Foundations Of British Policy In The Arab World: The Cairo Conference Of 1921 0801811252, 9780801811258

Table of contents :
Preface
Table of Contents
1 Wartime Commitments, 1914-18
2 The Difficulties of Peace, 1919
3 Failure at the Paris Peace Conference
4 The Year of Violence, 1920
5 London: Prelude to Cairo
6 The Cairo Conference, March, 1921
7 Iraq
8 Palestine
9 Transjordan
10 Perspective and Conclusions
Selected Bibliography
Biographical Sketches
Index

Citation preview

Foundations o f British Policy in the Arab W orld

F O U N D A T IO N S OF B R ITISH P O L IC Y IN TH E AR AB W O R L D : The Cairo Conference o f 1921

Aaron S. Klieman

T H E J O H N S H O P K IN S P R E S S B a ltim ore an d L on d on

END PAPERS Map illustrating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 included in a secret memorandum by the Foreign Office, "Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others,” G. T. Paper 3917 of February, 1918, CAB 24/45, W ar Cabinet. Reproduced by permission of the Public Record Office, London. The key has been altered for purposes o f clarification. MEMBERS OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE OF 1921 Photo by Radio Times Hulton Picture Library, courtesy o f BBC Publications, London. DE BUNSEN COMMITTEE MAPS Originally printed in CAB 27/1 as part of the de Bunsen committee report. Reproduced by permission o f the Public Record Office, London. The key to the maps has been altered for purposes o f clarification.

Copyright © 1970 by The Johns Hopkins Press A ll rights reserved Manufactured in the United States o f America The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore» Maryland 21218 The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., London library o f Congress Catalog Card Number 73-103613 ISBN-0-8018-1125-2

T o m y parents, fo r th eir fa ith and en cou ragem en t

Preface

T he decade o f war and peace between 1914 and 1923 witnessed the dissolution o f the Ottoman Em pire, and with it the foundation o f Great Britain’s p olicy in the Near and M iddle Elast. Against this background o f change— in England, in the A rab w orld, and internationally— those responsible fo r such p olicy sought its reconstitution in fidelity to tradi­ tional interests and in accord with existing political conditions. A policy o f d rift, o f reaction rather than initiative, nevertheless persisted until 1921, when a conference o f leading British authorities convened at Cairo and Jerusalem from 12 to 30 M arch under the direction o f the secretary o f state fo r the colonies, M r. W inston Churchill. The Cairo Conference, as it was known officially, represented a m ajor attempt to satisfy the im perative need fo r policy revision. A s they assembled, the participants had before them three immediate ob jectiv es: first, to consolidate gains and effect econom ies through m ore efficient adm inistration at the local level in the various parts o f the A rab w o rld ; second, to reconcile the different perspectives held by the British officials and governm ental agencies involved in M iddle Eastern affairs by means o f a centralized control exercised effectively from L ondon;

•• V ll

and third, by means o f the above, to arrive at a com prehensive fram e­ w ork, incorporating previous commitments and existing realities, fo r future relations with the Arabs. In 1921 the conference was regarded by m any people as the logical culm ination to a long period o f grow ing British involvem ent in, and control o f, the strategic area between the M editerranean Sea and the Persian G ulf. Finally, after years o f com petition with France, postBismarck Germany, and czarist Russia, England stood virtually un­ rivaled upon the ruins o f the Ottoman Em pire. Others saw the Cairo Conference as perhaps the inauguration o f a new era o f British pre­ em inence, but certainly one which w ould present grave responsibilities as well as opportunities. Still other individuals, how ever, took a dim view o f the conference, opposing it as a futile attempt to contain the rising force o f nationalism whereby the A rab people dem anded the right to be active subjects, rather than passive objects acted upon and spoken fo r by the European pow ers, in determ ining their political future. Until now , the C airo Conference and the events preceding and result­ ing from it have not received scholarly attention. The only official ac­ count to be made public was presented in an address by M r. Churchill before the House o f Com m ons in June, 1921, shortly after his return from the M iddle E ast One contem porary historian, attempting to ex­ plain this “ curious fact,” has w ritten: “ The reason (apart from the dis­ tressing British passion fo r secrecy) is not, so fa r as can be seen, that sham eful conspiracies were laid in C airo, but rather that am id the fear­ ful preoccupations o f the postwar years the im portance o f this meeting was not noticed.” 1 T oday, the earlier preoccupations having been dis­ posed o f, the relevant docum ents are available fo r analysis, and it has becom e possible to rem edy the deficiency. The purpose o f this study, therefore, is to consider the Cairo Confer­ ence as an episode im portant to the com plete history o f British relations with the M iddle East by relating the events that led to its convocation and its m ore im m ediate repercussions. The many traditions, pressures, and considerations involved can perhaps be best described by approach­ ing the conference as a prism through which these were filtered, em erg­ ing to form the new foundation fo r British policy in the interwar period.

1. Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (Cleveland: W orld Publishing Co., 1965), p. 56.

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P reface

Consideration is given as well to the im pact o f the conference on the political evolution o f those countries m ost directly affected: Iraq, Pales­ tine, Syria, Transjordan— com prising the Fertile Crescent— and Arabia. Thus elements o f European diplom acy and a chapter in the m odern his­ tory o f the A rab w orld are com bined with a political study o f the com ­ plexities inherent in any country’s decision-m aking process. In pursuing this task I have been fortunate in receiving counsel and support from P rofessor M ajid Khadduri o f the School o f Advanced International Studies. D rafts o f the m anuscript have benefitted from his suggestions. P rofessor H arry H oward also offered useful comments. Extended research overseas was made possible through the assistance o f The Johns Hopkins U niversity and The N ational Foundation fo r Jewish Culture. I had access to original docum ents at the P ublic R ecord Office in L ondon, in addition to several collections o f personal papers belonging to public officials involved in som e capacity with the Cairo Conference. Consequently, I wish to acknowledge the assistance rendered by per­ sonnel o f these various institutions in England and in Israel: the British Museum and its newspaper archives at Colindale, the India Office, the H ouse o f Lords L ibrary, M iss Elizabeth M onroe o f St. A ntony's College, O xford, P rofessor A . J. P . T aylor and The Beaverbrook L ibrary, the Central Zionist Archives, the Israel State Archives, and, lastly, the W eizmann Archives. Citations o f Crow n-copyright records in the P ublic R ec­ ord Office appear by perm ission o f the Controller o f Her M ajesty's Stationery Office. I am endebted m ost recently to M r. John Gallman and M iss Penny James o f The Johns Hopkins Press fo r guiding the m anuscript through publication. M y w ife, by sharing the frustrations no less than the re­ wards o f student life, research, w riting, and editing, has helped bring this w ork to fruition. A .S .K .

Table o f Contents

P reface Notes on A rabic Transliteration and Usage

v ii x iii

1.

W artim e Commitments, 1914-18

2.

The Difficulties o f Peace, 1919

19

3.

Failure at die Paris Peace Conference

33

4.

The Y ear o f V iolence, 1920

45

5.

L ondon: Prelude to C airo

77

6.

The C airo Conference, M ardi, 1921

105

7.

Iraq

139

8.

Palestine

171

9.

Transjordan

205

Perspective and Conclusions

237

10.

1

xi

XU

Appendices

255

Selected B ibliography

289

B iographical Sketches

303

Index

313

Contents

Notes on Arabic Transliteration and Usage

Because die follow in g study deals with a period in Great Britain’s diplo­ m atic relations with the M iddle East notable fo r its inconsistency, it is not surprising to find this reflected even in the matter o f A rabic trans­ literation. A t no time did officials o f the various governm ental depart­ ments conform to one pattern o f spelling o r usage when referring to personalities and locations within the A rab w orld. Thus the first lon g o f Iraq — or M esopotam ia— was written o f as Faisal, Feisul, o r F eisal; his father, the shareef (o r sh erif) o f M ecca was known as Hussein, Husain, o r Hussain. In like fashion, the area east o f the Jordan R iver was rendered on occasion Trans-Jordania, Trans-Jordan, or Transjordania. Rather than seek at this late date to im pose uniform ity on the indi­ viduals and institutions responsible fo r British policy, the author prefers to retain the original spelling when quoting directly from docum entary sources. H ow ever, he has adopted one form — fo r exam ple, Faysal, H usayn, sharif, A m ir A bdullah, T ransjordan, the H ijaz— in striving fo r consistency in his ow n w riting.

••• X lll

The follow ing abbreviations w ill be used in the footnotes : CAB

Cabinet M eetings

C.P.

Cabinet Paper

C.Z.A.

Central Zionist A rchives

C.O.

Colonial Office

Cmd.

Command (Parliam entary) Paper

E.C.

Eastern Committee

F.O.

Foreign Office

G.O.C.

General Officer Com m anding

I.O .

India Office

I.S.A .

Israel State Archives

O .E .T.A . (S )

O ccupied Enemy T erritory Adm inistration (South)

W .O .

W ar Office

W .A .

W eizmann Archives

The key to the filing system used by the Foreign Office is as follow s. The figures preceded by a letter are the numbers o f individual papers. These are follow ed successively by file number and index num ber, the last indicating the country and archives division. F or example, footnote 9 on page 48 reads: E811 8 /3 8 /4 4 [n o. 7 4 2 ], F .0 .4 0 6 /4 4 . Once decoded, this refers to individual paper 8118, which is part o f file 38 pertaining to Turkey (4 4 ) under Eastern affairs (E ). Egypt (1 6 ), Persia (3 4 ), Palestine (8 8 ), Syria (8 9 ), Arabia (9 1 ), and M esopo­ tamia (9 3 ) were other subdivisions under Eastern affairs. Paper 8118 happened to be a cable, no. 742, which is available to the researcher in volum e 4 0 6 /4 4 o f Foreign Office docum ents.

xiv

Transliteration and Usage

ch apter

i W artim e Commitments, 1 9 1 4 -1 8

The problem now is not how to keep the Turkish Empire permanently in being . . . but how to minimize the shock of its fallt and what to substitute for it.— Viscount Bryce

B y electing to align itself with the Central Powers shortly after the outbreak o f war in 1914, the Ottoman Em pire not only affected British p olicy but initiated as well a new chapter in the history o f the Near and M iddle E ast In tiie decades before 1914, British statesmen had sought an under­ lying consistency in p olicy toward the enduring, com plex Eastern Question. Great Britain encouraged widespread econom ic and adm inis­ trative reform s within the Ottoman Em pire, extending diplom atic or m ilitary support when necessary. Y et she also partook o f the spoils— Cyprus and Egypt, fo r example— when expedient, or if only to prevent their com ing under the control o f rival powers. Thus she endorsed the principle o f the survival o f an Ottoman Empire while at the same time helping to incorporate into the continental balance o f pow er the fact o f that em pire’s forced withdrawal from European and Mediterranean territories. The Great W ar o f 1914 afforded Britain an opportunity at last to resolve this inconsistency. Thereafter the problem fo r London becam e one o f measuring its response to the outright partition o f the constricted

