France and the Exploitation of China: A Study in Economic Imperialism, 1885-1901 0195827082, 9780195827088

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Maps
Tables
Abbreviations
1 France and China in the Nineteenth Century
Part I The Diffusion of Investment in Northern and Central China
2 The Quest for Industrial Hegemony 1885-1896
3 The Struggle for the Beijing-Hankou Railway Concession, 1896-1898
4 The Implementation and Consequences of the Beijing-Hankou Concession
5 Banking, Industry, and the Russian Alliance, 1895-1901
Part II Economic Penetration versus Territorial Control: France and South-western China
6 Early Attempts at Penetration and the Longzhou Railway, 1885-1899
7 French Initiatives in Yunnan, 1895-1898
8 Doumer’s Ambitions versus Mattress Diplomacy in Yunnan, 1899
9 Railways and Mining: Steps towards Anglo-French Co-operation in Yunnan, 1900-1901
10 Conclusion
Notes
Notes to Chapter 1
Notes to Chapter 2
Notes to Chapter 3
Notes to Chapter 4
Notes to Chapter 5
Notes to Chapter 6
Notes to Chapter 7
Notes to Chapter 8
Notes to Chapter 9
Notes to Chapter 10
Glossary of Chinese Names
Bibliography
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Holdings of the National Archives
Archives of the Ministry for Finances
Contemporary Books and Pamphlets
Selected Contemporary Articles
More Recent Articles
Index

Citation preview

F R A N C E A N D T H E E X P L O IT A T IO N O F C H IN A 1885-1901 A ST U D Y IN E C O N O M IC IM P E R A L IS M

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF

CHINA 1885-1901 A Study in Economic Imperialism

ROBERT LEE

HONG KONG

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD

NEW YORK

1989

Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto PetalingJaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan

© Oxford University Press 1989 A ll rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission o f Oxford University Press ' O xford*is a trade mark o f Oxford University Press

First published 1989 Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, Inc., New York

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Lee, Robert, 1952France and the exploitation o f China, 1885-1901: a study in economic imperialism. 1. China, 1644-1912 1. Title 95V.03 ISBN 0-19-582708-2 Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lee, Robert S. (Robert Stuart), 1952France and the exploitation o f China: a study in economic imperialism, 1885-1901 / Robert S. Lee. p. cm. — (East Asian historical monographs) Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-19-582708-2 1. Investments, French — China — History — 19th century. 2. China — Economic conditions, 1644-1912. 3. France — Colonies — Asia. 1. Title. II. Series. HG5472.L44 1989 332.6*7344051 — dc20 89-23196 CIP

Printed in Hong Kong by Liang Yu Printing Factory Ltd. Published by O xford University Press, Warwick House, Hong Kong

To Ceridwen

‘l’heure était venue de substituer aux gén­ éraux et aux amiraux, l’ingénieur et le banquier qui sont aujourd’hui les vrais conquérants de la Chine.’ Auguste Gérard, 1897

Preface

I mperialism remains a lively historiographical issue a generation after the dissolution of the European territorial empires in Africa and Asia. Most of this English-language historiography draws its empirical evidence from the British imperial experience and emphasizes formal territorial empires, that is the vast number of relatively undeveloped states which were either conquered or obliged to acknowledge European suzerainty, mostly during the nineteenth century. Yet France was, after Britain, the world’s second greatest imperial power, and, together with her ally Russia was Britain’s only serious rival in formal empire-building on the Asian main­ land. Moreover imperialism was not confined to formal empire; and Latin America, the Ottoman empire, and China, all of which preserved their political integrity and sovereignty during the period of the territorially acquisitive ‘new imperialism’, were deeply affected by the aggressive aspirations of the industrialized Western world. This book, then, is an attempt to correct two imbalances in the English-language historiography of imperialism, and so concen­ trates on France, the second imperial nation, and China, then as now the world’s most populous state, then as now perceived in the West as a potentially vast market, and then perceived by some in the West as a potential field for further territorial conquest. France, whose domestic economy was very different from that of Britain, naturally had different imperial aspirations and different means of achieving them. Hence the interaction between France and China differed greatly from that of Britain and China, and this book seeks to illuminate some of those differences. I wrote the book using mostly French archival sources, although I also consulted British archives. A study of imperialism is almost by definition Eurocentric, since it was the European powers which constantly took the initiative in attempting to resolve their economic and social tensions through the domination of weaker societies. Nevertheless I have sought to give some consideration to Chinese responses and so owe a great debt to a large historio-

