Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 2 A Comparative Perspective 9781503627420

Citation preview

Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume II. A Comparative Perspective

Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century VOLUME II: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Edited by William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

Stanford Security Studies An Imprint of Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2010 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st century I edited by William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. v. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v.2. A comparative perspective. ISBN 978-o-8047-6970-9 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 978-o-8047-6971-6 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation-Forecasting. I. Potter, William C. II. Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar. JZs66s.F68 2010 327.1747-dc22 2010011336 Typeset by Thompson Type in 10/14 Minion Special discounts for bulk quantities of Stanford Security Studies are available to corporations, professional associations, and other organizations. For details and discount information, contact the special sales department of Stanford University Press. Tel: (6so) 736-1782, Fax: (6so) 736-1784

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments PART I

vii

INTRODUCTION

1 An Introduction to Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova PART II

3

MIDDLE EAST

2 Will Egypt Seek Nuclear Weapons? An Assessment of Motivations, Constraints, Consequences, and Policy Options Jim Walsh

13

3 Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran's Nuclear Program Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

42

4 Saudi Petro-Nukes? Riyadh's Nuclear Intentions and Regime Survival Strategies Ibrahim ai-Marashi

5 The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle Leonard S. Spector and Deborah R. Berman PART Ill

100

EAST ASIA

6 The Perils of Prediction: Japan's Once and Future Nuclear Status Etel Solingen

131 v

vi

CONTENTS

7 South Korean Nuclear Decision Making Scott Snyder

158

8 Taiwan and Nuclear Weaponization: Incentives versus Disincentives Monte Bullard and Jing-dong Yuan

182

PART IV

EUROPE

9 Nuclear Weapons in the Balkans: Why Yugoslavia Tried and Serbia Will Not Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova 10 Turkey in Transition: Toward or Away from Nuclear Weapons? Jessica C. Varnum 11

PARTY

Ukraine: A Postnuclear Country Nikolai Sokov

205

229 255

OTHER REGIONS

12 Australia: A Potential Future Nuclear Proliferator? Wayne Reynolds and John Simpson

285

13 From Pariah to Nuclear Poster Boy: How Plausible Is a Reversal? Jean du Preez and Thomas Maettig

302

PART VI

CONCLUSION

14 In Search of Proliferation Trends and Tendencies William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

337

Notes

357

Contributors

441

Index

447

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

are the product of a multiyear effort by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies to explore nuclear proliferation dynamics. Although the orientation of the project evolved considerably over time-away from an initial embrace of the concept of proliferation chains and reactive proliferation-the research retained a consistent focus on harnessing the insights from both theory and comparative country studies to better understand past proliferation decisions and to anticipate proliferation trends. Many individuals, in addition to the chapter authors, contributed to this volume. They include Monterey Institute students in my graduate research seminar on "Proliferation Trends and Trigger Events"; anonymous reviewers; commentators at project workshops in Washington, D.C., in the fall of 2007 and Monterey in the summer of 2oo8; and CNS research assistants Liviu Horovitz, Kate Amlin, Sean Dunlop, Lala Kylycheva, and Daniel Cunningham. My CNS colleague Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, however, deserves special mention. This book would not have been possible without her exceptional editorial assistance and tireless efforts to help me navigate the treacherous waters of IR theory and quantitative methods. I also am grateful for the generous support provided to CNS for research related to forecasting proliferation developments by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Advanced Concepts and Systems Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The views expressed in this volume, however, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or THIS BOOK AND ITS COMPANION VOLUME

vii

viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Last, but not least, I wish to dedicate this book to my wife Anna Vassilieva, who frequently complains-not without some justification-that I am married first and foremost to nonproliferation. I am not sure which of us is more thankful that the study is at last completed. William C. Potter

Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume II. A Comparative Perspective

1

AN INTRODUCTION TO FORECASTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

IT IS INCREASINGLY FASHIONABLE to describe the nuclear nonproliferation regime as under siege from a variety of new and continuing threats. Although analysts and diplomats disagree about whether it is appropriate to depict the situation as a "crisis," few doubt its precarious nature or challenge the assumption that significant additional jolts to the system could set in motion chain reactions of proliferation that would greatly weaken if not undermine the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its associated institutions. In some national capitals, including Washington, one can find senior officials who speak almost matter of factly about the inevitability of further proliferation and the need to "manage" rather than "prevent" that process. Some of the concerns expressed today are not new ones, and the danger of nuclear proliferation chains and regional and global "domino effects" has been the subject of scholarly and governmental discourse since at least the mid1970s.1 One infrequently cited but innovative monograph by Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, for example, identified fifteen scenarios for nuclear weapons spread from 1975 to 1995, each based on the assumption that one state's acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit, which in turn would trigger a succession of additional nuclearization decisions. 2 Fortunately, their forecasts were almost without exception wildly off the mark. In retrospect, it appears that to the extent that the nuclear proliferation chain dynamics envisaged by Dunn and Kahn were at work, they were dampened during the Cold War by a number of factors, including the behavior of the two superpowers, who tended to hold convergent views on the subject of nonproliferation and pursued largely cooperative behavior in this domain.

3

4

POTTER AND MUKHATZHANOVA

Also probably helpful were such factors as widely shared international norms embodied in the NPT, the spread of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), the adoption of stringent nuclear export control guidelines by the major nuclear exporters, and the emergence in a number of prospective proliferators of policy makers who perceived nuclear weapons as counterproductive in terms of their international economic and political objectives. Today, arguably, many of these proliferation dampening effects no longer prevail. Among the factors that may have rekindled the prospect of a surge of proliferation decisions are the demise of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the international system; the subordination in the United States and the majority of other nuclear weapons states of nonproliferation objectives to other economic and political considerations (witness the U.S.-India nuclear deal); the pursuit by some of these same states of "nonproliferation exceptionalism," in which they apply different nonproliferation standards to selected countries; and the general weakening of international nonproliferation norms. Also possibly contributing to the diminished well-being of the nonproliferation regime is the increased danger posed by nonstate actors as potential nuclear suppliers, middlemen, and end users; the muted response of the international community to the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan; a similar lack of responsiveness to North Korea's decision to withdraw from the NPT and to conduct (multiple) nuclear weapons tests; the devalued benefits of non-nuclear weapons status under the NPT in a post-U.S.-India nuclear deal world; and Iran's exploitation of Article IV of the NPT for purposes that many consider to be consistent with a nuclear weapons option. The combination of these developments has led to increasing speculation by government officials and nongovernmental pundits alike about the potential for regional and global proliferation chain reactions, "tipping points," and cascades. To date, however, these proliferation prognoses are largely divorced from systematic or sustained research about the dynamics by which trigger events may set in motion national proliferation decisions, the process by which proliferation chains may arise, or even the extent to which one nation's decision is apt to have an impact on the nuclear decisions of other states. Indeed, most nuclear prognoses appear to be driven more by metaphors than empirical research or theory. Moreover, although there is a growing body of potentially relevant social science and case study literature, for the most part it has not been applied directly to the study of "reactive proliferation" 3 or, for that matter, to forecasting proliferation more generally.

FORECASTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

5

In an effort to remedy this knowledge deficit and to better gauge the prospects for nuclear proliferation during the next decade, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies launched a two-year research project in 2007 on "Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation Developments in the 21st Century." The study, supported primarily by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, focused on the proliferation propensity over the next ten years of twelve countries from different regions of the world; the impact on national nuclear decisions of various trigger events; the potential for national, regional, and international interaction effects; and the most effective policy tools available for impeding nuclear weapons spread. Although not the first effort to look systematically and comparatively at nuclear decision making, the CNS project is unique in the combination of its future orientation, comparative perspective, and emphasis on harnessing the insights from social science theory and country case studies to aid policy makers in forecasting nuclear proliferation developments. 4 This volume, one of two related books that report on the findings of the forecasting project, consists of twelve comparative case studies. 5 The authors of each case study were asked to address seven overarching questions: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5·

6.

7·

What is the likelihood that the country in question will decide to acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons option during the next ten years? What is the current balance of incentives and disincentives to "go nuclear" in the country under examination? What ongoing trends and/or "trigger events" in the next ten years might alter the current balance of incentives and disincentives to acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons option? How long would it take for the country to move from a decision to acquire nuclear weapons to actual nuclear weapons possession? If a nuclear decision is made, what will be the likely pathway to nuclear weapons acquisition (that is, overt versus concealed behind a civilian program)? What is the relationship between the country's nuclear decision making and the behavior of other states (that is, what are the external drivers of the country's nuclear decisions)? How treatable/preventable are future proliferation decisions?

6

POTTER AND MUKHATZHANOVA

Contributors to this volume represent a diversity of nationalities, professional experience, methodological sophistication, and theoretical predilections. Although they were not encouraged to endorse any particular perspective, they were asked to assess the relevance for their cases of two of the most important recent studies in the nonproliferation field: Jacques Hymans's The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation and Etel Solingen's Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. These books were singled out for particular attention because of their solid grounding in comparative field research and social science theory, their challenges to prevailing conceptions about the sources of nuclear decisions, and their promise for predicting proliferation developments. Authors also were encouraged to draw on, where appropriate, the terminology and insights from Stephen Meyer's pioneering study The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. 6 They include the concepts of propensity, salience, lag time, and treatability. Countries were selected for comparative analysis based on a number of criteria, most important of which were: (1) an assessment by project participants of the most likely Nth countries; (2) a similar assessment by "expert judges" involved in an ongoing National Defense University nonproliferation project; (3) the desire to include several intriguing cases that are rarely given much attention; and (4) the availability of experts who combine a deep knowledge of nonproliferation and familiarity with the domestic context in which nuclear decisions are made. The latter consideration was especially important in the selection process, as many past proliferation forecasts suffer due to the analysts' unfamiliarity with the culture, language, history, economics, and politics of the countries for which predictions were rendered. As is evident in this book's concluding chapter, which attempts to identify cross-national proliferation trends and tendencies, it is difficult to isolate any single factor that can explain all, or even most, of the variation in nuclear decision making across countries. It would be surprising, therefore, to anticipate that one could accurately predict nuclear choices without reference to multiple factors. Nevertheless, to the extent that different theoretical approaches attempt to offer guideposts for projecting proliferation decisions-as opposed to offering post hoc explanations of behavior-they vary considerably in the importance they ascribe to multicausality, the emphasis they attach to different determinants, and the level of analysis they employ. Several of the more influential approaches that inform the comparative case studies in this volume are summarized in the following pages?

FORECASTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

7

NEOREALISM

Much of the thinking about nuclear proliferation has been informed by realist perspectives, which assume that states are unitary actors that seek nuclear weapons because their security-precarious in an anarchic world-demands it. From a classical realist perspective, the quest for nuclear weapons is a rational form of self-help designed to maximize power. Neorealism embraces the same basic assumptions as classical realism, but it is more attentive to the impact of structural differences in the international system on the occurrence of war and peace. 8 Applied to the proliferation arena, neorealism offers an elegant and simple explanation as to why nations would go nuclear. In its view, regime type, domestic politics, and personalities are of no consequence, and all that really matters is an understanding of the balancing dynamics in which one state's pursuit of nuclear weapons begets another. 9 Taken to its logical conclusion, unadulterated neorealism predicts a lengthy nuclear proliferation chain that extends to as many states as have access to technical know-how and material to build nuclear weapons. The main reason to abstain from nuclear weapons, according to neorealist tenets, is the availability of security guarantees from a powerful ally, but even that option is viewed at best as temporary-until the state is powerful enough to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. As such, from a neorealist perspective not only is it "natural" behavior for states to covet nuclear weapons, but there are few circumstances in which one can envisage states voluntarily choosing to relinquish nuclear weapons in their possession. 10 NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

A leading challenger to conventional neorealist wisdom, neoliberal institutionalism also regards states as unitary actors, but it emphasizes the importance of absolute (rather than relative) gains that states can derive from participating in international regimes_ll From an institutionalist perspective, the vast majority of states made a rational choice when they joined the NPT, surrendering their sovereign right to build nuclear weapons in exchange for the promise of eventual disarmament by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) and the foreswearing of nuclear weapons by other non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)P Underlying institutionalism is the assumption that international regimes will function as long as promised benefits are delivered and punishment for cheating (noncompliance) is ensured. In this respect, the entirety of the NPT bargain-including the Article IV commitment to assistance in peaceful nuclear activities-is important for regime survival.

8

POTTER AND MUKHATZHANOVA

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Yet another way to view nuclear choice is in terms of constructivism and the influence of nonmaterial incentives. Social constructivist approaches look beyond security considerations and rational state interests in search of public and elite perceptions and norms related to nuclear weaponsP Where institutionalists argue that a decision to join and abide by the nonproliferation regime is the result of rational cost-benefit analysis, constructivists suggest that nuclear weapons abstention reflects an internationally accepted mode of "good state" behavior. According to this perspective, states with societies that have internalized the nonproliferation norm are less likely to consider or pursue nuclear weapons, even when faced with serious security challenges. As the embodiment of the international nonproliferation norm, the NPT therefore has important symbolic value in addition to its promise of practical benefits. As one proponent of this thesis puts it, "The international social environment, supported by first an emergent and then a full-fledged nuclear nonproliferation regime, has helped to provide that systemic impetus toward nuclear nonproliferation." 14 DOMESTIC SOURCES

There are a number of approaches to nuclear decision making that focus on the role of subnational or domestic sources. They include models that emphasize the force of bureaucratic politics, organizational processes, interest groups, and individual personalities. 15 Although often providing useful insights at odds with rational actor explanations of state behavior, they typically are not full-fledged theories, lack predictive power, and are best at explaining past behavior. As noted in the preceding discussion, two recent works that authors in this volume were asked to consider very carefully emphasize domestic sources of nuclear weapons decisions but with greater attention than most domestic approaches to hypothesis testing and theory building. They are the leadership psychology and regime survival approaches of Jacques Hymans and Etel Solingen, respectively. Leadership Psychology

Jacques Hymans's psychology-based model is related to constructivism in that it examines how national identity conceptions (NICs) define nuclear behavior. 16 The level of analysis, however, is different, as Hymans focuses on NICs of individualleaders and argues that only one leadership type (out of four) is apt to pursue nuclear weapons. Dubbed "oppositional nationalists," such leaders are

FORECASTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

9

driven by national pride and fear of the "other," which leads to the perception of the need for nuclear weapons as well as confidence in the achievement of such a goal. While the assumption of power by an oppositional nationalist leader is necessary for the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, according to Hymans it is not always a sufficient condition for their attainment. Other factors, such as regime type and bureaucratic politics, can play a significant role in the implementation phase of decision making and impede or prevent the realization of a nuclear weapons project. Regime Survival

Etel Solingen also focuses on subnational factors to explain nuclear decision making but identifies regime survival as the key domestic variable. 17 According to her thesis, nuclear weapons programs are driven more by concerns about domestic political survival of the ruling coalition than state insecurity. Differences in regime orientation toward the global political economy, she argues, have direct implications for the nuclear choices taken by states. Outward-looking ruling coalitions that derive legitimacy from ensuring economic growth and well-being through integration into the international economy are disinclined to pursue nuclear weapons. In contrast, inward-looking regimes that emphasize self-sufficiency and autarky are more likely to view nuclear weapons acquisition as strengthening their internal position and to act accordingly. Most of the contributors to this volume pay dutiful attention to the relative explanatory and predictive power of the aforementioned alternative approaches. As a consequence, it is possible to identify proliferation trends and tendencies based on a reasonably large set of comparative, empirically founded, and theoretically informed studies. This methodological rigor does not ensure accurate nuclear forecasts, but it provides a useful corrective to what too often has resembled speculation. A recent book by two former government officials with access to many nuclear secrets likens the current proliferation scene to a speeding express train driven by indifferent engineers and filled with fissile material, nuclear technology, and sleeping passengers. 18 The imagery is powerful, and the metaphor may yet prove apt. On the other hand, the nonproliferation train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected. Hopefully this volume will help wake up some passengers, inspire the engineers of nonproliferation policy, and delay further the departure of the nuclear express.

2

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS? An Assessment of Motivations, Constraints, Consequences, and Policy Options

Jim Walsh

is to consider nuclear decision making and potential nuclear developments in the largest country in the Middle East- the Arab Republic of Egypt. 1 Egypt figures prominently in current discussions of potential proliferators, as many commentators fear that Iran's nuclear program will force Egypt to pursue a nuclear program of its own. This analysis focuses on Egypt's actions over the next decade, but it begins with a brief look at why analysts worry about Egypt and Cairo's present and projected nuclear capabilities. It then considers the security, ideational/ psychological, and political variables that might encourage or constrain an Egyptian decision to seek nuclear weapons, as well as the steps that the United States and other governments might take to reduce the likelihood that Egypt would do so. The core conclusion of this chapter is that it is possible but not likely that Egypt will seek, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons. While one can point to a variety of factors that could push Egypt toward nuclear weapons, in every case these conditions were stronger during previous decades when a nucleararmed Israel was Cairo's chief concern. Egypt did not "go nuclear" then, and it is unlikely that it will do so now, when the conditions supporting such a move are less compelling and when the domestic and international environments are arguably more constraining. Nevertheless, there are troubling signs, in particular, the slow erosion of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and rising frustration in Cairo over Israel's nuclear weapons program. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER

13

14

JIMWALSH

WHY THE WORRY ABOUT EGYPT?

A number of pundits, policy makers, and scholars have suggested that Egypt is on the short list of potential proliferators. The most common line of argument suggests that Iran's nuclear program (whether it results in an overt arsenal or not) will provide the impetus for other nations in the region, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to get into the nuclear game. 2 Other analysts start with a different premise but arrive at the same conclusion. They reason that (a) the nonproliferation regime is on the verge of collapse, and a new wave of weapons states is around the corner; (b) the Middle East is prime real estate for proliferators; and therefore (c) Egypt is a good candidate for a nuclear weapons program. 3 Finally, the statements and actions of Egyptian officials themselves have given rise to speculation about the country's nuclear ambitions. Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak's son and the potential if not likely successor to his father, made a surprise announcement in 2006 suggesting that Egypt should once again pursue nuclear energy. Talk of building nuclear reactors raised suspicions that Egypt may pose the next big proliferation challenge. 4 How concerned should we be? Is Egypt likely to take the plunge? Before considering this question, it makes sense to first establish an empirical baseline. The next section briefly considers Egypt's current and projected nuclear capabilities. EGYPT AND THE ATOM: PRESENT AND FUTURE

Egypt's present nuclear capability is neither advanced nor rudimentary. Its nuclear program is more than fifty years old and today counts some 1,400 scientists, 2,300 technical staff, and 1,300 administrative staff as part of its effort. 5 It possesses a modestly upgraded version of the 2 MW Russian-built research reactor that it first acquired in 1961 and, more importantly, a 22.5 MW open pool research reactor built by Argentina's INVAP company. Egypt's atomic energy agency also makes active use of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Technical Cooperation program in support of various research and engineering projects. 6 What have garnered the most headlines, however, are Egypt's plans to build a series of nuclear power plants. As recently as 2001, the government expressed no interest in nuclear energy, consistent with its post-Chernobyl policy? That changed with a presidential speech in September 2006, when President Mubarak endorsed his son's earlier comments and declared that

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

15

Egypt would once again seek to draw energy from the atom. Reports suggest that the government believes that a new plant could be built by 2020 at a cost of $1.5 billion. 8 Still, many in and out of the government remain skeptical about the financial and practical feasibility of the new venture. Headlines aside, the real proliferation concern is not power reactors but Egypt's long-standing interest in reprocessing. This interest has persisted since the earliest days of Cairo's fledgling program but, in general, has not translated into results. For roughly twenty-five years, Egypt's nuclear program received only modest help with its radiochemistry projects.9 Shiyam Bhatia reports that the French company Robtel supplied Egypt with a hot cell complex for plutonium extraction in 1982, not long after the creation of the Hot Lab and Waste Management Center in 1980. 10 Sources suggested that this was done with the help and oversight of the IAEA. 11 Some reports maintained that the hot cells were functioning. Others claimed that they were becoming operational only in the late 1990s, just as the Argentine research reactor was being completed. One Russian intelligence report claimed that the upgraded radiochemistry department "could in the future be used [to] ... obtain weapons-grade plutonium from uranium irradiated in the research reactor." 12 In fact, almost none of this appears to be true. According to the 2005 IAEA report on possible Egyptian safeguards violations, Egypt ... concluded several contracts with a foreign company to build a laboratory (the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) for carrying out "bench scale radiochemistry experiments" involving the separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the 2 MW research reactor. The first of the three laboratories of the Pilot Plant consists of Modules 1 through 3 containing three hot cells: the first cell ... was never finished due to the fact that the foreign vendor had been unable to secure the necessary export licence for the shearing equipment; the second cell contains a completed dissolver and mixer settlers for first stage fission product separation; the third cell was designed for waste vitrification but no essential equipment has been installedP The second laboratory held Modules 4 and 5 and was intended for "second stage fission product separation" and "the separation of plutonium from uranium," while the third laboratory contained no equipment. 14 Egypt reported to the IAEA that it was unable to complete the facility and decided to use the pilot plant for radiological protection and management projects, abandoning reprocessing.

16

JIM WALSH

In short, the hot cell labs appear (1) not to have been constructed with IAEA assistance and oversight, (2) were never completed, and (3) were intended for bench-scale experiments, that is, insufficient for a serious bomb program. The same IAEA report also notes that Egypt is currently planning to build "a facility ... intended for the separation of radioisotopes from uranium enriched to 19.7% in U-235 to be irradiated at the 22.5 MW reactor, but that no nuclear relevant equipment has yet been procured for it." 15 Based on the author's recent discussions with Egyptian nuclear officials and experts, it is apparent that the issue of spent fuel disposition is not settled. In more than one interview, officials and experts emphasized that some of Egypt's nuclear cooperation agreements require the return of spent fuel but that others do not and that no final decision about how to handle spent fuel has been made. This stance is at odds with the near-unanimous view among nonproliferation specialists on the need to return spent fuel to its place of origin. Those interviewed acknowledged the international "consensus on limiting reprocessing and enrichment" but nevertheless maintained that the issue of spent fuel remains undecided and expected that, in any case, interim storage would be required. 16 Egypt has built an impressive cadre of nuclear personnel, and its research reactor could, in theory, be a source for reprocessed plutonium. On the other hand, the country has virtually no enrichment or reprocessing capability, and, thanks to the recent controversy, the IAEA has a very good baseline for assessing Egyptian nuclear activity. It is conceivable that Egypt could initiate a program to acquire a weapons capability, but it would be difficult to do so, and it would take time. WHY EGYPT MIGHT SEEK OR ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In this section, four kinds of variables that might affect Egyptian nuclear decision making are assessed: (a) security threats, (b) ideational and psychological factors, (c) domestic factors, and (d) trigger factors or events that might provide domestic bomb advocates with an opportunity to advance their cause. Security Threats

The idea that security threats cause states to seek nuclear weapons has long been a mainstay of writing on proliferation. 17 Unfortunately for social science, the notion of what constitutes a nuclear-relevant security threat is quite malleable and can be treated differently depending on the case. For the purposes of this inquiry, "security threat" is operationalized as those situations in which

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

17

a country faces one or more of the following: (1) a nuclear-armed adversary, (2) an adversary with a latent nuclear weapons capability, or (3) an adversary that enjoys an overwhelming advantage in conventional weaponry. 18 With regard to Egypt, one can imagine three plausible adversaries that meet those criteria. The first is Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons and has fought anumber of wars with Egypt in the past. Given its peace treaty with Israel, the country cannot currently be labeled as an "adversary," but because this analysis is future oriented it is reasonable to include the state with which Egypt has fought five wars and might again experience a more hostile relationship following a change of government or a regional conflict involving Israel and a third country. 19 The second is Iran. 20 Iran has neither nuclear weapons nor overwhelming conventional forces, but it is conceivable that over the next decade it could acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, most contemporary discussions of Egypt as a possible proliferator posit a security threat from a nuclear Iran. 21 Here again, however, there is some question as to whether Iran can be labeled an "adversary." Iran and Egypt have never fought a war and do not share a border or harbor irredentist claims. One Egyptian military analyst suggested that Egypt sees Iran as a regional actor of concern, rather than a direct threat. 22 Historically, Iranian-Egyptian relations have not been strong. During the time of the shah, the secular, nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser was viewed as a threat by all the monarchies in the region. Later, following Iran's revolution, Cairo's concerns about Tehran "exporting the revolution," Egypt's close military ties to Iraq, and an array of bilateral irritants kept the relationship icy. In recent years, however, both countries have moved to improve relations, but the results have been limited. Various disputes continue to dominate their public pronouncements. 23 The third and perhaps most surprising candidate for a security threat is the United States, which possesses both nuclear weapons and an overwhelming conventional advantage. The notion of an American threat obviously requires some creative imagining, namely, that Mubarak or his successor is forced out by radical or religious extremists, who then adopt policies anathema to the United States. While this scenario is more unlikely than not, one could point to Iran or Iraq as countries that enjoyed positive relations with Washington only to find themselves later threatened by the superpower. Interestingly, public opinion surveys suggest that average Egyptians overwhelmingly perceive

18 JIMWALSH

Israel and the United States as the two greatest threats to Egypt. By contrast, Iran is cited as a threat by less than 5 percent of those surveyed in two polls. 24 A radical government could assume power and might conclude that a U.S. threat warranted an Egyptian bomb, but that situation would be accompanied by a number of other developments that would complicate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For example, the government would likely face a deteriorating economic situation as European and other foreign investors pulled out. In this counterfactual, the new government would also be under intense international scrutiny and would find it difficult to (a) fund a weapons program and (b) acquire the required foreign technology. These obstacles would not be insurmountable, but they would not be trivial, particularly for a new government that had seized power and was trying to find its footing. In purely security terms, it would seem that Israel constitutes the most serious threat of the three. It already has nuclear weapons and is in close physical proximity to Egypt, and the two countries have previously fought wars with each other. In addition, Israel is arguably more likely to resort to nuclear weapons use than the United States. This threat assessment also comports with the perceptions on the ground in Egypt, where regional security issues, including Iran's nuclear program, are seen through the prism of Israel. By contrast, the Iranian scenario may be the least convincing. Those who cite an Iranian threat have yet to specify exactly why and most importantly how enmity between the two countries might rise to the level of a nuclearrelevant confrontation. In any case, it is difficult to imagine that, over the next ten years, a potential Iranian threat is more compelling than an extant Israeli threat. As regards Iran, it is worth noting that Egypt apparently did not change its nuclear policy during the period when Iraq began to build its nuclear program. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that Egypt and Iraq had good relations. But, after the invasion of Kuwait, the dismissal of Egypt's Iraq-friendly defense minister, Egypt joining the side of coalition forces against Saddam Hussein, and postwar revelations about Iraq's nuclear program, it is striking that Cairo's nuclear policy held steady in the face of what could have been a plausible threat. The same could be said about Libya and its nuclear program. This characterization and relative ranking of threats is important because it gets to a fundamental question about security threats as a cause of Egyptian proliferation. If the security threats Egypt faced over the past five decades were insufficient to overcome the constraints on its nuclear ambitions, why should

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

19

one expect that the same or weaker threats would succeed today? Frankly, it is difficult to conceive of a security threat that Egypt will face in the near to intermediate term that is equal to or more severe than the one it faced from 1960 to 1977. Of course, one possible answer would be that while security motivations are weaker than before, the constraints are also weaker, that is, the constraints are frail enough that even modest threats are sufficient to push Egypt into the nuclear club. The issue of constraints will be addressed below, but it is worth highlighting this central question because it will come up again as other purported causes of Egyptian proliferation are considered. If not before, when there was motivation aplenty, why now? Finally, it has to be said that the prospect of the "radical takeover scenario" may underline why Israel and Iran may not provide especially powerful motivations for a nuclear weapon. Simply put, Egypt's biggest threats are internal, not external. Because nuclear weapons do not help with these internal threats, it would be sensible for the government to put its money, human resources, attention, and political priority elsewhere. In sum, bomb advocates in Egypt could, in theory, make a case that future threats warrant nuclear weapons, but it is a tough case to make. It is even harder given more immediate internal security concerns. 25 Ideational and Psychological Factors

While most contemporary discussions of proliferation focus on security threats, increasing attention is being paid to the role of ideas, emotions, and mental processes in the decision making of potential proliferators. 26 This conceptual category includes a range of phenomena, from norms to cognitive heuristics; but, over the course of the nuclear age, the roles of prestige and pride have received the most comment, and they are frequently discussed with respect to the Egyptian case. Many who fear an Egyptian bomb cite prestige considerations as a reason the Arab Republic might seek nuclear weapons. 27 Historically, Egypt has considered itself the leading state in the Arab world; and, given its size, its history, and its political status, it is difficult to disagree. Analysts who believe that pride or prestige could push Egypt toward the bomb most often argue that the rise oflran would pose a threat to Egypt's status and would impel Cairo to respond in kind. Of course, other lines of argument are also possible. If Iran's initial entry into the nuclear club did not arouse Egypt's nuclear ambitions, but Iran later

20

JIMWALSH

parlayed its position as a weapons state into an embarrassing political defeat for Egypt, perhaps that would be too much for Cairo to take. Alternatively, Egypt's sense of self could be challenged by a humiliation at the hands of the Israelis or by a sudden and unexpected drop in Egypt's current status, for example, following a serious economic crisis. Will a self-perceived decline in Egypt's status, whether for internal or external reasons, push Egypt toward nuclear weapons? Etel Solingen's assessment of Egypt has emphasized the difference between inward-looking nationalists like Nasser and outward-looking, less proliferation-prone leaders like Sadat and Mubarak. If one were to employ Jacques Hymans's framework, the answer would turn on whether Egypt's identity can be categorized as oppositional nationalist vis-a-vis Israel and Iran or as oppositional subaltern. Both seem possible in principle. As an empirical matter, it seems unlikely that new status or identity concerns would be enough to result in an Egyptian proliferation decision. Again, there is over half a century of experience here; and, despite the combination of grand pretensions and sometimes severe humiliation, Egypt has not come close to acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a loss of status greater than what followed the 1967 War. In a matter of days, Egypt went from thinking of itself and being perceived by others as the most militarily powerful country in the Arab world to complete and utter military defeat and loss of territory. And while the 1967 War provided sufficient motivation for Nasser to approach his own nuclear scientists as well as foreign governments to discuss a nuclear weapons option, nothing came of it. Domestic Factors: Leadership, Organizations, Politics

The acquisition of nuclear weapons does not happen by itself. It is the product of decisions and actions by individuals and organizations in a policy process that is often fundamentally shaped by politics-personal politics, institutional politics, and, on occasion, even electoral politics. For the most part, the business of nuclear weapons is carried on in secret by organizations-defense ministries, nuclear energy authorities, defense industrial organizations. Still, individuals matter, and they can affect nuclear outcomes in critical ways. 28 If a president or prime minister, a science adviser or director of the nuclear program, a defense minister or service marshal becomes entranced by the promise of nuclear weapons, that person can often get the issue on the decision agenda or pursue limited weapons-related work within his or her own jurisdiction. Leadership

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

21

In the case of Egypt, there are a very small number of individuals who could single-handedly alter nuclear policy. One is the president, and it is possible that a pronuclear president might assume office. To date, however, none of the people discussed as possible successors to President Mubarak has espoused a strong, pronuclear weapons position, nor has anyone articulated the kind of nationalist vision that is most compatible with pronuclear views. There is great uncertainty about what a post-Mubarak Egypt will look like, but there is little in Egypt's establishment politics that predicts a pronuclear weapons leadership. Nevertheless, there are public voices that have spoken in favor of a nuclear weapons option. The Egyptian parliamentary speaker, Ahmad Fathi Sorour, has made some elliptical remarks regarding nuclear weapons. And every time the nuclear issue comes on to the Egyptian public agenda as it did in 1995 (NPT Extension Conference), 1998 (South Asian nuclear tests), 2005 (IAEA investigation), and 2006 (new policy favoring nuclear power), there are a variety of commentators who urge Egypt to consider nuclear weapons. Some are Nasserists, like those affiliated with the small and apparently fleeting Al-Wifaq Al-Qawmi opposition party. Others are retired military officials and national security analysts, as well as some religious figures. While one commentator has spoken of a "nuclear lobby," that overstates the level of organization and activity of the pronuclear partisans. 29 Some reports interpreted Gamal Mubarak's 2006 speech as both pronuclear and pronationalist, but by Egyptian standards it was pretty tame. The young Mubarak said that Egypt should have nuclear energy. Nasser, Sadat, and even Hosni Mubarak have made public statements about nuclear weapons that were far more disturbing from a nonproliferation point of view, and nothing ever came of them. 30 They were simply that-statements. Given the dearth of proweapon sentiment in Egypt's political establishment, what about the opposition or even radical and Islamist groups? If they managed to take power, is there a danger that they would bring a different view of nuclear weapons? The answer is certainly yes. Any change of government produces the opportunity for change in nuclear policy (good or bad). Oppositions often come to power looking to reverse the policies of their predecessors, and inward-looking nationalists are particularly susceptible to nuclear seduction. 31 The Muslim Brotherhood is the longest-standing and most important opposition group in Egypt. 32 Despite an official ban on the Brotherhood, the government has more or less tolerated its existence in recent years (accompanied

22

JIMWALSH

by episodes of mass arrest). The Brotherhood is not a violent, Islamist extremist group in the sense that al Qaeda is. It has officially forsaken violence and has run members in Egyptian elections. Indeed, in 2005, it shocked the political establishment by winning eighty-eight (20 percent) of the parliamentary seats, making it the largest opposition group in the legislature. This electoral achievement is noteworthy because the leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood have at various times (1) criticized the Mubarak government for the slow pace of progress on civilian nuclear energy, and (2) espoused the "right to obtain nuclear technology or even nuclear arms for deterrence, especially if it is being threatened by another nuclear country." 33 One representative went further, declaring, "We [Egyptians] are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict."34 At least one observer views Gamal Mubarak's endorsement of nuclear power as a response to the political challenge posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. 35 Every Egyptian interviewed for this study who commented on the topic downplayed both the status of the Brotherhood and the centrality of their views on nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Most viewed the Brotherhood's nuclear positions as simple political expediency and suggested that if the government changed its position, the Brotherhood would simply take the opposite point of view. It should be noted, however, that those interviewed were all people associated with the government or the National Democratic Party (NDP), and most were nuclear experts or diplomats, not analysts of domestic politics. Moreover, political expediency or not, if the Brotherhood finds that the nuclear issue at some point resonates with the public, that should be cause for concern. 36 As previously noted, the ascension of an opposition or even radical Egyptian pronuclear government does not guarantee an Egyptian bomb. The very fact that a pro-bomb government came to power will mean that its freedom of action on these issues will be constricted. The organizational politics of Egyptian nuclear decision making likely involves the defense ministry and, to a lesser extent, the nuclear bureaucracy and other organizations with a stake in foreign political and economic relations. As the situation currently stands, it is difficult to see how the key organizations would bureaucratically benefit from a nuclear weapons program. A defense ministry or civilian nuclear program could, in principle, expect more money or status with a weapons project but only at the risk of losing other streams of military and scientific support from allies and international Organizations

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

23

organizations. Revelations about a clandestine nuclear program would mean the end of any internationally financed power reactor or sales of advanced weaponry. To date, government nuclear scientists and engineers have toed the line; namely, they have said that Egypt has the technical wherewithal to pursue nuclear weapons but supports a nuclear weapons-free zone. In conversations with members of the Egyptian nuclear community, one cannot help but sense a personal desire to see Egypt match Israel's nuclear achievements, but material interests likely trump pride in this particular context. Domestic Politics The broader domestic politics of nuclear weapons is less clear, however. On the one hand, nuclear weapons are not a particularly salient issue in a country where economic and governance issues predominate. Still, they periodically come to the fore because of events in the news. In this context, it is interesting to see the results of public opinion polling on Egyptian attitudes toward nuclear issues. 37 Egyptians appear to be relatively tolerant of nuclear proliferation, with roughly 44 percent of the people surveyed by a 2006 Pew poll responding that "countries that do not now have nuclear weapons" should be allowed to develop them. Regarding Iran, a little less than 40 percent of the public thinks that the aim of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program is to acquire nuclear weapons. Stunningly, a nontrivial plurality favors an Iranian nuclear weapon. According to Pew, a whopping 44 percent in

2006

and a still sizeable

24

percent in

2007

favored an Iranian bomb. That

same 2007 Pew poll also found that 51 percent of those polled thought a nuclear Iran would pose either a minor threat to Egypt or no threat at all. Only 17 percent said it would be a serious threat. These threat perception numbers rank among the lowest in the Middle East, with only the residents of the Palestinian territories and Morocco exhibiting less concern. 38 When asked in a 2008 Sadat poll what would happen if Iran got the bomb, 43 percent said the outcome for the Middle East would be "more positive," compared to 28 percent who said is would be "more negative" (11 percent said it would not matter; 18 percent were not sure). In a follow-up question, respondents were asked to speculate as to what Iran might do with a nuclear weapon: Thirty percent said attack Israel, 45 percent said not use it but increase Iran's influence, 5 percent said use them against a Muslim country, and 19 percent were not sure. Comparing the answers of those who thought an Iranian bomb would be positive against those who thought it would be negative, both groups thought either an attack on Israel or no use would be the most likely outcomes.

24 JIMWALSH

The difference was that those who viewed it negatively were much more likely to believe that Iran would use the bomb against a Muslim country (13 percent versus 2 percent) or were more likely to say they were not sure of an answer (19 percent versus 5 percent). A poll by Pew in 2006 also found that Egyptians thought Iran was most likely to use its nuclear weapons to attack Israel or for defensive purposes, as opposed to attacking a Muslim country or giving it to terrorists. 39 What is one to make of these numbers? For nonproliferation specialists, the results might appear both worrying and puzzling. Egyptians seem to have a high tolerance for nuclear weapons, with a sizeable plurality expressing the view that the have-nots should be able to pursue their own. Most striking, however, is their tolerance for an Iranian bomb, with more than a few thinking that such an outcome would be positive. One would expect that citizens might favor their own country acquiring the bomb but object to a potential rival doing so, especially if they, themselves, did not possess one. The explanation for this paradox may be relatively simple: Israel. Egyptians see the nuclear issue not as an Iranian issue but through the prism of Israel and Israel's nuclear weapons arsenal. For the citizens of Egypt, Israel's nuclear weapons go completely unchallenged. They see their own government as having promised much and delivered little in the nuclear arena, which reinforces both their preexisting dissatisfaction with the government and their preexisting sense of humiliation and grievance vis-a-vis the Israelis. In short, if it takes an Iranian bomb to match the Israelis, so be it. Again, one must emphasize that these feelings are not set in stone. They will wax and wane as Egyptian relations with Iran rise and fall, but the core issue remains constant. For Egypt, it is about Israel. Whatever the public's view, Egypt is not the most democratic country in the world. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it is likely that the Arab Republic's electorate would have supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but it was not a factor in Egyptian decision making. Still, public opinion matters, and it is conceivable that a nuclear test by a neighbor, a wave ofhypernationalism, or an international dispute might animate the public's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, greater democracy in Egypt raises the possibility that the nuclear issue might, following an external shock, receive a push from the bottom up. This review of potential domestic factors finds that it is conceivable that there could be individuals or constituencies that might advocate for nuclear

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

25

weapons, be they a new pronuclear president or a pronuclear populace that demands action by its government. Still, these scenarios do not seem very likely. Moreover, a pro-bomb leader or faction would have to have the capacity to politically sustain the project over many years-arguably the toughest job that most bomb advocates face. 40 The most likely and most troubling weapons scenario is that the Muslim Brotherhood continues to espouse proweapons views and then manages to win power. At that point, a nuclear weapons program becomes more of a possibility but, for reasons already discussed, not likely. Trigger Events

Trigger events may be the most important and least understood variable in nuclear decision makingY This category contains a wide variety of internal and external shocks-from the death and replacement of a president to wars, natural disasters, and nuclear tests. Triggers create agenda-setting moments for governments, which allow countries to reconsider their nuclear policy. Depending on the constellation of political actors and preferences in play at the time, a trigger event can give new life to a bomb program that only the day before was considered moribund. Bomb advocates can advance their cause only if nuclear weapons are a "live issue," and trigger events can produce the required Lazarus effect. One can divide the pronuclear trigger events that could affect Egyptian nuclear policy into two simple categories: more salient and less salient. The higher the saliency, in this context a combination of perceived importance and shock value, the more likely the event will create an agenda-setting moment. The more salient trigger events that might aid bomb advocates include a use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states (especially Israel), Iranian defection from the NPT, and a declared nuclear test by Israel or Iran. Less salient trigger events include nuclear tests outside the region, a change in leadership in either the Egyptian presidency or in nuclear-relevant institutions, new arms control treaties requiring ratification, an offer by third parties to sell weapons-usable nuclear material and/or technology, evidence that a nonstate actor had acquired a sizeable quantity of fissile material or possessed a nuclear weapon, dramatic vertical proliferation by the weapons states, and the use of chemical or biological weapons by a regional actor. This list is not exhaustive, but it captures the kinds of events that can be relevant to nuclear decision making. Note that not all the events have a direct line oflogic between the event and a weapons decision. A change in leadership does not by itself promote nuclear

26

JIMWALSH

acquisition, but the change may lead to a general policy review that could include nuclear weapons policy. If a nonstate actor like al Qaeda acquires fissile material or a bomb, it is far from clear how a nuclear weapon would enhance Egyptian security, but the event itself might result in putting nuclear policy back on the decision agenda. A nuclear test by Israel would change virtually nothing in material terms-Israel has had the bomb since 1966-but the test would have the political effect of putting the nuclear question on the table. Similarly, an Iranian test might not translate into a direct threat to Egypt, but the event could generate an agenda-setting moment. The same is true for something seemingly "positive" like a new arms control treatyY Of course, not every trigger event has the power to force consideration of the nuclear option, and, even when it does, that does not guarantee a change in policy-only a discussion of policy. It does not appear, for example, that Egypt reconsidered its nuclear posture after the 1998 South Asia nuclear tests, in response to nuclear offers by the Khan network or others, following Iraq's use of chemical weapons, or even after revelations about Saddam Hussein's or Muammar Qaddafi's clandestine nuclear programs. 43 And in any case, these events did not lead to a weapons-acquisition decision by the government. Of the trigger events considered here, the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear actions by Iran and Israel would be the most powerful. But for now, at least, Israel is more likely to maintain (and Iran to adopt) an opaque nuclear posture than the Indian and Pakistani in-your-face approach of the 1990s. 44 Conclusion: Possible but Not Likely

This review of the factors and conditions that might push Egypt toward the bomb has identified plausible threats, concerns about prestige, domestic political scenarios, and trigger events that could lead Egypt to reevaluate its nuclear posture. Nevertheless, one is left with more than a little doubt about the prospects of a nuclear-armed Egypt. These doubts reflect the historical record-decades where the security and status variables loomed larger but with little effect. Skeptics of this view could cite the fallacy of induction. As the investment ads warn, "Past performance is no guarantee of future returns." Still, the past is the only data set available, and in this case the results look fairly robust. In addition, while it is possible to imagine a case for nuclear weapons, it does not have the look and feel of a very compelling case. Nuclear weapons usually require compelling reasons or persons who feel compelled, but neither appears present. Absent strong reasons or strong personalities, it is difficult to steward a nuclear weapons program

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

27

past the sizeable obstacles and opposition it is likely to encounter-a task that will require years of politically skillful navigation. The most serious scenario may be the one involving the Muslim Brotherhood, which has become increasingly pronuclear. Given their current views, a takeover could increase the chances that Egypt would seek nuclear weapons. Their assumption of power would change the bureaucratic dynamics and would likely result in a loss of influence by economic elites whose policy preferences support liberalization and a strong relationship with the United States. On the other hand, those very characteristics mean that the new government would find it difficult to obtain the financial and technical support needed to pursue a weapons program. It also has to be said that while no single variable or event may be sufficient to push Cairo toward the bomb, one can conceive of a combination of actions and events that prove powerful enough to force the issue. A more nationalist government combined with provocative Israeli or Iranian behavior mixed with a pronuclear populace or a dedicated defense minister and a "well-timed" trigger event might induce a decision to jump-start a weapons effort. Such an unwelcome collision of circumstances could occur, but, with each condition that must be added, the probability of the scenario declines. WHY EGYPT MIGHT ABSTAIN FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This section examines factors that might inhibit or prevent Egypt from pursuing nuclear weapons. These include ideational/psychological factors, resource limitations, international and regional constraints, domestic political variables, and assorted trigger factors. Ideational and Psychological Factors

The most commonly discussed ideational obstacle to nuclear weapons is the presence of an antinuclear norm, embraced either by policy makers or by the public. 45 While Egyptian officials have made strong statements opposing nuclear weapons and have long advocated a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, there is reason to doubt that antinuclear norms by themselves are an especially powerful factor in Egyptian nuclear policy. 46 To begin with, Egyptian statements condemning nuclear weapons have to be balanced against other statements by the Egyptian leadership that have implied that the government is keeping the nuclear option open. In addition, some of the antinuclear declarations have been conditioned on the actions of Egypt's neighbors, especially Israel. As previously noted, the polling data do

28

JIM WALSH

not paint the Egyptian public as a hotbed of abolition fervor. Perhaps most tellingly, Egypt is alleged to have maintained an arsenal of chemical weapons and has refused to join the Chemical Weapons Convention until Israel renounces its nuclear weapons. To believe a country opposes nuclear weapons on normative grounds and yet embraces chemical weapons requires a high tolerance for paradox. In sum, Egypt has been a staunch supporter of nuclear nonproliferation, but that stance is more likely grounded in interests and politics than normative considerations. Resource Limitations

Egypt is not a wealthy country. Since the 1950s, it has been bedeviled by a population growth rate that is often higher than its rate of economic growth-a situation that, when coupled with poor economic management and a series of wars, has left many of its citizens in or on the cusp of poverty. Still, if Pakistan and North Korea, states with modest economic resources, could find their way to the bomb, it would seem that Egypt could as well-if it was very highly motivated to do soY Egypt may not be rich, but it is large, and so the central government has the extractive capacity to raise funds. It has a highly, if unevenly, educated population, again certainly surpassing that of Pakistan, and it is an avid participant in IAEA Technical Cooperation programs and other technology partnership projects. 48 There is a legitimate question as to whether Egypt could produce enough nuclear technology indigenously to sustain a program on its own. But if it were able to sustain a successful procurement program under the radar of international suspicion, it is unlikely that resource limits alone would prevent an Egyptian nuclear program. The key, of course, would be acquiring either enrichment or reprocessing technology. Egypt's resources are limited, but Cairo could probably persevere with a small-scale, narrowly drawn, bomb-dedicated program of the South African variety. 49 What is unlikely is the kind of large, multiple reactor civilian program that could provide cover for military efforts. Given the costs of nuclear power plants, it is difficult to see how Egypt can afford to get into the nuclear energy game unless it finds a patron willing to foot the bill. 50 In short, resource limits would be constraining but not necessarily prohibitive. Egypt could find the funds and personnel if required. Shifting funds to a nuclear program might spark an internal fight over resources, and imports of sensitive technology would be a challenge, but a highly dedicated, narrowly focused project might be able to overcome the resource burdens over time.

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

29

International and Regional Constraints

If norms provide little or no obstacle to an Egyptian weapons program, and resource limitations pose a constraint but not an unconquerable obstacle, is there anything that might hold back Egypt if it suddenly developed a serious interest in nuclear weapons? The answer is "yes." An Egyptian nuclear weapons program would have significant regional and international consequences that make nuclear weapons an unacceptable option for most Egyptian policy makers. Regional and international constraints come in many forms, but two international constraints loom above the rest. The first is the impact an Egyptian nuclear program would have on U.S.-Egyptian relations. A not unrelated second is the impact a bomb program would have on Egypt's attempts to grow its economy through trade and foreign investment. In this latter regard, the role of Europe looms larger than the United States. 51 The U.S.-Egyptian relationship suffers its share of disagreements and problems, but both countries need each other. Washington needs every Arab and Muslim ally it can find to help with a long list of policy challenges. For Egypt, the United States is a source of very sizeable, if declining, economic aid and a key supplier of military assistance. 52 The issue of international trade and investment is no less important. Economic development is more than a humanitarian issue; it is a political and security issue. Presidents Sadat and Mubarak have, in fits and starts, supported the liberalization of Egypt's economy as the last best hope for economic progress and, thus, political stability. America's support for Egypt provides something that is intangible but useful. It signals to international investors and economic institutions that Egypt is a safe player worthy of attention in the global marketplace. For its part, Europe may be Egypt's most important economic partner. In short, Egypt and its Western allies have strong interests in maintaining a healthy relationship. As a consequence, almost every policy irritant can be overlooked or managed. The nuclear issue, however, is one of the few controversies that could rip Cairo and its Western allies asunder. Domestic Political Variables

There are a number of bureaucratic actors whose self-interest might lead them to resist a nuclear weapons effort (assuming they know about it). That list includes the economic and finance ministries who, for reasons described above,

30 JIMWALSH

would see a weapons program as a threat to foreign economic relations. In addition, elements in the nuclear bureaucracy might fear that a weapons program could jeopardize Egypt's ability to procure a civilian power plant and international assistance. They may also worry about a militarization of their positions and a consequent loss of autonomy and professional status. Constituencies in the defense ministries might oppose a nuclear weapons program insofar as its pursuit would risk the loss of foreign military assistance. Of course, many of these groups would likely have to battle colleagues within their organizations who see advantage in a bomb program, for example, those who expect that the program would bring increased budgets or other bureaucratic advantages. The most important domestic political constraint, however, concerns the elite political constituencies that provide material and political support for the establishment political parties, particularly the NDP. The economic interests that support the establishment parties want to see a continuation of economic liberalization and a strong U.S.-Egyptian relationship, not the pursuit of nuclear weapons or other policies that would put economic development at risk. Trigger Events

As discussed in the preceding pages, trigger events can produce agendasetting moments, where governments pause to reconsider their nuclear options. Such reconsiderations can lead to action or actions favoring either proliferation or restraint. The key point is that it is the act of reconsideration that matters as well as the constellation of political actors in power at the time of that reconsideration. So, while different sets of trigger events are discussed in the sections on motivations and restraints, in principle, many trigger events in either section could result in an agenda-setting moment that could lead to either a proweapons or antiweapons outcome. For example, the use of nuclear weapons by India or Pakistan could paradoxically create new pressures for an even stronger nonproliferation regime. Throughout the nuclear age, proliferation shocks have frequently set the stage for new nonproliferation measures. Thus, an event listed in the earlier section that might encourage Egypt to think about a nuclear weapons effort might instead take Egypt farther away from the path of nuclear weapons. What matters most is the disposition and distribution of the decision makers at the time of the consideration. If the pronuclear faction is outnumbered nine to one, then any reconsideration of nuclear posture is likely to reaffirm nonproliferation regardless of the trigger event.

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

31

This is not to suggest that the character of the trigger event itself never matters. The particulars can help or hurt the position of the pro- or antinuclear advocates sitting around the table. In general, an Israeli nuclear test is going to help Egyptian bomb advocates more than negotiation of a new arms control treaty. A nuclear accident outside of Egypt, like Chernobyl, could again bring a halt to plans for building Egypt's nuclear infrastructure. Similarly, a nuclear accident or scandal involving Egyptian authorities might undermine government and popular support for nuclear initiatives. Finally, it is worth mentioning a set of developments that are not trigger events per se but are changes in context or conditions that would either reduce the motivation for nuclear weapons or present new obstacles to a bomb program. These events include a global recession, a natural disaster, a regime change in Iran that brings more moderate elements to power, a resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and an inter-Arab conventional war involving Egypt (like the Yemeni civil war in the 1960s), which would have the effect of draining financial and military resources and requiring that the government give a higher priority to conventional rather than nonconventional weaponry. Conclusion: Constraints Not Insurmountable, but Probably Strong Enough

The review of the factors that might inhibit an Egyptian bomb decision suggests that the obstacles are not overwhelming but are serious. The resource limitations are not trivial, and both the international/regional considerations and the domestic political factors militate against a bomb decision. The most important restraint is the nexus between Egypt's need to grow its economy and maintain a strong U.S. and European relationship together with the elite domestic political constituencies that share those same objectives. These obstacles are likely even more powerful to the extent that Egyptian leaders worry more about internal threats than external threats. A determined pronuclear president supported by a pronuclear defense minister might overcome these constraints, but the odds do not favor that scenario. Indeed, an Egyptian bomb seems all the more unlikely if one considers the totality of Egypt's nuclear history. As has already been discussed, Egypt's motivations to acquire nuclear weapons were more intense in past decades than they are today or are likely to be in the near future. It also appears, however, that the constraints, as modest as they may be, are as severe if not more severe than in previous decades. Certainly, Nasser was more of a nationalist, pronuclear president than the current one, and there was less of an elite political constituency that supported liberalization and an Egyptian-U.S. relationship.

32

JIMWALSH

The issue of resource limitations can be reasonably argued either way. On the one hand, Egypt's basic nuclear infrastructure is more advanced than before, and the prospect of Khan-type networks peddling nuclear wares is a live possibility. On the other hand, the system was far looser in the past. There was much less transparency and less attention to proliferation given the predominance of the superpower rivalry, and the safeguards methodologies and technologies were far less sophisticated. Early in the nuclear age, France could secretly sell a reprocessing plant to Israel, Mao could declare his intention to transfer nuclear weapons to the developing world, and Egypt could ask China for a bomb. While the modern-day equivalents are not impossible, 'clearly times have changed and changed in ways that may have made it more difficult for would-be proliferators to achieve their goals. In any case, it is difficult to argue that the constraints on Egypt are weaker today than in the past. At best, they are stronger. At worst, they are about the same. In other words, they are more or less what they were when they were strong enough to prevent a nuclear-armed Egypt in the past. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO EVALUATING EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR TRAJECTORIES

So far, this analysis of Egypt's proliferation potential has followed one approach: starting with initial motivations and constraints and reasoning forward to the Arab Republic's likely behavior. One way to test the strength of these conclusions is to instead start with Egyptian behavior and then work backward in an effort to identify its intentions. A high degree of correspondence between the results of these two different types of inquiry would provide added confidence about the original analysis. A low degree of correspondence would suggest caution. To perform this cross-check, one can look at behavioral indicatorsactions and decisions made or not made that have historically been associated with either proliferation or renunciation. Of course, virtually no indicator is perfect. Most generate both false positives and false negatives. Public statements, for example, should be considered an indicator, but countries that seek nuclear weapons often have an incentive to lie about their intentions. On the other side of the ledger, analysts have learned the hard way from Saddam Hussein's Iraq that concealment is not always evidence of possession. Peter Lavoy's work provides an excellent starting place for this kind of endeavor. 53 He suggests a variety of behavioral indicators that bear watching:

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

33

public statements, personnel changes ("mythmaker movements"), scientific training and education, procurement activities, and the role of the military and intelligence personnel in the nuclear program. To this list, one could add other behaviors worthy of attention: response to IAEA investigations, response to arms control initiatives, centralization of decision making over nuclear policy, making a nuclear agency an independent body reporting directly to the national leader, and close military or other ties to proliferators or other problem countries. Applied to the Egyptian case, these indicators do not provide a clear picture. Some point strongly toward nuclear restraint, others to possible nuclear ambitions; and some do not apply at all. Public Statements

The value of Egyptian public statements as proliferation indicators is mixed. Sometimes statements about both nuclear weapons and nuclear power have proven telling, and in other cases they have been misleading. Nevertheless, no public official in the Mubarak period has made an unconditional endorsement of nuclear weapons, and the overwhelming majority of statements have emphasized Egypt's commitment to the NPT. In particular, the note verbale that Egypt issued in 2005 provides a comprehensive and unalloyed statement in favor of nonproliferation. 54 By contrast, however, statements by the Muslim Brotherhood supportive of nuclear weapons have ranged from mild to inflammatory. Personnel Changes

To date, there have been no personnel changes in Egypt's nuclear program that provide a strong indication of weapons interest, and certainly none that compare with Nasser's appointment of Salah Hedayat as minister of science. Scientific Training and Education

This indicator is largely irrelevant because Egypt already possesses a large body of personnel trained in nuclear science and engineering. Procurement and Military Involvement

There is no evidence of suspicious activity in this regard, but it would be a mistake to overstate this finding. States generally try to hide their procurement of sensitive technology as well as any military involvement in nuclear programs. Compared with public statements, evidence of these behaviors is usually difficult to obtain. 55

34

JIM WALSH

Response to IAEA Investigations

Egypt's response to the IAEA investigation of 2004-2005 suggests that Cairo is not currently interested in the bomb. While concealment activities may not be certain evidence of possession, in general, the more cooperative a country is with the IAEA, the greater confidence one should have in its nuclear policy. Countries can have, by their calculus, a good, non-weapons-related reason to obfuscate or interfere with IAEA inquires, but full and enthusiastic cooperation is nevertheless usually consistent with a clean program. Response to Arms Control Initiatives

Some analysts may see a cause for concern regarding this indicator. Egypt's refusal to join the ewe because oflsrael's nuclear arsenal is regrettable but understandable. More troubling is Cairo's lack of support for the Additional Protocol (AP), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). In addition, some analysts point to Egypt's actions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference as evidence that Egypt is repositioning itself on the nuclear issue. At the 2005 meeting, Egypt (among others) played a conspicuous role in blocking substantive progress toward a successful meeting. In each of these instances, critics may have the right premise but the wrong conclusion. With respect to the AP, CTBT, and FMCT, Egypt has objected to new nonproliferation obligations, but Egyptian diplomats and nuclear experts maintain that they cannot agree to do more when Israel has done nothing. This is both an elite and a mass issue. For many national security elites, there is no intrinsic objection to the AP or other nonproliferation measures, but there has been a growing feeling that Egypt's ratification of the NPT was a mistake. Joining the NPT, it is argued, left Egypt without any leverage; and, as a result, Israel has been free to conduct a nuclear weapons program without consequence or restraint. Seen in this light, the refusal to endorse the AP, CTBT, and FMCT is an attempt to regain lost bargaining power. Popular attitudes toward the NPT have also become increasingly unfavorable. This can be inferred both from the previously discussed public opinion polling and from the sensitivity with which the Egyptian government has handled arms control issues. Egypt's response to the 2005 IAEA inquiries, for example, was affirmative but quiet. Egypt wanted to assure the IAEA that it had no weapons intentions, but it did not want to do so in a public way that elicited the ire of average Egyptians. A public push to reassure the international community of its nonnuclear status might lead the public to wonder why their country

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

35

should grovel before the IAEA when Israel is allowed to keep its nuclear arsenal without objection. 56 The case of the 2005 NPT Review Conference points to a different but related dimension of this same dynamic. At the core of Egypt's response to the arms control measures and its behavior at the 2005 RevCon is a deep frustration over Israel's inflexibility on the nuclear question and the perception that Egyptian strategy is failing. In one of the great nonproliferation successes in the history of nuclear weapons, Egypt chose to respond to Israel's nuclear weapons with a political strategy rather than a military strategy (that is, building nuclear weapons of their own). 57 It sought to counter Israel's nuclear weapons by politically constraining Israel's ability to derive benefits from their arsenal and by leading the charge in favor of a NWFZ in the Middle East. With little progress achieved on a NWFZ, Egypt decided to use the opportunity provided by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to put Israeli nuclear weapons back on the agenda and to reassert Egypt's role as the leading Arab state on nuclear issues. Egypt won concessions at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT meetings only to arrive at the 2005 NPT meeting and have the American delegation led by John Bolton insist that the 2005 meeting document make no mention of the previous commitments. The Egyptian delegation fought back. While some observers believe that they overplayed their hand, it is certainly possible that Egypt preferred that the conference fail rather than "succeed" with a de facto repudiation of the prior commitments on which it had labored so long. In any case, a number of the closest observers of the 2005 meeting interpreted Egypt's actions as an attempt to promote nonproliferation goals, not undermine them. This stands in contrast to the behavior of other governments at the meeting, most notably the United States and Iran. The key point, however, is that Egypt's behavior at the 2005 meeting has to be understood in light of acute frustration set against a larger historical and political context of a strategy for constraining and eventually eliminating Israel's nuclear weapons. 58 What, then, should one conclude about Egypt's record with regard to this indicator and its nuclear intentions? On the one hand, it is clear that Egyptian behavior is not motivated by a decision to go for the bomb, and so, at that level, it is not a cause for concern. Still, however justified the reason, the outcome is the same, namely, that Egypt has not adopted the AP or joined the CTBT, which would provide greater confidence about the future. Put another way, by not adopting new measures, Egypt is inadvertently leaving the door open

36

JIM WALSH

for a future leadership to more easily consider a weapons option. In the end, however, the real significance of these events is that they raise a red flag about the international community's failure to address Egypt's legitimate grievances about Israel's nuclear program. Egypt has staked out a strong nonproliferation position, but that position is under increasing strain from both elites and popular opinion-not because Egypt feels threatened or seeks the prestige from a bomb but out of frustration that it has played by the rules and has gotten nowhere for its trouble. Institutional Reorganization of Nuclear Program

This category includes two indicators, centralization and the creation of a direct line of authority to the political leadership. The straighter the line between the political leadership and the nuclear authority, the easier it is to implement a weapons program. Indeed, one of the signs that Egypt was getting out of the weapons business was the decision to subsume the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) under the Ministry of Electricity. As regards Egypt today, there is nothing damning, but there is reason for further observation. When President Mubarak announced his new initiative on nuclear energy, he also announced a reorganization of the nuclear bureaucracy and the creation or resuscitation ofthe Supreme Nuclear Council that would report directly to the president. More troubling are reports that the council includes not only ministers from energy-related ministries but also representatives from the military and intelligence ministries. If true, this means that the "military/intelligence involvement" indicator would also be triggered. 59 When asked about military involvement on the Supreme Nuclear Council, those interviewed on the subject gave remarkably similar answers. They argued that it made sense for the military to be involved because (a) nuclear technology is a strategic issue, (b) the military would be needed to protect power plants from attacks or sabotage, (c) the military would likely need to give permissions for the use of defense ministry-owned property that would be the site of civilian installations, and (d) it is common practice for the military to be involved in major civilian construction projects, such as the highway linking Cairo and Suez. With the exception of reason "a," which invites speculation about whether the term strategic implies military applications of nuclear technology, the other explanations seem plausible if not convincing. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Egyptian military is involved in nuclear decision making. The current arrangement may be benign, but it is not ideal,

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

37

and it opens the door to potential proweapons developments at some point in the future. At a minimum, it is unwelcome and bears watching. Close Military or Other Ties to Prollferators

Egypt has had ties to North Korea and its missile program and is alleged to have had some unsavory and relatively recent involvement with Libya. 60 The extent of its relationships with other nuclear or would-be nuclear states is unclear. Given the apparent and surprising relationship between Syria and North Korea, this indicator warrants continued attention, not only vis-a-vis the DPRK but with respect to other countries as well. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 2.1. In this context, "positive" means that the indicator points to nuclear restraint, and "negative" points to potential proliferation. Together, the indicators offer a mixed message, with some positive markers and some negative markers as well. None of them provide unassailable evidence for either restraint or weapons intentions. In terms of actual behavior, the strongest indicator is very positive, that is, Egypt's response to the 2005 IAEA inquiry. Most of the indicators coded negative relate to potential problems Table 2.1.

Assessment of behavioral indicators regarding Egyptian nuclear intentions.

Indicator

Direction

Comment

Public statements

Positive/ Negative

Government statements positive, but Muslim Brotherhood statements negative

2

Personnel changes

No indication

3

Scientific training and education

NA

4

Procurement activities

No indication

5

Role of the military and intelligence in the nuclear program

No indication

But see #8 for possible concern.

6

Response to arms control initiatives

Negative

Role at 2005 NPT Review Conference and opposition to AP, CTBT, FMCT a concern, though not necessarily for reasons commonly cited

7

Response to IAEA investigations

Very positive

8

Institutional reorganization of nuclear decision making

Potentially negative

Centralization and direct line of authority negative; participation of military and intelligence also negative

9

Close military ties to proliferators

Potentially negative

Ties to DPRK, perhaps other states

38 JIMWALSH

that could arise in the future. The most troubling indicator is the one having to do with arms control initiatives, not because it suggests that Egypt is seeking the bomb but because it illuminates the real political problems Egyptian nonproliferation strategy faces in a world where Israeli nuclear policy is intransigent and where other governments ignore Israel's nuclear weapons. So how does this analysis of behavioral indicators match up against the initial review of motivations and constraints? Nothing here provides cause toreverse the initial conclusions, but the negative indicators do provide reason to be cautious. The general conclusion that it is more unlikely than likely that Egypt would pursue nuclear weapons is still warranted, but there is enough cause for concern-even if understandable in the Egyptian context-to remain vigilant. PREVENTING AN EGYPTIAN BOMB

This analysis has concluded that Egypt will likely remain nonnuclear. That is not the same as saying Egypt cannot pursue nuclear weapons. It could. Accordingly, this section outlines actions that the United States and other governments could take that might further encourage Cairo's nuclear restraint. Reducing Motivations

A prudent U.S. nonproliferation policy vis-a-vis Egypt would seek to reduce the security, prestige, and domestic motivations for nuclear weapons and reinforce the constraints. As regards security, it would be helpful if the United States stops demonizing and elevating Iran, which may add to Egyptian perceptions of threat (as well as affect matters of prestige). Washington should also find ways to support Cairo's political strategy vis-a-vis Israeli's nuclear weapons. Egypt has adopted a strategy of trying to constrain and counter Israel's nuclear weapons by staking out a leadership role on nonproliferation. It is in the U.S. interest to see that Egyptians view this strategy as worthwhile, if not wholly successful. If instead, Egypt perceives this strategy to be a failure, as it largely has been to date, bomb advocates may press for their alternative. This means that the United States must press Israel on nonproliferation, a politically unpalatable prospect but the right course for a number of reasons, not least because of its salutary effects on Egyptian perceptions. On prestige motivations more generally, the United States should seek to support a prominent and public role for Egypt regionally and on the international stage. This kind of support is best done behind the scenes. Some may object that a greater Egyptian role in international affairs may cause trouble

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

39

on issues where Washington and Cairo disagree, but it is a small price to pay to promote nuclear restraint in the Middle East. An additional but difficult way to reinforce Egyptian nonproliferation is to see that radicals or hypernationalists do not assume power. This approach requires indirect action because a heavy-handed American policy will backfire. Unfortunately, this is a policy domain where there are very large unknowns. For example, does American promotion of democracy in Egypt help or hurt the cause of preventing a future radical government? Many answers are possible, but few can be given with a high degree of confidence. Perhaps the safest approach on this issue is for the United States to help Egypt grow its economy and produce overt, tangible benefits for the average Egyptian. A lighter touch with U.S. foreign policy in the region would not hurt, either, because U.S. actions that inflame Arab opinion undermine the prospects for governance by moderates. Strengthening Constraints

Arguably, the most important step the United States can take to promote Egyptian nuclear restraint is to reverse the downward trend in both U.S.-Egyptian relations and American relevance. Yes, Washington provides economic and military aid, and that sum is greater than the amount given to most countries, but aid levels have declined over time. In addition, elites point out that the aid given to Israel surpasses Egypt's in both quantity and quality. Egyptians have also noticed the public fights in the U.S. Congress over assistance to Egypt. What they hear gives them more cause for resentment than reassurance. On the economic front, Europe now surpasses the United States in trade with Egypt. Increasingly, the Arab Republic looks to the European Union (EU), the Gulf, and Asia for economic partners, not the United States. A strong U.S.Egyptian relationship would be a formidable obstacle to Egyptian proliferation, but the decline in the relationship over the last ten years combined with rising frustration in Egypt is a serious cause for concern. Managing Trigger Events

Some trigger events are predictable, like arms control treaties coming up for ratification. Others, like nuclear accidents, are not. In both cases, the U.S. government should try to identify and anticipate-or at a minimum respond-to trigger events in ways that (1) maximize the chances that any agenda-setting moments will reaffirm nonproliferation while (2) minimizing the odds that such moments result in pronuclear decisions.

