Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World [1 ed.] 9781617617584, 9781608760794

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

GLOBAL POLITICAL STUDIES

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FOREIGN POLICY IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

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GLOBAL POLITICAL STUDIES

FOREIGN POLICY IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

GEORGE T. OVERTON

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EDITOR

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Foreign policy in an interconnected world / editor, George T. Overton. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN:  (eBook)

1. European Union countries--Foreign relations. 2. Globalization. I. Overton, George T. JZ1570.F66 2009 327.4--dc22 2009050568

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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CONTENTS Preface

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Chapter 1

vii Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective Weiqing Song

1

Chapter 2

Public Diplomacy, Multimodality and the World-Wide Web Giuliana Garzone and Chiara Degano

29

Chapter 3

Tying Disaster Diplomacy in Knots Ilan Kelman

59

Chapter 4

European Union Economic and Political Value Projection: Soft Power in the South Pacific Stephen Hoadley

75

International Initiatives to Address the Resource Curse: High on Rhetoric, Low on Relevance? Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

91

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson

101

Chapter 7

Strategic Arms Control after START: Issues and Options Amy F. Woolf

135

Chapter 8

Science, Technology and American Diplomacy: Background and Issues for Congress Deborah D. Stine

Index

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PREFACE In recent times, Web-mediated communication has qualified as a powerful strategic resource in foreign policy. It is central to any country's effort to reach foreign audiences pervasively, also in areas of the world which - for various reasons - are otherwise difficult to access for Western actors. This is why an effective exploitation of web resources is crucial in so-called "public diplomacy," which is an extension of traditional diplomacy directly addressing foreign publics. This book examines the use of web-mediated multimodal resources in contemporary U.S. public diplomacy in an effort to understand the strategies enacted to exploit internet-mediated communication and its affordances for political purposes. Moreover, in the Middle East and North African region (MENA), some of the world's most daunting resource and governance challenges meet. About 1% of the worlds freshwater are located in the MENA region but more than 5% of the population of the globe lives in that region. This book addresses the increasing complexity that confronts policy makers dealing with water management and the need for a water governance transformation in the region. The authors analyze the current use of water as a medium for diplomacy and cooperation and its future potential. Furthermore, disaster diplomacy examines how and why disaster-related activities do an do not reduce conflict and induce cooperation. This book explores the notion of 'disaster diplomacy' to provide further insights into particular aspects of the interconnectedness between disasters and foreign policy. In addition, a number of studies suggest that natural resources can have a negative impact on the developing prospects of countries, a phenomenon that has been labelled as the resource curse. This book reviews international initiatives to address the resource curse, with an emphasis on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and petroleum-related aid initiatives. Suggestions are made on policy and further research needed to improve the effectiveness of international foreign policy initiatives in terms of addressing institutional problems underlying the resource curse. Chapter 1 - European integration has entered such a stage that the European Union has now attained a certain degree of actor-ness on the world stage while, at the same time, the EU member states still retain much of their respective power as sovereign entities in the international arena. Thus, debates take place, with regards the existence of European foreign policy at the Union level, between ―European idealists‖ who try to convince an emerging role of the EU as an international actor autonomously and those ―state centric‖ analysts, believing that foreign policy is always firmly controlled at the hands of the national governments. This chapter locates itself in the broad category of European Union studies by focusing on how

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viii

George T. Overton

foreign policy and policy-making of EU member states operate in the context of European integration, particularly, in foreign policy cooperation. With the adoption of the concept of Europeanisation, it aims to approach European foreign policy studies from the opposite angle, the national level, on the assumption that if there is some form of union level foreign policy, the traditional national foreign policy must be undergoing a process of somewhat transformation. Thus, this research centers around the questions: how do foreign policy at the European and national level interact with each other? Furthermore, how and why national foreign policy and policy-making are affected due to its participation in the European integration over years? Based on the understanding of European foreign policy system comprising of European Community, European Union and national foreign policy sub-systems, the research takes a broadened view of foreign policy, which extends beyond traditional foreign policy sphere of high politics. Therefore, European effects on national foreign policy cover a wide range of issues including foreign economic matters with political implications and individual member states‘ foreign policy as well as cooperation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP. Chapter 2 - In recent times, Web-mediated communication has qualified as a powerful strategic resource in foreign policy. It is central to any country‘s effort to reach foreign audiences pervasively, also in areas of the world which – for various reasons – are otherwise difficult to access for Western actors. This is why an effective exploitation of web resources is crucial in so called ―public diplomacy‖, which is an extension of traditional diplomacy directly addressing foreign publics, i.e. foreign citizens, rather than their governments and ministries (cf. § 2. below). This chapter will look at the use of web-mediated multimodal resources in contemporary U.S. public diplomacy, on the basis of the analysis of a website, America.gov, produced and maintained by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, which is specifically devoted to public diplomacy and represents the main effort so far by the U.S. government to use Internet-mediated communication for public diplomacy purposes. In the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) America.gov is defined as ―the U.S. government‘s primary online source of information about the United States directed at foreign publics‖. It is managed by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IPP) of the Department, whose mission is ―to engage, inform and influence international audiences about U.S. policy and society to advance America's interest […] through the development of a variety of public diplomacy strategies, products and services‖ (1 FAM: 351.1). At the foot of each page of the website there is a short text that makes this clear: Chapter 3 - Disaster diplomacy (http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org) examines how and why disaster-related activities, such as preparedness before a disaster or response after a disaster, do and do not reduce conflict and induce cooperation. The wide variety of case studies has led to efforts to create typologies for them in order to seek a predictive model indicating the circumstances under which various forms of disaster diplomacy will and will not manifest. The most common outcome is that, for influencing diplomacy, disaster-related factors are dwarfed by non-disaster factors. That is, the main observation is that disaster diplomacy rarely succeeds, leading to the main prediction that disaster diplomacy is unlikely to have many successes. A key element in the general failure of disaster diplomacy so far, and the challenge of robust predictions beyond the overarching conclusion of the general failure, is the number

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Preface

ix

and diversity of the influences on disasters, on diplomacy, and on their interconnectedness. In particular, disaster diplomacy prior to a disaster tends to fail because the parties dealing with disaster risk reduction prefer to separate their work from diplomacy. That is, they wish to reduce interconnectedness. In contrast, disaster diplomacy following a disaster tends to fail due to too many disaster-related and diplomacy-related players with multiple relationships at multiple levels. That is, too much interconnectedness exists to permit the development and maintenance of strict links between disaster-related activities and diplomacy. Overall, hope seems to be misplaced in disaster diplomacy to resolve either disaster or diplomacy challenges. Even so, optimism is still feasible for disaster-related activities providing a useful connec means that disaster diplomacy might rarely be at the top of the foreign policy or disaster risk reduction agendas, but the extensive interconnectedness nonetheless leads to opportunities for positive disaster diplomacy results. Chapter 4 - European interaction with the Pacific islands has evolved from exploration and exploitation through a century of colonialism to the current post-colonial links of diplomacy, trade, aid, and cultural exchange. Bilateral relations by member states have been overlaid by the collective policies of the European Union (EU), often mediated through the coordination initiatives of the Pacific Island Forum, although policy variations between governments remain. The most significant development of the past decade, illustrative of the growing influence of the WTO on the European Union, is the conversion of the preferential trade arrangements of the EU‘s Cotonou Agreement into Economic Partnership Agreements despite potentially adverse consequences for the Pacific island states, namely loss of import tax revenue and erosion of the competitiveness of island enterprises. Of secondary but rising priority is the EU‘s exercise of political dialogue in pursuit of democracy, human rights protection, rule of law, and good governance on the part of partner island governments. Dialogue, followed by warnings and then sanctions, were applied to Fiji following the coup of December 2006. Despite EU (and other governments‘) persistent admonitions, the Interim Government of Fiji by mid-2008 had not responded with a credible roadmap leading to an election and return to civil government. Nevertheless the EU has gone ahead with an interim Economic Partnership Agreement with Fiji, and also with Papua New Guinea. Other island governments are hesitating. At time of writing the two stalemates – an incomplete network of Pacific island EPAs and the persistence of military rule in Fiji -- continue without a resolution in sight. These developments have relevance for theories of post-colonial relations, democracy promotion, and foreign policy analysis, and are illustrative of the limits of the EU‘s ‗soft power‘. Chapter 5 - A number of studies suggest that natural resources can have a negative impact on the developing prospects of countries, a phenomenon that has been labelled the resource curse. In particular, recent studies suggest that this resource curse is related to the institutional level of resource rich countries. This paper reviews international initiatives to address the resource curse, with an emphasis on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and petroleum-related aid initiatives. We argue that these initiatives only to a limited extent reflect the implications of the resource curse literature. Suggestions are made on policy and further research needed to improve the effectiveness of international foreign policy initiatives in terms of addressing institutional problems underlying the resource curse. Chapter 6 - Foreign assistance is a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The focus of

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U.S. foreign aid policy has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This chapter provides an overview of the U.S. foreign aid program, by answering frequently asked questions on the subject. There are five major categories of foreign assistance: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid. Due largely to the implementation of two new foreign aid initiatives—the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the HIV/AIDS Initiative—bilateral development assistance has become the largest category of U.S. aid. In FY2008, the United States provided some form of foreign assistance to about 154 countries. Israel and Egypt placed among the top recipients in FY2008, as they have since the late 1970s, although on-going reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan now place those nations near the top as well. The impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent use of foreign aid to support the war on terrorism are clearly seen in the estimated country-aid levels for FY2008. Pakistan and Jordan are key partners in the war on terrorism and major beneficiaries of U.S. assistance. Also among the leading recipients are some African countries that are the focus of the multi-billion dollar HIV/AIDS initiative. By nearly all measures, the amount of foreign aid provided by the United States declined for several decades but has grown in the past few years. After hitting an all-time low in the mid- 1990s, foreign assistance levels since FY2004, in real terms, have been higher than any period since the early 1950s, largely due to Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction and HIV/AIDS funding. The 0.19% of U.S. gross national product represented by foreign aid obligations for FY2008 is consistent with recent years, but quite low compared to the early decades of the foreign assistance program. The United States is the largest international economic aid donor in absolute dollar terms but is the smallest contributor among the major donor governments when calculated as a percent of gross national income. U.S. foreign aid is a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy.1 Each year, it is the subject of extensive congressional debate and legislative and executive branch initiatives, proposing changes in the size, composition, and purpose of the program. The focus of U.S. foreign aid policy has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2002, a National Security Strategy for the first time established global development as a third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy. This chapter addresses a number of the more frequently asked queries regarding the U.S. foreign aid program, its objectives, costs, organization, the role of Congress, and how it compares to those of other aid donors. In particular, the discussion attempts not only to present a current snapshot of American foreign assistance, but also to illustrate the extent to which this instrument of U.S. foreign policy has changed from past practices, especially since the end of the Cold War and the launching of the war on terror. 1

Other tools of U.S. foreign policy are the U.S. defense establishment, the diplomatic corps, public diplomacy, and trade policy. American defense capabilities, even if not employed, stand as a potential stick that can be wielded to obtain specific objectives. The State Department diplomatic corps are the eyes, ears, and often the negotiating voice of U.S. foreign policymakers. Public diplomacy programs, such as exchanges like the Fulbright program and Radio Free Europe, project an image of the United States that may influence foreign views positively. U.S. trade policy—through free trade agreements and Export-Import Bank credits, for example—may directly affect the economies of other nations. Foreign aid is probably the most flexible tool— it can act as both carrot and stick, and is a means of influencing events, solving specific problems, and projecting U.S. values.

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Data presented in the report are the most current, reliable figures available, usually covering the period through FY2008. Dollar amounts are drawn from a variety of sources, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and from annual State, Foreign Operations and other appropriations acts. As new data become obtainable or additional issues and questions arise, the report will be modified and revised. Chapter 7 - The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship, but have not agreed on whether to extend START or how to replace it. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They also have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other‘s compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START expired in mid-2006. They have, however been unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty‘s provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START‘s monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse or they could extend START for five years. They could extend START, then amend it to ease some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new Treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations. Chapter 8 - Science and engineering activities have always been international. Scientists, engineers, and health professionals frequently communicate and cooperate with one another without regard to national boundaries. This chapter discusses international science and technology (S&T) diplomacy, instances when American leadership in S&T is used as a

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diplomatic tool to enhance another country‘s development and to improve understanding by other nations of U.S. values and ways of doing business. According to the National Research Council, five developmental challenges where S&T could play a role include child health and child survival, safe water, agricultural research to reduce hunger and poverty, microeconomic reform, and mitigation of natural disasters. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1979 (P.L. 95-426) provides the current legislative guidance for U.S. international S&T policy. This act states that Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency in developing S&T agreements. The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) states that the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is to advise the President on international S&T cooperation policies and the role of S&T considerations in foreign relations. DOS sets the overall policy direction for U.S. international S&T diplomacy, and works with other federal agencies as needed. Within DOS, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) coordinates international S&T activities. The Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (STAS) provides S&T advice to the Secretary and the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). OSTP acts as a interagency liaison. A number of federal agencies that both sponsor research and use S&T in developing policy are involved in international S&T policy. A fundamental question is why the United States should invest in international S&T diplomacy instead of domestic research and development (R&D) and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education (STEM) activities, which are facing budget constraints. If Congress should decide that funding international S&T activities is important, agreeing on a policy goal beyond enhancing the country‘s development, such as improving U.S. relations with other countries, or enhancing popular opinion of the United States may help set priorities. Policy options identified for Congress by expert committees who have assessed U.S. international S&T diplomacy efforts include ensuring a baseline of science, engineering, and technical (SET) literacy among all appropriate DOS personnel, increasing the presence overseas of personnel with significant SET expertise, and expanding the Department‘s engagement within global SET networks through exchanges, assistance, and joint research activities addressing key global issues. Other proposed actions include increasing USAID support that builds S&T capacity in developing countries, and orienting other departments and agencies S&T developing country programs to support the development priorities of the host countries. Another proposal would establish a new U.S. government organization, modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) known for its risktaking and innovation, called the ―Development Applications Research Institute‖ (DARI) to develop and apply innovative technologies to development problems. In all of these efforts, Congress might wish to consider enhancing the prominence of the STAS, and coordination among S&T leaders at OES, STAS, and OSTP.

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Chapter 1

EUROPEANIZATION OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE Weiqing Song ABSTRACT

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European integration has entered such a stage that the European Union has now attained a certain degree of actor-ness on the world stage while, at the same time, the EU member states still retain much of their respective power as sovereign entities in the international arena. Thus, debates take place, with regards the existence of European foreign policy at the Union level, between ―European idealists‖ who try to convince an emerging role of the EU as an international actor autonomously and those ―state centric‖ analysts, believing that foreign policy is always firmly controlled at the hands of the national governments. This chapter locates itself in the broad category of European Union studies by focusing on how foreign policy and policy-making of EU member states operate in the context of European integration, particularly, in foreign policy cooperation. With the adoption of the concept of Europeanisation, it aims to approach European foreign policy studies from the opposite angle, the national level, on the assumption that if there is some form of union level foreign policy, the traditional national foreign policy must be undergoing a process of somewhat transformation. Thus, this research centers around the questions: how do foreign policy at the European and national level interact with each other? Furthermore, how and why national foreign policy and policy-making are affected due to its participation in the European integration over years? Based on the understanding of European foreign policy system comprising of European Community, European Union and national foreign policy subsystems, the research takes a broadened view of foreign policy, which extends beyond traditional foreign policy sphere of high politics. Therefore, European effects on national foreign policy cover a wide range of issues including foreign economic matters with political implications and individual member states‘ foreign policy as well as cooperation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP.



Corresponding author: Email: [email protected] Address: Av. Parde Tomas Pereira Taipa, Macao SAR, China

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EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM The bulk of the research on European foreign policy is devoted to the high-profile European CFSP, officially enshrined as the second pillar in the founding treaty of the European Union. The foreign policy of the European Union is synonymous with the CFSP in the minds of students of this creed. Their efforts have surely contributed to a better understanding of the topic. The focus on the narrowly defined CFSP is problematic, though. If discussion on foreign policy is confined to the very strict domain of foreign and security areas, it only presents a partial picture of an international actor‘s relations with the outside and therefore misses the true nature of foreign policy. This is because many of the low politics issues having direct external effects. High politics and low politics are inextricably intertwined. Thus, foreign economic policy and international aid policy, together with foreign, security and defense policies are included in the foreign policy family. Over years, the European Union has developed to cover the three domains of foreign policy: international economic policy, diplomatic policy and security policy. The conducting of these policy areas is a complicated and incoherent process as they are subject to different procedures. Soetendorp‘s idea of ―two separate decision regime‖ is typical of the conventional understanding of the status quo of foreign policy making of the EU. (Soetendorp 1999: 68) Namely, there is a CFSP decision regime and external economic relations decision regime. This explanation is relatively easy to understand because there is a clear-cut pillarized division in the legal term. The two regimes in general follow divergent procedures of intergovernmental and supranational processes respectively. However, the understanding is challenged when one observes the reality. Almost the same groups of actors are involved in the two ‗decision regimes‘: the EU institutions and its member states. More often than not, the same groups of actors make and implement decisions and policies across legally defined pillar systems. In this regard, Brian White contends with three arguments: First, the TEU has introduced a common institutional framework, bringing the Commission, the General Affairs Council (or GAC) and Committees of Permanent Representatives (or COREPER) to be jointly responsible for EU decisions in order to improve coherence, consistence and continuity; Community instruments are also created or improved to strengthen the effectiveness of CFSP policy; and after the cold war, the boundary between integrationist and intergovernmental elements of the policy process has been blurred out of expectations on the emerging new Europe. (White 2001: 45) It is justified that a broad approach to European foreign policy should be adopted instead of strictly distinguishing between the external trade policy and the CFSP. By this logic, it is better to approach European foreign policy as a complicated system, encompassing three strands: the European Community foreign policy, the European Union foreign policy and the national foreign policy of the EU member states. The three strands are themselves sub-systems operating in the overall European foreign policy system. They are analytically independent, but empirically inseparable. The Community foreign policy refers, essentially, but not exclusively, to the EU as a trading block vis-à-vis third parties. It is a policy area itself and at the same time contributes to the overall EU relations with the outside world. In other words, the EU with its common trade policy has enabled itself not only to have wielded powerful clout in international

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective

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commercial negotiations and disputes, but to ―expand its own regulatory practices to the rest of the world and use to promote internationally its own values and policies‖. (Meunier & Nicolaidis 2005: 248) The CFSP or foreign policy proper follows quite different decision-making procedures, basically known as inter-governmentalism. The term denotes that the EU member states‘ cooperation in this policy area takes the traditional route of international organization. On the surface, it seems a correct perception. However, it deviates to some extent in reality because of the involvement of supranational EU institutions and spillover effects of Community policies. This situation was a result of evolution over decades. The national foreign policy serves as the third strand in the European foreign policy system. While the EU member states cooperate their respective foreign policy in joint common policy of the Community and more coordinated policy in the CFSP, it acts independently out of the EU framework regarding matters falling in their respective ―domaine de réserve‖ usually due to historical legacies or geo-politics. Independent though, the way and substance of the EU member states conduct their foreign policies are presumably affected due to their involvement in the European foreign policy and European integration in general as their role in the first two strands of the overall European foreign policy system.

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EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY European foreign policy cooperation can be approached from at least three perspectives: from the viewpoint of third countries, from that of Brussels, and from that of national capitals. (Allen, 1996: 1) While much literature has been produced on the emerging foreign policy at the European level (from that of Brussels), the attention on the national foreign policy in the European context is relatively in sufficient and it is a little bit out of the fashion in European integration studies. However, no comprehensive and accurate understanding of foreign policy and process of the European Union can be achieved without enough research on the national foreign policy of the EU member states. This is because the EU member states are inalienable participants of European foreign policy: whether in the Community foreign policy and Union foreign policy ambits. Even in traditional national foreign policy area, it is increasingly involved as part of the European foreign policy system as defined in the above section. More concretely, policymakers at the European level are, more often than not, the same people who also act at the national level, dealing with possibly the same issues. The attention on the national dimension of European foreign policy cooperation did not become a fashion until the emergence of the concept of Europeanisation. The concept is borrowed from studies on European impact on domestic political institutions and public policies. Thus, there is much yet to be done with regards its application into the domain of foreign policy. In their typology of various policy areas under Europeanisation, Bulmer and Radaelli classify CFSP in the category of Facilitated Coordination with ―learning‖ as the explanation tool. (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004) They suggest that Europeanisation of policy areas in this type is processed through horizontal direction among the member states on the intergovernmental basis. Though this definition highlights some interesting points such as the

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explanatory power of ―learning‖ or socialization, it is not satisfactory. Most important of all, it does not comply with our observation of the existence of more comprehensive European foreign policy system. Therefore, the concept should be modified so as to accommodate the dynamics between European and national level in the European foreign policy system previously discussed. If coordination is generally agreed as the method of interactions between the two levels in the Union foreign policy system, regulation dominates in the Community foreign policy system, where member states are obliged to comply with the Community rules, particularly, in external trade policy. That means the way that member states may change their foreign policy substance and procedures is more under coercive pressures instead of voluntary cooperation. However, the member states are cautious about ‗European interference‘ in those areas, regarded as their ―domaine de reserve‖. At the same time, other EU partners and institutions usually understand sensitivity of those issues and leave free hand. They may provide assistance only if so requested by the member state concerned. Therefore, the dynamic in national foreign policy system may be characterized as exclusion. It might be suggested that Europeanisation of national foreign policy of the EU member states refers to the two-way process of both policy projection (uploading) and policy injection (downloading), in which changes in policy content and policy process (including policymaking procedures and institutional structure) take place at the national level in response to adaptational pressures and generated opportunities due to their participation in the European foreign policy system. The degree and nature of Europeanisation across the three sub-systems should vary as different dynamics are at play under different institutional arrangements. This research focuses on British foreign policy towards China in the process of European integration. Previous studies on the topic work on second-ranking member states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland or on the two dynamos of the European integration: France and Germany. Because of its notorious pro-Atlantic stance and lingering nostalgia with its past glory, the UK is therefore not considered an ideal case in this regard. However, some observers believe that in reality British foreign policy has also experienced significant changes due to its participation in the European project, much beyond what some British politicians publicly announced. In fact, former British foreign minister Douglas Hurd once wrote that its engagement in the European integration represented ‗the biggest change of diplomatic method‘ in his country. Whereas the UK had previously shared diplomatic information primarily with the US, since EPC (European Political Cooperation) ‗in some areas of diplomacy our policy is formed wholly within a European context, and in no area is the European influence completely absent. The flow of information between the (EU) foreign ministries is formidable‘. (Quoted in Smith M. E. 2004: 113) Thus, the British case may be a fruitful one in the sense that some interesting findings will possibly be reached. Suppose that a country traditionally reluctant in European foreign policy cooperation is also observed changes in its foreign policy, it will be much confident for the analyst to draw the conclusion more generally across the member states. The British case in this regard stands out as ‗the least likely‘ case, with much potential of generalization. Besides, the UK has strong historical and contemporary links with China and the Far East. Therefore, it is relevant to take China as the targeted country in the research. Given the long-time and many-issue interactions with China, detailed cases should be further selected to have more in-depth analysis. Three cases are selected to fit with the three sub-systems in the

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European foreign policy system: the cases of trade and economic relations, issue of human rights in China and the issue of Hong Kong. The UK has substantial business links with and interests in China. The selection of the case corresponds to the previously specified European Community foreign policy sub-system. The major governing procedure is on the supranational basis, complemented by intergovernmental and trans-governmental procedures. Because of its more stabled process, it is expected that changes in national foreign policy mainly occur in both the policy process and content dimension. In a sense, national governments act in a European context as well as the international one when dealing with third parties. Due to the regulatory nature of the policy area, the interactions largely take place bilaterally between the European and national level. Because of the weakened position of the EU in dealing with political matters on the world scene, in particular, vis-à-vis major powers like China, it is not easy to find a suitable case which falls in the category. However, the issue of human rights in China can be qualified as a perfect one in that both the European Union and Britain have conducted steady interactions over the human rights issue in China generally since the end of the cold war. Thus, a case fits perfectly well with the EU foreign policy sub-system. As assumed, intergovernmental and trans-governmental processes are the major governance system as decided by the European constitutional setting. Because of its more fluid nature of social construction, changes at the national level can be in both policy-making and content dimensions. The major direction of change is horizontal among the EU member states, coupled with the top-down and bottom-up processed between the European and national levels. The issue of Hong Kong remained the domain reserve of the British foreign policy before its handover to the Chinese sovereignty on the first of July, 1997. It therefore falls in the strictly national foreign policy category in the European foreign policy system. The intergovernmental cooperation between Britain and other EU member states should be the only possible governance approach in the category. It can be expected that changes in both policy-making and content are minimal as it remains strictly with the national government‘s hand. The direction of change should be bottom-up as the national government concerned takes the generated opportunities with policy projections from below.

CASE OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE REGULATION DYNAMIC The first period of trade and economic relations is roughly from 1975 to the end of 1980s. During this period, the EC substantially institutionalized its relations with China. The major achievements are the mutual recognition of each other by the EEC and China in 1975 and a series of trade and economic agreements, leading to the more comprehensive bilateral agreement in 1985 which is still effective today. The first issue that the EC dealt with China in an official manner involved the diplomatic recognition between the two sides. The international environment is amenable for the normalization of relations between the EEC and China. After President Nixon‘s stunning visit to China in 1972, one major external constraint upon the EEC had been lifted with regards its relations with China. The Commission took the initiative. It was justified by two incidents: the Commission forwarded a memorandum to China in 1974, laying down an outline

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agreement of provisions for the conclusion of a possible trade agreement between the two sides; in response to the unofficial invitation to Christopher Soames, Vice President and Commissioner in charge of external relations for a China visit, the Commission accepted the invitation, but insisted that Soames could only visit in his official capacity as the Vice President of the Commission. (Kapur 1986: 33-34) This suggests that the EC was eager to promote its international profile on this historical occasion. After several official contacts, decisions on establishing diplomatic relations were reached by the EC and its Chinese counterpart. The Chinese Ambassador to the Community, Li Lianpi, presented his credentials to the Presidents of the Council and the Commission on 15 September, 1975. (Kapur 1986: 37) The establishment of diplomatic relations made a record in the EC history in that it, for the first time, had official relations with a Communist country. Since 1975, the Commission has been conferred the mandate by the Council to negotiate on the Member States‘ behalf to negotiate with the so-called state trading countries. The authorization certainly provided the Commission with more clout in excising its international actorness vis-à-vis third parties. The bilateral talk on a trade agreement opened in January 1976 between the Commission and the Chinese diplomatic mission to the EEC. The talk was limited to ―first generation trade policy‖ issues of regulating commodity flows through quotas and duties, for which the Commission was authorized by Article 113 of the Rome Treaty. Consequently, the ―second generation trade policy‖ issue of trade promotion and creation were left over for the Member States to deal with China individually. In 1978 a trade and co-operation agreement was signed, two years later China secured access to the EC‘s General System of Preferences. The previous agreements were later replaced by a more comprehensive trade and economic cooperation agreement of 1985, overseen by a Joint Committee which meets once a year, alternatively in Brussels and Beijing. The European Commission and China also use the China-EC Joint Committee (CECJC) as a forum to conduct a number of cooperative programs. (McDonald 2000: 197) The new agreement and institutionalized economic interaction were a result of increased trade and economic activities between the two parties over the last decade and both parties felt it necessary to have their trade and economic relations more institutionalized. Though Britain was a reluctant member of the EC and a new member during the early years of the EC and China contact, it is ironic that two British played important roles in this regard: Christopher Soames, Vice President of the EC from 1973-1976 and Roy Jenkins, President of the EC from 1976 – 1981. Christopher Soames was in charge of external relations and had already established links with the Chinese Ambassador in London before the EEC normalized its relations with China in 1975. (Kapur 1986: 31) The long tradition, and diplomatic expertise and resources enabled Britain to serve as mediation for the EC and China contact. In this way, Britain in its membership capacity also contributed to the EC, though in more indirect way. British commercial policy towards China has always involved joint efforts by the British government and British business. More interestingly, there has been a recurrent tradition of British business pursuing its own relations with the PRC even if it conflicted with official British policy. The 48 Group is a typical example, which was formed at the prime time of the Cold War in the 1950 when the British companies interested in doing business with China decided to go ahead without governmental approval. During the 1980s, China attracted increasing attention from the UK as a potential trade partner, and the private business began to receive governmental support in their efforts to trade with China. By the end of the decade

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British ministers were visiting China regularly every month. However, Britain now had to compete with its EU partners. In fact, West Germany surpassed Great Britain as China‘s largest European trade partner during this period. Because of the same objectives of strengthening trade and economic relations with China, there was much convergence between British and EC policies in this regard. Instead of passively awaiting the EC‘s interactions with China, the British contributed to the substantive EC policies in dealing with China on the matter by taking advantage of its historical link, expertise and resources. The Community, which of course can only act as a regulator and facilitator, in fact points to a series of successful initiatives in institutionalizing economic co-operation with the Chinese side. Individual governments, on the other hand, have supported exports to China by a variety of means including high profile ministerial visits. (Yahuda 1998: 189) The de facto division of labor between the EC and its member states reflects the impacts of European integration on the member states. The institution of Community policy-making dictates that the national governments focus their attention on trade promotion, while leaving the matter of negotiation to the Community level. The change of national policy mainly takes place in terms of policy-making styles. The second period, between 1989 and 1994, is characterized by the tortuous path that the EU including the Institutions and the Member States took in readjusting their policies towards China in the changed international context. Immediately after the Tiananmen incident in June 1989, the European Council in Madrid decided imposing sanctions against China. In accordance with the decision, the Commission also took some actions. For example, it cancelled the pending visit to Brussels of Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin. The decision was, however, more out of emotional response without meticulous calculations. They were more political and therefore were ―never intended to inhibit European businesses from continuing their projects or stating new ones in China‖. (Shambaugh 1996: 16) In fact, the interest in the Chinese market was quickly reasserted. France was the first among EC countries to normalize its relations with the Chinese government. After visiting China, former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, stated that the adoption of sanction measures to isolate China and the refusal to provide aid is not sensible. In response, the European Community agreed to allow each member state to decide its own policy with China practically, to loosen the economic sanctions. The German government did the same in September 1990 by establishing political contacts. Spain followed the suit and its Foreign Minister visited Beijing, which made him the first high-ranking European envoy to visit Beijing after the incident. (Godement and Serra 2000: 8) Gradually, Community and national sanctions alike, except for the arms embargo, had disappeared by 1993. The Commission also made its contribution to compensating the insufficient information and the lack of mutual understanding of economic practices. Institutionally, trade and investment matters are monitored through specialized joint committees, developed under the Trade & Cooperation Agreement: the Joint Working Group on Economic and Trade Matters was convened in 1993 and meets every year to discuss on the balance of trade, financial services, intellectual property, agriculture and other sectoral issues; another committee on industrial cooperation meets to discuss on policy and technical matters; in December 1995 a framework agreement was reached for the European Investment Bank to grant long-term investment loans to China.

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At the member state level, the attitude of European business towards China is positive. It is obvious that China has already been competing with the EU in many sectors, which is generally regarded as an opportunity rather than a threat. ―In most of the EU‘s fifteen member states there are areas of special expertise on China, and specific organizations and committees helping the business community develop a more effective partnership with that country.‖ (Maclean 1995: 44) The EU member states, especially those with enough capability, links and expertise, concentrate on seeking economic opportunities for its own national business. In 1995, the EU devised its first ever strategy paper towards China: A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations. The motivation for the EU to take a serious look at China derives from the rise of China and its implications for Europe. In economic terms, ―China‘s size and influence on world trade gives it economic policy global significance‖ and ―in order for European industry to be globally competitive we must be present on the world‘s most dynamic markets‖. In 1994, China was already the fourth largest trade partner whether in export or import terms. Based on its analysis, the European Commission proposed a number of policy measures. These policy proposals reflect the EU‘s intention to engage China into the existing international economic system dominated by the West and the EU‘s ambition to play the roles of both partner and a bridge-builder between China and the West World. Furthermore, it devised some concrete measures to enhance bilateral trade and direct investment in China by means of increasing effectiveness of bilateral trade dialogues and developing a new program of business cooperation with China. The strategy paper signifies that the EU has decided after the readjustment period that it begins to treat China seriously as an important economic partner at the level with Japan. Britain joined its European partners‘ concerted sanctions after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. However, it soon relaxed its official contacts with China because it had to deal with it over the Hong Kong issue. Britain experienced a noteworthy increase in exporting to China in terms of volumes during 1992 and 1993 and then it stayed at that level, without strong increases as most other European countries did. (Taube 2002: 86-87) It can be explained by the fact that China deliberately gave lessons to the British because it was not happy with then Hong Kong governor Chris Patten‘s attempts to implement political reforms in the colony. Therefore, British business was kept out of bidding for tenders and contracts whereas other EU member governments were favored for their more friendly attitudes. The British official feared to be lagged too far behind other EU members and tried to improve bilateral relations. In 1993 the then Minister for Trade, Richard Needham, declared that China was his number one priority for developing trade links in Asia. He set about visiting a large number of provincial capitals as well as Beijing to ease the way for British companies. (Ferdinand 2000: 46) In a Memorandum submitted to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1993, the FCO outlined objectives for its policy towards China. In economic field, it includes: ―2) encouraging China to continue its more open economic policies; 4) promoting an increase in British exports and investment.‖ (Ferdinand 2000: 42) By means of high-ranking official visits and offering an export credit guarantee scheme which was commenced in 1995 and in 1997 and consequently led to a marked increase in British exports to China. Since then exports to China have picked up considerably and increased their relative importance in British total exports by more than 50 per cent. Along with official efforts, the semi-official business organizations also play important roles in trade and investment promotions. In the British case, there were until 1991 two organizations: the Sino-British Trade Council and the 48 Group. The two organizations have

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now merged into the China-Britain Trade Group, an area advisory group of the British Overseas Trade Board. It helps the British companies to do business with China by delivering services to these companies to trade in goods or services, to invest, and to establish manufacturing facilities within China. As the only Area Advisory Board under the British Overseas Trade Board to have offices in China, it focuses on developing economic and trade relations with China. In 1994 the British Business Forum was created, presided over by the President of the CBTG to bring together the British chambers of commerce and trade associations in mainland China and Hong Kong, the British Embassy, the Consulate-General in Hong Kong, the Department of Trade and Industry, the British Council and the CBTG to coordinate activities inside China. (Ferdinand 2000: 45) The mandate of the CBTG is to develop trade in general between the UK and China. The CBTG in practice helps mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are planning to enter the Chinese market but do not have the enough expertise and resources for that purpose. Similar to the observation over the previous period, promotion schemes on trade and investment are conducted at member state level as result of the EC rules and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. This leads to the internal competition among the EU member states. The uneven distribution of expertise, capability and traditions among the EU competitors created the situation that some countries, inter alia, the big three are quite at ease with the task as they have enough resources whereas some other countries have to rely more on the EC resources and capabilities for the promotion task. On the other hand, the EU provides protection umbrellas for its member states big and small alike. When the Chinese side proposed in 1994 to discriminate against the British in trade matters in order to punish the British for their deliberate political reform efforts in Hong Kong, the EU Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, quickly responded that the EU would not tolerate one of its member sate being singled out and treated in a discriminated way. China was hesitated and decided not to challenge the solidarity of the EU. The Commission‘s China policy paper in 1995 was important because it followed roughly similar positions that were taken by at least three of the key European states 1 . (Yahuda 1998: 186) The positions were important in the conduct of relations with China and were traditionally recognized and accepted by the Chinese authorities. In fact, the three countries devised their own policy papers with China, which followed similar lines. The process of Europeanization can be roughly traced in the way that it takes the uploading direction from the first-ranking EU member states to the European level, formulated at the European level and went back to all the other European member states. This suggests that with absence of internal conflicts among the major EU member states, it is fairly easy for the EU to reach consensus and devise a common policy. The change of national policy takes place in terms of policy-making styles as the Member States eagerly focus on creating effective channels to promote its trade and economic relations with China. The direction of dynamics in the Community policy-making is increasingly characterized by the twodimension process in which the Member States, especially, such big ones as Britain, were able to exercise their influences in policy-making at the Community level while they are receptive to the regulatory authority from the Community. In the last period of trade and economic relations from 1995 to 2005, the relations are much intensified in terms of official links and actual business contacts. The EC substantiated 1

The three EU countries are obviously Germany, France and Britain.

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its economic relations with China by formulating a number of policy papers to encourage its interactions with China and by implementing a series of cooperation programs. In 1998, the Commission devised its China policy in its communication entitled ―Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China‖, in which integrating China further in the world economy is prioritized as one of the five major tasks. Previous policy papers were further updated by the Commission policy paper in September 2003, entitled ―a maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU – China relations‖. It is devised in the background of rapid changes in both parties. In economic field, the EU‘s priority has focused on monitoring China‘s compliance with WTO requirements and launching new dialogues in intellectual property rights, environmental cooperation. In 2006, the Commission released its most recent communication on its China policy, entitled ―EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities‖. The title connotes that China is more regarded by the EU as an equal partner or stakeholder with common interests as it is mentioned in the Communication that it is devised in the context of ―China‘s revival‖. As for the issue of China‘s accession to the GATT/WTO, the EU has always played an actively supportive role in facilitating its membership application. This is clearly reflected in the series of the European Commission‘s China papers since 1995. The adoption of positive position by the EU derives from the reason that the EU considers the WTO membership can be both a means and an end itself in its overall engagement policy towards that country. On the one hand, for the self-interest of EU countries which were interested in a stable and calculable development of Chinese reform policy, it would not have been wise to isolate China or to reject its policy. The WTO memberships is therefore a further and significant step in integrating China into the international economic order and consequently into the Westdominated international institutional arrangements. On the other hand, it was at the same in Europe‘s interest to gain improved access to the Chinese market, e.g. for capital and industrial manufactured goods (like machines) or for higher developed consumer goods (like cars). (Algieri 2002: 75) In the latter case, it is an objective to promoting the European interests in the most populated country in the world. With some help from the EU, China finally joined the WTO in 2001. In general, the EU had good relations with China during the period. The economic relations prove to be the more stable aspect within overall external relations when political topics sometimes may incur some troubles in the bilateral relations. In economic and trade field, a common European approach towards China does exist. (Holslag 2006: 555) One typical example is that between the individual EU Member States, joint attitudes and policies occur with regards economic liberalization in China. Economic cooperation is utilized by the EU to persuade China to give in to Europe‘s demands. While the EU has been putting some attractive carrots under Beijing‘s nose, for example, GSP, market economy status, it can also impose negative measures such as embargos and import barriers. As a tradition, British foreign policy is heavily influenced by potential commercial opportunities. The phenomenal performance of the Chinese economy since the early 1990s has been known as the sign of China Rise and strong argumentations are built to maintain good relations with China. It lies at the heart of much of current attitudes among the British business not only in the UK, but also in other European states. This has direct effects on governmental policies. China has been regarded by the British government as an important trading partner because this perception is largely based on the argument that though the current trade and economic interaction between the two sides are not significant, the Chinese

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 11 market has a huge potential for the British business. As for the current pattern of trade, the major items of British export to China include heavy industry and, therefore, Britain is particularly interested in involving in big infrastructure projects in China. Also for this reason, China is regarded by the British as a long-term market, because most of the heavy industrial and infrastructure projects take relatively long time to complete. Therefore, it is necessary for the British government to build an overall friendly relationship with the Chinese government. Aware of this, the British government began to seek ways to restore bilateral ties after the handover of Hong Kong. Compared with other EU member states, the British trade and economic relations with China has both similarities and differences. A common feature in economic relations between all West European countries and China is that the importance of China as a trading partner for Western Europe has risen steadily, with China becoming much more important as a partner for imports. The consequence of this unbalanced trade structure for the West European countries is that trade deficits are increasing year by year in their bilateral trade. The general impression is that most West European countries have lost some of their relative importance as trading partners for China as China‘s Asian partners and the U.S. account more and more in its foreign trade volume. The different features of British trade and economic relations with China are also prominent. Its trade relations with China are comparative weak because it now lags behind not only Germany, but also France and Italy. In contrast, the UK is the main European investor in China. According to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the British FDI in China amounted to 2.86 per cent of the world‘s total in 2000, with Germany 2.56 per cent, France 2.09 per cent and the Netherlands 1.94 per cent. In this regard, British companies have the advantage from their status in Hong Kong, ―which provided them with an ideal basis to explore business opportunities in mainland China, gain experience in dealing with Chinese cadres and business people, and train personnel in Hong Kong before sending them to the mainland.‖ (Taube 2002: 100) At present, the UK is the biggest European investor in China and the sixth biggest foreign investor in total, although the UK‘s trade relationship with China is relatively weak. This has important implications for UK relations with China in that while trade issues and frictions remain important, resolving problems on behalf of UK companies operating within China is more important for the UK than other EU countries. The importance of political relations for commercial activities is more significant than other European-based actors given the structure of UK economic relations with China. UK diplomatic representation within China is performing increasingly economic functions on behalf of British companies operating in China. More importantly, it requires that the British government must have enough capability in dealing with China when problems emerge and it cannot expect much help from the EU, in reality, the Commission. In the case of trade and economic relations with China, which is selected in line with the Community procedure, the European context dominantly dictates the way the British policymakers conduct their own national trade and economic policy towards China. The policy domain used to be at the disposal of the former Department of Industry and Trade, coupled with the aid of the FCO before the UK joined the EEC in the early 19970. With the EEC membership and, particularly, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EEC and China in 1975, the British policy-makers in the policy field have increasingly been subject to the European impacts. The British Overseas Trade Board, the official specialized body under the DIT, is no longer holding the monopoly in conducting trade and economic

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policies with China. After the power of negotiating and concluding agreements transferred to the European level, it has to shift its focus on trade promotion in competition with other countries including its European partners on the Chinese market. It has been supported by the quasi-official advisory body of China-Britain Trade Council. Due to this imposition of European actors in this policy area, part of the issues has been removed from the agenda of the British policy-makers. In negotiating a series of trade and cooperation agreements and WTO accession with China, it is the European Commission has stepped in and acted on behalf of the member states including the UK. Similarly, relevant instruments such as trade sanctions, tariff and non-tariff measures are shifted to the European hands, with the British policy-makers can only influence indirectly. Because of the much convergence in terms of policy goals between the EC and Britain, there is very little conflict observed.

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CASE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND THE COORDINATION DYNAMIC It is a true observation that human rights played a very minor role or almost absent in relations between China and the EC and its member states before June 1989. In fact, China was immune from any discussion and criticism from human rights NGOs and governments. The virtual Western silence on human rights in China was explained by several factors. First and foremost, it is determined by the general context of the cold war. That the tacit de facto anti-Soviet alliance between China and the West had been so notable a feature since the early 1970s shielded China from too close a governmental scrutiny. (Foot 2000: 84) In addition, the domestic changes since the end of the 1970s gave much assurance to the Western countries about the future direction that China was destined to take. The reform policy initiated by later Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had already made achievements by then in that China gradually revived from decades-long isolation and market economy was taking shape. All this was in sharp contrast to the still inaccessible Communist block in Eastern Europe. All this, however, took a U-turn overnight due to the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989. In the aftermath of the human rights crisis, Western governmental responses were well coordinated. When the news about the incident reached to the World, the EC leaders were gathering in the framework of European Council in Madrid. On 6 June the EC leaders released a strongly-worded statement. It was then followed by a number of specific measures adopted by the European Council on 27 June. ―Even the Commission normally reticent to cast political judgments, issued a statement expressing its ―consternation‖ and ―shock‖ at the ―brutal repression‖. (Shambaugh 1996: 16) The European reaction foretold that the human rights situation in China would be a sensitive issue in EU-China relations for the next decade. Britain was certainly almost entirely concentrating on its dealings with China over the handover of Hong Kong in the 1980s. A process attracted most of its energy in its East Asian policy. Britain took a very cautious approach on the issue as it is generally believed as the best way of ensuring Hong Kong‘s peaceful transition and prosperous future. This ―silent‖ approach of British policies towards China on the human rights issue was, the same as other Western countries, broken off suddenly after Tiananmen. The British government‘s response to the incident was announced in the House of Commons on 6 June, 1989. The Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe stated that it would be impossible to keep normal business with the Chinese authorities: it decided that all scheduled ministerial exchanges and other high-

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 13 level contacts between Britain and China would be suspended; the proposed visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to China in November would not take place if those responsible for the Tiananmen incident stayed in power; and all arms sales to China would be banned. (Morphet 2000: P107) However, the British government at the same time expressed their concerns about the sincerity of the Chinese government to fulfill their obligations enshrined in the 1984 SinoBritish Joint Declaration over the handover of Hong Kong. The issue of Hong Kong therefore determines that Britain cannot break off all its high-level official contacts with China. Almost immediately after the EC‘s decision on imposing sanctions against China, an exception to the high-level contact prohibition had to be made for the United Kingdom (and also Portugal for its negotiations with China over the future of Macau) because of the ongoing interactions concerning the transition of Hong Kong back to Chinese sovereignty. During the second period, generally, from 1990 to 1998, the most prominent issue in EU human rights policy towards China was the coordinated actions of the EU within the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (or UNCHR) process. At the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission, the EU member states have made great improvements in coordinating their policies and actions so much so that they were by then able to adopt united front on various occasions. The Western idea of including the human rights issue in China in the UNCHR process arose for the first time in February 1990 in the wake of the Tiananmen incident. A resolution on the situation in China was tabled and was co-sponsored by all the twelve member states of the then EC. Ireland held the Presidency of the Council at the time. It spoke on behalf of the EC member states. China, however, was able to block the resolution by a procedural device: a ―no-action‖ resolution was proposed by Pakistan and was carried by a vote of 17 in favor to 15 against (with 11 abstentions). (Baker 2002: 52) Thus, began a process of battle between the Western states including the EU as the collectivity and China in the CHR. This process went on almost every year afterwards. In the 1997 CHR session that spring, another EU drafted resolution was submitted. The Netherlands held the Presidency. This time the position of the European Union was not clearly defined as in previous years. In February 1997 the General Affairs Council of EU indicated that a joint decision was not yet made on co-sponsoring a resolution against China in the CHR process. Finally, it was turned out that a draft resolution was put forward, but this time it was not co-sponsored by all the EU member states, but only by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In Particular, France broke from existing EU policy and declined to co-sponsor the resolution, and France‘s stance was followed by similar decisions from Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece. (Baker 2002: 55) This break with the established coordinated policy of cosponsoring the resolution in reality marked the end of a common EU foreign policy regarding the issue of human rights in China in the UNCHR process. It is generally believed that China won the battle with the EU states by its successful strategy of ―divide and rule‖ among the EU states. It focused on some major states, inter alia, France and Germany, with promise of business gains. The Tiananmen incident changed the agenda of British policy towards China. The FCO has devoted significant diplomatic efforts in pressuring China on the issue since then. At the end of 1992, a delegation led by the former UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Geoffrey Howe was sent to China by the British government. The sending of this delegation gave the impression

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that Britain was actively trying to help China with improving its human rights practice in a cooperative and non-confrontational manner. In 1993, China was bidding for the host of the 2000 Olympic Games. The European Parliament passed a resolution on 15 September. Shortly afterwards, Britain‘s Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, also spoke out against China‘s bid on the ground of the human rights record in the country. This move should be taken into consideration against the background of Sino-British quarrel over the political reform in Hong Kong. In this context, the British government also has to take into account the concerns of its EU partners when devising its foreign policies towards China. All of this means that British policy towards China is more complex than previous and also subject to a wider range of domestic and external pressures from within and without Britain. Its coordination with other EU states in co-sponsoring a draft resolution every year during the period indicates clearly that it has found a protective umbrella when dealing with China over the issue of human rights. It is safer than when it acted single-handedly. The UK‘s role in the coordinated EU action towards the issue of human rights in China was the most prominent when it was holding the EU Presidency. When the UK took the Presidency in 1998, the EU was preparing its position for the next CHR. Early from the late 1997, human rights NGO groups began lobbying the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook when the Labor government just took office with the newly released so-called ―ethical foreign policy‖. The thrust of the lobbying from most of the NGOs concerned was that the EU should not abandon its support for a resolution on China in favor of the policy of dialogue. (Baker 2002: 56) In February 1998, the EU General Affairs Council adopted the conclusion concerning the EU action towards China in the CHR framework: in view of the first encouraging results of the EU-China human rights dialogue, the Council agreed that neither the Presidency nor Member States should table or co-sponsor a draft Resolution at the 1998 UNCHR. However, it also stated that the EU will refer to the human rights situation in China in its opening statement and the EU delegation should vote against a no-action motion if it would be the case. In reality, the new EU policy on the subject marked a U turn from where all the EU member states co-sponsored a resolution to where no EU members co-sponsored one. At a meeting with NGOs, Robin Cook sought their understanding on change of the policy. The Foreign Secretary had decided that it was more important to have a unified EU stance at the CHR, even if this effectively meant abandoning the policy of actively raising China‘s human rights in international fora. (Baker 2002: 56-7) Despite the new Labor government‘s ambition for an ethical dimension in pursuit of an ethical foreign policy and all the NGOs efforts, Britain had to take the decision on the EU‘s behalf of not co-sponsoring a draft resolution. It was clearly a result of the EU impact on its behavior and policy. In the statement on behalf of the EU, the UK government pronounced that a higher prominence would be given to comments on China than in previous years. The UK Minister of State said that the EU has noticed some positive steps by the Chinese government. Instead of actions in the CHR process, the EU would keep the issue under close examination in the view of progress with the human rights dialogue with China and in human rights record within China. After 1998, however, the use of bilateral instruments became dominant. These included human rights dialogue and cooperation programs. The EU-China dialogue on human rights was initiated in January 1996, but was interrupted by China after Denmark (plus nine other

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 15 EU Member States) tabled a critical resolution at the 1997 UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) session. Later in 1997, China decided to resume the dialogue. Since then, the dialogue has been held twice a year. The EU is represented by the EU Troika (EU Presidency, European Commission, Council Secretariat and the incoming EU Presidency). The human rights dialogue was regularized, being held alternatively in China and Europe. For example, the first human rights dialogue between the EU and China was held in London in May 1998 when the UK was holding the rotating EU Presidency. Then in that year as reciprocity, it took place in Beijing again in October. Then the next year in Berlin in February 1999, and in Beijing in October 1999 and in Portugal in early 2000. It has thus become a routine activity between the two sides. To support the EU side, the EU Heads of Mission in Beijing produced quarterly reports monitoring the human rights situation in China. In correspondence to the Council conclusion on 25 June, 2001, the Working Party on human rights within the Council produced a European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues, which aims to promote the consistency, coherence and effectiveness of the EU human rights policy. It is important to note that the paper also emphasized the consistency between the Member States‘ bilateral dialogues and the EU dialogues. Information exchanges are highlighted, particularly, with regards issue selection and outcomes. The diplomatic post of the current Presidency in the country could also gather information on the spot. Interestingly, the guidelines also mentioned in the case of China, informal ad hoc meetings could be held between the Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) and other countries which maintain human rights dialogues. This opens the possibility for cooperation between the EU and the UK in their respective human rights dialogues with China. In relations with China, Britain‘s handover of Hong Kong to China marked opening of a new era in the bilateral relations. The removal of this issue cleared the way for a new China policy under the new Labor government elected two months before the transfer of sovereignty. According to the then minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Derek Fatchett, it created the environment for ―a new chapter of more constructive relations across the board, addressing both trade and more difficult issues such as human rights‖. (Breslin 2004: 409) However, the ambition of the new government did not come true as it followed other EU partners in the decision of not co-sponsoring a resolution at the CHR in 1998. Britain‘s decision not to criticize China‘s human rights record at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in April 1998 has been attacked by prominent Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng who said the move had had a very harmful impact on the pro-democracy movement in China. On the same day he met British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook and he also attacked other European Union countries who had taken the same position as Britain. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, came under attack in the House of Commons on the issue. Opposition Conservative Party leader William Hague said it was the first time in nine years that Britain had not supported a resolution on China. But Mr Blair rejected Mr Hague‘s criticism, saying the Government had been championing the cause of human rights in China. He said: ―Not merely have we raised human rights issues in respect of China continually, we have also, as president of the EU, been getting support from other European countries in order to make the very issues.‖2

2

Source from BBC news report Wednesday, March 11, 1998.