viii

PREFACE

graphy on Chinese affairs, much of which has been produced by the Harvard school. The sources consulted have used a wide variety of systems of transliteration of Chinese names. Most English-language sources have used a combination of Wade-Giles and Post Office forms. Late nineteenth-century French documents sometimes used these forms, sometimes standard French orthography, or a variant thereon, often a combination of all three. In this book pinyin forms have been used throughout, including quotations. All French quotations have been translated into English and their Chinese names rendered in pinyin. However in titles, both in the notes and bibliography, the original forms have been maintained. A list of Chinese names, listing pinyin, Wade-Giles or Post Office, and French forms is included in a glossary and should resolve any difficulties. A less troublesome problem has been the changes in some geographical names over the last century. The rule I have followed is that purely geographical names have been rendered in their modem forms, whereas names with a political content have retained their contemporary forms. Thus the metropolitan prov­ ince of China appears as Zhili, its name prior to 1912, not Hebei, its present name, while the capital of Yunnan is always Kunming, its modern name, not Yunnanfu. There are a few exceptions to this rule: Annam is offensive to modem Vietnamese, so Vietnam is substituted; the Chang Jiang is here described as the Yangzi Jiang in the interests of easy recognition; and for the same reason the Namti River retains its French and Vietnamese rather than any Chinese name. The Hong Ha always appears with its Vietnamese name, even though in China it is called the Yuan Jiang and it is more familiar to English-language readers as the Red River. ‘Our Hong Ha’ unfortunately lacks the imperial resonance of ‘notre fleuve Rouge’, but is more appropriate in a modem translation. The book had its origins as a doctoral thesis written at the University of Sydney. I was then the recipient of an Australian Commonwealth Government Postgraduate Award. I am indebted both to the Commonwealth Department of Education and to the University, in particular the History Department’s Postgraduate Studies Committee, for their support in undertaking the research, especially in enabling me to spend a year in Paris. The trans­ formation of the thesis into a book was mostly done while I was on study leave from my teaching at what was then the Macarthur

PREFACE

ix

Institute of Higher Education and I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Western Sydney, Macarthur for their support and encouragement with the project. While on study leave in Paris I was able to stay at the premises of the Institut francophone de Paris, and I wish to express my gratitude to M. Michel Fleury, Mme Françoise Auffray, and the staff of the Institut for their warm welcome, support, and assistance. M. Michel Bruguière, whose pioneering research on the Chemin de fer du Yunnan deserves wider recognition in the anglophone world, was most generous with his time and was a source of much information on the topic. The assistance and unfailing good humour of the archival staff in the French Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Overseas France, as well as in the Archives Nationales are also gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are due to a few people whose involvement with the book has been more intimate. Dr Bruce Fulton of the University of Sydney supervised the original thesis on which it is based. My mother has been a marvellous typist and both my father and my wife, Ceridwen, have provided helpful and learned crit­ ical comments. This book would not have been written without these people’s support, but its failings are certainly my own responsibility. R obert L ee Sydney December 1988

Contents

Preface Maps Tables Abbreviations 1 France and China in the Nineteenth Century Part I

6 7 8 9 10

1

The Diffusion o f Investment in Northern and Central China

2 The Quest for Industrial Hegemony, 1885-1896 3 The Struggle for the Beijing-Hankou Railway Concession, 1896-1898 4 The Implementation and Consequences of the Beijing-Hankou Concession 5 Banking, Industry, and the Russian Alliance, 1895-1901 Part II

vii xii xiii xiv

29 56 83 110

Economic Penetration versus Territorial Control: France and South-western China

Early Attempts at Penetration and the Longzhou Railway, 1885-1899 French Initiatives in Yunnan, 1895-1898 Doumer’s Ambitions versus Mattress Diplomacy in Y unnan,1899 Railways and Mining: Steps towards Anglo-French Co-operation in Yunnan, 1900-1901 Conclusion

230 267

Notes Glossary o f Chinese Names Bibliography Index

275 316 320 349

141 174 200

Maps

1 The Beijing-Hankou Railway and Connecting Lines 2 South-west China Railway Construction, 1890-1910

88 157

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.1

Percentages of Commodities Traded between Britain and France, 1888 Percentage of French Exports of Various Products Produced in Eleven Industrial Nations, 1899 Destination of Exports of Various European Countries by Percentage Percentages of Silk Sold by the Largest Suppliers to the Lyon Industry, 1865-1899 French Trade with China, 1890-1899 Chinese Trade with Britain, Germany, and France in Francs, 1895 China’s Foreign Trade : Imports, Exports, and Silk Exports, 1885-1900 Western Industrial Equipment Ordered in Tianjin, 1886-1890

16 17' 18 21 22 22 24 33

Abbreviations

AN Ch. de D. C.P. Dép. Dép. com. Dép. pol. DDF

FO HMSO IC IN

y. o.

MAE MC MF n.d. NF n.p. NS s.d. s. n. Tél. t. v.

Archives nationales Chambre des Députés Correspondance politique Dépêche Dépêche commerciale Dépêche politique France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Com­ mission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, Documents diplo­ matiques français (1871-1914) United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Archives Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Indo-Chine Imprimérie nationale France, Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel. Débats parlementaires Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Archives of the Ministère de Colonies (now Dé­ partement de la France d’Outre-Mer) Archives of the Ministère des Finances ho date nouveaux fonds no page nouvelle série sans date sans numéro Télégramme tome volume

1

France and China in the Nineteenth Century

T he period from 1885 until the end of the century marks both the final phase of French territorial expansion on China’s frontiers and the beginnings of serious French exploitation of China herself. It begins with the acquisition of Tonkin and ends with the movement towards Anglo-French co-operation in the exploitation of the south-western Chinese province of Yunnan. Despite the drama of these years and despite the changes the period brought in France’s role in East Asia, French imperialism in China at this time has not been the subject of any recent substantial published study.1 The French conquest of Tonkin (1883-5) was something of a watershed. It was undertaken not so much for the value of Tonkin itself but rather to establish a safe, convenient, and profitable trading route into south-western China. Although some French citizens regarded Tonkin as opening the way for further conquests at China’s expense, in a very real sense its conquest had been undertaken not in a spirit of territorial acquisitiveness, but with an eye to the commercial and other economic prospects it would open in China. As it turned out, France’s possession of Tonkin, in spite of considerable and sustained efforts by the French government, did little to improve her poor commercial position in China. After 1885, however, other French economic interests in China, especially investments, expanded considerably, and accelerated rapidly after China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. This process was started, to some extent, as a result of the terms of the treaty which, from the point of view of international law, ended the war of con­ quest. But the growing importance of investment was the result partly of the inability of French industry to produce cheaply the European goods which were in demand in China; partly of the need for French capital to find outlets abroad; partly of the im­ plementation of official policy which encouraged such investment; and partly of China’s political and economic problems which,

