands. In this period, the references to frictions between the two countries define the discourse. Positive developments or successes are usually not mentioned. From the end of the 1990s, the articles increasingly use portrayals of the Élysée Treaty and the Franco-German friendship as the basis for European cooperation. However, at the same time, the Netherlands feels more and more intimidated by the alliance between these two large countries. There is now a fear of Franco-German dominance in Europe, a loss of the means to influence, and a weakening of relations with the United Kingdom. It is notable that, even in positive comments by the Dutch press, the reconciliation process between the Germans and the French is not cited as a model at any point. There are no indications or even demands in the Dutch press to use this chapter of history as a role model for the Netherlands’ relations with Germany or even in other contexts, for example, postcolonial relations. It is in no way apparent that there is any endeavor to emulate the Franco-German relationship—not even in periods in which societal relations with its neighbor were tense. Instead of being seen as a role model, relations are, in general, perceived as more of an exception. A further reason for this may also lie in the clear asymmetry of German-Dutch and Franco-Dutch relations in a historical, political, and economic sense. As far as the dwindling significance of bilateral relations in a united Europe and the ongoing process of normalization are concerned, this development is, in all likelihood, set to continue in the years to come. It is along these lines that the Nederlands Dagblad concludes it article “Aachen as a Stage for the New Treaty Between Paris and Berlin” of January 22, 2019, with a quote from Hendrik Enderlein, Professor of Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin: “Even after 56 years, everyone is still aware of the Élysée Treaty. I doubt whether this will be the case with the Treaty of Aachen after 50 years.” (Ubels 2019: 9).

References Aspeslagh, R. (1995). Nachdenken über Deutschland (Reflecting on Germany). In B. Müller & F. Wielenga (Eds.), Kannitverstan? Deutschlandbilder aus den Niederlanden (Kannitverstan? Pictures of Germany from the Netherlands) (pp. 155–164). Münster: Agenda. Bendieck, B. (2020). Aufzeichnungen über den Feind: Armando, Deutschland und der niederländische Erinnerungsdiskurs (Notes on the enemy: Armando, Germany and the Dutch discourse of remembrance). Heidelberg: Synchron. Beunderman, M. (2013, January 22). ‘Nederland in Brits-Duitse spagaat’: Rede Cameron en FransDuitse viering markeren botsende visies (A balancing act between Germany and England for the Netherlands: Speech Cameron and Franco-German celebration mark clashing visions). NRC Handelsblad, p. 16.

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Beusekamp, W. (1998, August 16). Tentoonstelling verenigt de erfvijanden Duitsland en Frankrijk (Exhibition unites the hereditary enemies Germany and France). De Volkskrant, p. 13. Bik, J. M. (1993, January 21). Verstandshuwelijk van Parijs en Bonn vertoont wel baarstjes: Viering Frans-Duitse verjaardag wekt weinig enthousiasme (Marriage of convenience between Paris and Bonn shows cracks: French-German annual celebration do not arouse much enthusiasm). NRC Handelsblad. Boterman, F. (2000). Nederlands-Duitse politieke betrekkingen (Dutch-German political relations translation). In J. Vis & G. Moldenhauer (Eds.), Nederland en Duitsland: Elkaar kennen en begrijpen (The Netherlands and Germany: Knowing and understanding each other) (pp. 347– 368). Assen: Van Gorcum. Colin, N., & Umlauf, J. (2018). Im Schatten der Versöhnung: Die deutsch-französischen Kulturmittler im Kontext der europäischen Integration (In the shadows of reconciliation: Franco-German cultural mediators in the context of European integration). Göttingen: Steidl Verlag. Elshout, A. (1993, January 22). Erfenis Adenauer en De Gaulle bedreigd (Heritage Adenauer and de Gaulle in danger). Het Parool. Garvert-Huijnen, K. (2013). Deutsch-französische Freundschaft als Affront: Die Unterzeichnung des Élysée-Vertrages aus niederländischer Perspektive (Franco-German friendship as an affront: The signing of the Élysée Treaty from a Dutch perspective). Zeitschrift für interkulturelle Germanistik (Journal for Intercultural German Studies), 4(2), 129–146. Gerritsen, J. (1993, January 21). De Frans-Duitse roos heeft wel diep wortel geschoten (The FrancoGerman rose has put down deep roots). NRC Handelsblad. Het Financieele Dagblad. (2001, January 29). Frans-Duits verstandshuwelijk niet meer te redden (French-German marriage of convenience beyond remedy). Het Financieele Dagblad (2019, January 21). Veroordeeld tot vriendschap (Condemned to friendship), p. 9. Huët, B. (2019, January 23). Macron en merkel verstevigen militaire samenwerking (Macron and Merkel strengthen military cooperation). Het Parool, p. 17. Jansen, L. B. (1993). Bekend en onbemind: Het beeld van Duitsland en Duitsers onder jongeren van vijftien tot negentien jaar (Known and unloved: The image of Germany and Germans among young people aged fifteen to nineteen). The Hague: Instituut Clingendael. Jürgens, H. (2013, June 15). Duitsland is ons groot voorbeeld (Germany is our great example). Trouw. Lademacher, H. (1990). Zwei ungleiche Nachbarn: Wege und Wandlungen der deutschniederländischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Two unequal neighbours: Ways and changes of German-Dutch relations in the 19th and 20th century). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Martens, J. (2008). “Polizei und Justiz drehen völlig durch”: Die Rote Armee Fraktion in den Niederländischen Medien (“Police and justice are going crazy”: The red army fraction in the Dutch media). In N. Colin, B. de Graaf, J. Pekelder, & J. Umlauf (Eds.), Der “Deutsche Herbst” und die RAF in Politik, Medien und Kunst: Nationale und internationale Perspektiven (The “Deutsche Herbst”and the RAF in politics, media and art: National and international perspectives) (pp. 92– 108). Bielefeld: Transcript. Meijnen, J. (2003, January 22). “Frans-Duitse as is vooral kwestie van psychologie.” Voormalig Europees topantenaar Wellenstein (“Franco-German axis is mainly a matter of psychology.” Former European top Ambassador Wellenstein). NRC Handelsblad. Pekelder, J. (2008). Herbst in Holland: Die RAF in den Niederlanden 1970–1980 (Autumn in Holland: The RAF in the Netherlands 1970–1980). In N. Colin, B. de Graaf, J. Pekelder, & J. Umlauf (Eds.), Der “Deutsche Herbst” und die RAF in Politik, Medien und Kunst: Nationale und internationale Perspektiven (pp. 17–35). Bielefeld: Transcript. Pekelder, J. (2013). Neue Nachbarschaft: Deutschland und die Niederlande, Bildformung und Beziehungen seit 1990 (New neighborhood: Germany and the Netherlands, image formation and relation since 1990). Münster: Agenda.

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Renckstorf, K. (1996). Zum Bild der Niederländer von den Deutschen: Befunde einer empirischen Studie zur Exploration des Zusammenhangs von Medienzuwendung und Alltagsbewusstsein (On the Dutch image of the German: Findings of an empirical study for the exploration of the correlation between media use and everyday consciousness). In H. Süssmuth (Ed.), Deutschlandbilder in Dänemark und England, in Frankreich und den Niederlanden (Images of Germany in Denmark and England, in France and the Netherlands) (pp. 416–428). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Smeets, H. (2019, January 25). Achtung! Een machtsbang Duitsland kan’t niet alleen af (A fearful Germany can’t do it alone). NRC Handelsblad. Thijs, K. (2011). Kontroversen in Grau: Revision und Moralisierung der niederländischen Besatzungsgeschichte (Controversies in grey: Revision and moralization of Dutch occupation history). In N. Colin, M. N. Lorenz, & J. Umlauf (Eds.), Täter und Tabu: Grenzen der Toleranz in deutschen und niederländischen Geschichtsdebatten (Perpetrator and Taboo: Limits of tolerance in German and Dutch historical debates) (pp. 11–24). Essen: Klartext. Thomas, A., & Schlizio, B. (2007). Deutsch-niederländische Kulturstandards: Interkulturelles Verstehen in den deutsch-niederländischen Beziehungen (Germand-Dutch cultural standards: Intercultural understanding in German-Dutch relations). In A. Thomas & B. Schlizio (Eds.), Leben und arbeiten in den Niederlanden: Was Sie über Land und Leute wissen sollten (pp. 47–90). Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Trautmann, G. (1991). Die häßlichen Deutschen? Deutschland im Spiegel der westlichen und östlichen Nachbarn (Ugly Germans? Germany in the mirror of the western and eastern neighbours). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Ubels, R. (2019, January 22). Aken toneel van nieuw vriendschapsverdrag tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland (Aachen theatre of new friendship treaty between France and Germany). Nederlands Dagblad, p. 9. Van de Poll, W. (2017, May 16). Merkels dure Franse vriendjes (Merkel’s expensive French friends). Trouw, pp. 12–13. Van der Heijden, C. (2001). Grijs verleden: Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Grey history: The Netherlands and the Second World War). Amsterdam: Contact. Van Oudehoven, J.-P., & Matser, C. (2007). Wie denken Niederländer und Deutsche übereinander? (What do Dutch and Germans think about each other?). In A. Thomas & B. U. Schlizio (Eds.), Leben und Arbeiten in den Niederlanden: Was Sie über Land und Leute wissen sollten (Living and working in the Netherlands: What you should know about the country and its people) (pp. 79–99). Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Wielenga, F. (2000). Vom Feind zum Partner: Die Niederlande und Deutschland seit 1945 (From friend to enemy: Netherlands and Germany since 1945). Münster: Agenda.

Britta Bendieck Head of Duitslanddesk and Mobility at Amsterdam Institute for German Studies and Lecturer at University of Amsterdam, member of the research group “German Mediators: an Intellectual History of Cultural and Scientific Exchange”. Selected publications: Bendieck, B. (2020). Aufzeichnungen über den Feind: Armando, Deutschland und der niederländische Erinnerungsdiskurs (Records of the Enemy: Armando, Germany and the Dutch Discourse on Memory). Heidelberg: Synchron; Bendieck, B. (2017). Armando—Mittler oder Provokateur? (Armando—Mediator or Provocateur?). In N. Colin et al. (Eds.), Annäherung durch Konflikt (Rapprochement Through Conflict). Heidelberg: Synchron. Nicole Colin Full professor of German culture at Aix-Marseille University (AMU), director of the German–French graduate school “Conflicts of cultures – cultures of conflicts” (AMU/University of Tübingen) and honorary professor at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). Her research interests focus on the theory of cultural transfer, the cultural exchange between France and Germany, cultural heritage and the sociology of cultural fields. Selected publications: Colin, N., & Umlauf, J.

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(2018). Im Schatten der Versöhnung: Deutsch-französische Kulturmittler im Kontext der Europäischen Integration (In the Shadows of Reconciliation: Franco-German Cultural Mediators in the Context of European Integration). GöttingenSteidl Verlag; Colin, N., Defrance, C., Pfeil, U., UmlaufJ. (2015). Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945 (Dictionary of Franco-German Cultural Relations after 1945). TübingenNarr.

An Inspiring and Intimidating Relationship: Franco-German Cooperation from the Polish Perspective Kornelia Konczal ´

Abstract The unprecedented success of the Franco-German reconciliation after 1945 provoked a great deal of reflection and set the ground for political action. From the Polish perspective, the Franco-German relations played three functions being a source of inspiration, anxiety and hope. First, many aspects of the Polish-German reconciliation after 1989 have been inspired by similar developments that unfolded between France and Germany after 1945. Second, the leading role of France and Germany in the European Union has caused anxiety for both Euro-skeptics and Euro-enthusiasts in Poland. Whereas the former are anxious about Poland’s national sovereignty, the latter consider the close cooperation between France and Germany as a threat to the European project as a whole. Third, the Franco-German-Polish cooperation—in the form of the Weimar Triangle, launched in 1991—led many political actors and observers to believe that Poland could have a major impact on the course of European integration. This failed attempt to institutionalize the FrancoGerman-Polish relationship suggests that the transferability of the Franco-German experience relies upon imitation rather than innovation and that it might be limited to bilateral contexts.

1 Introduction On January 21, 1993, Klaus Kinkel, the then German Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered a speech to the Bundestag praising the achievements of the Élysée Treaty, signed between France and Germany in 1963 and rightly considered to be a milestone of the Franco-German reconciliation. With regard to the new geopolitical shape of Europe after the collapse of Communism, Kinkel believed that the Franco-German success story as, as he stated, the “real wonder of the post-war history” (Kinkel 1993: 60), would inspire a comparable process between Germany and Poland. He was not alone in expressing this hope. In the period around 1989, many French, German, and K. Ko´nczal (B) Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_6

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Polish voices had sought parallels between the Franco-German and Polish-German reconciliation processes. However, the idea that the Franco-German friendship could be source of inspiration for Poles and Germans tells only part of the story. The catalytic role played by France and Germany in European integration, popularly referred to as the “FrancoGerman motor,” “linchpin” “indispensable alliance” or simply “couple” has been not only an inspiring, but also an intimidating matter. In post-1989 Poland, a considerable part of the political scene considers the special relationship between France and Germany to be a threat to Polish interests, if not an attempt to establish FrancoGerman hegemony. This understanding not only evokes terrifying associations with Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe prior to 1989, but also draws extensively from anti-German, anti-European, and anti-Western sentiment that continues to shape the political imagination of large sections of Polish society. The tension between the inspiring and intimidating effects of the Franco-German friendship on Poland might partially explain why one of the most promising political projects in post-1989 Europe—the so-called Weimar Triangle—proved to be a distinct disappointment for those political actors and observers in all three countries who believed that cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland would imbue European integration with a new spirit. Founded in 1991, the Weimar Triangle was intended to stimulate various forms of cooperation with Poland. By recognizing Poland as an important political player, the establishment of the Weimar Triangle created an opportunity to reshuffle the dynamics of the European integration by extending the Franco-German tandem beyond the former Iron Curtain. Despite repeated political declarations, however, Franco-German-Polish cooperation continues to keep a low profile, and has yet to produce any political innovation for the European project to speak of. This chapter explores the three main functions that the Franco-German relationship has played in Poland after 1989: as a source of inspiration, anxiety, and hope. The sections discussing these interconnected issues are preceded by a short comparative historical overview of Polish-German and Franco-German relations. The second section shows to what extent Polish-German cooperation after 1989 drew on the Franco-German experience after 1945. The third section reveals how the various facets of the Polish anxiety about Franco-German leadership in the European Union (EU) continue to shape Poland’s political and popular thinking. The fourth and final section examines how the idea of the Weimar Triangle energized Poland in the early 1990s and seeks to explain why the Franco-German initiative to create trilateral cooperation with Poland failed. Taken together, the three perspectives discussed in this chapter explore the potential and limits of the transferability of the Franco-German model to the East.

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Table 1 Basic characteristics of France, Germany, and Poland Area (in km2 )

Population

GDP (per capita)

Gini index

Average wage (in euros per year)

UR (%)

CPI

DI (overall score/rank)

F

551,695

65,074,287

32,830

0.285

19,784.11

9.1

72

8.12/20

G

357,114

83,441,650

35,860

0.311

22,145.76

3.4

80

8.68/13

P

312,697

37,904,691

12,430

0.278

6,373.30

3.9

60

6.62/57

F France; CPI Corruption Perceptions Index; UR Unemployment Rate; G Germany; DI Democracy Index; P Poland; GDP Gross Domestic Product For population: World Population Review (2020); for GDP: Eurostat (2018c); for Gini index: Eurostat (2018b); for average wage: Eurostat (2018a); for UR: Eurostat (2018d); for CPI: Transparency International (2018); for DI: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2019)

2 Intersection: Historical Overview The facts and figures relating to economic performance, societal wellbeing, and political transparency listed below demonstrate the similarities between France and Germany, and how different Germany and Poland are today (Table 1). Indeed, Franco-German and Polish-German parallels are not embedded in measurable socio-economic features, but rather in historical experiences. Both France and Poland are Germany’s neighbors, both countries suffered from German invasion and rule, and in both countries, Germany was for a long time considered to be the main threat to national security. The concept of a “hereditary enmity” describing the allegedly ongoing Franco-German conflict resembles the idea of “ten centuries of struggle” between Germans and Poles.1 Eventually, both Franco-German and Polish-German relations were shaped by a process of reconciliation that is largely considered to be successful (Germond and Türk 2008; Hajnicz 1995; Wiatr 2014). However, these similarities should not conceal some basic differences between Franco-German and Polish-German relations. To begin with, the legacy of the Second World War in France differed greatly to that in Poland. Whereas France lost approximately 541,000 citizens including 211,000 soldiers, Poland lost over five million people—mostly civilians. Second, the collaboration of the French state with Nazi Germany had no equivalent in Poland. As a result, while the post-war trials of French citizens working for the Vichy regime affected several hundred thousand people, the purge of Nazi collaborators in Poland was limited to a relatively small group of individuals employed by German authorities or involved in the Holocaust by murdering or denouncing Jews (Judt 2005: 13–164). Third, in the direct aftermath of the war, France was troubled neither by changes to its borders nor by population transfers. By 1 The phrase “ten centuries of struggle” was coined by the Polish historian Zygmunt Wojciechowski

(1945).

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contrast, someone who left Poland before 1939 would probably not have recognized the country after 1945. Poland lost approximately half of its pre-war territory in the east, but gained German lands in the west and north. However, when compared to the pre-war period, Polish territory shrank by over 20%. In addition, Poland had to simultaneously manage the expulsion of the Germans and the resettlement of people from former German territory, as well as the transfer of Poles from the territories incorporated into the Soviet Union (Porter-Szücs 2014: 196–208). Fourth, the border demarcation between post-war France and Germany did not provoke any remarkable controversies, whereas, by comparison, the Western shift of the Polish borders agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 continued to fuel Polish-German conflicts for several decades (Hinrichsen 2015). What is more, large sections of German expellees calling for a revision of the Polish-German border observed the process of Polish-German reconciliation critically (Jakubowska 2012). Their emotional and political resistance toward Germany’s cooperation with Poland both prior to and after 1989 had no equivalent in Franco-German relations. The break-up of the wartime alliance between the UK, the U.S., and the Soviet Union led to the division of Europe into the capitalist West and Communist East, cutting across German territory and leaving France and Poland on different sides of the Iron Curtain. In the following decades, Franco-German and Polish-German relations thus developed along different trajectories. While the ever-closer cooperation between France and West Germany transformed into a major force of the European integration (Defrance and Pfeil 2012; Krotz and Schild 2013; Miard-Delacroix 2011), the official friendship between Poland and East Germany was driven by the spirit of socialist solidarity largely controlled by Moscow (Olschowsky 2005). The Élysée Treaty (1963) and the Treaty of Zgorzelec (1950), in which Poland and East Germany recognized the existing Polish-German border, marked milestones in these developments. At the same time, Franco-German and Polish-German relations cutting across the Iron Curtain were virtually non-existent. Whereas the non-relationship between France and East Germany produced neither political benefits nor burdens, the nonexistence of official relations between Poland and West Germany was accompanied by the existence of active enmity. In contrast to the anti-Polish attitude of West German expellee organizations mentioned above, which had a limited impact on the overall social perception of Poland in West Germany, the anti-German policy of the Polish government—providing it with legitimacy and support—had a lasting impact on the way in which West Germany was perceived in Poland (Friedrich 2003; Madajczyk 2007; Zaremba 2005: 156–163). A major shift in the European balance of power occurred in the 1970s when West German Ostpolitik introduced the conditions for establishing diplomatic ties across the Iron Curtain. By breaking from the Hallstein Doctrine, according to which West Germany could not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with countries that recognized East Germany, the social democratic government under Willy Brandt ushered in a new chapter in Bonn’s foreign policy. Under the Treaty of Warsaw (1970), West Germany and Poland committed themselves to non-violence and accepted the existing Polish-German border (Bingen 1998; Bingen and W˛ec 1993; Korbel and Ortmayer 1975; Stokłosa 2011). The Basic Treaty signed between both German states

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in 1972 paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and East Germany (Pfeil 2004). Followed in France with concern, the reunification of Germany in 1990 proved to have little impact on the nature of Franco-German relations: forms of cooperation based on the Franco-West German model were simply extended into former East Germany (Gehler and Graf 2017; Schabert 2009). The relationship between Germany and Poland, by contrast, entered a new stage. The German-Polish Border Treaty (1990) ultimately settled the thorny question of the Polish-German border and the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness (1991) protected the rights of national minorities and laid the groundwork for cultural, economic, regional, and scientific cooperation between Poland and Germany. Along with the Warsaw Treaty of 1970, these agreements are often regarded as the Polish-German equivalent to the Franco-German Élysée Treaty of 1963. When the existing ideological constraints disappeared with the collapse of Communism, Polish-German cooperation was able to develop more comprehensively (Bingen et al. 2011; Boysen 2019; Eberwein and Kerski 2001; Fiszer 2019; Phillips 2000; Ulatowski 2019) (Figs. 1, 2 and 3). Many scholars compare Franco-German cooperation after 1945 with PolishGerman relations after 1989. West Germany’s relations with France and Poland certainly have more similarities across time periods than within them. And yet

Fig. 1 Iconic images of the Polish-German reconciliation. July 6, 1950. The Prime Ministers of the German Democratic Republic and the People’s Republic of Poland, Otto Grotewohl and Józef Cyrankiewicz, walking in Zgorzelec (the former German town of Görlitz), where they signed the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Established and the Existing Polish-German State Frontier (BArch, Bild 183-R87570)

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Fig. 2 Iconic images of the Polish-German reconciliation. December 7, 1970. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling in front of the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943) after signing a treaty in which West Germany and Poland accepted the existing Polish-German border (Imago Images 50347819/Sven Simon)

several parallel developments shaped both bilateralisms already before 1989. The best-known example is the role of religious leaders in thawing bilateral relations. On the Franco-German side, this applies to the participation of French Protestants in the Speyer synod in 1946, and the Action Reconciliation Service for Peace founded in 1958 by the West German Evangelical Church, which continues to send volunteers to France and other countries that suffered under the Nazi occupation (Huener 2001). On the Polish-German side, major steps toward reconciliation were made in 1961 when the West German Evangelical Church issued a memorandum on forfeited German territories, and when Polish bishops wrote a pastoral letter to their German counterparts in 1965 forgiving Germans and asking them for forgiveness for acts of violence committed against Germans during the expulsion (Kerski et al. 2006). In the years that followed, seminal contributions to the Polish-German reconciliation were made by Catholic intellectuals (Frieberg 2019). Last but not least, the famous mass for peace at Reims Cathedral in 1962, attended by Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle, has parallels with the later Reconciliation Mass in Krzy˙zowa (the former German village of Kreisau) that was attended by Helmut Kohl and Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 (Czachur 2019), i.e., in the period of transition from late to post-socialism, when the first post-socialist Prime Minister had already taken office in Warsaw, but the Soviet Union was still alive and 65,000 Soviet troops were stationed in the Polish

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Fig. 3 Iconic images of the Polish-German reconciliation. November 12, 1989. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki embracing each other during what came to be known as the Reconciliation Mass in Krzy˙zowa (the former German village of Kreisau) (PAP/Rafał Guz)

territory. In both Franco-German and Polish-German relations, the paramount importance of religion prior to 1989 contrasts with its marginal role thereafter (P˛ekala and Dingel 2018). Possibly less well known than the entanglements between politics and religion are Franco-German-Polish parallels at the societal and local levels. Bilateral societies and town twinnings might serve as an illustration. The first Franco-German society was established as early as 1947; its first Polish-German counterpart was founded in 1971. A similar time lag can be observed in local cooperation. The first Franco-German twinning agreement was signed in 1950, while its first PolishGerman counterpart followed in 1976. In addition, the 1970s saw a number of new Polish-German initiatives: the German-Polish Textbook Commission was founded in 1972; the Robert Bosch Foundation started its activities in Poland in 1974; and the first German-Polish Forum was held in 1977. These examples show that the normalization of West Germany’s relations with Poland during the 1970s was not limited to official politics, and that 1989 stood not only for change, but also for continuity.

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3 Inspiration: Looking to the West Around 1989, experts, journalists, political leaders, and political activists hoped that, following the Franco-German model, the long history of Polish-German enmity would be eventually overcome (e.g., Czaja 1988; Dietrich 1989; Grosser 1988; Koschyk 1992; Mehlhorn 1990; Wahl 1988). In subsequent years, references to Franco-German cooperation accompanied Polish-German relations in both public and academic discourse (e.g., Gardner Feldman 2012; Jedynakiewicz-Mróz 2011; Krzemi´nski 2007; Ludwig 1995; Parzymies 1996; Skubiszewski 1993; Weber 2011). The comparative impetus not only drew on the comparable historical experiences discussed in the previous section, but was also energized by striking similarities between the institutionalization of Franco-West German cooperation after 1945 and the institutional transformation of Polish-German relations after 1989. First of all, we can find insightful correspondences between the declarations and goals expressed in the Élysée Treaty of 1963 and those of the Polish-German treaties from the early 1990s. In the years that followed, most of these were translated into political, economic, and educational practice. This applies, for instance, to the German-Polish joint cabinet consultations established in 1997 that echo the regular summits of the heads of state of France and Germany agreed upon in the Élysée Treaty (and later on transformed into the Franco-German Council of Ministers), or to the Coordinators of German-Polish Cooperation appointed in 2005, which corresponds to a similar institution that has existed on the Franco-German side since 1967. In 1992, an agreement between Hesse and Lower Silesia established Polish-German cooperation at a regional level, mirroring a similar process begun on the Franco-German side by Bourgogne-Franche-Comté and Rhineland-Palatinate in 1952. Strikingly, the cooperation between the German Bundesländer and the French régions and Polish województwa has been challenged by the same structural factor, namely the radical divergence between German federalism on the one hand and Polish and French centralism on the other. Different types of governance have also had a major impact on cross-border projects implemented along the Franco-German and Polish-German borders—a development that has been ongoing in Western Europe since the 1970s, and which has provided important tools for Polish-German cooperation since the early 1990s. In both cases, however, it was not the bilateral spirit that energized their cooperation, but the process of European integration. By the same token, the establishment of the German-Polish Chamber of Commerce in 1994, which corresponds to the Franco-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry that was set up in 1955, does not represent a Franco-German or German-Polish characteristic feature. In the 1990s, Germany also created similar bodies with other post-socialist countries. More exclusive, though, are the many Polish-German institutions established in the area of education and youth exchange. Three examples are particularly worth mentioning in this regard. The first relates to the German-Polish Youth Office (1993), which was inspired by the Franco-German Youth Office (1963), and remains without equivalent in any other country. Given the fact that Poland is significantly smaller than France, the Polish language is barely taught in German schools, and the

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German-Polish Youth Office is 30 years younger than its Franco-German counterpart, the overall success of the Polish-German exchange programs for schoolchildren is impressive: while the Franco-German Youth Office brought together over eight million French and Germans, the German-Polish Youth Office has done the same for more than 2.9 million young people from Poland and Germany. The second example of a Franco-German and Polish-German characteristic feature pertains to higher education. It is a well-known fact that various associations of universities running joint degree programs have developed across Europe in recent years. In some countries, there are also bi- and trilingual universities. With the creation of the European University Institute in Florence in 1972 and the Central European University in Budapest (and Vienna) in 1991, two genuinely transnational centers of graduate and post-graduate education emerged. Yet, there are only two academic structures in Europe that are fully driven by the spirit of bilateral cooperation: the Franco-German College for Higher Education, established in 1988 and transformed into the Franco-German University in 1999, and the Collegium Polonicum, established in 1992 by the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt an der Oder and Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna´n. Despite differences in scope and shape, both institutions provide a number of joint Franco-German and Polish-German degree programs—not at the margin of their academic activity, but as the core. The third and most recent example are history textbooks. As both the product and producer of the national imagination, textbooks were traditionally used only within but not across national borders. Attempts to create transnational textbooks were repeatedly made in Europe both before and after 1945. The first two successful projects in this regard were carried out by the French and Germans, and also by the Germans and Poles: three volumes of a Franco-German history textbook were published in 2006, 2007, and 2011, and four volumes of its Polish-German counterpart in 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2020.2 So far, there is very little evidence that the joint schoolbooks have actually been used at schools.3 However, considering the long history of FrancoGerman and Polish-German conflicts and their divergent historical interpretations, one might consider the mere completion of both projects—along with their inspiring effects on other bilateral relations—to be a success story (Fig. 4).4 The first Polish-German town twinning was established in 1976 between Bremen and Gda´nsk (the former German city of Danzig). Since then, and predominantly since 1989, Polish-German cooperation at the local level has developed considerably. As 2 The

Franco-German “Histoire/Geschichte” series consists of three volumes (Le Quintrec and Geiss 2006; Henri et al. 2008; Bendick et al. 2011); more information is available at https:// www.histoiregeschichte.com. The Polish-German “Europe – Our History” series consists of four volumes (Gemeinsame Deutsch-Polnische Schulbuchkommission 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020); more information is available at https://en.europa-unsere-geschichte.org See also Korostelina and Lässig (2013). 3 Whereas the popularity of the Franco-German textbook in France and Germany and the interest in the Polish-German textbook in Germany still has a chance to grow, the actual usage of the PolishGerman textbook in Poland has been made impossible owing to the 2017 school reform, which reverted the entire school system to the pre-1999 format. 4 The Austrian-Czech history textbook is an example (Perzi et al. 2019).

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Fig. 4 German-Polish town twinnings 2014. Source Mayr, Alois (2005): Kommunale Auslandsbeziehungen. In: Nationalatlas Bundesrepublik Deutschland/11. – Deutschland in der Welt/LeibnizInstitut für Länderkunde. Leipzig (ed.). Co-edited by Alois Mayr and Jörg Stadelbauer. Heidelberg, Berlin: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2005, p. 136

shown above, German towns and cities cooperating with Poland are located all over Germany while, by contrast, the majority of Polish localities with a cooperation agreement with a German partner are to be found in the former German territories (Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig 2005). What remains without an equivalent in Polish-German cooperation is not only the personal affinity between political leaders of both countries, but also structural connections that have been established by France and Germany since the 1980s across various policy areas. Considering the tensions that have shaped Polish-German relations since 2015, it is barely conceivable that an exchange of civil servants that has existed on the Franco-German side since 1986, the Franco-German Armaments Agency founded in 1995, or the Franco-German Centre for Police and Customs Cooperation created in 1999 could be implemented on the Polish-German side in the near future. In view of the disastrous effects of Poland’s diplomacy since 2015, joint Polish-German action in foreign policy inspired by the Blaesheim process, which has intensified Franco-German intergovernmentalism since 2001 by introducing consultations of the foreign ministers of both countries every few weeks, seems even less likely. Differing from Franco-German bilateralism in both nature and degree, the existing arrangements of Polish-German cooperation have barely produced the standardizing, structuring, and socializing effects that regularized intergovernmentalism and its societal underpinnings have had on France and Germany (Krotz and

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Schild 2013). This difference partially explains why Polish-German cooperation is much less resilient and much more susceptible to crisis than the Franco-German model. The long-term development of Polish-German connections is further jeopardized by Poland’s fragmented political scene and volatile political culture. Consequently, whereas changes of government or an ideological incompatibility between the governing parties in France and Germany had little impact on their “entente élémentaire” (Willy Brandt), the Polish-German “community of interest” (Krzysztof Skubiszewski) has proven to be an extremely fragile phenomenon. More broadly, whereas Franco-German bilateralism has had a decisive impact on the direction of European integration, Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 has not produced any original contribution to the European project.

4 Anxiety: Fearing the West Creating leadership usually means creating friction. This rule also applies to the leading role of France and Germany in the EU. As in other member states, the intimidating effects of the Franco-German tandem in Poland draw from two conventional wisdoms about European politics. First, nothing happens in the EU against France and Germany, and nothing happens without them. Second, a common FrancoGerman stance might not be a sufficient, but it is a necessary condition for moving the EU forward. Clearly, these beliefs simplify the dynamics of power relations in the successive incarnations of the EU and overlook how much the real impact of France and Germany on the course of the European integration has changed over time and across policy areas. Nevertheless, in the eyes of its critics, Franco-German leadership in the EU appears as an intentional, independent, and unchanging state of affairs. Anxiety about the leading role of France and Germany in the EU can be glimpsed in Poland’s official and popular thinking across political divides both before the country’s accession to the EU in 2004 and thereafter (Kubala 2016; Ziółkowski 2009; ˙ 2013). Remarkably, it underpins ideas that usually have little in common. Fears Zuk about the Franco-German leadership inform the mindset of most Euroskeptics and many Europhiles. Whereas Polish Euroskeptics prefer to see Poland beyond the EU or embedded in only some of its structures, Europhiles support Poland’s membership of the EU, but demand reforms. To a certain extent, the difference between the two camps is identical, albeit with an important distinction, to that between conservative and liberal positions. Sharing an anxiety about the Franco-German leadership does not, however, mean drawing the same conclusions from it. Euroskeptics consider the special relationship between France and Germany as a threat to Poland’s national sovereignty. For Europhiles, the Franco-German leadership embodies the specter of a two-speed Europe, deepens the democratic deficit in the EU, and endangers the future of the

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European project as a whole. Although both Euroskeptics and Europhiles track divergences between France and Germany, their goals differ. Whereas Europhiles diagnose the decline of the Franco-German partnership and advance their own ideas about how to establish a new balance of power in the EU—with Poland playing an important, if not even a key role in this process (e.g., Cichocki 2018; Sikorski 2018; Szczerski 2017), Euroskeptics spread conspiracy theories about what they call a Franco-German “axis,” “condominium,” “dictate,” “directory” or “duumvirate” (e.g., Adwent 2003; Bartnik 2009; Hybel 2003). The two reactions to the anxiety caused by the Franco-German leadership in the EU that can be observed in Poland are part of broader socio-political discursive struggles. First, they are embedded in a debate between conservative and progressive forces about Poland’s civilizational choice, which has shaped political thought in Poland since the late eighteenth century (Jedlicki 1999). While progressive authors and activists have seen Western civilization as desirable for Poland’s future, conservative thinkers have cherished Poland’s distinctiveness. The ongoing struggle between the two is a good illustration of Poland’s insecure identity in relation to Europe. At the same time, Polish anxiety about Franco-German leadership in the EU is derived extensively from anti-German sentiment (Dmitrów 1987; Weber 2019). Considering Poland’s strong Francophile inheritance, it is little wonder that anti-French emotions rarely enter the public domain (Adamczyk and Gostmann 2007: 172–174; Brzostek 2015; Laforest and Nieuwa˙zny 2004). Ironically, Polish disquiet about an EU controlled by France and Germany has more to do with anti-Soviet and anti-Russian than with anti-French sentiment. As in other post-socialist countries, large sections of Polish society perceive the pre-1989 period in colonial terms while Franco-German leadership in the EU awakens bad memories of being dependent on Soviet Moscow (Karolewski and Mehlhausen 2018). Since 1989, anxiety about Franco-German leadership in the EU has shaped Poland’s political life in various ways. Its intensity and impact has changed over time. Since 2015, however, when the national-conservative Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , PiS) came to power, Franco-German leadership in the EU has been invested with a new meaning. After many years of adapting Western, i.e., Franco-German, standards out of a fear of not joining the EU, the country can eventually “rise from its knees”—so the official slogan goes—and be proud of the Polish way of life. The continued high level of public support for the ruling party suggests that this view of Poland’s relations with Western Europe resonates strongly with the public mood.

5 Hope: Joining the West An attempt to understand Polish perspectives on French-German relations would not be complete without considering the Weimar Triangle—a form of French-GermanPolish cooperation launched in 1991. Attracting a great deal of public and academic attention, the Weimar Triangle provided an opportunity to create a new political space

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that was intended to help overcome the division between Europe’s West and East. The most confident observers hoped that the Weimar Triangle could even become a new motor of European integration, with Poland among the leaders and not mere followers of this process (e.g., Bisky 2014; Kühnhardt et al. 2000; Lang 2004: 22–24). In 1991, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries—Roland Dumas, HansDietrich Genscher, and Krzysztof Skubiszewski—jointly declared: We now have a unique opportunity to assume a shared responsibility and to develop the new Europe in the spirit of human solidarity, conscious of our common fate and building on our heritage of shared values. The natural desire of all peoples for democracy, prosperity and security can in the long term only be fulfilled if the whole of Europe combines its strengths to work together. (Genscher et al. 1991).

In the years to follow, French, German, and Polish heads of state and ministers met on several occasions, repeating similar statements or proclaiming a new opening in trilateral relations (Standke 2009: 351–373). Despite these solemn declarations, Franco-German-Polish cooperation has not materialized thus far (Koopmann 2016; Lang and Schwarzer 2011). The political existence of the Weimar Triangle seems to be limited to handshake politics, a number of policy papers, and nostalgia for a time when high-ranking politicians had the courage to think big. The meager political impacts of the Weimar Triangle contrast with the enthusiasm and creativity of journalists, academics, cultural workers, and social activists from France, Germany, and Poland. Admittedly, the group of people devoted to Franco-German-Polish projects remains small, but some of the results from initiatives that they have launched are remarkable. For instance, since the early 1990s, both the Franco-German and the German-Polish Youth Offices have brought together young people from France, Germany, and Poland. Around the same time, the Berlin-Brandenburg Institute for Franco-German Collaboration in Europe—renamed the Genshagen Foundation in 2005—became an important center for the trilateral dialogue about the past and present of the Franco-German-Polish relations and their future perspectives. From 2001 to 2016, the Franco-German television network ARTE worked together with the Polish public service broadcaster TVP.5 In 2015, the universities of Dijon, Mainz, and Opole established a trilateral MA program in European Studies affiliated with the Franco-German University. The list of individuals and institutions awarded the Weimar Triangle Prize, established in 2012 by the NGO the Weimar Triangle Association and the Mayor of Weimar, provides an overview of interesting trilateral initiatives launched at the local level (Weimarer Dreieck e.V. 2019). These examples show that, despite its political failure, Franco-German-Polish cooperation could indeed work. It is safe to assume that the civic dimension of the Weimar Triangle is less well known to the wider public than the assumption about the failure of the Weimar Triangle as a political project. In any case, the number of policy papers and public comments attempting to explain the non-existence of the Franco-German-Polish political agency is impressive. In Poland, the failure of the Weimar Triangle is mostly 5 In

2016, ARTE suspended its cooperation with TVP because of the increasing politicisation of public broadcasting in Poland (Zeit Online 2016).

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explained with reference to economic and socio-political asymmetries between France and Germany on the one hand and Poland on the other (e.g., Koszel 2006; Łastawski 2009). As shown in the first section of this chapter, the existence of these asymmetries cannot be denied. The same applies to their impact on international relations (Friend 2001; Szwed 2019). However, establishing a causal link between the lack of equality within the Weimar Triangle and its ultimate failure overlooks an important fact. Although the asymmetries between Poland and the countries participating in the Central European Initiative (1989), the Visegrád Group (1991), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992), and the Three Seas Initiative (2016) are— in most instances—less pronounced than in the case of the Weimar Triangle, these political projects likewise failed (Zi˛eba 2020). A closer look at the real motivations of France, Germany, and Poland in the early 1990s appears to provide a more accurate explanation. According to the most widespread opinion, France was at that time mainly interested in controlling Germany’s policy toward Eastern Europe and preventing a Polish-German drift toward a new-old kind of Mitteleuropa. Germany was mainly interested in reassuring France that it would not drift to the east, securing France’s commitment to socio-economic reforms so badly needed in Eastern Europe and fostering debate about the enlargement of the European Communities. Poland was mainly interested in integrating with the West and preventing Germany’s superiority in Eastern Europe (Standke 1998; Vogel 2008). In other words, France, Germany, and Poland were actually struggling with their age-old problems, and therefore only imitating innovation. In the face of Brexit, the refugee crisis, and the Green Deal, the EU would benefit more than ever from genuine cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland (Płóciennik 2020; Daniel-Vernet-Group and Kopernikus-Group 2020). Breathing life into the Weimar Triangle would not only require a departure from the politics of imitating innovation on the part of all of its members, but would also require Poland to abandon the illiberal drift pursued by the PiS government since 2015. Poland’s old dream of joining the West by becoming an important political player in Europe will otherwise never become a reality.

6 Conclusion The unprecedented success of the Franco-German reconciliation after 1945 provoked a great deal of reflection and set the stage for political action. From the Polish perspective, Franco-German relations have been interpreted in three ways: the FrancoGerman friendship was a source of inspiration, the Franco-German leadership caused a great deal of anxiety, and the Franco-German partnership inspired hope. Taken together, the three perspectives on Franco-German relations reveal a great deal about Poland’s ongoing identity struggle. Whether framed in terms of friendship, leadership, or partnership, the Franco-German cooperation embodies the West—a powerful shaper of Poland’s political imagination since the late eighteenth century.

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Considering the various parallels between Franco-German and Polish-German relations in modern history, it is unsurprising that many aspects of Polish-German cooperation after 1989 were inspired by similar developments that took place between France and Germany after 1945. The similarities between Franco-German and Polish-German rapprochement prior to 1989 are less well known. As a result, PolishGerman relations after 1989 can be interpreted as an extension of the Franco-German model of reconciliation to the east, and as the completion of the West German Ostpolitik from the 1970s (Gardner Feldman 1999: 334). The Franco-German leadership of the EU has deployed a different dynamic and, as in other European countries, has caused a great deal of anxiety in Poland. This feeling is shared by most Polish Euroskeptics and many Europhiles—i.e., people who usually have little in common. Whereas Euroskeptics are anxious about Poland’s national sovereignty, Europhiles consider the Franco-German leadership as a threat to the European project as a whole. When transforming into a partnership for Poland in the form of the Weimar Triangle, the close cooperation between France and Germany became a source of hope for reconfiguring European power relations. The political failure of trilateral cooperation is not only due to asymmetry and misunderstandings between France, Germany, and Poland, but also to their permanent inability to elaborate and pursue common political goals. The failed attempt to institutionalize the French-GermanPolish relationship suggests that the transferability of the Franco-German experience to the East relies upon imitation rather than innovation and that it might be limited ´ to bilateral contexts (Biele´n and Sliwi´ nski 2018; Iffly 2003).

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Kornelia Konczal ´ is a post-doctoral researcher at the Faculty of History and the Arts at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. Her research interests include the social history of post-1945 Europe, the transnational history of social sciences and humanities, and the politics of memory and memory activism in Poland. She is currently preparing a book on post-war plundering in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Selected publications: Ko´nczal (2017, 2020a, b).

On the Transferability of the Franco-German Model: The Case of Ukraine and Russia Alla Paslavska

Abstract Since 2014, Russia has been fighting a hybrid war against Ukraine. Besides conventional military forms of combat means of propaganda, economic measures as well as diplomacy are being used in this conflict. Started officially after the “Euromaidan” in 2014 to protect the Russian-speaking population from “Ukrainian fascists,” this war is unofficially a continuation of the Kremlin’s policy directed against Ukraine’s western integration. Eventually every war is bound to end. However, the wheel does not need to be reinvented for its peaceful ending and normalization of relations between belligerents to be achieved. If well-proven models for reconciliation and constructive cooperation are ready to be used, they obviously should be. This chapter analyzes the chances of a successful transfer of the Franco-German model to the architecture of the Ukrainian–Russian relations.