1

em pire in A sia and the transition from an Ottoman im perial structure to a narrow er Turkish nationalism . A lso inherent in this larger problem was the need to determ ine the political future o f those A rab regions w hich lay within the form er Turkish Em pire. W hen the final session o f the Paris Peace Conference ended on 21 January 1920, the future status o f Turkey still rem ained unresolved. Discussion had taken place am ong the victorious A llied and Associated Pow ers, but these had produced acrim ony rather than accord and served only to emphasize the com plex nature o f the subject. Although the man­ date system had been em bodied in A rticle 22 o f the Covenant o f the League o f N ations, no com prehensive agreement could be arrived at which w ould govern such specific aspects as the detailed provisions fo r a definitive peace treaty with Turkey, designation o f the actual manda­ tories, and a delineation o f boundaries fo r the mandated territories. The conference, content after providing the fram ew ork fo r an era o f inter­ national peace and cooperation through its principal achievements, the Treaty o f Versailles and the League covenant, consigned the entire ques­ tion o f the Near and M iddle East1 to further consultations between the interested parties, particularly England and France. As a result, this latter phase o f the Eastern Question was allow ed to persist beyond fiftyone months o f hostilities and secret diplom acy and the succeeding twelve months o f peacem aking as an unsettling factor in postwar w orld politics and in the reconstitution o f the Near and M iddle East, as well as in British foreign policy. From the single perspective o f Great Britain, the dom estic and external status o f those lands com prising the Ottoman Em pire had been o f im ­ portance since at least the beginning o f the nineteenth century. A ngloTurkish concert had been possible at that point because o f a mutual in-1 1. One outcome o f the 1919-21 rethinking o f British policy was the distinction made between the terms “ Near East” and “ M iddle East.” The form er was used there­ after with some degree o f consistency in reference to Turkey proper and to mat­ ters relating to Asia Minor, while “ M iddle East” came to be reserved for the Arab world. See Roderic H. Davison, “ Where Is the M iddle East?” Foreign A f­ fairs, July, 1960, p. 668. For the purpose of this study, the narrower term “ Fertile Crescent“ w ill be taken to include the geographical area presently comprised of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as described in P. M. Holt, Egypt and the F ertile Crescent, 1516-1922 (London: Longm ans, Green & Co., 1966), pp. 1-9.

2

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

teres! in frustrating the efforts at direct political penetration made by N apoleonic F rance; it was strengthened as the century progressed under the pressure o f Russian expansionism .2 3 W ith the consolidation o f con trol in India, successive British govern* menta cam e to hold the strategic value o f the Ottoman Em pire’s A rab regions in ever greater regard. Generals and statesmen alike acknowl* edged the necessity fo r retaining unim peded access to the two routes link­ ing England with her Indian em pire and the O rient: the northern over­ land route across Syria and M esopotam ia to the Persian G u lf; and, after the opening o f the Suez Canal in 1869, the southern waterway connecting the M editerranean Sea with the Indian Ocean.3 D. G. Hogarth, later a prom inent m em ber o f the A rab Bureau in C airo, in 1902 summed up both the attraction and the danger offered by the region : . . . it is a Debatable Land, distracted internally by a ceaseless war o f influ­ ence, and only too anxious to lean in one part or another on external aid. Therefore, it is always prone to involve in its own unrest those responsible for the peace o f the world, and ultimately to endanger the balance of power in Europe. Nor it is only as a Debatable Land that the Nearer East has a disquieting influence on the outer world, but also as an Intermediate Land, that is to say, a thoroughfare— the region through which must lie, and by which can be endangered, the communication between the West and the West-in-East.4 Great Britain, although conscious o f the excessive centralization o f authority at Constantinople and o f the corruption and decay weakening 2. The so-called eastern question and Britain’s relationship to it are most thoroughly discussed in three basic books on the subject: Sir John A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Q uestion: An H istorical Study in European Diplomacy (London: Ox­ ford University Press, 1940) ; H. W . V. Temperley, England and the Near East (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1964) ; and M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (New Y ork: St. Martin’s Press, 1966). 3. Strategic considerations governing Britain’s M iddle Eastern policy in the nine­ teenth and twentieth centuries are emphasized in Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), and in the Royal In­ stitute o f International Affairs, The Political and Strategic Interests o f the United Kingdom (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 100-186. In 1839 British troops occupied Aden, and British influence spread thereafter along the Persian G ulf and into the interior o f Arabia. 4. D. G. Hogarth, The Nearer East (London: W illiam Heinemann, 1902), pp. 28081.

,

W artim e Commitments 1914-18

3

the Sublim e Porte in its foreign relations, nevertheless saw little choice but to support the existence o f the em pire and to encourage reform .* Upon the assumption o f pow er by the Y oung Turks in 1908, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey wrote to Sir G. A . Lowther, British am bassador at Constantinople, that “ the rejoicin g at the upset o f the old and the pros­ pect o f a new régim e is genuine; our course is clear: we must welcom e and encourage this prospect as long as it continues.” * Even as the threat o f w ar drew near and hope fo r Turkish reform becam e dim m er, Grey continued to assert the traditional rationale: “ A grave question o f policy is involved and the only p olicy to w hich we can becom e a party is one directed to avoid collapse and partition o f A siatic Turkey. The effect o f the opposite course upon our own Mussulmans in India w ould be dis­ astrous to say nothing o f the com plications that w ould be produced between European Pow ers.” 7 Given this legacy o f support fo r the territorial integrity o f the Otto­ man Em pire— despite such departures as the annexation o f Cyprus in 1878 and the occupation o f Egypt in 1882— the conversion o f Turkish policy from professed neutrality to belligerency in late 1914 forced a com plete revision o f British m ilitary and political thinking. A fter con ­ siderable delay, and only in response to intense diplom atic pressure from France and Russia,8 the British governm ent sought to form ulate its ultimate war aims and territorial am bitions in the M iddle East. An interdepartmental com m ittee was specifically constituted under the chair­ manship o f S ir M aurice de Bunsen to consider British desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia. The com m ittee reviewed in detail the existing interests o f Great Britain in the region and then submitted a secret report to the W ar C ouncil on 30 June 1915. Addressing itself to the basic question o f whether the acquisition o f 5. Efforts made to revive the Ottoman Empire through social, administrative, and military reform are detailed in Frank E. Bailey, British P olicy and the Turkish Reform M ovement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), and in Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 6. Grey to Lowther, 11 August 1908, in British Documents on the Origins o f the War, vol. 5 : The Near East, 1903-9, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (Lon­ don: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), p. 266. 7. Grey to Lowther, telegram (no. 498), 4 July 1913, in ibid., voL 10 (1936), pt. 1, “ The Near and M iddle East on the Eve o f the W ar,” p. 481. 8. See the author’s article “ Britain's W ar Aims in the M iddle East in 1915,” Jour­ nal o f Contemporary H istory 3, no. 3 (July, 1968) : 237-51.

4

British P olicy in the A rab W orld

new territory was advisable o r not, the com m ittee argued the necessity o f m a in ta in in g a just relation between the prospective advantages to the British Empire by a readjustment o f conditions in Asiatic Turkey, and the inevitable increase o f Imperial responsibility. Our Empire is wide enough already, and our task is to consolidate the possessions we already have, to make firm and lasting the position we already h o ld .. . . It is then to straighten ragged edges that we have to take advantage o f the present opportunity, and to assert our claim to a sphere in settling the destiny of Asiatic Turkey.* In conform ity with this general claim (albeit a reluctant one) to bene­ fits from Turkey’s eventual defeat, nine specific desiderata in the A rab region were distinguished. The com m ittee called fo r a final recognition and consolidation o f Britain’ s position in the Persian G ulf which w ould entail security fo r the developm ent o f such undertakings as oil produc­ tion, river navigation, and construction o f irrigation w ork; exploiting M esopotam ia as a granary and an area fo r Indian colonization; and retaining Britain’ s strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean and Persian G ulf, plus security fo r British com m unications, by means o f a “ m in im um increase o f naval expenditure and responsibility.” Three o f

the desiderata pertained to the A rab peoples. They called fo r the fu lfill­ ment o f pledges under consideration or already given to the several

shayhhs o f the Arabian peninsula and, “ generally, maintenance o f the assurances given to the Sharif o f M ecca and the Arabs” ; insurance that A rabia and the Muslim holy places w ould remain “ under independent M oslem rule” ; and, lastly, a settlement o f the question o f Palestine and the h oly places o f Christendom . These, then, were the elements singled out as the constants fo r any future policy at a time when the exigencies o f war, the effects o f uncoordinated decision-m aking, and the excesses o f secret diplom atic bargaining had not yet com plicated Great Britain's position in the form er Turkish territories. The de Bunsen com m ittee concluded its report by advocating that a policy o f decentralization be im posed upon Constantinople which, “ while securing the vital interests o f Great Britain, w ill give to Turkey in Asia som e prospect o f a permanent existence” and w ould at die same tim e 9 9. Cabinet, Ad H oc Committees (secret), “ Report, Proceedings and Appendices o f a Committee Appointed by tbe Prime Minister. 1915. British Desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia,” CAB 2 7/1 , p. 4.

,

W artim e Commitments 1914—18

5

free the five great provinces o f Anatolia, Arm enia, Syria, Palestine, and Jazirah-Iraq from “ the vam pire-hold o f the m etropolis, . . . [thus giv­ in g] them a chance to foster and develop their own resources.” 101 2Such a scheme, it was thought, w ould satisfy Britain’s allies in their insistence upon an alteration o f the status quo ante bellum and an end to Ottoman independence, while avoiding such direct responsibilities as w ould re­ sult from the other, m ore extreme alternative o f partition. This proposal, however, never received the endorsement o f the British governm ent A s the W ar intensified, nothing less than the dissolution o f the Turkish Em pire could justify the many sacrifices demanded o f the public. In addition, the leaders o f the country had becom e so resent­ ful o f the Turks that L ord Curzon, who was undersecretary o f state fo r foreign affairs at the tim e, reflected their sentiment when he said later that “ the presence o f the Turks has been a source o f unm itigated evil to everybody concerned.” 11 This feeling was reinforced by the fear that Britain w ould deny herself the spoils o f victory while her present allies— but potential rivals— acquired new territory. A s Prim e M inister Asquith rationalized, if “ fo r one reason or another, because we didn’t want m ore territory, or because we didn’ t feel equal to the responsi­ bility, we were to leave die other nations to scram ble fo r Turkey with­ out taking anything ourselves, we should not be doing our duty.” 13 Although the m oderate proposals o f the de Bunsen com m ittee were rejected, its basic assumptions and considerations were those w hich the Foreign Office, India Office, and W ar Office shared in their future deal­ ings with the Arabs, the French, and the Zionists. The latitude possessed by each department in selecting the means deemed appropriate fo r achieving these aims stemmed in part from the conspicuous absence during the war years o f any com parable evaluation o f Britain’ s M iddle Eastern interests, or o f a com prehensive plan o f governm ent-sanctioned action fo r their implementation. This fact in turn explains many o f the 10. ¡bid., pp. 28,24. “ Al-Jarirah” and “ al-*Iraq” were used generally by the de Bun­ sen committee in reference to the northern and southern halves o f present-day Iraq. 11. Lord Curzon before the Eastern Committee in December, 1918, quoted in David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, voL 2 (London: V ictor Gollancz, 1938), p. 1014; see also Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (London: Methuen & Co., 1964), p. 35. 12. Asquith on 19 March 1915, in CAB 4 2 /2 ( “ Papers o f the W ar Council, Darda­ nelles Committee and the War Committee” ) .