40

JIMWALSH

This may seem too amorphous or difficult, but there are clear examples where such policies were successfully pursued. For instance, the Kennedy and Johnson governments anticipated that China would conduct a nuclear test sometime between 1962 and 1964. To minimize the political fallout, U.S. diplomats fanned out across the region with the purpose of reducing the shock and impact of a test. Essentially, they put out the message that the United States expected a test, that it would pose no danger, and that the American government would work even harder to coordinate and cooperate with its allies. Of course, the October 1964 test was still a major event, but its impact was less than may have otherwise been the case. Another lesson here is that when there is an agenda-setting event, the United States should press the cause of nonproliferation in those countries where the balance of relevant decision makers is likely to support greater commitments to nonproliferation. Even more importantly, it should not push for decisions when the balance of political forces is likely to support pursuit of the nuclear option. In other words, a smart nonproliferation policy would have the

ability to count votes in the countries it cares about. In cases where the country's leadership is susceptible to probomb advocates, the United States should play for time and employ alternative policy instruments (reassurance, supporting indigenous nonproliferation constituencies, clarifying costs, and so on). It should not press a losing hand, especially when a negative outcome would be difficult to reverse. CONCLUSION: EGYPT AND THE LARGER ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION

The foregoing analysis can be summarized as follows: It is possible but unlikely that Egypt will seek nuclear weapons. The United States and other governments can adopt policies today that will reinforce Egyptian nuclear restraint in the future. 3. The United States needs to reverse the decline in U.S.-Egyptian relations and take seriously the need for Egypt's nonproliferation policy (toward Israel) to show something in the way of success. 1.

2.

If this analysis is correct, it suggests important general themes about the

challenge of nuclear weapons today. To begin with, nuclear restraint may be stronger than many analysts recognize, and the extreme but widespread counterproposition-that proliferation is inevitable-should be treated with

WILL EGYPT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

41

skepticism. In addition, nuclear weapons are as much a matter of politics and policy as they are of technology and security threats. Whether or not Egypt goes for the bomb depends very much on its internal politics and less on external threats. Finally, the United States and other countries have a range of instruments available to them-some new and some old-that can reduce the chances and consequences of future proliferation. It is true for Egypt, and it may be true in other cases as well.

3

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE Understanding Iran's Nuclear Program

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

THE CASE ON EVERYBODY'S MIND

One cannot discuss the crisis of the nonproliferation regime or the alleged prospect of regional and global nuclear dominoes today without mentioning Iran. In fact, most such discussions start from, or center on, Iran's nuclear program. In the debate about how to "deal" with a defiant Islamic Republic, some argue for the continuation of negotiations and a more conciliatory approach, others push for tougher sanctions or even more forceful actions, while still others suggest the world should get accustomed to the idea of a nucleararmed Iran. Nonetheless, it remains the case that some twenty-five years after the revival of Iran's nuclear program and six years after "going public" about it, Iran has not yet built nuclear weapons. While it appears determined to keep the fuel cycle, it is less clear if a decision has been taken to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. This chapter examines Iran's calculus through the prism of various proliferation theories and models, including neorealism, regime survival, and bureaucratic politics. An effort is also made to assess the utility of these approaches for forecasting Iranian nuclear developments, in light of a number of trends and potential "trigger events." In addition, an evaluation is made of the salience of Iran's potential decision to go nuclear and its implementationthat is, the effect of such a behavior on other states, including the possibility of a "nuclear chain" dynamic in the region. The chapter concludes that internal dynamics play and will likely continue to play the central role in Iran's nuclear behavior. As such, the "treatability"the responsiveness to "antiproliferation intervention"1-will be low if the 42

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

43

internal balance tips in favor of determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. For now, the domestic interplay of influence between the hard-liners and the more pragmatic groups of the Iranian elite has not yielded a consensus on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. One should note, however, that threatening a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities and actions aimed at undermining the overall Iranian government structure are likely to be counterproductive, exacerbating suspicions and strengthening the hard-liners in the Iranian leadership. Overall, the Iranian case, while extremely complex, is not hopeless; and, should there be no military confrontation or a dramatic change in the internal balance of power, the country is not likely to acquire nuclear weapons in the next five to ten years. NUCLEAR PROGRAM: OVERVIEW

Iran's interest in nuclear energy dates back to the 1950s, when Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi established the country's first nuclear program. 2 By the mid-1970s, his nuclear plans became remarkably ambitious and included the construction of twenty nuclear power reactors, research reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a plant for the reprocessing of spent fuel. The scale of the program raised some eyebrows at the time, but the West did not oppose the plan, and the shah succeeded in concluding agreements on the supply of nuclear technologies and materials from West Germany, France, South Africa, Argentina, and others. Iran provided a loan to France for the construction of Eurodif's enrichment plant in exchange for a 10 percent stake in the facility, which was supposed to help secure the future supply of nuclear fuel to Iran. 3 The United States supplied Iran with a research reactor, and the two countries were negotiating a new nuclear cooperation agreement during the 1970s, before the internal situation in Iran deteriorated in 1978. After the new regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran proceeded to cancel contracts with West Germany and Eurodif, an action followed by lengthy disputes over mutual compensations for losses. By 1984, however, Iran expressed renewed interest in nuclear power and engaged in talks with India and China on nuclear cooperation. 4 The United States has long been suspicious about the Islamic Republic's nuclear intentions, but the current controversy began in 2002 when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group based in France, revealed that Iran had not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant, as

44

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

it was obliged to do. Shortly thereafter, Iranian officials announced the country was embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6,ooo MW and pursue "associated technologies such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management techniques." 5 Subsequently, it became known that Iran had been concealing a large part of its active nuclear program, including the construction of two enrichment facilities at Natanz and a heavy water research reactor in Arak. 6 Concealed activities also included laser enrichment and plutonium separation experiments, procurement of nuclear material (UF6, UF4, and U02) from China, and extensive contacts with the clandestine network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of Pakistan's bomb. Faced with a threat of referral to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), Iran agreed to extended cooperation with the IAEA; suspended activities related to uranium conversion, enrichment, and fuel reprocessing; and entered into negotiations with Great Britain, France, and Germany (E3/EU) in October 2003. The negotiations led to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which the E3/EU recognized Iran's rights under the NPT, while Iran committed itself to full cooperation with the IAEA. The agreement documented Iran's decision to continue its voluntarily suspension of enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, initially announced in the Tehran Statement of October 2003. The suspension was to be sustained for the duration of negotiations on a long-term cooperation agreement between Iran and the European Union. 7 The Framework for a Long-Term Agreement was presented by the E3/EU in August 2005, shortly after the election in Iran of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who-along with the hard-line conservative members of Parliament-was dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations and pushed for their cessation. The Framework contained provisions that Iran completely abandon its uranium conversion and enrichment programs, along with the construction of the heavy water reactor, in exchange for guarantees of nuclear fuel supply, cooperation in nuclear safety and security, and economic cooperation. The Framework required that Iran make a binding agreement not to pursue fuel cycle activities (excluding light water power and research reactors), not to withdraw from the NPT, and to ratify the Additional Protocol (AP) by the end of 2005. 8 The EU offered to discuss opportunities for energy and economic cooperation, support of Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization, and discussion of regional security arrangements, but Iran found the proposed framework unsatisfactory and rejected it. The same month, Iran

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

45

restarted uranium conversion at Isfahan, and, until the fall of 2009, negotiation attempts between Iran and the EU proved unsuccessful. Iran signed the AP to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on December 18, 2003, but has not yet ratified it. In spring 2004, Iran voluntarily began acting in accordance with the provisions of the AP, allowing environmental sampling and providing "requisite declarations and access to locations" to the agency. 9 However, after the negotiations with the EU collapsed in 2005 and the IAEA Board of Governors opened the door for the referral of the Iranian file to the Security Council, Iran stopped its implementation of the AP and resumed uranium enrichment activities in early 2006. 10 On February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the Iranian file to the U.N. Security Council and requested that the IAEA director general report to UNSC the steps required of Iran by the board. These steps include the reestablishment of suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, with the agency's verification, reconsideration of the construction of heavy water reactor in Arak, and implementation of transparency measures beyond the requirements of the Comprehensive Safeguards and AP, such as access to individuals and documentation on procurement, dual-use equipment, military-owned workshops, and research and development activities.U In the same resolution, the board expressed serious concern over the lack of clarification on, among other things, the design of uranium metal hemispheres that Iran possesses, as "this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components." 12 In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA agreed on a work plan to clarify outstanding issues. Most questions in the work plan were reported as clarified by May 2008, but, in the meantime, the United States provided the IAEA with intelligence pointing to Iran's studies in uranium conversion, high explosives testing, and design of a nuclear-capable reentry vehicle. Iran has admitted to conducting high explosive experiments, though for conventional purposes, and dismissed other allegations as baseless. 13 Iran subsequently provided some clarifying information to the IAEA, but these documents are not yet available from open sources, and the agency continues to review the data. As of late 2009, the issue of alleged weaponization studies remained unresolved. 14 By December 2009, Iran had produced about 1.8 tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and continued installation of new centrifuges at NatanzP Iran also announced plans to build two new nuclear power plants instead of adding the second unit to Bushehr. 16 Even though Iran had previously announced the

46

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

selection of Darkhovin as the site for the next nuclear power plant, the IAEA has been unable to obtain any preliminary design information since requesting it in December 2007P Since 2006, the U.N. Security Council has passed five resolutions on Iran, three of which impose sanctions on Iran's nuclear and missile programs, a freeze on Iranian assets, travel bans on a number of individuals involved in sensitive aspects of the nuclear program, financial sanctions, and an arms embargo. 18 Several attempts to restart negotiations failed, as Iran had refused to freeze uranium enrichment as a precondition for talks, while the West had resisted the return to the negotiations table while centrifuges are spinning. On September 21, 2009, Iran also informed the IAEA "that a new pilot fuel enrichment plant is under construction in the country," 19 just days before Barack Obama announced that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were aware of the facility's existence and presented related evidence to the agency. 20 On October 1, 2009, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (P-s) and Iran held talks in Geneva, which resulted in the opening of the new enrichment facility for the IAEA inspections and an agreement-"in principle"-that Iran would ship most of its LEU abroad for reenrichment and fabrication of fuel for its research reactor in Tehran. 21 The P-s and Iran met with the IAEA later in the same month and were presented with a draft outlining further details of the LEU deal, but Iran subsequently sought to alter the conditions of the LEUfor-fuel swap; and, at the time of this writing, no agreement has been reached. 22 Angered by the November 2009 resolution of the Board of Governors sharply rebuking Iran for concealing the Qom facility,2 3 the Iranian leadership announced plans to build ten more enrichment plants. 24 The seriousness of this announcement and the intentions underlying it remain to be seen. EXAMINING MOTIVATIONS

Iran's nuclear program has been at or near the top of the international nonproliferation agenda for many years, and the discussions of the program typically assume that Iran's goal is acquisition of nuclear weapons. The question for many analysts and policy makers is not whether Iran wants nuclear weapons but when it is going to acquire them and what will happen next. To better understand Iran's intent and the reasoning behind the behavior that some analysts have called schizophrenic, this section looks at the pressures and constraints on Iran to go nuclear through the prism of different theoretical frameworks.

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

47

Neorealism

The Iranian situation conforms to the neorealist formula quite comfortably, and the media, analysts, and policy makers alike often assert that the security challenge the Islamic Republic is currently facing drives its alleged desire for nuclear weapons. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, addressing the Senate before assuming his post in December 2006, commented that Iran is "surrounded by powers with nuclear weapons-Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the north, the Israelis to the west and [the United States] in the Persian Gulf," which presumably should explain Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. 25 Anthony Cordesman, describing Iran's security environment, also notes the conventional threats such as the "strong U.S. military presence in the Gulf," Turkey's military forces, and "southern Gulf states that are individually weak but could become collectively strong." 26 Finally, Iran's main rivals for regional dominance are Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both Arab Sunni and U.S. allies. Other analysts, on the other hand, caution that Iran faces no existential threats and does not have "hostile neighbors requiring it to compensate for a military imbalance with a nuclear program.'' 27 As pointed out by various authors, the validity of the security/neorealist argument is suspect, for there are historical examples of states facing security threats and deciding against the nuclear option and, on the contrary, cases of states launching nuclear weapons programs in the absence of an imminent and severe threat. 28 This is not to say that the security dimension does not matter, but one must be careful not to overestimate it at the expense of other factors that influence proliferation decisions. An examination of the Iranian situation from the neorealist standpoint indicates that, at different times, different factors and considerations could have shaped nuclear motivations. That is, while the Iraqi threat could reasonably account for the decision to revive the nuclear program and pursue weapons in the mid-198os, security-based justifications for the varying pace of the program and swings in Iranian behavior are harder to establish. The question with respect to the current Iranian situation from a security perspective is whether the threats are grave enough to necessitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons-and whether the Iranian leadership perceives them as such. The next section of the chapter assesses the credibility of a number of traditionally cited threats to Iranian security.

48

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

Fears of "Qadisiyyah"?

The main regional threat stemming from Iran's archrival and nemesis-the Ba'athist Iraq-was severely weakened in the early 1990s by the first Gulf War and finally removed by the American invasion in 2003 and deposition of Saddam Hussein. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq and the friendly relations between the new Shi'a leadership and Iran, Iraq does not represent a threat that requires or can in any way justify an Iranian nuclear deterrent. The situation, of course, was very different over two decades ago when Saddam was firmly in power and had not yet lost the support of the West and the Arab governments. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and by end of 1982 was actively using chemical weapons, without much reaction from the international community. This bitter lesson could not have left Iran's strategic thinking, threat perception, and ideas on self-sufficiency unchanged-the leaders realized the country could be easily attacked with weapons of mass destruction and would not be able to rely on outside help for defense. As Ray Takeyh observed, the Iranian doctrine had shifted toward not only self-reliance but also the recognition that "revolutionary zeal" is not sufficient defense against technological superiority. 29 That was the time-between 1984 and 1987-when Iran renewed work on its nuclear program, entered into secret negotiations with China on the construction of nuclear reactors and provision of nuclear technologies, and first came into contact with the A. Q. Khan network. 30 Considering the timing of the revival of the nuclear program, the security equation with Iraq, and the lack of a great-power patron or ally, it is certainly credible that in the mid-198os Iran decided to acquire nuclear weapons to satisfy its security demands, which is in line with the neorealist thesis. However, the program was slow to progress at first and seems to have picked up steam only in the late 1990s and early 2ooos, when Iraq ceased to be a serious threat. According to the IAEA reports, Iran decided to start centrifuge enrichment research in 1985 and in 1987 received the P-1 centrifuge drawings from A. Q. Khan. 31 Yet, the centrifuge components were not produced until at least 1997, while the decision to construct enrichment facilities at Natanz was made sometime between 1997 and 2001. 32 As Shahram Chubin suggests, the nuclear program could not have been given "the highest priority" until the late 1990s because of domestic economic difficulties and the need for postwar reconstruction. 33 In the meantime, Iraq was weakened by the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent sanctions, disarmed by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and, finally, invaded by the U.S.-led coalition. What is hard to explain

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

49

then, in the context of the neorealist approach, is why the pursuit of nuclear weapons that apparently was not on the very top of the agenda when the threat was higher would become so active just as the security environment becomes more favorable. In short, while the decision to acquire nuclear weapons (if it was made) in the 1980s was a response to the Iraqi challenge, the Iranian threat perception and nuclear calculus vis-a-vis its neighbor had changed subsequently, and the current active pursuit of the nuclear program can no longer be tied to the Iraqi threat. Other Arab States

Iran does not have many friends in the region, although its current relations with most states in the Middle East are remarkably better than they were in the early years of the Revolution. While the majority of Arabs and Iranians are Muslim, there is a historically grounded antagonism between the two, tracing back to Arab-Persian rivalry. The Iranians are very proud of their Persian roots and ancient civilization, which sets them apart from the neighbors. Furthermore, the predominantly Shi'a Iran is a minority in the region dominated by Sunnis, and it has bitter memories of the Iran-Iraq War, when all but one Arab state supported Iraqi aggression against the country. On their part, secular Arab governments in the region are wary of Iran's revolutionary ideology and its influence on domestic Islamist groups. A large country rich with oil and gas, with a growing population, the majority of which is young people in their twenties, Iran has aspirations for regional leadership, which stimulates rivalry with the other two giants of the Middle East, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are anxious about the rise ofShi'a. The relations with Egypt are complicated by mutual grievances dating back to Egypt's provision of asylum to the shah and the naming by Iran of a street in Tehran after the assassin of Anwar Sadat. The two countries reestablished economic relations in 1990 but so far have not managed to restore full diplomatic ties. 34 The two countries do not share a border and have no territorial disputes, and, apart from the ideological disagreement mentioned above, there are currently no grounds for serious confrontation. Iran's zeal for the spread of revolution has cooled since the 1980s. Egypt, on its part, has been pursuing the policy of infitah ("opening") since the early 1970s and, after regaining the Sinai Peninsula and signing a peace agreement with Israel, is averse to military confrontations. While being a regional rival politically, Egypt is certainly not a reason for Iran to pursue a nuclear deterrent.

50 GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

Although Iran has been building its conventional capabilities, it still cannot directly challenge the Arab Gulf states, especially taking into consideration their alliance with the United States. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, has concluded that even though Iran's conventional forces are large by the Gulf standards, they are considerably smaller and less powerful than during the shah's time or the Iran-Iraq War, and these forces hardly pose a serious threat to states in the region. 35 The analysts have noted that "Iran's conventional military readiness, effectiveness, and capabilities have declined since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran has not been able to find a meaningful way to restore its conventional edge in the region." 36 The cost of! ran's arms procurement agreements pales in comparison to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Iran would mount a fierce and probably effective defense if attacked, especially in the form of asymmetric warfare, but would not be able to "finish any offensive major conflict that it starts on favorable terms." 37 Such conventional inferiority could very well drive Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, according to neorealism. On the other hand, the probability of a military confrontation between Iran and its Arab neighbors is low, absent any drastic expansionist moves from the Islamic Republic. There is a lingering mistrust between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, but, for all the mutual suspicion, most countries in the region primarily seek stability and economic development. Furthermore, several Gulf States have developed economic ties with Iran, most notably the UAE, as they "appear to see the value of trade and investment relations with Iran." 38 From a structural realist standpoint, the regional balance of power is not in Iran's favor, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons could conceivably change that balance, placing Iran in a position of strength. At the same time, as Etel Solingen has observed, the very appearance of pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran is producing an adverse effect in that it stimulates the suspicions among the Egyptian, Saudi, and other governments and may provoke Arab hostility and counterbalancing. 39 Chubin has also noted that the growing opposition to Iran's nuclear developments from the Gulf States "serves notice on Tehran of the regional costs to be paid for continuation of the program." 4° Finally, Iranian intransigence is also a subject of criticism by countries outside the region. For example, even though the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) generally stands by Iran's right to peaceful nuclear program, several NAM states voted to report the Iranian file to the Security Council in 2006. Rather than becoming

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

51

a "benign hegemon" for the region, Iran risks pushing the Arabs toward unity among themselves and even closer ties with the United States, neither of which would benefit Iran's relative power position. As such, the very public profile of Iran's nuclear program removes the element of surprise, and even if Iran's initial goal was to develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of balancing, open pursuit of this option now would be counterproductive. Iranian officials, for their part, are keen to assure their neighbors that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, harbors no hostile intentions, and is even eager to share nuclear technology with all Muslim states. Iran's defense minister, for example, has stated that the country gives "priority to establishment and expansion of relations with our Muslim neighbors in [the] political field, but also favor[s] having constructive and effective defense cooperation to boost regional security side by side with our neighbors."41 How much of this stance is propaganda and posturing is open to discussion, but Iran is clearly trying not to position itself as a potential threat to the Arab states. Nuclear Threats: Pakistan and Israel

Much is said about Iran living in a "nuclear neighborhood," which, in the absence of a superpower ally, should motivate its pursuit of an independent deterrent. A closer examination, however, shows that such nuclear threats hardly figure in the Iranian calculus. Pakistan may present a latent concern-primarily because of the possibility of a radical anti-Iranian group coming to power and taking control over the nuclear arsenal. When the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, and ten Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, Iranian leadership held Pakistan partially responsible and demanded that it cease support of the Taliban. In Pakistan, attacks against the Shi'a, and Iranians in particular, occurred repeatedly throughout the 1990s. Sepah-e Sahaba, one of the militant Sunni Islamist groups, for example, assassinated an Iranian diplomat in Lahore in 1990. The group also destroyed Iran's cultural center in Lahore and killed another diplomat in Multan in 1997. The same year, Sepah-e Sahaba "shot dead five Iranian air force cadets in Rawalpindi." 42 As described in Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, security forces in Iran fear that anti-Iranian activities in Pakistan "may force conventionally armed Iran to challenge its nuclear neighbor for the first time." 43 Takeyh has also argued that "the specter of instability in Islamabad haunts Iran's leadership." 44 Iranian officials expressed their alarm after Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, but, in later years, Pakistan did not figure prominently in public statements as a

52

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

source of insecurity. The ties between the two countries are improving, and Iran often signals its support for the enhancement of Pakistan's internal security, even calling for joint efforts to fight terrorism. 45 The relations were tested in October 2009 when the Sunni terrorist group Jundullah, based in Pakistan, bombed a tribal unity meeting in Sistan-Baluchistan, killing several Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders along with triballeaders. 46 During the visit of Iran's interior minister to Islamabad, however, Pakistan's president "vowed to cooperate in capturing [the] attackers."47 In short, it is unlikely that active pursuit of the nuclear program is currently motivated by the need to counter a potential Pakistani threat. Iran's pride, however, is piqued by Pakistan's elevation to the status of a regional power in South Asia, instead of ostracism for acquiring nuclear weapons and staying outside of international regimes. Israel is Iran's enemy of choice, the target of most radical rhetoric and opposition for its very existence, occupation of Palestinian territories, unconditional support from the United States, and its nuclear arsenal. According to a widely held view, many Iranians "see Israel as an implacable enemy and believe that its nuclear capability is a threat to Iran's security."48 Such an assessment, however, misrepresents the strategic dynamics between the two countries. Israel continues to occupy Arab territories in the Golan Heights and Palestine, which is the main grievance of the Arab and Muslim world against the state. Iranians commiserate with the plight of the Palestinians but are growing wary of the government's providing financial support to the antiIsraeli militant groups. Barbara Slavin has observed that ordinary Iranians do not sympathize with the Palestinians "to the extent that they would jeopardize Iranian interests to help them."49 The fatigue with the government's "Death to Israel" slogans also showed on several occasions in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, when the crowd refused to chant the usual slogan and sometimes even chanted "Death to Russia" or "Death to China" instead. 50 On September 18, 2009, the Qods (Jerusalem) Day (the day of solidarity with the Palestinians celebrated in Iran), people in the crowd were reportedly heard shouting "not Gaza, not Lebanon, I'll only give my life for Iran." 51 The confrontation between Iran and Israel is certainly not as "historically grounded" as often reported in the media: As recently as in the 1970s, under the shah, Iran and Israel maintained a strategic alliance and cooperated on missile development. Iranian anti-Israeli rhetoric started with the Islamic Revolution and, while ranging in intensity over the years, has mostly served as a political tool for posing as the leader and protector of the Muslims. Iran never engaged

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

53

in a direct military confrontation with Israel, nor has Israel taken any forceful action against Iran for its support of anti-Israeli groups such as Barnas and Hezbollah. Iran often criticizes Israel's possession of nuclear weapons but does so primarily in the context of hypocrisy and double standards exercised by the West/United States, rather than because of a fear of a nuclear attack. While gaining certain support and recognition on the "Arab street" by refusing to recognize Israel and aiding Hezbollah and Barnas, Iran is inviting a threat from a state far superior in its military capability, not responding to one. The Israeli threat was not real in the past and only recently has become significant due to the fears oflran's nuclearization coupled with Ahmadinejad's rhetoric of eliminating Israel from the political map. Overall, Israel's nuclear arsenal, combined with conventional superiority, provides a ready justification, rather than a clear reason, for Iran's pursuit of a nuclear option. Addressing the issue of nuclear threats overall, former representative of Iran to the United Nations Javad Zarifhas written that, while the country has nuclear-armed neighbors, "this does not mean that Iran must follow suit. In fact, the predominant view among Iranian decision-makers is that development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons would only undermine Iranian security."52 Challenging the Superpower

U.S. relations with Iran have ranged from bad to worse since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis. Having experienced the U.S.-orchestrated coup d'etat in 1953, Iran harbors deep suspicions about the United States and expected another U.S. intervention during and after the Revolution. Mistrust of the United States was further deepened because of its role in the Iran-Iraq War and support oflsrael. During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States, viewing Iranian revolutionary ideology as a threat to the region, supported Iraq by assisting in procurement of weapons and even providing operational advice to the Iraqi military. In July 1988, USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airplane over the straits ofHormuz, having mistaken it for a fighter jet. 53 U.S. attitudes toward the Islamic Republic, for their part, have been shaped by the hostage crisis and Iran's poor human rights record and support of terrorism, including groups fighting against Israel. For about thirty years, regime change has been the leitmotif of U.S. policy toward Iran, but-before the arrival of the George W. Bush administrationthis did not presuppose an invasion or a preemptive strike. For the most part, the U.S. position was that it would not normalize relations with Iran unless

54

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

a different kind of government was in place, while the actual policy concentrated on containment and coercion through alliances with Iran's rivals, along with sanctions and embargoes. The United States has imposed an almost complete trade embargo on Iran and moved to sanction foreign companies investing in Iran's oil sector. 54 It openly talked ofits desire for a political change in Iran, supported Iranian dissidents, and accepted refugees. There was a brief spell of improvement in the interactions between the two countries when President Mohammad Khatami was in power, and, following the overthrowing of the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 9/n attacks, Iran even assisted the United States in bringing the Northern Alliance to power, headed by Hamid Karzai. 55 In his speech in January 2002, however, President Bush included Iran in the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea, seriously offending both the Iranian government and its public. 56 President Obama brought a different approach, speaking of"extending a hand" to unfriendly regimes and advocating direct talks with Iran. 57 The response from the Islamic Republic so far has been mostly cautious. The leadership of the Islamic Republic always perceived the United States as a threat; but, until the advent of the Bush doctrine of violent regime change, the threat was more peripheral than immediate and existential and could not account for Iran's weapons ambitions in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, when the United States was victorious in Iraq in 2003, the Iranians did not accelerate their nuclear program, setting it on a crash course to the bomb-as neorealism would predict. In fact, they did the opposite. As discussed earlier, in 2003 Iran decided to cooperate with the IAEA, negotiate with the EU and suspend conversion and enrichment-related activities, and made an unprecedented move toward reconciliation with the United States. It is reported that in May 2003 Iran sent a letter to the U.S. Department of State with a comprehensive offer that included "being completely open about its nuclear program, helping to stabilize Iraq, ending its support for Palestinian militant groups and help in disarming Hezbollah" in return for exclusion from the "axis of evil" and an end to U.S. hostility. 58 Iran may not have been able to deliver on all those promises, but the very attempt clearly indicates that, at the time, the Iranian leadership believed its security lay with the negotiations and rapprochement rather than weaponization. The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate also concluded that Iran had halted the weaponization activities in 2003. Thus, at the height of U.S. power and adventurism, the perception of threat in Iran was such that it led away from nuclear weapons, not toward them.

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

55

Now that the U.S. stance has softened and the United States is withdrawing its forces from Iraq and reassessing the mission in Afghanistan, is there a reason for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons due to a U.S.-centered security concern? To be sure, the U.S. wish for a regime change in Iran still exists; and, as was the case with Iraq, for neoconservative politicians and scholars this objective takes precedence over the larger goals of nonproliferation. Robert Kagan, for example, has argued that the "fixation on preventing Iran from getting the bomb has somehow kept us from pursuing a more fundamental and more essential goal: political change in Iran." 59 However, in the context of the U.S. experience in Iraq and popular dissatisfaction with the way the war was conducted, an invasion to overthrow the Iranian government is viewed in Tehran as extremely unlikely and is apt to remain so for years to come, which-once again-reduces the need for a nuclear deterrent. A much more discussed threat is a U.S. air strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Again, from a neorealist perspective, the "new rationale" for an Iranian weapons program would be to deter such a strike-which would also mean that, ironically, U.S. obsession with countering potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy. A strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would not be an easy operation to execute, and Iranians should know this better than anyone. As discussed by Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, Iran's most important nuclear facilities are dispersed throughout the country, with some buried underground. 6° Furthermore, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted in the fall of 2006 that the United States did not possess enough intelligence on the program to adequately plan an attack. 61 More recently, in August 2008, the Haaretz reported that not only was the United States unwilling to launch an attack, but it had also strongly advised Israel against doing so on its own. 62 The report was further corroborated in a New York Times article in January 2009. 63 The new U.S. administration is even less likely to launch a strike or support Israel in doing so. Iranian officials send mixed messages on their threat perception vis-a-vis the United States. On the one hand, they routinely point out U.S. weakness due to the entanglement in Iraq and other missions and operations. The chairman of the Expediency Council and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, for example, has stated that the "occupiers came to the region but they could not achieve their goals and were disgraced in the world and are in danger." 64 On the other hand, overwhelming U.S. military superiority and presence in the region are impossible to write off. Thus, former IRGC chief Mohsen Rezai

56 GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

shocked the domestic audience by telling Iran's Sedaosima TV that the United States would "try to strike" and that he was prepared to become a martyr in that case. 65 The government has also taken steps toward improving combat readiness of both the IRGC and the regular army (Artesh)-Iranian media have reported that Artesh was working on expanding its navy forces and employing more asymmetric tactics. 66 What is notable at present, however, is that Iranian officials do not employ the rhetoric of defending the country against the U.S./Israeli strike to justify potential acquisition of nuclear weaponsrather, the statements mostly project strength and Iran's ability to defend itself now, without nuclear weapons. Assuming that Iran takes the threat of a U.S./Israeli strike seriously, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, or just a full fuel cycle, only exacerbates the threat, which leads to a vicious circle-Iranians pursue nuclear weapons to fend off foreign aggression, while this pursuit increases the possibility of attack. Employing realist logic does not yield a clear answer on what action Iran should undertake under such circumstances. Should it pursue a "crash program" aimed at acquiring a weapon within a year or two and presenting the adversary with a fait accompli, or should it cooperate now to alleviate an immediate threat? A realist argument can be made for either option, so the choice is ultimately defined by the Iranian leadership's beliefs and internal politics rather than purely systemic pressures. The fact that Iranians have agreed to suspension of conversion and enrichment activities in the past and approached the United States with an offer to negotiate also indicates the lack of a firm and unified decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Overall, the neorealist framework is useful in highlighting the role of regional security factors but does not provide the key to understanding Iranian motivations and possible future developments. As Chubin explains in his important book, Iran's "motives for investing in a nuclear option stem more from political than security imperatives." 67 Considering that at no point was Iran offered a "nuclear umbrella" or other alliance protection, while security concerns were changing from Iraq to the United States, with Pakistan presenting a potential threat, and the rivalries with Egypt and Saudi Arabia almost always on the agenda, the neorealist logic cannot fully explain the swings in Iranian nuclear behavior. Another important challenge to the realist logic is Khomeini's initial decision to roll back the nuclear program. The grand ayatollah was not planning on making friends with superpowers in either East or West, declaring "Islam is the best"; and the freshly created Islamic Republic

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

57

entered into a confrontation with the United States almost immediately. Iran inherited the shah's ambitious program but, rather than considering the weapons option, Khomeini famously denounced the nuclear program as a "satanic plot against Islam" and canceled a number of projects, including the construction of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Darkhovin and participation in the Eurodif. 68 Khomeini's decision is hard to explain from the systemic neorealist perspective but makes sense in the context of his ideology and distaste for all things introduced and promoted by the shah. This is not to say that the neorealist framework failed completely in this case, as Khomeini came to reconsider his decision, but it shows that operating within neorealist logic without regard for domestic factors-such as ideology and personalities-might lead to faulty predictions. Among the many "swings" of Iranian behavior one could also note the spotty history of the Islamic Republic's participation in the NPT and cooperation with the IAEA. Iran's breach of its Safeguards Agreement and subsequent defiance of the Security Council are often cited as evidence that the international nonproliferation regime is ineffective, and, when it comes to such grave matters as national security, states are sure to cheat. A closer look at the history of! ran's interactions with the agency and other NPT members reveals more nuanced behavior and attitude than across-the-board contempt for international institutions, indicating that prospects for future cooperation are not as limited as a neorealist approach would suggest. Neoliberal Institutionalism

The institutionalist framework is generally more helpful in understanding why states forego nuclear weapons than why they choose to pursue them. The framework can reasonably explain Iranian transgressions and violations of the Safeguards Agreement but is less helpful in discerning the ultimate goal and outcome of Iran's nuclear development. From the institutionalist standpoint, states, as a result of rational cost-benefit calculation, choose to participate in international regimes and play by the rules, as doing so should benefit their security, economy, and so on. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this has not been the case for Iran: The U.N. Security Council did not protect the country from invasion and the use of chemical weapons, while NPT membership did not necessarily ensure access to nuclear technology. While Iran was still an NPT member in good standing, its attempts to revive its nuclear program and secure foreign assistance were consistently curtailed by the U.S. efforts, motivated by the mistrust based on activities not directly related to the NPT.

58

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

In the mid-198os, Iran sought foreign contractors for the construction of Bushehr reactor but was refused by West Germany and Argentina. 69 Cooperation with Russia in the 1990s was severely scaled down due to U.S. insistence. The history of cooperation with China is also notable, as China backed away from most ofits agreements with Iran in the nuclear sphere for no other reason than U.S. pressure. One should note that, in 1995, the United States acknowledged that the agreement between Iran and China fell inside the NPT framework but still requested that China refrain from any nuclear cooperation with Iran, except for the construction of two subcritical reactors that were deemed to be not of proliferation concern?0 (That same year, according to the IAEA reports, Iran received the designs ofP-2 centrifuges from A. Q. Khan.) In the context of such experience and failed attempts to secure cooperation from the European states and China, it is more understandable why the Islamic Republic accepted A. Q. Khan's offers and chose to pursue a secret route-regardless of whether the intent was military or entirely peaceful. In short, participation in the international regime had for many years failed to provide Iran with the benefits of either enhanced security (no negative security assurances from the NWS, no Security Council protection) or better access to nuclear technology, which should make noncompliance a rather logical and rational response. The situation, however, has changed since the early 2ooos. When the extent of Iran's nuclear program became public and the country faced the threat of referral to the U.N. Security Council, the leadership recognized the utility of keeping the issue within the IAEA framework. As long as Iran maintains cooperation with the agency (however limited) and insists on its rights under the NPT and not outside it, it is able to preserve legitimacy and undermine the reasons for a military action. In an interview with a conservative daily Keyhan, former head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Hassan Rohani explained that cooperation with the IAEA in 2003 through 2005 was necessary to avert an action by the U.N. Security Council. 71 From this perspective, it appears unlikely that Iran would withdraw from the NPT in the near future, absent a dramatic change in the current Iran-IAEA-U.N. Security Council dynamic. Unless Iran is attacked or credibly threatened with an imminent attack, withdrawal from the NPT and complete severance of IAEA inspections will be counterproductive because such action would substantiate current accusations and put Iran at odds not only with the West but also the NAM.

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

59

The institutionalist framework, like that of neorealism, fails to look into the domestic politics and interests of various factions within the leadership, the interplay of which greatly affects and often defines Iran's behavior vis-a-vis the nuclear issue. To better understand why at various times the program was accelerated or put on hold, why the negotiations with the West before and after summer 2005 were so different, and what role the nuclear issue plays in consolidating the Iranian society, one must look beyond security considerations and structural constraints and examine the role of domestic factors. Domestic Politics and Regime Survival

There is more to nuclear weapons than deterrence and security. Nuclear weapons can be a symbol of status and prestige for some states, represent the highest achievement of a country's scientific community, or serve to distract attention from internal problems and unite people under the banner of technological advancement and independence.72 Perceptions of prestige and power are not universal and homogenous, and how a state approaches the issue of nuclear weapons is defined as much, if not more, by its history, self-image, and international norms as by security considerations. Iranian self-image is a contradictory combination of the legacy of great empires and regional dominance on the one hand and the history of humiliation and abuse by foreign powers on the other. In addition, there is revolutionary ideology of the struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed and the emphasis on suffering and martyrdom that comes from Shi'a Islam. 73 In a November 2008 address to Hajj officials, for example, Khamenei highlighted the dual nature of Iranian identity, describing the nation as a victim, though a proud and righteous one: "The Islamic Republic is a victim .... The Islamic Republic is a system where all the axioms of strength through spirituality are incorporated into it. It is strong but at the same time victimised." 74 How the concepts of greatness, justice, and standing up to oppression are intertwined can be observed in virtually every official statement and speech of the Iranian leaders, where issues as diverse as Israeli-Palestinian conflict, international trade, and technological advancement are tied to the idea of overcoming foreignimposed obstacles to achieve fairness. In this respect, Persian nationalism should not be viewed as a desire to dominate at any cost but rather as an aspiration for both independence and recognition by the world. Coming out of the isolation that followed the Islamic Revolution, Iran is not the same kind of challenger to the international and regional system as it was under Khomeini,

60

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

and it does not want to be seen as an international pariah?5 It is often stated that Iran is still a revolutionary state as it seeks to challenge the U.S. dominance, especially in the region, referring to it as the power of"global arrogance and colonialism." On the other hand, after Khomeini's death and the 1991 Gulf War, Iran had largely ceased its incitement of revolutionary movements among the regional Shi'a and improved relations with the Arab states. 76 In a further departure from its original revolutionary behavior, Iran has been trying to work more within the existing systems and international institutions, ranging from its active role in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to seeking membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Iranian rhetoric certainly sounds extremely inflammatory to the West, but the country is not nearly as isolated from the rest of the world as American policy makers and observers tend to describe. Iran derives legitimacy both from its history of greatness and suffering and from belonging to international regimes. Iranian views of nuclear weapons are also shaped by these factors. On the one hand, the mastery of nuclear technology and possession of such power behoove the regional leader that Iran believes it should be; yet, on the other, the atomic bomb is the oppressors' weapon, and openly pursuing a weapons program would once again isolate Iran from the international community. One could note in this regard that the Iranian leadership is very consistent in harnessing and advertising the support for its nuclear program from various countries, particularly oftheNAM. For three decades now, Iran has not been able to reassert its regional dominance. Neighboring states are opposed to Khomeini's revolutionary ideology, the country was ravaged by an eight-year-long war, poverty and unemployment rates are high, technological progress has been slow, and opportunities for military modernization have been limited. Because of Western embargoes, Iran had to content itself with second-grade military suppliers such as China and Russia, while sanctions in civilian technological sector have resulted in severe deterioration of Iran's civil aviation. In this context, maintaining a self-sufficient domestic nuclear program for Iran is a sign of both modernity and defiance of external restrictions. It has also become the matter of national pride, which is consistently emphasized in the statements of Iranian officials. For example, after announcing the first success in enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, President Ahmadinejad declared that "dear Iran has joined the nuclear countries of the world," underlining the exclusivity of such a club?7

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

61

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, too, often praises Iran's indigenous technological achievements. Unlike the case oflndia, discussed by Peter Lavoy as an example where interested parties create myths of the glory and necessity of nuclear weapons, Iran's is the case where peaceful nuclear energy and fuel cycle are mythologized, almost to the point of being equated with a nation's worth. 78 This is not to belittle in any way the achievements of Iran's nuclear scientific establishment, as an indigenous program remains a challenging project for a developing country; but the meaning and symbolic value of nuclear energy is certainly exaggerated by the politicians for their own goals. An opinion poll taken in early 2008 in Iran indicated overwhelming public support for the nuclear program: Ninety percent of the surveyed believed it was very important (81 percent) or somewhat important (9 percent) to have a full fuel cycle program.79 When asked more specific questions about government policy, 66 percent agreed with the proposition that Iran should have a full fuel cycle program but not develop nuclear weapons. 80 A slight majority, 58 percent of those surveyed, believed the development of nuclear weapons was against Islam. One can conclude, therefore, that while the technological advancement that the nuclear program represents speaks to the nationalist sentiment oflranians, nuclear weapons are a far more divisive issue and could be a source of anxiety rather than pride. The unifying aspect of the nuclear program is not lost on the Iranian leadership. A nonissue for the domestic public eight years ago, the right to nuclear technology has been elevated by the regime to a highest level of prominence and is being exploited to rally public support and maintain its power. In the early years of the republic, revolution itself was the rallying point for the Iranian population, followed by the resistance to Iraqi invasion in the 198os. External threats often help divert attention from domestic problems, but after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death of Khomeini, the attention "shifted away from external perils to domestic quandaries." 81 Iran's numerous internal socioeconomic problems, along with the growing ideological vacuum, began to threaten the regime's legitimacy and, eventually, survival, which intensifies the need to promote another great cause that could bring the people together behind the government. 82 The Iranian leadership, therefore, has been keen to keep up the hype around the nuclear program, emphasizing the greatness and importance of technological achievement and the unjust pressure exerted by "foreign powers" to push Iran into backwardness. If one were to speak of nuclear mythmaking, Iran is a case where an indigenous civilian

62

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

nuclear program-rather than nuclear weapons-is actively promoted as an attribute of independence and strength. Thus, even though the program did not commence for the purpose of internal regime strengthening, its role has evolved to symbolize for a domestic audience the hypocrisy of the West and Iran's "noble struggle" in the face of such injustice. Insistence on retaining the enrichment program appeals to nationalist sentiment and therefore became a line that no politician in Iran is eager to cross. This is not to say, however, that the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons enjoys the same degree of approval. Indeed, competing factions within the Iranian establishment have different views on the issue and the costs of a nuclear option. Factions, Economics, and Nuclear Pork

Iran is by no means a country with one-man rule, and its domestic politics are a complex balancing game where several key groups strike alliances, compromise, and battle each other for dominance in the elected and appointed bodies. The system is arcane and hard to analyze from afar, but factionalism and deep divisions among the elites and society became evident during the dramatic events following the June 12, 2009, presidential elections. In what is largely perceived as election fraud, the incumbent, Ahmadinejad, was quickly pronounced a winner, which provoked a massive wave of protests-on a scale unseen since the 1979 Revolution. Until at least the beginning of 2010, smaller opposition protests continued throughout Iran, and the full significance of the postelection developments cannot yet be determined. What is clearly highlighted by the postelection crisis is the degree of disagreements among those usually identified as conservatives. Even Rafsanjani, normally a very cautious politician deeply rooted in the system, came out publically against the hardliners and the supreme leader. 83 Interfactional dynamics complicate the application of Etel Solingen's model to Iran, as the regime type in the Islamic Republic is what Solingen herself calls a "hybrid." No faction has been strong enough in recent years to exercise complete control; conflicting approaches to economic and foreign policy are very much in place; and the nuclear program is one of the products of both struggle and compromises. While the discussion of Iranian domestic politics since Mohammad Khatami's election has often centered on the division between the reformists and conservatives, some of the most important battles in recent years were taking place between conservative pragmatists and hard-liners. 84 With both camps represented at the highest levels of power in Iran, their disagreements

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

63

are likely to continue to affect the future oflran's nuclear program. Both sides seem to broadly agree that the fuel cycle is not to be given up. Yet the political and economic costs Iran should incur to maintain the program, and the program's ultimate goal, remain a subject of discussion. To date, there still appears to be no consensus on the issue of acquiring nuclear weapons. The pragmatists, most prominently represented by former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were behind the partial economic liberalization and postwar reconstruction in the 1990s. While supporting the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic, this faction sees utility in political and economic engagement with the rest of the world and favors a more moderate approach in foreign policy. Mir Hossein Mousavi, one of the presidential candidates in 2009 (and possibly the de facto winner), while now often identified as a reformist, was also one of the technocrats, a pragmatic conservative, not affiliated with the reformist camp until the 2009 election campaign. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the most powerful decision maker in Iran, is seen as associated with the hard-liners, but this has not always been the case. His support of the pragmatists' policies in the 1990s helped the latter introduce economic reforms, begin the reconciliation with other states in the region, and attract foreign investment. Rafsanjani's government "created free trade zones started construction projects, encouraged expatriates to return, devalued the currency, instituted export incentives, and lowered some barriers to foreign investment." 85 During the pragmatists' time in power, the nuclear program was put on a back burner and progressed slowly. According to Hassan Rohani, only in 1999-2000 was the Atomic Energy Organization oflran (AEOI) given "a freer hand with new credits and a more liberal spending procedure, new facilities, and special regulations. This allowed them to become more active, without being forced to go through bureaucratic and regulatory labyrinths."86 Ironically, Iran's nuclear program advanced the most during the reformist presidency of Khatami, which seems to undermine Solingen's argument that the outward-looking coalitions are less likely to favor nuclear option. However, there is reason to suggest that the acceleration of the program was pushed by the hard-line coalition, as it mobilized and consolidated its power in response to the reformists' electoral successes. The hard -line conservative camp, loyal to the values of the Revolution and opposed to reconciliation with the West, appears to be the main driving force behind the nuclear programY This faction, more than others, believes in the 0

•

0

,

64 GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

necessity of ensuring Iran's self-sufficiency and stands to lose the least from continued isolation and economic sanctions. The hard-liners' current power base is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) and the rich, influential Islamic foundations, or bonyads, who are subordinate to the supreme leader and benefit greatly from economic isolation. Pasdaran was first authorized to establish its own industrial entities in the early 1980s, quickly expanded its military production, and was subsequently tasked with the postwar reconstruction projects. Over the years, IRGC has grown to become one of the most important players in Iran's economic and political life. According to a 2008 report on Iran's economy, Pasdaran often uses its connections in the government to secure "business contracts for new projects at the expense of private sector business." 88 Furthermore, analysts observe that Pasdaran exercises "a monopoly over the black market trade in embargoed goods ... bringing in perhaps billions of dollars a year." 89 IRGC also controls Iran's missile development and some parts of the nuclear program. IRGC-owned companies are primarily in charge of construction and support of nuclear sites, along with procurement through the front companies. The actual nuclear work, such as research and enrichment, is conducted under the AEOI. The Pasdaran leadership consists primarily of conservative commanders who rose during the Iran-Iraq War, and they "hold common views on Iran's regional dominant role, the nature of the country's external threats, and protecting the values of the revolution." 90 Among such common views is the belief, driven by the experience of heavy losses in the Iran-Iraq War, that Iran should be in a position to deter any future attack. In approaching the nuclear issue, therefore, IRGC and radical conservative clerics are prepared to bear the costs of isolation and would even welcome it on both ideological and economic grounds. The politicization of Pasdaran activities and the growth of their influence with the supreme leader occurred during the Khatami presidency, as a backlash to the popular reformist movement. 91 Perceiving a threat to the Revolution and regime structure, IRGC came onto the political stage in the late 1990s as strongly opposed to Khatami and his policies and committed to preserving the power of the supreme leader. While the reformists enjoyed wide public support, they were never able to control several key institutions in the government, including the Council of Guardians, the judiciary, military forces, and intelligence. These institutions remained largely under the control of conservative

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

65

hard-liners. Although the Supreme Leader Khamenei supported the economic reforms under Rafsanjani and was allied with the pragmatists, fear that the reformists would undermine the institute of vilayat-e faqih had caused him to turn to the more radical camp. It is worth noting that these power shifts roughly coincided with the acceleration of the nuclear program in the late 1990s. Although the supreme leader's focus was on economic reconstruction during Rafsanjani's presidency, with the arrival of Khatami, Khamenei perceived a greater need to align with the hard-liners, and this likely allowed the inward-looking faction to expand the pursuit of a nuclear capability. It is hard to say precisely who in the leadership was pushing for the acceleration of the program, but it seems that the security apparatus (IRGC, defense and intelligence ministries), which was never controlled by the reformists, had the capability to advance the program in spite ofKhatami's reformist agenda. The differences in views between the hard-line and pragmatist groups came into play in the fall of 2003, when the regime had to decide how to manage the negotiations with the IAEA. Hassan Rohani, appointed chief nuclear negotiator at the time, admitted in an interview to Keyhan that he expected internal disagreements, as "some people in the country would take radical positions." 92 When asked why Iran decided to negotiate in 2003-2005, Rohani first brought up the economic argument, pointing out the paralyzing effect the revelation of nuclear program had on Iran's economy. "A decline in business activities pervaded the entire market and even ordinary trades were affected, because they [the West] had publicized in the world that Iran's case was going to the Security Council after the elapse of [the] deadline." 93 Between 2003 and 2005, the pragmatists controlled the management of the nuclear issue and were able to persuade the supreme leader that concessions were in Iran's interest, despite objections from the AEOI and several members of the Majlis. The decision to cooperate with the IAEA and freeze conversion and enrichment came under criticism from the neoconservative camp, including the head of IRGC at the time (Yahya Safavi); and, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in summer 2005, he immediately changed the negotiating team and restarted conversion activities at Isfahan. The U.S. failure to respond to the 2003 letter offering negotiations and unsatisfactory progress of talks with the Europeans in 2003-2005 strengthened the hard-liners' position internally, as they seemingly showed the futility of attempts to reconcile with the West. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad's aggressive line brought international sanctions rather than the economic

66

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

improvement promised during the 2005 election campaign. High oil prices benefited the regime (at least until their sharp decline in fall2oo8), as they provided cash to support Ahmadinejad's expansionist economic policies. At the same time, failure to control inflation and generate employment started to fuel domestic discontent well before the 2009 elections. Throughout 2007-2008, the president's populist policies attracted criticism from the pragmatist politicians, members of Majlis, government ministers, and occasionally from the supreme leader himself. 94 During his second term, Ahmadinejad's economic ineptitude (not to mention his questionable legitimacy as president) will likely draw additional criticism and may well provoke further divisions among the conservatives. Personal rivalries and factional disagreements continued to affect decision making on nuclear issues after 2005. Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, for example, at times contradicted each other in public statements even before the latter's resignation as chief nuclear negotiator. The balancing game persisted with the appointment of Saeed Jalili, a staunch hard-liner, as the new chief nuclear negotiator in October 2007, while Larijani and Rohani both remained the supreme leader's representatives on the Supreme National Security Council. Iran has often sent conflicting signals on its willingness to cooperate with the West. Khamenei and other top officials stated on many occasions that Iran was ready to continue negotiations-as long as certain "red lines" were respected. 95 On the other hand, Iran did not give a direct response to several offers over the years-from Russia's proposal to enrich uranium for Iran (2005) to the P5+1 proposals tabled in 2006 and 2008. Moreover, on occasion, members of the Iranian parliament call for scaling down cooperation with the IAEA or even reconsidering membership in the NPT. 96 The October 1, 2009, talks between the P-5 and Iran, as well as subsequent negotiations over the details of shipping Iran's LEU abroad for fuel fabrication, seemed to have yielded an agreement, and yet Iran did not provide a definitive answer by the designated deadline and later proposed changing the terms of the deal. Rather than as suming that the Iranian delegation negotiated in bad faith, it is important to note that the tentative deal was publicly criticized by both the hard-line and more moderate figures in Iran. Such criticism-coming, for example, from current Majlis speaker Ali Larijani-may be as much an attempt to assert authority visa-vis Ahmadinejad's government as an expression of opposition to the terms of the agreement. Even Hassan Rohani, who generally favors engagement on the nuclear issue, spoke against swapping LEU for the research reactor fuel, arguing that it would be equivalent to an enrichment freeze and even suggesting

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

67

that Ahmadinejad's government was giving away other administrations' achievement. 97 At the same time, Rohani did not express support for enrichment to 19 percent, rather arguing that Iran needs its 3·5 percent enriched LEU to fuel future power plants. The reaction to the LEU-fuel deal highlights the diversity of views on the course of nuclear action inside Iran and suggests that further progress of the nuclear program and interaction with the West are defined not just by broad considerations of national interest but also (and sometimes primarily) by the bureaucratic balance of power among different factions of the Iranian elite-a complex alignment, which became even more complicated after the 2009 elections. POSSIBLE TRENDS AND CONTINGENCIES

The famous saying, "It's hard to predict, especially the future," 98 applies to modern Iran to such an extent that a variety of experts focusing on this county, while disagreeing on peculiarities, broadly agree that forecasting Iranian behavior is impossible. In terms of domestic politics, coalitions among the elite form and shift and fall apart faster than the outside observers manage to identify them and discuss their significance. With the decision-making system so arcane, and the balancing and bargaining between interest groups in constant flux, it is not always evident which group is closer to prevailing and which version of a "nuclear option" each of them prefers. The neorealist framework, while offering a more straightforward logic, is not much more helpful that domestic politics models in predicting Iran's future behavior, as it generates multiple (and incompatible) scenarios and outcomes. This section discusses possible Iranian actions from the neorealist perspective and then addresses in broader terms the effect the strengthening of one faction or the other within Iran might have on nuclear developments. Neorealist Scenarios

As described earlier, living in a nuclear neighborhood and lacking superpower protection, Iran should be expected to covet nuclear weapons. However, one must note that neorealism does not predict how a state will behave in such a situation-rather, it posits that a state must behave within the structural constraints or be punished. In this respect, there are two basic scenarios to be considered, Iranian actions under a direct military threat and in the absence thereof. Absent a credible threat of imminent attack by the United States or Israel, now is a very opportune time for Iran to develop nuclear weapons to provide

68

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

for its long-term security and regional dominance. The assumption here is that the United States will continue to oppose the regime in Iran and threaten the country in the long run. Iran should therefore be on a crash course to the bomb, using the time when the United States is too weak to act. A rational, if simplistic, prediction stemming from this logic is that Iran will pursue nuclear weapons and acquire them as soon as technologically feasible. There is, however, no evidence indicating that a crash weapons program is currently in progress in Iran, as the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) determined that the weaponization activities had stopped in 2003. If the program was indeed halted because of U.S. demonstration of strength in Iraq, it would have made sense for Iran to restart the weapons program later, when it became evident that the United States was not as victorious as it initially seemed. Still, according to U.S. intelligence, weaponization activities had not restarted as late as 2009. 99 Iflran does not perceive an immediate threat and is not actively working on the bomb now, it is defying the neorealist logic-once again. There is an alternative way to treat this scenario. Given the demise of Saddam Hussein, the removal from power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Arab governments' aversion to military confrontation, and U.S. commitments in Afghanistan, Iran faces no credible threat in the near or medium term. It would be logical then to forego the nuclear option and enjoy the position of power without antagonizing the neighbors and international community by a weapons pursuit. The choice between the two views of the situation and subsequent actions is defined by the perception, rather than objective reality, of short- and long-term threats among Iranian leadership, which the neorealist framework is not equipped to explain or predict. If the pursuit of nuclear weapons or even a civilian full fuel cycle program provokes a threat of an imminent attack, predictions based on the neorealist logic become murkier. On the one hand, it would be appropriate to stop the program, even if it is purely civilian, and avert immediate danger. Failure to do so will be "punished" by the execution of an attack, diminishing the state's power capabilities. Therefore, if seriously threatened, Iran should be expected to "capitulate" and enhance its short-term security. On the other hand, Iran might take the risk and accelerate weapons acquisition, counting on the adversary's inability to destroy the program completely. Rather than leading to capitulation, the threat or execution of a military strike could persuade the Iranian leaders that nuclear weapons, indeed, are the only guarantee of national security. The preceding discussion suggests not only that multiple and incompatible outcomes will make sense under neorealism but also that a state (Iran) may

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

69

not always behave as the structural constraints dictate. This brings the discussion back to domestic politics, as the choice of action, whether "correct" from the neorealist standpoint or not, ultimately depends on the leadership perceptions and political dynamics. Domestic Trends

As discussed earlier, the conservative hard-line (or principlist) faction, ideologically and economically inward looking, views the world in "us versus them" terms-more so than do the pragmatists and especially the reformists. This faction derives legitimacy from upholding revolutionary and Islamic values, pursues populist policies, and does not feel threatened by economic isolation. The hard-liners, represented by radical clergy and elements of the Pasdaran and Basij, are therefore ready to bear the economic and political costs of weapons pursuit. Rising to prominence during the Khatami era, the hard-liners have had the upper hand in setting the economic and foreign policies in Iran since 2005. Yet even during this period weaponization activities, presumably halted in 2003, were not resumed. 100 It appears that ever since the secrecy of the nuclear program was compromised in 2002, and various parts of the program were put on hold in 2003 to reduce the political and economic costs of discovery, the Iranian leadership-which includes figures with various factional affiliations-was simply unable to agree on the actual end goal of continued nuclear development. To be sure, different actors have different goals in mind, but whose vision will prevail? There is a possibility that, should the principlists' influence and institutional power further increase, interested groups within this faction might be able to insist on a weapons option and prevent any compromise with the West. It is hard to estimate the probability of such a scenario, however, as the distribution of power among the factions after the events of the summer 2009 remains unclear. The worrying sign in this respect was Khamenei's open backing of Ahmadinejad before and after the 2009 presidential elections and his refusal to condemn the IRGC's and Basij's use of force against the protesters. The supreme leader's role as an arbiter was thus compromised, which indicates either that Khamenei's personal stance has hardened or that he has become too dependent on the principlist faction and hence susceptible to pressure. Events following the 2009 presidential elections demonstrated, on the one hand, the power of the hard-line faction, as it was able to keep its preferred candidate in the presidential seat, while the IRGC and Basij brutally repressed popular protests against perceived election fraud. On the other hand, the

70

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

postelection crisis bared the deep divisions in Iranian society and politics, damaging the legitimacy of the hard-line faction and the supreme leader himself, as even religious figures in Qom questioned the legality of election results.101 The very extent of people's negative response to Ahmadinejad's alleged victory, the duration of protests, open involvement of such influential figures as Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karroubi, and severe criticism of the government's use of force by senior ayatollahs all indicate that the hard-liners' hold on power is far from absolute and more internal bargaining lies ahead. To add even more complexity, one should note that the principlist faction itself may not be entirely cohesive, though in the face of reformist/pragmatist challenges, the divisions within the faction are less evident. 102 Chubin has pointed out that Khamenei prefers the alliance with the hardliners "as it strengthens his position and the revolution, as long as the costs are affordable." 103 The costs might have become too high, though, and faced with the need to restore at least some of the lost legitimacy, Khamenei should be expected to look for ways to demonstrate the regime's ability to ensure the country's well-being. While reconciliation with the reformists or even pragmatists is unlikely, the supreme leader might still seek some sort of an internal compromise and try to divert attention to solving economic problems (away from political reforms). With the change in U.S. approach, Khamenei and the hard-liners have no "clear and present danger" to point to and exploit to forge unity and may therefore find it expedient to engage with the West on the nuclear issue, portraying any sort of agreement as a victory domestically. If this happens, bomb proponents among the principlists will not be able to gain bureaucratic advantage to press for weapons pursuit. Such a scenario does not envision Iran giving up on the nuclear option completely-rather, it presupposes Iranian hedging and an extended delay in the decision on the ultimate goal of the program. As for the pragmatists, Kenneth Pollack suggests that they "would desperately like to give up the nuclear program because they want [a] better relationship with the outside world." 104 While this assessment is perhaps too optimistic, the pragmatists, motivated by economic concerns, are indeed much more open to a compromise, especially if they are not required to end the enrichment program altogether. As the internal struggle evolves, a number of pragmatist politicians remain influential, and the faction may yet enhance its power positions and press for less risk taking on the nuclear issue. It is not inconceivable that the postelection confrontation between the pragmatists and reformers on the one side and hard-liners on the other forced

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

71

the pragmatists to attach greater importance to political reforms (along with economic ones). The pursuit of nuclear weapons would not appear to fit into that kind of agenda. If the West shows greater flexibility on the enrichment issue and offers Iran a face-saving option concerning its past violations of the Safeguards Agreement, the pragmatists in Iran will have stronger ground to advocate engagement and cooperation. It will also deprive the hard-liners of the familiar target to mobilize against and exploit. One of the important consequences of the postelection unrest in Iran might be the diminished unification effect of the nuclear program. Nuclear advancement may still enjoy wide support among the population, but promoting this inalienable right is simply no longer enough to foster national unity and support of the regime-the clashes in the wake of the 2009 elections revealed just how deep the divisions in the society run, and several more kilograms of enriched uranium would not heal those wounds. Should the supreme leader recognize the diminished effect of the nuclear program in this respect, he might be more amenable to compromises. In this context, repeated Iranian statements about the readiness to return to the discussion of fuel swap105 should receive more serious attention from the United States-conducting the exchange on Iranian territory seems to be the option negotiated internally to allow Iran to look strong while still cooperating with the West. An engagement strategy is certainly not easy to design and implement, in light of both the complexity oflran's domestic politics and internal resistance to engaging Iran in the United States, but it deserves to be given a chance to work. In spite of the urgency of the issue, the United States should not expect a fast return on investing in engagement efforts, as three decades of mistrust and confrontation cannot be overcome by several months of "extending a hand," while-almost paradoxically-threatening further punishment if the offer is not immediately accepted. Toughening the rhetoric, imposing more sanctions, pressing the "regime change" line, and threatening military confrontation could enable the hard-liners to argue that Iran is under a growing threat, and reconciliation with the West is impossible. The worst development in this respect would be the much-discussed option of a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Military attack might well be the trigger event that would tip the internal balance toward a determined weapons pursuit in the near future. In the absence of a common vision of the purpose of the nuclear program, the bottom-line consensus remains that uranium enrichment is Iran's "red line" and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future. Rohani stated back

72

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

in 2005 that, since the beginning of negotiations with the Europeans, all the parties involved in the issue on Iran's side had agreed that the fuel cycle would not be given up. 106 It is unlikely that Iran would consider somehow limiting its enrichment program for anything less than a broad recognition of its legitimacy and standing in the region. Economic cooperation may not be enough if it does not come in the context of recognizing Iran's role as a legitimate regional player. As Stephen Walt observed, there is "an Iranian effort to force the United States and other countries in the Persian Gulf region to give it a place at the table: they wanted us to acknowledge that Gulf security is a legitimate Iranian concern and therefore they have a right to be heard on this issue." 107 No faction in Iran will want to be seen as "selling out" to the West. In this respect, the Libyan example is only partially useful. Iranian elites-hard-line or moderate-certainly see their country as a much more important figure on the chessboard than Libya ever was or will be. Absent a military escalation and more shocks in the internal distribution of power, it is reasonable to expect the current status quo to persist for at least the next year or two. That is to say, Iran will continue its enrichment activities, adding new centrifuge cascades at a steady, rather than accelerated, rate and advancing other elements of its fuel cycle program with probably more fanfare than the results would justify. Iran will not withdraw from the NPT, for the regime membership provides the legitimacy for its program internationally, but will keep cooperation with the IAEA at a minimum, as long as the implementation of additional measures does not promise an end to the Security Council's punitive actions. What appears inevitable at this point is that, despite the U.S. and Israeli proclamations that a nuclear-capable Iran is "unacceptable," within five years or less the Islamic Republic will reach the point where it could engage in nuclear hedging and will likely pause there, postponing a decision on weapons acquisition. Neighbors' Reaction

The effect of potential Iranian weaponization on the region is widely discussed in academic and policy circles, where most experts are asking who would be next and pointing primarily to such states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Patrick Clawson, for example, has argued that "several other Middle Eastern countries would seriously consider acquiring nuclear weapons were Iran to do so." 108 He suggests that Saudi Arabia would be the first to respond to Iranian weaponization, with Egypt following the suit. Ibrahim al-Marashi, discussing Saudi Arabia in Chapter 4 of this volume, also quotes such views from various

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

73

sources, though he does not endorse this perspective. Even the GCC states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, have been named among potential "reactive" proliferators, if only they could find a supplier of nuclear weapons. 109 From the neorealist standpoint, such chain reaction scenarios make sense, as each of the powerful states in the region would need to restore "the balance." Statements coming from some diplomats and experts in the Middle East also serve to fuel fears of reactive proliferation. On the other hand, this domino-style approach does not adeqfiately take into consideration the internal debate on nuclear acquisition in these countries, as well as the interests of the ruling coalitions. Some scholars from the GCC states promote the idea that the Gulf will not watch idly as Iran acquires nuclear weapons and would even support a U.S. military strike rather than be harassed by a nuclear Iran.U 0 An Egyptian diplomat has also recently expressed, in remarkably similar terms, that Egypt would not tolerate Iranian nuclearization and will have to consider its own nuclear deterrent.lll Such statements, however, appear to be more of an appeal for the United States to deal with the issue more effectively than a threat to "go nuclear" in response to Iran. It is also highly unlikely that the Gulf elites would support military action against Iran, given their own economic and political interests. Sheikh Mohammad of Kuwait, for example, has noted that "It is true that we are allies of America ... [but] we are against escalation against Iran." 112 A nuclear Iran will indeed pose a serious challenge, especially to the leading Sunni Arab states; but, in and of itself, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons may not be sufficient to reverse the decades-old policy of injitah in Egypt and force Saudi Arabia to risk its alliance with the United States. Jim Walsh suggests that Iranian weaponization might be an "agenda-setting" moment for Egypt, but the decision to pursue nuclear weapons would require a convergence of various conditions. 113 Ibrahim al-Marashi argues that nuclear weapons do not provide solutions for the main challenges that the Saudi Kingdom is facing, most of which are internal in nature, and would only exacerbate existing problems. Saudi Arabia is currently concentrating on tackling radicalism through counterterrorism measures and purging of mosques and schools. "Nuclear weapons," al-Marashi asserts, "do not fit anywhere in this formula for dealing with extremists." 114 Turkey, as pointed out by Jessica Varnum in Chapter 10 of this volume (and other analysts elsewhere), would prefer to continue relying on NATO alliance protection and not compromise the prospect ofEU membership by nuclear adventurism. 115 "Turkey's approach

74

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

to the Iranian issue thus far," Varnum writes, "suggests that it might-at least initially-prefer diplomacy to participation in a regional arms race." 116 Iran's progress down the nuclear path, whether military or civilian, is already provoking a wave of interest in indigenous programs in the region, with several states negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia, and the United States. However, the desire to attain some sort of nuclear capability appears to be driven primarily by prestige considerations and should not be equated with an immediate interest in nuclear weapons. It is possible that some of the states are interested in acquiring a latent capability-to be ready for the (hypothetical) day when Iran openly moves towards nuclear weapons. Yet, even if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons in the future, whether the reacting states ultimately go nuclear will depend on a host of other factors, many of them domestic. 117 With each nuclear-related decision a product of internal bargaining as much as, if not more than, the result of external pressures, it is far from certain that the outcome in the Middle East will be a rapid chain reaction. CONCLUSIONS

From a neorealist standpoint, Iran has been under pressure to go nuclear basically since the hostage crisis and confrontation with the United States. This pressure increased with the arrival of the Bush doctrine and eased somewhat with the arrival of Obama administration but will conceivably remain high as long as there is no reconciliation between the two countries and no reliable ally to protect Iran. Application of a neorealist framework to forecasting Iran's future proliferation behavior yields different and competing outcomes and highlights the importance of threat perceptions among domestic actors. External threats have had an uneven effect on different factions within the Iranian leadership and are moderated by these factions' varying perceptions of their own and national interests. To be sure, there are factions in the Iranian leadership that support a nuclear weapons option for a variety of reasons-mainly security and independence, combined with eagerness to accept the costs of isolation. But this perspective does not seem to be the prevailing view. There appears to be no consensus on how far down the nuclear path the country should go and what costs it could afford to pay. As such, the nuclear issue in the near future is likely to be largely defined by internal disagreements and struggles. This is not to say that Iran is immune to external shocks and incentives. Continued attempts to engage

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

75

Iran by the U.S. administration could help put pressure on the hard-liners to justify their defiance to the domestic audience and, ideally, help empower the more pragmatic faction. At a minimum, it can help buy time for those inside the Iranian elite and leadership who are against the acquisition of nuclear weapons and postpone the internal decision on the nuclear option. On the flip side, the only conceivable external trigger event for an accelerated weapons program is a U.S./Israeli air strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Such a strike, while not necessarily converting the reformers and pragmatists to bomb enthusiasts, would likely mobilize the society around the more radical conservatives and thus help the hard-liners pursue their preferred option. The issue of uranium enrichment will remain Iran's "red line," as the incentives short of broad recognition oflran's legitimacy and role in the region are not likely to be enough to overturn the current consensus on the necessity of a domestic fuel cycle capability. That said, the significance of the nuclear program as a symbol of advancement and national pride in Iran is likely to decrease, with the nation more focused on the outcome, consequences, and implications of the 2009 elections and protests. Iran is largely viewed as a "chain starter," whose nuclearization will seriously alter the balance of power in the region and trigger a wave of rampant proliferation. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is indeed stimulating or at least reinforcing a renewed interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the region's recent rush to secure nuclear cooperation agreements, which potentially could evolve into the pursuit oflatent capabilities or weapons. That said, states in the Middle East are not eager to launch nuclear weapons programs in the near term and are rather trying to promote preventive measures of a diplomatic nature. The GCC countries and Egypt are largely focused on economic development and are wary of jumping on the proliferation bandwagon under most circumstances. As three other case studies in this volume demonstrate, the balance of internal factors in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is currently against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and Iran's nuclearization alone will not be sufficient to quickly change that balance.