2

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

especially after 1895, obliged her to look to Western powers for capital. This growth in investment and the interaction between private interests and government policy which helped to produce it is one of the major themes of this book. A second is the continuing neo­ mercantilist attempt to use Tonkin to create a favourable, indeed quasi-monopolistic trading position in southern and south-western China. A third concerns the subordination of territorial ambitions to broader economic considerations. Until the end of the century there was a strong and widely held belief that France itself should annex part of the Chinese empire. Many of those who hoped to achieve this aim were resident in Indo-China. Paul Doumer, who was Governor-General in Hanoi at the crucial period, is the most notable example. Contrary to such ambitions was the growing conviction that French interests would best be served by seeking to exploit, in competition and if necessary in association with other powers, the entire Chinese empire rather than by attempting to conquer, govern, and exploit a part of that empire. This policy of maintaining Chinese inde­ pendence found powerful support in the diplomatic and business milieux of Paris. In the end it was the outlook of the métropole which triumphed. The final decision was not taken until late in 1899. The spec­ tacular events in Beijing during the following year, despite their enormous impact on popular European consciousness of China, in no way altered that decision. For this reason, the Boxer Rebellion does not play a large role in this account. Many local factors beyond French control, notably the attitudes of other imperialist powers and the resistance of the Chinese people and government, helped to decide French policy, but, ultimately, the French government gave priority to economic considerations. As opposi­ tion to annexation on the part of these economically minded decision-makers increased, there occurred what was both a re­ version to earlier mercantilist attitudes to Asia and an anticipa­ tion of the modem type of exploitation of weak nations which Dr Sukarno would later call neo-imperialism. The emphasis placed on the economic impulses for French policy in China is not intended to deny that other factors such as national pride or religious zeal were at work. They were, but the evidence suggests that they were not decisive. Both these factors, for example, were at play in the maintenance of the so-called

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

3

French religious Protectorate in China. Although an imperial edict according Chinese Christians certain rights had been issued under French pressure in 1846, the Protectorate only dated from the Tianjin and Beijing treaties of 27 June 1858 and 25 October 1860. The pretext for the French invasion which led to those treaties was the murder of a priest, père Chapdelaine in Guangxi. His residence there was quite illegal, but that technicality did not worry Napoleon III, whose aim was, as an anti-clerical republican succinctly put it, ‘to use the religious protectorate as a counter­ weight to the influence England exercised through her trade’.2 The relevant clauses obliged .China to protect Catholic missionaries and not to indulge in anti-Christian propaganda. In reality it was a Chinese Protectorate of missions, but France supervised that Protectorate and issued Catholic missionaries’ passports. The papacy never formally asked for nor granted France the Pro­ tectorate of Catholics in China, but on the whole accepted its reality with gratitude. The Protectorate did have a certain logic: about three-quarters of the Catholic missionaries in China were French and 19 of the 40 missions in the country were under French control.3 Except for a Portuguese bishop in Macao, the church in China had no terri­ torial-organization. Each mission was led by a monsignor, chief of whom was Alphonse Favier in Beijing. He once assured a French diplomat that ‘the Government can count on me and my coadjutor who are, by the grace of God, good Frenchmen who in our church business will never forget the primordial interests of France in China’.4 He was as good as his word, and when in 1886,1893, and again in 1900, Leo XIII considered sending an apostolic legate to Beijing, Favier, successfully opposed the moves.5 Like normally anti-clerical French politicians, he realized that such a move would much weaken the force of the French Protectorate. The 1886 pro­ posal was the most serious and provoked the strongest French reaction. The initiative for direct diplomatic relations between the Vatican and China came from the Chinese side. Li Hongzhang, who had negotiated the Treaty of Tianjin which ended the SinoFrench War in 1885, floated the idea with the clear aim of weakening French influence. The Vatican was receptive to the proposal and Leo even nominated an Italian, Monsignor Agliardi, to the Beijing post. The French reaction, however, was swift and savage. Despite his belief that relations between the Church and the secular republic should be improved, Foreign Minister Charles

4

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

de Freycinet threatened to withdraw the ambassador to the Holy See the moment Agliardi left for Beijing. Leo, who shared de Freycinet’s concern for improved relations, backed down. In defending his actions, de Freycinet provided the classical re­ publican defence of the Protectorate: In acting thus, the government is not pursuing an aim of religious propa­ ganda, which is as opposed to its principles as to the rules which govern politics at the moment; we are only proposing to use the relations and incessant progress accomplished by the missionaries among the Chinese people for the benefit of the name of France. Our trade in China has not grown sufficiently for us to create these predominant interests, and we must recognize that if we renounce the Protectorate of Catholic missions, our role in the Celestial Empire will in fact be considerably lessened.6