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Clearly, the European Union matters in the change of the British position on the issue. As was reported by the media 3 that one of the sorriest roles in the abandoning the CHR mechanism belongs to Britain, notably to its foreign secretary, Robin Cook, who once bravely spoke of giving British foreign policy an ―ethical dimension‖. Britain, apparently, wanted to seek a tougher line on China at Geneva, but in the end bowed, as it has done ever since Mr Cook took over, to ―European solidarity‖, and backed the kowtowing line. Britain and other countries that claim to care about human rights, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, could co-sponsor the American resolution as independent countries. But they don‘t. Abandoning the multilateral forum, the UK has also conducted a bilateral dialogue with China over human rights twice a year4 since 1997. The event includes meetings with British NGOs and field visits to China. The merits of human rights dialogues as stated by the FCO lie in the following ways: the Chinese now accept that human rights are a legitimate subject of discussion; dialogue has been catalyst for positive change and provide the environment for a wide ranging program of cooperation, particularly in the development of legal and judicial fields; the dialogue now covers sensitive issues such as the death penalty and administrative detention; China is now more engaged in international human rights mechanisms5. On the FCO‘s annul report on human rights in 2003, the foreign affairs committee of the Parliament recommended that the government do more to raise human rights questions with the Chinese authorities and does not let the human rights dialogue with China became nothing more than a talking shop. Similar considerations apply to the EU dialogue. In response, the FCO stated that the British officials raised the issue with their Chinese counterparts including Premier Wen Jian Bao and foreign minister Li Zhaoxing during their visit to London in May 2004. It is admitted that they could not change the Chinese attitudes overnight, but anyway the willingness on the Chinese part to discuss the issue has increased. Engaging China on human rights is not easy, and it requires sustained long-term efforts. As regards the relations with the EU-China human rights dialogue, it is stated that the EU dialogue has a very similar overall objectives to the UK dialogue. UK and the EU partners share information about the Sino-British bilateral dialogues, where they exist, in order to influence and get better value from the EU dialogue process. In its response to the Parliament‘s opinion on the 2004 annul report, the FCO denied that the human rights dialogue is failing to deliver results at sufficient speed. Instead the dialogue process is useful and contributes to incremental changes. Besides, the FCO response stated that the government consulted with other countries that hold dialogues with China through Berne process6. It also played a full part as an EU member in preparation of the EU dialogues and demarches. The EU dialogue has now a focus, as the British one, and consequently, the FCO would try to ensure that all the key human rights issue of concern are raised and 3

See Who will condemn China?, the Economist, March 22nd, 2001. Germany is the other EU state which holds bilateral human rights dialogue with China. The annual event, launched in 1999, includes symposiums on human rights involving both governmental and non-governmental participants. 5 Secretary of FCO‘s response to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament on 1999 human rights annul report, in March 2000.. 6 ―Berne process‖, launched by the Swiss government in 2001, brings together representatives of the governments conducting human rights dialogue with China for a one-day meeting, generally held annually, but having no fixed schedule. The meetings are primarily an opportunity for exchanging information although the agenda has also covered such items as cooperation programmes, development of common positions including benchmarks, and discussion of the possibility for more institutionalized cooperation among governments. 4

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discussed at least once a year through either the UK or EU dialogues. In this sense, the two dialogues became complementary. The two roles became overlapped when the UK held the EU Presidency. For example, the UK Presidency and the EU Commission are hosting an EU-China Human Rights Dialogue Seminar on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in London on 12 and 13 December, 20057. Aimed at encouraging China to make early progress towards ratifying the ICCPR, the seminar focused on several articles of the Covenant which China has identified as problematic, including fair trial provisions, arbitrary arrest and detention, and serious crimes punishable by the death penalty. The Presidency hopes that the discussions on these areas will help the Chinese delegation make progress in working towards the ratification of the ICCPR. As a whole, changes are subtle in the case of human rights issue in China. The British FCO still formulates and implements its own policy on the issue. It conducts its own human rights dialogue with China, issues its own policy declaration and sends its own official delegates. However, there is also a European option now. It acted with its EU partners in sponsoring collective EU resolution against China under the UNHRC process in the 1990s. It joined its EU partners, making collective policies usually in forms of the Council demarches, declarations and decisions, mostly based on the Commission‘s communication and other policy papers for its expertise and resources. The British attention on human rights in China is largely under the influences from the European institutions, inter alia, the Commission and the Parliament and other EU member states. The same issues are put on the agenda of the both European and the British policy-makers. For the British policy-makers, the European level becomes an additional instrument, which can be used when deemed to be useful and necessary. On the other hand, the British also makes its own contribution to the common European policy on the issue by providing its expertise and resources to the European level based on its long and rich experiences in relations with China. Besides, its own policy supplements that conducted collectively at the European level.

CASE OF HONG KONG ISSUE AND THE EXCLUSION DYNAMIC After the World War II, the British government adopted a pragmatic option on the issue of Hong Kong: to keep ruling the territory ―with a mixture of apathy and bewilderment, saying and doing as little as possible‖. (Fabian research series 324: 25) However, this longlast option could not stay any longer at the end of the 1970s. In Hong Kong, it was the business community who was the first to feel the pressure of the 1997 deadline. Leases on commercial property were usually signed for 15-year periods. So the problem arose that from 1982 onwards there would be a pressing need to establish a legal framework for the post-1997 period for lease contracts. Without that a growing crisis of confidence in the business community could easily be expected. In September 1984 the Chinese and British governments issued a Joint Declaration, stating that all the territory of Hong Kong would return to China on 1 July, 1997, and that the principle of ―one country, two systems‖ would apply to the territory for the subsequent 50 7

FCO press release on 13 December, 2005.

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years. The two sides should work together to ensure a smooth transition for the maintenance of prosperity and Hong Kong‘s ―traditional way of life‖ for 50 years. Equally important, Britain and China were not only seeking a settlement on the future of Hong Kong but were also, more subtly, laying the foundations for their own future relationship. (Scott 1989: 174) The two governments and the business community all knew well that there could be huge advantages in the future relations provided that a successful agreement could be reached. During this period, the issue of Hong Kong was handled in a typical way of bilateral diplomacy in that the British government dealt single-handedly with its Chinese counterpart in finding a solution to the future of the territory. Because of the changed situation of the respective positions in the international system, Britain lacks enough clout in negotiation process. As a matter of fact, the final settlement plan of Hong Kong was later criticized by some hardliners in Britain as too much in the Chinese favor. Britain could not expect help from its EC partners, either. The political cooperation among the EC member states was still in its infancy in the period. There was a complete absence of European involvement on the issue. This was due to several factors: first, the issue of Hong Kong is a very sensitive one, strictly confined to bilateral relations between Britain and China and there is no place for any other actors; second, the European integration in foreign policy was in its infancy and there was no willingness and capability to involve in the issue. It is perfectly the exclusion dynamic at work. The next few years after the Joint Declaration entering into force went quite smoothly, with two sides being friendly in handling issues arising from the transition through the SinoBritish Liaison Group as the consulting and monitoring mechanism. However, all this was disrupted by the dramatic events of the political turmoil in the early 1989, with the Tiananmen incident as the culmination. This was aroused strong response from the general public and the official aspects in the West. The issue of Hong Kong‘s transition was affected accordingly. For its dealings with China, the bilateral relations were getting sour. It seemed that Britain became remorse about signing the Joint Declaration. On 19 June, 1989, Geoffrey Howe sent a letter, to Qian, the then Chinese foreign minister, unilaterally delaying the SinoBritish liaison team‘s 13th meeting, originally planned in July. This was a very unusual behavior. It was the first since the formation of the Liaison Office in 1985. Shortly, in another letter, Howe explicitly cast doubt if the Chinese troops should be stationed in Hong Kong after its handover and expressed that the British side was reconsidering arranging for direct election in Hong Kong in 1991 and demanded that the Chinese side delay its issuance of the basic law. (Qian 2003: 323) It was obvious that the British government was trying to have more influence over the territory after 1997 by initiating some changes to the agreement reached before with China. The issue was fueled in the last years leading up to the transfer in 1997, with Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong taking office. Unlike his predecessors, he was keen to inform the people in Hong Kong than the Chinese government when initiating some new policies. In 1992, for example, he deliberately avoided going to Beijing first to inform the Chinese leaders about his first set of plans for Hong Kong, including his controversial proposals to change the arrangements for election to LegCo, so as to broaden the franchise. (Ferdinand 2000: 39) The proposals aimed to be open up to all employees in the functional constituencies, where votes had instead been reserved for the heads of companies active within a particular business sector. The Chinese government was annoyed. They declared that

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 19 all the proposals were not conform to original agreements. If implemented, they would be torn up after sovereignty being transferred. Not all people in the British government took a supportive attitude towards him, in particular, those China experts in the FCO. Cradock repeatedly warned that it was Hong Kong which would lose most, with China being in the advantageous position and Britain always being the scapegoat. He described Patten‘s reform plan as ―dangerous and reckless policy‖. (Ferdinand 2000: 41) As later development proves that after the handover the Chinese government abolished the Patten arrangements and returned to those which it had outlined in the 1991 Basic Law. What Patten achieved was to pave the way for the friendly agreement reached by Tony Blair, after the Labor took office shortly afterwards, with the Chinese leadership on turning to a new page of the bilateral relations. Thereafter, Hong Kong would serve as a bridge rather than a battlefield between them. Due to its sensitivity, the issue of Hong Kong had always been handled strictly on a bilateral basis between China and Britain, with little international interference. This was the case in the years of negotiation and largely remained the case in the transitional period. In July 1996 the British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, visited Brussels to encourage the EU to take a still more active stance in support of the agreements about the future of Hong Kong after the reversion of sovereignty. (Yahuda 1998: 185) To his disappointment, the request was responded without substantial return, but mere words of best wishes. In general, other European countries stood aloof when the British and Chinese governments were busy dealing with each other on the issue. However, their interest in the territory was getting increasingly strong as the time for the handover was approaching. The fact that Britain was about to clear its hands in the territory surely gave other European states more opportunities to be involved in this truly dynamic international city. However, things were not always gloomy. There were some positive signs. This mainly refers to the European Commission. Already in its first policy paper in the form of communication to the Council and the European Parliament in 1995, the Commission foresees the importance of the issue of Hong Kong and Macao in the overall relations with China after their handover. It states clearly the reason for its interests in the two regions. Then it draws attention to the principles of autonomy and continuity enshrined in the Declaration as the instruments for its engagement policy. Based on the argument, it asserts that the EU‘s relations with Hong Kong (and Macau) will be governed by the principle of continuity in the years leading up to the handover and beyond. The Commission was also relieved that its representative office in Hong Kong responsible for relations with Hong Kong and Macau which was opened in 1993 had been agreed by the Chinese government that it would continue to operate as an independent entity after handover. It is more important, in political term, that the Council of Minister, the de facto decisionmaking body of the EU, made its formal statement in the Council conclusions of the December 1995 on EU-China relations that the principles contained formally in the two Joint Declarations signed by China and the United Kingdom and Portugal respectively should be implemented strictly. At the Dublin European Council in December 1996, the Council conclusion ―reiterated the European Union‘s strong interest in the future peace and prosperity‖ of Hong Kong. The most systematic and comprehensive EU strategy on the issue of Hong Kong was, however, formulated on the eve of the handover of Hong Kong when the Commission published its first ever policy paper on the issue of Hong Kong The European Union and Hong Kong: Beyond 1997, Communication from the Commission to the Council

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in April 1997. The document is meant to provide the operational basis for the EU‘s future ties with Hong Kong. After the handover, the British focus on Hong Kong has shifted from managing the peaceful transition to monitoring the internal developments on the basis of the Joint Declaration. ―Britain‘s political and moral commitment to the people of Hong Kong and to the Joint Declaration lives on‖, as John Battle, former FCO Minister of State, spoke in Hong Kong on 18 Nov., 1999. He continued that Britain‘s relationship with Hong Kong was deeply rooted in history and growing towards the future and, therefore, the British government should continue to develop the forward-looking relationship stressed since the handover and to build partnerships on the basis of shared agenda for the future and common interests. The motivation for the British government in maintaining an effective policy and close ties with the post-handover Hong Kong derives from the awareness of important UK obligations and strong interests in the territory. The stakes that UK possesses in Hong Kong should be assessed on its own right, but not be neglected in its interests of the overall relationship with China as a whole. The basis that the British government holds firmly in its dealing with China over the issue of post-handover Hong Kong is the Joint Declaration. The FCO has decided that it should define the UK‘s obligation and formulate its policy to Hong Kong in terms of the Joint Declaration, not of the Basic Law. Thus, the Joint Declaration is regarded by the British government as its weapon on the issue. It was typified by the British government‘s response to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal‘s ruling over the case of right of abode.8 Shortly after the CFA‘s judgment, the British Consulate-General in Hong Kong issued a statement, stating that Hong Kong is entitled to judicial autonomy as enshrined in the Joint Declaration. The FCO‘s statement later also affirmed that the judgment strengthened confidence from the international community in the Chinese government‘s sincerity of upholding the ―One County, Two Systems‖ principle. It also warned that any move to impose limits on the independent judicial power of the Court of Final Appeal would be a matter of serious concern to the British government. The most fundamental issue in this area was relating to the reinterpretation of the Basic Law. Another issue was concerning the Hong Kong SAR passport holders and British National (Overseas) passport holders. As one of the most important remaining obligations set out in the Joint Declaration, the British government and parliament both agreed that the Government should continue to press for visa-free access for HKSAR passport holders, particularly in the EU as an indication of its determination to develop bilateral relations with post-handover Hong Kong and of its confidence on the SAR government in handling its own affairs.

8

In its ruling on 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal, the highest court in the SAR confirmed in Judgement 129 the right of abode of those people from the mainland, whose parents are HKSAR citizens. By this judegment, it is estimated that about 1.67 million PRC citizens are entitled to have right of abode in Hong Kong. In response to fears among the people in Hong Kong about the possibility of erosion of their prospeirity and welfare as a result of large scale immigrants from the mainland, the SAR government sought to reinterpretation by the National People‘s Congress‘ Standing Committee of Basic Law Article 24(2) and (3), and Article 22(4) (those relevant to the question of the right of abode) on 26 June 1999. As a follow-up, the CFA handed down its latest verdict on right of abode cases on 10 January 2002, which substantially reduced the number of legitmate abode seekers. This was strongly criticized by human rights groups on the ground of violation of rights of family reunion. Others, instead, question the independent status of the legal system of the SAR and further the one country, two systems principle.

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 21 Similar to the approach by the UK government, therefore, the EU also refers to the principle of ―autonomy‖ enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration as the legal basis for its handling of the issue. In this regard, the Commission‘s 1998 Communication on Hong Kong and Macau affirms that the EU should seek to underpin further the autonomous responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The EU considers the continued expression of differing opinions through the media and other channels in Hong Kong to be a healthy sign of political maturity. In terms of concrete policy measures, the European Commission proposed on 26 January, 2000 a Council regulation to grant Hong Kong and Macau residents visa-free access to the EU. The EU-Hong Kong SAR Customs Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force on 1st June, 1999, also helped to underpin the independent functioning of the Hong Kong SAR economy. As one of its policy proposals, the Commission produces an annual report on the internal development of the HKSAR. The Commission regularly send high-level officials to visit the territory and officials from the SAR are also invited to visit Brussels. Besides, senior officials from the Commission and the SAR Government also meet regularly in international fora. Trade, economic and immigration issues figure prominently in those meetings. The European Commission maintains an EC Office in Hong Kong, while Hong Kong SAR is represented in Brussels by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which covers all EU countries except the United Kingdom. The Commission believes that such high level visits from the EC could effectively raise the international profile of the SAR and to enhance bilateral relations. This strategy culminates in Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission‘s visit to Hong Kong in July 2005, demonstrating the Commission‘s clear support and commitment to strengthening bilateral relations. The visit is considered to highlight the importance that the EU attaches to the ―one country, two systems‖ principle. President Barroso held bilateral talks with Hong Kong‘s Chief Executive, Mr Donald Tsang, after which a joint statement was issued wherein they ―agreed that Hong Kong and the European Union should develop, broad and deepen cooperation in areas of common interest‖. (European Commission 2005 Annual Report on Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2006) Out of concern for its substantial European economic interests in Hong Kong, the Commission has tried to strengthen the EU‘s ties with Hong Kong on a more permanent footing so as to enhance its trade and investment relations with the SAR. The broader objective is to stress the autonomy of Hong Kong as an independent economic entity in the multilateral trading system. In this regard, the EU-Hong Kong Business Cooperation Committee is established to bring together business leaders from the EU and Hong Kong and has proved to be a successful channel to strengthen the economic and commercial ties between the two sides. The existence of the Committee meets the requirement of maintaining a regular and effective exchange of information and ideas after the changed situations in Hong Kong and the EU. Ever since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the EU has become watchful over the internal developments in the territory. The first big event which aroused its attention is the Court of Final Appeal‘s judgment. The European Commission remarked that it is important for Hong Kong‘s reputation that such a case should remain wholly exceptional. Another big issue which aroused internal controversy and outside attention is the initiative by the SAR government to propose a national security law according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, which would, as widely believed, undermine fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. On 19 December, 2002, the European Parliament adopted a unanimous resolution calling on

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the HKSAR Government to ensure that Article 23 proposals would not be used to silence opposition, and freedoms. Additionally, it called on the Government to publish a draft bill settling out clearly detailed provisions to be followed by further consultations.‖ (European Commission‘s annual report on Hong Kong SAR, 2003) The EU, in its statement of 23 December, 2002, noted the concerns that had been raised in Hong Kong and in particular the extra-territorial effect of some proposed offences as well as the broad definition of those offences, and called on the HKSAR Government to ensure that this legislation and its implementation would not undermine the principles of the rule of law and that the rights and freedoms outlined in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law would be protected. In fact, a political priority on the EU‘s agenda is to encourage the introduction of democracy in the territory and this becomes a consistent policy initiative. The EU claims that it shares with Hong Kong many common values including rule of law, respect for individual freedoms and human rights and the right of free enterprises. Maintaining these fundamental values and further developing democracy is essential to the success of ―one country, two systems‖ in Hong Kong. The Commission, in this respect, continues to pay close attention to the development of democracy in the SAR. On several occasions, the Commission has asked the SAR government to clarify in advance how and when the move towards universal suffrage will be completed, assuring that the SAR authority could earn considerable respect with little cost if they could accelerate the pace to introduce universal suffrage by a specific date. The Commission reiterates the calls it has made on a number of occasions. Shortly after the handover, during his visit to Hong Kong in 1998, Mr Santer as President of the EC, asked for the SAR Government to state its unequivocal commitment to a fully elected system of government and to announce a timetable for its introduction of universal suffrage. As time goes by, the triadic relations among the EU, Hong Kong and Chinese mainland is expected to be approaching towards an unbalanced one in that the link between the latter two could be closer given the reality. Consequently, it can be increasingly difficult for the EU to manipulate that relationship to their favor. Politically, the Chinese government stresses the one country element in the ―one country, two systems‖ formula and the SAR government has no alternative but relying on the Central Government for its support. From the economic perspective, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement or CEPA between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong was signed on 29 June, 2003. Under the free trade arrangement, most Hong Kong-made products exported to the Mainland will enjoy zero tariff rates and Hong Kong service providers will be granted liberalized market access in 18 service sectors in the Mainland ahead of delays or lower ceiling set for implementation of China‘s WTO commitments. This arrangement surely serves as an incentive to further integrate the two economies. The handover of Hong Kong on 1st July, 1997 marks the beginning of a new period in which two sets of policy-making are going on in parallel: the EU policy towards Hong Kong and the UK policy towards Hong Kong. The two policy-making processes are interacted in an interesting way. Sometimes, they are complementary to each other. On other occasions, they are more repetitive. As the general trend, however, there is increasing input from the EU, in particular, on the part of the Commission and, in fewer cases, collective actions taken in the Council. The UK has increasingly concentrated on pursuing business opportunities and retaining traditional links. The changes in national policy are more easily detected in that there is an emerging tendency of division of labor between the European and British policies. The EU focuses on more tough issues such as democracy and political reforms in Hong Kong

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 23 and the UK pays more attention on forging business links with the territory. In a word, the exclusion dynamic is on the decline as the EU is stepping in.

TOWARDS A POST-STATE DIPLOMACY

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The European foreign policy system is still undergoing a process of institutionalization. However, there is an emergence of multi-layered European foreign policy system. Horizontally, a tendency towards coherence occurs across the different divisions within the system although it is still a much fragmented one. Vertically, a multi-level structure encompasses actors from the European, national and non-governmental sources operating in the same arena. Consequently, foreign policy and policy making of the EU member states are rationalized in the sense that European and national foreign policies are conducted and inherently embedded in the overall European foreign policy system. Fragmentation – Coherence Continuum: The European cooperation on foreign policy is notoriously known as fragmented, with the pillar structure as the most obvious evidence. However, as the empirical findings from the case studies tell that the rigid separation between the Community and Union pillar and that between European and national level policy are increasingly blurred. The former is exemplified by the fact that the two largely separate regimes ―borrow‖ from each other actors, instruments and so on to fulfill their respective policy objectives. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the European Council imposed an economic sanction on the Community basis as one of the concrete measures in backing up its resolution against China. The other way around, the European trade and economic policies are supported by the regular political contacts between the Union and China bilaterally and at the fringe of multilateral framework such as Asia-Europe Meeting (or ASEM). On the other hand, the European and national policy-makers are increasingly getting used to cooperate with each other in dealing with a third party. When China intended to retaliate Britain for their disputes over Hong Kong by restricting British business opportunities on the Chinese market, the Commission stood out and warned China of possible counter-measures from the European side. Reversely, the European institutions also rely much on Britain for its expertise, experience and resources for its dealing with China on issues of trade, human rights and Hong Kong. The European foreign policy system, especially after the Maastricht treaty, provides much autonomy for the European actors and member states in inputting their ideas and objectives into European foreign policy system during specific phases of the policy process. Mutual trust is gradually built up among the partners of the European foreign policy system, in the sense that European institutions and the member states cannot use information shared between them to embarrass or blame other EU partners. With incorporation of such norms, partners in European foreign policy tend to make a compromise usually by reaching the median position, not necessarily, the position representing the lowest common denominator. Generally, the European foreign policy system involves an increasing coherence of the different policy sectors and rationalization of the policy process. This change can be proved by such facts as the linkages of the policies, actors, and procedures between different subsystems. Although the fragmentation problem still remains, it can be argued that much

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coherence among the sub-systems and between the European and national policies are increasing on the procedural and substantive dimensions alike. Dispersion – Centralization Continuum: The European foreign policy system is a hybrid governance, displaying both dispersed and centralized features. This feature is of varying degree across different sub-systems: within the Community pillar, European institutions take the dominant role as policy entrepreneurs and implementers and the member states are mainly promoters or barriers, dependent upon the issues concerned. In a word, supranational actors serve as facilitator and regulator from the above, national actors still play an important role as veto players and non-state actors play more important supportive roles. Thus, the Community foreign policy procedures are the most centralized of the three; within the Union pillar, the EU member states remain as policy entrepreneurs, facilitators, or in many cases, hurdlers, with the European institutions including the Commission and the Parliament mostly as sources of information, expertise and advocates. Over years of cooperation practice, however, the policy regime is increasingly legally binding on the member states, with somewhat limited compliance mechanisms. For example, the Union foreign policy includes several authoritative decision-making rules, in the form of qualified majority voting. After all, the Union policy making procedures are more decentralized, compared with the first pillar; The national foreign policy system is largely at the disposal of national policy-makers, with the European institutions playing a minimal supportive role when demanded by the member states concerned. It is the most decentralized policy-making procedures. The case of Hong Kong suffices to confirm the contention. The issue of Hong Kong had long been in the confine of traditional national foreign policy pillar, conducted by the British government single-handedly with China. After the negotiations over the future of Hong Kong which led to the 1984 Joint Declaration with China, it is still largely the British government alone deals with China in the transitional period. However, it is no longer the case in the last years leading up to the handover and, in particular, at the handover. Gradually, the European institutions, other EU member states and non-state actors have a free hand to deal with the SAR directly without fear of entering the domain reserve of the British. In the end, European policies towards Hong Kong have been developed across a much wider range of issues. Because of this fluidity on the dispersed and centralized continuum, the European foreign policy system is, more often than not, open to various actors at varying degree at different policy stages and across different policy procedures. Thus, there are numerous accession points to decision-making available to the European institutions and the member states and, subsequently, the potential influences of the European institutions and the EU member states as policy entrepreneurs or hurdlers are all possible. The accessibility is also open to nongovernmental and sub-national actors which usually provide information, put pressures or lobbying or help implement foreign policies. In this regard, it is noteworthy that though formal government-to-government relations between the member states remain important, two important changes should be pointed out. First, there is an increasing trans-governmental contacts between governmental agencies of the member states and between them and the agencies of the European Union. Second, non- and sub-state actors become increasingly engaged in supporting, furthering and changing government objectives while pursuing their own private interests on sectoral basis in case of sectional groups or promotional causes of public goods in case of some campaigning NGOs.

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Europeanization of British Foreign Policy toward China: An Institutional Perspective 25 Rationalizing European Foreign Policy: Originally, the relations between the European and national foreign policies were largely carried out independently of each other, sometimes contradictory in objectives. After participation in their cooperation in foreign policy areas, the European states started from the trade and economic issues by delegating some of their sovereign powers to the supranational level and later worked together in more sensitive areas of ―high politics‖ on the inter-governmental basis. Thus, a foreign policy system of much complexity has come into formation, featuring both fragmentation and coherence, and dispersion and centralization. In effects, the complexity gives rise to some rationalization of foreign policy making in the European Union, gradually and steadily regulating foreign policy-making and policies at the European and national level, with inputs from the actors from various sources within Europe. Supplementing effect can be identified in the first place as regards the relations between the European and national level foreign policy. In this case, both European and the member state concerned develop a policy in parallel to each other towards a same party or on a same issue. The same policies by the European and national policy-makers can be overlapping and complementary. When similar measures/methods are adopted, the European and national policies overlap and reinforce each other. When different aspects are deal with, the European and national policies are complementary to each other when a neglected part by one partner is covered by the other. The human rights dialogue with the Chinese government conducted respectively with the EU and the British government is a good example. The two dialogues are in parallel. They are overlapping if one considers that the same issue and the same dialogue partner are involved. They are complementary if one notes that the European and British officials share information and topics with each other. Supplanting effect is also identified regarding the interaction between the European and national foreign policies. There is an observation that the European and national actors have a ―division of labor‖ formula, focusing on each other‘s part in conducting a policy issue. As the trade and economic case suggests, a division of labor effect exists between the European and national level. The task of negotiating trade and economic agreements, implementing relevant policies is at the disposal of the Commission while the member states including the UK focus on trade promotion on the Chinese market so much as that there is a de facto competition among the European partners. Across the different sub-systems, the internal competition among the EU states on the Chinese market and the European institutions‘ raising of sensitive issues like democracy and human rights give the general public such an impression that there is a division of labor between the member states and the EU, with the member states focusing on economic trade issues whereas the collective European actors dealing on political issues. Not only the official European and national actors are involved in the European foreign policy system, but also non-governmental and sub-national governmental actors take their part in this process. In this regard, it is worthwhile to point out the role that trans-national NGOs play in the formulation and implementation of European foreign policy. In relations with China, their roles can be found in influencing European policies on human rights issue in China by providing the Commission and the Parliament with information, in lobbying European policy-makers on trade and economic issues towards China by pressuring the Commission and in helping implementing cooperation programs by sending personnel. Above all, the foreign policy of the EU member states has been in transformation, which goes beyond the state by delegating accession to both the above and the below. Hence, a post-state diplomacy is under formation.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Algieri, Franco. (2002). EU Economic Relations with China: An Institutionalist Perspective, in Richard Louis Edmonds (Eds.) China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective, The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 2, Cambridge University Press. Allen, David. (1996). The European rescue of national foreign policy, in Christopher (Eds.) The Actors in Euope’s Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge. Baker, P. (2002). Human Rights, Europe and the People‘s Republic of China, in Edmonds, Richard Louis (Eds.) China and Europe since 1978: a European perspective, China Quarterly special issue new series no.2, New York: Cambridge University Press, 45-63. Breslin, Shaun. (2004). Beyond Diplomacy? UK Relations With China Since 1997, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.6, 409-425. Bulmer Simon, J. & Claudio, M. Radaelli. (2004). The Europeanization of National Policy? Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, No.1/2004, extracted from http://www.qub.ac.uk/ schools/SchoolofPoliticsinternationalStudies/FileStore/EuropeanisationFiles/Filetouplod, 5182,en.pdf. Ferdinand, Peter. (2000). UK Policy towards China, in MIGUEL Santos Neves and Brian Bridges (Eds.) Europe, China and the Two SARs: Towards a New Era, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press LTD, 29-61. Morphet, Sally. (2000). British Foreign Policy and Human Rights: From low to high politics, in David P. Forsythe (Eds.) Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, United Nations University Press. Foot, Rosemary. (2000). Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China, Oxford University Press. Godement, Francois. & Regine, Serra. (2000). French Policy towards China: a Redefinition, in MIGUEL Santos Neves and Brian Bridges (Eds.) Europe, China and the Two SARs: Towards a New Era, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press LTD, 4-28. Hoslag, Jonathan. (2006). The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion, in European Foreign Affairs Review 11- 555-580. Kapur, Harish. (1986). China and the European Economic Community: The New Connection, Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publihsers (a member of the Kluwer Academic Publishers Group). MacDonald, Brian. (2000). Setting the Agenda for the Twenty-First Century: China, Hong Kong, Macau and the European Union, in in MIGUEL Santos Neves and Brian Bridges (Eds.) Europe, China and the Two SARs: Towards a New Era, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press LTD, 196-208. Maclean, Nicolas. (1995). Towards the Twenty-First Century: a View from the Private Sector, in Richard Grant (Eds.) The European Union and China: A European Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Meunier, Sophie. & Kalypso, Nicolaidis. (2005). The European Union as a Trade Power, in Hill and Michael Smith (Eds.) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press. Qian, Qichen. (2003). Waijiao Shiji (Ten Anecdotes in Diplomacy), Beijing: World Knowledge Press.

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Scott, Ian. (1989). Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, London: Hurst & Company. Shambaugh, David. (1996). China and Europe: 1949-1995, Contemporary China Institute, SOAS, University of London, Research Notes and Studies No.11. Smith, Michael E. (2004). Institutionalisation, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation, European Journal of International Relations, 10 (1), 95-136. Soetendorp, Ben. (1999). Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and Practice, London and New York: Longman. Taube, Markus. (2002). Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe, in Richard Louis Edmonds (Eds.) China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective, The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 2, Cambridge University Press. White, Brian. (2001). Understanding European Foreign Policy, Houndmills, Palgrave. Yahuda, Michael. (1998). Europe and China, in Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal and Wanandi (Eds.) Europe and the Asia Pacific, London and New York: Routledge, 183-193. Hong Kong: Britain‘s responsibility, Fabian research series 324, Fabian Society, London, January 1976.

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In: Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World Editor: George T. Overton, pp. 29-58

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Chapter 2

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, MULTIMODALITY AND THE WORLD-WIDE WEB Giuliana Garzone and Chiara Degano*

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1. STUDY DESIGN In recent times, Web-mediated communication has qualified as a powerful strategic resource in foreign policy. It is central to any country‘s effort to reach foreign audiences pervasively, also in areas of the world which – for various reasons – are otherwise difficult to access for Western actors. This is why an effective exploitation of web resources is crucial in so called ―public diplomacy‖, which is an extension of traditional diplomacy directly addressing foreign publics, i.e. foreign citizens, rather than their governments and ministries (cf. § 2. below). This chapter will look at the use of web-mediated multimodal resources in contemporary U.S. public diplomacy, on the basis of the analysis of a website, America.gov, produced and maintained by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, which is specifically devoted to public diplomacy and represents the main effort so far by the U.S. government to use Internet-mediated communication for public diplomacy purposes. In the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) America.gov is defined as ―the U.S. government‘s primary online source of information about the United States directed at foreign publics‖. It is managed by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IPP) of the Department, whose mission is ―to engage, inform and influence international audiences about U.S. policy and society to advance America's interest […] through the development of a variety of public diplomacy strategies, products and services‖ (1 FAM: 351.1). At the foot of each page of the website there is a short text that makes this clear:

*

While research for this study has been carried out jointly by the two authors, Giuliana Garzone wrote sections §1 to §3.2.2 and Chiara Deagano wrote sections § 3.3 to 4.

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This site delivers information about current U.S. foreign policy and about American life and culture. It is produced by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs.

Together with its companion website, USinfo.org, more specifically informative and encyclopaedic in approach, it offers ―foreign readers authoritative, timely, thorough, and balanced information about the United States, U.S. government policies and American society‖ (1 FAM: 351.2; 10 FAM: 331), which is given ―in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Russian, Spanish, and other languages as deemed necessary by the Department.‖ For the purposes of this analysis America.gov was monitored over a period of about ten months, from June 2008 to April 2009. In the discussion, three dates of access will be taken as conventional reference points, 22 June 2008, 25 February 2009, and 6 April 2009, considering them representative of three different stages in the history of web-mediated public diplomacy. Although for both websites in addition to the main English edition, there exist editions in five more languages – Spanish, French, Russian, Arabic, Chinese,1 which with English are the working languages at the UNO – with slightly different (and reduced) contents, here only the English version will be considered. The crucial questions our analysis will seek to answer concern the strategies enacted to exploit internet-mediated communication and its affordances for political purposes, and the functional effectiveness of the layout and the semiotic organization of the website, i.e. those aspects that materially condition the way users can explore the site, with pre-established inner navigation paths and external links leading to other sites. Last but not least, the role of language within the wider picture of multimodal web-mediated communication will be explored, looking in particular at the effectiveness of discursive practices. An element that will be given attention in connection with all these different aspects is the changes that the website has undergone in the early stages of Barack Obama‘s Presidency under the direction of the new Administration. The basic methodological framework of this study is in the area of critical discourse analysis, which provides instruments to identify and highlight the discursive – and often ideological – relevance of linguistic choices at all levels, including the microstructural one. The exploration of the use of hypermedia web-mediated resources will mainly rely on principles put forth in recent studies applying discourse analysis to multimodality, usually grouped under the denomination ―multimodal analysis‖ (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001, 1996/2006; O‘Halloran, 2004; LeVine & Scollon, 2004; Iedema 2003; Garzone 2007). Some useful tools will also be drawn from the sociological and political literature on public diplomacy (e.g. Leonard 2004; Blankey, Dale & Horn, 2008; Gilboa, 2008) and nation branding (Anholt & Hildreth, 2004; van Ham, 2008).

1

English, Spanish, French, Russian, Arabic and Chinese are the languages in which also all documents are published by the UNO and ancillary international organizations. On America.gov, occasionally single pages or texts are offered in translation into another language, depending on the topic dealt with.

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2. DEFINING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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As the activity of public diplomacy (PD) is by definition far-reaching and complex, it comes as no surprise that different definitions of it should have been given by various analysts, with variable degrees of breadth and generalization. In the broadest possible terms, public diplomacy can be seen to include the complex of a country‘s efforts – deliberate or inadvertent – of communication by public, private and social organizations to reach citizens of foreign countries, both abroad and within one‘s borders (as is the case – for instance – with European countries‘ communication programmes aimed at the ever larger communities of migrants they host).2 But the term ―public diplomacy‖ is more often associated with global information activities aimed specifically at objectives in foreign policy, and in particular those of the U.S. government, and this is not surprising because it is in connection with the U.S. that the term originally emerged. Although its ―prehistory‖ has been traced back to January 1856 (Cul, 2006), when an editorialist in The Times of London advocated ―public diplomacy‖ in President Franklin Pierce‘s foreign policy, essentially meaning ―open diplomacy‖, 3 the contemporary use of this expression to refer to the realm of international information and message dissemination is a product of American activity in the central years of the Cold War. It was in 1965 that the term was first used in its current meaning by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, when the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy was established.4 The definition that was given then in one of the earlier brochures of the Edward R. Murrow Centre is so comprehensive that it is still topical today: Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of intercultural communications. (http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm)

While this definition is general enough as to apply to campaigns enacted in their international policies by all countries alike, public diplomacy has often been defined with specific reference to the U.S., whose activities of this type seem to qualify as ―public diplomacy‖ par excellence. For instance, according to a definition contained in a report of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the American Academy of Diplomacy (2008: 24-25) the aim of public diplomacy is:

2

This definition, which has no claim to comprehensiveness, is broadly based on texts published on the website of FERPI, the Italian federation for public relations (www.ferpi.it). Unless otherwise specified, all websites referred to in this work were last accessed on 6 April 2009. 3 According to Cull, in the U.S. the expression was first used in 1871 by The New York Times, and then over and over again during the Great War, and in the inter-war years, always with the meaning of ―open diplomacy‖. 4 This information is contained in a Library of Congress study of U.S. international and cultural programs and activities prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Cf. http://www.public diplomacy .org/1.htm.

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Giuliana Garzone and Chiara Degano To understand, inform, engage and influence global audiences, reaching beyond foreign governments to promote greater appreciation and understanding of U.S. society, culture, institutions, values and policies.

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2.1. Public Diplomacy, Public Relations and Place Branding In some cases public diplomacy has been interpreted simply as an extension of traditional diplomacy, with only a variation in the interlocutors addressed. This is Michael McClellan‘s (2004) position, which sees it as a new focus of traditional diplomacy after the merger in 1999 of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State (USIA), leading to a unique form of diplomacy which has since been adopted by other foreign ministries and by the public relations industry in general. According to McClelland it is important to distinguish it both from propaganda and from Public Relations (PR). He conventionally adopts a definition of propaganda as ―the systematic propagation of a doctrine or cause or of information reflecting the views and interests of those advocating such a doctrine or cause‖ (cf. Bartelby.com/American Heritage Dictionary: ad vocem). Propaganda at its worst forces its messages on an audience, often by repetition and slogans, demonizes elements of the outside world, simplifies complex issues, often misrepresents the truth or deliberately lies (Brown, 2002). As concerns PR, which in the past was seen as confined to actors different from governments, in more recent times some authors have laid emphasis on its similarities with public diplomacy in terms of objectives and tools (cf. Wilcox, Ault &Agee 1992: 409410; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). In addition to PR, PD shares some aspects with some other communication activities, from which, however, it differs in many important respects. One of them is place branding and, more specifically, nation branding, both of which in line of principle are aimed at promoting a country‘s image mainly for commercial reasons, in particular for tourist promotion (as a development of traditional ―destination marketing‖). But in many cases they actually have political implications, offering interesting examples of how ―the presumed objectivity of organisational discourse and marketing communication may be made to serve a clearly ideological agenda‖ (De Michelis, 2007: 402). Thus if in theory nation branding is an effort to use strategies developed in the commercial sector to manage the soft power of a geographical location, through what van Ham describes as ―the mediagenic creation of emotional ties between the citizen-cumconsumer and the (place) brand‖ (van Ham, 2008: 126-127; 134), in actual fact its political implications are paramount. A meaningful example is that of the campaigns enacted by Britain – one of the first few countries engaging in fully-fledged nation branding activities. Starting from the mid-1990s, in the wake of the ―Cool Britannia‖ communication effort, it enacted the ―Branding Britain‖ and ―UKOK‖ campaigns, embodied in Mark Leonard‘s pamphlet Britain™: Renewing Our Identity (1997), which has been shown to be more in the service of political purposes rather than of purely marketing and promotional objectives (cf. De Michelis, 2007), in a context where according to experts states failing to establish ―relevant brand equity‖ will not be able to successfully compete economically and politically in the new world system (cf. van Ham, 2002: 52).

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Public diplomacy and place branding are akin in that they both combine foreign policy goals with internal soft-power strategies and objectives. For both of them, a key element is to build personal and institutional relationships and dialogue with foreign audiences by focusing on values. This sets them apart from classical diplomacy, which primarily deals with issues (van Ham, 2008: 135).5 Trying to identify the material elements that nation branding and public diplomacy have in common, Gilboa (2008: 68) lists image and symbol management, relationship building and extensive use of mass media, while the differences include goals and outcomes (i.e. increased sales versus foreign policy), means, types of communication, management, language and culture. In particular, the specific focus of advertising contrasts with the complexity and multifacetedness of the messages handled by public diplomacy.

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2.2. Communication in Public Diplomacy: Recent Developments In the aftermath of 9/11 in the U.S. it appeared urgent and necessary to step up public diplomacy efforts, which had not been seen as a priority for the country since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (Beehener, 2005), with a view to increasing international understanding of the U.S.‘s role on the world scene and garnering support from foreign publics. This was the rationale underlying the passing of the Freedom of Promotion Act 2002, which among other things greatly increased the amount of resources set aside for public diplomacy. The hope was that this would help counteract diffuse anti-American sentiments (e.g. Hollander, 2002), which had had their extreme expression in the terrorist attacks, and quite unexpectedly had been fuelled rather than quelled by the attacks themselves, above all in certain areas of the globe (e.g. in Islamic Middle Eastern countries). There is wide agreement that this increased effort gave disappointing results, as has been repeatedly pointed out in the more than 30 reports issued since then by government and nongovernmental organizations,6 highlighting the many shortcomings of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, which include some structural and organizational aspects, e.g. inadequate leadership, lack of personnel, insufficient language skills, insufficient concentration on actual strategic communication activities (cf. U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2008), lack of integration between national strategy and doctrine, inability to use modern communications tactics, etc. Other shortcomings are of a strategic nature and include the inability to overcome the self-centredness of the messages conveyed, which mainly rely on exquisitely American cultural categories, and the incapacity to open a dialogue with foreign audiences and foreign cultures (cf., among others, Zaharna, 2004; Peterson et al. 2002). These drawbacks are all the more serious in a context characterised in many countries by a degree of unpopularity of U.S. foreign policies and critical perceptions of American unilateralism. 5

The close connection between public diplomacy and nation branding is testified by the existence of an association which studies these two areas together, the Association for Place Branding & Public Diplomacy (http://www. nationbranding. de/site_english/publicdiplomacy.php), and a journal called Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, edited by Simon Anholt (published by Palgrave). 6 This emerges from a Heritage Foundation report issued in November 2008 (Blankely, Dale & Horn, 2008), which points out that these reports have highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Bush Administration‘s public diplomacy effort, pointing at its shortcomings.

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More thought given to this order of problems has led among other things to changes in the ways public diplomacy handles its activities and tasks, changes that were mainly triggered by revolutions in international relations due to a reshaped international order and to the spread of new communication technologies (Gilboa 2008: 58). These changes have been so extensive that the introduction of the term ―New Public Diplomacy‖ has been proposed (cfr. Vickers 2004). However, other authors think this renaming is pointless and confusing (Gilboa 2008: 58), and are rather in favour of an approach focusing on the effects of the revolutions in international relations and in the communication technologies deployed in public diplomacy. With respect to this, Gilboa (ibidem) relies on Potter (2002-2003) to identify four main areas of change:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

the increased importance of public opinion; the rise of more intrusive and global media; increased global transparency; the rise of a global culture leading to a reflexive desire to protect cultural diversity.

It is interesting to note that the first three areas are strictly interrelated and interdependent, with the rise of new global media which have been the driving force of change and contributed to turning communication into a planetary affair, while the fourth area, focusing on the need to preserve identity and diversity in an ever more globalized world, is the result of a reaction to the processes included in the previous three areas. In particular, there are reasons to believe that amongst the new media, the Internet is probably the main variable. Not only has it made swift and widespread communication possible within national borders and overseas, but it has also brought elements of interactivity within such a communication process. As pointed out by Lee (2007), thanks to the Internet ―previously invisible publics, such as multinational corporations, transnational NGOs, and even individual citizens‖ have emerged on the world diplomatic scene as active participants in the policy making process, having the chance to find relevant information on the web and to act on its basis, through advocacy activities which have potentially global resonance (cf. Nye 1990). The use of the Internet is part of those Public Diplomacy practices that Cull (2008: 34) calls ―international news broadcasting‖,7 which comprises attempts ―to manage the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television, and the Internet to engage with foreign publics‖. In actual fact in recent times the U.S. has also deployed other new broadcasting resources, radio and TV stations: cases in point are Radio Sawa, an Arabiclanguage radio station with studios in Washington DC8 and Dubai, and the al-Hurra (―the free one‖) TV station, launched in February 2004 (cf. Beehner, 2005). But Internet-based activities are certainly the most meaningful, forming part of what has been described as ―strategic communication‖, as opposed to traditional public diplomacy which aims to ―foster understanding of the United States and its policies through traditional ways such as exchanges, cultural programs, publications, interviews and speeches.‖ (W. 7

The other four practices of public diplomacy categorized by Cull (2008: 32-34) are listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy and exchange diplomacy. 8 It is important to note that Voice Of America English has mostly been silenced in the Middle East and Voice Of America Arabic has lost its voice altogether after Radio Sawa was created in 2002, which means that in practice Radio Sawa has to a large extent replaced VOA. This indicates a change in public diplomacy broadcasting in the region. Cf. Kassman 2007.

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Pincus, Washington Post, 12.01.2009). Its affordances make it possible to establish a relationship with foreign audiences which is not only more far-reaching than that made possible by any other medium, but also more direct and personal. And there are reasons to believe that the new Administration has started to give serious attention to the overhaul of U.S. strategic communication relying on HCME (Hypermedia Computer Mediated Environment: cf. Hoffman & Novak, 1995), also in line with the new President‘s electoral program. In the next section issues connected with the use of Web-mediated resources in public diplomacy will be discussed on the basis of the analysis of the website chosen as a case study, America.gov.

3. A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COMMUNICATION: AMERICA.GOV

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On the America.gov website, the overall structural design and its underlying concept, as well as the general layout of the page and the graphic interface have been virtually unchanged in the last few years, but the new Administration has recently made important modifications in the categorization and organization of information on the website, as is explained on the page itself in the illustrative screenshot accessible from the homepage (hyperlink: Checkout America.gov new Enhanced Design) in the first week of April 2009 (cf. Figure 1).

Figure 1. Explanation of changes in website layout (accessed 06/04/2009).

First and foremost among these changes is the new slogan accompanying the American eagle logo in the masthead appearing as site ID in the upper lefthand corner of the page. It used to be ―Telling America’s story‖, in line with President Bush‘s comment on U.S. perception by foreign publics: ―We have to do a better job of telling our story‖ (cf. Zaharna 2004: 133; emphasis added), and has now been changed into ―Engaging the world‖ which,

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according to the justification provided, ―better explains our mission‖. Conceptually, the new slogan involves two main changes. The first is the shift from narrative to dialogue, i.e. from a one-way form of communication addressed to foreign audiences to a two-way form of communication having the world as interlocutor, in line with the suggestions of many analysts (e.g. Council on Foreign Relations 2002; Riordan 2004; Cowan 2008). The second change is that now America is not the centre of interest any more, as a more dialogic approach is adopted in the new slogan where the U.S. – although being the unexpressed subject of the nominal verb form engaging – is not overtly encoded, while its foreign interlocutors are (―the world‖).

3.1. Reorganization of Thematic Categories At least as important is the change in the thematic categories contained in the main menu bar at the top of the page, (circled in Figure 2 below) which has the effect of reorganizing the map of the website, modifying the distribution of information and materials (although to date the materials have been renewed only partially).9

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Figure 2. America.gov‘s main menu bar.

While the three less prominent links on the right – World Regions, Multimedia and Publications – have remained unchanged, the five main items – Foreign Policy, U.S. Politics, American Life, Democracy and Health & Science – have been reduced to four – American Life, Economy, Global Challenges and International Relations – redistributing content and adding new labels. In the explanatory screenshot (cf. Figure 1 above) this is illustrated as follows: Streamlined navigation: the top level navigation on the site will display four broad thematic categories, American Life, International Relations, Economy, Global Challenges – each with drop-down menus linking to topical pages. Existing links will be redirected to new content as necessary.

This new categorization is combined with the redistribution and, occasionally, the renaming of the sub-categories. The differences between the two arrangements are synthesised in the Table below:

9

It is to be noted that so far these changes have involved only the English edition of the website, while the foreignlanguage editions are essentially unchanged.

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Table 1. Comparison of thematic categories and sub-categories in main menu bar February 2009 – April 2009 (the World Regions, Multimedia and Publications categories are not included as they have remained unchanged). Old version (February 2009) Foreign policy Economics and Trade American Giving Peace and Security U.S. politics U.S. Government American Life The Arts Diversity Education Sports Democracy

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Science and health

Democracy around the World Human Rights Press Freedom Environment Global Heating Science and Technology

New version (April 2009) American Life Education and Youth People and Places U.S. Government Economy

Business and Trade

Global Challenges

Democracy & Human Rights Development Energy and Environment Science and Technology

International Relations

Peace and Security

As can be seen from Table 1, in the main menu bar American Life now features in the first position, while it previously came after Foreign Policy and U.S. Politics, thus marking an upgrade of social and cultural aspects over institutional ones, as suggested also by the fact that it now includes the U.S. Government subsection – originally one of the six main thematic categories – while the U.S. Politics sub-category has been suppressed altogether. Other subcategories eliminated are The Arts and Sports. In the second position we now find Economics, previously merely a sub-category of Foreign Policy (denominated Economics and Trade), which has only one sub-directory entitled Business and Trade, maintaining the reference to trade, a fact that is not surprising for a country whose view of international relations has always given pride of place to commerce since the times of Thomas Jefferson, who ranked it only second in American priorities when, in his inaugural address, he called for ―peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none‖ (Anholt & Hildreth 2006: 44). The upgrading of Economics is not surprising at a time of serious economic crisis. Third comes the area of Global Challenges, which did not appear in the old version. It includes four sub-categories, Democracy & Human Rights, Development, Energy and Environment, Science and Technology, all already present in the previous version of the website, but included in other thematic categories, namely Democracy and Science and Health, both now downgraded to sub-categories under Global Challenges. Overall, the comparison between the two versions of the main menu seems to highlight a shift in perspective, from the outward-inwards focus of the original version (starting with foreign policy, then zooming in on U.S. politics, American life and democracy, and then opening up again to world regions) to a widening scope, focusing on the American society first and then moving on to consider international relations alongside the progression American Life, Economy, Global Challenges, International Relations.

3.1.1. Slogans and catchphrases Quite interestingly, all sub-categories are accompanied by a catchphrase, illustrating the activities that represent the main focus of each of them. Catchphrases already appeared in the Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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previous version of the website, but in the new version also the main thematic categories have been assigned a slogan in the form of a complete general statement; here is the complete list, with main categories in boldface and sub-categories in italics: American Life: Embracing diverse ideas, cultures and religions strengthens societies and protects individual freedoms. - Education & Youth: Driving tomorrow‘s achievements. - People & Places: Offering a place to everyone. - U.S. Government: A resilient balance of institutions. Economics: Strong markets, entrepreneurship and trade promote global prosperity. - Business & Trade: Achieving growth through open markets. Global Challenges. The world‘s nations meet 21st-century challenges to improve the human condition. - Democracy: Citizens with a voice. - Development: Strengthening community through generosity. - Energy & Environment: Protecting our natural resources. - Science & Technology: Seeking and sharing knowledge.

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International Relations. Responsible nations work independently and in partnership to promote international security and stability. - Peace and Security: Creating a more stable world. In this way, the slogans accompanying the thematic categories ostensibly state the values that underlie U.S.‘s policy in the different areas and the country‘s real intentions, but refrain from any direct or indirect reference to the United States itself. This represents a radical shift from the discursive attitude adopted in the previous stage of the public diplomacy effort when its main purpose was formulated as ―Telling America‘s story‖. In this respect a look at the main actors in the four sentences that accompany the titles of the main thematic categories is very meaningful. In the first sentence, Embracing diverse ideas, cultures and religions strengthens societies and protects individual freedoms, the grammatical subject (and Theme) is a nominal form of the verb, i.e. an action whose agent is not specified, thus making the statement absolutely general, a sort of declaration of intents, describing the behaviour nations ideally ought to have. In the second sentence, Strong markets, entrepreneurship and trade promote global prosperity, the subject/Theme consists in abstract inanimate objects, again suppressing agency and producing an abstract statement, formulating a general law of economics. The third and fourth statements – The world’s nations meet 21st-century challenges to improve the human condition and Responsible nations work independently and in partnership to promote international security and stability – have ―nations‖ (with no further specification) as subjects/Themes and have the form of a moral prescription. In particular, the fourth statement is even more evidently ethical, as the adjective ―responsible‖ takes on a conditional value (if nations are responsible, they work …). Thus in these four slogans the U.S. is not even mentioned, as the focus shifts towards the global political and economic scene. It can also be noticed that the absolutely general formulation of the slogans and catchphrases, expressing values on which virtually everyone would agree, obviously aims

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at establishing preliminary objects of agreement (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/2001: 69-104) with foreign audiences the world over, relying on hopefully sharable notions and values, thus serving a typically rhetorical function. Shared values can help establish a contact and make communication with the foreign user possible. A further function of these slogans is obviously that of offering the addressee a key for an accurate general interpretation of the information, notions and values put forth on the website. To conclude this brief analysis of the main menu of America.gov, one final observation: it is noteworthy that the first changes brought to the website by the new Administration do affect its construction, rather than its contents, most of which are in line with the past, many items having actually been retained unaltered. In the next section, the analysis will concentrate specifically on the homepage of the website, which is important as it is the point of access and the centre of the hypertextual system constituting the website.

3.2. The America.gov Homepage Useful tools to be employed in the analysis of the America.gov homepage can be found in Mark Leonard‘s authoritative conceptualization of public diplomacy (Leonard 2002: 10-12). The British scholar sees it as a highly complex process of delivering messages played out in three spheres – Political/Military, Economic, Societal/Cultural – and including three main dimensions, each operating according to a different time scale: 

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



a reactive dimension: reacting to news events as they occur in a way that tallies with a country‘s strategic goals (hours and days time-scale); a proactive dimension: proactively creating a news agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions (weeks and months); a relationship-building dimension: building long-term relationships with populations overseas to win recognition of our values and assets and to learn from theirs (years).

The America.gov website has contents falling under each of these headings, being poised between topical issues and updates spanning over a more or less long time period (the first two dimensions) on the one hand, and general, longer-lived information on the other hand (the third dimension). As in other websites, also in America.gov the homepage has a critical importance being the first element the user gets access to and determines the decision of whether to visit the website or not (cf. Crowston & Williams 1997; Askehave/Ellerup Nielsen 2005). In this respect, it performs two distinct functions. Its first function is one of elicitation of interest and is fulfilled through two different components, a logical / rational one, i.e. introducing ―the user to the general content of the site by presenting ‗informative‘ tables of contents‖, and a connotative / emotional one, ―providing ‗enticing‘ text bits‖ that may lure the potential visitor (cf. Askehave/Ellerup Nielsen 2005: 2). Its second function is more technical, and consists in making the adequate tools and links available to physically access the website and explore it.