4

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES? Riyadh's Nuclear Intentions and Regime Survival Strategies

Ibrahim ai-Marashi

On Iran's nuclear activities in early 2003 led a number of analysts to anticipate that Tehran's program would trigger a nuclear domino effect among its regional neighbors in the Middle East. According to this logic, an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would spark a regional nuclear arms race in which Saudi Arabia, among other states, would develop a nuclear arsenal to deter Iran. Even prior to 2003, some policy makers, security analysts, and scholars of the Middle East perceived a Saudi propensity to pursue a nuclear weapons option. Most observers of the region concur that Riyadh is in a vulnerable position, situated in a strategic environment in which external threats provide plausible incentives for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferation forecasts in policy circles tend to rely heavily on the predictive power of neorealism, which has underlied the conventional thinking in both the West and Middle East. In contrast to this security-centric perspective, other nonproliferation analysts sensitive to competing domestic and international proliferation pressures and constraints have argued that, although Saudi Arabia has the financial means to acquire nuclear weapons, it lacks the domestic physical resources and scientific infrastructure to develop such a program. In addition, they point to the constraining effects of the state's membership in the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Riyadh's endorsement of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Still other analysts seek to explain Saudi nuclear preferences in terms of the political economy of the kingdom and its global economic integration, as THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

76

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

77

well as the characteristics of the Al Saud leadership and the country's special relationship with the United States. This chapter analyzes the merits of these competing explanations with an eye to discerning the likely future course of Saudi nuclear decision making. GLOBAL DEBATES ON SAUDI NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

The international media play an important role in creating and sustaining "nuclear discourses" and have contributed to the notion of an "Islamic bomb." According to this discourse, Islamic countries have a proclivity to obtain nuclear weapons. Recognition of this terminology is relevant when analyzing Saudi Arabia's nuclear intentions because it is assumed that Riyadh's aspirations to serve as the spiritual vanguard of the Islamic world predisposes it to obtain an Islamic, if not "Arab," bomb. A commentator in an Indian Muslim organization not only adopts the rhetoric of a religious bomb but devises the notion of sectarian nuclear weapons in the headline of one of its articles: "Shia Bomb, Sunni Bomb against Islamic World." 1 The assumption is that Shi'a Muslim Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would trigger a domino effect in the Middle East, spurring its Sunni Arab neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, to acquire their own nuclear deterrent. In the 1990s, the defection to the United States of the former Saudi diplomat Muhammad Khilawi led to media interest in Riyadh's nuclear intentions. Khilawi alleged that from 1975 to the mid-1990s Saudi Arabia financed Baghdad's and Islamabad's nuclear weapons programs. It was unclear from his testimony whether Saudi Arabia had intended for Pakistan or Iraq to share a nuclear weapon with Saudi Arabia once one was developed or if it simply wanted to use both countries to provide a nuclear umbrella for the kingdom. 2 However, Khilawi's claims, as well as the documents that he provided from Saudi sources, have never been substantiated publicly. Renewed media attention to Saudi nuclear intentions was sparked by a 2003 article in the London Guardian in which it was alleged that the kingdom sought nuclear weapons following American invasion oflraq in 2003 and revelations about Iran's nuclear program. 3 According to this account, Saudi Arabia could no longer rely on an American nuclear umbrella due to the deterioration of bilateral relations following the revelation that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals. The article led Saudi policy makers, including the king, to vehemently deny their interest in a nuclear program. The Saudi response reiterated that Riyadh had no ambitions

78

IBRAHIM AL·MARASHI

to establish itself as a regional military superpower, did not want to spark a regional arms race, and lacked a nuclear energy industry that could produce the plutonium for such weapons. 4 Moreover, members of the Saudi royal family renewed their call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. 5 Despite these denials, reports continued to appear asserting Saudi nuclear weapons ambitions. Some stressed that the close relations between Riyadh and Islamabad provided Saudi Arabia the opportunity to obtain a nuclear weapon should it so desire. A 2006 article in the German magazine Cicero, for example, alleged that Saudi financial support for Pakistan's military and visits of Saudi officials to Pakistan (and vice versa) were evidence that the countries were cooperating in the development of nuclear weapons. 6 According to this account, Saudi nuclear scientists had been working in Pakistan since the 1990s, and Pakistani nuclear scientists traveled to Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2005 for joint work in the nuclear field, while under the guise of Muslim pilgrims. It further claimed that Pakistani Ghauri missiles had been hidden at secret underground locations south of Riyadh. THE KINGDOM'S NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE

To the extent that investment in nuclear technology is indicative of nuclear weapons aspirations, there is little evidence to date of Saudi nuclear hedging. Saudi Arabia has no known nuclear reactors, although it has been alleged that in the 1970s it sought to acquire one with the aid of a French company, a plan that reportedly was aborted following the Three Mile Island accident,? A national Atomic Energy Research Institute was established in 1988, and the country also launched a PhD program in nuclear engineering at King Saud University in Riyadh in the 1980s. However, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident again dampened enthusiasm for an indigenous civilian nuclear program, a situation that has persisted until recently. To be sure, there have been isolated calls within Saudi Arabia to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. One Saudi scientist, Amin Saati, argued that Saudi Arabia should become a member of the peaceful nuclear club because it is a "legitimate national right" for the kingdom and also would bestow national prestige on the country. 8 Elsewhere he developed this argument further, pointing to the double standard where Israel's nuclear program is rarely scrutinized and asserting that nuclear energy is seen as a symbol of prestige and power"for development, defense, and deterrence." 9 Saudi Arabia's collective identity is invoked when he refers to the Arab countries in opposition to both Iran and

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

79

Israel: "The reason for this is that the enemy does not respect the weak; it only respects and fears nuclear powers." 10 Although Saudi officials have begun to echo the calls in other Arab capitals about the need to initiate civilian nuclear power programs, the country has a very limited nuclear infrastructure. 11 Saudi scientists lack experience in the operation of nuclear reactors, much less in enriching uranium for reactor fuel, and their experience is largely limited to the use of radioisotopes at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center and the National Research for Agriculture and Animals Resources Center. Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia does possess reactor simulation software to train students and technicians, theoretical training would not provide hands-on experience. 12 Saudi Arabia has no known uranium deposits and lacks experience in uranium mining and enrichmentY In short, the kingdom "lacks the natural resources, technological capability, and scientific community necessary to develop an advanced nuclear weapons program." 14 As James Acton and Wyn Bowen have observed, Saudi Arabia also "has a significant distance to go before it has the legal and regulatory structure required even to start developing an NPP [nuclear power plant]."15 No national atomic energy authority exists in Saudi Arabia, and the King Abd Al-Aziz Center for Science and Technology (KAACST), whose board is chaired by the king, supervises, implements, and monitors all nuclear-related activities. Other members of the KAACST board include the crown prince and the ministers of defense, aviation, petroleum, and mineral resources. 16 Given Saudi Arabia's underdeveloped nuclear infrastructure and lack of a comprehensive legal framework for nuclear activities, it is not surprising that KAACST is a weak regulatory body. While the country does have an agency responsible for radioactive waste disposal, it has only one small, temporary waste storage facility. 17 In almost all respects, therefore, Saudi Arabia would appear to lack the legislation, safety culture, and human resources to implement, manage, and regulate nuclear activities.18 DOMESTIC POLITICAL DYNAMICS: REGIME SECURITY AND INTERNAL THREATS

Saudi Arabia does not suffer from high levels of domestic turmoil, but at various points in its history the monarchy has had to contend with internal threats from Arab nationalism, tribal uprisings, calls for reform (if not the overthrow of the House of Saud), and Sunni and Shi'a extremism. Other internal problems

80

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

include explosive population growth and resulting high levels of unemployment.19 Nevertheless, domestic unrest has never posed a serious threat to the kingdom comparable to that visible in neighbors like Egypt or Iraq. 20 The Saudi Arabian National Guard and intelligence forces are tasked with defending the royal family and the kingdom and are recruited from tribes loyal to the House of Saud. 21 While Saudi Arabia experiences some degree of domestic turmoil, the disturbances are not such as to incline the monarchy to pursue nuclear weapons for purposes of distracting or rallying the public. 22 In the aftermath of the 1990 Kuwait crisis, liberal Saudis petitioned King Fahd for political reform while religious protestors demanded the removal of U.S. troops, an expansion of Shari'a law, and economic reformsY Islamist opposition led by Safar Al-Hawali and Muhammad Al-Masari was quickly suppressed, and modest reforms were extended by royal decree in March 1992. 24 Even at its height, however, unrest in Saudi Arabia did not manifest itself in terms of strikes, riots, or antigovernment demonstrations, with the exception of protests among the Shi'a following the Iranian Revolution. The kingdom has never witnessed a military coup or a revolution. The royal family has continued its course of slow liberalization, calculated to maintain its legitimacy without ceding too much power to civil society. 25 The most pressing challenges in the kingdom are economic and demographic in nature, and the royal family is working to meet those challenges by adopting internationalizing policies. This trend suggests that the Saudi path to legitimacy is unlikely to include the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Royal Family

The process by which the Saudi government formulates policy in response to internal and external security threats remains opaque-or, more precisely, largely "impenetrable." 26 That being said, the kingdom has had a continuity of leadership and a high degree of centralized power, thus facilitating the identification of those actors most likely to be engaged in a decision to acquire nuclear arms. Analysts have observed how decisions typically are made by few members of the royal family, and even the senior military officers are often excluded from national security decision making. 27 For decades the royal family has made carefully calculated foreign policy decisions to preserve its lock on power and ensure its legitimacy. This centralization of power, however, does not mean that the Saudi decision making is monolithic or unchallenged. Although domestic politics are dominated by the monarchy, maintaining consensus has become complicated

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

81

for the Saudi leadership in recent times. 28 The Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, for example, notes in a report that while the king "theoretically is the highest authority in all decision making," in practice, "he has little personal interest in the development of nuclear power, relies heavily on advisers for technical advice, and plays the role of pro forma executor of decisions made by KAACST's board of directors." 29 In Saudi Arabia, key decision makers include the king, the crown prince, and a select few additional senior princes and ministers depending on whom the king in power has decided to trust and consult. After King Fahd's passing from the political scene, the cast of influential characters who emerged include the current King Abdallah bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz (who also commands the country's armed forces), Minister of the Interior Prince Nayifbin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud, Deputy Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz, and Assistant Vice Commander for Military Affairs Prince Mitab bin Abdallah. 30 The monarch will typically seek consensus, and it remains rare for a major decision not to be discussed informally among the most senior princes; but the king at all times retains the practical and legal authority to single-handedly take and implement policy decisions. 31 Thus, the king could in principle make a proliferation decision by himself by virtue of his near-absolute legal authority. 32 Although Saudi Arabia possesses a substantial government bureaucracy, the extremely hierarchical nature of the country's family-based government prevents bureaucratic interests from exerting substantive influence over key decision makers in matters of national security and defense policy. 33 Thus, Saudi Arabia's cadre of key decision makers is an extraordinarily small set of influential actors whom the king has decided to trust for input on critical security decisions. The elites consist of the royal family, allied tribes, and the religious establishment. The role of the royal family is crucial as it generates the future Saudi leadership. The process of succession, however, has aptly been described as closed and esoteric, "like the selection of a Roman Catholic pope .... Just as some cardinals are deemed 'papabile,' a handful of the many sons and grandsons of Saudi Arabia's founding King ... are understood to be in the running as future kings." 34 At present, the number of princes who could serve as future leaders is estimated to be upwards of s,ooo. 35 King Abdallah turned 85 in 2008, while his successor, Crown Prince Sultan, is presently 82 years old and has health problems. Although seniority and clan loyalties are likely to play a more significant role in determining the next king than

82

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

managerial talent, it is also the case, as Thomas Lippman observes, that no one outside the House of Saud has any particularly keen insight into who is and is not being seriously considered as successor. 36 Jacques Hymans, in The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, focuses attention on the role of individual leaders of states and their national identity conceptions (NICs) in nuclear proliferation decisions. Drawing on human and social psychology scholarship, Hymans argues that few leaders are inclined to pursue nuclear weapons. Those who are so predisposed, he argues, are "oppositional nationalists," who are driven by the combined emotions of fear and pride. 37 Saudi Arabia's present monarch, King Abdallah bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud, is not an oppositional nationalist of the sort depicted by Hymans and more closely resembles a "sportsmanlike subaltern." While Abdallah has maintained the protection of a nuclear umbrella, he has ensured that such a relationship is a low-profile one. He has not objected to formal international institutions like the NPT and appears to respect the power of the nonproliferation norm. In his speeches, King Abdallah discusses foreign policy issues in the name of"all peoples," "Muslims," and "Arabs," reflecting Saudi Arabia's main sphere of concern. Contrary to the perspective of an "oppositional nationalist," King Abdallah's public statements exhibit little in the way of starkly dichotomized identity conceptions even with respect to Israel and certainly not vis-a-vis Iran. Ideological Threats

While external dangers such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved threatening to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has a long history of weathering internal challenges to the rule of the royal family. In recent times, ideological tensions in the region have emerged as a threat to the conservative Islamic values of the Saudi leadership. Both secular leftist ideologies and radical interpretations of Islam pose a risk to the royal family, as does the Islamic zeal emanating from Iran. Tehran proves to be popular on the Arab street, at times, because of its anti-Israeli and anti-American agenda, yet Saudi rulers are deeply suspicious of Iran, concerned that it harbors hegemonic ambitions. 38 Moreover, international relations in the Middle East have to be viewed through the lens of negative sovereignty, beyond the scope of state-to-state relations, where foreign states often seek to leverage public opinion and protests in the domestic politics of a targeted state. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, the revolutionary pan-Arabism of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt threatened the conservative,

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

83

pro-Western orientation of Riyadh. 39 Nasser's pan-Arabism, socialism, and call for the unity of all Arab states under the aegis of Egyptian leadership challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi state and diminished only following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Six Days War. The ideology of the Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Khomeini's activist, revolutionary pan-Islamism has influenced both Saudi Arabia's militant Sunni Islamists and the Shi'a. Nevertheless, Saudi Islamists practice their own variant ofSunni Islam, which does not recognize the Shi'a as believers, limiting Khomeini's appeal due to his background. The development of Shi'a liberalism in Iraq after 2003 also posed a threat to the kingdom as it represented a system of governance that might serve as an alternative to the monarchy among Saudi Shi'a. However, the Saudi state has proven adept at handling its Shi'a question. Furthermore, it is not apparent how a nuclear deterrent would be of assistance in dealing with ideological threats that could spread among Saudi Shi'a. The Extremist Threat

The Saudi kingdom has had to balance between efforts at modernization and ensuring that the process does not upset the traditional religious constituency that forms the backbone of the monarchy. One of the first existential threats to the monarchy emerged among its own Ikhwan army, which revolted in 1928 when it was prevented from using arms to proselytize its strict Wahhabi interpretation oflslam through incursions into neighboring Jordan and Iraq. More recently, an extremist threat reemerged during the November 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 40 A group of several hundred well-armed Sunni extremists challenged the monarchy's legitimacy, which served as a rehearsal for ideologically inclined militants that emerged under the aegis of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia decades later. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the recruitment of extremists was facilitated by explosive population growth and unemployment. 41 Among extremist grievances are the corruption of the royal family, incomplete application of Shari'a law, the decision to allow foreign troops on Saudi soil in the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the relationship with the United States. 42 The presence of well-organized, radical Islamists within Saudi Arabiaand even within its own security services-cannot be entirely discounted_43 Saudi Arabia has prioritized counterterrorism and counterradicalism activities since the al Qaeda-linked Riyadh bombings of May 12, 2003. Having belatedly awakened to the internal threat, the Saudi leadership has sought to tackle the problem by means of" deradicalization" plan that involves cracking down on

84

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

provocative calls to arms, conducting counterterrorism operations, purging mosques and schools of thousands of the more radical teachers and imams, and reeducation programs for those who were not purged. 44 Nuclear weapons do not fit anywhere in this formula for dealing with extremists. In the security calculus of the Saudi leadership, nuclear weapons would be useless as a deterrent against Saudi nationals who seek to overthrow the state and might even prove dangerous because such technology could fall into the wrong hands. Though the aforementioned domestic measures appear to have largely contained the extremist threat, demographic and economic pressures continue to mount as more than so percent of Saudi Arabia's population is under the age of fifteen. 45 Although one might contemplate that the monarchy would consider trumpeting a nuclear weapons program as a means of distracting public attention from other problems, in fact such a move would more likely only destabilize the economy, further fueling popular discontent. THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT: SAUDI ARABIA'S ADVERSARIES AND ALLIES

According to classical realism and neorealism, the nuclearization of one state in the Middle East, like Iran, would motivate others, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, to follow suit. The priority for Saudi Arabia, it is argued, is to secure its continued existence by maximizing its power relative to other states such as Iran or Israel. Consistent with such assumptions, some analysts argue that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear weapons. For example, according to Richard Russell, "The Saudis have compelling reasons for working in the near-term on acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Riyadh probably bets that ... despite the risks, a policy of nuclear opacity offers the best chances for ensuring the kingdom's near- and long-term survival in the Gulf balance of power."46 According to Michael Levi of the Brookings Institute, Saudi Arabia would want nuclear weapons "because of a potentially dangerous confluence of events. The rapidly progressing nuclear program of traditional rival Iran has no doubt spooked the Saudi leadership." 47 A common view is that proliferation by Iran would lead to a regional nuclear arms race. According to this perspective, Saudi Arabia would seek to develop its own nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis Iran. Bradley Bowman argues that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would "place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit," 48 and Lippman reports that "some senior Saudi officials have said privately that their country's hand would be forced if it became known beyond doubt that Iran had become nuclear weapons capable."49

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

85

Saudi decision makers, it often is assumed, operate in an uncertain environment, unsure of the intentions of rival states like Iran, and thus are compelled to plan based on worst-case scenarios. According to realist paradigms, Saudi possession of nuclear weapons would increase the country's security and power, provide it with the ability to counter potential threats, and mitigate the risk of annihilation. A closer examination of these assumptions, however, leads to a different assessment. Saudi-Iranian Relations

The tense state of relations today between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be traced to a clash of ideologies and to power-based rivalries in the Gulf. The ideological dispute has a number of dimensions that include mutual perceptions of the other's dominant religious orientation as heretical, competition for the mantle of leader of the Islamic world, and a fear in Saudi Arabia that Iran's Islamic Revolution might have appeal among the kingdom's Shi'a. This ideological friction is reinforced by regional interstate rivalry that has persisted since the emergence of the Middle Eastern state system and was pronounced even when both states were under the leadership of conservative, pro-American monarchs. Until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated to contain the Arab nationalism promoted by Iraq's Ba'ath party. As Henner Fiirtig explains, Riyadh's balancing between Iran and Iraq in a triangle of power has provided the basis for regional order since the late 1950s. 50 The shah's Iran and Saudi Arabia cooperated after the British retreated from the Gulf in 1971 for the purpose of combating Soviet and leftist influence in the region, particularly during a Marxist uprising in the Dhufar region of Oman. Tensions spiraled, however, after the 1979 Revolution, creating a radical-conservative dichotomy between the two states. 51 Khomeini's rhetoric labeling of the Saudi monarchy as an "American agent" in the Gulf calls for the Saudi Shi'a in the kingdom's oil-rich province to foment their own Islamic Revolution presented a greater threat to Riyadh than socialist-inspired Iraqi Ba'athism. To balance the threat emanating from Iran, Saudi Arabia offered logistical and financial support to the Iraqis after their invasion of Iran in 1980, contributing the largest amount of funds among all Gulf states. 52 Animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran reached new heights during the Iran-Iraq War, particularly after Saudi planes shot down two Iranian F-4 fighter-bombers over the Gulf and following a skirmish between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces during the annual Hajj. Iranian pilgrims often used the Hajj as a venue to stage protests against the Saudi monarchy for its

86

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

close ties with the United States. During one such protest in 1987, close to 400 Iranian pilgrims were killed by Saudi security forces. The Islamic Republic intensified its political communication strategies calling for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, and Riyadh responded by implementing a quota system to limit the number of Iranian pilgrims allowed to partake in the Hajj. 53 During the author's field work in Saudi Arabia, interviewees recalled that they expected an Iranian invasion of the kingdom after this event. According to realist logic, Saudi Arabia should have embarked on a nuclear weapons program during this time to counter a threat from Iran, which enjoyed overwhelming conventional superiority. Lippman, for example, argued that the Saudis "could not defend their country against an all-out assault from Iran." 54 However, the threat from Iran did not prompt Saudi Arabia to pursue a nuclear option, possibly because Saudi leaders believed they could count on the support of the United States if Iran attempted an invasion. Furthermore, while Iran enjoyed numerical strength in terms of infantry numbers, Saudi Arabia's technological military superiority would have made an Iranian invasion difficult, particularly due to Tehran's lack of access to modern weaponry and defense systems as a result of various embargoes. 55 At the time, Iran also was bogged down in a conflict with Iraq, making an invasion of Saudi Arabia unlikely. Even after the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia possessed the largest defense budget in the region, outspending Iran. 56 Debates about conventional military threats from Iran subsided after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and allowed for a rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. Saudi Arabia restored its diplomatic ties with Iran and lifted the controversial Hajj quotas, and in return Iran refrained from protesting against the Saudi regime. 57 One might assume that the only way to protect Saudi interests in 1991, at a point when Iraq had invaded Kuwait and attacked Saudi soil with ballistic missiles and Iran and Syria seemed poised to emerge as regional hegemons, was to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, Saudi Arabia did not choose this path and in fact continued to pursue rapprochement with Tehran and Damascus. All three shared the common perception that Saddam Hussein was a regional threat and sought to ensure that Iraq would remain weak, contained by the international community and U.N. sanctions. In 2003, the three nations also shared the common perception that an American invasion would most likely destabilize Iraq with disruptive repercussions for the region. In fact, the invasion oflraq led to a power vacuum and a proxy war between Tehran and Riyadh, with Saudi Arabia lending support to Iraqi

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

87

Arab Sunni factions and Iran supporting Arab Shi'a groups. Realism would dictate the policy of indirect involvement to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, and Saudi nuclear weapons would not necessarily guarantee any advantage in this low-intensity proxy conflict. When international attention focused on Iran's nuclear program in 2003, and debates emerged on whether Iran had a latent capacity to develop a nuclear weapon, some analysts portrayed this potential as a proliferation catalyst for Riyadh. According to them, Saudi Arabia would be tempted to pursue a nuclear weapons option as a hedge whether or not Iran had a dedicated weapons program. An alternative perspective, however, was that ambiguity surrounding Iran's nuclear intentions might lead Saudi Arabia to pause before embarking down a nuclear weapons path. From this vantage point, Riyadh might hesitate to pursue a nuclear option for fear that such action would trigger Iran to shift from a latent capacity to active pursuit of nuclear weapons. At least for the time being, Saudi Arabia appears to have adopted a policy that depends on the international community to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capacity. 58 Yet, the international community's failure to force Iran to forego the full nuclear cycle has led to increasing skepticism within the Saudi government, and Riyadh is reluctant to entrust its national security entirely to the IAEA or the United States. 59 Riyadh continues to be concerned about Iran's nuclear aspirations. According to one congressional report, "senior and mid -level Saudi officials express an apparently unanimous belief among the upper-echelon of the Saudi government that the Iranian nuclear program does not solely exist for peaceful purposes." 60 While Saudi Arabia may not fear an Iranian nuclear attack, it would be wary of the redistribution of regional power that could dramatically alter the norms and alliances that have preserved the kingdom's legitimacy and kept it in power. 61 It remains unclear, however, at what point Saudi Arabia might launch a nuclear weapons program in response to Iran-that is, what event or development would serve as a trigger. Saudi-Israeli Relations

Just as Saudi-Iranian relations were aggravated by rival claims to leadership of the Islamic world, so are Saudi-Israeli relations affected by competing claims over holy sites in the region. More specifically, a major part of the Saudi monarch's legitimacy comes from the special role he plays as the custodian of Islam's holy sites, the third most sacred of which is Jerusalem. The entire city has been under Israeli control since 1967, leading Saudi Arabia to declare that,

88

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

until Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, are returned to Arab control, relations with Israel would not be normalized. Yet, if the Iranian threat has not compelled Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear weapons, adversarial relations with Israel seem even less likely to drive Riyadh's security perceptions. While the two countries have no diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia is not a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel's land forces do not pose a threat to Riyadh. Moreover, unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein or contemporary Iran, Saudi Arabia is not seen as posing anything resembling an existential threat to Israel. 62 Indeed, if Riyadh were to develop a nuclear program with the intention of deterring Iran, it might make Saudi Arabia less secure by inviting an Israeli air strike. It also is unlikely that a formal declaration oflsrael's nuclear arsenal would trigger a Saudi pursuit of nuclear weapons. Instead, a formal Israeli declaration would only increase international pressure to monitor Israel's nuclear weapons, which would ultimately be to the liking of the kingdom. Despite the absence of diplomatic ties and a generally adversarial relationship, Saudi-Israeli relations have thawed. Illustrative of this development was the land-for-peace initiative proposed in 2002 by then Crown Prince Abdallah. The plan was adopted by the Arab League during its summit in Beirut, and, although it never gathered subsequent momentum, it was significant in demonstrating the potential for improved relations. Arab Rivals

The rivalries between Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, particularly from the 1950s to 1990s, must be analyzed through the lens of ideological threats. As previously noted, the monarchy feared that secular, leftist Arab unity ideologies that emerged in Egypt in the 1950s and spread to Syria and Iraq also had the potential to destabilize the kingdom. Not only did the House of Saud fear the hegemonic ambitions of the father of Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser, but it was also wary that a future unified Arab state might deprive the monarchy of its extractive monopoly on the Kingdom's oil resources. Egypt and Saudi Arabia fought a proxy war in North Yemen, as well as a war of the airwaves in the 1950s and 1960s, but even when Egypt was at its strongest after unifying with Syria in 1958, it never posed a military threat to Saudi Arabia. As such, nuclear deterrence would have been superfluous. While Nasser did envision a pan-Arab state, he was consumed by the eventual secession of Syria three years later, as well as rivalries from Iraq. The complete defeat of Egyptian forces during the 1967 War with Israel removed any residual military threat from Egypt.

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

89

While the Saudi monarchy deemed the Arab socialism of Iraq's Ba'ath party a threat, it was not nearly as serious as Khomeini's overt calls for an Islamic revolution in the kingdom. As a consequence, Riyadh provided Baghdad with massive financial infusions during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. 63 However, shortly after the war ended, Saddam invaded Kuwait, causing a restructuring of regional alliances. Whether Iraq intended to invade the kingdom remains contentious, but Iraqi missiles did strike Saudi territory. The mere prospect of an Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia's oil fields was sufficient to bring the United States and a coalition of other states to its defense in the first Gulf War. This deployment set a precedent in which any attempted invasion of Saudi Arabia would have to contend with a massive international response. In 1990, a call from Riyadh to Washington and the price at the gas pump, rather than a nuclear deterrent, saved the Saudi kingdom. A new regional alliance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Syria and Egypt was envisioned after the 1991 conflict (known as the "GCC plus 2"), but Saudi Arabia also remained wary of the other two Arab states that had sought to emerge as regional hegemons in the past. Despite Iraq's nuclear intentions, which were known during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia did not attempt to develop a nuclear capability to hedge against Baghdad's potential weapons acquisition. As of 2009, the Iraqi government could barely defend itself, and the Iraqi military did not appear to be in a position to threaten Riyadh in the future. 64 The only other threat from an Arab state emanates from Yemen. The Saudisupported side in the Yemeni civil war lost in the 1960s, and there have been latent tensions between unified Yemen and Riyadh ever since. In the 1960s, the emergence of the People's Democratic Republic ofYemen in the south placed a Soviet ally on Saudi Arabia's doorstep. Ironically, Saudi Arabia supported the former Yemeni communists who revolted against the north after unification in 1991. Yemen poses no significant conventional threat and, in clashes over some islands in the Red Sea, Saudi forces prevailed. Yemen also is mired in its own internal conflicts with heavily armed tribes and does not appear to pose any threat to Riyadh in the near future. Thus, in terms of regional power politics, a conventional military threat does not appear on the horizon that would serve as a trigger for Saudi nuclear acquisition. Saudi-U.S. Relations

The strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States is often dated to 1945 when President Roosevelt met with King Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud

90

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

aboard USS Quincy in the Red Sea. Common opposition to the spread of communism in the Middle East ensured close cooperation throughout the Cold War and led to the provision of common aid to the Afghan mujahidin during the Soviet invasion. The Saudi-American relationship has been characterized as "a marriage of convenience." The United States deployed troops on Saudi soil to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait, despite the unpopularity of this move among segments of the Islamic world and within Saudi Arabia's own population. While the United States did come to Saudi Arabia's aid, the presence of American troops on Saudi soil proved to be unpopular in the region, was criticized within the kingdom, and was one of the reasons for Osama bin Laden's campaign against the monarchy. Thus, the durability of Saudi reliance on American deterrence cannot be taken for granted. Saudi Arabia does not have formal alliances, explicit security guarantees, or a "nuclear umbrella" relationship with any nuclear power. It does, however, maintain an informal alliance with the United States and also counts on implicit American security guarantees, as demonstrated by U.S. troop deployments during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis. Although informal in nature, this relationship provides Saudi Arabia with significant security benefits, from the ability to purchase advanced weaponry to the confidence that the United States would protect the country in case of a threat of external aggression. 65 This relationship has never been formalized due to domestic political considerations in both countries. In the case of the United States, America's special relationship with Israel renders overt or binding security guarantees to Saudi Arabia unpalatable for U.S. policy makers. 66 By the same token, for Saudi Arabia custodianship of the Two Holy Sites makes a formal alliance with the United States politically very difficult to sustain at home. A number of incidents have placed particular strains on the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United States reached a peak after Riyadh's role in the oil embargo of 1973, and contingency plans emerged among Washington policy circles for an armed seizure of the kingdom's oil fields. Relations also became strained following Saudi Arabia's purchase of close to fifty CSS-2 missiles from China in the late 198os-very inaccurate delivery systems that some skeptics in Washington believed made sense only if they were equipped with nuclear warheads. The purchase of the missiles, however, needs to be understood in the context of Saudi Arabia's failed attempt to acquire ballistic missiles from the United States. Regardless

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

91

of the Saudi rationale, the purchase produced a backlash in the United States, leading to increased pressure on the Saudis to sign and ratify the NPT. In addition, it led to the provision of personal assurances from King Fahd that Riyadh would not seek nuclear or chemical warheads for the missiles. 67 This experience suggests that the United States would respond very strongly should there be any signals that Riyadh was walking away from its prior nonproliferation commitments. At the time of the missile purchase, Saudi Arabia was situated in a neighborhood in which Iran and Iraq had deployed ballistic missiles during the eight-year war, and missile proliferation was observable in states such as Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Israel. Although neorealism might suggest an explanation for the Saudi purchase in terms of external security threats, Etel Solingen's domestic regime survival framework may be more helpful in pointing out the political utility of the missiles. Saudi Arabia's acquisition of missiles that could reach Tehran helped assuage fears among Saudi elites about a possible Iranian invasion or military strike but also demonstrated to the elite and the public that the monarchy could act independently of the United States. Probably the lowest point in U.S.-Saudi relations was the revelation following the September 11, 2001, attacks that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were of Saudi origin. This news prompted some to speculate that the marriage of convenience was "heading for a divorce." 68 On the U.S. side, Washington was very critical of the Saudi relationship with organizations deemed terrorist groups, 69 while in Saudi Arabia there was growing anti-Americanism because of the manner in which the kingdom was demonized in the United States.7° This anti-American sentiment built on a legacy of resentment in Saudi Arabia about the special U.S. relationship with Israel and the long-standing unpopularity of the United States within the religious establishment. 71 The U.S. invasion of Iraq also was widely criticized in Saudi Arabia as an action that strengthened Iran's regional influence, brought destabilizing sectarian civil strife to Iraq that might spill into Saudi Arabia, and deemed by some to be an "illegitimate foreign occupation." 72 Some Saudis even expressed the fear that the United States would seek to undermine or invade Saudi Arabia after the Iraq War. These opinions were documented in a Middle East Policy Council roundtable with Saudi participants, where it was said, "There is now a general rejection of U.S. policy across a range of issues and a fear of American intentions, even toward Saudi Arabia itself." 73 Some of the Saudis present suggested that, after invading Iraq, the United States would next take military

92

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

action against the kingdom due to the number of its nationals involved interrorism and its oil resources?4 This rising anti-American sentiment could eventually force the royal family to distance itself from the United States to preserve its own legitimacy. Nevertheless, public opinion is fickle in any country, and anti-Americanism could also decline in the kingdom if there were some shift in U.S. policy-for example, major progress toward a mediated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following the U.S. presidential elections in 2008, Saudi opinion had been more optimistic about the new administration, and President Obama's speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in June 2009 was generally positively received in the kingdom among journalists and policy makers. Even before Iran's nuclear program received much public scrutiny, Richard L. Russell made the case in a 2001 essay for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability. He argued, "It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom's defense under any and all circumstances." 75 He also asserted that "from Riyadh's perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary." Those "secure delivery systems," Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but "ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace." 76 This chapter challenges Russell's assertion but acknowledges that it is necessary to assess Saudi Arabia's nuclear posture in the light of the further downward spiral in bilateral U.S.-Saudi relations. An important potential trigger that could change Saudi Arabia's nuclear posture is possible reassessment by Riyadh of its confidence in U.S. readiness to defend the kingdom against external threats. Such a development could exert strong pressure on the Saudi government to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. However, as Gawdat Bahgat argues, a weakening of an American commitment to defend Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future: "The American-Saudi unofficial alliance is built on shared interests, not common values. Saudi oil is crucial to the prosperity of the American and world economies, and oil is projected to remain the main source of energy in the next few decades." 77 Moreover, the Saudis are aware that a significant strain in the relationship with America would result from a Saudi proliferation decision, and they are not likely to take that step casually. Washington, however, also will need to be sensitive to Saudi

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

93

concerns and continue to nurture its strategic relationship with Riyadh if it hopes to ensure the kingdom's nuclear abstinence. Saudi-Pakistani Relations

Saudi-Pakistani bilateral relations have remained consistently strong. Pakistan leased entire battalions of its army to protect the kingdom during the Iran-Iraq War, in the light of potential threats from the Islamic Republic, and the two countries cooperated in providing support to the same factions of the Afghan mujahidin during the Soviet invasion. Saudi Arabia also has provided a home for exiled Pakistani politicians, including former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Speculation about Pakistani-Saudi cooperation in the nuclear field began at least as early as Khilawi's defection in 1994. Renewed attention to the issue was precipitated in May 1999 when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif showed Defense Minister Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud Pakistan's nuclear weapon facilities in Kahuta.78 According to a senior Pakistani journalist at the Karachi Newsline, a Saudi Arabian defense team, along with the Saudi defense minister, visited the highly restricted uranium enrichment facility and the factory where the Ghauri missile is assembled.7 9 The visit to Kahuta was the first ever by a foreign dignitary and only the third visit by a Pakistani prime minister. Some observers have argued that the visit laid the foundations for closer Pakistani-Saudi relations in both missile- and nuclearrelated affairs. The Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan is known to have traveled to Saudi Arabia in November 1999, a few months after the Kahuta visit, ostensibly to attend a conference on the Islamic world. 80 In the following year, Dr. Khan headed a Pakistani delegation to visit Saudi Arabia at the behest of Prince Sultan; and, in 2002, a son of Abdallah was an honored guest when Pakistan first fired its 950-mile range Ghauri nuclear-capable missile. 81 Reports also emerged that in early 2002 the two countries began an exchange of nuclear scientists. According to a Pakistani analyst, U.S. intelligence claimed that, under cover of Hajj, several Pakistani scientists visited Riyadh and were missing from their hotels for more than two weeks. 82 The argument for a Saudi-Pakistani nuclear connection emphasizes the deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relations and also deduces that, because Pakistan would have had trouble financing a nuclear program, Riyadh must have subsidized the effort. Saudi Arabia, it is argued, had three options to maintain its security: acquire an independent nuclear deterrent; obtain a nuclear umbrella

94

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

from an existing nuclear power; or strive for a nuclear-free Middle East. Because the third option may be unrealistic given Israel's nuclear arsenal, the first and second options may be plausible ones for the kingdom, and both would imply Pakistani involvement. 83 The Israeli Defense Forces have explicitly expressed such fears, even reporting that "a senior Saudi delegation traveled to Pakistan and is negotiating the purchase of Pakistani nuclear warheads." 84 Other Israeli analysts, however, concede that such a scenario remains merely a scenario. "A top-level Israeli source," for example, said he "had no doubts the Saudis have the resources to purchase nuclear weapons but ... doubted they would make such a provocative move against the United States." 85 Indian commentators also point to a Riyadh-Islamabad axis. One of the more detailed accounts of the alleged history of cooperation is provided by G. Parthasarathy, former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, who argues that "beginning in the 1970s Saudi Arabia poured over $1 billion into Pakistan to help Pakistan develop an 'Islamic' nuclear bomb to help it counter the 'Hindu' nuclear threat." 86 Saudi Arabia, he contends, also aided Pakistan's purchase of nuclear-capable F-16s and continued to be its closest economic patron during the imposition of international sanctions following Islamabad's May 1998 nuclear tests. According to Parthasarathy, there are reports that Pakistan planned to station nuclear weapons on Saudi soil atop a new generation of Chinese-supplied ballistic missiles, which would be under Pakistani command. This action, it is argued, would provide Pakistan the strategic depth it lost after the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and would give China strategic depth in the Middle East. 87 These assertions are noteworthy because they appeared in a publication respected for its objectivity and investigative reporting and illustrate how ingrained the belief in South Asia is of a Pakistani-Saudi axis. Not surprisingly, Islamabad vehemently denies such allegations. That being said, a popular position in Pakistani society is that the state should proliferate nuclear technology to other Muslim states. This view is reflected in an editorial in the Pakistani daily Nawa-i Waqt, a conservative, pro-Islamic paper with a wide circulation: Israel is the only nuclear power in the Middle East. It is therefore important that not only Saudi Arabia but also all the countries in the region should be equipped with nuclear technology. With the grace of God, Pakistan by timely nuclear explosion has negated expansionist designs of its shrewd enemy-India.

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

95

Pakistan is now self-sufficient in its defense. The entire Islamic community can in fact benefit from Pakistan's experience, knowledge and technology. 88 While it appears that there has been some degree of interaction between Riyadh and Islamabad in the nuclear sphere, there is no conclusive evidence that Saudi Arabia has tried to purchase nuclear weapons from foreign suppliers nor that the country has bought delivery systems to pair with nuclear weapons. 89 Were Saudi Arabia to seek to procure materials for a nuclear weapons program, it might well attempt to use its Pakistani contacts. This would not be a simple task, however, given global efforts to prevent the proliferation of sensitive items and increased scrutiny of the kingdom due to its role as a "breeding ground" for terrorists. Moreover, while there are reports of Saudi nuclear scientists having cooperated previously with Iraq and Pakistan, there is no public evidence that the kingdom has gained the technical knowledge or the human capacity needed to develop an indigenous weapons program.90 In short, although the possibility of nuclear cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan cannot be discounted, this study argues that a combination of political and economic factors is likely to deter Saudi Arabia from seeking nuclear weapons from Pakistan. SAUDI ARABIA'S INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN AND PETRO-POLICY

The application of a neoliberal institutionalist framework to Saudi nuclear decision making would emphasize the role of key international treaties and organizations like the NPT and the IAEA, respectively, or shared norms and values that purportedly enable states to forego nuclear weapons without incurring substantial security risks. 91 One also might point to Saudi Arabia's active support for the establishment of NWFZ in the Middle East and statements by some of its leaders that nuclear weapons acquisition is contrary to the tenets of Islam as evidence consistent with a neoliberal institutionalist interpretation. 92 The kingdom's public foreign policy doctrine emphasizes the country's commitment to "adherence to the regulations of international law, agreements, charters and bilateral agreements." 93 Saudi Arabia's actual track record of behavior in the international sphere, though not without instances of meddling in the affairs of other Islamic countries (such as Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), historically has reflected this officialline. 94 Furthermore, the guiding

96

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

principle for Saudi foreign policy has been the maintenance of stability in the oil markets. 95 Although Saudi Arabia is one of the founding members of the Arab League, it is doubtful that the kingdom would rely on this pan-Arab framework to maintain regional order. The Saudi leadership, however, has sought to use the Arab League for the purpose of promoting a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for example, supported the establishment of a technical committee for the purpose of exploring a Middle East NWFZ under the umbrella of the Arab League at its 101st session in 2003.96 Saudi Arabia also participates in the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was formed in 1981 in response to the Iran-Iraq War. The council was intended to ensure the collective security and political survival of the six Arab monarchies in the Gulf. A basic premise was that if any one of the petro-monarchies were to be destabilized, the others also would likely falter. 97 As Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal emphasized in a December 2004 speech, a crucial element of any regional security framework is "a strong, vibrant Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in which the members are integrated economically, politically, and militarily." 98 As a GCC member, Saudi Arabia has voiced strong support for a joint nuclear energy program aimed at staving off a nuclear arms race in the region99 and providing nuclear fuel to Middle Eastern states. 100 According to King Abdallah, "We have proposed a solution, which is to create a consortium for all users of enriched uranium in the Middle East. We will do it in a collective manner through a consortium that will distribute according to needs, give each plant its own necessary amount, and ensure no use of this enriched uranium for atomic weapons." 101 In addition to supporting a multinational uranium bank in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States on nuclear energy cooperation in May 2008 in which the country "stated its intent to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel." 102 While several GCC countries have proposed a cooperative program under comprehensive safeguards with international control of the fuel cycle, the ultimate priority for this body and its constituent bodies is the stability of the oil market. Indeed, the stability of oil markets is crucial for understanding Saudi Arabia's nuclear weapons abstention. Regime survival and economic integration considerations are also incompatible with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Saudi elites seek to maintain their positions of privilege and power, and

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

97

economic integration fosters the security not only of the Saudi state overall but also of these elites in particular. In short, economic integration serves the interests of the monarchy better than a nuclear deterrent. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the world's swing producer, with most of the world's oil production capacity. The kingdom has the final sway on maintaining oil prices and is a key global supplier. The International Energy Information Administration, for example, projects that China alone may import up to 10 million barrels of oil per day by the year 2020, with most of this amount coming from Saudi Arabia. 103 The Saudi-American relationship is based on an agreement that, in exchange for Saudi Arabia's stable custodianship of its oil reserves, reasonable rates of production, and, more recently, efforts to contain militant Islamist elements within its borders, the United States guarantees Saudi security through the sale of conventional arms and an implicit commitment to defend the country should the need arise. 104 In response to emerging domestic issues-which include a population boom, rising unemployment rates, and lower per capita incomes, all of which have weakened the Saudi economy-the Saudi regime has sought an increase in foreign investments. 105 As Sammy Salama and Heidi Weber point out, the United States plays an important role in this regard and serves as an "indispensable patron" for Saudi Arabia. 106 Given the United States' "unequivocal" opposition to WMD proliferation, in Russell's words, "a decision to proliferate by Saudi Arabia obviously would have disastrous consequences for the U.S.-Saudi partnership." 107 Lippman similarly comments that seeking nuclear weapons "would antagonize [Saudi Arabia's] most important ally and protector, the United States." 108 Etel Solingen's "political survival model" suggests that the most important factor in nuclear decisions is domestic regime security as opposed to state security, which tends to receive the most attention in proliferation forecasts. 109 In terms of Solingen's model, the government of Saudi Arabia has adopted an "outward" economic orientation and greater internationalization and is thus less likely to seek nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has cultivated extensive economic relations with nearly every major world power, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and France. Nuclear proliferation would bring a volatile element into the equation that would be unattractive to foreign investors driving the country's growth. The kingdom's foreign investment policy stipulates that "the government's established policy is not to impose any restrictions on the movement of capital into and out of

98

IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI

the Kingdom." 110 A "Foreign Investment Law" adopted in 2000 gives investors 100 percent ownership of projects in the kingdom, grants them the opportunity to receive loans from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, and sets the objective of attracting one trillion dollars in foreign investment over twenty years.m In its "Doing Business in 2008" report, the International Finance Corporation (a private sector investment arm of the World Bank) rates the kingdom twenty-third of a total of 178 countries in which foreigners can invest, the highest ranking for a Middle Eastern country other than Israel. 112 In December 2005, the kingdom officially joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) after a twelve-year period of accession. 113 In what has evolved into another multilateral economic partnership, the GCC countries established a common market, which began January 1, 2008, and the plan is to move to a common currency in the future. Thus, the notion of"Saudi petro-nukes" adopted in the title of this chapter is meant to highlight the contradiction in the Saudi case of simultaneously pursuing petro and nuclear weapons policies. Nuclear weapons acquisition is an unlikely scenario in a rentier state like Saudi Arabia. Petro-nukes may appear as an ideal means to protect vulnerable assets, such as the oil fields in the kingdom's Eastern Province. However, unlike Iran, which is also a rentier state, Saudi Arabia has not developed the self-sufficiency of the Islamic Republic, which endured sanctions during the Iran-Iraq War. Unlike the current ruling elite in Iran, those in Saudi Arabia have a vested interest in international trade. CONCLUSION

Saudi Arabia appears content to remain a significant but nonhegemonal regional power. It is concerned about regional nuclear weapons proliferation, and the leadership has expressed strong reservations about both Israel's nuclear arsenal and Iran's nuclear intentions. There is little evidence, however, that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race. The most pressing threats to the Saudi monarchy are internal, and nuclear weapons would prove ineffective against such threats. This chapter examined a variety of factors bearing on Saudi Arabia's present and future propensity to proliferate. Solingen's emphasis on economic orientation is particularly appropriate in the Saudi case given the central role maintenance of vibrant external economic relations plays in Saudi foreign policy. Hymans's theory also can be applied to Saudi Arabia due to the hierarchical nature of the Saudi regime and the concentration of all critical security

SAUDI PETRO-NUKES?

99

decisions in the office of the king. The policy of the Saudi leadership should be interpreted through the filter of domestic political survival, which influences how the leadership will react to various trends and trigger events as it seeks to strengthen its own legitimacy. This approach offers an explanation for Saudi Arabia's decades-long effort to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in the Middle East, its policy of slowly liberalizing domestic politics, its controversial purchase of CSS-2 missiles from China, its current outward-looking economic policies, and its nuclear forbearance. Among potential proliferation incentives, only regional nuclear proliferation developments and considerations of Saudi regional power status/prestige appear to be significant. These pressures, however, are more than counterbalanced by the force of existing treaties, reputation, the risks of intervention by Israeli and other major powers, the danger of inadvertently stimulating Iran's nuclear program in a more threatening direction, and the existence of an informal alliance with a nuclear weapons state (the United States). These factors tilt decisively in the direction of Saudi nuclear restraint, a conclusion that is also consistent with the application of the theoretical models of Etel Solingen and Jacques Hymans. One possible, if unlikely, course of events that could alter the balance of proliferation incentives and disincentives would be a deterioration of the unofficial U.S. security guarantee coupled with the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. However, even in the case of a dramatic deterioration of relations with the United States in which informal U.S. security guarantees are no longer credible, Saudi Arabia could plausibly reorient its geostrategic dependence and seek guarantees from a number of other nuclear powers, such as Pakistan, China and Russia, each of whom has a significant stake in Saudi stability. Although regional proliferation on the heels of dramatic Iranian progress toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons would place pressure on Saudi Arabia to go nuclear, that pressure would be mitigated by the continuation of close relations with the United States, as well as the powerful force of economic pressures to maintain an "outward" orientation. Present and future Saudi leaders appreciate the fact that the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia constitutes the safest and most robust deterrent to external aggression. Indeed, a budding Saudi nuclear weapons program would not only threaten the kingdom's scrupulously internationalized economy and its hard-won reputation for stability and pragmatism, it would invite outside military, economic, and diplomatic aggression and intervention. The Saudis do not want any part of the spotlight Iran has enjoyed since 2003.

5

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE Leonard S. Spector and Deborah R. Berman

6, 2007, in a dawn air strike, Israel destroyed a facility in Syria near the town of Dair Alzour.1 According to an April 2008 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefing, which provided the first official comment on the episode, the facility was a nuclear reactor, built with North Korean assistance beginning in 2001, which appeared to many to have been the centerpiece of an incipient Syrian nuclear weapons program. Understanding the dimensions and the underlying objectives of Syria's apparent effort to develop nuclear arms poses a particular challenge, however. Not only has very little information about the program been released as of this writing, but Syria's closed political system makes the country's decision-making processes unusually opaque, the more so where the inherently sensitive subject of weapons of mass destruction is concerned. Such difficulties notwithstanding, this chapter will review what is known about the Syrian nuclear program itself and examine an array of factors that may have led to its development. Because crucial details, such as the dates of key decisions, remain unknown, this analysis will concentrate on the vision of the program's history that seems most plausible but will also comment on a number of alternative hypotheses. The chapter will then examine the extent to which the history of the Syrian nuclear program supports major theories that seek to explain and predict state decisions to acquire nuclear arms. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the likelihood that Syria will seek to rebuild its nuclear program, as Iraq did after Israel's destruction of the Osiraq reactor in 1981. ON SEPTEMBER

100

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

101

THE CONTOURS OF SYRIA'S APPARENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

On April 24, 2008, the U.S. CIA released a video and the text of an off-therecord briefing to journalists on the Dair Alzour facility. 2 According to the CIA, North Korean-Syrian nuclear cooperation-presumably with a military focus-began "probably as early as 1997,'' and construction of the AI Kibar reactor began in 2001. 3 The reactor, according to the agency, was modeled on North Korea's reactor at Yongbyon, which produced plutonium for that country's nuclear weapons program, and was "nearing operational capability" when it was destroyed. The CIA also stressed that Syria had taken extraordinary steps to disguise the facility in an effort to prevent its discovery by outsiders. It further underscored that the facility was not configured for the production of electricity and was ill suited for traditional nuclear energy research purposes, indicating that it was apparently built for the production of plutonium, which most observers presume was to be used for nuclear weapons. Until this revelation, Syria was believed to have only the most limited nuclear infrastructure, centered on a research reactor too small to be of military significance. However, the CIA stated that it had not found a plant for fabricating the reactor's natural uranium fuel and did not identify any other source of fuel for the facility, such as supply from North Korea. This raises questions as to how close to becoming operational the facility may have been. 4 In addition, the CIA also stated that it had not identified a "reprocessing" plant for extracting weapons-usable plutonium from spent fuel taken from the Dair Alzour reactor, an essential step in the production of nuclear weapons. Lacking evidence of a fuel fabrication facility and a reprocessing plant, the agency declared that it had only "low confidence" that Syria was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. 5 At this time, however, this appears to be the most plausible explanation for Syria's construction of the reactor. 6 Syria is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which it has pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place all of its nuclear activities under inspection by the IAEA. How Syria was going to fuel its reactor and separate plutonium created in that fuel constitute two of the key unanswered questions concerning Syria's nuclear activities. If it is presumed that Syria was, indeed, secretly seeking to develop nuclear arms, then an explanation must be provided as to how it intended to achieve this end. One hypothesis is that the necessary additional

102 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

facilities to permit the production of plutonium for weapons have been or were being built in Syria but have yet not been discovered. An alternative hypothesis is that North Korea was to provide the fuel for the initial loading of the reactor using excess fresh fuel originally intended for use in North Korea's Yongbyon reactor and that the facility for fabricating additional fuel was to be secretly built in Syria. 7 It is also possible that the reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from the Dair Alzour fuel once irradiated was to be built in Syria in the future; reportedly, North Korea did not complete its own reprocessing plant until after it had begun operation of the Yongbyon reactor. The principal alternative to these various possibilities-namely that Syria built the reactor but did not intend to operate it to obtain plutonium-does not appear credible in light of the expense and risk of exposure to international sanctions that building the reactor entailed and the numerous factors, discussed later in this chapter, that appeared to prompt Syria during the 1990s to pursue nuclear arms. Although the CIA places the commencement of some form of SyrianNorth Korea nuclear cooperation in 1997 and start of construction of the Dair Alzour facility in 2001, the summer of 2000 appears to be a crucial time for further scrutiny. As the agency notes, the nuclear dialog between Damascus and Pyongyang began during the tenure of Hafez al-Asad; but, until further details emerge, it will not be possible to determine with certainty whether he launched Syria's apparent bid for nuclear weapons before he died of a heart attack in June 2000 or whether Syria's nuclear engagement with North Korea during his lifetime was purely exploratory. The latter chronology would indicate that the reactor project was launched by his son, Bashar, who became Syria's president in July 2000. One Israeli press report states that the foundation for the deal was laid just before the elder al-Asad died, and arrangements were concluded soon afterward, when his son had become Syria's new leader. 8 The timing would be consistent with the CIA's 2001 start date for construction of the Dair Alzour reactor. Syria's reported September 2000 test of a North Korean-supplied 700 kilometer (km) range nuclear-capable Scud-D missile may be a separate indication that Syrian-North Korean strategic cooperation intensified over the summer of 2000. The system was later added to Syria's arsenal. Syria had purchased its first missiles from North Korea, the soo km range Scud-C, in 1991, and further purchases of the system were made throughout the early 1990s.9 If, indeed, the decision to build the reactor was taken in the summer of 2000, the failure of brief U.S.-brokered peace talks with Israel from December 16,

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

103

1999, to January 23, 2000, was likely a contributing factor, as the development meant the bilateral relationship would continue to be characterized by confrontation rather than accommodation. The timing of the decision to build the Dair Alzour reactor is, thus, a second crucial unanswered question concerning Syria's apparent nuclear weapon program. As the analysis in the following pages will consider in greater detail, multiple factors may have motivated Hafez al-Asad to pursue a nuclear weapon program in the period between Syria's reported early nuclear discussions with North Korea in 1997 and As ad's death in mid-2ooo. But, if the decision to launch the reactor project did not take place until after his death and the project was purely the initiative of his son Bashar, the effort could be the result of a somewhat different constellation of factors. To provide structure to the discussion that follows, as a baseline hypothesis, it will be assumed that the senior Asad made the decision to develop nuclear weapons between 1997 and his death in June 2000 and that he made the decision to build Dair Alzour, specifically, prior to his death but that the deal was finalized later in the summer of 2000 by Bashar. 10 Alternative hypotheses will, however, be addressed at appropriate points in the discussion. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING SYRIA'S NUCLEAR DECISIONS IN CONTEXT

As discussed, three key dates have been identified as major milestones for the development of Syria's clandestine nuclear program: 1997, when some degree of nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea was initiated; 2000, when the decision to construct the nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour was reportedly made; and 2001, when construction of the reactor actually began. To understand the motivations behind the decisions to advance the program, it is essential to understand the environment in which these decisions were taken. The geostrategic position, domestic political situation, and economic status of Syria around these key times will now be examined. Syria's modern existence began with its emergence from French colonial rule after World War II, which found it a fundamentally disunited postcolonial failed stateY A predominantly Sunni Arab country, it has been dominated by the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'ath Party) since 1963. In November 1970, after Syria experienced periods of instability, abortive efforts to confederate with Egypt and Ba'athist Iraq, and defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, then-Minister of Defense Hafez al-Asad, a member of the minority Alawite

104

SPECTOR AND BERMAN

tribe, seized power in a bloodless coup. His subsequent efforts to consolidate his authority entailed the suppression of dissent, as in the 1982 crushing of an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama that left thousands dead. Asad also implemented a socialist-style state-run economy, which further expanded his regime's control over the country. Although it is no longer as brittle as in the immediate postcolonial period of its history, Syrian society remains fragmentedY This influences its leadership, particularly insofar as the top echelon is composed of members of a historically disadvantaged minority, by forcing it to contend with a mild but persistent degree of instability that is always at risk of worsening. Some scholars, however, perceive that this threat of destabilization is neutralized by a general fear among the Syrian polity of the unknown alternative if the Asad regime were oustedY Geostrategic Environment

The international community in the mid-1990s and early 2ooos can be broadly characterized as caught up in the transition from the stability of Cold War bipolarity to the modern polyarchic or loosely unipolar system. 14 Many aspects of this transition have had a significant impact on the geostrategic situation of Syria as it pursued its objectives of pan-Arab irredentism and regional status. Collapse of the USSR Perhaps the geopolitical event with the most profound impact for Syria was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its longtime patron, in December 1991.15 For years the patron-client relationship with the Soviet Union had guaranteed an unimpeded flow of subsidized, technologically advanced arms to Syria. The Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Hafez al-Asad in 1980, codified existing cooperation between the countries, conferring on the Asad regime legitimacy, stability, and regional standing, while securing a staunch outpost in the Middle East for the Soviets. 16 Soviet patronage was particularly important to the Asad regime because of the great premium Damascus placed on achieving "strategic parity" with Israel. Although it was generally understood that the Soviet-Syrian relationship was not comparable in closeness to that between the United States and Israel, and in particular that the Soviet nuclear umbrella fell short of extending to Syria, 17 the close ties with Moscow gave Syria at least the appearance of strategic parity with Israel, which the Soviets allowed Damascus to advertise by remaining vague as to the relationship's limitations. 18 However, this was lost with the collapse of the USSR, as was any realistic

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

105

prospect for achieving either strategic parity or even a fully equalizing deterrent capability. 19 The relationship underwent initial strain under Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991), who, in addition to improving relations with Israel, staunched the flow of arms to Damascus under his "new thinking" by insisting that the Syrians, who by 1989 had accumulated a debt to the Soviets of between $9 and $20 billion, pay cash for any new weapon shipments. 20 Relations between Moscow and Damascus dramatically worsened after the Soviet Union's collapse, as ersatz patron Russia, under President Boris Yeltsin, found itself in dire economic straits. In addition, a severely weakened Russia was more susceptible to international pressure against selling arms to "rogue" regimes, such as Syria. Indeed, after the USSR's collapse, there were no Syrian arms deals with Russia until1998, and even that deal was far more restrictive than those to which Syria was long accustomed. 21 Syria, as a result, sought to purchase arms elsewhere, in particular from North Korea, Iran, and China, 22 and shifted its emphasis more toward asymmetric warfare. 23 The collapse of the USSR-and of the bipolar system overall-also deprived Syria of the political support that had underpinned its efforts to expand its influence in the region and globally. A small country with a weak economy, disunited society, and limited indigenous industrial and military production base, Syria had poor credentials for influencing external events. It has been observed that even Asad himself was well aware of the "weaknesses of his own power, of his regime, and of Syria as a state." 24 However, its position as a Soviet outpost-and Hafez al-Asad's remarkable panache in manipulating competing forces to advance Syria's interests-gave Syria a far higher profile than it might have otherwise enjoyed. The result was that Syria, despite its at-best middle-power qualifications, became a key regional player and commanded the consideration of the major powers. 25 Now, with no patron to compensate for its shortcomings and no bipolar system to manipulate to its advantage, 26 and instead an international community converging around a superpower intolerant of Syria's belligerent tactics, the prospects for Syria regaining the status, however inflated, that it had long enjoyed were increasingly dim. From another perspective, with the loss of its patron, Syria also freed itself from the strategic constraints such patronage most likely placed upon it. For, while providing essential political and military support to Damascus, it is reasonable to surmise that the Soviet Union also acted as a restraint on Syria's possible nuclear ambitions. Throughout its patronage of Syria, Moscow had

106 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

shown itself wary of fomenting a regional conflict in which it might become embroiled and generally restrained a belligerent Syria from any action with serious potential to destabilize the region. 27 As such, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union would have quashed any Syrian nuclear ambitions by the threat of withholding political-military support-much as the United States used similar threats to deflect Taiwan and South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons in the 1970s and, in the case of Taiwan, once again in the 1980s. After 1992, Russia's unwillingness or inability to make credible defense commitments to Damascus may have led the Asads to believe, that, in this respect, at least, they had little to lose, and potentially much to gain, by pursuing a nuclear arsenal. 28 New Fears of Encirclement

Since its creation, Syria has suffered from inherent strategic vulnerability, due in large part to the innate volatility of the region in which it is situated. Asad's regime had long sought to forestall "encirclement" by regimes hostile to its interests, allied to the United States, and tolerant toward Israel-along with its own marginalization and the irrelevance that was likely to follow. 29 However, from Asad's point of view, this feared outcome came increasingly closer to reality in the decade following the Cold War's end. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East grew, such that, according to Israeli Syria specialist Eyal Zisser, the senior Asad perceived Washington as a threat to Syrian interests in the region. 30 With the Gulf Arab states increasingly under the protection of Washington, Iraq defeated by a U.S.-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, U.S.sponsored peace talks dominating headlines in the Middle East, and the lack of another great power in the region to balance Washington's influence, Syria found itself virtually encircled by unsympathetic forces. Asad had long held the goal of improving relations with the United States, which he understood to be the key to influencing developments in the Middle East; thus, one of his primary foreign policy priorities had long been to "manage" the relationship with Washington so as to maximize the consideration it would show for Syrian interests. 31 However, he is said to have feared that he would not succeed unless Syria could come to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Asad's surprising willingness to participate in the 1991 U.S.-led peace talks with Israel indicated his recognition that the road to achieving his regional goals meant working with a United States now deeply entrenched in the region. Meanwhile, the sizable military buildup on which he simultaneously

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

107

embarked sought to address his concern that he was operating from a position of relative weakness. 32 The defeat oflraq by a U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991 had a particularly profound effect on Syria's strategic environment. After both Egypt and Saudi Arabia established close ties to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, Syria had turned toward Iraq as its sole remaining potential regional ally with substantial military capabilities. Although dire economic straits and the hope of a Western payout had pushed Syria so far as to participate in the coalition, this marriage of convenience did not assuage Asad's deeply rooted suspicion oflsrael and the West. Thus, Iraq's utter defeat dashed Syria's hopes for a strong regional partner to meet the enduring challenge from Tel Aviv and Washington. 33 This was a disastrous development for Syria, as its primary objective was regaining of the Golan Heights, lost to Israel in the 1967 Six Day Arab-Israeli War. Adding to anxieties in Damascus was that, in the midst of the transition to a post-Cold War world and on the heels of Iraq's defeat, Turkey and Israel, two states Syria had long considered threats, undertook a strategic alliance. A "gradual rapprochement" in their relations began as early as the late 1980s, but the process, according to scholar David Kushner, was "greatly accelerated" in the mid- to late 1990s, involving major economic agreements and culminating in the conclusion of two military accords in 1996 and the holding of joint military exercises and other cooperative undertakings. 34 While it has been suggested that threatening behavior on the part of Syria may have been an important spur to the newly formed Turkish-Israeli alliance-Kushner cites Syria's growing support for Kurdish separatists in Turkey, its accelerated armament, and the close relations formed between Syria and both Iran and Greece-the fact remains that the prospect of simultaneous pressure on both Syria's northern and southern borders caused great alarm in Damascus. This was demonstrated by a Syrian military buildup along its Turkish border soon afterward. 35 The threat from Turkey loomed still larger in 1998, when, in an effort to end Syrian support for Kurdish separatists, Ankara surged forces to the Syrian border in a confrontation that briefly brought the two countries to the brink of war. 36 A result of this shift in regional dynamics was the strengthening of SyrianIranian ties. The link had been established in the 1980s, when both states aided each other during their respective conflicts with powerful enemies-Syria, challenged by Israel during the latter's 1982 extended incursion into Lebanon;

108

SPECTOR AND BERMAN

and Iran, by Iraq's invasion in 1980 that led to the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Despite "less than complete confidence" between Tehran and Damascus, 37 Asad made deliberate efforts to upgrade bilateral ties throughout the 1990s, signing a strategic accord with Tehran in 1991. 38 The provisions of the agreement have never been disclosed, but it has been observed that the scope of military cooperation broadened dramatically to include joint production of 500-kilometer-range Scud-C missiles (with North Korea and Chinese technology and assistance), Syrian assistance with integration and maintenance of Russian equipment recently acquired by Iran, and the use of Iranian ports and airfields to transship North Korean Scud-Cs destined for Syria. 39 Their respective sense of isolation from the rest of the region and indeed from the international community, together with their shared anxieties about further U.S. intervention in the area, drew the two states closer. 40 In addition, former U.S. official Flynt Leverett posits that part of Syria's motivation in seeking closer ties with Iran was to "bolster its regional position" by leveraging bilateral relationships with "problem" states, increasing the prospective costs to the United States, Israel, and other regional actors of ignoring or threatening Syria's interests. 41 As Leverett notes, Hafez al-Asad was particularly motivated to this end after the announcement of the Israeli-Turkish alliance and the election of the ultrahawkish Binyamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in 1996. These combined pressures led the elder Asad to reach out even to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, beginning around 1996, in spite of the long-standing personal animosity between the two rulers and the U.N.-imposed restrictions on Iraq's military capabilities after the first Gulf War. 42 While rumors repeatedly surfaced in the regional press during 1998 and 1999 about the possibility of a diplomatic and strategic Syrian-Iraqi entente, and illicit trade between Damascus and Baghdad flourished until Saddam's ouster in 2003, how much stock Asad put in his ties to Baghdad remains unclear. 43 Syria also appears to have responded to growing external pressures by building up its nonnuclear unconventional forces. According to the 2001 U.S. Defense Department report Proliferation Threat and Response: Since the loss of its Soviet sponsor a decade ago and its inability to achieve conventional parity with Israel, Syria has increasingly relied on a strategic deterrent, based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities, as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival against potential regional adversaries. Syria also likely sees the development of these weapons as a cheaper alternative

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

109

than trying to achieve conventional parity with Israel. As a result, Damascus has continued to develop and expand its ballistic missile and chemical weapons capabilities, and, to lesser extent, biological weapons capabilities. Syria is likely to maintain and improve these capabilities over the long term. 44 The 2001 report goes on to state that "Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles. Additionally, Syria is trying to develop the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX."45 Syria is not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. (It has . signed, but not ratified, the Biological Weapons Convention.) As noted, the 1990s also saw Syria's acquisition of the Scud-C, with a range some 200 kilometers greater than the 300 kilometer range Scud-B, the previous mainstay of its missile force. 46 Syria continued to advance its missile capabilities in subsequent years, developing longer range missiles, such as the Scud-D, with North Korean and Iranian assistance and, also with North Korean support, seeking to develop solid-fueled systems, considered more reliable than the liquid-fueled Scud. 47 Work on chemical weapons also continued. 48 Domestic Political Environment