6

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

difficulties subsequently encountered by Great Britain in the first years o f peace. Stalemate along the western front, having becom e m ore pronounced during the latter part o f 1915, guided British energies toward a dual strategy: m ilitarily, to attack the eastern flank o f the Central Powers, and, politically, to arrest the decline in m orale within the Entente while securing support from previously uncom m itted parties. The m ilitary offensive had already resulted in the ill-fated assault upon the G allipoli peninsula and w ould yet inspire cam paigns against the Turks through M esopotam ia and along the eastern coast o f the M editerranean.18 The diplom atic phase induced simultaneous contact with the Arabs, the A l­ lies, and spokesmen fo r the Zionist m ovem ent.1 3 141 5 The em ergence o f the A rabs as a distinctive entity, and their recog­ nition as such by the British governm ent, was one o f the m ajor effects o f Anglo-Turkish hostility. W hereas previously the Arabs, as nom inal subjects o f the Sultan-Caliph, could be approached independently only at the risk o f offending the sensitivities o f the Sublim e Porte, a state o f w ar perm itted Britain to exploit grievances between A rab and Turk and to deal directly with A rab spokesm en.10 A s early as N ovem ber, 1914, a message had been sent to Sharif Husayn o f M ecca, ruler o f the H ijaz, at the instruction o f L ord Kitchener, the secretary o f state fo r war. It advised that, if the Amir and Arabs in general assist Great Britain in this conflict that has been forced upon us by Turkey, Great Britain will promise not to inter13. The official account o f military operations in the East is provided by Sir George Macmunn and Cyril Falls, M ilitary Operations: Egypt and Palestine, 2 vols. (London, 1928-30), and by F. J. M oberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 19141918,2 vols. (London, 1923-24). 14. In January, 1915, the Cabinet had before it a secret memorandum submitted by Herbert Samuel, then president o f the Local Government Board, on “ The Future o f Palestine.” It referred to “ a stirring among the twelve m illion Jews scattered throughout the countries o f the W orld” and urged the annexation o f Palestine by Britain (CAB 3 7 /1 2 3 ). In March Samuel wrote a revised memorandum stressing the political advantages for Britain in a claim to Palestine (CAB 37/126, no. 1 ). 15. Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Em ergence o f Arab National­ ism (Beirut: Khayats, 1958). See also Bernard Lewis, The Em ergence o f M odem Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) ; Philip P. Graves, trans^ M emoirs o f King Abdullah o f Transjordan (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), esp. pp. 84-92, 97-96; and Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey (N ew Y ork: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927), p. 53.

W artim e Com m itm ents, 1914-18

7

vene In any manner whatsoever, whether In things religious or otherwise. . . . T ill now we have defended and befriended Islam in the person o f the Turks: henceforward it shall be in that o f the noble A ra b .. . . It would be well if your Highness could convey to your followers and devotees, who are found throughout the world in every country, the good tidings of the freedom o f the Arabs and the rising o f the sun over Arabia.16 This message and an earlier visit by the sharif*s son, Abdullah, to the British Residency in C airo soon led to a direct correspondence between the British high com m issioner fo r Egypt and the ruler o f the H ijaz concerning prospects fo r an alliance.17 In his opening letter o f 14 July 1915 Sharif Husayn sought to gain the endorsem ent o f Great Britain fo r his definition o f A rab aspirations. He began by stating that “ the w hole o f the A rab nation without excep­ tion have decided in these last years to live, and to accom plish their freedom , and grasp the reins o f their adm inistration both in theory and practice.” 18 He then asked approval o f several “ fundamental prop o­ sitions,” the m ost im portant being that England should acknowledge “ the independence o f the A rab countries, bounded on the north by M ersina and Adana up to the 3 7 ° o f latitude . . . ; on the east by the borders o f Persia up to the G ulf o f Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception o f the position o f Aden to rem ain as it is ; on 16. CAB 2 7 /1 , p. 144 (note on Arabia made by the India Office on 26 A pril 1915). It should be noted that from the outset the British contributed to their own diffi­ culties by encouraging the sharif in his personal ambitions, even intimating to him that “ it may be that an Arab o f true race w ill assume the Khalifate at M ecca or Medina.” They also tended to overestimate the scope o f his prestige and au­ thority and the extent o f Arab homogeneity. The title “ sharif’ indicates descent from the prophet Muhammad and is a mark o f distinction within the Islamic community. 17. For Abdullah’ s role as an intermediary, see Graves, M emoirs o f K ing Abdullah, pp. 112-14. There are a number of books dealing in whole or in part with the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the foremost being: George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939), which provides the text o f the letters as well as a detailed exposition o f the Arab interpretation; Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence (Beirut, 1960), pp. 1-12; and Harry N. Howard, The Partition o f Turkey (Norm an: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1931). The official British translation was first published (with modifications) in 1939 as a parliamentary command paper: “ Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty’s High C om m ission« at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein o f M ecca, July, 1915-March, 1916” (Cm d. 5957) ; hereinafter cited as Cmd. 5957. 18. Cmd. 5957, p. 3»

8

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

die west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to M enina, England to approve o f the proclam ation o f an Arab Khalifate o f Islam.” 1* In return the sharif prom ised to acknowledge the preferential position o f England in all econom ic enterprises in the A rab countries. Replying on 30 August, Sir Henry M cM ahon expressed satisfaction that “ A rab interests are English interests and English A rab,” and that “ our desire [is ] fo r an independent A rabia.” Regarding the question o f lim its and boundaries, he advised that “ it would appear to be premature to con­ sume our time in discussing such details in the heat o f war.” 1 9 20 This first exchange o f letters set the tone fo r future correspondence by revealing divergent emphases. In com m unicating with the king o f the H ijaz, M cM ahon had but one immediate ob jective: to have the Arabs com m it themselves against their political suzerain and co-religionists. He thus sought to avoid lengthy, detailed negotiations over exact bound­ aries and spoke initially only o f an independent A rabia. The sharif, on the other hand, was specific both with regard to the nature o f m ilitary and financial support expected from Britain and to the territorial dimen­ sions o f future A rab rule. H is vagueness, however, appeared in a matter o f less immediate concern; he did not specify what form this future independence m ight take: whether one vast kingdom or several units, each with a separate form o f governm ent yet leagued together in som e type o f confederation. Thus, fo r exam ple, on 9 September Husayn wrote, “ I am m yself with all my m ight carrying out in my cou n try. . . all things which tend to benefit the rest o f the K ingdom ,” to which M cM ahon re­ plied on 24 O ctober: Great Britain would give advice and assist to establish “ what m ay appear to be the m ost suitable form s o f govern­ ment in these various territories.” 21 Husayn continued to press fo r a discussion o f frontiers, and M cM ahon,

19. Cmd. 5957, p. 3. It has been suggested that Sharif Husayn was influenced in his claim by a protocol drawn up early in 1915 by secret societies of Arab national­ ists at Damascus; see Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 157-58. 20. Cmd. 5957, p. 3. A ll maps drawn by the de Bunsen committee, whether for schemes o f partition, zones o f interest, Ottoman independence, or decentraliza­ tion, provided for an independent Arabia but confined it to an area whose north­ ern frontier began just south of Aqaba and extended across the desert to a point south o f Basra on the Persian G ulf; it was therefore not expected to include any area of the Fertile Crescent. These maps are located in CAB 2 7 /1 ; see also Appendix A o f the present volume. 21. Cmd. 5957, p. 6.

W artim e Commitments, 1914-18

9

having realized that the sharif regarded this question as one o f vital and urgent im portance and w ould delay entering the war, sought instruc­ tions from London. He was then authorized to make the follow ing state­ ment in his letter o f 24 O ctober: The two districts o f M enina and Alexandretta and portions o f Syria lying to the west o f the districts o f Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits. As for those regions lying within those frontien wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests o f her ally, France, I am empowered in the name o f the Govern­ ment of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the follow­ ing reply to your letter:— (1 ) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to rec­ ognize and support the independence o f the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif o f M ecca .. . Relieved at this acceptance o f his principal demand fo r independence, Husayn wrote back on 5 N ovem ber, retracting his insistence upon the inclusion o f the vilayets o f M ersina and Adana in the A rab kingdom . A t the same time, how ever, he did stress that the vilayets o f A leppo and Beirut and their sea coasts were purely A rab and that the vilayets in M esopotam ia were historically bound to the Arabs. But he was w illing to leave the latter under British adm inistration fo r a short tim e in return fo r a “ suitable sum paid as com pensation to the A rab K ingdom fo r the period o f occupation.” W ith this he claim ed to have made the utmost in concessions fo r the sake o f agreement. Having consented only reluctantly to the sh a rif s territorial claim s, the British governm ent subsequently introduced m odifications. By the tim e M cM ahon sent his letter o f 14 Decem ber to M ecca, three reserva­ tions were apparent: first, further consideration w ould have to be given to A leppo and Beirut, “ as the interests o f our ally, France, are involved in them both” ; second, since Britain could not repudiate agreements already in existence, those w hich were then in effect with A rab chiefs w ould still apply “ to all territories included in the A rab K ingdom ” ; and, finally, Britain insisted that her established position and interests in M esopotam ia would necessitate special adm inistrative arrangements.2 22. Ibid.

