Forks in the Road: How the Fratricidal Tragedy of 1971 could have been Avoided [1 ed.] 97896923980008

Table of contents :
Background
The events that Transpired
Analysis
What Should Have Been Done
The State of Affairs After the Event
Background (1)
Facts of the Case and the Events that Transpired
Analysis (1)
What Should Have Been Done (1)
The State of Affairs After the Event (1)
Background (2)
The Events that Transpired
Analysis (2)
What Should Have Been Done (2)
The State of Affairs After the Event (2)
Background (3)
The Events that Transpired (1)
Analysis/What Should Have Been Done
The State of Affairs After the Event (3)
Background (4)
The Events that Transpired (2)
Analysis (3)
What Should Have Been Done (3)
The State of Affairs After the Event (4)
“Examining the lives and deeds of men like Cyrus, one can see that they received nothing from fortune except the opportunity, which gave them the material they could mould into whatever form they desired, and without that opportunity the strength of t...
First Phase of the Civil War (March-June 1971)
Situation on the Indian Side
The Diplomatic Bridge between China and the US
The Opportunity?
Critical Analysis
Background (5)
The Events that Transpired (3)
Analysis (4)
What Should Have Been Done (4)
The State of Affairs After the Event (5)
As you sow, so shall you reap!
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FORKS IN THE ROAD HOW THE FRATRICIDAL TRAGEDY OF 1971 COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED

Dedicated to Iqbal’s vision of Pakistan

Contents Preface Chapter 1: The 1965 War’s impact on East Pakistan Chapter 2: The Agartala Conspiracy Case and the resultant Deification of Sheikh Mujib in East Pakistan

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Chapter 3: December 1970, The Election that bred Secession

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Chapter 4: 28 February 1971, The Fatal Decision that precipitated a revolt in East Pakistan

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Chapter 5: March 1971, The Last Chance to Save a United Pakistan

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Chapter 6: June/July 1971, Civil War in East Pakistan. Go Forth and Win?

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Chapter 7: October 1971, Political Capitulation to Sheikh Mujib was preferable over Military surrender to India

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Epilogue

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Preface

Almost 50 years have elapsed since the tragic vivisection of Pakistan. A fratricidal civil war followed by an ignominious defeat against the arch rival has made 1971 the greatest calamity ever to befall our nation. The 1971 debacle is a compound debacle that has struck at the roots of our ideology, economy, and military. Multitudes of Bengalis and non-Bengalis were killed by the Pakistani military and the Mukti Bahini rebels, respectively, vital infrastructure and macro-economic assets of East Pakistan/Bangladesh were destroyed in the conflagration, and a victory was handed to the enemy on the silver platter of civil war. The events of 1971 left lingering hostility between the erstwhile wings of Pakistan and greatly strengthened India’s hand in the strategic milieu of South Asia. Such a huge catastrophe demands intensive introspection on our part. Probably, the first question that arises in one’s mind is: “How could it have been avoided?” This study is an attempt to answer this question. The methodology used in this endeavour is to identify the specific inflection points in our history. Specific and intelligent interventions at any of those points could have avoided the tragedy altogether or at least significantly minimized the damage. Needless to say, as we moved from one crisis to the next, the situation became more complex and difficult to handle, and our options for successful intervention diminished in quantity and quality. This study is restricted to the question at hand. Of course, the seeds of the tragedy had been present long before the first inflection point mentioned in this study (the 1965 war). It is also no secret to those who study history carefully that in actuality the subtle governing dynamics of historical currents are much more important than the flashy ‘inflection points’. But those governing dynamics will be discussed in great detail at some other point in time. Nevertheless, the importance of these so-called inflection points lies in the fact that these events can provide a jolt to the nation and in this way they present an opportunity to channel the prevalent

historical currents into a more advantageous direction. These signature events also momentarily clarify the situation, which is helpful in taking remedial measures. A spirit of carpe diem at these points in time could well be the difference between destruction and survival. I have tried to be objective, original, and realistic in analyzing the historical scenario at each inflection point and suggesting suitable remedies. Nevertheless, I am aware of the fact that hindsight does inadvertently intrude upon a retrospective view and analysis of the problems concerned. I have tried my best to minimize this aspect in order to ensure that correct conclusions are derived from the historical events. After all, these correct conclusions, which can be helpful in the present and the future, are the sublime holy grail for the attainment of which a historian strives.

CHAPTER 1

The Impact of 1965 War on East Pakistan Background The 1965 War resulted from the Indian intransigence over Kashmir and a resultant Pakistani attempt to pressurize India militarily over the Kashmir issue. Had the war ended in a Pakistani victory, which was possible,1 Pakistan would have accrued huge strategic benefits. Had it ended in a Pakistani defeat, which was also possible, it might even have resulted in the country’s practical destruction. As it happened, the September war ended in a stalemate.2 This provided an opportunity for both patriots and anti-Pakistan/secessionist elements to use the war’s aftermath for their own ends. An important fact, which relates the 1965 war to the East/West Pakistan discord issue is the fact that West Pakistanis heavily dominated the military of united Pakistan. In East Pakistan, many Pro-Pakistan elements advocated that unity of both wings was essential for East Pakistan because the West Pakistani soldiers and officers were providing security to East Pakistan against India. Before the 1965 war, this argument was used to effectively counter the secessionists’ propaganda that East Pakistan was being economically exploited by West Pakistan. The strategy for the defence of Pakistan (devised by General Ayub Khan in the 1950s) envisioned that “the defence of East Pakistan will be conducted from West 1

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Mahmud Ahmed, A Military History of the Indo-Pak War 1965 (Karachi: Lexicon Publishers, 2002), 531. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 236.

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Pakistan.”3 This meant that out of a total of 9 divisions and 140-odd combat aircraft of the Pakistan Army and Air Force, only 1 division and 13 aircraft were posted in East Pakistan. The planners envisaged that in the event of a war, if India concentrated her forces for an attack on East Pakistan, the bulk of Pakistani forces in West Pakistan would deal a crippling blow to the weakened Indian forces on the Western front.

The events that Transpired There was almost zero active fighting on the Eastern front during the 1965 war. India concentrated 14 divisions (out of a total of 22) against West Pakistan.4 2-3 divisions stayed passive on the East Pakistan border and the rest stayed on the Sino-Indian frontier in the north. During the war, throughout Pakistan (including East Pakistan) the spirit of national unity was phenomenal, but the ceasefire elicited different reactions in both wings. In West Pakistan, it was sharply criticized whereas in East Pakistan it was accepted in good humour. The reason was the perception in East Pakistan that it had been left alone and helpless during the war.5 There were too few military units in East Pakistan and almost all communications between the two wings had been severed during the war.6 Where West Pakistan experienced the excitement and elation related to an active war and the successful glorious battles at Lahore and Chawinda, East Pakistan experienced complete isolation and a sense of insignificance/irrelevance due to scant attention paid by the Pakistani leadership to that province during the war.

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Kamal Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 19681981 (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1988), 333. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army (New York: Carrel Books, 2016), 59. Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 19. Ikram Sehgal and Bettina Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green (London: Oxford University Press, 2020), 78.

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After the war, two prominent politicians of Pakistan deepened the lack of harmony between East and West Pakistan. First, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the foreign minister of Pakistan at the time, declared that East Pakistan’s security was ensured during the war by a Chinese threat to India against attacking East Pakistan. He conveniently ignored the fact that India’s strike divisions were too busy in the offensive against West Pakistan because he was interested in claiming credit as foreign minister for the ‘security’ of East Pakistan. Bhutto’s tendency toward making far-reaching political manoeuvres for short-term personal ambition was to prove deadly for Pakistan later. Second, Mujib-ur-Rahman of Awami League put forward his famous six-points demand for complete provincial autonomy (a cloak for eventual secession according to some) soon after the war. Bhutto’s statement had far-reaching implications. It was also viewed negatively by Chinese officials who expressed consternation at the assertion that China was responsible for East Pakistan’s security.7 It also provided the Bengali secessionists in East Pakistan with a mighty stick to beat the West Pakistani leadership. GW Chaudhry writes, “Mr. Bhutto, Ayub’s Foreign Minister, proudly claimed in the National Assembly that East Pakistan had been protected by China. If that was so, the Bengalis began to argue, why do we not settle our own diplomatic and external relations? Why depend on West Pakistan, which could give no protection to East Pakistan?”8 If I dare use a soccer metaphor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played the through ball on which Sheikh Mujib scored a goal by launching his six points movement. There was nothing new in six points. The Awami League extremists had made similar demands as early as 1950.9 But after the ‘failure’ of West Pakistan to defend East Pakistan during the 1965 war,

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Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 79. G. W. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London: C Hurst and Co Publishers, 1975), 8. Hassan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 97.

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they quickly gained credence in East Pakistan. This movement, ostensibly for mere provincial autonomy, was to prove the death knell for united Pakistan.

Analysis While it could be argued that the strategy of East Pakistan’s defence from West Pakistan proved successful during the 1965 war as India couldn’t muster enough forces to attack East Pakistan during the monsoon season, it would be a spurious argument. Had India remained on the defensive in West Pakistan, it could have easily shifted 3-4 divisions from the western front to the east. This would have given her a 7 to 1 numerical advantage on the Eastern front. India actually did resort to this strategy successfully in the 1971 war and prescient Pakistani military officers were cognizant of this fact.10 The 1965 war also exposed the men who were going to be instrumental in the bloody break-up of Pakistan. Yahya Khan, as a division commander, showed phenomenal incompetence, though his lust for power was yet to be unmasked.11 Sheikh Mujib revealed his true colours by suggesting to Abdul Monem Khan (then Governor of East Pakistan) that the war and severed communications with West Pakistan presented a golden opportunity to declare secession.12 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto showed through his irresponsible statements that he didn’t care for Pakistan’s welfare rather his sole concern was the welfare of his political career.

What Should Have Been Done First of all, it must have been accepted (albeit behind closed doors) that the strategy of the defence of East Pakistan from the West had proven to be bankrupt. It also should have 10 11

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General Akhtar Hussein's letter to General Abdul Ali Malik. Mahmud Ahmed, A Military History of the Indo-Pak War 1965 (Karachi: Lexicon Publishers, 2002), 114. Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Divided (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2016), 35.

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been recognized that after failing to win an offensive against West Pakistan, India might well try her luck against East Pakistan next time (a point clearly appreciated by General Akhtar Hussain). This strategy should have been promptly changed and a new defence policy formulated. Additional allocations of conventional military assets to East Pakistan should have been combined with the formation of an effective people’s paramilitary force in both wings (similar to Iran’s IRGC). To employ these forces effectively, a new defence doctrine with a focus on the Chinese People’s war theory must have been created. The creation of local paramilitary forces in both wings is also synergistic with the second and more important step. Complete provincial autonomy should have been granted to East Pakistan. Ideally it should have been done in the early 1950s, but after the 1965 war it was painfully clear that in a high-stress situation like war both wings could not operate effectively under a unitary centralized government. This would have placated the Bengali masses too and taken away their most lethal weapon (of provincial grievances due to West Pakistani hegemony at the centre) from secessionists like Sheikh Mujib. Lastly, these new paramilitary forces would have served as a platform for the political education of numerous youths of both wings. They would have provided the opportunity for hundreds of thousands if not millions of youth to gain motivation through education about the common Islamic ideological roots of both East and West Pakistan. The youth thus trained would have become the vanguard advocates for the fraternal union of East and West Pakistan. They would have also threatened India with the spectre of Vietnam style behind-the-lines guerilla warfare in case of an invasion of West or East Pakistan by India and served as an effective deterrent.