Against this disquieting background, the late 1990s and early 2ooos saw the physical decline and eventual death of Syria's longtime ruler Hafez al-Asad and the transfer of the mantle of leadership to his young and politically unseasoned son. The attitudes of Hafez and Bashar at the end and beginning of their respective careers is a second crucial dimension to understanding the motivations behind Damascus's nuclear decision making during this time. Hafez al-Asad single-handedly brought stability to the coup-ridden, postcolonial semistate known as Syria49 and maintained this stability while parlaying Syria into a position of regional prominence. Indeed, his ability to forge a single state from the "fragile mosaic" of a society riven by sub- and transnational loyalties is considered his crowning achievement. 50 One of the last proponents of the pan-Arab cause, Asad is said to have viewed the world in the historical context of a West arbitrarily demarcating territory in the Middle East at the expense of Syrian nationalism. 51 Perceiving Syria as the stronghold of pan-Arabism, permanently beleaguered by imperialism and Zionism, 52 he is reported by all accounts to have genuinely believed that the West's colonial intentions, in tandem with Israeli expansionism, posed an existential threat to the Arab world and to Syria in particular. 53 Hafez ai-Asad: 1971-2000

110 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

Despite his accomplishments, Asad is considered to have been a better tactician than strategist. As the global transition away from the Cold War system continued to progress, it became increasingly evident that Hafez al-Asad's tendency toward passivity and generally reactive modus operandi was ineffective in adapting to the new, increasingly globalized, unipolar system. 54 The leaders with whom he had long kept ideological company, namely Kim 11 Sung and Nicolae Ceausescu, were no longer in power. Asad himself is reported to have feared that his regime would collapse like Ceausescu's or, most significantly, Gorbachev's, from whose example Asad learned to oppose any reforms on the grounds of potential destabilization. 55 The causes around which his worldview was centered-primarily socialism and pan-Arabism-had become irrelevant or obsolete. 56 However, regardless of the fecklessness that he and his policies demonstrated at the end of his life, Asad was glorified at his death for having effectively created a functional and formidable Syrian state, his greatest-and, really, his only-legacy. It is important to note that Asad's physical and mental health had deteriorated in the years before his death, although to what extent remains unknown. Physically, he allegedly never fully recovered from a near-fatal heart attack in 1983, and his decline intensified in the 1990s. It became apparent in his appearance and in physical functioning, according to Western diplomats who met with him. His mental health was already affected by severe "bunker mentality," which intensified after a narrow escape from an assassination attempt by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in 1980; acquaintances say this led him to alter his behavior and lifestyle, such that he rarely left the presidential palace. 57 In the 1990s, however, he is said to have grown increasingly isolated and detached from reality. He reportedly had difficulty concentrating during meetings; at a summit between Asad and President Bill Clinton in Geneva in March 2ooo, U.S. participants reported that toward the end of the meeting, when his medication had worn off, the Syrian president had difficulty speaking and relied on his translator to "assist" him in completing his remarks each time he faltered. Foreign media outlets were rife with reports that he was suffering from dementia. Foreign counterparts attested to severely deteriorated concentration and difficulty in speaking, a heavy use of medication, and reliance on aides to make his points. Several months before his death, the foreign press reported that he was under constant medical care. 58 Dementia notwithstanding, Hafez likely continued to exercise power in some fashion, as did Adolf Hitler during the closing months of World War II

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

111

or Stalin in the early 1950s. But it is also possible that Bashar was actually wielding his father's authority even before the latter's death, much as Edith Wilson and Colonel Edward House are thought to have made key presidential decisions after President Woodrow Wilson's stroke in October 1919. This issue, too, has an important potential impact on understanding the factors that may have motivated Syria's apparent bid for nuclear arms, but it cannot be resolved on the basis of currently available information. Bashar ai-Asad: 2000- Bashar-quiet, academic, modest, and introvertedwas not his father's first choice for successor. He became the fallback choice when Hafez's heir apparent, Bashar's older brother Basil, died suddenly in a car accident in 1994. Basil was seen as far better suited for political leadership than Bashar and had been groomed to succeed his father. Bashar, studying ophthalmology in London at the time, returned to Damascus and spent the next six years in a crash course on ruling the country. It has been observed that, during these early years, Bashar appeared unenthusiastic about his new role. 59 The sudden appearance of this political neophyte, who in 1994 was not yet thirty and lacked the charisma and personal magnetism of his father and older brother, brought uncertainty to the question of succession. When Bashar eventually assumed his dynastic role on his father's death in June 2ooo, he showed himself to lack the political insight and confidence of the late Asad, whose power, according to one scholar, did not derive as much from Syria's constitution as from his authority as a strong, skillful, and effectualleader. 60 Given his greater familiarity with the West, Bashar has been seen as more reform minded than his predecessor, but the new leader's lack of political acumen led him to an early misstep when he allowed domestic calls for change during the so-called Damascus Spring (a period of intense social and political debate within Syria from July 2000 to mid-2001) to spiral beyond control and threaten widespread instability. Presumably under pressure from the old guard in Hafez's inner circle and the country's security bureaucracy, in 2001 Bashar quashed further political debate, and the most outspoken opponents of the Ba'athist regime were imprisoned. The episode is said to have shaken Bashar's already tenuous support from the Hafez's closest loyalists. 61 Later, his mishandling of relations with Washington, effectively terminating the relationship, and with Lebanon, culminating in the ouster of Syrian forces and the 2005 Lebanese Cedar Revolution, were seen as failures and further indications of his lack of tactical skill at home and abroad. 62

112 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

By the early 2ooos, Bashar's worldview was not entirely apparent. He was, after all, still a relatively young man, and one still in the beginning of his career-"unbaked dough," in the words of one Israeli official. 63 Unlike his father, he understood the deep gulf between Syrian and Western society, primarily in the realm of technological and scientific progress, and had expressed a desire to narrow these differences. 64 He appeared to lack a strong ideological commitment to his father's creed of pan-Arabism and socialism, seeming to brush off the importance of Ba'athist dicta in an interview: "If it contributes to prosperity in Syria, we can call it socialism."65 Yet he stated his intention of carrying on his father's foreign policy with its narrow worldview in his inauguration speech. 66 However, Zisser speculates that in these early years Bashar himself" did not have a clear vision of the course he wished to chart for Syria's future." As Leverett observed in 2004, there was as yet "little analytic consensus about quality of his leadership, inclinations on key domestic and foreign policy issues, or the degree of influence he really exercises over Syria's internal and external policies."67 Bashar has consistently suffered from problems concomitant with his sudden rise to power after the death of his long-serving predecessor. In short, he lacked auctoritas: He was Tiberius to Hafez's Augustus. 68 It is often suggested that he initially had little standing with the "inner circle" that supported and perpetuated Hafez's regime, and, even after Hafez took his younger son under his wing following Basil's death and spared no effort to unite the inner circle around him, support for Bashar remained tenuous, as he was seen as too young and inexperienced to fill Hafez's shoes. As such, it is reasonable to infer that he did not command the categorical authority and obedience from the rest of the government-the old guard and bureaucracy-that his father had enjoyed and was limited by the practical need to accommodate them for the domestic stability they provided. 69 Economic Status

The early post-Cold War years found the statist Syrian economy in poor shape and with few opportunities for rejuvenation. This is in part due to the inadequacy of Syria's indigenous industrial capabilities but was also the product of what specialist David Lesch described in the late 1990s as an economy that had been dominated by the state for decades, causing economic rationalization to be subordinated to regime survival and the enhancement of regional standing, which "inhibit[ed] Syria's halting progression toward economic liberalization and global economic integration." 70 Rather than endanger his regime

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

113

by the openness required for such liberalization, Hafez al-Asad's "overriding economic objective" has been described as eschewing substantive economic reforms in favor of simply avoiding the profound socioeconomic change necessary for modernization. 71 Throughout the 1990s, international investment was negligible, being severely inhibited by the lack of a sufficient regulatory regime, rule oflaw, and transparency. 72 A law setting the standard for foreign direct investment was enacted in 1991, but concomitant reforms necessary to make this a useful step had yet to appear by the end of the decade. The result was that the public sector remained disproportionately large and composed mostly of inefficient state-owned enterprises. In addition, Syria's economy was undiversified in sources of income. The most important source was petroleum, but fields were aging, and oil production began a steady decline in 1995. Experts have anticipated for some time that Syria will become a net importer of petroleum by 2012.?3 Otherwise, the economy is largely agrarian, with varying output from year to year. Lesch has noted that Syria experienced an economic upturn by the early 1990s but that this was due largely to exogenous factors, such as the Gulf States' compensation for Syria's participation in the alliance against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, a modest increase in oil production, and the end of a drought of several years. 74 Moreover, unemployment was contemporaneously skyrocketing, as a consequence of extraordinary population growth in the 1970s. 75 The U.S. State Department notes that after 2000 the Ba'ath Party began to stress the need for economic reforms.76 Little progress was made, however, and Bashar's dramatic increase in illicit trade with Iraq between July 2000 and 2003, preceding Saddam's overthrow, has been seen as an urgent stopgap measure intended to help avert major deterioration in Syria's economic performance. 77 It is widely understood that balancing the imperatives of economic liberalization with the imperatives of consolidating and maintaining power as president have posed overriding challenges for Bashar. 78 As such, although (gradual) economic reform has been a central focus of Bashar's tenure and one of the few ways in which he appears willing to depart from his father's policies-for example, Bashar privatized the banking sector in 2001-the improvement of Syria's economic performance is generally not viewed as possible without very significant structural adjustments that are not likely to be forthcoming.7 9 Syria's technical and industrial infrastructure is generally considered to be very weak. Indeed, during the 1990s, the country was able to advance its chemical and missile capabilities only with extensive outside assistance. 80

114 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

Importantly, at that juncture it was also believed that Syria was so devoid of technical capabilities that nuclear weapons were simply beyond its reach. This led the U.S. Department of Defense to conclude in its 2001 report, Prolifera-

tion Threat and Response: Syria is not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. However, it retains an interest in nuclear technology and has a small Chinese-supplied research reactor, which is under IAEA safeguards. In addition, in May 1999, Syria signed a broad nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, which includes the construction of a small light-water research reactor, which will be subject to IAEA safeguards. Syria currently lacks the infrastructure and trained personnel to establish a nuclear weapons program. 81 THEORETICAL AND PREDICTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Over the years, a number of international relations theories have been offered to explain the national decisions to mount nuclear weapons programs. Four prominent theories, outlined in detail earlier in this volume, will be tested here against what is known about the Syrian case to see which, if any, best explains the country's apparent decision to acquire nuclear arms and which might therefore fare best as a tool for predicting future proliferation decisions in Syria and other states. The four theories that will be applied are neorealism, neoliberalism!constructivism, domestic politics/regime survival, and national identity conception. Neoreallsm

Neorealism focuses on state survival and power (as the means for survival) as the principal drivers of states' actions in the context of an anarchic international structure. It is not a foreign policy model but rather considers interaction among states. 82 As such, neorealism is used to understand how states' actions have an impact on other states and not to explain fully a particularly state's policy choices. Yet, there is much insight it can offer a posteriori as to what motivated Syria to pursue nuclear weapons. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, regional power Syria lost its great power ally, and with it, from a neorealist perspective, the guarantor of its survival in a fundamentally hostile world. This was particularly devastating because it left Syria unable to effectively balance a nuclear Israel, intensifying Syria's uncertainty. In what has been termed "internal balancing," uncertainly over survival impels states to look inward to

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

115

ensure survival. 83 This explains military buildups in response to uncertainty and the high premium placed on nuclear weapons, with their great destructive, and consequently deterrent, capability. To that end, it has been observed that neorealism understands one state's pursuit of nuclear weapons as begetting that of another. 84 As such, the neorealist model implies that Syria sought nuclear weapons as a deterrent-as "self-help" to balance Israel's power and ensure its own uncertain survival, having been left vulnerable by the Soviet collapse. Even though Syria aligned itself with the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition during the first Gulf War, Iraq's defeat at the Western hands in that conflict may have led Syria to believe it needed a greater deterrent capability, in two complementary ways. First, the war demonstrated the uncertain utility of chemical weapons, which Iraq had in abundance, as a deterrent against a nuclear-armed adversary; and, second, it dramatically confirmed the potential of Western high-technology conventional arms. Syria, lacking either a redoubtable conventional capability or the funds to obtain one with any dispatch, was left to rely on its sizeable chemical weapon arsenal to deter Israeli or Western aggression as best it could. This lack of an effective means for balancing Israel and its U.S. ally-in effect, a loss of relative power vis-a-vis Israel and the Westwould have exacerbated the potential threat to Syria's survival. Moreover, other actors in Syria's neighborhood were taking steps to enhance their security, which Syria would naturally see as necessitating an equally strong response. Among these measures were Israel and Turkey's fledgling military cooperation, as well as the growing interest of the Persian Gulf Arab states in increasing the presence of the United States in the region. Robert Jervis has noted that "what one state sees as insurance, the adversary will see as encirclement."85 1his growing sense of encirclement is likely to have intensified Syria's uncertainty over its future and to have spurred it to seek ways to shift the balance of power to better protect itself. 86 Nonetheless, objectively speaking, no immediate threat to Syria's survival likely existed at the time it made the key decisions to develop and advance its nuclear program. These factors suggest the innate inadequacy of neorealism alone in explaining actions taken by a state. Neorealism, with its focus on states' interactions within the international system, does not take into account the perceptions and motivations of the individual decision makers who make the state act. These individuals interpret the security environment through their own perceptions and base their judgments on their own experiences and

116 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

motivations. In the Syrian case, the singular perspectives and motivations of Hafez (and, presumably, Bashar) al-Asad amplified the objective threats to Syria's survival many times over and certainly played an important, if not decisive, role in the apparent decision to seek nuclear arms. As noted, in addition to the elder Asad's well-documented bunker mentality and possible dementia near the end of his life, Hafez's perceptions of Syria's security environment were deeply colored by the historical perspective oflsrael and the West as fundamentally expansionist, with deep-seated designs on Arab lands. Neoliberal Institutionalism/Constructivismand Technological Constraints

Given the currently known facts of the Syrian case, institutions and norms seeking to restrain the spread of WMD-considered powerful influences on state behavior under neoliberal institutionalism and constructivist theorieswould seem to have had little impact on decision making in Damascus. Syria has flouted the international norm against development of chemical weapons since at least the early 1980s, has not joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has exploited its chemical weapons (CW) deterrent through repeated veiled hints that have largely removed any doubt as to its existence. 87 If one assumes that the Dair Alzour reactor was being built to support a nuclear weapons program, moreover, construction of the facility with North Korean help was fundamentally at odds with Syria's basic obligation under Article II the NPT not to develop nuclear arms, as well with the global norm against acquiring such weapons. Syria's construction of the reactor also appears to directly violate the additional prohibition of Article II, specifying that nonnuclear weapons state parties, such as Syria, undertake, inter alia, "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The failure to declare the project to the IAEA also appears to be a clear violation of Syria's agreement with the agency regarding the inspection ("safeguarding") of the country's nuclear facilities. Under that agreement, Damascus was obligated to declare any new facility to the agency "as soon as the decision to construct" or "authorize construction" of a new facility were taken. 88 However, while nonproliferation institutions and norms may not have been internalized to the point that they tempered the Asads' desire for nuclear arms, the impact of these institutions and norms on external actors does appear to have affected the timing of Syria's apparent bid for nuclear weapons.

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

117

Lacking the domestic technical and industrial capabilities to mount a nuclear weapons program, Syria was, as noted, extremely dependent on outside assistance. However, because of nuclear trade restrictions adopted by other states, pursuant to international treaties, agreements, and widely held norms, Damascus was unable to obtain such assistance unless it was subject to IAEA safeguards, which would have precluded its use for nuclear weapons-until aid from North Korea that was free of such restrictions became available sometime after 1997. Thus, in the absence of such a state or nonstate supplier willing and able to provide the entire nuclear fuel cycle under these conditions-and probably a nuclear weapon design and missile warhead technology, as wellthe Asads' nuclear ambitions would have been stymied. Domestic Politics-Regime Survival

Syria appears to be a classic instance of an inward-looking regime, interested in sustaining legitimacy at home more through the invocation of nationalist themes and demonization of external enemies than through economic growth based on integration with the international community. Such regimes, according to scholar Etel Solingen, are strongly predisposed to pursue nuclear weapons as a means of reinforcing their legitimacy and ensuring regime survival within the context of domestic politics. 89 The correlations that Solingen identifies among economic orientation, regime stability, and nuclearization initially appears to hold true in the Syrian case. Hafez al-Asad's deeply entrenched opposition to the Western powers was both ideological and likely pragmatic-a function of his deeply held fear of their perceived expansionist intentions, as well as of his apparent need to manipulate the threat perception of his fundamentally disunited society to solidify what he believed to be a tenuous hold on power. This indeed translated into an autarkic economic policy and unwillingness to foster conditions that might encourage or facilitate Syria's participation in the global economy. Moreover, despite the occasional indication that Bashar al-Asad lacked his father's ideological commitment to the inward-looking economic policy, the upheaval caused by the Damascus Spring is likely to have taught the new leader a few lessons about the uncertain stability of his country and, consequently, the necessity of maintaining his father's repressive grasp. It is therefore feasible that the Asads sought a nuclear program to bolster what they considered to be an uncertain hold on power. Renewed legitimacy may have been anticipated to follow the nuclear program both directly or

118 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

indirectly. The direct benefit would result from the public's perception of Syria's increased international prestige resulting from the nuclear program, which was also likely to spark sufficient controversy internationally to feed the sense of external threat that such autocratic, repressive regimes rely on for legitimacy. In addition, the Asads may have hoped that the nuclear program would also bolster their hold on power indirectly, as the great powers would be likely to seek negotiations to deal with Syria's incipient nuclear capability. The result would be the achievement ofHafez al-Asad's long-standing goal of negotiating with the West from a position of strength. Being popularly perceived as wringing recognition from the global powers, Syria's new clout and status would vitiate any arguments against the effectiveness of the Asads in the post-Cold War world. Given the autocratic nature of the Asad regime, including Hafez al-Asad's history of brutally suppressing opponents, in the mid- to late 1990s his government did not appear to be suffering a direct challenge to its legitimacy in the form of widespread domestic discontent. Increasing oil revenues appeared to have compensated, at least in part, for loss of Soviet economic aid and the economy's otherwise lackluster performance, while the less-than-secret buildup of Syria's CW and missile capabilities at this time, together with closer ties to Iran, likely provided at least a partial substitute for Soviet military and political patronage. Rather, the principal issue of legitimacy and regime survival that Hafez confronted at this juncture was ensuring a successful transfer ofleadership that would sustain his lifework of building a coherent Syrian nation and dampen the possibility of conflict after his passing within the potentially fractious coterie running the country. In theory, for the elder Asad, a nuclear weapons program that would create unquestioned military parity with Israel and restore Syrian prominence in the Arab community could have served as the ultimate symbol of legitimacy for his regime and helped ensure Bashar's successful emergence as the nation's new leader. For Bashar, launching the program-if this occurred after Hafez's death-or sustaining the program already launched by his father could have served a similar legitimizing role, demonstrating his own capability as a visionary leader. There are difficulties, however, with these hypotheses because of the secrecy surrounding the Dair Alzour reactor and any other elements of the Syrian nuclear weapons program that may have been started. If the Syrian program was like Israel's or that of many other countries (including the United States),

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

119

it was known to only a small segment of the country's ruling elite, that is, to only a small fragment of the Asads' inner circle. At least one knowledgeable reporter has asserted that this was, in fact, the case. 90 Under such circumstances, the potential of the program to support Bashar's succession, or regime survival more broadly, could not be realized until the existence of the program were more widely disclosed. Presumably this would not have occurred before the start-up of the Dair Alzour reactor (whose radioactive inventory would then have at least partly immunized it from attack) in 2008 or 2009; more likely, disclosure would have been withheld until the point when a nuclear weapon (or at least the fissile material for the weapon) was actually in hand, at a still more distant time. It is possible, of course, that Hafez believed he would live to see one of these outcomes and that the succession of Bashar would follow, reinforced by the regime's nuclear triumph. Even so, it is hard to see how the nuclear adventure could have contributed to the regime's legitimacy in the near term. In effect, the Syrian case appears to support the view that inward-looking regimes are prone to proliferate, with nuclear arms seen as the apotheosis of such regimes' nationalistic objectives. But it is harder to argue in this instance that such arms were pursued as essential for regime survival within the context of Syria's domestic political arena. National Identity Conceptions

Another inward-focused foreign policy model, put forward by scholar Jacques Hymans, provides a different explanation for Hafez al-Asad's apparent decision to go nuclear, assuming it was he rather than Bashar who made the decision, a matter discussed further in a later section. 91 Hymans's theory singles out the decision maker's "national identity conception" as the particular lens through which he views his state's security environment. Some aspects of this model apply quite well to the case of Syria, where the center of power at the time the key decision to develop nuclear weapons was likely made, in fact, rested squarely on the shoulders of Hafez al-Asad (and later, Bashar), and it offers insight as to the internal drivers for Asad's decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Hafez al-Asad seemingly proves the model accurate in appearing to be a classic "oppositional nationalist," the type of leader most likely to seek nuclear weapons under Hymans's theory. That Asad possessed the characteristic highly dichotomized "us versus them" perspective vis-a-vis Israel (and, to a

120 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

lesser degree, the West) has been well documented, and a key strategic imperative of the Syrian leader, in the terms used by Hymans, was, indeed, to realize the vision that Syria's "natural place [was] in the sun," in contrast with its "perceived actual place in the gutter." 92 It is reasonable to assume that the immediate catalyst for Asad's nuclear decision was his perception of Syria's growing relative weakness, which, with his strong feelings of both fear and nationalist pride, he would have seen as a particularly menacing threat, as well as deeply insulting. However, a more detailed application of the Hymans approach reveals flaws in the causal connections between the factors-national identity conception, subsequent emotions, and decision making-that Hymans posits. To start with, in the past, oppositional nationalism had not affected Hafez al-Asad's decision-making processes in the way Hymans anticipates-certainly Asad was not one for hasty decisions, of the type Hymans ascribes to oppositional nationalists in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Rather, one of Hafez's most distinguishing characteristics was circumspection, sometimes to the point of stasis in making policy choices. 93 That is to say, Hafez was not an emotional decision maker, but a cognitive, strategic, and ultimately pragmatic one. It has even been pointed out that Hafez at times neglected the very ideology in which his worldview was grounded, when pragmatism called for a conflicting action. 94 Indeed, his greatest fault is seen by many as his passivity "to the point of obsession," and the consequent inability to effectively react to actions of other states on account of his extremely cautious-albeit suspicious-nature. 95 He typically eschewed impetuous decision making that risked upsetting the regional balance of power that he meticulously sought to sustain. His interest was in keeping Syria prominent, and one of his greatest assets for much of his political career was his sensitivity as to which strings to pull-and which to leave alone-to achieve this. As such, to ascribe to him either a rash decision to go nuclear or even a willingness to let emotions influence such a momentous choice would be inconsistent with standard delineations of his personality and decision-making style. Moreover, Hafez's oppositional-nationalist pride appears not to have been nearly as well etched as his fears; indeed, he has even been described as having acute awareness of Syria's inherent weakness, as well as the underlying fragility of his grasp on power within the Syrian polity. 96 In some ways, because of his belief that Syria lacked the technical and industrial capacity to muster a fully credible deterrent, he appears more like a second Hymans archetype, the

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

121

"oppositional subaltern," whom Hymans considers much less likely to pursue nuclear weapons. 97 Certainly he was happy to be under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, unlike the typical oppositional nationalist and rather more like the typical oppositional subaltern, and he was perfectly content to be seen by the world as protected by the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Indeed, it has even been observed that Hafez was disappointed that Moscow refused to codify the extension of its nuclear umbrella to Damascus in their 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.98 It might even be assumed that, had Russia been interested in continuing this patronage, Syria would have been quite pleased and would not have sought nuclear weapons after all. This is inconsistent with the intense nationalistic pride that characterizes the oppositional nationalist model. That being so, it does not seem as though nationalist pride per se was as much a factor in Hafez's decision to launch an apparent nuclear weapon program as, perhaps, a more profoundly pragmatic concern over obtaining and maintaining a lofty regional status for Syria, from which his image of power among the Syrian populace derived. Overall, while Hafez may indeed have appeared to possess an oppositional nationalist national identity concept, it is not clear whether he did so, in fact; and, if he did, whether this actually influenced his decision making to any significant degree. It seems more likely that Hafez's decision to develop nuclear weapons was made as the result of a much more careful cost-benefit calculation to address urgent pragmatic priorities pertaining to both state and regime survival. It must be noted as a caveat that the above discussion presumes that Hafez al-Asad was the particular leader who issued what Hymans refers to as "an authoritative order to proceed with deliberate speed to the creation of a nuclear weapons arsenal." 99 If this decision was made shortly after his death-or at some point before it, when he was not fully in command because of declining health-it is likely that the decision was made by Bashar, acting as a virtual extension of his father. At the beginning of his tenure in office Bashar both articulated and demonstrated his intention to carry on his father's foreign policy. However, given the uncertainties about the exact timing of the decision to build Dair Alzour and about Bashar's national identity concept, the possibility cannot be ruled out that, if Bashar was the decision maker, he was acting, at least partly, on his own personal convictions. For the moment, lack of information precludes a thorough application of the Hymans model to this alternative case.

122 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

Most Likely Explanation: Multiple Causation

The various plausible causative theories detailed above each apply to a degree, but none stands out as exclusively pinpointing the impetus for the decision to pursue an apparent nuclear weapon program. External threats posited as the driver by neorealism were present but exacerbated by Asad's personal worldview, which is outside the theory. The international institutions and norms of neoliberal institutionalism/constructivism constrained him but were bypassed when North Korean aid was made available. Domestic politics/regime survival seem to be a further motivation for the nuclear program, but secrecy prevented use of the program to effectively advance these goals in the near term. Hafez al-Asad's nationalist vision and ambitions, finally, unquestionably played a major role in his apparent decision to pursue nuclear weapons. But externalities-for example, the loss of Soviet patronage and the disadvantageous shift in the regional balance of power-created an urgency for an improved deterrent, without which the cautious Asad might not have chosen to take advantage of North Korea's nuclear assistance. 100 Predicting Future Cases

Although no single international relations theory on its own would have served as a reliable predictor that Damascus would have sought nuclear arms, there does appear to be a rather reliable technological indicator of such intent: Syria's possession of a militarized CW program. Indeed, virtually every state that maintained or developed an offensive CW program after World War II later sought to develop nuclear weapons. 101 The first five nuclear weapon states (the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China), Iraq, Iran, and Libya are the most notable cases. Presumably, the development of chemical and nuclear weapons are motivated by similar factors, so that if a state opts for the former, it is not surprising that it would seek the latter. But the indicator appears to be so reliable that once a state's possession of a militarized CW program is presumed, it would seem that, at a minimum, the country should be placed on the nuclear proliferation watch list. The model may not, however, have extensive application in the future because no new states are known to be developing chemical weapons, in part because of widespread adherence to the CWC. Moreover, new technologies, such as multipurpose chemical production facilities and microreactors, may make it possible for states to quickly transform peaceful industrial chemical programs to weapon production, thus obscuring which additional states may, in fact, be planning to develop chemical armaments.

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

123

FORECASTING FROM THE THEORIES: WILL BASHAR TRY AGAIN?

To evaluate whether Syria under Bashar is likely to make another attempt to develop nuclear weapons, it is necessary to consider first how key conditions that likely influenced the first decision to "go nuclear"-threats to the state, global nonproliferation institutions and norms, domestic challenges to the regime, and the worldview of the decision maker-have evolved or are likely to. External Threats: Parity with Israel and Fears of Encirclement

If the desire for parity with Israel was a key motivation for Syria's apparent decision to seek nuclear arms some time between 1997 and 2001, then to predict the likelihood of Syria making a second attempt at nuclearization, an initial question to answer is whether that motivation still exists. At first glance, it seems that the tension between Israel and Syria might be on the wane, with Damascus and Jerusalem currently engaging in negotiations for a comprehensive peace treaty through Turkish mediators. 102 Bashar's motives are understood to be regaining the Golan Heights, lost to Israel in 1967, a long-standing Syrian strategic imperative, and reestablishing relations with Washington, for which Syria is seen to be genuinely eager. Israeli leaders also perceive significant tangible benefits from a peace agreement with Syria. With both parties so inclined, there may be potential for an agreement to be struck through the current discussions. However, there is reason for skepticism: Even if an agreement can be reached ad referendum, it is unclear how it would be received in both countries. Moreover, since the resignation of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September 2008 and the ascendancy of Binyamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in March 2009, Israeli-Syrian peace talks have stalled. The factor that will have the greatest impact on Syria's relationship with Israel is, ultimately, what Syria wants from it. It has not yet become clear whether Bashar shares his father's Ba'athist worldview-anti-Zionist, antiWestern, and pan-Arab-and sees any peace agreement with Israel as merely a short-term expedient on the longer path toward pan-Arab supremacy or whether Bashar's sometime modernizing-reformist bent has inspired him to genuinely seek peace for its own sake. However, it must be considered that, as one scholar has observed, regimes like that of the Asads rely on external threats for legitimacy, using them to justify their repressive rule and unwillingness to enact domestic reforms that would risk destabilizing the regime.

124

SPECTOR AND BERMAN

Fear of encirclement is also likely to be less important as a future motivation for Syria to seek nuclear weapons than it was in the 1990s. In the past several years, not only has Syria's relationship with Iran deepened, perhaps even to the point of a new client-patron relationship, but widespread displeasure with the United States has also pervaded the region. Even the Arab Gulf states, among Washington's closest regional allies, have grown wary of excessive U.S. presence. 103 Moreover, French President Nicolas Sarkozy's creation of a union of Mediterranean states-and his welcome of Bashar in Paris in July 2008-has offered Syria new links with the West, diminishing its political isolation.104 Indeed, the United States itself appears ready to ease Syria's isolation, announcing in June 2009 that it would restore full diplomatic relations with Syria by sending a U.S. ambassador to Damascus. This would end four years during which Washington had withdrawn its ambassador to protest Syria's alleged involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 105 While it is unclear whether these dynamics will endure, at the present time this trend in regional affairs is likely to reduce Syria's threat perceptions. 106 International Nonproliferation Institutions and Norms

In light of the moderate, but unmistakable, criticism Syria has received for its violation ofNPT and IAEA rules in failing to disclose the Dair Alzour project, in particular from the United States, Bashar is likely to feel more constrained by international nonproliferation institutions and norms than his father. 107 Washington, Jerusalem, and the IAEA, moreover, are likely to be monitoring Syrian territory closely for any signs of new nuclear activities, further constraining Syria's options. In addition, the exposure of North Korea's secret assistance to Syria and Pyongyang's apparent cessation of that assistance, as part of its own denuclearization negotiations with the China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States, mean that Syria no longer has an obvious mechanism for bypassing international nuclear trade controls to overcome its own technical and industrial limitations. However, it must be acknowledged that the effectiveness of nonproliferation institutions and the status of antiacquisition norms are, at present, somewhat in doubt, given the uncertain progress of the international effort to dissuade Iran from its highly suspect "peaceful nuclear energy" program. If efforts to enforce Tehran's compliance with international nonproliferation directives are ultimately successful and that country abandons its suspicious nuclear activities, the sway of international nonproliferation institutions and

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

125

norms will be respectively reaffirmed and strengthened, providing an additional restraint on a future Syrian nuclear bid. If not, such a bid may well be encouraged by the regime's seeming impotence. The effectiveness of the IAEA's continuing investigation of the Dair Alzour nuclear site-which has found uranium particles at the site, whose presence supports the CIA view of the nature of activities there-and IAEA demands to gain access to other locations in the country may have the most direct impact on future Syrian nuclear behavior, however. It remains to be seen how effective this investigation and any associated enforcement actions may be. Domestic Political Instability

With Bashar still to achieve a major foreign policy success and the country's economic conditions still not improving, domestic instability is likely to be a greater threat to him than it was to his father, particularly because Bashar also lacks the legitimacy granted by longevity. Indeed, the discontent stirred by the country's growing penury has led some to suggest that Bashar's serious effort to make peace with Israel (and subsequently Washington) is motivated by a perception that desperate times are calling for desperate measures. 108 Bashar has indicated that he is intent on opening up Syria to the outside world and sees this as essential to the country's progress. If so, he is likely to appreciate that additional steps toward acquiring nuclear arms could bring further political isolation, creating serious obstacles to achieving his economic goals. National Identity Conception

Since he took Syria's helm in 2000, Bashar's intentions have appeared contradictory. As noted, there are indications of his desire to open the country economically and of a readiness to build better ties with Israel and the West. But, as suggested earlier, Syria's behavior regarding Iraq and Lebanon has taken a very different path. Perhaps, however, the contradictory nature of Syrian behavior is in itself an important clue to the future. Where his father's inclination appeared to be steered by the injustices of the past, Bashar appears more open to change-and any change from Syria's history of isolation and trouble making in the region is likely to one that makes its pursuit of nuclear arms less likely. Applying the Theories

With so much uncertainty still remaining about Syria's past nuclear behavior and so much still to be learned about the direction in which Bashar al-Asad

126

SPECTOR AND BERMAN

plans to take the country in the years ahead, compounded with Bashar's growing reputation for unpredictability, it is impossible to make thoughtful predictions of its nuclear future. The theories discussed above, however, do provide a guide as to what observers should look for. The easing of external threats, the strict implementation of international rules and norms, the diminution of threats to regime survival and the opening of the Syrian economy, and Bashar's evolution toward a less intensely nationalistic vision for Syria would all make it less likely that Syria would relaunch a weapons-oriented nuclear program. Moreover, because, as has been demonstrated, these factors tend to be closely interrelated, an improvement on any of the above axes may well result in a concomitant improvement on the others. Whether events will veer in this positive direction, however, remains a matter for future scholars to unravel. It must be remembered, however, that at least one state whose apparent nuclear weapons program had been disrupted by force-Iraq after the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osiraq reactor-resumed its clandestine nuclear weapon development program with redoubled effort. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYRIAN CASE

The Syrian case offers a number of lessons regarding future proliferation trends in addition to those described in the preceding sections. First, the case provides yet another example of the particular dangers posed by states or nons tate actors prepared to supply the constellation of key technologies and equipment needed for the development of nuclear weapons. Before the advent in 1985 of the supply network operated by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, states pursuing clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons-relevant technology needed to do so piecemeal, the path followed by Pakistan in the 1970s and 198os and by Iraq in the 1980s. By providing far more comprehensive packages of needed technology and equipment, Khan created the opportunity for his customers (Iran, North Korea, and Libya) to greatly accelerate their nuclear weapons efforts. 109 North Korea appears to have offered Syria similarly comprehensive assistance for its nuclear program, although many details remain to be learned about what it offered and transferred. This would appear to indicate that if there was a single development or triggering event that has threatened a cascade of proliferation since the mid1980s, it was the advent of the rogue, "full-spectrum" nuclear suppliers. The A. Q. Khan network has been largely rolled up, and North Korea has report-

THE SYRIAN NUCLEAR PUZZLE

127

edly committed not to make further nuclear transfers, but the precedent they established could well be followed by Iran, another state that has demonstrated its readiness to disregard international nuclear norms and rules. A second lesson of the Syrian case is that Israel's preemptive strike could well serve as a deterrent to additional Middle Eastern states that are considering clandestine nuclear programs and/or the development of sensitive ostensibly civilian nuclear facilities able to produce materials readily usable for nuclear weapons. The reluctance of the international community to criticize Israel's attack on Dair Alzour implies that the rules for using military force preemptively where emerging nuclear threats are concerned may be changing. Where, historically, international law prescribed that the use of force was permissible only in the case of an imminent threat, the state practice seen in the response to the Israeli strike suggests the possibility of the tacit acceptance of military attacks on clandestinely built nuclear installations that appear deliberately designed to support nuclear weapons programs, despite a number of disapproving statements heard at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19, zoo8.U 0 In effect, the magnitude of the potential danger may extend the timeline for permissible preemptive action where the foregoing circumstances are present. Nuclear fuel cycle facilities able to produce materials suited to nuclear weapons but built with the stated goal of supporting civilian nuclear energy programs and subject to IAEA inspection would fall outside this narrow definition. Nonetheless, the long lead times needed to construct such facilities (particularly if clandestine acquisition of components is required in the absence of a "wholesale" supplier) might lead states to calculate that their exposure to attack before they could acquire nuclear weapons materials was simply too long to be worth the risk. Thus, for the moment, the outcome in the Syrian case is more likely to have a chilling effect on the nuclear aspirations of other regional states. Indeed, it might prompt states genuinely interested only in nuclear energy to adopt the strategy of the United Arab Emirates and agree voluntarily not to build sensitive nuclear plants with weapons potential and to accept enhanced IAEA inspections by adopting additional protocols to their to IAEA inspection agreements.m Whether Iran, despite veiled Israeli and U.S. threats of preemption, succeeds in developing an open or de facto nuclear deterrent by means of a nuclear program with clandestine antecedents that Tehran now asserts is purely peaceful could also have significant impact on such decisions, however.

128 SPECTOR AND BERMAN

Finally, as suggested above, whether a single air strike can permanently terminate a nascent nuclear weapons program is by no means clear. The threat of future attacks and pressure from the IAEA for greater transparency could well stymie the renewal of a Syrian nuclear weapons program. Efforts by outside states to engage Damascus and gradually reduce its political isolation, coupled with negotiations on an Israel-Syria peace treaty, appear, however, to be a better approach for achieving a lasting end to Syria's nuclear weapons ambitions. Nonetheless, given Syria's history and politics, the path to a thoroughly engaged, cooperative, and nonthreatening Syria is not likely to be an easy one.

6

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION Japan's Once and Future Nuclear Status

Etel Solingen

following its defeat in World War II: possible Soviet blackmail, invasion, or nuclear attack; a nuclear-armed China after 1964; a potentially unified and antagonistic Korean peninsula; possible interdiction of its vital sea lines; and a hostile (and eventually nuclear) North Korea. Each of these threats could have led Japan to resort to indigenous nuclear weapons, but this has not happened yet. Clearly, any effort to look into the future must take stock of why this outcome obtained in the past. To explore potential answers to Japan's nuclear posture in a systematic way, I organize this chapter according to some of the hypotheses guiding this broader study on nuclear forecasting. 1 The emphasis is on Japan's more recent circumstances, particularly since North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, a crucial test for Japan's commitments to eschew nuclear weapons. I extrapolate from these hypotheses to explore what predictions they would yield regarding the possibility ofJapan's future nuclearization- or, conversely, of its staying the nonnuclear course. JAPAN FACED SUCCESSIVE EXTERNAL THREATS

EXPLAINING THE LAST SIXTY YEARS

Japan signed the 1951 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and a series of instruments that tied Japan's security to the U.S.-Japan alliance. The 1965 Sato-Johnson communique reiterated a U.S. pledge to defend Japan against any outside aggression. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made Japan the only victim ofimmense human devastation from nuclear attack. In 1967 Premier Sato Eisaku enunciated Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles (TNNP; hikaku sangensoku) 131

132

ETEL SOLINGEN

not to possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan's sea or air, included in a 1971 Diet resolution. 2 In 1968 Sato announced the Four Nuclear Policies, committing Japan to abide by the TNNP, advance global nuclear disarmament, use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and rely on U.S. extended deterrence as stipulated under the 1960 treaty. Yet in 1968-1970 Sato's Cabinet Information Research Office involved experts in a secret unofficial study on the feasibility and desirability of nuclear weapons, which concluded that the domestic political and international diplomatic costs of nuclear weapons were too high and that Japan's security would be better advanced through political and economic efforts rather than a power-based approach. 3 1hese conclusions suggest that a policy compatible with the Yoshida doctrine was favored, 4 challenging system-level realpolitik expectations that Japan's ascent to global power would inevitably turn it into a nuclear weapons state and that Japan's industrial, scientific, financial, and technological resources would lead it to acquire nuclear weapons. 5 Nonetheless Japan's potential nuclearization remained a subject of discussion, particularly during the early 1970s, when it deliberated on ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for seven years. Since ratification in 1976, Japan has remained a nonnuclear weapons state. A 1995 study by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) reiterated the high costs of nuclear weapons, concluding that they were not in Japan's best economic and political interest. Several conceptual frameworks could explain Japan's past nuclear behavior. Indeed, Japan's nonnuclear status may have been overdetermined by several factors that made this outcome virtually inevitable. When no single factor can unequivocally claim explanatory dominance, and where many alternative causal paths lead to the same outcome, we face an instance of causal equifinality.6 Yet, the brief historical overview below reveals strengths and inadequacies of individual causal explanations for Japan's nuclear decisions. I subsume those explanations under a single framework emphasizing the preferences and strategies leaders use to gain, retain, and enhance their own survival in power under given international circumstances. 7 The Yoshida doctrine was at the heart of Japanese politicians' favored model of political survival, providing the glue that kept Japan's nonnuclear package together.

STRUCTURAL FORCES Structural or systemic approaches-sometimes referred to as neorealist theory-dwell on calculations of states' relative power (vis-a-vis others) to assess why states acquire nuclear weapons. According to Daniel Okimoto, many

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

133

predictions of Japan's inevitable nuclearization were based on deductions from such theories rather than close acquaintance with Japanese politics. 8 Richard Nixon argued prior to becoming president that "looking toward the future, one must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the ties." 9 Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer also predicted Japan's nuclearization to be highly likely. 10 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) had conflicting assessments of the probability of Japan's nuclearization; the 1957 one, however, advanced that Japan would "probably seek to develop weapons production programs within the next decade."" Yet few scholars and practitioners within Japan are on record supporting these system-level predictions, with some arguable exceptions. In 1957 Premier Kishi, minister of commerce and industry during World War II, declared that defensive nuclear weapons would not challenge Japan's constitution.U Muramatsu Takeshi questioned the U.S. ability to protect Japan, concluding that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons jointly with the United StatesY Others favored independent nuclear capabilities, arguing that the United States would not risk a nuclear exchange with China or Russia to protect Japan. 14 Miyazawa Kiichi, before becoming premier, expressed that "there is already a body of opinion in Japan which feels that dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella is basically incompatible with our national sovereignty" and that the coming generations "may want to choose the lesser of two evils and opt to build their own umbrella ... to be their own masters." 15 But many others regarded nuclearization as a net liability given Japan's small size, dense population, geographically concentrated industry, and close proximity to potentially hostile powers, which rendered it vulnerable to nuclear strikes particularly if it were to develop an indigenous deterrent. This group included Kishida Junnosuke, Nagai Yonosuke (one of the authors of the 1968-1970 study), and the JDA's chief of the Defense Bureau in 1972, among others. 16 For Nagai, Kishida, Kosaka Masataka, Momoi Makoto, and others, the U.S.-Japanese alliance obviated Japan's need for its own deterrent. 17 Herein lies one of the most frequently cited explanations for why Japan did not acquire its own nuclear weapons, and one that tends to end all discussion, depriving the nonproliferation analyst of a more nuanced and balanced interpretation of why, and exactly how, the alliance played such a central role in Japan's case. Because the alliance remains at the heart of any analysis of Japan's nuclear postures, we must understand its precise role during those critical years.

134

ETEL SOLINGEN

First, Waltz argues that "the great powers of the world must expect to take care of themselves"; they do not easily surrender extant capabilities and power prerogatives in exchange for "second bests." 18 This premise would have been particularly relevant for Japan following China's 1964 nuclear test. Second, U.S.-based analysis sometimes overlooks the extent to which alliance commitments were a constant concern for Japanese policy makers, analysts, and the public. Japan did not even acknowledge an "alliance"-as opposed to a bilateral security treaty-until the 198os, due to apprehension of nationalists on the left and right. Concerns with alliance credibility were exacerbated when the NPT was opened for signature and ratification (1968) by the Nixon doctrine, signaling U.S. disengagement and greater burden sharing by allies. Japan was not even consulted prior to Nixon's 1971 visit to Beijing and suspension of dollar-gold convertibility, shocks that intensified Japan's perceived vulnerability at a time known as the "nightmare of the Foreign Ministry."19 Concerns with U.S. commitments never disappeared. A former director in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Kaneko Kumao, stated that were Japan to suffer a nuclear attack, the United States would be highly unlikely to use its nuclear arms to defend it unless U.S. forces in Japan were exposed to extreme danger. 20 In an anarchic world with no foolproof security guaranteesthe analytical cornerstone of neorealist theory-why would a major power relinquish the ultimate guarantee? As one Japanese vice admiral put it, "The nuclear umbrella held by the U.S. must surely be useful, but for complete faith there is the nuclear umbrella opened by oneself." 21 Even strong Japanese supporters of the alliance were concerned about the U.S. commitment. When questioned prior to Nixon's visit to China, former head of JDA's Defense Research Institute Momoi Makoto reportedly referred to the alliance as "a Bible. You may know every word in it, and believe it to be true, but can you really be sure of salvation?"22 Following Nixon's China visit, Momoi added that the Bible was put away, it was around the home, but the children don't read it any longer. 23 Third, public opinion reflected this ambivalence, precisely as Japan weighed fateful decisions regarding NPT ratification. Surveys in 1969 and 1971 found that only about 30 percent of respondents thought the United States would defend Japan in an emergency. 24 These gauges do not support a view that the alliance was a particularly strong pillar on which to sell Japan's renunciation of nuclear weapons. Decades later, in the mid-1990s, only 49 percent felt confidence in U.S. commitments when North Korea loomed as the newest nuclear threat. 25 If the strength of the alliance mattered, the propensity to

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

135

develop nuclear weapons should have declined as the perceived reliability of the ally's nuclear guarantee rose. Yet higher levels of public support for the alliance-72 percent in 2003, up from 41 percent in 1969-coincided with apparent weakening of the "nuclear allergy." 26 Fourth, there are additional reasons to question a simplistic, crude connection between the alliance and Japan's low interest in nuclear weapons, as if that connection operated in an analytical vacuum unrelated to other considerations. Some of those considerations questioned the alliance as the exclusive factor in Japan's nuclear calculus; others treated the alliance as an important pillar because of its domestic reverberations. The latter, however, are not relevant to orthodox or unalloyed neorealism, for which domestic politics play no role in geostrategic matters. Furthermore, beyond dilemmas of "abandonment," the alliance also entailed dilemmas of entrapment (makikomare-ron) or being dragged into policies of higher priority for the United States than Japan. This was as true in the 196os as today. Nor does the evidence support the view of the alliance as a "sweetener" offered to offset presumed U.S. coercion. It was reasonable for Japanese decision makers to be concerned with potentially costly U.S. responses to a nuclear Japan. But the historical record does not offer strong support for the view that U.S. coercion cornered Japan into abrogating its own nuclear weapons. 27 Fifth, the coercion hypothesis would be more persuasive if there was evidence for a strong Japanese demand for nuclear weapons that U.S. pressure succeeded in thwarting. But Japan's domestic politics did not generate such demand. Furthermore, there is at least some evidence that, at critical times, there was more than U.S. forbearing for Japan's nuclearization. Nixon reportedly suggested to Sato that Japan faced an unacceptable choice to either develop "its own deterrent power however unpalatable vis-a-vis its neighbors, who are armed with nuclear weapons, or ... [come] to an accommodation with them." 28 Sato replied that Japan's Diet had adopted the unanimous TNNP, and Japan had no recourse but to rely on the Mutual Security Treaty and the U.S. umbrella. Nixon also suggested that the United States exerted no pressure on Japan to ratify the NPT and that "Japan might take its time, and thus keep any potential enemy concerned." 29 Though Nixon asked Sato to forget his remark, he insisted that Japan would be better off not telling neighbors what it would not do. Sato reportedly claimed that Nixon "confused" him but U.S. diplomats reassured Japanese officials that Nixon and Kissinger had been "misunderstood." 30 In sum, rather than a countervailing by-product of U.S. coercion, the alliance was a useful instrument for Japanese leaders to extract commitments

136 ETEL SOLINGEN

from an occasionally erratic ally. Premier Hosokawa Morihiro, for instance, expressed that "it is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan withdraw from the NPT and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear umbrella." 31 Above all, the alliance played a major role domestically, in the effort by Japanese opponents of nuclear weapons to overwhelm proponents. Finally, this overview reveals a general deficiency of structural (neorealist) determinants ofJapan's nuclear choices. Competing injunctions emanated from the same structural landscape: Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, should not acquire them, should rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, should not rely on it, should build extensive conventional capabilities as substitutes for nuclear weapons, should not rely on conventional deterrence, and so on. This very open-endedness of systemic forces led to a wide range of indeterminate possibilities, nuclear and nonnuclear, on which Japanese decision makers could imprint their favored choices. The outcome was not structurally predetermined. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS: THE YOSHIDA COMPROMISE MODEL OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL

That the alliance was not the only consideration in play is evident from some U.S. intelligence assessments. A 1965 document advised that "we must recognize that Japanese domestic developments and international events, rather than U.S. desires, will be the prime determinant" of Japan's defense policies and that U.S. "ability to influence the rate of Japan's defense expansion will continue to be marginal at best."32 Systemic factors, including the alliance, are thus best understood in the context ofJapan's postwar domestic model, which acted as a filter for interpreting Japan's international interests and options. Japanese leaders adopted a model compelling a specific political economy of national security. The model's implications-nuclear abstention-were compatible with and reinforced normative and institutional considerations that leaders had to take into account as they sought to gain and retain power. This is different from asserting that antinuclear norms in and of themselves explain Japan's choices, except as part of this broader political model. The model rejected the 1930s war-oriented, autarkic, and militarized past, embracing instead a "trading state" strategy for enhancing economic growth and domestic legitimacy. Yoshida Shigeru's blueprint hinged on a "merchant nation" with strong economic infrastructure, manufacturing capabilities,

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

137

and swimming with (not against) the great tide of market forces. 33 By the early 1960s Premier Ikeda Hayato's income-doubling plan marked the official success of the Yoshida doctrine and the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) "economy first" strategy. As the "institutionalized center of Japan's political consensus," 34 this doctrine linked economic growth, global access, and nonnuclear status explicitly and implicitly. Economic growth deflated perceived threats of communist subversion and provided the glue that kept together LDP factions, disparate bureaucracies, big business and finance, energy and farming interests, smaller and medium-sized business, and some opposition parties. The model overwhelmed extreme right and left opponents, some of whom-on the right-favored kokusanka (domestic rearmament) and, in some instances, nuclear weapons. Kokusanka had high opportunity costs, negative macroeconomic and budgetary implications, and adverse consequences for alliance-related procurement and for "Japan's secure place in the global economy." 35 A nonnuclear status and capping military expenditures at 1 percent reassured public opinion that neither one would endanger economic growth (or democracy). Friendly relations with the United States and domestic stability were two sides of the same coin, both jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for security. 36 The nuclear umbrella obviated spending too many resources on security while facilitating access to global markets, natural resources, and international institutions. 37 Export markets helped secure earnings for importing 90 percent ofJapan's needed energy resources (99.7 percent of oil needs). In sum, the alliance was but a means to forge domestic political compromise over the prevailing model. The model had achieved high levels of sustained economic growth as Japan approached fateful nuclear decisions, turning Japan into the world's thirdlargest economy (196os), quadrupling its share of global trade and exports, and providing stable LDP political dominance, all of which made the LDP, big business, conservative politicians, and the bureaucracy hypersensitive to change. 38 Notwithstanding the severe Nixon shocks to Japan's sense of reassurance, LDP leaders rejected nuclear weapons that would have heightened uncertainty and posed major risks to the economic miracle and its "peace diplomacy." The model was already under threat from international criticism of Japan's trading practices, declining exports following the 1971 exchange rate shock, the 1973-1974 oil crisis, and from a serious recession. As Reiss argues, key economic activities would have been brought "almost to a standstill" had Japan embraced nuclear weapons. 39 Japan's nuclear industry-critical for the

138

ETEL SOLINGEN

economic miracle-would have been afflicted with disruptions in fuel supplies, enrichment, and related services from the United States, Canada, Australia, Britain, France, and others. A major architect ofJapan's abstention from nuclear weapons, Imai Ryukichi, stated that "if a Japanese intention to obtain nuclear weapons became known, the relationship with these countries could become so strained that the basic resources for nuclear power generation might no longer be available and the entire nuclear [energy] program would come to a complete stop."40 Unsurprisingly, the MOFA insisted on NPT ratification to ensure stable nuclear fuel supplies and Japan's Atomic Industrial Forum affirmed that "the long term position of Japan's nuclear technology, industry, and resources will be better if the treaty is ratified before long."41 All this suggests that Japan's nuclear energy program was doomed without international support; its economic miracle was doomed without nuclear energy; and the LDP was doomed without a sustained economic miracle. Whereas Japan's constitution has no specific reference to nuclear weapons, Article 1 of the Atomic Energy Law made clear its objective to secure energy resources and contribute to elevating national living standards, and Article 2 limited research, development, and utilization of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. 42 Large industries with interests in nuclear energy, and electric utilities providing the backbone for the economic miracle were also important LDP donors. Keidanren's (Federation of Economic Organizations) chairmanMitsubishi's Kono Fumihiko-declared that Japan does not need nuclear weapons at all. 43 Mitsubishi captured over 30 percent of defense procurement at the time, and Kono, as chairman of Keidanren's Defense Production Committee, represented the defense industry while serving on Sanken (Industrial Problems Study Council), the high command of Japan's business community and the strongest pressure group. In addition, continued growth and domestic political stability also required market access to-and raw materials from-Asian neighbors, as well as a stable region enhancing economic expansion and attracting foreign (particularly Japanese) investment. Japan was pouring official development assistance to reconstruct relations with East Asian countries in an effort to normalize economic and diplomatic relations, thus ensuring the continuity of its domestic model. A document summarizing the "Foundation ofNational Defense" stipulated that Japan's national defense was to establish friendship and cooperation with neighbors to lessen tensions and enable domestic policies for economic and social development. 44 As Momoi argued, "If Japan were to go nuclear, the hostility this would engender in the international environment would have

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

139

the most serious implications for the economic relationships [my emphasis] that are vital to Japan." 45 Developing nuclear weapons, as Berger noted, "was certain to provoke political chaos at home and hostility abroad."46 The Norms Argument

The experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki make Japan a unique case for exploring the role of antinuclear norms. Its pacifist movement clearly sensitized leaders to domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. The architects of the Yoshida model had to contend with this strand in Japan's public opinion, in addition to the constituencies mentioned earlier. Yet common perceptions of the influence of normative constraints tend to overestimate their independent effects on policy at the time. First, the very conduct of several govern ment studies on nuclear options suggests that nuclear weapons acquisitionalthough unlikely-was less than a taboo, particularly given special sensitivity to secret contingency studies following the 1965 Mitsuya Kenkyu liken simulation exerciseY Second, Japan signed the NPT eighteen months after its adoption and delayed ratification by nearly seven years (in addition to intense domestic divisions, the justification sometimes provided for this delay is that Japan preferred general disarmament). It is hard to see how a dominant nuclear taboo could have coexisted with such a protracted process of signing on to an international regime against nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly given Japan's sustained support for U.N. multilateralism in the postwar era, as a way to erase the memory of its wartime behavior. 48 Third, according to published polls, the "nuclear allergy" was much stronger subsequently than during the first two decades of the postwar era, when historic nuclear decisions were under consideration. Fourth, institutional restraints such as the Atomic Energy Law and the TNNP had significant force. Yet there was also continuous contestation over interpretations of the constitution's Article IX (renouncing the right of belligerency but not referring specifically to nuclear weapons), which may explain why the principles never became law. 49 Fifth, reliance on the U.S. umbrella was not precisely a policy suggestive of total nuclear abstinence, and compromises over U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan were also an expression of"embedded nuclearization." All this suggests that nuclear weapons were not "unthinkable" and that, as Mochizuki argues, "Japan's pacifism has always been pragmatic." 50 Nonetheless, the nuclear allergy and the pacifist movement reinforced other political constraints cast by the Yoshida doctrine. 51 The links among the socioeconomic and security-domestic, regional, and international-pillars

140

ETEL SOLING EN

of the LDP's model were evident in Japan's 1970 statement accompanying its NPT signature, noting that until Japan decides to ratify the NPT, it "will investigate cautiously the rest of the problems which must be seriously considered in order to secure national prosperity." 52 Alluding to trade-offs between a growing economy and a nuclear program, Nakasone reportedly declared that same year (1970) that China opted for "going nuclear without pants," whereas Japan "has remained non-nuclear, preferring to be decently dressed." 53 As a U.S. intelligence estimate argued, "The diversion of resources from development and welfare programs would not [have been] politically feasible." 54 Nuclear weapons would have precluded the logrolling of powerful economic forces and antinuclear groups, thus undermining the consensus and stability necessary for the model's survival. The slow erosion of the LDP's majority was exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis, hyperinflation, recession, corruption scandals, declining growth, and rising unemployment. In 1974 Premier Miki even made overtures to the opposition to split the LDP. The opposition challenged the LDP on presumed violations of the TNNP and pressed for alternative forms of national security, such as poverty elimination. Miki crafted a broad coalition of moderate LDP factions, opposition parties, MOFA and JDA leaders, high echelons of industry (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum), and the Atomic Energy Commission, in support ofNPT ratification, despite adamant opposition from Soshinkai, other LDP factions, and the Communist Party. 55 In sum, the expectations, achievements, and legacy of the Yoshida model arguably provided necessary conditions for Japan's nonnuclear status. The alliance and the nuclear allergy made the outcome even more likely, as vectors weaved into and reinforcing the favored policy. The Role of Individuals

Some analysts draw attention to the role of personal psychology in nuclear decisions. 56 The Japan case, however, raises serious doubts about such variables as drivers of nuclear behavior. The preceding overview in this chapter reflects on the political constraints operating on decision makers. Yoshida and his successors may have had varied positions on nuclear matters, but the economic dimension was primordial and dominated all others. "In the economic world," Yoshida argued, "nothing was more urgent than increased exports, and the improvement of Japan's position in world markets." 57 A 1958 NIE argued that even Kishi considered Japan's future "greatness" to rest primarily on economic rather than military strength and that there was "nothing to

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

141

suggest" that "responsible conservative leaders" were "seriously considering an independent nuclear weapons program."58 Yoshida later allegedly regretted the sweeping success of his own doctrine in discouraging changes in defense policy. 59 Yoshida's own memoirs make it clear that he opposed rearmament because of "the burden of national expenditure that the people of Japan already have to bear" and not because of normative concerns with Japan's militarization.60 Indeed, Yoshida envisaged that rearmament should not be precluded in the long run. While reviewing factors explaining Japan's "miracle," Tanaka's memoirs also listed restraint on arms expenditures in first place. 61 Unsurprisingly, Premier Tanaka also reaffirmed the TNNP. Political incentives stemming from the Yoshida doctrine explain these leaders' behavior exceedingly well, overriding potential differences in psychological traits. Whether or not it is feasible to evaluate Premier Sato's psychology systematically, the historical record available does suggest a fairly instrumental approach to nuclear issues. 62 On the one hand, Sato enunciated the TNNP. On the other hand, he reportedly conveyed to Ambassador Reischauer a personal preference for a nuclear Japan (December 1964) and expressed to President Johnson that if communist China had nuclear weapons so should Japan. 63 Yet Sato also confessed that he could mention that view only privately because his personal feelings were certainly not shared at home and the Japanese people felt that Japan should never possess such weapons. Sato also conveyed to Dean Rusk that most Japanese felt that their security rested with the U.S. alliance and that acquiring nuclear weapons "was not Japan's policy."64 A pragmatist through and through, Sato's unequivocal objective was to obtain Johnson's reassurance that Japan would be defended by nuclear means if necessary, a commitment that was not explicit in the bilateral treaty. 65 The Johnson-Sato communique fulfilled Sato's objective. Yet in 1967 Sato sent his advisor (and originator of the nonnuclear principles), Wakaizumi Kei, on a confidential inquiry into possible distinctions between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons. 66 Defensive weapons were allowed by Japan's constitution. A U.S. ambassador quoted Sato arguing in 1969 that while the TNNP were '"nonsense,' ... this should not be interpreted to mean Japan wants to have nuclear weapons."67 Finally, under Sato's watch, the Cabinet Information Research Office initiated the 1968-1970 study to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of nuclear weapons. Sato's zigzagging can be explained by pressures from extreme right conservatives and left-wing LDP members, who collaborated to oust him.

142

ETEL SOLINGEN

The 1968-1970 study took place in this unwieldy domestic context. 68 Many interpret this study as a means to counter pronuclear elements within Japan, but it also suggests-together with other evidence cited-that neither was Sato constrained by a nuclear taboo. Sato revealed both his personal views and his understanding of political constraints at a 1969 meeting with Keidanren leaders: Let me say this so that no one can misunderstand me: I do not regard it as a complete system of defense if we cannot possess nuclear weapons in the era of nuclear weapons. I will, nevertheless, adhere faithfully to the pledge I have made to the people. We will not possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons. 69 Had Sato been wholly committed to a nuclear Japan-over and above other objectives-he might have pushed for it under the more receptive context of the Nixon administration. He did not. Sato sought the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa while secretly agreeing to their return in emergency situations/0 Okinawa's reversion to Japan was Sato's foremost political purpose, one he was prepared to advance even by accepting the formal adoption of the nonnuclear principles in exchange for the Diet's approval of his Okinawa agreement. 71 Sato conspicuously presented the principles to the Diet's Budget Committee. In sum, regardless of their deep personal preferences, nuclear weapons were a political liability for Japanese leaders advancing a model of political survival and national security that was "economic in nature," and hinged on domestic consensus, regional stability, and international access. 72 Indeed, the succession of a large number of premiers and cabinets over several decadeshousing a wide range of personalities and psychological characteristics-have all yielded the same outcome. PROJECTIONS INTO THE FUTURE

This section extends some of the arguments introduced in the preceding section to identify potential triggers that might change Japan's nuclear trajectory. I begin with predictions based on structural determinants because these are the ones that are most often noted in studies of nuclear chains, tipping points, avalanches, and their kin. I then turn to Japan's domestic context to explore elements of continuity, change, and evolution in Japanese leaders' favored strategy of political survival and what they might portend for nuclear choices.

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

143

Structural Determinants and Potential Triggers

Orthodox, unalloyed structural perspectives consider great powers like Japan to be structural anomalies difficult to sustain: "How long can Japan ... live alongside other nuclear states while denying [itself] similar capabilities?"73 Japan has disputes with several neighbors, including China, South Korea, Russia, and Taiwan, but China and North Korea are most often mentioned in discussions of potential proliferation chains involving Japan. One crucial difficulty for orthodox structural theories, however, is the perennially shifting, unclear, and undefined thresholds of changes in structural power that must be crossed for Japan to finally turn to nuclear weapons. Those shifting thresholds are evident in the North Korean saga, beginning with violations of NPT commitments in the 1990s, expulsion of IAEA inspectors, unpunished NPT withdrawal, plutonium extraction, alleged enrichment activities, repeated verbal threats to Japan to turn it into a "sea of fire," progressive missile tests since 1993, declaration of"nukes" possession, and two nuclear tests (2006 and 2009). Each of these was estimated a priori to be likely to trigger Japan's nuclearization. That none of them led to the expected outcome thus far warns against predictions based on simplistic assessments of ever elusive power balances. Another difficulty is that this approach suffers from underdetermination, or the inability to predict which outcome-nuclear or nonnuclear-best guarantees Japan's security. One response to missile and nuclear tests by North Korea has been a joint U.S.-Japan research program on missile defense. Sea-based SM-3 systems in Aegis destroyers and land-based Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) are scheduled for deployment by 2011, ostensibly to deter North Korea, which has strongly condemned this program, as has China. In addition, the 2008 Basic Space Bill removed a long-standing ban on the military use of space. Many of Japan's nonnuclear steps in response to North Korea's actions are said to strengthen Japan's position against a more "real" looming rival: China. But this factor is not new either; the 1964 Chinese nuclear test was expected to drive Japan, and others, in the same direction. Over forty years later Japan's hypothetical turn toward an indigenous nuclear deterrent would buttress unalloyed structural theories while dealing a nearly fatal blow to the view that the alliance obviates the need for such deterrent. Issues of missile defense control, interoperability, and Japan's exercise of "collective self-defense" remain under discussion within the alliance.

144

ETEL SOLING EN

Were Japan to opt for its own deterrent, one would need to understand why structural power balances mattered more vis-a-vis North Korea than vis-a-vis other historical nuclear-armed neighbors (Soviet Union/Russia and China); why a rising (internationalizing) China would be a greater threat than a 1960s radical Maoist one, which did not trigger Japan's nuclearization; and why U.S. guarantees would be now perceived as weaker than ever before, given that serious episodes of weakening U.S. commitments in the 1970s-and subsequentlydid not lead to an indigenous Japanese deterrent either. Moreover, a structural argument is unable to consensually establish a priori whether nuclearization would be driven by North Korea, China, or both. Indeed, this may well be very hard to establish empirically even a posteriori. If so, we will not be able to learn much about how to improve the predictive and analytical value of such mechanical structural tools. This would not be particularly unusual according to studies gauging the predictive power of such tools/4 What about this approach's neorealist competitor, the alliance argument? Japanese perceptions of the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance vary over time and require perennial affirmation. The United States reiterated its commitment to Japan following North Korea's 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. Some insist that lingering perceptions of abandonment could fuel pressures for Japan's nuclearization. However, although alliance slack is nothing new, many previous episodes never yielded Japanese nuclearization. Estimating the weight of the alliance in such decisions requires a proper understanding of the domestic political landscape that filters external security dilemmas, about which more will be said later. Even with a strong alliance, some insist, a bilateral U.S.Japan agreement or a unilateral Japanese decision could lead to an indigenous deterrent.7 5 In either case, the argument that alliances provide strong disincentives for proliferation would suffer a strong blow, particularly given a robust alliance archetype, relative to most others. There may be a nontrivial probability that the alliance-in and of itselfmay be neither necessary nor sufficient for Japan to remain nonnuclear. The JDA 1995 study concluded that, even in the alliance's absence, "nuclearization would nevertheless not be in Japan's national interest, given the geographic and population constraints noted above, as well as the likelihood that the international stability Japan relies on to prosper as a trading state would be undermined, rather than enhanced, by such a decision." 76 The JDA's articulation of such a view may be far more noteworthy than one by the MOFA, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), or others, as an indication

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

145

of the Yoshida doctrine's durability. Japan's place in the global political economy may well be overshadowed by a rising China, but Japan's internationalizing incentives remain, including continued access to foreign markets, capital, and energy resources. Trade and stability in East Asia, so crucial to Japan's economic growth and domestic stability, remain more important than nuclear weapons, according to Izumi and Furukawa. 77 Thus, Japan would have renounced such weapons even after three of its neighbors acquired them, questioning the role of balance-of-power arguments even for a technologically well-endowed great power. Another contingency is South Korea's own development or possible inheritance of nuclear weapons from the North, through peaceful reunification or collapse. 78 Following North Korea's nuclear tests, South Korea's apprehension grew over stern Japanese statements, as if they aimed at rationalizing Japan's nuclearization. Some South Korean politicians argued that "Korea must also develop nuclear weapons," and selected public opinion surveys reported 70 percent agreement with that view. 79 Kim Dae-jung claimed that "if North Korea gets nuclear weapons, the stance ofJapan and our country toward nuclear weapons could change." 80 Yet polls also reveal that more people believe North Korea has a far more negative influence on South Korean society than Japan does and that, although historical memories and resentment over Japan's colonial behavior may still be deeply rooted, nearly half the population may be transcending them. 81 Whether unification will lead to a nuclear Korea is far from predetermined. Furthermore, a majority of polled Japanese thought that Korea would not be unified. Under unification, South Korea would be subject to the same constraints as Japan regarding access to foreign energy sources, markets, investments, technology, and capital, exacerbated by the gargantuan costs of unification. 82 Assuming a low likelihood of a unified nuclear Korea, another potential trigger for Japan's nuclearization would be removed. Without proper assessments of the domestic political landscape in the Koreas and Japan, reliable predictions remain elusive. A unified nuclear Korea and a nuclear Japan would entail a complete erosion of the presumed restraints imposed by both alliances. 83 This outcome would buttress unalloyed structural theories of nuclear dominoes or "breakout" and compel an analysis of alliance durability, thresholds, and dynamics that might enable better predictions in other contexts. This outcome would also draw attention to Taiwan's potential nuclearization via diffusion mechanisms and weakened confidence in alliances.

