Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani's First Term (2013–2017) [1st ed.] 9789811539237, 9789811539244

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xii
Introduction (Luciano Zaccara, Wafa Sultana Mohiddin)....Pages 1-13
Exploring President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine 2013–2017 (Mahdi Ahouie)....Pages 15-41
Revisiting Rouhani’s School of Thought: A Critical Discussion of Its Developmental and Foreign Policy Doctrines (Ali Fathollah-Nejad)....Pages 43-56
Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations (Luciano Zaccara, Mehran Haghirian)....Pages 57-86
The Sectarian Divide in Iran–Saudi Relations (Shahram Akbarzadeh)....Pages 87-106
Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era (Edward Wastnidge)....Pages 107-129
Iran and Russia: Between Pragmatism and Possibilities of a Strategic Alliance (Nikolay Kozhanov)....Pages 131-156
Regaining Space: Iranian Foreign Policy Toward Latin America During the First Presidential Term of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2017) (Sergio I. Moya Mena)....Pages 157-176
From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Iran’s Presence in Africa (Mahjoob Zweiri, Alieu Manjang)....Pages 177-203
The Feasibility of Energy Cooperation between Iran and the Gulf Arab States (Anna Aleksandra Gawlik)....Pages 205-228
From Isolation to Accommodation: Lessons Learnt from Hassan Rouhani’s First Term in Office (Anoushiravan Ehteshami)....Pages 229-235

Citation preview

CONTEMPORARY GULF STUDIES SERIES EDITORS: STEVEN WRIGHT · ABDULLAH BAABOOD

Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017) Edited by Luciano Zaccara

Contemporary Gulf Studies Series Editors Steven Wright College of Humanities and Social Sciences Hamad bin Khalifa University Doha, Qatar Abdullah Baabood National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

Salient Features: • The Gulf lies at the intersection of regional conflicts and the competing interests of global powers and therefore publications in the series reflect this complex environment. • The series will see publication on the dynamic nature of how the Gulf region has been undergoing enormous changes attracting regional and international interests. • The series is managed through Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, which has emerged as the leading institution within the Gulf region offering graduate degrees in Gulf Studies at both masters and doctoral level. Aims and Scope: This series offer a platform from which scholarly work on the most pressing issues within the Gulf region will be examined. The scope of the book series will encompass work being done on the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait in addition to Iraq, Iran and Yemen. The series will focus on three types of volumes: Single and jointly authored monograph; Thematic edited books; Course text books. The scope of the series will include publications relating to the countries of focus, in terms of the following themes which will allow for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquiry on the Gulf region to flourish: Politics and political development Regional and international relations Regional cooperation and integration Defense and security Economics and development Food and water security Energy and environment Civil society and the private sector Identity, migration, youth, gender and employment Health and education Media, literature, arts & culture More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15318

Luciano Zaccara Editor

Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017)

Editor Luciano Zaccara Gulf Studies Center Qatar University Doha, Qatar

ISSN 2662-320X     ISSN 2662-3218 (electronic) Contemporary Gulf Studies ISBN 978-981-15-3923-7    ISBN 978-981-15-3924-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover design: eStudio Calamar Cover image: Fernando Tatay, shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

The editor would like to thank all the authors involved in this book as well as those from the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University who made it possible, particularly the current and former directors Mahjoob Zweiri and Abdullah Baabood, and the support staff and editors, Arwa Kamal Eldin, Wafa Sultana Mohiddin, Lorraine Charles and Farah Anwar AlQawasmi. This project was partially funded by the Qatar University Faculty Grant, “The Performance of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Impact on the Gulf Region” QUUG-CAS-GSC/2017-2.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 Luciano Zaccara and Wafa Sultana Mohiddin 2 Exploring President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine 2013–2017 15 Mahdi Ahouie 3 Revisiting Rouhani’s School of Thought: A Critical Discussion of Its Developmental and Foreign Policy Doctrines 43 Ali Fathollah-Nejad 4 Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations 57 Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian 5 The Sectarian Divide in Iran–Saudi Relations 87 Shahram Akbarzadeh 6 Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era107 Edward Wastnidge

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7 Iran and Russia: Between Pragmatism and Possibilities of a Strategic Alliance131 Nikolay Kozhanov 8 Regaining Space: Iranian Foreign Policy Toward Latin America During the First Presidential Term of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2017)157 Sergio I. Moya Mena 9 From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Iran’s Presence in Africa177 Mahjoob Zweiri and Alieu Manjang 10 The Feasibility of Energy Cooperation between Iran and the Gulf Arab States205 Anna Aleksandra Gawlik 11 From Isolation to Accommodation: Lessons Learnt from Hassan Rouhani’s First Term in Office229 Anoushiravan Ehteshami

Notes on Contributors

Mahdi Ahouie  is Assistant Professor of international politics, and a member of the ‘Iranian Studies’ department at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran. He has received a PhD in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), University of Geneva, Switzerland. He holds a Master’s degree in the same field from the University of Geneva specializing in international history and politics, and a BA from the School of International Relations in Tehran. Ahouie’s main areas of research include Iran’s contemporary history, Iran’s political geography, Iranian foreign policy, and Middle East geopolitics. Shahram  Akbarzadeh is Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum and Deputy Director (International) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University (Australia). He researches Iranian foreign policy, regional politics in the Persian Gulf, and the role of religion in international relations. He held a prestigious Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (2012–2016) on Islam in Iranian foreign policy, and a joint project on sectarianism in the Middle East sponsored by Qatar Foundation. He is lead researcher on a project examining proxy wars in the region, sponsored by Carnegie Corporation New  York. He is the co-author of The Politics and International Relations of the Middle East: Crisis Zone (2018), editor of the Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East (2019), and has a host of related papers in International Politics, Middle East Policy, The Washington Quarterly, and Third World Quarterly to his name. ix

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Anoushiravan  Ehteshami  is Professor of international relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. He is also the Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Chair in International Relations and director of the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Programme in International Relations, Regional Politics and Security. He is, further, director of the Institute for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies (IMEIS) at Durham. He was Durham University’s first Dean of Internationalization, 2009–2011, and was the founding head of the School of Government and International Affairs (2004–2009). He has been a fellow of the World Economic Forum, and served as a member of the WEF’s foremost body, the Global Agenda Councils, 2010–2012, focusing on energy. He was vice-president and Chair of Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES), 2000–2003. He is Editor of two major book series on the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, and is member of Editorial Board of seven international journals. Ali  Fathollah-Nejad  is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Doha and Lecturer in Middle East and comparative politics in the University of Tübingen’s joint Master’s program with the American University in Cairo (AUC). He holds a PhD in international relations from the Department of Development Studies at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London). His chapter derives from his upcoming Iran in an Emerging New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani (Palgrave Macmillan’s Studies in Iranian Politics). Ali is also author of the Brookings Analysis paper “The Islamic Republic of Iran four decades on: The 2017/18 protests amid a triple crisis.” Anna  Aleksandra  Gawlik graduated in Middle Eastern studies from Jagiellonian University in Poland, where she specialized in Iranian studies. Before acquiring the MA degree, she participated in exchange programs with La Sapienza University in Rome, Oriental Studies Department and Tehran University, Iranian Specialization. As a PhD candidate at Qatar University she took various courses on the international relations in the Gulf, its foreign policy analysis, political economy of the region, as well as in courses on the qualitative and quantitative dissertations. She has spent more than ten years in the Gulf region working in the foreign service of Poland, which allowed her to reach interesting personages of political and academic background. Proficiency in communicating with people in the local languages—Persian, Arabic, and English—allows her to gather the

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first-hand data directly from the party concerned. At the same time being well-settled in the European culture enables her to have an objective standpoint on the analyzed matter. Mehran Haghirian  is a PhD candidate at Qatar University, and a researcher and assistant director at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences. He is a graduate of American University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC, with a master’s degree in International Affairs and a research focus on Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Nikolay Kozhanov  is a research associate professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University and Consulting Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme of Chatham House. His research focuses on the geopolitics of Gulf energy, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as Iran’s economy and international relations. Kozhanov holds his PhD in economics from St. Petersburg State University (2010). He also has an MA degree in Oriental Studies (2006, St. Petersburg State University) and MA degree in Middle Eastern Studies (2012, University of Exeter). Nikolay recent publications include Russia and the Syrian Conflict: Moscow’s Domestic, Regional and Strategic Interests (2016) and Iran’s Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy 1979–2017 (2018). Alieu Manjang  is a Gambian diplomat in Qatar and a graduate student at the College of Public Policy at Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Before joining diplomatic corps, Manjang worked in Qatar University as a Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant. Manjang holds double masters: MA in Gulf Studies (Qatar University) and MA in Public Policy in Islam (Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar, 2012). He obtained his BA in Journalism and Mass Communication from the Al-Azhar University, Egypt (2009). His areas of interest include, foreign policy (foreign policies of Gulf States toward Africa) and policy analysis (education and family). Wafa Sultana Mohiddin  is an MA student and a graduate research assistant in the Gulf Studies Program at Qatar University. Having a bachelor’s in law, her research interests largely focuses on conflict resolution, regional peace, and security studies in the Persian Gulf States. Sergio I. Moya Mena  is Coordinator of the Center for Middle East and North African Studies at the School of International Studies at the National University of Costa Rica. He is Professor of political science at the

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University of Costa Rica. He received his BS in international relations and theology from the National University and his PhD in philosophy from the University of Costa Rica. His books include The Middle East: Image and Conflict, Islamism in Tunisia: From Independence to the Rise of Salafism, At Your Service oh Hussein: The Shiite Militias and the Fight Against the Islamic State and Latin American Foreign Policies Towards the Middle East. Edward Wastnidge  is Lecturer in politics and international relations at the Open University, United Kingdom. Wastnidge’s research concerns the politics and international relations of the Middle East and Central Asia, focusing on Iranian foreign policy. His current work explores the intersection of ideas and foreign policy, cultural and religious diplomacy, and questions of identity in Iran’s international relations. His monograph, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami, was published in 2016. Wastnidge is deputy director of the Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD), and co-editor of the Identities and Geopolitics of the Middle East book series. Luciano  Zaccara is Research Assistant Professor in Gulf politics at the Qatar University, Gulf Studies Center. He is also a visiting assistant professor at the Georgetown University in Qatar, and director of the Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World in Spain. He obtained a BA in political science from National University of Rosario, Argentina, and a PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from Autonoma University of Madrid, Spain. He has been also post-­doctoral fellow at Autonoma University of Barcelona, a visiting researcher at Exeter University, Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies, and a visiting researcher at Princeton University, Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies. His research interests are Iranian politics and foreign policy, Gulf politics, international relations in the Persian Gulf, and electoral systems in MENA region. Mahjoob Zweiri  is the director of Gulf Studies Center. He is Associate Professor of contemporary politics of the Middle East at Qatar University. He was a visiting professor to School of Government & International Affairs at Durham University. From March 2003 to December 2006 he was a research fellow and then a director of the Centre for Iranian Studies in the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University. Zweiri has more than 60 publications in the areas of Iran and Contemporary Middle East History and Politics.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Luciano Zaccara and Wafa Sultana Mohiddin

The Constitutional reforms in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989 saw the abolition of the ‘Prime Ministerial’ position as the head of the government and assigned greater roles to the President, which in turn allow them to design their own foreign policy. Yet, the principles and objectives of the Iranian foreign policy remained unchanged as they continued to rely on the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after his demise in 1989. The Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) crafted diplomacy unique to their own times and derived specific outcomes in the Iranian foreign policy, which has been written about extensively. While Rafsanjani is hailed as the president who ‘reconstructed’ the country after the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) and brought Iran out of isolationism, Khatami is remembered for his ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ initiative which helped Iran reach out to almost every corner of the world. On the contrary, the hardliner President Ahmadinejad is remembered as the president whose ventures in diplomacy unfurled an endless roll of criticism

L. Zaccara (*) • W. S. Mohiddin Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_1

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from countries mainly in the West along with heavy sanctions from the United Nations Security Council and the European Union with regard to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. The footprints of the pragmatic President Hassan Rouhani on Iranian foreign policy after the completion of his first term in the office (2013–2017) were too deep and hence deserved to be analysed thoroughly to understand the determinants of his own foreign policy doctrine and objectives, and how Iran developed its relations with the rest of the world during his tenure. This edited volume has brought together experts from different parts of the world to perform this task. This project started as a workshop organized at the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, in which the foreign policy trends during the first term of President Rouhani were debated. The discussions culminated with this book, which explores Rouhani’s foreign policy based on theoretical framework and established foreign policy doctrines in the first two chapters. The remaining chapters cover many other important aspects relevant in understanding current issues related to sectarian politics and nuclear issue in particular and Iran’s strategic relations with countries like Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia while also including its expanding relations with countries in distant regions like Africa and Latin America. In his chapter, ‘Exploring President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine 2013–2017’, Mahdi Ahouie postulates the possibility of a distinct foreign policy doctrine adopted by the President Hassan Rouhani during his first term. The author has drawn components from both conceptual and operational areas, also taking into consideration the prevailing circumstances of geopolitics during the first term of Presidency. The chapter also provides a comprehensive analysis of both domestic and foreign policy behaviours signalling distinct principles that made Rouhani’s term different from the previous administration. While the author makes conceptual assessments based on ‘progressivism’, ‘pragmatism’ and regionalism’, the chapter also marks impediments during the term, which includes a changed leadership in Saudi Arabia, the American presidential elections, lack of clarity in his ‘moderate’ political discourse, structural complexity that makes it unclear as to who makes final decisions and insufficient credibility and lack of mandate receiving the minimum proportion of votes to win (50.7%), the lowest ever for a president in the history of the Islamic Republic. Rouhani started his term with the motto ‘constructive interaction’ with the world and was successful in doing so through regional dialogues and cooperation. He believed that peace and security of the Middle East solely

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depended on economic relations, social and cultural ties, invigorating private sectors, tourism and cooperation of world elites at large. Rouhani assured his neighbours that his government was willing to cooperate with its neighbours on issues like environment, safety of nuclear reactors, joint economic projects, trade, Palestine’s issue, Syrian human catastrophe, tackling extremism and regional security at large. It was a mandate on his government to defy those who treated it like renegade state and redefine its place and role in the international community. The administration succeeded in resolving the nuclear issue, which was one of the most complicated challenges in Iran’s contemporary history, but the author delves deeper into whether the whys and wherefores over the implementation of his motto was ever addressed since the regional dialogue and cooperation never really translated into direct agenda or action plan to solve any particular issue. President Rouhani strongly believed that Iranian practical steps to security and stability was only through development that comes with economic engagement, hoping for political understanding and fostering structural security cooperation to follow. Such an approach is further elaborated in the following chapter titled ‘Revisiting Rouhani’s School of Thought: A Critical Discussion of Its Developmental and Foreign Policy Doctrines’ wherein Ali FathollahNejad argues that Rouhani’s strategy has been implicitly a rejection of revolutionary foreign policy which is inadequate for stability, which the administration had stressed was central for economic development. His analyses are based on the Developmentalist foreign policy concept as elaborated by the research arm of the Expediency Council—the Center for Strategic Research (CSR). The pillars of this policy are around economic diplomacy, détente and constructive engagement (ta’âmol-e sâzandeh) driven by regime security concerns. The Expediency Council played the role of a mediator to settle disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council since 1988 with its research arm CSR created for advising political elites and the Office of the Supreme Leader. It was considered Iran’s most influential think tank on foreign policy matters and was headed by Rouhani since 1991. The Council credits for coming with the Iranian ‘grand strategy’ initiated in 1999 and eventually published by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the ‘Outlook of the Islamic Republic of Iran by 2025’ (Cheshm’andâz-e Jomhouri-e Eslâmi-e Irân dar ofoq-e 1404, henceforth will be referred to as the Outlook). The main targets that the Outlook posits is to put Iran ahead of 28 West Asian and North African countries in terms of economic, scientific and technological indicators

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while also being an inspiration to the Islamic world for its Islamic and revolutionary ideals without compromising on engaging with the global community constructively. The Outlook’s strategies maybe called Rouhani’s administration manifesto since the President was formerly its long-time Head from 1992 to 2013 and these grand strategies were published in his National Security and Economic System of Iran (in Persian) in 2010. The President’s cornerstones for his foreign policy action can be well interpreted from his ideals prerequisite for economic development when he stresses on the correlation between economic development and political stability which he explains as‚ ‘maintaining dialogue and friendly relations with the outside world’ in his publication. In addition, the concept of national security was present throughout the book as the prime concern which necessitated the need for economic development and thereby stable international relations. President Rouhani’s neoliberal economic model account has been proof enough of the rejection of revolutionary foreign policy ideals that is insufficient to provide Iran the stability in its relations with world powers and particularly its neighbours. However, the author argues that the persistence of US sanctions on Iran despite it fulfilling its obligations under (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) JCPOA has complicated foreign investments and has not shown structural improvements that reformed the economic situation in Iran. This could probably be as a result of contradicting foreign policy behaviour of Iran where on one side its defensive realism effectuated the JCPOA but the offensive realist regional policies adopted by IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s quasi-parallel government thwarts its rapprochement with the West. Iran’s engagement with the West has been detailed in the chapter, ‘Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations’ where Zaccara and Haghirian examine the tumultuous relationship with the United States while assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the JCPOA analyzing the impact on foreign and economic policies of Iran. It is also noteworthy to remind that the JCPOA was happening at a time when it was among the top most foreign policy priority for almost all the Democratic and Republican candidates. Although Iran benefitted itself economically when some of the sanctions were lifted, the US primary sanctions on Iran, which continued along with the threats from Trump administration to terminate the US participation in calling it a ‘disastrous deal with Iran’, inhibited any real reforms in Iran’s rapprochement efforts towards the United States in particular. This also comes with Iran’s

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immediate neighbours who were wishing the isolation of Iran continued because engaging with the United States constructively was giving Iran an opportunity to become a player in the region. This comes at a time when the regional hegemonic players perceive Iran as a major security threat to the existing power equations in the region. This has only been worsened since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring since 2011 with the Arab suspicion of emerging Shia crescent. Throughout the chapter, the authors provide a detailed analysis of economic gains of the Nuclear Deal, which ranged from the lifting of sanctions on Iran’s civil aviation, which were in place for decades for the removal of limitations on Iranian oil and gas exports. The golden period of the Rouhani administration began to fade away with Donald Trump’s victory, which not only impacted Iran’s economy but also hurt Rouhani’s global economic engagement efforts. What followed the victory was Trump administration’s rhetoric that halted several important developmental plans, mega-sized projects and investments inside the country. Under Rouhani’s leadership, the country did witness gradual reforms in economic, political and social realms as sanctions removal facilitated Iran’s re-entry into the International energy markets. The deal was an enabler of normalization of Iran’s status as a rational state having its sovereign rights to enrich its uranium according to rules set by the NPT. However, this was euphobia to its Arab neighbours—particularly Saudi Arabia—as its relations severely deteriorated following the Arab Spring 2011, which viewed Iran as a seriously destabilizing element in the Persian Gulf. The Saudi-Iranian issue has been highly intractable since the onset of Arab Spring as the stakes for gaining regional influence are higher than ever as the dominant dichotomies are at loggerheads in their pursuit of seeking dominance. This has only intensified the existing ideological feud making constructive trading engagements and diplomacy impossible. In the chapter ‘The Sectarian Divide in Iran–Saudi Relations’ the author Akbarzadeh examines key areas of tensions between the two regional heavyweights, namely the long existing Islamic ideological feud, the relations with the United States and the rivalry over culturally constructed Muslim leadership. The Saudis have always accused Iran of its expansionist policies at the expense of Saudi interests by providing patronage for Shi’a actors and undermining Sunni regimes in the Persian Gulf region. President Hassan Rouhani who was keen on portraying that the post-Ahmadinejad era was all about positive engagement with its immediate neighbours and far from the populist rhetoric could not pacify Saudi

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Arabia despite engaging with Riyadh calling it ‘neighbour and brother’. Even the Foreign Minister Javad Zarif reached out to Saudi Arabia stressing on the need to jointly counter terrorism, sectarianism and extremism, but these invitations have been of no avail. Rouhani’s tanesh-­zedai (reducing tensions) in the region has only weakened with the Nuclear deal, the execution of the popular Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia, the outbreak of Yemen war and the Saudi–Qatar tensions. The leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz continues to see Iran as an intolerable challenge whose role has to be limited, as the Saudis believe pursuing sectarianism agenda especially after their confrontations in the Syrian Crisis. This is also because Rouhani’s friendship extension has failed to erase memories of Khomeini’s accusations of Saudi rulers of being lackeys of the United States. Not only did he castigate the late King Fahd as someone who promoted anti-Quranic religion called Wahhabism but even warned his own officials that ‘economic and political difficulties shouldn’t compel our officials to forgo the principal task of exporting our lofty Islamic revolutionary goals’. The region had become a hotbed of rivalries and tensions which stood in the way of any conciliation. Nevertheless, the US factor has always been part of the quandary as ‘Anti-Americanism’ was the élan vital of the Islamic Revolution 1979 when Khomeini dynamized the masses against the pro US Pahlavi dynasty and did not spare the Saudi regime from Amrikai insult. The outbreak of the Syrian crisis only made the two belligerents with the United States siding with Saudi Arabia. Saudi–US partnership even strengthened as both fulminated against the nuclear deal. The Supreme Leader accused Saudi rulers of committing treason against the Muslims for aligning with United States and Israel on this subject. The US President despised Iran on his maiden visit to Saudi Arabia accusing it for funding arms and training terrorists in his speech—an expected American strategy as seen earlier with its support for tyrannical rulers in the Middle East. According to Akbarzadeh, Syria is a linchpin of Iranian regional policies as it offers Iran a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintain its anti-Israel stance partnering with an Arab State which is also an Israeli arch enemy. The Rouhani administration walked a tightrope between trying to build partnerships with their immediate neighbours and at the same time, not lose their revolutionary posturing as champion of the Muslim Ummah. Iran’s foreign policies constantly compensated confrontational behaviours with conciliatory posturing—which inadvertently becomes indicative even in Rouhani’s Gulf policies.

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Given the gravity of the Syrian contention between the two, an entire chapter is dedicated exclusively on Iranian policy towards Syria and Iraq during the Arab Spring 2011. In ‘Iran’s Own “War on Terror”: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era’ chapter, the author Wastnidge points out that in the Syrian and Iraqi crises, President Rouhani and his team were not the only drivers of the Iranian foreign policy towards these countries but a number of internal players within the Iranian polity that lead the Iranian engagement in the crises which also is considered as matters within the scope of IRGC and the Supreme Leader. This is particularly evident with the IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qasem Soleimani being outspoken about his planning and strategies in the regional crises stating, “we have created territorial continuity for the Islamic resistance by connecting Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon”. This highlights an interesting feature of Iranian regional policymaking where traditional administrational roles are often overstepped by informal links and personal networks. Despite the President’s own credentials of being one of the chief national security strategists in the Islamic Republic’s history, the regime allows Soleimani’s plan of action by virtue. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei honoured him with ‘Order Zulfiqar’—the highest military medal in the Islamic Republic—making him the first Iranian commander to receive. As the ‘living martyr of the Revolution’, Soleimani has assumed several duties within the government, particularly in matters better left to policymakers. The Iran–Syria partnership evolved over a period of time over shared interests in their foreign policies which also included the creation of an ‘Axis of Resistance’ to combat rising US–Israel perceived threats. Keeping the religious reasons aside (Damascus is home to shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab, the daughter of the first Shi’i Imam, Ali, and also granddaughter of the Prophet, and hence a revered figure in Shi’ism), Syria is a significant Arab country that not only helps Iran maintain its conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon but historically is the enemy of Israel. With the fall of Saddam, the political vacuum was filled in by Shi’i political parties in Baghdad, changing the Iranian stance towards Iraq from extreme scepticism to influencing the political landscape of Iran. Iraq is also home to two most important shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein in Najaf and Karbala respectively. For matters beyond mere sectarianist objectives, Iranian engagement in Syria was further propelled by the changing scene in Iraqi domestic politics, which made the latter a bridge between the Persian and Arab State. Once again, the IRGC has superseded President Rouhani and his executive team’s policymaking

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roles in the Iraqi scene. Neither ideologies nor sectarianism seem to be the driver of Iran’s Syrian and Iraqi ambitions but nevertheless has been used as powerful justifications in diplomatic armory of the Islamic Republic. A closer look into the Iranian policies in Syria and Iraq reveals its dynamic policymaking underlined by pragmatism which aims to consolidate its regional stakes through its alliances with Iraq and Syria, also involving Russia in its multilateral coalition in the region. The alliance has already been involved in intelligence sharing since 2015 with an effort to unify against ‘Islamic State’ both in Syria and Iraq. There are joint efforts undertaken by Russia and Iran to maintain regional security in South Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia as both these countries have common commitments to multipolarity world order and unwillingness to obey US dictatorship. The two countries had many political, security and economic drivers to boost cooperation and develop strategic ties despite tightened sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who met with his Iranian counterpart at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in 2019, remarked that Russian relations with Iran were ‘multifaceted’ and ‘multilateral’. The author Kozhanov examines internal drivers and external challenges of an evolving Russian-Iranian partnership in the midst of regional crisis since the onset of Arab Spring 2011 and the JCPOA saga in his chapter ‘Iran and Russia: Between Pragmatism and Possibilities of a Strategic Alliance’. Much of the geopolitical context had changed in the Middle East unlike during the years of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012) when Russian-­ Iranian relations had been on the decline. The new President Vladimir Putin (2012–) met with his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad within two months after his election displaying clear motives of strengthening ties between the two and ever since Kremlin regarded Iran as an important neighbor in international and regional discussions. Similar sentiments were reciprocated on the Iranian side as it aligned well with President Rouhani’s pragmatic foreign policy objectives, which according to the author revolved around three focused goals—easing burden of international sanctions, improving economic situation in the country and securing Iranian interests in the conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. Russian interest in Iran was definitely strategic as Putin focused on developing relations with non-Western countries to once again reinstate Russia as an important player in the Middle East—a period which the author calls ‘Moscow’s return to the Middle East’. This also is a strategic leverage against the dominance of US and EU in economic, political and security

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space. Russian involvement in the Syrian Crisis became the most important game changer as Iran had looked for a counterweight to limit US pressures in the region. Iran’s struggle and strategy planning in Syria is beyond Rouhani’s framework as it is a crucial State that falls on Iranian ‘line of defence’ (which also includes Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen) which was the Iranian frontline to counter international and regional opponents which primarily included United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, the Trump administrations’ rhetoric on restoring sanctions has taken the edge off growing relations between the two as Kremlin clearly showed that it wasn’t ready to fight for the Iranian cause in case the situation did not favour Iran. Iran’s relations according to the author has reached its maximum potential with Russians while it paid lesser attention towards regions which otherwise were part of the Iranian global strategy initiatives like Latin American countries. Unlike his predecessors, whose global strategic tropes like ‘dialogue of civilizations’ or ‘idea of struggle’ by Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad, respectively, were reaching out to countries in far east and west, Rouhani was focused entirely on regional and security matters. At a time when relations between Iran and Latin American countries progressed—albeit lesser than the Iranian expectation of their economic targets—little has been done under Rouhani’s presidency in the first term. In the chapter ‘Regaining Space: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America During the First Presidential Term of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2017)’, the author Moya Mena examines the changing paradigms of this relationship which formerly underscored ideological reasons for deep ties and now exhibits purely pragmatic links which makes Iranian-Latin American policy making predictions even more complex. The Latin American countries, particularly the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America (ALBA), enjoyed special status and were extremely significant in the Iranian purview, especially under President Ahmadinejad. Although this was mainly driven by anti-imperialist sentiments, on the hindsight pursuing these partnerships weren’t worthwhile as they did not necessarily cement relations on economic, political or diplomatic front. This is mainly because President Rouhani’s consolidated constructive policies had watered down ambitious revolutionary policies by his hardliner predecessor. President Rouhani’s diplomacy did face setbacks and inconsistencies in terms of its relations with Latin American countries, but it was also an era where anti-imperialism and anti-United States had taken a back seat allowing Iranian and American diplomats negotiate nuclear agreement for the

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first time in over three decades. Rouhani knew that a cautious diplomacy and engagement with the Latin American countries had become the sine qua non of the Nuclear Deal so as to not ruffle the American feathers. The author examines Iranian relations with specific focus on larger economies in Latin America like Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and selected ALBA countries. Although the countries have never been significant trading partners to Iran, they were strategically relevant for Iranian interests not long before sanctions were lifted. Despite Ahmadinejad’s charm offensive means and constructive engagement in the Latin American countries, a closer examination shows that the dominant ‘Western’ rhetoric and propaganda campaign that has ever prevailed since the Islamic Revolution 1979 continued to be fueled by United States- and Israel-funded conservative think tanks and mass media. Moreover, Rouhani’s moderate diplomacy made his Arab neighbors in the region even more cautious about the Iranians pursuing greater strategic objectives in the Latin American countries. There has also been increased interests among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the Latin American countries like Brazil and Argentina that already dominate food imports in the GCC markets where food security is a real challenge. This will only add wider tactical engagement in Latin American countries that will face balancing act by multiple contenders to maintain competitive advantage over another. Interestingly the Iranian-GCC rivalry on foreign soil through soft power mechanisms to increase influence and barraging power over another has Iran gaining substantial influence in the African continent by building diplomatic, economic and military relations with many African counties. Authors Zweiri and Manjang explore the interplay of the Iranian strategic interests and other areas of influence in Africa with special focus on Senegal in the chapter ‘From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Iran’s Presence in Africa’ and how President Rouhani’s foreign policy objectives were far different and less involved than his predecessor. In this chapter the authors examine various aspects of Iranian engagement in Africa from days preceding the Iranian revolution of 1979, through the Revolution and until President Rouhani’s era. Iran’s relations with unconventional partners primarily developed after sanctions in order to thwart the negative consequences of the same. Economic cooperation was the prime objective of Iranian diplomatic missions in Africa through exploration of Iran’s private sector undertaking in the African development. Not only did Iran gain their political trust and cooperation by being reciprocated positively by appointing Iran as an Observer in the African Union (AU) but also received African

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support when Iran was put to vote in the UN on human rights situation. Iran and African States also witnessed a sudden increase in bilateral trade and investment. This also paid off at the UN when South Africa was one of the staunchest supporters of Iranian nuclear program as it relied heavily on Iran for oil imports. However, by the time President Rouhani was elected, the relations had slowed down since Rouhani’s focus was on ending Iranian isolation with most of the initiatives halted. This affected African overtures to greater economic and diplomatic relations with Iran and this volatile situation was taken by benefits reaped by Saudi Arabia. On the ideological grounds, Ahmadinejad had taken a proactive role in promoting Shia Islam in Iran through institutional push in the region through Iranian embassies, schools, scholarships and Shiite seminaries (Hawza) across Africa. He capitalized on the opportunity of gaining sentiments when Israel bombed Lebanon in 2006 when many Africans were emotionally lured into accepting Shia Islam. The case of Senegal, particularly, is most important as it was a top priority for Iran which also helped the former organize OIC summit in the capital of Dakar, allowing it to leverage its identity as leader among Muslim countries, also gaining extensive support from developing countries for its nuclear programme. Senegal became Iran’s prime trading partner in the West Africa in both trade and energy sectors—with a strong presence of Iranian diplomats and investors. These growing relations were a matter of grave concern for Iranian rivals in the Arabian neighbourhood and were subjected to allegations of seeking dominance. The onset of Arab Spring 2011, however, became President Hassan Rouhani’s first and foremost priorities allowing regional rivals like Saudi and UAE seeking allies in Africa to soft pedal Iranian engagement. Across the Horn of Africa, the Gulf countries have invested massively—economically and politically—to counterbalance the presence of their adversaries in the region. The Saudi-Iran regional rivalry provides impetus for diplomatic powerplay extending beyond the Persian Gulf region—be it in Latin America or even Horn of Africa—albeit both scenarios witnessed sharp decline in Iranian engagement under Rouhani’s first-term Presidency. Although the Nuclear Deal 2015 should have served as a leap forward in the Iranian-Gulf rapprochement through possible energy cooperation, realist impulses in the region run deep in their relations. Mutual security threat perceptions and suspicions of hegemonic ambitions have marred any possibilities of meaningful cooperation or constructive engagement in any regional cooperative framework. However, author Gawlik has opined

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that depleting non-renewable resources in oil rich countries will have significant impact on the economies of the Sunni monarchies, soon increasing the possibility of cooperation in a new geopolitical scenario. In the chapter ‘The Feasibility of Energy Cooperation Between Iran and the Gulf Arab States’, the author examines whether an energy cooperation has taken precedence over the existing discord during the first term of President Hassan Rouhani when the liberalization of Iran post the Nuclear Deal of 2015 and Rouhani’s own diplomatic gestures facilitated greater cordiality and opportunities. While Iran hosts the largest gas field (North Field and South Pars), the GCC States like United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain are already finding ways to diversify their economies away from oil to find alternatives to their energy imbalances. Ideally, cooperation between the two regions over an effective energy distribution across the Persian Gulf region would curb the economic challenges and also help stabilize the region. However, the political fault lines are too deep in the region to bring about any potential cooperation in spheres beyond limited trade and mutual investments in developmental sectors. Iran’s perceived security threat loomed over any possibilities of meaningful dialogue over political antagonism with Saudi and UAE particularly. Rouhani’s government made distinct changes in its foreign policy objectives and the development of hydrocarbon sector reclaiming its position in the global oil market was a high priority. Though the nuclear deal was the biggest achievement of the reformist President’s government, this was also an indication that there were no further impediments to Iran’s ascendance to become regional power. Energy and security cooperation are only feasible if political ‘trust’ and ‘will’ prevailed over existing antagonism. The election of President Donald Trump, who switched friends and foes in the Persian Gulf region by sharing same opinions with the Saudis of Iran being the ‘source’ of global terrorism, only turned out to become a stumbling block for easing tensions and developing détente between the rivals. To conclude the book, Anoushiravan Ehteshami draws lessons learnt from President Hassan Rouhani’s first term in the office in ‘From Isolation to Accommodation: Lessons Learnt from Hassan Rouhani’s First Term in Office’. The author takes a step back and examines Rouhani’s background that provided him credentials to ‘attract support from significant sections of the country’s quarrelsome factions’. This enabled Rouhani deliver Iran out of both internal and external political stalemates created by Ahmedinejad’s presidency. It is clear that Rouhani had many

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responsibilities on his shoulders right from bringing stability and normalcy to the country, fixing its reputation abroad, working on relations within the region and providing greater opportunities to Iranians. Under Rouhani’s presidency, ‘accommodation’ has over taken ‘isolationism’ in a Revolution-­ inspired foreign policy that went through dialectical trials before policy shifts and crises with a greater objective of brining socioeconomic improvements in the country by lifting harsh sanctions. Negotiating with the West while dealing with domestic scrutiny that ever existed wasn’t a challenge unlike his predecessor because of a 30-year elite network that the president had developed over the period, including his proximity to the Supreme Leader himself. The usual ‘red lines’ had been challenged right from nuclear negotiations with the Great Satan to privatising businesses controlled by IRGC and other para statal organisations. Indeed, the lifting of sanctions in 2016 was a new era in Iran’s relations with a new geopolitical role as bridge of Eurasia. However, problems with Arab neighbours continue to pose a challenge, making building confidence difficult with involvement in regional crisis—whether Syria, Yemen or Lebanon—along with the election of Donald Trump in the United States.

Bibliography Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994. Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Dara Conduit. Iran in the world: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Mahjoob Zweiri. Iran’s Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad. England: Ithaca Press, 2012. Hunter, Shireen T. Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. California: Praeger, 2010. Kozhanov, Nikolay. Iran’s Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1979–2018. Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018. Ramazani, R.K. Independence without freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy. Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2013.

CHAPTER 2

Exploring President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine 2013–2017 Mahdi Ahouie

Introduction Foreign policy doctrine is most commonly defined as the prevailing roadmap of foreign policy principles and belief system of a country. It usually originates from a notable statement made by a national leader or a prominent diplomat, is associated with the name of the person who had made the statement, and has a significant impact on how the world perceives the country’s foreign policy at the given time. A foreign policy doctrine is a twofold construct: conceptual and operational. Conceptually, a doctrine is a lens through which the heads of States express their understanding of issues and concerns to their own people and to other nations. Yet, doctrines also have profound implications and effectively contribute to foreign policy objectives beyond both general and abstract notions. This implies that a foreign policy doctrine should be targeted towards specific issues, which will have a significant impact on effective policies and strategies.

M. Ahouie (*) University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_2

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Political doctrines and ideologies differ; the former has a more specific objective, yet they both focus on a narrow scope of action. Ideology can be defined as “a systematized and relatively hierarchical set of opinions,” that always displays generalizing tendencies, and thus, is more general than a doctrine.1 A foreign policy doctrine, unlike an ideology, does not have a universal interpretation of political reality, simply because it specifically belongs to one individual leader. It has more objective implications for the State’s bureaucratic bodies, and it may change and be modified more quickly and easily than an ideology. Ideology may provide the broader context in which an individual leader shapes his/her own political doctrine.2 In other words, a doctrine cannot remain an abstract notion but should be (1) case-finding and case-defining; (2) applied to the identified cases; (3) adapted to appropriate strategies and tactics for implementation. This chapter will assess whether President Hassan Rouhani developed a doctrine in Iran’s foreign policy during his first term in office (2013–2017). In doing so, the components of Rouhani’s foreign policy at both conceptual and operational levels will be analysed.3 The president’s position within the Iranian domestic political discourses will also be examined.

Conceptual Foundations of President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy In 2013, Hassan Rouhani was elected as the seventh President of the Islamic Republic with 51% of the popular vote under very difficult circumstances.4 When analysing Rouhani’s foreign policy during his first term in office (2013–2017), it is imperative to take into consideration the unprecedented and unusual circumstances that dominated Iran’s international relations at that time. The country was on the brink of complete isolation. All legal, economic, and commercial links between Iran and the international community had been severed. There was rapid inflation, and Iran’s national currency devalued in relation to the US dollar on three occasions in 2012.5 Iran’s crude oil exports dropped to 700,000 barrels a day in 2013 (one-fifth of the country’s production capacity in 2005),6 and foreign investment had almost completely ceased. Six UN Security Council Resolutions had been passed against Iran in less than five years and the country was recognised, and being treated, as a “threat to international peace and security” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which could

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ultimately lead to an endorsement of military intervention. The central demand of these six resolutions was that “Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program, as well as undertake several confidence-building measures … Four of them [the resolutions] included a series of progressively expansive sanctions on Iran and or Iranian persons and entities.”7 Iran’s international financial transactions were strictly contained and the country was unable to receive payment for its oil exports. The Islamic Republic was under the most intense economic and political pressure since 1979. For the first time since the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, the issue became a feature of public debate during the 2013 presidential elections. All presidential candidates spoke of the necessity to negotiate with world powers to resolve the problem. Rouhani published a detailed campaign plan entitled, “The Program of the Wisdom and Hope Government.” This campaign plan included six chapters—domestic politics, economy, culture, society, health and environment, and foreign policy. The chapter on foreign relations titled, “Foreign Policy on the basis of National Consensus, Regional Cooperation, and All-Inclusive Development,” revealed the preferences of his future administration. Making a direct link between foreign policy misconduct and the economic pressures from which the country was suffering, the Rouhani foreign policy manifesto lists examples of how the “weakening of Iran’s national power” as a result of Ahmadinejad’s “mistaken” policies had damaged Iran’s interests. They included securitisation of the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the creation of consensus among the enemies of the Islamic Republic; the weakening of Iran’s international position and credibility; the construction of Iran as the main threat to international security; the reduction of Iran’s strategic options; the acceleration of disagreements between Iran and its neighbours in the Persian Gulf; and the suspension of Iran’s productive relationship with the Arab countries.8 Rouhani’s campaign plan recognised three major categories of challenges that Iran’s foreign policy faced in 2013—challenges that needed to be urgently addressed and managed in the next administration9: 1. Structural Challenges: Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy put national interests and national security at stake because it ignored the principles, traditions, and existing strategic documents (i.e. the 20-year vision) of the Islamic Republic of Iran; it did not follow the three principles of dignity, wisdom, and expediency; it advocated a confrontational discourse in foreign policy, not based on any accurate understanding of the international environment, or a balance of costs and benefits, but followed a

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trial-and-error approach; it did not achieve prioritisation and coherence amongst goals and plans; and it did not maintain a balance between policies, potentials, and capabilities of the country. 2. Relational Challenges: Iran was experiencing serious problems in two areas of foreign relations—its interactions with its neighbours and with the big powers. The previous administration had failed to take advantage of several areas of opportunity that Iran could have used in order to achieve a more balanced relationship with the big powers. Simultaneously, Iran’s relations with other countries in the region (such as the Arab countries, Pakistan, and India) had become damaged and Iran’s international and regional position had weakened. Iran had lost its effectiveness in shaping regional trends and regimes. Much energy was wasted over irrelevant topics of no benefit to the country (e.g. controversy over the Holocaust). Iran’s foreign relations had been confined to countries that could play no role in consolidating Iran’s strategic place in the world (such as disproportionate expansion of relations with Latin America). 3. Thematic Challenges: The international challenge over Iran’s nuclear program constituted the most significant thematic challenge. However, the previous administration failed to manage this adequately due to its lack of diplomatic skills and experience and inappropriate behaviour. Iran’s relations with the UN Security Council had deteriorated, and several other challenges had arisen in the areas of international and regional security, terrorism and extremism, and human rights. The Rouhani announcement held that these challenges were certainly not inevitable, and that Iran could deal with these issues if it were better able to take advantage of the opportunities presented in its relationship with neighbouring countries and the big powers. It would be possible, it argued, to use better planning “to get out of the existing situation,” without retreating from the Islamic Republic’s major principles and goals. The Rouhani campaign plan then specified that certain goals could be achieved under the government of “wisdom and hope”. These goals can be considered as the conceptual foundations for Rouhani’s foreign policy doctrine. The principles that made his era distinct from the previous Ahmadinejad administration include: • Reduction of threats and leveraging Iran’s regional and international position; opening currently inaccessible markets [to Iranian products] and absorbing foreign investment.

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• Modifying Iran’s relations within the international system and attempting to reduce conflict or ambiguity, especially over the nuclear issue, in order to reduce the political and economic pressure against the country. • Rapprochement with neighbouring countries and the promotion of intra-regional cooperation through an interactive foreign policy. • Paying particular attention to Iran’s soft power in the “clash of ideas” under evolving international conditions, derived from Iran’s rich cultural and civilizational heritage, for the purpose of affecting the direction and conceptual foundation of the future international order.10 This clearly shows that for Rouhani, four major areas in foreign policy were of most significance, relations with big powers and international organisations; relations with neighbours; economic diplomacy; public and cultural diplomacy. Resolving the nuclear dispute was mentioned as only one of the means of achieving these goals. However, it is legitimate to question whether Rouhani treated all these goals with equal weight during his first four years in office. Rouhani’s campaign plan put significant emphasis on the combination of an economic-oriented and progressivist foreign policy, favouring rapprochement with big powers and neighbouring countries; expansion of relations with the non-Western rising powers in Asia and elsewhere; acting in accordance with the requirements of the international system, through participation in internationally coordinated initiatives and playing a more active role in international organisations. Sectors such as energy, transit, long-term transportation infrastructure, tourism, and agriculture, were mentioned as the most important areas of cooperation with the outside world, particularly the surrounding region. It is noteworthy that the nuclear issue is seldom mentioned in Rouhani’s campaign plan. The nuclear dispute is discussed only as one of the issues to be addressed.11 Yet the document is very clear about what should constitute Iran’s grand strategy under the Rouhani administration. This document was not written by Rouhani himself, but by a team of advisors close to him. Conceptually, the publication of this document is an exception in post-Revolution Iran. Unusually, it takes a very clear-cut approach to the articulation of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy goals and thus must be taken seriously. However, once Rouhani was elected, given that resolving the nuclear dispute was the one foreign policy concern widely

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discussed during the election campaign and for which Rouhani had received a mandate from the Supreme Leader, he dedicated his entire foreign policy machinery to the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 countries between 2013 and 2015. The Iran nuclear deal, known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was reached in July 2015 in Vienna after 20 months of tough negotiations. All nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union were lifted or suspended. All UN Security Council Resolutions against Iran’s nuclear program (passed between 2006 and 2010) were repealed. A new resolution (2231), drafted by the United States and passed unanimously in the Security Council, recognised Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology and uranium enrichment. Rouhani had finally fulfilled what he had promised to the nation; the nuclear issue was now off the table after a full decade of crisis, and the potential risk of war had been averted. Most economic sanctions had ceased and the country’s financial and trade routes with the world were reactivated. However, Rouhani failed to maintain a balance between nuclear talks and regional rapprochement. Iran’s economic and cultural diplomacy also trailed behind the achievement of the JCPOA.  It seems that Rouhani had considered the nuclear deal to be a “silver bullet” that, once agreed, would miraculously resolve the remainder of Iran’s foreign policy challenges. This idea, however, soon proved to be incorrect.

Framing President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, 2013–2017 Every foreign policy doctrine requires conceptual frames and practical implications that apply to specific parts of a State’s foreign relations. This section will examine how Rouhani defined both conceptual and practical aspects of his foreign policy, and to what extent he was successful in applying them to the specific aspects of his foreign policy conduct. This section will review Rouhani’s major foreign policy speeches—made before the United Nations General Assembly and other important international gatherings—and compare these to his foreign policy achievements. In his first address to the UN General Assembly, Rouhani denounced the classic domination-seeking policies of the great powers and warned about the rise of extremism and terrorism, characterizing both of these two extremes as consequences of a mentality dividing the world into

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“superior us” and “inferior others.” He portrayed an ideal picture of the world unified in saying “yes to peace and no to war,” by claiming, “people all over the world are tired of war, violence, and extremism. They hope for a change in the status quo. And this is a unique opportunity—for us all. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all challenges can be managed successfully through a smart, judicious blend of hope and moderation.” Despite his efforts to define the meanings of “moderation” and “hope” throughout the speech, he failed to articulate what his actual foreign policy “doctrine” would be. Perhaps, the only politically weighed statement that he had made was that “the age of zero-sum games is over” and that Iran was ready to act as a “responsible” member of the international community: The Iranian people (…) voted for the discourse of hope, foresight and prudent moderation. In foreign policy, the combination of these elements means that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regional power, will act responsibly with regard to regional and international security, and is willing and prepared to cooperate in these fields, bilaterally as well as multilaterally, with other responsible actors.12

In addition to mentioning the nuclear issue and announcing Iran’s readiness to “engage immediately in time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and removal of mutual uncertainties with full transparency,”13 Rouhani also acknowledged Barak Obama’s speech given earlier in the meeting and confirmed that Iran “does not seek to increase tensions with the United States,” and that the two countries could ultimately “arrive at a framework to manage [their] differences.”14 Although this reference to a possible Iran–US rapprochement was made in the context of the nuclear dispute, Rouhani seemed to hint that resolving “differences” between Iran and the United States in a more general sense could also be expected, if “equality, mutual respect, and principles of international law” governed the interactions, and if “a consistent voice” was received from Washington. Another highlight of Rouhani’s 2013 address to UN General Assembly was the proposed WAVE (World Against Violence and Extremism) initiative. Rouhani urged the United Nations to approve this initiative as an enduring project for shaping a “coalition for peace” in opposition to the so-called coalitions for war in various parts of the world. “We should accept and be able to open a new horizon in which peace will prevail over

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war, tolerance over violence, progress over bloodletting, justice over discrimination, prosperity over poverty, and freedom over despotism.”15 It is important to distinguish between the two main messages Rouhani delivered to the General Assembly. The first message was that Iran was ready to fully engage in negotiations with the international community over its nuclear program. More specifically, Rouhani referred to the United States and announced that Iran was ready for productive rapprochement with Washington. In Rouhani’s terminology, this new approach was called “constructive interaction with the world.” Constructive interaction, according the Rouhani agenda, was mainly restricted to the particular case of Iran’s nuclear talks. Other issues, for example, at the regional level, were not clearly defined, in spite of Rouhani announcing that “Iran seeks to resolve problems, not to create them,” and that Middle East crises did not have military solutions. Similarly, Rouhani did not define any operational detail or objective target for the “WAVE” initiative, and thus it too was left as a general, abstract, notion—quite similar to President Khatami’s idea of “Dialogue among Civilizations.” In delivering his first speech to the United Nations, therefore, Rouhani did not go beyond the articulation of a motto, which he was not able to convert into a concrete foreign policy doctrine, with respect to either the big powers or the regional players. In a meeting with representatives of American think tanks later in New York, Rouhani acknowledged that regional issues were also of major importance, but insisted that resolving the nuclear issue must be the “first priority.” However, he re-emphasised the possibility of further rapprochement and talks with the United States about a variety of bilateral and regional issues, on condition of the successful resolution of the nuclear dispute. He presented a positive vision for further Iran–US cooperation in the future, should the nuclear issue be successfully resolved. “We can begin by avoiding any new tension in Iran–US relationship and, at the same time, endeavour towards removing tensions that we inherited from the past; tensions that continue to mar the relations between our two countries … We need however to focus rather on the current situation and look forward to the future, trying to turn the turbulent past into a beacon lighting the path ahead. As leaders, we need to rise above petty politics and lead rather than follow the various interest and pressure groups in our respective countries.”16 The tentative nuclear agreement was finally reached between Iran and the world powers in Geneva in November 2013. This was a great victory

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for Rouhani’s “constructive” diplomacy and boosted hopes for further Iranian-American rapprochement. For the first time since the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian Foreign Minister and American Secretary of State held direct talks that allowed the two countries to overcome the deadlock around Iran’s nuclear program and reach a milestone in the history of Iran–US relations. At this point, major US allies in the Middle East— notably Saudi Arabia and Israel—began to feel uneasy.17 The Obama administration was quick to overtly criticize Saudi Arabia and use harsh rhetoric against Israel, sending clear messages to Riyadh and Tel Aviv that Iran must now be considered a participant in the regional security setting. Rouhani’s first international appearance after the Geneva agreement was during the 44th World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2014. His statement at this important global event is noteworthy. At this forum, Rouhani announced that his main objective was to “open up” Iran’s economy and facilitate foreign investment. He stressed that Iran was in need of a US$110b investment in its gas and oil industry over the next four years and said he would push for greater engagement with the world as part of his drive to make the Iranian economy one of the top ten in the world within the next three decades, asserting Iran’s economy was “the most congruent, capable and closest to that of successful emerging economies.”18 Rouhani emphasised “constructive engagement” as the guiding principle of his foreign policy agenda and reassured the world that Iran would never seek nuclear weapons. However, he portrayed the nuclear talks with the world powers in a context much broader than the nuclear issue, implying that the nuclear agreement was the first step toward Iran’s full engagement with the international community: By following the path of dialogue and peace, we succeeded to prevent a new war in our region that could bring horror to many countries. Through effective talks with the 5+1 countries, we found a solution to the nuclear issue based on interaction—a solution which both preserves the indispensable rights of the Iranian nation, and removes some countries’ logical concerns at the same time.19

In his address to the Forum, Rouhani spoke of his approach to the region. “The Iranian government is ready to cooperate with its neighbouring countries on issues such as the environment, safety of nuclear reactors, on joint economic projects, expanding trade transactions,

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safeguarding the Palestinians’ rights, preventing a human catastrophe in Syria, establishing security in the Persian Gulf as well as tackling extremism and terrorism.”20 Rouhani said he believed that peace and security in the Middle East would depend on economic relations, social and cultural cooperation, tourism, the invigoration of the private sector, and the cooperation of world elites. Rouhani also stressed the importance of regional cooperation, reiterating that his government was “determined to establish profound and amicable relations with its neighbouring states including Turkey, Iraq, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf littoral states, the Caucasus and the Central Asian states.” He also stated that Iran had intended to reopen trade and industrial and economic relations with its neighbours. With this choice of words, it seemed that Rouhani aimed to reassure Iran’s neighbours that the final deal between Iran and the 5+1 would bring tangible benefits for countries in the region. However, over the following months, Rouhani failed to take any major steps to realise this goal. Certain events such as the death of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and the ascension of a more Iran-sceptical leadership in Riyadh; the spread of terrorism throughout Iraq and most importantly, the fall of Mosul to the hands of Daesh; and the deepening of Iran–Turkey divergence on the Syrian question, made it more difficult for Rouhani to push for regional rapprochement. At the United Nations 69th General Assembly meeting in 2014, Rouhani referred to terrorism as a “global threat,” and urged members to unite against the spread of violence and extremism in the Middle East, calling it a “contagious disease” that could easily be transmitted to other parts of the world. He further stated that Iran and its neighbours were all “in the same boat,” and needed “confidence building” and to boost cooperation across social, political, and security arenas. Rouhani said Iran was prepared to play a “permanent, constructive and positive role” to combat extremism, threats, and aggression through an effective cooperation between Islamic nations. By this, he implied that Iran would willingly take part in a regional anti-terrorism coalition that would include the Republic. It is evident that even before the JCPOA was agreed, Rouhani had been promoting its potential benefits for the region in an attempt to reassure Iran’s neighbours that a prospective nuclear deal between Iran and world powers would not pose a threat to their interests. “My government’s principled policy is to work towards constructive interaction with our

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neighbours on the basis of mutual respect and with emphasis on common interests. The notion that Iran seeks to control other Muslim countries in the region is a myth fanned in the recent years in the context of an Iranophobic project.” Stressing the need for greater regional economic and social development, he implicitly preached to Saudi Arabia that countries that make an imaginary enemy of Iran were pushing for “redeployment of national resources away from development.”21 Rouhani adopted a very determined and transparent stance on his government’s determination to persevere with the nuclear negotiations until it was achieved, promising: If … we can overcome the problem and reach a longstanding agreement within the time remaining, then an entirely different environment will emerge for cooperation at regional and international levels, allowing for greater focus on some very important regional issues such as combating violence and extremism in the region.22

In this, Rouhani appeared to hint at the possibility of working with the United States and other world powers on broader international and regional concerns, if the nuclear deal was finalised. This is the key to understanding whether Rouhani had adopted a genuine foreign policy doctrine. If he were able to define specific areas of cooperation between Iran and the international community (including world and regional powers) following the nuclear deal, then the idea of a Rouhani Doctrine may have been evident. However, such statements were merely a tactic to facilitate the nuclear deal, and not based on consistent, well-defined, and unanimous decision-making inside the Iranian government. Another example of Rouhani’s inconsistency was evident in the statement, “we work towards putting an end to delusional Iranophobia, setting the stage for building strategic partnerships with our neighbours.”23 Despite his emphasis on a “constructive interaction with neighbours on the basis of mutual respect and common interests,” it is not clear which mechanisms Rouhani’s government had initiated to achieve this goal, and in what time frame. Rouhani was naïve in presuming the settlement of Iran’s nuclear dispute would bring an end to the “delusional Iranophobia” in the region and automatically pave the way for a “strategic partnership” between Iran and its neighbours. What he did not anticipate was that the resolution of the nuclear issue would cause a new wave of Iranophobia

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among its neighbours if Iran failed to provide them with timely and tangible reassurances. The president gave his most important UN speech in September 2015. Two months before this meeting, JCPOA was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries. This deal was lauded as a great triumph of diplomacy, and an achievement for the international community in attaining a peaceful resolution to a potential world crisis. Rouhani’s address to the 70th General Assembly meeting was given at this historic moment, and can be considered as the manifesto of his foreign policy in post-JCPOA era. In his speech, Rouhani personally thanked the US president and other leaders of the P5+1 countries for their willingness to make the nuclear deal possible, a sentiment not expressed by an Iranian leader since the Revolution. “I can now proudly announce that today, a new chapter has started in Iran’s relations with the world … At this point, I deem it necessary to recognise the role of all the negotiators, the leaders and heads of states and governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in achieving this agreement.” He confirmed that the mandate given to him by the Iranian people in the 2013 Presidential Election, to pursue constructive engagement with the world, was best manifested in the diplomatic efforts that resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the six world powers. In a statement about the consequences of JCPOA for the region, Rouhani announced that, “the [nuclear] deal can and should herald a new era and lead to positive outcomes regarding the establishment of sustainable peace and stability in the region. From our point of view, the agreed-­ upon deal is not the final objective, but a development which can and should be the basis of further achievements to come. Considering the fact that this deal has created an objective basis and set an appropriate model, it can serve as a basis for foundational change in the region.”24 Rouhani’s 2015 UN address coincided with the Mina incident—a stampede that left hundreds of Iranian pilgrims dead—and which occurred one day before he delivered his speech. Rouhani was under pressure by hardline media inside the country to cancel his speech and immediately return to Tehran to deal with the crisis. Rouhani began his address by harshly criticising what he called the “mismanagement, irresponsibility, and unaccountability” of the Saudi government. The Mina incident increased tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia to the extent that any

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important message about Iran’s desire to seek peace in the region was not heard by Iran’s Arab neighbours, and even inside Iran. Even a notable statement such as, “our policy is to continue our peace-seeking efforts in the region based on the … win-win principle, and act in a way that would lead to all in the region and world benefitting from these new conditions … [We need] to look to the future and avoid focusing on the past and rebuild our relationship with the countries in the region, particularly with our neighbours, based on mutual respect and our common and collective interests,”25 did not bring about any enthusiasm in the region, as Iran–Saudi hostility had reached boiling point. Rouhani linked the possibility of maintaining perpetual peace in the region with the strengthening of economic cooperation among neighbouring nations and also a firm commitment from states to pursue their own domestic development. “We know that the only way to perpetuate peace is through development. Peace without development is merely a recess while resentment and suspicion builds. Economic interaction may bring the [Middle East] region into a haven for peace and development. After the JCPOA, Iran will stand ready to show that the practical path to security and stability is through the development that comes with economic engagement.” Rouhani also stressed Iran’s readiness after JCPOA to engage with its regional neighbours “in a wide range of social and economic cooperation, which will enable the achievement of political understanding and even foster structural security cooperation.” While Rouhani’s rhetoric suggesting possible security cooperation based on shared political understandings among the countries of the region was remarkable—perhaps never before expressed by an Iranian leader—his rhetoric never found any practical manifestation in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy in the course of the months following this speech. Linking JCPOA with the “WAVE” initiative, Rouhani proposed a regional agenda for cooperation based on a four-step plan that included: • To create a collective and global movement to tackle regional problems in a serious manner through dialogue; • To prevent the slaughter of innocent people and the bombardment of civilians, as well as the promotion of violence and killing of other human beings; • To provide for stability in cooperation with established central governments to maintain stability; • To build democracy and democratic governance in the Middle East region.26

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The above statement was significant for many reasons. First, Rouhani had proposed a new JCPOA to be negotiated between Iran and its neighbours, to resolve their differences on a variety of regional issues. Second, Rouhani announced that the crises in the region, that is, in Syria and Yemen had no military solution, and that they should be resolved through diplomacy and “the vote of the people rather than arms”. Most significant in Rouhani’s 2015 speech was the acknowledgement that “any actor in the international system, who pursues maximalist demands and does not allow space for the other side, cannot speak of peace, stability, and development.” In his address to the 71th UN General Assembly meeting in September 2016, Rouhani used harsh rhetoric against Saudi Arabia, but from a progressivist perspective. In an implicit reference to Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) 2030 economic reform plan, Rouhani said, “if the Saudi government is serious about its vision for development and regional security, it must cease and desist from divisive policies, spread of hateful ideology and trampling upon the rights of neighbours, accept its responsibility for the protection of the lives and dignity of pilgrims and construct its relations with the nations in the region on the basis of mutual respect and accountability.”27 This statement was a warning to Riyadh that economic reform at home might never be accomplished while the whole region is in turmoil, and that the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen could jeopardise the pace of development in Saudi Arabia—therefore inviting the Saudi government to cooperate in the stabilization of the region for the sake of economic development and progress for all. Referring to the ongoing crises in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, he said, “if the region is to reverse the current dangerous trend into one towards development and stability, certain countries must stop bombing their neighbours, and abandon supporting Takfiri terrorist groups, and, while accepting responsibility, try to compensate for past mistakes.”28 The one message that was repeated in all of Rouhani’s UN speeches was that JCPOA was not just a one-off, but instead provided an exemplary and innovative model for conflict resolution in the evolving international system, “beyond the nuclear file, the JCPOA contains important lessons for resolving complicated international problems. This deal is not only a political agreement; it also represents a creative approach and method for constructive interaction with a view to peacefully resolving crises and challenges.”29 This argument could potentially have led to shaping a concrete

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foreign policy doctrine for Rouhani, had he been able to identify more cases to designate and apply it to. Finally, in his March 2017 speech at the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Islamabad, Rouhani briefly revealed his foreign policy doctrine in a call for seeking “a stronger region” instead of seeking to be the strongest in the region. “We should stop seeking hegemony, and cooperate instead in building a stronger region.” In defining the notion of a non-hegemonic regional system, President Rouhani urged the regional countries to focus their attention on “commonalities” and turn differences to strengths with dialogue and cooperation. “We [should] stop unnecessary and destructive rivalry and believe in our ability to resolve our own problems and mobilise our desires to return to our historical status, meaning the highway of civilization, culture and commerce.”30

Assessment of President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Doctrine, 2013–2017 It is clear from Rouhani’s statements, from his election campaign in 2013, and throughout his first four years in office as president, that the motto “constructive interaction with the world” was his foreign policy guideline. This aimed to foster Iran’s “progress” and “development” by improving Iran’s place in international community, rebuilding Iran’s image with the international community, removing economic sanctions, and attracting foreign investment. Rouhani’s idea of “World Against Violence and Extremism” was the only universalist message in his foreign policy. His main purpose was to position Iran within the international system and to portray Iran as a responsible state. He identified the nuclear talks with the major world powers as the first priority and the ultimate goal of his foreign policy. He also placed emphasis on Iran’s regional policy throughout his term in office—as a regional perspective is repeated in almost every foreign policy speech—but had little success in ameliorating Iran’s regional relations and preventing a deterioration of relations in certain cases. Conceptual Assessment This section will assess Rouhani’s foreign policy in the context of the three elements of “progressivism,” “pragmatism,” and “regionalism,” which were clearly reflected, as well as expressly proclaimed, in Rouhani’s 2013 election campaign.