The State of Affairs After the Event The aftermath of the 1965 war destroyed the last credible bond between East and West Pakistan which had hitherto been immune from the machinations of self-centred

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political leaders. By the time, it was clear that Pakistan quickly needed to evolve new and strong bonds of unity in order to keep the country united. Truly, the 1965 war and its aftermath represent a missed opportunity, and a watershed moment in the march towards the tragedy of 1971.

CHAPTER 2

The Agartala Conspiracy Case and the Resultant Deification of Sheikh Mujib in East Pakistan Background Soon after the 1965 war, Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman launched his six points movement for provincial autonomy. Ayub Khan’s government asserted that this movement was using the issue of provincial autonomy as a smokescreen and its real aim was the secession of East Pakistan.1 In the beginning, Ayub Khan’s government itself publicized the six points because it was thought that by projecting the six points as a ‘secessionist conspiracy’, Sheikh Mujib would become discredited as a traitor in East Pakistan.2 This poorly thought out tactic backfired spectacularly and instead resulted in increasing popularity for both Sheikh Mujib and the six points in East Pakistan. Feeling a bit threatened, the government arrested Sheikh Mujib in May 1966. The Awami League tried to launch a mass movement for his release but it couldn’t get off the ground due to public apathy and fizzled out soon. In December 1967, many Bengali civil servants and military officers were arrested. It was alleged that they had been conspiring to break up Pakistan with the help of India. There was also talk that some Bengali Military personnel had tried to kidnap or assassinate President Ayub Khan in Dhaka 1 2

Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, 37. Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, 38.

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in order to attain their nefarious objectives. Later, it was revealed that a group of thirty-five Bengali military and civil officials were to be tried for conspiracy and treason against the state of Pakistan under the ‘Agartala Conspiracy Case’. In the first list of the accused, released by the government, there was no mention of Sheikh Mujib.3. In January 1968, however, Sheikh Mujib’s name was added to the list. Not only that, he was also listed as the no.1 accused.4

Facts of the Case and the Events that Transpired In 1965, Sheikh Mujib visited India and met Indian officials.5 He also had a meeting with some dissident Bengali officials in which he encouraged them to continue their antiPakistan activities.6 Thus, was born the Agartala conspiracy. It was named so because the conspirators held meetings with Indian officials in the Indian town of Agartala (located close to the Indo-East Pakistan border). An official of the Indian Foreign service PN Ojha facilitated the meetings.7 There is no doubt that Sheikh Mujib gave his blessings to the Agartala conspiracy and it has been openly acknowledged by his daughter Sheikh Hasina8 and an Agartala conspirator Shaukat Ali,9 but the extent of his active involvement after his arrest is unclear. GW Chaudhry has reported that Sheikh Mujib kept active contact with the conspiracy even while he was in jail, and in fact he was leading the conspiracy from his jail cell.10 Other sources, however, report that Lt Commander 3

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Kamal Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice (Karachi: Oxford University Press), 30. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 89. Interview with Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar, cited in Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 276. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 276. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 278. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green. Statement of Shaukat Ali, an accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case, inside the Bangladeshi Parliament. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 24-25.

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Moazzam Hossein of the Pakistan Navy was practically leading the conspiracy on the ground.11 In the first list of conspirators released by the Government of Pakistan, Moazzam Hossein was listed as the no. 1 accused. Pakistani authorities first learnt about the conspiracy through a tip-off from a patriotic Bengali citizen to Lt Col Amir of the ISI in July 1966. Initially, Colonel Amir’s reports about the conspiracy weren’t taken too seriously by the higher-ups but soon the evidence started to pile up. Sheikh Mujib was already in jail but the correspondences and phone calls of the other leading conspirators including Moazzam Hossein left no doubt that a serious conspiracy to dismember Pakistan was being planned.12 When the case was first made public, the initial reaction of the East Pakistan press and civil society was to denounce the traitors vociferously.13 This changed overnight when Sheikh Mujib was listed as the no. 1 accused on 18 January 1968. Then it was alleged in East Pakistan that the whole case was a forgery and nothing more than a political ploy by the government in order to discredit Sheikh Mujib.14 A special tribunal under Justice SA Rahman was set up. It was also decided that instead of a trial behind closed doors, there will be an open trial. In November 1968, ZA Bhutto launched a huge popular movement in West Pakistan against General Ayub Khan’s government. It has been reported by some sources that this movement had the acquiescence of then Army Chief General Yahya Khan and a coterie of other generals. 15 Soon after, the unrest also engulfed East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib was lauded there as a brave leader who was facing the might of a tyrannical government. ZA Bhutto himself went to Dhaka to represent Sheikh Mujib in the Agartala case. 16 11 12 13 14 15 16

Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 88. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 277. Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, 39. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 89. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 31. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 26.

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Many other politicians in West Pakistan also jumped on the bandwagon and started demanding Sheikh Mujib’s immediate release and withdrawal of the Agartala case. On 15 February, Sergeant Zahurul Huq, an accused in the Agartala case, was killed in custody. It was alleged that he was trying to escape but no one in East Pakistan was ready to believe it. As a result, public anger against the government multiplied manifold. Under pressure in both West and East Pakistan, the government withdrew the Agartala case on 22 February 1969 and released all the accused. Sheikh Mujib was lauded and given the title of ‘Bangabandhu’ (Friend of Bengal) at a grand reception in the Dhaka Race Course by the Awami League.17

Analysis Absence of Sheikh Mujib’s name in the first list of the accused, the fact of his being in jail for the past 19 months, and lack of any concrete evidence against Sheikh Mujib doomed the case as soon as his name was included in it. The government failed to appreciate that a leader with huge mass appeal like Sheikh Mujib cannot be casually labelled a traitor. In order to do so, either concrete evidence is needed (for example Vidkun Quisling’s conviction for high treason in Norway), or the state must have huge coercive power and complete control of all communications and media (Stalin’s liquidation of Old Bolsheviks like Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev etc. in the 1930s). The flippant view of the situation hit the government and the state hard when the whole case had to be scrapped and all the conspirators were ‘vindicated’. Withdrawal of the case made it clear to all and sundry that the state was incapable of defending herself against treason. By this time, there was a clear faction (albeit in a small minority) that advocated the break-up of Pakistan even with the help of India.18 That faction received huge encouragement and recruitment after the botched Agartala case. 17 18

Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 89-90. Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 98-99.

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The West Pakistani politicians who wanted to oust Ayub Khan (Bhutto, Asghar Khan,19 etc.) also helped in making Mujib a hero.20 Bhutto (who was later to declare that Mujib was a confirmed traitor) even claimed credit for his release by the Ayub Khan government.21 Gullibility, powerhunger, and hatred of Ayub Khan blinded the West Pakistani politicians to the dangers posed to Pakistan by the treacherous conspirators.

What Should Have Been Done Einstein once said, “In the midst of every crisis, lies great opportunity.” The Agartala conspiracy was such a crisis. It provided opportunity to the government to destroy the secessionists in East Pakistan but instead it made heroes out of them through clumsy handling and poor planning. The government publicized the case before collecting rock-hard evidence against Sheikh Mujib. If the investigations had continued in secret, even after the arrests were carried out in December 1967, it was likely that clear evidence of Sheikh Mujib’s collusion with the Indians would have surfaced. On the other hand, if it were to be deemed essential to make the conspiracy public due to the large number of arrests (1,500 according to one account),22 a different tactic could have been applied. The case could have been pursued vigorously without including Sheikh Mujib in it (due to lack of concrete evidence). It was likely that in such a case, some conspirators would have implicated Sheikh Mujib anyway (without pressure from the authorities) in order to save themselves. Even if that had failed to pass, it would have greatly strengthened the state if it had successfully prosecuted and punished the treasonous officials. It would have acted as a deterrent for other wouldbe secessionists. 19 20 21

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Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 34. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 22. Z. A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971) 53-54. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 89.

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Instead of bowing down to pressure, Ayub Khan should have stayed firm on the Agartala case. Had the case been properly run, and investigations done diligently, Ayub Khan could have used the case to counterattack his opponents by asserting that those advocating the withdrawal of the case were playing in the hands of the enemy. Nevertheless, the slipshod investigative work and the poorly conducted judicial proceedings generated doubts about the veracity of the conspiracy even in the minds of patriotic Pakistanis. Conducting an open trial also proved to be a mistake. It led to open discussion on secession in East Pakistan. A closed-doors trial would have enabled the government to channel and modulate the discourse (which was necessary, given the sensitive nature of the case). Competent officers should have been charged to handle the public relations/media aspects of the case in both national and international media. Patriotic political leaders (Nurul Amin, Ghulam Azam, Moulvi Farid, Fazl ul Qadir, etc.) should have been used to generate popular rhetoric to appeal to the masses against treason. Simultaneously, demands for legitimate provincial autonomy and economic measures for East Pakistan should have been made in public meetings headed by these leaders. Subsequently, the government should have accepted these demands. That would have created the image of Mujib as a good-for-nothing traitor who couldn’t do any practical good for East Pakistan in contrast with the patriotic leaders who weren’t traitors and got the “West Pakistan dominated” Ayub Khan government to give in to the demands of East Pakistan.

The State of Affairs After the Event The Awami League and Sheikh Mujib received a huge boost and left competitors like Maulana Bhashani (NAP), Nurul Amin (PDP), Fazl ul Qadir Chaudhry (Muslim League), Maulana Maududi, and Professor Ghulam Azam (Jamaat-e-Islami) way behind in popularity. Many secessionists among the students and intelligentsia of East Pakistan now joined the Awami League and radicalized it

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further. Bhutto gained popularity in West Pakistan on the wave of his success against Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan had to vacate the seat of power and a junta of generals under Yahya Khan assumed charge in March 1969.

CHAPTER 3

December 1970: The Election that Bred Secession Background After the ouster of Ayub Khan in 1969, General Yahya Khan assumed supreme power in the country. At the time, the main issue facing the country was the restoration of democracy and transfer of power to a democratic government. The catch was that East and West Pakistan sharply differed on how to do it. West Pakistan preferred a bicameral legislature, parity between the two wings, and very limited provincial autonomy. On the other hand, East Pakistan preferred a unicameral legislature with 54% seats for East Pakistan (on the basis of population) and complete provincial autonomy.1 Post-election constitution-making was also a divisive issue with East Pakistan advocating that the constitution be passed by a simple majority in contrast to the West Pakistani demand of making two-thirds majority a prerequisite.2

The Events that Transpired Yahya Khan put forward his plan for elections and power transfer in a speech on 28 November 1969. He declared that he would promulgate a Legal Framework Order (LFO) which would lay down the rules for the election and post-election period until the newly elected national assembly would frame a constitution. The LFO, issued in March 1970, conceded almost all of Sheikh Mujibur 1 2

Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 81-83. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 86, 87.

