Formal Versus Explanatory Generalizations in Generative Transformational Grammar: An Investigation Into Generative Argumentation (Linguistische Arbeiten) 3484301503, 9783484301504

Table of contents :
PREFACE
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE STATUS OF LINGUISTICS AS A SCIENCE
III. THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION (LSG)' AND ITS CRITICS
IV. THE REVISED EXTENDED STANDARD THEORY (REST) AND ITS MODULES VERSUS THE STANDARD THEORY (ST)
V. THE MOTIVATION FOR EXTENDING THE BASE COMPONENT: THE LEXICALIST HYPOTHESIS (LH)
VI. MOTIVATIONS FOR CONSTRAINING THE 'EXTENDED' CATEGORIAL RULES: X' THEORIES
VII. FURTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST X1' AND X2 ' THEORIES
VIII. SOME CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS: 'ADVANCED' LEXICALISM VERSUS EARLY TRANSFORMATIONALISM
FOOTNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Citation preview

Linguistische Arbeiten

150

Herausgegeben von Hans Altmann, Herbert E. Brekle, Hans Jürgen Heringer, Christian Rohrer, Heinz Vater und Otmar Werner

Hans Ulrich Boas

Formal versus Explanatory Generalizations in Generative Transformational Grammar An Investigation into Generative Argumentation

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1984

C I P - K u r z t i t e l a u f n a h m e der D e u t s c h e n Bibliothek

Boas, Hans Ulrich: F o r m a l v e r s u s e x p l a n a t o r y g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s in g e n e r a t i v e transformational g r a m m a r : an investigation into generative a r g u m e n t a t i o n / H a n s U l r i c h Boas. - T ü b i n g e n : N i e m e y e r , 1984. ( L i n g u i s t i s c h e A r b e i t e n ; 150) NE: G T ISBN 3-484-30150-3

ISSN 0344-6727

(»y M a x N i e m e y e r Verlag T ü b i n g e n 1984 A l l e R e c h t e v o r b e h a l t e n . O h n e G e n e h m i g u n g d e s Verlages ist es n i c h t g e s t a t t e t , d i e s e s B u c h o d e r Teile d a r a u s p h o t o m e c h a n i s c h zu v e r v i e l f ä l t i g e n . P r i n t e d in G e r m a n y . D r u c k : W e i h e r t - D r u c k G m b H , D a r m s t a d t .

PREFACE The p r e s e n t study is a slightly a b r i d g e d v e r s i o n of my

'Habi-

l i t a t i o n s s c h r i f t ' , w h i c h I s u b m i t t e d to the

'Fachbereich

o r i s c h - P h i l o l o g i s c h e W i s s e n s c h a f t e n ' of the

'Georg-August-Uni-

v e r s i t ä t zu G ö t t i n g e n '

in N o v e m b e r

19 82, and w h i c h w a s

Hist-

subse-

q u e n t l y a c c e p t e d . I n its o r i g i n a l form the m a n u s c r i p t w a s c o m p l e t e d in fall 1982. Since in the m e a n t i m e no m a j o r cal b r e a k t h r o u g h " h a s o c c u r r e d in g e n e r a t i v e

"theoreti-

transformational

g r a m m a r , it t u r n e d o u t to be u n n e c e s s a r y to m a k e

substantial

a l t e r a t i o n s in the text. It s u f f i c e d to "enrich" t h e

footnotes

a n d t h e b i l b i o g r a p h y by a n u m b e r of r e c e n t a r t i c l e s and m o n o graphs. I

h o p e t h a t the lack of a s u b j e c t index is, a t l e a s t

p a r t i a l l y , c o m p e n s a t e d for b y the d e s c r i p t i v e e n t i t l i n g of chapters, sections and

subsections.

I w i s h to e x p r e s s m y g r a t i t u d e to the

'Deutsche

Forschungsge-

m e i n s c h a f t ' for a t w o - y e a r r e s e a r c h g r a n t w h i c h e n a b l e d m e to s p e n d the a c a d e m i c y e a r 1978/79 a t U C B e r k e l e y and to study w i t h Professors C h a r l e s F i l l m o r e , K a r l Zimmer, G e o r g e

Lakoff,

P a u l K a y a n d D a n Slobin. T h e i r i n f l u e n c e s t r e n g t h e n e d m y tical a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s o v e r l y formal a p p r o a c h e s to the of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s .

I w o u l d a l s o like to t h a n k

T h o m a s G a r d n e r n o t o n l y for t o l e r a t i n g m y

cri-

analysis

Professor

'heretic' v i e w s on

C h o m s k y a n t h e o r y , b u t also for e n c o u r a g i n g t h e m in m a n y c a s e s . I a m f u r t h e r m o r e g r a t e f u l to m y c o l l e a g u e s Dr. H a r t m u t

Czepluch,

G e r d v a n d e r S t r a t e n , T h i l o T a p p e , and e s p e c i a l l y Dr. Hero J a n ß e n for m a n y h o u r s of s t i m u l a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n s o v e r the y e a r s , a n d t o M r s K a r i n H ä h n e l for t y p i n g t h e m a n u s c r i p t . F i n a l l y I w o u l d like to t h a n k m y w i f e U r s u l a a n d o u r son H a n s C h r i s t i a n for t h e i r p a t i e n c e a n d for h a v i n g p r e v e n t e d m e b e c o m i n g too e n g r o s s e d in m y s c h o l a r l y w o r k .

Hannoversch Münden

June

1984

H. U. B.

from

N e w o p i n i o n s are a l w a y s s u s p e c t e d ,

and

u s u a l l y o p p o s e d , w i t h o u t any o t h e r

reason

b u t b e c a u s e they are n o t a l r e a d y John Locke,

common.

An Essay Human

Concerning

Understanding,

(1690), d e d i c a t o r y

epistle.

C O N T E N T S I.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Some History

1

1.2

Aims and Purposes

5

II.

THE STATUS OF LINGUISTICS AS A SCIENCE

2.1

The Early Theory and the 'Standard View 1

of

Scientific Theory Construction 2.1.1

Chomsky's and Lees'

(1957) positions

7

2.1.2

The deductive-nomological model of scientific explanations in the natural sciences

11

2.1.3

Observables, implicit discovery procedures and the native speaker's "predictions"

12

2.2

The Empirical Scientific Status of the Standard Theory and its Extensions and Revisions

2.2.1

The loss of the direct link to observables in ST: The competence-performance distinction

14

2.2.2

The incorporation of a semantic component

17

2.2.3

Implicit discovery procedures for ST grammars and the proliferation of theoretical constructs

18

2.2.4

The shift to 1 unobservables' in the Extended Standard Theory: Universal Grammar as a theory of a 'mental organ'

19

2.3

Explanation versus Explication

2.3.1

Generative grammars comparable to axiomatic theories in the nonempirical sciences

2.3.2

Linguistics as an 'unnatural', i.e. human science (Itkonen)

22

2.3.2.1

Linguistic rules versus regularities in nature

2.3.2.2

Natural versus artificial languages

27

2.3.2.3

Grammatical Explication

28

25

- VIII III. T H E C O N C E P T O F ' L I N G U I S T I C A L L Y S I G N I F I C A N T RALIZATION

1

GENE-

(LSG) A N D ITS C R I T I C S

3.1

D i f f e r e n t L S G s as B a s e s for D i f f e r e n t T h e o r i e s

3.1.1

L S G s as d e t e r m i n e d b y the formal d e v i c e s able in the t h e o r y

avail-

34

3.1.2

'Deep' s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s as L S G s

36

3.1.3

'Atomic p r e d i c a t e s '

37

3.1.4

'Generativist' v e r s u s

3.2

L S G s a n d the C o n c e p t of

3.2.1

'Abstract v e r b s ' as L S G s

3.2.2

'Standard h y p o t h e s e s ' v e r s u s theses'

3.3

T h e Role of H y p o t h e t i c a l

3.3.1

Empirical versus nonempirical generalizations

3.3.2

V a l i d a b s t r a c t i o n s v e r s u s f i c t i o n s (or e x p r e s s ing v e r s u s i n v e n t i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s )

47

3.3.3

Descriptive versus procedural metalanguages

52

3.4

Linguistically

Significant versus

ly S i g n i f i c a n t

Generalizations

as L S G s 'interpretivist' LSGs 'Independent

38

Motivation' 40

'generalized hypo-

41

Constructs 44

Statistical-

3.4.1

S i g n i f i c a n c e as a 'scalar' p r o p e r t y ?

3.4.2

Statistical * linguistic

55

significance

3.4.2.1

Word-order universals

58

3.4.2.2

The curly-brackets notation

60

3.4.2.3

The active-passive

62

3.5

relation

L S G s and the L e x i c a l E x t e n s i o n of L i n g u i s t i c Forms and Processes

64

3.6

Formal versus Explanatory

3.6.1

T h e terms

3.6.2

Primary and secondary generalizations

IV.

Generalizations

'formal' a n d 'explanatory'

THE REVISED EXTENDED STANDARD THEORY MODULES VERSUS THE STANDARD THEORY

69

(REST) A N D ITS

(ST)

4.1

Chomsky

(1980)

4.2

P r o l i f e r a t i o n of S u b t h e o r i e s a n d of L e v e l s of Representations

66

72

75

- IX 4.3

Data Restrictions

4.3.1

Sentence grammar

4.3.2

Exclusion of semantics re-adopted)

4.4

Preview: Examining the evidence for REST

V.

77 (or 'autonomy of syntax'

79 81

THE MOTIVATION FOR EXTENDING THE BASE COMPONENT: THE LEXICALIST HYPOTHESIS

5.1

(LH)

The Problem of the 'Trading Relations' between the Base and the Transformational Component

(LH

or TH) 5.2

83

Chomsky's Original Arguments for LH and Their Refutation

5.2.0

Introduction: Three arguments

5.2.1

The 'Derived Structures'Argument

84 (DSA)

5.2.1.1

Chomsky's analyses of some 'clear cases'

85

5.2.1.2

Some 'unclear cases': Bolinger

86

5.2.1.3

Other counterevidence to the DSA

(1973)

5.2.1.3.1

Chomsky's

5.2.1.3.2

Causative verbs and their DNs 1972)

5.2.2

(1977) analysis and more data

The'Internal Structure'Argument

5.2.2.1

(Smith

89

(ISA)

DSA and ISA: Generalizing transformations to NPs

5.2.2.2

88

90

Passives and their nominalizations

5.2.2.2.1

A history of the passive ± structure-building

transformation:

5.2.2.2.2

Passive DNs do have sentential origins: 'irregular' passives, DNs, sentential adverbs and 'picture' nouns

92

95

5.2.2.3

Degrees of 'nouniness'

100

5.2.2.4

A strategy for the disposing of counterevidence to LH: The postulation of 'analogical' rules

103

5.2.3

The'Semantic Kinkiness'Argument

5.2.3.1 5.2.3.1.1

Semantic idiosyncrasy versus productivity

(SKA) 'syntactic'

Productivity in ST versus EST

105

-

5.2.3.1.2

5.2.3.2

X

-

Productivity of word-formation processes: Morphological irregularity versus syntactic productivity

107

Lexicalization versus syntactic derivation

5.2.3.2.1

Lexemes versus syntactic derivatives

5.2.3.2.2

The 'pronominalization potential' of DNs and their regular ambiguities 111

5.2.3.3

'Metalinguistic' head nouns and LH versus TH

5.3

Further Counterevidence to LH

5.3.0

Introduction

5.3.1

The 'neutral entry' hypothesis refuted :

109

113

115

5.3.1.1

The directionality of word-forming processes

116

5.3.1.2

Nomina actionis and qualitatis versus agentand object-nominalizations: The 'double occurrence' constraint (DOC)

118

5.3.1.3

Proliferation of noun classes and lexical entries

120

5.3.1.4

Deverbal adjectives in -able

122

5.3.2

Lexical 2 (and morphological) versus syntactic, phonological and lexical^ redundancy rules

5.3.2.1

The transformational character of Chomsky's lexical 2 redundancy rules

125

5.3.2.2

Syntactic, phonological and lexical 1 dancy rules

128

5.3.2.3

Feature precipitation (phonological, syntactic and semantic) versus morphological feature creation

5.3.2.4

Morphological redundancy rules and the filtering effect of PS-rules: un-passives 135

5.3.3

redun-

129

Passive participles as verbs or adjectives or both or neither

5.3.3.1

Passive participles as verbs as adjectives: Hust (1977)

5.3.3.2

Passive participles as adjectives: Freidin (1975)

140

5.3.3.3

Deriving contradictory conclusions from the same data and ignoring some (with PS-rules as filters)

143

"Predicting" actives from passives: directionality reversed

146

5.3.3.4 5.4

un-passives

The "Empirical" Distinction between Transformations and Lexical Rules: Wasow

(1977)

138

- XI -

5.4.1

5.4.2

"Natural" properties of transformations as against lexical (redundancy) rules: Wasow's criteria

148

Wasow's arguments refuted:

5.4.2.1

V-able adjectives: transformations may feed category-changing rules

150

5.4.2.2

Lexical versus transformational passives (Wasow vs. Freidin vs. Hust)

154

Getting rid of counterevidence: PS-rules, empty (subject) nodes and additional semantic interpretation rules

156

5.4.3

VI. MOTIVATIONS FOR CONSTRAINING THE 'EXTENDED*

CATEGORIAL

RULES: X' THEORIES 6 .0

Preview

159

6 .1

Chomsky's Original Motivation for X' Theories

6 .1. 1

'Specifiers' and

'Complements'

159

6 . 1.2

Universality claims: The schema, its categories, their features and NP as a cyclic node

161

6 .2

The X' Schema as a Formalization of LH

163

6 .3

Counterevidence to LH as Counterevidence to X' Theory

6 .3. 0

Introduction

164

6 .3. 1

Counterargument I to LH and its consequences for X' theory

165

6 .3. 2

Counterargument II to LH and its consequences for X' theory

169

6 .4

Additional Counterevidence to X' Theories

6 .4. 0

Introduction

6 .4. 1

Word-formation processes: Denominal verbs and their nominal bases

6 .4. 1. 0

Productivity versus 'semantic' idiosyncrasy

171

172

6 .4. 1. 1

Locatum verbs

173

6 .4. 1 .2

Location and duration verbs

175

6 .4. 1. 3

Agent verbs

178

6 .4. 1. 4

Goal (and source) verbs

180

6 .4. 1 .5

Instrument verbs

181

6 .4. 1 .6

Results: Negative and positive generalizations

- XII 6.4.1.6.1

No relevant parallelisms between nouns and their verbal derivatives

183

6.4.1.6.2

Complex NPs and parallel nominal compounds

185

6.4.1.6.3

Lexicon-internal "syntactic" deep structures, obligatoriness of subcategorization features and "hypothetical" verbs

186

Denominal adjectives and deadjectival verbs

189

6.4.1.7 6.4.2

Adnominal NPs and their predicative counterparts

6.4.2.1

Chomsky's original treatment of adnominal genitive NPs

6.4.2.2

Syntactic sources for adnominal genitive NPs

191

6.4.2.2.1

Lexicalist case-grammars versus Chomskyan subject-predicate grammars

192

6.4.2.2.2

Predicate genitives as relative clause sources for 'alienable' and other possessives

195

6.4.2.3 6.4.2.3.1

Predicate and adnominal genitives as problems for Chomskyan X' theories Chomsky (1968): Subjects of DNs versus subjects of 'picture' nouns

197

6.4.2.3.2

Specifiers without heads

198

6.4.2.3.3

Syntactic irrecoverability versus semantic interpretation: Chomsky (1968) versus Jackendoff (1974, 1977) 200

6.4.2.3.4

Preposing versus postposing analyses of NP's N...constructions: Hornstein (1977) versus Jackendoff

6.4.2.3.4.1

Differences between NPs and Ss (S * V'» or V ' * )

202

6.4.2.3.4.2

Thematic functions versus grammatical relations: NP's N derived from N PNP

208

6.4.2.3.4.3

DNs versus 'picture' nouns

209

6.4.2.3.4.4

Postposing and spelling rules versus trace theory

210

6.4.2.4

Hornstein's arguments refuted

6.4.2.4.1

Spelling rules and semantic range of genitive NPs in preposing analyses

213

6.4.2.4.2

Thematic functions + trace theory versus LH + X' theory

216

6.4.2.4.3

Trace theory and the base-generation of passives

218

6.4.2.4.4

Formal syntax, trace theory and selectional information 220

- XIII 6.4.2.5

Conclusions

6.4.2.5.1

T h e readings of prenominal genitive N P s , postnominal PPs and their predicative equivalents

6.4.2.5.2

T h e differences b e t w e e n n o m i n a actionis (DNs) and all other types of nouns and their consequences for lexicalist grammars w i t h X' bases 231

6.4.2.5.3

Postposing (X.') versus preposing (X2') approaches ana their consequences for and compatibility w i t h REST tenets

22 3

6.4.2.5.3.1

D i v e r g e n t properties

234

6.4.2.5.3.2

C o m m o n failures

2 37

VII.

F U R T H E R ARGUMENTS A G A I N S T X., ' AND X 2 1

THEORIES

7.0

Introduction

7.1

X' Systems and the M o d i f i e r - H e a d Distinction the clearly

239

'unclear' case of p r e n o m i n a l

(or

adjec-

tives) 7.1 1

'Specifier' as a category symbol versus an abbrev i a t i o n of nodes

7.1 1.1

Introduction

7.1 1.2

"Category

7.1 1.2.1

2 39

Symbolists"

Hornstein

(1977): S * V ' "

7.1 1.2.1.1

'Specifiers' versus

7.1 1.2.1.2

"Relative clause source" a n d val" adjectives

7.1 1.2.2

Halitsky

7.1 1.2.2.1

A n X. 1 prediction: The S p e c i f i e r Hypothesis

7.1 1.2.2.2

Sentential subjects versus nominal s u b jects

247

7.1 1.2.2.3

L o c a l i t y , s t r i c t locality, and inherent subcategorization of sentential subjects

250

7.1 1.2.2.4

'Subjectival' adjectives versus the Left Branch Schema

252

7.1 1.2.2.5

The costs of the X 1 '

253

7.1 1.3 7.1 1.3.1

'modifiers'

241

"subjecti-

243

(1975): S = V " ' Recursion

"prediction"

245

'Specifier' as an abbreviation of nodes Jackendoff's

(1977) position: S = V ' 1 '

255

- XIV 7.1.1.3.2

Syntactic base-generation of two adjectival slots and semantic projection 257

7.1.1.3.3

Further deficiencies of Jackendoff's approach

7.1.1.3.3.1

Generalization of syntactic base rules versus generalization of semantic projection rules: Verbs and their DNs versus predicate adjectives and nominals and their DNs Locality versus non-locality of subjects

7.1.1.3.3.2 7.1.1.3.3.3

7.1.1.3.3.4

A possible modification of Jackendoff's approach and its refutation: r v " S = U , M ? (N' '* J Further extensions of generalized grammatical relations: 'subjectival' and 'objectivai' adjectives

7.1.2

Prenominal adjectives: The explanatory inadequacies of X' theories

7.1.3

Modifiers and heads versus verbs and their objects

259 262

263

265 266

7.1.3.0

Introduction: X' theories as formalizations of the modifier-head distinction

26 8

7.1.3.1

Fries (1952): Modifiers and objects belong to different layers of structure

269

7.1.3.2

Endocentricity versus exocentricity

7.1.3.2.1

Sentences as exocentric constructions

7.1.3.2.2

Emonds (1976) versus Harris

7.1.3.2.2.1

Endocentricity of X' phrase nodes versus surface equivalence of morpheme classes

271

7.1.3.2.2.2

The vacuousness of deep structure 'heads'

274

7.1.3.2.2.3

The parenthesis notation as a cause of overgenerating PS-rules

276

7.1.3.2.2.4

Emonds (1976) versus Lyons (1977): The exocentricity of 'common' NPs

278

7.1.3.2.2.5

The circularity of deep structure "explanations": Obligatory A heads and their deletion

280

7.1.3.3 7.1.3.3.1

7.1.3.3.2

271

(1951)

Modifiers and heads in a pre-ST approach (Lees 1962) Subordinate elements as optional coconstituents of major categories in PS-expansions Systematic optionality of modifiers versus occasional optionality of objects: a

2 82

- XV transformational reconstruction of the modifier-head distinction 284 7.1.3.4

"Heads" in the latest version of REST: Chomsky (1981)

7.1.3.4.1

The revision of REST (RREST): Interacting subcomponents and subtheories

2 86

7.1.3.4.2

Passive and active 'heads' in government versus ©-theory: subcategorization versus selection, the 'projection' principle and LF

287

7.1.3.4.3

Adjectival 'heads' in RREST

7.1.3.4.3.1

A second type of 'indirect' 6-marking for predicate adjectives

291

7.1.3.4.3.2

The questionability of 'small clauses', a third type of 'indirect' 9-marking and LF

293

Prenominal adjectives, a fourth type of 'indirect' e-marking and LF

295

7.1.3.4.3.3

7.2

The Alleged Restrictivity of X" Categorial Rules

7.2.0

Introduction: The programme of reducing the class

7.2.1

of possible base components and grammars

296

Jackendoff's Uniform Level hypothesis: S = V'''

297

7.2.2 Bresnan's features and types (X° - X''''') 7.2.2.1 An alleged inadequacy of PS-rules 7.2.2.2

29 8

The restrictivity of X' PS-rules versus Syntactic Structures types of PS-rules: Bresnan versus Lyons

300

7.2.3

'Perverse' PS-rules to generate GNs: Schachter (1976)

302

7.2.4

GNs and other exceptions to the X' schema: Jackendoff (1977)

304

7.2.5

The vacuousness of X' restrictivity claims and LH:

7.2.5.1

The "restrictivity" of exceptions to the X' schema

305

7.2.5.2

Word-formation rules as category-switching PS-rules

306

7.2.6

X' conventions as 'constraints on linguistic change': Lightfoot (1979)

307

7.2.7

Lightfoot's vacuousness criteria or the mutual incompatibility of X' conventions

309

- XVI 7.3

The Restrictivity of the SS-Theory versus EST, REST and RREST

7.3.0

Introduction

310

7.3.1

Restrictivity of PS-rules and the proliferation of possible and impossible subcategories in lexicalist grammars

7.3.1.1

Subcategorization of nouns in ST versus EST

311

7.3.1.2

'Mirror image' subject selection: prenominal adjectives

313

7.3.1.3

Base-generated 'garbage' and the lexicon (and other modules) as filters

313

7.3.2

Some restrictive properties of SS grammars

7.3.2.1

'True heads' and no subcategorizational 'garbage 1

7.3.2.2

An SS grammar versus ST

314

7.3.2.2.1

Fillmore's (1963) approach: SS plus motivated dummies

7.3.2.2.2

'Local grammaticality' versus unrestricted deep structures 317

7.3.2.2.3

Embedding transformations versus generalized phrase-markers and the cycle

7.3.2.3 7.3.3

"Formal" simplicity of ST- versus restrictivity of SS grammars

'empirical'

315

318 320

REST: Restrictivity of transformations traded for the proliferation of other theoretical constructs

7.3.3.1

Restricting transformations to 'Move a' at the expense of other modules

32 4

7.3.3.2

The 'history' of the active-passive revisited

324

7.3.3.3

Proliferation of formal devices versus explanatory adequacy 32 8

VIII. SOME CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS:

relation

'ADVANCED' LEXICALISM

VERSUS EARLY TRANSFORMATIONALISM 8.1

Introduction

8.2

'Advanced' Lexicalism: Recursive Word-Structure Rules, a 'Lexical' Lexicon and

33°

'Transformational''

Insertion Conditions 8.3

331

'Morphological' Insertions as Mirror-Images of Syntactic Ones

3 35

- XVII -

8.4

8.5 8.6

Disambiguation of Morphological Structures by Structure-Building 'Semantic' Interpretation Rules, i.e. Syntactic Paraphrases

3 37

The 'Clausiness' Squish: Syntactic Phrases as Inputs to Word-Structure Rules

339

'Morphological' Argument Structure Equals Syntactic Argument Structure

340

8.7

The DOC as Counterevidence to Early and 'Advanced' Lexicalism: Verbal Nexus Combinations and N+N Compounds 344

8.8

Hypothetical Verbs as "Semantic Features" in N+N Compounds or the Vacuousness of Modular Solutions to the Variability Problem 347

8.9

Structure-Building 'Interpretive' Filters as Substitutes for Transformations

352

Conclusions: The Common Failures of Lexicalist Models versus TH

354

8.10

FOOTNOTES Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes Footnotes

to to to to to to to to

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

I II III IV V VI VII VIII

359 360 365 375 377 392 408

436 442

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I. 1.1

1

-

INTRODUCTION Some

History.

From the beginnings of the Chomskyan revolution in linguistics the concept of generalization has played a central role in the development of generative transformational grammar (GTG). The structure of the first model, all its major modifications, revisions and extensions as well as almost all specific analyses or reanalyses within particular frameworks have been argued for or against on the basis of their capturing or missing one kind of generalization or the other. For the European observer who, notwithstanding certain reservations, had welcomed the general idea behind the model of Syntactic Structures (henceforth SS) and the incorporation of some aspects of "meaning into the Aspects model, i.e. the so-called Standard Theory (ST) 1 , but who was not directly involved in the MIT kind of advancement of linguistic research, the post-Aspects developments in GTG, especially the Extended Standard Theory (EST) and Generative Semantics 2

(GS) , exhibited a number of characteristics which, from the point of view of an ordinary working grammarian, were rather disturbing: For one thing, both sides in the controversy, the Lexicalists and the Transformationalists, made excessive use of the clear-case principle ^ in the sense of overgeneralizing those properties of a few clear cases to the rest of grammar that supported their theoretical commitments without ever checking the generality of their generalizations against the vast data base of at least one natural language, i.e. without examining whether the clear cases in favor of their generalizations would not be outnumbered by a majority of clear 'unclear ones'. Thus, the Generative Semanticists never tried to find out in how far the particular atomic predicates they had arrived at by lexical decomposition of a handful of largely monomorphemic English verbs could 4 also do the job with all the others ones not investigated . In

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2

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their attempt to justify a new theory of the base component, i.e. X-bar theory (henceforth X')/ the Lexicalists, on the other hand, based their arguments for relegating certain word-formation processes to the lexicon on only one type of deverbal substantive and ignored the existence of others whose productivity and regularity would have weakened or refuted their claims. A second disturbing characteristic which again both sides shared, though in a different sense, had to do with the relation between the hypothetical constructs proposed and the nature of the available evidence. Given the fact that the native speaker's intuitional judgments about grammaticality, ambiguity etc. can be concerned only with surface structure sentences and constructions, but in no case with deep-, underlying- or derived constituent structure, the concept of 'kernel sentence' in SS and the meaningpreserving postulate with respect to transformations in Aspects could be said to provide at least implicit discovery procedures for delimiting a narrow range of possible underlying structures. In the models of the post-Aspects 5 period (with the exception of Case Grammar) it became increasingly difficult to determine whether the surface evidence presented would really necessitate the introduction of some new hypothetical construct or rule or the modification of some other deep structure analysis. In the case of GS, this was due to the lack of explicitly formulated base rules and of corresponding lexical entries and to the countless possible interactions between prelexical transformations, lexical insertion-, raising- and lowering and other rules. On the lexicalist-interpretivist side, it became equally, if not more problematic to try to preserve unequivocally motiviated relations between surface data and the hypothetical constructs of the theory because of a considerable increase in the number of components, rule types and levels of representations or what Chomsky called an enrichment in the conceptual structure of the theory. Different theories of the categorial component (cf. X'), of the

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3

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lexicon, of transformations, of conditions on rules, each with a generalizing power of its own, were proposed but without always keeping track of their mutual compatibilities. The construction of these more or less separate theories together with Chomsky's return to the SS-position of the autonomy of syntax resulted in massive overgeneration on all levels of what formerly had been the syntactic component, namely the base and transformations, such that a variety of interpretive devices including the lexicon and different kinds of rules of logical form had to be invented in order to filter out the ungrammatical sentences of the language Another consequence of splitting up the syntactic component into distinct 'subtheories1 was that important syntactic processes which in the early models had been expressed by transformational relationships, i.e. which had been considered to be linguistically significant generalizations, could no longer be stated with the same degree of explicitness since they had to be distributed over two or more subtheories in accordance with the criteria of simplicity and generality of each of the modules. A third disturbing characteristic in the history of GTG, which after the disintegration of the GS-school 7 is restricted to the EST-movement, is the shift of primary interest of Chomskyan theory from the domain of a competence grammar for English to a theory of Universal Grammar (UG), i.e. to speculations about the human faculty of language. Whereas in Aspects linguistic theory was concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-hearer in a homogeneous speech community and with the description of his intrinsic competence' the goal of EST and of UG is taken by Chomsky "to be the expression of those properties of human language that are biologically necessary. ... Any particular grammar conforms to the principles of UG, but is further articulated: it presents as well accidental facts that distinguish the particular language in question" (1977a:2). Such a shift of theoretical interest might be welcomed if it were accompanied by a corresponding extension of the range of

_

4

-

data accounted for by the theory. But Chomsky holds that "deep analysis of a single language may provide the most effective means for discovering nontrivial properties of universal grammar" (1977c:65), the 'single language' being, of course, English. To ensure the plausibility of a research programme which tries to obtain "some insight into the general principles of UG that govern the mental computations underlying the use of language" (1977a:15) and to contribute "to a solution of the fundamental problem of accounting for the growth of language" (1977a:20), i.e. for language learning, by constructing a formal grammar "with autonomous and interacting components" (1977a:18) for a particular natural language it was necessary to introduce further concepts which would enable the theoretician to idealize away all those primary linguistic data which formerly had been in the domain of competence grammar, but which were at variance with the universal claims of the theory. The concepts referred to are 'core grammar' vs. 'discourse grammar' and 'syntactic markedness' as well as the theories thereof. The term 'core grammar' has obviously been coined in analogy to g the 'hard cores' of scientific research programmes , which according to a certain brand of the theory of science can be prevented from being falsified 9 by the 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses . Thus phenomena of natural languages which would contradict the universal theory of sentence grammar can be relegated to 'discourse grammar' or to the auxiliary theory of syntactic markedness

Adopting these concepts for linguistic

research also permits Chomsky to maintain: "The more abstract are the principles, the more deeply embedded in a particular theoretical structure and remote from presented phenomena, the more interesting and significant is the study of language" (1977a:16) while emphasizing at the same time that the issues he is concerned with are strictly empirical ones (cf. ibid.). Consequently, in Chomsky's view "citing phenomena and generalizations from a variety of languages but not pro-

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5

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posing partial rule systems that conform to some proposed theory of UG, whatever its value, is simply not very helpful in the present context" (1977a:21), the implication being that only by devizing theories of UG linguists can arrive at explanatory principles of the same degree of depth as the natural sciences "that have achieved substantial intellectual content" (ibid.). 1. 2 Aims and Purposes . It is the aim of this study to present a detailed investigation into same of the problematical aspects of GTG just outlined. In Chapter II I will first try to justify the view that, due to basic differences in their domains, theories in linguistics cannot be treated on an equal footing with theories in the natural sciences. Chapter III gives a critical survey of the notion of generalization as used in the literature and draws a fundamental distinction between formal and explanatory generalizations. Chapter IV compares^ Chomsky's (1965) model, the so-called Standard Theory (ST) with his (1980) version of the Revised Extended Standard Theory (REST). In the chapters to follow, the distinction between formal and explanatory generalizations will be documented by examining the validity and consistency of arguments and analyses that have been adduced in favor of the extensions and revisions of ST. Chapter V refutes first, one by one, Chomsky's (1970) arguments for the lexicalist hypothesis (LH) and for a corresponding extension of the generative power of phrase structure rules (henceforth PS-rules) at the expense of the transformational subcomponent. This is achieved by the general strategy of pointing out in detail what regularities in the data contradict LH, which generalizations are missed in adopting it and what kinds of mostly unforeseen consequences it entails for different components of the

-

6

-

grammar. The same strategy is followed while presenting further counterevidence against LH, such as lexicalist treatments of V-able adjectives, passives, and the "empirical" distinction between lexical and transformational rules. Chapter VI examines along similar lines the arguments for constraining the 'extended' PS rules, i.e. for X' theories. The counterarguments presented there are based on the properties of other wordformation processes such as the formation of denominal verbs and on the properties of adnominal NPs and their predicative equivalents. They attempt to demonstrate the failure of X' theoretical grammars to account adequately for these phenomena. Chapter VII disproves the claims that X' theories and the lexicalist grammars associated with them formalize the modifier-head distinction and that they permit a restrictive definition of the possible PS rules and transformational operations in natural languages. It is argued that such restrictivity claims hold true of early generative transformational rather than REST models. In conclusion Chapter VIII demonstrates that 'advanced' lexicalist models as 'over-modularized' formal theories suffer in principle from the same types of explanatory defects and descriptive and observational inadequacies as REST, and suggests that these deficiencies may be overcome through constructing 'complete' grammars within an 'extended' framework

of early transformational approaches.

-

7

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II.

THE STATUS OF LINGUISTICS AS A SCIENCE

2.1

The Early Theory and the 'Standard View' of Scientific Theory Construction

2.1.1

Chomsky's and Lees' (1957) positions

In his review of SS Lees praised Chomsky's (1957) book as "one of the first serious attempts on the part of a linguist to construct within the tradition of scientific theoryconstruction a comprehensive theory of language which may be understood in the same sense that a chemical, biological theory is ordinarily understood by experts on those fields" (1957:377). Though science, as a typical western institution, is marked by such different kinds of activities as "the use of precise measurement, complicated technical devices, laboratory experiments, or statistical analysis of masses of data" (1957:375), these activities are, according to Lees, "not nearly so characteristic of scientific method as is theory construction and validation" (ibid.). To illustrate this view he sketches the various stages through which chemistry, as we know it today, has passed during its history: The first systematic recordings of chemical properties which began with medieval alchemical studies were followed by theories of chemical behavior which were clumsy and fanciful at first, like the phlogiston theory of combustion, but became more and more sophisticated in the course of time. With Lavoisier's more satisfactory oxygen theory of burning and the change in attitude which accompanied the whole controversy over combustion theories chemistry "graduated from magical engineering to scientific discipline" (1957:376) and since then "has been concerned less with observation and classification of curious reactions and more and more with the proposal and validation of theories to account for chemical behavior" (ibid.). Scientific disciplines, once they have developed "beyond the prescientific stage of collection and classification of interesting facts" (ibid.), are chiefly concerned with

-

8

-

"the introduction of abstract constructs in theories and validation of those theories by testing their predictive power" (ibid.). Lees gives four criteria for such scientific theories to comply with: 1. freedom from contradiction 2. maximal cohesion with other branches of knowledge 3. maximal validity in coverage of known data 4. maximal elegance of statement (cf.Lees 1957:376) Among these criteria, 3. and j4.are the most important ones because, as will be shown below, they have turned out to clash constantly and to vacillate between different and sometimes incompatible interpretations in the further development of GTG:, if ones takes Lees' wordings of them as the basis of comparison: 3.

"Maximal coverage is desirable because it is the very purpose of scientific theories to explain by means of generalizations our understanding of particular events and o~ur intuitive perception of their interrelations ."

4.

"Elegance or simplicity of statement compensates for the inevitable limitations on validation which are entailed by finite size of the corpus of data available to us at any time; it may be thought of as a measure of the degree of generality achieved." (1957:376) [Italics mine, HUB]

With respect to linguistic theories Lees draws a distinction between the intuitions, the linguist,qua scientist, has about the data and their interrelations and the intuitions and judgments he has qua native speaker about the grammaticality and/or ambiguity of sentences which constitute the empirical data a linguistic theory must explain. He is, however, silent about the possibility of drawing a parallel distinction in connection with the natural science he is discussing namely (physical) chemistry (cf. Lees 1957:377). This is not surprising since there is simply no way in which a natural scientist could act as his own informant about the corpus of data he is trying to construct a theory for, and about the validity of the predictions his theory yields.

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9

-

If a physical chemist would be in the same position as the linguist who can decide even on the grammaticality of sentences of his native language he has never encountered before, the fundamental problem of his science, as formulated by Lees, "given the detailed nuclear and electronic structure of an atom, what will be the predicted chemical properties of that substance?" (Lees 1957:377) would be entirely meaningless because he would know in advance whether or not the predictions of his theory are true and there would be no point in devising experiments in order to confirm or falsify the theory. The same misconception about the parallelism between linguistic theories and theories in the natural sciences is exemplified by the following quotations, taken from SS; Our fundamental concern throughout this discussion of linguistic structure is the problem of justification of grammars. A grammar of the language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena by constructing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs such as (in physics, for example) "mass" and "electron". Similarly, a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (observations), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (laws) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (hypothetical constructs). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the indefinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (predictions). Our problem is to develop and clarify the criteria for selecting the correct grammar for each language, that is, the correct theory of this language. (Chomsky 1957:49) One way to test the adequacy of a grammar proposed for L is to determine whether or not the sequences that it generates are actually grammatical, i.e. acceptable to a native speaker. (1957:13) Any grammar of a language will project the finite and somewhat accidental corpus of observed utterances to a set (presumably infinite) of grammatical utterances. In this respect a grammar mirrors the behavior of the speaker who, on the basis of a finite and accidental experience with language, can produce or understand an indefinite number of new sentences. Indeed, any

10

explication of the notion "grammatical in L"(i.e. any characterization of "grammatical in L" in terms of "observed utterance of L") can be thought of as offering an explanation for this fundamental aspect of linguistic behavior. (Chomsky 1957:15) Though Chomsky is not as explicit as Lees about the role of the linguist, qua native speaker, for the validation of the grammatical theory of L, he cannot help admitting that the sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus, i.e. its predictions must be acceptable to the native speaker. On the bas is of the quotations given above it seems legitimate to represent Chomsky's and Lees' (1957) views on the parallelism between theories in linguistics and theories in the natural sciences as in figure 1..

Starting out from a finite number of observations or observed phenomena (particular events)

a finite corpus of observed grammatical utterances in L

+ general laws and hypothetical constructs » M ("mass", "electron")

+ grammatical rules stated in terms of hypothetical •i constructs ("phonemes", "phrases of L")

a theory of natural science (physics, chemistry)

a theory of a natural language (English, etc.)

predicts (explains) new, observable phenomena (e.g. chemical properties)

Figure 1:

new grammatical utterances not contained in the original corpus

Parallelism between theories in linguistics and in the natural sciences according to Chomsky (1957) and Lees (19 57)

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2.1.2

11

-

The deductive-nomological model of scientific explanations in the natural sciences

It is easy to see that the correspondence of structure and function of theories in linguistics and the natural sciences represented in figure 1 is to a large extent in accordance with the so-called "standard view" (Ringen 19 75:2) of explicit empirical science according to which scientific explanations should follow the deductive-nomological model. Ringen (1975:5) summarizes Hempel and Oppenheim's requirements for correct deductive-nomological explanations as in figure 2 (cf. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948: 247-249).

C

Logical deduction

Figure 2:

1 ,c2

C

n

LrL2,...Ln

Statements of initial conditions Statements of general laws

Explanans

DescriDtion of empirical phenomenon ? Explananto be explained J dum Requirements for correct deductive-nomological explanations

Thus, they call the phenomenon or event to be explained the 'Explanandum' and the set of statements needed for the explanation the 'Explanans* and formulate four adequacy conditions for scientific explanations, three logical and one empirical in character. The logical adequacy conditions are:

R 1:

There must be a deductive relation between the Explanans and the Explanandum in order to guarantee that the explanation can also be used to make predictions about future events and states of affairs not yet observed.

R 2:

The Explanans must contain general laws which must actually be used in deducing the Explanandum, not only universal statements.

R 3:

The Explanans must have empirical content, i.e. its statements must, in principle, be empirically testable.

R 4:

The empirical adequacy condition requires that the set of sentences in the Explanans be true 1 .

In connection with these adequacy conditions the following questions have been noticed to arise: In R 2: In R 3: In R 4:

What is it precisely whereby general (deterministic) laws can be distinguished from universal statements? How can theoretical entities or hypothetical constructs be shown to have empirical content? How is it possible to establish the truth of the Explanans, especially the validity of the general laws

Similar questions arise of course with respect to Chomsky's concept of a linguistic theory in SS as, e.g. whether the grammatical rules he proposes can be considered to equal general laws of nature and how the truth of hypothetical constructs like the levels of phrase structure, transformational structure and morphophonemics might be established. But given that in the theory of (natural) science, the questions ábove have not yet received definite answers and that the domain of a linguistic theory in SS is constituted by the grammatical utterances, observed and to be observed in a particular language; it is safe to say that Chomsky's early model exhibits at least one of the main features of the deductive-nomological approach to scientific explana2 tions, namely the reliance on observables

2.1.3

Observables, implicit discovery procedures, and the native speaker's "predictions"

Chomsky's commitment to observables is also evidenced by the implicit discovery procedures for transformational grammars that are deducible from the notion 'kernel sentence' and his remarks on weak and strong adequacy tests for linguistic

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13 -

theories in SS. Thus, after having mentioned that a certain number of clear cases, i.e. grammatical sentences, provide a criterion of adequacy for any particular grammar, he writes : For a single language, taken in isolation, this provides only a weak test for adequacy, since many different grammars may handle the clear cases properly. This can be generalized to a very strong condition however, if we insist that the clear cases be handled properly for each language by grammars all of which are constructed by the same method. That is, each grammar is related to the corpus of sentences in the language it describes in a way fixed in advance for all grammars by a given linguistic theory. We then have a very strong test of adequacy for a linguistic theory that attempts to give a general explanation for the notion "grammatical sentence" in terms of "observed sentence", and for the set of grammars constructed in accordance with such a theory. (Chomsky 1957:14) The method for constructing the simplest grammar of English Chomsky finally ends up with in SS is to set up a phrase structure component that generates kernel structures, i.e. terminal strings which underlie the set of simple, declarative, active sentences of English, and to derive from these by. transformational means all other simple and complex sentence types (cf. Chomsky 1957:80). This method has the advantage of allowing him to reduce the general problem of analyzing the process 'understanding a sentence' to the problem of explaining how kernel sentences are understood, "these being considered the basic 'content elements' from which the usual, more complex sentences of real life are formed by transformational development" (1957:92). Given the identifiability of simple, declarative, active, 4 indicative sentences across languages the concept 'kernel sentence' provides the SS-theory with observables which together with all other observables of a corpus may serve as the basis for discovering the transformational grammar of any language, each grammar being thereby related to the corpus of sentences in this language in a way fixed in advance by the general linguistic theory.

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14

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Up to now I have tried to establish the following points: Chomsky's theory in SS corresponds to the standard view of explanatory models in the natural sciences insofar as the initial conditions of the Explanans and the phenomena to be explained are observables, i.e. grammatical utterances of a native speaker of a particular language. It deviates, however, from theories in the natural sciences, as in fact any theory of a natural language necessarily deviates, in that the "predictions" it makes cannot be checked against independent evidence. In other words, the validity of the predictions made by any synchronic linguistic theory is known beforehand by the native speaker. It is therefore misleading and confusing to speak of "predictions" in connection with linguistic theories and the grammars associated with them. In the next section I will give a rough sketch of the ways in which some of the main modifications in Chomsky's linguistic theory since have affected its empirical scientific status. I will concentrate on the changes in the domain of phenomena the theory is supposed to explain and to account for. The discussion of the more technical aspects, i.e. the introduction of new components, types of rules, etc. will be postponed to Chapter IV.

2.2

2.2.1

The Empirical Scientific Status of the Standard Theory and its Extensions and Revisions The loss of the direct link to observables in ST: The competence-performance distinction

The most important innovation of Chomsky's Aspects-model, i.e. ST, as against SS is the competenee-performance distinction. How this distinction relates to the domain of the theory can be seen from the following passages: A grammar can be regarded as a theory of language; it is descriptively adequate to the extent that it

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15

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correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker. (Chomsky 1965:24) Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows his language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. (1965:3) We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations. (1965:4) In shifting the subject matter of his linguistic theory from a given corpus of observed utterances of L and novel utterances in L which must be acceptable to the native speaker (cf. Chomsky 1957:49-50) to the linguistic competence of an ideal speaker-listener Chomsky gives up the direct link of his theory to 'observables', i.e. the most important trait his SS-model shared with theories in the natural sciences One could object to this interpretation of the effect of the competence-performance distinction by pointing out that the distinction is parallel to the one made, for example, by physicists between legitimate and actual behctvior of particles Such an objection would be justified, if what Chomsky means by competence would be equivalent to 'idealized' performance. That this is not the case has been amply demonstrated, for example, by Derwing (1973). He argues that models of linguistic competence in Chomsky's sense are different in kind from models of idealized linguistic performance because the former lack certain properties which any model of the latter sort must possess, as e.g. the feature of 'selectivity' (cf. Derwing 1973: 7 263, 266) . Thus competence models, i.e. GTGs of the Chomskyan type, while incorporating the feature of recursiveness to account for 'novel utterances', do not provide for the speaker's ability to produce those novel utterances Q "on the appropriate occasion" (Derwing 1973:266) . In

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randomly generating sentences in isolation they are not even intended to specify the linguistic constraints on, e.g. possible question answer sequences in discourse. It is interesting to note that Chomsky himself has acknowledged that "it is necessary to observe the difference in logical character between performance and competence" (19 72b:71). Consequently, one wonders in what sense Chomsky's competence models can still be maintained to be empirical

scientific theories if "a relation of logical in-

compatibility

obtains between the real world entity (per-

formance) and its idealized counterpart (competence)" (Derwing 1973:293), i.e. if in terms of the deductive-nomological mode of explanation the observables of the Explanans, the initial conditions, as well as the observable phenomena to be explained, the Explanandum, are different in logical character from the subject matter of the theory. Introducing by stipulation the distinctions between sentences and utterances, grammaticality and acceptability parallel to the competence-performance distinction (cf. Chomsky 1965) is of no use either because it begs the question how it is possible to arrive at reliable competence data on the sole basis of performance data given their logical incompatibility and the lack of any controlled experimental settings to determine by manipulating the relevant parameters which aspects of actually occurring utterances should be attributed to the hypothetical competence model and which to the idealized performance model. Fromkin's characterization of competence models as belonging "like all such hypotheses which cannot be tested but somehow are "true" in and of themselves for all time... to the field of metaphysics, not to science" (Fromkin 1968:52) seems therefore to be valid granted of course that there is no other kind of scientific inquiry than that of the natural sciences.

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2.2.2

17

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The incorporation of a semantic component

Before proceeding to the discussion of the empirical nature of the next stages in the development of the Chomskyan model, i.e. EST and its revised versions, it is only fair to mention at least some of the respects in which, from the linguistic point of view, ST, as expounded in Aspects, compares favorably to the SS-model. Whereas in SS Chomsky concluded that"grammar is autonomous and independent of meaning" (1957:17) and was "not acquainted with any detailed attempt to develop the theory of grammatical structure in partially semantic terms or any specific and rigorous proposal for the use of semantic information in constructing or evaluating grammars" (1957:93) , his Aspectsg model contains a semantic component and he adopts Katz and Postal's (19 64) principle that "the only contribution of transformations to semantic interpretation is that they interrelate Phrase-markers" (Chomsky 1965:132) because "in a large variety of cases, where this general principle has not been met in syntactic description, the description was in fact incorrect on internal syntactic grounds" (1965: 133). This principle of the meaning-preservingness of transformations according to which "one major function of the transformational rules is to convert an abstract deep structure that expresses the content of a sentence into a fairly concrete surface structure that indicates its form" (Chomsky 1965:136) led to a model which incorporated the semantic side of a speaker's linguistic competence by marking sentences like colourless green ideas sleep furiously, which in SS were considered to be grammatical (cf. 19 57: 15), as semantically deviant, i.e. as ungrammatical. A reflex of Chomsky's recognition of the interdependence between syntax and semantics in Aspects was the postulation of a level of deep structure that formalized the assumption that "the semantic interpretation of a sentence depends only on its lexical items and the grammatical functions and relations represented in the underlying structures in which they appear" (1965:136).