146

ETEL SOLING EN

Summing up the discussion of structural considerations, Japan's sustained nuclear abstention is incompatible with unalloyed perspectives that have predicted Japan's imminent nuclearization. If this perspective was right, what was imminent should have-at some point in the last difficult decade-become actual and concrete. Yet, long-standing predictions of this looming outcome have failed to materialize. On the basis of this and other analytical flaws, one might surmise that estimating Japan's future status might include, but also transcend, this kind of analysis. Many outcomes would be compatible with balance-of-power considerations, rendering the approach virtually unfalsifiable and allowing only a posteriori justifications of whatever nuclear behavior obtains. Approaches that help explain when and how "security dilemmas" are exacerbated by external threats, such as the rise of China, seem more useful. Jervis proposed, for instance, that the domain of cooperation would be enlarged when decision makers perceived their states to be less vulnerable, either because of an ally's protection; because both the benefits of cooperation and the costs of war are high; or because the gains from exploitation are lower. 84 This conceptualization opens the door for further identifying the circumstances under which these conditions might obtain. For instance, in dyadic or multilateral contexts joining states with domestic ruling coalitions sharing interests in advancing economic growth via integration in the global economy, one can assume common interests in regional stability, foreign investment, and access to global resources, markets, technology, and aid. 85 The broadening of the domain of potential gains alleviates concerns with security dilemmas and enhances the probability of cooperation. Thus, the nature of regions-internationalizing in the case of East Asia-has systemic effects on individual decisions of states, reinforcing cooperation and down playing pressures for nuclearization. The Role of the Nonproliferation Regime

Another systemic trigger cited as a potential source of change in Japan's nuclear status is the possible collapse of the nonproliferation regime. 86 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, "a significant change globally in the political economic reward structure for states adhering to stringent nonproliferation behavior could alter how ruling coalitions assess the costs and benefits of nuclear restraint." 87 Some NIEs have also alluded to this risk and to potential emulation effects from India, Pakistan, Iran, and others. It is very difficult to establish empirically whether Japan's nuclear policy would have evolved differently in a world without the NPT. An institution's impact can be assessed

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

147

only by comparing actual outcomes with those that might have accrued in the absence of that institution, a counterfactual. Yet the historical record does not provide very strong evidence that Japan would have acquired nuclear weapons had the NPT not emerged in 1968. The NPT reportedly enjoyed limited currency in Japan's domestic debate, according to chief participants such as Imai, who labeled the NPT a "nonissue" during the mid-1970s, arguing that few people opposed the NPT and even fewer actively promoted its ratification. 88 In this view, Japan could-in weighing whether or not to ratify the NPT-"afford to pay due respect to the architects of the NPT world order, when and if it is required."89 Given this reported apathy toward the NPT and limited knowledge among the public (including Diet members) at the time, it is quite possible that the critical1970s decision to abstain from nuclear weapons was logically prior to, not a consequence of, the decision to ratify the NPT. But would this still be the case today, or down the road? Whatever hesitancy Japanese decision makers may have had about joining and ratifying the NPT, it was superseded by a decades-old excellent record of compliance with the NPT, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines, the Comprehensive NuclearTest Ban Treaty (CTBT), support for global disarmament (particularly since 1994), NPT indefinite extension (after some hesitation), and the Additional Protocol. In 2002 Japan published its first White Paper ("Japan's Disarmament Policy") informing its citizens of Japan's diplomacy in this area. 90 This should not be considered idle talk, as crude structural power theories sometimes do. Communicating commitments to domestic audiences tie the hands of politicians and parties in the future. Failure to deliver can have very high "audience costs" such as removal from office or no-confidence votes. 91 Japanese leaders have enjoyed rather brief tenures and are particularly sensitive to audience costs associated with nuclear choices. After decades of faithful adherence to the NPT, such commitments would not be easy to overturn. Yet Japan remains concerned with the erosion of the NPT following the U.S.India agreement and challenges by North Korea, Iran, and others. As Egyptian Ambassador Nabil Fahmy argued, "Some states are bound to reassess their [NPT] commitments or hesitate to make new ones without a change of course by the international community and more rigorous disarmament and nonproliferation efforts." 92 The future might provide additional tests ofNPT regime effects. A weakening regime could lead Japan to reconsider its options if sanctions and isolation become less likely, as Varnum suggests. 93 However, one may not want to bet on a (literal) "business as usual" scenario where global investors and traders

148

ETEL SOLING EN

do not adjust their prior assessments of risk and where regional neighbors impassively absorb such moves without severing crucial economic relations with Japan, if not worse. At least some private global investors-while retaining economic activities in South Korea-remain a step removed from deeper economic ties and demand additional guarantees, in part as a result of uncertainty about North Korea. 94 Moves by Japan and South Korea toward nuclear weapons could exacerbate such concerns. This argument may be countered by growing investments in post-1998 India, but those are largely in services. Furthermore, the possibility remains that foreign investments might have been higher had South Asia not stepped up the nuclear race. At the very least, nuclearization heightens business uncertainty. No less plausible is Dunn's argument that "proliferation shocks," perhaps not so paradoxically, strengthen the global regime. 95 Ongoing debacles with North Korea and Iran could lead to strengthened rules, raising the costs of defiance. Japan might support such developments if it tightens oversight over North Korea and creates additional constraints on South Korea, while strengthening Six-Party Talks coordination to disarm North Korea. China's leverage over North Korea may enhance possibilities for a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. A final potential sunny outcome of proliferation shocks might be progress toward a global nuclear zero, consonant with Japan's U.N. activism but less so with concerns by some Japanese with losing the protection afforded by extended deterrence. This tension between a global zero and the benefits of a U.S. nuclear umbrella is likely to remain. Japan's traditional resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons at the U.N. General Assembly regularly passes with overwhelming support, arguably making its nuclearization much less likely. Summing up, Japan's nuclear decisions cannot be considered a simple derivative of structural considerations, even if common discourse gives such considerations pride of place. Understanding the mechanisms through which the nonproliferation regime could affect states' policies requires a theory of domestic politics largely absent from the institutional literature on the NPT. One such framework links compliance and defection to domestic models of political survival. 96 Accordingly, the prospects that global or regional institutional arrangements curtail pressures for nuclear chains hinges largely on the continuity of compatible models of domestic political survival which, throughout East Asia (except for North Korea), have assumed the form of sustained economic growth through internationalization. Given the region's ascendance as the engine of the 21st-century global economy, the stakes in

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

149

maintaining such models are particularly high. I revisit these prospects next, while discussing Japan's domestic trends. Domestic Developments and Potential Triggers

As discussed in the companion volume, 97 theories attentive to the domestic foundations of nuclear decisions, far from autistic, are indeed quite sensitive to international developments. Such theories simply advance that, because the domestic realm largely refracts, interprets, and filters external stimuli, it must be a central component of any effort to understand nuclear decisions. External stimuli are clearly intrinsic to the analysis but not as independent as systemic theories assume; different domestic models translate those stimuli into different policies. This point bears repetition to avoid inaccurate imputations that such models entail (domestic) reductionist accounts of the sources of nuclear behavior. Other arguments take the impact of domestic politics even further. For instance, Akiyama claims that "for the Japanese people, nuclear issues were more or less subjects for domestic politics or domestic social movements, which seemed to be rather insulated from the reality of international security."98 And for Kase, "Japan may have likely remained non-nuclear regardless of any external security developments." 99 Nuclear Posture Debates

Yet North Korea's nuclearization has enhanced domestic calls for more proactive Japanese policies. Such calls assert that Japan's external and internal conditions enable greater space for nuclear weapons, not exactly an entirely new development among conservative politicians and former military officers. In 1999 Vice Minister of Defense Nishimura Shingo expressed that Japan's failure to consider nuclear armament left it open to "rape" by China. He was forced to resign immediately. As an opposition leader, Ozawa Ichiro, who had called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, also stated prior to the 2002 elections that "if China gets too inflated, the Japanese people will become hysterical in response," adding that "we have plenty of plutonium in our nuclear power plants, so it's possible for us to produce 3,ooo to 4,ooo nuclear warheads." 100 Ozawa became secretary general of the Democratic Party when the latter assumed power after defeating the LDP. Abe Shinzo, deputy chief cabinet secretary at the time, reiterated his grandfather Kishi's position that the constitution did not ban possession of nuclear weapons "as long as they are kept to a minimum and are tactical." 101 Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo argued that "under Japanese law, there is no reason to prevent Japan from arming itself with nuclear weapons .... If public opinion agrees with nuclear armament, the

150

ETEL SOLINGEN

denuclearization principle can be revised." 102 Opposition parties demanded Fukuda's resignation, yet he later became prime minister. Demands to enshrine the TNNP in the constitution have not been satisfied. Even opponents of nuclear weapons such as LDP legislator Takemi Keizo warned that if the alliance's credibility is undermined, more Japanese-including left-leaning, liberals, and the young-will advocate ending the alliance, and then "Japan's possession of nuclear weapons would be in sight." 103 LDP Diet member Kono Taro declared that "it's surprising how many lawmakers are in favor of having nuclear arms," although a poll found only eighty-three of 724 Diet members publicly supporting Japan's nuclearization in response to North Korea's. 104 Following North Korea's 2006 test, LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Nakagawa Shoichi argued that "constitutionally, nuclear weapons are not forbidden"; that discussion of the nuclear option was necessary; that it was unlikely that Japan would be aggressive if it had nuclear weapons; and that Japan must have the right to have a nuclear deterrent. 105 Foreign Minister Aso Taro reportedly stated that "'nuclear armament' is one way of thinking"; that debate is very important; and that "Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons," although "we are not saying we have plans to possess [them]." 106 LDP Parliamentary Policy Committee Chair Nikai Toshihiro criticized Nakagawa's remarks, and Premier Abe, meeting with important representatives from economic sectors, expressed that Nakagawa "recognizes" the TNNP and will "settle into place," while advising Nakagawa to exercise restraint. These and similar statements have fueled speculation that Japan might change its nuclear posture in tandem with the erosion of other legal safeguards (hadome; brakes) related to Article IX, collective defense, and arms exports, among others. Yet many of the domestic political-instrumental, normative, and institutional-barriers that operated for decades continue to bind Japan to nonnuclear status. The JDA again concluded in 1995 that the political and financial costs of nuclear weapons were too high and the adverse regional consequences too weighty. 107 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared no intention of seeking nuclear weapons and recommitted to the TNNP in 2002, adding that "it is significant that although we could have them, we don't." 108 Endo Tetsuya, vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, cited Japan's deeply rooted antinuclear sentiments, domestic statutes, international pacts on the peaceful use of nuclear power, the alliance, and cooperation with Asian neighbors to nurture trust and regional stability. Diplomat Funakoshi Takehiro unambiguously reiterated Japan's constraints viewed from an "economy first" model: "Japan is quite totally, economically interdependent

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

151

with the international community ... so if we receive economic sanctions, that very weight will fall into a very difficult situation." 109 Nishimura, as opposition legislator, argued that most Japanese politicians continued to avoid this debate due to strong strains of pacifism among voters. 110 As president of Japan's National Defense Academy, Nishihara Masashi warned that Japan's nuclearization would bring a worst-case scenario of economic sanctions and isolation.m JDA Director General Ishiba Shigeru asserted that no outcome of the North Korean crisis will lead Japan to enter a nuclear arms race. 112 Premier Abe Shinzo unequivocally reaffirmed in 2006-to a Diet budget committeethat "there will be no change" regarding the TNNP. 113 Finally, Democratic Party Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya strongly reaffirmed Japan's antinuclear stance in early 2010Y 4 The alliance may not be the only barrier preventing Japan's nuclearization; but, in its absence, domestic proponents of nuclear weapons might have stronger ammunition to persuade others of the presumed merits of Japan's nuclearization. The alliance helps moderate domestic arguments on defense; without it, some argue, Japan would split sharply into pronuclear and antinuclear camps and, in the process, harm Japan's very democracy. 115 Nakagawa expressed that both the alliance and the NPT are mere "assumptions" and that debate over nuclear weapons would take place naturallyY 6 As argued, public perceptions of the alliance fluctuate significantly, declining from 82 percent approval in 2006 to about 40 percent in 2007.m Indeed, 26 percent thought the United States could become a threat militarily to Japan, placing South Korea as a slightly lower threat. More respondents also advocated a reduction of U.S. forces in Japan than their strengthening or maintenance. The unraveling of the Six-Party Talks and North Korea's repeated nuclear tests are also cited as latent triggers for Japan's nuclearization, although they have not yet led to that outcome. Few of the respondents expected the North Korean nuclear issue to be resolved through the Six-Party Talks. The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea became a far more prominent public concern in Japanese domestic politics than North Korea's nuclearization. The U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism before the abductees issue was resolved and before complete, verifiable denuclearization was met with grave concern in Japan. Evolving Domestic Political Dynamics

Given the limited reliability of polling data, it is crucial to understand the fundamentals of an evolving Japanese political system and favored strategies of political survival. Some suggest Japan could be moving away from the Yoshida

152

ETEL SOLINGEN

doctrine, pointing to refueling operations in Afghanistan as watersheds in this evolution. Tracing these changes to international systemic considerations, Pyle regards the Yoshida doctrine as "a dead letter," pointing to the erosion of seven of eight binding restrictions that had limited Japan's foreign entanglements: no troops abroad, no collective defense mechanisms, no power projection, no more than 1 percent of GNP for the military, no sharing of military technology, no arms exports, no military use of space, and no nuclear weapons. 118 Only the last remains in place and is now discussed more openly. Constitutional changes, the 2007 JDA's upgrading into a ministry, nationalist revisions in education, and greater emphasis on political (rather than economic) intelligence are considered additional indicators of a possible erosion of hadome. Although much has changed, in Pyle's view, due to the primacy of external forces, he considers the inception of a new grand strategy premature because the implications of a changing balance of power remain unclear. Samuels views these changes largely as a result of domestic dynamics and responses to threats, not leading necessarily to huge departures but to a Goldilocks ("just right") more independent and assertive Japan. 119 Mochizuki discerns even less of a digression from the Yoshida doctrine.l2° Yet Hughes and Krauss also predict premiers increasingly dependent on public opinion, with greater incentives to adopt more assertive policies against North Korea and China, an enhanced nationalist orientation in security policy and a more erratic, capricious, obdurate, demanding, and perhaps even aggressive alliance partner. 121 Mochizuki concurs that premiers' incentives to mobilize public support are even more central in a two-party system and strengthened cabinet secretariat, but he does not regard these transitions as overturning Japan's trading state, bound by economic, institutional, and normative constraints that tie domestic stability and prosperity to favorable regional and international environments. 122 "Soft power" remains an important card for Japan, and one incompatible with nuclear weapons. 123 Changes in the party system and the rise of the premiership and cabinet office could suggest that personalities might become more central to nuclear policies as well. However, personalities remain constrained by the requirements of political survival, as suggested by recent experiences. Koizumia successful innovator who relaxed the shackles of LDP faction politicsbroadened Japan's global engagements, transformed the military domestically in ways not seen in the postwar era, and genuflected to the right through visits to the Yasukuni shrine but also stayed the nonnuclear course and traveled to Pyongyang pursuing normalization. If personality is so crucial, Abe Shinzo,

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

153

a conservative at heart who learned about Japanese strategic options at his grandfather's (Kishi's) knee, would have been a strong candidate to move Japan beyond the TNNP. 124 His 2002 statements might have been construed in that fashion. Yet, on assuming the premiership, Abe traveled to Beijing and Seoul to assuage concerns. Furthermore, even as North Korea tested nuclear weapons under his watch, Abe reaffirmed Japan's nonnuclear status, aware of the economic, political, regional, and global requirements without which Japan's (or any Japanese leader's) survival in the 21st-century global political economy could not be guaranteed. Abe plausibly also understood that most relevant individuals, bureaucracies, peak industrial interests, and an electoral majority believed that to be the case. His personal preferences were subordinated to that understanding, just as Sato's were-by his own acknowledgment-in the 196os and 1970s. As available historical data suggests, political survival and "audience costs" considerations seemed to have neutralized other proclivities that Kishi, Yoshida, Sato, Nakasone, or others may have had. 125 The confluence of major systemic triggers (North Korea's first nuclear test and missile tests) and a strongly conservative leader (Abe) at Japan's helm did not yield the shifts that might have been predicted by structural and personality variables. Nor did Fukuda's 2002 remarks on revising the TNNP preclude his 2007 accession to the premiership and promotion of conciliatory policies toward Japan's neighbors. Another confluence of major systemic triggers (North Korea's second nuclear test and additional missile tests) and a strongly conservative leader (Aso) in power also failed to produce the outcome predicted by structural and personality variables. This obtained despite Aso's beliefs that nuclear weapons "could deter foreign attacks" and help Japan hit back if attacked, his praise for Japanese colonial rule on Korea, his ultraconservative family background, and his naming of Nakagawa as finance minister. Japan, Aso declared, "has no position at all to consider going nuclear," and "there is no need to arm ourselves with nuclear weapons, either." 126 These latest cases, and the long list that preceded them, suggest that decision makers rarely act in a vacuum. Few postwar Japanese politicians have veered very far from the "economy first" model, at least thus far. Even one proponent of discussing Japan's nuclear options asked, "How can the security and prosperity of Japan and its people possibly be ensured by severing the alliance with the United States?" 127 Japan's postwar model has yielded economic miracles but also endured significant challenges. Reliance on the nuclear umbrella has been key to the model's survival but has also been perceived by leftist opponents of nuclear

154 ETEL SOLINGEN

weapons as "embedded nuclearization." Rejection of an indigenous deterrent was rooted in the model's features for both pragmatic and normative reasons. Yet the latter seem to fall short of a taboo, given the long list of statements cited earlier and acknowledgment by a former JDA head, as recently as 2006, that Japan had conducted "theoretical research" on nuclear weapons, concluding that it should not possess them. 128 Polls suggested that the public overwhelmingly favored the TNNP in 2006, with only 18 percent thinking they might be altered. 129 About 46 percent, however, believed that it would be acceptable to discuss whether Japan should possess nuclear weapons, suggesting perhaps a softening of antinuclear norms. This decline appears most evident among younger generations.U 0 Disentangling normative from pragmatic reasoning on this issue is difficult; the two have been mutually reinforcing and remain that way. A competing norm, rising nationalism in Northeast Asia, has emerged in some recent scholarship as a presumed source of a more fragile regional order, arguably more conducive to nuclearization. The precise mechanisms leading from nationalism, memory, or identity to nuclear weapons are unclear, particularly because historical antipathies are not new, and such emotions have been sublimated for decades into developmental models. For others, the shadow cast by history and memory notwithstanding, an emerging Pax Asiatica in the heart of the 21st-century global economy reduces the chances of nuclearization. 131 Premier Fukuda and Chinese president Hu Jintao launched conciliatory initiatives on sensitive maritime boundary conflicts and agreed to joint development of oil and natural gas reserves in the East China Sea. Keidanren Chairman Mitarai Fujio-representing Japan's influential business community-expressed strong support for Premier Abe's visit to China and South Korea to strengthen "a trusting relationship" with allied Asian nations. 132 Even Aso spoke favorably of China's development as an economic power; encouraged a focus on cooperation and reconciliation; dismissed Tamogami Toshio, an air force chief of staff who had justified Japan's wars of aggression and Japan's nuclearization; played down Nakagawa's criticism of the U.S. removal of North Korea from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism; and ultimately ousted Nakagawa, reportedly for appearing drunk at a G-8 meeting. 133 As this chapter goes to press, the DPJ replaces the long rule of the LDP following a landslide electoral victory. Hatoyama relied on populist rhetoric during the campaign, in the midst of a severe economic crisis, criticizing "U.S.-led market fundamentalism" and "untrammeled globalization." But

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

155

Hatoyama's actual policies on most issues are not yet well known, although he expressed support for President Obama's proposal to abolish nuclear weapons. Ozawa's past unorthodox statements on nuclear matters have not precluded his appointment as party secretary. At this early stage, many predict a concentration on economic issues primarily and a cooperative approach with Asian neighbors, suggesting that change in Japan's nuclear status may not be in the offing. If anything, considering the DPJ historical party origins, its efforts to introduce greater transparency on at least some nuclear-related issues, and its public positions thus far, Japan's nuclearization under its watch seems highly unlikely. What many see as a watershed in Japan's political history, the LDP's replacement, also reminds us that Japanese policies are likely to remain the product of democratic contestation.t 34 CONCLUSIONS: "NORMAL" MAY NOT BE NUCLEAR

An important theme in recent research on Japan is the meaning of becoming a "normal" country, the title of a 1994 book by Ozawa. A parallel theme in nonproliferation studies is the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. Although there may be some degree of overlap between these two conversations, there is also a danger of conflating these debates as if they were one and the same. Japan may well become "normal" in the sense of, among other things, enabling its military to adopt some of the same responsibilities with which the armed forces are entrusted elsewhere. As Inoguchi argues, "A global-oriented Japan must become a global-oriented ordinary power."t 35 Other dimensions sometimes associated with "normalization"-such as efforts to deny Japan's abhorrent colonial conduct in school history textbooks-are quite distressing to many in Japan and beyond. But whatever becoming "normal" entails, it is not necessarily a prelude to becoming "nuclear." Indeed, the "normal" state in today's community of over 190 U.N. members is a nonnuclear armed one; nuclear weapons states comprise a very small fraction of the total. From this standpoint, "normal" is not nuclear. A recent study of potential generational differences in Japan's House of Representatives suggests that despite stronger support among the younger generation for Japan's right to collective selfdefense, few other significant generational cleavages exist with respect to security issues, suggesting more continuity than change.B6 Notwithstanding continued concerns with the potential breakdown of long-standing barriers to nuclearization, Japan has not responded to North Korea's nuclear weapons with a deterrent of its own. Nor does there seem to be much of a domestic demand for nuclear weapons, according to Izumi

156

ETEL SOLING EN

and Furukawa, who also warn against what the Japanese public perceives as exaggerated foreign assessments of Japan's interest in nuclear weapons. 137 Japan's plutonium recycling, mixed oxide fuel, and fast-breeder reactors have stimulated suspicions inside and outside Japan, as have potential intercontinental rocket capabilitiesY8 Yet experts on Japan's nuclear history assert that no other peaceful nuclear power program has been so thoroughly examined by the IAEA as Japan's, in accordance with its own domestic law and international agreements, and that fissile materials could not be channeled into weapons programs without the world knowing. 139 The worst-case scenario that might compel Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, according to Kitaoka Shinichi, would include all the contingencies discussed throughout this chapter: a nuclear North Korea, a nuclear South Korea (or a unified peninsula), a highly diminished and unreliable U.S.-Japan alliance, and a collapse of the nonproliferation regime. 140 The probability of all these events (the "perfect storm") coming to pass is extremely hard to estimate. Furthermore, despite claims that the China factor may lead Japan toward nuclear weapons, China remains crucially important for Japan's economy, business, investments, inexpensive inputs, and consumer products. All this makes the health of Japan itself heavily contingent on the health of bilateral relations. No Japanese politician can ignore these constraints without threatening the well-being of an increasingly aging Japan with a declining work force. As Mochizuki argues, "Japan's grand strategy will evolve incrementally rather than change dramatically. Japan will continue to balance between the security imperative of its alliance with the United States and the economic imperative of developing a favorable Asian environment for its long-term commercial interests." 141 Both remain key pillars of Japan's domestic model of political survival, making it hard to envisage an inward-looking autarkic shift. 142 A 1957 NIE may have been right for its time and for the 21st century: "Japanese policy with respect to the production of nuclear weapons is likely to be determined primarily by domestic and regional considerations." 143 Primarily, however, does not mean uniquely determined. A focus on models of political survival commands attention to the synergies among the international, regional, and domestic; the political and the economic; the material interest and the normative aspiration; and the short-term and longer-term calculations that absorb politicians in Japan as elsewhere. In short, as a theoretical framework, models of political survival suggest the opposite of analytical reductionism; they indeed require awareness of complex causal mechanisms

THE PERILS OF PREDICTION

157

and demand a rich tapestry of information about how external constraints become domestic options. Sometimes confused with an exclusively domestic angle, these models provide an anchor for a multifaceted account of all the noted important vectors-exogenous and endogenous-that come together in the fulcrum of domestic nuclear decision making. By way of conclusion, a final word is needed on the perils of prediction, particularly because Japan has often been the subject of thus far unfulfilled proliferation prognoses by structural theories. In his award-winning book, Expert Political Judgment, Philip Tetlock found a perverse and inverse relationship between "good judgment" (accurate predictions) on the one hand, and "formulaic solutions," or blind commitment to one big theory on the other. 144 He also found an inverse relationship between good judgment on the one hand and work that reduces complexity to hypersimplicity (balance of power?) on the other. Tetlock finds parsimony to be the enemy of accuracy and thus a substantial liability in real-world forecasting. He also provides a stern warning about the analytical traits required in good forecasting. Tetlock defines hedgehogs as analysts with "high need for closure, integratively simple individuals ... who dislike ambiguity and dissonance in their personal and professional lives, place a premium on parsimony, and prefer speedy resolutions of uncertainty that keep prior opinions intact." Foxes, instead, are characterized by "low need for closure, integratively complex individuals ... tolerant of ambiguity and dissonance, curious about other points of view, and open to the possibility that they are wrong." 145 Why does this matter? Because hedgehogs, he claims, prove to be much more fallible in their predictions than foxes.

7

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING Scott Snyder

CONSIDERABLE ACADEMIC ATTENTION has

been paid to the question of what motivates states to pursue nuclear weapons. Much of this analysis has focused on the role of external security threats as the primary lens through which to examine nuclear decision making. 1 Such analysis has been particularly common in recent years in the Asian context, as popular analysis has featured the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction involving neighboring states in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's, or North Korea's) continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons. 2 The conventional wisdom has been that the advent of a nuclear North Korea would spark nuclear decisions by Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), and even Taiwan, if these states can no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to provide extended deterrence against nuclear threats. Within two weeks of North Korea's test of a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew to the region and provided strong public reassurances in Japan regarding the credibility of the nuclear umbrella as an extended deterrent. 3 Following North Korea's May 25, 2009, nuclear test, the United States further reassured South Korea regarding its commitment to extended deterrence in a meeting between Presidents Obama and Lee. The joint vision statement released at the time of the meeting reaffirmed the provision of U.S. positive security assurances to South Korea, maintaining that "the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance."4 The "security model" of explaining proliferation decisions, however, has increasingly been complemented and challenged by alternative theories for analyzing what motivates states to pursue nuclear weapons. 158

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

159

Scott Sagan suggested two additional lenses or "models" through which to examine state decisions to pursue nuclear weapons: the "domestic politics model," where nuclear decisions are shaped by domestic and bureaucratic interests and internal competition; and the "norms model," in which case nuclear weapons might be pursued for reasons of prestige as "an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and identity." 5 The domestic politics model he proposed focuses on the respective bureaucratic roles of the state's nuclear energy establishment, important units within the professional military, and politicians or political parties who favor the acquisition of nuclear weapons. A variant of this approach has been further developed and elaborated in the work of Etel Solingen, who has proposed that the struggle between domestic coalitions that either align themselves with, or fight against, global economic trends will decisively influence a state's approach to nuclear decision making. 6 The norms model focuses on the way in which nuclear decision making might both shape and reflect a state's identity. Elaborating on the role of prestige and identity in nuclear decision making, Jacques Hymans applies questions of identity and prestige directly to the psychology of national leaders as key players in nuclear decision making, arguing that strongly nationalistic leaders motivated by a combination of fear and pride are most likely to have a catalytic impact on state decisions to pursue a nuclear weapons program, in many cases circumventing established bureaucratic constraints and mobilizing efforts to build and direct capacities toward that end. 7 This chapter uses each of the models and variants listed in the preceding paragraphs to analyze the factors that might influence future South Korean decisions to pursue or not to pursue nuclear weapons. The chapter first provides a summary review of key decision points in the history and development of South Korea's civilian nuclear program and the evolution of Korean domestic bureaucratic interests as they relate to that program. Then it reviews the "security model" and its application to explain South Korea's historical experience with and current attitudes toward nuclear development. Applying the models that focus on internal factors, the chapter provides an analysis of bureaucratic political interests that are likely to be influential in shaping the future development of South Korea's nuclear policies and a qualitative evaluation of various leadership types on South Korea's current domestic political scene as part of a rough evaluation of the dominant political leadership personality types in a Korean political context. This analysis considers voter expectations and perceptions that might influence voter choice in the

160

SCOTT SNYDER

selection of national leadership types and fits those national leadership types into Hymans's framework for determining the propensity of political leaders to make decisions to pursue nuclear weapons. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

South Korea began to show interest in the development of peaceful nuclear energy capacity very shortly following the Korean War, joining the Atoms for Peace program and signing an agreement with the United States in 1956 on the peaceful use of atomic energy. Initiated by President Eisenhower over five decades ago, the Atoms for Peace program introduced the basic components of today's international nonproliferation regime, including most importantly the norm of nuclear nonproliferation in addition to the idea of nuclear safeguards, the principle of regulated nuclear commerce, and the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). South Korea joined the IAEA in 1957, while Hanyang and Seoul Universities established nuclear engineering departments, and the ROK government established the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) in 1959. With this foundation, South Korea's authoritarian government under Park Chunghee initiated preparations to establish its first nuclear power plant in 1962, a process that eventually led to the completion of the country's first three nuclear plants on a turnkey basis at Kori and Wolsung in 1978 and 1979. During the 1980s and 1990s, South Korea maintained a robust program to expand civilian nuclear energy on the indigenous energy-deprived peninsula by completing thirteen additional plants, taking a gradually expanding role in the construction and design of plants through the development of skills and capacities that would support localization and technological self-reliance. With the construction of what came to be referred to as the Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) in 1995 at Ulchin, South Korea had developed the capacity to design, build, operate, and even export nuclear power plants with relatively minimal reliance on outside entities with the exception of a limited number of critical parts. These developments took place within the parameters of a series of U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation agreements, through which the United States remained a key partner in providing the technology for core components of Korean reactors through the 1990s. Through this experience, South Korea's nuclear power industry developed R&D, construction, design, project management, plant maintenance, and fuel supply capabilities. Over time, American involvement in the Korean

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

161

nuclear power sector dwindled as U.S. companies themselves began to exit the nuclear plant construction market entirely. 8 During the 1970s, the South Korean nuclear program detoured into an effort to establish a nuclear weapons program, a development that has been studied closely from several different perspectives. The dominant analytical narrative focuses on Park Chunghee's perception that South Korea's security environment was rapidly deteriorating and that American security guarantees might not be reliable as a result of decisions by the Nixon administration to withdraw the Seventh Infantry Division from the Korean peninsula. At the time, South Korea's security and deterrence capabilities against North Korea, estimated to be more than twice as strong as the South, were highly dependent on the presence of U.S. forces and deployments of American tactical nuclear weapons at South Korean bases. Nixon's decision in 1969 to reduce U.S. forces, and the possibility that the Chinese might demand troop reductions in South Korea in the context of Nixon's diplomatic opening to China, spawned South Korean anxieties about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. Park's concerns about the credibility of the alliance with the United States were heightened with the 1976 presidential election ofJimmy Carter, who came to office determined to remove U.S. troops from South Korea and was highly critical of Park's repressive domestic policies, which routinely violated human rights of regime critics and dissidents. 9 Park Chunghee's decision to pursue a nuclear weapons option was directly linked to his concerns about the regional security environment and his doubts about America's commitment to defend South Korea against the North. Park decided in 1970 to establish the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) to modernize the ROK military and in 1971 to initiate a nuclear weapons program through the creation of a high-level coordinating committee known as the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), while the KAERI was tasked with acquiring reprocessing capabilities. 10 Control, administration, and budgeting of South Korea's nuclear program was compartmentalized within South Korea's bureaucracy and managed directly from the Blue House under the auspices of the Office of the Second Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs (OSPSEA)Y South Korean attempts to purchase a spent fuel reprocessing facility from France, a mixed-oxide reprocessing laboratory from Belgium, and a heavywater Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor from Canada tipped off the United States to South Korea's covert nuclear weapons production efforts. These efforts prompted heavy pressure from the United States, using economic

162 SCOTT SNYDER

and political coercion-in the form ofblocking approval ofloans necessary for continued development of South Korea's civilian nuclear program and even threats to end the alliance if South Korea proceeded with its nuclear weapons development program-to end South Korea's nuclear weapons acquisition attempts. Given the country's economic and security dependence on the United States, Park Chunghee decided to acquiesce to such demands, valuing South Korea's alliance with the United States over the potential security benefits of pursuing an independent nuclear weapons path. 12 The Carter administration's announcement of renewed plans to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea again stimulated Park Chunghee's interest in nuclear weapons in the late 1970s; but, following South Korea's ratification of the NPT and conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the focus was on acquisition of dual-use technology that would make South Korea nuclear capable. To this end, in December 1976 South Korea established the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI}, which was able to construct nuclear fuel fabrication pilot plants in 1979 with technological help from FranceY One of the positive side effects of the coup d'etat against Park and transition to Chun Doo Hwan was increased U.S. leverage to restrain such efforts in light of Chun's dire need for national legitimacy in combination with the easing of South Korea's security environment and enhanced capacities compared to North Korea during the 198os. To counter suspicions about South Korea's nuclear development program and regain American confidence, Chun took various steps to streamline government agencies and their budgets, which had expanded under the Park administration. The KNFDI was enfolded into KAERI as the "Daeduk Center" and tasked with conduct of academic research on nuclear fuel technologies. Abolishing the OSPSEA, Chun cut off direct channels between the Blue House and nuclear researchers and reduced the budgets for South Korea's nuclear-related research institutions, putting South Korea's nuclear efforts back under bureaucratic control within normal reporting structures. According to one scientist who worked at the ADD during the Chun Doo-hwan period, After Chongwadae (the Blue House) stopped providing special budgets for the ADD, all projects initiated by President Park were automatically canceled. The ADD lost budgetary independence. As long as the ADD depended for its budgets on the DIB under the Minister of National Defense, its R&D activities were institutionally under the supervision of the EPB and the National Assembly. 14

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

163

A Korean representative stated at an IAEA presentation in 1986 that South Korea ought to keep its "hands clean and keep our nose away from the stink of gunpowder and highly enriched uranium above 90 [percent]."15 Further evidence that the balance in South Korea had shifted away from pursuit of indigenous nuclear weapons capability toward a focus on peaceful nuclear production came in the form of a South Korean unilateral pledge not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing in 1991, following the U.S. announcement that it would withdraw land-based tactical nuclear weapons from foreign bases.16 An inter-Korean Joint Denuclearization agreement was signed in 1992, in which both countries voluntarily pledged that they "will not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.'' 17 In addition, South Korea's bilateral commitments with the United States and its international obligations as a member of the NPT have been reinforced. South Korea joined the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 1982, and the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1995.18 South Korea's domestic legal commitments to peaceful use of nuclear energy have been strengthened through the promulgation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Energy Promotion Plan (CNEPP) in compliance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), which affirms South Korea's commitments to peaceful, safe, and transparent use of nuclear energy. 19 U.S.-ROK bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements remain in place, and South Korea has strengthened its international commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy through the signing and ratification of the Additional Protocol in 2004. However, as part of South Korea's accession to the Additional Protocol, there have been revelations of small-scale experiments from the 1980s to 2000 that suggest a continued interest in development of a full fuel cycle capability and that have implications for South Korea's nuclear weapons development capacity. The ROK government revealed that atomic vapor laser isotope separation had been conducted on several occasions without being reported to the IAEA, characterizing these experiments as "isolated, laboratory-scale scientific experiments conducted at the initiative of a small number of scientists." Although the experiments in the year 2000 were reportedly approved by the director of KAERI, that information was not passed on to the Ministry of Science and Technology or the president. 20 Following a series of IAEA investigations, the South Korean government received a clean bill of health from the IAEA Secretariat's Safeguards Implementation Report submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2008. 21 Although news of the experiments was disturbing and renewed some doubts

164

SCOTT SNYDER

about South Korean commitments to abstain from nuclear weapons-related pursuits, the incident also provided reassurance that a strengthened IAEA inspections regime under the Additional Protocol is effective in providing "early warning" and in constraining covert nuclear weapons development for countries who have accepted inspections under that regime. South Korean senior officials view the IAEA's oversight as so comprehensive that there is little need for indigenous institutional checks to ensure compliance. 22 As South Korea's civilian nuclear power capacity and expertise have grown as part of its efforts to redress the country's extreme energy import dependency, the balance of domestic interest and expertise has continued to shift to the production of peaceful nuclear energy. As a result, the costs associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons have increased. South Korea's expertise and reliance on civilian nuclear energy production are among the highest in the world. South Korea is among the· nine countries that depend on nuclear power for at least a third of their electricity, with nuclear energy accounting for about 40 percent of electricity generation compared to about 20 percent for the United States. In recent years, South Korea has emerged as a leader in nuclear power plant performance along with the United States and JapanY The development of the KSNP reactor in the mid-1990s was a clear precursor to a desire on the part of South Korean nuclear energy industry not only to continue production to meet domestic needs but also to export South Koreandesigned and -built nuclear plants to other countries. In fact, one of the motivations for the South Korean government in signing on to the Geneva Agreed Framework, which committed it to playing a major role in the financing and construction of a "South Korean model" light water reactor in North Korea, was that involvement in such a project would help build South Korea's "brand" as an international player in the nuclear plant construction sector. 24 South Korean advances in nuclear energy technology are once again bumping up against international efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities because these technologies can also be used to produce the necessary materials for a nuclear weapon. However, South Korea is pursuing a technology called pyroprocessing as a potentially viable technological and commercial solution to nuclear waste storage, a problem that has become increasingly urgent given that the accumulation of spent fuel at South Korea's nuclear power plants is projected to saturate its existing storage capacity by 2030. 25 The technology seeks to reprocess nuclear spent fuel waste to be used as plutonium fuel for fast breeder reactors, but it is not yet clear whether such a process can be developed in a way that can assure that the fuel is not useful

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

165

for weapons purposes. As an alternative to spent fuel storage, pyroprocessing would also give South Korea the ability to manage every component of the fuel cycle. The ROK Ministry of Science and Technology announced plans to build a functioning next-generation fast reactor and a pyroprocessing fuel cycle by 2028, with the construction of a pilot facility completed by 2012. 26 In addition, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been funding joint pyroprocessing projects with KAERI since 2005. KAERI's goal is to produce a prototype commercial pyroprocessing plant by 2025Y South Korea's ambitious timetable for pursuing pyroprocessing as a solution to its nuclear waste problems could be derailed over proliferation concerns connected with efforts to contain reprocessing capabilities. President George W. Bush in 2006 initiated the Global Nuclear Energy Program (GNEP), a program that called for the establishment of regional reprocessing centers to prevent further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities while also meeting legitimate civilian needs for reprocessing as a means to handle waste. 28 South Korea's membership in GNEP in December 2007 was accompanied by renewed concerns about its decade-long R&D efforts in pyroprocessing, including its impact on proliferation and possible inconsistency with the 1992 inter-Korean agreement on denuclearization. The key question that has stirred debate is whether or not pyroprocessing should be considered reprocessing and thus a violation of state commitments under GNEP to forgo independent reprocessing capabilities. 29 A State Department official stated in October 2007 that "pyroprocessing is not reprocessing." However, that judgment remains subject to internal dispute within the U.S. government. Although South Korea has built a laboratory-scale facility for conducting additional pyroprocessing experiments, it is bound under its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States to obtain U.S. consent before conducting independent pyroprocessing experiments. As of March 2010, the United States had not yet provided such consent. The issue is likely to remain an important focus of debate in the context ofU.S.-ROK negotiations over a new bilateral cooperation agreement to replace the current one that expires in 2014. 30 PROJECTING THE FUTURE

As a modern, industrialized, prosperous, and vibrantly democratic country, South Korea faces different security challenges, a different domestic institutional context and relationship with the globalized economy, and a different self-identity from the South Korea of the Park Chunghee days. This transformation has affected every aspect of South Korea's circumstances and

166

SCOTT SNYDER

perceptions related to the question of whether to consider nuclear weapons, including the influence of external security factors, domestic institutional factors, norms, prestige, and identity. South Korea's Regional Security Environment: After the North Korean Nuclear Test

The South Korean reaction to the advent of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and nuclear test in October 2006 is instructive for how different South Korean responses to its own security environment are today compared to the 1970s. South Korea has widely surpassed North Korea in economic growth, international political influence, and military capability. No longer do South Korean leaders fear the North; instead, they are proud of their economic modernization and democratic transitionY According to Shim Sangsun, the easing of South Korea's external security environment from the 1970s was accompanied by a progressive willingness by successive South Korean presidents to reduce the country's reliance on nuclear weapons-either indigenous or the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. This improved security environment paved the way for ~oh Tae Woo to confirm that there were no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula in 1991 after George H. W. Bush announced his decision to eliminate the worldwide inventory of U.S. ground-launched theater nuclear weapons and to bring home and destroy all nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. 32 North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 and second test in 2009 do not appear to have had an impact on South Korean military security strategy or programs, at least through 2009. Public perceptions of the North Korean threat have changed drastically in the past decade, especially with the engagement policies of the Kim and Roh administrations that sought to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. The North Korean famine of the mid-1990s drew sympathy from many South Koreans, while the North-South summit in 2000 generated unprecedented public support for reconciliation under the "Sunshine Policy." Although the most recent nuclear crisis reignited debate on Seoul's North Korea policy, it appears to have had little impact on threat perceptions among South Koreans. In a 2005 poll by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 65 percent of respondents said they perceived North Korea as an object of cooperation or assistance, while 31 percent saw the North as an object of vigilance or an enemy. 33

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

167

Interviews conducted by Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in October 2007 suggested that South Korean feelings of superiority vis-a-vis the North have led to a diminished view of North Korea's military threat and capabilities. South Korean elite descriptions of their relationship with the North as one in which South Korea is the "elder brother" highlight the extent to which North Korea is no longer seen as an object or source of competition. 34 Under the Lee Myung-bak administration in particular, North Korea has become a lower foreign policy priority, as most Koreans are more concerned with achieving economic success within their own society. Survey findings of South Korea's National Statistical Office released in October 2008 showed that domestic rather than external security issues are the focus of concern of most Koreans. Sixty-nine percent of respondents were more concerned about food safety than North Korea's nuclear weapons, and over 50 percent said that society would become more dangerous in the next ten years due to crime, financial difficulties, and pollution. 35 This does not mean that South Koreans have completely dismissed North Korea as a potential security threat, but for the most part they appear to have concluded that the nature of the DPRK threat now derives more from the North Korean weak institutional capacity than from its military strength. The South Korean public no longer appears to take North Korea seriously as the baseline for comparison or competition, and the ROK government has also downplayed North Korea as a potential threat for many years. North Korea's threat has widely been perceived as deriving from its weakness rather than from its strength since the mid-1990s. The competition for legitimacy that was so active during the Cold War is no longer influential in South Korean threat perceptions and does not pose an· existential challenge. Instead, North Korea is viewed more as a political problem to be managed than as a direct threat to South Korea's security. 36 Also, the political debate over how to deal with North Korea, and in particular the deepening of a "south-south conflict" (nam-nam kalteung) over the most effective approach to addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, has come to obscure and politicize the nature of the North Korean threat. In addition, the relative impotency of the South to effectively address the nuclear issue with North Korea, in light of the North's insistence that its true partner in addressing such core security issues is the United States, not South Korea, has reduced the debate to one over political approaches rather than the strategic implications of and possible South Korean responses to North Korea's denuclearization.

168 SCOTT SNYDER

North Korea's nuclear test in 2006 heightened the differences among South Korea's political factions regarding North Korea policy. While the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) clashed with progressives over Roh's effort to continue economic projects with the North, advocates of continued engagement argued that further isolating the North would exacerbate the security situation on the Korean peninsula. Still, GNP leader Park Geun-hye expressed support for an engagement policy provided it would take into account the implications of the North's nuclear test, an act for which progressives including president Kim Dae-jung blamed U.S. policy. 37 Since the inauguration of conservative Lee Myung-bak as president in early 2008, however, the inter-Korean relationship has deteriorated in part over Lee's insistence that North Korea's denuclearization and opening are the prerequisites for South Korea to offer major economic assistance to the North. DPRK's response to such policies constitutes a new test as to whether the South Korean public will support principled engagement premised on North Korea's denuclearization or whether the process of engagement itself is perceived to have value quite apart from the future of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, regarded in progressive circles as primarily a way of generating leverage for negotiations outside the peninsula but having little significance in light of the overriding goal and appeals by North Korea to "the Korean race, by itself" (uri minjok kkiri). There are also perceptions that South Koreans expect to inherit North Korea's nuclear weapons program as a low-cost way of attaining nuclear status for a reunified Korea. In the postunification scenario, some South Koreans argue that, as the smallest country in the region, South Korea should keep North Korean assets to maintain a strong deterrent capability, while others see ballistic missiles and nuclear arms as a source of Korean strength and national pride. 38 But the idea that South Korea would easily be able to inherit North Korea's nuclear weapons runs counter both to regional opposition and to South Korea's own pledges in the context of the 1992 inter-Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. 39 Although the issue of how to coordinate U.S. and South Korean efforts in the event of North Korean contingencies has been a source of tension under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, it appears that such talks between the United States and South Korea are receiving renewed attention under the leadership of Lee Myungbak. A critical issue as part of this discussion is likely to be the disposition of "loose nukes" in the event of North Korean instability, including the question of who would be responsible for such a mission. In light of the close

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

169

coordination between the United States and South Korean militaries on the peninsula, it is highly unlikely that there would be misunderstanding regarding responsibility for this effort. In addition, the technical training and capability to undertake such a mission is more likely to exist in the U.S. military than in the South Korean military. In this regard, it may be argued that the alliance with the United States-and the necessity of coordination on any operation that might be undertaken to secure "loose nukes"-remains a major constraint on the prospect of South Korea "inheriting" North Korea's weapons. Moreover, the alliance is backed up by a regional consensus opposed to the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, there is the possibility of misunderstanding on this issue with the Chinese government, which reportedly has developed its own contingency plans for addressing "environmental issues" on the peninsula in the event of internal instability in the North. Chinese interlocutors have indicated their strong preference for actions in response to North Korean instability to be handled with authorization from the U.N. Security Council so as to avoid confusion among neighboring parties, but it is likely that the task of securing nuclear weapons would require action that would not await the outcome of a U.N. Security Council debate. 40 One manifestation of South Korea's changing security perceptions is that South Korean defense planners are no longer focused solely on the North as the "main enemy," instead preparing for a future in which South Korean investment in naval and air assets is also necessary while the focus on the army is maintained. South Korea's defense department in 2005 replaced its Defense White Paper's decade-old reference to North Korea as the "main enemy" with "direct military threat," suggesting a shift in policy preferences toward peacefully engaging the North. At the same time, the paper outlines U.S. military commitments in the case of a North Korean attack amounting to more than four times the U.S. force presence in IraqY Although the 2006 Defense White Paper's repeated descriptions of North Korea as a "serious threat" reflected a firmer tone after the October nuclear test, South Korean perceptions of the North remain divided. As argued by Nam Sung-wook at Korea University, the difference is between military experts, who are more likely to call the North a threat, and political leaders, who are more likely to support the efforts of peaceful engagement. 42 South Korean Defense White Papers have not explicitly targeted any other regional country to replace North Korea as a potential threat, but South Korean naval procurement suggests that the country's leadership is aware of Japan's

170

SCOTT SNYDER

acquisitions and capabilities and has a desire to keep up to the extent that they can. 43 China is rarely discussed as a military/security threat, although increasingly there are South Korean security analysts who are prepared to admit that China's rapid growth poses potential new security challenges to South Korea. The Korea Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) in 2006 released poll results showing that most Koreans identified China as the country's biggest security threat in a decade, followed by Japan, with North Korea ranking third. 44 One recent report links China's economic rise to rapid military build-up, calling for a stronger multilateral security framework including a ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance and the Six-Party system. 45 However, South Korean defense planners simply do not have good options for attempting to match a Chinese military build-up over the long term, so the task of managing security relations with China remains primarily a political problem rather than one that can be solved through military means. South Korea's lack of response may also be explained by the fact that South Korea's key peer competitor has shifted from North Korea to Japan. Japan appears to have evolved into the primary key comparison other for South Korea as Cold War tensions on the Korean peninsula eased. South Korea's foreign minister Han Sungjoo said in 1993 that "under no circumstances will we consider going nuclear ourselves ... [to do so] would legitimize the North Korean nuclear program and thus perhaps provoke Japan to reconsider one of its own."46 North Korea's first nuclear test fueled a debate in Japan over whether to consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Abe attempted to end discussion of the subject but was contradicted by his foreign minister, Taro Aso, and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi NakagawaY This debate drew a sharp rebuke from South Korea's then-foreign minister and currently U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon, who stated that he was "very concerned" over a debate in Japan regarding going nuclear. 48 South Korean concerns regarding the possibility of Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons are greater than their concerns regarding North Korea's nuclear program. Although a few figures on the Korean right, including the former GNP leader and founder of the Liberty Forward Party (LFP) Lee Hoi-chang, called for South Korea to consider going nuclear in response to the North Korean nuclear test, the test in fact triggered less of a response than concerns about the political debate in Japan over whether Japan should consider a nuclear option in response to DPRK. 49 Moreover, it should not be surprising that South Korea might track Japan's nuclear decisions closely given the fact that Japanese

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

171

political/military decisions have a lingering influence on South Korean political choices. Although Japanese nuclear developments have reportedly not been a direct influence on South Korean government policies, South Korean analysts argue that the country should keep up with Japan so as to be prepared if Japan were to go nuclear. 50 Some analyses of nuclear proliferation and regional arms races identify Japan's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as loss of confidence in the United States as a security partner, as major drivers of nuclear decision making in South Korea, especially given renewed fears about the possibility of Japan's emergence as a "normal" military power. 51 While it is clear that South Korea continues to benchmark militarysecurity developments in Japan as the clearest external influence on its own security and nonproliferation policies, the primary influence on nuclear decision making from the perspective of the security model is perceptions of the continued viability of the U.S. bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan, respectively. This focus on the role of U.S. alliance policy explains why Secretary of State Rice was so quick to provide Japan with clear assurances about the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the weeks following North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test. Likewise, the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement following North Korea's second nuclear test underscores the ways in which the U.S.ROK alliance has enabled U.S. efforts to pursue reassurance. The assumption that America's security commitments will ensure that Japan and South Korea do not make decisions to go nuclear provides a powerful rationale for sustaining the alliance. Based on the historical experience of the 1970s, there is a strong predisposition among policy analysts to view South Korea's prospects for going nuclear as directly proportional to the health of alliance relations with the United States. Former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sungjoo has argued that North Korea's recognition as a nuclear weapons state would further South Korea and Japan's security dependence on the United States, especially under a "nuclear umbrella" that would require a U.S. retaliatory strike in the case of a North Korean attack on either neighbor. 52 From this perspective, maintaining the alliance is critical to the credibility of U.S. security guarantees in Japan and South Korea, as any weakening of the relationship reduces the allies' confidence in continued U.S. support and heightens the possibility that they will seek alternative means to ensure their own security, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 53 Given the strength and persistence of those perceptions, one cannot dismiss the security model as irrelevant, especially in light of perceptions of the

172

SCOTT SNYDER

importance of continuing the alliance. But as one examines South Korea's current profile and status in the international community and changes that have occurred in South Korea's political and leadership structure with its transition to democracy, the alliance/security factor may no longer be the decisive variable in shaping South Korean nuclear choices, as it so clearly was in South Korea under Park Chunghee's leadership during the 1970s. The Domestic Institutional Context and Nuclear Decision Making

The dominant focus of South Korea's nuclear-related institutions and infrastructure is domestic energy production. Given South Korea's acute need for energy imports, the expansion of the nuclear industry as a means by which to cope with energy dependency is a logical decision. But to pursue a program that comprises such a large proportion of South Korea's indigenous capacity to meet its energy needs, it is necessary to cooperate with external partners. The U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement remains critical to achieving that goal, and South Korea has joined almost all multilateral organizations concerned with safe production of nuclear energy. South Korea's open style of democracy makes it even more challenging to imagine that it would be possible for a South Korean president to authorize a nuclear weapons production effort, especially given the ramifications for South Korea's international status and the prospect that such action would affect its extensive international trade. Although most of South Korea's nuclear energy sector capabilities have become indigenized, it would be exceedingly difficult to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program and keep it secret. A study by Shim Sangsun argues that South Korea's democratization and the accompanying development of a bureaucratic framework that dispersed power from the presidency serve as major structural differences from the 1970s that inhibit South Korea's institutional capacity to revive a nuclear weapons program. He also observes that, as early as the Chun Doo Hwan period, the growth of antinuclear civil society groups and lobbying of nuclear-related Korean conglomerates (chaebols) became important new factors against renewed development of a covert nuclear weapons program. 54 In their analysis ofJapan in the 1960s and 1970s, Okagaki and Hymans argue that elite views on whether to go nuclear were determined by various strategic and national identity factors rather than constraints from the United States or mass opinion and that the levels of transparency and accountability in democratic societies would make it virtually impossible to pursue a covert nuclear weapons

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

173

program. 55 Given that many U.S. observers feared that Japan would go nuclear due to the easing constraints on Japanese behavior, the Japanese case provides an illustration of the decisive role of domestic politics in nuclear choice. Etel Solingen describes Park's ultimate acquiescence to U.S. pressure to end South Korea's nuclear weapons development program in the context of changing fortunes of competing bureaucratic constituencies in South Korea. She observes that when it became clear that Park would have to choose between maintaining the international relationships necessary to fuel South Korea's economic development and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, the latter option was no longer viable because the economic costs accompanying proliferation would have been too high a price to bear. 56 Usually, South Korea's decision to give up its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s is credited to the extensive external pressure from its U.S. ally, but Solingen's analysis of the way in which internal constituencies assessed the economic and political benefits derived from internationalization provides a convincing parallel narrative for explaining the primary drivers influencing South Korea's past nuclear decision making. The progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration's apparent lack of interest in pursuing nuclear weapons in 2003 through 2006 despite high level of tensions in the U.S.-ROK alliance and North Korea's 2006 test of a nuclear device provide added weight to Solingen's framework. Given that the economic costs of proliferation have grown with South Korea's integration with the regional and global economy, they are likely to remain significant, particularly given the Lee Myung-bak administration's dual policy priorities of reviving the domestic economy and elevating South Korea's global role. Under South Korea's current system, KAERI operates as an autonomous institution that reports primarily to the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (formerly the Ministry of Science and Technology). However, oversight appears to be loose, as South Korea's 2004 IAEA disclosures indicate that the president ofKAERI authorized sensitive experiments without informing government ministries. In addition, the ROK National Assembly has an oversight role through an annual inspection process by which National Assembly members visit and investigate government projects to ensure that they are being carried out properly. In neither case does the exercise of oversight appear to be rigorous, however, leaving questions in the minds of critics as to whether KAERI can be effectively prevented from once again crossing the line in the experimental work that it performs. However, it is also impossible to imagine that a Blue House-led command structure would be able to mobilize a covert effort to develop nuclear weapons capacity without such efforts

174

SCOTT SNYDER

becoming known to the rest of the bureaucracy. In addition, the IAEA inspections regime sets a norm backed by a sufficiently rigorous verification process that it would be very difficult and potentially very costly for South Korea to pursue a covert program. Moreover, the fear and costs of being caught in dealings with shady international suppliers would hang over such a project. South Korea's exposure to the international economy remains high enough that the backlash resulting from the discovery of a covert nuclear program would entail high costs to South Korea's economy and its international reputation. One disturbing aspect of South Korea's current organizational structure is the ambiguity surrounding institutional accountability of some of South Korea's core nuclear-related bureaucracy. The failure to promote effective accountability and transparency has led to apparent mistakes that have marred South Korea's record with the IAEA, but these issues remain outstanding. In fact, they have been exacerbated under the Lee Myung-bak administration as a result of the decision to merge the Ministry of Education with the Ministry of Science and Technology. This reorganization has further muddied the waters in terms of the accountability and transparency of South Korea's primary nuclear energy-related institutions. Moreover, as South Korea moves into the export market, one aspect of the marketing of nuclear power plants abroad is that such efforts will require South Korea to maintain a strong safety record as well as to comply with international agreements, including the NPT and Additional Protocol. Given the strong commercial motivations that continue to gain momentum in connection with South Korea's nuclear energy industry and the prospect of participating in the design and export of nuclear power plants and their components, the covert pursuit of nuclear weapons by South Korea might disadvantage Korean business interests by costing tens of billions of dollars in business with other countries. North Korea's nuclearization worries some South Koreans involved in developing plants and components for export. South Korea's leading nuclear plant exporters are building an ever more powerful domestic constituency in favor of doing what is necessary to make sure that Korean nuclear exports can capture a large share of the international market. Identity, Norms, and South Korean Nuclear Decision Making

South Korean identity has become one that identifies itself at the elite level with internationalization and global standards. This also pertains to prestige derived from adhering to international rules and being accepted in global

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

175

society, so South Koreans are proud of their acceptance and participation in global regimes. But with regard to nuclear proliferation decisions, national pride can cut both ways. Tae-hyung Kim reports that a 1996 survey of retired generals found that 88 percent favored possessing a nuclear arsenal, not in response to the North Korean nuclear threat but "for the sake of national prestige and as a protest against the nuclear monopoly by the nuclear powers, especially the U.S." 57 The focus on prestige as a component of South Korean national identity may also be counterproductive when one considers the fact that South Korea is the country with the most advanced civil nuclear energy program not to have developed enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Efforts to prevent the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, when viewed in the context of the prestige connected with the development of an indigenous nuclear program, could work in the opposite way, leaving South Korean specialists aggrieved at restrictions that prevent them from moving into the first rank of countries with advanced programs capable of managing all elements of the fuel cycle. In Hymans's theory, the decision to launch a nuclear weapons program is one in which the leader plays a critical role in mobilizing a bureaucratic effort in the direction of nuclear weapons and that leader's psychology is key to forecasting decisions to pursue nuclear weapons. Linking national identities with foreign policy choices, Hymans argues that "oppositional nationalists" who are driven by this mix of pride and fear are most likely to pursue nuclear weapons. 58 One way of addressing this question then is to analyze the personality types that South Koreans have traditionally favored as national leaders and determine the likelihood that the dominant or most attractive personality types in a Korean domestic political context might be motivated by the combination of pride and fear that would prompt the leader to consider a nuclear weapons option. Whang Sang-min has conducted such an analysis of qualities and characteristics South Koreans have traditionally favored in their leaders. Whang's study places preferred South Korean leadership image types into three categories: (1) the revolutionary (scholarly, role-model, respectable, makes others feel "little"); (2) the practical manager (administrator, efficient at problem solving); and (3) the CEO type (feministic, local officer, democratic, rational conservatism). Unfavorable leadership types include the following image types: (1) politician (absolute obedience, demagogue, dictatorship); (2) "gambler" (fraud, no substance, flippant); and (3) eventful (gullible, delusional, loud,

176

SCOTT SNYDER

persistent). 59 If we take that analysis and place it into the context of Hymans's framework for categorizing leadership types, we find that most of the positive leadership image types are not motivated by fear but by pride and a record of accomplishment. In particular, a practical approach to problem solving or concrete abilities are prized as characteristics of the leader that correspond to the "sportsmanlike nationalist" or "sportsmanlike subaltern" categories in Hymans's analytical framework. Neither of these types is likely to make nuclear weapons program decisions given the practical and "wise" nature of decision making that Korean voters appear to prize in their favored categories. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that Koreans may vote for a favored personality type only to be disappointed by the president after he or she comes into office. One might easily argue that several past elected presidents have brought with them undesirable personality types that came to be on display while in office. In fact, it is easy to think of democratically elected South Korean presidents who displayed characteristics of the "politician," "gambler," and "eventful" types that might suggest a lack of selfconfidence, if not fear, mixed with the sort of populism that stands particular strains of national pride. It is important, however, to note that, generally speaking, the preferred leadership image types in South Korea strongly conform to types that are unlikely or unable to pursue a nuclear weapons program. 60 Kim Seung-young touches on aspects of Park Chunghee's personality but does not attempt to categorize Park according to Hymans's model. He describes Park as a leader who "had nationalism in his heart ... [but] he was not a Gaullist nationalist who would pursue national grandeur as the highest priority." According to his daughter, Park Keun-hye, who still plays a role in national politics as a possible candidate for president, "discussing national pride was a luxury during the desperate situation of the 1970s," and her father pursued nuclear weapons "to safeguard national security when American commitment became uncertain while China and the Soviet Union continued to provide the alliance support to North Korea."61 Although nostalgia for Park's strong leadership surfaces from time to time, especially given his legacy of achieving rapid growth and alleviating poverty, there seems to be little appetite, especially among South Korea's younger generation, for any hint of authoritarian leadership. In fact, the bigger leadership challenge in Seoul seems simply to be the task of bringing people together sufficiently to have the capacity to exert leadership. However, there is no shortage of nationalist pride in South Korean society, and the populist appeal is

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

177

often successful in catalyzing public support through mobilization politics. But expression of populism through public demonstrations can also be fleeting given the volatile and superficial nature of the news cycle and its impact on the South Korean public. Although Roh Moo-hyun was a populist, he also led pragmatically and was willing to go against the conventional wisdom of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve progress in both the U.S.ROK relationship and the inter-Korean relationship. Lee Myung-bak, however, falls into the "CEO type" category. He sees himself as good at providing leadership, but things also appear to be coming off track to the extent that his capacity for leadership (versus following the crowd) was severely diminished in the early part of his presidency in 2008. His image as demanded by the current South Korean political environment is that of the "sportsmanlike nationalist," placing priority on not only strengthening partnerships with the United States and Asian neighbors but also deepening and broadening South Korea's role in a range of transnational issues, including nonproliferation, so as to boost its status in the international community. CONCLUSION: FORECASTING SOUTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

As one considers the history, current development, and future plans of South Korea's nuclear industry, one cannot help but be impressed by the short time frame during which South Korea has been able to master almost all components of the R&D, construction, development, and systems management process related to the development of a civilian nuclear energy program. In addition, there is no doubt that such technological capabilities provide South Korea with a capacity to achieve a nuclear weapons capability within a short period of time, if such a dedicated effort were to be approved by political leaders in South Korea. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such a working capacity to build nuclear weapons could be developed in as little as two years, given the materials and level of technological expertise that resides in South Korea's peaceful nuclear energy development efforts. 62 South Korea's past interest in development of nuclear weapons in the 1970s and experience with unreported laboratory experiments as recently as 2000 set off alarm bells in the international nonproliferation community concerning the possibility that South Korea could once again pursue a nuclear weapons option. An analysis of a range of theoretical frameworks as a basis for examining South Korea's propensity to pursue nuclear weapons suggests that,

178 SCOTT SNYDER

under current circumstances and barring dramatic changes in South Korea's domestic and international political context, a South Korean decision to pursue a nuclear weapons capability is highly unlikely. South Korea's current security environment is essentially benign, and even North Korea's nuclear tests provoked a surprisingly weak political response in Seoul. The domestic political environment in South Korea is likely to produce "sportsmanlike nationalist" leaders who are unlikely to place major priority on nuclear weapons pursuit over continued international economic development as the primary source for prestige in the international community, while the potential returns for the country's nuclear energy industry as South Korean companies compete for international exports will reinforce the need to market a strong safety record and commitment to nonproliferation. In addition, South Korea's demonstrated commitment to international norms through participation in the major nonproliferation and international nuclear export control bodies as well as South Korea's continued relationship with the United States under the terms of bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreements all serve as inhibitions on a potential decision to pursue a covert nuclear weapons capability. This chapter has argued that North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts are regarded in South Korea as a political issue that has limited international security benefits, given the relative superiority of South Korea vis-a-vis the North in most other categories. Instead, the primary peer competitor for South Korea is Japan. The development of South Korea's nuclear energy sector has occurred in ways that parallel and appear to benchmark the development of Japan's civilian nuclear energy sector. South Korean security analysts continue to be concerned about whether Japan's peaceful nuclear energy production capabilities could potentially be used as a latent capacity to rapidly develop a nuclear weapons program in the future. Moreover, any difference in the relative capabilities ofJapan and South Korea, respectively, with regard to enrichment and reprocessing poses a complex challenge both in the context of national prestige and from the perspective of the need to prevent further proliferation of reprocessing and enrichment capabilities. These background issues are unlikely to come to the fore in any significant way as long as JapanSouth Korea relations remain cordial and there is no indication that Japan might indeed abandon its nonnuclear principles in favor of development of a nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, South Korean specialists show sensitivity to Japan's differential in capabilities and the implications for Japan's standing and international status as compared to that of South Korea. Given

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

179

such sensitivities, a severe downturn in South Korea-Japan relations connected with any deterioration in the regional security environment that might push Japan in the direction of rearmament may trigger security discussions in South Korea that might include reference to a need for a nuclear capability. A second and more important factor in South Korean decision making regarding the future of its nuclear program at the current stage appears to be the prestige considerations that South Korea attaches to the development of its own peaceful nuclear energy capacity. 63 Specifically, the immediate challenge presents itself in the form of a desire by South Korean specialists to use advanced technology-and especially pyroprocessing technology-to the extent possible to resolve questions related to nuclear waste. 64 This technological effort is justifiable given ongoing problems with waste. But such efforts are made more complex by the fact that the peaceful development of nuclear energy has long been encouraged, and the need to resolve nuclear waste issues poses a considerable obstacle to the continued safe development and use of nuclear energy capabilities. Pyroprocessing has proven to be controversial because it can be justified as a possible solution to the global unresolved problem of nuclear waste, but it could also exacerbate the challenge of proliferation of fissile material. As an issue in the U.S.-ROK relationship, the question of pyroprocessing also highlights potential contradictions in U.S. nuclear policy. On the one hand, GNEP clearly attempts to combine nuclear energy promotion and nonproliferation objectives, especially by containing the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing. On the other hand, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, which is also focused on the development of advanced spent fuel reprocessing and recycling technologies, attempts to achieve the same objectives South Korea is pursuing through the development of pyroprocessing, especially given that experiments in this area have thus far been conducted jointly and the U.S.-ROK bilateral cooperation agreement requires U.S. consent for South Korea to conduct independent experiments with U.S.-origin fuel. Thus, one of the critical questions related to the development of advanced fuel reprocessing is whether it will be possible to develop a method that forecloses the possibility of reprocessing intermediate products to produce weapons-grade material. As the country with the most advanced nuclear energy production capability but lacking a reprocessing capability, South Korean decisions may have a disproportionate influence on efforts to contain reprocessing by promoting regional fuel cycle centers. Japan has been allowed to develop uranium

180 SCOTT SNYDER

enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies under a similar bilateral nuclear energy agreement with the United States, but South Korea possesses neither capability in compliance with the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 65 This issue poses a complex new policy challenge for both the United States and South Korea as they prepare to negotiate a new bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement to replace the current one that is set to expire in 2014. 66 Although the Obama administration has yet to finalize a decision on South Korean pryoprocessing, U.S. officials and experts have recently suggested that the administration will likely classify pyroprocessing as reprocessing, a move that would potentially constrain South Korea's pursuit of the process. 67 The experimental development of pyroprocessing as a potential way of more efficiently managing nuclear waste storage appears in the short term to put the imperatives of nonproliferation and safe development of nuclear energy through effective management of nuclear waste issues at odds with each other. Despite the current debates surrounding South Korea's technological efforts, South Korea's close relationship with the United States, international commitments, and good nonproliferation record in recent years as the world's sixth-largest nuclear producer are all factors that appear likely to alleviate such concerns under current circumstances. Developments in international security that influence the relative value that the global community attaches to nonproliferation are in the case of South Korea most likely to be viewed through the combination lenses of international prestige and regional security (that is, latent competition with Japan), not as first-order triggers that might result in a change in South Korean proliferation policies. In other words, to the extent that a weakening of the international regime or other proliferation-related developments on a global scale provoke changes in Japan's nonproliferation policies, it is likely that such changes will have second-order effects on South Korean policy. But at present it is hard to envision that South Korea would have an incentive to pursue nuclear weapons in the event of a change in only one of these two variables. For instance, the international norm might prevent South Korea from following a Japanese nuclear breakout decision because South Korea could rest safe in the knowledge that Japan would face international consequences from its decision in the form of loss of trade relationships, economic sanctions, and the like, while a weakening of the international nonproliferation regime might not necessarily trigger South Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons for fear of inducing

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING

181

a nuclear competition with Japan. Likewise, as discussed above, a dissolution of the U.S.-ROK security alliance in the absence of a weakened global nonproliferation regime and/or a decision by Japan to pursue a nuclear option appears unlikely to trigger a decision by South Korea to pursue nuclear weapons, despite the conventional wisdom of the security model that has overweighed the influence of the alliance on South Korean nuclear decision making. South Korean perceptions of the regional and international security environment, the practical, political, and prestige considerations involved in the balancing of issues in the U.S.-ROK relationship, are likely to have a major impact on how South Korea reconciles its nonproliferation and technological initiatives, which will in turn influence the future direction of South Korea's nuclear program.