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Rahman’s demands at the expense of other political parties. It ended parity and gave 54% seats (162/300) to East Pakistan. The constitution was to be passed by a simple majority and, most significantly, the extent of provincial autonomy to be permitted was left undefined.3 This last point gave Sheikh Mujib a full license for turning the elections into a referendum on provincial autonomy/six points in East Pakistan. Many East Pakistani leaders (Nurul Amin, Maulana Bhashani, Professor Ghulam Azam, etc.) had warned Yahya Khan that leaving the explosive issue of provincial autonomy unsettled would give Awami League a huge edge. On the other hand, Sheikh Mujib had made it perfectly clear to the martial law authorities that any attempt by the government to define the extent of provincial autonomy would lead to serious consequences.4 The only issue on which Yahya Khan refused to placate Mujib was the insertion of a clause in the LFO that the new constitution would require presidential assent. This angered Mujib so much that he privately vowed to tear the LFO to pieces after winning the elections.5 On 1 January 1970, all restrictions on political activities were lifted and the year-long election campaign for the first-ever General Elections in Pakistan commenced. In East Pakistan, Awami League disrupted public meetings of Jamaat-e-Islami and Nurul Amin’s PDP early on through thuggery.6 The martial law authorities did nothing to stop the strong-arm tactics of Awami League, and as a result no other political party apart from Awami League was able to hold mass meetings in East Pakistan. Interestingly, instead of restricting the excesses of Awami League, the martial law authorities further helped it by curbing Maulana Bhashani and his National Awami Party (NAP).7 3 4 5

6 7

Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan,117-118. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 91. Saddiq Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha (Lahore: Islamic Publication Limited, 2019), 27. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 141. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 118-119.

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The Awami League and Sheikh Mujib adopted a twopronged strategy for the election campaign. They wanted to appeal both to the rural populace (the vast majority of whom didn’t want secession) and to the radical students/urban intelligentsia (most of whom were for secession,8 and were politically hyperactive in contrast to the rural masses). Making good use of the popular inability to comprehend glaring contradictions, Sheikh Mujib vowed that Pakistan had come to stay and even declared his aversion to secession while holding the Quran in his hand.9 On the other hand, he made inflammatory speeches and demonized West Pakistan as much as he could to placate the radicals and extremists. He knew that the rural masses could give him the votes required for becoming the Prime Minister of Pakistan but only the radicals would struggle for an independent Bangladesh if the former scenario did not pan out. Mujib’s rhetoric of six points frequently bordered on secession but the government refused to restrain him as Mujib had craftily assured Yahya that the six-points were a mere electioneering slogan and he would modify them significantly after the elections.10 Interestingly, whereas leaders like Nurul Amin (PDP), Maulana Maududi (JI), Fazal ul Qadir (Convention Muslim League), and Qayyum Khan (Qayyum Muslim League) publicly denounced the six-points as a veiled scheme of secession, Bhutto of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) failed to even mention them during the year-long campaign. 11 Bhutto’s sole focus was to portray himself as a revolutionary who would undo the forces of ‘status-quo’. More interestingly, Bhutto solely focused on West Pakistan and did not even bother to register a single PPP candidate in East Pakistan. For a person who was claiming to ‘revolutionize’ Pakistan, it appeared odd that he had completely neglected 8 9 10

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Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 126. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 142. Khadim Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country: 1969-1971 (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 22. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 123.

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the majority wing, unless it can be assumed that Bhutto thought that after securing a democratic victory in West Pakistan, he could just subjugate East Pakistan through other means. In November 1970, just weeks before the election, the monstrous Bhola Cyclone hit East Pakistan and claimed an estimated half a million lives. The government’s response to this huge tragedy was deemed inadequate and callous by the Awami League.12 It made full use of the tragedy to further her campaign of generating hate against West Pakistan. Maulana Bhashani, quite reasonably, suggested that in the wake of this disaster elections should be postponed and all governmental resources be galvanized to help the poor victims of the cyclone. Sheikh Mujib reacted angrily to this demand and strongly opposed it.13 Yahya Khan once again gave in to Sheikh Mujib’s demand. Maulana Bhashani was already distressed by the pre-poll Awami League rigging. This proved to be the last straw for him and he withdrew from the elections.14 The December 1970 elections were described as fair in the sense that there was no governmental interference but there were numerous reports of rigging by Awami League workers.15 The results were devastating for the unity of Pakistan. Awami League won 160/162 seats in East Pakistan but failed to win a single seat in West Pakistan. PPP emerged as the second largest party with 81/138 seats (all from West Pakistan).

Analysis The spectacular victory of Awami League wouldn’t have been possible without Yahya Khan’s cooperation who gave in to almost all of its demands, and refused to restrain it from muscling out the other parties from the political picture 12 13 14 15

Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 64. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 112. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 118. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 28, and Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 35-38.

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of East Pakistan. Why did Yahya appease Mujib so much? The most frequently proffered argument is that Mujib had assured Yahya that he would radically alter the six points after the election. Does Yahya’s gullibility explain his odd behaviour? Perhaps, it doesn’t. The answer lies elsewhere. It is now well known that Pakistani intelligence services had predicted that the Awami League would win only 45-70 seats.16 Yahya wanted a hung parliament in order to perpetuate his rule. A hung parliament wouldn’t be able to frame a constitution and would leave Yahya securely in control. Awami League was notorious in West Pakistan, so its winning a significant number of seats would have secured Yahya’s hand among all pro-Pakistan elements in East and West Pakistan who would have turned to Yahya as the only ‘saviour’ capable of restraining the Awami League and its separatism. A hung parliament with Awami League as the largest party with 60 odd seats would have suited Yahya perfectly. That’s why he curbed Maulana Bhashani who was supposed to be a bigger threat than Mujib on account of his fiery rhetoric and militant socialist followers. That’s why the only demand he refused Mujib was related to the power of presidential veto. He didn’t want constitutional restraints on Mujib, he wanted his own personal authority to ‘fix’ him. Even Mujib himself hadn’t imagined such a huge electoral victory in his wildest dreams. He had offered Mumtaz Daultana of the Council Muslim League 29 uncontested seats in East Pakistan for a political alliance17 (an offer which was refused by Daultana). Bhutto’s victory was similarly a huge surprise for Yahya whose intelligence officials had predicted 25 seats for the PPP. The intelligence failures left Yahya fuming on General Ghulam Umar on election night.18 Yahya’s ineptitude and power-lust had brought Pakistan to the brink of disintegration with the victory of two completely province centric parties. 16 17 18

Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 260. Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 260. Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 34.

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What Should Have Been Done Instead of plotting to manipulate the political process, Yahya Khan should have done his duty and ensured truly fair elections under a workable legal framework. In order to ensure that both wings participated in the constitutionmaking exercise, it was essential that either the legislature be bicameral or the prerequisite for passing a constitution be a two-thirds majority. According to Professor Donald Sassoon, “‘Democratic’ politics, that is, modern mass politics, is a battlefield in which the most important move is that which decides what the battle is about, what the issue is.”19 Yahya let Mujib decide the pivotal issue on which the election would be contested. The limits of provincial autonomy should have been defined to deny a single party this decisive advantage and had it led to violence on Mujib’s part, it could have been dealt with in a better way since at the time Mujib hadn’t yet earned legitimacy from a successful election. The cyclone was a grave crisis, as well as an opportunity. West Pakistani sources mention that the army in East Pakistan did its utmost in the relief operation, but it was deliberately maligned by the East Pakistan press in order to create a perception (contrary to reality) of a callous West Pakistan.20 Bangladeshi sources insist that Yahya Khan and the Martial law authorities in East Pakistan were insensitive and negligent.21 Neutral sources are divided on this issue. 22 But in politics perception is more important than reality. The key battle was the battle of perception which Yahya Khan lost due to his negligence.23 Compassion, diligence, and a well-

19

20 21 22

23

Donald Sasson, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: The New Press, 1998), 7. Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country: 1969-1971, 27. Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 64. David Loshak, Pakistan Crisis (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), 50 and Gary Brass, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Knopf, 2013), 23. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 112.

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executed media strategy could have gone a long way in denying Awami League the politicization of the largest natural disaster in Pakistan’s history. Yahya Khan’s and his cohorts’ power-lust did almost as much damage as their incompetence. They had conceded Sheikh Mujib’s demand of universal adult franchise as Mujib had convincingly argued that only an election in which everyone voted could be judged democratic. Why not go a step further then? Why not ensure that each vote cast is truly counted? Why not conduct the elections under a party-list system instead of a first-past-the-post one. In the latter, if a candidate gets 60,000 votes and his opponent gets 65,000, he and his 60,000 voters get no representation. On the other hand, each vote is important in the party list system and the number of seats of each party in the legislature depends on the total number of votes secured. If the party-list formula is applied to the 1970 election, Awami League gets 117 seats, PPP gets 57 whereas Jamaat-e-Islami, Council Muslim League, Qayyum Muslim League and JUI get 18, 17, 13, and 12 seats, respectively. This way the success of one-province parties like the PPP and Awami League would have been circumscribed and parties with popular bases in both provinces (like the Muslim Leagues and JI etc.) would have received seats commensurate with their popularity. Like the first-past-thepost system, the party list system is also widely used and is currently used in many successful democracies like Germany and Turkey.

The State of Affairs After the Event The 1970 elections decisively augmented the dissociation between East and West Pakistan. It gave Sheikh Mujib enough strength under the LFO to unilaterally bulldoze a constitution through the National Assembly. This threatened the military junta enough to contemplate desperate measures. Bhutto, having won his “democratic” victory, was now aiming to neutralize East Pakistan through other means. The situation looked extremely grim.

CHAPTER 4

28 February 1971: The Fateful Decision that Precipitated a Revolt in East Pakistan Background The first ever General Elections in the history of Pakistan were conducted on 7 December 1970. The results were a bad omen for the unity and integrity of Pakistan. The polarization between East Pakistan and the rest of Pakistan was made evident by the fact that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won 160/162 seats in East Pakistan but failed to win a single seat from West Pakistan. On the other hand, ZA Bhutto’s PPP managed to win 81/138 seats from West Pakistan but didn’t even field a candidate in East Pakistan. Outwardly, it looked plainly evident that the Awami League alone had enough seats to make the government and frame the constitution. But, it wasn’t that simple. Never before had Pakistan witnessed a democratic transfer of power. So, naturally, the victors were apprehensive of the military which had been in power for the last 12 years. Then there was the problem of Awami League’s reputation as a secessionist organization in West Pakistan. How could a party that only had representation in one province make a constitution for all 5 provinces of Pakistan? The military junta didn’t want to give up power, Sheikh Mujib wanted a speedy transfer of power, whereas Bhutto wanted a share of power at all costs. In this uncertain climate, with the military looming large in the background, both Awami League and PPP were apprehensive that if they compromised or failed to gain power immediately, the opportunistic elements in their ranks would desert them, resulting in the disintegration of

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their respective political organizations.1 The welfare and integrity of Pakistan were completely ignored and all actors became engaged in a political game of cat-and-mouse.

The Events that Transpired Instead of opting for statesmanship, Sheikh Mujib continued and enhanced his belligerent anti-West Pakistan rhetoric immediately after the elections.2 He was advised to visit West Pakistan as Prime Minister-in-waiting and conduct some public meetings there to show that as Pakistan’s most popular leader, he was cognizant of West Pakistani sensitivities as well. But Sheikh Mujib rejected this advice.3 He only seemed concerned with holding onto his popular base in East Pakistan. Bhutto took an even more controversial and fallacious course. He made provocative statements and claimed that there were two majority parties in the country.4 He claimed equivalence with Awami League despite having half the number of seats. He also declared that as the sole representative of West Pakistan, the PPP couldn’t be denied a share in the government.5 General Yahya Khan was much demoralized by the election results. He had expected a hung parliament that could be manipulated or discredited easily but instead was faced by a rock-solid Awami League majority. In January 1971, he went to Dhaka and met with Sheikh Mujib. He hoped that Mujib would abide by his promises of softening the six points demand. But, like Yahya, the election results were surprising for Sheikh Mujib as well. Those promises were made because Sheikh Mujib had wanted Yahya’s goodwill in the pre-election period and because he didn’t think that he would attain an unassailable majority in the National Assembly. Another issue was that Yahya Khan and his team were so incompetent that they hadn’t bothered to 1 2 3 4 5

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 56. Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 130. Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 132. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 59. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 60-61.