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1. Progressivism: Rouhani’s approach to foreign policy appeared to be derived from a belief that the progress and development of Iran was the main reason for the country’s foreign relations. From this perspective, foreign policy is a continuation of domestic politics and the domestic needs of the country and not a universalistic missionary philosophy. Rouhani’s progressivist approach was evident from his publications before running for president, when he headed a strategic studies centre in Tehran (1991–2013). It was also reflected in his 2013 election campaign, which included a harsh criticism of the policies of President Ahmadinejad on the basis that they were demagogic and therefore harmful to the country’s principal interests. Progressivism is evident in almost all of Rouhani’s foreign policy speeches and statements. His efforts to secure a nuclear deal were mostly driven by the urgent need of the country to rebuild its economy, and thus requiring economic sanctions against Iran to be lifted. Rouhani’s main intention in the nuclear talks was not to end historic problems between Iran and the US but only to put an end to US sanctions and open Iran’s economy to foreign investment. Rouhani believed that a comprehensive political settlement with the United States could only happen if, and when, the economic benefits of a more open, uncomplicated commercial relationship with the West were tangible to the Iranian people (hardliners included). Thus, Rouhani’s approach to the nuclear deal was technical and economic, rather than political, and for this reason, JCPOA did not automatically lead to a political opening between Tehran and Washington, neither under Obama nor Trump. While Rouhani succeeded in eliminating most of the economic sanctions against Iran, the main issues remained—most international banks and companies were reluctant to work with Iran despite the removal of sanctions. The political context of the nuclear deal was not addressed as adequately as the technical aspects. Rouhani neglected the fact that the international debate over Iran’s nuclear program was mostly “political,” and instead he focused on technical issues. This lack of foresight had serious economic consequences for Iran. Rouhani’s approach was in itself missing the big picture. He attempted to relieve Iran’s economic pressure by addressing the most problematic technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, without having a concrete strategy to address the core of the problem, the political challenge. Despite his earlier promises about the possibility of “engagement” with the United States in matters beyond the nuclear issue,31 it is clear that Rouhani, wary of pressures from hardliners at home, did not have a plan to pursue the renewal of Iran–US diplomatic relations during his first term

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in office. As Amin Saikal argues, if Iran and the United States had managed to restore relations, it would have the potential to change the regional strategic environment: “In spite of their present apprehension, Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Arab world may] have found[ themselves with little choice but to scale their concerns about what they perceive as Iran’s regional sectarian and geopolitical ambitions.”32 The Iranian government failed to fully benefit from the political context of JCPOA, particularly with regard to the normalisation of relations with the United States. Yet, Saudi Arabia and Israel mistakenly assumed that a political rapprochement between Iran and the United States was likely and imminent, and reacted angrily, perhaps even hysterically.33 Rouhani’s progressivism, although necessary, needed to be supplemented and supported by the other two elements—pragmatism and regionalism. This was the fatal flaw in Rouhani’s (lack of) foreign policy doctrine. 2. Pragmatism: Rouhani believed pragmatism was an interactive, solution-­oriented approach, which would lead to win-win situations. The Iranian political sphere regards Rouhani as a pragmatist politician. The most significant example of pragmatism in his foreign policy was the nuclear negotiations and relations with the P5+1 countries. Rouhani’s pragmatism can be compared with that of the late President Rafsanjani, whose approach to foreign policy influenced Rouhani. Both former presidents considered foreign policy a continuation of domestic politics and thus, empty of any utopian mission. Both regarded foreign policy as a tool for the reconstruction of Iran’s economy and pushed for greater development at home. However, each faced difficulties in applying pragmatism to all aspects of Iran’s foreign policy due to domestic pressures from more hardline stakeholders inside the political system. Yet, there were significant differences between the two periods. At the global level, there had never been more systemic hostility against Iran than in 2013. When Rouhani took office, the Islamic Republic was under unprecedentedly intense pressure from the West, as well as the United Nations Security Council. In the 1990s, the international system was reshaping after the Cold War, and Iran had not yet been framed by the US government and its allies as the number-one threat against their interests regionally and globally. Internally, Rafsanjani had a much more stable and powerful position than Rouhani within the Iranian political structure. As a founding father of the Islamic Republic, the former had the freedom to re-interpret the Revolution as he saw fit. The latter, on the contrary, was constantly judged by his opponents on whether he had sufficient “commitment” to the revolutionary

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principles, and thus occupied a vulnerable position in Iran’s internal politics. Relying on his charismatic personality and strong links to the Supreme Leader, Rafsanjani was able to use pragmatism to create consensus in Iranian politics, whereas Rouhani could only use pragmatism in foreign policy if the domestic consensus had already been shaped, or if he had been given a mandate from the Supreme Leader. Therefore, Rouhani’s pragmatism remained limited in scope to the nuclear talks, and was not able to be applied to other areas of foreign policy. Iran’s diplomacy in areas not related to the nuclear talks was not only conservative but also passive and idle. Interactions with the P5+1 countries followed a similar pattern, political topics were avoided and instead attention was devoted to discussions of economic sanctions and the technicalities of the nuclear issue. As a result, Rouhani’s pragmatism was not applied to cases beyond the nuclear negotiations and remained largely abstract, reflected in words and speeches rather than in action. 3. Regionalism: It could be argued that Rouhani had spoken of the necessity of regional integrity and cooperation more than any other president of the Islamic Republic. Rouhani dedicated extended passages of all of his UN and other major foreign policy speeches to the discussion of the problems in the Middle East, Iran’s proposed solutions to those problems, and most importantly, Iran’s readiness to fully cooperate with its neighbours to overcome those problems and to build trust through dialogue and interaction. Even Rouhani’s 2013 election campaign document, drafted when the nuclear dispute was at the top of Iran’s foreign policy problems, was dominated by a discussion of regional issues and the need for Iran’s rapprochement with its neighbours, leaving only a few lines for the nuclear case. For Rouhani’s foreign policy team, Iran’s regional policy was an urgent priority. Yet, in reality, the contrary occurred. Rouhani proved to be ineffectual in Iran’s regional policy, particularly with regard to the Syrian crisis and deterioration of the situation in Yemen. Rouhani’s trusted aides in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were completely preoccupied with the nuclear negotiations and had little time to engage effectively in regional issues. Moreover, most were better at talking to the West than Iran’s Arab neighbours. Reaching the nuclear deal was of extreme importance to Rouhani, as he had promised the nation that he would resolve this issue and remove the economic sanctions, which had made people’s lives difficult. In order to achieve this, Rouhani and his team had to break some of the longest-held, even sacred, taboos in the Islamic Republic’s history, such as shaking hands with top American diplomats and holding

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direct talks with the United States government at the highest level. This was a bitter experience for many hardliners inside the country, who were prepared to destroy the negotiation process if their power and principles were pushed too far. Rouhani may have realised that if he was not to be disturbed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other revolutionary institutions in the conduct of the nuclear negotiations, he would need to make enough concessions over regional issues. What Rouhani perhaps did not realise was that when his government lost control over the country’s regional policy, it also lost many of the benefits of the nuclear deal. In other words, Rouhani’s progressivism and pragmatism simply became impotent without regionalism. The hardline elements in the government deprived Rouhani and his foreign ministry from effective interactions with the region, while military forces expanded their operations beyond Iran’s borders. The takeover of the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January 2016, carried out by organised militias, was the nail in the coffin for Rouhani’s failed regionalism. Iran-Saudi and Iran-Bahraini diplomatic relations were cut following the embassy attack, and Iran’s relations with UAE and Qatar were also downgraded. The new Saudi ruling elite adopted an overt and aggressive anti-Iran strategy, embarking on a path towards all-encompassing political and economic confrontation with the Islamic Republic. Apart from its practical shortcomings, Rouhani’s theoretical approach to regional politics during his first term in office was remarkably progressive and should not be ignored or neglected. Rouhani proposed a comprehensive plan for regional dialogue and cooperation with Iran’s neighbours, based on mutual respect and non-interference in the domestic affairs. His call for “a stronger region instead of the strongest in the region” was in contrast to those who advocated for Iranian regional hegemony. He also proposed another “joint comprehensive plan of action” between Iran and its regional neighbours to overcome disagreements and address common problems. As brilliant as these ideas may have been, many problems remained with Rouhani’s approach to the region. First, he disregarded regional players and their potential positive or negative influence on the nuclear negotiations. Second, he underestimated the power of regional players in limiting the actual outcomes and the benefits of the nuclear deal for Iran. Third, his government delegated some of its authority over Iran’s regional policy to other institutions outside of government. Finally, he never succeeded in defining and designating clear-cut action plans for the implementation of his regional policy—perhaps because his government

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was not in an “agenda-setting” position vis-à-vis Iran’s regional policy—so his ideas found little opportunity to be carried out in practice. Contextual Assessment It is evident from Rouhani’s election campaign and his foreign policy speeches between 2013 and 2017 that he was aware of both Iran’s most urgent and long-term needs in its foreign relations and tried to correct many of the erroneous policies and approaches of the previous Ahmadinejad administration. Rouhani’s foreign policy motto, “Constructive Interaction with the World” together with his proposal for the “World against Violence and Extremism” had the potential to shape a concrete foreign policy doctrine. However, a doctrine must extend beyond a discussion of political philosophy and be “applied” to specific cases on the ground. Rouhani’s “constructive interaction” may be observed on the two following levels: 1. International level: The only issue that was properly defined was the nuclear negotiations. This was a very important example of constructive interaction with the international community. However, the nuclear talks, which Rouhani initially expected to be short, were protracted, eventually taking nearly two years. The case, despite its defined specificity, remained a “technical” agreement—lifting sanctions in return for limiting Iran’s nuclear program—and never transformed into a “grand bargain” between Iran and the West, addressing the full range of political and economic issues. Even at such a scale, Rouhani’s government was kept occupied with the negotiations for such a long time that it failed to effectively prepare plans, either for the public or the private sector, to promptly grasp opportunities arising from the deal. The remainder of the Rouhani administration’s first term was spent fighting with foreign partners to remove a sea of small technical obstacles in the way of JCPOA implementation (especially with regard to banking transactions, finance, and oil exports). 2. Regional level: There was no specific case that was defined by the Rouhani government. In most regional issues, the government followed the mainstream direction put forward by the Supreme National Security Council, where decisions were a product of efforts to achieve an overarching balance the interest of all stakeholders—including military and civilian authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became passive with regard to regional issues, until 2016. In the last year of Rouhani’s first term in office, a diplomatic effort was initiated between Iran, Turkey, and Russia to

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discuss how to end the war in Syria, coordinate on an operational level, and maintain a ceasefire, with the ultimate goal of preparing the ground for a political process to determine the future of the country. This process, known as “Astana Talks,” opened a new window for Rouhani’s government to effectively engage in the political arrangements of the region. However, an Arab-Iranian rapprochement in the region could not be realised without a prior normalisation of political relations between Iran and the West, especially the United States.34 The following reasons provide some explanation to Rouhani’s failures, despite the strength of his conceptual approach to foreign policy. External Factors 1. Changed leadership in Saudi Arabia: The deterioration of Iran–Saudi relations was not solely a product of the lack of a diplomatic offensive or initiative from Iran. The death of King Abdullah and the rise of a new generation of ruling elite in Saudi Arabia were important factors impacting the opportunity for an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement. For mainly domestic reasons, the new Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman had used an overt anti-Iran policy to consolidate his own position within the House of Saud. Hostility toward Shi’ite Iran was perhaps the easiest, if not the most effective, means for him to gain consensus in domestic Saudi politics. The Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen which began in early 2015, the Mina incident and the death of more than 400 Iranian Hajj pilgrims in the same year, the execution of a top Shi’ite religious leader, Sheikh Nemr, on charges of rebellion, and the subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in early 2016, and finally, an apparently secret rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel to shape an unannounced coalition against what they considered the common threat of Iran, added to the complexities of Tehran–Riyadh relations, bringing them to an almost deadlocked situation. Rouhani’s statements and proposals about regional cooperation and the reduction of tension were indiscriminately and entirely rejected by the Saudi government. 2. US presidential election: The 2016 American presidential election in which Donald Trump was elected the President of the United States also had a significant impact on Rouhani’s failure. While Obama had put pressure on the Saudis and Israelis to recognise the role of Iran in regional security arrangements, urging Saudi Arabia and Iran to reach a “cold peace,”35 Trump returned to traditional US foreign policy in the region, seeking to contain Iran, while giving full support to the new Saudi ruler,

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in the latter’s confrontation with Iran over its so-called destabilizing regional activities. Trump also posed a serious threat to the JCPOA, which he denounced as “the worst deal for the United States in history.” Trump’s first official overseas visit was to Saudi Arabia, during which arms deals worth several billions of dollars were signed between Riyadh and Washington. In short, the rise of MBS in the House of Saud and Donald Trump in the White House posed significant challenges for Rouhani’s foreign policy at the global and regional levels, as both foreign leaders objected to any sort of dialogue or engagement with Iran. Domestic Factors 1. Lack of clarity of political discourse: Rouhani had not been successful in defining his “moderation” doctrine as a genuine discourse in Iranian politics. Whereas Rafsanjani was known for his “spiritual pragmatism,”36 Khatami for his liberal reformism, and Ahmadinejad for his millenarian and apocalyptic philosophy, Rouhani appeared to be acting only as a “technocrat” politician who wanted to locate himself in the middle of the political spectrum but lacked a clear political philosophy. Moderation is hardly a way of “thinking” but more a way of “acting.” As a result, Rouhani’s discourse did not fit easily into any of the major political streams in the Islamic Republic. He was therefore unable to motivate popular social movement in his support, and this placed him in a weak position in the internal struggles over Iran’s foreign policy. 2. Structural complexity: Iran’s foreign policy decision-making process is very complex and it is often unclear who makes the final decision. In theory, it is the Supreme Leader who has the final say on matters of foreign policy, but a variety of organisations, including governmental and non-­ governmental bodies, are involved in the process. Further, there are also occasions when, in addition to the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme National Security Council, and the Majlis (parliament), other players such as the head of the judiciary, Friday prayer leaders, and top military commanders, interfere in foreign policy decisions. Some have an official mandate to do so (such as SNSC), but others have the capacity to create a psychological environment in which the president is unable to act as freely as would be expected. 3. Insufficient credibility and lack of mandate: Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 elections was not a landmark victory. He received the minimum proportion of votes to win (50.7%), the lowest ever for a president in the history of the Islamic Republic. During his campaign, Rouhani harshly

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criticised the other presidential candidate Saeed Jalali, who had served as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s top nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad, for wasting the time of the country, disregarding national interests, and missing every opportunity for a compromise with world powers. Rouhani was elected by the people to resolve the nuclear crisis and to remove economic sanctions. The Supreme Leader and the whole political system arrived at a consensus to grant Rouhani a mandate to negotiate with the world powers, including the United States, in (and only in) the context of the nuclear case. His narrow victory in the election confined his credibility to claim a mandate to pursue broader changes to Iran’s foreign policy, especially in the region.

Conclusion These discussions have shed light on Rouhani’s foreign policy during his first term in office and have shown that he did not follow a clearly defined foreign policy doctrine consistently across his regional and international policies. While Rouhani and his foreign policy advisory team were aware of the evolutions of the world system and Iran’s needs to define its new place and role in the international community, despite the fact that Rouhani succeeded in resolving the nuclear issue, one of the most complicated challenges in Iran’s contemporary history, it is not possible to identify any specific, consistent doctrine shaping Rouhani’s decisions. His motto, “constructive interaction” with the world, was never designated or applied to any cases beyond the nuclear deal, and the “when” and “how” questions over the implementation of his motto were never addressed. At the regional level, Rouhani delivered his most thorough theoretical statements on the necessity of regional dialogue and cooperation, yet, these were never translated into a direct agenda or action plans to solve any particular issue. A major reason for failure derived from the complexities of internal politics in Iran—the way Rouhani defined himself on the political spectrum and the actual power he held. Should Rouhani be more successful in turning his words into actions in his second term in office, we may expect a genuine Rouhani Doctrine to be shaped. Meanwhile, the US president’s bold decision to withdraw from the JCPOA in May 2018 created a major dilemma for Iranian foreign policy and has raised questions about the future of peace and stability in the Middle East region and in the world. There is more uncertainty about Iran’s future now than ever before, and Rouhani has a difficult task to lead his country through the upcoming turbulence.

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Notes 1. Daniel Șandru, “Ideology, Between the Concept and the Political Reality,” The Knowledge Based Society Project, no. 169 (Sfera Politicii), http://www. sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/169/art09-Sandru.php. 2. For more profound discussions of the various definitions of ideology, see Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction 5th ed (Palgrave Macmillan: 2012); Richard Dragger and Terence Ball, Ideas and Ideologies: A Reader 10th ed (Routledge: 2016). 3. For this purpose, several important primary sources will be used as references in this chapter, including but not limited to, Rouhani’s 2013 campaign plan, President Rouhani’s speeches at the UN General Assembly meetings in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016; as well as President Rouhani’s address to the 2016 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos and the March 2017 summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Islamabad. 4. “Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election,” BBC News, June 15, 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174. 5. “Iran’s currency hits all-time low as western sanctions take their toll,” The Guardian, October 1, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/oct/01/iran-currency-rial-all-time-low; “The Collapse of Iran’s Rial,” The Gatestone Institute, February 21, 2013, https://www. gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase. 6. “Sanctions push Iran’s oil exports to lowest in decades,” Reuters, June 5, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-iran-oil/sanctions-pushirans-oil-exports-to-lowest-in-decades-idUSBRE9540FV20130605; “Iranian Oil Minister Concedes Sanctions Have Hurt Exports,” New York Times, January 7, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/ world/middleeast/irans-oil-exports-and-sales-down-40-percent-officialadmits.html. 7. “UN Security Council’s Resolutions on Iran,” Arms Control Association, August, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-CouncilResolutions-on-Iran. 8. Hassan Rouhani, “Barnameh-ye Dolat-e Tadbir va Omid,” Tehran: Setad-e Entekhabati-ye Dr. Hassan Rouhani: Khordad, June, 2013. 9. Ibid., pp. 55–57. 10. Ibid., pp. 59–60. 11. Ibid., p. 56. 12. Hassan Rouhani, “Peace and Development; Recreation of the World Order” (Speeches of Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the UN General Assembly 2013–2016), Tehran: Office of the President, 1396/2017, p. 176.

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13. Ibid., p. 174. 14. Ibid., p. 173. 15. Ibid., p. 172. 16. Hassan Rouhani, “Dr. Rouhani’s speech in a gathering convened by Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations in New  York” (speech, New York, September 27, 2013), Official Website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, http://president.ir/en/71857. 17. Amin Saikal, “Iran and the Changing Regional Strategic Environment,” in Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 27. 18. Hassan Rouhani, “President’s speech addressing the 44th world Economic Forum” (speech, January 23, 2014), Official Website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, http://president.ir/en/74125. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Hassan Rouhani, “Peace and Development; Recreation of the World Order” (Speeches of Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the UN General Assembly 2013–2016), Tehran: Office of the President, 1396/2017, p. 156. 22. Ibid., p. 157. 23. Ibid., p. 156. 24. Ibid., pp. 130–131. 25. Ibid., p. 130. 26. Ibid., pp. 126–127. 27. Hassan Rouhani, “President Rouhani addressing United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2016), Official Website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, http://president.ir/ en/95419. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Hassan Rouhani, “President Rouhani at ECO Summit: 21st century the century of Asia’s leadership” (speech, Islamabad, March 1, 2017), Official Website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, http://president. ir/en/98040. 31. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 7. 32. Amin Saikal, “Iran and the Changing Regional Strategic Environment,” in Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 28–29. 33. Ibid., p. 26.

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34. Przemyslaw Osiewicz, “The Iranian Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf Regionalism under the rule of President Hassan Rouhani,” in Przegl1d Strategiczny, no. 7, 2014. 35. “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April, 2016, https://www.theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 36. I have borrowed this term from Rouhollah K. Ramazani, “Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy,” University of Virginia Press, (2013), pp. 196–212.

Bibliography “UN Security Council’s Resolutions on Iran.” August 2017. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-CouncilResolutions-on-Iran. Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Dara Conduit. Iran in the World; President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. BBC News. “Hassan Rouhani wins Iran presidential election.” June 15, 2013. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22916174. Dragger, Richard and Terence Ball. Ideas and Ideologies; A Reader. Routledge, 2016. Heywood, Andrew. Political Ideologies; An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic, April, 2016. https://www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. New York Times. “Iranian Oil Minister Concedes Sanctions Have Hurt Exports.” January 7, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/world/middleeast/irans-oil-exports-and-sales-down-40-percent-official-admits.html. Osiewicz, Przemysław. “The Iranian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region under the rule of President Hassan Rouhani: continuity or change.” Przegla ̨d Strategiczny, Number 7, 2014. http://studiastrategiczne.amu.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/okladka-nr-7-2014.jpg. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy. University of Virginia Press, 2013. Reuters. “Sanctions push Iran’s oil exports to lowest in decades.” June 5, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-iran-oil/sanctions-push-irans-oilexports-to-lowest-in-decades-idUSBRE9540FV20130605. Rouhani, Hassan. “Barnameh-ye Dolat-e Tadbir va Omid.” Speech, Tehran, June 2013. Setad-e Entekhabati-ye Dr. Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani, Hassan. “Dr. Rouhani’s speech in a gathering convened by Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations.” Speech, New  York, September 27, 2013. http://president.ir/en/71857. Rouhani, Hassan. “Peace and Development; Recreation of the World Order.” Speech, UN General Assembly, 2017. Office of the President website.

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Rouhani, Hassan. “President Rouhani addressing United Nations General Assembly.” Speech, New  York, September 22, 2016. http://president. ir/en/95419. Rouhani, Hassan. “President Rouhani at ECO Summit: 21st century the century of Asia’s leadership.” Speech, Islamabad, March 1, 2017. http://president. ir/en/98040. Rouhani, Hassan. “President’s speech addressing the 44th World Economic Forum.” Speech, Davos, January 23, 2014. http://president.ir/en/74125. Saikal, Amin. “Iran and the Changing Regional Strategic Environment.” In Iran in the World; President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, 28–29. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Șandru, Daniel. “Ideology, Between the Concept and the Political Reality.” The Knowledge Based Society Project (Sfera Politicii nr. 169). http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/169/art09-Sandru.php. The Gatestone Institute. “The Collapse of Iran’s Rial.” February 21, 2013. https:// www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3597/iran-rial-collpase. The Guardian. “Iran’s currency hits all-time low as western sanctions take their toll.” October 1, 2012.

CHAPTER 3

Revisiting Rouhani’s School of Thought: A Critical Discussion of Its Developmental and Foreign Policy Doctrines Ali Fathollah-Nejad

This chapter is based on the latter part of the author’s 2015 PhD thesis submitted at the Department of Development Studies of SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London, entitled A Critical Geopolitics of Iran’s International Relations in a Changing World Order. Versions or parts of this chapter have been presented at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on March 24, 2017, the University of Copenhagen on April 4, 2017, the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies (DI) in Qatar on May 24, 2017, and at the Summer School “International Iran Forum” of the Economics of the Middle East Research Group at University of Marburg’s Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies (CNMS) and International Iranian Economics Association (IIEA) at the University of Marburg on August 25, 2017, and the 24th International Congress of the German Middle East Studies Association (DAVO) at Friedrich Schiller University Jena on September 22, 2017. A. Fathollah-Nejad (*) Brookings Institution, Doha, Qatar Lecturer in Middle East and Comparative Politics, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_3

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Introduction This chapter is intended to provide flashpoints into areas barely discussed in policy or academic writings on Iran since the Hassan Rouhani presidency. Although some of the shortcomings to be discussed have been raised in some of Iran’s leading intellectual outlets within the first six months of his administration, the bulk of Iran writings have tended to focus on issues of international security, with only a very few economists or political economists engaging in policy-relevant discussion—as opposed to its neighbours affected by the so-called Arab Spring. Hence, the developmental aspects in Iran have largely been understudied. As can be seen from hindsight, the Rouhani administration has largely followed the doctrinal lines in foreign and developmental policies set out prior to 2013, providing the basis for both relative success and failure. Despite a cross-factional grand-strategic proposition to position Iran at the regional pole position in all conceivable fields, the specific priorities set forth by Rouhani’s “moderate” school of thought have often hit the boundaries set by its rivaling “hardline” school of thought, the nature and structure of the Islamic Republic, as well as the impact of US extraterritorial sanctions, which have undermined a successful implementation of Rouhani’s agenda.

The 2025 Outlook: Template for a Twenty-­First Century Grand Strategy In March 2005, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a widely publicized and binding document entitled “Outlook of the Islamic Republic of Iran by 2025” (Cheshm’andâz-e Jomhouri-e Eslâmi-e Irân dar ofoq-e 1404, henceforth referred to as the Outlook).1 This template for an Iranian “grand strategy” was initiated in 1999 by the Expediency Council.2 Created in 1988 to mediate disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council plays an institutionally important role within the political system; however it is its research arm, the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), that is of importance for foreign policy. CSR “is set up for the purpose of advising the political élite in general and the Office of the Supreme Leader in particular”.3 In fact, CSR’s primary affiliation has been to the person of the late Ali-Akbar Hashemi-­ Rafsanjani, chairman of the Expediency Council from February 1989 until January 2017. Established in 1989, CSR shifted its institutional affiliation

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along with him, i.e. from the Office of the Presidency until 1997 to the Expediency Council thereafter. Being perhaps Iran’s most influential thinktank, CSR has been headed by Rouhani since 1991 and after the latter assumed the presidency in autumn 2013 by Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to the Supreme Leader in international affairs and former Foreign Minister (1981–1997). The Outlook combines Iran’s post-war goal of economic reconstruction with new-found international ambitions. Its preamble posits that by 2025, that is, after the completion of four five-year development plans, Iran would be a fully advanced country, assuming the pole position among 28 countries in West Asia and North Africa in terms of economic, scientific and technological indicators. At the same time, Iran would be a country with an Islamic and revolutionary identity that provides an inspiration for the Islamic world, while it would engage in constructive interaction in its international relations. To reach those objectives, the Outlook envisages the realization of a number of economic goals: fast and sustainable economic growth; durable employment opportunities; rising productivity; active presence in regional and international markets; a diversified and knowledge-based economy; elimination of inflation; food security; and an economic environment conducive to domestic and international entrepreneurship. To facilitate the realization of those goals, the Expediency Council and its think-tank CSR have consulted Iranian experts to devise the tasks of both domestic and foreign policy towards that end. Given the large degree of consensus among these expert opinions, the following brief account can be regarded as representative.4 According to those experts, the government should aim at creating the conditions for economic liberalization and privatization, thus providing the basis for an outward-oriented economy which is deemed necessary because of insufficient domestic resources for attaining those development goals. This should include the stimulation of market forces, especially the expansion of private-sector activities. Overall, a conducive environment should be provided, including the rule of law and a more equitable distribution of state resources among various market forces. A key enabler in this regard would be the revised Article 44 of the Constitution that paves the way for an accelerated process of privatization, whose complete implementation, as urged by the Supreme Leader, should be viewed by the authorities as a form of jihad.5 The Outlook’s underlying assumptions have been laid out by former long-time CSR president (1992–2013) Rouhani in his National Security

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and Economic System of Iran (in Persian), published in August 2010. He argues that development, security and stable international relations are intrinsically interconnected. In a first step, he maintains that the issues of development and security are correlated: Economic growth and sustainable development will make the country more secure and will make it more powerful when confronting security challenges. This is why developing countries have more limited capacities than developed countries to provide for their security.6

He then adds the aspect of stable international relations, which he defines as the prerequisite for economic development: There is a close correlation between economic development and political stability, which means maintaining dialogue and friendly relations with the outside world. As stable international relations pave the ground for economic development, in turn economic development renders a country more secure or stable as it makes the country less vulnerable to external threats. Thus, there is a positive correlation, akin to a virtuous cycle, between the objective of economic development and the policy of establishing or maintaining friendly relations with the outside world.7

Rouhani’s account is an implicit rejection of a revolutionary foreign policy that is per definition inadequate to produce stability in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s international relations. Moreover, among those three core elements, the concept of national security—being omnipresent throughout the book—is arguably the central concern, from which the need for economic development facilitated by stable international relations is derived. The primacy of national security in that model can certainly be read in various ways (after all Rouhani himself has been one of the chief national-security figures in the Islamic Republic’s history), one of which would be to convince competing schools of thought that regime-­ encompassing, cross-factional “national security” or “regime survival” considerations can be best satisfied when following those recommendations.

Developmentalist Foreign Policy: Objectives and Requirements In order to specify the tasks of foreign policy in the effort to achieve the Outlook’s development goals, the concept of a “developmentalist foreign policy” (siâsat-e khâreji-e tose’eh-garâ, henceforth referred to as DFP) was

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elaborated by the CSR.8 DFP’s prime terrains can be summarized as economic diplomacy, détente and constructive engagement (ta’âmol-e sâzandeh). As to the economy-related objectives, foreign policy by way of economic diplomacy should aim to attract investment,9 gain access to latest technology and pave the way for access to regional and international markets. Accordingly, establishing links with three sorts of countries should be prioritized: Iran’s neighbours, Asia and the rest of the world. On the regional level, collaboration should be sought in order to promote peace and economic exchanges as well as competition. Since Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey constitute the most important economies of the region, collaboration between them (especially in the field of energy) would render the emergence of a North–South axis possible, connecting Iran to the EU and Central Asia on one side and to West Asia and North Africa on the other. Ideally, this axis should replace the Iran–Russia axis, which is seen as not having benefitted Iran. On the Asian level, in the short-term, economic relations with China, India and other South-Asian countries—all of them in need of oil, gas and petrochemical products—can establish the bases for an eventual reciprocal access to each other’s markets. Meanwhile, a long-term strategic tie with China should be envisaged, which could provide Iran with investments and mid-level technologies, while offering a suitable market for Iranian products. It is also deemed necessary to build economic ties with Japan, especially to provide Iran with high-tech. Regarding relations with the rest of the world, distinction is made between developed and developing countries. While ties with the former should enable Iran to attract investments and access to latest technologies, those with the latter—especially Muslim-majority countries in Africa—should aim at creating markets for Iranian products and eventually services. Relations with other Muslim countries with an intermediate level of development, such as Malaysia and Egypt, should pave the way to accessing their markets and fostering trade links.10 DFP advocates a foreign policy that seeks a reduction of tensions (détente) and constructive engagement with the world, with the guiding principle of producing win–win outcomes. Also, it vehemently opposes in particular the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration’s style and approaches mainly on grounds that they have deterred important international actors from seeking closer links with Iran, without which the Outlook’s objectives could not be reached, as maintained by Rouhani in 2008.11 Or as argued by Mahmoud Vaezi, then the CSR’s Deputy of Foreign Policy and International Relations and later President Rouhani’s

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Minister of Communication (2013–2017) before becoming his Chief of Staff, revisiting the Outlook’s key objectives would clearly show that they cannot be reached through a confrontational attitude towards the world order but most consistently through constructive engagement, by embracing the elements of impartiality, accommodation (hamrâh-sâzi), productive agreements and normalization of relations.12

Economic Development, National Security and Foreign Policy: A Critical Reading of the Proposed Development Model Taking into account the particular domestic and international situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the experiences by other countries with a similar development agenda helps identify the Outlook’s conceptual merits and pitfalls. In Iranian discussions on the Outlook, the cases of other countries considered to be at a similar level of development, such as Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Malaysia but also India and China, are studied. The Outlook basically favours a neoliberal economic model, with its advocacy for liberalization and privatization as the economy’s main organizing principles, coupled with the prioritization of fast-paced economic growth over sustainability.13 These aims should be facilitated by a DFP oriented towards détente and rapprochement with the rest of the world. In fact, such an economic and foreign-policy agenda displays stark similarities with that of Turkey under the Islamic conservative AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) government—very much followed through before Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Syria adventure. Adopting a neoliberal economic model at home with a social base composed of a “devout bourgeoisie”,14 the AKP government had devised a foreign policy guided by the doctrine of “strategic depth” developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, an academic turned politician.15 “Strategic depth” includes five principles, again echoing some of the above DFP propositions such as “constructive engagement”: Outreach to all surrounding regions; pro-active diplomacy premised on a “zero problem” and “maximum integration” policy towards all neighbours; presence in surrounding theatres of conflict in order to influence their evolution; equidistance visà-vis all actors and non-partisanship; as well as inclusion and mobilization of civil society and the economy into foreign policy.16 A key objective of Turkey’s model was to provide access for its firms to regional and

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international markets, seen as a way to enhance its “soft power”. With this strategy it strives to be among the world’s top ten economies by 2023— the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic.17 In comparison to Turkey, Iranian commentators contend that Iran’s international linkages are much weaker than Turkey’s and also Egypt’s, while the specific external alliances Iran has barely help reach its development goals.18 Keeping the Turkish model in mind, we can observe that Iran’s Outlook embraces an economic development model that is predicated upon a specific reading of globalization, deriving basically from accounts by experts associated with Rouhani’s school of thought. The latter almost exclusively focuses on economic growth figures while neglecting their socio-economic ramifications in particular and the uneven nature of globalization in general. Specifically, it avoids looking into the “black box” of (re-)emerging economic powerhouses. It is conventionally stated that in following neoliberal economic models, these countries have witnessed impressive economic growth rates with considerable parts of their populations having experienced socio-economic upward mobility. Ignored, however, is that this tendency has been accompanied by the equally significant phenomenon of social polarization and consequently social frustration over an uneven distribution of the newly acquired wealth. (Ramifications from such socio-economic disparities could be witnessed in China where in 2010 labour unrest swept over the country19; in India where still a large portion of the population lives in poverty and where reactionary nationalisms have been on the rise; in Brazil and Turkey where large-scale anti-­ government protests erupted in 2013.)20 In fact, it can be argued that domestic unrest fuelled by socio-economic disparities and authoritarian rule does not leave foreign policy untouched.21 In sum, the very phenomenon of rising economies, all of them following neoliberal prescripts in various shades, carries the risk of internal divisions disrupting the chances of non-military power projection. Despite such a hypothesis regarding the potential downsides of the proposed strategy, Iran’s Outlook undoubtedly includes corrective aspects. Arguably the most important one concerns the effort both to de-ideologize foreign policy and to define it as serving the purpose of domestic economic development. That constitutes a meaningful step towards the widely noticed lack of definition of Iranian “national interests”. As alluded to earlier, the Outlook’s principles are, as Posch correctly observes,

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for the first time putting the goals of growth and prosperity on a par with the radical ideals laid down as the guiding principles of the constitution. This signifies more than just pragmatism or expediency (maslahat), for which ideological positions would not need to be forfeited, and constitutes a real prioritisation of national interests over revolutionary axioms in foreign policy.22

This significant valorisation of objectives of an economic nature and concomitantly the relative degradation of those of an ideological nature has ramifications on the relationship between “national interest” and “regime survival”, suggesting the possibility that the latter might move towards taking a backseat as the focus will shift to more objectively verifiable criteria predicated upon economic development. However, such a hypothesis needs to be further scrutinized through a closer look at the development agenda, for which we will return to Rouhani’s above-mentioned book. Such an “Iranian–Islamic development” project, he writes, shall transform the Islamic Republic into a country that is “advanced, secure and that has the smallest class divisions”, which could only be achieved by a “strategy of competitive production”.23 If we take into account that the economic model envisaged in the Outlook is the acceleration of neoliberal recipes, his suggestion that this would constitute a prerequisite for a reduction of class divisions is misleading. In fact, on one hand, proponents of the Outlook agenda proclaim the aim to multiply the variety of economic actors that would engage in economic activities by providing them with better access to state resources. On the other, also in Rouhani’s book, there is no conception of a truly free entrepreneurship. Rather the argument can be read as one calling that the economy should be opened to wider sections of the political élite through enhanced privatizations who then would all engage in “competitive production” requiring reduced production costs to the detriment of labour. Hence, there is the possibility that the pursuit of such a neoliberal development pattern with its anticipation to involve more élite groups (and not free entrepreneurs) would ultimately help sustain “regime survival”, by widening the regime’s politico-economic élite base rather than opening up to actors not part of or connected to the regime. Rouhani’s neoliberal economic doctrine can also be traced back to his writings before assuming the presidency in summer 2013. In his 2010 book, National Security and Economic System of Iran, he deplores Iran’s “very oppressive” labour laws to business. He argues that the minimum

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wage must be abolished and restrictions on the laying off of workers eliminated if Iran’s “owners of capital” are to have the “freedom” to create prosperity. “One of the main challenges that employers and our factories face”, Rouhani states, “is the existence of labour unions. Workers should be more pliant toward the demands of job-creators.”24

Conclusion The intimate relationship between security, foreign policy and development in the school of thought associated with Rouhani is, as we have seen, driven by regime-security concerns. Although the latter is pursued by all regime factions, elements of intra-élite competition complicated the realization of the Rouhani school of thought’s other objectives. On the economic front, Rouhani’s agenda was met with domestic resistance by his rival monopolistic-capitalist camp mostly associated with the hardliners who feared losing privileges by an opening up of the economy as well as making the financial and banking system more transparent, as witnessed in the hardliners’ blocking bills that would have Iran meet international standards against money laundering and terrorism financing. Moreover, the persistence of US sanctions despite Iran committing to its obligations under the JCPOA also complicated foreign investment, while the impact of sanctions on Iran’s—mainly home-made—economic problems has been largely overblown. In this vein, despite a proclaimed willingness for reform, the Rouhani administration has not engaged in the necessary and overdue task to structurally reform Iran’s economy—thus not undermining the hardliners’ politico-economic stakes. On the foreign-policy front, Iran’s policy has been marked by contradiction. The success of Rouhani’s school of Defensive Realism that made the JCPOA possible was effectively thwarted by the continuation of an Offensive Realist Iranian regional strategy.25 This Janus-faced Iranian foreign policy has therefore placed Rouhani’s policy of rapprochement with the West on a fragile footing. Iran’s regional policies, run by the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s quasi-parallel government, have continued to be expansive, creating regional concerns about Iranian hegemonic ambitions further fuelled by the JCPOA.26 Despite those domestic and international exogenous factors hampering the realization of Rouhani’s economic and foreign-policy agendas, arguably the Rouhani school’s own recipes were inadequate. His neoliberal-­ authoritarian model as witnessed in his administration’s austerity- and

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security-based budgets failed to address both Iran’s extensive socio-­ economic problems and its authoritarianism. In developmental terms, an early critical reading of the Rouhani school’s core ideas would have had provided the basis for more sober and less rosy expectations. During his tenure, despite GDP growth, income inequality has risen and coupled with social frustration over the uneven distribution of economic dividends from the JCPOA and political stalemate; the path was paved for the 2017/18 nationwide protests by the “middle-class poor” that exhibited a new level of anti-regime slogans.27 The Rouhani administration’s shortcomings and the Islamic Republic’s systemic failures has produced an almost insurmountable triple crisis—socio-economic, political and ecological—that is overshadowing Rouhani’s final years in office.28

Notes 1. See Mirza-Amini 2005; and the Outlook can be accessed at http://farsi. khamenei.ir/message-content?id=9034 in Persian and at https://irandataportal.syr.edu/20-year-national-vision in English. 2. It is also known as the Expediency Discernment Council. 3. Therme 2012: 4. 4. See the volume edited by Vaezi 2008. 5. Ibid.; Khamenei 2007. 6. Rouhani 2010: 33. 7. Ibid.: 4. 8. See Vaezi 2008. The term, however, might be misleading as developmentalism in the usual sense refers to a politico-economic theory emerged in the Third World that posits the need for a strong domestic economy sheltered from malign external influences through high tariffs on imports. What DFP signifies here is rather a development-oriented foreign policy, but we will use that term nevertheless as Iranian scholars themselves do so. 9. Saadat 2008. 10. Zanganeh 2008; Mirza-Amini 2005. 11. Rouhani 2008. 12. Vaezi 2008. 13. As Farhi (2013) maintains, the Rouhani administration’s economic team also reflects a belief in a neoliberal economic model: “the desire to get state organs out of the economy seems to be the glue that holds together a largely neo-liberal economic team. It is one of the strange ironies of Iranian politics that the leftists of the 1980s were turned politically reformist and economically mostly neo-liberal in the late 1990s and continue to be so. It

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is true that the reaction Mohammad Khatami’s neoliberal policies elicited in the form of Ahmadinejad’s justice-oriented populism—at least rhetorically—has now been acknowledged and the economic policies pursued will try to strike a balance between ‘development’ and ‘justice’ and not simply assume that development will lead to the downward trickling of wealth. But the thrust of Rouhani’s center-reformist economic appointments indicates more concern with production and productivity in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.” For similar arguments, see Seyf 2014. 14. Gümüşçü and Sert 2009; Gümüşçü 2010. 15. That is also the title of his 2001 book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. 16. Gürbey 2010. 17. Erdoğan and Yildirim 2013; MacLeod 2012. 18. Hafezian 2008. 19. Straszheim 2008; Wacker 2002: 4; Simarro 2011. 20. Saad-Filho 2013; Yöruk 2013; Iğsız 2013 and Jadaliyya 2013. 21. Fraser and Emiroğlu 2013; Tepper 2013; Adilgızı 2013. 22. Posch 2013: 20. 23. Rouhani 2010: 35. 24. Rouhani 2010. 25. Fathollah-Nejad 2013. 26. Fathollah-Nejad 2017b. 27. Fathollah-Nejad 2018a, b. 28. Fathollah-Nejad 2019.

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Harvard University, Cambridge, MA), October 25. https://www.belfercenter. org/publication/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry ———. 2017c. “Where will the Rouhani administration’s neoliberal doctrine lead Iran to?” (in Persian). Political Economy Critique, November, https://pecritique.com/2017/11/20/‫ر‬-‫ایران‬-‫روحاین‬-‫دولت‬-‫نولیربال‬-‫�آموزه‌ی‬/  ———. 2018a. “Causes behind Iran’s protests: A preliminary account.” Al Jazeera English, January 6. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iran-protests-preliminary-account-180105232533539.html ———. 2018b. “There’s more to Iran’s protests than you’ve been told.” PBS NewsHour, April 3.  https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/opinion-theresmore-to-irans-protests-than-youve-been-told ———. 2019. “Swamped in a Triple Crisis.” Cairo Review of Global Affairs (33): 120–125. https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/swamped-ina-triple-crisis/ Fraser, Suzan and Emiroğlu, Bulut. 2013. “Occupy Gezi Protest: Erdogan Defiant As Police and Protesters Clash.” Associated Press, June 1. Gümüşçü, Şebnem. 2010. “Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt.” Comparative Political Studies  43 (7): 835–861. Gümüşçü, Şebnem and Sert, Deniz. 2009. “The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 75 (6): 953–968. Gürbey, Gülistan. 2010. “Changes in Turkish foreign policy under AKP government? Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s concept of strategic depth.” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 2: 16–27. Hafezian, Mohammad-Hossein. 2008. “Developmentalist State and Foreign Policy: The Experience of Iran, Turkey and Egypt” (in Persian). In op. cit., edited by Mahmoud Vaezi, 335–342. Iğsız, Aslı. “Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism, Law, and Neoliberalism”, Jadaliyya, Pt. 1 (12 July 2013) & Pt. 2 (13 July 2013). Jadaliyya. 2013. “Statement by Comrades from Cairo: We Can Smell the Tear Gas from Rio and Taksim to Tahrir.” June 30. https://www.jadaliyya.com/ Details/28880 Khamenei, Ali. 2007. “Ayatollah Khamenei Instructs Authorities in Charge of Article 44 Drive.” Leader.ir, February 19. https://www.leader.ir/en/content/3597/ Ayatollah-Khamenei-instructs-authorities-in-charge-of-Article-44-drive MacLeod, Scott. “Strategic Thinking.” Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu. The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Vol. 4 (Winter 2012), pp. 16–41.

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Mirza-Amini, Mohammad-Reza. 2005/1384. Cheshm’andâz-e 20 sâleh-ye keshvar: Dar hozeh-ye eqtesâd va fanâvari [The country’s 20-year outlook: In the areas of economy and technology], Tehran: Sharif Think-Tank. Posch, Walter. 2013. The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy. Trans. from German by M. Newton. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (SWP Research Paper, No. 3, April).  https://www.swpberlin. org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2013_RP03_poc.pdf Rouhani, Hassan. 2008. “Inauguration Address: Is the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Direction of the 20-Year Outlook?” (in Persian). In op. cit., edited by Mahmoud Vaezi, 15–25. ———. 2010. Amniat-e Melli va Nezâm-e Eqtesâdi-e Irân [National Security and Economic System of Iran]. Tehran: Center for Strategic Research. Saadat, Rahman. “The Role of Foreign Investment in the Country’s Economic Diplomacy” (in Persian). In op. cit., edited by Mahmoud Vaezi, 317–335. Saad‐Filho, Alfredo. “Mass Protest under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June–July 2013.” Critical Sociology, Vol. 39, No. 5 (September 2013), pp. 657–669. Seyf, Ahmad. Interview on Iran’s economic challenges and President Hassan Rohani’s economic policy (in Persian). Irân‐e Fardâ, No. 6 (6 November 2014 /15 Âbân 1392), pp. 86–91. Simarro, Ricardo Molero. 2011. “Functional Distribution of Income and Economic Growth in the Chinese Economy, 1978–2007.”  Working Papers (168). Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, February. https://www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file67178.pdf Straszheim, Donald H. “China Rising.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 157–170. Tepper, Fabien. 2013. “What the Gezi Park Protesters Think of Erdogan’s Syria Policy.” Syria Deeply, June 15. https://www.newsdeeply.com/ syria/articles/2013/06/15/what-the-gezi-park-protesters-think-oferdogans-syria-policy Therme, Clément. 2012. “When Tehran Looks at its Regional Environment: Iranian Think Tanks and their Analysis of Central Asia.” Iran Regional Forum (2). Central Asia Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, November 8.  https://centralasiaprogram.org/ archives/7646 Vaezi, Mahmoud. 2008. “Strategy of Constructive Engagement and Requirements of Developmentalist Foreign Policy” (in Persian). In Siâsat-e Khâreji-e Tose’eh-­ garâ (Developmentalist Foreign Policy), 43–78. Tehran: Center for Strategic Research.

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Wacker, Gudrun. 2002. China nach dem Parteitag: Zur politischen und wirtschaftlichen Situation Chinas [China after the Party Convention: On the political and economic situation of China]. Berlin: SWP, November. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ arbeitspapiere/2002_02Wkr___China_nach_dem_Parteitag_ks.pdf Yöruk, Erdem. 2013. “Brazil, Turkey: Emerging Markets, Emerging Riots.” Jadaliyya, July 21. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/29145 Zanganeh, Bijan. 2008. “The 20-Year Outlook and Requirements of a Developmentalist Foreign Policy from an Economic Angle” (in Persian). In op. cit., edited by Mahmoud Vaezi, 273–278.

CHAPTER 4

Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian

Introduction: Rouhani’s Election and Global Engagement Agenda Rouhani’s election in 2013 was a pivotal point in the history of the Islamic Republic and allowed Iran to present a new image on the global stage, one significantly different from the preceding eight years. The revitalization of the nuclear negotiations by the Rouhani Administration that led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, illustrated Iran’s restored commitment to global engagement and returning to a state of normalcy with the international community. This chapter assesses the Rouhani Administration’s foreign policy approach by analysing the nuclear negotiations and the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s relations with the United States. In addition, this chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the JCPOA by analysing its impact on the foreign and economic policies of Iran. This survey assists in

L. Zaccara (*) • M. Haghirian Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_4

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understanding the ways in which the nuclear deal, and the negotiations with the United States, continues to shape the domestic discourse on internal and external policies, be used for political infightings, and become subjects of debate in the subsequent legislative and presidential elections. The chapter concludes that even though Iran benefited from the deal in terms of presenting an enhanced image of Iran on the world stage, as well as the semi-normalization of its relations with the United States and dozens of other countries, the JCPOA and the negotiations with the United States did not have a practical impact on the prospects of restoring official diplomatic relations with Washington, nor was it sustainably effective in revitalizing Iran’s economy. Furthermore, even though Iran benefited economically by reaping the rewards from the lifting of some sanctions, the threats towards the agreement by the Trump Administration a year following the implementation of the agreement as well as the continuation of US primary sanctions have not allowed for meaningful changes on the day-to-day lives of ordinary Iranians. Thus, the continuation of US primary sanctions inhibited a reform in Iran’s strategic decision-­ making calculus towards the United States in particular, and foreign policy in general. Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 presidential elections was a pivotal juncture in Iran’s contemporary history and was an important turning point in the 34-year lifetime of the Islamic Republic. As a staunch supporter of the Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, a former member of parliament (Majles) for 20 years, member of the Expediency Council since 1991, the Supreme Leader’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council as well as the President’s National Security Adviser for 16 and 13  years respectively, Rouhani has been a key figure in the Islamic Republic. Rouhani, however, has at various times distanced himself from the conservative and reformist labels and has forged his political path in line with an approach based on pragmatic moderation on internal and external issues which shaped his campaign slogan of prudence and hope. Nevertheless, it has been clear that Rouhani enjoys more support from the reformist groups, evidenced by the strong backing of former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami who were instrumental in his success during the 2013 elections. Rouhani’s narrow victory on June 14, 2013, with 50.73 percent of the votes in an election that was participated by 72 percent of the more than 50 million eligible voters, however, was in contrast to the overwhelming victories of his predecessors in past elections, which in essence meant that

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he needed to rely more on the establishment and the religious leadership’s support rather than the popular support.1 In spite of this fact, Rouhani was able to satisfy both, Iranian people and the establishment on one hand, as well as foreign governments that had very high expectations on a future president that would fix what Ahmadinejad had damaged at the international level. The support Rouhani managed to garner was crucial in permitting the advancement of his global engagement agenda, and in tandem, the revitalization of the nuclear negotiations. Rouhani made it clear during the 2013 presidential campaigns that he aimed for the complete overhaul of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy approach and gradually implemented policies that would allow Iran to represent itself as a responsible and rational actor on the global stage, and, at the same time, to “restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy.”2 It can be inferred that the Iranian public decided to punish the policy choices of the previous president and voted for the candidate that represented the absolute opposite approach, mainly in the foreign policy arena. Furthermore, the 2013 presidential elections were an important litmus test for the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and the executive office following the chaos that ensued in 2009. Rouhani campaigned on his promise to resolve the nuclear issue and remove the sanctions on Iran, and by doing so, he deliberately and officially tied a foreign policy issue with domestic politics and recognized a problem that was having serious negative impacts on the Iranian economy and the daily lives of Iranians by extension. While various sanctions on Iran have been imposed unilaterally by the United States since 1979 as well as multilaterally by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union since 2006, the most impactful sanctions were imposed in 2010 which were expanded and reinforced in 2012  in response to Ahmadinejad’s failure to come to an agreement with the European countries on the nuclear issue. As analysts argue, President Obama put into force “the nuclear option in Washington’s financial war against Tehran,” which became possible after garnering the support of European countries as well as other permanent members of the UNSC—Russia and China.3 These sanctions targeted Iran’s central bank, access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and Iran’s oil and gas exports, as well as various other restrictions related to transportation, trade of goods and services, in addition to the freezing of Iranian assets and limiting foreign direct investments in the Islamic Republic.4 As a result, Iran’s economy was impaired dramatically,

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but not just because of sanctions alone, but also due to the Ahmadinejad Administration’s rampant mismanagement which were prompted by unwise government spending, low interest rates and ill-advised lending.5 In comparison to the year prior, the national currency devalued more than 100 percent in early 2013, inflation rose more than 40 percent, and the country went to recession with an annual GDP growth rate of negative 7.4 percent.6 As an Iranian official admitted shortly after the imposition of the 2012 round of sanctions, “Between Mahmoud Bahmani [the governor of Iran’s Central Bank] and David Cohen [U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence], I have a hard time deciding which one has been more harmful to Iran’s economy.”7 Such negative views against Ahmadinejad’s Administration by the public and some government officials in the last year of his presidency opened the door further for reformist and moderate candidates like Hassan Rouhani to join the presidential elections as candidates and rally on these sentiments during the campaign. With Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 elections, the world was faced with an option: to embrace the new president or continue the old path of conflict and hostility. Rouhani’s repeated promise to the Iranian people to remove sanctions as well as his calls for negotiations with the world powers on the nuclear issue, allowed Western countries, particularly the United States, to take advantage of this new opening and institute a new approach towards the Islamic Republic. Following Rouhani’s victory, for example, Barack Obama issued a statement congratulating the elected president and the Iranian people, expressing the United States’ readiness to “engage the Iranian government directly in order to reach a diplomatic solution that will fully address the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.”8 Obama’s remarks were in sharp contrast to his statements following the 2009 elections and were seen as an important turning point in Iran–US relations.