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Similarly to other website homepages, the America.gov homepage presents a structure which vaguely resembles the cover page of a daily newspaper, a familiar format for any user. This resemblance in itself suggests the idea of a communicative instrument which can offer access both to hard news, and to feature articles and editorials. The typical partition of the screen into three columns fits perfectly the needs of webwriting which, ideally, should avoid imposing linear reading, which is difficult and tiring in the computer-mediated environment.

Figure 3. The America.gov homepage (03/04/2009).

Each of the headlines – in actual fact hyperlinks – contained in the various columns is accompanied by three/four-line lexias (i.e. graphically separated blocks of text of the width of a column) 10 providing a short read on the actual content of the main text of the ―article‖ located at a deeper level within the website and accessible through the link itself, in the same 10

The word lexia was introduced into English by Landow (1992/1997: 34) to translate Roland Barthes‘ term lexie (1970), the meaning of which broadly corresponds to that of Derrida‘s morceaux (1972).

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way as headlines on the cover page of a newspaper offer hints to the articles published inside, being conceptually comparable to the summit of a typically inverted-pyramid structure.11 This is why only a limited quantity of text in the form of short lexias is displayed on the homepage, and the navigation mode, i.e. the display of links enabling the user to access the different sections of the website, prevails over the reading mode, i.e. the publication of complete texts, which are instead embedded in the deeper levels of the hypertext.

3.2.1. The “cover” stories As can be seen in Figure 3, in its upper section – broadly the size of the screen – the home page (a scrolling page) has the cover story that takes up the first column in all its height. In actual fact, it does not consist of only one, but of three main stories that alternate, appearing and disappearing in succession, each accompanied by a large photograph. On any single day, at least one of these three cover stories gives access to a feature which, although being topical, is of general interest and has a longer shelf-life, being set in Leonard‘s ―proactive‖ dimension (cf. § 3.2. above). In the first few days of April 2009, for instance, the ―long-lasting‖ cover story regarded the energy problem in American cities:

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Cities, States Change Country’s Energy Equation. U.S. cities and states addressed energy security and climate change more boldly than the federal government did. But with the president committed to energy efficiency and renewable energy, the country will move more aggressively toward a new energy future as a whole.

It is evident here that an effort is being made to draw the user‘s attention to a problem that has been detrimental to the U.S.‘s image abroad, attracting severe criticism to it for not joining the Kyoto protocol, in order to show that such an environmentally-indifferent reputation is not supported by facts any more and can be disproved: a brave attempt if it is true that – as many critics have pointed out – no public diplomacy effort can hope to restore the image of a country if its foreign politics heads in the opposite direction. The text above first of all resorts to an implicit dissociation (van Rees, 2005) to suggest that the limited assumption of responsibilities in energy-and-climate issues often attributed internationally to the U.S. regards only the federal government and not the other (smaller) institutional actors involved, whose behavior in this respect is described as addressing energy security and climate change ―more boldly‖: and ―boldly‖ is a highly evaluative adverb. This premise lays the ground for the statement that follows, starting with counterfactual ―but‖ (―But with the president committed to energy efficiency and renewable energy, the country will move more aggressively toward a new energy future as a whole‖), in which the taking of office of the 11

The inverted pyramid, at present the most widely used method of reporting news in spite of its still being under certain aspects controversial, puts the most newsworthy information at the top, sometimes with a short lead or preview of the article published on the cover page, and the remaining information follows in instalments (van Dijk 1988) on the inside pages of the newspaper in order of importance, with the least important in the final part of the article. There is still controversy on when this type of information organization originated, although there is agreement that the invention of the telegraph had a crucial role (Crichton, 1993: 57-59; Folkerts & Teeter, 1994: 205). According to some American journalism textbooks (e.g. Rogers, 1986: 30; Dominick, 1990: 92), it came into use during the Civil War. According to others like journalism historian David T. Z. Mindich, it was first used after Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in April 1865 (cf. Scanlan, 2003); his Secretary of War and Civil War censor, Edwin M. Stanton with his "terse, impersonal" style led to the popularization and dissemination of the inverted-pyramid structure and summary news leads across the front pages of American newspapers.

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new president is presented as a break with the past leading to a ―new‖ energy future; and recourse to the adverb ―aggressively‖ is symmetrical to the ―boldly‖ used previously, with a reinforcing effect. This message is confirmed and reinforced by the materials to which the user is directed by the link (or, better, the shortcut) in the title of this cover story‘s preview. Such materials were originally designed to be accessed mainly from the main menu bar, focusing on the experience of heavily polluted industrial cities now striving to go green and the emergence of new ―green‖ jobs in former industrial areas (―From Rustbelt to Greenbelt‖. This page will be analysed more in depth at a subsequent stage of this discussion - cf. § 3.3.2) The other two cover stories, of a typically ―reactive‖ kind, are updated more frequently (daily or every two or three days) as they report on current affairs, looking at them from the viewpoint of the United States. For example, on April 4th one story – ―U.S., France converge and increase odds for peace‖ – regarded Obama‘s encounters with various European leaders before the G20 meeting and the other reported his declarations at a press conference in Strasbourg before the NATO summit: U.S., France Converge and Increase Odds for Peace. President Obama meets with French President Sarkozy, saying that prospects for global peace and prosperity are stronger when the United States and France act together. President Nicolas Sarkozy says, "There is a total identity of views between us, convergence of views."

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Obama Brings Town Hall Meeting to Europe. ―America is changing, but it cannot be America alone that changes,‖ Obama told thousands of local residents who packed the Rhenus Sports Arena in Strasbourg, France, for an April 3 town hall meeting. ―Together, we must forge common solutions to our common problems.‖

In both cases the attention is centered on international relations, the main actor being President Obama. The focus is on collaboration and convergence: out of a total of only 99 words making up the two previews, fifteen (convergence, act together, total identity of views, convergence of views, common solutions, common problems) belong to the semantic field of collaboration. The texts to which both previews give access have the structure and organization of news articles, with a headline of their own (respectively ―United States, Europeans Share a Convergence of Views‖ and ―Obama Seeks Renewed Trans-Atlantic Ties‖), excerpts from interviews/remarks and relevant commentary. Verbatim transcripts of original remarks are also made available through a hyperlink. In contrast with the reputation of selfishness and self-centeredness often attributed to the U.S., the notions put forth and the language used to express them in these two cover stories and accompanying materials constructs an image of the President as seriously concerned with convergence, collaboration and alliance with European countries. By proposing three alternating cover stories rather than one, the website manages not only to provide updates, elucidating America‘s position and its perception of its role and of that of other actors in current affairs, but also to convey messages in the proactive dimension, reinforcing the core values inherent in the messages. In the second column the section entitled In the headlines, contains newslines on current affairs (e.g. on 06.04.2009: ―G20 acts on economic recovery‖ and ―Obama condemns missile

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launch‖), as well as a link to Latest listings, i.e. the news of the day. These lead to texts which are comparable in structure and content to news articles, being again ―reactive‖ in kind. On the contrary the other headlines and preview texts in this column mostly lead to features having more general relevance (and an ―extended shelf life‖), often through shortcuts to lower layers of the website (also accessible from the main menu bar).

3.2.2. Other homepage contents The third column is taken up by comments and forward looking announcements, mainly metatextual in kind. For instance, on 06/04/2009 the first of them was about America.gov‘s renewed design (Checkout America.gov new Enhanced Design), the second one introduced to the America.gov blog and the third announced a webcast: Coming up soon. The upper section of the page has its bottom line delimited by a box framed in navy blue running across its full width (cf. Figure 3 above), which contains alternating headlines accompanied by relevant short leads giving access to features set in the inner layers of the website (e.g. ―G20 countries seek calmer waters‖, ―Being Muslim in America‖, etc.). In the lower part of the page there are links to texts on U.S. foreign policy organized in geographical areas, as well as links to basic information about U.S. Embassies in the world and travel and visa, as well as an interactive quiz. It is to be noted that overall the layout just described does not follow the most widely used conventions for content distribution in the columns of web pages, which usually have the main text in the middle column, navigation info in the left column, additional reading connected to the main text in the right column (Nielsen, 2000). Looking at the homepage as a whole it can be stated that in terms of its actual contents and of the paths to which it provides access it does offer a mix of elements belonging to all three dimension of public diplomacy, reactive, proactive and relationship-building, although not in equal proportions, as there is a prevalence of attention given to current affairs and updates (the reactive dimension) which – as shall be seen in the next section – are much less prominent, if not mostly absent, in many of the pages in the inner layers of the website, and in particular those accessible from the main menu bar. This explains why occasionally, when problems of a more general nature are at issue, on the homepage there appear shortcuts leading to sections originally designed to be accessed from the main bar menu (cf. the link ―Cities, States Change Country‘s Energy Equation‖).

3.3. Looking Inside the Website The analysis of the general organization of the website will be completed with some general considerations concerning its inner layers. Of course, by definition a website is a hugely complex and greatly unstable artefact, so an accurate in-depth analysis is virtually impossible. However, some general considerations can be made about the selection and organization of contents, also from the viewpoint of the use of the different types of semiotic resources and from that of the deployment of discursive practices in the texts, also making a comparison with previous versions of the website along these variables. The layout of the pages accessible through the main menu bar is less complex than that of the homepage (cf. Figure 4 below).

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Figure 4. Layout of a level-2 page introducing one of the main thematic categories (accessed

08/04/2009).

The main pages of the various subcategories are characterized by an intensive use of visual resources. Some of them have a screen-wide picture accompanied by links or directly incorporating videos or photo galleries (cf. Figure 5 below); some others have a large box taking up half the screen with pictures and headlines of features alternating (e.g. for Science and Technology: Infectious Disease Surveillance; Mars: Exploring the Red Planet; and Disaster Early Warning Systems); and yet others have a photo gallery, consisting of a series of pictures and accompanying texts that can be shuffled manually (e.g. Greensburg, Kansas, Rises from Rubble, about reconstruction after a tornado in the Economics and Business section).

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Figure 5. Layout of level-3 page under the People and Places sub-category (accessed 06/04/2009).

On the whole, all these resources tend to focus on subjects of general interest rather than topical issues, although some of the features offered may be related to current affairs (e.g. information on the composition of Obama‘s Cabinet consisting of the members‘ photographs laid out on the page, or features related to political events like the NATO summit or the G20 Conference), but the news of the day is given relatively less attention and tends to be dealt with primarily on the homepage or in RSS Feeds. This is also the result of the recent improvements brought to the website by the new Administration, as illustrated in the explanatory screenshot Checkout America.gov new Enhanced Design (cf. Figure 1 above): New Features: the site will debut 28 new features that combine articles, photo galleries, videos, podcasts, and other multimedia elements in a focused, visually appealing format. Features are designed to have an extended shelf life, making content available for multiple purposes (emphasis added).

It is interesting to note that changes are indicated to include not only the addition of new features, but also a design conferring ―extended shelf life‖ on them, which reveals the desire to make attention to current affairs less prominent, enhancing the more general informative function of the website, which to date has been more specifically performed by InfoUS.org, the other public diplomacy website maintained by the State Department, which takes a more specifically informative approach. The explanatory text also underlines the ample recourse that is now made to different types of media and modes, which in actual fact include photos, pictures, interactive maps and other graphic aids, podcasts, audioclips and videos. For instance, as many as 18 videos are available in the American Life section, and 17 in the Global Challenge section.

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This extensive reliance on non-textual, non-verbal communication makes the website more palatable for those cultures that are characterized by non-linear thought patterns, in a context in which U.S. public diplomacy has been criticized for sticking to the rigidly linear thought pattern typical of American culture (Zaharna, 2004: 236), thus failing to communicate effectively with many foreign publics, in particular in the Middle and Far East.

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3.3.1. Examining the economics section In order to illustrate these characteristics, attention will now be focused on the examination of a single section of the website taken as a representative example, the section dealing with the economy (Economics) which – as already pointed out – has been upgraded to main thematic category from a sub-category under the Foreign Relations heading. The underlying reasons for this more prominent position are quite obvious. If terrorism remains in the background of American concerns, the real urgency is now represented by the economic crisis, which having its epicentre in the U.S. is a particularly sensitive issue, posing several threats to the perception of the country abroad. Although it has been observed that paradoxically the partial loss of its grandeur might earn the U.S. some of the sympathy usually accorded to those who are striving to achieve greatness, only to gradually vanish a while after success has been attained (Anholt & Hildreth, 2004: 159), it is undeniable that all in all the crisis may cast an unfavourable light on the U.S.‘s image, as its superpower status relies on its economic as much as on its military superiority. 3.3.2. Non-textual modal resources Among the pages included in the economic section of the website, that entitled ―Rustbelt to greenbelt‖ – as already pointed out (cf. § 3.2.1) –, is accessible not only from the main menu bar, but also from the homepage through a shortcut from one of the three cover stories (06/04/2009). It is noteworthy that in the overall construction of this page – as in many other pages in the deeper layers of the website – there is greater reliance on non-textual modal resources, first and foremost the visual component which has an important role. Figure 6 shows an impressive full-screen picture of an industrial landscape with smoking chimneys (in black and white) which gradually dissolves to give way to a brightly coloured modern city landscape where skyscrapers seem to be in harmony with natural elements such as a river and green areas. This graphic arrangement relies on well established Western conventions 12 for the semiotic organization of space in images (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen 1996/2006: 179-185), according to which the elements placed on the left are presented as ―given‖, i.e. ―as something the viewer or reader already knows, as a familiar and agreed departure point for the message‖, and the elements placed on the left are presented as ―new‖, i.e. as something not yet known (van Leeuwen & Jewitt 2001). Here, the polluted industrial scene of the past, depicted on the left, is presented as given/old information, while the picture of an agreeable modern city on the right, i.e. dealt with as ―new information‖, stands for the the present and the future. The basic message is made explicit in the headline, ―Rust belt to green belt‖, and in the caption accompanying the picture:

12

This convention regards in general all societies using Roman script, which is written and read from right to left and from top to bottom (cf. Kress & van Leewen, 1996: 179-185).

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Figure 6. ―Rustbelt to greenbelt‖ page.

It‘s not just progressive American cities that are on the environmental bandwagon. Industrial cities also are cleaning up and finding it pays

Altogether these elements tell of the transformation from an economy indifferent to environment preservation, to a new idea of the economy as intent on pursuing sustainable growth, which exactly from this change will get new strength. This is accompanied by a lengthy text (appearing in the lower part of the scroll page), where a case study of U.S. cities‘ ―green‖ commitment is presented focusing on Pittsburgh (―From Blue Collar to Green Collar‖) and by other texts regarding environmental issues (―Creation of Green Jobs Is Worthy but Elusive Goal‖, ―U.S. Community Colleges Are Ready to Train Green Work Force‖). But the most prominent feature is a video entitled ―Rust to renewal‖, presenting Pittsburgh as ―a leader in the ‗New Energy‘ economy with ‗green‘ jobs and innovations in alternative energy technology‖. An analysis of the soundtrack of the video, which consists of interviews with experts from universities and industries, tells the story of Pittsburgh‘s difficult reconversion and cleanup, led by innovative technologies, and combines it with a

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series of general considerations about the U.S.. The video opens with the declaration that: ―America is a country that can learn from its mistakes … There is an attitude that you can renew yourself, you can do something new and you are not limited by the past…‖, and closes with even more positive statements: ―As a country we are dedicated to a continuous renewal … America is a crucial point right now in our history … We are willing and capable of remaking ourselves when we realize that the opportunities are there‖. The recognition of past mistakes, which might cast a negative light on Brand America, is thus softened by declarations of renewal, made more credible by the taking of office of a new President and a new Administration. This discursive strategy is recurrent also in other sections of the website, and has been evidently calculated for foreign audiences, in the obvious attempt to make a fresh start, relying on the implicit association with the previous Administration of many unpopular actions taken by the U.S. in foreign policy, a move made easier by the actual profound political differences between Bush and Obama, in terms not only of political positions, but also of personal style.

3.3.3. Economics, entrepreneurship and personalization The Rustbelt to Greenbelt story is one of four main stories, all of which at present focus on environment-related issues, one dealing with wind energy, another with ―green‖ business and the third one with ―green‖ entrepreneurship. In actual fact the theme of entrepreneurship, which was devoted a whole set of stories in the previous version of the website, seems to play a less prominent role in the new version, where only one of the original stories has been maintained. It is a blog entitled Chronicles of a Startup which, in tune with the website‘s new style, is centred on the story of a young Afro-American entrepreneur (whose ethnic origins would go unnoticed without the young man‘s photograph), who founded a start-up technology company after working in IT and for the U.S. Army, as the caption informs. In this case the most striking feature is the headline: Chronicles of a start-up. Triumphs and tribulations of an unusual business venture. Apart from epical echoes attached to the word ―chronicles‖, the second level of the headline presents the story as exemplary, telling of ―difficulties that have to be overcome before reaching success‖, with reminiscence of 19th century rags-to-riches novels. In this blog, which has been running since December 2008 with a discrete number of postings by editorial staff and only few comments, messages about the U.S. can be read between the lines of personal narratives. First of all, the story conveys a message of racial equality, stemming from the fact that an Afro-American (portrayed in the photograph in traditional African dress) could fulfil his potential in the U.S., thanks to his entrepreneurial spirit and an education at Pennsylvania State University. Secondly, it reinforces the perception of the U.S. as the ultimate in innovation and technology (the ‗hero‘ does not run an ethnic restaurant, but an IT company). Finally, there is a message about U.S. values, as represented in the following extract: The best advice anyone will give you isn't on what company to build, how to build it, whom first to hire, where to locate or how much money to secure before a launch. Rather, the best advice is about how to prepare for the long mental and physical journey ahead when you are about to start a new business.

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Technicalities about the requisites necessary to start up a business, set forth in the first sentence, are dismissed as secondary to the development of personal qualities, which is rendered through the metaphor of the journey, a particularly typical American topos. Such a view seems also attuned with the discourse of the American dream, where success can be achieved thanks to personal qualities and the ability to seize opportunity. Among these qualities there is perseverance: My colleagues and I have to focus on executing our plans and ignoring the obstacles we face, day after day. By reminding ourselves why we started [our company] … and by believing steadfastly in how our company can change the community or even the country…, we have persevered on days when failure has seemed but a sneeze away.

The personal narrative thus contributes to the presentation of labels which are associated with the American brand, ranging from being the land of opportunity for hard-working people, to being the forerunner in technological innovation passing through being a multicultural and multiracial society. A particularly interesting aspect of this blog is that it embodies the tendency to deal with general issues or problems by means of exemplary stories of single individuals, who appear in photographs or videos. This form of personalization is a strategy that is commonly used in contemporary media, and in particular in the press. As Clark (2006: 24) points out:

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Most news stories are about individuals – whether famous or not – while issues and problems tend to be backgrounded. Even if the story is essentially about a wider issue, it will be reported in terms of the people involved.

Stories about individuals are generally more engaging for the reader, and tend to be more impressive than abstract speculations. Of course, in America.gov the stories chosen have a highly symbolic value in the representation of the American economy, as testified also by personal narratives contained in other sections of the website. For instance, the Youth subsection hosts the videostory of a very successful young Muslim fashion designer, and the Democracy and Human Rights sub-section presents the story of Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier depicted as a ―beacon of hope‖ for other children like him.

3.4. Some Observations on Website Construction and Exploitation of HCMC Affordances: Interactivity, Co-Articulation and Visual Resources For an evaluation of the effectiveness of the exploitation of the affordances of Hypermedia Computer Mediated communication on this website, in addition to the observations that have emerged in the course of the discussion there are two other aspects, strictly connected to each other, that are especially crucial, i.e. interactivity and coarticulation. Co-articulation means that designers conceive the architecture of a website in the form of a number of different options, consisting of pre-established inner navigation paths and shortcuts, and sometimes also external links leading to other sites, so it is the reader who materially contributes to its realization every time s/he explores it (cf. e.g. Garzone, 2002: 286-287; 2007: 23), although limited by the constraints pre-established by authors/designers.

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These characteristics are especially important because – as Lemke (2006) points out – coarticulation is a feature which contributes to conferring a dialogic quality on communication, in the Bakhtinian sense of including multiple social voices (Bakhtin, 1935/1981). America.gov is not particularly interactive and does not allow for any meaningful degree of co-articulation. Inside it the user can do little else but navigate, read, watch and listen. As is the case with online newspaper articles, at the end of each text there is an invitation (Tell us what you think of this article) to contribute opinions privately through the America.gov Feedback System, which even promises a reply. In some cases there is a more specific question to be replied on the website blog (for instance, at the end of the article mentioned above ―U.S., France Converge and Increase Odds for Peace‖ the question is: What foreign affairs decisions should President Obama consider? Comment on America.gov's blog). At present the blog itself – the detailed discussion of which does not fall within the scope of this study – consists of five different thematic blogs (one of them being ―The first 100 days: following Barack Obama‖). It mainly contains postings by staff writers and a relatively limited number of readers‘ comments. In order to evaluate the authoritativeness of the America.gov blog, useful data are offered by Technorati (http://technorati.com), a main Web directory which provides an assessment of blogs‘ impact on the basis of the reactions they stir. According to this web directory America.gov features quite low in the ranking, with a rate of 3513, as opposed for example to the blog of the White House, which with a 3,200 rate is among the top 100 blogs, or even to Dipnote, run by the Department of State, that has a rate of 132. Also in terms of co-articulation the liberty left to the user is relatively limited: the navigation paths are largely predetermined although, of course, there are shortcuts and external links, but only to highly selected sites. Thus the degree of interactivity and co-articulation of America.gov tends to be relatively low, and this is politically significant, both in terms of the image it conveys and of the unused ―listening‖ potential afforded by web-mediated communication. Apparently, the new Administration is aware of this problem, and is now considering the idea of solving it by means of recourse to Web 2.0 resources (social networks, YouTube) and other technologies (e.g. cellphone text messaging), as observed in the Washington Post when reporting on the appointment of Alec Ross as a senior adviser on innovation to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (Kang, 2009). A further step in this direction is the creation of America.gov communities on the social networks Facebook and Twitter, which really offer a possibility for interaction and for building relations. In the last week of April 2009, links to these two important social networks made their appearance in the third column of the homepage, with the invitation ―Join our online communities‖. Another crucial technical aspect in terms of exploitation of affordances to be evaluated is the use of visual resources, pictures, photographs, charts, etc. On the homepage this does not go beyond the ordinary approach of a daily newspaper‘s cover page, being limited to few photographs in small format. But, as already noted in § 3.3.2 above, in the inner layers of the site larger photographs are displayed and adequately exploited for communication purposes, with pictures used as a background taking up the whole page and an ample choice of photo galleries, which combine images (as in a photo album) and short accompanying texts. The 13

Data refer to April 19, 2009.

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relationship between pictures and texts is illustrative or explanatory, but the impression is that the selection of all the images to be published on the website has been guided by the intention not only of illustrating the notions put forth in the texts or captions, but also of using the visual component to convey supplementary messages, with special insistence on multiculturalism and environment conservation, all efforts which can be seen as aimed at capturing imagination and fostering the relation building dimension of public diplomacy. In some cases in the current version of the website, it appears that interactive and/or visual rather than verbal resources have been deployed to reduce bias in communication and inadvertent culture bumps. In the earlier version there figured a sub-category labelled American Giving,14 a denomination which not only had the effect of presenting international cooperation as a form of charity, but focused attention exclusively on the U.S., underscoring the identity of the donor rather than the action itself. This title was accompanied by a short text, ―The generosity of U.S. organizations and individuals strengthens communities‖, which reinforced the emphasis laid on the U.S.‘s beneficial intervention and provided a highly positive evaluation of it through the word ―generosity‖. A similar attitude permeated all the materials available in this sub-section of the website. But the insistence on the U.S. as the main actor on the scene and on its goodness is potentially disruptive and risks compromising the attempt to open a dialogue with indifferent or hostile foreign audiences. The changes made in the new version of the website indicate that an attempt has been made to find a solution to this contradiction through a shift from reading mode to navigation mode, from textual to visual. Today American giving in the world is only a hyperlink at the foot of the Development section, leading to an interactive world map: a click of the mouse on any given country provides access to pop-ups where single initiatives are summarized as facts and figures, thus avoiding the self-praising rhetoric which often emerged from texts and images. In this way the focus is on contextualized projects rather than on the U.S. as an actor. The factual representation conveyed by the map also avoids the boasting and blatantly self-praising tones of the old website version. In this way the content of the section might be more acceptable also for cultures which privilege indirect communication, where ―saving face‖ is particularly important (Zaharna, 2004: 136), and the show off of one‘s generosity might give rise to cultural tensions, placing the receiver in the position of being publicly grateful for help.

3.4.1. Longer texts Similar and often more serious difficulties arise in the selection and management of longer texts – today less numerous, having been partly supplanted by multimedia – embedded in the hypertext, which are mainly in the form of news ―articles‖, complying with all the relevant generic conventions. The difficulty in selecting passages that are suitable for public diplomacy stems from two potentially conflicting factors: on the one hand the ―reactive‖ approach, focusing on news and updates, imposes the need to report also on facts and speeches originally addressed to a national rather than to an external audience; on the other hand, web technologies exclude the possibility of segmenting the target audience separating domestic from international recipients.

14

American Giving was included in the Foreign Policy thematic category, while its present counterpart, Development, is located in the Global Challenges thematic area (cfr. Table 1, § 3.1)

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An example in point is a speech on the world economic crisis delivered by Obama on 8 January 2008 at George Mason University (Virginia), which as recently as in late February 2009 featured in the branch of the website devoted to the economy, then entitled Economics and Trade. An analysis of this passage shows very well that re-derecting content originally conceived for a domestic audience can be extremely dangerous. While the examination of the full speech goes beyond the scope of this work, we shall limit the discussion to few elements in its first part which are sufficient to evaluate its degree of appropriateness (or inappropriateness) for use in public diplomacy communication. In terms of Leonard‘s scheme (cf. § 3.2. above), in this text the reactive dimension, i.e. acknowledging the crisis and taking immediate action against it, coexists with the relation-building one realized by the effort to restore trust in Brand America (Anholt & Hildreth, 2004), first within its borders and only indirectly abroad, through a re-assertion of traditional U.S. values and qualities. In the speech, focused on the sweeping economic crisis, after a trenchant recognition of the seriousness of the downturn Obama, at that time President-Elect, encouraged Americans to trust in their innate qualities as a way out of the crisis:

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We can restore opportunity and prosperity. We should never forget that our workers are still more productive than any on Earth. Our universities are still the envy of the world. We are still home to the most brilliant minds, the most creative entrepreneurs, and the most advanced technology and innovation that history has ever known. And we are still the nation that has overcome great fears and improbable odds

A crucial element in this passage is the use of the first person plural pronoun we and its possessive our, which in its addressee-inclusive form (cf. Wilson, 1990) is often used in political discourse to involve the audience by establishing a bond of solidarity between the orator and the listeners. However, when the speech, originally addressed to a U.S. audience, is redirected to foreign publics, being posted on this website, the pronoun ―we‖ takes on an addressee-exclusive meaning, conveying a message of separation, rather than communion. Therefore, although the argument is impressive in a domestic perspective, there is no guarantee that it can be perceived positively by foreign publics as an assurance of the U.S.‘s ability to counteract the crisis for themselves and for the rest of the world. On the contrary, in many countries such a discursive approach may sound self-praising and presumptuous, reinforcing existing prejudices at a time in which U.S. reputation is flawed by a perception of this nation as politically arrogant and overbearing. Another good example that confirms the difficulty inherent in the selection of texts for use in public diplomacy communication is provided by one of the cover stories – briefly introduced above (cf. § 3.2.1.) – appearing on the homepage on April 6th, ―U.S., France converge and increase odds for peace‖, which reported on the remarks made by President Obama at a press conference in Strasbourg in the hours between the G20 meeting and the NATO summit. Although the main purpose of his declarations was obviously that of advocating an ever more complete and fruitful collaboration between the U.S. and its allies, at different points Obama‘s declarations quoted in the article laid emphasis on the shortcomings of the European partners, on the need to get more support from them (―friends and allies such as Europe should shoulder their share of the burden‖) and more collaboration in change (―America is changing, but it cannot be America alone that changes‖). Open charges of antiAmericanism are also made:

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There have been times where America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive,‖ Obama said. ―But in Europe, there is an anti-Americanism that is at once casual but can also be insidious. Instead of recognizing the good that America so often does in the world, there have been times where Europeans choose to blame America for much of what‘s bad.

While the content of this message can be suitable for a press conference, publishing these remarks on America.gov may seem hardly coherent with the purpose of strengthening international relations with foreign publics, which the paratext of the new version of the website, starting from the slogan ―engaging the world‖, strives to communicate. Remarkably, criticism towards ―Europeans‖ is expressed quite directly, using the personal construction ―Europeans choose to blame America‖ where both the grammatical structure (Europeans as active subject) and the use of the verb ―choose‖, denoting intentionality, emphasize Europe‘s ―guilt‖ and inadequacy. Probably intended as a constructive criticism to the European allies simply implying an invitation to greater friendliness and co-operation, in actual fact when published on a universally accessible website this statement risks having a negative resonance, both with European audiences, who may resent being chastized by Obama, and with publics in other continents, who may see it as a confirmation of the persistence of antiAmerican sentiments even among the U.S.‘s European allies, a fact which may reinforce their negative and diffident attitudes towards this country. The last two examples illustrate the limits of public diplomacy on the web clearly. They confirm that the impossibility to segment foreign publics from the domestic one is potentially problematic (Zaharna, 2004: 134), as words addressed to U.S. citizens might not suit overseas publics. At the same time the relocalization of speeches originating in a different context and with purposes that might not necessarily be in tune with those of public diplomacy, might produce equally awkward effects. Considering that giving the utomost consideration to one‘s audience is a fundamental tenet of rhetoric, let alone of public diplomacy, one can easily understand what the risk is when communication aimed at fostering the trust and pride of U.S. citizens in their nation is turned into a tool of public diplomacy. At best it can underline separation from foreign audiences rather than communion with them; at worst it can risk alienating all sympathies through what could be perceived abroad as an arrogant assertion of U.S. superiority.

4. CONCLUSIONS In this paper the America.gov website has been analysed as a representative example of public diplomacy effort, looking in particular at the strategies deployed to exploit the affordances of the web-mediated environment and the interaction among different semiotic codes it makes available for communication. As the monitoring of the website stretched over the period of transition between the Bush and the Obama Administration the analysis has involved an observation of the changes undergone by the website in the first few months of the new President‘s mandate. This has led to the identification of a continuous sequence of small changes and improvements gradually made over time since late January 2009, suggesting the desire to improve the website while maintaining some kind of continuity with the past. Considering the close relation between nation branding and Public diplomacy, it seems reasonable to interpret

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this operation as one of rebranding, effected gradually by making recourse to the techniques of corporate brand conversion, in which the passage from the old to the new brand is made through a series of small intermediate steps in order to prevent consumers from perceiving the change as abrupt or even from perceiving it at all. The changes brought to America.gov in the last few months have first of all involved a structural modification, which has contributed to streamlining the architecture of the website by decreasing the number of thematic categories and hence the number of sections in the hypertext. Another evolution has been the increased recourse to multimodal resources to the detriment of verbal communication. Considering the criticism expressed by many scholars of the U.S.‘s behavior in intercultural communication, the choice to move away from a model characterized by the centrality of written text has been interpreted here as an attempt to make the website not only more suitable to capturing imagination, but also more engaging for nonlinear cultures which privilege a form of communication where different semiotic stimuli concur simultaneously to the construction of meaning. An interesting aspect of the process of overhaul is the priority given to constructive modifications, thus confirming that in Hypermedia Computer Mediated communication decisions concerning the constructive properties of environments and the use of semiotic resources can have political or, more in general, ideological implications. The rationale underlying these evolutions is made explicit by a very meaningful change affecting an absolutely prominent element in the website‘s contents, i.e. the slogan appearing on every page: it used to be Telling America’s story and has now been changed into Engaging the world. This step indicates the desire to shift the communicative perspective from a oneway narrative with the U.S. represented as the only active voice, and at the same time as the object of the narration, to a more dialogic attitude aimed at strengthening relations with other countries and peoples. It has also had the effect of shifting the relative prominence given to different dimensions of public diplomacy (with reference to Mark Leonard‘s categorization): while the former slogan foregrounded the reactive dimension with its emphasis on news management activity and updates, the new slogan primarily frames the purpose of the website within the proactive (i.e. medium term) and relation building dimensions, which have the purpose of ―capturing the imagination‖ and ―earning a high level of trust‖ respectively (Leonard, 2004: 11). If the reactive dimension imposes tight timing, due to the need of keeping pace with events, as is the case for hard news and the relative comments, the other two dimensions of public diplomacy allow for longer-lived contents, constructed more accurately for the target audiences and with greater care for their communicative effect, a necessary requisite for effective communication campaigns (ibidem). The rebranding process has affected the main contents of the website. The most evident change is the emphasis placed on environmental issues, for the evident purpose of disproving the U.S.‘s reputation of environmental indifference due to its failure to sign the Kyoto protocols. Not only are environmental issues now included in the Global Challenges section which deals with some core issues of Obama‘s politics, but they recurrently emerge in various other sections of the website, with special prominence in the Business and Trade section. In general, the representation of contents on the website is characterized by the obvious attempt to convey messages of multiculturalism, solidarity and upward mobility embedding them in all of its various sections, regardless of the actual topic being dealt with, also by means of a careful selection of visual materials.

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More problematic seems to be the choice and use of longer texts or ―articles‖ published on the website, and in particular those reporting on the President‘s or other authorities‘ speeches, as their suitability to a U.S. audience often inevitably declines when they are addressed to an international multicultural audience. In particular Americans‘ proverbial directness in communication risks being perceived as naïve and lacking subtleness, if not arrogant and face-threatening, by audiences belonging to high-context and indirect communication cultures. However, there are now signs of an attempt to adapt messages to a more culturally neutral perspective. The ―short texts‖ and the slogans and catchphrases accompanying the page titles are especially meaningful in this respect, as they have been partly reformulated using linguistic strategies aimed at repositioning the role of America somewhat in the background, making recourse to syntactic constructions that suppress agency, producing abstract and general statements. This is in line with some general lines of orientation that emerge from the analysis, which clearly indicate the intention to refocus the overall organization of the website in the direction of dialogism, greater consideration for cultural variables and a check on self-complacency, all requisites that are not easy to meet as they involve the innermost layers of a country‘s cultural makeup. It is possible that a solution to some of these problems may come from the so called Web 2.0 applications, based as they are on a more mature and innovative medium inherently involving user participation, openness, and network effects (e.g. social networking, video sharing, blogs, etc.; cf. O'Reilly, 2005), a solution which is already being explored with the addition of the links to Facebook and Twitter on the homepage.

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Chapter 3

TYING DISASTER DIPLOMACY IN KNOTS Ilan Kelman ABSTRACT

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Disaster diplomacy (http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org) examines how and why disaster-related activities, such as preparedness before a disaster or response after a disaster, do and do not reduce conflict and induce cooperation. The wide variety of case studies has led to efforts to create typologies for them in order to seek a predictive model indicating the circumstances under which various forms of disaster diplomacy will and will not manifest. The most common outcome is that, for influencing diplomacy, disasterrelated factors are dwarfed by non-disaster factors. That is, the main observation is that disaster diplomacy rarely succeeds, leading to the main prediction that disaster diplomacy is unlikely to have many successes. A key element in the general failure of disaster diplomacy so far, and the challenge of robust predictions beyond the overarching conclusion of the general failure, is the number and diversity of the influences on disasters, on diplomacy, and on their interconnectedness. In particular, disaster diplomacy prior to a disaster tends to fail because the parties dealing with disaster risk reduction prefer to separate their work from diplomacy. That is, they wish to reduce interconnectedness. In contrast, disaster diplomacy following a disaster tends to fail due to too many disaster-related and diplomacy-related players with multiple relationships at multiple levels. That is, too much interconnectedness exists to permit the development and maintenance of strict links between disaster-related activities and diplomacy. Overall, hope seems to be misplaced in disaster diplomacy to resolve either disaster or diplomacy challenges. Even so, optimism is still feasible for disaster-related activities providing a useful connection point to pursue long-term reduction of enmity. Foreign policy in an interconn means that disaster diplomacy might rarely be at the top of the foreign policy or disaster risk reduction agendas, but the extensive interconnectedness nonetheless leads to opportunities for positive disaster diplomacy results.



Corresponding author: Email: http://www.ilankelman.org

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INTRODUCTION Despite the isolationist stance or desires of many political leaders, foreign policies of political entities, sovereign and non-sovereign, are becoming increasingly interconnected. Not just interconnected with other foreign policies, but also with other cross-border governance actions, including trade, the internet, tourism, and economic policy. Another governance aspect interacting with foreign policy is addressing disasters, in trying to prevent disasters as well as responding to them. Examples are disasters crossing international or other jurisdictional borders; humanitarian aid policy in terms of determining how to prioritise relief and from whom to accept relief; and the use of military assets for dealing with disasters especially on foreign, disputed, or conflict-ridden territory. To give further insights into particular aspects of the interconnectedness between disasters and foreign policy, this chapter explores the notion of ‗disaster diplomacy‘. The next section defines and provides background on the term, including a summary of some case studies. Then, typologies of the case studies are described along with the challenges of creating both typologies and a predictive model for disaster diplomacy. Following that discussion, these challenges are linked to disaster diplomacy‘s continual failure in most case studies due to different forms of interconnectedness between disasters and diplomacy. The final section explains that, despite hope in disaster diplomacy succeeding being frequently misplaced, all optimism should not be lost.

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DISASTER DIPLOMACY Disaster diplomacy examines how and why disaster-related activities do and do not reduce conflict and induce cooperation. Disaster-related activities refer to policies and practices before a disaster—incorporating prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and risk reduction—along with those after a disaster—namely response, relief, reconstruction, and recovery. Diplomacy has a wide remit, not referring to strictly bilateral relations between sovereign states, but encompassing many dimensions of international affairs, international relations, peace, and conflict. Entities cooperating or in conflict could be sovereign states, non-sovereign territories including municipalities and provinces, international organisations, private businesses, or non-profit groups. Aspects of disaster diplomacy have long been studied and applied. Clifford (1956) highlighted the cross-border aspect of the Rio Grande River‘s flood of 27-30 June 1954 and investigated sociological patterns in individual and organisational response to the flood disaster by comparing the border towns of Eagle Pass, Texas, USA and Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Mexico. Using mainly case studies from the USA, Quarantelli and Dynes (1976) identified factors influencing and consequences of the presence and absence of post-disaster community conflict. The influence of weather on certain naval battles is described by Wheeler (1991, 1995). Lewis (1999: 25) notes how ‗The November 1970 cyclone, and its subsequent alleged mismanagement, was one of the many influences that triggered the Bangladesh War of Independence which commenced in March 1971…The earthquake that destroyed much of Managua in 1972 triggered in its aftermath the armed uprising [and]

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ensuing civil war‘ in Nicaragua which, seven years later, toppled the dictatorship running the country. In 2000, Kelman and Koukis (2000) started an effort to systematically document and analyse disaster diplomacy through editing four papers. Ker-Lindsay (2000), followed by updates in Ker-Lindsay (2007), showed that after earthquake disasters hit Greece and Turkey less than a month apart in 1999, subsequent rapprochement between those countries was not due to disaster diplomacy. While the disasters brought into the spotlight and spurred on the improving relations, potentially against the will or expectations of decision-makers, the basis for the cooperation had substantial pre-earthquake roots. Meanwhile, Glantz (2000) analysed climate-related disaster diplomacy between Cuba and the USA, demonstrating that, despite plenty of climate-related disaster cooperation between the two countries, influences on diplomacy were primarily non-disaster related. In the third paper of Kelman and Koukis (2000), Holloway (2000) explained why the 1991-1993 drought emergency across southern Africa in the context of rapid political changes throughout the region did not become a drought disaster, emphasising the unprecedented regional cooperation that took place. She shows that pre-emergency mechanisms for cooperation had to be in place for that success to be witnessed during the emergency. The emergency did not create new cooperation, but the already existing cooperation permitted the emergency to be addressed in a cooperative fashion. Finally, Comfort (2000) examined these three case studies by detailing the properties and mechanisms of a ‗complex adaptive systems‘ approach as applied to disaster diplomacy. This approach turned out to be too mechanistic to yield useful insights, as described in Kelman (2006a). From this basis, many more disaster diplomacy case studies have been examined (http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org). India-Pakistan was examined by (i) Kelman (2003) investigating the 26 January 2001 earthquake disaster in Gujarat after which Pakistan offered aid to India and (ii) by Kelman (2006a) investigating the 8 October 2005 earthquake disaster in Kashmir after which India offered aid to Pakistan. Neither instance supported the longterm thawing of relations. As with Greece and Turkey, India-Pakistan rapprochement continued positive trends irrespective of, and with some commentators suggesting in spite of, the earthquake disasters. Kelman (2003) also examined a series of famines, droughts, and floods that struck North Korea since 1995, none of which reduced that regime‘s isolation or international conflicts over the long-term. Another failure to use drought to support peace, from 1999-2002 between Eritrea and Ethiopia, was documented by Kelman (2006a). Following Hurricane Katrina which devastated the USA‘s Gulf Coast in 2005, Kelman (2007) detailed the American government‘s intransigence on foreign policy despite offers of aid from several countries and international organisations having various degrees of conflict with the USA. Weizhun and Tianshu (2005a) view disaster diplomacy from China‘s perspective suggesting that it could assist China becoming responsible and powerful on the world stage, but so far, that opportunity has not been grasped. On 26 December 2004, a massive earthquake off the coast of Indonesia led to a tsunami disaster around the Indian Ocean killing over 250,000 people across more than a dozen countries, many of which had severe conflicts. Kelman (2005) suggested that disaster diplomacy would have little effect on these conflicts, which included Burma‘s isolation from the world and oppressive governance in the Maldives. Most subsequent literature on tsunami diplomacy focused on the internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and in Aceh, Indonesia (e.g. Enia,

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2008; Gaillard et al., 2008; Kelman and Gaillard, 2007; Le Billon and Waizenegger, 2007; Weizhun and Tianshu, 2005b). Whereas the consequences of the tsunami disaster exacerbated Sri Lanka‘s conflict, a peace deal was reached and has so far held in Aceh—although Kelman and Gaillard (2007) and Gaillard et al. (2008) point out that the negotiations that led to the peace deal started two days before the disaster. Drawing on Glantz‘ (1994, 1999) approach to ‗creeping environmental problems‘ as disasters, longer-term disasters such as climate change have also been explored in the context of disaster diplomacy. Kelman (2006b) examined how inter-state relationships could be affected when extreme events exacerbated by climate change are a factor in considering evacuation of islands. These wider investigations led to disaster diplomacy considering other disaster dimensions such as body identification where multiple nationalities are killed; disease diplomacy or health diplomacy covering epidemics and efforts at eradicating diseases; and international collaboration to identify and deal with astronomical threats such as comets and meteors on a collision course with Earth. Back to the island theme (and see also http://www.islandvulnerability.org), Kelman et al. (2006) focused on non-sovereign islands such as Tasmania and the Cayman Islands to see whether or not disaster-related activities might induce these jurisdictions to become further involved in international relations. The answer was that non-sovereign islands have ample opportunity to engage in disaster diplomacy, but rarely do, for two reasons. First, because the non-sovereign islands tend to rely on their governing state for assistance in times of need, irrespective of past evidence suggesting that the governing state might not give the level of support desired. Second, because most governing entities, including non-sovereign islands and their governing states, do not make disaster-related activities a high priority, preferring to deal with disaster only after one has manifested, when it is too late to prevent it. This wealth of evidence from disaster diplomacy case studies around the world and across disciplines, including many other publications (e.g. Akcinaroglu et al., 2008), converge on the overarching conclusion that disaster-related activities do not create fresh diplomatic opportunities, but they have a strong possibility of catalyzing action, although that possibility is not always fulfilled. In the short-term, on the order of weeks and months, disaster-related activities can, but do not always, impact diplomacy. That influence will occur where a preexisting basis was present for the diplomacy, with examples being cultural connections, trade links, or ongoing secret negotiations. Over the long-term, on the time scale of years, non-disaster factors have a more significant impact on diplomacy than disaster-related activities. Examples are leadership changes, distrust, belief that an historical conflict or grievance should take precedence over present-day humanitarian and peace needs, or priorities for action other than conflict resolution, diplomatic dividends, disaster risk reduction, or disaster response. In fact, over the long-term, disaster-related activities sometimes exacerbate conflict and reduce cooperation, even where many parties on opposite sides are seeking a more positive outcome. In summary, the disaster diplomacy case studies and analysis support the political truism that neither disaster-related activities nor conflict resolution are inevitably a high political priority.

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DISASTER DIPLOMACY TYPOLOGIES The wide variety of case studies has led to efforts to create typologies for them, to assist more robust analysis. Comfort‘s (2000) efforts to employ complex adaptive systems illustrated the devilish nature of applying mechanistic models to political systems. Since diplomacy and dealing with disasters are each, by definition, complex, adaptive, and systems, when disasters and diplomacy are combined, they would be expected to display some form or degree of all characteristics of complex adaptive systems. For each case study examined to a high level of detail, that is indeed the result (Kelman, 2006a). Four other categorisations of case studies were proposed by Kelman (2007): propinquity, aid relationship, level, and purpose. First, propinquity or neighbourliness refers to how close the disaster diplomacy entities are to each other. If they are political jurisdictions, do they share a land border, are they near but without a land border, or are they far apart? For other parties, propinquity could be interpreted as their location, the locations of their mandates, their sectors, or their spheres of influence. Second, aid relationship explains whether mutual aid is provided, such as in the earthquake disasters in Greece and Turkey where each country helped the other; whether some form of combined aid is provided, forcing parties to cooperate; or whether it is a strict donor-recipient relationship in which one party is a donor (is assisting) and one party is a recipient (is being assisted). An example of the latter is Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela offering aid to the USA after Hurricane Katrina (Kelman, 2007). That aid was not accepted. Third, the typology involving level of disaster diplomacy (after Glantz, 2000) asks if the disaster diplomacy efforts are focused on leadership from governments, from organisations which could include the United Nations or media, or from people which refers to individual or grassroots efforts. Varying combinations of levels and of levels within levels occur. Governments could be involved bilaterally or multilaterally, plus any jurisdictional level could be considered. Organisations might focus efforts on governments or on media lobbying or could be linked to the grassroots level such as some community-based groups. Individualled disaster diplomacy might need to be trumpeted by the media to be effective. Additionally, it could go through governments, with Akcinaroglu et al. (2008) describing how people-togovernment disaster diplomacy can be powerful under some circumstances; it could go through organisations; or it could be direct people-to-people contact. Fourth, disaster diplomacy purpose has been interpreted as having diverse options, including for self-survival, to accept mutual benefit, to support long-term widespread gains, to embarrass an enemy, or to save face. Purpose is the most complex, nebulous, and contentious of the typologies proposed, especially since judgements of purpose can easily match previously determined opinions. Groups opposing a leader could interpret rapprochement actions by the leader as weakness or as seeking to retain that leader‘s grip on power. In contrast, the leader‘s supporters would suggest that any disaster-related rapport evidences the leader‘s willingness to bury enmity for the common good of humanitarian action. Such opposing views were prominent for case studies such as Cuba-USA and IranUSA (Kelman, 2007). Usually, elements of both views are accurate. For another typology, Kelman (2003) identified and contrasted passive and active disaster diplomacy. Most case studies describe observations where disaster-related activities interacted with diplomacy processes without those involved necessarily being entirely aware

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of the implications, and desirability or otherwise, of disaster diplomacy. That is, any disaster diplomacy successes or failures were passive. Now, with more known about disaster diplomacy, parties could deliberately seek to intervene to make disaster diplomacy succeed or fail. Active disaster diplomacy might be lobbying at any level, including governments or the media, to ensure that a warning system or humanitarian aid are directly linked to, or explicitly separated from, peace building processes. Active disaster diplomacy could also be recognising when disaster-related activities could or not could influence conflict and acting to enhance the disaster diplomacy efforts—or to discourage any attempts because they will be doomed to failure. Kelman‘s (2006a) pathways indicate ways in which disaster diplomacy could be actively or passively handled. These pathways represent options available for influencing disaster diplomacy, although not all options are necessarily considered by the parties involved or are necessarily under their control. One pathway representing both support for and hindering of disaster diplomacy is to focus on disaster-related activities and to actively avoid linking disaster-related and diplomatic activities. The direct influence is to deny any possibility for immediate disaster diplomacy, thereby hindering disaster diplomacy. In support of disaster diplomacy, the indirect influence could be to promote trust and collaboration, setting the foundation for further cooperation which could then be linked to diplomacy, conflict reduction, and peace. Initial cooperation on small-scale projects without imposing further expectations could be the limited steps required to create confidence that wider, longer-lasting steps could and should be taken. Two main weaknesses can be identified with the typology work developed by Kelman (2003, 2006a, 2007). First, the approach is mainly taxonomic; that is, categorising. That is a helpful first step, but much more is needed, particularly explaining why certain categories appear and why case studies end up in certain categories and not in others. Some explanations, such as propinquity, are self-evident and unchangeable. Others require more depth than has been published. Questions to answer include: 





Why did Pervez Musharraf, then the de facto leader of Pakistan, telephone India‘s Prime Minister after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake disaster to offer aid, which led to attempts at India-Pakistan disaster diplomacy? Why did Sri Lankans not force people-led disaster diplomacy after the 2004 tsunami, instead actively supporting perpetuation of the conflict such as by electing a hardline President? After each provision of disaster relief to North Korea, why did the negotiators expect North Korea to be more open, rather than relying on history to indicate that Pyongyang would again shut the doors?

Just explaining what happened is useful, but more is needed to answer the deeper ―why‖ questions. The second weakness with the typology work is that it fails to engage fully with some of the more theoretical literature. Examples are democratic peace theory and its contrast with development peace theory (Banseka, 2002) along with different forms of environmental conflict theory (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1999 compared to the robust critique by Hartmann, 2007).

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By interpreting the taxonomic typologies witnessed within the context of well-established literature, especially on the theoretical side, disaster diplomacy might be more powerful and might have more depth in explaining the reasons behind the observations and classifications. As part of seeking broader and deeper explanations for different forms of disaster diplomacy witnessed, Kelman (2006a) proposed four questions to be answered for case studies, a list which was then refined and expanded to six questions by Gaillard et al. (2008): 

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Did disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activities? This question is a basic definition of disaster diplomacy. If the answer is no, then no basis exists for calling the case study ‗disaster diplomacy‘.  Did new diplomacy result? Or did the diplomacy being influenced already exist before disaster-related activities were considered?  Is the diplomacy legitimate? Or are the parties using the opportunity to manoeuvre politically or militarily, rather than genuinely seeking conflict reduction or conflict resolution?  Does the diplomacy last? Or does it soon become overwhelmed by non-disasterrelated factors, as outlined above? So far, the only cases where long-lasting diplomacy has been witnessed have been those cases where the first question, about disaster-related activities influencing diplomacy, was answered ‗no‘. The other two questions relate to cases in which the disaster diplomacy refers to postdisaster activities, rather than pre-disaster activities:  Is the diplomacy dependent on the characteristics of the post-disaster reconstruction?  How does post-disaster diplomacy address those longstanding political and economic issues? The importance of these two questions is to see whether or not long-standing theory on linking disasters and development (e.g. Cuny, 1983; Hewitt, 1983; Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004) is being put into practice—which could support disaster diplomacy either actively or passively. The end result of this research and analysis is to affirm the conclusions based on the case studies. Disaster-related activities can catalyze, but not create, diplomacy and peace, although that potential is rarely realised over the long-term because non-disaster factors have greater influence. Disaster-related activities are simply not high enough on the political agenda, until it is too late, to be able to use them for successful diplomacy. Meanwhile, peace making is not always the highest political priority. As such, none of these typologies are useful for producing a predictive model indicating the circumstances under which various forms of disaster diplomacy will and will not manifest. Most pathways for supporting disaster diplomacy are usually open, but are not usually taken. Meanwhile, pathways that hinder disaster diplomacy are actively or passively sought, especially on the time scale of months or longer. No pattern emerges from trying to correlate propinquity, levels, or aid relationship with different degrees of disaster diplomacy success. No case study examined has yet answered the six questions satisfactorily to indicate that disaster diplomacy had a major influence. The summary observation is thus that disaster diplomacy rarely succeeds, permitting the main prediction that disaster diplomacy is unlikely to have many successes.