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study and analyze the six points demand yet. 6 So, when confronted by Sheikh Mujib’s team of constitutional advisers, Yahya and his advisers found themselves at sea. At the end of the tour, Yahya publicly declared that Sheikh Mujib will be the future Prime Minister of Pakistan. 7 Nevertheless, privately he confided to his inner circle that Mujib had ‘betrayed’ him.8 From Dhaka, General Yahya (and his coterie of generals) headed straight to Bhutto’s home in Larkana. This led to great consternation and apprehension in Awami League circles. It was widely believed in East Pakistan that Yahya had gone to Larkana in order to ‘conspire’ with Bhutto and use him as a tool against Awami League. 9 Bhutto used Yahya’s Larkana visit to further poison his mind against Awami League. He whispered that Mujib would cut the military budget, promote and inject Bengali officers loyal to Awami League into the armed forces’ hierarchy, penalize senior generals through appointing Colonel Osmany (an Awami Leaguer ex-army officer who had grudges against many senior generals) as Minister of Defence, and abandon Kashmir to India.10 Yahya advised Bhutto to visit Dhaka and try to make an agreement for a grand coalition of PPP and the Awami League. Bhutto did go to Dhaka in end-January 1971 and met with the Awami League leadership. He didn’t show much interest in the six points and communicated that he was ready to accept them (apart from the single exception of making negotiation of foreign aid a provincial responsibility) as long as the Awami League would give him the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He also

6

7 8 9 10

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 55, and Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 43. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha, 44. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, 151. Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 68. Sultan M Khan, Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat(London: Centre for Pakistan Studies, 1997), 288.

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demanded four out of ten cabinet positions for PPP.11 Sheikh Mujib flatly rejected his demand and the negotiations failed. One of Bhutto’s successes in Dhaka was to further augment the suspicions of Sheikh Mujib. Bhutto frankly told Mujib that the army would never transfer power to a Bengali like him and the only way he could become the Prime Minister of Pakistan was to cooperate with PPP.12 So, on the one hand, he was telling Yahya that Mujib was a traitor who would ruin Pakistan and her fine army if given power, on the other, he was telling Mujib as an ‘insider’ that the army would never let him assume power and he needed the PPP supremo to save him from the army’s clutches. Bhutto’s machinations succeeded in multiplying the mutual distrust between General Yahya and Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh Mujib’s past record suggested that whenever faced with governmental hindrance in his quest for power, he opted for the path of treason and secession, whereas whenever he saw a chance of attaining power within Pakistan, he became a vocal patriot (e.g., Sheikh Mujib fathered the Agartala conspiracy after facing defeat in the 1965 elections). Bhutto’s whispers led him to become paranoid about Yahya Khan. As a response, in the beginning of February, he contacted the US consulate in Dhaka and attempted to find out whether the US would be supportive of East Pakistan’s secession.13 He also ordered his lieutenants Tajuddin Ahmed and Kamal Hossein to draft a declaration of independence for Bangladesh.14 Sheikh Mujib’s suspicions had also been amplified by Yahya Khan’s refusal to declare a date for the National Assembly session. Mujib thought that Yahya Khan was purposely delaying this in order to gain time for crushing Awami League. All of a sudden on 13 February, however, Yahya Khan declared that the National Assembly session will take place in Dhaka on the 3rd of March. Sheikh Mujib 11 12 13 14

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 70. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 71. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 41. Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 72.

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regained the hope of becoming the Prime Minister of all Pakistan, and as a result put his secessionist schemes on hold.15 But Bhutto got infuriated and on 15 February he declared that he would not attend the assembly session. In order to incite Mujib, he started using provocative language once again and termed the Dhaka assembly hall a slaughterhouse for PPP and West Pakistan.16 This slaughterhouse statement had far-reaching consequences. In February, Yahya Khan had invited Sheikh Mujib to ask him come to West Pakistan as his guest for political consultations. At that time, Mujib was very apprehensive of Yahya Khan’s intentions and even feared that he might be assassinated in West Pakistan. So, he declined. Yahya Khan deemed it a personal insult and became more convinced that Mujib was completely unconcerned about West Pakistan. But after the announcement of the date for the assembly session, Mujib had felt somewhat mollified. Accordingly, Yahya re-invited him through a Bengali officer Brigadier Karim. This time Mujib seemed willing but after Bhutto’s slaughterhouse statement he lost his cool and declared that if Dhaka was a slaughterhouse for Bhutto, then the whole West Pakistan was a slaughter house for him.17 In his mind, he had conflated Bhutto and Yahya, and thought that Bhutto was merely a pawn of Yahya.18 This fresh snub incensed Yahya to no end. And then there was the omnipresent Bhutto whispering, “I told you so!” in his ear. Mujib’s refusal confirmed him as a traitor bent on secession in Yahya’s mind. So, Yahya decided to punish Mujib for his temerity. On 22 February 1971, Yahya called a fateful meeting of his leading generals and declared that he had decided to infinitely postpone the National Assembly session.19 He rationalized his decision by saying 15 16 17 18 19

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 78. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 78-80. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 80. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 72-73. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 171-172.

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that a single-province party couldn’t be allowed to bulldoze a constitution for all of Pakistan. Admiral Ahsan (Governor East Pakistan) and General Yaqub (Chief Martial Law Administrator East Pakistan) opposed Yahya and opined that this decision would bring about the disintegration of Pakistan. But their sane voices were drowned in a chorus of sycophancy and belligerence by the rest. 20 The only concession Yahya made was that the decision was not to be made public until later. In order to get this decision reversed, Admiral Ahsan and General Rao Farman Ali (in charge of civil affairs at Dhaka) met Bhutto on 25 February and tried to convince him to attend the National Assembly session in wider national interest. Bhutto airily dismissed their concern, though, and ‘sagely’ commented that Awami League was a mere bourgeoisie party incapable of launching and sustaining a guerrilla war.21 Later, on 28 February, Bhutto made his infamous speech in which he threatened to break the legs of any PPP member who dared to go to Dhaka. He also threatened the other West Pakistani politicians willing to go to Dhaka for the assembly session.22 On this same fateful day, General Yahya Khan ordered Admiral Ahsan to inform Sheikh Mujib about the indefinite postponement of the National Assembly session. After informing Mujib, Admiral Ahsan again contacted Yahya and argued that at the very least a new date for the session be announced simultaneously to allay some of Awami League’s suspicions. But his request was refused and he was fired.23 The next day, when the decision was broadcast over the radio, Sheikh Mujib and Awami League were ready. Their response was swift and drastic. The Awami League declared a non-cooperation movement which practically turned into a revolt against the central government.

20 21 22 23

Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 142. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 85. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green,129. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 129-130.

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Analysis/What Should Have Been Done After the elections, Bhutto appeared as the weakest among the 3 key actors. He didn’t have democratic legitimacy (which Mujib had), and did not have brute force (which Yahya had). All he had was a hope that if he could somehow make the other actors mutually suspicious, a serious conflict may be generated. That conflict might create space for the PPP to enter the corridors of power. Mujib’s secessionist leanings and exclusive focus on East Pakistan helped Bhutto greatly. Bhutto’s close relations with some key generals also made Yahya fearful that if he opposed Bhutto sternly, he might be toppled.24 This situation generated an escalatory cycle in which Yahya and Mujib successively antagonized each other through aggressive moves and deepened their mutual mistrust. This cycle resulted in the fateful decision to postpone the National Assembly session by Yahya. The indefinite postponement of the session convinced Mujib of Yahya’s bad faith. As Mujib only wanted power (whether in Pakistan or Bangladesh) and cared little for Pakistan’s integrity, it made little sense for him to be cooperative after he became convinced that Yahya wasn’t going to transfer power easily. As for the question of what could have been done to avoid this tragic chain of events, the answer is simple. As President, Yahya should have done his duty and transferred power to the newly elected national assembly. Even if Bhutto’s 81 members had boycotted the session, the national assembly could have carried on with its business. The other parties of West Pakistan were willing to participate in the national assembly session.25 All Yahya had to do was to let democracy take its course. This would have increased goodwill for the army in East Pakistan and even mollified the non-extremist Awami Leaguers (like Khandekar Moshtaque). A general had opined in a meeting with Yahya on 20 February that Sheikh Mujib was a very incompetent 24

25

Rao Farman Ali, Pakistan Do-Lakht Kaise Hua (City: Publisher, Year), 67. Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, 91.

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person and would be resented and kicked out by the Bengalis themselves within six months.26 He had suggested that a democratic transition should be allowed to take place and Sheikh Mujib be allowed a full chance to display his monumental incompetence. After Sheikh Mujib’s abysmal failure, the secessionist elements would be deeply discredited in the eyes of East Pakistanis and as a result the unity of Pakistan would receive a huge boost. Yahya should have heeded this advice instead of falling into Bhutto’s trap and letting his egoistic rage cloud his judgment.

The State of Affairs After the Event On 1 March, the Awami League practically launched a revolt against central authority and the governmental writ almost completely disappeared from East Pakistan.27 The developments made a unilateral declaration of independence by the Awami League and a bloody civil war look imminent. The largest Islamic state in the world and the only country created in the name of Islam teetered on the brink of fratricide. Could anything be done to save the situation?

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27

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 82, and Ali, Pakistan Do-Lakht Kaise Hua, 65. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 91.

CHAPTER 5

March 1971: The Last Chance to Save a United Pakistan Background President General Yahya Khan’s decision to indefinitely postpone the National Assembly session on 1 March metaphorically opened the gates of hell. The provincial government practically collapsed.1 Even bureaucrats and government servants stopped taking orders from the Governor House and instead obeyed instructions from the Awami League. On Sheikh Mujib’s orders, directives drafted and issued by Awami League Leaders Tajuddin Ahmed, Dr Kamal Hossein, and Barrister Amirul Islam replaced the governmental orders. 2 A no-tax campaign was launched and the flow of remittances from East to West Pakistan was forcibly stopped. West Pakistanis on their way to the airport were stopped, searched, looted, and sometimes killed.3 In many areas (including Dhaka and Chittagong), goons and mobs killed multitudes of non-Bengalis.4 Some Awami League workers and mobs even tried to storm government buildings but

1 2 3 4

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 91. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 46. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 60. Numerous sources mention the violence against non-Bengalis in March 1971. Some of these include Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha (Chapter 7), Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst and Co., 2011) (Chapter 2), Qutbuddin Aziz, Blood and Tears (Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974), and Anthony Mascarenhas, “Genocide,” The Sunday Times, 13 June 1971.

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were stopped by the military, resorting even to live-fire. The whole province descended into anarchy and revolt. Here, a question arises: why there was such a severe reaction in East Pakistan against the postponement of the national assembly session? Basically, it was the fear of Awami League that it will be cheated and deprived of the fruits of its electoral victory by the Martial Law authorities. This was going to be the first-ever democratic transition of government in Pakistan and political leaders were uncertain whether it would ever take place at all. Even the original date of the session (3 March) was announced after much delay and that delay had led to misgivings about the government’s intentions. The abrupt decision to indefinitely postpone the session apparently confirmed Awami League’s doubts that the government did not intend to hand over power.