10

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

Twenty thousand British pounds sterling, an “ earnest o f intentions,” accom panied the letter in hopes o f softening the sh a rif s reaction. Any apparaît deadlock was averted by the next exchange o f letters in January, 1916. On 1 January, out o f a wish to avoid “ what may pos* sihly injure the alliance o f Great Britain and France,” Husayn agreed to cease pursuing his original claim . Yet he took the occasion to record his own enduring reservations: “ . . . we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) fo r what we now leave to France in Beirut and its co a sts.. . . it is im possible to allow any derogation that gives France, o r any other Pow er, a span o f land in those regions.” 28 M cM ahon’ s reply was forthcom ing on 25 Janu­ ary. Setting aside Husayn's warning o f future friction, it judged his decision to be “ entirely in the interests o f the A rab peoples” and ended with a strong statement o f Anglo-French solidarity from which Husayn was invited to benefit “ to the mutual welfare and happiness o f us all.” The A rab revolt against the Ottoman Em pire com m enced on 10 June 1916. In the course o f the war it facilitated British m ilitary campaigns in the area and contributed to the Turks' retreat from the A rab prov­ inces. Even m ore im portant, it created fo r Great Britain a sense o f ob li­ gation to the Arabs in general and to the sharifians in particular, while perm itting the extension o f sharifian influence from the Arabian penin­ sula to the Fertile Crescent, a movement sym bolized by the entry o f the H ijazi army into Damascus on 1 O ctober 1918. A month before the start o f die A rab revolt, the foreign ministers o f France, Great Britain, and Russia entered into a secret agreement gov­ erning their own partition o f the Ottoman Empire. Russian demands in M arch, 1915, fo r Constantinople and control o f the straits had prom pted her allies to consider their own claim s. When unofficial discussions dur­ ing the autumn o f 1915 reached a satisfactory stage, Sir Mark Sykes and M . Georges P icot were selected by their governments to draft the actual provisions fo r a form al agreem ent2 3 24 On 9 M ay 1916 M . Paul 23. lbidn p. 13. 24. An evaluation o f the role played by Sir Mark Sykes, who had been a member of the de Bunsen committee, is offered in Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956). Three useful accounts o f the negotiations are provided in Jean Pichón, L e Partage du Proche-Orient (Paris, 1938) ; H. W . V. Temperley, A H istory o f the Peace Conference o f Paris, voL 6 (London:

W artim e Commitments, 1914-18

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Cam bon, French am bassador to L ondon, conveyed to S ir Edward G rey the acceptance b y his governm ent o f “ les lim ites telles qu’elles ont été

fixées sur les cartes signées . . . » ainsi que les conditions diverses fo r­ m ulées au cours de ces discussions.” ** In his reply the follow ing day, G rey enumerated twelve conditions as a basis fo r the understanding, the first being the m ost im portant That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation o f Arab States in the areas (A ) and (B ) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty o f an Arab chief. That in area (A ) France, and in area (B ) Great Britain, shall have priority o f right o f enterprise and local loans. That in area (A ) France, and in area (B ) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request o f the Arab State or Confederation o f Arab States.28 The rem aining points provided fo r the establishment o f adm inistrative systems within the respective spheres; an international adm inistration fo r that area known to the Arabs as southern Syria and to Europeans as the H oly Land o r P alestine;*2 5 6 272 8control o f the key ports o f A cre, H aifa, and Alexandretta, the latter two being open to French and British trade respectively; and other measures concerning tariffs, arms control, and railway facilities. This accord, altered only to satisfy m inor Russian claim s and to com ply with a French request that the w ord “ protect” in the first clause be changed to “ uphold,” 28 rem ained secret until pub­ lished by the Bolsheviks in N ovem ber, 1917 (to the discom fiture o f Henry Frowde, Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), pp. 1-22; and Jukka Nevakivi, Brit­

ain, France and the Arab M iddle East, 1914-1920 (London: The Athlone Press, 1969). France, given the opportunity in 1915, immediately asserted a claim to Syria together with the region of the G ulf o f Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the Taurus range. 25. E. L. W oodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st ser., voL 4 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952), p. 244; hereinafter cited as Documents, 4. 26. Ibid., pp. 245ff. For the map, see the end papers o f the present volume. 27. In a handbook prepared by the Naval Intelligence Division o f the Admiralty at the end o f the war, “ Syria” was defined “ in its broadest acceptation” as “ the country that lies between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the deserts o f Arabia. In a narrower sense the name denotes that part of Syria which is not included in Palestine” (Handbook o f Syria [Including Palestine] [London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920], p. 9 ). 28. Cambon to Grey, 25 August 1916, Documents, 4:249. “ II me semble que les mots ’soutenir’ et ’uphold’ rendraient plus exactement notre pensée.”

12

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

the British, the French, and the Arabs a lik e ), and form ed the basis fo r A nglo-French discussions on the M iddle East at the Paris Peace Conference. The Sykes-Picot agreement— a striking exam ple o f traditional diplo­ m acy within a M iddle Eastern context— amounted to a calculated d ivi­ sion in advance o f territorial spoils o f war. A nd, fo r analytical pur­ poses, its specific term inology, provisions, and im plications were no less sign ifica n t First, it assumed that a spirit o f close cooperation and con ­ sultation would continue to govern relations between the two pow ers in peacetim e, in disregard o f the long record o f Franco-British rivalry in the area. Second, both parties appear to have held a lim ited definition o f A rab sovereignty; they considered themselves “ the protectors o f the A rab State” and believed that any adm inistrative systems w hich m ight b e established could be only “ as they desire and as they m ay think fit to arrange” with the A rab state. Y et they agreed to negotiate with the A rabs over the boundaries o f the A rab state and were prepared to accept the king o f the H ijaz as an equal to be consulted together with the other allies in matters pertaining to that area reserved fo r international con­ trol. T hird, the signatories were vague in their conception o f die form w hich A rab rule w ould take; the clause “ A rab State o r a Confederation o f A rab States” appears five times in the docum ent. Finally, Grey m ade acceptance o f the agreement by His M ajesty’s Governm ent conditional, provided that “ the co-operation o f the Arabs is secured, and that the A rabs fu lfil the conditions and obtain the towns o f Hom s, Hama, Da­ m ascus, and A leppo.” 29 It was apparent that Great Britain, in accepting the role o f interm ediary between the Arabs and the French, judged her undertakings up to that point to be com plem entary, and that in any event the specific interests o f all three parties could be adjusted reason­ ably and honorably once Turkey had been defeated. In this spirit, and out o f lingering anxiety as to the course o f the war, the British governm ent proceeded to take upon itself a further obliga­ tion in N ovem ber, 1917, this tim e to the Jewish people. Leaders o f the Zionist movement— D r. Chaim W eizm ann and Nahum Sokolow in par­ ticular— and their supporters in England had becom e increasingly ac­ tive in seeking official support fo r their cause since Herbert Samuel first tabled his mem oranda on Palestine before the Cabinet in the early 29. Ibid., p. 245.

W artim e Com m itm ents, 1914-18

13

months o f 1915. In audiences with individual members o f the govern­ ment they sought British endorsement o f their claim to Palestine as the historical and spiritual hom eland o f the Jewish people. In return the Zionists volunteered to assert their influence in rallying Jewish com m u­ nities throughout the w orld to the A llied cause. By the late summer and early fall o f 1917 the British governm ent was m oving toward an acceptance o f the Zionist proposal. A fter several ses­ sions devoted to discussion o f the wisdom and w ording o f a declaration, the Cabinet authorized Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to issue the follow ing statement, in the form o f a letter to L ord Rothschild, on 2 N ovem ber: “ His M ajesty’s Government view with favour the establish­ ment in Palestine o f a national hom e fo r the Jewish people, and w ill use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement o f this ob ject, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights o f existing non-Jewish com m unities in Pales­ tine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” 80 By issuing the Balfour D eclaration the British government had com ­ mitted itself even further to die em erging struggle fo r the M iddle East, a struggle between Britain and France fo r regional pre-em inence, be­ tween the Arabs and France fo r Syria, and between the Arabs and Zion­ ists fo r Palestine. The statement o f sympathy with Zionist aspirations appears to share certain features with its precursors. A deeply felt need fo r additional support may have made the governm ent prone to exag­ gerate the ability o f the Jewish people to substantially influence the war’ s outcom e.81 Sim ilarly, the likelihood o f immediate returns made3 0 1 30. The letter was first published by the Jewish Chronicle in London (9 November 1917, p. 10) and is reproduced on the frontispiece of Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Valentine-Mitchell, 1961), which is the most authoritative and scholarly presentation o f its evolution, the role o f Zionist diplomacy, and factors contributing to the British decision. In contrast to its open circulation in Europe, the declaration was kept a secret from the Arab communities. A copy was supplied by the general headquarters in Cairo to the chief administrator of O.E.T j M S ) on 9 October 1919, but with instructions to treat it as "extremely confidential, and on no account for any kind o f publication” (I.S.A ., file 2108). A public reading of the declaration apparently did not take place in Palestine until April, 1920. 31. In the case o f both France and Russia the need was rather to sustain them in their existing war effort. Thus the given rationale for British acceptance o f Petrograd’s 1915 demands was “ to avoid anything in the nature of a breach with

14

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

the endorsem ent o f such abstract principles as “ A rab independence“ and “ a national hom e fo r the Jewish people” politically expedient Lastly, British statesmen assumed a willingness on the part o f their allies to grant concession s: A rab nationalists w ould passively accept another lim itation o f their claim to sovereignty over the entire A rab region w hile the French approved a revision o f the Sykes-Picot agreement w hich w ould allow a special role fo r Britain in Palestine. Liberation o f the principal cities becam e the occasion fo r public statements by British m ilitary com m anders as the A llied forces swept through the Fertile Crescent in 1918. The address b y Lieutenant Gen­ eral S ir Stanley M aude to the people o f Baghdad on 19 M arch 1917 is representative. O people of Baghdad remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against an other in order that they might profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent to Great Britain and her allies, for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where there is enmity and misgovernment. Therefore I am commanded to invite you, through your nobles and elders and repre­ sentatives, to participate in the management o f your civil affairs in collabora­ tion with the political representatives o f Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may be united with your kinsmen in North, East, South, and West in realising the aspirations o f your race.32 Such declarations could not but serve to excite the expectations o f the loca l populace. F rom the point o f view o f the Arabs, how ever, the m ajor British un­ dertaking still rem ained the personal one involving the king o f die H ijaz.

Russia, or any action which would incline Russia to make a separate peace” (S ir Edward Grey, 3 March 1915, CAB 4 2 /2 ). This sensitivity to Russian attitudes contributed to the signing o f an Anglo-French-Russian agreement which imme­ diately preceded the more limited Sykes-Picot agreement. Grey recalled after­ ward that this same sentiment prevailed in negotiating the Sykes-Picot agree­ m ent: "H aving regard to the tremendous task upon which Britain and France were jointly engaged, the British Government were anxious to avoid any suspi­ cion which might interfere with the cordiality of our cooperation” (Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, 2:1022). W inston Churchill later charac­ terized the entire series o f secret agreements as "sim ply compulsive gestures of self-preservation” (T he World Crisis, 1911-1918, 3 vols. [N ew Y ork: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931], p t 1, p. 130). 32. Political Department memoranda, B. 253,1.O.