Nevertheless, the religious Protectorate continued to sit un­ easily with the secular and frequently anti-clerical quality of the Third Republic. Jules Ferry once described it as (only a burden with no compensations’, and in 1893 Foreign Minister CasimirPerier supported the papal proposal for an apostolic legation in Beijing. His successor, Gabriel Hanotaux, however, rallied to the Protectorate and the bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry consist­ ently supported it, in the opinion of one observer, because they feared any loss of influence, in the opinion of another, because of the malign influence of ‘the irresponsible clerical camarilla which runs the Quai d’Orsay’.7 Camarilla or not, the Ministry’s views were clearly expressed in advice it gave to Delcassé when he was asked in the Chamber to justify subsidies to religious orders in China. It argued two points, which were both doubtful. Firstly, ‘it is manifest that the requests to our representatives for support from all sides . . . can only fortify our prestige in the eyes of the Chinese and consequently contribute to support our views so far as general French policies in the Far East are concerned’. Secondly, the missions taught French in their schools and ‘French language education is one of the most powerful means for facilitating our penetration into the regions neighbouring on our Indo-Chinese possessions’.8 This ‘prestige’ could be a dangerous thing, for while the missions had a high public profile in China, they were never especially popular and generally provoked resentment which often flared into violence. The destruction of the cathedral of Notre Dame in Tianjin and massacre of Chinese Christians and some foreigners

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

5

including the French Consul on 21 June 1870 were early and notor­ ious examples of such hostility. Auguste Gérard, Minister in Beijing from 1894 to 1897, was determined to use the reconstruc­ tion of the church in 1897 as a symbol not only of Chinese expiation but also of the French prestige to which his colleagues in Paris were prone to allude. The church rejoiced in the name of Notre Dame des Victoires and the tombs of the ‘martyrs’ of 1870 were placed in the lateral naves. Gérard insisted on a spectacular inauguration on the anniversary of the riots despite popular rumours that the foundations were laid on the bodies of stolen children. Similar rumours had prompted the riot a quarter of a century earlier. The Chinese authorities, terrified of the threat to order that Gérard’s stipulations would pose, beheaded a man accused of stealing children, issued notices exonerating the priests, and moved so many troops into Tianjin that it looked like ‘a city under siege’. Marines from a French gunboat provided an honour guard, but a British offer to provide a further honour guard was declined with thanks, as Gérard believed that ‘the ceremony had to conserve a clearly French character and it was inappropriate to show the English colours beside ours’.9 Gérard felt that the whole event was a great demonstration of national prestige in the face of popular hostility, but many other Frenchmen would agree with J.L. de Lanessan, a former Resident-General in Tonkin, in questioning the efficacy of such a performance. ‘There are other’, and he implied, better ‘means than missions for establishing in China the prestige of France’. He argued that the Protectorate brought France much trouble and no prestige, if anything, quite the reverse. For when British, American, or German diplomats talked to the Chinese, it was normally about commercial or industrial matters of some genuine interest to all but the most reactionary Chinese politicians. But all too often French diplomats merely talked about missionaries, whom the Chinese despised. For although there were about 700,000 Chinese Catholics, there was amongst them ‘not one scholar, not a sole man enjoying the least influence in his village’.10 In fact, this was an exaggeration and influential Chinese Catholics did exist, including Jing Zhang, Minister in Paris during the late 1890s, but they were few in number and most educated Chinese found Christianity distasteful. The anti-clerical journalist, Paul Boell, spoke for many in both France and China when he asserted that the missionaries were singularly poor agents of French or

6

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

Western civilization because they taught obscurantist nonsense.11 Auguste François, a former Prefect and Consul in southern China, was one of those most critical of the Protectorate. While travelling to his post at Longzhou in Guangxi at the end of 1896, he met a young missionary fresh from Paris, dressed in Chinese clothes but speaking not a word of the language, accompanied only by a Chinese guide who was not a Catholic and who spoke neither French nor Latin. The ill-prepared priest, père Mazel, was headed into wild and inhospitable country. François was not suprised to hear that within a few months Mazel had been murdered. When he reached Longzhou he found the vicar apostolic of the province, Monsignor Chouzy, living at the consulate because amongst the ‘completely hostile population’ no one would sell or even lease him a house. François believed that missionary activity, because of the overt hostility it aroused, was contrary to wider French interests in China. ‘French religious and commercial interests are in a sense opposed to each other’, he suggested, also because missionaries ‘consider the establishment of our nationals in China as harmful to their own influence’. 12 Other Consuls may not have been as harsh or direct in their judgements, but were also constantly aware of the difficulties of supervising the Protectorate. The Berthémy Convention of 20 February 1865 permitted missionaries to buy buildings, but this right was often contested by local populations, sometimes with litigation, sometimes more crudely by arson. The arrogance of missionaries often exacerbated social tensions, so Chinese officials both despised and feared them. It was the unenviable and unceas­ ing task of French Consuls, who were often ideologically hostile to both parties, to mediate between the two. In cases of murders of missionaries or serious injury to them or their property, French demands typically were threefold: exemplary punishment of the culprits either in the cangue or by beheading; demotion of ‘negligent’ local officials; and payment of an indemnity, which, until 1897, was usually fairly modest. At times these demands would be reinforced by the visit of a French gunboat to the scene of the incident. The activities of enthusiastic but ignorant missionaries and arrogant converts who sought to use their adopted religion to flout Chinese law and social norms meant that conflict was frequent. In 1896, a Consul in Hankou reported that for the first time since 1891 he had no missionary claims outstanding in the area for which