The Events that Transpired On 3 March 1971, important developments took place. First, Sheikh Mujib delivered a fiery speech to militant students and threatened the government with dire consequences if power wasn’t immediately transferred to the elected representatives.5 Second, Yahya Khan announced that a roundtable conference of all parties will be convened in Dhaka on 10 March. Sheikh Mujib termed the roundtable conference a transparent attempt to equate his party with all the other defeated parties and labelled it “a cruel joke.”6 Apart from the PPP, no other party expressed interest in the idea of a roundtable conference and the idea was shelved. Third, General Sahibzada Yaqub (Governor and Chief Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan) pleaded with General Peerzada (Yahya’s right-hand man) to convince the President to immediately come to Dhaka for negotiations with Awami League. Yahya Khan refused and Yaqub promptly sent his resignation.

5 6

Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 84. Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 85.

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Presciently, in his resignation letter, Yaqub warned Yahya that a military operation against Awami League was not a ‘sane’ option and would only result in bloodshed, disaster, and disintegration.7 General Yaqub’s resignation chided Yahya but stimulated him enough to make some significant but contradictory moves. On the one hand, he showed hawkishness by replacing Yaqub with General Tikka Khan, who had a fearsome reputation. In his speech on 6 March, he squarely and solely blamed the Awami League for the anarchy and deadlock on constitutional issues.8 On the other hand, he showed a conciliatory spirit by announcing in the same speech that the National Assembly session would be held on 25 March. On the same day, he privately communicated to Sheikh Mujib that he would be coming to Dhaka soon and would satisfy Mujib even beyond his expectations.9 Sheikh Mujib was in a quandary at this time. The militant faction of the Awami League was pressing him to issue a unilateral declaration of independence, 10 but he was still hesitating in taking that irreversible step. Apparently, he still had some hope that he might to able to become the Prime Minister of a United Pakistan. He was also fearful that the military would attempt to crush him after the declaration of independence and the preparations of Awami League to counter this were far from complete as yet. True, the Awami League had encouraged its goons and militant students to organize and train themselves for an armed conflict under the leadership of Colonel Osmany but these ragtag elements were no match for the professional Pakistan Army. To face the army, Mujib needed the support of the Bengali East Bengal Regiment of the Pak Army, the paramilitary troops of the East Pakistan Rifles, and the Police. At this point, the 7 8 9 10

Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 266. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 99. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 61. Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 87, and Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 61.

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Awami League was busy inciting the ranks and officers of these organizations, but it wasn’t yet sure if they would rebel alongside the Awami League if independence was declared. Sheikh Mujib also received a blunt warning from General Khadim Raja (General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan) that if he tried to issue a unilateral declaration of independence in his speech on 7 March, the army would promptly use all the firepower at its disposal to crush the rebellion.11 Sheikh Mujib assumed that if he issued a declaration of independence in the public meeting on 7 March, he might be attacked and killed in the open. So, Sheikh Mujib chose to temporize. On 7 March 1971, Sheikh Mujib addressed more than a hundred thousand people in Dhaka. He delivered a speech full of contradictions. On the one hand he thundered that the (West Pakistani) army men shouldn’t receive either food or water, but in the same breath he called them brothers. He shouted that the struggle of Awami League was for independence, but he also ended his speech with the words ‘Jai Pakistan’ (Hail Pakistan).12 Instead of issuing a unilateral declaration of independence, Sheikh Mujib demanded that martial law be abrogated, troops be returned to their barracks, an inquiry be launched into shootings by the police and army during the period since the postponement of the Assembly (not into the killings of Biharis and West Pakistanis, though), and power be immediately transferred to elected representatives. Mujib’s speech, even though it was at times contradictory and vague, kept the option of a united Pakistan with Mujib at the helm open. Another important speech was delivered by ZA Bhutto on 14 March about which it was reported in the press that he had proclaimed, idhar hum, udhar tum (we here, you there). He hadn’t actually used those words but he had indeed said that power be transferred to the provinces, i.e., to Mujib in

11 12

Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country, 40-41. Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi Qureshi, 1971: Fact and Fiction (City: Publisher, Year), 572.

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the East and to him in the West.13 It has also been reported that he advocated the transfer of power to “two prime ministers” in a “confederated scheme of things.” 14 If Mujib was guilty of conspiring for the disintegration of Pakistan, in a way, Bhutto echoed him. On 15 March, Yahya Khan came to Dhaka and became very crestfallen after his first meeting with Sheikh Mujib. Reportedly, he ordered Tikka Khan to get ready for a military operation against Awami League.15 Accordingly, a plan named ‘Operation Searchlight’ was prepared on 18 March by Generals Khadim Raja and Rao Farman Ali (though both of these generals had vehemently opposed a military operation, they duly, and properly, complied with the orders issued by the supreme command despite their own misgivings).16 By this date, though, the situation seemed to be improving and the government and Awami League were reported to be nearing an agreement. This spelt doom for the political aspirations of Bhutto who immediately sent a belligerent message to Yahya Khan stating that any agreement without PPP’s concurrence will break down due to vehement resistance by his party.17 Deterred, Yahya Khan invited Bhutto to Dhaka so that he could also participate in the negotiations. After Bhutto’s arrival on 21 March, events took an ominous turn. Bhutto raised some objections regarding the proposed transfer of power scheme by the Awami League.18 On the same day, in an unscheduled meeting, Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin (reported to be the most anti-Pakistan among Awami Leaguers) met Yahya and asked that power be only transferred at the provincial level, with complete legislative

13 14 15 16 17 18

Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 193. Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, 104. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 70. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 132. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, 34. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 128.

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authority vested in the provinces.19 This demand was almost identical to Bhutto’s demand of 14 March and clearly represented a path towards separation. Two days later, on 23 March, Awami League further upped the ante when its negotiators demanded a ‘confederation’ instead of a ‘federation’.20 The governmental delegation members were flabbergasted and retorted that confederation was an arrangement between two sovereign states, and that the option wasn’t even on the table. The Awami Leaguers refused to budge and later Tajuddin termed these demands as final.21 With this turn of events, it became clear that Awami League was bent on the separation of ‘Bangladesh’ from Pakistan. Yahya now had only two options. He could launch Operation Searchlight or he could give in to the Awami League demands. He chose the former option. On the morning of 25 March, General Tikka Khan ordered General Khadim to launch Operation Searchlight that night.22 Yahya, despite being the army chief, chose not to command the operation from Dhaka but flew to Karachi in the evening. He also ordered Tikka, in the interest of his personal safety, that the operation should only be started after his arrival at Karachi (lest the Indians attack his aircraft en route to Karachi).23 Yahya’s departure became known to the Awami League as soon as he embarked on a plane at the Dhaka airbase.24 This was sure proof for them that the negotiations were over. Hence, they received advance notice of the impending military action. All leaders, except Sheikh Mujib, fled towards India. Around midnight on 25 March, the military operation, which ultimately tore Pakistan asunder, began. 19

20 21

22 23 24

Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 151, 152. For the motives behind this demand see Hossein, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, 96, 97. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 127. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 131, and Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 75. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 81. Ali, Pakistan Do-Lakht Kaise Hua, 92-93, 95. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 76-77.

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Analysis The commonality between Mujib, Bhutto, and Yahya was a quest for power. But their paths to power differed markedly. Yahya could only hold onto power if he could crush or sideline Mujib and Bhutto. The attainment of his goal required a political failure of both Mujib and Bhutto to acquire legitimacy but he failed in bringing it about. Sheikh Mujib wanted to become the Prime Minister of either Pakistan, or Bangladesh. He could become the Prime Minister of Pakistan by showing a little flexibility but instead he became paranoid after the postponement of the national assembly session. The success of his noncooperation movement and accompanying violence convinced him of the weakness of Pak Army.25 He assumed, wrongly though, that the army would bow down to his pressure tactics. Thus, he miscalculated greatly, and as a result civil war erupted in East Pakistan. Bhutto was in the weakest position in this three-way competition. He didn’t have either the power of guns (like the army), or electoral legitimacy (like the Awami League). The only way for him was to engineer chaos (which is a ladder according to the unscrupulous) through encouraging a destructive conflict between Awami League and the army. Thus, he did everything in his power to prevent a Yahya-Mujib agreement and a peaceful/democratic transfer of power. Of the three, Bhutto was the only one to achieve his objective, even though he was the least likely to do so. All three managed to commit heinous crimes during this quest for power. Yahya Khan tried to equate Bhutto’s 81 seats with Mujib’s 160 in order to create the semblance of political stalemate (which was necessary for his holding on to power).26 Then, he launched a bloody and certain-to-fail military operation despite being warned by the likes of General Yaqub, General Khadim, General Farman, Admiral

25 26

Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 66. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 94.

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Ahsan, and Air Commodore Masood. He also chose to flee instead of leading the operation himself.27 Mujib conspired for the separation of East Pakistan. He sought help from India and the US for his nefarious schemes and was given full support by the former (though the latter rejected his entreaties).28 He incited revolt against Pakistan and was responsible for the grizzly violence against non-Bengalis and West Pakistanis (in which thousands perished) just to bully the government into transferring power to him. Bhutto tore all democratic norms to pieces and insisted on parity with the Awami League despite having earned no such mandate from the elections. He also threatened to set West Pakistan ablaze from Karachi to Khyber if his demands weren’t met.29 Had Yahya not obliged Bhutto at every step along the way, Bhutto, instead of Mujib, might well have launched a destructive agitation. He also made it clear that he was even willing to consider the country’s disintegration if only he be made Prime Minister of West Pakistan. If Mujib was guilty of treason in March 1971, then so was Bhutto.

What Should Have Been Done When the Awami League had removed all the veils of dissimulation and deception by demanding a confederation,30 the government was only left with the options of acquiescence or military action. The government should have chosen the former option. At least, it would have retained a symbolic link between East and West Pakistan. More importantly, it wouldn’t have led to a murderous civil war and consequent defeat of Pakistan at India’s hands. It wouldn’t have given the Indians and their agents in East 27 28 29 30

Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country, 46. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 41. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 89. Awami League had always envisaged a confederation instead of a federation. See Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 37.

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Pakistan/Bangladesh the foundational myth of the ‘murderous Pakistani Army’ which is still being used in Bangladesh to undermine Bangladesh’s Islamic identity and its links to the fraternal country of Pakistan. The military option was quite a longshot. With East Pakistan surrounded on three sides by India, and 1,000 miles away from West Pakistan, it was very easy for India to support the anti-Pakistan rebels whereas the logistical realities made a long struggle by Pakistan Army in East Pakistan virtually impossible. Then, every civil war unleashes a cycle of repression which alienates the local population even further. That is why, General Yaqub had said that the military operation would achieve no sane aim. The only way for Pakistan’s success in a military operation was that it be completed very quickly. This was only possible if all Awami League leadership were captured at the very beginning. In this way, the rebels would have suffered from a leadership crisis at a nascent stage and might well have wilted under pressure. Then the arrested Awami League leadership could have been used to generate a political solution. But Yahya Khan’s cowardice destroyed this fragile hope of success by facilitating the escape of Awami League leadership to India.

The State of Affairs After the Event The failure of negotiations, the launching of Operation Searchlight, and the escape of Awami League leadership into the welcoming embrace of India practically destroyed all chances of a United Pakistan. Now, Pakistan needed a resounding military victory over the rebels and at least a military stalemate with India on the Eastern front to resurrect a slim chance for even a symbolic union/confederation. Failing in any one of these would make even a confederation impossible. Fratricide, defeat, and disgrace seemed on the cards as India made herself ready to make hay while the sun shone.

CHAPTER 6

June/July 1971: Civil War in East Pakistan. Go Forth and Win? “Examining the lives and deeds of men like Cyrus, one can see that they received nothing from fortune except the opportunity, which gave them the material they could mould into whatever form they desired, and without that opportunity the strength of their spirit would have been extinguished, and without that strength the opportunity would have come in vain.”