Rouhani, the Nuclear Negotiations, and Engagement with the United States In the spring of 2013, months before the presidential elections in Iran, secret backchannel talks were held in Muscat between officials from the Islamic Republic and the United States. President Obama directed senior American officials, including Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and

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Vice President Joe Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan, to take part with their Iranian counterparts (not officially clear who was representing Iran).9 Both Javad Zarif and John Kerry, however, were presumably briefed on these discussions before they assumed their positions as Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State respectively.10 The fact must not be lost that the Iranians started taking part in these talks during the presidency of Ahmadinejad who was responsible for expanding Iran’s nuclear program, the increased level of tensions between Iran and major players in the international community, and the decline of Iran’s economy. What this point illustrates is that the Supreme Leader sidestepped Ahmadinejad to engage in these backchannel talks with the United States.11 The secret talks were carried out five additional times in Muscat following Rouhani’s election in June 2013 and led to the revitalization of the nuclear negotiations that started in 2002 between Iran and European countries which repeatedly failed to arrive at a comprehensive resolution for more than a decade.12 Rouhani’s first appearance at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2013 was the most important illustration of this new approach in Iran’s foreign policy and the new administration’s global engagement efforts. Days before his trip, President Rouhani published an article in the Washington Post to reach his intended American audience, and stated that “the world has changed. International politics is no longer a zero-sum game but a multi-dimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously,” and that “World leaders are expected to lead in turning threats into opportunities.”13 In the same vein, Rouhani also spoke directly to the American people (and leaders) through an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour by stating in English that “I bring peace and friendship from Iranians to Americans.”14 Rouhani held bilateral meetings with dozens of world leaders on the sidelines of UNGA, expressed Iran’s interest in resolving the nuclear issue, proposed a resolution at UNGA for a “World Against Violence and Extremism,” and allowed for the first official meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and the US Secretary of State.15 While there was much international suspense for a meeting between Rouhani and Obama, the two leaders, however, agreed that a phone conversation will suffice which in and of itself was the first time the leaders of the two countries spoke in more than 34 years.16 In addition, during a lengthy meeting that was held between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries—China, France, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, plus Germany and the European Union’s

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High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—Zarif and Kerry officialized the months of backchannel talks that were held in Muscat and initiated a 22-month negotiation process with the goal of putting an end to Iran’s nuclear dossier at the UNSC. The mediation efforts by Oman, Rouhani’s determined efforts at resolving the nuclear issue, and the developments at UNGA, set aside more than 30  years of hostilities and allowed for Iranian and American government officials to be in the same room and engage each other in a cordial and constructive manner. These interactions led to a series of talks that took place in Muscat, Vienna, and Geneva in the subsequent months, which resulted in the Joint Plan of Action on November 24, 2013, the interim agreement that was the framework for the comprehensive deal signed later in 2015. The interim agreement guaranteed Iran’s right to develop a full cycle of nuclear energy and promised the lifting of nuclear-­ related sanctions that were imposed unilaterally by the United States and the European Union as well as the multilateral sanctions that were enshrined in a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions. In exchange, Iran agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities above five percent, reduce the number of centrifuges, export the already-enriched uranium and decrease its stockpile, as well as guarantee the complete transparency and supervision of the entire nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the American side, a significant factor was that for the first time since the Islamic Revolution, an American administration recognised a political–religious statement issued by the Supreme Leader as binding for Iranian foreign policy. Following significant progress in the negotiations, President Obama stated on April 2, 2015, that “Since Iran’s Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, this framework gives Iran the opportunity to verify that its program is, in fact, peaceful.”17 The statement referred to as a fatwa was unofficially issued by Khomeini in 1987, orally by Khamenei in the mid-1990s and 2003, and officially publicized by the second Supreme Leader in April 2010 during a speech to the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament that was held in Tehran, in which he considered weapons of mass destruction as un-Islamic (haraam) and forbade the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons.18 This fatwa, a source of a deep debate among scholars and diplomats, had never before been considered a legally binding statement by the United States. Furthermore, President Obama stated shortly after the Geneva Joint Plan of Action was signed,

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that “If Iran seizes this opportunity, the Iranian people will benefit from re-joining the international community, and we can begin to chip away at the mistrust between our two nations,” and further argued using keywords often desired by Iranian officials that “this would provide Iran with a dignified path to forge a new beginning with the wider world based on mutual respect”.19 The intricacy of Rouhani’s engagement in these negotiations was demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Leader tacitly supported the negotiations even though he allowed the critical factions, including elements within the Revolutionary Guards, to express their concerns and opposition to the agreement. Many of those who were critical of the negotiations, dubbed themselves as “those who worry” (delvapasan), constantly expressed their opposition to Rouhani and Zarif’s engagement with the West and particularly the negotiations over the nuclear issue. The infightings were evident from the first days following Rouhani’s inauguration and were intensified after Rouhani’s trip to New York in September 2013. The opposition factions mainly consisted of those loyal to Ahmadinejad, the (neo-) conservatives, and revolutionary figures who view any sort of engagement with the West, and particularly the United States, as a threat to their survival and the durability of the regime. An influential opposition was voiced through the hardline newspaper Kayhan which at one point caused Zarif to be hospitalized and later attend the negotiations in a wheelchair due to severe back pain.20 The fact must not be lost that Rouhani, as explained earlier, is a key figure in the Islamic Republic and naturally has the same concerns for the survival of the regime. Rouhani’s pragmatism with regard to trust-building measures with the United States and constructive engagement with the European countries was arguably aimed at solidifying and strengthening the Islamic Republic at home and abroad. More importantly, any action that deals with major security and foreign policy issues of the Islamic Republic has the official, or often unofficial, approval of the Supreme Leader. As such, and in the face of growing opposition, the Supreme Leader defended and praised the negotiating team, and positively characterized their actions by stating that they are “working, making efforts, breaking sweat … to obtain what is in the interests of the country and the regime.”21 Thus, the assumption that Rouhani’s presidency and global engagement efforts were about to bring a Gorbachev moment in Iran that would lead to the downfall of the Islamic Republic, as some analyst argued, proved to be totally inaccurate.22

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The close-to two years of intense negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program witnessed many peaks and valleys. Aside from domestic opposition, Rouhani and Obama also faced serious challenges by countries not party to the negotiations—namely Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since the start of the official negotiations in September 2013, both Saudi and Israeli officials voiced their disapproval of any future deal with Iran. Stated reasons for opposing the agreement were that the negotiations did not address Iran’s missile program or regional activities.23 However, it was clear that the unstated objective of obstructing the progress of the negotiations was the fear that a rapprochement between Iran and the United States will alter the latter country’s relationships with its traditional allies and partners as well as change the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor. As Aras and Yorulmazlar argue, the Iranian-American détente was “perceived by most of the region’s leaders as a major threat to the existing regional power equations,”24 and according to Mazhar and Goraya, “they don’t want Iran as a player in the region. They want Iran isolated and out of the picture.”25 The Obama Administration was mindful of the concerns put forward by some member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and attempted to reassure these rulers during a Camp David summit months before the JCPOA was finalized. The United States proposed increased military cooperation which was hailed by all GCC countries, and in turn, all six member states welcomed and recognized the JCPOA.26 At the Summit, President Obama also aspired for dialogue and negotiations between the GCC states and Iran, and stated that the “purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran,” arguing that “a key purpose of bolstering the capacity of our GCC partners is to ensure that our partners can deal with Iran politically, diplomatically, from a position of confidence and strength.”27 In parallel to Obama’s efforts, the Rouhani Administration was eager to reinvigorate the Islamic Republic’s relationships with the GCC countries. Rouhani repeatedly expressed his desire for better relations with the GCC countries and acted on his administration’s proposals by travelling to Kuwait and Oman to ease tensions and open the doors for dialogue.28 Additionally, Foreign Minister Zarif actively pursued this approach and, for example, published numerous articles, including one in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “Our neighbours are our priority” soon after the interim agreement was reached on the nuclear issue, stating that “In our interconnected world, the fate of one nation is tied to the destinies of its neighbours.”29

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Such overtures by both Iran and the United States allowed for the easing of some tensions in the Persian Gulf region and the gradual, yet shortlived, acceptance of the nuclear deal by Iran’s southern neighbours. When the JCPOA was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, it was clear that a new era in Iran’s international relations was officially initiated, while at the same time, Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment was recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and established the Islamic Republic as one of the few countries in the region with a peaceful nuclear energy program that is under strict supervision by the IAEA.  The 159-­ page final document, including the core text and five technical annexes, put in place a series of limitations on Iran and at the same time provide a timeline for the relief from sanctions, restrictions, and embargoes that have been imposed on Iran by the United States, European Union, and the United Nations Security Council. While some of the nuclear restrictions will be indefinitely lifted on Iran within the 25-year period, the IAEA’s transparency regulations and supervision of Iran’s nuclear program are also indefinite. The implementation of the JCPOA consisted of a series of steps with clearly defined deadlines, which included ratification by both the Iranian and American legislatures, despite reservations on the part of conservatives in both countries.30 Following the finalization of the agreement on July 14, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA in its entirety, terminated the provisions of the past six UNSC resolutions on Iran, and obliges all UN member states under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and follow the Security Council’s decision. The JCPOA was adopted on October 18, 2015, 90 days following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2231. Meanwhile, the IAEA expressed its satisfaction with the progress and the responses it received from the questions it posed to Iran with regard to unresolved concerns over past activities on August 15 and officially ended the investigation over possible military dimensions on December 15, 2015. Finally, the JCPOA was officially implemented on January 16, 2016, after the IAEA’s announcement that Iran has fully met its commitments outlined in the deal, which allowed for the termination of the application of all nuclear-related sanctions by the United States, EU, and the UNSC. Most importantly, the JCPOA managed to resolve a long-term controversy using multilateral diplomatic tools as opposed to military means. Both Iran and the United States recognized that the nuclear agreement

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was necessary to reduce tensions and move past the more than three decades of hostilities, even though neither party was fully satisfied with the terms of the agreement. President Obama recognised that this was “a deal between states that are not friends,” and that the deal was “not built on trust” but on “verification.”31 Rouhani also said that the deal “was not perfect but it was necessary to compromise,” adding that “it was really difficult to preserve some of our red lines,” but “no one can say Iran surrendered.”32 Simply put, all sides had to make concessions to reach an all-accepting comprehensive agreement. As the implementation of the JCPOA was being announced on January 16, 2016, Iran and the United States agreed to a prisoner exchange which included Iranian-Americans detained in Tehran on charges related to national security and espionage, in exchange for seven Iranians that were detained in the United States on charges related to violation of sanctions. Both sides insisted that the swapping of prisoners was not part of the nuclear negotiations and was a gesture of goodwill to end a source of irritation and open new horizons in bilateral ties. The good mood helped to resolve some non-related issues such as the quick liberation of US Navy vessels and ten sailors, on January 13. After a purported mechanical error that caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters, they were detained by Iranian forces. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari stated that this was an involuntary and non-hostile act which was solved rapidly through discussions by Kerry and Zarif, thanks to the newly established direct diplomatic channels.33 In addition, Iran exported 32  tons of heavy water to the United States at an estimated cost of 8.6 million dollars as part of the agreements pertaining to the JCPOA, a clear illustration of cooperation between Iran and the United States on the nuclear program.34 While there was hope for the betterment of Iran–US relations on other fronts following the implementation of the JCPOA, such hopes, however, did not fully materialize on the ground. Months after the finalization of the JCPOA and just before its full implementation, Iran’s Supreme Leader signaled that diplomatic relations with the United States will not be established anytime soon when he ruled out any further negotiations with the United States and warned that such talks would “open gates to their economic, cultural, political, and security influence” in Tehran.35 Analysts argue that these remarks were primarily prompted by the report that Zarif and Obama shook hands on the sidelines of the 2015 UNGA which

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triggered protests by the delvapasan and those who oppose the JCPOA and re-establishing relations with the United States.36 Furthermore, Iran and the United States once again traded barbs following the announcement by the United States that it imposed new sanctions on individuals and entities tied to the Iranian ballistic missiles program, and in response, Iran tested ballistic missiles on March 9, 2016, which further soured relations. Moreover, as the implementation of the JCPOA was occurring at a sensitive time in American domestic politics and during the heated presidential elections, Iran, and relations with it, was amongst the top foreign-policy talking points of all Democratic and Republican candidates. On March 21, 2016, then-candidate Donald Trump officially announced his intention to terminate the US participation in the JCPOA, by stating that the “number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”37

The Nuclear Deal’s Impact on Rouhani’s Foreign and Domestic Economic Policies In response to the 2012 round of sanctions, Iran adopted the notion of “Economy of Resistance,” a decree by the Supreme Leader to promote economic self-reliance and limit or circumvent the effects of international sanctions. The decree expands on Iran’s already high degree of protectionism and increases its support and advocacy for domestic production, with the objective of lowering dependency on revenues from the export of oil and gas. Moreover, it includes maintaining a positive balance of trade through foreign exchange reserves and export controls and the redistribution of the GDP by reducing the importance of oil revenues in the national budget, while generating growing revenues from taxes and privatization. Additionally, the economy of resistance, which became a hallmark of the Supreme Leader’s domestic economic policies, also aimed to increase the domestic refining capacity to allow Iran to refine petroleum for domestic use and, at the same time, become an exporter of refined crude and condensates and free up gas for exports. These measures continued to dominate the Rouhani Administration’s domestic economic policies all throughout the nuclear negotiations, and most aspects stayed intact following the implementation of the JCPOA in 2016. With the nuclear deal’s implementation and the subsequent removal of nuclear-related sanctions, Iran’s economy underwent some positive changes in 2016 and witnessed a brief era of revival. According to official

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Iranian and international statistics, Iran’s inflation rate dropped in 2016 to single digits for the first time in 25  years, remaining below 9.6 percent throughout the year. This was a major achievement for Rouhani who inherited an inflation rate of 45 percent.38 Furthermore, Iran’s annual GDP growth rate, which reached negative 7.4 percent in 2012, turned around to positive 13.4 percent in 2016, the highest rate since 1990.39 Without a doubt, the prospects of Iran (re)joining the global markets after the implementation of the JCPOA was a major factor in allowing these shifts in key economic indicators. The long-awaited agreement with Airbus that materialized with the landing of the first A-321 in Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport on January 12, 2017, was another important accomplishment for Rouhani as a result of the 2013 interim agreement that lifted the sanctions on Iran’s civil aviation which were in place for decades, barring Iran from purchasing new aircrafts, spare parts, and even refuelling at various international airports.40 In January 2016, during a visit to Paris by President Rouhani, a major contract was signed with Airbus to buy 118 planes worth approximately 27 billion dollars. Negotiations accelerated in October 2016 following the US decision to remove a final impediment for Western aircraft manufacturers to sell planes to Iran under contracts signed after the enforcement of the JCPOA. Iran sealed another deal with Boeing in June for the purchase of 80 passenger planes worth approximately 25 billion dollars, marking the largest US–Iran trade contract since the revolution. In December, the deal with Boeing was finalized and the first plane was expected to be delivered in 2018.41 Another indication of a shift in Iran’s global economic engagement post-JCPOA was the vast number of foreign businesses and tourists that visited the country. In 2016, all high-end hotels in Tehran were sold out due to the massive inflow of foreign companies and investors, and according to official statistics, there was a 200 percent increase in the number of visitors traveling to the country for business and leisure.42 A large number of companies signed preliminary agreements and Memorandums of Understandings with dozens of their Iranian counterparts with the hopes of taking advantage of Iran’s mostly untapped markets. A prime example of these large-scale contracts was in the automobile industry. In June 2013, the French manufacturer Peugeot-­ Citroen signed a joint venture with Iran’s largest automobile manufacturer, Iran Khodro, worth 400 million Euros.43 In parallel, Kia, Hyundai, Renault, Volkswagen, Daimler, and other companies also entered the

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Iranian market full force. Additionally, pharmaceuticals such as Roche and Sanofi, manufacturing corporations like Danielli, food and drink companies such as Nestle, are amongst the dozens of well-recognized multinational corporations that entered the Iranian market. Joint ventures were not just limited to established traditional organizations, but also expanded to investments in Iran’s booming e-commerce platforms, such as the Snapp Group, Iran’s equivalent of Uber. The most important positive impact of the JCPOA on the Iranian economy was the removal of limitations on Iran’s oil and gas exports and the rise in potential international buyers. Furthermore, Iran managed to convince OPEC and non-OPEC member states to free up space for increased Iranian exports in tandem with agreeing to reduce overall production to raise the price of oil in global markets. As a result, Iran managed to produce more than 4.2  million barrels per day (bpd) in December 2016, in comparison to 3.3 million bpd earlier in January, on an average price of 53 dollars per barrel.44 Royal Dutch Shell, for example, restarted its purchases of Iranian crude oil in June 2017, becoming the second major oil company after France’s Total to resume oil imports from Iran post-JCPOA.45 Additionally, various contracts were signed with Total, China’s national oil company CNPC, and Italy’s Eni, amongst others, to expand and develop Iran’s petrochemical infrastructure. While the intent to enter the Iranian market was clear, the vast majority of the aforementioned contracts were not fully materialized due to the ongoing US primary sanctions and the repeated threats to the durability of the agreement stemming from the campaign rhetoric during the US presidential elections by the Republican nominee, Donald Trump, and his supporters in the US Congress. In addition, the vague and unclear nature of directives by the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) during the Obama presidency made decision-making a daunting task for international and multinational corporations wanting to enter the Iranian market. Additionally, while sanctions on Iran’s banking and the limits to its access to SWIFT were lifted following the implementation of the JCPOA and access was reactivated for some 286 Iranian banks and branches; only 25 foreign banks, mainly Asian and smaller international ones, established brokerage links with Iranian entities.46 As such, these short-lived ventures and economic engagements were based more on hopes than tangible outcomes. Furthermore, the Dollar-Rial exchange rate, one of the indicators that directly affects the Iranian population, did not improve drastically in 2016.

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According to Iranian Central Bank information, 2016 started with an official exchange rate of 30,178 IR/1 US dollar (USD), and the year ended with 32,399 IR.47 However, in the first week of January 2017, the free market exchange rate spiked to 39,000 IR/USD, presumably in response to the inauguration of Donald Trump. The other challenging indicator, unemployment, seems to resist policies by the different Iranian governments, and accordingly, it was not significantly impacted by the JCPOA or the prospects of foreign investments following the lifting of sanctions. While in August 2013, when Rouhani’s tenure started, unemployment was at 10.5 percent, in 2016 the rate increased to 12.4 percent, according to non-official data.48 Unemployment has been a key issue in Iranian domestic politics and resolving it has been a priority demand by the Iranian populous. In polls conducted in February and March 2016, just over 50 percent of the Iranian respondents declared that reducing unemployment is the most important issue they care about. As such, the failure to reduce the unemployment numbers and the inability to establish the required number of jobs also damaged Rouhani’s domestic approval ratings as well as increased negative perceptions towards the United States.49 In sum, the Iranian economy did experience a brief era of a somewhat revival thanks to the JCPOA which illustrated an immeasurable potential for development and growth; however, all that was achieved started to fade away following Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections.

Trump’s U-Turn and the Reestablishment of Hostile Relations Since the start of his presidential campaign, and particularly following his address to the Tea Party’s Washington rally in September 2015 titled “End the Iran Deal,” Donald Trump was a fierce critic of the JCPOA and vowed to withdraw the United States from the agreement.50 However, despite the heavy anti-Iranian discourse, which characterised Trump’s presidential campaign, most of the interviewed scholars in Tehran showed relative optimism the first months after he assumed office.51 Some argued that regardless of Trump’s personal approach, the JCPOA involves numerous countries and organizations, and that the United States alone cannot abrogate the deal without triggering a general backlash within the

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international community. Others argued that the common interests that were always present in both American and Iranian positions regarding Al-Qaida, Daesh, and other terrorist groups should help to reinforce, rather than weaken, bilateral Iran–US relations. Trump gave credit to Iran for its role against terrorists in Syria during the presidential debates by stating “I don’t like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS and Iran is killing ISIS.”52 In the same debate, however, Trump also illustrated his disapproval with the JCPOA by bashing Hillary Clinton, arguing that “she made [Iran] strong and Kerry and Obama made into a powerful nation and a rich nation, very quickly, very, very quickly.”53 As soon as Trump took office, his administration was quick to alter President Obama’s post-JCPOA approach towards the Islamic Republic: they included Iran in the list of countries that were banned from travelling to the United States (the so-called Muslim Ban) and implemented a policy of “maximum pressure,” by first putting Iran “on notice,” and imposing new sanctions related to the Iranian ballistic missiles program.54 With countering Iran positioned high on the Trump Administration’s foreign policy, Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections was largely welcomed by some Arab states and Israel, and once again challenged the regional balance of power.55 On the other hand, it can also be inferred that that the United States views Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran’s primary regional adversaries, as important partners in guaranteeing the success of the maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic Republic. Trump’s decision to travel to Saudi Arabia and then to Israel as two legs of his first foreign trip that started on May 20, 2017, the day after Iran’s presidential elections, signalled exactly what many Israeli and Arab leaders hoped for and most analysts predicted: that the United States is no longer interested in peace with Iran and is back at supporting its traditional regional allies and partners to counter Iran’s growing influence around the Middle East and beyond. In turn, the new US led region-encompassing policy had a weighty impact on Iran’s regional posturing, actions, and policy planning, and was the primary reason for the heightening of regional tensions to levels unseen in the past decade. As a result of Trump’s U-turn, Iran once again readopted its anti-­ American posture, evidenced by the harshening of tone by Iranian officials as well as the full-force return of the “Death to America” chants at Friday Prayers.56 Rouhani, for example, stated during a speech marking the 38th anniversary of the Iranian revolution that “Some inexperienced figures in

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the region and America are threatening Iran,” adding that “Our nation is vigilant and will make those threatening Iran regret it … They should learn to respect Iran and Iranians.”57 In the same vein, Zarif also argued during an interview that “the US policy, at least the declared policy, was that they respected the Iranian people and had differences with the Iranian government. Now the current administration unfortunately decided to insult the entire Iranian nation.”58 He also argued that, “Iran is hardly moved by threats. We do not respond well to threats.”59 Trump’s election also had a major impact on Iran’s economy and drastically limited Rouhani’s global economic engagement efforts. While Iran witnessed a peak in its annual GDP growth in November 2016 with rate of 16.5 percent, for example, a decline started a month later following Trump’s inauguration, which reduced the GDP growth rate to 13 percent by May 2017.60 More importantly, the rhetoric from Washington forced hundreds of international companies, investors, and even tourists to abandon their plans to conduct business or travel to Iran, halting dozens of important development and mega-sized projects inside the country.61 Despite the rhetoric and the consequential impact of the new Iran policies, however, the Trump Administration upheld the United States’ JCPOA commitments by renewing sanctions waivers on May 17, 2017, two days before the presidential elections in Iran. This move marked the first time President Trump took a proactive step to implement the deal in the first four months of his presidency, despite the fact that new sanctions were also imposed on Iran’s ballistic missile program on the same day.62 Furthermore, the continuation of US adherence to the JCPOA renewed hopes that President Trump might not live up to its campaign promise to “rip up the Iran Deal.”63 As such, and due to the fact that the wavers occurred so close to the election day in Iran, Rouhani’s campaign on expanding the nuclear deal got a boost and helped secure the required votes to remain as the president of the Islamic Republic for a second term.

Conclusion Iran and the United States started to genuinely and tangibly reach a détente through the renewed nuclear negotiations that started after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and were on the path to initiate the development of a new type of relationship based on mutual respect and diplomatic brinksmanship. The negotiations leading to the JCPOA proved sceptics wrong and put aside close to four decades of animosity that inhibited an

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agreement between Iran and the United States. With the agreement in place, new horizons for Iran–US relations were opened and, for a brief period, prospects for reforming the severed relationship seemed within reach. The fact that Iran and the United States moved past their differences and reformatted the more-than-a-decade-long negotiation process over the Iranian nuclear program, set in motion a sequential agreement that ensures the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the removal of sanctions and restrictions that had been imposed on Iran because of the nuclear issue. The various phases of the nuclear negotiations allowed for the change in posture and perception of the establishment in both Iran and the United States towards one another. On one hand, it was no longer a taboo in Iran to negotiate with the United States, particularly on accepting limitations on the nuclear program. On the other hand, the US acceptance of Iran’s right to the enrichment of uranium as well as the recognition of the fatwas by Iran’s Supreme Leader(s) against the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons as legally binding, changed the course of close-to four decades of US–Iran diplomatic relations. Most importantly, the agreement solved a long-term controversy using diplomatic tools as opposed to military means, an ever-possible scenario. As such, the JCPOA was, and continues to be, considered a diplomatic success, both bilaterally with respect to Iran and the United States, as well as multilaterally considering Iran and the other P5+1 member states. Moreover, at the international level, the mere fact that the agreement was reached in July 2015 also had a lasting impact on the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. The agreement also allowed for the surfacing of Iran on the international stage for businesses and corporations as an untapped market. Rouhani’s pragmatic, foreign policy approach and dedication to ending the nuclear issue, in tandem with Obama’s commitment to solving the issue with Iran, established a new modus operandi for both countries towards one another. Rouhani and Obama did not, however, succeed in further advancing the positive steps that were taken during the nuclear negotiations, and the new horizon that was put in motion thanks to the JCPOA was destined to fail when Donald Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric and threats towards the nuclear agreement started to be amplified from the White House in January 2017. While Obama was no longer in charge and only his legacy was tied to the JCPOA, Rouhani’s fixation on reaching a deal on the nuclear issue to remove sanctions and his visible optimism with regard to the potential positive impacts of the JCPOA, both internally and

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externally, continued to drive the policy making of his administration and was the cornerstone of his campaign’s preparation for the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran. During the presidential debates, Rouhani also promised that he will remove all the remaining sanctions on Iran and vowed to negotiate with the Trump Administration.64 Interestingly, Trump’s antagonism towards Iran did not have a significantly negative impact on Rouhani’s re-election campaign, and ironically, boosted his bid following Trump’s adherence to the JCPOA just days before the Iranian presidential elections. Despite the U-turn following Trump’s inauguration and the scarce visible long-term economic impact for Iran, the JCPOA was, and continues to be, considered as an advantage for Iran for the following reasons: (a) The normalization of Iran’s status at the international stage as a rational and “normal” country, (b) The recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium in accordance with the regulations set forth in the NPT, (c) The removal of sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas exports and the re-entry of Iran into the international energy markets, and (d) Pushing the entire Iranian establishment to implement gradual reforms in economic, political, and social realms. Thus, it is expected that Rouhani will continue to insist on Iranian compliance of the nuclear issue in tandem with pursuing a path to comprehensively end the spat with the United States, including the removal of all primary US sanctions. Rouhani will only be able to pursue this path as long the Trump Administration does not implement non-­ reversible policies that can suffocate the Iranian economy or once again isolate it from the international community. More importantly, a comprehensive and lasting rapprochement can only be possible if Rouhani and his government do not face a serious challenge from hardliners inside the country that can potentially lead to his removal from office.

Notes 1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad got 61% and 63% of votes in his two elections in 2005 and 2009, with 53% and 83% turnout; Mohammad Khatami obtained 70% and 77% with the 80% and 67% turnout in his two terms, 1997 and 2001; Hashemi Rafsanjani got 95% and 62%, but with low turnout, 55% and 50% in 1989 and 1993; Ali Khamenei obtained 95% and 85% with 74% and 53% turnout in the 1981 and 1985 elections; Ali Rajai got 95% of votes in 1981, with 65% turnout; and finally Abol Hassan Bani Sadr obtained 75% of votes with 67% turnout in 1980.

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2. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, p. 7. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants. 3. Bijan Khajehpour, Reza Marashi, and Trita Parsi, “The Problem with Sanctions,” Cairo Review, October 2013, https://www.thecairoreview. com/issues/summer-2013/. 4. Restrictions on trade in several goods: prohibition to export to Iran arms, dual-use goods and goods which could be used in enrichment-related activities; prohibition to import crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical and petroleum products; prohibition to sell or supply key equipment used in the energy sector, gold, other precious metals and diamonds, certain naval equipment, certain software, etc. Restrictions in the financial sector: freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Iran and major Iranian commercial banks, laying down notification and authorization mechanisms for transfers of funds above certain amounts to Iranian financial institutions. Measures in the transport sector: preventing access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights, prohibition of maintenance and service of Iranian cargo aircraft or vessels carrying prohibited materials or goods. Travel restrictions and asset freeze imposed against other listed persons and entities “EU restrictive measures against Iran,” Council of the European Union, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/. “Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 12 https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1943/download?token=fxrcs1uZ. 5. “Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 24. 6. “Iran Indicators.” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/indicators. 7. “Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 25. 8. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Election in Iran. June 15, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/the-press-office/2013/06/15/statement-press-secretary-election-iran. 9. Michael Crowley, “Obama’s Iran Gamble,” Time, September 12, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2158653,00.html. 10. Javad Zarif, as Iran’s former Representative to the United Nations, was involved with the nuclear negotiations since its start in 2002 and it can be inferred that President Rouhani was aware of these developments when he nominated Zarif as his foreign minister. John Kerry, as Senator and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was involved in the decision-­making process with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to hold the secret talks in Oman.

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Additionally, it was only reported after the interim deal was signed in Geneva that John Kerry’s absence in Washington in December 2011 and again in May 2013 were due to the fact that he travelled secretly to Muscat on the request of President Obama to test the waters of Oman’s mediating capacity with regards to Iran. Bryan Bender, “How John Kerry Opened A Secret Channel to Iran,” Boston Globe, November 26, 2013, https:// www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/11/26/john-kerry-developed-secret-dialogue-with-iran-through-oman/rRBZZ8aeDrsP2Q2HdoWJEJ/story.html. 11. Ayatollah Rafsanjani mentions during a speech that the Supreme Leader was the primary architect of the new approach towards the nuclear issue before Rouhani’s election as he wanted to resolve the issue diplomatically, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwwutJkMyI. 12. In 2003, during Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, and after a negotiation with the EU-3 group (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) Iran agrees to meet IAEA demands to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities, ratify the additional protocols, and grant the IAEA broader rights of access to declared nuclear sites. Iran implemented the protocols unilaterally without the Majlis ratification as a good will gesture towards the international community. Once Ahmadinejad assumed office in August 2005, Iran reinitiated the uranium-enrichment activities and brought the agreement to a suspension. 13. Hassan Rouhani, “Time to Engage,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iranhassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html. 14. “Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s President, Hasan Rouhani,” CNN, September 27, 2014, http://amanpour.blogs.cnn. com/2014/09/26/full-transcript-hassan-rouhani/. 15. “United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/68/L.31,” Adopted December 18, 2013, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=A/RES/68/127. 16. Obama and Rouhani both decided on the manner in which they publicized the phone call by agreeing to state that while Rouhani was about to depart his hotel to leave New York, the White House called Iran’s UN ambassador and the two leaders spoke for 15 minutes. See details in Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, “Obama, Iran’s Rouhani hold historic phone call,” Reuters, September 28, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unassembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-call-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928; The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President. September 27, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of fice/2013/09/27/statement-

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president;‫متن کامل سخنان رییس جمهور در جمع خبرنگاران‬, October 2, 2013 http:// www.president.ir/fa/72111; and Rouhani on Twitter: “In phone convo, President #Rouhani and President @BarackObama expressed their mutual political #will to rapidly solve the #nuclear issue.” This tweet replaced an earlier statement in which Rouhani claimed that the phone conversation also ended with Obama saying Khodahafez (Goodbye in Farsi), https:// twitter.com/HassanRouhani/status/383680262539722752?ref_src=tws rc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm% 5E383680262539722752&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian. com%2Fworld%2F2013%2Fsep%2F27%2Fob ama-phone-call-iranian-president-rouhani. 17. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon. April 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/ statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon. 18. Supreme Leader’s Message to International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, April 17, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1287/ Leader-s-Message-to-International-Conference-on-Nuclear-Disarmament. Porter, Gareth, “When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-theayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/. President Obama also mentioned the Fatwa during his speech at UNGA in 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-addressunited-nations-general-assembly. 19. Special Correspondent, “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/12/the-struggle-for-irans-soulobama-zarif-rouhani-khamenei-reformists-hardliners/. 20. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Back Pain Breaks Ice During Iran Nuclear Talks,” Radio Free Europe, October 17, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/irannuclear-zarif-back/25139716.html. 21. ‫ دیدار رهبری مسئوالن و کارگزاران نظام‬,‫نظر رهبری درباره تیم مذاکره‌کننده‌ی هسته‌ای و منتقدین آنها‬, June 23, 2015, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/video-content?id=30061 ‫تیم مذاکره‬ ‫ گله‌ای از دولت ندارم‬/‫ شجاع و متدین هستند‬،‫ غیور‬،‫کننده ایران امین‬, ISNA News Agency, June 23, 2015, https://www.isna.ir/news/94040201442/-‫کننده‬-‫مذاکره‬-‫تیم‬ ‫ای‬-‫گله‬-‫هستند‬-‫متدین‬-‫و‬-‫شجاع‬-‫غیور‬-‫امین‬-‫ ایران‬. 22. See, for instance, Jochen Bittner, “Is Rouhani an Iranian Gorbachev?” New York Times, December 3, 2013; Natan Sharansky, “Is Rouhani the New Gorbachev?” The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2013; and Stephen Kotkin, “Rouhani’s Gorbachev Moment. What Makes a Genuine Reformer?”, Foreign Affairs, November 24, 2013.

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23. David Kenner, “Why Saudi Arabia Hates the Iran Deal,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/14/whysaudi-arabia-hates-the-iran-deal/. 24. Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/toc/14754967/21/4. 25. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Naheed Goraya, “Geneva Deal: Beginning of a New Era Between Iran-US Relations,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (2014). http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/5.%20Naheed%20 S.%20Goraya_29_1.pdf. 26. Remarks by President Barack Obama at A Press Conference after Meeting with GCC Leaders, Camp David, United States, May 14, 2015, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of fice/2015/05/14/ remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-gcc-summit. 27. Ibid. 28. Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Sami Aboudi, “Iran president eyes better ties with Gulf Arabs during trip,” Reuters, February 15, 2017, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-iran-gulf-oman-kuwait-idUSKBN15U0US. 29. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Our Neighbors Are Our Priority,” Ashraq Al-Awsat, November 21, 2013, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/m-zarif/ opinion/opinion-our-neighbors-are-our-priority. 30. The JCPOA was approved by Iran’s Majles famously in 20 minutes, after two months of intense debate in various fractions within the Majles as well as Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. President Obama also managed to secure the support of a Republican-majority US Congress without a single Republican voting in favour of the agreement. The US Senate did not arrive at the required 60 votes to block the implementation of the agreement. “Larijani Explains’s the JCPOA’s Approval Process in the Majles (‫ دقیقه‌‌ای برجام در مجلس‬۲۰ ‫ ”)توضیح الریجانی درباره تصویب‬Tasnim News, May 6, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/02/16/1718218/ ‫مجلس‬-‫در‬-‫برجام‬-‫ای‬-‫دقیقه‬-20-‫تصویب‬-‫درباره‬-‫الریجانی‬-‫توضیح‬. Jennifer Steinhauer, “Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, September 10, 2015, https://www. nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html. 31. Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E., “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/ middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html. 32. “Rouhani Says Nuclear Deal Political Victory for Iran,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/rouhani-nucleardeal-political-victory-iran-150715100849846.html.

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33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Spokesman: US marines entry to Iranian territorial water was not hostile,” Press release, January 13, 2016, https:// ifpnews.com/news/politics/security/spokesman-us-marines-entry-toiranian-territorial-water-was-not-hostile/ ‘‫‘( ’تصمیم‌گیری درمورد تفنگداران آمریکایی بادستور سلسه مراتب خواهد بود‬The decision about the US marines will be taken by the hierarchy’), Mehr News, January 13, 2016, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/3023790/ ‫خواهد‬-‫مراتب‬-‫سلسه‬-‫بادستور‬-‫آمریکایی‬-‫تفنگداران‬-‫درمورد‬-‫گیری‬-‫تصمیم‬. 34. “Deputy FM Cautions US to Remain Loyal to N. Deal,” Fars News, March 8, 2016, http://en.farsnews.com/13941218001208. 35. Special Correspondent, “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015. 36. Parisa Hafezi, “Obama, Iran’s Zarif shake hands in New  York, Iranian official says,” Reuters, September 29, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-un-assembly-obama-zarif/obama-irans-zarif-shake-hands-innew-york-iranian-official-says-idUSKCN0RT0WG20150929. 37. Carol Morello, “Iran nuclear deal could collapse under Trump,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-could-collapse-undertrump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_ story.html. 38. “Consumer Price Index,” Central Bank of Iran, http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx; “Iran Inflation Rates,” Trading Economics, http://www. tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi. 39. “Iran GDP Annual Growth Rate” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual. 40. Luciano Zaccara, “Iran 2016: From the Saudi Embassy Attack to the Demise of Rafsanjani,” Asia Maior, vol. 27. (2016) p.  368 (357–378), https://www.asiamaior.org/the-journal/asia-maior-vol-xxvii-2016/ iran-2016.html. 41. “Iran to Get First Purchased Airbus Aircraft Thursday,” Tasnim News, January 8, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/01/08/1291261/ iran-to-get-first-purchased-airbus-aircraft-thursday. 42. ‫ رزرو شد‬۲۰۱۸ ‫( تمام هتل‌های درجه‌ یک تهران تا پایان سال‬All high-end hotels in Tehran are sold out until the end of 2018), Tasnim News Agency, March 8, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/12/18/1349557/ ‫ش‬-‫رزرو‬-2018-‫سال‬-‫پایان‬-‫تا‬-‫تهران‬-‫یک‬-‫درجه‬-‫های‬-‫هتل‬-‫تمام‬. 43. “PSA signs JV deal with Iran Khodro,” Press TV, June 21, 2016, https:// www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/06/21/471458/PSA-signs-JV-deal-withIran-Khodro.

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44. “Iran crude oil Production,” Trading Economic, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/crude-oil-production; ‘OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report’, OPEC, December 14, 2016, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/ static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/MOMR%20 December%202016.pdf. 45. Rupert Rowling, Angelina Rascouet, and Julian Lee, “Shell Follows Total in Buying Iranian Crude After Sanctions End,” Bloomberg, June 8, 2016, http://businessweekme.com/7921/. 46. See the Iranian Banks’ SWIFT Code list, http://www.swift-code. com/iran. 47. “Foreign Exchange Rate,” Central Bank of Iran, http://www.cbi.ir/ exrates/rates_en.aspx. 48. “Iran Unemployment Rates,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate. 49. From May 2015 to April 2018, the proportion of Iranians who think the economic situation is bad increased from 44% to 72%. For the same periods, the Iranians who believe the economic situation is getting worse grew up from 37% to 64%. Moreover, in April 2018, 43% strongly agreed and 30% somewhat agreed with the statement “the government is not doing enough to help the poor”. On the other hand, the distrust on the United States notably increased, from 45% of Iranians that believed in 2015 that the United States would comply with the JCPOA dropped to just 11% three years later. Finally, the Iranians who considered the US presidential policies were “completely hostile” towards Iran increased from the 42% in December 2016 (Obama) to the 69% in January 2018 (Trump). “Iranian Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections,” Center for International and Security Studies at University of Maryland (March 2016), http:// www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/CISSM-IranPoll%20-%20 Feb%20%20March%202016%20%28Pre%20and%20Post%20election%20 results%20and%20trends%29%20-%20Final.pdf. 50. Nick Corasaniti, “Donald Trump Brings Theatrics to Iran Nuclear Deal Protest,” The New York Times, September 9, 2015, https://www.nytimes. com/politics/first-draft/2015/09/09/donald-trump-brings-theatrics-toiran-nuclear-deal-protest/. 51. Interviews conducted with ten Iranian scholars from Tehran University, Azad University, and Allameh Tabatabaei University in January 2017. 52. “Full transcript: Second 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, October 10, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/2016-presidentialdebate-transcript-229519. 53. Ibid.

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54. Nahal Toosi, and Louis Nelson, “Trump slaps new sanctions on Iran after missile test,” Politico, February 3, 2017, https://www.politico.com/ story/2017/02/iran-sanctions-234604. 55. Robin Wright, “President Trump’s surprisingly warm welcome in the Middle East,” The New  Yorker, November 10, 2016, https://www. newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-surprisingly-warmwelcome-in-the-middle-east. 56. Parisa Hafezi, “Iranian People Chant Death to America in Rally Against President Trump.” Reuters, February 10, 2017, https://www.aol.com/ article/news/2017/02/10/iranian-people-chant-death-to-america-inrally-against-preside/21711346/. 57. Ibid. 58. “Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s foreign minister,” CNN, February 17, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/17/ world/amanpour-zarif-full-transcript/index.html. 59. Ibid. 60. “Iran GDP Annual Growth Rate” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual. 61. In January 2016, the Obama Administration changed the Visa Waiver Program for Europeans and some Asian nationals that had been to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria in the previous five years or if they possess dual citizenship that includes one of those four countries. This regulation was further reinforced in the beginning of the Trump Administration causing many to choose between going to Iran or the United States, aside from having serious repercussions on the daily lives of thousands of Iranian dual nationals. “Been on holiday to Iran? It will make US trips more expensive and stressful,” The Telegraph, January 22, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co. uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/iran/articles/Been-on-holiday-toIran-It-will-make-US-trips-more-expensive-and-stressful/. 62. Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association, Updated April 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/ factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran. 63. Torbati Yeganeh, “Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground,” Reuters, November 9, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-onshaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E. 64. “Rouhani vows to target all US sanctions if re-elected,” Al Jazeera, May 13, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/rouhani-vowstarget-sanctions-elected-170512174313852.html.

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Bibliography Aras, Bulent and Yorulmazlar, Emirhan. “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ toc/14754967/21/4. Bender, Bryan. “How John Kerry Opened A Secret Channel to Iran,” Boston Globe, November 26, 2013. https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/ nation/2013/11/26/john-kerry-developed-secret-dialogue-with-iranthrough-oman/rRBZZ8aeDrsP2Q2HdoWJEJ/story.html. Corasaniti, Nick. “Donald Trump Brings Theatrics To Iran Nuclear Deal Protest,” The New York Times, September 9, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/politics/ first-draft/2015/09/09/donald-trump-brings-theatrics-to-iran-nucleardeal-protest/. Crowley, Michael. “Obama’s Iran Gamble,” Time, September 12, 2013. http:// content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2158653,00.html. Davenport, Kelsey. “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran,” Arms Control Association, Updated April 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/ Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran. Dehghanpisheh, Babak, and Aboudi, Sami. “Iran president eyes better ties with Gulf Arabs during trip,” Reuters, February 15, 2017. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-iran-gulf-oman-kuwait-idUSKBN15U0US. Esfandiari, Golnaz. “Back Pain Breaks Ice During Iran Nuclear Talks,” Radio Free Europe, October 17, 2013. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-nuclear-zarifback/25139716.html. Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E. “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time.” The New York Times, July 14, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/irannuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html?_r=0. Hafezi, Parisa. “Obama, Iran’s Zarif shake hands in New  York, Iranian official says,” Reuters, September 29, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/usun-assembly-obama-zarif/obama-irans-zarif-shake-hands-in-new-york-iranianofficial-says-idUSKCN0RT0WG20150929. Hafezi, Parisa. “Iranian People Chant Death to America in Rally Against President Trump.” Reuters. February 10, 2017. https://www.aol.com/article/ news/2017/02/10/iranian-people-chant-death-to-america-in-rally-againstpreside/21711346/. Kenner, David. “Why Saudi Arabia Hates the Iran Deal,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/14/why-saudi-arabia-hatesthe-iran-deal/. Khajehpour, Bijan, Marashi, Reza, and Parsi, Trita. “The Problem with Sanctions,” Cairo Review, October 2013. https://www.thecairoreview.com/issues/ summer-2013/.

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Mason, Jeff and Charbonneau, Louis. “Obama, Iran’s Rouhani hold historic phone call,” Reuters, September 28, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-un-assembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-callidUSBRE98Q16S20130928. Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem and Goraya, Naheed. “Geneva Deal: Beginning of a New Era Between Iran-US Relations,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (2014). http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/5.%20Naheed%20S.%20 Goraya_29_1.pdf. Morello, Carol. “Iran nuclear deal could collapse under Trump,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/iran-nuclear-deal-could-collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/ f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html. Porter, Gareth. “When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-saidno-to-nukes/. Rouhani, Hassan. “Time to Engage,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassanrouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c9c4293c47ebe_story.html. Rowling, Rupert, Rascouet, Angelina and Lee, Julian. “Shell Follows Total in Buying Iranian Crude After Sanctions End.” Bloomberg, June 8, 2016. http:// businessweekme.com/7921/. Special Correspondent. “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/12/the-struggle-for-iranssoul-obama-zarif-rouhani-khamenei-reformists-hardliners/. Steinhauer, Jennifer. “Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New  York Times, September 10, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the Press Secretary on the Election in Iran. June 15, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/2013/06/15/statement-press-secretary-election-iran. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon. April 2, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/ statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President. September 27, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/27/statement-president. Toosi, Nahal and Nelson, Louis. “Trump slaps new sanctions on Iran after missile test,” Politico, February 3, 2017. https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/ iran-sanctions-234604.

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Torbati, Yeganeh. “Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground,” Reuters, November 9, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trumpiran/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E. United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/68/L.31, Adopted December 18, 2013. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ RES/68/127. United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/68/L.31, Adopted December 18, 2013. Wright, Robin. “President Trump’s surprisingly warm welcome in the Middle East,” The New  Yorker, November 10, 2016. https://www.newyorker.com/news/ news-desk/president-trumps-surprisingly-warm-welcome-in-the-middle-east. Zaccara, Luciano. “Iran 2016: From the Saudi Embassy Attack to the Demise of Rafsanjani,” Asia Maior, vol. 27. (2016) pp. 357–378. https://www.asiamaior. org/the-journal/asia-maior-vol-xxvii-2016/iran-2016.html. Zarif, Mohammad Javad. “Our Neighbors Are Our Priority,” Ashraq Al-Awsat, November 21, 2013. https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/m-zarif/opinion/ opinion-our-neighbors-are-our-priority. Zarif, Mohammad Javad. “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, p.  7. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants. ‫ رزرو شد‬۲۰۱۸ ‫( تمام هتل‌های درجه‌ یک تهران تا پایان سال‬All high-end hotels in Tehran are sold out until the end of 2018), Tasnim News Agency, March 8, 2017. https:// w w w. t a s n i m n e w s . c o m / f a / n e w s / 1 3 9 5 / 1 2 / 1 8 / 1 3 4 9 5 5 7 / ‫شد‬-‫رزرو‬-2018-‫سال‬-‫پایان‬-‫تا‬-‫تهران‬-‫یک‬-‫درجه‬-‫های‬-‫هتل‬-‫تمام‬. ‫ گله‌ای از دولت ندارم‬/‫ شجاع و متدین هستند‬،‫ غیور‬،‫تیم مذاکره کننده ایران امین‬, ISNA News Agency, June 23, 2015. https://www.isna.ir/news/94040201442/ ‫ای‬-‫گله‬-‫هستند‬-‫متدین‬-‫و‬-‫شجاع‬-‫غیور‬-‫امین‬-‫ایران‬-‫کننده‬-‫مذاکره‬-‫تیم‬. ‫ دیدار رهبری مسئوالن و کارگزاران نظام‬,‫نظر رهبری درباره تیم مذاکره‌کننده‌ی هسته‌ای و منتقدین آنها‬, June 23, 2015. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/video-content?id=30061. ,‫متن کامل سخنان رییس جمهور در جمع خبرنگاران‬, October 2, 2013. http://www.president. ir/fa/72111 ‘‫‘( ’تصمیم‌گیری درمورد تفنگداران آمریکایی بادستور سلسه مراتب خواهد بود‬The decision about the US marines will be taken by the hierarchy’), Mehr News, January 13, 2016. h t t p s : / / w w w. m e h r n e w s . c o m / n e w s / 3 0 2 3 7 9 0 / ‫خواهد‬-‫مراتب‬-‫سلسه‬-‫بادستور‬-‫آمریکایی‬-‫تفنگداران‬-‫درمورد‬-‫گیری‬-‫تصمیم‬. “Been on holiday to Iran? It will make US trips more expensive and stressful,” The Telegraph, January 22, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/iran/articles/Been-on-holiday-to-Iran-It-will-make-UStrips-more-expensive-and-stressful/. “Consumer Price Index,” Central Bank of Iran. http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx.

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“Deputy FM Cautions US to Remain Loyal to N.  Deal,” Fars News, March 8, 2016. http://en.farsnews.com/13941218001208. “EU restrictive measures against Iran,” Council of the European Union. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/. “Foreign Exchange Rate,” Central Bank of Iran. http://www.cbi.ir/exrates/ rates_en.aspx. “Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s foreign minister,” CNN, February 17, 2017. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/17/world/ amanpour-zarif-full-transcript/index.html. “Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s President, Hasan Rouhani,” CNN, September 27, 2014. http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/09/26/ full-transcript-hassan-rouhani/. “Full transcript: Second 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, October 10, 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/2016-presidential-debatetranscript-229519. “Iran crude oil Production,” Trading Economics. http://www.tradingeconomics. com/iran/crude-oil-production. “Iran GDP Annual Growth Rate” Trading Economics Online Database. https:// tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual. “Iran Indicators.” Trading Economics Online Database. https://tradingeconomics. com/iran/indicators. “Iran Inflation Rates,” Trading Economics. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ iran/inflation-cpi. “Iran to Get First Purchased Airbus Aircraft Thursday,” Tasnim News, January 8, 2017. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/01/08/1291261/iranto-get-first-purchased-airbus-aircraft-thursday. “Iran Unemployment Rates,” Trading Economics. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate. “Iranian Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections,” Center for International and Security Studies at University of Maryland (March 2016). http://www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/CISSM-IranPoll%20-%20 Feb%20%20March%202016%20%28Pre%20and%20Post%20election%20 results%20and%20trends%29%20-%20Final.pdf. “Larijani Explains’s the JCPOA’s Approval Process in the Majles (‫توضیح الریجانی‬ ‫ دقیقه‌‌ای برجام در مجلس‬۲۰ ‫ ”)درباره تصویب‬Tasnim News, May 6, 2017. https:// w w w. t a s n i m n e w s . c o m / f a / n e w s / 1 3 9 7 / 0 2 / 1 6 / 1 7 1 8 2 1 8 / ‫مجلس‬-‫در‬-‫برجام‬-‫ای‬-‫دقیقه‬-20-‫تصویب‬-‫درباره‬-‫الریجانی‬-‫توضیح‬. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Spokesman: US Marines entry to Iranian territorial water was not hostile.” January 13, 2016. https://ifpnews.com/news/ politics/security/spokesman-us-marines-entry-to-iranian-territorial-waterwas-not-hostile/.

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“OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report,” OPEC, December 14, 2016. http://www. opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ MOMR%20December%202016.pdf. “President Obama’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/ remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly. “PSA signs JV deal with Iran Khodro,” Press TV, June 21, 2016. https://www. presstv.com/Detail/2016/06/21/471458/PSA-signs-JV-deal-withIran-Khodro. “Remarks by President Barack Obama at A Press Conference after Meeting with GCC Leaders,” Camp David, The United States, May 14, 2015. https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of fice/2015/05/14/ remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-gcc-summit. “Rouhani Says Nuclear Deal Political Victory for Iran,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/rouhani-nuclear-deal-politicalvictory-iran-150715100849846.html. “Rouhani vows to target all US sanctions if re-elected,” Al Jazeera, May 13, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/rouhani-vows-target-sanctionselected-170512174313852.html. “Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p.  12. https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1943/ download?token=fxrcs1uZ. “Supreme Leader’s Message to International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament,” April 17, 2010. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1287/Leader-s-Message-toInternational-Conference-on-Nuclear-Disarmament.

CHAPTER 5

The Sectarian Divide in Iran–Saudi Relations Shahram Akbarzadeh

Introduction The arrival of Hassan Rouhani in office (2013) offered the possibility of a new chapter in bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Rouhani was elected president at a time of significant regional crisis. Relations between the two regional heavyweights had deteriorated markedly following the 2011 Arab uprising. The Iranian leadership, with the firebrand President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in office, welcomed the Arab uprising as an extension of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and pledged to support it. At a regional conference, convened in Tehran under the rubric of Islamic Awakening, Ahmadinejad praised Arab masses for trying to follow the path of the revolution in Iran. These self-congratulatory statements reached their zenith when the first elected President of Egypt in the post-­ Mubarak era, Muhammad Morsi, visited Iran in August 2012 to attend the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Morsi’s credential as a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt won him many friends in Iran. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was seen as undeniable evidence that

S. Akbarzadeh (*) Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_5

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history was on the side of revolutionary Islamism, a mantra that Ahmadinejad was keen to uphold. But this view of history put Iran at odds with Saudi Arabia (and ironically with Morsi). Saudi Arabia has long viewed the Muslim Brotherhood with outright hostility and suspicion. Despite the Brotherhood’s Sunni orientation, it has ideologically represented a challenge to the Kingdom’s self-entitled leadership over the Sunni world. From an historical perspective, the Brotherhood’s support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait has not been forgotten in the Persian Gulf. For Iran, its anticipation at the prospect of an Islamic awakening was short-lived. After Morsi assumed power over Egypt, his administration was quick to back the Syrian opposition against Iran’s key strategic ally, Bashar al-Assad. Saudi Arabia viewed Iran’s approach to the Arab world to be destabilising and seriously dangerous. Iran’s propaganda against ruling Arab sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, its support for the increasingly belligerent President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and its growing influence in the post-­ Saddam Iraq were a source of serious concern in Riyadh. In 2013, Saudi politician and prince, Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, stressed the need to address Iranian influence in the region. ‘This must end’, he demanded. ‘Saudi Arabia will oppose any and all of Iran’s interference and meddling in other countries’.1 From the Saudi point of view, this was not new in essence. Iran had been criticised for its patronage of Hezbollah in Lebanon and for pursuing an expansionist policy throughout the Middle East. The Arab uprising brought these concerns ahead. According to Saudi Arabia, Iran leveraged social and political turmoil in the Arab world to pursue its expansionist ambitions at the expense of Saudi interests. The Saudis accused Iran of pursuing its policies by providing patronage for Shi’a actors and undermining Sunni regimes. This was a well-rehearsed charge. In 2004 King Abdullah of Jordan had famously coined the term, the Shi’a Crescent, to warn of Iran’s growing influence among the Shi’a population in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq which toppled Saddam Hussein and facilitated a significant change in the political fortunes of the Shi’a majority.2 In post-Saddam Iraq, Iran had many friends amongst Shi’a groups. The sectarian depiction of Iran’s regional policy has proven difficult to dismiss. Iran’s regional partners are Shi’a. The only Sunni actor that enjoyed Iran’s support, the Palestinian Hamas, broke relations with Tehran following Iranian support for Assad. In the Arab world, the Syrian war has become widely seen as a Shi’a–Sunni sectarian conflict. This reflects the Saudi perspective. By the time Hassan Rouhani

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came to office in August 2013, Iran’s image in the region was already tarnished with a sectarian brush. President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif started the post-Ahmadinejad era with a keen awareness that Iran’s image in the region, and internationally, needed urgent attention. The key message delivered by the Rouhani and Zarif team was positive engagement with Iran’s immediate neighbourhood.3 This strategy was to distance Iran from the populist rhetoric of Ahmadinejad. Regional engagement was aimed at complementing Rouhani’s pursuit of a nuclear deal with global powers. Pacifying Saudi Arabia and reducing tension between the two states occupied a special place in Rouhani’s regional strategy. In his first press conference as president, Rouhani spoke of his hope to engage with Riyadh as a ‘neighbour and brother’, making sure to mention Saudi Arabia’s important emotional appeal as the house of Islam’s holiest sites.4 Rouhani is also said to have been proud of the fact that he was a signatory to the 1998 security agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the first between the two states.5 This message of reconciliation was echoed by the Foreign Minister Zarif while touring the region only months since coming to office. Zarif deliberately reached out to Saudi Arabia and called for collaboration between the two regional powers. This revealed an acknowledgement in Tehran that bilateral tension could undermine Rouhani’s attempt to bring Iran out of isolation. Zarif stated: We believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia should work together in order to promote peace and stability in the region … Our relations with Saudi Arabia should expand as we consider Saudi Arabia as an extremely important country in the region and the Islamic world.6

Zarif pressed on the same theme in other opportunities. In mid-2015, he published a piece in a number of Arabic language media to call for regional dialogue, highlighting the need for a collaborative approach to counter ‘terrorism, sectarianism and extremism’.7 He later continued this charm offensive in relation to Saudi Arabia and remarked: we are after advancing friendly relations with our Saudi Arabian friends … We and Arabs in the region are in one ship, and if this ship sinks, everyone will drown together, and there is no one that will save us.8

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But relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have continued to deteriorate. Despite Rouhani’s agenda of tanesh-zedai (reducing tensions) in the region, the Saudi view of Iran as a source of instability has not only persisted but has become even more pronounced. Subsequent developments, such as the Iran nuclear deal, the execution of the Shi’a cleric Nimr alNimr in Saudi Arabia, the war in Yemen and the crisis in Saudi–Qatar relations have aggravated tensions between Tehran and Riyadh. The Rouhani administration is no closer to repairing ties between the two countries than the day he came to office in 2013. While the sectarian factor may be an easy explanation for the deteriorating relations, applying a geo-strategic lens may be more revealing. It is argued in this chapter that Saudi Arabia, especially under the leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz since 2015 sees Iran as an intolerable challenge to Saudi influence and prestige in the region. The risk Iran poses to Saudi Arabia has become even more pronounced as its regional ally in Syria has defied expectations and continued to fight for survival. Riyadh anticipates Iran to be emboldened by Assad’s survival and to gain greater audacity in its foreign policy. This concern with Iran has emerged as a top priority in Riyadh, overshadowing some of the traditional fault-lines (most notably the Arab-Israeli divide). In its efforts to put Iran back in the box and limit its regional role, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly accused it of pursuing a sectarianism agenda. This charge is expected to resonate with the Sunni majority Middle East and bolster the Saudi claim of speaking for all Muslims. The explanatory power of this accusation, however, is limited. It overestimates the significance of Shi’a identity as a source of foreign policy in Tehran and ignores the fact that Saudi Arabia itself has a sectarian affinity with some of the most destabilising Sunni groups in the region. This chapter examines three key areas of tension in Iran–Saudi relations: Islamic ideology, relations with the United States and the question of Muslim leadership. It is argued that these intersecting factors have defined bilateral relations since the 1979 revolution in Iran, but are increasingly overshadowed by attention-grabbing headlines on sectarianism. Presenting this regional rivalry between the two states as a primordial conflict between two early sects of Islam overlooks the real-world consideration for both states that is closely tied to their image and ability to expand their influence and soft power in the Muslim world, and ultimately provide security for the state.