W artim e Com m itm ents, 1914-18

15

In order to counter any adven e effects from the Bolsheviks’ publication o f the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, but also to allay A rab suspicions arising from British m ilitary-political occupation o f the liberated areas, D. G. Hogarth was instructed on 4 January 1918 to inform the sharif that the “ Entente P ow en are determined that the A rab race shall be given full opportunity o f once again form ing a nation in the w orld.” 8* This meeting with the sharif allowed the British em issary to inform the sharif as well that, “ since the Jewish opinion o f the w orld favours a return o f Jews to Palestine,” the British governm ent “ are determined that in so far as is com patible with the freedom o f the existing popula­ tion, both econom ic and political, no obstacle shall be put in the way o f this ideal.” Husayn's reaction, as recorded by Hogarth, was not with­ out an element o f incongruity, fo r while “ the K ing seemed quite pre­ pared fo r [th e] form ula and agreed enthusiastically, I have no doubt that in his own m ind he abates none o f his original demands on behalf o f the Arabs, or in the fullness o f tim e, o f him self.” 3 343 5 W ith each succeeding A llied statement disclosing new reservations and distinctions, the seeds were planted fo r future estrangement from the sharifians. On 16 June 1918, in response to a m em orial submitted by seven A rab leaders resident in Cairo concerning the liberated areas, the British governm ent distinguished am ong fou r categories: areas in Ara­ bia which had been free and independent before the w ar; areas em anci­ pated from Turkish control by the action o f the Arabs during the w ar; areas form erly under Ottoman dom inion but occupied by the A llied forces; and those areas still under Turkish control. In the first two categories the British reaffirmed their intention to “ recognise the com ­ plete and sovereign independence o f the A rabs,” while expressing their desire that in the third sector “ the future governm ent o f these regions . . . be based upon the principle o f the consent o f the g ov e rn e d .. . .” ** Anglo-French intentions were even m ore explicit in the last docum ent 33. “ Statements made on behalf o f His Majesty’s Government daring the year 1918 in regard to the Future Status o f certain parts of the Ottoman Empire” (Cmd. 5964), 1939, miscellaneous no. 4, p. 3 ; hereinafter cited as Cmd. 5964. 34. Ibid., pp. 4-5. On 2 November 1916 Husayn proclaimed himself “ King o f the Arab Countries” ; but the Entente Powers refused to accept his title. Instead, on 10 December France, Great Britain, and Russia formally recognized the inde­ pendence of the Hijaz and Husayn as “ King o f the Hijaz” (U .S., Department o f State, Division o f Near Eastern Affairs, Mandate for Palestine [W ashington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1927] ) . 35. Cmd. 5964, pp. 5-6.

16

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

o f consequence to emerge from the war period. A declaration was issued join tly by the two countries in N ovem ber, 1918, and was given wide publicity. A fter repeating the desire o f France and Great Britain to foster the em ancipation o f the peoples in the M iddle East and the estab­

lishment o f freely chosen national governm ents and adm inistrations, it stated: Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any par­ ticular institutions, they are only concerned to ensure by their support and adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administra­ tions freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the coun­ try . . . , to favour the diffusion o f education, to put an end to dissensions. . . , such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.3* Heightened self-interest, anxiety as to A rab fears and suspicions, facts created by the m ilitary cam paigns, and the im pact o f President W ilson’s espousal o f self-determ ination87 had com bined to produce a docum ent which encouraged A rab hopes while in effect com prom ising that en­ dorsem ent o f A rab independence first extended by Great Britain in 1915. These factors also reversed the earlier British equation o f Sharif Husayn’s wishes with those o f the region as a whole. H ie assumption that Husayn w ould becom e sovereign o f a m onolithic A rab nation was abandoned in favor o f separate relationships with the several narrower political, adm inistrative, and geographical units. W ith the signing o f the Arm istice o f M udros by the Entente Powers and Turkey on 30 O ctober 1918, fighting ceased in the M iddle East. In the period 1915-18, events had been determined largely by m ilitary strategy on the battlefield. In 1919 the emphasis was upon diplom atic m aneuvering within the council chambers at Versailles. Only two months separated these two phases as the nations and their leaders, weary from the protracted war effort, turned without respite to the challenges o f peace.3 6 7 36. Parliamentary Debates (Com m ons), 5th ser., 145:36. 37. Zeine (The Struggle for Arab Independence, p. 47) cites Lloyd George in stressing concern for Arab feelings as the motivation behind the Anglo-French declaration, while Arnold T. W ilson, writing at the time from Mesopotamia, condemned it as the unfortunate product of W ilsonian idealism (S ir Arnold T . W ilson, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash o f Loyalties [London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1931], 2:102--3).

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W artim e Commitments 1914-18

17

CHAPTER 2

The Difficulties o f Peace, 1919

T he w ar was on e thing— a p e r fe c tly trem endous strain, b u t on e was ca rried a lon g b y th e bign ess o f th e thing. E verybod y was w orkin g a bove his o r h er usual ca p acity. N ow com es th e in evitable Uslum p” . W e ca e a ll tired to death. W e have lo st th e old stim u lu s.. . . T he p rob lem s o f p ea ce a re n ea rly as b ig rea lly as th e p rob lem s o f w ar. B u t th e n ervou s exh au stion from w hich w e a re a ll su fferin g p reven ts ou r risin g to th e new ca ll.— C olon ial Secretary L ord M iln er, 8 A u gu st 1919

In preparing fo r and engaging in discussions about the A rab w orld at the P aris Peace Conference, the British delegation, headed by Prim e M inister D avid L loyd G eorge and Foreign Secretary Arthur James Bal­ fou r, had to deal with certain existing facts. A t the clim ax o f m ilitary operations, troops o f the British Em pire were positioned throughout the F ertile Crescent, from Sinai to the Persian G ulf. They exercised sole con trol o f Palestine and M esopotam ia and shared control o f Lebanon w ith France and o f Syria with the H ijazi arm y, which was under die com m and o f A m ir Faysal, second youngest son o f K ing Husayn o f the H ijaz. Over-all com m and o f the region was held by General Allenby, w hose headquarters were in Cairo. Because the A rab region had origi­ n ally been part o f the Ottoman Em pire, it was legally regarded as occu­ p ied enemy territory pending a treaty whereby the Turkish governm ent w ould be com pelled to relinquish its title. In the interim , m ilitary ad­ m inistrations were instituted.11

1. Syria and Palestine were divided into three administrative areas, Occupied En­ emy Territories South, North, and E ast Before 1914 the Fertile Crescent had

19

In terms o f both men and m ateriel, die overwhelm ing expenditure in this theater o f war had been British— a factor which weighed heavily on die thinking o f British leaders, generals, and the public. T oo great an investment had been m ade by Great Britain, it was felt, fo r her sim ply to withdraw. R adier, the opposite was argued: a continued presence w ould be necessary in order to protect British interests, often equated with tranquility in die region.* Instead o f dim inishing, these interests were expanding as the occupation becam e institutionalized, and new econom ic, social, and educational projects, first hinted at in the 1918 Anglo-French declaration, were begun. In M esopotam ia, fo r example, an influx o f civil officials bent upon consolidating the victory stimulated a large increase in the bureaucracy. An Irrigation Department was es­ tablished to cope with die menace o f floods, to econom ize in die use o f water, and to drain marshes. An Agricultural Department directed the cultivation o f irrigated lands and sought to grow cotton. A railway was constructed from Basra to Baghdad which, when opened to com m erce in 1919, becam e an integral part o f the Constantinople-Basra system. There was every indication that "th e British were in M esopotam ia to stay” 8 as efforts to secure existing interests led to the creation o f new ones and strengthened the inclination to remain. Earlier prom ises constituted a further restraint upon British diplo­ m atic flexibility. A t the war’s end the governm ent found itself a party to three m ajor undertakings: an official correspondence with the A rab 2 3 been governed as eight units: Mesopotamia was divided into the vilayets o f Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra and the mutasarrifiyah, or governorship, o f Dair alZ n r; Syria into the vilayets o f Aleppo, Damascos, and Beirut and the governor­ ships o f Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon. 2. The chief political officer in Palestine assured the Foreign Office on 22 Septem­ ber 1919, Mas long as British troops remain, it is my opinion we need anticipate no trouble” (Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary [London: The Cresset Press, 1959], p. 4 9 ). W riting in 1918, the civil commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, maintained that “ we should still hope to annex the Basrah Vilayet and exercise a veiled protectorate over the Baghdad Vilayet” (P olitical Depart­ ment memoranda, B. 284 [ ‘ T h e Future of Mesopotamia” ] , 22 A pril 1 9 1 8 ,1 .0 .). This was in keeping with the prevalent military argument: “ W ith Palestine, Arabia and Persia, Mesopotamia forms an important link in a chain o f contigu­ ous areas under British influence, extending from Egypt to India” ( “ Memoran­ dum by the General Staff on Mesopotamia,” 12 November 1919, app. 1, p. 2, C P . 120 in CAB 2 4 /9 3 ). 3. Edward M . Earle, Turkey, ike Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway (N ew Y ork: Macmillan Co., 1924), p.297.

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British P olicy in the Arab W orld

ch ief regarded as leader o f the A rab peoples, a secret treaty with the plenipotentiary o f a sovereign nation, and a public declaration to the Zionist leaders view ed as unofficial spokesmen fo r the Jewish people. W hatever their individual distinctions, these commitments were consid­ ered to be binding, not only by Husayn, France, and the Zionists, but, m ore im portantly, by the British themselves. It soon becam e apparent, how ever, that inconsistencies did exist am ong these undertakings, as B alfour admitted in August, 1919. These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clearcut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers; and yet so far as I can see, none o f them have wholly lost their validity or can be treated in all respects as of merely historic interest Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final arrangement about the M iddle East4 Even if their incom patibility was debatable, it was clear by 1919 that events had conspired to make the prom ises obsolete. The interests o f the A rabs, the British, the French, and the Zionists were semi to be no longer ( i f they ever had been) harm onious. Thereafter the emphasis and the dilem m a o f British p olicy lay in attempting to reconcile these divergent interests and demands. Foreign Secretary Balfour him self concluded: Since the literal fulfilment o f all our declarations is impossible, partly because they are incompatible with each other and partly because they are incompatible with facts, we ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And 4. Documents, 4:343; see also A lbeit H. Hourani, Great Britain and the Arab W orld (London: John M uiray, 1945), p. 19, for a valid interpretation o f the agreements as “ an attempt. . . to please everybody up to a certain point." W rit­ ing two months later, Lloyd George took exception with Balfour’s interpretation, maintaining instead that the “ obligations do not conflict with one another, but are complementary” (Documents, 4 :48 7). Conspicuously missing from Balfour’s list o f obligations was the declaration on Palestine bearing his own name. Quite possibly he continued to regard it as con­ sistent. He certainly did not dismiss it lightly, for in the memorandum dated 11 August 1919 he expressed the opinion that the “ four Great Powers are com­ mitted to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, o f far profounder import than the desires and prejudices o f the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that an­ cient land” (ib id ., p. 3 45).