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

7

the consulate was responsible. Georges Dubail, having coped with problems of missionaries' ‘doubtful titles' and their ‘perhaps excessive zeal’, thought all issues resolved when he left his post at Shanghai in August 18%, but his successor Georges Servan de Bezaure, found that they all resurfaced to plague him. The work also had its hazards: in 1897 Frédéric Haas, Consul at Chongqing, was ordered to the Tibetan frontier to resolve a dispute involving missionaries. He succeeded, but in the process contracted fever and a liver abcess which forced his repatriation.13 The difficulties the Protectorate created for French diplomacy prompted many to question its value. Stephen Pichon, who followed Gérard as Minister in Beijing, was not one of its critics. In fact he ardently defended it. But even he was forced to admit that: ‘The religious Protectorate absorbs the bulk of our diplo­ matic activity in China and . . . it is, as a result, the principal source of our expenses here.’ While he took pride in the fact that France was the only power willing to help Chinese Catholics, the resources this absorbed worried him. He therefore suggested that the Legation take two per cent of any indemnity paid to missions to defray expenses. Paris told him that the idea was illegal and could not be considered. Nevertheless its very conception is evidence of the frustration the Protectorate could create even in the minds of its supporters.14 Although the Protectorate brought only the vaguest and most dubious benefits to French diplomacy in return for the labour, expense, and aggravation its supervision entailed, it did provoke jealousy on the part of other powers and also resentment from the Chinese. In November 1889 both Germany and Italy asked France if they could issue passports to their own nationals who went to China as missionaries. Foreign Minister Goblet replied that France had no wish to impose her protection on anybody, and thereafter the Protectorate was to some extent shared.15 Germany was most solicitous of the German Catholic missionaries in southern Shandong, although their head, Father Anzer, found his government less concerned for his Chinese converts than the French had been.16 Ironically imperial Germany, the only country seriously to challenge the French Protectorate, was even less Catholic than the Third Republic. The curious dual protection of Anzer’s mission by a Protestant monarchy and a secular republic ended dramatically. In November 1897 two of Anzer’s German colleagues were

8

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

murdered. The event was used by the German government as a pretext to claim massive compensation. It demanded, and re­ ceived, an indemnity of 222,000 taels (compared with the 15,000 taels paid in the Mazel case), the lease of south Shandong’s best port, Qingdao, and two railway concessions.17 The incident marked not only the beginning of the struggle for concessions, but also the beginning of the end of the French Protectorate. Early in 1898 France agreed no longer to intervene in support of Catholics in southern Shandong, but at the same time the French felt they had to emulate the extravagance of German compensation claims. Thus when père Berthelot and two Chinese followers were killed in Guangxi, the French demanded a railway concession and con­ struction of an expiatory chapel as well as the usual three forms of amend. The murders thus became bargaining points in the struggle for French penetration into the provinces bordering on Tonkin.18 The relative moderation of French demands following Berthelot’s murder compared with German reaction to the Shandong murders was largely the result of very real French fear at the manic pace of the ‘scramble for concessions’ which the German moves had precipitated. But if the ‘scramble’ worried the French, it was devastating for the Chinese government, whose policy of playing the imperialist powers off against each other had gone disastrously wrong. In an attempt to recover the political initiative and to ensure that missionary difficulties would never again provide the pretext for such wild demands, an Imperial Decree of 15 March 1899 recognized Catholicism and allowed clergy to make direct contact with local officials. This would reduce the level of involvement of French Consuls and also provide local Chinese officials with an incentive to settle minor disputes involving missions as quickly and as fairly as possible.19 Its general effect was to augment the legal status of Catholicism in China while weakening the French Protectorate. The Quai d ’Orsay, however, still held that the Protectorate was of value. As one bureaucrat wrote with exquisite hypocrisy as late as April 1900: While other powers only seek material advantages in China, we are undertaking there a civilizing task which, far from prejudicing our economic interests, can only assist in their development, for it furnishes effective opportunities to demand not only fair compensation but at the same time the settlement of industrial or commercial matters.20

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

9

The folly of that argument was about to be proved, for a savage Chinese popular reaction to the symbiotic cultural and economic aggression of the West was fermenting. More than any Imperial Decree, the Boxers, ignorant and obscurantist as they were, amply demonstrated the hazards of close identification with missionary endeavours. Together with the religious Protectorate, the treaties of 1844, 1858, and 1860 conferred on France the privileges of the most­ favoured-nation clause, under the terms of which France shared in the commercial and other advantages secured from China by third powers, in effect by Great Britain. This assured France equality of access to the treaty ‘ports’ of China, where French merchants could conduct trade on the same terms as those from other countries. These privileges remained the legal basis of French activity in China until the almost simultaneous collapse both of the French empire in East Asia and of the Third Republic itself. The argument that economic factors bore most heavily on decision-making processes implies something of a Eurocentric ap­ proach to imperialism. The relative importance of events on the periphery of European expansion, and of events and pressures operating in the metropolitan power, have been the subject of a considerably recent historiography.21 As an Australian, that is a citizen of a former British colony which, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries greatly influenced British policy in the Pacific, the present writer is unlikely to underestimate the significance of the periphery. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the French population of Indo-China, consisting mainly of officials and soldiers, was not nearly as powerful a force as, for example, the British populations of Australasia or South Africa.22 Although there was a relatively strong and talented corps of milit­ ary officers in Tonkin after 1885, these men were never able to become a peripheral force which actually determined policy, as were their colleagues in the Western Sudan.23 Some certainly tried but the verdant plateaux and malarial valleys of Yunnan were destined not to experience the fate of the sands of the Western Sudan. The importance of peripheral factors is rightly emphasized in the case of the Gamier affair by Ella Laffey.24 But the Gamier affair in a very real sense ultimately came to nothing. Whatever its value to propagandists and romantics, it did not lead to any extension of French territorial control, nor even to any real