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2.2.3

18

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Implicit discovery procedures for ST grammars and the proliferation of theoretical constructs

Leaving technical details like the transformational cycle aside, the discovery procedure for the generative grammar of a language implied by the Aspects-model and its notion of linguistic competence amounted to looking for different abstract deep structure markers for distinguishing what formerly had been 'kernel structures' from otherwise semantically identical main clause types and to finding ways of representing semantically relevant differences between subordinate clause types, e.g. between restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, by assuming distinct deep structure 11 dominance relations . In general such assumptions are justified by pointing out that for a given type of structure, e.g. non-restrictive relative clauses, semantically equivalent types of paraphrases can be found, e.g. conjoined 12

sentences , from the underlying structure of which the former structure can be derived. In actual practice, then, the intuitions of real native speakers about syntacticsemantic surface equivalences between sentences or sentence types are used for setting up the formal apparatus of an Aspects-grammar contrary to the competence-performance distinction. The larger number of the sorts of theoretical constructs and their more indirect relations to surface observables in this model against SS has the effect of expanding, as it were, the variation space of possible analyses, i.e. of increasing the number and kinds of analyses of a given linguistic phenomenon within the system of theoretical devices of the model. The model still provided, however, a criterion for establishing transformational relationships between certain types of structures, namely their 'cognitive synonymy', 1 3 captured on the theoretical level of deep structure

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2.2.4

19

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The shift to 'unobservables' in the Extended Standard Theory: Universal Grammar as a theory of a 'mental organ'

Under the attack of abstract syntacticians, generative semanticists and Fillmorian case-grammarians in the postAspects period Chomsky weakened the meaning-preservingness requirement of transformations in what came to be called the Extended Standard Theory: ...semantic interpretation is held to be determined by the pair (deep structure, surface structure)..., rather than by deep structure alone; further, it is proposed that insofar as grammatical relations play a role in determining meanings, it is the grammatical relations of the deep structure that are relevant (as before), but such matters as scope of 'logical elements' and quantifiers, coreference, focus and certain kinds of presupposition, and certain other properties, are determined by rules that take surface structure (more precisely, phonetically interpreted surface structure) into account. (Chomsky 1972c:134) At the same time another shift in the subject matter of his theory was taking place; this time again further away from 1observables1. While linguistic theory in Chomsky (1965) had been concerned primarily with the competence of the ideal speaker-listener (see above) and its primary goal had been "to account for specific properties of particular languages in terms of hypotheses about language structure in general" (1966:65) its fundamental problem is in Empiri14 cal Issues "to account for the choice of a particular grammar, given the data available to the language learner" (1966:125). This may seem only a slight modification of the Aspects-position according to which a linguistic theory meets the condition of explanatory adequacy to the extent that it succeeds in selecting a descriptively adequate grammar on the basis of primary linguistic data (cf. 1965: 25-26) with the implication that such an explanatorily adequate theory should also incorporate a theory of language acquisition, an account of specific innate abilities

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20

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of the child, the linguistic universals, whose tacit knowledge makes this achievement possible (cf. 1965:27). Chomsky's later work proves however that what had been only a part of the evaluation measure for successful grammars within the Aspects-theory is gradually becoming its subject matter or domain under the name of Universal Grammar. ...the fundamental empirical problem of linguistics is to explain how a person can acquire knowledge of language. (Chomsky 1971:1) ...I assume that our aim is to assimilate the study of language to the general body of natural science. Linguistics, then, may be regarded as that part of human psychology that is concerned with the nature function, and origin of a particular 'mental organ'. We may take UG [Universal Grammar] to be a theory of the language faculty, a common human attribute, genetically determined, one component of the human mind... (Chomsky 1976:304) The task for linguistic theory is to discover the true nature of the biological endowment that specifies the general structure of the language faculty. (Chomsky 19 80:2) In addition, Chomsky's original direction of arguing from observables to 'unobservables' is now reversed: As the ultimate outcome of his investigations in SS he had envisaged "a theory of linguistic structure in which the descriptive devices utilized in particular [successful] grammars are presented and studied abstractly, with no specific reference to particular languages"

(1957:11).

Now,he takes his general theory of grammar, i.e. UG, for granted, explains "the fact that linguistic competence has the property P insofar as we can show that property P conforms to UG and is,furthermore, the special case of UG determined by experience" (1976:303) and argues "that a given language has the property P because UG requires that this be the case" (1976:304). UG "is a system of principles

-

21

-

that determines: (1) what counts as a grammar and (2) how grammars function to generate structural descriptions of sentences"(1976:303). It is linked to observables in the following way: "In the most interesting cases, the role of experience is limited or even non-existent so that the property P [of a given language] simply reflects some property of UG and thus gives as direct insight into the nature of UG" (1976:304). In practice, Chomsky's view that "deep analysis of a single language may provide the most effective means for discovering nontrivial properties of universal grammar" (1977c:65) boils down to ascribing to UG the set of formal means that have been developed for a syntax-based generative grammar of English like PS and transformational rules with their reliance on the linear order of constituents, the number of components, different levels of representation etc. without ever having shown that this set of descriptive devices would be sufficient to construct successful grammars for other languages, too . Thus, the 'structure-dependence' of linguistic rules is maintained by Chomsky to be required by the language faculty (cf. Chomsky 1977c:65), a concept that presupposes a notion of 'structure' which may be useful for formulating the syntactical components of artificial languages but is inadequate for the purposes of capturing the syntactic processes of 17 various natural languages . In view of such obscure relations between the subject matter of Chomsky's most recent theories - the language faculty as one 1 of the 8 'mental organs' - and linguistic observables it is hard to see how one can still assert that generative grammar is an empirical science comparable to the natural sciences (cf. Chomsky 1980). It seems more appropriate to share Gross' (1979) assessment that"generative theory has developed in a way that converges toward a demonstration of Chomsky's views about the "mind" (1979:878), i.e. a demonstration that "the human mind can be reduced to a formal class of abstract automata" (1979:879). This assessment, by the way, bears a striking resemblance to Lees' (1957) verdict that

-

22

-

a comprehensive theory of language should not be "another speculative philosophy about the nature of Man and Language, but rather a rigorous explication of our intuitions about our language in terms of an overt axiom system, the theorems derivable from it, explicit results which may be compared with new data and other intuitions, all based plainly on an overt theory of the internal structure of languages" (Lees 1957:378).

2.3 2.3.1

Explanation versus Explication Generative grammars comparable to axiomatic theories in the non-empirical sciences

In the last section I showed that, by the standards of the deductive-noraological model of scientific explanation and by Chomsky's and Lees' (1957) own criteria, Chomskyan linguistic theory can be interpreted as having lost step by step in the course of its extensions and revisions the main feature that originally had made it comparable to a theory in natural sciences, namely the commitment to observables. To support this interpretation I will now discuss some of the evaluations of the scientific status of GTG found in the literature. First, there are scholars, who, like Chomsky, adhere to the so-called 'methodological monism' in the philosophy of science (cf. Itkonen 1975:381), i.e. to the conception that all empirical sciences "are characterized by a common method of explanation" (ibid.), but who nevertheless come to the conclusion that GTGs in their present form are not empirical theories either because they are not open to experimental falsification or validation or because they are theories of a different sort altogether. Botha (1971), for example, gives as the most important reason for doubting that"transformational generative grammar AS A MENTALISTIC

- 23 -

LINGUISTIC THEORY" (1971:167) has established any significant results. Mentalist linguists have failed to develop the necessary methodologically valid procedures for validating the mentalistic hypothesis of the general linguistic theory and of particular grammars. (ibid.) All of the pragmatic, correspondence, and coherence norms for psychological reality, he has surveyed, are vitiated 19 by serious deficiencies . He thinks, however, that impressive results have been obtained by generative grammar "as a linguistic theory which makes the necessary formal devices available for constructing non-mentalistic grammars" (1971:170) whose empirical character he does not deny, in principle. Derwing (1973:23), on the other hand, contends, as has been alluded to above, that linguistics must be redefined "as that particular branch of psychology which deals with problems of linguistic behavior or language processing" (1973:306-307) because "linguistic structure is not something which is either 'built up* out ot utterances or 'overlaid' upon the language product, but is ... something which receives its only possible empirical realization as part of the language process of speech production and comprehension" (1973:305). Therefore, if linguists don't want to "remain mere 'hewers and drawers' of endless possibly (but never certainly) useful descriptive schemes for psychologists or others to evaluate experimentally" (1973:306), they "must become active in experimental research themselves" (1973:307). In contrast to Botha, Derwing and others ^ who accept, with the reservations just mentioned, the empirical nature of the generative enterprise, Ringen (1975) challenges the adequacy of such a characterization. Starting out from 21 the four-way distinction represented in figure 3 , he argues that a defense of the empirical scientific status of transformational generative grammars requires showing not only (a) that TGGs are like theories in the empirical sciences, but also (b) that they are unlike theories in the nonempirical sciences and nonsciences." (Ringen 1975:6)

- 24 Empirical Science

Nonscience

Figure 3:

Nonempirical

physics

formal logic pure mathematics formal analytic philosophy

chemistry

speculative and rational metaphysics

p

Empirical versus non-empirical sciences (cf. Ringen 1975:6)

He presents a detailed analysis of the analogy between axiomatic theories in physics and in arithmetic with respect to the criteria of the deductive-nomological model of explanation and shows that this analogy breaks down at a crucial point: "A statement of Galileo's Law describes an empirical fact. Statements of arithmetical facts (such as 2 + 2 = 4) are not statements of empirical fact" (1975: 8). Correspondingly, explanations in physics are very different from explanations in arithmetic. Statements involved in the former are empirically testable, statements 22

involved in the latter are not . Ringen establishes a close parallel between current methods used in evaluating GTGs and methods used in evaluating axiomatic theories in nonempirical sciences like the developing of branches of logic and formal analytic philosophy (cf. 1975:33)- e.g. the verification of factual claims by informant surveys is rejected in both - and concludes that "if grammars are to be compared with scientific theories at all, they should be compared with axiomatic theories in the nonempirical sciences like logic and mathematics and 23 not with theories of physics and chemistry" (1975:36)

- 25 -

2.3.2

2.3.2.1

Linguistics as an "unnatural", i.e. human science (Itkonen) Linguistic rules versus regularities in nature

The most extensi-ve and fundamental criticism of the empirical scientific status of GG has been put forward by Itkonen in a series of articles and in his book Grammatical Theory and Metascience (1978). As an opponent to methodological monism in scientific endeavors he maintains that explanations in generative grammar and in linguistics in general are fundamentally different from deductive-nomological explanations because every linguistic theory concerned with describing the native speaker's intuition is not a natural science, but a human science (1975:384). He identifies linguistic descriptions as instances of 'explication' which, instead of explaining and predicting' observable events, "articulate or reconstruct intuitive linguistic knowledge much in the same way in which conceptual analysis, including logical analysis, articulates 'presystematic' or 'preanalytic knowledge' of different 24 kinds" (1975:384). Using the Wittgensteinian approach Itkonen objects to Chomsky's formal or non-functional conception of language in which knowledge of language is treated as primary and the knowledge of its use , i.e. the intersubjectivity of rules, as theoretically secondary. He distinguishes between 'rules' which govern intentional social, i.e./ in this case linguistic, behavior and "are in return manifested by this same (rule-governed) behavior" (1975:390) and regularities (or uniformities) in nature. The latter, though falsifiable by counter-instances, can never be conclusively confirmed or verified, i.e. known to be true, while the former, i.e. rule sentences referring to rules, are known to be true with absolute certainty. They are about correct utterances which means that they are either necessarily true or necessarily false (cf. 1975:392). Thus, in the axiomatization of a natural science

-

26

-

"it is the purpose of the axioms and the rules of inference to generate true sentences as theorems, and the criterion for the truth of a sentence lies outside it, i.e. in the external world" (Itkonen 1976:190). In linguistics, however, "it is the purpose of a natural language grammar to generate not true sentences, but (syntactically and semantically) correct sentences, as its theorems, and the criterion for the correctness of a sentence lies in the sentence itself, not outside it" (ibid.). In this respect linguistics is similar to logic where the criterion for the validity or logical truth of a given sentence, just like that for the correctness, lies in the sentence itself. The conclusion Itkonen draws from this is: if the grammar of a language is considered as an axiomatization of L, it is a self-referential axiomatization because its theorems neither refer to nor are pictures of anything, but are themselves the object of axiomatization. In other words, the grammar does not speak about but shows its subject matter, i.e. the structures and interrelationships of the sentences of L. The axiomatization of a logical language is selfreferential in the same sense. Of course, a generative, self-referential grammar requires its own referential metagrammar which, using ordinary language, gives an interpretation of the generative apparatus. (Itkonen 1976:191) Itkonen also emphasizes that a generative grammar of L cannot be taken as an axiomatic theory, the reason being that the devices constituting the grammar such as rewriting rules and transformations which relate strings of grammatical symbols are neither true nor false "whereas the rules of inference of axiomatic theories relate (hopefully) true sentences" (1976:191). It is only the meta-grammar that can be considered a theory. It claims, either truly or falsely, that such and such rule types express generalizations about L and generate all and only correct senten-

- 27 ces of L just as "the metalogic, or the interpretation of a system of logic, claims, either truly or falsely, that the system generates all and only valid formulae" (ibid.). It follows that the 'explanatory' character of both, systems of logic and generative grammars, consists in the fact "that they show how, starting from one or more axioms, one gradually arrives, by means of antecedently given rules of inference, at a given sentence or formula" (1976:192).

2.3.2.2

Natural versus artificial languages

Linguistics and logic being concerned with the description and formalization of normative knowledge as against the natural sciences which ultimately deal with the description and explanation of physical events, the methods of conceptual analysis, i.e. explications, are applied to them. Due to their differing objectives, however, - formal logic tries to develop new, more controllable and complex ways of inferring and therefore invents new kinds of languages for definite and quite specific purposes while linguistics describes actual knowledge of natural languages which have existed prior to any attempts to provide grammars, i.e. axiomatization for them (cf. Itkonen 1976:196-197) - the criteria available for establishing the correctness of sentences in formal logic and in natural languages differ in an important way. In the artificial languages of formal logic the correctness of a sentence or formula can be decided on in a grammar-independent way, namely by simply inspecting whether it has been formed according to rules constructed in advance in such a way that definitions of yc

validity or correctness can be given for them (cf. 1976:206) . But natural languages have no similar liberty of shaping their own subject matter (cf. 1976:202). Being natural normative systems, their rules are characteristically open such that there is no independent way of determining the correct-

-

28

-

ness of their sentences

2.3.2.3

26

Grammatical Explication

The general method of explication that has to be applied in the case of such normative sciences as linguistics and analytic philosophy in order to attempt to formalize intuition (cf. Itkonen 1978:302), i.e. to turn atheoretical knowledge into theoretical knowledge (cf. 1975: 417), is characterized by Itkonen following Pap (1958): In the course of explication an intuitively known concept or conceptual system, i.e. 'explicandum', which is referred to by the corresponding explicandum- expression (s) , is replaced by its redefined or reconstructed form, i.e. 'explicatum', which again is referred to by the corresponding explicatumexpression(s) . Explicandum-expressions belong mostly to ordinary language, whereas explicatum-expressions are mostly part of some theoretical, formal language. ... An explicandum is identified with the aid of socalled criteria of adequacy, i.e. sentences which are intuitively known to be necessarily true and in which the explicandum (expression) occurs essentially. ... The actual process of explication consists in transforming these necessary truths of the intuitive kind into necessary truths of the formal or analytic kind. I Emphasis mine, HUB] (1978:301-302) ...When we are 'testing' an explicatum, we are looking over the implications of our formal description to find out whether or not we have succeeded in formalizing all, and only, that which we intended to formalize (1975:419). In a linguistic explication the explicandum is ultimately a certain natural language L. It is described by analyzing the concept 'correct sentence in L' where 'correct sentence' and 'L' are incomplete symbols in the sense "that neither of them can be analyzed in itself, but their conjunction must be analyzed as a whole" (1978:308) and where 'language L' is an abbreviation for "all the rules which are relevant for the correctness of sentences in L" (1975:420).

-

29

-

To identify the explicandum an indefinite set of atheoretical rule sentences and rule-instance sentences of the language is used which are intuitively known to be necessarily true and therefore serve as criteria of adequacy. The explicatum of a linguistic explication must then be the grammar of L, i.e. G^ as a theoretical definition of L, such that "grammatical explication consists in replacing the atheoretical reference to L by a theoretical reference to G l " (1978:309). Due to the self-referential nature of generative grammars noted above/ i.e. due to the fact that they do not speak about sentences of L and their properties but show them, and thus constitute, in a sense, objectlanguages, the theoretical reference to G L has to be supplemented by a meta-grammar, or a theory of G L , "which both defines the general notions of grammatical rule and derivation (viz. generation) and speaks about our particular grammar as well as the sentences derived or derivable from it" (Itkonen 1975:421). It is only in the language of this meta-grammar that the original atheoretical rule sentences of the natural language can be reformulated. The sentences of this meta-grammar, as explicated counterparts of rulesentences say in a theoretical way the same thing as the rule-sentences say an an atheoretical way (cf. 1978:309). Grammatical explication, therefore, consists, according to Itkonen, "in a systematic translation of sentences about 'correct in L' into sentences about 'generable in G L " (1978:309), the explicatum being the meta-grammatical, natural language interpretation of G L . Its sentences can be shown to be true (or false) in a formally necessary way: It is a formally necessary truth that an axiomatic system, whether extended or not, generates what it generates. That is, a sentence like "An application of the rule ' S-»aSB' followed by an application of the rule ' S-»ab' generates the string aabb" is formally true, or analytical, in precisely the same way as the sentence "'q' is derived from 'p z> q' and 'p' by Mod-us Ponens". More generally, the same is true of all sentences about the generative capacity, both weak and strong, of natural language grammars. -

- 30 I repeat that there is no formally necessary truth within G l , but only within the metagrammar which speaks about what GL generates or does not generate." (Itkonen 19 78:309) This means that if all rule-sentences and rule-instance sentences, which are intuitively necessary sentences about L, can be transformed into formally necessary sentences about the generative capacity of G^

and vice versa, the

grammar satisfies its criteria of adequacy and is, consequently, the best possible one (cf. 1975:422 and 1978:309). If, on the other hand, there are true (atheoretical) sentences about L which cannot be transformed salva veritate into corresponding metatheoretical, or metagrammatical, sentences, this means that the grammar fails to generate something which it ought to generate. Conversely, if there are true metatheoretical sentences about the forms generated, and the structures assigned, by the grammar which have no counterparts among the atheoretical sentences, this means that the grammar generates something which it ought not to generate. (1978:310) Within Itkonen's 'explicatory' framework these are the two principal ways, "explanatory and predictive, of falsifying 27 any proposed grammar" (ibid.) The question of how to discover and to decide on the kinds of formal means needed to construct the

1

correct1 generative

grammar is not explicitly addressed by Itkonen. The following remarks shed, however, some light on his position: ...writing a grammar means first, that one tries to bring the explications of the different subareas of a language [such as sentence types, HUB] to the point where there are no inconsistencies between them and, second, that after discovering generalizations implicit in particular subareas covered by corresponding explications, one tries to discover generalizations implicit in these different explications. When one is writing or refining a grammar, one has to consider it simultaneously from the viewpoint of particular generalizations (instantiating different degrees of abstractness) and general consistency. Because of the factual complexity of language, it seems clear, in any case, that no 'final1 explicatum will ever be achieved in the description of any language. (1975:423-424)

-

31

-

It is evident that the implicit discovery procedures of Chomsky's SS- and Aspects-models, as described above, are in accordance with this explicatory kind of grammar construction. In fact, Chomsky himself describes grammar-construction, at one point in SS, in terms of explicating intuitive knowledge: ...we assume intuitive knowledge of the grammatical sentences of English and ask what sort of grammar will be able to do the job of producing these in some effective and illuminating way. We thus face a familiar task of explication of some intuitive concept - in this case, the concept "grammatical in English", and more generally, the concept of "grammatical". (Chomsky 1957:13) 28 The contradiction between this statement in which Chomsky acknowledges the intuitive basis of both, linguistic data and grammar evaluation and his 'grammar as theory' conception supports Itkonen's thesis of a basic confusion in Chomsky's position. As a positivist who takes human "to be natural objects" (1975:183) and is expected to investigate regularities in nature (cf. Itkonen 1978:188) he can neither accept norms, i.e. atheoretical rules, within his data as the subject matter of grammar nor admit that he is looking for systematic, intuitively justifiable generalizations about such normative rules. Since, on the other hand, "he is well aware that he is dealing with intuitive knowledge and that, from this point of view, eventual regularities exhibited by actually occurring utterances are simply irrelevant" (Itkonen 1978:189)

- compare his dismissal of sta-

tistical considerations in grammar (cf. Chomsky 1957:15ff.) he has to maintain to be constructing empirical theories concerned with 'deep' or 'basic' regularities of language (Chomsky 1965:5) or with a mental organ in order to be considered, by the positivist standards prevailing in the philosophy of science in the United States, an empirical scientist (cf. Itkonen 1975:433-434). According to Itkonen, the fictitious choice of either providing deductive-nomological explanations or admitting that one is not an empirical scientist should be rejected

- 32 -

by linguists, a choice presented to them by the positivist philosophy of science which "attempts to dictate the criteria of all empirical sciences" (1975:433). Based on the distinction between natural sciences and human sciences and, correspondingly, between brute facts and 29 institutional facts ,observer's knowledge and agent's knowledge (Itkonen 1978:193ff.) they should point out that it is futile to attempt to reduce the explanation of intuitive knowledge of linguistic norms and of rule-governed intentional behavior to deductive-nomological explanations or to reify the sentences of natural languages as infinite sets of objects of some sort because within this positivistic framework "it remains incomprehensible why this particular set of objects (i.e. sentences), as distinguished from sets of objects investigated by standard natural sciences, requires its own type of knowledge (i.e. linguistic intuition)" (1978:190). It is thus the task of linguistics to discover generalizations concerning the correct sentences of particular languages, i.e. the atheoretical normative rules implicit in linguistic behavior, and to set up intuitively appropriate theoretical rules, i.e. formal means, to capture them. In concluding this section on explanation vs. explication, two points must be emphasized. First, even Itkonen admits that there is a sense in which one could genuinely speak of deductive-nomological explanations in connection with linguistic data : they could conceivably be causally explained from outside "by deducing them from some independently established general cognitive capacities ( = regularities) plus particular situational contexts ( = antecedent conditions)" (1975:415). Such psycholinguistic explanations

30

, however, have to

be distinguished from linguistic descriptions. Second, it can be argued that, though constructing the grammar of a particular language is an instance of explicating relevant intuitive knowledge, it is an empirical question in how far the same principles of analysis can be applied in the des-

-

33 -

cription of other languages

(cf. Itkonen 1975:425)

.

We will see below that, contrary to Itkonen's clear-cut dichotomy, deductive-nomological explanations vs. explications or generalizations, some aspects of normative linguistic knowledge such as, e.g. certain syntactic properties of linguistic structures, can be causally explained not by resorting to formal hypothetical syntactic constructs, b u t by establishing functional relationships between syntactic phenomena and lexical or semantic properties or by relating syntactic regularities to the effects the inorphophonological properties of these structures have on perceptual factors

- 34 -

III.

THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION (LSG)' AND ITS CRITICS

3.1 3.1.1

Different LSGs as Bases for Different Theories LSGs as determined by the formal devices available in the theory

After having given above some reasons why linguistics is not an empirical science in the sense of the natural sciences, like physics or chemistry, but must be considered at the level of individual languages as a normative science, similar to logic or formal analytic philosophy, and therefore, instead of explaining and predicting observable events, is concerned primarily with explication, i.e. with making generalizations about the various aspects and properties of intuitively correct sentences of natural languages, and with componentializing, systematizing and formalizing them at different levels of abstraction, I will now outline how the concept 'generalization' or 'linguistically significant generalization' has been used and characterized in GTGs in order to provide some background and motivation for the arguments in the chapters to come. Even though LSG "is perhaps the single key concept of generative linguistic theory" (Pullum 19 75:97), it "has proved frustratingly difficult to define precisely" (Hurford 1977:574). This is, as I will attempt to show, not so much due to the systematically ambiguous way in which Chomsky uses the term 'LSG' (cf. Hurford 1977:575)

- which,

by the way, merely reflects the systematic ambiguity of deverbal substantives

in English

-, but rather to its

obscure status in Chomsky's grammatical theory: It is supposed to be a defining characteristic of descriptive adequacy which, next to observational adequacy, is the second and higher level of success a grammatical description associated with a particular linguistic theory can attain. Descriptive adequacy is achieved

- 35 when the grammar gives a correct account of the linguistic intuition of the native speaker, and specifies the observed data (in particular) in terms of significant generalizations that express underlying regularities in the language. [Emphasis mine, HUB] (Chomsky 1964:63) This Implies that there are theory-independent criteria for finding out which of any given set of possible generalizations about a language are the significant ones. Yet, Chomsky also maintains: The major problem in constructing an evaluation measure for grammars is that of determining which generalizations about a language are the significant ones; an evaluation measure must be selected in such a way as to favor these. We have a generalization when a set ot rules about distinct items can be replaced by a single rule (or, more generally, partially identical rules) about the whole set, or when it can be shown that "a natural class" of items undergoes a certain process or set of similar processes. Thus, choice of an evaluation measure constitutes a decision as to what are "similar processes" and "natural classes" - in short, what are significant generalizations. [Emphasis mine, HUB] (Chomsky 1965:42) Moreover, Chomsky and Halle (1968) point out with respect to the phonological rules they have postulated: ..., with other formal devices than those we allow it is possible to express "generalizations" that are consistent with the data but that are not, we would maintain, linguistically significant. When we select a set of formal devices for the construction of grammars, we are, in fact, taking an important step toward a definition of the notion "linguistically significant generalization". Since this notion has real empirical content, our particular characterization of it may or may not be accurate as a proposed explication. [Emphasis mine, HUB] (1968:330)2 The circularity of reasoning

exhibited in these passages

becomes even more apparent if we consider how according to Chomsky and Halle the 'empirical' content of 'LSG'

the notion

can be tested: The notations that have been selected constitute an empirical hypothesis as to what is a significant generalization, a hypothesis which can be falsified

- 36 on grounds of descriptive inadequacy, if it is incorrect. (Chomsky and Halle 1965:109) Since descriptive adequacy is defined, as in the first quotation above, in terms of significant generalizations and of the intuition of the native speaker and since the native speaker cannot have intuitions about theoretical rules of grammar, it is ultimately the set of formal devices, selected by the generative grammarian, that decides which generalizations are significant and which 3 are not . In other words, only those regularities in the form and functioning of languages are significant which are expressible within the framework of Chomsky's theory in general and by means of its specific set of notational devices in particular. It should be obvious that such a claim is untenable. It reduces the terms 'empirical' and 'LSG' to absurdity by making them dependent on theory4 internal stipulations

3.1.2

'Deep' semantic relationships as LSGs

The invulnerability of the theory which appears to result from this theory-dependence of LSGs is, however, not as complete as generative theoreticians might wish. It is, paradoxically enough, exactly because no theory external definitions for LSGs have been given and no attempt has ever been made "to show why something claimed as a 'linguistically significant generalization' is indeed 'linguistically significant' (Garcia 1967:855) that the monolith of generative transformational grammar cracked in the late sixties into case grammar, GS and interpretivism. The origins of these schools can all be traced back to differences of opinion as to what constitutes a LSG, which generalizations should take precedence over which others or how they should be reflected in the organization of the grammar.

- 37 In developing 'Case Grammar' Fillmore questioned, for example, the necessity of expressing such grammatical relations as 'subject-of' and 'object-of' at the level of deep structure and postulated instead a deep structure division into a proposition consisting of a tenseless set of semantic relationships involving a verb and one or more nouns (and embedded sentences) and a 'modality' constituent which included negation, tense, mood and aspect (cf. Fillmore 1968:esp. 23). He held that the Chomskyan ST notion of deep structure is "an artificial intermediate level between the empirically discoverable 'semantic deep structure' and the observationally accessible surface structure, a level the properties of which have more to do with the methodological commitments of grammarians than with the nature of human languages" (1968:88). Yet, Fillmore kept to the generative tradition of failing to specify the procedures by which these 'semantic deep structures' may be empirically discovered

3.1.3

'Atomic predicates' as LSGs

While case grammar, at least in its early stages, generalized the deep structure identity of more or less intuitively motivated semantic relationships between verbs and their accompanying nounphrases, irrespective of their surface syntactic grammatical functions ^, generative semanticists abolished the integrity of lexical items by decomposing morphemes into abstract atomic predicates in their attempt to capture the fact that speakers can "explain" lexical items by paraphrasing them 7 . What they did not take into consideration was that in analyzing monomorphemic lexical items they had entered a descriptive domain totally different from that of Chomsky's or Fillmore's approach. Whereas in the case of the latter models the syntactic or semantic deep structure properties of lexical items restrict the number of possible analyses of a surface sentence, generative semanticists must face the problem of having

- 38 -

to assume as many semantic representations for a given lexical item

as there are distinct paraphrases of it

in all imaginable situational contexts, i.e. as there are g distinct referential possibilities . Thus, their particular analyses can always be disconfirmed by demonstrating that there are contexts in which the lexical item concerned and its

1

usual' paraphrase cannot be substituted for each

other. Emphasizing the abstract character of analyzing atomic predicates is of no help either. It cannot detract from the fact that the vocabulary and the rules of prelexical structure represent a metalanguage which is necessarily different from the one describing syntactic or sentence semantic relationships between lexical items. This is, of course, not to say that these metalanguages do not exhibit certain similarities. But it is a matter of opinion and of theoretical commitment how significant these similiarities are deemed to be. A generative semanticist will, for the sake of simplicity and of uniformity of grammatical structures and rules, accept the drawbacks of intermingling distinct metalanguages. An interpretivist, on the other hand, will, for the sake of establishing or preserving the autonomy of syntax, reject the claim that semantic and syntactic structures are of the same formal 9 nature and dismiss it as an overgeneralization

3.1.4

1

Generativist1 versus 'interpretivist' LSGs

The kinds of arguments, just sketched, abound in the generative literature. They have come to be called "Halletype of arguments"

Halle's famous argument against

the structuralist concept of a phoneme attempted to show (cf. Halle 19 59) that some generalization about voicing alternations in Russian is not formulable if an autonomous phonemic level in the structuralist sense exists as a welldefined level of derivation. He concluded that there is no level of autonomous phonemics in a GTG. Notice that in

- 39 -

the generativist-interpretivist debate mentioned above both sides have used 'Halle-type of arguments1.McCawley (1968), e.g., holds that the grammatical properties of respectively-sentences cannot be captured in a

unitary

way in a grammar with a level of deep structure of the Aspects-sort and that that conception of grammar must be rejected in favor of a "semantically-based" theory

(cf.

Chomsky 1972b:78) consisting of a formation rule component which specifies the class of well-formed semantic representations and a transformational component whose rules correlate semantic representations with surface syntactic representations

Similiarly, in defending his

position, Chomsky (1972c) approvingly discusses an argument by Jackendoff indicating "that some generalization is not formulable UNLESS deep structure exists as defined level of derivation

a well-

- furthermore, a level gene-

rated independently by base-rules" (1972c:158). This 'Halle-type of argument' has been criticized by Sadock (1976) as a clear illustration of "the danger of infatuation with unexamined generalizations" (1976:91). The generalization which would not be formulable if, as proposed by Jackendoff, genericness and specificness of noun phrases were not interpreted from surface structure but were represented in underlying structure, is according to Chomsky: "At the level of deep structure.... any noun phrase can be followed by any verb phrase" (1972c:l57). Sadock compares the merits of this argument for the existence of deep structure as a well-defined level of derivation with Halle's argument against a level of autonomous phonemics. Having demonstrated that the power of Halle's argument lies "in the gross difference in testability between his treatment and the phonemic treatment" (Sadock 1976:90) - his analysis has not succeeded in proving "that phonemic theory is flat-out wrong" (ibid.) Sadock examines the testability of Chomsky's contention that in deep structure any noun phrase goes with any verb

- 40 phrase. He finds that this contention cannot be falsified, in principle, for the deviance of any combination generated by base rules can be "attributed to the filtering effect of the semantic rules" (Chomsky 1972c:157,fn.27). Sadock concludes: "Apparently, then, it is not possible to disprove this claim, [i.e. Chomsky's deep structure generalization, HOB] by adducing empirical evidence. Thus Chomsky's putative generalization is not even a theory in Popper's sense" (Sadock 1976:92). He sees this as an instance where there is a principled reason for rejecting a putative generalization and distinguishes such cases from those in which "theoretical splits are based on mere differences of opinion over what is or is not a significant generalization" (ibid.) Neither of these Halle-type of arguments used in the generativist-interpretivist controversy was, however, decisive in settling the issue. Though significant generalizations had been at stake, the issue simply became obsolete. The 12 generative semanticists camp disintegrated and Chomsky, more or less silently, gave up the conception of deep structure of ST and EST in favor of the significant generalizations expressible in REST (cf. below).

3.2 3.2.1

LSGs and the Concept of 'Independent Motivation' 'Abstract verbs' as LSGs

Some of the attempts to specify the content of the notion LSG have been undertaken in terms of the concept 'independent motivation'. In Botha's methodologically oriented work (1973) , the following passage by Robin Lakoff iS given as a typical instance of this: The best theory is one that can most completely express the generalizations that a speaker of a language knows exist in his language. In the present case, the linguist must discover which rules are independently motivated and which rules are needed for describing dependent subjunctives and

-

41

-

infinitives in any theory anyway. He must also see whether these rules alone can be used to give us the sentences of the language, in a theory using abstract verbs, without extending the grammar by a large number of special rules to handle the "independent" cases. If a theory containing abstract verbs can make use of independently motivated rules and thus avoid setting up special rules, while a theory without abstract verbs must set special rules and thus lose the ability to make this significant generalization, the former will be naturally preferred. (R.Lakoff 1968:161-162) Botha points out that the basis of this concept of independent motivation is not a substantive linguistic but rather a general methodological one (1973:279), and therefore contributes very little to the definiton of the concept of LSG. In fact, a characterization of the latter notion in terms of the former amounts to nothing more than "the substitution of one unclear concept for another unclear concept" (1973:279) if, as in the case of R. Lakoff's postulation of abstract verbs, "an apparently non-identical conceptual distinction between 'syntax' and 'semantics'" (Botha 1973:247) is involved the respective proponents of which advocate different versions of the general linguistic theory, i.e. GS vs. EST, which, ironically enough, they ultimately justify on the grounds that they capture certain LSGs 1 4 .

3.2.2

'Standard hypotheses' versus 'generalized hypotheses '

Perloff and Wirth (1976) tackled the problem of clarifying the concept of independent motivation from a different angle but arrived essentially at the same results. Their initial step was to do some empirical research among contemporary linguists. The informal poll they took revealed that "no one was willing to try a precise account of 'independent'" (1976:96) and that even some respondents claimed that "there were arguments utilizing independent motivation which did not appeal to facts which were really indepen-

- 42 dent" (ibid.). In looking for a criterion which might underlie most arguments concerning this concept they noted a general agreement that 'independent motivation' is an evidentiary relation but discovered also that "on those accounts which were plausible and for which the evidentiary relation held, the account of 'independence' was unsatisfactory" (1976:96) because it relied on expectations, i.e. it presupposed that a hypothesis is independently motivated just in case it unexpectedly accounts for a set of facts distinct from those it was originally planned to account for

15

. Perloff and Wirth (1976) argue that "two

facts, or two sets of facts, cannot be independent if they are accounted for by the same hypothesis" (1976:97) and, therefore, contend that given a rather rigid, though accurate characterization of "linguistic hypothesis", independent motivation provides ancillary evidence for a hypothesis by providing additional support for one part of that hypothesis" (cf. 1976:97 and 101). What they understand by linguistic hypothesis or standard hypothesis and hypothesis part is described by them in the following way: A standard hypothesis consists of three items: (a) an underlying structure, (b) a set of rules, and (c) an ordering of the rules. A standard hypothesis accounts for, explains, or predicts a linguistic fact or set of linguistic facts just in case the rules in the hypothesis when applied to the •underlying structure in the order specified produce the surface structure. (19 76:101-102) In its ideal form the argument from independent motivation produces additional evidence for one hypothesis by showing that one part of the hypothesis has additional evidence for it, because that hypothesis has a place within an already established hypothesis. Presumably, the hypothesis part carries its share of the evidential weight from the already established hypothesis to the newly proposed hypothesis. (1976:102-103) They stress that this sort of argument is intragrammatical, i.e it can only be used successfully if the different hypotheses and hypothesis parts are from the same grammar.

- 43 It is thus inapplicable in the two cases discussed above. The issue in these cases is not intragrammatical in the sense that it relates to grammar as a complete, consistent set of standard hypotheses, but external to such a grammar, i.e. it has to do with the choice between different sets of standard hypotheses. Such different sets of standard hypotheses are called by Perloff and Wirth generalized 16

hypotheses

. As a case in point they present the arguments

used by Partee (1971) and Lakoff (1971) in their debate about the IMP(erative) node in underlying structure. Partee defended Katz and Postal's generalized hypothesis of the IMP node as an abstract marker for imperative sentences in deep structure while Lakoff contended that in deep structure the meaning of the imperative construction in a sentence like Come here must be given in terms of a three-place predicate relating the speaker, the addressee, and a sentence describing the action to be performed, as expressed overtly in the sentence I order you to come here... (1971:283) They conclude that independent linguistic motivation cannot be called upon to decide among these different grammars. Independent evidence for or against such rival grammars will have to came from the relevant results of theories of other disciplines (cf. Perloff and Wirth 1976:108). In order to be"able to settle disputes like those over the IMP node hypothesis grammars have to be produced which are as 17 complete as possible . Another methodological stance proposed by Perloff and Wirth is "to set about producing complete, consistent grammars which integrate those hypotheses believed to be preferable" (1976:109). This is an ambitious goal and they admit that it is difficult to decide when a grammar is complete. They underestimate, however, the difficulties which arise if one tries to determine

whether a given set of standard hypotheses

is consistent, i.e. whether it constitutes a grammar. It is at this point that, again, problems of evaluation have to be taken into account which are intimately connected

- 44 -

to the significance of generalizations captured by the formal devices of the grammar.

3.3

The Role of Hypothetical Constructs

3.3.1

Empirical versus nonempirical generalizations

Another contribution which is of interest for the purposes of characterizing the concept 'generalization', is Eckman (1976). In the positivistic vein he regards linguistics as an empirical science and draws a distinction between empirical and nonempirical generalizations on the basis of a number of examples in which the laws and principles stated by linguists and the relevant evidence are devoid of empirical content. He starts out by introducing the following terminology. At the earlier stages of investigation scientists gather data and define a certain number of pretheoretic notions, i.e. "concepts by intuition" (cf. Northrop 1949) whose meanings are given by something which is immediately apprehended by direct inspection or pure observation. Linguistic concepts of this sort are "sentence", "nonsentence", "phonetic segment", "noun", 18

etc. . The scientist then, according to Eckman, introduces hypothetical constructs from which consequences are deduced that have to be checked against the real world. The laws or empirical generalizations are formulated in terms of the constructs of a theory and have the general characteristic that they are statements of universal form which assert a connection between empirical phenomena or between aspects of empirical phenomena. Thus, all nondefinitional statements must have empirical consequences which make them subject to falsification, [italics added, HUB] (1976:36) Eckman adds that the theoretical constructs postulated in the theory are not required to be observable, they only must have empirical implications. He goes on to discuss Ross' theory of Gapping (1970) within

- 45 -

which Ross formulates a principle which is supposed to explain the "universal non-occurrence of a certain pattern 19 of Gapping (*S0 SVO) and which has the appearance of a law . "...it is in the form of an unrestricted universal statement which asserts a relation between objects or properties of objects, namely deep structure constituent order and transformational rules" (1976:39). Eckman concludes that since the order of elements in deep structure is not a fact, but is postulated as part of a theory of grammar and since there are no pretheoretical notions about deep structure this principle being formulated in terms of deep structure has no empirical consequences, and therefore is not an empirical statement. Notice at this point that Eckman's conclusion presupposes that there is no necessary connection between surface 20 structure constituent order and deep structure order . As a second example of a law or generalization which is devoid of empirical content Eckman gives Bresnan's (1970) Expansion Universal which, as an outcome of her theory of complement types, is meant to explain the alleged fact that languages in which relative clauses follow the head noun have clauseinitial question words by relating underlying word order 21 to the class of possible transformations Eckman contrasts these two examples where generalizations are stated about theoretical assumptions like deep structure order of constituents rather than empirical phenomena with Perlmutter's (1971) Unlike Subject Constraint which restricts a class of English verbs from being inserted into a deep structure phrase marker if the subject of that verb is identical to the subject of the object complement 22

sentence . Though this is a constraint on deep structures it is empirical "because it is formulated in terms of the notion of identity of constituents" (1976:46) which is determinable upon inspection of surface structures. Eckman sums up his position:

...the only viable linguistic arguments are those in which assumptions and explanatory principles are justified on the basis of generalizations statable about empirical phenomena. (1976:47) We noted above that Eckman's conclusion as to the nonempirical nature of Ross' principle presupposes that there is no necessary connection between surface structure constituent order and deep structure order. This assumption is, however, open to doubt for two reasons. First, there is the nature of the evidence Eckman himself gives in support of this assumption. McCawley's (1970a) analysis of 23 English and Ross' (19 72) suggestion that all simple sentences containing verbs of action must be derived from underlying complex structures in which the simple sentence is embedded as a complement 24 clause under a subordinate predi cate containing the verb do . It is obvious that in terms of Perloff's and Wirth's distinction above McCawley's and Ross' proposals would count as generalized hypotheses, i.e. as rival grammars, incompatible with the framework of the Gapping hypothesis, and not as belonging to the same set of standard hypotheses. Eckman's argument relating to the fact that transformations have the power to derivational ly reorder constituents (cf. 1976:39) does not carry any weight either. It mistakenly identifies the formal properties of a descriptive device with the properties of the objects to be described. In other words, it would be absurd to suppose that a given language must make use of all formally possible transformational reorderings. The second reason for doubting that there is no necessary connection between surface structure constituent order and deep structure order is a historical one, as it were. All attempts to describe a language within the transformational paradigm usually ended up with a deep structure order of constituents which, if they had followed the implicit discovery procedure of SS or ST, turned out to be identical to the surface order of constituents in main declarative active clauses. It was only in the case of languages in which linear order is not instrumental for expressing grammatical

- 47 relations that conflicting results were obtained depending on which theory-internal criteria were given preference to. But, as I have shown in (1975), such conflicts do not discredit deep structure as a level of representation, they merely discredit linearity-based formal devices like phrase-structure and transformational rules as means for capturing syntactic generalizations about highly inflecting languages Despite these objections concerning Eckman's supporting evidence his main claim that deep generalizations and their corresponding hypothetical constructs should be at least partly determinable upon inspection of surface structures is basically sound

3.3.2

Valid abstractions versus fictions (or expressing versus inventing generalizations)

We have just seen that a crucial connection exists between the hypothetical constructs of a theory (in the positivistic sense) and its laws or empirical generalizations in so far as the latter are supposed to be formulated in terms of the former. It seems, therefore, necessary for our concerns to consider what apart from Chomsky's pro27 grammatic statement in SS (see Chapter II,p.9 ) generative linguists have had to say in the meantime about the nature of hypothetical constructs of their theories. Notice first that there is a discrepancy between Chomsky's conception of hypothetical constructs and, e.g. Eckman's. While in Chomsky's early writings (cf. 1956 and 1957) the hypothetical constructs in terms of which the general "laws" (grammatical rules) were framed had been taken to be "the particular phonemes, words, phrases, and so on, of the language under analysis" (1956:105). Eckman identifies the same or similiar notions, 2 8 such as sentence or noun, as pretheoretical notions , hypothetical constructs being equivalent to such concepts as 'deep structure'. In the

- 48 absence of any unequivocal parallel in Chomsky's more 29 recent writings we take this discrepancy as another indication of the basic differences between Chomskyan theories discussed above. This appears all the more justified as the only work which, to our knowledge ^ , addresses itself explicitly to the problem of determining the status of hypothetical constructs in generative grammar, namely Kac (1976) is in accord with Eckman's interpretation in relevant repects. Kac examines the doctrine of the abstractness of constructs in generative theory formation and argues that this common place of the philosophy of science has been abused in some of the most influential work of recent years (cf. 1976: 49) to such an extent that the central problem today is not that "we have too many alternative theories and too much equivocal data" (ibid.) but rather

that "we have

no theory at all, and hence nothing for linguistic data to be relevant to" (ibid.). In substantiating this pessimistic position, he first strikes a distinction between valid abstractions and fictions. He observes that among the three main senses of the term "abstract" (or "abstraction")

- namely meaning either "incomplete with respect

to some property", or "ideal or idealized", or "unobservable", i.e. known by inference rather than observation (cf. 1976:51) -

it is the last one that poses the most

serious problems. If recourse to such abstract constructs were unconstrained "there would be no way to distinguish scientific theories from fanciful or mythic accounts of the world" (1976:52). Valid abstract hypothetical constructs must therefore satisfy at least the following two criteria: A. The construct must be shown to be "essential", that is, it must be shown that an adequate account of the facts is possible only if recourse to this construct is permitted 31. B. Maintenance of the construct must not come at the cost of the introduction of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. (1976:52)

-

49

-

Criterion B thus excludes auxiliary assumptions whose only purpose is to insulate a hypothetical construct from disconfirmation, but allows additional assumptions for which independent support in Perloff and Wirth's sense is availv.! 32 able As a paradigmatic case of a valid argument for an abstract hypothetical construct which satisfies these criteria he presents an account of the ambiguity of the constructional homonym old m e n and women in which an abstract level of organization is imposed on the linearly arranged sequence A - N - CONJ - N by means of the phrase structure rules 33 N -» A - N and N -» N - CONJ - N. The indeterminacy as to how these rules are applied in building up distinct trees is resolved by the auxiliary assumption that an attributive adjective modifies only the N with which it shares a directly dominating N-node, an assumption that receives

indepen-

dent support from the necessity of interpreting the adjectives the old m a n saw the young woman as modifying only the adjacent noun (cf. Kac 1976:54). The analysis thus "predicts" that and "explains" why such sequences are ambiguous. The two cases which Kac shows to involve abstractions concern Ross'

"fictitious"

(1970) Gapping Analysis and

what are commonly called Equi-structures. Having already seen above that Ross' deep structure generalizations about 34 Gapping patterns are devoid of empirical content we will concentrate on the m a i n points of Kac's arguments against Equi-NP deletion. First, he discusses a "hole-in-the-paradigm" argument according to which representations like (1) are posited as underlying

(2).

(1)

[g Harry wants t g Harry go ]]

(2)

Harry wants to go

(cf. Kac 1976:58)

- 50 in order t o maintain, at the l e v e l of underlying the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n that the source of

(1) i s p a r a l l e l t o

structure,

(3) which

is

(4).