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince This chapter is a bit different from the rest. It aims to explore a novel idea that hasn’t been given much attention by historians. It addresses a significant ‘what if’. “What if Pakistan had initiated full-scale hostilities against India in June/July 1971? The idea was actually proposed by General Niazi (Commander of the Eastern Command) to General Abdul Hameed (who was the de facto Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army at the time).1 But Niazi, at that time, did not know about the significant diplomatic manoeuvres taking place at that time which could have given a whole new context to his idea. Let’s dive into the murky world of war and diplomacy in that fateful summer of 1971 and see for ourselves whether the opportunity really existed.

1

A A K Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65.

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First Phase of the Civil War (March-June 1971) On 25 March 1971, Yahya Khan ordered General Tikka Khan (at that time serving as Governor, Chief Martial Law Administrator, and the commander of Eastern Command) to launch a military operation ‘Operation Searchlight’ against Awami League and its secessionist supporters. The story most of us have been told growing up goes like this: The West Pakistani army under Tikka Khan launched a fierce assault on the hapless (and unarmed) Bengalis. Many were killed mercilessly, whereas even more managed to run off to India where they started receiving training and arms from the Indians. Thus, Pakistan Army, overnight, turned thousands (if not hundreds of thousands) of peaceful Bengalis into rebels through acts of brutality. This story is guilty of over-simplification of some and omission of other very important facts. Whenever studying any war or conflict, the respective strength of both sides is ascertained. What was the strength of both sides on that fateful night of 25 March 1971? We know that only a single regular division of the army was stationed there. It had a total of about 15,000 men but 4,500 of them were Bengalis of the East Bengal Regiment.2 Then there were 1,500 regular army soldiers stationed at the East Bengal Regimental Centre at Chittagong. In addition to these, there were the almost 100 per cent Bengali paramilitary forces of East Pakistan Rifles (akin to Punjab Rangers), the Razakars, and the Ansar. Together these numbered around 45,000 armed men (not to mention the 50,000-plus police).3 So, on 25 March, about 10,000-12,000 West Pakistani soldiers faced around at least 60,000 Bengali soldiers.4 The Bengalis were on their home turf and could hope to get at least logistical support from India. On the other hand, the West Pakistanis were completely cut-off from their base. No wonder the 2 3

4

Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 225. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 198, and Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 225. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 247.

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Americans thought that the West Pakistanis would be defeated by the rebels.5 No wonder Sheikh Mujib was playing hardball during negotiations. No wonder Yahya Khan fled Dhaka before the beginning of the military operation. Pakistan Army, though, also had some significant advantages. By deciding to strike, it had gained the initiative and—albeit somewhat diluted due to Yahya’s flight—the element of surprise. It also possessed a clarity of vision about its objectives which the Bengali rebels didn’t have due to the fact that Sheikh Mujib had hedged his bets till literally the last moment. It was a very delicate situation in which the side that used its unique advantages the best would emerge victorious. As it happened, the Bengali rebels completely failed to coordinate and utilize their superior numbers and homeadvantage. They did wipe out isolated Pakistan Army detachments of about 150 men each in Kushtia and Pabna.6 They also managed to fight for about three weeks in Chittagong and its vicinity, but were defeated despite having about 5,000 professional soldiers of the 8 East Bengal Regiment (commanded by a future president of Bangladesh Major Ziaur Rahman after he had killed his CO Colonel Janjua), the East Bengal Regimental Centre, and the East Pakistan Rifles. Their opposition consisted of only 600 West Pakistani soldiers of an incomplete battalion (20 Baloch).7 Pakistan Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Tikka Khan and Major General Khadim Raja, in contrast, was able to utilize its advantages more successfully. It gained complete control of Dhaka within 24 hours8 and had ‘recaptured’ virtually the entire province by mid-May.9 The rebels weren’t allowed breathing space and heavy casualties were inflicted on the armed rebels whose remnants 5 6 7 8 9

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 90. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 91-93. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 87. Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country, 52-53. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha, 87, and Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 72.

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escaped to India. It appeared that Pak Army had emerged victorious against the odds in the initial phase of the civil war.10 From 25 March to the beginning of April, a mammoth air operation was conducted by Pakistan to airlift reinforcements into East Pakistan. Two divisions were sent which raised the number of West Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan to about 40,000 troops.11 In mid-April, Lieutenant General AAK Niazi was sent to take over the Eastern Command. Niazi continued Tikka Khan’s strategy of pursuing the rebels right up to the border, while Tikka Khan stayed put as the Governor and Chief Martial Law Administrator of the province.12 By June, most of the mopping-up operations had been completed.13 So, in June 1971, Pakistan Army had 3 battle hardened divisions in East Pakistan, even though two of them were without their heavy weapons. According to Sisson and Rose, “By mid 1971 the Pakistani army was capable of launching military action on both the eastern and the western frontiers with India.”14

Situation on the Indian Side From the above discussion, a burning question comes to mind: why didn’t India attack East Pakistan in March/April 1971 when Pakistan Army was facing strong Bengali resistance and was in no position to defend against a determined assault by professional Indian forces? Well, according to Sisson and Rose, “The Indian army was prepared neither for direct intervention in East Pakistan nor for the inevitable counterthrust from West Pakistan.”15 Soon after the eruption of civil war in East Pakistan, Indian PM Indira Gandhi asked her Chief of Army Staff Sam 10

11 12 13 14 15

Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 2-11, and Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 96-97. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 96-109. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 100. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 72. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 146. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 151.

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Manekshaw to launch an offensive against East Pakistan.16 Manekshaw refused by saying that the Indian armed forces were far from ready to face a full scale war against Pakistan. He argued that the Indian army needed several months to redeploy her forces for defensive and offensive actions against West and East Pakistan, respectively. He told Indira Gandhi that if he launched an immediate attack on East Pakistan, there was a 100 per cent chance of defeat. 17 On the other hand, he argued that if he was allowed to work according to his plan and timetable, he could guarantee success in a war launched in November 1971 as by that time the Indian Army would be properly re-equipped and redeployed.18 Moreover, the post-monsoon weather in winter was best for large-scale military operations in East Pakistan and the chance of Chinese intervention would be almost zero due to the closure of the Himalayan passes by snow. Did Manekshaw miss an opportunity here by being conservative? After all, he had at least 3 divisions ready near the border of East Pakistan, whereas Pakistan had only one which was busy battling the rebels. Interestingly, a well-known and well-connected analyst K. Subrahmaniyam (who was heading the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi at that time) had advocated an early Indian attack (as opposed to Manekshaw’s ‘slow but sure’ strategy) to liberate Bangladesh through a full-scale war with Pakistan. He recommended that India should aim “for rapid escalation to subsequent overt limited intervention, quarantine of Bangladesh, full scale intervention and a full scale war with Pakistan.” Subrahmanyam concluded that “intervention on a decisive scale sooner than later is to be preferred.” 19 Both Manekshaw’s and Subrahmaniyam’s strategies entailed significant risks. 16 17 18

19

Matinuddin, Tragedy of errors, 291. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 67. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 69, and Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 298. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 69, 70.

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Manekshaw’s strategy ruled out full-scale war till November. It relied on the Bengali rebels to keep Pakistan at bay during that period but after the rebels were decimated by June (an event not foreseen by Manekshaw) this strategy’s flaw gave Pakistan an opportunity to strike while India was still far from ready. Subrahmaniyam’s strategy could have given India a spectacular victory before the end of April. But had India attacked in April, it would have made it crystal clear to all and sundry that Awami League was nothing more than an Indian proxy. The civil war was still young in April and many Bengalis were still not that alienated from Pakistan. Had India attacked in April, the threat of the ‘external enemy’ might well have pushed a lot of Bengalis into the Pakistani camp. If that hastily planned attack had failed, India would be compelled to permanently say adieu to its dream of dismembering Pakistan. The attack would also have been a disaster for India in terms of international relations because by April India hadn’t received many refugees (an issue later used by India to justify her aggression) nor had it been able to generate ill will against Pakistan internationally through a concerted media campaign (which it was able to do so by November). India, it must be remembered, was one of the largest recipients of foreign aid at the time. 20 International pressures would have compelled the Indian forces to accelerate their timetables and this could also have caused the offensive to fail due to haste. Indira Gandhi chose to defer to Manekshaw, instead of Subrahmaniyam, who embarked on his grand plan to dismember Pakistan through military means. This meant that for some months the Indian Army would be a bit off balance as it strained to attain a war posture. Therein lay the opportunity for Pakistan.

20

See David Engerman, The Price of Aid – The Economic Cold War in India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). See Pages 315328 for an account of US aid to India from 1969 to 1971.

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The Diplomatic Bridge between China and the US In June/July 1971, Pakistan was involved in bringing about the greatest diplomatic coup of the century after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Since 1949, when communists under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had taken over China, Chinese-US relations were marked by extreme hostility. They had also bled each other white during the long Korean War of the early 1950s. Interestingly, in the late 1950s mutual relations between the ‘fraternal communist states’ of China and the Soviet Union began to sour. By 1969, the situation had gotten so bad that they fought a border war and the USSR threatened China with a nuclear attack. 21 Here, the US spotted an incredible opportunity of isolating the USSR (its chief cold war rival) by wooing China. But, there had been no diplomatic relations between China and US since 1949, and the US was at a loss about how to initiate contact. Here, Pakistan the ‘iron brother’ of China, entered into the picture. Pakistan was in the unique position of being on good terms with both powers, even though Pak-US relations had been hit seriously by American perfidy during the 1965 war. US President Nixon decided to utilize Pakistan’s services for this diplomatic coup and Yahya Khan had been working on this project since 1969.22 The breakthrough came in July 1971 when Henry Kissinger secretly travelled through Pakistan to China and met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.23 From 1969 to 1971, President Nixon had made sure to keep Yahya in good humour because he was providing America with an indispensable diplomatic service. Even after the military action in East Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger maintained a pro-Pakistan tilt in contrast to the decidedly pro-India tilt of the Congress and the State Department, which were completely in the dark about the approach to 21

22 23

Immanuel CY Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 684. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 86. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh,105.

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China. When Farland, the US ambassador to Pakistan, protested about this policy and stated that West Pakistan wouldn’t be able to hold on to East Pakistan by force indefinitely, Kissinger told him that the US just needed six months to grind its own axe.24 Pakistan’s window of opportunity to take advantage of this unique diplomatic situation would close the moment the US stopped needing a go-between to China.

The Opportunity? According to Indian Major General Sukhwant Singh, if Yahya had struck India before the onset of heavy monsoon rains (in July), he could have inflicted serious reverses on India on both Eastern and Western fronts.25 The Indian army wasn’t ready for a war at that time but it had vigorously started training and organizing theBengali rebels in about 59 camps situated near the India-East Pakistan border. 26 General Niazi had recommended to General Abdul Hameed in June that he should be allowed to enter Indian territory in pursuit of the rebels. It is also a well-known fact that the Indians were regularly trespassing and even engaging Pakistan army in encounters inside East Pakistan during that summer.27 Any attempt by Niazi to attack Bengali rebel camps inside India would have most probably led to an Indian response and a full-scale war. Shirking from a fullscale war, Yahya Khan strictly forbade Niazi against entering the Indian territory.28 Did Yahya Khan miss an opportunity here? Let’s analyze the situation. True, the Pakistan Army had inflicted a defeat on rebels but the repression only served to alienate even more Bengalis. Pakistan Army was engaged in a vicious 24 25

26 27 28

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 92. “The Liberation of Bangladesh” by Sukhwant Singh (Page 65) [mentioned in “The Betrayal of East Pakistan” by A. A. K. Niazi (Page 67)]. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 184. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 253. “The Betrayal of East Pakistan” by A. A. K. Niazi (Page 67).