10

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

improvement in conditions for French commerce. The decision to conquer Tonkin was taken not in Saigon but, as Kim Munholland argues, in Paris, extraordinarily enough by the Minister respons­ ible, Admiral Jauréguiberry.25 Furthermore, this work will argue that the decision not to conquer Yunnan was similarly taken in Paris, similarly by the Minister responsible, and in spite of strong peripheral pressure to do so.26 Despite its great causal importance in Africa and the Pacific, the periphery was less significant in the formulation of French policy in East Asia. Even historians who have taken a Eurocentric approach to French imperialism in East Asia, however, have tended to emphasize factors other than the economic impulses which to this writer seem dominant. Thus, in an important analysis Henri Brunschwig argues that imperial expansion was essentially part of the French search for a prestige which had been lost in 1870.27 In support of this contention he produces statistics which indicate the very small percentage of French trade with and investment in her colonies.28 He acknowledges the existence of economic pressure groups and the use of economic arguments in support of the establishment of empire, but suggests that these date from Jules Ferry’s defence of the acquisition of Tonkin in July 1885, in which Ferry appealed to Tonkin’s, and its Chinese hinterland’s, value as potential markets for French goods.29 In this argument Brunschwig follows the lead made by John F. Cady who, after examining religious and economic factors, suggests that ‘the tap­ root of French imperialism in the Far East from first to last was national pride — pride of culture, reputation, prestige and in­ fluence’.30 Certainly it is not difficult to find evidence in support of this conclusion in the form of contemporary imperialist rhetoric which spoke continually of national glory. Bismarck was well aware of this aspect of French imperialism, and so encouraged it, as was the radical nationalist Déroulède, who objected to the attempt to compensate for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine by acquiring colonies in the most bitter terms: ‘I have lost two children and you offer me twenty servants.’31 The emphasis which Cady and Brunschwig placed on prestige has been challenged effectively by a number of writers. Prestige may have contributed to the decision to conquer Tonkin, but it was hardly significant in determining French policy in China itself. And even though the possession of Indo-China did bring the Third Republic some prestige, Dieter Brötel rightly suggests that French

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

11

motivation was complex and that economic factors were far more important.32 C. A. Julien made the same point as long ago as 1946.33 The complex role of the Geographical Societies, where passions as diverse as national prestige, scientific research, exotic exploration, and economic gain were fused into an intoxicating mixture, have been examined.34 The work of John Laffey on the interest of the Lyon Chamber of Commerce in China and IndoChina has led him seriously to challenge Cady's approach and to conclude that: contrary to the views of Cady and his followers, economic motivation had a role of prime importance in the expansion of France in the Far East.33

W. C. Hartel has attempted to identify the businessmen and corporations which supported imperialist endeavour through organizations such as Geographical Societies, Chambers of Commerce, and colonial committees and to estimate their in­ fluence on governments.36 Even Fieldhouse admits that in the early 1880s, ‘French interest in Tongking was undoubtedly economic’, although he rightly suggests that at this stage it was still largely a commercial interest, — the hope that ‘the Red River [Hong Ha] would give France a shorter, cheaper and above all monopolistic route to markets and sources of raw materials in southern China’.37 An account of the background to the Sino-French peace treaty of 1885 is essential to an understanding of French objectives in China during the years 1885-1901. To a large extent the story begins with the annexation of part of Cochin-China in 1862 which seemed to offer an alternative means of access to open competi­ tion with Britain in the treaty ports. Just four years after this annexation, an official expedition left Saigon under the command of Doudart de Lagrée. Its aim was to ascertain whether the Mekong River was a navigable stream which could be used to transform the newly founded colony into the outlet for the trade of south-western China. The expedition found that it was not navigable but, after de Lagrée’s death, his replace­ ment, Francis Gamier, discovered that the Hong Ha flowed from the Yunnan plateau to the Gulf of Tonkin. Another potential route had been found. Garnier’s report of the expedition was a significant document in the development in France of the myth of the putative wealth of Yunnan and south-western China gen­ erally.38 This myth was to be a potent force in determining both