1 Introduction Since 2014, Russia has been waging a “hybrid” war against Ukraine, combining military forms of fighting with systematic action in the areas of propaganda, economics, and diplomacy. Officially, the war was started in 2014 after the Euromaidan in Ukraine, on the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking population from “Ukrainian fascists” (Ruptly 2014). Unofficially, it is a continuation of the Kremlin’s longstanding policy against Ukraine’s independence and western integration. However, every war comes to an end eventually and, since human lives are at stake, the sooner this happens, the better. Drawing up a peace settlement and helping to restore relations between the parties to the conflict does not necessarily mean re-inventing the wheel. If tried-and-tested models of reconciliation and constructive engagement are of use, they should be applied. In this article, I analyze the possibilities of transferring the Franco-German model onto the structures of Ukrainian–Russian relations. Certain parallels can be found A. Paslavska (B) Ivan Franko National University, Lviv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_7

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in the past: Like Germany and France before them, Russia and Ukraine have a long history of fighting and enmity. However, while Germany and France were on a par with each other even as enemies, relations between Russia and Ukraine have always been asymmetrical. Ukraine has known only short periods of autonomy, and Russia has always pursued a colonial policy in the country, aided by propaganda about Ukraine’s alleged political backwardness and its inability to build up a nation state. This goes for the pre-First World War era, the interwar period, and the decades following the Second World War—and the cliché of backwardness persists to this day. Peace may be attained by means of pressure and even war, but reconciliation requires a dialogue between equals, as postulated in the Franco-German model. The two situations are, however, not easily comparable, because a military solution to the crisis currently seems unrealistic for both Russia and Ukraine. Rapprochement or reconciliation between the two warring parties remains impossible as long as acts of war are being committed in Ukraine. The Franco-German model cannot be applied to Russian–Ukrainian relations until the war is over. What follows, then, are suggestions for a future stage in Russian–Ukrainian relations when peace has been achieved, people are no longer being killed, separatists in the east are no longer being supplied with weapons, and all innocent prisoners of war have been released.

2 The Russian–Ukrainian War 2.1 Historical Background Since declaring independence in December 1991, Ukraine has faced some of the greatest challenges of its recent history. In spring 2014, after years of playing the role of big brother and protector, Russia occupied the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and initiated and supported a separatist movement in the Donetsk region. The war, which Russia describes as an “internal Ukrainian conflict” in the Donbass (“Peskov: Putin gotov” 2019), has now claimed more than 13,000 lives, and the number of victims continues to rise daily (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2019). This war was closely preceded by the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, which broke out in fall 2013 when the then president Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. At the same time, demonstrations were held on the Maidan in Kyiv to protest against rampant corruption in Ukraine and new dictatorial laws restricting civil liberties (Stern 2013). The peaceful demonstrations ended on January 22, 2014, when the first protestors were shot dead, and in the street fights that followed more than a hundred people were killed. However, it was not long before the desired effect was achieved: On February 22, 2014, Yanukovych fled to Russia, and the Ukrainian parliament removed him from office and called elections.

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In Russia, there was some concern that the success of the protests could inspire Russians to attempt something similar, and the unclear situation was taken by Moscow as a pretext to annex the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, whose population is about 60% ethnic Russian. On the night of February 26, 2014, a Russian task force stormed the parliament of the Republic of Crimea. A sham referendum was held soon afterward, on March 16, 2014, but the results were rigged and, despite Moscow’s claims, there was not an overwhelming majority of Crimeans in favor of the reunion (Umland 2018). Ukraine was almost powerless to resist Russian aggression. The army was illequipped for war, and the top ranks were infiltrated by Russian agents. After the annexation of Crimea, armed pro-Russian groups, financed and organized by the Russians, went on to occupy the government buildings in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. If it had not been for the voluntary groups that were formed during the Maidan protests and later became part of the Ukrainian army, Russia would have gone on to intervene in other regions such as Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, and Zaporizhzhia. When Russian armed forces invaded Donetsk and Luhansk, the Ukrainian government was forced to sign the Minsk Protocol (Minsk I) on September 5, 2014, and the second Minsk Agreement (Minsk II) on February 12, 2015, in order to de-escalate the conflict (von Osten and Schdanowa 2018). The continuing war is exacerbating Ukraine’s economic and social problems. If Kyiv were to accept the demands of the Russian President, Ukraine would effectively return to being part of a “new” Soviet Union and forfeit its prospects of joining the EU. Moscow has called for the decentralization of the state and the autonomy of the separatist-held regions—measures that would increase Russian influence on Ukrainian politics without accommodating Ukrainian demands such as “complete control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict zone […], withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE monitoring, and the disarmament of all illegal armed groups […]” (Trilateral Contact Group 2015).

2.2 Political Background Russia’s present attitude toward Ukraine continues a centuries-long colonial policy. At the same time, it is part of an attempt to reconstruct the Soviet Union with Russia at its head. This idea is consistently defended by Russian politicians such as Mikhail Yuriev: It is necessary to restore the violated military-strategic balance, the old status quo, and, most importantly, this country’s place in the world order—a place which our people (not to mention those in power) are not prepared to give up or rethink (Klyamkin 2007: 168).

Russia’s inability to imagine an existence without superpower status was clearly voiced by Putin in a documentary released in spring 2018, Miroporyadok 2018: “What Use is a World Without Russia?” (Putin 2018). The country’s efforts to position

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itself as a counterweight to the West call for an ideology to unify the post-Soviet states. This is supplied by the concept of “Russian world,” which defines the Russian state as a Eurasian project with claims to global domination and legitimizes those claims by pointing to the existence of a universal “Russian culture.” Two notions are closely linked with this idea of Russian culture: that of Moscow as a “Third Rome,” a spiritual successor to the Byzantine Empire—and that of “Holy Rus,” according to which Russia is the core and protector of Christian orthodoxy and orthodox world culture, and the successor to Europe-oriented Kyivan Rus with its ties to Constantinople, Rome, and Jerusalem (Perepelytsya 2019). This project cannot be realized without Ukraine, whose territories, in the context of this ideology, are referred to as “Malorossiya” (Little Russia). Most Russian politicians and a great many Russian citizens believe that Ukraine is part of Russia and has no claim to sovereignty. In a survey conducted in Russia in November 2005, 81% of respondents agreed with the statement that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are “three branches of a common nation.” Almost two thirds (32%) said they did not consider Ukraine a foreign country (Levada 2016). These beliefs go back to a nineteenth century myth that posits that Russians and Ukrainians are one people with a shared language, culture, and religion. Following the logic of this myth, national languages such as Ukrainian and Belarusian are mere dialects of Russian and, as such, part of folklore (Dmitriyev 2014). In line with this, the majority of the Russian population regards the annexation of Crimea as restoring a historically legitimate state of affairs. This way of thinking is the result of years of massive Russian propaganda and a lack of access to information on the Ukrainian position. Other factors have also played a part: President Yanukovych’s agreement to extend the deployment of the Russian fleet in Crimea until 2042; acts of treason in parts of the Ukrainian militia, military, and secret service; and Russia’s support of the occupation of Ukrainian territories (Shurkhalo 2014). The annexation of Crimea was the first step in Putin’s revision of what, in 2005, he termed the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”—the dissolution of the Soviet Union. “This is decked out with eclectic arguments of an ethnic nationalist, historically idealized, and even mythologically romanticized nature—arguments that were previously alien to the official Russian discourse and especially to Putin himself” (Dembinski et al. 2014: 3). This example makes clear the difference between the Russian narrative and the Ukrainian one. In Russia, Ukraine is regarded as contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, with its detrimental impact on Russia’s superpower status (Vassylenko 2015). The Ukrainian referendum of 1991 put a definitive end to the Soviet Union (Kravchuk 2016)—reason enough to impose sanctions on the country and to do everything to bring it back into the zone of Russian influence. Since a successful and independent Ukraine would pose a risk to the future of the Russian Federation, all possible tactics of hybrid war are deployed to weaken the country. Political, economic, and informational pressure is exerted, and separatist movements organized and supported, to create a manipulated chaos designed to destabilize Ukraine politically, economically, and socially, and give Ukraine a negative image abroad. The peaceful protests on the Maidan were therefore cynically exploited to make the war over Ukraine (Dembinski

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et al. 2014: 5) look like a war in Ukraine with “an organised and well-equipped army of militants” (Putin 2014).

3 The Transferability of the Franco-German Model onto Russian–Ukrainian Relations Russian–Ukrainian relations are currently going through a tricky phase. The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s support of separatists in eastern Ukraine have greatly exacerbated matters. Sooner or later, however, the conflict will come to an end and the question of future relations will arise. When this happens, the countries will be welladvised to draw inspiration from others’ experiences. The Franco-German model is often cited in the literature on conflict research as an ideal recipe for reconciliation between states (Ackermann 1994; Gardner Feldman 1999; Krotz 2007). Chaigneau and Seidendorf, for example, regard Franco-German relations as a “building-block model” whose component parts have the potential to be applied in other contexts. At the same time, though, they warn of the risks of a one-to-one translation. There are two dangers in idealizing the model. One is to follow it too closely; the other is to treat it in an overly abstract way. In both cases, it loses potential for application (Chaigneau and Seidendorf 2012, 13). According to Gardner Feldman, the impressive development of Franco-German relations post-1945 is due to a combination of four variables, all essential to mutual understanding: (1) history; (2) institutions; (3) leadership, and (4) international context. In the next sections, I will present each of these criteria in turn, using the Franco-German model as a concrete example and examining the opportunities and limitations of applying it to Russian–Ukrainian relations.

3.1 History Successful future cooperation depends on a critical approach to past conflicts. However, it is essential that the focus is not on national histories, but on international constellations—on social, civil society, and regional relations (Bock 2010: 351). It is important to be clear about which international civil society organizations can productively influence (inter)national politics and under what circumstances. How is a discourse of reconciliation initiated and how is it pursued? How does it affect the parties involved and what checks can be made to ensure that certain important changes have taken place in the relations between the two sides (Seidendorf 2012)? Reconciliation requires not only genuine peace, but also a readiness to forgive and to recognize one’s own mistakes. Unlike Germany in 1945, Russia cannot currently be expected to develop any sense of collective guilt for the war in eastern Ukraine

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and its many victims. As an authoritarian democracy, Russia is not ready for a critical examination of its own history; instead, it seeks to heroize idols such as Lenin or Stalin or events such as the Great Patriotic War—a war that was, in fact, won not only by the Russians, but also by the Ukrainians and other Soviet nationalities. Under different circumstances and at a more propitious moment in time, independent international organizations will perhaps be able to act as mediators between the two countries, providing an objective analysis and discussion of controversial questions in their shared history. This can only happen, however, when both states are politically tolerant enough not to criticize intermediaries for analyses that do not correspond with their own views. A good example is the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement in the 1990s, when Ukrainian President Kuchma was invited by Polish President Kwa’sniewski to attend a meeting of nine Central and Eastern European countries in Ła´ncut in 1996 (Choinowska 1996: 143). This was followed in 1997 by a joint statement signed by the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (1997) “On Concorde and Reconciliation” which aimed to “reduce historical conflicts between the two nations” and “in which both presidents stressed that Ukraine and Poland were sovereign states, good neighbors, and strategic partners” (Klymenko 2009: 148). One possibility for this kind of rapprochement would be through the dissident groups on either side who fought against their shared totalitarian past, uninfluenced by propaganda. Another opportunity for reconciliation is perhaps to be found in the associations of war veterans, especially those who fought in the Afghan War. There is a greater chance of mutual understanding here than among those involved in today’s war, especially those involved voluntarily. Should the war come to an end and dialogue be renewed, city twinnings would offer another possible path to reconciliation. The Association of Soviet and Foreign Cities, a member of the Fédération mondiale des cités unies (FMCU), was founded in 1964, and in 2013, there were 895 twinnings between cities in Ukraine and 60 other countries. Most of these (199) were with Poland, but Russia was the runner up with 138 partnerships (Bohorodets’ka 2016). As a result of the war in Ukraine, many of these Russian–Ukrainian twinnings have been broken off; in 2014, for instance, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv terminated partnerships with five Russian cities and one region. Under more favorable circumstances, such partnerships could be reinstated.

3.2 Institutions Institutions play a central part in building up lasting bilateral relations. They have binding force, obliging politicians to play by their rules. Gardner Feldman regards institutionalized change as one of the motors in the process of reconciliation and rapprochement (Gardner Feldman 1999: 336). Collective activities and the behavior and practices that they foster encourage mutual trust and build bridges that are not easily destroyed. If one side does try to overstep the boundary—perhaps led on by the political situation of the moment—it does so in the knowledge that it is violating the institutional order and acting against the public interest of its own country.

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When there is little opportunity for rapprochement on a state level, institutions make it possible to promote civil society exchange. Beside the city twinnings mentioned above, associations and clubs can also help to intensify the exchange of views important in stabilizing and accelerating the process of reconciliation. The process of Franco-German reconciliation is a good example of how much more swiftly and effectively relations can be built up between institutions and people than between states (Baasner 2012: 144). Although it will no doubt be some time before cooperation can resume in the border regions of Russia and Ukraine, it is nevertheless likely that people will be relatively quick to start talking again, especially as many of them have worked in the same businesses or taught in the same schools—and may even be related to one another. Even today, there are intellectuals, artists, and sportspeople who have maintained cross-border relations through the clubs, groups, and associations they belong to. At present, this is fraught with difficulties because every form of contact with the other side is regarded as a betrayal, but a change in the political constellation would help revive former relations, and social actors could play a crucial role in breaking the ice once the war was over. At this point, it is worth noting that the French and Germans also started off by deliberately avoiding topics that might have rekindled hostility, choosing instead paths that led more directly to reconciliation. In this process, institutions develop a dynamic of their own, providing an additional spur to cooperation. Academic collaboration and exchanges between young people can also prove to be fruitful, which is also demonstrated by the success of various Franco-German projects. The Franco-German Youth Office, for instance, played an important role in the process of rapprochement; a similar investment in the future would be to the benefit of Russia and Ukraine. There is a great deal to be done. Using massive propaganda at home and abroad, Russia has worked long and hard to cultivate an image of the average Ukrainian, young or old, as an out-and-out fascist, while Ukrainian television has portrayed Russian youths (if at all) as avid Putin fans. A period of intense constructive effort will be necessary to destroy these stereotypes at state and non-state levels. University exchanges between Germany and France provide further persuasive examples of rapprochement—a unique and highly productive two-track relationship (Geifes 2012: 110) that, to this day, makes important contributions to reconciliation and bilateral relations. Given the large number of collaborations between Russian and Ukrainian universities in the past, it seems likely that improved political relations would soon lead to a revival of academic cooperation. Since such connections tend to be between people rather than institutions, they have plenty of potential for long-term reconciliation. Last but not least, trade relations can also contribute to international rapprochement. Despite the war, in which both states are de facto involved at present, there is still brisk trade between Russia and Ukraine. Strange though it may sound, Ukraine continues to export more goods to Russia than anywhere else, and Russia remains Ukraine’s top source of imported goods (Romanyuk 2019). Ukraine has tried but failed to do without strategic products from Russia, notably oil and crude oil products, but also organic fertilizers and nuclear fuel, which are much cheaper than those

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from other countries and better suited to Ukrainian needs. Ukraine also has long-term contracts with Russia such as the gas transit contract whereby gas is transported to Central and Western Europe via Ukraine (Romanyuk 2019). With this in mind, if the conflict were peacefully resolved, economic relations could easily be stepped up.

3.3 Leadership One of the most subjective variables in the process of rapprochement is that of political leadership: Someone has to make the first move. Such initiative requires courage because it can have negative consequences, both short- and long-term. If all goes well, it will eventually prove beneficial, but it can also destroy existing collaborations between institutions; politicians who declare themselves willing to take the first step toward reconciliation with the archenemy after years of counterpropaganda risk being branded traitors by their fellow citizens and ruining their political careers. Political leadership seems to be one of the most important factors in the Russian– Ukrainian constellation, but because of the asymmetrical nature of the relationship it is also problematic. During the presidential election campaign in summer 2019, the new Ukrainian President Zelensky repeatedly stressed his willingness to negotiate an end to the war with the Russian president at any time. Putin, on the other hand, shows no interest in changing tack and continues to maintain that Russia has nothing to do with the “internal” Ukrainian war. At the same time, he has no intention of giving up Crimea and is still supplying the separatists in the Donbass with weapons. He also demands that Ukraine changes its constitution in accordance with the Minsk agreements, to guarantee additional rights to the two “republics” Donetsk and Luhansk. This is not with the intention of consolidating Ukraine’s independence; rather, by federalizing the state, introducing Russian as a second state language, etc., Putin is trying to split and weaken the country and undermine its prospects of joining the EU. In light of these developments, it would make sense for the political leadership on both sides to familiarize themselves with the Franco-German model of reconciliation. No politician goes down in history as a great statesman for demonstrating their own superiority and putting pressure on their neighbor. Instead, the goal must be to forge relations on equal terms, despite the asymmetry, and to signal a willingness to compromise. It would not be the first example in Russian–Ukrainian history of a partnership on equal terms; in December 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the heads of government of Ukraine and Belarus, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shuskevich, formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A similar decision was made by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer when they accepted the compromises of the Élysée Treaty in 1963; by signing the treaty, both sides agreed to hold regular government consultations. At first, the delegations sat opposite each other in silence for hours on end, and there seemed little hope of results, but eventually the problems were confronted and discussion began—a prerequisite for any form of cooperation. In the current situation of war, the two leaders would, of course, be at far greater risk of destroying their

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political careers; not everyone wants peace at any price. Whether or not a sacrifice is worthwhile is something that only history can decide.

3.4 International Context The international context can open up new prospects for conflicting countries— or, alternatively, it can limit their scope for action. Either way, it is quite a vague concept: International context does not necessarily ensure that a conflict is settled in a fair manner, because the concrete interests of international players vary widely. Depending on their political and/or economic status, parties to a conflict can play an active or passive role in international dialogue. When political leadership cannot agree on a compromise, international mediators can help the two sides to reach an understanding. International institutions have had a very positive influence in the Russian–Ukrainian war. It took a long time for international organizations to respond to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the occupation of territories in eastern Ukraine, but even somewhat belated initiatives such as those of the OSCE at Minsk I and the presence of François Hollande and Angela Merkel at the Minsk II negotiations alongside then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin helped to de-escalate hostilities. Although it was not possible to speak of a ceasefire or withdrawal of weapons, there was a fall in the number of casualties. Even a fragile peace makes life easier for the civilian population, reduces military casualties, and facilitates prisoner swaps. At the same time, the Minsk agreements confirm that, in a world of global superpowers, it is not justice but strength that has the upper hand. It was, ultimately, the geopolitical climate that was to blame for de Gaulle’s failure to draw up a FrancoGerman Treaty that would create a European counterweight to the USA. And it was because of favorable power relations that Putin was able to push his demands through at the Minsk agreements; Russia was not identified as a party to the conflict, but the two “people’s republics” were, so that, although not internationally recognized, they were effectively legitimized. Ukraine had been left in such dire straits by the offensive by Russian troops that it was forced to sign an unfavorable treaty. In this, it was let down by the USA and the UK, the two guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum,1 despite their commitment to respect its sovereignty and existing borders. This can be explained in part by the controversial (and non-binding) nature of the memorandum. Russia, meanwhile, violated the territorial integrity of the country and continues to do so (OSCE 2019). It is not, however, impossible that international context will have a more positive impact on the parties to the conflict in the future. The sanctions imposed on Russia 1 Under

the Budapest Memorandum (Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1994) which was signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the USA in 1994, Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons on its territory which had formed a substantial part of the arsenal of the former USSR.

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by the EU and the USA, for example, seem to be having an effect on the situation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Financial and economic pressure has more impact than cautionary words or expressions of “concern.”

4 What Next? It can be concluded that the Franco-German model still has potential, and that certain elements of it could be adopted and developed by former warring parties to good effect. In particular, civil society exchanges between young people, artists, sportspeople, and academics offer great potential for rapprochement between Russia and Ukraine. There can be no doubt that it would be worth following France and Germany in developing and institutionalizing such relations, as soon as the necessary conditions are in place. There are, admittedly, few grounds for optimism. Thanks to the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 and the OSCE Mission in the region, fighting in the Donbass has been considerably reduced, but the expert forecasts on the situation are not positive (Buna 2016; Meister 2016). In order to put an end to the armed conflicts, both sides would have to be willing to compromise, and neither Russia nor Ukraine shows much sign of this at present. The Minsk format will probably be retained in future negotiations, making it possible for Russia to continue to weaken Ukraine through the war in the Donbass. Even in this postcolonial age, Russia is attempting to secure control of its neighbors with policies of “controlled destabilization and the expansion of non-governmental spaces” (Meister 2016: 8); it is not impossible that the Donbass will meet the same fate as Transnistria or Abkhazia and become the scene of a “frozen conflict,” where, although there is no longer any fighting, there is also no resolution to the disputes. In spite of all of this, there are grounds for hope. If Moscow suddenly changed its position and stopped supporting the separatists in the east, Ukraine could quickly recover its territories and people. One of the peculiarities of the Russian–Ukrainian war is that it was never officially declared; this means that it need not be officially ended either; the peace process can begin at any time, as soon as one or both sides bring about peace—or are forced to bring about peace by a certain combination of political and/or economic circumstances. When that happens, former relations between the two neighboring countries and onetime partners can be rapidly revived.

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Levada, Y. A. (2016). Vremya peremen: Predmet i pozitsiya issledovatelya (Time of Changes: The Subject and the Researcher’s Position). Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie. Meister, S. (2016). Perspektiven des bewaffneten Konflikts in der Ostukraine – wenig Aussichten auf Veränderung (Perspectives of the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine – Few Propsects of Change). Ukraine-Analysen, 194. https://www.laender-analysen.de/ukraine/pdf/UkraineAnalysen194.pdf. Accessed September 02, 2019. Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine, Russia, United Kingdom, United States. (1994). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/507/64/PDF/ N9450764.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed April 01, 2020. NN. (2019, May 20). Peskov: Putin gotov budet pozdravit’ Zelenskogo s uspekhami v uregulirovanii v Donbasse (Peskov: Putin Prepared to Congratulate Zelensky on Success in the Donbass). TASS. https://tass.ru/politika/6448982. Accessed October 02, 2019. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2019). Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 November 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ 28thReportUkraine_EN.pdf. Accessed March 05, 2020. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2019). Extension of the Mandate of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (Decision No. 1323). https://www.osce.org/per manent-council/415988?download=true. Accessed September 07, 2019. Perepelytsya, G. (2019). Russian world ideology as a threat to the security of the world and Ukraine (peace, security, democracy, and prosperity). Centre for Russian Studies. https:// r-studies.org/cms/index.php?action=news/view_details&news_id=81655&lang=eng. Accessed September 02, 2019. Putin, V. (2014). Address by the President of the Russian Federation. https://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/20603. Accessed September 02, 2019. Putin, V. (2018). Interview by V. Soloviev. In: “No Russia, no world!” – World Order 2018 (documentary). Moscow: Vesti. Romanyuk, O. (2019, January 11) Torhivlya Ukrayiny z Rosiyeyu znovu zrostaye: v chomu prychyny? (Trade is On the Increase Again Between Ukraine and Russia. Why?). Segodnya. https://ukr.segodnya.ua/economics/enews/pochemu-torgovlya-s-rossieysnova-rastet1204663.html. Accessed March 05, 2020. Ruptly. (2014). Vladimir Putin visits the educational forum ‘Seliger-2014’. YouTube. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=evBjnWLnwDM. Accessed March 05, 2020. Seidendorf, S. (Ed.). (2012). Deutsch-Französische Beziehungen als Modellbaukasten? Zur Übertragbarkeit von Aussöhnung und strukturierter Zusammenarbeit. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Shurkhalo, D. (2014, April 14). Dveri rayviddiliv MVS separatystam vidkryvayut’ hroshi “Sim’yi” (The ‘Family’ Opens Up District Departments of the Ministry for the Interior to Separatists). Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25333161.html. Accessed September 03, 2019. Stern, D. (2013, November 25). Ukraine Protest: EU Deplores ‘Russian pressure’. BBC. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25088608. Accessed October 02, 2019. Trilateral Contact Group. (2015). Minsk Agreement. https://www.unian.info/politics/1043394minsk-agreement-full-text-in-english.html. Accessed November 19, 2019. Umland, A. (2018). Inwieweit war Russlands Anschluss der Krim historisch gerechtfertigt? Zur Problematik ‘realistischer’ Annexionsnarrative (How far was Russia’s Annexation of the Crimea Historically Justified? On the Problem of ‘Realistic’ Annexation Narratives). SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen, 2(2), 162–169. Vassylenko, V. (2015, April 03). Russisch-ukrainischer Krieg: eine Analyse. Teil 1/3. (RussianUkrainian War: An Analysis. Part 1/3). Euromaidan Press. https://de.euromaidanpress.com/ 2015/04/03/prof-volodymyr-vassylenko-russisch-ukrainischer-krieg-eine-analyse/. Accessed September 03, 2019. von Osten, D., & Schdanowa, D. (2018, November 26). Krieg mit Unterstützung aus Moskau (War with Support from Moscow). Tagesschau.de. https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/ausland/rus sland-ukraine-103.html. Accessed September 03, 2019.

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Alla Paslavska holds the Chair of Intercultural Communication and Translation Studies at the Ivan Franko University in Lviv, where she researches the theory and practice of literary translation and intercultural communication. She is also president of the Ukrainian Association of German Teachers and Germanists, and the translator and (co-)editor of a number of GermanUkrainian anthologies: Lass es Liebe sein (Let it Be Love). L’viv: PAIS, 2014; Galizien. Aus dem Großen Krieg (Galicia: Texts from the Great War). L’viv: VNTL-Klasyka, 2014; Vivere Memento: Anthologie deutschsprachiger Werke von Ivan Franko (Vivere Memento: An Anthology of German Texts by Ivan Franko). L’viv: VNTL-Klasyka, 2016; Lwiw: Literarischer Reiseführer (Lviv: A Literary Guidebook). L’viv: VNTL-Klasyka, 2017; Schwester, leg die Flügel an! Frauenstimmen aus der Ukraine (Sister, Don Your Wings: Women’s Voices from Ukraine). L viv: VNTLKlasyka, 2019.

Reconciliation Through Trust and a Common Destiny: The Algerian and Moroccan Relationship on the Line Idriss Jebari

Abstract This chapter explores the possibility of reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria, inspired by the French and German reconciliation model. Mutual mistrust has set in over the past few decades following several crises. Reconciliation efforts are complicated by each side’s sense of grievance, among leaders and an increasingly belligerent public. They both now see the status quo as the safest option. Faced with the limits of traditional approaches, the Franco-German model could break the deadlock by binding their destinies together and creating incentives for collaboration. The model owes its success to the ability to overcome multi-generational conflict and distrust through integrative economic measures and symbolic gestures. It jumpstarted European construction, just as this reconciliation could resuscitate the Arab Maghreb Union as a prosperous block that includes Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Hence, their reconciliation should overcome the root of mistrust and address the structural incompatibility between the two economies.

1 Introduction The Maghreb region is arguably the world’s least integrated economic bloc with 3% intra-regional trade, compared to the EU’s 60%. This shortcoming is largely attributed to the latent conflict between Algeria and Morocco (Zoubir 2000: 43). Despite what they share—including culture, religion, and social values—the two countries have not overcome mutual mistrust, a lack of political will, and fundamental disagreements over the Sahara since achieving political independence in 1956 and The author would like to express his most sincere thanks and appreciation for the important contribution of Adel Hamaizia to the ideas contained in this chapter, and to our common dream of a united Maghreb. I. Jebari (B) Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_8

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1962, respectively (Zoubir 2012: 84). The symbol of their fraught relationship is their long physical border in western Algeria and eastern Morocco, which has been closed for 26 years. This has impeded the movement of goods and people, and a lack of relations has cost the countries from two to three GDP points annually (Ghilès 2010). As the two countries experience high youth unemployment, social instability, high levels of emigration, a brain drain, and religious extremism, there is a strong case to be made for the benefits of complementary economies and multisectoral coordination (Dahshan and Masbah 2020; Lounnas and Messari 2018). This chapter explores the possibility of reconciliation between the two North African countries, inspired by the French and German reconciliation model. Mutual mistrust has set in over the past few decades following crises in 1963, 1975, and 1994. Reconciliation efforts are complicated by each side’s sense of grievance among leaders and an increasingly belligerent public. They both now see the status quo as the safest option. Faced with the limits of traditional approaches, the Franco-German model could break the deadlock by binding their destinies together and creating incentives for collaboration. The model owes its success to the ability to overcome multi-generational conflict and distrust through integrative economic measures and symbolic gestures. It jumpstarted European construction, just as this reconciliation could resuscitate the Arab Maghreb Union (1989) as a prosperous block that includes Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Hence, their reconciliation should overcome the root of mistrust and address the structural incompatibility between the two economies. Reconciliation has a chance if the two sides display bold thinking. First, by using the process of reconciliation and conflict resolution to institute a new culture of dialogue, and second, by following up their economic rapprochement by addressing long-standing domestic issues. The authorities in both countries must pursue common economic projects while simultaneously entrusting greater political power to the middle classes to truly effect a lasting cultural change. While the comparison with the French and German example holds promise, the major difference lies in the two North African countries’ lack of democratic political cultures. Both elites resist measures that would alter power structures where they currently enjoy significant “insider” rents and benefits. They also need to induce a shift in public opinion toward closer neighborly relations. Taking inspiration from the European Community’s experience, Algeria and Morocco can also reconcile and create a strong union alongside Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania and offer an inspiring goal for the region’s disillusioned youth.

2 The Relationship Between Algeria and Morocco: A Historical Primer The Algerian and Moroccan people share remarkably similar traits and solidarity through history (Stora 2002). However, the relationship between the two countries broke down over a series of crises since their political independence that have bred a

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climate of mistrust. Their respective portrayals of the rifts show competing narratives and a lack of recognition for the other side. These discourses have contributed to a negative perception of each other’s intentions, offered justifications for separate destinies, and shaped public opinion of the other. Algeria and Morocco’s historical destinies were intertwined for centuries, from the Islamic Empires to Ottoman and French colonial control. Under the latter, North African nationalist leaders met and coordinated their struggle in Paris and in Cairo while declaring their hope to build a united Maghreb region. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) fought the War of Independence from 1954 to 1962 with support from its neighbors, while Morocco and Tunisia became independent in 1956. The three leaders even met in Tangiers in April 1958 to discuss this possible Maghreb unity (Seddon 2009: 198) and ways to bring about this aspiration. The first act of recrimination between Algeria and Morocco took place soon after independence over an unresolved disagreement regarding the drawing of their colonial border and its aftermath. The two sides fought a brief “War of Sands” in 1963. The war caused a moderate amount of physical and human damage but led to their first rift. The relationship between King Hassan II and President Houari Boumedienne was characterized by distrust for the ensuing decades. The two countries stood on opposing sides of the Cold War: Morocco was a conservative monarchy allied with the Western camp, while Algeria chose socialist economic planning and allied with the non-aligned and progressive camp (Willis 2012: 233). Both sides devoted considerable resources to their militaries and build-up of troops. The two countries took diverging economic pathways after gaining independence (Chena 2012). Morocco chose an elite-driven, diversified liberal economy, focusing its attention on agriculture, international trade networks, and tourism while providing cheap labor for European manufacturing. Meanwhile, the Algerian leadership chose a state-led industrialization development model. Thanks to the country’s hydrocarbon resources, it guaranteed generous welfare for its population (Willis 2012: 235). Efforts to build a common Maghrebi market were frustrated. From 1964 to 1970, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Permanent Consultative Committee for the Maghreb, inspired by the EEC by bringing together their competent ministers to discuss technical harmonization in the region. This organization was unable to overcome the region’s structural differences (Santucci 1970; Flory 1970). These development approaches created two different economic cultures with lasting legacies. One was driven by an interventionist state in Algeria, and the other by an entrepreneurial class in Morocco working outside of the state. The second act of recriminations took place during the 1970s on the question of the Sahara’s decolonization. Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria clashed over the future of this territory under Spanish colonial control, with competing claims over its future. Algeria supported the Polisario organization’s claim for independence, while Morocco and King Hassan II orchestrated the Green March in November 1975 to reclaim de facto control over this territory while citing its historical links with the Moroccan homeland (Dunbar 2000). Algeria interpreted this unilateral move as a sign of imperial designs, of a “Greater Morocco” that would include parts of the Algerian territory. As Polisario waged a guerilla war against Morocco in the South,

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Algeria lent its symbolic and material support. In 1991, all parties agreed to a UN ceasefire and the idea of a referendum, which has since been frozen. The Sahara conflict is not the source, but a symptom of their competition for regional supremacy that impedes regional unity (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2004). In 1988, their relationship witnessed an unexpected boost when the five heads of state met at ZeraldaI (North Algiers) to sign the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) into existence. This institution was modeled on the European Union. It created a free-trade zone and shared institutions, as well as multi-sectorial collaborations between the five countries. This economic union would be the first step toward laying the groundwork for a political union (Mortimer 1989; Deeb 1989). The Algero-Moroccan rapprochement that made the AMU possible took place between 1985 and 1987. Thanks to Saudi mediation, Hassan II and new President Chadi Bendjedid met at the Zouj Bhal/Akid Lotfi border crossing to iron out their differences. The two sides agreed to set aside their competition and the Sahara issue temporarily, which made their reconciliation unstable and temporary. Furthermore, the parties signed out of fear rather than hope. Under Bendjedid, energy prices on the world market slumped and forced the whole region to make drastic welfare and subsidy cuts at the behest of international financial institutions. They were rocked by bread riots, in Morocco in 1984 and in Algiers in 1988 (Walton and Seddon 1994) . The AMU was meant to placate domestic discontent by creating economic opportunities under a shared market (Balta 1990). The third crisis highlights the weakness of a hasty reconciliation. In 1994, a group of armed men entered a hotel in Marrakesh, killing several foreign tourists. In the ensuing investigation, the Moroccan security services blamed the attack on Islamists and the Algerian security services. They immediately closed their land border, rounded up scores of Algerians, and expelled those they deemed to be on their territory illegally. Meanwhile, the Algerian authorities were embroiled in a civil war against an Islamist insurgency. They denied Moroccan allegations and denounced the treatment of their nationals. The two sides imposed punitive measures on each other, culminating in the closure of their land border and freezing the AMU. This crisis highlights the lingering mistrust and suspicions of foul play. The treatment of Algerian civilians and images of Islamic radicalism now created public stereotypes among the public that justified state closure. Moroccans associated Algerians with violence while Algerians denounced Moroccans as inhospitable and disdainful. In the absence of dialogue and constrained by their publics, both countries are beset by mutual recrimination, the origins of which lie in previous crises. After a cooling period since 1994, the leadership has failed in numerous attempts to achieve reconciliation. The border symbolizes the conflict and has since remained closed. Each side laments the status quo, but stands firm on its grievances. For the Moroccans, the open border has been a security risk for the infiltration of terrorist elements. For the Algerians, the border has witnessed drug trafficking to the detriment of its youth (Boukhars 2018). There was a positive climate under two new leaders in 1999, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (known for his Moroccan ties), and Moroccan King Mohammed VI, who met on several occasions. However, since 2011, there has not been any bilateral head of state meetings between the two countries.

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Heads of state issue formulaic statements on national or religious occasions or official days, reiterating their “hopes” for a “new dynamic” for a unified Maghreb. Rarely do they earnestly acknowledge the conflict. Instead, it is portrayed as a knock-on effect of the Western Sahara conflict and the closure of the land border, without a clear will to break the deadlock. Mediation attempts by the Tunisian President were stillborn: Moncef Marzouki in 2012 and Kais Saied in 2019 (Llarramendi 2019). Reconciliation stumbled in the face of respective red lines, accumulated distrust, and the bad optics of concessions. In 2018, during the 43rd anniversary of the Moroccan Green March, Mohammed VI publicly called on Algerians to mend their relationship. He offered “direct and frank” talks about their issues and denounced the abnormality of the closed border. In Algiers, this was not seen as an earnest call, due to its symbolic date, but as an attempt to gain the moral high ground and make a strategic advance on the Sahara issue. The call went unanswered. On the day of his inauguration, President Tebboune expressed a similar hope for improved relations, but is known to be a hawk on this topic, declaring: “Let us remember the events that caused the closing of borders […] We must first erase the main cause of the conflict, and the rest will follow.” Similar hopes for a national apology went unanswered (Kasraoui 2019). The possibility of true reconciliation must find a way to combine all the dimensions of their respective grievances while offering a path forward that suits both countries. This is a terribly complicated endeavor that has crystallized the status quo rather than the risk-laden possibilities of change. With the right impetus or external stimuli, the two sides could be brought together for good. In conclusion, their relationship has stumbled over three crises that have heightened their mutual distrust. Traditional reconciliation approaches have clearly proven ill-suited, and the two countries suffer from a non-existent relationship. Worse still, the population is now often an obstacle to any thaw. As was the case for the French and Germans, incentives to de-escalate are trumped by individualistic calculations. Could their reconciliation model and economic integration offer a path forward?

3 Conflict and Reconciliation in Algeria and Morocco: A Current Analysis The two issues lying at the heart of this conflict are the public appearance of a past slight and economic concerns over the countries’ border region. By untangling these two issues from their political history, we can envisage more creative approaches to overcoming their stalemate. As such, their relationship is comparable to distrustful, low-conflict neighbors such as between Greece and Turkey, Japan and Korea, and India and Pakistan. The ideal approach would be to promote dialogue between the sides to the conflict through a framework of public forgiveness to allow communities to make peace with their past and move on (Salberg and Grand 2016; Minow 2002). Official state apologies are regularly brought up as a solution for improving the

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bilateral relationship. The Franco-German reconciliation offers another argument in favor of symbolism. The process that culminated with the Élysée Treaty of friendship in 1963 offers an ideal path for this performative process. De Gaulle and Adenauer were seen embracing, laying wreaths at monuments of the dead, turning the page of the past, and taking a firm step toward the future together (Ackermann 1994). While the past cannot be changed, it can be acknowledged to allow both sides to achieve closure. In the first instance, I list the four major areas of grief between the two countries while identifying in each case the unaddressed traumatic component that hinders their relationship.

3.1 Grief 1—The Algerian War of Independence Against France (1954–1962) The two countries have clashed over the extent of their respective sacrifices during the war. Algerians see this as the high point of the Algerian national experience during which its people and fighters bore the brunt of the suffering in their bid to win independence, at the cost of “one million martyrs.” They stood alone after the Moroccans and Tunisians accepted France’s offer for their own independence in 1956. The Moroccans, on the other hand, lament how the Algerian official national narrative does not acknowledge or make room for them. This comprises their support and solidarity, including bases on its territory, logistical support, diplomatic backing, and shelter for Algerian refugees. This led to mutual recriminations and a narrative of a lack of solidarity at a crucial time of need.

3.2 Grief 2—Territories, Borders, and Regional Ambitions The issue of the Sahara attests to how the two sets of leaders ascribe nefarious motivations to their public positions on land, territories, and decolonization. The Moroccans have claimed national ownership of the Tarfaya–Rio del Oro territories from Spain by organizing a Green March in 1975, emphasizing its peaceful character. In turn, the Algerians have suspected Moroccan leaders of wider territorial ambitions—the idea of a “Greater Morocco” extending into West Africa and integrating the Algerian West—and been in favor of Sahrawi rights to self-determination and in support of the Polisario front, in the name of their own struggle for freedom against France. The Moroccans have denounced this as an interference in domestic affairs and this group as a puppet organization, designed to hinder Moroccan growth and give Algeria a corridor to the Atlantic in order to export their resources. The Algerian leadership claims that their support for the Sahrawi cause is a separate track from the Algerian and Moroccan relationship. This issue represents the most difficult issue to overcome

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because each side’s public position strikes at the heart of their respective national narratives: freedom from foreign control in Algeria, national recovery and territorial integrity for Morocco. Unless these national myths can be altered, both leaderships will fear a public backlash for any concession.

3.3 Grief 3—Oil Wealth and Different Economic Cultures The two countries have been at odds over wealth and their respective economies, a factor that hampers economic collaboration. Algeria’s sudden windfall thanks to hydrocarbon was difficult for Moroccans to stomach, especially during their own droughts and rural poverty. In turn, they find solace in Algeria’s post-socialist woes compared to the country’s seemingly improved fortunes under globalization. For the Algerians, the Moroccan economy is dominated by a corrupt series of notables and the Makhzen deep state at the expense of the working classes, perpetuating offensive levels of inequality, while selling its assets to foreign owners. In reality, both countries contain pockets of dynamic entrepreneurship and bloated state companies. Economic stereotypes are weaponized and mask serious difficulties for both. Algeria has upheld a public commitment to welfare and the growth of its economy through state intervention, but it has not fully acknowledged the failure of its management of hydrocarbon resources. Morocco has celebrated its market economy and innovation, ignoring rampant corruption, nepotism, and mass poverty. The narrative of unfairness and “taking advantage” peddled by each side is merely a distraction to structural issues.

3.4 Grief 4—Closed Border, Security, and Collaboration The closed border does nothing to resolve real issues requiring inter-state collaboration. Moroccans cite security concerns and terrorism risks while Algerians denounce the smuggling of cannabis grown in the Moroccan Rif. Both sides accuse the other of doing nothing to stem the tide, or even encourage such traffic. As a result, the Oran–Oujda wider regional space is a dead-zone of industrial and trade activity, which hurts the two populations and creates more incentives for smuggling. This border presents an obvious opportunity for inter-state cooperation to ensure security and economic prosperity for these neglected regions. At the heart of this conflict lie four issues—two political and two economic—tied like a Gordian Knot. To overcome decades of self-centered postures, the two sides will have to display creative approaches rather than expect resolutions overnight: first by creating opportunities for generating wealth in the border region, and second by addressing public traumas. Together, these are incentives for reconciliation.