(3)

[g Harry want

[g Bill

(4)

Harry wants B i l l t o go

go]]

In t h i s way one avoids having t o roar an o t h e r w i s e

regular

p a t t e r n by excluding s t r u c t u r e s i n which the two s u b j e c t s happen t o be i d e n t i c a l . Kac demonstrates t h a t t h i s type o f argument, which usually a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t analyses not p e r m i t t i n g such a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s "miss a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n " , i s empty by p r o v i d i n g a " c o n c r e t e " a n a l y s i s which r e q u i r e s phrase s t r u c t u r e r u l e s

(5) a. and b. t o generate

(6) a. and

b.

(5) K '

VP

(6) a.

" S } IV - VP J

' b.

a

[g Harry k n o w s B i l l

b.

is

smart]]

Harry wants I v p t o k i s s Maxine]

and the output constraint (7) t o block (7)

(8):

Mark as i l l - f o r m e d any sentence i n which two i d e n t i c a l nonpronominal NPs occur i n a c o n f i g u r a t i o n such t h a t e i t h e r commands the o t h e r .

(8)

* Harry wants Harry t o k i s s Maxine

Though t h i s a n a l y s i s generates as garbage by (7)

( c f . Kac 1976:60-61)

(8) o n l y t o be f i l t e r e d out

- i t does, however, not i m p l y , as the

a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s does t h a t

(8) i s w e l l - f o r m e d a t some

l e v e l - i t turns out t o be l e s s ad hoc than the a b s t r a c t one. Both of them n e c e s s i t a t e the same number o f descriptive

distinct

devices (compare f i g u r e 4 ) , but the output

c o n s t r a i n t of the c o n c r e t e a n a l y s i s has broader

applicabili-

ty than the ad hoc o b l i g a t o r i n e s s s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f

the

Equi-NP-Deletion

rule

35

Abstract Analysis

Concrete Analysis

1.)

PS-rule

1.)

dito

2.)

Equi-NP-Deletion

2.)

PS-rule

3.)

Indication of obligatoriness of (2)

3.)

Output Constraint

Figure 4:

(5)a.

(5)b. (7)

Abstract versus Concrete Analysis of Equistructures

(cf. Kac

1976:64)

Kac characterizes the invalidity of the rationale of such "hole-in-the-paradigm" arguments as a confusion of the idea of capturing or expressing a generalization with inventing or creating one. "By positing Equi-structures to 'fill the holes', we merely conjure up an artificial world, so to speak, in which the facts are as we would like them to be rather than as they are"

(1976:62).

Two further arguments in defense of Equi-structures are presented by Kac and shown to be invalid. One has to do with the fact that the application of Equi-NP-Deletion is governed, i.e. that verbs like believe, expect, want, which are similar in that they may take complements in the object relation but differ as to the types of surface configurations into which they may enter, have to be distinguished from paradigmatic like-Subject-verbs

such

as condescend which require that their subject and that of their complement be identical. In whatever way the special properties of such like-Subject-verbs are handled by the 'abstract' analyses

- by a combination of strict

subcategorization and rule features, by a positive absolute exception or by a deep structure constraint ^

-

it turns

out to be a more complex treatment than the one required by the 'concrete'

analysis.

- 52 3.3.3

Descriptive versus procedural metalanguages

To a second hypothetical argument in favor of an abstract analysis in which (1) above as a syntactic deep structure is supposed to be motivated solely by consideration of semantic transparency, Kac responds by pointing out that such a motivation would not only fail to support the claim that (1) is a valid hypothetical construct, it would, on the contrary, prove that such abstract underlying structures are simply observational representations, not hypothetical constructs. Since meanings are observationally accessible, statements of associations of meanings with sentences are observational representations., i.e. translations of observational statements into a particular metalanguage. In the case at hand (cf. p.49f.above) (1) is a translation of the semantic statements "(2) expresses two propositions" and "Harry is the subject of want and go" into the syntactic statements "(2) derives from a structure containing two S's" and "(2) is derived from an underlying structure in which Harry occurs as the NP immediately dominated by the uppermost S which also dominates want and as the NP which is directly dominated by a lower S directly dominating 20" (cf. Kac 1976:68). Thus, the "underlying structure (2) is not arrived at by inferential reasoning from facts but through a translation procedure which converts the description of the meaning of a sentence into a P-marker. In Kac's view, GTG, therefore, provides a specific metalanguage within which statements can be made about the relationship between two observationally accessible levels, the level of surface syntax and the level of semantics, i.e. of semantically ideal syntactic organization. Since such an algebra of correlations between surface syntactic structures and underlying, semantically based structures "is no more a theory of these correlations than propositional calculus is a theory of propositional logic or a set of algorithms for ordinary arithmetic a theory of arithmetic" (1976:71)

- 53 it is mistaken to maintain that GTG provides a theory of syntax. "It merely provides a metalanguage within which to couch such a theory" (ibid.). Kac illustrates this view by discussing a standard example the chicken is ready to eat - the ambiguity of which is commonly held to provide evidence for the necessity of transformational descriptions, i.e. for two levels of structural descriptions. His detailed discussion demonstrates that the ambiguity can be explained by the interaction of certain properties of particular predicates with a specific type of syntactic construction the descriptions of which can be couched entirely in terms of such pretheoretical notions as 'subject', 'object', 'selectional restriction', etc., without ever making reference to 'underlying structures' or 'transformations'. "In other words, we can state our explanation in a metalanguage which is completely neutral as to how the explanation might be translated into a particular type of algebraicization" (Kac 1976:74). This does not entail that a transformational account is necessarily erroneous, Kac only claims that "such notions as 'transformations' and 'underlying structure' play no essential role in the discovery or the articulation of the explanation, being merely terms of the metalanguage via which the explanation is expressed" (1976:75). Another example given by Kac in support of this claim concerns Chomsky's "famous" treatment of the Auxiliary complex in English (cf. ss). First Chomsky sets up a phrase structure rule like AUX -» C (M)-(have+en)-(be+ing) which contains all possible constituents of the English system of auxiliaries in abstract terms, i.e. in an order in which they never occur on the surface. An obligatory permutation transformation, Affix Hopping, then puts them into the right order. I have shown elsewhere (1975:29-35) that this artificial treatment, which also involves an ad hoc imposing of constituent structure on the output of the phrase structure component by transformations, results from the linearity principle governing the Chomskyan type

- 54 of phrase structure and transformational rules, i.e. from fact that transformations must make up for the impossibility of adequately handle discontinuous dependencies between 37 constituents . I, therefore, wholly agree with Kac when he characterizes Chomsky's abstract analysis as "a particular type of 'procedural' metalanguage, that is, one associated with an algorithm for mechanically "cranking out" all and only these VP's with the requisite structural properties" (1976:76). The conditions which an English VP must satisfy in order to be well-formed can be explicitly defined in a "descriptive" metalanguage without taking recourse to a translation into Chomsky's "procedural" metalanguage. In fact the descriptive statement is more explicit than

the

procedural one in that it states the restrictions directly which in the procedural metalanguage can only be expressed in the roundabout ways which the properties of a certain type of algorithm happen to require. Kac emphasizes that with respect to truth claims about the structure of English it makes no difference whether or not the descriptive metalanguage is translated into a procedural one (cf.1976: 76). It is only when one wants to discover what procedural metalanguages are needed to express the relevant generalizations that the "matter of translation becomes significant. "But to say that a language is a formal system of a particular type (i.e. that it is

describable by a par-

ticular type of metalanguage) is not to explain its formal properties, it is merely to represent them" (1976:78). Kac concludes that the excessive preoccupation of much recent work in syntax with mechanical detail at the expense of substantive insights is due to this tendency to confuse theory with metalanguage. This is particularly obvious in the ongoing debate about limiting the power of grammars by excluding certain types of descriptive devices such as global rules, arbitrary syntactic features, the transformational cycle and, one might add, unbounded movement 38 transformations . All these issues involve representation rather than explanation, i.e. they concern primarily the

- 55 capabilities of particular metalanguages to express specific kinds of generalizations (cf. Kac 1976:78-79). It is noteworthy at this point that the results of Kac's 39 paper arrived at from a positivistic point of view provide independent support so to speak for Itkonen's hermeneutically motivated view that generative grammars are self-referential, i.e. that they do not speak about the structures and interrelationships of the sentences of L, but show them. This corresponds to Kac's contention as to the representational character of GTGs and their concern with the expressive power of particular descriptive devices. In addition Kac's conception of 'pretheoretical notion' closely corresponds to Itkonen's 'atheoretical rules'. 3.4

3.4.1

Linguistically Significant versus Statistically Significant Generalizations Significance as a 'scalar' property?

Before presenting our own suggestions as to an adequate characterization of linguistic generalizations it is necessary yet to discuss in some detail another contribution, namely Hurford (1977), which "proposes a rigorous objective method for determining the significance of a generalization based on probability theory" (1977:574). Hurford's main idea is to separate the two notions 'generalization' and 'significant' and to attempt to show that significance is a scalar property which, once a generalization has been recognized, can be expressed as a number between one and zero, using probability theory. He derives this quantitative interpretation of 'significance' from his analysis of Chomsky's discussion of LSGs in Aspects (1965:42-44). According to Hurford, Chomsky uses the notion LSG there to denote either "(a) a scalar property possessed by languages and grammars or their sub-parts; or, more frequently, (b) a particular instance of a sub-part of

56

a language or grammar possessing this property to a high degree" (1977:574). It seems, however, that this characterization of Chomsky's usage of LSG is wrong. The reason is that Hurford disregards the nature of the context out of which the quotation is taken on which he bases his 40 interpretation : (9) [16]

Tense, Tense

Modal, Tense

Perfect,

Tense ^

Progressive, Tense Modal Perfect, Tense Modal Progressive, Tense Perfect Progressive, Tense Modal Perfect Progressive (10) 117] Tense^Modal^Perfect^Progressive, Modal Perfect-^ Progressive ~ Tense, Perfect^Progressive^Tense^ Modal, Progressive^Tense^Modal^Perfect, Tense^ Perfect Modal Progressive ...adoption of the familiar notational conventions involving the use of parentheses amounts to a claim that there is a linguistically significant generalization underlying the set of forms in list 16 but not the set of forms in 17. It amounts to the EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESIS THAT REGULARITIES OF THE TYPE EXEMPLIFIED IN 16 ARE THOSE FOUND IN NATURAL LANGUAGES ... WHEREAS CYCLIC REGULARITIES OF THE TYPE EXEMPLIFIED IN 17, THOUGH PERFECTLY GENUINE, ABSTRACTLY, ARE NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE, [emphasis added by Hurford] (Hurford 1977:584, Chomsky 1965:43) It is true that a claim like 1 regularities of the type exemplified in 16 are those found in natural languages' is, as Hurford remarks, "quite deplorably imprecise" (1977:585). But Hurford, in his quotation, has omitted Chomsky's further qualification of the regularities in [16] "and are of the same type that children learning a language will expect" (Chomsky 1965:43) as well as the one concerning cyclic regularities which "are not of the type for which children will intuitively search in language materials, and are much more difficult for the language learner to construct on the basis of scattered data or to use" (1965:43-44). In what follows Chomsky, moreover, explicitly states:

-

57

-

One might easily propose a different notational convention that would abbreviate list (17) to a shorter rule than list (16), thus making a different empirical assumption about what constitutes a linguistically significant generalization. (Chomsky 1965:44) Hurford's other quotation, if considerd in its larger context, does not give rise to a scalar interpretation either: (11) [15]

Aux -» Tense (Modal) (Perfect) (Progressive)

...Rule (15) is an abbreviation for eight rules that analyze the element Aux into its eight possible forms. Stated in full, these eight rules would involve twenty symbols, whereas rule (15) involves four (not counting Aux, in both cases). The parenthesis notation, in this case, has the following meaning. It asserts [thatthe difference between four and twenty symbols is a measure of the degree of linguistically significant generalization achieved in a language that has the forms given in list (16)], for the Auxiliary Phrase, as compared with a language that has, for example, the forms given in list (17) as the representatives of this category. (cf. Chomsky 1965:43) Thus Hurford's impression "Here he seems to be saying that particular languages may be ranked in relation to one another according to the degree of LSG that they have achieved" (1977:575) may be justified when one takes only into account the position of the text that he quotes (which I have marked by square brackets). As the context proves, however, this impression is completely mistaken. Chomsky's claim does not concern any ranking of different languages according to the degree of LSG that they have achieved, it concerns the abbreviatory capabilities of different notational devices in the face of a set of systematically possible forms into which a constituent may be analyzed by phrase structure rules in a given language. Chomsky makes this claim in the larger context of his discussion of length as an evaluation measure for the notational conventions of a grammar (1965:42). One may take issue with this sort of evaluation measure and with

- 58 the linguistic significance of the parentheses notation as such because, as pointed out by Sanders (1977) "it would seem to be simply impossible for any abbreviating statement to express anything that is not expressible by the simple conjunction of statements it abbreviates" 41 (1977:13) but it is illegitimate to attribute to Chomsky's notion of LSG a scalar sense which would imply that "some languages 'achieve' more than others" (Hurford 1977: 575). That Hurford's interpretation of "significant" is mistaken is implicitly confirmed by his observation that most linguists in the generative tradition have tended to ignore the scalar sense of LSG, which he takes as primary, and to concentrate on the 'instance' sense, i.e. on LSGs as 'basic regularities'. 3.4.2 3.4.2.1

Statistical * linguistic significance Word-order universals

Hurford (1977) also notes the circularity of defining LSGs in terms of the formal devices made available by linguistic theories (cf. 19 77:575) such that every regularity which is not capturable by the formal apparatus of the theory 42 must be considered as 'not significant' , but he fails to see that even more severe charges can be put forward against his way of defining the significance of generalizations which is to equate 'significant' in the phrase LSG "with the concept (familiar in the social sciences) of 'STATISTICALLY significant', as applicable to statements" (1977:591). For reasons of space the demonstration of this point will be restricted to three of Hurford's examples two of which relate to the same generalization type, namely that of infinite non-statistical generalizations, the other to that of "finite generalizations". His third type concerns 'infinite statistical generalizations' (cf. 1977:582). One of the infinite non-statistical generalizations about

-

59 -

all possible natural languages "and hence about an infinite class of objects"

(1977:584) is the negative word-order

universal: "(5) b. No language has OSV, OVS, or VOS as the dominant word order"

(1977:583) which is based on 43 Greenberg's Universal 1 (cf. Greenberg 1963:77) . Assuming the null hypothesis, i.e. that all six possible orderings of S, V and 0 are equally likely to occur as the basic word order of an arbitrary language, Hurford calculates the significance of this infinite non-statistical generalization relative to the number of languages examined by Greenberg, namely 30. His result is that (5)b. is extremely significant, "and demands explanation by some suitable hypothesis"

(1977:597). Given Hurford's strict

demarcation of the terms 'generalization' and 'hypothesis' the former are about languages, the latter about w h a t languages reveal, i.e. "about another, less directly accessible domain which underlies and explains languages, be it "the psychological reality of a grammar, a child's innate language processing apparatus, or a historical proto-language"

(1977:580) -

it is a mystery from w h a t

kind of hypothesis this generalization, granted its high degree of significance, could be said to follow. Since contrary to Hurford's view,

(5)b. is not substantive but

rather a statistical "universal

- Greenberg himself ad-

mits that the generalization in question is not exceptionless (1963:76) and many of his other universals contain qualifications like "almost always" or "with overwhelming44 ly greater than chance frequency" - it could only be some kind of statistical hypothesis concerned with different psychological realities of grammars or different innate language processing mechanisms. But such hypotheses would hardly reveal anything interesting or significant from the linguistic point of view

-

3.4.2.2

60

-

The curly-brackets notation

The second of Hurford's

(1977) examples to be discussed here

is the so-called Curly-Brackets Generalization, a formal universal, given by Hurford as

(5)c:

The PS component of the grammar of every language contains at least one pair of rules of the forms X -» a fJ r and X -» a 6 r (where a, 0, y and 6 are arbitrary strings of symbols, a and r m a y be null, and M 6). (1977:597) Hurford observes that because of its wide applicability this convention boils down to nothing more than: In the PS component of the grammar of every language, there are m o r e (uncollapsed) rules than there are non-terminal categories. (1977:597) For Hurford's approach this means that an assessment of the significance of

(5)c. is totally dependent on the assump-

tions that are m a d e about the numbers of uncollapsed rules and of non-terminal categories in the PS grammars of languages

(cf. 1977:597). Having deplored that a theory

"which precisely characterizes the range and variability of the number of rules and categories found in individual 46 natural language grammars" (1977:598) is still missing , Hurford examines "various sets of assumptions and concludes from his calculations that whichever set one adopts the Curly-Brackets Generalization is hardly significant. This result may be right by his purely formal and quantitative standards. But, as in the first example, it is fallacious and counterintuitive from a linguistic point of view. Consider the reason Hurford holds to be responsible for his result: "The very low significance ascribed to the Curly-Brackets Generalization in § 3.2.3 is no doubt caused by the fact that the curly-brackets convention does not require any kind of similarity between the strings of symbols to be enclosed. The curly-brackets notation can be used to collapse quite dissimilar strings" 600, [emphasis added]).

(1977:

-

61

-

Again, it is certainly true that a formal device does not require that it be \ised in a specific way except that it must be formally consistent. But Hurford has overlooked that this is exactly how this convention has been generally used in GTG, namely to express the substantive linguistic insight that in the grammar of particular languages formally dissimilar strings or non-terminal symbols behave in the same way with respect to some rule, syntactic process or syntactic relation. In other words, the elements of the disjunctive list enclosed by curly brackets are claimed to be in complementary distribution with respect to the phenomenon in question. Thus, e.g. the rule of the Aspects-fragment, reproduced by Hurford (1977:601), which rewrites VP disjunctively into Copula + Predicate and Verb expresses together with PS rules expanding S and Predicate Phrase the significant fact that in Ehglish the syntactic roles of Copula + Predicate and, e.g.,intransitive verbs are systematically equivalent. Similiarly the curly brackets following V and enclosing NP and S specify that NP and S bear the grammatical relation 'direct object of' with respect to the upmost S. Of course, one may attempt to describe identical behavior of dissimilar elements capturable by curly brackets as generalizations on a higher level of abstraction as it has been done by gene47 rative semanticists . But postulating, e.g., a universal syntactic category Verb of which M, V, have, and be are instances, and correspondingly a subcategory 'auxiliary verb' of which M (modals such as will, can, etc.), have, and be are instances in order to state Chomsky's affixhopping rule in a uniform way (cf. Lakoff 1969:293) is not a sufficient reason for dismissing curly brackets "as a formal device for expressing the claim that a generalization does not exist" (1969:291). It merely generalizes on a higher level certain language- and subcategory-specific properties away which then have to be reintroduced if the particular grammar is to be observationally and descriptively adequate and explicit in its lower level

-

6 2

-

statements. This may suffice to show that substantive 48 use can but must not be made of a formal universal like the curly-brackets convention and that from this point of view it permits to state significant generali49 zations

3.4.2.3

The active-passive relation

The uselessness of Hurford's scalar notion of 'significant' is also obvious in the case of finite generalizations which make general claims embracing finite sets of individual facts each of which can in principle be checked (cf. 1977:582). Take, for example, his finite generalization (4)a.s Every verb found in both active and passive sentences in English imposes (i) the same selectional restrictions on the subject of passives as on the object of actives, and (ii) the same selectional restrictions on the NP of the b^ phrase of passives as on the subject of actives. (1977:582) In order to apply his method of determining significance to this generalization Hurford has to assume the possibility that the selectional restrictions on verbs in English active and passive sentences are distributed at random. Based on this assumption his method enables him to "decide the probability of the observed distribution's being 'accidental', the result of a random process" (1977: 59 4). In this case, his calculations show that this probability is very low and hence that (4) a. is an extremely significant generalization. It is captured in standard GTG, according to Hurford, by the postulation of a set of hypotheses from which it follows. These hypotheses are, roughly: (i) English speakers store the selectional restrictions on verbs in terms of a level of structure where active and passive sentences are represented identically; and (ii) they have internalized rules relating this abstract level of structure to the observable active and passive sentences. (19 77:594)

-

63

-

Notice first that from a logical point of view Hurford's calculations are completely superfluous because if (4)a. is true, i.e. is a valid statement about English, it makes no sense at all to first assume its invalidity and then to calculate its probability of being true or false. It is equally unnecessary to postulate specific hypotheses like Hurford's about abstract underlying structures for it would follow from his repeated assertions

- to the

effect that the significance of a generalization, as determined by his method, theory -

is entirely relative to a given

that (4)a. could lose its significance in a

different linguistic theory, as it has, in fact, to a large extent in REST

, though it is still valid as an

observational statement, i.e. a generalization about English. The absurdity of this consequence demonstrates that the linguistic significance of Hurford's method of determining the significance of generalizations is nil and that significance in his sense of a scalar property of generalizations has to be rejected. The primary sense of 'significant' is rather the one in which this qualitative adjective has been used by most linguistics namely as equivalent to "of importance, worth noticing" (cf. Hurford 1977: 592). It is another matter that as we have seen above generative linguists tend to consider only those generalizations to be important, i.e. to be regularities on some level, which can be represented by their formal devices, and therefore tend to disqualify regularities not capturable by their (current) theoretical machinery as spurious or unimportant Such issues relating to differences of opinion and of theoretical conviction can only be settled if it would be possible to provide ultimately theory-independent criteria and reasons to decide which generalizations should be taken as more significant than which others.

- 64 3.5

LSGs and the Lexical Extension of Linguistic Forms and Processes

There is at least one criterion that fulfills the requirement of being theory-independent and may serve to establish the relative significance of competing generalizations. It is based on a quantitative and even statistical method, but yet completely different from Hurford's (1977). This method consists in determining what has been called by Gross "the lexical extension of linguistic forms" (1979: 867), i.e. one checks how many lexical items of a certain syntactic category may undergo the syntactic process for the description of which a rule or another hypothetical construct is being postulated. Though this statistical method has been implicitly used by generative grammarians in certain cases

- the fundamental structural dichotomy

Subject-Predicate rests, for example, on the statistical observation that all finite verbs must have subjects (cf. Gross ibid.) -

it has never been systematically applied

in order to establish the significance, i.e. the productivity, of transformational rules and other descriptive devices. In fact, Chomsky's early position on exceptions to generalizations has favored an attitude which denies the necessity of enumerating all instances covered by a generalization: The goal of a grammar is to characterize all the utterances of the language. Where possible, it will use broad generalizations to do this. It will also list individual forms which do not fall under generalizations, i.e. exceptions. There are, in fact, exceptions to many of the transformational rules given above, perhaps all. These will have to be separately listed, unless some more general formalization can be found to account for them as well. The discovery of such exceptions is in itself of little interest or importance (although the discovery of an alternative formulation in which exceptions disappear would be highly important). (1962:244) But neither comprehensive lists of exceptions to generalizations nor systematic lists documenting all instances of particular generalizations have been set up in the

- 65 meantime by generative grammarians. Guided by the clearcases principle, they either discovered alternative and more general formulations in which exceptions were generalized away or developed other strategies for getting rid of exceptions and counterinstances to their claims. One kind of such a strategy is evident from a recent passage 53 of Chomsky's : To find evidence to support or to refute a proposed condition on rules, it does not suffice to list unexplained phenomena; rather, it is necessary to present rules, i.e. to present a fragment of a grammar. The confirmation or refutation will be as convincing as the fragment of grammar presented. This is a simple point of logic, occasionally overlooked in the literature. The status of conditions on rules is empirical but evidence can only be indirect and the argument, one way or another, is necessarily rather abstract and "theory bound". (Chomsky 19 77:74) It is also a point of logic that if the extension of a proposed rule or theoretical construct is not verified by enumerating all instances to which it applies and by comparing their number with the number of counterinstances in the language, it is possible that the latter outnumber the former by far such that the generalization in question turns out to be only a minor subregularity or to hold just in the other, opposite way, as it were. In his critique of this aspect of GTG Gross (1979) gives as an example the Raising transformation whose existence has been 54 the subject of a controversy between Postal and Chomsky Chomsky (1971) holds that in structures like (12) only (12) a. b.

It seems to me that Max is stupid. Max seems to me to be stupid . I believe that Max is stupid. I believe Max to be stupid.

(cf. Gross 1979:867)

the first pair is transformationally related, whereas the members of the second pair are base-generated, which, among other things, implies that in believe Max to be stupid the substring Max to be stupid is an S-constituent, more

-

66

-

precisely an untensed S, just as it is in underlying structure. Postal (5974), on the other hand, defends the 'traditional' position of assuming raising operations in both cases, such that in the derivation of the sentence just mentioned the NP Max would be raised out of the embedded clause into the object position of the matrix sentence. Though Postal at least presents illustrative lists of the different types of Raising elements he has established (1974:289-321) neither he nor Chomsky indicates that the lexical extension of the phenomena in question would make any difference to their theoretical positions. Gross points out that when such a determination of lexical extensions was made for equivalent verbs in French the problem of Raising is essentially the same

- where

- only

three verbs like to seem were found, but more than 6oo 55 like to believe (1979:867) . He concludes from this that because of such an extremely large difference in productivity between the two types, "the second process might well be considered more important than the first" (1979:867). Since according to Chomsky's usual assumptions productive and regular phenomena are to be treated transformationally and 'unproductive' ones lexically

, his

handling (12)b. in the lexicon and (12)a. by transformational means contradicts his own criteria. Ignoring thus the necessity for demonstrating the existence of a phenomenon by accumulating relevant data

, has led, according

to Gross, to the anecdotal character and the sketchy theories of GTG (1979:86 6) where linguistic examples appear to be significant only if they allow one to choose between competing theories but where the generality of the corres58 ponding phenomena is never determined

3.6 3.6.1

Formal versus Explanatory Generalizations The terms 'formal' and 'explanatory'

Presupposing that a data-oriented program like Gross' experimental syntax or more generally 'experimental grammar'

- 67 has been carried out (cf., e.g., Gross 1975), a grammar would, ideally, consist of hierarchical representations of regularities and subregularities, i.e. of more or less significant generalizations about the elements in the different components and about the relations and correspondences existing between the components, where in all cases the respective extensions of generalizations have been determined Our more modest goal is to clarify, on the basis of the discussion above, in what respects the kinds of generalizations expressed by generative models have changed in the course of development of generative grammar, especially in the post-Aspects period, in how far the generalizations and arguments adduced in support of major modifications are consistent and have extensional backing, and whether these changes have enhanced the explanatory, i.e. explicatory power of generative theory. In describing these changes we will use the term 'generalization' in its theory-independent sense of "regularity which is worth noticing, of interest, significant" We will try to show that, given the characteristics of generative research and argumentation exposed so far, a distinction must be made between formal and explanatory generalizations ^ in the description of a single language and between formal and explanatory principles of analysis across languages. The term 'formal' covers the following two readings: formal^:

a phonological, morphological or syntactic regularity stated in an explicit, descriptive metalanguage which is formulated exclusively in terms of pretheoretical notions that refer to the atheoretical linguistic knowledge of spea, 62 kers

forma^:

a phonological, morphological or syntactic regularity stated in a particular procedural

-

68

-

metalanguage whicpi because of the formal properties of its rule types and/or its formal division into certain components, i.e. because of "theory"-dependent hypothetical constructs, may lead to the postulation of fictitious abstractions and non-empirical regularities 6 3 . Since semantic regularities are assumed to be observationally accessible, too, they may also be formulated in terms of correspondingly distinct metalanguages. What has to be understood precisely by 'explanatory' generalizations, on the other hand, will emerge from our investigations into the deficiencies and limitations of formal^ and forma^ generalizations in the following chapters. As a first approximation they can be defined, on the one hand, as correlations between formal^ regularities and semantic or lexical regularities observable in the spea64 ker's atheoretical linguistic knowledge or competence and as correlations between formal^ regularities that are attributable to perceptual or cognitive factors on the other. In the first class of cases forma^ approaches try to "explain", for example, the relation between verbs and their derived nomináis by postulating at the level of deep structure a fictitious formal^ parallelism between them which ignores the directionality of the relationship and requires that the grammatical function 'subject of' be extended to NPs, but permits to generalize the theory of the transformational cycle to the domain of NPs and to exclude from the class of possible transformations all category switching operations, thereby allegedly reducing the class of permissible grammars, i.e. the formal generative power of linguistic theory 6 5 . In contrast to this, explanatory approaches reflect the directionality of the relation between verbs and their

- 69 derived nominals by taking the sentential structures associatable with verbs as basic and deriving the corresponding nominals from them. Though such analyses necessitate a more powerful concept of 'transformation' they presuppose simpler PS rules and a simpler lexicon containing only the basic lexemes of a language. In reconstructing thus the speaker's 'observable' knowledge of paraphrase relationships between different morphosyntactic constructions explanatory approaches can do with a smaller number of theoretical constructs than formal2 ones. In the second class of cases forma^ approaches 'explain' e.g. restrictions on movement transformations by postulating constraints and conditions on syntactic rules and their derivational operations, i.e. on the hypothetical constructs of the syntactic component, whereas explanatory approaches try to establish causal connections between such syntactic restrictions and the morphophonological properties of the elements occurring in these constructions

3.6.2

Primary and secondary generalizations

Another distinction which it is useful to introduce at this point is the one between primary and secondary generalizations. This distinction which I proposed in (1975: 27ff.) is meant to account for the fact that despite Chomsky's pronouncement "one may arrive at a grammar by intuition, guess-work, all sorts of partial methodological hints, reliance on past experience, etc." (1957:56) generative grammarians have always implicitly used discovery procedures in the sense that while arguing for a certain grammatical model certain sets of linguistic regularities were taken to be primary or basic and others 67 secondary . On a more general level, primary generalizations are those regularities and properties of linguistic elements that are used to justify such basic assumptions of linguistic theories and grammatical models as

- 70 the different kinds of rule types and the componentialization of grammars. In other words, they concern regularities in linguistic data whose degree of significance may 68 be rated differently by rival grammars . The choice of primary generalizations within a general linguistic theory may be restricted by its being committed to a particular subject matter or domain, as e.g. to a certain notion of competence or of UG, and/or by the type of natural language for which the grammar is being developed and/or69by the kinds of formal descriptive devices available . Given a certain selection of regularities that have been justified as primary ones in theory and grammar construction it follows that all other regularities must be considered as secondary. They must be stated in terms of the formal descriptive devices determined by the primary generalizations of the theory. This may lead to situations in which basic regularities of languages, typologically different from the one for which the theory and its formal apparatus have originally been developed, must be represented as secondary, as, for example, when a free word-order language is described within the framework of a GTG. Since the amount of case-marking ^

and inflectional morphology is

minimal in English such that there is no need to recognize their syntactic status phonological component -

- they can be relegated to the the primary regularity that

grammatical relations do not correlate with linear order but with case-marking in highly inflecting languages cannot be expressed adequately, i.e. on the level of deep structure, in a standard GTG (cf. Boas 1975). These phenomena have to be distributed over different components and levels of representations as secondary regularities. But similar situations may even arise in English where, due to their structuralist heritage, generative grammarians concentrated on capturing formal generalizations in their grammars at the expense of semantic regularities such that Fillmore (196 8) felt obliged to substitute for Chomsky's syntactic deep structure a level on which primary sentence semantic

- 71 regularities could be stated which, if at all, had been expressed incoherently at different "locations" in the ST-model. Against the background of the distinctions between different sorts of generalizations, introduced so far, we will now examine the major modifications in generative theory since Aspects, i.e. the changes with respect to the primary generalizations of his grammatical models and their concomitant shift further away from "observables". To facilitate presentation we will first sketch one of the 71 most recent, published versions of REST and compare it with the standard model. The arguments given in support of some major innovations will then be scrutinized, one by one, as to their extensional backing, consistency and tenability.

IV.

72 -

THE REVISED EXTENDED STANDARD THEORY

(REST) AND

ITS MODULES VERSUS THE STANDARD THEORY 4.1

Chomsky

(ST)

(1980)

In accordance with his revised view that "the task for linguistic theory is to discover the true nature of the biological endowment that specifies the general structure of the language faculty"

(1980:2) by developing "a more

principled theory of grammar with far more restricted descriptive devices and some abstract principles that are,..., rather natural for a system of mental computation..."

(1980:1) Chomsky

(1980) assumes a grammatical

model which has roughly the following structure: i

1.

Base rules

2.

Transformational rules

3a.

Deletion rules

3b.

Construal rules

4a.

Filters

4b.

Interpretive rules

5a.

Phonology and stylistic rules

5b.

Conditions on bind' ing

(cf. Chomsky Figure 5:

The structure of Chomsky's

1980:3)

(1980) REST model

This highly restricted system of 'core grammar', representing the 'unmarked case' is provided by UG which, as we have seen above

(cf. 2.2.4), is arrived at through deep

analysis of a single language, namely English

(cf. 1977c:

65). Chomsky takes the language learner to develop a full grammar representing grammatical competence by "fixing the parameters of core grammar and adding more marked constructions that make use of richer descriptive resources"

(1980:3).

The chart below lists some of the properties of the different rule systems Chomsky

(cf. figure 5), as

described

(1980), and summarizes the interdependencies 2 between these modules

in

- 73 BASE COMPONENT Lexicon

Categorial component 1.

Base rules a) are context-free PS rules b) are optional and unordered c) fall under some version of the X-bar theory 3 d) generate an infinite class of abstract phrase markers

a set of lexical entries, each lexical entry being a pair (D,C), where D is a phonological distinctive feature matrix and C a complex symbol (a collection of specified syntactic features)

Rules of the base generate deep structures..3 with lexical items as terminal nodes

4

, i.e. base phrase markers. Deep

structures., are those base phrase markers that map into £ 5

well-formed surface structures

TRANSFORMATIONAL COMPONENT 2.

Transformational rules a) are optional and unordered b) are restricted to the single rule 'Move a' (apart from minor movement rules)where a is a category c) movement of a is assumed to "leave behind" the category a I e ] in accordance with trace theory d) a and its trace are coindexed by convention e) NP movement m u s t be structure-preserving in the sense of Emonds (1976)', if wellformed representations in LF are to b e generated, unless there is some rule of interpretation that converts the surface structure into an appropriate representation in L F f) apart from NP movement all instances of "Move a" are adjunctions

- 74 1. and 2. - the syntax of core grammar - generate .surface structures which are more abstract than in other presentations of GTG, because of the presence of traces, etc., and because the effects of deletion and stylistic rules are abstracted away from. Surface structures undergo semantic interpretation by the rules 3b. - 5b. which associate representation in Logical Form (LF) to surface structure. 3a. - 5a. associate phonetic representations to surface structures. Well-formedness conditions are imposed on surface structures by deletion rules and surface filters, on the one hand, and by construal and interpretive rules and conditions on binding, on the other. PHONETIC INTERPRETATION COMPONENT 3a.

Deletion rules:

LF- INTERPRETIVE COMPONENT 1 0 3b.

are of restricted variety: they follow all transformations, aaay delete freely in some domain (cf. free deletion in COMP) 8 , may delete specific items, specific categories, and may delete under identity (cf. 19 80: 5-9) 9 4a.

Filters: are obligatory (1980:23), all aspects of obligatoriness of syntactic rules, contextual dependencies and ordering fall in a natural way Tender local surface filters concerned primarily with COMP (1980: 6)

Construal rules: relate anaphors to antecedents (1980:6), basic construal rule: coindex (1980:9), reciprocal-, reflexiveand disjoint reference rules (cf. ibid.)

4b.

Interpretive rules : among them there are "structure-building rules that assign to (38a,b) representations like (39a,b) in LF (cf. 1980:18): (38)a. They regard me as very much like each other (them) b. I impress them as very much like each other (them)

75 (39)a. they regard me as ig j aa PRO rt\w be vvery much like each other (them)] b. I impress them as very Lg PRO iTJW be uc VCJ.J much like each other (them) ] (cf. 1980:17) 5a.

Phonology and stylistic

5b.

Conditions on Binding:

rules: rules of phonology are obligatory (up to free variation) (1980:23)

4.2

Nominative Island Constraint , Opacity Condition (1980:13)

Proliferation of Subtheories and of Levels of Representations

Compared to ST, as outlined above (cf. 2.2.1 - 2.2.3), the most obvious changes concern the levels of deep and surface structures of the respective models. Whereas an Aspects-deep structure contains all information relevant to the operation of the interpretive semantic component, i.e. constitutes the input to the semantic component, such that transformational operations including permutations, additions and deletions can be assumed to be meaning-preserving, the corresponding semantic interpretation rules in REST operate on a level of surface structure which is more abstract than that of Aspects because of the presence of traces of the only transformation allowed, namely "Move a". In addition, deletion rules and surface filters which belong to the phonetic interpretation component, as well as the rules of the LF-interpretive component are said to impose well-formedness conditions on these surface structures. One consequence of this division of labor between

-

76

-

the two interpretive components is that in contrast to ST there exists no single level in REST at which the grammatically of generated structures can be "observed". It seems at first as if the structures that have passed the system of surface filters (4a) would be comparable to the syntactic surface level of Aspects which only permitted grammatical inputs to the phonological component ^ ^. But this parallel is deceptive for the various rules, constraints and conditions in the LF component may filter out certain structures as "logically deviant", though thfese structures will be processed by the phonetic inter12 pretation component . Whether this state of affairs is supposed to reflect the possible divergence between syntactic and logical semantic well-formedness and thus would be an admissible consequence of the autonomy of syntax position is difficult to decide in the absence13of any theory-independent separation of these concepts From our point of view, however, it is a serious defect of the REST-model since it deprives the theory of an observable, unequivocal level of grammaticality. Together with the theory-internal relation of the other components of the model to 'observables' this means that given the grammaticality of a certain syntactic structure there are, in the worst case, as many different ways of "explaining" it as there are distinct classes of hypothetical constructs, or, in REST terminology, modules in the over-all theory, and possibilities of interaction between them. The adoption of the modularity approach also brought about a change in the nature of grammatical analysis. While work in the Aspects-paradigm concentrated on setting up a variety of transformational relationships between cognitively synonymous sentence types by postulating common deep structures for them, and on examining in what respects these transformations had to be constrained, REST analyses are mainly concerned with theorizing about the formal properties of the different modules.

- 77 Thus, there are theories being developed about base rules, the lexicon, traces, coindexing, case-assignment, deletion rules, filters, and the different types of rules in 14 logical form

. It follows that the over-all theory

requires theories which deal with interaction between these individual subtheories.

4.3

Data Restrictions

4.3.1

Sentence grammar

While developing REST, the range of data which the linguistic theory is expected to account for was considerably restricted in two respects. The first restriction has to do with the term "sentence grammar" that was introduced e.g. in Chomsky (1975) and (1976) in order to dispose of counterexamples to his claim that rules of anaphora associating he with John in sentences like (13) obey (13)a. b.

John thought that he would win John thought that Bill liked him (cf. Chomsky 19 76:183)

conditions like the Specified Subject Constraint Thus he states "The rule of anaphora involved in the (normal but not obligatory) interpretation of (25) [i.e. (13)] should in principle be exempt from the conditions on sentence grammar, since it is not a-rule of sentence grammar at all" (1976:183). This motivation for the introduction of "sentence grammar" is even more evident in Chomsky (1975) where, after a discussion in which the Specified Subject Condition and trace theory are justified and assumed to be "part of universal grammar, part of the biologically necessary schematism that determines the essence of human language" find the following passages:

(1975:103), we

- 78 -

The rules of semantic interpretation assign the scope of logical operators ("not", "each", "who", etc.) and fix their meaning, assign antecedents to such anaphoric expressions as reciprocal ("each other") and necessarily bound anaphors (e.g. "his" in "John lost his way", where "his" must refer to John, as contrasted with the unbound anaphor "his" in "John found his book", where "his" may refer to any male, including John). The result of the application of these rules we may call a "logical form". It would be reasonable to say that the theory of grammar - or more precisely, "sentence grammar" ends at this point. The conditions on grammar so far discussed - the specified subject condition, subjacency and so on - apply to the rules of sentence grammar. (Chomsky 1975:104) Given the logical forms generated by sentence grammar further rules -may apply. Pronouns not yet assigned an antecedent -may be taken to refer to entities designated elsewhere in the sentence, though this is never necessary and is not permitted under certain conditions,... . These further rules of reference determination may involve discourse properties as well, in some manner, and they interact with considerations relating to situation, communicative intention, and the like. (ibid.) ...the rules of sentence grammar obey quite different conditions from those that apply beyond. The former are governed by the specified-subject condition, the latter are not (...). Other semantic rules apply, interacting with rules belonging to other cognitive structures, to form fuller representations of "meaning" (in some sense). (1975:105) Chomsky recapitulates this "reasonable" picture of the general nature of grammar and its place within the system of cognitive structures in the diagram below (cf. figure 6) where SR-1 stands for the semantic rules of interpretation which obey Chomsky's conditions and SR-2 stands for the ones that do not.

-

B

Sentence grammar: SR-2 other systems

LF

79

-

IPM

T

SS

SR-1

LF

iimeaning . it

(B = base, IPM = initial phrase-markers, T = transformational component, SS = surface structure, LF = logical form) (cf. Chomsky 1975:105) Figure 6:

Chomsky's (1975) view on the general nature of grammar

But apart from the circularity

of Chomsky's definition

of sentence grammar that manifests itself in the first line of figure 6

- phenomena that violate hypothetical

constructs of the linguistic theory are banished from its domain by fiat without theory-independent evidence the diagram is indicative of another change in Chomskyan theory.

4.3.2

Exclusions of semantics (or 'autonomy of syntax' re-adopted)

Chomsky completely abandons the Katz-Postal-hypothesis that meaning

- in the sense of relations like synonymy,

and properties like analyticity -

is determined fully

at the level of deep structure and essentially re-adopts the 'autonomy of syntax1 position of SS. We already noted above (cf. 2.2.4) Chomsky's weakening of the Katz-Postal hypothesis in EST by holding that semantic interpretation takes place partly in deep structure and partly in surface structure. Now, in REST, no aspect of this hypothesis is retained. As pointed out by Katz (1980), Chomsky's semantic scepticism which, in Aspects, concerned only the possibility of separating syntax from semantics, and semantic systems from systems

-

80

-

of knowledge and belief (cf. 1965:159-160) but included the representation of meaning in grammar - now specifically excludes meaning from grammar (Katz 1980:16). This also follows from Chomsky's thesis of "absolute autonomy of formal grammar" (1977b:41) which implies that the formal conditions on 'possible grammars' and a formal property of 'optimality' are so narrow and restrictive that a formal grammar can in principle be selected (and its structures generated) on the basis of a preliminary analysis of data in terms of formal primitives excluding the core notion of semantics..." (1977b:42). The core notions of semantics he takes to be notions like "synonymous", "significant", "denotes", "satisfies", "refers to concrete objects" (1977b:41) 1 6 . Note also the remark that concludes his defense of the "autonomy thesis" 17 against some counterarguments of Montague grammarians and generative semanticists. "It seems to me reasonable to adopt the working hypothesis that the structures of formal grammar are generated independently, and that these structures are associated with semantic interpretations by principles and rules of a broader semiotic theory" (1977b:57)18. In his thorough and far-reaching critique of various aspects of EST and REST Katz (1980) examines the consequences of this exclusion of meaning from grammar and shows that Chomsky's new concept of grammar (cf. figure 6 above) is incoherent. Assuming a 'formal' lexicon without representations of lexical senses makes it impossible to account for meaning relations between lexical items on which standard cases of nominal/pronominal coreference and disjoint reference depend as for example in Someone came in the front door and he went out the backdoor where the subjects of the clauses can corefer, vs. The woman came in the front door and he went out the backdoor where this is not the case. It is equally impossible to specify the thematic relations in sentences 19 without information

-

81

-

about the meanings of their main verbs and other major constituents. B"ut capturing coreference and other thematic relations is among the goals of sentence grammar. Thus Chomsky's theory both requires sentence grammar to account for these properties and relations, and precludes it from doing so. One could hardly want a more cogent refutation of a theory. _n (Katz 1980:19)

4.4

Preview: Examining the Evidence for REST

Having sketched in the last sections the structure and functioning of a recent version of REST we will now turn to an examination of some of the arguments and analyses that have been presented by generative grammarians in the course of the development of this theory. The main emphasis of our investigations will be on the subtheories constituting the base component, i.e. the categorial component and the lexicon. Since by providing the inputs to the other subcomponents they are basic to the consistency of the whole model, their tenability is decisive in evaluating the tenability of REST in its entirety. We will first examine systematically the arguments put forth in support of an extension of the ST-types of base rules, i.e. the Lexicalist Hypothesis (LH). This will be followed by a detailed investigation into the validity of another important innovation introduced by Chomsky as a consequence of LH, namely the X-bar (X') theory of PS rules. The latter is held to be the most promising approach to constraining the theory of the base (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik 1977:429) and is thus part of the attempt to solve the major problem of grammatical theory as conceived by adherents of REST, namely to restrict the class of grammars available to the language learner (cf. Chomsky 1976:167). The other modules of the over-all theory, i.e. the transformational, the phonetic interpretation and the LF-interpretive component(s), and the

-

82

-

attempts to impose formally definable restrictions on the kinds of rules permitted in these subtheories and on their mode of operation, will only be dealt with as the need arises, i.e. if they are directly affected by the particular analysis being discussed, or if they, in turn, require for reasons of theory-internal consistency that a certain option be taken in the base component. In analyzing the arguments for LH and X' theory and their properties we

will try to demonstrate that apart from

the lack of extensional support for many of these arguments restricting and simplifying the formal descriptive devices in one subtheory may entail not only that significant generalizations can no longer be expressed but also that additional subtheories and auxiliary hypotheses have to be postulated which turn out to be mere artefacts of the theory. Moreover, the strive for generality and unified treatments in individual subtheories may lead to generalizations that are incompatible with those made in other subtheories or even with those regularities on the basis of which the subtheory in question was originally argued for.

-

V.

5.1

83

-

THE MOTIVATION FOR EXTENDING THE BASE COMPONENT: THE LEXICALIST HYPOTHESIS (LH) The Problem of the 'Trading Relations' between the Base and the Transformational Component (LH or TH)

Chomsky's (1968) paper Remarks on Nominalization 1 starts out from the general observation that because of grammars being tightly organized systems an enrichment of one component of a grammar may be expected to permit simplification in other parts and contends that "the proper balance between various components of the grammar is entirely an empirical issue" (1968:13). Since "we have no a priori insight into the 'trading relation' between the various parts ... it would be pure dogmatism to maintain, without empirical evidence, that the categorial component, or the lexicon, or the transformational component must be narrowly constrained by universal conditions, the variety and complexity of languages being attributed to the other components" (ibid.). Chomsky illustrates the problem by considering alternative treatments of the sentence type John felt sad in which verbs like feel are accompanied by predicate phrases such as sad or courageous as complements in surface structure. Such sentences may either be generated by permitting structures of the form NP - V - Pred in the categorial component and specifying feel in the lexicon as an item capable of appearing in pre-predicate position in deep structure or by deriving them as instances of the deep structure configuration NP - V - S, i.e. from John felt [g John be sad] by means of a series of transformations. The former approach extends the base, i.e. the categorial component and the lexicon, the latter extends the transformational component. The relevant empirical evidence for deciding between these two possibilities is, according to Chomsky (1968:14), to be found in the semantic interpretation of such sentences. Their deep structure must not be NP - V- S because

-

84 -

"to feel angry is not necessarily to feel that one is angry or to feel oneself to be angry" (ibid.). Therefore, Chomsky prefers in this -case an elaboration of the base 2 to an elaboration of the transformational component

5.2

Chomsky's Original Arguments for LH and Their Refutation

5.2.0

Introduction: Three arguments

Having emphasized what large-scale effects a decision to elaborate the base will have in the grammars of all languages ^ Chomsky goes on to examine an analogous question, namely whether what he calls derived nominals (henceforth DNs) (cf. (16)) should be accomodated in the base directly by extending the rules of the categorial component and the lexicon thus simplifying the transformational component or whether they should be transformationally related to the associated propositions in (14) just like the gerundive nominals (henceforth GNs) in (15). (14) a. b. c.