8

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION Incentives versus Disincentives

Monte Bullard and Jing-dong Yuan

for Studies of nuclear proliferation andrestraint. On the one hand, neorealist theory and the security model of nuclear proliferation would explain Taiwan's pursuit of nuclear weapons as a natural response to persistent threats from mainland China. Militarily inferior to its nemesis, fearful of abandonment by the United States, and determined to secure regime survival, Taiwan has ample reasons to seek whatever means are at its disposal for self-preservation, including a nuclear weapons option. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, and again during the 1980s, Taiwan covertly sought to develop a nuclear weapons capability, but strong U.S. intervention and threats of reprisal forced Taipei to abandon its covert efforts. Today, most observers agree it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will pursue or acquire nuclear weapons. When weighing Taiwan's incentives and disincentives for "going nuclear," the balance tips toward Taipei's keeping its nonnuclear status. Although a realist perspective offers a good first cut of the rationale behind Taipei's earlier attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for why Taipei has not revisited the nuclear option given the growing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait. Other factors such as bureaucratic and domestic politics must be considered, as well as the role of norms and belief systems. 1 Among important recent efforts to understand the nuclear proliferation puzzle are books by Etel Solingen and Jacques Hymans. 2 Their works reject a primary focus on systemic, structuraldeterminants and attach more importance to the role of subs tate and idiosyncratic factors. This chapter attempts to test a number of their propositions, including the explanatory power of Solingen's model of regime survival and Hymans's theory about

TAIWAN OFFERS AN INTERESTING CASE

182

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

183

the force of individual leadership/national identity conception (NIC) types. 3 Consideration also is given to Stephen Meyer's argument that it may be possible to identify indicators, such as a certain technological level, a concurrence of political and military factors, or a combination of individuals or particular events, that will lead to decisions to develop nuclear weapons. 4 This chapter begins with a brief review of Taiwan's past efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, in particular the internal and external factors and constraints that informed and influenced its decision about a nuclear weapons option. The chapter then turns to an examination of military, strategic, economic, and domestic-political factors that affect both Taiwan's propensity to go nuclear in the future and its latent capacity to do so if and when a political decision to pursue nuclear weapons is made. Finally, it asks if there are trigger events that could cause Taiwan to translate a latent nuclear ability into a nuclear weapons capability. TAIWAN'S NUCLEAR PAST

Taiwan lives in existential insecurity. Since the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) Party retreated to the island after being defeated by the communists in 1949, it has been facing two serious challenges to survival: an overwhelming external military threat from China and internal economic and development needs. These two challenges have had a profound effect on Taipei's defense and economic policies. The former threat directly affects state survival, while the latter has had an impact on regime survival. The military threat has been countered primarily by internal balancing through defense buildup and maintenance of sufficient military capabilities and external balancing through a security pact with the United States (1954-1980) in which Washington publicly offered protection of the island against China and U.S. arms sales under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. 5 Taiwan addressed the domestic challenge of ensuring economic growth by developing an export-oriented economy highly dependent on international trade and foreign direct investment. The external security threat posed by mainland China might be assumed to provide strong incentives for Taiwan to buttress its defense by means of a nuclear weapons capability. However, as described in more detail in the following pages, the uncertainty resulting from the security dilemma is not the only variable shaping Taiwan's nuclear posture; also important are the changing geostrategic environment and a variety of domestic economic and political factors. Especially significant is the island's dependence on the international

184

BULLARD AND YUAN

economy in a world in which nonproliferation norms prevail, thereby raising the costs of developing nuclear weapons. Further complicating the nuclear calculus is Taiwan's complex economic entanglement with its presumed enemy-mainland China. Taiwan's nuclear program began in the 1950s with its participation in the Atoms for Peace program. At that time Taipei still could credibly claim legitimacy and sovereignty as it retained the seats for China in most international organizations, including the U.N. Security Council. In 1955 Taiwan signed an agreement on cooperation in the civil use of atomic energy with the United States,6 and its nuclear program accelerated after China's first nuclear test in 1964 and hydrogen bomb test in 1967. These events apparently shocked the Chiang Kai-shek government, which began a dedicated program to acquire nuclear weapons. In the wake of the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, the Taiwanese leaders decided to set up the covert "Hsin Chu Program" at the military's Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST) to explore the nuclear weapons option. The key elements of the program included the purchase of a heavy water reactor, a heavy water production plant, and a plutonium separation plane The program coincided with a period when Taiwan began to question the U.S. commitment to its security. President Nixon took a historic visit to China in February 1972, and in July 1974 the United States withdrew the nuclear weapons it previously had deployed in Taiwan. 8 In 1973, the 40-megawatt thermal, natural uranium, heavy water Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR), which the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) procured from Canada in 1969, began operation. This reactor was the same type used by India to produce plutonium for its 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." During the early 1970s, several other INER projects were also under way, including a plant to produce natural uranium fuel, a reprocessing facility, and a plutonium chemistry laboratory. A pilot-scale fuel fabrication plant with a capacity of 20 to 30 metric tons (MT) began operating in 1972 or 1973 at INER with natural uranium (100 MT) received from South Africa. 9 During the 1970s, Taiwan also tried to procure reprocessing facilities from Europe, established a reprocessing laboratory, and allegedly had a uranium enrichment program. 10 In the early 1970s, the United States became suspicious of Taiwan's nuclear program; U.S. embassies in Taipei, Tel Aviv, and Bonn sent dispatches to Washington reporting dubious research and procurement activities by Taiwan. A 1972 Special National Intelligence Estimate indicated that the "evidence suggests that the generation of electric power is not the only serious interest

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

185

that the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) has in the nuclear field." Most of this evidence involved activities at the Chung-shan Institute. 11 A 1974 Special National Intelligence Estimate suggested that "the Republic of China (ROC) is gradually developing a potential for the production of nuclear weapons."12 Washington sought to block Taiwan's nuclear acquisitions in allied countries such as West Germany. In addition, the U.S. embassy in Taipei was instructed to confront Taiwanese authorities about the seriousness of the issue and to warn that such activities could jeopardize bilateral nuclear cooperation, including U.S. supply of low-enriched uranium used in Taiwan's power plants. The United States continued to press Taiwan to cease development even after Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo pledged that while Taiwan had "the ability and the facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons ... it would never manufacture them." Under U.S. pressure, Taipei eventually dismantled its reprocessing facilities in 1978. 13 In the 1980s, Taipei initiated a new nuclear weapons program after the United States and China formally established diplomatic relations in 1979 and Washington annulled the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980. At that time, high-ranking Taiwanese officials, including then-President Chiang Chingkuo, were deeply worried about the island's security environment and unhappy about U.S. actions. As the retired chief of staff (1981-1989) General Hau Pei-tsun indicated in his diary, Taiwan had the capability to develop nuclear weapons, and one of CIST's missions was to achieve that goal. Hau also revealed potential nuclear cooperation with South Africa and Taiwan's possession of the technologies necessary for nuclear weapons development. Despite U.S. intervention, Hau emphasized that CIST should maintain its nuclear capability.14 Media reports suggested Taiwan had close contacts with Israel and South Africa regarding nuclear cooperation and missile programs. 15 Taipei's second attempt to develop a nuclear weapons program was foiled thanks to good intelligence information and, most critically, the 1987 defection of Colonel Chang Hsien-Yi, CIST's deputy director who was recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1960s. Chang provided critical information about the nuclear program, and the Reagan administration confronted President Lee Teng-hui, who had assumed office in January 1988 after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death. As a result, Taipei capitulated and closed down the 40 megawatt TRR in Lung Tan.16 Taiwan's two attempts to develop a nuclear weapon were clearly driven by its security concerns. The first attempt followed China's nuclear test, and the second occurred after Washington switched diplomatic recognition from

186

BULLARD AND YUAN

Taipei to Beijing, raising serious questions about the credibility and reliability of the U.S. defense commitmentY During much of the 1950s and 196os, Washington was deeply committed to Taiwan's defense and even contemplated using nuclear weapons against the mainland during the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises. The United States stationed troops and deployed nuclear weapons on the island and provided military advisors to the Taiwanese armed forces. But the situation changed in the late 1960s as the Nixon administration reevaluated the geostrategic landscape and issued the Guam Doctrine, in which U.S. allies were asked to shoulder greater defense responsibilities as Washington explored its new opening with China. Taiwan's vulnerability was again exposed when Washington established diplomatic relations with China in January 1979 and terminated the 1954 U.S.-ROC security pact. These developments provided strong incentives for Taiwan to explore a nuclear weapons option. While Taiwan's pursuit of a nuclear weapons option is consistent with the logic of realist theory, recently declassified documents suggest that there was no consensus among top government officials in Taiwan about the wisdom of that policy. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek reportedly did not initially support a nuclear weapons program, and Wu Ta-you, the head of the Academia Sinica and director of the Science Development Advisory Committee of Taiwan's National Security Council, opposed the plan because of concerns about both costs and potential U.S. objections. It was Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kaishek's son and defense minister at the time, who decided to pursue plutonium separation. 18 Although Taiwan's nuclear rollback can be attributed largely to U.S. pressure, regime survival considerations also played a reinforcing role. The KMT government was keen on following an export-led industrial policy, which depended heavily on the United States for both its external market and for its manufactured products and continued inflows of foreign investments. This situation resembles Solingen's outward-looking model, which predicts that an orientation toward integration in the global economy is more conducive to nuclear restraint. Nevertheless, Taiwan did seriously explore a nuclear option on multiple occasions and might have acquired a weapons capability had it not been for U.S. opposition. Hymans's typology ofleaders may be helpful in explaining these developments. Without probing deeply into the biographical and psychological details of the two Taiwanese leaders-Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo-one could characterize the senior Chiang as fitting an oppositional subaltern NIC profile, while the junior Chiang more closely

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

187

resembles the oppositional nationalist NIC. 19 Chiang Kai-shek was less enthusiastic than his son about pursuing a nuclear weapons option but was nevertheless open to such action should it help Taiwan regain confidence and strengthen its capabilities. Chiang Ching-kuo was driven more by fear, which led him to question U.S. commitments and other traditional means of defense. As such, he appears to have endorsed a decision to go nuclear without careful analysis of the benefits and costs and to have ignored some experts' cautionary advice. THE MILITARY SECURITY FACTOR

Among the most influential explanations of why nations go nuclear are realist and neorealist views based on balance-of-power or balance-of-threat models of international politics. According to these perspectives, a nation that is under intense military threat is likely to "go nuclear" for survival purposes if alternative means of defense are either not viable or nonexistent. The security dilemma of states in an anarchic international system and the sensitivity to shifts in relative power and balances inform strategic decisions on whether or not to go nuclear. This is especially salient in asymmetrical dyads where the weaker party turns to nuclear weapons as the force equalizer. 20 The Taiwan-mainland China relationship would appear to be a good example of this asymmetrical dyad as the cross-Strait military balance has continued to shift in favor of the mainland. Indeed, one could argue that no government has faced a greater external threat than the one Taiwan endures from China. Not only does the People's Republic of China (PRC) have a preponderance of military power, it also has overwhelming economic and political power or, as China calls it, "comprehensive national power." 21 China has issued formal decrees stating its intent to reunify with Taiwan, has placed that unification in its constitution, and has passed a law in the National People's Congress that makes it legal and necessary to use nonpeaceful means against Taiwan to prevent separation. 22 Over the years, the PRC has built up its military capabilities, and the number of short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan has increased to about 1,400. 23 Under such circumstances, even though Taiwan's missile shield and relative air superiority over the Taiwan Strait may provide some measure of security, in the long run China's power is increasing rapidly relative to Taiwan's ability to defend itsel£.2 4 Taiwan's defense policy, including force structure and arms procurement, has been driven by the need to protect its political autonomy, resist Chinese coercion, and defend against Chinese invasion. While not completely ruling

188

BULLARD AND YUAN

out negotiations with the mainland, Taipei has rejected any preconditions for talks and views adequate defensive capabilities as the only way to ensure that Beijing does not dictate the terms of a "negotiated" settlement. Maintaining aerial superiority, antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, and early warning capabilities is critical in Taiwan's defense and therefore informs Taipei's weapons procurement decisions. 25 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Taiwan ranks among the top arms importers in the world, having acquired $20 billion worth of weapons in 1989 through 2007. The United States has been the principal supplier of defense articles and services to Taiwan since the signing of the TRA, with total sales of $19.9 billion, about three-quarters of all Taiwan's arms acquisitions ($26.8 billion) during the 1979-2007 period. 26 Over the past decade, as Chinese military modernization has continued, so, too, have Taiwan's arms purchases from the United States. Taiwan's purchases of various ships, aircraft, and early warning and air defense systems from the United States have enabled it to maintain pockets of superiority in an otherwise rapidly changing military balance in favor of the mainland. Taiwan's Security Calculus

Whether Taiwan's sense of insecurity leads to a nuclear weapons option in the future will depend on the perceived threat from China and a calculation about the utility of a nuclear capability for purposes of deterrence. 27 One would anticipate that Taiwan's decision would be based on strategic military calculations, influenced by international and domestic political and economic considerations, including perceptions of the U.S. commitment to its defense. 28 Taiwan's response, however, need not be black or white-nuclear weapons or nothing. Instead, Taiwan may seek to chart a security-driven course between those extremes. Also having an impact on the security calculus and leadership threat perceptions will be the changing dynamics in cross-Strait relations, including growing economic interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland and changes in Beijing's Taiwan policy. The overall cross-Strait military balance has always been a critical factor in Taipei's security calculus. While China's current military capabilities remain inadequate for launching an invasion of Taiwan (and the Chinese leadership for the time being is relying on other means of deterring Taiwan from independence), over time, this could change as a result of ongoing Chinese defense modernization. Beijing's current strategy is to deter Taiwan from declaring

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

189

independence, create conditions for resuscitating the cross-Strait dialogue, and/or otherwise force it to accept unification on Chinese terms, and prevent or at least raise costs for a U.S. intervention through developments and deployment of asymmetrical capabilities. 29 For three decades, the TRA has been the key U.S. instrument for maintaining nonofficial economic and security contacts with Taiwan. The act stipulates that it is U.S. policy to "provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" and to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." 30 However, the uneven and sometimes precarious nature of U.S. arms sales policy has raised larger questions about the interpretation and implementation of the TRA. 31 The shifts in U.S. priorities and focus affect defense ties with Taiwan to a varying degree and occasionally raise concerns about U.S. commitments to Taiwan's defense. In this context, it is not surprising that national security decision makers and military planners in Taipei have to consider if a Taiwanese nuclear weapons capability would serve to deter military action by China. Now, as before, Taiwanese leaders are faced with the same key dilemma of whether a nuclear deterrent would add to Taiwan's security and, if so, what would constitute an acceptable price to pay in terms of international economic and political costs. Would Washington tolerate a Taiwanese bomb given its emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation? Would the pursuit of the nuclear option invite preemptive attacks from the mainland? Taiwan's leaders have periodically made controversial comments about a nuclear deterrent. On July 28, 1995, after China had fired six DF-15 missiles to within ninety miles of the island's ports in an effort to influence Taiwan's presidential elections, President Lee Teng-hui countered by admitting that Taiwan had tried to develop nuclear weapons and perhaps should reconsider that program. 32 Three days later he rescinded the statement. On September 26, 2004, Premier Yu Shyi-kun evoked the possibility of a "balance-of-terror" and stated that "if you fire 100 missiles at me, I should be able to fire at least so at you. If you launch an attack on ... Kaohsiung, I should be able to launch a counterattack on Shanghai." 33 The statements were all made by civilian leaders, and their views were not necessarily shared by those in the Taiwan military. 34 These instances notwithstanding, Taiwanese leaders have largely disavowed any intentions to go nuclear. Following North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006, Taiwan's defense minister Lee Jye in a November 2006 statement

190

BULLARD AND YUAN

reaffirmed the position that Taipei would not possess, develop, acquire, store, or use nuclear weapons. 35 Taiwan has set out this nonnuclear position in every defense White Paper published since 2000. While differences exist between politicians and military strategists in Taiwan over the effectiveness of a nuclear deterrent against China, they both agree that the costs of developing nuclear weapons would be excessive in economic terms. Most importantly, Taiwanese strategists recognize that they could not keep such a program secret in today's democratic environment and that, once exposed, a combination of U.S. and Chinese actions could effectively prevent Taiwan from obtaining the necessary materials to build a nuclear weapon. In the early 1980s, Taiwan was still an authoritarian state that could initiate small secret programs without great fear of disclosure. By the 1990s, when Taiwan had become more democratic, it became much more difficult to initiate programs in secrecy. In a volume edited by Muthiah Alagappa, several authors suggest that incentives for or disincentives against nuclear weapons acquisition are closely tied to the nature of threats and the dual characteristics of abandonment and entrapment typical of alliances between partners of asymmetrical power attributes. 36 In Taiwan's case, barring a formal alliance commitment from the United States, the TRA serves as the only legal vehicle through which Washington can choose if, when, and how to extend deterrence to Taiwan and the amounts and types of armaments it is willing to provide to strengthen the island's self-defense capabilities. As long as such arrangements continue and Beijing's priority remains one of preventing Taiwan's independence rather than one of seeking forceful unification, there is less impetus for Taipei to go nuclear. 37 Our discussion of the military security environment raises a number of intriguing issues. As the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has shifted in mainland China's favor and the United States is equivocal about providing guaranteed security protection, there should be ample incentives for decision makers in Taipei to seriously reconsider the nuclear option. However, contrary to neorealist logic, there is no evidence to suggest that Taiwan has pursued a nuclear option over the past two decades. Vincent Wang makes a convincing case that, from both the demand and supply sides, the desirability and feasibility of obtaining nuclear weapons are more than outweighed by the potential costs, pitfalls, and retribution from the United States and China. 38 One must take into account the fact that Taiwan's natural endowments, geography, and market size dictate a heavy dependence on the global economy for its

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

191

well-being and survival. Any attempt to develop nuclear weapons or even a latent capability would most likely be met with severe sanctions from both the United States and China. At the very least, Taiwan's international economic position would be destroyed. The cross-Strait tension has gradually eased since the late 198os when both China and Taiwan adopted policies that encouraged limited contacts between the two sides and engaged in sporadic dialogue dealing with a multitude of issues. As a result, investments and two-way trade have grown significantly over the past two decades. What Taiwan views as the China threat today is different from the threat described by U.S. military observers who base their views on narrow military criteria. 39 The threat, in the eyes of some Taiwanese leaders, is mitigated by the growing economic and cultural interchanges, which are not considered in a purely military assessment. Indeed, growing interdependence provides incentives for the mainland to refrain from the use of force barring a formal declaration of independence from Taipei. At the same time, given the relatively small size of Taiwan's economy, overexposure to such interdependence could pose threats of a nonmilitary nature to its autonomy and economic security. 40 THE DOMESTIC POLITICS FACTOR

When examining the domestic, demand-side incentives or disincentives for nuclear proliferation, analysts typically identify domestic coalitions or interests groups in their efforts to push for the nuclear option. But Taiwan offers a somewhat different case where, until recently, supreme leaders dominated the policy deliberation and decision-making processes. From the 1950s to the early 198os, Taiwan was ruled by a strict dictatorship using Leninist organizational methods to maintain social and political control. All senior members of the bureaucracy and all military officers were party members and subject to strict party discipline. Decisions were made at the highest level and passed down without question. The legislative and judicial branches of government were rubber-stamp organizations designed to promote or carry out whatever policies were decided on at the upper levels of the party. The press was strictly controlled. Anyone in the society who spoke out against the government or released what were considered state secrets was subject to serious punishment, and many were sent to reeducation prisons. It was quite possible to develop any government program in complete secrecy. After 1987, when martial law was lifted and opposition parties were allowed, domestic politics in Taiwan became hotly contested, and the country

192

BULLARD AND YUAN

became a neophyte democracy. Taiwan now has a multiparty political system that behaves more like a two-party system. The two main party groups are Pan-Blue, consisting of the KMT and the People's First Party (PFP), and PanGreen, consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). By 2000, the DPP had gained enough support to win the presidency and control the executive branch of government. 41 A nativist party, the DPP was characterized by its policies of creating a new "Taiwanese" identity and attempting to secede from China and become a separate independent nation state. Former President Chen Shuibian, a fierce pro independence nationalist, tried to move the independence agenda while in power; however, his ability and willingness to actually reintroduce the nuclear option were doubtful. Given the island's democratization process and the fractured nature of partisan politics, any such attempt would have involved the risk of exposure. In the 2oo8legislative and presidential elections, Taiwan's citizens rejected the DPP's confrontational independence-centered approach to China and its inept governing style that damaged the economy. They returned the KMT party to power in both the legislative and executive branches of government. However, even though the KMT won by a landslide, the ruling party does not have carte blanche in policy makingY The press is open, and the opposition parties are active and ready to expose any actions that are against the will of the Taiwanese people. Defense budgets are actively debated, and any policy that even appears to be suspicious is exposed. Ironically, the DPP's independence platform was not implemented through the buildup of military capabilities, including the nuclear option. Instead, the party followed what could be described as a policy of "creeping independence," whereby residual links between the mainland and Taiwan were gradually chipped away while a new Taiwan identity was promoted. When it controlled the government, the DPP did not seriously consider developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, as soon as it assumed power it found itself in the awkward position of having to deal with popular opposition to the island's fourth nuclear power plant. 43 Employing Hymans's framework, one might ask if an oppositional nationalist leader from a radical faction of one of the political parties in Taiwan could come to power and launch a nuclear weapons program. Former President Chen Shuibian indeed resembles an oppositional nationalist leader, and members of the influential New Tide Faction within the DPP were the strongest advocates of developing an offensive nuclear deterrent. 44 But the political structure and

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

193

the nature of factional and bureaucratic politics in Taiwan suggest that an oppositional nationalist leader would encounter serious obstacles in pursuing nuclear weapons. That is, even if Chen did have the psychological inclination to start a nuclear weapons program he would find it difficult to do so (at least in secret) due to the transparency of democratic institutions and an open press. Taiwan's leaders are extremely sensitive to the risks of being perceived as engaged in the process of developing a nuclear weapon. Even Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, for example, sought to assure U.S. officials that Taiwan would never develop nuclear weapons, although it had the capacity to do so. 45 With the departure of such towering and authoritarian figures as Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, no contemporary Taiwanese leader could exert sufficient influence or expect the loyalty from a very fractured and still democratizing polity and society. Current and future leaders are more akin to what Hymans characterizes as sportsmanlike leaders, who view the world and their security environment in less fearful terms. Chen Shuibian could be an exception, but there is no evidence that he ever seriously entertained a nuclear weapons option. Indeed, he even failed to push through the government's special defense appropriation budgets to purchase U.S. weapons. THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

In her comparative study of nuclear decision making in East Asia and the Middle East, Solingen argues that "states whose leaders or ruling coalitions advocate integration in the global economy ... have incentives to avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons because such costs impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization."46 Taiwan's case to a certain degree seems to be a convincing illustration of this conclusion. An island state with scarce natural resources and a small market base, Taiwan is heavily dependent on international trade to sustain its economic viability. Thus, it has adopted an export-oriented industrial policy, taking full advantage of the first wave of the international division oflabor in the 1960s when multinational corporations began to invest overseas. This policy led to a period of economic prosperity during the 1970s and 198os, making Taiwan one of the four "East Asian Tigers"; it ranked among the world's developed economies and further increased its dependence on the global economyY Since the late 1980s and especially over the past decade, cross-Strait economic ties have expanded-and this has taken place despite periodic attempts by Taipei to restrict the flows of trade and investments between the two erstwhile enemies. In 2008, Taiwan's gross domestic product amounted to

194

BULLARD AND YUAN

$401 billion, making it one of the world's top twenty-five economies. It ranked eighteenth in exports in 2008, with $255·7 billion, almost 30 percent of which went to mainland China, Taiwan's number-one export destination, whereas the United States ranks a distant second, accounting for only 12 percent of Taiwanese exports. In 2008, two-way trade between China and Taiwan was over $105 billion, about 21 percent of Taiwan's total foreign trade. 48 Reversing the previous administrations' policies, Ma Ying-jeou scrapped thirty-two major regulatory barriers restricting trade, investment, and contact with China in less than three months after his May 2008 election, and he has plans to get rid of sixty-seven more restrictive policies. As more and more restrictions fall, Taiwan will become a major player in China's economic relationship with the rest of the world. 49 In addition to trade, Taiwanese business people are making more investments throughout China, from small restaurants to major factories. By 2007, approximately 7o,ooo Taiwan companies, employing millions of Chinese, had set up manufacturing businesses throughout China. 5° Between 1991 and 2008, Taipei approved over $76 billion in investments to China. Even the Chen Shuibian administration, which had serious disputes with Beijing, was in general rather relaxed when it came to restrictions on investment flows to China. 51 Taiwan's heavy dependence on international trade and China complicates the question of what would happen if Taiwan were to embark on a nuclear weapons program, assuming that it would be nearly impossible to keep a program secret, as our analysis of the political variable indicates. China's ability to apply economic leverage to Taiwan goes far beyond the methods described by common understanding of economic interdependence. 52 The two economies have become much more entangled than just investments or trade in goods and services. Taiwan has become increasingly dependent on China for economic well-being. The statistics are astounding. One in twenty-three of Taiwan's citizens resides and does business in China more than 300 days a year. Not only does this give China some economic leverage over Taiwan's trade and investment patterns, it also changes Taiwan's perception of China's threat to its security. There seems to be a contradiction between Taiwan's perception of China as a security threat and its apparent lack of concern over growing economic interdependence with China. However, as Solingen points out, Exports, economic growth, and prosperity-which propelled Taiwan from the poorest to one of the top eighteen largest economies worldwide-were and

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

195

remain the indisputable favored means for Taiwan's politicians to ensure their political survival; all other goals have been subordinated to these objectives. 53 And mainland China has become a critical factor in ensuring that economic growth and prosperity can be achieved. For this reason, since the post-Chiang Ching-kuo era (post-1988), Taiwanese authorities, regardless of party affiliation, typically have been open to greater economic interactions across the Strait. 54 At the same time, growing economic interdependence also means that the mainland has increased stakes-investments, employments, and economic growth-that are closely linked to cross-Strait peace and stability. Over time, the reduced tension should lessen the need for Taipei to sustain high-level defense spending, let alone the pursuit of a nuclear weapons option, which is hard to justify and difficult to conceal and could place at risk its survival. THE TECHNOLOGICAL FACTOR 55

In The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, Stephen Meyer developed a model to assess nuclear latency based on various technological indicators. He defined a country's "latent capacity" as "the sufficient technical, industrial, material, and financial resources to support a wholly indigenous weapons program."56 This section evaluates Taiwan's latent capacity for building a nuclear weapon and also addresses the lag time that would be required between a political decision to build a nuclear weapon and completion of the project. Nuclear Capabilities 57

Taiwan currently operates six nuclear power reactors in three plants, with a fourth plant being planned that will employ two advanced boiling water reactor units. The three existing nuclear power stations (NPSs) have an installed nuclear power capacity of 5,144 megawatts (MW), constituting 15.5 percent of the total installed electricity power capacity in Taiwan. In 1999, Taiwan Power Company (TPC or Taipower) initiated the construction of a fourth NPS, whose two reactors were scheduled to go critical in 2004 and 2005; however, in 2001, the DPP government announced plans to freeze the project, after having completed one-third of the work, only to be overturned by the opposition parties. With legal intervention, the project was restarted the following year and, according to revised estimates, the project should be completed in 2010 (Unit 1) and 2011 (Unit 2), with commercial operation expected in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The nuclear reactors for the Lungmen NPS will be supplied by General Electric (GE) and the turbines by Mitsubishi. 58

196

BULLARD AND YUAN

Taiwan gets its uranium from various sources, including Canada, France, the United States, and a number of African countries. In 2006, Taipower concluded a contract with two Australian companies for the delivery of 70o,ooo pounds of uranium per year. Australian uranium destined for Taiwan would be enriched in the United States and therefore is subject to the "Agreement between the United States of America and Australia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" of 1979, INFCIRC/133, and INFCIRC/158. 59 While Taiwan allegedly developed an enrichment program in the past, it currently lacks any known uranium enrichment facility. 60 Both former President Chiang Chingkuo and later the Planning and Project Head for INER's Administration Division denied that the island ever had a uranium enrichment program. While media reports continue to speculate on Taipei's interest in developing an enrichment capability,6 1 the United States remains the only enrichment service provider for Taiwan's civilian nuclear program. Taiwan has no known reprocessing facility, though its ability to establish and operate one cannot be ruled out. Reports indicate that during the 1970s Taiwan built a pilot-scale reprocessing facility with indigenous design and equipment obtained from France, Germany, and the United States. Although the facility was closed due to U.S. pressure, speculation persists that remnants of the plant, including the hot cells, might still exist and even be in operation. 62 In 2004, media reports noted that Taiwan was able to separate plutonium during the operation of the pilot plant at a laboratory scale, but the government denied these reports and stated that scientists only researched the possibility.63 In 1999, the United States repatriated 4 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Taiwan, and it was estimated that Taiwan might retain approximately 3 to 10 kg of HEU stockpiled. 64 However, a recent U.S. government report suggests that Taiwan is cleared of any HEU. 65 In addition, according to Carnegie Endowment estimates, by 2010 Taiwan will have approximately 3,320 MT of spent fuel, of which 29 MT will be plutonium. 66 The island faces enormous challenges in dealing with spent fuel and has been unable to locate a final depository due to its limited geographical area and legal and technical restrictions. At the same time, disposition of the U.S origin fuel would require prior U.S. approval. In the past few years, Taiwan nuclear energy officials have expressed interest in using foreign reprocessing facilities or joining the U.S.-sponsored Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP}. 67 According to Nuclear Fuel, Taiwan officials proposed that the spent fuel be reprocessed at a foreign facility, with Taipei being compensated by fresh fuel

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

197

for its civilian reactors. It is expected that any such attempt will be opposed by China, nor would Beijing allow Taipei to participate in any governmentsponsored initiatives such as GNEP. 68 Nuclear Safeguards

The IAEA safeguards in Taiwan are guided by INFCIRC/133 and INFCIRC/158. In 1955, the ROC-U.S. agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed, and, in the same year, U.S. officials conducted the first safeguards inspections in Taiwan. After the international safeguards inspection mechanism was established at the IAEA, Taiwan signed an IAEA-ROC safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/158) in Vienna in 1971, thereby transferring the responsibility of safeguarding nuclear materials from the United States to the IAEA. The IAEA safeguards are applied "to all nuclear material and nuclear facilities [in Taiwan] as if it were an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state Party."69 Taiwan signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, ratified it in 1970, and subsequently concluded a trilateral agreement with the United States and the IAEA in 1971 to abide by the terms of the treaty. However, since Taiwan left the United Nations, it has not been allowed to participate in the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings.7° Nevertheless, it continues to maintain IAEA safeguards and to report all of its peaceful nuclear activities to the IAEA. Since 1995, Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has assigned a nuclear expert to its mission in Austria as a liaison to assist nuclear safeguards activities. Annual meetings on safeguards implementation between the AEC and IAEA have been held since 1995. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to the implementation of measures provided for in the Model Protocol additional to its trilateral safeguards agreement. With the implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol, the agency and the international community have the tools for detection of any anomalies or diversions within Taiwan's civilian nuclear program. By May 2005, 198 declarations have been submitted by the AEC to the IAEA. The AEC cites the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 2006 indicating Taiwan's nuclear materials had not been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities. 71 Assessment

Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons but has a sophisticated civilian nuclear power industry. It also possesses some, but not all, of the latent capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons identified by Meyer. 72 Although it

198

BULLARD AND YUAN

has made the political decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, many experts regard Taiwan as technically advanced "with the infrastructure necessary to launch a full-scale nuclear effort." 73 IAEA inspections and environmental samplings in Taiwan have uncovered evidence of its past undeclared nuclear activities involving plutonium separation experiments conducted in the mid-198os?4 In 2005, Nucleonics Week reported that, during the 1990s, Taiwan conducted research on producing uranium-233 by irradiating thorium-232 in a reactor. However, the program was unsuccessful and was terminated. 75 With the implementation ofiAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol, Taiwan has very little room to maneuver, even if it were to launch a clandestine weapons program. However, its international political pariah status could either deter or encourage nuclear weapons restraint. In 2007, there were reports that Taiwan was on the IAEA's "noncompliance list" because Taipei could not produce complete documentation of its past nuclear activities, especially the ones related to TRR-F6 It was noted that the IAEA contemplated submitting Taiwan's case to the U.N. Security Council for further deliberations; however, given the sensitivity of Taiwan's political status, the IAEA backtracked.77 A 1995 Russian intelligence assessment, cited by Solingen in Nuclear Logics, provides a succinct description of Taiwan's nuclear capability: Taiwan does not have nuclear weapons .... We can assert with sufficient confidence that officially imported nuclear technologies, knowledge, and equipment do not enable Taiwan to create nuclear weapons, but do provide it with the necessary know-how to do work in the nuclear field and may accelerate the country's own nuclear development of a military nature, if such a decision is made.78 In sum, while Taiwan does have a sophisticated civilian nuclear industry, its ability to acquire nuclear weapons is limited due to the lack of full-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities, implementation of IAEA safeguards, conversion of its main research reactor to low-enriched uranium fuel, limited funding, and retirement of the scientists who worked for the nuclear weaponsrelated program. 79 CONCLUSION

This chapter suggests that Taiwan remains sui generis, defying generalizations or theories about nuclear proliferation. No other country has a presumed enemy numbering 1.3 billion people less than 100 miles across the sea. No other

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

199

political entity has been in a near state of war for more than fifty years, has over 1,400 short-range ballistic missiles pointed at it, yet has chosen not to develop a nuclear weapons option even as its own defense appears increasingly inadequate against China's growing military capabilities. Clearly, the mainstream proliferation theory cannot explain this puzzle. Most analytical approaches to the study of nuclear proliferation suffer from serious flaws. The most common is that of being excessively reductionist and averse to multicausal explanations. Some generalize from too few cases or from quantitative analyses that obscure important country-specific determinants. While many approaches offer useful insights, none approximate a full-fledged theory. Another shortcoming of most proliferation frameworks is their lack of attentiveness to how decisions change over time, especially with respect to nuclear restraint. The case of Taiwan illustrates that the rationale for abandoning a nuclear weapons program at one point in time is quite different from that at a later date. This variation is to be expected as changes in the political, economic, and military environments lead to differences in leadership perceptions about threats posed by adversaries. Major changes in bureaucratic structure and decision-making processes also can be expected to have an impact on nuclear decisions. This impact was evident in Taiwan, which experienced a major transformation from a strict authoritarian political system to a democratic one. Hymans's and Solingen's path-breaking works offer important new perspectives on why states choose to pursue or renounce nuclear weapons. In particular, they provide perspectives that go beyond the traditional realist fixation on international systemic and security factors. Both the political economy approach, focusing on the island's dependence on international trade, and the psychological perspective, emphasizing individual leaders, provide useful ways to (re)examine the available historical data and apply them to an explanation of past events and the prediction of future behavior. We find Solingen's approach to be compelling in this regard although, in Taiwan's case, it is the leaders rather than the coalitions that have influenced the nuclear decisions. In this context, Hymans's analysis of leader types nicely complements Solingen's, where both emphasize the importance of exploring the demand side of nuclear proliferation. Based on the examination of security, domestic politics, and economic variables, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will pursue a nuclear weapons capability in the next ten years. A wide range of factors influences

200

BULLARD AND YUAN

Taiwan's restraint: economic integration with the international community, the external threat environment, domestic political developments, likely exposure of any covert nuclear weapons program, the limitations of existing nuclear infrastructure, international monitoring, and a possible Chinese mainland preemptive attack. The conditions for Taiwan's interest in a nuclear weapons capability have changed significantly over the past two decades since the island has moved from the one-party authoritarian rule to a vibrant and maturing multiparty democracy. One could argue that the brief period between late 2001 and 2004 offered a window of opportunity for pursuing nuclear weapons as the DPP/ Green Coalition controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government and as President Chen could be regarded, in Hymans's typology, as an oppositional nationalist leader. That opportunity, however, was not seized by the government because of a lack of consensus even within the DPP/Green Coalition and its inability to get the military on board. The domestic variables that could affect Taiwan's decision to go nuclear relate to at least four separate although interrelated sets of factors: (1) leadership perceptions, determination, and abilities to prevail in an increasingly pluralistic and fractured political framework; (2) the ability to conceal programs and activities in an open society with polarizing partisan squabbles, an intrusive and cynical media, and a dubious military; (3) absence or presence of military strategies that can incorporate and integrate nuclear weapons into existing defense posture/doctrines that could actually provide better ends-means correlation; and (4) virtual nuclear capabilities in terms of human resources, materials, and infrastructure conducive to speedy development of nuclear weapons once political decisions are made. One strategic variable continues to work against Taiwan-China's growing military power. China's strength seemingly provides incentives for Taipei to acquire the necessary defensive and offensive capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to deter the mainland from intimidation or outright coercion. However, there are no guarantees that a nuclear weapons option would significantly enhance Taiwan's security against China's use of force. One can argue that even if Taiwan had nuclear weapons, it would not deter a Chinese attack if Taiwan were to declare independence. Further, because Taiwan is not likely to be able to develop such weapons in secret it is quite probable that China would preemptively destroy any nuclear facilities at an early development stage. It should also be noted that even though the United States is not

TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION

201

perceived as a completely reliable guarantor of Taiwan's security, the leaders, both military and civilian, do not see nuclear weapons as the solution. Taiwan's current threat perception and security environment remove a critical motivating factor in the realist analysis of why states decide to go nuclear. Many of Taiwan's leaders have concluded that even the possession of nuclear weapons could not protect Taiwan because in today's strategic climate they are not useful and would certainly lead to universal condemnation, if not the destruction of Taiwan. Apart from doubts over the military utility of nuclear weapons, perhaps the most significant disincentives are the potential costs going nuclear would impose on Taiwan politically and economically. Politically, Taiwan would be further isolated if it defied international norms. Economically, Taiwan is completely dependent on the international community and its presumed enemy, China, for survival. As a result, any adventure that would alienate either of them would provoke severe sanctions and endanger continued economic successes. This finding is consistent with Solingen's thesis that outward-looking regimes tend to be averse to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The degree of entanglement between Taiwan and China is unprecedented and affects both parties. From a nonproliferation perspective, the key conclusion is that because of extensive business or personal ties between Taiwan and the mainland most people in Taiwan do not see China as a military threat and believe the development of nuclear weapons would be an unnecessary provocation. Even more importantly, the cross-Strait rapprochement following victories by Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT removed the most imminent causes of military conflict. Taipei appears to have forsaken provocative diplomatic moves, while Beijing has shown a willingness to accommodate Taiwan's need for international recognition. In short, Taiwan's security is in large measure in its own hands. Taiwan can avoid a showdown with China by refraining from actions that suggest a move toward independence or permanent separation, moves that are likely to trigger a "nonpeaceful" response. More difficult to assess is the impact on the current relatively stable cross-Strait situation of the continued growth in Chinese military power. Under such circumstances, the perception of the credibility of U.S. commitments to Taiwan's security is apt to grow in importance. Finally, given Taiwan's current nuclear infrastructure and its peculiar status in the international system, it will take more than ten years-and probably much longer-to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, even assuming there

202

BULLARD AND YUAN

is domestic consensus on the issue. It is difficult to imagine that Taiwan could conceal a covert program. Procedures for appropriation of funds, designation of institutions, and appointments of key personnel can no longer be done secretly; and no single political party, or the government itself, could effectively conceal such a substantial initiative. In addition, enhanced international inspections and monitoring of Taiwan's nuclear program would complicate concealments efforts. Given its dependence on foreign suppliers for its projected expansion in civilian nuclear power, the costs of an exposed covert program would be enormous. The conditions that led to Taiwan's flirtation with a nuclear weapons option have changed dramatically over the past three decades. In pure military balance terms, Taiwan's position has declined significantly during this period, despite U.S. arms sales. On the other hand, nonmilitary cross-Strait developments have reduced the probability that China will resort to the use of force. Consequently, the incentives for Taiwan to pursue a nuclear weapons option also have diminished over time. The fact that Taiwan is outside almost all international organizations, treaties, and regimes significantly undercuts analyses based on liberal institutional approaches. Nor is prestige a likely driver associated with Taiwan's possible pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities-the reverse could well be the case. Precarious as its security environment is, under most scenarios, nuclear weapons are unlikely to provide a corrective or be perceived as such by Taiwan's leadership-at least for the next ten years.

9

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS Why Yugoslavia Tried and Serbia Will Not

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova

included in this volume, Serbia is not among the usual proliferation suspects, and nuclear weapons are far removed from current domestic debates in the country. Serbia also does not possess the kind of nuclear industry or technological base to suggest much latent capability and potential hedging, while the quality of what was once Yugoslavia's strongest asset in this respect-trained personnel-has significantly deteriorated since the late 1980s. On the other hand, Serbian research institutes were at the heart of two nuclear weapons programs in what used to be Yugoslavia. The last such program was terminated in the late 1980s, and for over a decade thereafter the Vinca Institute near Belgrade housed fresh HEU fuel, with the West seemingly oblivious to this sensitive stock. Yugoslavia's past weapons programs are among the least documented, and no detailed exploration of the motives behind them or the reasons for their termination has been published.1 The Yugoslav/Serbian case serves as an interesting test for several theories that attempt to explain nuclear proliferation. From a neorealist point of view, for example, Yugoslavia had a good reason to pursue nuclear weapons to defend or balance against both superpowers. In the same vein, Serbia, having suffered a defeat in the Balkan Wars, losing Kosovo and still lacking reliable great power protection, might be expected to revisit the nuclear option. This chapter, therefore, explores the extent to which the security environment played a major role in the initiation and conclusion of Yugoslavia's nuclear weapons programs. UNLIKE MOST OTHER STATES

205

206

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

Domestic politics models raise the question of whether the programs were ambitious projects of individuals or coalitions vying for power. Was there really a determination to acquire nuclear weapons, or was it confused muddling on the part of the leadership and an opportunistic use of resources by scientists to advance their own research? This chapter also provides a test of the bureaucratic politics model that emphasizes the role of interest groups and explores whether a nuclear scientific establishment is likely to push for the bomb and under what circumstances it might reverse course. Drawing on Yugoslavia's past nuclear decision making, and with an eye to the future, this chapter asks if a "right" (or wrong, for that matter) combination of factors can again come into play to prompt Serbia to reconsider a nuclear option. Looking through the lenses of different theoretical frameworks, the chapter discusses whether there are any preconditions in place for another attempt at the bomb and, if not, how likely they are to arise in the foreseeable future. YUGOSLAVIA'S BOMB PROJECTS

Take One

Yugoslavia embarked on a nuclear research program in the late 1940s. Between 1948 and 1950, three major nuclear institutes were established in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, where scientists engaged in research on a wide variety of subjects, including the generation of nuclear energy, reactor physics, radiation, isotope production, uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent fuel, and plutonium separation. Between 1948 and 1953, the young socialist state spent some $35 million (over 1.75 billion dinars) on the construction and operation of the three institutes. 2 Between 1961 and 1965, expenditures on nuclear institutes constituted 48 percent of the total expenditures on science in Yugoslavia.3 By 1960, the Boris KidriC Institute (IBK, now known as Vinca) in Belgrade employed 1,284 people; the Rudjer BoskoviC Institute (IRB) in Zagreb, 486; and the Josef Stefan Institute in Ljubljana, 362 people. The scientific staff of the three institutes at the time exceeded 1,200 people, and over 1,500 papers were published by the Yugoslav nuclear researchers. 4 In March 1955, a highlevel Federal Commission on Nuclear Energy (SKNE) was established, chaired by Aleksandar RankoviC, vice-president of the Federal Executive Council and head of secret police (State Security Administration, UDBa) at the time. The push for the establishment of nuclear centers and promotion of nuclear research came from the country's top leadership. According to Pavle SaviC,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

207

the founder of the institute at Vinca, Josip Broz Tito himself, while visiting Moscow in 1946, asked SaviC to come to Yugoslavia and establish a research institute. 5 (It was also during that visit that Tito found out about Stalin's plans on nuclear weapons.) The official decision about the creation of the institute was taken on the federal level in 1947. The three institutes were established separately from the existing universities and were heavily favored by the government. The Communist Party was apparently afraid to "lose control over an activity which they thought of paramount importance.''6 The Boris Kid riC Institute, in particular, was under the direct control of the central government. Assignment of RankoviC as the chairman of the commission further emphasized the importance of nuclear activities, and he exercised close supervision of the work at Vinca. 7 Ostensibly civilian, the nuclear program included extensive research in areas with direct implications for a nuclear weapons project and, according to some of the early participants, was initiated primarily for military purposes. As discussed by William Potter, Djuro MiljaniC, and Ivo Slaus, the Boris Kidric Institute had a Department for Spent Fuel Processing, housed a heavy water-moderated critical assembly, and a Soviet-supplied heavy water research reactor operating on HEU. 8 Both Vinca and the Rudjer BoskoviC Institute conducted research and experiments in uranium enrichment-the former with the use of a calutron, and the latter with the use of a cyclotron. 9 Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Yugoslav scientists, especially at Vinca, maintained contacts and cooperated with Norway, and at least fifteen scientists spent extended periods of time on research and training at the Research Institute for Energy and Nuclear Technology at Kjeller. 10 In his letters to the Kjeller director Gunnar Randers, Stevan Dedijer, who headed the IBK in 19 52-19 55, indicated special interest in the "work on the chemistry ofirradiated uranium and ... the extraction of plutonium and other fission products." 11 In 1953, Yugoslavia came close to purchasing 10 tons of heavy water from Norsk Hydro-Elektrisk Kvaelstofaktieselskab, and in 1961 SKNE and the Norwegian Institutt for Atomenergi (Noratom) reached a cooperation agreement. The cooperation entailed, among other things, the construction of a fuel reprocessing facility in Yugoslavia, the blueprints for which were provided in 1962Y Noratom had also agreed to review and comment on Vinca's hot cells lab design. 13 However, neither the purchase of heavy water nor the reprocessing plant construction materialized. Yugoslavia opted for a Soviet heavywater-moderated reactor, RA, which went critical in 1959, while the plans for a

208

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

reprocessing plant were shelved. In 1965, Milorad Ristic, then director of Vinca, contacted Randers at the Kjeller Institute in an attempt to purchase 100 grams of plutonium, the purpose of which is not specified in the available letters. Ristic indicated willingness to notify the IAEA of the transaction, but Randers, citing an insufficient quantity of available plutonium, decided to supply only 10 grams and not involve the agency. 14 Olav Njolstad, the author of a book about the Kjeller Institute, has noted that Randers gave false reasons for not selling 100 grams, but it is unclear whether Randers was concerned with the Yugoslav intentions or simply did not want to attract the IAEA attention. 15 It appears that weapons-related work ended sometime in the mid-196os, with few tangible results. The reprocessing laboratory at Vinca continued to produce isotopes, but the focus of the nuclear program had shifted to the production of nuclear energy. The financing of the program decreased significantly in the late 1960s, and the institute at Vinca broadened its specialization to include research in nonnuclear areas. 16 The Federal Commission on Nuclear Energy was disbanded in 1971. Technological indicators aside, firsthand reports on the military aspect of Yugoslavia's first nuclear program are at times contradictory, which is not surprising as the sources are scientists who had been involved in the program. Explicit revelations about the weapons intent come primarily from Stevan Dedijer, who directed the IBK in the early 1950s. In an unpublished monograph written in 1969, Dedijer described how he was recruited to work at Vinca in 1949 and how in January 1950 Edvard Kardelj, then secretary for foreign affairs and one of Tito's closest confidants, told him that Yugoslavia "must have the atomic bomb ... even if it costs us one half of our national income for years."17 According to Dedijer's memoir, Pavle SaviC had already been charged with the bomb project but, in Kardelj's opinion, was not making sufficient progress. Dedijer later repeated his revelations in an interview to a Croatian newspaper Vecernji List and for a documentary film produced by Croatian Television in 2002-2003. 18 Furthermore, a confidential document dated May 1953 and signed by Dedijer, SaviC, and Robert J. Walen states that the nuclear activities in Yugoslavia had commenced with the primary purpose of building nuclear weapons. 19 Pavle SaviC himself never admitted to working on the bomb. Rather, according to his interview with the newspaper Politika, he was more interested in research and wanted the institute at Vinca to be a center of nuclear education. Still, he noted that there had been "behind-thescenes considerations of nuclear weapons." 20 In 2001, Milorad Mladjenovic,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

209

who had also worked at Vinca, published an article in Glas javnosti, discussing the weapons intent behind the establishment and early work of the institute. He pointed out that the true intentions of the program were betrayed by the decision to build a reprocessing laboratory: "It was like building a marmalade factory before planting a garden." 21 Finally, Ivan Supek, the first director of Rudjer Boskovic Institute in Zagreb, wrote about his suspicions of a "conspiracy" to produce an atomic bomb-the conspiracy that, he believed, was centered around Rankovic and the institute at Vinca. 22 Take Two

The nuclear weapons program, which seemingly withered away in the 1960s, was resurrected about a decade later. In June 1974, shortly after India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), directors of the three nuclear institutes were called to a secret meeting to discuss both military and peaceful components of Yugoslavia's nuclear program. Notably, the meeting took place at the headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), and attendees included a twostar general and other military officials. 23 Several more meetings took place, one of them in December 1974 at Tito's residence in Vojvodina, where the participants were told Yugoslavia was to develop nuclear weapons, but little progress appears to have been made until after Tito's death in 1980. According to eyewitness accounts, the second program was led by Admiral Branko Mamula, who was appointed secretary of defense in 1982. The work was carried out in two parallel tracks, where Program A focused on developing a nuclear weapon, and Program B was devoted to nuclear power. 24 The long-term plan of nuclear energy development and application in Yugoslavia was adopted by the Federal Executive Council and the executive councils of the republics and autonomous regions in 1981 and entered into force in 1982. The highly ambitious nuclear energy development program envisioned research and development in both uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, along with the construction of four power plants by 2000. On the basis of this plan, the Federal Committee on Energy and Industry established a working group to prepare a fuel cycle development program. The Business Association for Research, Development and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (NUKLIN) submitted a draft Program for Mastering Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies in March 1985. The program was focused on available and potential domestic capabilities, though not ruling out entirely cooperation with other countries. The program included fourteen projects, covering areas from uranium explora-

210

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

tion to the production of heavy water, uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, and waste utilization. 25 Reportedly, it was assumed that Program B (civilian) would produce and provide fissile material to Program A. 26 Both programs were placed under the authority of the secretary of defense, who reported to the Federal Presidency. Direct organization and supervision of the programs was exercised by the Military Technical Institute (MTI), headquartered in Belgrade and headed by Colonel Martin Sajnkar. 27 Energoinvest, the largest commercial company in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bore the principal responsibility for organizing the work under Program B. Most of the weaponsrelated work was carried out in Serbia at Vinca, the University of Belgrade's Institute of Physics, and at MTI, but the institute in Zagreb was tasked to design and produce a neutron source for a plutonium-implosion bomb. 28 By 1987, the Zagreb team still had not decided on the type of source to choose and did not produce a prototype polonium-beryllium source on which it had been working. 29 According to the information provided by a scientist who was involved in the weapons program, the effort lacked urgency, which was "reflected in the uneven quality of those scientists recruited for the program" and lax approach to setting and meeting the target dates for the projects. 30 In 1987, Program A was terminated for reasons not specified to its participants. MOTIVATIONS: THE WHY AND THE WHO Security

In retrospect, it seems hardly surprising that Yugoslavia would pursue nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and early 1950s, at least from a realist point of view. After Tito's conflict with Stalin and the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform in 1948, the country faced a serious threat from a conventionally superior and soon-to-be nuclear-armed state. In 1949, following failed attempts to remove Tito by means of assassination and coup d'etat, the USSR assembled forces around Yugoslav borders in apparent preparation for an invasionY The Soviet Bloc also imposed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia in an attempt to force Tito into submission. Considering its ideological dispute with the West, Yugoslavia could not readily count on NATO protection from the Soviet Union. Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons could have only added to the perception of vulnerability among the Yugoslav leadership. Given such a security environment, it is certainly plausible that the initial intent behind the launch of the Yugoslav nuclear program was to build a bomb

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

211

to protect the country from the East and, if need be, from the West as well. Such thinking would be consistent with Tito's emphasis on independence, which was evident even at the time when relations with the Soviet Union were much more cordial. For example, in a speech delivered in May 1945, Tito passionately made a case for sovereignty: Our goal is that every man be the master of his own house.... Why should it be held against our peoples that they want to be completely independent? And why should that autonomy be restricted, or the subject of dispute? We will not be dependent on anyone ever again. 32 During this same period, however, Yugoslavia moved towards rapprochement with the West in political and economic terms. The first foreign trade contract with a U.S. company was signed in 1948, as Yugoslavia began to diversify its trade partners. During 1949, Yugoslavia either initiated or expanded trade agreements with most of the members of the Organization of European Economic Co-Operation. 33 Moreover, Yugoslavia sought assurances from the United States that it would be protected by the West in case of a Soviet attack, and Dean Acheson reportedly responded that the U.S. reaction to a potential Soviet invasion could be gauged from the Korean War. 34 Following a series of negotiations, in 1951 Yugoslavia and the United States concluded an agreement on military assistance. 35 U.S. intelligence estimates at the time assessed that the Soviet Union was not ready to launch an attack, either alone or together with the Eastern Bloc armies. 36 Despite the growth of ties with the West, decreased dependence on trade with the Soviet bloc, and demonstration of U.S. resolve in confronting communist expansion in Korea, the Yugoslav leadership's perceptions of the Soviet threat did not dissipate. In 1951, Tito told foreign correspondents that "the danger of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia was greater than ever." 37 Indeed, from the Yugoslav point of view, the Soviet threat never truly disappeared, even after the restoration of relations following Stalin's death. In this respect, realist theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation of why the nuclear weapons pursuit was abandoned. Assuming the Yugoslav leadership recognized the futility of the bomb project, it should have-from a realist perspective-opted for the maximum available protection from the friendlier superpower. Indeed, the United States and, later, other allies broached the possibility of Yugoslavia's integration into NATO. The "possibility for joint military engagement of Yugoslav and NATO

212

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

forces was mentioned" during a meeting between General Dwight Eisenhower and Yugoslav Chief of StaffKoca PopoviC in 1951. 38 In 1952, the United States further promoted the idea of closer Yugoslav cooperation with NATO in exchange for greater military assistance, yet Tito did not express an interest in harmonizing defense plans with the alliance. 39 Moreover, although the Balkan Pact of 1953 provided the country with NATO protection without pressing for membership, Yugoslavia lost enthusiasm for this agreement even before the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus broke out and destroyed the pact. 40 Thus, at the time when state security was still far from assured in military terms, Yugoslavia declined an opportunity to join a powerful alliance while not making any significant progress in obtaining nuclear weapons. With time, it became evident that Yugoslavia's response to the need for balancing in a bipolar world was not in joining alliances or building its own nuclear weapons but in forging soft power, most notably through leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The realist approach is even less helpful in explaining Yugoslavia's second bid to develop a weapons program. While India posed no security challenge to Yugoslavia, a neorealist interpretation might posit that the PNE disrupted the balance of power within the developing world and prompted Yugoslavia to seek to restore it. Although the timing of the revival of the Yugoslav weapons program one month after the Indian nuclear test is consistent with this thesis, Tito's apparent loss of interest in the program is not. The Soviet threat also cannot readily explain the revival of the program, as it was no greater in 1974 than it had been in the 1950s and diminished further in the 198os, when most of the weapons-oriented work within Program A was conducted. Even though the second program was mostly led by the military, it seems it was not aimed at fending off external aggression but was rather a muddled attempt to prevent the country from disintegrating. Paradigms focusing on internal determinants of nuclear decision making, therefore, are more appropriate for the discussion of the second weapons program as well as the end of the first one. An additional challenge to a realist interpretation of Yugoslavia's nuclear decision making is the complete lack of interest in nuclear weapons on the part of the Milosevk regime. One might have expected Milosevk to at least have considered the nuclear option, given the West's support for the secessionist republics and the absence of Russian protection. Although the pursuit of nuclear weapons at the time may not have been economically feasible, other countries in similarly dire straits had attempted and succeeded in their nu-

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

213

clear quests. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that MiloseviC even inquired about available expertise and materials to make an informed judgment on whether Serbia could acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, the disinterest in all things nuclear was such that peaceful nuclear research and education deteriorated severely during MiloseviC's rule. Some observers have noted that MiloseviC had a very limited grasp of international affairs, suggesting that "he apparently gave very little systematic thought to foreign policy and strategic relations."41 A lack of understanding of strategic issues and a preoccupation with ideology and personal loyalties may explain MiloseviC's failure to look in the direction of nuclear weapons but also point to the influence of domestic rather than systemic factors on nuclear decision making. Political Economy and Regime Survival

As discussed in the preceding section, systemic factors do not adequately account for the demise of Yugoslavia's first nuclear weapons program. While its origins were likely motivated by security considerations, the program's progress and eventual freeze were very much affected, if not defined, by domestic politics and considerations of regime survival-factors that figure prominently in Etel Solingen's theory of nuclear weapons choices. Solingen suggests that states' nuclear paths are shaped by the economic models that ruling coalitions choose in order to remain in power. Outward-looking regimes adopt open export-oriented economic models, view isolation from the international community as unacceptable, and are, therefore, less likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Inward-looking regimes, on the other hand, emphasize self-sufficiency and incur relatively lower political costs if they opt for nuclear weapons. 42 Tito's hold on power in the early 1950s was stable, but a developing economic crisis and opposition to communism among large segments of the population posed an inchoate threat to the regime. 43 To secure its own legitimacy, the Yugoslav leadership needed to improve living conditions, which prompted it to turn to the West for trade and assistance and to implement internal reforms, many of which constituted a further departure from the Soviet/Eastern Bloc course. For example, the peasants in Yugoslavia were adamantly opposed to agricultural collectivization, and in 1953, as the peasants continued to leave the cooperatives and government attempts to crush revolts by force failed, obligatory collectivization was abandoned. 44 Further liberalizing measures were introduced in the early 196os: In 1961, Yugoslavia opened its economy to world markets and reorganized its financial system. 45

214

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

The period of larger economic reforms and greater liberalization came in the second half of the 1960s and was preceded and accompanied by internal struggles among the party leaders. As early as 1952, factional disagreements over the form and pace of socioeconomic development emerged in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), with RankoviC and Kardelj appearing on the more conservative side that opposed fast decentralization.46 Tito initially favored this more conservative attitude. With time, however, Kardelj changed his views and favored "free market mechanisms," drastically reducing state involvement in managing the economy. In a series of articles in the Yugoslav media in 1965, Kardelj argued that "only if centralized control is abandoned and economic laws allowed to operate freely could the Yugoslav economy hope to make progress."47 RankoviC, in the meantime, consolidated his role as the leader of the conservative camp and resisted the implementation of reforms. As Sabrina Ramet puts it, "Rankovic, as head of the state security service, had carved out a small empire for himself and had long opposed Kardelj's increasingly more liberal, polycentric visions with his own neo-Stalinist doctrinaire views."48 The debate over the economic course resulted in the adoption of the 1965 economic reforms, which included delegation of greater powers from the central government to the republics and "increasingly integrating the economy with the international division of labor."49 The liberal coalition within the party won and subsequently hastened the fall of Rankovic. Charged with deviating from the party line, failure to implement its decisions, conspiring to assume power, and organizing surveillance over Tito himself, Rankovic was removed from all the posts he held and expelled from the central committee of the party in 1966. His deputy, Vojin Lukic, was also fired, and a number of "key security personnel" were removed from the secret police (UDBa). 50 Coincidentally, the weapons aspect of the nuclear program was deemphasized, and the more sensitive activities came to a halt at around the same time as the confrontation between the "conservatives" and "liberals" heated up, ending with the victory of a national-liberal coalition. The Federal Commission on Nuclear Energy, which Rankovic chaired for over ten years, was disbanded in 1971. It is hard to determine if there was a direct link between the decisions to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons and liberalize the economy, but Tito probably recognized the risk oflosing trade partners in both the West and the East should the bomb project become known. At the very least, preoccupation with implementing economic reforms, against the background of the dimin-

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

215

ished Soviet threat, must have diverted leadership attention from the nuclear program. It appears that, with the fall of RankoviC and people close to him, there was no obvious successor to lead and promote the nuclear weapons effort. The scientific community also was not sad to see the bomb project end. Bureaucratic Politics and Parochial Interests

A bureaucratic politics model seeks to explain how political decisions are made on a substate level, influenced by various internal actors rather than overarching national interests. Applying the model to nuclear proliferation, Scott Sagan posits that within states different groups pursue their own interests, including the development of nuclear weapons. As he puts it, "Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state." 51 He further suggests three kinds of groups that are likely to favor a nuclear option: the professional military, nuclear industry or the scientific establishment, and political parties. In the context of Yugoslavia, the most relevant groups in terms of nuclear developments are nuclear scientists, especially those at Vinca, and political leaders, including Tito and his closest associates. While the lack of capability and resources must have been at least partially responsible for the halt of the weapons effort, it also appears that Yugoslavia was not a case where the leadership's determination crashed against insurmountable technological obstacles. Rather, the demise of the program can be explained in terms of a shift in leadership priorities and growing opposition from within the scientific establishment. The Leaders and the First Program: Tito's Bomb, or Rankovic's? Communist ideology allocates a special place for science as the engine of progress and emancipation. Tito and other top Yugoslav leaders also believed in the power of science to transform society and might reasonably have supported nuclear research due to the conviction that the mastery of nuclear science would help advance Yugoslavia's development. In the postwar period, nuclear science was at the forefront of technological development, and possession of a nuclear program was a sign of modernity and progress. As such, it appealed not only to the communist/socialist ideological convictions but also to the more specific Yugoslav aspiration for independence. As Dusan Razem notes, "The prospective success of any undertaking offered the possibility of high prestige for the ruling communist elite, who desired to prove their efficiency and self-sufficiency."52 While Tito surely authorized the establishment of nuclear centers and was informed about the activities of the institutes and the Federal Commission, it

216

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

is unclear how determined he was to acquire nuclear weapons. His views and motivations might have changed over time. The only available quote on the subject attributed directly to him (apart from public and numerous proclamations in support of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses) comes from the memoirs of Dobrica CosiC, a writer, who in 1992 became the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1961, CosiC was travelling with Tito and asked him if it were possible that many more states would soon have nuclear weapons. Tito's response was that, indeed, it was possible and that Yugoslavia would have them as well: "We are working in that direction. We are not building the bomb, but are developing the capability, so that we, too, can build an atomic bomb."53 Judging by this statement, Tito did not consider the bomb an immediate necessity but believed in the utility of a latent capability, particularly in case more nuclear weapons states emerged-a kind of"if they have them, we should, too" thinking that came into play again after India's PNE. The projections of the world of many more nuclear states, however, were not quick to materialize, and as long as the number of "them" with nuclear weapons remained low, the pursuit of the bomb never became urgent. As far as the desire for prestige and status is concerned, Tito's pride was for the most part satisfied by Yugoslavia's growing international stance as the leader of the developing world, a country that managed to withstand the pressure of both superpowers. Furthermore, India's 1974 PNE was a mixed blessing and did not catapult it into a superpower position but initially attracted condemnation and sanctions from both East and West-the kind of international attention that Tito did not want. Among the political leadership, two figures besides Tito were prominent in the "nuclear drive": Aleksandar RankoviC and Edvard Kardelj. The latter was identified by Stevan Dedijer as the person who first told him that Yugoslavia needed the bomb. However, Kardelj's interest in the nuclear program-be it peaceful or military-was short lived. He was not formally involved in managing the program and was increasingly consumed by economic concerns. With time, Kardelj also became a fierce opponent, if not a personal enemy, of Rankovic. Although not a scientist by training, RankoviC headed the Federal Commission, closely supervised the institute at Vinca, and was involved in at least some of the commission's procurement activities. SaviC, for example, claimed that it was RankoviC, together with the SKNE Secretary Slobodan NakiCenoviC, who ordered the heavy water research reactor from the Soviet Union. 54 According to Ivan Supek's memoirs, Rankovic was particularly angered by his (and col-

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

217

leagues') opposition to the purchase of the Soviet reactor and unwillingness of the IRB staff to engage in applied science rather than fundamental research. 55 RankoviC is often described as being Stalinist in methods and, eventually, ideology. He favored strong central government to exercise greater control over the republics, while consolidating his personal power as the chief of public and secret police. It is unclear when RankoviC embraced the idea of a Yugoslav bomb, but once the Secret Police were charged with supervising Vinca and the nuclear program overall, he became more involved. Considering his aspirations for state leadership as Tito's heir apparent, one might speculate that RankoviC believed that control over the nuclear weapons project would reinforce his own position in the succession process and as the country's leader. On the other hand, Rankovic never openly spoke about the need for nuclear weapons. In his public interviews, he emphasized the importance of nuclear science for development and stressed the need for international cooperation in this field. After his downfall, RankoviC did not produce any memoirs and generally remained silent about past activities. Still, judging by the evidence from other commentators, his commitment to the nuclear project appears to have been the strongest among the political leadership. The Role of the Scientists A popular misconception about the role of scientific establishments in nuclear programs is that scientists lobby for the bomb as a means to increase their clout and access to funds. To be sure, there are examples of this tendency, Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan being perhaps the prime case. However, there is little evidence that nuclear scientists generally are predisposed to favor nuclear weapons development or desire to work on bomb-building projects. The Yugoslav case provides some insight into this phenomenon. During the 1950s, in the early days of Yugoslavia's involvement in nuclear research, its scientific community was excited about the prospects of cuttingedge research. Such enthusiasm, however, was not necessarily motivated by a desire to build a bomb. Still, at least one Yugoslav scientist-Pavle SaviCdoes appear to have been interested initially in the military dimension of the program. SaviC, a Serbian physicist and chemist, worked in Paris with Irene JoliotCurie in the 1930s, and the two scientists came close to discovering nuclear fission. At Tito's request, he founded the institute at Vinca in 1947. As noted earlier, Dedijer was told by Kardelj that Savic had promised to develop a nuclear weapon. SaviC himself told a journalist in 1993 that he had once drawn