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TOO MUCH AND TOO LITTLE INTERCONNECTEDNESS A key element in the general failure of disaster diplomacy, and the challenge of robust predictions beyond the overarching conclusion of general failure, is the number and diversity of the influences on disasters, on diplomacy, and on their interconnectedness. The interconnectedness has been demonstrated by the numerous disaster diplomacy cases and their wide variety of forms. At times, the boundaries become blurred between different forms of diplomacy, so that the topic is easily generalised into the interactions between politics and disasters. Considering just one country, German reunification is linked to the discourse on the 1997 Oder River flood (Doering, 2003) while Gerhard Schröder‘s response to the 2002 floods assisted him in being re-elected as Chancellor that year (Roberts, 2002). The Radix Network (http://www.radixonline.org) provides the most expansive view, seeking root causes of disasters and how disaster-related activities can overcome these root causes, by exploring fundamental political issues such as human rights. Embedding disasters and disaster-related activities within the wider societal concerns of human rights, sustainability, and development demonstrates the complexity and interconnectedness of disaster topics. The best science shows that disasters result from human decisions, even where an environmental event such as an earthquake or tornado is involved. Considering earthquakes, the argument is that the earthquake happens rapidly, but infrastructure collapsing—rather than the earthquake—causes the disaster, including the majority of casualties. The knowledge for designing earthquake-resistant structures, engineered and non-engineered, exists (e.g. Blondet et al. 2003; Coburn et al., 1995; Dixit, 2003; GHI 2006) but political reasons and human choices mean that is not always done (e.g. Bosher, 2008; Lewis, 2003). These reasons and choices manifest over the long-term because it takes several years for building codes to be developed or avoided, for urban planning to take place, and for corruption, incompetence, and apathy to pervade governance structures. Hence, the earthquake is natural, being a normal part of the environment, but the earthquake disaster is a political disaster or a human disaster, not a natural disaster (O‘Keefe et al., 1976). Such analyses are repeated across all forms of disaster based on scientific evidence obtained in the field and backed up by robust theory (e.g. Hewitt, 1983, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Mileti et al., 1999; Oliver-Smith, 1986; Wisner et al., 2004). The consequence is that no disasters are truly ‗natural‘ nor are they ‗events‘ per se. Instead, the process of society permitting disasters to happen (the ‗disaster process‘) is rooted in the concept of vulnerability, with the vulnerability process referring to human and societal values, paradigms, behaviour, decisions, and actions over the long-term that set the stage for a disaster to occur. Unfortunately, some recent discourse on vulnerability—by authors such as W.N. Adger, D. Liverman, S. Cutter, and C. Folke—ignores this wealth of evidence and moves the field of vulnerability science backwards. The most informed science, as per the references given earlier in this paragraph, understands this field‘s history, showing that the ‗vulnerability process‘ leads to the ‗disaster process‘. That covers more than taking a snapshot of the present state. Instead, it extends to society‘s actions over the long-term, usually with one part of society augmenting the vulnerability of other parts; it examines why and how that has been done in order to reach the present state; and it seeks to understand how the present state might be changed to improve in the future.

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Therefore, to be successful, disaster-related activities must connect to the long history that created and perpetuated the vulnerability leading to the disaster. Topics encompassed are as wide ranging as building codes (development, monitoring, and enforcement), policy development, transparency, corruption, livelihoods, and education. All facets of day-to-day life and of decade-to-decade society are interconnected with vulnerability and hence with disaster. For success, disaster-related activities must thus engage with all facets of day-to-day life and of decade-to-decade society, in order to overcome the vulnerability process and the disaster process. This high level of interconnectedness is witnessed with diplomacy too, with examples from the vast literature on this topic being Bayne and Woodcock (2007), Chasek (2001), and Lecours (2002). Only a brief outline of examples of diplomacy‘s interconnectedness is provided here. Diplomacy covers many facets of governance, from tourist and business visa agreements to treaties on trade, natural resources, environmental management, and tax. These interactions occur between two or more parties and at all varieties of fora including direct intergovernmental negotiations along with activities at international organisations such as the United Nations or at specific international treaty negotiations such as the Antarctic Treaty System. Diplomacy is not restricted to official representatives of sovereign states, but includes other levels of government, all forms of non-sovereign governance, public and private organisations, and individuals. A specific forum, a specific diplomat, or a specific instance of diplomacy can be simultaneously connected to many of these diverse possibilities. With these high levels of interconnectedness amongst disaster-related activities and amongst diplomacy, sorting through the interactions becomes a huge challenge when connecting the two via disaster diplomacy. Predictive approaches to disaster diplomacy would not necessarily be expected and are not yet found. Predictive approaches might not be possible given the contextualities of disasters, diplomacy, and disaster diplomacy. That is, each case study has its own contexts helping to dictate the ultimate disaster diplomacy outcome—or lack thereof. Recognition of that predictive challenge premised on interconnectedness assists in explaining why disaster diplomacy from pre-disaster activities tends to fail. Recognising the political challenges in dealing with disasters, many involved in pre-disaster activities voice their concern about disaster diplomacy. They suggest that they spend so much effort trying to separate their pre-disaster activities from political influences that they do not wish to seek or promote another possible way of joining disasters and politics. They prefer to focus on their disaster-related activities, trying to navigate through only the tangled interconnectedness of disasters, without added complications of diplomacy or wider political issues. Overall, this view suggests that disaster diplomacy‘s interconnectedness should be actively reduced in order to avoid connections between disaster and diplomacy. An example comes from Glantz (2000) for the Cuba-USA case study. Much of the scientific and technical cooperation between Cubans and Americans might be successful because it occurs as only scientific and technical cooperation—without any other expectations and without connecting it to politics. The diplomats and politicians, especially on the American side, have remained largely ignorant of that cooperation, so they cannot politicise it, criticise it, or otherwise interfere with it. The pathway of focusing on disaster-related activities and actively avoiding linking disaster-related and diplomatic activities is exemplified.

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The counterargument is that this view is naïve. As shown by the interconnectedness and the vulnerability and disaster processes, disasters are inherently political. Separating disasters and diplomacy is artificial, evading reality. Even for Cuba and the USA, according to this counterargument, much more could be achieved for disasters and for diplomacy if the scientific and technical cooperation were used to forge political cooperation. On the other hand, if setting up artificial barriers—in order to bypass reality by avoiding disaster and diplomacy interconnectedness as much as feasible—assists in achieving the goals of predisaster activities, is that a justifiable method? The answer could depend on the prioritisation of pre-disaster actions compared to wider political, human rights, development, and sustainability processes. In contrast to pre-disaster actions, disaster diplomacy following a disaster tends to fail due to too many disaster-related and diplomacy-related players with multiple relationships at multiple levels pursuing multiple purposes. The earlier discussion on the complication, and complications of interpreting, disaster diplomacy purposes is relevant. In a post-disaster situation, too much interconnectedness exists to solidly sort through possible disaster diplomacy achievements and how to reach those achievements, especially given the rapidly evolving nature of many disaster situations along with the diplomacy or politics connected to those situations. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated this speed when the American government had trouble during the catastrophe‘s initial days in keeping up with the offers of international aid (Kelman, 2007). Developing and maintaining strict links between disaster-related activities and diplomacy might not be feasible during a post-disaster situation due to the large level of interconnectedness that cannot be avoided and that rapidly evolves. Kelman (2006a) describes that for the Ethiopia-Eritrea case study. Some aid agencies were trying so hard to create disaster diplomacy that, perhaps, it was bound to fail. If drought aid and conflict resolution had been sought separately, the outcome could potentially have been more successful for both. If this speculation is correct, then the separate successes would have occurred irrespective of the realities of (i) the drought and the conflict, and their root causes, being highly interconnected, (ii) the rapidly evolving situation, in both the drought and the conflict, and (iii) the inevitable links between drought, aid, and conflict that other parties might make, fairly or unfairly. An imposed and artificial separation between disaster and diplomacy could perhaps be used as a powerful force for addressing both disaster and diplomacy in separate fora. Established and respected modes for humanitarian aid and disaster risk reduction could be promoted; for example, the Seven Fundamental Principles bonding the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. These seven principles are Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary service, Unity, and Universality. The impartiality and neutrality principles support the approach of not connecting disaster-related activities with diplomatic or political demands. Yet others have questioned the relevance, practicality, and appropriateness of these principles in all circumstances (e.g. Cuny, 1983; Norris, 2007; Rieff, 2003; Terry, 2002). The accusation of naivety comes to the forefront because disasters are inherently political and disaster-related activities are inherently political processes. Since disasters and diplomacy are inherently interconnected, why not admit that and try to use that reality to seek positive outcomes from the interconnectedness?

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The answer is that, given the complexities and interconnectedness, how can ‗positive outcomes‘ ever be certain, especially over the long-term? Would it be preferable to focus on each activity separately, however artificial the separation between disaster-related activities and politics, in order to be more certain of achieving more modest and targeted goals? Ultimately, the answers to those questions, and the decisions that must be made with or without convincing arguments, are contextual. They are contextual in terms of case studies, circumstances, histories, desired goals, and views of the parties involved especially regarding prioritisation of disaster-related activities compared to diplomacy. That prioritisation might cover, for example, whether or not a rights-based approach or specific foreign policy doctrines would be adopted as the starting point. The fundamental question is: Irrespective of the real interconnectedness, for the most effective action, how and how much should disasters and diplomacy be separated? No answer will be obvious, agreeable to all, or absolute. The consequence of the lack of lucid and universal answers is that disaster diplomacy discussions end up entangled in theoretical and practical knots. So many threads interconnect disaster topics, diplomacy topics, and disaster diplomacy topics that following one or sorting through selected ones becomes a futile exercise, especially at the time scales where action on disasters, diplomacy, or disaster diplomacy would be useful.

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CONCLUSION Disaster diplomacy tends to fail and has so many competing interests and complexities that it might not be feasible to make it work. Hope in disaster diplomacy resolving either disaster or diplomacy challenges seems to be misplaced—at least, according to the evidence of case studies examined so far. Despite this bleakness, it is important to remember that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. That is, successful disaster diplomacy being absent amongst the case studies examined precludes neither (i) further case studies, either historical or in the future, showing cause for optimism in disaster diplomacy or (ii) further depth of investigation revealing more positive outcomes. Regarding further case studies, history is rife with battles affected by weather. Lewis (1999) suggests Robert Louis Stevenson‘s discussion of the 1889 typhoon in Apia, Samoa wrecking German, American, and British fleets, preventing a battle. As noted earlier, Wheeler (1991, 1995) describes the influence of storms on a few European naval battles. In 1672 and then by both sides during World War II, parts of the Netherlands were flooded deliberately to impede enemy soldiers (Wagret, 1968). Russia‘s winter weather has severely hindered an invading army contributing to Russia‘s victory at least three times: Charles XII of Sweden from 1708-1709, Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of 1812 and Adolf Hitler from 1941-1943. These examples, amongst many more, could be investigated in light of disaster diplomacy work to see how well they relate to disaster diplomacy‘s analysis and conclusions. More contemporary examples remain to be analysed fully as well. As one illustration, on http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org Nick Cater suggests that the 1988 earthquake in Armenia influenced the glasnost and perestroika processes that opened up the USSR because the Soviet government (i) admitted that they could not cope with the disaster, setting a precedent, (ii), permitted outsiders to enter the USSR to assist, setting another precedent, and (iii)

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revealed to Mikhail Gorbachev the inadequacies of the Soviet system compared to the better abilities of the outsiders. Since Gorbachev‘s reforms started before this disaster, it did not create the Cold War thaw, but delving deeper into the disaster‘s influence on Gorbachev‘s thought processes and governance actions would be useful. Finally regarding case studies, disasters including various forms of conflict continue to occur. Investigating new instances of potential disaster diplomacy would contribute to identifying any possible successes. Aside from more case study analysis, further depth of investigation is warranted into disaster diplomacy patterns, especially over longer time scales than many case studies have been investigated to date. A particular track to pursue is to recognise that even entirely failed disaster diplomacy attempts teach those involved about disaster diplomacy, create contacts, and generate lessons for future scenarios. As Glantz (2000) notes for the Cuba-USA case study, the high level of disaster-related scientific and technical cooperation means that when the politicians of both countries decide to strengthen ties, as happened after Fidel Castro stepped down from leading Cuba in 2008, a foundation exists for cooperation to expand. That form of disaster diplomacy, happening at the individual level until the governmental level is ready to engage with it, could prove to be the most successful manifestation. Other possible successes from individual level disaster diplomacy are discussed by Akcinaroglu et al. (2008) who suggest that a grassroots desire for reconciliation can be a powerful driver. Similarly, the abysmal failure of India-Pakistan disaster diplomacy following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake disaster contributed to the threat of violent conflict between the two countries later that year (Kelman, 2003). Two years later, the failure of India-Pakistan disaster diplomacy following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake was not so bitter, being treated cautiously by the leaders, as part of the ups and downs of India-Pakistan relations (Kelman, 2006a and see also Akcinaroglu et al., 2008). Were lessons learned from 2001 and applied, softening the 2005 situation? Greece and Turkey also learned from their disaster diplomacy roller-coaster after the 1999 earthquakes (Ker-Lindsay, 2000, 2007) which might have helped their rapprochement survive other difficult times. This speculation requires more research to determine if the negative attitude towards disaster diplomacy could be overturned somewhat. Positive but more subtle outcomes might be ever-present, feeding into the slow pace of diplomacy and supporting peace-making in more understated and indirect manners than the disaster diplomacy literature to date has uncovered—or even considered. The disaster diplomacy literature might not have uncovered that because the authors have not looked for it, having become mired in the negative outlook. The conclusion is that optimism is appropriate for disaster-related activities providing a useful connection point to pursue long-term reduction of enmity and augmented cooperation. The knots tying disaster diplomacy might inspire attempts at loosening them, even if not untying them, in order to make some progress towards simultaneous disaster risk reduction and reconciliation — means that disaster diplomacy might rarely be at the top of the foreign policy or disaster risk reduction agendas—even if that prioritisation can be legitimised from both disaster and diplomacy perspectives—but that the interconnectedness leads to opportunities never being absent for positive disaster diplomacy results.

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REFERENCES Akcinaroglu, S., DiCicco, J. M., & Radziszewski, E. (2008). Avalanches and Olive Branches: Natural Disasters and Peacemaking between Interstate Rivals. A 2008 update of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 27 March 3, 2007 in Chicago, Illinois. Available at http://www.disasterdiplomacy. org/publications.html#akcinarogluetal2008 Banseka, C. L. (2002). Development for Peace: In Search for Solutions to Conflicts in SubSaharan Africa. PhD dissertation, Münster: Münster University. Bayne, N. & Woodcock, S. (Eds.) (2007). The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Blondet, M., Garcia, G. V. & Brzev, S. (2003). Earthquake-resistant construction of adobe buildings: A tutorial. Contribution to the World-Housing Encyclopedia http://www. world- housing.net/Tutorials/Tutorial.asp Bosher, L. S. (Eds.) (2008). (2008) Hazards and the Built Environment: Attaining Built-in Resilience. London: Taylor and Francis. Chasek, P. (2001). Earth Negotiations: Analyzing thirty years of environmental diplomacy. Tokyo: UNU Press. Clifford, R. A. (1956). The Rio Grande flood; a comparative study of border communities in disaster. Publication No. 458, Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council. Coburn, A., Hughes, R., Spence, R., & Pomonis, A. (1995). Technical Principles of Building for Safety. London: Intermediate Technology Limited. Comfort, L. (2000). Disaster: Agent of Diplomacy or Change in International Affairs? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIV(1), 277-294. Cuny, F. (1983). Disasters and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dixit, A. (2003). The Community Based Program of NSET for Earthquake Disaster Management. Paper presented at The International Conference on Total Disaster Risk Management, Kobe, 2-4 December 2003. Doering, M. (2003). The Politics of Nature: Constructing German Reunification During the Great Oder Flood of 1997. Environment and History, 9, 195-214. Enia, J. (2008). Peace in its Wake? The 2004 Tsunami and Internal Conflict in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Journal of Public and International Affairs, 19, 7-27. Gaillard, J. C., Clavé, E. & Kelman, I. (2008). Wave of peace? Tsunami disaster diplomacy in Aceh, Indonesia. Geoforum, 39(1), 511-526. GHI. (2006). Seismic Safety for Adobe Homes: What Everyone Should Know. Palo Alto, CA: GHI (GeoHazards International). Glantz, M. H. (1994). Creeping Environmental Problems. The World & I, June, 218-225. Glantz, M. H. (Eds.) (1999). Creeping Environmental Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Glantz, M. H. (2000). Climate-Related Disaster Diplomacy: A US-Cuban Case Study. Cambridge Review of International Affairs XIV, no. 1, 233-253. Hartmann, B. (2007). Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Who‘s Taking the Heat for Global Warming?. Paper delivered at the panel on Climate Change, 4S Annual Conference Montréal, Québec, 11 October 2007.

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Hewitt, K. (Eds.) (1983). Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology. London: Allen & Unwin. Hewitt, K. (1997). Regions of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disasters. Longman, Essex: Addison Wesley. Holloway, A. (2000). Drought Emergency, Yes...Drought Disaster, No: Southern Africa 1991-93. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIV(1), 254-276. Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kelman, I. (2003). Beyond Disaster, Beyond Diplomacy. In M. Pelling (Eds.) Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World, (110-123). London: Routledge. Kelman, I. (2005). Tsunami Diplomacy: Will the 26 December, 2004 Tsunami Bring Peace to the Affected Countries?. Sociological Research Online, 10(1), http://www.socresonline. org.uk/10/1/kelman.html Kelman, I. (2006a). Acting on Disaster Diplomacy. Journal of International Affairs, 59(2), 215-240. Kelman, I. (2006b). Island Security and Disaster Diplomacy in the Context of Climate Change. Les Cahiers de la Sécurité, 63, 61-94. Kelman, I. (2007). Hurricane Katrina Disaster Diplomacy. Disasters, 31(3), 288-309. Kelman, I., Davies, M., Mitchell, T., Orr, I., & Conrich, B. (2006). Island Disaster ParaDiplomacy in the Commonwealth. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 95(386), 561-574. Kelman, I., & Gaillard, J. C. (2007). Disaster diplomacy in Aceh. Humanitarian Exchange, 37, 37-39. Kelman, I., & Koukis, T. (2000). ‗Disaster Diplomacy‘, Special section in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIV(1), 214-294. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2000). Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of ‗Disaster Diplomacy‘? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIV(1), 215-232. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2007). Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. London: IB Tauris. Le Billon, P. & Waizenegger, A. (2007). Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32(3), 411-427. Lecours, A. (2002). Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions. International Negotiation, 7, 91-114. Lewis, J. (1999). Development in Disaster-prone Places: Studies of Vulnerability. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Lewis, J. (2003). Housing construction in earthquake-prone places: perspectives, priorities and projections for development. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 18(2), 35-44. Mileti, D. & 136 contributing authors. (1999). Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. Norris, J. (2007). The Disaster Gypsies: Humanitarian Workers in the World‘s Deadliest Conflicts, Westport. CT: Praeger Security International. O‘Keefe, P., Westgate, K. & Wisner, B. (1976). Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. Nature, 260, 566-567.

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Oliver-Smith, T. (1986). The Martyred City: Death and Rebirth in the Andes. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. Quarantelli, E. L. & Dynes, R. R. (1976). Community Conflict: Its Absence and Presence in Natural Disasters. Mass Emergencies, 1, 139-152. Rieff, D. (2003). A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Roberts, G. K. (2003). ‗Taken at the Flood‘? The German General Election 2002. Government and Opposition, 38(1), 53-72. Terry, F. (2002). Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wagret, P. (1968). Polderlands. London: Methuen & Co. Weizhun, M. & Tianshu, Q. (2005a). Shanghai Institute For International Studies International Review and World Economy and Politics, Spring, 2005, 111-124. Weizhun, M. & Tianshu, Q. (2005b). Disaster Diplomacy: A New Diplomatic Approach? The Apocalypse of the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. World Politics and Economy (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), no. 6, no pagination. Wheeler, D. (1991). The Influence of the Weather During the Camperdown Campaign of 1797, The Mariner’s Mirror, 77(1), 47-54. Wheeler, D. (1995). A climatic reconstruction of the Battle of Quiberon Bay, 20 November 1759. Weather, 50(7), 230-239. Wisner, B., Blaikie., P., Cannon, T. & Davis, I. (2004). At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (2nd) (Eds.) London: Routledge.

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In: Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World Editor: George T. Overton, pp. 75-90

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Chapter 4

EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VALUE PROJECTION: SOFT POWER IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC Stephen Hoadley

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ABSTRACT European interaction with the Pacific islands has evolved from exploration and exploitation through a century of colonialism to the current post-colonial links of diplomacy, trade, aid, and cultural exchange. Bilateral relations by member states have been overlaid by the collective policies of the European Union (EU), often mediated through the coordination initiatives of the Pacific Island Forum, although policy variations between governments remain. The most significant development of the past decade, illustrative of the growing influence of the WTO on the European Union, is the conversion of the preferential trade arrangements of the EU‘s Cotonou Agreement into Economic Partnership Agreements despite potentially adverse consequences for the Pacific island states, namely loss of import tax revenue and erosion of the competitiveness of island enterprises. Of secondary but rising priority is the EU‘s exercise of political dialogue in pursuit of democracy, human rights protection, rule of law, and good governance on the part of partner island governments. Dialogue, followed by warnings and then sanctions, were applied to Fiji following the coup of December 2006. Despite EU (and other governments‘) persistent admonitions, the Interim Government of Fiji by mid-2008 had not responded with a credible roadmap leading to an election and return to civil government. Nevertheless the EU has gone ahead with an interim Economic Partnership Agreement with Fiji, and also with Papua New Guinea. Other island governments are hesitating. At time of writing the two stalemates – an incomplete network of Pacific island EPAs and the persistence of military rule in Fiji -continue without a resolution in sight. These developments have relevance for theories of post-colonial relations, democracy promotion, and foreign policy analysis, and are illustrative of the limits of the EU‘s ‗soft power‘.

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INTRODUCTION European relations with the Pacific islands have evolved rapidly from colonialism to tutelage to partnership in the aftermath of World War II. At present an array of diplomatic and economic linkages connect the two regions. The relationship is generally harmonious, but three issues have arisen in the past decade that have challenged the leaders of both regions. The first is the EU initiative to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with island states to replace the preferential trade passages of the Cotonou Agreement ruled illegal by the World Trade Organisation. The aims, process, content, and possible adverse consequences of these new agreements are worthy of close inspection and assessment. The second is the implementation by the EU of ‗political dialogues‘ prescribed by the Cotonou Agreement, particularly the democracy and suspension clauses now standard in all EU agreements with partner governments. The third is the application of political dialogue to Fiji in the wake of the December 2006 military coup. The actions taken by the EU (and other governments) have been robust but the Fiji Interim Government‘s resistance has been equally stout and the outcome of the test of wills is still in doubt at time of writing. At the same time, the EU has deployed its diplomatic, trade, and aid influence to promote democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance in the region and in Fiji in particular. Success has proved elusive to the EU. But it may be argued that it is premature to judge until March 2009, the date the Interim Government has indicated an election is to be held, and also acknowledge that no other government has provided a more promising alternative, and that all governments are working in consultation with the EU to persuade the Interim Government voluntarily to return to constitutional democracy. The actions of the Interim Government suggest indifference to, and sometimes defiance of, the EU‘s importuning, suggesting limits to the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion policies exercised by means of the EU‘s soft power. Nevertheless the EU persists since democracy promotion policies are expressions of the EU‘s identity whether or not they produce results. Finally, it is suggested that study of this and related cases of EU-Pacific island relations could be adapted to hypothesis-testing in several spheres, notably post-colonial theory, democracy theory, foreign policy analysis, and the efficacy of soft power.

EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC IN HISTORY From the 16th century Europeans have transited, explored and exploited the Pacific islands.1 The earliest were the Spaniards Magellan, Ortiz de Retes, and de Mendana in the 1500s, at which time the first European colonies in Guam and Manila were founded. The English explorers Francis Drake, James Cook and William Dampier arrived in the 17th century, and France sent its first explorer, Antoine de Bougainville, to the Pacific in 1767. A succession of English, French, Dutch, German and Russian explorers arrived soon thereafter, 1

For South Pacific history see J. C. Beaglehole, The Exploration of the Pacific (London: A.C.Black, 1934), D. L. Oliver, The Pacific Islands (Garden City: Doubleday, rev ed 1951) and N.Douglas and N. Douglas eds., Pacific Islands Yearbook, (North Ryde NSW: Angus & Robertson, 16th ed. 1989), and R. D. Craig and F. P. King, eds., Historical Dictionary of Oceania (London: Greenwood, 1981). A convenient chronology may be found in Steve Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 16-17.

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leaving their names on the maps of the region but little else of permanence. They were followed by whalers and sealers, petty traders, and missionaries. Settlement by Europeans began in earnest in the 19th century, initiated by the British colony of New South Wales in 1799. Colonisation was driven in part by the rivalry of Britain and France following the Napoleonic Wars. During this period Spain extended her colonies in the central Pacific and Germany established new colonies in the South Pacific. But by the end of the century Britain emerged as predominant in the region with colonies or protectorates in Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Papua, and Pitcairn. France followed with overseas territories in New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia and a condominium with Britain in New Hebrides, now Vanuatu. 2 For a time Spain hung on in Guam, and Germany held Nieuw Guinea and Western Samoa, but by the end of World War I both had been expelled from the region by Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand respectively. By the end of World War II Japan, a relative late-comer in the inter-war period, retired to its home islands and only the United States remained in possession of Pacific islands north of the Equator. Britain and France were the sole European powers left south of the Equator, not counting those ‗outposts of Britain‘ (as their detractors in Asia call them) Australia and New Zealand. Post-war responsibilities to their subject peoples, enshrined in the United Nations Charter and monitored by the Trusteeship Council, and also strategic concerns to forestall rivalry and instability, led the governing powers to set up the South Pacific Commission in 1947. Besides the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, its membership initially included Britain, France, and the Netherlands. This forum was devoted to gathering information about, and coordinating economic and technical assistance to, the island dependencies. Over time, as island colonies became independent and joined in their own right, the Commission grew in membership to its present 26 (see Table 1), changed its name to the Pacific Community, and undertook coordination of initiatives ranging from cultural and educational promotion to environmental protection.3

DIPLOMACY At the same time, the European governments established bilateral diplomatic and economic ties with the newly independent governments of their former colonies, starting with Samoa‘s independence from New Zealand in 1962 and continuing until Belau achieved independence in free association with the United States. At present Britain has resident diplomatic posts in Suva, Fiji, Honiara, Solomon Islands, Port Vila, Vanuatu, and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, and accredited diplomatic ties with most of the other Pacific islands. Pitcairn remains directly administered. France has concentrated its attention on its three overseas territories, which are self-governing but not independent. In the past decade France has taken a rising interest in the neighbouring independent Pacific states and extended

2

Stephen Hoadley, New Zealand and France: Politics, Diplomacy and Dispute Management (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2005), p. 7. Also see R. Aldrich, The French Presence in the South Pacific (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) and Stephen Henningham, France in the South Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University Peace Research Centre, 1989).

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a small portion of its bilateral aid to them, particularly Vanuatu, a former colony, and Cook Islands which borders on French Polynesia. France has embassies in Suva, Port Moresby, and Port Vila. The ambassadors of Britain, France, and Germany resident in Wellington, Canberra and Washington are accredited to a number of Pacific island governments, for example the German ambassador to New Zealand is accredited to Fiji, the ambassador to Australia is accredited to Vanuatu, and German interests in Papua New Guinea are looked after by an honorary consul. The freely associated states of the central Pacific are dealt with by the European ambassadors resident in Washington DC. All these European governments encourage trade and investment and facilitate tourism and cultural and educational exchanges between their countries and Pacific island countries on a bilateral basis

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Table 1. Membership of the Pacific Community. Island state members American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna. Outside members* Australia, France Great Britain** New Zealand, United States of America. *The Netherlands withdrew in the 1962. **The United Kingdom withdrew at the beginning of 1996, rejoined in 1998 and withdrew again in January 2005. Source: Pacific Community Secretariat at http://www.spc.int/corp/ accessed 2 May 2008 3

Find basic information from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community at http://www.spc.int/corp/ accessed 2 May 2008.

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TRADE AGREEMENTS

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The establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 injected a new element into the Europe-Pacific island relationship. The EEC is a customs union that maintained barriers against imports from non-members. 4 To accommodate their former colonies as they became independent states and therefore moved outside the EEC‘s tariff and quota wall, France and Britain persuaded their fellow members to make special arrangements for the so-called ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific). A series of treaties was negotiated between the EEC states and the ACP states whereby the EEC granted the exports of the ACP countries preferential entry to the EEC market. Other facets of the arrangements included guaranteed prices to be paid by the EEC for key import commodities such as sugar, coffee, rice and tuna, a programme of assistance to the ACP countries to be administered through the European Development Fund, and loans to private sector enterprises by the European Investment Bank. Over time the membership of the ACP group grew from an initial 31 to the current 79 as small poor dependencies achieved independence, for example, East Timor, formerly a colony of Portugal. The privileges were non-reciprocal, that is, the ACP countries were not obligated to open their markets to European imports at zero tariffs or quotas if they chose not to, or to grant any special privileges to European governments, firms, or individuals, but they had the effect of structuring incentives in such a way that the former colonial nexus of exchange of raw materials and commodities for manufactured goods and technical services was prolonged into the post-colonial era. These arrangements were formalised in agreements concluded in 1964, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1995, and 2000, better known by their names the Yaoundé Convention, the Lomé Convention, and most recently the Cotonou Agreement, the latter of which was signed in 2000 and came into force in 2002.5

TRADE CONTROVERSY Traders of those countries not members of either the EU6 or the ACP treaties suffered tariff and quota discrimination, and their governments began to complain that the EU was violating the principles of the World Trade Organization (formerly General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that prescribed non-discrimination and ‗most favoured nation‘ treatment.7

4

Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein, The International Relations of the European Union (Hadlow: Pearson Education, 2005). 5 On the Cotonou Agreement see http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm accessed 2 May 2008. For discussion see Holland, Martin, ed. Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years (London: Continuum International, 2nd ed 2004) and Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 6 The EEC, set up by the Rome Treaty in 1957, was subsumed by the European Communities in the Brussels Treaty 1967, which were subsumed by the first pillar of the three-pillar European Union in the Maastricht Treaty 1992, of which the European Commission is the executive agent for purposes of treaty negotiation. For simplicity the term EU is used hereafter, which may be taken to mean the European Commission (primarily the Directorate General for Trade) representing Pillar One (trade and economic affairs) of the European Union. 7 This and following issues are summarised by Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002). The official EU version is found at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs

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The complaints escalated as a consequence of the so-called ‗banana war‘ wherein the United States and several banana-growing states filed a case against EU discrimination of ‗dollar bananas‘ (grown in Central and South American countries and sold mainly to the United States) in favour of ACP bananas. The WTO ruled against the EU. Other non-ACP developing countries joined the chorus and opposition in the WTO to the EU-ACP arrangements hardened. The EU was obliged to seek a temporary waiver to prolong the special arrangements, now formalized in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. With reluctant acquiescence of the complainants, the WTO granted a waiver, but only to the end of 2007, with little prospect of it being renewed, given the determination of the non-ACP states and the United States to oppose it. Table 2. ACP members, by region Africa Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo-Brazzaville Congo-Kinshasa Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea

Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia

Niger Nigeria Rwanda São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

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Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Cuba Dominica Dominican Republic Grenada

Guyana Haiti Jamaica Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago

Pacific Cook Islands Timor-Leste Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands FS Micronesia Nauru Niue

Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

Source: Map at http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries_en.cfm accessed 2 May 2008.

/2003/december/tradoc_115007.pdf and related documents presented by the Directorate General of Trade http://trade.ec.europea.eu, accessed 12 May 2008. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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The EU in the early 2000s devised a new strategy to maintain Europe‘s special links with the ACP countries. It proposed to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to replace the Cotonou Agreement. These EPAs were to be reciprocal free trade agreements, therefore ‗WTO-legal‘ under Article 24 of the GATT agreement. EU and ACP states would be on a level footing, agreeing as nominal equals to open their markets to each other. These agreements were to be comprehensive, that is, to include liberalisation not only of commodity trade but also of services and investment. The EU‘s aim was to group the ACP states into six regions, each of which would have a uniform regional EPA. This approach was designed by the EU to encourage regional cooperation, policy harmonisation, and institutional consolidation, and thus equip the ACP economies better to compete in a rapidly developing and globalising world. However, many ACP governments hesitated to forego revenues generated by import duties or to surrender control over their economies entailed by guaranteed entry of European service providers or investors. They also argued that countries within a region differed substantially, and therefore standardised regional agreements were not only politically difficult to achieve but also insensitive to local economic conditions. Some sceptics, and many ACP leaders of a nationalistic persuasion, saw the European approach as paternalistic, an attempt to replicate the European Union model in the developed world. Finally, the ‗political dialogue‘ provisions of the EPAs were characterised as imposition of European values on non-European governments and criticised as a new version of ‗conditionality‘ so disliked when applied by the IMF during financial crises.8 Throughout the mid-2000s the EU devoted considerable diplomatic energy to drafting EPAs and negotiating with ACP states. To the consternation of the Europeans, but not surprising to those familiar with the regions and sensitive to their wide diversity, the negotiations were more difficult than anticipated, and slipped far behind schedule. The ACP governments required varied ‗carve-outs‘ (exemptions) to protect sensitive industries or services, and long phase-in times that stretched the envelope of WTO acceptability. They lobbied for continuation of guaranteed purchases of sugar and other commodities, more generous provision of aid and loans, and limitations on the ‗political dialogues‘. Furthermore they demanded access to labour markets as well as commodity markets, essentially the right for their workers to migrate in search of jobs in Europe. EU negotiators, well aware of heightened political controversy in Europe over rapid legal and illegal migrations, fended off these demands by pointing out that immigration was a competence of member governments and could not be negotiated at the EU level.

EPAS IN THE PACIFIC? By the end of 2007 there was only one region, the Caribbean Economic Community (CARIFORUM) that had signed a consolidated EPA. Southern, Eastern and Western African regions signed partial interim agreements but without those of its members that objected to

8

Tenu Avafia and Dirk Hansohn, ‗Political Conditions in the Cotonou Agreement: Economic and Legal Implications‘, Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, Windhoek, NEPRU working Paper No. 93 (February 2004).

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provisions that they found incompatible with their specific interests.9 In the Pacific islands, no regional agreement was achieved. In 2006 Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Kiribati had broken ranks with their Pacific Islands Forum partners by asserting their intention to negotiate separate tuna access agreements with the EU.10 Issues including fisheries, services, investment, rules of origin and migration proved intractable. A heated exchange of letters ensued in which the Pacific islands representative accused the EU of ‗pressure‘ by threatening to withhold European Development Fund monies development funds if the Pacific ACP governments did not accept the European draft agreement.11 The EU spokesperson denied that was the case.12 The EPA initiative was partly salvaged by the Directorate General for Trade who at the last moment succeeded in concluding ‗interim‘ EPAs bilaterally with Papua New Guinea and Fiji. He then announced that the region-wide EPA negotiations, with the assistance of the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, would continue with a target date for completion set for December 2008. Meanwhile the WTO‘s continuance waiver for the Cotonou Agreement had expired at the end of 2007, and its preferential access provisions became ‗illegal‘. But the practical consequences for the small Pacific states were minimal because their exports to the European Union were miniscule and already granted preferential entry under either the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or the special provisions for nonreciprocal entry allowed by the WTO to Least Development Countries (LDCs). All of the Pacific ACP countries were also Least Developed Countries (LDCs) entitled to trade privileges, and the EU in its Everything But Arms (EBA) policy adopted by the European Council in 2001 had declared its willingness to accept without tariffs or quotas (save residual restrictions on sugar, rice, and bananas) all LDC non-weapon exports that qualified under normal rules of origin. Samoa, however, was on the verge of ‗graduating‘ from the LDC category, so was expected to encourage the regional negotiations or, if they stalled, to explore the bilateral interim EPA route taken by PNG and Fiji. For the other Pacific states there was little urgency. On the contrary, scepticism prevailed about the wisdom of surrendering national economic policy prerogatives, losing tariff revenues, incurring the compliance costs necessary to meet and maintain complex European standards of performance, monitoring, and reporting.

DIALOGUE ON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW While the economic issues posed by the negotiation of EPAs absorbed much EU diplomatic energy, political issues embedded in the EPAs, and in particular the provision for ‗political dialogue‘ over democracy, human rights and the rule of law, gradually assumed more importance. The requirement for political dialogue is embedded in the EPAs and their 9

‗Update: Interim Economic Partnership Agreements‘, in EU Directorate General for Trade newsletter Trade Policy in Practice (19 December 2007). 10 Samisoni Pareti,‘Trade Furore: Pacific Solidarity Thrown into Disarray‘, Islands Business (September 2006), text found at www.bilterals.org, accessed 26 February 2008. 11 Samisoni Pareti, ‗EPA with Europe in Doubt‘, Islands Business (January 2007), found at www.bilaterals.org, accessed 26 February 2007. 12 Letter from Roberto Ridolfi, Head of EU Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific to Greg Irwin, Secretary General , Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 3 August 2007.

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parent treaty the Cotonou Agreement, which remains in force (minus the non-reciprocal trade access provisions) whether ACP governments have signed an EPA or not. The provision for ‗political dialogue‘ has its roots in the 1980s, emerged formally in the Lomé IV Agreement in 1990, and reached maturity in the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2001. 13 It is now a consolidated guideline manifested in standardised passages that obligate all signatories of Cotonou, and by extension the EPAs that derive from Cotonou, to acknowledge liberal political values. 14 The following paragraphs trace how it came to be an element of the economic agreements between the EU and the ACPs. The original association agreements signed by the EU with European colonies as they became independent were economic in character, devoted primarily to trade arrangements, and resting on the implicit assumption that trade would promote development which would in turn foster good governance and democratic politics. Furthermore, the Europeans wished to avoid the appearance of paternalism, and the newly independent leaders were hypersensitive to any action that could be construed as intervention by the former colonial governments. The Lomé Convention of 1976, for example, in Article 40 mentioned only ‗social development‘ and ‗greater wellbeing of the population‘ as purposes of economic cooperation with Europe; it was silent on other matters related to democracy or human rights. The atrocities committed by Idi Amin in Uganda in 1977, added to mounting evidence of repressive behaviour by many governments of former colonies, stimulated reconsideration by European liberals, who began to search for a means of using economic agreements to leverage political reform. In 1977 the European Council, reflecting on a study by the Commission, for the first time linked human rights to development assistance. EU Commissioner Claude Cheysson proposed to formalise the link by inserting clauses referring to Articles 3 (right to life, liberty, and security) and 5 (freedom from torture or cruel and degrading punishment) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the Lomé Convention when it was renegotiated. Strong opposition by the ACP governments, and lack of consensus among EC member governments, stopped this initiative and Lomé II (1981) contained no reference to human rights. However, pressure from the European Parliament after 1979 added ti continued concern over apartheid in South Africa and the adoption of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights in 1981 combined to produce a more amenable political atmosphere for human rights proponents. Consequently the Lomé III agreement of 1986 acknowledged the states-parties‘ ‗faith in fundamental human rights, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations big and small‘, albeit only in the preamble. In Lomé IV, concluded in 1989, the pledge ‗the promotion of human rights‘ and ‗structures to promote human rights‘, in Article 5, appeared for the first time in the text of an EC-APC agreement. This innovation paralleled clauses on democracy and human rights inserted into agreements with Central American governments in 1985 and South American governments later in the decade. For example, an agreement with

13

The source for this and the following passages is Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005). 14 Vaughne Miller, ‗The Human Rights Clause in the EU‘s External Agreement‘, House of Commons Library International Affairs and Defence Research Paper 04/33 (16 April 2004) accessed at www.parliament.uk/ commons/lib/research/rp2005 on 20 April 2008., and Horng, Der-Chin, ‗The Human Rights Clause in the European Union‘s External Trade and Development Agreements‘, European Law Journal, Vol 9, No. 5 (December 2003, pp. 677-701.

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Argentina in 1990 asserted that ‗this agreement in its entirety [is] based on the respect for democratic principles and human rights….‘15 The end of Soviet domination and the flowering of democracy in Eastern Europe and Latin America stimulated further European initiatives. 16 In 1991 the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted the Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development formally providing for negative as well as positive measures in aid policy and economic agreements with non-EU states. The following year a democracy and human rights clause was incorporated as ‗an essential element‘ in agreements with Brazil, the Andean Pact states, the Baltic states, and Albania. Also a ‗suspension clause‘ was added, allowing EU to suspend aid in response to bad behaviour by partner governments, and this clause became standard in subsequent EU agreements. And in 1995 a clause enjoining ‗respect for the rule of law‘ was added to clauses requiring adherence to democracy and human rights.17 To give institutional support to these admonitions, the Council, prodded by the European Parliament, in 1994 established the European Initiative (later renamed European Instrument) for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIPDHR) to be managed by European Commission. The initial budget of Euro59 million grew to Euro102 million annually by 2001, and member states separately allocated another Euro500 million to DHR by 2000. Germany allocated Euro200 million mostly via political party foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for party strengthening. Despite misgivings by many ACP governments, these initiatives were prominent in the negotiations leading to the Cotonou Agreement which replaced the Lomé arrangements. Cotonou was more ambitious and comprehensive regarding the elements that should comprise an economic partnership. It reversed the previous assumption that development would lead to democracy by asserting that democracy, human rights, rule of law, and ‗good government‘ (a phrase devised to decry corruption without giving offence to Third World leaders) were prerequisites of the effective use of aid, loans, and trade privileges. The Cotonou Agreement‘s Article 9 states Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development….The Parties reaffirm that democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing….The Partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance.[abridged quotations]

However, in contrast to the reputedly more muscular practices of the United States,18 the European Council mandated that these values would be encouraged not by threats of 15

Bartels, cited above, p. 16. Rosa Balfour, ‗Principles of Democracy and Human Rights‘, in Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, ed. Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (London: Routledge, 2006), 114-129. 17 Bartels, p. 37. 18 Pointing out the contrast between EU and US approaches are Tanja A Borzel, and Thomas Risse, ‗One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law‘, Paper prepared for Workshop on Democracy Promotion, October 4-5, 2004, Center for Development, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, found at http://www.atasp.de/downloads/tandt_stanford_final.pdf, accessed 9 May 2008 16

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suspension of agreements but rather by ‗political dialogue‘, meaning EU representatives would undertake quiet diplomacy to encourage voluntary reform rather than engage in public admonition and punishment to secure compliance. The Cotonou Agreement‘s Article 8 enjoined the parties to ‗regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides‘ in order to ‗exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas…‘. Other aims included facilitation of consultations and prevention of situations that might lead to the non-execution [suspension] clause. The dialogues are to be ‗flexible‘, ‗formal or informal according to the need‘, conducted at the ‗appropriate level‘, and are to include representatives of regional organisations and civil society organisations. The carefully crafted phrase ‗enhanced political dialogue‘ was reserved for especially difficult negotiations, entailing greater frequency and closer monitoring of progress by the delinquent government. Nevertheless a ‗non-performance‘ or ‗suspension‘ clause was inserted in all EU agreements as a legal last resort to deal with a situation of gross violation such as occurred in Uganda.19

INTERIM EPA AGREEMENTS WITH FIJI AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA

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The texts of the interim EPAs with Fiji and PNG followed these drafting formulae, particularly as regards the passages relating to political values. In the preamble of the unofficial text the EC and PNG agreed to the following REAFFIRMING their commitment to the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and to good governance, which constitutes a fundamental element of the Cotonou Agreement, and to sustainable and equitable development, along with greater involvement of an active and organised civil society and the private sector, which, along with the market economy, are the main elements recognised in the Cotonou Agreement as 20 contributing to achieving the objectives of the partnership….

In the body of the agreement these values are not repeated, and the following 56 pages of text plus annexes are devoted to economic matters. But Article 2, Principles, does make reference to the democracy passages (quoted above) of the Cotonou Agreement, which remains in force between the parties. This Agreement is based on the Fundamental Principles as well as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as spelt out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the Cotonou Agreement.

19

Cotonou Article 96 states that ‗The ―appropriate measures‖ [i.e. sanctions] referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement. It is understood that suspension would be a measure of last resort.‘ 20 The official texts have not been released since they must first be ratified by the governments concerned. An unofficial text is in this author‘s possession, and others are circulating on the internet, accessible via www. bilaterals.org.

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Thus PNG and Fiji are bound in the interim EPA agreement as well as the parent Cotonou Agreement to give consideration to the political values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, and in addition the inclusion of civil society and if they fail to do so, the EC is authorised to commence a ‗political dialogue‘ which as a last resort can lead to a suspension of the agreement.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH FIJI On 5 December 2006 the Fiji military led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama staged a coup d‘état against the elected civilian government of Prime Minister Laisenea Qarase and installed an interim government. Clearly the democracy passages of the Cotonou Agreement, of which Fiji is a signatory, were violated. European Commissioner Louis Michel on 11 December condemned the coup and warned that EU funds were ‗in danger‘. Michel specified that not only programming for the 10th European Development Fund allocations of some 64 million Fiji dollars would be delayed but also disbursements of the special fund for adaptation of Fiji‘s sugar industry of over 340 million Fiji dollars would be ‗slowing down‘. 21 Altogether, the value of EU aid in jeopardy was estimated at 100 million Euros. The provisions of Article 96 on political dialogue and consultations and of Article 37 on development aid having been triggered, on 27 February 2007 the EU sent a formal invitation to the president of Fiji (a civilian of Fijian chiefly rank who remained in office under military guidance) to begin consultations in Brussels within 30 days. 22 Consultations began on 18 April 2007. They were successful inasmuch as Fiji‘s interim government undertook a number of commitments, which are summarised below:

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     

To respect the 1997 constitution and the independence of the judiciary, the media, and the Human Rights Commission To lift the Public Emergency Regulations within 30 days To return to democracy within 24 months by means of parliamentary elections not later than 1 March 2009 To submit a ‗road map‘ of steps to the return of democracy to be audited by the Pacific Islands Secretariat To agree to ‗close monitoring‘ by the EU by means of ‗progress reports‘ to be submitted quarterly To consult with civil society and other stakeholders and continued political dialogue.23

21

Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific Press Release ‗EU Aid Funds in Danger‘, 11 December 2006. 22 Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific Press Release ‗EU Invites Fiji Interim Government to Consultations‘, 6 March 2008. 23 Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific Press Release ‗Outcome Statement on Consultations between the EU and Fiji held in Brussels from 18-19 April, 2007‘, 20 April 2007. Details on thirteen commitments by Fiji may be found in ‗Agreed Commitments with the Republic of the Fiji Islands‘, Official Journal of the European Union, L260/19, 10 May 2007.

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During mid-2007 the EU set up a serious of meetings between the ‗troika‘ of the EU, British, and French ambassadors based in Suva on the one hand and representatives of the Fiji interim government on the other, moderated by the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat. The EU representatives also participated in a second joint committee set up to consult on preparations for elections which included the Australian and New Zealand high commissioners and other diplomats and international agencies offering aid. Meanwhile, EU aid already ‗in the pipeline‘, including the 7th, 8th, and 9th EDF fund tranches and aid for human rights and civil society promotion, environmental protection, and water and energy development was resumed and regional aid and loan programmes valued at approximately 100 million Fiji dollars were continued.24 Bilateral aid by EU members was also largely uninterrupted save for selected programmes discontinued because they were thought to benefit the interim regime rather than the general population. But the 2008 and 2009 sugar allocation and planning for the next tranche of EU aid from the 10th European Development Fund were suspended pending a return to civilian democratic government. Military cooperation of all kinds was banned and diplomatic contact with the top military leaders was avoided, although contacts with mid-level civilian officials continued. The EU did not ban Fiji military leaders from travel to Europe, not having competency in immigration policy, but some individual member states such as Britain and Italy imposed travel bans. The EU in September and again in November 2007 publicly cautioned Fiji regarding a temporary imposition of emergency regulations and arrests without due process of alleged plotters.25 It might be added that the EU‘s political dialogue process, which included promotion of the political values specified in the Cotonou Agreement and the interim EPAs, was applied to other Pacific ACP governments. For example, the EU ambassador in Port Moresby conducted regular consultations with the government of Papua New Guinea in which democracy, human rights, and the rule of law were on the agenda.26 EU political dialogues with other partner government were reported to be taking place but because most Pacific island government remained constitutional and orderly (temporary exceptions being ethnic strife in Solomon Islands and riots in Honiara and Nukualofa in 2006 and 2007) there were few political differences between the EU and the Pacific island governments, and the dialogues remained infrequent, brief, and confidential.

ASSESSMENT The EU believed that the interim government‘s April 2007 undertakings and its willingness to engage in consultations constituted evidence of the success of the EU‘s Cotonou political dialogue process. 27 In contrast to frequent public criticism by the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, EU officials were muted in 24

‗Council Decision of 1 October 2007 on the conclusion of consultations with the Republic of Fiji Islands under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and Article 37 of the Development Cooperation Instrument‘, Official Journal of the European Union L260/15, 5 October 2007. 25 Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific Press Release ‗EU Statement on the Reactivation of Fiji‘s Public Emergency Regulations 2007‘, 7 September 2007 and ‗Declaration by the Presidency of behalf of the European Union on the detentions in the Republic of Fiji, 20 November 2007. 26 Interview with a European diplomat, Suva, 21 February 2008. 27 Interview with a European diplomat, Suva, 21 February 2008.

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their public criticism of the Fiji government, preferring ‗quite diplomacy‘ and ‗pragmatism‘. However, media commentators, academic analysts and NGO activists were not so sanguine about the interim government. 28 They decried the interim government‘s failure to set an election date or produce an election run-up plan, and condemned actions such as deportation of two newspaper editors, criticism of the media bordering on intimidation, a ban of the SDL party that had won the 2006 election, the failure to fund and staff the necessary election administration bodies, and hints by Commodore Bainimarama that the constitution would be amended without reconvening parliament. Fiji‘s unilateral withdrawal in June 2008 from the Fiji-Pacific Island Forum Working Group set up to consult on the return to civilian government was a further indication of the Commodore‘s intransigence. The EU‘s negotiation and signing of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement despite the Fiji interim government‘s curtailment of civilian electoral democracy and civil liberties was slated by critics as expediency bordering on hypocrisy. Officials of partner governments made the same points although more discreetly. Nevertheless the critics could not suggest viable alternatives, and partner governments in the Pacific region were not able to devise new sanctions to strengthen those already in place. The dilemma facing the EU as well as the partner governments was generic. To intervene in Fiji more forcefully risked economic harm to the innocent and a hardening of authoritarianism by the interim government rationalised by accusations of neo-colonial insensitivity. For instance, in response to a criticism of Fiji‘s media policy by New Zealand‘s minister of foreign affairs Winston Peters, Fiji‘s human rights commissioner Shaistra Shameem, a recent appointee of the interim government which had summarily sacked the previous commissioner, lashed back. Shameem accused Peters of being uneducated, ignorant, racist, anti-Asian, and ‗currying favour with the media empire in New Zealand‘, and advised him to ‗tend to his own back yard‘ before criticising Fiji.29 Commodore Bainimarama in his infrequent public speeches has made it clear he would make changes in his own way, at his own pace, not in response to pressure from abroad, and he blamed Australia‘s and New Zealand‘s economic sanctions and official travel warnings that discouraged tourism for Fiji‘s poor economic performance. On the other hand, the EU and partner governments could not ignore Fiji‘s displacement of a democratically elected government by a military junta. The EU is bound by the Cotonou Agreement to initiate an enhanced political dialogue and to activate the suspension clause if reforms are not made leading to restoration of democracy. The European Parliament has been vocal in pressing the European Commission to act. Partner governments likewise were pressed by their media and NGOs to act. The result is a mix of unilateral admonitions, selective aid curtailments, travel and contact bans, bilateral dialogues, and multilateral economic sanctions. In the view of EU spokespeople, the role of the EU collectively is constructive, complimenting the somewhat harsher policies of some EU members and partner governments in the Pacific region. The EU claims its approach is more effective and can show some evidence of success in persuading the interim government to make the April 2007 28

Outspoken in criticism were the Fiji Times, the Fiji Sun and the Pacific Network on Globalisation, all based in Suva, and overseas NGOs such as Oxfam New Zealand, Oxfam Australia, and Human Rights Watch. (New York). The Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon also voiced concern. 29 ‗Winston Peters: Still time for Fiji to commit to elections‘, NZ Herald on line, 25 March 2008, found at www. nzherald. co.nz on 25 March2008, and ‗Blistering attack on Peters from Fiji rights campaigner‘ in NZ Herald (25 March 2008).

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pledges and subsequent adjustments, notably the lifting of the emergency regulations, and regular participation in consultation with the EU troika in Suva. But if one applies a stricter standard, such as evidence of concrete steps by the interim government leading to the conduct of an election in March 2009, the EU cannot claim much success. But neither can the partner governments such as Australia, New Zealand or the United States, not to mention the media, the NGOs, or academic critics either in Fiji or abroad. This sceptical conclusion may be applied more broadly to EU results in the ACP sphere, in which governments have signed up to the democracy clauses embedded in the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs and engaged in dialogues but have not produced notable improvements in the democracy practices attributable to the EU‘s democracy policies. In contrast, EU results in the neighbouring pre-accession states of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean during the 2000s, and to a lesser extent in the Euro-Med Partnership and Stability Pact states at present, are more substantial, and significant reforms have been induced.30 The effectiveness of EU democracy promotion and values exportation generally appears to be inversely proportional to distance (political and economic as well as geographic) from Brussels. The Pacific ACP states are the most distant so expectations must be the most modest.