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The D ifficulties o f Peace 1919

21

the next best thing may, perhaps, be attained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely the material interests, but the hopes and habits o f the native population ; which shall take into account the legitimate aspirations o f other peoples and races, in particular, o f the French, the British, and the Jews; and which shall embody, as completely as may be, the essential spirit o f the various international pronouncements, whose literal provisions it seems impossible in all cases to fulfil.56 N or was die task o f reconciliation made easier by developments within the Near and M iddle Elast. W ith the demise o f Turkish rule, A rab nationalist leaders returned from exile to com pete fo r the support o f the masses, and a number o f political groups em erged from hiding. Com ­ prising the A rab nationalist movement, these particularistic societies differed over fundamental issues: W as the emphasis to be pan-Islam ic or pan-Arab? Could unity be achieved with a European presence, and if so, peacefully or through m ilitancy? D id the sharifian dynasty, headed by Huaayn, represent the appropriate instrument fo r achieving nationalism and independence? W hich was most desirable, local or broad nationalism ? Despite such doctrinal differences, however, con ­ cern over the fate o f the watan al-‘arabi, or A rab hom eland, had by 1919 led most o f the groups toward a com m on awareness o f what the nationalist thinker al-Afghani had w arned: “ By G od’s L ife! Madness and infidelity are leagued together, and folly and greed are allied to destroy religion, to abrogate the H oly Law, and to hand over the Hom e o f Islam to foreigners without striking a blow or offering the least resistance.” * Few British statesmen as yet appreciated the potential o f this under­ current o f nationalist sentim ent S ir Arthur Hirtzel o f the India Office expressed a m inority opinion when he ventured, “ Is it not then better to

5. Document», 4:346. 6. Quoted in E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution o f 1905-1909 (Cam bridge: The University Press, 1910), p. 26. According to T . E. Lawrence, the term “ Arab Movement” encompassed all the vague discontent against Turkey which existed in the Arab provinces before 1916 (Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 103). See also Albert H. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal A ge, 17981939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), particularly chap. 11; Docu­ ments, 4:360-65, for a description o f four specific societies operating in Je­ rusalem; and M ajid Khadduri, “ ‘A dz ‘AB Miçrï and the Arab Nationalist Move­ ment,” St. Anton/s Papers, no. 17 (M iddle Eastern Affairs no. 4 ) (London: Ox­ ford University Press, 1965), pp. 140-63.

22

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

d o voluntarily what one w ill, sooner rather than later, be com pelled to d o ? . . . W e must swim with the new tide which is set tow ards the educa­ tion , and not the governm ent, o f what used to be subject peoples.” 7 But resistance to such pleas was part o f a general European insensitivity— traced as far bade in M iddle Eastern history as the U rabi revolt in Egypt in 1882— to the force o f nationalism . Consequently, the British negoti­ ated the future o f the M iddle East in Paris with insufficient attention to loca l conditions. I f fo r the tim e being Great Britain could afford to ignore such a force, S h arif Husayn could not, fo r A rab nationalist sentiment directly a f­ fected his status and prestige. T o som e M uslims Husayn's opposition to the Caliph during the war was inexcusable. M any natives o f the Fertile Crescent considered themselves intellectually and culturally superior to the H ij azis o f the Arabian desert. The m ufti o f Jerusalem allegedly said in 1919: “ I have been asked if the H edjaz K ingdom w ill satisfy our national aspirations. N ot at all. That is fo r the Bedouins across die Jordan. W e are different peoples. Our native country is Palestine.” 89 Sim ilar antipathy toward the sharif and his fam ily was reported from Baghdad several weeks earlier by C olonel A . T . W ilson. Instructed by L ondon to make inquiries into local sentiment at the possible candidacy o f A m ir Abdullah fo r ruler o f a united M esopotam ia, W ilson replied that hostility toward any m ember o f the sh a rif s fam ily was grow ing be­ cause “ H edjaz politicians and persons have no connection with o r hold upon M esopotam ia and even [th e] idea that K ing Husein should be prayed fo r in M osques has found litde favour there.” 8 Still others, m ore extrem e and anti-European, viewed Husayn as subservient to British wishes. Husayn’s personal authority over the A rab provinces was further dim inished by the appearance o f a rival in the m ore im m ediate arena o f A rabia. The bitter contention between the Hashimi fam ily, led by K ing H usayn, and Ibn Sa‘ ud had resumed after the arm istice, and on 19 M ay 1919 Sa‘udi forces defeated the H ijazi troops com m anded by A m ir A b7. Hirtzel to A . T. W ilson, private letter o f 17 September 1919, Arnold T. W ilson Papers, British Museum. 8. General Headquarters of Egyptian Expeditionary Force to the Foreign Office, 3 M arch 1919, copy o f an article o f 10 February “ written by a certain Miss W ein­ stein o f Jerusalem to the Associated Papers o f New York” (F .0 .6 0 8 /9 6 ). 9. Curzon to Balfour (cipher telegram ), 26 January 1919, F .0 .608/96.

,

The D ifficulties o f Peace 1919

23

dullah at Turaba. Husayn was spared further defeat only through Brit­ ain’s diplom atic intervention with Ibn Sa‘ ud. N ot only had it been true in wartime that “ autom atically, the S h a rif s control o f affairs waned as the fighting receded farther and farther from his seat o f pow er,” 101but his dom estic position in peacetim e was being underm ined as well. A n­ gered at Abdullah’ s m ilitary failure, Husayn also criticized the states­ manship o f Faysal in strong terms during the tense period over Syria at the end o f the year.11 Having becom e estranged from his own sons, Husayn com pounded his difficulties by allow ing relations with the British to worsen. In N o­ vem ber, 1919, General A llenby paid an official visit to the king at Jidda. Husayn insisted upon fu ll British com pliance with their prom ises and opposed French designs on Syria, leaving the im pression with Abdullah that these discussions “ resulted only in increased m isunderstanding” on the subject o f Syria, Palestine, and Iraq.12 A s Husayn’s stature dim in­ ished, so did British hopes— fo r the time being— o f solving their A rab problem through the agency o f the sharifians. The rise o f two revolutionary forces beyond the im m ediate perim eter o f the A rab provinces and the danger o f their coalescing into an antiBritish drive also had an im portant effect on British attitudes tow ard the M iddle E ast On 19 M ay 1919 a Turkish officer, M ustafa K an al, landed at Samsun on the Black Sea coast o f Anatolia and, in defiance o f his superiors in Constantinople, proceeded to organize a movement fo r Turkish nationalism and against an im posed peace settlem ent W hen added to the lingering anim osity tow ard the Turks, the fact that this resistance jeopardized A llied arrangements fo r the partitioning o f Tur­ key sufficed to set British p olicy against the Kemalists. F or not only did 10. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's M om ent in the M iddle East, 1914-1956 (Baltimore, M d.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 47. Abdullah portrays his father as “ bad tempered, forgetful and suspicious” and as having lost “ his quick grasp and sound judgment” (Graves, p. 183). 11. Dispatch no. 571 o f 22 November 1919 transmitted a literal translation o f a let­ ter from Husayn to Faysal, who was then in Paris: 'T herefore, the result is, Sir, that if I encounter an incident (notwithstanding the patience and tolerance prom ised), and if anything interferes with my decisions as you have already done more than once, I will withdraw that same moment. . . . Moreover, if the Syrians decide to fight for their liberty and independence, I w ill not hesitate in going over to them to co-operate with them . . . so that they may know that I did not betray them. God w ill not guide traitors” (Documents, 4 :5 5 0 ). 12. Graves, M emoirs o f King Abdullah, p. 190.

24

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

these nationalists intend to oppose the Sublim e Porte in their fight to retain an independent Turkey in Anatolia, but they sought solidarity with their fellow M uslims to the south, as was first articulated in die Turkish N ational Pact at A ngora.18 Emanating from Russia, com m unism was the second force bent on re­ versing the status quo. Unlike the Kem alists, the Bolsheviks had sought quite early to feed on M iddle Eastern discontent W ithin a month o f their seizure o f pow er the Council o f People’ s Commissars issued an “ A ppeal to the M uslim s o f Russia and the East” seeking their support fo r the revolution. Addressing itself to “ M oslem s o f the Elast! Persians, Turks, Arabs and Hindus,” the appeal condem ned the “ rapacious Euro­ pean plunderers,” expressed Bolshevik opposition to die seizure o f fo r­ eign territory, and ended by asking fo r M uslim support “ in the w ork o f regenerating die w orld.” 1 3 141 5Anti-Bolshevik resistance in the Caucasus collapsed and the Red A rm y advanced along a w ide front in the wake o f a general British troop withdrawal. Alarm grew in London and Paris at the prospect o f a Turco-Bolshevik drive aimed at m enacing India through the M iddle East. One result was the greater emphasis placed upon the strategic im portance o f this region, M esopotam ia in particular, b y those responsible fo r m ilitary planning.18 The specific threat posed b y the Turks and the Bolsheviks, in addition to the general unrest in 13. The first article o f the pact referred to a link between the Arab M iddle East and the Turkish Near East: M. . . the whole o f these parts . . . imbued with senti­ ments o f respect for each other and o f sacrifice . . . form a whole which does not admit o f division for any reason in truth or in ordinance” (text in Temperley, H istory o f the Peace Conference o f Paris, 6 :6 0 5 -6 ). 14. Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, voL 1: 1917-1924 (Lon­ d on : Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 15-17. 15. On 12 January 1920 the Eastern Committee o f the British government was o f the opinion that Min view o f our inability to find the force entailed in the holding o f line (a ) [Constantinople-Batum-Baku-Kraznovodsk-Merv] or (b ) [Constantinople-Baku-Enzeli-Tehran-Meshed], o f the difficulties o f reinforcing troops in areas south and east o f Caspian, and of military argument that such a force would be more profitably employed in aggressive action elsewhere, it was in­ evitable that we should fall back on alternative (c ) [Northern PalestineM osu l]” (Lord Hardinge at the Foreign Office to Earl o f Derby, Paris, for Curzon’s attention [telegraph], 13 January 1920, in 169528/ME58, F .0 .4 0 6 /4 3 ). The record o f friction and cooperation between the two revolutionary groups and against the A llies is presented in Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey o f International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 316-76 ( “ Rus­ sia, Transcaucasia, and Turkey” ) , and in Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921) (New Y ork: Philosophical Library, 1951).