John is eager to please. John has refused the offer. John criticized the book.

(15) a. b. c.

John's being eager to please John's refusing the offer John's criticizing the book

(16) a. b. c.

John's eagerness to please John's refusal of the offer John's criticism of the book (cf. Chomsky 1968:15)

The first option he terms the "lexicalist position", the second the "transformationalist position". The empirical evidence which Chomsky presents in favor of the lexicalist position centers around three main differences between

-

85 -

gerundive nominals and derived nominals which, after 4 Ross (1973) , can be summarized in the following way: The Derived Structures Argument: There are GNs which correspond to sentences that have undergone transformations , but there are no DNs which correspond to such derived structures. The Internal Structure Argument: While DNs have the internal structure of NPs (i.e., they pluralize and take determiners and internal adjectives), GNs do not. The Semantic Kinkiness Argument: While the relationship between GN complements and synonymous NPs containing finite clause is (generally) fairly regular and one-to-one, that between DNs and synonymous NPs with finite clauses is often less regular, and is usually one-to-many. (cf. Ross 1973:209)

5.2.1 5.2.1.1

The 'Derived Structures" Argument

(DSA)

Chomsky's analyses of some 'clear cases'

In support of the Derived Structures Argument Chomsky cites the data in (17)-(21) and tries to show that the ungrammaticality of (19) as against (20) (17) a. b. c.

John is easy(difficult) to please. John is certain (likely) to win the prize. John amused (interested) the children with his stories.

(18) a. b. c.

John's being easy (difficult) to please John's being certain (likely) to win the prize John's amusing (interesting) the children with his stories

(19) a. *John's easiness (difficulty) to please b. ""John's certainty (likelihood) to win the prize c. *John's amusement (interest) of the children with his stories (20) a. b. c.

John's John's John's dren's

eagerness to please (cf. (14a), (16a) above) certainty that Bill will win the prize being amused at (interested in) the chilantics

-

(21) a.

86

-

John's being eager to please

(cf. (14a), (15a) above)

b.

John's being certain that Bill will win the prize

c.

John's being amused at (interested in) the children's antics (cf. Chomsky 1968:18-19)

follows as a consequence from one of the lexicalist subhypotheses which claims that lexical items "appear in the lexicon with fixed selectional and strict

subcatego-

rization features, but with a choice as to the features associated with the lexical categories noun, verb, adjecr

tive" (1968:22)

. Thus, with respect to eager in (20a),

(16a) and (14a) against easy in (17a), (18a) and (19a) Chomsky argues that "eager must be introduced into the lexicon with a strict subcategorization feature indicating that it can take a sentential complement, as in John is eager (for us) to please" (1968:22-23) or in John's eagerness (for us) to please, whereas for easy there is no structure of the form ...easy S generated by the base rules. This item appears only in base phrase-markers as an adjective predicated of propositions as subject ((for us) to please John is easy) from which surface forms such as it is easy (for us) to please John may be derived by extraposition ^. Therefore, the impossibility of introducing easy into the noun position with sentential complements prevents (19a) from being derived, thus "explaining" its ungrammaticality as a consequence of the LH.

5.2.1.2

Some 'unclear cases': Bolinger (1973)

Chomsky's explanation for the ungrammaticality of (19a) in terms of LH has been accepted

at face value

by trans-

formationalists like Ross (1973) and McCawley (1973), though they objected to the LH on other grounds (cf. 5.2.2 below). What they seem to have overlooked however is that even this aspect of it is untenable in view of

- 87 -

a number of data not taken into account by Chomsky. Consider, for example, the grammaticality of sentences like John's easiness to please us surprised everyone where the derived nominal is related to a structure like for John to please us is easy and it :Ls easy for John to please ~us.

Whatever analysis in terms of underlying struc-

tures is adopted for these construction it is irreconciliable with Chomsky's lexically motivated generalization that only the eager type of adjectives admits of DNs and not the easy type. Thus, within his "atheoretical framework", Bolinger (1973:17) argues against the claim that John is easy to please and Ijt is easy to please John represent the same deep structure. He advocates the traditional view that in the former structure "easy is simply a complement of the subject and to please is a restrictive modifier of the complement" (1973:19) and suggests on 8

the basis of a variety of examples for

that the explanation

*John's easiness to please cannot be sought in

Chomsky's basic generalization about nominalization possibilities, but is rather a matter of individual word meanings (cf. 1973:24): It is a lexical accident that easiness does not appear in the required sense. But facility does and enables the meaning of easy to "be introduced by lexical insertion into the noun position with sentential complements" It is easy to work with . Its facility to work with is what pleases me most about that preparation, (ibid.) Some of Bolinger's other examples are: A short story is convenient to write. Its convenience to write is what makes a short story so often more attractive than a novel. A garment like this is simple to put on and take off. What I appreciate about a garment like this is its simplicity to put on and take off. (ibid.)

-

88

-

Bolinger admits that it is hard to predict what sense of an adjective will nominalize, but his generalization that "the most central meaning is the one generally nominalized, and that this meaning more often accords best with the noun as agent" (cf. 1973:25) 1 0 covers at least more cases than Chomsky's. It accounts, for example, for the interpretability of his difficulty to persuade (Bolinger 1973:25), which, according to Chomsky (cf. (19a) above), should be "ungrammatical. Bolinger's 'predictions' about the data receive further support from Quirk (1977). He draws attention to the fact that when in structures like John is easy (for us) to please and The house is ready (for John) to buy (it) the optional ' for + subject' is absent, the object is obligatorily absent as well. Compare John is easy to please (*him) The house is ready to buy (*it)

(Quirk 1977:99)

11

It thus seems that the ungrammaticality of *John's easiness to please should be explained in terms of lexical properties of items and Quirk's surface restriction and not as a consequence of the LH.

5.2.1.3

Other counter-evidence

5.2.1.3.1

to the DSA:

Chomsky's (1977) analysis and more data

Denying that the ungrammaticality of *John's easiness to please can be deduced from LH is all the more warranted as Chomsky (1977) has abandoned his (1968) analysis of the difference between eager and easy type adjectives on which the above argument for LH hinges. Now, in his attempt to reduce all major movement transformations to the single operation "move a" within trace theory, he takes the complement in (22) to be essentially the same as in (23) . (22)

John is easy (for us) [to please]

- 89 (23)

John is eager

[for Bill to leave] (cf. Chomsky

1977:102,103)

without, however, being aware that this assumption makes his

(1968) argument for LH untenable.

Chomsky's other examples

(cf. (19b) and (20b) above)

for the ungrammaticality of which the LH is supposed to provide an explanation can be shown as well to fail in this respect. Thus, *John's certainty to w i n the prize (= (19b)) is grammatical if the reflexive pronoun

himself

is added, i.e. as the DN of John is certain that he^ will w i n the prize himself^ and, as pointed out by Bolinger (1973:27) the same sense of certain appears in John is certain to win the prize and in This formula is certain to work. But, contrary to the predictions of the LH there is a DN corresponding to this sense, namely What reassures 12 m e about this formula is its certainty to work Similarly Chomsky's

*John's amusement of the children with

his stories

(= (19c) above, p.85) is grammatical in the

context

keeps them quiet while retaining the inter-

pretation of the GN

(cf. (20c), p.85). The parallelism

suggested by Chomsky between the derivation of (24b) from (24 a) (24) a. b.

He was amused at the stories. The stories amused him.

(Chomsky

1968:24)

and the causative relationship of tomatoes grow to John grows tomatoes where, as Chomsky maintains

(cf. 1968:25)/

the growth of tomatoes is unambiguously intransitive, thus excluding

^John's growth of tomatoes, rest moreover on

false premises.

5.2.1.3.2

Causative verbs and their DNs

(Smith

(1972))

An investigation of a large number of causative verbs, carried out by Smith

(1972) revealed that the pair grow -

growth is simply an instance of a group of verbs which

- 90 are exceptional in that they permit only intransitive DNs. The generalization arrived at by Smith is that there are almost as "many causative verbs that have both, transitive and intransitive DNs, as there are causatives that have only intransitive nomináis. In fact "among several hundreds of verbs, there is less than 10% difference in frequency between the two types" (1972: 1 37). What distinguishes the two types is the way in which the DN is formed. If a causative verb takes a nominalizing suffix of Latin origin (-tion, -al, -ment), then it has both transitive and intransitive derived nomináis" (Smith 1972:137) (cf. The priest's conversion of Robert and Robert's conversion). If it does not take such a nominalizing suffix, i.e. if it is of Anglo-Saxon órigin, its 13 DN occurs only intransitively . One of the exceptions to this rule, mentioned by Smith, is increase which, though of Latin origin, takes the nominal suffix 0, usually reserved for verbs of Anglo-Saxon origin. It follows that since an adequate grammar of English must allow for both transitive and intransitive DNs of causative verbs the lexicalist position which in combination with Chomsky's causative analysis (1968:24-26) permits only intransitive DNs must be given up in favor of the transformationalist position.

5.2.2 5.2.2.1

The'Internal Structure' Argument (ISA) DSA and ISA: Generalizing transformations to NPs

One of Chomsky's other arguments for LH concerns the analysis of phrases like (25)-(27) and involves elements of the DSA and the ISA according to which DNs as against GNs have the internal structure of NPs. (25)

the enemy's destruction of the city

(26)

the destruction of the city by the enemy

(27)

the city's destruction by the enemy (cf. Chomsky 1968:40-43)

-

91

-

Chomsky claims that (27) is only apparently the nominalization of a passive sentence (cf. 1968:43). If it were really the nominalization of a passive sentence "with the auxiliary "mysteriously disappearing" (1968:44) this would refute the LH since "it follows from this hypothesis that transforms should not undergo the processes that give derived nominals" (1968:43-44). What he proposes instead is to explain structures like (27) as "passives of base-generated derived nominals, by independently motivated transformations" (1968:44), i.e. by processes like NP-preposing which apply in complex NPs whose head is morphologically underived relating e.g. the picture of John to John's picture (1968:40). Thus, Chomsky's base rules generate (25) as the enemy's [destroyf +N] - the city - b£ A 1 4 parallel to (28). (28) (29)

The enemy destroyed the city. The city was destroyed by the enemy.

To this structure and to (28) his rule of Agent-postposing applies yielding (26) and (29) respectively.By preposing and possessivizing the NP the city he derives (27). Thus, the rule of Agent-postposing is a generalization of the rule that is responsible for by-phrases in passive sentences. Chomsky introduces this generalization in the following way: Agent-postposing will then apply, as in the passive, giving the destruction of the city by the enemy. To provide this result we need only generalize the operation so that its domain may be a noun phrase as well as a sentence, a modification of the theory of transformations that is implicit in the lexicalist hypothesis... (1968:42) As rightly observed by Ross (1973:212), the problem here lies in the words "need only". Following Chomsky's kind of reasoning one needs only generalize the operation of Dative Movement to NPs and the result will be ungrammatical (cf. (30)) (30)a.

Our gift of a bull moose to Mark

-

b.

92

*Our gift Mark

-

(of) a bull m o o s e

15

(cf. Ross 1973: 213)

though generalizing PP-shift to NPs does not affect grammaticality

(cf.

(31)).

(31)a.

Our talk w i t h Gretchen about hockey

b.

Our talk about hockey with Gretchen

(ibid.)

Ross points out that "if one 'need only' generalize w h e n the facts show this to be necessary, how could there ever be any counterexamples to the DSA?"

(1973:213) and demon-

strates further deficiencies of Chomsky's

independently

motivated rules applying in complex NPs w i t h morphologically simple and derived head nouns 5.2.2.2 5.2.2.2.1

Passives and their nominalizations A history of the passive -

transformation:

structure-building

Before turning to the evaluation of

Chomsky's claim

that transforms such as passives should not undergo the processes that give DNs

(cf. 1968:44) because this w o u l d

refute the LH, it is necessary to make a brief digression into the history of the passive transformation up to 17 (1968) in order to be able to determine the validity of the analysis of sentential passives on which Chomsky's claim is based, namely the justification for assuming "that the underlying structure for passives is roughly NP - Aux - V - N P - by A" (1968:41). Chomsky's own remark that "by A is an agent phrase related, in ways that are still unclear in detail, to adverbials of means and m a n n e r " (ibid.) already gives a hint as to where the main weakness of this analysis is to be found. It has to do with Chomsky's still sticking to his Aspects-treatment of passives. In SS passives were derived,for reasons of simplicity and 18 descriptive adequacy , from underlying kernel sentences by an optional singulary transformation with structurebuilding power which, in Chomsky's opinion, could intro-

- 93 duce a difference in meaning

(compare (32) and (33))

19

(32)

Everyone in the room knows at least two languages

(33)

At least two languages are known by everyone in the room

(Chomsky 1957:100-101)

Katz and Postal (1964), in defending the hypothesis that singulary transformations do not change meaning, dealt with Chomsky's interpretation of the data by claiming that both sentences could have the same two readings and that even if Chomsky were right, their hypothesis could be maintained by deriving passives "not from corresponding active forms, but rather from underlying P-markers containing3 an Adverb. constituent dominating J by manner —*plus a passive morpheme dummy" (1964:72). This kind of underlying structure was supposed to account for the alleged fact that verbs whose sentences could be passivized were also the verbs which allowed manner adverbs. It provided a way to take care of verbs like cost, weigh, 20 marry, and resemble - Lees'(196 3) 'middle verbs' which, though syntactically transitive, are not passivizable, and to derive "pseudo -passives" such as the proposal was vehemently argued against and the bed was slept in by Harry (cf. Katz and Postal (1964:72 fn.2), Chomsky 1965:104-105) by means of the passive transformation

21

.

Katz and Postal's approach to passivization was adopted by Chomsky in (1965:102ff.) and, as indicated above, in (1968) as well, despite the counterevidence presented in Lakoff (1970)

22

. Lakoff showed

(cf. 1970:156ff.) that

stative verbs like know, believe, consider, think, see, hear, perceive may not take manner adverbials freely, but may undergo the passive transformation. Moreover, Chomsky's "manner'-analysis yields incorrect results in connection with verbs that are strictly subcategorized by prepositonal phrases of direction and place and take manner adverbials. Thus, his passive transformation may apply to John dashed into the room with great enthusiasm producing

*the room was dashed into by John with great

- 94 enthusiasm (cf. Lakoff 1970:164-165) because it is formulated as (34) in order to be applicable to 'intransitive (34)

NP - Aux - V - . . . - _ N P - ... -by passive - ... (cf. Chomsky 1965:104)

verbs in structures like "everyone looks up to John by passive" (ibid.) thereby yielding the correct "pseudopassive" John is looked ~up to by everyone (ibid.). In view of such exceptions to the passive- manner adverbial

correlation

- there are passivizable verbs that

do not take manner adverbials and unpassivizable ones that take manner adverbials but meet the structural description of the generalized version of the passive transformation -

Chomsky's adherence to it is hard to justi-

fy. Its advantage of being able to avoid a

structure-

building transformation showing that by-NP is a prepositional phrase comes at the cost of generalizing in an ad hoc fashicn."a superficial syntactic correlation between manner adverbs and passivization to cases where it does not hold, a correlation, moreover, for which there is not the slightest semantic motivation. For, as pointed out by R. Lakoff (1971), "what could a manner adverb have to do with passivization? The two phenomena are unrelated semantically." (1971:151)

23

.

Permitting in the Chomskyan framework a specific kind of structure-building operation of the passive transformation seems therefore preferable to an analysis which, for the sake of constraining transformational operations, uses

obscure syntactic motivations for generating the

required constituents by phrase structure rules. This is all the more advisable as in languages like Latin this specific kind of structure-building is accompanied by a change in verb morphology which even affects subjectagreement affixes. Compare the Latin paradigms: Present indicative passive:

Sg.

Present indicative active : amo, amas, amat

Pl.

amamus, amatis, amant

amamur, amamini, amantur

amor, amaris, amatur

- 95 5.2.2.2.2 Passive DNs do have sentential origins: 'Irregular' passives, DNs, sentential adverbs and 'picture'-nouns In the light of this short history of the treatment of passives in GTG consider now more closely Chomsky's contention that structures like (27) for ease of reference (27)

- repeated here

cannot be the nominalization

the city's destruction by the enemy

of a passive sentence because transforms should not undergo the processes that give DNs. Evidence which would disconfirm this contention is not too difficult to come by. First, there is a class of verbs that have only 'passive' nominals, i.e. their 'active' counterparts are ungrammatical such that no neutral lexical entry can be motivated for these verbs.

(35)

(36)

(37)

(38)

"The result What he did

^annoyed surprised pleased disappointed interested

( John 1 me

1

f annoyed at surprised at pleased at disappointed with interested in

u

f John

J

the result ? what he had > done ]

'annoyance surprise *fthe result's pleasure of John [what he did disappointment .interest V /'annoyance at surprise at i John's ? pleasure at the result [my disappointment with what he had interest in done

J

\

(cf. Lakoff 1970:126) 25

Consequently there is no lexicalist way to generate these passive nominals except by postulating an ad hoc and ungrammatical [+N] base structure for Agent-Postposing and NP-Preposing to operate on. In a lexicalist treatment it

- 96 is moreover a totally accidental fact that such passive nominals take exactly the same unusual 'passive preposition' as their 'verbal' passive counterparts. Since, according to LH, there is no direct derivational, i.e. transformational, link between passive sentences and their nominalizations, the unusual choice of passive prepositions with these verbs must be recorded twice, as a morphological exception to the verbal and to the nominal 26

passive Another class of facts that clearly proves, even within Chomsky's own theoretical framework, the sentential origin of DNs whether active or passive has to do with the different kinds of adverbials recognized by traditional 27 grammars and by Chomsky (1965) as well, and their introduction into derivations. In Aspects Chomsky distinguishes between, roughly, three types of adverbials. First, there are those adverbials which play a role in the strict subcategorization of verbs. Along with manner adverbs he introduces them as Prepositional Phrases (PPs) 28 by rule (39iii) to be expanded as in (39iv) (39)

(ii) (i)

Predicate-Phrase -» A U X ' V P S NP^Predicate-Phrase

(Place) (Time)

\

Adj c' S' (like) Predicate-Nominal V (iv)

Prep-Phrase -»

(cf.Chomsky 1965:102) Second, there are the place and time adverbials (cf. (39ii)) which have no particular connection with the verb but

- 97 modify "the entire Verb Phrase or perhaps the entire sentence" (cf. 1965:101). Being associated with the full predicate-phrase in (39ii) they can occur quite freely with various types of VPs. About the third type, sentence adverbials, which are not covered by the fragment (39), Chomsky only says that they "form a 'pre-sentence' unit in the underlying structure" (1965:102). It turns out that it is especially on the basis of this last type of adverbials that structures like the city's destruction by the enemy can be shown to be nominalizations of passives in the sense of requiring a sentential source. Thus, while it may still be possible to adduce some 'independent motivation' for generating the adjectival forms of the first two types of adverbials (cf. (40)) as modifiers of base noun phrases (40) a.

c. d. e. f.

the enemy's

fast sudden intentional

destruction of the city

the city's

{ fast sudden intentional

destruction by the enemy

the city's destruction yesterday by the enemy the city's destruction by the enemy yesterday yesterday's destruction of the city by the enemy 29 the careful wording of the letter by John ^

this is excluded in the case of sentence adverbials. That is, whatever way one chooses to introduce adverbials into derivations - as prepositional phrases into base phrasemarkers under the assumption that 'adverb' is a derived 31 category or as members of a base category adverb consisting of two formally distinct classes of constituents sentence adverbials, if they admit of an adjectival form, must be generated in the prenominal slot of DNs like the city's unfortunate destruction by the enemy without any 'subcategorizational' information subject only to the occurrence restrictions they may exhibit as Dresentence units of the corresponding full sentences 32

- 98 That they cannot occur as adjectives with simple morphologically underived nouns except if these nouns have a 33 1 nominalization-reading1 is anple proof that DNs must be derived from a sentential source and cannot be base-generated. Compare (41). (41) a. *the alleged/regrettable house/table b.

the enemy's alleged/regrettable destruction of the city

c.

the city's alleged/regrettable destruction by the

e.

enemy ("the enemy destroyed the city Allegedly/regrettably, • the city was destroyed by the enemy John's alleged picture of Mary

f.

Allegedly, John painted/made a picture of Mary

d.

g.

the alleged painting of Mary by John

h.

Allegedly, Mary was painted by John.

Thus, out of the three readings given by Chomsky for the phrase John's picture, namely one the picture that John has, two the picture of John and three the picture that John painted

(cf. 1968:45), it is only the last that

can be selected in John's alleged/unfortunate picture. The same 'nominalization' reading is selected in John's alleged/unfortunate picture of Mary which without the sentence adverbial may be interpreted, according to Chomsky, as deriving either from the base structure Det-N-NPby A

or from the structure underlying the picture of Mary

that John has

(cf. 1968:45-46).

Chomsky touches on the problem that adjectives appearing with DNs pose for the lexicalist hypothesis (1968:29). But he dismisses adverbial constructions as possible sources for the adjectives in John's sudden refusal or John's obvious sincerity because this would presuppose according to him "that derived nominals can be formed from such structures as John refused in such-and-such a manner, John was sincere to such-and-such an extent, etc." (ibid.) and because "adjectives that appear with derived

- 99 nominals often cannot appear (as adverbs) with the associated verbs, for example we have John's uncanny (amazing, curious, striking) resemblance to Bill but not *John resembled Bill uncannily (amazingly, curiously, strikingly) " (ibid.).He overlooks, however, that his first reason is only valid if it is assumed that adverbials are derived from prepositional phrases rather than recognized 34 as a category in the base and that (42) (42)

Uncannily Amazingly Curiously Strikingly

I

resembled Bill

is the grammatical source of John's .... resemblance to Bill

35

-

The occurrence of sentence adverbs as adjectives in DNs and their exclusion from non-norainalized, morphologically simple nouns, therefore constitute decisive evidence in favor of a sentential source for DNs whether active or passive and consequently against Chomsky's claim that DNs do not contain elements that never appear in other noun phrases (cf. 19 72c) 3 6 Our investigation above suggests moreover that Chomsky's assumption of a parallelism between passive DNs and complex NPs containing agentive by-phrases can ultimately be traced back to his adoption of the Katz-Postal position with respect to the passive-manner adverb correlation and their deriving such manner adverbs from prepositional phrases in order to be able to base-generate a PP-node for the passive dummy marker thereby avoiding the postulation of a structure-building transformation which would be meaning-changing. If the counterexamples to the passive - manner adverbial correlation are accepted and adverbs are recognized as a category of the base distinct from Prep-Phrases, as e.g. in Jackendoff (1977:23), the whole chain of arguments based on KatzPostal1 s analysis of the passive collapses including

-

100

-

Chomsky's dismissal of adverbial sources for adjectives in DNs and thus the corresponding motivations for the DSand IS Arguments as well. This again gives way to a transformational explanation of the otherwise mysterious fact that in the so-called independently motivated base noun phrases of the form Pet-N-NP-by A "where the head is not derived from an underlying stem that also appears as a verb" (1968:45) it is only if the head noun admits of a verbal interpretation with respect to the noun in Pet that this subject NP can be moved by Agent-Postposing into the A position. The fact that a noun may admit of such an interpretation is, however, not predictable in any way from the LH. It simply has to be recorded in the lexical entry for that underived noun by the subcatego37 rization feature b^ A together with the selectional constraints to be imposed on the subject NP in the Pet position. This part of the LH thus boils down to the ad hoc assumption of subcategorization frames for underived nouns to reflect the parallelism in interpretation between them and derived nouns, a parallelism which in transformational approaches would be accounted for by postulating abstract verbs Given this state of affairs, the transformational hypothesis

has to be preferred to the lexicalist one because

instead of postulating ad hoc hypothetical syntactic constructs which in any case have to be supplemented by abstract semantic predicates

it assumes a common under-

lying structure for PNs and complex NPs, i.e. a sentential source, thereby explaining in a unified way the paral39 lei semantic interpretation of the structures concerned

5.2.2.3 Having

Pegrees of 'nouniness' refuted, some of the main claims of Chomsky's

PS- and IS Arguments let us now deal with the other components of the ISA namely that PNs as against GNs have the

-

101

-

internal structure of NPs because many of them pluralize and take determiners

(cf. Chomsky 1972c:159). Notice first

the most obvious objection to this argument. It is the trivial observation that there are several classes of underived nouns in English and other languages for which these qualifications do not hold. Proper names, mass nouns and certain abstract nouns do, in general, not take the full set of determiners such as articles, quantifiers or the plural morpheme Since it would be absurd to deny the nominal status of these elements it is already clear from the properties of underived nouns that "having the internal structure of an NP" is not a matter of all or none. In fact, the evidence collected by Ross

(1973) in developing his theory

of non-discrete grammar demonstrates that, contrary to Chomsky's claim there is no sharp, binary distinction between DNs and other nominalizations

(cf. 1973:169).

They are points in a quasi-continuous hierarchy of complement types, the (42)

Nouniness Squish (cf. (42)), where

that > for to > Q > Acc Ing > Poss Ing > Action Nominal > Derived Nominal > noun (cf. Ross 1973:141)

41

each position further down in this hierarchy involves more features of nouniness than the construction in the preceding position. Thus, it is in accordance with the LH that the rules of Particle Movement, Dative and Raising can only apply in Poss-Ing and Acc-Ing constructions but not in action nominalizations

(cf. (44) vs. (43)), it

contradicts, however, the LH that already in the former construction type nouny elements like this, no, some and attributive adjectives may occur, which, as in (45), can be accompanied by such 'verby' elements as auxiliaries and aspect. (43) a.

This looking

[

Sdi««"«?

j

has

9ot

to

sto

P"

-

. . No 3giving 3

102

-

flumpy cigarettes to freshmen ? .,, 1 * d i • i will (freshman lumpy cigarettes J

be tolerated. Some simple showing

'that is is necessary to "J wash them it to be necessary to wash them

may be requested. (44) a.

Bill's looking

up of addresses •of addresses "up

„ . . Your generous giving 3

was efficient.

(of lumpy cigarettes to 1„ u I freshmen (•freshmen of lumpy cigarettes

has been approved of . r

Sam's quick showing

that it is necessary to wash them •of it to be necassary to kwash them

was masterful.

(45) a.

(cf. Ross 1963:167-168)

That having been followed for years must have been nerve-racking.

b.

This being seduced continually is kind of fun-

c.

That having had to pay early must have crimped your vacation plans.

These data and Ross' systematic

(Ross 1963:168) investigation of the

interplay between the nouniness-hierarchy his hierarchy of 'noun-requiringness' 42 (46) clearly prove that Chomsky is 'has the internal structure of an NP' binary predicate with DNs having such not having it (cf. Ross 1973:173) 4 3 .

(46)

NPs

>

this that

( careful reluctant etc.

'no some much little!

(cf. (42)) and

of determiners mistaken in treating as if it were a a structure and GNs

the prior

occasional frequent

> (good 1> other 1 bad I mere

(Ross 1973:169)

-

5.2.2.4

103

-

A strategy for the disposing of counterevidence to LH: The postulation of 'analogical rules'

In concluding this section it is worthwhile looking at an instance of Chomsky's strategy for the disposing of counterexamples to his lexicalist assumptions. As part of the DSA he claims that although gerundive nominalization applies freely to sentences with verb phrase adjuncts yielding a grammatical output as in (47), this is not true of the rules for forming DNs as in (48) (cf. Chomsky 1968:27). This is supposed to follow from the LH "since true verb phrase adjuncts such as before-clauses and because-clauses will not appear as noun complements in 44 base noun phrases" (ibid.) (47)

his criticizing the book before he read it (because of its failure to go deeply into the matter, etc.)

(48)

*his criticism of the book before he read it (because of its failure...) (cf. ibid.)

Chomsky's judging (48) ungrammatical has been questioned in the literature by so many people (cf. Bowers (1969) , Hankamer (1972), McCawley (1973), Ross (1973)) that it may be considered to be an idiosyncrasy of his personal competence. What has, however, been more sharply criticized is the way in which he deals with grammaticality judgments differing from his own. He suggests that speakers who find (48) acceptable "are not aware of a property of their internalized grammar" (1968:28). On the basis of his (1965) distinction between the "fully grammatical" and deviant sentences - the former are 'directly generated' by the grammar of a language, the 45 latter are 'derivatively generated' (cf. 1965:227) he argues that on the lexicalist hypothesis phrases like (48) can only be derivatively generated, i.e. structural descriptions are assigned to them by the grammar indicating somehow the nature and the degree of their deviance, and concludes that their acceptability to speakers "results

-

104 -

from a failure to take note of a certain distinction of grammaticalness"

(1968:27). Ungrammatical sequences like

(48) are then said to be formed by analogy to the GNs in (47) "by a rule that converts X-ing to the noun X-nom (where nam is the element that determines the morphological form of the derived nominal) in certain cases"

(1968:

27-28). The empirical evidence Chomsky goes on to present in favor of such analogical rules required by LH consists of the claim that, with regard to (48), (49) and

(50),

there are fundamentally two types of acceptability ments of speakers

(cf. 1968:29). One group, the LH group

as it were, accepts (49)a.

judg-

(50), but rejects (48) and (49).

His criticism of the book before he read it is to be found on page 15.

b.

I studied his criticism of the book before he read it very carefully.

(50)a.

His criticism of the book is to be found on page 15.

b.

I studied his criticism of the book very carefully.

(1968:28)

The other one accepts

(50) and (48) but not (49). Even if

it were true that all speakers reject (48)

'empirical'

would still be an odd term to use for a method which amounts to saying that sentences which are judged grammatical by native speakers

(cf. (48)) but contradict a

proposed hypothesis do not necessarily constitute counterevidence to this hypothesis

(cf. Bowers

1969:521).

But apart from this methodological absurdity which reduces thè empirical content of the LH to nil (cf. Hankamer 1972: 111) Chomsky exhibits in his attempt to find support for the LH a remarkable willingness to introduce a significant theoretical innovation.As pointed out by McCawley

(19 73:

18) his analogical rules which are really a kind of transderivational constraint, in the sense of Lakoff

(19 73),

appear to need no particular justification because they

-

105 46

can be relegated to 'performance' . It is moreover completely unclear how ideal speakers whose linguistic competence Chomsky defines as their tacit knowledge of a language can fail to notice a property of their internalized grammar.

5.2.3

The'Semantic Kinkiness" Argument (SKA)

5.2.3.1

5.2.3.1.1

Semantic idiosyncrasy versus 'syntactic' productivity Productivity in

ST versus

EST

Chomsky introduces the SKA in the following way: The idiosyncratic character of the relation between the derived nominal and the associated verb has been so often remarked that discussion is superfluous. Consider, for example, such nominals as laughter, marriage, construction, actions, activities, revolution, belief, doubt, conversion, permutation, trial, residence, qualifications, specififications, and so on, with their individual ranges of meaning and varied semantic relations to the base forms. There are a few subregularities that have frequently been noted, but the range of variation and its rather accidental character are typical of lexical structure. (1968:19) Notice first that Chomsky does not bother at all to substantiate the claim about the idiosyncratic character of the relation between the derived nominal and the associated verb. He does not even give any bibliographical references. This is not surprising since there are, to the best of my knowledge, no contributions in the literature 47 which would support this claim in any detail . On the contrary, it was exactly the regularity of the relationship between verbs, adjectives and their nominalizations that most transformational and 'traditional' works in the field of word-formation have attempted to demonstrate Thus, Lees (1963) , one of the first applications of the SS model to a larger body of data, draws attention to the fact that parallel to the action nominal in -ing as in

-

106

-

his strong objecting there is for many verbs another in which the nominal head is a derived verbal (cf. his strong objection (1963:66)), i.e. in Chomsky's (1968) terminology a DN, and that such action nominals cannot be formed from "non-action" verbs like believe or admire (cf. *His believing of it...

*His admiring of her...) 49 (Lees 1963:66) though all verbs except modals permit GNs (cf. (51)) (51)

His having a hat.... His catching her working.... His resembling his mother.... His considering her silly.... His admiring her....

(cf. Lees (1963:66-67))

for which fact paraphrases exist. Lees (1963:64) also notes the use of ing-forms as concrete nouns, i.e. as a count-noun in the case of His drawing fascinated me because it was so large and as a mass-noun in the case of

approved

of his writing because it was so legible without, however, giving any hint that DNs might be as idiosyncratic as Chomsky deems them to be in the quotation above. In fact, Lees attempts to detect and formalize as many regular relationships as possible between sentences and their different kinds of nominalizations including compounding process

. It is also surprising to find no

explicit discussion of Chomsky's own treatment of DNs in Aspects

where phrases like "their destruction of the

property" are "considered to be instances of productive derivational processes to be handled by nominalization transformations which operate on generalized phrase-markers containing configurations like "they destroy the property" dominated by S" (cf. Chomsky 1965:184). Since it is unlikely that the productive derivational processes that warranted a nominalization transformation for English in (1965) had become unproductive by (1968) the idiosyncrasies of DNs referred to by Chomsky (1968) are probably more induced by his theoretical bias against the transformational hypothesis than by a thorough investigation

-

107

-

of the regularities exhibited by DN-formation.

5.2.3.1.2

Productivity of word-formation processes: Morphological irregularity versus syntactic productivity

There is however a further reason that might have contributed to the radical change in Chomsky's position with respect to the productivity of the same primary data. It has to do with the failure of GT-grammarians to come to terms with the notion 'productivity' in general and the appropriate application to the field of word-forma52 tion in particular . Thus, in elaborating on the DSA Chomsky uses 'productivity' to denote the property of grammatical transformations to apply freely to propositions of subject-predicate form, thereby producing GNs "from an underlying sentence-like structure" (1968:16) where the relation of meaning between the two is quite regular. With respect to the formation of DNs, on the other hand, productivity is said to be much more restrict53 ed and the semantic relation between the DN and its associated proposition to be quite varied and idiosyncratic. This alleged contrast is then exploited by Chomsky to ihotivate the LH, i.e. the base-generation of DNs, the implication being that syntactic processes, i.e. transformations, are general, regular and exceptionless while 'lexical' processes are sporadic, irregular and 54 accidental . This implication is further strengthened by the nature of the fourteen examples (cf. (52)) which Chomsky presents as proof of the idiosyncratic character of the relation between the DN and the associated verb. (52) laughter, marriage, construction, actions, activities, revolution, belief, doubt, conversion, permutation, trial, residence, qualifications, specifications (1968:19)

-

108

-

They exhibit at least eight different nominalizing suf55 fixes , only five of which are productive in the morphological sense, i.e. it is possible to make up new forms on their model

This morphological diversity

of nominalizing suffixes and their different degrees of productivity cannot be compared with the

'productivity'

of syntactic transformations. Since due to the strict separation of components in Chomskyan models syntactic processes are usually formulated exclusively in terms of categories and positions of formatives in phrase-markers, i.e. irrespective of their morphological shape, the question relevant for the syntactic productivity of DNs can only be whether all verbs can be combined with such a categorychanging suffix. The answer to this question being posi57 tive , the formation of DNs must, from the syntactic point of view, be considered to be a productive process w h i c h is only subject to the usual conditions on the application of syntactic transformations in the Aspectsparadigm such as meeting certain structural descriptions and being meaning-preserving. A rejection of this conclusion commits one to the view that, for example, pasttense formation in English is an unproductive and accidental process, because, as pointed out by Bickerton (1969) "on any system of analysis at least two or three dozen 'root-alldmorphs' or suppletive alternants'

(or

whatever) are necessary to account for irregular pasttense formations, whereas it would appear that no more than seven

-/Jn/, /eijn/, /mant/, /ans/, /a/, /i/,

/0/ - will account for all but a tiny handful... of nomlnalizations"

(1969:49)

[emphasis added, HUB]. It would

be equally absurd to conclude form the morphological idiosyncrasies of English plural allomorphs that plural formation is an unproductive process 5 8

-

5.2.3.2 5.2.3.2.1

109 -

Lexicalization versus syntactic derivation Lexemes versus syntactic derivatives

Having established that irregularity of morphological realizations of grammatical formatives is irrelevant for the syntactic productivity of the processes involved Chomsky's claim as to the individual ranges of meaning of DNs and their -varied semantic relations to base forms remains to be examined. To accomodate these 'semantic idiosyncrasies' within a transformational approach it is necessary, according to Chomsky to resort to the artifice of assigning a range of meanings to the base forms, stipulating that with certain semantic features the form must nominalize and with others it cannot. (1968:19) He adds "..., the appeal to this highly unsatisfactory device, which reduces the hypothesis that transformations do not have semantic content to near vacuity, would have 10

to be quite extensive. " (ibid.). Since Chomsky does neither specify the nature of the individual ranges of meaning nor indicate to what kinds of base forms the derived nominals in (52) are supposed to have varied semantic relations, the intended meaning of these passa59 ges is open to speculation . On the most favorable interpretation Chomsky is referring to the often-noted fact that derived nominals and other types of word-forming syntagmas may exhibit different degrees of lexicalization Tip to idiomaticization such that because they have acquired specific semantic features, their meaning is no longer predictable from their constituent parts Such formations may end up as unanalyzable lexemes without any discernible connections to their former parts. It is self-evident that the properties of such isolated units have to be recorded in the lexicon But not a single one of the derived nominals in question (cf. (52) above) answers this description. Irrespective of

-

110

-

the specific semantic features they may acquire in par62

ticular vocabularies, styles or registers , all of them may occur as syntactic derivatives, i.e. as nomina actionis which, depending on the Aktionsart of the verbal base and the semantic - syntactic properties of the matrix verb, are derived from appositional complement clauses to 'metalinguistic' head nouns like fact, act, proposition, activity, process, event, state 6 3 Thus, each of the DNs in question may occur as the com64 plement of a factive verb in constructions like (53). (53) Isjj

I resented i

the ( fchat

f a c t t h a t t h e y lau hed -) I fchey laughed> 9

their laughter.

J

(cf. Menzel 1975:95) All items among them which are derived from an action verb can occur across the copula from the noun event

65

and as complements on the head noun event (cf. (54)) (54)

Their laughter was an event. The event of their laughter occurred at noon• (cf. Menzel 1975:124)

Many of the alleged semantic idiosyncrasies of DNs, i.e. of nomina actionis, thus turn out to be systematic regularities explainable from the interplay of two factors. DNs as ncaminalizations of simple main clauses which can at the same time belong to more than one sentence type (e.g. John ate the meat expresses a proposition, describes an event and an action on the part of John (cf. Menzel 19 75:202)) share these ambiguities with their sources if used in isolation 6 6 . It is only when they are inserted into another sentence that such ambiguities may be resolved in favor of one of the readings of the 67 DN appropriate to the matrix or container verb Compare the insertability of event versus process verbs into Vendler's (1968) test frame for events (cf. (55)).

-

(55)

111

-

•The construction of the building The conversion of the building

DNs thus inherit their

occurred at ten o'clock.

'semantic idiosyncrasies'

from

their source sentences

5.2.3.2.2

The

'pronominalization potential' of DNs

and their regular ambiguities Further support

for the transformational relation between

sentences and DNs comes from the pronominalization po69 tential

exhibited by derived nominals. That is, nomina

actionis

(and other types of DNs for that matter) can

be used to refer back to sentential structures in the preceding context in the same way as ordinary pronouns (cf. (56)) where, depending on the kind of matrix verb, the fact-manner ambiguity is preserved or resolved.

¡

The fact that they laughed / Their laughter ?

The manner in which they J laughed was resented by everyone surprised everyone

(

The artifice of assigning a range of meanings and underlying structures to DNs is therefore a well-motivated method of making explicit the covert ambiguities of the sentential sources of DNs, ambiguities that have to be stated somewhere in the grammar anyway. Postulating distinct deep structures to render the systematic meaning differences in the interpretation of DNs is thus not qualitatively different from the Katz-Postal representation of different sentence types by assuming abstract markers. Therefore, the transformational is, contrary to Chomsky's claim

approach

(1968:19), in accordance

- 1 1 2 -

with the hypothesis that transformations do not have 71 semantic content . This is, in fact, implicitly acknowledged by Chomsky himself at the beginning of footnote 10 the only place in the whole of his paper where he discusses transformational approaches to nominalizations in any detail: The artificiality [of assigning a range of meanings to the base forms] "might be reduced by deriving nominals from underlying nouns with some kind of sentential element included, where the meaning can be expressed in this way: for example, John's intelligence from the fact that John is intelligent (in John's intelligence is undeniable), and from the extent to which John is intelligent (in John's intelligence exceeds his foresight). (1968:19-20) Chomsky finds this analysis dubious on the grounds that (a) "It is difficult to find a natural source for the nominal...in such sentences as John's intelligence is his most remarkable quality", and (b) "vie can say John's intelligence,which is his most remarkable quality, exceeds his foresight, but the appositive clause, on this analysis, would have to derive from

*the extent to which

John is intelligent is his most remarkable quality" (1968:20). McCawley (1973) dismisses Chomsky's doubts by pointing out that the example in (a) allows the paraphrase 'that John is as intelligent as he is is his most remarkable quality' and "that the structure underlying That John is as intelligent as he is would be the obvious source to

72

propose for this sense of John's intelligence" (1973:10) For McCawley, Chomsky's asterisked example in (b) is grammatical whereas he finds that John's intelligence, which is his most remarkable quality,exceeds his foresight displays an oddness which is absent if the roles of main clause and appositive clause are reversed" (1973:11). He explains these data by relating them to a transformation dubbed Telescoping (1973:10) which is independently required to derive sentences like It's appalling (that have to put up with) what I have to put up with and

-

113

-

You'11 never believe (that Susan is going to marry) who she is going to marry by deleting the bracketed material . McCawley (1973:9-11) shows that Chomsky's lexicalist analysis as against his transformational treatment neither provides any clue as to why there should be any difference in grairanaticality between the examples above, nor contributes anything towards an understanding of the question of what nominalizations and what relationships between a ncominalization and its meaning are possible. Ross' (1973) critique of Chomsky's SKA points in this direction, too. He finds it difficult to see "how the SKA could justify choosing a lexicalist analysis of nominalization over a transformationalist one" (1973:216) because of the trading relationship involved. While the transformationalist will seek to explain the synonymies of derived naminals and their sentential sources by postulating a specific set of syntactic rules, the lexicalist will have to explain these synonymies by various cognates to these rules in his semantics" (cf. ibid.) 73

5.2.3.3

'Metalinguistic' head nouns and LH versus TH

Apart from being forced to postulate semantic cognates to transformational rules lexicalists face the problem of having to specify separately syntactic well-formedness conditions for all those structures in which DNs and GNs share co-occurrence restrictions. As the examples in (57) show , these include the optional surface realizations of what have been called above 'metalinguistic' head nouns which transformationalists make use of in their derivations of nominalizations. It therefore seems that in order to be descriptively adequate a lexicalist grammar (57)a.

'That Fred is sallow Fred('s) being sallow Fred's sallowness

is a fact.

b.

114 -

The fact

'that Fred is sallow , of Fred('s) being sallow of Fred's sallowness ,

is beyond question. c.