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4 A Franco-German Model? National Reconciliation and Economic Integration Algeria and Morocco should be buoyed by the Franco-German model, which swapped decades of mistrust for proximity and cooperation. They kick-started a dynamic of reconciliation by tying together their economic destinies in the plan for a European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. Other factors for success included the rapport between leaders such as De Gaulle and Adenauer, and the Cold War that brought them closer. They even reduced the stakes over the territory of AlsaceLorraine. There are parallels with the Algerian and Moroccan case. Their different economic attributes could form a strong complementarity to become the powerhouse of the southern Mediterranean. However, I am cautious when it comes to identifying issues specific to the North African context that might derail this ambitious goal, especially those related to its economic challenges and political structures. If the two countries were to establish a common, integrated economic megaproject in their shared border region, the benefits would be hugely significant. This would emulate the impact of the European Coal and Steel Community and form a common market of 100 million consumers with a trickle-down effect on numerous other sectors in their respective economies. It would also create greater bargaining power in negotiations with the EU and other international partners. The Algerian– Moroccan border region offers many social benefits between the cities of Oran and Oujda on the Mediterranean and offers benefits in symbolic terms. The Algerian northeast and Moroccan west are regions that have traditionally been neglected and have suffered from economic underdevelopment compared to other parts of their countries. Due to the closed border, they are a haven of informality and lost revenue. As with the maquiladoras at the USA–Mexico border, Algeria and Morocco could establish complementary manufacturing ecosystems. They could combine Algeria’s resources and industrial know-how with Morocco’s workforce expertise in the textile, technology, and automotive industries. It would require a firm commitment to upscale their transport and energy infrastructures in the region to connect it to the TangerMed port (550 km), the national highway (200 km to Maghnia), or the Mediterranean Algerian gas pipeline (Beni Saf, 130 km). Finally, upscaling travel infrastructures would resolve Morocco’s isolation in the region and be to the benefit of families across the Oujda/Oran region forced into making cumbersome air journeys instead of short drives to visit relatives. Currently, the border region is rife with rampant corruption and illegal trafficking. Most expert assessments underline the necessity of cooperative schemes to address these issues (Boukhars 2019; Hekking 2019; Mandraud 2013; Spencer 2019; Babuta and Haenlein 2018). The two states should establish “free zones” or investment corridors at several locations close to the border, with tax breaks and opportunities for traders, progressively removed over a timeline of ten years. These spaces would render illegal trade pointless and allow security forces to concentrate their efforts on the import and circulation of more dangerous substances such as amphetamine pills, while raising state revenues without hurting local populations. Over time, increasing

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trade would improve both countries’ average growth, absorb youth into the labor force, and multiply intra-regional trade. The French and German experience succeeded due to favorable circumstances. The Marshall Plan injected capital to rebuild their destroyed economies. This differs strongly from the current case: Algeria and Morocco would have to significantly reorient their economic systems, thereby dismantling several economic systems to suit their supposed complementarity (rather than their structural incompatibility) and create a great many “losers” or disgruntled actors losing their rents so that the two larger economies can grow. These networks of privilege often act as obstacles to reform (Heydemann 2004; Hinnebusch 2011). Furthermore, it is commonplace to talk about their potential for complementarity only in absolute terms. Morocco has fruit, vegetables, phosphates, renewable energy sectors, and a diversified workforce, while Algeria has tourists, hydrocarbon, and heavy industry. In practice, the two economies are blighted by several challenges to growth, ranging from Algeria’s dependency on hydrocarbon resources, red tape that deters foreign investments, Morocco’s dependency on foreign markets, and poor distribution of wealth. Both suffer from large informal markets and “crony capitalist” sectors that are unsuited to government oversight and redirection, and act as a barrier against a shifting economic model (Escribano 2013). Labor presents another challenge. Skilled youth in the region often migrate to the Gulf or Europe for better opportunities. The current brain drain would scupper this large-scale project. In fact, any rapid opening of borders and population movements might spark a backlash and upset the two political systems in light of different qualities of life. As of 2018, GDP per inhabitant in Algeria stood at 4154 US dollars in Algeria compared to 2919 US dollars in Morocco; there is a 68.5% literacy rate in Morocco compared to 80.2% in Algeria (Delmas and Marin 2018). The two social contracts—the unspoken rapport between rulers and citizens—have, in the past, proved an obstacle to structural reform (Eibl 2020; Larbi 2015). Algerians and Moroccans have come to expect different provisions from their respective states: an excessive welfare safety net vs. competition for wealth-generating activities (Larbi and Christensen 2017). In the current trajectory, neither offers a path toward a strong, reform-minded constituency in the entrepreneurial middle class that could promote wealth and call for political participation and democratization (Malik and Awadallah 2013). Some optimism can be derived from the Maghrebi managerial class of entrepreneurs, especially those who hold several citizenships and enjoy greater mobility, which has been building ties and sharing their expertise together (Denieuil and Madoui 2010; Lahnait 2009). In February 2014, the Moroccan Union for Companies (CGEM) held the third Forum for Maghrebi Entrepreneurs in Marrakesh, which brought together around 500 participants to reflect on legal and administrative obstacles and concluded that obstacles were also psychological. Entrepreneurs still do not perceive the Maghreb as a natural region for making investments. To induce a change, they require compelling and tangible business opportunities. In conclusion, the two economic systems need to address domestic issues that could derail the unity project. Increasing the volume of Algerian–Moroccan exchange at the border and trade zones may introduce new scrutiny and transparency and create

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a favorable dynamic to address these long-standing issues as a whole. It is more realistic that they would be scuppered by the obstacles highlighted above. Change relies on sincere political reforms toward a better business climate, social and gender reform, and educational opportunities (Paciello et al. 2012). After France and Germany established economic complementarity, they achieved political reconciliation. Algeria and Morocco can therefore take inspiration from this path by engaging in a reflective process that acknowledges the other side’s painful past and brings about an end to their conflict. This saves them the costs of making an apology (Biggar 2001; Schaap 2003; Hamber and Wilson 2002; Amstutz 2005). Algeria and Morocco have been through their own experiences of transitional justice at the national level in the past twenty years from which they can draw lessons. The 2004 Moroccan Truth Commission demonstrated the power of being proactive, recognizing past crimes, giving victims an opportunity to share their testimonies, and vowing to break with that painful past (Hegasy 2017; Vairel 2008; Slyomovics 2005). The 1999 National Amnesty and 2005 Referendum on Peace and National Reconciliation in Algeria asserted the principles of amnesty, forgiveness, and turning the page from the civil war (Mundy 2015; Joffé 2008; Tlemcani 2008; Bustos 2005). Despite their limits, the two experiences show some readiness to confront painful pasts. A symbolic process for reconciliation might offer a minimum common denominator and a first stage for relaunching their frozen relations. In the first step, the two countries should work together to recognize each other’s past, in particular the painful experiences that ensued from the events highlighted above. In the second instance, they should envisage organizing a symbolic and theatrical performance of this act of reconciliation involving the heads of state, as the Franco-German model showed. The border and the events of 1994 offer an ideal stage for performing this reconciliation for the two publics. The land border was closed following these attacks, and repeated calls from civil society to reopen the land border continuously fall on deaf ears. The border offers a unique opportunity to break the deadlock and start the reconciliation process: not by ignoring it, but by coming together to remember this painful episode, tell its story, and achieve catharsis. Only then will they recognize and accept each other’s sense of aggrievement: How the Algerians were hurt by the treatment of their nationals in 1994, and why Moroccans are so attached to territorial integrity. Based on the model of the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission, they could share their testimonies and record them for public consumption. This would be consistent with the Moroccan Truth Commission’s public admission of the systematic heavy-handedness of its security services during the “years of lead” and represent a firm commitment to break from those practices. As with the Algerian “concorde civile,” the two sides can embrace a narrative of “moving on” and positive values prior to addressing all their remaining grievances. An official ceremony may also be held at a symbolic location, from Marrakesh to the border at Zouj Bghal to reopen the border. The Algerian leadership can reassert its legitimacy, severely undermined by the Civil War. To bring the Moroccan side on board, special care should be taken to frame this as a reconciliation among equals to avoid political instrumentalization or claims of “winners” and “losers.” Instead, the path to reconciliation should ensure

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it gives full weight to these two countries’ main narratives: The Moroccan monarchy, Algerian heroism, and a spirit of brotherhood found in Islamic culture. Political reconciliation stands a chance if both sides acknowledge each other’s grievances without suffering high political costs. The ultimate goal is to offer a symbolic break with a traumatic past. Even a small common denominator allows sides to advance. Obstacles remain: As mentioned above, the two sets of leaders have committed to a narrative of enmity and suspicion that is difficult to reverse overnight. Concessions will be scrutinized by the public, especially on the Sahara issue, and held to account. Pursuing symbolic reconciliation therefore runs parallel to solutions to material challenges.

5 Future Scenarios: Changing Public Perceptions and Stereotypes Any political movement will depend on the outcome of the Algerian Hirak and the new leadership after Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s resignation in 2019. The Moroccan side is unlikely to see a change in leadership or shifting positions, hence the importance of its ability is to compartmentalize the Sahara issue and to manage public opinion. According to conventional wisdom, the conflict is between leaders while the two populations naturally love each other. In practice, the two populations exist in a climate of jingoistic and mutual stereotypes ranging from everyday conversations, social media platforms, and media declarations that can derail political rapprochement. Hence, the chances for national reconciliation will also hinge on the two public’s willingness to overturn these narratives. In times of crises or political upheavals, the leadership in the two countries frequently demonize their neighbors. More worryingly, the two populations have been willing to go along. In October 2017, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelkader Messahel declared publicly that “we know that Moroccan banks in Africa only launder drug money … Royal Air Maroc carries more than travelers” (Alilat 2017). During the Algerian Hirak, the head of the Algerian Army, Ahmed Gaid Salah, denounced those “who seek to destabilize the country from abroad.” (Attia 2019) Public signs and chants targeted France, but also the Moroccan neighbor. In 2014, Moroccan Foreign Minister Salahedine Mezouar issued remarks to Parliament about Algeria’s “despicable methods” (“méthodes minables”) to counter Moroccan diplomatic outreach in African arenas (Telquel Maroc 2014). These comments caused a stir in Algerian media, and the vocabulary he used reiterates a long-standing disdain on the part of Moroccans toward their neighbors. A few years later, Mezouar made similar remarks as head of the Employers Union (CGEM), causing yet another backlash and forcing him to step down after pressure from the government (Telquel Maroc 2019). The Moroccan media is rife with dismissive judgments about its neighbor, such as the op-ed by Moroccan intellectual Hamid Barrada entitled “The Algerians are jealous of us” (Barrada 2005; Messari 2011). These two instances reveal

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how the public is more in tune with the leadership than is conventionally believed. Expert commentator Anouar Boukhars has lamented the irresponsible conduct of both countries for failing to stem the tide and encourage such outpourings (Boukhars 2018). A considerable effort needs to be made in the area of public education alongside economic and political reconciliation. While politicians revel in vilifying their neighbors, several civil society initiatives are working toward a “people’s Maghreb.” These demands for reconciliation are more often timid and restricted in scope and number, but their small scale might play in their favor. Far from the public eye, they work to build bridges despite the political climate and act as leaders of opinion. They include organizations that were created for artists, cinema, doctors, and sociologists, among others, all working to reactivate this “dream” of regional unity, expressed by the late Moroccan novelist Abdelkebir Khatibi (2019). These meetings have quietly built up friendships and partnerships (such as the Maghrebi Entrepreneurs network, cited earlier) over the past decades. They also help these professionals share their expertise and compare across contexts. This “people’s Maghreb” is alive and well in the cultural arena. Raï music is a distinctive Maghrebi musical genre that blends a multitude of influences and expresses the concerns of young people and the working classes. It originated in western Algeria in the 1990s and spread across the border to Oujda, as cassettes and radio airwaves are not blocked by closed borders. This musical genre’s biggest and most recognizable figure is Cheb Khaled, who recently moved from France to Morocco, and was given Moroccan citizenship in 2013, which he “did not ask for, but could not refuse.” Cheb Khaled described his new “Moroccan home” but sparked criticism from Algerians online, forcing him to declare: “I will always remain Algerian” (Khaled 2013). In his ensuing media tour, he argued that Raï, like his hometown Oran, was truly Maghrebi with multiple influences and plural belongings, adding that, for him, “borders have never existed.” (Khaled 2013). As a musical spokesperson, his voice is influential throughout the region. Another instance of this “people’s Maghreb” took place in the summer of 2019. As the Algerian national football team stormed to victory in the Africa Cup of Nations, the Moroccan public watched and cheered them on. In Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and other big cities, Moroccan supporters came out in droves to celebrate these wins, chanting the famous slogan “One, Two, Three, Viva l’Algérie” and also “I’m a Moroccan, therefore I’m an Algerian.” In turn, the Algerian leadership is expected to support Morocco’s bid to host the 2026 World Cup. One finds numerous calls to reopen the border from media personalities and leading voices, building on the curiosity and skepticism of a new generation (Tozy 2020; Hatim and Chahid 2018). The authorities are doubtless monitoring this growing enthusiasm and still determining the path forward.

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6 Conclusion Comparisons between the Algerian–Moroccan and the Franco-German models start by recognizing the multifaceted and constantly evolving nature of their grievances. From this vantage point, the Franco-German model created the impetus for two long-time enemies to tie their destinies together: first, in the economic realm, then by improving their political ties, until they became the drivers of the European unification project. On the surface, there are strong comparative elements with the North African case: two regional competitors with a strong potential for economic complementarity and a popular demand for regional unification. On paper, this should be an ideal route to follow. In practice, their grievances run deep and force us to think more closely about the issue of reconciliation between nations. We have discussed the areas of grievance between the two sides and how they play out on a regular basis and define their political interactions. Addressing them head on will take courage and vision, similar to what De Gaulle and Adenauer displayed half a century ago. Similarly, for the economy to drive the reconciliation process, it will first have to overcome considerable obstacles in both countries as well as their ideological incompatibility. France and Germany benefitted from the Marshall Fund to ward off the threat of Soviet take-over. Algeria and Morocco face popular discontent, immense challenges with respect to job creation, radical terrorism, and fluctuating economic performances, but lack strong and decisive resources to level up. Instead, there are too many factors that deter cooperation and favor the status quo. Among the community of experts, regional reconciliation and unification are portrayed as a romantic aspiration with no basis in reality. They claim that leaders on both sides have no appetite for this and, according to Yhprum’s law, the fact that it has not yet happened is telling. Change, however, takes time, effort, daring, and imagination, as Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer would have undoubtedly agreed.

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Hinnebusch, R. (2011). Change and continuity after the arab uprisings: the consequences of state formation in Arab North African States. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1), 12–30. Joffé, G. (2008). National Reconciliation and General Amnesty in Algeria. Mediterranean Politics, 13(2), 213–228. Kasraoui, S. (2019, December 15). King Mohammed VI Congratulations Algeria’s President Elect Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Morocco World News. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/ 12/289029/king-mohammed-vi-algeria-president-abdelmadjid-tebboune/. Accessed March 24, 2020. Khaled, C. (2013, November 13). L’invité: “Je resterai toujours algérien” (The guest: “I will always remain Algerian”). TV5Monde. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UGYXIsnAkY&. Accessed March 25, 2020. Khatibi, A. (2019, March 06). What happened to the dream of a united Maghreb? Le Monde Diplomatique. Lahnait, F. (2009). Les binationaux: La clé du développement économique et social du Maghreb? (Binationals: The Key to the Economic and Social Development of Maghreb?). In F. Lahnait (Ed.), The role of binational entrepreneurs as social and economic bridge builders Between Europe and North Africa (pp. 69–73). Amsterdam: IOS Press. Larbi, H. (2015). Rewriting the Arab social contract: Toward inclusive development and politics in the Arab World. Cambridge: Middle East Initiative. Larbi, H., & Christensen, L. (2017). Smart development strategy for the Maghreb: Structural reform, a new role for the state, regional integration. Tunis: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3676dc02-4110-6654-8539-cba 354836aeb&groupId=252038. Accessed March 24, 2020. Llarramendi, M. H. (2019). Doomed regionalism in a redrawn Maghreb? The changing shape of the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in the post-2011 era. The Journal of North African Studies, 24(3), 506–531. Lounnas, D., & Messari, N. (2018). Algeria-Morocco relations and their impact on the Maghrebi regional system. MENARA Working Papers, No. 20, October 2018. https://www.iai.it/sites/def ault/files/menara_wp_20.pdf. Accessed March 24, 2020. Malik, A., & Awadallah, B. (2013). The economics of the Arab spring. World Development, 45, 296–313. Mandraud, I. (2013, October 15). Algeria turns off tap on Morocco’s smuggled petrol trade. The Guardian. Messari, N. (2011). Au-delà des clichés: différences et similarités entre les pays arabes (Beyond Clichés: Differences and Similarities between Arab Countries). Cultures and Conflits (Cultures and Conflicts), 2011(3), 113–117. Minow, M. (2002). Breaking the cycles of hatred: Memory, law, and repair. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Mortimer, R. (1989). Maghreb Matters. Foreign Policy, 76, 160–175. Mundy, J. (2015). Imaginative geographies of Algerian violence: Conflict science, conflict management and antipolitics. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. Paciello, M.C., Ayeb, H., Gillot, G., Moisseron, J.-Y. (2012). Reversing the vicious circle in North Africa’s political economy: Confronting rural, urban, and youth-related challenges. Mediterranean Paper Series May 2012. Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Salberg, J., & Grand, S. (2016). Wounds of history: Repair and resilience in the trans-generational transmission of trauma. London: Routledge. Santucci, J.-C. (1970). L’unification maghrébine: Réalisations institutionnelles et obstacles politiques (Maghreb Unification: Institutional Achievements and Policy Obstacles). Annuaire De l’Afrique Du Nord, 9, 129–156. Schaap, A. (2003). Political grounds for forgiveness. Contemporary Political Theory, 2(1), 77–87.

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Seddon, D. (2009). Dreams and disappointments: postcolonial constructions of ‘The Maghrib.’ In A. Ahmida (Ed.), Beyond colonialism and nationalism in the Maghrib: History, culture and politics (pp. 197–231). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Slyomovics, S. (2005). The performance of human rights in Morocco. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Spencer, C. (2019, August & September). The fence blighting the Maghreb. The World Today. Stora, B. (2002). Algérie, Maroc: Histoires parallèles, destins croisés (Algeria, Morocco: Parallel Stories, Crossed Fates). Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose. Telquel Maroc. (2014, July 11). Sahara. Les méthodes de l’Algérie sont ‘minables’ selon Mezouar (Sahara. Algeria’s methods are miserable’ according to Mezouar). https://telquel.ma/2014/07/11/ sahara-les-methodes-lalgerie-minables-selon-mezouar_1409123. Accessed March 24, 2020. Telquel Maroc. (2019, October 13). Tancé par le ministère des Affaires étrangères après sa sortie sur l’Algérie, Mezouar démissionne (Reprimanded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs After his Exit to Algeria, Mezouar Resigns). https://telquel.ma/2019/10/13/tance-par-le-ministere-desaffaires-etrangeres-apres-sa-sortie-sur-lalgerie-mezouar-demissione_1654120. Accessed March 24, 2020. Tlemcani, R. (2008). Algeria under Bouteflika: civil strife and national reconciliation. Carnegie Papers Number 7. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Tozy, M. (2020, February 27). Frontière algéro-marocaine: Pays du Maghreb, unissez-vous! (Algéro-Morrocan Border: Countries of the Maghreb Unite!). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeu neafrique.com/mag/900153/politique/tribune-frontiere-algero-marocaine-pays-du-maghreb-uni ssez-vous/. Accessed March 24, 2020. Vairel, F. (2008). Morocco: from mobilizations to reconciliation? Mediterranean Politics, 13(2), 229–241. Walton, J., & Seddon, D. (1994). Free markets and food riots: The politics of global adjustment. Oxford: Blackwell. Willis, M. (2012). Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from independence to the Arab Spring. London: Hurst. Zoubir, Y. (2000). Algerian-Moroccan relations and their impact on Maghribi integration. The Journal of North African Studies, 5(3), 43–74. Zoubir, Y. (2012). Tipping the Balance towards intra-Maghreb unity in light of the Arab spring. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 47(3), 83–99. Zoubir, Y., & Benabdallah-Gambier, K. (2004). Morocco, Western Sahara and the Future of the Maghrib. The Journal of North African Studies, 9(1), 49–74.

I. Jebari is Al Maktoum Assistant Professor in Middle East Studies at the University of Dublin. His research focuses on North African cultural history and Arab thought. After completing his doctorate on the history of the production of critical thought in Morocco and Tunisia at the University of Oxford, he held a postdoctoral fellowship at the American University of Beirut to study the dynamics of intellectual and cultural exchanges between the Maghrib and the Mashriq. He held an Andrew Mellon postdoctoral fellowship at Bowdoin College (Maine, USA), where he taught Middle East History. He has published on the intellectual projects of several North African intellectual figures such as Abdelkebir Khatibi, Mohamed Abed al-Jabri, and Malek Bennabi, as well as the theory and practice of Arab intellectual engagements. He also works on collective memory in the Arab world, focusing in particular on its role for reconciliation processes and transitional justice.

Transferability of the Franco-German Model in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Cécile Cohen-Blaser and Gisela Dachs

Abstract When it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Franco-German rapprochement clearly has its limits as a transferable blueprint for reconciliation. At its core, the Israeli–Palestinian entanglement is not a rivalry between two entities only, but must be situated within the wider Israeli–Arabic conflict in which many players are at work. Nevertheless, this chapter points out that there are similarities, such as geographical proximity, the courage of political leaders to reach out to the “other side” in order to alter relationships and help to build trust, and the overriding influence of geopolitical changes. Even though these similarities are limited and should not be overrated, this chapter uses a combined theoretical and empirical approach to argue that the historical example of the Franco-German reconciliation shimmered through in the Middle Eastern peace talks time and again and serves to this day as a point of reference and projection space for hope.

1 Introduction Interlocked in a long-lasting conflict over territory and national legitimacy, Israelis and Palestinians alike share a fascination for the open borders within Europe. This form of freedom, rendered possible by the peaceful coexistence of neighbors, appears as a remote dream, and the invisible border between France and Germany has a particular appeal. The simple fact that these two countries—as the driving forces behind the European project—managed to become trusting partners, after centuries of animosity, provides a projection space for hope.

C. Cohen-Blaser University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] G. Dachs (B) Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_9

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Although it would be far-fetched to think of the historical process of FrancoGerman reconciliation as being a transferable model for the Middle East, this partnership functions at least as a point of reference. Shortly after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, the then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres detailed his greater vision for the region based on that of the European Community in his book “The New Middle East.” He argued that if all the countries of the Middle East were to work toward a common goal of peace and economic unity, they could be a thriving, prosperous community of the world within 20 years. As we know, history has since taken a different path, but we argue that interest in the Franco-German reconciliation has all but lost its appeal. We will look at this development with a practical and theoretical approach. Our article is based on the experiences of Israeli students, Jews, and Arabs1 who attended a Master’s course on Franco-German relations in spring 2018 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as well as a related study trip entitled “From Berlin to Paris.” Our aim is to point out similarities and differences between both relationships. We will focus on common factors such as geographical proximity, the courage of leaders to overcome their own animosities and reach out to the “other side”—at the risk of a domestic political cost—and the overriding influence of geopolitical changes. The similarities are, however, limited and should not be overrated. While France and Germany overcame enmity and hatred after the devastation of several wars and the total surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has—after several failed attempts to reach a diplomatic solution—not ended, but is still ongoing. Moreover, while Israelis and Palestinians are geographically close, their relationship is not only a rivalry between two entities, but must be situated within a wider regional context with many more players at work. While France and Germany could relate to each other after 1945 as two internationally recognized nations, with similar heft in terms of population and size, the Israeli–Palestinian case is more complicated. A dual asymmetry is at work here: while there is a power imbalance between the “weak occupied Palestinians” vis-a-vis the “strongly armed occupying Israelis,” the latter still see themselves as a small and vulnerable entity threatened by extremists in the whole region who do not recognize their right to exist.2 Our combined approach should help to show how the Franco-German relationship has nevertheless become imbued with a symbolism for hope extending far beyond its own borders and context. At the same time, the curiosity of young Israelis about the inner workings of the Franco-German reconciliation process can also be explained by inner developments—such as a more relaxed relationship that Israelis nowadays maintain with Germany, which has, in many respects, become a trusted ally in Europe.

1 Palestinians

with Israeli citizenship and from East Jerusalem. closer inspection, the emerging relationship between France and Germany had not been on equal footing either as West Germany was a semi-sovereign state until 1990, and political forces in France had been in favor of closely controlling and even occupying Germany after the Second World War.

2 On

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2 Geographical Proximity: Defending and Crossing Borders When asked about their dreams, Israelis, and Palestinians might answer alike: driving for a long time without being stopped by borders and/or checkpoints. In Europe, this has become a reality. When traveling from one EU member state to another, there is—usually—no need to have a passport or visa. When crossing the border from the Saarland in Germany to Lorraine in France on their study trip from Berlin to Paris in May 2018, the students from the Hebrew University asked the bus driver to stop at the geographic intersection between France and Germany, a border that has been rendered almost invisible, marked only by a sign. They wanted to take pictures in order to document what could be characterized as a triumph over history, a “triumph over a brutal past full of animosity, enmity, and wars,” as one student later described it.3 “The Europe of today is a Europe without borders between states; between France and Germany, two former bitter enemies, one can drive without even knowing where exactly the border is. […] In this situation, it is very hard to imagine that there were once tanks and armed fortifications standing there,” another student wrote. The subsequent visit to the former Maginot Line at Fort Hackenberg in Lorraine then reminded the students of this past. The two and a half hours that they spent underground, traveling by train through the ten kilometers of tunnels to infantry and artillery blocks, left a lasting impression on the group. The Maginot Line was a memorial site that some had always wanted to see. The contrasting concepts of war and peace could probably be perceived nowhere else so closely than at the Franco-German border. A student elaborates: One of the most fascinating things about the study trip was crossing the Franco-German border; there was no fence, no border control or any other sign of the border, except for a small, semi-hidden road sign. In contrast – only a 15-min drive from the border – we visited one of the fortresses of the Maginot Line, one of the most extensive defense lines in history. This experience illustrates […] for me remarkable living evidence of the ‘wind of change.’

Not only the Master’s students from the Hebrew University were fascinated by the French Maginot Line and its symbolism of “a false sense of security,” as one of the students put it. The monumental fortification also resonated with the larger Israeli collective. At least this is what the exhibition that opened at the end of November 2018 at the Art Gallery at Tel Aviv University suggested. It was called “Defense Lines: Maginot, Bar-Lev and Beyond.” Alongside displays of works on the Great Wall of China, the wall between the USA and Mexico and the Israeli Separation Barrier, it documented the history of the two fortification lines, the French Maginot Line, erected in the 1930s to deter German aggression, next to the Israeli Bar-Lev Line, a fortification built along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal after the Six-Day War 3 For

the sake of preserving the students’ anonymity, no detailed sources are provided after the following quotes by the students. All citations are based on contributions such as presentations or final written reports and essays following the study trip or the seminar.

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of 1967 to deter further Egyptian assault. Showing how defense lines operate from a historical point of view, the exhibition pointed to prior impressive fortifications that have been destroyed and abandoned, left to the mercy of nature, to become monuments of failure and testimonies to deep-seated human fear. In an article about the exhibition in the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, the journalist Moshe Gilad explains why, for people growing up and living in Israel, these fortification lines have a particular resonance: “The exhibition […] allows the visitor to see life in Israel, and in general, as one long sequence of building fortifications. Some of them will turn out to be superfluous—or stupid” (Gilad 2018). To clarify his point, Gilad lists some of the Israeli defense lines: The outposts on the road to Jerusalem, Ammunition Hill, the minefields in the Arava desert and on the Golan Heights, the fortifications in the Jordan Rift Valley, and the Separation Barrier around the West Bank and around the Gaza Strip—concluding that “names change, defense remains.” The accompanying exhibition’s catalogue explains that, by placing these various works side by side, the exhibition encourages viewers to “reconsider the promises and illusions involved in the act of fortification and sharpens their awareness that every fortification line, from the moment of its construction, already contains the moment of its destruction.” It is exactly this alternation from a moment of armament and rigid border to a moment of détente and fluid border that captured the minds of the students from the Hebrew University at the Maginot Line. One of the above-mentioned students called this a “wind of change” while others termed this a transformation: When visiting [the Maginot Line], I was able to grasp the massiveness of the old-world wars. I could truly understand why the French built it, and what it represented – this sense of security, which totally failed in the end. Above all, I was amazed by the beautiful, green, and peaceful view that you see when climbing up and out of the fortress; in this moment of looking outside, towards the border with Germany, without seeing any sign that there is a border there, I really understood the unbelievable transformation of Europe and the transformation of Franco-German relations.

There could have been no better illustration of this transformation than the existence of a joint army. Although largely symbolic, the Franco-German Brigade in Metz (which was next on the program) showed how former enemies can become brothers in arms. With their own military background, preoccupied with the necessity of security, the Israeli students engaged in lively discussions with the (French) officers in Metz, asking about linguistic and operational challenges in training and during missions.4 Later that same day, standing at the Verdun Memorial to what is considered one of the most blood-stained battlefields in world history,5 the Jewish–Israeli students not only tried to grasp the magnitude of Franco-German confrontation and reconciliation, but also discovered another layer of “their” history. Not far from the joint 4 The Franco-German Brigade is, in fact, only bi-national at the level of command at its headquarters

in Müllheim. 5 Considering

the length of the battle (the battle lasted from February 21, 1916 until December 19, 1916), the number of men involved (an estimated 800,000 men were considered dead, wounded, or missing) and the size of the battlefield, which was not even ten square kilometers in size.

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Franco-German monument, a separate monument lists the names of the French Jewish soldiers who fell while defending their French homeland. The patriotism of Jews on both sides, in France and in Germany, during the First World War was also the subject of the novel “Süss und ehrenvoll” by the former Israeli diplomat Primor (2013). From 1914 to 1918, some 120,000 Jewish soldiers fought on the German side, while in France they numbered about 50,000. With their willingness to die, Jews sought to prove their national allegiance as citizens in both countries. In his address to the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, the German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II had appealed to the patriotism of German Jews when he declared that, from now on, he knew no parties, but only Germans. Jews saw this as a providence that they would be equal that no differences would be made any more between them and other Germans. Initially, Primor wanted to explore the question as to whether it was legitimate during the First World War to kill a fellow Jew from the enemy side. His book tells the story of a fictional German Jewish soldier named Ludwig, who was killed in October 1918 on the battlefield by the French Jewish soldier Louis. During his research, however, Primor was unable to find any documents relating to the question of legitimacy. This led him to think that it was “probably so natural to be a patriotic soldier” that the question had not even arisen. He concludes that this was a unique experience in Jewish history: “It could not repeat itself in the Second World War, because then Jews could be only on one side, that is, not on the German side.” (Primor 2014). We would like to emphasize that this is not an instance in which memories and collective histories overlap. Many actors in the Franco-German rapprochement were, or are, of Jewish descent. They include Joseph Rovan, who was born in Munich, and the French politician Simone Veil, both survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, as well as Alfred Grosser, whose father fled with his family in 1933 to France when he was no longer allowed to practice his profession as the director of a children’s hospital in Frankfurt. After the war, Veil found it hard to fathom how one European country could wage war against another. During her political career, she became increasingly committed to the idea of a Europe in which such atrocities could never happen again.

3 Transforming Relationships: Looking for Common Ground Humanizing the relationship between representatives of the two countries and trying to influence public opinion by visiting the respective other country is considered to be one of the crucial factors behind the Franco-German rapprochement (Ackermann 1994: 238). However, the courage of leaders to overcome their own animosities and reach out to the other side—as was the case with the mutual visits of Konrad Adenauer and Charles De Gaulle as well as French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1984 when they held hands at the Douaumont

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cemetery in Verdun—has parallels also in the Middle East: Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat managed to get close to each other during the Camp David negotiations in 1978 and marked an end to a history of wars between Israel and Egypt with their symbolic three-way handshake (including negotiation leader Jimmy Carter) on the White House lawn on March 26, 1979 after the signing of a peace agreement. For the Israelis, Sadat’s courageous decision to fly to Jerusalem in November 1977 had a tremendous impact, convincing them that he genuinely intended to make peace. Until, Sadat actually emerged from the plane, many had feared that his announced visit would only be a cover for a terrorist attack. Sadat, who was later assassinated by an opponent of his path of reconciliation, was well aware of the political risk he took, but decided to show political leadership, which earned his country generous support also from the USA. In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasser Arafat also shook hands at the White House in Washington, DC and signed the Oslo I Accord, and in October 1994, Rabin met King Hussein of Jordan in the Arava Desert in Israel to shake hands and sign a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. However, a rapprochement of leaders and a peace treaty are not all that is needed for a successful reconciliation. “Reconciliation is probably the most difficult condition because it asks for a deep cognitive change, a real change of beliefs, ideology, and emotions not only among the ruling elites but also among most if not all sectors of both societies” (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 4) the Israeli scholar Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov writes in an edited volume on conflict resolution and reconciliation, a research project that he started after studying the peace between Israel and Egypt. Looking at this case, which has been largely described as a cold peace,6 he wondered about the conditions that help to stabilize peace after the resolution of domestic or international conflicts. He was convinced that “reconciliation is probably the most important condition for shifting current peace toward stable peace. Only reconciliation can build mutual trust and provide mutual assurances for maintaining peace in [the Middle East].” Bar-Siman-Tov speaks about cognitive and emotional conditions of peace, which come into consideration after the structural, functional, and instrumental conditions of peace have been met. A look at reconciliation theory shows that whereas a structural approach deals with the interests and the issues at stake, the so-called socialpsychological approach focuses on the transformation of relationships between the parties—both on the governmental and on the societal level. Combining both approaches—even though which approach was taken first is the subject of conjecture—the historical example of the Franco-German reconciliation has a special appeal and serves as a point of reference (e.g., Ackermann 1994; Gardner Feldman 1999; Rosoux 2008). In the case of the Middle East, however, peace treaties did not lead to reconciliation between the peoples. “When I think about the Israeli reconciliation with Jordan and Egypt, I think we still have a long way to go because the relationships are still filled 6 There

is security cooperation, but it remains the case until this day that no Egyptian journalist, lawyer, teacher, or engineer can be in touch with Israelis without risking losing his or her membership of professional associations. The same goes for Jordan.

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with feelings of stress and a lack of trust,” one student reminded us. As for the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, even a formal peace treaty has not been reached to date. Looking at Franco-German relations from afar, one question always lingers, namely how the French and Germans overcame their animosities. For the students of the Hebrew University, one answer pointed to the common ground that both sides share. This stretches from the shared roots symbolized by Charlemagne, and later on also by the texts of Kant and Voltaire, to the devout Catholics Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.7 Historical, cultural, and religious proximity and transfers thus made it easier for both sides to look for what unites them. It is important, however, to point out that this common ground is not evidently based on similarities, but rather on a deeply rooted dichotomy between the two states. One of the students wrote the following: [T]he historical development of German identity was almost always defined, in one way or another, against France and anything French. It appears to me therefore that the FrancoGerman relationship, both as an idea and as a historical reality, was pivotal to the emergence of a German national identity, and that, even during times of bitter warfare, this axis was experienced by Germans as a rivalry, or even as a mirror image, more than as a fundamental animosity.

The student here argues that the reconciliation between France and Germany is as much an example of historical continuation as, at the same time, its renunciation. In any case, this reciprocal appeal—on the one hand, consisting of envy/rivalry, and on the other of respect—creates a symmetry between the two enemies and proved to be decisive for the Franco-German rapprochement (Rosoux 2015: 562). Mutual influence due to proximity also has parallels in the Middle East. For the Palestinians, having Israelis as their close neighbors not only meant occupation and confrontation, but also knowledge about their lifestyle and political system via the reception of Israeli TV or via Israel as a place of work. When in the wake of the Oslo Accords hopes were running high, Palestinians frequently mentioned the Israeli political system as the model for their own future state.8 This was their reference point—in contrast to the authoritarian Arab regimes surrounding them. These similarities should not be overrated, however. As mentioned above, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is still ongoing, which makes any comparison with processes of reconciliation in other places of the world difficult, as they usually happen after the conflict has formally ended. As far as the case of the Israelis and

7 We

are aware that, by talking about this “common ground,” we are referring to a cautiously and deliberately constructed narrative of Franco-German rapprochement that emerged in the 1960s and that was pejoratively labeled “Versöhnungskitsch” (reconciliation kitsch) by the journalist Klaus Bachmann. The strategy of referring to common ground such as the era of Charlemagne or clear military confrontation history such as Verdun was chosen to avoid talking about a much more difficult past of both France and Germany during the Second World War (Moll 2012: 31 et seq.). 8 See surveys of public opinion between 1993 and 1995 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, summarized in Shikaki (1996).

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Palestinians is concerned, there is currently no agreement in sight.9 Moreover, since its foundation in 1948, the State of Israel had to fight (and still has to fight) for its right to exist, as many neighbors and radical non-state actors do not accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state in the Middle East. It took many wars, culminating in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, before the hostile front started to crumble and a new era of negotiating peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and with Jordan (1994) started.10 The main conclusion from these processes has been for Israelis that only a strong Israel that proves to its Arab neighbors that it cannot be defeated by force can lead to a process of mutual compromise resulting in coexistence and acceptance of Israel. In contrast to the Arab countries, the Palestinians’ struggle took a different path. In the absence of an independent territorial base, the Palestinians first tried to establish a base in Jordan, from which they were expelled in 1970, and then in Lebanon, from where its leadership was expelled to various Arab countries following the first Lebanon war (1982). Gradually, these defeats led to an evolution in the Palestinian position, and subsequently to the Oslo Accords in 1993. This was not the only factor, however.11 The international arena had also changed in the meantime.

4 Geopolitical Change: (The End of) the Cold War as a Factor of Rapprochement Looking at the respective geopolitical frameworks, it is important to emphasize that the Franco-German rapprochement was a success of international politics dominated by the Cold War. After the Second World War, both countries had a vital interest in sticking to each other as part of a Western alliance against the Communist East. At the same time, France wanted to keep Germany down, but also powerful enough to resist the Soviet Union. In addition, both countries rebuilt themselves as democracies embedded within a larger European framework. Both events—the Cold War and the historic example of European integration—also influenced the Israeli–Palestinian 9A

recent poll by the Arab Barometer shows that optimism about reconciliation is continuing to drop, with 30% of Palestinians being optimistic and 67% of Palestinians pessimistic about the success of reconciliation with Israel. Three months ago, optimism stood at 33% (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2019). However, the latest issue of the Peace Index, a longitudinal research project by Tel Aviv University based on a monthly survey that monitored public sentiments on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict since June 1994, showed in December 2018 that 47% of the Jewish–Israeli citizens and 72% of the Arab–Israeli citizens found it important for the next Israeli government to renew negotiations with the Palestinian Authority (Yaar and Hermann 2019). 10 Keeping in mind that Sadat was the first Arab president to officially acknowledge Israel’s right to exist in his speech before the Israeli Knesset in November 1977. Sadat hoped for a domino effect, but instead his action prompted a vast majority of Arab state leaders to sever diplomatic relations with Egypt. 11 In Israel, the first ‘Intifada’ (Arab: to shake off) from 1987, a civil uprising of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, as well as a growing internal criticism of this occupation had led to a gradual rethinking.

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conflict, albeit from a very different angle and with a strong role played by the US as a mediator. In contrast to the beginning and the consolidation of the Cold War that helped to shape the Franco-German rapprochement and the early phase of European integration, it was the end of the Cold War in 1989 that presented itself as a “window of opportunity” for ending the proxy wars in the Middle East. A weakened Soviet Union could no longer be counted on as a firm supporter of the Arab world in terms of a “Soviet Patron Saint” and arms transfers. The PLO was running out of money, and with the support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War of 1991, Yasser Arafat had bet on the wrong horse. A political change was thus an opportunity for him to get back into the game. The Gulf War following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait also provided new lessons for the Israelis. The United Nations had tried in vain to persuade the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. US-led international troops then launched a military operation against Iraq. In response, Iraq fired Scud missiles at Israel, some of which struck cities such as Tel Aviv and Haifa, killing several people and leading to the realization that strategic depth alone no longer provides an adequate security guarantee. The Madrid Peace Conference at the end of October 1991 marked the beginning of a new stage in the Middle East peace process. For the first time ever, Israel attended a Middle East conference together with its neighbors Jordan (whose delegation included Palestinian representatives), Syria, and Lebanon. However, while these talks stagnated, Israeli government officials and high-ranking PLO officials in Norway singlehandedly negotiated the bilateral Oslo Accords, in which both sides mutually recognized each other. That was just the beginning of a process that promised the Israelis peace and the Palestinians their own state—but without paying too much attention to details. The main issues (borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, and water) were deliberately left aside. While this seemed quite a unique approach, we can point out here that a number of thorny disputes in the Franco-German case had likewise been postponed, such as control over the Saarland, which was returned to Germany only in 1954, or the lingering question of German war criminals detained or sentenced in France (seen in Germany as “prisoners of war” who needed to be brought “home” before staring reconciliation). In 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo I Agreement, followed two years later by the Oslo II Agreement. Among other things, they agreed on the gradual transfer of territory and political responsibilities to the Palestinians, which was to be concluded with a peace treaty in May 1999. What drove Rabin was the idea of a new dichotomy—a Middle East divided into moderate and fundamentalist regimes. His aim was to create a security ring around Israel, backed up by treaties with the Palestinians, with Jordan and Egypt, and later— this was the aim—with Syria and Lebanon. Thus, the Middle East would consist of a pacified core and a ring of more distant hostile states such as Iran and Iraq. Israel would make common cause with the moderate Arabs—against the extremists in the region.

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There was also an internal political argument that pushed the Oslo Accords that is still valid today. Israel could not be democratic, Jewish, and inclusive at the same time, according to Rabin’s main argument. If Israel were to keep the occupied territories under its control and give the Palestinians citizenship, it would be inclusive and democratic, but would, sooner or later, lose its Jewish majority. If Israel claimed permanent control of the occupied territories by annexing them without naturalizing its Palestinian citizens, it would be Jewish and comprehensive, but no longer democratic. The Oslo process was designed as an experiment. Israel handed over control of parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the newly established Palestinian Authority, which received billions in international aid and weapons for the security forces and was recognized by the West. In return, the Palestinian Authority was to fight violence and incitement (in media and schools) against Israel. The hope was that mutual trust would gradually emerge, thus, reaching an all-inclusive peace agreement at the end of the process. However, an unprecedented wave of Palestinian terror attacks and the assassination of Rabin put an end to this (Dachs 2016: 367–370). Although it would be far-fetched to think of the historical process of FrancoGerman reconciliation as being a transferable model for the Middle East, the European dimension of the Franco-German rapprochement somehow shimmered through whenever there were negotiations on a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflicts. Shortly after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, its main protagonist and then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres claimed in his book “The New Middle East” that he and his government had “designed the new Middle East on the basis of the draft of the European model: as a first phase economic cooperation and then the creation of political consensus in a continuous process, a consensus that grows and manifests itself between all parties” (Peres 1993: 23). His vision of a regional concept of a peaceful future—which did not change until his death in 2016—was based on that of the European Community. He argued that if all the countries of the Middle East were to work toward a common goal of peace and economic unity, they could be a thriving, prosperous community of the world within 20 years. “It is precisely the transition from war to peace, from an economy of confrontation to an economy of peace, that creates the historic opportunity to integrate into the historical trend” (Peres 1993: 137). Similar approaches addressing the whole region were expressed in the Saudi peace proposal of 2002, which sketched out a grander vision that would make Israel a recognized part of the Middle East in exchange for compromises with the Palestinians. But herein lies a big difference with Franco-German relations: to date, there is no such thing as an overriding common identity to which people might refer. There is no equivalent to a European identity or a European compass of values—even though these are fragile constructions—that could help the parties to reunite under one bigger

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flag. There is no such thing as a “Middle-Eastener” and Israelis are, by definition, excluded from the term “Arab world.”12 At the same time, their geographical proximity makes cooperation in many fields not only desirable, but necessary. Environmental hazards and health epidemics cannot be stopped by separation lines. Managing together or at least coordinating the way in which existing resources are handled would be an obvious common interest for both countries, but the absence of a political agreement often makes progress difficult. It is therefore doubtful that—as long as the conflict has not been resolved—the example of the European Coal and Steel Community could serve as a model for rapprochement. Economic prosperity alone is not a big enough incentive as long as the conflict over land, legitimacy, borders, the right of return of Palestinians refugees, and Jerusalem lingers. All attempts to solve these issues had also to deal with controversial historical narratives standing in the way of a process of reconciliation. Yet, efforts to reconfigure the incompatible narratives and to include the views of history of “the other” in schools or in non-formal contexts failed.13 Moreover, recent developments in this area seem to take both sides even further apart. In May 2019, the European Union announced that it would conduct an examination of new Palestinian school textbooks following a study that found them to be more radical than in the past and containing incitement and rejection of peace with Israel.14

5 Discussion Can the Franco-German process of reconciliation be seen as a model for the Middle East, or more specifically for Israelis and Palestinians? We doubt it. The limits of its transferability are obvious. As long as the Israeli–Palestinians conflict is not resolved by a political agreement respected by both sides, processes of reconciliation are not bound to happen. It is important to remember here that what made the rapprochement between France and Germany possible was the official end of the conflict, symbolized by Germany’s surrender in May 1945. However, the sheer idea and possibility of reconciliation between both countries and their respective populations after long periods of confrontation remain highly relevant as an inspiration—and as a source of hope. Examining the differences also sharpens our perception of the specificities of Franco-German relations, and this can 12 Historically, there might be references in the canon such as “Semites” to include Jews and Arabs from the Middle East, but this term is simply not in use anymore. On the Israeli side, Jewish immigrants from the Islamic world prefer to be called “oriental Jews” to make a distinction with the term “Arab Jews.” The latter is only used by a number of left-wing intellectuals in Israel (Shenhav 2009; Shohat 2017). 13 See Rosoux (2019). Neither in the Israeli–Palestinian context nor in the Franco-German context projects of a joint history textbook can be seen as a big success. 14 See the study by the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (Pardo 2017), an NGO that studies attitudes toward peace and “the other” in school textbooks throughout the Middle East. See also Schreiber (2019).