218

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

a sketch of nuclear weapon components for his colleagues at Vinca. 56 Supek's memoirs also mention "rumors" coming from Belgrade that SaviC knew how to build the bomb and was working on it. 57 If SaviC had indeed told the Yugoslav leadership he could make an atomic bomb, his motivation might well have been the desire to head his own nuclear institute and gain wider recognition. It is unclear if SaviC really believed he could deliver on this task or if pride drove him to declare that such a goal was within reach. In any case, SaviC appears to have changed his mind about the bomb-or just given up-sometime in the 1950s. He resigned from Vinca's scientific board and from the Federal Commission, reportedly over disagreements concerning the institute's future orientation, arguing that Vinca should be a center for education rather than applied science. 58 Two other prominent scientists involved in the early weapons program, Stevan Dedijer and Ivan Supek, also eventually became opponents of the project and were removed from their respective institutes. Supek, a well-known pacifist, seems to have had primarily moral objections, while Dedijer's stance involved more pragmatic considerations. In the 1953 document, Dedijer and SaviC argued that Yugoslavia did not have and was not likely to soon attain the capability to acquire nuclear weapons: "Only a country whose industrial and scientific capability and available uranium reserves are comparable to those of Great Britain and France can think of building nuclear weapons." 59 What might have also contributed to cooling the enthusiasm about the nuclear weapons at Vinca was the criticality accident at the heavy water research reactor (RB) in 1958. The accident killed one person and injured five more. Although SaviC appears to have been interested in the project initially, it soon became evident-to him and others-that the work on the Yugoslav bomb was unlikely to yield tangible results in the near term. The 1953 letter also reveals that the scientists had to deal with secrecy and incompetence, and as RankoviC's power and oversight grew, there was little reason to believe the work would become more rewarding. Dedijer and Supek, in particular, were known as strong independent personalities, who must have detested the idea of being supervised and controlled by poorly educated secret police and party bosses. True to the communist system, ideology and party loyalty eventually trumped scientific merit, when, for example, Stevan Dedijer's position at Vinca was compromised by his brother Vladimir's support ofMilovan Djilas-a rare public critic ofTito. On the other hand, leading Yugoslav scientists enjoyed considerably more freedom than their Soviet or Chinese counterparts and were able to express

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

219

disagreement and leave the weapons project. Dedijer, SaviC, and Supek had extensive ties to the outside world, maintained working relationships with scientists and institutes abroad, and may have been reluctant to sacrifice those for the seclusion and secrecy associated with a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, Supek held firm humanist and pacifist views, while Dedijer was increasingly more interested in pursuing research on dissemination of information, later becoming the founder of the discipline of business intelligence. While not necessarily anxious to pursue nuclear research for the sake of a bomb, a number of Yugoslav scientists were not averse to using the government's support for a weapons program to advance their own research. One prominent Yugoslav scientist, Dragoslav PopoviC, for example, was able to use his time at the Kjeller Institute and work at Vinca to publish a number of scientific papers on fission and reactor physics. One such paper, in fact, caused a controversy in 1954, as it presented information that the U.S. government deemed weapons related. 60 It is, indeed, quite startling today to review the very long list of papers published by Yugoslav nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s. In his correspondence with Stale Hansen, Dedijer recounted a story about asking an engineer why he participated in the procurement of the heavy water RA rector from the Soviet Union. The engineer's response was quite telling: "If the idiots want to give me a five million dollar toy to play with, I'll take it and won't argue with them."61 Overall, although a number of key scientists might have initially treated the bomb project as "a problem to solve," eventually most leading scientists opposed the idea of building weapons and drifted toward nonweapons research and education. There was little promise of recognition and "heroic" treatment to motivate the Yugoslav scientists' active support for the development of nuclear weapons, but their standing was also not so repressed as to simply force them to stay and work on the project they personally did not favor. Furthermore, none of the scientists discussed here suffered from excessive nationalist feelings, so the pursuit of the bomb for the glory of the nation was not among the motivating factors, either. As far as bureaucratic politics and nuclear myths go, the case of Yugoslavia suggests that the nuclear scientific community, often a prime suspect in promoting all things nuclear, was in fact opposed to the bomb. Herding Cats: The Second Program and the Military As discussed earlier, the second weapons program was driven primarily by the military. While the 1974 meetings almost certainly were convened in response to the Indian explosion, they were not motivated by immediate security concerns but rather by NAM

220

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

politics and prestige considerations. By the early 1980s, when the program picked up steam, the issue of international prestige was hardly on the agenda anymore. India was less of a point of reference for the post-Tito leadership, and Yugoslavia had more pressing domestic political and economic concerns. Insider accounts point to Admiral Branko Mamula as the person who "forcefully promote[d] the weapons program."62 Admiral Mamula was Yugoslav secretary of defense between 1982 and 1988-a post vested with considerable power. By the late 1970s, however, the role of the federal government was significantly weakened, a trend that increased in the 1980s. The years following Tito's death were dominated by factional and interrepublic struggles and attempts to prevent the rise of another strong leader. The convoluted system of republican representation and rotating presidency also made it difficult to advance an overarching "national program" such as nuclear weapons pursuit and ensured that no single politician could exercise control comparable to that ofTito's. In 1971, Tito designated the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) as the guarantor of national unity, pointing out that the army had to not only protect against external aggressors but also "defend the achievements of [the] revolution within the country."63 Given JNA's loyalty to the country (rather than individual republics), top army officials might have viewed the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means to increase their clout and retain Yugoslavia's integrity after Tito's death. 64 The army, however, underestimated the extent of disagreement among the republics' leadership and the degree of independence that the scientific community came to enjoy. As noted earlier, both Programs A and B were under the aegis of the Federal Presidency. By 1986, the federal government was barely able to exercise control over the republics. According to one analyst, "policy making at the federal level came to a halt," and resolutions adopted by the federal government were increasingly ignored at the republican level. 65 The limits of Admiral Mamula's personal power along with the inability of the republics' party leaders to agree were demonstrated by the failure to forge effective opposition to Slobodan Milosevic in 1987. 66 Nuclear activities were dispersed among different institutes, consistent with Tito's old principle of equality and balancing among the republics. This approach helped to slow down the weapons program as it guaranteed duplication of effort and allocation of resources unrelated to expertise. 67 The lack of enthusiasm about the program on the part of the scientists is evident in a quote by Milorad MladjenoviC, who claims to have participated in two meetings concerning the bomb project in the second half of the 1970s:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

221

The most important question was how much it would cost to build the bomb. Since we didn't like the idea of making a bomb, we named a very large sum and pointed out that in our circumstances, such a project could neither remain concealed for a long time, nor be finished quickly. 68 Even the civilian part of the nuclear program encountered significant opposition from various groups, including the Serbian coal mining industry, which was wary of the development of nuclear power as a competitor. The Chernobyl tragedy of 1986 was the catalyst for the formal end of Yugoslavia's second nuclear program-Croatia decided not to build a proposed nuclear power plant (NPP) in Prevlaka, and then Slovenia initiated a law banning the construction of NPPs. 69 In 1989, Yugoslavia adopted a federal law banning the construction of nuclear power plants and allocation of federal funding for related research. With so many conflicting interests pulling the country in different directions in the 1980s, there was no group or individual both committed and powerful enough to move the nuclear weapons program to an advanced stage. It is likely that, at the end of the day, no one in Yugoslavia was in a position to take the responsibility for such an endeavor in the environment of uncertainty and failing national unity.7° INTO THE FUTURE

The history of Yugoslavia's two nuclear weapons attempts demonstrates the multicausality of decisions to initiate and terminate weapons programs, the fluidity of intentions and motivations, and the importance of individual and group actors in both advancing and countering nuclearization. It also offers insights relevant to forecasting the Republic of Serbia's nuclear future. This section discusses Serbia's predisposition toward a nuclear option, or what Stephen Meyer refers to as propensity/ 1 taking into account security factors, the political-economic orientation of the regime, and potential role of individual leaders. Another factor that comes into play is Serbia's current position visa-vis the international nonproliferation regime, particularly its cooperation with the IAEA. Security

At present, Serbia faces no existential threat, or any threat comparable to the one posed by the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While relations with the United States and NATO are complicated by the Kosovo issue, another military conflict with the West is unlikely. As the case of

222 GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

Kosovo's proclamation of independence in February 2008 demonstrated, the government of Serbia is not eager to use force to secure territorial integrity, and the majority of the Serbian population is not supportive of a new war. Yet, if one were to employ a realist theoretical approach, one might speculate that the country may yet consider a nuclear option. After all, Serbia was defeated in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, was unable to keep Kosovo, could conceivably still lose Vojvodina, and has no reliable allies. If plans to accede to the European Union (EU) suffer a serious setback and tensions with the West over the status ofKosovo escalate (unlikely as it may seem now), realist logic would dictate that Serbia should develop an independent deterrent to defend itself and perhaps even reclaim the breakaway province. An alternative route to security vis-a-vis NATO would be to acquire a powerful ally, namely Russia. However, recent history has demonstrated that Russia is not a reliable protector for its "Slavic brothers," and the extension of its nuclear umbrella to Serbia is highly unlikely. Under these circumstances, according to realist logic, the only reason for Serbia to refrain from weapons pursuit would be the country's lack of capability to succeed before its intentions were discovered, as it would invite a harsh U.S./NATO reaction. The preceding exercise in realist logic, of course, largely ignores domestic politics-that is, the nature of the Serbian regime, the goals it pursues, and how the country's population views itself today and in the future. The combination of these internal factors makes a nuclear weapons future for Serbia nearly inconceivable. A Nation Divided: Political-Economic Choices of the Democrats and Radicals

It is useful to keep in mind that today's Serbia is not a direct successor to or "continuation" of Tito's Yugoslavia. It is currently a different state with a different ideology, leadership, and self-perception. It is no longer an important international player comparable to Tito's Yugoslavia, not a NAM leader vying for prestige, nor a strategic buffer between two superpowers. Today, Serbia is a state emerging from isolation, struggling to overcome the consequences of wars and economic sanctions, grappling with the history of its own aggression and the loss of territory, and aspiring to regain its place in Europe. Finally, in spite of popular support for joining the EU, 72 Serbia today is still a divided society in search of national unity, and the disagreements between those in favor of westernization and the more nationalistic groups of the population have yet to be

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

223

overcome. In the political realm, the two sides are represented primarily by the Democratic Party (DS, pro-European) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The parliamentary elections of May 2008 resulted in the victory of proEuropean forces-the coalition Za evropsku Srbiju (For a European Serbia, ZES)? 3 won 38.7 percent of the vote, leading the second-placed SRS by almost ten percentage points.74 Thus, the feared popular backlash against the West after Kosovo's proclamation of independence did not materialize. Moreover, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), formerly led by Slobodan Milosevic, refused to form a coalition government with SRS and the increasingly nationalistic Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), joining instead the pro-European ZES. In the context ofSolingen's model of political survival, Serbia's nonnuclear future appears secure, at least as long as the pro-European coalition stays in power and is able to deliver on its campaign promises of better economic conditions. In April 2008, Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which opened European markets to Serbia and paved the way for further integration. The freshly elected parliament ratified the agreement in September 2008 in spite of the opposition from SRS and DSS. Minister of Economy Mladjan DinkiC announced that Serbia would begin unilateral implementation of the Interim Trade Agreement with EU in January 2009, even though it was projected that it would hurt government revenue through the reduction of import tariffs?5 Though it was criticized by the opposition, unilateral implementation of the agreement began on January 30, 2009. 76 Clearly, the current government favors economic liberalization and intends to continue active privatization initiated in recent years, attract foreign investment, and expand trade with the EU states, aiming at the growth of exports. Between 2002 and mid-2007, the Share Fund of Serbia already managed the sale of shares of "approximately 900 companies" and planned to put on sale the shares of 400 more companies by end of 2008.77 Minister of Economy DinkiC is an active promoter of liberalization and has so far been quite successful in attracting foreign investors/8 In April 2008, for example, he signed a memorandum of understanding, strategic cooperation, and joint investment with Fiat. 79 The Italian carmaker acquired a 70 percent share of Zastava automobile company, and production of the first Fiat automobiles in Serbia began in March 2009. 80 In July 2008, the government of Serbia agreed to the privatization of the national airline, JAT Airways, 81 but the plan was dropped after the tender failed to attract any bidders. 82 It is indicative that in its first month of work, the new government adopted amendments to the rules on attracting

224

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

foreign direct investment, aiming to generate greater investment into automotive, electronic, and telecommunication industries. 83 As Solingen points out in her discussion of outward- and inward-looking models, the pursuit of nuclear weapons can "dwarf other economic endeavors," as it entails a massive diversion of resources to support the bureaucratic, military, scientific, and industrial complex. 84 In this respect, the politicaleconomic goals and policies ofthe current pro-European government in Serbia could not be further from nuclear weapons aspirations. The Serbian Radical Party, which still receives considerable support from the population, is far more isolationist (or at least anti-Western) in its economic outlook. While the party is not opposed to EU accession in principle, SRS conditions its support on the revocation of Kosovo's independence and is keen to warn against "excessive" fascination with Euro-Atlantic integration. This situation is somewhat similar to that in Ukraine discussed by Nikolai Sokov in Chapter 11 of this volume. As he puts it, "the main fault lines in the country's domestic politics and interest group orientation are not along inward-outward preferences but rather between Western and Russian orientation."85 The divisions on the West versus Russia issue, however, are ideologically sharper in Serbia. An article in the April 2008 issue of SRS official magazine, Velika Srbija (Great Serbia), lamented that the goal ofEU integration was "the triumph of the concept of market and profit over the proper spiritual, idealistic and traditional values of old Europe."86 Another article in the same issue pointed to Russia as the "right economic choice for Serbia."87 Accordingly, the radicals enthusiastically support energy cooperation with Russia and view with suspicion the privatization of Serbian firms by Western companies. One of the elements of SRS ideology is opposition to globalization as an American-led attempt to enslave the world. 88 1he party does not reject economic integration and cooperation altogether, but its official program underlines the need for state-ownership of, and assistance to, "strategic sectors of economy." Such assistance should include import protectionism, subsidies, and preferential loans. 89 Overall, SRS seems to fit quite well Solingen's description of an inwardlooking coalition-but this is insufficient ground for a prediction that SRS would try to turn Serbia towards nuclearization should it assume power. Even if the radicals succeed in forming a ruling coalition in the future, it is unlikely that they will be able to institute a complete reversal in Serbia's general economic course. Considering existing divisions in society and the majority's desire for EU accession, an SRS-led coalition would have to morph into what

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

225

Solingen describes as a hybrid, compromise model.9° As such, the coalition would not be strong enough domestically to aggressively pursue an endeavor as complex as a nuclear weapons program, nor would it feel sufficient regional pressure to do so, considering that Serbia's neighborhood is both nonnuclear and liberalizing. Finally, while nationalist and antagonistic in relation at least to the Western world, Serbian radicals are not the kind of party to aspire for grandeur that some associate with nuclear weapons. Almost paradoxically, the radicals' brand of nationalism is the kind that thrives more on the history of defeat and suffering than great achievement. 91 Where Tito took pride in having successfully resisted the Nazi Germany, taking an independent line with Stalin, and withstanding Soviet pressure, the SRS nationalists speak of the humiliation and victimization of Serbs and look up to Russia as an "older brother" and protector. National Identity and the Role of the Leaders

Several scholars who emphasize the importance of domestic factors in shaping nuclear choice focus on the role of individuals-either state leaders or otherwise influential people. Peter Lavoy has written of "nuclear mythmakers," asserting that internal actors with vested interests exaggerate external threats to perpetuate the myth that nuclear weapons are the main guarantee of power and security, thus making the case for a state to go nuclear. 92 More recently, Jacques Hymans posits that only state leaders of a certain psychological type, or profile, are likely to make a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. He describes this type as "oppositional nationalist"-the kind ofleader who is motivated by both the pride for his or her nation and fear of an external threat coming from the "key comparison other."93 The question in relation to proliferation forecasting then is whether an oppositional nationalist leader could (or is likely to) emerge in Serbia and attempt to lead it down the nuclear weapons path. Hymans gives few clues as to what kinds of regions, countries, or societies are more conducive to the emergence of oppositional nationalists. Judging by its recent history, however, Serbia appears to be a fertile ground for the rise of nationalist and antagonistic figures. Former President Slobodan Milosevic was able to win elections and inspire large crowds of supporters in the late 1980s and beginning 1990s. Ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj, in custody at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is still officially the head of the Serbian Radical Party. The former de facto SRS leader Tomislav Nikolic finished a close second in the 2008 presidential elections,

226

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

after winning the first round. 94 DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica, democratically elected to the presidency in 2000, has also proved to be a controversial figure, hardening his nationalist rhetoric and opposing the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Nationalism and mistrust of the international community are still very much alive in Serbia, although possibly on a downward trend. In both 2003 and 2007, the radicals (SRS) won the largest share of votes in the parliamentary elections, but they were second in 2008. SRS came close to forming a government in coalition with DSS and the Socialist Party (SPS) following strong performance at the May 2008 elections. Clearly, the radical nationalists cannot be written off as a marginal force, and their popularity indicates that should there emerge a charismatic leader with ultranationalist views, the individual could potentially rise to power, though this will also depend on the performance of the pro-European government and progress toward EU membership. Yet, although it is conceivable that a powerful nationalist leader might try to exaggerate external threats to garner support for a nuclear weapons program, the current brand of Serbian nationalists does not entertain notions of a nuclear Serbia and is unlikely to adopt such a perspective in the near future. In addressing the issue of national identity, it is also important to note that the debate on nuclear proliferation is largely absent in Serbia. National media do report news on the two main proliferation crises of the day-Iran and North Korea-but there is no discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in relation to Serbia's national security, and nuclear weapons are generally viewed as a superpowers' game to play. When in January 2008 former Russian chief of staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy said that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons to protect its allies, 95 the reaction in Serbian media was almost a yawn. Militarypolitical observer Miroslav Lazanski commented that Russia was trying only to mirror U.S. nuclear doctrine and Serbia "had no particular place in this great game." 96 Even were an oppositional nationalist or a coalition led by radical nationalists to assume power in Serbia, nuclear weapons are likely to remain outside the realm ofleadership considerations. Institutionalism: Serbia and the IAEA

As a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Yugoslavia under Tito was a vocal critic of the nuclear-armed powers and the international regime for the lack of progress on disarmament and insufficient assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the developing

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS

227

world. The situation is very different today, as Serbia benefits greatly from the cooperation with the IAEA, the United States, and European Commission in implementing the Vinca Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) Program. A follow-on to Project Vinca, which resulted in the repatriation of 48 kg of fresh HEU fuel to Russia, the VIND Program envisions the removal of about 2.5 tons of spent nuclear fuel, the construction of waste storage and processing facilities, and complete decommissioning of the RA research reactor that was purchased from the Soviet Union. 97 VIND is a massive and very expensive effort-one that Serbia certainly could not handle on its own. Considering that Serbia has willingly forsaken the construction of nuclear power plants and has no nuclear fuel supply concerns at the moment, there are no obvious reasons for it to complain about the structure of the nonproliferation regime nor contemplate withdrawal from the NPT. The VIND program is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2015, and, as long as it is successful, it would be in Serbia's interest to continue supporting the nonproliferation regime and associated institutions. Capability

As discussed by Potter, Slaus, and Miljanic, Yugoslavia's "most valuable and enduring asset" after the end of the second weapons program was the personnel, the nuclear scientists who remained in Serbia.98 Today, the value of this asset has significantly deteriorated due to aging of the original cadre of scientists and the lack of state support for nuclear research and education since the late 1980s. According to Milan PesiC and Dragana Nikolic of Vinca, throughout the 1990s the Institute and the country lost "both experts and technicians qualified to operate the [research] reactor and carry out research in the nuclear field." 99 In the meantime, the termination of "undergraduate and postgraduate studies, research courses and training in nuclear science and engineering" meant that there was no influx of young researchers and scientists. 100 This situation has improved somewhat after the fall of the Milosevic regime and particularly with the start of active cooperation with the IAEA, and the VIND program also has a training component to it. Still, the work is currently focused on nuclear safety and radiation protection, and it is not clear how soon (if ever) there will be a new generation of nuclear scientists in Serbia willing and able to engage in more "sensitive" research. It is ironic that the only state nuclear program in Serbia today is focused on removal of spent fuel and decommissioning of the heavy water reactor once

228

GAUKHAR MUKHATZHANOVA

meant to be a part of Yugoslavia's weapons effort. With the dismantling of the RA reactor, Serbia will remove an important part of its previous capability and also symbolically close a chapter in the former Yugoslavia's flirtation with nuclear weapons. CONCLUSION

Yugoslavia represents a rarely discussed case of nuclear renunciation. The history of its attempted weapons programs demonstrates the multicausality of nuclear decisions, the shifting nature of intent, and the importance of domestic factors in shaping nuclear decisions and outcomes. After a period of initial interest, the balance of domestic bureaucratic powers in Yugoslavia was tipped against a nuclear weapons program, and in the absence of an immediate and overwhelming external threat (since the 1950s), the proponents of the bomb were limited in their potential "mythmaking" activity. Yugoslavia's thirst for independence and prestige, in the meantime, was satisfied not only through nuclear research, but through the leadership of the NAM and overall economic development. The unwillingness of the country's leading nuclear scientists to build the bomb along with the lack of resources and the leadership's preoccupation with economic problems played a crucial part in halting the first weapons program. Scarce resources and the lack of a strong federal government contributed to the failure of the second program. Serbia currently does not possess the capability to go nuclear, and it is unlikely to acquire such capability in the foreseeable future. An analysis of Serbia's security situation, the orientation of the ruling coalition, and the likelihood of the rise of an oppositional nationalist leader show, on balance, that Serbia's propensity to pursue nuclear weapons in the next decade is exceptionally low. The country, even the radical nationalist part of it, views itself as decidedly nonnuclear, and the transformation of this self-perception will require a change of ruling coalition, deliberate efforts of a pronuclear lobby, and dramatic changes in the regional military, political, and economic environment. A scenario under which all these factors converge within the next decade is implausible.

10

TURKEY IN TRANSITION Toward or Away from Nuclear Weapons?

Jessica C. Varnum

for a nuclear proliferation forecasting study. From a U.S. perspective, Turkey is a country surrounded by increasingly menacing neighbors suspected of proliferation aspirations of their own. If we were Turkey in this neighborhood, so the reasoning goes, of course we would want nuclear weapons. Yet in Turkey, this reasoning finds little resonance. Relationships with Iran, Syria, Russia, and other neighbors have never been more stable and cooperative. External threats to Turkish security emanate primarily from nonstate actors such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), not from neighboring states' conventional or unconventional arsenals. Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO, and as Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nam1k Tan asserted in 2006 in response to press queries about whether Turkey had nuclear weapons ambitions: "The common security umbrella provided by NATO to its allies gives Turkey the capacity for nuclear deterrence."1 If Turkey is an unlikely nuclear aspirant, why examine its case? Turkey is a high salience state, meaning that its nuclear decisions will resonate widely and are likely to have a profound impact on regional stability. 2 Analyzing counterintuitive cases- if they are highly salient-should be integral to futureoriented assessments because proliferation is a dynamic phenomenon. If the conditions underlying Turkey's nonproliferation decision change, so could that decision. Understanding the nature of these conditions is essential to monitoring the balance of proliferation incentives and constraints in Turkey and to providing strategic warning of possible changes over the next ten years. TURKEY IS BOTH AN OBVIOUS AND A COUNTERINTUITIVE CHOICE

229

230

JESSICA C. VARNUM

Past studies have often black-boxed3 Turkey's proliferation choices, emphasizing other states' actions while treating Turkey in reactive terms. This chapter's analytical framework emphasizes domestic political factors, asking not only what Iran is doing or whether the nonproliferation regime is in crisis but also how relevant Turkish decision makers interpret these events. Notably, the internal and external determinants of Turkish policy are in flux. A controversial May 2007 cover story in The Economist boldly declared the existence of a "battle for Turkey's soul,"4 referring to the standoff between the governing AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma, or Justice and Development Party) and its Kemalist opponents over who would become the next president of Turkey. But Turkey faces a much longer list of "battles for its soul" than the ongoing political struggles between the AKP and its opponents. It must decide how much further it is willing to reform its system in the name of Westernstyle democracy and determine what role it will play in the international community. Will it embrace further political and economic integration, acting as a bridge between East and West, or adopt an insular "Sevres Syndrome" worldview in which "Turks have no friends but themselves"? 5 Turkey's political landscape and strategic worldview are shifting-either toward or away from greater political and economic liberalism, integration with the West, and nuclear nonproliferation. While a more politically and economically isolated Turkey would not inevitably pursue nuclear weapons, it would be dramatically more likely to do so. This chapter outlines a framework for understanding proliferation, applies it to forecasting Turkey's proliferation choices over the next ten years, and concludes with implications for U.S. policy. MODELING TURKEY'S PROLIFERATION CHOICES

Both capabilities and intent factor into whether a state successfully acquires nuclear weapons, but intent almost exclusively determines whether it will pursue them. Two questions aid in forecasting state intent: (1) Who could make a nuclear weapons decision? and (2) Under what circumstances would they be likely to do so? Answering "who" requires understanding a state's domestic political structure, while "under what circumstances" is rooted in the rich but unresolved theoretical debate over the question: "Why do states pursue nuclear weapons?" This chapter employs a proliferation causality model that emphasizes domestic politics and rejects the notion that structural variables alone explain the variance in states' proliferation choices. As such, it subscribes to Etel Solingen's

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

231

notion "that the domestic realm largely refracts, interprets and filters external stimuli."6 The model distinguishes among deep (or underlying), intermediate, and precipitating causes of proliferation. 7 The underlying cause of nuclear proliferation is the anarchic structure of the international system, which imposes survival dilemmas on all states. How states mitigate these dilemmas varies, however, as not all seek nuclear weapons. Intermediate causal variables-defined as the degree to which key domestic political actors are receptive to nuclear weapons as a solution to insecurity-help explain these contradictory choices. Actors' receptivity to nuclear weapons is predicated on their strategic worldview, or grand strategy, which leads them to interpret and respond to events-such as a neighbor's acquisition of nuclear weapons-in different ways. How influential actors define their state's "long-term best interests" 8 will have enormous implications for the threats they perceive, the solutions to those threats they consider viable, and whether they accept multilateralism as legitimate or desirable. Underlying and intermediate causes are necessary if a state is to pursue nuclear weapons but insufficient. As Joseph Nye observes, "Some say precipitating events are like buses-they come along every ten minutes .... [but]logs and kindling may sit for a long time and never be lit. Indeed, if it rains before somebody comes along with a match, they may not catch fire." 9 Similarly, while a state may possess the "logs and kindling" for a proliferation decision, a precipitating cause, or "match," will still be required. The chapter uses this model to determine Turkish propensity, a term used by Stephen Meyer to describe "the chance that a given country will come to be a proliferation problem." 10 TURKISH PROPENSITY TO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OF LATE 2009

Determining Turkish propensity requires knowing whether and to what degree intermediate causes exist. This section identifies Turkey's most influential security policy actors, outlines their interpretations of five proliferationrelevant variables, and concludes with an assessment of Turkish propensity as oflate 2009. Whose Grand Strategy? (Who Could Make a Proliferation Decision?)

Asking who in Turkey could make a proliferation decision assumes that a big decision must occur before a state develops nuclear weapons, a hypothesis

232

JESSICA C. VARNUM

some analysts dispute. While companion volume contributor Jacques Hymans maintains that somewhere along the path to nuclear weapons a top leader must make a "revolutionary decision," 11 for Muller and Schmidt it is not always possible or useful to attempt to pinpoint a nuclear weapons decision. They argue, "Political leaders may pursue an 'option' policy rather than a weapon policy." 12 Yet options-or hedging-strategies can take a state's nuclear program only so far. Hedging may facilitate a later political decision to acquire nuclear weapons, but it cannot supplant one. While moving from a complete nuclear fuel cycle to weapons may require minimal time, it would still require a major political decision by a state's top leadership. Who in Turkey could make a proliferation decision? Legally, a nuclear weapons program would require the acquiescence of Turkey's elected government -the prime minister, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), and the president, whose veto powers and formal role as commander in chief would afford him influence in any proliferation debate. Public opinion could also play a significant, though secondary, role in shaping the government's decision. In principle, no single person or institution in Turkey is empowered to make a proliferation decision-in practice, the military's opinion would most influence the outcome of any debate. If military support for nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for proliferation, could it also be sufficient? The Turkey of 2009 is not the Turkey of twenty or even ten years ago, when military coups were a routine form of political changeY It is a parliamentary democracy, and the military recognizes that its continued legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish people rests on its respect of basic democratic principles. Since 2002, the AKP has controlled the government under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Significant friction exists between the right-of-center AKP, often characterized by nonmembers as Islamist, and Turkey's traditional Kemalists, best institutionally represented in the military, judiciary, and other state organs. 14 While the debate over religion's role in society is part of the problem, Islam is to some degree a rhetorical scapegoat for other fundamental differencesthe AKP and its opponents have different worldviews, and correspondingly different priorities. For example, many in the military and security sector worry that the AKP is too soft on the security issues that matter most to them, from Kurdish terrorism to the future of Cyprus. 15 The closure case launched against the AKP by Turkey's Chief Prosecutor in 2008 was as much a reflection of these differing worldviews and the dysfunctional nature of Turkish

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

233

political parties as a battle between Islamists and secularists. 16 The fragmented nature of Turkey's opposition parties has resulted in a status quo in which the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and its unelected allies exercise a form of extraparliamentary opposition. Yet in the name ofEU membership, the TSK and its General Staff(the GK) have accepted monumental reforms. One of the most dramatic involved placing the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) under civilian leadership and diminishing its role to an advisory capacity from one in which the government had been required to give MGK decisions "priority consideration."17 Additionally, the government has gained significant fiscal oversight of military procurement. While states with covert nuclear weapons programs have commonly disguised their activities in parallel military programs, it is unlikely Turkey's military could undertake such a program without the knowledge and consent of the government. In addition to needing exorbitant funding, any military program would require cooperation from Turkish civilian entities with nuclear and other technical expertise. These are overwhelmingly controlled by the prime minister,18 who chairs the Science and Technology Supreme Board (BTYK), responsible for setting "national policy and priorities for science and technology," including the 2007-2015 National Nuclear Technology Development Programme, and whose office oversees the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). 19 If a nuclear weapons debate occurred openly, what role would nongovernmental actors play? Traditionally, the media, private sector, and general public have not enjoyed a significant role in national security decision making. The public forms perceptions of issues largely based on domestic media coverage, yet journalists exercise extreme caution in their reporting. This is unsurprising, given that the military and the government often exert extrademocratic pressure on political opponents, 20 manipulating antiquated provisions of Turkish law to support their behavior. The infamous Article 301, for example, makes denigrating the "Turkish Nation, Turkish Republic, Turkish Parliament, Turkish Government or the state judicial organs" a crime punishable by up to two years' imprisonment. 21 Pmar Tremblay argues, ''At this point [nuclear proliferation] is a non-issue for the public." 22 The media regularly report certain nuclear issues-namely the Iranian nuclear controversy, the occasional small public protest over U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, 23 and the debate over constructing nuclear power plants (which for the public is about safety, environmental, and "not in my

234

JESSICA C. VARNUM

backyard" concerns). However, whether Turkey should acquire nuclear weapons is a "nonissue." The context in which proliferation becomes an issue will structure any debate over nuclear weapons and its outcome. The Iran chapter suggests a possible parallel. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova argues that while proliferation was a "nonissue" for the Iranian public only eight years ago, the regime has since manipulated public opinion in favor of the nuclear program and used this support to bolster its popularity. 24 Although replication of the Iranian case in Turkey is highly unlikely, Iran's situation illustrates how a state's leadership can intentionally politicize debates over nuclear technology. Indeed, unless Turkey's government and military publicly disagree on the best course of action and battle over public support for their respective preferences, public opinion is more likely to be shaped by government and military positions on proliferation policy than to shape it. Ultimately, the relative influence of the military, the government, and the public in any nuclear debate would be context dependent. Does military (or government) interest in nuclear weapons arise in the current strategic environment or after a security crisis? Following a crisis, military preferences could be decisive. Even during the lowest points of its relationship with the military, the AKP has tended to follow its lead on issues of national security such as the fight against the PKK. As F. Stephen Larrabee argues, "The exacerbation of the external threat environment strengthens the role of the military and the willingness of the population to support the military." 25 However, the structural requirements-from funding to the expertise of various civilian institutions-make it unlikely, short of a military coup, that military support alone could ever be sufficient for a successful nuclear weapons program to materialize. Therefore, proliferation decision making in Turkey ought to be viewed as a consensual process-while not all players are equally influential, none can individually control outcomes. 26 Under What Circumstances? Proliferation Pressures and Constraints

Turkey's domestic receptivity to nuclear weapons will reflect the prevailing strategic worldview embraced by its leaders. During the Cold War, Turkish grand strategy was consistent. With both the end of the Soviet threat and the increased democratization of Turkish politics, internal conflicts over Turkey's appropriate role in the world emerged. The most policy relevant differences are those between mainstream AKP and mainstream military thought.

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

235

Rejecting Islamist labels, the AKP self-identifies as a party of"conservative democrats." 27 Its strategic worldview is firmly entrenched in the mutually reinforcing goals of economic development, soft power diplomacy, and Europeanization. Ahmet Davutoglu, elevated in 2009 from Prime Minister Erdogan's chief foreign policy advisor to Turkey's foreign minister, has shaped AKP foreign policy. Referred to by Mark Parris as "Turkey's Kissinger," Davutoglu is the father of the "strategic depth" doctrine and "zero problems with neighbors," which stress the need for Turkey to positively influence its region and diversify its relationships beyond exclusive reliance on the West. 28 The military's worldview is rigidly defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk's legacy, emphasizing secularism and national unity. While the AKP proclaims "zero problems with neighbors," the military approach is more skeptical and threat centric. Traditionally committed to strong relations with the United States and Europe as natural extensions of Atatiirk's belief in Westernization,29 an increasing minority of high-level officers are questioning Western alliances, advocating alternative strategic relationships with states such as Russia or adopting a more insular "Sevres Syndrome" mentality. What are the proliferation implications of these only partially compatible worldviews? This section outlines mainstream AKP and military perceptions of five proliferation-relevant variables, including: (1) the external threat environment; (2) the credibility of alliances; (3) the desirability ofEU membership; (4) the pursuit of prestige; and (5) the legitimacy of international regimes. Leaders' threat perceptions, not their state's objective security environment, determine policy. In the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, both the military and the AKP see the upsurge in PKK terrorism as the greatest security threat to Turkey, bordering on existential should an independent Kurdish state emerge out of the chaos in neighboring Iraq. In light of Turkey's advanced conventional capabilities and improved relations with Middle Eastern neighbors, the AKP does not perceive neighboring states as pressing threats. However, the military is ever aware of the missile and unconventional weapons capabilities of states such as Iran and Syria30 and disinclined to distinguish between capabilities and intentions (the latter of which can change without notice). Thus, while the perceived threat environment is currently a proliferation constraint for the AKP government, it is a slight pressure for the military-one traditionally countered by U.S. extended deterrence. {1) Turkey's External Threat Environment

236

JESSICA C. VARNUM

(2) Alliances Both the AKP and the military accept U.S./NATO security guarantees as integral to Turkish security. In a White Paper (2ooo), the Turkish Ministry of Defense listed "deterrence" and "collective security" as two of the four pillars of Turkey's national defense policies. 31 Even Foreign Minister Davutoglu, famous for advocating "strategic depth," has asserted, "Security means NATO for Turkey." 32 However, both the first Gulf War and the 2003 invasion oflraq precipitated serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the United States (whose overthrow of Saddam's regime created the lawless border pockets the PKK thrives on) and to a lesser degree NATO (which refused a Turkish request to invoke Article 4 prior to the Iraq War). 33 Turkish favorability toward the United States, assessed annually by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, has plummeted since 2003, nowhere approaching the 52 percent high it enjoyed in 1999-2000. In 2008, favorability increased to 12 percent from the 9 percent rock bottom it hit in 2007. 34 The same survey asked whether the United States is "a partner, an enemy, or neither," and in 2008 70 percent of Turkish respondents selected "enemy."35 While Turkey's civilian and military leaders rarely voice such extreme opinions, U.S.-Turkish relations have suffered at all levels. To the degree that the United States is perceived as untrustworthy in the context of Iraq and the fight against the PKK, its credibility as Turkey's security guarantor will also suffer. This is equally true of such seemingly petty bilateral conflicts as the regularly recurring debate over whether the U.S. Congress will pass an Armenian Genocide Resolution. Each time the resolution resurfaces on the American political scene, the Turkish public becomes enraged, and Turkish leaders are forced to distance themselves from the United States and to threaten a sharp curtailing of defense cooperation. 36 Thus while the NATO/U.S. security guarantee remains one of the most important proliferation constraints for Turkey, it is a constraint under serious pressure. How strongly negative Turkish perceptions of the United States were linked to specific policies of the George W. Bush administration remains to be seen. Certainly, the symbolism of President Obama's decision to make his second official state visit to Turkey in April 2009 was tremendously positive. Initial Turkish goodwill toward President Obama/7 however, will stand the test of time only if his administration follows through with concrete policies to improve bilateral relations.

Turkish EU membership is a major component of the AKP's platform. The military initially supported membership as well, despite (3) The European Union

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

237

the extensive civil-military reforms required by the acquis communautaire. While the EU finally opened accession negotiations in October 2005, the process is plagued by a series of never-ending obstacles. In addition to voicing legitimate concerns, such as the need for additional democratic reform to the Turkish system and resolution of the Cyprus dispute, several EU members have made plain their unwillingness to admit Turkey into the fold. Turkey's military, population, and to a lesser degree the AKP government have thus become markedly less enthusiastic about EU membership. Even so, the AKP has dedicated much of its time in government to this goal and would be reluctant to give up the possibility. Accession negotiations therefore remain an important proliferation constraint for the AKP, as "a nuclear Turkey would be suicidal to Turkey's EU membership bid." 38 (4) Prestige Many analysts have identified prestige as a key factor in states' proliferation decisions. Unfortunately, prestige is a vague phenomenon with conflicting definitions. This chapter highlights two closely related interpretations: personal prestige (the leader/coalition seeks to be more positively viewed by the citizenry than are rival domestic factions); and national prestige (the leader/coalition seeks to advance the status of the state in its region and the world). In either case, both objective conditions and leaders' worldviews will determine whether seeking prestige means pursuing nuclear weapons, adopting a middle ground position (for example, hedging), or working toward global disarmament. Although states universally seek to advance their status vis-a-vis the outside world, they do so in very different ways. What constitutes "national prestige" is far from universal, yet the literature almost always depicts states' desire to improve their status as a proliferation incentive. Richard Betts, for example, focuses on "regional hegemony-seekers," 39 but only some states perceive prestige and hegemony as synonymous. Canada and Sweden stake their prestige on the success of the multilateral initiatives they champion, such as land mine elimination. In the nuclear realm, Australia and (postapartheid) South Africa are well known not for breaking the rules but for working to strengthen them. Why does one leader decide that nuclear weapons will confer prestige on his or her state and him- or herself while another sees them as undermining both objectives? One possible answer lies in the literature linking nationalism and proliferation. Leaders seeking to advance their personal prestige are likely to succeed in doing so by capitalizing on public sentiment. Jacques Hymans argues that leaders' national identity conceptions (NICs) shape their

238

JESSICA C. VARNUM

perceptions of nuclear weapons and that "oppositional nationalists" who "see their nation as both naturally at odds with an external enemy, and as naturally its equal if not its superior" are more likely to make a nuclear weapons decision than are "sportsmanlike" nationalists. 40 Hymans applies his typology to individual leaders' NICs, but it seems equally applicable to differentiating nationalist movements. Leaders are products of the societies in which they are raised, and while Hymans rightly observes that in rare cases they may be "less an NIC consumer than an NIC producer," he agrees that "most often, the leader will simply have chosen from among the mainstream conceptions available in society."41 While an untested proposition, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that democratic societies such as Turkey will elect leaders whose NICs are compatible with those of a large percentage of the population. Nationalism predicated on pride in Turkish citizenship is a sine qua non of Turkish politics, but such mainstream Turkish nationalism is more "sportsmanlike" than "oppositional" in character. Fringe exceptions to this norm such as theN ationalist Movement Party (MHP) regularly make headlines but are comparatively small in numbers. The possibility for their future growth and its impact on proliferation is discussed later in the chapter. Solingen's "domestic political survival" model is fundamentally an argument about personal prestige because ruling coalitions decide whether to pursue nuclear weapons based on how it will affect their political continuity. Solingen argues that leaders of internationalizing domestic coalitions "have incentives to avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons."42 Solingen's linkage of proliferation tendencies with inward-oriented regimes is unsurprising not only from a politicaleconomy standpoint but also because such regimes typically embrace the kind of "oppositional nationalism" that bathes nuclear weapons acquisition in a positive light. One need only look to the Indian (1974) and Iranian examples for proof of the rally-around-the-flag effects of a nuclear program in societies both fiercely proud of themselves and starkly at odds with the rest of the world. Yet neither the AKP nor Turkey's military favor inward-oriented political survival models. The AKP's platform has embraced economic and political liberalization. With minor differences, mostly over reforms pertaining to religion and ethnic minority rights, the military also supports an internationalizing model. Both face strong material disincentives to pursue nuclear weapons because their prosperity depends on Turkey's continued "good citizen" status.

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

239

Proliferation would also undermine the AKP's vision for Turkey to become a widely respected regional leader-a different form of prestige than hegemony. In Davutoglu's words, "Turkey's aim is to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms."43 Erdogan's government has pursued this vision by dramatically increasing Turkey's diplomatic activism on the world stage, an approach exemplified by Turkish facilitation of IsraeliSyrian peace negotiations and the $50 million44 Turkish campaign to (successfully) secure a two-year nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security Council beginning in 2009. Rather than launching a Saddam Hussein-style bid for regional dominance, Turkey is therefore likely to continue to pursue prestige multilaterally, constraining it from pursuing nuclear weapons. Turkish decision makers' perceptions of the legitimacy and utility of international regimes may act as either a proliferation pressure or constraint. Turkey is an active participant in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and subscribes to the NPT, the IAEA Additional Protocol, and numerous other formal and informal agreements. Its leaders have consistently advocated working through the regime to address challenges such as Iran's nuclear program. There are two reasons to believe that international regimes will continue to constrain both Turkey's government and its military from pursuing nuclear weapons. First, although any state can rhetorically support the regime while covertly planning to break out, doing so would be inconsistent with Turkey's political culture. Of Turkey's commitment to upholding the international agreements it has signed, Ian Lesser argues: "Their political culture is legalistic. In the spectrum of countries who take this stuff seriously versus countries who are not sure of the legitimacy of the regime to begin with, the Turks are in the adherence camp."45 More fundamentally, as discussed earlier, the AKP and the military have committed to an internationalizing political survival model that incentivizes adherence to the nonproliferation regime. (5) International Regimes

Conclusions on Turkish Propensity as of Late 2009

The AKP faces no serious proliferation pressures at this time-given its good relations with neighboring states, belief in alliances with the West and international regimes, desire for EU membership, and preference for obtaining international prestige through diplomatic leadership. Because of its differing strategic worldview and mission, the military faces greater proliferation pressures than does the government. While it has supported the goal of EU

240

JESSICA C. VARNUM

integration and proclaims a commitment to the nonproliferation regime, there are narrowly defined limits to this support. Moreover, the greatest proliferation constraint for the military has always been its robust security ties with the West. Eroding U.S. credibility is therefore a possible proliferation pressure for military strategic planners. Turkey's proliferation propensity as oflate 2009 is low to moderate. However, most of the proliferation constraints faced by its leadership are in decline and could erode simultaneously in the wake of a crisis. The next section considers how events might alter Turkish propensity between 2009 and 2019. COULD EVENTS TRIGGER A NUCLEAR TURKEY?

As proliferation constraints decrease and pressures increase, so does Turkey's propensity to pursue nuclear weapons. Yet there is a difference between the effects oflong-term trends, such as slowly eroding alliances, and sudden shocks. Could a single event catalyze Turkey into making a proliferation decision? Trigger events can act as intermediate causes, dramatically increasing propensity by altering existing decision makers' receptivity to nuclear weapons or placing new decision makers with different views in power. Alternatively, if propensity is sufficiently high, a trigger event could precipitate proliferation. While determining the exact threshold between the two levels of causes is impossible-and would vary-individual events are highly unlikely to provoke a state to pursue nuclear weapons unless some groundwork for a proliferation decision already exists. Building on Nye's analogy, 46 consider what would happen if you attempted to light a fire using only a match and logs-without kindling, the match would almost certainly burn out before a proper fire started. Figure 10.1 depicts the probability/expected impact of seven trigger events with the potential to increase Turkish propensity or precipitate a proliferation decision. While based on a qualitative assessment, the graph offers a snapshot of comparative risk. All of the events are of moderate to high consequence. Those with a low probability are worth consideration but are assigned less forecasting weight. (1) Another State Acquires Nuclear Weapons Another state's acquisition of nuclear weapons would pose two different kinds of dilemmas to Turkish policy makers. First, if the state were in Turkey's region, it might directly threaten Turkey or its interests. Second, an additional state's breakout from the nuclear nonproliferation regime could severely diminish its legitimacy. Iran, as the highest probability candidate for breakout, is the example considered here.

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

241

High

--..

.... 'I'

-

A

Low Low

High

Expected impact on propensity

+

f1

e

0 Figure 10.1.

New nuclear state Leadership change Preemptive strike on Iran U.S. security guarantees

• •

D

EU rejection Nonnuclear shock Vertical proliferation

Comparison of trigger events.

Both the AKP and the military have cultivated good relations with Iran in recent years-the AKP through economic development and soft power initiatives and the military through cooperation against Kurdish terrorism. 47 Few fear that Turkey would be a target of Iranian nuclear weapons, but many view a nuclear Iran as harmful to Turkey's strategic interests. Commonly voiced concerns center around the disruptive impact on the region-including possible reactive proliferation-and the creation of a balance of power problem between Iran and Turkey. As Hakkl Uygur, a fellow at the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research in Ankara, argues, "Turkish concerns center around the possible change of military balances in the region."48 Additionally, while Turkish decision makers are dedicated to upholding their international commitments, they also strongly believe in the concept of reciprocity. 49 Were other states to break out of the NPT with impunity, Turkey might reconsider its membership. As Mustafa Kibaroglu argues, some in Turkey already believe that "no international treaty should constrain Turkey anymore if Iran follows the example after North Korea in evading its obligations under the NPT by simply walking out with a unilateral declaration."50 The impact an additional nuclear weapon state would have on Turkey's nuclear

242

JESSICA C. VARNUM

propensity will vary depending on a number of considerations. If other proliferation constraints also eroded considerably (for example, American security guarantees), this would amplify the negative effects. However, it would be shortsighted to assume that proliferation will beget either proliferation or some other form of Turkish brinksmanship. Turkey's approach to the Iranian issue thus far, including offers to mediate the crisis, suggests that it might-at least initially-prefer diplomacy to participation in a regional arms race. 5 1 Any event that shook Turkish confidence in U.S. security guarantees could impose serious proliferation pressures on Turkey's leaders. One possibility would be U.S. removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey, which are a symbolically-though not militarily-critical component of the bilateral relationship. According to U.S. analyst Hans Kristensen, while the United States consolidated the roughly ninety nuclear weapons at the incirlik location in 1995, the forty previously stationed at Aktncr and Bahkesir air bases "continue to be earmarked for 'host nation use' and delivery by the national air forces." 52 While public awareness of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey has historically been low, top leaders have traditionally considered them to be tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to Turkey's defense. In the context of dramatically deteriorating relations, Turkish officials could therefore interpret withdrawal of the weapons as the end of extended deterrence, whether or not that was the U.S. intention. Kibaroglu extensively discusses Turkish elite's attachment to these weapons, observing that "the official view is diametrically opposed to their withdrawal." 53 He recounts a 1997 interview in which Orner Ersun, then Turkish Ambassador to Ottawa, asserted: "NATO without the US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey would mean nothing to the Turks."54 Despite recent bilateral difficulties, the destruction of the alliance in the wake of a single event is improbable. However, the possibility for alliance rupture is important to consider because it would likely have a higher impact on Turkey's proliferation propensity than any other event-including a nuclear Iran. (2) Perceived Abrogation of U.S. Security Guarantees

The effects of a conventional preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities on Turkish nonproliferation policy are unclear and would be highly context dependent. Turkey's public is adamantly opposed to a preemptive strike against Iran, making it unlikely Ankara would assist either the United States or Israel in an operation against Iran. Even if it failed to support the strikes, Turkey would be caught between Iran and the United States/Israel and might fear that (3) Conventional Preemptive Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

243

as a U.S. ally it could become a target oflranian nuclear weapons. It would be forced either to rely on American protection or to distance itself politically and militarily from the United States, NATO, and Israel. Especially if Turkey chose the latter option, it might consider a nuclear weapons program of its own. Ian Lesser's observation is therefore quite apt: "The real source of nuclear risk to Turkey flows from the strategic decisions of others-the United States and Israel-regarding Iran." 55 (4) Vertical Proliferation/Major New Nuclear Weapons Deployments by Nuclear Weapon States The only nuclear weapons state (NWS) that has ever been on adversarial terms with Turkey (while possessing nuclear weapons) is Russia. Turkey might disapprove of vertical proliferation by other NWSs, but would likely only interpret a Russian build-up as a proliferation pressure. Hostilities between various iterations of Russia/the USSR and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey were a fact of the international system for centuries. Duygu Sezer wrote in 1995, "The majority view within the political elite sees Russia as inherently driven toward empire, and to warm-water ports." 56 In the wake of Vladimir Putin's presidency, such suspicions likely remain fresh in the minds of Turkish elites. Under Putin, Russia disavowed such critical elements of its rapprochement with the West as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It has taken a renewed interest in Central Asia and the Caucasus, exemplified by the 2008 conflict in Georgia, which placed Turkey in the unenviable position of choosing between the proverbial frying pan (the United States) and fire (Russia). Any new nuclear weapons deployments in areas Turkey considers its neighborhood would greatly concern Turkish leaders. However, Turkey faces strong incentives to maintain positive bilateral relations with Russia. Russia is Turkey's largest trading partner-including as exporter of 40 percent of Turkey's total "mineral oil and fuel imports." 57 Tellingly, Prime Minister Erdogan indicated during the Caucasus crisis,

Certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner either with the United States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey's national interests require. 58 Ultimately, were bilateral relations sufficiently adversarial as to trump economic interests, Turkey's safest response would be to rely on NATO extended deterrence.

244

JESSICA C. VARNUM

Any event that dramatically worsens Turkey's regional security environment could increase its proliferation incentives. There is not a sense among AKP or military elites that any particular country would have reason to attack Turkey. However, regime changes in neighboring states could alter this assessment. From the military's perspective, one nightmare scenario would involve the assumption of power in a neighboring Sunni state of radical Islamists. Another security shock that the Turkish military would view as an existential threat to Turkey would be the establishment of an independent (and bordering) Kurdish state. As exemplified by the Georgia crisis, Turkey will face many nonnuclear shocks over the next ten years. Such events are only moderately likely to increase proliferation propensity because Turkey possesses highly advanced conventional capabilities, which are far superior to those of most of its potential adversaries. (5) Nonnuclear Regional Security Shock

A significant change in Turkey's leadership could alter its proliferation calculus. One possibility is the assumption of power by one or more individuals either explicitly favoring nuclear weapons or ideologically inclined to pursue them. It is unclear what effect, if any, the election of a prime minister favoring nuclear weapons would have on Turkish policy. Given the constraints imposed by Turkish democracy, it is unlikely that a Hymans-style "oppositional nationalist" would possess sufficient personal authority to make a proliferation decision without broad support from his or her governing party, the president, and the military. But what about the ascent to power of an entire party likely to favor nuclear weapons? Recalling Solingen's model, one would expect such a party to be politically and economically "inward oriented." Such parties do not enjoy mainstream support in Turkey. The ultranationalist and xenophobic MHP is anti-American and anti-EU and favors statist economic policies. Its members rarely talk about nuclear weapons but would be ideologically inclined to favor proliferation. A 2000 statement by MHP Transport Minister Enis Oksiiz provides anecdotal support for this assumption. Oksiiz asserted of nuclear weapons, "Turkey's possession of such a bomb would provide a measure of security. It would deter our enemies from taunting us." 59 The MHP reentered parliament in the 2007 elections with 14 percent of the vote, but much additional support in future elections is unlikely given the party's extremism on an array of issues. (6) Leadership Change

TURKEY IN TRANSITION

245

One cannot discount the possibility that dramatic leadership changes could catalyze a Turkish proliferation decision, but election of an "oppositional nationalist" or "inward-oriented" government is extremely improbable in the near future. The AKP has justified countless painful political and economic reforms in the name of EU membership. For as long as Turkey's leaders believe that membership is possible and desirable, they will be constrained from pursuing nuclear weapons. As ~ebnem Udum argues, Turkey's "EU prospects keep the country in cooperative mechanisms to address security issues."60 Especially for the skeptics, a decision by Turkey to break out of the nonproliferation regime would provide indelible evidence that Turkey did not belong in the European Union. While EU refusal of membership would not propel Turkey into a nuclear decision, it would remove a key proliferation constraint. (7) EU Refusal of Full and Equal Membership

HOW MUCH TIME WOULD TURKEY NEED TO PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

Lag time is defined by Stephen Meyer as "the amount of time a given country requires after the proliferation decision to produce its first nuclear weapon"61 and also represents the time available to policy makers to reverse a state's proliferation decision. However, Meyer's definition requires pinpointing a leadership decision to pursue nuclear weapons, which may not always precede a weapons program. It also assumes that lag time is quantifiable in absolute terms, when at best it is a bounded estimate. Defining lag time in minimum, median, and maximum terms may therefore provide more policy utility. 62 While the minimum or "crash" scenario assumes a weapons decision, the median and maximum scenarios could take into account the time a state requires to build a weapons option through an initially ambiguous program. Determining where Turkey fits into these scenarios requires understanding its current infrastructure. Turkey is neither a state with ready access to enriched uranium and separated plutonium nor one with the large-scale reactors required for efficient plutonium production. Despite these disadvantages, Turkey has a strong background in basic nuclear research and applications. Investments in nuclear infrastructure date to the 1956 establishment of the TAEK. Turkey possesses two small research reactors, the TR-2 s-MWt reactor at the

453

349; "Isotopes and Identity," 426nn4,10; on management of nuclear programs, 247; on national identity conceptions (NICs), 8-9, 82, 119-21, 125, 159, 172, 182-83,237-38,279-80,299.303,317-18, 339-40; on NPT, 438n8; on oppositional nationalists, 8-9, 20, 82, 119-21, 159, 175,186-87,192-93,200,225,237-38, 244,245,299-300,317-18,339-40;on oppositional subalterns, 120-21, 186-87, 387n97; on sportsmanlike nationalists, 193, 238, 299, 318, 340; 1he Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 6, 8-9, 82, 159,160,176-77, 199,299,362n26, 369n28,387n97.393ns6,403n2,405n19, 438nn7,8, 439n15 IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency Ikeda, Hayato, 137 Ilias, Shayerah, 369n38, 372n88 Imai, Ryukichi, 138, 147, 395n88 India: civilian nuclear program of, 293; economic conditions in, 148; and NPT, 430n45; nuclear test of 1974, 184, 209, 212,216,219,238,291,311,428n29; nuclear test of 1998, 4, 21, 148, 285, 298; nuclear weapons program of, 4, 30, 61, 94, 146,148,184,209,216,219, 2}8,285,289, 291, 298, 311, 323, 333, 364n42; prestige/ status motivations in, 61, 238; relations with IAEA, 293, 311; relations with Iran, 43; relations with Pakistan, 26, 94-95; relations with South Africa, 333; relations with United Nations, 323; relations with United States, 4, 147, 289, 293 Indonesia and Australia, 287, 294 Inoguchi, Takashi, 155, 395n83, 398n135;

Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change,389n4,394n72 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 266 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Additional Protocol (AP), 34, 35, 37, 44, 45. 147. 163, 164, 174. 197. 198, 239. 247> 251, 315, 316, 325, 351; relations with Egypt, 14, 15-16, 21, 28, 34-35, 37, 36on6; relations with India, 293, 311; relations with Iran, 43-44, 45-46, 48, 54, 57, 58, 65, 66, 71, 72, 325, 346, 367mo; relations with Japan, 156; relations with North Korea, 143; relations with Saudi Arabia, 76, 87, 95; relations with Serbia, 221, 227; relations with South Africa, 302, 311,

454

INDEX

(IAEA) (Continued) 313,315,316,319-20,328,329,433n2s, 437n86; relations with South Korea, 160, 162, 163-64, 173, 174; relations with Syria, 101, 114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 127, 128, 386n81, 387n88; relations with Taiwan, 197, 198, 200, 202; relations with Turkey, 239, 247, 248, 249, 251; relations with Ukraine, 257; significant quantity as defined by, 258; Technical Cooperation program, 14, 28. See also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 225 International Energy Information Administration, 97 international law, 127, 262 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 321, 323 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle (INFCE) discussions, 293, 294 Iran: Ahmadinejad, 44, 53, 6o, 62, 65-67, 69-70, 373n94; Atomic Energy Organization oflran (AEOI), 63, 65; Basij, 69; chemical weapons of, 122; conventional forces of, so, 56, 86; economic conditions in, 63, 65-66, 72, 373n94; enrichment in, 43-44.45.46,48,s6,6o,6s,66-67,70, 71-72, 75; and Framework for a LongTerm Agreement, 44-45; incentives for proliferation, 42, 43, 47-57, 59, 67-69, 71, 74, 75; Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Pasdaran, 52, 55-56, 64-65, 69; Khamenei, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69-70, 71, 373n102; Khatami, 54, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69; Khomeini, 43, 56-57, 59-60, 83, 85; nationalism in, 59-62; and neoliberal institutionalism, 57-59, 67, 73, 84; and neorealism, 42, 47, 48, so, 54, 55, 56-57, 59, 67-69, 74, 339, 342; and NPT, 4, 34, 35,44-45, s7-s8,66,72, 124-25,146, 147, 148,241-42,325-26,344-45;and nuclear fuel cycle, 42, 43-44, 61, 63, 66-67, 68, 71-72, 75, 87, 259; nuclear program of, 13, 14, 17, 23-24, 25, 42-47, 48,so-st,s4.s6-shs8,6o-62,63-64, 6s, 66-69, 70-75, 76, 84-Ss, 87, 98, 99, 122,124-25,126,127,146,226,234,238, 240-41,242-43,248,253,259,261,323, 325-26,342,343.344-46,350,351-52, 367nn2,10, 372n82, 387n100, 420n79; nuclear reactors in, 43-44, 45-46, 48, 57, 58, 65; ongoing trends regarding,

42, 67-72; Paris Agreement of 2004, 44; political conditions in, 31, 42-43, 44, s6, 57, s9-67,69-72,74-75,234,339. 345> 352, 372nn82,85, 373nnl01,102; presidential elections of 2009, 52, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69-70, 71, 75> 373nn101,102; prestige/status motivations in, 59-62, 75, 238, 343; and proliferation chains, 42,72-74.75>76,77,84,326,344-45> 350; propensity to proliferate, 42-43, 52, 67-72, 75; public opinion polls in, 61; Rafsanjani, 55, 62, 63, 65, 70, 372n82, 373n95; relations with Afghanistan, 54; relations with Arab Gulf States, 47, so, 73, 75, 124-25; relations with Argentina, 43, s8; relations with China, 43, 44, 48, 58, 6o; relations with Egypt, 13, 14, lh 18, 19-20,23,25,26,27,47>49> so,s6,72,7S,84,344.345.3so,36on2, 362024, 369n34; relations with EU, 44-45, 54; relations with France, 43, 44, 46; relations with Germany, 44, 352; relations with IAEA, 43-44, 45-46, 48, s4.5hs8,6s,66,71,72,325,346,367nto; relations with India, 43; relations with Iraq,47,48-49.53, s6,s7,6t,64,85, 86-87, 91, 93, 96, 98, 108; relations with Israel, 23, 24, 47, 52-53, 55, 56, 67, 72, 75,82,98,12h242-43,345-46,370nS6, 388n no; relations with NAM, so, 58, 6o; relations with North Korea, 108, 381n6, 383n28; relations with Pakistan, 47, 51-52, s6; relations with Russia, 47, 58, 6o, 66; relations with Saudi Arabia, 44,4h49, so,s6,72-73.76,7h78-79, 82,84-87,88,89,91,93,99.344.347-48, 350; relations with South Africa, 43, 325-26, 333; relations with Syria, 105, 107-8,109,118,124,344,381n6,383n28, 387n94; relations with Turkey, 47, 71, 72, 73-74, 84, 229, 230, 235, 240-41, 242-43> 246, 248, 250, 253, 420n79; relations with Ukraine, 280; relations with United Kingdom, 44, 46; relations with United Nations, 44, 45, 46, so, 57, 58, 65, 72, 323, 325, 367mo, 368m8; relations with United States, 17, 38, 43, 45, 46, 47, so, s3-s8,6o,67-68,7o,71,72,73,74-7s, 82,86, 108,127,242-43,248,253,259, 345-46, 351-52; relations with West Germany, 43, 58; Revolution of 1979, 43, 49, 52, 53, 56-57, 61, So, 85; sanctions against, 42, 46, 6o, 65-66, 72, 86, 98,

INDEX 455

261, 325; security concerns of, 47-57, 59,67-69,71,84-89,339.342;Shah of, 43, 49, 52, 57, Ss; Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), 58, 66; Tehran Statement of 2003, 44; trigger events regarding,42,43.71,75,87,345-46 Iran-Iraq War: Iran during, 49, so, 61, 64, 85-86, 98; Saudi Arabia during, 85-86, 89, 91, 93, 96; Syria during, 108, 387n94 Iraq: Ba'ath party, 85, 89, 387n94; chemical weapons of, 26, 48, 115, 122; Gulf War of199I,I8,48,6o,82,83,86,89,90, 106, 10h 108,113, 115,236,285;Saddam Hussein, 18, 26, 32, 48, 68, 86, 88, 108, 247; invaded by United States, 48, 54, 55, 68, 77. 86-87, 91, 236, 430n52; Kurds in, 235, 236, 244, 253; nuclear weapons program of, 18, 89, 100, 122, 126, 247, 261, 285, 438mo; Osiraq reactor destroyed by Israel, 100, 126; political conditions in, 48, 83; relations with Egypt, 17, 18, 26, 88; relations with Iran, 47, 48-49, 53.56,sh61,64,85,86-87.91,93·96, 98, 108; relations with Israel, 100, 106, 126; relations with Saudi Arabia, 77, 82, 83, 85, 86-87, 88, 89, 95; relations with Soviet Union, 438mo; relations with Syria, 103, 107, 108, 113, 115, 125, 387n94; relations with Turkey, 235; relations with United Nations, 48, 86, 108; relations with United States, 17, 48, 53, 54, 55, 68, 7h86-8h90,91, 106,107,115,236 Ireland and New Agenda Coalition, 435n5o Ishiba, Shigeru, 151 Islam: the Hajj, 85-86, 93; holy sites of, 87-88, 90; and nuclear weapons, 61, 95; Shari'a law, So, 83; Shi'a, 48, 49, 51, 59, 6o, 77, 79, So, 83, Ss-86, 87, 387n94; Sunnis, 47, 49, 51,52,73.7h79.83,85-86,1o3,244 Israel: incursion into Lebanon of 1982, 107; missiles of, 91; Netanyahu, 108, 123; nuclear weapons program of, 13, 18, 23,25,26,28,31.34-36, 38, 52·53.78, 94-95.98,118,289.313,351,438niO; relations with Egypt, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 34-36, 38, 40, 49. 83, 88, 350, 351, 361llll19,21; relations with France, 32; relations with Iran,23,24,47.52-S3.SS.56,67,72, 75,82,98, 127,242-43.345-46,370n56, 388nno; relations with Iraq, 100, 106, 126; relations with Saudi Arabia, 78-79, 82, 84, 87-88, 350; relations with South

Africa, 434n42; relations with Syria, 100, 102-3,104, 10h 108-9,114-15,116,118, 119-20,123-24,125,127-28,239.346. 38m4, 382mo, 388n11o; relations with Taiwan, 185; relations with Turkey, 107, 108, 115, 242-43; relations with United States, 38, 39, 52, 53, 55, 90, 91, 92, 104, 289, 438mo; security concerns of, 313; Six Day War, 20, 83, 88 Italy and United States, 296 Ivanovic, Dragisa, 412n57 Ivzhenko, Tatyana, 425n39 Izumi, Hajime, 145, 155-56, 392n37, 394n75, 398ll140 Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, 401n37 Jain, Purnendra, 427m9 Jalili, Saeed, 66 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 5, 409n6s Japan: Abe, 149, 150, 151, 152-53, 154, 170, 397n124; Aso, 150, 153, 154, 170; Atomic Energy Commission, 140, 150; Atomic Energy Law, 138, 139; Atomic Industrial Forum, 138, 140; Cabinet Information Research Office study of 1968-70, 132, 133, 141-42; civilian nuclear program of, 137-38, 149, 156, 164, 178, 179-80, 349, 389n5, 427n15; Constitution, 139, 141, 149, 150, 152; conventional forces of, 427n15; Democratic Party of (DPJ), 149, 151, 154-55; disincentives for proliferation, 132, 133, 134-35, 137-42, 144-45, 148, 150-51, 152, 18o-81, 346-47; economic conditions in, 136-39, 140-41, 142, 144-45, 150-51, 152, 153,156,290,389n4,398ni42; Four Nuclear Policies, 132; Fukuda, 150-51, 153, 154; Hiroshima/Nagasaki, 131, 139; Hosokawa, 136; Ikeda, 137; incentives for proliferation, 131, 133; Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 132, 134,144-45,150, 151,152,154,392TI37; Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), 138, 141, 154; Kishi, 133; Koizumi, 150, 152, 397m24; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 137, 138, 140, 141,149.150,152,154,155. 170.399n142; Miki, 140; Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), 144-45; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 138, 140, 144-45; Mitsuya Kenkyu liken simulation exercise, 139; Nakasone, 140, 153, 289;