That Fred is sallow I Fred('s) being sallowr Fred's sallowness J

is beyond question. (cf. Ross 1973:218-219)

would have to refer in the lexical entries of those nouns which are possible heads for DNs to the derived status of DNs. Thus, it is not sufficient to require that the noun heads of the prepositional of-complements to these 'head nouns' or their 'beheaded' equivalents 74 be abstract . They have to be nominalizations. But since in the lexicalist framework DNs are base-generated, their nominalized status can only be indicated by adding a whole range of new features to those introduced by the context-free subcategorization rule for nouns (cf. [¿Count], [¿Animate],[±Human], [¿Abstract], (Chomsky 1965:82, 83, 107). Leaving aside, for the moment, the question in how far under lexicalist assumptions the category 'noun' can still be maintained to be selectional75 ly dominant - it seems that at least for DNs a contextsensitive subcategorization rule is required to state their 'subject' and 'object' selection -

those additio-

nal features have to parallel exactly the kinds of head nouns assumed in transformational analyses in order to ensure that base-gener.ated DNs alone and in construction with their optional head nouns can be properly selected by the matrix verbs. On the other hand, it is only when these nouns are accompanied by nominalizations that they neither plura-

¡

lize nor take genitive NPs as determiners (cf. (59)). of Fred's sallowness

I

•of Fred's problem, idea, notion ( •of the table, of water, the man J The event of ' the enemy's destruction of the city Serena's refusal of the offer Beth arriving at the station John's falling into the water •Serena's problem, idea, notion, occurred at noonetc. 76

-

(59)

115 -

*Fred's facts of sallowness Fred's facts have to be questioned *The events of the enemy's destruction of the city The events of the week Yesterday's events

In other words, a lexicalist grammar is forced to make various kinds of ad hoc provisions to straighten out the syntactic and semantic consequences of denying the sentential sources of DNs by base-generating them . A transformational approach along Ross' or McCawley's lines though it may necessitate formally more complex types of syntactic rules, provides nevertheless an explanatorily more adequate account by explicitly relating the wellformedness of all types of possible nominalizations to the well-formedness of their 'metalinguistic' paraphrases and their sentential sources. In concluding this section it should be noted that whatever merits Chomsky's SKA may be deemed to have its main raison d'être has become obsolete in REST because of the autonomy of syntax assumed within this theory. We thus have the embarassing situation that a major argument for adopting the lexicalist approach and, correspondingly, an X-bar type of base component, is vacuous within 77 REST . Below we will encounter similar situations with respect to the evidence presented for other components of REST. 5.3 5.3.0

Further Counterevidence to LH Introduction

Having invalidated Chomsky's original arguments for the LH let us now explore some further consequences of adopting this position, consequences whose import neither Chomsky nor his critics seem to have been aware of. In connection with the easy-eager part of the DSA we

-

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noted above (cf. 5.2.1.1) that the ungrammaticality of DNs of the easy-type follows, according to Chomsky, from the lexicalist claim that a great many items appear in the lexicon with fixed selectional and strict subcategorization features, but with a choice as to the features associated with the lexical categories noun, verb, adjective" (1968:22). It also follows from this 'neutral lexical entry' hypothesis that an entry may specify certain semantic features as being dependent on the choice of one or another of these categorial features, i.e. it involves Boolean conditions on features which express conditional dependencies of various sorts. Regularities concerning such conditional dependencies Chomsky takes to be expressible by a second innovative theoretical device, namely by 78 redundancy rules in the lexicon (cf. 1968:22)

5.3.1 5.3.1.1

The 'neutral entry' hypothesis refuted: The directionality of word-forming processes

The first of Chomsky's theoretical innovations, the neutral entry hypothesis, bears a close resemblance to Bolinger's (1969) proposal which treats word classes and features like 'Mass', 'Count', 'Plurality', etc. as attributes of lexical items in the sense that the word is separated altogether as a semantic entity "leaving a set of grammatical attributes which speakers are more or less free to attach at will" (1969:37). Bolinger's multicategorial treatment of lexical items and similar views advocated by Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1937) have been criticized from the point of view of wordformation by Lipka (1971) and Kastovsky (1976) for denying the priority of a morphologically simplex base over its morphologically complex derivatives. Within his modified version of Marchand's (1969) theory of word-formation involving morphological, syntactic and

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117

-

semantic descriptions of productive word-forming patterns Kastovsky (1976) specifically discusses Jacobs and Rosenbaum's (196 8) statement to the effect that Chomsky's lexicalist proposal "avoids the»difficult-to-justify claim that one of two or more derivationally related words is somehow basic" (1976:228). Kastovsky contrasts this with Fillmore's remark: Syntactically and semantically different uses of the same word-type should be registered in the same lexical entry whenever their differences can be seen as reflecting a general pattern in the lexical structure of the language. I shall call attention to certain situations in which a word that is basically a noun can also be used verbally. (Fillmore 1971:385) and concludes "Hier ist Fillmore über seine eigene, richtige, Intuition gestolpert, denn normalerweise ist eben eine Funktion primär, die andere abgeleitet. Dies gehört zum Charakteristikum der Wortbildung und verbietet eine multikategoriale Behandlung der Lexeme" (1976: 83) . Note that this notion of directionality of derivation 79 also extends to zero derivatives whose postulation follows automatically in a theory like Marchand's which bases its concept of productivity in word-formation on morphemes viewed as two facet signs, i.e. as incorporating the Saussurean signifiant/signifié relationship (cf. Marchand 1969:1). Such theories reflect the fact that only meaningful units combine to new word-formations and thus avoid the pitfalls of most generative approaches which for the sake of simplifying the description of phonological processes are forced to assume the existence of meaningless morphemes by assigning internal structure to smallest meaningful units 80

-

5.3.1.2

118

-

Nomina actionis and qualitatis versus agentand object-nominalizations: The 'double occurrence' constraint

(DOC)

Returning to the main theme of this section, it has also been noted by various people that the initial plausibility of Chomsky's arguments for category-neutral lexical entries is simply due to his systematically ignoring 81 of certain classes of data . His discussion is restrict82

ed to action and property nominalizations

which as

nominal renderings of sentential structures take, not unexpectedly, the same kinds of NPs as their verbal or adjectival bases such that a single statement of strict subcategorization and selectional features is normally sufficient to cover both, verbs or adjectives and its direct nominal counterpart. As soon as other types of DNs are admitted as evidence the plausibility of such neutral lexical entries diminishes, however, to zero. In McCawley's words, "it would take great ingenuity in the employment of curly and angular brackets (though nothing in the way of linguistic insight) to combine action, agent, and object nominalizations and a related verb into a single dictionary entry that gives the strict subcategorization properties of all" (1973:10). Consider McCawley's examples: The inventor of dynamite (*by Nobel); Newton's writings (*of treatises) on theology (cf. 1973:9). In the former, an agent nominalization of an underlying structure like someone invented dynamite, the occurrence of a second subject NP is, for obvious reasons, systematically excluded. 83 If John's inventor of dynamite is acceptable at all , it can only have an interpretation in which the genitive NP exhibits a relationship to its head which being neither that of intrinsic connection nor of subject is impossible for base-generated genitives under lexicalist assumptions. In object nominalizations like Newton's writings (*of treatises) on theology from Newton wrote theology there is a similar prohibition against the

-

119

-

occurrence of a second object. The same restriction, call it the double occurrence constraint

(DOC) is in effect in all the other cases -

not

mentioned by McCawley in which a possible NP position 84 within the subcategorization frame of a given verb is relativized and inserted as a derived nominal into the matrix clause. Thus, with an underived verb like pay which has to be subcategorized at least for direct and indirect objects, we have the following set of 85nominals derivable by way of relativization (cf. (60)) : (60)a. Subject-type:

the payer of the money to Bill

(*by

John) John is the payer of the money to Bill John is the one who pays 86

(paid) the

money to Bill direct Object- type:

The payment

(*of the money) to Bill

by John arrived too late. John's payment

(*of the money) to

Bill... This is John's payment

(*of the money)

to Bill. This is what John paid

(*the money)

to Bill. c. indirect Object-type:

The payee of the money

(*to Bill)

(*by

John) •John's payee of the money to Bill Bill is the payee of the money

(*by

John). Bill is the one who someone paid the money to. Due to their different subcategorization frames, other verbs disallow such object nominalizations but while observing the DOC permit their locative or instrumental complements to be nominalized, cf. diner, sleeper

(dining-

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120

-

car, sleeping-car), (bus)-stop (0), cooker, washer, 87 fertilizer . It therefore seems that the kinds of nomináis derivable from a given verb are a direct reflection of the nature of the syntactic-semantic information contained in its subcategorization frame, i.e. they are predictable from the kinds of noun phrases that may accompany the verb and from their interrelations. With respect to the sensitivity of syntactic processes to subcategorization features there is thus no qualitative difference between the nominalization potential and passivizability of verbs. In both cases, the applicability of the process is predictable, given the structural description of the syntactic trans formations, 8 8Relativization or Passive, and the subcategorization frame . Surface identity of certain suffixes which, e.g. leads to the agent-instrument ambiguity cbf -er derivatives (cf. nutcracker, dishwasher) and other morphological or lexical idiosyncrasies of nomináis originating from relativized structures are as irrelevant for the syntactic productivity of the different types as they were in the case of Chomsky's DNs, i.e. nomina actionis and qualitatis discussed above. Since the different insertion possibilities of all types of DNs into matrix clauses match exactly the different types of antecedents postulated for them - abstract head nouns of non-restrictive complement clauses and indefinite proforms as heads of restrictive relatives and since all types have the ability to pronominalize entire preceding clauses or parts of them a transformational treatment of all these syntactically productive 89 deadjectival and deverbal nomináis is justified

5.3.1.3

Proliferation of noun classes and lexical entries

Consider now some of the consequences of incorporating the full range of DNs into neutral lexical entries. For pay the neutral entry would not only have to contain a single occurrence of [+N] as postulated by Chomsky,

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121

-

but would have to introduce at least three additional instances of this categorial feature with distinct strict subcategorization frames in each case. Starting out from the statement that the strict

subcategorization

and selectional restrictions of [+V] pay and of [+N] 90 payment are by and large identical if this N is [+abstract] and furthermore (61) a.

b.

[+event] or [+fact]

John

paid

the money

[+human]

[+V]

I+concrete]

John('s) I+human]

payment [+N,+fact]

to

(cf.

(61))

Bill [+human]

of the money [+concrete]

to

Bill [+human]

(surprised everyone). the entry would also have to specify that

with [+N^]-payER which must be [+human] the subject slot to the left of pay cannot contain a noun phrase, i.e. that the PS rule

Article

[±def,(NP)]

is vacuous in this case because the optional NP cannot be chosen

^,

that

with I+N-,]-payMENT,, which must be [+concrete] pay 92 cannot have a direct object , and

that

with I+N^j-payEE

which must be [+human] pay cannot

have an indirect object. If in the lexicalist framework "grammatical relations are defined by configurations in the deep structure, and selectional features relate the heads of phrases that are associated in specific grammatical relations"

(Chomsky

1968:38), DNs like N 2 , N 3 , and N 4 must either be admitted as counterevidence to this hypothesis or marked as systematically and productively violating its main generalization regarding the base-generability of DNs and the possible grammatical relations associated with them. In the latter case the lexicalist has to provide some sort of additional interpretive mechanism to capture, for example, the subject relation underlying

agent-nouns.

-

122

-

This would amount to introducing an ad hoc distinction between 'syntactically1 and 'lexically' grammatical relations with respect to the same verbal nucleus. Apart from saving LH such a mechanism, which would also have to make the internal 'relational' structure of DNs accessible to the syntactic base rules, is totally unsupported 93

5.3.1.4

Deverbal adjectives in -able

Further untenable consequences which follow from the neutral entry hypothesis but which Chomsky does not seem to have taken into account relate to his treatment of deverbal adjectives in -able. Thus, the lexlcalist hypothesis entails that readable in (62a) and readability in (62b) must both be considered to be base structures (62)a. b.

The book is readable The book's readability

(Chomsky 1968:55)

rather than transforms from other structures such as, perhaps (63) (cf. ibid.). (63)

the book is able

g[for

the book to be read]g

Chomsky then argues against a transformational analysis in which V-able adjectives have the same source as -able to be V-ed on the grounds (a) that readable is much more restricted in meaning than able to be read, (b) that in cases like laudable, irreplacable, admirable, lovable, etc. the meaning is restricted or based on a very different subregularity, (c) that with adjectives like knowledgable, reasonable, possible, palatable there is no possible base form such as (63) (cf. 1968:56 fn.36); (d) and that "it is difficult to see how such an analysis co-uld account for the fact that readability may refer not to a fact, event, process, etc. but rather to a

-

123

-

property" (1968:57) (d) being easily refutable along the lines of the "diffe94 rent meaning - different antecedents"-argument , (a), (b) and (c) are only valid as counterarguments to the specific transformational solution Chomsky is dealing with, namely the one proposed by Chapin (1967) . They do not affect a transformational treatment which excludes laudable, possible, 'palatable, etc. as 95synchronically unanalyzable units from word-formation and corrects Chapin's erroneous identification of the lexeme able with the derivational suffix of the same phonological make-up by assuming semantically more appropriate sources such as can/must be V-ed for V-able and possesses/ has N for N-able adjectives. In this way it is also possible to distinguish between the perfectly predictable readable1 'legible', i.e. a descriptive derivation, and the idiomatic readable., 'enjoyable to be read', i.e. a naming derivation 96 Consider now the consequences of base-generating both readable and readability. The neutral lexical entry for read would have to contain besides [+V] and the different instances of [+N] for action, agent- and 97 object nominal!zations , the categorial feature [+A] for readable and a further occurrence of [+N] for readability indicating that read [+A] is only insertable into derivations where potential objects of the verb read appear as subjects and potential subjects of the verb in an optional by-phrase. In other words, read [+A] is equivalent to a passive version of read [+V], but being an adjective lacks a corresponding active (cf. (6 4) ) is readable (64)a. This book by a ten-year old. can be read b.

A ten-year old can read this book.

-

124

-

Since V-able adjectives are only possible for those verbs which are transitive and passivizable and permit a generic reading (cf. Leitner (1972:244),Chapin (1967)) - intransitive, middle and absolute reflexive verbs are excluded (cf. *sleepable, *haveable. *resemblable. 98 •shaveable) - it is hard to avoid the conclusion that such adjectives are transformationally derived from verbal bases, a conclusion which defies Chomsky's neutrality of lexical entries. This point is even more obvious if the properties of the nominals derived from V-able are compared with those based on underived ones. While the latter can only have the same kinds of subjects as the corresponding 'intransitive' or 'transitive' adjective (see (65)) (65)a. b. c.

John is sincere John's sincerity John is short of money John's shortage of money *The -money's shortage of by John

the former may be accompanied by two types of subjects, as it were, the subject of the adjective and the subject of the verb from which the adjective is derived. Compare (66) .

100 The book is readable by a ten-year old/by John. 'The The book's readability by b. . ten year olds makes it a best-seller. The readability of this kbook by ten year olds

(66)a.

c.

*a ten year old's

readability of this book

That such second order subjects are restricted to V-able adjectives and their DNs cannot be expressed without recognizing the verbs as basic entities.

-

5.3.2

5.3.2.1

125

-

Lexicalj (and morphological) versus syntactic, phonological and lexical^ rules The transformational character of Chomsky's lexicalj redundancy rules

The mechanism proposed by Chomsky (1968) in rejecting a transformational treatment of V-able adjectives, namely a lexical redundancy rule "that assigns the feature [X ] to a lexical item [V-able] where V has the intrinsic selectional feature [ X]" (1968:56), does not do what Chomsky intends since, as pointed out by McCwaley (1973:15) "selectional restrictions have to do with more than just the NP that immediately follows the verb". Other material besides 'subject' and 'object' can occur, even...objectless prepositions: (67)a. b. c.

Linguistics papers are mailable in plain brown envelopes. Blowouts are avoidable only by changing the tires periodically. The existence of stranded prepositions is not accountable for under Schwartz's assumptions. (cf. ibid.)

McCawley therefore suggests that the metarule would have to be "along the lines of 'if V has the selectional feature [X Y Z] or [X W Y Z], where X and Y are single NP matrices and W is a preposition matrix, then V-able has the selectional feature [Y Z (by X)] or 1 [Y W Z (by X)] respectively "(1973:15-16). McCawley observes that such redundancy rules are not transformations in Chomsky's sense but rather resemble Harrisean transformations insofar as both, the implicans and the implicatum belong to the same level of structure - with

101

Harris they are surface structures , in the case at hand they must be deep structures. He overlooks, however,

-

126

-

that even his improved version of Chomsky's redundancy rule does not do what it is supposed to do. It fails to specify that its applicability is restricted to verbs that have been passivized. Since the way to indicate passivizability in Chomsky's (1968) framework is to assume the optional presence of 'b^ A' in the subcategorization frame of verbs (cf. 5.2.2.2.1 above) the redundancy rule must obligatorily refer in its implicans to the presence of this dummy marker ([X Y Z b^ A], [X W Y Z bj[ A]) , and indicate in the implicatum ([Y Z (by X) ] ( [Y W Z (b^ X)], that the b^ x constituent is only optional, i.e. that in one of its possible outputs the original subject may be missing (cf. (68)). (68)

X

Y Z byA -»

Y Y

Z b£ X Z

It is easy to see that rule (68), which in contrast to Chomsky's and McCawley's versions represents the condi102 tion on the source of V-able adjectives correctly , bears strong resemblances to the Chomskyan kind of passive transformation. Though, from the formal syntactic point of view it expresses a well-formedness condition on distinct deep structures it involves at the same time clearly transformational operations like permutations (i.e. Agent-Postposing and NP-Preposing), addition, i.e. category-change, and deletion. The transformational character of this 'redundancy'rule is particularly striking from the point of view of semantic interpretation. If, as in the lexicalist model, the rules that interpret grammatical relations semantically apply at the level of deep structure, i.e. after lexical insertion but before any movement, deletion or addition rules, there is in the case of the implicans only one deep structure terminal string to be interpreted in terms of logical subject and object and the passive marker. (69)

a ten year old can read this book by A

-

127

-

In the case of the implicatum, however, there are two distinct deep structure terminal strings associated with the same V-able adjective which, according to the principles of semantic interpretation, should exhibit two distinct semantic readings. Yet their meanings are identical or at least as identical as the meanings of passive sentences and their truncated counterparts can be argued to be because [Y

Z] is derived from [Y

Z by

X] by means of a meaning-preserving deletion transformation. In other words, it turns out that [Y V-able Z] configurations cannot be deep structures but must be transformationally derived structures if their predictably passive meaning is to be represented adequately Consider now the consequences of base-generating V-able adjectives for the semantic interpretation rules. Notice first that the by-phrase for which they must be strictly subcategorized requires an extension of the PS rules introducing adjectives because no other class of ad-

104

jectives is strictly subcategorized for PPs in English Since in contrast to the base phrase-markers of verbal passives this by-phrase cannot contain A already filled by the original subject

but must be - there is no

"independent"-manner motivation for assuming by A with adjectives -

it is necessary either to set up a V-able

specific ad hoc rule of semantic interpretation or to require that the general rules interpreting adjectival clauses at the deep structure level be permitted to have access to the internal syntactic-morphological structure of these adjectives and to be able to read the lexicalist redundancy rule backwards, as it were, in order 'to get at' the passive meaning of the corresponding verbal deep structure. Either of these ad hoc extensions of semantic rules being undesirable, it appears that Chomsky's lexical redundancy approach to V-able adjectives must be abandoned in favor of a treatment along transformational lines, especially because, as we have seen, this redundancy rule itself exhibits transforma-

-

128

-

tional properties, if adequately formulated, thereby deviating considerably from his original (1965) concept of redundancy rules

5.3.2.2

Syntactic, phonological and lexical.^ redundancy rules

Recall that Chomsky (1965) introduced redundancy rules in his attempt to simplify the structure of the lexicon. He distinguished between universal notational conventions and language particular syntactic redundancy rules. Both playing the role of eliminating redundant specifications from the lexicon, the former involved, on the one hand, the positive versus negative specifications of strict subcategorization versus selectional features (cf. 1965: 164-165) and on the other the filling in by lexical redundancy rules of all the hierarchically superior inherent features in the lexical representation of items given one 'position* of the hierarchic sequence of specified features (cf. 1965:166). As an example of the latter, language-particular syntactic redundancy rules, Chomsky discusses (70). (70)

[+

NP^Manner]

[+

NP]

(cf. 1965:167)

This rule is intended to capture the fact that in English every verb "that can occur with a Direct-Object and a following Manner Adverbial can occur as well just with a Direct-Object, though not conversely" (1965:166). Chomsky interprets (70) in the following manner: if (D,C) is a lexical entry with distinctive feature matrix D and complex symbol C containing [+ N P ^ Manner] , then C is replaced by C', which contains each specified feature [aF] of C, where F * [ NP], and also the specified feature [+ NP] (1965:167). read, for example, can be entered in the lexicon with the complex symbol [+ NP^Manner,...]. This will then be automatically extended to [+ NP~Manner,+ NP,- Manner, —,...] by rule (70) and the universal conventions, thus account-

-

129

-

ing for the optionality of the Manner Adverbial in he read the book (carefully, without great enthusiasm) (1965: 166). Resemble and cost, however, being specified positively for [_NP] and negatively for [_ NP Manner] cannot be subject to rule (70) Chomsky compares such rules to phonological redundancy rules or morpheme structure rules which "are designed to deal with the fact that certain phonological feature specifications are predictable, given others" (1965:168). Both kinds, syntactic and phonological redundancy rules, serve the purpose of stating general properties of all lexical entries, "and therefore make it unnecessary to provide feature specifications in lexical entries where these are not idiosyncratic" (ibid.). The fundamental difference between such syntactic redundancy rules, which just like the convention spelling out the full set of the hierarchy of lexically inherent features (i.e. the lexical redundancy rules) fills in the feature values for lexical items on the basis of the minimal syntactic feature specification for those items, and the type of lexical2 redundancy rule used in Chomsky's treatment of V-able adjectives is particularly obvious from the formalization of Chomsky's informal rule proposed by Hust (1978).

5.3.2.3

Feature precipitation (phonological, syntactic and semantic) versus morphological feature creation

In his attempt to develop a framework for expressing regularities and correlations among related lexical items with respect to their syntactic behavior, in particular between participles prefixed with un- and their verbal bases. Hust (1978) adopts the Chomskyan conception of lexical entries as Boolean functions of features in the particular interpretation given to it in Dougherty (1968)

-

130

-

where the lexicon is conceived of as containing a set of branching lexical entries. As an illustration Hust gives the following (incomplete) lexical entry for refuse (cf. figure 7) . refuse Phonological features common to all derivatives Semantic features common to all derivatives Syntactic features common to all derivatives, including the following: +

NP

+

VP 1

-t-human]

+V

+N

Features peculiar to

+Det

the verb refuse

+

-al (Feature indicating

affixation of -al to form Nom) ^ Other features peculiar to refusal Figure 7:

Structure of lexical entries according to Hust (1978:64)

108

which is also supposed to reflect diagrammatically Chomsky's neutral entry hypothesis. To each lexical entry a convention of 'feature precipitation' applies which, analogous to Dougherty's (1968) "Feature Percolation Mechanism" in the syntax, assigns all features of a node A in a lexical entry to all nodes dominated by A. According to this convention refusal will receive

-

131 -

"the features [+N], [+Det [-[-human]

], [+

NP], [ +

VP],

], phonological features common to all deri-

vatives, etc.

The feature complexes which result at

the terminal nodes in such a branching diagram are the words

(lexical items) of the language, subject to lexi-

cal insertion"

(H-ust 1978:65).

Having given some reasons for stating selectional in the format of

features

(72) where the features for the selec-

tion of subject NP and object NP are independent as against (71) where they are dependent on each other -

the

relevant dependencies are now, in contrast to Chomsky (1965), expressed by the branching mechanism goes on to discuss Chomsky's redundancy rule (71)a.

a Aux

b.

a Aux

(72)a.

a Aux

b.

Det 0

Hust

(70)

&

(Hust 1978:69)

(cf. p.128 above) relating to strict subcategorizational features of verbs and proposes the following formalization for Chomsky's V-able rule

(cf. p.125 above) in which

f is a noun feature such as [+animate] (73)

[+

-able] - [a[f]

(cf. (73)).

]/ J j — (Hust 1978:76)

In connection w i t h the partial representation of the lexical entry for read (see (74)) rule

(73)

is to be interpreted as assigning the feature [a[f] ] to adjectives w i t h the (morphological) feature [+ -able], that is, adjectives in -able, if they are dominated in the branching diagram of their lexical entry by a node containing the features [+ NP] and [a [f]]. The rule thus applies to node J in (74), i.e. readable, assigning the feature [-[-written] ], since it has the specific feature [+ -able] and is dominated in the branching lexical entry by a node containing the features [+ NP] and [ - [-written]]. (cf. Hust 1978:76), changed, HUB])

[numbering

-

132

-

read

(74)

common features A

[-written]

+

[-written]

(read s.o.'s m i n d , etc.)

etc. (ibid.)

Notice first that this

formalization shares the weaknesses

of Chomsky's V-able rule discussed above (cf. 5.3.2.1). It fails to indicate that the bases of such adjectives must have been passivized [a

[f]]

- the features [+

NP] and

are insufficient to discriminate between read

and resemble, for example - and that therefore the deri109 vatives exhibit 'passive' meaning , i.e. that in their semantic representation the subject of the underlying sentence is obligatorily present, though the corresponding by-phrase is syntactically only optional. It seems, moreover, that there is no way to remedy this

-

133

-

deficiency in Hust's framework. Changing the feature of node D [+ NP] to [+ NP Manner], which has to be done anyway to account for manner adverbs, is insufficient because, due to the postulated passive-manner correlation, noted above, the possible co-occurrence of a manner adverbial can only indicate that a certain verb can be, 110 but not that it has been passivized Hust's formal trick to obscure these deficiencies of his approach consists in assuming as given the morphological existence of adjectives in -able and then assigning to them the feature [aff] ] under the condition that they are dominated in the branching diagram of their lexical entry by a node containing the features [+ NP] and [a [ f ] ]. This method of starting out from the result of the wordforming process to be explained, namely V-able adjectives, and of subsequently supplying it with its 'felicity conditions' 1 1 , i.e. with an interpretation, misrepresents the directionality of the process by reversing the antecedent conditions for it and thus disqualifies itself as an explanation. The rule is not: there are V-able adjectives in English and they are interpreted as exhibiting selectional restrictions which are the mirror-images of those of their verbal bases. It rather says: if an English verb is passivizable and permits a generic reading, then there is a corresponding V-able adjective with a passive meaning whose selectional restrictions with respect to subject and optionally accompanying by-phrase are the mirror-image of the underlying verb. But Hust's formalism does not only fail to explain such word-forming processes adequately he is also not aware of a fundamental formal difference between Chomsky's syntactically motivated redundancy rules (cf.(70)) and such rules as (73). In fact, he sees the latter "to be only a very minor extension of the form and function" (1978:75) of the former. This is incorrect because while all the features in terms of which redundancy rules like

- 134 -

(70) are formulated have syntactic constituent counterparts in the base rules of the grammar, i.e. are syntactic, a feature like [+ -able] in (73) is clearly not syntactic, but morphological in nature. To put it differently, rule (73) introduces out of the blue a feature which is not defined in any way because there is no analogue for it in the base rules. In order to make his approach formally coherent, i.e. to change (73) into a "systematic" redundancy rule, Hust would have to postulate "categoryanalyzing" base rules like (75) which are able to generate morphological affixes along with syntactic categorysymbols and, correspondingly, within the syntactic lexicon a morphological or morpheme lexicon specifying the strict subcategorization and selectional features of 11 2 morphemes with respect to each other (75)

Adj

V + Suffix

Given that these assumptions would be solely dictated by having adopted LH in the first place

- a transformational

treatment requiring category-changing rules but only the statement of subcategorization features of the basic, i.e. morphologically underived, words of a language would be substituted by complex base rules and additional machinery stating a subset of the relevant properties twice - Hust's "morphological kind of redundancy rules is highly questionable. Since it introduces additional morphological, i.e. nonsyntactic information it is not a very minor extension of the form and function of Chomsky's (1965) syntactic redundancy rules but a major theoretical deviance from the originally reasonable conception of redundancy rules which on the basis of minimal feature specifications filled in predictable features of the same category but 113 were not permitted to be structure-building

5.3.2.4

135 -

Morphological redundancy rules and the filtering effect of PS rules: un-passives

The questionability of Hust's (1978) morphological redundancy rules is heightened by a number of problems arising from the way in which they are supposed to interact with other rules in Hust's framework and the consequences thereof. Consider the subtree (76) of the branching lexical entry for read dominated by the node G in (74) above (cf. p. 1 32) . (76)

G +Ad j K

J +

-able

+un

etc.

-ed etc.

This node which bears the feature [+Adj] dominates node J with the morphological feature [+ -able] just discussed and a node K which accounts for the un-passive parti114 ciple unread by introducing the feature [+un -ed] which, again, is clearly morphological in nature. To capture the parallelism between V-able adjectives and un-passive participles - the latter also select as subjects the same class of noun phrases that the corresponding active verb stems select as objects - Hust sets up the redundancy rule (77) , an extension of (73). (77)

[+_. able] t [+un- ed]

^

[a[f]

j/

NP a_tf] J (Hust 1978:77)

He does, however, not realize the formal problem connected with the introduction of discontinuous features like [+un-

-ed]. Since according to the usual assumptions

about their formal properties PS rules are only permitted

-

136 -

to analyze symbols into contiguous elements impossible to generate the morphological

115

, it is

'syntactic'

equivalent of this feature by PS rules. It would have to be generated by assuming "morphological" PS rules like (78) followed by a transformation the "Affix-Hopping" rule of SS „., (78)

116

reminiscent of

.

( (Prefix + Suffix) + V*1 { V + (Prefix + Suffix) j

Adj

Another problem concerns the kinds of features node K in (76) possesses after the operation of the feature precipitation mechanism and of lexical redundancy rule (cf.

(77)

(79)).

(79) read +un-

ed

(inherent feature)

-[-written] -

[-written]

+

NP

+Ad j

1

(by rule

(77))

(by feature precipitation)

(cf. Hust 1978:81)

Hust notes that further rules seem to be needed to give the correct feature constellation of unread. In (79) it has the feature [+

NP], though it never takes NP comple-

ments. "Since failure to take NP complements is not peculiar to participles in un-, b u t rather is a property of all adjectives, the correct value for the feature [+

NP] could be assigned by rule (80)" (1978:82)

[number-

ing changed, HUB]. (80)

[+Adj]

-

[-

NP]

(Hust 1978:82)

-

137 -

He dismisses (80) as unnecessary because, in his view, this regularity is already accounted for by the PS rules in the base which do not generate adjectives followed by NP complements. Entertaining this view amounts, however, to having to use the phrase-structure component as a filter mechanism to get rid of incorrect feature constellations which, in turn, can only arise because of the percolation of features that is needed to make the morpholo117 gical redundancy rules work 'correctly' . Given Hust's position that the PS rules introducing adjectives disallow NP complements there is a further complication having to do with the feature constellation assigned to the derived nominal (nin)-readability. If according to the LH DNs must be subcategorized with respect to NP complements to render the parallelism between the enemy destroyed the city and the enemy's destruction (of) the city where of is inserted trainsformationally, the PS rules for NPs cannot be called upon to filter out the feature [+ NP] which (un)-readability requires by feature percolation and which would make it insertable into (of) the book. Since according to LH the (un)readability of the book must be derived from the book's 118 unreadability - book is the subject of the nominal in both cases - the feature [+ NP] must be excluded from the lexical entry of the nominal. This, however, can only be dene in Hust's approach by setting up an ad hoc redundancy rule which reverses the value of the feature. In view of nodes J and K in (76) above being dominated by the same feature [+Adj] it is furthermore unclear how Hust could except through an ad hoc rule express the fact that only (un)-V-able but not un-V-ed adjectives can serve as bases for the property nominal just discussed (cf. (un)-readability versus *unreadness, *unreadity). Since it is well-known that the most prominent characteristic of "full" adjectives is their being able to derive such abstract nouns 119 , the different behavior

-

138

-

of (un)-V-able and un-V-ed combinations with respect to this property must either be indicated by another ad hoc feature or Hust's analysis of un-V-ed constructions as adjectives must be abandoned. Which alternative ought to be chosen is difficult to decide because of the number of contradictory analyses of the same or similar data permitted by the lexicalist possibility of first basegenerating almost anything and then trying to reintroduce lexically or semantically subcategory specific distinctions .

5.3.3

Passive participles as verbs or adjectives or both or neither

5.3.3.1

Passive participles as verbs adjectives: Hust (1977)

- un-passives as

Hust's (1978) treatment of un-passive participles involving branching lexical entries and feature precipitation hinges, as we have seen, on the assumption that false feature assignments can be filtered out by the base rules which, according to him, do not permit adjectives, but only verbs and nouns, to be subcategorized for NP, NP PP and PP PP (cf. also Hust (1977:42)). As support for the adjectival status of these constructions Hust (1977) cites certain distributional properties that differentiate them from passive participles 120 which consequently must belong to the category verb Un-passive constructions as against passive participles are adjectives because 1.

un- appears only as a prefix to adjectives and their derivatives (cf. unkind, untrue, untruth, unkindness, ungracefully etc.) but not as prefix to verbs *unsee, *Unknow, to underived nouns *unhonor, *unlove, or to nouns

-

139

-

derived from verbs *unarrival, *unresistance (cf. Hust 1977:33) 2.

they can occur freely in the environment Art NP which is typical of adjectives whereas passive participles are more restricted in terms of prenominal occurrence (cf. an unseen 12 thief versus *a seen thief, cf. Hust 1977:34)

3.

they cannot occur in environments like the book remains to be in which only participles are permitted (cf. 1977:34-35)

4.

they cannot take progressive aspect, *the package was being open/unopened, the package was being opened (cf. 1977:35)

5.

they can be conjoined with adjectives The child was (both) noisy and unloved, *The child was (both) spanked and unloved (cf. ibid.)

6.

the presence of b^-phrases renders them ungrammatical in many cases *The door was unpainted bx Tom (cf. 1977:41)

7.

they are excluded in the case of passivizable verbs which a. take two prepositional complements •The old law was undone away with or b. are subcategorized for NP PP •Susie will be untaken care of The gift was given to the school •The gift was ungiven to the school The school was given the gift •The school was ungiven the gift (cf. 1977:41-42)

8.

they take neither participial nor infinitival complements even when the associated verb does •Mary was unheard singing softly 122 •John was unseen to be a crook (1977:43)

-

5.3.3.2

140

-

Passive participles as adjectives: Freidin (1975)

Contrary to Hust, Freidin (1975), in arguing for a lexical interpretive and against a transformational approach to passives, categorizes passive participles to be adjectives whose relation to actives is captured in the lexicon

(cf.

Freidin 1975:392). Consequently, he postulates the PS rule (81) to be able to base-generate them. (81)

AP -» A

(NP) (PP)

(Freidin 1975:401)

In favor of this categorial assignment which presupposes the lexicalist framework he presents the following ten arguments. Passive participles are adjectives because 1.

it is possible to extend Chomsky's

(196 8) way

of handling productive derivational morphology in the lexicon to all predicates - in parti123 eular to passive ones (cf. 19 75:392) ; 2.

they show a considerable overlap in distribution with adjectives

124 a. jjptDET-A-N]^

PASSIVE PREDICATE

ADJECTIVE

the locked door

the unintelligible solution

the acclaimed speaker

the enthusiastic linguist

b. s [NP-be[ Ap -A-PP] Ap ] s

^[DET-N-APW

The door was locked by Sam.

The solution was unintelligible to Max-

The speaker was acclaimed by the senator.

The linguist was enthusiastic about lexicalism.

the door locked by Sam

the solution unintelligible to Max

the speaker acclaimed

the linguist enthu-

by the senator

siastic about lexicalism (cf. 1975:397)

-

3.

141

-

under an analysis distinguishing passive predicates from adjectives it would be an accident that both appear in the same surface positions "and furthermore are moved there by the same transformation, Modifier Shift"

(ibid.)[footnote

omitted, HUB] 4.

in this way ad hoc explanations of the special status of 'passive verbs' can be avoided

(for

hit and mention, for example, "both a lexical subject and a lexical object are obligatorily unless they are passivized"

(ibid.), i.e. "in

terms of semantic function, passive predicates function like adjectives rather than verbs"

(1975:

398) 5.

even where there is a clear morphological distinction between passive participles and related adjectives, both can occur in the same syntactic 125 contexts (cf. 2a-c above)

6.

the constructions N P seem A, NP be very A and NP be extremely A in which they do not occur also exclude certain adjectives: •The theory seems unpublished. •The child seems helped . •The lizard was very dead. •Sam was very arrested. •Your are extremely next. •The chef was extremely congratulated for his fine performance. (cf.

7.

1975:398-399)

it seems appropriate to analyze the examples in 6. as syntactically well-formed, but to rule them out, nevertheless, on the basis of the internal semantic structure of lexical items 1975:399)

8.

(cf.

126

although the great majority of English adjectives

-

142

-

are not associated with specific prepositions there exist same which are such that they parallel the decide on class of participles (cf. 1975: 401) : (82)

McCawley is fond

r of •with * to •about

Benzer is content ( with *°f •to •about

Chinese food.

his flies.

(ibid.) 9.

the participles of double object verbs such as give (as in (83)) can be treated as adjectives by PS rule (81) whose optional NP complement expansion is also necessary to handle the adjectives in (82) and (84). (81)

AP

-> A (NP) (PP)...

(83)

The turtle was given an ear of corn. (1975:401)

(84)a. This is too difficult a problem to give to a beginner. •This is a too difficult problem, b. Harold is so obnoxious a person that not even his analyst can stand listening to him . •Harold is a so obnoxious person... (cf. 1975:401) 10.

given that fond of and content with (cf. (82) above) may be assumed to be directly dominated by the node A, "then the examples in both (82) and (84) contain surface structures which can be filtered by (81) in which case they could conceivably be generated by the base rules" (1975:402)

127

[numbering changed, HUB].

-

5.3.3.3

143

-

Deriving contradictory conclusions from the same data and ignoring some (with PS rules as filters)

A comparison of these arguments for and against the adjectival status of passive participles shows that neither set is conclusive. What is worse, in so far as Freidin's and Hust's arguments refer to syntactic distribution both appeal in principle to the same range of facts to support opposite points. This paradoxical state of affairs is due to two complementary strategies. The first is to make it appear as if the occurrence of an element in certain syntactic environments would unambiguously establish its category membership, and to belittle the number of counterexamples to the generalization in question. Compare Hust's 2. where passive participles are said to be more restricted than adjectives in terms of prenominal occurrence to Freidin's 2a. which presents only instances of passive participles that are grammatical in this position Hust's 6. according to which unpassives are adjectives because they are rendered ungrammatical by the presence of by-phrases in many cases to Freidin's 2b. which equals adjectives followed by a PP to the presence of by-phrases with passive participles and Hust's 7b. where un-passives are argued to be lexically derived adjectives because they are excluded in the case of passivizable verbs like give which have a subcategorization frame ( NP,PP) that adjectives cannot possess to Freid in s 9. that suggests that the passive participle given can be treated as an adjective by the PS rules. The second strategy consists in ignoring available counterevidence altogether: Hust does not mention that (cf. his argument (1)) the prefix un- in English

-

144

-

also appears with verbs (cf. untie, unlock, undo) ] 29 whose passive participles blatantly contradict his arguments 3 and 4 (cf. The door remains to be unlocked, The door was being unlocked) , that, contrary to (4), there are adjectives which can take progressive aspect and which, if they do, cannot be conjoined with un-passive participles (cf. his argument (5)),The child was being noisy •and unloved and

that (cf. (8)) adjectives may take participial and infinitival complements: John is unhappy being a politician.. Mary is happy to see him. John is eager to please .1

Freidin does not take into consideration in (1) that his handling fully productive derivational processes like the formation of passive participles in the lexicon is not only incompatible with Chomsky's empirical justification for LH (cf. in particular the SKA discussed in 5.2.3 above) but also deprives the ISA of its 'empirical' basis insofar as there is no longer the intended parallelism between the deep structure of sentences containing verbs (cf. the enemy destroyed the city (by A))and the deep structure underlying derived and other complex nominals Det-N-NP-(by A) (cf. The enemy-destructionof the city-by A) and John-picture-of Mary-by A)). To put it differently, if passives are base-generated as sentences containing adjectives with filled byphrases the corresponding nominals must be basegenerated, too, thus requiring another interpretive rule to relate them to their 'active' counter-

Moreover, Freidin ignores

-

145

-

that passive participles cannot be conjoined with full adjectives

(cf. Hust's

(5)),

that, although certain adjectives are excluded

from

the same syntactic contexts as passive participles (cf. (6)) these adjectives, nevertheless, cannot be conjoined with passive participles, that double object verbs

(cf.

(9)) necessitate the

postulation of two adjectives with different subcategorization (83)'a.

frames,

The turtle was given an ear of corn by John. A

b.

NP

PP

An ear of corn was given to the turtle by John. A

PP

PP

and, correspondingly, a modification of the PS rule (81) (cf. (81)'

(81)'), AP

-»

A

(NP) (PP)

(PP)

133

as well as an additional rule of semantic

interpre-

tation, since it seems impossible to analyze given to as being directly dominated by the node A parallel to fond of or decided on

(cf. Freidin's

Having demonstrated that Freidin's lexicalist for the PS rule

AP -» A

(NP)

(PP)

(10)). arguments

(cf. (81)) and Hust's

lexicalist arguments against it are equally inconclusive

1 34 ,

it should also be noted that these contradictory PS rules are used in both approaches for the same purpose, namely to filter out ungrammatical structures which, in Hust's case, are generated by the feature precipitation mechanism in the lexicon required to feed the morphological

redun-

dancy rule for V-able and un-V-ed adjectives and, in Freidin's case, arise from the unwarranted

parallelism

between the complement structure of adjectives and passive participles.

- 146 -

5.3.3.4

"Predicting" actives from passives: directionality reversed

Apart from the use of PS rules as filtering devices for lexical structures Freidin's analysis of passives shares with Hust's analysis of un-passives the lexicalist method of starting out from the result of the process to be explained and of subsequently supplying it with an interpretation or its 'felicity conditions'. Parallel to Hust's morphological redundancy rule (see (73) and (77)), discussed above

(cf. 5.3.2.4), Freidin postulates the

morphological redundancy condition (85) where M is pass identical to the morphological rule "Ma : root + ed is (85)

M

pass

entails the existence of an active verb where

^V-ACTIVE

NP

x -

NP

y]

if

^V-PASSIVE

NP

y -

N

V '

and V-ACTIVE and V-PASSIVE are semantically equivalent.

(cf. Freidin 1975:395)

135

analyzed as an A" (cf. 1975:394 and 396)

136

. (85) pre-

dicts that if there is a passive verb in the lexicon, then there is also an active counterpart. Freidin maintains that (85) "is not a notational variant of a transformational analysis of passives, because it does not admit of exceptions" (1975:395-396) and emphasizes that the selectional restrictions in (85) must be stated in terms of semantic functions like Source, Theme, Goal 137 rather than syntactic categories (cf. (86)) . Depending on the semantic class of the verb, the linear order (86)

V-ACTIVE:

[X

Y]

V-PASSIVE:

[Y

X]

(cf. Freidin 1975:396)

of these semantic functions is specified in its selectional frame such that for a verb like send [Source

Theme]

condition (85) can predict the selectional frame [Theme Source] for the passive form sent (cf. 1975:396). What

-

147

-

Freidin fails to see, however, is that his arguments against a transformational analysis of passives are circular. (85) predicts on the basis of the morphological existence of passive participles the existence of an active counterpart, but needs at the same time information about the selectional frame of this "predicted" active verb in order to predict the properties of the selectional frame of the passive participle, i.e. of its own input. Freidin thus misrepresents the directionality of the process of passivization by reversing and confusing the antecedent conditions for it. His arguments are moreover insufficient to discredit a transformational account of passives since the main problem which induced him to adopt his lexical interpretive analysis - namely the impossibility of identifying passivizable verbs in terms of exclusively syntactic subcategorization frames - may be overcame if the structural description of the passive transformation is permitted access to semantics of the selectional frame of the active verb in the same way as Freidin's redundancy rule (85). In other words, if the generalization, implicit in (85), holds that the passivizability of a verb is predictable from the kinds of semantic functions associated with it in its selectional 138 frame , it seems preferable to capture this generalization by transformational means which reflect the directionality of the process and its conditional dependencies even if this entails formally an extension of the class of 'grammatical transformations' - than to keep this class formally restricted by relegating the specification of the relevant dependencies to ad hoc lexical and interpretive machinery with all kinds of internal contradictions and incompatible consequences 139

-

5.4

148 -

The "Empirical" Distinction between and Lexical Rules: Wasow

5.4.1

Transformations

(1977)

"Natural" p r o p e r t i e s of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s lexical

(redundancy)

rules: W a s o w ' s

as

against

criteria

B e f o r e leaving the t o p i c of V - a b l e a d j e c t i v e s a n d their 1 40 r e l a t i o n to p a s s i v e s w i t h i n l e x i c a l i s t f r a m e w o r k s it seems a p p r o p r i a t e to t o u c h "upon a n o t h e r

argument

a g a i n s t d e r i v i n g t h e m by a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o p e r a t i n g the o u t p u t of the P a s s i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . S u c h an is p u t f o r w a r d b y W a s o w

argument

(1977) in h i s a t t e m p t to d e f e n d

a s e t of c r i t e r i a for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n tions a n d lexical

on

(redundancy)

transforma-

rules. T h e n e e d

for

d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e m p i r i c a l l y the f u n c t i o n s of t h e s e a n d o t h e r t y p e s o f rules a r i s e s for a d h e r e n t s of R E S T b e c a u s e if the c o n s t r a i n t s to b e p l a c e d o n the form a n d

function

o f e a c h r u l e type a l l o w e d b y R E S T c a n n o t b e s h o w n to h a v e c o r r e c t e m p i r i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n

for

a s s u m i n g s u c h a m u l t i p l i c i t y of rule types is lost a n d s o m e of them m a y b e c o n f l a t e d as p r o p o s e d b y

Generative

S e m a n t i c i s t s . W a s o w ' s c r i t e r i a are a l s o i n t e n d e d to m a k e REST m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e by o f f e r i n g p r i n c i p l e d m e a n s c h o o s i n g b e t w e e n a n a l y s e s . T h e y are b a s e d o n h i s

of

assump-

tions r e g a r d i n g w h a t s e e m to b e "natural" p r o p e r t i e s transformations undancy)

(cf. 1977:329)

as a g a i n s t l e x i c a l

r u l e s . T h e f o l l o w i n g table p r e s e n t s

summary of c r i t e r i a

(cf. 1977:331)

Wasow's

together with

some

of the r e a s o n s w h y he b e l i e v e s t h e m to b e a p r i o r i plausible.

of

(red-

criterion 1

-

149 -

Lexical

Rules

do n o t a f f e c t structure

Transformations need not be preserving

structure-

Since transformations may deform base-generated s t r u c t u r e s , w h e r e a s lexical r e d u n d a n c y rules relate i t e m s t h a t m u s t b e i n s e r t e d i n t o s t r u c t u r e s g e n e r a t a b l e by p h r a s e s t r u c t u r e r u l e s , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s m a y be r e f o r m u l a t e d as lexical redundancy rules j u s t in case they p r o d u c e o u t p u t s i s o m o r p h i c to b a s e s t r u c t u r e s (19 77:328)141.

criterion 2

m a y r e l a t e items of different grammatical categories

do n o t c h a n g e node labels

T h e m a i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n for this c r i t e r i o n is the l e x i c a l i s t a c c o u n t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n d e r i v e d n o m i n a l s a n d their a s s o c i a t e d v e r b s or a d j e c t i v e s 1 4 2 (cf. 1977:329-330)

criterion 3

are "local", involve only NPs bearing gramm a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s to items in q u e s t i o n

n e e d n o t be "local", f o r m u l a t e d in terms of s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r ties of p h r a s e m a r kers

In c o n t r a s t to t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w h i c h are m a p p i n g s b e t w e e n e n t i r e p h r a s e m a r k e r s , lexical r e d u n d a n cy rules are only m a p p i n g s b e t w e e n lexical items a n d s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e n o t be able to r e f e r t o o t h e r a s p e c t s of the e n v i r o n m e n t s of a n i t e m t h a n those t h a t h a v e to b e s p e c i f i e d in its entry a n y w a y

criterion 4

apply b e f o r e a n y transformations

m a y b e fed b y formations

trans-

T h i s is a d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e of the o r g a n i z a t i o n of EST g r a m m a r s w h i c h r e q u i r e s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s to o p e r a t e on p h r a s e m a r k e r s into w h i c h lexical items have b e e n i n s e r t e d 144^

- 150 criterion 5

have idiosyncratic exceptions

have few or true exceptions

This criterion is based on the conception of the lexicon as the receptacle of idiosyncratic information about the properties of lexical items and, correspondingly, on the notion that transformations are more productive than lexical rules (cf. 1977:330-331) 1 4 5 .

Wasow claims that these five criteria favor a lexical 146 over a transformational analysis of causatives and then tries to refute Lakoff's transformational approach to V-able adjectives, i.e. his ABLE -SUB rule (cf. 1970: 32). He is forced to do this because if the -able rule were a transformation his criteria 2 and 4 would be mutually incompatible.

5.4.2 5.4.2.1

Wasow 1 s arguments refuted : V-able adjectives: transformations may feed category-changing rules

Wasow starts out from the observation that Lakoff's (1970) classification of ABLE-SUB(stitution) as a minor rule, i.e. a rule that applies only to exceptions and not to 147 ordinary lexical items , would already lead him (by criterion 5) to assign this rule to the lexicon, quite independently of the fact that it changes category membership (cf. Wasow 1977:334). He then derives "predictions" from Lakoff's analysis and investigates whether or not they are correct. Prediction 1, which says that verbs that do not passivize should not have corresponding -able adjectives, is confirmed 1 48 by middle verbs like resemble, cost and last . Its value as an argument for ABLE-SUB is, however, according to Wasow, considerably weakened by the existence of verbs like regret whose

-

151

passives sound significantly worse than the corresponding 149 -able adjectives . A second prediction which, in Wasow's opinion, follows from Lakoff's proposal is that "any contexts in which Vable adjectives may appear should allow either able to be yen

or can be ven

to appear"(1977:334).

Wasow disconfirms this prediction by presenting the data in (87)-(90) though he concedes that a sufficiently abstract version of Lakoff's analysis could accomodate them. (87)

This book promises to

(88)

I was expecting

(89)

The bottles began

be readable. *be able to be read, •can be read. be tolerable. *be able to be tole rated, •can be tolerated.

the evening to

being returnable ??being able to be returned ^ »canning be returned

last year.

(90)

The ordeal seemed

endurable ??able to be endured *can be endured

until now

(cf. Wasow 1977:335)

A difficulty for Lakoff's analysis, which Wasow holds to be

more serious (cf. 1977:335), arises from the existence

of verbs (as in (91)-(95)) whose -able adjectives may not be substituted for can be V-en in all environments which allow this latter. (91)a.