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help us to answer the question as to why this particular reconciliation has been so successful. “The discourse of contemporary conflicts is – to say the least – discouraging,” writes one of the students in his final report after the study trip “From Berlin to Paris” in spring 2018. It is often hard to imagine a different reality when [in your daily life you are] looking at intense ongoing animosities. However, a pessimistic outlook is not the same [as] a realistic one. In reality, reconciliations do occur, even between neighbors who share the ugliest of histories. For this reason, the Franco-German reconciliation is a milestone for those who wish to understand conflicts and their potential resolution.

The seminar about Franco-German relations at the Hebrew University was a success that surprised us. We wonder whether, a few years ago, so many students would have shown a similar interest in this subject—and doubt whether this would have been the case. If so, this increased curiosity could be explained by a more relaxed relationship that Israelis nowadays have with Germany, as well as by an increased need for holding on to hope. In the meantime, one direct outcome of the successful Franco-German reconciliation has taken root in Ramallah in the West Bank. Founded in 2004, the FrenchGerman Cultural Center brings together “two institutions in one location” (FrenchGerman Cultural Center 2016) the Goethe-Institut for the Palestinian Territories and the Ramallah branch of the Institut Français in Jerusalem. Besides common cultural projects in various fields (such as cinema, visual arts, performing arts, and architecture), French and German language courses are offered. Its Robert Schuman Multimedia Library also features over 10,000 documents while a “Bibliobus” delivers “a selection of this collection to various Palestinian cities, visiting schools in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that teach French and German to their pupils.” However, there appear to be limits to this Franco-German cooperation when it comes to defining it formally to outsiders, especially when they come from Israel. For a presentation, two students at the Hebrew University had tried—to no avail—to reach possible interview partners that could speak for and about the joint center. With a view to past projects and exhibitions, it seems that both institutions function well, but rather next to each other than together under one roof. When it comes to the Middle East, the Franco-German relationship also has its limits.

References Ackermann, A. (1994). Reconciliation as a peace-building process in postwar Europe: The FrancoGerman case. Peace & Change, 19(3), 229–250. Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (2004). From conflict resolution to reconciliation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dachs, G. (Ed.). (2016). Länderbericht Israel (Country report Israel). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education). French-German Cultural Center. (2016). Official website. Retrieved March 02, 2020 from https:// www.frenchgermanculturalcenter.org/.

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Gardner Feldman, L. (1999). The principle and practice of ‘reconciliation’ in German foreign policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic. International Affairs, 75(2), 333–356. Gilad, M. (2018, December 14). Security or stupidity? Haaretz Guide, pp. 3–4. Moll, N. (2012). Effacer le passé au nom de l’amitié? La gestion des mémoires de la Seconde Guerre mondiale au sein du processus de réconciliation franco-allemande (Erase the past in the name of friendship? The management of the memories of the Second World War within the Franco-German reconciliation process). Allemagne d’aujourd’hui (Germany Today), 2012(3), 28–39. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. (2019). Public opinion poll, 73. Retrieved March 10, 2020 from https://pcpsr.org/en/node/775. Pardo, E. J. (2017). Palestinian elementary school curriculum 2016–17, radicalization and revival of the PLO program. IMPACT-se. Retrieved March 02, 2020 from https://www.impact-se.org/ wp-content/uploads/PA-Curriculum-2017-Revised.pdf. Peres, S. (1993). Die Versöhnung: Der neue Nahe Osten (Reconciliation: The new Middle East). Berlin: Siedler. Primor, A. (2013). Süß und ehrenvoll (Sweet and honorable). Berlin: Quadriga Verlag. Primor, A. (2014, January 17). When a French Jew met a German Jew on the Battlefield, Interview with Avi Primor by G. Dachs. i24news. Rosoux, V. (2008). Reconciliation as a peace-building process: Scope and limits. In J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, & W. Zartman (Eds.), The Sage handbook of conflict resolution (pp. 543–563). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Rosoux, V. (2015). Réconciliation post conflit: À la recherche d’une typologie (Post-conflict reconciliation: In search for a typology). Revue internationale de politique comparée (International Review of Comparative Politics), 22(4), 557–577. Rosoux, V. (2019). Israeli and Palestinian stories: Can mediators reconfigure incompatible narratives? Global Policy, 10(2), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12675 Schreiber, C. (2019). Kinder des Koran: Was muslimische Schüler lernen (Children of the Koran: What Muslim pupils learn). Berlin: Econ Verlag. Shenhav, Y. (2009). Arabische Juden (Arabic Jews). In G. Dachs (Ed.), Jüdischer Almanach der Leo Baeck Institute: Identitäten (Jewish Almanach of the Leo Baeck Institutes: Identity) (pp. 79–93). Berlin: Shurkamp. Shikaki, K. (1996). The peace process: National reconstruction and transition to democracy in Palestine. Journal of Palestine Studies, 24(2), 5–20. Shohat, E. (2017). On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and other displacements, selected writings. London: Pluto Press. Yaar, E., & Hermann, T. (2019). The peace index December 2018. Peace Index. Retrieved March 10, 2020 from https://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=338&monthname=Dec ember.

Cécile Cohen-Blaser is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of European Studies at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. As a Doc.Mobility scholarship fellow of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), she is currently working as a visiting research fellow at the Richard Koebner Minerva Center for German History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in Israel. In her Ph.D., she examines the question of transferability of the Franco-German reconciliation model to the context of former Yugoslavia. Her work places a particular focus on the effectiveness of structured youth encounters and dialogue groups in reconciliation processes. For her Master’s degree, she spent one year at the Nouvelle Sorbonne in Paris. Since 2007, she has been working as a journalist for Swiss and German publications. Selected publication: Altermatt, B., Blaser, C., Casasus, G. (Eds.). (2015). La Suisse dans les relations franco-allemandes: 1945–1963–2015 (Switzerland in Franco-German Relations: 1945– 1663–2015). Zurich: Somedia Buchverlag.

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Gisela Dachs is a journalist, author and professor at the European Forum and the DAAD-Center for German Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where she teaches also a course on Franco-German relations. She holds a Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University in the department of communication. She has started her journalistic career at the French daily Liberation in Paris and worked for more than 20 years as the Israel-correspondent of the German weekly Die Zeit and writes currently for the Swiss weekly NZZ am Sonntag. Selected publications: Dachs, G. (1998). Getrennte Welten: israelische und palästinensische Lebensgeschichten (Separated Worlds, Life stories of Israelis and Palestinians). Basel: Lenos. Dachs, G. (Ed.). (1999). Deutsche, Israelis und Palästinenser: ein schwieriges Verhältnis (Germans, Israelis, Palestinians: A Difficult Relationship). Heidelberg: Palmyra; Dachs, G. (2010). Israel in kurz (Israel in Short). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung; Dachs, G. (Ed.). (2016) Länderbericht Israel (Country Report Israel). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Difficult Pathway Toward Reconciliation: A Conversation Adnan Tabatabai

Abstract This chapter is dedicated to how Iran and Saudi Arabia might ultimately find a pathway toward reconciliation. In the background, it asks how the GermanFranco relationship can, after decades of enmity, serve as a blueprint for resolving geopolitical antagonisms. Iran and Saudi Arabia find themselves in a geopolitical context that has undergone manifold transformations in the past decades. The Islamic Revolution in Iran 1979, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011, and the wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have all impacted the relationship between two countries competing for geopolitical and ideological predominance. In all of these contexts and conflicts, Tehran and Riyadh have positioned themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum. While their rivalry might not be the root cause, it is often a driver of currently ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

1 Introduction Iran and Saudi Arabia find themselves in a geopolitical context that has undergone manifold transformations in recent decades. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Iran–Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011, and the wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have all impacted the relationship between two countries competing for geopolitical and ideological predominance. In all of these contexts and conflicts, Tehran and Riyadh have positioned themselves at opposite ends of the spectrum. While one supports an uprising, the other supports the ruling elite and vice versa. While their rivalry might not be the root cause, it is often a driver of currently ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. The reflections in this contribution will shed light on how Iran and Saudi Arabia might ultimately find a pathway toward reconciliation, and on how A. Tabatabai (B) Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_10

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the German-Franco relationship can, after decades of enmity, serve as a blueprint for resolving geopolitical antagonisms.

2 What are the Origins of the Conflict Between Iran and Saudi Arabia? How has it Developed Until Today? When looking at the geography of the Middle East, you could immediately argue that Iran and Saudi Arabia are destined to be rivals. Both countries are much bigger than their immediate neighbors in terms of territory and (particularly in the case of Iran) with the size of their populations. Given their geostrategically formidable positions along the lines of global trade routes, Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in competition over which country is to become the prime partner to industrial powers as a transit hub for trade with the Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa. Until the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, both countries were on good terms with Western powers in general and the USA in particular. Occasional waves of anti-Western movements led to temporary recalibrations of trade relations with the USA in both countries, but they negotiated the depth of these ties in the same way as the USA and other industrial powers balanced their trade relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Things drastically changed, however, after 1979 and the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Not only did the new Iranian state now turn into a staunch adversary of the USA, but as a state with an Islamic political order based on revolutionary Shia ideology it additionally emerged as a contender for Islamic predominance in the Islamic world. The King of Saudi Arabia is referred to as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” namely Mecca and Medina—a destination tens of millions of Muslims from around the world travel to for their Hajj and Umrah pilgrimage. This unique and uncontested prerogative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was then challenged by the emergence of the Islamic Republic under the leadership of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who, in reference to Iran’s neighbors in the Persian Gulf, had referred to the monarchy as an “unislamic political system.” Hence, with immediate effect, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia turned into a multilayered rivalry over economic, religious, and political predominance in the Middle East. When Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran in 1980 (a war that lasted until 1988), he received substantial financial support from Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia had now effectively turned from rivals into enemies. Throughout the 1990s, however, tensions gradually scaled down (which will be discussed in Q2), only to worsen once again from the early and mid-2000s onwards. Whenever Saudi interlocutors are asked, they express their dismay over the US invasion in Iraq 2002 and the beginning of the post-Saddam era in Iraq from 2003 onwards. Iraq under Saddam was seen as a counterbalance to Iran from the Saudi point of view. In contrast, Iran exerts a massive amount of influence in Iraq in political, economic, social, and religious terms. In the course of the Arab Spring in 2010 and

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2011, other powerful Arab states descended into chaos and civil war such as Syria and Libya, or have become significantly weakened fragile states such as Egypt. When considering other Arab Spring contexts like Tunisia, Yemen, or Bahrain, it can also be said that, in all of these countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia had diametrically opposed interests. Furthermore, with the demise of significant Arab states in the region, power politics in this region have become even more focused on the two remaining power houses, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, the above-mentioned dimensions of the economy (i.e., primary trade partner), religion (i.e., Islamic predominance), and politics (i.e., accepting or rejecting US dominance) can now be joined by a fourth dimension of geopolitics, i.e., competition over political influence in the neighboring region. Today, Iran blames Saudi Arabia for the spread of Wahhabism, which it sees as the root cause behind the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida and the terrorist organization “Islamic State”—commonly referred to as “Daesh” in the region. Saudi Arabia, in return, views Iran’s foreign policy in the region as being sectarian and expansionist and, hence, as the actual cause behind the emergence of Al Qaida and Daesh because they, it is argued, came into being as a consequence of unbearable living conditions for Sunnis in both Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the rivalry between both countries has worsened owing to what can be referred to as the “US lens.” Under President Barack Obama, Saudi Arabia blamed the USA for elevating Iran’s status through the nuclear agreement (finalized in Vienna in 2015 with other members of the UN Security Council and Germany), while under President Donald Trump the Kingdom has been pushing for a hardline approach toward Iran, which is now materializing in what Washington has dubbed a campaign of “maximum pressure.” For Iran, this is another reason to view Saudi Arabia as its enemy. There is reason to believe that Iran played a role in the attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure in September 2019, just as there is reason to believe Saudi Arabia had a hand in funding Persian-speaking opposition satellite channels, and also supporting violent separatist groups inside Iran. To sum up, it can be said that the two states have viewed each other as rivals, adversaries, and actual threats over the years. However, it is only since 2017 that Iranians have also seen Saudi Arabia as a threat to their security. This was after two terrorist attacks were carried out in Tehran on June 7 that year. Previously, it was only Saudi Arabia that viewed Iran as a threat, but not vice versa. Diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran were cut in January 2016 after the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and the Consulate General in Mashhad were set ablaze by protesters in response to the execution of Saudi Shiite Cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia. Toward the end of 2019, rumors about a measure of cautious backchannel bilateral dialogue circulated. Officials from both countries may have rejected these rumors to date, but acknowledging their existence in public would not be an option because of the sensitivity. 2020 might therefore bring some movement on that front.

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3 Have the Two Countries Tried to Carry Out a Reconciliation Process or at Least a De-escalation Process in the Last Few Decades? Who were the Initiators and the Actors in this Process, and Which Factors have Supported or Hindered this? Throughout the 1990s, after the devastating Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) a détente between Tehran and Riyadh was agreed on. State officials held regular meetings, often behind closed doors. This process ultimately led to a security pact that was signed by both interior ministers in Tehran in 2001. This entailed a non-aggression agreement as well as an understanding on joint efforts in the fight against terrorism and money laundering, as well as other issues. Then Iranian presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and the late King Abdullah respected each other, and it is believed by many Iranian and Saudi interlocutors that it was their respective approach and personal link based on mutual respect that paved the way to a genuine security dialogue. This approach was continued into the early 2000s, but was abruptly undermined by the events after September 11, 2001, and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These wars and the political turmoil that followed brought significant changes to the (some would say non-existent) regional balance of power, and a new set of security calculations in both Riyadh and Tehran. In many debates, Saudi interlocutors argue, the USA allowed Iraq to turn into a country leaning toward Iran by not doing enough to counter Iran’s growing influence on Saudi Arabia’s northern neighbor. Additionally, the domestic scene in Iran underwent significant changes after the presidencies of the late Ayatollah Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. The eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) was characterized by an ideological and provocative foreign policy approach. Toward the end of his tenure as president, the events of the Arab Spring, with Iran and Saudi Arabia further drifting apart politically, made any form of resuming the security dialogue of the late 1990s impossible.

4 In the Case of the Franco-German Relationship, External Actors Such as the USA Played a Decisive Role. Is this also the Case for Iran and Saudi Arabia? In the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, we are, unfortunately, witnessing the opposite of what helped France and Germany to come together. With the exception of the second term of President Barack Obama (2012–2016), the USA has actively encouraged Riyadh to play its part in containing and isolating Iran. Moreover, other regional actors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel—for their very own political reasons—have pursued a staunchly anti-Iran approach. Mohammed ben Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and a key driver behind the UAE’s foreign

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policy, emerged as an influential proponent of the “maximum pressure campaign” pursued by Donald Trump’s administration in order to contain and neutralize Iran. Abu Dhabi’s position is expressed in public statements, outlined in a number of op-eds by Emirati officials and explicitly supported and elaborated on in track 2 conference formats. Similarly, Israel’s position, particularly under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, plays strongly into the hardline policy of the current administration in Washington. Public posturing by these two regional rivals of Iran has played a significant role in fueling tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, states in the region such as Oman, Iraq, and Kuwait have repeatedly offered to play a role as mediators and facilitators of dialogue in recent years. Even China offered to mediate between the two, an offer that was rejected by Saudi Arabia when it was raised. After 2016, when diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran were cut, Switzerland assumed the role of diplomatic caretaker of messages from one to the other—similar to the role it plays between Washington and Tehran. Interlocutors in Saudi Arabia have often voiced grievances over the role Oman played in the run-up to direct talks between Iran and the USA prior to the nuclear talks. The reasoning behind this is that Oman helped Iran out of isolation. This may very well disqualify Oman for Saudis as a mediator, while Iran would very much like to ascribe this role to Muscat. The USA, while being in a formidable position to influence Saudi decision-making, is viewed as the archenemy in Tehran. European countries such as France, Germany, and Switzerland, or Scandinavian countries like Norway and Finland are good conveners at best, but lack leverage in both capitals. This used to be different in Tehran, but with Europe’s failure to safeguard the nuclear agreement in light of the USA’s withdrawal from the same, decision-makers in Iran never miss an opportunity to express their disappointment of Europe, and decry its lack of strategic autonomy in issues of global relevance such as the nuclear agreement. This leaves us with Russia and China. Geopolitically, Russia may appear to be more on Iran’s side, but very much tries to keep its political and trade relations intact with the kingdom, as the multiple visits between Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and President Vladimir Putin have shown. China seeks to balance its energy needs between Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to avoid dependencies and disturbances in the oil supply. Over the summer of 2019, when developments in the Persian Gulf region escalated, Beijing and Moscow are believed to have warned both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh not to take their confrontation with Iran any further.1 Particularly in the case of the UAE, this may indeed have had an effect. It may very well be that, from a European perspective, engaging Russia and China in order to seek coordinated approaches to easing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia might be a way forward in times of a US approach that seems hell-bent on confronting and further neutralizing Iran. The events between May and September 2019, when the world witnessed attacks on oil tankers, oil facilities, and the seizure of a British tanker, illustrated how rapidly such a political context can lead to open confrontation.

1 Conversations

with interlocutors in both countries.

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5 To What Extent Does Civil Society Play an Active or Passive Role in the Relationship Between Iran and Saudi Arabia? Unfortunately, animosities between Iran and Saudi Arabia have trickled down into both societies. Stereotypes and preoccupations toward each other can be sensed across all strata of society in Iran and Saudi Arabia.2 Many Saudis believe Iranians are arrogant, arabophobic, and have a sense of superiority toward their immediate neighbors. Iranians often state their disregard for the Saudis as “Wahhabis” who follow the most outdated strand of Islam and must be held responsible for the spread of Salafist jihadi groups. As a matter of fact, there has been no impetus in society on either side with a view to easing tensions with the respective other side—with one exception: Iranian pilgrims have called on their authorities to enable them to practice their Hajj and Umrah pilgrimage in spite of all political tensions. In similar fashion, merchants in Mecca and Medina have called on their decision-makers to refrain from barring Iranians from attending any pilgrimage trip out of an understandable interest for their own business. And interestingly, with the exception of 2017 (because of the deadly stampede in 2016), Iranian and Saudi pilgrimage authorities have managed to sit together and ensure safe journeys and arrangements for Iranian pilgrims. There was hope that this could lead to a positive domino effect for other aspects of IranianSaudi relations—such as trade, environmental issues, or even regional politics—but this has not materialized to date. Instead, political tensions even make themselves felt in sports in general and football in particular. During many matches between both national teams or their clubs in the Asian Champions League, fans chant disrespectful slogans against each other in this particularly emotionalized competitive space. Very limited one-on-one or people-to-people exchange takes place in arts or science. The Iran-Saudi Dialogue Initiative pursued by the Germany-based Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and the Brussels-based Middle East Department of the EastWest Institute (EWI) have gained relevance because they regularly bring together policy experts and think tankers from Iran and Saudi Arabia for closed-door roundtables. Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) endeavors to ensure that some dialogue channels remain intact. Such initiatives by CARPO, EWI, and ICG are indispensable at a time when not only no official contacts are pursued, but societal exchange is also otherwise minimal.

2 The

assessments shared here are based on impressions obtained during visits of both countries, continuous exchanges with interlocutors from Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as the constant media review of both contexts.

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6 To What Extent do the Narratives of Conflict Differ? Are There any Attempts to Bring Them Together, for Example by Historians? In the course of the above-mentioned dialogue meetings, it has become very apparent how greatly narratives on regional developments, views on history, and perceptions about one another drift apart. With regard to the conflicts in the region, there is a degree of asymmetry because Saudi interlocutors view Iran’s regional conduct as the single root cause, while Iran focuses its accusations and blame first and foremost on the USA—its allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, play a secondary role in Iranian reasoning. When it comes to the threat of terrorism in the region, each side blames the other for this. Iranians decry the spread of Wahhabism by Saudi Arabia, while Saudis blame the rise of terrorist groups on Iran’s sectarian policies. Similarly, each side’s interlocutors either point to a different historical event as the starting point of Iranian-Saudi enmity, or provide a conflicting reading of events such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian crisis, or the emergence of Daesh. In the course of CARPO’s and EWI’s dialogue initiative,3 an effort is being made to address issues of current concern and to explore the scope for a common interpretation of their underlying dimensions. Issues such as the root causes of the emergence of Daesh, the refugee crisis in Europe, environmental challenges, the post-oil economy, and debates about the media landscape and public discourse have been put on the table to try and develop a joint narrative. And while the underlying interpretations continue to feature stark discrepancies, there is a consensus on the need to address these. But for this constructive agreement to have a significant effect, influential figures from the fields of culture, sports, religion, the arts, and politics will have to dare to be “on the record” on this. The political climate is still not conducive for any “big shot” to dare to be a proponent of Iranian-Saudi rapprochement—that is particularly the case in Saudi Arabia, where Iran in itself is viewed as a threat, unlike the Iranian view of Saudi Arabia as representing the continuation of the threat posed by the USA. It can be assumed that, unless this climate improves for the better, and this can only be achieved through backchannel dialogue among the dignitaries of both countries, we cannot expect proponents of rapprochement and dialogue to publicly speak out and have an impact on societal views on the matter.

3 For

a brief project description online, see https://carpo-bonn.org/en/projekte/iran-saudi-dialog-ini tiative/. Accessed 02 March 2020. Many publications are derived from this format.

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7 What is the Image of Iran/Saudi Arabia in the Respective Neighboring Country Today? What Role do Stereotypes Play in the Bilateral Relation? In terms of political preoccupations, both sides tend to view each other in the most negative light possible—as being responsible for all evil in their shared region. When it comes to views toward Iranians and Saudis as a nation, a significant asymmetry exists. Many Saudis express admiration and respect for Iranian literature, music, cuisine, and art—it is just the political class and the leadership that they explicitly despise. In the case of the Iranians, however, there is hardly any acknowledgment (or knowledge) of the history of Saudi Arabia. There is very little interest in exploring Saudi culture, and, at times, many people question whether there is anything like a Saudi historic culture at all. Many look down at their neighboring state as an artificial construct run by a single family (i.e., the Al-Saud family). All perceptions are focused on the notion of Wahhabism and the archconservative Sunni current in Islam. The only reason for the average Iranian to travel to Saudi Arabia is the Umrah and Hajj pilgrimage, while many Saudi interlocutors have either been to Iran before or express an interest in visiting the country. This is yet another reason why personal encounters even on a societal or people-to-people level are often characterized by a certain reluctance to interact and engage—unless there is a shared profession or issue that is on the agenda for the two sides to discuss, as has been in the case in the dialogue format led by CARPO and EWI. On the political level, hardly any positive statements can be heard about each other. As mentioned earlier, the blame game over all the ills in the Middle East is driven by a zero-sum mentality that leaves very little scope for self-critical reflection through which both sides could express acknowledgment for the other side’s grievances. Neighbors of these two countries have, until now, done too little, or have not been successful in attempting to get each side to dial down the hostile rhetoric toward one another. As has been established in CARPO and EWI’s dialogue formats, many of these hardened views toward “the other” are purely based on perceptions. Unlike empirical data, or knowledge for that matter, perceptions are not based on strict fact-finding methods, but emerge as a result of narration, rumors, and speculation. What could be achieved in the course of the discussions with Iranian and Saudi interlocutors was to accept that one should not be judgmental about perceptions, and that there should be both a willingness to address and deconstruct them, as well as a willingness to accept that some misperceptions need to be overcome.

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8 To What Extent Can the Franco-German Experience be Helpful for Observing the Relationship Between Iran and Saudi Arabia? To What Extent Can the Franco-German Model not be Transferred to It? The single most important aspect of the history of German-Franco rapprochement was the encouragement of both sides by neighbors as well as the USA to pursue the path of dialogue. Between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there are only warnings not to take tensions too far in order to avoid major escalation. Furthermore, the USA in particular currently encourages Riyadh not to seek a more reconciliatory approach toward Tehran. The other key regional stakeholders not playing a conducive role with respect to Iranian-Saudi rapprochement are the UAE and Israel. While the UAE changed its approach slightly in the summer of 2019—after multiple incidents in the Persian Gulf that started to pose a serious threat—there are no signs that the UAE leadership is encouraging Riyadh to do the same. In the case of Israel, it cannot be expected that Tel Aviv will call for rapprochement with Iran, as it holds the view that Iran poses a major threat to its security. Given that GCC member states such Oman, Kuwait, and even Qatar, which has its own grievances with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have expressed an interest in the Iran-Saudi rift coming to an end, efforts to convince the UAE leadership in Abu Dhabi and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to seek rapprochement with Iran may receive impetus at the multilateral level in the region. Iran has launched the HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) initiative just recently. It is well known that those behind this idea in the Iranian Government deliberately avoided the term “Persian Gulf” in this initiative, as this (historically correct) name irritates many Arab neighbors. The initiative is focused on taking a multilateral approach to seeking shared maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. The outcome of such a multilateral setting could very well be bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in a more official capacity. This should, however, be viewed as an addition to ongoing efforts to facilitate bilateral talks.

9 What Scenarios are Conceivable Today for the Future of the Iranian-Saudi Relationship and for the Region in the Next Decade? The region we are looking at is simply too volatile to consider in such a long-term timeframe. Even a one- to two-year forecast seems too ambitious a challenge. Nevertheless, a number of indicators need to be highlighted. The events in the Persian Gulf region throughout the summer and fall of 2019 may have been a necessary lesson for all regional stakeholders that the adversarial state of affairs in this region is not sustainable. When passing the Strait of Hormuz, international tankers were attacked with sea mines, and others seized by helicopters or speedboats. Crucial Saudi oil

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infrastructure came under severe missile and drone attacks, and a US drone was shot down while flying over Iranian airspace. The region was extremely close to witnessing the outbreak of yet another devastating war, all of which must be seen as a consequence of what the USA has called its campaign of “maximum pressure”4 against Iran, with the latter having no other means to push back other than causing harm to US allies for them to demand less confrontation against Iran because they themselves would be hit by Iranian retaliation. Dubai is hosting the Expo2020, while Saudi Arabia will receive the G20 in its capital. Both have to be postponed because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Any further deterioration of the security situation would undermine the intended prestige in hosting such global events—and attendance would be minimal. For this further escalation to be halted, regional stakeholders have no choice but to revisit their approaches. For this to develop into a meaningful multilateral security dialogue, a measure of trust-building must first be developed and undertaken. Furthermore, such tendencies require international backing—the USA, China, and Russia are especially important in this regard, with the latter having already succeeded in convincing Abu Dhabi in particular that an open USA–Iran confrontation cannot be in their interest and should be avoided. Washington should weigh in and take the lead in trying to ease tensions in the region.

Adnan Tabatabai obtained his M.Sc. in Middle East Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He is co-founder and CEO of Germany’s Middle East think tank CARPO—Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient. As an Iran analyst, he is consulted by European policymakers and businesses on Iranian affairs. Through his work at CARPO, he has designed and facilitated track 2 and civil-society dialogue formats between Iran and Saudi Arabia since 2015. Furthermore, he is involved in a variety of projects at CARPO on regional security in the Persian Gulf region. Adnan Tabatabai is the author of the book Morgen in Iran (Körber-Stiftung, 2016). He is regularly featured in international media with commentary and analysis on developments in Iran and the Middle East.

4 U.S.

officials started to refer to their policy as maximum pressure in 2017.

Indo-Pak Reconciliation Through the Franco-German Mirror Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

Abstract The pulls and pressures influencing the India–Pakistan bilateral relationship have ebbed and flowed for the better part of a century, sculpting not only the contours of the bilateral, but also those of South Asian regional relations, stability, security, and integration. Over the years, numerous different attempts aimed at trustbuilding and enhancing cooperation between India and Pakistan have been made. Often, the trajectories of these efforts, big or small, have tended to fall into a repetitive cycle best illustrated in the oft-heard catchphrase used to describe this relationship, namely “one step forward, two steps backward.” Although the entirety of the Franco-German experience might not be applicable to the Indo-Pak context, it does provide a point of reference for drawing comparisons and gleaning insights to not only identify workable ways forward, but to also identify those measures that might not be effective.

1 Introduction On November 28, 2018, at the ground-breaking ceremony for the India–Pakistan Kartarpur Corridor, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan asked “[i]f France and Germany who fought several wars can live in peace, why can’t India and Pakistan?” (Geo News 2018). This was not the first time that such a question had been posed. This is a question that arises occasionally during policy discussions on India–Pakistan relations in the subcontinent and elsewhere. However, even a brief review of India– Pakistan relations shows that this is easier said than done, primarily due to the considerable trust deficit that exists between the two sides. In today’s globalized world, achieving reconciliation between states requires not only an intention to do so, but also a coming/bringing together of conducive circumstances, both domestic and external. It is on this aspect that attempts at improving India–Pakistan relations have fallen short. Indeed, there are several examples of both R. Krishnamurthy (B) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_11

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opportunities and challenges as regards this endeavor. However, to understand their relevance and potency, it is necessary to understand India–Pakistan relations in their historical context along with the contemporary context. In this regard, this essay focuses predominantly on state-to-state relations.

2 A Very Different Historical Background 2.1 Emergence of National Identities and Bilateral Relations One of the fundamental factors differentiating the Indo-Pak and Franco-German contexts pertains to the circumstances of their respective creations/emergence as national entities, and subsequent evolution of their respective bilateral relations. By the end of the Second World War, France and Germany had experienced well over 12 centuries of rivalry that finally culminated in a major humanitarian crisis in their respective territories during the Second World War. It was only after this that active efforts toward transforming their relationship began to be undertaken in earnest. In comparison, the hostility in the India–Pakistan relationship does not have a lengthy historical component comparable to that of the Franco-German experience. India and Pakistan did not exist as two distinct national entities prior to 1947. The seeds of creating the two as two separate countries only took root closer to the Second World War period, against the backdrop of which the Indian independence movement was reaching a crescendo. However, it is important to note that the people who comprised British India (present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) were largely united and worked together for decades to achieve the common goal of independence from colonial rule, without particularly seeking the creation of two (or three) separate countries. Moreover, the notion of a common overarching Indian identity was at the heart of India’s struggle for freedom. The extensive cultural and civilizational links among the peoples of this region have a considerably longer history than contemporary political relations. In August 1947, after over a century under British colonial rule, British India became independent. However, independence came with a cost, not just on the political and administrative, but also on the humanitarian and social fronts. British India was partitioned into two countries, namely India and Pakistan (with present-day Bangladesh as a Pakistani territory), and boundaries were drawn in haste (Chester 2002). With territory, families were divided and peoples displaced as large-scale cross-migration ensued, often dotted with large-scale violence. The future of social, political, and economic links that the people of the subcontinent had for long shared began to be influenced by artificial borders that were a product of empire. The circumstances, rationales, and impact of partition and its legacy continue to play a substantial role in defining the nature of bilateral as well as regional relations today. In the brief 72-year history of India’s and Pakistan’s existence as independent countries, they have clashed in four wars (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999). These wars

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have had an especially profound impact on the trajectory of bilateral relations. The 1947 war over Kashmir culminated in UN Security Council Resolution 47. The 1971 war resulted in the creation of present-day Bangladesh from what had until then constituted East Pakistan, marking a significant change in Pakistan’s territorial expanse. The 1999 war derailed the substantial progress the two sides had made at the watershed Lahore Summit in February 1999. Moreover, there has, over the years, been a slew of military stand-offs, skirmishes, ceasefire violations, and clashes of varying degrees between the two sides. Another significant factor that exists in the India–Pakistan context but did not in the Franco-German context is cross-border terrorism. A simple comparison of the timelines and circumstances of the four respective countries’ births and the evolution of their respective bilateral relations suggests that the Franco-German hostility was not necessarily just a mere direct outcome of the creation of the two countries/national entities, but that other factors too had a significant role to play in sculpting it. In comparison, the creation of India and Pakistan as two separate countries had a significant role to play in shaping the hostilities in this relationship.

2.2 The Cold War Factor The state of international relations, especially global and regional geopolitical conditions, played a substantial role in how bilateral relations between France and Germany, and India and Pakistan, evolved. While there are several examples in this regard, this section provides a brief overview of the ways in which the Cold War influenced bilateral relations. While the foundations of the Franco-German reconciliation project were laid as a new world order emerged after the end of the Second World War, factors feeding hostility between India and Pakistan evolved alongside that very new world order. For example, it has been argued that the prospect of a common Soviet threat (among other factors) played an instrumental role in shaping France and the then West Germany’s decisions to improve their bilateral relations, and that the Cold War environment also proved to be a conducive atmosphere in which reconciliation became an appealing, practical option for both France and the then West Germany’s national interests (Yikang 1996). In comparison, the burgeoning Cold War did not have a similar effect on India–Pakistan relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003). The USA’s approach to its bilateral relations with each of the four countries is a useful example. Here, it must be noted that its policy is merely one example of how the Cold War and the regional geopolitical condition influenced how Indo-Pak relations evolved. The policies of other countries such as those of Russia and China also had a role to play. In Europe, the USA endeavored to not take sides between the then West Germany and France. Instead, it pursued a consistent policy objective focused on remedying their bilateral differences in a bid to facilitate a stronger and integrated Western

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Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet expansion (Larres 2009), as well as to advance the USA’s economic and foreign policy objectives (Nguyen 2017: 30–48). The USA’s actions in Europe demonstrated a policy with a long-term vision supplemented by concrete action plans, beginning with the Marshall Plan, which the USA viewed as “America’s answer to the challenge facing the free world” (Truman 1948). By establishing institutions that enabled economic cooperation and coordination across Western Europe, the Marshall Plan catalyzed economic revival (Mee 1984), which in turn made the environment conducive to European political and economic integration (Milward 1984). It was in line with this trajectory that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was conceived, given how the European integration project would have been vulnerable to collapse in the absence of rapprochement between France and Germany. The ECSC was thus the first step toward making war between the two countries “not merely unthinkable but materially impossible” (Schuman 1950)—an initiative favored by the USA (Eisenhower 1953). When compared with its policy in Europe, the USA’s policy in South Asia during the Cold War years seems more ad hoc. For instance, it appears to have involved a balancing of its ‘investment’ in its relations with India and Pakistan, but with said balance tilting in the favor of one or the other depending on the USA’s changing strategic priorities. In contrast to the USA’s conduct in Europe in the initial decades of the Cold War, there appears to have been no broader vision or action plan within which the USA conducted its relations and policy in South Asia. While the USA was inclined to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia as well (Kodikara 1979: 35), its lack of consistent long-term vision and actions, unlike in the case of Europe, contributed to circumstances not becoming conducive for reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The context of the creation of Bangladesh and the developments that took place in the run-up to the India–Pakistan War of 1971 are a useful example. As the Bangladesh movement gained momentum in the then East Pakistan, a refugee crisis emanating from it intensified in India. Successive developments in that period indicated that a military confrontation between India and Pakistan was inevitable. However, at the time, Washington was in the process of undertaking efforts to normalize relations with Beijing, and to that end, the USA had enlisted Pakistan’s assistance (Phillips and Keefer 2006). A corollary of this reliance was that the USA ended up having to factor in its relationship with Pakistan to secure what it viewed as its immediate national interest at the time, when tensions between India and Pakistan were intensifying against the backdrop of the crisis in the then East Pakistan. The USA did eventually make a policy shift and recognized Bangladesh in April 1972 (Nixon 1972). However, this came about long after the USA had deployed a taskforce led by an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 to signal an ultimatum to New Delhi to avoid escalation of military confrontation with Pakistan. Meanwhile, India, sensing the need to counter any impending US ultimatum, had enlisted Soviet help, and the 20-year India-USSR Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in August 1971 (four months before East Pakistan became Bangladesh), despite India being a non-aligned country.

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Furthermore, the Cold War did not play out in binary terms in the context of India– Pakistan relations—i.e., it did not result in either country categorically choosing a side. Instead, it resulted in complex relationships in which India and Pakistan engaged both the USA and the USSR, relying on one more than the other, depending on the circumstances at hand. The addition of China to this mix created further layers of complexity in the India–Pakistan relationship. In 1962, China and India clashed in war, which resulted in India losing parts of its territory (Indian Council of World Affairs 2012). Hot on the heels of this war, China and Pakistan signed the SinoPakistan Boundary Treaty in 1963 (Geographer, Office of Strategic and Functional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State 1968). Under this agreement, the boundary between Northern Kashmir (which was then administered by Pakistan) and Xinjiang was redrawn, resulting in an exchange of territory (Dobell 1964). This took place despite the fact that, at that time, Kashmiri territory held by Pakistan was claimed by India based on the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir (Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir 1947), and UNSC Resolution 47 was pending implementation. This, combined with the India–Pakistan War in 1965, further complicated the prospects of any détente between India and Pakistan at that time. Another effect of the 1962 India–China war was that it prompted the USA to view India as a significant factor (and a potential ally) in the USA’s objective of containing China (Kodikara 1979: 38–39). This meant that the USA, which had thus far cultivated closer relations with Pakistan, began to invest relatively more in its relationship with India. Add to this mix the context of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the initial decades of post-independence Indian and Pakistani foreign relations and regional developments offer substantial insights into how the Cold War impacted India–Pakistan bilateral relations, as well as how India–Pakistan relations influenced how the Cold War played out in South Asia. These twists and turns played a considerable role in shaping South Asian inter-state relations, security, and regional geopolitical conditions. Similarly, the post-Cold War period also witnessed a similar spate of the USA’s shifting strategic priorities in the region. Overall, in the case of Europe, the USA viewed European integration, economic revival, and political cohesion as vital for its national interests, and conclusively ending enmity between France and Germany as crucial to achieving that objective. This was not the case in terms of the USA’s outlook toward South Asia or Indo-Pak relations.

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3 Reconciliation and Normalization of State Relations: A Difficult Comparison 3.1 Different Experiences of Reconciliation Attempts Developments that took place in the run-up to the 1963 signing of the Élysée Treaty can be viewed as conducive factors that enabled the Franco-German reconciliation project to progress. These include the Marshall Plan, the 1950 Schuman Declaration, the creation of the ECSC, and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—all of which facilitated the creation and consolidation of the European Union (EU) in practical terms. With the Élysée Treaty, a structured, systematic, timebound, tangible framework for the Franco-German reconciliation exercise emerged. Compared with the Franco-German experience, Indo-Pak efforts aimed at reconciliation through confidence-building seem to fall short with respect to comprehensiveness in the scope of cooperation frameworks, synchronicity on domestic and external circumstances, reciprocity, as well as long-term commitment that enables trust-building. This is not to say that the two sides have not cooperated in the past or that efforts that have been made toward improving relations to date have been inherently ineffective. Over the years, numerous attempts have been made with a view to improving and normalizing relations between India and Pakistan. While some, such as the Composite Dialogue process, were structured and systematic in their frameworks, others, such as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Pakistan in December 2015, have been less formal overtures (BBC 2015). Other initiatives have included mechanisms for cross-border trade along the bordering states (including in Jammu and Kashmir), bus connections between India and Pakistan, etc. There have also been numerous treaty agreements on a range of issues. However, these have not resulted in steady progress or consistency necessary for confidence- and trustbuilding. The experiences of the Lahore Summit, Agra Summit, and the Composite Dialogue process, as well as the 2005–2008 back channel talks are helpful experiences for understanding why some of these attempts did not achieve the goals they were intended to bring about.

3.2 Significant Experiences 3.2.1

The Lahore Summit and the Kargil War

Not long after bilateral tensions had increased in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests by the two countries, India and Pakistan held a summit in Lahore, Pakistan, in February 1999. India’s then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee traveled to Pakistan by road on the maiden journey of the newly launched bus service between New Delhi and Lahore, where he was received by his Pakistani counterpart Prime Minister

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Nawaz Sharif. This summit concluded with the signing of the Lahore Declaration, which was a broad-based undertaking outlining the guiding principles for managing bilateral relations. For example, it included commitments pertaining to intensifying efforts to “resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir,” refraining “from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs” and reaffirming “their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace,” among others (Lahore Declaration 1999). In essence, it was a reiteration by both sides of their commitment to the principles agreed to in the India-Pakistan Simla Agreement of 1972, which was signed in the aftermath of the 1971 war. This declaration was a watershed moment for the two countries and was well received by the public on both sides, and the prospects for improvement in bilateral relations seemed optimistic. This optimism was short-lived, however. Within three months of signing the Lahore Declaration, soldiers of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry infiltrated the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in Kargil district and nearby areas in May 1999 (Qadir 2002), triggering the Kargil War. This military conflict, which lasted two months, damaged the goodwill and confidence that the Lahore Declaration had engendered in India earlier that year. Bilateral relations suffered a major setback, and the composite and integrated dialogue process, which the two sides had committed to intensify under the Lahore Declaration, was suspended.

3.2.2

The Agra Summit and Its Collapse

Not long after the Kargil War, India’s then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan’s then President General Pervez Musharraf1 (who had by then assumed the office of the president after ousting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a coup) met in India for the Agra Summit in July 2001 to resume efforts to reduce bilateral tensions. This summit collapsed, however, an outcome that could be attributed to the lack of a clear prior agreement on the agenda regarding the topics of discussion, as well as on public disclosure of the contents of the discussions. This resulted in an impasse during the summit, with the public perceptions arising from General Musharraf’s keenness to focus on the Kashmir issue and India’s reticence to do so at that juncture compelling the two leaders to harden their stances. The wisdom of discussing substantive issues at the summit has been questioned (Chari 2001), given how it took place not long after the Kargil War. The counter-argument to this could be that even if substantive issues had to be discussed, better coordination on publicizing the contents of the discussions should have been undertaken in advance given the sensitivity of the issues and the timing of the summit. More importantly, this summit should have been approached as the first step toward a thaw rather than a substantive step toward normalizing relations. Less than six months after the Agra Summit debacle, in mid-December 2001, the Indian parliament was attacked by terrorists affiliated with Pakistan-based terrorist 1 General

Pervez Musharraf was Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff at the time of the Kargil War.

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outfits, namely Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which in turn resulted in increased tensions between the India and Pakistan, kicking off a large-scale military standoff that lasted six months. Furthermore, even though a ceasefire was subsequently implemented in 2003 and has held since that time, violations of the ceasefire have occurred regularly and frequently over the years.

3.2.3

Composite Dialogue

In 2004, India and Pakistan initiated work on the bilateral Composite Dialogue (CD) process. The CD was one of the commitments contained in the 1999 Lahore Declaration. However, it was not until 2004 that concrete action in that direction could be taken in earnest. The CD was instituted to discuss eight key issues (Manjunath et al. 2006): – – – – – – – –

Jammu and Kashmir The Siachen Glacier Peace and security, including confidence-building measures Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project Sir Creek Economic and commercial cooperation Terrorism and drug trafficking The promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

The CD framework enabled dialogue on a range of issues and facilitated incremental progress in various aspects of Indo-Pak bilateral relations. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, these included “confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to peace and security; enhanced people-to-people contacts through bus and train services; revival of the Bilateral Joint Commission after 16 years; setting up of the Judicial Committee to look into the humanitarian issue of civilian prisoners/fishermen held in each other[’s] jails and growth in bilateral trade by 550% between the years 2003–2004 and 2007–2008 from US$ 344.59 million to US$ 2.23 billion” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2012). However, CD talks were paused in the aftermath of the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, India, which were perpetrated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (MEA 2008). The talks did eventually resume in 2010 under the title, “Resumed Dialogue,” but were suspended again in 2012. The circumstances that caused this back and forth point to the need for serious and comprehensive action at all levels to demonstrate the sincerity of commitments made on paper, in order for it to engender confidence regarding the practicability of, and faith in, reconciliation efforts.