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Iran’s Ideological Challenge to Saudi Arabia The Iran–Saudi rivalry dates back to the Iranian revolution. Saudi Arabia presents itself as leader of the Sunni Muslim world based on it religious credentials of being the protector of Islam’s two holiest places, Mecca and Medina. Iran on the other hand, is home to 90 percent of the world’s Shi’a population and follows the Twelver School of Shi’a Islam. Shi’ism constitutes a minority sect in Islam. However, Tehran from the onset has been acutely aware of the potential limitations this holds and thus purports that its revolutionary brand of Islamism represents the interests of the entire Muslim ummah (community). Moreover, central to Iran’s revolutionary message is resistance to oppression, which has appealed to many Muslim communities across the Islamic world. Iran’s challenge to Saudi Arabia is not in traditional security terms. Iran’s military was depleted during the eight-year war with Iraq (1980–1981). While Iran has recovered from the devastation of that war, years of sanctions have meant that the Iranian military hardware remain outdated. As defence analyst expert Anthony Cordesman has observed, ‘Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry’.9 Iran has tried to compensate for this by boosting the sheer number of troops. But this tactic is highly unlikely to offer Iran an edge. The tactic of sending human waves against Iraqi posts in the protracted Iran–Iraq war simply bogged down the Iraqi advance. It is seriously doubtful that any such tactic could help in any future conflict in the region. Iran does not have the military hardware, or the support infrastructure to project military power beyond its borders.10 At the same time, Saudi Arabia has benefitted from significant arms sales from the United States and also the European states.11 A 2017 report revealed that Saudi Arabia has become the number one destination for arms sales for Europe.12 Furthermore, the United States has made repeated commitments to Saudi’s security against external threats. This has been articulated by successive US administrations, including that of President Barak Obama which was viewed in Riyadh as being soft on Iran. The US commitment to Saudi security has been reiterated by President Donald Trump, leaving no doubt that Washington sees Saudi Arabia as a key partner against Iran. In spite of this clear power imbalance between the two regional protagonists, Saudi Arabia remains on edge. The Saudi unease has more to do with the political challenge emanating from Iran than any tangible military threats.13

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Iran’s political challenge was articulated very early in the 1980s as the new Islamic Republic sought to present itself as a model state to be emulated by others in the region. The ruling regimes in Iraq and Saudi Arabia were the primary targets of the most venomous propaganda. Saudi Arabia represented everything that the revolution had destroyed in Iran: a monarchy with close ties with the United States. But the Saudi dynasty also had an explicit claim on Islam, which gave it a potent advantage. This meant that the Iranian propaganda could not stop at accusing the Saudi regime of not representing the wishes of Muslims and being beholden to foreign interests; it had to discredit the Saudi claim on Islam. The Iranian commitment to discrediting the Saudi dynasty was spearheaded by the founder of the new regime in Iran. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini famously ridiculed Saudi rulers as ‘palace dwellers’, notorious for flaunting their wealth, conspicuous consumption, cosy relations with the US, and—most damning—for their ‘false piety’.14 For Khomeini, there was nothing Islamic about the Saudi regime. He rejected that dynastic rule could be consistent with Islamic law.15 In his will, Khomeini castigated King Fahd as propagating the ‘anti-Qur’anic religion of Wahhabism—this utterly unfounded and superstitious cult—thereby attracting ignorant people and nations towards the superpowers and taking advantage of noble Islam and the Holy Qur’an’.16 The message of discrediting Saudi rulers and their Wahhabi practices of Islam has been echoed by other Iranian leaders. In 1990, the speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karroubi17 proclaimed that the Saudis advocated an Eslame Amrikaee (‘American-style’ Islam) which was a departure from the ‘genuine Islam of the Prophet’.18 This charge against Saudi rulers has remained a consistent feature of Iranian propaganda. The current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is on the record for calling the Saud family ‘sinful idols of arrogance and colonialism’.19 Anti-Saudi rhetoric has remained a stock-in-­ trade of Iranian regime, with Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani in 2007 decrying the Wahhabi sect for making ‘Islam and Muslims appear horrible to the rest of the world’ and accused the Saudis of attempting to bring the region under a ‘Wahhabi yoke’.20 This message has been amplified even more in Tehran following the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which shares ideological underpinnings with Wahhabi Islam. Despite Rouhani’s efforts to find a circuit breaker, the intensity of conflicts in the region and the threat that ISIS posed to Iran has kept tensions high. Iran sees an ideological affinity between Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia and the extremism of ISIS. Iran elevated its accusation of Saudi support

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for extremism after the June 2017 terrorist attacks, which saw Iran struck by twin attacks.21 ISIS claimed these attacks and justified them as retaliation for Iran’s support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria.22 Iran saw in this echoes of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia who famously declared that Iran is like a snake in the region and exhorted the United States to ‘cut off the head of the snake’.23 Now ISIS appeared to be attempting just that by launching terrorist attacks on the Iranian parliament and the shrine of Imam Khomeini. Iran’s act of sectarian coupling to present Saudi Arabia and ISIS as two bodies cut from the same cloth has only aggravated the situation, but neither side appears prepared to step back. This means that both sides are ready to accuse the other of interference in their internal affairs and sowing discord. The explosion of spontaneous unrest across Iran in December 2017 and January 2018 saw Iran blame Saudi Arabia and the United States for instigating unrest.24

The US Factor Anti-Americanism has been a constant feature of the Iranian state since 1979. At the time of the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini galvanised popular support as a fervent Iranian nationalist and anti-American stance against the authoritarian, pro-US, ruling Pahlavi dynasty. For Khomeini, the world was dominated by imperialist powers, headed by the US, the ‘Great Satan’, which sought to oppress the weak (Mustazafin) to exploit their resources.25 This narrative tied in neatly with Iranian experiences of imperialism under the Shah. Popular discontent towards the United States was embodied by the 1979 hostage crisis, which saw a group of Iranian students storm the US embassy in Tehran and hold 56 US citizens hostage for 444 days. Khomeini’s unwillingness to compromise dealt a serious blow to the Islamic Republic’s international standing. Indeed, it marked the beginning of Iranian isolation. The crisis ushered in widespread condemnation against Iran, the drafting of UN Security Council resolutions calling for the release of hostages and a series of US economic sanctions against Iran and the freezing of Iranian assets.26 Domestically, the event led to a fracture within Iran’s revolutionary leadership. The Islamic Republic’s first Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, pursued an end to the hostage crisis and repairing the damage to relations with the United States. However, he was met with a fierce domestic rebuff and forced to resign.27 In the proceeding decades, Iran–US relations continued to plummet. Washington’s support of Iraq during its war against Iran, the continued

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use of US economic sanctions against Iran, US President George W. Bush’s 2002 declaration that Iran ‘constitute an axis of evil’ in response to its nuclear program, and the antagonistic relationship between US President Bush and Ahmadinejad only stood to inflame tensions. The inauguration of US President Barack Obama (2009) and Iranian President Rouhani (2013) significantly altered the dynamics of Iran–US relations. Rouhani pledged to bring Iran out of international isolation, while Obama expressed a willingness to engage with Iran. These efforts culminated in the signing of the landmark nuclear deal in 2015. Nevertheless, ‘American’ or Amrikaee remains a barbed insult that is a stock-in-trade of the Iranian leadership, slung at any practice or anybody that is deemed to diverge from the Iranian vision of revolutionary Islam. As Shahram Chubin has argued, Iran’s regional policy is heavily influenced by its attitude towards the United States and its presence in the Middle East: ‘confronting the US and the US-sponsored regional order has been an Iranian core interest since its inception’.28 As noted earlier, Iran’s conservative leadership readily threw the Amrikaee insult against Saudi Arabia soon after the revolution, but recent developments have given it more force. The war in Syria has put Saudi Arabia and the United States (as well as other regional players) in the opposite camp of Iran and Bashar al-Assad. This alignment is further strengthened by the Saudi opposition to Iran’s nuclear deal which the new American President Donald Trump lambasted as a bad deal. The Saudi– US partnership gains even greater notoriety from Iran’s point of view when noting that Israel has also been a vocal advocate of scrapping the Iran nuclear deal and has commenced talks with Saudi Arabia on developing a common strategy against Iran. Reports of secret talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel were a source of embarrassment for Riyadh as the official Saudi position has been to withhold formal relations with Israel until the latter’s withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.29 Iran’s nuclear deal, however, presented Saudi Arabia with a more urgent challenge which overrode the historical concern with the cause of Palestine. The Saudi decision to side with Israel and lobby President Trump for the annulment of the nuclear deal offered the Iranian leadership a perfect propaganda tool to reiterate its charge against Saudi Arabia as betraying Islam and Muslim interests. The Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei did not mince words when he accused Saudi rulers of committing ‘treason’ against Muslims by aligning themselves with the United States and Israel.30 The convergence of interests between Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United

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States (especially under the Presidency of Donald Trump) is not new. As Fredric Wehrey noted nearly a decade ago, Washington saw Saudi Arabia as a natural counterweight to Iran in the region.31 This analysis still holds true today. President Trump made that point clear in his public attacks on Iran while visiting Saudi Arabia in May 2017. During his visit to Saudi Arabia, which involved a sword dance with members of the Saudi royal family, President Trump endorsed the Saudi view of Iran and declared: From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fuelled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror. It is a government that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing the destruction of Israel, death to America, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room. Until the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of conscience must work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism, and pray for the day when the Iranian people have the just and righteous government they deserve.32

President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 was a victory for the Saudi and Israeli lobbyists. The convergence of interests between Washington, Riyadh and Tel Aviv serves to vindicate the Iranian claim that the United States and its regional allies are circling to silence the voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran and trample on Muslim interests. The history of American support for tyrannical regimes in the Middle East (from Egypt to the deposed Shah of Iran) and the Israeli occupation of Muslim lands (including the third holiest site of Islam in Jerusalem) feed into this narrative. The Saudi decision to prioritise Iran as a threat over Israel and ISIS and break the taboo to side with Israel, and the US, feeds into Iran’s worldview which asserts the Islamic Republic of Iran to be the true champion of Muslim interests globally and dismisses other Muslim actors as charlatans. In this worldview the leadership role for the Muslim world falls naturally on Iran. Saudi Arabia’s close relationship with the United States and Israel undermines its claim to leadership of the Muslim world.33

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Leadership Iran sees itself as a natural leader in the region. This idea relies on the twin pillars of revolutionary Islamism that gave birth to the first popular Islamic state in modern times and a sense of history. Iran sees itself as a ‘natural state’ with thousands of years of history, a favourable comparison with most of its neighbours—notably with Saudi Arabia’s ‘artificial, post-­ colonial construction’.34 Ray Takeyh contests that ‘a presumption of greatness and sense of superiority over its neighbours’ is a key feature of Iran’s thinking.35 Under the Islamic Republic, this sense is couched in terms of revolutionary Islamism, with cliché references to Iran acting as a beacon for other Muslim societies to follow. Yet, the translation of Iran’s revolutionary brand of Islamism into foreign policy has differed greatly among Iranian presidents. For example, reformist President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) advocated a liberalised Islam to accommodate for the demands of modern day society. While Khatami recognised Iran’s historical-­cultural identity as a pillar of its foreign policy, he also stressed the need for engagement with the outside world. Khatami recognised Western civilisation as the dominant force of the international system and pledged that if ‘Iran wants to make progress it needs to deal with this entity’.36 To fulfil these aspirations Khatami initiated the Dialogue for Civilisations in 1998, which was endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2001.37 Khatami’s initiative received widespread support for stressing the need to bridge the gap between the Muslim and Western worlds, a need which became more pronounced after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Khatami’s successor Ahmadinejad ushered in a radically different foreign policy approach. Indeed, the election of hardliner Ahmadinejad in 2005 was, in part, due to fears of an encroaching US presence in the region, exacerbated by regime change in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Ahmadinejad proclaimed Iran’s nuclear program as a national right to defend its territorial integrity. This irked the United States and further isolated Iran from the international community. Like Khatami, reformist President Rouhani assumed power on a policy platform to bring Iran out of isolation. His foreign policy agenda centred on rebuilding Iran’s economy, a feat which in Rouhani’s view, could only be achieved through the lifting of sanctions, which necessitated engagement with the West and the United States. Iran’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries, including the United States, was hailed a landmark achievement by Rouhani and his reformist administration. However,

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Iran’s conservative leadership criticised the deal for undermining Iranian dignity and alluding Iranian subservience to the United States. The Rouhani government argued that the deal allowed Iran to ‘blossom’ by gaining its rightful place within the community of nations and recovering economically.38 The subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of sanction on Iran was a significant setback for the Rouhani government and his foreign policy agenda. Yet, Iran has not given up on its self-image of a natural regional leader. This assumption permeated a piece penned by Foreign Minister Zarif for an international audience in 2014. Zarif argued that ‘since antiquity’, Iran has ‘enjoyed a preeminent position in the region and beyond’ due to its ‘landmass and unique geographic position along the east-west transit route’.39 He further noted that ‘Iran’s civilization and cultural heritage have remained intact’—giving Iran an added advantage. ‘Any objective analysis of Iran’s unique attributes would highlight the country’s worthiness to play a prominent regional and global role’.40 According to Zarif, Iran’s vision and regional responsibilities were ‘embedded in its constitution’. While Zarif did not include a direct reference to Saudi Arabia in his piece, the inference was blatantly clear. The Iranian challenge to Saudi claims to leadership found a sharp focal point in the wake of the hajj disaster in September 2015. Over 2000 pilgrims were crushed to death during a stampede at 2015 hajj, among them many Iranian nationals. This incident led to questions about safety measures and crowd management in Saudi Arabia. Iran spearheaded the barrage of criticism, accusing the Saudis of incompetence and mismanagement.41 In the following year, Iran continued to challenge Saudi Arabia for its handling of the disaster, with the Iranian Supreme Leader suggesting that the Muslim world should ‘fundamentally reconsider the management of the two holy places and the issue of hajj’.42 This challenge hits at the heart of the Saudi view of itself as the rightful custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites. It is noteworthy that the Saudi leadership adopted this title in the wake of growing Iranian criticism of Wahhabism as American Islam. The new title was the Saudi response to reassert its Islamic credentials and remind the Muslim world of the Arabian Peninsula as the birthplace of Islam. In that narrative, the Saudis’ role in preserving and protecting Islamic holy sites was a significant contribution to all Muslims. This was to serve as the moral and religious foundation for Saudi Arabia’s claim to leadership in the Muslim world.

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Threat Assessment Saudi Arabia sees Iran as a source of significant threat to its stability, a perspective that has been reinforced by Tehran’s perceived role in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. This assessment may be exaggerated as it overestimates Iran’s capacity and willingness to project power in Saudi Arabia’s backyard. But that does not make the threat assessment any less urgent for Riyadh. Internally, Saudi Arabia has been very sensitive to challenges to its political legitimacy, a favourite topic for the Iranian leadership. This concern is more pronounced in relation to the Shi’a minority population of Saudi Arabia. As Toby Mattheisen has argued, Riyadh has been suspicious of their loyalty and has imposed limitations on the Shia’s ability to secure positions of influence within the Saudi regime.43 This suspicion is fed by frequent calls from Iran on behalf of disadvantaged communities, which is code for the economic and political plight of the Shi’a population in Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, the 2012 anti-government protests were painted by Saudi Arabia and the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family along sectarian lines. Despite genuine Shi’a grievances of marginalisation within the Bahraini state, Iran was accused of mobilising the Shi’a population to overturn the Sunni monarchy. The depth of these fears was revealed by the deployment of Saudi security forces to crush protests in Bahrain, under the cover the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreements. An act which was justified by Riyadh and Manama as necessary to protect the GCC’s sovereignty from a meddling Iran. Riyadh’s state execution of prominent Shi’a religious leader Sheykh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in January 2016 for his political opposition to the Saudi regime served as another flashpoint in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. News of this execution ignited a series of protests in Iran, which included attacks on Saudi diplomatic mission in Mash’had and the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Chanting ‘down to al-Saud’, the protests served to vindicate the view in Saudi Arabia that Iran pursued an expansionist policy in the region and was directly targeting Saudi Arabia for sedition and revolution. In response, Saudi Arabia, alongside Bahrain and Sudan, cut their diplomatic ties to Iran. While this view has been a constant feature of the Saudi perspective for decades, the leadership change in Riyadh has aggravated tensions and elevated the crisis. In January 2015, Salman bin-Abdulaziz succeeded to the throne and appointed Adel Al-Jubeir as his foreign minister and his son Mohammad bin Salman as defence minister. Both men were outspoken critics of Iran and not bound by the cautious approach that characterised

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the Saudi position in the past. The new leadership deemed decisive action on Iran as necessary against the backdrop of nuclear talks and a growing disillusionment with President Obama’s strategy of negotiating with Iran. From Riyadh’s point of view, Washington was ready to betray Saudi security interests to make a deal with Iran and this meant that Saudi Arabia could not take US support for granted. This called for a more assertive Saudi foreign policy to protect its interests. The palace coup of 2017 that elevated Mohammad bin Salman as Crown Prince next in line to the throne has consolidated this new regional assertiveness. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is widely noted by observers in two regional flashpoints. In Syria, Iran has made no secret of its efforts to bolster the Assad regime. Syria is a linchpin of Iran’s regional policy. Syria offers Iran a land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and allows the Iranian leadership to maintain its anti-Israel posture through its alliance with an Arab state that has not signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Saudi role in Syria is less evident, but is assumed to have been in the form of financial support for the US-backed Free Syria Army.44 In Yemen, the reverse is true. Saudi Arabia has been directly involved in the civil war to reassert the authority of the loyal presidency of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was pushed out of office by Houthi rebels. The prospects of Houthi dominance in Yemen presented a security challenge to Saudi Arabia as it put Saudi territory within the range of hostile Houthi troops and also presented a threat to Saudi maritime activity in the Red Sea. Yemen sits at the mouth of the Red Sea and has the potential to disrupt the shipping lines. This threat assessment led to a major military mobilisation and the first-ever direct military operation for Saudi Arabia to reinstall the Saudi-­ friendly Hadi as president and push back Houthi rebels who were accused of being sponsored by Iran. The Saudi military operation in Yemen has highlighted the significance of the threat from Riyadh’s point of view. Tehran on the other hand has denied military and financial support for the rebels and has instead blamed the ongoing crisis on Riyadh.45

Conclusion While the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is conveniently described as sectarian in nature by many observers, that explanation masks more worldly dynamics. Both states aspire to a regional leadership role and refer to their history, culture, religion and geography to justify that claim. Iran sees the continuous Persian civilization and its ideology of revolutionary

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Islamism as giving it natural authority and prestige. Iran carefully manages a persistent position in relation to the United States and Israel to protect its claim of being a revolutionary vanguard for the global ummah (Muslim community). This claim is central to Iran’s self-perception and enshrined in its constitution. Protecting Muslim interests globally is a cherished foundation bloc of Iran’s foreign policy. Iran prides itself for its consistent anti-Israel position and points to its support for Hezbollah and Hamas as evidence of its commitment to stand up for Muslim interests, a claim that puts many Arab states in a bad light. Iran’s claim to regional leadership, therefore, is presented in ideological terms aimed at appealing to all Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. This revolutionary posturing also serves to discredit other regimes in the region for their failure to champion Muslims interests. The Saudi regime has been the target of a torrent of denunciation from Tehran for its close ties with the United States and reluctance to challenge Israel. The consequence of Iran’s revolutionary posturing, however, has won Iran difficult relationship with its neighbours and a hostile attitude in the United States. The threat of regime change, aired by the George W. Bush administration following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the stationing of US troops on either side of Iran fed into the official Iran-versus-the-­ United States narrative and reinforced the threat perception in Tehran. Against this backdrop, Iran invested in its allies to ensure that it could compensate for its limitations in conventional power by bringing an asymmetrical factor into the equation. Investing in the Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as the Shi’a militia in Iraq, served the double purpose of Iranian propaganda in terms of consolidating the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the terror threats emanating from ISIS, as well as allowing Iran to warn off the United States (and Israel) against military action on its soil. From Riyadh’s point of view, however, these actions are aimed at destabilising the region and expanding Iranian influence. Furthermore, this expansionism has a strong Shi’a flavour as beneficiaries of Iranian patronage in the region tend to be Shi’a. The Saudi leadership has been uncomfortable with the message of the Iranian regime for decades and has accused Iran of driving a sectarian agenda. But it was under the new leadership since 2015 and concerns with President Obama’s willingness to find rapprochement with Iran that Riyadh’s apprehension escalated significantly. The Saudi position is a mirror image of Iran’s. The Saudi leadership wishes to guard its self-­proclaimed status as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites in the Arabian Peninsula, as the

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patron of Islam globally. The external benefits of this stature for Saudi Arabia are obvious as it pushes for authority and allegiance among Muslim states. But there is also an internal aspect to the Saudi agenda aimed at silencing dissent which targets the political and religious legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty. This threat perception, internally and externally, is tied with Iran’s posturing and just as the Iranians seek to delegitimize the Saudis by labelling them as ‘American’, the Saudis seek to discredit Iran as a sectarian regime with an agenda that is harmful to the Sunni majority in the Middle East and beyond. The sectarian label does not have explanatory powers to make sense of the underlying fault-lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It simply masks deep state anxieties and leadership aspiration. This is not to say that sectarian affiliations do not matter. Indeed, repeated references to Shi’a and Sunni loyalties tend to harden differences and offer a convenient, albeit misleading, lens to interpret the rivalry between the two regional powers.

Notes 1. Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy,” Middle East Policy, 20 (4), 2013, pp. 38–39. 2. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran,” Washington Post, December 8, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html. 3. Payam Mohseni, “Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, August 2015, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Impact%20on%20 Arab%20World%20-%20Web.pdf. 4. Mahmood Monshipouri and Manochehr Dorraj, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape,” Middle East Policy, 20 (4), 2013, pp. 133–147. 5. Ibid. 6. “Zarif asks Saudi Arabia to work with Iran,” Al Jazeera, December 3, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/zarifasks-saudi-arabia-work-with-iran-2013122154323461970.html. 7. “Iran FM calls for cooperation with Arab Gulf neighbors,” Al Araby, August 3, 2015, http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/8/3/ iran-fm-calls-for-cooperation-with-arab-gulf-neighbours.

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8. Arash Karami, “Iran calls for dialogue with Saudi,” Al Monitor, October 15, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/zarifiran-saudi-talks.html. 9. Anthony H Cordesman, “The Conventional Military,” The Iran Primer, August 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/conventional-military. 10. Stephen Walt, “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republicof-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/. 11. Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Daniel Byman, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), 2001, p. 8. 12. “EU Nations Sell the Most Arms to Saudi Arabia,” The Spiegel, March 19, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-makes-controversial-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-822288.html. 13. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-oil Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 14. Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 132. 15. Henner Fürtig, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy,” Middle East Journal, 61 (4), 2007, pp. 627–640. 16. Ruhollah Khomeini, “Last Will and Testament” (1989), http://www.alislam.org/imam-khomeini-s-last-will-and-testament. 17. In 2009, Mehdi Karroubi suffered the ire of the conservative leadership for his role in the 2009 anti-government protests, later denoted as the Green Movement. In 2011, he was placed under house arrest in which he remains. For more see Chan, Sewell, “Mehdi Karroubi, Iranian Cleric Under House Arrest, Quits Political Party”, The New York Times, December 23, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/world/middleeast/mehdikarroubi-iran-national-trust-party.html. 18. Kayhan, June 28, 1990; cited in Takeyh, p. 133. 19. Kayhan, July 6, 1989, cited in Takeyh, p. 133. 20. “Ayat Azam Makaram, “Nouri va Safi dar mahkoumiyat e fatway e muftihaye Saudi,” (Translated: Grand Ayatollahs Makaram, Nouri, and Safi Condemn Fatwas Issued by Saudi Clerics) Iranian Student News Agency, July 23, 2007. 21. The June 7, 2017 terrorist attacks against Iran resulted in the death of 12, while injuring 42. For more info on attacks see Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Islamist militants strike heart of Tehran, Iran blames Saudis,” Reuters, June 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-security-idUSKBN18Y0HV. 22. Bethan McKernan, “Tehran attacks: Iran parliament gunman ‘detonates suicide vest on fourth floor,” The Independent, July 7, 2017, https://

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www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/tehran-attacks-iranparliament-suicide-bomb-vest-gunman-shooting-explosiona7776556.html. 23. Ross Colvin, “‘Cut off head of snake’ Saudis told U.S. on Iran,” Reuters, November 29, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wikileaksiran-saudis/cut-of f-head-of-snake-saudis-told-u-s-on-iran-idUSTRE6AS02B20101129. 24. Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell, “9 killed overnight in Iran as Khamenei points finger at Saudis, US,” Boston Globe, January 2, 2018, https://www. bostonglobe.com/news/world/2018/01/02/iranian-official-blamesunited-states-saudi-arabia-for-stoking-unrest/dV6pfTyLSnnypeM9k92WGL/story.html. 25. Raymond Hinnebusch, The international politics of the Middle East (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), p. 214. 26. David Patrick Houghton, US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Vol. 75, p. 106. 27. Nicholas Cumming Bruce, “Bazargan Government Resigns in Iran,” New York Times, November 7, 1979, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/politics/1979/11/07/bazargan-government-resigns-in-iran/ e4360d7c-31ba-4cd0-9cbb-4649d24f50f2/?utm_term=.101ddba71bfd. 28. Shahram Chubin, “Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated,” Gulf Papers (Gulf Research Centre, 2012), p. 3. 29. Jeffrey Heller, “Israel has held secret talks with Saudi Arabia over Iran threat, says minister,” The Independent, November 20, 2017, https:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-saudi-arabiasecret-talks-iran-threat-middle-east-yuval-steinitz-benjamin-netanyahucrown-a8064566.html. 30. “Iran’s Supreme Leader accuses Saudi Arabia of committing ‘treason’ against Muslims with US alliance,” The Independent, January 17, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-saudiarabia-treason-accusation-muslims-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-donald-trumpjerusalem-israeli-a8163306.html. 31. Frederic Wehrey, Saudi Iranian relations since the fall of Saddam: rivalry, cooperation, and implications for U.S. policy (Santa Monica: Rand, 2009), pp. 3–4. 32. Donald Trump, “US President Donald Trump’s Saudi speech – full transcript,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 22, 2017, https://www.smh. com.au/world/us-president-donald-trumps-saudi-speech-full-transcript20170522-gw9wkm.html. 33. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2nd edition, 2010, p. 131.

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34. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), p. 5. 35. Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 2. 36. Shabnam J.  Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 111. 37. UNESCO, “Dialogue Among Civilizations,” 2001, http://unesdoc. unesco.org/images/0012/001238/123890E.pdf. 38. Ariane M. Tabatabai and Annie Tracy Samuel, “What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” International Security, 42 (1), 2017, p. 117. 39. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era”, Foreign Affairs, 93 (3), 2014, p. 52. 40. Ibid. 41. “Iran nearly doubles its death toll from Hajj stampede,” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/iran-doubles-death-toll-hajj-stampede-151001073425842.html. 42. “Iran Suggests Saudi Arabia Should Not Run Haj,” Reuters, September 5, 2016, https://thewire.in/world/ iran-suggests-saudi-arabia-should-not-run-haj. 43. Toby Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 44. Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzojan, “U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, January 23, 2016, https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavilyon-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html. 45. “Guards chief rejects Trump ‘slander’ that Iran behind Saudi missile,” Reuters, November 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudimissiles-iran-trump/guards-chief-rejects-trump-slander-that-iran-behindsaudi-missile-idUSKBN1D50QD.

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archive/politics/1979/11/07/bazargan-government-resigns-in-iran/e436 0d7c-31ba-4cd0-9cbb-4649d24f50f2/?utm_term=.101ddba71bfd. Chan, Sewell. “Mehdi Karroubi, Iranian Cleric Under House Arrest, Quits Political Party.” New York Times, December 23, 2016. https://www.nytimes. com/2016/12/27/world/middleeast/mehdi-karroubi-iran-national-trustparty.html. Chubin, Shahram, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Daniel Byman. “Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (2001): 8. Chubin, Shahram. “Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated.” Gulf Papers, Gulf Research Centre (2012): 3. Colvin, Ross. ““Cut off head of snake” Saudis told U.S. on Iran.” Reuters, November 29, 2010. Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Conventional Military.” The Iran Primer, August 2015. http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/conventional-military. Fürtig, Henner. “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy.” Middle East Journal, 61 (4), (2007): 627–640. Heller, Jeffrey. “Israel has held secret talks with Saudi Arabia over Iran threat, says minister.” The Independent, November 20, 2017. Hinnebusch, Raymond. The international politics of the Middle East. Manchester University Press, 2010. Holliday, Shabnam J. Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance. London: Routledge, 2016. Houghton, David Patrick. US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis. Cambridge University Press, 2001. Iranian Student News Agency. “Ayat Azam Makaram, Nouri va Safi dar mahkoumiyat e fatway e muftihaye Saudi.” (Translated: Grand Ayatollahs Makaram, Nouri, and Safi Condemn Fatwas Issued by Saudi Clerics) July 23, 2007. Karami, Arash. “Iran calls for dialogue with Saudi.” Al Monitor, October 15, 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/zarif-iransaudi-talks.html. Karimi, Nasser, and Jon Gambrell. “9 killed overnight in Iran as Khamenei points finger at Saudis, US,” Boston Globe, January 2, 2018. Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Last Will and Testament.” 1989. http://www.al-islam. org/imam-khomeini-s-last-will-and-testament. Mabon, Simon. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. Matthiesen, Toby. The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Mazzetti, Mark and Matt Apuzzojan. “U.S.  Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels.” New York Times, January 23, 2016. https://www. nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudimoney-to-support-syrian-rebels.html.

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McKernan, Bethan. “Tehran attacks: Iran parliament gunman ‘detonates suicide vest on fourth floor.’” The Independent, July 7, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/tehran-attacks-iran-parliament-suicidebomb-vest-gunman-shooting-explosion-a7776556.html. Mohseni, Payam. “Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era.” August 2015. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Monshipouri, Mahmood and Manochehr Dorraj. “Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape.” Middle East Policy, 20 (4), (2013): 133–147. Reuters. “Guards chief rejects Trump ‘slander’ that Iran behind Saudi missile.” November 6, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-missiles-irantrump/guards-chief-rejects-trump-slander-that-iran-behind-saudi-missileidUSKBN1D50QD. Tabatabai, Ariane M., and Annie Tracy Samuel. “What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” International Security, 42 (2017): 117. Takeyh, Ray. Guardians of the revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press, 2009. Trump, Donald. “US President Donald Trump’s Saudi speech – full transcript.” May 22, 2017. https://www.smh.com.au/world/us-president-donaldtrumps-saudi-speech-full-transcript-20170522-gw9wkm.html. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-oil Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. UNESCO. “Dialogue Among Civilizations”, 2001. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0012/001238/123890E.pdf. Walt, Stephen. “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria.” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteriairan-middle-east-trump/. Wehrey, Frederic. “Saudi-Iranian relations since the fall of Saddam: rivalry, cooperation, and implications for U.S. policy.” Rand Corporation (2009): 3–4. Wright, Robin and Peter Baker. “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran.” Washington Post, December 8, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html. Zarif, Mohammad Javad. “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era.” Foreign Affairs, 93 (3), (2014): 52.

CHAPTER 6

Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era Edward Wastnidge

Introduction When Hassan Rouhani came into office in 2013, he was confronted with a rapidly developing crisis engulfing not only its long-standing ally, Syria, but also its neighbour and close ally, Iraq. The lightning advances of the so-called Islamic State group across Syria and Iraq during 2014 prompted Iran’s biggest military engagement since the Iran–Iraq war. Iran’s close relationship with Syria stems from Tehran and Damascus having a shared strategic outlook regarding key regional issues such as the plight of the Palestinians and maintaining a presence in Lebanon. There is also a strong defensive element in the Islamic Republic’s thinking towards the Syrian civil war, with Iran seeking to maintain its position in the region. Iran’s relationship with Iraq has its foundations in the sanctuary provided to Shi’i opposition groups that took refuge in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s

E. Wastnidge (*) Open University, Milton Keynes, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_6

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rule. With the ouster of Saddam, and the subsequent installation of a friendly government there representing Iraq’s Shi’i majority, Iran gained a significant ally. As both states became theatres of conflict, Iran sought to defend its allies against the extremist threat posed by what it refers to as ‘takfiri’ groups, such as the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda, something seen as a direct threat to its own national security as well. Thus, it sees itself as being on the front line of its own ‘war on terror’, and during Rouhani’s tenure has actively engaged diplomatically and militarily in the two interlinked conflicts in Iraq and Syria. This chapter takes each state in turn, starting with Syria.1 It gives brief explanations for the foundations of Iran’s relationships with Syria and Iraq, before going on to explore the active support for each governments’ war efforts. In doing so, it highlights the religious overlay, or justification, that has characterised Iran’s military engagements during Rouhani’s first term in office. It shows that Iran’s most extensive military engagement since the Iran–Iraq war has been undertaken with its own security and that of its key allies in mind, as the Islamic Republic looks to maintain its strategic depth in the region.

Syria Foundations The relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Assad dynasty has its roots in the sanctuary that Hafiz Al-Assad provided to members of the Iranian opposition who were seeking the ouster of the Shah during the 1970s.2 As in the present day, Lebanon provides a key link between the two countries, and while the religious element has arguably not been a determining factor in the Iran-Syria alliance,3 it does play a significant role in linking Iran and Syria via the shared value that both place on Lebanon’s Shi’i community. Ayatollah Khomeini was also offered asylum in Syria after he was exiled from Iraq in 1978.4 The historical confessional linkages and connections made in the pre-revolutionary era by key figures in the Islamic Republic such as Mostafa Chamran, were also to become crucial in Iran’s establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon.5 The Iran–Syria axis is an alliance that has strengthened and acquired greater institutional depth over the last 37 years, as both states face perceived common threats from Israel and the United States and see themselves as part of an Axis of Resistance in the Middle East. To this end, the alliance has been characterised by scholars as being primarily defensive in nature.6 As will be noted in

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the following section, the commitment to upholding the resistance has since been repurposed to have a broader remit than just Israel, and provides a continued narrative justification for Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict during the Rouhani era. At the core of the Iran–Syria relationship lie common views on a number of key foreign policy issues dating back to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Shared interests vis-à-vis Iraq and Lebanon, relations with key external powers such as Russia and the United States, and opposition to Israel are the most important. In the post-Saddam era of chaos and conflict that has plagued Iraq since 2003, Iran and Syria have again found common cause there. Though some analysts sought to emphasise how Tehran–Damascus ties stagnated as Iran’s ties with Iraq expanded post-2003,7 the arrival of the Islamic State group onto the world scene further deepened the impetus for cooperation. Consequently, Iran–Iraq interdependence has increased due to the ongoing Syrian crisis—with Iraq acting as potential bridge between the two,8 as discussed in the second half of this chapter. The three states, along with Russia, have been involved in intelligence sharing since September 2015, as they seek to unify their effort against Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq.9 A key area where Iran–Syria ties were cemented historically has been with regard to Lebanon, and most notably Iran’s Levantine ally, Hezbollah. Iran’s desire to protect its interests in Lebanon, in the form of Hezbollah, is a  part of the  reason for its continued involvement there.10 Having a strong Hezbollah in Lebanon served Syria historically as a check on Israeli aggression and also reduced Tel Aviv’s room for manoeuvre in Lebanon. For Iran, the benefit is clear, in that it has a forward base against an entity to which it is ideologically opposed. It is with this thinking in mind that Iran, Syria and Hezbollah see themselves as constituting an Axis of Resistance against Israeli, and by extension US, aims in the region. Until the Syrian conflict, Israel and the United States had also been the two biggest existential threats to both Syria and Iran, so a common front against them naturally reinforced their defensive alliance. The Syrian Civil War and Iran’s Involvement When the uprising against Assad began in 2011, it was widely viewed within the context of the Arab Uprisings that were sweeping across the region, challenging the autocratic order there. For Iran, these unprecedented changes were viewed through the prism of an ‘Islamic Awakening’,

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with Khamenei stating “after years of selfless efforts, the people of Iran can now witness the reflection of their oppressed, yet powerful yell in the events of North Africa, especially in Islamic Awakening of the people of Egypt and Tunisia.”11 This was a narrative that allowed the Islamic Republic to claim a sense of solidarity with ‘the people’ of the region over their unjust rulers—and Iran’s leaders saw the uprisings as drawing inspiration from their own revolutionary experience in deposing the Shah. However, with its Syrian ally, the Iranian perception of the uprising took on a different hue, with the Islamic Republic fully cognisant of the need to maintain one of its most vital alliances in the region. As a result, the Islamic Republic has sought to present the Syrian conflict as part of a wider conflict against terrorism, something that has gained further traction with the rise of the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq in 2014. Militarily, it has gone from vague acknowledgement of an advisory role, and providing rhetorical support to Assad in the early years of the conflict, to one of open military involvement in recent times—particularly in the organisation and training of armed multinational Shi’i groups. As will be discussed below, Iran has also added a religious overlay to justify its involvement and undertake the facilitation of Shi’i volunteer forces fighting in the conflict. This is not to view its activities through the sectarian lens in which its involvement is often presented in media analyses, but rather it has more to do with securing domestic legitimacy amongst the Islamic Republic’s core support for their continued role in Syria and maintaining its strategic depth in the region. The mutual fear and loathing of the United States (and Israel) has helped the alliance endure,12 and the immediate geopolitical concerns of securing Iraq and maintaining the strength of Hezbollah have been key strategic reasons for Iran’s continued support of a country that shares its desire for resistance. In narrow realist terms, Hezbollah serves Iran’s interests due to its ability to strike at Israel, and therefore acts as a deterrent against potential Israeli strikes against Iran. This was particularly useful for Iran during the confrontation over its disputed nuclear programme, where the threat of Israeli pre-emptive action loomed large. Though this threat was reduced due to the nuclear deal with Iran, it remains necessary for the Islamic Republic to maintain a powerful deterrent on Israel’s borders. The Iran-Hezbollah  relationship is not purely uni-directional, however. As  Saad argues, the relationship between them is an alliance borne not only from their shared ideological roots, but also through Tehran’s reliance on Hezbollah's  increasing  role as a ‘regional subpower’.13 This is

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illustrated by the signifcant role that Hezbollah played in supporting Assad in Syria. According to Slim,14 Iran relied on Hezbollah operatives to track evolving military developments in Syria, and was involved in training Syrian paramilitaries in early days of uprising. For Hezbollah itself, maintaining the link with Iran is key, and its engagement in Syria can be seen in terms of its desire to protect itself from the extremist threat,  and its increasing role as a regional power in its own right. Iran needs an accommodating ally in Syria to maintain its conduit to Hezbollah, and having a key Arab state as an ally in an increasingly fractious Middle East, where Arab interests are being shaped by its main rival Saudi Arabia, remains important for Iran too. Tehran naturally has concerns about any potential replacement of Assad by Saudi  or Turkish-­ backed, anti-Shi’i Islamists within the Syrian opposition.15 For Iran, Syria is a vital cog in its wider aims in the region, and this explains the lengths to which it has gone to support it. This was made abundantly clear when prominent cleric Mehdi Taeb stated that “Syria is the 35th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us … if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.”16 Syria has also gained increased importance as a theatre for the wider rivalry with Saudi Arabia in the region. Iran sees Saudi backing of Wahhabi groups as fuelling instability in the region. In a 2016 op-ed for the New  York Times, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif claimed: “The fanciful notions that regional instability will help to ‘contain’ Iran, and that supposed rivalries between Sunni and Shiite Muslims are fuelling conflicts, are contradicted by the reality that the worst bloodshed in the region is caused by Wahhabists fighting fellow Arabs and murdering fellow Sunnis.”17 The rise of the Islamic State group, particularly its presence in Iraq is also a key concern, where it constitutes a serious existential threat to the Islamic Republic. This further drives Iran’s involvement across both Syria and Iraq, as defeating the group will protect and help sustain its influence in both capitals. Tehran views both conflicts through a defensive lens, and is trying to maintain the post-2003 status quo,18 which has seen its influence in the region grow despite the tightening of the sanctions regime against it. This status quo sees Tehran maintaining close ties with friendly governments in Iraq and Syria and the provision of continued support for Hezbollah and the Palestinian cause. As a result, there has been something of a ‘repurposing’ of the Axis of Resistance, widening it as an alliance against the threat posed by Islamic State and other Sunni militant groups in the region. Iran views itself as victim of sectarianism in the region,

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seeing a Salafist conspiracy that has been enabled by the United States,19 and this adds further impetus to its active engagement in Syria as part of its own ‘war on terror’. Iran’s interests in Syria run deep and are the key reasons for its material support for Assad, both economically and militarily. The economic support has manifested itself in vital trade agreements that have helped sustain the Syrian economy through the war. Notable actions prior to Rouhani taking office include Iranian assistance in providing the means for Syria to circumvent Western powers’ embargo against Syrian oil exports,20 and three successive loans to help shore up the Syrian economy. The first $1 billion loan was arranged in January 2013 to pay for imported food commodities and replenish the government’s foreign reserves.21 The second was an agreement in May 2013 to extend credit lines for oil products worth $3.6 billion that provided badly needed financial support to Assad,22 while a further $1 billion loan was extended to Syria in May 2015.23 The Syrian conflict has been Iran’s most prominent combat role since the Iran–Iraq war. Iran began its involvement through advising Assad on how to deal with the anti-government protests in 2011, before working with Hezbollah to deepen its involvement and subsequently dispatching members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) elite Quds Force, in an advisory role to Syria.24 The Iranian narrative in the first few years of the conflict primarily revolved around its establishment of the Syrian National Defence Forces (NDF), a paramilitary group modelled on its own Basij militia. Precise numbers are difficult to determine both in terms of the number of Iranian forces operating in such roles and the manpower of the NDF themselves. Speaking in October 2015, IRGC commander-in-chief Mohammad Ali Jafari said the NDF had some 100,000 fighters, and that he had been personally involved in their training.25 Iran has sent a good portion of its Quds Force, including key senior commanders such as Qassem Soleimani, to Syria, and in March 2016 announced that members of its regular ground forces were also now serving as advisors there.26 Indeed, the IRGC can be seen as having far greater agency than Rouhani’s government in Syria. Akbarzadeh and Conduit have noted how the IRGC managed to largely sideline Iran’s political leaders in increasing their military support for Assad,27 particularly following the UN’s withdrawal of Rouhani’s invitation to the Geneva II peace talks in 2014, thus showing the limits of presidential power in Iran.

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The Religious Overlay Perhaps Iran’s most significant involvement has been in its organization and training of Shi’i volunteer fighters. This is where Iran has applied something of a religious overlay, in part arguably to strengthen domestic support amongst its core constituencies for its support of Assad. Although the alliance has ostensibly little to do with confessional linkages between Iran and Syria, the religious card has proven to be of significant advantage to Iran in securing its Syrian ally. Although Syria’s Shi’i population, in terms of adherents to Twelver Shi’ism as practiced in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, is nominal, Damascus is home to the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab, the daughter of the first Shi’i Imam, Ali, and also granddaughter of the Prophet, and hence a revered figure in Shi’ism. The cultural diplomacy enacted by Iran towards Syria in relation to such shrines helps further reinforce the relationship.28 Making use of its transnational religious networks, Iran has facilitated the insertion of volunteers into the conflict from Shi’i communities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon. It has also encouraged its own citizens to volunteer in the defence of Shi’i shrines. For example, in encouraging members of Iran’s Basij to volunteer, IRGC Major General Rahim Nowi-Aghdam stated: “If you do not volunteer to fight in Iraq and Syria, I will go myself, and I will martyr myself in the defence of Sayyidah Zaynab or the Shi’i shrines in Iraq.”29 Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has also crafted a similar narrative to garner support among Hezbollah’s Lebanese constituency, noting that for Hezbollah, their involvement in Syria was borne of a duty to defend Shi’i shrines in Syria from the takfiris (extremists).30 Viewing Iran’s involvement in the conflict through purely religious or even sectarian lens is simplistic, however. As Sadeghi-Boroujerdi has recently argued “The historical development of post-revolutionary Iran’s security policies, which are intimately intertwined with its espousal of asymmetric ‘strategies of opposition’, has often taken the form of financial and military support for politically responsive co-sectarians.”31 The invoking of religious duty remains a useful asset for the Islamic Republic, however, and chimes well with its core revolutionary values. Media outlets in Iran affiliated with the IRGC have hailed the Iranian dead in Syria as selfless individuals driven by religious conviction.32 Iran’s facilitation of such volunteer forces from across the Shi’i world is pitched in terms of its role as a vanguard in the fight against Sunni extremist groups, namely Islamic State. In early 2016, IRGC’s head Mohammad Ali Jafari noted: “The

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current developments in the region, the formation of Daesh [Islamic State] and Takfiri groups, and the events that occurred in the past years are paving the ground for the emergence of Imam Mahdi, and you can now see the positive results in the readiness of nearly 200,000 young armed in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen”33 adding that Iran had trained fighters within and outside Iran to defend the Axis of Resistance.34 This strategy comes right from the centre of power in Iranian politics, approved by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who has the final say on Iranian foreign and security matters. It is based on a strong defensive mindset that typifies the Iran–Syria alliance, one that is now enhanced by the threat of militant Sunni groups operating in Syria and Iraq, with Khamenei stating that “If they were not stopped, we would have to fight them in Kermanshah and Hamedan,”35 thus directly linking Syria’s security with that of Iran. In 2016, retired IRGC General Mohammad Ali Al Falaki also stated that a ‘Shi’i Liberation Army’ had been formed in Syria to organise foreign Shi’i volunteers under then-Quds Force head Qassem Soleimani’s leadership.36 This is a stronger claim for involvement than previous Iranian statements on its role in facilitating Shi’i volunteer forces in the conflict. For example, Iran has previously denied its involvement in forming the Liwa Fatemiyoun,37 a fighting force operating in Syria that is drawn largely from Afghanistan’s Shi’i community and Afghan refugees residing in Iran.

Iraq Foundations Until the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran’s relations with its western neighbour had historically been fraught with difficulty. Geopolitical competition, border disputes and fear of Iraqi Shi’a receptivity to the message of Iran’s Islamic Revolution led to Iraq’s invasion of Iran and a brutal eight-year war claiming over a million lives. The repression of Iraqi Shi’a by Saddam resulted in hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees fleeing to Iran, from which came opposition figures who went on to play a key role in Iraq’s post-Saddam political future. The present Iran–Iraq relationship, largely characterised by good relations and close security cooperation since the fall of Saddam, has its foundation in the ties that Tehran has cultivated with Shi’i political parties in Baghdad. Groups that formerly took sanctuary in Iran during Saddam’s rule—such as the Dawa party and the Supreme

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Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, have become a valuable avenue of influence for Tehran in the post-Saddam era. Following the US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s position toward its neighbour evolved from one of extreme scepticism at the US presence there to one of sensing an opportunity for influence as the post-invasion political landscape in Iraq began to take shape. Thus, as the United States became bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire, Iran went from viewing Iraq as a possible launching point for US hostility against it to seeing it as hosting an embattled occupying force in a country in which it had huge influence.38 Iran has developed considerable economic ties with Iraq since 2003, and by the time Rouhani came to office, Iraq was the second biggest export market for Iranian goods, after China.39 Previous sticking points in relations, such as the demarcation of the contested Arvandroud/Shatt al-Arab waterway between the two countries have been resolved, with both countries agreeing in 2014 to finally fully implement the 1975 Algiers Accord.40 Iran also has deep cultural ties with Iraq due to the latter’s custodianship of two of Shi’ism’s holiest sites—the shrines of Imams Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala respectively. This shared cultural history and religious identity has been reinforced over the centuries, with shrine visits helping to foster networks of people, charitable giving and commerce, and the numbers of pilgrims have increased dramatically since 2003. With increasing numbers of Iranian pilgrims visiting Iraq each year,41 Iranian investment has been encouraged in Iraqi shrine cities,42 and they provide a powerful incentive and justification for Iran’s interest in a secure and stable Iraq. This is not to assume that Iran–Iraq relations are purely shaped by sectarian considerations, and it is erroneous to assume that the Shi’a constitute a monolith that are in thrall to Iranian interests, but a religious overlay acts as a useful means of garnering support for Iranian engagement in Iraq, particularly in light of its role in fighting the Islamic State group there. However, the Islamic Republic is fully cognisant of the dangers that pursuing an overtly sectarian agenda poses to Iran and the region. To this end, it was keen early on to present its assistance to Iraq in broader terms, as shown by Rouhani’s acknowledgement of Iran’s role in Iraq in 2014: “Iran has taken huge steps to safeguard security and stability in the region … The Islamic Republic … has had the greatest contribution in saving the people of Iraq—in [Iraq’s] south, west, east and north—its Kurds, its Sunni-dominated [areas], Shi’i-dominated [cities] in the whole country. Iran has rendered greatest service to establish relative security and stability in Iraq.”43

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The Islamic State Group in Iraq and Iranian Involvement Iran’s engagement with Iraq over the last four years has been largely based on maintaining its own security and enhancing its strategic depth in the Middle East, not least in trying to secure a viable land corridor to its allies in Syria and Lebanon. As Rouhani came to power, the emphasis had already begun to shift from a focus on countering US interests in Iraq to confronting the rise of Sunni extremist groups there. Walsh notes how relations between Iran and Iraq were aided by the arrival of the Islamic State group and domestic political developments within Iraq. Iran was aided by a more friendly government coming to power in Iraq, with Iranian allies replacing Sadrists and more secular-minded parties in government from 2014.44 Subsequently, the narrative emanating from key Iranian figures aimed at confronting the extremist threat and tying Iraq’s security to Iran’s own. As with Syria, Rouhani’s own foreign policy agency has been somewhat superseded by the active role of the IRGC in Iraq. However, his position as the elected head of government gave him international diplomatic standing that he used to promote the counter-­ extremism message to a global audience. Starting with his first speech to the UN General Assembly in 2013, Rouhani sought to build on former president Mohammad Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilisations initiative as a tool of international diplomacy,45 in proposing a ‘World Against Violence and Extremism’ (WAVE). The resultant WAVE conference that took place in Tehran the following year was characterised by the Iranian criticism of Western complicity in helping the Islamic State group undermine Iraqi (and Syrian) security.46 The conference also brought the Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers together for discussions over Iran’s role in combating Sunni extremist groups, and was notable for then-Iraqi Foreign Minister, Ibrahim al Jafari, giving Iraqi consent for Iran to carry out air strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq.47 Rouhani’s 2014 UN General Assembly address was also key in articulating Iran’s view on combating the threat posed by the Islamic State group, his speech coinciding with their rapid gains across Iraq. In his speech, Rouhani positioned Iran as a vital partner in fights against extremist forces in the region. He emphasised the need for a regional solution to the crisis, but also castigated Western intelligence agencies who, as he put it “placed blades in the hands of mad men.”48 Rouhani also grouped himself alongside the so-called moderate regional leaders, noting that they served as the true face of moderate Islam in the

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region; in doing so, he was holding himself and his administration up as vanguards of an anti-IS ideological and political bloc.49 He also noted that the ongoing nuclear talks could serve as the beginning of greater multilateral strategic co-operation in the region, paving the way for Iran to play a role in combating violence and extremism in co-ordination with its neighbours.50 Iran also upped coordination with the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government during this period, brokering energy cooperation deals and was the first external government to provide weapons and ammunition to the Peshmerga as part of the fight against the Islamic State group.51 Iran’s decision to engage militarily in Iraq coincided with the United States ramping up its involvement in the fight against Islamic State, resulting in a common  enemy to both. Senior Iranian military figures were quick to dampen the speculation of cooperation with the United States in Iraq, with the Deputy Chief of Staff of Iran’s Joint Armed Forces, Seyyed Masoud Jazayeri accusing the Americans of creating the Islamic State group and ruling out any form of cooperation.52 Khamenei was also keen to voice his opposition to any Iranian cooperation with America on Iraq, turning down their offers of cooperation because they had ‘dirty hands’, in reference to their previous occupation of the country.53 Iran’s strategy in Iraq has been to coordinated with its own allies, thus affording greater protection of its own interests there. While the Islamic State group may have been a shared enemy, the desire for Iran to secure its interests in Iraq and establish a viable corridor to the Levant runs counter to US motives, even if a stable Iraq and defeat of Islamic State is a shared aim. As noted previously, Iran has sought to foster its own multilateral coalition, involving Iraq, Syria and Russia with the aim of sharing intelligence among the four nations.54 For Iraq, such help was appreciated but it had to play a delicate balancing act given its continued reliance on US support. To this end, then-Iraqi premier Haider Al-Abadi emphasised that Iraq was not fighting for any regional or international axis powers, emphasising the national threat that the Islamic State group posed to Iraq,55 and thus allowing Iraq to draw on the support of often-competing international alliances. As with Syria, Iran began by offering tacit acknowledgement of an advisory role in the conflict, but once the Islamic State group grew in stature after seizing large swathes of Iraqi territory, Iranian involvement became much more explicit, viewing the group as a serious threat not only to key regional allies but also to its own security. The IRGC have been the most prominent Iranian actor and have taken the lead in shaping Iran’s strategy

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towards Iraq, and arguably the wider region. The contrast with the government’s approach is telling, as noted by Tabatabai and Esfandiary “The Iranian government is more inclined to keep its involvement in Iraq covert, but the Revolutionary Guards in charge of executing Iran’s counter-­ISIS strategy see signalling as an inherent and crucial part of its campaign.”56 What is not in doubt is that the Islamic State group’s presence in Iraq, now mercifully on the wane, has allowed Iran to increase its influence there, indeed Iran’s clout is arguably at its highest since the foundation of modern Iraq.57 This has come about through the active involvement of Iranian military forces, and material backing for the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)—particularly those with pre-existing ties to Iran such as the Badr Brigades. The PMF act as a collection of paramilitary groups. They have been one of the most successful fighting forces on the ground in Iraq, playing a major role in degrading the Islamic State group while enhancing Iran’s influence in Iraq.58 The PMF are on the official payroll of the state, and Iranian support for certain brigades within them has Iraqi government consent.59 It is worth mentioning that the PMF are not purely subservient to Iranian interests. Indeed, Mansour and Jaber note that the PMF are split into three key factions, with one group pledging allegiance to Iranian leader Khamenei (which is also the most powerful and well-equipped), one to Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and the others to Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s and arguably the world’s highest-­ ranking Shi’i cleric.60 In a similar vein to the Iranian intervention in Syria, the IRGC’s Quds Force chief, Qassem Soleimani was a key presence in directing operations against the Islamic State group in Iraq, prior to his assassination by the US in 2020. Iraqi commanders acknowledged that he was playing a key role in planning the liberation of Iraqi territory as early as summer 2014.61 Soleimani had close relations with the most powerful leaders of the PMF, most notably Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Iran-backed Badr Brigades who fought the US occupation, and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis. Soleimani’s role in directing Iraqi forces’ victories against the Islamic State group, and thus maintaining Iran’s own security, elevated him to ‘hero status’ among champions of the IRGC’s regional activities in Iran,62 with the IRGC becoming more popular on the whole as a result of their battlefield successes in Iraq and Syria.63 The support of Iran, particularly in their material backing of the PMF has been acknowledged by Iraqi figures. The former deputy leader of the PMF, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, who was assassinated alongside Soleimani, was unequivocal in his support for Iran’s backing, noting that “The popular mobilization could not do such big operations

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without big support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, above all Ali Khamenei who instructed Al-Quds forces to back PMF and he is backing us by providing weapons, ammunitions, consultations and planning.”64 Despite US calls to disband them, the PMF now form a key part of daily life in Iraq and are vital in helping the Iraqi army maintain security in territories reclaimed from the Islamic State group.65 The Religious Overlay To view Iran’s policies towards Iraq through a purely sectarian lens is problematic. The Islamic Republic is more concerned with maintaining a secure neighbour, which allows it to consolidate its strategic depth in the region through its alliances with Iraq and Syria. However, in common with its Syria policy, a religious overlay helps in providing a justification for Iran’s engagement in the Iraqi conflict. Defence of the Shi’i shrine cities of Iraq is regularly cited by Iranian political, religious and military leaders as a religious duty of all Shi’a. Despite its desire to offer an Islamic model that has a universalistic message, Iran has been forced to utilise sect-based discourses due to the virulently anti-Shi’i message of Sunni extremists such as the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda. The view from Tehran is that, in the words of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, the region is experiencing a “surge in the activities of extremist and violent non-state actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, with a clear and unmistakable anti-Iran [and] anti-Shi’ite platform.”66 Hence, Iran sees itself as a victim of sectarianism, and while it has broadly managed to keep its borders secure from such groups through its Iraqi and Syrian interventions, the Islamic State group were able to launch an attack in Tehran in June 2017, shortly after Rouhani won his second term. The cities of Karbala and Najaf are the most sacred Shi’i sites. Rouhani has declared that any threat to them is a red line for Iran, and has vowed to protect them at all costs, stating “[w]hen we say red line we mean it … It means we will not allow Baghdad to be occupied by the terrorists or the religious sites such as Karbala or Najaf to be occupied by the terrorists.”67 The religious element has also allowed Iran to act in concert with Ayatollah Ali Sistani, arguably the highest ranking Shi’i cleric and main source of emulation for Iraqi Shi’a. While it is possible to view Sistani and Khamenei as rivals for leadership among the global Shi’i community, Sistani’s 2014 fatwa, calling for volunteers to defend the holy shrines, led to the creation of the PMF. This meant that Iran could act with his tacit blessing, in providing material support to the PMF. Mansour and Jaber note that while

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the political support and overt legitimisation of Sistani for the PMF is limited, many who decided to take up arms were guided by a religious duty to abide by his fatwa and to protect Shi’i religious sites.68 Iran’s role in providing backing to the Iraqi government and Shi’i groups in particular has had an impact among its co-religionists. In surveying the opinions of Iraqi and Iranian nationals on the Arba’een pilgrimage to Karbala,69 Christia, Dekeyser and Knox highlight how the vast majority of respondents (75% of Iraqis and 72% of Iranians) “held overwhelmingly positive views of Iran’s role in global affairs, conveying Iran as the protector of Shiite interests throughout the Middle East.”70 Shrine defence acts as a powerful calling card for volunteers from across the Shi’i world fighting in Iraq, and Iranian officials cast this act as essential in guaranteeing Iran’s own security.71 In Iran, those who have acted as martyrs for the cause of defending holy shrines are lauded by the government and press, reinforced through cultural production activity such as the 2016 ‘Defenders of the Holy Shrine’ film festival that took place in Tehran.72

Conclusion Iran’s relations with Syria and Iraq during Rouhani’s first term of office have been largely shaped by the ongoing, interlinked conflicts that have raged across both states, particularly in light of the rise of the Islamic State group, which Iran views as a direct security threat. In its desire to consolidate its regional standing, Iran has undertaken its most significant military engagement since the Iran–Iraq war, and has been instrumental in the fight against the Islamic State group in both countries. For Iran and Syria, the sense of a shared regional outlook has provided the basis for an enduring relationship that persists to this day, and has been further reinforced through the Syrian civil war. Thus, while their ideological persuasions of pan-Arab nationalism and attempted Islamic universalism may be widely divergent, their common desire to promote resistance in the Middle East binds them closely together. These common concerns drive Iran’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and are reinforced from Iran’s perspective through the use of religious-based narratives to serve as a justification for its actions there. With Iraq, the threat posed by the Islamic State group came uncomfortably close to Iran’s borders, and has subsequently even breached it. Iran sees Iraq as a vital ally in keeping anti-Shi’i terrorist forces at bay. A stable and friendly Iraq also acts as a fundamental part of its desire to maintain a strategic depth in the region. Although the Iraqi

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government does not subscribe to Iran’s resistance narrative, being cognisant of its own need to balance United States and its allies’ interests in the country, it is crucial to Iran’s need to keep hostile powers in check. Furthermore, the role of the PMF, drawn as they are largely from Shi’i groups, and some with overtly pro-Iranian leanings, has enhanced Iran’s ability to influence matters in Iraq. With the defeat of the Islamic State group in Iraq, Iran will be able to secure a vital land corridor to its allies in Syria and Lebanon, which will help maintain its ability to counter US, Israeli and Saudi moves against its interests. While the Rouhani presidency provides the chronological context for this volume, in both cases examined here, it can be assumed that the president and his executive team were not the sole drivers of Iran’s foreign policy towards these two nations. Due to the multiple centres of power within the Iranian polity, Iranian foreign policy towards both states was shaped by core security concerns that ultimately reside within the purview of the Supreme Leader and IRGC, as evidenced by Soleimani’s regular appearances on the battlefield in both arenas of conflict, and his feting as a national hero back home. Rouhani and Zarif did not directly challenge Khamenei’s position on Iran’s involvement in both conflicts as they were broadly in agreement with the need to secure Iran’s own national interests in the region. In addition, the transnational religious linkages that Iran has fostered, reinforced through cultural ties that Iran has developed with both countries over the years, act as a useful vector for reinforcing its wider strategic aims in the region. This is done by Iran to help sell the benefits of maintaining this alliance to its core domestic constituencies, insofar as it provides a narrative and validation for its continued involvement in both theatres. Religion might not have been the core driver of Iran’s Syria and Iraq policies, but it is now used as a powerful justification and acts as a powerful tool in both the military and diplomatic armoury of the Islamic Republic.