456

INDEX

Japan (Continued) and neorealism, 132-36, 142-46, 153, 339; nonproliferation norms in, 131-32, 135> 136, 139-40, 141, 142, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 326, 345· 350, 389n2, 392n51, 438n9; and NPT, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139> 140,146-48, 151,291,345>438n9; nuclear latency of, 178, 248, 349, 350, 389n5, 397n128; and Okinawa, 142; political conditions in, 135, 136-39, 141-42,144, 14h 148, 149-57,268,339> 398m42; propensity to proliferate, 131, 155-57, 342, 350, 437m; public opinion polls in, 134-35, 139, 145, 151-52, 154; relations with Australia, 138, 288-90, 291, 348, 350, 427nU14,18,2o; relations with Canada, 138; relations with China, 131, 134, 141, 143> 144· 146, 149> 152, 153> 154, 156, 289, 300, 398n128; relations with France, 138; relations with IAEA, 156; relations with North Korea, 124, 131, 134, 143-44> 148, 150, 151, 152, 153> 155-56, 158, 170, 171,248,381n7,395n83,398n128; relations with Russia, 143; relations with Saudi Arabia, 97; relations with South Korea, 143, 145, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 169-71,178-79> 180-81,289,348-49> 398n128; relations with Soviet Union, 131, 144; relations with Taiwan, 143, 289, 348; relations with United Kingdom, 138; relations with United Nations, 139, 148; relations with United States, 131-32, 133-36, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143> 144> 145> 148, 150, 151, 153, 154> 155> 156, 158,171-72, 180,289,296,29h300, 346-47, 389m, 391lln27,29, 394nn65,75, 395n83, 397U127, 398n128, 427nm8,2o, 428ms; Sanken (Industrial Problems Study Council), 138; Sato, 131-32, 135, 141-42, 393nn62,63, 394nn64,68; security concerns of, 131, 132-36, 141, 143-56, 171, 339, 346-47, 348-49; security guarantee from United States, 131-36, 137> 139, 141, 144, 148, 150, 151, 153-54, 158, 171, 346-47, 394n65; Tanaka, 141; Three Non-Nuclear Principles (TNNP), 131-32, 135, 139, 140,141,142,150,151,153, 154,389n2; trigger events regarding, 142-56, 179, 346-47; Yoshida doctrine, 132, 136-41, 146,151-52,153-54,389n4 Jardine, Roger, 433n26

Jenkins, Gareth, 417n21, 418nn36.44, 426m2 Jervis, Robert, l15, 146; System Effects, 390lll0 Jewett, Pamela, 260 Johnson, Chalmers: Blowback, 431n7o Johnson, Lyndon, 141, 394n65 Johnson, Rebecca, 366ns8 ]oint Vision 2010/]oint Vision 2020, 296 Juliot-Curie, Irene, 217 Jun Bong-geun, 403n63 Jundullah, 52 Kagan, Robert, 55; The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 432n71 Kahn, Herman: on proliferation chains, 3, 352-53; Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 352-53 Kalyoncu, Mehmet, 420n79 Kamiya, Matake, 389n3, 396nno Kang, Jungmin, 401n25 Kan, Shirley, 405n25 Kardas, Saban, 418n36, 420n71 Kardelj, Edvard, 208, 214, 216, 217 Karem, Mahmoud: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, 365n46 Karroubi, Mehdi, 70 Karzai, Hamid, 54 Kase, Yuri, 149, 389n3 Kaskiv, Vladislav, 269 Kastner, Scott L.: Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, 407n54 Katzenstein, Peter J.: Cultural Norms and National Security, 392n51; japan's National Security, 393n51 Katz, Yaakov, 375n11 Kaye, Dalia Dassa, 378n61 Kazakhstan: nuclear weapons possessed by, 248, 265, 303, 424m8; relations with Russia, 255, 424n28; as virtual nuclear state, 256 Keating, Paul, 297, 429n4o Kechichian, Joseph A, 376n38; Succession in Saudi Arabia, 376n31 Keddie, Nikki R., 372n85 Keinon, Herb, 375n11 Kemburi, Kalyan, 408n55, 408n57 Kennedy, Paul: on grand strategy, 416n8 Keohane, Robert 0.: After Hegemony, 358nn Kerr, Joseph, 429nn39.41.42 Kerr, Paul, 409n74 Khaitous, Tariq, 377n59

INDEX

Khalaf, Roula, 360n4 Khamenei, Ali, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69-70, 71,373lll02 Khan, A. Q., 93, 217; nuclear network of, 26, 32,44,48, 58, 126-27,248,388n109 Khatami, Mohammad, 54, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69 Khilawi, Muhammad, 77, 93 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 43, 56-57, 59-60, 83, 85,89 Khong, Yuen Foong: Analogies at War, 420n83 Khrushchev, Nikita, 306 Kibaraglu, Mustafa, 241, 242, 419n63 Kidd, Joanna, 360n2 Kim Dae-jung, 145, 166, 168 Kim Il-sung, no Kim Seung-young, 176, 399mo, 400m2 Kim, Tae-hyung, 175, 403n61; South Korea in Peril, 402n 5o Kishida, Junnosuke, 133, 140-41 Kishi, Nobusuke, 133, 149, 153, 390m2 Kissinger, Henry, 135, 298 Kitamura, Motoya, 391ll27 Kitaoka, Shinichi, 156 Kjeller Institute, 207, 208, 219 Klare, Michael, 300; Blood and Oil, 378n66 Kohen, Amit, 379nn84,85 Koizumi Junichiro, 150, 152, 397m24 Kono, Fumihiko, 138 Kono, Taro, 150 Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), 166 Korea Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA), 170

Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP), 148, 164 Korysheva, Alena, 422m1 Kosaka, Masataka, 133, 392n36; A History of Postwar Japan, 389n4, 392n33, 393n57 Ko Shu-ling, 406n33, 407n44 Kosovo,221-22,22J,268,269-70,414n91 Kostenko, Yuri, 269, 270 Kostunica, Vojislav, 226 Kramer, Kimberly, 408n64 Krauss, Ellis, 152 Kravchuk,Leonid,261-62,267,275,279 Kristensen, Hans, 242 Kruse, Karl, 395n79 Kruselj, Zeljko, 411m8 Kuchma, Leonid, 261, 262, 267, 268, 275-76, 277, 279-80 Kugler, Richard L., 430nn51,54

457

Kumao, Kaneko, 134 Kurosawa, Mitusuru, 389n3 Kushner, David, 107 Kusuda Minoru, 391m9, 394n7o Kuwait, 18, 73, So, 82, 83, 86, 89, 90 lag time, 6, 341-42; Meyer on, 6, 245, 303, 327; for South Africa, 303,327-31, 332; for Turkey, 246-48 Laipson, Ellen, 384n36 Landis, Joshua, 382m3 Landler, Mark, 368n21, 407n52 Lange, Peter, 423n24 Lantis, Jeffrey, 426n5, 429nn32,37 Lardner, Mark, 388n105 Larijani, Ali, 66, 373mo2 Larijani, Sadeq, 373n102 Larrabee, F. Stephen, 234, 276 Lausanne, Treaty of 1923, 415n5 Lavoy, Peter, 32-33, 61, 225, 359n15, 361n17, 363n28, 437nn98,1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: US Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century, 296-97 Lazanski, Miroslav, 226, 415n96 Leape,Jonathan,435n61,437n97 Lebanon and Syria, 111, 124, 125 Lee Hoi-chang, 170 Lee Myung-bak, 158, 167, 168, 173, 174, 177 Lee Teng-hui, 185, 189 Lee, Wei-Chin, 405n25 Legrenzi, Matteo, 362n2o Legro, Jeffrey W., 394n74 Le Jye, 189-90 Lenin, V. I., 305 LePere, Garth, 435n66 Lesch, David, ll2, 113, 386nn70,72 Lesser, Ian, 239, 243, 416n16, 418n45 Leverett, Flynt, 108, 112, 383nn23,25,29,31,32, 384n49, 385nnsz,s3,55,6s,67, 386nn71,77-79, 387n94 Levi, Michael, 84 Levite, Ariel E., 362m9 Lewis, Steve, 429n39 Liberman, Peter, 309 Libya: chemical weapons of, 122; nuclear weapons program of, 18, 26, 72, 91, 126, 247,367n6o,387n1o0,388nl09,438n1o; relations with Egypt, 18, 26, 37, 367n6o; relations with South Africa, 333 likelihood of proliferation. See propensity to proliferate

458

INDEX

Lim, Robyn, 431n61 Lippman, Thomas, 81-82, 86, 97, 376n26, 378nn67>78 Litvin, Vladimir, 268 Litwak, RobertS., 369n27 Long, David E., 377n51 Long, William, 359m3; on NPT regime, 358m2; on self-identification of elites, 262-63,271,275,279,280-81 low-enriched uranium (LEU), 45, 46, 66-67, 185,198,259,288, 292,293,294,32~328 Lukic, Vojin, 214 Lyman, Edwin, 401nn27,28,30 Lyon,Rod,295,426n3 MacAskill, Ewen, 366nss, 375n3 MacLachlan, Ann, 432m, 436n81, 437nn86,92 Madson, Peter, 362n25 Mahfoud, Nawara, 388mo8 Mamula,Branko,209,220 Mandela, Nelson, 314, 315, 318, 435n58 Mangena, Mosibudi, 437n87 Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database, 39Sn81,397m17 Mao Zedong, 32 Ma'oz, Moshe, 382n11 Marashi, Ibrahim a!-, 72-73, 340, 347, 350, 42ln92 Masari, Muhammad AI-, So Matlosa, Khabele, 436n68 Ma Ying-jeou, 194, 201 Mbeki, Thabo, 318, 321, 322, 324 McCain, John, 296 McClaran, John P., 405n25 McGee, Sibel, 418n49 McGoldrick, Fred, 400n21, 401n26, 403n64 McGregor, Andrew, 416m4 McLennan, A. D., 431n61 McManus, Doyle, 399n2 McMillan, Joseph, 378n72 Mearsheimer, John J.: on Japan, 133; The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 390mo; on Ukraine, 260 Mearshheimer, John J., 358n8 Medium Air Defense System (MEADS), 296 Menzies, Robert, 287 Meshaei, Isfandiar-Rahim, 373m02 Mexico and New Agenda Coalition, 435n5o Meyer, Stephen M.: on lag time, 6, 245, 303, 327; on nuclear latency, 195, 197; on propensity, 6, 221, 231, 303; on salience, 6, 303, 326, 415n2; The Dynamics of

Nuclear Proliferation, 6, 183, 195, 250-51, 361nnq,18, 367m, 415n2, 435n64; on treatability, 6, 42-43, 250-51, 303, 331, 367m Middle East Media Research Institute, 363n29 Migdalovitz, Carol, 253, 421n94 Miki, Takeo, 140 Milbraith, Lester, 423n24 MiliceviC, Obren, 412n6o Miljanic, Djuro, 207, 227, 41onn1,2,8, 41lnn19,23,24,26, 413n62, 415n98 Miller, Judith, 404n15 Miller, Steven, 422m5 MiloseviC, Nemanja, 411nn35,38 Milosevic, Slobodan, 212-13, 220, 223, 225, 227, 340, 413n64 Minty, Abdul S., 324-25 Mir, Amir, 378n79, 379n82 Mirovic, Dejan, 414n87 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 316, 319, 320 Mitarai, Fujio, 154 Mitchell, Derek J., 405m7, 410n79 Mitsubishi, 138 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 133 MladjenoviC, Milorad, 208-9, 220-21, 41ln21 Mochizuki, Mike, 139, 152, 156, 391n26 Mohammadi, Mehdi, 374mo6 Mohammad of Kuwait, Sheikh, 73 Moller, Frederik, 41on13 Moinoi,Makoto,133, 134,138-39 Moniz, Ernest: The Future of Nuclear Power, 365nso Montazeri, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali, 373D101 Montgomery, Michael, 437n95 Moran, Dominic, 363nn27,35 Moravcsik, Andrew, 394n74 More Secure World, A, 360n3 Morocco, 23 Morrow, Adam, 363n27 Morrow, James D., 406n28 Morton, JeffreyS., 394n74 Motlanthe, Kgalema, 318 Mousavi, Mir Hossein, 63 Mozan1bique,3o6 MPLA resistance movement, 306-7 Mubarak, Gamal, 14-15, 21, 22 Mubarak,Hosni,14-15,17,20,21,29,33,36 Mugabe, Robert, 323 Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar, 146, 234, 423m9, 439n16

INDEX 459

Mukhin, Volodimir, 269 Miiller, Harald, 232, 365n46, 366n58, 398m34, 416m2, 436nn77,78, 438n8 multicausality, 6, 122, 199, 221, 228, 231, 337, 352-53 Mumtaz, Kashif, 375n19, 377n44 Muramatsu, Takeshi, 133 Murata, Koji, 391n19, 394n70 Murray, WilliamS., 406n39 Musa, Uthman, 375n7 Nagai, Yonosuke, 133 Nagasaki, 131, 139 Naidoo, Brindaveni, 436n83, 437n84 Nakagawa, Shoichi, 150, 151, 153, 154, 170 Nakamura, Akemi, 397n113 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 140, 153, 289 NakicenoviC, Slobodan, 216, 410nn4,10,12 NAM. See Non-Aligned Movement Namibia and South Africa, 307, 313, 322, 433ll15, 434n47 Nam Sung-wook, 169 Nasr, Vali, 372n89 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 17, 20, 21, 31, 33, 82-83, 88, 363n3s National Council of Resistance oflran (NCRI), 43-44 National Defense University, 6, 437m nationalism: Arab nationalism, 85, 88, 109, 110, 112, 123; Hymans on oppositional nationalists, 8-9, 20, 82, 119-21, 159, 175, 186-8h192-93,200,225,237-38,244> 245, 299-300, 317-18, 339-40; in Iran, 59-62; in Japan, 154; in Serbia, 225-26; in Ukraine, 261-62, 270. See also prestige/ status motivations National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 306, 307 NATO: Article 4, 236, 418n33; and Australia, 287; relations with Turkey, 73, 229, 236, 242, 243, 251, 347, 418n33; relations with Ukraine, 261, 263, 264, 270, 276-77, 278, 280, 281, 347; and Serbia, 221, 222; and Yugoslavia, 210,211-12, 412n4o Nechiporenko, Vladimir, 269 neoliberal institutionalism: vs. constructivism, 8; criticisms of, 59, 122; defined, 7; and Iran, 57-59, 67, 73, 84; and Saudi Arabia, 95; and Serbia, 226-27; and Syria, 116-17, 122; and Taiwan, 202 neorealism: and Australia, 338-39; and balance of power, so, 115, 146, 187, 339, 358n9, 360-61; criticisms of, 47-48,

54, 56-s7,s9,68-69,74,86,91,115-16, 122,132-36,143-44,146,153,190, 199> 201, 211-13, 260-61, 338-39; defined, 7; and Egypt, 339; and Iran, 42, 47, 48, so, s4,s5,s6-sh59,67-69,74,339, 342; and Japan, 132-36, 142-46, 153, 339; and maximization of power, 84, 114; neoclassical realism, 358n9; and proliferation chains, 7; prudential realism, 358mo; and Saudi Arabia, 76, 91; security concerns in, 47-48, 84-85, 86,91,114-16,122,132-36,143-45,182, 199,205,210,211-13,222,279,338,339> 352, 358nn9,10; and Serbia, 222; and South Africa, 338-39; and Syria, 114-16, 122; and Taiwan, 182, 186, 190; and Ukraine,26o-61,269-70,279,281,339; and Yugoslavia, 205, 210,211-12 Netanyahu, Binyamin, 108, 123 New Agenda Coalition, 316, 435n5o New Zealand and New Agenda Coalition, 435nso Nikai, Toshihiro, 150 Nikolic, Dragana, 227 Nikolic, Tomislav, 225-26, 414n94 Nir, Amiram, 382nm6,17, 387n98 Nishihara, Masashi, 151 Nishimura, Shingo, 149, 151 Nixon, Richard: Guam doctrine, 134, 186, 287; and Japan, 133, 135, 137, 142, 39lll29; visit to Beijing, 134, 184, 298 Nj0lstad, Olav, 208 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), so, 58, 6o, 212,219-20,228,316 Nonneman, Gerd, 379094 nonproliferation norms/policies: in Australia, 285, 286, 292, 293, 295-96, 297-99, 300, 426n3; in Egypt, 27-28, 29, 33, 34-36, 37, 38; in Japan, 136, 139-40, 148, 154> 326, 345> 350, 392n51, 438n9; role in nuclear abstinence, 4, 7, 8, 27-28, 29,95> 116-1h12J,124-25, 126,136, 139-40,146-49,182,239,262,263-64, 271, 280, 281, 344-45, 358m2, 365n45, 438n9; Sagan on, 159; in Saudi Arabia, 76, 78, 91, 95, 96, 350; in South Africa, 303,314-16,324-26,329,332,333-34, 345, 350; in South Korea, 163, 174, 178, 180, 326, 345, 350; in Soviet Union, 3, 105-6, 346; in Turkey, 239, 241-42, 254, 345, 350; in Ukraine, 262, 263, 271, 274-75, 280, 281, 345, 350; in United States, 3, 4, 38-40>9h 161-62,165,179,184-85,189,

460

INDEX

nonproliferation norms/policies: (Continued) 196,248,250-54,258-59,274-75,280, 288,290,291,295,297,298-99,300,311, 320,334,346,350,351,428n29 nonproliferation regime: Atoms for Peace program, 16o, 184, 308; effectiveness of, 4, 7, 8, 14, 42, 57, 123, 124-25, 126, 146-49,156,180-81,241-42,285, 290-91,295,303,324-26,333>343, 344-45,350-53,358n12,360n3,364n42, 438nn8,9; nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), 4, 27, 35, 76, 78, 95, 96, 296, 298, 316, 365n46. See also International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Nonproliferation Review, The: "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016," 357n4 nonstate actors, 4, 25, 26, 52, 83 Norris, RobertS., 404n8 Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, 148 North Korea: and Agreed Framework of 1994 NPT, 4, 143, 147, 148, 241-42, 344, 387n88, 438n6; economic conditions in, 148, 166, 365n47; Geneva Agreed Framework, 164; Kim 11-sung, 110; nuclear test of 2006, 131, 143, 144, 150, 158,166,168,169,170,171,173,178, 189-90, 285; nuclear test of 2009, 143, 144, 158, 166, 171, 178; nuclear weapons program of, 4, 28, 101, 126, 143, 144, 150, 153. 158, 166, 167-69, 170, 171, 173, 174, 178, 226, 247, 261, 285, 298, 381n7, 438mo; and proliferation chains, 158; relations with China, 124, 148, 169, 381n7; relations with Egypt, 37; relations with IAEA, 143; relations with Iran, 108, 381n6, 383n28; relations with Japan, 124, 131,134,143-44> 148,150, 151,152,153> 155-56,158,170, 171,248,381n7,395n83, 398m28; relations with Pakistan, 388mo9; relations with Russia, 124, 381n7; relations with South Korea, 145, 158, 161, 164, 166-69, 170, 173> 175> 177, 348, 349, 381n7; relations with Soviet Union, 176, 438mo; relations with Syria, 37, 100, 101, 102-3, 105, 108, 109, 116, 117,122,124,126-27,381n6,382nlo, 383n28, 387n88; relations with Taiwan, 158, 189-90; relations with United States, 54> 124, 144, 151, 154> 167, 168, 171, 381n7; sanctions against, 261; Six-Party

Talks, 148, 151, 168, 381n7; Yongbyon reactor, 101, 102, 381n7 North Yemen, 88 Norway: Kjeller Institute, 207, 208, 219; Norwegian Institutt for Atomenergi (Noratom), 207; relations with Yugoslavia, 207-8 NPT. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nuclear abstinence: role of economic liberalization in, 148-49, 150-51, 230, 271,274-75,280,290,320-21,332,338, 339, 342-43, 352; role of nonproliferation norms in, 4, 7, 8, 27-28, 29, 95, 116-17, 123,124-25,126,136,139-40,146-49> 182, 239,262,263-64,271,280,281,344-45> 358m2, 365n45, 438n9; role of security guaranteesin,7,77,86,92, 131-36,139, 141, 144, 150, 151-52, 153-54, 158, 161, 171,176,185,186,188,189,190,200-201, 229,235,236,240,242,243>250,251-52, 253-54,268,269,270,285,286,289,290, 301,338-39,344,346-48,351,358n10, 438mo Nuclear Control Institute, 409n66 nuclear disarmament, 147, 285, 296, 298, 302, 316,324-26,329,332,334 nuclear hedging, 72, 78, 87, 232, 295 nuclear latency, 74, 75, 285,341-42, 438n4 Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, 362n25 nuclear suppliers, 25, 28, 43, 93-95, 174, 219, 308, 331; A. Q. Khan network, 26, 32, 44, 48, 58, 126-27, 248, 388n109; civilian assistance, 7, 28, 74, 160-61, 162, 172, 184, 304, 308; export controls, 4, 117; Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 147, 163, 292, 293,316,319,333.351 nuclear testing: by China, 40, 131, 134, 143, 184, 185, 287; cold testing, 310, 433n31; byindia,4,21,148,184,209,212,216, 219,238,285,291,298,311,428n29;by North Korea, 131, 143, 144, 150, 158, 166, 168,169,170,171,173,178,189-90,285: by Pakistan, 4, 21, 51, 94, 285, 298; as trigger event, 25, 26 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 409n7o; Iran Profile, 367n2; Yugoslavia Profile, 410n9 Nuclear Tipping Point, The, 357n4 nuclear waste, 164-65, 179, 180, 196, 210, 300 nuclear weapons: as deterrent, 22, us, 122, 188,200,261, 290,297>303,30?-8, 312-14, 322; secrecy regarding, 33, 58,

INDEX

100,118-19, 12h 182,184,190,191,200, 202, 219, 233, 247-48; use of, 30, 131, 139, 392n48,426n9 nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), 4, 27, 35, 76, 78, 95, 96, 316, 365n46; Treaty of Rarotonga, 296, 298; Treaty of Pelindaba, 316 nuclear weapons states (NWS): nonproliferation exceptionalism among, 4, 351; and NPT, 7, 193, 324-25, 334; number of, 155 Nucleonics Week, 198 Nurick, Robert, 422n8 Nye, Joseph S., Jr.: Understanding International Conflicts, 231, 240, 416n7 Obaid, Nawaf: National Security in Saudi Arabia, 376nn30,32,33, 377n56 Obama, Barack, 46, 54, 92, 155, 236, 300, 428025 Oberdorfer, Don: The Two Koreas, 399n9 bcalan, Abdullah, 250 Ogilvie-White, Tanya, 431n64 oil: crisis of 1973-74, 90, 137, 140; policies of Saudi Arabia regarding, 90, 96-97, 98; prices of, 66, 89 Okada, Katsuya, 151 Okagaki, Tomoko, 172 Okawara, Nobuo: Japan's National Security, 393n51 Okazaki, Hisahiko, 394n75, 397n127 Okimoto, Daniel, 132-33, 391029, 392n47 Okruhlik, Gwenn, 377n53 Oksiiz, Enis, 244 Olmert, Ehud, 123 Oman, 85 opaque proliferation, 26, 84, 365n44 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,6o Ouba,Shinya,396n105 Ozawa, Ichiro, 149, 155 Pabian, Frank, 307 Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 167 Pakistan: economic conditions in, 365n47; Nawa-i Waqt, 94-95; nuclear testing in 1998, 4, 21, 51, 94, 285, 298; nuclear weapons program of, 4, 28, 30, 47, 93-95, 126, 146, 285, 298; relations with China, 94; relations with India, 26, 94-95; relations with Iran, 47, 51-52, 56; relations with North Korea, 388mo9;

461

relations with Saudi Arabia, 77, 78, 93-95, 99; relations with Turkey, 248, 420n78; relations with United States, 438mo Palestinian territories, 23, 52, 87-88, 92 pan-Arabism, 82-83, 88, 96, 104, 109, 110, 112, 123. See also Arab nationalism Park Chung-hee, 160, 161, 162, 165, 173, 176, 400n11 Park Geun-hye, 168 Park, John, 402n4o Park Keun-hye, 176 Parris, Mark, 235 Parthasarathy, G., 94 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, 434n44 Paul, T. V.: Power versus Prudence, 358n10; on security guarantees, 358mo Pebble Bed Modular Reactors (PBMR), 327, }28,330 Pelindaba, Treaty of, 316 Pempel, T. J., 391029, 397n123 Pe5ic, Milan, 227 Peterson, J. E., 375n2o Peters, Robert, 425n2 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 236 Pfaff, William, 360n3 Pilat, Joseph: on virtual nuclear states, 256 Pinkston, Daniel A., 400n2o plutonium. See fissile material. Pollack, Jonathan D., 400012, 401036 Pollack, Josh, 376n39, 378n7o Pollack, Kenneth, 70 Pomper, Miles A., 401n29 Poore, Stuart, 426n12 Popovic, Dragoslav, 219 Popovic, Koca, 212 Porter, Jonathan, 429n40 Posen, Barry R.: The Sources of Military Doctrine, 386n86 Potter, William C., 146, 207, 227, 411n027,28, 422n8, 423n19, 439m6; Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, 357n4, 361n17, 364n41, 425m, 435nn51,63; The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, 421m, 423n25, 424n29; "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," 41Dnn1,2,8, 411nn19,23,24,26, 413n62, 415n98 prestige/status motivations: in Egypt, 19-20, 23, 24, 26, 38-39, 343, 362n21; in India, 61, 238; in Iran, 59-62, 75, 238, 343; personal vs. national, 237; Sagan on, 159, 371n72; in Saudi Arabia, 78-79, 99;

462

INDEX

prestige/status motivations (Continued) in South Korea, 165-66, 168, 174-77, 178, 179, 180, 343; in Taiwan, 202; in Turkey, 235, 237-39; in Yugoslavia, 216, 220, 228, 345 Prideaux, Eric, 397n 113 proliferation chains: danger of, 3-5, 52, 126-27, 337,338,341,349-50,352-53,357n1; Dunn and Kahn on, 3, 352-53; and Iran, 42, 72-74, 75, 76, 350; and Japan, 142, 143, 145, 350; and neorealism, 7; and North Korea, 158 propensity to proliferate, 5, 337, 338-43; Australia, 286, 295-301, 338-39; Egypt, 13, 14, 24-25,26-27, 31-38,40-41,72, 75,350,437n1;Iran,42-43, 52,67-72, 75;Japan, 131, 155-5A342,350,437n1; Meyer on, 6, 221, 231, 303; Saudi Arabia, 72-73.75,80,84-85,86,87-88,94.95, 98-99, 347, 350; Serbia, 221, 222, 225-26, 228, 350; South Africa, 303, 317-26, 329,330-31,333-34.338-39,350;South Korea, 177-81, 342, 350; Syria, 123-28, 350, 437m; Taiwan, 182, 199-202, 339, 342; Turkey, 73-74, 75, 229, 230, 231-45, 248, 250-51, 350; Ukraine, 264, 279, 281, 342, 350 Puglisi, Rosaria, 275 Pusica, Marko Z., 414n86 Putin, Vladimir, 243 Pyle, Kenneth, 152 Qaddafi, Muammar, 26, 247 Quester, George: The Politics of Nuclear proliferation, 357n4 Rabinovich, !tamar, 38211m5,18, 383nn27,31, 384n37· 385n54 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 55, 62, 63, 65, 70,372n82,373n95 Ramet, Sabrina, 214, 411nn31,35,37, 412nn44,46.48,5o, 413nn65,66 Randers, Gunnar, 207, 208, 410n10,11 Rankovic, Aleksander, 206, 207, 209, 214, 215, 216-17, 218 Razem, Dusan, 215, 41onn3,6,7 reactive proliferation. See proliferation chains. realism/neorealism. See neorealism Reed, Thomas C.: The Nuclear Express, 359m8 Reischauer, Edwin, 141, 393n63 Reiss, Mitchell, 137, 400m2, 401n36, 433n26, 437111; Bridled Ambition, 422m; Without the Bomb, 357n4, 365n45

Revolution in Military Affairs, 296, 301, 430n53 Reynolds, Wayne, 340, 347, 348, 350, 428m8; Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 426nn6,7 Rezai, Mohsen, 55-56 Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 306 Rice, Condoleezza, 55, 158, 171, 427n18 Richelson, Jeffrey T.: Spying on the Bomb, 404nnl0,13, 405ni6, 433nn18,29, 434n44, 4391116 Rigger, Shelley: Dangerous Strait, 407n42; Politics in Taiwan, 407n41 Ristic, Milorad, 208 Rivera, David, 260 Robtel, 15 Rodhan, Khalid R., 369n36 Rohani, Hassan, 58, 63, 65, 66-67, 71-72 Roh Moo-hyun, 168, 173, 177 Roh Tae-woo, 166, 168 Roosevelt, Franklin, 89-90 Rose, Gideon, 386n82 Rossant, John, 378n68 Roul, Animesh, 369n42 Rozman, Gilbert, 290 Rublee, Maria Rost: Nonproliferation Norms, 1, 13, 14, 359n Rudd, Kevin, 293, 294, 295, 298, 428nn25,30 Rumney, Reg, 435n61 Rumsfeld, Donald, 278 Rusk, Dean, 141 Russell, James A., 376n28, 38omo3 Russell, Richard, 84, 92, 97, 360112, 378n75, 379n91 Russia: economic conditions in, 105; nonproliferation policies of, 271; nuclear cooperation agreements with, 74; Putin, 243; relations with Australia, 293; relations with Beralus, 255; relations with Egypt, 14; relations with Georgia, 243, 244, 277-78, 279, 293, 432n71; relations with Iran, 47, 58, 6o, 66; relations with Japan, 143; relations with Kazakhstan, 255; relations with North Korea, 124, 381n7; relations with Saudi Arabia, 97; relations with Serbia, 222, 224, 225, 226; relations with Syria, 105, 106, 114, 121; relations with Turkey, 229, 235, 243, 246, 252; relations with Ukraine,255,256,257,258,26o,262, 263,265,266-67,268,269,271-72, 273-74,275-76,277-79,280,281, 303, 422n1o, 424nn28,3o; relations

INDEX

with United States, 226, 266; Yeltsin, 105,260 Ruster, Karen, 55 Saati, Amin, 78-79 Sadat, Anwar, 20, 21, 29, 49, 428n29 Safavi, Yahya, 65 Sagan, Scott, 361n17, 369n28, 399m; on domestic politics, 159, 215, 359n15, 371n72, 403n1; on lag time, 247; on nonproliferation norms, 159; on prestige motivations, 159, 371n72; on virtual nuclear weapons states, 341, 438ns Sajnkar, Martin, 210 Sakaguchi, Hirohiko, 396mos Sakamaki,Sachiko,398n133 Salama, Sammy, 55, 97, 363n34, 378n64, 38omo6 salience: of Iran, 13, 14, 25, 42, 72-74, 344-45, 350, 362n2o; oflsrael, 25; of Japan, 348-49, 350; Meyer on, 6, 303, 326, 415n2; of South Africa, 303, 326; of Turkey, 229, 251 Samuels, Richard, 152, 398nm36,142; Machiavelli's Children, 389n4, 392n34 Sanger, David E., 371n63 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 124 Sato, Eisaku, 131-32, 135, 141-42, 153, 393nn62,63, 394nn64,68 Saud, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz AI-, 81 Saudi Arabia, so; King Abd Al-Aziz AI-Saud, 89-90; King Abdallah, S1, 82, 88, 96, 340; disincentives for proliferation, 75, 76,82,S3,S4,S8,92-93.94,95>96-98, 99, 351; economic conditions in, 76-77, So, 84, 96-98, 99, 38om12; extremism in, 83-84; King Fahd, So, 81, 91; foreign investment in, 98; incentives for proliferation, 14, 72-73, 76, 84-85, 86, 87-SS, 92, 99; Islamists in, 83; King Abd Al-Aziz Center for Science and Technology (KAACST), 79, 81; and neoliberal institutionalism, 95; and neorealism, 76, 91; nonproliferation policies of, 76, 78, 91, 95, 96, 350; and NPT, 76, 82, 91, 95; nuclear capability of, 76, 78, 79, 95; oil policies, 90, 96-97, 98; ongoing trends in, 79-80; political conditions in,73.79-84,85,91,98-99.339.340; population of, So, S4, 97; prestige/status motivations in, 78-79, 99; propensity to proliferate, 72-73, 75, So, 84-85, 86,

463

87-88, 94> 95> 98-99> 347> 350, 437lll; relations with Afghanistan, 95; relations with China, 90-91, 97, 99; relations with Egypt, 82-S3, SS, 89; relations with France, 97; relations with GCC, 96, 98; relations with Germany, 97; relations with IAEA, 76, 87, 95; relations with Iran, 44, 47, 49, so, 56, 72-73, 76, 77, 78-79,82,84-8h88,89,91,93.99.344, 347-48, 350; relations with Iraq, 77, 82, 83, Ss, S6-S7, SS, 89, 95; relations with Israel, 7S-79, 82, S4, 87-8S, 350; relations with Japan, 97; relations with Pakistan, 77, 7S, 93-95, 99; relations with Russia, 97, 99; relations with South Korea, 97; relations with Syria, 86, 8S, 89; relations with United States, 47, 73, 77-78, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89-93. 96, 97> 99> 107, 296, 344> 347-48, 351; relations with Yemen, 89, 95; Riyadh bombings of 2003, 83; royal family/House of Saud, n, 7S, So-82, 83, 88, 92; security concerns of, 72-73, 76,77-78,8o,84-8S,86-88,91,92-94• 96-97, 347-4S, 350; security guarantee from United States, 77, 86, 89, 90, 92, 97, 99, 347-48, 351; Crown Prince Sultan, 81, 93; takeover of Grand Mosque, 83; trigger events regarding, 72-73, 75, 76, 77,84,87,92-93>99.344.347-48 Saud, King Abd Al-Aziz AI-, 89-90 Saud, King Abdallah bin Abd AI-Aziz AI-, 81, 82, 88, 96, 340 Saud, Prince Nayifbin Abd Al-Aziz AI-, S1 SaviC, Pavle, 206-7, 208, 216, 217-19, 412n57 Schaller, Michael, 392nn29,30 Schell, Phillip, 408nss Schmidt, Andreas, 232, 398n134, 416m2, 436nn77,78, 438n8 Schrenk, Martin, 412nn45,49 Schriver, Randall, 406n31 security guarantees: and Australia, 285, 286-87,288,29A298,301,347,351; and Japan, 131-36, 137, 139, 141, 144, 148, 150, 151, 153-54, 158, 171, 346-47, 394n65; by NATO, 229, 236, 251-52, 270, 280, 347; role in nuclear abstinence, 7, 77, 86,92,131-36,139,141,144,150,151-52, 153-54, 158, 161, 171, 176, 185, 186, 188, 189,190,200-201,229,235,236,240, 242,243,250,251-52,253-54>268,269, 270,285,286,289,290,301,338-39,344> 346-48, 351, 358mo, 438mo; and Saudia Arabia, 77, 86, 89, 90, 92, 97,

464

INDEX

security guarantees (Continued) 99, 347-48, 351; and South Korea, 158, 161, 166, 171, 176, 348; and Taiwan, 183, 184,185,186,188,189,190,200-201, 348; and Turkey, 229, 235, 236, 240, 242, 243. 248, 249> 250,251-52, 253-54> 347, 351; from United Kingdom, 286-87, 288; from United States, 77, 86, 89, 90, 92, 97, 99.131-36, 13h 139.141,144,148,150, 151-52, 153-54> 158, 161, 166, 171, 176, 183,184,185,186,188,189,190,200-201, 235,236,240,242,243,248,249,250, 251-52,253-54,285,287,288,289,290, 297,298,301,}38-39.344.346-48, 351, 394n6s, 438n10 Segal, Gerald, 406n32 Seng, Tan See, 429n44 Sepah-e-Shaba,51 Serbia: Democratic Party (DS), 223, 413n73; Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), 223, 226; disincentives for proliferation, 221-22; economic conditions in, 223-25, 413n78; incentives for proliferation, 205, 222; and Kosovo, 221-22, 223, 414n91; Milosevic, 212, 223, 225, 227, 340; and NPT, 227; political conditions in, 206, 222-26, 228, 340, 413n73; propensity to proliferate, 221, 222, 225-26, 228, 350; public opinion polls in, 222, 413n72; relations with EU, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 413n72; relations with IAEA, 221, 227; relations with Russia, 222, 224, 225, 226; relations with United States, 221, 222, 227; Sandzak Democratic party (SDP), 413n73; security concerns of, 205, 212-13,221-22,226,228,340;Serbian Radical Party (SRS), 223, 224-25, 226, 414n88; Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), 413n73; Socialist Party (SPS), 223, 226; Vinca Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) Program, 227-28; Vojvodina League of Social Democrats (LSV), 413n73; Za evropsku Srbiju (ZES), 223, 413n73 Seselj, Vojislav, 225 Sevres Treaty of 1920, 415n5 Sezer, Duygu, 243 Shaffer,Brenda,42on68 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 43, 49, 52, 57, 8s Shanahan, Dennis, 429n42 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 6o

Shapir, Yiftah: The Middle East Military Balance, 384nn45,46 Sharif, Nawaz, 93 Shaw, Robert, 408nss Sheikholeslami, A. Reza, 378n63 Shevtsov, Anatoliy, 257 Shim, Sangsun, 166, 172, 40onn11,13,14, 401n32,402n54 Shlapak, David A.: A Question of Balance, 406n29 Shoham, Danny, 386nn8o,87 Shultz, George P., 421n89 Siddiqi, Mazhar Hasan, 379n81 Sieg, Linda, 396nmo4,110 Simmons, Howard, 357n1 Simon, David: Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, 406n31 Simonenko, Petro, 269, 270 Simpson, John, 340, 347, 348, 350 Slackman, Michael, 373m01, 388mo6 Slaus, Ivo, 207, 227, 410nn1,2,8, 411nn19,23,24,26, 413n62, 415n97 Slavin, Barbara, 52 Slovenia, 221 Smirnov, Yegor, 424n33 Smith, Mark: Britain, Australia and the Bomb,426n8 Smith, Sheila A., 396moo Smuts, J. C., 308 Snyder, Scott, 343, 348-49, 401n34, 402n4o Sokov, Nikolai, 224, 339, 343, 347, 414n8s, 421nl Sole, Donald B., 433n25 Solingen, Etel: on domestic politics, 6, 8, 9, 17},199,21},230-31,280,290,299,303, 318-21, 341, 342-43, 345, 349-50; on East Asia, 291; on economic liberalization, 9. llh 159,193,194-95. 21},238, 244. 262,26h271,272,279,280,290,339, 342-43; on Egypt, 20; on inward-looking regimes, 9, 20, 21, 117-19, 159, 213, 224-25,238,244,245,262,280,318-19, 321, 339, 342-43; on Iran, so, 62; on Japan, 346-47, 438n9; Nuclear Logics, 6, 198, 199. 357n3, 363n}1, 369ll28, 389m, 403n2, 404mO, 438mo, 439m1; on outward-looking regimes, 9, 20, 63, 97, 98, 99, 159, 173> 186, 193, 201, 213, 224,238,262,280,}18-19,320-21,339> 342-43; on reactive proliferation, 349, 357n3; on regime survival, 9, 91, 97, 182-83,213,223, 238,303,318-21;on

INDEX

security guarantees, 438mo, 439n11; on South Africa, 319; on South Korea, 173; on Taiwan, 194-95, 404n10 Solomon, Hussein, 436n76 Solomon, Ronen, 381n8 Sorour, Ahmad Fathi, 21 South Africa: African National Congress (ANC), 305, 306, 316, 318, 320-21, 325, 333, 435n58; and Angola, 303, 304, 305, 306-7, 310, 312, 313-14, 319; apartheid government,303,304-14,316,317-18, 319-20,322,327,329,331,333,432n7; Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), 308, 311, 312, 314, 330; Atomic Energy Board (AEB), 309, 310; Atomic Energy Corp. (AEC), 309, 314, 315, 329, 330; Botha, 311, 312, 317, 320; civilian nuclear program of, 302, 308-9, 327, 328, 330; conventional forces of, 307, 322; deterrence strategy of, 312-14; disincentives for proliferation, 303, 316,318,}20-21,322-24,331,332-33, 339; dismantling of nuclear weapons program by, 302, 303, 309, 313, 314-16, 315,31h319-20,328,329,333>435n58; economic conditions in, 321, 325, 330-31, 332; and flash in South Atlantic, 313, 434n44; highly enriched uranium (HEU) in, 302, 320, 327-29, 331, 342; incentives for proliferation, 317-18; lag time for, 303, 327-31, 332; Mandela, 314, 315, 318, 435n58; Mbeki, 318, 321, 322, 324; missiles of, 304, 311, 312, 330; Motlanthe, 318; and Namibia/South West Africa, 306,313,322,433n15,434n47;and neorealism, 338-39; and New Agenda Coalition, 435n5o; nonproliferation norms/policies in, 303, 314-16, 324-26, 329, 332, 333-34, 345, 350; and NPT, 302,311,313,314-15,319-20,324-26, 329, 332, 333-34, 345; nuclear arsenal of, 311-12; Nuclear Energy Act of 1999, 316; Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa, 316; nuclear weapons program of, 28, 302-3, 304-14, 316, 317-18, 319-20,322,328,329-30,333.342, 434nn42,44, 435n58, 438mo; political conditions in, 303, 304-6, 339; prestige/ status motivations in, 237; propensity to proliferate, 303, 317-26, 329, 330-31, 333-34, 338-39, 350; relations with Africa, 318, 320-21, 322-23, 326, 331-32,

465

333; relations with France, 304, 307, 310, 319, 334, 435n54; relations with IAEA, 302,311,313,315,316,319-20,328,329, 433n25, 437n86; relations with India, 333; relations with Iran, 43, 325-26, 333; relations with Israel, 434n42; relations with Libya, 333; relations with Soviet Union, 303, 304, 305-7, 310, 311, 312, 314, 319-20; relations with Taiwan, 184, 185; relations with United Kingdom, 286, 307, 308, 319-20, 334, 435n54; relations with United Nations, 305, 306, 307, 310, 313, 319, 322, 323-24, 332, 434n47; relations with United States, 303, 304, 307, 308, 310,311,319-20,331,332,334>435ns4; relations with West Germany, 310; salience of, 303, 326; sanctions against, 307-8, 309-10, 311, 319, 322; scientists in, 329-30; security concerns of, 303, 304-8,310-11,312-14,317-18,321-23, 326,333,339,342;Smuts,3o8;South African Communist Party (SACP), 305, 320; South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI), 308, 311; space launch vehicle (SLY) program, 320; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 305, 306; Vorster, 317; Zuma, 318. See also De Klerk, Frederik Will em Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 287, 297, 426n9 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC}, 321, 322 South Korea: Agency for Defense Development (ADD), 161; Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 163; chemical weapons of, 387n101; Chun Doo Hwan, 162, 172; civilian nuclear program of, 159, 160-65, 172, 174, 177, 178-80, 343; Comprehensive Nuclear Energy Promotion Plan (CNEPP), 163; disincentives for, 148, 161-62, 163-64, 170,172-74, 177-78,180,343;economic conditions in, 148, 166, 173, 174, 178, 290, 343; Grand National Party (GNP), 168; Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 168, 180; Kim Dae-jung, 145, 166, 168; Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 173; Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI), 162; Lee Myung-bak, 158, 167, 168,

486

INDEX

South Korea (Continued) 173, 174, 177; National Assembly, 173; nonproliferation norms in, 163, 174, 178, 180, 326, 345, 350; and NPT, 162, 163, 174, 345, 400n18; nuclear weapons program of, 161-63, 172, 176, 177-78, 302-3, 342, 387mo1; Park Chunghee, 160, 161, 162, 165, 173> 176, 400n11; political conditions in, 159-60, 172-77, 178, 339; prestige/status motivations in, 165-66,168,174-77,178,179, 180,343; propensity to proliferate, 177-81, 342, 350, 437m; public opinion polls in, 145, 166, 167, 170; pyroprocessing in, 164-65, 179, 180, 403n64; relations with Belgium, 161; relations with Canada, 161; relations with China, 161, 169, 170, 176; relations with France, 162; relations with IAEA, 160, 162, 163-64, 173, 174; relations with Japan, 143, 145, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 169-71,178-79,180-81,289,348-49, 398n128; relations with North Korea, 145,158,161,164,166-69,170, 173> 175, 177, 348, 349, 381n7; relations with Saudi Arabia, 97; relations with United States, 106, 145, 158, 160-62, 163, 165, 166,168-69,170,171-72, 173,175> 176, 177> 178, 179> 180, 181, 291, 296, 297> 348, 395n83, 403n64, 428n29; Roh Moo-hyun, 168, 173, 177; Roh Tae Woo, 166, 168; security concerns of, 159, 160, 165-72, 175> 178, 180-81, 289, 342, 347> 348; security guarantee from United States, 158, 161, 166, 171, 176, 348; trigger events regarding, 179,180-81,348-49;Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), 161 South West Africa and South Africa, 307, 313,322,433n15,434n47 South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), 306 Soviet Union: breakup of, 104-5, 110, 114-15,256, 258, 259, 266, 314, 385n55; Chernobyl accident, 14, 31, 78, 221; invasion of Afghanistan, 90, 93; nonproliferation polices of, 3, 105-6, 346; nuclear weapons program of, 122, 207, 210, 257, 266, 303; relations with Egypt, 347; relations with Iraq, 438mo; relations with Japan, 131, 144; relations with North Korea, 176, 438mo; relations with South Africa, 303, 304, 305-7, 310, 311, 312, 314, 319-20; relations with Syria,

104-6,114-15,118, 121,122,382n17; relations with Turkey, 249; relations with Yugoslavia, 207-8, 210-11, 212, 219, 225, 227; Stalin, 210, 211, 225. See also Cold War Spector, Leonard, 346, 381n5 Spence, Jack, 436n69 Stalin, Joseph, 210, 211, 225 Stankovic, Slobodan, 412n47 START I (Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty), 265, 266, 267 Stefanovic, Dusan, 412n6o Stein, Janice Gross, 363n26 Stern, Nicholas, 429n39 Steyn, Hannes: Armament and Disarmament, 317, 432nn5,6, 433nn23,24, 434nn39,40, 435ns2, 436n73 Stiglitz, Joseph E.: The Three Trillion Dollar War, 432n7o Stillman, Danny B.: The Nuclear Express, 359ll18 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 188, 294 Stoll, Richard, 4o8n56, 409n72 Stumpf, Waldo, 433n34, 434nn43.46 Sumio, Tarui, 395n9o Sunohara, Tsuyoshi, 390m2, 395n86 Supek,Ivan,209,216,218,219,412n57 Sweden: and New Agenda Coalition, 435n5o; nuclear weapons program of, 302-3; prestige/status motivations in, 237 Symon, Andrew, 428n3o Syria: Ba'ath Party, 103, 112, 113, 123, 385n56; chemical weapons of, 108-9, 115,116,118,122,384n48,386n87; and constructivism, 116-17, 122; Dair Alzour reactor, 100-103, 116, 118-19, 121, 124, 125, 127-28, 38om, 381nn4-6, 388n11o; Damascus Spring, 111, 117; disincentives for proliferation, 124-25; economic conditions in, 103, 104, 112-14, 117, 125, 126; Golan Heights, 107, 123; incentives for proliferation, 102, 103, 109, 114-22, 123-24; missiles of, 91, 102, 108-9, 118; Muslim Brotherhood, 104, 110; and neoliberal institutionalism, 116-17, 122; and neorealism, 114-16, 122; and NPT, 101, 116, 124, 345; nuclear weapons program of, 100-103, 114-28, 247, 342, 346, 38on1, 381nn4-6,1o, 383n28; political conditions in, 103-4, 109-12,117-19,121,122,123,125,340,

INDEX

345, 386n71; propensity to proliferate, 123-28, 350, 437m; relations with China, 105, 108, 114; relations with Egypt, 88, 103; relations with Greece, 107; relations with IAEA, 101, 114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 127, 128, 386n81, 387n88; relations with Iran, 105,107-8,109,118,124,344, 381n6, 383n28, 387n94; relations with Iraq,103, 107,108,113,115, 125,387n94; relations with Israel, 100, 102-3, 104, 107, 108-9, 114-15, 116, 118, 119-20, 123-24, 125, 127-28,239,346,381n4,382n10, 388n11o; relations with Lebanon, 111, 124, 125; relations with North Korea, 37, 100,101,102-3,105,108,109,116,117, 122,124,126-2h381n6,382n10,383n28, 387n88; relations with Russia, 105, 106, 114, 121; relations with Saudi Arabia, 86, 88, 89; relations with Soviet Union, 104-6,114-15,118,121, 122,382n17; relations with Turkey, 107, 108, 115, 229, 235, 250; relations with United States, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 115, 123, 124, 125, 351-52; security concerns of, 106-9, 114-16,120-21,122,123-24, 126,342; Six Day War, 103, 107, 123. See also Asad, Bashar al-; Asad, Hafez a!Tabler, Andrew, 381n1o, 382n13, 386n75 Tadros, Mariz: 1he Muslim Brotherhood and Isla mist Politics in the Middle East, 363n32 Taiwan: Atomic Energy Council (AEC), 197, 408n57; Chen Shuibian, 192-93, 194, 200; Chiang Ching-kuo, 185, 186-87, 193, 196, 340; Chiang Kai-shek, 184, 186-87, 193; Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST), 184, 187; civilian nuclear program of, 184, 185, 192, 195-97, 202; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 192-93, 195, 200; disincentives for proliferation, 182,184,190-91, 194-95> 198,199-202, 339; economic conditions in, 183-84, 186,190-91,193-95,199, 200,201,290; incentives for proliferation, 182, 183-91, 200, 202, 348; Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), 184, 186, 196; Kuomintang (KMT), 183, 191-92, 201; Lee Teng-hui, 185, 189; Ma Ying-jeou, 194, 201; and neorealism, 182, 186, 190; and NPT, 197; nuclear latency of, 183,

467

195-98; nuclear weapons programs of, 182, 183-8h 189,198, 202,342,348; People's First Party (PFP), 192; political conditions in, 182, 183, 191-93, 199, 200, 339, 340; prestige/status motivations in, 202; propensity to proliferate, 182, 199-202, 339, 342; relations with Australia, 196; relations with Canada, 184, 196; relations with China, 182, 183-91,192,193-94,19h198-99,200-201, 339; relations with France, 196; relations with Germany, 196; relations with IAEA, 197, 198, 200, 202; relations with Israel, 185; relations with Japan, 143, 289, 348; relations with North Korea, 158, 189-90; relations with South Africa, 184, 185; relations with United States, 106, 158, 182,183, 184-8h188, 189, 190-91,193> 194,196, 19h200-201, 202,291,29h348, 428n29; relations with West Germany, 185; security concerns of, 182, 183-91, 194-95,198-99,200-201,289,339,342, 347, 348; security guarantee from United States, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 200-201, 348; Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR), 184, 185, 198; Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 192; trigger events regarding, 145,183,348 Taiwan Power Co. (TPC), 195, 196 Takagi, Jinzaburo, 398n138 Takemi, Keizo, 150 Takeyh,Ra~48,51,371n73,372n87

Talent, Jim: World at Risk, 36om Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., 358n9 Tamogami, Toshio, 154 Tanaka, Kakuei, 141, 391n19, 394n7o Tan, Nam1k, 229 Tannenwald, Nina, 359m3; 1he Nuclear Taboo, 365n45 Tanner, Murray Scot: Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 406n40, 407n52 Tarasyuk, Borys, 268 Tashan, Seyf!, 246 Tavernise, Sabrina, 419n51 Teitelbaum, Joshua, 377n43 Tellis, Ashley, 301 Tenet, George J., 384n47 Tertrais, Bruno, 438n10 Tetlock, Philip: Expert Political Judgment, 157 Thornas,Lynne,435n61,437n97 Tirnoshenko, Viktor, 425n39

468

INDEX

Timoshenko, Yulia, 269, 270, 277 Tito, Josip Broz, 210, 211, 213, 217, 220, 222, 225, 226-27; and Yugoslavia's nuclear weapons program, 207, 208, 209, 212, 214,215-16 Tkacik, John J., Jr., 406n39 Tow, William: Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations, 43lll69 Traynor, Ian, 375n3 treatability/preventability of proliferation decisions, 5, 337, 350-53; in Egypt, 38-41; in Iran, 42-43; Meyer on, 6, 42-43, 250-51, 303, 331, 367m; in South Africa, 303, 331-32 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 131, 132 Treaty of Rarotonga, 296, 298 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Article II, n6; Article IV, 4, 7, 291; Article VI, 324-25, 332; and Australia, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 296, 345, 347; and Egypt, 33, 34-35, 37, 344, 345, 351; and Iran, 4, 34, 35, 44-45, 57-58, 66, 72, 124-25, 146, 147, 148,241-42,325-26,344-45;andJapan, 132,134,135,136,138,139,140,146-48, 151, 291, 345, 438n9; and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), 4, 7, 8, 33, 34, 116, 291-92, 293, 324-25; and North Korea, 4, 143, 147, 148, 241-42, 344, 387n88, 438n6; and nuclear weapons states (NWS), 7, 193, 324-25, 334; Review and Extension Conference of 1995, 21, 35, 302, 366n58; Review Conference of 2000, 302, 316, 325; Review Conference of 2005, 34, 35, 37, 329, 366n58; Review Conference of 2010, 324-25, 395n9o; and Saudi Arabia, 76, 82, 91, 95; and South Africa, 302, 311, 313, 314-15, 319-20, 324-26, 329, 332, 333-34, 345; and South Korea, 162,163, 174,345,400n18;and Syria, 101, n6, 124, 345; and Turkey, 239, 241-42, 249, 345; and Ukraine, 264-65, 267, 280, 345; and United States, 35, 293, 311, 351; and Yugoslavia, 226-27, 345 Tremblay, Pmar, 233, 416nm5,22 trigger events, 5, 337, 343-49, 364n41; regarding Australia, 285, 286-90, 347, 348; regarding Egypt, 16, 25-26, 27, 30-31, 39-40,72,75,84,344,345:regardingiran, 42,43,71,75,8~345-46;regardingJapan,

142-56, 179, 346-47; regarding Saudi

Arabia, 72-73, 75, 76, 77, 84, 87, 92-93, 99, 344, 347-48; regarding South Korea, 179, 180-81, 348-49; regarding Taiwan, 145, 183, 348; regarding Turkey, 84, 240-45, 250,344.345.346-47 Trilateral Security Dialogue, 289, 427m8 Trofimov, Yaroslav: The Siege of Mecca, 376n40 Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf: Strait Talk, 404n5 Turkey:Ataturk,235,415n5,416n14;

248-49, 253-54; Dogan Group, 417n2o; economic conditions in, 230, 238, 243, 246, 252;Erdogan, 232,235,239,243, 417n2o; incentives for proliferation, 229, 230,240-45, 250,252,344>345-46,347; Justice and Development Party (AKP), 230,232-33,234-3~238-39,241,244,

245, 246, 253, 416n13; Kemalists in, 230, 232, 235; and Kurdish separatists/PKK, 107,229,234,235,236,241,244,250, 252, 253; lag time for, 245-49; military/ Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in, 232-33, 234, 235-37,238-40,244,341,416n13, 417n26; Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 238, 244; National Nuclear Technology Development Programme, 233; nonproliferation norms in, 239, 241-42, 254, 345, 350; and NPT, 239, 241-42, 249, 345; nuclear reactors in, 245-46, 249; political conditions in, 230-35,244-45,246,250,251,339, 416m3, 417nn2o,26; prestige/status motivations in, 235, 237-39; propensity to proliferate, 73-74, 75, 229, 230, 231-45,248, 250-51, 350, 437m; public opinion polls in, 236; relations with EU, 73, 233, 235, 236-37, 239-40, 245, 248, 250, 252-53; relations with Greece, 212; relations with IAEA, 239, 247, 248, 249, 251; relations with Iran, 47, 71, 72, 73-74,84,229,230,235,240-41,242-43, 246, 248, 250, 253, 420n79; relations with Iraq, 235; relations with Israel, 107, 108, ll5, 242-43; relations with NATO, 73,229,236,242,243,251,347,418n33; relations with Pakistan, 248, 420n78;

INDEX

relations with Russia, 229, 235, 243, 246, 252; relations with Soviet Union, 249; relations with Syria, 107, 108, 115, 229, 235, 250; relations with United Nations, 239; relations with United States, 230, 235,236,240,242-43,248,249-54> 344, 345-46, 347, 351, 420n79; relations with Yugoslavia, 412n4o; Science and Technology Supreme Board (BTYK), 233; scientists in, 247-48; security concerns of, 84, 229, 230, 231, 234-37, 240-45, 249-50, 252, 253, 344, 347, 351; security guarantee from United States, 229, 235, 236,240,242,243,248,249,250,251-52, 253-54, 347, 351; Sevres Syndrome in, 230, 235, 415n5; trigger events regarding, 84,240-45,250,344,345,346-47; Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), 233, 245, 249; Turkish National Security Council (MGK), 233 Udum, ~ebnem, 245, 417n3o, 418n38, 421n93 Ukraine: BYuT/Bloc ofYulia Timoshenko, 268, 269, 270, 277; civilian nuclear program of, 258-59: and Commonwealth oflndependent States (CIS), 265, 266,271,272,273,278-79,280; Communist Party, 269; disincentives for proliferation, 256, 259, 343; economic conditions in, 255-56, 260, 262, 263-64, 267, 271-79, 280; incentives for proliferation, 255-56; Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, 257-58, 266; Kravchuk, 261-62, 267, 275, 279; Kuchma,261,262,267,268,275-76, 277, 279-80; Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, 257; Lisbon Protocol, 261, 267; missile production (PivdenMash) in, 259, 262; nationalism in, 261-62, 270; and neorealism, 260-61, 269-70, 279, 281, 339; nonproliferation norms in,262,263,271,274-75,28o,281,345, 350; and NPT, 264-65, 267, 280, 345; nuclear reactors in, 258; nuclear weapons possessed by, 248, 255-56, 264-68, 279, 303, 421m; Orange Revolution/Orange coalition, 258, 262, 263, 269, 276, 277; Our Ukraine, 268, 269, 270, 276; Party of Regions, 263, 268, 276-77; Peoples' Self-Defense, 276; political conditions in,224,261-64,267-70,272,275-76, 279-80, 281, 339; Pora Party, 269, 270;

469

Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, 269; propensity to proliferate, 264, 279, 281, 342, 350; public opinion polls in, 277-78; relations with EU, 263, 264, 270, 271, 272-74,276,27h278,280,281,343; relations with IAEA, 257; relations with NATO, 261, 263, 264, 270, 276-77, 278, 280, 281, 347; relations with Russia, 255, 256, 257> 258, 260, 262, 263, 265, 266-67, 268,269,271-72,273-74,275-76,277-79, 280, 281, 303, 422n10, 424nn28,30; relations with United States, 258-59, 265, 267, 274-75, 278; security concerns of, 255, 260-61, 267, 268, 269, 270, 281, 339, 347; Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, 257; SocialDemocratic Party of Ukraine (United), 269; Socialist Party of Ukraine, 224; trade balance of, 271-74, 275; Ukrainian People Bloc of Kostenko and Plyusch, 269; Verkhovna Rada, 267, 268, 269; as virtual nuclear state, 256-60, 279; Yushchenko,2s8,261-62,269,270,275, 276,278 United Arab Emirates (UAE), so, 73, 127 United Kingdom: nonproliferation policies of, 334; nuclear weapons program of, 122, 218, 286-87; relations with Australia, 286-87, 288, 299, 347; relations with Japan, 138; relations with South Africa, 286,30h308,319-20,334,435n54; relations with United States, 287, 296 United Nations: relations with India, 323; relations with Iran, 44, 45, 46, so, 57, 58, 65, 72, 323, 325, 367mo, 368m8; relations with Iraq, 48; relations with Japan, 139, 148; relations with South Africa, 305, 306, 30h310,313,319,322,323-24, 332, 434n47; relations with Turkey, 239; Security Council, 44, 45, 46, 50, 57, s8, 6s, 72, 169, 184, 239, 269-70, 307, 313,319,323-24,325,332,351,367n10, 368m8, 434n47 United States: George H. W. Bush administration, 166; George W. Bush administration, 53-54, 74, 165, 236, 289, 294, 403n64, 427m8; Carter administration, 161, 162, 291, 295, 299, 310; CIA, 81, 100, 101, 102, 125, 140, 185, 309, 381n5, 384nn47,48, 386n81, 390m2; civilian nuclear program in, 164; Clinton administration, 110, 296-97;

470

INDEX

United States (Continued) Ford administration, 291; Guam Doctrine, 134, 186, 287; Johnson administration, 141, 394n65; National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 54, 68, 133, 140-41, 146, 156, 184-85, 390ll12, 433n28; National Security Strategy (NSS), 297; neoconservatives in, 55; Nixon administration, 133, 134, 135, 13h 142,160,184,186,287,291,298, 391n29; nonproliferation policies of, 3, 4,38-40,97> 161-62,165,179,184-85, 189, 196, 248, 250-54, 258-59, 274-75, 280,288,290,291,295,29h 298-99, 300,311,320,334,346,350,351,428n29; and NPT, 35, 293, 311, 351; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 311; nuclear weapons program of, 118, 122, 175, 296-97; Obama administration, 46, 54, 74> 92, 155, 180, 236, 251, 295> 300, 428n25; Ploughshares PNE program, 309; preemptive strategies, 296, 297; Reagan administration, 185; relations with Afghanistan, 54, 55, 68; relations with Angola, 306, 307, 319; relations with Australia, 196, 285, 287, 288-89, 290,294-95,296-99,300-301,338-39, 347, 351, 427m8, 428n25, 429n42, 430nn46,52, 432n72; relations with Canada, 296, 429n42; relations with China,4o, 134,184,185-86,189,289, 298,300,391n29,426n9,427n18,428n25; relations with Egypt, 13, 17-18, 27, 29, 30,31,35,38-40,107,252,296,351, 428n29; relations with Germany, 296, 297; relations with India, 4, 147, 289, 293; relations with Iran, 17, 38, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50,53-58,60,67-68,70,71,72,73>74-75, 82,86,108,127,242-43,248,253,259, 345-46, 351-52; relations with Iraq, 17, 48, 53, 54,55,68,77,86-87,90,91, 106, 107, 115, 236; relations with Israel, 38, 39, 52, 53,55,90,91,92, 104,289,438n1o; relations with Italy, 296; relations with North Korea, 54, 124, 144, 151, 154, 167, 168, 171, 381n7; relations with Pakistan, 438mo; relations with Russia, 226, 266; relations with Saudi Arabia, 47, n 77-78, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89-93, 96, 97, 99, 107, 296, 344, 347-48, 351; relations with South Africa, 303, 304, 307, 308, 310,311,319-20,331,332,334,435n54; relations with South Korea, 106, 145,

158,160-62,163,165,166,168-69,170, 171-72,173,175,176, 17h178, 179,180, 181,291,296, 297,348,39sn83,403n64, 428n29; relations with Syria, 105, 106, 10h108, 111,115,123,124, 125,351-52; relations with Taiwan, 106, 158, 182, 183, 184-8h 188, 189, 190-91, 193, 194, 196, 19J,200-201,202,291,29h348,428n29; relations with Turkey, 230, 235, 236, 240, 242-43, 248, 249-54, 344, 345-46, 347, 351, 420n79; relations with Ukraine, 258-59, 265, 267, 274-75, 278; relations with United Kingdom, 287, 296; relations with Yugoslavia, 211-12; and SEATO, 426n9; September 11th attacks, 54, 77, 91; Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 183, 188,189,190 Uranium Enrichment Company (URENCO), 291,292,293,310 U.S. Defense Dept.: "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009," 405n24; Proliferation Threat and Response, 108-9, 114, 386n81 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, 131, 135 Uslu, Emrullah, 417n29, 418n37 US Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century, 296-97 USS Vincennes, 53 Uygur, Hakk1, 241, 418n48 Vander Walt, Richard: Armament and Disarmament, 317, 432nn5,6, 433nn23,24, 434nn39,40, 435n52, 436n73 Van Loggerenberg, Jan: Armament and Disarmament, 317, 432n5,6, 433nn23,24, 434nn39,40, 435n52, 436n73 Varnum, Jessica, 73-74, 147, 339, 347 Vasquez, john: The Power of Power Politics, 394n74 Venezuela, 388nno; propensity to proliferate, 437lll Vidricaire, Marc, 368m9 Villiers, J. W. de, 433n26 Vinca/Baris Kidric Institute, 205, 206, 207, 208-9,210,215,216,217-18,219,227-28, 410n7,411n16,412n6o Vitrenko, Natalya, 269, 270 Vorster, john, 317 Vydrin, Dmitry, 269 Wakaizumi, Kei, 141 Walen, Robert J., 208 Walker, Ron, 430n45 Walker, Thomas C., 394n74

INDEX

471

Wallis, William, 360n4 Walsh, Jim, 73, 250, 339, 343, 350, 352, 426n4, 439lll5 Walt, Stephen, 72 Waltz, Kenneth: on Japan, 133, 143; Theory of International Politics, 358n8, 386n83 Wang,Vincent,190,406n37 Wassenaar Arrangement, 316 weaponization, 248-49 Weber, Heidi, 97, 38omo6 Wehrey, Frederic M., 378n61 Weiner, Tim, 404m6 Wesley, Michael, 428n23 West Germany: relations with Iran, 43, 58; relations with South Africa, 310; relations with Taiwan, 185. See also Germany Westinghouse Electric Co., 328 Whang Sang-min, 175-76 Whitlam, Gough, 288, 299 Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky: Mobilizing Islam, 363n32 Wolff, Lester: Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, 406n31 Wolfsthal, Jon, 403n66 World Bank, 273-74, 323; International Finance Corp., 98 World Nuclear Association, 408n58, 409n69, 436n8o World Trade Organization (WTO), 44, 6o, 98, 274> 277 Worth, Robert F., 388mo8 Wright, Robin, 381n6, 387n9o Wright, Steven, 376nn23,25, 379n97 Wu, SamuelS. G., 406n28 Wu Ta-you, 186

Use of Nuclear Energy (NUKLIN), 209-10; civilian nuclear program of, 209, 221; Communist Party, 207, 210, 214; economic conditions in, 211, 213-15, 228; Energoinvest, 210; Federal Commission on Nuclear Energy (SKNE), 206, 208, 214, 215, 216, 218; incentives for proliferation, 205, 206; Josef Stefan Institute, 206, 207, 209; Military Technical Institute (MTI), 210; and NATO, 210, 211-12, 412n4o; and neorealism, 205, 210, 211-12; and NPT, 226-27, 345; nuclear latency of, 216; nuclear weapons programs of, 205,206-13,212-13,214-21,227-28, 342, 41onm,9, 412nn57,6o; political conditions in, 206, 213-21, 228; prestige/ status motivations in, 216, 220, 228, 345; Rankovic, 206, 207, 209, 214, 215, 216-17, 218; relations with Greece, 412n4o; relations with NAM, 212, 219-20, 228; relations with Norway, 207; relations with Soviet Union, 207-8, 210-11, 212, 219, 225, 227; relations with Turkey, 412n4o; relations with United States, 211-12; Rudjer Boskovic Institute, 206, 207, 209, 210, 217; scientists in, 217-19, 220-21, 227, 228; security concerns of, 206, 210-13, 228, 342; Yugoslav National Army (JNA), 220, 413n64. See also Serbia; Tito, Josip Broz Yushchenko, Viktor, 258, 261-62, 269, 270, 275,276,278 Yu Shyi-kun, 189 Yusin, Maksim, 425n43

Yamani, Mai, 377n45 Yanukovich, Viktor, 276, 277 Yan Xuetong: Analysis of China's National Interests, 405n21 Yekhanurov, Yuri, 268-69 Yeltsin, Boris, 105, 260 Yemen: civil war, 31, 89; missiles of, 91; relations with Saudi Arabia, 89, 95 Yoshida,Shigeru, 132,136-41,145,151-52, 153-54.389n4.393n57 Yuan, Jing-dong, 148, 348 Yugoslavia: Business Association for Research, Development and Peaceful

Zangger Committee, 163, 315 Zarif, Javad, 53 Zgurets, Sergey, 422n6 Zimbabwe, 306, 323 Zisser, Eyal, 106, 112, 383nn24,30, 384nn38,5o, 38snns2,54,56-s8, 60,62-64,66,69, 387nn93,95,96 Zuma, Jacob, 318 Zuma, Nkosazana Dlamini, 323 Zweiri, Mahjoob: Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives, 372n91; Iran's Foreign Policy, 362023