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3.3 Back Channel Talks The mid-2000s witnessed multi-year, closed-door, back channel talks between India and Pakistan, aimed at exploring ways to resolve the Kashmir issue. By that time, there had been a change in government in India following the 2004 general elections, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s administration had come to power. Pakistan was still under President General Pervez Musharraf’s rule. These talks made substantial progress (Kasuri 2014; Lambah 2015; Parthasarthy 2016). Ceasefire violations across the Line of Control (LoC) also dipped considerably during this period (Indo-Pak Conflict Monitor 2004, 2005, 2006). These talks have even been viewed as having almost resolved the Kashmir issue (Coll 2009). One of the factors that enabled progress was the fact that Pakistan’s then President General Musharraf was also the country’s army chief. This meant that the lopsided civil-military relationship in Pakistan (where the army is dominant)—which has otherwise tended to throw a spanner in the works whenever a civilian government in Pakistan attempted to normalize relations with India—was no longer a factor, as the military was also on board with this initiative. It is relevant to mention here that the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has been plagued by a protracted armed insurgency and militancy supported from the other side of the border (Chalk 2001). In addition to being a major national security problem, terrorism in the state also affects the prospects for sustainable return of the thousands of Kashmiri Pandits who were forcibly displaced (Evans 2002) in an exodus that took place between 1989 and 1990. Given the complex backdrop of the Jammu and Kashmir issue, the fact that an agreement on an alternative solution for it was almost reached during the back channel talks, one in which both sides “agreed there would be no reference to the United Nations resolution or a plebiscite in Kashmir” (Lambah 2015), essentially bypassing the territorial claims aspect (Parthasarthy 2016), was an unprecedented and significant development. Interestingly, the alternative under consideration did bear some resemblance to the logic of free movement within the EU—i.e., it hinged on the idea of making borders irrelevant. However, by the time the negotiations had reached an advanced stage, domestic developments in Pakistan resulted in Musharraf ultimately resigning in 2008. Although the talks did continue after the 2008 Mumbai attacks as well (Lambah 2015)—by which time a civilian government was in power in Pakistan—it did not possess the same vigor as it had previously. The back channel talks are an example of a factor crucial for any reconciliation effort between two states to succeed: consistency in domestic politics (Heo 2011). In the case of post-Second World War France and Germany, this factor largely existed, enabling successive leaders of both of the countries to take the reconciliation process forward steadily. In the India–Pakistan case, this factor has been deficient. For its part, India approaches practical efforts to improve relations with Pakistan with caution because consistency in sustained reciprocity by Pakistan’s leadership

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(especially military) has been lacking. For decades, India has suffered from fundamentalist extremism originating from across its borders. Consequently, one of the issues on which India expects conclusive action from Pakistan as evidence of its commitment to normalizing relations pertains to eliminating Pakistan-based terror outfits targeting India. However, this has not materialized. In fact, it is not uncommon to see the leaders of these groups making public appearances in Pakistan’s major cities (Hasan 2015) or to see Pakistan Armed Forces personnel mingling with persons affiliated with such groups (Laskar 2019). A recent example of how terror groups’ activities derail efforts to improve relations took place in 2015. Less than a week after incumbent Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to Pakistan to meet his then counterpart Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in December 2015, militants stormed an Indian military base in Pathankot, Punjab (BBC 2016). The United Jihad Council, an umbrella network of militant groups (of which Pakistan-based Lashkare-Taiba is also a part) operating in Kashmir claimed responsibility for the attack, but Indian security agencies suspected that Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Muhammad were the perpetrators (Ashiq 2016). On the other hand, Pakistan–Bangladesh relations have evolved since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974. However, for Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh from the erstwhile East Pakistan is among the factors that feed into mistrust and skepticism in its outlook toward India. The birth of Bangladesh was as much an outcome of Islamabad’s (and Rawalpindi’s) heavy-handed policies in East Pakistan as it was of the 1971 India–Pakistan War (Bass 2013). In this regard, the conclusive role New Delhi played in the birth of an independent Bangladesh also feeds into Islamabad’s and Rawalpindi’s mistrust of India. Similarly, due to mistrust as well as concerns surrounding a potential “twofront scenario” (Usher 2009), Pakistan has tended to conduct its policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan based on its rivalry with India, seeking “strategic depth” (Dawn 2010) in Kabul instead. Not only do Kabul and New Delhi share healthy relations, Afghanistan was also the only country that did not vote in favor of Pakistan’s bid to join the UN in 1947. Moreover, Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line as its border with Pakistan—the very reason it cited for its decision during the 1947 vote in the UN (United Nations 1947). Islamabad’s discomfort over an expanded Indian security role in Afghanistan is also partly why New Delhi has largely tended to turn down Kabul’s requests for the supply of lethal weapons (Swami 2013).

4 Opportunities and Limits of the Human Factor 4.1 Humanitarian Assistance 4.1.1

Treaties

While the abovementioned experiences demonstrate why normalization of relations between India and Pakistan has been a slow-moving activity, these obstacles have not

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entirely prevented cooperation. The two sides have cooperated and provided humanitarian assistance to each other during natural disasters. These include Pakistan’s supply of relief material to India during the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India (BBC 2001), and India’s supply of relief material to Pakistan during the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (Dawn 2005). The two have also helped evacuate each other’s citizens from war zones, such as during the 2015 Yemen war (Al Jazeera 2015). Additionally, people-to-people exchanges such as those of actors and musicians are common. Even when tensions between India and Pakistan soared in the wake of the 2019 terrorist attack in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, India, and the Indian military responded by aerial bombing a terrorist camp in Balakot, Pakistan, both sides proceeded with opening up the Kartarpur Corridor (an idea floated during the Lahore Summit). This corridor is a secure border crossing connecting Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan to the Indian border that enables Indian and Overseas Citizen of India cardholders to enjoy visa-free travel to Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan. Furthermore, not all cooperation has been short-lived. The most enduring example of Indo-Pak cooperation is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Facilitated by the World Bank and midwifed by the USA, the IWT is a bilateral water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan that has been in force since September 19, 1960, made effective retrospectively since April 1960 as per XII (2) of the treaty. This treaty provides the regulatory framework for the shared use of the waters of six rivers—the Beas, Ravi, Sutlej, Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum—between India and Pakistan. The treaty has a provision for establishing a Permanent Indus Commission to settle differences and disputes. It also comprises provisions for modalities of mediation and arbitration, as well as for referring matters to a neutral expert (The Indus Waters Treaty 1960). The IWT has been complied with since its inception and has endured through wars and other conflicts. Similarly, compliance with the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations between India and Pakistan (1988) has also continued uninterrupted since it came into force in 1991 (Ministry of External Affairs 2019).

4.2 SAARC: An Instrument for Promoting Regional Cooperation? The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was instituted in December 1985 with a view to facilitating regional cooperation through an overarching institutional mechanism. SAARC members include India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan, and the association itself has multiple focus areas, departments, and specialized bodies, spread across the SAARC member states. The SAARC Arbitration Council (Islamabad, Pakistan), the SAARC Development Fund (Thimphu, Bhutan), the South Asian University (New Delhi, India), and the South Asian Regional Standards Organization (Dhaka, Bangladesh) are some examples. Periodic consultations among SAARC member

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states have been institutionalized and take place on a wide range of issues. However, although the SAARC framework has delivered a number of positive outcomes so far, its potential for invigorating regional cooperation has yet to be exploited optimally. Among other factors, the state of affairs of the India–Pakistan relationship tends to affect progress on this front. While SAARC could have possibly been South Asia’s solution with respect to regional integration and cooperation, its structures as well as regional realities limit its potential (Bhargava 1998). Furthermore, unlike in the case of the European integration project in which regional integration and cooperation were pursued hand in hand with the goal of French–German rapprochement and interdependency, SAARC’s fate and Indo-Pak rapprochement have not been pursued simultaneously for a variety of reasons. Note on the Kashmir Issue and UN Security Council Resolution 47 The erstwhile Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir is geographically vast, and comprised the present-day Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir2 on the Indian side of the current Line of Control (LoC), as well as Northern Territories, Gilgit, Baltistan, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (which Pakistan refers to as ‘Azad Kashmir’) on Pakistan’s side of the LoC. It is also ethnically and religiously diverse, encompassing Punjabi Rajputs, Baltis, and migrants from Punjab on Pakistan’s side of the LoC, as well as Kashmiri Muslims, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, Ladakhi Muslims, and Ladakhi Buddhists, among others, on India’s side of the LoC. At the time of independence, neither India nor Pakistan had a legal claim to the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, with its Maharaja still weighing his options: (a) joining India; (b) joining Pakistan; or (c) remaining independent. From a legal standpoint, it became an Indian territory when the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession in favor of India in late October 1947 (Nayak 2019) against the backdrop of an armed Pakistani raid. UN Security Council Resolution 47 of April 1948 in turn outlines sequential and conditional steps for restoring law and order, with the first step being Pakistan demilitarizing from the region completely.

4.3 External ‘Assistance’ In the 1972 Simla Agreement, the two sides agreed to settle their differences by peaceful means “through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them” (Simla Agreement 1972). However, Pakistan often calls for international intervention in the form of mediation, etc., on the Kashmir 2 Union

Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and Union Territory of Ladakh, as of October 31, 2019.

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issue, but refuses to accept an international role with respect to addressing terrorism. India calls for international intervention on the issue of terrorism, but refuses to accept any foreign role on the Kashmir issue. The IWT experience might suggest that external assistance could be constructive in resolving India–Pakistan disputes. However, it is important to remember that the two countries are sovereign, post-colonial national entities that have come a long way from the nascence of their nationhood. As such, neither might view a substantial degree of external involvement in an India–Pakistan reconciliation process with much enthusiasm. In the case of France and Germany, not only did each of the two countries accept considerable external assistance and involvement in order to transform their relationship, but the circumstances of the time made accepting such assistance possible and necessary. Franco-German reconciliation involved a paradigm shift on multiple levels in the immediate aftermath of a massive tragedy and war, the likes of which the world had never seen before. Moreover, domestic leaders and at least one key external actor (the USA) had a vested interest in ensuring a stable Europe due to the burgeoning Cold War. Furthermore, from a domestic point of view as well, for France and Germany, incentives for remedying the relationship far outweighed any potential benefits that not reconciling might have offered. The context of the India–Pakistan is not similar. While there are several incentives for transforming the relationship, they are yet to outweigh the contrary. In terms of external actors, while Indo-Pak reconciliation might be favored by most, it does not seem to be a strategic priority for anyone yet. Moreover, the solution to the India– Pakistan rivalry, much like for other cases, cannot be imported in toto from another context.

5 Looking Ahead The experiences discussed above highlight a key contextual difference between the Indo-Pak and Franco-German experiences in reconciliation efforts. Efforts aimed at improving India–Pakistan relations have largely resulted in ‘cold peace’ (in which the possibility of a return to violence is not improbable), whereas those aimed at improving Franco-German relations appear to have systematically bypassed the cold peace conundrum. In the case of India and Pakistan, confidence-building often seems to be understood as synonymous with trust-building. Here, it might be relevant to ask whether confidence can be generated in the absence of sustained actions and measures that engender reliability and in turn trustworthiness. Finally, reconciliation must be understood and attempted both as a process and as an outcome (Bloomfield 2006). The India–Pakistan contestation has multiple dimensions, including land disputes, terrorism, trauma, mistrust, and regional geopolitics, to name but a few (Wojczewski

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2014). While “reconciliation” in its broadest interpretation might not be a straightforward journey for the two countries, the two have also demonstrated potential for constructive cooperation. Effecting a paradigm shift in a situation as complex as this will not only require incentives that render reconciliation beneficial, but also incentives that render not reconciling as being against each’s respective national interests. However, given the prevailing regional geopolitical conditions, asymmetry and inconsistency in domestic politics and political realities, as well as a mismatch in reciprocity, incentives with such potential do not seem to be on the horizon, at least for the time being. Yet, given the extensive civilizational, historical, and cultural links that the peoples on either side share, in an event that both sides decide to pursue reconciliation in earnest, the chances are that improving people-to-people relations would require relatively less effort than improving state-to-state relations. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations to which she is affiliated.

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Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy is Deputy Director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, India. Her research focuses on issues in foreign policy and international security such as geopolitics, grand strategy, political stability, armed conflict, peace processes, and rule of law in South Asia. At IPCS, she also coordinates the Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS). Rajeshwari edits the annual Women and Public Policy Journal (WPPJ) published by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies, Afghanistan, and is an advisory council member at the Women & Peace Studies Organization—Afghanistan. She has been a Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, DC, and a Beyond Borders Women in Conflict 1325 Fellow, funded by the Scottish government. Prior to joining IPCS, she was the Content Manager for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai.

Generous Gesture? Franco-German Reconciliation from the Korean Perspective Dong-Ki Lee

Abstract The relationship between South Korea and Japan has been greatly influenced by unresolved historical problems. The main reason for South Korea’s interest in Franco-German reconciliation is that Germany and France have been able to face the pain of their shared past. In their criticism of Japan, most Koreans always refer to the German admission of guilt for Nazi crimes as a model. In view of the Japanese rejection of coming to terms with the past, a new approach must be adopted in South Korea: First the intensification of possible contacts with Japanese society, then a joint search for a long-term political solution to historical conflicts. The institutionalization of Franco-German cooperation, such as with the Franco-German Youth Office, can directly encourage South Koreans to take a further step towards closer and more stable cooperation. The contacts and networks for the cooperation between South Koreans and Japanese should not be disturbed by the politics of memory, but be intensified.

1 Introduction Since the South Korean Supreme Court ruled at the end of 2018 that Japanese companies must compensate South Korean workers for forced labor during the Second World War, the Japan-South Korea relationship has entered a dangerous new stage. In the relationship between South Korea and Japan, which has been greatly influenced by historical problems, there has neither been a political stable basis for reconciliation nor a bilateral setting for relations across the board. In view of the long-standing rejection of the Japanese government to coming to terms with historical problems, a new approach must be adopted in South Korea: South Koreans should take decisive initiatives for a reconciliation process from a forward-looking perspective and intensify contacts with Japanese society instead of accusing it of an inability to look at history. In this regard, the history of the D.-K. Lee (B) Professor, Department of Peace Studies, Kangwon National University, Chuncheon, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_12

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Franco-German reconciliation process can provide an insight into a new way of thinking about the meaning and role of coming to terms with history for the bilateral reconciliation process. Moreover, a self-critical attitude to its own history of violence on the part of South Korea can inspire Japan to also reconsider its past crimes. This self-critical confrontation with their history of violence, in which much can be learned from Germany, could be a new starting point for transnational reconciliation in East Asia.

2 Franco-German Rapprochement: A Difficult Model for Japanese-Korean Relations In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, which has been transformed into a series of entangled relationships and interdependencies, events seeking transnational reconciliation and regional cooperation are still diverse and at times diverge immensely. On January 22, 2019, which happened to be the 56th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, the Treaty of Aachen was signed between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron in the Aachen City Hall; with the treaty, France and Germany signed off on a plan for deepening their bilateral friendship and even closer European integration. By contrast, the relationship between South Korea and Japan has been plunged into a deep crisis for years (Sakaki 2019). In 2015, the conflict over demands for redress of injuries, inflicted during the Japanese colonial rule in Korea, broke out once again, and since then a nationalist politics of emotions has escalated both in Seoul and in Tokyo (Sakaki and Nishino 2018; Lewis 2016; Hwang 2015).

2.1 Unresolved Historical Problems At the end of 2015, Japan and South Korea reached a “final and irreversible” agreement, in their first such deal since 1965, to settle the issue of “comfort women” forced to work in Japanese military brothels during the Second World War. On the condition that the two governments would avoid reproaching each other over the issue in the international political arena, Japan provided one billion yen ($9.3 million) to set up a fund to compensate the former “comfort women.” However, many South Koreans, including co-representatives of support groups, opposed the deal, which was made without consulting the victims, who were supported by the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, which had been established in 1990 by 37 Korean feminist organizations. Even though under this deal the Japanese government issued an apology, stating that the “Japanese government fully accepts responsibility” (Ser and Yoo 2015), the victims asserted that the apology did not go far enough in acknowledging the war crimes, and cast doubt on Japan’s seriousness

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in taking political responsibility. South Korean public opinion was incensed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reiterated denial of the Japanese military’s involvement in the coercion and enslavement of the “comfort women.” Under President Moon Jae-In, who took office in May 2017, South Korea shut down the fund and called for a new deal with Japan, “based on understanding of the emotions and reality of the people” (Griffiths 2017) as President Moon emphasized. Abe’s government was frustrated as South Korea refused to accept the agreement. This paved the way for heightened mistrust on the part of the Japanese toward the South Koreans. The unresolved issue (Jonsson 2015; Hahm and Heo 2019; Kim 2018) has managed to take the mutual distrust and animosity between Japan and South Korea to an unprecedented level. In addition, the Supreme Court of South Korea ruled on October 30, 2018 that the Japanese company Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had to compensate four former South Korean forced laborers. The Japanese government reacted uncompromisingly and demanded immediate action from the South Korean government to remedy the international breach. Since then, political leaders in Tokyo and Seoul have repeated accusations that have poisoned public perceptions on both sides. In July 2019, Abe’s administration placed export restrictions on chemicals and other materials that South Korea’s technology industry requires to produce semiconductors and smartphone screens, and removed South Korea from Japan’s list of trusted trading partners. South Korea also responded by removing Japan from its own “white list” of trade partners and announced that it would not renew GSOMIA (the General Security of Military Information Agreement). Their diplomatic conflict over historical issues expanded through trade disputes to security issues.

2.2 Only a Historical Point of Reference In the midst of these antagonisms in East Asia, two Europeans took the floor in Seoul to give East Asians a lesson from Europe. On January 22, 2019, German Ambassador Stephan Auer and his French counterpart Fabien Penone met at the German School in Seoul. Together with the pupils from the school and the Lycée Français de Séoul, they celebrated the 56th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty. They also drew the attention of the Korean journalists, invited for the occasion, to the relevance of the spirit of the treaty for improving Japanese-Korean relations. Nowhere has the model of Franco-German reconciliation been so much discussed and so well received by the public as in East Asia. Not only East Asian scholars, but also foreign observers take great interest in celebrating the Franco-German reconciliation as an instructive model for mutually antagonistic East Asian countries to follow (He 2004; Ku 2008; Lee and Hwang 2007; Gardner Feldman 2013). The tense relations between Japan and South Korea can be viewed as an intra-bloc problem based on similar political systems and social norms, and are different from those between China and Japan. The experience of Franco-German reconciliation for “overcoming

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shadows of the past” (He 2004) can therefore be regarded as being more relevant for Japanese-Korean reconciliation than for Sino-Japanese relations. South Korean Ambassador to Japan from 2011 to 2013, Shin Kak-Soo, proposed in Tokyo on October 25, 2012 that Japan and South Korea should conclude a treaty modeled on the 1963 Élysée Treaty (Gardner Feldman 2013). At the “4th KoreaJapan Future Dialogue,” organized by the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies in Seoul on September 2, 2016, Lee Sook-jong, President of the East Asia Institute and professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University, also advocated adapting the Franco-German model of reconciliation in the Japanese-Korean case. The intellectual discussions about and political interests in a similar construction of a possible Japanese-South Korean reconciliation have not yet led to an actual improvement of the relationship between South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, Franco-German reconciliation and European integration are perceived with envy as a successful peace project. South Koreans are well aware of significant differences between Europe and East Asia in terms of political constellations. At first, it should be noted that, unlike in the case of Franco-German relationship, the Cold War failed to provide any impetus for reconciliation and amicability between the two “hereditary enemies” in East Asia. In the post-Cold War period, after 1989/90, Japan and South Korea have not always shared common security interests and policies toward China and North Korea. The South Korean liberal political forces and the present Moon government are seeking to improve relations with North Korea. The Japanese government fears that South Korea may make concessions to the Communist regime in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula that run counter to Japanese security interests. South Korean government and liberal as well as leftwing politicians, on the other hand, consider Tokyo’s harsh attitude toward Pyongyang to be an obstacle to its rapprochement policy. For South Korea and Japan, the functional necessity of security cooperation has not paved the way to harmonious bilateral relations (Chun and Kim 2014: 258). Second, there is no prospect of regional integration in East Asia. Compared to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation, which served as a motor for European integration, East Asia has had, to date, neither a stable peace-making foundation for transnational reconciliation nor an approach to regional integration. The deepening rift on the Korean peninsula and the rise of Communist China as a superpower are also darkening the prospect of an “East Asian community” (Lee and Hwang 2007: 245–247; Hummel 2003). In this respect alone, Franco-German rapprochement and reconciliation are not a transferable model for the East Asian countries. The successful reconciliation between Germany and France cannot serve as a model in the case of South Korea and Japan, but can only be used as a historical point of reference.

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3 Heated “Shadow of the Past” In Europe and other parts of the globe, the tension and enmity between Japan and South Korea are difficult to understand. The two neighboring East Asian countries enjoy close cultural and historical ties; they both have a democratic system of governance with forward-looking civil societies and highly developed industries and have strong technology and export sectors. Both countries are closely allied militarily with the U.S. Quite a few South Korean celebrities, K-pop singers, and movie/soap opera actors are very popular in Japanese society. The number of South Korean tourists visiting Japan is increasing. In 2014, some 2,760,000 South Korean tourists visited Japan, while South Korean tourists to Japan numbered more than 7,140,000 in 2017. For years, South Koreans have accounted for nearly one-fourth of all inbound tourists in Japan. Japanese manga and animate have also enjoyed significant attention from South Koreans. The period from 1998 to 2002 witnessed reconciliatory efforts on the part of political leaders of both countries and improved public perceptions of one another (Ku 2016a, b: 58–61). However, despite significant commonalities and a temporary improvement in relations, South Korea and Japan have essentially failed to find a deeper level of reconciliation.

3.1 Two Different Visions of the Politics of Memory On the whole, the relationship between the two former adversaries has been greatly influenced by unresolved territorial disputes and historical problems. For years, Japan and South Korea have fought over the island of Dokto (Korean name) or Takeshima (Japanese), which is a group of small islets in the Sea of Japan (Japanese name) or East Sea (Korean). Japan emphasizes its claim in history textbooks with nationalistic content. South Korea’s government and civil society have fought hard against this. Most Koreans have neither forgotten the illegal nature of the annexation process (1905 and 1910) and their great suffering under the harsh colonial rule (1910–1945), nor have they forgiven the colonial misdeeds and war crimes of the Japanese. Since 1991, surviving Korean ex-slaves have protested every Wednesday together with the activists of women’s associations in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, demanding an apology and compensation (Lee 2014; Soh 2008). The majority of South Koreans point out that reconciliation between Japan and Korea should be preceded by a credible politics of memory on the Japanese side (Lee 2014). The Japanese, however, are not bothered about Korea’s insistence on an honest apology for their past deeds. From the Japanese point of view, this had long since taken place (Yoshida 2016). The Basic Treaty between Japan and South Korea was signed in Tokyo on June 22, 1965 to reestablish diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. On the same day, the two governments entered into an agreement on the right of claim to demand compensation and on economic cooperation. South Korea received a total of $800 million from Japan, including $300 million in grants,

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$200 million in Japanese government loans and another $300 million in private commercial loans, without the Japanese government tendering an official apology. The 1965 treaty did not state that the funds were “reparation” for Japan’s colonial rule or wartime aggression. According to the treaty, they were merely a goodwill gesture to reestablish relations. However, the treaty declared that all claims by South Korea from the Japanese colonial and wartime period had been fulfilled.

3.2 Controversy About “Comfort Women” In South Korea, the treaty was highly controversial from the outset (Park 2011; Yoon 2008; Ku 2008: 20–22). In 1965, the dictator Park Jung-Hee repressed a strident student movement protesting against the treaty, which was also summarily rejected by the population. Since the democratization of its political system in the late 1980s, South Korea has claimed that historical problems such as “comfort women” and forced laborers had not been addressed in the 1965 Basic Treaty. The issue of “comfort women” was never included as a topic on the agenda of the Japanese-South Korean negotiations in 1965. After all, the sexual enslavement of Korean women in Japanese military brothels during the Second World War was virtually unknown at that time. Japan’s claim that the issue was resolved in accordance with the agreement is, in the view of most South Koreans, nothing but an arbitrary interpretation of the treaty (Park 2011). As for compensation for enforced labor under Japanese colonial rule, the Supreme Court of South Korea argued that the 1965 treaty had acknowledged only interstate claims, not individual ones. This view is in line with a trend in international law in recent decades toward improved protection of individual rights and greater consideration of human rights. In contrast, the Japanese conservative political elite sees the “comfort women” as nothing more than voluntary prostitutes. In addition, since the late 1990s, the public sphere in Japan has been dominated by right-wing academics and journalists, who are obsessed with revisionist opinions justifying past colonial atrocities and war crimes against the colonized Koreans (Yoshida 2016: 30). Under the political pressure of the Abe administration, most of school history textbooks do not refer to the “comfort women” issue (Tanaka 2016: 166). From the point of view of the Japanese mainstream, the real cause of the Japanese-Korean disagreement lies rather in Korean nationalist resentment than in a Japanese rejection of a credible settlement of colonial misdeeds and war crimes. From the Korean perspective, Japan’s apologies seem insincere. In addition to the pronounced revisionism in Japan’s history textbooks for schools, the regular visits by top Japanese politicians to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine cause outrage in South Korea. The Shinto shrine to the war dead who served the Emperor of Japan during wars from 1867 to 1951, which is located in Chiyoda, Tokyo, commemorates not only Japanese soldiers who died in the imperialist wars, but also convicted war criminals. The diametrically opposed views and perceptions as well as conflicting

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collective memories continue to haunt the two East Asian countries at a fundamental level.

4 Coming to Terms with the Past Against this backdrop, the real reason for the South Korean interest in Franco-German reconciliation is that Germany and France had been able to face the pain of their shared past and were willing more than ever to move forward together with a common memory of the past. In the Korean perception, it was a great achievement that the Federal Republic of Germany and France had concluded a reparation agreement for the French victims of National Socialism in July 1960, i.e. before the signing of the Élysée Treaty. Furthermore, the South Koreans were attracted by the repeated confessions of guilt by West Germany and the country’s acknowledgment of crimes as well as a reparation policy, and also by the fact that, with sincere and self-reflective criticism of its own past, the Federal Republic of Germany was able to prove its sincerity, thus laying the groundwork for mutual understanding and bilateral cooperation with not only France, but Poland as well.

4.1 Reconciliation as a Complex Process The South Korean perception of Germany’s efforts to come to terms with its dark history as the most important prerequisite for successful reconciliation with France does not reflect historical reality. Until the late 1960s, West German society still found it difficult to address the Nazi past in a critical light. The behavior of most Germans after 1945 was characterized by repression, silence, and selective remembrance of their Nazi past. The Germans in the early post-war period were apt to “stylize themselves as Hitler’s victims and thus ignored their own responsibility” (Defrance and Pfeil 2016: 23). Besides, a bilateral process of reconciliation cannot be described as a one-off act, but as a complex “process of changing emotions and attitudes with political and socio-cultural components,” as Defrance and Pfeil (2016: 35–37) point out (Wienand 2015). Coming to terms with the past is an integral part of the reconciliation process, but it must not be expected to occur to a tangible extent in the very first phase of reconciliation. In the case of Franco-German reconciliation, the Germans’ clear and sincere understanding of their Nazi past was neither regarded as a prerequisite for nor did it act as the starting point of the Franco-German reconciliation. It did not overshadow the first phase of post-war Franco-German reconciliation process. The whole exercise proved to be a long learning process for society in both countries (Defrance 2013: 20). What is close to the hearts of South Koreans in relation to reconciliation with Japan, however, is simply a clear acknowledgment by Japanese politics and society

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of their colonial atrocities and war crimes. They emphasize that the Japanese-South Korean reconciliation depends on the Japanese recognition of and their remorse for the suffering of Korean victims and that this should be based on the collective memory of the history of violence by Japanese imperialism. In their criticism of Japan, not only South Korean politicians, but also the majority of educated citizens always refer to the German admission of Nazi crimes as a model (Lee 2015). However, it should be noted that France did not demand this and the Franco-German reconciliation process began earlier than the process of coming to terms with Nazi crimes.

4.2 Two Sides of Reconciliation On March 9 and 10, 2015, during her visit to Tokyo, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that “coming to terms with our own past was an essential factor in making reconciliation possible” and stressed her position that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should squarely face the past (Bundesregierung 2015). The echoes of her words reverberated through South Korea. Seoul’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Japan to follow in the footsteps of Germany by sincerely atoning for its past crimes and wrongdoings. “It is a historical lesson that Germany’s contrition and self-reflection toward its past history has become the basis of reconciliation and integration in Europe,” Noh Kwang-il, Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul, stated in a press briefing (Yonhap 2015). However, Merkel also argued that reconciliation would not have been possible if there had been no “generous gesture” by Germany’s neighbors, taking France as an example. “There was also tolerance on the part of our neighbor (France),” she added (Pollmann 2015). Her other statements that “reconciliation always needs two sides, France was willing to extend a hand of friendship to Germany after the Second World War” and that “neighboring states such as South Korea and China also need to change their approach” did not draw public attention in South Korea (Bundesregierung 2015; Yun 2015). Asked whether Merkel’s comments had any bearing for Seoul, Noh said that generosity could be offered only after a sincere apology for the past was made first (Yonhap 2015). His response reflects the mentality and perception of the majority of South Koreans. The criticism of Japan’s politics of memory is justified and should be intensified with broad-based international solidarity. Reconciliation cannot be pursued with denials of or being oblivious to past crimes. However, Korea’s criticism of Japan’s politics of memory has not acted as an impetus for starting a reasonable process of rapprochement and understanding in recent years, but merely as a catalyst for the nationalist mobilization of Japanese right-wing extremists. The majority of South Korean politics and society considers a comprehensive and sincere apology and a self-critical reflection on the past to be the normative standard of historical justice and the universal basis of bilateral reconciliation. Still, South Korean criticism of Japanese politics of memory is by no means liberated from the nationalist tone it has assumed and, to a considerable extent, it restricts the efforts of Japanese critical civil

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society organizations to achieve Japanese-Korean reconciliation. The overemphasis on coming to terms with the past as the most important prerequisite for reconciliation serves as political instrument for South Korea in the dispute with Japan over moral integrity and national self-confidence. Of course, reconciliation requires that both parties should undergo “multiple changes of mentality” (Defrance and Pfeil 2016: 22). South Koreans also need to “change their approach,” as Merkel recommended. The way in which—given the Japanese denial of their past crimes—they were able to “extend a hand of friendship” to Japan must be explored and discussed further. A study on how the Franco-German reconciliation process coped with the complexity of coming to terms with Nazi past can inject impetus into the East Asian discussion and reflection on a new approach to resolving this issue.

5 Lessons Learned from the Franco-German Experience Despite the fundamental differences in political frameworks between Europe and East Asia, South Koreans admire with great interest the institutionalization of bilateral cooperation between France and Germany and the pioneering role of the political leaderships of both countries in this regard. South Koreans are jealous not only of speeches focusing on political remembrance and gestures of reconciliation by German and French statesmen and women, but also of the cooperation at the political level, such as the Franco-German Council of Ministers, the Franco-German Cultural Council, the Franco-German Finance and Economic Council, the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, and the Franco-German Environment Council (Lee 2007).

5.1 Failure of Bilateral Cooperation on the Governmental Level Social and cultural cooperation between France and Germany predictably impresses South Koreans more than political cooperation does. For South Korean and Japanese politics can hardly be expected to move toward reconciliation at the moment (Sakaki 2019; Tanaka 2016; Ku 2016a, b: 66–71). Although the decisive impetus for cooperation between France and the old Federal Republic came from politics, it has snowballed immensely in various areas of culture, science, and society (Kaelble 2003). The fields and forms of action of Franco-German reconciliation and friendship have expanded to include society and culture such as youth encounters, city twinning projects, discussions about textbooks, and also cooperation, as well as exchange programs in sectors such as science and media.

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In comparison, a handful of South Korean-Japanese joint declarations and agreements at the governmental level have not achieved anything in terms of a stable form of reconciliation and friendship. Aside from the Treaty on Basic Relations between South Korea and Japan of 1965, the joint declaration announced by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung on October 8, 1998 had expressed the determination to build a new partnership between South Korea and Japan toward the twenty-first century. The two leaders agreed to further reinforce bilateral relations by holding bilateral summit meetings on a regular basis and enhancing ministerial talks on foreign affairs and other fields. Obviously it contributed to a cultural exchange between South Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, the situation did not develop favorably for the reconciliation between South Korea and Japan. The political leaders in both nations were not able to overcome the inveterate dispute on historical issues and there was no further fundamental bilateral cooperation at the governmental level. In both Korea and Japan, such political efforts as Kim-Obuchi declaration were not based on any domestic political consensus, nor were they founded on any interaction between the political leadership and civil society actors. After all, JapaneseSouth Korean relations lack the institutionalization of understanding and a bilateral network of cooperation on the governmental level. The organizations and institutions that ensured reliability of expectations in Franco-German relations after 1963 and continue to perform transnational coordinating functions hardly exist in relations between Japan and South Korea.

5.2 Joint Textbook Projects There are, however, different tracks of contacts and exchange in the social sphere. After all, the project for a bilateral joint history textbook was at the center of Japan and South Korea’s attempts to achieve reconciliation (Chung 2003; Toshiki 2003). Since the 1970s, there have been several dialogues on history textbooks between Japan and South Korea at the governmental level, but without success. They failed not only because the respective Japanese governments refused to accept political responsibility for colonial crimes. As for South Korean administrations, the project was also nothing more than an instrument for nationalist mobilization. Nevertheless, Japanese left-liberal historians and civil society organizations have shown great interest in European history dialogues. In the late 1990s, South Korean civil society organizations and a new generation of history professors also came up with the idea of continuing the project for a common history textbook together with Japanese left-liberal historians. In contrast to the Franco-German case, where it was possible to carry out the project of a common textbook at the governmental level after long-standing efforts by civil society to achieve reconciliation, in Japan and South Korea civil society organizations, including motivated history professors and teachers, launched a series of projects. Interested Chinese parties were subsequently actively involved in two of them.

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The most important results to emerge from these dialogues are two publications by the Trilateral Joint History Compilation Committee of Korea, Japan, and China: “A History to Open the Future” (2006), and “Modern East Asian History” (2012). The former is a textbook of East Asian modern history for students, published in 2005 in three languages, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean (China-Japan-Korea Common History Text Tri-National Committee 2015). It took 17 Chinese, 23 Korean, and 13 Japanese professors more than three years to agree on an interpretation of the most delicate events, such as the Nanking Massacre and the issue of “comfort women,” which is different yet communicable (Lee 2015; Sin 2008). However, the book does not serve as official teaching material, but as an accompanying booklet in the classroom. Despite its limitations, it has met with a great response in the three countries, even though there has been no lack of resistance in Japan. In 2012, the East Asian history professors also published another history book for adults, also in three languages. There were other joint history books between Japan and South Korea that civil society and teacher organizations published on their own initiative to encourage mutual understanding and reconciliation (Ku 2016a, b: 55). In East Asia, it is regarded as the only form of ongoing, regular cooperation at the level of civil society. In the successful execution of the joint history book project, the Korean and Japanese participants and supporters drew not only on the long history of bilateral history dialogues in Europe, but also on the project of the Joint German–French History Book in the period from 2003 to 2006. The Franco-German project strongly encouraged and supported Japanese and Korean stakeholders to work with it (Lee 2015: 153–154). A number of South Korean historians, mostly specialists in European history, wrote in detail about the history and actual development of the European history dialogues and the Joint German–French History Book project (Kim 2009).1 There were direct exchanges with European experts, for example, experts from the Georg Eckert Institute in Germany. Prof. Eckhardt Fuchs from the Institute attended the Peace Forum, which took place following the workshop for the East Asian joint textbook project in Beijing in November 2008, and reported on the European experience. German experts from the Institute offered undeniable encouragement and tangible assistance for the development of the East Asian history dialogue (Lee 2015: 153–154). Incidentally, the first part of the German–French History Book, History of Europe and the World since 1945, which was published in 2006, has been translated into Korean (Geiss et al. 2008), read extensively, and received positively on the whole. From a post-colonial perspective, however, it faced strong criticism on the issues of colonialism and imperialism. South Korean teachers who have read and discussed the German–French History Book feel uncomfortable with its Eurocentric view, insufficient dealing with European colonial crimes, and a lack of understanding for the independent movements of colonized peoples. Sin-Choel Lee, a leading Korean historian and activist for the East Asian history dialogues, underlined that “the European historical dialogue made no substantial progress in terms of the issue of settling colonialism, to include the joint textbook of Germany and France” (Lee 2015: 162). 1 On

reports and articles written in Korean (Kim 2002, 2003; An 2006; Lee 2007).

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Meanwhile, in the context of the joint textbook project, historians, history teachers, and civil society activists have been meeting annually for the last 20 years. They have made joint statements and recommendations on peacebuilding and historical policies throughout East Asia on multiple occasions. At the same time, there is a regular meeting of students from South Korea and Japan. Aside from a number of joint courses for high school children, the East Asian Youth Camp for History Experience has taken place annually with more than 100 participants from Japan, China, and South Korea since 2001. The institutionalization of Franco-German cooperation, such as the Franco-German Youth Office, can directly encourage East Asians to take a further step toward closer and more stable cooperation and networks.

6 Conclusion The term reconciliation has long been a preserve of religion and philosophy. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, reconciliation transformed into “political, social, and cultural processes that seek to create peaceful coexistence in the present and the future after a conflictual past” (Wienand 2015: 474). Its new meaning developed through practice and discourse within the framework of the emergence and development of a global norm: “historical justice.” Franco-German reconciliation has shown that the crimes of the past are not forgotten by reconciliation, but that a common policy of remembrance allows them to occupy appropriate realms. However, it cannot be concluded from this that a comprehensive and sincere effort to come to terms with the past should be a prerequisite for reconciliation. It is appropriate and realistic that, in view of the timid and unfavorable phase of understanding existing between South Korea and Japan, the clarification of and coming to terms with the problems of history should not be prioritized, but be carried out step by step in the long and arduous journey to rapprochement. As long as leading Japanese politicians are not prepared to accept responsibility for the past, a new approach must be adopted in South Korea: First, the intensification of possible contacts with Japanese society and then a joint search for a long-term political solution to the historical conflicts. As Demesmay and Kunz (2018: 133) have suggested to Koreans, bilateral reconciliation and cooperation need firstly “to be broadly anchored in society: among youths, through exchange programs and education, or at the local level through partnerships between cities and villages.” The contacts and networks for the cooperation between South Koreans and Japanese should not be disturbed or interrupted by the politics of memory on both sides, but be intensified and extended. South Korea should also self-critically address its own history of violence going beyond nationalistic criticism of Japan. The human rights violations and state crimes in Korean contemporary history after 1945 and the massacre of Vietnamese civilians by South Korean soldiers in the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1975 can be cited as examples (Sakaki 2019: 8). Precisely this self-critical attitude of South Korea to its own history of violence can inspire Japan to reconsider its past crimes. Koreans can thus build trust with the Japanese and “extend a hand of friendship” to learn from their

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respective past. This self-critical confrontation with their history of violence, in which much can be learned from Germany, could be a new starting point for transnational reconciliation in East Asia. Moreover, if Germany and European countries could come to terms with their colonial atrocities and crimes at long last, there is no reason why Japanese society and politics would not be strongly encouraged by these acts to adopt a self-critical approach while dealing with history. Finally, the present status of the peace dialogues with North Korea must not be forgotten and the issue of reconciliation should loom large in the Korean perspective. In view of the newly emerging détente between South Korea and North Korea, the Franco-German reconciliation can offer South Koreans food for thought for a similar exercise with the Communist North. For years, the French and German places that bore the scars of the First World War have become the most notable places of remembrance in common history. Much can be learned in Korea from the Franco-German experience of how the former enemies became friends in the end. Contrary to what most South Koreans hope for, the two-state phase on the Korean peninsula will continue for a long time yet despite the inner-Korean rapprochement and détente. Kim Jong-un, the North Korean ruler, does not consider the prospect of reunification, preferring instead to remain independent through intensive cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea. The North Korean leadership aims to transform the miserable and isolated country into a small China or a second Vietnam. It is therefore important to enshrine and institutionalize reconciliation and relations between South and North Korea. Not only the West and East German rapprochement in the 1970s and 1980s, but also the various fields and forms of action in Franco-German reconciliation can have a stimulating effect on reconciliation and understanding between the two Koreas.

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Yun, H.-I. (2015, March 10). Merkel in Japan “settling the past is the precondition for reconciliation”. The Kyunghyang Shinmun. https://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201503101757 337&cxxode=710100. Accessed September 2019.

Dong-Ki Lee is a Professor at the Department of Peace Studies, at Kangwon National University, South Korea. His research focus lies in German history, contemporary history, the Cold War, peace studies, and public history. Prof. Lee actively engages in projects that deal with political violence and memorial museums, the Cold War, and peace processes. His monograph in German is entitled: Option oder Illusion? Die Idee einer nationalen Konföderation im geteilten Deutschland 1949–1990 (Option or Illusion? The Concept of a National Confederation in the Divided Germany 1949–1990). Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2010. He has written two books in Korean: hyeondaesa mongtaju (Montage of Contemporary History). Seoul: Dolbegye 2018; 20 segi pyeonghwa (Text of Peace in the 20th Century). Seoul; 2013.

Franco-German Reconciliation Through the Prism of East Asia: A Japanese Perspective Akiyoshi Nishiyama

Abstract Franco-German reconciliation is often seen as a model in Japan. As a historical process, however, it is not necessarily transferable to East Asia, where there is a need to come to terms with war and colonial history and to reconcile perpetrators and victims. Over the last three decades, the East Asian countries have become closer both economically and culturally, but this has not led to political cooperation based on mutual trust; if anything, the rise of globalization has seen an increase in history-related conflicts. Despite this, though, Japan has led a number of initiatives for conducting dialogues about its painful past with its neighbors. The Franco-German example (e.g., the principle of multiperspectivity) can be instructive in this context. Franco-German experiences with youth exchanges or town twinning as “parapublic underpinnings” of reconciliation can also provide a model for East Asia, where, despite China’s predominance, there is a certain shift toward greater symmetry.