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CONCLUSION Nevertheless, despite its meagre record of effectiveness, democracy promotion by the EU remains a worthy cause deeply embedded in the European identity and in its treaties and external policies. The democracy policy is encouraged and monitored by the European Parliament, political reformers, NGOs, and opinion leaders. Lack of success in Fiji is accepted stoically as a consequence of post-colonial nationalism and the resistance by traditionalist island leaders to Western liberal political values. Furthermore, interim leader Commodore Bainimarama may perceive that Fiji has alternative partners such as China, Taiwan, and South Korea, and several Pacific island neighbours, which do not impose democracy conditionality. However, assistance from new Asian sources may prove episodic, tied to showcase projects executed by donor agencies, and ultimately insubstantial relative to carefully planned and negotiated project aid from traditional benefactors Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Europe. And the political centre of gravity within Fiji could shift, making the interim government or its successor more responsive to its old friends. The EU may yet achieve success through persistent dialogue and mild sanctions, as it claimed to have done following the 2000 coup in Fiji.31 Thus, judgement should be suspended at least until 2008 has run its course and the March 2009 election deadline approaches. Meanwhile patience and courtesy, backed by calibrated economic suasion, are sure to remain the EU‘s continuing policies, as the EU remains true to time-tested European values and diplomatic traditions. Even without visible results the EU will press on with its democracy-promoting political dialogues with Fiji, other Pacific 30

Karen E. Smith, ‗The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU‘s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?‘ European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 3 (1998), 253-274. 31 Maurizio Carbone, ‗Normative Power and Political Dialogue: The European Union in the South Pacific‘ AsiaPacific Journal of EU Studies, Vol 4:1 (2006), 27-42, Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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governments, and indeed all of its many partners in the ACP group, the Mediterranean, and around the world. Democracy promotion is an intrinsic good for the EU and its members, however much they may subordinate it to geopolitical and economic interests in specific cases such as Fiji. It is a deeply embedded element of the European identity, not measured by outcomes but by outputs. To paraphrase, the exercise of democratic virtue is its own reward for the EU, and will continue to feature in European relations with the Pacific island states. Finally, the case of EU relations with the Pacific islands in general, and Fiji specifically, is recommended for further study by theorists of post-colonial relations and also by theorists of democracy. For the former it confirms the asymmetric and contested nature of the NorthSouth discourse in which the final but often effective recourse of a developing state is to say no to its better-resourced patrons, a stance in which political commitment can prevail over material inducement. For the latter it provides a sobering example of the resilience of traditional elite political culture in the face of the liberal assumption that democracy is generic and merely awaits liberation, mentoring, and capacity-building to flower. Foreign policy analysts, too, may gain deeper appreciation of the domestic drivers that sustain foreign policy initiatives in the absence of observable outcomes. Enthusiasts for soft power may be disappointed to learn that the alleged attractiveness of the European market and the ingenuity of European solutions are not always compelling among non-Western political leaders and that, as Joseph Nye has pointed out in a passage often overlooked by liberals, soft power is most effective when backed by hard power. Nevertheless the spread of European values by means of the exercise of soft power is apparently satisfying in and of itself amongst those who deploy it, not least as an expression of the European identity, and outcomes in the South Pacific may be less important than the maintenance in Brussels of institutions and rituals of democracy promotion and value projection.

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In: Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World Editor: George T. Overton, pp. 91-99

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Chapter 5

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THE RESOURCE CURSE: HIGH ON RHETORIC, LOW ON RELEVANCE? Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig

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ABSTRACT A number of studies suggest that natural resources can have a negative impact on the developing prospects of countries, a phenomenon that has been labelled the resource curse. In particular, recent studies suggest that this resource curse is related to the institutional level of resource rich countries. This paper reviews international initiatives to address the resource curse, with an emphasis on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and petroleum-related aid initiatives. We argue that these initiatives only to a limited extent reflect the implications of the resource curse literature. Suggestions are made on policy and further research needed to improve the effectiveness of international foreign policy initiatives in terms of addressing institutional problems underlying the resource curse.

1. INTRODUCTION Why do 70% of the Angolan population live on less than $2 a day, in a country that earns 30 billion USD in oil revenues a year? And why did the poverty rate double in Nigeria in the period 1970-2000, when the country received cumulative oil revenues of 350 billion USD (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003)? These country examples reflect a more general pattern termed the resource curse, where, rather than being a blessing, revenues from resources such as oil can have a detrimental impact on economic development. The pattern has been documented in a number of empirical studies starting with the seminal work by  Corresponding authors: Email: [email protected]. Phone: +47 55 57 42 39  Email: [email protected]. Phone: +47 55 57 43 73

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Sachs and Warner (1995). Subsequent studies suggest that whether or not a country suffers a resource curse, depends on its institutions. Countries with bad institutions of democratic accountability and rule of law, suffer problems of patronage and rent-seeking detrimental to economic development, whereas countries with good institutions fare better.1 Predictably, no apparently good deed goes untouched by the donor community. The problems of resource rich developing countries have led to a number of international initiatives towards their alleviation. But do these initiatives address the key problems behind the resource curse? Do they reflect the present state of knowledge in the scientific literature on the resource curse? This article critically examines two types of international initiatives that have been implemented to improve the situation in resource rich countries, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and petroleum-related aid programmes. The article shows that these initiatives only to a limited extent reflect the implications of the resource curse literature, drawing on recent evaluations in Kolstad and Wiig (forthcoming) and Kolstad et al (forthcoming). There is thus little reason to expect these foreign policy initiatives to have much of an impact. The failure of several prominent initiatives to reflect available evidence suggests that the general approach of foreign policy to resource related problems is flawed. The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief, up-to-date guide of main results from the scientific literature on mechanisms behind the resource curse. Section 3 presents the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and discusses its focus in light of the resource curse literature. Section 4 takes a closer look at petroleum-related aid programmes, with a particular emphasis on the Norwegian Oil for Development programme, which is the only integrated programme of this kind. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for policy and research.

2. A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE LITERATURE A number of studies have confirmed the result of Sachs and Warner (1995) that natural resources reduce growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).2 Natural resource have also been found to reduce human development and increase inequality and poverty (Bulte et al, 2005; Gylfason, 2001). The negative effect of resources seem in particular to be related to point-source resources, such as petroleum or minerals. However, there are important exceptions to the empirical regularities uncovered by these studies, countries like Norway or Botswana seem to have performed well despite their resource wealth. Attention has therefore shifted to finding the reasons why some countries suffer a negative impact of natural resources. In other words, what are the mechanisms behind the resource curse? 1

In the following, institutions are defined as ―rules of the game‖ in society (North, 1981). This term is used somewhat inter-changeably with the term governance denoting political institutions or rules of the political game (Kolstad et al, forthcoming). 2 Where these studies use export intensity as a proxy for resources, other recent studies instead use measures of resource abundance and do not find a negative effect on growth. They therefore argue that the resource curse is a ―red herring‖ (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008) or ―elusive‖ (Lederman and Maloney, 2008). However, as argued by Kolstad and Wiig (2008) and as will become apparent below, the key mechanisms behind the curse revolve around resource rents, for which resource abundance is a poor proxy.

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Early studies pointed to so-called Dutch disease effects, where currency appreciation leads to a contraction of the manufacturing sector and a subsequent loss of productivity, as an explanation of the resource curse (Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001; Torvik, 2001, Matsuyama, 1992). However, more recent studies have cast doubt on whether this mechanism explains much of the negative effect of resources on growth, and whether Dutch disease effects are even a problem (Matsen and Torvik, 2005). Another possibility is that the resource curse operates through an institutional effect; that resources are detrimental to country institutions which in turn hurts growth. For instance, a number of studies have shown that natural resources reduce the level of democracy (Ross, 2001; Aslaksen, 2007). However, empirical results indicate that their detrimental effect on institutions does not really account for the negative effect of resources on growth (Collier and Goderis, 2007). There are strong indications that the resource curse is conditional on institutions, however. Several studies show that the negative effect of resources on growth, depends on the level of institutions of democratic accountability or the rule of law (Mehlum et al., 2006; Damania and Bulte, 2003; Kolstad, forthcoming). These and results on intermediate variables such as patterns of public spending in Collier and Goderis (1997), support political economy models of the resource curse. These models focus on how natural resource rents create incentives for patronage and rent-seeking, leading to a worse allocation of resources, and possibly reduced national income. Broadly, there are two types of political economy models of the resource curse, centralized and decentralized models, which differ on the type of agent whose behaviour is modelled.3 Centralized political economy models (or patronage models) focus on the decision problem of government officials in resource rich countries. In a typical model, a government official decides between consuming resource rents in this period, or using the rents to shore up political support in order to ensure access to resource rents in future periods. Political support can be secured in various ways, such as through offering public sector jobs to political supporters as in Robinson et al (2006) or through investment projects with high political but little economic payoff (white elephants, cf. Robinson and Torvik, 2005). If the value of natural resources increase, officials have an incentive to invest more in these forms of patronage, to increase the chance of having access to rents in future periods. This reduces allocative efficiency in the economy, as human capital is allocated to inefficient public sector jobs, or capital to inefficient investment projects. If institutions of democratic accountability are sufficiently poor, patronage and its associated inefficiencies may become sufficiently extensive to dominate the direct income that comes from more natural resources, leading to a reduction in national income. By contrast, decentralized political economy models (or rent-seeking models) centre on the decisions of skilled agents outside the power elite or entrepreneurs. In a typical model (see e.g. Mehlum et al., 2006), agents choose between using their effort, time and talent on acquiring a share of the resource rents (rent-seeking), and using them on productive activities such as starting a business. In these models, resource rents increase income, but there is also a displacement effect from productive sectors to rent-seeking since it becomes more attractive to fight for a share of the rents. Due to various kinds of external effects, when some leave the productive sector profitability there is further reduced, leading even more agents to leave. If 3

See Caselli and Cunningham (2007) for an overview of political economy models of the resource curse.

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institutions governing the rule of law are sufficiently bad, and the profitability of being in the productive sector hence low, we may be in an equilibrium where the displacement effect dominates any direct income effect from more resources, i.e. more resources lead to less national income. In both types of models, institutional weaknesses lead to dysfunctional behaviour to capture rents from natural resources. The key mechanisms behind a resource curse are hence patronage and rent-seeking, respectively. The type of institutions that matters differs, patronage models stress the importance of democratic accountability, whereas rent-seeking models emphasize the rule of law. Given the empirical support for these mechanisms, policy should focus on improving these institutions to reflect current knowledge. The question we raise below is, do international initiatives in this area do so?

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3. THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI) The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) focuses on increasing transparency of resource revenues. It aims to support improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. At its inception in 2003, then Prime Minister Tony Blair stated ―I firmly believe that the initiative can make a significant contribution to ensuring that the proceeds from mining and energy industries are used for development‖.4 Is it likely that the EITI will in fact make such a contribution? Accession to the EITI is voluntary, and 23 candidate countries have so far committed to the EITI process. To progress from being an EITI candidate to being EITI compliant, countries have to complete steps of preparation (establishing a multi-stakeholder committee and reporting procedures), disclosure (verifying company and government disclosure) and dissemination (agreeing on quality of dissemination), and finally undertake external independent validation to assess whether the country has met 20 implementation indicators. The full validation process was agreed on in March 2008, and no country has yet has time to complete an EITI validation, but only one country (Azerbaijan) is in the process of being validated. The reach of the initiative is somewhat limited; candidate countries only comprise 6.4 per cent of global oil production and 7.6 per cent of proven global oil reserves.5 While transparency is potentially important in many areas, the EITI focuses on transparency in revenue collection only. It does not address transparency in other important activities, such as procurement, nor does it cover the distribution of income and public expenditure stemming from the extractive industry revenues. The EITI provides a partial basis for accountability in the management of revenue flows from oil and other extractive industries. By comparing the payments made to governments by companies, with the payments received by governments, the revenues to governments are subjected to closer verification than would otherwise be the case. Since substantial amounts are otherwise believed to disappear in the process of collection, this is no doubt important. The EITI also underscores the importance transparency plays in governance, and represents an international standard on transparency and good governance in the area in question. 4

http://eitidev.forumone.com/UserFiles/File/speeches/blaireitidraftreportspeech.pdf

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In light of the preceding review of the resource curse literature, however, it is not immediately apparent that the EITI addresses the key challenges in resource rich countries. The EITI is an initiative that focuses on revenues from extractive industries in resource rich countries. This implies a narrow take on transparency, as only a small section of the public sector is covered. Importantly, the initiative does not address transparency in the use of public resource, i.e. the expenditure side. The expenditure side is clearly central to many of the political economy perspectives on the resource curse. Patronage politics, whereby funds or positions are transferred to supporters, is clearly about the expenditure side. The study by Robinson et al (2006) suggests that accountability in the use of public resources, is the key to avoiding the resource curse. There is, therefore, a possibility that the EITI initiative is not only narrow, but that it also gives priority to the wrong set of issues in resource rich countries. Moreover, the EITI includes the construction of a multi-stakeholder group to participate in the validation process. While this has the potential of improving accountability and participation in revenue management, there is also a risk that the group can become another arena for rent-seeking and patronage. Though civil society is to be represented in the multistakeholder group, civil society is not one thing nor necessarily representative of the population. Civil society in many resource rich developing countries is also weak. Since the multi-stakeholder group is to be appointed by the government, there is a chance that it will be peopled with government supporters. Or along the lines of rentier state arguments, a government may use its power of appointment to undermine the existence of social groups independent of the government. Moreover, fractionalistic stakeholder groups may use their potential leverage in the EITI, to acquire a greater proportion of resource rents. This suggests the need for a critical analysis of the composition and behaviour of the multi-stakeholder system of the EITI, to assess the commitment of the government to real reform in the area of transparency. There are also more general challenges in terms of implementation of EITI principles. EITI membership is voluntary for states and companies. This means that countries and companies may choose whether or not to accede to the initiative, and whether to wholeheartedly follow up on it if they do join. For instance, a country such as Angola has opted not to join the EITI. Whether or not a government chooses to accede to an initiative of this kind most likely depends on what it has to gain and its compliance costs by doing so. As corrupt government officials may have vested interests in not promoting transparency in their country, expanding EITI membership and implementation is likely to remain a problem. Unless membership status is linked to effective sanctioning mechanisms there is a low cost of non-accession or non-compliance with the validation criteria. Furthermore, transparency is, in and of itself, insufficient in improving government behaviour. In the absence of accountability, whereby other groups can hold a government to account and sanction misbehaviour, it is unclear that the EITI will have much of an effect. It is, for instance, unclear that failing to meet EITI criteria will necessarily have any repercussions on a government, in countries where accountability mechanisms are weak. Moreover, in addition to accountability, the effect of the initiative will depend on the degree to which other groups are able to process the information made available, i.e. their level of education. There are also potential free-rider problems in providing highly aggregate data that affect everyone in general but no one in particular. The EITI likely needs to be coupled with 5

Information in the paragraph updated as of June 2008.

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other types of reform to have an effect resource rich countries. The EITI+ initiative of the World Bank may represent a step in the right direction by extending the issue of transparency to the expenditure side of the public sector.

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4. PETROLEUM-RELATED AID Aiming to improve the development effect natural resources, a number of developed countries have introduced petroleum-related aid activities in developing countries rich in oil and gas. These include Norway, the US, Canada, Britain, and multilateral organizations notably the World Bank. Of these, Norway is the only country which has integrated its activities in this area into a single programme, the Oil for Development programme. This programme is a priority area in Norwegian foreign aid, and according to the Norwegian Foreign Minister ―it is hard to imagine a more strategic use of Norwegian resources in the fight against poverty‖ than this programme.6 Below, we discuss the extent to which this is the case, whether the priorities of the programme reflect the key problems in resource rich countries. While the points raised below relate to the Norwegian programme, it should be noted that they are also relevant to petroleum-related aid from other countries (see Kolstad et al, forthcoming). Norway launched the Oil for Development programme in 2005 in an effort to coordinate and extend its petroleum-related aid. It has a projected budget of about USD 45.6 million in 2008, the largest recipients of which are Sudan, East Timor and Angola. The Oil for Development programme emphasizes three ―main integrated themes‖:7 resource management, revenue management, and environmental management and control. These three main themes account for almost 90% of country allocations, with resource management being dominant and comprising more than two-thirds of this percentage. The majority of the programme‘s activities are directed at enhancing the capacity of government and civil service staff. This probably reflects the programme‘s emphasis on being demand-driven, where demand largely means government demand. Previous evaluations of Norwegian petroleum-related aid have pointed to a lack of governance activities (Ekern, 2005), which has led to more activity in this area, but these activities are still limited. Though governance is claimed to be a cross-cutting issue in the three main themes, specific activities in main cooperating countries do little to suggest that this is in fact the case.8 The priorities of the programme thus do not really reflect the policy prescriptions of the scientific literature on resources and development. The existing focus on revenue, resource, and environmental management prevalent in petroleum-related aid is too narrow and sectorspecific to address overarching problems of accountability and unfavourable incentives that are at the core of the resource curse. Nor does capacity building and technical assistance per se induce positive institutional change. While such change may be difficult to induce where key players benefit from below-par arrangements, the lack of emphasis on vertical and societal modes of accountability (democratisation, support to civil society, the free press) will 6

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/utenriksminister_jonas_gahr_store/taler_artikler/2007/En-ny-strategi. html?id=498098&epslanguage=NO, our translation. 7 http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=10060 8 http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=10094 Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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do little to produce the necessary reform. Unfortunately, no systematic analysis of the political economy of recipient countries is performed - this is done only sporadically in some cases. A recent evaluation of Norwegian petroleum-related aid to four countries concludes that ―the strict petro-technical capacity building in the programmes to a high extent has been successful, in particular in the ‗new‘ petroleum producing countries. Institutional capacity development has been less successful‖ (Norad, 2007:5). There is also little emphasis on improving institutions for the private sector that act as an inducement to productive activities as opposed to rent-seeking. In addition to a lack of reflection of the literature on natural resources, the programme has received criticism for promoting Norwegian strategic or interests and extrapolating Norwegian experience to developing country contexts.9 Allegations can easily be made that petroleum-related aid is provided or designed to further commercial ends of donor countries with strong domestic oil industries. Limiting the influence of donor country interests in petroleum-related aid has implications for organization of these types of programmes. Moreover, policies that work well in Norway, or in another developed country, do not necessarily work well in another social and political context. Experiences from other countries at a similar development stage might be more valuable for a developing country than the experience from donors like Norway. There might be alternative institutions that fit better to local institutions and are more efficient.

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5. CONCLUSION The relevance of international initiatives to address the resource curse does not match the rhetoric surrounding these initiatives. As this article has argued, the priorities of the EITI and petroleum-related aid do not reflect the implications of the scientific literature on the resource curse. To have an impact, it is imperative that international initiatives address the key problems of resource rich countries. This implies improving the accountability of governments to their citizens, particularly through activities that enhance vertical accountability (elections), and societal accountability (civil society and the media). Moreover, improving the rule of law to make productive activities a more attractive alternative to rentseeking, is important. More research is needed to provide institutional recommendations at a more detailed level, and also on how institutional change can be induced in countries where vested interests cement current institutions and practices (cf. Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). By juxtaposing two types of initiatives in this area, the preceding review also indicates that there are common problems of misdirected focus, which suggests that the overall approach of foreign policy to resource related issues is flawed. This raises the question of why inefficient initiatives like these are adopted in the first place, and perpetuated even as evidence to that effect emerges. This might reflect inertia as scientific findings are only slowly adopted in policy circles, or political and bureaucratic investment in past initiatives. However, there is also the possibility that current initiatives reflect the interests of those implementing them. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the countries behind these initiatives 9

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often have a large and dominant oil industry, which indicates that exploring the interaction of multinational oil companies and foreign policy in this area may be important. More generally, further research on the political economy in both donor and recipient countries is necessary to consider possibilities for introducing international initiatives more conducive to alleviating the resource curse.

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REFERENCES Aslaksen, S. (2007). Corruption and Oil: Evidence from Panel Data, mimeo, Department of Economics, Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Brunnschweiler, C. N. & Bulte, E. H. (2008). ―The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings‖, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55, 248-264. Bulte, E. H., Damania, R. & Deacon, R. T., (2005). ―Resource intensity, institutions and development‖, World Development, 33, 7, 1029-1044. Caselli, F. & Cunningham, T. (2007). Political decision making in resource abundant countries, Paper prepared for the OxCarre launch conference, December 2007. Collier, P. & Goderis, B. (2007). Commodity prices, growth, and the natural resource curse: Reconciling a conundrum, Paper 274, The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, Oxford University. Damania, R. & Bulte, E. (2003). Resources for sale: Corruption, democracy and the natural resource curse. Discussion paper no. 0320. Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide. Ekern, O. F. (2005). The Norwegian assistance to the petroleum sector: A state of the art study, Prepared for Norad, Final report, 12 December 2005. Gylfason, T. (2001). ―Nature, power and growth‖. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48, 5, 558-588. Kolstad, I., (forthcoming). ―The resource curse: Which institutions matter?‖ Applied Financial Economics Letters. Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A. (2008), How theory meets practice - Political economy models of the resource curse and current donor initiatives. Paper presented at the African Economic Research Consortium 20th Anniversary Conference on Natural Resource Management and Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 15–17 September 2008, Nairobi. Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A. (forthcoming), "Is transparency the key to reducing corruption in resource rich countries?", World Development. Kolstad, I. Wiig, A. & Williams, A. (forthcoming), ―Mission improbable. Does petroleum− related aid address the resource curse?‖, Energy Policy. Lederman, D. & Maloney, W. F. (2008). In search of the missing resource curse, mimeo, April 23 2008, Washington D.C.: World Bank. Matsen, E. & Torvik, R. (2005). ―Optimal Dutch disease‖, Journal of Development Economics, 78, 494-515. Matsuyama, K. (1992). ―Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth,‖ Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 317-334.

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Mehlum, H., Moene, K. & Torvik, R., (2006). ―Institutions and the Resource Curse‖. The Economic Journal, 116, 1-20. Norad. (2007). Evaluation of the Norwegian petroleum-related assistance – Case studies regarding Mozambique, Bangladesh, East Timor and Angola – Executive summary, Evaluation report 1/2007, Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. North, D. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York. Robinson, J. A. & Torvik, R. (2005). ―White Elephants‖, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 197-210. Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R. & Verdier, T. (2006), ―Political foundations of the resource curse‖, Journal of Development Economics, 79, 447-468. Ross, M. L. (2001). ―Does oil hinder democracy?‖, World Politics, 53, 325-361. Sachs & Warner (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth, NBER working paper series 5398. Sachs. & Warner. (1997). Natural resources and economic growth – revised version, working paper, Harvard University. Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. (1999). ―The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth,‖ Journal of Development Economics, 59, 43-76. Sachs, J.D. & Warner, A.M. (2001), ―The Curse of Natural Resources,‖ European Economic Review, 45, 827-838. Sala-i-Martin, X. & Subramanian, A. (2003). ―Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,‖ NBER Working Paper no. 9804. Stevens, P. & Dietsche E. (2008). ―Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward‖, Energy Policy, 36, 56-65. Torvik, R. (2001). ―Learning by doing and the Dutch disease‖, European Economic Review, 45, 285-306. Van Wijnbergen, S. J. G. (1984). ―The Dutch Disease: a Disease after All?‖ Economic Journal, 94, 41-55.

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In: Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World Editor: George T. Overton, pp. 101-134

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Chapter 6

FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson

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SUMMARY Foreign assistance is a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The focus of U.S. foreign aid policy has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This chapter provides an overview of the U.S. foreign aid program, by answering frequently asked questions on the subject. There are five major categories of foreign assistance: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid. Due largely to the implementation of two new foreign aid initiatives—the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the HIV/AIDS Initiative—bilateral development assistance has become the largest category of U.S. aid. In FY2008, the United States provided some form of foreign assistance to about 154 countries. Israel and Egypt placed among the top recipients in FY2008, as they have since the late 1970s, although on-going reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan now place those nations near the top as well. The impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent use of foreign aid to support the war on terrorism are clearly seen in the estimated country-aid levels for FY2008. Pakistan and Jordan are key partners in the war on terrorism and major beneficiaries of U.S. assistance. Also among the leading recipients are some African countries that are the focus of the multi-billion dollar HIV/AIDS initiative. By nearly all measures, the amount of foreign aid provided by the United States declined for several decades but has grown in the past few years. After hitting an all-time low in the mid- 1990s, foreign assistance levels since FY2004, in real terms, have been higher than any period since the early 1950s, largely due to Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction and HIV/AIDS funding. The 0.19% of U.S. gross national product represented by foreign aid obligations for FY2008 is consistent with recent years, but quite low compared to the early

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decades of the foreign assistance program. The United States is the largest international economic aid donor in absolute dollar terms but is the smallest contributor among the major donor governments when calculated as a percent of gross national income. U.S. foreign aid is a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy.1 Each year, it is the subject of extensive congressional debate and legislative and executive branch initiatives, proposing changes in the size, composition, and purpose of the program. The focus of U.S. foreign aid policy has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2002, a National Security Strategy for the first time established global development as a third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy. This chapter addresses a number of the more frequently asked queries regarding the U.S. foreign aid program, its objectives, costs, organization, the role of Congress, and how it compares to those of other aid donors. In particular, the discussion attempts not only to present a current snapshot of American foreign assistance, but also to illustrate the extent to which this instrument of U.S. foreign policy has changed from past practices, especially since the end of the Cold War and the launching of the war on terror. Data presented in the report are the most current, reliable figures available, usually covering the period through FY2008. Dollar amounts are drawn from a variety of sources, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and from annual State, Foreign Operations and other appropriations acts. As new data become obtainable or additional issues and questions arise, the report will be modified and revised. Foreign aid acronyms used in this chapter are listed in Appendix B.

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A NOTE ON NUMBERS AND SOURCES The numeric measures of foreign assistance used in this chapter come from a variety of sources. Different sources are necessary for comprehensive analysis, but can often lead to discrepancies from table to table or chart to chart. One reason for such variation is the different definitions of foreign assistance used by different sources. The Budget of the United States historical tables data on foreign assistance, for example, includes only those programs that fall under the traditional 151 and 152 budget subfunction accounts. This excludes various programs run by federal agencies outside of the traditional State/USAID framework. USAID‘s U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants database (Greenbook), in contrast, uses a broad and evolving definition of foreign aid which in past years has included mandatory retirement accounts, Departments of Defense and Energy nonproliferation assistance, and other U.S. agency accounts that many would not classify as foreign assistance. Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1

Other tools of U.S. foreign policy are the U.S. defense establishment, the diplomatic corps, public diplomacy, and trade policy. American defense capabilities, even if not employed, stand as a potential stick that can be wielded to obtain specific objectives. The State Department diplomatic corps are the eyes, ears, and often the negotiating voice of U.S. foreign policymakers. Public diplomacy programs, such as exchanges like the Fulbright program and Radio Free Europe, project an image of the United States that may influence foreign views positively. U.S. trade policy—through free trade agreements and Export-Import Bank credits, for example—may directly affect the economies of other nations. Foreign aid is probably the most flexible tool— it can act as both carrot and stick, and is a means of influencing events, solving specific problems, and projecting U.S. values.

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reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), differs from both U.S. Budget and Greenbook numbers because it excludes all military assistance. Apparent discrepancies also arise due to funding being recorded at different points in the process. U.S. Budget historic tables represent budget authority, funds appropriated by fiscal year, whereas the Greenbook reports funds obligated by fiscal year. The disparity this creates is apparent when comparing recent aid levels in Figures 7 and 9. Figure 9 shows a sharp spike in appropriations in FY2004 for Iraq Reconstruction, but that appropriation was obligated over multiple years, resulting in the much less dramatic rise in FY2004 and FY2005 obligations depicted in Figure 7. The reporting calendar may result in discrepancies as well—ODA figures, unlike budget and Greenbook numbers, are reported by calendar year rather than fiscal year. The differences between sources make precise comparisons difficult. For this reason, CRS has attempted not to mix sources within figures and tables, with the exception of Table A-3 (on which Figure 7 is based), which was necessary because no single source exists for data from 1946 through to 2008. Though imperfect, this compilation of data is useful for depicting long-term trends in U.S. foreign assistance levels.

FOREIGN AID PURPOSES AND PRIORITIES What Are the Rationales and Objectives of U.S. Foreign Assistance?

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Foreign assistance is predicated on several rationales and supports a great many objectives. Both rationales and objectives have changed over time.

Rationales for Foreign Aid Since the start of modern U.S. foreign aid programs, the rationale for such assistance has been posited in terms of national security. From a beginning in rebuilding Europe after World War II under the Marshall Plan (1948-1951), U.S. aid programs reflected anti-communist Cold War tensions that continued through the 1980s. U.S. development assistance programs to newly independent states were viewed by policymakers as a way to prevent the incursion of Soviet influence in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Military and economic assistance programs were provided to allies offering U.S. base rights or other support in the anti-Soviet struggle. In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, aid programs lost their Cold War underpinnings. Foreign aid programs reflected less of a strategic focus on a global scale and instead responded to regional issues, such as Middle East peace initiatives, the transition to democracy of eastern Europe and republics of the former Soviet Union, and international illicit drug production and trafficking in the Andes. Without an overarching theme, foreign aid budgets decreased in the 1990s. However, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, policymakers frequently have cast foreign assistance as a tool in the global war on terrorism. This has comprised an emphasis on aid to partner states in the terrorism war, including the substantial reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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As noted, global development is now accepted, along with defense and diplomacy, as a key element of U.S. national security.2 Even during periods when aid programs were framed in the context of anti-communism, and more recently in the context of anti-terrorism, foreign aid programs were justified for other reasons as well, primarily commercial and humanitarian. Foreign assistance has long been defended as a way to either promote U.S. exports by creating new customers for U.S. products or by improving the global economic environment in which U.S. companies compete. At the same time, a strong current existed that explained U.S. assistance as a moral imperative to help poverty-stricken countries and those trying to overcome disasters or conflict. Providing assistance for humanitarian reasons in response to natural disasters has been the least contested purpose of aid by the American public and policymakers alike.

Objectives of Foreign Aid The objectives of aid are thought to fit within these rationales. Aid objectives include promoting economic growth and reducing poverty, improving governance, addressing population growth, expanding access to basic education and health care, protecting the environment, promoting stability in conflictive regions, protecting human rights, curbing weapons proliferation, strengthening allies, and addressing drug production and trafficking. The expectation has been that, by meeting these objectives, the United States will achieve its national security goals as well as ensure a global economic environment for American products and demonstrate the humanitarian nature of the U.S. people. Some observers have returned to the view that poverty and lack of opportunity are the underlying causes of political instability and the rise of terrorist organizations, much as poverty was viewed as creating a breeding ground for communist insurgencies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Generally speaking, different types of foreign aid support different objectives. Focusing on any single element of the aid program would produce a different sense of the priority of any particular U.S. objective. But there is also considerable overlap among categories of aid. Multilateral aid serves many of the same objectives as bilateral development assistance, although through different channels. Both military assistance and economic security assistance serve U.S. objectives in the Middle East and South Asia. Drug interdiction activities, backed in some cases with military assistance and alternative development programs, are integrated elements of American counter-narcotics efforts in Latin America and elsewhere. Depending on how they are designed, individual assistance projects on the ground can also serve multiple purposes. A health project ostensibly directed at alleviating the effects of HIV/AIDS by feeding orphan children may also mobilize local communities and stimulate grassroots democracy and civil society while additionally meeting U.S. humanitarian objectives. Microcredit programs may help develop local economies while at the same time providing food and education to the children of entrepreneurs.

2

Development was again underscored in the Bush Administration‘s re-statement of the National Security Strategy released on March 16, 2006. Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Security Strategy 2002 and 2006, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006].

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Table 1. Bilateral State/USAID Assistance by Objective: FY2006-FY2008 (in Millions of Current Dollars) Aid Objectives and Program Areas FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 Peace and Security $6,817.1 $8,684.6 $7,480.3 Counter-Terrorism $157.0 $242.1 $178.5 Combating WMD $229.9 $228.0 $247.8 Stabilization/Security Sector Reform $5,1 78.0 $6,668.6 $5,579.5 Counter-narcotics $1,007.1 $1,148.1 $1,125.1 Transnational Crime $60.2 $51.2 $73.2 Conflict Mitigation $184.8 $346.6 $276.4 Investing in People $4,957.4 $6,659.4 $8,522.7 Health $2,595.2 $5,705.1 $7,277.2 Education $689.8 $754.5 $928.4 Social Services/Protection of Vulnerable $136.9 $199.7 $317.0 Governing Justly & Democratically $1,233.2 $2,141.3 $2,260.4 Rule of Law & Human Rights $301.1 $532.0 $606.1 Good Governance $354.2 $763.2 $818.9 Political Competition $197.3 $305.4 $288.7 Civil Society $380.6 $540.8 $546.8 Economic Growth $2,826.2 $3,212.2 $2,920.6 Macroeconomic Growth $409.1 $591.5 $330.5 Trade & Investment $408.7 $331.6 $210.9 Financial Sector $277.2 $176.8 $190.8 Infrastructure $414.9 $723.9 $850.4 Agriculture $562.0 $538.1 $487.7 Private Sector Competitiveness $350.5 $385.4 $358.3 Economic Opportunity $111.6 $127.0 $167.9 Environment $292.1 $337.8 $324.0 Humanitarian Assistance $1,808.4 $3,097.4 $3,157.8 Protection, Assistance & Solutions $1,664.1 $2,963.7 $3,025.5 Disaster Readiness $74.8 $78.2 $74.5 Migration Management $69.6 $55.5 $57.7 Source: USAID and Department of State budget documents. Notes: Figures include Iraq funding and supplementals, with exception of FY2008 3rd supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-329) of $465 million in ESF.

In an effort to rationalize the assistance program more clearly, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) at the State Department developed a framework (Table 1) in 2006 that organizes U.S. foreign aid—or at least that portion of it that is managed by the State Department and/or USAID—around five strategic objectives, each of which includes a number of program elements, also known as sectors. 3 The five objectives are Peace and 3

The framework, representing about 90% of the traditional foreign aid budget in FY2008 (including supplementals), does not include the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, other independent agencies, and international financial institutions. It also excludes non-traditional foreign aid programs, such as

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Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance. Generally, these objectives and sectors do not correspond to any one particular budget account in appropriations bills.4

Peace and Security The Peace and Security objective is composed of six program areas: counter-terrorism; combating weapons of mass destruction; stabilization operations and security sector reform; counter-narcotics; transnational crime; conflict mitigation and reconciliation. With an elevated level of engagement in the aftermath of 9/11, these types of programs have been emphasized by the Bush Administration as essential to the war on terrorism, and to promote stability in failing states that may become permissive environments for terrorism. For FY2008, the Peace and Security objective was funded at $7.5 billion. Major portions of these funds were allocated to Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Jordan. Were the DFA framework to include all foreign aid, regardless of source, the DOD training and equipping of Iraqi and Afghan security forces would add $5.8 billion in FY2008 under this objective.

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Investing in People The Investing in People objective is composed of three program areas: health; education; and social services and protection for vulnerable people. For FY2008, the objective was funded at $8.5 billion. Most of the funding falls in the health program area, particularly the President‘s Global AIDS Initiative. Health programs also include funds for combating avian influenza, tuberculosis, and malaria. A significant portion of health funds are provided for maternal and child health, and family planning and reproductive health programs. The objective also includes education programs with the majority of funds focusing on basic education needs, especially in Africa, but increasingly in south and central Asia and the Middle East. Governing Justly and Democratically This objective includes a number of program areas related to promoting the rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition, and civil society. The two largest components for FY2008 were the rule of law and good governance. Some aid experts believe that development is more effective when the recipient government is democratic in nature and respectful of citizens‘ rights. Program goals include strengthening the performance and accountability of government institutions, such as the judiciary and police, and combating corruption. Funding levels have grown somewhat in recent years; the objective totaled $2.3 billion in FY2008. Economic Growth The Economic Growth objective, amounting to $2.9 billion in FY2008, includes a wide range of program areas that are believed to contribute to economic growth in developing economies, including agriculture, the environment, infrastructure, and trade. Agriculture DOD-funded activities. While the framework includes the State Department‘s HIV/AIDS program, it is not under the direct management responsibility of the DFA. 4 Most are funded through several accounts. For instance, the objective of Governing Justly and Democratically and each of its individual sectoral elements (see Table 1) are funded through portions of the Development Assistance, SEED, FSA, ESF, and INCLE accounts.

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programs focus on science and technology advances that reduce poverty and hunger, tradepromotion opportunities for farmers, and sound environmental management practices for sustainable agriculture. Private sector development programs include support for business associations and microfinance services. Programs for managing natural resources and protecting the global environment focus on conserving biological diversity, improving the management of land, water, and forests, promoting environmentally-sound urban development, encouraging clean and efficient energy production and use, and reducing the threat of global climate change while strengthening sustainable economic growth. Were the DFA framework to encompass all foreign aid, regardless of funding source, the economic growth objective would likely include most of the Millennium Challenge Account, adding perhaps another $1.5 billion in FY08, and much of the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the latter funded by DOD at $1.8 billion in FY08.

Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian assistance responds to both natural and man-made disasters as well as problems resulting from conflict associated with failed or failing states. Responses include protection and assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons and provision of emergency food aid. Programs generally address unanticipated situations and are not integrated into long-term development strategies. In FY2008, humanitarian programs were funded at $3.2 billion.

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What Are the Different Types of Foreign Aid? The framework introduced by the DFA organizes assistance by foreign policy objective. But there are many other ways to categorize foreign aid. More commonly, Congress and others group traditional foreign aid by five major types of assistance, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. Each category of assistance is funded by discrete aid accounts in the U.S. budget. There are many such accounts, supporting different aid agencies, offices, and programs. This methodology encompasses all traditional aid, a larger universe than that in the DFA framework. 5 However, as noted, the Department of Defense and some other government agencies undertake assistance programs with funding outside traditional foreign aid budget accounts. These non-traditional programs are not captured in this discussion.

5

In the U.S. federal budget, all commonly accepted, traditional foreign aid accounts are subsumed under the 150, international affairs, budget function. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has designated development and humanitarian assistance as subfunction 151 and security assistance as subfunction 152. Currently, all traditional foreign aid accounts fall under one of these two subfunctions.

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Source: U.S. Department of State, Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, FY2009, House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and CRS calculations. Figure 1. Aid Program Composition, FY2008

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IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING In recent years, reconstruction assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan has accounted for billions of dollars and has, perhaps, disproportionately shaped the portrait of the U.S. foreign aid program. Aid efforts in both countries have been mostly directed at improving the security capabilities of police and armed forces, at building and rehabilitating infrastructure, promoting governance, and stimulating economic growth. Reaching a total of $49 billion in appropriations from all sources in the years FY2003 to FY2009, the U.S. assistance program to Iraq is the largest aid initiative since the 19481951 Marshall Plan. Nearly $21 billion of the total was funneled through an Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in just two fiscal years, FY2003 and FY2004. About $22 billion has been provided under the DOD budget, not traditionally included in foreign aid totals, and, therefore, unless otherwise noted, not captured in the context of this chapter. The Afghanistan program to date accounts for about $11 billion in traditional foreign aid and another $15 billion in DOD-funded aid. While traditional foreign aid amounts noted in this chapter include figures for Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction, it is important to keep in mind that these aid efforts— running currently at $2-$3 billion a year—might overshadow and obscure key trends in changing aid budget and policy priorities for the period FY2002-2009. Therefore, at various points throughout the text, a notation may be made stating what a particular amount would equal if Iraq and/or Afghanistan assistance was excluded.

Bilateral Development Assistance Development assistance programs are designed chiefly to foster sustainable broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $10.3 billion in such assistance, an amount accounting for nearly 37% of total foreign aid appropriations. A significant proportion of these funds—largely encompassed by the Development Assistance and the Child Survival & Health accounts—is managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is used for long-term projects in the areas of economic reform and private sector development, democracy promotion,

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environmental protection, population control, and improvement of human health. Development activities that have gained more prominence in recent years include basic education, water and sanitation, and support for treatment of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Other bilateral development assistance goes to distinct institutions, such as the Peace Corps, Inter-American Development Foundation, African Development Foundation, Trade and Development Agency, and Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Economic Aid Supporting U.S. Political and Security Objectives For FY2008, Congress appropriated $7.8 billion, 27% of total assistance, for five major programs whose primary purpose is to meet special U.S. economic, political, or security interests. The bulk of these funds—$5.3 billion—was provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), designed to advance American strategic goals with economic assistance. ESF funds can be used for development projects, or in other ways, such as cash transfers, to help a recipient country stabilize its economy and service foreign debt. For many years, following the 1979 Camp David accords, most ESF funds went to support the Middle East Peace Process. Since 9/11, ESF has largely supported countries of importance in the war on terrorism. In FY2008, for example, about $1.8 billion in ESF was directed at Iraq and Afghanistan alone. With the demise of the Soviet empire, the United States established two new aid programs to meet particular strategic political interests. The SEED (Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989) and the FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992) programs were designed to help Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSA) achieve democratic systems and free market economies. In FY2008, SEED countries were allocated about $294 million while the FSA countries received $397 million in appropriated funds (not counting an emergency appropriation at the end of the fiscal year of $365 million specifically for Georgia). Both accounts have seen decreases as countries graduate from U.S. assistance, from a ten-year high of $676 million in 2001 for SEED and $958 million in 2002 for FSA countries. Especially since 2001, policymakers have given greater weight to several global concerns that are considered threats to U.S. security and well-being—terrorism, illicit narcotics, crime, and weapons proliferation. They have addressed each concern with aid programs that provide a range of law enforcement activities, training, and equipment. In FY2008, the anti-narcotics and crime program accounted for about $1.3 billion in foreign aid appropriations—about a quarter of which was for an Andean anti-narcotics initiative. Anti-terrorism programs added another $150 million, and weapons proliferation-related activities, including humanitarian demining, were funded at $347 million. Humanitarian Assistance For FY2008, Congress appropriated $4.2 billion, 14.4% of assistance, for humanitarian aid programs.6 Unlike development assistance programs, which are often viewed as long-term efforts that may have the effect of preventing future crises from developing, humanitarian aid 6

Because of the unanticipated nature of many disasters, humanitarian aid budget allocations often increase throughout the year as demands arise. Figures listed here include supplemental funds provided at various stages throughout the year as of the end of FY2008.

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programs are devoted largely to the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies. A large proportion of humanitarian assistance goes to programs aimed at refugees and internally displaced persons administered by the State Department and funded under the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts. These accounts support, with about $1.4 billion in FY2008, a number of refugee relief organizations, including the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Transition Initiatives (TI) accounts managed by USAID provide relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to victims of man-made and natural disasters, activities totaling $694 million in FY2008.7 Food assistance supplements both programs (about $2.1 billion in FY2008). The food aid program, generically referred to as P.L. 480 (after the law that authorizes it) or the Food for Peace program, provides U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries. USAIDadministered Title II (of the public law) grant food aid is mostly provided for humanitarian relief, but may also be used for development-oriented purposes by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) or through multilateral organizations, such as the World Food Program. Title II funds are also used to support the ―farmer-to-farmer‖ program which sends hundreds of U.S. volunteers as technical advisors to train farm and food-related groups throughout the world. A new program begun in 2002, the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, provides commodities, technical assistance, and financing for school feeding and child nutrition programs ($100 million in FY2008).8

Multilateral Assistance A relatively small share of U.S. foreign assistance—5.5% in FY2008—is combined with contributions from other donor nations to finance multilateral development projects. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $1.6 billion for such activities implemented by international organizations, like the United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and by multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank. On average, U.S. contributions represent about 23% of total donor transfers to the MDBs. Military Assistance The United States provides military assistance to U.S. friends and allies to help them acquire U.S. military equipment and training. Congress appropriated $5.1 billion for military assistance in FY2008, 17.5% of total U.S. foreign aid. There are three main programs, administered by the Department of State, but implemented by DOD. Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $4.7 billion in FY2008, is a grant program that enables governments to receive equipment from the U.S. government or to access equipment directly through U.S. commercial channels. Most FMF grants support the security needs of Israel and Egypt. The International Military Education and Training program (IMET), $85 million, offers military training on a grant basis to foreign military officers and personnel. Peacekeeping funds, $261 7 8

The IDA account was previously known as the International Disaster and Famine Assistance account (IDFA). Until FY1998, food provided commercially under long-term, low interest loan terms (Title I of P.L. 480) was also included in the foreign assistance account. Because of its increasing export focus, it is no longer considered foreign aid.

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million in FY2008, are used to support voluntary nonU.N. operations as well as training for an African crisis response force. As noted earlier, since 2002, DOD appropriations, not included in counts of traditional foreign aid, have supported FMF and IMET-like programs in Afghanistan and Iraq at a level of nearly $6 billion in FY2008.

What Are the Funding Priorities and Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance?

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Tracking changes in the amount of funds distributed to each objective, sector, type of assistance, or funding account is one means of measuring the relative priority placed by the executive branch on any of the aid activities represented by that category of assistance. Because Congress closely examines the executive‘s distribution of bilateral economic resources and in a number of cases modifies the President‘s proposed budget plan, funding trends also characterize congressional aid priorities and areas of special concern.9

Source: U.S. Department of State and CRS calculations. Notes: To illustrate the impact of Iraq funding on the aid program, the column ―FY04 without Iraq‖ excludes $18.4 billion in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) aid. Figure 2. Shifts in Program Emphasis (FY1998-2008) (as % of total U.S. foreign assistance)

9

It is important to note that the amount of resources allocated to any single development sector relative to other sectors in any given year is not necessarily a good measure of the priority assigned to that sector. Different types of development activities require varying amounts of funding to have impact and achieve the desired goals. Democracy and governance programs, for example, are generally low-cost interventions that include extensive training sessions for government officials, the media, and other elements of civil society. Economic growth programs, on the other hand, might include infrastructure development, government budget support, or commodity import financing, activities that require significantly higher resources. What may be a better indicator of changing priorities is to compare funding allocations over time to the same objective or sector.

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Trends in Types of U.S. Aid As shown in Figure 2 (and Table A-2), there have been shifts in the use of different types of U.S. assistance in response to world events and changing priorities. Funding a Middle East peace supplemental, the Andean Counter-narcotics Initiative and economic support for countries assisting U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism pushed strategic-oriented economic aid from a 26% share in FY1995 to an average 33% share from FY1997 through FY2002. The injection of significant assistance to Iraq raised political-strategic assistance to 50% in FY2004.10 Excluding the anomaly of Iraq, however, would lower the proportion of political-strategic aid to 29% in FY2004. Even with Iraq funding included in the following years, this grouping of aid drops to about 29% in the period FY2005 through FY2007, reflecting somewhat the impact of a continuing ten-year plan to reduce economic aid to Israel and Egypt, and, except in the case of Afghanistan, less robust aid for partner states in the war on terrorism. The growth of development-related aid in this period also diminished the relative proportion of other forms of assistance. The proportion of total aid represented by political-strategic assistance in FY2008 was 27%. For more than two decades, military assistance as a share of total aid obligations has declined, a trend that began after military aid peaked at 42% in FY1984. Despite increases in other forms of assistance in the period from 1998 through FY2004, military aid hovered in the 25% range as the United States provided additional security support to many of the partner states in the war on terrorism and other countries that might face new external threats due to the pending conflict in Iraq. From FY2005, however, its share continued to fall, largely due to the rise in prominence of the development assistance category. In FY2008, military assistance represented less than 18% of total aid. However, as discussed in a later section, foreign assistance provided by the Department of Defense, and not counted in estimates of traditional foreign aid, has been increasing with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with new authority to train and equip foreign militaries, and with anti-narcotics activities in Latin America and Afghanistan. Perhaps the most striking trend in this period has been the growth in development-related assistance, including humanitarian aid, food aid, and contributions to multilateral institutions. Development-related aid rose steadily from a 38% share in FY1990 to nearly 48% by FY1995. The growth of more politically driven economic programs in central Europe and the former Soviet Union, plus sizable cuts to development aid in FY1996/1997 and increased emphasis on security assistance following the September 11 terrorist attacks, drove the share down to an average of 41% during the late 1990s through FY2002. If Iraq funding were excluded in FY2004, the proportion of development aid would jump to 47%, rather than the deep decline to 25% if Iraq is included. With the approval of significant amounts of funding for two new presidential aid priorities, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the HIV/AIDS Initiative, development assistance grew to represent over half of total U.S. foreign aid by FY2005, the highest proportion in more than twenty years. This share has since continued to increase, reaching 55% in FY2008.

10

Of the $18.4 billion provided in FY04 for Iraq from the IRRF, $5 billion was utilized in the same way as military assistance and delegated to DOD for implementation. The remainder was used in ways similar to ESF and, therefore, is considered political-strategic assistance for purposes of this analysis

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Trends in Programs and Sectors of Special Interest There are multiple ways to define and categorize U.S. foreign assistance programs. At various times, congressional and public attention centers on one or another slice of the aid effort. For instance, the large community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on international sustainable development activities most often concerns itself with what it calls ―core development accounts,‖ usually defined as including the USAID Child Survival and Health, USAID Development Assistance, Millennium Challenge, and HIV/AIDS accounts. Collectively, these have grown exponentially over the ten year period from 1998 to 2008, from $1.9 billion to $9.6 billion, largely due to the launching of the HIV/AIDS and MCA programs. One of the most striking changes in the distribution of economic aid resources in recent years has been the sharp growth in funding for health programs, especially in the area of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases (see Table 1). In 2004, the Bush Administration launched a five-year Global AIDS Initiative, the President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with the goal of treating two million HIV-infected individuals, and caring for ten million infected people and AIDS orphans that eventually provided over $18 billion. The program was re-authorized in 2008 (P.L. 110-293) at $48 billion for FY2009 through FY2013 to support prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Spending on non-AIDS infectious diseases has increased by 400% since FY2001. Funding has also risen notably for Child Survival and Maternal Health projects that aim to reduce infant mortality, combat malnutrition, improve the quality of child delivery facilities, and raise nutritional levels of mothers. Funding for these activities has grown by 45% in the past seven years. Public support and congressional and Administration action often raise the priority given to specific sectors or programs. In recent years, high profile programs include support for microenterprise, basic education, clean water and sanitation. For each of these specific interests, funding has been boosted by Congress in the form of legislative directives or earmarks in the annual foreign aid appropriations legislation. Funding for microenterprise, for instance, went from $58 million in FY1988 to $111 million in FY1996 and $216 million in FY2006. Congress mandated a level of $245 million for microenterprise assistance in FY2008. Basic education programs were funded at about $95 million in FY1997; they were set at $700 million in FY2008. Funding for water and sanitation projects was not closely tracked ten years ago; the directed level for FY2008 was $300 million. Some sectors once strongly favored by Congress and the executive branch have lost out in the funding competition in recent decades. Agriculture programs have seen significant decreases since the 1970s and 1980s when they represented the bulk of U.S. development assistance. In FY1984, for instance, agriculture and rural development received an appropriation of $725 million from the development assistance account, compared to $315 million in FY1998 and $413 million in FY2008 from all USAID/State accounts. Programs managing natural resources and protecting the global environment fell from $504 million in FY2002 to $324 million in FY2008. The rapid rise in HIV/AIDS funding overshadows to some extent reductions for other health sectors. Spending on family planning and reproductive health programs has been flat during the past 15 years, with the FY2008 level of $457 million only slightly higher than the 15-year average of $444 million.

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Which Countries Receive U.S. Foreign Aid?

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In FY2008, the United States is providing some form of foreign assistance to about 154 countries. Figure 3 and Figure 4 identify the top 15 recipients of U.S. foreign assistance for FY1998 and FY2008, respectively. 11 Assistance, although provided to many nations, is concentrated heavily in certain countries, reflecting the priorities and interests of United States foreign policy at the time. As shown in the figures below, there are both similarities and sharp differences among country aid recipients for the two periods. The most consistent thread connecting the top aid recipients over the past decade has been continuing U.S. support for peace in the Middle East, with large programs maintained for Israel and Egypt and a relatively smaller program for West Bank/Gaza. The commitment to Latin America counter-narcotics efforts is also evident in both periods, with Peru and Bolivia appearing in FY1998 and Colombia and Mexico among the top U.S. aid recipients a decade later. Assisting countries emerging from conflict, usually under more temporary circumstances, is another constant aspect of U.S. foreign aid. Haiti and Bosnia, leading recipients in FY1998, have been replaced currently by Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But there are also significant contrasts in the leading aid recipients since FY1998. The impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent use of foreign aid to support other nations threatened by terrorism or helping the U.S. combat the global threat is clearly seen in the country aid allocations for FY2008. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan, none of which was a top recipient in FY1998, are key partners in the war on terrorism.

Source: USAID and Department of State. Figure 3. Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY1998 (appropriations in millions, US$) 11

FY2008 is the latest year for which reliable data is available, and includes supplemental funds that largely went for activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Georgia. Figures do not include Millennium Challenge Corporation Compacts as MCC appropriations are not broken out by recipient country until they are obligated, a one-time event for each country and on a scale that would distort the aid picture in any given year.

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Source: USAID and State Department.

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Figure 4. Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY2008 (appropriations in millions, US$)

Another relatively new feature of American assistance—the emphasis on HIV/AIDS programs— is evident in FY2008 aid figures with Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa among the top recipients, largely due to their selection as focus countries for the Bush Administration‘s HIV/AIDS Initiative. A further shift concerns the former Soviet states in which the United States invested large sums to assist in their transitions to democratic societies and market-oriented economies. In FY1998, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia were among the top fifteen U.S. aid recipients. By FY2008, only Georgia remains because of a U.S. reconstruction initiative following Georgia‘s recent conflict with Russia. Finally, a striking feature of the more recent aid recipients is the robust level of assistance provided to those below the top-ranked two or three countries. Ten years previously, the gap between the second and third recipients, Egypt and Bosnia, was nearly $2 billion. In FY2008, the gap between the second and fourth recipients, Afghanistan and Jordan, was less than $1 billion, and, on average, the bottom dozen recipients received more than four times what their counterparts received in FY1998. On a regional basis (Figure 5 and Figure 6), the Middle East has for many years received the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance. With economic aid to the region‘s top two recipients, Israel and Egypt, declining since the late 1990s and overall increases in other areas, however, the share of bilateral U.S. assistance consumed by the Middle East fell from nearly 57% in FY1998 to nearly 34% by FY2008. Since September 11, 2001, South Asia has emerged as a significant recipient of U.S. assistance, rising from a 4% share ten years ago to about 17% in FY2008, largely because of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similarly, the share represented by African nations has increased from a little more than 13% to nearly 29% in 2008, largely due to the HIV/AIDS Initiative, that funnels resources mostly to African countries. Latin America, despite a renewed effort to deter illicit narcotics production and trafficking with large aid programs, is a region where the proportion of total U.S. assistance has remained level. With the graduation of several East European aid recipients in recent years and the phasing down of programs in

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Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet states, the Europe/Eurasia regional share has fallen significantly. The proportion of assistance provided to East Asia grew in the past decade, but the region remains the smallest area of concentration, accounting for 4% of U.S. foreign aid in FY2008.