Notes 1. Some elements of the section on Syria have appeared in a previous article by the author entitled “Iran and Syria: an enduring axis,” Middle East Policy, 24 (2), 2017. The article offers a broader overview of the foundations of the Iran–Syria relationship. 2. Goodarzi argues that this sanctuary was due to the deteriorating relations between the Shah and Assad from the mid-1970s onwards, on account of

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the improving ties between Iran and Iraq during this period. See Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, London, 2009), p. 22. 3. Ibid., p. XIV. 4. Ibid., p. 25. 5. See Houchang Chehabi (ed), Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Past 500 Years (I.B. Tauris, London, 2006). In the same volume, see in particular Houchang Chehabi and Hassan Mneimneh “Five Centuries of Lebanese-Iranian Encounters,” pp. 1–50, and Houchang Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” pp. 201–230. 6. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (Routledge, 1997); Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 2016). 7. Matteo Legrenzi and Fred H. Lawson, “Iran and its neighbors since 2003: New Dilemmas,” Middle East Policy, 21 (4), 2014, pp. 105–111 (p. 106). 8. Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s ISIS Policy,” International Affairs, 91 (1), 2015, pp. 1–15 (p. 4). 9. Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Surprises U.S. With Accord on Battling ISIS,” New York Times, September 27, 2015. 10. Randa Slim, “Hezbollah and Syria: From Regime Proxy to Regime Savior,” Insight Turkey, 16 (2), 2014, pp.  61–68, Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Military Intervention in Syria: Long-Term Implications,” Policy Watch 2025  – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-military-intervention-in-syria-long-term-implications; Phillips, The Battle for Syria. 11. See “Leader Leads Tehran Friday Prayers,” February 5, 2011 from the website of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, http://english.khamenei.ir/ news/1407/Leader-Leads-Tehran-Friday-Prayers. 12. Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria,” CTC Sentinel, 6 (8), 2013, pp. 11–14 (p. 11). 13. Amal Saad, “Challenging the sponsor-proxy model: the Iran-Hizballah Relationship,” Global Discourse, 9 (4), 2019, pp. 627–650. . 14. Slim, Hezbollah and Syria, p. 63. 15. W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Assad,” Middle East Journal, 69 (2), 2015, pp. 222–236, p. 224. 16. Cited in Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Head of Ammar Strategic Base: Syria is Iran’s 35th Province; if we lose Syria we cannot keep Tehran,” Al Monitor  – Iran Pulse, February 14, 2014, http://iranpulse.al-monitor. c o m / i n d e x . p h p / 2 0 1 3 / 0 2 / 1 3 4 6 / h e a d - o f - a m m a r- s t r a t e g i c base-syria-is-irans-35th-province-if-we-lose-syria-we-cannot-keeptehran/.

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17. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism,” New York Times, September 13, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/ opinion/mohammad-javad-zarif-let-us-rid-the-world-of-wahhabism. html?_r=0. 18. Christopher Philips, The Battle for Syria (Yale University Press, October 2016). 19. Daniel Byman, “Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East,” Survival, 56 (1), 2014, pp. 79–100 (p. 89). 20. Jay Solomon and Alan Cullison, “New Bid To Stifle Iran Aid To Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2012. The authors claim that “American officials investigating the Iranian operation said it is designed to quietly ship Syrian crude oil to Iran, where it can be sold on the international market, with revenue going back to Damascus.” 21. Salam al-Saadi, “Iran’s Stakes in Syria’s Economy,” Sada Journal  – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2015. Available online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/60280. 22. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Iran grants Syria $3.6 billion credit to buy oil products,” Reuters World News, July 31, 2103, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iran-idUSBRE96U0XN20130731. 23. “Syria accepts $1bn credit loan from Iran,” Middle East Monitor, July 9, 2015, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150709-syria-accepts1bn-credit-loan-from-iran/. 24. Ali Alfoneh and Michael Eisenstadt, “Iranian Casualties in Syria and the Strategic Logic of Intervention,” Policy Watch 2585  – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-casualties-in-syriaand-the-strategic-logic-of-intervention. 25. Hossein Bastani, “Iran quietly deepens involvement in Syria’s war,” BBC News  – Middle East, October 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-34572756. 26. Ali Alfoneh and Michael Eisenstadt, “Iranian Casualties in Syria and the Strategic Logic of Intervention,” March 11, 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-casualties-in-syria-andthe-strategic-logic-of-intervention. 27. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, “Testing Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Agency in Syria,” in Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, Shaharam Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 133–154. 28. Nadia von Maltzahn, The Syria-Iran Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, London, 2013). 29. Quote taken from Iranian news agency Rayhab News, translation reproduced in Andrea Spada’s article ‘Iran: General Nowi-Aghdam urges recruits to fight in Syria as Assad stumbles’, Islam Media Analysis, June 2015, http://www. islamedianalysis.info/iran-general-nowi-aghdam-urgesrecruits-to-fight-in-syria-as-assad-stumbles/.

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30. Slim, Hezbollah and Syria, p. 63. 31. Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Strategic Depth, Counterinsurgency & the Logic of Sectarianization: The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Security Doctrine and Its Regional Implications,” in Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, ed. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (C Hurst & Co, 2016). 32. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran Promotes Its New ‘Martyrs,’ Cementing Role In Syria Fighting,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 12, 2016, http:// www.r ferl.org/content/iran-syria-new-mar tyrs-r ole-in-fighting/27853933.html. 33. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: We have armed 200,000 fighters in the region,” Middle East Monitor, January 15, 2016, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160115-irans-revolutionar yguards-we-have-armed-200000-fighters-in-the-region/. 34. Ibid. 35. Golnaz Esfandiari, op. cit. 36. Tallha Abdulrazaq, “Iran’s ‘Shia Liberation Army’ is par for the course,” Al Jazeera  – Opinion: Politics, August 21, 2016, http://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/iran-shia-liberation-armypar-160821091935110.html. 37. Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects,” February 2015, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ the-shiite-jihad-in-syria-and-its-regional-effects. 38. Kamran Taromi, “Iranian Foreign Policy Toward the new Iraq,” Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 23 (4), 2005, pp. 455–473. 39. “I. R. Iran’s main export destinations in 2013,” Iran Trade Statistics in brief 2013, Iranian Trade Planning Office, http://eng.tpo.ir/ uploads/2013statictic_word_tabdil_be_pdf_7454.pdf. 40. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Iran and Iraq agree to implement Algiers Accord,” (in Persian) Iranian Students News Agency, http://www.isna.ir/ news/92120704936/. 41. According to the Iranian economic news site “Financial Tribune,” the easing of visa restrictions between Iran and Iraq has led to an increase in Iranians crossing into Iraq from two hundred thousand in 2014 to over two million in 2016, https://financialtribune.com/articles/peopletravel/72206/visa-needed-for-iraq. 42. Mehiyar Kathem, “The troubling political economy of Iraq’s Sh’ia clerical establishment,” Open Democracy, March 29, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/mehiyar-kathem/troubling-politicaleconomy-of-iraq-s-sh-ia-clerical-establishment; Sam Dagher, “Devotion and Money Tie Iranians to Iraqi City,” New York Times, May 30, 2009, h t t p : / / w w w. n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 9 / 0 5 / 3 1 / w o r l d / middleeast/31karbala.html.

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43. “Rouhani praises Iran’s role in ensuring security in Iraq,” speech given by Hassan Rouhani at shrine of Imam Reza, Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network/BBC Monitoring, September 6, 2014. 44. James J.  Walsh, “Iran and Iraq,” in Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbors, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam, Gawdat Bahgat (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 81–122. 45. For more on how the Dialogue among Civilizations was used as a tool of international diplomacy see Edward Wastnidge, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami (I.B. Tauris, London, 2016). 46. See “The First International Conference on the World Against Violence and Extremism (WAVE) – newsletter,” 9–10th December 2014, published by the Iranian Foreign Ministry-affiliated “Institute for Political and International Studies,” http://www.ipis.ir/uploads/WAVE_ Newsletter_3735.pdf. 47. Iran Daily, December 10, 2014. 48. Hassan Rouhani’s speech to the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 25, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IR_en.pdf. 49. Edward Wastnidge, “Rouhani positions Iran as vital partner against Islamic State,” The Conversation, September 26, 2014, https://theconversation. com/r ouhani-positions-iran-as-a-vital-par tner-againstislamic-state-32192. 50. Ibid. 51. Costas Laoutides, “How Foreign is the Kurdish Issue in Iran’s Foreign Policy?” in Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy, ed. Shaharam Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) pp. 93–110 (p. 105). 52. “Commander Jazayeri: Iran-US cooperation against Daesh is not possible by any means,” Fars News Agency (in Persian), September 12, 2014, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930621000238. 53. Lizzie Dearden, “Islamic State: Iran rejects requests to help fight Isis in international coalition,” The Independent, September 15, 2014, http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/islamic-state-iranrejects-requests-to-help-fight-isis-in-international-coalition-9733686.html. 54. “Iraq, Russia, Iran and Syria coordinate against ISIL,” Al Jazeera, September 27, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/iraq-russia-iransyria-coordinate-isil-150927125919507.html; Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Surprises U.S. With Accord on Battling ISIS,” New York Times, September 27, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/28/world/middleeast/ iraq-agrees-to-share-intelligence-on-isis-with-russia-syria-and-iran.html. 55. “Iraqi premier denies foreign presence in war against Islamic State,” Shafaq News via BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 13, 2015.

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56. Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary, “Cooperating with Iran to Combat ISIS in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2017), p. 137. 57. Walsh, p. 113. 58. Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Iran’s Uncertain Standing in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2017), p. 116. 59. Buddhika B. Jayamaha, Kevin Petit and Will Reno, “Iraq’s Path to State Failure,” Small Wars Journal, April 21, 2017, http://smallwarsjournal. com/jrnl/art/iraq%E2%80%99s-path-to-state-failure. 60. Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jaber, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Carnegie Middle East Centre, April 28, 2017, p.  11, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_ Web.pdf. 61. Asia News Monitor, November 13, 2014. 62. Akbarzadeh, p. 112. 63. Tabatabai and Esfandiary, p. 131. 64. Ali Kurdistani, “Profile of Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis,” Rudaw News, June 7, 2016, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/07062016. 65. Tabatabai and Esfandiary, p. 133. 66. Mohammad Javad Zarif “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era,” Foreign Affairs, 93 (3), 2014, pp. 49–59 (p. 56). 67. “Threat to Shiite Sites of Iraq, Iran’s Red Line: President,” Tasnim News Agency, March 12, 2016, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/ news/2016/03/12/1026173/threat-to-shiite-sites-of-iraq-iran-s-red-linepresident. 68. Mansour and Jaber, p. 1. 69. Arba’een marks the end of the 40-day period of mourning following Ashura—the commemoration of the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala. Each year pilgrims mark the occasion by travelling to Karbala, in what has become the largest yearly gathering in the world. 70. Fotini Christia, Elizabeth Dekeyser, and Dean Knox, “To Karbala: Surveying Religious Shi’a from Iran and Iraq,” MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, No. 2016-39, 2016. 71. See comments of Ali Akbar Velayati, “Iran owes its security to bravery of defenders of Holy Shrines: Velayati,” Ahl ul-Bayt News Agency, August 12, 2017, http://en.abna24.com/news/iran/iran-owes-its-security-to-bravery-of-defenders-of-holy-shrines-velayati_847771.html. 72. See, for example, “Film festival: Iran depicts unsung heroes of war on Takfiris,” Press TV, June 2, 2016, http://www.presstv.com/ Detail/2016/06/02/468586/Iran-filmfest-holy-shrinesdefenders-Syria-Iraq.

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Solomon, Jay and Alan Cullison. “New Bid to Stifle Iran Aid to Syria.” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2012. Tabatabai, Ariane and Dina Esfandiary. “Cooperating with Iran to Combat ISIS in Iraq.” The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2017. p. 137. Taromi, Kamran. “Iranian Foreign Policy Toward the new Iraq.” Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 23 (4), (2005): 455–473. Tasnim News Agency. “Threat to Shiite Sites of Iraq, Iran’s Red Line: President.” March  12, 2016. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/ news/2016/03/12/1026173/threat-to-shiite-sites-of-iraq-iran-s-red-linepresident. Wastnidge, Edward. “Rouhani positions Iran as vital partner against Islamic State.” The Conversation, September 26, 2014. https://theconversation.com/ rouhani-positions-iran-as-a-vital-partner-against-islamic-state-32192. Wastnidge, Edward. Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami. London: I.B. Tauris, 2016.

CHAPTER 7

Iran and Russia: Between Pragmatism and Possibilities of a Strategic Alliance Nikolay Kozhanov

Introduction Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, and the subsequent election of Hassan Rouhani as the president of Iran in 2013, marked the beginning of a new period in Russian–Iranian relations, which had been in decline during the years of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012). On June 7, 2012 (only two months after his election), Vladimir Putin met his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. During the protocol part of the meeting, the Russian president clearly stated Moscow’s interest in boosting its relations with Tehran. The problems that, in the opinion of president Putin, both countries should discuss first were outlined in his speech. They included a range of regional problems (such as the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, instability in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, cross-border crimes, and political processes in Central Asia and the Trans-­ Caucasian region), bilateral relations, and perspectives on the settlement of the nuclear dispute. The presidents discussed the problem of the

N. Kozhanov (*) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_7

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inadequately low volume of bilateral trade and investment, the prospect of the Russian–Iranian cooperation in the nuclear and oil and gas sectors, as well as the options for Russian military exports to the Islamic Republic. It is an unlikely coincidence that the intensity of the Russian–Iranian political dialogue would have substantially increased after that meeting. Moscow and Tehran began to actively coordinate their efforts on Syria. The Kremlin advocated for Iran’s inclusion in international discussions of the situations in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. In September 2014, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov even called Iran ‘a natural ally’ of Russia in the struggle against religious extremism in the Middle East. These gestures were supposed to demonstrate that Russia regarded Iran as more than just a ‘southern neighbour’. The intension of the two countries to build closer relations after the presidential elections in Russia and Iran in 2012 and 2013 respectively was determined by a complex mixture of internal drivers and external challenges. Both presidents were to reconsider their foreign policy priorities. While the ideational factors related to the Russian confrontation with the West became one of the main determinants for Putin’s foreign policies, Rouhani came to power with the extremely pragmatic task of saving the country from the pressure of sanctions. Consequently, this difference determined the perception of each other in the minds of the two presidents. Finally, both Russia and Iran were compelled to deal with the challenges posed to their interests by the Syrian crisis and the outcomes of the Arab Spring. This chapter will demonstrate how the aggregated effect of these factors unexpectedly boosted and, at the same time, limited the dialogue between Moscow and Tehran.

Rouhani and His Foreign Policy Priorities Rouhani’s perception of Russia was largely determined by the foreign policy objectives of Iran’s political agenda when he came to power. From this perspective, Rouhani could be perceived as a unique Iranian president. In contrast to his predecessors, starting with Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Rouhani did not think globally, but instead was focused on concrete goals to be achieved. He aimed to ease the burden of international sanctions, improve the economic situation in the country, and secure Iran’s regional interests in the unfolding conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. In the absence of a global strategy such as Khatami’s ‘dialogue of civilizations’ or Ahmadinejad’s ‘idea of struggle’ for the reign of global justice

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(hukumat-e adl-e jahani),1 Rouhani’s ideas were more regional and security-­focused. His foreign policy thinking was more instrumental and pragmatic. This played a special role in Tehran’s relations with Moscow. Since 2013, Tehran paid less attention to such directions of its foreign policy, as relations with Central Asian countries, Latin America, Non-­ Alignment Movement or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The attention of the Iranian leadership was concentrated on its Western and Middle Eastern vectors of diplomacy.2 This did not mean an end to Tehran’s interests in other issues, but they were not at the forefront of Iran’s efforts.3 As a result, dialogue with Russia on some of these issues decreased, whereas it intensified on others. For instance, there was an obvious difference between Ahmadinejad’s and Rouhani’s vision of the dialogue on Iran’s accession to the SCO with Moscow. Under Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), Tehran paid particular attention to participation in the so-called SCO Energy Club, the main forum for discussing the creation of a united SCO energy market that would take into account the interests of both gas producers and gas consumers. Iran was actively involved in a number of other projects within the SCO, such as the reconstruction of Afghanistan and campaigns against drug trafficking. Yet, Russia and China were cautious about accepting Iran as a full-­ fledged member. At least twice—in 2009 and 2010—Tehran expressed hope that it would be granted full membership status, particularly since Russia served as SCO chair in 2008–2009. However, full membership was never granted, presumably with Russia’s active consent. This rejection stemmed from both external and internal factors. In 2009, Russia and other SCO members were worried about the civil unrest that erupted in Iran after the disputed presidential election. Also, in 2010, Moscow was concerned about US–Iranian tensions related to another twist in the story of Tehran’s nuclear research. Under these circumstances, Iran’s accession to the SCO would have aggravated the organisation’s relations with the West, particularly with the United States. As a result, Russia initiated the adoption of certain amendments in the SCO statutes in 2010 including language that barred countries under UN sanctions from attaining full membership. The then president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, delivered this message to Iran bluntly. During the 2010 summit of SCO leaders in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, he stated that “countries experiencing legal issues cannot apply for SCO membership. This is particularly related to states under UN sanctions. This, I think, is clear”. Given that this was the year when the UN Security Council adopted

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a further round of punitive measures against Iran, there was no question about which country Medvedev had meant in this speech. It is notable that the partial lifting of the sanctions as a result of the agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions, JCPOA) signed between Iran and the group of international negotiators in 2015 did not lead to the improvement of Tehran’s relations with the SCO. While Russia started to support Iran’s application to the full membership in the Organisation after 2015, the Central Asian countries opposed this, due to their mistrust of Tehran. Under these circumstances, seeing the SCO direction as opposing the achievement of his main political goals, Rouhani decided to stop negotiations for Tehran’s membership in this organisation till better times.4 The nuclear issue represented a different case and Iran sought dialogue with Moscow on this. By 2013, it was obvious that the sanctions against Iran were working. Tehran was almost cut off from the international banking and insurance system. Its access to foreign investments, advanced technology, and international sea carriage services was restricted. Iran’s options to sell oil on external markets and import gasoline were limited. By March 2013, the volume of oil production and its export fell from 3.8 and 2.4 million barrels per day to 2.7 and 1.3 million barrels per day respectively. This substantial drop inevitably caused a deficit in the Iranian budget, which was heavily dependent on the inflow of petrodollars. Under these circumstances, the growth rate of the Iranian GDP in 2012 was estimated at 0.36% with an official inflation rate of 32% in March 2013 (compared to 21.5% in early 2012), and the consumer price annual growth rate at 32% in November 2012. Under these circumstances, social indicators had also deteriorated. By 2013, up to 60% of the population lived either on, or under, the poverty line. The social stratification was large and increasing. The income of three richest segments of the population was 15 to 16 times higher than that of the three poorest. In 2012, the official rate of unemployment reached 12.2% (and more than 19% in unofficial calculations). The shutdown of industrial projects requiring foreign technology, investments, and equipment accelerated the growth of this indicator.5 Consequently, Rouhani came to power by playing on the feelings of the majority of Iranian society, which expected the new government to substantially improve their quality of life and the socio-economic conditions in the country. The latter was inseparably related to the easing of US and EU sanctions, which put pressure on the Iranian economy. This was where Moscow played a significant role, proposing initiatives that created the necessary framework for Iran’s negotiations with the international

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community on the nuclear issue. For Tehran, it was extremely important to have the Russians on board during these negotiations, as for the Iranian leadership, Moscow and, to a lesser degree, Beijing were the forces that could, at least partly, counterbalance the West during the nuclear talks. Since 2012 (even before the elections of Rouhani to president), the Russian government actively worked to secure an effective dialogue between authorities in Tehran and the West on the nuclear issue. Sergei Lavrov’s 2012 proposals set the stage for the negotiations that led to the signing of the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 group and the beginning of the partial lifting of sanctions. Russian interest in the settlement of the nuclear issue was simple; Moscow hoped that a nuclear agreement would guarantee that Iran would not become another ‘hotspot’ on the post-Soviet space’s periphery. The end of Iran’s pariah status and its gradual reintegration into the international community would also allow Russia to cooperate with the Islamic Republic more actively on regional affairs without danger for the Kremlin of being accused of creating ‘unholy’ alliances. Finally, Moscow hoped that reaching a nuclear agreement would eliminate the sanctions that had hindered Russia’s economic activity in Iran. Indeed, international sanctions were a serious obstacle for the development of economic cooperation between the two countries. In the eight years preceding the JCPOA, Russian companies failed to make any substantial economic gains in Iran (even when European enterprises pulled out of Iran). Russian investment activity in the Islamic Republic since 2006 had been unimpressive (the volume of accumulated Russian investments was less than $50 million). Since 2011, the volume of trade between the countries had been consistently falling by more than 30 percent annually and, by 2014, it had reached around $1.7  billion. According to Moscow experts, the main reason for this was the international sanctions adopted against Iran, which compelled the Russian business to refrain from dealing with Iran. The end of the sanctions regime would, in turn, grant Russian corporations better access to the Iranian economy. In 2015, international talks resulted in the signing of a ‘nuclear agreement’, the JCPOA, which put Iran’s nuclear programme under the control of the IAEA and the international community, resulting in sanctions being partially lifted. This was certainly a significant achievement of Iranian diplomacy and guaranteed Rouhani’s re-election for a second presidential term in 2017. For Russian–Iranian relations, the successful end of the nuclear negotiations provided a necessary boost for further development.

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Russia Turns to Iran Russia took the initiative to improve bilateral relations with Iran for several reasons. First, after four years of Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012), Putin was again elected as Russian president. As opposed to the liberal and more pro-Western Dmitry Medvedev, Putin was determined to develop relations with non-Western countries. Moreover, he was determined to confront the West. Russian economic and political losses in Libya also persuaded Putin that any cooperation with the West over the Middle East should be carefully defined and definitely not at the expense of other Russian interests. In general, 2012 was a point of transition in the post-1991 history of the Russian presence in the Middle East and Asia. After this date, the Russian leadership adopted a more strategic approach to these regions by seeing its contacts with the non-European countries of Eurasia as of growing importance for achieving Russian political goals. This period of Russian diplomacy could be titled as the period of Moscow’s return to the Middle East. Russia re-established itself as an important player in the Middle East—a status that was lost by Moscow after the fall of the USSR. The increased frequency of Russian contacts with the Middle East and Iran was partly due to its confrontation with the United States and the EU. As a result of Russia’s tensions with the West, its focus shifted to non-­ European countries, including the Middle East. Addressing the Federal Assembly on December 4, 2014, Putin declared cooperation with the Middle East as one of the priorities of Russian diplomacy, and on February 27, 2015, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that “the turn to Asia” (which in Russian traditional understanding includes the Middle East) reflected long-standing national interests in the twenty-first century.6 On the one hand, the decision to intensify contact with the non-­ Western countries had a very pragmatic rationale. Russia’s active policy towards the Middle East and Asia was leverage to affect the behaviour of the United States and the EU, and to mitigate the negative effects of confrontation with the West on economic and security issues. On the other hand, the proclaimed “turn to Asia” was also determined by an ideational factor. The current leadership believed that Russia, as a country that lay between Europe and Asia, should diversify its political and economic diplomacy that, in their mind, had been excessively concentrated on the West since 1991. In this context, Putin’s vision contrasted with Russian

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views on the Middle East and Asia under Boris Yeltsin and Medvedev, who both considered the region to be of little importance. Since 2012, the intensity of Moscow’s dialogue with Tehran had been growing. Only during the years 2013 and 2014, Putin and Rouhani met four times. They met on the sidelines of the 4th Summit of the Caspian states on September 29, 2014, in Astrakhan. They also held negotiations in Dushanbe on September 12, 2014, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) summit; on May 23, 2014, in Shanghai, on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA); and on September 13, 2013, in Bishkek, again at an SCO summit. The visit to Bishkek was Rouhani’s first foreign trip as president, read as a sign of his government’s interest in strategic ties with Russia and China. During consultations, Russian and Iranian officials discussed the issues of bilateral relations and perspectives of the settlement of the nuclear dispute. The list of topics comprised a wide range of regional problems, including economic issues. Moscow’s experts believed that Russia and Iran had a unique opportunity to create an economic basis for their cooperation, and the main task was not to miss this opportunity. Both sides had concrete suggestions and discussed the details of these proposals and adjusted their positions. In 2014, the Russian energy minister Alexander Novak, also the head of the Russian–Iranian Joint Trade and Economic Commission, established good relations with the Iranian Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, and the head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi. His efforts resulted in the adoption of an all-­ embracive Memorandum of Understanding on the principles of the trade and economic relations between the two countries signed by Novak and Zanganeh in Moscow on August 5, 2014. The adoption of this document was welcomed by Putin, who stated the necessity to fill the created legal framework with concrete substance. It established an important basis for the 11th meeting of the Joint Commission held between September 7 and 11, 2014, in Tehran. According to sources, the sides agreed to increase the volume of bilateral trade tenfold, and the overall volume of hypothetical investment contracts that might be signed as an aftermath of this event could potentially reach USD70 billion. The first steps that were taken by the Kremlin towards Tehran were also provoked by the events of the Arab Spring. In mid-2012 the Russian authorities decided to intensify their contacts with the Islamic Republic, as they were seriously concerned with the actively shrinking Russian political

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and economic presence in the Middle East. Moscow considered Iran as one of its last footholds in the Middle East and tried to secure Russia’s position there. As one of the first steps, Moscow unofficially supported the activities of Russian business in Iran. The Kremlin closed its eyes on loopholes created by Russian business in the context of US and EU sanctions against Iran for their Iranian business dealings. This, in turn, resulted in positive feedback from Tehran. Shortly before the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the sides even started talking about possibilities to resume exports of Russian missile complexes S-300 to Iran (or their close equivalents). Finally, on July 1 and 2, 2013, Ahmadinejad visited Moscow under the pretext of the participation in the GECF summit. Support provided by Tehran and Moscow to Damascus after the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011 also played the role of bringing the two countries closer. Analysts in Moscow believed that this positive collaboration allowed the strengthening of the Russo–Iranian relations under the successor of Ahmadinejad, Rouhani.7 Yet, the outcomes of the Arab Spring demanded that Moscow more actively establish contacts with Tehran after Rouhani’s victory in 2013. At that moment, concerned by growing tensions in Iranian society and the possibility of a revolutionary ‘spring’, the ruling regime of the Islamic Republic decided to loosen control over political life in the country by allowing people to choose candidates for the president’s seat (from a preselected group). It was no surprise that the population, tired of radicals and neoconservatives, chose probably the most moderate figure who promised the long-awaited domestic liberalisation and normalisation of relations with the West. To a certain extent, the new president of Iran could be called a product of the Arab Spring. Rouhani’s speech in the General Assembly of the UN on September 24, 2013, left no illusions that the improvement of Tehran’s relations with the West was his top priority. This seriously disturbed Moscow. Yet, at the same time, Russian authorities had already got signals from Tehran that the window of opportunity for the Russo–Iranian relations could soon be closed if the Kremlin remained reluctant about the improvement of ties with the Islamic Republic. This was the case in mid-August 2013 when Moscow failed to organise Putin’s trip to Islamic Republic because Iran did not agree on the proposed format of the visit.8 Subsequently, Russia became more active in Iran. On September 13, 2013, Putin and Rouhani met on the sidelines of the SCO summit. Later, in December 2013, Lavrov travelled to Iran to

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establish a plan on the restoration of bilateral ties, discussed by the two presidents at the SCO meeting, in more solid agreements. Another reason for the intensification of Russian–Iranian cooperation was economic. Since the late 1990s, the Iranian authorities had been promising to help European countries decrease their dependence on gas supplies from Russia. In most cases, statements by Iranian officials on Tehran’s intentions to enter the European gas market still remained the part of the political game played by the Islamic republic’s authorities to make the West more inclined to lift sanctions and restore economic ties with Iran. Russian authorities took the challenge of Iran’s natural gas for their interests in the European market seriously. Indeed, within the next decade Tehran would hardly be able to represent a threat to the Russian presence there. However, Moscow tried to view the situation with a long-­ term perspective. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin did not exclude the scenario when, in the long run, Tehran would finally implement its promises to reach the European market. Nevertheless, although perceiving Iran as a potential rival, Russia still preferred cooperation to confrontation. Moscow followed the principle of judo, staying in full contact with the opponent and keeping him close. Consequently, wherever possible, Moscow tried to ensure the flow of hydrocarbons in the direction necessary for itself, or at least to ensure that it had a stake in the energy projects of Iran. As a result, Gazprom and other Russian energy corporations demonstrated open interest in the development of Iran’s gas production and infrastructure. This strategy of involvement in Iran’s gas sector was supported and promoted at the top level of the Russian political elite. However, by March 2017, Moscow did not progress beyond mere discussion of potential investment projects with Tehran.9 During the Baku summit of Azerbaijan in August 2016, when the Russian and Iranian presidents met, Putin called for the necessity of closer cooperation and coordination in the oil and gas sector, particularly over shared use of existing pipeline infrastructure and joint development of Caspian hydrocarbon resources.10 He formulated a plan to supply the northern provinces of Iran with natural gas via Azerbaijan in exchange for the Iranian liquefied natural gas that the Russian companies would receive in the Persian Gulf. The implementation of this project would allow Iran to decrease its dependency on Turkmenistan as its sole supplier of natural gas to the northern districts, while the Russian authorities would be able to ensure that at least some Iranian gas would not reach Europe but would, instead, be channelled by the Russian companies to other regions.

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Syrian Civil War as the Main Game Changer Russian military engagement in the Syrian conflict in late 2015 became the main factor that brought the two countries together. For Tehran, the beginning of Moscow’s military involvement in Syrian affairs gave the Iranian authorities what they had been looking for in the last decade: a solid political and military base for the development of bilateral relations. Since the 2000s, Tehran had been looking for a leading world power that could be a counterweight to the US pressure on Iran. Traditionally, Russia was one of the (if not the most) preferred candidates for this role. Yet, during the two preceding decades, any Iranian attempts to win Moscow’s support had failed. The Kremlin cooperated with Tehran only on a case-­ by-­case basis, and closely watched that this cooperation never reached the level when it could negatively affect the development of the Russian dialogue with the West or other countries of the Middle East. Even when occasionally blocking some US actions against Iran or taking measures to mitigate their negative effects, these Russian efforts were largely determined not as partner obligations between Moscow and Tehran, but by the pragmatism of the Kremlin that used Iran to reach its own goals. Moreover, until 2012, Moscow had sacrificed its good relationship with Tehran many times in order to improve its ties with the United States and the EU. Thus, the so-called reset in Russian–US relations declared by Medvedev and Obama in 2009 was one of the reasons that the Russian authorities postponed the delivery of the S-300 missile complexes to Tehran and imposed unilateral sanctions against Iran in 2010. However, even under these circumstances, Russia still remained the most appealing candidate for the Iranian authorities as a potential counterweight to the US influence in the Middle East. Tehran’s attempt to use China for this role from the late 2000s to the early 2010s had failed. Initially, the Iranians expected that intensive economic and investment cooperation with Beijing would boost the building of the Iranian–Chinese political alliance. Nevertheless, in spite of all Iranian efforts, China did not want to lose its neutral status in Middle Eastern affairs. Even more than Russia, Beijing tried to avoid forming any alliances that could spoil its good relations with any other countries of the region. Moreover, in most difficult situations related to Iran, the Chinese authorities preferred to follow Russia’s lead.11 By 2012, Iran realised that it would be more advantageous to build closer relations with Moscow.

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Even the signing of the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 group that substantially eased Iranian relations with the West did not change Tehran’s plans to use Moscow. Statements made by Khamenei between September and December 2015 showed that the highest Iranian leadership still mistrusted the West, and expected continued confrontation with the United States. This meant that Tehran remained interested in Russia as a counterbalance to American influence in the Middle East. However, in the case of Moscow, economic relations could not provide a solid basis for the formation of a political partnership with Iran. Between 2011 and 2015, bilateral trade had gradually decreased while the volume of mutual investments remained negligible. All attempts to revitalise these ties between 2007 and 2009, as well as between 2012 and 2015, were futile. Consequently, Tehran attempted to build stronger political cooperation with Russia. The Iranian authorities tried to find political issues of mutual interest whose discussion could lead to long-term cooperation between the two countries. The unprecedented degradation of Russian relations with the United States after Euromaidan in Ukraine and Moscow’s involvement in Syria created the long-awaited conditions for increasing discussions between Russia and Iran, with a high likelihood of working out common approaches. Putin’s decision to deploy Russian troops in Syria opened even more options for such cooperation. Shortly after the beginning of the Russian military operation, Iranian authorities sent a clear message about their readiness to interact with Russia. In October 2015, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, visited Sochi to take part in the Valday discussion club, an international intellectual forum annually organised in Russia. Unexpectedly, Larijani, who traditionally had very critical views on Russia and Russian foreign policy, appeared to be very positive about the prospects of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in Syria. He was unusually emotional when criticising US and EU policy in the Middle East and called upon Russia to intensify its efforts aimed at strengthening regional security and stability.12 During his Sochi trip, Larijani openly stated that in spite of the lifting of international sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic and the gradual end of Iran’s international isolation, the current leadership saw Russia as a priority partner.13 The Russian leaders also appeared to be extremely interested in strengthening relations with Tehran after the signing of the JCPOA. Since 2012 when the international community resumed its attempts to settle the Iranian nuclear issue, the Russian leaders were concerned with the

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possibility that the end of the sanctions and subsequent Iranian rapprochement with the West might diminish Moscow’s influence in Tehran and distance the Islamic Republic from Russia. The failure for Iran and Russia to establish a solid relationship through the intensification of bilateral economic contacts compelled Moscow to intensify discussion of political issues of mutual interest with Iran. Subsequently, cooperation in Syria became one of the main issues as a base for the development of the bilateral dialogue between Iran and Russia.14

Should We Form an Alliance? During 2013–2015, some Iranian policymakers and analysts cautiously questioned the rationale behind Tehran’s military involvement in Syria. These questions were raised within a certain (not very large) group of the Iranian political elite, remaining removed from the national level of discussion. Some members of the Iranian middle class demonstrated a certain fatigue from Tehran’s active and obtrusive involvement in regional affairs. They believed that it would be much more reasonable for the government to invest the money it spent in Iraq, Palestine, and Syria to support the pro-Iranian forces in the Iranian economy that had been experiencing difficult times. The message of these people to the authorities of Iran was simple: “stop feeding the foreigners at our expense”.15 These views had also been rarely, but occasionally, expressed by Iranian politicians. In 2013, high-ranking Iranian diplomat Mohammad Sadr openly doubted the necessity of the unconditional support for Bashar al-­ Assad.16 Under these circumstances, the Russian military involvement in Syria also received a very negative reception. In October 2015, prominent Iranian politician Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani clearly stated his criticism of any military attempts to solve the Syrian crisis. When commenting on the beginning of the Russian air raids in Syria, Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that he was against the bombings in Syria as air strikes could hardly be an alternative to negotiations, as a way to put an end to the conflict.17 However, neither Sadr’s nor Hashemi Rafsanjani’s views on the Russian– Iranian involvement in Syria were openly supported by other Iranian policymakers. Unexpectedly, Moscow also initially criticised Tehran’s active role in the Syrian crisis, along with Iranian radical conservatives and IRGC members. The Russian policymakers believed that the immense military efforts by Tehran to support the Assad regime gave the Iranian authorities a right

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to decide on the destiny of Syria. Indeed, Iran deployed its military advisers and Special Forces in Syria long before Putin’s decision to send Russian troops to Syria. Tehran’s proxies (Lebanese Hizbollah and Shi’a militia) were the first to come to the aid of Assad. Moreover, even after the beginning of the Russian air raids, Moscow tried to play the role of the third side in the conflict by flirting with the legal opposition in Syria and occasionally distancing itself from Assad. At the same time, Iran had been clearly positioning itself as the loyal ally of the regime from the beginning of the civil war in Syria. In addition to the military assistance provided by Tehran, the Islamic authorities had been supporting the Assad’s regime materially and financially. During the most difficult periods for Damascus (2013–2014) the salary of the Syrian army was paid directly from Iran’s budget, while Iranian petrol and energy resources fuelled the Syrian economy. Iranian military advisers trained the Syrian army for urban fighting, and their civil colleagues helped the Syrian administration to build an effective wartime economy.18 Under these circumstances, the Russian direct military involvement in the conflict created serious concerns for the Iranian military elite. They were afraid that Moscow might ‘steal’ the Iranian victory in Syria. Shortly after the beginning of the Russian military operation, pro-IRGC media outlets in Iran argued that the Russian air raids and the huge psychological effect they had could make the Syrian regime forget the Iranian input in the survival of Assad during the previous years. This would have meant that Tehran might not play a role in determining the future of post-­conflict Syria. In addition, some Iranian media outlets called upon the Iranian authorities not to trust Russia, and argued that Moscow could easily betray them and might trade off its support for Damascus for increased investments from the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The active contacts between Russia and the GCC only strengthened these concerns.19 Thus, in October 2015, the IRGC commander, General Mohammad Ali Jafari openly questioned Moscow’s loyalty to Damascus by saying that Iran was much more concerned with Assad’s destiny than Russia was.20 Yet, neither Hashemi Rafsanjani nor the IRGC commanders backed by radical conservatives had the last word in determining Tehran’s approaches to Syria and Russia. As opposed to some authoritarian Arab regimes, the Iranian political system allowed a certain degree of pluralism and debate in society about the foreign and domestic policies of the government. For instance, the political views of Sadr on the Syrian issue, which were obviously different from the views of the majority, did not cost him his career.

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In fact, by 2016, he still was one of the advisers of the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. Moreover, he retained good relations with the Supreme Leader of Iran.21 However, this pluralism and relative freedom to express cautious disagreement with Iranian authorities on the international arena should not be a deception. These intra-Iranian debates had little chance to bring changes in the diplomatic course of the country without the blessing of Khamenei, who made the final decisions on all sensitive political questions, including the Syrian issue. In other words, Jafari, Zarif, and Sadr had the right to openly express their opinions, but it was the Supreme Leader and his cabinet that made the final decisions on every issue. During his meeting with Putin in November 2015, Khamenei gave the green light for Iranian cooperation with Russia on Syria. The Supreme Leader’s decision was largely supported by moderate conservatives who, by November 2015, dominated the political life of the country. Thus, immediately after Putin’s trip to Tehran the adviser on international affairs to the Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati (who was deeply involved in the Iranian diplomacy on Syria), formulated the official point of view on Russian–Iranian cooperation that became widely accepted in the Iranian political establishment. He argued that the Iranian authorities were determined to have “continuous and long-lasting cooperation with Russia” on Syria.22 According to Velayati, “Russian efforts aimed at settlement of the Syrian issue were completely coordinated with Iran”. Occasionally, and also in the past, “Russia and Iran had conflicting views on some aspects of the problem, but, finally, the two countries reached an agreement”.23 In order to emphasise the depth of Russian–Iranian cooperation, the politician also mentioned that, after Putin’s visit to Tehran, the commander of the Al-Quds Force (an IRGC division responsible for extraterritorial military operations including those in Syria), Qasem Soleimani, could become a regular guest to Moscow, facilitating “the exchange of information” between Russia and Iran on Syria.24 Iranian politicians were unanimous in their reaction to the tragedy in which a Russian bomber was shot down by Turkish air forces in November 2015. They recognised Ankara’s decision to attack the Su-24 plane as a serious mistake. Immediately after this event, Rouhani strongly recommended that his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, be more cautious with the use of force, whereas another prominent Iranian politician, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, openly advised the Turkish president to “pay [more] attention to the settlement of domestic issues rather than to the creation of new problems on the international arena”.25

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After November 2015, the majority of Iranian news agencies were also unanimous in their positive coverage of Russian military involvement in Syria. Irrespective of their political preferences, the main news outlets of the Islamic Republic argued that the Russian military deployment was necessary to save the Assad regime. Thus, while the official and conservative news agencies (such as FARS, IRNA, and IRIB) were speaking about the Russian military involvement only in positive and extremely passionate tones, the reformist newspapers such as Mardom Salari, Arman, and Iran were more balanced in their judgements, periodically reminding their readers that the Russia cooperation with Iran in Syria was driven exclusively by Moscow’s pragmatism and not by a partnership obligation.26

What’s the Future of the Russian–Iranian Partnership in Syria? Iranian approaches to the Syrian and Iraqi issue were mainly shaped by the views of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his conservative supporters, who still saw the Islamic Republic as a ‘besieged fortress’. For them, improvement in relations with the West, which started after the signing of the JCPOA in mid-2015, was just a temporary break in the endless struggle for Iran’s national interests.27 Within this approach Tehran’s struggle for Syria was believed to be a part of the greater strategy designed by the Supreme Leader and his team whose final goal was to secure the right of the Islamic Republic to regional supremacy. The Iranian conservatives formulated the concept of the “chain/line of defence” that comprised of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.28 According to the authors of this theory (such as the adviser to the Supreme Leader, Velayati), each of these countries represented a ‘front line’ of the Iranian defence against the international and regional opponents of the Islamic Republic that sought to undermine its influence in the Middle East. Consequently, the weakening of the Iranian presence in these four states could have global negative consequences for Tehran’s geostrategic plans. The list of enemies against whom Iran had been struggling in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen may occasionally differ, but, as a rule, it included the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Both Moscow and Tehran became interested in saving the remaining government institutions in Syria. This common goal allowed for Russian– Iranian cooperation, although each country had its own motivations for

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saving the remnants of the regime. Russia was largely driven by its security concerns and strong beliefs that the building of a new post-conflict Syria would be possible only through the evolution of the old regime, not through its destruction. The confrontation with the West and Putin’s plans to re-establish Russia as an influential world power were the other key factors that led Moscow’s support for the Syrian authorities in their struggle. However, neither Moscow nor Tehran had any illusions about their ultimately divergent goals in Syria. When characterising the level of cooperation between Russia and Iran in Syria, the adviser to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Velayati, argued that “each country pursued its own benefits [by supporting Assad], [but] Russia cannot protect its interests in the Middle East and the region alone”. In turn, Iran agreed to help Moscow. Iranian authorities believed that in Syria, they were involved in a “small world war,” and without Russian support, it will be difficult to profit from the war. In other words, Russia and Iran came to an understanding that in order to secure their own interests in Syria they needed to cooperate. Consequently, Moscow and Tehran formed a marriage of convenience where each partner tried to reach its own goals through joint efforts. Such an approach implied that the partners not only coordinated their activities, but also tried to avoid unnecessary confrontation over issues of secondary importance. They made concessions by temporarily postponing any discussion of disputed issues that might have prevented either side from achieving their primary goals. Despite the positive dynamics in the Russian–Iranian dialogue, several factors substantially limited the cooperation between the two countries. First, the formation of any comprehensive strategic alliances with Tehran was not in Moscow’s interest, as this might have seriously harmed Russian dialogue with other countries of the Middle East including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Moscow had no wish to be part of an Iranian pro-Shi’a camp confronting the GCC-led Sunni coalition. This would affect Russian security, as its Muslim population of 15  million is largely Sunni. Salafi groupings in the Gulf have depicted Russians as new crusaders since the beginning of the civil war in Syria. In October 2015, Moscow received a warning when approximately 50 Saudi clerics signed an open declaration calling for jihad against Moscow. Tehran was also concerned about being involved in the wider Russian confrontation with the West while it sought European technology and money.

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Second, Moscow guaranteed Israel that Russian actions in the Middle East would not pose a threat to Israel. This, of course, was contrary to Iran’s interests. Iran’s aim would be to increase its presence in southern Syria to have better access to Hezbollah and the Israeli borders. The Iranians had also expected a pay-off from Syria when the conflict ended. Instead, they would need to share this with Moscow. This would undermine any revival of the Iran–Iraq–Syria–Mediterranean gas pipeline project that Tehran wanted, but was a concern for Russia. Moreover, a part of the Syrian elite welcomed Russia’s presence as a means to balance Tehran. This would inevitably concern the Iranians whose military leaders did not see Assad as just a mere foreign policy tool. Third, although the drivers that brought Moscow and Tehran together were strong, the destiny of the Russian–Iranian ‘marriage of convenience’ depended on a number of factors. Thus, the serious challenge for the continuation of interaction between Moscow and Tehran would be framed by questions related to the future of post-conflict Syria. Apart from the issue of Assad’s replacement, Russia and Iran might not agree about Kurdish rights in new Syria or the country’s form of governance. Thus, Moscow would not object to the idea of turning Syria into a federal republic whereas Tehran would want to see it only formally federal in order to secure Damascus’ capacities to control the situation in the country. The Iranian authorities would be afraid of the possibility that the federal system could turn the Syrian central authorities supported by them into a formal structure and, thus, undermine Iranian influence. Strong Russian presence in post-conflict Syria might also be a serious impediment for the fulfilment of Iran’s regional plans. Moscow would definitely be against using Syrian territory for the anti-Israeli activities. The Kremlin could also object to Tehran’s plans to resume the discussion with Damascus about the building of the Iran–Iraq–Syria–Mediterranean Sea gas pipeline, whose construction would be against Russian interests in the international gas market.