12

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

French and British policy in the region for the next 30 years.39 In 1873 Garnier died in a melodramatic attempt to open the Hong Ha to French trade. In the wake of the incident, under the terms of the Treaty of Saigon of 1874, Vietnam agreed to open the entire length of the Hong Ha, including the ports of Hanoi and Haiphong, to international trade.40 However, along the upper reaches of the Hong Ha power lay less in the hands of the Hue government than in those of the Black Flag armies (independent remnants of Taiping forces operating in northern Tonkin under the leadership of Liu Yongfu). To preserve their own independ­ ence, they ensured that trade on the river was very insecure, indeed impossible for Europeans. The revival of French interest in Tonkin which was ultimately to lead to its conquest began with the accession to power of the moderate republicans in 1879. In July 1881, during the first ministry of Jules Ferry, funds were voted for the dispatch of an expedition to reclaim the right of navigation conferred by the treaty of 1874. Initially a small detachment of seven hundred men was sent from Saigon to Hanoi. The war escalated and hostilities ultimately reached as far north as Fuzhou. Chinese support for the Black Flags and Chinese claims to suzerainty over Vietnam led to a needlessly prolonged undeclared war with China.41 It was not until June 1885 that Patenôtre, the French Minister in Beijing, and Li Hongzhang, signed at Tianjin a convention by which China relinquished her claims to suzerainty over Vietnam and allowed the French to trade along the Tonkin border at customs rates lower than those in the treaty ports.42 Although interest in the acquisition of Tonkin was displayed by the two de Freycinet governments, especially by their Minister for the Marine, Admiral Jauréguiberry, and by the ‘grand ministère’ of Gambetta, it was during the second ministry of Jules Ferry (1883-5) that the conquest of Tonkin was completed. In doing so Ferry was pursuing objectives which were firmly established republican policy: nevertheless, his contemporary notoriety as the ‘tonkinois’ and his vigorous and articulate arguments in support of its acquisition make him a highly significant figure in an analysis of the aims of the French in both Tonkin and China itself. T. F. Power has argued that Ferry’s main interest was in the prestige which would accrue to France as a result of an extension of her authority in Indo-China.43 Certainly Ferry argued that French control of Tonkin was necessary for the security of Cochin-

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

13

China in similar terms to those he used to describe the situation of Tunisia vis-à-vis Algeria during his first ministry.44 This suggests that he assumed that colonies were intrinsically a good thing, but for Ferry the economic possibilities of China itself were probably an even more important consideration. To Ferry, China’s chief attraction for France was the allegedly large and prosperous population which was believed to inhabit the south-western provinces adjacent to Tonkin. This population he saw as constituting a potentially captive market for French in­ dustry. His vision was mostly, although not entirely, mercantilist, which was not really surprising at a time when, as Ferry himself was acutely aware, tariff barriers were being erected with increas­ ing enthusiasm on both sides of the Atlantic.45 With France in control of Tonkin and hence the easiest means of access to south­ western China, the use of discriminatory tariffs on goods in transit through Tonkin rather than actual French administration of the area could lead to the establishment of a French commercial monopoly over a considerable portion of the Chinese empire. Ferry, like so many other Europeans and Americans, became captivated by the chimerical vision of four hundred million po­ tential consumers of Western goods. As Ferry himself stated in his defence following the fall of his ministry: the creation of the outlet with which we are now concerned will give us, in a certain future, free and even privileged exchange with China and, with that, markets of four hundred million inhabitants . . . [earlier described by Ferry as] not poor blacks like the inhabitants of equatorial Africa, but . . . one of the most advanced and wealthy people in the world.46

There was also a more modern and prescient element to Ferry’s imperial ambitions, which in 1885 was in fact incorporated into the peace treaty. He cited the investment opportunities which would become available for French surplus capital as a factor in support of his Tonkin policy: I say that France, which has always abounded in capital and has exported considerable quantities abroad — in fact you can count in billions the capital exports of this great country — which is so rich; I say that it is in France’s interests to consider this side of the colonial question.47

It has been argued, notably by Henri Brunschwig and T. F. Power,48 that Ferry’s use of economic arguments was merely part of an attempt to defend the aggressive policies which he had

14

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

followed and which had led to his fall. His concern for the possibility of the creation of new opportunities for investment or markets for French products was neither genuine nor consistent, but part of his rhetoric only after the fall of his ministry. Both writers see these arguments first emerging with clarity in the defeated Ferry’s speech to the Chamber on 28 July 1885. Yet, while Ferry’s most complete statements of an economic theory of imperialism are to be found in that speech and in Le Tonkin et la mère-patrie written in 1890, Ferry, as a Lorrainer, always had been concerned for industrial expansion and sought to bolster the industrial interests of the north-east.49 As early as November 1883 Ferry had justified the continuation of hostilities in Tonkin on the ground that its acquisition would be a step towards the opening up of Chinese markets to French industry: Cast your eyes on the map of the world and see with what vigilance, with what eagerness the great nations who are your friends or your rivals are reserving outlets for themselves . . . See with what eagerness each of these industrial races . . . strain to take their share in the still unexplored world, in that Africa, in that Asia that holds so much wealth and particularly in that vast Chinese empire. It is not a question of wanting to conquer that great Chinese empire . . . But we must be at the gateway of that rich region . . . And it is for that that we admire and thank the vigilance, the wisdom or deep instinct that pushed our predecessors toward the mouth of the Hong Ha and which established for them as a goal the possession of Tonkin.50

Moreover, at the time of Ferry’s first ministry the aim of using Tonkin as a means of commercial entry into China had been expressed. In July 1881 Antonin Proust, the rapporteur of a bill to provide reinforcements in Indo-China, followed a reference to the need to defend Cochin-China with these comments: We must, besides, neglect nothing to obtain an uncontested influence in the Indochinese peninsula, which must ultimately open up commerce between Yunnan and the South China Sea. In fact the European powers have been constantly preoccupied for a long time with the establishment of new commercial routes into central China.Sl

Thus the motives behind Ferry’s aggressive Tonkin policy were threefold. Firstly, he believed in the necessity to sustain French prestige in the East, which was not an unreasonable concern when France had so little else and was still suffering from the memory of French impotence at the time of the Tianjin massacre of 1870.