Source: USAID and Department of State. Note: Based on appropriated levels. Figures include supplemental appropriations and Iraq.

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Figure 5. Regional Distribution of Aid, FY1998

Source: USAID and Department of State. Note: Based on appropriated levels. Figures include supplemental appropriations and Iraq. Figure 6. Regional Distribution of Aid, FY2008

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FOREIGN AID SPENDING How Large Is the U.S. Foreign Assistance Budget and What Have Been the Historical Funding Trends?

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There are several methods commonly used for measuring the amount of federal spending on foreign assistance. Amounts can be expressed in terms of budget authority (funds appropriated by Congress), outlays (money actually spent), as a percent of the total federal budget, as a percent of total discretionary budget authority (funds that Congress directly controls, excluding mandatory and entitlement programs), or as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) (for an indication of the national wealth allocated to foreign aid). By nearly all of these measures, some of which are illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8, foreign aid resources fell steadily over several decades since the historical high levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This downward trend was sporadically interrupted, with spikes in the 1960s and early 1970s, 1979, and the mid-1980s, largely due to major foreign policy initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress for Latin America in 1961 and the infusion of funds to implement the Camp David Middle East Peace Accords in 1979. The lowest point in U.S. foreign aid spending came in 1997 when foreign operations appropriations fell near $18 billion (in constant dollar terms) and represented roughly 29% of the peak foreign aid committed during the Marshall Plan period. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, foreign aid became a key instrument in fighting the global war on terrorism and contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. See Figure 9 at the end of this section for a more detailed snapshot of foreign aid funding trends and related foreign policy events.

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) July 1,1945-September 30, 2006; House and Senate appropriations legislation; CRS calculations. Notes: This figure is based in the data from Table A-3. See the notes following Table A-3 for an explanation of the methodology used. Figure 7. U.S. Foreign Aid: FY1946-FY2008 (obligations, in millions of constant 2008 US$)

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Source: Greenbook, U.S. Department of Commerce, CRS calculations.

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Figure 8. Foreign Aid as % of GDP

As a percent of gross domestic product, prior to the mid-1960s, in most years foreign aid represented over 1%. Following the Vietnam War, foreign assistance as a percent of GDP ranged between 0.5% and 0.25% for the next 20 years. The program‘s share of GDP dropped to its lowest level ever in FY2001 (0.15%), but has risen somewhat in recent years, averaging about 0.20% between FY2006 and FY2008 (Figure 8). Congress appropriates most foreign aid money through annual State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill. That legislation represents the most direct congressional action on foreign assistance spending decisions, although small but growing amounts of foreign aid are funded in other legislation. 12 Like other measures of foreign assistance programs, State-Foreign Operations appropriations declined in the mid-1990s to near $16 billion in 2008 dollars, the lowest level during the past decade in real terms (Table 2). Appropriated amounts rose beginning in FY1998 and averaged about $19 billion in constant dollars through the next four years. The combination of additional funding for the war on terrorism, Afghanistan reconstruction, and new foreign aid initiatives focused on HIV/AIDS and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, have pushed average annual Foreign Operations appropriations well above $20 billion consistently since FY2003. Including Iraq funding, FY2004 was the largest Foreign Operations appropriations level, in real terms, in at least 30 years.13

12

Most notably, food aid and certain Department of Defense aid programs are not appropriated in the Foreign Operations measure, while the Export-Import Bank, an activity not considered ―foreign aid,‖ is funded in the Foreign Operations annual bill. 13 Due to changes over time in appropriation ―scoring,‖ calculating historic Foreign Operations appropriations that are precisely equivalent to the methodology used currently is virtually impossible. This is especially true since Congress altered, beginning in FY1992, the methodology for ―scoring‖ credit programs. The 30-year estimate noted here compares the FY2004 appropriation level of $44.0 billion ( in FY2008 dollars) with total foreign aid obligations of about $40 billion (real terms) in the early 1970s.

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How Does Foreign Aid Compare with Other Federal Programs? Foreign aid spending is a relatively small component of the U.S. federal budget. As part of the estimated total amount spent in FY2008 on all discretionary programs (those controlled by Congress through appropriations), entitlements, and other mandatory activities, foreign aid outlays represent an estimated 1%. This figure is in line with typical foreign aid outlay amounts, which have generally equaled slightly less than 1% of total U.S. spending. Figure 10 compares foreign aid outlays for FY2008 with those of other major U.S. government spending categories.

How Much of Foreign Aid Dollars Are Spent on U.S. Goods?

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Most U.S. foreign aid is used to procure U.S. goods and services, although amounts of aid coming back to the United States differ by program. No exact figure is available due to difficulties in tracking procurement item by item, but some general estimates are possible for individual programs, though these may vary from year to year. In FY2008, roughly 87%, or $4.1 billion, of military aid financing was used to procure U.S. military equipment and training. The remaining 13%, $614 million, was allocated to Israel for procurement within that country.

Source: Budget of the United States Government: Historic Tables Fiscal Year 2009, Table 5.1: Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction, 1976-2013; appropriations acts for FY2008. Figure 9. Foreign Aid Funding Trends, FY1977-FY2008 (budget authority, in millions of constant 2008 US$)

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FY99

FY00

FY01

FY02

FY03

FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

$ Constant 2008

FY98

$ Current

FY97

Table 2. Foreign Operation Appropriations, FY1997-FY2008 (in billions of dollars)

12.3

13.2

15.4

16.4

14.9

16.5

23.7

39.0 (20.6)

22.3

23.2

26.08

27.7

16.3

17.3

19.7

20.3

17.9

19.5

27.4

44.0 (23.2)

24.3

24.5

26.81

27.7

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Source: Annual appropriations acts; CRS calculations. Notes: FY1999 excludes $17.861 billion for the IMF because it is offset by a U.S. claim on the IMF that is liquid and interest bearing, resulting in no outlays from the U.S. treasury. The FY2004 figure in parenthesis shows the total without Iraq reconstruction funds to illustrate the significant but anomalous impact of those funds on total foreign assistance spending.

Food assistance commodities are purchased wholly in the United States, and most expenditures for shipping those commodities to recipient countries go entirely to U.S. freight companies. Under current law, 14 three-fourths of all food aid must be shipped by U.S. carriers. On this basis, a rough estimate suggests that more than 90%—or nearly $1.85 billion in FY2008—of food aid expenditures were spent in the United States. Because U.S. contributions to multilateral institutions are mixed with funds from other nations and the bulk of the program is financed with borrowed funds rather than direct government contributions, the U.S. share of procurement financed by MDBs may even exceed the amount of the U.S. contribution, as occurred in 2003. However, no recent figures showing procurement on a nation-by-nation basis are available. Although a small proportion of funding for bilateral development and political/strategic assistance programs results in transfers of U.S. dollars, the services of experts and project management personnel and much of the required equipment is procured from the United States. Section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2151)— often referred to as the ―Buy America‖ provision—limits the expenditure of foreign assistance funds outside the United States, though subsequent amending legislation has loosened the restriction to allow for more expenditures within poor countries receiving assistance. Countries receiving MCC Compact grants are required to follow a modified version of World Bank procurement guidelines that call for open competition, excepting only specific countries subject to sanctions under U.S. law. In addition to the direct benefits derived from aid dollars used for American goods and services, many argue that the foreign aid program brings significant indirect financial benefits to the United States. First, it is argued that provision of military equipment through the military assistance program and food commodities through P.L.480, the Food For Peace program, helps to develop future, strictly commercial, markets for those products. Second, as countries develop economically, they are in a position to purchase more goods from abroad and the United States benefits as a trade partner.

14

The Cargo Preference Act, P.L. 83-644, August 26,1954.

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Source: Budget of the United States Government: Historic Tables Fiscal Year 2009, Table 3.2: Outlays by Function and Subfunction, FY2008 Estimates.

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Figure 10. U.S. Budget Outlays, FY2008

The use of ―tied‖ aid—which is conditional on procurement of goods and services from the donor-country or a limited group of designated countries—has become increasingly disfavored in the international community. Critics of such conditional aid argue that it inhibits a sense of responsibility and support on the part of recipient governments for development projects and impedes the integration of the host country into the global economy.15 Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and up to 40% for food aid, reducing the overall effectiveness of aid flows.16 Reflecting donor concerns about these findings, the average percent of official bilateral development assistance from donor countries that was tied fell from 70% in 1985 to 15% in 2007. Meanwhile, 31% of U.S. bilateral development assistance in 2007 was tied, down sharply from 55% in 2006.17 This is the highest level of tied aid among donor countries, and widely believed to reflect policy makers‘ perception that maintaining public and political support for foreign aid programs requires ensuring direct economic benefit to the United States. The United States joined other donor nations in committing to reduce tied aid in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, but the Declaration did not set target goals on tied aid as it did for the other indicators of progress identified in the document.18

15

OECD Report on The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid, p.1, available at http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/5/22/41537529.pdf. Id., p.1 17 see http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1; 2008 DAC Reporting Documents, Table 7B, provided by Bill McCormick at USAID. 18 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and the Mutual Accountability, a product of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness; Paris, France (March 2, 2005). 16

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How Does the United States Rank as a Donor of Foreign Aid?

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For decades, the United States ranked first among the developed countries in net disbursements of economic aid, or ―Official Development Assistance (ODA)‖ as defined by the international donor community.19 In 1989, for the first time, Japan supplanted the United States as the largest donor. The United States was again the leading donor from 1990 to 1992, and fluctuated between a second and third position from 1993 to 2000. In 2001, it again became the largest contributor and remained in that position in 2007, the most recent year for which data is available, with a commitment of $21.75 billion. Germany followed at $12.3 billion, the European Community at $11.8 billion, and both France and the United Kingdom at $9.9 billion. Japan, which has significantly scaled back its foreign aid program in recent years, gave $7.7 billion in 2007. As a group, the 22 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)‘s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), representing the world‘s leading providers of economic aid, transferred $103.6 billion in 2007, down slightly in current dollars from $104.4 billion in 2006. Even as it leads in dollar amounts of aid flows to developing countries, the United States is often among the last when aid transfers by developed country donors are calculated as a percent of gross national income (GNI). 20 In 2007, as has been the case since 1993, the United States ranked last among major donors at 0.18% of GNI. Sweden ranked first at 1.02% of GNI, while the United Kingdom dispensed 0.51%, France 0.47%, and Germany 0.26%. The average for all DAC members in 2007 was 0.48%, up from .25% in 2003.

Source: OECD/DAC. Figure 11. Economic Aid From Major Donors, 2007 (in millions, US$) 19

The OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms defines ODA as ―flows of official financing administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25%. By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries and to multilateral institutions.‖ ODA does not include military assistance. 20 Gross National Income (GNI) comprises GDP together with income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less similar payments made to other countries.

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Source: OECD/DAC. Figure 12. Economic Aid as % of GNI for Major Donors, 2007

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DELIVERY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE How and in what form assistance reaches an aid recipient can vary widely, depending on the type of aid program, the objective of the assistance, and the agency responsible for providing the aid.

What Executive Branch Agencies Administer Foreign Aid Programs? U.S. Agency for International Development For over 40 years, the bulk of the U.S. bilateral economic aid program has been administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Created by an executive branch reorganization in 1961, USAID became an independent agency in 1999, although its Administrator reports to and serves under the ―direct authority and foreign policy guidance‖ of the Secretary of State. USAID is directly responsible for most bilateral development assistance and disaster relief programs, including economic growth, global health, many democracy programs, and Title II of P.L. 480 (Food for Peace program) food assistance. These programs amounted to $5.138 billion in FY2008. In conjunction with the State Department, USAID manages the ESF, SEED, and FSA programs, amounting to $6.05

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billion in FY2008.21 USAID‘s staff in late 2008 totaled 7,291, of which only about 2,692 were U.S. citizen ―direct hire‖ employees. Almost three quarters of USAID staff—about 5,273—are U.S. citizen foreign service employees and foreign nationals working overseas in one of the 84 country missions, six regional offices, and three representational offices to oversee the implementation of hundreds of projects undertaken by thousands of private sector contractors, consultants, and non-governmental organizations.22

U.S. Department of State In addition to those programs jointly managed with USAID, the Department of State administers several aid programs directly. Individual offices at State oversee activities dealing with international narcotics control and law enforcement, terrorism, weapons proliferation, non-U.N. peacekeeping operations, refugee relief, and voluntary support for a range of international organizations such as UNICEF. In FY2008, appropriations for these State Department- administered bilateral aid programs totaled about $2.4 billion. State is also home to the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, created to manage President Bush‘s Global AIDS Initiative, which administered $4.6 billion in FY2008 for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs. The funds are channeled through USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes for Health, and other implementing agencies. In addition, State has policy authority, together with the Department of Defense, over the FMF and IMET programs, which are implemented by the DOD‘s Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), a State Department position created in 2006, is charged with coordinating U.S. assistance programs. Until January 2009 when a separate acting DFA was appointed, the DFA served concurrently as the Administrator of USAID. The DFA has authority over most State Department and USAID programs. Though the DFA is also tasked with providing ―guidance‖ to other agencies that manage foreign aid activities, major foreign aid programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Account and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, have remained outside of the DFA‘s authority. U.S. Department of Defense Most military assistance, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), is administered by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the primary DOD body responsible for Foreign Military Financing and related training programs. DOD has also been involved in an expanded range of foreign assistance activities in recent years, providing development assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan through the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and elsewhere through the Defense Health Program, counter-drug activities, and humanitarian and disaster relief activities. While DOD managed about $4.9 billion in traditional military aid in FY2008, other funds appropriated through defense appropriations legislation, and not counted as foreign assistance for the purposes of this chapter have been used to carry out state-building development 21

The State Department generally determines the policy on distribution of funds from these accounts, but the funds are appropriated and attributed to USAID when foreign assistance is reported by obligations. 22 Semi-Annual USAID Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of November 30, 2008, Table 1. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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activities, usually in the context of training exercises and military operations, that were once the exclusive jurisdiction of civilian aid agencies.

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U.S. Department of the Treasury The Treasury Department administers three foreign aid programs. U.S. contributions to and participation in the World Bank and other multilateral development institutions are managed by Treasury‘s Under Secretary for International Affairs. Presidentially appointed U.S. executive directors at each of the banks represent the United States‘ point of view. Treasury also deals with foreign debt reduction issues and programs, including U.S. participation in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The Treasury Department further manages a technical assistance program, offering temporary financial advisors to countries implementing major economic reforms and combating terrorist finance activity. For FY2008, funding for activities falling under the Treasury Department‘s jurisdiction totaled about $1.3 billion. Millennium Challenge Corporation A new foreign aid agency was created in February 2004 to administer the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) initiative. The account is intended to concentrate significantly higher amounts of U.S. resources in a few low- and low-middle income countries that have demonstrated a strong commitment to political, economic, and social reforms. A significant feature of the MCA program is that recipient countries formulate, propose and implement mutually-agreed multi-year U.S.- funded projects known as Compacts. Compacts in the 18 recipient countries selected to date have emphasized construction of infrastructure. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is charged with managing this results-oriented, competitive foreign aid delivery mechanism. The MCC is a U.S. government corporation, headed by a Chief Executive Officer who reports to a Board of Directors chaired by the Secretary of State. The Corporation maintains a relatively small staff of about 300. The MCC managed a budget of $1.5 billion in FY2008. Other Agencies Other government agencies that play a role in implementing foreign aid programs include the Peace Corps, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The Peace Corps, an autonomous agency with an FY2008 budget of $331 million, supports nearly 8,000 volunteers in 76 countries. Peace Corps volunteers work in a wide range of educational, health, and community development projects. TDA finances trade missions and feasibility studies for private sector projects likely to generate U.S. exports. Its budget in FY2008 was $50 million. OPIC provides political risk insurance to U.S. companies investing in developing countries and the new democracies and finances projects through loans and guarantees. It also supports investment missions and provides other pre-investment information services. Its insurance activities have been selfsustaining, but credit reform rules require a relatively small appropriation to back up U.S. guarantees and for administrative expenses. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $71 million to OPIC. Two independent agencies, the Inter-American Foundation and the African Development Foundation, also administer U.S. foreign aid. Both organizations emphasize grassroots

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development by providing financial support to local private organizations in developing countries. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $21 million and $29 million, respectively, to the Inter-American Foundation and the African Development Foundation.

What Are the Different Forms in Which Assistance Is Provided? Most U.S. assistance is now provided as a grant (gift) rather than a loan, but the forms a grant may take are diverse.

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Cash Transfers Although it is the exception rather than the rule, some countries receive aid in the form of a cash grant to the government. Dollars provided in this way support a government‘s balanceofpayments situation, enabling it to purchase more U.S. goods, service its debt, or devote more domestic revenues to developmental or other purposes. Cash transfers have been made as a reward to countries that have supported the United States in its war on terrorism (Turkey and Jordan in FY2004), to provide political and strategic support (both Egypt and Israel annually for decades after the 1979 Camp David Peace Accord), and in exchange for undertaking difficult political and economic reforms. Countries receiving cash transfers in 2007 were Pakistan ($200 million), Egypt ($284 million), Jordan ($116 million), and Lebanon ($250 million). Equipment and Commodities Assistance may be provided in the form of food commodities, weapons systems, or equipment such as generators or computers. Food aid may be provided directly to meet humanitarian needs or to encourage attendance at a maternal/child health care program. Weapons supplied under the military assistance program may include training in their use. Equipment and commodities provided under development assistance are usually integrated with other forms of aid to meet objectives in a particular social or economic sector. For instance, textbooks have been provided in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a broader effort to reform the educational sector and train teachers. Computers may be offered in conjunction with training and expertise to fledgling microcredit institutions. In recent years, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) provided through PEPFAR programs to individuals living with HIV/AIDS have been a significant component of commodity-based assistance. Economic Infrastructure Although once a significant portion of U.S. assistance programs, construction of economic infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, electric power facilities, etc.—was rarely provided after the 1970s. Because of the substantial expense of these projects, they were to be found only in large assistance programs, such as that for Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, where the United States constructed major urban water and sanitation systems. In the past decade, however, the aid programs in Iraq and Afghanistan have supported the building of schools, health clinics, roads, power plants and irrigation systems. In Iraq alone, more than $10 billion has gone to economic infrastructure. Economic infrastructure is now also supported by U.S. assistance in a wider range of developing countries through the Millennium Challenge

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Account. In this case, recipient countries design their own assistance programs, most of which, to date, include an infrastructure component.

Training Transfer of know-how is a significant part of most assistance programs. The International Military and Educational Training Program (IMET) provides training to officers of the military forces of allied and friendly nations. Tens of thousands of citizens of aid recipient countries receive short-term technical training or longer term degree training annually under USAID‘s participant training program. More than one-third of Peace Corps volunteers are English, math, and science teachers. Other programs provide law enforcement personnel with anti-narcotics or anti-terrorism training.

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Expertise Many assistance programs provide expert advice to government and private sector organizations. The Treasury Department, USAID, and U.S.-funded multilateral banks all place specialists in host government ministries to make recommendations on policy reforms in a wide variety of sectors. USAID has often placed experts in private sector business and civic organizations to help strengthen them in their formative years or while indigenous staff are being trained. While most of these experts are U.S. nationals, in Russia, USAID has funded the development of locally-staffed political and economic think tanks to offer policy options to that government. Small Grants USAID, the Inter-American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation often provide aid in the form of grants that may then be used by U.S. or indigenous organizations to further their varied developmental purposes. For instance, grants are sometimes provided to microcredit organizations which in turn provide loans to microentrepreneurs. Through the USAID-funded Eurasia Foundation, grants are provided to help strengthen the role of former Soviet Union nongovernmental organizations in democratization and private enterprise development.

How Much Aid Is Provided as Loans and How Much as Grants? What Are Some Types of Loans? Have Loans Been Repaid? Why Is Repayment of Some Loans Forgiven? Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may determine the terms and conditions under which most forms of assistance are provided. In general, the financial condition of a country, its ability to meet repayment obligations, has been an important criterion of the decision to provide a loan or grant. Some programs, such as the humanitarian and disaster relief programs were designed from the beginning to be entirely grant activities.

Loan/Grant Composition During the past two decades, nearly all foreign aid, military as well as economic has been provided in grant form. Between 1962 and 1988, loans represented 32% of total military and Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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economic assistance. This figure declined substantially beginning in the mid-1980s, until by FY2001, loans represented less than 1% of total aid appropriations. The de-emphasis on loan programs came largely in response to the debt problems of developing countries. Both Congress and the executive branch supported the view that foreign aid should not add to the already existing debt burden carried by these countries.

Types of Loans Although a small proportion of total aid, there are several significant USAID-managed programs that provide direct loans or guarantee loans. Under the Israeli Loan Guarantee Program, the United States has guaranteed repayment of loans made by commercial sources to support the costs of immigrants settling in Israel from other countries. Other guarantee programs support low-income housing and community development programs of developing countries and microenterprise and small business credit programs. A Development Credit Authority in which risk is shared with a private sector bank can be used to support any development sector.

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Loan Repayment Between 1946 and 2006, the United States loaned more than $108 billion in foreign aid, and while most foreign aid is now provided through grants, $22.6 billion in loans to foreign governments remained outstanding in 2007.23 Most recipients of U.S. loans remain current or only slightly in arrears on debt payments. For nearly three decades, Section 620q of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Brooke amendment) has prohibited new assistance to any country that falls more than one year past due in servicing its debt obligations to the United States. Argentina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe are countries to which the provision applies as of October 2008.24 The President may waive application of this prohibition if he determines it is in the national interest. Debt Forgiveness The United States has also forgiven debts owed by foreign governments and encouraged, with mixed success, other foreign aid donors and international financial institutions to do likewise. In total, the United States forgave or reduced about $24.3 billion owed by foreign governments between 1990 and 2007.25 In some cases, the decision to forgive foreign aid debts has been based largely on economic grounds as another means to support development efforts by heavily indebted, but reform- minded, countries. The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. This initiative, which began in the late 1990s and continues in 2008, includes for the first time participation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions in a comprehensive debt workout framework for the world‘s poorest and most debt-strapped nations. The largest and most hotly debated debt forgiveness actions have been implemented for much broader foreign policy reasons with a more strategic purpose. Poland, during its 23

U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) 2006; U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget. U.S. Government Foreign Credit Exposure as of December 31, 2006, part 1, p. 20. 24 Information provided by Department of State, F Bureau, 1/6/2009. 25 U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget. U.S. Government Foreign Credit Exposure as of December 31, 2006, part 1, p. 9.

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transition from a communist system and centrally-planned economy (1990—$2.46 billion), Egypt, for making peace with Israel and helping maintain the Arab coalition during the Persian Gulf War (1990—$7 billion), and Jordan, after signing a peace accord with Israel (1994—$700 million), are examples. Similarly, the United States forgave about $4.1 billion in outstanding Saddam-era Iraqi debt in November 2004, and helped negotiate an 80% reduction in Iraq‘s debt to Paris Club members later that month.26

What Are the Roles of Government and Private Sector in Development and Humanitarian Aid Delivery?

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Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly implemented by U.S. government personnel but by private sector entities. Generally speaking, government foreign service and civil servants determine the direction and priorities of the aid program, allocate funds while keeping within legislative requirements, ensure that appropriate projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select implementors, and monitor the implementation of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability. At one time, USAID professionals played a larger role in implementing aid programs, but the affect of budget cuts on personnel and the emergence of private sector alternatives over the past thirty years has led to a shift in responsibilities.27 Private sector aid implementors, usually employed as contractors or grantees, may be individual personal service contractors, consulting firms, non-profit non-government organizations (NGOs), universities, or charitable private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These carry out the vast array of aid projects in all sectors.

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN AID What Congressional Committees Oversee Foreign Aid Programs? Numerous congressional authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees maintain responsibility for U.S. foreign assistance. Several committees have responsibility for authorizing legislation establishing programs and policy and for conducting oversight of foreign aid programs. In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, have primary jurisdiction over bilateral development assistance, ESF and other economic security assistance, military assistance, and international organizations. Food aid, primarily the responsibility of the Agriculture Committees in both bodies, is shared with the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House. U.S. contributions to multilateral development banks are within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Financial Services Committee.

26

For more on debt relief for Iraq, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq‘s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss. 27 Currently there are about 2,400 U.S. direct hire personnel at USAID, down from 3,406 in 1992 and 8,600 in 1962. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Traditionally, foreign aid appropriations are provided entirely through subcommittees of the Appropriations panels in both the House and Senate. Most foreign aid funds fall under the jurisdiction of the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittees, with food assistance appropriated by the Agriculture Subcommittees. As noted earlier, however, a growing segment of military activities that could be categorized as foreign aid have been appropriated through the Defense Subcommittees in recent years.

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What Are the Major Foreign Aid Legislative Vehicles? The most significant permanent foreign aid authorization laws are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151), the Arms Export Control Act (1976), authorizing military sales and financing (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2751), the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), covering food aid (P.L. 83-480; 7 U.S.C. 1691), and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945) authorizing U.S. participation in multilateral development banks (P.L. 79-171; 22 U.S.C. 286).28 In the past, Congress usually scheduled debates every two years on omnibus foreign aid bills that amended these permanent authorization measures. Although foreign aid authorizing bills have passed the House or Senate, or both, on numerous occasions, Congress has not enacted into law a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since 1985. Instead, foreign aid bills have frequently stalled at some point in the debate because of controversial issues, a tight legislative calendar, or executivelegislative foreign policy disputes.29 In lieu of approving a broad authorization bill, Congress has on occasion authorized major foreign assistance initiatives for specific regions, countries, or aid sectors in standalone legislation or within an appropriation bill. Among these are the SEED Act of 1989 ( P.L. 101-179; 22 U.S.C. 5401), the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511; 22 U.S.C. 5801), the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25; 22 U.S.C. 7601), the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-293), and the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D, Title VI of P.L. 108-199). In the absence of regular enactment of foreign aid authorization bills, appropriation measures considered annually within the State-Foreign Operations spending bill have assumed greater significance for Congress in influencing U.S. foreign aid policy. Not only do appropriations bills set spending levels each year for nearly every foreign assistance account, State-Foreign Operations appropriations also incorporate new policy initiatives that would otherwise be debated and enacted as part of authorizing legislation.

28

29

Separate permanent authorizations exist for other specific foreign aid programs such as the Peace Corps, the Inter- American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation. A few foreign aid programs that are authorized in other legislation have received more regular legislative review. Authorizing legislation for voluntary contributions to international organizations and refugee programs, for example, are usually contained in omnibus Foreign Relations Authorization measures that also address State Department and U.S. Information Agency issues. Food aid and amendments to P.L.480 are usually considered in the omnibus ―farm bill‖ that Congress re-authorizes every five years.

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APPENDIX A. DATA TABLES Table A-1. Aid Program Composition, FY2008 Aid Program $s (billions) % of total aid Bilateral Development $10.298 35.5% Humanitarian $4.169 14.4% Multilateral Development $1.594 5.5% Economic Political/Security $7.840 27.1% Military $5.068 17.5% TOTAL $28.969 100.0% Source: House and Senate Appropriations Committees and CRS calculations. Note: Based on appropriated levels in the 151 and 152 subfunction accounts. Table omits operational expense accounts.

Table A-2. Program Composition, FY1995-FY2008 (Current $ in Billions, and as % of Total Aid) Development/ Economic Military Total Humanitarian Political/Security 1995 $6.539 47.6% $3.636 26.4% $3.572 26.0% $13.747 1996 $5.096 41.4% $3.689 29.9% $3.536 28.7% $12.321 1997 $4.969 41.0% $3.827 31.6% $3.333 27.5% $12.129 1998 $5.575 42.8% $4.038 31.0% $3.425 26.3% $13.038 1999 $6.433 42.1% $5.352 35.0% $3.507 22.9% $15.292 2000 $5.331 33.1% $5.780 35.9% $4.998 31.0% $16.109 2001 $6.365 43.8% $4.430 30.5% $3.753 25.8% $14.548 2002 $6.649 41.3% $5.557 34.6% $3.875 24.1% $16.081 2003 $8.361 34.1% $9.737 39.7% $6.399 26.1% $24.497 2004 $9.520 24.6% $19.310 49.9% $9.849 25.5% $38.679 2004 (w/o Iraq) $9.520 47.0% $5.873 29.0% $4.849 24.0% $20.242 2005 $11.531 47.9% $7.027 29.2% $5.502 22.9% $24.060 2006 $12.087 50.6% $6.891 28.9% $4.902 20.5% $23.880 2007 $13.784 50.9% $7.957 29.4% $5.365 19.8% $27.106 2008 $16.061 55.4% $7.840 27.1% $5.068 17.5% $28.969 Source: USAID, House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and CRS calculations. Notes: Based on appropriated levels in the 151 and 152 subfunction accounts. FY2004 without Iraq subtracts $18.4 billion in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds from political-strategic aid—$5 billion from military aid and the rest from political-strategic aid. Table omits operational expense accounts.

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Fiscal Year

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Table A-3. Foreign Aid Funding Trends Fiscal Year

Billions of current US&

Billions of constant 2008 $s

As % of GDP

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976a 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

$3.08 $6.71 $3.18 $8.30 $5.97 $7.61 $6.81 $4.98 $4.77 $4.10 $4.85 $4.87 $4.01 $5.07 $5.22 $5.48 $6.53 $6.38 $5.27 $5.42 $6.90 $6.34 $6.76 $6.64 $6.57 $7.84 $9.02 $9.45 $8.50 $6.91 $9.11 $7.78 $9.01 $13.85 $9.69 $10.54 $12.32 $14.20 $15.52

$28.38 $56.07 $24.26 $61.27 $48.72 $57.12 $50.39 $35.57 $34.76 $30.09 $33.90 $34.07 $27.33 $34.32 $34.61 $35.89 $42.50 $40.77 $33.21 $33.77 $41.75 $37.24 $38.17 $35.92 $33.93 $38.72 $43.32 $42.62 $34.97 $26.20 $32.65 $26.24 $28.42 $39.87 $25.10 $24.91 $27.46 $30.41 $31.85

1.38% 2.75% 1.18% 3.10% 2.03% 2.24% 1.90% 1.31% 1.25% 0.99% 1.11% 1.06% 0.86% 1.00% 0.99% 1.01% 1.12% 1.03% 0.79% 0.75% 0.88% 0.76% 0.74% 0.67% 0.63% 0.70% 0.73% 0.68% 0.57% 0.42% 0.47% 0.34% 0.35% 0.50% 0.31% 0.32% 0.35% 0.36% 0.37%

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As % of total discretionary budget authority — — — — __ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3.15% 3.47% 5.02% 3.11% 3.09% 3.46% 3.66% 3.66%

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Table A-3. (Continued) As % of total discretionary budget authority 1985 $18.13 $35.91 0.41% 3.97% 1986 $16.62 $32.30 0.35% 3.79% 1987 $14.80 $27.76 0.29% 3.32% 1988 $13.97 $22.85 0.28% 3.08% 1989 $14.85 $25.52 0.26% 3.15% 1990 $16.02 $26.13 0.27% 3.22% 1991 $17.05 $26.67 0.27% 3.12% 1992 $16.43 $24.95 0.25% 3.09% 1993 $17.91 $26.41 0.25% 3.42% 1994 $17.04 $24.50 0.23% 3.32% 1995 $16.14 $22.58 0.21% 3.22% 1996 $14.68 $19.94 0.18% 2.93% 1997 $13.66 $18.15 0.16% 2.67% 1998 $14.69 $19.21 0.16% 2.77% 1999 $17.55 $22.44 0.18% 3.02% 2000 $16.39 $20.27 0.16% 2.80% 2001 $15.33 $18.46 0.15% 2.31% 2002 $17.93 $21.24 0.16% 2.44% 2003 $22.40 $25.93 0.19% 2.64% 2004 $29.69 $33.50 0.24% 3.27% 2005 $30.17 $32.92 0.23% 3.06% 2006 $27.26 $28.80 0.20% 2.73% 2007 $26.08 $26.81 0.20% 2.59% 2008 $27.68 $27.68 0.19% 2.40% Source: USAID, Office of Management and Budget, annual appropriations legislation and CRS calculations. Notes: The data in this table represent obligated funds reported in the USAID Greenbook up through FY2006 (FY2007-FY2008 are appropriations), but the Greenbook accounts included in the total have been adjusted by CRS to allow for accurate comparison over time. CRS has attempted to include only programs that correlate with the traditional foreign assistance budget accounts, excluding, for example, such Greenbook additions as State Department accounts for embassy security and Foreign Service retirement , Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to the former Soviet Union, and certain funds administered by the Department of Defense in Iraq and Afghanistan. FY2008 % of GDP based on 3rd Quarter reports. a. FY 1976 includes both regular FY76 and transition quarter (TQ)funding, and the GDP calculation is based on the average FY76 and TQ GDP.

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Fiscal Year

Billions of current US&

Billions of constant 2008 $s

As % of GDP

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APPENDIX B. COMMON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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DA DOD ERMA ESF FMF FSA GDP GNI HIPC IBRD IDA IDA IMET IMF INCLE MCC MDBs MRA NADR NGO ODA OECD OFDA OPIC OTI PEPFAR P.L. 480 PVO SEED TDA UNDP UNICEF USAID

Development Assistance Department of Defense Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Economic Support Fund Foreign Military Financing FREEDOM (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets) Support Act of 1992 Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income Heavily Indebted Poor Country World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development World Bank, International Development Association International Disaster Assistance International Military Education and Training International Monetary Fund International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Millennium Challenge Corporation Multilateral Development Banks Migration and Refugees Assistance Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs Non-Governmental Organization Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Overseas Private Investment Corporation Office of Transition Initiatives President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Food for Peace/Food Aid Private Voluntary Organization Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989 U.S. Trade and Development Agency United Nations Development Program United Nations Children‘s Fund U.S. Agency for International Development

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Chapter 7

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AFTER START: ISSUES AND OPTIONS Amy F. Woolf*

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SUMMARY The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and is due to expire in December 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss options for continuing their arms control relationship, but have not agreed on whether to extend START or how to replace it. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They also have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other‘s compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START expired in mid-2006. They have, however been unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty‘s provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to *

Email: [email protected], 7-2379

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extend, informally, some of START‘s monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse or they could extend START for five years. They could extend START, then amend it to ease some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new Treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations.

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INTRODUCTION The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on July 31, 1991. After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the parties signed a Protocol that named the four former Soviet Republics with nuclear weapons on their territory—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia—parties to the Treaty.1 START entered into force on December 4, 1994. The Treaty was to remain in force for 15 years, unless replaced by a subsequent agreement, and, therefore, will expire on December 5, 2009.2 According to Article XVII of the Treaty, the parties must meet ―no later than one year‖ before this date to consider whether the Treaty should be extended or allowed to lapse.3 If the parties agree to extend the Treaty, the extension would last five years, unless START were replaced by a subsequent agreement during that time. The United States and Russia held several meetings in the latter years of the Bush Administration to discuss the options for continuing their bilateral arms control relationship after START, but have did not reach an agreement on whether to extend START or on how to replace it. The Obama Administration has pledged to resume the discussions, both to extend the monitoring and verification provisions in START and to seek an agreement on further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The discussions thus far, along with the statements from Members of Congress and others following the process, reflect not only on the specific issues that may be addressed in a possible follow-on Treaty, but, also on the broader question of what, if any, role arms control should play in future U.S.-Russian relations. The United States and Soviet Union negotiated START between 1994 and 2001. It contains many detailed definitions and restrictions that not only limit the permitted number of 1

The leaders in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate all of the nuclear weapons on their territories and to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. These three states have been nuclear free since the late 1990s; all remaining Soviet-era nuclear warheads are deployed in Russia. 2 The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty) on May 24, 2002. They do not, however, consider this Treaty to be a successor to START. Article II of the Moscow Treaty specifically states that the START Treaty remains in force. See CRS Report RL3 1448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf. 3 The Parties did not need to make a decision about the future of START in December 2008, they just needed to meet to consider the question.

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nuclear warheads but also restrain the locations and movement of delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and require extensive exchanges of data about them. Many of these provisions reflect the more competitive relationship between the United States and Soviet Union, and the concerns that drove their inclusion in the Treaty, may no longer seem as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship. Specifically, some in the Bush Administration and the broader foreign policy community have argued that, because the United States no longer structures its nuclear forces in response to a Russian threat, it no longer needs a treaty that restrains and reduces the weapons that make up that threat. They, therefore, question whether the START Treaty, or U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control in general, remain important as tools in the political relationship between the United States and Russia. Some U.S. critics of arms control have argued that the bilateral arms control process should fade away after START expires. They note that START may have served its purpose by helping to reduce the size of the Russian arsenal after the demise of the Soviet Union and by restraining the permitted operations of the remaining forces, but its reductions have been overtaken by deeper cuts mandated by the Moscow Treaty and the restrictions on Russian forces also serve to restrict the flexibility of U.S. forces. In the current environment, the United States may be better served by maintaining its own freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces than by retaining START‘s or similar restraints on U.S. and Russian forces. Others, however, argue that START remains relevant to the U.S.-Russian relationship and deserves to be either extended or replaced with a similar treaty. In this view, the predictability created by START‘s well-defined restrictions on Russian and U.S. nuclear forces can benefit both countries. Moreover, continuing this cooperation can help to restore some trust in the relationship between the two nations. In addition, some in Russia still feel threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons and continue to value the restraints provided by arms control treaties. Some Members of Congress have joined this debate, with several endorsing the view that extending START, and its monitoring and verification provisions, will help improve the relationship between the United States and Russia. For example, Senator Richard Lugar has stated that ―the current U.S.-Russian relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty. Failure to preserve the START Treaty would increase the potential for distrust between the two sides.‖4 Some also believe, as Senator Lugar has noted, that the ―failure to renew START will be seen worldwide as weakening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a further sign to many foreign leaders and experts that U.S. nonproliferation policy is adrift.‖5 Congress has limited influence on the process of seeking a replacement for START. If the United States and Russia amend START, or negotiate a new treaty to replace it, the Senate will have to provide its advice and consent before the parties ratify the Treaty. However, if the two parties do not reach any agreement and START lapses, or if they choose simply to extend START for five years, according to the provision in Article XVII, the Senate would not have to approve or reject the outcome. Nevertheless, Congress can, through resolutions, hearings, and consultations, offer the Administration its views on the future of the START Treaty and the U.S.-Russian arms control process. 4 5

Richard Lugar. Speech at Conference on Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. January 20, 2008. Richard Lugar. ―Trust Still Needs Verification.‖ Washington Times. July 18, 2008. p. 24.

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This chapter provides background information about the START Treaty and reviews the discussions about a possible successor to START. It also presents a range of alternatives that the United States and Russia might consider if they choose to follow START with a new framework for the arms control process.

THE START TREATY6

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Key Provisions Central Limits START limits long-range nuclear-capable delivery systems—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—in the United States and the four states of the former Soviet Union. The Treaty limits both the number of delivery systems and the number of warheads carried on these systems. As Table 1 below indicates, each side can deploy 6,000 ―attributed‖ warheads on no more than 1,600 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, with no more than 4,900 attributed warheads on land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles. Within the aggregate limits on ballistic missile warheads, START also limits each side to no more than 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs, which are defined as those with a throwweight greater than 4,350 kilograms, and 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. These two limits are an added effort to restrain forces that the United States feared would provide the Soviet Union with an avenue to exceed the warhead limit. The United States had long sought to use the arms control process to limit, or eliminate, the Soviet monopoly on heavy ICBMs because it believed that the Soviet Union could expand the capabilities of these missiles by deploying them with more or higher yield. The United States did not have any ballistic missiles of this size, and had no plans to develop or deploy them. The Soviet Union initially resisted U.S. pressures to limit these missiles, but eventually agreed to halve their force of 304 SS-18 ICBMs, each of which was deployed with 10 warheads, under START. As the START negotiations proceeded through the 1980s, the United States also grew concerned about the Soviet deployment of ballistic missiles on mobile launchers. The Soviet Union had begun to deploy single-warhead SS-25 missiles on road-mobile launchers and 10warhead SS-24 missiles on rail-mobile launchers. The United States considered these missiles both a military and an arms control problem. Because the United States did not think it could locate and track these missiles all the time, it believed it would be difficult to target them during a conflict. Moreover, because the Soviet Union had large land areas where it could operate and conceal these missiles, U.S. negotiators argued that the United States would not be able to monitor mobile ICBM deployments well enough to count the missiles and verify Soviet compliance with the limits in START.

6

The full text of the Treaty and its many annexes is available at the U.S. State Department website: http://www. state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm.

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Table 1. Central Limits in START Deployed Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Heavy ICBMs Accountable Warheads on Deployed Delivery Vehicles Ballistic Missile Warheads Warheads on Heavy ICBMs Warheads on Mobile ICBMs Total Ballistic Missile Throwweight

1,600 154 6,000 4,900 1,540 1,100 3,600 metric tonsa

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Source: U.S. Department of State, Text of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm. a. This is around 54% of the amount of throwweight deployed on Soviet missiles when the treaty was signed.

The United States initially proposed that START ban mobile ICBMs, even though it was considering the possible use of mobile launchers for its new 10-warhead Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM and for a prospective small, single-warhead ICBM. But, after the United States and Soviet Union began to consider options for a monitoring and verification regime that might track the numbers of mobile ICBMs, they agreed to limit, rather than ban, these systems. The limited numbers, when combined with location restrictions, notifications prior to movement, data exchanges that identified the numbers of missiles and warheads based at approved locations, and a continuous monitoring regime outside the final assembly facility for one type of mobile ICBM, would help each side count the number of acknowledged mobile ICBMs and complicate efforts to conceal extra missiles or warheads. Even though the United States eventually dropped its plans to deploy mobile ICBMs, it agreed to apply these limits and restrictions to the Peacekeeper (MX) missiles that were deployed in silos. START also limits the total amount of throwweight on each side‘s ballistic missiles, to an amount equal to around 54% of the amount of throwweight on Soviet missiles before the Treaty entered into force. Throwweight is the combined weight of the post-boost vehicle, warheads, guidance system, penetration aids, and other equipment found on the front end of a missile. It is considered to be a measure of a missile‘s destructive capacity because larger missiles with greater throwweight can carry larger or greater numbers of warheads. Hence, this limit was a further effort by the United States to limit the potential for the Soviet Union to add warheads to its missiles in violation of the Treaty‘s limits. Because Soviet forces deployed when START was signed carried had than three times as much throwweight as U.S. missiles, the United States did not have to reduce its forces to comply with this limit. However, the United States could have exceeded the limit on throwweight if it had deployed new, larger missiles while START remained in force.

Counting Rules START counts each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, and each deployed heavy bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles. They count regardless of whether they are

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equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. They also continue to count under the Treaty limits until the launchers or bombers are eliminated according to the Treaty‘s detailed elimination procedures. For example, a bomber, such as the B-1, that has been converted to carry conventional weapons continues to count under the Treaty limits. Moreover, an empty missile launcher, either on land or on a ballistic missile submarine, continues to count as if it still holds a missile and the missile still carries the attributed number of warheads, even if the missile system is deactivated or the launcher is converted to another purpose. The number of warheads attributed to each type of missile or bomber is listed in an agreed data base. 7 For the most part, the number of warheads attributed to each type of missile equals the maximum number of warheads that the missile had been tested with and could be equipped to carry when the treaty entered into force. In some cases, however, such as for the U.S. Trident II (D-5) missile, the number of warheads attributed to the missile (8) fell below the maximum number the missile could carry (12). The Soviet SS-18 missile had also been tested with 12 or 14 warheads, but the data base counted it as carrying only 10. The parties adopted this formula of counting delivery vehicles and attributing warheads to each type of delivery vehicle, because, although they sought to reduce warheads, they could not monitor the actual numbers of warheads deployed on the delivery vehicles but could identify and count the large delivery vehicles with their monitoring systems. The number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers falls far below the maximum number that could be carried on those aircraft. Heavy bombers that are not equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)8—such as the U.S. B-1 and B-2 bombers— count as only one warhead under the START limits. This number applies even though these bombers can carry at least 16 bombs and short-range missiles. Further, heavy bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as half of the maximum number of weapons they are permitted to carry. START states that U.S. bombers can be equipped to carry up to 20 ALCMs, but they only count as 10 warheads under the Treaty limit of 6,000 warheads. Russian bombers can be equipped to carry up to 16 ALCMs, and count as only 8 warheads under the Treaty limit. START allows the United States and Soviet Union to reduce the number of warheads attributed to a particular type of ballistic missile through a process known as ―downloading.‖ According to the Treaty, each party can reduce the ―attributed number‖ listed in the data base for up to three types of missiles. If they do this, they must then reduce the number of warheads carried on each missile, and if the number declines by more than 2 warheads, they must replace the platform on the missile that holds the warheads, so that it does not have space for the larger number of missiles. This ―downloading‖ process would allow each country to spread its 4,900 ballistic missile warheads among a greater number of missiles. The countries use short-notice on-site inspections to confirm that the number of warheads actually deployed on a particular missile does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that type of missile in the data base. The United States has taken advantage of this provision with its Minuteman III and Trident II missiles. Existing types of missiles cannot be deployed with more warheads than the number attributed to that type of missile in the data base. The number in the data base could only 7

The most recent data base exchanged among the parties to the Treaty can be found at U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/2008/110337.htm. 8 Long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles are those with a range of more than 600 kilometers. Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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increase if the missile were altered to meet the definition of a ―new type‖ of missile. START bans new types of heavy ICBMs. For smaller missiles, it contains an elaborate definition that is designed to allow the parties to distinguish between modified versions of existing ballistic missiles, which would be subject to the warhead attribution numbers already in the data base, and new types, which would receive a new warhead attribution number. During the negotiations, the parties agreed that the definition would reflect changes in missile characteristics such as the propellant used, the number of stages, its length and diameter, and its throwweight, but they differed on the magnitude of the changes that would define a ―new type.‖ The United States feared that, with smaller changes, the Soviet Union would be able to have a missile that was virtually identical to an existing missile declared a new type with a greater number of warheads, and then might secretly backfit the older version with more warheads, as well. This was one of the last issues resolved in the START negotiations.9

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Collateral Constraints START contains detailed definitions of the items and activities limited by the treaty. The parties have also been required to exchange copious amounts of detailed data on the technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. The Treaty mandates that the parties locate all strategic forces limited by the Treaty at ―declared facilities‖ which include production, assembly, testing, storage, maintenance, deployment, and elimination facilities. It outlines detailed notifications that must be provided and procedures that must be followed when items move from one location to another. It further defines detailed procedures that the countries must follow when they eliminate weapons limited by the Treaty, or close down facilities that had once housed these items. Designed to reduce ambiguities and minimize the opportunities for dispute, these details provide the ―foundation‖ for the Treaty‘s verification regime by drawing sharp distinctions between permitted and prohibited forces and activities.

Monitoring and Verification Verification is the process that one country uses to assess whether another country is complying with an arms control agreement. To verify compliance, a country must determine whether the forces and activities of another country are within the bounds established by the limits and obligations in the agreement. Treaty language forms the core of the verification regime: it describes the limits and obligations the countries must observe and allows them to identify the forces and activities that comply with the terms of the Treaty. The identification of compliant activities also helps a country focus on what it should look for when it collects information about the other country‘s forces and activities. No verification regime can ensure the detection of all violations, but the START regime is designed to ensure that parties would have a high probability of detecting militarily significant violations. The parties to a treaty use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor— the forces and activities of the other parties. Some of these monitoring systems, such as 9

The Soviet Union suggested that a 15% change in throwweight would be enough to distinguish a new type of missile, while the United States wanted a throwweight change of 30% and a change in one other missile characteristic. They eventually agreed to essentially split their differences and defined a new types of missile as one with a 21% change in throwweight and at least a 5% change in the length of the first stage. This would make new types of missiles significantly different from existing types.

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overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. But the parties can also cooperate in providing information by exchanging data, displaying treaty-limited items, and allowing on-site inspections. Once they have collected this information, the parties analyze and refine the raw data to help develop a meaningful picture of each other‘s forces and activities. They then evaluate the results of the monitoring process, compare the observed forces and activities with the expected forces and activities, and determine whether the other party has complied with its obligations under the terms of the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. To achieve this goal, the countries have had to

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establish the number and location of deployed and stored ballistic missiles and deployed bombers when the Treaty entered into force; confirm the technical characteristics of existing types of weapons and establish the measurements for new types of weapons; add the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers deployed after the treaty entered into force; subtract the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers eliminated, according to treaty rules, during the life of the treaty; track treaty-limited items when they move between declared facilities; monitor the armament on permitted systems, to confirm that missiles and bombers are deployed with the numbers and types of warheads permitted by the START data base; and monitor ballistic missile flight tests to determine the characteristics of different types of ballistic missiles. START contains a complex verification regime that is designed to allow the parties to achieve these objectives. Both sides use their own satellites and remote sensing equipment— their National Technical Means of Verification (NTM)—to gather the vast majority of the information each needs to monitor the other country‘s forces and activities and to determine whether the other country has complied with the limits in START. But the Treaty also contains a number of specific verification provisions that are designed to help the parties gather and confirm the needed information. For example, it bans measures that would interfere with the parties‘ ability to collect information with their NTM, and requires that they use data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections to gather information about forces and activities limited by the Treaty. These measures do not replace monitoring with NTM, but they can add detail to information collected by NTM, enhance a country‘s confidence in the meaning and reliability of the information, and help deter violations. The Treaty also established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), where the parties meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.

Access Measures START contains several verification measures that allow the countries‘ NTM to gain access to information about the other country‘s treaty-limited forces. These measures include a ban on interference with NTM—for example, the parties cannot interfere with the launch or

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operation of the other side‘s satellites—and a requirement that they broadcast telemetry, the technical data generated during missile flight tests over open channels. START also bans efforts to conceal forces and activities from NTM and mandates that the parties display treaty limited items under certain circumstances, so that NTM can confirm their locations and some characteristics. The ban on data denial during missile flight tests was a particularly important feature of START for the United States. Each nation transmits data, known as telemetry, during its flight tests of ballistic missiles. Even without START, each nation monitored the other‘s missile flight tests to gain information about characteristics such as missile throwweight, launch weight, and the number of reentry vehicles releases tested during the flight. The nations could deny each other access to this data by encrypting it and transmitting it in coded form, recording it during the flight and storing it aboard the missile for recovery after the test, or by jamming and otherwise interfering with the other side‘s receiving instruments. Because the United States believed that this information would be critical to its efforts to monitor Soviet compliance with START, it insisted that the Treaty contain a complete ban on the denial of data generated during flight tests. Not only must the parties broadcast unencrypted data during the tests, they also agreed to exchange the tapes of data recorded during the flight tests.

Information Exchanges START mandates that the parties exchange detailed information about the numbers, locations, and characteristics of treaty-limited ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. For the most part, this information confirms information that each country collects with its own NTM. It can provide additional details and help the countries interpret ambiguous or incomplete data. The countries have also had to notify each other when they move ballistic missiles or bombers that are limited by the treaty. These notifications help each country monitor the locations of the other side‘s permitted systems and detect the possible presence of excess or illegal systems. On-site Inspections Under START, the United States and Russia have conducted several different types of on-site inspections. They use these inspections to collect information about permitted systems and activities at declared facilities, but they are not permitted to go ―anywhere, anytime‖ in search of treaty violations. These inspections may not provide much new information that is needed to verify compliance with the Treaty, but can confirm and add detail to information collected by NTM and data exchanges. Further, with the short notice available before many of these inspections, a country would find it difficult to hide evidence of a violation at a declared facility. START has permitted inspections at all the declared facilities that produce, house, and support ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The countries use these inspections to confirm information about the number of systems located at each facility. They have also viewed treaty-limited items to confirm information about their characteristics; for example, they can use short-notice inspections to confirm that the number of warheads on a missile does not exceed the number attributed to that type of missile in the data base. Each country has also

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established permanent monitoring systems around a final assembly facility for one of the other country‘s mobile ICBMs to help them count mobile ICBMs as they enter the force. Each of the inspections permitted by the START Treaty is governed by complex and detailed procedures that address everything about the inspection process. These procedures outline, among other things, the airports the inspectors can use when they arrive in the country, the amount of notice they need to give before the start of the inspection, the amount of time the host country has to transport the inspectors to the selected site, the types of equipment the inspectors can use, the amount of time that can transpire during the inspection, and the procedures the inspectors and hosts would use to resolve questions that came up during the visit. These procedures and rules are designed to outline the rights and responsibilities of both parties, and minimize any potential conflict that might occur during inspections, but they also can create conflicts and of their own if questions about procedures come up during the process. Most analysts agree, however, that the START inspection process has had few significant problems over the years.