1 Introduction On January 28, 2013, Mainichi Shimbun, one of Japan’s biggest daily newspapers, published an editorial on the 50th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty that stated the following: Both states, previously in bloody conflicts with one another for about a hundred years, are now motors of European integration. The 50th anniversary of Franco-German reconciliation reminds us how important it is for neighboring countries to put an end to their disputes and speak out for understanding and cooperation. (Miachi Shimbun 2013)

In the context of binational cultural policy abroad (including in Japan and other East Asian countries), the French and German governments have themselves contributed to the positive image of their reconciliation. An early example in Japan was the A. Nishiyama (B) Kyoritsu Women’s University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_13

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2005 World Expo in Nagoya, where representatives of France and Germany created a “common space” between the French and German pavilions with a photo exhibition dedicated to Franco-German reconciliation. During celebrations to mark the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty (2013) and the end of the First World War (2018), the French and German ambassadors in Tokyo came together to advocate democracy and international understanding in Japanese newspapers. Moreover, in early June 2013, then French President François Hollande made a speech to the Japanese Parliament, expressing his hopes for an understanding between China and Japan with reference to the Franco-German reconciliation, which showed, he said, that “everything is possible.” (Inada 2013). Between 2012 and 2014, Japan’s relations with China and South Korea were very tense because of territorial disputes with South Korea over the island of Dokdo/Takeshima, and with China over the island of Diaoyu. In late 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Shinto Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates not only Japan’s fallen soldiers, but also leading politicians and military figures who were sentenced to death as class A war criminals by the Tokyo Military Tribunal and executed in 1948. This provoked an immediate clash between diplomatic representatives abroad. In an article in Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Chinese Ambassador saw Abe’s visit—unlike Willy Brandt’s gesture of humility in Warsaw in 1970—as a sign of the nationalist-revisionist direction in which Japanese politics was headed. This opinion was countered by the Japanese Ambassador in a letter to the editor stating that the more aggressive foreign policies were in fact being pursued by China, which showed a lack of open-mindedness when it came to the question of reconciliation (Nishiyama 2014: 323–324). 2014 was described by a U.S.-Korean-Japanese trio of intellectuals as “the worst” year for relations between South Korea and Japan (Ogata et al. 2014), but in 2019, the year of the Treaty of Aachen, the situation was arguably worse still. Mutual mistrust reached such heights that economic relations, security cooperation, and public perception were badly damaged. The trigger—as the Japanese saw it—was a Supreme Court verdict. In 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea sentenced a Japanese business to pay compensation for employing Korean forced laborers during the war—a matter that the Japanese government considered settled by the terms of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations. This episode in Korean-Japanese relations is a good example of the political explosiveness of a “past that will not pass” (Ernst Nolte).

2 Franco-German Reconciliation—A Model for East Asia? 2.1 Reconciliation and Coming to Terms with the Past In politics and public life in Japan—and in East Asia in general—Franco-German reconciliation has often been perceived above all as the result or success of Germany’s

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post-war efforts to come to terms with the past. Indeed, the initial focus in East Asia was more on Germany’s efforts to come to terms with the past than on the process of reconciliation. This interest in Germany was especially strong since the 1980s. Following the historical-political conflicts in East Asia over Japanese history school books and the Yasukuni Shrine, President Weizsäcker’s speech on May 8, 1985 had some resonance with the Japanese public and helped shape an image of Germany as a nation that took a critical approach to its dark past (the fact that Weizsäcker was a conservative politician only served to emphasize Japan’s political and moral backwardness.) This image of Germany was reinforced by (re-)unification in 1990 and the process of European integration in the years that followed. Liberals and leftists at home and the Chinese and South Korean governments abroad often cite Germany’s political development in these years to point up the contrast with Japan, where there is a comparative lack of effort to come to terms with the past. However, while it is true that Japan falls short when it comes to facing up to its past, especially in terms of commemorative culture, this is not to say that Germany was always more advanced. As German historian Sebastian Conrad has pointed out, Japanese historians, who were leftists in majority, were originally much more critical of their national past than their West German counterparts (Conrad 1999: 404). Germany’s process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung or coming to terms with the past—a West German not an East German phenomenon—was not developed until the 1970s (Rürup 2014), and even later in Austria. Retrospectively, the reception of Franco-German reconciliation in East Asia is such that Japan’s liberal public widely assumes that reconciliation follows a process of coming to terms with the past, rather than vice versa1 —that reconciliation can only take place when the “perpetrator state” has sufficiently processed its criminal past— or at least when its efforts to do so have been recognized by the “victim states.” This scenario, however, does not entirely correspond with the history of FrancoGerman reconciliation, which was already well advanced by the time Germany began to confront its past like that between U.S. and Japan (Lind 2008: 156). Although Konrad Adenauer’s Federal Republic did not question Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 or the genocide of the Jews, it was a rather passive admission; the main focus in West German society at that time was on the suffering of the Germans. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when coming to terms with the past played an increasingly important role in West German politics and society, the paradigm of reconciliation without active confrontation continued to prevail (Moll 2013: 447). In this context, it is interesting to note that, while talking as a guest speaker in Tokyo on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Richard von Weizsäcker quoted the speech François Mitterrand had given in Berlin earlier that year, in which 1A

fierce reaction on the part of Japanese conservatives to the liberals’ high estimation of Weizsäcker’s speech, among other things, that Germany’s coming to terms with the past was essentially a tactical politics of history or a one-sided shifting of the war guilt onto the ‘Nazis’, would indicate that this ‘liberal’ perception of Germany’s coming to terms with the past was connected with Japan’s lack of coming to terms with the Japanese past, which prevented reconciliation with its Asian neighbors.

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he praised the German Wehrmacht soldiers: “They were brave. They accepted the loss of their lives. For a bad cause, but their gesture to them had nothing to do with it. They loved their fatherland.”

2.2 Coming to Terms with Colonial History Soon after Jacques Chirac succeeded Mitterrand as President in 1995, he owned up to France’s part in the Shoah; that same year, the image of “brave and patriotic soldiers, willing to sacrifice themselves,” which, incidentally, could also be found in the U.S.-Japanese reconciliation over the Battle of Iwo Jima,2 was challenged by the Wehrmacht exhibition, which showed its greater role than is generally assumed in the genocide of Jews and massacres of Slavic populations on the Eastern Front. Neither the narrative of “patriotic soldiers” nor the victim-centered, shared historical responsibility in the Franco-German reconciliation can be transferred one-to-one to East Asia. However conflict-ridden France and Germany’s past is, they are two nation states of comparable size and importance constituting Europe. The history of Korean-Japanese relations, on the other hand, is shaped by 35 or 40 years of colonialism. The historical disputes between South Korea and Japan over issues such as forced laborers and “comfort women” tend to concern the final stage of colonial rule, when total war mobilized an ever-greater proportion of the colonial population. At the same time, however, they are also inextricably tied up with the beginnings of colonial rule. From an international law perspective, Japan’s 1910 annexation of the Korean Empire is still a point of dispute between Japanese and Korean historians.3 All in all, the question of responsibility toward former colonies is more complicated than between nation states (Frevert 2017: 203). The narrative of reconciliation between patriotic soldiers is not applicable; it is difficult to bridge the gap between a history of discrimination and exploitation on the one hand and modernization and civilization on the other. A more comparable case within European continent could be found in German-Polish relations, to which more attention has been paid in Japan than to Franco-German ones in terms of reconciliation process (Barbasiewicz 2019). Moreover, if we enlarge our scope beyond Europe, we could find the gap mentioned above in Franco-Algerian relations. The law that encouraged an emphasis on the “positive role” of French colonial rule in schools (a law passed in 2005, but partially repealed in 2006, after the decision to produce a joint Franco-German history

2 The

image of marines hoisting the national flag on the peak of Iwo Jima became a powerful icon of the U.S. culture of commemoration (Dülffer 2006). However, a U.S.-Japanese memorial service was held on the island and a monument erected to the memory of the fallen of both countries in 1985. 3 The above-mentioned Supreme Court verdict on forced laborers from South Korea was based on the fact that this forced labor had come about partly through the illegitimate annexation of the Korean Empire, an issue on which the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations was ambiguous, leaving room for opposing interpretations.

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book in 2003), caused a furor, and confirmed once again the asymmetry between the countries’ attitudes to the past and their memories of it (Rosoux 2017: 196). The same asymmetry applies to East Asia, although Korean-Japanese relations are not identical to the Franco-Algerian conflict, partly because there was never a war of independence between the two countries. Like Germany in 1918, Japan automatically forfeited all its colonies when it was defeated in 1945, and this made it all the easier for Japan’s colonial past to be overlooked in the country’s historical consciousness. At the same time, Japan began to experience rapid economic growth since the mid-1950s, while the peninsula of Korea was divided into North and South after the Korean War.4 In West Germany, the “economic miracle” went hand in hand with Western European integration; Japan, on the other hand, had been economically strong in East Asia for so long that the country’s colonial attitude to its neighbors persisted, with little awareness of the problematic nature of that attitude. In the 1990s, however, after the Japanese economy had entered a long phase of stagnation, this stance became increasingly anachronistic. When the neighboring countries—in particular China, South Korea, and Taiwan—began to catch up economically, this led, on the one hand, to social and cultural rapprochement and an intensified exchange. On the other hand, though, previously suppressed memories of the war and colonial rule were stirred up, criticism of Japan became more forceful and direct, and the Japanese reacted with resentment and frustration (Figs. 1 and 2).5

4 In

the case of Taiwan, another former Japanese colony, relations are less tense, but it is important to take into account not only Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and tensions with the People’s Republic of China, but also the fact that Taiwanese memories of Japanese colonial rule were partly overlaid by the dictatorship of Kuomintang. 5 See Appendix. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, it is clear that Japanese sympathies were greater before the 1990s than afterward—that those Japanese who declared themselves ‘sympathetic’ outnumbered those who declared themselves ‘unsympathetic’, whereas the trends are reversed in the 2000s. By comparison, South Korea is less clear-cut and more fluctuating. In the 2000s, Japanese “sympathetic” towards South Korea outnumbered those who were “unsympathetic,” although a clear reversal in trends can be seen starting in 2012 and 2019 marks a low point, with sympathy at 26.7% (and a massive 71.5% of Japanese “unsympathetic” toward South Korea). The high level of “sympathy” in the 2000s owed much to the wide-scale import of Korean pop culture, leading to a discrepancy in mutual perception. While the Japanese associate South Korea with actors, musicians, and sportspeople, Koreans associate Japan with politicians and historical figures (cf. Nishiyama 2014: 326–7).

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Although Franco-German reconciliation cannot be transferred one-to-one to East Asia, this does not mean that East Asia can learn nothing from the example of France and Germany. Despite frequent conflicts and the growing superiority of China in the region, it would be possible to establish an East Asian reconciliation on the basis of horizontal trust (Blum 2003: 384–5). Civic initiatives can also play an important role in reconciliation, alongside politics (Defrance et al. 2010), though their scope of action is more limited in East Asia, particularly with regard to China, not to mention North Korea.

3 Historical Dialogue and Transnational Commemorative Cultures 3.1 Historical Dialogue and History Textbooks in East Asia When the Franco-German history book was published in 2006, it was well received in the liberal media, but the conservative and nationalist media remained silent (Nishiyama 2009). Its two final volumes were translated into Japanese. Not long before, there had been a stir in Japan and East Asia when a Japanese revisionist history textbook for middle-school students was introduced in schools in 2005, having been approved by the Ministry of Education in 2004. Although the proportion of books used was negligible (0.04%),6 this was a sign that the nationalist movement in civil society, no longer content to support conservative state policy, was attempting to go on the offensive, using textbooks as weapons. In 2006, the revised Basic School Law in Japan was amended to demand that schools instill patriotism in children. This would seem to be further confirmation of the problem described above: In Europe, history unites; in East Asia, it divides. There are, nevertheless, a number of bi- and trinational history readers and source books in East Asia, all published at around the same time as the Franco-German textbook (Babicz 2007; Nishiyama 2014). Published in reaction against the aforementioned nationalist textbook, these are the result of various dialogues conducted since the 1980s by East Asian historians and history education specialists in response to conflicts over textbooks and inspired by the German-Polish textbook debates of the 1970s. They include books about relationship and gender history, the trinational “History that Opens the Future” (Chinese-Japanese-Korean Joint History Textbook Commission 2005), and its two-volume sequel “New History of Modern and Contemporary East Asia” (Chinese-Japanese-Korean Joint History Textbook Commission 2012). The trinational team of historians held in-depth dialogues to find a common narrative for the history of East Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, without eliminating the different points of view (Saito 2008). “History that Opens the Future” 6 The proportion of revisionist and nationalist history books has, however, increased since the books

were approved. Since 2015, Ikuho-sha’s history book, a slightly moderated version of the nationalist narrative, has accounted for 6.3% of all history textbooks used in Japanese junior high schools.

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offers a problem-oriented account of the history of Japanese expansion in East Asia, and Japan’s reluctance to confront that history. The second book provides a more general history of East Asia and is supplemented by a topic-based volume that covers areas such as transport, family, education, media, and commemorative cultures.7 A comparison of the two books points to a development or even a shift in perspective that was clearly influenced by the Franco-German history book (Nishiyama 2014: 330–332). Alongside liberal academic and social networks, two official binational commissions for historical research were set up at the beginning of the twenty-first century: a Korean-Japanese commission (2002–2005 and 2007–2012) and a Chinese-Japanese counterpart (2006–2010). A sub-commission for history textbooks was also set up during the second phase of the Korean-Japanese commission, although it did not lead to results that could be compared to the “recommendations” published in the wake of the Franco-German textbook debates of 1935 and 1950 or the German-Polish commission of 1976. While there were Chinese and Koreans on the commissions who were also involved in the social projects mentioned above, there was no such overlap among the Japanese. Members appointed to the second phase of the Korean-Japanese commission were selected by governments of opposing political hues, with the result that there is more mutual recrimination than common ground in the concluding evaluative chapter on the textbooks (Japanese-Korean Joint History Studies Commission 2010). The Chinese-Japanese commission also ran into difficulties. Although it was agreed that Japanese warfare should be classified as military aggression and the Nanjing Massacre (irrespective of the number of victims) as a fact, the part that was to cover history from 1945 remained unpublished at the request of the Chinese— despite the fact that both the Tokyo Military Tribunal and the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989—events whose interpretation is crucial to the national identity of the two countries today—were the subject of fierce discussion (Kawashima et al. 2013: 53).

3.2 What the Franco-German History Book Can Teach Us Under the present circumstances, it does not seem possible to develop a collaborative history textbook for use in schools in East Asia, on either a bi- or a trinational level. Firstly, the curricula of the countries are too different, and secondly there is hardly any political will. A more fruitful strategy would be to consider how the transnational perspectives achieved through the dialogues might be further developed and integrated into the textbooks of the individual countries. We could learn lessons 7 Tellingly, the chapter “War and Nation: Experiences and Memories”, written by a Korean historian,

was not accepted by the Chinese and Japanese historians. Because of the publication deadline, there was not enough time to continue discussions, and the comments of the two dissenting historians were published separately (Chinese-Japanese-Korean Joint History Textbook Commission 2012: 216–224). The result is an unintended exchange of perspectives on the different commemorative cultures of the three countries.

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here from the Franco-German history book: Despite its innovative approach, the textbook has, unfortunately, been put to less everyday use in schools than expected, but it is worth considering its impact on other French and German history textbooks. The aspects of the history book that are innovative by East Asian standards include multiperspectivity and respect for controversy—both key principles of political education in Germany advocated in the Beutelsbach Consensus (1976), along with the indoctrination ban and an emphasis on student interests.8 According to German specialist on history education Klaus Bergmann, the goal of multiperspectivity in history education means “respecting others’ perspectives on what they perceive, feel, and value; reflecting on one’s own perspective; and being able to see oneself through the eyes of others” (Bergmann 2000: 12). However indispensable a more critical account of the modern and contemporary history of Japan, there would be little point in replacing one mono-perspective with another. Multiperspectivity may not be identical to reconciliation, but it is an important basis for it. The Franco-German history book encourages students from both countries to embrace multiple perspectives with “Questions and Suggestions” such as “Do you think the defeated nations should be allowed to take part in the celebrations to commemorate the Allied victory?” (Le Quintrec and Geiss 2006: 33). Another important factor to be considered is the different pedagogical cultures of the countries in question. The Franco-German example teaches us that, apart from the contents of history, it should be a mutual learning process in this regard, too (Geiss 2018: 155–8). History and history-teaching in East Asia should continue to explore through dialogue the possibilities of putting multiperspectivity into practice in the respective regions. At the same time, it is necessary to discuss the fundamental issue of how to define the ambiguous term “East Asia”—i.e. whether it is merely a group of states with common economic interests, or rather a “community of destiny” bound by history, culture, and/or environment (Wada et al. 2014: 181–237).9

8 These are further developed in the German-Polish history book, of which three of the four volumes

planned have already been published (Ruchniewicz 2009; Strobel and Wojtaszyn 2017). Interestingly, the third volume of the textbook contains part of the 2017 petition of the Herero people (demanding compensation for the German Empire’s brutal political repression of their ancestors), and accompanies the extract with the question: “whether the former colonial powers should provide reparation and, if so, what form it might take?” (Gemeinsame Deutsch-Polnische Schulbuchkommission 2019: 205). Such a question would be unthinkable in a Japanese textbook, from both a didactic and a political point of view. 9 In South Korea, “East Asian History” was introduced as an optional high-school subject in 2012. An interesting account of this can be found in Ku (2017). While there is still no equivalent subject in this direction in Japan, a new mandatory subject, “General History”, will be introduced in 2022, which integrates world and Japanese history, separated until now in the high-school curriculum, by focusing on modern and contemporary history and ascribing importance to Asian history. However, the separation of world and Japanese history will not be completely abolished, as advanced subjects for both will be offered as options in the context of “General History.”.

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3.3 Reconciliation and Memory as Political Symbolism One of the problems facing Japan’s current official history policy is the fact that the present government is following a “clean-break policy,” thus conveying the impression that the discussion is focused exclusively on reparation money. It is rare to find efforts on the part of Japan to keep alive memories of colonial and wartime history and its victims outside of the country. A political gesture could be a signal or a prelude to changing this impression, if followed by efforts to establish a corresponding memorial culture—anything else would quickly degenerate into kitsch. As a first step, the Japanese Prime Minister should visit a Korean or Chinese memorial site recalling the colonial era or the war and express his sympathy, basing his speech on the 1995 statement by Prime Minister Murayama and the 1993 statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono (with particular reference to the so-called “comfort women”). This is all the more important because Prime Minister Abe declared its intention to stick to these statements in his communique of 2015, although he and his conservative government had planned to revise them. At the same time, however, it would be desirable for the Korean or Chinese head of state to reciprocate with a similar visit to Japan, to Hiroshima or Nagasaki, for example10 —there are, after all, memorials to the Korean and Chinese forced laborers who were among the victims of the atom bomb. This would not mean blurring the different memories of suffering by ignoring the historical context, but universalizing the message of reconciliation by extending it to include other, “forgotten victims.” This would hopefully also represent a way out of the nationalist accusation of “tu quoque.” Reciprocal gestures of reconciliation, such as those between France and Germany, would be the best way of achieving this. These graphs reflect the survey statistics of the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government HP: https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r01/r01-gaiko/2-1.html (December 22, 2019).

4 The Vitality of Civil Society and the Creation of a “Parapublic” Sphere 4.1 Youth Exchanges Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild suggest talking about the “parapublic underpinnings of a bilateral relationship” when describing Franco-German relations:

10 In

May 2016, Barack Obama visited Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Park with Abe and made a speech, which generally found a positive resonance in Japan, but made no mention of regret or apology. In return, Abe visited the Pearl Harbor Visitor Center with Obama in December 2016; he, too, commemorated the fallen soldiers in only very general terms.

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For over half a century, beneath the relations between the French and German states and separate from French and German societal interaction and economic interpenetration, there has existed a Franco-German institutional reality that is neither public nor strictly private, but ‘parapublic’. (Krotz and Schild 2012: 98)

One example of a “parapublic” sphere is youth exchanges. It should be recalled that the Franco-German history textbook was originally an idea of the binational Youth Parliament commission organized by the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO). The project was suggested to heads of government, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, “to break down prejudices caused by ignorance.” It was a suggestion that was all the more impressive since it came from young people—stakeholders in the textbook, and the hope for their countries’ future. Indeed, in the context of FGYO events, young people often play an active part in the symbolic celebrations of reconciliation, such as in Hartmannswillerkopf (2014) and Verdun (2016), both in the context of the centenary of the First World War. Since its establishment in 1963, the FGYO, “loveliest child of the Élysée Treaty,” has enabled about nine million young people to get to know their neighboring country thanks to a huge range of exchange programs, including language-learning, vocational training, and debates about social issues. The figure alone is remarkable in comparison with the number of Korean and Japanese pupils, students, and accompanying teachers sent to the partner country by the Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation (JKCF) and its South Korean equivalent between 1989 and 2013: In those 25 years, “only” 20,000 young Koreans visited Japan and “only” 30,000 young Japanese travelled to South Korea with an exchange program of these organizations (JKCF 2014: 33). The large-scale project Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youth (JENESYS), which originally ran from 2007 until 2012 and was then continued, invited approximately 6000 people a year from other Asian countries. The absolute figures cannot, of course, be compared, because geographical distances and the resulting costs are considerably larger in East Asia. But if we take into account the relative population sizes of the countries in question, it is clear that exchanges in East Asia should be stepped up. There are also qualitative differences. The exchanges between France and Germany after 1945 were based on a broad concept of culture which “should not be limited any more to the cultural elite and to the works of the “high culture” of the two countries, but include larger sectors of the population and cultural events in a wider sense of the word” (Bock et al. 2008: 27). These exchanges would have been unimaginable without the participation and support of civic groups such as the local and regional Franco-German societies, sports clubs, etc. The high level of commitment to these civic initiatives is reflected in the structure of the FGYO, which works together with more than 6000 partners. In Japan, youth exchanges are strongly subordinate to state economic and foreign policy. While the original JENESYS program spoke of “youth exchanges as a means to create a firm basis for large-scale solidarity in Asia,” the goals of JENESYS 2.0 (2013–2015) were “the revitalization of the Japanese economy by promoting potential interests toward Japan, increasing visitors to Japan, and at the same time,

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promoting global understanding on Japan’s strengths and attractions as well as Japanese values, including Cool Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017). The significance of “soft power” diplomacy cannot be dismissed, but the principle of subsidiarity and a certain distance from politics would allow the youth exchanges to contribute more—and more dynamically—to mutual understanding. Institutionalized autonomy would also aid historical dialogue in Japan, but this could go more so for youth exchanges. A good illustration of this is the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) in the Western Balkans, which was set up on the basis of the Franco-German model in 2016.11 Here, youth exchange was given precedence over a collaborative history textbook (promoted by Franco-German cultural diplomacy) because the transitional justice activists in the region considered an acknowledgment of crimes to be more important than a manifestation of reconciliation (Moll 2016: 692).

4.2 City Twinnings Another example of “parapublic underpinnings” is the city twinnings model pioneered by France and Germany after the Second World War. Since the first partnership between both countries was set up between Montbéliard and Ludwigsburg in 1950, the number of Franco-German city twinnings has reached about 2200. A recent survey study reported the following: “Franco-German city twinnings have played a central role in bringing together and reconciling the two countries since the end of the Second World War. They are an important pillar of Franco-German relations” although reconciliation is no longer a priority (Bertelsmann Stiftung and Deutsch-Französisches Institut 2018: 57). With city twinnings, as with youth exchanges, there is a big quantitative difference between Europe and East Asia: In 2019, 883 Japanese departments and municipalities are twinned with a total of 1757 foreign locations, though it should be taken into consideration that the average size of a Japanese local administration is bigger than that of Germany and France. The majority of these are in the U.S. China takes second place with 368 partnerships, and South Korea comes third with 162 (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations 2019a, b); these partnerships were all set up after diplomatic relations had been established—in 1973 in the case of China, and in 1968 with South Korea—, though the network had been already developped before that.12 As with the Franco-German twinnings, the diverse partnership programs range from exchanges between public officials—(as yet) unimaginable on a state level practiced in the Franco-German case—to citizens’ excursions, school partnerships, participation in festive events, and collaborative projects on topics such 11 See

Nicolas Moll’s contribution in this book.

12 The first city partnership with Russia was established earlier (Nahtoka-Maizuru 1961). There was

also a partnership with North Korea between the cities of Wonsan and Sakaiminato, but this lasted only from 1992 until 2006. For the history of Japanese city partnerships (Menju 2018).

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as the protection of the environment and coping with natural disasters. The individual encounters that result from such programs almost certainly go a long way toward relativizing the idea that the nation state is a fixed point of identity,13 and this in turn should prove beneficial to historical dialogue. For that reason, such encounters should be both more common and more intense—and here again, we can learn from current challenges facing Franco-German city partnerships. In East Asia, however, the political explosiveness of the past is such that developments like these are under constant threat. With every historical dispute, it is reported (as happened only recently) that some city partnership or other has been called off. In fact, though, it is in tricky times like these that such connections must be maintained: Individual exchange programs may occasionally be suspended, but only very few partnerships are completely disbanded. The tendency until now has been to avoid confronting the pains of the past in the context of an exchange. However, as examples such as Tulle-Schorndorf and Coventry-Dresden have shown, the local level might be a good place to start coming to terms with one’s memories of the past—while at the same time providing inspiration for the state, and giving expression to a common desire to live together in peace (Defrance and Herrmann 2016: 601–603).

4.3 The Trans-Nationalization of the Media In the world of media, too, France and Germany have realized a unique project in the form of the television channel arte. I will not discuss the transferability of this binational culture channel; it would at present require too much political effort to launch something similar in East Asia. Besides, Korean drama and music channels, particularly popular among Japanese girls and women, are so present on Japanese television that it would hardly make sense to launch a new television channel. However, a major part of arte’s contribution is to foster mutual understanding, not only through bilingualism, but also through programs that actively encourage an exchange of ideas (Mairesse 2012: 172). One example of this is the program “Karambolage” (Collision), whose brief episodes vividly convey the similarities, differences, and connections between the two countries in a way that is particularly appealing to young people. The exchange of perspectives encourages viewers to acknowledge or reflect on how similar and different the neighboring countries are. Another arte creation that inspires an awareness of the interconnectedness of Franco-German history is the documentary series “Geliebte Feinde”/“Chers Ennemis” (Beloved Enemies). It is true that there is no shortage on the Japanese public television station NHK of documentary series such as “2000 Years of Japan and the Korean Peninsula” (2009–2010) and its sequel, but it would be good to see some co-produced documentaries that show signs of an exchange of perspectives—perhaps realized with the help of arte. At present, though,

13 On

the topic of youth exchanges from a biographical perspective (Egloff et al. 2013).

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the media are under increasing political pressure in Japan14 —a trend that is also to be observed in other countries.

5 Conclusion: Germany and France in the Global “Reconciliation Cloud” Franco-German reconciliation was driven by the combined efforts of politics and civil society. Despite the tensions and differences between the two countries that may occasionally appear, this cooperation provided the foundations for binational collaboration, creating stability and trust on the one hand, and dynamic understanding on the other. In East Asia, however, and especially in Japan, politics and civil society— or, to be more precise, the reconciliatory parts of civil society, because there are also nationalist groups—are often in opposition to one another. This means that those reconciliatory parts of civil society are often quicker to criticize what has not been done than what has been done. We could confront the problems of the nation state and nationalism by asking ironically: “Do the Europeans really have to teach us how to combat something we actually learnt from them?” But such anti-Eurocentric cynicism appears to me to be wrong for two reasons: Firstly, even in Europe, nationalism is by no means a closed chapter, but remains a challenge to this day. And secondly, as Corine Defrance has pointed out, learning does not mean copying: [W]hen complex problems arise in the process of rapprochement and reconciliation, there are no panaceas that can be directly transferred from one situation to another.[…] Instead there are long processes of transfer and appropriation. As long as we are aware of their limitations, such measures [such as binational youth exchange programs or a collaborative history textbook – A.N.] can act as “tools” in a “toolbox” and provide inspiration and new ideas for innovative forms of cooperation in Europe. (Defrance 2019: 86)

This is, without a doubt, also true of East Asia. We can learn from France and Germany, but Franco-German reconciliation should serve less as a foil than as an important part of the “reconciliation cloud.” It is to be hoped that Japan and East Asia can lead their own process of reconciliation, involving a mutual coming to terms with the colonial era and the war. Then they, too, will be able to contribute to that cloud.

14 In

2016, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications of the Abe government said that broadcasters that repeatedly failed to show ‘fairness’ in their political coverage, despite official warnings, could be taken off the air. In 2017, the UN’s special rapporteur on freedom of expression published his critical assessment of eroding media freedoms and stifling public debate in Japan, including historical issues, through the growing pressure of the government and the self-censure resulting from it, while the government strongly denied this (Human Rights Council 2017).

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Menju, T. (2018). Shimai toshi no ch¯osen. Kokusai k¯ory¯u wa gaik¯o wo koeruka (Challenges of the city partnership: Can international exchange have an effect beyond diplomacy?). Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017). JENESYS 2.0 overview. https://www.mofa.go.jp/reg ion/page24e_000001.html. Accessed March 03, 2020. Moll, N. (2013). Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. In N. Colin, C. Defrance, U. Pfeil, & J. Umlauf (Eds.), Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945 (Lexicon of Franco-German cultural relations after 1945) (pp. 447–449). Tübingen: Narr. Moll, N. (2016). Lässt sich Versöhnung exportieren? Deutsch-Französische Aktivitäten in den Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens (Can reconciliation be exported? German-French activities in the successor States of Yugoslavia). In C. Defrance & U. Pfeil (Eds.), Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem “Zivilisationsbruch”? (pp. 681–699). Brussels: Peter Lang. Nishiyama, A. (2009). Ein Ziel in weiter Ferne? Das gemeinsame deutsch-französische Geschichtsbuch aus japanischer Sicht (A target in the far distance? The joint Franco-German history book from a Japanese perspective). Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande (Review of Germany and German-Speaking Countries), 41(1), 105–123. Nishiyama, A. (2014). Im fernen Osten nichts Neues? Transnationale historiografische Perspektiven im nationalistischen Ostasien (Nothing new in the Far East? Transnational historiographical perspectives in nationalistic East Asia). Historie. Jahrbuch des Zentrums für historische Forschung Berlin der polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Historie. Yearbook of the Center for Historical Research Berlin of the Polish Academy of Sciences), 7, 323–338. Ogata, S., Han, S.-J., Vogel, E. F. (2014, November 04). Japan and South Korea can work together to wash away the pains of the past. Washington Post. Rosoux, V. (2017). Comment faire la paix (How to make peace). In E. François & T. Serrier (Eds.), Europa, Notre histoire: L’héritage européen depuis Homère (Europa, our history: The European heritage since homer) (pp. 185–199). Paris: Les Arènes. Ruchniewicz, K. (2009). Verständigung über die Grenzen hinaus: Das deutsch-französische und das deutsch-polnische Geschichtsschulbuch (Understanding beyond the borders: The GermanFrench and the German-Polish history textbook). In K.-H. Standke (Ed.), Das Weimarer Dreieck in Europa: Die trilaterale deutsch-französisch-polnische Zusammenarbeit—Entstehung, Potentiale, Perspektiven (The Weimar triangle in Europe: The trilateral Franco-German-Polish cooperation— Origin, potentials, perspectives) (pp. 43–53). Toru´n: Adam Marszałek. Rürup, R. (2014). Der lange Schatten des Nationalsozialismus: Geschichte, Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungtskultur (The long shadow of national socialism: History, politics of history and culture of remembrance). Göttingen: Wallstein. Saito, K. (2008). Ch¯ugoku Rekishi Ky¯okasho to Higashi Ajia Rekishi Taiwa. Nicch¯ukan 3 goku ky¯ot¯u ky¯ozai zukuri no genba kara (History textbooks in China and history dialogue in East Asia—From a workshop to create a Japanese-Chinese-Korean joint textbook). Tokyo: Kadensha. Strobel, T., & Wojtaszyn, D. (2017). Das gemeinsame Geschichtsbuch zur Geschichte Europas als neues Element im historischen Dialog zwischen Polen und Deutschen (The joint history book on the history of Europe as a new element in the historical dialogue between Poles and Germans). In E. Opilowska, K. Ruchniewicz, & M. Zybura (Eds.), Kreisau und Verdun: Wege zur deutschpolnischen und deutsch-französischen Versöhnung und ihre Symbole im kollektiven Gedächtnis (Kreisau and Verdun: Pathways to German-Polish and German-French reconciliation and their symbols in collective memory) (pp. 203–214). Osnabrück: Fibre. Wada, H., et al. (Eds.). (2014). Higashi Ajia Kingendaishi Ts¯ushi. Vol. 2: 19 seiki kara gendai made (A modern and contemporary history of East Asia. Vol. II: From the nineteenth century to the present). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Wienand, C. (2013). Versöhnung (Reconciliation). In N. Colin, C. Defrance, U. Pfeil, & J. Umlauf (Eds.), Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945 (pp. 451–453). Tübingen: Narr.

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Akiyoshi Nishiyama is a professor at Kyoritsu Women’s University (KWU) in Tokyo. After studying history at the University of Tokyo and Saarland University, Saarbrücken, he was Associate Professor of European History at the KWU Faculty of International Studies from 2002 to 2008 and has been a professor at the same faculty since 2009. He has also been guest researcher at the Center for Contemporary History Research in Potsdam (2011), the Humboldt University, Berlin (2013/14), and the University of St. Andrews, Scotland (2014).

The Deconstruction of Ethnic Identity: Germany, France, and Rwanda Eric Ns. Ndushabandi and Rainer Schmidt

Abstract Rwandan “ethnic” confrontation and inner European (German-French) conflicts are both good examples of the destructive potential of socially and politically constructed identities. In a mesalliance of power and identity politics, both cases brought about terrible destruction. “Europe” and “Rwanda” function as inclusive identity constructions with the intention to substitute and finally abolish narratives of exclusion, hierarchy, and cultural superiority. In both contexts, civil society and government actors apply grassroots strategies of neighborhood reconciliation and national memory politics. The parallels and differences in both cases can alert us to the opportunities or risks when actors intervene in identity politics.

1 Introduction Germany and France had a long ambivalent relationship marked by elements and eras of mutual admiration followed by confrontation and even hatred. Elites of both countries observed each other carefully, designed strategies of peaceful coexistence, or invented grand narratives of domination and superiority. With Germany’s victory in 1871, the then unified Germany became an economic, political, and military powerhouse. This caused geopolitical challenges and irritation at the center of Europe. The new nation inspired its intellectuals, who fashioned ideas of national destiny especially in the late nineteenth century and during the First World War. This new entity wanted to be understood, was craving for meaning and a mission. Politics demanded “grand narratives” and intellectuals—historians, biologists, geographers, and economists, to name but a few—offered them. Under these circumstances, ideas were selectively integrated into political strategies and became issues of political E. Ns. Ndushabandi Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace-Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda e-mail: [email protected] R. Schmidt (B) University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_14

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domination and mutual confrontation. From this time on, it became unimaginable for some generations in both nations that this conflict would ever end. The confrontation finally culminated in two world wars in which the armies of both countries clashed in the most dramatic manner. Hostilities did not exist in governments only, but also in the mindsets of the people. The conflict ended with Germany’s total defeat and was followed by common attempts to build up an inclusive collective identity after the war: Europe. If we take Europe and the attempt at European identity construction as a point of reference, we can attempt a comparison of the Rwandan and the FrancoGerman/European pathways. Divisions and allegedly irreconcilable cleavages also determined Rwanda’s history in the twentieth century. Internal divisions in Rwanda were built up over a long time and finally escalated in the genocide against Tutsi, ending with the total defeat of the genocidal regime. After the era of divisions and divisionism, a new unifying policy determines Rwanda’s present state of mind. The government currently in office in Rwanda has to deal with the burdens of history in the same way as post-war Europe is still well aware of its conflictual history. The Franco-German conflict was deeply ingrained in European minds and outlasted the actual conflicts. Mutually exclusive identities persist in people’s memories and minds long after the conflict itself is overcome. In this paper, we will reflect on the reasons and historical contexts in which the respective cleavages and divisions emerged (2). We will then take a look at the policies and contexts of unification and overcoming divisions in the post-conflict era (3). We will subsequently attempt to make a brief comparison based on the theoretical assumption that identities, even those of an ethnic nature, are socially and culturally constructed and can be changed, formed, and recontextualized (4). In this part, we will explore a number of systematic questions regarding parallels between the two reconciliation processes: the role of leadership and diplomacy, the role of civic education, and the culture of memory. With the awareness that some of the elements of Fraco-German and internal Rwandan conflicts are not compatible, we are looking for mechanisms and patterns to deconstruct ethnic identity. We will then (5) make some concluding remarks.

2 The Construction of Divisions and Ethnic Identity in Europe and Rwanda 2.1 Divisions and Divisionism in Rwanda Everything starts with the traditional Rwanda composed of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, controversial concepts that had a socio-economic meaning based on socio-economic activities. They lived on the same territory called Rwanda, spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda, believed in the same God, “Imana,” shared central elements of

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their traditional cultural practices, and obeyed the same organized power structure throughout the kingdom. These characteristics were particular and unique to Rwanda and Burundi, compared to other nations around Rwanda, in the eastern and the western part of Africa. What is the origin of these social categories and what relationships do they constitute? How can we understand these particularities in the region? Colonial and post-colonial history in Rwanda were both marked by the increasingly aggressive use that was made of the distinction between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, which culminated in genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. These categories predated colonialism, but their meaning and character changed significantly over time. It would not be correct to call these categories ethnic. They were rather used to distinguish different, quite flexible, and permeable social groups, as well as intergroup and power relations in pre-colonial Rwanda. They had their origin in a division of labor between herders and agriculturalists. However, what followed is a good example of socially and politically constructed identities and the role of power in this process. Colonizers, German and Belgian, referred selectively to knowledge they found useful for understanding the Rwandan population. We are talking about the first half of the twentieth century, in which European science and politics were fascinated by the idea of race and ethnic identities and origin and migration. At this time, knowledge was presented in racial theories on the one hand and hamitic and nilotic theories on the other. The first interpretations are not so much based on local knowledge as on existing interpretative models in Europe dominated by these theories, Marxism, social class division, and theories used to understand the origin of people in Africa known as “exogene” and “endogene” models. The Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa social categories have been given different definitions depending on authors and periods. As Anastase Shyaka wrote, Hutu and Tutsi have been qualified as being races, tribes or ethnic groups (Pages 1933; Hayez 1933; Maquet 1952; de Lackger 1959; Vansina 1962; d’Hertefelt 1962; de Heusch 1966; Codere 1973), social states, or social classes (Shyaka 2006). In a context of oral transmission of knowledge and traditions in Rwanda, the first tentative historiography was made by colonialists and missionaries. At this time, Europe reached the peak of its global power. It dominated almost the entire globe and looked for proof that legitimized this. Sciences such as history, anthropology, and biology provided a terminology that came in handy. Races and ethnic groups were ordered, systematized, and put into a hierarchy of superior and inferior races—races and ethnic groups that were born to rule and those who were born to obey. These categories were helpful with respect to ordering and dominating Rwanda. And these categories were helpful when justifying the domination by “superior races” in Rwanda to which, of course, the colonizers themselves and their allies in the country belonged. The Belgian government supported the Tutsi as led by the king defined by the Tutsi. Justifying the choice, they had to find subjective explanations such as Tutsi are born for ruling, they are intelligent as opposed to Hutu, defined as less intelligent, born to serve, and subjected to hard work. This logic created feelings and complexes of superiority on one side and of inferiority on the other.

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Rwandans were fathers, farmers, came from different regions, belonged to families and villages, but these multitudes of identities became irrelevant. Only one question dominated the “collective imaginaire” of the colonizers, namely whether people were Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Moreover, because this distinction was crucial for establishing a system of domination, it persisted and outlived the colonizers. It was revolutionized and “democratized.” The same categorization that was used to keep the Hutu dependent, as an allegedly inferior group, was later in 1959 instrumentalized to bring them to power. Inside this socially constructed system, the logic was convincing. The age of democracy had reached Africa and the masses were to bring down the aristocracy. Here again, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were used and increasingly developed their destructive nature in favor of the new regime. This explosive history explains why it occurred to the post-genocide government to abandon the public use of this terminology and declare it a burden from the colonial legacy. It had such an enormous destructive capacity. To the new government, mending the social fabric after genocide would not be possible inside this “collective imaginaire.” We will come back to this later. Inequalities and segregation were inherent for such traditional societies (Class 1922: 677–693; Pages 1933; Paternostre de la Mairieu 1983; Harroy 1984: 62). This is also widely known in today’s official memory in Rwanda. In this memory, the unity of ancient Rwanda has an important function. It is a positive point of reference for today’s Rwanda. This argument is also widely used in the post-genocide reconstruction process to explain the broken social links within Rwandan society (NURC 2006: 82). It states that the dichotomy and polarization of Rwandan society between Hutu and Tutsi was the result of a long process. Early ethnologists and historians from Europe described migrations and settlements in Rwanda as well as economic relationships in traditional Rwandan society and worked them into the abovementioned hierarchy. Political decisions depend on frameworks that explain and contextualize reality. Politics needs to be explained and told (Münkler 2014: 113–121). Furthermore, the abovementioned framework of allegedly “ethnic” groups and hierarchies also structured colonial politics. It determined how the colonialists played a key role in the political upheaval of 1959. The terms were used to make politics to legitimize and delegitimize existence in Rwanda. Scientists described the Hutu as majority people but unable to rule, whereas the Tutsi were described as invaders who should be removed from power, killed, and sent back to Abyssinia along the Nile. Once caught in a certain explanatory framework, the colonialists were nor really interested in doing justice to the complexity of Rwandan history. Their restricted view distorted Rwanda’s complex reality. What is more, they had no interest in preserving knowledge about the founding myth about the origins of Rwandans. The Gihanga myth talks about the ancestors of all Rwandans and the creation of Rwanda (NURC 2006: 48–53). Shyaka Anastase summarized European writers’ views as follows: A close look at the works published during the colonial period on Rwanda and Burundi and at their populations’ social relations shows that the majority of these works repeat or refer to the data provided by the first German explorers of the nineteenth century without

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showing an interest in the sources on which those works were based. Observations made by the first German explorers such as Oskar Baumann, Earl Gustav Adolf von Götzen, and Dr. Richard Kandt articulated the same facts: “A considerable population, hundreds of thousands of Bantu Negroes, the Wahutus, in slavish subordination to the Watussis. A foreign caste, the Watussis, governs and exploits ruthlessly the Wahutus and the Watwas, that tribe of dwarves.” From that viewpoint, the demographic weight of the Hutu (85 or 90%), the Tutsi (9 or 14%), and the Twa (1%) is a particular point of reference. As a matter of fact, none of those percentages was based on adequately collected and periodically updated numerical data. The knowledge production was highly inspired from sociological and ideological theories of social structures in some European countries and especially in Belgium influenced by society structures in Europe mainly in Belgium. These explanatory frameworks of “who was first” and “born to rule” or “born to obey” were not just stories to be told, but were part of politics and power games. All these mindsets and explanatory frameworks significantly shaped the path of Rwandan history during the colonial period and thereafter. The main purpose of these divisive discourses was based on a strategic principle of dividing people in order to rule over them more easily (divide et impera). This is mainly proven by shifting alliances as in the first stage before 1957. The same year, the alliance changed with the advent of republicanism and the rise of democracy, which put the Hutu at the forefront as the majority. There was a shift from kingdom as a mode of governance to the republic of the so-called majority (Chrétien 1996; Semujanga 1988).

2.2 Nationalism and Divisionism in Germany and Europe In a similar manner, the cleavage in Europe was exploited and naturalized for political purposes. Nationalism became the crucial divisive and increasingly toxic narrative in Europe. It was able to play a productive role in the emancipation process in the early nineteenth century. However, as the century wore on, the more divisive this ideology and the more apparent the differences between the nationalisms became (Winkler 1978). Nationalism existed in a republican and progressive fashion: in France. There, it was compatible with and the driving force of republicanism and egalitarian, anti-aristocratic state ideologies. From the German perspective, however, this republican spirit came with Napoleonic military might. France imposed its will on Prussia/Germany. In the long run, it was fatal that national liberation in Germany became anti-French. Liberation from French occupation became conservative or reactionary. The German republicans—such as in Mainz—could be rejected as French spies or as the fifth colony of French occupation. You can see this in the case of Karl Marx and Heinrich Heine, as well as with respect to Francophile leftwing writers and intellectuals. German nationalism became reactionary and antirepublican after the missed opportunities in the prerevolutionary and revolutionary eras (1848). The German southwest was inspired by French republicanism, but the liberal potential was consumed between the unsuccessful European revolutions and

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the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. This led to the fatal liaison in Germany between nationalist and reactionary forces after the failed 1848 revolutions in Europe. AntiWestern German nationalism laid the foundations for the ideologies of two world wars. 1848 was proof of the weakness of German and European republicanism. For another more than 70 years, reaction overruled progressive movements. Cleavages deepened in times of war in 1870/71, in 1914–18, and in 1939–45. And after the Peace Treaty of 1871, anti-German propaganda also flourished in France. The Franco-German cleavage was further deepened by the devastating experiences of the First World War and the Versailles Treaty. Reactionary forces in Germany were able to exploit this treaty and understand Germany as colonized by French ideology and French interests after the First World War. The Second World War was merely a continuation of the same pattern.