Russia and Iran After the US Withdrawal from the JCPOA Another challenge that was faced by Moscow and Tehran in the process of developing their relations was the US decision to leave the JCPOA, as stated by President Donald Trump in May 2018. The unpredictability of

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JCPOA’s future immediately revived old rumours that Moscow was de facto profiting from anti-Iranian sanctions, and was much more interested in preserving them rather than lifting them. While there was a certain grain of truth in these speculations, the reality was different and much more complicated. The situation that existed in Iran before May 2018 completely suited Russian interests. Tehran was cornered by the remnants of the sanction regime of 2010–2015. These sanctions, as well as Trump’s threats to impose new punitive measures against Tehran, prevented Western investors from entering the Iranian economy. Yet, these were not an obstacle for Russian businesses. As opposed to their Western rivals, the Russian companies were among the first to trade Iranian oil after the nuclear deal (JCPOA) was signed in 2015. Almost all Russian oil and gas companies were negotiating their participation in Iran’s hydrocarbon projects. By May 2018, the Kremlin was confident that Russia was not limited by time and it should not be in a hurry when working with Iran giving the Iranian leadership time to get used to the idea that there was no alternative to Russia. There were also no illusions in Moscow that Russian businesses could completely replace Westerners. In other words, Russia aimed to fill the niches that it was interested in, but not to take the whole economy. At the same time, the Kremlin was not interested in strengthening the US sanction regime above the existing level. On the one hand, Russia was concerned that new US sanctions could lead to the partial restoration of the pre-2015 sanction regime that could negatively affect Iran’s economy and, thus, lead to socio-economic destabilisation of the country. On the other hand, new sanctions could put pressure on Russia’s companies interested in Iran and make them withdraw. Consequently, Moscow demonstrated clear interest in securing the implementation of the JCPOA and motivating Iran to stay loyal to the deal. Nevertheless, after statements by Trump in May 2018 this negative scenario became a reality. The tone of the statements by Russian and Iranian officials on the prospect of bilateral cooperation under sanctions differed. While the Russians tried to be cautious, the Iranians (due to obvious propaganda reasons) declared the beginning of a new age of Russian–Iranian partnership determined by Trump’s decision to leave the JCPOA, naturally pushing Tehran towards Moscow.29 Thus, they repeated the words of the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Sanaei, that Russian oil companies were about to sign new contracts in Iran. As argued by Sanaei and Rosneft, Gazprom made significant progress in negotiations with the

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Iran. Gazprom intended to invest in the development of the Iranian LNG producing capacities. Rosneft, in turn, signed a cooperation road map with the NIOC that implied USD30 billion of investments in the oil and gas sector of Iran (the total oil output of projects to be developed by Rosneft might reach 55  million metric tons annually).30 Gazprom Neft provided Iran with the technical plan to develop the Cheshm-e Khosh and Shanguleh oil fields. In early December 2017, it also stepped up the proposal to develop the Iraqi Badr oil field and Iranian Azar oil field, as a united cluster (obviously hoping to profit from Iranian intentions to develop border oil fields). Yet, all these intentions have never been implemented due to a number of reasons. First, Iran was interested in demonstrating to the international community that Trump’s actions were futile. By speaking about plans to get closer with the Russians, Tehran was trying to play on the American nerves, believing that US policymakers would not like to see Iran and Russia forming a real alliance under the pressure of sanctions. Second, blunt statements on the prospects of Russian–Iranian cooperation under sanctions were often made by Iranian or Russian politicians who were not responsible for the practical development of these ties.31 Those who were responsible, on the contrary, were often modest in their statements. They probably understood that Trump’s decision would not help in the development of economic ties between the two countries.32 Third, the Russian policymakers and businessmen were critical about the US decision to restore sanctions. This criticism was not determined by compassion to Iranian problems, but by the negative attitude towards sanctions as an instrument of political pressure. It is important to note that Moscow was also under the US sanctions and could not afford to be silent on this issue. The same was true for Russian business. On May 25, 2018, the managing director of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, heavily criticised the US decision to use sanctions against Iran and Venezuela. Yet, if read between the lines, his speech largely reflected the concerns of Russian businesses on the sanctions imposed on Russia.33 In practice, Russian businesses seemed to be ready to adopt ‘wait and see’ tactics and, if necessary, were prepared to step back from Iran in certain areas. There had already been the case of a Russian company’s withdrawal from Iran, allegedly under the influence of US sanctions. Thus, in May 2018, the Russian–Middle Eastern Trade Centre declared its decision to leave Iran.34 This company had been contracted to build desalination facilities in Iran. Shortly after, one of Russia’s main oil producers, Lukoil,

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also stated its intention to leave Iran. As of June 2018, other Russian companies operating in Iran had showed interest in continuing their efforts to enter the Iranian market.35 However, there was a clear understanding that Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA made this task more risky and challenging. Although the Kremlin had been trying to ensure its Iranian partners its readiness to continue business with Tehran, further Russian presence in this country depended on two factors: first, the behaviour of the Europeans. Moscow observeed whether EU politicians were to support their statements on EU readiness to secure ties with Iran in order to make sure that Russia would not be standing alone against the US if decided to protect Iran from the American sanctions.36 The second factor was Trump’s determination to restore sanctions and implement new measures against Iran. By 2019, none of these factors could persuade Russia that it should keep its business in Iran.  Moscow’s leverage to affect the US behaviour was negligible (if not nil). This was officially recognised. In early May 2018, Lavrov argued that Russia could do nothing about new sanctions that would be imposed by Trump.37 The Kremlin was not ready to fight for Iran. If Moscow saw that the situation was not developing in favour of Iran, and the Europeans failed to present an appropriate resistance to the Americans, the majority of Russian oil and gas companies would probably put cooperation with Tehran on hold or at least reassess their strategies in Iran. Nevertheless, this would not mean the complete disruption of cooperation, as this would inevitably backfire, compromising the political dialogue between the two countries, which Moscow would try to avoid. In the worst-case scenario, if the Europeans left Iran and the United States placed secondary sanctions, the area of cooperation would probably shrink and be limited to the number of projects actively protected by the Russian government, or that were in the areas not covered by sanctions such as the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the building of the Sirik power plant, and, maybe, Russian Railways Company (RZD) projects. Government oil companies would also try to remain in Iran, and, probably maintain their presence hoping to secure their share of the Iranian market until better times. Yet, despite Russia’s ‘wait and see’ response, Moscow did not plan to stay completely idle and wanted to try to protect Iran from external pressure. Russian vice prime minister Dmitry Kozak stated on May 17, 2018, that Moscow saw difficulties for its companies in Iran, including those caused by the use of dollars for financial transactions.38 Yet, it would seek to minimise the negative effect on bilateral relations. First, Moscow

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thought to return to the situation of 2012–2015 when the lion’s share of business between the two countries was done in grey areas by small and medium enterprises that were not affected by sanctions (for some of them, Iran was the only external market). Second, Russia could try to create a legal means to avoid the US sanctions. Trump’s sanctions could boost the use of national currencies in bilateral trade; Novak argued that local currencies could be used by Russia in oil deals with Iran, although he emphasised that this would require the creation of certain administrative mechanisms.39 Russian and Iranian businessmen would open corresponding accounts in Russian and Iranian banks. Moscow also established direct connections between Russian and Iranian banking systems. Also, in November 2017, Russia and Iran implemented the ‘oil-for-­ goods’ programme where Moscow purchased Iranian oil in exchange for Russian machinery and investment. This initiative had been discussed since the early 2010s. Initially, it was meant to help Iran evade the oil trade embargo imposed by the United States, the EU, and their partners. This programme saved Iran’s economy form collapse and provided Russian companies with additional oil reserves to trade abroad. After the adoption of the JCPOA, the discussion of this deal was postponed, but later renewed. This time, the oil-for-goods programme was expected to compensate for the lack of financial reserves in Iran that had stopped Tehran from paying for imports of Russian equipment in hard currency. If the United States had tried to persuade the buyers of Iranian oil to find alternative suppliers, the oil-for-goods programme could be used for the needs it had been initially supposed to satisfy. In 2017, Moscow confirmed that, in 2018, it planned to continue the implementation of this programme. It was expected that Moscow would buy 5 million tons of oil annually from Iran. In exchange, the Kremlin had planned to supply Iran with goods of the value of USD45 billion. Third, on May 17, 2018, the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran signed a temporary agreement on the creation of a free trade zone that implied the lowering of existing trade tariffs and custom duties.40 This move would not be able to have a positive global effect on Iran’s economy. The overall volume of trade between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran had been USD2.7  billion (the share of Russian–Iranian trade was USD1.7 billion), and this would not dramatically increase. The immediate positive effect was also questionable. According to Kozak, Russian business would be able to earn an additional USD150 million.41 Yet, this free trade zone would create certain loopholes for sanctions evasion and still

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help to develop the Russian–Iranian economic relations under sanctions. Between 2012 and 2015, Iran had also been actively using the post-Soviet space as a territory from which it could access technologies and funds, and even reach international financial systems.42 Finally, Russia and Iran also discussed exotic ways to evade new US sanctions. As a method to compensate for the potential removal of Iran from the SWIFT system, Tehran suggested the use of crypto-currencies for bilateral financial transactions. According to the head of the economic commission of the majlis, Mohammad Reza Pourebrahimi, the Central Bank of Iran had already received a proposal to study this option.43 In May 2018, Pourebrahimi met his Russian counterpart, the head of Duma’s economic commission, Dmitry Mezentcev, and suggested the use of crypto-currencies for bilateral trade. According to the Iranian MP, the reaction of Russian parliamentarians was positive, although there was no precedent that crypto-currencies had been used in this way before.44

Conclusion Rouhani’s presidency outlined two main directions of the Russian–Iranian political dialogue: the situation in Syria and the future of the JCPOA. In both of these cases the two countries strived to strengthen cooperation and substantial results were  achieved. Yet, the Russian-Iranian  dialogue also had its limits. Thus, Moscow and Tehran were forced to become partners in Syria under the influence of different  circumstances. However, their cooperation was occasionally limited by those cases where they were both interested in this interaction. The further forming of the full-fleged alliance was hampered by mutual mistrust and concerns that this  could harm Russian and Iranian relations with third countries. It could therefore be concluded that Russian–Iranian dialogue on Syria had already reach the maximum of its potential by the end of the first Rouhani’s presidential term in the office. While actively discussing the issue of US sanctions with Moscow, Tehran still counted on Russia as the last resort in the JCPOA issue. This was determined by the fact that Russia could offer Iran only diplomatic support and some marginal practical  measures to mitigate the negative effects of American sanctions. The latter was largely because of the lack of economic potential to help Iran, although, if it could, Moscow would assist Tehran in sanctions evasion. One might expect that Moscow would be more active in protecting Iran’s interests in its stand-off with the US,

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and try to mobilise the international community against the United States. Russia and Russian businesses, on the contrary, had chosen a wait-and-see strategy. Moscow did not want to leave Tehran, but it was to limit its economic presence in Iran considering the threat of the American secondary sanctions to be imposed against Russian business.

Notes 1. Dabirkhane-ye Shoura-ye Ettelaatrasane-ye Doulat, Barname-ye Doulat-e Nehom (Tehran: 2005): 8–16. 2. Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies, Tehran, October 2017, March 2018. 3. Interviews with Iranian experts of Tehran’s foreign policy, IRAS, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran, March 2018. 4. Interviews with Iranian experts of Tehran’s foreign policy, IRAS, University of Tehran. Tehran, Iran, March 2018. 5. Patrick Clawson, “Iran beyond Oil?,” The Policy Watch, No. 2062, April 3, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranbeyond-oil. 6. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” http:// eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23341. 7. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August 18, 2016, https://carne gie . r u/2 0 16 / 0 8/ 1 8 / r u ssi a -a n d -i ran-histori c -mi str ust-a ndcontemporary-partnership-pub-64365. 8. Vladimir Sazhin, “Istoriya s Vizitom Putina v Iran Dostoyna Izucheniya v Institutah Mezhdunarodnyh Otnosheniy,” Iran.Ru, August 1, 2013. 9. Aleksey Topalov, “Rossiya Zamakhnulas na Iranskiye Nedra,” Gazeta. Ru, March 14, 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2017/03/13/10574165.shtml. 10. Lubov Stepushova, “Noviy Gazoviy Kartel: Rossiya, Iran, Azerbayjan,” Pravda, August 9, 2016, https://www.pravda.ru/economics/materials/ gas/09-08-2016/1309352-iran-0/. 11. Interviews with Iranian businessmen and policymakers, Rasht, Iran, December 25, 2011; London, the UK, June–July 2015. 12. Kira Latukhina, “Vladimir Putin Obsudil s Iranskim Politikom Borbu s Terrorizmom,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 22, 2015, http://www.rg. ru/2015/10/22/larijani-site-anons.html. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.

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15. Interview with the expert on the Middle East. Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2015. 16. Alex Vatanka, “Russia, Iran and the Syria Test,” The Middle East Institute, September 30, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/ russia-iran-and-syria-test. 17. For instance, see http://www.globalresearch.ca/iran-special-forces-fightingisis-terrorists-in-syria/5482392. 18. Interviews with the experts on Syria, Beirut, Lebanon; London, St. Andrews, the UK. May–August 2015. 19. Elena Dunayeva, “Voyennaya Operatciya Rossii v Sirii: Vzglyad iz Tegerana,” Institute of the Middle East, October 14, 2015, http://www. iimes.ru/?p=26236. 20. Jack Stubbs and Polina Devitt, “Russia Stance on Assad Suggests Divergence with Iran,” Reuters, November 3, 2015, http://www.reuters. com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKCN0SS0TY20151103. 21. Alex Vatanka, “Russia, Iran and the Syria Test,” The Middle East Institute, September 30, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/russia-iranand-syria-test. 22. “Velayati: Asad Khatt-e Qermez-e Ma-ast,” Mehr, 14 Azar 1394. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. “Erdagan be Ja-ye Farafkani Mushkelat-e Turkiye-ra Hall Konad,” Mehr, 17 Azar 1394. 26. Mohammad Mahdi Mozaheri, “Tagyir dar Vaziyat-e Suriye: Chera va Chegune?,” Mardam Salari, 5 Dey 1394, http://tinyurl.com/z4m4j4u; Ellahe Qullayi, “Jeupolitik-e Iran dar Negah-e Rusiye,” Arman, 5 Dey 1394, http://tinyurl.com/oqdowug. 27. “Bashar Asad Nakhohad Raft,” Mehr, 28 Azar 1394; “Luzumi Nadorad ta in Khadd dar Muqabele Amrika Latif Bashim,” Mehr, 29 Azar 1394; “Bahs-e Tagyir-e Bashar Asad Kharidari dar Bazar-e Siyasi-ye Khavar Miyane Nadarad,” Mehr, 29 Azar 1394 28. “Bashar Asad Nakhohad Raft,” Mehr, 28 Azar 1394. 29. Denis Davydov, “Vozobnovleniye Sanktciy SShA, kak i Ozhidalos, Sblizilo Iran i Rossiyu,” Tekhnoblog, May 16, 2018, https://teknoblog. ru/2018/05/16/89381. 30. Ibid. 31. “Volodin: SShA Provodyat Sanktcionnuyu Politiky protiv Aktivno Razvivayushchikhsya Stran,” TASS, May 15, 2018, http://tass.ru/ ekonomika/5200151. 32. “Kozak: Riski dlya Biznesa RF v Irane iz-za Sanktciy SShA Est, no Ikh  Mozhno Minimizirovat,” TASS, May 17, 2018, http://tass.ru/ ekonomika/5208923.

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33. Mikhail Kalmatckiy, “Nerynochniye Obstoyatelstva,” Federal Press, May 25, 2018, http://fedpress.ru/article/2052377. 34. “Iz-za Sanktciy Kompaniya Syna Chayki Otkazalas ot Proyekta v Irane za 180 Milliona Dollarov,” TV Rain, May 10, 2018, https://tvrain.ru/ news/igorja_chajki_irane-463406/. 35. “Kozak: Riski dlya Biznesa RF v Irane iz-za Sanktciy SShA Est, no Ikh Mozhno Minimizirovat,” TASS, May 17, 2018, http://tass.ru/ ekonomika/5208923. 36. Aleksandr Andreev, “Rossya Prizvala ne Ignorirovat Interesy Partnerov Irana v Situatcii s Sanktciyami,” Parlamentskaya Gazeta, May 10, 2018, https://www.pnp.ru/politics/rossiya-prizvala-ne-ignorirovat-interesypartnyorov-irana-v-situacii-s-sankciyami.html. 37. “Lavrov Schel ne Podlezhashchey Peresmotru Otmenu Sanktciy SB OON protiv Irana,” RBC, May 10, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5 af430ac9a79471125fe4a64. 38. “Kozak: Riski dlya Biznesa RF v Irane iz-za Sanktciy SShA Est, no Ikh Mozhno Minimizirovat,” TASS, May 17, 2018, http://tass.ru/ ekonomika/5208923. 39. “Raschety v Yevro za Iranskuyu Neft ne Okazhut Vliyaniya na Neftyanoy i Valutniy Rynki,” 1Prime, May 16, 2018, https://1prime.ru/Financial_ market/20180516/828830635.html. 40. “Kozak: Riski dlya Biznesa RF v Irane iz-za Sanktciy SShA Est, no Ikh  Mozhno Minimizirovat,” TASS, May 17, 2018, http://tass.ru/ ekonomika/5208923. 41. Ibid. 42. Nikolay Kozhanov, “The US Economic Sanctions against Iran: Undermined by External Factors,” The Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2011. 43. Mikhail Tetkin, “Iran i Rossiya Mogut Nachat Ispolzovat Kriptovaluty dlya Obkhoda Sanktciy,” RBC, May 17, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/crypto/ news/5afd4fb69a794757df44fa3a. 44. Ibid.

Bibliography 1Prime. “Raschety v Yevro za Iranskuyu Neft ne Okazhut Vliyaniya na Neftyanoy i Valutniy Rynki.” May 16, 2018. https://1prime.ru/Financial_market/20180516/828830635.html. Andreev, Aleksandr. “Rossya Prizvala ne Ignorirovat Interesy Partnerov Irana v Situatcii s Sanktciyami.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta, May 10, 2018. https://www. pnp.ru/politics/rossiya-prizvala-ne-ignorirovat-interesy-partnyorov-irana-vsituacii-s-sankciyami.html.

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Clawson, Patrick. “Iran beyond Oil?” The Policy Watch, no. 2062, (2013). http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-beyond-oil. Davydov, Denis. “Vozobnovleniye Sanktciy SShA, kak i Ozhidalos, Sblizilo Iran i Rossiyu.” Tekhnoblog, May 16, 2018. https://teknoblog.ru/2018/ 05/16/89381. Dunayeva, Elena. “Voyennaya Operatciya Rossii v Sirii: Vzglyad iz Tegerana.” Institute of the Middle East, October 14, 2015. http://www.iimes. ru/?p=26236. Kalmatckiy, Mikhail. “Nerynochniye Obstoyatelstva.” Federal Press, May 25, 2018. http://fedpress.ru/article/2052377. Kozhanov, Nikolay. “The US Economic Sanctions against Iran: Undermined by External Factors.” The Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, (Fall 2011). Latukhina, Kira. “Vladimir Putin Obsudil s Iranskim Politikom Borbu s Terrorizmom.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 22, 2015. http://www.rg. ru/2015/10/22/larijani-site-anons.html. Putin, Vladimir. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” Speech, Moscow, December 4, 2014. http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23341. Stepushova, Lubov. “Noviy Gazoviy Kartel: Rossiya, Iran, Azerbayjan.” Pravda, August 9, 2016. https://www.pravda.ru/economics/materials/gas/09-0 8-2016/1309352-iran-0/. Stubbs, Jack and Polina Devitt. “Russia Stance on Assad Suggests Divergence with Iran.” Reuters, November 3, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKCN0SS0TY20151103. Tetkin, Mikhail. “Iran i Rossiya Mogut Nachat Ispolzovat Kriptovaluty dlya Obkhoda Sanktciy.” RBC, May 17, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/crypto/news/ 5afd4fb69a794757df44fa3a. Topalov, Aleksey. “Rossiya Zamakhnulas na Iranskiye Nedra.” Gazeta.Ru, March 14, 2017. https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2017/03/13/10574165.shtml. Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership.” Carnegie Moscow Center, August 18, 2016. https://carnegie. ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporar ypartnership-pub-64365. Vatanka, Alex. “Russia, Iran and the Syria Test.” The Middle East Institute, September 30, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/russia-iranand-syria-test.

CHAPTER 8

Regaining Space: Iranian Foreign Policy Toward Latin America During the First Presidential Term of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2017) Sergio I. Moya Mena

Introduction Iranian relations with Latin America and particularly with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, for its Spanish acronym) acquired a notable vitality during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). One of the most significant examples of this relation was the anti-imperialist speech that Ahmadinejad endorsed along with left-­ wing leaders like Hugo Chavez, Daniel Ortega, and Evo Morales. This anti-imperialist speech came to create tension with the United States, precisely when Iran launched a nuclear energy program that was questioned by some Western countries. Relations between Iran and Latin America experienced remarkable progress, but they did not meet Teheran’s

S. I. Moya Mena (*) University of Costa Rica, San Pedro, Costa Rica e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_8

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expectations, especially in economic terms. Hassan Rouhani posed a new type of relation with the world, and when he became president, it raised questions about the possibility of changing or maintaining those relations. In effect, a series of changes and continuations can be identified during the first administration of Rouhani (2013–2017). By considering Iran’s relations with its main counterparts in Latin America, this chapter will analyze the evolution of Iranian foreign policy during this term and will show how the Islamic Republic has left the anti-imperialist and anti– United States rhetoric behind in order to make way for a pragmatic foreign policy that is less contentious and more centered on expanding economic and commercial exchanges.

Legacy of the Ahmadinejad Administration Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy is founded on two pillars: one policy of “accommodation” and another that can be called “policy of alliances.”1 With the former, the Iranian president sought to expand cooperation with the most important Arab countries and additional significant partners in the Middle East and Caucasus. On the other hand, with the “policy of alliances,” Ahmadinejad hoped to avoid a possible attack from the United States by building alliances with regional and non-regional states2 that could eventually provide support for top objectives of Iran’s foreign policy, like the nuclear program. It is within this second pillar that relations with Latin America and Iran were framed, reaching their highest intensity during the administrations of Ahmadinejad in Iran (2005–2013) and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (2002–2013). President Chavez opened Latin America’s doors to Iran and pushed for diverse cooperation initiatives with the Islamic Republic. Within these established ties to some countries in the region, this country found a space to diversify political alliances founded on anti-imperialism and to reduce the impact of economic sanctions, which meant “situational” links born from the feeling of Iran’s insecurity before the United States. However, despite a large quantity of initiatives and established agreements between the Islamic Republic and countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, Nicaragua, Bolivia, or Ecuador, by the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, it was clear that these relations were not sufficiently solidified on a political and diplomatic plane; nor were they worthwhile or strong in the economic area, just as its defenders had predicted.

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Start of the Rouhani Era Even though his election campaign was based on domestic topics like corruption and the country’s economic problems,3 Hassan Rouhani argued that many of Iran’s problems had roots in the country’s international relations. He affirmed that “it was time for foreign policy to serve Iran’s economy.”4 On the nuclear issue, Rouhani said that “the spinning of uranium enrichment would be valuable when the economy’s wheels also spun.”5 Once he was sworn in as president in 2013, Rouhani bet on a new strategy of reunion with the world, replacing the contentious policy of Ahmadinejad. In his first press conference, Rouhani declared that he hoped to increase mutual trust between Iran and other countries, and he boasted about his prior experience as an Iranian chief negotiator in nuclear matters from 2003 to 2005. The new president stated that his proposal would avoid punitive sanctions and resolutions from the United Nations against Iran that characterized the era of Ahmadinejad. In this sense, his moderate and constructive foreign policy focused on two priorities: resolving the nuclear problem and alleviating tensions with neighbors. All the other factors, both themed and regional, were subordinate to those two large objectives, which led Rouhani to dedicate his first year as president to bettering the image of the Islamic Republic before the international community and to presenting himself and his government as “ready” to deal seriously with the West. If Ahmadinejad’s interest in Latin America had already been subject to criticism within Iran due to a lack of concrete results, it did not seem feasible that Rouhani would maintain the same interest in the region as his predecessor. Despite this, the new president stated shortly after taking office that he considered Latin America as “one of the priorities of his administration’s foreign policy,” even though he insisted that his fundamental mission was “to improve ties with neighbors, Islamic countries, and non-allied countries.”6 The setting of relations with Latin America was complex for Rouhani. In previous years, Iran had notably expanded its relations with the region, although with few concrete benefits and some setbacks at the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidential term, which concerned the three most important actors for Teheran in the area. With Venezuela, Iran had found a partner that endorsed the same loud anti-imperialist rhetoric of Ahmadinejad, but beyond that, in spite of hundreds of signed bilateral agreements (around a thousand according to one Iranian diplomat

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interviewed in Caracas),7 the relation seemed to contribute little to the country. With Argentina, the lack of interest from Teheran to advance the Memorandum of Understanding established between the two countries to “resolve” the attack against the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA, for its Spanish acronym) had taken the diplomatic relations to a level of practically no communication and led to a notable descent in trade. The deterioration was also noted in Brazil, where President Dilma Rousseff had distanced the country from the friendly policies of Lula da Silva toward Iran, and she began to question the condition of human rights in the Islamic Republic, leaning toward a rapprochement with the United States. In this context, the Rouhani administration considered relations with Latin America through a process that involved consistencies and breakdowns. Iran continued with many bilateral rapprochements carried out during the period of Ahmadinejad; however, emphasis was clearly placed on economics and business, and the presidential diplomacy acquired a lower profile. Furthermore, Teheran benefited from the possibility of reintegration in the international economy eased by the nuclear agreement to expand relations with countries with which it had not had significant ties in the past. Iran was also able to recover strategic relations with Brazil. It is important to remember that, during the best time for relations between ex-president Lula da Silva and Ahmadinejad, Brazil was considered the “trophy” of Iran’s foreign policy in Latin America. In terms of breakdowns, Iranian diplomacy set aside the anti-­imperialistic and anti–United States rhetoric that characterized it during the Ahmadinejad era. For the first time in more than three decades, Iranian and U.S. diplomats sat at the same table to negotiate the nuclear agreement. Teheran did not want to create distorted or provoking speeches that would interfere with the negotiation. The call to build anti-imperialistic and anti–United States axes between the Islamic Republic and left-wing Latin American governments was left behind.

Venezuela Venezuela is the Latin American country with which Iran has endorsed more agreements and conventions, although with very limited assessment. There are few significant displays of cooperation between the two countries other than the following: collaborating to build housing called the “Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela” (Great Housing Mission of Venezuela),

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Table 8.1  Exports from Latin American Countries to Iran 2012–2016 (Unit: 1000 US Dollars) Country

Argentina Brazil Colombia Venezuela Mexico Chile

Year 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

987,374 2,183,928 1045 0 5689 1528

1,102,961 1,609,137 505 0 471 4060

928,825 1,439,185 806 0 257 4384

721,085 1,666,185 745 0 326 9443

426,477 2,232,512 2355 0 324 19,928

Source: Prepared by the author using Trade Map and Iran International Magazine

which built 1,725,000 houses by August 20178; a cement plant built in the Monagas State together with the Iranian company Ehdasse Sanat; the binational automotive company VENIRAN that assembles tractors and two types of automobiles (Centauro and Turipal); and the Iranian line of credit for US$500 million announced in 2015. Established in 2009, the Binational Bank has had very limited operations due to the severe economic situation of Venezuela, which has also affected investments and the expansion of combined initiatives such as VENIRAN. Furthermore, commercial trade is nonexistent. After years of tense relations between these two countries, Venezuela does not export anything to Iran9 (see Table 8.1). Iranian investments in the pharmaceutical industry and the sale of Iranian tankers would continue to be in a state of uncertainty at the end of the first presidency of Rouhani. President Maduro even asked to reinstate the Caracas–Teheran air route, claiming that “it would give greater opportunities to both countries to obtain more knowledge and facilitate the process of exporting goods,” but Iranian authorities seemed to not be convinced of Venezuela’s ability to become a promising economic partner, especially after the profound crisis that this South American nation’s economy currently suffers. Despite the limited nature of the economic and commercial relations, the presidential diplomacy has maintained a certain energy. Rouhani and his Venezuelan counterpart Nicolas Maduro met on four occasions: September 2014 (New York),10 January 2015 (Teheran),11 September 2015 (New York),12 and October 2016 (Teheran).13 During these meetings, the presidents called to “deepen bilateral relations” and agreed on common policies to obtain stability in the price of oil.

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Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of both countries have responded to the most noticeable events and occurrences in the two nations. Thus, during the analyzed period, Venezuela reiterated on many occasions its support of Iran in its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful means, while Teheran expressed its support of Maduro’s government in the face of different protest conferences that his administration has experienced since 2014.

Brazil If Iran was able to maintain relations with Venezuela, stripping it of the anti–United States rhetoric, Brazil presents an important “recuperation of land” for Iranian diplomacy in the region. When President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad governed their respective countries, Brasilia became one of the most influential extra-regional allies of Iran. Ahmadinejad found Lula da Silva to be a willing leader to mediate the most delicate topics of Iranian relations with the international community and found him capable of sponsoring, along with Teheran and Ankara, a diplomatic agreement to exchange enriched uranium that allowed Iran to avoid new international sanctions.14 However, the arrival of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency in January 2011 meant a “cooling” of relations with Teheran. On the one hand, Brazil began to question the human rights situation in Iran, which meant votes against this country on the United Nation’s Human Rights Commission, particularly in matters related to the condition of women. On the other hand, the Brazilian president decided to distance her country from Iran for geopolitical reasons and specifically due to a desire to become closer to the United States. A clear sign of this distancing between both countries was when Ahmadinejad visited Brazil in June 2012 to participate in the conference Rio+20, during which the Brazilian president refused to meet the Iranian leader.15 After the cooling of diplomatic relations between the Rousseff and Ahmadinejad administrations and the decreasing bilateral trade that went from US$2367  million in 2012 to US$1444  million in 2014 (see Table 8.1), the Rouhani administration managed to advance the commercial agenda and bilateral cooperation. Rouhani’s moderate and practical foreign policy was well received at the Itamaraty Palacy (location of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This showed their “satisfaction” of the preliminary agreement achieved in

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April 2015 between Iran and six world powers of the P5+1 group. Application of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) invigorated and facilitated meetings between both nations, opening the door to a possibility of resuming commercial trade, which was strongly affected in recent years by sanctions placed against Iran. This in turn made it difficult to establish financial flows necessary to make Brazilian exports viable on a large scale.16 Just a month after signing JCPOA, the deputy director general of the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), Abbas Kazemi, reported that his country was negotiating with Brazil to build a petroleum refinery that could process 300,000 barrels per day (bpd).17 At the same time, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, gathered with his Brazilian counterpart Mauro Vieira, emphasized that Teheran “will not forget Brazil’s active role regarding the Iranian nuclear issue”18 and highlighted the “wide possibilities to open doors and allow Brazil to access new markets in central Asia, which has a population of around 350 million people.” For his part, Rouhani met with Rousseff in New  York in September 2015 and declared that “Iran was in a place to increase its level of cooperation with countries in the BRICS group, among those Brazil.” According to what he said, Brazil was a country that “held a special place among the Latin American countries.” In this context, the Iranian president stressed that the new environment created after the JCPOA milestone would permit Brazilian businesses and companies to have an active presence in the economic sector of Iran. These encounters produced a rapid revitalization of economic and commercial relations and specifically triggered activities and meetings from the Political Consultation Mechanism, established between the two countries in 1999. On October 27, the Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, assured that Brazil sought to purchase Iranian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and to cooperate in building teams for the oil industry. In February 2016, Brazil lifted sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program, while Minister of Trade Armando Monteiro said: “Everyone is racing after Iran now. … The trade potential is very big.”19 Brazil also announced that it would accept euros and other currencies from Iran to pay for the sale of planes, cars, and machinery as a way to avoid U.S. sanctions. At the same time, he made known his interest in acquiring 50 planes from the Brazilian group EMBRAER, the world’s third largest commercial airplane maker after Boeing and Airbus,20 and in July of that year, he

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also announced that Iran had purchased 60,000  tons of raw sugar from Brazil. In the context of the work of the Brazil–Iran Economic Trade Commission, an agreement on trade and investment promotion was passed by both countries in November 2016 in which they agreed to push a joint agenda in areas such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, and technology parks.21 Near the final months of Rouhani’s first presidency, expectations for deepening trade relations were high. According to Brazilian trade authorities, the goal was to make commercial flow between the two countries USD$5 billion.22

Argentina The notable development of relations with Brazil contrasts, at least in the diplomatic realm, relations between Iran and Argentina, which are clouded by legal consequences of the perpetrated terrorist attack on the AMIA in 1994. At that time, Argentine authorities blamed this on a group of Iranian officials and diplomats, whom INTERPOL had issued orders to capture.23 In 2013, both governments agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding which proposed that the Argentine judge in charge of the AMIA case go to Iran to interrogate the accused suspects of the attack. The agreement also outlined a commission integrated by five commissioners and two members designated by each country who would evaluate the evidence included in the legal record. This Memorandum was permanently defended by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s administration (2007–2015), despite rejection from many sectors of the Argentine opposition and from the influential local Jewish community represented by organizations like AMIA and the Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA for the Spanish acronym, “Delegation of Argentine Israeli Associations”). In February 2014, Foreign Minister Hector Timerman rejected requests to repeal the Memorandum from the two Jewish organizations, even though he recognized that carrying out the agreement “was taking more time than necessary,” given that it was signed in January 2013 and they still had not found those responsible for the attack. Argentine authorities have reached twenty years now without solving the case. The Argentine government’s frustration led them to suspend dialogue with

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Teheran, which generated a breakdown in bilateral relations that would continue until the end of Rouhani’s first presidency. Despite repeated criticism and no progress in implementing the Memorandum, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner insisted on defending the agreement with Iran in places such as the United Nations General Assembly. During her last speech at the UN, Fernandez de Kirchner referred to the topic, reviewing the legal and political fluctuations since 1994 and comparing the Memorandum with the nuclear agreement between the 5+1 Group and Iran. However, she admitted that the process was virtually paralyzed. “We can appeal only to the goodwill of Iran because we do not have any other means to attain the declaration of the [accused] Iranians,” said the Argentine president.24 Facing the Argentine administration’s insistence, Iran restricted themselves from recognizing that the Memorandum was an “obligation of State” and accepting that an Argentine judge travel to Teheran to interrogate the accused. However, at the same time, Iranian diplomatic sources warned that “the text of the Memorandum did not specify that Iran had to do what the Argentine judge said.” In reality, the agreement with Argentina was never a relevant topic for Iran, which was worried about regional and international conflicts of much higher importance and impacts on its foreign policy interests. Iran’s only expectation was to eliminate international warrants from INTERPOL for various important figures in Iranian politics, and these attempts were unsuccessful.25 On May 15, 2014, Argentine authorities determined that the Memorandum of Understanding was “anti-constitutional,” given that it violated powers of the judiciary. This decision was questioned by Foreign Minister Timerman, claiming that it “invaded powers of the executive branch and Congress,” while the Iranian government only said that it “regretted the decision of Argentine authorities” and at the same time insisted on the “lack of foundation of accusations drawn out against its citizens.”26 “The Iranian government considered the Memorandum of Understanding to be an adequate solution and an opportunity to uncover the truth in regards to the AMIA tragedy and solutions to differences in this way, but the Argentine court deprived both sides of that opportunity,” commented Marzieh Afkham, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shortly after the unconstitutional declaration. Although it is a fact that the AMIA case has drastically clouded diplomatic relations between the two countries, it is worth mentioning that this has been one of the most complex cases in Argentine legal history and its

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file has been at the center of much extrajudicial tampering. Furthermore, Iran’s responsibility is hardly a hypothesis as one of the judges in charge of the process had recognized it.27 In any case, disinterest from the Rouhani administration has been evident by “opening up” this legal process and not searching for any strategy of rapprochement with Argentina.

Iran and the Countries of ALBA Ahmadinejad’s administration maintained ideological proximity with Latin American countries that were members of ALBA.28 Relations with these countries did not see any substantial progress in Rouhani’s first administration. As for Ecuador, there was an exchange of visits between vice ministers of foreign affairs and trade, the latter part of their title being a topic that formed a central piece of the relationship. On May 10, 2016, the National Assembly of Ecuador passed the Trade Agreement between Ecuador and Iran, and in October of that year, Ecuador opened a trade office in the Iranian capital with the intent of promoting Ecuadorian exports and attracting investments for strategic sectors of Ecuadorian economy. In the bilateral discussion, both countries also highlighted the importance of expanding cooperation in areas such as mining, oil, and nanotechnology. Likewise, they stressed the possibility of counting on Iranian financing for social housing projects in Ecuador, a proposal based on the Venezuelan model “Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela.” Iranian authorities have also laid out the possibility that their country would become a logistical platform for Ecuadorian products to arrive in central Asia. During Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit to Ecuador in August 2016, the financial and economic agenda moved forward with the signing of different agreements between the Central Bank of Ecuador and Bank Merkazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, intended to facilitate bank payments for business activities.29 As for Bolivia, their wish to develop nuclear energy with Iranian counsel stands out.30 Additionally, during a meeting of vice ministers of foreign affairs in Teheran in September 2015, the Iranian government voiced their support for Bolivia’s maritime aspiration. Bolivia has a legal dispute with Chile to attain an exit to the Pacific Ocean. On that occasion, Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi said: “The best way to reach a solution for the maritime dispute that Bolivia has with Chile is through dialogue.”31

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Cuba was the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that Rouhani visited for bilateral reasons during his first term. In September 2016, the Iranian government visited Cuba during a peculiar moment as both countries started to experience benefits after the removal of financial sanctions imposed by the United States. Rouhani met with Cuban President Raul Castro to discuss the state of bilateral financial cooperation and opportunities to expand in areas such as the latest technology. Rouhani also met with Fidel Castro to speak about topics like climate change, constantly increasing world population, and dangers that lurk for preserving world peace.32

Trade Relations Latin America has not ever been a significant trade partner for Iran. Despite efforts from Teheran to increase commercial ties with the region and therefore lessen the impact of financial sanctions during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, Latin American countries have been far from becoming important partners. Brazil and Argentina represent barely 6% of Iranian imports. The Islamic Republic has maintained close political relations with other countries such as Venezuela, and these countries do not export anything to Iran. The table shows the deteriorating Latin American exports as a consequence of the sanctions. The most notable case is Brazil, whose exports fell by 35% between 2012 and 2014. As for Argentina, the worsening political–diplomatic relationship between the two countries, resulting from the failed Memorandum of Understanding in 2015, is evident in the decrease of Argentine exports. On the other hand, the effect of passing JCPOA in 2015 is clear, which has a positive impact on the recovery of exports for countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Chile. The main products that Brazil exports to Iran are meat, edible offal, residue and waste from the food industry, fodder prepared for animals, cereals, sugar, oleaginous seeds and grains, diverse fruits, and medicines, among others. On the other side, Iran’s exports to Brazil include iron, steel, dry fruits, nuts, and citrus and melon fruit peels. Argentine exports to Iran are similar. The bulk of their exports are residue and waste from the food industry, fodder prepared for animals, animal or vegetable fat and oil, prepared edible fat, and pharmaceutical products.

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Relations with Other Countries The new reasonable tone of Iranian foreign policy and JCPOA negotiations created an atmosphere that favored expanding relations with countries that Iran had not had any close ties with during the Ahmadinejad era. In terms of Mexico, since January 2014, the Rouhani administration had been achieving rapprochement destined to strengthen trade, but it was not until passing JCPOA that Iran started more direct bilateral actions. In November 2015, Deputy Foreign Minister Ravanchi conducted a work visit, accompanied by a business delegation. Ravanchi and his Mexican counterpart Carlos de Icaza reviewed the state of bilateral relations and exchanged points of view on different subjects on the international agenda. Furthermore, they endorsed a joint statement and Memorandum of Understanding on Political Consultation. In October 2016, both countries signed another Memorandum of Understanding to develop cooperation efforts in terms of work and employment. As for Chile, the fifth largest economy in Latin America, the Iranian government began a diplomatic rapprochement in September 2015 that led to the opening of the first Chilean embassy in Teheran in December of that year. Zarif included Chile in his Latin American tour in August 2016, meeting with President Michelle Bachelet. The Minister of Foreign Affair’s visit was criticized by Chilean NGOs that pointed out the poor human rights situation in Iran. When the subject was brought up to the minister during a press conference, he said: “Clearly, NGOs in Chile have the privilege to give their opinions, just like in Iran. We are happy to have pluralist societies where people can express their opinions […] we have to get to know one another better, we have to engage in more serious dialogue regarding various topics, including human rights. I believe as we are two democracies that have had a relationship with one another, we can have serious dialogue that is open and respectful.”33 Ravanchi visited Colombia in December 2015 and had meetings with peers with whom he explored the possibility of Colombia receiving cooperation in matters related to agricultural development and innovation. Furthermore, he discussed Colombian interest in opening markets for bovine meat and its by-products, taking advantage of Iran’s expressed interest to import these Colombian products. Finally, Uruguay became one of the main suppliers of rice to Iran by the end of 2016, selling 60,000 tons. The negotiations that made this important sale possible were a result of an official visit from Vice President Raul Sendic to Iran in April 2016, which included a meeting with Iranian President Rouhani.

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Relationship Under a Magnifying Glass During the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, relations with Iran were considered time and again as a “security threat” to the North and South American continents. The direct and indirect presence of Iran in Latin America was often associated with terrorism and different types of organized crime such as drug trafficking, asset laundering, and gangs.34 In this respect, a variety of accusations linked to the “powerful” Iranian presence in Latin America compromised a broad range of topics, like establishing a complex and sophisticated logistical Iranian network that involved installing missiles, having military troops, commands, trainers, and intelligence personnel present who were dedicated to sponsoring and carrying out acts of terrorism, kidnappings, uranium trafficking, and so on. However, careful consideration of accusations showed a lack of conclusive evidence as a common denominator and rather pointed to the existence of a propaganda campaign and misinformation intended to isolate Iran, organized by right wings in the United States and Israel, conservative think tanks, and large mass media. The start of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency means a much more moderate diplomacy than his predecessor and implies lessening tensions with the West. However, the Islamic Republic’s relations will continue being questioned by some governments like those of the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and conservative think tanks like the Washington Institute or the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) that insisted on the “hyperactive” presence of Iran and “affiliated” organizations such as Hezbollah.35 For example, during the Fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government of South America and Arab Countries (ASPA, for its Spanish acronym) carried out at Riyadh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Adel al-Yubair, stated that rapprochement of Arab nations to South American countries “would increase Iran’s isolation in the world.” In addition, Al-Yubair claimed that the ever-strengthening ties between Iran and other Latin American countries were due to the Islamic Republic’s “weakness” and that this would increase ties to Arab nations and Latin America would isolate Iran even more.36

A Presidential Foreign Policy of Low Intensity From an active presidential diplomacy during the era of Ahmadinejad, Iran moved to a much less active presidency in terms of relations with Latin America during Rouhani’s first administration. Indeed, if we use the number of visits by the president or minister of foreign affairs as an indicator, the differences between administrations is clear. Ahmadinejad visited

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Venezuela six times, Bolivia three times, and Brazil, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador two times. President Rouhani visited the Americas only during a multilateral event, the XVII Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, carried out on Margarita Island (Venezuela) in September 2016. With the exception of a visit to Havana after the Summit and Nicolas Maduro’s visits to Teheran, all meetings with Latin American heads of state took place during the Summit on Margarita Island or during meetings of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Visits from government officials were few, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif (August 2016 in Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Venezuela) and the Deputy Foreign Minister Ravanchi (January 2014  in Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela, and November 2015  in Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, and Colombia). The most significant trip was Javad Zarif’s in August 2016 during which he accompanied 90 Iranian businessmen. According to Iranian diplomats in the region, this particular visit “showed that Iran continued to have a large interest in Latin America.”37

Conclusions Subscription to the nuclear agreement constituted the main objective of President Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy during his first term. At that time, Iran carried out notable diplomatic efforts by regaining influence on its geographic region and reopening the Iranian economy to the world. Latin America was far from being considered as a priority during said period and was conceived only as a secondary space for strengthening economic and trade relations. The anti-imperialist speeches and the call to build transcontinental axes against “Great Satan” were left behind. A new pragmatism, raised by the possibility of normalizing relations with the international community after removing economic sanctions, drove a foreign policy focused on establishing fundamental relations in the retention and trade complementaries and not necessarily in the ideological affinities as in the past. Even though there is evidence of relations with the ALBA countries, Teheran has been willing to deepen relations with centralized or right-­ wing governments. The most significant case is Brazil. This country was at one time considered the “trophy” of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy, and after the left-wing presidency of Dilma Rousseff, Brazil pushed for a cooling of relations with Iran. The pragmatism and moderation of Rouhani’s foreign policy enables the approval of JCPOA and, from this, allows for

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recovering strategic relations with the administration of a conservative president, Michel Temer. Even though relations between Iran and Latin America will surely continue being viewed as suspicious by some sectors, Rouhani’s foreign policy toward the region in his first term fostered a non-ideological focus that made his country less vulnerable to the ups and downs of Iranian foreign policy in the geographical region immediately surrounding the Islamic Republic.

Notes 1. Henry Jackson Society, “Iran’s ambitions in Latin America and Africa,” February 9, 2009, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/2009/02/09/ irans-ambitions-in-latin-america-and-africa/. 2. Sermin Przeczek, “Iran’s Foreign Policy under President Rouhani: Pledges versus Reality,” Ortadogu Analiz, Eylul 2013. p. 69. 3. Ibid. p. 68. 4. Diario Omid, ‫ بدهد یارانه اقتصاد به خارجی سیاست‬:‫روحانی‬. http://omidiraniannewspaper.ir/detail/974, 2013. 5. Isfahan Metropolis News Agency (IMNA), ‫بچرخد هم اقتصاد چرخ که است ارزشمند‬ ‫ کنیم می دراز جهان کشورهای همه سوی به دوستی دست امروز‬/‫زمانی سانتریفیوژها چرخش‬. http://www.imna.ir/news/185551/-‫است‬-‫که‬-‫چرخ‬-‫اقتصاد‬-‫هم‬-‫بچرخد‬-‫امروز‬ 2013 ,‫چرخش‬-‫سانتریفیوژها‬-‫زمانی‬-‫ارزشمند‬. 6. Frank López, “Irán replantea su agenda de relaciones internacionales,” Caracas, El Universal, http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/131209/iran-replantea-su-agenda-de-relaciones-internacionales, 2013. 7. Interview with Amir Ejtehadi, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, July 19, 2017. 8. Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV), Misión Vivienda Venezuela llega al hogar 1.725.210 en manos del pueblo, Caracas, http://rnv.gob.ve/mision-vivienda-venezuela-llega-al-hogar-1-725-210-en-manos-delpueblo/, 2017. 9. Interview with Amir Ejtehadi, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy Caracas Venezuela, July 19, 2017. 10. “Presidente iraní Rouhani llama a poner fin a aislamiento internacional de  Irán,” Reuters, https://lta.reuters.com/articulo/topNews/ idLTAKBN0KD0K920150104. 11. “Venezuela e Irán comprometidos para fortalecer la OPEP,” Telesur, https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Venezuela-e-Iran-comprometidos-parafortalecer-la-OPEP-20150110-0005.html.

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12. “Rohani y Maduro destacan vínculos amistosos Irán-Venezuela,” HispanTV, https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/diplomacia/58969/ rohani-maduro-nueva-york. 13. Embajada de Venezuela en Alemania, “Presidente Nicolás Maduro estrecha relaciones con Irán,” http://www.botschaft-venezuela.de/emba/index. php/noticias/1355-presidente-nicolas-maduro-estrecha-relaciones-con-iran. 14. Sergio Moya, “Entre las grandes expectativas y la demonización: las relaciones entre Irán y América Latina 2005–2013,” Perspectivas Internacionales, Vol. 10 (No. 2). p. 22. 15. “Dilma Rousseff se niega a reunirse con Ahmadinejad,” El País, https:// elpais.com/internacional/2012/06/19/actualidad/1340110601_ 844259.html. 16. “O Irã contemporâneo: perspectiva histórica e relações com o Brasil,” in: Os desafios e oportunidades na Relação Brasil-Ásia na perspectiva de jovens diplomatas. Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa (Organizer) Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasilia, 2017. p. 492. 17. “Irán y Brasil construirán una nueva refinería en América Latina,” Hispan TV, http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/economia/31009/iran-y-brasilconstruiran-una-nueva-refineria-en-america-latin, 2015. 18. Cristine Zanella, “Brazil-Iran Relations: What to Expect from a Post-­ Sanctions Era,” Revista Mundorama, https://www.mundorama.net/ ?p=17993. 19. “Nuevos planes comerciales de Brasil en Argentina e Irán,” Caras y caretas, Buenos Aires, 2016, http://www.carasycaretas.com.uy/nuevos-planescomerciales-de-brasil-en-argentina-e-iran/. 20. “Irán ordena 50 aviones a brasileña Embraer, El Economista, Ciudad de  México, 2016, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industria-global/ 2016/02/23/iran-ordena-50-aviones-brasilena-embraer. 21. “Brasil e Irã aprofundam cooperação em ciência e tecnología,” Portal Brasil, http://www.brasil.gov.br/ciencia-e-tecnologia/2016/11/ brasil-e-ira-aprofundam-cooperacao-em-ciencia-e-tecnologia. 22. “Brasil e Irã realizam Comissão Econômica e Comercial para reforçar parceria e ampliar comercio,” Comex do Brasil, https://www.comexdobrasil. com/brasil-e-ira-realizam-comissao-economica-e-comercial-para-reforcarparceria-e-ampliar-comercio-bilateral/. 23. Among these are Moshen Rezai, ex-commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Fallahian, ex-Minister of Intelligence and Ali Akbar Velayati, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Counsellor of International Policy for the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 24. “En la ONU, Cristina Kirchner defendió el acuerdo con Irán y pidió colaboración a EE.UU. para encontrar a Stiuso,” La Nación, http://www.

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lanacion.com.ar/1831933-cristina-kirchner-brinda-su-ultimo-discursocomo-presidenta-en-la-asamblea-general-de-la-onu. 25. Sergio Moya Mena, “Entre las grandes expectativas y la demonización: las relaciones entre Irán y América Latina 2005–2013,” Perspectivas Internacionales, Vol. 10 (No. 2), p. 21. 26. “Irán lamenta la decisión de la Justicia argentina,” Clarín. Buenos Aires, 2014, https://www.clarin.com/politica/Iran-lamenta-decision-Justiciaargentina_0_Byhrf6cvXx.html. 27. “El juez del caso AMIA duda sobre la responsabilidad de Irán en el atentado: Es todavía una hipótesis,” INFOBAE, https://www.infobae.com/2014/06/15/1573052-el-juez-del-caso-amia-duda-laresponsabilidad-iran-el-atentado-es-todavia-una-hipotesis/. 28. Toward the end of the Ahmadinejad government, the ALBA Alliance consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Venezuela, and Haiti (observer). 29. “Ecuador e Irán firmaron tres acuerdos de cooperación,” El Telégrafo, http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/ecuador-e-iranfortalecen-relaciones-comerciales-y-economicas. 30. “Irán reitera otorgamiento de apoyo técnico a Bolivia para energía nuclear,” La Tercera, http://www.latercera.com/noticia/iran-reitera-otorgamientode-apoyo-tecnico-a-bolivia-para-energia-nuclear/. 31. “Bolivia e Irán deciden ampliar la cooperación bilateral en nueve áreas,” La Razón, http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Bolivia-Iran-ampliarcooperacion-bilateral_0_2336766385.html. 32. “Fidel Castro recibe al presidente iraní Hassan Rouhani, en Cuba,” El Mundo, Madrid, 2016, http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2016/0 9/20/57e0ecb5ca474114328b4576.html&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8. 33. “Visita de canciller iraní: reunión con Bachelet fue reservada y Heraldo Muñoz marca diferencia en materia de DDHH,” Movilh Chile, http://www. movilh.cl/protestan-por-visita-de-homofobico-canciller-irani-a-chile/. 34. Sergio Moya Mena, “Entre las grandes expectativas y la demonización: las relaciones entre Irán y América Latina 2005–2013,” Perspectivas Internacionales, Vol. 10, (No. 2), p. 24. 35. Matthew Levitt, “Iran and Hezbollah Remain Hyperactive in Latin America,” The Washington Institute, http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/iran-and-hezbollah-remain-hyperactive-inlatin-america; Scholem, Melissa, “Peru, Abancay & Hezbollah: the party of god in the city where the godsspeak,” International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), Herzliya, 2016.

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36. “Arabia Saudí pide nexos arabo-latinoamericanos para ‘aislar’ a Irán,” HispanTV, http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/politica/74557/arabiasaudi-america-latina-aislar-iran. 37. Interview with Amir Ejtehadi, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy Caracas Venezuela, July 19, 2017.

Bibliography Batista Barbosa, Pedro Henrique (organizer). Os desafios e oportunidades na Relação Brasil-Ásia na perspectiva de jovens diplomatas. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília, 2017. Caras y Caretas. “Nuevos planes comerciales de Brasil en Argentina e Irán.” Buenos Aires. http://www.carasycaretas.com.uy/nuevos-planes-comercialesde-brasil-en-argentina-e-iran/. Clarín. “Irán lamenta la decisión de la Justicia argentina.” https://www.clarin. com/politica/Iran-lamenta-decision-Justicia-argentina_0_Byhrf6cvXx.html. ———. “Irán envió a un nuevo encargado de negocios a su embajada en la Argentina.” https://www.clarin.com/politica/iran-envio-nuevo-encargadonegocios-embajada-argentina_0_rkp7qamLx.html. Comex do Brasil. “Brasil e Irã realizam Comissão Econômica e Comercial para reforçar parceria e ampliar comercio.” https://www.comexdobrasil.com/ brasil-e-ira-realizam-comissao-economica-e-comercial-para-reforcar-parceriae-ampliar-comercio-bilateral/. El Economista. “Irán ordena 50 aviones a brasileña Embraer.” http://eleconomista.com.mx/industria-global/2016/02/23/iran-ordena-50-aviones-brasilenaembraer. Henry Jackson Society. Iran’s ambitions in Latin America and Africa. https:// henryjacksonsociety.org/2009/02/09/irans-ambitions-in-latin-americaand-africa/. Hispan TV. “Irán y Brasil construirán una nueva refinería en América Latina.” http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/economia/31009/iran-y-brasilconstruiran-una-nueva-refineria-en-america-latina. ———. “Arabia Saudí pide nexos arabo-latinoamericanos para ‘aislar’ a Irán.” http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/politica/74557/arabia-saudi-americalatina-aislar-iran. ———. “Rohani y Maduro destacan vínculos amistosos Irán-Venezuela.” https:// www.hispantv.com/noticias/diplomacia/58969/rohani-maduro-nueva-york. INFOBAE. “El juez del caso AMIA duda sobre la responsabilidad de Irán en el atentado: Es todavía una hipótesis”. https://www.infobae.com/2014/06/15/ 1573052-el-juez-del-caso-amia-duda-la-responsabilidad-iran-el-atentado-estodavia-una-hipotesis/.

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Isfahan Metropolis News Agency (IMNA). ‫بچرخد هم اقتصاد چرخ که است ارزشمند زمانی سانتریفیوژها‬ ‫ کنیم می دراز جهان کشورهای همه سوی به دوستی دست امروز‬/‫چرخش‬. http://www.imna.ir/ news/185551/‫چرخش‬-‫سانتریفیوژها‬-‫زمانی‬-‫ارزشمند‬-‫است‬-‫که‬-‫چرخ‬-‫اقتصاد‬-‫هم‬-‫بچرخد‬-‫امروز‬. Kahn, Tzvi. Iran renews ties with Latin America. The Foreign Policy Initiative. http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-iran-renews-tieslatin-america. Kemer, Thaíse. Política Externa do Brasil e a questão nuclear iraniana: vão-se os anéis, ficam os dedos. Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2016. Levitt, Matthew. Iran and Hezbollah Remain Hyperactive in Latin America. The Washington Institute. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ view/iran-and-hezbollah-remain-hyperactive-in-latin-america. López, Lopez. “Irán replantea su agenda de relaciones internacionales. Caracas,” El Universal. http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/131209/iran-replanteasu-agenda-de-relaciones-internacionales. Ministry of External Relations of Brazil. Brazilian foreign policy handbook. Brasilia, 2008. Movilh Chile. “Visita de canciller iraní: reunión con Bachelet fue reservada y Heraldo Muñoz marca diferencia en materia de DDHH.” http://www.movilh.cl/protestan-por-visita-de-homofobico-canciller-irani-a-chile/. Moya Mena, Sergio. “Entre las grandes expectativas y la demonización: las relaciones entre Irán y América Latina 2005–2013”. Perspectivas Internacionales, Vol. 10 (No. 2). ———. “La política exterior del presidente Mahmud Ahmadinejad hacia América Latina (2005–2010).” Revista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Vol. VII, (No. 1), julio 2010. ———. Iran and Latin America: vital interests and soft-power strategy. Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte CEMOAN, Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales – Universidad Nacional, 2012. El Mundo. “Fidel Castro recibe al presidente iraní Hasan Rohani, en Cuba.” http://www.elmundo.es/inter nacional/2016/09/20/57e0ecb5 ca474114328b4576.html&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8. 2016. La Nación. “En la ONU, Cristina Kirchner defendió el acuerdo con Irán y pidió colaboración a EE.UU. para encontrar a Stiuso.” http://www.lanacion.com. ar/1831933-cristina-kirchner-brinda-su-ultimo-discurso-como-presidenta-enla-asamblea-general-de-la-onu. Omid. ‫ بدهد یارانه اقتصاد به خارجی سیاست‬:‫روحانی‬. http://omidiraniannewspaper.ir/ detail/974. Przeczek, Sermin. “Iran’s Foreign Policy under President Rouhani: Pledges versus Reality”. OrtadoguAnaliz, Eylul 2013. Portal Brasil. “Brasil e Irã aprofundam cooperação em ciência e tecnología.” h t t p : / / w w w. b r a s i l . g o v. b r / c i e n c i a - e - t e c n o l o g i a / 2 0 1 6 / 1 1 / brasil-e-ira-aprofundam-cooperacao-em-ciencia-e-tecnologia.

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Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV). “Misión Vivienda Venezuela llega al hogar 1.725.210 en manos del pueblo.” http://rnv.gob.ve/mision-vivienda-venezuelallega-al-hogar-1-725-210-en-manos-del-pueblo/. Reuters. “Presidente iraní Rouhani llama a poner fin a aislamiento internacional de Irán.” https://lta.reuters.com/articulo/topNews/ idLTAKBN0KD0K920150104. Scholem, Melissa. “Peru, Abancay & Hezbollah: the party of god in the city where the godsspeak.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). Herzliya, 2016. Shanahan, Rodger. Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani. The Lowy Institute for International Policy. Sidney, 2015. El Telégrafo. “Ecuador e Irán firmaron tres acuerdos de cooperación.” http:// www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/ecuador-e-iran-fortalecenrelaciones-comerciales-y-economicas. Telesur. “Venezuela e Irán comprometidos para fortalecer la OPEP.” https:// www.telesurtv.net/news/Venezuela-e-Iran-comprometidos-para-fortalecer-laOPEP-20150110-0005.html. La Tercera. “Irán reitera otorgamiento de apoyo técnico a Bolivia para energía nuclear.” http://www.latercera.com/noticia/iran-reitera-otorgamiento-deapoyo-tecnico-a-bolivia-para-energia-nuclear/. Wastnidge, Edward. “Strategic Narratives and Iranian Foreign Policy into the Rouhani Era.” http://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/10/strategic-narratives-andiranian-foreign-policy-into-the-rouhani-era/2006. Zanella, Cristine. “Brazil-Iran Relations: What to Expect from a Post-Sanctions Era.” Revista Mundorama. https://www.mundorama.net/?p=17993.

Interviews Amir Ejtehadi, Counselor of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Venezuela, July 19, 2017. Hossein Mirzaei, Cultural Counselor of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Venezuela, July 19, 2017. Saeid Inanlou, Attaché of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Cuba, Venezuela, May 24, 2017.