The D ifficulties o f P eace, 1919

25

Asia at this tim e, contributed to a British regional view in which the Fertile Crescent would form the base fo r dealing with a crisis in any o f the adjoining areas o f tension. Despite the above challenges— incom patible prom ises, national ex* haustion, the logic o f im perialism , a tendency to react with condescen­ sion toward nationalism , Turkish and Bolshevik rejection o f the status quo, general turbulence, and the failure o f Husayn to fulfill British ex* pectations— France and Great Britain m ight have dealt effectively with the Fertile Crescent in the early postwar years had they been able to concert p olicy. Instead, under the pressures o f peace in Europe and Asia, the wartime coalition began to break apart. Divergence became increasingly apparent in their respective approaches to Europe, the Rhine, the future o f Germany, and Turkey, but it was especially evident in matters concerning the M iddle E ast The last o f the Ottoman Empire to be divided was the Fertile Crescent north o f A rabia, and the contend­ ers fo r control o f the area were Britain and France. In 1919 events re­ vealed that the Anglo-French relationship had been an alliance de con -

venance, one without a firm , lasting foundation. Mutual distrust and recrim ination exposed the Entente Cordiale o f 1904 as a façade which had suppressed deep historical differences instead o f resolving them. On the one hand, France was determined to retain at least one sphere o f influence in the region, both as com pensation fo r her heavy sacrifice in the European fighting and in keeping with her traditional interests in the Levant Prem ier Clemenceau therefore insisted upon France’ s right to Syria, a claim based on the Sykes-Picot agreem ent The French were also concerned that Britain, a form er rival in the M iddle East, m ight achieve unchallenged pre-em inence in this area o f econom ic potential and strategic im portance.19 Consequently, they began to think in terms o f an Anglo-Syrian conspiracy whereby the Syrians would be encour­ aged to resist the French occupation o f Beirut and claim to prim acy in 1 6 16. Professor Toynbee has placed this phase of the rivalry in its proper historical perspective: “ One cannot understand— or make allowances for— the postwar re­ lations of the French and British Governments over the ‘Eastern Question’ unless one realizes this tradition of rivalry and its accumulated inheritance o f suspicion and resentment.. . . The French are perhaps more affected by it than the English, because on the whole they have had the worst of the struggle in the Levant as well as in India, and failure cuts deeper memories than success” (T he W estern Question in G reece and Turkey [London: Constable & Co., 1923], pp. 4 5 -4 6 ).

26

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

Syria.17 M oreover, their suspicions were not entirely unfounded; the unauthorized activity o f certain British agents, who allegedly were un­ aware o f the official British position, was dam aging the credibility o f claim s in London to a “ p olicy o f désintéressaient** in Syria.181 9Finally, the French refused to be governed in their A rab policy by the prom ises o f H is M ajesty’s Government to Sharif Husayn, as Clemenceau duly in­ form ed L loyd G eorge on 9 N ovem ber.1* On the other hand, French uneasiness at the state o f die alliance was reciprocated by the British. The apparent unwillingness o f the French to com prom ise with A rab demands was viewed as a threat to the influ­ ence and prestige o f Britain with the A rabs; the need to consult Paris, to consider French interests, and to restrain the Syrians on behalf o f France pointed up the liabilities inherent in the alliance. W hen asked fo r an appraisal o f A rab potential to resist France, General Allenby re­ ported deep m isgivings. I f the French were given a mandate in Syria, he submitted, there w ould be serious trouble and probably a war involving Great B ritain; “ the consequences would be incalculable.” 20 The extent o f the Anglo-French divergence was reflected in an ex­ change o f letters between Clemenceau and Lloyd G eorge in O ctober, 1919. On the 14th the French Prem ier wrote, inter alia, to die Earl o f D erby, British ambassador in P aris: “ Je com prends fort bien l’embarras où se trouvent les négociateurs anglais, qui sous le coup des nécessités politiques, ont été amenés à prendre au H edjaz, au N edjd [Ibn Sa‘u d] et avec la France des engagements sinon opposés, du m oins difficiles ¿ ajuster.” 21 On the 18th a reply was forthcom ing from the British 17. The fact that a British officer, Colonel T. E. Lawrence, accompanied Amir Faysal in his appearance before the peace conference contributed to mounting French suspicions. On 21 August a member of the Foreign Office expressed criti­ cism o f Lawrence's role: “ W e and the W ar Office feel strongly that he is to a large extent responsible for our troubles with the French over Syria . . (Documeats, 4 :35 4). 18. Upon learning o f such activity, Balfour termed it “ most unfortunate" and “ o f a nature to lend some colour to these repeated French com plaints" (Balfour to Curzon from Paris, 28 July 1919, no. 1208 [telegram ], ibidn p. 323; see also French charges on pp. 321,327-28). 19. Clemenceau to Lloyd George, 9 November 1919, ibid., p. 521. 20. Quoted in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlem ent, voL 3 (London: W illiam Heinemann, 1923), p. 15. 21. Documents, 4:459.

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The D ifficulties o f Peace 1919

27

Prim e M inister in w hich he expressed surprise at die "com plete change from die friendly tone you adopted in our discussions on this subject in Paris*' and said that it w ould be hard fo r him to conceive " o f a m ore offensive im putation m ade b y one A lly to another, after five years in com radeship in arms.” 2 232 4He went on to charge the French governm ent with being under a "com plete m isapprehension” as to British policy, o f com m unicating messages o f a "som ew hat insulting form ,” and o f ad­ vancing unfounded accusations. L loyd G eorge ended b y pleading that Anglo-French relations not becom e estranged, yet warned that his gov­ ernment w ould be com pelled to publicly refute French accusations if they continued, though "certainly nothing w ould be m ore calculated to encourage the enemies o f that Anglo-French A lliance which was the principal cause o f the A llied victory in the war. But they w ill not shrink from this duty if it is thrust upon them.*'23 In the absence o f mutual good faith, little could be done to conciliate differences in outlook toward the Arabs, the engagements o f 1916, or the m ost appropriate form ula fo r rem oving at least the M iddle Eastern obstacle to Anglo-French am ity. Thus the breach, first reopened in the final stages o f the war and widened in the clash o f ideas and personal­ ities in 1919, persisted thereafter as an im portant irritant in the trian­ gular relationship am ong the French, the Arabs, and the British. Controversy within Great Britain over ends and means further lim ited the capacity o f her statesmen to deal effectively with A rab affairs. En­ glish society as a w hole was weary from the unprecedented w ar effort— an effort which was to affect British im perial relations profoundly. D . G. H ogarth was one o f the few people who at the tim e grasped its fu ll im plications. “ The em pire has reached its maximum and begun the de­ scen t There is no m ore expansion in us . . . and that being so we shall make but a p oor Best o f the A rab C ountries; Had the capture o f Bagh­ dad ended the W ar we could have done m uch; but the rest o f 1917 and all o f 1918 and 1919 have low ered our vitality permanently. W e started in 1914 young and vigorou s and we have com e out in 1919 to find we are old and must readjust all our ideas.’ *34 Even to the less perceptive it was clear that people were exhausted, anxious to return to norm alcy as 22. Ibid., pp. 479£E. 23. Ibid., p. 489. 24. Hogarth to Miss Gertrude Bell, Oriental secretary to the acting civil commis­ sioner, Mesopotamia, 11 A pril 1920, W ilson Papers.

28

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

soon as possible, and therefore impatient with foreign adventures or ex­ pensive overseas commitments. Public im patience asserted itself in a demand fo r m ilitary dem obili­ zation. W hen questioned about the disposition o f a large number o f British forces abroad, S ir Henry W ilson, ch ief o f die Im perial General Staff, advised: “ get out o f die places that don’ t belong to you and hold on to those that d o.” 2 5 26 In January, 1919, W inston Churchill assumed die office o f secretary o f state fo r war and in the next twelve months suc­ ceeded in dem obilizing m ore than fou r m illion soldiers. Nevertheless, continuing public pressure dictated the need fo r a dip­ lom atic initiative in the Near and M iddle East: either to quickly achieve a peace settlement with Turkey o r to withdraw the occupation troops from Constantinople and Syria. Churchill strongly advocated decision and action in his letter o f 12 August to the foreign secretary in P aris: I know how great your difficulties are, but I trust you will realise that the length o f time which we can hold a sufficient force at your disposal to over­ awe Turkey is lim ited.. . . A ll the men we are raising in this country are needed either to hold down Ireland, to maintain order here, or to relieve our demobilisable garrisons in Egypt or India. The delays in demobilisation caused by the delay in reaching Peace with Germany and Turkey have already added more than 60 millions to the Army Estimates, for which no Parliamentary sanction has been obtained, and I must really ask for assist­ ance in this matter, which is from day to day assuming greater prominence in the House of Commons and throughout the country.2* The fact that the logic o f public discontent and financial lim itations had im pressed itself upon the governm ent was reflected in a decision on Syria com m unicated by Curzon to A m ir Faysal on 9 O ctober. Britain w ould begin a troop withdrawal from Syria on 1 N ovem ber because: the peoples o f the British Empire have lost over 950,000 lives, and they have incurred a debt o f £9,000,000,000 in securirg the freedom o f the nations of Europe and o f the peoples who formerly languished under the Turkish yoke. . . . It has sustained the onerous and expensive burden o f maintaining law

25. Quoted in Field Marshal Viscount A . P. W . WaveD, AUenby in Egypt (London: George G. Harrap & Con 1943), p. 52. 26. Churchill to Balfour, 12 August 1919, Arthur James Balfour Papers, British Museum; see also Stephen R. Graubard, “ Military Demobilization in Great Brit­ ain,” Journal o f M odem H istory 19, no. 4 (December, 1947) : 309.