3 The Deconstruction of Ethnic Identities When we change perspectives and cease looking at narratives and explanatory frameworks but at what actually happened, we can briefly dive into the world of truth and falsehood and historical facts. The genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 is a simple fact. The mass murders fulfilled all the criteria that the United Nations and leading scientists defined as genocide. This, of course, does not prevent genocide deniers from presenting their versions of “interethnic conflict,” of double genocide theories, or relativizing genocide by placing it into the context of the RPF’s war of liberation in 1990. Genocide against the Tutsi is denied in the same way as there are people who deny the Holocaust. However, the facts, that the genocide was committed against the Tutsi and assimilated1 in 1994 tell a different story. Therefore, if biologically there is no Hutu or Tutsi blood, if social mobility was possible in the context of the genocide, Hutu killed during the genocide are “de-hutucized” and not killed as Hutu. They are “tutsicized” in the understanding of the criminals. However, there are various opinions concerning the explanation of the causes, to determine the perpetrators and the victims, to determine the facts, to remember, to suggest a vision for rebuilding of the nation after the genocide. Given the time and efforts required to have a right qualification of these as genocide. The official memory took time to settle down. The atrocities that occurred from April to July 1994 were initially called “ethnic genocide and massacres,” translated from “Itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba” in Kinyarwanda. This qualification was used 1 By

assimilated, we mean that ethnic distinction in the literature is more a result of subjective construction than a distinction based on any objective and irrefutable criteria. In 1994, “assimilated” indicated three categories: Political opponents to the regime; those who were defined as Hutu and killed during the genocide due to their physical characteristics as defined by genocidal ideology; and those who opposed or had been inactive or refused to take part in killings. All of them were not killed because they were Hutu, but killed for these different reasons highlighted above. This means that, owing to these facts, they ceased to be considered as Hutu in the minds of killers; they had already been de-hutucized and then victimized or tutsicized according to the criminals’ psychology.

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in speeches and official documents from 1995 until the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004. Since 2003, the new Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda adopted the word “jenoside” in order to avoid any confusion between massacre and genocide. Since 2004, the adopted terminology was “genocide of the Tutsi,” similar to “genocide of the Jews.” This vocabulary was confusing. By saying “genocide of the Tutsi,” no clear differentiation was made between the perpetrators and the victims. After 2008, an ad hoc committee, with the support of CNLG, adopted the vocabulary used until the recent 20th anniversary of the genocide: “genocide against the Tutsi,” a public qualification recently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as it highlights well the victims of the genocide as Tutsi.2

3.1 The Politics of National Reconstruction After the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda In deconstructing this so-called and confusing ethnic identity, the policy of unity and reconciliation (1998), mainly disseminated and transmitted through political spaces such Ingando, played a significant role in bringing people to mutual acceptance, social cohesion, and even reconciliation. Ingando is a civic education institution in Rwanda. It is organized as a camp and is mandatory for students, people in leadership positions, and public servants. Its content differs slightly depending on which institution organizes it. However, in general, it is a mixture of physical, paramilitary exercises, cultural instructions (songs, dances, etc.), and civic education about the “new Rwanda.” Reconciliation is a process, however. Conflicts from 1995 to 2000 appear to be characterized by a transitional period with a discourse on security, bringing back all Rwandans from exile, and memory of the past through commemoration under the general principles of unity, democracy, and development as stipulated by the RPF’s official/public policy. In practice, since 1994 and after nine years of transition—1994–2003 ended with the first constitutional referendum and presidential elections—reconstruction efforts adopted the paradigm of security/stability and economic development as the necessary prerequisites for engaging in the democratization process (Ndushabandi 2013a, b). The Unity and Reconciliation Commission was created in 1998 with the overall mission of reinventing the future by bringing all Rwandans to mutual acceptance, united and reconciled with themselves, with Rwandan society embracing human cultural and traditional values. The past was reformulated and oriented to unionism and a reconciliatory historical narrative.3 2 General

Assembly Designates 7 April International Day of Reflection on 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, GA/12000, January 26, 2018. 3 Ingando denotes a break taken by Rwandan traditional fighters for the purpose of resting and reflecting on the national destiny and sovereignty. Ingando were brought back from Rwandan tradition in 1996 as “solidarity camps” to bring all Rwandans to sit together and reflect on the issues of national cohesion and how to overcome challenges.

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From 2007, Ingando was replaced by Itorero in contemporary Rwanda as a traditional mechanism that emphasizes values-based education. As Ingando contributed to mutual acceptance and the stabilization of Rwandan society (Ndushabandi 2013a, b) from 2007, all Rwandans attend the Itorero camps to learn about Rwandan history and cultural values, as well as about Rwanda’s political programs after the genocide. National identity education or “Ndi Umunyarwanda” is the most important topic. Nationhood is seen through a tentative lens of harmonizing the interpretation of national history and unifying Rwanda by deconstructing the ethnicity that destroyed Rwandan society. The first commemoration of genocide integrated the past, history, and justice in the reconstruction process. The “Ndi Umunyarwanda” policy (“I am Rwandan,” or national identity as opposed to ethnic identity) is largely disseminated in Rwanda as a national program to enhance the sense of belonging to the same nation, history, and destiny. The program was initiated and used public talks from 2013 in line with the policy of national unity and reconciliation, which guided the sense of togetherness made as a political choice since 1987 by the RPF’s political ideology. What is important is that “Rwandaness” as an identity common to all Rwandans is not an external pure creation or a superficial concept of power created by political actors because Rwandans have much in common beyond being part of the same nation. For many decades they have lived on the same territory, speaking the same language despite a minor level of linguistic interference from outside for some villages on the borders, and have shared large parts of their culture and practices. This is irrefutable even if some voices continue to resist unionism and call for official recognition of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as objective ethnic identities which led to the genocide. In any case, Ndi Umunyarwanda is not a political creation or imagination. All Rwandans share the feeling of being Rwandans what some people are claiming is mainly social justice political and civic rights. The approach is more likely to bring people to togetherness and unity as major societal objective. Ndi Umunyarwanda as a national identity education program is a significant basis for rapprochement of different memories and shared destiny of Rwandans. It must be a good basis for establishing a society of equals and striving for social justice and political participation lightened by the ideal of unity and genocidal ideology as a crucial weapon in confronting a divisive society and ideologies of genocide. In the first place, at the top of the scale is the government as the principal custodian of the official culture of remembrance. Its role is to ensure that the local population adopts this official culture of remembrance through dialogue. This allows the government to enjoy a measure of legitimacy. Second, those who remember should enjoy a minimum of popular legitimacy. Our research results have revealed that the social representations are not the same as the official representations. The Rwandan Government’s resolve to tell the so-called historical truth and the way in which certain events are mentioned and taught during the Ingando show us that social representations in Rwanda have yet to be adopted (Ndushabandi 2013a, b). The national collective memory will not be the single product of official representations of Rwandan past history. Valerie Rosoux has demonstrated the need to consider various memories and suggested also to consider these events within the

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context of a specific time/era. Considering all these aspects, we suggest an inclusive approach that would bring together three main elements and three stakeholders, namely the official culture of remembrance of the government, social representations (people), scientific research (researchers), and members of the international community such as Belgium, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

3.2 Deconstruction of German/French Conflict Identities Part of the overall reconciliation process after the war included forgetting and a change of perspectives. Here, the parallels to Rwanda are pretty obvious. One of the preconditions for this process of forgetting the Franco-German history of conflict was a widely accepted exchange of elites. It was the old elite especially in the German military that transported anti-French sentiments. These elites were delegitimized by the catastrophe of the Second World War. They represented forces that traditionally focused on the confrontation between Germany and France. One of the main focuses of anti-French sentiments in Germany was the narrative of French civilization versus German culture. The wars (more the First World War and less the Second) were accompanied by ideological battles. The so-called ideas of 1914 contained the story of German distinction from the West. Germany, as the old story run, was a country/empire at the center of Europe. It was equally different from the West (Britain/France) and the East (Russia). To cut a long story short, “Germany does not belong to the West” was, for the longest time, a conviction held by the German elites (political, cultural, military). Even authors such as Thomas Mann supported this.4 Only fragments of German society supported Germany’s integration into the West. These included Jewish intellectuals, a handful of writers, and limited milieus in Germany. It demanded some leadership against the silent majority in post-war Germany to change this mental map. Konrad Adenauer was one of them. From then, Germany began to take the necessary steps—politically—to become a member of the Western military alliance and “the West.” To overcome this deep cleavage between Germany and France, the post-war generations guaranteed the integration of West Germany into the West also in other respects: economically, and also in terms of their mindset, culture, and mentality. As Jürgen Habermas famously put it, West Germany’s integration into the political culture of the West was its major achievement. It was only this that allowed West Germany to adopt a political culture of critical thinking, deliberation, liberalism, and constitutional patriotism. France and Germany were the driving forces and powerhouses of European integration. Leadership also played a role in this. Without the will to overcome experiences of war, Adenauer, de Gaulle, and other crucial figures of European post-war 4 Thomas Mann is an interesting case. He used the abovementioned mental images of culture versus

civilization in his “Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen” (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man) in 1918. Later on, however, he changed his position, exiled in the United States, and became a convinced and convincing European.

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politics would not have achieved integration. Never again war in Europe, never again war between these two neighboring countries, was the decisive refrain of postwar Europe. However, both countries benefitted also economically from their new integration policies. It became a “raison d’état” in Germany that it is everybody’s responsibility to face the dark and destructive side of German nationalism, which was for the longest time (from the mid-19th to the mid-twentieth century) associated with xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and aggressive tendencies toward its neighbors. Germany in Europe cannot be a nationalist Germany in this sense of the word. It needs to be a country that takes a critical approach toward nationalist tendencies. An aggressive nationalist Germany at the center of Europe would jeopardize European integration.

4 Comparative Overview The two divisions in Europe and in Rwanda can be compared with reference to various aspects. National identities in Europe were constructed in the interest of dividing ideas and ideologies, of drawing borders and distinctions, of territorial claims and access to natural resources. These divisions were exploited for political ends while intellectuals used them for their own interests and modified or consolidated them. This happened in Europe with the division between Germany and France for some 150 years. Moreover, we can see the same in Rwanda not on the national level, but on the sub-national level of allegedly “ethnic” division. Just as this division can be overcome in Europe, it can be overcome in Rwanda. This process will never be completed, but will always be contested. The old patterns of divisionism on the one hand and nationalist sentiments on the other can be reactivated if political or social forces in the respective countries believe that this is in their interest. In the same way that Rwanda tries to overcome the country’s division, European decision-makers seek to overcome divisions in Europe. The roots of these narratives of European unification can be found in Enlightenment and pre-nationalist times. At that time, Europe was a concept espoused by Latin-speaking intellectual elites. This can be a potential reference point for unifying stories to tell. European founders of the post-war era referred to pan-European movements and shared traditions. After the war, the additional driving force of European integration was the desire for peace and economic prosperity. Further European integration was increasingly understood to be in the common interest of all (west) Europeans. At the same time, at least in Germany, an elite exchange helped to strengthen links. Total military defeat eliminated the influence of military elites in West Germany after the war and their values and memories were lost. The abovementioned mental change spelled an end to the culture of obedience (“Untertanenkultur”) and a transformation to a participatory, civic culture in the 1960s and 1970s. A new generation demanded a new politics (Dörner and Rohe 1990). There is a rich debate about the question as to how and to which degree public education can influence and transform citizens’ beliefs, especially as far as ethnic

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identities are concerned. Some would argue that ethnic identities are stable and immune to attempts on the part of governments. Others would, however, say that ethnic identities are constructed and hence can be shaped and influenced (McGarry et al. 2008). Rwanda uses nationalism as an instrument of nation-building. It is today intended to help overcome internal divisions inside the country. Inside Europe, if we change the perspective, nationalism had a divisive character. It united the nations, but divided Europe into alien and mutually hostile entities. Europe as an idea is today what the nation is for Rwanda. Both are ideological vehicles for overcoming internal divisions. Viewed in terms of the pro-European discourse on integration, nationalism is widely understood as reactionary and a step backwards. In the same way, Rwandans would consider it to be a step backwards if the old “ethnic” identities were used to divide the nation again. Divisive identities are reconciled with promoting inclusive ideas (Europe/Rwanda). This integration is an element of government ideology and programs, and also of grassroots initiatives. Churches and NGOs promote integration in Rwanda and grassroots initiatives of voluntary fire departments in southwest Germany or school partnerships and Franco-German cooperation between mayors build bridges between former borders. We can see these as laboratories for achieving consensus or reconciliation. History books were also rewritten and the new inclusive ideology made its way into schools and their curricula. Old divisive narratives were substituted with new, integrative ones. The culture of remembrance in both countries keeps the memory of the war and genocide alive. However, the war is a common point of reference for the hatred of the past and is framed accordingly. Integrative leadership decisions were made in both Europe and Rwanda alike. The culture of remembrance was and continues to be institutionalized in both contexts. The commemoration week, regular visits to memorial sites in Rwanda, and lieux de mémoire like the European flag are examples of this.

5 Conclusion Although there are undeniable parallels between the two divisions in Europe and in Rwanda, there are also limits to transferring one trajectory of reconciliation onto the other. European integration was framed by the logic of the Cold War, like in a pressure cooker, against the backdrop of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiments. Germany’s military and culture of military obedience lost every bit of credibility after more and more details about Wehrmacht crimes came to light and were subject to critical reflection. Germany’s military culture was associated with the Holocaust, with disrespect for human rights, a lack of critical thought, and poor judgment. The standing of the military in Rwanda is completely different. It won the war, defeated the genocidal regime, and took over power to determine the path of reconstruction.

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Part of remembering is forgetting. The German public, for example, was not the least interested in France’s role in Africa in the post-war era. However, when it comes to symbolic integration, grassroots initiatives, and policies of reconciliation, there are some parallels between the two cases. Development prospects in Rwanda became a kind of social contract between the government/elite and the population/farmers along the lines of “we provide conditions for a better life and you support the government.” All of this is bound up with new narratives of shared values, history, and beliefs based on projects looking to the future. This is how divided countries (Rwanda) or continents (Europe) can overcome divisions. Europe right now lost its faith in telling new stories after the old story (no more war) lost momentum and the failed constitution making process disillusioned and demobilized pro-European forces. Future generations deserve visions and inspiring stories about the meaning and sense of politics.

References Chrétien, J. P. (1996). Le défi de l’ethnisme. Paris: Rwanda et Burundi. Codere, H. (1973). The biography of an African society: Rwanda 1900–1960: Based on forty-eight Rwandan autobiographies. Tervuren: Musée royal de l’Afrique centrale (MRAC). d’Hertefelt, M. (1962). Les anciens royaumes de la zone interlacustre meridionale: Rwanda, Burundi, Buha. Tervuren: Musée royal de l’Afrique centrale (MRAC). de Heusch, L. (1966). Le Rwanda et la civilisation interlacustre; études d’anthropologie historique et structurale. Brussels: ULB. de Lackger, L. (1959). Ruanda. Kabgayi. Dörner, A., & Rohe, K. (1990). Von der Untertanenkultur zur ‚Partizipationskultur‘. Kontinuität und Wandel der politischen Kultur in Deutschland. Politische Bildung, 23(3), 18–33. Harroy, J. P. (1984). De la féodalite à la Democratie 1955–1962. Brussels: Marcel Hayez. Hiernax, J. (1954). Les caractères physiques des populations du Ruanda et de l’Urundi. Brussles: Institut Royal des Sciences naturelles de Belgique (ISNB). Maquet, J. J. (1952). Le problème de la domination Tutsi. Zaïre, 6(10). McGarry, J., O’Leary, B., & Simeon, R. (2008). Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation. In S. Choudhry (Ed.), Constitutional design for divided societies: Integration or accommodation (pp. 41–88). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Münkler, H. (2014). Der Mythos und die Politik: Warum kommen politische Akteure nicht ohne sinnstiftende Erzählungen aus? In Denkwerkstatt Demokratie (Ed.), Sprache. Macht. Denken. Politische Diskurse entstehen und führen (pp. 113–121). Frankfurt/Moscow/New York. Ndushabandi, E. (2012). La gestion politique de la mémoire du génocide au Rwanda: Mémoire officielle face aux representations sociales. Cahiers de Sciences politiques de l’Ulg, 21. Available online at https://popups.uliege.be/1784-6390/index.php?id=568&format=print. Ndushabandi, E. (2013a). La Politique de la mémoire au Rwanda après le génocide de 1994: Etude du dispositif des “Ingando” (Doctoral thesis). Université Saint-Louis, Brussels. Available online at https://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/133662. Ndushabandi, E. (2013b). Processus de Démocratisation Dans la Région des Grands Lacs: Poids du Passe et Perspectives. Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, 2(1). Available online at https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol2/iss1/6. Pages, A. (1933). Un royaume hamite au centre de l’Afrique. Brussels. Paternostre de la Mairieu, B. (1983). Le Rwanda, son effort de développement: antécédents historiques et conquêtes de la révolution rwandaise. Brussels: A. de Boeck.

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Semujanga, J. (1988). Récits fondateurs du drame rwandais. Discours social, idéologies et stéréotype. Paris Montréal: L’Harmattan. Shyaka, A. (2006). The Rwandan conflict. Origin, development and exit strategy. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Ed.). Available online at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/han dle/2152/4746. Vansina, J. (1962). L’évolution du royaume du Rwanda des origines à 1900. Brussels: Arsom. Winkler, H. (1978). Vom linken zum rechten Nationalismus. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 4(1), 5–28.

Eric Ns. Ndushabandi holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Louvain Academy in Belgium. He works as a lecturer in the field of political science at the University of Rwanda and is the Director of the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, a think tank and peacebuilding organization. Furthermore, Mr. Ndushabandi is Chair of the Media High Council in Rwanda. His research focuses on memory and identity in post-conflict reconstruction processes. Selected publications: Ndushabandi, Eric Ns. (2019). Intrafamily conflicts: A constant challenge to Peace. Saarbrücken: LAP; Ndushabandi, Eric Ns./Rutazibwa, Olivia U. (2019). Agaciro. (pp. 79–82). In A. Kothari et al. (Eds.), Pluriverse: A Post-Development Dictionary. New Delhi: Tulika Books; Ndushabandi, Eric Ns. (2013). Processus de Démocratisation Dans la Région des Grands Lacs: Poids du Passé et Perspectives. Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, 2(1), pp. 54–75. Rainer Schmidt is a lecturer in history and political science affiliated with the College of Arts and Social Sciences (CASS) of the University of Rwanda (UR). Since September 2016, he has represented the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Rwanda. From 2009 to 2014, he was Martius Chair of German and European Studies (DAAD) at the USP (Universidade de Sao Paulo) in Brazil. He taught political theory and the history of ideas at the TU Dresden from 1994 to 2009. His publications are mainly in the area of the history of ideas and constitutionalism. Among his recent publications: Alternatives to Liberal Democracy—revisited: Lessons from Latin America in: Volker Depkat/Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (ed.), Cultural Mobility and Knowledge Formation in the Americas, Heidelberg 2019, pp. 191–207.

South Africa’s Reconciliation Project 25 years After Democracy Jan Hofmeyr

Abstract This chapter aims to highlight the importance of economic justice within any reconciliation model that seeks to bring sustainable peace, comparing the FrancoGerman approach to that of the South African approach. Twenty five years after the end of apartheid, poverty levels remain high and inequality is higher than at the time of the political transition. While laws no longer separate South Africans, class does. This contrasts strongly with the approach that characterized efforts to restore Franco-German relations in the immediate wake of the Second World War. While cultural exchange has been the more visible feature of the reconciliation between these countries in recent decades, the stability on which these relations rested for most of the post-war period is anchored within the economic foundations for shared prosperity that were laid in the immediate wake of the war.

1 Introduction The signing of the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron on January 22, 2019 in the German city of Aachen occurred exactly 56 years after their respective predecessors Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty in Paris in 1963. The conditions under which these agreements were signed could not have been more different. Having emerged from the ruins of a catastrophic war, the Élysée Treaty, broadly regarded as the official starting point of the reconciliation process between the two countries, represented hope for a peaceful and prosperous future. The Treaty of Aachen, on the other hand, was signed against the backdrop of—and in response to—an increasingly fractious and unstable global order that not only threatens the countries’ bilateral relationship, but indeed the entire European postwar project that was largely anchored by their strong bond. With uncertainty—if not J. Hofmeyr (B) Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_15

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fear—in the air, the most recent agreement represents an attempt to defend, rather than advance, the status quo. Moreover, as external pressures mount, domestic ones are pushing for a narrower, inward-looking focus within national borders. Can this much-touted example of political reconciliation withstand the forces that threaten to dilute the impact of what has become known as the “motor of Europe”? Is this still an example to be emulated by other nations affected by protracted and debilitating conflict? Another reconciliation process that captured the world’s imagination in the early 1990s was that of South Africa. It was a transition that defied the odds. Following more than four decades of brutal legislated racial oppression in the form of apartheid and, prior to that, three centuries of colonial rule that treated the country’s black majority as second-class citizens, few expected that any political transition at the southernmost tip of Africa would be bloodless. Prospects for a peaceful transfer of power appeared slim during the tumultuous 1980s, which saw several states of emergency proclaimed by the then governing National Party (NP). Nevertheless, a host of contextual factors conspired to usher in the ascendance to power of Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk, who authorized the release of political prisoners, including that of the future president, Nelson Mandela, and the unbanning of the organizations that they represented. This paved the way for the transitional negotiations that resulted in the election of the country’s first democratic government, led by Mandela. Shortly thereafter, the country’s parliament promulgated the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, which provided for the creation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). For the period between 1996 and 2000, when the TRC’s public hearings were conducted across the country, the Commission and the process itself captured the world’s attention, with many punting it as the new gold standard for reconciliation processes around the world. However, a little more than a quarter century after its political transition, the country appears to be more fragmented and polarized than at any time since its democratic transition. A sense of disillusionment has set in, and among many—particularly young—South Africans the concept of “reconciliation” is being met with a sense of cynicism. In a global environment increasingly characterized by isolationism between states and social polarization within national borders, we can ask ourselves whether these once celebrated processes still remain instructive in any way for the times that we are living in. This chapter seeks to grapple with this question by looking at how each unfolded since its inception to the present day. It will commence with a brief discussion of the reconciliation concept before proceeding to an overview of key elements of the Franco-German case that I deem relevant for the discussion. From here, my attention will shift to the South African reconciliation process, and then, finally, I will provide a synthesis of the insights that the former may hold for the latter. I conclude, firstly, that a coherent political narrative in favor of reconciliation needs to be sustained over time. However, a national reconciliation process, secondly, cannot be sustained only at the rhetorical level if it is not reinforced materially with broad-based economic inclusion across all spheres of society. This failure to provide substance to underpin rhetoric largely accounts for South Africa’s present

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challenges with regard to forging a more cohesive society and, arguably, the comparative degree of success achieved by the Franco-German project during the latter half of the previous century—and well into the first two decades of the 2000s. However, the latter process is also appearing increasingly tenuous, and the reasons for this may likewise lie in both nations’ growing difficulty with respect to providing inclusive prosperity for their citizens.

2 Reconciliation: A Conceptual Clarification If it is the objective of this chapter to appraise the experiences of reconciliation made in the context of the South African and Franco-German processes as well as the insights that may be derived from each, then we need a conceptualization that is extensive enough in order to do so. At the outset, we have to be clear that the very different contexts in which they occurred make comparisons tricky. Firstly, they occurred at different historical junctures, with the Franco-German experience being directly influenced by the end of the Second World War and the South African process being a direct consequence of international sanctions in the 1980s, which coincided with the major global ideological realignment that saw the collapse of the so-called Eastern bloc. Secondly, and more importantly, the Franco-German process involved two independent nation states and, as such, reconciliation was conceived of both interstate and interpersonal processes in pursuit of a broader European peace. In the case of South Africa, the focus was entirely restricted to the interpersonal dimension, with the objective of forging a nation at peace with itself. While apartheid, at a cognitive level, shaped vastly divergent cultural, political, and material experiences, resulting in something akin to an experience of different “nationhoods” within the borders of the same country, the South African challenge in the wake of the system’s demise was a distinctly national project. However, while these differences may preclude strict comparison between the two on substantive policy approaches, the South African TRC process and the postNuremberg Franco-German process both focused on the pursuit of a sustainable peace that was based on mutual dependence rather than the mere tolerance of difference. For the purpose of understanding how we should conceive of the concept of “sustainable peace” the work by the eminent peace scholar Johan Galtung remains instructive. Galtung (1967) makes an important distinction between two types of peace, namely negative peace and positive peace. The negative variant, in Galtung’s opinion, constitutes a condition, characterized by the absence of “organized collective violence” between major collectives, such as nations, ethnicities, and racial groupings. Importantly, though, this version of peace does not imply the absence of grievances or latent social tensions, but merely describes a state in which the fighting has stopped. In such contexts, the latent potential for conflict always exists, but is constrained by legislative arrangements, active suppression by the security apparatus, or structural discrimination that robs an aggrieved constituency of its agency. Peace under these circumstances is tenuous and relies on effective enforcement and, more

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often than not, fear. Positive peace, on the other hand, denotes circumstances in which integration, cooperation, and a growing awareness of mutual interdependence result in harmonious relations between former adversaries. In this conception, therefore, we are not only talking about the absence of organized violence, but also about the active reinforcement of a sense of mutual dependence. In both the Franco-German and South African cases, stakeholders pursued this latter positive variant of peace, underpinned by an articulated understanding that its success will depend on the extent to which reconciliation can take root between former adversaries. This, in turn, hinged on the extent to which the processes were seen to be pursuing the objective of truth, justice, and a shared memory of the nature of the conflict and the identity of its victims. Philpott (2009), for example, notes that reconciliation involves a restoration of relationships, underpinned by a mutual recognition of historical wrongs. Given the gravity of historical wrongs, reconciliation may (and should), according to Villa-Vicencio (2004), not always require forgiveness on the part of victims or groups of victims, but it does, according to Du Toit (2018), call for acknowledgment of the “radical interdependence” between former adversaries and the development of a common agenda to create a peaceful future. While context may therefore be decisive as far as the specific terms of reconciliation processes are concerned, these core ingredients—a shared recognition of the impact of historical wrongs and an awareness of a common destiny—should, arguably, always be present. These broad traits, rather than the specificities of policy characteristics that are invariably dependent on context, will therefore be the reference point for this discussion. Both processes embraced the acknowledgment of shared destinies and mutual dependence between former adversaries. While describing context in order to outline the unfolding of the two processes within the respective settings and historical junctures, I wish to draw the reader’s attention to the extent to which this articulated commitment to reconciliation was followed by substantive action in order to create the “radical interdependence” that Du Toit refers to in both contexts.

3 Salient Features of the Franco-German Reconciliation Process Franco-German post-war engagement must, in the first instance, be understood in terms of its strategic importance for both nations after the Second World War. Not only was Germany politically and economically defeated, its greatest loss had been on the normative front. In the wake of Nazism, the country had to be rehabilitated in the eyes of the international community. For France, there was likewise a strong material incentive with its economy almost halved in size and the infrastructure required to resuscitate it all but decimated. However, there was also a broader geopolitical imperative, driven by fears of Soviet expansion in Western Europe. Linked to this came a massive diplomatic push from the United States for greater market integration (Rosoux 2019), underpinned by economic support in the form of the Marshall Plan.

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For this material support to be leveraged and maximized, however, it was critical for these former adversaries to nurture a sense of trust. On both sides of the former political divide, leadership played a critical role in convincing citizenries of the need for integration. Both De Gaulle and Adenauer made frequent visits to each other’s countries in the years running up to the Élysée Treaty from 1958 to 1962, emphasizing the need for friendship between the two. The Élysée Treaty itself provided for the institutionalization of the reconciliation process through the creation of official dialogue mechanisms, such as biannual meetings between Heads of State and more frequent meetings between Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense, and bureaucratic technical working groups (Yeong 2013). In order to sustain such cooperation over time, however, it was important also to maintain an inclusive narrative that rationalized cooperation. Importantly in this regard, the official approach by the French was to shy away from collective condemnation and focus instead on the crime of Nazism, even though the degree of public collaboration between private citizens and bureaucrats in the Nazi regime was well documented. This evolved into a mutually entrenched common metanarrative that differentiated between Nazis and Germans. In light of this, both De Gaulle and Adenauer, together with successive generations of leaders, were able to reflect on their unity as “the liberation from barbarism” (Rosoux 2019). Although later generations stringently interrogated societal complicity in the deeds of the National Socialist regime, this notion of collective guilt was actively rejected at the official level. As such, the Nuremberg trials represented the official retributive dimension of the reconciliation process at the time. The Élysée Treaty, however, not only provided a political framework for engagement at the government level, but also prioritized the enhancement of relations between people on different sides of the border. Cross-border forums were set up by think tanks to promote cultural exchange, while religious bodies were instrumental in creating a sense of collective mourning of war loss (Rosoux 2019). Yeong (2013) notes that, in terms of the latter, Christian teachings with regard to forgiveness, which both had in common, were particularly instrumental. Education also played a critical role and involved youth exchanges as well as an emphasis on language training. Of great importance, too, was the joint compilation of history curricula, which had the long-term effect of shaping a common narrative about the past, present, and future, as well as, importantly, instilling a sense of reciprocal trust (Demesmay and Kunz 2018) without which the forging of a positive peace would have been impossible. These exchanges on the political, economic, and cultural fronts succeeded in terms of creating an intergenerational bridge for improved relations. Despite these achievements, this does not mean that both countries had seen eye to eye on critical issues. While Berlin was more inclined toward political integration, and less so on the economic score, the converse was true for Paris. Their approaches were very different, particularly in the economic realm. Demesmay and Kunz (2018) highlight a number of these. The first concerned the state’s role in the management of the economy in domestic politics. Whereas the French preferred a hands-on approach to coordinating economic inputs and allowed for more flexibility in the interpretation

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of rules and regulations, the German ordoliberal approach viewed the state as the author and enforcer of measures that govern the behavior of private stakeholders, leaving it up to companies and their employees to create prosperity (Demesmay and Kunz 2018). The second divergence concerned economic monetary policy in the eurozone. While Germany preferred budget orthodoxy and strict adherence to management rules, with “austerity” as a key word in the country’s political economy lexicon, the French have allowed for a more pragmatic approach to ensure that growth potential is not subdued by excessive caution. In more recent years, the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) represented the third contentious point. Whereas Germany stood firm on the question of its legal and political independence, generally in line with its ordoliberal approach, this notion was less palatable to French policymakers. However, despite these differences, the persistence with which the Franco-German reconciliation project has been pursued on both sides can be regarded as one of the key traits that have contributed to its relative longevity. It was not a one-off event, but an incremental process, steadfastly pursued prior to the signature of the Élysée Treaty and thereafter. It involved a commitment over decades that witnessed the nurturing of mutual trust and understanding at the social and cultural levels, as well as a sense of shared destiny resulting from greater political and economic integration. Like all relationships, it required commitment and compromise, and while there have been major sources of friction over the years, the greater and mutually beneficial benefits of peace and stability outweighed differences pertaining to political culture, economic governance, and the degree of integration. The mutual trust that evolved both at the political and official level contributed to the revival of both economies and greater prosperity on both sides of the Rhine. The political promise of reconciliation became tangible in its material benefits to citizens of both countries. I contend here that, in this case, the mutually reinforcing dimensions of trust at the political and social level on the one hand and shared prosperity on the other became a major contributing factor for the Franco-German process as a whole. By the same token, I argue here that its current stagnation—and some would say unraveling—should be viewed through the same lens. Amid growing social inequality and stagnating wages, disenchanted and anxious working- and middle-class citizens are increasingly turning inward, demanding the prioritization of domestic issues over bilateral and regional relationships. In Europe, this has been evident in the British public’s vote to leave the EU and in the election of populist leaders in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Slovenia. Although not yet dominant in Germany and France, the rise of parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the former and Marie le Pen’s Rassemblement National in the latter suggest that the nationalist impulse is growing also in these countries. This, in turn, has made compromise on key political and economic reforms more difficult, forcing Macron and Merkel into delicate balancing acts between domestic political survival and long-term shared objectives. In the first half of 2019, the sheer magnitude of public anger in France became evident as clashes between the police and the “Gilets jaunes” brought large parts of France to a standstill.

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Both France and Germany find themselves in a very different Europe and, indeed, a very different world order. In an era when the digital transformation is increasingly obfuscating the relationship between politics, markets, and alliances, it will become increasingly important to reflect on the values that hold them together. While the migration question underscores the continued importance of geographic proximity, this new era will require a renewed commitment to a normative framework, broadly accepted at the public and elite level, that will allow them to preserve the broader objective of stability and shared prosperity.

4 Reconciliation in South Africa at a Crossroads After close to five decades of apartheid and three more centuries of colonialism that preceded it, South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994 represented the culmination of four years of multiparty negotiations that were on the verge of collapse on numerous occasions. When it finally occurred, some went as far as to describe the country’s political transition as a “political miracle.” The end of apartheid signaled the end of legislated racialized discrimination and extended the voting franchise to the country’s black majority. In some ways, it represented a new beginning for Africa’s southernmost country, and in many others it did not. The legacy of apartheid was brutal, and the scars that it left on society were not going to be erased overnight. Citizens were victimised merely for having a particular skin color while livelihoods were disrupted and families destroyed. Although figureheads such as former Archbishop Desmond Tutu referred to the country as a “rainbow nation,” it was a deeply divided nation at the time, consisting of victims and beneficiaries of the same despised system. Recognizing this reality and being aware that a peaceful transition could only be sustained if the sources of social division were addressed, leaders on both sides of the historical divide agreed to establish a commission to help the country come to terms with its divided past. In light of this, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act was promulgated in 1995, paving the way for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was chaired by Tutu and convened for the first time in 1996. It was to hear evidence on politically motivated human rights abuses on both sides of the political divide that occurred between 1960 and 1994 (Hamber 2000). This process, however, differed radically from the Nuremberg trials that were conducted after the Second World War to seek justice for crimes that were committed in the course of that conflict. Like the Nuremberg process, the focus of the TRC was on the political dimensions of the conflict. Unlike its German equivalent, the balance of power at the conclusion of the conflict determined that the terms of this reckoning were jointly determined by those that found themselves on opposite sides of the historical divide. Without any prospect of an end to the conflict at the end of the 1980s, both parties were forced into negotiations by prevailing circumstances. In terms of global push factors, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc had implications that

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shaped the bargaining strategies of both sides. During the Cold War era, the apartheid regime sought to legitimise itself to the West and its white domestic constituency as resisting the encroaching communist threat by banning the liberation movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC), which at the time received substantial backing from former East Block states. As the East Block, therefore, imploded, the apartheid regime’s rationale, along with the ANC’s material support disappeared. In light of these developments, both parties came under external pressure to meet around the bargaining table, which resulted in the constrained and pragmatic mandate of the TRC. The result was a process that was restorative in its approach, rather than retributive, seeking to unify a deeply divided country. Perpetrators of political violence were given amnesty for their deeds, provided that these were not gratuitous and that full disclosure was made. Although the TRC had no prosecutorial powers, it was able to refer certain cases of perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty, or those who were deemed not to have made full disclosure, to the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). Due to the lack of resources and the destruction of evidence, few of the alleged perpetrators felt compelled to testify before the Commission. As a result, prosecutions directly following from the TRC or thereafter have been few and far between. In instances where perpetrators were brought to book, they were foot soldiers of the regime and not their political superiors who gave their orders. In light of this, prosecutions in South Africa were not as cathartic in terms creating a post-apartheid political narrative as was the case with the Nuremberg trials. While the latter served as a symbolic punishment of an evil system, the same can probably not be said about prosecutions (or lack thereof) that followed as a consequence of the TRC process. While the TRC’s major contribution was to foreground the brutality of apartheid in ways that ensured that nobody could ever again deny the true character of the system, its constrained mandate hampered the Commission’s ability to bring justice to those who were affected materially, physically, and psychologically as a result of the day-to-day functioning of the apartheid system (Hofmeyr 2016). Probably the most significant shortcoming of the South African transition process was the way in which it eschewed the question of economic justice and redress. Although reparations were extended to some of the direct victims of political violence, the Act had no jurisdiction as far as broader redress for economic dispossession and systematic marginalization over the course of decades were concerned. As a result, the scars of racialized poverty and inequality remained visible, even in the wake of apartheid. For many years, the response to this critique was that the entirety of post-apartheid dispensation was constituted around the logic of restitution, and hence macro-economic policy offered a vehicle for redress that the TRC could not. Faith in macro-economic policy has been misplaced, however. In fact, much of apartheid’s economic legacy was exacerbated by the timing of South Africa’s re-entry into global markets in the early 1990s, at the height of global neoliberal economics. Shortly after the transition, it embarked on a course of austerity to rebalance the books of an almost depleted fiscus, and while it succeeded in restoring the country’s economic foundations by the early 2000s, many of its critics contend that it came at the cost of rising unemployment, widening inequality, and sustained high levels of

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poverty. Several short-lived macro-economic policies that followed had some impact in terms of the creation of a small and fragile black middle class, but had limited influence vis-à-vis the structural obstacles to inclusive economic growth. Today, stuck in a rut of sluggish growth and perceived political incapacity to effect meaningful political change, poverty levels remain high, and inequality, as measured in terms of the Gini coefficient,1 is higher than at the time of the political transition. While laws no longer separate South Africans, class does, and these lines still run along the contours of race. As the country’s economic health deteriorates, its social relations are likewise worsening. This fragmentation is occurring not only along the lines of the previously advantaged and disadvantaged, but also within the latter category as competition for access to scarce resources increases. Moreover, strong undercurrents of xenophobia toward Africans from elsewhere on the continent are coming to light with increasing frequency and brutality. The country is, arguably, more polarized than at any time since 1994, and for many young black South Africans, “reconciliation” has become a concept that is treated with growing cynicism. Achieving reconciliation’s objective of creating a society with a shared destiny, predicated on mutual dependence, remains as distant a prospect as ever.

5 The Franco-German and South African Reconciliation Processes: Similarities and Differences An appraisal of the two processes that were described above points to the importance of a transitional narrative that underscores the importance of interdependence as a prerequisite for sustained peace and prosperity. However, the longevity of the narrative depends on its material verification over time by means of concrete arrangements to nurture such peace and prosperity. Without a proper structural and institutional framework to support it, their promise is likely to remain hollow (Rosoux 2017). The Franco-German process was arguably more successful on both counts. Some of the reasons for this can be found in the distinct contextual factors that framed and shaped each, not least of which the unique historical junctures during which the respective transitions occurred. However, I would like to contend that a large amount of the difference in outcomes can also be ascribed to the longer-term commitment to a reconciliation narrative, which was backed up by the political, economic, and cultural institutionalization of mechanisms to ensure traction across all layers of society. Despite significant disagreements about the political and economic nature of integration in the Franco-German case, there was sustained impetus with respect to the search for consensus and cooperation between the two countries. In the wake of the Nuremberg trials, which represented a political response to the crimes of National Socialism, both parties capitalized on this political space to forge a common path 1A

statistical measure indicating the spread of income within a society. A coefficient of 0 points to absolute income equality, while a coefficient of 1 points to absolute inequality.

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to the future. They not only relied on the zeitgeist and good intentions, however, but concrete steps were taken to institutionalize the pursuit of a long-term quest. As indicated above, this took the form of scheduled official exchanges at predetermined intervals, at the political, economic, and cultural levels, which were mirrored by similar exchanges at the academic, religious, and civil society levels. These steps to concretize the reconciliation narrative brought tangible economic benefits to ordinary people and gave it symbolic legitimacy on both sides of the border. The South African process represents a missed opportunity. Despite the constraints on its mandate and its insufficient resources, the TRC managed to cast the spotlight on the extent of apartheid’s atrocities. It represented an important marker that could have formed the basis for a coherent and comprehensive historical narrative as far as political and economic justice in post-apartheid South Africa was concerned. Instead, the work of the Commission was repeatedly challenged by political parties across the political spectrum, including the ruling ANC when the TRC sought to pronounce judgment on atrocities that occurred within the party’s own military camps. Following the submission of its final report, containing recommendations pertaining to prosecutions, compensation to victims, the memorialization of the struggle, and the promotion of future reconciliation initiatives, the Commission ceased to exist. This also marked the end of any coherent and structured attempt to promote national reconciliation in a coherent fashion, through its location in policies that impact redress and inclusive growth. I contend that, in the absence of such a shared, institutionalized historical narrative, backed by a complimentary institutional and structural infrastructure, there are also limited prospects for a coherent response in favor of a more inclusive and equitable distribution of economic resources, which is a major source of division in presentday South Africa. Relations between the major economic stakeholders (government, labor, and business) are characterized by high levels of distrust, and negotiations between these parties more often than not result in zero-sum outcomes that benefit a particular constituency at the expense of others. As a result, the country lacks a social compact outlining a shared vision of the kinds of development outcomes that are worth pursuing and the ways in which they can be achieved. This lack of consensus, together with internal ideological battles within the ANC, represent a major obstacle to the decisive actions that need to be taken to create a more inclusive society in which economic divisions no longer sustain racial inequality. In light of these failures, a young generation of South Africans is becoming increasingly dismissive of what they regard as superficial reconciliation, characterized by political inclusion, but economic exclusion (Mda 2013).

6 Conclusions This chapter has sought to contrast the Franco-German and South African reconciliation processes in order to distill their relevance in a world increasingly characterized by fragmentation and polarization. Although they unfolded in very distinct contexts

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that make direct comparison difficult if not tenuous, focusing on important overarching dimensions with regard to the sustainability of reconciliation processes does hold some important insights. The pursuit of reconciliation in both instances was motivated by the need to address a divided past, and also the aspiration to shape a more inclusive, unified future. Such an inclusive future inevitably entails shared prosperity. I have argued that the Franco-German project was more successful in this regard owing to the extent to which reconciliation was institutionalized politically and economically, and also at the level of civil society. It created trust, understanding, and hence also a sense of shared destiny. In South Africa, this sense of shared destiny continues to elude its citizens. Much of this can be ascribed to an incomplete reconciliation process, which lost its impetus in the wake of the submission of the final report of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Following the Commission’s formal hearings, the South African government failed to create an institutional framework to sustain what was, from the outset, a process fraught with fragility. As a result, the currency of “reconciliation” as a means to create a more inclusive society diminished, and its perfunctory invocation has been reserved for official public holidays and celebrations. In the absence of a sustained and shared reconciliation narrative, reinforced by institutions to support this vision, the vision of an inclusive society is drifting further and further away. In the absence of concerted action, growing inequality that largely overlaps with race is increasingly testing the limits of the country’s social fiber. Unless this matter is addressed, reconciliation in South Africa will continue to be deferred. Moreover, there may also be lessons here with respect to the longevity of the Franco-German reconciliation project. As both countries increasingly experience internal strain as a result of growing inequality and migration within their respective national contexts, fanning sentiments of growing—and often toxic—nationalism, it is not only the cohesion of their societies that is being threatened, but also their relationship and, indeed, a united Europe.