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cycle where successful military operations led to increased discontent among the populace which made subsequent operations more difficult. Pakistan’s economy was very weak and aid dependent. Due to the ongoing civil war, most of the donors had halted the aid to Pakistan.29 This meant that Pakistan couldn’t hope to maintain its armies in East Pakistan for a long time. So, Pakistan had to conclude the civil war quickly. It was also clear that India was heavily invested in the rebellion. The Awami League leaders in India were now in complete Indian control and India wouldn’t allow them to come to terms with Pakistan. Khandekar Moshtaque (Foreign Minister in the Bangladesh Government in exile) tried to initiate a political solution brokered by the US but his activities were detected by the Indian intelligence and he was removed from his post on Indian orders. 30 So, a political solution without Indian concurrence appeared impossible. How could Pakistan pressurize India into agreeing on a reasonable political solution? Pakistan couldn’t wait long, because the Indian military preparations were progressing at full speed. After the monsoon, India could deploy her full military might along with a rejuvenated Mukti Bahini. Pakistan was truly in a very tough situation. Desperate times call for desperate measures. Pakistan could have formulated a grand plan to hit India and resolve the civil war in June. At that time, the US-China diplomatic endeavour was nearing its climax and the US was especially willing to avoid aggravating Pakistan’s woes.31 Pakistan couldn’t have realistically hoped to defeat a militarily superior India, but it could have hoped to utilize the element of surprise (particularly on the western front) in hitting India hard initially. Pakistan could have readied her forces on both fronts quietly and then initiated hostilities by launching a 29

30

31

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 81, for a detailed account see Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, Chapter 7. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 221. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 81.

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lightning strike on two or three locations inside India where training camps for Bengali rebels were present. The strike forces used for these attacks should have been accompanied by army media teams who should have collected video evidence regarding these rebel training camps being run by India. Capturing Indian and rebel prisoners from these camps should have been identified as a priority. The videos and prisoners taken could have served to humiliate India internationally. The blatant violation of Indian territory coupled with a scathing media offensive would have forced India to retaliate forcefully. Indian retaliation would have given Pakistan the excuse for launching a thrust against India on the western front. Simultaneously, Pakistan could have engaged both the US and China to lead the global chorus for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution of both the Indo-Pak war and the civil war. In this way, the war could have ended before India could bring up her reserves from the hinterland to the front. The monsoon in July would also have acted as a spoiling factor for the Indian counteroffensive against East Pakistan.32 The USA would have shown much more alacrity than usual in helping out Pakistan at this time when the fate of her diplomatic approach to China was in Pakistan’s hands. Had Pakistan even gained a stalemate like the 1965 war, it would have been an acceptable result (especially when one looks at what happened in December 1971). After the ceasefire, when Pakistan would have shown India, the Awami Leaguers, and the world, that it could fight India to a stalemate and gain effective diplomatic support from both US and China, a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis could have been worked out under the aegis of global powers. The Awami League leaders would now have negotiated with the knowledge that Pakistan had managed to hit the rebels hard and keep India at bay at the same time. In this India-free atmosphere, is it too wild to hope that a mutually acceptable political solution could have been worked out? 32

Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 270.

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Critical Analysis It is a well-known fact that in war, events seldom unfold according to plan. The Pakistani attacks on rebel camps in India could have failed miserably. Even if they had succeeded, there was no guarantee that Indira Gandhi would take the bait. Even if she were inclined to retaliate immediately, General Manekshaw would have tried his best to make sure that she didn’t. Even if India had retaliated, there was no guarantee that the war would bring a favourable result for Pakistan. Even with some Indian reserves being away in the hinterland, India still outnumbered Pakistan by a large margin on both fronts. 33 Banking on China and US for arranging an internationally mandated ceasefire within a week or two of the beginning of hostilities was also by no means a sure thing. Had India gained some military successes early on, it would have backed itself to defy the international calls for a ceasefire. It might well have found the USSR a very useful ally in this respect. But, we have to look at the other side of the coin as well. It was clear to many inside and outside Pakistan by that summer that India was bent on going to war against Pakistan over East Pakistan/Bangladesh.34 Indian preparations and shifting of huge forces towards East Pakistan (which were known to Pakistan intelligence services) made it evident that East Pakistan was going to be the primary target. It was also well known that the best weather for large-scale military operations in that region was from November to early March. Pakistani leadership should have also seen that the diplomatic window of opportunity represented a limited time offer that would expire soon. It was also obvious that the civil

33 34

Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 298, 299. Both the Pakistani National Security Advisor General Umar (mentioned in “Crossed Swords” by Shuja Nawaz, Page 286) and his US counterpart Henry Kissinger (mentioned in “1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh” by Srinath Raghavan, Page 104) had come to this conclusion by the summer of 1971.

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war was ruining the economy of Pakistan.35 It was also serving to tire the Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan who were sustaining casualties daily.36 The Bengalis were also becoming more alienated with the passage of time. So, even without the benefit of hindsight, it should have been clear to any intelligent observer that even though Pakistan might lose a war in June, it would surely lose it in November/December. It was also clear that there was going to be a war sooner or later. Then, why not make war at a time when the enemy was at its greatest disadvantage? At least in June Pakistan would have possessed the advantages of the element of surprise, initiative, and the full support of China and US. Whereas, a war in November gave India all the advantages of readiness, initiative, superior force, a tired and stretched enemy, a rejuvenated friendly rebel force, favourable weather conditions, and a dedicated ally (India signed the treaty of friendship with the USSR in August as a reaction to the US-China rapprochement. By June, the USChina diplomatic activity had remained secret and thus both India and the USSR had been rather passive in their cooperation. After the US-China rapprochement became public knowledge, both India and the USSR felt threatened enough to massively ratchet up their cooperation in diplomatic, economic, and military spheres).37 As far as both paths or forks in the road for Pakistan are concerned, it is manifest that a war in June was a much preferable option. It wasn’t a good option. But by that stage Pakistani leadership had bungled up the situation so much that our only choices were the bad, the worse, and the worst. Instead of behaving like an ostrich who buries its head in the ground when threatened, Pakistani leadership would have done well to take the bull by the horns. It should have chosen to fight a war—made inevitable by its past mishandling of the East Pakistan crisis—at a time of its own choice, not that of the enemy’s. Sometimes, fortune does favour the bold. But 35 36 37

See “The Separation of East Pakistan” by Hassan Zaheer (Chapter 7). Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha, 104. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 202, 243.

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our leadership refused to discard its indolence. Yahya Khan continued his slumber.38 He continued to naively believe that Nixon and Kissinger will bail Pakistan out despite all the evidence to the contrary. Thus, the last opportunity for salvaging the situation was lost. By August/September, Pakistan had permanently lost the ability to gain the initiative. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan continued to wear themselves out while the Indians completed their preparations. By the end of summer, the ‘bad’ option had vanished. Only the ‘worse’ and the ‘worst’ options were left on the table.

38

Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha, 115.

CHAPTER 7

October 1971: Political Capitulation to Sheikh Mujib was Preferable over Military Surrender to India Background The outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971 had all but destroyed any chance of retaining a united Pakistan. Even though Pak Army had gained a significant victory against the rebels in the counterinsurgency campaign by June, our political leadership, comprising the generals of the ruling military junta, had failed to take advantage of this last opportunity to salvage even a symbolic link (like a confederation) between the two wings of Pakistan.1 Yahya Khan showed fateful and frightful politico-military inertia during the summer of 1971. All he came up with was a meaning-less plan for constitutionmaking which wasn’t taken seriously by any of the significant internal and external actors.2 Apparently, Yahya Khan was too busy at that time with bringing about a US-China rapprochement. When the news of Kissinger’s momentous visit to Beijing was made public in July 1971, it sent shockwaves through both India and the Soviet Union. Unlike Yahya, the leadership of both these countries was alive to the situation and the opportunities hidden behind the crisis. 1

2

“Blood over Different Shades of Green” by Ikram Sehgal/Bettina Robotka (Page 211), and “The Last Days of United Pakistan” by G. W. Chaudhry (Page 187). Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 246, 247.

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Both India and the USSR dreaded a China-US alliance and the former was especially concerned about the possibility of Pakistan getting significant and practical help from China and the US. These fears brought India and the USSR together on the table to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation in August 1971. Thus, India could once again feel secure that its schemes regarding East Pakistan won’t be upset by foreign powers.3 After the initial setback in April/May, Mukti Bahini rejuvenated itself with Indian help. It also launched a monsoon offensive during the summer which miserably failed.4 Notwithstanding this failure, the Mukti Bahini continued to tire out the Pakistan Army. India also upped the ante and its forces now started taking an active part in Mukti Bahini operations. Many of these operations were led and executed by Indian military personnel especially from the commando and engineer battalions of the Indian Army.5 By the time, due to the successful Indian propaganda campaign and the exercise of soft power through events like the Concert for Bangladesh in New York in August 1971, the Western public opinion had turned decisively against Pakistan.6 Most western governments (the United Kingdom, France, and the US) had already concluded that the break-up of Pakistan would be in their strategic interests.7 In such a climate, Pakistan could not hope for a resumption of foreign aid. As a result, its economy continued to experience immense strain.8 It was becoming clearer by the day that Pakistan won’t be able to sustain the military effort in East Pakistan infinitely. 3

4 5

6 7

8

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 108. Sehgal and Robotka, Blood over Different Shades of Green, 241. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 211, 212, and Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 213. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 217. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 163, 164 and Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 282. See “The Separation of East Pakistan” by Hassan Zaheer, Chapter 7 for details.

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In July 1971, Khandekar Moshtaque, the Foreign Minister of the Bangladesh Government in exile at Calcutta, contacted the US consulate in Calcutta and communicated his willingness for a political solution through which a united Pakistan could be preserved. 9 He requested the US to play a mediatory role in negotiations with Yahya Khan and even offered to travel to Pakistan for negotiations. Due to the US dilly-dallying and Yahya Khan’s initial inertia regarding the matter, no significant progress could be made until September. In September, Yahya Khan communicated his whole-hearted willingness to US officials regarding negotiations with Moshtaque but the ship had sailed by then10. Khandekar Moshtaque’s activities had been detected by the intelligence services and, consequently, he did an about-face and declared on 29 September 1971 that anything less than total independence for Bangladesh was unacceptable. Nevertheless, Moshtaque was removed from his post of foreign minister of the government in exile on the express directions of Indira Gandhi’s confidant DP Dhar, who was actually running the Bangladesh Government in exile.11 The Khandekar Moshtaque episode demonstrated beyond doubt that India wouldn’t let the Awami Leaguers at Calcutta reach a political solution without Indian acquiescence. India was only interested in using them as tools for dismembering Pakistan.

The Events that Transpired By the beginning of October the Indo-Pak tensions had reached peak levels. Both countries had completed the full mobilization of their armed forces in early October. 12 Around 366,000 Pakistani soldiers stood face-to-face against 9

10

11

12

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 218. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 220. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 220. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 190.