The D ifficulties o f Peace, 1919

29

and order In countries just liberated from alien rule in die hopes that die Peace Conference would come to a rapid and peaceful solution o f the difficult problems connected with the future o f the Middle East. But it is unfair to the British taxpayer to ask him to bear any longer the burden of occupy* ing provinces for which the Empire does not propose to accept permanent responsibility.37 W hile the debate over dem obilization, econom y, and disengagem ent from the increasingly com plex M iddle East situation affected British p olicy significandy, the lack o f coordination ham pered the policy-m ak­ ing establishment itself. H istorically, the extension o f British influence into the Fertile Crescent during the nineteenth century had occurred from two directions, the M editerranean Sea and along the Persian G ulf. Because the first thrust involved Britain in continuous diplom atic rela­ tions with the Ottoman Em pire, and frequently in com petition with other European pow ers, responsibility fo r British p olicy in the Levant had rested with die Foreign Office. Sim ilarly, because econom ic pene­ tration o f M esopotam ia and Persia had been stimulated by considera­ tions particular to Britain’s Indian em pire, jurisdiction in that sphere had been entrusted traditionally to the India Office. By the turn o f the century this division o f authority had been made m ore permanent through the grow th o f separate bureaucratic and ad­ m inistrative structures, each with its priorities and particular regional perspective. N ot only did the war reinforce this distinction, but it also injected the W ar Office into M iddle Eastern affairs, as evidenced by L ord Kitchener’s diplom atic initiative toward Sharif Husayn late in 1914 and Churchill's concern in 1919-20. A s a consequence the several departments possessed different sensi­ tivities. The Foreign Office sought to meet the susceptibilities o f Brit­ ain’s allies (France, G reece, Italy, and the United States), to punish the Turks, and to devise a com prehensive foreign policy o f which the A rab provinces were but one element. Conversely, in its capacity as spokes­ man fo r the governm ent o f India, die India Office was m ore concerned with the sensitivities o f m illions o f Indian Muslims. The A rab Bureau in C airo cam e to support the sharifians as the instrument m ost suitable 2 7 27. C anon to Faysal, 9 October 1919, Documents, 4:447. Lloyd George claimed that, with regard to Syria, domestic prenotes "le ft no other course open to the British Government” (T he Truth A bout the Peace Treaties, 2:1093, “ Extract from Aide-M emoire o f September 13th, 1919” ) .

30

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

to British interests and A rab aspirations, whereas officials in the India Office urged support fo r the Sa'udis as the rising pow er in A ra­ bia. D iffering over whether to court the Arabs specifically o r to ap­ pease the Islam ic w orld as a w hole by dealing leniently with the Turks, whether to retain British influence by direct control o r by indirect m eans, and whether to endorse the prim acy o f Husayn o r that o f Ibn Sa'ud, the so-called M editerranean and Indian schools o f thought con­ tinued along separate paths even after the 1919 arm istice.28 A ny efforts at coordination, such as the Interdepartmental Conference on M iddle Eastern A ffairs,28 proved too slow and cum bersom e. This failure to provide the necessary guidance from London was re­ sented and criticized by British personnel stationed in the M iddle East, and one o f the m ore outspoken men was C olonel A . T . W ilson. “ It was generally useless to refer questions to London, fo r the adm inistrative m achinery at hom e was so com plicated that telegrams seldom elicited a reply in less than a m onth, and the answers were often insufficiently definite and specific to be useful as a guide to action.'’80 H is view from M esopotam ia was reaffirmed in Palestine, objection being taken, fo r ex­ am ple, to the faulty lines o f com m unication between London and that reg ion : “ . . . we had but the slightest and vaguest inform ation about the Sykes-Picot negotiations . . . and there was far too little realization o f Indian operations in Iraq and o f Indian encouragement o f Ibn Sa‘ud. S o fa r as we were concerned it seemed to be nobody’ s business to har­ m onize the various views and policies o f the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Adm iralty, the W ar Office, the Governm ent o f India and the R esidency in Egypt.” 81 Although Balfour had brushed aside repeated criticism o f the lack o f effective, integrated m achinery by prom ising 2 8 9 3 0 28. For a fuller treatment o f the Foreign Office-India Office rivalry, see Monroe, Britain's Moment in the M iddle East, pp. 35-38, 54; John Marlowe, The Persian G ulf in the Twentieth Century (London: The Cresset Press, 1962), pp. 42-50; Hubert Young, The Independent Arab (London: John Murray, 1933), pp. 27172. 29. The Eastern Committee o f the W ar Cabinet held thirty-eight meetings from 28 March to 21 November 1918 and was then replaced by the Interdepartmental Conference with Curzon as chairman. A great many o f the latter’s forty-one meet­ ings between 7 January 1919 and 16 June 1920 were taken up with the unset­ tling events in Persia and the Caucasus. The full records o f both committees are in P. 9 4 0 /1 9 ,1.O. 30. W ilson, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920,2:140. 3 1 .Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Nicolson & Watson, 1937), p. 179.

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The D ifficulties o f Peace 1919

31

that die question o f control w ould be dealt with after die w ar,82 existing arrangements persisted through 1919. Consequendy, instead o f present* ing a well-defined form ula fo r dealing with the M iddle East, w hich m ight have succeeded in breaking the deadlock that developed at V er­ sailles, the governm ent found itself subjected to a num ber o f conflicting opinions, interests, and pressures from within its own ranks. N or was this fundamental weakness alleviated with the replacem ent o f B alfour by G eorge Nathaniel Curzon as secretary o f state fo r foreign affairs on 27 O ctober 1919. 32. Balfour to Edwin Montagu, 27 J u if 1918, and secret memorandum E.C. 24A, 13 August 1918, both in CAB 21/186.

32

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

c h a p t e r

3

Failure at the Paris Peace Conference

A p p etites, passions, h op es, reven g e, starvation, and anarchy ru led th e h o u r; and from this sim ultaneous w elter a ll ey es w ere tu rn ed to P a ris.— W inston C h u rch ill, T he W orld C risis

Great Britain shared in the m ood o f optim ism and expectation sur­ rounding the form al opening o f the Paris Peace Conference on 18 Jan­ uary 1919. The Fourteen Points enunciated by President W oodrow W ilson had excited the w orld’ s im agination as a fram ew ork fo r restruc­ turing international relations; the assem bly o f leaders offered an un­ precedented opportunity to translate these principles into reality.1 The agenda items, as com plex as they were diverse, included disarmament, reparations, Germany’s boundaries, peace treaties, a League o f Nations, and the dissolution o f fou r em pires— o f w hich the A rab regions com ­ prised but one portion. H iose Arabs o f the Fertile Crescent and A rabia w ho were politically alert looked to the conference as an international forum prepared to acknowledge their contribution to the war and qualified to approve their «im o f independence. But as the months passed, and as what President LA nalyais o f the peace conference is facilitated by access to the participants' many diaries, memoirs, and descriptions as well as by studies o f specific aspects. Temperley’ s H istory o f the Peace Conference o f Paris remains the standard work on the subject.

33

W ilson termed “ the w hole disgusting scram ble” fo r territory becam e apparent in the A rab provinces, disillusionm ent set in and m oderation yielded to m ilitancy. This regression in relations between the A rab w orld and the European powers and, on a secondary level, between France and Great Britain, is illustrated by the chronology o f events originating in Damascus as well as in London and Paris. T w o events o f significance occurred shortly before the conference opened, the first pro* viding one o f the few instances o f accord during 1919, the second estab­ lishing the tone fo r dialogue between Prem iers L loyd G eorge and Cle­ menceau regarding the A rab question. On 3 January an agreement was signed between D r. W eizm ann, on behalf o f the Zionist O rganisation, and A m ir Faysal, acting as repre­ sentative o f the kingdom o f the H ijaz. Its nine articles looked to “ the m ost cordial goodw ill and understanding” in relations between “ the A rab State and Palestine.” Effect was to be given to the British declara­ tion o f N ovem ber, 1917, in return fo r w hich the Zionist O rganisation w ould use “ its best efforts to assist the A rab State in providing the means fo r developing the national resources and econom ic possibilities thereof.” 23The W eizm ann-Faysal agreem ent, w hile but a footnote to the later record o f enmity between A rab and Jewish nationalism s, was re­ garded by the British in 1919 as an auspicious beginning to an era o f cooperation in Palestine.2 Faysal’ s willingness to enter into such an agreement stemmed largely from the nature o f his m ission and the reception accorded him in Eu­ rope. Having only begun to establish an A rab governm ent in Damascus

2. The text ie in Moshe Pearlmann, “ Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 19181922,” Jewish Social Studies 6, no. 2 (A pril, 1944) : 135-36. The original English version, with Faysal’s handwritten proviso in Arabic, is in the possession o f St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Although Faysal later claimed to be unable to recall the agreement, his letter to Sir Herbert Samuel, dated 10 December 1919 and found in the Samuel Papers at the Israel State Archives, contains the follow ing: “ J’ai la ferme conviction que la confiance réciproque établie entre nous et le parfaite accord de notre point de vue qui a permis une parfaits compréhension entre le Dr. Weizmann et m oi.. . . ” 3. The fact that the British encouraged such contacts is reflected in the remark by Gilbert Clayton that Weizmann’s earlier visit to Faysal in June, 1918, “ was in­ stigated by me and not by Weizmann himself” (G . S. Clayton to Symes, 13 June 1918, Reginald W ingate P apers). The British helped foster the impression among the Arabs that “ the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence” (Cm d. 5964, p. 3 ).

34

British P olicy in the Arab W orld

on 1 O ctober 1918, he was called away two months later by his father, Sharif Husayn, and ordered to proceed to the Paris Peace Conference as head o f the A rab delegation and there to act in concert with the British.4 W hile his father view ed boundaries and the form o f an A rab govern­ ment as subjects fo r negotiation, Faysal, being directly involved in the struggle fo r Syria, sensed that the m ore fundamental issue o f A rab in­ dependence was as yet unresolved. This conviction was reinforced in the course o f his b rief visits to France (2 6 N ovem ber-9 D ecem ber) and to England (1 0 D ecem ber-7 January), where it becam e apparent that the A rabs, contrary to their expectations, were to be regarded as supplicants rather than as equal members o f the victorious coalition and that the Sykes-Picot agreement rem ained very m uch an obstacle to A rab selfgovernm ent In London Faysal was advised to accept French control in Syria, w hile at the same tim e his visit was used to encourage contact with die Zionists. Conscious o f French opposition to A rab claim s and uncertain o f British intentions, Faysal was led to regard the Zionists as a potential ally in the com ing struggle o f w ills. In signing the agreement with Dr. W eizm ann, Faysal personally appended a proviso to the effect that this agreem ent w ould be deemed void and o f no account or validity if the A rabs failed to obtain the independence which they sought through the g ood offices o f Great Britain. A rab-Zionist relations were to be affected thereafter by the Great Powers* treatment o f the Arabs, a fact all too often overlooked by analysts o f the Palestine problem . A nxiety on Faysal’ s part was fully justified by die outcom e o f sev­ eral m eetings between Clemenceau and L loyd G eorge in London from 2 to 4 Decem ber. W hile Faysal was being given a co o l reception in France, the British prim e m inister pressed fo r an alteration o f the SykesP icot agreement, asking that M osul and Palestine be transferred from the French to the British sphere. H is request, based on an expanded con­ ception o f Britain’ s strategic needs in the Fertile Crescent and stemming from what Hogarth termed (