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

15

Secondly, and largely as a result of the first concern, he wished more firmly to establish the security of existing French possessions in Indo-China. Thirdly, and most importantly, he expected the new Protectorate to provide access to new markets for French goods and new avenues for the investment of surplus French capital, not just in Tonkin, but more significantly within the borders of the Chinese empire itself.52 Moreover Ferry was not alone. Admiral Jauréguiberry had acted with very similar motives when he was responsible for colonial matters in the de Freycinet governments.53 In fact France failed to develop a large export trade in China. This was a great disappointment to the ardent imperialists who followed Ferry and a source of constant concern to French foreign ministers and their agents in Asia. As late as 1900 there were only twenty-four French businesses established in Shanghai, the centre of European economic life in China. Valued at 64,196,067 francs, their activities included the provision of services such as insurance, banking, hotels, and restaurants; international trade in commodit­ ies like silk and wine; and retailing bicycles and food products.54 Virtually all these businesses, apart from the silk exporters, provided luxury goods and services to the European and com­ prador populations of the city. There were not four hundred million potential consumers of Bordeaux and the age of the bicycle as mass transportation in China was far in the future. The poor performance of French goods in the Chinese market was the result of France’s unique pattern of industrialization in the late nineteenth century. For while Britain, and later Germany and the United States of America, tended to specialize in cheap massproduced consumer goods, made in factories by relatively un­ skilled labour, French industry concentrated on higher valueadded goods of superior quality and price, often produced in smaller workshops. This specialization was particularly marked in export goods. The nature of commodities exchanged with France’s largest trading partner, Great Britain, in 1888 reveals the extent of this specialization and the differences between the two economies. The figures in Table 1.1 suggest that while French industry was not underdeveloped compared with that of Britain, it was very different and tended to complement rather than rival its neighbour.55 Certainly France did have large factories and did produce both cheap consumer goods, typically hardware and textiles, and heavy industrial goods such as ships, machinery, and

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA

16 Table 1.1

Percentages of Commodities Traded between Britain and France, 1888

Category

GB

France

1. Raw materials, for example, coal, wool, hides 2. Intermediate goods, for example, iron, copper, cotton and other thread, and cloth 3. Finished industrial products, for example, silk, leather, machinery, hardware, clothing 4. Processed food, for example, wine and spirits, flour, sugar 5. Unprocessed food, for example, butter, eggs, grain, and vegetables 6. Unclassified items

15 55

7 8

20

43

2

17

2

16

6

9

Source : Patrick O’Brien and Caglar Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France 1780-1914: Two Paths to the Twentieth Century (London, George

Allen and Unwin, 1978).

railway equipment. Such products were not, however, areas of special French expertise and efficiency, and did not enjoy great success as exports. The proportion of French exports as a percent­ age of those of eleven industrial nations in 1899 clearly shows both French failure in these fields and French success in more valuable luxury consumer goods.56 (See Table 1.2.) Since luxury goods, almost by definition, carry cultural as well as material value, the products at which French industry excelled were, on the whole, exported more to wealthy than to poor countries, and were very much attuned to European taste. This meant that French exports were consumed more in Europe than elsewhere, and, ironically, in view of the common French percep­ tion that her great rival in Asian markets was British industry, were consumed more in England than anywhere else. Moreover, while other industrializing countries like Germany, Belgium, and the United States of America followed the British lead in increas­ ing the proportion of their exports to places outside Europe, France did not. Between 1880 and 1910 only Africa, where France had the bulk of her colonies, emerged as a significant market for French products.57 (See Table 1.3.) In the early nineteenth century British trade in China was dominated by exports of Indian opium, but later in the century trade changed from opium to cotton cloth, the cheap manchester

FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

17

Table 1.2 Percentage of French Exports of Various Products Produced in Eleven Industrial Nations, 1899 Products Tobacco and alcohol Clothing Books, films, etc. Bicycles, motor cars, etc. Skin, wood, paper Minerals Textiles

Per Cent

Products

Per Cent

45.0 33.5 26.4

Chemical products Non-ferrous metals Metal goods (unspecified) Capital goods Ferrous metals Railway equipment and ships Electrical goods Agricultural machinery

13.4 11.0

21.0 20.5 16.7 15.8

10.4 7.4 5.6 4.7 4.6 3.1

Note: The eleven countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Source : H. Tyszynski, ‘World Trade in Manufactured Commodities 1899-1950’, The Manchester School o f Economic and Social Studies, No. 3, September

1951, in Paul Blairoch, ‘La Place de la France sur les marchés inter­ nationaux’, in Paul Levy-Leboyer (ed.), La Position internationale de la France: aspects économiques et financiers, X I X - X X siècles (Paris, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1977), p. 49.

with which the first industrial society had been created. In the five years from 1894 to 1898 an average of £3,606,673 worth of cotton cloth was exported from Britain into China. Total British exports to China over that period averaged £5,322,081 per annum, so cotton cloth constituted no less than 67.8 per cent of all British exports to that market. Against English cotton French industry could not compete effectively. Nevertheless it was the one European product for which there was a large market in China and it also dominated French exports. During the same period cotton products exported from France into China averaged 13,730,733 francs per annum out of an average total of 21,624,882 francs, or 63.5 per cent. Thus the domination of cotton was almost as great in French as in British exports, albeit on a much smaller base. British cotton exports to China were worth 6.57 times more than French exports at this time.58 French officials and politicians were well aware of the problem. Despite their high quality, French products were over-priced and ill suited to Chinese tastes, lamented the Consul in Guangzhou in 1889, while he urged French industry to adapt to the needs of

FRANCE AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHINA Oceania

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