CHAPTER 9

From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Iran’s Presence in Africa Mahjoob Zweiri and Alieu Manjang

Introduction Since their independence from colonial rule, African countries have had uninterrupted foreign presence within their borders. The African continent has been influenced by the United States of America (USA), the communist bloc and the former European colonial powers. The presence of these countries was due to the abundant supply of natural resources, and the fragility of postcolonial African states, which constituted a threat to Western interests. The same dynamics have facilitated the presence of the emerging economies, that is India and Brazil, in Africa.1 Middle East countries also have strategic interests in Africa. The decades-old Arab– Israel conflict and the quest for decolonisation stimulated Middle East countries to engage with Africa.2 While the early influence of some Arab

M. Zweiri (*) Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] A. Manjang Embassy of the Republic of Gambia in the State of Qatar, Doha, Qatar © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_9

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Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia, remained intact in Africa, their presence was challenged by Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran, under the reign of Ahmadinejad, successfully gained influence on the continent, by forging diplomatic, economic and military relations with many African countries.3 Iran’s overture into countries of West Africa, especially into Senegal, is even more significant. Iran has fought to project its national interests through traditional and public diplomatic tactics in Senegal. This outreach has aroused the apprehension of its regional rival, Saudi Arabia, whose cultural influence in West African countries is long-standing. However, the rise to power of the leadership created a setback in Iran’s rising activism in Africa. Against this background, this paper integrates insights drawn from Neoclassical Realism to explain the impact of regional and international factors, and the perspectives of leaders vis-à-vis the regional and international systems on Iranian presence in Africa from the reign of Ahmadinejad to the first term of Hassan Rouhani. With a specific focus on Senegal, this paper investigates the factors that have encouraged Iran to project its foreign policy strategies in Africa in general, and in Senegal in particular, during the reign of Ahmadinejad, and the factors that had shaped Iran’s retreat from Africa during the reign of Rouhani. The paper is written with the view that Iran’s engagement in the continent was triggered by two fundamental factors during Ahmadinejad’s rein: first, international sanctions generated against Iran’s nuclear programme and second, the sense of victory and regional gain that had been prompted by the rise of Shiite power in the Middle East. The environment on the continent allowed these two factors to shape Iran’s interest under the leadership of Ahmadinejad, as he charted his strategies. These strategies included building strong political and economic relations with African countries, regardless of religion, and engaging in cultural activities through public diplomacy strategies. On the other hand, Iran’s isolation by the international community and the dynamics of politics in the Middle East, where Iran is actively engaged in supporting its allies, have collectively consumed the attention of Hassan Rouhani to uphold the legacy of his predecessor to ensure Iran’s strong engagement in Africa. Rouhani opted for a more passive foreign policy towards Africa with an immediate focus on engaging the international community to end Iran’s isolation and garner the support for its allies in the ongoing civil wars in the Middle East. This paper aims to assess Iran’s engagement in Africa. It will be divided into two sections. The first section introduces Iranian foreign policy

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towards Africa. It will initially discuss Iran’s historical presence in Africa prior to the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution and throughout the early stages of the revolution. This will be followed by a discussion of Iran’s relations with Africa from 2005 to 2017, the first term of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. In this context, the discussion is centred on how the dynamics of politics at the regional and international levels have shaped Iranian foreign policy behaviour towards Africa under Ahmadinejad. This section will also explain how Rouhani’s determination to end Iran’s isolation made Africa less relevant for his foreign policy objectives. This will be followed by a deliberation on how the rise of Shiism in the Middle East energised Iranian public diplomacy in Africa under the reign of Ahmadinejad, and how the political dynamics in the Middle East distracted Iran from throwing its religious weight in Africa under the reign of Rouhani. In the second section, Iran’s presence in Senegal, under the reign of Ahmadinejad, will be spotlighted. The emphasis will be on the nature of the relationship between Senegal and Iran, the areas of cooperation and the issues brought up by this relationship. Iran’s public diplomacy in Senegal will also be discussed. The strategies employed by Iran and the factors that facilitate or preclude these activities will also be explicated. Finally, the failure of Hassan Rouhani to continue with such policies will also be highlighted.

International and Regional Determinants of Iran’s Presence in Africa Iran’s presence in Africa is not limited to the Iranians’ noticeable presence in Africa during the eight years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005–2013). During the Shah’s rule, there was significant engagement with the developing countries in Africa. One factor that encouraged this was Iran’s future need for raw materials and export markets amid the rapid industrialization pursued by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1960s. However, Iran’s self-image of championing issues of deprived masses also played a critical role in shaping Iran’s foreign policy objectives in Africa in the 1970s. Thus, the ascendency of the Islamic regime in 1979 saw the rise of Iranian diplomacy in Africa. The coming of the Islamic regime in 1979 could have suggested that Iranian–African partnerships would not continue due to the political and ideological mismatch between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the fervently secular African regimes.4 Nevertheless, Iran has developed a pragmatic and self-serving foreign policy towards

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Africa, with the exception of the early 1980s, when Iran’s perceived intervention in specific African countries prompted these countries to sever diplomatic ties with Iran. Iran’s early diplomatic activities in Africa—which also included the visit of the then President Ali Khamenei in January 1986—was ineffective as Iran could not win the hearts of the African countries that sided with Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. Thus, from the early 1980s to 1990, Iran’s foreign policy towards African countries showed no significant change. Nevertheless, the decades that followed the 1990s showed significant developments in Iranian– African relations, with a strong foreign policy approach towards African countries due to the international sanctions imposed on Iran by the West, and a sense of victory prompted by the rise of Shiite power in the Middle East.5

International Sanctions and Iran’s Engagement in Africa The international efforts of the USA to financially isolate Tehran followed by consequent UN and EU sanctions encouraged Iran to revive its interests in developing countries, including Africa. Sanctions on Iran were provoked by international concerns that Iran was pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon, although Iran claimed to exploit its resources for the nuclear enrichment programme to supply for its energy needs. These concerns resulted in impositions of US sanctions on foreign firms thought to be facilitating a nuclear arms programme in Iran.6 The US sanctions were followed by UN Security Council sanctions. The first batch of the UN sanctions in 2006 included, but was not limited to, an embargo on materials and technology that could be used for the enrichment of uranium, while the subsequent UN sanctions in 2007, 2008 and 2010 targeted non-humanitarian economic assistance to Iran, its oil profits and its banking/financial sector, including its central bank.7 The UN, US and EU sanctions took a toll on Iran’s economy. It was estimated that Iran’s economy was 15 to 20 percent smaller than it would have been had the sanctions not been intensified in 2012.8 This encouraged Iran to revive its relations with developing countries in order to neutralise the impact of multiple sanctions on its economy. The revival of foreign relations between Iran and Africa manifested in consecutive Iranian administrations conducting diplomatic activities in Africa, as a means of securing economic

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relations with the continent. During his presidency, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) visited six African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and South Africa. Although no agreements were signed during these visits, African countries, especially South Africa, expressed the wish to begin trading with Iran, especially in energy.9 The shift in Iran’s relations with Africa occurred during the reign of Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005). During the Khatami Presidency, rhetoric of the revolution was replaced by close cooperation in a bid to promote Iran’s national interests, especially economic. Khatami made several official visits to Africa in 2005, emphasising economic cooperation via exploration of Iran’s private sector engagement in the development.10 Tehran’s foreign policy was overshadowed by Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme with the election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in 2005. Ahmadinejad revived the narrative common in the early years of the Revolution, alarming the West. As a result, Iran’s relations with the West deteriorated, as it did not only provoke Western pressure but also led to the imposition of economic sanctions because of its nuclear enrichment programme. Ahmadinejad’s efforts to counter these sanctions culminated in the strengthening of Iran’s relations with Africa. Thus, the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s presidency witnessed extensive Iranian diplomatic activities in Africa, the prime focus being promoting trade ties and gaining international diplomatic support for its nuclear programme. At the diplomatic level, Iran gained significant benefit from its engagement with Africa. For example, Iran was granted observer status in the African Union (AU), and Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the AU’s seventh summit in the Gambian capital, Banjul, in 2006.11 Additionally, in November 2009, when the UN voted on the human rights situation in Iran, all of the West African nations except Liberia and Togo preserved their previous UN voting positions. Nigeria took an even weaker stance, voting against the resolution when it had previously abstained from votes on such measures.12 Iran’s attempt to neutralise the effect of the sanctions and to lessen its isolation manifested itself in Iran laying the groundwork for an enlargement of Iranian business into new markets in Africa. For example, Iran’s exports to West Africa increased dramatically between 2000 and 2009, as had the value of Iranian exports in 2009 to Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal to roughly 2700%, 2800%, and 3600% higher (respectively) than exports in 2000.13 In other parts of Africa, Ahmadinejad’s visits accompanied the expansion of trade and investment between Iran and these countries. In his visit

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to Djibouti in 2009, Iran signed five economic cooperation agreements and granted a credit line to the country. Similarly, in his visit to Kenya, Ahmadinejad was accompanied by a large delegation of private businessmen, and the trip resulted in the signing of a number of agreements which would increase the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries to $500 million by 2010.14 Iran was also able to gain a strengthened trade position with South Africa, as Johannesburg held a lenient position towards the Iranian nuclear programme. South Africa has been consistently seen as one of Iran’s bravest supporters at the UN, given its status within the system of international institutions, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the economic level, this diplomatic stance was reflected in trade relations between the two countries. For example, South Africa depended on Iran for 65.90% of its oil imports in 2011. This then dropped to 35% in July 2012, in response to the US threat to sanction entities in countries that continued to import Iranian oil. Yet, South African industries continued to provide other opportunities for Iran. South Africa Synthetic Oil Liquid (SASOL), a South African state-owned energy enterprise, invested millions of dollars in Arya Sasol, a petrochemical joint venture with Iran’s state-owned National Petrochemical Company located in the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone in the province of Bushehr. Additionally, the South African telecommunications corporation Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) viewed Iran as one of its most vital marketplaces as 10% of the company’s revenue originated from Iran in 2016.15 The advent of Rouhani’s presidency in Iran in 2013 slowed the advancement of Iran’s relations with Africa. Unlike his predecessor, Rouhani understood that solving the nuclear issue was necessary for Iran’s economy to recover and to end its international isolation. Thus, the P5 + 1– Iran negotiations on a comprehensive settlement began in February 2014, and on April 2, 2015, the parties reached a framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was confirmed on July 14, 2015. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015, also endorsed the JCPOA and imposed restrictions on Iran’s importation and exportation of conventional arms (for up to five years), and on development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon (for up to eight years). On January 16, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had completed the work required for sanctions relief and “Implementation Day” was declared.16

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While the implementation of JCPOA might have led to the lifting of sanctions, it had actually been an obstacle, to some extent, to Rouhani’s proactive international engagement. A good illustration of this was Rouhani’s declining African engagement relative to his predecessors. Rouhani’s Presidency resulted in a cooling off of relations with Africa, with many initiatives introduced by the former President halted. President Ahmadinejad’s engagement with African went to the extent of Iran hosting an Iran–Africa Forum in Tehran in 2010.17 Despite these proactive foreign policy events during the reign of Ahmadinejad, the relationship with Africa did not garner sufficient consideration during Rouhani’s first term. This was also demonstrated in the limited number of high-level visits undertaken by Iranian officials to various African countries. Unlike during President Ahmadinejad’s administration, the high-level visits to Africa during Rouhani’s first term were only held at ministerial levels. In fact, President Rouhani’s proposed visit to Algeria and two other African countries was suspended indefinitely, despite the actual significance of these, to consolidate the Iran–Africa socio-economic and political relationship.18 The Iranian retreat from Africa during the reign of Rouhani also had a negative impact on Iran’s economic and diplomatic prospects in African countries. The severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea is an example. These countries established enduring diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran, as they were Iran’s strategic gateway to secure a strong foothold to maintain its socio-­ economic and political interests both in Africa and the Middle East. However, these countries are now under the influence of Saudi Arabia, Iran’s enemy in the region. Thus, while the international isolation of Iran had been an impetus for Ahmadinejad to cultivate a relationship with African countries and to gain a significant foothold in the African market, President Rouhani’s first term was characterised by limited socio-economic and political engagements with the continent. This seriously constrained the strategic partnership between Tehran and many African countries. This is in contrast to the situation in the pre-Rouhani era, as Ahmadinejad exploited Iran’s international and regional isolation not only to pursue economic interests on the continent, but also to promote the rise of Shi’a Islam.

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Regional Politics and Iran’s Influence in Africa Beyond Iran’s isolation by the international community, the rise of Shi’a Islam in the Middle East dramatically broadened Iran’s outreach in Africa under the reign of Ahmadinejad. This outreach was extensive, and it included diplomatic contacts with various populations on the continent. Two events had been particularly essential for this development: the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Lebanon–Israel war of 2006. These two events conveyed a sense of victory to the Shias in the Middle East, and they facilitated the unleashing of the Iranian religious mission in Africa. The aftermath of the US war on Iraq and the fight for political power inside the country, which resulted in the rise of the Shiite government, stimulated sentiments of Shiite revival in various Arab countries to the extent that King Abdullah II of Jordan reflected the fears of many Sŭnni rulers when he spoke of a ‘Shiite Crescent’ in an interview with The Washington Post.19 The rise of the Shiite government in Iraq was a triumph for Iran’s leadership, which was challenged by Saddam Hussain for extending its influence. Iran, being the only Shiite country in the Middle East, tried to create a Shiite geopolitical region, which opposed the so-called Sŭnni geopolitical position. The fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq and the subsequent rise of the Shiite government favoured Iranian interests in the region. Therefore, as Shias gained more power in Iraq, political labels such as ‘Shi’a rising’, ‘the Shiite revival’, ‘Shia’s axis’, ‘Pan-Shiis’, ‘Shiite international’, ‘the Shiite renaissance’, ‘the Shiite bloc’, ‘the Shiite empire’, ‘Shiitestan’ and ‘the Shia’s awakening’ emerged to express the rising power of the Shiite front vis-à-vis the Sŭnni front. This Shiite revival perpetuated the emergence of the Shiite common front based on the premise of increasing Iran’s influence in the region and through uniting Shiites from Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. This was a triumph for Iran. This sense of victory was an inspiration for Iran to embark on expanding its cultural activities in Africa, which resulted in the conversion of many Africans to Shi’a Islam.20,21 Generally, there had been little attention paid to Shiism in Africa since the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, in which many African Muslim thinkers—especially from Nigeria—converted to Shiism after visiting Iran in the early 1980s.22 Despite this, conversion to Shiism in Africa was low until the early 2000s, during which an institutional push was accorded to Shiite activities in Africa through Iranian embassies. This

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institutionalisation was reflected in Iran’s erection of schools, scholarship and Shiite Seminaries (Hāwzā) in different parts of Africa.23 Another factor that encouraged Iran’s religious mission in African was Lebanon’s war with Israel in 2006. This war was another episode in the intensifying sectarian divisions in the Middle East. The Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, a protégé of the Iranian regime, challenged Israel by frustrating its war strategy. Despite the heavy causalities and deaths among the Lebanese population, Hezbollah gained significant acceptance and support in the region and beyond, even among the Sŭnni public, for being the force that actively engaged in resistance against Israel, while all of the Arab states remained passive.24 The then Iranian President, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, capitalised on this momentum to advance the militant rhetoric against Israel and the West. This response contrasted with the perceived complacency of Arab Sŭnni leaders who, unlike the Iranian president, were mute in their response, and criticised Hezbollah for bringing unnecessary devastation to Lebanon by its adventurism. This resistance towards Hezbollah and the Iranian president’s criticisms of Israel of the West and of the Arab neighbours was perceived as Iran’s strong support for the Muslim cause.25 This was the rhetoric that Iran used to spread Islamic discourse in Africa and to win the acceptance of Muslims in Africa who hardly understood the difference between Sŭnni and Shi’a Islam. Thus, since 2006, Shi’a Islam experienced a dramatic increase in some parts of Africa. This was achieved through Iran’s public diplomacy, which targeted ordinary people in a bid to win their hearts and minds. In East Africa, Iran sponsored schools, provided scholarships to students to study in Iran and built several Hāwzā (Shiite Seminaries), all as instruments to disseminate Shiism in Africa. This culminated in the conversion of Sŭnni Muslims to Shiism.26 On Comoros Island, for example, the leader of a Shi’a sect confirmed that prior to 2006, there were no converted Shias on the island. However, according to Sheikh Mahmoud Ibrahim Abdullah, the number of Shias grew to more than 100 within a year.27 Likewise, in Kenya the spreading of Shiism resulted in the building of Iran’s largest cultural office in Nairobi, which works with Iran’s embassy to oversee cultural and religious activities. Essential to the mission of the cultural centre is the facilitation of the conversion of people to Shiism.28 Similarly, Iran’s outreach in West Africa exemplified an approach by which Iran attempted to build and exploit soft power through cultural diplomacy. By building universities in Ghana, hospitals in Mali, schools, Islamic centres

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and Shi’a Seminaries in Guinea Conakry, Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, Iran was able to convert masses in these countries to Shi’a Islam.29 Despite Iran’s successful penetration into Africa, controversies have marred Iran’s African adventure. The rise of Iran’s influence in Africa goes hand in hand with the alleged Iranian involvement in illegal arms trade, and the financing and arming of terrorists groups, such as the Islamic Movement in Nigeria headed by Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky, a Shi’a Muslim cleric and separatist movements such as Polisario Front, a Western Sahara independence movement. Iran was also accused of exploiting its Lebanon-­ centred network as another source of revenue and as a transportation network for Hezbollah’s operations.30 These allegations took their toll on Iran’s relations with some of its allies in Africa. For example, Senegal and the Gambia severed their relations with Iran in 2011 when an Iranian arms cargo bound for Gambia was intercepted in Nigeria.31 Additionally, Iran’s alleged support of Al Shābāb in Somalia precluded the growth of Iran’s relations with Ethiopia. Similarly Mali’s relations with Iran were overshadowed by the latter’s alleged support of the Tŭāreq separatist movement in Northern Mali.32 Predictably, Iran’s outreach to Africa and the allegations that are associated with its operations on the continent have been a source of concern for Iran’s Middle Eastern competitors, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. The growing strategic cooperation between Iran, Eritrea and Sudan, and the subsequent operation of Iran’s naval forces, warships and cargo ships in the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea aroused the concern of Israel over the extent of Iran’s presence in these strategic locations. These concerns promoted the Israeli allegation that Iran exploited its relations with Sudan and Eritrea to smuggle arms to Hamas in Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon.33 Similar allegations had been put forward by the Saudis and their Arab neighbours, suspecting that Iran used Eritrea’s port of Assab to smuggle arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen.34 This influenced Saudi’s foreign policy towards the countries on the Horn of Africa. Since the beginning of its operations against the Houthi rebels in 2015, Saudi Arabia has extended invitations to the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea to visit Riyadh. The hospitality extended to these leaders during their state visits to Riyadh was not just protocol; rather, it reflected the Saudi goal of cementing relations with countries in the Horn of Africa, which Iran had used to increase its influence over the rest of the continent. Moreover, Sudan’s participation in the Saudi-led coalition, a multinational grouping of armed forces led primarily by Saudi Arabia and the United

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Arab Emirates (UAE) that launched Military Operation in Yemen in 2015  in support of the legitimate Yemeni government, which included sending soldiers to Yemen, is also perceived in the context of Saudi’s quest to distance Sudan from Iran.35 While the growing presence of Iran in Africa’s economic and cultural landscapes during the presidency of Ahmadinejad was a point of concern for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbours, such concerns have dissipated to a great extent with the eclipse of Ahmadinejad from the political scene of Iran. Although Africa remains vital for Iran’s political and economic interests, other developments in the Middle East have garnered greater consideration of Iran’s President since his advent to power in 2013. The events in the Middle East, notably the Arab Spring and its consequent events in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf States, have consumed Rouhani’s foreign policy. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran’s policy had been to support the Shiite-led governments in Iraq and Syria against armed insurgencies or other domestic elements that posed threats to those governments. This extended to Iran sending its fighters to Iraq and Syria in an effort to help these regimes address challenges from the Islamic State, a Sunni radical Islamist movement that used internal dissension to capture significant territory in both of those countries.36 In Syria, the efforts of Iran’s leaders in the first six years of the uprising allowed Assad to remain in power, despite his secular ideology. This consistent support to Assad can be ascribed to Iran’s understanding that Syria’s cooperation is crucial to Iran’s arming and protection of Hezbollah, and also to the fact that the Assad regime had been Iran’s closest Arab ally in a troubled region, where Iran faces opposition from regional governments.37 Additionally, Iran’s support for Assad can be appreciated as an attempt to prevent a Sunni opposition government, hostile to Iran, from coming to power should Assad fall. Iran’s intervention in Syria may be an assurance that Sunni extremist groups are not able to effortlessly attack Hezbollah in Lebanon from across the Syrian border. Given these factors, Iran, under the leadership of Rouhani, spared no effort to escalate its intervention in Syria to the extent that it was estimated that by late 2015, Iran had deployed 1300–1800 military personnel in Syria, including Basij militia and the Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) IRGC ground force.38 Generally, Iran’s interest in Syria cannot be compared to its interest in Yemen as Iran views the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria as losing not

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only an important Arab ally, but also its aptitude to offer support for Hezbollah, restraining its influence in Lebanon and over the Arab–Israeli issue.39 However, instability in Yemen appears to be an opportunity for Iran to acquire additional leverage against Saudi and American interests as this would allow Iran to further strengthen its alliance with the Houthi rebels for sectarian and ideological considerations and to increase its relevance to the Houthi amid the war.40 Thus, the Yemen civil war featured highly on Iran’s foreign policy agenda. These and other regional developments in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remain a foreign policy priority of Hassan Rouhani. Thus, despite the vitality in the horn of Africa, and the growing competition between Iran’s regional counterpart for influence in Africa, Iran remained sidelined from developments in the region. The Gulf States, especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are also actively seeking allies in Africa and fighting over influence, especially in the Horn of Africa.41 Thus, the region is no longer a battlefield for the fierce rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but a competition between Gulf countries and Turkey. Turkey is actively playing its card, worrying both Saudi Arabia and UAE because of its military expansion to counteract the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi blockade of Qatar, and maintain close relations with Iran. Given the convergent position between Turkey and Qatar since the beginning of the Gulf crisis in June 2017, when a group of Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia imposed land, maritime and air blockade on Qatar, it would not be surprising that Turkey is further projecting its influence in the Horn of Africa with an aim to curtail Qatar’s rivals, that is Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Turkey has a training facility in Somalia, and is discussing the establishment of a base in Djibouti. It has recently reached an agreement worth US$650 million with Sudan to enable Turkey to have a military base on the Red Sea to help fight terrorism.42 Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which have bases in Berbera in the semi-autonomous republic of Somaliland and in Eritrea, fear the agreement will allow Turkey, with whom they have tense relations given their divergent views over Qatar, Iran and Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, to post troops close to Jeddah.43 These and the recent efforts of many Gulf countries to stretch their influence to East Africa, the Sahel as well as Central and West Africa, as demonstrated by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s tour of six West African nations in December 2017 to gain support for his country in its dispute with the other Gulf States, all indicated that Iran had retreated from Africa during the reign of Rouhani.

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Thus, as the Gulf States escalated their penetration on the continent, Iran continued to lose key allies in Africa to Saudi Arabia. This is more acute in the case of Sudan, which had had close relations with Iran since the early 1990s. This relationship deteriorated considerably from 2014 as Sudan developed closer ties to Iran’s rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In an unprecedented move, the Sudanese government shut down all Iranian cultural centres in Sudan and expelled the cultural attaché and other Iranian diplomats under the pretext that Iran was exploiting its facilities and personnel to promote Shiite Islam.44 In another dramatic move, Sudan participated in the Saudi-led Arab coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. This seemed to confirm Sudan had significantly decreased its strategic relations with Iran.45 While this was the case with the collapse of Iran’s engagement with Sudan, a similar situation could be seen with Iran’s engagement with other African countries like Senegal, where Ahmadinejad successfully established strong cultural, political and economic relations during his tenure as president.

Dynamics of Iran’s Presence in Senegal The West African country of Senegal is a good example of Iran’s recent assertive and unapologetic push into Africa. This has occurred since the political development at the beginning of the twenty-first century at both international and regional levels, and has shaped Iranian foreign policy. Prior to Iran’s isolation by the international community due to its antagonistic relations with the West, Senegal and the Islamic Republic of Iran maintained a friendly relationship. With the onset of the Islamic regime, relations between Senegal and Iran became tense, as Senegal accused Iran of supporting Islamic movements on its soil. This culminated in the breaking of diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1984.46 Iran later proved to Senegal its interest in re-establishing relations when Tehran opened its embassy in Dakar in the 1990s. This was followed by the resumption of diplomatic ties as Dakar reciprocally opened its diplomatic mission in Tehran. Dakar–Tehran ties further strengthened when the former hosted the Organization Islamic Conference’s summit in Dakar in 1992—to which Iran sent a high-level delegation headed by President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. This symbolised Tehran’s willingness to begin a new chapter in its relations with Dakar. Since then, Dakar–Tehran relations have been friendly and are seen as the model of Iran’s relations with African countries.

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While Iran’s isolation by the international community was a significant determinant in its increased engagement with Senegal, Iran’s commitment to engaging was strategically calculated. Tehran is aware of the significance of Senegal’s geostrategic location within West Africa, and it is also cognisant of how this could serve its Shiite Islamic identity and political interests. Senegal is located in the westernmost part of the African continent, and has a coastline of 700 km. For centuries, Senegal has been one of the continent’s trade gateways. As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a sub-regional space with approximately 300  million consumers, Senegal’s geographical location brands it as a point of access to Mali and other countries in the sub-region, and a centre for trade between Africa, Europe and America.47 Thus, for Iran, Senegal represented a viable destination for investments in Africa. Considering these attributes and its relative political stability, Senegal was seen as an access point to the sub-regional market. In addition, Senegal’s growing infrastructure as a potential investment zone attracted Iran. It was within this context that Iranian officials viewed their relationship with Senegal. Apart from the economic opportunities that Iran could yield in Senegal, the fact that Senegal possessed the diplomatic lead in Francophone Africa and had influence in the UN, where a number of African governments took its lead in some big votes,48 also ignited Iran’s diplomatic activities with Senegal. Senegal’s demographic composition and the manifestation of Islamic practices were other factors that Iran saw as an advantage when making the evaluation to utilise its soft power. Iran set about proselytising the Shi’a form of Islam in Senegal. Traditionally, Senegalese Islam was predominately Sŭnni, yet dominated by Sŭfi orders founded by saints whose offspring inherited the spiritual power of their forefathers, and led the various Sŭfi orders or brotherhoods (tarı̄qa; plural, turūq). The largest of these Sŭfi brotherhoods in Senegal is the Tijāniyya, which began in Fez, Morocco, with Ahmad al-Tijani in the late eighteenth century.49 The fact that the practice of Islam in Morocco has been shaped by its Shi’a legacy, as Imami Shiism had spread there from 788 with the arrival of Idris ibn Abd,50 means that the practice of Islam through Senegal brotherhoods included Shiite elements. This affinity between Shi’a Islam and Sŭfism made Senegal a fertile ground for the spread of Shi’a Islam. Consequently, Iran never shied away from showcasing its Muslim character in its dealings with other Muslim countries and communities on the continent. Accordingly, economic, political and cultural interests moulded Iran’s

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actions in committing itself to directly engaging with Senegal at the official level, and in establishing close ties with religious institutions at the community level. Politically, and in the early days of the Islamic regime, Senegalese officials did not view Iran as a potential partner. Iran’s assertive activities in spreading its revolutionary ideology damaged its image in Africa and forced some countries, upon the rise of domestic Islamic movements, to cut diplomatic ties. Senegal also followed suit. In 1984, Dakar cut diplomatic relations with Tehran, suspecting that the staff of the Iranian embassy were involved in propagating fundamentalist ideologies among Senegalese Muslim communities.51 Thus, the relationship between Iran and Senegal remained strained, as Tehran remained consumed by its war with Iraq and its internal political struggle that followed the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. However, the changes of leadership and Iran’s strained relations with the West, and the USA in particular, forced Iran to act to improve its image in Africa, and to establish meaningful relations with African countries including Senegal. The visit of Iranian president Muhammad Khatami to Dakar in 2005, followed by subsequent visits of the Senegalese president Abdullaye Wade in 2006, 2008 and 2009, was a positive turning point in Tehran–Dakar ties signalling the end of a tense relationship between the two countries.52 Following the election of the conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran expanded its relations with African countries, and Senegal held a special position within Iranian foreign policy. In 2008, Iran helped Senegal to prepare for the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit, which was held in the Senegalese capital of Dakar. This helped Iran to further position itself as a leader among Muslim countries, and also to further its goal of winning diplomatic backing from developing countries for its nuclear programme.53 In the last of his three visits to Senegal in November 2009, President Ahmadinejad was publicly assured by his Senegalese counterpart that his country endorsed Iran’s right to nuclear power and recognised that this was for peaceful purposes only.54 Moreover, Senegalese support for Iran resonated in the statements of officials. In May 2010, Senegal’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Madicke Niang, stated: “Given the political resolve of the two countries’ presidents, Senegal always sides with Iran. We would never back down on our support for Iran and we would never backtrack on the path that we have opted [for]”.55 Furthermore, Senegalese parliamentary speaker Pape Diop called for more cooperation between the two countries as part of the

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mutual relations between Iran and Senegal during his visit to Tehran in January 2009. He iterated that “[t]he relations between Iran and Senegal are very good and based on mutual respect and should expand in different economic and industrial fields”.56 The visits of Senegalese officials to Iran were matched with the reciprocal visits of Iranian officials. On July 22, 2007, judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi and government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham travelled to Dakar where they convened with President Wade and Senegalese Prime Minister Cheikh Hadjibou Soumaré. In this meeting, Shahroudi declared: “We believe it is our duty to expand ties with Islamic countries and use the capabilities and potentials [sic] of Muslim states to help the growth and spread of Islam.”57 The political and economic ties between Iran and Senegal enabled the two countries to have convergent stands on many international issues, especially issues of concern to Iran. For example, Dakar followed Tehran’s lead on Israel by issuing a joint statement in January 2009 that condemned Israel over its operation in Gaza, and another in March 2004 which indicated that Palestinian refugees should return and that Jerusalem should be the capital of an independent Palestinian state.58 As the impetus that drove Iran into Africa in general, and into Senegal in particular, is grounded in pragmatism, Iran’s political and diplomatic engagements with Senegal increased trade and other forms of economic cooperation. In this respect, Iran had been able to achieve two economic goals, securing markets for Iranian goods and gaining access to increased petroleum-refining capacity. Senegal was Iran’s principal trading partner in West Africa. Iranian exports to Senegal increased to $16  million in 2009, roughly a 3600% increase compared to exports to the country in 2000.59 In the energy sector, Senegal’s economy provided relief to Iran by buying crude oil directly. This was significant because of Iran’s limited number of customers due to international economic sanctions. In August 2007, the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company undertook an expansion of Senegal’s state petroleum refinery from 1.2  million to 3  million tons. The contract also involved a 34% Iranian share in the refinery and the provision of Iranian crude oil to Senegal for a year.60 Iran’s increasing economic appetite for investment in Senegal intensified with the establishment of an automobile factory 60 km east of Dakar in 2008, which started a production line of 5000 Samands for the Iran Khodro Company. The establishment of the facility reportedly cost $80 million, of which Iran Khodro provided 60% of the financing, while the Senegalese government and private sector funded half of the

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remaining amount.61 Economic cooperation between the two countries also included activity in the power and mineral industries. As Iran continued to invest heavily in Senegal, it exploited the relationship to compete with its regional enemies, especially Israel. The government of Israel had offered to assist the prominent Sŭfi Muslim town of Touba to build a water and sewage system. However, negotiations over the project were obstructed when Iran promised to carry out the same work—and to give a bigger donation to the town, as well as construct the water and sewage system.62 Despite strong political and economic relations between Iran and Senegal, Iranian–Senegalese relations halted in 2011, when Senegal claimed that the Iranian arms cargo intercepted in Nigeria was destined for rebels in the southern Senegalese region of Cansamance. This caused a diplomatic row between the countries and Senegal cut its diplomatic relations with Tehran, recalling its ambassador.63 Though Senegal pledged to maintain economic ties, the blow was damaging for Tehran’s economic interests in the country. Iran rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties with Senegal in early February 2012, when former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Senegalese President Macky Sallah agreed, during their talks on the sidelines of the 12th Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in Cairo, to resume their diplomatic relations.64 Tehran and Dakar maintained diplomatic relations, despite this short pause, and Iran’s cultural diplomacy in Senegal continued, resulting in the unprecedented spread of Shiism. Senegal is predominately a Sŭnni Muslim country and the geographic centre of Sŭfi orders in West Africa. Yet, the spread of Shi’a Islam in Senegal was a relatively new phenomenon. Despite the presence of Lebanese migrant65 traders in Senegal as early as 1888, Shiism was not introduced to the religious landscape of Senegal until Iran’s diplomatic ties with the country were established.66 This was because religion in general, and Shi’a Islam in particular, was not a part of the process of the settlement of the Lebanese community in Senegal and in the formation of their identity as migrants. However, the arrival of the Lebanese cleric, Abdul Monem El-Zein, and the establishment of the Islamic Institute in the Dakar Plateau neighbourhood in 1978 marked the institutional presence of Shi’a in the West African country. Sheikh El-Zein, who was trained in Najaf, Iraq, under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during the latter’s decade-long exile in Najaf, was thought to have gone to Senegal to reinforce the religious identity of the immigrants. Nevertheless, he also

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embarked on converting Senegalese Muslims to Shi’a Islam. He was involved in the founding of dozens of mosques, and more than 100 mādrāsās, or religious schools, around the country. This facilitated the conversion of many Senegalese to Shi’a Islam.67 While Sheikh El-Zein can be credited for the early spread of Shi’a Islam in Senegal, subsequent efforts that led to the placing of Shi’a in the Senegalese religious landscape is ascribed to the later involvement of Iran, starting in the late 1970s. In Senegal, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran inspired a considerable number of Senegalese, including two brothers, Ahmed Khalifa Niasse and Sidy Lamine Niasse, sons of a famous Tijāni marabout. Khomenei’s doctrine inspired these two brothers in their open calls for the overthrowing of Senegal’s revered first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, a scholarly Roman Catholic.68 The establishment of a biweekly Islamist magazine, Wāl Fādjri, by Sidy Lamine Niasse featured lengthy abstracts of the collected works of Ayatollah Khomeini, attacks on the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War and condemnations of Saudi Arabia and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. This aroused the suspicion of Senegalese authorities, who thought that Iranian diplomats had been involved in funding the magazine.69 As a result, Abdou Diouf’s administration expelled Iranian diplomats and severed diplomatic relations.70 Thus, despite the early efforts of Sheikh El-Zein and the Iranian diplomatic missions to bring Shi’a Islam to Senegal, their influence remained limited and the practice among Senegalese people was largely invisible. However, diplomatic and economic ties thrived between Iran and Senegal, which led to a heavy presence of Iranian investors and diplomats. The 2006 Hezbollah–Israel War led to an influx of Lebanese refugees into Senegal, increasing the awareness of Senegalese people about the existence of Shi’a Islam. This paved the way for Senegal to convert to Shi’a Islam. The development of the economic and political relationship between Iran and Senegal existed in parallel with Iran’s religious missionary activities in the country, carried out by Iranian diplomats and other Iranian-­ backed institutions. This was facilitated by the implicit support of the Wade administration and its muted response to the concerns of local Sŭnnis. President Wade allowed the construction of a Persian-language school at Senegal University in 2003. He also allowed an Iranian cleric to build a traditional Shi’a seminary, or Hāwzā (Hāwzā al-Rasūl al-Ă krām), in Senegal, not far from the University of Dakar. In the Hāwzā al-Rāsūl al-Ă krām, which was run by Senegalese Iranian graduates, youth were

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introduced to Shiite doctrines using Arabic language and texts. The graduates of the Hāwzā were offered scholarships to pursue their education at Iranian universities.71 In addition, Iran, through its cultural centre in Dakar, was involved in many other cultural and educational activities that targeted current and prospective Shiite converts. These included, but are not limited to, Mādārāsāt Rasūl al-Azhām in Cassamance, Hussaine College in Fass Mbao and the Mozdahir Foundation in Dakar, which is involved in social development projects aimed at helping orphans and needy people.72 A number of Senegalese Muslims converted to Shi’a Islam because of the influence of these institutions, and a number of Iranian-­ sponsored “non-governmental” organisations, as well as Lebanese–Shiite cultural and social foundations and institutions.73 Another key factor that sustained the Iranian missionary project in Senegal was the 2006 war between Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, and Israel. This war fuelled the popularity of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in Muslim communities across the world. His resistance to Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon was a victory that not only legitimised his position as leader, but also reinforced the Iranian Shiite cause. This war and its aftermath raised the profile among Muslims of Iran and Hezbollah as a Muslim–Shiite resistance against Israel’s military operation. In Senegal the impact of the war had a far-reaching impact. It provided increased awareness among Senegalese people about the existence of a large group of Shi’a Muslims in their country because of demonstrations and marches that brought together large numbers of Iranian and Lebanese Shias, as well as Senegalese Shiite converts. On July 20, 2006, almost 3000 Lebanese participated in a demonstration in the area between Senegal’s national television station and Dakar’s Grand Mosque. Dozens of people also joined the demonstration, including Karim Wade, the son of the then President Abdullaye Wade; Mustafa Niass, the former prime minister and leader of the opposition; and other Senegalese politicians, professors, religious leaders of Senegalese Sŭfi orders, and members of non-governmental organisations. During the demonstration, protestors waved Lebanese and Hezbollah flags in support of Lebanon and in protest against Israeli attacks.74 While this gathering could be perceived as a political rally, the presence of Lebanese Shias along with Senegalese and Iranian diplomats qualified the event as a token of the unity of the fragmented Shiite community in Senegal. Religious discussions given by Shi’a cleric Abdul Monem El-Zein, the presence of Senegalese politicians and civil society alongside Iranian

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diplomats who marched with demonstrators, and the press coverage of the demonstration in Senegalese newspapers not only exposed Senegalese people to Shi’a Islam, it was also a declaration of official support for the presence of Shi’a religious activities in the country, and it also mobilised Senegalese tolerance of the cultural mission of Iran. This created a fertile environment for the Iranian diplomatic mission to intensify it religious missionary through public diplomacy and soft power. As a result, since 2006, Senegal has witnessed the increased construction and establishment of cultural and educational institutions funded by Iranians. The increased social and cultural visibility of Iranian activities and the conversion of Senegalese people to Shi’a Islam led some Senegalese Sŭnnis to organise a debate with Senegalese Shias on April 14, 2008.75 In addition to the growth of Iranian–Senegalese ties and the Lebanese– Israeli war of 2006, the growing antagonistic relations between Saudi-­ trained scholars and Senegalese communities were advantageous to the Iranian cultural mission in Senegal.76 Owing to its particular historical and contemporary circumstances, moderation and the balance between traditional Islam and secularism remains the basis on which Senegal is identified.77 This explains why the Sŭfi orders have maintained a peaceful coexistence with Westernised and secular state institutions.78 However, the religious landscape has been marred by the emergence of Sālāfism, which promotes a conservative Wahhabi Islam that condemns Sŭfi Islam, the dominant Islamic order in Senegal, as “heterodox” and contrary to traditional Islam.79 The preaching of these ideologies in Senegal has not only created hostility between this group of Saudi scholars or Saudi-sponsored institutes and various Sŭfi orders, but has also pushed local Sŭfis closer to Shi’a Islam. This affinity in religious rites between Shias and Sŭfis facilitated their alliance, seen as they celebrated Ă shŭrā at the same venue.80 The Sŭfis’ clash with Sālāfists emboldened Iran’s missionary activities in Senegal, and was significant enough to influence the masses, who were not in a position to differentiate between Shi’a and Sŭnni Islam. This alerted Saudi Arabia, other Sŭnni Arab countries and Sŭnni-based organisations, reinforcing their perceived view of the threat of Shi’a Islam in Senegal. For example, the Qatar-based organisation, the Union of Muslim Scholars, published a 700-page book to describe what they have perceived as the threats of Shi’a Islam in African countries, including in Senegal.81 This discussion reinforces Iran’s success to secure a stronghold in Senegalese economic, political and cultural contexts during the tenure of Ahmadinejad. However, this legacy was not maintained by his successor,

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although under Rouhani Iran had an opportunity to become more influential in Senegal. This is especially so given the growing importance of Senegal in the sub-region of West Africa, and the existence of a Muslim leadership vacuum, as Saudi Arabia appears to be losing its grasp on the leadership of the Muslim world since the outbreak of war in Yemen and its social reforms that have been seen by some as an effort by the leadership to reduce the influence of Islam at the social scale. Despite being a subtle and sophisticated operator, the potential to engage in more proactive foreign policy in Senegal remained irrelevant to Rouhani. Rouhani’s engagement in Syria, Yemen and Iraq remained significant constraints on his ability to continue the legacy of his predecessor in projecting Iran’s influence in Senegal.

Conclusion In broad terms, geopolitical developments in the Middle East, Iran’s strained relations with the West and the subsequent sanctions, which paralysed Iran’s economy and isolated Tehran politically, have been the impetus for Tehran to seek relationships beyond the Middle East during the reign of Ahmadinejad. The African continent was the target for Iran’s thriving political, diplomatic and economic ambitions. Iran’s presence in Senegal is part of Tehran’s effort to compensate for its diplomatic and economic loss in the West, and to cultivate the presence of Shi’a Islam. Iran, under former President Ahmadinejad, received significant economic, political and cultural benefits from its presence in Senegal. Within a period of one decade, Iran was able to position itself as a viable economic partner for Senegal. Through its diplomatic ties in Senegal, Iran also created an environment in which it has been able to proselytise Shi’a Islam. While Africa in general, and Senegal in particular, still stands out as being unique in terms of its significance to Iran, it remains to be seen how the unfolding political developments at the global and regional levels will direct President Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy towards the continent. On the one hand, the establishment of the deal between the P5 + 1 and Iran and the ending of civil wars in Syria and Yemen in favour of Iran’s allies could lead to Iran’s geopolitical rise beyond the Middle East. The lifting of international sanctions on Iran, and Tehran’s subsequent reintegration into global political and economic structures, might reinforce Iran’s presence on the African continent. Although Saudi Arabia is exerting significant effort to bring African countries into its camp, jeopardising

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Iran’s influence, it is yet to be seen whether these countries would remain loyal to Saudi Arabia, which lacks a vibrant foreign policy tool, except for financial aid, to project its goals in developing countries. The collapse of oil prices and the subsequent economic challenges in the Kingdom, coupled with the escalation of terrorist attacks in Africa, for which Saudi’s ideological offspring of Wahhabism is blamed, might signal that Iran’s influence in Africa would continue to flourish. In the case of Senegal, it would be naïve to suggest that its participation in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and the Islamic Coalition for Combating Terrorists will mark the end of Iranian–Senegalese ties. Both Iran and Senegal are aware of the political and economic significance of each other. Therefore, while Senegal’s participation was a blow to Iran, it should not be seen as a culminating event in their long-standing strategic relationship.

Notes 1. Bereke Selassie, “Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa,” New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980, 129–133. 2. Wai, “African–Arab Relations,” 195–198. 3. Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa,” 117–118. 4. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 255. 5. Ibid. 6. Borszik “International sanctions against Iran and Tehran’s responses,” 21–22. 7. Laub, “International Sanctions on Iran.” 8. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 229. 9. Ibid. 10. Sidati,“Kāifā Tālćāb irān biāwrāqāhā,” 3. 11. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 299. 12. Szrom, “Ahmadinejad in West Africa,” 2. 13. Ibid. 14. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 228–229. 15. Onderco, “South Africa’s Iran Policy,” 300–301. 16. Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” 7–10. 17. Hawas, “Iran’s Africa Policy during Rouhani’s First Term.” 18. Ibid. 19. Zweiri, & König, “Are Shias Rising in the Western Part,” 513. 20. Haji-Yousefi, “Whose Agenda Is Served,” 120–125. 21. Ibid. 22. Union of Muslim Scholars, “Ă ltăsâ ̄ŷ ı ̆ f ı̆ āfrı̆qı ̆yā:tāqrírí māíýdāné,” 122. 23. Ibid.

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24. Zubaida, “Sectarian dimensions,” 318. 25. Ibid. 26. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Iran’s Activity in East Africa,” 19. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Szrom, “Ahmadinejad in West Africa,” 14. 30. Berman, “Iran’s various Voices.” 31. “Senegal severs ties with Iran.” 32. Szrom, “Ahmadinejad in West Africa,” 5. 33. Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa,” 128. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.” 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Goodarzi, “Iran: Syria as the first line of defense,” 27. 40. Al Qadhi, “Iranian Role in Yemen,” 24–24. 41. Ashenafi “Gulf-Horn of Africa Geopolitics: The New Frontier.” 42. Dorsey, “Gulf Crisis Extend to the Horn of Africa.” 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” 56–57. 46. Schraeder, “Senegal Foreign Policy,” 485–508. 47. British Embassy Dakar, “Doing Business in Senegal,” 1. 48. Ibid. 49. Diouf, “Introduction: The Public Role of the ‘Good Islam,” 12. 50. Zweiri, & König, “Are Shias Rising in the Western Part,” 518. 51. Pham, “Shi’a in Senegal.” 52. Ibid. 53. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 228–229. 54. Farrar-Wellman, “Senegal-Iran Foreign Relations.” 55. FARS News Agency, “Senegalese Minister Underlines Expansion.” 56. SiasatRooz, “Iran-Senegal to Expand Relations.” 57. Rubin, “Iran’s Global Ambition.” 58. Szrom, “Ahmadinejad in West Africa,” 9. 59. Ibid., 6. 60. “Iran to Expand Senegal Refinery, Sell It Oil.” 61. “Iran-Khodro Starts Samand Assembly in Senegal.” 62. Pham, “Shi’a in Senegal.” 63. “Senegal Severs Ties with Iran.” 64. Hammond, “The Dakar Dance: Tumultuous Iran-Senegal.”

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65. There are between 15,000 and 30,000 Lebanese people in Senegal; 95% of them are Muslim, with a small Christian population and an insignificant Sŭnni Muslim presence (see Leichtman, “Migration, War”). 66. Leichtman, “Migration, War,” 274. 67. Ibid., 147. 68. Leichtman, “Shia Cosmopolitanisms in Africa,” 154–156. 69. Pham, “Shi’a in Senegal.” 70. Schraeder, “Senegal Foreign Policy,” 505. 71. Leichtman, “Shia Cosmopolitanisms in Africa,” 161. 72. Union of Muslim Scholars, “Ă ltăsâ ̄ŷı ̆ fı̆ āfrı̆qı̆yā,” 236. 73. Leichtman, “Shia Cosmopolitanisms in Africa,” 161. 74. Leichtman, “Migration, War,” 269–270. 75. Union of Muslim Scholars, “Ă ltă sâ ̄ŷ ı ̆ fı ̆ āfrı ̆ qı ̆yā,” 373. 76. Leichtman, “Migration, War”; Ibid. 77. David Dickson, “Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 9. 78. Villalón, “Sŭfi Rituals as Rallies,” 416. 79. Hussein, “Islam in Africa”. 80. Union of Muslim Scholars, “Ă ltă s ̂āŷı ̆ fı̆ āfrı̆ qı̆yā,” 378. 81. Union of Muslim Scholars, “Ă ltă sâ ̄ŷ ı ̆ fı̆ āfrı ̆qı̆yā”.

Bibliography “Iran to Expand Senegal Refinery, Sell It Oil’, Iran Focus August 29, 2007. http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-economy/iran-to-expand-senegal-refinerysell-it-oil/75516. “Iran-Khodro Starts Samand Assembly in Senegal” Payvand Iran News, August 4, 2008. http://www.payvand.com/news/08/apr/1101.html. “Iran, Senegal Discuss Expansion of Ties” Fars News Agency’ September 28, 2015. http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940706000258. “Senegal severs ties with Iran” Aljazeera. February 23, 2011. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122392022223897.html. Al-Mustafa, Hassan. “Saudi Diplomacy Distances Iran from Horn of Africa”, Al-Arabia, October 23, 2015. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/ middle-east/2015/10/23/Saudi-diplomacy-distances-Iran-from-Horn-ofAfrica.html. Al Qadhi, Mohammad Hassan “The Iranian Role in Yemen and its Implications on the Regional Security”. Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies. https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/12/The-IranianRole-in-Yemen-and-its-Implications-on-the-Regional-Security-.pdf. Ashenafi, Neimin “Gulf-Horn of Africa Geopolitics: The New Frontier”. TesfaNews. https://www.tesfanews.net/gulf-horn-africa-geopolitics-new-frontier/.

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Berman, Ilan. “Iran’s various Voices”, The American Foreign Policy Council, June 2015. http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewPolicyPaper/2813. Borszik, Oliver. “International sanctions against Iran and Tehran’s responses: political effects on the targeted regime”, Contemporary Politics, 22:1 (2016), 20–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2015.1112951. British Embassy Dakar. “Doing Business in Senegal” Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012): 1. http://www.developingmarkets.com/sites/default/files/ FCO-445-Doing-Business-in-Senegal-Print-lr.pdf. Dickson, David. “Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda”, United States Institute of Peace. May 10, 2005, p. 9. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr140.pdf. Diouf, Mamadou. “Introduction: The Public Role of the ‘Good Islam’: Sŭfi Islam and the Administration of Pluralism” in Tolerance, Democracy, and Sŭfis in Senegal, edited by Diouf, Mamadou. New  York: Columbia University Press, 2013: 12. Farrar-Wellman, Ariel. “Senegal-Iran Foreign Relations”, Iran Tracker, March 2, 2010. http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/senegal-iran-foreignrelations. Fars News Agency. “Senegalese Minister Underlines Expansion of Tehran-Dakar Ties”, May 15, 2010. https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-226547099.html. Goodarzi, Jubin. “Iran: Syria as the first line of defence”. European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2013. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR86_ SYRIA_REPORT.pdf. Haji-Yousefi, Amir M. “Whose Agenda Is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2009): 120–125. https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/1660. Hammond, Joseph. “The Dakar Dance: Tumultuous Iran-Senegal Relationship Enters New Chapter” Diplomatic Courier, March 6, 2013. http://www.com/ the-dakar-dance-tumultuous-iran-senegal-relationship-enters-new-chapter. Hawas, Muzeyen. “Iran’s Africa Policy during Rouhani’s First Term: Changes and Progressions”. https://ankasam.org/en/tag/rouhani/. Hunter, Shireen T. Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara, CA:Praeger, 2010. Hussein, Hassan D. “Islam in Africa”, CRS Report for Congress. May 9, 2008. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22873.pdf. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. “Iran’s Activity in East Africa, The Gateway to the Middle East and the African Continent”. July 29 (2009): 19. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_09_197_2.pdf. Laub, Zachary. “International Sanctions on Iran”, Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/iran/international-sanctions-iran/p20258.

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Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. “Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies’ Middle East Policy”, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (2012): 117–118. http://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00539.x/full. Leichtman, Mara, A. “Migration, War, and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shia Community in Senegal”, Int. J.  Middle East Stud. 42 (2010): 276, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074381000005X. http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7516136&fileId =S002074381000005X. Leichtman, Mara, A. Shia Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversation in Senegal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015): 154–156. Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies”. Congressional Research Service Report R44017, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf. Monsatt, A., Naef, S. & Sabati, F. “Shiism, Sufism and Sacred Space in the Deccan: Counter-Narratives of Saintly Identity in the Cult of Shah Nur” (2007): 21. http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/anthropologyiran/veneration/images/stories/docs/articles/shiism_sufism_.pdf. Oladipo, Tomi. “Saudi Arabia and Iran Fight for Africa’s Loyalty” BBC, January 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35252039. Onderco, Michal. “South Africa’s Iran Policy: ‘Poster Child’ Meets Renegade”, South African Journal of International Affairs, 19:3 (2012): 300–301, https:// doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2012.740179. http://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2012.740179?journalCode=rsaj20. Pham, J.  Peter. “Shi’a in Senegal: Iran’s Growing Reach into Africa”, World Defense February 18, 2010. http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/ shia-in-senegal-irans-growing-reach-into-africa. Rubin, Michael. “Iran’s Global Ambition”, America Enterprise Institute Middle Eastern Outlook, March 17, 2008. http://www.meforum.org/1873/ irans-global-ambition. Schraeder, Peter. “Senegal Foreign Policy: Challenges of Democratization and Marginalization”, Oxford Journals of African Affairs Volume 96, Issue 385 (1997): 485–508. http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/385/485.abstract. Selassie, Bereke. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 129–133. SiasatRooz. “Iran-Senegal to Expand Relations”, January 10, 2009. http://www. siasatrooz.ir/prtc.1qsa2bqi1y-82.html. Sidati, Al-Sheikh. “Kāifā Tālćāb irān biāwrāqāhā fi ġārb āfriqiyā” Al-Jazeera Center for Studies. March 3, 2015. http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/ reports/2015/05/201553659458124.html. Szrom, Charlie. “Ahmadinejad in West Africa: What Iran Outreach to the Region Reveals about Tehran’s Foreign Policy”, American Enterprise Institute, August 3, 2013. p.  2. http://www.irantracker.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/ analysis/Ahmadinejad_Iran_West_Africa_Szrom_CriticalThreats20100803.pdf.

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Union of Muslim Scholars. Ă ltăsâ ̄ŷı ̆ fı̆ āfrı̆qı̆yā:tāqrírí māíýdāné’ mārkāzi nı̆māı ̄ lilbŭhŭt ̧ wāldirāsāt: 122. Villalón, L.  A. “Sŭfi Rituals as Rallies: Religious Ceremonies in the Politics of Senegalese State-Society Relations”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (July 1994), p.  416. https://doi.org/10.2307/422024. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/422024?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Wai, Dunstan M. “African–Arab Relations: Interdependence or Misplaced Optimism?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21 (1983): 195–198. http://www.jstor.org/stable/160772?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Wege, Carl. “Hizballah in Africa, Perspectives on Terrorism”, Volume 6, issue 3 (2012): 2–3. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/ view/wege-hizballah-in-africa/html. Zubaida, Sami. “Sectarian dimensions”, The Middle East Journal, Volume 68, Number 2, Spring (2014): 318. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/545050. Zweiri, Mahjoob & König, Christoph. “Are Shias Rising in the Western Part of the Arab world? The Case of Morocco”, The Journal of North African Studies, 13:4 (2008): 513. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 13629380802343632.

CHAPTER 10

The Feasibility of Energy Cooperation between Iran and the Gulf Arab States Anna Aleksandra Gawlik

Introduction The nuclear deal signed on July 14, 2015, should have been a breakthrough in the Iranian–Gulf Arab States energy cooperation. Yet, while Western companies have been eager to sign energy deals to boost the sector and benefit from Iranian oil and gas, the Gulf region has remained reluctant to any economic rapprochement. It would have been expected that the Arab Gulf States—as the closest potential partner (in liberal market circumstances)—would be the first to advise their northern neighbours on technology and partnerships, yet this has not happened. The political agenda against Iran remains the most important criterion in a region whose leaders’ behaviour is driven by realist impulses. Although the area is rich in energy, resources are shrinking and countries like Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman will soon become energy importers rather than exporters. “In April 1977, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began exporting gas as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) built the region’s first LNG liquefaction terminal and began sending LNG to Japan.

A. A. Gawlik (*) Independent Researcher, Cracow, Poland © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_10

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A little more than 30 years later, in August 2009, the GCC began importing gas, as Kuwait received its first LNG cargo from Russia at its fast-track LNG receiving terminal.”1 The Gulf countries have faced significant economic challenges, and thus respective governments have had to revise expenditures and cut subsidies. Shared energy fields are also the subjects of further analysis. However, this has not urged the GCC, as an organisation, to work on a common long-term solution. The GCC states within the political framework are obliged to reconsider options for their economic survival in this new geopolitical situation. The aim of this chapter is to assess whether the liberalisation of Iran, during the first term of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, created a favourable environment for energy cooperation between Arab Gulf States and Iran, or if discord between the parties existed beyond the nuclear threat, and what are the major impediments that need to be resolved. Iranian gas imports have been on the agenda of GCC states during the last decade. The Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Bahrain are not alone in facing energy challenges. The United Arab Emirates and State of Kuwait also need solutions for their energy imbalances. As Iran hosts the largest gas field (North Field/South Pars), the Gulf States should view the Islamic Republic as a potential partner. Yet the establishment of a pipeline connection would involve much more than only an economic agreement. Political will, regional stability, long-term planning, and consensus among the GCC members must first be achieved. Yet, although the Iranian nuclear threat has been annihilated, there are still many issues that need to be settled before commencing an energy partnership. The identification of two regional energy demands that could potentially be solved by establishing a closer cooperation with Iran will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. The third section addresses common energy projects in the GCC that have been implemented or are being planned. The GCC members acknowledge and support the need for joint projects that would facilitate an effective energy distribution system in the region; however, there is no consensus over the feasibility of longterm cooperation with an external (out of GCC) energy provider. Hassan Rouhani’s election as president of Iran in 2013 became a turning point in the country’s foreign policy. Economic and political sanctions led to economic isolation and high social discontent. The Rouhani government made a distinct change of foreign policy, in terms of its neighbours, both with a promise to enter into dialogue with the Gulf countries and with

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respect to the world powers. The political circle associated with the new president also decided to introduce a change in foreign energy policy. Its main assumptions, implementation and success are discussed in the fourth section. The nuclear deal was a turning point in the contemporary history of the Islamic Republic, which not only changed relations with the negotiating parties, but also opened a new chapter for Iran. The GCC members observed the talks with caution, knowing that once sanctions were removed, Tehran could rise as a regional power. They perceived this to be a threat to their sovereignty. Common projects, if successfully implemented, could have been the basis for cooperation between Iran and the GCC—discussed in the subsequent section—yet political distrust and a security agenda based on Iran’s perceived threat prevailed. The article concludes with feasible scenarios for energy cooperation based on analyses made throughout this chapter.