This book can be read.

b.

This bobk is readable.

c.

Johnny can be read this book.

d.

*Johnny is readable this book.

(92)a. b.

Such behavior cannot be allowed, S"uch behavior is not allowable.

- 152 c. d. (93)a.

Such behavior cannot be allowed him . *Such behavior is not allowable him. Shirley can be elected.

b.

Shirley is electable.

c.

Shirley can be elected President.

d. (9 4)a.

*Shirley is electable President. John's conjecture can be proved.

b.

John's conjecture is provable.

c.

John's conjecture can be proved to be wrong.

d. (95)a.

*John's conjecture is provable to be wrong. John's arguments can be believed.

b.

John's arguments are believable.

c.

John's arguments can be believed to be plagiarized.

d.

*John's arguments are believable to be plagiarized. 150 (cf. Wasow 1977:335)

Wasow claims that since these verbs cannot be m a r k e d as exceptions to ABLE-SUB without incorrectly excluding the (b) examples, Lakoff's analysis would falsely predict that the (d) examples should be grammatical. He maintains that there is no way to rule out the

(d) examples under

such a transformational analysis and concludes that thereby his claim that transformations m a y not feed category-changing rules

(see criterion 4 above) is saved

from a class of apparent counterexamples

(cf. 1977:336).

Notice first the questionability of the reasoning by which Wasow derives incorrect predictions from Lakoff's analysis. In both cases the premise is substitutability of the transform for its source or vice versa in all environments in which either of the structures is permitted to occur. This requirement is not only overly restrictive on general grounds

- even in Wasow's own

lexicalist framework the kinds of passives which he deems to be transformationally generated cannot be sub-

-153

-

stituted for their corresponding actives in many instances

- but is particularly inconclusive as the

basis of an argument against transformational analyses, if, as in Wasow's data, the syntactic environments in which substitution is prohibited would, under transformational assumptions, have to be considered to be trans1 52 forms themselves

. Thus, the structures underlying

Wasow's (87), (88), (90), (94) and (95) would be along the lines of (87'), (88'), (90') and (94"), (95') such that Wasow's starred examples can be excluded by rule reordering and/or by making infinitivization of the complement clause dependent on the presence of an ad(87')

This book promises that it can be read. This book promises that it is readable

(88')

153

I was expecting that the evening could be tolerated. I was expecting that the evening would be tolerable.

(90')

It seemed until now that the ordeal could be endured. It seemed until now that the ordeal would be en, , 154 durable

(94')

It can be proved that John's conjecture is wrong. It is provable that John's conjecture is wrong.

(95')

It can be believed that John's arguments are plagiarized. It is believable that John's arguments are plagiarized 1 5 5 .

jective

156

. Similarly, (91'), (92') and (93') show that

the underlying structures of Wasow's (c) examples are more complex than the ones of his (a) and (b) examples -

(91')

You can read this book to Johnny. This book can be read to Johnny. This book is readable to Johnny. •Johnny is readable this book.

- 1 54 (92')

One cannot allow him such a behavior. He cannot be allowed such, a behavior. *He is not allowable such a behavior. Such a behavior cannot be allowed him. Such a beh-avior is not allowable for/?to him. •Such a behavior is not allowable him.

(93')

One can Shirley Shirley •Shirley

elect Shirley for President. can be elected (for) President. is electable for President. is electable President.

they all contain two complement NPs - such that the generation of the 'ungrammatical (d) examples can be prevented in (9V) by ordering the transformation that is reminiscent of PP fronting and yields (91c) before ABLE-SUB and in (92') and (93') by restricting the input to ABLE-SUB to direct object passives and disallowing the deletion of the prepositions introduced by this transformation These considerations together with the above jnentioned lexicalist incapability of accounting for the occurrence and interpretation of the by- phrases potentially accom158 panying V-able adjectives may suffice to prove that Wasow has not succeeded in disposing of V-able adjectives as counterexamples to his claim that transformations may not feed category-changing rules. 5,4,2,2

Lexical versus transformational passives (Wasow vs. Freidin vs. Hust)

The defectiveness of Wasow's arguments is further evidenced by another step he is forced to take in order" to .make V-able adjectives comply with his criteria for distinguishing between lexical rules and transformations. In contrast to Hust, who treats only un-passives as adjectives, i.e. as lexically derived, and to Freidin, who analyzes all passive participles as adjectives (see

-

155 -

above), Wasow is lead by his criteria to classify certain passives as lexically derived - this set includes more items than Hust's - and others as transformationally generated. He uses four diagnostics to identify the former: prenominal position, appearance as complements to verbs like act, look, seem, prefixing of un-, and degree modification by very (without much) (cf. 1977:343) 159 The following kinds of passives require, according to him, a transformational derivation: "passives of double object constructions, passives of the 'accusative subject' construction passives of idiom chunks, passives of help and thank and passives followed by predicative expressions like a fool or President" (1977:343). In all of these cases, except possibly the last one, non-direct objects become the subject (cf. ibid.). In order to maintain this classification and keep it consistent with criterion (3) above, he must, however, assume that with double object verbs like teach, which permit both objects to become the subject of an -able adjective (cf. (96)) , the NP handicapped children that is the indirect object if a direct object is present (cf. (96a)) is a direct object in the absence of a second object NP (cf. (96b)) and that both -able adjectives (cf. (96c) and (96d)) can be claimed to be lexically derived. (96)a. b. c. d.

John teaches handicapped children manual skills. John teaches handicapped children. Manual skills are teachable. Handicapped children are teachable. (cf. Wasow 1977:337)

(96')a. John teaches manual skills (to handicapped children) b. Manual skills are/can be taught (to handicapped children) (by John). c. Manual skills are teachable (to handicapped children) (by John). d. Handicapped children are/can be taught manual skills (by John).

- 1 5 6 e. All handicapped children are teachable skills)

(by John)

: m

(manual

.

The grammaticality of the structures in (96') and in particular the systematic differences in meaning between (96'b,c) and (96'd,e) demonstrate clearly that the claims of Wasow's analysis are completely ad hoc. If the NP handicapped children would really be a direct object in (96b), (96a) would, because of (96'd) necessarily contain two direct objects and the lexical rule yielding

(96c)

would have to reintroduce in some way the distinction between the two objects, direct and indirect, present in (96a) and (96'a-e) in order to capture the parallelisms in m e a n i n g between (96'b,c) and

(96d,e).

For these reasons the subject handicapped children in (96'd) is a former indirect object, i.e. the subject of a transformational passive.

(96'd)and (96'e)

constitute,

therefore, counterevidence to Wasow's prediction that "the passive transformation m a y not feed any lexical rules"

(1977:347)

162

.

The only other way to capture such parallel semantic interpretations in EST w o u l d be to postulate an additional set of semantic rules to m a k e up for Wasow's erroneous but necessary syntactic analysis of

5.4.3

(96b).

Getting rid of counterevidence: PS rules, empty (subject) nodes and additional semantic interpretation rules

The strategy of postulating additional semantic interpretation rules and other devices is employed by Wasow in an attempt to get rid of counterexamples to Criterion 5. According to this criterion his syntactic passive transformation should be able to apply to the sentences in (98) , yielding the structures in (100), just as it derives

(99) from (97).

-

(97)a. b.

157 -

His friends regard him as pompous. Aunt Mary made the boys good little housekeepers.

c.

Her friends had failed her in some unclear way.

d.

The vision struck him blind.

e.

Frank persuaded Mary to leave.

(98)a.

He strikes his friends as pompous.

b.

The boys made Aunt Maty good little housekeepers.

c.

Max failed her as a husband.

d.

The vision struck him as a beautiful revelation.

e.

Mary promised Frank to leave.

(99)a. b.

He is regarded by his friends as pompous. The boys were made good little housekeepers by Aunt Mary.

c.

She has been failed by her friends, in some unclear way.

d.

He was struck blind by the vision.

e.

Mary was persuaded to leave by Frank.

(100)a. * His friends are struck by him as pompous. b. *Aunt Mary was made good little housekeepers by the boys. c.??She was failed by Max as a husband. d. *He was struck by the vision as a beautiful revelation. e.??Frank was promised to leave by Mary. (1977:352-353) But the sentences iA (100) are ungrammatical and thus invalidate the claim that transformations have few or no true exceptions. In order to be able to preserve this claim nevertheless Wasow assumes on the one hand that the deep structure

of

passive sentences contains

only lexically filled by-phrases b u t no subjects, i.e. that such subject nodes are empty in deep structure and that therefore the passive transformation consists only of object-preposing, and on the other hand that

-

158 -

the semantic component relates only subject-oriented complements to deep structure subjects

(cf. (99)). Thus,

the syntactic passive transformation can be claimed to apply quite freely to (98), producing forms like

(100),

which are then filtered out by the rules of semantic interpretation because they will not assign readings to such forms. In view of such a strategy by which apparently any data that do not fit Wasow's criteria can, nevertheless, be reconciled with them by simply making appropriate assumptions about PS-rules, as, e.g., empty subject nodes in the deep structure of passives, and about semantic interpretation rules, it is hard to see how Wasow's criteria can be said to distinguish empirically between the functions of lexical and trans formational rules with-

-

VI.

6.0

159

-

MOTIVATIONS FOR CONSTRAINING THE 'EXTENDED' CATEGORIAL RULES: X' THEORIES Preview

In the preceding chapter we refuted Chomsky's original (1968) arguments for the LH - the DSA, the SKA and the ISA - and exposed the most glaring deficiencies and mutual incompatibilities of subsequent lexicalist analyses of the relation between V-able adjectives and passives in terms of lexical redundancy rules. We will now first outline another important theoretical innovation proposed in Chomsky (1968) as a consequence of LH, namely X' theory. Secondly, it will be demonstrated how our counterevidence to LH affects this theory of categorial rules. We will then show that other basic "predictions" of X' theory with respect to certain word-formation processes are not borne out by the data and that Chomsky's and other X' theories and the lexicalist grammars associated with them cannot account adequately and consistently for adnominal NPs and their predicative counterparts in English. Finally, the of X' theory patibilities trace theory

6.1 6.1.1

divergent claims of the two main will be investigated in terms of with LH and such other tenets of and the base-generation of empty

versions their comREST as nodes.

Chomsky's Original Motivation for X' Theories 'Specifiers' and 'Complements'

Chomsky (1968) introduces what later came to be known as X' theory in two steps. Starting out from the lexicalist position that such DNs as eagerness (for John) to please, refusal of the offer, belief in a supreme being, etc. (cf. 1968:30) are base-generated, he proposes as

-

160

-

a first approximation to account for the range of complements that may accompany them that the rules of the categorial component of the base must include the following: (101) a.

NP

-»

N Camp

b.

VP

-+ V Camp

c.

AP

-• A Comp

(102)

Comp

NP, S, NP S, NP PP, PP

PP, etc.

(cf. 1968:30) As independent evidence for such base rules he gives a list of 23 noun phrases with underived head nouns which, in his opinion, require an analysis as determinernoun- complement constructions

(cf. 1968:31) because of

certain shortcomings of the transformational treatments proposed for them

- analysis of the head noun as a

nominalized verb or of the complement as a reduced relative clause In a second step phrase category

(cf. 1968:32)

1

.

(cf. 1968:52ff.) Chomsky abolishes the 'complement' in the rules

(101) and

(102),

since it seems to play no role in transformations, and suggests to replace these rules by a single schema 2 where X'

(103)

is the symbol for a phrase containing X as its

head ^ which, in turn, stands for the lexical categories N, A, and V, and where in place of ... there appears the full range of structures that can serve as complements. (103)

X'

X...

The phrases immediately dominating X', i.e. N', A' and V' are designated N " , A'' and V ' ' respectively. introduce further terminological uniformity"

"To

(1968:52)

Chomsky refers to the phrase associated with N', A' and V' in the base structures as the 'Specifier' of these elements. Schema

(104) thus represents X ' 1 , the highest

-

161

-

level of structure, as incorporating the immediate constituents specifier of X' and X' where [Spec, N'] is analyzed as the determiner, "[Spec, V'] as the auxiliary (perhaps with time adverbials associated), and [Spec, A'] perhaps as the system of qualifying elements associated with adjective phrases (comparative structures, very, etc.)" (104)

(ibid.). X"

[Spec, X'] X'

(ibid.)

With the addition of an appropriately modified version

4

of the well-known initial phrase structure rule S -+ NP+VP Chomsky's X' base component for English consists of the following set of rules: (105)

S

-» N' ' V "

X'* - [Spec, X*] X'

X'

X Comp

X

-» N, V, A

[Spec, N 1 ] -» Det [Spec, V' ] -» Aux [Spec, A' ] -» very Comp

-» N'', S, N'' S, N 1 ' PP, PP PP, etc.

Det

-»

Article

6.1.2

(Prearticle of) Article Udef,

1

(N' )]

(Postarticle)

5

Universality claims: The schema, its categories, their features and NP as a cyclic node

In commenting on the X' schema Chomsky points out 1.

that the "primitive" categories N, A, V induce a skeletal form of the base though they may differ in other respects as for example "if V' is analyzed into a copula-predicate tion"

(1968:53)

construc-

-

162

-

2. that "the base rules for any language will contain language-specific modifications of the general pattern"

("1968;53) in the sense that the

structures generated by the base component of any grammar conform to the skeletal form of base rules projected from the basic lexical categories N, "V, A "with only certain variation possible

(e.g. in range of complements, in

order of elements)"(1972c:160

fn.32)[Emphasis

mine, HUB] and

3. that these basic lexical categories m a y themselves be the reflection of an underlying feature structure, i.e. that they m a y be taken as bundles of syntactic features

("two features would pro-

vide the categories: N, V, A, everything else, where N and A share a feature and V and A share a •

feature"

(1972c:160-161

fn.32)

6

.

It follows from this 4. that the internal structure of a DN as in (106) mirrors that of the related sentence N' 1

(106) 1 [Spec,N 1 ] I several

(107)

1 [+def,N"]

I

John

'

1 N' | N

I

[prove,pi]

,

the

(several of John's proofs of the theorem)

1 N''

L_,

theorem

-

(107)

.

163 -

'

.

S

N' 1 I John

V'

i [Spec,V]

1 V'

past

V

I

prove

N''

,

the

1

(John proved the theorem) (cf.

1968:53)

since a.

"the s t r i c t subcategorization features of the l e x i c a l item prove take account of the phrases V' and N' dominating the category to which i t i s assigned in (106), (1968:53-54)

b.

(107),

respectively"

["numbering changed, HUB] and

" i t s s e l e c t i o n a l features r e f e r to the heads of the associated phrases, which are the same in both cases"

(1968:54).

and 5. that t h e r e f o r e the category N ' ' , l i k e S, i s a recursive element of the base f o r which i t i s natural t o suppose that in the c y c l i c application of transformations i t plays the same r o l e as the phrases of the form S in s p e c i f y i n g the domain of transformations.

6.2

The X' schema as a formalization of LH

I t i s evident from points 4 and 5 in the preceding section that the X' schema i s meant t o capture and formalize the syntactic consequences of adopting a lexicon organized along the l i n e s of the LH. Without the l e x i c a l i s t claim concerning the empirical necessity of extending the

,

theorem

-

164

-

categorial base by base-generating DNs and its consequence, namely that DNs and their verbal or adjectival bases appear in the lexicon and neutral lexical entries, i.e. with fixed selectional and subcategorization features, but with a choice as to the features associated with the lexical categories N, V, A (cf. 1968:22) there would be no reason to assume the parallelism of strict subcategorization features in the range of complements between derived and underived members of these lexical categories postulated by ... in the rule X* ->X... above (cf. (103)). Without Chomsky's rejection of the transformational origin of DNs there would also be neither a motivation for his deriving a subset of prenominal possessive NPs as base forms (cf. 1968:15) nor for his "suitable" generalization of the interpretation of the selectional relation between the subject of a sentence and its main verb to these possessive NPs and their "derived" or underived heads (cf. (1968:38). Correspondingly,it would also be unnatural to suppose that N'1 is a recursive element of the base which can serve as the domain of transformations ^.

6.3 6.3.0

Counterevidence to LH as Counterevidence to X' Theory Introduction

It follows from 6.2 that most of the evidence against the lexicalist claims presented above affects in a more or less direct way the empirical validity of X1 theory. We will therefore begin our examination of the validity of this purportedly universal theory of base rules by recapitulating those of our reasons for rejecting the LH that are directly relevant to the claims inherent in the X' schema. In the following two sections our counterevidence to ChoJtosky's original formulation of LH is summarized in

-

165

-

g the form of chains of arguments

where CA stands

for 'counterargument', CE for 'counterevidence' supporting the CA, and CONS for 'consequences' which the CA and CE in question have for X' theory and/or the structure of the lexicon or other 'modules' of lexicalist grammars. The argument chains show in particular why the parallelism of specifiers and of strict subcategorization features in the range of complements between derived and underived members of the lexical categories N, V, A claimed by the rules X''

[Spec, X'] X', X' -»X ..., and X

N, V, A is

unwarranted.

6.3.1

Counterargument I to LH and its consequences for X' theory

CA

I:

CA

1.1:

DNs should not be base-generated since there are DNs which correspond to sentences that have undergone transformations (cf. 5.2.1)

CE

1.1.1:

Easy-type of adjectives also admit of DNs (cf. 5.2.1.2) (our easiness to please John from

for us to please John is easy by

Extraposition and Nominalization) CONS 1.1.1:

Easy-type DNs cannot be collapsed with their adjectival bases in neutral lexical entries because they do not exhibit the necessary parallelism in their Specifiers and Complements (cf. our easiness to please John, *we are easy to please John, * our being easy to please John).

-

166

-

Even an analysis that base-generates the structures

it i£ difficult/easy

(for us) to persuade/please John must employ transformational operations to derive our

CE

1.1.2:

Í difficulty ") easiness

There are almost

to

fpersuade I please

John

as many causative verbs

with intransitive and transitive DNs as there are causatives that have only intransitive DNs (cf. 5.2.1.3.2)

(The

growth of tomatoes, *John's growth of tomatoes

but

Robert's conversion and

the priest's conversion of Robert). CONS 1.1.2:

DN formation being not restricted to the intransitive basis of causative verbs, the feature [+cause] assigned to certain intransitive verbs as a lexical property (cf. Chomsky 1968:59) cannot be used to 9 predict the impossibility of DNs . Such DNs can only be excluded by marking

the

transitive verbs derived by a lexical redundancy rule from intransitives with the feature [+cause] as exceptions to the category-neutrality of lexical entries based on the morphological information whether or not the verb is of Anglo-Saxon origin. CE

1.1.3:

There are verbs like annoy and surprise which have only 'passive' nominals such that no grammatical [+N] base structure can be motivated to derive them from (cf. 5.2.2.2.2).

CONS 1.1.3:

Ungrammatical active DN sources must be assumed to generate the correct 'passive' nominals by the generalized operations

-

167

-

of Agent-Postposing and NP-Preposing. The unusual choice of passive prepositions must be recorded twice.

CA

1.2:

'having the internal structure of an NP' is a matter of degree and not a matter of all or none

CE

1.2.1:

(cf. 5.2.2.3).

Proper names, mass nouns and certain abstract nouns do, in general, not take the full set of determiners.

CONS 1.2.1:

There is thus a basic discrepancy between the lexical categories V and N. While any member of the former class is obligatorily

accompa-

nied at least by a 'subject', a subset of members of the latter class, i.e. proper nouns, is systematically prohibited from taking any

'specifiers' or 'complements' at all,

thus defying the structural parallelism between Vs and Ns postulated by X' theory. CE

1.2.2:

GNs as transforms of [+V]s may nevertheless be accompanied at the same time by

'nouny'

elements like this, that or some and by

'ver-

by' elements such as auxiliaries and aspect. CONS 1.2.2:

The rule of Gerundive Nominalization must be permitted either to introduce bare determiners into the N'' position of g[N'' nom pect) V''] g

(cf. Chomsky

(As-

1968:16) or to

delete some unspecified N in that position 'This ") That V The

(*Bill's) looking up addresses

(cf.

10

A non-transformational account of GNs, on the other hand, requires a phrase structure rule that rewrites N' as V " , i.e. as a rule which contradicts the X' theoretical requirement that major categories not expanded into other major categories CA

1.3:

The formation of DNs is a syntactically pro-

-

168

-

ductive process despite its surface morphological idiosyncrasies CE

1.3.1:

(cf. 5.2.3.1).

Apart from possibly lexicalized versions all DNs may occur as syntactic derivatives, i.e. as pronominalizations of (preceding) 12 tial structures (cf. 5.2.3.2)

CONS 1.3.1:

senten-

To capture the partial synonymies of DNs, their sentential sources and their pronominalization potential various cognates to the set of nominalization transformations have to be postulated in the semantic component.

CE

1.3.2:

DNs reflect the ambiguities of simple main clauses which may express a proposition, describe an event or an action, etc.

(cf.

5.2.3.2). CONS 1.3.2:

In the subcategorization and selectional frame of exactly those nouns that are possible head nouns for DNs (proposition, event, action, state, fact, etc.) reference must be made to the derived status of DNs in order to account for the fact that it is only when these

'meta-

linguistic' head nouns are accompanied by nominalizations that they neither pluralize nor take genitive NPs as determiners Thus, nouns m u s t be inherently

(cf. 5.2.3.3).

subcategorized

with respect to the features [±DN], [±Fact], [±Event], etc. CA

1.4:

DNs do contain elements that never appear in underived NPs (cf. 5.2.2.2).

CE

1.4.1:

Adjectival forms of sentence adverbs can only occur with DNs and underived nouns that admit of a 'nominalization reading'

(cf.

'picture

nouns'). In the "independently motivated" base NPs of the form Det-N-NP-by A it is

-

169 -

only if the underived noun permits such a verbal interpretation with respect to the noun in Pet that this subject NP can be moved by Agent-Postposing into the A position (cf. 5.2.2.2.2). CONS

1.4.1:

An ad hoc subcategorization feature C by Al must be assumed in the lexical entries of (underived)

'picture' nouns to generate their

'passive' forms

6.3.2

13

.

Counterargument II to LH and its consequences for X' theory

CA

lis

Lexical items cannot be listed as category-neutral entries since

CA

II. 1:

the relation between a base and its derivatives is directional, i.e. one to many

CE

II.1.1:

(cf. 5.3.1).

In addition to action and property nominalizations (to which Chomsky's

(1968) discussion

is restricted) there are subject (agent)

and

object nominalizations of the same verbs which due to their different subcategorization and selectional frames cannot be collapsed with the former in a single lexical entry but must be listed separately as Nj, N^,... CONS

II.1.1:

The lexicon must indicate in the strict subcategorization features of agent nouns

that they neither can contain a 'subject NP' in their specifier nor, in the case of passivizable verbs, can share the feature 14 Lb^ A] with their bases , of

direct object nominalizations

[N^]

that they

cannot be followed by an NP in their complement, of

-

170

-

indirect object nominalizations that they cannot be followed by a PP in their complement. The semantic component must assume corresponding lexicon-internal semantic interpretation rules for the grammatical relations subject, direct and indirect object. CE XX.1.2:

Adjectives in -able derived from the same verbs as in CE II.1.1 cannot be listed as instances of t+A] in neutral lexical entries because they, too, have subcategorization and selectional frames that are systematically different from those exhibited by the related verbs and nomina actionis, but are , in turn, shared by the nominals derived from them. These property nominalizations would also have to be included in the 'neutral' entries as distinct instances of [+N] (cf.5.3.1.4).

CONS II.1.2:

If V-able adjectives are nevertheless considered to be base structures, they must be subcategorized for an optional by-phrase which 15 requires an extension of the PS-rules Whether or not this option is taken, the semantic rules must distinguish two types of subject relations, the original subject of the verb in the by-phrase and the derived subject of the adjective, i.e. the original object of the verb. In order to interpret the former type of subjects, they either must have access to the internal structure of such adjectives at the level of syntactic deep structure, i.e. have to be able to read the lexical redundancy rules backwards (cf. 5.3.2.1) or must be assumed to have cognates

-

171

-

which operate on the input to the lexical redundancy rule, i.e. on a level similar to the 'prelexical syntax1 of the Generative Semanticists

6.4 6.4.0

Additional Counterevidence to X' Theories Introduction

In connection with the main conclusions of the argument chains presented in 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 - an X-bar grammar obviously cannot do without assuming transformations to generate certain derived nominals (cf. CONS 1.1.1), exception features based on morphological information (cf. CONS 1.1.3), cognates to transformational rules in the semantic component (cf. (CONS 1.3.1, CONS II.1.1 and 2), ungrammatical source structures for passive DNs (CONS I. 1.3), and a variety of ad hoc subcategorization features for derived and "underived nouns and adjectives (CONS I. 3.2 and 4.1, CONS II .1.1 and 2) to make up for lexicalist claims - it is interesting to explore how lexicalist grammars with an X' categorial component can cope with word-formation processes other than deverbal nouns and adjectives and deadjectival nouns,, especially since Chomsky (1968) and most subsequent lexicalist treatments of word-formation are restricted to just these types of de17 rivations . Being particularly concerned, at this point, with the claim of the X' schema that a parallelism of the specifiers and of the strict subcategorization features in the range of complements obtains between the derived and the underived members of the lexical categories N, V, 18 and A , let us select the area of denominal verbs, the converse, as it were, of deverbal nominals, for closer scrutiny in order to see whether the internal structure of sentences containing denominal verbs mirrors that of the related noun phrases, i.e. of their bases.

-

6.4.1

6.4.1.0

172 -

Word-formation processes: Denominal verbs and their nominal bases Productivity versus 'semantic' idiosyncrasy

19 Notice first that in the case of denominal verbs Chomsky's (1968) criteria for a lexicalist treatment do not yield as 'unequivocal results' as in the case of DNs, i.e. nomina actionis. Thus, the almost unrestricted potential for creating new denominal verbs in English as well as the morphological regularity of the process - most of them are zero-derived - would favor a transformational treatment 20 . Their 'semantic idiosyncrasies', on the other hand, would certainly induce lexicalists to assign 21

the formation of denominal verbs to the lexicon where, if the neutral entry claim were true, they should be listable as instances of [+V] in the lexical entries of their t+N] basis sharing the selectional and the strict subcategorization features with them. To be able to judge whether these predictions of the X' schema are borne out by the facts consider the following sample of types of innovative denominal verbs drawing on the most recent 22 work on this topic, namely Clark and Clark (1979) Their classification of some 1300 items is based on the different case roles the parent nouns of denominal verbs i.e. their bases, may occupy in the paraphrases of these verbs, i.e. on the roles these parent nouns may denote in the states, events, or processes encoded by the verbs, the remaining surface arguments 23 of the verbs denoting other possible (case) roles . In the sample below each of the main types of denominal verbs is introduced in terms of the general characteristics attributed to it 24 within Clark and Clark's case-theoretical framework This is followed by a detailed presentation of a. a noun phrase of the form NP^'s Nj... (and its possibly NP-preposed or post-posed versions) whose head N is the parent noun of the denominal

-

173 -

verbs of t h i s type ( c f . N 2 ) . The features [+MAKE], [+POSS(ESSIVE)], e t c . which as parts of a theoryneutral, d e s c r i p t i v e semantic metalanguage are used t o characterize the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the prenominal g e n i t i v e NPs r e f l e c t the semantic relationships these NPs may e x h i b i t with respect t o the head N, relationships which in a transformational account would be made e x p l i c i t by assuming underlying hypothetical verbs. A l l the many other possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , of prenominal g e n i t i v e NPs are disregarded in the presentation below since they do not show up with post-head NPs within NPs

25,

b. a sample sentence of the form NP1

V ... [from N2] e x h i b i t i n g the corresponding denominal verb,

c. the DN (and i t s possible transforms) that p a r a l l e l s the denominal verb, d. a generative-semantics type of paraphrase

(as

proposed in Clark and Clark (1979)) that roughly f i t s most members of the category, e . a paraphrase containing a more s p e c i f i c underlying verb than

(d).

Under f . further examples of the same type w i l l be l i s t e d .

6.4.1.1

Locatum verbs

In to blanket the bed the parent locatum, i . e . the base (blanket) which appears in the o b j e c t i v e case in the parent clause ( c f .

( c ) ) , corresponds t o the surface verb,

and the parent l o c a t i o n (bed) to the surface o b j e c t . The

-

parent preposition and Clark a.

174

(on) is l e f t u n s p e c i f i e d

1979:769,

(NP., 's)

(pnp3)

blanket

fl+MÄKE]]

(J+POSS]J

Det

*of on for

the b e d

by N P 1

PNP-

The blanket

(cf. C l a r k

771). N„

Jane's

-

*of 1 for on

the b e d b y J a n e I+MAKE]

?The b e d ' s b l a n k e t b y J a n e

26

?Jane's bed blanket (t+MAKE]7 [[+POSS]J * b.

27

NP

V [from N j ]

1

Jane

*PP

NP.,

b l a n k e t e d the b e d

*with a coverlet

[-MAKE] t-POSS] but c. = b. (NP 1 's) Jane's

(of) N P .

b l a n k e - of the b e d =

[+MAKE] [-POSS]

d.

=

Det

by N P 1

T h e b l a n k e - o f the b y J a n e tins bed [+MAKE] [-POSS]

J a n e d i d s o m e t h i n g to cause it to come a b o u t t h a t [the b e d h a d one or m o r e b l a n k e t s on it]

e.

of N P 3

NP1

V

NP.

PNP.

J a n e p u t the b l a n k e t on the b e d

28

(1979:769)

-

f.

175

-

The company's polyurethane on the floor The company polyurethaned the floor

but

The company's polyurethaning of the floor fTheir I tenants in the building I John's] T hey tenanted the building but

* 29 ;

*

Their tenanting of the building; f?John'^, | The! John

"J

bark of the tree

barked the tree

but

John's barking of the tree and the barking of the tree by John; John's license plate

the car

John's license-plated the car

but

John's license-plating of the car ?The license-plating of the car by John; ( i p j

ilMl.) { ! ]

John fleaed the dog but

the dos

*

(cf. Clark and Clark 1979:770) 30

John's fleaing of the dog

=

The fleaing of the dog by John

6.4.1.2

Location and duration verbs

A. In Kenneth kenneled the dog, the parent location (kennel), i.e. the base of the denominai verb, corresponds to the surface verb and the parent locatum (dog) to the surface object.

-

176

(NP1's)

(pnp3)

Kenneth's

i*of for

kennel

'I+POSS]} t+MAKElJ

Det

-

N. "2

The kennel

the dog

" "'3

P NP.

by NP, "" 1

for the dog

by Kenneth [+MAKE]

?The dog's kennel by Kenneth

n

31

Kenneth's dog kennel 'I+POSS]T [+MAKE]j V

NP,

NP.

*PNP

[from N 2 ] Kenneth kenneled

the dog

*in a cage/shed

[-MAKE]

I-POSS]

but

(of)

(NP5's)

NP,

Kenneth's kenneling of the dog [--MAKE] [-POSS]

Det

N

(of)

The kenneling of the NP 3

by NP1

dog

by Kenneth I-MAKE] [-POSS]

Kenneth did something to cause it to come about that [the dog was in a kennel] 1979:772) NP 1

NP.

V'

Kenneth put

PNP. *• 2

the dog in a kennel

John's doormat

f of for

the boots

(cf. Clark and Clark

-

177

-

John doormatted the boots

(*on the floor)

but

John's doormatting of the boots 33

for

The general's horse(s)

the troops

*

The general horsed the troops *on/with cameIs

but

The general's horsing of the troops Their bed for/*of the child They bedded the child

33

*

but

Their bedding of the diild

The boy's porch for/*of the newspaper ?The boy's newspaper porch

=

*

The boy porched the newspaper *in the garden/*on the shelf

but

The boy's porching of the newspaper

=

The porching of the newspaper by the boy John's youth-hostel in Europe John youth-hostelled in Europe

* 34

John's frequent youth-hostelling in Europe

B.

With duration verbs, the parent noun which must denote

a stretch of time, appears in a prepositional phrase or as a direct object in underlying structure below). a.

CNP^'s)

N2

(PNP 3 )

Julia'S

summer

in Paris

*Det

N2

PNP 3

*by NP 1

•The summer in Paris *by Julia ?Julia's Parisian * b.

NP.,

V [from N 2 ]

summer PNP~

Julia summered in Paris *in winter but

(cf. d. and e.

- 178 -

= b. (NP1's) 1

N

PNP

3

Julia's summering in Paris Det

N

PNP 3

The summering

by NP^j

in Paris

?by Julia

The summering of Julia in Paris

36

Julia did something to cause it to come about that [Julia was in Paris for a summer] NP.j

V

NP 2

PNP

(cf. 1979:773)

3

summer in Paris *in winter

Julia spend |

Washington's winter *of/with his troops at Valley Forge Washington wintered his troops at Valley Forge Washington's

but

wintering of his troops at Valley Forge

John's weekend at the cabin

*

John week-ended at the cabin

but

PJohn's week-ending at the cabin; Their honeymoon in Hawaii

*

They honeymooned in Hawaii

but

Their honeymooning in Hawaii

4.1.3

Agent verbs

John butchered the cow, the parent noun (butcher) is , 37 agent (NP^s) John's

N2 butcher

[-POSS] [+AGENT]

(of) NP 3 of the cow(s)

-

*Det

N2

179

(of)

-

NP3

*by NP1

•The butcher of the cow(s) *by John

38

John's cow butcher I+POSS] [-AGENT] b.

NP1

V NP3 [from N21 John butchered the cow [-POSS] [+AGENT]

but (NP ' S )

c. = b.

N

(of)

NP.

John's butchering of the cow [-POSS] [+AGENT] Det

N

of

NP.

bv NP

The butchering of the cow by John [-POSS] [+AGENT] John did to the cow the act one would normally expect [a butcher to do a cow] (3979:773) NP,

V PNP, copular V V NP2

John

acted as the butcher was the butcher played the butcher

of NP-

NP„

of the cows

The/?John's general of the army (= the/John's army general) * John generaled the army

but

John's generaling of the army John's nursemaid for/*of the baby John nurse-maided the baby

but

John's nurse-maiding of the baby

*

-

180

-

John's housewife *for a living * John housewifed for a living but ?John's housewifing for a living John's quarterback for/*of the giants 39 John quarterbacked the giants but John's quarterbacking of the giants

*

Goal (and source) verbs 40

6.4.1.4

If the verb is transitive, as in Edward powdered the aspirin or loafed the dough, the parent clause specifies both a source (aspirin, dough) and a goal (powder, loaf) which appear as a direct object and its verb on the surface. If the verb is intransitive, as in the cow calved the parent noun can only be a goal, i.e. it denotes the entity brought into existence without mentioning the 'substance' from which it was made (cf. Clark and Clark 1979:774) 4 1 . a.

(NP^s)

N2

of

NP3

Edward's powder of aspirin ([+MAKE]) ([+P0SS]J Det

N2

of

NP3

by NPj

42 the powder of aspirin by Edward [+MAKE]

=

Edward's aspirin powder f [+MAKE] "I H+POSS] J b.

NP

V NP [from N 2 ] Edward powdered the aspirin *into flakes I+MAKE] [-P0SS]

but c. = b.

NP1

N

of

NP 3

Edward's powdering of the aspirin *into flakes I+MAKE] [-P0SS]

-

Det

181

-

of

N

by NP

NP.

The powdering of the aspirin by Edward [+MAKE] [-POSS] d.

Edward did something to cause it to come about that [the aspirin was powder]

e.

NP„

Edward

f.

PN 2 PNP of NP„ NP of N„ ^

NP.

V

'made converted put gave

the the the the

aspirin aspirin aspirin aspirin

into powder into powder in the form of powder the form of powder

John's loaf of dough (= John's dough loaf) John loafed the dough *into a lump

*

but

John loafing of the dough John's portion of the loot

(= John's loot portion)

John portioned the loot

but

John's portioning of the loot The pope's saint »of »for the reformer The pope sainted the reformer

43

*

but

The pope's sainting of the reformer 6.4.1.5

Instrument verbs

In John bicycled into town, the parent noun

(bicycle)

denotes an instrument. The majority of this commonest type of denominal verbs can be analyzed as falling under the "parent verbs" 20, fasten, clean, hit, cut (or stab) and destroy a.

(cf. Clark and Clark

(NP^s) John's F[+MAKE]Ì 1[+POSS]J

N2 bicycle

1979:776).

(PNP 3 ) »into town in the shed

*

-

Det

182

-

PNP.

by NP^

i

*into town 7 in the shed J

the bicycle

V (PNP,) [from N 2 ] ' John bicycled into town [-MAKE] [-POSS]

by John

44

[+MAKE]

NP

3.

(NP^s)

N

f*in a car W bus

(PNP3)

John's bicycling into town [-MAKE] [+POSS] Det

N

PNP 3

by NP 1

the bicycling into town by John [-MAKE] [-POSS] John caused it to come about that he was in town by doing the act one would expect [one to do with a bicylce] (1979:776). NP1

V

PNP3

by N 2

John went into town by bicycle 'go':

John's cablecar * John cablecared

but John's

cablecaring (cf. to trolley, cab, taxi) 'fasten':

John's tape(s) *of boards

(?John's board

tape) * John taped the boards •with nails

together

but

John's taping of the boards together (cf. to seat-belt someone) 'clean':

John's broom for/*on the floor

(John's

floor broom) * John broomed the floor

-

183

-

( with a mop, a vacuum cleaner)

=

John made the floor clean with a broom but John's brooming of the floor (cf. to sponge the window clean) 'hit':

John's hammer for/*of the nails * John hammered the nail into the board (with 45 his shoe) but John's hammering of the nail into the board 'cut, stab': John's sabre for/*of the enemy * John sabred the enemy (?with a knife) but John's sabring of the enemy (cf. to hatchet the tree down (*with an ax), to ripsaw the board) 'destroy': Their napalm for/*of the village * they napalmed the village but their napalming of the village (cf. to mace the strikers, to carbon monoxide oneself to death), (cf. 1979:777)

6.4.1.6 6.4.1.6.1

Results: Negative and positive generalizations No relevant parallelisms between nouns and their verbal derivatives

From the data samples in 6.4.1.1-5 the following negative and/or positive generalizations can be extracted. Contrary to the requirements of the X' schema, there is with one 47 possible exception not a single case among all these types of denominai verbs in which one of the interpretations of a base-generated (or derived) NP of the form (NPj's) N 2 ... (cf. the a.-structures above) parallels the interpretation of a sentence whose subject NP is identical to NP^ and whose verb is derived from N 2 (cf. the b.-structures above). The required parallelism only obtains between the selectional and subcategorizational features of the denominai verbs and the nominals (nomina

-

184

-

actionis) derived from them in turn (cf. the c.-structures 48 above) which are all mixed forms in Chomsky's sense The possible exception referred to seems to be constituted by a small class of 'picture'-nouns whose preposed genitive NPs Chomsky considers to be base-generated in the determiner position if they exhibit an agent-reading with respect to the head noun (cf. 5.2.2.2.2). Thus, the subjects of verbs derived from picture nouns and their objects correspond more closely to the 'subjects' and 'objects' of their nominal bases (cf. (108)) than in all other instances listed above. (108)a.

b

'

c. d. e.

Jane's photograph/picture of the children the photograph/picture of the children by Jane Jane

(photographed ] t h e children. (Cf. Clark and Clark 1979:772) The children were photographed/pictured by Jane , Jane's recent photographing/picturing of the children The recent photographing/picturing of the children 49 by Jane

The correspondences are, however, by far not as close as those between the interpretation of the "denominal sentence" and its naminalization, i.e. nomen actionis. This strongly suggests that 'de-pictorial' verbs are not true exceptions to the negative generalization in question. Such a conclusion is further corroborated by the fact that the only other preposed genitive NPs which Chomsky takes to be base-generated, i.e. inalienable possessives, do not exhibit the required parallelism either. Compare the agentive and instrument verbs derived from nouns denoting kinship (and social) relations (cf. (109)) or expressing parts in part-whole relations with the NPs they should correspond to. (109)a.

Jane mothered/fathered the child (cf. Clark and Clark 1979:774) - Jane's mother/father

-

185 (but: the child's .mother/father, the mother/father of the child)

b.

He "uncled the child (cf. ibid.) His uncle

c.

(but:

the child's "uncle)

John husbands Jane (cf. ibid.) •John's husband

6.4.1.6.2

(but; Jane's husband)

Complex NPs and parallel nominal compounds

The positive generalization that emerges from the data samples of denominal verbs above concerns the head nouns of the NPs listed and their PP complements. It appears that for all instances there exist parallel nominal compounds in which the PP complement occurs in the prenominal modifier position of the head noun, i.e. as the determinant of a N+N nominal compound

such that the inter-

pretation of the structure NP^'s N 2 PNP^ is equivalent in each case to that of a structure of the form NP_,'s (N 3 +N 2 ) N (110)

1

(see (110)) Locatum:

Jane's blanket

the bed

=

?Jane's bed blanket 2A. Location:

Kenneth's kennel

(*of \

{for]

the dog

Kenneth's dog kennel 2B. Duration:

Julia's summer in Paris Julia's Parisian summer

3.

Agent:

John's butcher of the cow John's cow butcher

4.

Goal:

Edward's powder of aspirin Edward's aspirin powder

=

- 186 John 1 s loaf of dough = 52 John *s doughloaf 5. Instrument: John's bicycle

•into town in the shed for the road for the street

•John's shed bicycle John's road bicycle ^ John's street bicycle

6.4.1.6.3

Lexicon-internal "syntactic" deep structures, obligatoriness of subcategorization features and "hypothetical" verbs

Having demonstrated that it is impossible to collapse denominal verbs and their bases in one lexical entry as required by the X' schema, we are left with generating them within the lexicon. If purely formal, and ad hoc word-formation rules like (111) are to be avoided (111)

XN

->• X v

54

,

Ccf. Aronoff 1980:53)

the rules .must be assumed to have as their input structures more or less identical to the ones under e. above (cf. 6.4.1.1-5) which are made available by the grammar on some kind of lexicon-internal syntactic deep structure and as their output denominal verbs with their subcategorization frames which, as the data show, must obey the double occurrence constraint . In other words, such word-formation rules must be able to relate the variety of structures in figure 8 to only three types of denominal subcategorization frames, the transitive frame NP^

V NP^ having, for example, at least [from N2] nine different syntactic sources.

-

187

-

1.

NP1

V

NP2

PNP3

2 A. B.

NP1 NP1

V V

NP 3 NP 2

PNP2 PNP3

r

3.

NP„

V PNP2 ") cop V NP2 V NP„

4.

NP„

V

NP.

(of

NP„

Figure 8:

NP

PN

of N i of N: 1}

V

PNP, by N

V

NP 3 with a N 2

V

[from N 2 ]

(NP3)

*PNP2

NP3)

TPN2

NP

5.

+

NP-

V PNP3 *PNP2 [from N 2 ]

Subcategorization frames of "denominal sentences" and their syntactic sources

In all cases the obligatoriness of a direct object NP 3 or a PNP3 is matched by the source-verb's obligatorily requiring the presence of an N 2 and a N 3 in its subcategorization frame. Locatum and Location verbs (cf. 6.4.1.1 and 2) above), for example, even share the verb put as their soiarce verb that appears in their parent clauses. This verb is obligatorily subcategorized for a direct object NP and a locative PP. The two surface verb types differ with respect to which of these subcategorizing NP-positions of the parent clause is fused with the source verb, as it were, to form a surface verb, the other NP ending ~up in either case as the surface direct object. If put is fused with one of its possible direct objects, a locatum verb arises (cf. Jane blanketted the bed), if it is fused with the locative PP, a location verb arises (cf. Jane bedded the child)

-

188

-

The lexicon internal word-formation rules in question, which, while preserving semantic equivalence in each case, map syntactically and semantically distinct sentential source structures unto the same kinds of syntactic target struc57 tures ,also reflect the main differences between (underived) nouns and (derived or underived) verbs as far as the obligatory presence of syntactic contexts is concerned. Whereas all finite verbs require that they be accompanied by a subject NP and, possibly, by a direct and/or indirect object, or an adverbial complement, there are - with the exception of a small class of relational expressions no derived or "underived nouns that syntactically require a genitive NP as subject or an obligatory NP or PP comple58 ment As already mentioned above (cf. 5.2.2.3), proper nouns and certain mass or abstract nouns even prohibit the presence of any determiner or complement in their subcategorization frames. Most classes of nouns, including proper nouns and mass nouns, do, however, permit the formation of denominal verbs features with the just range of obligatory verbal 59 subcategorization indicated Due to this absence of obligatory subcategorization features from nouns the only not ad hoc way to introduce the subcategorizational contexts for denominal verbs consists in deriving these verbs from intuitively motivated sentential paraphrases in which the parent noun occupies one of the obligatory NP positions that strictly subcategorize the postulated source verb. For a lexicalist grammar this means that just like a transformationalist grammar it has to provide for the assumption of such hypothetical source verbs, for the phrase structure means td> generate the corresponding underlying sentential structures in the lexicon, and for the transformational means to map these unto the corresponding denominal target structures even if such transformations involve intercategorial mappings which are formally undesirable and would therefore have to figure as lexical

- 189 -

redundancy rules

^.

In concluding this section it should be pointed out that, given the non-collapsability of denominal verbs and their nominal bases into category neutral lexical entries, the necessity of postulating sentential under62

lying structures with "hypothetical" verbs for them makes lexicalist grammars m e r e notational variants of transformationalist grammars irrespective of whether the regularities in question are captured by lexicon 63 internal copies of PS - and 'redundancy' rules or by cognates to these rules in the semantic component if an ad hoc word-formation rule X N -» Xy is assumed. This seems to be also true of another imaginable lexicalist alternative which would relate denominal verbs to their sources by a surface interpretive mechanism that pairs surface structures containing denominal verbs with their surface paraphrases which, as grammatical sentences of the language, have to be generated by thegrammar in any case

6.4.1.7

64

.

Denominal adjectives and deadjectival verbs

Similar arguments against lexicalist grammars w i t h X' bases can be put forward with respect to the word-formation processes

yielding denominal full adjectives

(cf. 13 2)) and deadjectival verbs (cf. (113))

65

. In

neither case, the interpretation of the nominal viz. sentential construction viz.

NP, V 1

_ Adj cop

[from N 2 ]

(NP^'s Nj.-.ior Det N j . - . N P ^ ) , where N_ viz. Adj is the 2

basis, paralells that of the related sentence containing the derivative as predicted by the X' schema.

-

(112)a.

190

-

The shelf's dust

=

the d u s t on the

shelf

versus T h e shelf is d u s t y b.

John's music

(113)a.

from

versus

J o h n is m u s i c a l .

The b o t t l e w a s empty. from

b.

c.

versus

J o h n m a d e the b o t t l e

J o h n ' s face is red. from

T h e s h e l f h a s d u s t o n it.

empty.

versus

J o h n ' s face b e c a m e

John emptied the bottle.

J o h n ' s face

red.

T h e c o u r t w a s legal, v e r s u s from

d.

The court bussing. 66 T h e c o u r t m a d e b u s s i n g legal

John was sober. versus John became

reddened.

John sobered,

legalized

from

sober.