Synergy in Monitoring and Verification Each verification provision in START is designed to provide the parties with a distinct source of information about the forces and activities of the other side. They also mesh together in a way that is designed to deter violations and increase confidence in the parties‘ compliance with the Treaty. For example, much of the data collected during on-site inspections can also be collected by NTM or shared during data exchanges. The inspections essentially confirm expected information. Nevertheless, this redundancy can detect inconsistencies and thereby complicate efforts to hide information and evade Treaty limits. For example, if one party did not notify the other before it moved a treaty-limited item to a different facility, but the other party‘s NTM detected the movement, the inconsistency might raise questions about whether the first party were trying to hide or conceal an item limited by the treaty. Over time, the START regime has also allowed the parties to collect information that may not be central to the goals of the Treaty but could still add to their understanding of the forces and operations of the other side. Many of the Treaty‘s supporters argue that this adds confidence and predictability to assessments of the other side‘s strategic forces.

START Implementation In September 1990, before START entered into force, the United States had more than 10,500 accountable warheads deployed on nearly 2,250 delivery vehicles.10 By mid-2008, this number had declined to 5,941 accountable warheads on 1,214 delivery vehicles. 11 Soviet forces had declined from more than 10,000 accountable warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in September 1990 to 4,138 accountable warheads on 839 delivery vehicles in mid-2008. All the nuclear warheads from the SS-18 ICBMs and heavy bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May 1995. All the nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine‘s territory by June 1996, and all 81 SS-25 mobile ICBMs had been moved from Belarus to 10 11

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Archives. START Data Base, exchanged September 1, 1990. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Fact Sheet. START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons. October 1, 2008.

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Russia by late November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all the ICBM silos and heavy bombers that were deployed on its territory. All the parties have also participated in the onsite inspections permitted under the Treaty. They continue to meet, twice each year, in the JCIC. While both the United States and Russia have raised some questions about compliance with the Treaty, both agree that there have been few significant compliance disputes.

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THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY12 In 2001, during its first year in office, the Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture Review to evaluate the size, structure, and role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a part of that review, the Administration determined that the United States could reduce its strategic forces to between 1,700 and 2,000 ―operationally deployed nuclear warheads.‖ During a summit meeting with Russia‘s President Vladimir Putin in November 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would pursue these reductions unilaterally in the next decade, without signing a formal arms control agreement. President Putin indicated that Russia wanted to use the formal arms control process to achieve deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals, and emphasized that the two sides should focus on ―reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement.‖13 Within the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell supported the conclusion of a ―legally binding‖ arms control agreement. He apparently prevailed over the objections of officials in the Pentagon who reportedly wanted the United States to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own needs. 14 Consequently, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty) on May 24, 2002. It received the advice and consent of the Senate on March 6, 2003 and the approval of the Russian parliament on May 14, 2003; it entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Moscow Treaty states that the United States and Russia will reduce their ―strategic nuclear warheads‖ to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012.15 The text does not define ―strategic nuclear warheads‖ and, therefore, does not indicate whether the parties will count only those warheads that are ―operationally deployed,‖ all warheads that would count under the START counting rules, or some other quantity. The text does refer to statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in November and December 2001, when each outlined their own reduction plans. As a result, the United States and Russia each use their own definition when counting strategic nuclear warheads, and neither uses the START counting rules. The Treaty does not limit delivery vehicles or impose sublimits on specific types of weapons systems. Each party shall determine its own ―composition and structure of

12

The text of this treaty can be found at U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Treaties and Agreements. http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/10527.htm. 13 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Press Conference. President Bush and President Putin Discuss New Relationship. November 13, 2001. 14 Jonathan Landay. ―Rumsfeld Reportedly Resists Firm Limits on Nuclear Arms,‖ San Jose Mercury News. April 27, 2002. 15 For details on the substance of the Treaty, see CRS Report RL3 1448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.

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its strategic offensive arms.‖ In addition, the Treaty does not contain any definitions or descriptions of the types missiles and bombers whose warheads count under the Treaty limits. In addition, the Moscow Treaty does not contain any monitoring or verification provisions. During the hearings on the resolution of ratification, the Bush Administration noted that the United States and Russia already collect information about strategic nuclear forces under START and during implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. At the time, some in Congress questioned whether this information would be sufficient for the duration of the Treaty, since START expires three years ahead of the Moscow Treaty.16 This break in the time lines is one of the primary reasons why many analysts and Members of Congress believe the two sides should at least extend the monitoring and verification provisions in START through the end of the Moscow Treaty.

PREPARING FOR START EXPIRATION

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U.S.-Russian Discussions In September 2006, U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak met to initiate a new strategic security dialogue. This dialogue evolved into a series of meetings that addressed a range of issues. START was included, but was not high on the agenda of the meetings. During the first meeting, and at a second one in December 2006, the two sides outlined their goals for the talks. Russia indicated that it wanted to follow START with a new formal treaty that would be ―similar in size and complexity to START‖ and would use many of the same definitions and counting rules as START. Russia also suggested that the two sides establish a regular working group, with meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level, to work out the details of this new Treaty. According to a Bush Administration official, the United States had ―no appetite for those big, giant documents that try to script every single element of strategic forces.‖17 The Administration emphasized that the United States and Russia no longer needed arms control agreements to manage their strategic relationship. The United States also did not want to set up a working group or negotiate a new Treaty to follow START, and preferred to pursue broader ―strategic discussions‖ within a political framework.18 In spite of their differences, the United States and Russia agreed that they should continue to implement some of the monitoring and verification provisions in START after the Treaty expired. Russia proposed that they include these verification provisions in a new, legally binding Treaty that would also limit the number of warheads permitted on each side. According to one Russian official, these measures would have to be a part of a legally binding agreement to be permitted by domestic Russian law.19 The United States, however, argued for a less formal arrangement of transparency and confidence-building measures. These could

16

For details, see U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell. July 9, 2002. 17 Sebastian Sprenger. ―Nations to Kick off Initiative Against Nuclear Terrorism Next Week. Separate U.S.-Russian meeting on START expected.‖ Inside Defense. com, October 26, 2006. 18 Nicholas Kralev. ―Russia, U.S. to Discuss START.‖ Washington Times. March 6, 2007. p. 1. 19 Wade Boese. ―U.S., Russia exploring post-START Options.‖ Arms Control Today. May 2007.

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include voluntary notifications and site visits, but would not contain the detailed procedures and provisions included in START.20 Although Undersecretary of State Joseph initially rejected the idea, the two sides did hold a series of meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level in search of a possible monitoring and verification agreement. They continued to disagree, however, on whether the verification measures should be voluntary or legally binding, and whether they should be attached to a formal treaty that would also limit the numbers of deployed warheads. In addition to the periodic meetings at the Undersecretary level (Joseph/Kislyak, then Rood/Kislyak) and the working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level, the United States and Russia held several high level meetings that addressed the future of U.S.-Russian arms control. For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Russia‘s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in July 2007. Their formal statement after the meeting said that ―The United States and Russia reiterate their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments.‖ It added that the ―Ministers discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces.21 But the United States still did not accept Russia‘s proposal to pursue a formal Treaty. The U.S. position began to shift later in 2007. Secretary Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held joint meetings in Moscow with their counterparts in October, and concluded that, although the United States was still seeking something ―far less formal than a major treaty‖ it might accept, according to Secretary Gates, ―a binding agreement‖ preserving some of START, as long as it was ―narrowly focused.‖ 22 Nevertheless, the United States continued to reject a formal treaty that would limit the number of nuclear weapons. When Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice traveled to Moscow to discuss START again in March 2008, Secretary Rice argued the current U.S.-Russian relationship does not require ―the kind of highly articulated, expensive limitations and verification procedures that attended the strategic arms relationship with the Soviet Union.‖23 Russian officials, however, continued to reject the U.S. proposals for an informal ―notification‖ regime. Presidents Bush and Putin failed to break this stalemate when they met in Sochi, Russia in April 2008. Although they signed a new Strategic Framework that contained a pledge to enact nuclear weapons reductions ―to the lowest possible level consistent with our national security requirements and alliance commitments,‖ they failed to agree on the way forward in their arms control relationship. Russia still wanted to negotiate a Treaty based on the START framework; the United States was only willing to codify some verification measures.24 The talks continued through the spring and summer of 2008, although, according to some news reports they were ―irregular and unproductive.‖ 25 Some reports suggested that the United States might suspend the talks in response to the Russian incursion into Georgia in August, 2008, but both sides agreed the talks were important enough to continue in

20

Nicholas Kralev. ―Russia, U.S. to Discuss START.‖ Washington Times. March 6, 2007. p. 1. U.S. State Department. Office of the Spokesman. Joint Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov. July 3, 2007. 22 Ken Fireman. ―Gates, Rice made Last-Minute Offer of New Arms Ideas in Moscow.‖ Bloomberg News, October 13, 2007. 23 Wade Boese. ―U.S., Russia at Odds on Key Arms Issues.‖ Arm Control Today. April 2008. 24 Wade Boese. ―Bush, Putin Leave Arms Disputes Unsettled.‖ Arms Control Today. May 2008. 25 Wade Boese. ―Russia Wants Limits on Prompt Global Strike.” Arms Control Today. June 2008. 21

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September and October. 26 Nevertheless, the two sides remained far apart. Russia was unwilling to recede from its call for a formal Treaty with detailed definitions and counting rules; the United States still preferred a less formal agreement that outlined transparency and confidence-building measures. The United State did, however, recognize that Russia would not permit on-site visits without a formal Treaty, so Washington proposed in October 2008 that the two sides attach an informal transparency regime to a legally binding Treaty that essentially reiterated the limits and declarations outlined in the Moscow Treaty. Russia rejected this proposal. In a speech delivered on October 10, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia attaches ―exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding Russian-American agreement on nuclear disarmament‖ to replace START. He further noted that ―what we need is a treaty and not a declaration,‖ which is a reference to the format used in the Moscow Treaty.27 The United States and Russia, along with representatives from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, met in the JCIC from November 13 through 21, 2008. This forum provided the venue for the formal meeting, mandated by START, where the parties considered whether to extend the Treaty.28 They did not reach any agreements during this meeting, other than to note that they were leaving the options open for the Obama Administration. The United States and Russia held one final meeting in their series of strategic security discussions on December 15, 2008; bi-lateral arms control was one of many issues on the agenda.29 They held extensive discussions about the U.S. draft treaty, but they failed to reach agreement on any of the outstanding issues.

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U.S. and Russian Proposals Neither the United States nor Russia believes the two parties should extend the START Treaty. Neither wants to continue to implement all the monitoring and verification provisions included in START; the lengthy and highly detailed lists of procedures and requirements have proven costly and complicated. In some cases, these details were designed to address concerns about the potential for cheating and evasion that no longer exist in the current environment. Moreover, as is noted below, some of the limits and restrictions have begun to interfere with ongoing weapons programs for both nations. A simple extension of START would not reduce these pressures, and, unless the parties could agree on a new Treaty, could remain in force for five years.

Russian Proposals In a speech to Russian diplomats in June 2006, then-President Vladimir Putin proposed that the United States and Russia begin negotiations to replace START with a new Treaty.30 26

Wade Boese. ―U.S.-Russian Strategic Dialogue in Limbo.‖ Arms Control Today. October 2008. Wade Boese. ―Bush Administration Sets Russian Arms Talks.‖ Arms Control Today. October 2008. 28 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Statement by the United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Fact Sheet. November, 21, 2008. 29 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. ―Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John C. Rood To Travel to Moscow for Bilateral Strategic Security Dialogue Talks.‖ Media Note. December 12, 2008. 30 Wade Boese. ―Russia Seeks New Nuclear Accord.‖ Arms Control Today, September 2006. 27

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Since then, Russia has consistently and repeatedly insisted that the two sides replace START with a treaty that would not only reduce each side‘s strategic offensive forces to 1,500 warheads, but would count the warheads on all deployed delivery vehicles, as START has done.31 Such an agreement would maintain the predictability and the stability afforded by START, an outcome that would not be possible in the absence of a detailed, legally binding Treaty.32 The new treaty would not need to keep all the provisions of START, but should preserve ―the main systematic structure of the agreement,‖ including limitations on delivery vehicles and warhead deployments.33 Reports indicate that Russia would like the new treaty to relax START‘s requirements for new types of ballistic missiles. As was noted above, START contains a precise definition of the changes needed to have a new missile counted as a ―new type.‖ These provisions were designed to prevent Russia from deploying its SS-25 missile with more than one warhead. But Russia has developed the RS-24 missile, a new variant of its single-warhead SS-27 missile, which is, itself, a variant of the SS-25, and it plans to deploy this new missile with three warheads on each missile. 34 Because the missile does not satisfy the Treaty‘s ―new types‖ definition, it would be limited to a single warhead under START, and a three-warhead version would violate the Treaty. This missile had its third successful test launch in late November 2008, and recent press reports indicate that Russia now plans to deploy this missile in December 2009, as soon as START expires. Russian officials have indicated that this missile is critical to the future of Russia‘s strategic forces, not only because it can carry up to three warheads, but also because it will incorporate technologies that would allow it to penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses.35 According to some reports, Russia would also like the new Treaty to ease some of the restrictions that START imposes on mobile ICBMs. 36 Although these restrictions were intended to apply to both parties, the United States has never been affected by them because it never deployed mobile ICBMs. These provisions, including limits on the size of deployment areas, notifications about exercises, and the rights to special on-site inspections after the missiles have dispersed for exercises, were designed to complicate any effort to hide extra missiles within the legal deployments of mobile ICBMs. But they also impinge on the operations of the permitted missiles and add to the costs of operating the systems.37 Over the years, Russia has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability to add warheads to its missiles quickly by restoring warheads that had been removed under START‘s downloading provisions. It may insist that a new Treaty require the United States to replace the platform on all downloaded missiles, instead of just those that have had more than two warheads removed.38 31

Wade Boese. ―Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia.‖ Arms Control Today. September 2007. Nikolai Sokov, ―START I Replacement: The End of Cold War Disarmament.‖ PONARS Policy Memo No. 418. Monterey Institute of International Studies. December 2006. 33 Arms Control Association, Interview with Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the United States. December, 2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/KislyakInterview. 34 Pavel Podvig. ―Why START is Important.‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July 3, 2007. 35 ―Russia To Deploy Missile To Counter US Missile Shield Next Year.‖ London Daily Telegraph. November 29, 2008. 36 Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov. ―ReSTART: The Need for a New U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement.‖ Arms Control Today. September 2006. 37 Nikolai Sokov. ―Review of Disarmament Issues in U.S. Russian Relations.‖ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. November, 2007. 38 Ibid. 32

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Russia would like to retain some of START‘s monitoring and verification provisions, although it would like to make them less costly and cumbersome. For example, the two sides could reduce the numbers of short-notice inspections permitted each year, and replace these inspections with less formal ―visits.‖ The parties could also reduce the number of mandatory notifications, which were intended to help each side monitor the numbers and locations of treaty-limited items, and replace them with routine, periodic data exchanges.39

U.S. Proposals When U.S. and Russian talks on the future of START began in 2006, the United States expected START to expire and the parties to pursue their own priorities when modernizing and modifying their nuclear forces. However, the participants in the U.S. government were divided on the question of whether to extend START‘s monitoring provisions. According to some reports, U.S. officials believed the two sides should evaluate whether they even needed to continue to implement these provisions because, even without START, the amount of military cooperation and transparency between them had increased over the years. 40 They further argued that the inspections regime had become too costly and cumbersome for the United States, and could interfere with military operations, without providing certain knowledge about Russian‘s nuclear forces. Moreover, in the new security environment, the United States no longer needs detailed information about Russian forces; it just needs to understand the general trends and pending changes in force size and structure. Therefore, the two sides need, at most, an informal system with less structured visits and looser inspections. Others argued that the START regime provides valuable information about Russian forces that is not available elsewhere, while also helping to build confidence and cooperation between the two sides. 41 Further, reports indicate that officials in the U.S. intelligence community have argued that, without START ‘s cooperative monitoring provisions, it will not be able to assess, with confidence, Russia‘s compliance with the limits in the Moscow Treaty.42 While the United States has not identified any of the central limits in START that impinge on its current plans and programs, some officials have expressed concerns that an extension of these provisions, or their inclusion in a new Treaty, could affect future plans, such as the possible deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles and the potential deployment of these conventional missiles at sites that are not listed in the Treaty.43 This concern has emerged as a major roadblock in the recent U.S.-Russian discussions about what type of treaty should follow START.44 Russia has insisted that the new treaty count the warheads that could be deployed on all strategic delivery vehicles, as START did, in part to capture the warheads that could be carried on missiles converted to carry conventional weapons. It wants to count these warheads to limit the U.S. ability to break out of the treaty 39

Ibid. David Francis. ―Arms Expert Calls for START Verification Extension.‖ Global Security Newswire. November 8, 2005. 41 Carol Giacomo. ―U.S. to let START nuclear treaty expire.‖ Reuters. May 22, 2007. See also, Jonathan S. Landay. ―Dispute Delays Arms Control Talks with Moscow.‖ McClatchy Washington Bureau. June 18, 2007. 42 Wade Boese. News Analysis: ―The Bush Administration and Verification.‖ Arms Control Today, April 2005. 43 Phil Gardner, Michael George, Vera Lev, and Sandra McMahon. Extension of the START Treaty? An SAIC Emerging Issues Project. December, 2005. 44 Walter Pincus. ―U.S., Russia Split over Scope of Arms Treaty Follow-up But Concur on Goal, Negotiator Says.‖ Washington Post. December 22, 2008. p. 19. 40

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by converting the missiles back to nuclear warheads.45 The United States, however, does not want the warheads that could be carried on these missiles to count under the Treaty because it does not want any limits on conventional warheads or any forced trade-offs between numbers of nuclear and conventional warheads. U.S. officials have also expressed concerns about some of START‘s monitoring and verification provisions. For example, the Navy has indicated that Russian requests for reentry vehicle inspections on U.S. ballistic missile submarines can interfere with the scheduled maintenance and operations of the submarines, because the Navy must bring the submarine into port and the missile into a handling facility on the base. The treaty‘s limits on the number of warheads that can be removed, or downloaded, from Trident submarines might also interfere with the Navy‘s deployment plans for the future, particularly the United States chooses to remove more warheads from Trident missiles as it continues to reduce the overall number of strategic warheads in its arsenal. Some in the U.S. government have also argued that START‘s provisions requiring the exchange of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles will interfere with U.S. military plans and programs. 46 In particular, the United States uses retired Minuteman II ICBMs as target vehicles during tests of its missile defense capabilities. Because these missiles are still limited by the START Treaty, the United States must provide Russia with all the telemetry generated during these flights. Yet, the data from these tests may reveal information not only about the Minuteman II ICBMs but also about the goals of the flight test and the characteristics of the missile defense interceptors. This concern has been a key issue in discussions about whether, and how, the United States and Russia should extend some of START‘s monitoring provisions. The Bush Administration eventually proposed that the two sides replace START with a short, legally binding Treaty similar to the Moscow Treaty and a longer, non-binding appendix on transparency and cooperation. This transparency regime would be far less detailed and complex than START. It would allow for informal visits, without the detailed plans and notifications required by START, and probably would relax the telemetry provisions, or at least exempt Minuteman II flights during missile defense tests from the requirement to broadcast and exchange telemetry. Moreover, as is noted above, the legally binding portion of the U.S. proposal would not contain any of the detailed definitions and counting rules of START; the parties would declare their numbers of deployed warheads, as they do under the Moscow Treaty. The Obama Administration has not yet outlined any specific proposals for advancing the U.S.- Russian arms control agenda, although it has indicated that it may resume discussions at an early date, and that it has two separate objectives for these discussions. In response to questions posed by the Arms Control Association, then-candidate Obama stated that he would ―seek Russia‘s agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of START before it expires.‖ He also said that he would seek ―real, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—whether deployed or nondeployed, whether strategic or nonstrategic.... ‖47 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered a similar response during her nomination hearings, indicating that the Obama Administration would continue negotiations 45

―Russia Concerned by U.S. Position on START, Deputy Foreign Minister Says. Interfax, December 19, 2008. Ibid. 47 Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama. Arms Control Association. September 24, 2008. 46

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with Russia to replace START and would seek to negotiate ―deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, whether deployed or non-deployed, strategic or nonstrategic.‖48 During a speech before the Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2009, Vice President Biden also stated that the United States and Russia should cooperate to ―renew the verification procedures in the START treaty and then go beyond existing treaties to negotiate deeper cuts in our arsenals.‖49 Press reports indicate that the White House and State Department have begun to hold internal talks on potential arms control proposals.50 While the statements quoted above do not specify whether the Administration will support a simple extension of START or its replacement with another agreement, it indicates that President Obama is more open to completing formal agreements with Russia, in general, and to negotiating further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

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OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE The United States and Russia have two distinct issues to consider when they contemplate the future of their arms control relationship. First, what, if anything, should they do within the next year to extend or replace START? And, second, should they seek to negotiate a new treaty to replace the Moscow Treaty before it expires in 2012? Moreover, should the provisions in a new Treaty focus on transparency and confidence-building measures, or should the two nations also seek to impose deeper reductions on their strategic offensive forces? It is unlikely that the United States and Russia will be able to negotiate and ratify a new Treaty before the end of 2009, even though both sides have said they want to do so. The Obama Administration has to name the senior State Department and Defense Department officials who may craft U.S. policy on arms control and nuclear weapons, develop its negotiating positions for a future arms control treaty; and negotiate and reach agreement on a wide range of issues with Russia. Both sides must present the treaty to their legislatures for advice and consent. Moreover, during its first year in office, the Obama Administration must conduct a Nuclear Posture Review,51 which could recommend changes in both U.S. nuclear weapons policy and the U.S. force structure. These changes could affect U.S. arms control proposals, but the study will not be completed until early 2010. The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse or they could extend START for five years. They could negotiate a new Treaty, or they could pursue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. A new Treaty could include further reductions in nuclear weapons, or it could simply establish a transparency regime that called for continued cooperation in monitoring without further reductions in deployed weapons. In their 48

Walter Pincus, ―Clinton‘s Goals Detailed,‖ Washington Post, January 19, 2009, p. 17. The White House, Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Washington, D.C., February 7, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksbyVicePresidentBidenat45th MunichConferenceonSecurityPolicy /. 50 Barry Schweid, ―Obama Admin. Seeks Treaty to Cut U.S., Russia Nukes,‖ Associated Press, February 5, 2009. 51 The mandate for the new Nuclear Posture Review is contained in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act. (P.L. 110- 181, Sec. 1070). 49

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discussions thus far, the United States and Russia have agreed they do not want to extend START, but they have been unable to agree on what kind of arrangement will follow START, in part because they do not agree on the goals they seek to achieve in their discussions. Hence, this paper will review some of the possible goals for the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control relationship before it reviews the range of options.

Possible Goals

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Improving the U.S.-Russian Relationship Many of the public discussions about the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control process focus on whether arms control can help the United States and Russia manage and improve their broader political relationship. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, many observers, including some who served in the Bush Administration believe that the U.S.Russian relationship has evolved to the point where the parties no longer need arms control as a symbol of their cooperation on resolving common security issues. Others, however, including some Members of Congress, believe that START and the arms control process still represent ―the foundation of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship‖ and a ―key basis for trust between the two sides.‖52 Supporting Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals During the past few years, the public debate over arms control and nuclear weapons has increasingly focused on the role that the U.S.-Russian arms control process can play in furthering broader international nuclear nonproliferation goals. For example, many analysts have argued that a U.S.-Russian agreement to either extend or replace START can demonstrate their commitment to their arms reduction obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,53 and can, therefore help strengthen the nonproliferation regime, in general, and help ensure a successful outcome at the 2010 review conference of the NPT. Others, however, argue that the nations who are currently seeking nuclear weapons would not be swayed in their decisions by any steps taken by the United States or Russia, as their nuclear programs derive from their own political and security concerns. Moreover, they note that the United States and Russia have already reduced their Cold-War era nuclear arsenals sharply, without reaping any benefits in their efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. Restraining Weapons Many analysts in the United States and officials in the Bush Administration have argued that, in the current security environment, the United States and Russia no longer need to worry about all the details related to the size or structure of the other side‘s nuclear forces, they just need to understand the general trends.54 Both have reduced their forces in recent years and neither needs to fear that the other would attack it with its remaining forces. Therefore, they no longer need to negotiate formal treaties to establish and maintain balance 52

Senator Richard Lugar. ― Trust Still Needs Verification.‖ Washington Times. July 18, 2008. P. 24. Jenifer Mackby ad Edward Ifft. ―The End of START.‖ Special to the Washington Post, April 20, 2007. 54 Jonathan S Landay. ―Dispute Delays Arms Control Talks with Moscow.‖ McClatchy Washington Bureau. June 18, 2007. 53

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between their two force structures. Moreover, these treaties undermine the flexibility that each nation may need to adjusts its forces in response to future threats from emerging adversaries. Although Russia recognizes that the relationship between the two nations is not as tense as it was during the Cold War, it still sees threats to its security from U.S. policies and programs. Therefore Russia continues to value arms control measures that restrain U.S. forces because these measures provide both stability between the two sides forces and predictability for Russia when it considers how U.S. forces may evolve.55 Many analysts in the United States also believe that the stability and predictability offered by arms control agreements are valuable enough to offset any limits the treaties may create for U.S. flexibility. Some argue that the process of implementing an arms control treaty, with its communication and cooperation, by itself, is important, so that the parties can avoid misunderstandings while they work together to reduce nuclear forces and nuclear dangers. Others, however, emphasize that the actual limits and restrictions in the treaty, as much as the cooperation to implement them, determine the amount of stability and predictability offered by the treaty. They note that the United States and Soviet Union included many of the detailed provisions in START because both wanted to restrain and reduce the nuclear forces of the other side to reduce the threat from those forces, and both agreed to include detailed monitoring and verification provisions so that they could be more confident about achieving the goal of reducing the threat.

Promoting Transparency and Cooperation Many have argued that, at least in the near-term, the United States and Russia should seek to replace START with a regime that will ensure transparency and build confidence, even if it does not mandate deeper reductions in nuclear weapons.56 This type of agreement will ensure that some form of monitoring and verification provisions remains in place after START expires and while the Moscow Treaty remains in force. A confidence-building regime can foster cooperation between the two sides even if the data it provides is not needed to verify compliance with an arms control Treaty. As one observer has noted, START ―forces the United States and Russia to communicate,‖ and to interact in ways that can build trust between them. 57 Therefore, an agreement that allowed the parties to continue with data exchanges, notifications, and some inspections, even without further reductions, could prove valuable. Some argue that the United States and Russia can promote transparency and continue their cooperation without signing a formal arms control agreement. They note that the two sides will continue to cooperate on reducing nuclear dangers through the nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that the United States funds to improve security and eliminate weapons in Russia. These efforts can be bolstered by informal visits to weapons deployment areas and storage facilities. Moreover, some have argued that the formal monitoring and 55

In a recent interview with the Arms Control Association, Russia‘s Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak, who, as Deputy Foreign Minister participated in talks on the future of START, stated that ―the mutual constraints provided for in START should not be lost because they do provide stability and are one of the important things that also should be preserved and should not be discarded.‖ See, Arms Control Association, Interview with Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the United States. December, 2008. http://www. armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/KislyakInterview. 56 Edward Ifft. ―The Future of START.‖ June 11, 2007. 57 Pavel Podvig. ― Why START is Important.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July 3, 2007.

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verification provisions in START can create tensions and undermine cooperation with their rigid requirements and stringent rules, which do not allow the parties to adapt their activities when conditions change.58

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Scope Reductions vs. Transparency Some analysts have argued that START provides the United States and Russia with the framework they could use to move quickly to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that would both reduce forces below the Moscow Treaty limits and outline a wide-ranging monitoring and verification regime. 59 This approach would not only satisfy Russia‘s preference for pursuing deeper reductions in a follow-on to START in the near-term, but would also allow the United States and Russia to demonstrate bold leadership to the international community in the months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The two sides may not have time to complete this type of agreement before START expires, but this could still advance the arms control agenda by highlighting their commitment to pursue a Treaty on deep reductions even if START were to lapse in the near-term. On the other hand, some have argued that a shorter, less detailed document, like the Moscow Treaty, might be sufficient to foster communication and cooperation. Even without specific definitions and restrictions, such a document can still demonstrate the parties‘ intent to reduce nuclear arms. Further, with fewer detailed restrictions, both sides would be able to maintain the flexibility they might need to alter their forces to meet unanticipated changes in the international security environment. Moreover, the negotiations could probably proceed more quickly than those that sought to produce a lengthy, detailed treaty. The United States and Soviet Union took seven years to negotiate START, but the United States and Russia completed the Moscow Treaty in less than a year. Linkages The START Treaty limits only strategic offensive delivery vehicles and the warheads carried by those forces. But the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations is full of examples where one or the other side has tried to include limits or restrictions on other types of weapons. Over the years, both countries have sought to include some types of limits on their shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons in arms control agreements; analysts continue to suggest that these limits are both necessary and inevitable in a future agreement.60 The two sides have also often linked progress in discussions on missile defense programs with progress on limits on strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This linkage was explicit in the 1970s, when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced both the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms. This linkage between offenses and defense remains important to Russia, as is evident in its concerns about the U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. 58

Phil Gardner, Michael George, Vera Lev, and Sandra McMahon. Extension of the START Treaty? An SAIC Emerging Issues Project. December, 2005. 59 Daryl G. Kimball. ―START Over.‖ Arms Control Today. June 2007. 60 Oliver Thranert. U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 10, 2008.

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Several analysts have also suggested that future treaties should limit not only deployed warheads, but also the numbers of warheads that each side retains in its stockpile of reserve warheads.61 While no arms control treaty has ever sought to reduce either nation‘s stockpile of reserve warheads, as the number of deployed warheads declines further, the number of warheads in storage could create an imbalance if either side could return them to deployment quickly. Moreover, reductions in the numbers of stored warheads, and their consolidation in fewer storage facilities, might ease concerns about the possibility that some might be stolen from insecure storage facilities.

Participants Although the United States and Soviet Union signed START as a bilateral agreement, it evolved into a multilateral treaty when Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan succeeded the Soviet Union as parties to the Treaty. Each of the four former Soviet states is subject to the limits, restrictions, and monitoring provisions in START, even though Russia is the only one with nuclear weapons left on its territory. Each also has a voice and a vote in the deliberations in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission established by the Treaty. If the parties agree to extend START, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will remain as parties to the Treaty unless they agree to amend it to include only the United States and Russia. If the United States and Russia sign a new Treaty, these other three states probably would not be included.62 Analysts have long suggested that, as the United States and Russia reduce their forces to ever lower levels, they may eventually open up the arms control process to other nuclear weapons states. This was rarely an issue during the Cold War, because the United States and Soviet Union each deployed thousands of warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons. France, Great Britain, and China have deployed just a few hundred warheads each. 63 Most analysts agree that these other nations should not join the process until the United States and Russia reduce to 1,000 or fewer warheads. Hence, as the United States and Russia decide how, or whether, to advance their bilateral arms control agenda, they may also begin to think about when, or whether, to expand the process to include other nuclear nations.

Potential Paths Allow START to Lapse The United States and Russia could allow START to lapse at the end of 2009. The Bush Administration initially preferred this option because it did not want to continue the formal U.S.- Russian arms control process at all, but also believed that START could lapse without 61

President Obama has indicated that he would seek to include limits on weapons in the stockpile in a future arms control treaty. See ―Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama.‖ Arms Control Association. September 24, 2008. 62 According to an official with the U.S. State Department, Russia ―prefers working bilaterally with the United States on nuclear weapons issues and wants to ‗exclude‘ Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine from future arrangements.‖ See Wade Boese. ―START Decision Put Off to 2009.‖ Arm Control Today. December, 2008. 63 For summaries of the nuclear forces of these nations, see, Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen. ―Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008.‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. July/August 2008; Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen. ―British Nuclear Forces, 2005.‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. November/December, 2005.

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signaling the end of U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation or even the end of formal arms control. As the Bush Administration eventually suggested, the two sides could agree, without signing a formal Treaty, to continue to implement some of the monitoring provisions in START so that they could both gather information needed to verify compliance with the Moscow Treaty and retain the cooperative relationship that had developed during START‘s verification process. This path could, however, conflict with Russia‘s domestic law as it would need to be a party to a legally binding Treaty before it could allow foreigners to have access to sensitive military and nuclear sites. 64 To rectify this problem, the parties might seek to negotiate a separate executive agreement or memorandum of understanding to allow the visits. Alternatively they could, as the Bush Administration suggested, attach the monitoring provisions to a simple treaty document that essentially restated the provisions of the Moscow Treaty. If the parties allowed START to lapse, and did not have the time to agree on a replacement before December 2009, they could still pursue negotiations on a treaty that would eventually replace both START and the Moscow Treaty. Concerns about the absence of any arms control limits might inspire them to press forward on this task and seek compromises in a short amount of time. Conversely, if the absence of arms control limits did not appear to upset stability or the level of cooperation between the parties, then the pressure to reach a new agreement might diminish. Hence, this path may be attractive to those who believe that the United States and Russia no longer need formal treaties to manage their relationship, but it may appear too risky to those who believe that the arms control process remains an important part of the relationship.

Extend START Neither the Bush Administration nor the current Russian leadership want to extend START in its present form, particularly for the full five years allowed under the terms of the Article XVII. Yet, this path may be the only one available if the parties want to retain some of the START monitoring and verification provisions in the near term. They could possibly agree to extend START for a shorter period of time, perhaps two years, while they negotiate a new Treaty that would replace START. But this option is not mentioned in the current Treaty, so it might need to be treated as an amendment to the Treaty and require the advice and consent of both nations‘ legislatures. The U.S. Senate might not object to a short-term extension of START, particularly since several Members have already called on the parties to extend the Treaty‘s monitoring and verification regime, but Russia‘s parliament may not be as accepting. The current tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship, along with ongoing concerns about U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, could lead some in Russia to question whether any extension of START, with its limits on Russia‘s ability to modernize its forces and deploy multiple warhead ballistic missiles, serves Russia‘s interests. Extend and Amend START Instead of amending START so that they could extend it for less than the mandated five years, the parties might extend START according to the Treaty provisions, which they could 64

Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller. ―New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control.‖ Arms Control Today. July/August 2008.

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do without seeking approval from their legislatures, then try to amend the Treaty to adjust the provisions that each finds too binding in the current environment. For example, Russia might want to alter the ―new types‖ rule in START, or it might seek a waiver from the rule for the RM-24 missile; the United States might want to alter the provision requiring the exchange of telemetry from missile flight tests, or seek a waiver for retired Minuteman II missiles that are used as missile defense targets. Both sides might want to modify the verification protocol to remove some of the more costly and intrusive requirements, particularly if the parties believe the data they provide is no longer critical to understanding the other side‘s nuclear forces. Consequently, they might be able to craft a ―package‖ of amendments that would incorporate each side‘s highest priorities. Both the United States and Russia would have to submit this package for approval by their legislatures. Some in the U.S. Senate might object to the changes that relieve Russia of some of its obligations, but a package that addressed both nations‘ concerns might still win the approval of the necessary 67 Senators. The Russian parliament might object to any agreement that extended START without addressing Russia‘s concerns about U.S. missile defense plans. However, it might, nevertheless, accept an amendment package that addressed some of Russia‘s concerns with the provisions in START. In addition, if the United States and Russia extended START for five years before negotiating the amendments, the Russian parliament would have to accept either the unmodified extension, or the amendment package.

Replace START Regardless of whether they allow START to lapse or extend it before December 2009, the United States and Russia could continue negotiations on a new Treaty. If they completed the Treaty before an extended START expired, the new Treaty could replace START, or, if it were similar to the Moscow Treaty, with aggregate limits but no detailed definitions, counting rules, or monitoring provisions, it could run concurrently without substituting for START. As was noted above, Russia would like the new treaty to be a complete package of further limits on nuclear weapons, detailed definitions and counting rules, and monitoring and verification provisions. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, would have liked the new treaty to essentially replace the Moscow Treaty, with some informal monitoring provisions to offer a measure of transparency and cooperation. A future Treaty could take either of these forms, or it could focus solely on monitoring measures by establishing a legally binding framework for transparency and cooperation not linked to the need to verify compliance with restrictions on nuclear forces and activities. Further Reductions with START Rules A new treaty could contain START-style definitions and counting rules, along with deeper reductions in the permitted numbers of warheads. This combination of provisions would continue to reduce U.S. and Russian deployed forces and would also provide transparency and predictability for the future. Without the START-style definitions and counting rules, neither side would be able to confirm that the other has complied with the Treaty‘s reductions because each will not know what the other side considered to be limited by the treaty. At the same time, a Treaty that required the United States to reduce its forces below the Moscow Treaty limits of 1,700-2,200 warheads, but also used the START counting rules to

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calculate the number of warheads attributed to deployed delivery vehicles could force the United States to make hard choices and significant changes in the structure of its nuclear forces. Under START, all deployed delivery vehicles count under the Treaty‘s limits (Russia has proposed that the same be true in a new agreement); the parties then calculated the number of deployed warheads by multiplying the number of deployed delivery vehicles by a number of warheads listed in the data base for that type of delivery vehicle. The Moscow Treaty, on the other hand, does not assume all delivery vehicles carry deployed warheads, and allows the parties to exclude those that do not. As a result, the United States does not count the launchers or warheads on 2 of its 14 Trident submarines because they are in overhaul and not ―deployed.‖ These would count under the START rules. It also has removed more than 2 warheads from some Trident missiles, without changing the front end of the missile. Under START, these missiles would count as 6 warheads each; in its declaration under the Moscow Treaty, the United States counts only the aggregate number of actual deployed warheads; it does not even have to specify how many warheads are deployed on any given missile or submarine. Moreover, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States counts only the bomber weapons maintained in the active stockpile at U.S. bomber bases. Under START each bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles would count as 20 warheads, regardless of available weapons or actual deployments. These differences produce striking differences in the number of warheads that count under each Treaty. In May 2008, the United States declared that it had 2,871 operationally deployed strategic warheads that would count against the Moscow Treaty.65 At the same time, when it exchanged START data with Russia in July 2008, it stated that it had 5,951 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Many of these attributed warheads could be eliminated with some accounting changes,66 but it is clear that under START definitions, the United States would have to count hundreds of warheads that it excludes from the Moscow Treaty total because it does not consider them to be operationally deployed. To bring its warhead totals down to 1,500 or less, while using definitions and counting rules similar to those in START, the United States could seek to deploy each of its remaining Trident missiles with a smaller number of warheads. However, if START rules apply, a reduction of more than 2 warheads would necessitate the costly replacement of the platform on the post-boost vehicle on each missile. The United States could suggest that the new Treaty relax this rule, but Russia may object as it has been concerned about the U.S. ability to upload its missiles and increase its warheads in a crisis. Russia has long suggested that the parties tighten the downloading rules to minimize the possibility. As an alternative, the United States could reduce its total warheads by eliminating some of its deployed launchers (bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs), or even removing one leg of its ―strategic triad‖ from the nuclear force. However, the United States probably would not want to reduce the number of B-52 and B-2 bombers, as these fly conventional missions in ongoing 65

U.S. Department of State. 2008 Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty. Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation. Washington, D.C. May 13, 2008. 66 For example, this total includes 400 warheads attributed to Peacekeeper missiles. These missiles have been deactivated, but the United States did not eliminate the silos according to START Treaty rules, so the warheads still count. It also excludes up to 768 warheads that could be deployed on four Trident submarines. The U.S. Navy has converted these submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles, but, because it did not remove the launch tubes for the Trident missiles, they still count under START as if each launch tube held one missile and each missile carried either six or eight warheads.

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conflicts, so it might have to remove them from the nuclear force altogether. It also might be difficult to reduce the Minuteman fleet of ICBMs below the current number of 450 without also reducing the number of bases and cutting into the number of personnel trained to operate the system. Further, as the number drops, it may be also be difficult to justify the costs associated with retaining the smaller force. Most experts agree that the Trident submarines are going to be the mainstay of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the future. But, unless the United States cuts deeply into the other ―legs‖ of its strategic triad, deep reductions in total warheads may require reductions in the number of Trident submarines. If the United States were to reduce its Trident fleet to 10 or fewer submarines, it might not be able to operate out of two bases, as it does now, and retain submarines on patrol in the areas from where they would fire their missiles, in both oceans. Changes in this deployment pattern might require changes in the missions and targets of the submarine fleet. The President and the U.S. military would probably want to consider the implications of these basing and operational changes before deciding whether to accept arms control limits that produce such changes. Hence, if the United States agrees to replace START with a new Treaty that reduces warheads below the levels in the Moscow Treaty but retains many of the definitions and counting rules of START, it will have to make difficult choices about how to structure and operate its nuclear force. These decisions are not likely to come easily or quickly, and could delay both the start and the finish of negotiations on a new Treaty.

Further Reductions without START Rules The complexities detailed above demonstrate why the Bush Administration has been unwilling to follow START with a similar, detailed document. Even those in the Administration who believe that the U.S.-Russian arms control process should continue argue that the two sides should pursue a Treaty that did not contain the level of detail in START. For example, during a speech before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, ―I am not sure that agreements that are the size of a telephone book and take years to negotiate are in the interest of either party.‖ He went on to say, ―I believe we should go for another agreement with Russia. I believe it could involve further cuts in the number of warheads. I believe we do need the verification provisions. But I think it ought to be an agreement that is shorter, simpler, and easier to adjust to real-world conditions than most of the arms control agreements I‘ve seen over the last 40 years.‖67 A shorter, less detailed Treaty may not, however, provide the level of transparency or predictability sought by many analysts. Under the Moscow Treaty, which is short and contains few details, neither the United States nor Russia has to offer any transparency into the structure of its nuclear forces. Each simply has to declare how many warheads it has deployed on its operational forces. Further, because the Treaty includes no time lines for the reduction process and no definitions of the items limited by the Treaty, neither side can predict with confidence the process or outcome of the other side‘s reductions. As a result, some argue that, while the shorter negotiations may seem preferable, a shorter Treaty with an 67

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 28, 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ 1028_transcrip_gates_ checked.pdf.

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absence of details would not necessarily serve the goals of an arms control process that sought to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Russia or to reduce the perceived threats from their nuclear weapons.

Transparency and Confidence Building Measures Some Members of Congress and analysts outside government have called on the United States and Russia to extend the monitoring regime in START, even if they cannot reach agreement on further reductions in nuclear forces. In a ―Dear Colleague‖ letter circulated in July 2007, Representative Ellen Tauscher, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, noted the ―transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues.‖68 As was noted above, Secretary of State Clinton and Vice President Biden both referred to the possibility of extending the monitoring and verification provisions in START. An agreement that established a transparency regime without imposing any further reductions on nuclear weapons could allow the United States and Russia to sustain their confidence in their knowledge of each other‘s nuclear weapons deployments. The START regime‘s extensive exchanges of data about the characteristics of each party‘s weapons systems provide each party with significant amounts of information that would not have been available, or would have been difficult to acquire, otherwise. The parties can be confident in the accuracy of this data because they have the opportunity to visit the sites and view the weapons themselves. Moreover, START required each party to notify the other when they changed the numbers or locations of strategic systems. Even if the parties have not agreed to limit or reduce their nuclear weapons, they could continue to house their weapons at agreed sites, provide data about their characteristics and capabilities, and provide notifications when they moved them. Some have also argued that, by continuing to cooperate in monitoring the locations and characteristics of deployed nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia would be better positioned to monitor compliance with the Moscow Treaty. The notifications and data exchanges would continue to inform them about the numbers and locations of missiles and bombers, while on-site visits would give them an opportunity to count the warheads deployed on some missile. These inspections would not, however, provide the parties with an opportunity to calculate all the warheads that would count under the Moscow Treaty. Because START inspections were designed to confirm that the number of warheads deployed on a particular missile did not exceed the number declared in the data base, they do not provide a way to count the total number warheads deployed on the entire force. However, by confirming that the deployed warhead number did not exceed the number in the data base, the inspections could provide the parties with some confidence in the number of warheads they might then use in their calculations of deployed warheads across the force.

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Representative Ellen Tauscher. Call on the President to Extend the Most Significant Remaining Arms Control Agreement of Our Time. July 2007.

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Choosing a Path

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Although President Obama has stated that he would like the United States and Russia to negotiate deeper reductions in their nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia still may not be on the same path forward in their arms control relationship. They still have to decide what, if anything, to do about START before it expires, and what, if any, type of Treaty they should negotiate to replace START in the longer term. They may agree that the Treaty should contain more details than were included in the Moscow Treaty, but they will still have to decide which of START‘s counting rules and definitions will continue to apply, whether the new Treaty would ease or tighten the rules governing the downloading of missiles and the deployment of new types of missiles, and which of the Treaty‘s monitoring and verification provisions they would continue to implement. Moreover, they would have to decide whether to include only deployed warheads, or all deployed and reserve warheads, and whether to link reductions in strategic weapons to other issues, like nonstrategic nuclear weapons or missile defense.69 Because each side would like some of START to continue and some of it to end, both may find it difficult to reach an agreement on the substance of a new treaty that matches their priorities. On the other, if they balance and offset their differing preferences and priorities they may be able to craft a compromise that provides them with more transparency and predictability than the Moscow Treaty, but less precision than the START Treaty.

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For a detailed proposal that addresses these issues, see Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller. ―New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control.‖ Arms Control Today. July/August, 2008.

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In: Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World Editor: George T. Overton, pp. 163-175

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Chapter 8

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Deborah D. Stine*

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SUMMARY Science and engineering activities have always been international. Scientists, engineers, and health professionals frequently communicate and cooperate with one another without regard to national boundaries. This chapter discusses international science and technology (S&T) diplomacy, instances when American leadership in S&T is used as a diplomatic tool to enhance another country‘s development and to improve understanding by other nations of U.S. values and ways of doing business. According to the National Research Council, five developmental challenges where S&T could play a role include child health and child survival, safe water, agricultural research to reduce hunger and poverty, micro-economic reform, and mitigation of natural disasters. Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1979 (P.L. 95-426) provides the current legislative guidance for U.S. international S&T policy. This act states that Department of State (DOS) is the lead federal agency in developing S&T agreements. The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) states that the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is to advise the President on international S&T cooperation policies and the role of S&T considerations in foreign relations. DOS sets the overall policy direction for U.S. international S&T diplomacy, and works with other federal agencies as needed. Within DOS, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) coordinates international S&T activities. The Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (STAS) provides S&T advice to the Secretary and the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). *

Email: [email protected], 7-8431

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OSTP acts as a interagency liaison. A number of federal agencies that both sponsor research and use S&T in developing policy are involved in international S&T policy. A fundamental question is why the United States should invest in international S&T diplomacy instead of domestic research and development (R&D) and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education (STEM) activities, which are facing budget constraints. If Congress should decide that funding international S&T activities is important, agreeing on a policy goal beyond enhancing the country‘s development, such as improving U.S. relations with other countries, or enhancing popular opinion of the United States may help set priorities. Policy options identified for Congress by expert committees who have assessed U.S. international S&T diplomacy efforts include ensuring a baseline of science, engineering, and technical (SET) literacy among all appropriate DOS personnel, increasing the presence overseas of personnel with significant SET expertise, and expanding the Department‘s engagement within global SET networks through exchanges, assistance, and joint research activities addressing key global issues. Other proposed actions include increasing USAID support that builds S&T capacity in developing countries, and orienting other departments and agencies S&T developing country programs to support the development priorities of the host countries. Another proposal would establish a new U.S. government organization, modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) known for its risktaking and innovation, called the ―Development Applications Research Institute‖ (DARI) to develop and apply innovative technologies to development problems. In all of these efforts, Congress might wish to consider enhancing the prominence of the STAS, and coordination among S&T leaders at OES, STAS, and OSTP.

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INTRODUCTION Scientists, engineers, and health professionals frequently communicate and cooperate with one another without regard to national boundaries. Dating back to the 1700s, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson are thought of as the nation‘s first scientific diplomats. 1 Scientists and inventors themselves, they corresponded with colleagues and brought knowledge back from their visits to Europe to enhance the development and policies of the very young United States. Today, the United States serves the same role for other countries that are in the early stages of development or at a major point of transition. Congress is currently discussing how to maximize the effectiveness of these international science and technology (S&T) policy activities.2 This chapter provides an overview of current U.S. international S&T policy; describes the role of the Department of State (DOS), the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other federal agencies; and discusses possible policy options for Congress. It focuses on international 1

Silvio A. Bedini, Thomas Jefferson: Statesman of Science (New York: Macmillian, 1990). I. Bernard Cohen, Benjamin Franklin’s Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Joyce E. Chaplin, The First Scientific American: Benjamin Franklin and the Pursuit of Genius (New York: Basic Books, 2007). 2 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://science.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=2134.

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science and technology diplomacy, where American leadership in science and technology is used as a diplomatic tool to enhance another country‘s development and to improve understanding by other nations of U.S. values and ways of doing business. These efforts could focus on both enhancing a nation‘s science and technology (S&T) resources, as well as addressing developmental challenges where S&T could play a role. According to the National Research Council, five potential challenges include child health and child survival, safe water, agricultural research to reduce hunger and poverty, micro-economic reform, and mitigation of natural disasters.3

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OVERVIEW OF CURRENT U.S. INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) POLICY Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979 (P.L. 95-426, 22 U.S.C. 2656a - 22 U.S.C. 2656d, as amended) provides the current legislative guidance for U.S. international S&T policy, and made DOS the lead federal agency in developing S&T agreements.4 In that act, Congress found that the consequences of modern S&T advances are of major significance in U.S. foreign policy—providing many problems and opportunities— meaning that its diplomacy workforce should have an appropriate level of knowledge of these topics. Further, it indicated that this workforce should conduct long-range planning to make effective use of S&T in international relations, and seek out and consult with public and private industrial, academic, and research institutions in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of U.S. foreign policy. The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94- 282) states that the OSTP director is to advise the President on S&T considerations in foreign relations. Further, the OSTP director is to ―assess and advise [the President] on policies for international cooperation in S&T which will advance the national and international objectives of the United States.‖ The following sections discuss the international S&T activities of DOS, OSTP, USAID, and other federal agencies.

Department of State (DOS) DOS sets the overall policy direction for U.S. international S&T diplomacy, and works with other federal agencies, as needed. In its May 2007 strategic plan, DOS and USAID identify the following key S&T diplomatic strategies:

3

4

National Research Council, The Fundamental Role of Science and Technology in International Development: An Imperative for the U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2006), at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11583. According to DOS, science and technology agreements ―establish frameworks to facilitate the exchange of scientific results, provide for protection and allocation of intellectual property rights and benefit sharing, facilitate access for researchers, address taxation issues, and respond to the complex set of issues associated with economic development, domestic security and regional stability.‖ See State Department, ―List of Umbrella S&T Agreements,‖ at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2006/77212.htm for more information.

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Deborah D. Stine encourage science and technology cooperation to advance knowledge in areas related to water management; promote sharing of knowledge in the international scientific community that will enhance the efficiency and hasten the fruition of U.S. research efforts, and promote international scientific collaboration; strengthen major international collaborations on cutting-edge energy technology research and development in carbon sequestration, biofuels, clean coal power generation, as well as hydrogen, methane, and wind power; apply research including promotion of technological improvements to foster more sustainable natural resource use, conservation of biodiversity, and resilience to climate change impacts; support scientific and technological applications, including biotechnology, that harness new technology to raise agricultural productivity and provide a more stable, nutritious, and affordable food supply; and enhance outreach to key communities in the private sector.5

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DOS uses a variety of tools to implement this strategy, such as formal bilateral S&T cooperation agreements that facilitate international collaboration by federal agencies; promotion and support of S&T entrepreneurs and innovators; 6 scientist and student exchanges; workshops, conferences, and meetings; public-private partnerships; seed funding for scientific programs and innovation activities; and production of educational materials, including films, websites, posters, and cards.7 Within the State Department, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) coordinates international S&T activities, and the Science and Technology Advisor (STAS) provides S&T advice to the Secretary of State, DOS staff, and the director of USAID. USAID is an independent federal government agency that, with guidance from DOS, supports developmental and U.S. strategic interests, among other duties.

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) OES coordinates international S&T cooperative activities throughout the federal government.8 Within OES is the Health, Space, and Science Directorate, which works with federal agencies on S&T policy issues. 9 In addition, some U.S. embassies have bilateral Environment, Science, Technology, and Health foreign service officers. Embassies may host 5

U.S. Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: Transformational Democracy, May 7, 2007, available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/coordination/ stratplan_fy07- 12.pdf. 6 This report does not discuss issues related to the promotion and support of technological innovation such as export controls or technology, trade, and security issues. For more information on these issues, see CRS Report RL31832, The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, by Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS Report RL32591, U.S. Terms of Trade: Significance, Trends, and Policy, by Craig K. Elwell. 7 Jeff Miotke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space, and Health, OES, DOS, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation,110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science. house. gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2008/Research/2apr/Miotke_Testimony.pdf. 8 For more information, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/c20049.htm. The FY2008 budget estimate for OES is $31 million. See State Department FY2009 budget justification, available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ statecbj /2009/. 9 According to the FY2009 State Department budget justification, the FY2008 budget estimate for this directorate is $4 million and includes 24 staff members.

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their own country-specific activities such as joint research grants, junior scientist visit grants, events, and workshops. Some have a joint board that includes both scientists from the host country as well as government scientists to oversee these activities.10 There are also ―hubs‖ that focus on environmental issues on a regional basis.

Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (STAS) Within the State Department, but distinct from the OES, is the Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (STAS).11 The STAS acts as an advisor for both DOS and USAID. The goals of this office are to enhance the S&T literacy and capacity of DOS; build partnerships with the outside S&T community, within the U.S. government, with S&T partners abroad, and with foreign embassies in the United States; provide accurate S&T advice to DOS; and shape a global perspective on the emerging and ―at the horizon‖ S&T developments anticipated to affect current and future U.S. foreign policy.12 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID is an independent federal government agency with the goal of supporting transformational development, strengthening fragile states, supporting U.S. geostrategic interests, addressing transnational problems, and providing humanitarian relief.13 Although independent, USAID‘s overall foreign policy guidance comes from the Secretary of State. At one time S&T had a major role at USAID. Today, however, S&T capacity, staffing, and funding, particularly in overseas missions, are far less than in the past.14

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White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) OSTP, a staff office within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), does not fund domestic or international programs. Rather, the Assistant to the Director for International Relations acts as a liaison: within the EOP, to organizations such as the National Security Council; with federal agencies, including DOS and the international offices of federal agencies such as the National Science Foundation; and with the science liaisons of foreign

10

For an illustration, see http://egypt.usembassy.gov/usegypt/contacts.htm. For more information, see Nina Fedoroff, Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation,110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2008/Research/2apr/ Fedoroff_ Testimony.pdf. 12 For more information, see http://www.state.gov/g/stas/c6063.htm. 13 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It, January 2006, at http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/PDACG100.pdf. 14 National Research Council, The Fundamental Role of Science and Technology in International Development: An Imperative for the U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2006) at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11583. Nina Fedoroff, Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation ,110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/ File/Commdocs/ hearings/2008/Research/2apr/ Fedoroff_Testimony.pdf. 11

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country embassies in the United States.15 Within OSTP, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), currently established by Executive Order 12881, coordinates S&T policy across the federal government.16 Management of international S&T policy issues at OSTP and NSTC has varied among Presidential administrations.17 During the Clinton Administration, OSTP had a Presidentiallyappointed associate director whose primary focus was on international policy. This presidential appointee, along with a DOS presidential appointee, co-chaired a NSTC Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET) that addressed ―international science cooperation as it related to foreign policy and the Nation‘s research and development (R&D) agenda.‖18 In the George W. Bush Administration, rather than an OSTP political appointee focused on international issues, there is a staff member who serves as an assistant to the director for international affairs. 19 Another difference is that rather than focusing an NSTC committee on overall international S&T policy, OSTP coordinates federal international S&T activities through NSTC committees that focus on a particular topic, like nanotechnology, or a specific country, like Brazil.20

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Role of Other Federal Agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations A number of federal agencies that both sponsor research and use S&T in developing policy are involved in international S&T policy. These include National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Agriculture, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, and others.21 Federal programs may be formal ―top-down‖ activities focused on the agencies‘ mission and identified by agency leadership, or ―bottom-up‖ activities identified by scientists and engineers. Examples of ―Top-down‖ activities include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)‘s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service focused on Earth observation data exchange, or the National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST)‘s development of uniform 15

John H. Marburger, Director, OSTP, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation, 110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings /2008/ Research/2apr/Marburger_Testimony.pdf. 16 National Science and Technology Council, at http://www.ostp.gov/cs/nstc. 17 A Woodrow Wilson Center report identifies what they consider to be the best practices regarding OSTP and international S&T policy. For more information, see Jennifer Sue Bond, Mark Schaefer, David Rejeski, Rodney W. Nichols, OSTP 2.0: Critical Upgrade: Enhancing Capacity for White House Science and Technology Policymaking: Recommendations for the Next President (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2008) at http://wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/OSTP%20Paper1.pdf. 18 National Science and Technology Council, 2000 Annual Report, at http://www.ostp.gov/pdf/nstc_ar.pdf. 19 John H. Marburger, Director, OSTP, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation, 110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2008/ Research/2apr/ Marburger_Testimony.pdf. 20 Ibid. 21 A description of federal agency international S&T activities is provided in Jeff Miotke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space, and Health, OES, DOS, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation,110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/Commdocs/ hearings/2008/Research/2apr/ Miotke_Testimony.pdf.

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measurement standards for ethanol and biodiesel. ―Bottom-up‖ activities often arise from proposals submitted in response to a specific solicitation or as part of a general solicitation for research in their field.22

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ROLE OF CONGRESS An April 2008 House Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on Research and Science Education hearing examined global and domestic benefits from cooperation in science and technology.23 One fundamental question asked during the hearing was why the United States should support international science diplomacy rather than invest in domestic R&D. Table 1 provides a summary of the Bush Administration‘s response. For the United States to be competitive, according to Bush Administration witnesses, it needs to know where the frontier of science is occurring. As other countries increase their investment in higher education and R&D, the top science and engineering research and facilities may not be in the United States, but in other countries. This increases the importance of U.S. investment in international S&T diplomatic activities, said Bush Administration witnesses, including federal programs that support U.S. scientists‘ collaborations with foreign scientists, and access to the best research facilities in the world, as well as enhancing the international connections of U.S. science and engineering students and leaders. In addition, U.S. science and engineering higher education and research helps developing countries by enhancing their human resource capacity, and as a result, their ability to achieve long-term development. These international connections can be important, say Bush Administration witnesses, not just for those countries, but in helping the U.S. respond to global challenges such as infectious diseases such as avian flu. Further, according to a Bush Administration witness, international cooperative activities at their agency in almost all instances are conducted on a ―no exchange of funds‖ basis with U.S. funding supporting U.S. scientists and engineers, not those in the cooperating country.24 Some believe, however, that the United States should enhance its international science and technology activities. They believe that such investments are sometimes viewed by policymakers as either ―giving away knowledge‖ or a ―humanitarian luxury,‖ when they actually could help all countries to reach common goals such as developing safe and reliable nuclear power, or enhancing all countries‘ economic development.25 Others express concerns that although the United States has many programs to promote science and technology in the developing world, such programs have limited due to insufficient financial and human 22

Ibid. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://science.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=2134. 24 Testimony and response to questions by John H. Marburger (OSTP), Arden Bement (NSF), Nina Fedoroff (STAS), Jeff Mitoke (DOS), and Michael O‘Brien (NASA) at U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://science.house.gov/publications/ hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=2134. A transcript of the hearing is available from Congressional Quarterly. 25 See, for example, Rodney W. Nichols, US Science Office Must Promote Global Collaboration, Science and Development Network, October 31, 2008 at http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/us-science-office-must-promoteglobalcollaboratio.html?utm_source=link&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=en_opinions. 23

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resources at DOS, AID, and OSTP that limit the ability of these agencies to achieve their mission.26 If Congress should decide that funding international S&T activities is important, agreeing on a policy goal beyond enhancing the country‘s development, such as improving U.S. relations with other countries, or enhancing popular opinion of the United States may help set priorities. Activities funded might differ depending on those priorities. For example, two possible goals might be (1) improving U.S. relations with the government of a country or in a region, or (2) raising popular opinion of the United States in that country or region. In the case of the first goal, activities might focus on enhancing the foreign government(s) decisionmaking based on science and engineering information or providing financial or technical aid to a country‘s science and engineering efforts. In the case of the second goal, activities might focus on a challenge more visible to the public, such as increasing access to water, enhancing agricultural productivity, or obtaining high quality STEM education.

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Table 1. U.S. Objectives in International Research and Development Programs 1. To maintain and continually improve the quality of U.S. science by applying global standards of excellence. (Performing science to the highest standards) 2. To provide access by U.S. scientists to the frontiers of science without regard to national borders. (Access to the frontiers of science) 3. To increase the productivity of U.S. science through collaborations between U.S. scientists and the world‘s leading scientists, regardless of national origin. (Access to scientific talent) 4. To strengthen U.S. science through visits, exchanges, and immigration by outstanding scientists from other nations. (Augmentation of scientific human capital) 5. To increase U.S. national security and economic prosperity by fostering the improvement of conditions in other countries through increased technical capability. (Security through technology-based equity) 6. To accelerate the progress of science across a broader front than the U.S. may choose to pursue with its own resources. (Leveraging on foreign science capabilities) 7. To improve understanding by other nations of U.S. values and ways of doing business. (Science diplomacy) 8. To address U.S. interests of such global nature that the U.S. alone cannot satisfy them. (Global support for global scientific issues) 9. To discharge obligations negotiated in connection with treaties. (Science as a tradable asset) 10. To increase U.S. prestige and influence with other nations. (Science for glory) Source: John Marburger, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, ―National Science Board Hearing on International Science Partnerships,‖ speech, May 11, 2006. John H. Marburger, Director, OSTP, Response to questions at House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation,110th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://science.house.gov/ publications/hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=2134.

26

David Dickson, The World’s Poor Deserve Better U.S. Leadership, Science and Development Network, October 31, 2008, at http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-world-s-poor-deserve-better-us-leadership.html.

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Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy

Although the effectiveness of different S&T diplomatic initiatives has not been studied, the State Department contends that some key elements for success are finding areas or Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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programs that (1) break new ground, sometimes in a neglected area of science or development; (2) are educationally and developmentally transformative; (3) address core developmental issues of poverty and human development; (4) promote sustainable uses of natural resources; (5) stimulate job creation and private sector investment; and (6) are collaborative projects with tangible results.27 Six broad categories of international S&T cooperative activities include (1) agreements; (2) research; (3) facilities and equipment; (4) academic opportunities from primary through postsecondary education; (5) meetings, dialogues, and visits; and (6) private sector activities (see Table 2). International S&T cooperative activities can be multinational, regional, or bilateral. A related question is who might best lead such efforts relative to the desired goal. Options include scientists, engineers, and health professionals at academic institutions, business and industry, and non-governmental organizations; scientists, engineers, and health professionals who work for the federal government; and S&T federal government leaders. Expert committees which have assessed U.S. international S&T diplomacy efforts express concerns about (1) the lack of S&T expertise, presence, and global engagement at DOS, (2) a decline in support for S&T capacity at USAID, (3) a lack of coherent and integrated international S&T policy direction and federal coordination role at OSTP, and (4) insufficient technological research to respond to development challenges. The following sections discuss proposed recommendations to respond to these concerns.

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S&T Expertise, Presence and Global Engagement at DOS The report of the State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, State Department in 2025 Working Group 28 recommends that the State Department expand its investment in Science, Engineering, and Technology (SET) expertise, presence, and global engagement. The report‘s specific recommendations include ensuring a baseline of SET literacy among all appropriate Department personnel, increasing the presence overseas of personnel with significant SET expertise, and expanding the Department‘s engagement within global SET networks through exchanges, assistance, and joint research activities addressing key global issues. In addition, the report recommends creating a closer connection between the roles of the Assistant Secretary for OES and the STAS to bring senior attention to the full range of SET challenges and opportunities facing the Department. For example, if the Assistant Secretary for OES is a scientist, that person could serve simultaneously as the Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State. Otherwise, the STAS could become the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (PDAS) in OES.29

27

Jeff Miotke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space, and Health, OES, DOS, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, International Science and Technology Cooperation,1 10th Cong. 2nd sess., April 2, 2008, at http://democrats.science.house. gov/Media/File/Commdocs/hearings/2008/Research/2apr/Miotke_Testimony.pdf. 28 State Department, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy: Final report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/diplomacy/99774.htm. 29 Ibid.

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S&T Capacity at USAID A National Research Council (NRC) report recommends Congress and others take action to reverse what they state is the decline in USAID support for building S&T capacity, and strengthen the capabilities of its leadership and program managers in Washington, DC, and in foreign countries on S&T issues. In addition, the report recommends that Congress encourage other departments and agencies to orient their S&T developing country programs to support the development priorities of the host countries, and that USAID take actions to enhance interagency coordination.30

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International S&T Policy Direction and Federal Coordination at OSTP and NSTC A National Science Board (NSB) report31 recommends that the United States create a coherent and integrated international science and engineering strategy, balance U.S. foreign and R&D policy, and promote intellectual exchange. In addition, it recommends reestablishing the NSTC Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology, and appointing a high-level international S&T policy official in OSTP. Congress, according to NSB, should amend the Government Performance and Results Act to require Federal agencies to address international S&T partnerships. Further, Congress should direct the Department of Commerce, OSTP, DOS, and the Department of Homeland Security to balance U.S. security policies with international science and engineering (S&E) needs. The report also contends it is important to facilitate ―brain circulation‖ as opposed to ―brain drain,‖ by supporting study abroad opportunities for American students, streamlining the visa process for foreign scientists, engineers and students, and identifying and increasing the use of U.S. and international facilities for collaborative research.32

New Institute to Support Technology Research The United States Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People Around the Globe (HELP Commission) was charged in Section 637 of P.L. 108-199 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004) to study, develop, and deliver to the President, Congress, and the Secretary of State actionable proposals to enhance and leverage the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance to reduce poverty through sustained economic growth

30

National Research Council, The Fundamental Role of Science and Technology in International Development: An Imperative for the U.S. Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2006), at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11583. 31 National Science Board, International Science and Engineering Partnerships: A Priority for U.S. Foreign Policy and Our Nation’s Innovation Enterprise, NSB 08-4 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2008), at http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2008/nsb084.pdf. 32 Ibid.

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and selfsufficiency.33 One study by several commissioners found the following characteristics of successful efforts:

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Ownership and initiative must be local; Partnership is the premise; Technology adaptation and adoption matter; Leaders and policy must drive toward self-reliance; and Continual information loops contribute to learning and adjustments.34 The study found that some of the most widely acknowledged foreign assistance successes have incorporated the application of technologies including the Green Revolution of the mid20th century, which they state doubled food production in developing countries, and the presence today of Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a partnership of government, nongovernmental organizations, and businesses that support 15 international research centers to provide technical support. Other examples include bednets to reduce malaria, smallpox and polio vaccines, and ―smart cards‖ that provide loans to businesses located in poor areas where no bank is available. The study also indicates that the scientific and technological capacity of developing countries is growing, such as the African Laser Center. In its report, the Commission proposed the establishment of a new U.S. government organization, modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) known for its risk-taking and innovation, 35 called the ―Development Applications Research Institute‖ 36 (DARI). According to the Commission, DARI could ―develop and apply innovative technologies to development problems in order to jumpstart research and development aimed at reducing global poverty,‖ and its head could serve as the science advisor to the lead U.S. government official in charge of development policy. The Commission proposed that DARI focus on all relevant development areas including agriculture, health, and education; carry out its work in partnership with development countries to spur the development of local R&D capabilities; and carefully structured to ensure accountability and performance. The cost of DARI, according to the Commission would be $50-100 million per year.

Additional Considerations If Congress should decide to address the trends described above, additional financial resources and personnel with expertise in S&T may be necessary. If Congress is concerned 33

The HELP Commission, ―Mission,‖ webpage at http://www.helpcommission.gov/Mission/tabid/53/Default.aspx. Carol Adelman, Nicholas Eberstadt, Susan Raymond, and Melissa Griswold, Foreign Assistance: What Works and What Doesn’t with Recommendations for Future Improvements, December 14, 2007 at http://www. helpcommission.gov/portals/0/HELP_WWWD.pdf. 35 For more information on DARPA and other similar models, see CRS Report RL34497, Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E): Background, Status, and Selected Issues for Congress, by Deborah D. Stine. 36 HELP Commission, Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, December 7, 2007 at http://www.helpcommission.gov/portals/0/Beyond%20Assistance_ HELP_Commission_ Report.pdf. 34

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about a lack of overall international S&T policy direction at OSTP or coordination among the White House and federal agencies as described by the reports above, possible actions include enhancing the prominence of the STAS, and coordination among, S&T leaders at OES, STAS, and OSTP. One option that takes into account all three reports is for the STAS to play a greater role in coordination by appointment to a high-level position within OES as well as chairing a revived CISET. If Congress decides to establish DARI, the STAS might also play a leadership role there as well.

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INDEX 9 9/11, 33, 106, 109

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A accountability, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 106, 129, 174 adaptation, 86, 174 administrative, 16, 125 advisory body, 12 Afghanistan, xii, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 124, 126, 133 Africa, 61, 71, 72, 79, 80, 83, 98, 103, 106, 115 age, 58 agent, 38, 79, 93 agricultural, 110, 163, 165, 166, 170 agriculture, 7, 106, 113, 174 aid, xi, xii, 2, 7, 11, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68, 75, 76, 78, 81, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 160, 170 AIDS, 106, 113, 115, 124, 130, 134 airports, 144 Albania, 84 allies, 52, 53, 103, 104, 110 allocative efficiency, 93 alternative, 22, 47, 76, 89, 97, 104, 159 ambassadors, 78, 87 amendments, 130, 158 Amsterdam, 58 analysts, ix, 1, 31, 36, 88, 90, 144, 146, 153, 154, 155, 156, 160, 161 Andes, 73, 103 Angola, 80, 95, 96, 99 anomalous, 120 Antarctic, 67 anti-American, 33, 52, 53

anti-Americanism, 52, 53 anti-terrorism, 104, 127 apathy, 17, 66 APC, 83 appendix, 151 appetite, 146 appropriations, xiii, 102, 103, 106, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 124, 128, 129, 130, 133 appropriations bills, 106, 130 Appropriations Committee, 108, 131 Argentina, 84, 128 argument, 11, 19, 52, 57, 66 armed forces, 108 Armenia, 69, 115 arms control, xiii, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 160, 161, 162 Army, 48 articulation, 49, 50 Asia, 8, 23, 27, 77, 89, 103, 104, 106, 116 Asian, 11, 12, 88, 89 assessment, 50, 76 assets, 39, 60 Atlantic, 4, 42 atrocities, 83 attacks, xii, 33, 101, 102, 104, 112, 114, 117 attitudes, 8, 10, 16, 31, 53 attribution, xiii, 135, 141 Australia, 77, 78, 87, 88, 89 Austria, 13 authoritarianism, 88 authority, 10, 22, 103, 112, 117, 119, 123, 124, 132, 133 autonomy, 19, 20, 21, 23 avian flu, 169 avian influenza, 106 Azerbaijan, 94

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B back, 9, 13, 31, 88, 119, 122, 125, 151, 164 ballistic missile, xiii, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 149, 150, 151, 157 Bangladesh, 61, 99 banks, 110, 125, 127, 129, 130 Barack Obama, 30, 50, 151, 156 Barbados, 80 barriers, 10, 24, 68, 79 behavior, 14, 18, 41, 54 Beijing, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, 18, 27 Belarus, 136, 144, 148, 156 benefits, 120, 153, 169 bilateral aid, 78, 124 bilateral development aid, xii, 101 bilateral relations, 8, 10, 15, 18, 19, 21, 60 binding, 24, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 157, 158 blame, 23, 53 blocks, 40 blog, 43, 48, 49, 50 Bolivia, 114 bonding, 68 Bosnia, 114, 115 Botswana, 80, 92 bottom-up, 5, 168 brain drain, 173 Brazil, 84, 168 Bretton Woods, 130 Britain, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 27, 32, 56, 57, 58, 77, 79, 87, 96 Brussels, 3, 6, 7, 19, 21, 79, 86, 89, 90 budget cuts, 129 building code, 66, 67 Burkina Faso, 80 Burma, 62 Burundi, 80 Bush Administration, xiii, 33, 104, 106, 113, 115, 136, 137, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 160, 168, 169 C Camp David, 109, 117, 126 campaigns, 31, 32, 54 Canada, 57, 58, 96 Caribbean, 79, 80, 81 case study, 35, 47, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70 cast, 12, 18, 46, 48, 93, 104 categorization, 35, 36, 54 Central African Republic, 80 Central America, 83 Central Europe, 109

CFA, 20 CFSP, x, 2, 3, 4 channels, 9, 21, 104, 110, 143 child nutrition programs, 110 Child Survival and Health, 113 children, 49, 104 China, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 61, 89, 156 citizens, x, 20, 29, 31, 34, 53, 97, 106, 127 civil servants, 129 civil service, 96 civil society, 85, 86, 87, 95, 97, 104, 106, 111 civilian, 86, 87, 88, 125 climate change, 41, 62, 166 coherence, 2, 15, 23, 25 Cold War, xii, 7, 31, 70, 102, 103, 149, 154, 156 collaboration, 42, 52, 62, 64, 166 Colombia, 114 colonialism, xi, 75, 76 commodities, 79, 81, 110, 120, 126 commodity, 6, 81, 111, 126 Common Foreign and Security Policy, x, 2, 79 communication, x, 10, 17, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 154, 155 communities, 31, 50, 51, 71, 104, 166 community, 8, 17, 18, 20, 38, 49, 60, 63, 92, 113, 121, 122, 125, 128, 137, 150, 155, 166, 167 competition, 9, 12, 25, 106, 113, 120 complexity, 25, 33, 66, 146 compliance, xiii, 10, 24, 82, 85, 95, 135, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 150, 154, 157, 158, 161 complications, 67, 68 components, 39, 106 composition, xii, 45, 95, 102, 145 concentration, 33, 116 concrete, 8, 21, 23, 89 confidence, 17, 20, 64, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 160, 161 conflict, x, 12, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 104, 106, 107, 112, 114, 115, 138, 144, 157 conflict resolution, 62, 65, 68 Congress, 20, 31, 102, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 136, 137, 146, 153, 161, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 173, 174 consensus, 9, 83 consent, 137, 145, 152, 157 conservation, 51, 166 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 173 consolidation, 81, 84, 156 constraints, xiv, 49, 154, 164 construction, 39, 46, 53, 54, 71, 72, 95, 125, 126 consulting, 18, 129 continuity, 2, 19, 53, 147

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Index contractors, 124, 129 contracts, 8, 17 control, 64, 81, 96, 109, 124, 136, 137, 145, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 160 convergence, 7, 12, 42 conversion, xi, 54, 75 Cook Islands, 77, 78, 80 corruption, 66, 67, 84, 98, 106 costs, xii, 82, 95, 102, 121, 128, 149, 160 Cotonou Agreement, xi, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 covering, xiii, 62, 102, 130 credentials, 6 credit, 8, 118, 125, 128 crime, 106, 109 criticism, 12, 15, 41, 53, 54, 87, 88, 97 cruise missiles, 140, 159 Cuba, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70, 80 cultivation, 31 cultural connections, 62 culture, 30, 32, 33, 34, 51, 90 Czech Republic, 155, 157

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D DARPA, 174 death, 16, 17 debates, ix, 1, 130 debt, 109, 125, 126, 128, 129 decisions, 2, 6, 13, 17, 50, 54, 66, 69, 93, 118, 153, 160 defense, xii, 2, 102, 104, 124, 151, 155, 158, 162 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), xiv, 164, 174 Defense Authorization Act, 152 definition, 4, 22, 31, 32, 43, 63, 65, 103, 141, 145, 149 delivery, xiii, 113, 125, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 145, 149, 150, 155, 159 democracy, xi, 15, 22, 23, 25, 37, 75, 76, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 98, 99, 103, 104, 108, 123 democratisation, 84, 97 democrats, 166, 167, 168, 172 Deng Xiaoping, 12 Denmark, 4, 13, 15, 16 Department of Agriculture, 168 Department of Commerce, 118, 173 Department of Defense, 107, 112, 118, 124, 133, 134 Department of Energy, 168 Department of Health and Human Services, 124 Department of Homeland Security, 173

Department of State, x, xiv, 29, 30, 32, 50, 57, 105, 108, 110, 111, 114, 116, 124, 128, 139, 144, 145, 148, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166 detention, 16, 17 developing countries, xiv, 80, 92, 95, 96, 108, 110, 122, 125, 126, 128, 164, 169, 174 development assistance, xii, 83, 101, 103, 104, 109, 112, 113, 121, 123, 124, 126, 129 Development Assistance, 103, 106, 108, 113, 122, 134 development banks, 110, 129, 130 Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), 105, 124 disaster, x, xi, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 123, 124, 127 discourse, 30, 32, 49, 52, 57, 66, 90 discretionary, 117, 119, 132, 133 displacement, 88, 93 disputes, 3, 23, 130, 145 distribution, 9, 36, 43, 94, 111, 113, 124 diversity, xi, 34, 59, 66, 81, 107 division, 2, 7, 23, 25 division of labor, 7, 23, 25 Dominican Republic, 80 donor, xii, 51, 63, 89, 92, 97, 98, 102, 110, 121, 122 draft, 13, 14, 22, 82, 148 drought, 61, 68 due process, 87 duties, 6, 81, 166 E earthquake, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 72 East Asia, 12, 116 East Timor, 79, 96, 99 Eastern Europe, 12, 84, 89 economic assistance, xii, 101, 103, 109, 128 economic crisis, 37, 46, 52 economic development, 91, 122, 165, 169 economic growth, 99, 104, 106, 108, 123, 173 economic policy, 2, 8, 11, 60, 82 economic reform, xiv, 108, 125, 126, 163, 165 economic reforms, 125, 126 economic security, 104, 129 Economic Support Fund, 109, 134 Education, 37, 38, 79, 105, 110, 124, 134, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172 Egypt, xii, 101, 106, 110, 112, 114, 115, 126, 129 election, xi, 18, 75, 76, 88, 89 electric power, 126 Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance, 110, 134 emotional, 7, 32, 39 employees, 19, 124

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energy, 12, 41, 48, 81, 82, 87, 94, 107, 166 engagement, xiv, 4, 10, 19, 106, 164, 172 entrepreneurs, 24, 52, 93, 104, 166 entrepreneurship, 38, 48 environment, 5, 15, 16, 34, 40, 47, 48, 51, 53, 66, 104, 106, 113, 137, 148, 150, 153, 155, 158 environmental issues, 47, 54, 167 environmental protection, 77, 87, 109 Environmental Protection Agency, 168 EPA, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86 EPC, 4 Equatorial Guinea, 80 equity, 32, 170 Eritrea, 61, 80 erosion, xi, 20, 75 Ethiopia, 61, 68, 80, 115 EU, ix, xi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 Eurasia, 116, 127 Europe, xii, 2, 8, 10, 15, 25, 26, 27, 42, 52, 53, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 102, 103, 112, 116, 155, 164 European Commission, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 21, 79, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88 European integration, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 7, 18 European Investment Bank, 8, 79 European Parliament, 14, 19, 22, 83, 84, 88, 89 European policy, 17, 25 European Union, ix, x, xi, 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 75, 79, 81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89 Europeanisation, x, 1, 3, 4 Europeans, 42, 53, 76, 77, 81, 83 evacuation, 62 evolution, 3, 54 exclusion, 4, 18, 23 execution, 31, 85 Executive Branch Agencies, 123 Executive Office of the President, 104, 167 exercise, xi, 10, 69, 75, 90 expenditures, 120 expertise, xiv, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 23, 24, 126, 164, 172, 174 exploitation, x, xi, 29, 49, 50, 75 Export-Import Bank, xii, 102, 118 exports, 7, 8, 79, 82, 104, 125 external relations, 6, 10 eyes, xii, 102 F Facebook, 50, 55 failure, x, 49, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66, 70, 88, 92, 137

faith, 83 family, 2, 20, 106, 113 family planning, 106, 113 Far East, 5, 46 fears, 20, 52 federal budget, 107, 117, 119 federal government, 41, 166, 167, 168, 172 feeding, 70, 104, 110 Fidel Castro, 70 Fiji, xi, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 films, 166 finance, 110, 125 financial institution, 105, 128 financing, 110, 111, 119, 122, 130 Finland, 13 firms, 79, 129 flexibility, 137, 145, 154, 155 flight, 142, 143, 151, 158 flood, 60, 66, 71 FMF, 110, 124, 134 focusing, ix, 1, 25, 33, 34, 37, 42, 47, 51, 67, 106, 168 food, 104, 107, 110, 112, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126, 130, 166, 174 food aid, 107, 110, 112, 118, 120, 121, 130 food commodities, 120, 126 Food for Peace, 110, 123, 134 food production, 174 foreign affairs, 16, 31, 50, 88 foreign aid, xii, 96, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130 foreign assistance, xii, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120, 124, 129, 130, 133, 173, 174 Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 110, 124 foreign policy, ix, x, xi, xii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 43, 48, 57, 59, 60, 69, 70, 75, 76, 90, 92, 97, 101, 102, 107, 114, 117, 123, 128, 130, 137, 165, 167, 168 fragmentation, 24, 25 France, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 42, 50, 52, 76, 77, 78, 79, 121, 122, 156 free trade, xii, 22, 81, 102 free trade agreement, xii, 81, 102 freedom, 83, 137 freedoms, 22, 38, 84 FSA, 106, 109, 123, 134 funding, xii, xiv, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 117, 118, 120, 125, 133, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170 funds, 82, 86, 95, 103, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 117, 120, 124, 129, 130, 133, 154, 169

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G gas, 94, 96 GATT, 10, 81 Gaza, 114 GDP, 117, 118, 122, 132, 133, 134 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 79 generalization, 4, 31 Geneva, 15, 16, 58 Georgia, 109, 114, 115, 147 Germany, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 77, 78, 84, 122 Global Warming, 71 goals, xii, 12, 33, 39, 68, 69, 101, 104, 106, 109, 111, 121, 144, 146, 151, 153, 161, 167, 169, 170 goods and services, 119, 120, 121 governance, xi, 5, 24, 60, 62, 66, 67, 70, 75, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 104, 106, 108, 111 government budget, 111 Government Performance and Results Act, 173 government revenues, 94 government-to-government, 24 grants, 110, 120, 127, 128, 167 grassroots, 63, 70, 104, 125 Great Britain, 7, 78, 156 Greece, 13, 61, 63, 70, 72 greed, 7, 146 gross domestic product, 117, 118 groups, 2, 14, 20, 25, 31, 60, 63, 95, 110 growth, 38, 47, 92, 93, 98, 99, 104, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 123, 173 GSP, 10, 82 Guam, 76, 77, 78 guidance, xiv, 86, 123, 124, 139, 163, 165, 166, 167 guidelines, 15, 120 Guinea, xi, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 85, 87 Gujarat, 61, 64, 70 Gulf Coast, 61 Gulf War, 129 Guyana, 80 Gypsies, 72 H Haiti, 80, 114 handling, 18, 21, 151 hands, ix, 1, 12, 19 hardening, 88 harm, 46, 88 harmony, 46 Harvard, 99, 164 health, xiii, 37, 62, 104, 106, 109, 113, 123, 125, 126, 163, 164, 165, 172, 174 health care, 104, 126

health clinics, 126 hearing, 164, 169 high-level, 13, 21, 173, 175 HIPC, 125, 128, 134 HIV, xii, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 113, 115, 118, 124, 126, 130 HIV/AIDS, xii, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 113, 115, 118, 124, 126, 130 Hong Kong, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 horizon, 167 host, xiv, 14, 31, 121, 127, 144, 164, 167, 173 House, 8, 13, 15, 83, 108, 117, 129, 130, 131, 161, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172 housing, 71, 128 human, xi, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 38, 66, 68, 75, 76, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 93, 104, 106, 109, 169, 170, 172 human capital, 93, 170 human development, 92, 172 human rights, xi, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 66, 68, 75, 76, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 104, 106 humanitarian, xii, 60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 101, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, 124, 126, 127, 129, 167, 169 humanitarian aid, xii, 60, 64, 68, 101, 109, 112 Hurricane Katrina, 61, 63, 68, 72 hypertext, 39, 41, 51, 54 hypocrisy, 88 hypothesis, 76 I id, 41, 57, 96, 97, 111, 165, 167, 173 IDA, 110, 134 identification, 53, 62, 141 identity, 34, 42, 51, 56, 76, 89, 90 IDFA, 110 Illinois, 71 images, 46, 50, 51 imagination, 51, 54 IMET, 110, 124, 127, 134 IMF, 81, 120, 134 immigrants, 20, 128 immigration, 21, 81, 87, 170 implementation, xii, 22, 25, 76, 94, 95, 101, 112, 124, 129, 142, 146, 165 imports, 11, 79 iincentives, 79, 93, 96 INCLE, 106, 134 inclusion, 86, 137, 150 income, xii, 93, 94, 102, 122, 125, 128 independence, 77, 79, 86

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India, 61, 64, 70 Indian Ocean, 61, 72, 73 indication, 20, 88, 117 indicators, 94, 121 indigenous, 127 Indonesia, 61, 71 industrial, 8, 10, 11, 42, 46, 165 industry, 8, 11, 32, 86, 94, 98, 172 iinfectious diseases, 109, 113, 169 Information Age, 32, 130 infrastructure, 11, 66, 106, 108, 111, 125, 126 injection, 4, 112 innovation, xiv, 48, 49, 50, 52, 83, 164, 166, 174 inspections, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 154, 161 institutional change, 96, 97 institutions, 2, 3, 4, 17, 23, 24, 25, 32, 38, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 106, 109, 112, 120, 122, 125, 126, 165, 172 instruments, 2, 12, 15, 19, 23, 30, 143 integration, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 7, 18, 33, 121 intellectual property, 7, 10, 165 interaction, xi, 6, 11, 25, 31, 50, 53, 75, 98 interactions, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 66, 67 interactivity, 34, 49, 50 interference, 4, 19, 142 internally displaced person, 107, 110 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 134 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 International Disaster and Famine Assistance, 110 international financial institutions, 105, 128 International Military Education and Training, 110, 124, 134 International Monetary Fund, 128, 134 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, 134 international relations, 31, 34, 37, 42, 53, 60, 62, 165 internet, 30, 60, 85 Internet, x, 29, 34 intervention, 51, 83 interviews, 34, 42, 47 investment, 7, 8, 9, 21, 78, 82, 93, 97, 125, 169, 172 investors, 81 Iran, 63 Iraq, xii, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, 108, 111, 124, 131 Ireland, 4, 13 IRRF, 111, 112

irrigation, 126 Islamic, 33 island, xi, 62, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 87, 89, 90 isolation, 12, 61, 62 Israel, xii, 101, 106, 110, 112, 114, 115, 119, 126, 128, 129 Italy, 11, 13, 29, 87 J Jamaica, 80 Japan, 8, 77, 89, 122 Jefferson, 37, 164 jobs, 42, 47, 81, 93 joining, 41, 67 Jordan, xii, 101, 106, 114, 115, 126, 129 journalism, 41 judgment, 20, 21 judiciary, 86, 106 jurisdiction, 125, 129, 130 jurisdictions, 62, 63 justification, 36, 166 K Kashmir, 61, 70 Katrina, 61, 63, 68, 72 Kazakhstan, 136, 144, 148, 156 Kenya, 80, 115 Kiribati, 77, 78, 80, 82 knots, 69, 70 Kobe, 71 Korea, 61, 64 Kyoto protocol, 41, 54 L labour market, 81 land, 49, 63, 107, 138, 140 language, 30, 33, 34, 36, 42, 141 Latin America, 84, 103, 104, 112, 114, 115, 117 law, xi, 18, 21, 22, 38, 75, 76, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 94, 97, 106, 109, 110, 120, 124, 127, 130, 146, 157 law enforcement, 109, 124, 127 LDCs, 82 leadership, xiii, 19, 33, 62, 63, 155, 157, 163, 165, 168, 170, 173, 175 learning, 4, 174 Least Developed Countries, 82 Lebanon, 126 LED, 55

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Index leg, 159 legislation, 22, 113, 117, 118, 120, 124, 129, 130, 133 legislative calendar, 130 liberal, 83, 89, 90 liberalisation, 81 liberalization, 10 liberation, 90 Liberia, 80 liberty, 50, 83 limitations, 81, 147, 149 linear, 40, 46, 54 linguistic, 30, 55 linkage, 155 links, xi, 5, 6, 8, 10, 22, 30, 36, 39, 41, 43, 44, 49, 50, 55, 59, 62, 68, 75, 81 listening, 34, 50 literacy, xiv, 164, 167, 172 loans, 8, 79, 81, 84, 125, 127, 128, 174 lobbying, 14, 24, 25, 63, 64 location, 32, 63, 139, 141, 142 London, 6, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 31, 55, 56, 57, 58, 71, 72, 73, 76, 79, 84, 149

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M Maastricht Treaty, 79 Macao, 1, 19 Macau, 1, 13, 19, 21, 26 machines, 10 maintain balance, 153 maintenance, xi, 18, 59, 90, 141, 151 malaria, 106, 113, 124, 174 malnutrition, 113 management, 33, 51, 54, 67, 94, 95, 96, 106, 107, 120, 166 mandates, 63, 141, 143 man-made, 107, 110 manufactured goods, 10, 79 manufacturing, 9, 93 Mariana Islands, 78 market, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 25, 79, 85, 90, 109, 115 market economy, 10, 12, 85 markets, 8, 38, 79, 81, 120 Marshall Islands, 78, 80 mass media, 33 mathematics, xiv, 164 mathematics education, xiv, 164 Mauritania, 80 Mauritius, 80 MCA, 113, 125 MCC, 114, 120, 125, 134

measures, xii, 7, 8, 10, 12, 21, 23, 25, 84, 85, 92, 101, 102, 117, 118, 130, 142, 146, 147, 148, 152, 154, 158 media, 16, 21, 33, 34, 45, 49, 63, 64, 86, 88, 97, 111 Mediterranean, 89, 90 membership, 6, 10, 12, 77, 79, 95 memorandum of understanding, 157 Mercury, 145 messages, 32, 33, 39, 42, 48, 51, 54, 55 Mexico, 60, 73, 114 Micronesia, 78, 80 Middle East, 33, 34, 56, 103, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 115, 117 middle income, 125 Migration and Refugee Assistance, 110 military, xi, xii, xiii, 46, 60, 75, 76, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 104, 110, 112, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 138, 150, 151, 157, 160 military aid, xii, 101, 112, 119, 124, 131 military junta, 88 Millennium Challenge Corporation, xii, 101, 105, 109, 112, 114, 118, 125, 134 missile defense, 149, 151, 155, 157, 158, 162 missiles, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 149, 150, 151, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 missions, 124, 125, 159, 160, 167 models, 56, 63, 93, 94, 98, 174 money, 48, 117, 118 Moscow, xiii, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 motivation, 8, 20 movement, 15, 137, 139, 144 Mozambique, 80, 99 MRA, 110, 134 multicultural, 49, 55 multiculturalism, 51, 54 multilateral, xii, 16, 21, 23, 88, 96, 101, 110, 112, 120, 122, 125, 127, 129, 130, 156 multimedia, 45, 51 Muslim, 43, 49 N NADR, 134 Namibia, 80 nanotechnology, 168 narcotics, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, 114, 115, 124, 127 narratives, 48, 49 NASA, 168, 169 nation, 30, 32, 33, 52, 53, 79, 120, 143, 154, 156, 164, 165

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National Academy of Sciences, 71 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 168 national income, xii, 93, 94, 102, 122 National Institutes of Health, 168 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 168 national policy, 7, 9, 22, 23, 24, 25 National Research Council, xiv, 71, 163, 165, 167, 173 National Science and Technology Council, 167, 168 National Science Foundation, 167, 168, 173 national security, xii, 21, 102, 103, 104, 147, 170 National Security Strategy, xii, 102, 104 NATO, 42, 45, 52 natural, xi, xiv, 38, 46, 66, 67, 72, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 104, 107, 110, 113, 163, 165, 166, 172 natural disasters, xiv, 72, 104, 110, 163, 165 natural resources, xi, 38, 67, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 107, 113, 172 Nauru, 77, 78, 80 Navy, 151, 159 negotiating, xii, 12, 25, 81, 102, 152, 158 negotiation, 7, 18, 19, 79, 82, 88 Netherlands, 4, 11, 13, 16, 57, 69, 77, 78 network, 55, 75 New Jersey, 57 new media, 34 New Mexico, 73 New South Wales, 77 New York, 26, 27, 31, 55, 56, 57, 58, 73, 88, 99, 164 New Zealand, 77, 78, 87, 88, 89 newspapers, 41 NGO, 14, 88, 134 NGOs, 12, 14, 16, 25, 34, 88, 89, 113, 129 Nicaragua, 61 Nielsen, 39, 43, 55, 57 Nigeria, 80, 91, 99, 115 NIST, 168 Niue, 77, 78, 80 nongovernmental, 33, 127, 174 nongovernmental organization, 33, 127, 174 non-nuclear, 136, 159 nonproliferation, 103, 137, 153, 154 normal, 13, 66, 82 North Korea, 61, 64 Norway, 91, 92, 96, 97 Notre Dame, 57 NPT, 136, 153, 155 NRC, 173 nuclear, xiii, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 169

nuclear weapons, xiii, 136, 137, 144, 147, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 161, 162 O obligations, xii, 13, 20, 102, 103, 112, 117, 118, 124, 127, 128, 141, 142, 153, 158, 170 observations, 49, 63, 65 Oceania, 76 oceans, 160 OECD, 103, 121, 122, 123, 134 Office of Management and Budget, xiii, 102, 107, 128, 133 Official Development Assistance, 103, 122, 134 oil, 91, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99 OMB, xiii, 102, 107 online, x, 29, 50 open markets, 38 opposition, 22, 80, 83 optimism, xi, 59, 60, 69, 70 organ, 105, 107 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 103, 122, 134 OSTP, xiv, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 125, 134 P Pacific, xi, 27, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 Pakistan, xii, 13, 61, 64, 70, 101, 106, 114, 115, 126 Papua New Guinea, xi, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 85, 87 parents, 20 Paris, 55, 56, 57, 121, 129 Paris Club, 129 Parliament, 16, 17, 24, 25 partnership, 8, 10, 38, 76, 84, 85, 174 partnerships, 20, 166, 167, 173 pathways, 64, 65 Peace Corps, 105, 109, 125, 127, 130 penalty, 16, 17 PEPFAR, 113, 126, 134 perception, 3, 11, 35, 42, 46, 48, 52, 121 perceptions, 33, 39, 55 periodic, 147, 150 permit, xi, 59, 148 Persian Gulf War, 129 personal qualities, 49 Peru, 114 Pervez Musharraf, 64 petroleum, xi, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99 photographs, 45, 49, 50

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Index planning, 9, 66, 87, 106, 113, 165 play, xiv, 4, 8, 9, 24, 25, 48, 125, 136, 153, 163, 165, 175 PNG, 78, 82, 85, 86 Poland, 128, 155, 157 police, 106, 108 policy initiative, 22, 130 policy making, 23, 24, 25, 34 policymakers, xii, 102, 103, 104, 109, 169 political leaders, 60, 90 politicians, 4, 67, 70 politics, x, 1, 2, 3, 25, 26, 37, 41, 54, 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 83, 95 Polynesia, 77, 78 poor, 79, 88, 92, 93, 120, 170, 174 population, 83, 87, 91, 95, 104, 109 Portugal, 13, 15, 19, 79 poverty, xiv, 91, 92, 96, 104, 107, 163, 165, 172, 173, 174 power, ix, xi, 1, 4, 12, 13, 20, 32, 33, 63, 75, 76, 90, 93, 95, 98, 126, 166, 169 powers, 5, 25, 77 predictability, 137, 144, 147, 149, 154, 158, 160, 162 prediction, x, 59, 65 predictive model, x, 59, 60, 65 preferential trade arrangements, xi, 75 preparedness, x, 59, 60 president, 16, 41, 86 President Bush, 35, 124, 145 President Vladimir Putin, 145, 148 press, 17, 20, 42, 49, 52, 53, 89, 97, 149, 152, 157 pressure, 17, 82, 83, 88, 157 prevention, 60, 85, 113 prices, 79, 98 private sector, 79, 85, 97, 108, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 166, 172 private sector investment, 172 production, 103, 104, 107, 115, 141, 166, 174 productivity, 93, 166, 170 profit, 60, 129 program, xii, 8, 16, 35, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 173 proliferation, 104, 109, 124, 153 prosperity, 18, 19, 38, 42, 52, 170 protection, xi, 9, 75, 77, 84, 87, 106, 107, 109, 165 protocol, 41, 158 public, x, xii, 3, 18, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 67, 85, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 104, 110, 113, 121, 153, 165, 166, 170 public sector, 93, 95, 96 punishment, 83, 85

Putin, 145, 147 Pyongyang, 64 Q quotas, 6, 79, 82 R R&D, xiv, 164, 168, 169, 173, 174 range, x, 1, 14, 24, 106, 109, 112, 124, 125, 126, 138, 140, 146, 152, 153, 155, 161, 165, 172 reading, 40, 41, 43, 51 real terms, xii, 102, 118 reality, 2, 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 22, 68 recognition, 5, 39, 48, 52 reconciliation, 70, 106 reconstruction, xii, 44, 60, 65, 73, 101, 102, 104, 108, 110, 115, 117, 118, 120 recovery, 42, 60, 143 Red Cross, 68, 110 reforms, 8, 23, 70, 88, 89, 125 refugees, 107, 110 regional, 61, 81, 82, 85, 87, 103, 115, 116, 124, 165, 167, 172 regional cooperation, 61, 81 regular, 21, 23, 87, 89, 130, 133, 146 regulation, 4, 21 regulations, 87, 89 relationship, xiii, 11, 18, 20, 22, 33, 35, 39, 43, 51, 63, 65, 76, 79, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162 relationships, xi, 33, 39, 59, 62, 68 relevance, xi, 30, 43, 68, 75, 97 remote sensing, 142 rent, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97 Republic of the Congo, 128 reputation, 21, 41, 42, 52, 54 research and development, xiv, 164, 166, 168, 174 Research and Development, 170 resilience, 90, 166 resistance, 76, 89 resolution, xi, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 62, 65, 68, 75, 146 resource management, 96 resources, x, xi, 6, 7, 9, 17, 23, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 54, 67, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 107, 111, 113, 115, 117, 125, 165, 170, 172, 174 responsibilities, 10, 21, 41, 77, 129, 144 revenue, xi, 75, 94, 95, 96 rhetoric, 51, 53, 97

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risk, xi, xiv, 53, 59, 60, 62, 68, 70, 95, 125, 128, 164, 174 road map, 86 Robert Gates, 147, 160 Rome, 6, 79 rule of law, xi, 22, 75, 76, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 94, 97, 106 rules of origin, 82 rural, 113 Russia, xiii, 69, 109, 115, 116, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 Russian, 30, 76, 136, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162 Rwanda, 80

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S S&T, xiii, xiv, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174 sales, 13, 33, 130 Samoa, 69, 77, 78, 80, 82 sanctions, xi, 7, 8, 12, 13, 75, 85, 88, 89, 120 sanitation, 109, 113, 126 SAR, 1, 20, 21, 22, 24 school, 26, 110, 126 search, 81, 83, 97, 98, 143, 147 second generation, 6 Secretary of Defense, 147, 160 Secretary of State, xiv, 50, 123, 125, 145, 146, 147, 151, 161, 163, 166, 167, 172, 173 Secretary-General, 88 security, xii, 2, 21, 38, 41, 83, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 129, 130, 133, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155, 165, 166, 170, 173 SEED, 106, 109, 123, 130, 134 Senate, 31, 108, 117, 129, 130, 131, 137, 145, 146, 157, 158 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 129 separation, 23, 52, 53, 68, 69 September 11, xii, 101, 102, 103, 112, 114, 115, 117 series, 5, 7, 10, 12, 17, 26, 27, 44, 48, 54, 61, 79, 99, 146, 147, 148 services, x, 7, 9, 29, 79, 81, 82, 106, 107, 119, 120, 121, 125 Seychelles, 80 Shanghai, 73 sharing, 38, 55, 165, 166 short-term, 62, 127, 157 Sierra Leone, 80 sign, 10, 21, 54, 136, 137, 156

signs, 19, 55 sites, 30, 49, 50, 150, 157, 161 SMEs, 9 social network, 50, 55 sociological, 30, 60 solidarity, 9, 16, 52, 54 Solomon Islands, 77, 78, 80, 82, 87 Somalia, 80, 128 sorting, 67, 69 South Africa, 80, 83, 115 South America, 80, 83 South Asia, 104, 115 South Korea, 89 South Pacific, 75, 76, 77, 89, 90 Southeast Asia, 103 sovereignty, 5, 13, 15, 19 Soviet Union, xiii, 33, 103, 109, 112, 127, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 147, 154, 155, 156 Spain, 7, 13, 77 Spaniards, 76 speculation, 68, 70 speech, 52, 148, 152, 160, 170 speed, 16, 68 spheres, 39, 63, 76 spillover effects, 3 sponsor, xiv, 13, 14, 16, 164, 168 Sri Lanka, 62, 64, 71 stability, 38, 104, 106, 108, 149, 154, 157, 165 stabilization, 106 stages, 24, 30, 109, 141, 164 stakeholder, 10, 94, 95 standards, 82, 169, 170 State Department, xii, 33, 45, 102, 105, 106, 110, 115, 123, 124, 130, 133, 138, 140, 147, 152, 156, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172 STEM, xiv, 164, 170 stockpile, 156, 159 storage, 141, 154, 156 strategies, x, 29, 30, 32, 33, 53, 55, 107, 165 stress, 21, 94 students, 2, 169, 173 submarines, 151, 159, 160 Sub-Saharan Africa, 71, 98 Sudan, 80, 96, 114, 128 sugar, 79, 81, 82, 86, 87 superiority, 46, 53 supplemental, 105, 109, 112, 114, 116 supplements, 17, 110 survival, xiv, 63, 163, 165 sustainability, 66, 68 sustainable development, 84, 113 Sweden, 13, 16, 69, 122

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T talent, 93, 170 tangible, 172 Tanzania, 80 targets, 158, 160 tariff, 12, 22, 79, 82 taxonomic, 64, 65 teachers, 126, 127 technical assistance, 77, 96, 110, 125 telephone, 64, 160 territory, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 58, 60, 136, 144, 156 terrorism, xii, 46, 101, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 124, 126, 127 terrorist, xii, 33, 101, 102, 104, 112, 114, 117, 125 terrorist attack, xii, 33, 101, 102, 104, 112, 114, 117 terrorist organization, 104 Texas, 55, 60 textbooks, 41, 126 Third World, 79, 84 threat, 8, 70, 107, 114, 137, 154 threatened, 114, 137 threatening, 55, 82 threats, 46, 62, 84, 109, 112, 154, 161 title, 10, 42, 51 Tonga, 77, 78, 80 Tony Blair, 15, 19, 94 top-down, 5, 168 tourism, 60, 78, 88 tourist, 32, 67 tracking, 119 trade, xi, xii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 21, 22, 23, 25, 37, 38, 60, 62, 67, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 102, 106, 120, 125, 151, 166 trade agreement, xii, 6, 81, 102 trade deficit, 11 trade policy, xii, 2, 3, 4, 6, 102 trade-off, 151 trading, 3, 6, 11, 21 tradition, 6, 10 training, 106, 109, 110, 111, 119, 124, 126, 127 trans, 5, 24, 25 transformation, x, 1, 26, 47 transition, 12, 13, 18, 20, 53, 103, 129, 133, 164 Transition Initiatives, 110, 134 translation, 30, 96 transnational, 34, 106, 167 transparency, 34, 67, 94, 95, 98, 146, 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, 158, 160, 161, 162 travel, 43, 87, 88 Treasury, 125, 127, 128 treaties, 67, 79, 89, 137, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 170

Trinidad and Tobago, 80 trust, 23, 52, 53, 54, 64, 137, 153, 154 tsunami, 61, 64 Tsunami, 71, 72, 73 tuberculosis, 106, 113, 124 Tuberculosis, 130 Turkey, 61, 63, 70, 72, 126 Tuvalu, 77, 78, 80 two-way, 4, 36 typology, 4, 63, 64 U U.S. Agency for International Development, xiii, xiv, 102, 108, 123, 134, 164, 165, 166, 167, 173 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 125, 128 U.S. military, 110, 119, 151, 160 Uganda, 80, 83, 85 Ukraine, 115, 116, 136, 144, 148, 156 UN General Assembly, 13 UNDP, 110, 134 UNICEF, 110, 124, 134 uniform, 81, 168 United Kingdom, 13, 19, 21, 78, 122 United Nations, 13, 26, 63, 67, 77, 110, 134 United Nations Development Program, 110, 134 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 83 universities, 47, 52, 129 USAID, xiii, xiv, 102, 105, 108, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 164, 165, 166, 167, 172, 173 USSR, 69 V validation, 94, 95 values, xii, xiv, 3, 22, 32, 33, 38, 39, 42, 48, 52, 66, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 102, 163, 165, 170 Vanuatu, 77, 78, 80 variables, 43, 55, 93 variation, 32, 102 vehicles, xiii, 135, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 155, 159 Vice President, 6, 152, 161 visa, 20, 21, 43, 67, 173 visible, 89, 170 voice, xii, 34, 38, 54, 67, 102, 156 voluntary organizations, 110, 129 vulnerability, 66, 67, 68

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Y yield, 61, 138 Z Zimbabwe, 80, 128

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Wales, 13, 77 war, xii, 31, 77, 80, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 126 war on terror, xii, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 126 Washington Post, 35, 50, 56, 57, 150, 152, 153 water, xiv, 87, 107, 109, 113, 126, 163, 165, 166, 170 weakness, 63, 64 wealth, 62, 66, 92, 117 weapons, xiii, 104, 106, 109, 124, 126, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162 Weapons of Mass Destruction, 137 web, x, 29, 30, 34, 43, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57 Web 2.0, 50, 55, 57 websites, 30, 31, 39, 166

wellbeing, 83, 109, West Bank, 114 Western countries, 12, 13 White House, xiv, 50, 145, 152, 164, 167, 168, 175 WMD, 105 workers, 52, 81 World Bank, 96, 98, 110, 120, 125, 128, 134 World War, 17, 69, 76, 77, 103 writing, xi, 75, 76 WTO, xi, 10, 12, 22, 75, 80, 81, 82

Foreign Policy in an Interconnected World, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,