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833,000 Indian soldiers on the borders of East and West Pakistan.13 India outnumbered Pakistan in the eastern theatre by 1:4 and in the western theatre by 1:1.6. Pakistani aircraft numbering 290 were facing 640 of the Indian air force. In the eastern wing, it was believed that the Pakistani air force would not survive for more than 24 hours as its sole squadron could be put out of action by destroying the sole runway at Dhaka.14 India had 11 squadrons in the eastern theatre to establish complete air supremacy over East Pakistan from the very beginning of active hostilities. The weather was also suitable at the time for major military operations in East Pakistan. From October onwards, India also greatly stepped up its military activities. In the second week of October, Indian army’s eastern command ordered its formations to carry out offensive operations up to ten miles inside East Pakistan in order to capture important targets in East Pakistan that would assist in the eventual full-fledged military intervention.15 Mukti Bahini activities in the border areas also increased greatly. According to Kamal Matinuddin, Pakistan had lost more than 7,000 square kilometres of East Pakistani territory by the end of October.16 The international scenario was also looking very bleak for Pakistan. Despite providing valuable diplomatic services to the US, Pakistan did not receive any US assistance (military or economic) after the summer of 1971. The US also refused military sales to Pakistan. On the other hand, massive US economic assistance to India continued uninterrupted. Sisson and Rose are spot-on in saying that in 1971 if there was a tilt in the US policy, it was towards India, not Pakistan.17 Pakistan’s ‘iron brother’ China was also experiencing a tumult of its own. Mao Zedong’s designated 13 14 15

16 17

Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 298. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay dekha, 142. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 231, 232 Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 347. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 258.

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successor and the chief of Chinese armed forces Marshal Lin Biao had tried to mount a coup against Mao. The coup failed and Lin Biao was killed in an air crash while fleeing towards Russia on 13 September 1971.18 Lin Biao had packed many significant offices of the Chinese military with his loyalists. Now, Mao Zedong sacked and removed all officials who were believed to be in cahoots with Lin Biao. As a result, China seemed to be in no position to assist Pakistan militarily in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war. China also was very apprehensive about the Soviet threat from the north, and the Soviet Union had assured India that China would not dare to think of intervening in East Pakistan with dozens of Soviet divisions massed on the Soviet-Chinese frontier.19 In sharp contrast to Pakistan’s allies, the USSR came out fully and unabashedly to India’s succour. Not only did it supply India with military and economic aid worth more than a billion US dollars20 it also offered India any and all weapons it desired. Mig-21s, Su-7s, T-55 tanks, helicopters, and hovercrafts to leapfrog East Pakistan’s formidable rivers found their way to India. Thus, not only was India getting way more foreign support than Pakistan, it was also militarily much stronger on both eastern and western fronts. Indian commander General Sam Manekshaw had got the Indian army in shape as he had promised Indira Gandhi in April. The aftermonsoon weather was the best time to strike in East Pakistan. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, India had all the advantages derived from heaven and earth.21 All India required was a suitable excuse for starting a war, and it already had that as well. Tens of thousands of refugees had crossed into India during the civil war. India had claimed that 10 million refugees had crossed over into India and 18

19

20 21

For the details of this episode see Immanuel CY Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 710-715. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 122. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 243. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 1: Laying Plans (New York: Harper Press, 2005).

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termed them an ‘intolerable economic burden’. When the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadruddin Aga Khan tried to send UN personnel to India-run refugee camps, India flatly refused to grant access. India also barred the return of refugees (Pakistan had established refugee rehabilitation centres along the borders and had announced to accept the return of all refugees in the summer of 1971) and asserted that only after a ‘political solution’ (as defined by India) could the refugees return home. This clearly malevolent Indian stance greatly peeved the UNHCR22 but the Indian media campaign—aided and abetted by the Western governments in service of their cold strategic interests—had cast such a spell over the world that Sadruddin Aga Khan’s protestations were ignored. In order to avoid a war, UN Secretary General U Thant had proposed that both India and Pakistan move their forces away from the border and allow UN to station observers on the border. Pakistan readily agreed but India contemptuously refused.23

Analysis India’s careful manipulation of the refugee issue, its refusal to cooperate with the UN’s efforts for peace, and its aggressive military posture made it quite clear to any intelligent observer that India was bent on war with Pakistan. Henry Kissinger had communicated this assessment to Pakistanis as early as July.24 In August, Pakistani intelligence services had also reached the same conclusion and had informed the president accordingly.25 It was known by all Pakistani generals that the best months for conventional large scale military operations in East Pakistan were from November to March. Hence, it made sense to assume that the Indian attack on East Pakistan would come in November. 22

23 24 25

Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 151. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 190. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 306. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 460.

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If anyone were to analyse the military situation in a calculated manner devoid of emotionalism, he would conclude that Pakistan was doomed to be defeated in the Eastern theatre and there was no reasonable hope for spectacular success on the western front to offset the debacle in the east. Pakistan couldn’t expect a lot of practical help from either China or the US, whereas India could count on total support from the USSR.26 The civil war had also taken a heavy toll on the forces of the Pakistani Eastern command where 40,000-odd soldiers had been consistently in the field for seven months.27 Thus, in case of a war, the situation appeared hopeless for Pakistan. Logically then, at this stage, the only sane option for Pakistan was to avoid war at any cost. A political solution acceptable to the Bengalis and the Awami League was essential for this. The Khandekar Moshtaque episode had clearly shown that the so-called Bangladesh government in exile couldn’t move a muscle without Indian permission. Since India was clearly bent on making war, it was unreasonable to expect any meaningful dialogue with the Awami Leaguers in Calcutta. But Pakistan still had one important card in its possession. The undisputed leader of Awami League, the Bangabandhu, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman still languished in a Pakistani prison facing a trial for treason.

What Should Have Been Done India clearly wanted to dismember Pakistan but it was equally important to India that instead of Bengalis/Mukti Bahini, India and only India should be seen and acknowledged as the ‘liberator’ of Bangladesh. India also wanted to humble Pakistan through a military victory. Pakistan’s suicidal politics and policies had bred a civil war and given India a golden opportunity to realize these dreams. Over time, the situation had reached a juncture where the separation of East Pakistan had become inevitable. But the 26 27

Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 202. Salik, Mein ne Dhaka Doobtay Dekha, 124-125.

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manner in which the separation was to occur remained undecided. At this stage, Pakistan could aim to deny India an outright victory in East Pakistan. India recognized this possibility, and, thus, kept a close watch over the Bengali leaders in Calcutta. But Pakistan could checkmate India at this point by utilizing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. If Pakistan were to capitulate, and it was bound to happen in case of a defeat to India which looked on the cards, then better capitulate to our East Pakistani brothers instead of the sworn enemy. Had Yahya Khan offered Mujib independence for East Pakistan/Bangladesh in exchange for a symbolic confederal link, Mujib might well have accepted it. Had he insisted on removing even the symbolic link, this should have been accepted (after all that’s what happened after 16 December anyway). The important point here is that Pakistan, not India, should have been the one to grant independence to Bangladesh. Yahya should have sacrificed his office in the national interest and transferred power to both majority parties in both wings. Pakistani forces should have been withdrawn from East Pakistan after the announcement of Sheikh Mujib’s release and the transfer of power. This would have led to significant symbolic and substantive advantages for Pakistan. First, an orderly transfer of power in East Pakistan in October would have immediately stopped the bloodshed. The horrific massacres of Biharis which occurred from December 1971 to March 1972 would have been avoided.28 The turning of Biharis into stateless people, the wholesale theft of their property, and their subsequent removal to refugee camps in Bangladesh would have also been prevented. Second, Pakistan would have avoided the humiliation of military defeat and surrender at the hands of India. Third, Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League wouldn’t have felt any need for creating and propagating the myth of 3 million killed by the Pakistan army. This myth is even used today to poison mutual 28

Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst and Co., 2011), 159.

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relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The two beneficiaries of this myth are India, which wants Pakistan and Bangladesh at loggerheads to avoid the nightmare scenario of two fraternal Islamic states on its flanks united in resisting Indian tyranny and hegemony,29 and Awami League, which garners political capital by portraying Pakistan as the mythical villain and itself as the mythical hero in the emotionally charged mythical epic of Bangladesh’s liberation. Without Awami League’s cooperation, it would have been impossible for India to keep this gigantic rumour alive.

The State of Affairs After the Event As it happened, Pakistan did not make any use of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who remained in jail until December 1971. Instead of trying to avoid the impending disastrous war, Yahya Khan satisfied himself with delusions. He convinced himself, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that India would not dare attack Pakistan and, even if it did, Pakistan would be preserved by the intervention of China and the US.30 India began the war of 1971 by invading East Pakistan on 21 November 1971.31 Predictably, Pakistani forces, despite fighting with courage on the Eastern front, collapsed and surrendered on 16 December 1971. Yahya Khan didn’t even bother to launch the planned grand-offensive from West Pakistan.32 In this way, the disastrous doctrine of defending East Pakistan from West Pakistan died with the demise of East Pakistan. Yahya Khan’s criminal negligence of practically abandoning his beleaguered forces in the eastern wing proved to be the last of his disservices to Pakistan. Four 29

30

31

32

Abdul Mu’min Chowdhury, Behind the Myth of Three Million (Rawalpindi: Al-Hilal Publishers, 1974), 72-73. Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, 418, and Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, 460. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, 205. Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 305-306.

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days after the surrender, Yahya Khan was ousted from power and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over in (West) Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib was released by Bhutto who made a triumphant speech in Dhaka upon his return on 10 January 1972.

Epilogue In a few short years, the trio of unscrupulous men who were chiefly responsible for civil war and the dismemberment of Pakistan met ignoble ends. Yahya died in obscurity, despised by his countrymen. Bhutto was ousted from power in a coup and was hanged soon after. Mujib was brutally killed by his own military. His killers were the ‘freedom-fighters’ who had fought against Pakistan. It is interesting to note that the Pakistan Army, which was accused of killing millions of people by him, had not harmed a hair on his head during his arrest and incarceration. His family was also not touched by the military. In sharp contrast to the alleged ‘butchers of the Pakistan army’, when Mujib’s own ‘humanistic, libertarian, and brave freedom fighters turned against him, they killed their ‘Bangabandhu’ in cold blood. Not only that, they also killed dozens of his family members including women and little children.

As you sow, so shall you reap! So, all the chief miscreants met sticky ends. Does that compensate even a little for the tragedy? No, it does not. Even the jolt of 1971 could not galvanize the left over Pakistan into fulfilling Iqbal’s vision of Pakistan: a country that was to be unapologetically Islamic yet not a theocracy; a country that was to be immensely powerful yet not tyrannical; a country that was to set an example for the world in terms of social justice, ingenuity, and hard work; a country that was to become the Islamic vanguard state and unify the Islamic world under its leadership; a country where ethnicity, caste, sect, or gender was to count for naught and where the only merit was to be one’s service and sacrifice rendered to the Islamic cause.

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Our weakness as a state is chiefly caused by our indolence, lethargy, ignorance, cowardice, and a cardinal lack of dedication to Iqbal’s vision. This state was made with a promise from our ancestors. That promise has been consistently broken by Pakistanis since the country’s inception. Any promise or commitment made for a political project is a debt to be paid to history and posterity. Nations who fail to pay that debt in time are fated for liquidation and oblivion. We have already seen our country broken, whereas our East Pakistani/Bangladeshi brothers saw theirs get mangled. These painful episodes are warnings of the consequences that will follow if the debt isn’t paid. We can succeed only by single-mindedly working to turn Iqbal’s dream into reality. Instead of flirting with a different theory each day and swooning over the ‘intellect’ of our Western ‘masters’, we should solely focus on fulfilling the promise that was made. Only then can Pakistan survive and thrive. Otherwise, well, the knives are already being sharpened next door!