T h u s , h e r e a g a i n l e x i c a l i s t g r a m m a r s h a v e to p o s t u l a t e lexicon internal paraphrase based sentential sources the d e r i v a t i v e s if w o r d - f o r m a t i o n rules are to be w h i c h , as for e x a m p l e w i t h t r a n s i t i v e d e a d j e c t i v a l like to e m p t y , w o u l d e i t h e r h a v e to i n t r o d u c e b y l a t i o n t h a t such v e r b s s e l e c t c l a s s e s of d i r e c t

for

avoided verbs

stipuobjects

w h i c h , a c c i d e n t a l l y , c o m p r i s e the same c l a s s of n o u n p h r a s e s t h a t the u n d e r l y i n g a d j e c t i v e s s e l e c t as or w o u l d h a v e to e x p r e s s the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s by permitting context-sensitive like (114)

subjects,

in q u e s t i o n

category-analyzing

rules

(114) V I

Adj +NP.j]

[NP 1 A u x

+ Suffix -NP]

w h e r e the s e l e c t i o n a l a n d s u b c a t e g o r i z a t i o n a l

features

of the b a s i s a d j e c t i v e s serve as w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s tions for the d e r i v e d v e r b s a n d d e t e r m i n e the 67 of t h e i r d i r e c t o b j e c t s

condi-

selection

-

6.4.2

6.4.2.1

191

-

Adnominal NPs and their predicative counterparts Chomsky's original treatment of adnominal genitive NPs

In the last sections we saw that the relations between the syntactic properties of denominal verbs, denominal adjectives and deadjectival verbs and those of their respective bases falsify the predictions of the X' schema with respect to the collapsability of the bases and the derivatives into category neutral lexical entries and that alternative treatments of these word-forming processes either involve the postulation of lexicon internal sentential sources and a corresponding level of deep structure or run the risk of being explanatorily inadequate. We will now investigate how lexicalist grammars with X' categorial components cope with deriving genitive NPs other than base-generated ones. In Chomsky (1968) the latter class contained as noted above (cf. 5.2.2.2.2) subjects of derived nomináis, of "picture" nouns and of inalienable possessor constructions (where the latter two may be subsumed -under expressions of "intrinsic" 68

connection) . In all remaining cases, i.e. in all constructions of alienable possession, Chomsky assumes that the genitive possessor NP originates as the subject of a relative clause. The alienable possession reading of John's leg, for example, he derives from the structure underlying the leg that John has along the same lines as John's table from the structure underlying the table that John has (cf. 1968:37-38). Compare also the Metropolitan Museum's portrait of Aristotle by Rembrandt from Rembrandt's portrait of Aristotle by A that the Metropolitan Museum has (1968: 46) via Agent-Postposing and a relative clause reduction and preposing rule 6 9. What Chomsky (19 68) fails to

-

192

-

mention and what all subsequent lexicalist workers in the Chomskyan tradition have ignored as well is that they, too, have to postulate hypothetical verbs if they assume relative clause sources for 'alienable' possessives

6.4.2.2

~>0

Syntactic sources for adnominal genitive NPs

6.4.2.2.1

Lexicalist case-grammars versus Chomskyan subject-predicate grammars

Though it is an open question whether it is appropriate to postulate have as the only verb underlying 'alienable' possessives

- obviously the relation may be much

looser as the collection of interpretations in (115) and (116) shows (115)

and whether the large number

the President's table 'table the President owns' 'table at which the President dines' 'table about which the President has recurring nightmares' 'table the President is constructing in the basement of the White House because he believes everyone should know a trade' 71

(116)

my tree the tree that I

( like j see every day i^have mentioned before (cf.Aronoff 1980:65-66)

of possible interpretations of genitive constructions can and should be dealt with in the synchronic grammar of a language or to be accounted for by a theory of 72 extralinguistic situational contexts there still remains the problem for the syntax of a lexicalist grammar of having to provide a syntactic source for 'alienable' possessives distinct from the ones for the

-

193 -

other genitive NPs. A solution to this problem is suggested in Stockwell et al.

(1973). It circumvents, however, the issue of multi-

ple interpretations of 'prenominal possessives' by relegating it to another level, i.e. to a related construction type which m u s t be generated in any case if the grammar is to be at least observationally

adequate.

Stockwell et al.'s theoretical framework combines a 'categorial component' organized along the lines proposed first by Fillmore

(1966, 1968)

(cf. 3.1.2 above) with

the claim of Chamksy's LH that the relationship between verbs and adjectives and their derived nominals is a matter of the properties which the related items share in the lexicon (cf. Stockwell et al. 1973:5), i.e. case frames. Since, contrary to Chomskyan X' categorial components, case grammars do not assume a deep structure 73 subject-predicate analysis , but start out from the primary generalization that sentences of natural languages consist of a modality complex that includes such elements as Tense, Mood, Aspect and Negation and a proposition complex S -» N "

V"

(compare Chomsky's first rule

in (105) above to theirs

S

M o d Prop).

This proposition complex specifies the semantic case relationships (Agent, Instrument, Locative, Dative, 74 Neuter, Essive ) that noun phrases co-occurring with verbs, adjectives and certain nouns (and as

'subjects'

of predicate nominals) may exhibit with respect to these heads (cf. Prop -* V (Agt)

(Ess)

(cf. 1973:28) and NOM -» N

(Neut)

(Dat)

(Loc)

(Ins)

(Neut)...(1973:30).

Syntactic relations like 'subject of' and 'object of' being introduced transformationally, Stockwell et al. are able to avoid one of the main inadequacies of the Chomskyan subject-predicate analysis which by placing the subject of a sentence outside V'' while generating the subject of the corresponding DN inside N'', i.e.

-

194 -

in the Specifier of N' 1 , prevents his grammar from formulating in a uniform manner that the respective NP is in both cases in the same relationship to V' viz. N' from the point of view of subcategorization, selec75 tion and semantic interpretation . Compare (106) and (107) (cf. p. 163 and 164) to (117) and (118) (117) Spec V'

destroy

the city

the enemy

N' '

(118)

Spec N'

the city

the enemy

(cf. Stockwell et al. 1973 where the deep structure parallelism between V and N claimed by LH really obtains. In accordance with LH Stockwell et al. draw a distinction between those nouns that take case frames, i.e. are subcategorized for certain deep structure semantic relationships, and those 76 that do not . The former class comprises roughly the same type of nouns for which Chomsky (1968) postulated 77 deep structure subjects, namely DNs, 'picture' nouns , and 'inalienable' possessive constructions including nouns denoting kinship (and social) relations or express78 ing parts in part-whole constructions . Prenominal

- 195 -

surface genitives, thus, may be derived either from one of the cases on the head noun or from a relative 79 clause, if the head noun does not take a case frame

6.4.2.2.2

Predicate genitives as relative clause sources for 'alienable' and other possessives

As a suitably constrained relative clause source for 'alienable' possessives Stockwell et al.(1973) propose the predicate genitive construction because this has several advantages over deriving them from have relatives. First, they find, with regard to case-derived genitives, that unwanted alternative derivations from a relative clause source are, in general, excluded if the predicate genitive option is taken. Compare (119) and (120) . (119)a. b. c.

John's rich uncle the rich uncle that John has *the rich uncle that is John's

(120)a. b. c.

her knowledge of mathematics the knowledge of mathematics that she has *the knowledge of mathematics that is hers (cf. Stockwell et al.1973:700)

Second, they note that the semantic range of predicate genitives is considerably closer to that of the preposed genitives in question than is the semantic range of have constructions. Thus, while there is a semantic disparity between the preposed genitive in (121a) and the relative clause with have in b. insofar as b., in contrast to a. (probably) cannot refer to the house (121)a. b. c.

Bill's house The house that Bill has The house that is Billy's (cf. Stockwell et al. 1973: 701)

-

196

-

that Billy merely lives in (cf. 1973:698) an implication of ownership in b. is found between

no such disparity

(121a) and the predicate genitive

construction in c. ( 122)a.

- there is

Compare also

Peter's team

b.

The team that Peter has

c.

The team that is Peter's

( * The team Peter plays

for, supports, plans to organize)

(cf. 1973:698)

Similarly, John has Billy's ruler is not paraphrased by John has the ruler that Billy has b u t rather by John has the ruler that belongs to Billy or John has the ruler that is Billy's

(cf. 1973:698-699 and 701).

Third, they emphasize that deriving preposed genitives in constructions like John's book, "where the interpretations may include John's having written, illustrated, or published the book, etc."

(1973:701) is unproblematic

if their sources are predicate genitives because, as (123) shows, predicate genitives themselves permit all these interpretations. (123)

That book is John's but he seems to prefer the one that Harry wrote/illustrated/printed/ published

(1973:701)

Despite certain reservations they nevertheless conclude that the predicate genitive which in their rules is itself derived from a Dative case on be represents the m o s t suitable sentential source for 'alienable' posses80 sives

-

6.4.2.3

197

-

Predicate and adnominal problems for Choroskyan X

6.4.2.3.1

Chomsky

genitives 1

as

theories

(1968): Subjects of DNs versus

subjects of 'picture' nouns Let us now examine how Chomskyan types of lexicalist grammars would accomodate Stockwell et al.'s proposal to derive those prenaminal genitive NPs from predicate genitives that share readings with the latter. Such an examination promises to be particularly

interesting

because so far all lexicalist treatments of prenominal genitive NPs have ignored the existence of predicate genitives as a construction type and its relations to preposed

genitives

For Chomsky

^.

(1968) predicate genitives seem, at first

sight, to provide a viable relative clause source for 'alienable' possessives. They would permit him to differentiate structurally between

'subjects' of

'alienable' possessive constructions and subjects of derived nominals, on the one side, and

'alienable'

possessives on the other

(cf.

(124)a.

the book that is John's

John's book

-

(124)).

(= that John has, owns) b.

John's head

c.

The enemy's destruction of the city -

- *the head that is John's

•the destruction of the city that is/was the enemy's d.

The city's destruction by the enemy •the destruction by the enemy that is/was the city's

A closer look at all the possible interpretation of predicate genitives of picture nouns reveals, however, that their agentive readings blatantly contradict one of Chomsky's main arguments for LH according to which

- 198 the agentive reading of genitive NPs with picture nouns, as in John's picture of Mary or its postposed version the picture of Mary by John constitutes independent support for LH, i.e. for the base-generation of such 82

genitives

. Thus, all 'picture' constructions of the

type The picture is Johnf s or the picture that is John's permit the reading John painted/took/ made the picture

as

evidenced by such sentences as (125)

That picture is John's but he seems to prefer the one that Harry painted/made. (cf. Stockwell et al. 1973:701)

Notice that such sentences not only seriously discredit the postulated parallelism between 'subjects' of DNs and 'subjects' of picture nouns on which LH is based the latter, as against the former do have predicate versions -

but at the same time yield 'independent

support' for the assumption of hypothetical verbs if the grammar is expected to syntactically resolve the ambiguities of predicate genitives.

6.4.2.3.2

Specifiers without heads

But even if predicate genitives are taken as basic and not derived from sentences with hypothetical verbs, thus leaving the task of disambiguating them to some other component, their generation poses a number of insurmountable difficulties for a categorial component of the X' variety and its accompanying lexicon. First, it seems impossible to subsume predicate genitives under the base rule (126) that generates NPs, APs and PPs as complements of the copulative verb be (cf. (127)). (126)

V'

V

f NP" AP \PP

(cf. Czepluch 1980:179)

-

(127)a.

199

-

John is sad.

b.

John is well off.

c.

John is in good health.

d.

John is an idiot.

(cf. 1980:169)

Obviously predicate genitives can be categorized neither as APs nor as PPs. Though there are predicate PPs equivalent to the agent and 'object' reading of predicate genitives

(cf. The portrait is by John, The portrait is

of John) no predicate PP exists that would be parallel to their possessive readings. In addition, the specific properties of predicate genitives

(cf. (128)) clearly

distinguish them from all types of predicate nominals whose generation as full NPs

(N'') in the sister node

position of be is already an overgeneralization in view of the highly constrained set of determiners that may occur in that position (cf. John is a fool, ?John is

(128)a.

The portrait is John's/ the man's *who 1 m e t 83 yesterday

b. *The portrait is the man's 84 the fool that did it) Since it is m o r e o v e r impossible to derive predicate genitives from the specific position of a full predicate nominal NP by deletion

- the predicate genitive in

(129b) does not have the 'object' reading with respect 85 - we are left

to portrait that it has in (129a) (129)a. b.

That portrait is Sarah's portrait, That portrait is Sarah's. (cf. Stockwell et al. 1973:700)

with having to base-generate on its own a form which in all other instances occurs in the specifier or complement of a nominal head N, a situation that runs counter to the basic tenet of the X' schema that requires the obligatory presence of at least the categorial head

-

200

-

on the lowest level of a rewrite rule

86

Given that in whatever way formal and autonomous syntacticians will decide to generalize away predicate genitives and their relations to pre-head genitives and post-head PPs as counterevidence to the X1 schema - their 'solutions' will have to assign the task of reintroducing the distinctions removed from the syntax by this generaliza87 tion to the semantic rules and/or the lexicon - let us now look at some instances of this lexicalist procedure in order to determine their motivations and their mutual compatibility.

6.4.2.3.3

Syntactic irrecoverability versus semantic interpretation: Chomsky (1968) versus Jackendoff (1974, 1977)

Jackendoff (1974) and (1977) rejects Chomsky's (1968) relative clause source for alienable possessives because "a transformation reducing the relative clause to a possessive'will violate the recoverability requirement on deletion transformations" (1977:13) and proposes instead that "one projection rule for the possessive position can specify a rather loose notion of 1 intrinsic connection' between the possessive NP and the object 88

denoted by the larger NP" (ibid.) . This notion is supposed to be sharpened by the semantic nature of the larger NP to the effect that the burden of specifying "intrinsic connection" can be placed on the semantic component or preferably on real world knowledge) instead of on the syntax and the violation of recoverability can be eliminated. Thereby, Jackendoff contends to simultaneously explain the creativity in the use of "intrinsic connection" as for example in John's chair which may denote "the chair that John owns (alienable possession), or by intrinsic connection, the chair that John built, designed, or habitually sat in" (1977:

-

201

-

13). Jackendoff' final conjecture is that 'intrinsic connection' in his sense is a rather fundamental cognitive function of which his examples are simply special 89 cases In view of Jackendoff's general position of eliminating relative clause sources as violations of syntactic recoverability at the expense of the semantic component cnewonders not only how far the semantic rules he has in mind are formally constrained - there is obviously no'semantic recoverability' requirement - but also where and how he would deal with the relation between predicate and preposed genitives, i.e. with the fact noted above that the possible readings of predicate genitives are identical only to a subset of the readings of preposed genitives, namely to their 'alienable' possession and agentive but not 'object' reading. Syntactic transformational relations being excluded for reasons of syntactic recoverability of deletion, Jackendoff' s semantic projection rule would apparently have to fulfill this task which would enhance its formal 90 power proportionately . Granted that such a semantic projection rule of 'intrinsic connection' is a sort of linguistic reflection of "a rather fundamental cognitive function" it would be a linguistic and/or cognitive mystery why this possibly universal semantic projection rule only includes predicate genitives just in case predicate genitives exist as a construction type in the 91 language in question . From the legitimate assumption that the grammar of such a language would have to account at least for the syntactic generation of predicate genitives in its syntactic categorial component it follows that the accompanying lexicon would have to 92 contain a list of all admissible NP be NP's sequences in order to guarantee that only well-formed ones will 93 pass the filter of lexical insertion . Hypothetical verbs being unavailable in Jackendoff's lexicalist approach it would appear to be a mere semantic accident

-

202

-

that speakers of English are able to assign to sentences containing predicative genitives semantically equivalent syntactic paraphrases specifying their possible interpretations in terms of sentential structures that consist of types of subject NPs that are identical to those of the predicate genitives and of forms of full verbs that relate these subjects to other specific types of NPs or PPs in a completely regular fashion (cf. That picture is John's = that picture was taken by John , was 94 painted by John • is a picture of John) . Since such more precise sentential structures are, in addition, 'independently motivated' in so far as their syntactic semantic well-formedness conditions must be accounted for by the grammar anyway, it seems that Jackendoff's lexicalist approach fails to capture significant regularities and generalizations in order to avoid a formal problem in the syntactic component which is necessarily due to turn up again in the semantic rules if these are supposed to uncover the predication relations underlying predicate genitives as internalized by native speakers

6.4.2.3.4

6.4.2.3.4.1

Preposing versus postposing analyses of NP's N ... constructions: Hornstein (1977) versus Jackendoff Differences between NPs and Ss (S * V'' or V' " )

The existence ofpredi-cate genitives in English and their syntactic semantic relations to a subset of preposed genitives and to be + by/of NP constructions is also not accountable for in versions of the X' theory diffe96 rent from Jackendoff's . In contrast to Jackendoff (1974, 19 77), who following Chomsky (196 8) in the attempt to generalize notions like 'subject' and 'object' to NPs, proposed to identify S with V'' and V''' respectively

- 203 97

(cf. 1977:40-41)

, Hornstein

(1977) tries to show

"that it is a mistake to incorporate S in the X' convention by identifying it with any level of V"

(1977:

137). Since his arguments for this position contain, apart from their contribution to our discussion at this point - genitive NPs -,quite a number of inconsistencies which are characteristic of X" theories in that the 98 evidential support u s e d is mutually incompatible the following examination of Hornstein 1 s paper will be rather extensive. Hornstein starts out from the drastic changes m a d e by Jackendoff in remodeling the configurations in (130) and (131). In (130) Spec V' is eliminated as a node such that it becomes, m u c h like Comp, an abbreviation 99 for a series of nodes (cf. 1977:133)) (130)

I' ' N'

Spec V'

N

V'

pres^have^en

prove

John

the theorem

(131) Spec N' Prearticle several

of

N'

^^Poss N'' John

's

proofs

P." ' of the theorem

(cf. Hornstein 1977:133) In (131) several of is transferred from Spec N' to a

- 204 -

higher N'', the possessive ''s' is removed in favor of a transformational rule possessivizing the subject NP of any NP and Spec N' is eliminated

as a node treating

it in (133) as "an abbreviation for the sequence of nodes defining the determiner system"

(Jackendoff 1974:

16). This leaves us with structures of the form (132) where X = N,V (cf. (132) and

(133)).

(132)

(133)

John

~~

N

I

proofs

P' 1 of

r \N'' the theorem

(134) N' '

I

John

Aux

V'

pres have en

prove

N' the theorem

(cf. Hornstein 1977:138-139)

100

Hornstein objects to (132), (133) and (134) for the following reasons: First, there are hardly any generalizations to be made concerning the constituents abbreviated by Spec X' because Spec V', consisting of, among other things, NP-Aux, and the determiners and quanti-

-

205

-

fiers in Spec N' do not have much in common. Among the constituents abbreviated by Comp, however, significant generalizations about the kinds of constituents and their order across nodes can be found (cf. 1977:139)

101

Comp X' and Spec X' being therefore not much alike "the treatment of Comp as an abbreviation of nodes lends no support for the treatment of S p e c X' as such"

(ibid.).

Hornstein's second objection concerns the parallelisms between NPs and Ss postulated by Jackendoff for (133) and (134). He claims that "the generality of the N and V expansions is gained by Jackendoff's ignoring the real differences in the structures of NPs and Ss"

(1977:139)

which, in turn, is particularly facilitated if one considers Spec X' to be an abbreviation for a series of nodes. Thus, Spec V' abbreviates not only N''-Aux as in (134) but also the complementizer node and sentence adverbs as in (135) while Spec N' would still look very much like

(131).

(135) Camp

N''

Adv Camp (Hornstein 1977:140) 102

In view of such structural discrepancies between NPs and Ss the cost of Jackendoff's 'subject of' projection rule becomes almost prohibitive. The plausibility, suggested by Hornstein, of defining a general notion of subject without having to assume Spec X' to be a series of nodes (compare (136)) makes the cost of Jackendoff's proposal higher still. (136)

t (

Comp j

NP - Y - X 1 - Z ] , X is N or V (ibid.)

-

206

-

On the basis of the structural configurations in (136) where 'subject' is definable as the first N'' to the left of X' (for X = N,V) the projection rule (in conjunction with the 'A over A convention') can correctly interpret John as the subject of N'' in (133) and of S (= V'') in (134), thereby giving a unified account of this relation in both NPs and Ss without identifying S with V'' (cf. 1977:140). Thirdly and most importantly it is not clear according to Hornstein that Jackendoff's generalization concerning subjects (and objects) is worthwhile capturing. He sees two problems with Jackendoff's belief that "there must be appropriate generalizations of the projection rules, so that selectional restrictions can be generalized over sentences and derived nominals" (1974:16). One has to do with the question whether, as presupposed by Jackendoff's generalized projection rule, the relation between an NP head and its predicate in a sentence is in fact the same as that between an NP and its nominal head in an NP. As evidence for his doubts that these relations are semantically parallel Hornstein quotes a remark by Chomsky (1975). In a discussion of the differences between the derivations of sentences (cf. (137)) and derived nominals (cf. (138)) (137)a.

the enemy [ v p destroyed the city] (initial phrase-marker)

b.

t [yp destroyed the city by the enemy] (by NP-Postposing)

c.

the city [ v p was destroyed t by the enemy] (by NP-Preposing)

(cf. Chomsky 1975:108)

within the framework of an early version of his 'trace theory' Chomsky points out that in the case of the passive of the sentence (137), the rule of NP-preposing must

- 207 apply if the rule of NP-postposing has applied because there is no such sentence as (139) corresponding to (138)a.

the enemy - destruction of the city (initial phrase-marker)

b.

t - destruction of the city by the enemy (by NP-postposing)

c.

the city1s-destruction t by the enemy (by NP-preposing) (cf. 1975:113)

(139)

t destroyed the city by the enemy (ibid.)

(137b) whereas in the case of the 'passive' of the derived nominal (138) NP-postposing may apply without a subsequent application of NP-preposing. See (140) in which (140)

the destruction of the city by the enemy

(ibid.)

the trace of (138b) has been erased by a rule spelling out the determiner. In this connection Chomsky comments n an argument by Emonds to the effect that different rules of NP-preposing must be operative in NPs and Ss because NP-preposing may apply to the noun phrase the lecture yesterday giving yesterday's lecture but not to the sentence he lectured yesterday giving yesterday was lectured by him (cf. 1975 13 fn.41)104. Chctnsky continues I think that in many cases, perhaps all, the discrepancies can be attributed to other factors. Thus, as noted before,the subject-predicate relation is defined on surface structures of sentences (but not noun phrases), and it might be plausibly argued that "was lectured (by NP)" is not a possible predicate of "yesterday", accounting for the ungrammaticalness (ibid.) 1 0 5 . Presupposing the correctness of Chomsky's argument, Hornstein concludes that Jackendoff's generalization regarding subjects of sentences and of NPs is not significant (cf. 1977:141).

-

6.4.2.3.4.2

208

-

Thematic functions versus

grammatical

r e l a t i o n s : N P ' s N d e r i v e d from N PNP H o r n s t e i n ' s o t h e r o b j e c t i o n to J a c k e n d o f f ' s p o s i t i o n is that if the p r o p e r d e e p s t r u c t u r e for N P s is a s s u m e d to be

(141)

(141)

such NP

N

(poss)

(of) N P (theme)

(by) N P (agent)

(cf. H o r n s t e i n that

1977:141)

s e l e c t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s are s t a t e d n o t on

tical r e l a t i o n s b"ut o n t h e m a t i c f u n c t i o n s

gramma-

which have

d e s i g n a t e d d e e p s t r u c t u r e slots the m o t i v a t i o n f o r a g e n e r a l i z e d n o t i o n o f 'subject of' e v a p o r a t e s

(cf.

1977:

141). T h i s o b j e c t i o n i g n o r e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t if the

gene-

r a l i z e d n o t i o n of

'subject of' a n d the

complementary

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of N P - p o s t p o s i n g are done away w i t h , as H o r n s t e i n suggests, the m o t i v a t i o n for L H , an rial c o m p o n e n t a n d a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y

structured

X'

catego-

lexicon

e v a p o r a t e s as w e l l . H o r n s t e i n is n o t aware of the

fact

that C h o m s k y ' s o r i g i n a l a r g u m e n t s for L H , i.e. the DSA, ISA, and SKA, as w e l l as for the X 1

theory

(cf. the

n e u t r a l i t y of lexical entries) h i n g e for the m o s t p a r t on the p a r a l l e l i s m of g r a m m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n

sen-

t e n c e s o n the one h a n d a n d d e r i v e d n o m i n a l s o n the 107 other

. Thus, his objection against Halitsky's

(1975)

N P - p o s t p o s i n g rule, n a m e l y that it g e n e r a t e s all b y p h r a s e s as d e r i v e d s t r u c t u r e s a n d t h e r e f o r e

cannot

a c c o u n t for cases such as

(142) in w h i c h t h e r e is 108 n o p l a c e the b y - p h r a s e c o u l d h a v e b e e n m o v e d from , d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t s n o t only C h o m s k y ' s

(142)

John's

' portrait painting photograph film review

(1968)

arguments

of M a r y by W a r h o l

(Hornstein

1977:144)

-

209

-

concerning the parallelism of passives in NPs and sentences, but also his(1975) treatment of the same phenomenon within early trace theory, just mentioned, an approach on the correctness of which Hornstein has just relied in rejecting Jackendoff's generalization. Hornstein nevertheless concludes from cases like

(142) that

"the thesis that all by-phrases are derived by an N'' 1 Postposing transformation is untenable and that in these cases the by-phrase is generated directly by base rules" (1977: 145) . He supports this point by arguing on the basis of (143)

(143)

*the sense of danger by John. vs. Danger was sensed by John, •the fear of Harry by John

vs.

Harry was feared by John. •the respect for Mary by John vs. Mary is respected by J o h n . / • u j i 109 (ibid.) that NP-Postposing is not very productive in contrast to the completely productive rule that moves by-phrases, whenever they are in the sequence N by NP, to the prenominal NP slot. This rule can, in Hornstein's opinion

(cf.

1977:146), be furthermore subsumed under an already existing rule of NP-Preposing moving NPs to prenominal position in sentences, i.e. into an empty NP slot

1

Generating N by NP as base forms and NP's N as derived forms would thus require no extra transformational machinery.

6.4.2.3.4.3

DNs versus 'picture' nouns

Notice, here, the similarity of Hornstein's views on productivity and regularity to Freidin's Hust's

(1978), critized above

(1975) and

(cf. 5.3.3.4). Just as

Freidin's morphological redundancy rule predicted that,

-

210

-

if there is a passive verb in the lexicon, then there is also an active counterpart, thus starting out from the result of the process to be explained and subsequently supplying it with an interpretation or its felicity conditions - Hornstein's analysis presupposes the existence of post-nominal base-generated by-phrases such that a completely productive and exceptionless rule can be assumed to move them into a prenominal slot ^ ^ . This does, however, explain neither why the by-phrases are ungrammatical in the post-head position of the NPs in (143) but grammatical in the corresponding passive 112 sentences nor take into account that if DNs (i.e. nomina actionis) are substituted for the head nouns in (142) (cf. p. 208) the by-phrases in post-nominal position are ungrammatical 113 as well, due to the double occurrence constraint In other words, Hornstein fails to acknowledge that given the fact that the class of prenominal NPs exhibiting a subject reading with respect to the head noun is much larger than the class of postnominal by-phrases with the same interpretation - the former includes the latter as a subset - the problem is not to state this inclusion relation but to specify and explain why there are prenominal genitive NPs with a subject reading for which no corresponding by-phrases exist 11 4

6.4.2.3.4.4

Postposing and spelling rules versus trace theory

The next argument against NP-Postposing constructed by Hornstein is based on the requirements of trace theory. In this theory semantic interpretation no longer takes place at the levels of deep structure and surface structure but can be done exclusively at surface structure because movement rules are now postulated to leave traces in the deep structure positions of NPs with their desig-

-

211

-

nated thematic functions. Traces being only bindable by NPs to their left, any rightward NP movement rule results in unbound traces that must be converted by spell115 ing rules into a variety of determiners such that the information needed to do semantic interpretation is obliterated (cf. Hornstein 1977:146). By abolishing NPPostposing such ad hoc spelling rules could therefore be eliminated. In the light of this trace-theoretical position Hornstein then presents the advantages his NPPreposing solution has over the traditional lexicalist postposing analysis with its assumption of neutral lexical entries for related verbs and nouns to simplify the lexicon. Hornstein contends that in such a traditional approach the semantic range of the subject position would have to be specified "for in NPs, at least, the prenaminal slot is multiply ambiguous for certain nouns" (1977:148). In John's portrait, for example, John can be either I+possessive] - John is the owner of the portrait - T+theme] - John is the person in the painting - or [+agent] - he is the painter of the portrait. Since, by contrast, John's horse means, according to Hornstein, only "horse that John owns" (1977:148) the assignment of semantic range would differ from noun to noun. The traditional NP-postposing analysis would therefore require at least that, one the semantic range for the subject of each noun be specified, and two a rule of by-phrase interpretation be assumed to recover the information lost by the spelling rules. On the other hand, the preposing account combined with trace theory would, in Hornstein's opinion, not require such a specification of the semantic range of prenominal NPs, if, in addition, a format of lexical entries for nouns is assumed (cf. (144)) that, as noted in connection with (141) above (cf. p. 209), states selectional restrictions on thematic functions. (144) NP N (of) NP (by)NP +possession +theme +agent (cf. Hornsteinl977:149)

-

(145)a. b.

212

-

np Portrait (by) John John's portrait (by) t

c.

np Portrait (of) John

d.

John's

portrait

(of) t

(ibid.)

In such an approach, John's portrait in its reading like

'agent'-

(see (145b)) is derived from a deep structure

(145a) by preposing. In its 'theme'-reading

(145d) it is generated via the same rule from

(cf.

(145c).

The 'possession'-reading"in which John is interpreted as owning or having the portrait"

(Hornstein 1977:149)

arises when John is base-generated in initial position. Although a by-phrase interpretation rule is needed, the interaction of NP-preposing, trace theory and the format of lexical entries specifies, according to Hornstein, the possible semantic interpretations of the prenominal NPs. This principled account therefore explains the semantic richness of the prenominal position in complex NPs. The prediction of the preposing analysis that, given N by NP, we can get NP's N with NP carrying the agent meaning leads in Hornstein's view "to a simplification of the lexical entries for nouns, as the semantic range of prenominal NPs need not be specified independently for each lexical entry"

(1977:150). Hornstein

concludes that while both approaches offer a w a y of expressing selectional restrictions in a parallel fashion for related verbs and nouns and have to employ a rule of b ^ interpretation, it is only the postposing analysis that "will need a set of spelling rules to convert stranded traces into determiners"

(1977:150).

- 213 -

6.4.2.4 6.4.2.4.1

Hornstein's arguments refuted: Spelling rules and semantic range of genitive NPs in preposing analyses.

Hornstein's claims as to the advantages of the preposing approach over the 'traditional' postposing approach are unwarranted for the following reasons. In the preposing approach there is no way to derive the grammatical surface equivalent to (145a), i.e. the portrait by John, unless same ad hoc device is postulated which ensures that the empty prenominal NP slot in (145a) is filled by a definite or indefinite article just in case the optional NP-Preposing rule does not apply. To put it differently, given the framework of trace theory, Emonds' structure-preserving hypothesis, and the Empty Node Convention ^ ^ through which (145a) would be marked as deviant, the NP-Preposing just like the NP-Postposing analysis needs same kind of spelling rule to convert the empty prenominal NP slot into the definite or indefinite determiner. Under the NP-Postposing hypothesis which incorporates some version of Chomsky's original 117 doubly filled node device it seems moreover less difficult to account for the distribution of 'subjects of NPs', definite and indefinite determiners and quantifiers in prenominal position as in (146)

John's portrait - the/a portrait by John John's many portraits - the/*a many portraits by John •John's any portrait - any portrait by John same of John's portraits - some portraits by T u 118 John

Most of the premises on which Hornstein's Preposing solution rests are untenable or at least extremely dubious. Take, for example, his contention that the postposing analysis requires the specification of the semantic range of preposed genitive NPs because of

-

214

-

the different degrees of ambiguity this slot exhibits at least with nominal heads (cf. the three readings of John's portrait as against one in John's horse) whereas their different semantic ranges would follow from his approach in terms of trace theory such that they need not be specified for each lexical entry. First, it is obvious from the primary generalization of case grammars noted above that the surface subject slot is multiply ambiguous in English not only with nouns, but also 11 9 with verbs . To simplify the lexicon by collapsing the lexical entries for verbs with the same phonological and semantic properties, differing only in their surface subject selection was in fact one of Fillmore's main motivations for taking semantic case relations as basic and introducing syntactic relations transformationally. It even seems that more NPs can end up in the surface subject slot of verbs than in that of the corresponding nouns. Compare (147)a.

John opened the door with a key John's opening of the door with a key

b.

The door was opened by John with a key The opening of the door with a key by John ? The door's opening with a key by John

c.

The door opened ? The door's opening The opening of the door

d.

The key opened the door ? The key's opening of the door The opening of the door with a key

1 20

Second, the evidence from various sources presented above (cf. 6.4.2.2) suggests that Hornstein is wrong in claiming that John's horse can only mean 'horse that John owns'. Depending on the extralinguistic or preceding linguistic context, the meaning of such a preposed genitive may just as well be 'horse that John saw

-

215

-

yesterday, that John will buy (in John's horse will be black), that John will raise, or has raised, that John used to ride, etc.', thus exhibiting a pronominalization potential closely akin to the one we encountered 121 above with nominalization processes . Similarly, the interpretations of John's portrait are not restricted to the three readings Hornstein gives, namely 'agent', 'theme' or 'possession'. It may be interpreted in any number of ways from 'the portrait that John found in the attic, or hid in a cellar' to 'the portrait that John burned because he couldn't stand it' where it is difficult to discern any connection to a possessorpossession relationship. The only 'structural' features all these possible non-agent and non-thematic interpretations have in common are one that the genitive NP of the nominal occupies the position of a subject with respect to some predicate expression in which the head N occurs in some other NP position, be it direct or indirect object, or adverbial complement, and two that these interpretations are impossible in those cases where the genitive NP occurs postnominally in one of the prepositionally marked slots, (cf. the portrait of John, by John). This means that, though in post-head position the 'agent' and 'theme'readings are marked structurally, i.e. by the surface prepositions by and of respectively, in pre-head position all interpretations including 'agent' and 'theme' may arise, subject, of course to the condition that they are not yet expressed elsewhere, e.g. postnominally, in the instance at hand (cf. (148)). (148)a.

John's [ POSS] [ AGENT] [ THEME] [ ALL OTHERS]1 2 2

portrait

-

b.

216

-

Jane's portrait of John [-THEME]

[+THEME]

[POSS] [AGENT] [ALL OTHERS] c.

Jane's portrait of John by Bill [-THEME] [-AGENT]

[+THEME]

123

[+AGENT]

It follows from these observations that in order to attain at least observational adequacy Hornstein's preposing approach can dispense neither with specifying for each underived noun in the lexicon which of the structurally markable interpretations,

'theme' or

'agent', it may take, nor with postulating a relative clause source and corresponding

'hypothetical verbs' 124 for all the other possible interpretations . He could,

of course, try to avoid the formal problems of the latter approach by base-generating in pre-head position as many alternatives to the possessive feature as there are possible interpretations. Such a move would, however, be too ad hoc to deserve any further discussion.

6.4.2.4.2

Thematic functions + trace theory versus LH + X' theory

Other untenable consequences of Hornstein's preposing approach derive from the interactions of trace theory and the

kind of format for lexical entries he is assum-

ing. We noted above

(cf. p.208

and 211) that this format

correlates designated deep structure slots with w h a t • Hornstein calls thematic functions like theme, agent, possession such that selectional restrictions can be stated on them and need not be stated on grammatical relations. This m a y have its advantages for the treatm e n t of 'picture' nouns to which Hornstein's analysis

-

217

-

is restricted. If one tries to adopt this format for DNs (nomina actionis) and their verbal bases, one is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, there is no independent support for postulating a prenominai slot into which one of thè postnominal NPs can be moved

(cf. (149)) -

DNs do not take possessive NPs and languages which lack a determiner system do nevertheless have adnominal geni125 tive NPs - on the other hand the obligatoriness of

Í

The

1

•Bill's!

b.

opening of the door by John [+THEME] [+AGENT]

John's opening of the door by t

subjects in English finite clauses requires that the lexical entries for verbs specify the selectional features of the NPs possible in subject position (cf. (150)). (150)a.

John opened the door with a key [+AGENT]

b.

[+THEME]

The door opened

[+INSTR]

*by John

[+THEME] c.

This key opens the door [+INSTR]

*by John

[+THEME]

Thus, the parallelism between verbs and their DNs with respect to selectional and subcategorization features, a

precondition for maintaining the LH and X' theory

is lost in an approach like Hornstein's which attempts to combine Chomsky's subject-predicate analysis with

126

case grammar like notions such as thematic functions The required parallelism can, if at all, only be maintained by downgrading one of the primary generalization levels, the subject-predicate division or semantic case relations, to the secondary level 127

-

6.4.2-. 4.3

218

-

Trace theory and the base-generation of passives

The adoption of the trace-theoretical framework cannot save Hornstein's (1977) analysis either. On the contrary, it leads not only to some of the untenable consequences just sketched - forcing him to assume post-head slots as basic in order to have exclusively leftward move128 ments - but also to various conflicts with lexicalist analyses. Compare, for example, Freidin's lexicalistinterpretive analysis of passives discussed above (cf. 5.3.3.2-4) to the way passives would have to be treated in Hornstein's approach. With Freidin all passive verb forms are listed in the lexicon as Cy-p^ssiVE N P Y by NP X ] - where the selectional restrictions on the NPs concerned are stated, as with Hornstein, on thematic 129 functions like 'Source', 'Theme', 'Goal' - and there is a morphological redundancy condition that predicts the existence of an active counterpart ty^cTjvE N P X NP y^' if V p A S S and are semantically equivalent, and exchanges the specified thematic functions accordingly. Due to the trace-theoretical requirement that only NPs moved to the left can bind their traces, Hornstein would have to assume that the base-generated and lexically registered structure of active as well as passive sentences is (151)

np

V

NP by NP 1 3 0 I+THEME] I+AGENT]

Since this does not correspond to any well-formed sentential surface structure - the empty subject node would mark this structure as deviant - a leftward movement rule, giving either the active or the passive, would have to apply obligatorily, thus violating the REST 131 principle of the optionality of transformations . Ih case the NP of the by-phrase is preposed there would moreover have to be a rule deleting the stranded preposition

-

219

-

by. This would pose for REST the converse problem, as it were, to the one we noted above in connection with the generation of passives within the ST. In the latter framework great pains were taken to establish by A as an independently supported, syntactically motivated subcategorization feature for passivizable verbs in order to prevent passive from being a structure-building transformation that introduces a PP. Now within REST and trace theory there seem to be two mutually incompatible ways to generate actives and passives. In Freidin's lexicalist132

interpretive approach it is simply registered in the lexicon whether or not a given verb has a passive form, i.e. whether there is a related adjective with a subcategorizing PP complement, and the semantic syntactic correspondences between actives and passives are mediated through a morphological redundancy and an interpretive semantic rule, the syntactic component being able to base-generate phrase-markers corresponding to both sen133

tence types . Hornstein's trace-theoretical analysis would start out from a base-generated structure that is neutral with respect to the active/passive distinction and in which deep structure subjects are empty nodes with no selectional constraints on them, thus presupposing a format of lexical entries radically different from 134 that in Freidin's lexicalist lexicon . It would then be left to an obligatory preposing rule that optionally operates on either the theme or the agent NP to derive a passive or an active structure, necessitating in the latter case a rule that obligatorily gets rid of the preposition b^. In this approach, then, the formal problem would arise to find "independent evidence" for active being a structure-reducing operation.

-

6.4.2.4.4

220

-

Formal syntax, trace theory and selectional information

Notice, by the way, that since both, the lexicalistinterpretive and the trace-theoretical approach to passives, involve some version of an 'active' transformation

they cannot distinguish between sentences like

(152a) and (152b) without taking recourse to the semantic (152)a.

The wine was drunk by John

b.

John was drunk by midnight

(cf. Chomsky 1957:80)

information of selectional features. For, as pointed out by Chomsky

(1957), "there is no structural way to diffe-

rentiate properly between taken as kernel sentences"

(152a) and (152b) if both are (1957:80)

[numbering changed,

HUB], i.e. can be base-generated in REST. "But application of the 'active' transformation to (152b) does not give a grammatical sentence"

(ibid.). Compare John drank the

wine versus "midnight drank John. Why the 'autonomy of syntax' claim that syntactic transformations can only be sensitive to the category and the 136 position of a constituent and not to selectional information m u s t be violated in such cases is particularly obvious in the trace-theoretical analysis. Given that, despite his use of case-grammar-like thematic functions for lexical entries, Hornstein would nevertheless have to assume different lexical entries for a verb like open in order to exclude the starred examples in (153) (153)a.

np

open^

the door I+THEME]

by John

by midnight

t+AGENT]

John opened the door by midnight The door was opened by John by midnight b.

np open,,

the door

*by John

by m i d n i g h t

I+THEME] The door opened (*by John) by midnight

-

c.

221

np openj the door [+THEME]

-

with the key [+INSTR]

This key opened the door

*by John

*by John

and given that his categorial component is context-free such that as in ST context-sensitive subcategorization and selectional rules in the lexicon would determine lexical insertion, it would be possible for prepositio137 nal phrases other than agentive by-phrases to be generated by the categorial component in preterminal strings like NP V NP PP, i.e. each of the three structures (154) would be acceptable for lexical insertion. (154)a.

np open^ the door by John

b.

np ojaenj tfie door by midnight

c.

np open^ the door with a key

Since from the formal syntactic point of view all three structures are alike nothing can prevent the trace-theoretical preposing rule from applying to the PF in (154b), thus generating such ungrammatical sentences as *midnight opened the door by t, unless it is permitted access to the selectional information that b^ midnight is not an 138 agentive by-phrase . In view of the great descriptive latitude of semantic interpretation rules in REST it would of course be possible to let the syntax generate this structure and leave it to same semantic rule to filter it out, thus begging once more the question of the autonomy of syntax 139 A similar 'selectional' problem arises in Hornstein's preposing analysis of genitive NPs from the existence of another prenominal slot, namely the one for attributive adjectives. In arguing above against the base-generation of Chomsky's DNs one of our points was that the prenominal adjectival remnants of sentence adverbs only occur with DNs (nomina actionis) and with nouns that permit an agent reading of their preposed genitive NPs, as,

-

for example,

1

222

-

picture' nouns. We took this property as

evidence for a sentential source of both types of structures. Consider now, how Hornstein would have to deal with a situation in which a picture noun head is preceded not only by a genitive NP but also by an attributive adjective of the sentence adverbial type. Granted, for the sake of the argument, that there is a non ad hoc way of lexicalistically specifying the conditions of lexical insertion for such adjectives, i.e. without referring 140 to their derivational history in the lexicon , Hornstein w o u l d have to ensure that in the presence of prenominal adjectives with a sentence or manner adverb source (cf. (155)) the only possible interpretation of a genitive NP with a picture noun head is [AGENT]. (155)a.

^fast^ 6 * 3 }

John's

P o r t r a i t °f Mary

by t

[+THEME]

[+AGENT]

[+AGENT] ?Mary's

[alleged! (fast J

portrait

[+THEME] »Bill's [+P0SS]

of t [+THEME]

f alleged"! [fast j

by John [+AGENT]

portrait of Mary by John [+THEME]

[+AGENT]

To achieve this result would require the following move. Apart from his normal format of lexical entries for NPs (cf. (141) and (144) above) Hornstein would have to permit a second type of deep structure format for NP entries

which would systematically exclude a possession

reading of the prenominal NP slot either by not speci141 fying any thematic function for this position , if the prenominal adjectival slot is filled with an bial' adjective

'adver-

(cf. (156)), and subsequently restrict-

ing the application of his general NP-preposing rule to

- 223 -

(156)

np

{fagt9edj

p o r t r a i t of M a r y by J o h n I+THEME]

the a g e n t NP in the b y - p h r a s e e x c l u d e the u n a c c e p t a b l e

t+AGENT]

(cf.

(157b))

in o r d e r to

(155b) a n d the u n g r a m m a t i c a l

(157a), (157) a.

»Mary's

^fagt9^]

p o r t r a i t of t [+THEME]

b.

Mary's

ifast9^}

Portrait by t

^

[+AGENT]

o r by b a s e - g e n e r a t i n g the a g e n t i v e N P p r e n o m i n a l l y this i n s t a n c e (158)

(cf.

NP's

(158)). Adj

N of N P

[+AGENT] I f r o m S - a d v e r b ]

6.4.2.5

in

t+THEME]

Conclusions

6.4.2.5.1

T h e r e a d i n g s of prenorainal g e n i t i v e

NPs,

p o s t n o m i n a l PPs a n d t h e i r p r e d i c a t i v e

equi-

valents In c o n c l u d i n g t h i s s e c t i o n on a d n o m i n a l N P s , let m e s u m m a r i z e the m a i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s w e h a v e c o m e u p w i t h c o n c e r n i n g the p a r a l l e l i s m s a n d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n readings of prenaminal genitive NPs and their tionally m a r k e d versions

preposi-

in p o s t - h e a d p o s i t i o n ,

c a t e g e n i t i v e s a n d p r e d i c a t e PPs a n d p r e d i c a t e

the

predinomináis,

generalizations that either contradict basic lexicalist 142 a n d X' c a t e g o r i a l c l a i m s o r do n o t s e e m to b e c a p t u r a b l e in g r a m m a r s t h a t e x c l u d e in p r i n c i p l e

relative

clause sources with appropriate hypothetical verbs prenominal constituents of d e l e t i o n .

for r e a s o n s of

for

recoverability

- 224 -

The following charts "use the 'thematic'features [POSS], [AGENT],ITHEME] in the way introduced by Hornstein to 1 43 characterize the relevant readings of 'picture' nouns The negative value of a feature indicates that the interpretation in question is impossible for the respective position with the given class of nominal heads. The feature [ALL OTHERS] is meant to account for the large number of other readings that preposed genitive NPs and their predicative equivalents may exhibit with respect to their nominal heads and subject NPs respectively, in referring to portions of preceding 144 linguistic contexts or extralinguistic situations Chart 1 compares the readings of the NPs accompanying 'picture no*uns' with the readings of the corresponding predicate genitives. Chart 2 gives the possible readings in connection with an item that can either be a derived nominal in 1 45 Chomsky's sense (i.e. a namen actionis) or a picture noun, i.e. an object ncuninalization. The particular properties of namina actionis as against other classes of nouns (cf. the agent noun painter in Chart 2) are confirmed in Chart 3 where the possible readings of genitive NPs preposed to the types of nouns that may serve as bases for denominal verbs (cf. 6.4.1 above) and of their corresponding predicate genitives, predicate nominals and predicate PPs are compared with the behavior of the nominals derived from such denominal verbs, . 146 i.e. noraina actionis

CHART 1

A. Adnominal NPs of 'picture' noun; Bill's

portrait of Mary

f[+POSS] I[+AGENT] [+THEME] Í+ALL OTHERS]

by John

[+THEME] [-POSS] [-AGENT] [-ALL OTHERS]

[+AGENT] [-POSS] I-THEME] [-ALL OTHERS]

- 225 -

B.

Predicatives ; The portrait of Mary

is by John.

[+THEME]

[+AGENT] t-THEME] t-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS]

The portrait by John is of Mary. [+THEME] The portrait is John's.