The Regional Energy Demand The necessity for GCC governments to transform their power generation capacity is crucial due to two factors: . Recurrent summer power shortages 1 2. The struggle of most Gulf States to obtain sufficient amounts of natural gas With the expansion of cities, population growth, technological boom and increasing energy demands, increasing electricity consumption and the proportion of natural gas generated has been a challenge for the region. It is an irony that the world’s largest energy producers have to confront energy shortages and blackouts.2 Although almost 23% of the world’s gas reserves can be found in the GCC, the supply–demand imbalance means that GCC states (except for Qatar) need to import gas to meet the growing demand for energy.3 The Arab states of the Gulf still use fossil fuels for most of their electricity production. It is the oil and natural gas–fuelled power plants that dominate the Gulf electricity sectors. While Bahrain, Oman and Qatar depend exclusively on natural gas for power generation, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still rely heavily on both crude oil and oil products to generate power. “Forecasts by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggest that as a result, over 90 per cent of new power generation capacity added in the

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GCC area up to 2030 will be gas fired.”4 Therefore, the necessity to provide local power plants with sustainable fuel will continue to be a challenge. The quantity of oil and gas reserves in each Gulf State in not equal. Also, the GDP per capita is very distinctive, especially when comparing Qatar (74,686.60 USD5) and Oman (15,965.90 USD6).7 These differences mean that greater cooperation between the Gulf States with regard to energy would be beneficial. Capacity shortages are not only a problem of physical ability to produce electricity, but of the availability of gas for power generation. Some of the 2010 electricity summer outages resulted from a short-term lack of sufficient gas supplies. The practice of load-­ shedding was used when parts of the cities or entire villages in Kuwait, the Northern Emirates in the UAE and Bahrain were affected by electricity cuts, and water shortages as desalination plants were not working.8 The Emirate of Sharjah, despite having had sufficient installed capacity, was one of the worst hit by electricity shortages in the summers of 2008 and 2009.9 As a result of the lack of guarantee of adequate supplies, numerous industrial projects were delayed or cancelled.10 In 2010, Oman allocated all new production of natural gas to the country’s electricity sector. Meanwhile, other GCC countries were evaluating different mid- to long-term options to diversify the energy sources used for power generation, such as coal,11 renewables12 and nuclear energy.13 The UAE’s nuclear agenda is the most advanced solution for large-scale generation capacity in the medium term, with projected operation in late 2019 or early 2020 of the first reactor, Barakah 1, and by 2021 for three others.14 Oman, on the other hand, had been considering the use of renewable energy sources. “While much of Oman may be highly suitable for exploiting solar energy, the key challenge is identifying promising conditions and commercial viability converge[nce].”15 For many years the government has been greatly subsidising electricity produced from burning fossil fuels. However, the “electricity tariffs have been in place since the 1980s, meaning consumers only pay 54% of the cost to produce electricity; the government makes up the difference”.16 Since the electricity prices in Oman are unrealistic, this “significantly impedes development and implementation of solar power electricity options to take over from gas-fired plants”.17 Apart from that, “Oman’s wind energy prospects also offer strong potential. Particularly good wind resources exist in the southern and eastern areas of the country: recorded wind speeds in these

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locations compare to speeds in European sites where commercial windpower projects already operate successfully.”18 With the implementation of such projects, the GCC countries are on the path towards achieving a sustainable solution for energy that would allow power generation from natural resources and reserve shrinking fossil fuels for the export. Yet, common energy projects, power grids and technological exchange are among the solutions that have been on the table for more than three decades and little progress has been made for these to become a reality.

The Common GCC Projects In 2008, GCC member states agreed to establish a common market which would allow equal treatment of GCC citizens in the economic activities of member states. However, this has not yet become a reality.19 Trade among GCC states remains limited due to the similarity of the economic structures, as well as the lack of industrial diversification. In 2014, inter-­ GCC trade made up for up to 8% of the total GCC trade.20 “The GCC electricity grid interconnections is an example of the Council’s integration, where the project provided benefits to all member states by increasing electricity efficiency, while reducing the investment requirements for new electricity generation capacity. The GCC Dolphin pipeline, which transports natural gas from Qatar to UAE and on to Oman, is an example of how cross-border initiatives can create value for all GCC stakeholders.”21

Electricity Grid The GCC’s answer to its energy problem was the installation of a common electricity grid. Gulf Co-operation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) was established in 2001.22 Its first phase—interlinking Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar—became operational in July 2009. The UAE joined the project in April 2011, and finally Omani linkage via UAE territory was added in 2013.23 The delay of the final stage was due to disagreements between the UAE and Oman, as Oman preferred to have electricity from Saudi Arabia rather than from the UAE. However, the establishment of the GCC grid did not solve the summer electricity outages. Critics claim that the system is only for limited emergency power transfer, not a fully operational commercial solution.

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The grid is prone to the same issues as national systems—peak load collectivism, that is highest power demand in summer days—and this makes the operation insufficient and unreliable. News in 2010 reported that “Kuwaiti pleas for emergency power had been rejected by its neighbours due to a lack of spare capacity in their own power sector”.24 However, the officials from GCCIA supported Kuwait when “a record heat wave [] called on all of Kuwait’s generating capacity. At one point during the crisis, the country asked for 1000 megawatts from the GCC grid. […] That is equal to 10 per cent of the country’s generating capacity.”25 In addition, none of the member states had finalised bilateral agreements to buy electricity recurrently. The most problematic issue was to set a price for electricity, as rates varied widely across the region. Qatar is the only country that maintains a large electricity surplus, and is thus willing to export power to its neighbouring countries, but “the country’s Minister of energy and industry Abdullah al Attiyah said the country had not received any serious proposals to buy its power”.26 Nevertheless, the international agencies and advising bodies suggested the following solutions for the GCC: 1. Substantial investment in the generation capacity of all GCC countries’ power sectors.27 2. Investment in power generation capacity GCC-wide with greater participation of private sector investors.28 3. Diversification of the fuel mix for power generation in GCC countries, which is still dominated by oil and natural gas. 4. Removal of subsidies on electricity in the region. These subsidies not only artificially inflate domestic consumption due to the lack of incentive for efficient use, but also render any imported electricity— charges for which are based on actual cost—more expensive compared to domestically produced and subsidised electricity. Connecting the grid to electricity-exporting countries that experience peak demand in periods other than summer—such as Iran—could be a mid-term solution, before achieving self-sufficiency in power generation. The final mid-term solution suggests the possibility of taking advantage of the differences during the peak periods. The highest power demand in Iran is in winter, which makes it an ideal option for a power swap with the GCC. However, “this potentially most practical extension option for the grid also remains unlikely, given the current political difficulties that would

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surround any energy trade agreement between the two Gulf coasts”. In September 2010, the Iranian state–owned TV news agency reported that Iran would export electricity to the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait in the near future. Yet, such reports have never been confirmed by any of the GCC countries.29

The Common Gas Market The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, the Sultanate of Oman and the State of Qatar are the only natural gas exporters in the GCC. Due to the inequalities in gas distributions within the GCC, countries have debated the option of finding a common solution since the 1980s. “Back in the late 1980s, Qatar considered the gas export pipeline a more meaningful undertaking than LNG exports. The second phase of Ras Laffan development in north of Qatar was designed to establish pipelines for export to the neighboring GCC countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and UAE (Dubai).”30 This was Qatar’s proposal to address the problem; however, the cost of the investment of 2 billion USD was discussed to be equally divided between the participating nations. During the next GCC summit in November 1989 the rulers from Riyadh, Kuwait City, Manama and Dubai “expressed interest in a GCC pipeline to import up to 2 bcf/d of dry North Field gas. At the December 1990 summit, the GCC nations agreed to nearly all the essentials for the regional pipeline, except for the price.”31 Despite initial hopefulness, the agreement has never been settled because of the “political tensions, minor diplomatic squabbles, and border disputes [regarding] the proposed project. Formerly an ardent supporter of the proposed project, Saudi Arabia, not only withdrew from the GCC pipeline negotiations in 1992, but denied transit rights for the pipeline to pass overland to Kuwait.”32 The only three natural gas exporters within the GCC have opted for long-term contract obligations for energy deliveries that would secure their revenue for decades. However, such commitments would exacerbate gas supply shortages while demand continues to increase. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that Oman is short of LNG for its Qalhat LNG plant.33 Due to this restriction and limited resources, it is only Qatar that can both export and supply its domestic industries and the power sector with cheap gas. In addition, since 2007, both Oman and Abu Dhabi have started importing gas from Qatar.34 However, with the current system of subsidies and low price of gas in the GCC domestic market, the

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gas-exporting countries would rather seek direct economic benefits, by exporting on the global market, than the common Gulf welfare. Doha exports its gas to countries that pay real prices, and hopes not to be forced to sell at subsidised prices. In fact, it is expected to finalise the 2000 kilometre deep-sea gas pipeline connecting Qatar with India.35 Today, the only existing gas connection within the GCC is the Dolphin pipeline that began to export natural gas from Qatar to the UAE and Oman in July 2007. In 2015 Dolphin Energy reached the 5 trillion cubic feet production milestone.36

President Rouhani’s Oil and Gas Policy The World Energy Outlook (WEO) in 2009 conveyed that “[d]espite holding the world’s second-largest gas reserves, Iran currently imports almost 5% of its gas needs from Turkmenistan to satisfy local demand. Iran is the third-largest consumer of gas globally, and local gas demand will increase by around 7% per year over the next decade.”37 Currently the power sector consumes about one-third of Iranian gas, and Iran’s aging oil reservoirs require about one-quarter of the country’s gas for reinjection. According to the WEO, the “demand for gas for re-injection will quadruple by 2015”.38 On the supply side, the most significant energy development project in Iran is the off-shore South Pars field (also known in Qatar as the North Field), which is estimated to contain about 50% of Iran’s total natural gas reserves. However, much of natural gas development in South Pars is stated to be allocated to the domestic market for consumption and gas reinjection. In addition, “Iran has contracted to import gas from Azerbaijan … in 2011 and has expanded its pipeline import capacity from Turkmenistan. Considering Iran’s domestic gas needs and political uncertainty, it is unlikely that Iran will be able to export a significant amount of gas at least until the end of the next decade.”39 Rouhani’s promises in electoral speeches to develop the hydrocarbon sector were optimistic and economically feasible. The agenda was based on the 100-day development programme for the Iranian economy and a quick and comprehensive nuclear deal with the West. However, during the second year of Rouhani’s term, with the prolongation of nuclear talks, the decline in oil prices and the emergence of former government domination and legacy, delays became evident. Rouhani’s government expressed a tighter tone in economic positions about the performance of economic institutions beyond the control of the state.

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In the context of increasing oil and gas production, the government, in its first years of term, managed to maintain the same level of production. However, with the prolongation of nuclear negotiations, implementation of agreements and the elimination of international constraints on oil and gas production and exports, the cabinet realised that its electoral promises were not viable. Yet, in the following years, there were a rising number of nuclear-related agreements. Removal of the sanctions allowed preliminary talks with International Oil Companies (IOCs), some of which even reopened their offices in Iran. As the oil prices and the shale oil output in the global market dropped, the cost of oil and gas in Iran was reduced, the sanctions on oil exportation were lifted and the desire of Western companies to invest in Iran grew. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran hoped to take further steps to increase oil and gas production.40 The main strategy of Hassan Rouhani’s agenda for oil and gas development in the first tenure was to attract foreign investment. The government made efforts to revise the features of joint projects from buyback agreements to Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) that would benefit foreign investors. Previously, under a buyback agreement, IOCs invested in projects and when the production started, the field would be handed over to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or one of its delegates. The amount of initial investment was returned to investors in addition to a contracted amount paid out of gross profits. This arrangement was highly criticised by experts who claimed that such solutions were only profitable to the Iranian side, while it was the IOC that bore the risk. In addition, the “IOCs claimed that the utilization of Iran’s oil and gas reserves will be sub-optimal if they are not involved in optimizing long-­term recovery”.41 Under the new type of agreement, the NIOC would set up joint ventures for hydrocarbon production with international companies, which would be paid with a portion of the output. This strategy has so far been implemented with French energy giant TOTAL to develop the 11th phase of South Pars.42 At the time, other companies were still conducting feasibility studies.43 While attending a debate for the candidates for the presidential election in May 2017 President Rouhani stated44 that the government managed to revive Iran’s right to the oil market, especially in the following areas: 1. Most of the petrochemical products that for a long time had been stored in the warehouses were finally exported. Rouhani also discussed the achievement of his government to restore the gas condensate and the crude oil exports.

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2. Joint investment with foreign companies to develop phases of the South Pars field had been announced and resumed. Although some of the phases of South Pars were awarded to foreign companies, their development could not have been implemented due to the sanctions regime. Therefore, most of the projects were delayed. The new developments could only begin after the sanctions were lifted. 3. Development of some of the transnational common fields. Hassan Rouhani summarised that it was his government’s intention to improve the oil sector, which would allow Iran to resume its position in the global oil market, reclaim its position in OPEC and compete with the production from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Yet, the President stressed the danger of refining the country’s gas condensate that could lead to depletion of the reserves.45 The following are the Iranian main foreign policy goals in the context of oil and gas46: 1. Self-sufficiency in production of oil and petroleum products, especially gasoline 2. Increase of the role of gas in foreign policy 3. Gas exports to neighbouring countries 4. Development of LNG industry 5. Reduction of the share of crude in exports A total of 28 hydrocarbon fields are jointly located on the border between Iran and neighbouring countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Azerbaijan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkmenistan).47 According to an NIOC representative, “Iran’s rapprochement with its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors is in line with a national policy to accelerate the development of joint oil and gas fields, though the government has placed a higher priority for shared fields with Iraq and Qatar such as the giant South Pars Gas Field”.48 The reports written in President Rouhani’s first term of office showed that Iran’s neighbours extract nine times more from joint oil fields.49 Four common oil fields—Esfandiar (Saudi name LuLu), Foruzan (Marjaan), Farzad A (Fars 1) and Farzad B (Fars 2)—are located along the marine border between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Till date only Saudi Arabia has carried out oil exploitation from the Foruzan oil field.50 The Iranians had started the development of the Esfandiar field, however, due to sanctions it has been disrupted. The natural gas fields Farzad A and B have also not yet been exploited; however, the Indian energy company Videsh Ltd.

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had shown interest in investing in its development.51 The Arash field, discovered in 1967, is geographically shared by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. This gas field, which is called “Al-Dawra” by the two Arab countries, has for decades been the subject of dispute between the sides to determine the shares. Tehran contends that during the 1960s the Iranian Oil Company paid for the geophysical studies, which resulted in the discovery of these reservoirs.52 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established Al-Khahji Joint Operations in 2000 to develop the Arash field. Iran is not operating in the Arash field, but it has invited investors to develop its gas reserves.53 The Salman oil and gas field is shared between the UAE and Iran. Studies for this field have shown that 70% of the reserves are Iran’s, with the UAE controlling 30%. Yet, reports from 2016 showed that Iran produced 40,000 b/d from the field and the UAE 70,000 b/d.54 The UAE owns most of the reserves from the joint Nosrat oil field, co-owned with Iran. It was only in 1995 that Iran initiated the production from the Nosrat field; still financial constraints led to cancellation of the project.55 Discovered in 1975, the Farzam oil field is shared between Iran and the Emirate of Dubai.56 The Hengam oil and gas field is Iran’s only joint field with Oman. Eighty percent of Hengam lies within Iran, with production of oil and natural gas outstripping Oman.57 With Qatar, Iran shares the oil field at Rashadat, which has not yet been exploited, and the world’s largest gas field South Pars (North Field). According to reports by British Petroleum (BP), Doha converts 80% of the exploited amount to LNG and exports it. Qatar also extracts some 450,000 barrels of oil from the field’s oil layer, while Iran has failed to tap this resource.58 Tehran claims that its neighbours have been tapping joint oil and gas fields without signing the necessary agreements. The report of Majlis Research Center also “accuses some of the States of delaying the negotiations in order to continue extraction of oil and gas. Tehran believes that these governments should be fined by international courts.”59

The Breakthrough in Relations Throughout the years of sanctions the Arab Gulf States have maintained diplomatic relations with Iran. In April 2015, Javad Zarif, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, called for regional dialogues to “address the causes of tension in the wider Persian Gulf region”. He explained that “without such a dialogue, there is a high risk that the differences between Iran and GCC states over the emerging regional order will continue to play out

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violently in various states in the region”.60 On July 14, 2015, the 5 + 1 negotiators agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, changing Iran’s regional situation and presenting Tehran with more alternatives. The Arab Gulf States had expected that the deal would be more comprehensive and would regulate the stabilisation of the region that, according to them, was threatened by the Iranian hegemonic agenda. “The deal focused on limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities but did not take the stability of the Middle East or the security of Iran’s Arab neighbors into consideration.”61 According to Al Jazeera Center for Studies in Doha, the GCC countries alleged that they should have been consulted regarding the negotiations of the nuclear agreement and its implementation. The concluded agreement was perceived as an “enabler of Iran’s ascendance to regional leadership. It gave Iran access to its frozen financial assets, the ability to increase its capacity to project power throughout the region, and to facilitate Iran’s return to the global oil market.”62 The lack of engaging the GCC countries in the negotiations “led to increased tensions and mistrust between Iran and Saudi Arabia.63

Possible Projects During the Iranian Revolution, all foreign investors were forced to leave the country and the NIOC assumed absolute control over the oil sector. Due to lack of support and investment from foreign companies Iran’s technology became outdated, inefficient and polluting. As the energy sector remains the major driver of the Iranian economy, the modernisation of these facilities has become an urgent issue. At the regional level, its long coastline with vast adjacent offshore gas fields means that Iran has enormous potential as an exporter of hydrocarbons. Many would-be European partners such as Total and Royal Dutch Shell have had ambitions to help develop and import Iran’s natural gas, but have been unsuccessful, mainly because of sanctions. With the implementation of new projects, an upgrade of the existing facilities and access to the latest technology, Iran could become a regional and global resource of energy. The relation between the State of Qatar and Iran is involuntarily special due to the fact that these countries share the world’s largest gas field. Over the years, Tehran and Doha agreed on the allocation of quotas on gas extraction. Since Iran does not yet possess the advanced technology to liquefy gas, it is restricted to transmit energy through its

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limited existing pipeline connections. Envying the prosperity and presence of modern technology, Iranian officials repeatedly accused Doha of exceeding the imposed limits of gas extraction, implying that Qataris steal from Iranian resources.64 The Al Thanis, who enjoyed the benefits of the presence of foreign investors and multinational energy giants in their country, remain conscious that the nuclear deal could end their privileged position. Once restrictions are completely removed, Iran could also attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In this context, in order to maximise benefits, Doha should opt for facilitating investment projects that could be launched on the joint Qatari–Iranian gas fields. Such developments would require coordination and understanding between the two parties. Combining these, Doha could again use its advanced diplomatic skills to introduce Western companies and technology to the Iranian market. For many years, negotiations between Iran and Oman,65 UAE and Kuwait66 over the construction of pipelines that would supply these sheikhdoms with gas had been put on hold. In 2013, an agreement was signed to construct a natural gas pipeline between Iran and Oman that would supply the Sultanate’s citizens with blue energy, and would also supply liquefied gas to the Omani LNG plant.67 Oman’s Minister of oil and gas, Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhy, added that the project had been modified to avoid the passage through Emirati waters in order to avoid any territorial dispute.68 In early 2014, Sultan Qaboos personally played a key role in secret talks between Washington and Tehran, which paved the way for the nuclear agreement. At that time, both countries signed a memorandum to construct a natural gas pipeline.69 An alternative project could involve the construction of an underwater pipeline from Chahbahar in Iran to Porbandar in Gujarat province in India via Ra’s al Jifan in Oman. Its cost is estimated at about 4.5 billion USD.70 Oman remains the most trusted partner in the Gulf for both India and Iran, creating a favourable atmosphere for investment. In addition to Iranian gas resources, the pipeline could be supplied by Turkmenistan through an overland tube over Iranian territory.71 Parts of such connections already exist as Iran is an importer of Turkmen gas to meet the demands of its north-eastern provinces. This project involves the supply of natural gas to Oman/UAE on its route to India.72 Turkmenistan has also benefitted greatly from Iran’s frequent inability to produce enough natural gas, not only for export but also to meet its domestic demand. According to the Energy International Agency, 30% of Turkmenistan’s total natural gas exports go to Iran.73 In addition, in 2015, Alireza Kameli, managing

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director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) suggested that Iran could export gas to Kuwait through a short pipeline crossing the Basra region.74 The IOCs see the potential and possibilities through investment in such projects, perceiving that seabed pipeline technology would create more opportunities than overland pipelines, mitigating the strategic location of Iran. However, there is still strong evidence that companies and governments in the region are reluctant to get involved in developing Iran’s gas fields.75

Political Antagonism In the beginning of 2016, when the Saudi Shi’a cleric Nimr al Nimr was executed, and Iranians stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, Riyadh cut diplomatic ties with Tehran. Subsequently, Manama did the same, and Abu Dhabi downgraded their relations. In such an environment, it is difficult for countries to build economic cooperation. Although the potential benefits are huge, the political atmosphere does not favour greater political engagement. Yet, there are several areas of potential cooperation that are not limited to trade or foreign investment, but given the geographical proximity, the countries could cooperate in many more spheres. Muscat’s recent reversal on Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT—intergovernmental counter-terrorist Alliance where Iran is not a member) came at a time of increasing disillusionment with Tehran. Oman had expected to see greater economic dividends from Iran’s international reintegration after the 2015 nuclear deal. However, business was slow to resume as Iran prioritised ventures with more lucrative partners, such as the European Union. The Sultanate felt that Tehran was purposely delaying on many joint projects, including the Oman–Iran gas pipeline. Oman had also welcomed Iranian direct investment in a hospital complex and a nanotechnology plant, both of which were meant to help in the diversification of the country’s economy away from oil. In March 2016, Iran Khodro, a car manufacturer, announced the establishment of a 200 million USD joint venture to produce cars in Oman. Iran also saw Oman (and Armenia) as its top economic partners in the region. It was no real surprise that the announcement of Oman’s contribution to IMAFT was only two months after the country had publicly been accused of allowing Iran to smuggle weapons to the Houthi rebels, leading to virulent

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criticism from its GCC allies.76 According to one source, Oman had changed its direction in the region after it realised the “lack of seriousness and of benefits” of cooperation with the Iranians.77

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated the necessity of energy cooperation between Iran and the Arab Gulf States. However, there are several possible scenarios for its breadth. It is vital for the future of the regional energy sector and peaceful coexistence in the neighbourhood to reach legal agreements that would regulate each country’s share in common gas fields. Without clear and binding procedures, countries will always accuse each other of illegal extraction. Moreover, foreign companies will abstain from investing in a project in which the legal status is uncertain. The next step of potential cooperation would be a joint investment in common fields, for which the current political climate is highly unfavourable. The lack of trust between the sides has resulted in a lack of financial stability for joint investments. Sanctions on Iran’s underdeveloped natural gas industry has been more tepid, as nations such as Pakistan, India and China candidly weigh their options to solve increasingly dire energy demand and create long-term energy security. It is also a flexible fuel that could play a larger role in electric power, both for its own features and as an effective—and indeed necessary—complement to greater reliance on renewable generation.78 In the end, many countries that have been involved in discussions with Iran may want to buy Iran’s natural gas, but they do not necessarily need it. Dialogue between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries could encourage them to adopt reconciliatory approaches to manage their regional relations. A regional conference among regional powers for regional security and cooperation could help reduce tensions. There will be no energy cooperation if the political antagonism is not dismantled. Behind Doha’s pro-Iranian rhetoric is Qatar’s trepidation of an increased Saudi dominance in the region. Doha does not desire to be part of the Saudi camp in the sectarian conflict. It has border disputes with the Wahhabi kingdom and does not opt for being under the influence of a state that considers itself a leader in the Arab World. This is another reason for Qatar to diversify its alliances and move closer to Tehran after the healing of the rift between Iran and the West. The policy of the Al Khalifa family of Bahrain and Al Sabah of Kuwait would be the opposite of that of

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the Al Thani’s— they are afraid of their own Shi’a population’s hypothetical loyalty to the Shi’a regime in Tehran.79 Therefore, for the same reason as the House of Saud, they would not risk suspending their security concerns for the sake of economic benefits. The crisis in the GCC (the socalled Qatar crisis) has revealed a lack of trust, understanding and tolerance between the members of the organisation. It is essential to recognise the need for collective work to find a solution. Even if this solution would be to import gas from Iran, the GCC states should work on a solution that would be acceptable for all members. They should understand that aspirations of one country cannot sacrifice the needs of another. Any further, closer and long-term cooperation in creating common infrastructure projects, making Iran the source of energy for a new intraregional configuration, would require political consensus and cessation in the regional struggle for power. Nonetheless, the weapons deal signed between the USA and the KSA during President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in 2017, combined with a shared vision of Iran as a source of global terrorism, also does not provide today a platform for constructive dialogue.

Notes 1. “Gas Shortage in the GCC: How to Bridge the Gap,” The Memri Economic blog, June 16, 2010, http://www.memrieconomicblog.org/bin/content. cgi?article=317. 2. Yasin Kakande, “Power blackouts hit Khor Fakkan,” The National, June 28, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/power-blackoutshit-khor-fakkan; Chris Stanton, “Improved Gulf power grid reduces blackouts,” The National, July 29, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/ business/energy/improved-gulf-power-grid-reduces-blackouts; “Most of Kuwait hit by power blackout,” Gulf News, April 23, 2017, http:// gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/most-of-kuwait-hit-by-powerblackout-1.1455544; Elsa Baxter, “Bahrain investment in power to reduce blackouts,” Arabian Business, June 27, 2010, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/bahrain-investment-in-power-reduce-blackouts-293044.html. 3. “Gas Shortage in the GCC: How to Bridge the Gap,” The Memri Economic blog, June 16, 2010, http://www.memrieconomicblog.org/bin/content. cgi?article=317. 4. Laura El-Katiri, “Interlinking the Arab Gulf: Opportunities and Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation,” July 2011, Oxford Institute for  Energy Studies, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/ uploads/2011/07/EL_81.pdf.

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5. World Bank, April 2017, www.worlbank.org. 6. World Bank, April 2017, www.worlbank.org. 7. Luciano Zaccara and Marta Saldaña, “Cambio Y Estabilidad Política En Las Monarquías Del Golfo Tras La Primavera Árabe / Change and Political Stability in the Gulf Monarchies after the Arab Spring,” Revista CIDOB D’Afers Internacionals, no. 109 (2015): 179–180. 8. “Gulf Power/Water Privatization Continues, as Saudi Arabia Conducts Review,” MEES, 52:28, July 13, 2009, 8–9. 9. “Demand for electricity soars in Abu Dhabi,” MEED, March 28, 2010, Oxford Business Group (2008b), 63. 10. Ajman-based Crown Paper Mill, for example, decided to relocate its new 23,000 t/yr tissue paper machine to Abu Dhabi in search of more secure power supplies, while Abu Dhabi Basic Industries Corporation (ADBIC) appears to have scrapped a project to build a 5 billion USD aluminium smelter in Ruwais due to concerns over adequate power supplies. An exemplary case is the opening of Ras Al-Khaimah’s Safeer Mall in December 2008, more than one year after it had been completed. After waiting more than a year for a connection to the emirate’s power grid, the shopping mall finally opened, powered with an electric diesel generator. Other emirates— Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman—face similar lengthy connection times, with many businesses resorting to emergency generators. Oxford Business Group (2009), 91; Oxford Business Group (2008b), 63; ‘Oman Electricity gears up to meet increasing demand’, Times of Oman, February 8, 2010. 11. “Ras Al Khaimah to invest 1.5 billion USD in Indonesia coal transportation,” Emirates 24/7, March 3, 2009, Government of Dubai; “DEWA Gets Tenders for a Techno Economic Study on the Application of Coal based Electricity Generation in Dubai,” Press Release, January 9, 2011. 12. Justin Dargin, “Saudi Arabia, UAE promote energy from sun and wind,” Oil & Gas Journal, March 23, 2009, 107, 12; pg. 18. 13. Zoheir Hamedi, “A Multilevel Perspective for an Energy Transition in the Power Generation Sector of the GCC Countries,” Durham theses, Durham University, pp: 265–267, Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur. ac.uk/10753/. 14. Caline Malek, “UAE’s first nuclear power plant could begin operating by May,” The National, January 22, 2017, http://www.thenational.ae/ uae/20170122/uaes-first-nuclear-power-plant-could-begin-operatingby-may; Caline Malek, “Dh63m project to link power from Barakah nuclear plant to Abu Dhabi power grid,” The National, March 19, 2017, http://www.thenational.ae/uae/dh63m-project-to-link-power-frombarakah-nuclear-plant-to-abu-dhabi-power-grid; “S.  Koreans win $20bn UAE nuclear power contract,” Financial Times, December 27, 2009; “UAE’s first nuclear power station scheduled to start in 2017,” Gulf News, December 22, 2010.

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15. “Oman’s Search for Renewable Energy Sources,” Dan Price, March 22, 2017, http://www.Earthisland.Org/Journal/Index.Php/Oeuvre/Dan-Price/. 16. Ibidem. 17. Ibidem. 18. Ibidem. 19. Dylan Bowman, “GCC common market comes into effect,” Arabian Business, January 1, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/gcc-common-market-comes-into-effect-122387.html. 20. Oli Havrylyshyn & Peter Kunzel, “Intra-Industry Trade of Arab Countries: An Indicator of Potential Competitiveness,” IMF Working Papers, 97. 21. Nasser Al-Mawali, “Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia Effects,” Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 2015), p. 539. 22. Hassan K.  Al-Asaad and Ahmed A.  Ebrahim, “The GCC Power Grid: Benefits & Beyond,” https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=2830. 23. Laura El-Katiri, “Interlinking the Arab Gulf: Opportunities and Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/ wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/EL_81.pdf; “Rabt Oman bi-kahraba’ al-Khalij fi A3amain, Al-Jazeera online, April 21, 2011. 24. Laura El-Katiri, “Interlinking the Arab Gulf: Opportunities and Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation,” https://www.oxfordenergy. org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/EL_81.pdf; “Rabt Oman bi-kahraba’ al-Khalij fi A3amain,” Al-Jazeera online, April 21, 2011. 25. Chris Stanton, “Improved Gulf power grid reduces blackouts,” The National, July 29, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/ improved-gulf-power-grid-reduces-blackouts. 26. Chris Stanton, “Improved Gulf power grid reduces blackouts,” The National, July 29, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/ improved-gulf-power-grid-reduces-blackouts. 27. “GCC countries to invest $272b in energy by 2015,” The Saudi Gazette, November 9, 2010; “Oxford Business Group” The Report: Bahrain (2008) 128; “Bahrain investment in power to reduce blackouts,” ArabianBusiness. com, June 27, 2010; “BMI, Kuwait Power Report Q4” (2010) 26; “UAE nuke energy push may start deal bonanza,” Zawya Dow Jones, July 26, 2009; “Qatar power boost will end era of blackouts—official,” ArabianBusiness. com, September 23, 2009. 28. “The private capital and commercial orientation is likely to also remove part of the investment burden from GCC governments. Attracting more private investment will require the continuation of the ongoing reform process in the areas of government regulation, restructuring, and the possible privatization of further parts of the GCC countries’ utilities sectors”; Laura El-Katiri, “Interlinking the Arab Gulf: Opportunities and

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Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation.” https://www. oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/EL_81.pdf; “Rabt Oman bi-kahraba’ al-Khalij fi A3amain,” Al-Jazeera online, April 21, 2011, p. 27. 29. “Iran to export electricity to seven regional countries,” BBC Monitoring Caucasus, September 12, 2010 (a translation of the original text broadcast at Islamic Republic of Iran News Network, Tehran on the same day). 30. Dargin Justin, “The Dolphin Project: The Development of a Gulf Gas Initiative” (2008), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/dolphinproject-development-gulf-gas-initiative. 31. Ibidem. 32. Ibidem. 33. “Gas Shortage in the GCC: How to Bridge the Gap,” The Memri Economic blog, June 16, 2010. http://www.memrieconomicblog.org/bin/content. cgi?article=317. 34. Qatar’s natural gas reserves are the largest in the GCC, the world’s third largest, after Russia and Iran. Qatar’s North Field, the world’s single largest natural gas fields. Qatar is the world’s largest producer of LNG.  BP (2010), 22, 30. 35. “Qatar-India Gas Pipeline,” October 25, 2018, https://www.bncnetwork.net/project/QatarIndia-Gas-Pipeline/NDY4Mjk=/. 36. Dolphin Energy, official webpage, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/ en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us. 37. According to the International Energy Agency’s “World Energy Outlook 2009” (WEO). 38. Ibidem. 39. Dr. Raed Kombargi, Otto Waterlander, George Sarraf, Asheesh Sastry, Gas Shortage in the GCC. How to Bridge the Gap. http://strategyand.pwc. com/media/uploads/Gas_Shortage_in_the_GCC.pdf. 40. Mulk School of Global Affairs and University of Toronto, “‫بررسیعملکرددولت دردومینسالریاستجمهوریروحانی‬,” Rouhani Meter, August 2014, https://rouhanimeter.com/media/RM-2nd-Year-ReportREVISED.pdf. 41. Willem J.H. Van Groenendaal and Mohammad Mazraati, “A critical review of Iran’s buyback contracts,” December 2006, Energy Policy 34, no. 18. 42. “،‫ پارس جنوبی نه تنها یک قرارداد اقتصادی‬:‫دکتر روحانی در دیدار مدیرعامل شرکت توتال فرانسه‬ ‫ فناوری و مدیریتی است‬،‫بلکه یک همکاری علمی‬,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran Official Website, July 3, 2017, http://en.hongkong.mfa.ir/?fkeyid=&site id=1&pageid=176&newsview=464133. 43. “‫ برنامه روحانی برای توسعه گاز و نفت ممکن است به مانع بخورد‬:‫کارشناسان آمریکایی‬,” Voice of America, August 17, 2017, https://ir.voanews.com/a/iran-oil-contract/3975330.html.

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44. ISNA ‫ سند‬،‫ هدفمندی یارانهها‬،‫ صنعت‬،‫اشتغال‬،‫ نظام بانکی‬،‫ توسعه صادرات‬،‫مبارزه با قاچاق‬ ‫ … چشمانداز و‬Iran Student News Agency, May 12, 2017, https://www.isna. ir/news/96022214059/. 45. IRNA, “‫ نجومی‬:‫قالیباف‬/‫ حق ایران را در بازار نفت بازپس گرفتیم‬:‫توسعه صادرات؛ روحانی‬ ‫بگیر و نجومی بخور شما هستید‬,” IRNA, May 12, 2017, http://www.irna.ir/fa/ News/82526687. 46. “‫ایران باید در تولید بنزین خودکفاشود‬/‫نقش صادرات گاز در سیاست خارجی‬,” Mehr News Agency, August 11, 2016, http://www.mehrnews.com/news/3728771/ ‫خودکفاشود‬-‫بنزین‬-‫تولید‬-‫در‬-‫باید‬-‫ایران‬-‫خارجی‬-‫سیاست‬-‫در‬-‫گاز‬-‫صادرات‬-‫نقش‬. 47. “In search of investments,” Oil & Gas News (OGN), 2013, http://www. oilandgasnewsworldwide.com/Article/35641/In_search_of_investments. 48. “Iran Reiterates Interest in Joint Gas Field with Kuwait,” Financial Tribune, February 21, 2017, https://financialtribune.com/articles/ energy/60124/iran-reiterates-interest-in-joint-gas-field-with-kuwait. 49. Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “Iran’s joint fields offer development, partnership opportunities,” Oil and Gas Journal, February 1, 2017, http://www.ogj. com/articles/print/volume-115/issue-1/exploration-development/ iran-s-joint-fields-offer-development-partnership-opportunities.html. 50. Irina Slav, “Iran is stepping up production at an oil field it shares with Saudi.” Business Insider, May 7, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/ iran-stepping-up-production-at-an-oil-field-shared-with-saudiarabia-2017-5?IR=T. 51. Natural Gas Asia, “Iran, India to Seal Farzad-B Gas Field Before 2016 is Out,” April 10, 2016. 52. Based on ‫ميدان گازي آرش اواخر امسال به بهرهبرداري ميرسد‬:‫پايگاه خبري تحليلي نفت ايران و جهان‬. http://www.naftnews.net/telex-11100.html; and Jamejam, ‫جام جم “ميادين مشترک‬ ‫خط مقدم صنعت نفت‬.” Jamejam Online. December 22, 2009, http://jamejamonline.ir/Online/670503005685968499. 53. H. Aryan, “Arash gas field-Dura, the conflict with Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,” July 30, 2016. 54. “Joint assessment of Iran’s position in 28 oil and gas fields,” Mashregh News, March 3, 2016. 55. “Last detail of articulation in shared fields,” Fars News Agency, May 2, 2016. 56. Farzam Field Details, http://www.iranoilgas.com/fields/details?id=39&t itle=Farzam&type=oil. 57. “Joint assessment of Iran’s position in 28 oil and gas fields,” Mashregh News, March 3, 2016. 58. “PSA contracts attractively favor Iran’s interests,” Azernews, February 10, 2014, https://www.azernews.az/analysis/64257.html.

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59. “In search of investments,” Iran Review 2013, Oil & Gas News (OGN), https://www.oilandgasnewsworldwide.com/Article/35641/In_search_ of_investments. 60. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “A Message from Iran,” The New York Times, April 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/mohammadjavad-zarif-a-message-from-iran.html?_r=0. 61. Riham Bahi, “Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement,” The International Spectator 52, no.2 (2017). 62. G. Shabneh, “The Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China, and Russia, Report,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, June 14, 2015. 63. Ibidem. 64. Dargin Justin, “The Dolphin Project: The Development of a Gulf Gas Initiative,” (2008), p.45. 65. Sigurd Neubauer and Alex Vatanka, “Central Sultanate,” Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2015; Ankit Panda, “India, Iran and Oman Open Talks On Deep Sea Gas Pipeline,” The Diplomat, March 1, 2014. 66. Indrajit Sen, “Iran in talks with Kuwait, UAE to export gas,” Arabian Industry, November 2, 2015, https://www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com/ article-14778-iran-in-talks-with-kuwait-uae-to-export-gas. 67. M. R. Raghu, “What the lifting of Iranian sanctions will mean for GCC countries,” The National, October 21, 2015. 68. Fatma Alarimi, “Oman says to change Iran gas pipeline route to avoid UAE,” Reuters, August 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-oman-iran-gas-idUSKCN10L21N. 69. M. R. Raghu, “What the lifting of Iranian sanctions will mean for GCC countries,” The National, October 21, 2015. 70. Artem Sanzhiev, “Gas pipeline to India being considered, Russia and India report,” December 21, 2015, https://in.rbth.com/economics/cooperation/2015/12/21/gas-pipeline-to-india-being-considered_553397. 71. Indrani Bagchi, “India, Iran and Oman go under sea to build pipelines, change geopolitics,” The Times of India, March 1, 2014, http:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Iran-and-Oman-go-under-seato-build-pipelines-change-geopolitics/articleshow/31227746.cms. 72. “South Asia Gas Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. (SAGE),” (2011), http://www.sageindia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48& Itemid=54. 73. “Country Analysis Brief: Iran,” Energy Information Administration, March 8, 2013, 18. 74. Indrajit Sen, “Iran in talks with Kuwait, UAE to export gas,” Arabian Industry, November 2, 2015, https://www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com/ article-14778-iran-in-talks-with-kuwait-uae-to-export-gas.

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75. Adal Mirza, “Sanctions Prompt Shell to Scale Back Tehran Office,” Middle East Economic, August 13, 2010, Digest 54, no. 33. 76. Dina Esfandiary and Ariane M.  Tabatabai, “Scent of an Oman: The Sultanate Moves Toward the Saudis,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2017-01-17/ scent-oman. 77. Samia Nakhoul and William Maclean, “Oman joins Saudi-led Islamic alliance: Gulf sources,” Reuters, December 28, 2016, http://www.reuters. com/article/us-saudi-oman-coalition-idUSKBN14H1L4. 78. Daniel Yergin, “The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World,” (Penguin Press: 2011), 340. 79. IRDiplomacy: 2011.

Bibliography Alarimi, Fatma. “Oman says to change Iran gas pipeline route to avoid UAE,” Reuters, August 10, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oman-irangas-idUSKCN10L21N. Al-Mawali, Nasser. “Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia Effect.” Journal of Economic Integration 30, no. 3 (September, 2015): 532–52. Al-Asaad, Hassan K. and Ahmed A. Ebrahim. “The GCC Power Grid: Benefits & Beyond”. http://www.gccia.com.sa/Data/PressRelease/Press_13.pdf. Bagchi, Indrani. “India, Iran and Oman go under sea to build pipelines, change geopolitics.” The Times of India, March 1, 2014. http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/India-Iran-and-Oman-go-under-sea-to-build-pipelineschange-geopolitics/articleshow/31227746.cms. Bahi, Riham. “Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement.” The International Spectator 52, no. 2 (2017): 89–101. Doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1306395. Baxter, Elsa. “Bahrain investment in power to reduce blackouts.” Arabian Business, June 27, 2010. http://www.arabianbusiness.com/ahrain-investment-in-powerreduce-blackouts-293044.html. Bowman, Dylan and Reuters. “GCC common market comes into effect.” Arabian Business, January 1, 2008. http://www.arabianbusiness.com/gcc-commonmarket-comes-into-effect-122387.html. Carter, Stephen G. “Iran, Natural Gas and Asia’s Energy Needs: A Spoiler For Sanctions?” Middle East Policy, 31, No. 1, spring 2014. Dargin, Justin. “The Dolphin Project: The Development of A Gulf Gas Initiative.” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2008. Dargin, Justin. “Saudi Arabia, UAE promote energy from sun and wind”, Oil & Gas Journal, March 23, 2009; 107, 12; pg. 18.

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Elston, Leigh. “South Korea seeks stronger ties with Oman to counter Strait closure” Interfax Global Energy. March 18, 2016. http://interfaxenergy.com/ gasdaily/article/6530/south-korea-seeks-stronger-ties-with-oman-tocounter-strait-closure. Esfandiary, Dina, and Ariane M. Tabatabai. “Scent of an Oman.” Foreign Affairs, April 27, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ahrain-gulf/201701-17/scent-oman. El-Katiri, Laura. “Interlinking the Arab Gulf: Opportunities and Challenges of GCC Electricity Market Cooperation.” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, July 2011. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/ 2011/07/EL_81.pdf. Government of Dubai. “DEWA Gets Tenders for a Techno Economic Study on the Application of Coal based Electricity Generation in Dubai”, press release, January 9, 2011. Van Groenendaal Willem J.H. and Mohammad Mazraati, “A critical review of Iran’s buyback contracts,” Energy Policy 34, no. 18 (December 2006). International Energy Agency’s “World Energy Outlook 2009” (WEO). Hamedi, Zoheir. (2014) “A Multilevel Perspective for an Energy Transition in the Power Generation Sector of the GCC Countries”, Durham theses, Durham University, pp: 265–267. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10753/. Havrylyshyn, Oli & Kunzel, Peter. (1997). “Intra-Industry Trade of Arab Countries: An Indicator of Potential Competitiveness”. IMF Working Papers. 97. Kakande, Yasin. “Power blackouts hit Khor Fakkan.” The National, June 28, 2011. http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/power-blackouts-hit-khor-fakkan. Kombargi, Raed and Otto Waterlander, George Sarraf, Asheesh Sastry. “Gas Shortage in the GCC. How to Bridge the Gap”. http://strategyand.pwc.com/ media/uploads/Gas_Shortage_in_the_GCC.pdf. Malek, Caline. “UAE’s first nuclear power plant could begin operating by May”. The National, January 22, 2017a. http://www.thenational.ae/uae/20170122/ uaes-first-nuclear-power-plant-could-begin-operating-by-may. Malek, Caline. “Dh63m project to link power from Barakah nuclear plant to Abu Dhabi power grid”. The National, March 19, 2017b. http://www.thenational. ae/uae/dh63m-project-to-link-power-from-barakah-nuclear-plant-to-abudhabi-power-grid. Mirza, Adal. “Sanctions Prompt Shell to Scale Back Tehran Office,” Middle East Economic Digest 54, no. 33 (August 13, 2010). Nakhoul, Samia, and William Maclean. “Oman joins Saudi-led Islamic alliance: Gulf sources.” Reuters. December 28, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-saudi-oman-coalition/oman-joins-saudi-led-islamic-alliance-gulfsources-idUSKBN14H1L4.

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Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World. US: Baker & Taylor, 2012. Neubauer, Sigurd, and Alex Vatanka. “Central Sultanate.” Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2015. Panda, Ankit, “India, Iran and Oman Open Talks on Deep Sea Gas Pipeline”. The Diplomat, March 1, 2014. Price, Dan. “Oman’s Search For Renewable Energy Sources”. March 22, 2017. http://www.Earthisland.Org/Journal/Index.Php/Oeuvre/Dan-Price/. Raghu, M. R. “What the lifting of Iranian sanctions will mean for GCC countries”. The National, October 21, 2015. Sanzhiev, Artem. “Gas pipeline to India being considered.” Russia Beyond, December 21, 2015. https://www.rbth.com/economics/cooperation/2015/12/21/ gas-pipeline-to-india-being-considered_553397. Sen, Indrajit, “Iran in talks with Kuwait, UAE to export gas”. Arabian Industry, November 2, 2015. Slav, Irina. “Iran is stepping up production at an oil field it shares with Saudi.” Business Insider, May 7, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/iran-stepping-up-production-at-an-oil-field-shared-with-saudi-arabia-2017-5?IR=T. Stanton, Chris. “Improved Gulf power grid reduces blackouts”. The National, July 29, 2010. http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/improved-gulfpower-grid-reduces-blackouts. Zaccara, Luciano, and Marta Saldaña. “Cambio Y Estabilidad Política En Las Monarquías Del Golfo Tras La Primavera Árabe / Change and Political Stability in the Gulf Monarchies after the Arab Spring.” Revista CIDOB D’Afers Internacionals, no. 109 (2015): 179–180.

CHAPTER 11

From Isolation to Accommodation: Lessons Learnt from Hassan Rouhani’s First Term in Office Anoushiravan Ehteshami

The Rouhani presidency was meant to be transformative, putting the dark days of the neoconservative administration behind and taking the necessary strides towards a better and brighter future for Iranians. This was a radical agenda for an individual such as Dr Hassan Rouhani who had been an integral part of the ‘nezam’ of the Islamic Republic since its inception. His background is telling in this regard: He was elected to the republic’s first parliament in 1980 and stayed a parliamentarian until 2000. At the same time, he served on the Supreme Defence Council during the Iran– Iraq war and had risen to a senior position in the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the end of the war. Upon Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s elevation to the position of Supreme Leader in 1989 Rouhani became the Leader’s representative on the newly established Supreme National Security Council. He has been a member of the Expediency Council since 1991 and served as the

A. Ehteshami (*) Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 L. Zaccara (ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017), Contemporary Gulf Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_11

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Secretary of the Council until 2005, and only left this position when Dr Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president of the republic. At the same time, he was also close to the country’s two centrist-reformer presidents (Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami), serving both as their national security adviser and as the latter’s chief nuclear negotiator. Therefore, Rouhani is an operator, well-connected, and influential. These attributes are important in Iran’s faction-ridden political establishment and provide huge political capital for someone seeking to become the president of the republic. The background is important partly because it provides context for the rise of Rouhani to the pinnacle of executive power in the Islamic Republic, and partly because it provides scope for appreciating the shifting sands of politics in the republic. This background also has a direct bearing on his presidency, I contend. Firstly, it gave him the credentials to be a credible contender and to attract support from significant sections of the country’s quarrelsome factions. He was a known quantity. Secondly, he provided a credible alternative to the masses and the middle classes in particular to the reckless neoconservative allies of the outgoing president and the politically dour conservatives. His crushing victory over Mohammad Baqir Qalibaf (18.7 million against 6.1 million votes) was only possible because the urban masses and the middle classes rallied to his cause and came out in large numbers to guarantee his victory. A turnout of nearly 37 million (72% voter turnout) was very welcome after the legitimacy crisis which had gripped the regime following the re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009.1 Rouhani’s victory was good for the middle classes and others and it was good for the regime’s credibility at home and legitimacy overseas. Rouhani offered the world a better side of the republic and for the electorate a way out of the nuclear impasse created by Ahmadinejad. Rouhani was a man of the people now with a heavy mandate to break the country out of its tight straightjacket. Rouhani stood on the ticket of returning normalcy to the country, repairing its tarnished reputation internationally, rebuilding relations with neighbours, opening up the country to the outside world again, and bringing prosperity and opportunity to the people. The path to prosperity, he had argued, would open with the lifting of the crippling international economic sanctions, sanctions that were being imposed on the country in direct response to the erroneous external policies of his predecessor. Thus, not unlike previous presidential races, there was a direct line being drawn between the country’s foreign relations and its national well-being. It is

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ironic, to note in passing, that for all its efforts to be ‘autonomous’ and ‘independent of foreign influences’, the Islamic Republic has been a hostage of its foreign relations since the outset, starting with the US hostages fiasco way back in November 1979. The republic’s revolution-inspired policy choices, arguably, brought the external realm to the very heart of power in the country. This dialectical process has arguably been shaping the republic’s policies for decades and tensions within it can help in explaining much of the policy shifts and crises, and the regime’s unfathomable behaviour at critical junctures.2 In 2013, however, the country was demanding change and Rouhani presented himself as the man to lead the change. At his victory rally, he declared that this was the victory of wisdom and moderation over extremism. He argued that Iran had turned a new page, and under instruction from the people, the president had the mandate to end Iran’s international isolation and negotiate a nuclear deal which would remove the threat of use of force, and at the same time the barriers to socio-economic improvement, against the country. The success of his presidency, in other words, was bound to the lifting of sanctions as a precondition of economic improvements. Nuclear policy under Ahmadinejad had become highly politicised, however, and the insertion of regime ‘red lines’ suggested that the president would have to navigate domestic obstacles while reaching out to the West in particular for a negotiated solution to the impasse. Everything was now conditioned by nuclear politics and no wonder that the president’s team, having recovered the nuclear file from the grips of the multi-agency Supreme National Security Council, pressed ahead with the strategy of negotiations. While his popular mandate shielded him from overt criticism, the president’s elite networks, built over the previous 30 years, provided him with considerable leeway in pushing forward with his agenda of engagement. It was difficult in other words for his rivals to erode his authority without damaging themselves. His close proximity to the Leader, despite a close working relationship with the reformists in the elite, also helped assuring him a visible degree of support from the highest office in the land. This also provided his government the shield of protection for their very public and risky engagements with American officials. From the start of his presidency, then, several taboos had been broken. The question in 2013 was whether some of the ‘red lines’ would also disappear?

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In practice, President Rouhani challenged those red lines which he knew were already eroding: Nuclear negotiations with the ‘Great Satan’ (which had started before his election thanks to the good offices of Sultan Qaboos of Oman), dialogue with Riyadh, closer cooperation with European Union countries (and the ‘EU3’ of Britain, Germany and France in particular), encouraging direct foreign investment from the West, facilitating access to Iran’s oil reserves and infrastructure by Western oil companies, and privatising industries and businesses controlled by the IRGC and other para-statal organisations. At home, his promise of ending corruption, containing nepotism, reimposing the rule of law, freeing political prisoners, opening up civil society, encouraging civility and making state bureaucracy accountable to the people spoke to the core demands of the electorate. So, he had cleared the way for a successful term in office, even though it was clear from the outset that he would not be able to meet many of the democratic aspirations of the electorate. The speed with which the JCPOA was concluded helped his cause enormously and the return of European corporations (the United States held back from building economic relations with Iran) and their airlines to the country, alongside massive interest from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and elsewhere heavily underlined the efficacy of his strategy of dialogue and compromise with the major powers. The lifting of sanctions in January 2016 appeared to herald a new era in the Islamic Republic’s relations with the outside world. In just two years following his election, President Rouhani appeared to have accomplished, without surrendering the republic’s interests, what his reformist and hard-line predecessors had failed to do: Restore the country’s geopolitical role at the crossroads of Eurasia. But problems persisted, particularly with his efforts to rebuild confidence with Iran’s neighbours. To begin with, the Arab uprisings which intensified during his presidency began to contextualise Tehran’s relations with its Sunni Arab neighbours. Iran’s direct intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad’s beleaguered regime undermined Rouhani’s message of dialogue with Iran’s Arab neighbours, Iran’s support of the al-Houthis in Yemen left it exposed to direct criticism in undermining Saudi Arabia’s national security, and its mobilisation of Shi’a militias— whether Hezbollah in Lebanon or from other parts of the Muslim world— in support of its activities in Iraq and Syria brought the prospect of empire building into Arab minds. The accusation of being an occupier of Arab lands had been made during President Rouhani’s tenure and did not sit

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well with Tehran’s carefully crafted image of the Muslims’ unflinching friend wherever they may be. The label of ‘occupier’, it is worth underlining, was reserved for Israel before the 2010s. Further, the worsening of relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, following the vandalisation of Saudi missions in Iran in January 2016, opened the way for a deep period of hostility from Riyadh, at a time when the Kingdom’s leadership was in transition and a single-minded nationalist figure in the shape of Mohammed bin Salman was emerging as the Kingdom’s strongman. The deteriorating situation compounded by the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars in which both countries had a stake and in Iran’s growing control of Iraq was arguably worse now than at the height of the Iran–Iraq war in which the Saudis openly supported Baghdad’s war effort against Iran. While the Rouhani administration ultimately failed in restoring confidence in its relations with many of its Arab neighbours, the biggest blow to the administration’s strategy of compromise came in 2016 and the election of Donald Trump as US president. It was again external factors, arguably, which not only blunted the strategy of dialogue and compromise but actually put the country in peril. One can draw a parallel with President Khatami’s ‘dialogue of civilisations’ strategy to push open the gates of mistrust and place Iran on the path of global reintegration after 9/11 and thus pave the way for the return of US-led military forces to Iran’s neighbourhood. American anguish translated into a policy of pre-emptive military intervention on Iran’s doorstep in Afghanistan and Iraq in rapid succession (2001 and 2003). While US action removed two of Tehran’s entrenched enemies in those countries, it also securitised the region so much that Tehran’s message of dialogue appeared as no more than a hollow phrase. The United States was in no mood to compromise and saw Iran as a target country in its ‘axis of evil’. Of course, information about Iran’s secret nuclear activities in 2002, in direct contravention of its NPT obligations, played its part in discrediting President Khatami’s strategy of dialogue. But it was the rapid securitisation of regional relations following 9/11 which undermined the reformist strategy of compromise and arguably opened the way for the emergence of an aggressive neoconservative in the shape of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the president of the republic. His two-term tenure (2005–2013) can rightly be seen as the wasted decade for the Islamic Republic which forced his successor to expend energy in rebuilding at home and abroad.

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So, with the election of Dr Rouhani in 2013 Iran had come full circle, to the unfinished business of Presidents Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and Khatami (1997–2005)—to return Iran to its previous role as a major economic, political and diplomatic power in West Asia and beyond. President Rouhani’s efforts of rebuilding relations, ultimately, were stymied more by the changing external environment than his policies at home. This conclusion does not make of Iran a passive actor or victim of circumstances, but does speak to the reality that revolutionary states are more prone to external forces than other actors in the international system and this is what becomes the Achilles heel of such regimes. As we have seen, political actors in Iran can galvanise massive domestic support, build strong coalitions and try to turn the wheel of fortune forward towards a new beginning for the country. But the elite’s world view, shaped by a religiously infused revolution, has shaped the country’s polity in such a way as to make it incapable of breaking out of the vicious cycle of transition. With the country ‘stuck in transition’ the regime arguably needs to break the loop of transition before it can finally align its interests with the necessities of keeping a country of 80 million people content and prosperous.3 President Rouhani’s first term marked the road to the promised land of openness and prosperity, but sadly his presidency in its second term became the victim of regional tensions—in which Iran itself played a direct part. And the unpredictability of American politics came to hold Iran hostage to the legacy of past animosities and present and real fears of Tehran’s regional reach. When the doors began to shut Tehran retrenched and fell back on the familiar strategy of asymmetrical response. Now unable to make compromises which might be interpreted as a sign of weakness and vulnerability, even the centrist-reformist president has fallen back on revolutionary slogans and posturing in defence of the republic. While this can be seen as a totally justifiable response to the situation of being subjected to punishing economic and political sanctions by its arch enemy, a situation which is beyond its control, Tehran’s responses to this pressure have opened it to further criticism by its neighbours and erstwhile partners in Europe. Falling back on these tactics will likely merely entrench transition and thus inhibit the country’s ability to move forward. Perhaps it is time for the political establishment in Iran to ask itself why Americans hate Iran, instead of looking for scapegoats in justification of its conduct overseas. In the last analysis, Tehran’s power externally is determined by conditions at home, something which President Rouhani instinctively and readily recognised on his way to the presidential office but soon neglected when

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international pressure began to mount. To retrench has meant the tightening of the knot and pressure from the outside has invariably and inevitably raised the cost of living a normal life for Iranians. To accept the dialectical relationship between the external and domestic realms is the necessary step for making the transition to a republic which is prosperous at home and at peace with the rest of the world. Forty years on since the revolution, Iran is still a long way away from putting in place policies and political forces that can ensure that transition is not the only permanent feature of the Islamic Republic.

Notes 1. Anoush Ehteshami, Luciano Zaccara “Reflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections”, Orient, German Journal on Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East, Vol IV, issue 54, 2013, pp. 7–14. 2. See Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Foreign Policymaking the Middle East: Complex Realism’, in Louise Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 239–58. 3. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran: Stuck in Transition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

Bibliography Ehteshami, Anoush and Zaccara, Luciano. “Reflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections.” Orient, German Journal on Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East, Vol IV, issue 54, 2013, pp. 7–14. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. Iran: Stuck in Transition. New  York, NY: Routledge, 2017. Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East: Complex Realism.” In International Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett, 239–258. Oxford: OUP, 2018.