References Demesmay, C., & Kunz, B. (2018). Whither the Franco-German motor? In F. Nicolas & H. Kim (Eds.), The European Union in crisis: What challenges lie ahead and why it matters for Korea (pp. 109–137). Sejong: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Du Toit, S. F. (2018). When political transitions work: Reconciliation and interdependence. New York: Oxford University Press. Galtung, J. (1967). Theories of peace: A synthetic approach to peace thinking. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. https://www.transcend.org/files/Galtung_Book_unpub_Theories_of_ Peace_-_A_Synthetic_Approach_to_Peace_Thinking_1967.pdf. Accessed April 01, 2020. Hamber, B. (2000). Repairing the irreparable: Dealing with double-binds of making reparations for crimes of the past. Ethnicity and Health, 5(3), 215–226. Hofmeyr, J. (2016). Restorative justice in post-apartheid South Africa: The truth and reconciliation commission and its deferred promise. In K. Bachmann & D. Heidrich (Eds.), The legacy of crimes

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and crises: Transitional justice, domestic change and the role of the international community (pp. 71–80). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Mda, Z. (2013). Mandela neither a sell-out nor a saint. The Guardian Online. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/06/nelson-mandela-statesman-savedsouth-africa-economic-reform. Accessed April 01, 2020. Philpott, D. (2009). An ethic of political reconciliation. Ethics and International Affairs, 23(4), 389–407. Rosoux, V. (2017). Reconciliation as a puzzle: Walking among definitions. In V. Rosoux & M. Anstey (Eds.), Negotiating reconciliation in peacemaking: Quandaries of relationship building (pp. 15–26). Berlin: Springer International Publishing. Rosoux, V. (2019). The administration of post-war memory in the Franco-German and FrancoAlgerian negotiations. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 32, 227–244. Villa-Vicencio, C. (2004). Reconciliation. In E. Doxtader & C. Villa-Vicencio (Eds.), Pieces of the puzzle: Keywords on reconciliation (pp. 3–9). Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Yeong, L. H. (2013). 50 years of the ‘twin engine’: Franco-German reconciliation, European integration and reflections for Asia. EU Centre in Singapore Background Brief, 8. https://aei.pitt.edu/ 47399/1/BB08-50yearstwinengine.pdf. Accessed March 02, 2020.

Jan Hofmeyr is Programme Head for Research and Policy at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa. He forms part of the IJR’s core management team, and also serves on the executive committee of Afrobarometer, Africa’s most cited public opinion research project into social-, political, and economic governance issues. A seasoned political analyst, with extensive experience in the coordination of quantitative and qualitative research projects, Hofmeyr’s thematic portfolio covers the fields of democratisation, governance reform, peacebuilding, transitional justice, and political economy. He has led, participated, or served in an advisory capacity, in the execution of multi-country and multi-year projects, in partnership with major international donors and multilateral organisations. Jan forms part of the Bertelsmann Foundation’s International Transformation Thinkers Network, as well as the German International Cooperation Agency’s (GIZ) Global Leadership Academy International Fellows Network.

Debating the History of Franco-German Reconciliation with Third-Party Countries: A Review Corine Defrance

Abstract Over the years, France and Germany have developed a set of reconciliatory tools, some of which can be adapted by third-party countries in their own processes of reconciliation. In this chapter, I review the results of meetings I have attended in some of those countries over the course of the last 15 years. A comparative approach between the Franco-German rapprochement and those of other countries is fruitful because it enables us to understand the characteristics and mechanisms of the process and the actors involved in it. An exchange with third parties also opens up the possibility of rethinking Franco-German history from the outside. If presented as a simple success story, the narrative of reconciliation may be dismissed as “easy” by third parties. It is important to uncover the construction of antagonisms in order to refute essentialist arguments, and to recognize that rapprochement is a non-linear process that feeds on its failures as well as its success.

1 Introduction France and Germany are aware of the lesson they have learned from their history and of the exemplary value of their reconciliation. They are convinced that their models of exchange and friendly contacts at all levels of society can be fruitfully applied to South Eastern Europe. (Chirac, Jospin and Schröder 2000)

These words were spoken by French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at a bilateral summit in Mainz in June 2000. The idea of a Franco-German model that can be exported to other countries—not just to the Balkans, but also far beyond—is widespread. Even those, like Alfred Grosser, who are critical of the notion of “reconciliation” have had recourse to this so-called model (Grosser 2004). Historians and political theorists, among others, have given much thought to the participants in and vehicles of Franco-German reconciliation, to the C. Defrance (B) CNRS, University of Paris, 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_16

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various phases of the process, and to the differences between rapprochement and reconciliation. They have raised the question of the transferability of experiences (Seidendorf 2013). Furthermore, in addition to providing a theory of the processes of reconciliation, they have made a major contribution to the rejection of the simplistic idea that “methods” of reconciliation can be exported and adopted, preferring to draw attention to what is known as the “Franco-German toolbox”. The idea behind this is that third-party countries acquainted with the “tools” can choose to make use of them to ease their own tensions. This allows for a genuine “transfer,” as defined by Espagne and Werner (1988)—with importation and adaptation or hybridization. Thanks to a number of new programs, there has been an increase in the number of meetings with Franco-German experts in recent years. Specialists on the various aspects of rapprochement and issues of memory prevalent since the 1970s (Nora 1984–1992) have been particularly in demand. Historians bring to bear their knowledge and indirect experience of the past, and, because they are also specialists with respect to long-term developments, reflect on ways of applying the past to contemporary issues—to view the past through the prism of the present. This results in temporal—and spatial—transfers that require “old recipes” to be transformed rather than reproduced. Historians can thus help to provide an answer to the following decisive question: in a given spatio-temporal context, what measures and strategies can be drawn on to define and perhaps resolve current problems? This article is an overview of my experiences at the various missions and meetings I have attended since 2006, principally in Asia, Europe, and the French Overseas Departments. Having worked for a long time on the processes of rapprochement and reconciliation between France and Germany in the twentieth century (Defrance and Pfeil 2016; Cahiers SIRICE 2016; Defrance 2018), I am often invited to take part in debates and missions on the restoration of peaceful coexistence in the wake of wars and conflicts—in France, Europe, and beyond. I shall begin by examining the conditions of expertise, and then go on to explore the benefits, limits, and perhaps also the pitfalls of such ventures. The objective of this article is thus not to provide yet another theory of the transferability of the Franco-German experience based on the countries’ bilateral history, but to reflect on the prerequisites for transferability after coming together with other countries.

2 Conditions of Expertise 2.1 Initiating Meetings: French and Germans or Third-Party Countries in Conflict The nature of a “meeting” depends above all on who organizes it: a country that is emerging from a conflict and seeks to ease relations with a neighboring country— or one or more third-party countries acting as mediators. Only once, in Greece in 2015, did I take part in a workshop that was jointly organized by partners from two

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countries that were going through a crisis. Though symbolically powerful, such a case is rare because it requires a strong desire to overcome the conflict, and a certain amount of pre-existing trust between participants. The meeting was held in Athens. Societal stakeholders from Greece and Germany devoted a day to analyzing the role of Greco-German relations in the school textbooks of the two countries.1 It was a turbulent time for relations between the two nations owing to the Greek financial crisis of 2008 and the drastic conditions imposed on Greece by the German government as part of the European “rescue” of the country’s public finances. In the course of this tense period, the Greek press and government stirred up anger against Berlin by invoking the Nazi occupation of Greece during the Second World War, German crimes committed during the occupation, and the inadequacy of the reparations paid after 1945. These were very particular circumstances. Although the traumas of the past had not been adequately discussed on an official level (Rondholz 2016), the two countries had enjoyed many years of cooperation since the Second World War (and, indeed, for much of the nineteenth century). On each side, there was a network of determined people who could be depended on to ease tensions between the countries. This is reflected by the close and longstanding ties between the experienced organizers of the conference. The two German institutions (the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a political foundation with close links to the Social Democratic Party, and the association Gegen Vergessen—Für Demokratie (Against forgetting—For democracy), an independent association that seeks to promote tolerance and democracy) have make it part of their mission to participate in processes of appeasement and rapprochement. On the Greek side, the meeting was organized by Christina Koulouri from the Panteion University in Athens, a historian known for her contributions toward restoring peace and encouraging peaceful coexistence in the wake of conflicts. In the 2000s, she masterminded the “Balkan Textbook,” an educational publication containing material from a variety of countries and encouraging an interactive approach. The work was carried out by a team of committed teachers and historians from different countries on the Balkan peninsula and, thanks to the support of a European NGO, was published not only in the various languages of the region, but also in English. These volumes offer secondary school teachers a different take on the history of South-Eastern Europe, from the Ottoman conquest to the present day (Koulouri 2007, 2009, 2016). More often, the meetings I attended were organized by one side of the conflict only—a country in conflict with one or more neighboring countries. This was the case in Japan in 2009 and China in 2015, where the organizers’ objective was to take advantage of an easing of local or regional tensions in order to share knowledge and experience with their guests. In Japan in 2009, the meetings were organized by two progressive young academics, Hisaki Kenmochi and Akiyoshi Nishiyama, 1 On

November 12, 2015, a day of debate on “History Textbooks and Greco-German Relations” was organized by the Panteion University (Athens), the Archives of Contemporary Social History (ASKI, Athens), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Bonn and the Athens office), and the organization “Against Forgetting—For Democracy” (Berlin).

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who specialized in France and Germany respectively and had completed a close study of Franco-German “reconciliation”—particularly the work on a joint history book that was in progress at the time (Le Quintrec and Geiss 2006; Henri et al. 2008; Bendick et al. 2011). This Franco-German textbook has since been translated into Japanese to allow Japanese teachers to reflect on different ways of teaching the history of Japan’s painful relations with its neighbors. The two Japanese academics invited French and German colleagues and members of a wider public to join in their discussions. Indirectly, the idea was to encourage the Japanese to reflect on their school textbooks that, even today, tend to present a nationalist picture of history— and on possible ways of easing relations with China and Korea, which were attacked or colonized by the Japanese in the early twentieth century. The Nanking massacre and the “comfort women” remain open wounds and markers in the memory of the Chinese and Koreans. These wounds are kept open by the silence on or downplaying of what was done by the political authorities and a section of Japanese society.2 The memory of past conflicts is also revived by more recent regional antagonisms of an ideological, economic, and geopolitical nature. In China in 2015, the stated objective was similar. The event was jointly organized by the Chinese authorities and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in China, but the invited delegates sometimes had the impression that they had been summoned there by their Chinese colleagues to be told why the rapprochement with Japan had reached an impasse. There is much interest among the Chinese in the way that Germany—the “baddie” in the war—has faced up to its Nazi past and made rapprochement and reconciliation with its former “victims” the focus of its foreign policies (Trommler 2013). The Chinese view is that if Sino-Japanese reconciliation has come up against a stumbling block, it is because of Tokyo’s failure to make similar efforts to come to terms with its past. From a Chinese perspective, however, good neighborly relations are important, particularly for economic reasons; tensions and suspicions come at a financial and psychological price. Most often of all, however, the events I attended were Franco-German initiatives in partnership with a third-party country in a situation of conflict. These were cases of “mediation,” although there is sometimes a fine line between an offer of services from France and Germany and a third-party request for Franco-German expertise. The creation of the joint fund known as the Élysée Fund in 2003 has provided an important boost to joint cultural events in third-party countries. This fund is an effective means of promoting Franco-German cooperation outside France and Germany, and the two countries have used it to highlight their “reconciliation” as a major aspect of their common heritage. In cooperation with host country partners, the cultural and diplomatic services of France and Germany (the sole bodies authorized to present projects) have taken—and continue to take—advantage of this program to push forward debate on the past. It was as part of this program that I attended meetings

2 Mission

undertaken by Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil in Japan from November 23–29, 2009, with conferences and public debates at the Goethe-Institut, Maison Franco-Japonaise, Kyoritsu University in Tokyo (UP), University of Shizuoka (CD), and the University of Ryûkoku in Kyoto.

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in Baku in 2006 (on the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia), Cambodia in 2016 (on tensions with Vietnam), and Croatia in 2017 (on tensions with Serbia). In such cases, much of the impact of the event depends on how motivated the third-party countries are. In Baku in 2006 (at a time when the Franco-German fund was still at an experimental stage), the local partner was the very official Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, which politely welcomed the speakers and listened to them, but without giving any impression of wanting to get involved in a post-conflict process. In Croatia, on the other hand, the meeting in the small town of Petrinja was organized by a Zagreb-based NGO, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights. In Cambodia, the event was a Franco-German initiative involving several local partners from very different fields, including the Senate and the Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE) in Phnom Penh. The very different status of these two institutions and of the audiences we addressed—political stakeholders on the one hand and academics and students on the other—had a profound impact on the nature of the events.

2.2 Formal Frameworks—Informal Meetings: A Blurred Line A formal framework can prove to be something of a straitjacket, preventing or distorting debate because of the inevitable emphasis on symbolism, while a more informal framework tends to facilitate discussion. This was what our Cambodian experience showed us. A discussion organized at RULE was entitled “Culture and Education as Tools of Rapprochement and Reconciliation” and brought together four academics (German, French, Cambodian, and Vietnamese) before an openminded audience made up largely of Cambodian students.3 The result was an interactive debate, based on mutual understanding and a comparison between the Franco-German and the Cambodia-Vietnam situation. As the chairman of the debate remarked, it must have been one of the first times that a Vietnamese academic had been invited to speak to students of a Cambodian university. What is more, he had spoken in Khmer and focused his talk on his experiences as a Vietnamese student in Cambodia. A quick audience survey revealed that, although a great number of students had spent time in the U.S., a mere handful had visited neighboring Vietnam. In a lively debate with the students, the four panelists brought to bear their experience and expertise on the subject of academic collaboration. This four-way discussion was not, however, accepted by the Senate, which argued that as the Cambodia-Vietnam situation was well known, it would only be necessary to hear the presentations on Franco-German history. In the event, though, the senators’ 3 The

debate was held on May 26, 2016; the speakers were Pia Nordblom (Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz), Chheang Vannarith (co-founder and chairman of the Cambodian Institute of Strategic Studies), Nguyen Thanh Van (Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences), and myself (CNRS/Sirice, Paris).

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first questions all focused on our views of the political situation between Cambodia and Vietnam. As French and German ambassadors and diplomats were present in the audience, this created a rather delicate situation. The symbolic nature of the setup and the presence of politicians and diplomats meant that we specialists were under strong pressure to leave our area of expertise and “legitimize” the position of our host country—or risk provoking an “incident”. My colleague from the University of Mainz and I refused to be led into controversial debate, and, in the end, there was barely any discussion at the Senate on possible transfers between Franco-German and local practices. As in Baku in 2006, the debate ended up bypassing the topic that was supposed to be discussed. The Chinese mission was similarly mixed in character, with a number of “closed” meetings with representatives of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and members of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing—and some freer discussions at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). The latter was the only place where we were able to talk to Chinese and foreign students, and, rather tellingly, the discussion suddenly took off when a Japanese student asked a question in English. Until this point, all events had been held in German or Chinese with simultaneous or consecutive interpretation, but now the debate flipped into English and with this shift into a foreign language, the questions began to flow and the cultural rules of discussion were loosened. I shall end this section by mentioning a case at the other extreme of this official and constrained setting, and the only one of its kind that I have ever come across. This was a meeting held in the French Overseas Departments and Territories and was organized by NGOs. In conjunction with Tous Créoles and with the support of the Education Authority of Guadeloupe,4 La Page d’Histoire held a conference at the Schoelcher University in Martinique in April 2013. The aim was to debate Franco-German reconciliation on the one hand and, on the other, the problems of coexistence experienced by the different communities of the French Caribbean.5 By organizing and mediating such a meeting, the association raised its profile and reaffirmed its commitment to promoting peaceful coexistence, while distancing itself from communitarian trends in the Caribbean that call for segregation.

4 The

President of the Academy of Guadeloupe at the time was the Germanist Stephan Martens, an analyst of Franco-German and European relations. 5 “The Élysée Treaty: A Long Process of Rapprochement. What Can it Tell Us about Martinique?” Schoelcher University, April 6, 2013.

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3 Benefits and Limits of Meetings with Third-Party Countries It would be futile to try to quantify the benefits of these meetings on FrancoGerman reconciliation in third-party countries. None of them has had any immediate effects. The main transfers of experience—in particular the creation of offices closely modeled on the Franco-German Youth Office, established in 1963—are the result of carefully considered political decisions and exchanges between those with experience in youth groups. Examples include the German-Polish Youth Office established in 1991, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) for the Western Balkans, established in 2016, and, more recently, the German-Greek Youth Office established in 2019.

3.1 Different Types of Specialist Contributions Specialists, and especially historians, have contributed and continue to contribute to such processes of rapprochement. Take, for example, German medievalist Fritz Kern and his French colleague Jean de Pange, who launched a Franco-German history textbook project in the early 1930s. Although the project was not a success at the time, it inspired the Franco-German textbook project of the 2000s (Defrance and Pfeil 2013). More recently, a tremendous job has been done by the Balkan Textbook team (Koulouri 2007, 2009, 2016). It is, however, more difficult to gauge the impact of such specialists in other forums. The most fruitful situations are those in which Franco-German experts debate with specialist colleagues from countries in a situation of conflict. The debate at the Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE) in Phnom Penh brought this home. When asked by a student “How can we forget?” my Vietnamese colleague replied: “I think, on the contrary, that we have to remember.” This led to a series of comparisons with the Franco-German experience; despite the discrepancy in space and time and the uniqueness of each case, the debate allowed for a genuine comparison of the two processes. When discussion is free, it becomes possible to identify problems and factors of dissent together with those at grassroots level, while at the same time pinpointing initiatives that are beginning to yield results. At RULE, for example, the debate dealt not only with academic exchanges, but also with the question of coexistence in border areas, with commercial exchanges and tourism, and with the issues of minorities and migration, which play a major role in relations between Cambodia and Vietnam.

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3.2 Limits and Pitfalls of Comparison Some people appear to organize such events with the aim of convincing their guests of the uniqueness and incommensurability of the “crime” committed against them. During the mission in China, for example, several of the speakers stressed the fact that one unique aspect of the Sino-Japanese conflict made the process of reconciliation particularly difficult, namely that there were 14 years of conflict or war, from 1931— when Manchuria was invaded by the Japanese army—until 1945, and 21 million Chinese victims. Of course, each process of rapprochement is different and part of a unique constellation. It depends on a variety of factors, of which the most important are: – The nature of the conflict: the breakup of an empire presents different problems from civil wars or confrontations between nation states. – The intensity of the conflict: as my colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe often remind me, the scale of the crimes committed on the Eastern Front during the Second World War is immeasurably greater than those committed in the occupied territories in the west. – The features of the conflict: in the case of France and Germany, neither religion nor population transfer played a major role—a crucial difference from, say, the case of Greece and Turkey. Several times in the course of the discussions, we were told by the Chinese speakers that it was “easy” for France and Germany to achieve “reconciliation” because the antagonism between the two countries was not so “serious”. By putting this distance between theirs and the Franco-German case, they were, at a deeper level, expressing the difficulties they had imagining a rapprochement with Japan—difficulties inherent to the process itself. The pioneers of Franco-German rapprochement after 1945 were often condemned by their compatriots, who called them “traitors” and “new collaborators” (Defrance and Pfeil 2011). Even as late as the 1990s, city twinnings were thwarted by painful memories of the past and the burden of crimes committed in the locality (Herrmann 2019). It is thus particularly important to discuss the difficulties of this process, which is far from straightforward and inevitably punctuated by failures. In some cases, the host country seemed to have an even more insidious objective, namely to consolidate its “victim” status. Such countries made use of the FrancoGerman example to demonstrate to their guests the impossibility of reconciliation with the “aggressor” enemy. At the Academy of Sciences in Baku in 2006, for instance, a local historian responded to one of the presentations with the following argument: France was able to reach reconciliation with Germany once Alsace and Moselle had been restored. Until, therefore, Armenia has restored Nagorno Karabakh to us, we cannot begin the process of rapprochement. Even setting aside the flawed logic of this argument (restoration of territory leading to reconciliation is not equivalent to non-restoration of territory leading to non-reconciliation), it was imperative to refute this “reasoning” with an example taken from Franco-German history. The

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Saarland post-1945—not only under French occupation, but also in an economic and monetary union with France—may have been a bone of contention between France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) until well into the 1950s, but it did not present an obstacle to the overall process of rapprochement. It is, however, undeniable that the peaceful resolution of the “Saar question” and the restoration of the Saarland to Germany after the 1955 plebiscite removed a considerable obstacle to the continuation of the rapprochement between the two states and their societies.

3.3 Conveying Symbolic and Diplomatic Messages Against the Odds This example brings us to another form of exchange, and one which is not always verbalized. I refer here to the “diplomatic” messages that are conveyed in the makeup of a delegation or the format of an event. What, for example, probably impressed our Azerbaijani counterparts more than anything else at the meeting described above was the presence, alongside the historians, of specialists in the practice of FrancoGerman cooperation—and, in particular, the talk given by a German diplomat posted at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris outlining the recently established exchange program for senior French and German officials. The fact that a German is able to speak on France’s behalf—and vice versa—is a true symbol of the restored trust between the two countries. Another message was to be found in the format of the seminar on the difficulties of reconciliation and détente that was organized in China to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Rather than taking a Franco-German tandem as their partner, the Chinese (CICIR) chose a German political foundation, the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung. This choice reflects the Chinese authorities’ interest in Germany, which, largely because of its economic power, is China’s main European partner. The make-up of the foundation’s delegation is equally symbolic: a German political scientist, a Polish diplomat, and a French historian were invited to discuss Germany’s rapprochement with its neighbors and the role played by European integration.6 Faced with Chinese partners in favor of bilateralism, the German foundation chose to draw attention to Germany’s Europeanness and neighborly cooperation. In the course of the seminar, Sino-Japanese relations were presented exclusively from a Chinese perspective and the guest delegation was, largely speaking, called to bear “witness” to China’s difficult relations with Japan. Among the colleagues we met, only one was involved in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, namely the editor-in-chief of People China Magazine. Despite the tensions, he continued to advocate understanding, and paid tribute to Japanese demonstrations against Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s highly controversial past policies and his visits to the Yasukuni 6 Political scientist Hanns-Werner Maull (Trier), Polish diplomat Janusz Reiter (former ambassador

to West Germany and the U.S., and president of the Warsaw International Relations Center), and myself.

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Shrine, where the war dead are worshipped, including several dozen war criminals. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is also home to the War Museum, a mecca of Japanese nationalism and historical revisionism. Yasukuni thus crystallizes much of the tension between Japan and its neighbors with respect to memory. Most of the other Chinese colleagues gave very pessimistic presentations on the state of bilateral relations—considered almost exclusively in their inter-state dimension—and their increasing deterioration just before the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Several of them explicitly accused Japan of not doing its “work on the past”. The message was clear. It was to tell the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung that Japan is not Germany and to set the “good” and the “bad” defeated of the Second World War against each other. In the discussions, our Chinese colleagues focused their interest not on Germany’s rapprochement with its Polish and French neighbors, but on the issue of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung or “coming to terms with the past” that was practiced in West Germany—they asked questions, for example, on the federal law forbidding the glorification of Nazism. The role of European integration as a framework for and vehicle of rapprochement was repeatedly underscored by the European participants, but seemed of little interest to our hosts. European and transatlantic multilateralism—also spotlighted by the three delegation members—even provoked negative reactions because of the critical view taken by the Chinese of the role played by the U.S. and NATO in international relations. For example, a Chinese colleague argued that Greece’s participation in NATO’s interventions would have increased its debt and thus jeopardized security and peace in Europe. When the head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Beijing office summed up the debate with representatives of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he stressed the fact that West Germany’s efforts to come to terms with the past could be made only in close cooperation with its neighbors and with the goodwill of its former “victims.” In this way, he responded to the bilateralism favored by China with the European multilateralism reflected in his delegation.

3.4 Risk of Increased Tension and Boomerang Effects Debates with Franco-German specialists can sometimes highlight internal rifts in the host countries. This does not happen at officially organized and highly regulated meetings (Academy of Sciences in Baku, Cambodian Senate, Chinese institutions, etc.), but it can occur when the local partner hosting the meeting is from civil society. The partner’s point of view—and, even more so, their approach in organizing the meeting—can be the object of (sometimes violent) dispute. In Croatian Petrinja in 2017, for example, former Croatian soldiers who had fought in the war against Serbia protested against the event and against the project planned by the Zagrebbased NGO Youth Initiative for Human Rights to found a “Museum of Memory of Civilian Victims” in Petrinja and reflect “on the challenges of remembering, the questions of tolerance between ethnic communities, and the welcome and integration

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of refugees”.7 The NGO’s approach—taking into account the suffering of civilians, whether Serb or Croat, whether the dead or victims of displacement or exile—was offensive to the former Croatian soldiers. They hurled abuse at the young organizer, Mario Maži´c from Petrinja, accusing him of presenting them as “persecutors” when “we spilled our blood to defend your liberty”.8 Addressing the French diplomatic representatives, they also touched on the ambiguity of French politics at the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia and President François Mitterrand’s sympathy for Serbia. Such a move is a way of reminding those who think they can contribute to a solution that they are also, in a sense, a part of the problem. It should, however, be pointed out that in this particular case the association Youth Initiative for Human Rights would almost certainly not have managed to organize this event in Petrinja unaided. The Franco-German framework provided logistical and financial support, but, above all, it made it possible to channel tensions within Croatian society while at the same time allowing them to be expressed. In Martinique, members of the programmatically named association Tous Créoles are opposed by heavily communitarian groups. If the idea of a debate on FrancoGerman reconciliation and Creole problems of coexistence may seem surprising, the discussion turned out to be one of those that made us think more deeply on the question of transferability. While, for example, Alfred Grosser described “mixed couples” and their children as “human capital” in the Franco-German rapprochement, our Martiniquan hosts reminded us that the vast majority of them had white and black ancestors, colonizers and colonized, but that they could not be called love stories. “Interbreeding” or “métissage” was sometimes the result of rape, situations of male and colonial domination, or cultural strategies. Take, for example, the matrimonial strategy of mothers to “whiten the race”—a strategy perceived by the brothers and sons as betrayal.9 These last two examples demonstrate how much “experts” themselves can learn from such debates, to look with fresh eyes at what they think they know.

4 The Tale of “Franco-German Reconciliation” Seen from Outside I should like to end this retrospective overview by underlining the mutual benefit of a comparison between France and Germany on the one hand—their former antagonism and subsequent rapprochement—and, on the other, the situation in other countries and societies emerging from conflicts. It is by comparing the advances and difficulties of the processes of rapprochement that we gain a deeper understanding of the typical features of those processes, the actors involved, their mechanisms and limits. The 7 Author’s archives, working paper entitled “Petrinja: Sharing Memory and Citizenship,” n.d. (2017). 8 Quoted

from memory. Delsham, writer, member of the association Tous Créoles, and co-organizer of the meeting, writes widely about this topic in his work.

9 Tony

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processes are, it seems, more complex when they follow the breakup of an empire and colonial conflicts, especially asymmetrical ones. This is illustrated, for example, by the Franco-Algerian and Sino-Japanese efforts to achieve rapprochement (Rosoux 2001). National reconciliation and coexisting again are also extremely difficult after a civil war, because each side has to resume dialogue not only with the former “enemy”, but also, worse still, with the “traitor”. French and Germans ought to be aware of this.10 Discussion with third-party countries prevents us from thinking about the transferability of the so-called Franco-German model in purely Franco-German terms. It also facilitates a counter-transfer or return transfer and the opportunity to rethink FrancoGerman history from the outside. When comparing processes of reconciliation, it is common for people to stress the scale of antagonism and the extreme difficulty of the process they are caught up in. Experts on Franco-German rapprochement and, to an even greater extent, cooperation practitioners, often have a different attitude. They underline the progress made and make a show of the “reconciliation” of the two countries. The first grand orchestration of Franco-German reconciliation was surely the joint mass held in Reims cathedral on July 8, 1962, and attended by De Gaulle and Adenauer. More recent events have included commemorations of the centenary of the First World War, and the Treaty of Aachen, signed on January 22, 2019. By commemorating the Élysée Treaty of 1963 and, at the same time, supplementing it with this new treaty of cooperation, France and Germany made a common heritage site of their “reconciliation”—a heritage site with positive connotations (Defrance 2012). This may prove counterproductive, however. The tale of reconciliation, repeated ad nauseam and disconnected from the realities of Franco-German relations, risks boring French and Germans. It also has to potential to annoy third-party countries, especially those who are constantly confronted with an (often self-proclaimed) Franco-German model. It becomes clear at the meetings with third parties that this slick narrative leads them to downplay the scale of the former antagonism between France and Germany and to devalue what they see as an “easy” rapprochement. Because of this, the issues of rapprochement and reconciliation should never be raised without recalling the scale and historic significance of the conflict and the mutual trauma. Even more importantly, it is indispensable to update the mechanisms for constructing antagonism and the perception of the enemy in order to make it easier to refute essentialist arguments and deconstruct the myth of the “hereditary enemy” and “age-old hatred”. It is also crucial that we underline the difficulties and failures and the resentment that can reappear at any given moment to show that these things are inevitable, normal, and not insurmountable. Lastly, if we want to tell the story of reconciliation in all its complexity, we should talk openly about the economic competition and political tensions that are part of day-to-day cooperation.

10 Henri Rousso has shown that Franco-French reconciliation following occupation and collaboration between 1940 and 1944/45 was undoubtedly more difficult than Franco-German reconciliation (1987: 78).

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Koulouri, C. (2016). Teaching Contemporary Southeast European History (1944–2008) (Vol. 2). Thessaloniki: CDRSEE. Le Quintrec, G., & Geiss, P. (Eds.). (2006). Europa und die Welt seit 1945. Histoire–Geschichte: Deutsch-französisches Geschichtsbuch (Europe and the World since 1945. Histoire–Geschichte: Franco-German History Textbook) (Vol. 3). Stuttgart: Klett. Musée des Alliés/AlliiertenMuseum, Tout a commencé par un baiser. Les relations germano-alliées après 1945 / Es begann mit einem Kuß. Deutsch-alliierte Beziehungen nach 1945, 21 octobre 2005-19 mars 2006, Jaron Verlag, Berlin 2005 (p. 35). Nora, P. (Ed.). (1984–1992). Les lieux de mémoire (Memory Spaces) (Vol. 3). Paris: Gallimard. Rosoux, V.-B. (2001). Les usages de la mémoire dans les relations internationales: Le recours au passé dans la politique étrangère de la France à l’égard de l’Allemagne et de l’Algérie de 1962 à nos jours (The Use of Memory in International Relations: Recourse to the Past in France’s Foreign Policy Towards Germany and Algeria from 1962 Until Today). Brussels: Bruylant. Rousso, H. (1987). Vichy: Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 à nos jours (Vichy: Vichy Syndrome from 1944 Until Today). Paris: Le Seuil. Seidendorf, S. (Ed.). (2013). Le modèle franco-allemand: Les clés d’une paix perpétuelle? Analyse des mécanismes de coopération (The Franco-German Model: Keys to Perpetual Peace? Analysis of Cooperation Mechanisms). Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion. Rondholz, E. (2016). Distomo: Versöhnung ad calendas graecas? (Distomo: Reconciliation ad calendas graecas?). In C. Defrance & U. Pfeil (Eds.), Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem “Zivilisationsbruch”? Deutschland in Europa nach 1945 (pp. 261–279). Brussels: Peter Lang. Trommler, F. (2013). Kulturmacht ohne Kompass: Deutsche auswärtige Kulturbeziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert (Cultural Power Without a Compass: German Foreign Cultural Relations in the 20th century). Cologne: Böhlau

Corine Defrance is research director at the CNRS (UMR SIRICE, Paris), professor at the University of Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne and member of the LabEx EHNE, “Écrire une Histoire nouvelle de l’Europe.” Selected publications: Defrance C., Herrmann, T., & Nordblom, P. (Eds.). (2020). Städtepartnerschaften in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert (Town Twinning in Europe in the 20th Century). Göttingen: Wallstein; Defrance, C., & Pfeil, U. (Eds.). (2016). Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem “Zivilisationsbruch”? Deutschland in Europa nach 1945 (Understanding and Reconciliation after the “Break with Civilisation”? Germany in Europe after 1945). Brussels: Peter Lang; Defrance, C., Kißener, M., Nordblom, P. (Eds.). (2010). Wege der Verständigung zwischen Deutschen und Franzosen nach 1945: Zivilgesellschaftliche Annäherungen (Ways of Understanding Between Germans and French after 1945: Civil Society Approaches). Tübingen: Narr.

Post-War Reconciliation Around the World: Lessons Learned from the Franco-German Experience Claire Demesmay

Abstract If the unique nature of the Franco-German experience makes any attempt to reproduce it impracticable, that experience can nonetheless arouse interest, enthusiasm, and even a certain fascination elsewhere. Without serving as an example, it can act as a point of reference and provide useful inspiration even in very different situations. Comparisons cannot, however, supply all the answers and must be made with caution if misunderstandings are to be avoided. This means always taking into account not only the parameters of the Franco-German experience, but also the parameters of those countries where there is conflict and scope for reconciliation. The Franco-German experience may be a point of reference for countries that are still beset by regional rivalries and conflicts, but the French and Germans would do well to remind themselves of the ground they have covered.

In the course of our project, experts from several different countries analyzed the transferability of the Franco-German narrative of rapprochement and cooperation by examining it in the specific geopolitical and transcultural contexts of their own countries. They all arrived at the conclusion that the historical experience of France and Germany is unique and cannot, such as it is, be reproduced in the context of other, contemporary conflicts; it is not possible to take the rapprochement as a whole and simply duplicate it across the board. Although one-to-one translation is neither possible nor desirable, it is widely agreed that other countries can learn from the Franco-German experience, in order, for example, to “establish an East Asian reconciliation on the basis of horizontal trust” (Akiyoshi Nishiyama), to “promote regional cooperation in the Western Balkans” (Tara Tepavac), or, quite simply, to “live in peace” (Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy). If the unique nature of the Franco-German experience makes any attempt to reproduce it impracticable, that experience can nonetheless arouse interest, enthusiasm, and even a certain fascination elsewhere. Without serving as an example, it can act as a point of reference and provide useful C. Demesmay (B) German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Colin and C. Demesmay (eds.), Franco-German Relations Seen from Abroad, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55144-5_17

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inspiration even in very different situations. Comparisons cannot, however, supply all the answers and must be made with caution if misunderstandings are to be avoided. This means always taking into account not only the parameters of the Franco-German experience, but also the parameters of those countries where there are conflict and scope for reconciliation. Across the different chapters, it becomes clear that historical context played a crucial role in the rapprochement between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the height of the Cold War, it was in the interest of both countries to keep up their allegiance to the Western Alliance against the communist threat. France, moreover, wanted to maintain a certain degree of control over Germany and anchor it in the West, while at the same time creating the conditions to resist the Soviet Union and guarantee French independence. The USA, as the head of the Western camp, also played a decisive role, encouraging the two neighboring countries to forget their dispute, and backing the reconstruction of their devastated economies, notably with the help of the Marshall Plan. In other geographical contexts, meanwhile, such as India and Pakistan, the Cold War played no part in rapprochement. Nor was the objective necessity to cooperate in matters of collective security after the Cold War great enough for South Korea and Japan to overcome their bilateral tensions and join forces. One possible reason for this is that the USA played a very different role in those conflicts than in the one between France and Germany. Some authors mention Washington’s lack of a long-term strategy—as, for example, in the conflict between India and Pakistan—or even its destabilizing interventions, such as the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regional integration has contributed not only to Franco-German rapprochement, but also to its perpetuation. From the 1950s to this day, Germany and France have effectively placed their bilateral cooperation at the service of the European project and pledged their joint responsibility for it. As we are reminded in the contributions on the Netherlands and Poland in the present volume, this position riles some of their European partners, but it also creates expectations that France and Germany cannot disappoint. In a way, the European process played a similar role in the rapprochement between Serbia and Croatia; regional cooperation is one condition of their accession to the European Union (EU)—and France and Germany have themselves played a part in the integration process, helping to set up the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), an organization established in 2016 to promote youth exchanges in six Western Balkan states. A major difference, however, is that in the Balkans the pressure comes from outside—from Brussels and the major European capitals. There has, especially in recent years, been little sense of responsibility on the part of the countries themselves. Indeed, in most of the cases discussed in this book, regional cooperation is, despite its importance, either non-existent or at a very early stage of development; this commendable and, from a rational point of view, apparently necessary objective conceals a host of political and economic obstacles. Morocco and Algeria, for example, had to dismantle large parts of their economic systems before they could engage in any form of cooperation. One issue that crops up repeatedly in the discussion on reconciliation is the balance of power. In the case of France and Germany, the symmetry of the actors was,

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of course, relative to begin with, because France left the Second World War one of the victors, while Germany was morally and economically bankrupt, occupied by the Allies, and deprived of its sovereignty. The establishment of a democratic system, however, and the reconstruction of the German economy restored a degree of equilibrium between the former enemies, all the stronger for the comparable size of the two countries.1 This is not always the case. The equal status of two nations can have the opposite effect and fuel their rivalry, as with Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are locked in bitter competition for regional leadership. As a rule, however, reconciliation between equals seems easier than when power is less evenly distributed—especially when the imbalance is linked to a colonial conflict as, for example, with Japan and South Korea. Here, the relationship of domination and exploitation between colonizer and colonized stifles any talk of reconciliation between patriotic soldiers. The Israeli– Palestinian conflict follows a similar logic because of the occupation of territories and the Palestinians’ sense of vulnerability in the face of the powerful Israeli army. The same is true—although the situation is different again—of the transition in South Africa, where racial oppression is connected to apartheid. Moreover, as Corine Defrance remarks at the end of this book, reconciliation following civil war, as in Rwanda, is particularly complex, because here even one’s fellow citizens are potential traitors. There are various paths to reconciliation, but all of them are precarious and risky. This makes it all the more important for political leaders to initiate rapprochement without regard for the majority opinion of their countries. French President Charles de Gaulle, for example, helped turn the page on the Franco-German dispute by extending his hand to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, despite the imbalance between the two states and the negative public image that each nation had of the other. The understanding between the two men was almost certainly enhanced by their shared ideas and common religious faith, but the deciding factor was their determination to overcome collective resentment. In the years that followed, the two countries’ heads of state and government continued to add to the political iconography of the Franco-German friendship with a plethora of symbols referring to sites of common memory and contributing to a mutual positive perception. Before such a process can be initiated, it is, of course, indispensable that the conflict has already been resolved politically. In a number of cases, however— Ukraine and Russia, for example, or Israel and Palestine—this condition has not been met. Nor is it the only necessary condition. Even in the absence of open conflict, suspicion and mutual accusations are often enough to deter any attempt at political rapprochement. In Serbia and Croatia, for example, the coming to power of nationalist movements in 2012 corresponded with a deterioration in bilateral relations in the years that followed. Similarly, mutual distrust in Morocco and Algeria has made it necessary to regard the “status quo as the safest option” (Idriss Jebari). In such 1 In

reality, this equilibrium was based on a double imbalance: Germany’s economic and financial power versus France’s foreign policy and (thanks to its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council) ambitious defense policy. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, this equilibrium shifted once again, provoking a discussion on France’s disengagement and Germany’s dominant position within the couple.

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circumstances, it is rare to find political leaders who are prepared to pay a heavy political price for their courage. Competing memories further complicate the task of reconciliation and present a considerable obstacle to a cooperative approach, be it the joint management of regional challenges by two rival states or a “more inclusive and equitable distribution of economic resources” (Jan Hofmeyr) within a society, as in South Africa. Working on the past is a long and painful process. Despite what is commonly believed, Germany’s efforts to come to terms with its Nazi past were not the first step in its rapprochement with France, and it was only in the second half of the 2000s that the first volume of the Franco-German history textbook was published. In some situations, it can be necessary to forget the past, at least for a time—and on the condition that both sides wish to resolve the conflicts. However, if patience is essential, incompatible historical narratives are counterproductive, especially those that are characterized by nationalism, fuel hatred of others, or encourage victimization. In a number of regions marked by tensions, such as South East Asia and the Balkans, historians have applied themselves to producing joint history books. These are of great symbolic significance; although (like the Franco-German textbook) they are not much used, they have the merit of providing a multiperspectivist approach to history and facilitating differences of opinion. The main thing, as Nicolas Moll points out in this book, is to discuss the different historical narratives that exist—even before trying to agree on a common history. When a conflict has been going on for years or even decades, it can be difficult to break the vicious circle of animosity in which public opinion and political leadership feed off each other. In the case of France and Germany, representatives of civil society—many of them from Jewish families and survivors of Nazi persecution— played a significant part in initiating this change. This was true, for example, of Joseph Rovan, who was barely out of Dachau concentration camp in 1945 when he penned a piece for the magazine Esprit that was to become the manifesto of Franco-German rapprochement. Convinced that French policy toward Germany would determine the way in which Germany—and thus Europe—developed, he called on his compatriots to reconcile themselves with their neighbors rather than hold grudges. The enthusiastic men and women who organized the first meetings of young Franco-Germans in 1948 were also a long way ahead of the political deciders of their countries. To this day, stakeholders in civil society and cultural life play a crucial role in the process of rapprochement; the case studies in this book present a range of different approaches. While the social dimension is largely absent from the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Western Balkans boasts a network of intellectuals, artists, and activists who continued to cooperate even in the darkest hours of the conflict. Several experts have stressed the potential of such exchanges, especially when political dialogue is at a standstill. For example, there can, in principle, be an “intensification of possible contacts” (Dong-Ki Lee) between Japanese and South Koreans, despite the political tensions between the two states. Moreover, while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine makes it difficult to organize civil society exchanges, the reactivation of city twinning will contribute to “stabilizing and accelerating the process of reconciliation” (Alla Paslawska), if the conflict is ever resolved. That said, if such initiatives are

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not institutionalized like the Franco-German youth exchanges, their political impact is likely to remain limited. To conclude, let us remember that the Franco-German narrative of rapprochement and cooperation is by no means definitive. The rise of nationalism and egoistic impulses within the EU is weakening the system of Franco-German dialogue and undermining the traditional representative compromises between the two countries. France and Germany’s response is to put the emphasis on continuity; in the Treaty of Aachen of January 2019, they provided new mechanisms to supplement and update the “software” of the past decades by stepping up policy coordination, facilitating cross-border coordination, and encouraging exchanges between citizens. Their reiterated commitment to close bilateral cooperation does not, however, provide them with a guarantee against the tensions or difficulties involved in finding an ambitious solution for Europe. Even today, Franco-German rapprochement requires energy, imagination, and goodwill on both sides of the Rhine. The Franco-German experience may be a point of reference for countries that are still beset by regional rivalries and conflicts, but the French and Germans would do well to remind themselves of the ground they have covered.

Claire Demesmay is head of the “France/Franco-German Relations” programme at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. Her research focuses on Franco-German cooperation in European policy, as well as on French and German foreign policy. Before joining the DGAP in 2009, she worked at the Chair of French and Francophone Studies at the Technical University of Dresden (1998–2002), then as a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri) in Paris (2002–2009). She holds her Ph.D. in political philosophy from the University of Paris 4-Sorbonne and the Technical University of Berlin. Selected publications: Demesmay, C. (2018). Idées reçues sur l’Allemagne. Un modèle en question (Common preconceptions about Germany. A model in question). Paris: Le cavalier bleu; Calla, C. & Demesmay, C. (2013). Que reste-t-il du couple franco-allemand? (What remains of the Franco-German couple?). Paris: Documentation française; Franco-German Parliamentary Prize 2016.