(

t+AGENT] [+POSS] [+ALL OTHERS] [-THEME]

? The portrait is John. [+THEME] [-AGENT] [-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS]

Chart 2

A. Adnominal NPs of nomen

John's

|fast9ed]

Paintinc>

of

[+AGENT] [-POSS] [-THEME] [-ALL OTHERS]

Í

The 1 •Bill's)

actionis: Mary [+THEME]

fast painting of Mary by [+THEME]

John [+AGENT]

B. Predicatives: •The fast painting is John's. •The fast painting is by John. •The fast painting is of John, (cf. •The destruction of the city is the enemy's.

-

226

-

*The destruction by the enemy is of the city. •The destruction of the city is by the enemy. ) A.

Adnominal NPs of object nominalization : John's large painting of Mary [+POSS] [+AGENT] [+THEME] [+ALL OTHERS]

Í

The

Í

Bill's)

B.

t+THEME]

l a r 9 e painting of Mary by John

Predicatives: The large painting is by John. The large painting is of John. The large painting is John's. [+AGENT] [+POSS] t+ALL OTHERS] [-THEME] ?The large painting is John. [+THEME] I-AGENT] [-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS]

A.

Adnominal NPs of agent noun: The painter of Mary [+AGENT][+THEME] Mary's painter

1 48

[+AGENT]

f[+THEME] I H+POSS] ( ([+ALL OTHERS] [-AGENT]

?Bill's painter of Mary |[+POSS] \ ([ +ALL OTHERS ] J [-THEME] [-AGENT]

[+THEME]

- 227 -

B.

Pfedicatives: j?The j

Chart 3

Painter I+AGENT]

is

Mary's. [+POSS] [+ALL OTHERS] [-AGENT] [-THEME]

1. Locatum v e r b s :

A. Basis noun of denominal verb and i t s adnominal NPs Jane's blanket ([+MAKE] 149 [+POSS] [+ALL OTHERS] The blanket

(•of 4 on

( for J

'»Of ] on for

B. P r e d i c a t i v e s : •of on The blanket for

The blanket

the bed

fof Ì on for

the bed by Jane [+MAKE]

the bed i s Jane's . [+MAKE] [+POSS] [+ALL OTHERS] the bed i s by Jane. [+MAKE]

A. Nomen a c t i o n i s of denominal v e r b : Jane's blanketting [+AGENT] [-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS]

r Of •on •for

the bed [+THEME]

The blanketting of the bed by Jane [+THEME]

[+AGENT]

The bed's blanketting by Jane [+THEME] [-POSS]

[+AGENT]

228

-

B. P r e d i c a t i v e s : •The blanketting of the bed i s Jane's. •The blanketting of the bed i s by Jane.

150

•The blanketting by Jane i s of the bed . 2. Location verbs A. Basis noun of denominai verb; Kenneth's kennel j * f o r [ ' [+MAKE] 1 [+POSS] | [+ALL OTHERS]J The/a kennel ^ * f Q r j eor]

the

do9

ddog o g bby y KKenneth

the the

[+MAKE]

B. P r e d i c a t i v e s : The kennel f o r the dog i s Kenneth's. [+MAKE] [+P0SS] [+ALL OTHERS]J The kennel f o r the dog i s by Kenneth. [+MAKE] The kennel by Kenneth i s

j * o f

j

t h e

dog•

?The kennel by Kenneth i s the d o g ' s . A. Nomen a c t i o n i s of denominai verb: [•for] Kenneth's kenneling j of [+AGENT] I-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS] The kenneling

^ o°rj

the dog I+THEME)

the

[+THEME] The dog's kenneling by Kenneth [+THEME] [+AGENT] [-P0SS] [-ALL OTHERS]

Kenneth [+AGENT]

-

229

-

B. Predicatives: •The kenneling of the dog is Kenneth's, *The kenneling of the dog is by Kenneth. •The kenneling by Kenneth is the dog's. •The kenneling by Kenneth is of the dog.

3. Agent verbs: A. Basis noun of denominai verb: John's butcher of the cow(s) [+POSS] • [-AGENT] [+ALL OTHERS]

152

[+THEME]

The butcher of the cow(s) •by John B. Predicatives: The butcher of the cow(s) is John's. [+POSS] • [-AGENT] [+ALL OTHERS] •The butcher of the cow(s) is by John . •John's butcher is of the cow(s). A. Namen actionis of denominai verb: John's butchering of the cow(s) [+AGENT] [-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS]

[+THEME]

The butchering of the cow(s) by John [+THEME]

[+AGENT]

B. Predicatives : •The butchering of the cow(s) was John's . •The butchering of the cow(s) was by John . •The butchering by John was of the cow(s).

- 2 30 -

Goal (and Source) verbs; A. Basis noun of denominal verb: Edward's powder of aspirin [+MAKE] [+P0SS] t+ALL OTHERS] The powder of aspirin by Edward B. Predicatives; The powder of aspirin is Edward's. ([+MAKE] j[+P0SS] [[+ALL OTHERS] The powder of aspirin is by Edward. ?The powder by Edward is of aspirin. A. Nomina actionis of denominal verb; Edward's powdering of the aspirin [+AGENT] [+THEME] [-P0SS] [-ALL OTHERS] Thepowdering of the aspirin by Edward B. Predicatives t •The powdering of the aspirin was Edward's . •The powdering of the aspirin was by Edward •The powdering by Edward was of aspirin . Instrument verbs; A. Basis noun of denominal verb; John's bicycle in the shed [+MAKE] [+P0SS] [+ALL OTHERS]^ The bicycle in the shed by John

-

231

-

B. Predicatives: The bicycle in the shed is John 1 s. t+MAKE] [+POSS] [+ALL OTHERS] The bicycle in the shed is by John. [+MAKE] The bicycle by John is in the shed. A. Nomen actionis of denominal verb: John's bicycling into town [+AGENT] [-POSS] [-ALL OTHERS] The bicycling into town by John B. Predicatives: •The bicycling into town is John's. •The bicycling into town is by John. •The bicycling by John is into town.

6.4.2.5.2

The differences between nomina actionis

(DNs)

and all other types of nouns and their consequences for lexicalist grammars with X' bases It emerges from the charts above that prenominal genitive NPs in namina actionis as against in other types of underived or derived nouns 1.

do never exhibit a possessive interpretation with respect to the head noun ^ ^ ,

2.

do not have corresponding predicate genitives, not 154 even with an agent interpretation ,

3.

do not permit of predicate PPs corresponding to their internal prepositionally marked occurrences

These discrepancies between the properties of nomina actionis and of other kinds of nouns demonstrate again

- 232 -

the weaknesses of lexicalist grammars. Treating nomina actionis as being of the same base-generated syntactic category as underived nouns commits lexicalists to put ad hoc restrictions on the rules introducing nouns into derivations, i.e. to reintroduce all the particular properties of nomina actionis that have been generalized away in the attempt to equate them with nouns. By excluding hypothetical verbs as common syntacticsemantic origins for equivalent interpretations of prenominal genitive NPs,of thteir postposed prepositionally marked versions, of predicate genitives, of predicate PPs and certain predicate naminals, lexicalists and autonomous syntacticians are moreover forced to specify independently in terms of strict subcategorization and selectional features of the copula be the syntacticsemantic relations between any two nouns as many times as there are categorially distinct occurrences of one 157 of them with respect to the other . In addition, lexicalist approaches with X' bases are unable to show that the failure of nomina actionis to take possessive genitive NPs, to serve as subjects of predicate genitives or predicate PPs is a direct syntactic consequence of their derivational origin. Since the NPs accompanying a nomen actionis are still under the control of the 158 verbal nexus of the sentence underlying it - in contrast to 'object' or 'subject' nominalizations where a noun position out of the subcategorizational and selectional domain of the verb is singled out as the head of a relative clause nomina actionis derive from clausal complements to 159such metalinguistic nouns like FACT, ACTION, etc. - there is no way for such NPs to escape, as it were, the domain of this verbal nexus and to became part of other predicates such as predicate PPs or predicate genitives as it is possible with NPs accompanying underived nouns or nouns derived from relative clauses with 'object-linguistic'-heads

- 233 Constructions with underived nouns as heads, on the other hand, contain no explicit verbal nexus at all between the head and any of the NPs in its subcategorization domain. This is why any of these non-head NP can, together with the copula, become part of a predicate expression (cf. the predicate genitives, PPs and predicate nominals above) with the head NP and the remaining nonhead NPs as subject. These predicate expressions formed from non-head NPs are semantically equivalent to the verbal relationships that can exist between an underived head NP and the other NP in its domain, i.e. in transformational terms, to a certain range of hypothetical verbs for the 'object-linguistic' equivalents of which the grammar has to account anyhow in terms of subcategorization and selection . Constructions with head nouns derived from verbs via relativization of one of their subcategorizing 'object-linguistic' NPs, as, for example, agent nouns, share some properties with nomina actionis and some with 'underived NPs' insofar as, like the former, they contain an underlying verbal nexus which binds subcategorizing NPs in its domain, and, like the latter, contain an 'object-linguistic' head that can enter into certain semantic relationships with at 162 least one other noun . Thus, though the NPs that subcategorize the verb underlying an agent noun cannot escape the domain of this verb to form part of a predicate expression - there are no predicate PPs like *This painter is by Mary/of Mary - agent nouns can be accompanied by genitive NPs with which they may exhibit a 164 possessive or contextually determined interpretation And it is exactly these interpretations that predicate genitives with agent noun NPs as subjects are limited to.

6.4.2.5.3

Postposing

234

-

(X^') versus preposing

(Xj')

approaches and their consequences for and compatibility with REST tenets: 6.4.2.5.3.1

Divergent properties

Summarizing now the results of the preceding sections in terms of the competing analyses w e discussed, i.e. NPpostposing versus NP-preposing

(cf. 6.4.2.3-4), which go

with the two m a i n versions of X' theory , following Postposing

and X 2 ' , the

divergent properties can be listed: as against Preposing analyses

1. retain the parallelism between NPs

(in particular

nomina actionis) and sentences in accordance with Chomsky's original arguments for LH and its categorial coionterpart, X 1 ' t h e o r y 2. require only one type of format for lexical entries in which due to the incorporation of S in the X' convention strict subcategorizational and selectional features are specified for a.

transitive verbs, their passives and their corresponding nomina actionis ; cf. the base structure

b.

of Ss:

active

NP^ V N P 2

passive

NP.J V NPj b^ A

active

NPj ( ' s) N N P g

passive

NP.j ('s) N N P 2 b^ A

intransitive verbs and their nomina actionis: cf. the base structure of Ss: NP^ V of NPs: NP 1 Cs)

John arrived N

John's arrival c.

head nouns of inalienable possessive constructions:

d.

NP 1 Cs) N

John's lea

168

the actives and passives of picture nouns;

167

- 235 -

cf. the base structures active:

NP 1 (*s) N NP,

passive: NP 1 Cs) N NP 2 by A

169

3. require relative clause sources for 'alienable' possessive constructions (and contextually determined readings of prenaminal genitive NPs) and consequently the postulation of hypothetical verbs

17

°,

or, if one subscribes to the formal syntactic recoverability condition, a corresponding semantic projection rule (which relates all syntactic construction types with the same reading) 4. generate all (passive) by-phrases in NPs and Ss as derived

structures (cf. 2a. and d. and p.208 above)

and therefore need a b ^ A interpretation rule, 5. require spelling rules for the Pet-position in NPs 172 if Postposing has applied , 6. are incompatible with versions ;of trace theory that exclude rightward movement rules. Preposing analyses 1. discard

173

, on the other hand,

with the parallelism between NPs and Ss

as not significant

(cf. 6.4.2.3.4.1) and therefore

do not incorporate S in the X' convention contrary to a basic tenet of LH and its categorial counterpart , X' theory, 2. require a proliferation of the types of formats of lexical entries for the 'same' lexical item such that all pre-head occurrences that have posthead counterparts can be derived by moving these base-generated post-head categories into the basegenerated, but empty, prenominal slot. The number of input structures to the semantic projection rules increases correspondingly. Thus, there have

- 236

-

to be different lexical entries for a. transitive verbs, their passive forms and their nomina actionis, cf. the base structures of Ss: active

g[NP1

passive of Ns: active

[vp

stNp[e]

NP 1 N N P 2

passive

V NP2]]g was[

eaten

NP]]

174

175

Det N N P 2 by NP^

b. intransitive verbs and their nomina actionis: cf. the base structures of Ss:

NP^ V

of Ns:

NP^Cs)

John/the m e n arrived n

Det N NP 1

John's arrival The arrival of the m e n

c. head nouns of 'inalienable' possessive constructions : NP.jCs) N

John's m o t h e r

Det N of NP1

The mother of all these children

d. picture nouns: - without a prencnminal possessive NP, i.e. with an empty prenominal slot

np N

of NP

by NP

portrait Mary

John

[-HTHEME] [+A3ENT] - preceded by an 'alienable' possessive NP - preceded by an 'adverbial' adjective

N P 3 ( ' s ) N NP 2 by NP. [+POSS]

NP^'sjAdj [+AGENT]

N

17fi

of N ^

t+THEME]

In addition, a mechanism is needed to account for the obligatory absence of definite pronouns in the 177 'direct object' position of nominals ,

- 237 cf. a) b)

3.

*the destruction of it by the barbarians *the arrival of him/them

c)

*the mother of him/them

d)

*the portrait of her by John

base-generate prenominal alienable possessor NPs (cf. 2d. above) to explain Bill's portrait of Mary by Warhol, but need relative clause sources for contextually determined readings of genitive NPs,

4.

base-generate all (passive) by-phrases

(cf. 2a,d)

and therefore need a. a by-phrase interpretation rule for NPs and Ss relating its agent reading to the one exhibited by the pre-N and pre-V subjects of intransitives and by the of-phrases in intransitive nominals, and b. an

obligatory by- and of-deletion rule if the

NP in question has been preposed, 5.

require spelling rules for the Pet-position if Preposing has not applied,

6.

are compatible with versions of trace theory that assume exclusively leftward movements, but incompatible with any version of trace theory that is based on an X 1 ' subcategorization format which

178

systematically prohibits empty subject positions

6.4.2.5.3.2 Ccanmon fai lures Being more or less consistently committed179 to LH and to an X' make-up of the categorial component , both, preposing and postposing analyses have however in common that 1. they cannot account syntactically for the relations between pre-head genitives, post-head PPs and predicate genitives (cf. e.g. 6.4.2.3.2),

,- 2 3 8

2.

-

they have to assume as many separate lexical entries for a given verb as there are different subject choices for it (cf. 6.4.2.4.2-4.4),

3.

they w o u l d have to find a way to ensure that in the presence of a prenominal adjective with a sentence or manner adverbial source the prenominal genitive NP slot of a picture noun can only be filled by an NP which permits an 'agent' interpretation with respect to the 'picture' noun p. 236

4.

(cf.

and 6.4.2.4.4) ,

they are unable to explain the particular syntactic properties of nomina actionis which distinguish them from other types of nouns as a consequence of their transformational origin

(cf. 6.4.2.5.2).

- 239 -

VII. 7.0

FURTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST X 1 ' AND X 2 ' THEORIES Introduction

In the last chapter we showed how the syntactic properties of denominal verbs, denominal adjectives and deadjectival verbs and those of their respective bases falsify the predictions of Chomsky's original X' schema and why the existence of predicate genitives and their relations to pre-head genitives, post-head PPs and predicate PPs and nominals pose insurmountable

diffi-

culties for all categorial components of the X' variety. It was also demonstrated that the two main versions of X' theory, X 1 ' and X 2 ',differ from each other in so far as

' by incorporating S into the schema is compa-

tible with LH, but incompatible with trace theory, while 1 X_ by excluding S from the schema is incompatible with i i LH, but compatible with trace theory

We will now investigate whether other kinds of arguments that have been given in support of X' categorial bases exhibit similar defects. The arguments in question 2 center around two main claims X" systems are said to constitute a natural

formalization

of the modifier-head distinction and to permit a restrictive definition of the possible PS-rules of natural languages ^.

7.1

X' Systems and the Modifier-Head Distinction the clearly

(or

'unclear' case of prenominal adjec-

tives) 7.1.1

'Specifier' as a category symbol versus an abbreviation of nodes

7.1.1.1

Introduction

Above we noted phrase category

(cf. 6.1.1) that Chomsky introduced the 'Comp'

(cf. X' -» X Comp) in order to

account for the supposed parallelism in the range of

- 240 complements that may accompany DNs, other base-generated determiner-noun constructions, verbs and adjectives, i. e. the 'heads' of phrases containing the lexical cate4 gories N, V and A . Similarly, a new category label 'Specifier' was introduced by Chomsky to refer to the phrases associated with N', V', A' in the schema X 1 ' -» [Spec X'] X' where [Spec N'] is analyzed as the determiner with subject-genitiveNPs as one of its realizations, [Spec V'] as the auxiliary (perhaps with time adverbials associated) and [Spec A'] "perhaps as the system of qualifying elements associated with adjective phrases (comparative structures, very, etc.)" (1968:52).

We also

noted that, as a consequence of his deep structure subject-predicate analysis which places the subject of a sentence outside V'' (cf. (107) on p.163 above) while generating the subject of the corresponding DN inside N'', i.e. in the specifier of N 1 ', Chomsky's original X' proposal (1968) is prevented from formulating in a uniform manner that the respective NP is in both cases in the same relationship to V', viz. N', from the point of view of subcategorization, selection and semantic interpretation (cf. 6.4.2.2.1). Contrary to Chomsky's lexicalist intentions, his grammar thus fails to assign internal structures to DNs that mirror those of the related sentences. Such difficulties do not arise in a case grammar framework. In fact case grammars and dependency grammars

seem to provide the only available

sets of primary generalizations in the framework of which the deep structural parallelisms between V, N and A claimed by LH can be coherently expressed in so far as none of the subcategorizing NPs is deemed to play a more prominent role than any of the others and the elements appearing under the [Spec X'] node need not include, for example, subjects of NPs, but are all "actualizers" in the traditional sense, i.e. articles and auxiliary elements

- 241

-

Apart from Chomsky's dubious interpretation of prenominal (subjective) genitive NPs as Specifiers of N' which falsely identifies complementary distribution of constituents with semantic similarity

7

, there are however

other grounds for questioning the validity of the notion 'Specifier'. Following Chomsky's original proposal some X' syntacticians use 'Specifier' as a category symbol, or node (cf. Hornstein 1977, Halitsky 1975), others, Jackendoff (1977) in particular, use it to refer to the material in a phrase to the left of the 'head', i.e. just like 'Camp' as an abbreviation of nodes, "for expository convenience only, with no theoretical significance imo plied" (Jackendoff 1977:37) and still others, as, for example, May

(1977) introduce 'Specifier' as a cate-

gory symbol in the base rules

(cf. May (1977:18)), but

consider the notion 'Specifier' nevertheless as a functional notion of the grammar "comparable to the notions 'subject' or 'object'"

7.1.1.2

(1977:43).

"Category Symbolists"

7.1.1.2.1 7.1.1.2.1.1

Hornstein

(1977):

S * V" '

'Specifiers' versus 'modifiers'

Within the first group, the "category symbolists", as it were, there is disagreement on the question of incorporating S into the X' convention by identifying it w i t h some level of V (cf. Hornstein 1977:160 fn.23). As we have already seen above

(cf. 6.4.2.3.4) Hornstein, an

adherent of NP-Preposing, is opposed to such an incorporation. He proposes a set of base rules in order to be able to formulate a rule of X' Deletion

(X = N, V, P),

a rule of Neg-Placement, as well as to offer an analysis 9 of ambiguous phrases like an old man's book . These proposals are assumed to give better accounts of the phenomena in question than Jackendoff's

(1971, 1974)

- 242

-

approaches. Hornstein's base rules assign parallel expansions to N, V, P, Quant, Adv and Adj according to the schema (159). They all have the structure (160). (159)

X'" X' ' X' X

(160)

In contrast to Chomsky's original structural schema (cf. (161)) 1 0 which in Jackendoff's words "is claimed to constitute a linguistically significant generalization of the structures associated with major categories" (1977:17) and where only one specifier node, an immediate (161)

Spec X' Comp (Jackendoff 1977:17) constitutent of X'',is assumed as an obligatory sister node to X', and no occurrence of a lexical category X is permitted to dominate itself (i.e. an instance of the same lexical category in the projection line), Hornstein generates an optional 'Specifier' node on the

- 243 X'' and the X" level and expands the basic category symbol X into Mod(ifier of) X and X. Unfortunately, he neither gives any explicit reasons for postulating these extra structures nor motivates the introduction of a 'Modifier' node on the lowest level of structure. An inspection of the rewriting possiblities he offers for Spec X'' shows, in fact, that his rules only contain an optional expansion for X=N, (cf. Spec N"1 -» (Q)) the remaining categories being without Specifiers on the highest structural level ^ ^. It thus is legitimate to dispense with Spec X'' as ad hoc and consequently with the X"'' level of structure. 'Mod X', on the other hand, appears at first sight to represent a real advantage over Chomsky's schema because it occurs with all categories (Mod N -» Adj, Mod P -* Adv, Mod V Adv, Mod Q Adv (cf. Hornstein 1977: 158)) and provides in particular a position to base-generate prenominal adjectives in, if one accepts the lexicalist arguments against deriving them from relative clause 12 sources or by means of a nominalization transformation (cf. the American attempt to attack Cuba from [America attempts [America attack Cuba]c]c (see Chomsky 13 1972c:165)) JJ

7.1.1.2.1.2

"Relative clause source" and "subjectival" adjectives

A closer look at the structures generatable by Hornstein's rule N -»(Mod N) N reveals, however, that, due to the recursion implicit in this expansion, Mod N = Adj comes at the cost not only of violating the X' categorial 14 prohibition against self-dominating categories , but also of being unable to specify, with the formal machinery available within REST, the conditions for inserting 'relative clause source' adjectives into the 'Mod N' position. Since the admissibility of such prenominal ad-

- 244 jectives primarily depends on the syntactic-semantic nature of the nominal head

stating such insertion

conditions for the class of adjectives that also may occur in predicate position would require reformulating the selectional rules for subjects of predicative adjectives in the structural format of strict subcategorization rules in so far as these subject NPs occur, in the simplest case, to the right of prenominal adjectives. Apart from the fact that one would thereby state the same regularity twice, such 'strict subcategorization rules' would not obey the Strict Locality 16

Condition in those cases in which one or more other prenominal adjectives intervene between the left-most one and its 'head' noun. This would amount to introducing discontinuous 'strict subcategorization frames' a contradiction in terms - which, in turn, would lead to an increase of the class of base derivations and consequently in the class of possible base components of grammars 17 Trying to specify the prenominal insertability conditions for adjectives like American in the American attempt to attack Cuba runs into insurmountable difficulties, too, within Hornstein's approach. Though the projection rule he proposes (cf. 1977:140) can correctly assign the 'subject' relation to the furthest NP to the left of X' on the basis of the structural configuration (136) (cf. p. 205 above), as for example in America attempts to attack Cuba and in America's unfortunate attempt..., thus (136)

[( C ^ mp )

NP-Y-X'

- Z], X is N or V (Hornstein 1977:140)

giving a unified account of 'subject' in both NPs and Ss without identifying S with V'', it is impossible within a lexicalist framework to modify this structure in such a way that it can also capture the subject relation between the denominal adjective American and the DN attempt in the unfortunate American attempt ... 1 8

- 245 -

Even if the projection rule would be permitted access to the internal structure of such denominal adjectives, it could not account for the fact that no other adjective, or any other element for that matter, may separate such 'subjectival' adjectives from their deverbal heads ^ and that, due to the DOC, no 'subjective' genitive NP may be generated in the Spec N' position in the presence of such adjectives

7.J.J.2.2

Halitsky (1975): S = V'''

7. J. 1.2. 2.1

An X^j 1 prediction: The Specifier Recursion Hypothesis

Halitsky (1975), another 'category symbolist', starts out from the observation that, from a purely formal point of view, Jackendoff's (1968) proposal to incorporate S into the X" schema as a higher bar-level of the lexical category V (cf. (163)) implies that there should be bar-notation structures like (164) which are precisely parallel to structures like (162) in that, there too, only one category constant appears in the entire configuration. (162)

the enemy's

destruction of the city

(163)

the enemy

destroyed the city (Halitsky

1975:280)

- 246 -

(164) [Spec,V]

V'

V* '

ZX ?????? (Halitsky 1975:281) Halitsky's suggestion is that (164) is not simply a .mechanical prediction of X' theory which is not empirically realized in the form of any English sentence (cf. 1975:281), but that it actually underlies sentences with tensed and infinitival sentential subjects as in (165) which therefore can be claimed to be structurally 21 exactly parallel to the peasants' two rebellions (165)a. b.

That the peasants rebelled displeased the count, For the peasants to rebel would displease the count.

(Halitsky 1975:282)

He states this claim as in (166). (166)

The Specifier Recursion Hypothesis:

A grammar

of English should use the same recursive device to generate noun-phrase determiners of noun phrases and tensed and infinitival sentential subjects of sentences. This recursive device is the Left-Branch Rule Schema: (i)

X m - [Spec, X

(m-1)

] X

(m_1)

(ii) [Spec, X Xm where:X = N or V ; in (ii), X™ is the highest barlevel of the lexical category X, in (iii ): X™ = X' ' ' , if in = 3, etc. (Halitsky 1975:284) Halitsky's PS-rules Schema fn. 3) -

22

- which accord with the Left Branch Rule

and provide for complementizers too (cf. 19 75:283 are of the form (167):

- 247 -

(167)

X" '

Spec X'''

X' ' '

Spec X''

X' ' X'

X' ' ' X''

->

Spec X" X' 23 -» X . . .

such that each major node has the following expansion: (168)

Spec X Spec X

Comp

7.1.1.2.2.2

Sentential subjects versus nominal subjects 24

Presupposing Eraonds' Structure-Preserving Hypothesis Halitsky

(1975) formulates an optional N''' and V ' "

Postposition Transformation

(cf. (169) and (170)) which

produce structures as in (172) and (171) respectively. (169)

X - N111

(170)

X - V " ' - Y

- Y

X-

the - Y - N'''

X - [_it + N] - Y - V' ' 1 (cf. Halitsky 1975:284)

(171)

[ v ,„ t [ S p e c # v - ] count

(172)

[N,„

[v„

ifc

Hv„

PAST [ v ,

displease the

that the peasants rebelled]]]]

tISpeCfN.»]

the] [ N „

the peasants]]]]

25

two [JJ,

rebellions

(cf. ibid.)

(of)

248 A - X''1 - B -+ 1 2 3 1 3 2 which collapses the two rightward movement rules, NP-Postposing and Extraposition, the Specifier Recursion Hypothesis together with a general Surface Structure Condition on interpretability blocking structures like (173) and (174) make then, according to Halitsky, The general transformational process

(173)

*That that Harry left is obvious 26

(174)

*the corn's growth's rapidity

the following claims: (175) Sentences may appear as subjects of sentences in English for the same reason that noun phrases may appear as the determiners of noun phrases - there exists in English a general recursive process ... the Left Branch Rule Schema (see (166)). (cf. Halitsky 1975:295) (176)

Sentences may be extraposed from subject position in English for the same reason that noun phrases may be postposed from determiner position...

(177)

Sentences may not appear in the subject position of embedded sentences in English for the same reason that noun phrases which properly contain noun phrases may usually not appear in the determiner position of noun phrases - there exists in English a general Surface Structure condition on interpretability... (cf. ibid.)

The Specifier Recursion Hypothesis is furthermore held to reconcile the two conflicting analyses of tensed and infinitival sentential subjects by Rosenbaum (1967) and 27 Emonds (1972) . In Rosenbaum's extraposition approach such subjects are dominated by noun phrases in deep structure. Emonds' intraposition approach base-generates them as verbal complements. In contrast to this, the Specifier Recursion Hypothesis claims that (178)a. Tensed and infinitival sentential subjects are generated in Deep Structure subject position.

-

249

-

b. T e n s e d a n d i n f i n i t i v a l s e n t e n t i a l s u b j e c t s are not dominated by noun phrases in Deep Structure. (Halitsky

1975:287)

T a k i n g u p the latter p o i n t s f i r s t , n o t i c e t h a t the S p e c i f i e r R e c u r s i o n H y p o t h e s i s does n o t

reconcile

R o s e n b a u m ' s and E m o n d s ' d i v e r g e n t c l a i m s in the s e n s e of r e s o l v i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e m o n a h i g h e r of a b s t r a c t i o n .

It s i m p l y m o d i f i e s R o s e n b a u m ' s

level

analysis

by d e n y i n g , w i t h o u t any s u b s t a n t i v e a r g u m e n t ,

that

t e n s e d a n d i n f i n i t i v a l s e n t e n t i a l s u b j e c t s are d o m i n a t e d b y n o u n p h r a s e s in d e e p s t r u c t u r e . H a l i t s k y o n l y some d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s of i n f i n i t i v a l

cites

senten-

tial s u b j e c t s a n d g e r u n d s o f f e r e d b y E m o n d s as

evidence 28

a g a i n s t their b e i n g d o m i n a t e d b y NPs i n d e e p He fails to m e n t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t t e n s e d

structure

sentential

s u b j e c t s , as for e x a m p l e t h a t c l a u s e s , d o n o t e x h i b i t • t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s if t h e i r o p t i o n a l lexical h e a d n o u n s are p r e s e n t . T h u s , in c o n t r a s t to i n f i n i t i v a l

sentential

s u b j e c t s w h i c h c a n n o t o c c u r in the b y - p h r a s e of p a s s i v e s (cf.

(179)), the t e n s e d s e n t e n t i a l s u b j e c t of H a l i t s k y ' s

example

(179)a. b.

(165a) above can o c c u r in this p o s i t i o n if p r e -

For John to strip would cause to strip,

(cf. 1975:287)

c e d e d b y t h e lexical h e a d n o u n f a c t (180)

embarrassment,

'Embarrassment would be caused by

(for)

John

29 30

(cf.

(180)).

T h e fact t h a t the p e a s a n t s r e b e l l e d d i s p l e a s e d the count. T h e c o u n t w a s d i s p l e a s e d b y the fact t h a t the peasants

rebelled.

It is o b v i o u s that i n o r d e r to a c c o m o d a t e s u c h

structures

H a l i t s k y e i t h e r has to a d m i t t h a t t h e s e t e n s e d

senten-

tial s u b j e c t s are d o m i n a t e d b y N P s in d e e p s t r u c t u r e or m u s t a s s u m e a PS rule w h i c h by o p t i o n a l l y e x p a n d i n g V ' ' ' into N P S w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t the c l a i m s of X'

syntacticians

- 250 -

as to the restrictive format of their PS rules (cf. 7.2 below). Either solution would, however, still fail to account for the exceptional properties of the lexical head nouns of the that clauses concerned. As noted above (cf. 5.2.3.3) nouns like fact, proposition, etc., if they function as metalinguistic head nouns of complement clauses, neither pluralize nor take prenominal adjectives and cannot be preceded by genitive NPs but only by the definite determiner the. It is difficult to see how Halitsky's X' rules could generate the required restrictions on these optional head nouns of sentential subjects without violating lexicalist tenets.

7.1.1.2.2.3

Locality, strict locality, and inherent subcategorization of sentential subjects

But even within the limited range of data Halitsky is dealing with there are descriptive problems which he does not seem to be aware of. Notice first, that his PS-rules, as they stand ( V'' ' -» [Spec V'' ] V " ; N' ' '1 (1975:283)), permit the generation v , ,,}• of full main clauses in the subject position of verbs 31 which obviously yields only ungrammatical results

i

Having done away with NP-domination of tensed sentential subjects - which in Rosenbaum's approach indicated at least the subordinate character of such clauses - Halitsky is now left with the subcategorizational and selectional frames of individual lexical items to exclude full main clauses from subject position in deep structure. Though his identifying S with V''' makes the subjectverb relation "local" with respect to the X''' category, subcategorization features cannot do the job because, with Spec V' = TENSE intervening, the sentential subject is not '¡strictly local', i.e. adjacent to the lexical 32 head V . In the case of Halitsky's example displease, which in any event must be strictly subcategorized for its direct object, it would moreover necessitate the

-

251

-

postulation of discontinuous strict subcategorization frames. Trying to account for the restrictions on the tensed sentential subjects of displease in terms of subject-selection rules runs into severe problems as well. Thus, they must not only be of the form Comp V''', i.e. must be introduced by a member of the syntactic category of complementizers, but displease, like any other verb or adjective, also selects only certain members of that class, namely that-complements, exclamatory complements but no interrogative complements (cf. (181)) though the former may be identical in form, i.e. (181)a. b. c. d.

That the peasants rebelled What the peasants did How rebellious the peasants were ^Whether the peasants were rebellious

displeased the count.

syntactic representation, to the latter 3 3 . It follows that tensed sentential subjects must be inherently subcategorized as to their syntactic and semantic type in order to provide a basis for the subject selection rule to work on. Note, finally, that this additional machinery owes its necessity solely to the requirements of Halitsky's attempt to establish a parallelism between the subjects of NPs and Ss as predicted by the X' theory. Except for linear order and the special properties of the metalinguistic head noun, it duplicates the information needed anyway in stating, to the right of the head, the strict subcategorization features for the majority of English verbs in general and for the passive entry of displease in particular (cf. (182)). (182)a.

b.

fact|

displeased the count that the peasants

rebelled. It displeased the count

r, , ,. . .. 1 how rebellious the / peasants were, what the peasants did. ^whether the peasants were rebellious

- 252 -

c. The count was displeased with

7.1.1.2.2.4

the fact that the peaj sants rebelled . ( •that the peasants rebelled *how rebellious the pea- I sants were . > •whether the peasants were rebellious . the peasants' rebellion .

'Subjectival' adjectives versus the Left Branch Schema

Turning now to prenominal 'subjectival' adjectives of the type discussed above, it is immediately obvious that Halitsky's rules cannot generate them. As (183), the adjectival version of the DN in (184) shows, there is no base-generated position to insert such adjectives into. (183)a. b. c.

the two (unfortunate) peasant rebellions *the soldiers' two peasant rebellions the two unfortunate peasant and soldierly rebellions

(184)

peasants'

two

(cf. Halitsky 1975:286) Due to the prohibition against doubly filled nodes they cannot be generated under ISpec, N'] as sisters of NUM. Due to Halitsky's Left Branch Schema a rule like N' -»

- 253 [Spec,N] N Comp,which would yield a prenominal adjectival slot, is impossible because, though carrying the specifier parallelism one level lower, it would violate the principle of binary branching. Saving the latter principle by substituting for N' -• [Spec,N] N Comp the two rules N'

[Spec,N] N

and

N

N Comp would, on the other hand,

violate the X' categorial prohibition against the selfdomination of lexical category symbols and, what is worse, would permit the recursive generation of ungrammatical outputs, i.e. of unjustifiable complement nodes

7.d.].2.2.5

The costs of the

' "prediction" :

In the light of the foregoing discussion evaluate now the merits of Halitsky's attempt to flesh out the predictions of Jackendoff's X'''(or X'''') theory with respect to an exact parallelism between the expansions 36 of N''' and V ' 1

. This parallelism is supported by

his two parallel rightward movement rules and by the 'principled explanation 1 his general surface structure condition on interpretability gives for the unacceptability of stacked N ' ^ s in N' 1 ' subject position and of stacked V'''s

(=Comp S) in sentential subject posi-

tion. The hypotheses which Halitsky

derives from these

parallelisms are that 1. may appear as the subjects of sentences in English sentences 2. may be extraposed from subject position in English 3. may not appear in the subject position of embedded sentences in English for the same reason that

noun pDhrases

1. may appear as the determiners of noun phrases 2 * m a y b e P o s t P o s e d from determiner position which properly contain noun phrases may usually not appear in the determiner position of noun phrases •

- 254 Their 'explanatory power' and hence the explanatory power 37 of Halitsky's version of X^theory comes at the cost of 1. syntactically differentiating sentential subjects without lexical head nouns from their semantic equivalents possessing such lexical heads with a corresponding enrichment of the semantic component , 2. being forced to carry out this syntactic differentiation by means of rules like V' ' ' -» the N S which violate the X' schema, 3. of postulating subject selection rules which, through their partial identity with independently needed strict subcategorization rules, duplicate syntactic information already expressed and which amount to the establishing of discontinuous subcategorization frames, 4. of being unable, like any other X' categorial grammar, to provide for the generation of prenominal, particularly 'subjectival' adjectives in a way that is compatible with X' principles purportedly formalizing linguistically significant generalizations. Summing up the preceding sections, we discussed two approaches which both use 'Specifier' as a category symbol but differ from each other with respect to the identification of S with V''' (or V'''') and consequently with respect to the NP-Preposing vs.-Postposing parameter. Hornstein's motivation for taking the former option was to be able to formulate a rule of X' Deletion and of Neg-Placement and to provide an analysis of am38 biguous phrases like an old man's book . Halitsky, on the other hand, motivated his • postposing approach to tensed and infinitival sentential subjects and NP subjects as the attempt to substantiate a prediction of X' theory with regard to the structural parallelism of these 'Specifiers'. In neither approach, however, was it possible to account for the occurrence and interpretation of prenominal, particularly 'subjectival' adjectives without violations of basic tenets of X'

- 255 theories such as the prohibition against the selfdomination of categories of the same hierarchical level 39 or against ternary branching

'Specifier1 as an abbreviation of nodes

7.3.1.3 7.1.3.3.J

Jackendoff's (1977) position: S = V'''

Examining new the properties of a version of X' theory where 'Specifiers' are not assigned the status of a category symbol or node, it is first necessary to mention some of the reasons that may be adduced in favor of such a decision. Jackendoff (1977), whose drastic modifications of Chomsky's X' schema were motivated by his desire to establish a real parallelism between NPs and Ss (i.e. V ' ^ J w i t h respect to the grammatical relation 'sub40 ject-of' , justifies his abolishment of 'Specifier' as a syntactic category as follows. . . .there is to my knowledge no evidence that either complements or specifiers function as constituents, no part can be designated as a head. Consequently,! will use the terms specifier and complement for expository convenience only, with no theoretical significance implied. (Jackendoff 1977:37) In the canonical form (185) which he sets up for phrase structure rules he therefore refers to the terms C^,..., Cj as X n specifiers and to c j + 1 f ..., C^ as X n complements . (185)

Xn

-

A

(252) NP 1 V3

(NP)

NP 9

adjectives

stands for a lexical redundancy

206

rule or morphological redundancy (81)'

(81)' of

(passive)

condition

(PP) (PP) NP3

(see p.145 ) NP2

Adj i

207

NP3

(P NP.,)

John gave the turtle an ear » of c o m J NP 1 V2 NP3 P NP2

The turtle was given an ear of c o m

John gave an ear of com

An ear of com

to the turtle

»

NP3

Adj2

P NP2

was given to the turtle

(by John) (P NP.,) (by Jchn)

Chomsky's most recent version of REST advocates a distinction between syntactic passive participles that are neutralized verb adjectives with the feature structure

[+V] (cf. (254)) and adjectival

passives with the feature structure

lexical

[+N,+V]

(see

such that ambiguous passive participles like which, according to Chomsky, appear in both 208 (254)

(253))

frightened (253) and

, can be treated as adjectival and sometimes

as verbal, depending on whether the participle is lexically generated or a syntactic passive

(cf. 1981:

55) . (253)

John seems old

(sad, tired, frightened,

untaught,

•taught by Bill, *believed to be a fool, *killed) (254)

John had Bill leave *sad, *frightened,

(killed, taught French, *untaught) (Chomsky

1981:54)

- 327 While Chomsky's distinction is incompatible with the three EST analyses just mentioned, but like them ignores the existence of the untie class of passivi209 zable verbs - following Chomsky's morphological criterion they should be generated in the lexicon despite their occurrence in all syntactic passive contexts - Chomsky's approach requires nevertheless just like Freidin's, three lexical entries for a simple transitive verb like kill and its syntactic passive. (214)" Bill INFL [ [ + v _ N ] kill John] (active) (214)' [ N p e] INFL be

kill* John, by Bill] (full syntactic passive )

(214)

[

e]

INFL be [p-^, kill* John]( truncated syntactic passive) (cf. p.289 above)

But due to the empty category generated in the subject position of the passive participles (cf. (214)' and (214)) Chomsky's approach also requires an obligatory application of NP-Preposing, i.e. 'Move a', in (214) and (214)' and the postulation of an ad hoc condition on 'Move a' to prevent the NP Bill from being moved out of the by-phrase in (214)' by Preposing 210 Besides the complications these three lexical entries cause for Chomsky's theories of government, ©-marking and grammatical functions (cf. 7.1.3.4.2) Chomsky's projection principle requires furthermore that these three lexical 'heads' must be kept distinct all the way to the LF component only to be collapsed there, if their common logical subject and object are to be identified ^ ^ . The same unfortunate consequences arise with the six lexical entries which must be assumed for the class of double object verbs in Chomsky (1981). 'Move a'

- 328 must be restricted in such a way that it can prepose only one out of the three categories that subcategorize give* in (255) and (256) and all six entries (255)

I N p e]

INFL be Ij^j give* the turtle, an ear of

corn, (by John)] (256) I N p e]

INFL be

[pp^ give* an ear of corn, to

the turtle, (by John)]

212

must be collapsed in LF into one three-place predicate whose nominal arguments are solely distinguished from each other by the different 6-roles they exhibit ir213 respective of their syntactic occurrences

7.3.3.3

Proliferation of formal devices versus explanatory adequacy

It is hard to see how in view of the consequences for the other subcomponents and subtheories and in particular for the lexicon the REST reduction of the variety of transformational operations to the single rule 214 'Move a' (to the left) can be claimed to contribute anything to the goal of reducing the class of available grammars. It rather seems that REST approaches answer Chomsky's own description of explanatory inadequacy. ... it is evident that a reduction in the variety of systems in one part of the grammar is no contribution to these ends [explanatory adequacy, HUB] if it is matched or exceeded by proliferation elsewhere. Thus , considering base rules, transformations, interpretive rules mapping the output of these systems to phonetic and logical form, and output conditions on PF and LF, it is no doubt possible to eliminate entirely the category of transformations by enriching the class of base systems and interpretive rules. Shifting the variety of devices from one to another component is no contribution to explanatory adequacy. It is only when a reduction in one component is not matched or exceeded elsewhere that we have reason to believe that a better

-

329

-

a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d g r a m m a r is a c h i e v e d [footn o t e o m i t t e d , HUB]. 2 1 5

(Chomsky 1981:111)

O u r investigations i n t o the v a l i d i t y of the

arguments

p r e s e n t e d in favor of v a r i o u s formal t h e o r e t i c a l

inno-

vations suggest moreover that by combining the overg e n e r a t i n g n o t a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s of ST a n d its

theory

of the cycle w i t h the u n w a r r a n t e d a n d m u t u a l l y i n c o m 216 p a t i b l e t e n e t s o f the LH a n d the X' s c h e m a , i n c l u d ing the e m p t y c a t e g o r y c o n v e n t i o n , t r a c e a n d o t h e r t h e o r i e s , the a d h e r e n t s of R E S T h a v e e n l a r g e d the

subclass

of c o n t r a d i c t o r y , f r a g m e n t a r y a n d d e s c r i p t i v e l y 217 inadequate grammars permitted by generative theory

-

VIII.

8.1

330 -

SOME CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS: 'ADVANCED' LEXICALISM VERSUS EARLY TRANSFORMATIONALISM Introduction

In the light of the preceding demonstrations of the methodological, theoretical and empirical deficiencies and shortcomings in the developments irt generative theory and practice we will now further substantiate the claim implicit in Chapters IV - VII that the generalizations expressible within an extended and "semantically enriched" framework 1 of early transformational approaches are explanatory in the sense of 3.6.1, i.e. that they provide "restrictive" correlations between syntactic, morphological (including word-formational) and phonological regularities and semantic and/or lexical regularities as observable from the 2 atheoretical linguistic knowledge of native speakers This is in accordance with Chomsky's early views on grammar-construction as explicating the intuitive knowledge of grammatical sentences and as answering the question "what sort of grammar will be able to do the job of producing these in some effective and illuminating way" (1957: 13 and 2.3.2.3 above). In trying to further substantiate this claim, we will apply our "negative strategy", followed so far, to some of the arguments and analyses offered by 'strict' or 'advanced' lexicalists, i.e. by modularized approaches that have not yet been discussed in the main body of this study. This strategy will make explicit some additional counterintuitive tenets to which 'advanced' lexicalism is committed and will demonstrate as well that any lexicalistically modularized theory suffers, in principle, from the same types of explanatory defects and descriptive and observational inadequacies as EST, REST and RREST, thereby confirming our arguments against such formal models.

331

3.2

'Advanced' Lexicalism: Recursive Word-Structure Rules, a 'Lexical' Lexicon and

'Transformational'

Insertion Conditions While discussing Hust's "early" lexical redundancy

approach

to V-able adjectives with its mechanism of feature precipitation and ad hoc morphological feature creation

(cf.

5.3.2.3) we noted that in order to make such an approach formally coherent one would have to postulate analyzing" base rules like

Adj -» V+Suffix

"category-

which are

able to generate morphological affixes along with the syntactic category symbols and,correspondingly, within the syntactic lexicon a morphological or morpheme

lexicon

specifying the strict subcategorization and selectional 3 features of morphemes with respect to each other . Our "prediction" is borne out in such recent 'advanced'

lexical-

ist papers as Hoekstra et al.

(1980b), Selkirk

Lieber

(1983) wehre separate word-

(1981) (1983) and Toman

(1981) (1982),

structure rules analoguos to the X' PS-rules of the syntactic base component are assumed, which generate an infinite set of well-formed w o r d frames and in which affixes are given the full status of lexical entries just like free morphemes

(cf. also Moortgat et al. (eds.)

1981:vii-viii,

and Hohle 19 82). Hoekstra et al. , for example, present a canonical X' rule schema for the two-level word-structure

rules of suffixation and prefixation (cf. (257) and

(258)) generating deverbal adjectives and deadjectival (257)

X° - Y° X~ 1

(258)

X°

X-1

Y° ,o V"

o A'

(259)

read

able

en

rich

(cf. Hoekstra et al. 19 80b:21) verbs as in (259) where the bound morphemes are of level

- 332

-

-1. This reflects the traditional view that suffixes i n 4

dicate the category of the derived word

. Affixes as heads

of constructions are furthermore claimed to maximally project structures of level 0, i.e. free morphemes. "The level 0, then, is considered to be the recursive cyclic domain of word formation, i.e. the maximal processing unit of the WSR's [word-structure rules, HUB]. Affixes select complements of a certain categorial type? these complements, or bases as they are generally called in the morphological literature, are themselves of the maximal level 0"

(Hoek-

stra et al. 1980b:22). To ensure that affixes only select appropriate bases, or, in Hoekstra et al.'s terminology, complements, they have associated w i t h them in the lexicon a finite set of insertion conditions whose

function

is identical to that of subcategorization frames in syntax in so far as they restrict the possibility to occur in w o r d frames (cf. 1980b:21). Similarly, the complex symbols of the word-structure rule component are defined by Hoekstra et al.as "ordered pairs consisting of an integer i and a syntactic feature matrix. The features are taken from the set {±N, ±V, ±m,...}; they define the categorial status of the morpheme."

(ibid.). The integer defines, as we

have seen, the level of the category. The feature

[±m(ajor)]

is used to distinguish between projecting and non-projecting members of the same categorial type, as, e.g., between prefixes that change the categorial value of their bases (cf. (258)) and those that do not (cf. (260))

5

. Hoekstra

et al. thus formulate the lexical entries of the morpholo(260)

X

(261) a.

b.

i Y [-m]

read,

+V -N _+m

-able,

+V +N +m

„o (cf. Hoekstra et al.1980b:22)

-1